Case Title: STATE v SHARBONO

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13111 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1977 STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, V S . LOREN D U A N E SHARBONO, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Seventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Bonorable L. C . Gulbrandson, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For A p p e l l a n t : Moses, Kampfe, T o l l i v e r and Wright, B i l l i n g s , Montana C h a r l e s F. Moses argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Michael G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana V i c t o r G. Koch a r g u e d , County A t t o r n e y , Sidney, Montana Submitted: J a n u a r y 24, 1977 ~ e c i d e d : P n ! ? 3 1 19fl M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant appeals from a jury conviction of deliberate homicide entered i n the d i s t r i c t court, Richland County. Defendant was sentenced t o 75 years i n the Montana S t a t e Prison. Defendant Loren Sharbono was an independent o i l f i e l d service worker whose job took him away from home. He resided with h i s wife Ellen Sharbono and t h e i r 12 year old son i n Baker, Montana. A t the time of her death Ellen was eight months pregnant. O n November 15, 1974, defendant picked up h i s son i n Baker and took him t o stay i n Glendive, Montana. Defendant was to return on November 16, 1974, t o pick up Ellen and go t o Sidney, Montana o r t o Dickinson, North Dakota, f o r the weekend t o t a l k over some domestic problems. Testimony of witnesses indicated Ellen was a f r a i d of night driving and was not going unless de- fendant came f o r her. Defendant denied t h i s , but t e s t i f i e d she did have poor eyesight and wore thick lens glasses. Defendant had been going with a Sidney g i r l , J a n i s Hams, for two years and t h i s was known by Ellen. According t o testimony of J a n i s , they were contemplating marriage. Thirty days before ~ l l e n ' s death a December 6, 1974 marriage date was s e t . Defendant told J a n i s h i s divorce would be f i n a l November 23, 1974, although he refused t o name h i s attorney and asked J a n i s t o t r u s t him. Defendant denied any i n t e n t t o divorce Ellen and t e s t i f i e d he had no intention t o marry Janis. However, sometime following ~ l l e n ' s death, he t o l d an is' father he was i n love with Janis. O n November 16, 1974, defendant.made a date with J a n i s to pick her up from work a t 11:30 p.m. A t 7:01 p.m., telephone records indicated he called h i s Baker home from a telephone booth i n Wibaux, Montana, 45 miles from Baker, charged t o h i s business credit card, and talked for 2 minutes. Defendant t e s t i f i e d he then drove t o Glendive and went coon hunting i n western Richland County, without a gun. H i s hunting consisted of using a stick and flash- light, striking the coons between the eyes. A t about 11:15 p.m. that evening, defendant called Janis from Savage, Montana, and told her he was running l a t e and would pick her up about 12:15 o r 12:20 a.m. She t e s t i f i e d t h i s was the f i r s t time he had been l a t e i n t h e i r two year courtship. He l a t e r advised her he had pickup trouble. Ross Wilson of Savage, Montana, a key witness for the s t a t e , went to Glendive the evening of November 16 t o see a movie. H e l e f t Gkndive about 20:00 p.m. H e t e s t i f i e d he was anxious t o get home and drove a t 80-90 miles per hour on the t r i p home. H e was approximately four miles south of Savage when he came upon an Because h i s parents lived nearby orange Ford pickup truck, parked i n h i s lane of t r a f f i c . /Be -thought it might be poachers, so he slowed down and checked the license number, getting the county designation 39- and the f i r s t and l a s t numbers of 10-9. The middle two numbers he could not catch due t o the fact they were p a r t i a l l y covered with d i r t . Estimating h i s speed between Glendive and the parked truck, he thought he came upon the orange pickup a t about 10:30 p.m. H e slowed down t o 12 t o 15 miles per hour before passing the truck and i n so doing noted there were two occupants of the truck cab; a passenger was getting into the truck and a man was bent over i n an e f f o r t t o close the door. H e noted the driver had dark hair. Upon hearing of the "accident" l a t e r that night, he went t o the scene and reported t h i s information t o a fireman and the undersheriff. Defendant was driving h i s orange Ford p ~ c k u p , wich License number 39-1969. Savage, Montana i s located approximately 23 miles south of Sidney on the highway t o Glendive. A t approximately LL;15 p.m., November 16, 1974, a witness Clinton Patterson was driving toward Glendive. About four miles south of Savage he s a w a glowing on the side of the h i l l s . When he arrived a t t h e scene he saw a car i n a ravine with flames coming out of the window area and around the hood. About t h i s same time a beet truck arrived a t the scene. this cruck was driven by off-duty highway patrolman Jack Gaughan, who instructed Patterson t o return t o Savage and c a l l t h e f i r e department and authorities. Gaughan could only get within 10 t o 12 f e e t of the car, since it was burning f i e r c e l y , but he read the license number of t h e car a s 39-924. The vehicle was registered i n the name of Ellen Sharbono and defendant. Other o f f i c e r s , t h e Savage f i r e department, and the coroner subsequently arrived a t the scene. The f i r e department took about 25 minw~testo control the f i r e . By t h i s time the badly charred remains of Ellen Sharbono had been discovered lying on the floor board, with her head against the passenger side of the car. The victim's body was removed by the coroner. I n the early morning of November 1-7, 1974, defendant was located a t a motel i n Sidney and n o t i f i e d of h i s wife's death. H i s truck, with license number 39-1969, was parked a t t h e motel. About 4:15 a.m. on November 17, 1974, the Sharbono truck was seen stopping a t the home of J i m Fischer, a r e t i r e d highway patrolman and brother-in-law of defendant married t o defendant's s i s t e r , Louella. Fischers t e s t i f i e d defendant called them t o t e l l them of ~ l l e n ' s death and asked t o come out t o t h e i r home. They t e s t i f i e d he was very upset when he arrived and it had been an emotional experience. Defendant talked with them f o r sometime and s l e p t on a couch i n the living room f o r an hour and half early i n the morning of the 17th. During h i s conversations with t h e Fischers, from the testimony of numerous witnesses, it would appear defendant made an e f f o r t t o g e t them t o provide an a l i b i f o r him by s t a t i n g : "You can say we was fox hunting together.'' The Fischers t o l d t h i s story about fox hunting t o several investigating o f f i c e r s and it was not u n t i l December 26, the day of defendant's a r r e s t t h a t J i m Fischer voluntarily went t o t h e county attorney's o f f i c e and gave him a corrected story. I n t h e meantime, on November 20, upon learning t h a t h i s w i f e ' s body had been taken t o Great F a l l s , defendant contacted Fischers and had them drive over a country road from Sidney t o Wibaux with him. During t h i s t r i p he had them note certain,places where he said he had been, a t specified times, during t h e evening of November 16-17. During defendant's v i s i t t o the home of Fischers on the 17th, he asked h i s s i s t e r t o say they were playing "pinochle" t h a t evening. When h i s s i s t e r asked him why she should say t h a t , he replied "I was on t h a t road--the Glendive-Sidney road". H e also told h i s s i s t e r he called h i s g i r l friend from Savage a t about 11:OO t o 11:lO p.m. on November 16. A t no time during h i s testimony did defendant admit being on the p a r t i c u l a r section of the Glendive-Sidney road where the accident occurred. Investigation of the accident revealed the victim's c a r went o f f the road a t almost a 90' angle. This was described by the investigators a s a most unusual angle of leaving t h e highway. Investigation by the state fire marshal's office revealed the fire was caused by accelerants, starting in the passenger portion of the victim's automobile. The chemist from the state crime laboratory concluded the gasoline sample taken from the interior of the victim's car was a different gasoline than that in the tank of the automobile. On November 20, 1974, Dr. Joseph McKinley, a Sidney pathologist, made a partial autopsy and found fractures of the hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage, which to him indicated manual strangulation. On December 20, 1974, the body was flown to Great Falls where a complete autopsy was performed jointly by Dr. McKinley and Dr. Pfaff, a forensic pathologist. Both concluded Ellen Sharbono died of manual strangulation. The victim's own doctor testified that Ellen Sharbono was previously in good health. In1;addition, the state introduced evidence that defendant obtained life insurance on his wife on September 24, 1974. The policy was a joint whole-life policy for Loren and Ellen Sharbono in the amount of $150,000. Defendant's agent testified he had suggested the additional insurance due to defendant's going into business for himself. On appeal, defendant presents 14 issues for'this Court's review: 1) Was Patrolman Gaughan improperly allowed to give an unresponsive answer and testify as to his opinions and conclusions in describing the burning car? 2 ) Was Patrolman Rowe improperly allowed to testify as to a self-serving statement by saying he went to view the car "to gather evidence" ? improperly 3) Was Patrolman ~aul/allowed to give his opinion as to the speed of the car when it left the highway and its speed when it hLt the bottom of the ravine without proper foundation? 4 ) Was Exhibit A-14, a gaschromebiography analysis of gasoline, improperly admitted into evidence without sufficient foundation? 5) Was it error to permit Dr. Pfaff to repeat his opinion that the cause of death was by strangulation? 6 ) Was hearsay testimony improperly allowed into evidence when Mary McGonigal testified as to a telephone conversation she had with Ellen Sharbono? 7) Was hearsay testimony improperly allowed into evidence when James Fischer testified as to a telephone conversation he had with the county attorney? 8 ) Was the State improperly allowed to impeach its witness, James Fischer, without a showing of surprise? 9 ) Was there sufficient evidence at the close of the state's case to go to the jury? 10) Should the case have been dismissed at the close of the state's case because the medical testimony failed to satisfy the circumstantial evidence test by failing to rule out all other reasonable hypotheses as to the cause of death other than strangulation? 11) Was the sheriff improperly allowed to present hearsay and conclusionary testimony by stating he had no reason to believe Wilson would be involved? 12) Was the sheriff improperly allowal to repeat his testimony about Wilson? 13) Was it error for the district court to refuse the 'burn film''? 14) Did the district court err in refusing Sharbono's proposed instruction i l l 4 which defined "deliberation" ? Issues 1, 2 and 3 involve the tescirnony of three highway patrolmen and w i l l be considered a s one. Jack Gaughan was one of the f i r s t witnesses on the scene. Sefore going down t o the burning c a r , he sent Patterson, the f i r s t witness on the scene, t o Savage t o get help from the volunteer f i r e department. Gaughan estimated h i s time of a r r i v a l a t the scene between 11:15 and 11:30 p.m. He took an extinguisher from h i s truck down t o the f i r e i n an e f f o r t t o extinguish it, but was unable t o get closer than from 10 t o 12 f e e t , due t o the intensity of the f i r e . I n describing what he saw, he said "* * * it would---like a piece of rag burning t h a t has been o i l soaked o r something, t o m e it reminded m e of ---- .'I ~ e f e n d a n t ' s dounsel objected alleging the answer was not responsive and was che opinion and conclusion of the witness. Defendant argues the court erred i n overruling h i s objection and c i t e s numerous cases and t e x t i n support of h i s objection. N e have examined those cases and t e x t c i t e d and find none c p n t i o l - ling,, Here, Gaughan was asked the question "Would you describe whac you saw i n regard t o the burning vehicle?" The answer was a description of what Gaughan saw and defendant objected and moved to s t r i k e the e n t i r e answer as not responsive and a s an opinion and conclusion. N o e f f o r t was made t o s p e c i f i c a l l y point out what h i s objection was directed t o and it was an improper objection. H witness, a s the witness here, who saw the car burning, may, a r t e r s t a t i n g a s much a s he can of the constituent f a c t s , s t a t e h i s impression o r inference with respect t o what he saw. I n r e ~ ~ L l e r ' s Estate, 36 Utah 228, 102 P. 996; Paulich v. Nipple, 104 Yan. 801, 180 P.771; H i l l v. Chappel Bros., 97 Mont. 305, 33 P.2d 819; Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gilland, 4 Wyo.395, 34 P. 953; 32 Z.J.S., Evidence §546(9). - 8 - Defendant next objects t o the testimony of Patrolman Rowe a s "self -servingu. Rowe , along with several other investi- gating o f f i c e r s , went t o the fairgounds where the burned vehicle was stored f o r the purpose of getting c e r t a i n p a r t s of the vehicle t h a t where l a t e r used i n t h i s case. The testimony and objection was: "Q. Was there any purpose i n going out and meeting with these other p a r t i e s you described on the 25th of November? A. Yes. Q . What was t h a t purpose? "MR. MOSES: I object upon t h e ground t h a t it i s s e l f -serving.'' W e find no m e r i t t o defendant's argument. Rowe was a p a r t of an investigative team f o r the purpose of "gathering evidence1'. His answer was not a self-serving statement. 3LA C.J.S. Evidence, 9216, p. 590, s t a t e s the r u l e regarding s e l f ~ s e r v i n g declara- tions : "A 'self-serving declaration' within the r u l e i s one made by a party i n h i s own i n t e r e s t a t some time and place out of court, and does not include t e s t i - mony which he gives a s a witness a t the t r i a l . " See Welch v. Thomas, 102 Mont. 591, 601, 61 P.2d 404. Defendant a l s o objected t o the testimony of Sgt. John Kaul of the highway p a t r o l a s t o h i s opinion of t h e speed of the death vehicle when it l e f t the road. Sgt. Kaul t e s t i f i e d he had been a highway p a t r o l sergeant f o r approximately 12 years; had considerable special training i n accident investigations and had investigated some 300 accidents. He qualified a s an expert i n h i s f i e l d . Kaul s t a t e d , i n h i s opinion, the vehicle l e f t t h e road a t "a very low r a t e of speed" --- somewhere i n the v i c i n i t y of from 10 t o 15 miles per hour. Prior t o t h a t testimony, he had totally familiarized himself with the scene, observed .the tracks of the vehicle on the grass slope, checked for skid or gouge marks on both the slope and highway and found none, observed the damage done to the automobile caused by its coming to rest against the bank of the ravine, took photographs of the scene (later used as exhibits), and noted the unusual angle of the vehicle as it left the highway. The trial court properly admitted this testimony. The rule in Montana relating to the admission of expert testimony is set forth in Haynes v . County of Missoula, 163 Mont. 270, 517 P.2d 370, This Court has held highway patrolmen are experts in their field of accident investigation. See: State v . Souhrada, 122 Mont, 377, 204 P.2d 792; State v. Stoddard, 147 Mont. 402, 412 P.2d 827; State v . Deshner, 158 Mont.188, 489 P.2d 1290; 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic 5990, We find defendant's issues 1, 2 and 3 to be without merit. Issue 4, alleges there was insufficient foundation for the admission of evidence obtained from the gaschromebiography. We find no merit in ,issue , 4 . The objection arose during the testimony of Arnold Melnikoff, the forensic chemist and lab supervisor of the criminal investiga- tion department when he tried to use a chart to illustrate the gaschromebiography analysis of gas samples taken at the scene and from the burned vehicle. Following extensive direct examination and cross-examina- tion on the operation and use of the gaschromebiograph, and a discussion in chambers with the judge, counsel for defendant made his objection as to the competency of the evidence in a criminal case. The court ruled a proper foundation had been laid and stated: - 10 - "* * * Certainly I am convinced it was adequate after you [Moses] got through with him. I think I understand the process but 1 am not sure it makes it more competent evidence, but in mind I am much more familiar with the process. * * *" Defendant's objection can be divided into two parts: 1 ) The lack of foundation of the verification of the accuracy of the instrument. 2 ) The competency of the gaschromebiograph in a criminal case. 1 ) The foundation was laid by the qualifications of Melnikoff, the state chemist, and his testimony of how the machine was periodically checked and that it was in good working order. 2 ) Concerning the competency of such evidence on the fractionation of mixtures of substances and its ability to afialyze both organic and inorganic compounds, see: The Cyclopedia of Chemistry, 2d Ed.(1966); The Journal of Chromatopgraphy, a 116 volume work of scientific scholars; and the Journal of Forensic Medicine from 1971 through 1976. Whfle admission of this type of evidence in a criminal case is a matter of first impression in this jurisdiction, we have allowed its admission in a civil case, Jangula v. United States Yubber.Co., 147 Mont. 98, 410 P.2d 462. Several states, Missouri, California, Arkansas and Vermont have allowed its admission in criminal cases. State v. Perryman, (Mo.App. 1975), 520 S.W.2d 126; State v. Munn, 257 Ark. 1057, 521 S.W.2d 535; People v. Rawlings, 42 Cal.App.3d 952, 117 Cal.Rptr. 651; State v. Burack, 133 Vt. 482, 346 A.2d 192, 194; 23 C , J . S . , Criminal Law, §858(2), p . 380. We adopt the position of the Vermont Court in - Burack --- in allowing ~ h e admission of the tests made by a gaschromebiograph. This Court has long held it is within the jurisdiction OL the trial judge to admit scientific and expert testimony. We find no abuse of t h a t discretion here. Graha~n v. Kolandson, 150 Mont. 270, 435 P.2d 263; Hurley v. S t a r Transfer Company, 141 Mont. 176, 376 P.2d 504. Issue 5 is directed a t alleged repetitious opinion t e s t i - niorly of D r . Pfaff, the forensic pathologist. During d i r e c t testimony D r . Pfaff t e s t i f i e d t h a t , i n h i s opinion "I believe she died a s the r e s u l t of manual strangulation and asphyxia therefrom. I I O n r e d i r e c t , he gave the same testimony i n answer t o a question---over the objection of defendant. The r e d i r e c t testimony cane a f t e r defendant's cross-examination where an e f f o r t was made t o e s t a b l i s h the cause of death occurring from a steering bheel injury. Its purpose was t o c l a r i f y any question i n the airids of the jury members a s t o what was D r . ~ f a f f ' s expert opinion on the cause of death. W e find no error. Moore v. rremelling, 100 F. 2d 39 ; 3 Wigmore, Evidence, 5 782 (2) (Chadbourn Kev. 1970) ; 4 Jones on Evidence, 5 28: 7. Issue 6 is directed t o hearsay conversations between Ellen and Mary McGonigal, a nurse and neighbor friend of Ellen. rhey saw each other d a i l y and talked often on the phone. Mary WcJonigal t e s t i f i e d she could recognize Ellen's voice on the ohone, she knew of ~ l l e n ' s plans t o spend the weekend with de- Lendant, and had, i n f a c t , loaned her a suitcase t o go on the trip. She was allowed, over objection and a f t e r argument i n chambers t o t e s t i f y t h a t she talked on t h e phone with Ellen on Yovember 5 about her weekend plans; t h a t Ellen was a f r a i d t o d r i v e a t night and t h a t she would not go on the weekend unless her husband drove. The t r i a l court allowed the admission of the testimony under the state-of-mind exception t o the hearsay rule. W e agree. - 12 - The hearsay r u l e generally dxcludes statements made aut of court, where the speakers a r e not present t o be examined. There are exceptions made f o r statements and a c t s which serve t o explain the a c t i n question where the speaker i s incapable of being present. Telephone conversations, a s i n t h i s case, are admissible. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law $662(2) (4); Anno. 113 A.L.R. 268 303, $ V(b) (2). This Court i n Thompson v. Steinkamp, 120 Mont. 475, 481, 187 P.2d 1018, allowed hearsay testimony t o show i n t e n t . The Court said: "' When i n t e n t i s a material element of a disputed f a c t , declarations of a decedent made a f t e r a s well a s before an alleged a c t t h a t indicate the i n t e n t with which he performed the a c t a r e admissible i n evidence a s an exception t o the hearsay r u l e * 9~ *."I Testimony r e l a t i ~ ~ e t o the i n t e n t of a decedent a s t o destination o r taking a tr2p i s admissible and i s one of the state-oE-mind hearsay exceptions. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L ed 706; People v. McMonigle, 29- Cal.2d 730, 177 P.2d 745. I n a case nearly on a l l fours with the i n s t a n t case the Supreme Court of Oregon i n S t a t e v. Bartolon, 8 Ore.App.538, 495 P.2d 772, admitted a statement by deceased of her i n t e n t t o go t o a c e r t a i n place. I n the i n s t a n t case arguments of both counsel were made t o the court i n chambers, questions t o be propounded t o the ' witness Mary McGonigal were discussed and many were dropped by the county attorney due t o defendant's objections. I n the end the solution on admissibility was i n the hands of the t r i a l court whose sound discretion is subject t o review only i n a case of manifest abuse. None i s found here. S t a t e v. Medicine Bull, Jr., i j 2 Mont. 34, 445 P.2d 916. Issue 7 is directed at hearsay testimony by a witness in a telephone conversation with the county attorney. Defendant contends it was error to permit James Fischer, defendant's brother-in-law, to testify as to a hearsay conversation he had with the county attorney. Fischer had given a statement to the county attorney that the defendant had been hunting with him on the night of November 16. The conversation referred to was between James Fischer and the county attorney: "Q. Prior to that time, Mr. Fischer, before any conversation that we have been refreshing your memory on on the statement, did you make any state- ment to any law enforcement officer about going to the Sidney-Wibaux road with the defendant and stopping at a pay booth where you made a telephone call on November 16, 1974? A. Go over that one more. "Q. Prior to the time that -- let me go back a minute. After you learned that the defendant had been arrested and what he was charged with, what did you do? Did you notify anybody? A. Not that I know of really. If mean, if I did now you can refresh my memory. "Q. All right, that very evening, did you call the County Attorney? A. I did, sir. "Q. What did you say? A. I simply lied to you." No error is found in the court's ruling. Where the witness can answer the question propounded to him of his own knowledge, and the value of his testimony does not depend in any degree upon the veracity or competency of any other person, his answers are not objectionable as hearsay. In State v. Crean, 43 Mont. 47, 59, 114 P. 603, a similar fact,case, this Court said: "* * 9~ Our Code * * * provides: ' A witness can testify to those facts only which he knows of his own knowledge', etc. The term 'hearsay,' as used in the law of evidence, signifies a11 evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited * * The principal objections to this species of evidence are ( 1 ) that it is given under oath--that is, that the person whose words are repeared was r i o t under oarh-- and ( 2 ) that such person is not subject to cross-examination. That the evidence sought to be elicited by these questions was not hearsay is apparent enough. The witness could ans- wer every question of his own knowledge, and the value of the testimony given did not depend in any degree upon the veracity or competency of any other person. I I See also: McGonigle v. Prudential Insurance Co., 100 Mont. 203, Issue 8 relates to charges the state was erroneously per- mitted to impeach its own witness without showing surprise. James Fischer, defendant's brother-in-law, who made the quoted statement in Issue 7, and who went with defendant over the Sidney-Wibaux road to cover defendant's travels on the night of the death, was a most reluctant witness for the state. This re- luctance came after he called the county attorney and admitted he lied and after voluntarily going to the county attorney's office and giving a clarifying statement. That statement was taken home by Fischer and his wife a week before the trial for any corrections, but in spite of all of this he was a most evasive witness. Finally, after two sessions in the judge's chamber and some 30 pages of testimony, the trial court declared him a hostile witness and allowed impeachment. The state contends that it was refreshing the witness' memory, but since the defense's objection is to impeachment, we cite the Montana sections pertinent: Section 93-1901-8, R. C .M. 1947. "The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credit by dvidence of bad,character, but he may contradict him by other evidence, and may also show that he has made dt other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony as provided in section 93-1901-12.'' jection 93-1901-12, R.C.M. 1947. "A witness may also be impeached by evidence that he has made, at other times, statements inconsistent with his present testimony; but before this can be done the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of times, places, and persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing, they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them. " Here, Fischer voluntarily gave a statement correcting a previous statement and was also allowed time to correct same. He failed to tell the truth and the trial judge, from all the testimony he heard and from what he saw of the witness, ruled the county attorney was surprised. We find no merit in defendant's Issue 8 . Issue 9 questions whether there was insufficient evidence at the close of the state's case to grant a motion to dismiss. Defendant directed his motion on an alleged failure of the state to establish his presence in the vicinity or as to the evidentiary value of the attempt by defendant to establish an alibi. The court recognized the problems of the case at that point of the trial and ruled there was sufficient circumstantial evidence before the jury with ( I ) the double indemnity insurance, ( 2 ) the proposal of marriage to the girl £rid,, ( 3 ) the alibi attempt, and ( 4 ) the statement of the defendant made to Mary McGonigal on the day of Ellen's funeral. Defendant cites authority that there must be substantial proof to convict and suspicion is not enough. He relies on State v. McCarthy, 36 Mont. 226, 92 P. 521; State v. Powers, 39 Mont. 259, 102 P. 583; State v . Brower, 55 Mont.349, 117 P. 241; State v. Merseal, 167 Mont. 409, 538 P.2d 1366, 32 St.Rep. 823. We find the cases cited unrelated to the issue of alibi and have little value to the facts here. The thrust of defendant's motion was directed at the alibi testimony. We find the rule on such testimony stated in People v. Wayne, 41 Cal.2d 814, 264 P.2d 547, 551, where it was said: " ' 9 ~ * * But where a material f a c t is established by evidence and it is shown t h a t a defendant's testimony a s t o t h a t f a c t was wilfully untrue, t h i s circumstance not only furnishes a ground f o r disbelieving other testimony of t h i s defendant * * * but a l s o tends t o show consciousness of g u i l t o r l i a b i l i t y on h i s p a r t and has probative force i n connection with other evidence on the issue of such g u i l t o r l i a b i l i t y . Such f a l s e testimony is i n the nature of an admission from which other evidence g u i l t o r l i a b i l i t y may be inferred. ' " See also: 2 Wigmore, Evidence, 5 278. Here, the court noted the circumstantial evidence before the jury and found it s u f f i c i e n t t o overrule defendant's motion t o dismiss. W e find no e r r o r i n the c o u r t ' s ruling f o r not only was there an attempt t o e s t a b l i s h an a l i b i but there was testimony t h a t (1) placed defendant a t the scene, (2) established motive f o r the crime, (3) showed deceased feared night driving, (4) the medical testimony on the cause of death, and (5) Mary ~ c G o n i g a l ' s testimony a s t o t h i s conversation with defendant on the day of ~ l l e n ' s funeral: "Q. Would you c i t e a s near a s possible the conversa- tion? A. He said: 'Mary, I a m awfully sorry about your suitcase and I want t o replace it' and I t o l d him it was a l l r i g h t . "Q. Did you have any reaction t o t h a t ? A. Yes, I did because nobody knew I loaned it. I I See: S t a t e v. Cor, 144 Mont. 323, 396 P.2d 86. Issue 10 contends e r r o r because the t r i a l court f a i l e d t o dismiss a t the close of the s t a t e ' s case on the basis t h a t the medical evidence a s t o death f a i l e d t o s a t i s f y the circumstantial dvidence t e s t . While the two pathologists could not r u l e out a blow t o the neck from the steering wheel, they both found other ovidence of damage t h a t the throat fractures would have been i n d i i f e r e n t locations had there been a blow t o the windpipe. I n chat case the fractures would have been along the sides, not the front. Both pathologists t e s t i f i e d t h a t Ellen was dead before the fire began and in their opinions death was caused by asphyxiation, due to manual strangulation. Defendant cites State v . Allen, 34 Mont. 403, 415, 87 P. 177, for the rule for admitting circumstantial evidence. There the Court speaking to an instruction, noted: "* * * Reading this paragraph with the rest of the charge, we do not think the jury could have been mislead; yet, it should have stated that the jury should convict only if the circumstances were of such a character as to satisfy the minds of the jury of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the defendant." (Emphasis added.) While we do r i o t disagree with this citation in an early case of this Court, we find the evidence here could well have satis- fied the minds of the jurors "to the exclusion of every reason- able hypothesis." This Court in State v. Fitzpatrick, 163 Mont. - 220, 227, 516 P.2d 605, stated: "* * * this Court held in reviewing a case the Court is to give to each circumstance in evidence all the legal effect toward guilt which it could - support to see whether a rational conclusion of innocence was excluded. * * *" See: State v . Radi, Mont . , 542 P.2d 1206, 32 St.Rep. 1143; State v . Cor, supra; State v . DeTonancour, 112 Mont. 94, 98, 112 P.2d 1065; State v . Warrick, 152 Mont. 94, 4 4 6 P.2d 916. Issue 11 alleges that hearsay and conclusion testimony was permitted by the sheriff. Over the objections of the defendant the sheriff was allowed to testify to what was clearly hearsay and conclusion answers in regard to matters concerning-whether or not Ross Wilson was involved. Allowing the sheriff to testify in the manner he did was improper and error. However, we do not find it so prejudicial as to require reversal. Before this Court will reverse a judgment, prejudice must be shown. State v. Totterdell, 135 Mont. 56, 336 P.2d 696; State v. Hay, 120 Mont. 573, 194 ~ e i e n d a n c ' s Zssue 12 alleges the s h e r i f f ' s statements, discussed i n Issue 11, were repetitious. W e find no e r r o r . The rnatter is discretionary with the t r i a l court and no substantial r i g h t s of defendant were damaged. Issue 13 alleges the court erred i n refusing t o allow the jury tu view a "burn filmt' offered by the defense. Defense called ds i t s witness D r . F. D. Lee, a physics teacher from Ball S t a t e University, Muncie, Indiana, who t e s t i f i e d a s t o the speed of the death vehicle and the i n j u r i e s t h a t could have resulted. The defense then attempted t o put i n t o evidence a film which de- monstrated s i x d i f f e r e n t car burnings, and a film t h a t had been prepared t o demonstrate what could happen a s f a r a s f i r e s were concerned when c a r s were involved i n collisions. Defendant argues t h i s evidence was v i t a l t o the defense i n view of the testimony given by s t a t e witnesses and t h a t under Montana law i c was e r r o r not t o allow the jury t o see these films, c i t i n g Gobel v. Rinio, 122 Mont. 235, 238, 200 P.2d 700. Here, the court viewed the film i n chambers and noted t h a ~ a l l s i x c o l l i s i o n s d e a l t with r e a r end c o l l i s i o n s where the gas tanks were ruptured and noted t h a t there was no rupture i n the i n s t a n t case, further t h a t there was no evidence of a fuel l i n e rupture o r a showing of gas burning underneath the a . The t r i a l court denied a showing of the films. This Court considered the same issue i n Leary v. Kelly !?ipe Co. , Mont . , 549 P.2d 813, 817, 33 St.Rep. 413, 411, involving the negligent unloading of a Itruck where the tlrlal court excluded evidence on a showing of the proper method J E loading a truck, and said: "These photographs do not d e y i c c ALLY conditiori r e l a t e d t o t h i s controversy. The pictured trucks are d i f f e r e n t trucks loaded d i f f e r e n t l y from the F-B truck and t r a i l e r involved i n t h i s case. W e find no e r r o r i n excluding them." Here, the films involved experiments with d i f f e r e n t and smaller vehicles i n crash s i t u a t i o n s e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t than the f a c t s here. Leary controls and a s noted i n Gobel, c i t e d by defendant: "This court i s committed t o the view t h a t the t r i a l court has a wide discretion i n admitting any diagram, map o r photograph * * *." Defendant's Issue 14 concerns the c o u r t ' s denial of defendant's offered instruction No. 14 a s t o the required intent f o r deliberate homicide. Defendant's proposed instruction No. 14 reads: "You a r e instructed t h a t homicide which i s perpetrated by any kind of w i l l f u l , deliberate and premeditated k i l l i n g i s committed purposely o r knowingly and i s deli6erate homicide. "To constitute t h i s type of crime, the k i l l i n g must be accompanied and must be preceded by a c l e a r deliberate i n t e n t t o take l i f e , an i n t e n t t o k i l l which must be the r e s u l t of deliberation and premedi- t a t i o n so t h a t it must have been formed upon a preexisting r e f l e c t i o n and not under a sudden heat of passion o r other condition such a s precludes the idea of deliberation. I I I t is defendant's position t h a t before he can be convicted of t h i s crime the s t a t e must beyond a reasonable doubt s a t i s f y i t s burden t h a t defendant had a g u i l t y mind, a g u i l t y or wrongful purpose, a criminal intent. I n support he r e l i e s upon a number of cases but principally the holding i n Morissette v. United S t a t e s , 342 U.S. 246, 96 L ed 288, 72 S.Ct. 240. Defendant argues t h a t under the instructions given by the court the necessity f o r the jury t o find defendanfs mens rea (criminal i n t e n t ) i s eliminated. Further t h a t knowingly and purposely, a s defined by the Montana Criminal Code, and a s given i n the c o u r t ' s given instructions do not include t h i s v i t a l element and therefore f a i l u r e t o give defenant's proposed instruction No. 14 was e r r o r . The statute involved ,is section 94-5-102, R.C.M. 1947, the pertinent part of which reads: "~xcept as provided in section 94-5-103 ( 1 ) ( a ) , criminal homicide constitutes a deliberate homi- cide if: "(a) it is committed purposefully or knowingly". The Commission Comment states: "Section 94-5-102 relates only to conduct which is done deliberately; that is, purposely or knowingly. * * *" (Emphasis supplied.) What the legislature did, in enacting the Montana Criminal Code 1973, was to reduce the difficulty in this area by arti- culating general principles that shall apply when the definitions of a particular offense are ambiguous. The culpability re- quirements adhere to familiar concepts, purposely, knowingly. Upon the whole it is the person who means to do the thing that constitutes a crime , knows he is doing it, and knows that there is a substantial and unjustifiable risk in doing it, whose conduct warrants condemnation of the kind from which conviction results. The problem of scienter, guilty knowledge, goes to the question of culpability generally and has been usually dealt with by the concept of -- mens rea. While culpability is variously stated in criminal statutes in terms such as "willful","willfully and unlawfully", "with intent to" and other phrases, these exact words are not necessary in determining whether the statute is vague. The United States Supreme Court has held in a series of cases that a statute will not be evaluated on its face, but ... , .. - 21 - only i n the context with which a defendant is,charged. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 91 L ed 1877, 67 S.Ct. 1538. It has also looked into the requirement of scienter i n the statutory definition of the crime i n words like " ~ i l l f u l l y ' ~ , "intentionally1' and "knowingly" as overcoming the vice of vague- ness. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 91 L ed 367, 72 S.Ct. 329. Under the provisions of section 94-5-102, R.C.M. 1947, the necessary requirements for "mens rea" and "criminal intent" are embodied i n the use of the new language of the statute "purposely" and "knowingly". The court's given Instruction No. 1 7 defined both I I purposely" and "knowingly" i n terms s e t forth i n section 94-2- 101, R.C.M. 1947. It i s defendant's contention the homicide statute requires more to be clear. W e do not agree, for it i s clear from the Commission Comment that it was the legislative intent t o replace such terms a s "deliberately". This Court i n State v. Klein, Mont . , 547 P.2d 75,78, 33 St.Rep. 283,288, spoke t o t h i s issue. I n Klein, a robbery case, it was alleged the t r i a l court committed error i n refusing defendant's instruction defining "feloniously". There we referred t o the Annotator's notes under section 94-2-101, Montana Criminal Code of 1973, Annotated, which stated: "A major problem of prior Montana criminal law was the use i n the code of numerous terms affecting culpability that were largely undefined. Under the new Code, the mental states required for various degrees of culpability are defined carefully i n a hierarchy. 'Purposely' i s the most culpable s t a t e and implies a design. This term replaces a term frequently used i n the old code, 'intentionally' J : 3c **" The Court then stated: "It is clear that the legislature intended the words I purposely' and 'knowingly' would substitute for the word ' felonious' ( i . e . intentionally) as used in the old code.* * *" Here, the court gave defendant's offered instruction No. 17, defining both "purposely" and "knowingly". We find no error. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed. We Concur: , - - - - 7