Case Title: Matter of Contempt Order Issued Against Anderson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-12-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Contempt Order Issued Against Anderson1988 WY 149765 P.2d 933Case Number: 88-100Decided: 12/12/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
CONTEMPT ORDER ISSUED BY THE HONORABLE ROBERT B. RANCK, JUDGE, NINTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, STATE OF WYOMING, AGAINST ROBERT O. ANDERSON, ATTORNEY, IN CIVIL 
ACTION NO. 24864.

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofFremontCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

F.M. Andrews, 
Jr., Andrews & Anderson, P.C., Riverton, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Clinton D. Beaver, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The primary question in 
this case, which involves the invocation of the contempt powers of a district 
court in a proceeding instituted by an administrative agency to enforce 
discovery in a contested case, is whether the court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. As an incident of the enforcement proceeding, the district court 
found an attorney for a party guilty of indirect criminal contempt. The appeal 
raises other claims of error to the effect that: the order of the court placed 
an impossible burden upon the respondent attorney; a separate case, brought in 
the name of the State of Wyoming, must be instituted to prosecute an indirect 
criminal contempt; and the respondent attorney was denied due process of law as 
guaranteed by both the federal and the state constitutions. We conclude that the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, it is 
unnecessary to address the additional issues. The order finding the respondent 
attorney in contempt is reversed.

[¶2.]     The Department of 
Environmental Quality, State of Wyoming (DEQ), issued a Notice of Violation to 
V-1 Oil Company (V-1) for an accidental surface spill of gasoline at V-1's 
service station in Lander. The Notice of Violation was resisted by V-1, and a 
contested case proceeding evolved. At a later time, traces of a petroleum 
product appeared in a utility trench adjacent to V-1's service station, and the 
DEQ then proceeded to inquire about the possibility that a storage tank on V-1's 
property was leaking.

[¶3.]     In pursuing this latter 
theory, the DEQ sought to take the depositions of several employees of V-1 and 
an independent expert who had been retained by V-1. In addition, it sought the 
production of various records and documents. This effort at discovery was 
pursued solely by a notice of deposition. None of the witnesses were subpoenaed. 
No order to produce any documentary evidence can be found in the 
record.

[¶4.]     V-1, through its 
attorney, objected to the several notices of deposition asserting that the DEQ 
had not amended the Notice of Violation to include any allegations of leaking 
underground storage tanks. V-1's objections were overruled by the hearing 
examiner, and Robert O. Anderson, the attorney for V-1 and the appellant in this 
case, then informed the DEQ that, notwithstanding the overruling of the 
objections, the witnesses would not testify with respect to matters concerning 
underground storage tanks. The witnesses did not appear at the depositions which 
had been scheduled by the several notices.

[¶5.]     The DEQ then sought to 
enforce discovery by filing a Motion to Compel before the District Court, Ninth 
Judicial District. At a hearing on this motion, the district court ordered the 
witnesses to appear and testify about those matters as to which discovery was 
sought. The witnesses still did not appear. Instead, V-1, seeking relief from 
the order of the district court, filed a Verified Petition for Writ of 
Prohibition with this court. Prior to any action on the Verified Petition for 
Writ of Prohibition, the DEQ filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause and for 
Civil Contempt Order in the district court seeking the arrest and detention of 
the witnesses until they appeared and testified as ordered. V-1 responded to 
this motion by asserting that the district court was without subject matter 
jurisdiction. The several witnesses, however, did appear and testify as they had 
been ordered, and the Verified Petition for Writ of Prohibition filed in this 
court then was dismissed as moot.

[¶6.]     The district court 
then, on its own motion and under the caption of the administrative enforcement 
proceeding, sent an Order to Show Cause to Robert O. Anderson to appear and show 
cause why he should not be held in indirect criminal contempt for failure to 
comply with the enforcement order of the district court. In his response, Mr. 
Anderson explained that the order compelling the witnesses to appear was not 
addressed to him; it did not direct him to produce the witnesses; any such order 
would exceed the jurisdiction of the district court; he would have no authority 
to compel the witnesses to appear; and the issue was moot because the witnesses 
already had testified. Following the response, a hearing was scheduled and held. 
No witnesses were sworn and no testimony was taken, but the district court did 
prepare summary findings of fact. The court found Robert O. Anderson in indirect 
criminal contempt, and he was sentenced to serve three days in the county jail. 
His appeal is taken from that Order of Contempt, and the execution of the 
sentence was stayed pending this appeal.

[¶7.]     In his brief, Robert O. 
Anderson sets forth the issues (in his words "Grounds for Error") as 
follows:

"1. An order of contempt 
cannot be based on the failure to comply with an order entered when the court 
was without subject matter jurisdiction.

"2. Even if, by 
implication, the order required Attorney Anderson to produce designated 
witnesses, the order places a burden on him that he is without a duty or 
authority to perform.

"3. Criminal contempt 
proceedings can only be prosecuted in the name of the State of Wyoming. The court was 
without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the contempt 
proceedings.

"4. As a criminal matter, 
Attorney Anderson was denied due process of law, as provided by the 5th and 6th 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Art. 1, § 6, 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming, and § 7-11-201, W.S. 
1977."

The appellee 
simply states this issue:

"Did the district court 
act properly in issuing the order of contempt?"

[¶8.]     An administrative 
agency is an arm of the executive branch of government, and it, unlike the 
judicial branch, has no inherent power to enforce discovery. Interstate Commerce 
Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 S. Ct. 1125, 38 L. Ed. 1047 (1894). Any such power that the administrative agency may possess is 
derived entirely from legislative mandate incorporated in an appropriate 
statute. Hupp v. Employment Security Commission of Wyoming, 715 P.2d 223 (Wyo. 1986); United States v. Security State Bank 
and Trust, 473 F.2d 638, 22 A.L.R.Fed. 922 (5th Cir. 1973). The Wyoming statute which 
authorizes discovery in contested cases before administrative agencies is § 
16-3-107 (c), W.S. 1977, which states:

"(c) In all contested 
cases, depositions and discovery relating thereto, agencies shall have the 
authority to administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses and require the 
production of any books, papers or other documents relevant or material to the 
inquiry. In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued by the agency 
in a contested case, deposition or discovery relating thereto, to any person, 
the district court for the district in which the hearing or deposition or other 
proceeding is being conducted shall upon application of the agency issue to the 
person refusing to obey the subpoena 
an order requiring the person to appear before the agency or other person 
designated by it there to produce documentary evidence if so ordered or there to 
give evidence touching the matter in question. Any failure to obey the order of 
court may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof." (Emphasis 
added.)

The judicial 
enforcement passage in the statute addresses only discovery which is to be 
accomplished by the use of a subpoena. The statute is silent with respect to any 
discovery to be accomplished by any other method including requests set forth in 
a notice of deposition. The limitations of the statute are significant in the 
disposition of this case.

[¶9.]     It is fundamental, if 
not axiomatic, that, before a court can render any decision or order having any 
effect in any case or matter, it must have subject matter jurisdiction. Earle v. 
McVeigh, 91 U.S. 503, 23 L. Ed. 398 (1875); Ex 
Parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214 
(1868). Jurisdiction is essential to the exercise of judicial power. Fauntleroy 
v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 S. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039 
(1908). Unless the court has jurisdiction, it lacks any authority to proceed, 
and any decision, judgment, or other order is, as a matter of law, utterly void 
and of no effect for any purpose. Earle, 91 U.S.  at 503. 
Subject matter jurisdiction, like jurisdiction over the person, is not a subject 
of judicial discretion. Ex Parte Bradley, 74 U.S.  at 364. 
There is a difference, however, because the lack of jurisdiction over the person 
can be waived, but lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be. Subject matter 
jurisdiction either exists or it does not and, before proceeding to a 
disposition on the merits, a court should be satisfied that it does have the 
requisite jurisdiction.

[¶10.]  In this instance, the statute provides 
only that "agencies shall have the authority to administer oaths and 
affirmations, subpoena witnesses and require the production of any books, papers 
or other documents relevant or material to the inquiry." Section 16-3-107(c), 
W.S. 1977. The assistance of the court may be sought to enforce discovery in an 
administrative proceeding but only "[i]n case of contumacy or refusal to obey a 
subpoena issued by the agency in a contested case * * *." Section 16-3-107(c), 
W.S. 1977. There is no question that this matter arises from a contested case. 
It is clear that the depositions were not sought by the issuance of any subpoena 
but only by "Notice of Deposition." The statute authorizes the pursuit of 
discovery, but only by subpoena, and the authority granted is limited by the 
statute. Hupp, 715 P.2d  at 223; Tri-County Electric Association, Inc. v. City of 
Gillette, 525 P.2d 3 (Wyo. 1974). See 
Servitron, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 380 F. Supp. 1344 (M.D.La. 
1974), aff'd 420 U.S. 999, 95 S. Ct. 1440, 43 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1975). The reach of 
the statute is to be strictly construed. Tri-County Electric, 525 P.2d  at 3. The 
provision for judicial enforcement of a subpoena justifies the enforcement of a 
subpoena only, and nothing else, including a notice of deposition, may be the 
subject of an enforcement proceeding in the district court. U.S. v. Stanack 
Sales Company, 387 F.2d 849 (3rd Cir. 1968). See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967).

[¶11.]  The proper method for initiating an 
enforceable effort to take a deposition is for the agency to issue a subpoena to 
the witness. Then, and only then, if the witness does not appear or refuses to 
testify, the agency may invoke the assistance of the judicial branch of 
government in an enforcement proceeding. Belle Fourche Pipeline Company v. 
United States, 751 F.2d 332 
(1984); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 84 S. Ct. 508, 11 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1984), cert. denied 474 U.S. 818, 106 S. Ct. 64, 88 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1985). If 
the parties to the administrative proceeding circumvent this approach, there is 
not the requisite "ripeness" for judicial enforcement. In this instance, the 
discovery proceedings were not sufficiently ripe to invoke the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the district court because the DEQ did not issue an appropriate 
subpoena.

[¶12.]  There is ample justification for this 
rule. In requiring a formal subpoena so as to demonstrate the requisite 
"ripeness," the judicial branch ensures that: its authority is not prematurely 
invoked in administrative proceedings; the administrative agencies are protected 
from judicial interference; and the judicial branch of government is protected 
from entangling itself in administrative matters until the administrative 
decision has been formalized and its effects manifested in a concrete way by the 
parties. Belle Fourche Pipeline, 751 F.2d  at 332; Abbott Laboratories v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967). While in this instance it is the agency itself seeking judicial 
assistance, the same doctrine is valid and should be universally applied. A 
further justification for this approach is found in the very purpose of 
judicial, instead of agency, enforcement of administrative sanctions. The system 
is intended to provide a meaningful day in court for those resisting 
administrative proceedings. Cf. United 
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 85 S. Ct. 248, 13 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1964); Security State Bank, 473 F.2d  at 638. If less 
than complete agency adherence to the essential procedure is required, the day 
in court for the resisting party will not be meaningful. If the courts were to 
simply provide blanket enforcement of any and all proceedings brought out of 
administrative matters, the foregoing purpose of all such doctrines would be 
substantially diminished.

[¶13.]  It follows that the district court in 
this matter had no subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the enforcement 
proceedings. Any order entered regarding those proceedings, including the 
contempt order addressed to Robert O. Anderson, cannot stand. It is an order 
issued without requisite jurisdiction and necessarily null, void, and of no 
effect.

[¶14.]  The appellee urges that Anderson's conduct was an 
affront and an insult to the dignity of the court. It is contended that this 
alone somehow makes the contempt order justifiable and proper. Even if this 
allegation, which is not supported by the record, were true, the judicial power 
is simply lacking in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, in spite 
of any alleged motive or conduct by Robert O. Anderson, the contempt order 
cannot issue under the circumstances of this case. Because this case is resolved 
by the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, all other issues and questions 
become inconsequential and immaterial. For the reasons stated above, we conclude 
that the contempt order resulting in the sentence of Robert O. Anderson could 
not issue. It has no legal efficacy. The finding of contempt is 
reversed.