Case Title: Ayers v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 14, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANDREW AYERS, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 14, 2002 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
 
)  Cr. ID. No. 9911005831 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
Submitted:  April 17, 2002 
Decided:  July 18, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER and STEELE, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Edward C. Gill, Georgetown, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Kim Ayvazian, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Justice: 
 
2
 
In this appeal, Appellant Andrew Ayers alleges that the Superior Court erred 
when it found that he had received effective assistance of counsel at his trial on 
charges of delivering cocaine.  We conclude that the Superior Court judge acted 
within his discretion when he determined that Ayers offered insufficient evidence 
to support his claim that his trial counsel’s representation descended to the level of 
ineffective assistance.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 
On April 3, 2000 a Superior Court jury convicted Ayers on a single charge 
of Delivery of a Narcotic Schedule II Controlled Substance (crack cocaine).  The 
trial judge sentenced Ayers to 30 years at Level V supervision, suspended after 15 
years for diminishing levels of supervision.  On direct appeal of that conviction to 
this Court we affirmed the judgment of the trial court.1  In August 2001, Ayers 
filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel 
at trial.  The Superior Court denied that motion.  Ayers now appeals. 
On the afternoon of November 5, 1999, Monroe Hudson of the Delaware 
State Police observed Andrew Ayers get into a black pick-up truck on Pinetown 
Road near Lewes, Delaware.  After driving a short distance on Pinetown road, the 
truck turned behind a row of bushes that blocked Hudson’s view.  When the truck 
emerged from behind the bushes, Ayers was no longer in the truck.  Shortly 
thereafter, the police identified the driver of the truck as Troy Abbott.  Suspecting 
                                                 
1 Ayers v. State, 781 A.2d 692, 2001 WL 292610 (Del. March 16, 2001) (Veasey, C.J., order). 
 
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that Ayers and Abbott had conducted a drug transaction, the police sent a trooper 
to Abbot's residence to question him.  During the ensuing interview, Abbott 
admitted that he had purchased a quantity of crack cocaine from Ayers for forty 
dollars, and Abbott surrendered the cocaine to the trooper.  Based on Abbott's 
statements, the police arrested Ayers and charged him with one count of delivery 
of cocaine.   
At Ayers’ trial, Abbott appeared as a witness for the State and repeated his 
description of the drug transaction with Ayers.  Abbott also testified about his 
addiction to crack cocaine, his appearance in drug court stemming from his arrest 
for possession of cocaine in this case, and the resulting treatment process he was 
undergoing at the time of trial.  At trial, the State also introduced the testimony of 
Hudson and Rodney Layfield, also of the Delaware State Police.  Hudson testified 
that he observed Ayers get into Abbott’s pick-up truck and turn down the side road 
where a hedgerow obscured his view from Pinetown Road.  A video taken from a 
camera in his patrol car confirmed Hudson’s observations.  He noted that this was 
a usual spot for drug transactions because of the hedgerow screen and that the 
activity he witnessed was consistent with a drug deal, based on his experience as a 
police officer.  Layfield primarily testified about earlier dealings involving 
purchases of cocaine from Troy Abbott.  In addition, he stated that, in his 
considerable experience with drug related arrests, he did not recall anyone 
 
4
convicted of a misdemeanor like the one with which Abbott was charged ever 
being jailed as a result. 
Before examining the merits of any Motion for Postconviction Relief, our 
courts must first apply the rules governing the procedural requirements for relief 
set forth in Rule 61.2  Except in exceedingly limited circumstances, the failure to 
meet those requirements bars any further consideration of the petitioner’s claims.  
The trial judge found that each of the grounds Ayers cited as a basis for relief, 
except for his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, were procedurally 
barred.  Specifically, he determined that each of those claims was known and 
available to Ayers before he instituted his direct appeal.  A defendant who fails to 
raise an issue on direct appeal is generally barred from raising it in a 
postconviction motion.3  The only exception is the narrow one provided for by 
Rule 61(i)(5), which allows the court to consider the merit of a motion that would 
be otherwise barred when it presents a colorable claim that the fundamental 
fairness of the proceedings has been undermined.  This was not the case here.  
Therefore the Superior Court judge correctly examined the merits of Ayers’ 
petition only to the extent that they supported his non-barred claim. 
A petitioner’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel is 
measured under the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
                                                 
2 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1980). 
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 
 
5
Strickland v. Washington.4  Under this exacting test, a claimant must demonstrate 
not only that his counsel’s errors were so grievous that they fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, but also the existence of a reasonable degree of 
probability that, except for his counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different.5  Actions of defense counsel are entitled to a strong 
presumption that they were professionally reasonable.6  In addition, the petitioner’s 
claims must include specific allegations of prejudice as well as the facts necessary 
to substantiate them.7 
Although the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was the only claim that 
was not procedurally barred, the Superior Court judge recognized that six of the 
other grounds cited, though otherwise procedurally barred, reflected Ayers’ claim 
of ineffective assistance.  The judge thus examined the merits of these claims 
under the Strickland standard.  Ayers contends that each of these grounds for relief 
carries the implication that trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of 
certain evidence and argument was both unreasonable and prejudicial.  More 
specifically, Ayers’ claims that he suffered prejudice when counsel failed to object 
when:  1) the prosecutor improperly interjected his personal opinion on Ayers’ 
guilt into his opening statement and closing argument; 2) the State failed, before 
                                                 
4 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.2d 674 (1984).  
5 Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. 
6 Id. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. 
7 Younger, 580 A.2d at 555. 
 
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trial, to identify Hudson and Layfield as expert witnesses, even though they 
referred to their expertise in testifying about the events surrounding Ayers’ alleged 
drug deal; 3) Hudson testified outside of his personal knowledge when stating that 
a drug transaction occurred in an area obscured from his observation post; 4) the 
State offered extrinsic evidence of a witness’ character to bolster his credibility on 
direct examination; 5) Layfield testified that people don’t go to jail for 
misdemeanors; and 6) Layfield testified that Ayers was “on Operation Safe 
Streets.” 
In his postconviction motion, Ayers alluded to two types of improper 
comment made by the State.  First, he contends that the prosecutor’s reference to 
Ayers as a “drug dealer” in his opening statement was objectionable because it 
unfairly and prejudicially characterized the defendant.  When the State’s use of the 
term “drug dealer” is examined in context, however, we find that Ayers’ claim is 
without merit.  The prosecutor’s complete statement was, “The State is alleging 
that Andrew Ayers, Slim as he is ironically known, is a drug dealer.”  We fail to 
see how this remark impermissibly characterized the defendant, when the State’s 
very obligation was to prove exactly what it alleged – that the defendant indeed 
delivered drugs.  In the context of this trial, we find no meaningful distinction 
between the State alleging that a defendant delivered drugs and that he was a drug 
 
7
dealer.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that trial counsel’s failure to raise this 
essentially trivial objection was unreasonable under the circumstances. 
The second set of challenged comments reflects not on Ayers’ character, but 
on the prosecutor’s individual belief in Ayers’ guilt.  Ayers contends that the 
prosecutor’s remarks in his opening statement and closing argument were 
improper.  In his opening statement, the prosecutor stated, “I believe at the end of 
the State’s case you will see that there is clear and consistent evidence that a drug 
transaction took place and that Andrew Ayers…sold $40 worth of crack cocaine.”  
While we discourage the use of the personal pronoun “I,” this is not an improper 
expression of personal belief in guilt, but rather an expression of confidence in the 
conclusions that the jury will draw from the evidence.  The latter is not 
impermissible under our law.  In summation, however, the prosecutor concluded, 
“I’m certainly arguing for the position I believe, the State believes…”  We have 
consistently and repeatedly held that a prosecutor is not to express his or her 
personal belief in the truth or falsity of any evidence, testimony, or the guilt of the 
defendant.8  We agree with Ayers that this closing statement clearly violates the 
well-defined standards of prosecutorial conduct.  Nevertheless, the failure to object 
to a clear violation of courtroom conduct does not necessarily mean that counsel’s 
inaction resulted in ineffective assistance.  Almost as often as we have admonished 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del. 1981). 
 
8
the State for improper comments like those described in this instance, we have 
similarly admonished the defense bar for failing to object to prosecutorial 
misconduct.9  This case offers no exception and, consequently, counsel’s failure to 
object under these circumstances may well fall below an objective standard of 
reasonable conduct.   
We note, however, that it is not per se unreasonable for defense counsel to 
withhold an objection, even in the face of serious prosecutorial misconduct.  
Because of the ultimate goal of representation is not to win an objection, but to 
prevail when the verdict is read, courts operate on the presumption that a 
challenged action was the result of a tactical decision that could be considered 
sound trial strategy.10  It is not beyond comprehension to envision an instance 
where a surely winnable objection may still hurt the defense in the eyes of the jury.  
Yet, we need not decide concretely whether in this instance the conduct was 
unreasonable, because as discussed supra, this is but one prong of the Strickland 
test.  Even if we were to presume that defense counsel’s failure to object under 
these circumstances was unreasonable, Ayers has failed to meet the second prong 
by offering no evidence by which we could conclude that a proper objection would 
have likely produced a different outcome. 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 963, 969-70 (Del. 2000) (“Despite separate admonitions by 
this Court, some members of the defense bar still fail to assert timely objections to such 
prosecutorial conduct.”) 
10 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. 
 
9
On this record we are unable to reach the conclusion that there exists a 
reasonable probability that a timely objection to these two comments would have 
altered the outcome of Ayers’ trial.  Although clearly improper, the prosecutor 
commented only on Ayers’ general guilt and did not lend undue credibility to any 
particular piece of evidence or witness’ testimony.  In fact, Ayers has failed to 
point to any evidence that the jury was likely to have considered in a different light 
as a result of the State’s error.  Moreover, as the Superior Court noted, the totality 
of the unchallenged evidence, including the videotape of Abbott and Ayers, 
Abbott’s testimony, and the testimony of several officers, suggests that the 
prosecutor’s objectionable statement in closing was not pivotal in the jury’s 
determination of guilt.  Because Ayers cannot demonstrate sufficient prejudice to 
overcome the second prong of the Strickland test, the Superior Court correctly 
found that this did not contribute to the ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Ayers next argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 
to object to what he characterizes as the “expert testimony” of Hudson and 
Layfield, who had not been identified as expert witnesses before trial.  The 
allegedly “expert” testimony was, in fact, that of percipient witnesses testifying 
about their own observations and actions.  The fact that the two officers testified 
that they used their expertise in recognizing drug transactions simply served to 
place their actions in a relevant context.  This is not expert testimony under our 
 
10
rules of evidence.11  Because of the substantial likelihood that any objection would 
have been overruled, counsel’s failure to object was not unreasonable.  Moreover, 
Ayers has again failed to demonstrate that if sustained there would likely have 
been a different outcome. 
We now turn to Ayers’ claim that his trial counsel’s failure to object to 
Abbott’s testimony as impermissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence 608 
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.  We agree with the Superior Court 
that Ayers presents no evidence that this failure to act was unreasonable under the 
circumstances.  Indeed, on this record, we find it unlikely that a Rule 608 objection 
was even proper in this instance.  Rule 608 governs the use of extrinsic evidence to 
bolster the credibility of a witness.  The evidence adduced from Abbott on direct 
examination concerning his drug addiction and later recovery was not extrinsic.  
Rather, it had a direct connection to Abbott’s presence at the scene of the alleged 
crime.  Specifically, the State introduced this evidence to develop a context for 
Abbott’s decision to purchase drugs from Ayers and to show the consequences of 
that decision.  In light of this, we can hardly find that trial counsel’s action was 
unreasonable.  An objection based on lack of relevance may have been appropriate, 
but Ayers failed to forward this argument in his Motion for Postconviction Relief 
                                                 
11 See McLain v. General Motors Corp., 569 A.2d 579, 584 (Del. 1990) (“When a witness 
testifies based on their own experiences, knowledge and observation about the facts of the case, 
they are not giving ‘expert testimony,’ as that term is defined by the rules of evidence.” 
(Emphasis in orignial)). 
 
11
or in this appeal.  Once again, even if that argument had properly come before the 
court, Ayers offers no evidence that the objection would have been sustained or 
that, if it had been, the absence of the testimony in question from the available pool 
of evidence would have altered the jury’s verdict in any manner.   
Ayers argues that Layfield’s testimony about the remoteness of the 
possibility that Abbott might suffer incarceration as a result of his misdemeanor 
charge was similarly impermissible character evidence.  Presumably he is arguing 
that this characterization will somehow enhance his credibility with the jury.  A 
more likely and effective objection would have been that Layfield’s testimony was 
beyond the scope of his personal knowledge or expertise.  In either case, the 
benefit of such an objection appears to this Court to likely have been minimal.  
Thus, we presume that this was simply a valid tactical judgment by defense 
counsel that does not exceed the bounds of reasonable trial practice and again note 
the lack of evidence that the outcome of the trial would likely have been different 
had counsel registered an objection. 
Ayers contends that trial counsel’s failure to move for a mistrial after 
Layfield offered unsolicited testimony that Ayers was on Operation Safe Streets.12  
Ayers’ trial counsel did move to strike the non-responsive comment immediately 
and the trial judge granted the motion, ordering the jury to disregard the testimony.  
                                                 
12 Operation Safe Streets is a joint police and probation program designed to apprehend offenders 
who fail to comply with the terms of their probation. 
 
12
There were no further allusions to Operation Safe Streets during the testimony.  
Layfield’s testimony did not include any explanation of the nature of Operation 
Safe Streets or reasons why Ayers might have been involved with it.  We have held 
that curative instructions are usually sufficient to remedy any prejudice that might 
result from the inadvertent introduction of inadmissible evidence.13  A mistrial is 
only mandated where there are “no meaningful and practical alternatives” available 
as a remedy.14  In this instance, trial counsel sought an alternative remedy.  Any 
further objection, as the Superior Court judge noted in his Rule 61 decision, would 
have likely drawn unwarranted attention to what was, essentially, a comment that 
was meaningless to the jury.  Again, we will defer to the presumption that this was 
a valid tactical decision and well within the bounds of reasonable conduct for an 
attorney. 
Ayers’ final two arguments are directed not toward the conduct of trial 
counsel, but toward the inadequacy of his counsel on appeal.  Specifically, Ayers 
claims that his appellate counsel should have challenged the trial judge’s decision 
to admit testimony that “everyone knew” that drug deals occurred behind the 
hedgerow where the State claimed Ayers delivered drugs to Abbott as well as the 
judge’s decision to overrule an objection at sentencing to the State’s use of an 
earlier delivery conviction that had been inadvertently not turned over in 
                                                 
13 Zimmerman v. State, 628 A.2d  62, 66 (Del. 1993). 
14 Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d  57 (Del. 1994). 
 
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discovery.  Because Ayers failed to raise any claim of inefficiency of appellate 
counsel in his Motion for Postconviction Relief, that argument may not be raised 
before this Court.15 
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
                                                 
15 Supr. Ct. R. 8; Casalvera v. State, 410 A.2d 1369 (Del. 1980).