Case Title: Worcester Regional Retirement Board v. Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13137

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13137 
 
WORCESTER REGIONAL RETIREMENT BOARD & others1  vs.  PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 3, 2021. - February 4, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission.  County, 
Retirement board.  Municipal Corporations, Retirement 
board.  Retirement.  Public Employment, Retirement, 
Vacation pay, Sick leave benefits, Worker's compensation.  
Administrative Law, Exhaustion of remedies, Judicial 
review.  Jurisdiction, Judicial review of administrative 
action, Justiciable question.  Retroactivity of Judicial 
Holding.  Statute, Construction.  Words, "Regular 
compensation." 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on August 9, 2018. 
 
Following transfer to the Superior Court Department, the 
case was heard by Patrick M. Haggan, J., on motions for judgment 
on the pleadings. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
1 Essex Regional Retirement Board, Franklin Regional 
Retirement Board, Stoneham Retirement Board, and Peabody 
Retirement Board. 
2 
 
 
Julia E. Kobick, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
Michael Sacco for the plaintiffs. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In this appeal, we consider the scope of our 
prior interpretation of the term "regular compensation" defined 
in G. L. c. 32, § 1, as excluding vacation or sick leave pay 
used to supplement workers' compensation payments.  Public 
Employee Retirement Admin. Comm'n v. Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Bd., 478 Mass. 832, 832 (2018) (Vernava).  Here, we are 
asked to determine whether our construction of "regular 
compensation" narrowly applies only to determinations of an 
employee's effective retirement date under the provision in 
G. L. c. 32, § 7, relating to accidental disability retirement, 
or more broadly applies to any form of retirement, including the 
ordinary disability or superannuation retirement provisions of 
G. L. c. 32, §§ 5 and 6.  Additionally, we are asked to address 
the authority of the Public Employee Retirement Administration 
Commission (PERAC) to issue memoranda that bind retirement 
boards to PERAC's interpretation of appellate court decisions, 
and whether the plaintiff retirement boards (boards) may seek 
judicial review of such memoranda without first exhausting 
available administrative remedies. 
 
Because our interpretation of "regular compensation" in 
Vernava did not depend on the specific retirement provision 
3 
 
under which the issue arose, we conclude that this construction 
applies consistently across uses of the term in G. L. c. 32, 
§§ 5, 6, and 7, thereby applying to superannuation, ordinary 
disability, and accidental disability retirement, and does so 
retroactively.  Where the existing statutory framework and case-
specific application of the exhaustion doctrine have served 
amply the parties' need to address the statutory construction 
question raised in this case, no actual controversy is raised by 
the abstract issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies in 
hypothetical disputes over future PERAC memoranda interpreting 
appellate opinions. 
Background.  In Vernava, 478 Mass. 832, we addressed the 
intersection of G. L. c. 32, concerning retirement systems, and 
G. L. c. 152, concerning workers' compensation.2  We considered 
"whether the supplemental pay received pursuant to G. L. c. 152, 
§ 69, constitutes 'regular compensation' as defined by G. L. 
c. 32, § 1, when received in conjunction with workers' 
compensation."3  Vernava, supra at 834.  In concluding that the 
 
 
2 "Employees who are unable to work because of injuries 
sustained on the job can seek benefits in lieu of salary under 
the workers' compensation act."  Public Employee Retirement 
Admin. Comm'n v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 478 Mass. 
832, 833 n.2 (2018) (Vernava). 
 
 
3 "[A] public employer may pay an employee receiving 
workers' compensation all of that employee's accrued vacation 
and sick time in part until any sick leave allowance which the 
employee has to [the employee's] credit has been used," so long 
4 
 
two hours of supplemental pay received per week by the employee 
in Vernava did not constitute "regular compensation" for the 
purposes of determining the effective date of his accidental 
disability retirement under G. L. c. 32, § 7, we held that where 
an employee receives accrued vacation or sick leave pay in 
conjunction with workers' compensation benefits, such accrued 
vacation or sick leave used as supplemental pay is not "regular 
compensation" because the injured "employee has ceased providing 
services to the employer."  Vernava, supra at 838. 
Subsequent to our decision in Vernava, PERAC, the 
regulatory agency overseeing the 104 retirement systems 
constituted under G. L. c. 32, issued a memorandum advising 
retirement boards on the scope of that decision.  This 
memorandum alerted members that the Vernava decision "will have 
no applicability to any member retiring under any section of 
[G. L. c.] 32 other than [§] 7."  Highlighting footnote 3 of our 
opinion in Vernava, PERAC interpreted our holding to be limited 
such that the meaning of "regular compensation" applied solely 
 
as the employee receives only "so much of any sick leave 
allowance payment as, when added to the amount of any disability 
compensation . . . will result in the payment to [the employee] 
of [the employee's] full salary or wages" (quotations and 
citation omitted).  Vernava, 478 Mass. at 833 n.2, quoting G. L. 
c. 152, § 69. 
5 
 
to calculations of an employee's effective date of accidental 
disability retirement pursuant to § 7 (2).4 
PERAC emphasized the language of the first sentence of the 
footnote, including its direct reference to "the purpose of 
determining an employee's effective date of retirement under 
G. L. c. 32, § 7."  PERAC concluded that 
"[t]he limited language of footnote 3 presents a challenge 
in determining whether or not a supplemental payment is 
regular compensation at the time it is received, because 
many members may receive Workers' Compensation at certain 
times during their careers, but may or may not ultimately 
retire pursuant to the provisions of [G. L.] c. 32, § 7.  
Thus, a person who was out on Workers' Compensation mid-
career who subsequently retires for superannuation will 
have those payments counted as regular compensation." 
 
PERAC thereafter issued a second memorandum emphasizing that all 
Massachusetts retirement boards were bound by its interpretation 
of the scope of this court's holding in Vernava. 
In response to the PERAC memoranda, the boards filed a 
complaint in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 1.  
The complaint sought two declarations:  first, that the Vernava 
construction of regular compensation as excluding supplemental 
 
 
4 Footnote 3 states:  "Our interpretation of 'regular 
compensation' in this case is limited to the receipt of 
supplemental pay in connection with workers' compensation 
benefits, for the purpose of determining an employee's effective 
date of retirement under G. L. c. 32, § 7.  We need not address 
the effective date of retirement for public employees who are 
not receiving workers' compensation, such as those who 
voluntarily retire and use their supplemental pay before doing 
so" (emphasis in original).  Vernava, 478 Mass. at 834 n.3. 
6 
 
pay when paid in conjunction with workers' compensation applies 
regardless of whether a retirement system member retires for 
disability under G. L. c. 32, § 6 or 7, or for superannuation 
under G. L. c. 32, § 5 (count 1); and, second, that PERAC's 
memoranda interpreting case law are not binding on retirement 
boards, who have independent authority to interpret retirement 
statutes and associated case law (count 2).5 
The case was transferred to the Superior Court by order of 
a single justice.  In the Superior Court, the boards requested 
that, in the alternative, the judge declare as to count 2 that 
retirement boards may seek review of PERAC memoranda 
interpreting appellate court opinions by an action for 
declaratory judgment without first exhausting administrative 
remedies.  With regard to the first claim, the judge rejected 
PERAC's interpretation of our holding in Vernava and held that 
footnote three did not restrict the construction of "regular 
compensation" to apply only with respect to accidental 
disability retirement.  The judge declined to reach the merits 
of either version of the boards' second claim, characterizing 
the declarations sought as akin to an advisory opinion.  PERAC 
appealed from the judge's declaration as to count 1; the boards 
appealed from the judge's decision to decline to reach the 
 
 
5 The boards also requested that the court order any other 
relief it deemed proper and just. 
7 
 
merits of count 2, pressing on appeal their alternative request 
for a declaration that retirement boards may seek review of 
PERAC memoranda interpreting appellate court opinions without 
first exhausting administrative remedies.6  We granted PERAC's 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Jurisdiction.  Declaratory relief pursuant 
to G. L. c. 231A, § 1, in the form of "binding declarations of 
right, duty, status and other legal relations," is limited to 
cases where "an actual controversy has arisen and is 
specifically set forth in the pleadings."  "An actual 
controversy arises under our law where there is 'a real dispute 
caused by the assertion by one party of a legal relation, status 
or right in which [that party] has a definite interest, and the 
denial of such assertion by another party also having a definite 
interest in the subject matter, where the circumstances 
attending the dispute plainly indicate that unless the matter is 
 
 
6 The boards also sought to include in the issue raised on 
appeal the statutory interpretation opinions of the Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB).  CRAB is not a party to this 
action.  The boards' brief does not offer any arguments 
specifically addressing CRAB opinions -- the cursory reference 
falls short of the level of acceptable appellate argument, and 
we do not reach it here.  See McCone v. New England Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 393 Mass. 231, 236 (1984) ("cursory and conclusory" 
statement of claim, without citation to supporting legal 
authority, is "insufficient appellate argument"), quoting Tobin 
v. Commissioner of Banks, 377 Mass. 909, 909 (1979) (deeming 
insufficient appellate argument waived); Lolos v. Berlin, 338 
Mass. 10, 14 (1958) (party's "duty is to assist the court with 
argument and appropriate citation of authority"). 
8 
 
[adjudicated] such antagonistic claims will almost immediately 
and inevitably lead to litigation.'"  Libertarian Ass'n of Mass. 
v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 538, 546-547 (2012), 
quoting School Comm. of Cambridge v. Superintendent of Sch. of 
Cambridge, 320 Mass. 516, 518 (1946).  Where no actual 
controversy is presented by a claim for declaratory relief, the 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, and the 
claim must be dismissed.  Hingham v. Department of Hous. & 
Community Dev., 451 Mass. 501, 502, 505 (2008) (affirming 
judgment of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on 
ground that "in order for a court to provide declaratory relief, 
an actual controversy . . . must exist").  "[W]henever a problem 
of subject matter jurisdiction becomes apparent to a court, the 
court has both the power and the obligation to resolve it" 
(quotation omitted).  Doherty v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 486 Mass. 
487, 491 (2020), quoting Rental Prop. Mgt. Servs. v. Hatcher, 
479 Mass. 542, 547 (2018). 
 
Here, we find no problem of subject matter jurisdiction 
concerning count 1:  there is an actual controversy as to the 
scope of our holding in Vernava regarding the meaning of 
"regular compensation."  Each party has asserted a specific 
interest in the scope of our construction of "regular 
compensation" in Vernava –- PERAC has a specific interest in its 
duty of "efficient administration of the public employee 
9 
 
retirement system," G. L. c. 7, § 50, and the boards have a 
specific interest in accurate calculations of retirement 
allowances and creditable service for workers and retirees under 
G. L. c. 32.  Litigation arising from this issue appears 
inevitable; the boards assert that PERAC's interpretation of 
Vernava already has been contradicted by the Division of 
Administrative Law Appeals in several proceedings currently 
pending before the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board.  For 
that reason, we conclude that this court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over count 1, and we reach that question on the 
merits. 
 
However, although not raised by the parties, we conclude 
that we do not have subject matter jurisdiction as to count 2.  
No actual controversy is presented by the alternative 
declaration the boards press on appeal, which would identify a 
sweeping prospective right to proceed directly, without first 
exhausting administrative remedies, to judicial review of PERAC 
memoranda concerning appellate statutory interpretation opinion.  
"A mere difference of opinion or uncertainty over the meaning to 
be ascribed a statute does not, without more, rise to the level 
of a justiciable controversy."  Department of Community Affairs 
v. Massachusetts State College Bldg. Auth., 378 Mass. 418, 422 
(1979).  Controversy is properly shown where both parties assert 
a definite interest in the meaning of the statute, in 
10 
 
circumstances clearly showing that "such antagonistic claims 
will almost immediately and inevitably lead to litigation."  
Libertarian Ass'n of Mass., 462 Mass. at 547, quoting School 
Comm. of Cambridge, 320 Mass. at 518.  The declaration sought on 
appeal by the boards as to count 2 does not meet such a 
standard:  it addresses an abstract question unmoored from any 
particular circumstance, and applies to purely hypothetical 
disputes over future PERAC memoranda in which the boards cannot 
establish a specific, present interest.  Libertarian Ass'n of 
Mass., supra ("declaratory relief . . . is not a vehicle for 
resolving abstract . . . [or] hypothetical . . . questions"). 
 
The lack of an actual controversy raised by count 2 is 
demonstrated by the adequacy of the remedy available to the 
parties under G. L. c. 231A, § 1, for the specific and present 
controversy that we address in count 1.  The doctrine of 
exhaustion has not precluded this court from reaching the merits 
of count 1 in the specific circumstances of this case, which 
raise not only a pure question of law, but also an important 
public issue that immediately concerns a numerous group of 
government employees and retirees.  See Suburban Health Care, 
Inc. v. Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., Office of 
Medicaid, 488 Mass. 347, 352 (2021), quoting Temple Emanuel of 
Newton v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 463 Mass. 
472, 479-480 (2012) ("When considering whether to excuse the 
11 
 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, we look at 'whether 
resort to the administrative remedy would be futile; whether the 
case raises important public questions whose resolution will 
affect people beyond the parties to the case; whether pursuing 
the administrative remedy will result in irreparable harm to 
either party; and whether there is a question of law peculiarly 
within judicial competence'"). 
 
For those reasons, we conclude that count 2 must be 
dismissed upon our own motion.  See Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. 
v. Commissioner of Revenue, 412 Mass. 243, 248 (1992), citing 
Department of Community Affairs, 378 Mass. at 422-423 (issues of 
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by appellate court on 
its own motion). 
 
2.  The merits.  General Laws c. 32, § 1, defines "regular 
compensation" as "compensation received exclusively as wages by 
an employee for services performed in the course of employment 
for his employer."  By the express language of § 1, this 
definition applies "as used in [§§ 1 to 28], inclusive, unless a 
different meaning is plainly required by the context."  Id.  
PERAC does not identify any specific uses of the term "regular 
compensation" within § 5 or § 6 as plainly requiring a different 
meaning due to context.  Instead, PERAC argues that the specific 
language of the § 7 (2) standard for determining the effective 
date of accidental disability retirement differs from the 
12 
 
provisions setting retirement dates in §§ 5 and 6, and thus our 
interpretation of "regular compensation" in Vernava was limited 
solely to the context of § 7.7  Although we afford deference to 
an agency's interpretation of a statute that it administers, 
such deference does not extend to facially unreasonable 
constructions.  Cf. Boston Retirement Bd. v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Bd., 441 Mass. 78, 82 (2004) (deference 
afforded to PERAC's "reasonable interpretation of the statute on 
its face").  For the reasons set forth infra, we reject as 
unreasonable PERAC's interpretation of "regular compensation" as 
having multiple meanings amongst §§ 5, 6, and 7. 
 
Section 6, setting forth the requirements for ordinary 
disability retirement, contains eight references to "regular 
compensation," the majority of which relate to the computation 
of retirement allowances.  As in § 7 (2), the effective date of 
retirement under § 6 is constrained by the last date an employee 
 
 
7 General Laws c. 32, § 7 (2), states:  "Upon retirement 
under the provisions of this section a member shall receive an 
accidental disability retirement allowance to become effective 
on the date the injury was sustained or the hazard or account of 
which [the employee] is being retired was undergone, or on the 
date six months prior to the filing of the written application 
for such retirement with the board and [the employee's] 
respective employer, or on the date for which [the employee] 
last received regular compensation for his employment in the 
public service, whichever date last occurs." 
 
13 
 
receives "regular compensation."8  Section 5, setting forth the 
requirements for superannuation retirement, contains forty-five 
references to "regular compensation," largely relating to 
computation of required deductions or retirement allowances.  
Unlike §§ 6 and 7, the effective date of retirement under § 5 is 
not constrained by the date the employee last received "regular 
compensation."9 
 
However, when read as a whole, the context of the various 
uses of "regular compensation" in §§ 5 and 6 is not 
distinguishable from the fourteen uses of the same term in § 7.  
 
 
8 General Laws c. 32, § 6 (1), states that upon written 
application, the employee "shall be retired for ordinary 
disability as of a date which shall be specified in such 
application and which shall be not less than fifteen days nor 
more than four months after the filing of such application but 
in no event later than the maximum age for [the employee's] 
group, nor earlier than the last day for which [the employee] 
received regular compensation" (emphasis added). 
 
 
9 General Laws c. 32, § 5 (1), requires that the employee 
specify a retirement date in the written application, which date 
"shall be subsequent to but not more than four months after 
filing of such application."  For certain classifications of 
public employees, the retirement date must occur by a specified 
"maximum age."  G. L. c. 32, §§ 1, 3.  If such employees serve 
in positions with duties falling into two different 
classifications and paid from two appropriations, the required 
retirement age is determined by which duties account for the 
major portion of the employee's "regular compensation."  Id.  In 
short, the source of certain public employees' "regular 
compensation" determines the mandatory retirement age, and thus 
the latest possible retirement date, for such individuals.  
However, unlike in §§ 6 and 7, the date such employees last 
received "regular compensation" does not constrain the effective 
date of retirement for the purposes of § 5. 
14 
 
Accordingly, there is no clear basis in G. L. c. 32 to overcome 
§ 1's explicit application of a single, consistent definition of 
"regular compensation" to §§ 5, 6, and 7, in the absence of 
context that "plainly require[s]" a different meaning.10 
 
To the extent any ambiguity remains in the face of the 
plain language applying a uniform definition of "regular 
compensation" throughout the statutory scheme, we resolve it to 
similar effect.  "Where the Legislature uses the same words in 
several sections which concern the same subject matter, the 
words must be presumed to have been used with the same meaning 
in each section."  Meyer v. Veolia Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 208, 
214-215 (2019), quoting Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of 
Ins., 356 Mass. 184, 188-189 (1969).  Sections 5, 6, and 7 
concern the same general subject matter:  various forms of 
 
 
10 This uniform construction is consistent with our past 
opinions interpreting the limits of "regular compensation" as 
defined in § 1, without restriction to a specific type of 
retirement.  See, e.g., Rotondi v. Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 644, 652-654 (2012) (determining meaning 
of "fixed annual compensation" for purposes of membership 
eligibility under § 3 [2] [d] not substantially different from 
meaning of "regular compensation" in § 1, without consideration 
of future retirement type); Pelonzi v. Retirement Bd. of 
Beverly, 451 Mass. 475, 482 (2008) (determining "regular 
compensation" excludes value of employee's use of automobile 
provided by employer in appeal from § 5 retirement allowance 
calculation, but relying on apparent intent of "entire statutory 
scheme" and making no distinction for other retirement types); 
Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 661 
(2006) (determining "regular compensation" excludes particular 
annuity payments in appeal from § 5 retirement allowance 
calculation, without distinction from other retirement types). 
15 
 
retirement by public employees.  Within each section, the term 
"regular compensation" is referenced in relation to the 
calculation of retirement allowances and required contributions.  
In §§ 6 and 7, the latest date of receipt of regular 
compensation is used to constrain an employee's retirement date, 
using nearly identical phrasing.11  Absent any evidence of 
contrary legislative intent, this consistent use of the term 
throughout the c. 32 statutory scheme must be presumed to 
reflect a uniform meaning, regardless of the specific type of 
retirement at issue. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that our construction of "regular 
compensation" in Vernava to exclude supplemental pay received in 
conjunction with workers' compensation applies equally whether 
an employee receiving such pay subsequently retires under 
superannuation, ordinary disability, or accidental disability, 
G. L. c. 32, §§ 5-7, and affirm the judge's declaration that 
PERAC's memorandum is incorrect as a matter of law by limiting 
our holding in Vernava to accidental disability retirement under 
G. L. c. 32, § 7. 
 
3.  Retroactivity.  "In general, when we construe a 
statute, we do not engage in an analysis whether that 
 
 
11 General Laws c. 32, § 6, uses the phrase "last day for 
which [the employee] received regular compensation," while § 7 
uses the phrase "date for which [the employee] last received 
regular compensation." 
16 
 
interpretation is given retroactive or prospective effect; the 
interpretation we give the statute usually reflects the court's 
view of its meaning since the statute's enactment."  Eaton v. 
Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 587 (2012), citing 
McIntire, petitioner, 458 Mass. 257, 261 (2010), cert. denied, 
563 U.S. 1012 (2011).  "There must be good reason 'to disturb 
the presumptively retroactive application' of a statutory 
interpretation."  Commonwealth v. Ashford, 486 Mass. 450, 453–
454 (2020), quoting American Int'l Ins. Co. v. Robert Seuffer 
GmbH & Co. KG, 468 Mass. 109, 121, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1061 
(2014).  "This court traditionally has given prospective effect 
to its decisions in very limited circumstances," Eaton, supra at 
588, and "would have to be satisfied that special circumstances 
exist to limit our answer here to only prospective application," 
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 565 (1982).  We have been 
more willing to apply our decisions prospectively in the 
property and contract law contexts than other subject areas.  
See Pinti v. Emigrant Mtge. Co., 472 Mass. 226, 243 (2015) ("in 
the property law context, we have been more willing to apply our 
decisions prospectively than in other contexts"); Eaton, supra, 
quoting Blood v. Edgar's, Inc., 36 Mass. App. Ct. 402, 407 
(1994) (applying statutory interpretation decision prospectively 
in "circumstances where the ruling announces a change that 
affects property law" and where "prior law is of questionable 
17 
 
prognosticative value"); Payton, supra at 565, 570, and cases 
cited (declining to apply prospective effect to tort law 
decision, unlike property or contract law).  Our exercise of 
discretion to apply a decision prospectively "is guided by 
consideration of the novelty of the interpretation, whether 
retroactivity is consistent with the purposes of the rule 
announced, and whether 'hardship or inequity would result from 
retroactive application' (citation omitted)."  Ashford, supra at 
453. 
 
PERAC urges this court to limit our interpretation of 
"regular compensation" to prospective application to 
superannuation and ordinary disability retirement under G. L. 
c. 32, §§ 5 and 6.  PERAC argues that this case presents an 
exceptional circumstance where our interpretation could require 
the boards to recalculate retirement allowances for any existing 
retiree who at one time received supplemental pay along with 
workers' compensation, and could possibly result in the total 
loss of benefit eligibility for some retirees who received 
supplemental pay in conjunction with partial incapacity workers' 
compensation, if recalculation resulted in a reduction of 
creditable service below the minimum retirement threshold. 
The hardship of reduced retirement allowance amounts for 
superannuation and ordinary disability retirees is akin to the 
hardship facing accidental disability retirees due to our 
18 
 
decision in Vernava, which we did not limit to prospective 
effect.  However, this case presents a novel question of 
hardship, where recalculation of creditable service may affect 
an individual retiree's eligibility for any benefits, and 
individual employees may have relied upon the boards' prior 
calculations of creditable service on the basis of PERAC's 
erroneous interpretation of Vernava when choosing a particular 
retirement date under § 5 or § 6. 
This is an issue that did not arise in Vernava, because 
existing retirees who received workers' compensation for total 
incapacity are protected by statute from impacts on the 
creditable service they otherwise would have accrued during the 
period of injury.12  In contrast, existing retirees who received 
workers' compensation for partial incapacity in conjunction with 
supplemental pay would lose prorated creditable service for the 
period workers' compensation benefits were received, where the 
 
12 General Laws c. 32, § 14 (1) (a), "protects employees who 
are injured on the job by allowing them to continue accumulating 
creditable service while receiving workers' compensation [for 
total incapacity] and by instructing the employer to make the 
contributions to the employee's annuity fund which would have 
been deducted from the employee's salary had [the employee] not 
been injured" (footnote omitted).  Hayes v. Retirement Bd. of 
Newton, 425 Mass. 468, 473-474 (1997) (distinguishing right to 
accrue creditable service while receiving workers' compensation 
benefits from "different question of an employee's receipt or 
nonreceipt of regular compensation").  Partial incapacity 
workers' compensation benefits under G. L. c. 152, § 35, are not 
among the types of workers' compensation explicitly included in 
§ 14 (1) (a). 
19 
 
supplemental vacation or sick pay used along with those benefits 
no longer constitutes "regular compensation" for the purposes of 
calculating weeks of creditable service.13 
Nevertheless, we decline, as we implicitly did in Vernava, 
to depart from the presumption of retroactivity for our 
construction of "regular compensation" in this case.  See 
McIntire, petitioner, 458 Mass. at 261.  PERAC does not offer a 
specific estimation of how many existing retirees would be 
rendered ineligible for superannuation or ordinary disability 
retirement benefits due to retroactive recalculation to exclude 
periods of partial incapacity from their creditable service.14  
 
13 General Laws c. 32, § 5 (1) (m), requires at least ten 
years of creditable service to be eligible for superannuation 
retirement, while § 6 (1) requires at least either ten or 
fifteen years of creditable service to be eligible for ordinary 
disability retirement, depending on the date the employee began 
service or the particular retirement system at issue.  Section 
4 (1) (c) states that creditable service "shall include any 
period of [the employee's] continuous absence with full regular 
compensation, or in the event of his absence with partial 
regular compensation such period or portion thereof, if any, as 
the board shall determine.  Creditable service in the case of 
any member may be allowed by the board for any period of [the 
employee's] continuous absence without regular compensation 
which is not in excess of one month.  Any portion of any leave 
. . . which is in excess of one month shall not be counted as 
creditable service except as specifically otherwise provided for 
in this section . . . ."  (Emphases added.)  No other provision 
of § 4 explicitly allows the inclusion of a period of partial 
incapacity workers' compensation exceeding one month. 
 
 
14 PERAC estimated that "at least hundreds" of retirees had 
received supplemental pay in conjunction with partial incapacity 
workers compensation, but did not estimate the number or 
proportion of individuals for which recalculation would result 
20 
 
Nor is it clear that the boards lack existing statutory 
discretion to waive recalculations that would result in the 
total loss of retirement benefit eligibility for some existing 
retirees, and thus that the risk of hardship to those 
hypothetical retirees truly is imminent.15 
 
in creditable service falling below the minimum statutory 
threshold. 
 
15 After our holding in Vernava, PERAC advised retirement 
boards that correction of § 7 retirement allowances for existing 
accidental disability retirees need only be completed "as far as 
practicable," G. L. c. 32, § 20 (5) (c) (1), and recommended 
that boards only engage in retroactive recalculation when an 
affected retiree "self-identif[ied] to the retirement board" by 
filing for retirement allowance recalculation.  Similarly, in 
response to our holding in Pelonzi v. Retirement Bd. of Beverly, 
451 Mass. 475, 482 (2008), excluding the value of an employee's 
use of an employer-owned vehicle from the § 1 definition of 
"regular compensation," PERAC issued a memorandum advising that 
retirement boards had the discretion under G. L. c. 32, 
§ 20 (5) (c) (3), to waive collection of related overpayments to 
existing retirees where "the error in any benefit payment . . . 
persisted for a period in excess of one year," "the error was 
not the result of erroneous information provided by the member," 
and "the member . . . did not have reason to believe that the 
benefit amount . . . was in error." 
 
The questions whether the § 20 (5) (c) practicability and 
overpayment waiver provisions permit boards to decline to 
proactively identify existing retirees whose creditable service 
would fall below the minimum eligibility threshold as a result 
of our holding in this case, or permit retirement boards to 
waive revocation in such circumstances on the basis of reliance 
upon PERAC and the boards' prior representations of sufficient 
creditable service, have not been briefed before this court, and 
we do not reach such questions here.  We reserve a determination 
of the rights of any such retirees until such time, if ever, 
when these questions come to us as fully developed issues. 
21 
 
This absence of specific evidence establishing the likely 
occurrence of extraordinary hardship weighs in favor of the 
presumption of retroactive application.  Ashford, 486 Mass. at 
453.  There is little novelty in a uniform application of the 
meaning of "regular compensation" to all types of retirement 
under G. L. c. 32, given the explicit application in § 1 of a 
uniform definition of the term "as used in [§§ 1 to 28], 
inclusive."  See Eaton, 462 Mass. at 588, quoting Blood, 36 
Mass. App. Ct. at 407 (prospective effect may be appropriate 
where "prior law is of questionable prognosticative value").  
Moreover, just as in Vernava, retroactivity is consistent with 
the purpose of limiting the meaning of "regular compensation" to 
that intended by the Legislature, as regular, ordinary 
compensation for services performed by the employee.  For those 
reasons, our construction of the meaning of "regular 
compensation," as applied to superannuation, ordinary 
disability, and accidental disability retirement under G. L. 
c. 32, §§ 5 to 7, has retroactive effect. 
Conclusion.  The judgment of the Superior Court as to count 
1 of the complaint, declaring that the construction of "regular 
compensation" set out in Vernava is not limited to accidental 
disability retirement under G. L. c. 32, § 7, is affirmed.  We 
remand the case to the Superior Court for an order of dismissal 
of count 2 of the complaint. 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.