Case Title: Matthews v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 202, 2012

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAVID MATTHEWS,  
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 202, 2012  
 
 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court  
 
  
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and  
v.  
§ 
for New Castle County  
 
 
§  
 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
§  
ID No. 1104015690 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
 
Appellee 
§ 
 
Submitted:  August 9, 2012 
Decided:  October 15, 2012 
 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices.  
 
 
O R D E R 
 
On this 15th day of October 2012, it appears to the Court that:  
(1) 
Defendant-below/Appellant David Matthews appeals from his 
Superior Court Conviction for Robbery First Degree.  Matthews raises one claim 
on appeal.  Matthews contends that it was plain error for the Superior Court to 
admit testimony which amounted to witness vouching.  We find no merit to 
Matthews’ appeal, and affirm.  
(2) 
On April 19, 2011 Kerryanne Sterling was engaged in her duties as a 
teller at the Wells Fargo in Meadowwood when a man wearing a black jacket with 
distinctive green and yellow markings approached her station.  The man threw two 
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handwritten notes onto Sterling’s station which demanded that she give him all of 
the cash in her drawer.  Sterling gave him all of the money in her drawer, totaling 
$1,077, and the robber exited the bank. 
(3)  
Within minutes, Corporal John Jefferson of the Delaware State Police 
responded to a radio dispatch for the bank robbery, and observed Matthews 
walking along the road less than a mile from the bank.  As Corporal Jefferson 
began to question Matthews, Matthews walked over to Corporal Jefferson’s 
vehicle and placed his hands on the Officer’s car.  Corporal Jefferson handcuffed 
him and placed him in his vehicle to transport him to the bank for identification.  
Corporal Jefferson observed that Matthews was carrying a coat which matched the 
description of the robber’s clothing.  While being transported, Matthews stated “I 
can’t even rob a bank.”  At the bank, Officers searched Matthews and discovered 
$1,077 in cash concealed in his sock.  Officers also discovered the two demand 
notes the robber had given Sterling. The Officers conducted a “show up” 
identification, in which Sterling identified Matthews as the man who robbed her.   
(4)  
Matthews was subsequently arrested and charged by indictment with 
Robbery First Degree.  A two-day jury trial was held in November, 2011.  One of 
the State’s witnesses was Detective Corey Godek of the Delaware State Police, 
who supervised the show-up identification at the bank.  On cross-examination, 
Matthews’ counsel pursued a line of questioning aimed at attacking the reliability 
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of show-up identifications.  After Matthews’ counsel made several failed attempts 
to elicit an admission from Detective Godek that show-up identifications were less 
reliable than photo array identifications, the prosecutor asked for a sidebar. 
(5)  
At sidebar, the prosecutor objected to the questioning on the grounds 
that Detective Godek was not qualified as an expert in identification techniques.  
Matthews’ counsel responded by requesting a curative instruction that Det. Godek 
should not be considered an expert in identification techniques or, in the 
alternative, for permission to continue his line of questioning because he believed 
Det. Godek had opened the door.  The trial court allowed Matthews’ counsel to 
continue his questioning in order to lay a proper foundation.  After several more 
questions about the reliability of show-up identifications, Det. Godek testified that 
in regards to cases he worked on in which he used show-up identifications, “in 
every single one, the person was convicted.”  Matthews’ counsel did not object or 
move to strike Det. Godek’s testimony. 
(6)  
Matthews was convicted of First Degree Robbery and sentenced to 
twenty-five years in prison.  This appeal followed.   
(7)  
Matthews’ argues it was plain error for the Superior Court to have 
allowed Det. Godek to testify as to the reliability of “show up” identifications.  We 
need not address the parties’ arguments regarding plain error review, because even 
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if the Superior Court’s admission of Detective Godek’s statement was error, it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.1   
(8)  
It is well-established that this Court will not reverse when there is 
error at trial but that error is deemed to be harmless.2  Harmless error will be found 
when “the evidence exclusive of the improperly admitted evidence is sufficient to 
sustain a conviction.”3  When a review of the entire record reveals that the 
evidence against the defendant is “overwhelming,” we will not reverse for the 
harmless admission of inadmissible evidence.4  Even when improper witness 
vouching is admitted, the testimony may be deemed to be harmless error when 
“measured against the strength of the total evidence against [the defendant].”5 
(9)  
Here, there was overwhelming evidence presented at Matthews’ trial 
sufficient to sustain his conviction apart from any improper witness vouching.  
This includes:  Matthews’ presence less than a mile from the bank within minutes 
after the robbery carrying a coat which matched the description of what the robber 
was wearing; his admission to the officer that transported him to the identification 
that he “can’t even rob a bank”; Matthews’ possession of the exact amount of 
money stolen from the bank; and the two handwritten notes discovered on 
                                          
 
1 Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 77 (Del. 1993).  
2 Id.  
3 Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 587 A.2d 444, 451 (Del. 1991). 
4 Id. 
5 Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 601-02 (Del. 2001). 
5 
 
Matthews which matched the demand notes used in the robbery.  When measured 
against the strength of the total evidence presented against Matthews, the 
admission of Detective Godek’s statement, even if error, was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
(10) NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice