Case Title: Watson v. State

Citation: 501 S.W.2d 609

Docket Number: CR 73-131

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1973-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
501 S.W.2d 609 (1973) Samuel J. WATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. CR 73-131. Supreme Court of Arkansas. December 3, 1973. Sam Edward Gibson, P. A. by Sam Gibson, Benton, for appellant. Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen. by O. H. Hargraves, Deputy Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee. FOGLEMAN, Justice. Appellant contends we should reverse his conviction of robbery, asserting that there was error in the admission into evidence of his purported confession, and in the court's refusal to give his requested jury instruction relating to the voluntariness of his confession, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We find reversible error in the admission of the alleged confession. We have for some time been committed to an independent determination of the voluntariness of a confession based upon an examination of the entire record, whenever an attack is made upon federal constitutional grounds. Harris v. State, 244 Ark. 314, 425 S.W.2d 293; Mosley v. State, 246 Ark. 358, 438 S.W.2d 311; Scott v. State, 251 Ark. 918, 475 S.W.2d 699. The question of voluntariness must be determined by looking to the whole situation and surroundings of the accused. Dewein v. State, 114 Ark. 472, 170 S.W. 582; Boyd and Byrd v. State, 230 Ark. 991, 328 S.W.2d 122; Mitchell v. *610 Bishop, 248 Ark. 427, 452 S.W.2d 340. Upon our examination, the findings of the trial court are not shunned but are given considerable weight in resolving evidentiary conflicts and respectful consideration on the crucial issue. Our examination of the record leads us to the inescapable conclusion that, when the totality of the circumstances surrounding Watson at the time is viewed, the state failed to meet its burden of showing his statement was made freely and understandingly without hope of reward or fear of punishment, as we have always required for the admission into evidence of a statement made by one in custody. Mitchell v. Bishop, supra; Boyd and Byrd v. State, supra. Among the factors to be considered in determining this issue are: the age and the intellectual strength or weakness of the defendant, the manner in which he is questioned, the presence or absence of threats of harm or inducements in the form of promises or favor (Dewein v. State, supra; Williams v. State, 69 Ark. 599, 65 S.W. 103; Barnes v. State, 217 Ark. 244, 229 S. W.2d 484), and the delay between the advice of constitutional rights required by Miranda and the giving of the confession. Summerville v. State, 253 Ark. 16, 484 S.W.2d 85; Scott v. State, 251 Ark. 918, 475 S.W.2d 699. Where threats of harm or promises of favor or benefit are used to wrest a confession, it may be attributed to those influences. Brown v. State, 198 Ark. 920, 132 S.W.2d 15. In order to be admissible, a confession must be free from official inducement proceeding either from hope of gain or the torture of fear. Bullen v. State, 156 Ark. 148, 245 S.W. 493. Holding out to a simple person that she would be awarded a very light punishment, if she confessed having stolen money, has been held sufficient inducement to make her confession involuntary and its admission into evidence reversible error. Porter v. State, 206 Ark. 758, 177 S.W.2d 408. Viewing the testimony in the light most favorable to the state, as we must in order to give the circuit judge's holding appropriate weight, examination of the entire record discloses that: Our review of the record discloses that, in view of appellant's mentality and the statements made to him by the deputy sheriff, the advice to Watson about his constitutional rights may not have been given with sufficient clarity to enable him to understand that, if he desired, and was unable to employ a lawyer, a lawyer would be appointed before he was questioned. The form employed to advise appellant of his rights sets them out as follows: In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court said: The opinion also points out that the burden is clearly on the state to establish a waiver of rights. Appellant was advised that he had a right to have a lawyer provided in a court of law, if he could not afford one and that, if he decided to answer questions without a lawyer present, he would have the right to stop answering at any time until he did talk to a lawyer. This can easily be construed to mean that he could stop the questioning until a lawyer had been appointed. It has been held that advice that an attorney would be appointed "at the proper time," even though a slight deviation from the Miranda prescription, will not negate the overall effectiveness of the warning. Tasby v. United States, 451 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1971), certiorari denied, Feggett v. United States, 405 U.S. 992, 92 S. Ct. 1273, 31 L. Ed. 2d 459. This warning is not as defective as that condemned in Moore v. State, 251 Ark. 436, 472 S.W.2d 940, where the form relied upon contained the statement "We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, when and if you go to court." There the implication that a lawyer could not be appointed before the accused's case came up in a court is clear. It is not clear that the provision of an attorney in a court of law would be postponed beyond "a proper time" in this case. This situation is also quite different from that in Reed v. State, 255 Ark. ___, 498 S.W.2d 877, where it was admitted that it was only indicated to the accused that, if he did not have an attorney before he went to trial, the court would appoint one for him. Still, it remains doubtful that young Watson, with his intellectual weakness, would have understood, either before or after the coercive and inducive language used by the officer, that he had the right to ask that a lawyer be appointed for him before interrogation. All doubts about the voluntariness of a confession must be resolved in favor of individual rights and constitutional safeguards. Smith v. State, 240 Ark. 726, 401 S.W.2d 749. In view of Watson's limited mentality, the coercive nature of Smith's interrogation and the lack of clarity in the only advice given to Watson as to his constitutional rights, when we resolve all doubts in his favor, we are compelled to hold that the confession was involuntary, because it was obtained through duress, threats of harm, and a promise of favor or reward, condemned in such cases as in Dewein v. State, supra,[1] without adequate warnings as to his constitutional rights. In so doing, we have given respectful consideration to the holding of the trial court and resolved any conflicts in the evidence in favor of that ruling. We need not discuss appellant's other points extensively. The question of voluntariness of the statement is unlikely to arise on retrial, but it appears to us that the circuit judge's instructions, given without objection, adequately covered the matter of the consideration to be given the confession by the jury, particularly in view of the fact that no specific instruction was requested. In view of the positive identification of Watson by the victim of the "purse-snatching" of which appellant was accused, the evidence without the confession was legally sufficient, but admission of an involuntary *613 confession must be taken to be prejudicial and reversible error. For the error indicated, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded. It is so ordered. [1] As explained in Needham v. State, 215 Ark. 935, 224 S.W.2d 785, 790.