Case Title: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency v. Hatfield

Citation: 200 N.W.2d 572

Docket Number: 43738

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1972-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
200 N.W.2d 572 (1972) MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, Respondent, v. Rolland HATFIELD, Auditor of the State of Minnesota, Appellant. No. 43738. Supreme Court of Minnesota. August 11, 1972. *573 Trench, Ericson, MacGregor, Lohmann & O'Brien, Minneapolis, for appellant. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Curtis D. Forslund, Sol. Gen., Geoffrey P. Jarpe, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent. Heard and considered en banc. KNUTSON, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment upholding the constitutional validity of Ex. Sess.L.1971, c. 20. There is no material issue of fact involved. During the 1971 special legislative session, c. 20 was enacted pursuant to a legislative determination that "state financial assistance for the construction of water pollution prevention and abatement facilities for municipal disposal systems is a public purpose and a proper function of state government, in that the state is trustee of the waters of the state and such financial assistance is necessary to protect the purity of state waters, and to protect the public health of the citizens of the state, which is endangered whenever pollution enters state waters at one point and flows to other points in the state." Ex. Sess.L.1971, c. 20, § 1, subd. 1. The legislature authorized a water pollution control fund to which $9,750,000 was appropriated from the general fund and bonds not to exceed $25 million were to be issued by the state auditor upon request of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, which was to administer the fund, making grants and loans to municipalities for the purpose set out in the legislative act. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency requested the state auditor to issue $1 million of the bonds authorized by c. 20. He refused to do so, stating that he was in doubt as to the constitutionality of the act on the ground that the state might be investing in works of internal improvement, which is proscribed by Minn.Const. art. 9, § 5, and on the additional grounds that the legislature had improperly delegated legislative authority to the Pollution Control Agency. The evidence presented to the trial court consisted of six affidavits from experts in the areas of water, water pollution, and water-related activities, together with an affidavit of the state auditor and his attorney specially appointed for that purpose, questioning the constitutionality of the act. The six affidavits submitted in support of the constitutionality of the act stated that water pollution was a serious problem in Minnesota; that untreated sewage was a health hazard when discharged into surface waters or directly into the ground; that central sewage collection and treatment systems help alleviate the problem; that good sewage facilities were conducive to attracting industry and tourists and in the preservation of fish and other wildlife. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the act and this appeal followed. The questions are: (1) Do the provisions *574 of Ex.Sess.L.1971, c. 20, violate Minn. Const. art. 9, § 5, prohibiting the investment by the state of public money in internal improvements? (2) Do the provisions of the act disbursing funds from general obligation bonds sufficiently state the purpose for which the money is to be spent, as required by Minn.Const. art. 9, § 6, subds. 2 and 4? (3) Do provisions of the act provide for an unlawful delegation of legislative authority in contravention of Minn.Const. art. 3? 1. At the outset, we note that the declaration of a public purpose by the legislature in the act involved is not conclusive. In Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 184, 89 N.W.2d 635, 643 (1958), we said in that regard: Minn.Const. art. 9, § 5, provides in pertinent part: In interpreting this constitutional provision, we said, in Rippe v. Becker, 56 Minn. 100, 117, 57 N.W. 331, 335 (1894), involving the appropriation of funds by the legislature for the building of a grain elevator in Duluth: This definition of internal improvements has been cited approvingly by this court and followed in other courts. In Visina v. Freeman, supra, which involved the expenditure of money for construction of port facilities by the port authority in Duluth, we said (252 Minn. 193, 89 N.W.2d 648): *575 In State ex rel. La Follette v. Reuter, 33 Wis.2d 384, 403, 147 N.W.2d 304, 315 (1967), which cites and follows our cases of Rippe and Visina, the Wisconsin court, in a case almost identical on this issue to the one now before us, said: Similarly, in Oakland Drain Commr. v. Royal Oak, 306 Mich. 124, 10 N.W.2d 435 (1943), the Michigan court held that the establishment and operation of a sewage disposal system is not a work of internal improvement prohibited by the Michigan constitution. We have long recognized that proper disposal of sewage involves the preservation of the public health. City of Ada v. Melberg, 135 Minn. 130, 160 N.W. 257 (1916). Preservation of the public health and the suppression of disease involve a governmental function. Indeed, it is probably one of the most important functions of government. In this case it is undisputed that the discharge of untreated or insufficiently treated sewage into our lakes and streams constitutes a menace to the public health and endangers the public waters not only for human consumption but for recreational purposes and the propagation of fish. In Lipinski v. Gould, 173 Minn. 559, 218 N.W. 123, 730 (1928), we held that activities of our state game and fish commissioner in conducting state fishing operations was not a violation of Minn.Const. art. 9, § 5. We there said (173 Minn. 561, 218 N.W. 124): Similarly, in Schulte v. Fitch, 162 Minn. 184, 202 N.W. 719 (1925), we held that assistance by the state to counties in the control of tuberculous cattle was not violative of the constitutional proscription against engaging in works of internal improvement. We there said (162 Minn. 188, 202 N.W. 721): Pollution of our air and waters has now become one of the chief concerns of our citizenry. It must be generally conceded that alleviation of pollution in our waters in order that they may be made safe for human consumption and safe for recreational purpose and the propagation of fish involves the preservation of the public health as well as the public welfare and as such it constitutes a governmental function for which the expenditure of public money does not contravene Minn.Const. art. 9, § 5, prohibiting the expenditure of such funds for internal improvements. 2. Appellant next contends that c. 20 contravenes Minn.Const. art. 9, § 6, subds. 2 and 4, in that it does not "distinctly specify the purpose or purposes" for which bonds are to be issued. The pertinent provision of art. 9, § 6, reads as follows: While we have not been asked to construe the word "distinctly" as used in this constitutional provision, we think its meaning is clear and that the purpose for which the bonds are to be issued under c. 20 is stated in the following language (§ 2, subd. 1): While the facts are not similar, we have held that the words "acquisition and betterment" sufficiently describe the purpose of a school bond. Buhl v. Joint Independent Consolidated School Dist. No. 11, 249 Minn. 480, 82 N.W.2d 836 (1957); see, also, Green v. Independent Consolidated School Dist. No. 1, 252 Minn. 36, 89 N.W.2d 12 (1958). We think the statute here sufficiently describes the purpose for which the funds are to be used so that it is not in violation of the constitution. 3. Finally, appellant claims that c. 20 unlawfully delegates legislative authority to the Pollution Control Agency in contravention of Minn.Const. art. 3, which reads: This objection has been adequately answered in former decisions of this court. In Visina v. Freeman, supra, we said (252 Minn. 199, 89 N.W.2d 653): See, also, Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 126 N.W.2d 778 (1964); Welsand v. Railroad & Warehouse Comm., 251 Minn. 504, 88 N.W.2d 834 (1958). The statute we are concerned with in this case is quite involved. It sets out the manner in which the grants and loans are to be made, but the actual appropriation is made by the legislature. We think the act comes well within the statements of this court in differentiating between the enactment of a law and the administration of it. Appellant also raises some question as to whether or not a regulation, WPC 34, was properly promulgated by the agency. This has no bearing on the constitutionality of the act, and it would serve no good purpose to discuss the validity of this regulation. We find no constitutional barrier to the act involved and the trial court is, accordingly, affirmed.