Case Title: Michael Seitzinger, M.D. v. Community Health Network

Citation: 2004 WI 28

Docket Number: 2002AP002002

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 28 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2002 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Michael Seitzinger, M.D., 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Community Health Network and Berlin  
Memorial Hospital,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 25, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 4, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Green Lake   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel W. Klossner   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
BRADLEY and PROSSER, J.J., join dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by Richard F. 
Rice and Fox & Fox S.C., Madison, and oral arguments by Nicholas 
Kardar, M.D. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by James 
W. Greer, Dennis J. Purtell and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral arguments by James W. Greer. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by George Burnett, Green 
Bay, and Thomas Basting, Sr., Madison, on behalf of the State 
Bar of Wisconsin.  
 
2004 WI 28 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2002  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 92) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Michael Seitzinger, M.D.,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Community Health Network and Berlin  
Memorial Hospital,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 25, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Green Lake 
County, Daniel W. Klossner, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case is before us on 
certification 
from 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2001-02).1  Michael Seitzinger, M.D. 
(Seitzinger) appeals an order of the circuit court, which denied 
his motion for declaratory judgment and Nicholas Kadar, M.D., 
                                                 
1 "Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.  Bypass by certification 
of court of appeals or upon motion of supreme court.  The 
supreme court may take jurisdiction of an appeal or other 
proceeding in the court of appeals upon certification by the 
court of appeals or upon the supreme court's own motion. . . . " 
  
No. 
02-2002   
 
2 
 
J.D.'s (Kadar) petition to be admitted pro hac vice.  The court 
of appeals certified two issues to this court.  The first issue 
certified is whether the legal representation of a physician at 
a peer review hearing constitutes the practice of law, thereby 
requiring representation by a licensed Wisconsin attorney.  If 
we answer in the affirmative to the first issue, the second 
issue 
is 
whether 
there 
should 
be 
an 
exception 
to 
the 
unauthorized practice of law statute, Wis. Stat. § 757.30 (2001-
02),2 to allow for such unlicensed representation.3 
¶2 
While we do not answer the first issue certified as to 
all peer review hearings, we decide in this case that, as a 
matter of contract, the words "legal counsel" as used in the 
contract in question are reasonably interpreted to apply only to 
an attorney licensed to practice law in Wisconsin.  We hold that 
Community Health Network's (CHN) interpretation of the words 
"legal counsel" in the Corrective Action Procedures and Fair 
Hearing Plan Addendum to the Medical Staff Bylaws of the 
Hospital (Bylaws) as referring to an attorney licensed to 
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2001-02 edition. 
3 Seitzinger raised a third issue before the court of 
appeals, 
which 
asked 
the 
court 
to 
determine 
whether 
Wis. Stat. § 757.30(2) 
was 
unconstitutional 
as 
applied 
to 
hospital fair hearings.  The court of appeals did not address 
this issue, stating that it did not have jurisdiction to decide 
such question because Seitzinger failed to give notice of the 
allegation 
to 
the 
attorney 
general 
as 
required 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11).  For the same reasons, we also decline 
to address the issue of whether § 757.30(2) is unconstitutional 
as applied to a hospital fair hearing.  We therefore limit our 
analysis to the two abovementioned issues. 
No. 
02-2002   
 
3 
 
practice law in Wisconsin was a reasonable one.  The general 
rule is that hospital bylaws can constitute a contract between a 
hospital and its staff members such as Seitzinger.  Since the 
reasonable interpretation of the contract would require that a 
person representing Seitzinger be an attorney licensed in 
Wisconsin, and since the activities that it is reasonable to 
anticipate Kadar would be engaging in on behalf of Seitzinger 
would, at the very least, focus on legal issues, we conclude 
that the circuit court properly denied Seitzinger's motion for 
declaratory judgment and the petition for Kadar's admission pro 
hac vice.   
¶3 
While we find that Kadar's likely activities on behalf 
of Seitzinger would, at the very least, focus on legal issues, 
it 
is 
not 
necessary 
that 
we 
determine 
whether 
such 
representation would constitute the practice of law, since the 
reasonable interpretation of the contract resolves this case.  A 
reasonable person would understand that the words "legal 
counsel" in the Bylaws mean an attorney licensed to practice law 
in Wisconsin. 
¶4 
We further decline to construct an interpretation, or 
create an exception, to Wis. Stat. § 757.30 that would permit 
Kadar, an attorney unlicensed in this state, to represent 
Seitzinger at his peer review hearing.  If Seitzinger appears 
with an attorney, he must appear with an attorney licensed to 
practice law in Wisconsin, consistent with the reasonable 
interpretation of the contract. 
I 
No. 
02-2002   
 
4 
 
¶5 
Seitzinger 
is 
a 
board 
certified 
obstetrician-
gynecologist licensed to practice medicine in Wisconsin.  CHN is 
a not-for-profit Wisconsin corporation that owns and operates 
Berlin Hospital (Hospital).  Seitzinger was employed with CHN 
from October 1995 to July 2001.   
¶6 
On May 14, 2001, CHN indefinitely suspended all of 
Seitzinger's clinical privileges at the Hospital pursuant to 
Bylaw § 1.4.4  CHN then sent Seitzinger a letter detailing his 
right to request his choice of an expedited or standard peer 
review hearing and explaining the hearing process generally.  In 
the letter, CHN informed Seitzinger that his suspension was 
based on cases in which he "demonstrated serious errors in the 
preoperative, perioperative and postoperative management of 
patients (and including surgical complications and follow-up 
care post-discharge) with the potential for severe harm to the 
patients."  After receiving this letter, Seitzinger timely 
requested a peer review hearing. 
                                                 
4 1.4  Suspension of Privileges 
(a) Any of the following:  the executive committee, 
the 
president 
of 
the 
medical 
staff, 
the 
chief 
executive officer, the chief of the service in which 
the 
practitioner 
has 
privileges, 
the 
executive 
committee of the governing body or the governing body 
shall each have the authority whenever action must be 
taken in the best interests of patient care in the 
hospital, to suspend all or any portion of the 
clinical privileges of a medical staff member and such 
suspension shall become effective immediately upon 
imposition. 
  
No. 
02-2002   
 
5 
 
¶7 
In order to provide some insight into the hearing 
process, it is necessary to give a brief explanation of the 
procedures involved.  In accordance with the Bylaws, the hearing 
is held before a hearing committee, which is comprised of three 
to five active members of the medical staff.  Prior to the 
hearing, the affected practitioner is given a list of seven 
individuals who may serve on the hearing committee.  The 
affected practitioner is permitted to strike two of the names.  
During the hearing, pursuant to Bylaw § 3.4, both parties may 
examine witnesses, introduce exhibits, and submit a written 
statement at the end of the hearing.5 
                                                 
5 3.4  Rights of Parties 
"Parties" for the purpose of this Fair Hearing Plan 
shall be the affected practitioner and the body whose 
action prompted the request for hearing.  During a 
hearing, each of the parties shall have the right to: 
(a) Call and examine witnesses, including expert 
witnesses. 
(b) Introduce exhibits and present relevant evidence. 
(c) Question any witness on any matter relevant to 
the issues. 
(d) Impeach any witness. 
(e) Rebut any evidence. 
(f) Submit a written statement at the close of the 
hearing. 
(g) Record the hearing by use of a court reporter or 
other mutually acceptable means of recording. 
If the practitioner who requested the hearing does not 
testify in his own behalf, the practitioner may be 
No. 
02-2002   
 
6 
 
¶8 
Bylaw § 3.3 addresses representation at the peer 
review hearing.  Bylaw § 3.3(a) explains that the affected 
practitioner is entitled to representation by a member of the 
active medical staff in good standing.6  Alternatively, Bylaw § 
3.3(b) states that the affected practitioner may be represented 
by legal counsel at the peer review hearing.7   
                                                                                                                                                             
called by the Hearing Committee or the other party and 
examined as if under cross-examination. 
6 3.3  Representation 
(a) By a Member of the Medical Staff 
The practitioner who requested the hearing shall be 
entitled to be accompanied by and represented at the 
hearing by a member of the active medical staff in 
good standing.  The executive committee or the 
governing body, depending on whose recommendation or 
action prompted the hearing, shall appoint at least 
one (1) of its members and/or another person of its 
choosing to represent it at the hearing to present the 
facts in support of the professional review action, 
and to examine witnesses. 
7 3.3  Representation 
(b) By Legal Counsel 
If the affected practitioner desires to be represented 
by an attorney at any hearing or at any appellate 
review appearance pursuant to this Plan, his request 
for such hearing or appellate review must so state.  
Such notice must also include the name, address and 
phone number of the attorney.  Failure to notify the 
Hearing Committee in accord with this section shall 
permit the Committee to preclude the participation by 
legal counsel or to adjourn the hearing for a period 
not to exceed twenty (20) days.  The executive 
committee or the governing body may also be allowed 
representation by an attorney.  While legal counsel 
may attend and assist the respective parties in 
proceedings provided herein, due to the professional 
No. 
02-2002   
 
7 
 
¶9 
Seitzinger hired Kadar to assist him at the peer 
review hearing.  Kadar is a board certified obstetrician-
gynecologist, a board certified subspecialist in gynecologic 
oncology, and a member of the New Jersey Bar.  CHN objected to 
Kadar's representation of Seitzinger at the peer review hearing, 
stating that, since Kadar was not a member in good standing of 
CHN's medical staff, that he needed to be licensed to practice 
law in Wisconsin in order to represent Seitzinger. 
¶10 Seitzinger filed a complaint for declaratory judgment 
in Green Lake County Circuit Court, seeking a declaration by the 
court that Kadar could represent him at the peer review hearing.  
In the alternative, Kadar filed a petition for admission pro hac 
vice for the hospital hearing and appellate review proceedings.  
Kadar requested that he be allowed to appear with Seitzinger at 
the peer review hearing and stated that Kadar would associate 
                                                                                                                                                             
nature of these review proceedings, it is intended 
that the proceedings will not be judicial in form but 
a forum for professional evaluation and discussion.  
Accordingly, the Hearing Committee and/or appellate 
review body retains the right to limit the role of 
counsel's active participation in the hearing process. 
. . .  
No. 
02-2002   
 
8 
 
with a licensed Wisconsin attorney at those proceedings.8  
Seitzinger subsequently amended his complaint to add a second 
claim.  The second claim alleged that CHN committed a breach of 
contract, which arose out of the Medical Executive Committee's 
recommendation 
that 
Seitzinger's 
clinical 
privileges 
be 
terminated.   
¶11 CHN filed a motion to dismiss Seitzinger's first claim 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  
CHN alleged that Kadar's representation of Seitzinger at the 
hearing would violate Wis. Stat. § 757.30 because it would allow 
Kadar to practice law in Wisconsin, even though he is not 
licensed to do so by this state.  With respect to Seitzinger's 
second claim, CHN filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
basis that Seitzinger was time-barred from asserting that claim. 
¶12 The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
Kadar's 
representation of Seitzinger at the peer review hearing would 
constitute 
the 
unauthorized 
practice 
of 
law 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 757.30(2).  The circuit court noted that at the 
peer review hearing Kadar would function as Seitzinger's legal 
                                                 
8 Seitzinger alleges that CHN originally took the position 
that Kadar could represent him at the peer review hearing, 
provided that local counsel was retained.  CHN did send a 
memorandum to Kadar suggesting that Wisconsin counsel be 
involved.  A reasonable interpretation of this correspondence 
suggests that while CHN anticipated that Seitzinger might seek 
counsel from Kadar, that an attorney licensed in this state 
would be required to appear on Seitzinger's behalf at the peer 
review hearing.  The memo referred to § 3.3(b) of the Corrective 
Action Procedure and Fair Hearing Plan and stated:  "This 
envisions that legal counsel is licensed in the State of 
Wisconsin."  
No. 
02-2002   
 
9 
 
counsel, as that was the only role the Bylaws permitted him to 
assume.  The circuit court further stated that it did not have 
the authority to admit Kadar pro hac vice.  Supreme Court Rule 
10.03(4) (2002)9 allows a judge to admit an attorney for 
appearances in "his or her court" and to participate "in 
association with an active 
member 
of 
the 
state bar of 
Wisconsin . . . ."  The circuit court concluded that because a 
judge could only admit an attorney for an appearance in the 
judge's own court, and because the rule contemplates the active 
involvement 
of 
an 
attorney 
licensed 
to 
practice 
law 
in 
Wisconsin, Seitzinger failed two conditions set forth by SCR 
10.03(4).  Thus, the circuit court denied Seitzinger's motion 
for declaratory judgment and Kadar's petition for admission pro 
hac vice.   
¶13 Regarding Seitzinger's second claim, the circuit court 
noted that there was no genuine issue of material fact, as 
Seitzinger failed to request a hearing regarding the termination 
of his hospital privileges within the 45-day time limit set by 
the Bylaws.  Thus, the circuit court concluded that CHN was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Seitzinger appealed 
the circuit court's decision with respect to his first claim. 
¶14 As stated previously, the court of appeals certified 
two issues to this court.  The first issue certified is whether 
the legal representation of a physician at a peer review hearing 
                                                 
9 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Supreme 
Court Rules are to the 2002 edition. 
No. 
02-2002   
 
10 
 
constitutes 
the 
practice 
of 
law, 
thereby 
requiring 
representation by a licensed Wisconsin attorney.  If we answer 
in the affirmative to the first issue, the second issue is 
whether there should be an exception to the unauthorized 
practice of law statute, Wis. Stat. § 757.30, to allow for such 
unlicensed representation. 
II 
 
¶15 In its brief, CHN asserts that, because Seitzinger 
failed timely to request a hearing regarding the termination of 
his hospital privileges, his request for a hearing is now moot.  
Even if Seitzinger's suspension is lifted, CHN points out that 
his privileges will still be terminated. 
 
¶16 Seitzinger asserts that this case is not moot because 
the underlying controversy is whether CHN's suspension of his 
hospital privileges was justified.  Seitzinger argues that this 
court's decision as to whether Kadar may represent him at the 
peer review hearing will directly affect his right to a fair 
hearing.  Seitzinger further notes that the question before this 
court has already recurred in a case involving another Wisconsin 
obstetrician-gynecologist whose privileges were revoked by a 
hospital.  This physician has also hired Kadar, and the hearing 
in that matter has been stayed pending our decision in the 
present case. 
¶17 Appellate courts will generally decline to decide moot 
issues.  State ex rel. Wis. Envtl. Decade v. JCRAR, 73 
Wis. 2d 234, 236, 243 N.W.2d 497, 498 (1976).  An issue is moot 
when a determination is sought that will have no practical 
No. 
02-2002   
 
11 
 
effect on an existing legal controversy.  Racine v. J-T Enters. 
of Am., Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 691, 700, 221 N.W.2d 869, 874 (1974). 
¶18 Nevertheless, this court has carved out exceptions 
with respect to its general policy regarding moot issues.  We 
will decide a case, even though moot, when the issue is of great 
public importance, when the constitutionality of a statute is at 
issue, when the situation occurs so frequently that a decision 
is necessary to guide the circuit courts, when the issue will 
likely arise again and should be resolved by this court so as to 
avoid uncertainty, or when the issue will likely be repeated yet 
evade appellate review because of the length of the appellate 
review process. State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit 
Court, 115 Wis. 2d 220, 229, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983). 
¶19 We conclude that this case is not moot, since our 
decision 
in 
this 
case 
will 
have 
a 
direct 
effect 
upon 
Seitzinger's peer review hearing regarding his suspension.  
Simply because Seitzinger cannot appeal the termination of his 
hospital privileges does not mean that the blemish of a 
suspension on his record is inconsequential.  Further, a hearing 
in another case is being stayed pending the outcome of this 
case.  Thus, it is important for both Seitzinger and future 
parties that we address the issue before us.  
III 
 
¶20 We 
now 
consider 
whether 
the 
representation 
of 
Seitzinger 
by 
Kadar 
at 
a 
peer 
review 
hearing 
requires 
representation by a licensed Wisconsin attorney.  In doing so, 
No. 
02-2002   
 
12 
 
we focus on the contract between CHN and Seitzinger and its 
interpretation.  
¶21 We conclude that contract law satisfactorily addresses 
the issue of whether "legal counsel," as referenced in Bylaw 
§ 3.3(b), refers to an attorney licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin. 
 
¶22 The primary goal in contract interpretation is to give 
effect to the parties' intentions.  Johnson Controls v. 
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶30, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257.  We ascertain the parties' intentions by looking to 
the language of the contract itself.  Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. 
Pleva, 155 Wis. 2d 704, 711, 456 N.W.2d 359 (1990).  If the 
language within the contract is ambiguous, two further rules are 
applicable:  (1) evidence extrinsic to the contract itself may 
be used to determine the parties' intent and (2) ambiguous 
contracts are interpreted against the drafter.  Central Auto Co. 
v. Reichert, 87 Wis. 2d 9, 19, 273 N.W.2d 360 (1978); Moran v. 
Shern, 60 Wis. 2d 39, 48-49, 208 N.W.2d 348 (1973).  Contracts 
are interpreted to give effect to the parties' intent, as 
expressed in the contractual language.  Danbeck v. Am. Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI 90, ¶10, 245 Wis. 2d 186, 629 N.W.2d 150.  
See also Garriguenc v. Love, 67 Wis. 2d 130, 134-35, 226 
N.W.2d 414 
(1975). 
 
Such 
language 
is 
to 
be 
interpreted 
consistent with what a reasonable person would understand the 
words to mean under the circumstances.  Id., ¶22.  The 
general 
rule is that hospital bylaws can constitute a contract between a 
hospital and its staff.  Bass v. Ambrosius, 185 Wis. 2d 879, 
No. 
02-2002   
 
13 
 
885, 520 N.W.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1994); Keane v. St. Francis Hosp., 
186 Wis. 2d 637, 651, 522 N.W.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1994).  The 
bylaws bind both parties to the terms contained within.  Bass, 
185 Wis. 2d at 885.  Applications of hospital bylaws are 
reviewed under a deferential standard of review.  Hale v. 
Stoughton Hosp. Ass'n, 126 Wis. 2d 267, 276, 376 N.W.2d 89 (Ct. 
App. 1985).  Based on these cases, we conclude that a hospital's 
interpretation of its bylaws should stand if reasonable.  
¶23 Seitzinger contends that in order to determine whether 
representation of an affected practitioner at a peer review 
hearing is the practice of law, the court must conduct a factual 
inquiry into the degree of legal knowledge and skill required to 
represent the client.  Seitzinger argues that a fair hearing is 
not a disciplinary proceeding; thus, the hearing committee is 
unauthorized to take any decisive action against the affected 
practitioner.  The committee's sole task, Seitzinger contends, 
is to review adverse actions that have already been implemented 
against the affected practitioner and determine whether those 
actions are supported by substantial medical facts.  Thus, 
Seitzinger argues that Kadar's role would be confined to 
rendering scientific or medical advice and not protecting 
Seitzinger's legal rights. 
¶24 In addition, Seitzinger asserts more generally that 
not everything attorneys do for their clients constitutes the 
practice of law.  As proof that the present situation does not 
constitute the practice of law, Kadar points to CHN's own 
Bylaws.  If a physician is capable of assuming the same role as 
No. 
02-2002   
 
14 
 
an attorney at these hearings, Seitzinger contends that simply 
because an attorney occupies this role at the hearing does not 
mean that he or she is engaging in the practice of law.  
Seitzinger asserts that he seeks Kadar's representation because 
of his 
ability to draw 
upon his 
medical 
knowledge and 
experience, not for the benefit of his legal services. 
 
¶25 CHN asserts that Kadar would be advising Seitzinger of 
his rights and CHN's obligations, thus providing legal advice 
and services to Seitzinger.  CHN contends that simply because 
the hearing does not take place in a courtroom setting does not 
change this fact.  CHN rejects Seitzinger's portrayal of the 
hearing as non-disciplinary in nature.  Instead, CHN asserts 
that a finding by the committee that there is evidence 
supporting the adverse action against the affected practitioner 
is clearly unfavorable and part of a disciplinary process.  
While Kadar may also assist Seitzinger with the scientific 
evidence he presents at the hearing, this too does not negate 
the fact that Kadar is rendering legal advice.  CHN also points 
out that witnesses are examined, exhibits are introduced, and 
the affected practitioner may submit a written statement at the 
close of the peer review hearing.  Thus, according to CHN, 
Seitzinger would clearly benefit from Kadar's legal advice and 
assistance. 
¶26 CHN 
further 
argues 
that, 
although 
Kadar 
is 
a 
physician, Seitzinger hired Kadar to provide him with legal 
services.  CHN contends that, in keeping with the Bylaws, 
Kadar's role was limited to that of attorney.  Because Kadar is 
No. 
02-2002   
 
15 
 
not a member of the active medical staff in good standing, he 
could not represent Seitzinger under Bylaw § 3.3(a).  Although 
the person subject to the hearing may choose between a physician 
and an attorney as a representative, CHN asserts that this does 
not lessen the attorney's role in providing legal advice related 
to the hearing to his or her client.  In fact, CHN contends, the 
only reason an affected practitioner would retain an attorney to 
assist at the hearing, instead of an active CHN physician in 
good standing, would be to have the benefit of the attorney's 
legal advice and services. 
 
¶27 We 
conclude 
that 
interpreting 
the 
words 
"legal 
counsel" in the Hospital's Bylaws to refer to an attorney 
licensed to practice law in Wisconsin is clearly reasonable.  To 
construe it otherwise might permit attorneys unlicensed in the 
state or non-attorneys to violate Wis. Stat. § 757.30.10  
¶28 As Wis. Stat. § 757.30 makes clear, a person may 
engage in the practice of law in or out of court.  Thus, simply 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 757.30(2) states: 
Every person who appears as agent, representative or 
attorney, for or on behalf of any other person, or any 
firm, partnership, association or corporation in any 
action or proceeding in or before any court of record, 
circuit 
or 
supplemental 
court 
commissioner, 
or 
judicial tribunal of the United States, or of any 
state, or who otherwise, in or out of court, for 
compensation or pecuniary reward gives professional 
legal advice not incidental to his or her usual or 
ordinary business, or renders any legal service for 
any 
other 
person, 
or 
any 
firm, 
partnership, 
association or corporation, shall be deemed to be 
practicing law within the meaning of this section. 
No. 
02-2002   
 
16 
 
because the peer review hearing takes place outside the confines 
of a traditional courtroom does not mean that a person, acting 
in a representative capacity for his or her client, cannot be 
deemed to be practicing law.      
¶29 In Jadair Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 2d 187, 
204, 562 N.W.2d 401 (1997), we stated that the legislature's 
intent in enacting Wis. Stat. § 757.30 was clear and, thus, held 
that a corporation's notice of appeal was rendered fatally 
defective due to the fact that it was not signed by an attorney.  
In reaching this conclusion, we noted that the primary purpose 
of statutes preventing the unauthorized practice of law is to 
protect 
the 
public 
against 
inadequate 
or 
unethical 
representation.  Id. at 201-02.   
 
¶30 In State ex rel. Junior Ass'n of Milwaukee Bar v. 
Rice, 236 Wis. 38, 53, 294 N.W. 550 (1940), noting the 
difficulty that courts generally have in defining the practice 
of law, this court concluded that determining whether a person 
is engaging in the practice of law must be conducted on a case-
by-case basis.  In Rice, we rejected the defendant's contention 
that he could not have violated the state's unauthorized 
practice 
of law statute11 
because 
everything 
he did was 
"incidental to his usual or ordinary business of adjusting 
losses for insurance companies."  We concluded that, although a 
                                                 
11 At the time State ex rel. Junior Ass'n of Milwaukee Bar 
v. Rice, 236 Wis. 38, 53, 294 N.W. 550 (1940), was decided, the 
applicable statute was Wis. Stat. § 256.30.  Section 256.30 was 
amended, 
effective 
August 
1, 
1978, 
and 
renumbered 
as 
Wis. Stat. § 757.30. 
No. 
02-2002   
 
17 
 
layperson 
may 
adjust 
losses 
for 
insurance 
companies, 
an 
insurance adjuster was prohibited from doing anything that 
resembled the practice of law.  This court, in Rice, discussed a 
number of activities, including rendering legal advice for 
compensation, that amounted to the practice of law.  Rice, 236 
Wis. at 54-57. 12    
 
¶31 In State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 
109 N.W.2d 685 (1961), this court created a narrow rule that 
permitted a real estate broker to fill in the blank spaces on 
standard conveyancing forms, when transferring the title of a 
client's real estate, without violating the prohibition against 
a layperson practicing law.  We stated that the regulation of 
the practice of law is a judicial power vested in the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court.  Id. at 206.  Nevertheless, we noted that the 
legislature may aid the court in exercising its power.  Id. at 
203.  We reasoned that, although lapse of time alone does not 
make a legal violation attain legality, the brokers had been 
using these forms for over 100 years without incident.  Id. at 
204.  Thus, we concluded that because this practice had not 
posed any danger to the public, or subjected it to undue 
expense, it would be against the public interest to halt this 
                                                 
12 In Rice, 236 Wis. at 53, the insurance adjuster engaged 
in numerous other lawyer-like activities, such as advising an 
insurance company as to his opinion of its potential liability, 
advising an insurance company whether or not to settle a claim, 
attempting 
to 
negotiate 
settlements 
between 
the 
insurance 
company and injured persons, and dictating and entering into 
stipulations. 
No. 
02-2002   
 
18 
 
long-standing method of conveyancing and require that only 
licensed attorneys be permitted to complete the forms.  Id. at 
205.   
 
¶32 In State ex rel. State Bar v. Keller, 21 Wis. 2d 100, 
102, 123 N.W.2d 905 (1963), we modified our earlier injunction 
preventing a layperson from engaging in the unauthorized 
practice of law,13 in order to permit a person to represent 
others before the Interstate Commerce Commission in Wisconsin, 
as authorized by the person's federal license.  Keller attempted 
to persuade this court that, where leases and contracts were 
approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, an attorney 
licensed by the Commission, but unlicensed by the State of 
Wisconsin, should be able to draft such leases and contracts.  
We noted: 
Although we recognize that he may advise whether a 
particular lease or contract complies with federal law 
or 
regulations, 
leases 
and 
contracts 
create 
substantive rights and obligations of parties and to 
prepare them and advise concerning their significance 
other 
than 
their 
standing 
under 
the 
interstate 
commerce laws and regulations would constitute the 
practice of law outside the scope of his practice 
before the interstate commerce commission. 
Id. at 103.  Thus, we reasoned that Keller could not engage in 
the 
more 
general 
practice 
of 
advising 
parties 
of 
their 
substantive rights and obligations.  Id.  We also concluded that 
Keller should be enjoined from acting in a representative 
                                                 
13  See State ex rel. State Bar v. Keller, 16 Wis. 2d 377, 
114 N.W.2d 796 (1962). 
No. 
02-2002   
 
19 
 
capacity for his clients before the Wisconsin Public Service 
Commission.  Id. at 104.    
 
¶33 Based on the abovementioned case law, we conclude that 
the reasoning regarding Wis. Stat. § 757.30 set forth in Jadair 
and Rice is more applicable to the present situation than the 
narrow exceptions recognized in Dinger and Keller.  As noted in 
Jadair, we are concerned with protecting people against the 
inadequate 
representation 
that 
unlicensed 
attorneys 
might 
provide to their clients.  Granted, an affected practitioner 
appearing at a peer review hearing may choose the assistance of 
an active CHN physician in good standing.  However, as CHN aptly 
points out, if the affected practitioner selects legal counsel, 
instead of a physician, it would be in order to secure the 
benefit of representation by a person who is capable of giving 
accurate advice regarding legal rights under Wisconsin law.   
¶34 We explained in Rice that a layperson must refrain 
from engaging in any acts that resemble the practice of law.  
Kadar suggests that he will be assisting Seitzinger only by 
marshalling the scientific and medical evidence presented at the 
hearing.  Yet, as noted previously, Bylaw § 3.3(a) prevents 
Kadar from assisting Seitzinger in his capacity as a physician, 
as Kadar is not a member of the active medical staff of CHN in 
good standing.  Thus, it is clear under the Bylaws that the only 
role Kadar may assume at the hearing is that of Seitzinger's 
legal counsel.  Allowing Kadar to represent Seitzinger at such a 
peer review hearing where, at the very least, he could be 
No. 
02-2002   
 
20 
 
expected to focus on legal issues, would mean that he would be 
acting as Seitzinger's legal counsel.   
 
¶35 Although Dinger and Keller present situations where we 
have held that unlicensed attorneys and non-attorneys may engage 
in limited lawyer-like activities, we have concluded that the 
holdings in those cases were sufficiently narrow, and limited in 
scope, 
so 
as 
to 
be 
inapplicable 
to 
Kadar's 
proposed 
representation of Seitzinger.     
¶36 It is not necessary that we determine whether Kadar's 
representation of Seitzinger would constitute the practice of 
law 
for 
purposes 
of 
the 
statute, 
since 
the 
reasonable 
interpretation of the contract resolves this case.  A reasonable 
person would understand that the words "legal counsel" in the 
Bylaws mean an attorney licensed to practice law in Wisconsin. 
¶37 Based 
on 
the 
Hospital's 
Bylaws 
which, 
under 
application of the general rule, form a contract between 
Seitzinger and CHN, we conclude that, if Seitzinger chooses to 
have legal counsel present at the peer review hearing, he must 
choose an attorney who is licensed to practice law in this 
state.  CHN's interpretation of the relevant section is a 
reasonable one.  Further, the activities it is reasonable to 
anticipate that Kadar would be engaging in on behalf of 
Seitzinger would, at the very least, focus on legal issues.  As 
we stated in Rice, 236 Wis. at 54:  "Giving advice as to legal 
rights is clearly the function of a lawyer." 
IV 
No. 
02-2002   
 
21 
 
 
¶38 While it is not absolutely necessary to address the 
second certified issue, we conclude that it would be helpful to 
do so.  Therefore, we next consider whether there should be an 
exception 
to 
the 
unauthorized 
practice 
of 
law 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 757.30, to allow for such unlicensed representation 
at a hospital peer review hearing.  
 
¶39 As noted previously, the Wisconsin Supreme Court is 
exclusively vested with the power to determine what constitutes 
the practice of law.  Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d at 202.  Nevertheless, 
we are aided in this task by the legislature.  Id. at 203.  The 
only exception the legislature has made to Wis. Stat. § 757.30 
is 
Wis. Stat. § 799.06(2), 
which 
permits 
non-lawyers 
to 
represent themselves in small claims court.  Jadair, 209 
Wis. 2d at 202.  When the legislature clearly enumerates 
exceptions to a statute, we may assume that it intended to 
preclude 
any 
additional 
exceptions 
unless 
specifically 
enumerated.  Id. (citing In Interest of Angel Lace M., 184 
Wis. 2d 492, 512, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994)).  The legislature has 
not created an exception which would permit an unlicensed 
attorney to represent a physician at a peer review hearing.  
Moreover, we decline to exercise our power to create an 
exception applicable to these circumstances as well. 
 
¶40 In 
State 
v. 
Olexa, 
136 
Wis. 2d 475, 
481, 
402 
N.W.2d 733 (Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals concluded that 
a defendant was not denied her due process right when she was 
not permitted to have an attorney unlicensed in this state 
appear 
on 
her 
behalf 
in 
court. 
 
Although 
Olexa 
is 
No. 
02-2002   
 
22 
 
distinguishable from this case, as it involved whether an 
unlicensed attorney could appear on behalf of a client in a 
Wisconsin circuit court, the message is still clear:  there is 
no due process right to be represented by counsel unlicensed in 
Wisconsin.   
 
¶41 Finally, we conclude that Kadar cannot be admitted 
under SCR 10.03(4).14  Supreme Court Rule 10.03(4) permits a 
judge to admit "nonresident counsel to appear in his or her 
court."  Because Kadar is appearing at a hospital peer review 
hearing, the circuit court correctly noted that it could not 
admit Kadar pro hac vice.  Moreover, even though Rule 10.03(4) 
states that nonresident counsel may appear "in association with 
an active member of the state bar of Wisconsin," this wording is 
also linked to the requirement that the proceeding be before the 
judge permitting the nonresident attorney to represent the 
client in his or her court.  Clearly, Kadar cannot be admitted 
pro hac vice under SCR 10.03(4), and we decline to construct an 
                                                 
14 SCR 10.03 Membership 
(4) Only active members may practice law.  No 
individual other than an enrolled active member of the 
state bar may practice law in this state or in any 
manner purport to be authorized or qualified to 
practice law.  A judge in this state may allow a 
nonresident counsel to appear in his or her court and 
participate in a particular action or proceeding in 
association with an active member of the state bar of 
Wisconsin who appears and participates in the action 
or proceeding. 
 
No. 
02-2002   
 
23 
 
interpretation, or create an exception, which would allow for 
his admission under these circumstances.15 
V 
¶42 While we do not answer the first issue certified as to 
all peer review hearings, we decide in this case that, as a 
matter 
of 
contract, 
the 
words 
"legal 
counsel" 
must 
be 
interpreted to apply only to an attorney licensed to practice 
law in Wisconsin.  In sum, we hold that CHN's interpretation of 
the words "legal counsel" in the Bylaws as referring to an 
attorney licensed to practice law in Wisconsin was a reasonable 
one.  The general rule is that hospital bylaws can constitute a 
contract between a hospital and its staff members such as 
Seitzinger.  Since the reasonable interpretation of the contract 
would require that a person representing Seitzinger be an 
attorney licensed in Wisconsin, and since the activities that it 
is reasonable to anticipate Kadar would be engaging in on behalf 
of Seitzinger would, at the very least, focus on legal issues, 
we conclude that the circuit court properly denied Seitzinger's 
motion for declaratory judgment and his petition for Kadar's 
appearance pro hac vice.   
¶43 While we find that Kadar's likely activities on behalf 
of Seitzinger would, at the very least, focus on legal issues, 
it 
is 
not 
necessary 
that 
we 
determine 
whether 
such 
                                                 
15 This court currently has before it a petition asking the 
court to establish a committee that would, among other things, 
review the issue of the unauthorized practice of law.  This is 
yet another reason that it is inappropriate, at this time, for 
us to establish an exception. 
No. 
02-2002   
 
24 
 
representation would constitute the practice of law under the 
statute, since the reasonable interpretation of the contract 
resolves this case.  A reasonable person would understand that 
the words "legal counsel" in the Bylaws mean an attorney 
licensed to practice law in Wisconsin. 
¶44 We further decline to construct an interpretation, or 
create an exception, to Wis. Stat. § 757.30 that would permit 
Kadar, an attorney unlicensed in this state, to represent 
Seitzinger at his peer review hearing.  If Seitzinger appears 
with an attorney, he must appear with an attorney licensed to 
practice law in Wisconsin, consistent with the reasonable 
interpretation of the contract. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶45 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (dissenting).  This case 
involves the interpretation of a hospital's bylaws pertaining to 
a doctor's right to representation at a peer review hearing to 
determine whether his clinical privileges should be suspended.   
¶46 The 
relevant hospital bylaw, 
§ 3.3, 
governs the 
representation of the parties at the peer review hearing.  Bylaw 
§ 3.3(a) provides that the charging entity shall be represented 
by one of its members "and/or another person of its choosing."  
The latter phrase does not explicitly state that the other 
person must be a staff doctor.  The bylaw also explicitly allows 
the charging entity to be represented by an attorney. 
¶47 Bylaw § 3.3(a) provides that the affected doctor 
"shall be entitled to be accompanied by and represented at the 
hearing by a member of the active medical staff in good 
standing."  The bylaw also allows the affected doctor to be 
represented by "an attorney."  
¶48 The 
bylaws 
do 
not 
specify 
whether 
an 
attorney 
representing either the charging entity or the affected doctor 
must be "licensed in Wisconsin."16   
                                                 
16 Bylaw 3.3 provides in full as follows: 
Representation 
(a) By a Member of the Medical Staff 
The practitioner who requested the hearing shall be 
entitled to be accompanied by and represented at the 
hearing by a member of the active medical staff in 
good standing.  The executive committee or the 
governing body, depending on whose recommendation or 
action prompted the hearing, shall appoint at least 
one (1) of its members and/or another person of its 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶49 The majority opinion treats the bylaws as a contract 
between Dr. Seitzinger and the hospital, Community Health 
Network (CHN), and asserts that it will interpret the bylaws by 
applying principles of contract interpretation.17 
                                                                                                                                                             
choosing to represent it at the hearing to present the 
facts in support of the professional review action, 
and to examine witnesses. 
(b) By Legal Counsel 
If the affected practitioner desires to be represented 
by an attorney at any hearing or at any appellate 
review appearance pursuant to this Plan, his request 
for such hearing or appellate review must so state.  
Such notice must also include the name, address and 
phone number of the attorney.  Failure to notify the 
Hearing Committee in accord with this section shall 
permit the Committee to preclude the participation of 
legal counsel or to adjourn the hearing for a period 
of not to exceed twenty (20) days.  The executive 
committee for the governing body may also be allowed 
representation by an attorney.  While legal counsel 
may attend and assist the respective parties in 
proceedings provided herein, due to the professional 
nature of these review proceedings, it is intended 
that the proceedings will not be judicial in form but 
a forum for professional evaluation and discussion.  
Accordingly, the Hearing Committee and/or appellate 
review body retains the right to limit the role of 
counsel's active participation in the hearing process.  
Any practitioner who incurs legal fees in his behalf 
shall be solely responsible for payment thereof. 
The bylaws sometimes use the word "attorney" and sometimes 
the phrase "legal counsel."  These terms do not seem to have 
different meanings in the bylaws. 
17 Majority op., ¶¶2, 20, 22.  See Bass v. Ambrosius, 185 
Wis. 2d 879, 885, 520 N.W.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1994) (treating 
hospital bylaws as a contract between physician and hospital); 
Keane v. St. Francis Hosp., 186 Wis. 2d 637, 651, 522 N.W.2d 517 
(Ct. App. 1994) (same). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶50 The majority opinion recites several principles of  
contract interpretation18 but fails to apply them.  Rather, the 
majority 
opinion 
adopts 
as 
reasonable 
the 
hospital's 
interpretation of the bylaws that Mr. Kadar (a doctor who is 
also an attorney licensed to practice in New Jersey), whom Dr. 
Seitzinger wanted as his representative at the peer review 
hearing, must be an attorney licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin.  The majority opinion concludes that because Mr. 
Kadar 
cannot 
"assist[] 
Seitzinger 
in 
his 
capacity 
as 
a 
physician, as Kadar is not a member of the active medical staff 
of CHN in good standing[,] . . . it is clear . . . that the only 
role Kadar may assume at the hearing is that of Seitzinger's 
legal counsel,"19 and that Mr. Kadar cannot assume that role 
because he is not licensed to practice law in this state.  The 
majority opinion concludes that to construe the contract 
"otherwise might permit attorneys unlicensed in the state or 
non-attorneys to violate Wis. Stat. § 757.30 [which defines the 
practice of law and prohibits the unauthorized practice of 
law]."20   
¶51 I agree that rules of contract interpretation govern 
this case.  The majority opinion, however, fails to apply well-
worn principles of contract interpretation in construing the 
terms of the contract. 
                                                 
18 Majority op., ¶22. 
19 Id., ¶34. 
20 Id., ¶27.  See also id., ¶4. 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶52 I set forth seven rules of contract interpretation 
relevant to the present case and apply them to the undisputed 
facts.  Each rule, and the rules read together, points to the 
conclusion that the hospital's bylaws should be interpreted to 
mean that if an attorney represents Dr. Seitzinger at the peer 
review hearing, the attorney need not be licensed in the State 
of Wisconsin. 
¶53 The seven rules are set forth in order of their 
increasing scope, from the rule pertaining to the objective 
interpretation of the text of a contract to the rule requiring a 
court 
to 
consider 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
competing 
interpretations.  I conclude that the majority opinion's 
interpretation of the hospital bylaws violates or ignores these 
rules and ultimately fails to reach a reasonable interpretation 
of the bylaws.  The majority opinion's interpretation is based 
on the vague concept that representation at a peer review 
hearing would "focus on legal issues"21 or "resemble the practice 
of law"22 and upon its conclusion, which it purports not to have 
reached, that the representation in question constitutes the 
practice of law.  The majority opinion's interpretation renders 
the bylaws internally contradictory, unfair to Dr. Seitzinger, 
and fails to foster the public policy underlying the licensing 
of attorneys and the prohibition on the unauthorized practice of 
law.  For these reasons, I conclude that the majority opinion's 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., id., ¶¶2, 3. 
22 See, e.g., id., ¶¶30, 34. 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
5 
 
interpretation is unreasonable and contrary to the intentions of 
the parties. 
¶54 Rule 1.  The inquiry into the parties' intent is not a 
search for subjective intent but rather focuses on the language 
the parties used.23  Words in a contract are to be read as a 
reasonable person would under the circumstances.24  It is the 
objective meaning of the contract, not the subjective intent of 
the parties, that controls.25  The subjective intent of the 
parties entering into a contract is immaterial.26 "[T]he law 
presumes that the parties understood the import of their 
contract and that they had the intention which its terms 
                                                 
23 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 31:4 at 271-
72 (4th ed. 1999). 
24 Danbeck v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI 91, ¶10, 245 
Wis. 2d 186, 629 N.W.2d 150. 
25 Williston, supra note 23, § 31:4 at 280-83, § 32:2 at 
405; State ex rel. Siciliano v. Johnson, 21 Wis. 2d 482, 487, 
124 N.W.2d 624 (1963). 
26 Kernz v. J.L. French Corp., 266 Wis. 2d 124, 139-41, 667 
N.W.2d 751 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]he creation of an enforceable 
agreement is usually predicated on the language used in the 
contract and the expressed intentions of the parties.").  See 
17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 352, 368 (1991) ("It is not 
necessarily the real intent, but the expressed or apparent 
intent, which is sought.  Indeed, a party's subjective, 
undisclosed intent is immaterial to the interpretation of a 
contract. The court will not attempt to ascertain the actual 
mental processes of the parties in entering into the particular 
contract; rather the law presumes that the parties understood 
the import of their contract and that they had the intention 
which its terms manifest."). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
6 
 
manifest."27  The common meaning of language will be given to the 
words of a contract.28  
¶55 As the majority opinion recognizes, the primary goal 
of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties' 
intentions.29  Our cases have frequently stated that judicial 
interpretation of a contract is not to determine what the 
parties "intended to agree to, but what, in a legal sense, they 
did agree to, as evidenced by the language they saw fit to 
use."30  The majority opinion recites this rule and repeatedly 
states that "a reasonable person would understand that the words 
'legal counsel' in the Bylaws mean an attorney licensed to 
practice law in Wisconsin," but provides no reasoning to support 
this assertion.31  
¶56 The parties' intentions are set forth in the language 
of the contract.  Here the contract uses the word "attorney."  
The contract's language is not limited to a lawyer licensed to 
practice in Wisconsin.   
¶57 The drafter, the hospital, easily could have inserted 
words limiting the state of licensure.  It did not.  Applying 
                                                 
27 Williston, supra note 23, § 31:4 at 275-77. 
28 Id., § 32:3 at 408; 5 Margaret A. Kniffen, Corbin on 
Contracts, § 24.6 at 27 (rev. ed. 1998). 
29 Majority op., ¶22. 
30 Miller v. Miller, 67 Wis. 2d 435, 442, 227 N.W.2d 626 
(1975) (citations omitted), cited with approval in Koenings v. 
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis. 2d 349, 366, 377 N.W.2d 593 
(1985), State ex rel. Journal/Sentinel Inc. v. Pleva, 155 
Wis. 2d 704, 711, 456 N.W.2d 359 (1990). 
31 Majority op., ¶¶3, 36, 43. 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
7 
 
Rule 1, I conclude that because the text does not delineate the 
state of licensure, the parties did not intend to limit 
attorneys who provide representation at peer review hearings to 
those licensed in Wisconsin. 
¶58 Rule 2:  A court should not add terms or provisions to 
the contract.32  "In construing a contract, 'courts cannot insert 
what has been omitted or rewrite a contract made by the 
parties.'"33.  
¶59 The majority opinion does not mention this rule but 
violates it nonetheless by adding the words "licensed to 
practice law in the state of Wisconsin" after the word 
                                                 
32 Williston, supra note 23, § 31:6 at 313 ("Traditionally, 
the general rule which prohibits a court from rewriting the 
parties' 
agreement 
while 
purporting 
to 
construe 
it 
also 
precludes the court from adding terms or provisions to the 
contract.  Additional obligations or undertakings may not be 
imposed upon a party to a contract under the guise or authority 
of contractual construction."). 
33 Columbia Propane, L.P., v. Wis. Gas Co., 2003 WI 38, ¶12, 
261 
Wis. 2d 70, 
661 
N.W.2d 776. 
 
See 
also 
Danbeck, 
245 
Wis. 2d 186, ¶10 (Courts are "to avoid rewriting the contract by 
construction and imposing contract obligations that the parties 
did not undertake."); Levy v. Levy, 130 Wis. 2d 523, 533, 388 
N.W.2d 170 (1986) ("In the guise of construing a contract, 
courts cannot insert what has been omitted or rewrite a contract 
made by the parties."); Jones v. Jenkins, 88 Wis. 2d 712, 722, 
277 N.W.2d 815 (1979) ("The court cannot redraft the agreement, 
but must adopt that construction which will result in a 
reasonable, fair and just contract as opposed to one that is 
unusual or extraordinary."); Batavian Nat'l Bank of LaCrosse v. 
S. & H. Inc., 3 Wis. 2d 565, 569, 89 N.W.2d 309 (1958) ("In the 
name of construction, courts cannot insert what has been omitted 
or rewrite a contract made by parties."); Jarvis v. Northwestern 
Mut. Relief Ass'n, 102 Wis. 546, 549, 78 N.W. 1089 (1899) ("Such 
a construction of the insurance contract would be exceedingly 
unreasonable,——would add, we may say, something not found in the 
language used in the contract by any rational construction of 
it, and would be contrary to all authority on the question."). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
8 
 
"attorney." 
 
Flouting 
this 
rule, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
nevertheless claims to have made a reasonable interpretation.  
It is highly dubious that an interpretation that rewrites the 
contract language is reasonable. 
¶60 Applying Rule 2, I would not add words to the bylaws.  
I would stick to the words of the bylaws as written and conclude 
that the parties intended the word "attorney" to mean any 
attorney regardless of the state in which the attorney is 
licensed.   
¶61 Rule 3.  If a contract is characterized as ambiguous 
because it can be interpreted in more than one reasonable way,34 
extrinsic evidence may be used to determine the parties' 
intentions.35  
¶62 The bylaws are silent on the subject of an attorney's 
state of licensure and thus may be viewed, for purposes of this 
case, as susceptible to at least two interpretations:  (1) the 
attorney needs to be licensed in Wisconsin, or (2) the attorney 
need not be licensed in Wisconsin.  The hospital argues that the 
bylaws require a Wisconsin-licensed lawyer to appear at the peer 
                                                 
34 Danbeck, 245 Wis. 2d 186, ¶10 ("Contract language is 
ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation."); Dieter v. Chrysler Corp., 2000 WI 45, ¶15, 
234 Wis. 2d 670, 610 N.W.2d 832 (same); Donaldson v. Urban Land 
Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 230-31, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997) 
(same); Tempelis v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 169 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 485 
N.W.2d 217 (1992) (same). 
35 Majority op., ¶22.  Words in a contract are ambiguous 
when 
they 
are 
susceptible 
to 
more 
than 
one 
reasonable 
interpretation. 
 
Just 
v. 
Land 
Reclamation, 
Ltd., 
155 
Wis. 2d 737, 744-45, 157 Wis. 2d 507, 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
9 
 
review hearing; Dr. Seitzinger argues that any lawyer can appear 
on his behalf. 
¶63 Although Rule 3 is recited by the majority opinion,36 
this rule has no application to the present case.  No evidence 
(extrinsic or otherwise) was presented in the circuit court.  
The parties merely presented briefs and argued the law before 
the circuit court.  
¶64 Rule 4. If a contract is characterized as ambiguous 
because it can be interpreted in more than one reasonable way, 
the contract is to be interpreted against the drafter because 
the language was presumptively within the control of the party 
drafting the agreement and that party could have made it clear.37  
"[A]mbiguous agreements are to be construed most strongly 
against the maker or drafter."38  This rule is especially 
                                                 
36 Majority op., ¶ 22. 
37 Williston, supra note 23, § 32:12 at 471-72 ("Ambiguity——
the possibility that a word or phrase in a contract might be 
reasonably and plausibly subject to more than one meaning——
frequently occurs in the language used by the parties to express 
their meaning.  Since the language is presumptively within the 
control of the party drafting the agreement, it is a generally 
accepted principle that any ambiguity in that language will be 
interpreted against the drafter.").    
38 Moran v. Shern, 60 Wis. 2d 39, 49, 208 N.W.2d 348 (1973).  
See also Dieter, 234 Wis. 2d 670, ¶15; Tempelis, 169 Wis. 2d at 
10; Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 745, 456 
N.W.2d 570 (1990); Capital Invs., Inc. v. Whitehall Packing Co., 
91 Wis. 2d 178, 190, 280 N.W.2d 254 (1979); Cent. Auto Co. v. 
Reichert, 87 Wis. 2d 9, 19, 273 N.W.2d 360 (1978); Strong v. 
Shawano Canning Co., Inc., 13 Wis. 2d 604, 609, 109 N.W.2d 355 
(1961). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
10 
 
applicable when the drafter wants to interpret the ambiguous 
language in its favor.39  
¶65 The majority opinion recites Rule 4,40 fails to apply 
it, and proceeds to violate it.  
¶66 The rationale for construing an "ambiguous agreement" 
against the drafter is well articulated in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, § 206, Comment A:  The drafter had the 
power to make the contract clear and the drafter of a 
standardized contract had the stronger bargaining position. 
Comment A reads as follows: 
Where one party chooses the terms of a contract, he is 
likely to provide more carefully for the protection of 
his own interests than for those of the other party.  
He is also more likely than the other party to have 
reason to know of uncertainties of meaning.  Indeed, 
he may leave meaning deliberately obscure, intending 
to decide at a later date what meaning to assert.  In 
cases of doubt, therefore, so long as other factors 
are not decisive, there is substantial reason for 
preferring the meaning of the other party.  The rule 
is often invoked in cases of standardized contracts 
and in cases where the drafting party has the stronger 
bargaining position, but it is not limited to such 
cases. 
¶67 The hospital's bylaws appear to constitute the kind of 
standardized contract between two parties of unequal bargaining 
                                                 
39 Corbin, supra note 28, § 24.27 at 282-83 ("If, however, 
it is clear that the parties did attempt to make a valid 
contract and the only remaining question is which of two 
possible and reasonable meanings should be adopted, the court 
will often adopt the meaning that is less favorable in its legal 
effect to the party who chose the words.  This technique is 
known as 'contra proferentem.'").  See Donaldson v. Urban Land 
Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 230-31, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997) 
(applying rule of contra proferentem). 
40 Majority op., ¶22. 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
11 
 
power that particularly justifies an interpretation against the 
drafter.  Dr. Seitzinger, in all probability, had no control 
over the language of the bylaws and was in no position to 
bargain for more favorable language when he obtained his 
employment.  
¶68 Assuming 
that 
this 
contract 
is 
"ambiguous" 
and 
applying 
Rule 
4, 
I conclude that 
the bylaws 
should be 
interpreted against the hospital and that Dr. Seitzinger, who 
wishes to appear at the hearing with an attorney licensed in 
another state, should be allowed to do so. 
¶69 Rule 5: Interpretation of a contract is a question of 
law for the court if the contract is unambiguous or if the 
contract is ambiguous but no extrinsic evidence has been 
presented.41  "Construction of bylaws and their application to 
undisputed facts present a question of law that we review de 
                                                 
41 Williston, supra note 23, § 30:7 at 92-93; Corbin, supra 
note 28, § 24.30 at 338. 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
12 
 
novo."42  The court need not give deference to the drafter's 
interpretation.43 
¶70 The majority opinion does not recite Rule 5.  Instead, 
the majority opinion ignores this rule and violates it by 
asserting that "[a]pplications of hospital bylaws are reviewed 
under a deferential standard of review" and that "a hospital's 
interpretation of its bylaws should stand if reasonable."44  To 
support its conclusion, the majority opinion relies on (but 
misreads) Hale v. Stoughton Hospital Ass'n, 126 Wis. 2d 267, 376 
N.W.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1985). 
¶71 The Hale decision does not support the majority 
opinion's conclusion that "a hospital's interpretation of its 
                                                 
42 Keane v. St. Francis Hosp., 186 Wis. 2d 637, 649, 522 
N.W.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1994). 
43 Danbeck, 245 Wis. 2d 186, ¶10 ("The interpretation of an 
insurance contact is a question of law subject to de novo 
review."); 
Dieter, 
234 
Wis. 2d 670, 
¶15 
("We 
review 
the 
interpretation of a warranty or any other contract de novo, and 
in doing so, our primary purpose is to ascertain and give effect 
to the intent of the parties."); Tempelis, 169 Wis. 2d at 9 
("Contracts of insurance are controlled by the same principles 
of law that are applicable to other contracts . . . . The 
construction of an insurance contract is a question of law which 
we review de novo.") (quoting Cardinal v. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co., 
166 Wis. 2d 375, 382, 480 N.W.2d 1 (1992)); Katze v. Randolph & 
Scott Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 206, 212, 341 N.W.2d 689 
(1984) ("[T]he construction of the words and clauses in an 
insurance policy is a question of law for the court."). 
44 Majority op., ¶22. 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
13 
 
bylaws should stand if reasonable."45  In Hale, the bylaw at 
issue required the hospital to have an honest belief that 
termination was in the best interests of the hospital.  There 
was no dispute over the legal meaning of the phrases "honest 
belief" or "best interests" as used in the bylaws.  The court of 
appeals in Hale did not show deference to the hospital's legal 
interpretation of these phrases.  Rather, the court of appeals 
deferred to the board's substantive determination of what was in 
the best interests of the hospital.  The court of appeals 
concluded that it would not "inquire into the board's decision-
making process to determine whether its decision is correct.  
Inquiry is limited to whether the board really believed Hale's 
termination was in the hospital's best interests."46  
¶72 In Keane v. St. Francis Hospital, 186 Wis. 2d 637, 522 
N.W.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1994), a case subsequent to Hale, when an 
interpretation of hospital bylaws was at issue, the court of 
appeals did not defer to the hospital's proposed interpretation 
of its bylaws but rather concluded that "[c]onstruction of 
bylaws and their application to undisputed facts present a 
question of law that we review de novo."47  This correct and 
                                                 
45 Majority op., ¶23.  Although "courts normally do not 
interfere with a reasonable management decision concerning staff 
privileges . . . hospitals must adopt rules, regulations, and 
bylaws concerning procedures for admission to staff membership, 
and they may not arbitrarily prevent otherwise qualified doctors 
from exercising staff privileges."  Belmar v. Cipolla, 475 A.2d 
533, 538 (N.J. 1984) (citation omitted). 
46 Hale v. Stoughton Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 267, 
276, 376 N.W.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1985).   
47 Keane v. St. Francis Hosp., 186 Wis. 2d 637, 649, 522 
N.W.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1994). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
14 
 
relevant statement of the law should be followed in the present 
case.  The majority opinion cites Keane but does not abide by 
it.48 
¶73 Applying Rule 5 and using the objective standard of 
interpretation, not adding words to the bylaws, and interpreting 
language against the drafter, I conclude as a matter of law that 
the parties did not intend the bylaws to provide that an 
attorney must be licensed in Wisconsin to appear with an 
affected doctor at a peer review hearing.     
¶74 Rule 6: "The contract must be read as a whole and 
every part will be read with reference to the whole."49  "The 
general rule as to the construction of contracts is that the 
meaning of particular provisions in the contract is to be 
ascertained with reference to the contract as a whole."50 
¶75 The majority opinion fails to recite this rule and 
violates it by ascertaining the meaning of a bylaw without 
                                                 
48 Majority op., ¶22. 
49 Williston, supra note 23, § 32:5 at 420-21 ("A contract 
will be read as a whole and every part will be read with 
reference to the whole.  If possible, the contract will be so 
interpreted as to give effect to its general purpose as revealed 
within its four corners or in its entirety."), § 32:11 at 464 
("A contract must be construed as a whole and the intention of 
the 
parties 
is 
to 
be 
collected 
from 
the 
entire 
instrument . . . ."). 
50 Tempelis, 169 Wis. 2d at 9; see also McCullough v. 
Brandt, 34 Wis. 2d 102, 106, 148 N.W.2d 718 (1967) ("In the 
interpretation of a contract, the contract must be considered as 
a whole in order to give each of its provisions the meaning 
intended by the parties."); Corbin, supra note 28, § 24.21 at 
204 ("[T]he terms of a contract are to be interpreted and their 
legal effects determined as a whole."). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
15 
 
considering the bylaws as a whole.  In this case, the hospital's 
bylaws limit the scope of representation at the peer review 
hearing so that it is evident that the parties did not intend  
that an attorney must be licensed to practice law in Wisconsin 
in order to assist at the peer review hearing.   
¶76 The bylaws refer to the hearing as a non-judicial 
forum at which the hospital is free to limit the role of an 
attorney's active participation.  Specifically, Bylaw § 3.3(b) 
provides that "[w]hile legal counsel may attend and assist the 
respective parties in proceedings provided herein, due to the 
professional nature of these review proceedings, it is intended 
that the proceedings will not be judicial in form but a forum 
for professional evaluation and discussion.  Accordingly, the 
Hearing Committee and/or appellate review body retains the right 
to limit the role of counsel's active participation in the 
hearing process." 
¶77 While Bylaw 3.3(b), which governs the scope of an 
attorney's participation at a peer review hearing, prohibits an 
attorney from acting in certain capacities, it does not explain 
in what ways a representative of the affected doctor and a 
representative of the charging entity participate at a peer 
review hearing.  The scope of each party's activities (and 
therefore those of each of their representatives) are governed 
by Bylaw 3.4.  Bylaw 3.4 explains that each party has the right 
to call and question witnesses, rebut evidence, and submit a 
written statement at the close of the hearing.  Bylaw § 3.4 
provides as follows: 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
16 
 
Each of the parties shall have the right to:  
(a) Call and examine witnesses, including expert 
witnesses. 
(b) Introduce exhibits and present relevant evidence.   
(c) Question any witness on any matter relevant to the 
issues.   
(d) Impeach any witness.   
(e) Rebut any evidence.   
(f) Submit a written statement at the close of 
hearing.   
(g) Record the hearing by use of a court reporter or 
other mutually acceptable means of recording. 
 
¶78 The hearing committee is ordinarily composed of 3 to 5 
members of the medical staff, with the chairman being the 
presiding officer.51  Under certain circumstances a hearing 
officer may preside over the hearing.  The hearing officer may, 
but need not, be an "attorney-at-law," but must be experienced 
in conducting hearings.52 
 
¶79 Bylaw § 3.8 sets forth the rules of procedure and 
evidence that govern the hearing.  According to § 3.8, the 
"hearing need not be conducted strictly according to rules of 
law relating to the examination of witnesses or presentation of 
evidence.  Any relevant evidence shall be admissible if, in the 
judgment of the presiding officer, it is the sort of evidence on 
which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct 
of serious affairs."  The Bylaw further provides that "the 
                                                 
51 Bylaw §§ 2.9, 3.2. 
52 Bylaw § 9.2. 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
17 
 
presiding 
officer 
shall 
have the 
power to 
rule on the 
admissibility of pieces of evidence." 
¶80 These enumerated procedures are common to many types 
of hearings.  Some are conducted by and with attorneys licensed 
to practice law in Wisconsin.  Some are not. 
¶81 As is evident from the bylaws, the expectation is that 
the peer review hearings may be totally conducted by and with 
medical staff.  The bylaws do not envision that the hearings 
will 
require 
persons 
knowledgeable 
in 
Wisconsin 
law 
or 
procedure.  The hearings are not conducted in reliance on any 
specialized knowledge of the law, to say nothing of Wisconsin 
law or procedure, particularly given that the peer review 
hearing is explicitly described as not being a "judicial forum." 
¶82 In fact, laypersons routinely perform the activities 
set forth in the bylaws for the peer review hearings in other 
contexts, such as governmental administrative hearings.  For 
instance, non-attorneys may serve in a representative capacity 
in worker's compensation cases.  Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 
80.06 provides that "parties to the controversy . . . may appear 
in person or by an attorney or agent."  The licensing procedure 
established in § DWD 80.20 by the Department of Workforce 
Development does not require that an individual appearing before 
the Department be an attorney.53 
                                                 
53 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.17(1)(c) governs the licensing of 
non-attorneys who appear in worker's compensation hearings.  It 
provides: 
Any party shall have the right to be present at any 
hearing, in person or by attorney or any other agent, 
and to present such testimony as may be pertinent to 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
18 
 
¶83 The rules governing the procedure in a worker's 
compensation hearing are substantially similar to those of the 
hospital peer review hearing.  Wisconsin Admin. Code § 80.12 
provides that "[t]he rules of practice before the department 
shall be such as to secure the facts in as direct and simple a 
manner as possible."54  Furthermore, the examiner in a worker's 
compensation hearing "may limit testimony to only those matters 
which are disputed"55 and "may not allow into the record, either 
on 
direct 
or 
cross-examination, 
redundant, 
irrelevant 
or 
repetitive testimony."56   
¶84 In other words, at a worker's compensation hearing, 
laypersons are authorized to present and rebut evidence, cross-
examine and impeach witnesses; the proceedings are recorded.57  
                                                                                                                                                             
the controversy before the department. No person, 
firm, or corporation, other than an attorney at law 
who is licensed to practice law in the state, may 
appear on behalf of any party in interest before the 
department or any member or employee of the department 
assigned to conduct any hearing, investigation, or 
inquiry relative to a claim for compensation or 
benefits under this chapter, unless the person is 18 
years of age or older, does not have an arrest or 
conviction record, subject to ss. 111.321, 111.322 and 
111.335, is otherwise qualified, and has obtained from 
the department a license with authorization to appear 
in matters or proceedings before the department. 
Except as provided under pars. (cm) and (cr), the 
license shall be issued by the department under rules 
promulgated by the department. 
54 Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.12(1)(a) (Nov. 2002). 
55 Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.12(1)(b) (Nov. 2002). 
56 Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.12(1)(c) (Nov. 2002). 
57 See Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.14(1) (Nov. 2002). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
19 
 
There seems to be little if any difference between the 
procedures in a worker's compensation hearing and in a peer 
review hearing.  Similarly, a person who is not a Wisconsin 
licensed attorney may represent a person in an unemployment 
compensation proceeding58 and perform activities similar to those 
performed by a representative in a peer review hearing.59   
¶85 In considering whether the parties intended that a 
person who is not a licensed attorney in Wisconsin may appear as 
a representative for an affected doctor, I apply Rule 6.  I read 
the bylaws as a whole and give effect to the bylaws' 
characterization of the venue as a non-judicial forum and the 
bylaws' preclusion of an attorney from acting as an attorney at 
the peer review hearing.  I also give effect to the bylaws' 
                                                 
58 Unemployment insurance appeals also do not require 
attorney representation.  Wisconsin Admin. Code § 140.02 (Sept. 
2000) provides that: 
Any party may appear on the party's own behalf at any 
hearing under this chapter or appear with or by a 
representative.  The representative shall be presumed 
to have full authority to act on behalf of the party, 
including the authority to file or withdraw an appeal.  
The representative shall have authority to act on 
behalf 
of 
the 
party 
until 
the 
party 
or 
the 
representative 
terminates 
the 
representative's 
authorization and notifies the department that such 
representation has ended. 
The Department of 
Workforce 
Development's 
website further 
clarifies that a representative need not be an attorney.  See 
http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/uibola/BOLA/FAQs/Representation2.htm. 
59 See Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 140.15(1) (Sept. 2000) ("Each 
party shall be given an opportunity to examine and cross-examine 
witnesses."); § DWD 140.16(1) (Sept. 2000) (statutory and common 
law rules of evidence do not apply). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
20 
 
statement of the rights of the parties and the rules of 
procedure.  In discerning the parties' intent, I look at whether 
a person who is not a licensed Wisconsin lawyer can appear to 
perform 
similar 
functions 
in 
governmental 
administrative 
hearings.  On the basis of all of these factors, I conclude that 
the parties did not intend the bylaws to limit representation of 
an affected doctor by an attorney before the peer review board 
to an attorney licensed in Wisconsin.  
¶86 Rule 7: "[A]n interpretation which gives a reasonable, 
lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to 
an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or 
of no effect."60  "[W]here one construction would make a contract 
unusual and extraordinary while another [construction] equally 
consistent with the language used would make the contract 
reasonable, just, and fair, the latter must prevail."61 
¶87 Although 
the 
majority 
opinion 
asserts 
that 
its 
interpretation of the bylaws is reasonable, I conclude, for the 
following reasons, that the majority opinion has adopted an 
unreasonable interpretation of the bylaws and therefore one that 
violates the intent of the parties.  
A. 
The 
majority 
opinion's 
determination 
that 
its 
interpretation is reasonable rests on its conclusion that 
                                                 
60 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 203(a) (1981).  See 
also Williston, supra note 23, § 32:11, at 453-64; Corbin, supra 
note 28, § 24.22, at 232-48. 
61 Capital Invs., 91 Wis. 2d at 193 (quoting Bank of Cashton 
v. LaCrosse County Scandinavian Town Mut. Ins. Co., 216 
Wis. 513, 257 N.W. 451 (1934)). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
21 
 
a representative of an affected doctor at a peer review 
hearing could be expected to focus on legal issues or 
engage in activities that resemble the practice of law 
and that therefore the parties intended that the bylaws 
require a Wisconsin-licensed lawyer.  "Focus[ing] on 
legal issues" and "resembl[ing] the practice of law" are 
vague, broad, undefined phrases.  The concept that 
activities "focusing on legal issues" or "resembling the 
practice of law" can be performed only by a Wisconsin-
licensed lawyer is foreign to our jurisprudence and 
creates an unworkable rule of law. 
B. 
The 
majority 
opinion's 
determination 
that 
its 
interpretation is reasonable rests on its conclusion that 
a representative of an affected doctor at a peer review 
hearing engages in the practice of law and that therefore 
the parties intended that the bylaws require a Wisconsin-
licensed lawyer.  Despite its repeated protestations that 
it need not and does not determine whether representation 
at a peer review hearing constitutes the practice of law, 
the majority opinion concludes that such representation 
does constitute the practice of law.  
C. 
The majority opinion's interpretation of the bylaws 
renders provisions of the bylaws contradictory and 
therefore results in a rewriting of the bylaws to make 
the provisions consistent.  Such an interpretation is not 
reasonable and cannot be the intent of the parties.  
According to the majority opinion, an attorney must be 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
22 
 
licensed to practice law in Wisconsin in order to 
represent an affected doctor at a peer review hearing.  
But the bylaws allow a staff doctor to represent the 
charging entity and allow any person of the entity's 
choosing to represent the charging entity.  The bylaws 
also allow an attorney to represent the charging entity.  
A doctor may not practice law any more than an attorney 
not licensed in Wisconsin.  Therefore, the majority 
opinion's interpretation of the bylaws either renders 
them internally contradictory or rewrites them to read 
that only a Wisconsin-licensed attorney can represent a 
doctor or the charging entity at a peer review hearing.   
D. 
The majority opinion's interpretation of the bylaws is 
unreasonable because it is unfair.  It denies Dr. 
Seitzinger access to the attorney of his choice.  Yet the 
proceeding has very significant consequences to him, and 
the bylaws allow the charging entity to be represented by 
anyone 
it 
chooses. 
 
Such 
an 
interpretation 
is 
unreasonable and cannot be said to be the intent of the 
parties, no matter how many times the majority opinion 
flatly insists that a reasonable person would view them 
that way. 
E. 
The majority opinion's interpretation is unreasonable 
because it does not foster the public policy underlying 
the licensing of lawyers and the prohibition on the 
unlawful 
practice 
of 
law. 
 
The 
justification 
for 
licensing lawyers and the public policy underlying the 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
23 
 
prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law is to 
protect consumers of legal services.  This policy is not 
implicated in the hospital bylaws and peer review 
hearings. 
 
Accordingly 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
interpretation is unreasonable and cannot be said to be 
the intent of the parties. 
A 
¶88 The majority opinion's conclusion that the bylaws mean 
that a non-Wisconsin licensed attorney cannot represent Dr. 
Seitzinger at the peer review hearing rests on the majority 
opinion's characterization that representation at a peer review 
hearing "at the very least . . . could be expected to focus on 
legal issues."62  Such an interpretation cannot be reasonable and 
the intent of the parties.  The concept that an activity that 
"focuses on legal issues" or "resembles the practice of law" can 
be performed only by a Wisconsin-licensed lawyer is foreign to 
our jurisprudence and creates an unworkable rule of law. 
¶89 The majority opinion states several times that Mr. 
Kadar's likely activities would closely "focus on legal issues"63 
or "resemble the practice of law"64 and that "a layperson must 
refrain from engaging in any acts that resemble the practice of 
law."65  In a similar vein, the majority opinion reasons that 
                                                 
62 Majority op., ¶34. 
63 Majority op., ¶¶3, 43. 
64 Majority op., ¶¶30, 34 
65 Majority op., ¶34. 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
24 
 
because Mr. Kadar might provide legal advice at the peer hearing 
despite the bylaws' limitations on any attorney who represents 
an affected doctor, a reasonable interpretation of the bylaws is 
that a non-Wisconsin licensed attorney cannot represent an 
affected doctor.66  
¶90 The record does not disclose the activities a doctor's 
representative performs, and the majority opinion provides no 
explanation, justification, or citation of authority for drawing 
a line between activities that can or cannot be performed by 
non-Wisconsin licensed attorneys by their resemblance to the 
practice of law.  "Focus[ing] on legal issues" or "resemble[ing] 
the practice of law" are broad, vague, and undefined phrases 
that encompass the activities of many professionals who are not 
licensed attorneys.  Such an interpretation can only cause 
problems in the future.  
¶91 Although the majority opinion relies on State ex rel. 
Junior Ass'n of Milwaukee Bar v. Rice, 236 Wis. 38, 294 N.W.550 
(1940), for the notion that an unlicensed person's activities 
may not "resemble the practice of law,"67 the Rice decision never 
uses that or any similar phrase.  The Rice case (and our other 
cases) speak of activities that constitute the practice of law, 
not those that merely focus on legal issues or resemble the 
practice of law.68   
                                                 
66 Majority op., ¶¶27-37. 
67 Majority op., ¶34. 
68 See, e.g., Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 248, 102 
N.W.2d 404 (1960); aff'd,  367 U.S. 820 (1961). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
25 
 
¶92 The majority opinion claims that its interpretation of 
the bylaws is required because another interpretation "might 
permit attorneys unlicensed in the state or non-attorneys to 
violate 
Wis. Stat. § 757.30."69 
 
What 
does 
"might" 
permit 
unlicensed persons to engage in the practice of law mean?  Why 
is it reasonable to conclude that the possibility that a person 
might engage in providing legal services while he or she is 
providing non-legal services is a sufficient basis to interpret 
the hospital bylaws as barring a non-Wisconsin licensed attorney 
from appearing at a peer review hearing?  Many professionals who 
are not Wisconsin-licensed attorneys engage, as I explain later, 
in a myriad of diverse acts that focus on legal issues, resemble 
the practice of law, or put the professional in a position in 
which he or she "might" engage in the practice of law.  Our 
cases do not take the approach that an activity's merely 
resembling the practice of law or focusing on legal issues bars 
a non-Wisconsin licensed lawyer from engaging in it.  Rather, 
our cases analyze each activity challenged and determine whether 
that activity does or does not constitute the practice of law.70 
¶93 I therefore conclude that the majority opinion's 
interpretation is contrary to the intent of the parties and that 
no reasonable person would understand the words "legal counsel" 
in the Bylaws to mean an attorney licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin.     
                                                 
69 Majority op., ¶27. 
70 See, e.g., State ex rel. Junior Ass'n of Milwaukee Bar v. 
Rice, 236 Wis. 38, 53 294 N.W.550 (1940). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
26 
 
B 
¶94 The majority opinion is internally contradictory. 
Despite its repeated protestations that it need not and does not 
determine whether "such representation [at a peer review 
hearing] would constitute the practice of law,"71 the only 
possible reading of the opinion is that representation at the 
peer review hearing constitutes the practice of law. 
¶95 The 
majority 
opinion 
explicitly 
states 
that 
to 
construe the bylaws to refer to a non-Wisconsin licensed 
attorney "might permit attorneys unlicensed in the state" to 
engage in the unauthorized practice of law.72  What does this 
sentence mean if it doesn't mean that an appearance at a peer 
review hearing is the practice of law?  If there is any doubt 
about the meaning of the sentence, we need only examine the 
section of the majority opinion devoted to discussing the 
interpretation of the bylaws.73  
 
¶96 Eight of the 15 paragraphs of the majority opinion,74 
that is, approximately two-thirds of the "total ink" the 
majority opinion spills on the substantive analysis of the 
bylaws, address cases defining the unauthorized practice of law.  
If the majority opinion does not conclude that Mr. Kadar's 
appearance is the practice of law requiring a Wisconsin license, 
                                                 
71 Majority op., ¶¶3, 36, 39, 41, 43. 
72 Majority op., ¶27. 
73 Majority op., ¶¶27-41. 
74 Majority op., ¶¶28-35. 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
27 
 
why does the majority opinion engage in this lengthy discussion?  
If the majority opinion does not conclude that Mr. Kadar's 
appearance is the practice of law requiring a Wisconsin license, 
what is the basis for the majority opinion's interpretation that 
the bylaws were intended to bar an out-of-state attorney from 
appearing at the peer review hearing?  
¶97 I am sympathetic with the majority's attempt to avoid 
deciding 
what 
constitutes 
the 
practice 
of 
law 
and 
the 
unauthorized practice of law.  Defining these terms has 
generated a great deal of discussion among lawyers, judges, and 
non-lawyers for many years.  In the last year or so, both the 
American Bar Association and the State Bar of Wisconsin have 
independently abandoned their respective attempts to reach an 
acceptable definition or approach to defining the practice of 
law or the unauthorized practice of law.   
¶98 As the majority opinion points out, the State Bar of 
Wisconsin has petitioned our court to appoint a committee to 
study this area of the law.75  Numerous lawyers, representatives 
of 
consumer 
groups, 
non-lawyers, 
and 
trade 
association 
representatives appeared before this court at its hearing on the 
Bar's petition.  These persons carefully explained (and gave 
many examples) how professionals engage in activities on a daily 
basis that sometimes have a legal focus and resemble the 
practice of law.  To name a few such professionals: financial 
advisers, investment advisers, accountants, bankers, mediators, 
arbitrators, trust officers, engineers, geologists, realtors, 
                                                 
75 Majority op., ¶41 n.15. 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
28 
 
paralegals, and land planners.  That many professionals engage 
in activities that focus on legal issues or resemble the 
practice of law presents one of the key difficulties in trying 
to define the practice of law and the unauthorized practice of 
law. 
¶99 Because the majority opinion contradicts itself by 
addressing an issue it denies addressing, I conclude that the 
majority opinion's interpretation of the bylaws is contrary to 
the intent of the parties and that no reasonable person would 
understand that the words "legal counsel" in the Bylaws mean an 
attorney licensed to practice law in Wisconsin. 
C 
¶100 The majority opinion's interpretation renders the 
bylaws internally contradictory.  Such an interpretation cannot 
be reasonable and intended by the parties. 
¶101 Why is it reasonable to interpret the bylaws as not 
allowing an out-of-state attorney to represent an affected 
doctor when the bylaws allow a staff doctor to represent an 
affected doctor at the hearing and allow any person of its 
choosing to represent the charging entity?  A non-lawyer, as 
well as an out-of-state lawyer, cannot engage in the practice of 
law in Wisconsin.  Carried to its logical conclusion, the 
majority opinion bars any person who is not a Wisconsin-licensed 
attorney from representing an affected doctor or the charging 
entity at a peer review hearing.  Indeed, the majority opinion 
states that interpreting the bylaws as allowing a non-Wisconsin 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
29 
 
licensed attorney to appear "might permit . . . non-attorneys" 
to engage in the unauthorized practice of law.76 
¶102 If it is reasonable to interpret representation of an 
affected doctor at a peer review hearing as an activity in which 
laypersons cannot engage, as the majority opinion does, then it 
is reasonable for the majority opinion to render the hospital's 
authorization of its staff doctors to provide representation at 
these hearings to either the affected doctor or to the charging 
entity an illegal authorization of the staff doctors and other 
non-lawyers to engage in the practice of law.77  A reasonable 
person would not think that the same activities that can be 
performed by a doctor require an attorney licensed in the State 
of Wisconsin.  Why is it reasonable for the majority opinion to 
                                                 
76 Majority op., ¶27. 
77 An interpretation of a contract that could produce 
unlawful results is not reasonable.  Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, § 203(a)(1981) ("[A]n interpretation which gives a 
reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is 
preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, 
unlawful, or of no effect.").  See also Williston, supra note 
23, § 32:11 at 453 ("Consonant with the principle that all parts 
of a contract be given effect where possible, an interpretation 
which renders a contract lawful is preferred to those which 
render it unlawful.").  
See also Glendale Prof'l Policemen's Ass'n v. City of 
Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d 90, 102, 264 N.W.2d 594 (1978) ("[A] 
contract provision interpreted to permit an employee to violate 
an ordinance requiring him to live within the city was 
illegal."); WERC v. Teamsters Local No. 563, 75 Wis. 2d 602, 
612-13, 250 N.W.2d 696 (1977) ("Just as a contractual provision 
to directly violate the law is void, a contractual provision 
conferring upon a third party the power to interpret the 
contract in such a manner that a violation will occur is also 
void."). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
30 
 
adopt an interpretation of one provision of the bylaws that 
renders other provisions invalid and changes the procedures set 
forth in the bylaws?  My answer is that such an interpretation 
is not intended by the parties and that no reasonable person 
would understand that the words "legal counsel" in the bylaws 
mean an attorney licensed to practice law in Wisconsin.   
D 
¶103 The majority opinion's interpretation unreasonably 
denies to Dr. Seitzinger the right to a representative of his 
choice under the circumstances of the case.  It limits his right 
of representation, yet allows the charging entity to be 
represented by anyone it chooses.  This case is very important 
to Dr. Seitzinger.  His livelihood and professional reputation 
are in jeopardy at the peer review hearing.  His choice of Mr. 
Kadar falls within the text of the bylaws and within the well-
worn rules of contract interpretation.  Accordingly, the 
majority opinion's interpretation of the hospital bylaws is 
contrary to the intent of the parties and no reasonable person 
would understand that the words "legal counsel" in the Bylaws 
mean an attorney licensed to practice law in Wisconsin.  
E 
¶104 The majority opinion's interpretation is unreasonable 
because it does not foster the public policy underlying the 
licensing of lawyers and the prohibition on the unlawful 
practice of law.  The policy consideration underlying licensure 
and the prohibition on unauthorized practice is the protection 
of consumers of legal services from harm that might be visited 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
31 
 
upon them by persons presumably untrained and incompetent in the 
law who will provide inadequate or unethical representation.78   
¶105 This public policy is not implicated in interpreting 
the hospital bylaws in favor of Dr. Seitzinger.  Here, the 
activities of a representative at the hearings are limited by 
the bylaws:  the forum is non-judicial and the representative's 
activities are restricted to non-attorney functions.  According 
to the bylaws, the hospital will restrain an attorney from 
engaging in the practice of law.  
¶106 Under these circumstances, interpreting the bylaws to 
require a licensed Wisconsin lawyer does not protect Dr. 
Seitzinger as a consumer of legal advice.  The licensing of 
lawyers and the prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law 
do not exist to protect the economic livelihood of lawyers. 
Accordingly, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
interpretation of the bylaws is contrary to the intent of the 
parties and that no reasonable person would understand that the 
                                                 
78 See majority op., ¶29, citing Jadair Inc. v. U.S. Fire 
Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 2d 187, 201-02, 562 N.W.2d 401 (1997) 
(primary purpose of statute preventing the unauthorized practice 
of 
law 
is 
to 
protect 
against 
inadequate 
or 
unethical 
representation); ¶31, citing State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 
14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961) (allowing real estate 
brokers to complete conveyancing forms because this practice 
does not pose a danger to the public). 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
32 
 
words "legal counsel" in the Bylaws mean an attorney licensed to 
practice law in Wisconsin.79    
¶107 In sum, the majority opinion follows its own approach 
to contract interpretation in this case rather than heeding the 
general rules of contract interpretation that have long guided 
Wisconsin courts.  As a result, the majority opinion opts for an 
unreasonable interpretation, 
rather 
than for 
a 
reasonable 
interpretation, of the bylaws.   
¶108 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶109 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent. 
 
                                                 
79 The majority opinion argues that Mr. Kadar cannot be 
admitted pro hac vice under SCR 10.03(4) and declines to 
construct an interpretation or create an exception that would 
allow for his admission for the hearing.  Majority op., ¶41.  It 
makes little sense that Wisconsin courts can and do allow pro 
hac vice admissions of out-of-state lawyers, including those 
appearing before this court, but cannot authorize the appearance 
of an out-of-state lawyer at a peer review hearing.  If the rule 
is the problem, then the rule should be changed.  Furthermore, 
at least one jurisdiction has recognized that a lawyer can be 
admitted pro hac vice even if not expected to appear in court.  
See Permission to Practice, Connecticut Law Tribune, Feb. 23, 
2004, at 8. 
No.  02-2002.ssa 
 
 
 
1