Case Title: EDDIE TENIENTE MAGALLANES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-64

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
EDDIE TENIENTE MAGALLANES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 119142 P.3d 1147Case Number: 05-64Decided: 09/26/2006
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
EDDIE 
TENIENTE MAGALLANES,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Tonya A. 
Morse, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Pauling.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL,* KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 
* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Eddie Magallanes 
was convicted following a jury trial of first-degree premeditated murder in the 
death of Joseph Lopez and conspiracy to commit that murder.  In this appeal, Magallanes challenges 
the adequacy of the evidence supporting those convictions and asserts claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.  Finding no merit in the issues raised by 
Magallanes, we affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Magallanes 
submits the following issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
Whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find [Magallanes] 
guilty of murder in the first degree where the evidence failed to show a 
conclusive cause of death, where no witness testified that they saw [Magallanes] 
actually shoot the victim, and where there is no physical evidence linking the 
victim to the crime?

 
 
II.          
Whether ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically in failing to 
follow up on DNA and scientific testing, denied [Magallanes] his constitutional 
right to a fair trial?

 
 
III.         
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the law, 
vouching for the credibility of a witness, and misstating facts in closing 
argument?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      During the 
evening hours of January 17, 2004, Joseph Lopez and his younger brother, 
Anthony, went to the home of Emilio Teniente in Greeley, Colorado.  There, they met Bobby Rojas, Magallanes 
and his brother, Jesse Magallanes (hereinafter "Jesse").  The six young men sat around drinking, 
conversing, and listening to music.  
After a period of time, Teniente, Rojas, Lopez, Magallanes and Jesse 
decided to drive to Cheyenne to party. 

 
 
[¶4]      Jesse drove that 
evening, and Teniente occupied the front passenger seat.  In the rear, Magallanes sat behind 
Jesse, Lopez sat in the middle, and Rojas sat behind Teniente.  At some point during the drive to 
Cheyenne, Lopez 
made an inflammatory comment to Magallanes about his mother.  Magallanes became angry and began 
punching Lopez.  Thereafter, punches 
were thrown by all three occupants of the back seat.  When the men reached Cheyenne, Jesse stopped 
the car, and he and Magallanes pulled Lopez out of the vehicle.  Apparently believing they intended to 
leave Lopez there, Teniente told them to put Lopez back in the car because "he 
knows who I am." 

 
 
[¶5]      After placing 
Lopez back in the car, the men went to the house where Teniente's sister Sophia 
lived.  Sophia immediately noticed 
blood on Lopez's face and admonished the men for fighting.  She then helped Lopez clean up and gave 
him a clean shirt to wear while she washed the one he had been wearing.  After that, things calmed down between 
the men and they sat around drinking and talking with Sophia and one of her 
female friends, Vanessa Hernandez.  
Approximately two hours later, Teniente suggested they return to 
Greeley, and the 
five men left Sophia's house.1  

 
 
[¶6]      Shortly 
thereafter, Lopez began to scold the others for hitting him earlier.  He told them they should have killed him 
and that they needed to take care of him before they returned to Greeley because his family 
would get revenge for the beating he had taken.  At that point, Magallanes struck Lopez, 
and Teniente pulled out his .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol, pointed it at 
Lopez's head and told him to shut up.  
Teniente then directed Jesse to drive to Campstool Road.  When they arrived at the College Drive 
overpass on Campstool Road, Magallanes and Teniente had Jesse stop the 
vehicle under the bridge. 

 
 
[¶7]      Magallanes 
removed Lopez from the car and started beating and kicking him, eventually 
driving him to the ground.  By this 
time, Jesse and Teniente were outside the vehicle.  While Jesse attempted to stop the 
fracas, Teniente passed his pistol to Magallanes and told him to "shoot that 
guy."  Magallanes then shot Lopez 
twice in the head, once above the left ear and once toward the back of the 
head.  The four men left Lopez on 
the road and returned to Sophia's house, where Magallanes and his brother 
dropped off Teniente and Rojas before heading home.  Approximately forty-five minutes later, 
around 2:00 a.m., Sophia and Hernandez drove Teniente and Rojas back to 
Greeley. 

 
 
[¶8]      Shortly before 
2:00 a.m., Michael Hampton, a security officer for Frontier Refinery, left the 
refinery and drove east on Campstool 
Road.  As he approached the area of the 
overpass, he saw what appeared to be debris on the roadway and attempted 
unsuccessfully to swerve and avoid it.  
After hitting it, Hampton stopped his vehicle and discovered that 
the object was the body of a young man.  
The Laramie County Sheriff's Office was immediately contacted. 

 
 
[¶9]      During the 
ensuing investigation, law enforcement learned that Lopez had accompanied 
Teniente and others to Cheyenne the previous evening.  Law enforcement's investigation into 
Lopez's murder, however, was hampered by an orchestrated effort to cover up what 
had taken place in Cheyenne.  
As part of the cover-up, Rojas, Jesse, Sophia and Hernandez told a 
similar fabricated story that Lopez had left Sophia's home by himself and never 
returned, and conveniently failed to mention Magallanes' presence in Cheyenne on the night in 
question.  Those fabrications 
started to unravel when Sophia was arrested for possession of a controlled 
substance. 

 
 
[¶10]   Based on information obtained from 
the ongoing investigation, the State charged Magallanes with the premeditated 
murder of Lopez and with conspiring with Teniente to commit that murder.  In September 2004, a jury found him 
guilty on both charges.  The 
district court sentenced Magallanes to concurrent terms of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.  
This appeal followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Issue I 
 Evidentiary Sufficiency

 
 
[¶11]   Magallanes contends that his 
conviction for first degree murder cannot stand because:  (1) the State failed to conclusively 
prove Lopez's death was caused by the bullet wounds to his head; (2) no witness 
actually saw Magallanes shoot Lopez; and (3) there was no physical evidence 
linking Lopez to the crime.2  In reviewing Magallanes' sufficiency of 
the evidence claim, we must determine whether a rational jury could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Vlahos v. State, 2003 WY 103, ¶ 36, 75 P.3d 628, 637 (Wyo. 2003).  We do 
not consider conflicting evidence presented by Magallanes, and afford to the 
State every favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the 
evidence it presented.  Id., ¶ 36, 75 P.3d  at 637-38.  We have 
consistently held that it is the jury's responsibility to weigh the evidence, 
assess the credibility of the witnesses and resolve conflicts in the 
evidence.  Leyo v. State, 2005 WY 92, ¶ 11, 116 P.3d 1113, 1116-17 (Wyo. 2005).  We 
will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when applying this rule; 
our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals could have come to the same result as the jury did.  Id.; Vlahos, ¶ 36, 75 P.3d  at 
638.

 
 
[¶12]   Magallanes' complaint concerning 
the cause of Lopez's death rests largely on selected portions of the testimony 
of Dr. Stephen Cina, the forensic pathologist who autopsied Lopez.  Dr. Cina testified he could not 
determine whether Lopez died before or after being run over by Hampton's vehicle, but 
that Lopez would not have been exposed to that vehicle had the gunshots not left 
him incapacitated and lying in the roadway.  Magallanes argues this latter conclusion 
is unsupported by the record, speculating that Lopez may have been shot 
someplace other than the road and somehow managed to move himself onto the road 
after being shot twice in the head.

 
 
[¶13]   In advancing this argument, 
Magallanes ignores the evidence that after his brother pulled over on 
Campstool 
Road  presumably on the right hand side of the road 
 Rojas remained seated on the right hand side of the rear passenger seat.  Thus, when Magallanes, who was seated 
behind the driver, pulled Lopez out of the back seat and began to beat him, 
those activities can reasonably be inferred to have occurred on the road.  Magallanes also ignores that the .25 
caliber shell casings were also found on Campstool Road in close proximity to 
Lopez's body. 

 
 
[¶14]   Magallanes further fails to note 
evidence indicating that Hampton's vehicle did 
not hit Lopez's body until shortly before 2:00 a.m., which was approximately the 
same time Sophia and her friend embarked for Greeley to take Teniente and Rojas home and 
approximately forty-five minutes after Magallanes shot Lopez.  That lapse in time is significant 
because, although Dr. Cina testified that the gunshot wounds to the brain might 
not have immediately resulted in death, and that the injuries caused to Lopez's 
body by Hampton's vehicle occurred either shortly 
before or shortly after Lopez expired, he also testified the bullet wounds would 
have incapacitated Lopez.  
Furthermore, Dr. Cina testified that Lopez had aspirated blood from those 
wounds and, from the amount of such blood discovered, Lopez could have been 
gasping for breath only for a short time after being shot. 

 
 
[¶15]   From that evidence, a rational jury 
could have reasonably inferred that Lopez was shot in the roadway and left there 
to die.  A rational jury also could 
have reasonably concluded that the bullet wounds immediately rendered Lopez 
incapable of moving and, after a few minutes, no longer capable of gasping for 
breath, and that death's door was swinging shut, if not already closed, 
when  Hampton encountered him that 
morning.  We find ample evidence in 
the record to support a reasonable conclusion that Lopez's death was a direct 
result of the bullets Magallanes discharged into his head.  Magallanes has not convinced us 
otherwise.

 
 
[¶16]   Similarly unpersuasive is 
Magallanes' claim that the evidence supporting his murder conviction is 
inadequate because neither of the two eyewitnesses testifying at trial, Jesse 
and Rojas, stated they actually saw him fire the bullets into Lopez's head.  The record reveals that both witnesses 
testified Magallanes was the last person to handle the gun prior to the 
shooting.  Jesse testified Lopez was 
on the ground when Magallanes pointed the gun towards the ground and fired it 
twice.  Additionally, Rojas 
testified that, after observing Magallanes fumbling with the gun, he saw him go 
towards Lopez and then heard two gun shots.  Rojas further testified that when 
Magallanes returned to the car following the shooting, he stated that he had 
shot Lopez both in the forehead and the back of the head.  A rational jury could easily conclude 
from that evidence that it was Magallanes who killed 
Lopez.

[¶17]   Magallanes' final claim, as set 
forth in the title of his argument, is that there "is no physical evidence 
linking [Lopez] to the crime."  
Magallanes, however, has not mentioned, let alone developed, this claim 
in the body of his argument.  
Needless to say, we will not address it.

 
 

Issue II 
 Ineffective Assistance

 
 
[¶18]   Magallanes contends that trial 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance.  
We evaluate Magallanes' claim under the following 
standard:

 
 
In 
reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, our paramount 
consideration is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 44, 57 P.3d 332, [346-47] (Wyo. 2002).  An 
appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that counsel's performance was deficient.  Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).  Ordinarily, he must 
also demonstrate that prejudice resulted.  
Under this test, the inquiry is whether or not counsel rendered the 
assistance a reasonably competent attorney would have offered and, if not, 
whether his failure to do so prejudiced the defense of the case.  Id.  This two-part test, the Strickland test, 
is the test we normally apply in reviewing ineffectiveness claims .  .  
.  .  

 
 
We 
examine the conduct of defense counsel in light of all the circumstances in 
determining whether the identified acts or omissions fall outside the ambit of 
professionally competent assistance, bearing in mind the function of counsel is 
to make the adversarial testing process work in every case.  Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 609 
(Wyo. 
1992).  The benchmark for judging 
any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied 
upon as having produced a just result.  
Gleason, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332.  We do not evaluate the efforts 
of counsel from a perspective of hindsight but endeavor to reconstruct the 
circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct and evaluate the professional 
efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time.  Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 609.  We invoke a strong presumption that 
counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all decisions within 
the bounds of reasonable professional judgment.  Id. 
The burden is on the defendant to overcome this presumption that, in light of 
the circumstances, the challenged action or failure of the attorney might be 
considered sound trial strategy.  
Id.

 
 

Leyva v. 
State, 2005 
WY 22, ¶ 19, 106 P.3d 873, 878 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting CLC v. State, 2004 WY 2, ¶ 11, 82 P.3d 1235, 1238-39 (Wyo. 2004)).  We have also stated that an appellant 
assailing counsel's assistance must provide more than mere speculation or 
equivocal inferences.  Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 36, 99 P.3d 928, 943 (Wyo. 2004), cert. 
denied, 544 U.S. 1062, 125 S. Ct. 2513, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (2005).

 
 
[¶19]   Magallanes' allegations of 
ineffectiveness concern trial counsel's failure to have DNA testing performed on 
fingernail scrapings taken from Lopez, to have the car driven that night checked 
for fingerprints and tested for blood or other biological specimens, and to have 
testing performed on the shirt Lopez left at Sophia's house.  Magallanes' attack on counsel's 
performance rests entirely on his speculation that such testing would have 
uncovered exculpatory evidence and discounts the possibility that it could have 
adversely affected the theory of defense presented at 
trial.

 
 
[¶20]   The record reveals that Magallanes 
defended against the charges on the theory that he was not in Cheyenne the night Lopez was killed, that the initial 
statements given by all who saw Lopez in Cheyenne that night indicated as much, and that 
those witnesses changed their stories only after being pressured to do so by law 
enforcement and Lopez's family.  
Defense counsel drew the jury's attention to such matters during his 
examination of witnesses and in his opening and closing statements.  To complement that defense, trial 
counsel attacked the State extensively for not having tests performed to 
identify fingerprints and biological specimens that were gathered, or could have 
been gathered, during its investigation of the case.  That attack, in part, addressed the very 
items which Magallanes now claims trial counsel should have tested.  

 
 
[¶21]   It is clear from the record that 
trial counsel's strategy was to use the unknown nature of the untested evidence 
to Magellanes' advantage by suggesting it would have shown he had no contact 
with Lopez on the night of the murder, a defense that could not have been 
pursued had testing of that evidence linked Magallanes to the crime.  Trial counsel further argued the State 
purposely did not test the evidence because it feared the results would weaken 
its case against Magallanes.  
Counsel would have had to sacrifice that aspect of Magallanes' defense if 
he had the evidence tested.  When 
viewed in this context, trial counsel's strategic decision to forego testing was 
well within sound trial strategy of a reasonably competent attorney.  We will not second guess 
counsel.

 
 
Issue 
III  Prosecutorial Misconduct

 
 
[¶22]   In his final claim of error, 
Magallanes identifies several statements made by the prosecutor during closing 
arguments and argues they constitute misconduct.  Specifically, Magallanes claims: 

 
 
            
1.         
The prosecutor misstated the law as to the State's burden of proof on the 
conspiracy charge when he stated in rebuttal closing:

 
 
Emilio 
handed the gun, Jesse handed the gun to Eddie.  Which one is it?  I don't know.  It just doesn't matter.  Who cares?  The fact is the gun was in his 
hand.  He's the one with the 
gun.  I don't care who gave it to 
him.  He's got the gun.  He makes the choice.  Bam, twice.  Who cares?  It just doesn't matter. 

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
Ladies 
and gentlemen, we are here because he executed him.  Keep your eye on the ball.  I don't care who gave him the gun.  He used the gun deliberately twice.  He and Emilio, thinking along the same 
lines, we'll take care of it. 

 
 
            
2.         
The prosecutor improperly vouched for Jesse's credibility by 
stating:

 
 
[Eddie's] 
the one who pulls Joe out of the car, beats on him.  Eddie's the one that takes the gun from 
Emilio, and you saw Jesse testify from that stand.  It was not comfortable for him to have 
to testify against his own brother.  
It was difficult, but he had the courage to say, "My brother shot him 
twice in the head."  We had to drag 
him here, but he testified. 

 
 
            
3.         
The prosecutor misrepresented Jesse's testimony when he said in 
rebuttal:

 
 
The 
critical thing that the two eyewitnesses and the corroborating evidence tells 
you is on this particular critical date, this defendant, by the testimony of 
Jesse Magallanes, who had to point at his own brother and say, "He shot him," 
Bobby had to point at his cousin and say, "I heard it, but then he told me, I 
shot him twice in the head.'"  
That's why we're here. 

            
4.         
The prosecutor misrepresented the testimony as to what brand of beer 
Magallanes and his friends consumed on the night of Lopez's murder by stating in 
rebuttal:

 
 
Remember 
in the investigation after all the initial interviews completed by the 22nd, what is the one beer they all drank?  Bud Light.  Bud Light all night long.  Bud Light, Bud Light, Bud Light, and 
Lord Calvert whiskey.

 
 
So 
there's a Keystone beer can out in the area of the homicide.  All they did was overcollect the 
scene.  I would submit that beer can 
had nothing to do with this case.  
All they drank was Bud Light, so we knew that we're focused on the 
investigation, and you move forward.  
All we had at that scene for physical evidence are the casings and the 
body of Joe, and Joe's not talking. 

 
 
[¶23]   "Claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
are settled by reference to the entire record and hinge on whether the accused's 
case has been so prejudiced as to constitute the denial of a fair trial."  Duke, ¶ 100, 99 P.3d  at 957.  This Court judges the propriety of any 
comment within a closing argument "in the context of the prosecutor's entire 
argument, considering the context of the statements and comparing them with the 
evidence produced at the trial."  
Id. (quoting Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 26, 49 P.3d 975, 986 (Wyo. 2002)).  We have 
consistently stated that the purpose of closing argument is to permit both the 
prosecution and defense counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance of the 
trial evidence.  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 12, ¶ 19, 126 P.3d 897, 904-05 (Wyo. 2006); Moe v. 
State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 20, 110 P.3d 1206, 1214 (Wyo. 2005).  Prosecutors, like defense counsel, are 
entitled to review the evidence and suggest to the jury inferences that may be 
reasonably drawn from that evidence.  
Id.

 
 
[¶24]   In the instant case, Magallanes did 
not object at trial to the alleged incidents of misconduct.  Therefore, his claims must be evaluated 
under the doctrine of plain error, which requires: (1) the record be clear as to 
the incident alleged as error; (2) Magallanes demonstrate the existence of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law which was violated in a clear and obvious, not 
merely arguable, way; and (3) Magallanes prove the error adversely affected a 
substantial right which materially prejudiced him.  Duke, ¶ 101, 99 P.3d  at 957.  In order to satisfy the prejudice prong, 
Magallanes must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that, in the absence of the 
alleged errors, the outcome of his trial would have been more favorable to him. 
 Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d 143, 157 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶25]   Despite acknowledging his 
heightened burden of establishing plain error, Magallanes has not presented this 
Court with a plain error analysis on his misconduct claims.  Magallanes' argument consists of 
isolated excerpts from the prosecutor's closing arguments without a legal 
analysis explaining the rule of law allegedly transgressed by the prosecutor's 
statements.  Magallanes also fails 
to provide any explanation, within the context of the record, how the challenged 
comments materially prejudiced him.  
Instead, he provides only a singular assertion that the prosecutor's 
remarks "adversely effected [sic] Appellant's rights, including his 
constitutional right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution."  Merely asserting prejudice without a 
factual presentation from the record is wholly insufficient to satisfy the plain 
error standard.  Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 23, 131 P.3d 963, 971 (Wyo. 2006).  While we 
could summarily reject Magallanes' misconduct claims because of the identified 
deficiencies, due to the severity of the charges against Magallanes we have 
taken it upon ourselves to independently examine the challenged comments in 
light of the entire record and applicable legal principles and conclude that 
Magallanes' complaints are meritless.

 
 
[¶26]   Since we continue to see complaints 
of misconduct arising from remarks made by prosecutors during closing arguments, 
we take this opportunity to remind litigants of what we said in Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 50, 123 P.3d 543, 558 (Wyo. 2005) (internal citation omitted):

 
 
We have 
said many times that we are reluctant to find plain error in closing arguments 
because we do not want to place the district court in the position of having to 
act as opposing counsel.  We would 
expect that appellate counsel would begin to take us at our word in that regard, 
and would raise as plain error only those closing arguments that did, indeed, 
violate an unambiguous rule of law in an unambiguous manner, and that, at least 
arguably, resulted in prejudice to the appellant.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   We find sufficient evidence in the 
record to sustain Magallanes' conviction for first degree murder.  Our review of the record also convinces 
us that trial counsel's assistance was not constitutionally deficient and that 
no prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing argument.  Affirmed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Jesse, once 
again, drove the car and the other men got in the seats they occupied on the 
trip to Cheyenne.

   

2Magallanes 
also seems to suggest that insufficient evidence exists to sustain his 
conspiracy conviction.  The adequacy 
of that evidence has not been properly raised as an issue before this 
Court.  Additionally, Magallanes has 
failed to provide this Court with a cogent legal analysis supporting such a 
claim.  We will therefore not 
consider it further.  Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 49, 99 P.3d 928, 946 (Wyo. 2004).