Case Title: Saudi Basic Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 493, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
SAUDI BASIC INDUSTRIES  
§ 
CORPORATION, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
§ No. 493, 2003     
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
 
§ Court Below:  Superior Court  
 
 
 
§ of the State of Delaware in and  
              v. 
 
 
§ for New Castle County 
 
 
 
§ 
MOBIL YANBU PETROCHEMICAL § C.A. No. 00C-07-161 
COMPANY, INC. and EXXON 
 
§ 
CHEMICAL ARABIA, INC., 
 
§  
 
 
 
§  
 
 Defendants Below,  
§  
 
Appellees. 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 1, 2004 
 
Decided: 
January 14, 2005 
 
 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, 
Justices, and STRINE, Vice Chancellor,1 constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
 
 
Upon appeal from Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to Art. IV, § 12 of the Delaware Constitution and 
Supreme Court Rules 2 and 4. 
 
A. Gilchrist Sparks (argued), Donald E. Reid and Jason A. Cincilla, 
Esquires, of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, Delaware; Of 
Counsel:  Kenneth R. Adamo, Joseph L. McEntee, Jr. and Margaret I. Lyle, 
Esquires, of Jones Day, Dallas, Texas; Gregory A. Castanias, Lawrence D. 
Rosenberg, Elizabeth Rees and William K. Shirey II, Esquires, of Jones Day, 
Washington, D.C.; for Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
William J. Wade, Esquire, of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, 
Delaware; Of Counsel:  James W. Quinn (argued), David Lender and Gregory S. 
Coleman, Esquires, of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, New York; 
Andrew S. Pollis and David J. Michalski, Esquires, of Hahn Loeser & Parks LLP, 
Cleveland, Ohio; Elizabeth J. Sher, Esquire, of Pitney Hardin LLP, Florham Park, 
New Jersey; Kenneth C. Johnson, Esquire of Exxon Mobil Corporation, Houston, 
Texas; for Appellees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JACOBS, Justice: 
 
 
 
 
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation ("SABIC"), the counterclaim defendant 
below, appeals from a $416.8 million Superior Court judgment entered against 
SABIC and in favor of SABIC's joint venture partners, Mobil Yanbu Petroleum 
Company ("Mobil") and Exxon Chemical Arabia, Inc. ("Exxon").2 SABIC brought 
this action in the Superior Court of Delaware, seeking a declaratory judgment that 
any payments made to SABIC by the joint venture partnerships were not 
overcharges that violated any applicable contract.  In response, Mobil and Exxon 
asserted counterclaims in tort3 and for breach of contract, alleging that for over two 
decades, SABIC had secretly overcharged the partnerships for technology that 
SABIC had licensed from Union Carbide Corporation.  After a two-week trial, the 
jury found that SABIC had breached the joint venture agreements and had also 
committed the Saudi tort of usurpation against both Mobil and Exxon.  Based on 
those findings, the jury awarded compensatory damages of $220,238,108 to Mobil 
and $196,642,656 to Exxon. 
 
On this appeal, SABIC contends that the judgment should be reversed and/or 
that the case should be remanded for a new trial, because the trial judge made 
numerous rulings, both substantive and evidentiary, that were erroneous as a matter 
                                                 
2 Except where the context otherwise requires, Mobil and Exxon, the two counterclaim plaintiffs 
below, are referred to collectively as "ExxonMobil."  Although Exxon's and Mobil's respective 
parents merged in 1999 to form ExxonMobil, they were separate companies and competitors at 
the time that most of the critical events in this lawsuit took place. 
 
3 As discussed more fully herein, ExxonMobil's tort claim was based upon the Saudi Arabian tort 
of ghasb (usurpation). 
 
2
of law.  Having considered in depth the parties' briefs and the extensive record, we 
conclude that none of SABIC's multitudinous claims of error has merit and that the 
judgment of the Superior Court should be affirmed. 
FACTS 
 
The facts that are pertinent to this appeal are either undisputed or, where 
disputed, are based upon reasonable inferences from the record evidence that, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing parties, raise issues of material 
fact that the jury could justifiably have resolved in ExxonMobil's favor.4 
1.  Formation of the Joint 
     Venture  Partnerships 
 
SABIC is a Saudi Arabian corporation that originally was 100% owned (and 
now is 70% owned) by the Saudi government.  SABIC was formed in the late 
1970s to work jointly with several firms to use petroleum-based feedstocks in 
manufacturing polyethelene, which is a type of plastic.  During the mid-to-late 
1970s, in order to diversify Saudi Arabia's industrial base, SABIC began exploring 
the possibility of forming joint ventures to manufacture polyethylene.  The result 
                                                 
4 The facts recited in this Opinion are shaped by the applicable standard of review.  SABIC 
claims on appeal, among other things, that the trial court erroneously denied SABIC's motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.  This Court reviews the denial of such a motion to determine 
"'whether the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, taken in a light 
most favorable to the non-moving party, raise an issue of material fact for consideration by the 
jury.'  In other words, we will not disturb a Superior Court ruling denying a motion for judgment 
as a matter of law where 'under any reasonable view of the evidence the jury could have 
justifiably found for [the non-moving party].'" Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, 706 A.2d 526, 
530 (Del. 1998) (internal citations omitted); accord, Chrysler Corp. (Del.) v. Chaplake Holdings, 
Ltd., 822 A.2d 1024, 1036 (Del. 2003). 
 
3
was the formation of two separate 50-50 joint ventures, one between SABIC and 
Mobil (the "Yanpet joint venture"), and the other between SABIC and Exxon (the 
"Kemya joint venture").  The Yanpet joint venture was formed by an agreement 
SABIC and Mobil entered into on April 19, 1980; the agreement for the Kemya 
joint venture was entered into between SABIC and Exxon on April 26, 1980.  Both 
joint ventures had the same ultimate purpose:  to manufacture polyethelene in 
Saudi Arabia. 
A critical, carefully negotiated premise of both joint ventures was that the 
profits enjoyed by each joint venture partner would be limited to the profits earned 
by the joint venture.  As a result, no partner would profit at the joint venture's 
expense.  Consistent with that principle, the joint venture agreements forbade any 
partner from charging a "mark-up" on technology procured from a third party and 
sublicensed to the joint venture.  Thus, Article 6.3 of the Yanpet joint venture 
agreement provided:  
To the extent either Partner or any Affiliate thereof procures patents, 
processes and other licensing rights of third parties, and sublicenses 
such rights to the partnership, it shall not receive any remuneration 
other than actual cost incurred in acquiring and sublicensing such 
right. 
 
And, Article 6.3 of the Kemya joint venture agreement, which was to the 
same effect, provided that: 
 
 
4
Patents, processes, and other licensing rights of third parties which 
require the payment of royalties, rentals and other remuneration to 
such third parties shall be paid by the Partnership against appropriate 
invoices.  To the extent either Partner or any Affiliate thereof procure 
such rights and sublicenses for the Partnership, it shall not receive 
any remuneration other than actual cost disbursed in acquiring such 
license. 
 
2. SABIC   Secretly Overcharges  The  
Yanpet And Kemya Joint Ventures 
 
In order to manufacture polyethylene, Yanpet (the SABIC/Mobil joint 
venture partnership) needed technology that it did not own.  Initially, the parties 
intended that Yanpet would license Unipol® PE technology directly from Union 
Carbide Corporation ("UCC").  After a Spring 1980 meeting in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia, however, SABIC informed its partner, Mobil, that SABIC itself would 
license the technology directly from UCC and then sublicense it to Yanpet.  
Consistent with Article 6.3, SABIC assured Mobil that SABIC would pass through 
to Yanpet at its cost, "dollar for dollar," the amounts SABIC paid to UCC for 
Yanpet's use of the Unipol® PE technology.  In fact, however, SABIC intended to 
furnish the technology to Yanpet at a mark-up above SABIC's cost. 
In September 1980, SABIC and UCC executed an agreement granting 
SABIC an exclusive license to the Unipol® PE technology within the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (the "SABIC/UCC License Agreement").  Neither Mobil nor Yanpet 
was permitted to attend any of the meetings between SABIC and UCC at which the 
financial terms of the SABIC/UCC License Agreement were discussed.  That did 
 
5
not concern Mobil, because having been assured that SABIC would be providing 
Yanpet the same terms that SABIC itself had procured from UCC, Mobil and 
Yanpet did not negotiate, or even comment upon, the financial terms of the 
sublicense.  Ultimately, SABIC and Yanpet executed the SABIC-Yanpet Unipol® 
PE Technology License Agreement, which was dated effective October 15, 1980. 
Over the following two decades, SABIC charged Yanpet sublicense fees and 
royalties that were substantially higher than what SABIC was paying to UCC 
under the SABIC/UCC License Agreement.5  Because SABIC never told Mobil 
that it had marked up the sublicense fees and royalties, Mobil believed, during that 
entire time, that SABIC's license royalties were being passed through to Yanpet at 
cost. 
The negotiation of and performance under the sublicense agreement between 
SABIC and Kemya (the SABIC-Exxon joint venture partnership) mirrored the 
Mobil/Yanpet fact pattern.  Originally, SABIC and Exxon planned for Kemya to 
use Exxon's own proprietary technology to manufacture polyethylene.  Later, they 
understood that instead, Exxon would acquire the right to use UCC's Unipol® PE 
technology, and would then grant a Unipol® PE license to Kemya, as sublicensee. 
Ultimately, however, as with Yanpet, SABIC informed Exxon, in a March 1980 
                                                 
5 There is evidence that SABIC's motive for the surreptitious overcharges was to create a 
"cushion" for itself in case the joint ventures failed.  SABIC accounted for the mark-up in its 
own internal accounting documents as its "profit" or "net gain." 
 
6
meeting in Riyadh, that it (SABIC) would license that technology directly from 
UCC, and then sublicense the technology to Kemya.  Like Mobil, Exxon was 
excluded from the negotiations over the financial terms of the SABIC/UCC 
license.  That did not concern Exxon because Mr. Ibrahim Bin Salamah, SABIC's 
chief negotiator for the Kemya and Yanpet Joint Venture Agreements and also for 
the Kemya and Yanpet Unipol® PE/UCC technology sublicenses, assured Exxon's 
representative that SABIC was "not interested in profiting on the technology 
passed on to its [joint ventures]." 
In fact, however, SABIC never intended to limit its royalty charges to 
Kemya to the amount(s) that SABIC would be paying to UCC.  As with Yanpet, 
SABIC had determined to charge a marked-up royalty to Kemya.  Following the 
same pattern that it employed with Yanpet, SABIC overcharged Kemya for its use 
of the Unipol® PE technology, to create a "cushion" in case the ventures failed.  
SABIC accounted for the overcharges as a "profit" in its internal financial records. 
In June 1987, because of poor market conditions in the polyethylene 
business, UCC agreed to reduce the royalties due from its licensees, including 
SABIC.  Correspondingly, the joint venture partners amended the Yanpet and 
Kemya sublicenses to reduce the royalties payable by the joint venture partnerships 
to SABIC.  Unbeknownst to ExxonMobil, however, SABIC had negotiated for 
itself a royalty rate reduction that was significantly larger than the reduction 
 
7
SABIC had granted to the joint ventures.  Exxon and Mobil representatives 
testified that SABIC never told Mobil, Yanpet, Exxon or Kemya that it had 
extracted a reduction in the cost of Unipol® PE technology that was much larger 
than the reduction SABIC had extended to Yanpet and Kemya.  SABIC's 
concealment of the discrepancy between those royalty reductions—which had the 
effect of increasing SABIC's reserves—was intentional. 
Not until the year 2000 did ExxonMobil discover the overcharge.  That 
occurred as a result of a dispute between SABIC and the Saudi taxing authority 
relating to the royalties paid by SABIC to UCC under the SABIC/UCC 
Agreement.  The Saudi taxing authority determined that those payments were 
taxable.  That decision prompted SABIC to send letters to Kemya and Yanpet 
informing them of the tax dispute and demanding that the partnerships pay a share 
of the tax to SABIC.  While attempting to determine the accuracy of SABIC's 
 
8
indemnification demand, ExxonMobil discovered, for the first time,6 that SABIC 
had overcharged the partnerships for furnishing the UCC's Unipol® PE 
technology. 
3. 
The Procedural History Of The Litigation 
 
To aid an understanding of the issues presented by SABIC’s arguments, it is 
helpful first to summarize the procedural history of the litigation, including the trial 
court rulings that are challenged on this appeal. 
 
a.  The New Jersey Federal Action 
 
The claims at issue first surfaced in litigation brought by SABIC against 
ExxonMobil in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  In 
that court, SABIC sought a declaratory judgment that ExxonMobil had used 
technology, previously developed for Kemya, to obtain proprietary information 
                                                 
6 In support of its argument that ExxonMobil had waived their overcharge claims and that, in any 
event, the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, SABIC points to testimony of Richard 
Todd, a Kemya secondee, speculating about a possible difference between the amounts paid by 
Kemya and amounts paid by SABIC.  Todd conceded, however, that he had no actual evidence 
of any differential, that he did not know whether there was, in fact, any difference, and that he 
was unaware of any assurances by SABIC to Exxon and Kemya that there would be no mark-up. 
 
 
In an effort to establish its defense of waiver or, alternatively, that ExxonMobil had been 
on inquiry notice of its claims for statute of limitations purposes, SABIC also cites two June 
1994 form letters, sent separately by SABIC to Yanpet and Kemya, that inadvertently attached a 
June 10, 1994 statement from UCC to SABIC.  There is no evidence that anyone at Mobil ever 
saw that document or that anyone at Yanpet ever told Mobil about it.  Nor did Kemya know what 
the document meant, because the UCC document addressed several joint ventures and the 
numbers relating to each were different.  When Kemya asked SABIC about the document, 
SABIC reassured Kemya that the sublicense was a pass-through and that there were no 
overcharges.  As a result of, and in reliance upon, that representation, Exxon and Kemya made 
no further inquiry about this issue. 
 
 
9
(including patent and trade secrets) in violation of ExxonMobil's service agreement 
with Kemya.  SABIC sought a declaratory judgment that Kemya owned the 
patents, and also sought an injunction directing ExxonMobil to transfer legal title 
to those patents to Kemya.7 
ExxonMobil raised the defense of unclean hands against SABIC's claim, 
contending that SABIC had wrongfully overcharged Kemya for the royalty 
payments at issue here.8  During the discovery stage, SABIC agreed to a consent 
order that would have required SABIC to respond to discovery regarding the 
overcharge claims.  But SABIC did not comply with that order.  Instead, it filed the 
Delaware Superior Court action that is the subject of this appeal.9   
b.  The Delaware Superior Court Action 
In its Superior Court action, SABIC sought a declaratory judgment that 
Kemya's and Yanpet's royalty payments to SABIC were not overcharges that 
violated any applicable contract.  In response, ExxonMobil interposed 
counterclaims for damages, based upon SABIC's alleged breaches of the joint 
                                                 
7 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 194 F.Supp. 378, 384 (D.N.J. 2002), vacated in 
part and remanded in part, 364 F.3d 102 (3rd Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 310 (2004). 
 
8 Id.  Shortly after SABIC filed the Superior Court action, ExxonMobil filed a separate action 
against SABIC in the New Jersey federal court to recover the royalty overcharges.  SABIC 
moved to dismiss that second action, claiming that, as a "foreign state," it was immunized from 
being sued in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 
et. seq. ("FSIA").  The New Jersey District Court held that by filing suit in New Jersey, SABIC 
had waived any FSIA immunity as to the overcharge claims.  See 194 F.Supp.2d at 401, 403. 
 
9 Id., 194 F.Supp.2d at 413-414, n.15.   
 
10
venture agreements, breaches of fiduciary duty and upon the implied duty of good 
faith, and the doctrines of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel.  
ExxonMobil also demanded a jury trial, to which SABIC made no objection until 
only weeks before the trial, when SABIC moved (unsuccessfully) to strike the jury 
trial demand. 
On March 21, 2003, at the conclusion of a two week trial, the jury returned a 
verdict awarding compensatory damages of $220,238,108 to Mobil and 
$196,642,656 to Exxon.  The jury found that SABIC had breached Article 6.3 of 
both the Yanpet and Kemya joint venture agreements, and also that SABIC had 
committed the Saudi tort of usurpation ("ghasb") against both Mobil and Exxon. 
SABIC claims on this appeal that that jury verdict must be set aside because 
it was the product of multitudinous rulings, all erroneous as a matter of law, made 
by the trial judge during the course of the Superior Court action.  The rulings that 
are contested on this appeal fall into five separate groupings.  To better understand 
SABIC's claims on appeal, and our analysis of those claims, the contested rulings 
are briefly summarized at this point. 
(1)  The Statute of Limitations Rulings 
Before trial, SABIC moved for summary judgment on the ground that 
ExxonMobil's claims were barred by Delaware's three-year statute of limitations.  
The trial court denied that motion, holding as a matter of law that (1) under 
 
11
substantive principles of Saudi law (which both sides agree is applicable), 
ExxonMobil's claims were property rights that could not be barred by the passage 
of time; and (2) Delaware's borrowing statute (which would have subjected 
ExxonMobil's claims to the three year limitations period) was inapplicable.10  The 
trial court later denied SABIC's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law 
or, alternatively, for a new trial, holding that the court had previously determined, 
as a matter of law, that the Delaware three year statute of limitations did not bar 
ExxonMobil's claims.11 
(2) The Evidentiary Rulings 
Both before and during the trial, the Superior Court made evidentiary 
rulings.  Four of those rulings are contested on this appeal and are next described. 
(a) the exclusion of certain testimony by Ibrahim Bin Salamah—proffered 
by SABIC long after the discovery cutoff date and shortly before trial—that 
contradicted the prior testimony of Bin Salamah and of another SABIC witness, as 
well as SABIC's formal admissions that SABIC intended to charge a marked-up 
royalty to Yanpet and Kemya but never disclosed that intent to its partners;  
(b) the admission of an internal memorandum authored by Exxon employee, 
John Webb, reflecting representations by Mr. Bin Salamah in 1986, that the royalty 
                                                 
10 Bench Ruling, C.A. No. 000-07-161, Feb. 10, 2003 (Appellant's Opening Br. at R4-8). 
 
11 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co. et al., C.A. No. 000-07-161, 2003 
WL 22016813 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2003). 
 
12
rates paid by SABIC to UCC for its Unipol® PE license were the same as the 
royalty rates being paid by ExxonMobil as sublicensees of SABIC;  
(c) the admission of testimony of Exxon employee George Fitzpatrick, and 
of Mobil employee Robert Murphy, that SABIC had promised ExxonMobil a "pass 
through" license, and later represented that it (SABIC) had "passed through" its 
billings to Kemya and Yanpet at SABIC's cost; and  
(d) the limitation of the scope of evidence (proffered by SABIC) of Exxon's 
subjective intent relating to drafts of agreements that predated the joint venture, 
and that were never executed, in connection with ExxonMobil's possibly providing 
polyethene technology to the joint ventures.12 
(3)  The  Rulings On SABIC's Defense of Release 
One of SABIC's defenses to ExxonMobil's counterclaims was that the 1987 
Letter Agreements, wherein ExxonMobil and SABIC renegotiated the joint 
ventures license fees, operated to release all payment-related claims that 
ExxonMobil could have brought against SABIC.  The trial court granted judgment 
as a matter of law to ExxonMobil on that release defense on three separate 
grounds:  (i) neither Exxon nor Mobil had signed the 1987 Letter Agreements; (ii) 
the unambiguous language of those Agreements limited the scope of any release to 
technology-related claims and did not include payment-related claims; and (iii) the 
                                                 
12 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22048238 at *2-*5, *8-*9 (Del. Super. Sept. 2, 2003). 
 
13
only evidence as to the relevant Saudi law was the unrebutted testimony of 
Professor Wael B. Hallaq, who opined that the 1987 Letter Agreements would not 
affect ExxonMobil's claims as a matter of law.  After the jury verdict, SABIC 
renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law, based on the same release 
defense that the trial judge had previously rejected.  The Superior Court denied that 
motion by order dated August 27, 2003.13 
(4) The Rulings on ExxonMobil's 
     Claims For Breach of Contract   
 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found that SABIC was liable to 
ExxonMobil for having breached Article 6.3 of the joint venture agreements, 
which (the jury found) was controlling and required SABIC to limit its royalty 
charges for providing Unipol® PE technology to the partnerships to a "pass 
through" of SABIC's own cost of licensing that same technology from UCC.  After 
the close of the evidence, SABIC moved for judgment as a matter of law on those 
contract claims.  The trial court denied that motion.   
After the jury verdict, SABIC renewed its motion for judgment as a matter 
of law or, alternatively, a new trial.14  The basis of the renewed motion for 
judgment was that as a matter of law no reasonable jury could have found for 
ExxonMobil on their contract claims.  The thrust of SABIC's alternative motion for 
                                                 
13 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22048236 at *5 (Del. Super. Aug. 27, 2003). 
 
14 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22048236 (Del. Super. Aug. 27, 2003) 
 
14
a new trial was that the great weight of the evidence established that the 1980 
Unipol® PE licenses had superseded and/or modified the joint venture 
agreements.15  
 
The trial court denied both motions, holding that:  (a) a reasonable jury 
could have found that Article 6.3 (which required a cost pass through) governed 
the terms under which SABIC could sublicense the Unipol® PE technology to the 
joint ventures; and (b) the record dispositively negated SABIC's contention that 
specific joint venture polyethylene licenses entered into in October and November 
1980 had superseded or "trumped" Article 6.3 of the joint venture agreements, 
because Exxon and Mobil did not sign the sublicenses, and did not understand or 
intend that the sublicenses would operate to supersede Article 6.3.16  
(5)  The Rulings on ExxonMobil's 
      Tort  Claims for  "Usurpation" 
 
The jury also found SABIC liable to ExxonMobil for committing the tort 
known under Saudi law as usurpation (ghasb).  The amount of the jury award for 
                                                 
15 Id. at *1. 
 
16 SABIC's defense that Article 6.3 was superseded by the sublicenses was stricken by the 
Superior Court.  On appeal, SABIC contends that it is entitled, at the very least, to a new trial at 
which that defense could be presented to the jury.  
 
The Superior Court also rejected SABIC's contention that ExxonMobil had abandoned 
their contract claims, concluding that "this particular argument borders on frivolous and 
[that]…the record establishes, unequivocally, that ExxonMobil asserted, and continued to 
vigorously assert, its breach of contract claim and never stopped litigating this claim."  2003 WL 
22048236 at *1.  SABIC has not appealed that ruling. 
 
15
usurpation was $416 million, of which $92 million represented Exxon's and 
Mobil's pro rata share of the amounts that (the jury found) SABIC had 
overcharged for the Unipol® PE technology, and $324 million represented those 
parties' pro rata share of the profits that SABIC had earned through its use of the 
overcharges in its business operations.  
Following the jury verdict, SABIC filed two separate motions for judgment 
as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial or remittitur on ExxonMobil's ghasb 
claims.  In its first motion, SABIC sought judgment as a matter of law, claiming 
that there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find 
for ExxonMobil, and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported a verdict in 
SABIC's favor.17  Specifically, SABIC argued that the ghasb verdict was deficient 
as a matter of law because (1) the trial court declined to instruct the jury that under 
Saudi law, for SABIC to commit ghasb it must have acted "forcefully and with the 
victim's knowledge" (as distinguished from usurpation by secrecy or stealth), and 
(2) here, SABIC had acted secretively and without the victims' knowledge.18 
The Superior Court denied that motion, ruling that (a) the court's 
determination of the Saudi law elements of ghasb on which it based the jury 
instruction was the culmination of many months of study, research, discussion and 
                                                 
17 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22016864 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2003). 
 
18 Id. at *2. 
 
 
16
extensive expert testimony on Saudi law, including a separate live hearing on the 
subject;19 (b) the court's rejection of the elements of "knowledge" and "force" 
advocated by SABIC was "consistent with the classical Hanbali authorities that 
would be followed by a Saudi judge;" 20 and (c) the jury verdict was not against the 
great weight of the evidence and indeed, was amply supported by the evidence.21 
In its second (renewed) motion for judgment as a matter of law or, 
alternatively, a new trial or remittitur, SABIC contended that the damages award of 
$324 million (which SABIC characterizes as "enhanced damages"),22 was 
unprecedented under Saudi law and, therefore, the jury should not have been 
allowed to award damages above the actual $92 million overcharge.  Alternatively, 
SABIC argued, it was entitled to a new trial wherein the jury would be given 
adequate instructions on enhanced damages, rather than being led to believe that an 
enhanced damage award follows automatically once the elements of ghasb are 
                                                 
19 Id. at *1, *2. 
 
20 The court found that the expert whose testimony was offered to support SABIC's view of the 
law, was "more of an advocate than an objective scholar of Islamic law."  Id. at *4. 
 
21 Id. at *5. 
 
22 SABIC characterizes the $324 million component of the $416 million award as "enhanced 
damages," but at trial the Saudi law experts agreed that under Saudi law the injured plaintiff is 
entitled to recover compensatory damages for usurpation, which may include a return of the 
actual overcharged amounts plus the actual past profits obtained from the wrongful use of the 
overcharged amounts.  Although SABIC's use of the term "enhanced damages" is vaguely 
suggestive of punitive damages, SABIC's expert, Dr. Frank E. Vogel, conceded that damages 
awarded for the tort of usurpation are not akin to punitive or exemplary damages. 
 
 
17
established.  Those instructions (SABIC urged) should include a list of six factors 
that a Saudi judge would consider, plus the admonition that "enhanced damages" 
are permitted only under the most "unusual or egregious of circumstances."23 
The Superior Court denied SABIC's motion, finding that its jury instruction 
relating to ghasb damages was correct and that the ghasb damages award was not 
against the great weight of the evidence.  Specifically, the trial judge ruled that:  (a) 
SABIC's argument that damages for ghasb are virtually unprecedented and rarely 
awarded in the Saudi legal system, was unsubstantiated, unverifiable and 
irrelevant;24 (b) the jury instruction properly left any award of usurpation damages 
to the jury's discretion; (c) the six factors on which SABIC argued that the Court 
should have instructed the jury had no foundation in Saudi law as determined after 
a studied analysis based upon the authoritative texts; and (d) instructing the jury on 
the factors advocated by SABIC would be misleading and, in some cases, would 
invite inappropriate speculation.25 
c. Proceedings After The Filing of This Appeal 
After it commenced this appeal, SABIC filed a motion in this Court to 
supplement the record to include what SABIC characterized as an "official 
                                                 
23 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22016843 at *1, *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2003). 
 
24 Id. at *3. 
 
25 Id. at *2.   
 
 
18
statement of Saudi Arabian law issued by the Ministry of Justice of Saudi Arabia."  
That "official statement" had never been presented to, or considered by, the trial 
court whose determinations of Saudi law had become final, subject only to review 
by this Court.  SABIC's motion was also filed without leave of this Court.  
ExxonMobil vigorously opposed the motion.  Weeks later, SABIC filed a motion 
to remand the case to the trial court to reconsider certain of SABIC's post trial 
motions for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively for a new trial, in light of 
its newly-filed "official statement of Saudi law."  This Court denied both motions 
as procedurally improper on January 29, 2004. 
ANALYSIS OF SABIC'S CLAIMS OF ERROR 
(1) THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RULINGS 
(a)  The Issues Presented 
Before the trial, SABIC moved for summary judgment as a matter of law on 
the ground that the application of Delaware's borrowing statute26 resulted in 
ExxonMobil's twenty-plus year old claims being barred by Delaware's three year 
statute of limitations, 10 Del. C. § 8106.  SABIC claimed that Exxon and Mobil 
had inquiry notice of their overcharge claims no later than 1994, and that there was 
no legal basis to toll the running of the statute.  More specifically, SABIC argued 
that:  (i) because ExxonMobil's claim arose "outside of Delaware" (i.e., in Saudi 
                                                 
26 10 Del. C. § 8121. 
 
19
Arabia), the limitations periods prescribed by both Delaware and Saudi Arabian 
law were potentially applicable; (ii) Delaware's borrowing statute required the 
Superior Court to apply the shorter of those two potentially applicable limitations 
periods; (iii) in this case, the shorter period of limitations was the three year period 
prescribed by Section 8106, and as result, ExxonMobil's claims were time-barred.  
 In a pretrial bench ruling, the trial judge denied the motion, holding as a 
matter of law that the borrowing statute did not apply and that ExxonMobil's 
claims were not time-barred under substantive Saudi law principles.  Under Saudi 
law (which, all parties agree, governs ExxonMobil's contract and tort claims), 
property rights (including ExxonMobil's claims) are eternal and cannot be 
extinguished by the passage of time.  As the trial judge explained:   
The Delaware borrowing statute, the purpose of it, is (a) to prevent 
forum shopping; and[ ] (b) [ ] to protect the residents of Delaware. 
 
To apply the borrowing statute and [conclude] that Delaware's statute 
of limitation[s] would apply would basically turn the borrowing 
statute on its head for the purpose for which it was enacted. 
 
SABIC purposefully chose this forum.  And all indications strongly 
suggest that they chose this forum to obtain a shorter statute of 
limitations.  So it [is] somewhat of a twist; in that, usually these cases 
involve a plaintiff who chooses this forum, hoping to get a longer 
statute of limitations.…  So here, it's a twist on the normal set of facts.  
But the bottom line is:  Our legislature intended to prevent people out 
of state, foreign plaintiffs, from coming into this forum and getting the 
benefit of a statute of limitations that really ought not to apply given 
the fact that the substantive law is interwoven with the procedural 
right. 
 
 
20
And here because Saudi law makes it clear and the parties don't 
dispute that Saudi law makes it clear, that a property right is eternal.  
And there is no concept in Saudi law that the usurper of the property 
can rely on the passage of time to extinguish claims. 
 
 
On that basis, the trial court ruled that ExxonMobil's claims were not time-
barred as a matter of law.  That ruling, SABIC contends, is erroneous because:  (1) 
the Delaware borrowing statute does apply and as a result, makes applicable the 
shorter (three year) Delaware statute of limitations, which bars ExxonMobil's 
claims; (2) the three-year statute was not tolled or, alternatively, any tolling had 
ceased by 1994; and (3) even payments made by ExxonMobil within the three-year 
limitations period (i.e., after 1997) are not recoverable because they represented 
continuing damages, as opposed to continuing wrongs. 
 
SABIC's contentions frame the limitations-related issues, which are first, 
whether Delaware's borrowing statute applies; second, if so, whether the Delaware 
three year statute of limitations was tolled and if so, for how long; and third, 
whether post-1997 royalty payments made within the three year limitations period 
are also time-barred.  We review these claims de novo for errors of law.27  For the 
reasons next discussed, we uphold the trial judge's determination that the Delaware 
borrowing statute (and, as a consequence the Delaware three year statute of 
limitations) does not apply.  We further conclude that, independent of the 
                                                 
27 City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust v. Cont'l. Cas. Co., 624 A.2d 1191 (Del. 1993); Chrysler 
Corp. (Del.), 822 A.2d at 1031, 1035.  
 
21
borrowing statute, the Delaware tolling statute tolled any limitations period until 
SABIC commenced this action in July 2000, because before that time SABIC was 
not amenable to suit in Delaware and, therefore, was "out of the State" for tolling 
statute purposes. 
(a)  Applicability of The Borrowing Statute 
It is undisputed that if Saudi law governs the limitations issue, then 
ExxonMobil's claims are not subject to any bar of limitations; but if Delaware law 
governs the limitations question, then the three-year statute applies and (absent 
tolling) bars ExxonMobil's claims.28  The issue of which law applies turns upon 
whether the Delaware borrowing statute is applicable.  That statute provides: 
Where a cause of action arises outside of this State, an action cannot 
be brought in a court of this State to enforce such cause of action after 
the expiration of whichever is shorter, the time limited by the law of 
this State, or the time limited by the law of the state or country where 
the cause of action arose, for bringing an action upon such cause of 
action.  Where the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a 
person who at the time of such accrual was a resident of this State, the 
time limited by the law of this State shall apply.29 
 
 
This statute, if literally read and applied, would cause the three-year 
Delaware limitations statute to govern ExxonMobil's overcharge claim.  SABIC 
urges us to adopt such a literal reading.  SABIC argues that under the first sentence 
                                                 
28 Given our disposition of this issue, we do not reach SABIC's contention that the post-1997 
royalty payments would not be recoverable. 
 
29 10 Del. C. § 8121. 
 
 
22
of Section 8121, ExxonMobil's cause of action arose "outside of this State," i.e., in 
Saudi Arabia.  Therefore, the applicable limitations period must be prescribed by 
Delaware law, which is the "shorter" of the "time limited by the law of this State" 
(Delaware: three years) and "the time limited by the law of the…country where the 
cause of action arose" (Saudi Arabia: no limitations period).  Moreover, SABIC 
argues, the application of Delaware's three year statute is similarly mandated by its 
second sentence, because the two joint venture partnerships were "resident[s] of 
this State" at the time the "cause of action originally accrued." 
 
The infirmity in SABIC's argument is that its literal construction of the 
borrowing statute, if adopted, would subvert the statute's underlying purpose.  Our 
case law precedent eschews such a construction.  As both this Court and the trial 
court have recognized, borrowing statutes "are designed to prevent shopping for 
the most favorable forum…."30  To accomplish that purpose, those statutes are 
normally designed to "shorten the time limit—not to extend it."31  Borrowing 
statutes such as Section 8121 are typically designed to address a specific kind of 
forum shopping scenario—cases where a plaintiff brings a claim in a Delaware 
court that (i) arises under the law of a jurisdiction other than Delaware and (ii) is 
barred by that jurisdiction's statute of limitations but would not be time-barred in 
                                                 
30 Pack v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 132 A.2d 54, 58 (Del. 1957). 
 
31 Id., citing 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1263 Developments in the Law:  Statutes of Limitation, 
(1950) ("Borrowing statutes provide only a shorter time limit than the local period, which is still 
applicable to bar an action not barred by the borrowed foreign limitation."). 
 
23
Delaware, which has a longer statute of limitations.  Under that "standard 
scenario," the borrowing statute operates to prevent the plaintiff from 
circumventing the shorter limitations period mandated by the jurisdiction where 
the cause of action arose.  
 
Our decision in Pack v. Beech Aircraft Corporation illuminates that purpose.  
In Pack, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action in a Delaware court under 
the New Jersey Wrongful Death Statute, which had a "built in" two-year statute of 
limitations.  Had the lawsuit been brought in New Jersey it would have been time-
barred, because the suit was not filed until after the two-year limitations period had 
expired.  The plaintiff argued that the action was not time-barred, because the 
applicable statute was not the New Jersey statute but the Delaware three-year 
statute of limitations.  Rejecting that argument, this Court held that Delaware's 
borrowing statute would be applied in order to enforce New Jersey's "built in" two-
year limitations period: 
If a non-resident chooses to bring a foreign cause of action into 
Delaware for enforcement, he must bring the foreign statute of 
limitations along with him if the foreign statute prescribes a shorter 
time than the domestic statute.  Our statute does not apply to a 
resident of this State suing on a foreign cause of action provided he 
was a resident when the cause of action arose.  As to such a resident 
the common law rule that the lex fori governs the matter of limitations 
of actions is left in full force.32 
 
                                                 
32 Pack, 132 A.2d at 57. 
 
 
24
 
Although the plaintiff in Pack was a resident of Delaware, this Court 
recognized that a literal application of the second sentence of Delaware's 
borrowing statute to that particular plaintiff would extend, rather than shorten, the 
applicable limitations period.  This Court declined to apply the borrowing statute in 
such a literal way, because to do so would undercut the overriding purpose of 
borrowing statutes, which is "to prevent shopping for the most favorable forum."  
Because the two-year limitations period was "built in" to New Jersey's statutory 
cause of action for wrongful death, this Court applied Delaware's borrowing statute 
so as to "enforce the New Jersey law as we find it."33 
 
The sane reasoning that led this Court to eschew a literal application of the 
borrowing statute in Pack, requires us to uphold the reasoning of, and the result 
reached by, the trial court in this case.  Here, ExxonMobil's claims arose under 
Saudi law, which imposes no time bar upon those claims.  If ExxonMobil had 
prosecuted their overcharge claims in Saudi Arabia, their claims would not be 
time-barred.  But ExxonMobil did not assert these claims in Saudi Arabia, or bring 
suit in Delaware as plaintiff to enforce those claims against SABIC.  Rather, it was 
SABIC who came to Delaware to obtain an adjudication that (inter alia) 
Delaware's three year statute of limitations barred ExxonMobil's claims.  Given the 
nature of SABIC's affirmative claim for declaratory relief, ExxonMobil was 
                                                 
33 Id.  at 60. 
 
25
entitled to assert its overcharge causes of action as counterclaims for damages.  In 
these circumstances, as the trial judge found, the party that was "shopping for the 
most favorable forum" was SABIC, not ExxonMobil.  
The trial judge recognized that to apply the borrowing statute to ExxonMobil  
would subvert the statute's fundamental purpose,34 by enabling SABIC to prevail 
on a limitations defense that would never have been available to it had the 
overcharge claims been brought in the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose, 
i.e., Saudi Arabia.  Because the Superior Court properly ruled that the borrowing 
statute did not apply, it follows that that court also correctly held that 
ExxonMobil's counterclaims to recover the royalty overcharges were not time-
barred. 
(b) The Application of The Tolling Statute  
The conclusion that ExxonMobil's counterclaims were not time-barred was 
correct for a second, independent reason.  Even if the borrowing statute did apply 
and thereby triggered Delaware's three-year statute of limitations, Delaware's 
tolling statute stopped the running of the three-year statute until SABIC filed this 
                                                 
34 The correctness of the trial court's construction of the borrowing statute is also supported by 
other Delaware precedent.  In Air Prod. & Chem., Inc. v. Lummus Co., 252 A.2d 543 (Del. 
1969), the plaintiff (like SABIC here) filed a preemptive action in Superior Court seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the defendant's threatened contract claim was barred by Delaware's 
three-year statute of limitations.  There, as here, the contract claim had no relationship with the 
forum state (Delaware), and arose under the law of Puerto Rico, whose period of limitations was 
fifteen years.  This Court required the declaratory judgment plaintiff, as a condition to requiring 
the litigation to proceed in Delaware, to stipulate that the Delaware borrowing statute would not 
be asserted as a defense.  Id. at 545. 
 
26
action in Delaware and as a result, became amenable to service of process.  Our 
tolling statute provides: 
If at the time when a cause of action accrues against any person, such 
person is out of the State, the action may be commenced, within the 
time limited therefor in this chapter, after such person comes into the 
State in such manner that by reasonable diligence, such person may be 
served with process.  If, after a cause of action shall have accrued 
against any person, such person departs from and resides or remains 
out of the State, the time of such person's absence until such person 
shall have returned into the State in the manner provided in this 
section, shall not be taken as any part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action.35  
 
 
It is settled law that the purpose and effect of Section 8117 is to toll the 
statute of limitations as to defendants who, at the time the cause of action accrues, 
are outside the state and are not otherwise subject to service of process in the 
state.36  In those circumstances, the statute of limitations is tolled until the 
defendant becomes amenable to service of process.37 
 
Here, SABIC was "out of the state" and service of process upon SABIC 
could not have been accomplished in Delaware.  Because SABIC lacked 
significant contacts with Delaware before it filed this lawsuit, the Delaware courts 
would have lacked personal jurisdiction over SABIC.  Therefore, ExxonMobil 
                                                 
35 10 Del. C. § 8117. 
 
36 Hurwitch v. Adams, 155 A.2d 591, 594 (Del. 1959). 
 
37 Brossman v. FDIC, 510 A.2d 471, 472-73 (Del. 1986) (statute of limitations tolled until the 
effective date of the Delaware long-arm statute because prior to that time the nonresident 
defendant was not amenable to service of process). 
 
 
27
could not have obtained personal jurisdiction over SABIC in Delaware.  Only by 
voluntarily initiating this action in Delaware as plaintiff did SABIC "come[ ] into 
the State" and thereby become amenable to service of process.38  Thus, even if the 
three-year Delaware statute of limitations were found applicable to ExxonMobil's 
claims, the running of that statute was tolled until the date that SABIC filed its 
Superior Court action.39 
 
We conclude, for these reasons, that the Superior Court did not err by 
rejecting SABIC's defense (and claim-in-chief) that ExxonMobil's counterclaims 
are barred by the statute of limitations.  
(2) THE  EVIDENTIARY RULINGS 
We turn next to SABIC's claim that the trial judge made four erroneous 
evidentiary rulings.  We review rulings on the admission of evidence for abuse of 
                                                 
38 Shortly after SABIC filed this action, ExxonMobil commenced an action in the New Jersey 
federal court, raising claims similar to its counterclaims here.  SABIC immediately sought to 
dismiss that action, claiming that it was immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et. seq. ("FSIA") and could not be sued anywhere in 
the United States.  The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that 
SABIC's filing suit in New Jersey waived any FSIA immunity as to the overcharge claims in 
New Jersey and the Delaware courts.  Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 194 F.Supp.2d at 401-03, 
vacated in part and remanded on other grounds, 364 F.3d 102 (3rd Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the federal court of subject matter jurisdiction over suit by 
ExxonMobil once final judgment on the identical issue was granted by the Delaware Superior 
Court.), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 310 (2004). 
 
39 It is undisputed that ExxonMobil asserted their overcharge counterclaims well within the three-
year period from the filing of SABIC's complaint. 
 
28
discretion.40  Where a court "has not exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the 
circumstances and has not so ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to 
produce injustice, its legal discretion has not been abused."41  We conclude that 
none of the contested evidentiary rulings constituted an abuse of discretion. 
(a) The first contested trial court ruling,42 is the exclusion of SABIC's 
proffered testimony of Ibrahim Bin Salamah, the SABIC official who negotiated 
the joint venture agreements.  The proffered testimony was that Mr. Bin Salamah 
had personally told his counterparts at Exxon and Mobil that SABIC would receive 
a margin or "mark-up" on the Unipol® PE technology.  That testimony, if allowed, 
would have contradicted the testimony of SABIC's Rule 30(b)(6) representative, 
Dr. Richard Pai, whom ExxonMobil had deposed three times.  On each of those 
occasions Dr. Pai testified that SABIC always intended to charge the joint ventures 
a margin on the Unipol® PE technology, but had never informed Exxon, Mobil, 
Kemya or Yanpet of its intent.  The proposed new testimony would also have 
directly contradicted Ben Salamah's previous deposition testimony—given only 
days before trial—that SABIC "never talk[ed] about the margin;" as well as 
SABIC's October 4, 2002 interrogatory responses, filed shortly before the trial, that 
                                                 
40 Bell Sports, Inc. v. Yarusso, 759 A.2d 582, 590 (Del. 2000); Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 
(Del. 1994). 
 
41 Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Adams, 541 A.2d 567, 570 (Del. 1988). 
 
42 That ruling was one of several bases of SABIC's post-verdict motion for a new trial. 
 
29
expressly adopted Dr. Pai's testimony.  Lastly, the proffered new testimony would 
have contradicted SABIC's responses to ExxonMobil's requests for admissions, in 
which SABIC represented that it had "no information that shows, one way or the 
other" whether SABIC had disclosed the royalty mark-ups to the joint ventures or 
to ExxonMobil.  
Granting ExxonMobil's motion in limine, the trial court prohibited Mr. Bin 
Salamah from giving his proffered new testimony, on two grounds.  First, that 
testimony would reverse all of SABIC's prior positions on this issue; and second, 
the reversal of position would be highly prejudicial.  The proffered testimony was 
never disclosed to ExxonMobil until SABIC filed its reply brief in support of its 
motion for summary judgment—long after the discovery cut-off date and at a time 
that ExxonMobil was effectively foreclosed from countering the new testimony.  
The persons to whom Mr. Bin Salamah had supposedly revealed this information 
were not available either to be re-deposed or to be called as rebuttal witnesses at 
trial.  By that point in time, one of those witnesses had died and the other (who was 
never questioned about this subject at his deposition) was unavailable to testify at 
trial.  Not surprisingly, the trial judge ruled that: 
 
30
[I]t was SABIC's conduct during discovery that resulted in exclusion 
of this testimony.  Simply stated, had SABIC complied in good faith 
with the letter and spirit of our discovery rules before trial, the Court 
would probably not have been forced to exclude this portion of Mr. 
Bin Salamah's testimony.43 
 
The trial court reasoned that Mr. Bin Salamah's new testimony was 
reasonably available to SABIC at all times during the discovery period; that Rule 
30(b)(6) required SABIC's counsel to review that testimony with Mr. Bin Salamah 
before submitting the (contrary) Rule 30(b)(6) deposition testimony of Dr. Pai (as 
the spokesperson for the SABIC organization); and that the consequences of 
counsel's failure to do that should fall upon SABIC, not ExxonMobil.44  On the 
basis of "fundamental fairness,"45 the trial court concluded that to have "allowed 
Mr. Bin Salamah to testify on this subject…would have rewarded SABIC for 
discovery techniques that do not pass muster in this Court and would have resulted 
in a thorough sandbagging of ExxonMobil."46 
We agree.  Given these facts, the trial court's evidentiary ruling could not 
possibly constitute an abuse of discretion.  Mindful of that, SABIC attacks the 
ruling's factual and legal predicates.  SABIC argues (contrary to the trial judge's 
finding) that Mr. Bin Salamah's new testimony would not have contradicted that of 
                                                 
43 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22048238 at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 2, 2003). 
 
44 Id. at *4-*5. 
 
45 Id. at *3. 
 
46 Id. at *5. 
 
31
Dr. Pai, and that SABIC's counsel was not procedurally obligated to consult with 
Bin Salamah before Dr. Pai's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.  That argument amounts to 
little more than assertion without support in the record.  Nowhere does SABIC 
come to grips with the case law that supports the trial judge's analysis and result.  
Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's 
ruling is solidly grounded in both law and fact, and that SABIC's contrary 
arguments lack merit. 
(b)  The second contested evidentiary ruling was the admission into evidence 
of an internal memorandum by Exxon employee, John Webb, reflecting 
representations made by Mr. Bin Salamah in 1986, that the royalty rate called for 
by the SABIC/UCC license agreement for the Unipol® PE technology was 
identical to the royalty rate required by the SABIC-Kemya license agreement.  
SABIC claims that the Webb memorandum was admitted erroneously, because it 
was hearsay.  The trial court, however, admitted the document as  past recollection 
recorded, which is a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.47  We find no abuse 
of discretion in the admission of that document.  Nor was SABIC prejudiced by its 
admission into evidence.  The trial court gave SABIC the opportunity to cross-
examine Webb about the memorandum and also to call Mr. Bin Salamah and elicit 
                                                 
47 D.R.E. 803(5). 
 
 
32
his denial that he made any statement to Webb.  SABIC availed itself of both 
opportunities. 
(c)  The third contested evidentiary ruling is the admission of the testimony 
of two ExxonMobil employees, George Fitzpatrick and Robert Murphy, to the 
effect that SABIC had promised ExxonMobil a "pass through" license, and had 
represented (to Messrs. Fitzpatrick and Murphy) that SABIC had "passed through" 
its billings to Kemya and Yanpet at SABIC's cost.  SABIC claims that this 
testimony was "multiple hearsay."  That contention is misguided.  A statement is 
not hearsay if offered only to prove that the statement was made, rather than for the 
truth of the matter asserted.48  Here, Fitzpatrick's testimony about SABIC's 
statements was offered to rebut SABIC's defense that Exxon had waived its breach 
of contract claim, by showing that Exxon did not know about the overcharge and 
therefore could not have intentionally relinquished a known right.  Nor could the 
out-of-court statement attributed to SABIC (that there was no overcharge) have 
been offered for its truth, because the truth was the precise opposite.  
Mr. Murphy's disputed testimony was also to the effect that SABIC had 
promised a "pass through" license and that it had passed through its billings to 
Kemya and Yanpet at SABIC's cost.  Murphy's testimony also was not hearsay 
because it was not offered for its truth.  The statement was offered to correct a 
                                                 
48 D.R.E. 801(c); Fawcett v. State, 697 A.2d 385, 387 (Del. 1997). 
 
33
misimpression, created during Murphy's cross-examination, that Murphy had been 
told that SABIC intended to make a profit from furnishing the Unipol® PE 
technology, yet despite being so informed, ExxonMobil made no effort to follow 
up on that disclosure.  Nor was the Murphy testimony prejudicial, because Murphy 
had previously testified that he received assurances from SABIC that the UCC 
royalties would be passed through directly to Yanpet. 
(d) The fourth contested evidentiary ruling concerns the limitation by the 
trial court of the scope of SABIC's proffered evidence of Exxon's subjective intent 
in connection with ExxonMobil's possibly providing polyethene technology to the 
joint ventures.  SABIC attempted to prove Exxon's intent by offering into evidence 
drafts of never-executed agreements that predated the joint venture agreements.  
The trial judge excluded only the evidence and testimony that pertained to Exxon's 
internal state of mind, as distinguished from specific objective communications to 
and by SABIC on this subject (which were admitted).  The trial court reasoned that 
Exxon's intent regarding never-executed agreements that predated the joint venture 
were not probative of Exxon's state of mind as of the later time when the parties 
did execute the joint venture agreements.  This ruling was a rational exercise in 
determining the bounds of relevancy.  Even more important, the ruling did not 
prejudice SABIC, which was permitted to introduce evidence of the earlier 
negotiations as of the time that (it appeared) Exxon and Mobil might provide the 
 
34
polyethylene technology to the joint ventures.  Moreover, in closing argument 
SABIC's counsel was permitted to (and did) argue that SABIC believed that a 
royalty mark-up was acceptable, based upon the parties' early negotiations relating 
to the possible provision of the technology by Exxon and Mobil.  The jury chose 
not to credit that argument, however. 
For these reasons, none of the contested evidentiary rulings constituted an 
abuse of discretion. 
(3) THE  RULINGS ON SABIC'S  RELEASE DEFENSE 
SABIC's third claim of error is that the trial court improperly struck SABIC's 
release defense.  SABIC argues that the 1987 Letter Agreements, wherein 
ExxonMobil and SABIC renegotiated the joint ventures' license fees, operated to 
release all of ExxonMobil's payment-related claims against SABIC.49  Because the 
court dismissed that defense as a matter of law, we review its ruling de novo for 
legal error.50   
The trial judge ruled the release defense out of the case for three independent 
reasons.  The first was that neither Exxon nor Mobil had signed the 1987 Letter 
Agreements; the second was that the plain language of those Agreements limited 
the scope of any release to technology-related claims and did not include payment-
                                                 
49 SABIC argues that the trial court erred by granting ExxonMobil judgment as a matter of law 
on the release defense, and by denying SABIC's post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of 
law on the basis of that same (previously stricken) defense of release. 
 
50 Chrysler Corp. (Del.), 822 A.2d at 1031, 1035. 
 
35
related claims; and the third was that the only evidence on this issue from a Saudi 
law expert was the unrebutted testimony of Professor Hallaq, who opined that the 
1987 Letter Agreements would not affect ExxonMobil's claims as a matter of law.  
We conclude that the trial court ruled correctly in all respects. 
Articles 18.2 and 19.2 of the joint venture agreements expressly require that 
any "amendment, modification, or waiver of any provision" must be "in writing 
and signed by the Partners."  The term "Partners" is defined to mean SABIC and 
Exxon (in the Kemya Agreement) and SABIC and Mobil (in the Yanpet 
Agreement).  Because Exxon and Mobil did not sign, and were not parties to, the 
1987 Letter Agreements, they cannot be found to have waived claims under the 
joint venture agreements.  The express requirement of a signature by the "Partners" 
in the joint venture agreement provisions, and the absence of any actual signatures 
by Mobil or Exxon, disposes of SABIC's contention that "the Exxon and Mobil 
partners [Kemya and Yanpet] are deemed to have signed the agreements…because 
[they] were the joint venturers, and because they accepted the lucrative benefits of 
those agreements."51  
In addition, the scope of the release provisions in the 1987 Letter 
Agreements is clearly limited to "UCC LDPE Technology" and "UCC HDPE 
                                                 
51 That argument lacks even facial coherence in the case of the 1987 Letter Agreement between 
Yanpet and SABIC, because that agreement was signed on behalf of Yanpet by SABIC's Bin 
Salamah, who knew—but concealed from Mobil—that SABIC had received from UCC a larger 
discount than it was passing on to the joint ventures. 
 
 
36
Technology."  Both terms are limited in the sublicenses to "technical information 
and data."  There is no evidence that the parties (SABIC, Kemya and Yanpet) 
intended a meaning different from that connoted by the agreement's plain 
language.52  Furthermore, Professor Hallaq testified that under Saudi law, a release 
regarding the "object of the contract" (here, technology) cannot be construed as a 
release of claims relating to payment.  That testimony is unrebutted. 
Finally, as the trial court pointed out, Professor Hallaq, who was the only 
Saudi law expert who offered an opinion on the purported release, testified that 
even if the release language could be construed to cover claims for payment, under 
Saudi law the representations of Kemya and Yanpet in the 1987 Letter Agreements 
"are not binding and do not in any way preclude ExxonMobil's payment claims in 
this case."  The reason (Hallaq testified) was that SABIC never disclosed that its 
royalty payments to UCC were less than Kemya's and Yanpet's royalty payments 
to SABIC.  As a result, SABIC's representations in the 1987 Letter Agreements 
were "not accurate or complete."  That testimony also stands unrebutted. 
 
We conclude, for these reasons, that the trial court committed no error in 
dismissing SABIC's release defense as a matter of law. 
                                                 
52 Freddie Merrell, who was president of Yanpet at the time, testified that he did not believe that 
Yanpet was releasing any payment-related claims in the 1987 Letter Agreement.  Similarly, 
Gregory McPike, who was a member of the Kemya board at the time, testified that he did not 
believe the 1987 Letter Agreement had anything to do with releasing payment-related claims, 
and that he did not have authority to release a "$180 million claim" on behalf of Exxon. 
 
37
 
(4)  THE RULINGS ON EXXONMOBIL'S  
               BREACH  OF  CONTRACT  CLAIMS 
 
By its verdict the jury found SABIC liable to ExxonMobil for having 
breached Article 6.3 of the joint venture agreements.53  Those provisions (the jury 
determined) were controlling and limited SABIC's royalty charges for providing 
Unipol® PE technology to the partnerships, to a "pass through" of SABIC's own 
cost of obtaining a license for that same technology from UCC.  During the trial, 
SABIC moved for judgment as a matter of law on ExxonMobil's contract claim, 
and after the adverse jury verdict, SABIC moved (again) for judgment as a matter 
of law or, alternatively, for a new trial.  The trial judge denied both motions and 
judgment was ultimately entered against SABIC on the contract claims.  
On appeal, SABIC contends that the trial judge erred in denying its pre (and 
post) verdict motions for judgment because:  (1) as a matter of law Article 6.3 does 
not apply to SABIC's provision of the Unipol® PE technology to the joint venture 
partnerships; rather, the parties intended that Article 6.1—which does not require a 
cost "pass through"—would control; and (2) in any event, the joint venture 
agreements do not govern what royalties SABIC could charge for providing the 
Unipol® PE technology to the joint venture partnerships.  The reason (SABIC 
argues) is that the parties intended that the later-executed Unipol® PE/UCC 
                                                 
53 Except where the context shows otherwise, the references (in the singular) to Article 6.3 and to 
Article 6.1, are to Articles 6.3 and 6.1 of both the Yanpet and the Kemya joint venture 
agreements. 
 
38
technology sublicense agreements between SABIC and the joint venture 
partnerships—which have no "pass through" provision—would supersede and 
repeal any application of Article 6.3 of the joint venture agreements.54   
To the extent SABIC claims that the trial court determined the applicable 
law incorrectly, or instructed the jury erroneously, or failed to grant judgment as a 
matter of law because of legally insufficient evidence, we review those claims de 
novo for legal error.55  We will not disturb a jury's findings of fact on the basis of 
legally insufficient evidence, however, if there is "any competent evidence upon 
which the verdict could reasonably be based."56  Having applied the appropriate 
review standards to the facts and evidence of record, we discern no error of law in 
the trial court's rulings, or any legal insufficiency of evidence to support the jury 
verdict, with respect to ExxonMobil's breach of contract claims. 
                                                 
54 Alternatively, SABIC contends that it is entitled to a new trial to allow SABIC to present to the 
jury the same contract defenses that were the subject of its motions for judgment as a matter of 
law.  That contention lacks merit because SABIC was allowed to present those defenses to the 
jury, which chose not to accept them.  2003 WL 22048236 at *3.  Because we conclude that the 
trial court correctly rejected the contentions that underlie SABIC's motions for judgment, and 
that the jury's verdict (which was adverse to SABIC) is based upon competent and legally 
sufficient evidence, we do not further address SABIC's new trial argument. 
 
55 Chrysler Corp. (Del.), 822 A.2d at 1034, 1036; City Co. Liquidating Trust v. Cont'l. Cas. Co., 
624 A.2d 1191, 1194 (Del. 1993). 
 
56 Mercedes Benz of N. Am. Inc. v. Norman Gershman's Things to Wear, 596 A.2d at 1358, 1362 
(Del. 1991) (quoting Turner v. Vineyard, 80 A.2d 177, 179 (Del. 1951)). 
 
39
(a) SABIC's    Argument   That   Article   6.3  
      Does Not Apply To ExxonMobil's Claims 
                For Breach of Contract  
Our analysis of SABIC's first challenge to the judgment for breach of 
contract starts with the uncontested fact that when SABIC furnished the Unipol® 
PE technology to the joint venture partnerships, SABIC did not limit its royalty 
charges to the partnerships to a "pass through" of its own cost to procure that 
technology from UCC.  It is undisputed that SABIC charged the partnerships a 
"mark up" over and above its actual cost.  The record discloses substantial 
evidence (based upon which the jury found as fact) that SABIC had concealed 
those markups from ExxonMobil for almost two decades.   
 
SABIC virtually concedes that those facts would constitute a violation of 
Article 6.3 of the joint venture agreements, if (as the jury found) Article 6.3 
governs the overcharge breach of contract claims.  SABIC can hardly contend 
otherwise, as Article 6.3 of the Yanpet agreement directs that "to the extent either 
Partner or any Affiliate thereof procures patents, processes, and other licensing 
rights of third parties, and sublicenses such rights to the Partnership, it shall not 
receive any remuneration other than actual cost incurred in acquiring and 
sublicensing such right."57  Article 6.3 of the Kemya joint venture agreement is 
substantially identical.  SABIC's position must therefore be (and indeed is) that 
                                                 
57 Yanpet Joint Venture Agreement, Art. 6.3 (italics added).   
 
 
40
Article 6.3 does not govern the overcharge claims.  That position contains two 
prongs. 
 
SABIC first argues, as it did in the Superior Court, that Article 6.3 does not 
apply to the Unipol® PE technology that SABIC licensed to the joint ventures.  
According to SABIC, Article 6.3, by its plain terms, applies only to partner-
licensed polyethylene technology that is then sublicensed to the joint ventures, as 
distinguished from partner-owned polyethylene technology that is then licensed to 
the joint venture.  SABIC argues that the parties intended that Article 6.1(a)—
which does not require a cost pass-through but instead allows the parties to 
negotiate transaction-specific financial terms—would apply to partner-owned 
polyethylene technology.  Article 6.1, SABIC asserts, "plainly reflects the parties' 
intent that separate, later-executed technology [l]icenses, not the [joint venture] 
agreements, would exclusively govern the provision by a partner of the technology 
'required' to 'manufacture' polyethylene."  Because SABIC owned the Unipol® PE 
technology, Article 6.3 does not apply and therefore (SABIC concludes), no breach 
of Article 6.3 could legally have occurred. 
 
The Superior Court rejected this argument on the ground that it ignores the 
plain language of Articles 6.3 and 6.1, as well as the substantial persuasive 
evidence that undermines SABIC's position.  We conclude that the trial court ruled 
correctly.  SABIC's entire position rests upon a distinction between partner-
 
41
licensed and partner-owned polyethylene technology.  Article 6.3, however, makes 
no such distinction.  Article 6.3 does not exclude partner-owned polyethylene 
technology from its coverage.  Indeed, that provision covers technology that a 
partner "procures," and as the trial judge held, "[a] reasonable jury could conclude 
that 'procures' includes a 'purchase.'  In fact…a number of witnesses at 
trial…testified that 'procures, as it appears in Articles 6.3, would include a 
purchase of technology.'"58 
SABIC's distinction does not aid its position for a second reason:  a 
reasonable jury could have found that SABIC was a licensee, not the owner, of the 
Unipol® PE polyethylene technology.  That technology SABIC then sublicensed 
to the partnerships—the very scenario that is contemplated and covered by Article 
6.3.  The trial court so held:   
SABIC's argument that it purchased the Unipol® PE technology and 
then licensed it to the Joint Ventures rings hollow in light of the great 
weight of evidence in the form of documents that refer to sub 
licenses.…  The record is replete with documents referencing the 
UCC-SABIC transaction as a license and the SABIC Joint Venture 
transactions as sublicenses.  SABIC's witnesses attempted to explain 
to the jury that while the term "sublicense" may have been used, 
SABIC "attached no legal meaning" to that term.  The overwhelming 
documentary evidence supports the jury's finding that the true 
character of the UCC-SABIC agreement was a license, that the 
agreements with KEMYA and YANPET were sublicenses, and that 
Articles 6.3 applied.59 
                                                 
58  Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22048236 at *3. 
 
59 Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
 
 
42
 
 
SABIC next argues that the evidence conclusively establishes that the parties 
intended for Article 6.1 of the joint venture agreements (which contains no pass-
through requirement)—not Article 6.3 (which does)—to govern the terms under 
which SABIC could sublicense the Unipol® PE technology to the joint venture 
partnerships.  Only if the plain language of Article 6.1 is ignored can this argument 
attain plausibility, because in fact Article 6.1 fatally undercuts SABIC's claim. 
Article 6.1(a) of the Kemya joint venture agreement provides that: 
To the extent patents and licensing rights and related technical 
proprietary information are in the opinion of the Partners required to 
design and construct the Petrochemical Plant and produce 
Manufactured Products, ECAI [Exxon Chemical Arabia Inc.] and its 
affiliates to the extent they are permitted (without having to account to 
a third party) shall offer to provide to the Partnership, all such patents, 
licensing rights, technical and proprietary information necessary to 
perform its obligations hereunder consistent with Annex XI hereto.60 
 
 
Article 6.1 explicitly and specifically refers to Exxon and Mobil, but that 
provision does not in any way mention, refer or even allude to SABIC.  For that 
                                                 
60 Kemya Joint Venture Agreement, Art. 6.1 (italics added).  Article 6.1 of the Yanpet joint 
venture agreement is substantially identical.  It provides: 
 
To the extent patents and licensing rights and other technical and proprietary 
information which are owned or controlled by Mobil and/or Mobil Affiliates are 
required to design and construct the Petrochemical Complex and manufacture the 
Manufactured Products, Mobil and its Affiliates shall provide all such patents and 
licensing rights and other technical and proprietary information to the Partnership, 
necessary to perform its obligations hereunder on mutually agreeable terms and 
conditions. 
 
Yanpet Joint Venture Agreement, Art. 6.1 (italics added). 
 
 
43
reason alone the jury had a reasonable basis to find that Article 6.1 does not apply 
to SABIC and, therefore, confers no rights upon SABIC. 
On appeal SABIC argues—as it did before the trial court and the jury—that 
the references to "ECAI and its affiliates" in Article 6.1 of the Kemya joint venture 
agreement, and to "MOBIL and/or MOBIL Affiliates" in Article 6.1 of the Yanpet 
joint venture agreement,61 must be construed to mean "a partner."  Under that 
construction, SABIC would be an "affiliate" of Mobil or Exxon because those 
entities are partners in the two joint ventures.   
That argument labors under multiple infirmities.  Nothing in the joint 
venture agreements or in any case law cited by SABIC persuasively supports, let 
alone compels, that interpretation.  To read "affiliates" as including all entities with 
which Mobil and Exxon have formal relationships as partners—a construction that 
SABIC insists the jury was required to accept as a matter of law—would be odd, to 
say the least.  SABIC was not an "affiliate" of Mobil or Exxon as that term is 
commonly and ordinarily understood.62  To the contrary, SABIC was 
ExxonMobil's bargaining adversary, the party on the other side of the arm's-length 
negotiations that resulted in the joint venture agreements.  Reuel Agarrado, 
SABIC's own witness, testified that Article 6.1 "does not apply to SABIC."  There 
                                                 
61 See note 60 supra. 
 
62 For example, SABIC was not a parent, or a subsidiary, or a sister corporation, of Exxon or 
Mobil, or of any person or group that controlled Exxon or Mobil. 
 
 
44
is no evidence that SABIC ever informed Exxon or Mobil that it was relying upon 
Article 6.1 when SABIC violated the pass-through terms of Article 6.3.  Nor did 
SABIC ever allege in its original or amended complaint that it had relied upon 
Article 6.1. 
 
Despite these infirmities, the trial court allowed SABIC to present its Article 
6.1 argument to the jury, which ultimately rejected it.  The jury's rejection of 
SABIC's argument has an ample and sufficient basis in the evidentiary record, as 
did the trial judge's post-trial ruling that the jury was justified in reaching that 
result: 
The Court notes that at trial ExxonMobil introduced a copy of 
[SABIC's] Second Amended Complaint…and Article 6.1 of the Joint 
Venture Agreements is nowhere mentioned in that complaint.  The 
Court also notes that SABIC witnesses admitted that they never 
advised anyone at Exxon or Mobil that SABIC believed Article 6.1(a) 
applied to the provision of Unipol® PE technology to the Joint 
Ventures.  Given all of this, there is more than a sufficient basis from 
which a reasonable jury could conclude that SABIC's Article 6.1(a) 
argument was an afterthought, and an unavailing one at that.  This 
Court seriously considered precluding SABIC from presenting [that] 
argument…because of the lack of evidentiary basis supporting such 
an argument, and because the argument was not asserted until very 
late in [the] litigation….  After…characterizing SABIC's claim…as 
"hanging on by a thread," the Court nonetheless permitted SABIC to 
argue this to the jury over ExxonMobil's objection.  Thus, SABIC had 
a full and fair opportunity to present this argument to the jury for its 
consideration.  The jury rejected it….  [T]here is no basis to overturn 
the jury's rejection of that argument.63 
 
 
We find that ruling to be free from error and correct. 
                                                 
63 2003 WL 22048236 at *3. 
 
45
(b) SABIC's   Argument That The Sublicenses  
Supersede And Repeal Any Application of  
      Article 6.3 
 
Alternatively, SABIC contends that even if Article 6.3 does govern (thereby 
limiting SABIC's royalty charges to a pass through of its actual cost of obtaining 
the Unipol® PE technology), in this case Article 6.3 had no force or effect, 
because the SABIC/Kemya and SABIC/Yanpet sublicense agreements superseded 
and repealed any application of Article 6.3.   
The trial court rejected this argument, holding that: 
SABIC next argues that, under Saudi rules of contract interpretation, 
the Joint Venture polyethylene licenses which were entered into in 
November and October 1980 "trump" the general provisions of the 
Joint Venture Agreements, including Article 6.3.  In support of this 
argument, SABIC states that under Saudi law, partnership agreements 
like the Joint Venture Agreements are ja'iz contracts, which are not 
prospectively binding on the partners but rather serve as a starting 
point for later, transaction-specific agreements.  The later transaction-
specific contracts are lazim agreements which are prospectively 
binding on the partners and "trump" inconsistent terms of ja'iz 
contracts.  According to this argument, the detailed transaction-
specific nature of the Unipol ® PE technology licenses makes them 
lazim contracts that supercede [sic] Article 6.3 of the Joint Venture 
Agreements.  The infirmity of this argument is that there is no 
evidence in the record to suggest that Exxon or Mobil knew that 
SABIC was deriving a profit from its provision of the Unipol® PE 
technology to the Joint Ventures or that Exxon or Mobil knew the 
financial terms in the UCC-SABIC license.  Thus, as a matter of law, 
the sublicenses cannot possibly modify Article 6.3 of the Joint 
Venture Agreements.  In fact [on ExxonMobil's motion for judgment 
as a matter of law the Court pointed out that] on SABIC's contract  
 
 
46
modification argument, the parties' Saudi law experts agreed that…for 
there to be a modification of an agreement, the [parties] to the 
agreement must have conferred on the proposed modification and 
understood what they were agreeing to…. 
 
While the Saudi law experts who testified disagreed on many aspects 
of Saudi law, they did agree that it was not possible under Saudi law 
to modify an agreement unless the parties understood that they were 
modifying an agreement and understood the terms of the modification.  
There is no evidence in the record that Exxon or Mobil knew that the 
financial terms of the sublicenses were different than the UCC-SABIC 
license.…  SABIC can point to no set of factual circumstances that 
suggest Exxon or Mobil understood, much less intended, that the sub-
licenses modified Article 6.3.  The Court also notes that Article 18.2 
of the KEMYA Joint Venture Agreement and Article 19.2 of the 
YANPET Joint Venture Agreement specifically require that any 
amendment, modification or waiver of any provision of the Joint 
Venture Agreement be in writing and signed by the partners.  Dr. 
Hallaq testified that these provisions would be honored under Islamic 
principles of contract law.  Because Exxon and Mobil, the partners, 
never signed the sublicenses...the sublicenses cannot possibly 
supercede [sic] or modify the Joint Venture Agreements as a matter of 
Saudi law.64 
 
 
The above-quoted analysis effectively disposes of SABIC's argument that 
the sublicense agreements modified and superseded Article 6.3 of the joint venture 
agreements.  Nothing advanced by SABIC on this appeal straightforwardly 
addresses the trial court's reasoning.  SABIC asserts that the trial judge 
misunderstood the significance of the ja'iz nature of the joint venture agreements, 
but that assertion ignores the testimony of SABIC's own Saudi law expert, 
Professor Frank E. Vogel, that even ja'iz partnership contracts remain binding on 
                                                 
64 2003 WL 22048236 at *4 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 
47
the partners unless and until the partners reach agreement on the changed terms.  
That event never occurred here.  As Professor Hallaq explained, under Saudi law, 
the sublicense agreements cannot be deemed to supersede the obligations upon 
which the parties agreed in Article 6.3 of the joint venture agreements, because no 
language in the sublicense agreements purports to waive SABIC's obligations to 
ExxonMobil under those that provision.  "This absence of waiver," Professor 
Hallaq explained, "is dictated by the Islamic legal principle that unspecific, general 
or implied language cannot supersede specific and clear language which Articles 
6.3…represent."65   
SABIC's remaining challenges to the trial court's breach of contract rulings 
are equally unavailing.66  The evidence amply suffices to sustain the jury's finding 
                                                 
65 The expert testimony establishing the applicable principles of Saudi contract law vitiates 
SABIC's claim on appeal that the integration clauses of the sublicenses (which nowhere 
specifically purport to modify or supersede Article 6.3 of the joint venture agreements) must be 
regarded as "conclusive evidence" that the parties intended to supersede the prior joint venture 
agreements. 
 
66 SABIC also assails the trial judge's determination that the sublicenses could not possibly 
modify or supersede the joint venture agreements because Mobil and Exxon did not sign the 
sublicense agreements.  Exxon's and Mobil's actual signatures were not needed, SABIC argues, 
because the signature of SABIC—Exxon's and Mobil's partner in these joint ventures—was 
legally sufficient to bind Exxon and Mobil.  This argument, like others advanced by SABIC, 
ignores the plain language of the governing contract.  The joint venture agreements explicitly 
require that any amendment, modification or waiver of any provision of the joint venture 
agreements be "in writing and signed by the partners."  The term "Partners" is defined in the 
Kemya agreement to mean SABIC and Exxon; and in the Yanpet agreement, is defined to mean 
SABIC and Mobil.  SABIC's argument ignores the definition of "Partners," as well as the 
evidence provided by its own witness, Mr. Bin Salamah, who testified that when the partners 
intended to modify the joint venture agreement, they "sat down in a room and agreed in writing 
and signed it at the bottom of the page." It is undisputed that no authorized representative of 
Exxon and Mobil ever sat down in a room with SABIC and signed the sublicense agreements. 
 
48
that the joint venture agreements, and specifically Article 6.3, controlled 
ExxonMobil's contract claims and was not superseded by the sublicense 
agreements.  No authority that SABIC presented either to the trial court or to us 
required the trial judge or the jury to accept SABIC's contrary position as a matter 
of law.  Because the jury verdict finding SABIC liable for breaching Article 6.3 of 
the joint venture agreements was properly grounded both legally and factually, it 
must stand. 
(5)  THE RULINGS ON EXXONMOBIL'S  
CLAIMS OF USURPATION (GHASB) 
 
SABIC reserves its final and most extensive set of challenges for the portion 
of the judgment holding SABIC liable to ExxonMobil for committing the tort 
known under Saudi law as "usurpation" or "ghasb."  The amount of the jury award 
and judgment for usurpation was $416.8 million, which includes both the amount 
of overcharged royalties ($92.8 million) and the profits SABIC obtained from 
using those overcharges in its business ($324 million). 
 
SABIC divides its challenges to the usurpation award into two separate 
categories of claimed error:  (1) errors that resulted in SABIC being held liable for 
usurpation, and (2) errors that resulted in an award of what SABIC describes as 
 
49
"enhanced damages." 67  For both categories, SABIC argues that it is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on ExxonMobil's ghasb claims of liability and 
enhanced damages; or alternatively, to a new trial on both the liability and 
enhanced damages issues.  
In support of its challenges SABIC advances five separate claims of error.  
First, SABIC contends that the trial court as a matter of law erred in denying its 
motion for judgment, because to be found liable for ghasb under Saudi law, 
ExxonMobil was required to—but did not—establish "an open and obvious taking 
that is intentional and without any color of right."  SABIC argues that all 
ExxonMobil alleged and proved was that SABIC had engaged in "secret 
conduct...based upon color of right."  Those contentions also form the basis for 
SABIC's second argument, which is that SABIC is entitled to a new trial on the 
issue of liability for ghasb, because the trial court erroneously declined to instruct 
the jury that the wrongdoer's actions must be "open, obvious, intentional and 
without color of right."  Third, SABIC claims that it is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on the claim for enhanced damages, because no Saudi court would 
award enhanced damages in a contract case such as this one.  Fourth, and 
                                                 
67  SABIC characterizes the latter component of the usurpation award (the profits earned from the 
overcharges) as "enhanced damages," to accentuate its argument that a disgorgement of profits is 
"unprecedented" and should not have been allowed in this case.  ExxonMobil, on the other hand, 
characterizes the entire amount of the award as "compensatory damages," to underscore its 
position that past profits obtained by the tortfeasor's wrongful use of the overcharged amounts is 
an element of allowable damages for usurpation with "solid support" in the treatises of the 
Hanbali guild or school of Islamic law, the school that Saudi judges are instructed to follow. 
 
50
alternatively, SABIC contends that it is entitled to a new trial in which the jury 
would be given adequate guidance in considering whether to award enhanced 
damages.  Fifth, and finally, SABIC argues that the trial court, although purporting 
to employ the methodology that a Saudi judge would follow to determine the 
applicable Saudi law ("ijtihad"), in fact invoked ijtihad merely as a "post hoc 
rationalization" for foreign law rulings that were essentially arbitrary and 
unprincipled.68 
To the extent SABIC contends that the Superior Court made incorrect 
determinations of Saudi law or instructed the jury incorrectly on issues governed 
by Saudi law, such determinations and jury instructions are treated as rulings on a 
question of law and are subject to de novo review.69  But where, as here, the trial 
court's determination of foreign law rests on the credibility of foreign law experts, 
the trial court's predicate credibility findings will be accorded appropriate 
deference.70 
                                                 
68 Appellant’s Op. Br. at 40-41. 
  
69 SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 44.1; see Corbitt v. Tatagari, 804 A.2d 1057, 1062 (Del. 2002) (trial court's 
jury instructions reviewed de novo); J.S. Alberici Constr. Co. v. Mid-West Conveyor Co., 750 
A.2d 518, 520 n.2 (Del. 2000) (foreign law determinations treated as rulings of law and reviewed 
de novo). 
 
70 See, BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 268 (3rd Cir. 2000) 
("[T]he District Court is in the best position to determine what at this point is essentially a 
credibility issue—i.e, which [foreign law] expert to believe."); Servicios Comerciales Andinos, 
S.A. v. Gen. Elec. Del Caribe, Inc., 145 F.3d 463, 476, n.7 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[T]he finder of fact is 
entitled to make its own assessment of the credibility of [foreign law] experts."). 
 
 
51
(a) The  Trial  Court's  Use  of  The Ijtihad  
Methodology To Determine  Saudi Law 
We first address SABIC's fifth argument, because it challenges the 
methodology that the trial court employed to determine Saudi law, and, thus by its 
very nature, assails the procedural foundation of all of the challenged substantive 
Saudi law rulings.  In essence, SABIC claims that the ijtihad process that the trial 
judge employed to determine Saudi law was "free wheeling," "standardless," and a 
"bare 'guess' as to the correct content of Saudi law."71  We reject these contentions, 
because the record clearly establishes that the trial judge went to extraordinary 
lengths to understand the applicable Saudi law and to make rulings that were 
consistent with the numerous Saudi law sources presented to her.  To understand 
how and why that is so, a prefatory discussion of the Saudi system of 
jurisprudence, and of the Saudi ijtihad analytical approach, is helpful. 
In Saudi Arabia, Islamic law (shari'a), which is a fundamentally religious 
law based on both the Q'uran and the model behavior of the Prophet Muhammed, 
is the law of the land.  Although early Islamic law scholars eventually coalesced 
into various guilds or schools, only four of those guilds have survived in modern 
                                                 
71 SABIC also asserts that ijtihad was "raised for the first time in post-trial briefing" and that "the 
court never indicated prior to its post-trial orders that it was engaging in ijtihad to determine 
either the elements of ghasb or the availability of enhanced damages."  Id. at 40.  That assertion 
is contradicted by the record, which discloses that the trial judge questioned one of the expert 
witnesses about the ijtihad methodology during the Saudi law hearing, and that the judge 
indicated that she had relied upon that methodology in ruling upon a pre-trial motion for 
summary judgment. 
  
 
52
times:  the Hanbali, the Hanafi, the Shafi'i and the Maliki.  In Saudi Arabia, the 
judges are instructed to rule exclusively in accordance with the teachings of the 
Hanbali guild.72 
 
The Saudi law system differs in critically important respects from the system 
of legal thought employed by the common law countries, including the United 
States.  Perhaps most significant is that Islamic law does not embrace the common-
law system of binding precedent and stare decisis.  Indeed, in Saudi Arabia, 
judicial decisions are not in themselves a source of law, and with minor exceptions, 
court decisions in Saudi Arabia are not published or even open to public 
inspection. 
 
The trial judge was keenly mindful of this distinctive characteristic of Saudi 
law and of the problems that it created for defining the elements of, and remedies 
for, ghasb and for how to instruct the jury on those issues.  The court observed: 
SABIC's arguments ignore the simple truth that the circumstances 
under which ghasb (usurpation) damages are available under Saudi 
law are not well known, much less defined, because Saudi law is not 
based on precedent or stare decisis.  Contrary to the implication of 
SABIC's briefing on this issue, the reality is that one cannot simply 
consult a statute book or a case reporter to find the elements of, or 
damages available for, the Saudi law tort of ghasb.  Nor can one point 
to one definition of, or a given set of circumstances giving rise to, 
ghasb.  To illustrate the extreme difficulty of discerning and 
interpreting Saudi law, the Court notes that none of the Saudi law 
experts who testified agreed on the proper elements of ghasb….  
                                                 
72 Dr. Vogel, SABIC's Saudi law expert, agreed that Saudi judges hew conservatively to the 
Hanbali school. 
 
53
Finally, because Saudi law decisions are not published, even if the 
decisions had precedential value (which all the experts agree they do 
not) the Court could not look to decisions of Saudi judges to 
determine the proper elements or define the recoverable damages.73 
 
 
 
Instead of relying upon statutes or decisional precedent to discern the law 
applicable to a particular case, judges in Saudi Arabia must "first and 
last…navigate within the boundaries" of the Hanbali school's authoritative works, 
which are the scholarly treatises primarily consulted by Saudi judges.74  Using 
these scholarly writings as guides, Saudi judges identify a "spectrum of 
possibilities on any given question, rather than a single 'correct' answer."  
Thus, in this highly different legal environment, the predominate factor in 
determining the Saudi law on a given issue is the study and analysis, or ijtihad, that 
a judge brings to bear in each particular case.  To state it in different terms, the 
critical inquiry is whether "the proper analytical procedures are followed in 
reaching the results."  The trial judge so recognized, observing that "[w]hen faced 
with the daunting task of determining the elements of ghasb and the damages 
available for this tort, the Court, weighing the credibility of each Saudi law expert, 
                                                 
73 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22016843 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2003) at *1 (italics in 
original, internal footnotes omitted). 
 
74 Particularly important are two works by Mansur al-Bahuti, a 17th century scholar, as well as the 
works of Ibn Qudama and Al Maqdisi. 
 
 
54
exercised, as best it could under the circumstances, ijtihad, to reach the 'right' 
result."75 
Mindful of how "daunting" would be the task of determining the Saudi law 
principles applicable to this case, the trial judge made exceptional efforts to ensure 
that she was fully informed of the Hanbali teachings upon which to ground her 
legal rulings.  Before trial, the parties presented the trial judge with seven reports 
from four Saudi law experts (two expert witnesses for each side), as well as each 
expert's lengthy deposition.  Perceiving a conflict in the experts' opinions, the trial 
judge retained an independent expert, Mr. Herbert S. Wolfson, and obtained his 
advice on critical issues, including the elements of, and the damage remedies 
available for, usurpation.  Mr. Wolfson prepared an initial report and the trial court 
permitted him to conduct additional research in Saudi Arabia, after which Wolfson 
prepared a supplemental report and was deposed for a full day.  After reviewing a 
total of nine reports and over one thousand pages of deposition testimony, the trial 
judge then held a day-long pretrial hearing, to permit the parties to present live 
testimony from Professor Hallaq, Dr. Vogel and Mr. Wolfson.  Only after this 
extensive process did the trial court undertake to determine the disputed elements 
                                                 
75 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22016843 at *2, n.8 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2003) (citing 
the testimony of Professor Hallaq that every time a Muslim judge exercises ijtihad, "it is 
basically his best…effort to find what is the right thing to do…" and the testimony of Herbert S. 
Wolfson, that a Saudi judge performing ijtihad tries to do the "right thing.").   
 
55
of ghasb.  Even after that comprehensive inquiry, the court considered (over 
ExxonMobil's objection) two additional reports of Dr. Vogel submitted post-trial. 
It is notable that only after SABIC received the adverse jury verdict did it 
attack the trial court's ijtihad process, even going so far as to contend, in a post-
trial affidavit of Dr. Vogel, that the trial judge "was simply not qualified to practice 
ijtihad."  SABIC advances that same position on appeal.  Confronting that 
contention, the trial judge made the following observations which, in our view, 
afford a complete answer to SABIC's position: 
What troubles the Court even more is that Dr. Vogel opines that this 
Court cannot credibly engage in the ijtihad process.  According to Dr. 
Vogel, "ijtihad requires for its credibility qualifications which on the 
very face of things, neither Prof. Hallaq, myself or, with respect, any 
U.S. Court possesses."  If Dr. Vogel is correct, then why did SABIC 
choose to file this dispute in a United States Court?  If Dr. Vogel is 
correct in that neither he nor Dr. Hallaq possess the qualifications to 
engage in the ijtihad process, then what Saudi law "expert" would be 
able to assist this United States Court in determining the applicable 
Saudi law? 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
It is remarkable that SABIC, having [purposefully] selected this forum 
instead of a Saudi Court, knowing the United States legal system is 
dramatically different than the Saudi legal system, comes forward 
 
56
after a verdict against it to claim that no American judge is qualified 
to interpret and apply Saudi law.  This is particularly incredible in 
light of SABIC's vehement argument that this case should be tried by 
a U.S. judge.76 
 
As we view it, the careful, painstaking inquiry that the trial judge conducted 
puts to rest SABIC's contention that she engaged in a standardless, "seat of the 
pants" determination of the disputed Saudi law issues.  It is one thing for SABIC to 
argue that one or more specific decisions resulting from the trial judge's inquiry are 
legally erroneous.  On this record, however, it is not fair for SABIC to contend that 
the trial court's analytical process itself was arbitrary, unprincipled or lawless. 
We turn next to the specific legal errors that SABIC claims the trial judge 
made in her ghasb liability and damages determinations and jury instructions. 
  
(b) The  Claim That  The  Trial  Court  Determined  
The   Legal   Elements  of  Ghasb   Erroneously 
 
After considering the extensive documentary and testimonial evidence of 
Islamic law pertaining to ghasb, the trial court determined that: 
In order to establish a claim for usurpation, Mobil or Exxon must 
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that SABIC wrongfully 
exercised ownership or possessory rights over the property of another 
without consent, which means with blatant or reckless disregard for 
those property rights.  The conduct need not be intentional.77 
 
                                                 
76 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22016864 at *4 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2003) (italics in 
original, internal footnotes omitted). 
 
77 Id. at *1. 
 
 
57
 
 SABIC does not dispute that ExxonMobil factually established each of 
those elements.  Rather, SABIC argues on appeal, as it did in the Superior Court, 
that the trial court's formulation of the tort of usurpation is erroneous because 
ghasb includes two additional elements that the trial court ignored:  (1) SABIC's 
taking of the joint ventures' property must be "open and obvious," and (2) the 
taking must be "intentional and without any color of right."  Thus, SABIC argues 
that it cannot be adjudicated as a usurper so long as its seizure of its partners' 
property was surreptitious, as distinguished from being open and obvious.   
The trial judge rejected this argument on the ground that SABIC's two 
additional proffered elements find no support in the Hanbali works, as explicated 
by the Saudi law experts whose testimony she found to be credible.  Having 
reviewed the extensive record developed on this issue, we conclude that the trial 
judge's legal rulings, and the intermediate evidentiary and factual rulings upon 
which they are grounded, are correct. 
 
Bearing importantly on this issue, as the trial judge found, is that "[as] Mr. 
Wolfson opined…there is no single binding definition of ghasb, 'but rather a range 
of possibilities.'"  Dr. Vogel testified that…there is "no single 'binding definition of 
usurpation [or ghasb].'"78  Not surprisingly, all three experts "differed on the proper 
                                                 
78 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22016864 at *4 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2003) (internal 
footnotes omitted). 
 
 
58
elements of a ghasb claim."79  That being the case, the trial judge had no 
alternative but to decide which expert's testimony to accept or reject.  The trial 
court determined to accept the opinion testimony of Professor Hallaq and Mr. 
Wolfson, and to reject that of Dr. Vogel.  The court found: 
ExxonMobil points out that Dr. Vogel's "varying and inconsistent" 
definitions of ghasb only confirm that there is no one correct 
definition.  The Court is inclined to agree.  Each time he opined on the 
subject, Dr. Vogel's definition [of] ghasb seemed to change…. 
 
 
The Court does not find Dr. Vogel's latest definition of ghasb 
persuasive.  Having had the opportunity to watch Dr. Vogel testify, 
observe his demeanor on the witness stand when his interpretation of 
Saudi law was challenged, and review his latest affidavit as well as his 
prior affidavits and deposition testimony, the Court finds he has 
become (or been exposed as) more of an advocate than an objective 
scholar of Islamic law.  His relentless attacks on Dr. Hallaq's 
qualifications and expertise further undermine his credibility in the 
Court's eye.  The Court is concerned about Dr. Vogel's objectivity.80 
 
 
That finding is entitled to deference on appeal.  Based upon the testimony of 
Mr. Wolfson (and even, to some extent, of Dr. Vogel), the trial court determined 
that SABIC's first disputed element—an "open and obvious" taking—cannot be 
located in the works of the Hanbali school.  As Mr. Wolfson noted, "the most 
influential Hanbali scholars, whose works enjoy tremendous respect in Saudi 
Arabia," do not "include openness or notoriety as elements in the definition of 
                                                 
79 Id.  at *3.  
 
80 Id. at *4 (footnotes omitted). 
 
 
59
ghasb."  Dr. Vogel also agreed that the Hanbali scholars do not include open and 
notorious in their definition of usurpation, and he conceded that even if the victim 
is completely unaware that a taking has occurred, the taking qualifies as 
usurpation: 
Q.  Now suppose, just suppose, I have a bunch of horses, okay?….  
And you come into my corral and take one of my horses, but I'm in 
Brazil….  So I have no idea that you have in fact taken my horses….  
And, indeed, when I come back, I don't know that the horse is 
gone?….  That would be usurpation, too, wouldn't it? 
 
A.  Yes.81 
In short, the record supports the trial judge's foreign law determination that 
the Hanbali sources do not require that the wrongful exercise of ownership or 
possessory rights over the property of another must be "open and obvious."  Nor do 
the Hanbali texts support SABIC's second argued-for element, that the taking must 
be "intentional."  SABIC bases that argument upon the (rejected) testimony of Dr. 
Vogel, who never identified any Hanbali source that supports a definition of 
usurpation which includes an element of intentional transgression.  Mr. Wolfson, 
whose testimony the trial judge did accept in some important respects, opined that 
"the intent to infringe cannot possibly be a necessary element" of a civil claim for 
usurpation, based on numerous examples of usurpation in the authoritative texts 
                                                 
81 Professor Hallaq explained that "[t]he victim doesn't have to know that he was violated in order 
to be considered a victim of usurpation." 
 
 
60
that demonstrate that even an innocent purchaser of wrongfully taken property can 
be held liable.  Although the usurper must "inten[d] to exercise ownership, he need 
not inten[d] to infringe the rights of the true owner."  The trial judge's 
determination of Saudi law, based entirely on expert testimony, is entitled to 
deference, as no basis has been shown to overturn it. 
Accordingly, we find that the trial court committed no error in submitting 
the usurpation claim to the jury or in denying SABIC's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law. 
(c) The Claim  That The Trial Court 
Instructed The Jury Erroneously 
On The Elements of Ghasb 
 
SABIC next argues that even if the trial court was correct in denying its 
motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court erred by not granting SABIC's 
alternative motion for a new trial.  The basis for this argument is that the jury was 
not, but should have been, told that to find that SABIC committed usurpation, it 
must find that SABIC's conduct was "open, obvious, intentional, and without color 
of right."  We have rejected that argument as the basis for SABIC's claim of 
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.  The argument fares no better when it is 
recast as a claim of entitlement to a new trial.  Because we have upheld the trial 
court's determination that to constitute usurpation a wrongdoer's conduct need not 
be open, obvious, or intentional, it follows that the trial court committed no error in 
 
61
refusing to instruct the jury on definitional components that were not elements of 
that tort under Saudi law.82 
(d) The  Claim That The Trial  Court Erroneously 
Permitted  The  Jury  To  Decide  Whether  To  
Award "Enhanced Damages" To ExxonMobil 
SABIC next contends that the trial court erred by denying its motion for 
judgment as a matter of law as to the portion of the jury verdict that awarded 
"enhanced damages" to ExxonMobil.83  The ground for this claim is that "no Saudi 
court would award enhanced damages in a contract case such as this one," because 
"enhanced damages are unprecedented in contract cases, even where the elements 
of ghasb are otherwise present."  
 
SABIC presented that same argument to the trial judge, who concluded that 
"SABIC's argument that damages for ghasb are rarely awarded in the Saudi legal 
system and are virtually unprecedented[,] is unsubstantiated, unverifiable and 
irrelevant…."84  As the trial court explained:  
                                                 
82 The trial court instructed the jury "that the tort of ghasb is comprised of the following 
elements: (a) the exercise of ownership or possessory rights, (b) over the property of another, (c) 
without consent, (d) wrongfully."  Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22016864 at *1 (Del. 
Super. Aug. 26, 2003). 
 
83 As previously noted, "enhanced damages" refers to $324 million of the total $416.8 damages 
award, which represents the profits realized by SABIC for using the overcharged amounts in its 
business. 
 
84 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22016843 at *3 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2003). 
 
 
62
[S]imply because SABIC's expert is unable to name a case in which a 
Saudi judge awarded damages for usurpation is of little import to this 
Court considering that Saudi law does not recognize stare decisis and 
Saudi law opinions are not published.  To say that usurpation damages 
are "highly unusual" presumes that there are Saudi law cases where 
judges refuse to award damages for usurpation even when the 
elements have been clearly established.  No such case law was 
provided to the Court, nor could it be, given the nuances of the Saudi 
law system.  Moreover, whether a form of damages is 
"unprecedented" is also irrelevant if such damages are available 
according to the authoritative Hanbali texts which are the primary 
works consulted by Saudi judges to determine the law applicable to 
the type of dispute raised in this case.85 
 
 
SABIC makes no effort to confront the trial judge's reasoning in its briefs.  
Instead SABIC strives to create the impression that all the Saudi law experts, 
including Mr. Wolfson, agreed that a Saudi judge would be unlikely to award so-
called "enhanced damages" in a contract action.  That argument, besides being 
legally irrelevant, is factually wrong.  A claim for ghasb lies in tort, not in contract.  
Mr. Wolfson testified that compensatory damages for the tort of ghasb, which 
includes repayment of both the actual overcharged amounts and the actual past 
profits obtained by SABIC's use of those amounts in its business operations, finds 
solid support in the Hanbali treatises.  Even Dr. Vogel acknowledged that "the 
Hanbalis have made a point of…trying to pursue that usurper for all conceivable 
                                                 
85 Id. at *2.  The trial judge further observed "[b]y way of analogy [that] under U.S. law, punitive 
damages are rarely awarded, yet we do not instruct the jury about the frequency or lack of 
frequency of such awards."  Id. 
 
 
63
profits."86  Accordingly, no basis has been shown for SABIC's claim that the trial 
court committed legal error by submitting the "enhanced damages" issue to the 
jury.   
(e) The  Claim  That  The  Trial   Court 
Instructed The Jury Erroneously On 
      The Question of Enhanced Damages 
 
SABIC's final argument is that it is entitled to a new trial on enhanced 
damages, because the trial judge instructed the jury that it "may" award enhanced 
damages for ghasb, yet provided no guidance to cabin the jury's discretion in 
awarding such damages.  That "total lack of guidance," SABIC urges, was not only 
"prejudicial and reversible error," but also a denial of due process of law, because 
the instruction granted "unfettered…discretion…without any consideration by the 
jury of the factors that would be taken into account by a Saudi Court."  
 
Implicit in SABIC's position, but never straightforwardly argued to us or to 
the trial court, is the premise that this case should never have been tried to, or 
decided by, a jury.  We address that implicit premise first.  Had SABIC taken this 
position frontally and from the outset of the case, that argument might have 
considerable force.  The reason is that in an American jury trial, the division of 
labor between judges and juries does not readily lend itself to the ijtihad 
methodology that Saudi Arabian jurists are required to employ. A jurist deciding a 
                                                 
86 Id. at 0066. 
 
 
64
case under Saudi law would have wide discretion that, as the Superior Court found, 
differs significantly from that which is normally vested in an American jury.  A 
Saudi jurist is empowered—although not legally required—to consider all equities 
that might bear on what, if any, damages the Saudi jurist, unconstrained by 
American rules of evidence,87 might choose to award.88  
To put it in different terms, had SABIC brought this case in Saudi Arabia, 
the litigation would have been not unlike a proceeding in equity before a jurist 
having capacious authority to make factual and legal determinations, including 
shaping a remedy in accordance with the jurist’s sense of equity, circumscribed 
and influenced by the traditions of Islamic law that he would bring to bear on the 
dispute.  In such a proceeding, the Saudi jurist would have had complete discretion 
to conclude that an award requiring SABIC to disgorge the profits it earned from 
the wrongfully retained overcharges was equitable.  Unlike the division of labor 
inherent in an American jury trial, the Saudi jurist’s application of ijtihad, and his 
                                                 
87For example, the Saudi jurist would not be constrained by D.R.E. 403, under which the trial 
judge in this case excluded evidence because its probative value was outweighed by its potential 
for prejudice.   
 
88 By way of example, as Mr. Wolfson testified, a Saudi adjudicator could (but would not be 
required to) take into account factors such as: (i) whether SABIC’s conduct was intentionally 
harmful; (ii) whether, even if tortious, SABIC’s conduct was not intended to deprive Yanpet or 
Kemya of their property; and (iii) whether any obligation SABIC had to restore any wrongful 
overcharges should be mitigated by the length of time ExxonMobil took to assert their claims.   
 
 
65
resulting remedial decision, would not neatly divide between determinations of law 
and fact. 
But, this case was not brought in Saudi Arabia.  Instead, SABIC voluntarily 
brought this case in an American court of law, where SABIC knew there is a 
division of labor between the judge (whose duty is to determine the applicable law) 
and the jury (whose duty is to determine the facts).  Nor did SABIC ever seek to 
avoid a jury trial at the outset of the case, which it could have done.  Instead, 
SABIC waited until only a few weeks before the trial to file a motion to strike 
ExxonMobil’s jury trial demand.  Even then, the basis for SABIC’s motion was not 
that a jury was inherently incapable of deciding Saudi law claims, but rather that 
the war in Iraq and the other events unfolding in the Middle East would prejudice 
the jury against SABIC.  The trial judge denied that motion and SABIC’s post-
verdict motion for a new trial (arguing the same ground).  The trial court ruled that 
ExxonMobil was constitutionally entitled to have a jury decide its counterclaims.  
Moreover, the court had taken extraordinary precautions to identify, and to afford 
SABIC an opportunity to strike, any potentially prejudiced jurors.89  SABIC has 
not challenged that ruling on appeal. 
Having chosen an American forum whose adjudicatory processes SABIC 
knew were different from those of Saudi Arabia, SABIC cannot fault the trial court 
                                                 
89.  Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22048238 (Del. Super.) at *1-*2.  
 
66
for having followed those procedures.  That is especially true where, as here, 
SABIC presented the trial judge very little by way of helpful proposed instructions, 
and where the instructions it did propose were reasonably found to be not well 
grounded in Saudi law.  Having rationally taken into account the unusual (from a 
Saudi law standpoint) procedural posture in which she was functioning, and having 
grounded her instructions to the jury upon a well-reasoned distillation of the Saudi 
principles articulated by the foreign law expert whose testimony she was entitled to 
credit, the trial judge did all that could have fairly been expected.  
 
Turning to the specifics of SABIC's claim, our review of a challenged jury 
instruction focuses "'not on whether any special words were used, but whether the 
instruction correctly stated the law and enabled the jury to perform its duty.'"  Jury 
instructions "need not be perfect," but they "must give a correct statement of the 
substance of the law and must be 'reasonably informative and not misleading.'"90  
We conclude that the instruction given to the jury as to awardable ghasb damages 
satisfies those standards.  The jury was instructed as follows: 
I will now explain to you an additional element of  damages that you 
may award only if you find that SABIC is liable for usurpation, a 
claim I defined for you earlier. 
 
If you find in favor of Exxon or Mobil on the claims for usurpation, 
then you may award damages above the amount, if any, you awarded 
                                                 
90 Corbitt v. Tatagari, 804 A.2d 1057, 1062 (Del. 2002) (quoting Cabrera v. State, 747 A.2d 
543, 545 (Del. 2000)). 
 
 
67
for breach of contract based upon any profits you may determine 
SABIC derived by using in its operation the money, if any, that was 
usurped from YANPET or KEMYA.  Damages for usurpation may 
not include any interest.91 
 
 
Any appellate determination of whether a jury was afforded sufficient 
guidance in exercising its fact-finding discretion on a given issue, must necessarily 
depend upon the law that governs that issue and the instruction that the trial court 
gave (or refused to give) on that subject.  In this case, the only specific request 
SABIC made to the trial court to furnish such guidance, was that the court instruct 
the jury on six factors that Mr. Wolfson suggested might possibly enter into a 
Saudi judge's perception of the equities in this case.92  The trial judge declined to 
give the requested instruction, for two reasons.  The first was that the requested 
instruction did not represent established Saudi law; the second was that to give the 
requested instruction would likely confuse and mislead the jury.  The trial court's 
analysis of these concerns, as reflected in her post-trial denial of SABIC's motion 
for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial on the damages issue, 
                                                 
91 Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22016843 at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2003). 
 
92 Those factors include:  "(1) the court's perceptions as to the relative culpability of each party; 
(2) the lapse of time between the start of the alleged wrongful conduct and ExxonMobil's 
decision to file suit; (3) a desire to find the middle ground between competing litigants; (4) the 
sheer size of ExxonMobil's claim in terms of the absolute number of dollars at stake (and the 
attendant perception that awarding compensation above the principal amount might be 'too 
much'); (5) a desire to balance ExxonMobil's right to recover any wrongfully taken principal 
amounts with the possibility of undue hardship to SABIC and/or (6) a concern that ExxonMobil's 
decision to invoke the Islamic law tort of ghasb may have been motivated by a desire to sidestep 
the unavailability of interest or lost profits in Saudi Arabia and, thus, should not be rewarded."  
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 2003 WL 22016843 at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2003). 
 
68
is thoroughly textured, well-reasoned, and, in our view, dispositive of SABIC's 
claim of error. 
 
The trial judge's first reason for not instructing the jury on the six "Wolfson 
factors" was that they did not represent established Saudi law: 
It is important to place the six factors articulated by Mr. Wolfson in 
the proper context.  It is clear from the context in which Mr. Wolfson 
offered this testimony that he was not stating that these factors were 
Saudi law, that the factors were exclusive, or that consideration of 
these factors was required.  To the contrary, these factors, according 
to Mr. Wolfson[,] are non-exclusive considerations that "might 
possibly enter into a Saudi judge's perception of the equities" in this 
case.  Mr. Wolfson clearly opined that "[a] Saudi Arabian judge 
enjoys considerable discretion to rule in a manner leading to what he 
perceives as a fair and just result." ….  The Court did not find during 
the Saudi law hearing, nor does it find now, that Mr. Wolfson's list of 
factors reflects established Saudi law…based upon the authoritative 
texts….  The Court noted during the Saudi law hearing that Professor 
Hallaq and Dr. Vogel did not identify any such list of factors and there 
was no evidence to suggest that such a list of factors had ever been 
embraced by the Hanbali school.  Nowhere in Dr. Vogel's pretrial 
affidavits or in his post-trial affidavits does he provide the Court with 
authority in the Hanbali texts or otherwise to support a jury instruction 
on these…factors….  [A]nd while the Court certainly considered Mr. 
Wolfson's list of factors in the context [in which] they were 
presented…the Court believed then, as it does now, that it would be 
error to instruct the jury on these factors.  The Court did not want to 
supply to the jury an incomplete list of factors or suggest factors that, 
under Saudi law, are not "factors" embraced by the Hanbali school.93 
 
 
The trial judge's second reason was that to instruct on those factors would 
confuse and mislead the jury: 
                                                 
93 Id. at *2  (italics in original, internal footnotes omitted). 
 
69
Moreover, the Court did not believe that the jury would be able to 
meaningfully engage in an analysis of each of the factors without 
creating tremendous confusion and uncertainty.  This situation is a 
good example of the difficulty in applying Saudi law in a jury trial.  A 
Saudi judge exercises tremendous discretion and is not bound by 
precedent.  A Saudi judge is free to consider whatever evidence he 
feels is worth considering and disposing of any evidence he does not 
consider worthwhile.  In other words, under the Saudi legal system, 
Delaware Rule of Evidence 403 has no place.  Here, the Court 
exercised its discretion in determining not only what the Saudi law is, 
but how it should be explained to the jury.  Obviously, many of the 
concepts of Saudi Arabian law are not easily understandable to a U.S. 
judge, much less a lay person in the United States.  The Court in this 
case attempted to set forth the elements of the tort and convey to the 
jury in a clear, understandable manner the circumstances under which 
ghasb damages would be awardable.  The Court could not present to 
the jury every conceivable circumstance under which ghasb damages 
could be awarded, nor could it tell the jury...that it is "rare" for juries 
to award damages for ghasb….  The factors Mr. Wolfson suggested 
are factors that a judge could analyze.  The factors invite 
considerations that an American jury would not be permitted to 
consider, such as "a desire to find the middle ground between 
competing litigants," in other words, a compromise verdict or a 
consideration of the consequences of the jury verdict.  Factor 5 may 
have prompted the jury to balance ExxonMobil's right to recover any 
wrongfully taken principal amounts against the possibility of undue 
hardship to SABIC.  Such an instruction would invite inappropriate 
considerations by the jury having no place in deliberations and 
encourage the jury to engage in endless speculation about the 
"possible" undue hardship that SABIC might experience if ordered to 
pay damages.  In addition, the Court was concerned that Factor 2 
impermissibly injected into the case the issue of statute of limitations 
which the Court had ruled pretrial was contrary to Saudi law.  To 
suggest 
to 
the 
jury 
that 
ExxonMobil's 
delay 
could 
be 
considered…when deciding whether or not to award damages for 
usurpation flies in the face of the Saudi substantive law which 
provides that property rights are eternal and cannot be extinguished by 
the passage of time.94 
                                                 
94 Id. (italics in original, internal footnotes omitted). 
 
70
 
 
On appeal, SABIC argues that even if the trial court correctly refused to 
grant judgment to SABIC as a matter of law, the court should nonetheless have 
granted SABIC a new trial, because the jury was given no guidance on how to 
properly exercise its otherwise unfettered discretion.  Given the difficult 
circumstances that confronted the trial judge, we cannot conclude that her jury 
instructions relating to ghasb, however succinct, subjected SABIC to any injustice 
that warrants reversal.   
The jury was not given unbridled authority to do whatever it wished.  The 
trial judge plainly instructed the jurors that they could not find for ExxonMobil 
unless “SABIC wrongfully exercised ownership or possessory rights over [their] 
property…without consent, which means with blatant or reckless disregard for 
those property rights.”  That is, the jury was told that SABIC’s state of mind and 
conduct must have been far more culpable than an inadvertent breach of contract.95  
The jury was also instructed that they could, but need not, award additional 
damages beyond damages for breach of contract if they concluded that SABIC had 
committed ghasb.  And, if, in that event, the jury made a discretionary decision to 
award additional damages, the trial judge cabined that discretion by limiting any 
additional award to “any profits you may determine SABIC derived by using in its 
                                                 
95 The jury was told that, at a bare minimum, it must find that SABIC acted with “reckless 
disregard” for ExxonMobil’s rights. 
 
71
operations the money, if any, that was usurped…”  These instructions flowed from 
the trial judge’s legal determination, based upon Saudi law principles well 
grounded in the expert testimony that she accepted, that if the jury found that 
SABIC committed ghasb as she defined it, an award of damages so limited would 
do justice.   
If the trial judge, based upon the identical record, had reached the same 
result in a bench trial as the jury did in this trial, SABIC would have had no ground 
to attack that result as contrary to law or equity.  By parity of reasoning, the verdict 
reached by the jury here—a product of the combined effort of the jurors and of the 
trial judge who circumscribed the jury’s discretion in accordance with her 
application of ijtihad—affords SABIC no independent basis for reversal.96  To the 
extent SABIC suggests that the result would have been different had the case been 
litigated in Saudi Arabia, that argument, even if true, has no greater merit than 
would the argument that a jury verdict should be set aside because another jury 
would have decided the case differently, or that an equitable decree should be set 
                                                 
96 Even if the trial judge’s instructions were regarded as giving the jury an implicitly binary 
choice regarding damages—i.e., to award damages as she formulated them or to award no 
additional damages beyond damages for breach of contract—that binary choice worked no 
fundamental unfairness upon SABIC.  For a jury to find that a party that recklessly disregarded 
the property rights of another should be required to disgorge all profits it wrongly obtained, is 
hardly alien to our tradition.  Nor would be an order requiring full disgorgement by a party 
committing tortious conduct inconsistent with Saudi law.  In large measure, SABIC’s argument 
reduces to a contention that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury that it could, based on 
some generalized sense of equity, award partial, rather than full, disgorgement, once it found that 
additional damages for ghasb were warranted. 
 
72
aside because another chancellor might have crafted a different remedy.  
Arguments of that kind have never, for good and obvious reason, found favor 
under our law, and they find no favor here.   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court awarding 
damages to ExxonMobil, and against SABIC, is affirmed.  The mandate shall issue 
forthwith.