Case Title: In re Jennings

Citation: 

Docket Number: S115009

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2004-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 8/23/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
S115009 
In re MICHAEL LEE JENNINGS 
) 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C041479 
 
on Habeas Corpus. 
 ) 
 
 
) 
Sacramento County 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Super. Ct. No. 00M07614 
Petitioner invited some guests to his home and served them alcoholic 
beverages.  One of the guests, only 19 years old, after leaving the party caused an 
automobile accident resulting in serious injury.  Charged with violating Business 
and Professions Code1 section 25658, subdivision (c) (section 25658(c)), which 
prohibits the purchase of an alcoholic beverage for someone under 21 years old 
who, after drinking, proximately causes death or great bodily injury, petitioner 
sought to defend against the charge by claiming he did not know his guest was 
under the legal drinking age and in fact believed he was over 21 years old.  The 
trial court and two levels of appellate courts ruled that because knowledge of age 
is not an element of the crime, a mistake of fact as to age is not a defense.  We 
agree the People need not prove knowledge of age to establish a violation of 
section 25658(c), but we conclude petitioner was entitled to defend against the 
charge by claiming a mistake of fact as to age.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment.   
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code 
unless otherwise stated. 
 
 
2
FACTS2 
On May 30, 2000, petitioner Michael Jennings, a supervisor for Armor 
Steel Company in Rio Linda, invited coworkers Charles Turpin, Curtis Fosnaugh, 
Daniel Smith and Donald Szalay to his home to view a videotape demonstrating 
some new machinery the company was to obtain.  Szalay stopped at a convenience 
store and bought a 12-pack of beer to bring to the gathering.  At petitioner’s 
direction, his wife went to a store and purchased another 12-pack of beer.  The 
five men sat in the garage and drank beer.  
Some time later, the men went into the house where they watched the 
videotape and drank more beer.  Around 6:00 p.m., the party broke up.  Fosnaugh 
left driving a white Ford pickup truck.  Turpin then left driving his Volkswagen 
Beetle, accompanied by Smith.  Fosnaugh stopped at a stop sign at the intersection 
of E Street and 20th Street in Rio Linda.  Turpin, intending to overtake and pass 
Fosnaugh on the left without stopping at the intersection, drove on the wrong side 
of the road.  By his own estimate, Turpin was driving around 55 miles per hour.  
Unaware of Turpin’s intention to pass on the left, Fosnaugh attempted to make a 
left turn, resulting in a major collision and serious injuries to Turpin, Smith and 
Fosnaugh. 
Turpin, who had to be pried from his car with the Jaws of Life, told police 
responding to the scene that he drank about seven beers between 4:00 and 
6:00 p.m.  The results of a preliminary alcohol screening test indicated Turpin had 
a blood-alcohol concentration of .124 percent.  Later at the hospital, a blood test 
                                             
 
2  
Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial and submitted his case on the 
police report.  The facts are drawn largely from that report. 
 
 
3
determined Turpin’s blood-alcohol concentration to be .16 percent.  Turpin was 19 
years old.  Fosnaugh was 20 years old.  
Petitioner was charged with violating section 25658(c), purchasing alcohol 
for someone under 21 years old who consumes it and “thereby proximately causes 
great bodily injury or death to himself, herself, or any other person.”  The People 
moved in limine to exclude evidence that petitioner was unaware Turpin was not 
yet 21 years of age.  Petitioner opposed the motion and made an offer of proof that 
he was ignorant of Turpin’s age.  Specifically, petitioner alleged that a few weeks 
before the accident, he was with several coworkers drinking beer in front of a local 
market after work when a police officer arrived and confronted Turpin, who was 
holding a beer.  Petitioner alleged he heard Turpin tell the officer he was 22 years 
old.  In addition, petitioner alleged that, although he was Turpin’s supervisor, he 
did not process Turpin’s employment application (which did not, in any event, 
have a space for the applicant’s age), and Turpin’s employment file did not have a 
photocopy of his driver’s license. 
The trial court granted the People’s motion, ruling that section 25658(c) 
was a strict liability offense and ignorance of Turpin’s age was not a defense.  
Petitioner then submitted the case on the police report subject to a reservation of 
the right to challenge on appeal the correctness of the trial court’s evidentiary 
ruling.  The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged.  The court sentenced him 
to six months in jail, with sentence suspended and probation granted on conditions 
including service of 60 days in jail.   
DISCUSSION 
A.  Background 
The regulation of alcoholic beverages in this country has taken a long and 
twisting path (see U.S. Const., 18th Amend. [prohibiting “the manufacture, sale, or 
 
 
4
transportation of intoxicating liquors” within the U.S.]; id., 21st Amend. 
[repealing the 18th Amend.]), but regulation has now devolved to the states, 
who “enjoy broad power under § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate 
the importation and use of intoxicating liquor within their borders.”  (Capital 
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp (1984) 467 U.S. 691, 712.)  One active area of 
California’s regulation of alcoholic beverages concerns underage drinkers.  No 
citation to authority is necessary to establish that automobile accidents by 
underage drinkers lead to the injuries and deaths of thousands of people in this 
country every year.  Nevertheless, the statistics are sobering.  “In 2002, 24% of 
drivers ages 15 to 20 who died in motor vehicle crashes had been drinking 
alcohol.”  (http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/drving.htm [as of Aug. 23, 2004].)  
“Analysis of data from 1991–1997 found that, consistently, more than one in three 
teens reported they had ridden with a driver who had been drinking alcohol in the 
past month.  One in six reported having driven after drinking alcohol within the 
same one-month time period.”  (http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/teenmvh.htm 
[as of Aug. 23, 2004].)  “In 2002, 25 percent of 16–20-year-old passenger vehicle 
drivers fatally injured in crashes had high blood alcohol concentrations (0.08 
percent or more).  Teenage drivers with BACs in the 0.05-0.08 percent range are 
far more likely than sober teenage drivers to be killed in single-vehicle crashes—
17 times more likely for males, 7 times more likely for females.  At BACs of 0.08-
0.10, risks are even higher, 52 times for males, 15 times for females.”  
(http://www.hwysafety.org/safety%5Ffacts%20qanda/underage.htm [as of 
Aug. 23, 2004].)  
Given these facts, that our laws shield young people from the dangers of 
excess alcohol consumption is no surprise.  Our state Constitution establishes the 
legal drinking age at 21, three years past the age of legal majority (see, e.g., Cal. 
Const., art. II, § 2 [must be at least 18 years old to vote]; Fam. Code, § 6500 [a 
 
 
5
“minor” is one under 18 years old]; Prob. Code, § 3901, subd. (a) [“adult” defined 
as one “who has attained the age of 18 years”]), both for purchases and personal 
consumption at on-sale premises.  (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 22.)  The “likely 
purpose” of this constitutional provision “is to protect such persons from exposure 
to the ‘harmful influences’ associated with the consumption of such beverages.”  
(Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561, 
567.) 
The Legislature has implemented this constitutional mandate in a number 
of ways.  For example, section 25658, subdivision (a) (§ 25658(a)) makes it a 
misdemeanor to sell or furnish an alcoholic beverage to any person under the age 
of 21 years.  Section 25658, subdivision (b) makes it a misdemeanor for an 
underage person to buy alcohol or consume an alcoholic beverage in any on-sale 
premises.  Under a new law enacted in 2003, a parent who permits his or her 
minor child to drink an intoxicating beverage can under some circumstances be 
guilty of a misdemeanor.  (§ 25658.2.)3 
                                             
 
3  
Section 25658.2 provides:  “(a) A parent or legal guardian who knowingly 
permits his or her child, or a person in the company of the child, or both, who are 
under the age of 18 years, to consume an alcoholic beverage or use a controlled 
substance at the home of the parent or legal guardian is guilty of [a] misdemeanor 
if all of the following occur: 
 
“(1) As the result of the consumption of an alcoholic beverage or use of a 
controlled substance at the home of the parent or legal guardian, the child or other 
underage person has a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.05 percent or greater, as 
measured by a chemical test, or is under the influence of a controlled substance. 
 
“(2) The parent knowingly permits that child or other underage person, 
after leaving the parent’s or legal guardian’s home, to drive a vehicle. 
 
“(3) That child or underage person is found to have caused a traffic 
collision while driving the vehicle.” 
 
 
6
Of course, an underage person creates a potentially deadly situation when 
he or she drives after imbibing.  Addressing that situation, the Legislature has 
provided penalties for persons under the age of 21 who drive with a blood-alcohol 
concentration much less than that prohibited for persons over 21 years old.  For 
example, the Legislature has enacted what has been termed a “zero tolerance” law 
(Coniglio v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 666, 673), 
making it unlawful for a person under 21 years old to operate a motor vehicle with 
as little as a 0.01 percent blood-alcohol concentration as measured by a 
preliminary alcohol screening device (Veh. Code, §§ 23136, 13390).  Violation of 
this law carries civil penalties.  An underage person who drives with a 0.05 
percent blood-alcohol concentration is subject to a one-year loss of driving 
privileges as well as other administrative liabilities (id., §§ 23140, 13202.5, subds. 
(a) & (d)(4), 13352.6; see also id., § 23224 [possession of alcoholic beverages by 
an underage driver].)  A driver 21 years old or older, by contrast, is not subject to 
criminal penalties until his or her blood-alcohol concentration rises to 0.08 percent 
or more.  (Id., § 23152, subd. (b).)  Irrespective of his or her blood-alcohol 
concentration, of course, a person of any age is subject to criminal penalties if he 
or she drives while “under the influence of any alcoholic beverage.”  (Id., § 23152, 
subd. (a).)   
Specifically addressing the circumstance where an individual purchases 
alcohol for an underage person, section 25658(c) makes such purchase punishable 
where the underage person, as a consequence of consuming the alcohol, causes 
great bodily injury or death to anyone.  Though just a misdemeanor, the offense is 
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for a minimum of six months, by a 
fine of up to $1,000, or both.  (§ 25658, subd. (e)(3).) 
Section 25658(c) does not explicitly require that the offender have 
knowledge, intent, or some other mental state when purchasing the alcoholic 
 
 
7
beverage, and this lacuna forms the basis of the present dispute.  The question is 
whether we should construe the statute to require some mental state as a necessary 
element of the crime.  Preliminary to that question is a determination of what acts 
the section prohibits, for if petitioner’s actions did not violate section 25658(c), his 
knowledge or mental state would be irrelevant. 
B.  What Acts Does Section 25658(c) Prohibit? 
To determine the meaning of section 25658(c), we look to the intent of the 
Legislature in enacting the law, “being careful to give the statute’s words their 
plain, commonsense meaning.  [Citation.]  If the language of the statute is not 
ambiguous, the plain meaning controls and resort to extrinsic sources to determine 
the Legislature’s intent is unnecessary.”  (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County 
Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 919.)  Additionally, we must 
interpret section 25658(c) in context with the entire statute and the statutory 
scheme.  (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 743.) 
Section 25658(c) provides in full:  “Any person who violates subdivision 
(a) by purchasing an alcoholic beverage for a person under the age of 21 years and 
the person under the age of 21 years thereafter consumes the alcohol and thereby 
proximately causes great bodily injury or death to himself, herself, or any other 
person, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”  Subdivision (a), in turn, states that “every 
person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, 
any alcoholic beverage to any person under the age of 21 years is guilty of a 
misdemeanor.”  Consequently, subdivision (c) prohibits the selling, furnishing or 
giving away of alcohol to an underage person, but only in the circumstance therein 
specified, namely, by “purchasing” such beverage “for” an underage person.  Only 
persons who (1) furnish or give away alcoholic beverages, (2) by purchasing such 
beverages, (3) for an underage person can be guilty of violating section 25658(c). 
 
 
8
Section 25658(c) plainly embraces the situation in which an underage 
person, loitering in front of a liquor store, asks an approaching adult to buy 
alcoholic beverages for him or her, commonly known as the “shoulder tap” 
situation (see Yu v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 286, 293 
[describing how “minors tap adults on the shoulder” as they enter a market and 
“get them to buy liquor for the minors”]) or, more colloquially, “shoulder tapping” 
(http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=shoulder+tapping [as of 
Aug. 23, 2004]).  In such situations, that the buyer “purchas[ed] an alcoholic 
beverage for a person under the age of 21 years” (italics added) in violation of 
section 25658(c) is not open to doubt.  Used in this sense, the statutory phrase 
“purchas[e] . . . for” means the offender must stand in the shoes of the underage 
person and act as a buyer by proxy; the word “for” in this case means “in place 
of.”  (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 886, col. 2 [giving example of 
definition 5a:  “go to the store [for] me”].) 
That the Legislature’s attention was focused on the phenomenon of 
shoulder tapping when it enacted section 25658(c) is clear from the legislative 
history.  (In re J. W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 211 [“To determine the purpose of 
legislation, a court may consult contemporary legislative committee analyses of 
that legislation, which are subject to judicial notice”].)  Subdivision (c) of section 
25658 began as Assembly Bill No. 2029 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.), introduced by 
Assemblyman Keeley on February 18, 1998.  When the bill was introduced in the 
Assembly Committee on Public Safety on April 14, 1998, the author’s comments 
were incorporated into the bill’s analysis:  “ ‘Last July, a tragedy occurred in the 
district I represent which brought to my attention the high level of access that 
minors have to alcohol.  Three minors died in a drunk driving accident, in which 
the driver, a minor, had consumed alcohol that was purchased for him by an adult.  
The adult served 30 days in a county jail and the driver of the car is serving an 
 
 
9
eight-year sentence in state prison.  [¶] According to the United Way, nationwide, 
62% of 12th graders have been drunk.  In Santa Cruz County alone, 95% of 11th 
graders say that they could easily obtain alcohol if they wanted to.  One of the top 
ways in which minors gain access to alcohol is by ‘shoulder tapping,’ or asking an 
adult, often in front of a liquor store, to purchase alcohol for a minor.  [¶] Adults 
who do this must be held responsible for their actions.  The intention of 
[Assembly Bill No.] 2029 is to provide an effective deterrent to adults who are 
irresponsible enough to buy alcohol for minors.’ ”  (Assem. Com. on Public 
Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2029 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 14, 1998, 
italics added.)  The Superintendent of the San Lorenzo Unified School District 
provided a similar argument in support of the bill.  (Ibid.)  Assemblyman Keeley’s 
statement was later included in the state Senate’s bill analysis.  (Sen. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1204 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) June 23, 
1998.)4  No contrary statements of intent appear in any of the legislative history of 
these bills. 
Whether the statute is limited to the shoulder tap situation or embraces 
other circumstances is a more difficult question.  The archetypal shoulder tap 
scenario involves strangers, a request from an underage person, a business 
establishment that sells alcohol, and no intent on the buyer’s part to share in 
drinking the purchased beverage.  But does the statute apply when, for example, a 
parent, without solicitation, goes to a grocery store and buys beer for her underage 
son?  In that hypothetical situation, as apparently in the instant case, no actual 
request to purchase the alcohol is made.  Or does the statute apply when an adult 
                                             
 
4  
By this time, Assembly Bill No. 2029 had been incorporated into Assembly 
Bill No. 1204 for technical procedural reasons. 
 
 
10
attending a baseball game announces he is going to the concession stand and at the 
request of an underage friend brings him back a beer?  Although that situation 
involves a request to purchase, the participants (as in this case) are not strangers.  
Further, does section 25658(c) apply if an adult purchases beer for himself but 
days later gives one to an underage guest?  In that case, no intent to purchase for a 
third party exists at the time of sale, but the purchaser later provides the alcohol to 
an underage person.  Finally, does the statute apply to the social party host who 
purchases alcoholic beverages generally for a party but not for any particular 
guest?  In that situation, the host certainly purchased the beverages for the party,5 
but did he do so for a particular underage guest?   
In resolving the meaning of section 25658(c), we must be careful not to add 
requirements to those already supplied by the Legislature.  (Robert F. Kennedy 
Medical Center v. Belshé (1996) 13 Cal.4th 748, 756.)  “Where the words of the 
statute are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that 
does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.”  (Burden 
v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562.)  Here, although the Legislature was 
focused on the shoulder tap scenario, the language of section 25658(c) is not so 
limited.  Section 25658(c) imposes no requirement that the underage person make 
a request to a proxy to buy alcohol, nor that the two principal actors be unknown 
to each other.  Nor is there a statutory requirement that the underage person wait 
outside the place of sale or that the buyer have no intention to share the beverage.  
                                             
 
5  
In fact, party guest Szalay purchased some of the beer, and petitioner’s wife 
purchased the remainder, at petitioner’s request.  Presumably petitioner’s 
culpability as a purchaser of intoxicating beverages flows from his status as an 
aider and abettor, an issue we need not decide here inasmuch as he essentially 
entered a “slow plea” of guilty by submitting the case on the police report. 
 
 
11
The statute requires only that the offender “purchas[e]” an alcoholic beverage 
“for” an underage person.  That event can occur in a variety of settings.  In short, 
section 25658(c) embraces more than merely shoulder tapping. 
Nevertheless, some limits are apparent when we consider section 25658(c) 
together with section 25658(a).  (See Renee J. v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.4th 
at p. 743.)  As indicated, subdivision (a) of section 25658 sweeps more broadly 
than does subdivision (c), criminalizing the selling, furnishing, or giving of 
alcoholic beverages “to any person under the age of 21” (italics added), whereas 
subdivision (c) criminalizes the violation of subdivision (a) “by purchasing an 
alcoholic beverage for a person under the age of 21 years” (italics added).  
Viewing together these two subdivisions of the same statute, it is apparent the acts 
prohibited by subdivision (c) involve a subset of the universe of possible situations 
in which one might violate subdivision (a).  The Legislature’s use of the phrase 
“purchas[e] . . . for” delineates a smaller group of prohibited actions by identifying 
specific goal-directed behavior by the purchaser of alcoholic beverages, involving 
an identified and particular underage person.  In other words, to violate section 
25658(c), one must not only furnish alcohol to an underage person, one must 
purchase the alcohol for that person.   
Although section 25658(a) clearly embraces the social party host (because 
such persons furnish or give away alcoholic beverages to their guests), the 
generalized actions of the typical social party host, providing libations for his or 
her guests, do not run afoul of the more specific section 25658(c) because, as a 
general matter, such hosts cannot be said to have purchased alcohol “for” any 
 
 
12
particular guest.6  Although a social host could be said to have purchased alcoholic 
beverages for every one of his or her guests, such an interpretation would be 
unreasonable, as in that case, “purchase for” would mean the same as “furnish to,” 
blurring the distinction between the two subdivisions.  As used in section 
25658(c), the term “for” is “used as a function word to indicate the person . . . that 
something is to be delivered to.”  (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict., supra, p. 886, 
col. 2 [giving example of definition 3d:  “any letters [for] me”].)   
In light of the plain meaning of the statutory language, we conclude section 
25658(c) applies to any situation in which an individual purchases alcoholic 
beverages for an underage person.  This includes, but is not limited to, the buyer-
by-proxy and shoulder tap scenarios.  We now consider whether section 25658(c), 
so interpreted, requires proof of some mental state such as knowledge of age. 
C.  Knowledge of Age 
1.  Section 25658(a) 
Because section 25658(c) describes a subset of actions prohibited by 
section 25658(a),7 if subdivision (a) requires the People to prove a violator knew 
the age of the person to whom alcohol was furnished, such proof would also be 
required to show a violation of subdivision (c).  Conversely, if subdivision (a) is a 
strict liability offense, lacking any knowledge requirement, that fact would weigh 
heavily in our determination whether subdivision (c) requires proof of knowledge.  
                                             
 
6  
We thus disagree with the People’s position, stated at oral argument, that to 
ensure one does not violate section 25658(c), a social host can simply choose not 
to serve alcoholic beverages. 
7  
Of course, subdivision (c) has the additional requirement that the underage 
person actually consume the alcohol “and thereby proximately causes great bodily 
injury or death to himself, herself, or any other person.”  Strictly speaking, then, 
subdivision (c) is not a lesser included offense of subdivision (a). 
 
 
13
We thus consider whether section 25658(a) requires such proof.  We conclude it 
does not. 
For criminal liability to attach to an action, the standard rule is that “there 
must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.”  
(Pen. Code, § 20.)  “[T]he requirement that, for a criminal conviction, the 
prosecution prove some form of guilty intent, knowledge, or criminal negligence 
is of such long standing and so fundamental to our criminal law that penal statutes 
will often be construed to contain such an element despite their failure expressly to 
state it.  ‘Generally, “ ‘[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the 
exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’  . . .”  
[Citation.]  In other words, there must be a union of act and wrongful intent, or 
criminal negligence.  [Citations.]  “So basic is this requirement that it is an 
invariable element of every crime unless excluded expressly or by necessary 
implication.” ’ ”  (In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 872 (Jorge M.); see 
1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Elements, § 1, pp. 198-199.)   
The prevailing trend in the law is against imposing criminal liability 
without proof of some mental state where the statute does not evidence the 
Legislature’s intent to impose strict liability.  (People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 
493, 521; Liparota v. United States (1985) 471 U.S. 419, 426 [extension of strict 
liability crimes disfavored]; see 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, supra, 
Elements, § 18, p. 223 [examples given of strict liability crimes are not “indicative 
of a trend.  Indeed, the opposite appears to be true”].) 
“Equally well recognized, however, is that for certain types of penal laws, 
often referred to as public welfare offenses, the Legislature does not intend that 
any proof of scienter or wrongful intent be necessary for conviction.  ‘Such 
offenses generally are based upon the violation of statutes which are purely 
regulatory in nature and involve widespread injury to the public.  [Citation.]  
 
 
14
“Under many statutes enacted for the protection of the public health and safety, 
e.g., traffic and food and drug regulations, criminal sanctions are relied upon even 
if there is no wrongful intent.  These offenses usually involve light penalties and 
no moral obloquy or damage to reputation.  Although criminal sanctions are relied 
upon, the primary purpose of the statutes is regulation rather than punishment or 
correction.  The offenses are not crimes in the orthodox sense, and wrongful intent 
is not required in the interest of enforcement.” ’ ”  (Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at 
p. 872.)8  Alcohol-related offenses, such as driving with a prohibited blood-
alcohol concentration (Ostrow v. Municipal Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 668) 
and employment of a minor at an establishment selling alcoholic beverages (Kirby 
v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. App. Bd. (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 895), have been found to 
constitute such public welfare offenses. 
We found in Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th 866, a “useful” analytical 
framework “where the legislative intent is not readily discerned from the text [of 
the law] itself.”  (Id. at p. 873.)  We there explained that “courts have commonly 
taken into account . . . :  (1) the legislative history and context; (2) any general 
provision on mens rea or strict liability crimes; (3) the severity of the punishment 
provided for the crime (‘Other things being equal, the greater the possible 
punishment, the more likely some fault is required’); (4) the seriousness of harm to 
                                             
 
8  
Examples of public welfare offenses for which criminal liability attaches in 
the absence of any mens rea include improperly labeling and storing hazardous 
waste (Health & Saf. Code, § 25190; see People v. Matthews (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 
1052, 1057-1058), sale of mislabeled motor oil (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 13480; 
People v. Travers (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 111), sale of food contaminated with 
fecal matter (People v. Schwartz (1937) 28 Cal.App.2d Supp. 775), sale of 
shortweighted food (In re Marley (1946) 29 Cal.2d 525), and use of an unlicensed 
poison (Aantex Pest Control Co. v. Structural Pest Control Bd. (1980) 108 
Cal.App.3d 696).   
 
 
15
the public that may be expected to follow from the forbidden conduct; (5) the 
defendant’s opportunity to ascertain the true facts (‘The harder to find out the 
truth, the more likely the legislature meant to require fault in not knowing’); 
(6) the difficulty prosecutors would have in proving a mental state for the crime 
(‘The greater the difficulty, the more likely it is that the legislature intended to 
relieve the prosecution of that burden so that the law could be effectively 
enforced’); [and] (7) the number of prosecutions to be expected under the statute 
(‘The fewer the expected prosecutions, the more likely the legislature meant to 
require the prosecuting officials to go into the issue of fault’).”  (Ibid.) 
We need not address all of the Jorge M. factors because section 25658(a) 
falls easily into the category of crimes courts historically have determined to be 
public welfare offenses for which proof of knowledge or criminal intent is 
unnecessary.  First, the statute does not expressly require a mental state.  More to 
the point, the statute is closely akin to those public welfare offenses that “ ‘are 
purely regulatory in nature and involve widespread injury to the public.’ ”  (Jorge 
M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 872.)  Like those offenses, section 25658(a) is more 
regulatory than penal, addressed more to the public welfare than to the individual 
punishment of the transgressor.  As one court has opined when addressing the 
purpose of section 25658:  “[I]t may be assumed that the provisions prohibiting 
certain transactions with minors are designed to protect them from harmful 
influences.”  (Lacabanne Properties, Inc. v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control (1968) 
261 Cal.App.2d 181, 188; accord, Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Appeals Bd., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 567.)   
The statute’s goal of avoiding a broader societal harm rather than imposing 
individual punishment is illustrated by the light penalties prescribed for its 
violation.  Violation of section 25658(a) imposes a $250 fine, between 24 and 32 
hours of community service, or a combination thereof.  (§ 25658, subd. (e)(1).)  
 
 
16
For a first offense involving a minor and not simply an underage person, the 
penalty is a $1,000 fine and at least 24 hours of community service.  (Id., subd. 
(e)(2).)  No violation of section 25658(a) results in incarceration of any length.  
Thus, as for other public welfare offenses, section 25658(a) “ ‘ “involve[s] light 
penalties and no moral obloquy or damage to reputation.  Although criminal 
sanctions are relied upon, the primary purpose of the statutes is regulation rather 
than punishment or correction.” ’ ”  (Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 872.)  The 
light penalties for violating section 25658(a) strongly suggest the Legislature has 
dispensed with any requirement that the People prove knowledge or some other 
criminal intent. 
Petitioner argues section 25658(a) must be interpreted to require knowledge 
of age despite any explicit statutory requirement, citing Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd 
Motor Co. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 87.  Brockett concerned civil, not criminal, 
liability.  In passing, it stated about section 25658(a):  “If one wilfully disobeys the 
law and knowingly furnishes liquor to a minor with knowledge that the minor is 
going to drive a vehicle on the public highways, as alleged in this case, he must 
face the consequences.”  (Brockett, supra, at p. 93, italics added.)  Not addressed 
in Brockett is whether one must face the same consequences absent such intent or 
knowledge.  An opinion, of course, is not authority for propositions not 
considered.  (Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 581.)  In any event, 
Brockett relied extensively on Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, which 
subsequently was statutorily overruled.  (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25602, subd. 
(c); Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (b).) 
More on point is Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 
supra, 7 Cal.4th at page 569, where this court held as to seller-licensees that “the 
laws against sales to minors [citing Cal. Const., art. XX, § 22; Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 25658(a)] can be violated despite the seller’s (or its agents’) lack of knowledge 
 
 
17
of the purchaser’s minority.”  Provigo, then, at least suggests section 25658(a) 
also does not require proof of knowledge or intent by other persons who provide 
alcohol to underage persons.  We conclude that to obtain a conviction under 
section 25658(a), the People need not prove the offender knew the person to 
whom he or she furnished, sold or gave an alcoholic beverage was in fact not yet 
21 years old.   
2.  Section 25658(c) 
Whether subdivision (c) of section 25658 dispenses with a proof of 
knowledge requirement is a more complex question.  Unlike with subdivision (a), 
three factors mentioned in Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at page 873—the legislative 
history and context of the statute, the severity of the punishment, and the 
seriousness of the harm to the public—have substantial application in the analysis 
for subdivision (c).  Nevertheless, we similarly conclude the People need not 
prove knowledge or intent to establish a violation of subdivision (c). 
First and foremost, the legislative history of section 25658(c) strongly 
suggests the Legislature intended to impose guilt without a showing the offender 
knew the age of the person for whom alcohol was purchased.  As discussed, ante, 
section 25658(c) was an amendment to the existing statute, responding to an 
incident in Santa Cruz County in which someone over 21 years old purchased 
alcoholic beverages for an underage person who thereafter became intoxicated and 
crashed his car, killing three minors.  As originally proposed, Assembly Bill No. 
2029 would have proscribed “furnish[ing]” an alcoholic beverage to a “minor” if 
the minor then caused death or great bodily injury.  This original version of the bill 
made the new crime punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor, commonly 
called a wobbler.  (Assem. Bill No. 2029 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as introduced 
Feb. 18, 1998.)  The bill was amended in the Assembly to substitute the phrase 
 
 
18
“purchasing . . . for” in the place of “furnishing . . . to.”  The amendment also 
deleted reference to a “minor” and replaced it with “a person under the age of 21 
years.”  That the crime could be a felony punishable in state prison remained 
unchanged.  (Assem. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 2029 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) 
Mar. 26, 1998.)   
The bill was then referred to the Assembly Committee on Public Safety.  
Comments to the bill include this telling one:  “This bill requires little or no intent 
on the part of the purchaser of alcohol for underage persons.  There is no 
requirement that GBI [great bodily injury] or death be foreseeable to the 
purchaser, other than the general knowledge that alcohol can sometimes lead to 
dangerous situations.  As is stated above, a commercial vendor is only found 
civilly liable and guilty of a misdemeanor if he or she sells to an obviously 
intoxicated minor.  [¶] Should this bill be amended to provide that the purchaser 
must know, or reasonably should have known, that GBI was a likely result of the 
purchase of the alcohol for the underage person?”  (Assem. Com. on Public 
Safety, Analysis of Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 2029 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) 
Apr. 14, 1998, italics added, underscoring in original.)   
Before the full Assembly a week later, Assembly Bill No. 2029 was again 
amended.  Proposed section 25658(c) was then to read in pertinent part:  “Any 
person who violates subdivision (a) by purchasing an alcoholic beverage for a 
person under the age of 21 years and the person under the age of 21 years 
thereafter consumes the alcohol and thereby proximately causes great bodily 
injury to himself, herself, or any other person is guilty of a public offense 
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year or in state 
prison.  In order to be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison pursuant to 
this subdivision:  [¶] (1) The purchaser shall have known or reasonably should 
have known that the person for whom he or she was purchasing was under the age 
 
 
19
of 21 years . . . .”  (Assem. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 2029 (1997-1998 Reg. 
Sess.) Apr. 21, 1998, italics added.) 
As the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for this proposed amendment 
explained, “[t]he bill would require that to be punishable as a felony the purchaser 
must have known or reasonably should have known that the person for whom he 
or she was purchasing was under the age of 21 years . . . .”  (Legis. Counsel’s 
Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2029 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 21, 1998.)   
The substance of Assembly Bill No. 2029 was then added to Assembly Bill 
No. 1204, then before the state Senate.  (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1204 
(1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) June 3, 1998.)  In the Senate Committee on Public Safety, 
a question was raised concerning the foreseeability of the injury caused by the 
underage drinker.  “As the opposition notes, this provision would provide a 
potential prison sentence for an act not directly caused by the person.  A 21 year 
old college student who gives a 20 year old friend a beer could be subject to an 
increased misdemeanor penalty if that 20 year old friend were to trip down a flight 
of stairs after drinking the beer and breaks his/her arm.”  (Sen. Com. on Public 
Safety, Analysis of Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1204 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) June 
3, 1998.)  “SHOULD WE PUNISH ONE PERSON FOR THE 
UNFORESEEABLE SUBSEQUENT BEHAVIOR OF ANOTHER BECAUSE 
THE FIRST PERSON COMMITTED AN OFFENSE?”  (Ibid.)   
Although a concern was raised in the Senate committee about the 
foreseeability of the injury, no question was raised about the felony provision or 
its requirement that the offender knew or should have known the age of the person 
for whom he was buying alcohol.  Nevertheless, Assembly Bill No. 1204 was 
thereafter amended to delete the felony option together with its intent  
requirement, leaving section 25658(c) as a misdemeanor provision only, with no 
explicit intent requirement.  (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1204 (1997-1998 
 
 
20
Reg. Sess.) June 30, 1998.)  It was this version that was eventually passed, 
enrolled, sent to the Governor, and signed into law.9 
The Court of Appeal below reasoned:  “A review of this history shows that 
the Legislature considered incorporating an express mental state element into the 
statute when the subdivision could be prosecuted as a felony.  It may be inferred 
that the Legislature intended the misdemeanor to be a strict liability statute when it 
deleted the felony provision without moving the requirement of a specific mental 
state into the remaining misdemeanor portion of subdivision (c).”  While this 
inference is strong, petitioner contends the appellate court’s view of the legislative 
history is simplistic because it fails to view the totality of the legislative history, 
which indicates a legislative concern with not only the potential offender’s 
knowledge of the drinker’s age, but also with his or her subjective awareness of 
the foreseeability of the harm caused by the drinker. 
As our recitation of the legislative history demonstrates, the Legislature 
was, at various points, concerned both with the possibility that one could be 
convicted of a felony under the new law even though unaware of the age of the 
person for whom alcohol was bought and with the possibility the purchaser could 
be convicted although unaware the drinker intended to become intoxicated or to 
drive.  But that the Legislature may have entertained multiple concerns about the 
                                             
 
9  
As the Court of Appeal explained:  “The substance of [Assembly Bill No.] 
1204 was then incorporated into a related bill proceeding through the Senate, 
[Senate Bill No.] 1696, to ensure that its provisions would not be super[s]eded if 
both bills were enacted and [Senate Bill No.] 1696 was chaptered last.  (Legis. 
Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1696, Stats. 1998 (1997 - 1998 Reg. Sess.).)  
([Senate Bill] 1696)  In fact, that is what happened.  [Assembly Bill No.] 1204 was 
chaptered on September 14, 1998.  [Senate Bill] 1696 was chaptered on 
September 18, 1998.  Section 25658 was amended to include subdivision (c) by 
Senate Bill 1696.”  
 
 
21
proposed law does not undermine the obvious inference that in deleting the felony 
option, with its attached intent requirement, the Legislature intended to leave the 
new crime a misdemeanor only, with no intent requirement.   
Interpretation of section 25658(c) as a strict liability offense is bolstered by 
a consideration of other statutes addressing related issues, all of which appear in 
the same portion of the Business and Professions Code as does section 25658.  
(See art. 3 [“Women and Minors”], ch. 16 [“Regulatory Provisions”], div. 9 
[“Alcoholic Beverages”].)  For example, section 25658.2, subdivision (a) 
provides:  “A parent or legal guardian who knowingly permits his or her child . . . 
under the age of 18 years, to consume an alcoholic beverage . . . at the home of the 
parent or legal guardian [under certain conditions] is guilty of [a] misdemeanor.”  
(Italics added.)  Similarly, section 25657, subdivision (b) provides:  “In any place 
of business where alcoholic beverages are sold to be consumed upon the premises, 
to employ or knowingly permit anyone to loiter in or about said premises for the 
purpose of begging or soliciting any patron or customer of, or visitor in, such 
premises to purchase any alcoholic beverages for the one begging or soliciting [is 
guilty of a misdemeanor].”  (Italics added.)  Finally, section 25659.5, subdivision 
(d) provides:  “Any purchaser of keg beer who knowingly provides false 
information as required by subdivision (a) is guilty of a misdemeanor.”  (Italics 
added.)   
Because the wording of these statutes shows the Legislature if it wishes 
knows how to express its intent that knowledge be an element of an offense, the 
absence of such a requirement in section 25658(c) indicates it intended no such 
requirement.  (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 159.)  “It is a settled rule 
of statutory construction that where a statute, with reference to one subject 
contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute 
concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different legislative intent 
 
 
22
existed with reference to the different statutes.”  (People v. Norwood (1972) 26 
Cal.App.3d 148, 156.)  In sum, the legislative history and context of section 
25658(c) tilts heavily in favor of criminal liability without proof of knowledge or 
intent. 
The second factor we find significant is the severity of the punishment.  
(Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 873.)  The greater the punishment for a 
particular crime, the more likely the Legislature intended to require the state to 
prove an offender acted with some culpable mental state.  “For crimes which 
impose severe punishment, ‘. . . the usual presumption that a defendant must know 
the facts that make his conduct illegal should apply.’  (Staples v. United States 
[(1994)] 511 U.S. [600,] 619.)”  (People v. Coria (1999) 21 Cal.4th 868, 878.)  
For example, we reasoned in Jorge M. that the “Legislature’s choice of potential 
felony [rather than misdemeanor] punishment . . . reinforces the presumption 
expressed by [Penal Code] section 20 and suggests that correspondingly strong 
evidence of legislative intent is required to exclude mens rea from the offense.”  
(Jorge M., supra, at p. 880.) 
Section 25658(c) is punishable as a misdemeanor, not a felony.  In general, 
punishment for a misdemeanor cannot exceed confinement in a county jail for up 
to six months, a fine not to exceed $1,000, or both.  (Pen. Code, § 19.)  The 
maximum confinement for a misdemeanor is one year in jail.  (Id., § 19.2.)  A 
violation of section 25658(c), though not a felony, provides for a punishment 
greater than that prescribed for the typical misdemeanor because a violator “shall 
be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a minimum term of six months 
not to exceed one year, by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or 
by both imprisonment and fine.”  (§ 25658, subd. (e)(3), italics added.)  
Although the heightened penalty tends to distinguish section 25658(c) from 
the ordinary misdemeanor and suggests we should imply a mental element to this 
 
 
23
crime, a higher than normal penalty does not necessarily preclude a crime from 
being a public welfare offense; the severity of the punishment is, instead, a factor 
in the overall calculus in determining whether proof of a mental element must be 
implied.  Here, the punishment falls somewhere in the middle, greater than that 
prescribed for the typical misdemeanor, but less than that for the typical wobbler 
or felony. 
In addition to the potential length of possible incarceration, petitioner 
contends the reputational injury and personal disgrace he will suffer should his 
conviction for violating section 25658(c) be allowed to stand are factors relevant 
to determining the severity of the punishment.  We agree.  Discussing this issue, 
Justice Traynor opined for this court:  “Under many statutes enacted for the 
protection of the public health and safety, e.g., traffic and food and drug 
regulations, criminal sanctions are relied upon even if there is no wrongful intent.  
These offenses usually involve light penalties and no moral obloquy or damage to 
reputation.  Although criminal sanctions are relied upon, the primary purpose of 
the statutes is regulation rather than punishment or correction.  The offenses are 
not crimes in the orthodox sense, and wrongful intent is not required in the interest 
of enforcement.”  (People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798, 801, fn. 2, italics added 
(Vogel), quoted in Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 872.)  At issue in Vogel was 
the crime of bigamy.  Justice Traynor further explained:  “The severe penalty for 
bigamy [then up to a $5,000 fine, confinement in county jail, or in state prison for 
up to 10 years], the serious loss of reputation conviction entails, the infrequency 
of the offense, and the fact that it has been regarded for centuries as a crime 
involving moral turpitude, make it extremely unlikely that the Legislature meant to 
include the morally innocent to make sure the guilty did not escape.”  (Vogel, 
supra, at p. 804, fn. omitted, italics added.) 
 
 
24
More recently, the Court of Appeal addressed the question whether the 
crime of misdemeanor animal cruelty (Pen. Code, § 597f, subd. (a)) required a 
showing of either civil or criminal negligence.  (People v. Speegle (1997) 53 
Cal.App.4th 1405.)  The court found the reputational injury associated with the 
criminal mistreatment and neglect of animals to justify the higher, criminal 
negligence standard.  “In our society, those who mistreat animals are the deserved 
object of obloquy, and their conduct is wrongful of itself and not just as a matter 
of legislative declaration.”  (Id. at p. 1415.) 
Like the bigamist in Vogel, supra, 46 Cal.2d 798, and the defendant who 
kept, neglected, and starved 200 poodles in People v. Speegle, supra, 53 
Cal.App.4th 1405, a person who purchases alcoholic beverages for an underage 
person, enabling that person to become intoxicated and to cause “great bodily 
injury or death,” may expect severe censure from the general public.  That drunk 
drivers, and especially underage drunk drivers, cause death and destruction on our 
highways is common knowledge, and anyone contributing to that societal tragedy 
would suffer significant reputational injury.  Considering the heightened 
misdemeanor penalty together with the societal condemnation a violator of section 
25658(c) would encounter, we conclude the severity of the punishment weighs in 
favor of requiring some intent element for section 25658(c). 
The third factor we find particularly pertinent is the seriousness of the harm 
or injury to the public.  (Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 873.)  The more serious 
and widespread the expected harm from the prohibited conduct, the more likely 
the Legislature intended to create a public welfare offense for which no proof of 
knowledge or intent is required.  We explained the significance of this factor in 
Jorge M.:  “The AWCA [Assault Weapons Control Act] is a remedial law aimed 
at protecting the public against a highly serious danger to life and safety.  The 
Legislature presumably intended that the law be effectively enforceable, i.e., that 
 
 
25
its enforcement would actually result in restricting the number of assault weapons 
in the hands of criminals and the mentally ill.  In interpreting the law to further the 
legislative intent, therefore, we should strive to avoid any construction that would 
significantly undermine its enforceability.  This is not to suggest this court would 
or should read any element out of a criminal statute simply to ease the People’s 
burden of proof.  But, when a crime’s statutory definition does not expressly 
include any scienter element, the fact the Legislature intended the law to remedy a 
serious and widespread public safety threat militates against the conclusion it also 
intended impliedly to include in the definition a scienter element especially 
burdensome to prove.”  (Id. at pp. 880-881.) 
The harm that section 25658(c) aims to avoid is the death and great bodily 
injury of underage drivers, their passengers and other collateral victims.  Unlike 
section 25658(a), which criminalizes the mere furnishing, selling or giving of 
alcohol to an underage person, section 25658(c) includes two additional and 
significant elements:  consumption of the beverage and serious injury or death.  
One may fairly conclude the law addresses a “serious and widespread public 
safety threat.”  (Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 881.)  Implying an intent or 
knowledge requirement would necessarily undermine the statute’s enforceability 
and reduce its effectiveness in reducing the number of deaths and injuries 
associated with underage drinking.  We conclude this factor militates against 
inferring an intent requirement for section 25658(c).   
Considering these factors together, we find the legislative history of section 
25658(c), its context, and the seriousness of the harm to the public particularly 
persuasive in demonstrating that no knowledge of age requirement should be 
imposed.  Although the public obloquy for violation of the statute and the 
minimum of six months in jail for its violation result in a more severe penalty than 
normal for a misdemeanor offense, section 25658(c) remains a misdemeanor, not a 
 
 
26
felony nor even a wobbler.  On balance, we are convinced the legislative history 
provides the strongest evidence of legislative intent.  That history indicates the 
Legislature intended that a conviction of violating section 25658(c) does not 
require a showing the offender had knowledge of the imbiber’s age or other 
criminal intent.  Accordingly, although the People must prove an accused 
“purchas[ed]” an alcoholic beverage “for” an underage person, the People need 
not also prove the accused knew that person was under 21 years of age. 
D.  The Mistake of Fact as to Age Defense 
Although the People need not prove knowledge of age in order to establish 
a violation of section 25658(c), the question remains whether petitioner was 
entitled to raise a mistake of fact defense concerning Turpin’s age.  The Penal 
Code sets forth the broad outlines of the mistake of fact defense.  Section 26 of 
that code provides:  “All persons are capable of committing crimes except [¶] . . .  
[¶] Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged under an 
ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent.”  Thus, for 
example, in a case where a defendant was convicted of murder for shooting his 
wife, but claimed he honestly believed the gun was not loaded, the trial court erred 
by refusing to instruct the jury that a person who entertains “an honest and 
reasonable belief in the existence of certain facts and circumstances which, if true, 
would make such act and omission lawful, is not guilty of a crime.”  (People v. 
Goodman (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 705, 709.)10  Similarly, in a case where a 
defendant, charged with forcible rape and kidnapping, claimed a reasonable belief 
that the victim consented, we held the jury should have been instructed on a 
                                             
 
10  
People v. Goodman, supra, 8 Cal.App.3d 705, was disapproved on another 
ground in People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 451-452. 
 
 
27
mistake of fact because, if a reasonable yet mistaken belief in consent was proved, 
the accused would not “possess the wrongful intent that is a prerequisite under 
Penal Code section 20 to a conviction of either kidnapping . . . or rape by means of 
force or threat.”  (People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 155.) 
As a general matter, however, a mistake of fact defense is not available 
unless the mistake disproves an element of the offense.  (People v. Parker (1985) 
175 Cal.App.3d 818, 822; 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, supra, 
Defenses, § 39, p. 372.)  Thus, in Parker, the defendant illegally entered a 
structure allegedly believing it was a commercial building.  Because the building 
was in fact a residence, he was charged with and convicted of first degree 
burglary.  (Pen. Code, § 459.)  On appeal, the appellate court rejected his 
argument that the trial court had erred by failing to instruct the jury that his 
mistaken belief the building was an uninhabited structure constituted an 
affirmative defense.  (Parker, supra, at p. 821.)  The appellate court reasoned that 
because the prosecution was not required to prove a defendant knew the building 
entered was a residential one in order to convict of burglary, “ignorance 
concerning the residential nature of a building does not render a defendant’s 
unlawful entry into it with a felonious intent innocent conduct.”  (Id. at pp. 822-
823.) 
Of course, murder (People v. Goodman, supra, 8 Cal.App.3d 705), rape 
(People v. Mayberry, supra, 15 Cal.3d 143) and burglary (People v. Parker, supra, 
175 Cal.App.3d 818) all require proof of criminal intent, whereas public welfare 
offenses such as a violation of section 25658(c) do not.  We addressed the mistake 
of fact defense for public welfare offenses in People v. McClennegen (1925) 195 
Cal. 445, which involved a joint prosecution of several defendants for violating the 
state’s antisyndicalism statute.  It was alleged the defendants conspired to effect a 
change in the “industrial ownership and control in the existing economic and 
 
 
28
social system” and to “effect political changes in this state and in the United States 
of America by means and methods denounced by [the antisyndicalism] act.”  (Id. 
at p. 448.)  Although we ultimately found the antisyndicalism act did not establish 
a public welfare crime, we discussed the mental state required for such offenses, 
which we denoted “statutory crimes.”  “The commission of various acts are made 
punishable under our criminal procedure, even though the doer be ignorant of the 
fact that the doing of the act constitutes an offense.  A mistake of fact, or a want of 
intent, is not in every case a sufficient defense for the violation of a criminal 
statute.  Statutes enacted for the protection of public morals, public health, and the 
public peace and safety are apt illustrations of the rule just announced.  [Citations.] 
. . .  [¶] ‘. . . [T]herefore if a criminal intent is not an essential element of a 
statutory crime, it is not necessary to prove any intent in order to justify a 
conviction.  Whether a criminal intent or guilty knowledge is a necessary element 
of a statutory offense is a matter of construction to be determined from the 
language of the statute, in view of its manifest purpose and design.  There are 
many instances in recent times where the Legislature in the exercise of the police 
power has prohibited, under penalty, the performance of a specific act.  The doing 
of the inhibited act constitutes the crime, and the moral turpitude or purity of the 
motive by which it was prompted and knowledge or ignorance of its criminal 
character are immaterial circumstances on the question of guilt.  The only fact to 
be determined in these cases is whether the defendant did the act.  In the interest of 
the public the burden is placed upon the actor of ascertaining at his peril whether 
his deed is within the prohibition of any criminal statute.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 469-470, 
italics added.)  In other words, for public welfare offenses for which intent need 
not be proved, a mistake of fact defense was unavailable. 
People v. Schwartz, supra, 28 Cal.App.2d Supp. 775, illustrates the point.  
That case involved the sale of impure or adulterated food, a public welfare 
 
 
29
offense.  The court there explained that the defendant “does not need to engage in 
that business; but if he does engage in that business the law will not permit him to 
evade his responsibility to the public, declared by law, by pleading ignorance of 
the quality or contents of that which he may lawfully sell only if it is pure.”  (Id. at 
p. 778, italics added.)  Similarly, in People v. Bickerstaff (1920) 46 Cal.App. 764, 
a case involving the sale of a beverage with greater than 1 percent alcohol, “it is 
not a defense for the defendant to prove that he did not know the liquor sold by 
him contained the prohibited amount of alcohol.”  (Id. at p. 771.)  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the modern trend is to require proof of 
some criminal intent or knowledge in order to secure a criminal conviction.  
(People v. Simon, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 521.)  Vogel, supra, 46 Cal.2d 798, is 
illustrative.  In Vogel, the defendant was charged with bigamy in violation of 
Penal Code section 281, which at that time provided that “[e]very person having a 
husband or wife living, who marries any other person . . . is guilty of bigamy.”  
The trial court rejected the defendant’s proffered evidence that he reasonably 
believed his first wife had divorced him, citing People v. Kelly (1939) 32 
Cal.App.2d 624, 625, which held that “[a] second marriage under an erroneous 
assumption that the first marriage has been annulled or dissolved is not a defense 
to a charge of bigamy.”  
The Vogel court agreed the People need not establish the defendant knew 
he was still married to his first wife, but need only prove he was in fact still 
married to her.  Nevertheless, we concluded the defendant was entitled to raise a 
mistake of fact as an affirmative defense, explaining that he would not be “guilty 
of bigamy, if he had a bona fide and reasonable belief that facts existed that left 
him free to remarry.”  (Vogel, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 801; see also People v. Stuart 
(1956) 47 Cal.2d 167 [mistake of fact defense available to charge of selling 
 
 
30
adulterated drug]; In re Marley, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 530 [suggesting but not 
deciding mistake of fact defense available to charge of shortweighting].)   
Most notable, perhaps, of this line of cases is People v. Hernandez (1964) 
61 Cal.2d 529.  In that case, the defendant was charged with statutory rape (now 
called unlawful sexual intercourse; see Pen. Code, § 261.5), a crime that does not 
require proof the defendant knew the prosecutrix’s age.  The defendant claimed 
“he had in good faith a reasonable belief that the prosecutrix was 18 years or more 
of age” (Hernandez, supra, at p. 530), whereas in fact she was 17 years nine 
months old.  Since the 19th century the law had made the defense of mistake of 
fact as to age unavailable for this crime.  (People v. Ratz (1896) 115 Cal. 132, 134-
135.)  In an example of an opinion’s venerability offering it no protection, this 
court overruled Ratz and held the defendant was entitled to raise a defense of 
mistake of fact.  Citing Penal Code section 20 and Vogel, supra, 46 Cal.2d 798, we 
stated:  “We are persuaded that the reluctance to accord to a charge of statutory 
rape the defense of a lack of criminal intent has no greater justification than in the 
case of other statutory crimes, where the Legislature has made identical provision 
with respect to intent.  ‘ “At common law an honest and reasonable belief in the 
existence of circumstances, which, if true, would make the act for which the 
person is indicted an innocent act, has always been held to be a good defense. . . . 
[I]t has never been suggested that these exceptions do not equally apply to the case 
of statutory offenses unless they are excluded expressly or by necessary 
implication.” ’ ”  (Hernandez, supra, at pp. 535-536.) 
These cases follow the modern trend away from imposing strict liability for 
criminal offenses and to require some showing of knowledge or criminal intent, 
even if only criminal negligence.  (See Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 887 [“the 
People bear the burden of proving the defendant knew or should have known the 
firearm possessed the characteristics bringing it within the” Assault Weapons 
 
 
31
Control Act].)  In addition to interpreting statutory language to require some 
showing of criminal intent, as we did in Jorge M., we may permit a conviction 
absent evidence of knowledge, but allow a defendant to raise a mistake of fact in 
his defense, as in Vogel, supra, 46 Cal.2d 798, and People v. Hernandez, supra, 61 
Cal.2d 529.  Although by tradition (and due process) the People often have the 
burden to prove knowledge or intent, shifting the burden to the defendant to prove 
his lack of guilty or criminal intent is in some cases also permissible.  Thus, for 
example, addressing the crime of bigamy in Vogel, we explained that “guilty 
knowledge” was “formerly a part of the definition of bigamy [but] was omitted 
from [Penal Code] section 281 to reallocate the burden of proof on that issue in a 
bigamy trial.  Thus, the prosecution makes a prima facie case upon proof that the 
second marriage was entered into while the first spouse was still living [citations], 
and his bona fide and reasonable belief that facts existed that left the defendant 
free to remarry is a defense to be proved by the defendant.”  (Vogel, supra, at pp. 
802-803, italics added, fn. omitted; see also People v. Taylor (2001) 93 
Cal.App.4th 933, 952-953 (conc. & dis. opn. of Morrison, J.) [suggesting the same 
reallocation of the burden of proving intent in a prosecution for possession of a 
cane sword in violation of Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(1)].)    
As in Vogel, supra, 46 Cal.2d 798, we conclude that, although the 
prosecution need not prove an offender’s knowledge of age in order to establish a 
violation of section 25658(c), petitioner was entitled to raise an affirmative 
defense, for which he would bear the burden of proof, that he honestly and 
reasonably believed Turpin was at least 21 years old.  Recognizing the viability of 
a mistake of fact defense is consistent with the modern trend away from strict 
liability for criminal offenses as well as with Penal Code section 20 and the 
statutory scheme of which Business and Professions Code section 25658(c) is but 
a part.  Article 3, chapter 16, division 9 of the Business and Professions Code 
 
 
32
contains both section 25658(c) and 25660, and the two statutes must be construed 
together.  (Renee J. v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 743.)  Section 
25660, relating to licensees, provides in pertinent part:  “Proof that the defendant-
licensee, or his employee or agent, demanded, was shown and acted in reliance 
upon such [described] bona fide evidence [of majority and identity] in any 
transaction, employment, use or permission forbidden by Sections 25658, 25663 
or 25665 shall be a defense to any criminal prosecution therefor or to any 
proceedings for the suspension or revocation of any license based thereon.”  
(Italics added.)  Section 25660 thus specifically authorizes licensees to raise a 
mistake of fact defense as to the age of a customer to whom alcohol was sold or 
served.  “Although a violation of section 25658 can occur despite the seller’s lack 
of knowledge that the purchaser is under the age of 21, the seller’s liability is not 
absolute because ‘the Legislature has furnished a procedure whereby he may 
protect himself, namely, . . . section 25660 [allowing the seller to rely on bona fide 
evidence of majority and identity].’ ”  (Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Appeals Bd., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 564-565.)   
Does section 25660 suggest the Legislature’s intent to permit a similar 
defense to nonlicensees?  We hold that it does.  A contrary conclusion would lead 
to an absurd result (see, e.g., In re J. W., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 210; City of Cotati 
v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 77), to wit, while licensees, who may serve 
alcoholic beverages to dozens or even hundreds of customers in a single night, can 
demand, check and act in reliance on bona fide evidence of identity and age and 
thereby enter a safe harbor, protected from criminal liability, a nonlicensee who 
serves alcoholic beverages only occasionally and to just a few persons, and who 
similarly demands, checks and acts in reliance on bona fide evidence of identity 
and age, and may honestly and reasonably believe the person for whom he or she 
purchased alcohol was over 21 years old, would absent a mistake of fact defense 
 
 
33
be subject to criminal liability, punishable by a minimum of six months in jail.  
(§§ 25658(c), 25658, subd. (e)(3).)  The Legislature could not have intended this 
disparity of treatment.   
We conclude the trial court erred in refusing petitioner’s offer to prove he 
honestly and reasonably believed Turpin was over 21 years old.    
CONCLUSION 
We reach the following conclusions:  (1) Section 25658(c) is not limited to 
the shoulder tap scenario, but applies whenever an offender purchases alcoholic 
beverages for an underage person; (2) section 25658(c) does not apply in the 
typical social party host situation, because the host does not purchase alcohol for 
any particular guest; (3) the prosecution need not prove an offender knew (or 
should have known) the age of the person to whom he or she furnished alcohol in 
order to prove a violation of section 25658(a); (4) the prosecution need not prove 
an offender knew (or should have known) the age of the person for whom he or 
she purchased alcohol in order to prove a violation of section 25658(c); and (5) a 
person charged with violating section 25658(c) may defend against the charge by 
claiming an honest and reasonable belief that the person for whom he or she 
purchased alcohol was 21 years of age or older.  The defendant bears the burden of 
proof for this affirmative defense. 
Because the trial court refused to admit evidence that petitioner believed 
Turpin was over 21 years old, it erred.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal 
denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the cause remanded 
to that court.  The Court of Appeal is directed to grant the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, vacate the judgment of the Sacramento County Superior Court in 
People v. Michael Lee Jennings, No. 00M07614, and remand the case to the 
superior court for further proceedings.  The clerk of the Court of Appeal is 
directed to remit a certified copy of this opinion to the superior court for filing, 
 
 
34
and respondent shall serve another copy thereof on the prosecuting attorney in 
conformity with Penal Code section 1382, subdivision (a)(2).  (See In re Gay 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 830.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Jennings on Habeas Corpus 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 106 Cal.App.4th 869 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S115009 
Date Filed: August 23, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Gail D. Ohanesian 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Rothschild, Wishek & Sands, Kelly Lynn Babineau and M. Bradley Wishek for Petitioner Michael Lee 
Jennings. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez, Mathew Chan, 
Janet Neeley, David Andrew Eldridge, Stephen G. Herndon and Rachelle A. Newcomb, Deputy Attorneys 
General; Robert A. Ryan, Jr., County Counsel, and James G. Wright, Deputy County Counsel, for 
Respondent State of California. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
M. Bradley Wishek 
Rothschild, Wishek & Sands 
901 “F” Street, Suite 200 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 444-9845 
 
Rachelle A. Newcomb 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
P.O. Box 944255 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5320