Case Title: MICHIGAN COALITION STATE EMP V CIVIL SERVICE COMM

Citation: 

Docket Number: 115579

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 27, 2001  
MICHIGAN COALITION OF STATE  
EMPLOYEE UNIONS,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
and  
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED 
AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE & 
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS  
OF AMERICA (UAW) and LYNDA 
TAYLOR-LEWIS,  
Intervening 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v  
No. 115579  
MICHIGAN CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
This case presents the question whether a party alleging  
a violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5, the provision of the  
Michigan Constitution related to the state civil service  
 
system, 
must 
make 
a 
particularized showing of irreparable harm  
to obtain a preliminary injunction against the alleged  
violation.  We conclude that such a showing is required as one  
condition 
of 
obtaining 
a 
preliminary 
injunction. 
 
Accordingly,  
we vacate the preliminary injunction entered by the circuit  
court in this case in its entirety.  Notably, we are not  
considering the question whether an actual constitutional  
violation, which could be remedied by entry of a permanent  
injunction, has occurred.  
I. Factual and Procedural Background  
This case arises from the adoption by defendant Civil  
Service Commission on May 8, 1997, of amended Civil Service  
Rule 4-6, with a stated effective date of June 1, 1997.  While  
the details of this rule are not important to our analysis,  
the rule generally governs circumstances in which state  
agencies subject to civil service regulation are allowed to  
contract and pay for personal services from persons who are  
not state civil service employees and procedures to be  
followed in that regard.  The rule contains two provisions  
that have been alleged by plaintiffs to be violative of Const  
1963, art 11, § 5.1  First, there is a “preauthorization”  
1  Section 5 generally governs the responsibilities and 
duties of defendant Civil Service Commission.  Central to the  
present case is the last paragraph of this constitutional 
provision, which states:  
(continued...)  
2  
provision that would allow a state agency to authorize  
disbursements for any services on a preapproved list without  
submitting a specific request for approval to the Civil  
Service Commission.  Second, the amended rule would add a new  
provision for “decentralized approval” of contracts and  
payments for personal services rendered by persons other than  
state civil service employees in certain situations.  
In June 1997, the trial court granted plaintiffs a  
preliminary injunction that prohibited the Civil Service  
Commission 
“from 
implementing, 
executing, 
enforcing, 
or 
in 
any  
way giving effect” to Civil Service Rule 4-6.  Critical to the  
issue presently before this Court, the trial court opined in  
its oral ruling on the preliminary injunction motion that a  
showing of “some particularized injury or damage” was not  
necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction against an  
alleged violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5.  The trial court  
stated that “if a violation of [§ 5] occurs, my reading is  
that would be irreparable harm, not just to the Plaintiffs,  
but to every citizen of the state.”  
1(...continued) 
No payment for personal services shall be made  
or 
authorized 
until 
the 
provisions 
of 
this  
constitution pertaining to civil service have been 
complied with in every particular.  Violation of  
any of the provisions hereof may be restrained or 
observance compelled by injunctive or mandamus 
proceedings brought by any citizen of the state.  
3  
 
 
In July 1998, the Court of Appeals granted defendant’s  
application for leave to appeal from the issuance of the  
preliminary injunction, and eventually affirmed in part and  
reversed in part.2  The Court of Appeals opined that the  
“decentralized 
approval” subrule of Civil Service Rule 4-6 was  
“facially unconstitutional”3 and that the trial court did not  
2  While we recognize that the order of the Court of 
Appeals granting leave also stayed further proceedings in the 
trial court, over a year passed between the issuance of the 
preliminary injunction and that Court of Appeals order.  It is  
undisputed that, during this entire period from June 1997 to 
July 1998, the preliminary injunction remained in effect. 
While there may be reasons to explain the delay, it does seem 
troubling that the parties were subjected to such a long 
period of uncertainty and that a preliminary injunction 
against an officially promulgated governmental rule remained 
in effect for so long without any decision on the merits.  We  
are today issuing proposed changes to the Michigan Court Rules 
to establish limitations on the period in which a preliminary 
injunction may be in effect pending final resolution of a 
case.  The proposed changes to the court rules are attached as 
an appendix to this opinion.  
3 We note that the Court of Appeals later in its opinion 
seemed to disavow reaching a final or ultimate conclusion on 
the constitutional issues:  
For purposes of reviewing the preliminary 
injunction only, we determine that the trial court 
properly concluded that plaintiffs were likely to 
prevail on their constitutional challenge to the 
“decentralized approval” procedure, although it 
incorrectly determined that they will likely 
prevail in their constitutional challenge to the 
preapproval provision. . . .  We stress, however, 
that our analysis of these issues is for the 
purpose of ruling on the propriety of the  
preliminary injunction only. When the matters are  
tried, the actual determinations of all plaintiffs’ 
claims must initially be made by the trier of fact 
(continued...)  
4 
abuse its discretion by finding that plaintiffs were likely to  
prevail on that provision.  236 Mich App 96, 102; 600 NW2d 362  
(1999).
 However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the  
“preauthorization” provisions of the challenged civil service  
rule were not facially unconstitutional and that the trial  
court abused its discretion by enjoining those provisions.  
236 Mich App 103-105.4  
Central to the present issue, the Court of Appeals  
rejected defendant’s position that plaintiffs should not have  
been granted any preliminary injunction whatsoever because of  
their failure to show irreparable harm.  The Court of Appeals  
stated:  
Defendant next argues that no injunction 
should have been ordered where plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate that they would suffer irreparable 
injury if the injunction was not issued.  It argues  
that “[a] bare allegation of a constitutional  
violation fails to demonstrate irreparable harm.”  
We disagree because Const 1963, art 11, § 5 
specifically provides that “[v]iolation of any of 
the 
provisions 
hereof 
may 
be 
restrained 
or  
observance compelled by any citizen of the state.” 
As a matter of first impression, we believe that 
this language is a constitutional declaration that 
a violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5, in itself, 
amounts to irreparable harm supporting injunctive 
relief. [236 Mich App 106 (emphasis added).]  
3(...continued) 
in the trial court. [236 Mich App 104-105.]  
4 
 Given that plaintiffs have not filed a cross-appeal, 
the portion of the Court of Appeals opinion reversing part of 
the trial court’s preliminary injunction is not before us for 
review.  
5  
While it may have been more clearly stated, the emphasized  
language 
indicates 
that “a bare allegation of a constitutional  
violation” is sufficient to show irreparable harm. In other  
words, the Court of Appeals concluded that a showing of  
irreparable harm to a particular party is not required for a  
preliminary injunction against an alleged violation of § 5.  
We granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal,  
“limited to the issue whether a showing of irreparable harm is  
required to justify a preliminary injunction against an  
alleged violation of section 5.” 463 Mich 925 (2000).  
II. Analysis  
We review a trial court’s grant of injunctive relief for  
an abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Holly Twp v Dep’t of  
Natural Resources, 440 Mich 891 (1992) (explaining that  
“granting of injunctive relief is within the sound discretion  
of the trial court, although the decision must not be  
arbitrary and must be based on the facts of the particular  
case”).  
Ordinarily, the first requirement that a party must meet  
to request a trial court to grant any type of relief,  
including an injunction, is that the party have “standing” to  
request the relief.  This means that a party is normally  
required to have a sufficiently concrete interest in bringing  
a case that it can be expected to provide effective advocacy.  
6  
 
 
  
Allstate Ins Co v Hayes, 442 Mich 56, 68; 499 NW2d 743 (1993).  
Said another way, standing has been described as a requirement  
that a party ordinarily must have a substantial personal  
interest at stake in a case or controversy, as opposed merely  
to having a generalized interest in the same manner as any  
citizen. 
House Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560, 572; 506  
NW2d 190 (1993).5  Recently, we have described it even more  
5  Justice Powell, in his concurrence in United States v  
Richardson, 418 US 166, 192; 94 S Ct 2940; 41 L Ed 2d 678 
(1974), articulated reasons for the requirement of standing, 
apart from assuring effective advocacy in a particular case:  
[W]e risk a progressive impairment of the 
effectiveness of the federal courts if their  
limited resources are diverted increasingly from 
their historic role to the resolution of public­
interest suits brought by litigants who cannot 
distinguish themselves from all taxpayers or all 
citizens.  The irreplaceable value of the power [of 
judicial review] articulated by Mr. Chief Justice 
Marshall lies in the protection it has afforded the 
constitutional rights and liberties of individual 
citizens and minority groups against oppressive or 
discriminatory government action. It is this role, 
not public esteem for the federal courts and has 
permitted 
the 
peaceful 
coexistence 
of 
the  
countermajoritarian implications of judicial review 
and the democratic principles upon which our  
Federal Government in the final analysis rests.  
The considerations outlined above underlie, I 
believe, the traditional hostility of the Court to 
federal taxpayer or citizen standing where the 
plaintiff has nothing at stake other than his 
interest as a taxpayer or citizen.  It merits  
noting how often and how unequivocally the Court 
has expressed its antipathy to efforts to convert 
the Judiciary into an open forum for the resolution 
of political or ideological disputes about the 
(continued...)  
7  
succinctly by indicating that the concept of standing  
ordinarily requires that a party have “an interest distinct  
from that of the public.”  Lee v Macomb Co, 464 Mich ___; ___  
NW2d ___ (2001).  
It 
is 
this 
requirement that unquestionably is targeted by  
§ 5 when it provides that “[v]iolation of any of the  
provisions 
hereof 
may be restrained or observance compelled by  
injunctive or mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of  
the state.”  Plaintiffs further contend, however, that more  
than this was targeted by § 5's language; that not only did  
these words eliminate usual standing requirements, but they  
also should be read to mean that the usual requirement that no  
preliminary 
injunction 
should 
issue 
unless 
the 
plaintiff 
could  
5(...continued) 
performance of government.  
In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court 
observed in Lewis v Casey, 518 US 343, 349; 116 S Ct 2174; 135  
L Ed 2d 606 (1996):  
The requirement that an inmate alleging a 
violation of Bounds [v Smith, 430 US 817; 97 S Ct 
1491; 52 L Ed 2d 72 (1977),] must show actual 
injury derives ultimately from the doctrine of 
standing, a constitutional principle that prevents 
courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to 
the political branches.  It is the role of courts  
to provide relief to claimants, in individual or 
class 
actions, 
who 
have 
suffered, 
or 
will  
imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role 
of courts, but that of the political branches, to 
shape the institutions of government in such  
fashion as to comply with the laws and the  
Constitution.  
8  
demonstrate a showing of irreparable harm was eliminated.  
It is important to be clear that the present appeal  
involves only the requirements for preliminary injunctive  
relief, an extraordinary remedy that is sometimes granted  
before a case is even decided on the merits.  It is beyond  
reasonable dispute that a trial court has the authority, and,  
in appropriate cases, the duty, to enter permanent injunctive  
relief against a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Sharp  
v Lansing, 464 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2001) (discussing  
availability of injunctive relief against a constitutional  
violation).  Moreover, the plain language of § 5 provides that  
“[v]iolation of any of the provisions here may be restrained  
or observance compelled by injunctive or mandamus proceedings  
brought by any citizen of the state.”  Thus, it is plain that  
any Michigan citizen may bring an action in a state trial  
court against an alleged violation of § 5 and that, if the  
trial court in ruling on the merits of the case at its final  
resolution concludes a violation has occurred, that violation  
may be remedied by appropriate injunctive or mandamus relief  
such as a permanent injunction.  The only question we are  
considering is whether a plaintiff may also obtain a  
preliminary injunction against the alleged constitutional  
violation before the case is even decided on the merits  
without making a particularized showing of irreparable harm.  
9  
 
To 
evaluate 
plaintiff’s 
position 
regarding 
the  
requirements for a preliminary injunction in the present  
context, it is appropriate to begin our analysis by  
considering the historical background of Const 1963, art 11,  
§ 5.  
It is generally accepted that the state’s modern civil  
service system had its genesis in the 1936 Report of the Civil  
Service Study Commission.  Council No 11, AFSCME v Civil  
Service Comm, 408 Mich 385, 397; 292 NW2d 442 (1980).  That  
commission  issued “a 94-page ringing condemnation of the  
longstanding ‘spoils system’, or ‘patronage system’[6] of state  
personnel practices and detailed recommendations for the  
6  The report provided the following description of the 
prior “spoils system” of state employment:  
The spoils system presupposes the existence of 
government jobs to be filled with loyal party 
workers who can be counted on not to do the state  
job better than it can be done by others, but 
rather to do the party work or the candidate work 
when elections roll around.  The state office  
buildings 
are 
nearly 
empty 
during 
political 
conventions, and state money has always been used— 
indirectly of course—to enable state employees to 
move about the state and keep political fences in 
repair.  
It is impossible to estimate the loss to the 
state of this kind of political activity, but the 
most 
inexperienced 
know 
that 
the 
amount 
is  
considerable. Not only is the regular work of the 
state interrupted or interfered with, but its 
services and funds are put at the disposal of 
political parties. [Id. at 397 n. 10]  
10  
 
 
 
  
  
enactment of legislation to establish a state civil service  
system.” 
Id. 
The following year, the Legislature enacted  
civil service legislation in 1937 PA 346.  
However, the bulk of the civil service reforms enacted in  
1937 were gutted during the next regular session of the  
Legislature in 1939 when, “obviously dissatisfied with reform  
that had been wrought, the newly elected anti-civil service  
Legislature adopted a group of bills designed primarily to  
destroy the civil service system which had just been  
established. . . .”  Council No 11, supra at 399.7  Fed up,  
the response of the people of the state in 1940 was to place  
on the ballot and pass a constitutional amendment,8 described  
formally as Const 1908, art 6, § 22.  This amendment included  
provisions that defined the state employees to be included in  
the state civil service, provided for the composition and  
7  Among other provisions, the 1939 legislation reduced 
the scope of the state classified civil service, reduced the 
appropriation for the Civil Service Commission, and provided 
increased employment preferences for former state employees.  
8 As this Court explained in Council No 11, supra at 400­
401:  
Finally, in 1940, apparently dissatisfied with 
four years of political maneuvering and legislative 
advance and retreat on the civil service system 
issue, 
the 
people 
of 
Michigan 
adopted 
a  
constitutional 
amendment 
establishing 
a  
constitutional 
state 
civil 
service 
system, 
superseding the 1939 legislation.  
11  
 
duties of the Civil Service Commission, and, in language that  
has been continued in our present Michigan Constitution in  
§ 5, provided that “[v]iolation of any of the provisions  
hereof 
may 
be 
restrained or observance compelled by injunctive  
or mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of the state.”  
Const 1908, art 6, § 22.  
Given this background, we then must ask what exactly was  
it that the people would have understood they were doing in  
passing this amendment, because it is this understanding that  
is the key to its meaning.  In particular, it is this inquiry  
that will answer our question with respect to how expansively  
the citizens can be understood to have changed the rules, not  
only regarding standing, but also the rules regarding the  
irreparable injury requirements for securing a preliminary  
injunction.  
To 
begin 
this 
probe, 
basic 
doctrines 
regarding  
constitutional construction are useful to recall.  Initially,  
of course, if the language of a constitutional provision is  
plain, it is that meaning we give to it.  As was stated in  
Peterman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 446 Mich 177, 184; 521  
NW2d 499 (1994), we examine how constitutional language was  
“understood by its ratifiers at the time of its adoption.”  
This is straightforward.  Yet, what if the constitutional  
language had no plain meaning, but rather is a technical legal  
12  
 
term or a phrase of art?  In answering this, the great  
constitutional law scholar and member of this Court in the  
nineteenth century, Justice Thomas M. Cooley, said that in  
construing technical legal terms used in a constitution “we  
must suppose these words to be employed in their technical  
sense.” 
 
1 
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed), p 132).  
Paying heed to this rule, this Court applied this principle to  
the technical legal phrase “assistance of counsel” in People  
v Pickens, 446 Mich 298; 521 NW2d 797 (1994):  
[T]he phrase “assistance of counsel,” by 
necessity, will not be defined in great detail in 
the constitution. Nevertheless, it is one of many 
terms that has “acquired a well-understood meaning, 
which the people must be supposed to have had in 
view in adopting them.”  [Id. at 310, quoting 1 
Cooley, supra at 132.]  
In a similar vein, this Court observed in Walker v Wolverine  
Fabricating & Mfg Co, Inc, 425 Mich 586, 596-597; 391 NW2d 296  
(1986), that one method of interpreting constitutional  
language that is “in no way a part of the common vocabulary”  
(which would surely apply to the phrase “injunctive  
proceedings”) 
is 
to 
“survey 
contemporaneous 
judicial 
decisions  
and legal commentaries for evidence of a consensus within the  
legal community regarding the meaning of a term.”  This, then,  
is the rule: if a constitutional phrase is a technical legal  
term or a phrase of art in the law, the phrase will be given  
the meaning that those sophisticated in the law understood at  
13  
 
 
the time of enactment unless it is clear from the  
constitutional language that some other meaning was intended.9  
Let us then examine what was understood in the law in  
1940 by the phrase “injunctive proceedings.”  The traditional  
rules 
governing 
“injunctive 
proceedings” 
were 
well 
established  
by 1940 including a requirement of a showing of irreparable  
injury to the person or entity seeking the injunction as a  
condition for obtaining a preliminary injunction or, as it was  
often termed at the time, an interlocutory injunction.  
Indeed, a 1905 treatise on injunctions provided that an  
interlocutory 
injunction will not be allowed “where the injury  
which will result from the invasion of that right is not  
irreparable.”
 1 High, Injunctions (4th ed), § 22, p 367.  
Discussion of this point in Michigan case law predating 1940  
also indicates that a showing of irreparable harm is a  
requirement for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.  See  
9 
 It is noteworthy that the Michigan Legislature has 
expressly adopted the same basic principle in connection with 
the interpretation of its work, statutes, namely, that common 
words and phrases are to be understood in conformity with 
their common meaning, but that technical words and phrases 
should be interpreted in accordance with their technical 
meaning:  
All words and phrases shall be construed and 
understood according to the common and approved 
usage of the language; but technical words and 
phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar 
and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be 
construed and understood according to such peculiar 
and appropriate meaning. [MCL 8.3a.]  
14  
 
 
Baltic Mining Co v Houghton Circuit Judge, 177 Mich 632, 643;  
144 NW 209 (1913), where this Court indicated that a  
preliminary injunction may be granted “if it appears that  
there is a real and substantial question between the parties,  
to be investigated in a court of equity, and, in order to  
prevent irremedial injury to the complainant, before his  
claims can be investigated, it is necessary to prohibit any  
change in the conditions and relations of the property and of  
the parties during the litigation” (citation omitted).  
Similarly, in B Siegel Co v Wayne Circuit Judge, 183 Mich 145,  
154; 149 NW 1015 (1914), this Court stated that, for a  
landlord 
to 
obtain 
a 
preliminary 
injunction 
against 
structural  
changes to a building, it was necessary to show an  
“irreparable injury by reason of the damage done to the  
freehold through changes in the building impairing its  
structural safety.”10  
10 Notably, 
other cases predating the adoption of the 1940 
constitutional amendment that do not expressly state that a 
showing of irreparable harm is a requirement for obtaining a 
preliminary 
injunction 
nevertheless 
include 
language 
indicating that such a requirement was commonly understood to 
exist within the legal community.  For example, in Grand  
Rapids E R Co v Calhoun Circuit Judge, 156 Mich 419, 421-422; 
120 NW 1004 (1909), this Court found no abuse of discretion in 
a circuit court’s decision to dissolve a preliminary 
injunction where the circuit court concluded that the action 
sought to be enjoined would not cause irreparable injury to 
the moving party.  Similarly, Heliker v Heliker, 184 Mich 657, 
659; 151 NW 757 (1915), noted that a preliminary injunction 
against cutting trees on a parcel of land was issued after the 
(continued...)  
15  
 
 
Thus, it is clear that in 1940 it was beyond dispute in  
the legal community that a party needed to make a  
particularized showing of concrete irreparable harm or injury  
in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.  Moreover, there  
is no basis to conclude that the requirements to secure a  
preliminary injunction changed in any pertinent way between  
the adoption of the amendment in 1940 and the adoption of its  
successor, § 5, in the present Michigan Constitution in 1963,  
or even up to this day.  The requirement of a showing of  
irreparable harm remains as it did a century ago.  In our  
latest statement on this issue in Michigan State Employees  
Ass’n v Dep’t of Mental Health, 421 Mich 152, 157-158; 365  
NW2d 93 (1984), this Court reiterated the requirement of a  
showing of irreparable harm as a prerequisite for a  
preliminary injunction, explaining that it was a requirement  
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to demonstrate  
“that the applicant will suffer irreparable injury if a  
preliminary injunction is not granted.”11  
10(...continued) 
filing of a complaint alleging “loss and irreparable injury to 
the inheritance and great damage to the complainant.”  
11 We note that Michigan State Employees Ass’n also arose  
in the civil service context.  In the course of reversing a 
preliminary injunction granted in favor of a discharged civil 
service 
employee, 
this Court noted that its “holding addresses 
the required showing of irreparable injury necessary to 
support the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” 
Id. at  
(continued...)  
16  
Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
a 
particularized 
showing 
of  
irreparable harm was, and still is, as our law is understood,  
an 
indispensable 
requirement 
to 
obtain 
a 
preliminary  
injunction.  Moreover, the people, in causing the Michigan  
Constitution to be amended in 1940, evidenced no desire, as  
they had done with standing, to modify the traditional rules  
that had pertained with regard to this requirement for a  
preliminary injunction.  Therefore, when considering the  
request for a preliminary injunction in this matter, the trial  
court and the Court of Appeals were in error in granting any  
preliminary 
injunction 
without 
a 
showing 
of 
concrete  
irreparable harm to the interests of a party before the Court.  
We underscore, in accordance with the limited grant of  
leave in this case, that we are concerned only with the  
requirements for a preliminary injunction. 
This opinion  
expresses no view about the proper resolution of the merits of  
this case, i.e., whether Civil Service Rule 4-6 is violative  
11(...continued) 
135. This Court stated that such a preliminary injunction 
“should issue only in extraordinary circumstances.”  Id. at  
166.  
The Court also outlined that, in addition to the required 
demonstration of irreparable harm to the moving party in the 
absence of a preliminary injunction, a trial court should 
consider (1) harm to the public interest if such an injunction 
is issued; (2) whether harm to the applicant absent such an 
injunction outweighs the harm it would cause to the adverse 
party, and (3) the strength of the moving party’s showing that 
it is likely to prevail on the merits. Id. at 157-158.  
17  
 
 
in whole or in part of § 5.  
III. Response to Dissent  
Contrary 
to 
the 
possible implication of the dissent, this  
opinion does not preclude the ability to obtain any injunctive  
relief when the Civil Service Commission acts in violation of  
§ 5.  Nothing of the sort has happened.  This appeal does not  
involve what relief is available when, after a hearing on the  
merits, the court is confronted with whether to issue a  
permanent injunction.  Rather, we are concerned with the  
preliminary injunction, an injunction that is sought before  
the parties have had their day in court.  Then, in that  
situation and that situation alone, the petitioner must  
demonstrate 
irreparable 
injury. 
This 
is 
utterly  
unexceptional.  It has, indeed, been our law, as this opinion  
has taken pains to point out, unvaryingly since Michigan  
became a state.  It is, we believe, the law in every other  
state of the union as well.  
Thus, 
the 
dissent is incorrect in describing our approach  
as being “to completely destroy the power of ‘any citizen’ to  
compel constitutional compliance.”  Post, p 10. Nothing in  
this opinion restricts, in any way, the authority of a trial  
court to grant appropriate relief, including entry of a  
permanent injunction, if a Michigan citizen establishes an  
actual violation of § 5 when a case is decided on the merits.  
18  
 
Rather, pursuant to the plain language of § 5 stating that  
“[v]iolation of any of the provisions hereof may be restrained  
or observance compelled by injunctive or mandamus proceedings  
brought by any citizen of the state, ”any Michigan citizen may  
bring suit to challenge an alleged violation of this provision  
of 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution 
without 
meeting 
ordinary 
standing  
requirements.  Further, if the trial court decides the merits  
of the case in favor of the plaintiff, the trial court may  
then enter a permanent injunction or other appropriate relief  
against the violation–even in the absence of irreparable harm  
to any person.  This is because § 5 expressly provides the  
authority to restrain a violation of its provisions.  Thus, if  
a trial court, in resolving the merits of a case, determines  
that a violation of § 5 has actually occurred, the trial court  
necessarily has authority to grant injunctive or mandamus  
relief against the violation.  However, by definition, a  
decision on a preliminary injunction is made before there is  
even a determination of the merits of a case.  This opinion  
merely reaffirms that a plaintiff alleging a violation of § 5  
may not obtain preliminary injunctive relief, which in the  
ordinary course of things would be addressed before a  
constitutional 
violation 
has 
been 
established, 
without 
meeting  
the traditional requirements for this extraordinary relief.  
Further, we are not “implying that irreparable harm must  
19  
 
 
have already occurred in order for [preliminary] injunctive  
relief to be available.”  Post, p 6. 
Rather, as stated  
earlier, we recognize that a preliminary injunction may be  
appropriately entered if it is demonstrated that “the  
applicant 
will 
suffer 
irreparable 
injury” 
absent the  
preliminary 
injunction 
(and 
the 
other 
appropriate  
prerequisites to the grant of a preliminary injunction are  
met), p 17, quoting Michigan State Employees Ass’n, supra.  In  
other words, a trial court may properly grant a preliminary  
injunction if a party shows that it will otherwise imminently  
suffer irreparable harm and the other proper grounds for such  
relief are satisfied.  
Finally, 
unlike 
the 
dissent, 
we 
see 
nothing  
“inconsistent,” post, p 13, n 7, in recognizing that any  
Michigan citizen has “standing” to challenge an alleged  
violation of § 5, but that a party doing so must make a  
particularized showing of irreparable harm in order to obtain  
a preliminary injunction against the alleged violation. As we  
have discussed, the plain language of § 5 necessarily requires  
the courts to allow any Michigan citizen to challenge an  
alleged violation of this constitutional provision and to  
obtain relief if an actual violation is found when the case is  
resolved on the merits.  However, a preliminary injunction  
before there is a decision on the merits—and, thus, before it  
20  
can be said that a violation of § 5 has been established in  
court—is an extraordinary type of relief available only with  
a showing of irreparable harm. It is no more “inconsistent”  
to draw this distinction than it is to recognize that there  
are multitude of suits between private litigants in which both  
sides obviously have standing to litigate the case, but  
neither has any basis to obtain a preliminary injunction  
against the other.  
IV. Conclusion  
We conclude that the lower courts erred in viewing a  
particularized showing of irreparable harm as unnecessary to  
obtaining a preliminary injunction against an alleged  
violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5.  In other words, we read  
nothing in § 5 that would suggest that, in the civil service  
realm, the actions of the government are any more susceptible  
to preliminary injunctive relief than are the actions of any  
other private or public entity. Pending the resolution of a  
suit claiming a violation of § 5, a party to such a suit may  
obtain a preliminary injunction only after satisfying all the  
requirements traditionally required for this extraordinary  
relief.  Accordingly, the circuit court abused its discretion  
by granting a preliminary injunction in the present case in  
the absence of such a showing.  Thus, we reverse the Court of  
Appeals in part, vacate the preliminary injunction entered by  
21  
 
 
 
the circuit court in this case in its entirety, and remand  
this case to the circuit court for any appropriate proceedings  
consistent with this opinion.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and YOUNG, 
and MARKMAN, 
JJ., concurred with  
TAYLOR, J.  
22  
___________________________ 
 
01-XX  
Proposed Amendments of 
Rules 3.310, 7.208, and 7.213 
of the Michigan Court Rules  
On order of the Court, this is to advise that the 
Court is considering amendments of Rules 3.310, 7.208, and 
7.213 of the Michigan Court Rules. Before determining whether 
the proposal should be adopted, changed before adoption, or 
rejected, this notice is given to afford any interested person 
the opportunity to comment on the form or the merits of the 
proposal.  We welcome the views of all who wish to address the  
proposal or who wish to suggest alternatives. Before adoption 
or rejection, this proposal will be considered at a public 
hearing by the Court. The Clerk of the Court will publish a 
schedule of future public hearings.  
Publication of this proposal does not mean that the 
Court will issue an order on the subject, nor does it imply 
probable adoption of the proposal in its present form.  
[The present language would be amended as indicated below.]  
Rule 3.310 
Injunctions  
(A) Preliminary Injunctions.  
(1) - (4) [Unchanged.]  
(5)  If a preliminary injunction is granted, the 
court shall promptly schedule a pretrial 
conference.  The trial of the action on the  
merits must be held within 6 months after the  
injunction is granted, unless good cause is 
shown or the parties stipulate to a longer 
period.  The court shall issue its decision on  
the merits within 56 days after the trial is 
completed.  
(B) - (I) [Unchanged.]  
Rule 7.208 Authority of Court or Tribunal Appealed From  
(A)  Limitations. After a claim of appeal is filed or leave 
to appeal is granted, the trial court or tribunal may not 
set aside or amend the judgment or order appealed from  
23  
 
except  
(1)  by order of the Court of Appeals,  
(2)  by stipulation of the parties,  
(3)  after a decision on the merits in an action in  
which a preliminary injunction was granted, or  
(4)  as otherwise provided by law.  
In a criminal case, the filing of the claim of appeal 
does not preclude the trial court from granting a timely 
motion under subrule (B).  
(B) - (I) [Unchanged.]  
Rule 7.213 Calendar Cases  
(A) - (B) [Unchanged.]  
(C) Priority on Calendar. The priority of cases on the 
session calendar is in accordance with the dates of the  
clerk’s notice to the parties, except that precedence shall be 
given to interlocutory criminal appeals, child custody cases, 
and interlocutory appeals from the grant of a preliminary 
injunction.  
(D) - (E) [Unchanged.]  
Staff Comment: 
The proposed amendments of Rules 
3.310, 7.208, and 7.213 were announced by the Supreme Court in 
Michigan Coalition of State Employee Unions v Michigan Civil  
Service Commission, Docket No. 115579 (decided July 
, 2001). 
The amendments would require trial courts to expeditiously 
decide actions in which preliminary injunctions have been 
granted, and would allow them to proceed even if the Court of 
Appeals 
has 
granted 
interlocutory leave to appeal.  Similarly, 
if the Court of Appeals granted leave to review entry of a 
preliminary injunction on an interlocutory basis, that court 
would be required to give priority to resolution of the 
appeal.  
The staff comment is published only for the benefit of the 
bench and bar and is not an authoritative construction by the 
Court.  
24  
 
_____________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________ 
Publication of this proposal does not 
mean that the Court will issue an order  
on the subject, nor does it imply 
probable adoption in its present form. 
Timely comments will be substantively 
considered, 
and 
your 
assistance 
is  
appreciated by the Court.  
A copy of this order will be given to the secretary 
of the State Bar and to the State Court Administrator so that  
they can make the notifications specified in MCR 1.201. 
Comments on this proposal may be submitted in writing or 
electronically to the Supreme Court Clerk by November 1, 2001. 
P.O. 
Box 
30052, 
Lansing, 
MI 
48909, 
or  
MSC_clerk@jud.state.mi.us.  When submitting a comment, please 
refer to File No. 01-XX.  
25  
____________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHIGAN COALITION OF STATE  
EMPLOYEE UNIONS,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
and  
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED 
AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE & 
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS  
OF AMERICA (UAW) and LYNDA 
TAYLOR-LEWIS,  
Intervening 
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
No. 115579  
MICHIGAN CIVIL SERVICE  
COMMISSION,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
The 
majority 
provides 
interesting 
commentary 
on 
the 
civil  
service system.  Yet, it skims only the surface of the issues  
necessary to the resolution of this case, and while seeming to  
address a narrow issue, leaves behind a rule that could limit  
 
 
the power that the people have reserved in themselves.1  In my  
view, Const 1963, art 11, § 5 clearly preserves the power of  
the people to restrain the actions of the Civil Service  
Commission 
whenever 
the provisions of the constitution are not  
complied with. I agree with the courts below that a showing  
of a constitutional violation may constitute irreparable harm  
to every citizen of this state, and that each citizen may not  
only bring injunctive or mandamus proceedings, but also has a  
meaningful opportunity to obtain relief.  Further, I would  
hold that Const 1963, art 11, § 5 does not limit the class of  
citizens who may obtain relief in the form of a preliminary  
injunction. Therefore, I dissent.  
I  
The majority spends pages upon pages discussing the  
accepted maxim of constitutional construction that the  
constitution should be given the meaning intended by the  
people. Additional pages are dedicated to establishing that  
the existence of irreparable harm is traditionally a  
precondition to the issuance of a preliminary injunction.  
1  Despite its attempts to leave the issue narrow, 
however, the majority expands its opinion to include  
discussion of Michigan’s Rules of Court. Because of how the  
majority decides this case, the opinion is not affected by the 
proposed 
court 
rule 
incorporated 
into 
the 
majority’s 
appendix. 
My comments about the substantive propriety of the court rule 
will be reserved for discussion as part of the standard 
procedure for implementing court rule changes.  
2  
Yet, the majority’s observations are somewhat puzzling since  
neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals held that  
Const 1963, art 11, § 5 eliminates the requirement that  
irreparable harm must be shown. To the contrary, the courts  
below held that a constitutional violation may cause  
irreparable harm.  
The majority errs at the outset by determining that the  
rule that irreparable harm must be shown somehow forms a basis  
for vacating the preliminary injunction issued by the trial  
court. 
Yet, though I agree with the majority that  
irreparable harm must be shown, I believe that the majority is  
simply wrong in basing reversal on the theory that “when  
considering the request for a preliminary injunction in this  
matter, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were in error  
in granting any preliminary injunction without a showing of  
concrete irreparable harm to the interests of the parties  
before the Court.”
 Slip op at 18. 
Rather, both courts  
explained why irreparable harm to the parties would exist in  
this case and clearly found there to be a clear likelihood of  
success on the claim of a constitutional violation.  The trial  
court in fact discussed the issue at great length and the  
trial court opinion reveals that the court understood the  
requirements of a preliminary injunction.  The following  
excerpt unequivocally shows that the trial court validly  
3  
 
exercised its discretion and found concrete irreparable harm  
to the interests of the parties before the Court:  
Irreparable harm, there has been a zealous 
plea by the Commission, Counsel for the Commission 
that these Plaintiffs have to show, as I hear the 
argument, some particularized harm.  Given that  
none of their positions are immediately scheduled 
to be eliminated, they cannot make that showing.  
* * *  
I understand the Plaintiffs claim, assert 
their positions are affected, but as I view this 
case, they stand before this Court as citizens of 
this state, who challenge the conduct of the 
Commission 
in 
light 
of 
its 
constitutional  
obligations.
 
And, 
unless 
I 
read 
this  
constitutional language as having no meaning 
whatsoever, a part of Article 11, Section 5 of the 
1963 Constitution says very clearly violation of 
any of the provisions hereof may be restrained or 
observance compelled by injunction, injunctive or 
mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of the 
state. No qualification there.  
And, that clearly means does somebody have to 
show some particularized injury or damage as a 
result. I don’t think so. Because, every citizen  
of this state is entitled [to] have a civil service  
system that works, that does the state’s business  
and does it fairly, does it honestly, does it  
economically, and we’re all affected.  So to that  
extent, to the extent that any contract is entered  
to [sic] in violation of this constitutional  
provision, that any position is abolished in  
violation of the constitutional provision, every  
citizen of this state is damaged.  And, I believe 
that I am obligated here to effectuate that  
language certainly, that language takes precedence 
over . . . some of these other holdings.[2]  
I mean, we need to keep in mind . . . this  
came about because the Legislature did not act  
2  Citations omitted.  
4  
 
 
sufficiently in the view of Michigan citizens to 
protect their interest in having a strong system of 
merit in selecting public employees, but in effect 
allowed, and apparently had been present for many, 
many years, a spoils system. And so, they weren’t 
just satisfied to make changes and create [Const 
1963, art 11, § 5], they said not only are we 
making changes, we are going to empower any citizen 
of this state by an action, essentially, at any 
time to assure that this provision is complied 
with.  
So in effect, if a violation of this occurs,  
my reading is that would be irreparable harm, not  
just to the Plaintiffs, but to every citizen of  
this state and the Plaintiffs or someone else, the  
citizens of Bay City or the factory workers of  
General Motors Corporation can file an action to  
bar this unlawful, alleged unlawful activity. And  
in this case, I’m satisfied that there is a 
sufficient showing the citizens would be harmed, 
because it appears that at least one or more of the 
provisions of Article 11, Section 5 are not  
complied 
with 
under 
the 
rules 
as 
proposed. 
[Emphasis added.]  
This language demonstrates that the trial court’s holding was  
not that plaintiffs are relieved from showing irreparable  
harm, but that a constitutional violation irreparably harms  
every individual in this state.  In other words, the harm  
resulting in an art 11, § 5 context does not flow from an  
action taken by the Civil Service Commission against a  
specific individual as would be the case under the  
commission’s view.  Instead, the harm flows from the violation  
itself, and flows to each individual citizen.  
The majority holds that any citizen may obtain permanent  
injunctive 
relief 
after 
a 
constitutional 
violation 
occurs, 
but  
5  
 
that a citizen may not obtain a preliminary injunction to  
enjoin 
the 
probable 
harm 
that 
could 
result 
from 
a  
constitutional violation. The majority correctly recognizes  
that the derogation of a constitutional right has been held to  
be 
irreparable 
harm 
for the purposes of determining injunctive  
relief.  Slip op at 9-10. Thus, the type of injury wrought by  
a constitutional violation can clearly be irreparable.  The  
majority’s error lies in implying that irreparable harm must  
have already occurred in order for injunctive relief to be  
available. The fundamental flaw in this logic is that the  
point of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status  
quo ante and prevent the harm from occurring until a decision  
may be rendered on the merits.  In other words, preliminary  
injunctive relief is designed to meet the threat of a future  
wrong. 42 Am Jur 2d, Injunctions, § 2, § 10.  In any event,  
an applicant seeking preliminary injunctive relief need only  
establish a likelihood of success on the merits. See MSEA v  
Dep’t of Mental Health, 421 Mich 152; 365 NW2d 93 (1984).  
Further, by precluding preliminary relief in cases where  
a citizen alleges that irreparable harm will result if a  
constitutional violation is allowed to occur, the majority  
essentially rewrites the constitution as providing that  
“violation of any of the provisions hereof may be restrained  
or compelled by any citizen seeking permanent injunctive or  
6  
 
 
mandamus relief.”  However, the constitution is not so  
limited.
 It allows any citizen to compel observance or  
restrain 
violations 
through 
injunctive 
or 
mandamus  
proceedings. As the majority aptly points out, Michigan has  
long recognized the availability of preliminary injunctions.  
Those injunctions are necessarily issued through injunctive  
proceedings.  
Like the trial court, the Court of Appeals recognized  
that irreparable harm to every citizen occurs simultaneously  
with a constitutional violation. It wrote:  
Defendant next argues that no injunction 
should have been ordered where plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate that they would suffer irreparable 
injury if the injunction was not issued.  It argues 
that “a bare allegation of constitutional violation 
fails to demonstrate irreparable harm.” 
We  
disagree 
because 
Const 
1963, 
art 
11, 
§ 
5  
specifically provides that “violation of any of the 
provisions hereof may be restrained or observance 
compelled by injunctive or mandamus proceedings 
brought by any citizen of the state.” As a matter  
of first impression, we believe that this language 
is a constitutional declaration that a violation of  
Const 1963, art 11 § 5, in itself, amounts to 
irreparable harm supporting injunctive relief.[3]  
[236 Mich App 96, 106; 600 NW2d 362 (1999).]  
In light of these statements by the courts below, I  
believe it clear that the problem the majority finds is not  
with the failure to address the existence of irreparable harm,  
3  The Court of Appeals did say that an “additional” 
showing of irreparable harm was unnecessary, but it first 
found that the threatened harm would be irreparable because of 
the alleged constitutional violation.  
7  
 
but with the idea that the irreparable harm caused by a  
violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5 may be remedied by  
preliminary injunctive proceedings brought by any citizen  
rather than only by citizens affected in some way peculiar  
from the rest of the populace.  I agree with the courts below  
and believe that the majority’s approach is contrary to the  
language and purpose of the constitution.  
II  
The majority acknowledges that the lower courts stated  
that a constitutional violation amounts to irreparable harm,  
but nonetheless concludes that neither court required a  
finding of the requisite irreparable harm.  Specifically, the  
majority writes:  
Critical to the issue presently before this 
Court, the trial court opined in its oral ruling on 
the preliminary injunction motion that a showing of 
“some particularized injury or damage” was not  
necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction 
against an alleged violation of Const 1963, art 11, 
§ 5.  The trial court stated that “if a violation  
of [§ 5] occurs, my reading is that would be 
irreparable harm, not just to the Plaintiffs, but 
to every citizen of the state.” 
Slip op at 3-4.  
Similarly, with respect to the Court of Appeals opinion, the  
majority writes:  
While it may have been more clearly stated, 
the emphasized language indicates that “a bare 
allegation of a constitutional violation” is  
sufficient to show irreparable harm.  In other  
words, the Court of Appeals concluded that a 
showing of irreparable harm to a particular party 
is not required for a preliminary injunction  
8  
against an alleged violation of § 5. [Slip op at 6, 
emphasis added.]  
While I agree with the majority that the courts below said  
that a constitutional violation is equivalent to irreparable  
harm, I do not agree with the conclusion that the courts “in  
other words” implied that harm to an individual party need not  
be shown.  Rather, in my view, the courts below “in other  
words” said that every individual citizen is irreparably  
harmed by a constitutional violation.  I am at a loss to  
understand how the Court’s statement that these plaintiffs  
would suffer irreparable harm can simultaneously be a  
conclusion that the plaintiffs need not show that they  
themselves would suffer irreparable harm.  The majority makes  
the mistake of reading the trial court opinion as providing  
that any citizen can bring suit by saying, “I can bring suit  
for all of us, because society as a whole is harmed by a  
violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5.”  In my view, the trial  
court decision actually provides that a violation of Const  
1963, art 11, § 5 injures each citizen individually.  As such,  
every 
citizen 
may 
institute 
injunctive 
or 
mandamus  
proceedings.
 Thus, under the trial court opinion, any  
plaintiff bringing suit would be constitutionally authorized  
to allege “I will be hurt individually because of the  
9  
 
violation.”4  
Interestingly, the majority concludes:  
[S]tanding has been described as a requirement 
that a party ordinarily must have a substantial 
personal interest . . . as opposed merely to having 
a generalized interest in the same manner as any 
citizen. . . . It is this requirement that  
unquestionably is targeted by § 5 when it provides 
that “violation of any of the provisions hereof may 
be restrained or observance compelled by injunctive 
or mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of 
this state.” Slip at 7-9.  
Despite the fact that the aforementioned constitutional  
language mentions neither standing nor the requirements for a  
preliminary injunction, the majority reaches the conclusion  
that particularized injury is suspended for the purposes of  
coming before the Court, but once there, particularity is  
reintroduced in association with the requirement that  
irreparable harm be shown.  In other words, under the  
majority’s approach, anyone can come before the court to seek  
an injunction, but if the person cannot show the type of  
particularized harm that would normally be required for  
standing purposes, then they cannot obtain relief in the form  
of a preliminary injunction. The effect of such an approach  
is to completely destroy the power of “any citizen” to compel  
constitutional compliance.  
4  In any event, this issue relates to the question of 
standing, as will be further explained.  
10  
 
The constitutional language does not provide only that  
injunctive proceedings may be brought by any citizen.  It  
additionally says that a violation may be restrained or  
observance compelled by any citizen.  Yet, under the majority  
view, only a citizen whose job will be adversely affected by  
a decision of the commission may restrain the violation by  
preliminary injunctive proceedings. Thus, in the context of  
preliminary proceedings, the protection afforded to “any  
citizen” of this state effectively becomes a protection  
afforded to a limited class of citizens.  I cannot support an  
approach that allows all citizens with valid legal claims  
regarding a constitutional violation to institute legal  
proceedings, but which nullifies the purpose of those  
proceedings by making preliminary injunctive relief per se  
unavailable to a large percentage of those citizens despite  
the contrary purpose and language of our constitution.  
I believe that the problem created by the majority  
approach stems in part from the fact that the majority injects  
particularity into its analysis of irreparable harm, rather  
than limiting the question of particularity to the standing  
context.  The generally accepted analysis used in preliminary  
injunction cases considers four factors:  
harm to the public interest if an injunction 
issues, whether the harm to the applicant in the 
absence of a stay outweighs the harm to the  
opposing party if a stay is granted; the strength  
11  
 
of the applicant’s demonstration that the applicant 
is 
likely 
to 
reveal 
on 
the 
merits; 
and  
demonstration that the applicant will suffer  
irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction is 
not granted. [MSEA v Dep’t of Mental Health, 421 
Mich 152; 365 NW2d 93 (1984).]  
The focus of the four-factor analysis is on the type of injury  
rendered by the issuance or nonissuance of an injunction.  In  
the context of issuing injunctions, irreparable injury has  
special meaning under the law.  The injury is traditionally  
defined in terms of whether the injury can be repaired by  
means other than through the issuance of an injunction.5  
Although it is true that the MSEA test and the tests  
applied in various cases cited by the majority refer to  
injuries to the “plaintiff” or to the “complainant,” the  
references are fairly unremarkable since it is always the  
complainant who seeks redress of an injury.  Also, in an  
injunction case involving subject matter not governed by a  
constitutional provision such as Const 1963, art 11, § 5, the  
complainant will have had to prove particularity in order to  
establish standing.  What is remarkable, however, is the fact  
that the majority offers no authority for the proposition that  
a plaintiff must show that the harm he suffers is somehow  
5  For example, Black’s law dictionary provides the 
following explanation, “‘Irreparable injury’ justifying an 
injunction is that which cannot be adequately compensated in 
damages or for which damages cannot be compensable in money.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 786.  
12  
 
 
 
irreparable in a different way than it is irreparable to any  
other plaintiff.  The reason, in my view, is that the  
“requirement that a party ordinarily must have a substantial  
personal interest at stake in a case or controversy as opposed  
merely to have a generalized interest in the same manner as  
any citizen,”6 pertains to standing and not to the question  
whether a party will suffer irreparable harm.7  Here, Const  
1963, art 11, § 5 specifically confers standing on all  
citizens.  
For all these reasons, I believe that the majority  
opinion is erroneous and that its reasoning fails to support  
its conclusion.  I prefer the reasoning and holding of the  
trial court.  I would, therefore, affirm the recognition by  
the courts below that irreparable harm may be established by  
6  Slip op at 6-7.  
7 As was recently recognized by a majority of this Court  
in Lee v Macomb Co, 464 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2001), the 
type of particularized harm referenced by the majority is 
clearly a requirement of the standing doctrine.  As noted  
previously, no similar particularity requirement is required 
as part of the irreparable harm inquiry. However, even if I 
agreed with the majority that particularity is required in the 
context of irreparable harm, as explained at length in this 
opinion, I believe it is inconsistent to conclude that the 
people of the state of Michigan intended to suspend the 
requirement 
of 
particularized harm for the purpose of allowing 
citizens to enter the courtroom door, but nonetheless those 
citizens must afterward show the very type of particularized, 
concrete harm suspended for standing purposes in order to 
receive a preliminary injunction.  
13  
proof of a violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5, and hold that  
the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  
WEAVER and KELLY, JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
14