Case Title: Owens v. State

Citation: 426 N.E.2d 372

Docket Number: 181S15

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
426 N.E.2d 372 (1981)
Curtis OWENS, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 181S15.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
October 5, 1981.
Yvonne F. Watkins, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.
Curtis Owens pled guilty to one count of murder, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), two counts of armed robbery, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), and one count of attempted robbery, Id., and Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.). The trial court accepted his plea and sentenced *373 him to concurrent terms of forty years, ten years, ten years, and thirty years, respectively. In his direct appeal, he challenges the validity of his guilty plea through interrelated and overlapping allegations of error:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it refused to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea by reason of defendant's denial of particular factual allegations recited by the state; and
2. Whether the trial court erred when it refused to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after he espoused his innocence of the murder and robbery charges.
The allegations to which defendant pled guilty charged him with the robberies of Charles Woods and Oscar Vaughn, as well as the attempted robbery and murder of Luther Woods on September 28, 1979, in Marion County, Indiana.
Due to the inter-related nature of defendant's contentions, we consolidate them for purposes of discussion.
The record of the hearing wherein defendant entered his guilty plea reveals a full advisement of defendant's constitutional and statutory rights prior to the entry and acceptance of the plea. In addition, the record reveals that near the outset of the proceeding, the court read aloud the factual allegations contained in each count of the charging information. Thereafter, the court inquired as to the factual basis for the plea. The state responded with a monologic factual recitation of the events of September 28, 1979, which had prompted the charges against defendant. After deputy prosecuting attorney Ressler had closed, defense counsel Watkins immediately objected, and the following colloquy occurred:
We agree with defense counsel Watkins that few matters are a waste of time when a defendant is entering a guilty plea. Generally attended by an extended deprivation of liberty, the entry of a plea of guilt is a "grave and solemn act" to be accepted by the trial court "only with care and discernment." Brady v. United States, (1970) 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1468, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756; see, also, Boykin v. Alabama, (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274; Stowers v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 403, 363 N.E.2d 978.
We disagree, however, with Watkins's suggestion that the simple reading of the "capias information sheet" would generally not cause "any problems" with the trial court's records. The statements contained in the charging instrument are merely allegations. The statutory requirement of Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-4 (Burns 1979 Repl.) that the trial court satisfy itself that a factual basis for the plea exists is designed *374 to insure there is evidence to support defendant's professed guilt. Statements of fact and evidence, rather than allegations of fact, satisfy the requirements. Boles v. State (1973) 261 Ind. 354, 303 N.E.2d 645; Anderson v. State, (1979) Ind. App., 396 N.E.2d 960.
Here, the trial court properly was not satisfied with the simple recitation of the allegations contained in the information; the court properly requested Detective R.C. Green of the Indianapolis Police Department testify as to his knowledge of the facts surrounding the offenses charged. His testimony revealed that on September 28, 1979, defendant took United States currency from both Charles Woods and Oscar Vaughn at gunpoint. His testimony also revealed defendant shot Luther Woods when Woods refused to give him money, and that Woods died as a result of his wounds.
Following Green's testimony, the court engaged defendant and his counsel in the following colloquy:
The trial court then took defendant's plea under advisement and scheduled a second hearing. The court indicated that, contingent upon its acceptance of the plea, sentencing would occur at the hearing, which was scheduled for a date approximately three weeks hence.
It was midway through that second hearing when the trial court formally accepted defendant's plea. Prior to the court's acceptance of the plea, defendant orally requested the court permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. In support of defendant's request, defense counsel alluded to the confusion over the prosecutor's recitation of the facts at the previous hearing and indicated her client now professed his innocence. The relevant portions of the transcript read:
The trial court then refused to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, accepted the plea, and sentenced him for the various offenses.
The withdrawal of a properly entered guilty plea is governed by Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-6(b) (Burns 1979 Repl.). Subsection "(b)" reads:
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was neither tendered "in writing" nor "verified." Technically, defendant has waived his assertions regarding the trial court's refusal to permit his withdrawal of the plea. Id. The plea had been formally "entered" by defendant three weeks earlier, at the close of the hearing; only the "acceptance" had been delayed so that the court might satisfy itself that a factual basis existed for the plea.
Due to the grave and constitutional implications which surround the entry and acceptance of a guilty plea, however, we turn to the merits of defendant's assertions. Brady v. United States, supra; Hathaway v. State, (1968) 251 Ind. 374, 241 N.E.2d 240. The question whether a defendant should be permitted to withdraw a guilty plea, once it has been formally entered, is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-6(b), supra; Thacker v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 665, 262 N.E.2d 189; Hathaway v. State, supra.
Here, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Defendant's statements at the second hearing in support of his motion were very general in nature. Counsel for defendant alluded generally to the prior "confusion" over the prosecutor's recitation of facts, but the record of the previous hearing reveals that defendant accepted as true the facts alleged in the charging instrument. Nor did the defendant dispute the testimony of Police Officer Green prior to the entry of his plea. Defendant's protestation of innocence at the second hearing was also general in nature and in no way sustained his burden to show by specific facts that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea. Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-6(b), supra; Hathaway v. State, supra; Anthony v. State, (1976) 169 Ind. App. 314, 348 N.E.2d 60; King v. State, (1974) 161 Ind. App. 196, 314 N.E.2d 805.
Defendant concedes he was properly advised of his rights prior to the entry of his plea. Officer Green's testimony established a factual basis for the plea. In the face of these facts, it cannot be said the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to *376 permit him to withdraw the plea on the basis of his general statements. Id.
For the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER, PRENTICE and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.