Case Title: HOUGHTON v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-99

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
HOUGHTON v. STATE2000 WY 1196 P.3d 643Case Number: 96-99Decided: 05/18/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming

Sandra HOUGHTON, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

                                 

 

Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, Dan 
Spangler, J.

  

    Representing 
Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel; and T. Alan Elrod and Scott J. Olheiser, Student Interns, Wyoming 
Defender Aid Program.

 

    Representing 
Appellee: William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia 
L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution 
Assistance Program, and Sandra Boudreaux, Student Intern.

 

    Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, and GOLDEN, JJ., and TAYLOR, J., Ret.

 

    LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

  [¶1]        This is the second time we have 
considered Sandra Houghton's appeal from a conviction of felony possession of 
methamphetamine in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 (c)(iii). In the 
first appeal, a majority of this court found that the search of Houghton's purse 
in the course of a traffic stop of the car in which she was riding violated the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and reversed the conviction 
on that basis without addressing the 
other issues raised by Houghton.  
Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363 (1998). The State sought review of that 
ruling by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the search did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment and reversed our holding. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408, (1999). On remand to this court from 
the United States Supreme Court, we are left to consider the three remaining 
issues raised by Houghton but not addressed in our prior opinion. We find 
reversible error on the first of those issues, the district court's failure to 
give a lesser-included offense instruction, and reverse the 
conviction.

 

                                     
ISSUES

 

[¶2]         Houghton raises the following 
issues not previously addressed by this court:

 

            1. 
Whether the trial court denied her fundamental constitutional right to present a 
c  defense by refusing to submit a lesser-included offense 
instruction to the jury;

 

            2. 
Whether the trial court violated her right to counsel by interrogating her after 
she had invoked her constitutional 
right to counsel;

 

            3. 
Whether the trial court deprived her of her fundamental constitutional right of 
confrontation by

            
refusing her request for a continuance in order to obtain a transcript of 
a witness' prior testimony.

 

                                     
FACTS

 

 [¶3]        On July 23, 1995, at approximately 
1:00 a.m., the vehicle in which Houghton was riding as a passenger was stopped 
by a police officer for speeding and a faulty brake light. While searching the 
vehicle relative to the driver's open and obvious possession of a syringe which 
the driver freely admitted he used to take drugs, the officer searched 
Houghton's purse which he found in the car. Inside the purse, the officer found 
two bags - a brown bag with a syringe inside containing what was later 
determined to be approximately .51 grams of methamphetamine and a black bag 
containing a syringe and a vial. The vial from the black bag was later determined to contain .27 grams of 
methamphetamine. The substance found in the syringe from the black bag was also 
determined to be methamphetamine. Witnesses for the State gave differing 
testimony as to the amount of 
methamphetamine contained in the syringe. The State's expert witness described 
it as a residue of an undeterminable amount; a DCI agent involved in the 
investigation testified that it contained .10 gram of methamphetamine.

 

  [¶4]      At the scene, Houghton admitted 
ownership of the black bag and its contents but denied any knowledge or 
ownership of the brown bag and its contents. Houghton was arrested and charged 
with felony possession of methamphetamine in a liquid amount greater than 0.3 of 
a gram. The day after her arrest, July 24, 1995, Houghton was brought before the 
court for an initial appearance. She was advised by the court that she had the 
right to an attorney; that she had the right to remain silent; and that, if she 
chose not to exercise her right to silence, anything she said could be used 
against her. Houghton asserted her Sixth Amendment right to counsel by asking the court to appoint counsel to 
represent her in forma pauperis.

 

 [¶5]        On July 25, 1995, Houghton made a 
written request from the Natrona County Detention Center to speak to Pat Bergen, 
an officer with the Casper Police Department. She received a response stating 
that Lieutenant Bergen had been notified and would come to see her when he 
could. On July 31, 1995, an order was entered appointing counsel to represent 
Houghton.

 

 [¶6]       The day after the order appointing 
counsel was entered, August 1, 1995, Agent Chris Peters of the Department of 
Criminal Investigation interviewed Houghton. It is undisputed that Peters' 
interview of Houghton was unrelated to 
Houghton's request to speak with Bergen; Peters testified that he was not aware 
of the request until sometime later.  
According to Peters' testimony, the purpose of his interview was to 
obtain information about the driver of the vehicle in which Houghton was riding 
on the night of her arrest. In the course of the questioning by Agent Peters, 
Houghton allegedly made inculpatory statements concerning the methamphetamine found in her purse at the time of 
her arrest. After having made the statements, Houghton invoked her right to 
remain silent and the interview ended.

 

 [¶7]        Sometime later, in response to 
Houghton's earlier requests to speak with him, Lieutenant Bergen met with 
Houghton. During their conversation, Houghton told Bergen she had spoken with 
Agent Peters but that he ended the 
interview after she invoked her right to silence.  Believing that he should not be talking 
with her either, given her earlier assertion of her right to silence, Bergen 
ended the conversation.

  

[¶8]          Prior to trial, on October 
17, 1995, Houghton filed a motion in limine to preclude any reference during the 
trial to statements she made to any law enforcement officer after the 
appointment of counsel. She also filed a 
motion to suppress aimed specifically at her statements to Agent Peters in the 
August 1 interview. A hearing was held on the motions on November 1, 1995. In a 
decision letter issued November 3, 1995, the district court denied the motions, finding that Houghton had 
requested to communicate with law enforcement; that Peters' purpose in 
interviewing Houghton was not to obtain information about her but rather general 
information about methamphetamine and 
drug trafficking; that Houghton knowingly and intelligently chose to communicate 
with law enforcement without her attorney present; and that the knowingly and 
intelligently waived her right against self incrimination prier to making the 
statements to Peters. The case proceeded to trial on November 6, 1995, and, 
based on the court's ruling, Peters testified that Houghton admitted during the 
interview that all of the items found in her purse, including the syringe 
containing the larger amount of methamphetamine, belonged to 
her.

 

 [¶9]        On the second day of trial, 
Houghton submitted proposed jury instructions to the court, including an 
instruction on the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor possession. Houghton 
argued that the instruction was warranted because the elements of misdemeanor 
possession are identical to part of the elements of felony possession and that 
the evidence reasonably supported a jury finding that Houghton possessed less 
than the 0.3 of a gram of methamphetamine required for felony possession and 
that she, therefore, committed the lesser offense of misdemeanor possession. The 
district court refused to give the instruction; its reasons for doing so, 
however, do not appear in the record before us. Houghton objected to the court's 
refusal to give the lesser-included 
offense instruction.

 

 [¶10]     On November 7, 1995, the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of possession of a controlled 
substance in excess of 0.3 grams.  
Houghton was sentenced to a term of not less than two nor more than three 
years in the Wyoming Women's Center with 
credit for time served.

 

                               
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶11]       Where proper objection is 
made on the record, a district court's failure to give a lesser-included offense 
instruction is subject to a de novo standard of review. Paramo v. State, 896 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Wyo. 1995). We review a 
district court's denial of motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion 
standard, which means an error of law committed by the court under the 
circumstances. Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Wyo. 1996).

 

                                   
DISCUSSION

 

  The Lesser-Included Offense 
Instruction

 

 [¶12]     A lesser-included offense 
instruction is appropriate where: 1) all of the elements of the lesser offense 
are also elements of the greater offense, and 2) there is some evidence that 
would rationally permit a jury to find 
the accused guilty of the lesser offense and not guilty of the greater offense 
State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1134 and 1136 (Wyo. 1993). The failure to give a 
lesser included offense instruction when such an offense exists and the evidence presented 
would, support conviction of' that offense constitutes reversible error. Paramo, 
896 P.2d  at 1344.

 

 [¶13]     Under Wyoming's possession 
statute, possession of methamphetamine is a misdemeanor if the substance weighs 
no more than 0.3 gram; it is a felony if the substance weighs more than 0.3 
gram. The State concedes that the elements of misdemeanor possession are also 
elements of felony possession and that 
misdemeanor possession is a lesser-included offense of felony 
possession.

 

 [¶14]     We turn then to the question 
whether there was some evidence that would rationally permit the jury to find 
Houghton guilty of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor possession and not 
guilty of felony possession.  That 
is, was there some evidence from which the jury could have concluded that 
Houghton possessed 0.3 of a gram or less of methamphetamine? In considering this 
question, we are bound by the rule that only a minimal amount of evidence is 
necessary to support the giving of a lesser-included offense instruction. Nava v. State, 904 P.2d 364, 367 (Wyo. 
1995). In addition, we keep in mind that:

 

            To 
convict for possession of illicit drugs, the prosecution must establish that 
[the defendant]: (1) either 
individually or jointly with another exercised dominion and control over the 
substance; (2) had knowledge of its 
presence; and (3) had knowledge that the substance was a controlled substance. 
 Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 620 
(Wyo. 1993); Wise v. State, 654 P.2d 116, 119 (Wyo. 1982). It is not necessary 
to offer direct evidence of the defendant's actual possession of the contraband. 
"[C]ircumstantial evidence linking together a series of facts" allowing a 
reasonable inference that the defendant had the requisite control and knowledge 
of the substance is sufficient to show constructive possession. Wise, 654 P.2d  
at 119. The court must consider the totality of the circumstances when 
determining whether sufficient evidence was presented to allow the jury to infer 
that the defendant had the requisite control and knowledge of the contraband. 
Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 967 (Wyo. 1996).

 

  Mora v. State, 984 P.2d 477, 481 (Wyo. 
1999) (quoting Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 176 (Wyo. 
1998)).

 

 [¶15]     At trial, Houghton testified that 
the black bag found in her purse belonged to her but that the brown bag was not 
hers and she did not know how it got into her purse. Patrolman Baldwin testified 
that when he removed the brown bag from 
Houghton's purse on the night of her arrest, she stated that it was not hers and 
could not say whose it was. Mr. Angelos, a forensic scientist from the state 
crime lab who testified on behalf of the 
State, and who was the only expert witness in the case, testified that the 
syringe found in the brown bag contained .51 grams of methamphetamine, the 
syringe found in the black bag contained a residue of methamphetamine of undeterminable weight, and the 
vial found in the black bag contained .27 grams of methamphetamine From this 
testimony, the jury rationally could have concluded, if it believed Houghton's 
testimony that only the black bag was hers and the State's expert testimony that 
the weight of. the residue in the syringe found in the black bag was 
undeterminable, that she was in possession of only .27 grams of methamphetamine, less than the amount required for 
conviction of felony possession.

 

 [¶16]     The State argues that the evidence 
was not such that the jury could have reached that conclusion because Agent 
Peters and Patrolman Baldwin testified that the syringe found in the black bag 
which Houghton admitted was hers contained .10 gram of methamphetamine. That 
amount, the State correctly asserts, combined with the .27 gram in the vial 
exceeds the amount required for conviction of felony possession. Therefore, the 
State argues, the evidence supports the conviction for felony possession even if 
the jury believed Houghton's testimony that only the black bag belonged to her. 

 

[¶17]       The State's argument in this 
regard is well taken up to the point that it says the evidence was undisputed 
that the second syringe contained .10 gram of methamphetamine. While it is true 
that Agent Peters and Patrolman Baldwin testified on behalf of the State that 
the second syringe contained .10 gram, their testimony was refuted by the 
testimony of the only expert witness in the case, Mr. Angelos, the forensic 
scientist called on behalf of the State 
who had performed thousands of tests relating to controlled substances. He 
testified that the weight of the residue found in the second syringe was 
undeterminable. Thus, if the jury believed his testimony, the only measurable 
amount of methamphetamine in the black bag which Houghton admitted was hers was 
the .27 gram of methamphetamine found in the vial, an amount insufficient to 
support conviction for felony 
possession.

 

 [¶18]     Because there was some evidence 
that would rationally permit the jury to find Houghton guilty of misdemeanor 
possession and not guilty of felony possession, we hold that the lesser-included 
offense instruction should have been given. The district court erred in refusing 
to give the instruction.  The case 
is, therefore, reversed and remanded for a new trial.

 

 [¶19]     Given our determination that the 
district court committed reversible error in not giving the lesser-included 
offense instruction and that Houghton is entitled to a new trial, we address 
Houghton's second issue-whether her 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when she was interviewed outside 
the presence of counsel on August 1, the day after counsel was appointed to 
represent her.

 

  Interrogation after Invoking Right to 
Counsel

 

 [¶20]     In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held 
that an accused person in custody who has expressed his desire to deal with the 
police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the 
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused 
himself initiates further communication with the police. 451 U.S.  at 484-85, 101 S. Ct.  at 1885. The Court further held that when an accused has invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid 
waiver of that right cannot be established by   showing 
only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even 
if he has been advised of his rights. 451 U.S.  at 484, 101 S. Ct.  at 
1885.

 

[¶21]       Thereafter, in Michigan v. 
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1986), the Court extended 
its holdings in Edwards to apply to a defendant who has been formally charged 
with a crime and has requested 
appointment of counsel at his arraignment. The Court reasoned that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel at a postarraignment interrogation requires at least 
as much protection as the Fifth Amendment right to counsel at a custodial interrogation. 475 U.S.  at 632, 106 S. Ct.  at 1408-09. Thus, under Jackson, where a defendant 
asserts his right to counsel at an arraignment by requesting the appointment of 
counsel, any subsequent waiver of the right to counsel during police-initiated 
interrogation is invalid.

 

 [¶22]     Under Jackson, the question we 
must answer in the present case is whether the interview conducted by DCI Agent 
Peters the day, after Houghton invoked her right to counsel was police 
initiated. If it was not, if the 
interview instead could be said to have been initiated by Houghton, the Jackson 
rule does not apply, and we must then determine whether the purported waiver 
obtained from Houghton at the beginning of the interview was knowing and intelligent under the 
totality of the circumstances. Jackson, 475 U.S.  at 633, 106 S. Ct.  at 
1409.

 

[¶23]       In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045, 103 S. Ct. 2830, 2835, 77 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1983), the Court held 
that the accused initiated conversation with the authorities by asking "Well, 
what is going to happen to me now?". The 
Court found that this, question "evinced a willingness and a desire for a 
generalized discussion about the investigation" and was not "a necessary inquiry 
arising out of the incidents of the, custodial relationship." 462 U.S.  at 1046, 
103 S. Ct.  at 2835.

 

 [¶24]      Applying this test, we are 
not persuaded that the interview conducted by DCI Agent Peters violated 
Houghton's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. By asking to speak with Police 
Officer Bergen, Houghton evinced a willingness and a desire discussion with, the 
authorities. That DCI Agent Peters, rather than Police Officer Bergen, spoke 
with her does not change our conclusion. The test is whether a defendant 
"himself initiates dialogue with the authorities." Oregon v. Bradshaw, 
462 U.S.  at 1044, 103 S.Ct. at, 2834 (emphasis added) (quoting Wyrick v. Fields, 
459 U.S. 42, 46, 103 S. Ct. 394, 395, 74 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1982)). Thus, where a 
defendant reinitiated communication with an FBI agent after earlier invoking his 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, state law enforcement officials were not 
barred from questioning the defendant even though they were unaware of the 
reinitiation. Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372, 1384 (5th Cir. 1984). See also 
Hopkins v. State, 263 Ga. 354, 434 S.E.2d 459, 462 (1993).

 

[¶25]       Here, after invoking her 
right to counsel at the July 24 court appearance, Houghton initiated contact 
with the authorities by requesting in writing on July 25 to speak with Officer 
Bergen. We turn, therefore, to the question whether the waiver obtained by Agent 
Peters on August 1 was knowing and intelligent.

 

[¶26]       Houghton was advised at her 
court appearance on July 24, 1995, that she had the right to counsel and to 
remain silent and that if she chose not to exercise her rights anything she said 
could be used against her. The same day, Houghton signed a written statement of 
her constitutional rights indicating that she had read the statement and fully 
understood her rights. On July 25, 1995, the day after she was informed of her 
rights and requested that an attorney be appointed, Houghton made a written 
request to speak with Police Officer Bergen. Testimony at the suppression. 
hearing reflected that Houghton asked to speak with Bergen because she viewed 
him as a friend. On July 31, 1995, Houghton signed another statement of her 
rights and acknowledged that she understood them. Counsel was appointed to 
represent her that same day.

 

 [¶27]     The next day, DCI Agent Peters met 
with Houghton in an interview room at the police department. Peters testified, 
and his report reflects, that he advised Houghton of her Miranda rights and she 
agreed to talk to him.  According to 
Peters, Houghton expressed no hesitancy in talking with him. After talking with 
him for some period, Houghton stated she "did not wish to talk any further and 
wanted to speak with an attorney before she made any more statements." After 
this interview, Houghton made phone calls to Peters on at least two occasions 
and spoke with Police Officer Bergen on one occasion as 
well.

 

[¶28]       Given the totality of these 
circumstances, we hold that Houghton knowingly and intelligently waived her 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and her Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination. Prior to agreeing to talk with Agent Peters, Houghton was 
advised of her rights on at least three occasions and knew that counsel had been 
appointed to represent her. Despite having been informed of her rights, Houghton 
initiated contact with the authorities by requesting to speak with a police 
officer. Despite the knowledge that counsel had been appointed to represent her, 
Houghton agreed to talk with Agent Peters. That she invoked her right to silence 
and to counsel during the interview with Peters is evidence that she understood 
her rights. That she later reinitiated 
contact with Peters and spoke with Officer Bergen without her attorney present 
even . after invoking her rights during the August 1 interview is evidence that 
she freely and voluntarily chose to communicate with the authorities without her 
attorney present. The district court, did not err in finding that Houghton's 
statements were admissible and that the motion to suppress should be denied. On 
remand, Houghton's statements to Peters are admissible as evidence in the new 
trial.

 

  Request for 
Continuance

 

 [¶29]     We do not find it necessary to 
address Houghton's final issue - whether the district court erred in denying 
her, request for a continuance until such time as she could obtain a transcript 
of the suppression hearing. On remand, Houghton will have the transcript and can 
then determine whether Peters is impeachable based upon any inconsistency in his 
sworn testimony.

 

 [¶30]      Reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.