Case Title: Robert S. Grant Construction, Inc. v. Frontier Bank

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1100565

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 9/16/11
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2011
_________________________
1100565
_________________________
Robert S. Grant Construction, Inc., et al.
v.
Frontier Bank
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
(CV-10-900457)
WOODALL, Justice.
Robert S. Grant Construction, Inc. ("the corporation"),
Robert S. Grant ("RSG"), and Pam E. Grant ("PEG") (the
corporation, RSG, and PEG are hereinafter collectively
referred to as "the Grants") appeal from an order striking
their jury demands in an action commenced by Frontier Bank
1100565
2
("the bank") against the Grants and others alleging breach of
contract, fraud, and the fraudulent conveyance of real estate.
We dismiss the appeal.
This case arises out of a loan from the bank to the
corporation.  The loan ultimately involved a number of related
agreements, including a construction-loan agreement ("the
agreement") between the corporation and the bank and a series
of "continuing guaranties" ("the guaranties"), whereby RSG
personally guaranteed repayment of the loan.  Each of the
guaranties contained the following provision:
"24. JURY TRIAL WAIVER. LENDER AND GUARANTOR HEREBY
WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY CIVIL
ACTION 
ARISING 
OUT 
OF, 
OR 
BASED 
UPON, 
THIS
GUARANTY."
(Capitalization in original.) The agreement contained a
similar provision:
"24. JURY TRIAL WAIVER.  BORROWER AND LENDER HEREBY
WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY CIVIL ACTION
ARISING OUT OF, OR BASED UPON, THIS AGREEMENT."
(Capitalization in original.)
On May 19, 2010, Frontier sued the Grants.  As last
amended, its complaint essentially alleged (1) breach of
contract obligations and default on the loan against the
corporation; (2) breach of the guaranties against RSG; (3)
1100565
3
liability  under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
§ 
8-9A-1 
et 
seq. 
("the 
Act"); 
(4)
misrepresentation and suppression against RSG; and (5) fraud
and conspiracy against RSG and PEG.   The Grants filed an
answer "demand[ing] a trial by [a] struck jury as to all
issues in this case."
Frontier moved, largely on the basis of the waiver
provisions in the guaranties and the agreement, to strike the
jury demands of the corporation and RSG as to all Frontier's
claims against them.  It also moved to strike the jury demand
of PEG as it related to the claim against her under the Act.
On January 13, 2011, the trial court granted Frontier's motion
and purported to certify the order granting the motion as a
final judgment pursuant to Ala. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  From that
order, the Grants appealed.
On appeal, the Grants concede that the waiver provisions
in the guaranties and the agreement preclude a jury trial on
the breach-of-contract claims.  They contend, however, that
the tort claims neither "arise out of" nor are "based on" the
guaranties or the agreement.  They also insist that the claims
asserting liability under the Act are triable to a jury.
1100565
See James v. Rane, 8 So. 3d 286, 288 (Ala. 2008) (absence
1
of a final judgment deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction); Ex parte Pinnoak Res., LLC, 26 So. 3d 1190,
1198 (Ala. 2009) (appellate courts notice the absence of
4
However, we are unable to reach the merits of the Grants'
contentions, and we dismiss the appeal because, despite the
invocation of Rule 54(b), the trial court's order is not final
and appealable. 
It is well settled that, "[i]f an order does not
completely dispose of or fully adjudicate at least one claim,
a court's Rule 54(b) certification of the order is not
effective."  Grantham v. Vanderzyl, 802 So. 2d 1077, 1080
(Ala. 2001) (emphasis added).  It is clear to this Court that
a jury demand is not a "claim."  See Sledge v. IC Corp., 47
So. 3d 243 (Ala. 2010).  See also Howard v. Parisian, Inc.,
807 F.2d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1987) ("Because an order
denying a jury demand does not dispose entirely of a claim but
leaves the claim pending for a bench trial, it is an
interlocutory order. ... Therefore, the order was not subject
to certification under Rule 54(b)[, Fed R.Civ.P.].").  Because
a jury-trial demand is not a claim contemplated to be made
final by Rule 54(b), the purported certification order was
ineffective to confer appellate jurisdiction over this case.1
1100565
jurisdiction ex mero motu).  
5
It is only in the context of an otherwise final and
appealable judgment that an interlocutory order denying a jury
demand merges with the final judgment and becomes reviewable
by way of appeal.  In other words, "[a] 'party may have review
of the denial of a jury on an appeal from the final
judgment.'"  Bowdry v. United Airlines, Inc., 58 F.3d 1483,
1489 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 2322, at
175 (1995)) ("[T]he summary judgment in this case disposed of
these 
appellants' 
only 
remaining 
claim, 
completely 
terminating
their action.  Once certified under Rule 54(b), that judgment
was final.  All prior interlocutory judgments affecting these
appellants merged into the final judgment and became
appealable at that time.").  See also Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Pabon, 903 So. 2d 759, 765 (Ala. 2004) ("This
Court has addressed the denial of a jury demand on appeal.
See Poff v. Hayes, 763 So. 2d 234 (Ala. 2000)  (on appeal from
a judgment entered after a bench trial, this Court held that
the trial court erred in striking the plaintiff's demand for
a jury trial); Baggett v. Sims, 387 So. 2d 792 (Ala. 1980) (on
1100565
6
appeal from a judgment entered after bench trial, this Court
held that the trial court erred in overruling the plaintiff's
demand for a jury trial).  Under the procedural posture of
this case [appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict],
the trial court was within its right to revise the earlier
order setting the coverage issue for a nonjury trial.").
This case is clearly distinguishable from Pabon, Poff,
and Sims in that this appeal does not come to us in the
context of an otherwise final judgment.  Because the Rule
54(b) certification was ineffective to confer appellate
jurisdiction on this Court, the appeal is dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Malone, C.J., and Bolin, Murdock, and Main, JJ., concur.