Case Title: State v. Summers

Citation: 351 N.C. 620

Docket Number: 195PA99

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 195PA99
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ALLEN T. SUMMERS, JR.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 132 N.C. App. 636,
513 S.E.2d 575 (1999), reversing a judgment entered by Read, J.,
on 9 October 1997 in Superior Court, Durham County, and remanding
for a new trial.  Heard in the Supreme Court 16 February 2000.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Isaac T. Avery,
III, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-
appellant.
The Law Offices of James D. Williams, Jr., P.A., by
James D. Williams, Jr., for defendant-appellee.
LAKE, Justice.
Defendant was stopped on 23 March 1996 for passing
another vehicle in a no-passing zone and was subsequently
arrested for driving while impaired (DWI) in violation of
N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1.  He was taken to the magistrate’s office,
where the charging officer recorded that defendant willfully
refused to submit to an Intoxilyzer breath-alcohol test. 
Defendant’s refusal was reported to the Division of Motor
Vehicles (DMV), which notified defendant that his driver’s
license was being revoked for one year, pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
16.2(d).  Defendant appealed for a hearing before DMV, at which
time the revocation was upheld.  He then appealed to civil
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superior court, and on 17 April 1996, Superior Court Judge David
Q. LaBarre overturned the revocation upon finding that defendant
did not willfully refuse to submit to the Intoxilyzer test.
 Defendant was found guilty of DWI in criminal district
court on 7 October 1996 and appealed to superior court for a
trial de novo.  The trial court denied his motion in limine to
exclude evidence relating to his alleged refusal to submit to the
breath-alcohol test.  Defendant was tried before a jury at the 7
October 1997 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Durham County. 
The jury found defendant guilty of DWI, and he appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals issued a unanimous decision
granting defendant a new trial.  The court held the doctrine of
collateral estoppel prevented relitigation of the question of
whether defendant willfully refused to submit to an Intoxilyzer
test because that issue had been conclusively decided on appeal
to civil superior court from defendant’s driver’s license
revocation by DMV.  State v. Summers, 132 N.C. App. 636, 645, 513
S.E.2d 575, 581 (1999).  On appeal to this Court, the State
contends the Court of Appeals erred in applying the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.  We disagree.
The question of whether defendant did, in fact,
willfully refuse to submit to an Intoxilyzer test is irrelevant
to the determination of this appeal.  The only issue before this
Court is whether a civil superior court determination, on appeal
from an administrative hearing, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 20-
16.2(e), regarding an allegation of willful refusal, estops the
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relitigation of that same issue in a defendant’s criminal
prosecution for DWI.
Under North Carolina law, “[a]ny person who drives a
vehicle on a highway or public vehicular area thereby gives
consent to a chemical analysis if charged with an implied-consent
offense,” which includes an offense involving impaired driving. 
N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(a) (1999).  If an individual charged with an
implied-consent offense willfully refuses to submit to chemical
analysis, after being informed of the consequences of willful
refusal, in accord with N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2, the charging officer
must execute an affidavit to that effect, pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 20-16.2(c).  Upon receipt of the affidavit, DMV must
expeditiously notify the person charged that his or her license
to drive is revoked for twelve months.  N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(d). 
The person charged may request a hearing by a DMV hearing
officer, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(d), and, if the
revocation is sustained, he or she has the right to a hearing de
novo in superior court.  N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(e).
In the case sub judice, DMV revoked defendant’s license
on the basis of an alleged willful refusal to submit to an
Intoxilyzer test.  Defendant’s revocation was sustained through
all stages of administrative review, and defendant filed a
petition for a hearing de novo in superior court.  At the civil
court hearing, with the State Attorney General’s office
representing DMV, Judge LaBarre made findings of fact supporting
the conclusion of law that defendant “did not willfully refuse to
submit to a chemical analysis upon the request of the charging
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officer” and, on that basis, dismissed the revocation order.  The
State did not appeal the trial court’s ruling, which accordingly
became the law of the case.  This Court must now determine
whether the trial court’s ruling became conclusive in defendant’s
criminal trial for DWI.
The companion doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel have been developed
by the courts of our legal system during
their march down the corridors of time to
serve the present-day dual purpose of
protecting litigants from the burden of
relitigating previously decided matters and
of promoting judicial economy by preventing
needless litigation.
Thomas M. McInnis & Assocs. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 427, 349
S.E.2d 552, 556 (1986).  The doctrine of collateral estoppel,
also referred to as “issue preclusion” or “estoppel by judgment,”
precludes relitigation of a fact, question or right in issue
“when there has been a final judgment or
decree, necessarily determining [the] fact,
question or right in issue, rendered by a
court of record and of competent
jurisdiction, and there is a later suit
involving an issue as to the identical fact,
question or right theretofore determined, and
involving identical parties or parties in
privity with a party or parties to the prior
suit.”
 
King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 355, 200 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1973)
(quoting Masters v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520, 524, 124 S.E.2d 574,
576 (1962)).  The doctrine of collateral estoppel “‘is designed
to prevent repetitious lawsuits over matters which have once been
decided and which have remained substantially static, factually
and legally.’”  Id. at 356, 200 S.E.2d at 805 (quoting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599, 92
L. Ed. 898, 907 (1948)).  “‘[W]hen a fact has been agreed upon or
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decided in a court of record, neither of the parties shall be
allowed to call it in question, and have it tried over again at
any time thereafter, so long as the judgment or decree stands
unreversed.’”  Id. at 355, 200 S.E.2d at 804 (quoting Dunstan,
256 N.C. at 523-24, 124 S.E.2d at 576).
The requirements for the identity of issues to which
collateral estoppel may be applied have been established by this
Court as follows:  (1) the issues must be the same as those
involved in the prior action, (2) the issues must have been
raised and actually litigated in the prior action, (3) the issues
must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the
prior action, and (4) the determination of the issues in the
prior action must have been necessary and essential to the
resulting judgment.  Id. at 358, 200 S.E.2d at 806.  Here, there
is no dispute as to “the issue” element of collateral estoppel. 
The State does not contest that “the issue” is whether there was
willful refusal, that it was raised and litigated and that it was
material and necessary to the resulting judgment in defendant’s
appeal of his license revocation.  Therefore, it is unnecessary
to further analyze the collateral estoppel element of issue
identity.
Unlike issue identity, the rules for determining
whether the parties in question are or were in privity with
parties in the prior action are not as well defined.  Except in
cases where the parties in each claim are identical, the meaning
of “privity” for the purpose of collateral estoppel is “somewhat
elusive . . . [and] ‘[t]here is no definition of the word
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“privity” which can be applied in all cases.’”  Hales v. N.C.
Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 337 N.C. 329, 333-34, 445 S.E.2d 590, 594
(1994) (quoting Dunstan, 256 N.C. at 524, 124 S.E.2d at 577). 
“In general, ‘privity involves a person so identified in interest
with another that he represents the same legal right’” previously
represented at trial.  State ex rel. Tucker v. Frinzi, 344 N.C.
411, 417, 474 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1996) (quoting 47 Am. Jur. 2d
Judgments § 663 (1995)).  “Whether or not a person was a party to
a prior suit ‘must be determined as a matter of substance and not
of mere form.’”  Grindstaff, 284 N.C. at 357, 200 S.E.2d at 806
(quoting Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U.S.
611, 618, 70 L. Ed. 757, 763 (1926)).  “‘The courts will look
beyond the nominal party whose name appears on the record as
plaintiff and consider the legal questions raised as they may
affect the real party or parties in interest.’”  Id. (quoting
Davenport v. Patrick, 227 N.C. 686, 688, 44 S.E.2d 203, 205
(1947)).
This Court previously determined the question of
privity between an attorney general in a civil action and a
district attorney in a criminal action in State ex rel. Lewis v.
Lewis, 311 N.C. 727, 319 S.E.2d 145 (1984).  In Lewis, there was
privity and commonality of interest between the State in its
criminal prosecution for nonsupport and the State in its civil
action for indemnification of its payments of support to
defendant’s children.  This Court concluded that the State was
not a nominal party in either action, and that the defendant was
collaterally estopped from litigating the underlying issue of
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paternity in a civil action after the issue had been fully
litigated in the criminal action.  Id. at 734, 319 S.E.2d at 150.
In the instant case, the State contends the district
attorney, representing the State in defendant’s criminal
prosecution for DWI, was not in privity with the Attorney
General, representing the State in defendant’s appeal to civil
superior court from his license revocation.  However, there can
be no question that the district attorney and the Attorney
General both represent the interests of the people of North
Carolina, regardless of whether it be the district attorney in a
criminal trial court or the Attorney General in a civil or
criminal appeal.  See N.C.G.S. § 114-2(1), (2), (4) (1999);
N.C.G.S. § 7A-61 (1999); Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 368, 451
S.E.2d 858, 865 (1994).
The State also contends the Attorney General’s interest
in the revocation proceeding, “to remove from the highway one who
is a potential danger to himself and other travelers,” State v.
Carlisle, 285 N.C. 229, 232, 204 S.E.2d 15, 16 (1974), is
significantly different from a district attorney’s interest in
criminally prosecuting an individual for DWI, which is to seek
justice and punish offenders.  We find this argument
unconvincing.  The State’s “interest” in this case is not the
consequence of the outcome of the civil appeal or criminal
action, i.e., license revocation or criminal punishment.  It is
the common interest in protecting the citizens of North Carolina
from drunk drivers which supports a finding of privity between
the Attorney General and a district attorney in judicial actions
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involving the determination of whether there was a willful
refusal to submit to an Intoxilyzer test.  Accordingly, as in
Lewis, we conclude the State’s interest was fully represented in
the civil action and, therefore, the privity element of
collateral estoppel was met.
Finally, the State argues that even if the requirements
for collateral estoppel are met, the application of the
judicially created doctrine in this case is inconsistent with the
legislative intent to independently regulate DWI prosecution and
driver’s license revocation.  The State contends the General
Assembly could not have intended the outcome of one to offset the
admissibility of evidence in the other.  However, a review of the
statutory language of sections 20-16.2 and 20-139.1, the primary
sections prescribing the procedures for conducting chemical
analysis and the civil and criminal consequences of the analysis,
indicates a commonality of purpose and reflects direct cross-
reference and reliance between the two.  Section 20-16.2 requires
that an individual obtaining blood samples for analysis meet the
qualification outlined in section 20-139.1, and that a person
requesting administration of a chemical analysis of his or her
breath be given chemical analysis in accordance with the
procedures of section 20-139.1(b).  N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b), (i). 
Likewise, section 20-139.1 specifically states that a chemical
analysis performed by an arresting officer or by a charging
officer under the terms of section 20-16.2 is not valid unless it
is performed in accordance with the provisions of section 20-
139.1(b).  N.C.G.S. § 20-139.1(b) (1999).  Section 20-139.1(b3)
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also establishes the need for sequential breath tests in chemical
analysis and provides that a person’s willful refusal to give
sequential breath samples constitutes a willful refusal under
section 20-16.2.  N.C.G.S. § 20-139.1(b3).  These are only a few
of the reciprocal references outlined in sections 20-16.2 and 20-
139.1; however, they establish the State’s common interest, from
both a civil and criminal perspective, in the proper
administration of chemical analysis and in the outcome of that
analysis.
In appealing from the opinion of the Court of Appeals,
the State urges this Court to reinstate the precedent established
in Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226, 182 S.E.2d 553 (1971).  In
Joyner, this Court stated:
“It is well established that the same motor
vehicle operation may give rise to two
separate and distinct proceedings.  One is a
civil and administrative licensing procedure
instituted by the Director of Motor Vehicles
to determine whether a person’s privilege to
drive is revoked.  The other is a criminal
action instituted in the appropriate court to
determine whether a crime has been committed. 
Each action proceeds independently of the
other, and the outcome of one is of no
consequence to the other.”
Id. at 238, 182 S.E.2d at 562 (quoting Ziemba v. Johns, 183 Neb.
644, 646, 163 N.W.2d 780, 781 (1968)).  We stand by Joyner and do
not perceive that our analysis of the issue at hand has any
bearing on its rationale or holding.  The instant case is not
one, as it was in Joyner, where the outcome of a civil
administrative proceeding, in which the Attorney General did not
participate, is being submitted as determinative in a judicial
proceeding.  To the contrary, this case is focused on a prior
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civil judicial determination of one specific issue, in which the
Attorney General did participate, and how that prior
determination impacts a judicial criminal prosecution involving
that very same issue.  Cf. Brower v. Killens, 122 N.C. App. 685,
472 S.E.2d 33 (1996) (finding of no probable cause in judicial
criminal proceeding given preclusive effect within subsequent
judicial civil proceeding involving same issue), disc. rev.
improvidently allowed per curiam, 345 N.C. 625, 481 S.E.2d 86
(1997).  The holding of this Court in Joyner, that the civil
administrative license revocation process and the criminal
judicial proceedings in a DWI case are separate actions, does not
relate to the issue involved here.
In the case sub judice, all of the elements of
collateral estoppel were satisfied:  the interests of the State
were represented in the civil appeal by the Attorney General, the
district attorney is in privity with the Attorney General, and
the issue in interest between the Attorney General in the civil
action and the district attorney in the criminal action was
material and relevant to the disposition of the civil action and
was fully litigated.  Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals’
holding that the State was collaterally estopped from
relitigating the issue of willful refusal when the prior court
had determined as a matter of law that a refusal, in fact, did
not exist.  Summers, 132 N.C. App. at 645, 513 S.E.2d at 581.  We
also affirm the Court of Appeals’ determination that the holding
in this case is “limited to collaterally estopping the
relitigation of issues in a criminal DWI case when those exact
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issues have been litigated in a civil license revocation hearing
with the Attorney General representing DMV in superior court.”
Id.
AFFIRMED.