Case Title: 79 RANCH INC v PITSCH

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82-361

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1983-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
190. 82-361- I N T H E SUPREME COURT OF TEE STATE OF MONTANA 1983 7 9 RANCH, I N C . , a Mont. c o r p . , and HARRY V A N D E R V O O R T , P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, -vs- REUBEN C. PITSCH, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal f r o n : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Golden Valley, The Honorable LeRoy XcRinnon, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Records For A ~ p e l l a n t : F e l t & Nar-tin; Laurence R. I ~ l a r t i n acgued, Bj.llings, Montana For Respondents: Ask & P r a t t : Thomas M. Ask argued, !?oundup, Montana T~loulton, Bellingham, Longo & Flather; W i l l i a m Mather argued & William Forsytke argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: A p r i l 7 , 1983 Decided: June 2 1 , 1983 F i l e d : JUN 2 1 1983 ----- Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e L . C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f s , 79 Ranch and Harry Vandervoort, began t h i s a c t i o n i n 1977 s e e k i n g t o e n j o i n d e f e n d a n t P i t s c h from using w a t e r i n Big Coulee Creek, and seeking a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of each p a r t y ' s w a t e r r i g h t s i n t h e c r e e k . A f t e r a h e a r i n g , t h e D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d s c a n t f i n d i n g s and e s t a b l i s h e d t h e following water r i g h t s and p r i o r i t i e s : " ( a ) Vandervoort -- 50 i n c h e s f o r use on W$ S e c t i o n 23-6N-21E., w i t h p r i o r i t y d a t e a s of J u n e 1, 1924. " ( b ) 79 Ranch -- 45 i n c h e s f o r use on SWV~ S e c t i o n 25-5N-19E., w i t h p r i o r i t y d a t e a s of J u n e 13, 1973. " ( c ) P i t s c h -- 68 i n c h e s f o r use on S e c t i o n 35-5N-19E., w i t h p r i o r i t y d a t e a s of J u l y 1, 1976." P i t s c h and 79 Ranch appealed from t h i s judgment, b u t t h e c a s e was remanded f o r f u r t h e r f i n d i n g s by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. See, 79 Ranch, I n c . v. P i t s c h ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont. , 631 P.2d 690, 38 St.Rep. 1048. On remand, t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court amended its f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s , and t h e n r e e n t e r e d t h e o r i g i n a l judgment quoted above. P i t s c h and 79 Ranch a g a i n a p p e a l . P i t s c h , 79 Ranch, and Vandervoort own land along Big Coulee Creek i n Golden V a l l e y County, Montana. P i t s c h l i v e s immediately upstream of 79 Ranch. V a n d e r v o o r t ' s ranch is about e i g h t e e n miles downstream. I n 1975, P i t s c h bought h i s land from B e r t S c h a f f . B e r t S c h a f f had decided t o begin i r r i g a t i n g h i s land i n 1973 and f i l e d a n o t i c e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n f o r 30 c u b i c f e e t per second ( c . f . s . ) of w a t e r . He ordered a s p r i n k l e r system, b u t d i d n ' t r e c e i v e a l l of t h e n e c e s s a r y p a r t s and t h e r e f o r e never i r r i g a t e d . When P i t s c h bought t h e land and water r i g h t s , he i n s t a l l e d a d i f f e r e n t s p r i n k l e r system and began i r r i g a t i n g i n J u l y 1976. 79 Ranch, o p e r a t e d by Eugene S c h a f f , a l s o f i l e d a n o t i c e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n and ordered a s p r i n k l e r system i n 1973. 79 Ranch i n s t a l l e d t h e s p r i n k l e r system, s i m i l a r t o t h e one ordered by B e r t S c h a f f , and began i r r i g a t i n g i n J u l y 1973. P i t s c h and 79 Ranch c l a i m a p o r t i o n of a water r i g h t e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1893 by t h e Montana C a t t l e Company. Montana C a t t l e Company had f i l e d a n o t i c e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n and i r r i g a t e d , by a s e r i e s of d i t c h e s , land now owned by P i t s c h and 79 Ranch. Testimony a t t r i a l i n d i c a t e d t h a t i r r i g a t i o n by Montana C a t t l e Company stopped i n 1911 o r 1913. P i t s c h a l s o c l a i m s a s e p a r a t e water r i g h t stemming from two n o t i c e s of a p p r o p r i a t i o n f i l e d by Claude H i l l , a s u c c e s s o r i n i n t e r e s t t o 1/3 of t h e Montana C a t t l e Company water r i g h t and p r e d e c e s s o r t o P i t s c h . These n o t i c e s d i d n o t comply w i t h t h e s t a t u t o r y procedures. Testimony a t t r i a l i n d i c a t e d t h a t a few a c r e s of P i t s c h ' s land was i r r i g a t e d i n t h e 1 9 2 0 ' s . No firm evi- dence was p r e s e n t e d , however, showing e x a c t l y when t h e d i t c h e s were used, how much water they c a r r i e d , and which l a n d s were i r r i g a t e d a t which times. Vandervoort t r a c e s h i s water r i g h t from four n o t i c e s of a p p r o p r i a t i o n : 1,000 m i n e r ' s inches f i l e d i n 1902, 100 miner I s i n c h e s f i l e d i n 1909, 320 m i n e r ' s i n c h e s f i l e d on J u n e 11, 1925, and 300 i n c h e s f i l e d i n 1926. The d i s p u t e h e r e a r o s e i n t h e d r y summer of 1977. 79 Ranch and Vandervoort c l a i m t h a t when P i t s c h began i r r i g a t i n g i n J u n e of 1977, t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t water i n t h e creek f o r t h e i r c a t t l e and f i e l d s . N e g o t i a t i o n s f a i l e d and t h i s l a w s u i t followed. While t h e main i s s u e on appeal is whether the water r i g h t s claimed by P i t s c h and 79 Ranch were abandoned, P i t s c h h a s a l s o r a i s e d t h e following o t h e r i s s u e s on appeal : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by f a i l i n g t o f i n d t h a t P i t s c h ' s predecessor i n i n t e r e s t , Claude H i l l , had acquired a water r i g h t i n t h e 1 9 2 0 ' s . 2. Whether t h e District Court e r r e d by f i n d i n g t h a t B e r t S c h a f f f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e reasonable d i l i g e n c e . 3. Did t h e District Court e r r i n f i n d i n g t h a t V a n d e r v o o r t ' s r i g h t t o use 50 i n c h e s of water has a p r i o r i t y d a t e of J u n e 1, 1924? 4. Did t h e District Court e r r i n f i n d i n g t h a t 79 Ranch may a p p r o p r i a t e 45 i n c h e s of water under t h e J u n e 1 3 , 1973, n o t i c e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n f i l e d by Eugene Schaf f ? The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t t h e water r i g h t s claimed by P i t s c h and 79 Ranch had been abandoned because t h e water had not been used f o r a t l e a s t f o r t y , and perhaps a s many a s s i x t y suc- c e s s i v e y e a r s . P i t s c h and 79 Ranch argue t h a t t h e mere showing of nonuse even f o r a long period of time, is not s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g of abandonment. W e d i s a g r e e . Abandonment of a water r i g h t is a q u e s t i o n of f a c t . S e c t i o n 89-802, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, ( a p p l i c a b l e h e r e , r e p e a l e d i n 1 9 7 3 ) . Our scope of review is t h e r e f o r e l i m i t e d t o d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e r e is s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s . Bagnell v. Lemery ( 1 9 8 3 ) , Mont. - , 657 P.2d 608, 40 St.Rep. 58. Forty y e a r s of nonuse is s t r o n g evidence of an i n t e n t t o abandon a water r i g h t , and, i n e f f e c t , r a i s e s a r e b u t t a b l e presumption of abandonment. Because P i t s c h and 79 Ranch have f a i l e d t o r e b u t t h i s presumption, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g must be a f f i r m e d . The a p p r o p r i a t i o n of water is based on its b e n e f i c i a l u s e . When t h e a p p r o p r i a t o r or h i s successor i n i n t e r e s t abandons o r c e a s e s t o use t h e water f o r its b e n e f i c i a l u s e , t h e water r i g h t c e a s e s . S e c t i o n 89-802, R.C.M., 1947 ( r e p e a l e d 1973 ) . T h i s fundamental p r i n c i p l e h a s long governed t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of water r i g h t s i n Montana. I n Power v. Switzer ( 1 8 9 8 ) , 21 Mont. 523, 55 P. 32, t h i s c o n t r o l l i n g p o l i c y of b e n e f i c i a l use was e x p l a i n e d : ". . . I t has been a mistaken i d e a i n t h e minds of many, n o t f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e c o n t r o l l i n g p r i n c i p l e s a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e use of water i n a r i d s e c t i o n s , t h a t he who h a s d i v e r t e d , o r ' c l a i m e d ' and f i l e d a claim o f , w a t e r f o r any number of g i v e n i n c h e s , h a s t h e r e b y acquired a v a l i d r i g h t , good a s a g a i n s t a l l subsequent persons. But, a s t h e s e t t l e m e n t of t h e c o u n t r y h a s advanced, t h e g r e a t value of t h e use of water has become more and more a p p a r e n t . L e g i s l a t i o n and judi- c i a l e x p o s i t i o n have, a c c o r d i n g l y , proceeded w i t h i n c r e a s i n g c a u t i o n t o r e s t r i c t a p p r o p r i a t i o n s t o s p h e r e s of u s e f u l n e s s and b e n e f i c i a l purposes. A s a r e s u l t , t h e law, c r y s t a l i z e d i n s t a t u t o r y form, is t h a t an a p p r o p r i a t i o n of a r i g h t t o t h e use of running water flowing i n t h e c r e e k s must be f o r some u s e f u l o r b e n e f i c i a l purpose, and when t h e a p p r o p r i a t o r , o r h i s successor i n i n t e r e s t , abandons and c e a s e s t o use t h e water f o r such purpose, t h e r i g h t c e a s e s . ( S e c t i o n s 1880, 1881, C i v i l Code.)" 21 Mont. a t 529. Water r i g h t s have t h e r e f o r e been l i m i t e d t o t h e amount of water a c t u a l l y p u t t o a b e n e f i c i a l u s e , d e s p i t e t h e amount of water d i v e r t e d or claimed under a n o t i c e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n . See a l s o , Conrow v. Huffine ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 48 Mont. 437, 138 P. 1094; Peck v. Simon ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 101 Mont. 1 2 , 52 P.2d 164; G a l i g e r v. McNulty ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 80 Mont. 339, 260 P. 401. I n determining t h e abandonment of a water r i g h t , t h i s Court h a s o f t e n recognized t h e r u l e t h a t mere nonuse of t h e water does n o t c o n s t i t u t e abandonment. To prove abandonment, one h a s t o prove t h e o t h e r p a r t y intended t o abandon h i s water r i g h t . Atchison v. P e t e r s o n ( 1 8 7 2 ) , 1 Mont. 561, P. Tucker v. - 1 J o n e s ( 1 8 8 8 ) , 8 Mont. 225, 19 P. 571; Thomas v. B a l l ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 66 Mont. 161, 213 P. 597; M u s s e l s h e l l V a l l e y F. & L . Co. v. Cooley ( 1 9 2 9 ) , 86 Mont. 276, 283 P. 213; S t . Onge v. Blakely ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 76 Mont. 1, 245 P. 532; Shammel v. Vogl ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 144 Mont. 354, 396 P.2d 103. N e v e r t h e l e s s , s e v e r a l Montana c a s e s have a l s o recognized t h a t nonuse, while not c o n c l u s i v e , is evidence of an i n t e n t i o n t o abandon. I n Smith v. Hope Mining Co. ( 1 8 9 6 ) , 18 Mont. 432, 45 P. 632, t h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t n i n e y e a r s of nonuse " i s c e r t a i n l y v e r y p o t e n t evidence, i f it stood a l o n e , of an i n t e n t i o n t o abandon." 18 Mont. a t 438. I n our most r e c e n t case c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s i s s u e , Holmstrom Land Co. v. Meagher Cty. Newlan Creek Water D i s t r i c t ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 605 P.2d 1060, 37 St.Rep. 295, w e s t a t e d t h a t s e v e n t y - f i v e y e a r s of nonuse is " c l e a r e v i d e n c e " of abandonment. 605 P.2d a t 1069. Here, t h e evidence c l e a r l y shows a t l e a s t f o r t y y e a r s of con- t i n u o u s nonuse of t h e water r i g h t s claimed by P i t s c h and 79 Ranch. A s i n Smith and Holmstrom, such a long period of nonuse is s t r o n g evidence of an i n t e n t t o abandon t h e water r i g h t s . I n e f f e c t , such a long period of continuous nonuse r a i s e s t h e rebut- t a b l e presumption of an i n t e n t i o n t o abandon, and s h i f t s t h e bur- den of proof onto t h e nonuser t o e x p l a i n t h e reasons f o r nonuse. T h i s conclusion is h i g h l y c o n s i s t e n t with t h e fundamental p o l i c y t h a t a water r i g h t does not mean p o s s e s s i o n of a q u a n t i t y of w a t e r , b u t its b e n e f i c i a l u s . The Colorado Supreme Court r e c e n t l y expressed w e l l how t h e burden of proof s h i f t s onto t h e nonuser once a long p e r i o d of nonuse has been shown: "Under Colorado water law, abandonment of a water r i g h t r e q u i r e s a concurrence of nonuse and i n t e n t t o abandon. However, i n t e n t is t h e v e r y e s s e n c e of abandonment. . . . I n t e n t may be shown e i t h e r e x p r e s s l y o r by i m p l i c a t i o n , w i t h nonuse f o r a long p e r i o d of time being evidence of an i n t e n t t o abandon. . . . Nonuse a l o n e w i l l n o t e s t a b l i s h abandonment where t h e owner i n t r o d u c e s s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o show t h a t during t h e p e r i o d of nonuse t h e r e never was any i n t e n t i o n t o permanently d i s c o n t i n u e t h e use of water ." [ C i t a t i o n s omitted .I Beaver Park Water, I n c . v. C i t y of V i c t o r (1982 I C O ~ O . I 649 P.2d 300, 302. To r e b u t t h e presumption of abandonment, t h e r e must be e s t a b l i s h e d some f a c t o r c o n d i t i o n excusing long p e r i o d s of nonuse, n o t merely e x p r e s s i o n s of d e s i r e o r hope. C F & I S t e e l C o r p o r a t i o n v. P u r g a t o i r e River Water Conservation D i s t r i c t (Colo. 1 9 7 3 ) , 515 P.2d 456; Cundy v. Weber (S.Dak. 1 9 4 1 ) , 300 N.W. 17; C i t y of Anson v. A r n e t t (Tex. 1 9 5 2 ) , 250 S.w.2d 450. Here, P i t s c h argues t h a t h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t d i d n o t have s u f f i c i e n t funds t o i r r i g a t e . Such a broad c l a i m , u n s u p p o r t e d by more s p e c i f i c evidence, is not s u f f i c i e n t t o r e b u t t h e presumption of abandonment. I n response t o t h i s same argument, t h e Colorado Court has s t a t e d : ". . . Considering t h e l a r g e demands f o r a l l of t h e a p p r o p r i a t a b l e water i n t h i s s t a t e . . . it might be s a i d t h a t n e a r l y every abandoned water r i g h t could have its non-use j u s t i f i e d by t h e economics t h a t might p r e v a i l sometime i n t h e f u t u r e f o r use of t h i s water. . . . T h i s gleam-in-the-eye philosophy is not c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p r o t e c t i o n and p r e s e r - v a t i o n of e x i s t i n g water r i g h t s . " [ C i t a t i o n s omitted] CF & I S t e e l C o r p o r a t i o n , 515 P.2d a t 458. 79 Ranch's predecessor i n i n t e r e s t , Ralph S c h a f f , s t a t e d t h a t he was a d r y land farmer and d i d n ' t know how t o i r r i g a t e . N e i t h e r B e r t Schaf f , P i t s c h ' s p r e d e c e s s o r i n i n t e r e s t , nor Eugene S c h a f f , t h e owner of 79 Ranch, knew he had a c l a i m t o an 1893 water r i g h t when he f i l e d a n o t i c e f o r a p p r o p r i a t i o n i n 1973. The P i t s c h land may have been i r r i g a t e d i n t h e 1 9 2 0 1 s , b u t no c l e a r evidence was presented showing how much and when. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of abandonment a r e t h e r e f o r e a f f i r m e d . T h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n a p p l i e s t o t h e 1893 w a t e r r i g h t claimed by 79 Ranch, a s w e l l a s t h e 1893 and 1 9 2 0 ' s water r i g h t s claimed by P i t s c h . I t should be noted t h a t i n s e c t i o n 85-2-404, MCA, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s provided t h a t t e n s u c c e s s i v e y e a r s of nonuse w h i l e water was a v a i l a b l e c r e a t e s a prima f a c i e presumption of abandonment. T h i s presumption w i l l be a p p l i e d af t e r a l l e x i s t i n g water r i g h t s have been a d j u d i c a t e d under p a r t 2 of T i t l e 85, MCA. I n our h o l d i n g , h e r e , we a r e simply recognizing t h i s g e n e r a l , modern t r e n d , and providing an approach f o r t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of abandonment of water r i g h t s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e e x p r e s s i n t e n t of o u r l e g i s l a t u r e . On May 30, 1973, B e r t S c h a f f , P i t s c h ' s p r e d e c e s s o r i n i n t e r e s t , f i l e d a n o t i c e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n of 30 c . f . s . of w a t e r . Schaff had purchased a new s p r i n k l e r system, b u t f a i l e d t o r e c e i v e c e r t a i n n e c e s s a r y p a r t s . Under s e c t i o n 89-811, R.C. M. 1947 ( r e p e a l e d 1 9 7 3 ) , a person is r e q u i r e d t o proceed w i t h r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e t o d i v e r t t h e w a t e r . P i t s c h c l a i m s t h a t B e r t Schaf f proceeded w i t h r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e by o r d e r i n g t h e s p r i n k l e r system and t h a t f a i l u r e of d e l i v e r y r e a s o n a b l y e x p l a i n s any d e l a y . Also, Schaf f ' s n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r s a l e of h i s land postponed development of an i r r i g a t i o n system. "Reasonable d i l i g e n c e " is a q u e s t i o n of f a c t t o be determined on a case-by-case b a s i s . Montana Department of Natur a1 Resources & Conservation v. I n t a k e Water Company ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 171 Mont. 416, 558 P.2d 1110. Here, t h e D i s t r i c t Court found a lack of r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e on the p a r t of B e r t S c h a f f . Such f i n d i n g s w i l l not be d i s t u r b e d by t h i s Court u n l e s s t h e r e is a c l e a r preponderance of t h e evidence a g a i n s t them. Smith v. Krutar ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 153 Mont. 325, 457 P.2d 459. Here, t h e r e was a three-year and three-month d e l a y between t h e f i l i n g of the n o t i c e and a c t u a l d i v e r s i o n . P i t s c h a r g u e s t h e d e l a y was excusable o r r e a s o n a b l e , and t h e r e f o r e h i s claimed water r i g h t should r e l a t e back t o S c h a f f ' s f i l i n g of t h e n o t i c e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n . The t e s t is whether t h e r e was an on-going e f f o r t t o p r o s e c u t e t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of an i r r i g a t i o n system. S e e I n t a k e Water Co., s u p r a . While t h e record shows t h a t Schaf f purchased a s p r i n k l e r system, it does not show an on-going e f f o r t t o proceed t o completion and d i v e r s i o n . The o r i g i n a l s p r i n k l e r system purchased by Schaff was n e i t h e r i n s t a l l e d nor used t o d i v e r t water. P i t s c h purchased and i n s t a l l e d a whole new system. The record t h e r e f o r e s u p p o r t s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Schaf f f a i l e d t o d i l i g e n t l y p r o s e c u t e t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e s p r i n k l e r system. P i t s c h c l a i m s t h e r e is no s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t a l l 50 i n c h e s awarded t o Vandervoort has a p r i o r i t y d a t e of 1924. P i t s c h a r g u e s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e shows o n l y 30 i n c h e s w i t h a p r i o r i t y d a t e i n t h e 1 9 2 0 1 s , and t h e remaining 20 i n c h e s w i t h a p r i o r i t y d a t e of 1941. I n V i d a l v. Kensler ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 100 Mont. 592, 51 P.2d 235, t h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t t h e f i x i n g of an a r b i t r a r y d a t e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n is harmless e r r o r u n l e s s t h e o b j e c t i n g c l a i m a n t can show t h a t h i s water r i g h t a n t e d a t e s t h e d a t e f i x e d f o r a n o t h e r . Here, P i t s c h has not shown a water r i g h t p r i o r t o e i t h e r 1924 o r 1941 and t h e r e f o r e t h e e r r o r , i f any, i n s e t t i n g t h e 1924 p r i o r i t y d a t e is harmless. I t should be noted t h a t t h i s r u l e i n V i d a l - a p p l i e s o n l y when t h e p r i o r i t y d a t e and not t h e amount of water is challenged. P i t s c h p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e o n l y evidence on record shows t h a t 79 Ranch has used 30 i n c h e s of water and not 45 i n c h e s a s determined by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. While 79 Ranch f i l e d a n o t i c e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n f o r more t h a n 45 i n c h e s , a water r i g h t is d e t e r - mined by t h e e x t e n t of t h e use. I r i o n v. Hyde ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 107 Mont. 84, 81 P.2d 353. S i n c e t h e o n l y evidence on t h e record shows t h a t 79 Ranch has used 30 i n c h e s of water and not 45 i n c h e s , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s judgment must be modified a c c o r d i n g l y . I n summary, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s judgment is affirmed w i t h r e s p e c t t o V a n d e r v o o r t ' s water r i g h t s . The judgment should be modified t o reduce 79 Ranch's water r i g h t from 45 i n c h e s t o 30 i n c h e s . W e cannot a f f i r m t h e amount of P i t s c h ' s water r i g h t and t h e p r i o r i t y d a t e s e t f o r t h a t r i g h t . The D i s t r i c t Court, a f t e r f i n d i n g a l a c k of reasonable d i l i g e n c e and t h e r e f o r e no r e l a t i o n back t o 1973, a p p a r e n t l y granted P i t s c h a "use" r i g h t a s of 1976. The Water Use Act of 1973 e m p h a t i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t it contained t h e e x c l u s i v e procedures f o r a c q u i s i t i o n of a water r i g h t a f t e r 1973. S e c t i o n 89-880 (1) R.C.M., 1947 (now s e c t i o n 85-2-301, MCA.) Nothing on t h e record s u g g e s t s P i t s c h complied w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r e s of t h e Water Use Act. W e t h e r e f o r e acknowledge o n l y t h a t t h e water r i g h t s of Vandervoort and 79 Ranch precede any water r i g h t claimed by P i t s c h . Remanded f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n of accordance with t h e views e x p r e s s We concur: The Honorable Chan Ettien, District Judge, sitting in place of Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell. Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber respectfully dissents as follows : While I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent from a portion of the legal conclusions upon which it is based. The majority refers to decisions of this Court which established the rule that mere non-use of water does not constitute abandonment, and that proof of intent to abandon the water right is a necessary element in proving abandonment. That rule has been stated and restated a number of times in the cases cited in the majority opinion. In Shammel v. Vogl (1964), 144 Mont. 354, 396 P.2d 103, Chief Justice Harrison pointed out that the testimony presented by the defendants in substance showed that the ditch in question was not carrying water from 1914 to 1956. He pointed out there was other evidence presented of water in the ditch. In affirming the holding of the District Court that the ditch had not been abandoned, the Court stated: "The loss of a water right or a ditch right by abandonment is a serious occurrence in Montana and other semi-arid western states. The early case of Thomas v. Ball, 66 Mont. 161, 213 P.597, stated in this connection: 'The authorities are all of one accord in holding that the party claiming - abandonment has the burden of - - rovinq his contention a preponderance of The gidence, a t h a t s t a b l i < h abandonment theevidence to that -- -- effect should be clear and definite.' 66 Mont. 161, at 168, 213 P.597, at 600. We find no error in the court's findins that the Weidman ditch riaht had not been abandoned. 4 Mere nonuser is not sufficient to establish abandonment, a n i the testimony presented by the defendants relates exclusively-to establishinq periods of nonuser. No - - evidence -of intent to abandon is ~resented." (Emphasis supplied.) l m ~ o n t . at 362, 396 P.2d at Shammel follows many preceding cases and, in particular, the leading cases of St. Onge V. Blakely (1926) 76 Mont. 1, 245 P. 532, and Thomas v. Ball (1923) 66 Mont. 161, 213 P. 597. Shammel has not been modified or overruled by this Court. As pointed out in the majority opinion, in Holmstrom Land Co. v. Meagher County Newlan Creek (1979) Mont . I 605 P.2d 1060, 1069, 36 St.Rep. 1403, 1413, this Court stated: ". . . Seventy five years of non-use is sufficient to provide 'clear evidence' of abandonment." Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to Thorson, we concluded that all but 80 miner's inches were lost through abandonment. The majority opinion here takes a significant step in holding that not only is a long period of non-use strong evidence of intent to abandon, but that continuous non-use raises the rebuttable presumption of an intention to abandon and shifts the burden of proof to the non-user to explain the reasons for non-use. As authority for that conclusion the majority then refers to Colorado decisions. Unfortunately, the majority in this case as well as the majority in Holmstrom did not analyze Shammel and the numerous earlier cases. Prior to Holmstrom the clear rule under the decisions of this Court was that a party claiming abandonment had the burden of proving his contention by a preponderance of the evidence. Mere non-user was not sufficient to establish abandonment. While Holmstrom may be explained as merely restating a previous rule that non-use is evidence of abandonment, though not conclusive, the present majority opinion proceeds well beyond that point. As stated by the majority, a long period of continuous non-use raises the rebuttable presumption of an intention to abandon and shifts the burden of proof to the non-user. While the majority expressly did not overrule Shammel that is the effect of the opinion. Long established rights to the use of water deserve more accurate analysis and treatment. As stated in Shamrnel, the loss of a water right by abandonment is a serious occurrence in Montana. I am particularly concerned as to the effect of the majority opinion on the adjudication of water rights under Chapter 2 of Title 85, MCA. Neither the majority here nor the Holmstrom opinion demonstrates a reason for such a significant change in the long-standing rule on abandonment of water rights. The Honorable J. Chan E t t i e n , District J u d g e , d i s s e n t i n g . I d i s s e n t . A t a time when t h e f i x i n g of Montana water r i g h t s is i n a t r a n s i t i o n a l s t a g e , t h e Court is o v e r t u r n i n g a r u l e which h a s been an i n t e g r a l p a r t of Montana water law f o r almost 1 0 0 y e a r s . Tucker v. J o n e s ( 1 8 8 8 ) , 8 Mont. 225, 230, 19 P. 571. T h a t r u l e is: "non-use s t a n d i n g a l o n e is not s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h abandonment of a water r i g h t . " Mere l a p s e of time d u r i n g which t h e r e is no use does n o t c o n s t i t u t e abandonment w i t h o u t proof of a c l e a r i n t e n t i o n t o abandon. M u s s e l s h e l l V a l l e y Farming & L i v e s t o c k Co. v . Cooley ( 1 9 2 9 ) , 86 Mont. 276, 283 P. 213; Moore v. Sherman ( 1 9 1 6 ) , 52 Mont. 542, 159 P. 966; Featherman v. Hennessy ( 1 9 1 1 ) , 42 Mont. 535, 1 1 3 P. 751; Tucker v. J o n e s , 8 Mont. a t 225. Abandonment must i n c l u d e proof of i n t e n t t o abandon. Tucker v. J o n e s , s u p r a ; McCauley v. McKeig ( 1 8 8 9 ) , 8 Mont. 389, 2 1 P. 22. There must be c o n c u r r e n c e i n r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of p o s s e s s i o n and i n t e n t t o aban- don. Thomas v. B a l l ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 66 Mont. 161, 213 P. 597. S e e a l s o , I r i o n v. Hyde ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 107 Mont. 84, 8 1 P.2d 353. The r e q u i r e m e n t of i n t e n t t o abandon is a c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e of Montana water law, which h a s been upheld by t h e c o u r t s and r e l i e d upon by Montana's farmers and r a n c h e r s f o r over a c e n t u r y . The 1973 Water A c t p r o v i d e s f o r a d j u d i c a t i o n of a l l water r i g h t s claimed b e f o r e J u l y 1, 1973, t o be determined under t h e s t a t u t o r y and c a s e l a w a p p l y i n g t o a p p r o p r i a t i o n and use of w a t e r r i g h t s b e f o r e t h a t d a t e . MCA 85-2-404 r e l a t i n g t o abandonment under t h e 1973 act s t a t e d t h a t : MCA-85-2-404 ". . . d o e s n o t a p p l y t o r i g h t s u n t i l t h e y have been determined i n accordance w i t h . . ." t h e w a t e r l a w i n e x i s t e n c e p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1973. On J u l y 1, 1973, t h e r u l e was t h a t nonuser a l o n e was n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h abandonment of a water r i g h t . To me, it is clear t h e l e g i s l a t u r e wanted t h e s t a t u s quo on p r e - J u l y 1, 1973, water law t o be maintained u n t i l w a t e r r i g h t s were e s t a b l i s h e d under t h e 1973 A c t . Overturning a 100 y e a r r u l e is n o t m a i n t a i n i n g t h e s t a t u s quo. Beginning w i t h t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e 1973 Water A c t , t h i s w r i t e r , i n h i s p r a c t i c e of law, and I am s u r e o t h e r a t t o r n e y s i n t h e i r s , began t o be c o n s u l t e d by farm and ranch people on t h e i r w a t e r r i g h t s . It was not unusual t h a t an o l d a p p r o p r i a t i o n and i r r i g a t i o n system was p r e s e n t , b u t had n o t been i n use f o r many y e a r s , twenty, t h i r t y , f o r t y , f i f t y y e a r s o r more. I t was my a d v i c e , and I ' m s u r e t h e a d v i c e of my p r o f e s s i o n a l c o l l e a g u e s , t o f i l e a c l a i m of r i g h t based on such a p p r o p r i a t i o n . Such a d v i c e was grounded on t h e r u l e t h a t nonuse s t a n d i n g a l o n e could not c o n s t i t u t e t h e abandonment of a water r i g h t . Claims were made and f i l e d w i t h t h e water c o u r t s on t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e a n c i e n t law. Back i n t h e 1 9 6 0 1 s , t h e S t a t e Water Conservation Board made a w a t e r r e s o u r c e s u r v e y of t h e s t a t e . The survey covered t h e h i s t o r y of land and water use i n i r r i g a t e d a r e a s , maps showing i r r i g a t e d a r e a s , and water r i g h t d a t a of a p p r o p r i a t i o n and d e c r e e s f o r each county. It is common f o r t h e maps t o show a n c i e n t i r r i g a t i o n works "not i n u s e , " b u t which had had water a p p l i e d by t h o s e works t o i r r i g a t i o n . I t is my understanding t h a t such a n c i e n t i r r i g a t i o n works were mapped because of t h e l o n g s t a n d i n g r u l e a g a i n s t abandonment being determined s o l e l y by nonuse. Many o l d nonuse systems were worked i n t o c l a i m s f i l e d w i t h t h e water c o u r t a s e x i s t i n g r i g h t s . I n 1980, t h i s Court was faced w i t h Holmstrom LD. Co. v . Meagher County, e t a l . ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 605 P.2d 1060, 36 St.Rep. 1903. The p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t i n q u e s t i o n involved an e a r l i e r conveyance of 337 i n c h e s of water s e p a r a t e and a p a r t from l a n d . The g r a n t e e s had twenty a c r e s of land s u b j e c t t o i r r i g a - t i o n and e i g h t y i n c h e s of t h e 337 i n c h conveyance a p p l i e d . The 257 i n c h balance was never used. T h i s Court found, under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h a t t h e unusued 257 i n c h e s had been abandoned by nonuse, saying: "Seventy-f i v e y e a r s of non-use is s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o v i d e 'clear e v i d e n c e ' of abandonment." I t is w e l l a t t h i s s t a g e t o a g a i n p o i n t o u t t h a t a water r i g h t is s u b j e c t t o t r a n s f e r s e p a r a t e and detached from l a n d , as w e l l as being t r a n s f e r r e d w i t h t h e l a n d . Yellowstone V a l l e y Co. v . A s s o c i a t e d Mortgage I n v e s t o r s ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 88 Mont. 73, 290 P. 255; S t . Onge v. B l a k e l y ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 76 Mont. 1, 245 P. 532. The former is t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e of Holmstrom. A w a t e r r i g h t , t h e use of which h a s been a p p l i e d t o l a n d , becomes a p p u r t e n a n t t o t h a t l a n d . Tucker v. J o n e s , s u p r a . Nonuser of an u n a t t a c h e d r i g h t cannot become v e s t e d because it h a s n o t been a p p l i e d b e n e f i c i a l l y w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e time of i t s a c q u i s i t o n . For example, a water company h a s an unattached r i g h t which must be a p p l i e d b e n e f i c i a l l y w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e , whether it be f o r i r r i g a t i o n , d o m e s t i c , commercial o r i n d u s t r i a l u s e , o r it may be l o s t . v . T i n t i n g e r ( 1 9 1 1 ) , 4 5 Mont. 154, 177-178, 1 2 2 P. 575. I n our c a s e , b o t h t y p e s of t r a n s f e r a r e p r e s e n t . The 79 Ranch claim was by r e a s o n of Yellowstone LD. Co. I s conveyance of S e c t i o n 25 w i t h an a p p u r t e n a n t 83.33 i n c h e s of t h e Mont. Cattle Co. r i g h t . - P i t s c h claims 166.66 i n c h e s , u n a t t a c h e d , d a t e d J u n e 1, 1912, o f t h e Mont. C a t t l e a p p r o p r i a t i o n by r e a s o n of Yellowstone LD. I s conveyance of S e c t i o n 35 and 166.66 i n c h e s of t h e Mont. C a t t l e a p p r o p r i a t i o n t o Claude H i l l . Evidence i n d i c a t e d about 74.3 a c r e s was i r r i g a t e d i n t h e 1 9 2 0 ' s i n t h e n o r t h e r n p a r t of S e c t i o n 35. Thus, we have a s i t u a t i o n where about 92.3 i n c h e s of t h e Yellowstone LD. t r a n s f e r was never used f o r a p e r i o d of over s e v e n t y - f i v e y e a r s . Holmstrom f a i l s t o c o n s i d e r its e f f e c t on mining r i g h t s . L o c a t o r s of l o d e claims of t e n l o c a t e d a m i l l s i t e i n c o n j unc- t i o n w i t h t h e i r claims, and a p p r o p r i a t e d water f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e i r m i l l . The v a g a r i e s of m i n e r a l p r i c e s have o f t e n l e f t t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s i n o p e r a b l e , though ownership was m a i n t a i n e d . T h e r e a r e p a t e n t e d and o t h e r l o d e claims which, w i t h t h e i r m i l l s i t e s , have n o t operated f o r p e r i o d s up t o f i f t y , s i x t y , o r s e v e n t y y e a r s , but have p o t e n t i a l given t h e r i g h t economic con- d i t i o n s . P l a c e r o p e r a t i o n s a p p r o p r i a t e d water t o wash g o l d o r gem b e a r i n g g r a v e l s . Many such v e n t u r e s have been down f o r long y e a r s because economic c o n d i t i o n s have not j u s t i f i e d o p e r a t i o n . I t is no argument t o say s e v e n t y - f i v e y e a r s o r so of nonuse i s abandonment, because it is obvious i n such mining s i t u a t i o n s t h e owners intend t o use t h e water r i g h t i n mining o p e r a t i o n s a t some time. The m a j o r i t y cites Smith v. Hope Min. Co. ( 1 8 9 6 ) , 18 Mont. 432, 45 P. 632, i n s u p p o r t of its p o s i t i o n . The case is t o t h e c o n t r a r y . The Hope and Algonquin companies were s i l v e r producers a t P h i l i p s b u r g , Montana, which had s e t t l e d t h e i r water r i g h t s from F r o s t Creek. With t h e demonetization of s i l v e r , t h e Algonquin m i l l s h u t down b u t was kept under maintenance and s e c u r i t y f o r n i n e y e a r s o r more. I t was argued t h a t t h e Algonquin had aban- doned its water r i g h t by t h e n i n e year nonuser. The Court prefaced its remark quoted by t h e m a j o r i t y h e r e by c i t i n g t h e accepted r u l e : " . . . mere nonuser of a water r i g h t is n o t an abandonment." Smith v. Hope Min. Co. 18 Mont. a t 439, and followed t h e m a j o r i t y q u o t e w i t h t h e s e words: " I t cannot be contended f o r a moment t h a t t h e r e was a s c i n t i l l a of evidence tending t o prove t h a t t h e Algonquin Company intended t o abandon t h e m i l l . Every a c t shows t h a t they d i d n o t so i n t e n d . They d i d n o t use t h e w a t e r , simply because t h e machinery of t h e m i l l was n o t i n motion. When it t h u s appears t h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n was c l e a r l y not t o abandon t h e p r i n c i p a l e s t a t e ( t h a t is, t h e m i l l ) , we cannot hold t h a t t h e f a c t of temporary and n e c e s s a r y nonuser of t h e appurtenance ( t h a t is, t h e w a t e r ) was any evidence whatever of an i n t e n t t o abandon t h a t appurtenance. The appurtenance was a n e c e s s i t y t o t h e m i l l , and t h e i n t e n t i o n t o abandon t h a t appurtenance must c l e a r l y appear. (See c a s e s l a s t c i t e d . ) W e t h i n k t h e c o n t r a r y c l e a r l y appears i n t h i s c a s e . I f we s u s t a i n t h e f i n d i n g of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a s t o t h e abandonment, it would be holding, i n p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s , t o t h i s e f f e c t , v i z . , t h a t i f , through t h e v i c i s s i t u d e s of mining, a company f i n d s i t s e l f o b l i g e d t o c l o s e its m i l l f o r a c o n s i d e r a b l e p e r i o d , -- a p e r i o d a s long a s t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , -- t h e n , i n o r d e r t o p r e s e r v e t h e w a t e r r i g h t a p p u r t e n a n t t o t h e m i l l , they w i l l n o t be p e r m i t t e d t o a l l o w t h e water t o remain i d l e , b u t must c o n t i n u e its use. To c o n t i n u e its use t h e y must keep t h e machinery of t h e m i l l moving. These views l e a d i n t o absur- d i t i e s . They simply demonstrate t h a t , i f a m i l l i n g o r mining company is o b l i g e d t o c l o s e its m i l l , and t h u s cease t h e use of its water r i g h t f o r a p e r i o d equal t o t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , it w i l l by such an a c t be deemed t o have abandoned t h e water r i g h t , which is an a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y appurtenance t o t h e m i l l . W e cannot s u b s c r i b e t o any such d o c t r i n e a s t h i s . " One wonders what t h e Anaconda's s i t u a t i o n w i l l be w i t h its w a t e r r i g h t appurtenance t o its s m e l t e r and c o n c e n t r a t o r a t Anaconda i f it c a r r i e s o u t its announced i n t e n t i o n t o r a z e t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s t o t h e ground. I t is s a f e t o say t h a t t h e p r e s e n t owners of t h e Hope and Algonquin p r o p e r t i e s a r e holding t h e i r lode c l a i m s and millsites, even though t h e m i l l s a r e long gone, looking t o t h e day of pro- f i t a b l e o p e r a t i o n , and s t i l l c l a i m t h e i r a p p r o p r i a t i o n s t o t h e i r m i l l s i t e s . Nor, is t h e r e p r e j u d i c e t o j u n i o r u s e r s , because use of t h e w a t e r is r i g h t f u l l y t h e i r s i f t h e s e n i o r r i g h t is not being used. I t is t h e h i s t o r y of Montana water t h a t , i f t h e r e is a use f o r it, it w i l l be used. The water w i l l be of b e n e f i t t o someone. Judge McKinnon, i n f i n d i n g abandonment of t h e Montana C a t t l e C & 1983 r i g h t must have r e l i e d on Holmstrom. There is no o t h e r b a s i s f o r such r u l i n g . To a f f i r m e f f e c t s d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e o l d r u l e . The o l d r u l e had t h e q u a l i t y of being i n black and white; t h e r e was no in- between. Everyone understood. T h i s Court has now i n t r o d u c e d c o n f u s i o n and chaos t o t h e 1973 A c t . I n t h e n e x t few y e a r s w a t e r judges a r e going t o be c o n s i d e r i n g water c l a i m s r e f l e c t i n g v a r i o u s p e r i o d s of nonuser. Under Holmstrom and t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , where is t h e c u t - o f f which s a y s a g i v e n p e r i o d c o n s t i t u t e s abandonment? W e have four water judges. Is t h i s Court going t o g i v e * d i r e c t i o n t o t h e problem of nonuser, o r , w i l l each water judge be f r e e t o e s t a b l i s h h i s own cut-off r u l e ? The o l d r u l e should be kept because it is of even a p p l i c a t i o n t o a l l , and everyone is f a m i l i a r w i t h it. Holmstrom is e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . It had a detached r i g h t and its purchaser was bound w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e time t o a p p l y it t o i d e n t i f i a b l e land. B a i l e y v. T i n t i n g e r , s u p r a . He made no e f f o r t t o a p p l y more t h a n e i g h t y i n c h e s t o h i s land. A f a i l u r e t o a p p l y an u n a t t a c h e d water r i g h t t o use w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e a f t e r a c q u i s i t i o n is s u s t a i n a b l e evidence of i n t e n t t o aban- don. On t h e o t h e r hand, an extended nonuse of water t o land t o which it is a p p u r t e n a n t is not a l o n e evidence of i n t e n t t o aban- don. The p r e s e n t c a s e h a s both s i t u a t i o n s . Under t h e evidence i n t h i s c a s e , I would f i n d : (1) Under t h e o l d r u l e , t h a t t h e r e had not been abandonment of t h e one-sixth of t h e 1893 r i g h t a p p u r t e n a n t t o S e c t i o n 25-5-19 a s claimed by 79 Ranch, and t h a t it was e n t i t l e d t o o n e - s i x t h o r 83.3 i n c h e s of t h e 1893 r i g h t ; ( 2 ) t h a t 74.3 i n c h e s of t h e one-third 1893 r i g h t conveyed t o Claud H i l l thence t o P i t s c h was a p p l i e d t o t h e n o r t h e r n p a r t of S e c t i o n 35-5-19, and had n o t been abandoned; ( 3 ) t h a t 92.36 i n c h e s of t h e 1893 r i g h t conveyed t o H i l l a l o n g w i t h S e c t i o n 35 had n o t been used, and was abandoned; and ( 4 ) t h a t t h e Vandervoort r i g h t be a f f i r m e d , it being shown t h a t V a n d e r v o o r t ' s undisturbed p o s s e s s i o n and use was f o r a p e r i o d of time i n e x c e s s of t h e t i m e n e c e s s a r y t o a c q u i r e t i t l e by p r e s c r i p t i o n , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , and was s u f f i c i e n t t o v e s t r i g h t t o use of water a s of 1924. Cook v. Hudson ( 1 9 4 0 ) , 110 Mont. - : t Judqe, s i t t i n q i n p l a c e o f M r . c h i e f - ~ u s t i c e ~ ; a n k I. Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. specially concurs as follows : I concur in the result but would like to add these comments. My dissenting opinion filed in 79 Ranch, Inc. v. Pitsch (1981), Mont. , 631 P.2d 690, 38 St.Rep. 1048, accurately sets forth my views in this matter. However, upon remand to the District Court, findings of fact were made with respect to reasonable diligence and those findings bind me in reviewing this appeal. There is evidence in the record which would support a finding of reasonable diligence by Pitsch's predecessor-in- interest but I am unable to say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding lack of diligence. Therefore, I must vote to affirm though, had I been the trial judge, reasonable diligence would have been found and the Pitsch right therefore would date from 1973 and. would be exercised pursuant to filing.