Case Title: Ex Parte Vaughn

Citation: 495 So. 2d 83

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1986-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
495 So. 2d 83 (1986)
Ex parte Paula VAUGHN.
(Re Paula Vaughn v. State).
84-739.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 13, 1986.
*84 Stephen P. Bussman, Fort Payne, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and James B. Prude, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Paula Vaughn, the petitioner herein, was adjudicated a delinquent by the Juvenile Court of DeKalb County after she was found to have committed the offense of assault in the first degree as charged in the petition. As a result of that court's adjudging her to be a delinquent child, the petitioner was placed in the care and control of the Alabama Department of Youth Services.
On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the petitioner contended that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support the juvenile court's findings. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, 495 So. 2d 82, refusing to review that issue on the ground that it was not initially raised in the juvenile court and thus was not preserved for review on appeal. After the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled the petitioner's application for rehearing, she filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted. We now reverse and remand.
As required by § 12-15-65(c), Code 1975, the juvenile court made the following findings of fact in this case:
The record shows, and in fact the State concedes, that the petitioner did not commit the offense of assault in the first degree because there was no serious physical injury to the victim.[1]
In Scott v. State, 374 So. 2d 316 (Ala. 1979), the Court stated:
See also Driskill v. State, 376 So. 2d 678 (Ala.1979) (an adjudication of delinquency must be reversed if there is a material variance between the allegations of the delinquency petition and the proof introduced at trial).
Therefore, it is clear that in the present case the adjudication of delinquency must be reversed unless the issue concerning the sufficiency of the evidence was not subject to review on appeal.
Rule 1 of the Alabama Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides:
The issue with which we are concerned is not dealt with specifically in the juvenile rules or by statute.[3] We therefore turn to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Because hearings in the juvenile court are conducted by the court without a jury (see § 12-15-65(a), Code 1975), Rule 52 is applicable. It reads as follows:
Rule 52(b), supra, is deceptively captioned "Amendment." In addition to providing a procedure for the post-trial amendment of findings and judgments, it contains a provision allowing a party to make an appellate attack on the sufficiency of the evidence without having first raised the issue at the trial level. See 2 C. Lyons, Jr., Alabama Practice: Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated, p. 255 (1973). The rule expressly authorizes an appellate challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's findings, notwithstanding a party's failure to raise that question in the trial court by way of an objection to the findings, a motion to amend them, a motion for a new trial, or a motion for judgment.[4]
The reasons for the rule can be discerned from the majority and dissenting opinions of the Court in Securitronics of America, Inc. v. Bruno's, Inc., 414 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 1982). In that case Securitronics brought an action against Bruno's, seeking the unpaid balance of the purchase price for certain equipment. One of the defenses was that Bruno's had never accepted the equipment, and thus could not be liable for the purchase price. The trial court, having heard ore tenus evidence, made no written findings of fact and rendered a judgment in favor of Bruno's. Securitronics made no motion for findings of fact, a new trial, or a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. On appeal, Securitronics sought to raise the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment of the trial court. Bruno's contended that some motion must have been made at the trial level which would have given the trial court the opportunity to reconsider its decision before a costly and inconvenient appeal process could be instituted. In disagreeing with Bruno's, a majority of the Court stated:
In his dissent in Securitronics, Justice Faulkner noted:
Thus, even though the Court, under the facts in that case, was not in full agreement as to when a party should be exempted from the requirement of a Rule 59 motion, the reasons expressed in both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion are enlightening as to an understanding of Rule 52(b). Rule 52(b) provides an exemption from the requirement of invoking a ruling by the trial court on the issue of evidentiary insufficiency when written findings of fact are made. The trial court's ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence is implicit in a decree in which the trial judge is the trier of the facts. Moreover, by making written findings of fact, the trial judge has had the additional opportunity to reconsider the evidence and discover and correct any error in judgment which he or she may have made upon initial review. Thus, when written findings of fact are made, they serve the same useful purpose as does an objection to the trial court's findings, a motion to amend them, a motion for a new trial, and a motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b), suprato permit the trial judge an opportunity to carefully review the evidence and to perfect the issues for review on appeal.
The issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's findings of fact was properly before the Court of Criminal Appeals in the present case and it erred in summarily affirming without a review. Had it considered the matter on the merits, it would have been compelled to reverse and remand on the authority of Scott v. State, supra. The petitioner was adjudicated a delinquent *88 based upon a clearly erroneous finding by the juvenile court.
We hold, therefore, that the juvenile court's error was preserved for review on appeal and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the cause for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, BEATTY, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.
[1]  "(a) A person commits the crime of assault in the first degree if:

"(1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he [or she] causes serious physical injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument...." § 13A-6-20(a)(1), Code 1975.
[2]  Because juvenile jurisdiction may be exercised by district courts as well as by circuit courts, the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure referred to in the juvenile rule contemplate the civil rules as modified for applicability in the district courts where juvenile jurisdiction is exercised at the district court level. Committee Comments to Rule 1, Ala.R.Juv.P.
[3]  Rule 25, Ala.R.Juv.P., in pertinent part, provides as follows:

"If the allegations of the petition are denied, the court shall direct that testimony of witnesses be taken. The conduct of the hearing shall be consistent with legal and due process requirements and shall proceed generally in a manner similar to the trial of a civil action before the court sitting without a jury, except that the child may not be compelled to be a witness...." (Emphasis added.)
[4]  The reference in the rule to a "motion for judgment" appears to be to a motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b), Ala.R. Civ.P. That rule, in pertinent part, reads as follows:

"After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court may make findings as provided in Rule 52(a)...."