Case Title: In re E.A.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015 ME 37

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2015 ME 37 
Docket: 
And-14-251 
Submitted 
  On Briefs: 
February 26, 2015 
Decided: 
March 24, 2015 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE E.A. et al. 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  The mother and father of E.A. and E.A. appeal from a judgment of the 
District Court (Lewiston, Beliveau, J.) finding jeopardy and the existence of 
aggravating factors pursuant to 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(1-B)(B)(3), 4002(1-B)(B)(5), 
4002(1-B)(A)(1), and 4035 (2014).  We conclude that the court did not err when it 
found aggravating factors as to the father or admitted in evidence an autopsy report 
of the parents’ son.  Because the evidence supports the court’s findings, we affirm 
the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts are supported by competent record evidence.  
See In re M.E., 2014 ME 98, ¶ 16, 97 A.3d 1082.  On October 3, 2013, premature 
twins E.A. and E.A. were born at Maine Medical Center in Portland.  Six days 
later, the Department of Health and Human Services (Department) petitioned for a 
child protection order, alleging that the twins were in circumstances of immediate 
 
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risk of serious harm based on the mother’s infliction of fatal injuries to the parents’ 
adopted son in February 2003, and the father’s infliction of serious bruising to the 
son two days before his death.  The court granted the petition.  After spending 
several weeks in Maine Medical Center’s neonatal intensive care unit, the twins 
were discharged into a foster home.  In an early December 2013 visit with their 
pediatrician, the mother and father declined to give consent for vaccinations for the 
twins.  In January 2014, the twins received only two of the five recommended 
vaccines.  On February 25, 2014, the court ordered that the twins be administered 
any and all vaccinations recommended by the pediatrician.  The twins are currently 
healthy. 
[¶3]  On May 30, 2014, the court concluded that E.A. and E.A. would be in 
circumstances of jeopardy to their health and welfare if returned to the custody of 
their parents.  The court found that the parents have failed to acknowledge 
responsibility for the injury and death of their adopted son. 
[¶4]  The sequence of events that started in 2003, and which loomed large in 
the court’s consideration, are as follows: On February 13, 2003, when the son was 
less than two years old, the father beat him at least three times with a wooden 
spoon on his buttocks, leaving substantial bruises.  The next night, the mother 
called 9-1-1 because the son had stopped breathing.  She told the police that he had 
fallen several times during the day and hit his head on the bathtub and the floor.  
 
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The son died on February 15, 2003, after suffering retinal hemorrhages, optic nerve 
sheath hemorrhage, subarachnoid hemorrhage, cerebral edema, hemorrhage in 
muscle and soft tissue surrounding the upper cervical vertebrae, and a subdural 
hematoma.  The Chief Medical Examiner determined that cranio-cervical trauma 
was the cause of death, and ruled the son’s death a homicide. 
 
[¶5]  The mother was indicted for manslaughter in the son’s death.  In her 
2005 jury trial, Dr. Lawrence Ricci testified for the State and concluded that the 
son’s injuries were not consistent with the mother’s statement of the events.  
Dr. Ricci opined that the son’s injuries were consistent with violent shaking and 
that the extent of his injuries could not be produced by a fall or a group of minor 
falls.  The mother was convicted and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment, with 
all but forty-two months suspended.  In a separate jury trial, the father was 
convicted of assault (Class C) for hitting the son with a wooden spoon and causing 
severe bruising.  He was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment, with all but 
six months suspended.  We affirmed both convictions.  State v. Allen, 2006 ME 20, 
¶ 1, 892 A.2d 447; State v. Allen, 2006 ME 21, ¶ 1, 892 A.2d 456. 
 
[¶6]  In its jeopardy order, the court concluded that the father’s inability to 
grasp the severity of the violence to which the son had been subjected, based 
primarily on the parents’ continued belief that his death was caused by an 
undiagnosed seizure disorder brought on by a vaccination, “present[s] a threat of 
 
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serious harm or serious injury to [the twins].”  The court also found that the father 
“has not admitted to any wrongdoing” in the spanking that left severe bruising on 
the son two days before his death.  It determined that the father’s “recent actions, 
including refusing to vaccinate his highly susceptible premature infants, show utter 
disregard for the health and welfare of [the twins].”  The court similarly concluded 
that the mother is unable to show remorse for her actions, has not admitted to 
wrongdoing, and still maintains that the son died of an undiagnosed medical 
condition.  After finding aggravating factors as to both the mother and father, the 
court relieved the Department of its obligation to provide the parents with 
reunification services.  It ordered the twins to remain in foster care and established 
a permanency plan of adoption.  Both parents timely appealed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
[¶7]  The parents argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
court’s findings and assert that their failure to take responsibility for the death of 
their son does not establish jeopardy.  Jeopardy is defined as “serious abuse or 
neglect, as evidenced by . . . [s]erious harm or threat of serious harm” or 
“[d]eprivation of necessary health care when the deprivation places the child in 
danger of serious harm.”  22 M.R.S. § 4002(6)(A) and (B-1) (2014); see 
In re M.E., 2014 ME 98, ¶ 17, 97 A.3d 1082.  We review a court’s factual findings, 
 
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which “must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence,” for clear error.  
In re M.E., 2014 ME 98, ¶¶ 16-17, 97 A.3d 1082.  “[T]hose findings will be upheld 
unless there is no competent record evidence that can rationally be understood to 
establish as more likely than not that the child was in circumstances of jeopardy to 
his health and welfare.”  Id. ¶ 16 (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶8]  We conclude that there is more than sufficient evidence in the record to 
support the court’s findings establishing jeopardy as to both parents.  Contrary to 
the parents’ contentions, the evidence supports the court’s findings that (1) the son 
died as a result of inflicted “severe violent shaking,” not an undiagnosed seizure 
disorder, and (2) the parents have not acknowledged wrongdoing regarding his 
death or the bruising inflicted by the father’s spanking.  The mother contests the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s jeopardy finding by relying on 
testimony of defense witnesses at her manslaughter trial and discounting the 
State’s witnesses, including Dr. Ricci, who concluded that the injuries “certainly 
were consistent with inflicted trauma more than accidental trauma.”  Although the 
mother admitted to treating the son “roughly” the day of his death, believed that 
she should have secured medical attention sooner, and grieved after he died, she 
has never admitted that he died as a result of inflicted trauma.  Although the father 
acknowledges that he hit the son with a wooden spoon and has promised not to use 
corporal punishment in the future, he also testified that hitting the son “was the 
 
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wrong thing to do because it didn’t work.”  The father maintains that he was 
convicted of assault only because the son died and the jury saw a prejudicial photo 
of his injuries. 
[¶9]  The court properly considered the parents’ past conduct and whether 
they have sufficiently accepted responsibility for their actions.  “In child protection 
proceedings, what is past is often prologue regarding the threat of serious harm 
posed by the parent . . . .”  In re E.L., 2014 ME 87, ¶ 14, 96 A.3d 691.  “Evidence 
of historical behavior is relevant to a finding of jeopardy . . . . [T]he court must 
consider whether there is prospective jeopardy.  And in making that 
determination, . . . the trial court must consider what has happened in the past.”  Id. 
(citation and quotation marks omitted); see also In re Kafia M., 1999 ME 195, 
¶ 12, 742 A.2d 919 (“While our inquiry as to ability to protect from jeopardy is 
prospective, the evidence we consider is retrospective.”).  As Dr. Ricci testified, 
“the fact that there was a pattern of abusive physical discipline to [the son] . . . is 
relevant to future intervention [and] prediction.”  The parents continue to 
demonstrate a profound lack of insight regarding the cause of their son’s death.  
The court did not err given that, notwithstanding unequivocal testimony to the 
contrary, both parents maintain that the son’s death was caused by an undiagnosed 
 
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seizure condition brought on by a reaction to a vaccination that mimicked 
shaken-baby syndrome.1 
B. 
Aggravating Factors 
[¶10]  The court determined that the father’s assault conviction constituted 
an aggravating factor pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4002(1-B)(B)(5), which provides 
that an aggravating factor exists if a parent has been convicted of “[f]elony assault 
that results in serious bodily injury” against “a child for whom the parent was 
responsible.”  The father argues that his conviction pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 207(1)(B) (2014) was for bodily injury—not “serious bodily injury” as provided 
in section 4002(1-B)(B)(5).  (Emphasis added.)  See 17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(B) 
(“A person is guilty of assault if . . . [he] intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
causes bodily injury to another person who is less than 6 years of age.”).  “We 
review de novo the court’s interpretation of [a] statute for errors of law, and review 
the court’s application of . . . statutory language to the facts at issue for abuse of 
discretion.”  In re Ashley S., 2000 ME 212, ¶ 11, 762 A.2d 941, overruled on other 
grounds by In re B.C., 2012 ME 140, ¶ 14 n.2, 58 A.3d 1118. 
                                         
1  The parents’ initial refusal to vaccinate the twins further confirms their current lack of insight.  The 
pediatrician testified that vaccinations were particularly important for premature babies and that the 
parents declined to give consent for the vaccines at the two-month visit.  At the jeopardy hearing, the 
father testified that he believed that a hepatitis B immunization had caused the son “to stop developing 
and growing.”  That the parents ultimately consented to the vaccines does not render the court’s finding 
clearly erroneous. 
 
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[¶11]  There was no error here.  First, in addition to its finding pursuant to 
section 4002(1-B)(B)(5), the court also found that the father’s conduct constituted 
an aggravating factor pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4002 (1-B)(A)(1), which includes 
“any . . . treatment that is heinous or abhorrent to society.”  The court properly 
concluded that bruising a child with a wooden spoon is “treatment that is heinous 
or abhorrent to society,” and therefore did not err in finding an aggravating factor 
on that basis alone.  Further, based on the evidence and photographs presented, the 
court did not abuse its discretion in applying section 4002(1-B)(B)(5) to the facts 
here and concluding that the father committed an assault resulting in serious bodily 
injury to the son. 
C. 
Documents of the Chief Medical Examiner 
 
[¶12]  Finally, the mother argues that documents produced during the 
criminal investigation into the son’s death—the investigative report, the autopsy, 
and the neuropathology report—were hearsay and that admitting them in evidence 
violated her substantive due process rights because she was unable to 
cross-examine their author.  “A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude alleged 
hearsay evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion,” Walton v. Ireland, 
2014 ME 130, ¶ 12, 104 A.3d 883 (quotation marks omitted), but we review 
de novo the application of the Confrontation Clause, State v. Johnson, 
2014 ME 83, ¶ 8, 95 A.3d 621. 
 
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[¶13]  The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Me. Const. art. I, § 6.  
This right does not extend to civil matters, however.  See, e.g., Covell v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 791 N.E.2d 877, 893 (Mass. 2003) (“There is no right of confrontation 
in civil proceedings.”). 
[¶14]  “The due process to which a parent in a child custody proceeding is 
entitled does not rise to the same level as that accorded the defendant in a criminal 
prosecution.”  In re Jo-Nell C., 493 A.2d 1053, 1055 (Me. 1985).  Child protection 
proceedings, although “deserving of more elaborate procedural safeguards than are 
required for the determination of lesser civil entitlements” due to the 
“constitutional dimension” of the right to parent, id., are nonetheless civil matters.  
The Confrontation Clause therefore does not apply in child protection proceedings.  
See, e.g., In re Noah W., 813 A.2d 365, 371 (N.H. 2002) (“Because an action to 
terminate parental rights is a civil proceeding, the Sixth Amendment confers no 
right of confrontation on the respondent.”); In re A.L., 669 A.2d 1168, 1170 
(Vt. 1995) (“[P]arents do not have a right to face-to-face confrontation in [child 
protection] proceedings.”).2  The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
                                         
2  See also In re D.B., 947 A.2d 443, 449 n.11 (D.C. 2008); In re L.K.S., 451 N.W.2d 819, 822 
(Iowa 1990); In re J.D.C., 159 P.3d 974, 981 (Kan. 2007); In re S.A., 708 N.W.2d 673, 679 & n.8 
(S.D. 2005) (citing cases). 
 
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documents, all of which were accompanied by a certificate of the Chief Medical 
Examiner.  See 22 M.R.S. § 3022(6) (2014) (“Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law or rule of evidence, the certificate of the Chief Medical Examiner . . . shall 
be received in any court as prima facie evidence of any fact stated in the certificate 
or documents attached to the certificate.”). 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Jamesa J. Drake, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Auburn, for appellant 
father 
 
Adam P. Sherman, Esq., Paradie, Sherman, Walker &Worden, 
Lewiston, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for 
appellee Department of Health and Human Services 
 
 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2013-73 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY