Case Title: State v. Damon L. Hill

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-80-03

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Anne King owned and lived in a three-story Asbury Park home named King Manor, formerly used as a rooming house. Seventeen-year-old Damon L. Hill, defendant, as a practical matter, lived with his fourteen-year-old pregnant girlfriend, Mika Taylor. The Taylor family lived on the second- and third-floors of the house next door to King Manor. Mika s bedroom was located on the third-floor and her bedroom window was in close proximity to the ledge of a third-floor window to King Manor. Hill burglarized King Manor while the owner was away by climbing onto the ledge from Mika s window. On February 29, 1996, however, Hill broke into King Manor while King was home. Hill met up with King and bludgeoned her to death with a hammer. Detective Frank Cavalieri of the Major Crimes Unit in the Monmouth County Prosecutor s Office went to the Taylor home to investigate after noting that the only unlocked window at King Manor was on the third-floor and that Mika s bedroom window was in close proximity to the King third-floor window. While at the Taylor home, Detective Cavalieri met with Hill. Hill was subsequently arrested on an unrelated outstanding juvenile warrant. At police headquarters, Hill s mother consented to the questioning of her son and Hill waived his Miranda rights. Hill admitted to being at the Taylor home on the evening of February 29, 1996 and that he had heard King had bumped her head and died. When asked if he had entered King Manor, Hill withdrew. Hill was taken to the Youth Detention center, where he confessed to three of his fellow inmates, on three separate occasion, that he had broken into King s home looking for money, had robbed her, and then had killed her with a hammer. On September 1, 1998, the State moved to try Hill as an adult for the murder of King. That motion was granted on October 8, 1998. In May 2000, Hill was indicted for purposeful or knowing murder, felony murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, first degree armed robbery, second degree burglary, two counts of third degree burglary, two counts of fourth degree criminal trespass, third degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and fourth degree unlawful possession of a weapon. One count of third degree burglary and one count of fourth degree criminal trespass relate to an earlier burglary of King Manor and the balance of the charges relate to the events of February 29, 1996. Hill s first trial was held in March 2001. The jury acquitted him of the knowing and purposeful murder charge, but was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining charges. In October 2001, Hill was retried. This time the jury convicted Hill of felony murder, armed robbery, second degree burglary, two counts of third degree burglary, two counts of fourth degree criminal trespass, third degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and fourth degree unlawful possession of a weapon. At sentencing on January 11, 2002, the sentencing court merged Hill s third degree burglary and fourth degree trespass convictions into his conviction for first degree armed robbery; the fourth degree unlawful possession of a weapon into the conviction for third degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose; and the fourth degree criminal trespass conviction into his conviction for third degree burglary. As a result, for sentencing purposes, Hill was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility for felony murder, fifteen years imprisonment for first degree armed robbery, seven years imprisonment for third degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and four years imprisonment for third degree burglary, all of the sentences to run concurrently. Hill appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed his felony murder conviction, but vacated his convictions for third- degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, second-degree burglary, and first-degree robbery and remanded the case for modification of the sentence. State v. Hill, 365 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 2004). The Appellate Division held that, in the absence of a special verdict indicating which predicate offenses the jury found as a condition precedent to a conviction for felony murder, all of the predicate offenses of which Hill was convicted merged into the felony murder conviction. The Supreme Court granted the State s petition for certification. HELD: There is a compelling need for the use of special verdict [ ] [forms], State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 644 (1996), under Rule 3:19-1(b) for the jury to designate which felony or felonies constitute the predicate crime for a felony murder conviction. If the jury designates more than one felony as the predicate for felony murder, the trial court at sentencing is to merge only the predicate felony that set in motion the chain of events leading to the murder the first-in-time predicate felony into the felony murder conviction. 1. In this State, the statutorily defined term [c]riminal homicide is defined as the purposeful, knowing or reckless murder, manslaughter or death by auto of another human being. N.J.S.A. 2C: 11-2. Felony murder is codified at N.J.S.A. 2C: 11-3(a)(3), the primary purpose of which is to ensure that one who commits a felony should be liable for a resulting, albeit unintended, death State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 20 (1990). By definition, a conviction for felony murder must have as its predicate the commission or attempted commission of either robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape or terrorism N.J.S.A. 2C: 11-3(a)(3). Inasmuch as the crime of felony murder requires a predicate crime, when more than one predicate felony is found by the jury the question becomes whether, and to what extent, one or more of such predicate crimes merges into the felony murder conviction for sentencing purposes. (Pp. 8-10) 2. Generally, State v. Brown sets forth this Court s approach to merger issues: Convictions for lesser-included offenses, offenses that are a necessary component of the commission of another offense, or offenses that merely offer an alternative basis for punishing the same criminal conduct will merge. 138 N.J. 481, 561 (1994). In following this approach, we look to N.J.S.A. 2C 1-8a, as it establishes the legislative parameters for merger of offenses, the purpose being to avoid double punishment for a single wrongdoing. State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 637 (1996). The standard set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C 1-8a has been characterized as mechanical and a more flexible approach was pronounced in the pre-code case of State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69 (1975). Indeed, merger analyses directly impact sentencing determinations and, therefore, we also must be mindful of the overarching consideration that there can be no free crimes in a system for which the punishment shall fit the crime State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643 (1985). The quandary of which predicate crimes merge into a conviction for felony murder has led to two lines of analysis. The first, to which a number of states adhere, simply holds that an underlying predicate felony constitutes a separate offense and, hence, never merges into the felony murder conviction. The second requires that the prosecution charge each predicate offense as a separate charge of felony murder; if multiple convictions for the same death are returned by the jury, the court vacates any duplicative ones. A comparison of case law from other states yields two separate views: the single predicate felony merger view (only one predicate crime merges into the felony murder conviction) versus the multiple predicate felony merger view (all potential predicate offenses merge into the felony conviction). (Pp. 10-16) 3. Our own Appellate Division jurisprudence exemplifies the random confusion produced by these competing analyses and highlights the unevenness of our application of the merger doctrine. Our review of this jurisprudence leads us to conclude that, in the context of felony murder considerations, the best course is to simplify the merger determination. We therefore hold that there is a compelling need for the use of special verdict [ ] [forms], State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 644 (1996), under Rule 3:19-1(b) for the jury to designate which felony or felonies constitute the predicate crime for a felony murder conviction. If the jury designates more than one felony as the predicate for felony murder, the trial court at sentencing is to merge only the predicate felony that set in motion the chain of events leading to the murder the first-in-time predicate felony into the felony murder conviction. (Pp. 16-20) 4. The guiding principle here as applied to a merger analysis is clearly outlined in Rule 3:19-1(b): special interrogatories or special verdicts may be allowed when a written verdict sheet will simplify the determination of a verdict when multiple charges are submitted to the jury. In the narrow circumstances presented here, we can simplify matters and provide the trial bench with a manageable procedure to follow. An unembellished special verdict form that asks the jury to identify the predicate felony on which the jury bases its felony murder conviction is a more reasonable approach to the merger question. (Pp. 20-22) 5. In this case, there was no request for a special verdict form and the jury found Hill guilty of, among other charged offenses, felony murder and, separately, the predicate robbery and burglary felonies. Because we hold that, in a felony murder prosecution, the predicate felony that was first-in-time here, Hill s conviction for third-degree burglary under count five of the indictment must merge into the felony murder conviction, we must remand for correction and re-sentencing. (Pp. 22-24) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN, and WALLACE join in JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO s opinion. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAMON L. HILL, Defendant-Respondent. Argued November 30, 2004 Decided March 9, 2005 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is Reported at 365 N.J. Super. 463 (2004). Maura K. Tully, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Robert L. Sloan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal requires that we address a conflict in decisions from the Appellate Division and presents a discrete yet repeatedly vexing question: what, if any, predicate crimes must merge with a felony murder conviction for sentencing purposes when more than one predicate crime has been proven. We hold that there is a compelling need for the use of special verdict[] [forms], State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 644 (1996), under Rule 3:19-1(b) for the jury to designate which felony or felonies constitute the predicate crime for a felony murder conviction. If the jury designates more than one felony as the predicate for felony murder, the trial court at sentencing is to merge only the predicate felony that set in motion the chain of events leading to the murder - - the first-in-time predicate felony - - into the felony murder conviction. . . . . (3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape or terrorism . . ., and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants[.] The historical justification for the rule is that it serves as a general deterrent against the commission of violent crimes. The rationale is that if potential felons realize that they will be culpable as murderers for a death that occurs during the commission of a felony, they will be less likely to commit the felony. From this perspective, the imposition of strict liability without regard to the intent to kill serves to deter the commission of serious crimes. [State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 20 (1990) (citations omitted).] This explanation, however, does not fully address the merger considerations present when a defendant has been convicted of both felony murder and more than one predicate offense. By definition, a conviction for felony murder must have as its predicate the commission or attempted commission of either robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape or terrorism. . . . N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3). Inasmuch as the crime of felony murder requires a predicate crime, when more than one predicate felony is found by the jury the question becomes whether, and to what extent, one or more of such predicate crimes merges into the felony murder conviction for sentencing purposes. Stated differently, the question confronted by a sentencing court in these circumstances is whether all or only one of those predicate crime convictions must merge into the felony murder conviction. We, therefore, must harmonize the felony murder rule - - a crime that requires as its predicate the commission of yet another enumerated crime - - with the legal principles applicable to merger. [State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 561 (1994), overruled on other grounds, State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326 (1997) (citations omitted).] See also State v. Cole, 120 N.J. 321, 325-30 (1990) (acknowledging that merger implicates a defendant s substantive constitutional rights and reaffirming the adoption of a flexible approach in resolving merger issues. ); State v. Rodriguez, 97 N.J. 263, 271 (1984)( The application of merger can have significant penal consequences. . . . Not only does merger have sentencing ramifications, it also has a measurable impact on the criminal stigma that attaches to a convicted felon. ) In following that approach, we look to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8a, as it establishes the legislative parameters for merger of offenses. The Legislature defines the unit of prosecution or offense and ordains the punishment. In the sentencing context, the federal constitutional guarantee [against double jeopardy] is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. Similarly, merger issues implicate a defendant s substantive state constitutional rights that are rooted in principles of double jeopardy, due process, or some other legal tenet. The purpose of merger is to avoid double punishment for a single wrongdoing. The standard for merger of offenses set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8, providing that offenses are different when each requires proof of facts not required to establish the other, has been characterized as mechanical. A preferred and more flexible standard was articulated in the pre-code case of State v. Davis [where] the Court observed: Such an approach would entail analysis of the evidence in terms of, among other things, the time and place of each purported violation; whether the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under another count; whether one act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; and the consequences of the criminal standards transgressed. [State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 637-38 (1996) (citations omitted).] The preferred and more flexible standard . . . articulated in . . . State v. Davis[, 68 N.J. 69, 81 (1975)], must be tempered by the injunction that, particularly in its application to felony murder, when there is sufficient evidence to support two or more alternative felony theories, a jury need not designate which felony theory it relies on to convict one of felony murder so long as there is sufficient evidence to sustain each felony and jurors need not always be unanimous on the theory of guilt, provided they are unanimous in the finding of guilt of the offense charged. State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 562 (1995) (citations omitted; emphasis supplied). Guidance also arises from the principle that the Legislature may fractionalize a single criminal episode into separate offenses when the Legislature intends them to be punished separately and when the fractionalization does not offend constitutional principles. State v. Mirault, 92 N.J. 492, 504 (1983). Indeed, merger analyses directly impact sentencing determinations and, therefore, we also must be mindful of the overarching consideration that there can be no free crimes in a system for which the punishment shall fit the crime. . . . State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S. Ct. 1193, 89 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1986). Because the crime of felony murder, by definition, subsumes in its grasp a committed predicate crime, when, as here, more than one predicate crime is found by the jury, we must grapple with which of those predicate crimes merges into a conviction for felony murder. We are not alone in that quandary as other states similarly have wrestled with this question, often to further confusing results. At the outset, there are two lines of analysis worth noting. The first, to which a number of states adhere, simply holds that an underlying predicate felony constitutes a separate offense and, hence, never merges into the felony murder conviction. State v. Bisner, 37 P.3d 1073, 1092 (Utah 2002); State v. Ramos, 24 P.3d 95, 101-02 (Kan. 2001); Todd v. State, 917 P.2d 674, 679 (Alaska 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 966, 117 S. Ct. 391, 136 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1996); Talancon v. State, 721 P.2d 764, 768 (Nev. 1986); State v. Enmund, 476 So. 2d 165, 167-68 (Fla. 1985); State v. Blackburn, 694 S.W.2d 934, 936-37 (Tenn. 1985); State v. Close, 623 P.2d 940, 950-51 (Mont. 1981); People v. Berzups, 402 N.E.2d 1155, 1160 (N.Y. 1980). The second addresses the problem before it arises by requiring that the prosecution charge each predicate offense as a separate charge of felony murder; if multiple convictions for the same death are returned by the jury, the court vacates any duplicative ones. Waller v. United States, 531 A.2d 994, 999 n.9 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987). Two separate views -- what can be called, for ease of reference, the single predicate felony merger view versus the multiple predicate felony merger view -- can be discerned from a comparison of the case law of other states that engage in a merger analysis when more than one predicate crime also has been proven in a felony murder prosecution. The single predicate felony merger view holds that only one predicate crime merges into the felony murder conviction; the confusion arises in determining which predicate crime so merges when, as here, more than one predicate crime is proven. One school of thought in this view examines the predicate crimes on a sliding scale, with some courts merging into the felony murder conviction the predicate crime with the greatest penological implications for the defendant, while others merge into the felony conviction the predicate crime with the least penological implications for the defendant. Compare State v. Dudley, 566 S.E.2d 843, 847 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002), review denied, 378 S.E.2d 314 (2003) (merging the predicate offense with the greatest penological implications) and Thompson v. State, 426 S.E.2d 895, 897 (Ga. 1993), disapproved on other grounds, McClellan v. State, 561 S.E.2d 82, 85 (Ga. 2002) (merging the most serious predicate offense), with Small v. State, 458 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (merging the predicate offense with the least penological implications). See footnote 1 Another school of thought requires a form of but-for or causation analysis, requiring merger of that felony which most directly contributes to the death of the victim . . . . Callis v. People, 692 P.2d 1045, 1054 (Colo. 1985). Yet another branch of this view applies a first-in-time analysis, seeking for merger purposes the felony that was the initial felony which began the chain of events ultimately leading to the victim s death . . . . Munson v. Oklahoma, 758 P.2d 324, 333 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S. Ct. 820, 102 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1989). In contrast, under the multiple predicate felony merger view, all potential predicate offenses merge into the felony conviction. See Michigan v. Greve, No. 234430 2 003 WL 178786, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2003); Fisher v. State, 786 A.2d 706, 747 (Md. 2001) (Bloom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [State v. Hill, 365 N.J. Super. 463, 472 (App. Div. 2004) (citations omitted).] Most of the risks inherent in the use of special interrogatories are not present in special verdict sheets that have been properly prepared and submitted to the jury with appropriate instructions. Special verdict sheets that list only the charges and lesser-included offenses under an indictment, and do not list the elements of the offenses, are unlikely to be confusing or have any coercive effect on the jury. When multiple offenses are submitted to a jury, special verdicts are often helpful to an orderly deliberative process. The use of special verdicts was approved in State v. Petties. Furthermore, Rule 3:19-1(b) permits trial courts, in their discretion, to submit special verdicts to juries to facilitate the determination of the grade of the offense under the Code of Criminal Justice or otherwise simplify the determination of a verdict when multiple charges are submitted to the jury. Consistent with State v. Petties, State v. Simon, and Rule 3:19-1(b), when there is a compelling need for the use of special verdicts, the trial court in its discretion should use them to avoid reversal of ambiguous verdicts. [State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 643-44 (1996) (citations omitted).] That said, the guiding principle here as applied to a merger analysis is clearly outlined in Rule 3:19-1(b): special interrogatories or special verdicts may be allowed when a written verdict sheet will simplify the determination of a verdict when multiple charges are submitted to the jury. Because of the merger considerations that can and do arise as a result of a jury s determination that more than one predicate felony has been established in a felony murder prosecution, a compelling need, State v. Diaz, supra, 144 N.J. at 644, is present sufficient to overcome the general principle that the use of special verdicts in criminal cases in this State is discouraged. Id. at 643. In the narrow circumstances presented here, we can simplify matters and provide the trial bench with a manageable procedure to follow. An unembellished special verdict form that asks the jury to identify the predicate felony on which the jury bases its felony murder conviction is a more reasonable approach to the merger question. This approach does not unduly expand Rule 3:19-1(b); indeed, it is within its spirit. If the Rule permits a jury to use a special verdict when dealing with multiple charges, an often daunting task, then it follows with greater force that a jury should be allowed to provide a one-word answer when asked to identify the predicate felony. Thus, for example, in State v. Lado, supra, 275 N.J. Super. at 157, a special verdict form was allowed where there was a question of merger with respect to possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and a substantive offense committed with that weapon. Judge Stern, former Chair of our Criminal Practice Committee, writing for the panel in Lado, recognized the opinion s slight extension of Rule 3:19-1(b), stating that [w]hile R. 3:19-1(b) was adopted . . . essentially to clarify which degree of offense the jury found applicable, we see no problem with its use in this context. Id. at 158 n.10. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAMON L. HILL, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED March 9, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY