Case Title: State v. Sellhausen

Citation: 2012 WI 5

Docket Number: 2010AP000445-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 5 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP445-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Sharon A. Sellhausen, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 330 Wis. 2d 778, 794 N.W.2d 793 
(Ct. App. 2010-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 1, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 7, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT 
 
COUNTY: 
SHEBOYGAN 
 
JUDGE: 
EDWARD L. STENGEL 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J. joins concurrence. 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
PROSSER, ROGGENSACK and GABLEMAN, JJ. join 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Byron C. 
Lichstein and the Frank J. Remington Center, UW Law School, 
Madison, and oral argument by Bryon C. Lichstein. 
 
 
2012 WI 5
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2010AP445-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF771) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Sharon A. Sellhausen, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 1, 2012 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published opinion of the court of appeals.1  The court of appeals 
reversed the judgment of conviction of Sharon A. Sellhausen, the 
defendant, and the order denying post-conviction relief of the 
circuit court for Sheboygan County, L. Edward Stengel, Judge. 
¶2 
The dispositive issue before this court is whether the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial even though she used a 
                                                 
1 State v. Sellhausen, 2010 WI App 175, 330 Wis. 2d 778, 794 
N.W.2d 793. 
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
2 
 
peremptory challenge to remove the judge's daughter-in-law from 
the jury.   
¶3 
The circuit court denied the defendant's motion for a 
new trial, noting that neither party moved to strike the 
daughter-in-law for cause and neither the State nor the 
defendant suggested that the daughter-in-law was not a suitable 
juror.  The circuit court concluded that it did not believe it 
"would have been within its appropriate discretion just to 
automatically exclude a juror that had otherwise been legally 
selected."   
¶4 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction of the circuit court and the order denying post-
conviction relief.   
¶5 
"[I]nterstitially applying the underlying rationale of 
[State v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737],"2  
the court of appeals held that "presiding judges must sua sponte 
remove their immediate family members from the panel of 
potential jurors."3   
¶6 
Distinguishing State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, 245 
Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223, the court of appeals further held 
that "the Lindell holding is not applicable to this case or 
others like it because [the defendant's] use of a peremptory 
                                                 
2 Sellhausen, 330 Wis. 2d 778, ¶23.  The decision in State 
v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737, was 
released approximately three weeks before the defendant's trial; 
neither the circuit court nor the parties were aware of the Tody 
decision during the trial in the present case. 
3 Sellhausen, 330 Wis. 2d 778, ¶14. 
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
3 
 
challenge did not adequately correct a trial court error."4  The 
court of appeals concluded that "a bright-line rule [that a 
circuit court must remove an immediate family member sua sponte] 
is far more efficient than a case-by-case analysis of whether 
the presence of a prospective juror on the voir dire panel might 
have affected the outcome of a trial."5      
¶7 
We conclude that the present case is governed by State 
v. Lindell.6  We conclude that because the defendant exercised a 
peremptory strike to remove the circuit court judge's daughter-
in-law from the jury, and because the defendant does not claim 
the jury was unfair or partial, a new trial is not required 
under the circumstances of the present case.7  The defendant has 
                                                 
4 Id., ¶21. 
5 Id., ¶23. 
6 In State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, 238 Wis. 2d 422, 617 
N.W.2d 500, the court overruled State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 
564 N.W.2d 328 (1997).  The Lindell court held that when a 
peremptory challenge is used to strike a juror, reversal of a 
conviction and a new trial are not required in light of the 
Wisconsin law on peremptory challenges and harmless error, 
United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 598 U.S. 304 (2000), the 
systemic problems resulting from the Ramos decision, and the 
significant steps the court has taken to address the issue of 
juror bias.  See Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶53.  
7 The court unanimously agrees that Lindell governs the 
present case and a new trial is not warranted.   
Justice Ziegler's concurrence is the majority opinion on 
the issue addressed in Tody, namely, whether a circuit court has 
inherent authority to strike his or her immediate family member 
from the panel of potential jurors.  Thus, Justice Ziegler's 
concurrence in Tody and Justice Ziegler's concurrence in the 
present case now represent the opinion of the majority of this 
court.   
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
4 
 
not shown that the presence of the challenged juror in the pool 
of potential jurors affected the defendant's substantial rights.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
ordering a new trial.   
¶8 
Because the defendant asserts that the judgment of 
conviction should be reversed on the additional ground of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we remand the cause to 
the court of appeals to decide this issue.8   
I 
¶9 
The facts relating to the issue before this court are 
not in dispute.  The jury, which did not include the presiding 
circuit court judge's daughter-in-law as a member, convicted the 
defendant of battery to a law enforcement officer and disorderly 
conduct.   
¶10 The 
circuit 
court 
judge's 
daughter-in-law 
was, 
however, in the pool of potential jurors.  During voir dire, the 
circuit court judge and his daughter-in-law had the following 
exchange: 
THE COURT:  All right.  Nikki, you're my daughter-in-
law.  All right.  I've told the attorneys that you and 
I have had no discussions about the case, correct? 
JUROR STENGEL:  Correct. 
                                                 
8 The circuit court rejected the defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel; the court of appeals 
did not reach this issue.  The parties stipulated, and the court 
agreed, that if the court of appeals' decision on the juror 
issue were reversed, this court would remand the claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel to the court of appeals.   
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
5 
 
THE COURT:  As a matter of fact, I didn't know until 
last night that you were coming in as a juror in this 
matter, right? 
JUROR STENGEL:  Correct. 
THE COURT:  Very good.  You didn't ask and I wouldn't 
have excused you anyways so.  But you're competent, 
you can be fair and impartial? 
JUROR STENGEL:  Uh-huh. 
THE COURT:  The fact that I'm the judge wouldn't 
affect your ability in this matter at all? 
JUROR STENGEL:  No. 
THE COURT:  Listen to all the evidence and decide the 
case, correct? 
JUROR STENGEL:  Correct. 
THE COURT:  And if we see you after the case, you 
wouldn't be at all hesitant as to how you decide the 
case, right?  
JUROR STENGEL:  Correct. 
THE COURT:  Very good.  And I have told the lawyers 
about this, so they understand that as well. 
¶11 Shortly 
after 
this 
exchange, 
defense 
counsel 
questioned the circuit court judge's daughter-in-law as follows: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I guess I have to ask you, Ms. 
Stengel, since you're related to the judge.  If you 
would have any preference over any law enforcement 
officials of any kind over a private citizen? 
JUROR STENGEL:  No. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  No preference whatsoever? 
JUROR STENGEL:  No preference. 
THE COURT:  You're not talking about judges, are you? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Oh, absolutely, that's included. 
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
6 
 
THE COURT:  All right. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I think that's all I need to ask.  
Thank you. 
¶12 Defense counsel did not move to strike the daughter-
in-law for cause.  Defense counsel did, however, use a 
peremptory challenge to remove the daughter-in-law from the 
jury.  At the hearing on the defendant's post-conviction motion, 
defense counsel testified that he did not believe he had 
specific grounds to strike the judge's daughter-in-law for cause 
because the circuit court had established that the daughter-in-
law could be impartial.  Nonetheless, defense counsel used a 
peremptory challenge because he "thought that there might be 
some prejudice there and it's just better safe than sorry." 
¶13 Also 
at 
the post-conviction motion hearing, the 
circuit court judge stated that before voir dire, he had spoken 
with both parties' attorneys off the record to tell them that 
his daughter-in-law would be one of the potential jurors.  The 
judge also recalled telling counsel that he would be glad to 
excuse the juror if either party so requested.  Defense counsel 
could not recall this conversation clearly enough to confirm or 
deny its substance. 
II 
¶14 This case requires us to determine the application of 
the Lindell and Tody cases to the present case.  The 
interpretation and application of prior cases to a new set of 
facts 
is 
a 
question 
of 
law, 
which 
this 
court 
decides 
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
7 
 
independently of the circuit court or court of appeals but 
benefiting from their analyses.      
III 
¶15 We turn first to the Lindell case.   
¶16 Lindell overruled State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 
N.W.2d 328 (1997), "which would have required an automatic 
reversal in any situation where the defendant used a peremptory 
strike to remove a prospective juror who should have been 
excused for cause . . . ."9  The Lindell court, applying a 
harmless error analysis based on the harmless error statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) (2009-10),10 concluded that because 
Lindell exercised a peremptory strike against the challenged 
juror, "the circuit court's error did not affect the substantial 
rights of the defendant."11  Thus, under Lindell, reversal of the 
                                                 
9 Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶5.   
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18(2) (2009-10) provides: 
No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of selection or misdirection of the jury, or 
the improper admission of evidence, or for error as to 
any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the 
opinion of the court to which the application is made, 
after 
an 
examination 
of 
the 
entire 
action 
or 
proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained 
of has affected the substantial rights of the party 
seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to 
secure a new trial. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
11 Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶5.  
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
8 
 
conviction is not automatically required when a peremptory 
strike removes the challenged juror from the jury.   
¶17 The Lindell court acknowledged, however, that although 
"[t]he substantial rights of a party are not affected or 
impaired 
when 
a 
defendant 
chooses 
to 
exercise 
a 
single 
peremptory strike to correct a circuit court error," situations 
might arise when the exercise of a peremptory challenge does not 
cure the trial court's error of failing to excuse a juror for 
cause.12  Although the Lindell court declined "to evaluate other 
situations,"13 it referred to Pool v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. 
Co., 94 Wis. 447, 453, 69 N.W. 65 (1896), in which the court had 
commented that "if, by the erroneous ruling [of the trial 
court], the party is obliged to exhaust all his peremptory 
challenges, the error is harmful."14  The Pool court explained:  
                                                                                                                                                             
The court has rejected the State's argument, which has been 
made in prior cases.  The State argues that a defendant's 
failure to exercise a peremptory challenge to a juror who was 
challenged for cause but not excused results in a waiver of the 
defendant's right to raise the issue of whether the juror should 
have 
been 
struck 
for 
cause. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Lindell, 
245 
Wis. 2d 689, ¶117; State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 569 
N.W.2d 770 
(1999); 
State 
v. 
Gesch, 
167 
Wis. 2d 660, 
482 
N.W.2d 99 (1992).  Under Wisconsin case law, if a juror who 
should have been removed for cause is erroneously allowed to be 
a member of the jury, the conviction must be reversed without 
inquiry into harmless error even if the defendant declined an 
opportunity to remove the juror with a peremptory challenge.  
Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d at 671.   
12 Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶113.  
13 Id. 
14 Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶113 (quoting Pool v. Milwaukee 
Mechanics' Ins. Co., 94 Wis. 447, 453, 69 N.W. 65 (1896)).    
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
9 
 
"The true rule, we hold, is . . . to the effect that it is not 
prejudicial error to overrule a challenge for cause, unless it 
is shown that an objectionable juror was forced upon the party, 
and sat upon the case after such party had exhausted his 
peremptory challenges."15  
¶18 The Lindell court also referred to two situations 
posed by the State in which the State asserted that a trial 
court's error of failing to excuse a juror for cause might 
justify a new trial: "[W]hen a circuit court judge repeatedly 
and deliberately misapplies the law to force a defendant to use 
peremptory challenges or when the court makes errors that force 
a defendant to use most or all of his or her peremptory 
strikes."16    
¶19 None of the scenarios referred to in Lindell as 
exceptions to the rule that a peremptory strike "cures" the 
circuit court's error of failing to excuse a juror for cause 
occurred in the instant case.  The present case seems to fall 
squarely within the holding of Lindell, not any referenced 
exception.  We acknowledge, however, that the Lindell court's 
examples of exceptions to the rule are obviously intended as 
illustrative, not exhaustive.  
¶20 In an effort to distinguish the present case from 
Lindell, the defendant relies on what she labels "the path this 
                                                 
15 Pool, 94 Wis. at 453. 
16 Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶119. 
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
10 
 
Court charted in Tody."  Thus, we turn to the Tody case for 
guidance. 
¶21 Tody, 316 Wis. 2d 689, presented a very different fact 
situation than the instant case.  In Tody, the defense counsel 
moved to strike the circuit court judge's mother from the pool 
of potential jurors for cause; the circuit court judge denied 
the motion.17  Neither party in Tody used a peremptory challenge 
to remove the mother from the jury, and the circuit court 
judge's mother sat on the jury that convicted Tody.   
¶22 Two key differences exist between the present case and 
Tody.  First, in the present case, unlike in Tody, neither the 
State nor the defendant moved to excuse the daughter-in-law for 
cause and the circuit court judge did not rule on a motion 
involving his family member.  Second, in the present case, 
unlike in Tody, the defendant exercised a peremptory strike and 
the challenged juror did not sit on the jury.18     
¶23 The defendant contends that the Lindell harmless error 
test does not apply in the present case.  She makes three 
arguments in support of her claim that her use of a peremptory 
                                                 
17 The Tody circuit court, like the circuit court in the 
present case, believed it had no legal basis for excusing the 
juror. 
18 Although the court of appeals suggested otherwise, see 
Sellhausen, 330 Wis. 2d 778, ¶22, neither the Tody concurrences 
nor the Tody lead opinion rested on this court's inherent powers 
regarding jury selection.  We need not and do not address the 
State's argument that only this court, not the court of appeals, 
has the constitutional superintending authority to declare that 
presiding judges must sua sponte remove their immediate family 
members from the panel of potential jurors. 
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
11 
 
challenge did not cure the harm caused by the circuit court's 
failure to strike the challenged juror sua sponte:  "The harm 
from failing to strike the juror sua sponte stemmed from a 
combination of factors: the appearance of judicial impropriety 
in not dealing with the situation clearly and decisively, the 
risk that counsel or the judge will behave differently during 
the trial due to antagonism caused by counsel striking the 
judge's family member, and the unfairness of the defendant 
having to use a peremptory challenge on a juror who cannot be 
subjected to aggressive voir dire."19   
¶24 First, the defendant argues that the circuit court 
created an appearance of impropriety when it failed to swiftly 
and decisively remove the challenged juror from the jury pool. 
The defendant cites several cases for the proposition that a 
harmless 
error 
analysis 
is 
inappropriate 
when 
an 
error 
implicates or imperils public confidence in the integrity of the 
courts, judges, or juries.20   
                                                 
19 Response 
Brief 
of 
Defendant-Appellant 
Sharon 
A. 
Sellhausen at 21-22 (emphasis in original). 
20 See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils 
S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 811 (1987) ("[A]ppointment of an interested 
prosecutor creates an appearance of impropriety that diminishes 
faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general.  
The narrow focus of harmless-error analysis is not sensitive to 
this underlying concern."); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 
187, 195 (1946) (when women are systematically excluded from the 
jury, "[t]he injury is not limited to the defendant——there is 
injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the 
community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the 
processes of our courts.").  
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
12 
 
¶25 According to the defendant, the circuit court judge's 
reference to his conversation with his daughter-in-law the night 
before trial, the judge's leading questions to his daughter-in-
law at voir dire, and the judge's off-the-record conversation in 
which he offered to excuse his daughter-in-law each demonstrate 
that he handled the situation casually and without enough 
attention to appearances of propriety.  
¶26 It seems to us, however, that the defendant overstates 
the appearance of impropriety in the present case.   
¶27 The circuit court was aware of the risk of an 
appearance of impropriety and took steps to prevent such an 
appearance.  The circuit court displayed its concern that all 
jurors, including the challenged juror, be fair and impartial.  
The circuit court judge mentioned that he had only recently 
learned his daughter-in-law would be in the jury pool and that 
they had no discussions about the case. 
¶28 Nothing in the record suggests that the circuit court 
judge was unconcerned with or indifferent to the appearance of 
propriety or the integrity of the courts.  Indeed, the record 
shows that the circuit court judge was acutely aware of these 
concerns and that his decision to allow his daughter-in-law to 
remain in the pool of potential jurors may have been motivated 
by a misunderstanding of the scope of the circuit court's power 
to remove a family member juror who asserts she can be fair and 
impartial.       
¶29 We agree with the court of appeals that "it is much 
cleaner when a judge removes the immediate family member sua 
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
13 
 
sponte."21  We have urged circuit courts on several occasions "to 
err on the side of striking prospective jurors who appear to be 
biased" because "[s]uch action will avoid the appearance of 
bias, and may save judicial time and resources in the long 
run."22  The circuit judge in the instant case did not heed this 
recommendation.    
¶30 Nevertheless we are not persuaded that in the present 
case an appearance of impropriety exists warranting reversal of 
the conviction and a new trial.  The daughter-in-law did not sit 
on the jury, and as the court of appeals stated, "the presiding 
judge in this case genuinely attempted to alleviate potential 
problems."23  
¶31 Second, defense counsel argues that the use of a 
peremptory challenge harmed the defendant because it forced 
defense counsel to adopt an adversarial stance to the presiding 
judge.  The particular concern seems to be that this adversarial 
stance is likely to affect the behavior of the circuit court and 
defense counsel during the trial.   
¶32 Defense counsel fears that he may offend the circuit 
court judge when counsel removes the circuit court judge's 
immediate family member from the jury, especially after the 
                                                 
21 Sellhausen, 330 Wis. 2d 778, ¶16. 
22 State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 503, 579 N.W.2d 654 
(1998) (citing Kanzenbach v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 
621, 627, 79 N.W.2d 249 (1957)).  See also Lindell, 245 
Wis. 2d 689, ¶49.    
23 Sellhausen, 330 Wis. 2d 778, ¶15. 
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
14 
 
judge has taken pains to show (and has determined) that the 
family member could be a fair and impartial juror.  Defense 
counsel argues that a circuit court judge might, consciously or 
unconsciously, harbor resentment toward defense counsel and 
counsel's client.  Defense counsel also claims that he (or other 
counsel in a similar position) may be hesitant to aggressively 
challenge the presiding judge's other rulings in the proceedings 
for fear of exacerbating the problem and further alienating 
counsel from the judge. 
¶33 Defense counsel's concerns seem overstated in the 
present case.  We understand that attorneys fear antagonizing 
judges.  This fear is part of the legal lore and legal culture.  
Lawyers fear that judges, like other persons, may harbor ill 
will to the messenger when they dislike or are bothered by the 
message.  As judges ourselves, we tend to view any such concerns 
by lawyers as exaggerated, but we appreciate that lawyers' 
perceptions may be different.  Although judges are expected to 
perform 
their 
duties 
objectively, 
impartially, 
and 
unemotionally, lawyers and non-lawyers alike must concede that 
judges are not immune to human emotions.     
¶34 We are not persuaded, however, that the risk of an 
adversarial relationship developing between the presiding judge 
and defense counsel in the circumstances of the present case is 
great enough to warrant automatic reversal absent evidence that 
a party's substantial rights were actually impaired. 
¶35 Nothing in the record suggests that defense counsel 
changed trial strategy because he feared antagonizing the 
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
15 
 
circuit court judge.  Nothing in the record suggests that the 
circuit court judge harbored any resentment toward defense 
counsel for using a peremptory strike to remove the daughter-in-
law from the jury.  The potential chilling effect that concerned 
the court in Tody does not appear to be present in the instant 
case.  
¶36 The defendant's third argument is the argument that 
the court of appeals found most compelling.  As the court of 
appeals put it, "when a presiding judge does not remove his or 
her family member sua sponte, the defendant is essentially 
robbed of the right to aggressively question a juror related to 
the presiding judge."24  In other words, the argument is that 
Lindell is distinguishable because in Lindell the challenged 
juror was not an immediate relative of the circuit court judge 
and the lawyer conducted full, uninhibited voir dire of the 
challenged juror.  Defense counsel in Lindell was able to decide 
that the potential juror at issue was biased and to conclude 
that a peremptory strike was warranted. 
¶37 In contrast, in the present case, according to the 
court of appeals, defense counsel was unable to explore fully in 
voir dire whether the challenged juror (a member of the judge's 
immediate family) was biased for fear of antagonizing the 
circuit court judge, and defense counsel was forced to use a 
peremptory 
challenge 
without 
determining 
whether 
it 
was 
                                                 
24 Id., ¶20. 
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
16 
 
necessary to strike the juror or whether the defendant might 
have preferred that the person remain in the jury pool. 
¶38 We are not persuaded that the distinctions between the 
present case and Lindell warrant a deviation from Lindell's 
general rule.  That defense counsel in the present case may have 
been 
forced 
to 
exercise 
a 
peremptory 
challenge 
without 
thoroughly exploring the possible bias of one juror is not 
sufficient to render Lindell inapplicable.  
¶39 Lindell held that a circuit court's failure to excuse 
a juror who should have been excused is harmless error if the 
defendant uses a peremptory challenge to remove that juror and 
ends up with a fair, impartial jury.  In the instant case, the 
defendant used a peremptory strike and ended up with a fair, 
impartial jury.  The defendant's substantial right we are 
concerned with is the defendant's right to a fair, impartial 
jury, not the defendant's right to the exact jury that the 
defendant prefers.25   
                                                 
25 See Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶115 ("A defendant is 
entitled to a jury which will insure him [or her] a fair and 
impartial trial, but not to an unlimited choice in an attempt to 
secure a jury which will acquit him [or her]." (quoting Pollack 
v. State, 215 Wis. 200, 207-08, 253 N.W. 560 (1934), overruled 
in part by State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 
N.W.2d 753 (1965)).  See also State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 
33, 
564 
N.W.2d 328 
(1997) 
(Crooks, 
J., 
dissenting) 
("[P]eremptory challenges are not intended to enable the state 
or the defendant to select particular jurors who they think may 
be more favorable to their side; rather, peremptory challenges 
are intended to be a means to the end of ensuring the selection 
of an unbiased jury."). 
No. 
2010AP445-CR   
 
17 
 
¶40 The defendant does not claim that the jury was biased, 
unfair, or partial.  Nor does the defendant claim that she falls 
within any of the situations set forth in Lindell that might 
justify a new trial even when a defendant receives a fair and 
impartial jury.26  There is no evidence in the record that 
defense counsel was stifled in questioning other prospective 
jurors as a result of his experience with the challenged juror; 
that defense counsel was forced to exhaust all of the peremptory 
challenges without conducting adequate voir dire; or that the 
circuit court acted in bad faith.   
¶41 In sum, the defendant exercised her peremptory right 
to remove the judge's daughter-in-law from the jury.  The 
defendant agrees that she was tried by a fair, impartial jury.  
The defendant has not demonstrated harm.  Thus, we hold that the 
defendant's substantial rights were not impaired.  The Lindell 
case governs the instant case.  The defendant is not entitled to 
a new trial on the ground that the circuit court erred in 
failing to excuse the juror sua sponte for cause.   
¶42 For the reasons stated above, we reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the court of 
appeals 
for 
consideration 
of 
the 
defendant's 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals. 
 
                                                 
26 See ¶¶16-17, supra. 
No.  2010AP445-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶43 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I write 
to discuss Justice Ziegler's concurrence in the present case.  
The concurrence contains many uncontroversial statements, which 
all the Justices can support.   
¶44 We can all agree that a circuit court "has broad 
inherent authority" to "fairly, efficiently, and effectively 
administer justice."1  We can all agree that in accordance with 
this authority, a circuit court has discretion to remove jurors 
who are biased.  We can all agree that it is preferable that 
immediate family members of a presiding circuit court judge not 
sit on the jury.2  We can all agree that a close relative as a 
juror is a problem waiting to happen.  We can all agree that a 
circuit court judge should not be ruling on matters affecting 
members of his or her immediate family.      
¶45 I do not, however, join Justice Ziegler's concurrence 
in the present case to "adopt in full" her concurrence in State 
v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737.  The Tody 
concurrence becomes law today that will govern Tody-like 
situations in the future when neither party strikes the 
challenged family-member juror and Lindell's harmless error rule 
does not apply.  
¶46 Justice Ziegler's Tody concurrence was flawed in 2009 
and remains so today.   
                                                 
1 State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶73, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 
N.W.2d 350 (citation omitted). 
2 State v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶4, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 
N.W.2d 737 (lead op.); Tody, 316 Wis. 2d 689, ¶63 (Ziegler, J., 
concurring). 
No.  2010AP445-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶47 In Tody, the presiding judge's mother sat on the jury 
that convicted the defendant.  The Tody lead opinion and Justice 
Ziegler's concurrence agreed that the conviction had to be 
reversed because the mother sat on the jury. 
¶48 The Tody lead opinion explained the flaw in Justice 
Ziegler's Tody concurrence, which was joined by two other 
justices, as follows: 
[The concurring Justices] reach the same ultimate 
conclusion that we do, namely that the circuit court 
judge erred in permitting his mother to serve on a 
jury in a case in which the judge presided and that 
the defendant is entitled to a new trial as a result 
of this error.  They do not, however, identify the 
authority they rely upon in concluding that the 
circuit court erred or in concluding that the circuit 
court's error warrants a new trial for the defendant.  
Their concurrence explains that it would have been 
within the circuit court judge's discretion to strike 
his mother as a prospective juror or to recuse himself 
from the case.  But their concurrence does not explain 
why the circuit court judge not only was permitted but 
also was required, on pain of reversal by this court, 
to exercise his discretion in this manner.3 
 
¶49 In other words, in joining a decision reversing the 
conviction, 
Justice 
Ziegler's 
Tody 
concurrence 
must 
have 
concluded that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion 
by 
failing 
to 
use 
its 
discretionary 
inherent 
authority to remove the judge's mother.  The flaw in the Tody 
concurrence is 
that it does not explain the basis for 
determining that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  As the court of appeals explained in the present 
case, the Tody concurrence "stopped short of saying that a 
                                                 
3 Tody, 316 Wis. 2d 689, ¶6 (lead op.) (footnotes omitted, 
emphasis added). 
No.  2010AP445-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
presiding judge must remove his or her immediate family members 
sua sponte in every case . . . ."4  The court of appeals 
determined, 
however, 
that 
"[t]he 
logic 
behind 
the 
Tody 
concurrence is in harmony with the proposition that judges must 
act sua sponte to remove immediate family members from the panel 
of potential jurors in each case."5 
¶50 In contrast, Justice Ziegler explained her concurrence 
and vote that a new trial was required in Tody as follows:  "I 
believe the judge should have either stricken his mother from 
the jury or recused himself from the case. . . . Within their 
inherent authority, I would merely call upon our judges to 
select a fair and impartial jury and avoid such foreseeable 
appellate issues."6  Yet the concurrence declares that the mother 
is not a biased juror.7     
 
¶51 This court cannot find an erroneous exercise of 
discretion and reverse a circuit court simply because a Justice 
(or four justices of the supreme court) would have exercised his 
or her or their discretionary inherent authority differently 
were he, she, or they sitting on the bench wearing the robe of a 
circuit court judge.   
¶52 A circuit court's discretionary decision will be 
sustained if the circuit court:   
                                                 
4 State 
v. 
Sellhausen, 
2010 
WI 
App 
175, 
¶12, 
330 
Wis. 2d 778, 794 N.W.2d 793. 
5 Id., ¶13. 
6 Tody, 316 Wis. 2d 689, ¶67 (Ziegler, J., concurring). 
7 Id., ¶66 (Ziegler, J., concurring). 
No.  2010AP445-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
(1) examined the relevant facts,  
(2) applied a proper standard of law, and  
(3) used a demonstrably rational process to reach a 
conclusion a reasonable circuit court could reach.8   
¶53 It is unclear from Justice Ziegler's Tody concurrence  
which of the three grounds for not sustaining a circuit court's 
discretionary decision applied in Tody.   
 
¶54 As to the first ground, the circuit court judge in 
Tody clearly considered the relevant facts, which were simply 
that his mother was going to be a juror.   
 
¶55 As to the second ground, Justice Ziegler does not 
explain the proper standard of law the circuit court should have 
applied in Tody in exercising its discretion or the improper 
standard of law that the circuit court did apply.  A circuit 
court's inherent power to disqualify a juror is a discretionary 
power that must be exercised within defined parameters.9  The 
thrust of the Tody concurrence was that the case was not about 
juror bias, so that area of the law could not provide the 
parameters.     
 
¶56 Perhaps Justice Ziegler's Tody concurrence should be 
read as reversing the conviction because the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by reaching a conclusion 
that no reasonable circuit court could reach.  In other words, 
                                                 
8 Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 
(1982). 
9 State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶12, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 
N.W.2d 377 (addressing a circuit court's inherent authority to 
modify sentences).  
No.  2010AP445-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
Justice 
Ziegler's 
Tody 
concurrence 
might 
stand 
for 
the 
proposition that no reasonable circuit court could choose not to 
invoke its inherent authority to remove the judge's mother from 
the jury.   
 
¶57 Even if this is what was intended by Justice Ziegler's 
Tody concurrence, the reasoning would circle back to the problem 
that the concurrence provides no legal standard for a circuit 
court to apply in exercising its discretion in disqualifying a 
presiding judge's family-member juror.  The concurrence fails to 
explain why the circuit court was subject to reversal for 
erroneously exercising its discretionary authority in Tody in 
not removing the challenged juror.   
¶58 Justice Ziegler's Tody concurrence apparently stands 
for the proposition that a circuit court will be reversed when 
it fails to exercise its "broad inherent powers . . . to fairly, 
efficiently, and effectively administer justice;"10  when it does 
not "make every attempt to avoid foreseeable problems,"11 and 
when it does not "avoid appellate issues."12  Justice Ziegler's 
concurrence in the instant case instructs circuit courts in 
deciding whether to disqualify a judge's family-member juror to 
give 
"serious 
consideration" 
to 
"the 
potential 
for 
both 
foreseeable and unforeseeable problems."13  
                                                 
10 Tody, 316 Wis. 2d 689, ¶62 (Ziegler, J., concurring). 
11 Id., ¶64 (Ziegler, J., concurring). 
12 Id., ¶65 (Ziegler, J., concurring). 
13 Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶75. 
No.  2010AP445-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶59 These concepts are too broad for circuit courts to 
apply in a meaningful way in determining whether to disqualify a 
challenged juror.  If a circuit court's judgment is to be 
reversed by an appellate court when the circuit court does not 
exercise its discretion to remove a juror in a particular case, 
that reversal must be based on an articulated legal standard 
governing the circuit court's exercise of discretion.  No such 
articulated legal standard is set forth in Justice Ziegler's 
concurrences.  
¶60 Thus, with regard to the third ground, because Justice 
Ziegler's Tody concurrence does not establish a legal standard 
for a circuit court to apply, an appellate court cannot 
determine whether the circuit court used a demonstrably rational 
process to reach a conclusion a reasonable circuit court could 
reach.        
 
¶61 The confusion engendered by Justice Ziegler's Tody 
concurrence is clearly on display in the court of appeals' 
opinion in the present case.  The court of appeals struggled to 
make sense of Justice Ziegler's concurrence when it interpreted 
the Tody concurrence as ruling that a circuit court should sua 
sponte disqualify a judge's immediate family members from the 
jury and stated, "We understand the concurrence to have 
concluded, within the inherent power of the supreme court, that 
this rule is necessary . . . ."14  The court of appeals cited 
Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, making it 
clear that it interpreted Justice Ziegler's concurrence to 
                                                 
14 Sellhausen, 330 Wis. 2d 778, ¶22 (emphasis added).  
No.  2010AP445-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
invoke 
the 
supreme 
court's 
constitutional 
superintending 
authority. 
 
¶62 The court of appeals' effort is commendable.  One way 
to make sense of Justice Ziegler's Tody concurrence is to infer 
that it invoked this court's constitutional superintending and 
administrative authority to establish a rule or standard 
governing a circuit court's disqualifying a presiding judge's 
family-member juror.15  The supreme court's constitutional 
authority, 
while 
not 
"invoked 
lightly," 
is 
"broad 
and 
flexible."16   
¶63 This court could rely on its superintending authority 
to create a bright-line rule governing when a circuit court 
judge should exercise his or her discretion to remove sua sponte 
a juror who has a familial relationship with the circuit court 
judge or to recuse himself or herself from presiding over the 
case.  However, Justice Ziegler makes clear that the Tody 
concurrence 
did 
not 
invoke 
this 
court's 
superintending 
authority.  
¶64 Justice Ziegler praises the court of appeals in the 
present case for relying on her Tody concurrence but shoots down 
its attempt to make sense of her prior writing.  Justice 
Ziegler's concurrence, ¶75.     
                                                 
15 See Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3 ("The supreme court shall 
have 
superintending 
and administrative authority over all 
courts."). 
16 See 
In 
re 
Jerrell 
C.J., 
2005 
WI 
105, 
¶41, 
283 
Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110. 
No.  2010AP445-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶65 As 
a 
result 
of 
Justice 
Ziegler's 
concurrences, 
appellate courts are left to wonder, as the court of appeals in 
the present case wondered, what legal authority they can rely on 
to review a circuit court if a case like Tody arises in the 
future.  
 
¶66 The instant case does not call for further discussion 
of Tody-like situations in which the circuit court judge's 
immediate family member sits on the jury.  Nevertheless, Justice 
Ziegler, 
joined 
by 
three 
of 
our 
colleagues, 
uses 
this 
opportunity to re-open the book and to close it by adopting her 
Tody concurrence, rather than by taking a different path, which 
would be more coherent and would provide better guidance to 
circuit and appellate courts. 
¶67 One option would be to hold that the legal authority 
to reverse a circuit court for allowing a judge's immediate 
family member to sit on the jury can be grounded in the concept 
of bias, either by the juror or the circuit court judge.  If 
that reasoning commanded a majority of the court, the court 
could take the additional step and define what categories of 
family members of the circuit court judge must be excluded from 
the jury.  The parties in the present case recommended the 
second degree of kinship.17  In contrast, the court of appeals 
opted to exclude the category "immediate family members," 
without 
further 
definition. 
 
Declaring 
that 
it 
was 
                                                 
17 The court might also be guided by SCR 60.04(4)(e), which 
requires a judge to recuse himself or herself if a party, 
lawyer, interested person, or material witness is within the 
third degree of kinship of the judge or the judge's spouse.  
No.  2010AP445-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
"interstitially applying the underlying rationale of" the Tody 
concurring opinion,18 the court of appeals held "that presiding 
judges must sua sponte remove their immediate family members 
from the panel of potential jurors."19   
¶68 Another option would be for this court to explicitly 
invoke its superintending and administrative authority to 
require circuit courts to ensure that members of a specified 
category of family members of the presiding circuit court judge 
do not sit on juries.  Again, if that reasoning commanded a 
majority of the court, the court could take the additional step 
and define what categories of family members of the circuit 
court judge are excluded from the jury.  
¶69 Because Justice Ziegler's concurrence in the present 
case rejected the court of appeals' effort to make sense of her 
Tody concurrence and again explained that these cases are not 
about jury or judge bias, Wisconsin circuit and appellate courts 
will be, I think, left scratching their heads looking for legal 
principles to apply to the facts presented. 
¶70 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶71 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
                                                 
18 Sellhausen, 330 Wis. 2d 778, ¶23. 
19 Id., ¶14. 
No.  2010AP445-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶72 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority's holding and its application of State v. Lindell, 
2001 
WI 
108, 
245 
Wis. 2d 689, 
629 
N.W.2d 223, 
to 
the 
circumstances of this case.  That is, I agree with the majority 
that Sellhausen is not entitled to a new trial because she 
exercised a peremptory strike to remove the circuit court 
judge's daughter-in-law from the jury and because she has not 
demonstrated that reversal is otherwise appropriate.  See 
majority 
op., 
¶7; 
Lindell, 
245 
Wis. 2d 689, 
¶¶113, 
119 
(concluding that "[t]he substantial rights of a party are not 
affected or impaired when a defendant chooses to exercise a 
single peremptory strike to correct a circuit court error" but 
acknowledging that reversal might nevertheless be appropriate 
if, 
for 
example, 
"a 
circuit 
court 
judge 
repeatedly 
and 
deliberately misapplies the law to force a defendant to use 
peremptory challenges or when the court makes errors that force 
a defendant to use most or all of his or her peremptory 
strikes"). 
¶73 Still, I write separately and concur because, unlike 
the majority, I would discuss this court's decision in State v. 
Tody, 2009 WI 31, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737.  To be clear, 
I do not adopt the Tody lead opinion and its conclusion that a 
presiding judge's immediate family member, when serving as a 
juror, is per se objectively biased.  See id., ¶5.  Instead, I 
adopt in full my concurrence in Tody that notes a circuit 
court's inherent authority to strike such a juror.  See id., 
¶¶59-68 (Ziegler, J., concurring).  Today, three justices join 
No.  2010AP445-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
me.  Accordingly, this concurrence is the majority opinion on 
the issue of Tody's application to this case.  Therefore, my 
concurrence in Tody and this concurrence now represent the 
opinion of the majority of this court.   
¶74 The court of appeals in this case went to great 
lengths to interpret and apply Tody, even to the point of 
declaring that "[t]he issue in this appeal is whether Tody 
requires a new trial for Sellhausen."  State v. Sellhausen, 2010 
WI App 175, ¶7, 330 Wis. 2d 778, 794 N.W.2d 793.  The court of 
appeals' reliance on Tody deserves our attention.   
¶75 Relying on my concurrence in Tody, the court of 
appeals concluded that efficient and effective operation of the 
court system requires presiding judges to sua sponte remove 
their immediate family members from a panel of potential jurors.  
See id., ¶¶11, 22-23.  I part ways with the court of appeals' 
decision to impose a duty upon circuit court judges to always 
sua sponte remove their immediate family members from a panel of 
potential jurors.  Parties may very well receive a fair and 
impartial jury even if the jury includes a member of the judge's 
family.  Still, in such circumstances, the potential for both 
foreseeable and unforeseeable problems warrants the judge's 
serious 
consideration. 
 
Accordingly, 
consistent 
with 
my 
concurrence in Tody, I continue to urge circuit court judges to 
exercise their inherent authority to ensure the fair, efficient, 
and effective administration of justice by considering whether 
the removal of their immediate family members from a panel of 
potential jurors or whether recusal from the case would avoid 
No.  2010AP445-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
such problems.  Tody, 316 Wis. 2d 689, ¶¶60, 67 (Ziegler, J., 
concurring).   
¶76 As the court of appeals acknowledged, this case, like 
Tody, does not present a question of juror bias or a criminal 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be tried by an impartial 
jury.  Sellhausen, 330 Wis. 2d 778, ¶22 (citing Tody, 316 
Wis. 2d 689, ¶61 (Ziegler, J., concurring)).  A reasonable 
person in the juror's position may be quite able to base her 
decision solely on the evidence presented and the law as 
instructed, without regard to the fact that the neutral, non-
fact-finding judge is her relative.  See Tody, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 
¶66 (Ziegler, J., concurring).  Rather, this case is about a 
circuit court judge's inherent authority to fairly, efficiently, 
and effectively administer justice through the process of jury 
selection.  See Sellhausen, 330 Wis. 2d 778, ¶22 ("This is a 
question of how courts will administer justice.").  Permitting 
the presiding judge's immediate family member to remain on a 
jury has the potential to create problems, including the 
possibility that the judge may be called upon to rule on an 
issue in which his or her family member is the subject of 
inquiry.  See SCR 60.04(4)(e)4.  Of course, such problems may 
never surface.  However, to ensure the fair, efficient, and 
effective administration of justice, judges should consider 
whether they can avoid foreseeable problems by removing their 
immediate family members from a panel of potential jurors or 
recusing themselves from the case.  Indeed, had the judge in 
this case removed his daughter-in-law from the panel of 
No.  2010AP445-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
potential jurors, and had the judge in Tody removed his mother 
from the panel of potential jurors, see 316 Wis. 2d 689, ¶¶17-
18, this very issue probably would not have come before us. 
¶77 In summary, I, unlike the majority, agree with the 
court of appeals that Tody is worthy of discussion in this case.  
For the reasons stated in my concurrence in Tody and adopted in 
full today, I respectfully concur. 
¶78 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER, PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join 
this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2010AP445-CR.akz 
 
1