Case Title: Musick v. State

Citation: 280 N.E.2d 602

Docket Number: 871S243

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
280 N.E.2d 602 (1972)
Charles Bud MUSICK, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 871S243.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
April 5, 1972.
Frederick F. McClellan, Muncie, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Michael Schaefer, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.
This is an appeal by Charles Musick from a judgment in the Randolph Circuit Court convicting him of the crime of Second Degree Burglary. Trial was to a jury, and upon conviction appellant was sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for a term of not less than two (2) years nor *603 more than five (5) years. Appellant's Motion to Correct Errors was overruled, and this appeal followed.
Appellant was charged by Affidavit which, omitting the caption, reads as follows:
On appeal, appellant contends that the State failed to prove that George Polley owned or had any proprietary interest in the Polley Farm Store in Lynn, Indiana, which is the building that was allegedly burglarized. We do not agree.
It is well established in the law that the crime of burglary is an offense against the possession of property and not against the ownership thereof. See, Jay v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 534, 206 N.E.2d 128; Bradley v. State (1964), 244 Ind. 630, 195 N.E.2d 347. In the case at bar, Mr. Polley testified that he operated the Polley Farm Store; he testified that he conducted his business transactions there; throughout his testimony, he referred to the store as "our store" and "our place of business." This Court is of the opinion that the above uncontradicted testimony is sufficient to establish that George Polley was in possession of the premises allegedly burglarized by the appellant. Thus it was unnecessary for the State to establish absolute ownership of the premises in question, and such allegation in the Affidavit may be treated as mere surplusage. See, Jay v. State, supra.
The appellant's remaining assignment of error concerns the correctness of Final Instruction Number 7 which was given to the jury. The instruction set forth, verbatim, the language contained in IC 1971, XX-XX-X-X, (Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-701(b) [1956 Repl.]), which defines Second Degree Burglary as follows:
Appellant contends the last sentence of the above statute should have been excluded from the instruction because it has a tendency to mislead the jury into believing that the judge may suspend the sentence should the jury find the defendant guilty. There is absolutely no merit in this contention. If a statute is not unconstitutionally vague, ambiguous, or misleading, and if it is relevant to the issues in the case, it is not error to give an instruction in the exact language of the applicable statute. See, Southerland v. State (1935), 209 Ind. 308, 197 N.E. 841; Sanford v. State *604 (1926), 198 Ind. 198, 152 N.E. 814. The language contained in IC 1971, XX-XX-X-X, (Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-701(b) [1956 Repl.]), is not vague or misleading, and, therefore it was not error to include it in the instruction.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.