Case Title: JUSTIN DANIEL BREAZEALE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0097

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
JUSTIN DANIEL BREAZEALE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 10Case Number: No. S-10-0097Decided: 01/24/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
JUSTIN DANIEL 
BREAZEALE,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. Lozano, 
State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior 
Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Ms. 
Craig.

 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Justin Daniel 
Breazeale appeals his conviction on one count of aggravated homicide by vehicle, 
raising six separate claims of error.  
We will affirm his conviction.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
Mr. Breazeale 
presents these issues:

 
 

1.    
Did the trial court 
err in denying the suppression of medical records obtained from Mr. Breazeale 
after assertion of his right to silence and counsel?

 
 

2.    
Did the evidence 
support a conviction of reckless driving?

 
 

3.    
Did the evidence 
support a conviction of driving under the influence of 
cocaine?

 
 

4.    
Did the presentation 
of evidence of cocaine use two days prior to the incident violate W.R.E. 
404(b)?

 
 

5.    
Did the district 
court have jurisdiction to try Mr. Breazeale on a charge different from the 
one on which he was bound over by the circuit court?

 
 

6.    
Did the trial court 
deny Mr. Breazeale his constitutional right to present his defense of a medical 
cause of his unconsciousness?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On March 15, 2009, 
Mr. Breazeale and his girlfriend were running errands in Casper, Wyoming, in a 
pickup borrowed from a friend.  
While driving, Mr. Breazeale lost consciousness or "blacked 
out."  During the black out, his 
pickup veered to the left, crossed three lanes of traffic, and collided head-on 
with a small station wagon.  The 
driver of the station wagon died from injuries suffered in the wreck.  According to Mr. Breazeale, he did 
not realize he had wrecked the pickup until he regained consciousness after the 
collision.  

 
 

[¶4]        
At the scene of the 
collision, Mr. Breazeale's girlfriend told the police she did not know how the 
wreck occurred.  She was looking at 
something in her lap, she said, and the next thing she knew, the pickup was 
crashing into the other vehicle.  At 
trial, however, she testified that Mr. Breazeale had lost consciousness 
after inhaling "canned air" they had purchased at an office supply store.  At trial, a toxicology expert testified 
that the active ingredients in "canned air," when inhaled, cause a "very rapid 
intoxication phase, a euphoric phase . . . [a] very fast high."  The toxicologist also stated that 
inhaling "canned air" can cause loss of consciousness and loss of muscle 
control.  

 
 

[¶5]        
Mr. Breazeale was 
taken to the hospital after the wreck.  
There, he agreed to testing of his blood and urine.  The tests did not reveal any traces of 
the "canned air," but as the toxicologist explained, the active ingredients in 
"canned air" are so volatile that they become undetectable "within an 
hour."  The analyses did reveal the 
presence of cocaine metabolites.1  In addition, the police analyzed the 
used can of "canned air" found in the pickup after the wreck, and found DNA 
consistent with Mr. Breazeale's on the tube through which the "canned air" was 
sprayed.  After these test results 
were returned, the police arrested Mr. Breazeale and charged him with aggravated 
vehicular homicide.

 
 

[¶6]        
At trial, Mr. 
Breazeale denied inhaling "canned air" before the wreck.  He asserted that his black out was due 
to a seizure disorder, which was not diagnosed until after the wreck.  A neurologist who testified at trial 
confirmed a diagnosis of epileptic seizures.  According to the neurologist, 
Mr. Breazeale could have experienced a seizure just prior to the wreck, 
though he could not say whether Mr. Breazeale actually had suffered a 
seizure at that time.  

 
 

[¶7]        
The jury found 
Mr. Breazeale guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i) and (ii) (LexisNexis 2009): 

 
 
A person is guilty of 
aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years, if:

 
 

(i)            
 While operating or driving a vehicle in 
violation of [specified statutes prohibiting such while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor or controlled substances], he causes the death of another 
person and the violation is the proximate cause of the death; 
or

 
 

(ii)          
He operates or drives 
a vehicle in a reckless manner, and his conduct is the proximate cause of the 
death of another person.

 
 
In its verdict form, 
the jury specifically found that Mr. Breazeale was guilty under both of these 
subsections.  The district court 
sentenced Mr. Breazeale to eighteen to twenty years in prison.  Mr. Breazeale appealed his conviction to 
this Court.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did the trial court 
err in denying the suppression of medical records obtained from 
Mr. Breazeale after assertion of his right to silence and 
counsel?

 
 

[¶8]        
In 
the hospital after the wreck, a police officer asked to talk with Mr. 
Breazeale.  Mr. Breazeale contends 
that he told the officer he did not want to talk without an attorney 
present.  The officer nevertheless 
remained in the room with Mr. Breazeale, and later asked him to sign a form 
consenting to the release of his medical records.  Mr. Breazeale agreed.  In a pretrial motion, however, 
Mr. Breazeale claimed that it was improper for the police officer to 
continue talking with him after he invoked his right to counsel, and that his 
consent to release the medical records was coerced rather than voluntary.  On that basis, he 
moved to suppress the evidence of his medical records, including the results of 
the blood and urine tests.  The 
district court denied the motion, and Mr. Breazeale appeals that 
decision.

 
 
When 
we review a district court's decision to deny motions to suppress, we defer to 
the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  The evidence is viewed in a light 
favorable to the district court's determination, because that court had the 
opportunity to hear the evidence and assess the credibility of the 
witnesses.  The issue of law  
whether a search was unreasonable and in violation of constitutional rights  is 
reviewed de novo.  

 
 

Lovato 
v. State, 
2010 WY 38, ¶ 11, 228 P.3d 55, 57 (Wyo. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

 
 

[¶9]        
The 
district court found, and Mr. Breazeale admits, that he was not in police 
custody while he was in the hospital.  
The district court ruled that, because he was not in custody, Mr. 
Breazeale's right to counsel and his right to remain silent did not yet 
apply.  This ruling is consistent 
with our precedent.  Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 41, 84 P.3d 320, 337 (Wyo. 2004) 
("[T]his Court adheres to the principle that the rights recognized in Miranda, including the right to counsel, 
apply only in the context of custodial interrogation.").

 
 

[¶10]     
On 
appeal, Mr. Breazeale concedes that he was not in custody, and that the police 
were not required to inform him of his right to counsel.  He maintains, however, that he still had 
the right to counsel, and that the police officer was required to stop 
questioning him once he invoked his right to counsel.  "Once the officer refused to honor 
Mr. Breazeale's request to terminate the contact," he argues in his brief, 
"his consent became coerced."

 
 

[¶11]     
Mr. 
Breazeale's argument is directly contrary to our ruling in Hannon.  In that case, Mr. Hannon was interviewed 
by a police officer, but was not in custody.  At one point during the interview, Mr. 
Hannon said, "Well, if I'm going to be charged I need to go see my lawyer."  Hannon, ¶ 33, 84 P.3d  at 335.  On appeal, Mr. Hannon contended that 
"the interview should have ceased" after he invoked his right to counsel.  Id., ¶ 39, 84 P.3d  at 337.  We considered federal precedent 
including Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 424 n.3, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1140 n.3, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1984) (A person has 
no right to have an attorney present during a non-custodial interview.), and 
cases from other states including People 
v. Villalobos, 193 Ill. 2d 229, 239, 737 N.E.2d 639, 645 (2000) ("It is the 
right to an attorney during custodial 
interrogation that Miranda and 
its progeny protects.  That right 
does not exist outside the context of custodial interrogation.  One cannot invoke a right that does not 
yet exist.").  We concluded that, 
because Mr. Hannon was not in custody, he "had no right to have counsel 
present during the interview," and the police officer was not required to 
terminate the interview when Mr. Hannon asked for counsel.  Hannon, ¶ 49, 84 P.3d  at 339.  Similarly, in Mr. Breazeale's case, he 
was not in custody when he attempted to invoke his right to counsel, and it was 
not improper for the police to continue the interview.

 
 

[¶12]     
In 
Hannon, we recognized that "the 
question of whether a confession is voluntary may arise whether or not the 
defendant was in custody when it was given."  Id., ¶ 50, 84 P.3d  at 339.  "When such a claim is raised, it is the 
duty of an appellate court . . . to examine the entire record and make an 
independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness.'"  Id., quoting Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 
348, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 1617, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976).  To determine voluntariness, we consider 
"the totality of the surrounding circumstances," including "the atmosphere and 
events surrounding the interrogation, such as the use of violence, threats, 
promises, improper influence or official misconduct."  Hannon, ¶ 51, 84 P.3d  at 340.  In Mr. Breazeale's case, the record is 
devoid of any suggestion that the police officer was coercive or threatening at 
any time during the interview.  
There is no basis to conclude that Mr. Breazeale's consent to release his 
medical records was coerced.  We 
therefore affirm the district court's denial of Mr. Breazeale's motion to 
suppress the evidence contained in his medical records.

 
 
Did the evidence 
support a conviction for driving in a reckless 
manner?

 
 

[¶13]     
As 
his second issue, Mr. Breazeale contends that there was insufficient evidence to 
prove that he was driving in a reckless manner.

 
 
When 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case, we must 
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of 
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  We do not consider conflicting evidence 
presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every favorable inference which 
may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful party's evidence.  We have consistently held that it is the 
jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence.  We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury [and] our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of 
reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same 
result as the jury actually did.

 
 

Masias 
v. State, 
2010 WY 81, ¶ 8, 233 P.3d 944, 947 (Wyo. 2010), quoting Lewis v. 
State, 2006 WY 81, ¶ 7, 
137 P.3d 909, 911 (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 

[¶14]     
Mr. 
Breazeale was convicted of aggravated homicide by vehicle, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(ii), which provides that "A person is guilty of 
aggravated homicide by vehicle . . . if: . . . (ii) He operates or drives a 
vehicle in a reckless manner, and his conduct is the proximate cause of the 
death of another person."  On 
appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he drove in 
a reckless manner, pointing to the lack of any evidence that he "exceeded the 
speed limit or disregarded traffic control devices."  He acknowledges that there was evidence 
he had inhaled a controlled substance which could have impaired his ability to 
drive, and admits that driving while under the influence of a controlled 
substance is prohibited by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233.  He claims, however, that driving while 
under the influence of a controlled substance does not necessarily constitute 
reckless driving, which is prohibited by a separate statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-5-229 ("Any person who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton 
disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless 
driving.").  Absent evidence of 
willful or wanton disregard, Mr. Breazeale contends, he could not be found 
guilty of driving in a reckless manner.

 
 

[¶15]     
As 
set forth above, Mr. Breazeale's argument relies on the definition of reckless 
driving found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-229.  However, as we stated in Rogers v. State, 971 P.2d 599, 603 (Wyo. 1999), the definition of recklessly for purposes 
of aggravated vehicular homicide is the one set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-1-104(a)(ix):

 
 
A 
person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the harm he is accused of causing will occur, and the 
harm results.  The risk shall be of 
such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the 
situation[.]

 
 
This 
definition was correctly included in the instructions given to the jury in 
Mr. Breazeale's case.  Contrary 
to his argument, under this definition it is not necessary to prove "willful or 
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property" in order to prove 
reckless driving.

 
 

[¶16]     
The 
record contains ample evidence that Mr. Breazeale consciously disregarded a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk when he drove while inhaling the "canned 
air."  His girlfriend testified that 
he first inhaled the "canned air" while parked in the lot of the store where the 
"canned air" was purchased.  At that 
time, "his head cocked over to the side, and he was unconscious" for one to two 
minutes.  Even after regaining 
consciousness, he remained dizzy and "out of it."  She offered to drive, but 
Mr. Breazeale refused.  While 
driving on the street, he inhaled the "canned air" again, and lost consciousness 
again.  Regardless of the obvious 
risk, Mr. Breazeale inhaled the "canned air" a third time.  This time, he lost consciousness again, 
and collided with the victim's vehicle.  
Given this evidence, a rational jury could reasonably conclude 
Mr. Breazeale was driving the vehicle in a reckless 
manner.

 
 

Did the evidence 
support a conviction for driving under the influence of 
cocaine?

 
 

[¶17]     
Mr. 
Breazeale's third issue is also one of the sufficiency of the evidence, and we 
apply the same standard of review.  
Mr. Breazeale was also convicted of aggravated homicide by vehicle under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i), which provides that "A person is guilty of 
aggravated homicide by vehicle . . . if:  (i) While operating or driving a vehicle 
in violation of [Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§] 10-6-103, 31-5-233 or 41-13-206, he causes 
the death of another person and the violation is the proximate cause of the 
death[.]"  In Mr. Breazeale's case, 
he was accused of driving in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-5-233(b)(ii)(B), which prohibits a person from driving or having 
actual physical control of a vehicle while "under the influence of a controlled 
substance" to a degree that "renders him incapable of safely 
driving."

 
 

[¶18]     
At 
trial, the prosecution presented evidence that the blood and urine samples taken 
from Mr. Breazeale after the wreck tested positive for the presence of cocaine 
metabolites.  An expert witness 
explained that the metabolites indicated Mr. Breazeale had used cocaine in the 
recent past.  This was consistent 
with the testimony of a friend of Mr. Breazeale, who said that the two had used 
cocaine two days before the wreck.  
The expert witness further indicated that although the cocaine 
metabolites were present, that did not mean there was any cocaine present in Mr. 
Breazeale's system.  Because there 
was no cocaine in his system, only cocaine metabolites, Mr. Breazeale 
argues that he could not have been under the influence of cocaine at the time of 
the wreck.  The evidence was 
therefore insufficient, he claims, to prove that he was driving while under the 
influence of a controlled substance.

 
 

[¶19]     
Mr. 
Breazeale's argument misses the mark.  
As discussed further in the next section, the prosecution alleged that 
Mr. Breazeale's prior use of cocaine could have affected his physical 
condition.  But the prosecution's 
basic theory, as reflected in the jury instructions, was that Mr. Breazeale 
was under the influence of "glue, aerosol or other toxic vapor which, when 
intentionally inhaled or sniffed, results in impairment of an individual's 
ability to drive safely."  This 
language is taken from the definition of a controlled substance found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(a)(ii)(B).  
The record contains ample evidence from which a rational jury could find 
that Mr. Breazeale was under the influence of a controlled substance after he 
inhaled the "canned air."

 
 
Did the presentation 
of evidence of cocaine use two days prior to the incident violate W.R.E. 
404(b)?

 
 

[¶20]     
In 
his fourth issue, Mr. Breazeale argues that evidence of his prior use of cocaine 
was evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts," and that the district court 
should have excluded this evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b).  "A trial court's decision on the 
admissibility of evidence is entitled to considerable deference, and will not be 
reversed on appeal unless the appellant demonstrates a clear abuse of 
discretion."  Leyva v. State, 2007 WY 136, ¶ 17, 165 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 

[¶21]     
Prior 
to trial, Mr. Breazeale filed a request for notice of the prosecution's 
intent to introduce evidence of prior bad acts.  The prosecution disclosed that it was 
prepared to offer evidence that:  
(1) at the hospital immediately after the wreck, Mr. Breazeale had 
tested positive for cocaine metabolites; (2) a friend had used drugs along with 
Mr. Breazeale on several prior occasions, and the two had used cocaine two 
days before the wreck; (3) on March 19, 2009, a plastic wrapper with 
cocaine residue was found in a search of Mr. Breazeale's vehicle; (4) about 
two months after the wreck, while released on bond for a separate criminal 
charge, Mr. Breazeale tested positive for cocaine metabolites;  and (5) about two years before the 
wreck, Mr. Breazeale had been stopped for speeding, and tested positive for 
marijuana, oxycodone, cocaine, and cocaine metabolites.

 
 

[¶22]     
The district court 
held a pretrial hearing to consider the admissibility of this evidence.  It ruled that most of the evidence 
offered by the prosecution would be excluded under W.R.E. 404(b) because it 
served only "to show bad character."  
The district court ruled, however, that the prosecution would be allowed 
to present evidence of the cocaine metabolites in Mr. Breazeale's blood and 
urine samples, and that the friend could testify that he and 
Mr. Breazeale had used cocaine two days before the wreck.  The prosecution argued that this 
evidence was offered to show that Mr. Breazeale was "under the influence of 
drugs . . . under the influence of the cocaine metabolites in his 
blood."  The district court observed 
that "if the evidence goes directly to an element of the crime, it is not 
404(b)."  Evidence that 
Mr. Breazeale used cocaine two days before the wreck was admissible because 
it was "proffered to show that in fact he was under the influence," and so was 
"directly related to the crime."  
That was a reasonable conclusion, and no abuse of 
discretion.

 
 

[¶23]     
Mr. Breazeale 
contends, however, that at trial "the prosecution did not present evidence tying 
the prior [cocaine] use to the causation of the accident."  In other words, Mr. Breazeale 
claims that the prosecution, despite its argument at the pretrial hearing, 
failed to show that he was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the 
wreck.  His use of cocaine two days 
before the wreck was not directly related to the crime, he argues, and so the 
evidence should have been excluded pursuant to W.R.E. 
404(b).

 
 

[¶24]     
In making a pretrial 
determination regarding the admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the 
district court must rely on the prosecution's representations about what the 
evidence will be.  When the actual 
evidence is presented at trial, however, it may not be exactly as represented in 
the pretrial hearing.  This does not 
necessarily mean that the prosecution intentionally misrepresented the 
evidence.  Variations could occur, 
for example, because new evidence is discovered, a witness provides unexpected 
testimony, or counsel did not fully understand the evidence at the time.  When the evidence at trial is not the 
same as represented by the prosecution during the pretrial hearing, defense 
counsel has an opportunity to make an appropriate objection.  In other words, the district court's 
pretrial ruling on the admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b) does not 
preclude an objection at trial that the evidence is not as represented earlier, 
and is not admissible under W.R.E. 404(b).  
Mr. Breazeale made no such objection during his 
trial.

 
 

[¶25]     
Our review of the 
record, however, reveals no meaningful discrepancy between the evidence as 
represented during the pretrial hearing and as actually introduced at 
trial.  At the hearing, the 
prosecution represented that the evidence would show that Mr. Breazeale was 
"under 
the influence of drugs . . . under the influence of the cocaine 
metabolites in his blood."  
At trial, the 
prosecution's expert witness admitted that the presence of cocaine metabolites 
did not mean Mr. Breazeale was under the influence of cocaine at the 
time.  However, she indicated that 
the use of cocaine two days earlier could still have a direct effect on his 
physical condition on the day of the wreck.  She described three phases of response 
to the ingestion of cocaine.  First 
is the "rush" phase, in which the person feels euphoric and exhibits rapid 
movements and speaking.  Next is the 
"run" phase, during which the euphoria and rapid movements diminish.  Finally there is the "crash" phase, 
during which the person becomes very sleepy and tired.  The expert testified that a person 
experiencing the "crash" phase could have impaired driving abilities due to 
sleepiness and lowered cognitive functions.  Moreover, the active ingredient in 
"canned air" acts as an analgesic, and a person in the "crash" phase "could pass 
out" after inhaling "canned air."  
The expert further testified that if Mr. Breazeale had used cocaine two 
days before the wreck, he could have been experiencing the "crash" phase just 
prior to the wreck. 
 W.R.E. 404(b) prohibits evidence of 
"other crimes, wrongs, or acts" offered "to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith."  It does not prohibit evidence of a 
defendant's physical condition at the time of the alleged crime.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion by admitting this evidence at trial.

 

Did the district 
court have jurisdiction to try Mr. Breazeale on a charge different from the 
one on which he was bound over by the circuit 
court?

 
 

[¶26]     
After a preliminary 
hearing, the circuit court bound Mr. Breazeale over to the district court on 
charges of aggravated homicide by vehicle in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-106(b)(i) and (ii).  
Approximately five months later, and only a few days before trial, the 
circuit court filed an "Amended Transcript," apparently to correct the date of 
Mr. Breazeale's initial appearance.  
The amended document stated that Mr. Breazeale had been bound over 
for trial on a charge of violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(b)(i) and 
(ii), a statute relating to murder in the first degree.  Mr. Breazeale contends that, because the 
circuit court bound him over on a charge of murder, the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to try him on a charge of aggravated homicide by vehicle.  The jurisdiction of the trial court is a 
question of law subject to de novo 
review.  DeLoge v. State, 2010 WY 60, ¶ 15, 231 P.3d 862, 865 (Wyo. 
2010).

 
 

[¶27]     
For purposes of this 
case, we can agree with Mr. Breazeale's basic contention that a defendant should 
not be bound over to the district court on one charge, but tried on a different 
charge.  See Jackson v. State, 891 P.2d 70, 74 (Wyo. 1995).  However, a review of the record 
establishes that the recitation in the "Amended Transcript" that 
Mr. Breazeale was charged under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(b)(i) and 
(ii) (first degree murder) was a clerical or typographical error.  The murder statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-101(b), does not include subsections (i) or (ii).  The aggravated vehicular homicide 
statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b), does contain subsections (b)(i) and 
(b)(ii).

 
 

[¶28]     
The record indicates 
that this typographical error never caused any confusion about the actual 
charges against Mr. Breazeale.  The 
Information and supporting affidavit indicated that he was charged with 
aggravated vehicular homicide, as did the criminal warrant.  The circuit court informed Mr. Breazeale 
he was charged with aggravated homicide by vehicle.  He was arraigned in the district court 
on a charge of aggravated vehicular homicide.  The jury verdict specified the charge 
against him as aggravated vehicular homicide.  Transcripts of the trial, motions 
hearing, and other proceedings leave no doubt that everyone involved knew that 
the charge against Mr. Breazeale was aggravated homicide by 
vehicle.

 
 

[¶29]     
Mr. Breazeale 
correctly asserts that he has a constitutional right to be informed of the 
nature of the charge against him.  
See Estrada-Sanchez v. State, 2003 WY 45, ¶ 11, 66 P.3d 703, 708 (Wyo. 2003).   In the circumstances of this case, 
we are satisfied that he was fully informed.  The typographical error listing the 
wrong statute number was utterly harmless and did not deprive the district court 
of jurisdiction to try Mr. Breazeale on the correct charge of aggravated 
homicide by vehicle.

 
 
Did the trial court 
deny Mr. Breazeale his constitutional right to present his defense of a medical 
cause of his unconsciousness?

 
 

[¶30]     
As 
his sixth issue, Mr. Breazeale claims that the district court erred when it 
precluded three defense witnesses from testifying at trial.  The witnesses, two doctors and a nurse 
practitioner, were offered by the defense to testify that Mr. Breazeale suffered 
from a seizure disorder.  The 
district court ruled that the witnesses would not be allowed to testify because 
the defense had not complied with the disclosure and discovery requirements of 
W.R.Cr.P. 12.3(a).

 
 
[T]he 
applicable standard of review is whether the district court abused its 
discretion in deciding that the appropriate sanction for a discovery violation 
was to exclude [the] testimony of a defense witness.  In determining whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion, "the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did."

 
 

Lawson 
v. State, 
994 P.2d 943, 946-47 (Wyo. 
2000), quoting Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).

 
 

[¶31]     
W.R.Cr.P. 
12.3(a) provides as follows:

 
 
Upon 
written demand of the attorney for the state, stating the time, date, and place 
at which the alleged offense was committed, the defendant shall serve within 10 
days, or at such different time as the court may direct, upon the attorney for 
the state, a written notice of the defendant's intention to offer a defense of 
unconsciousness, automatism, or traumatic automatism.  Such notice by the defendant shall state 
with particularity the facts upon which the defendant relies to justify the 
defense of unconsciousness, automatism, or traumatic automatism and the name and 
addresses of the witnesses upon whom the defendant intends to rely to establish 
such defense.

 
 
On 
July 29, 2009, the prosecution filed a demand pursuant to this rule.  The defense did not respond within the 
ten-day period specified by the rule.  
It did not respond by October 20, 2009, the date set by the district 
court for both sides to provide discovery information.  It did not respond by November 2, 2009, 
the deadline set by the district court for filing all pretrial motions.  In a hearing held on November 20, 2009, 
the prosecution pointed out that the defense had failed to respond.  The district court extended the time, 
allowing the defense until November 24, 2009, to file its notice if it intended 
to offer a defense of unconsciousness.  

 
 

[¶32]     
On November 24, 2009, 
approximately two weeks before the trial was scheduled to begin, the defense 
filed its notice.  It set forth 
Mr. Breazeale's contention "that on March 15, 2009, he suffered from 
the effects of a seizure [that] rendered him temporarily unconscious causing him 
to lose control of the vehicle he was operating."  It stated that "Information to support 
this allegation has been forwarded to the State on this day and consists of 
medical records from Casper Wyoming Neurology."  The notice listed three witnesses, two 
doctors and a nurse practitioner, to "provide information relating to the 
Defendant's seizure diagnosis and treatment."  The 
prosecution filed an objection, claiming that the notice was inadequate to 
satisfy the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 12.3(a).  The district court agreed, and ruled 
that the three defense witnesses could not testify at trial.    

 
 

[¶33]     
On appeal, Mr. 
Breazeale contends that the district court's ruling impinged upon his 
constitutional right to present his defense.  We have previously observed that the 
"right to offer testimony is grounded in the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process 
Clause and can be violated by imposition of a discovery sanction that excludes 
defense witness testimony."   
Lawson, 994 P.2d  at 946, 
citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409-10, 108 S. Ct. 646, 653, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1988).  Applying this rule, we held that a trial 
court abused its discretion by excluding defense witnesses solely on the basis 
of a missed discovery deadline.  Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 9, 63 P.3d 875, 881 (Wyo. 2003).  But while the right to present a defense 
may be "fundamental," it "is not absolute," and can be "outweighed by 
countervailing public interests."  
Lawson, 994 P.2d  at 946.  

 
 
The 
factors to be weighed in the balance include, but are not limited to those 
relevant to the "integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the 
presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the 
interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and the potential 
prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process." 

 
 

Id., 
quoting Taylor, 484 U.S.  at 414-15, 
108 S. Ct.  at 656. 

 
 

[¶34]     
In 
Mr. Breazeale's case, the three witnesses were not excluded because of a missed 
discovery deadline.  The defense had 
missed deadlines for filing its notice, but the district court granted an 
extension, and the notice was filed by the extended deadline.  Instead, the district court excluded the 
witnesses because the notice did not "state with particularity the facts upon 
which the defendant relies to justify the defense of unconsciousness," as 
required by W.R.Cr.P. 12.3(a).2 

 
 

[¶35]     
Based 
upon our review of the record, we believe the district court's conclusion was 
reasonable.  The notice filed by Mr. 
Breazeale stated that the witnesses "can provide 
information relating to the Defendant's seizure diagnosis and treatment," but 
provided no other details about the testimony 
they were expected to give.  It 
listed the witnesses' names and addresses, but provided no information about 
their qualifications to provide medical testimony.  The notice did not list any of the facts 
relied upon by the defense, but only indicated that such information could be 
found in Mr. Breazeale's medical records.  As the district court observed, the 
parties knew from the beginning of the case that Mr. Breazeale claimed to 
have suffered a black out.  
Accordingly, the minimal information contained in the notice "was not new 
to anybody."  Further, the district 
court said, a broad reference to medical records "is not particularly helpful" 
to the prosecution's efforts to respond to a defense of unconsciousness.  Because the notice did not state with 
particularity the facts upon which Mr. Breazeale's defense was based, the 
district court reasonably determined that it did not comply with W.R.Cr.P. 
12.3(a).  Mr. Breazeale has not 
demonstrated that it was an abuse of discretion to rule that the three medical 
witnesses could not testify at trial.3

 
 

[¶36]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1As explained by a 
forensic toxicologist at trial, cocaine is metabolized rapidly in the body, and 
breaks down into distinctive molecules known as metabolites.  

 
 

2The district court 
actually cited W.R.Cr.P. 12.3(b), but when the comments are read in context, it 
is plain that the district court was relying on W.R.Cr.P. 
12.3(a).

 
 

3During trial, the 
prosecution presented evidence that Mr. Breazeale had performed computer 
searches for information on seizure disorders.  The implication was that 
Mr. Breazeale used this information to fake or enhance his diagnosis.  The district court ruled that the 
prosecution, by offering this evidence, had "opened the door" for Mr. Breazeale 
to present medical evidence about his seizure disorder.  Countering its earlier ruling, the 
district court allowed one of Mr. Breazeale's doctors to testify.  Both parties discuss this development at 
some length in their briefs, but we find that the district court's later ruling 
has no significance to the question of whether its initial decision to exclude 
the witnesses was an abuse of discretion.