Case Title: State ex rel. Nickoli v. Erie MetroParks

Citation: 2010-Ohio-606

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Nickoli v. Erie MetroParks, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-606.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-606 
THE STATE EX REL. NICKOLI ET AL. v. ERIE METROPARKS ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Nickoli v. Erie MetroParks,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-606.] 
Mandamus — Appropriation proceedings — Res judicata — Claim of interference 
with property rights was barred by statute of limitations — Claimed 
interference was a one-time event, not a continuing violation. 
(No. 2009-0026 — Submitted December 1, 2009 — Decided February 25, 2010.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
____________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of mandamus to compel a park 
district and its board of commissioners to commence appropriation proceedings 
for property allegedly seized and occupied by the district.  We deny the writ 
because (1) res judicata neither entitles relators to the requested extraordinary 
relief nor prevents the park district and its board of commissioners from raising 
defenses that they did not raise in a previous mandamus action involving different 
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relators, and (2) the statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09(E) bars relators’ takings 
claim. 
I.  Facts 
{¶ 2} The historical background of the property involved and the 
previous litigation regarding the property are essential to understanding the 
posture of this case. 
A.  History 
1.  The Canal Company and the Railroad Lease 
{¶ 3} In 1827, the General Assembly chartered the Milan Canal 
Company to construct and operate a canal from Milan, Ohio, to the Huron River.  
The act incorporating the canal company gave it authority “to enter upon, and take 
possession of any lands, waters and streams necessary to make said canal” and 
provided that “a complete title to the premises, to the extent and for the purposes 
set forth in or contemplated by this act, shall be thereby vested and forever remain 
in said company, and their successors.”  Section 8, Act of January 24, 1827, 25th 
General Assembly. 
{¶ 4} Noncontiguous tracts of land from Ebeneser Merry and Kneeland 
Townsend were acquired by the canal company as part of the canal corridor.  In 
1881, the canal company entered into a 99-year lease with the Wheeling & Lake 
Erie Railway Company for a 150-foot-wide right-of-way to construct and operate 
a railroad.  The lease was renewed in 1980 for another 99 years. 
{¶ 5} The canal company was dissolved in 1904, and its property 
interests devolved to a testamentary trust and its trustee, Key Trust Company of 
Ohio.  The dissolution order specified that the canal company owned land “within 
the bounds of a strip of land one hundred and fifty feet in width, commencing at 
the southerly end of the canal basin of said Milan Canal Company * * * and 
running thence in a northerly direction to the mouth of the Huron River, * * * the 
east and west lines of said strip of land being one hundred and fifty feet apart and 
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running north parallel with each other and with the central line of said railroad, as 
surveyed, located and being constructed.” 
{¶ 6} Rail traffic on the leased property ceased in the 1980s, and portions 
of the rail line were paved.  In 1995, the railroad company’s successor 
quitclaimed its interests to respondent Board of Commissioners of Erie 
MetroParks, a park district created pursuant to R.C. 1545.01 et seq.  The board 
acquired the property to build a recreational trail. 
2.  Relators’ Acquisition of Canal Company Property 
{¶ 7} In February 2000, Key Trust conveyed a portion of the canal 
company property to relators Richard and Carol Rinella.  Key Trust conveyed the 
remaining property owned by the canal company to Edwin and Lisa Coles and 
Buffalo Prairie, Ltd., a limited liability company of which Edwin Coles serves as 
president.  Sections of the canal company property were then conveyed to others, 
including relators Gerald O.E. Nickoli and Robin L.B. Nickoli; trustee Patricia A. 
Sipp (f.k.a. Charville), as to an undivided half interest, and successor trustees 
Patricia A. Sipp,  Mark Charville, and David A. Charville, as to an undivided half 
interest (“Charville trusts”); Douglas Hildebrand; Dale A. Hohler and Ellen H. 
Hohler; Theresa R. Johnston; co-trustees John F. Landoll and Virginia A. Landoll; 
Michael P. Meyer and Cheryl Lyons; Donna J. Rasnick; Maria Sperling; Gary R. 
Steiner and Virginia M. Steiner; and Rita M. Beverick. 
3.  Huron River Greenway 
{¶ 8} By the end of 1998, respondent Erie MetroParks had started 
construction of a recreational trail known as the Huron River Greenway through 
the corridor, which is a 66-foot-wide path.  The trail was opened to the public in 
2003.  The former canal corridor runs through each relator’s property; the 
recreational trail is thus located within relators’ properties.  None of relators’ 
property, aside from a .9-acre piece of the Charville trusts’ property within the 
Townsend tract, are within the Merry or Townsend tracts. 
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B.  Litigation Involving Property 
{¶ 9} In 1999, the Erie MetroParks Board of Commissioners initiated a 
declaratory-judgment action in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas against 
Key Trust.  In 2000, the board filed an amended complaint for declaratory 
judgment that added those property owners, including most of the relators in this 
case, who may have received Key Trust’s interests in the former canal-company 
property.  The common pleas court entered a judgment finding that the property 
leased by the railroad consisted solely of the Merry and Townsend properties but 
that the lease was void because it had been breached by a predecessor in interest 
to the board of park commissioners. 
{¶ 10} On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
common pleas court insofar as it found that the railroad lease was limited to the 
land obtained by the canal company from Merry and Townsend.  Erie MetroParks 
Bd. of Commrs. v. Key Trust Co. of Ohio, N.A. (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 782, 
787-788, 764 N.E.2d 509.  The court of appeals held that the trial court had, 
however, erred by concluding that the board’s predecessor in interest had 
breached the railroad lease.  Id. at 790.  The court of appeals reversed that portion 
of the trial court’s judgment invalidating the lease and remanded the cause for 
further proceedings.  Id. at 791. 
{¶ 11} On remand, the common pleas court held that the lessee had not 
abandoned the leased property, that the lease is in full force and effect, that the 
board of park commissioners is the current lessee and the holder of the lessee’s 
rights under the lease, that the board is entitled to the sole occupancy and use of 
the leased property, that the rights of the defendants – including most of the 
relators here – are subject to the board’s rights under the lease, and that the lease 
permitted the board to improve and use the leased property as a parkway or 
recreational trail.  The trial court further concluded that the extent of the leased 
January Term, 2010 
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property was limited to the Merry and Townsend tracts conveyed to the canal 
company. 
{¶ 12} In an appeal from the common pleas court’s judgment on remand, 
the defendants, including most of the relators here, asserted that the portion of the 
judgment describing the leased property differed from a prior description, which 
had restricted the leased property to the Merry and Townsend parcels.  The court 
of appeals rejected this contention by holding that the judgment on remand did 
not contradict the finding in the previous judgment entries “that the leased 
property encompassed only land obtained from Townsend and Merry.”  Erie 
MetroParks Bd. of Commrs. v. Key Trust Co. of Ohio, Erie App. Nos. E-02-009 
and E-02-011, 2002-Ohio-4827, ¶ 22.  The court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment. 
1.  Federal Litigation 
{¶ 13} In 2003, the Coleses, Buffalo Prairie, and certain other landowners 
filed a civil-rights action in federal district court under Sections 1983, 1985(2), 
and 1985(3), Title 42, U.S.Code, against the board and its director-secretary for 
violations of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.  Coles v. Granville (Jan. 24, 2005), N.D. Ohio No. 
3:03 CV 7595, 2005 WL 139137.  They alleged that in developing the 
recreational trail, the board asserted entitlement to property beyond that found to 
be covered by the railroad lease in the Key Trust cases.  The federal district court 
dismissed the case and determined that, as a federal court, it was barred from 
reviewing the state court’s findings.  Id. at *4.  On appeal, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs’ cause of 
action for unconstitutional takings was not ripe for federal review when they had 
not brought a state action in mandamus to compel appropriation proceedings.  
Coles v. Granville (C.A.6, 2006), 448 F.3d 853, 865. 
2.  First Mandamus Case 
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{¶ 14} Shortly after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Coles, the Coleses, 
Buffalo Prairie, and certain other property owners who are successors to the 
canal-company property – but not including the relators in the present mandamus 
case – filed an action in this court for a writ of mandamus to compel the board of 
park commissioners and its director-secretary to either (1) commence an 
appropriation proceeding to compensate them for the board’s taking of their 
property or (2) relinquish the seized property and direct the park district not to file 
an eminent-domain action to appropriate their property. 
{¶ 15} In November 2007, we granted a writ of mandamus to compel the 
board to commence an appropriation proceeding to compensate the property 
owners for an involuntary taking of their property.  State ex rel. Coles v. 
Granville, 116 Ohio St.3d 231, 2007-Ohio-6057, 877 N.E.2d 968, ¶ 59.  We 
found that the property owners had “established that by employing their private 
property for public use as a recreational trail, the board of park commissioners has 
taken their property.” 
3.  Second Mandamus Case 
{¶ 16} In January 2009, relators filed this action for a writ of mandamus 
to compel respondents, Erie MetroParks and its board of commissioners, to 
“initiate, within sixty (60) days of the issuance of the Writ, appropriation 
proceedings” pursuant to R.C. Chapter 163.  After the park district and its board 
filed an answer and motion for judgment on the pleadings, we granted an 
alternative writ.  Respondents filed an amended answer raising a statute-of-
limitations defense. 
{¶ 17} The parties have now filed evidence and briefs.  We granted 
relators the Hohlers’ application to dismiss their claims. 
{¶ 18} The parties have also filed motions for leave to supplement their 
evidence.  For the parties’ initial motions, because they are unopposed and neither 
side claims prejudice from their consideration by the court, we grant the motions.  
January Term, 2010 
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We also grant relators’ July 30 motion for leave to supplement their evidence 
because we find that the proffered evidence is pertinent to their mandamus claim 
and relators could not have been submitted it at the time that their evidence was 
due. 
{¶ 19} This case is now before us for our consideration of the merits. 
II.  Legal Analysis 
A.  Res Judicata 
{¶ 20} We must first determine whether – as relators claim – Coles and 
the Key Trust litigation bar the park district and its board from raising these 
defenses and entitles relators to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus. 
{¶ 21} In Ohio, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata encompasses the two 
related concepts of claim preclusion, also known as res judicata or estoppel by 
judgment, and issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.”  O’Nesti v. 
DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, 862 N.E.2d 803, ¶ 
6.  “Claim preclusion prevents subsequent actions, by the same parties or their 
privies, based upon any claim arising out of a transaction that was the subject 
matter of a previous action,” whereas issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, 
“precludes the relitigation, in a second action, of an issue that had been actually 
and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action that was based on a 
different cause of action.”  Ft. Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. 
Relations Bd. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395, 692 N.E.2d 140; see Holzemer v. 
Urbanski (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 129, 133, 712 N.E.2d 713. 
{¶ 22} For res judicata to apply, “one of the requirements is that the 
parties to the subsequent action must be identical to or in privity with those in the 
former action.”  Kirkhart v. Keiper, 101 Ohio St.3d 377, 2004-Ohio-1496, 805 
N.E.2d 1089, ¶ 8.  None of the relators in the Coles case is a party here so the 
relators in the case now before us may rely on res judicata only if they are in 
privity with the Coles relators. 
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{¶ 23} Relators are not in privity with the relators in Coles.  They did not 
participate in Coles or have any control over that case.  Cf. State ex rel. Schachter 
v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 121 Ohio St.3d 526, 2009-Ohio-1704, 905 
N.E.2d 1210, ¶ 36.  Nor were Erie MetroParks and its board bound to apply the 
result in Coles to relators, who own different property from the property at issue 
in Coles.  Id. at ¶ 37. 
{¶ 24} Privity was not created simply because relators received their 
properties from the same transferors as the relators in Coles and owned property 
adjoining the property of the relators in Coles.  See, e.g., O’Nesti, 113 Ohio St.3d 
59, 2007-Ohio-1102, 862 N.E.2d 803, ¶ 12, in which we held that the 
“relationship between co-employees subject to the same employment-related 
contract, without more, does not establish privity.” 
{¶ 25} This result comports with our admonition that “the use of offensive 
claim preclusion is generally disfavored.”  O’Nesti, 113 Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-
Ohio-1102, 862 N.E.2d 803, ¶ 17.  “Offensive claim preclusion involves a 
situation in which a plaintiff seeks to bar a defendant from raising any new 
defenses, while defensive claim preclusion includes any scenario in which a 
defendant seeks to completely bar relitigation of a claim already determined in a 
prior lawsuit.”  Id. at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 26} Therefore, because relators are not in privity with the relators in 
Coles, our judgment in the prior mandamus case does not bar Erie MetroParks 
and its board of commissioners from raising new defenses or entitle relators to the 
writ based on res judicata. 
{¶ 27} Nor does the Key Trust litigation prevent the park district and its 
board from raising new defenses, e.g., the statute of limitations and lack of 
standing, that were not actually decided in the context of those declaratory-
judgment proceedings.  “Unlike other judgments, * * * ‘a declaratory judgment 
determines only what it actually decides and does not preclude other claims that 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
might have been advanced.’ ”  State ex rel. Mora v. Wilkinson, 105 Ohio St.3d 
272, 2005-Ohio-1509, 824 N.E.2d 1000, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Shemo v. 
Mayfield Hts. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 69, 765 N.E.2d 345. 
B.  Statute of Limitations 
{¶ 28} Erie MetroParks and its board of commissioners contend that the 
statute of limitations bars this mandamus action. In their amended answer, 
respondents raised the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense to relators’ 
mandamus claim. 
{¶ 29} Under R.C. 2305.09(E),1 an action for relief on the grounds of a 
physical or regulatory taking of real property must generally be brought within 
four years after the cause accrued.  Although this provision was enacted after 
most of the property was acquired by relators, “[a] period of limitations already 
running may also be shortened by the legislature” as long as “a period sufficiently 
long to allow a reasonable time to begin suit” is allowed.  See generally 1A 
Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d Ed.2006) 4-74, Section 4.102[3] 
(recognizing rule in takings cases); see also Cook v. Matvejs (1978), 56 Ohio 
St.2d 234, 237, 10 O.O.3d 384, 383 N.E.2d 601, and Gregory v. Flowers (1972), 
32 Ohio St.2d 48, 54, 61 O.O.2d 295, 290 N.E.2d 181, applying this rule in tort 
and workers’ compensation cases.  Respondents claim that relators failed to 
institute this mandamus action within the applicable four-year period when the 
taking had occurred at the latest by 2003, the year that the recreational trail was 
first opened to the public. 
{¶ 30} As previously noted, R.C. 2305.09(E) requires that an action “[f]or 
relief on the grounds of a physical or regulatory taking of real property” shall be 
                                                 
1.  Insofar as relators assert that R.C. 2305.09(E) is unconstitutional, their claim lacks merit.  
Notably, the primary case cited by relators for this proposition – Maricopa Cty. Mun. Water 
Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Warford (1949), 69 Ariz. 1, 206 P.2d 1168, has not been interpreted to 
preclude a state legislature from establishing a statute of limitations for takings claims.  See Flood 
Control Dist. of Maricopa Cty. v. Gaines (2002), 202 Ariz. 248, 43 P.3d 196, ¶ 9-18. 
 
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brought “within four years after the cause of action thereof accrued.”  No matter 
which date is chosen as the date when this cause of action accrued, the four-year 
statute of limitations had run and was a bar to a lawsuit sounding in eminent 
domain.  In 1995, Erie MetroParks entered into a written agreement to purchase 
the former railroad-corridor property.  In November of that year, Erie MetroParks, 
under its rules and regulations, declared the property to be a “closed area” open 
only to park employees and certain other authorized persons and threatened all 
others with a fine of up to $500 for a violation of its rule.  By the end of 1998, 
according to its executive director, Erie MetroParks “occupied, possessed, used 
and exercised exclusive dominion and control over the Real Estate.”  And in 
2003, the Huron River Greenway was opened to the public.  Relators did not file 
their takings claim until January 2009, more than four years after any one of these 
dates. 
{¶ 31} Relators claim that based on the “continuous-violation doctrine,” 
R.C. 2305.09(E) does not bar relators’ mandamus action.  In examining the 
doctrine of continuous violation  to determine whether a statute of limitations 
barred a claim under the Clean Air Act, Section 7401 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit first observed that 
“‘[c]ourts have been extremely reluctant to apply this doctrine outside the context 
of Title VII.’ ”  Natl. Parks Conservation Assn., Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Auth. 
(C.A.6, 2007), 480 F.3d 410, 416, quoting LRL Properties v. Portage Metro 
Hous. Auth. (C.A.6, 1995), 55 F.3d 1097, 1105, fn. 3. 
{¶ 32} And in refusing to apply the doctrine in the context of a takings 
claim, the Sixth Circuit has noted that it distinguished continuing violations from 
the continuing effects of prior violations:  “ ‘[T]he present effects of past 
[violations] * * * do not trigger a continuing violations exception.’ ”  Ohio 
Midland, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (C.A.6, 2008), 286 Fed.Appx. 905, 912, 
quoting Tenenbaum v. Caldera (C.A.6, 2002), 45 Fed.Appx. 416, 419.  The court 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
explained further that “ ‘[a] continuing violation is occasioned by continual 
unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation.’ ”  Broom v. 
Strickland (C.A.6, 2009), 579 F.3d 553, 555, quoting Ward v. Caulk (C.A.9, 
1981), 650 F.2d 1144, 1147. 
{¶ 33} Even if we accept the idea that a continuous violation may toll the 
statute in certain takings cases, the evidence here establishes that the claimed 
interference with relators’ property rights emanate from one event – Erie 
MetroParks’ construction of the recreational trail – which was completed at the 
latest by 2003, when the trail was officially opened to the public.  Every event 
that has occurred after the trail was opened was merely a continuation of the 
effects of that solitary event rather than the occurrence of new discrete acts.  That 
is, relators’ property interests were not further materially damaged after 2003. 
{¶ 34} A “cause of action against the government has ‘first accrued’ only 
when all the events which fix the government’s alleged liability have occurred 
and the plaintiff was or should have been aware of their existence.”  (Emphasis 
omitted.)  Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States (Fed.Cir.1988), 855 
F.2d 1573, 1577; see also United States v. Dickinson (1947), 331 U.S. 745, 749, 
67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (“when the Government chooses not to condemn 
land but to bring about a taking by a continuing process of physical events, the 
owner is not required to resort either to piecemeal or to premature litigation to 
ascertain the just compensation for what is really ‘taken’ ”).  Here, the events that 
comprised the alleged taking of relators’ properties were completed at the latest 
by 2003, when the recreational trail was opened to the public.  Relators either 
were or should have been aware of this.  The taking occurred in 2003, and any 
further actions by Erie MetroParks in asserting control over the recreational trail 
afterwards merely continued the effects of that taking. 
{¶ 35} The relators’ request, in effect, seeks a ruling that the recreational 
trail constitutes a continued taking until the respondents’ decision to open the trail 
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to the public is reversed.  If we were to adopt this position, we would eviscerate 
the statute of limitations, which would be an untenable result. 
{¶ 36} As the Sixth Circuit noted in rejecting a comparable takings claim, 
“If this court were to accept the plaintiffs’ theory that a taking is continuous until 
it is reversed, then all takings would constitute ‘continuing violations,’ tolling the 
statute of limitations.  There would effectively be no statute of limitations, and the 
plaintiffs’ theory could easily be extended to many other violations outside the 
takings context.  This is not the law.”  Ohio Midland, 286 Fed.Appx. at 913; see 
also Painesville Mini Storage, Inc. v. Painesville, Lake App. No. 2008-L-092, 
2009-Ohio-3656, ¶ 32 (rejecting application of continuing-violations doctrine to 
takings claim because “the extent of the damages stemming from the alleged 
taking, i.e., the decrease in the value of its real property interests, was complete as 
soon as the roadway on the tract was no longer accessible”). 
{¶ 37} Therefore, the continuing-violations doctrine does not toll the 
application of the statute of limitations here, and R.C. 2305.09(E) bars relators’ 
mandamus claim because it was not brought within four years after the 
recreational trail was opened to the public in 2003. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 38} Res judicata does not entitle relators to the requested relief or 
prevent the park district and its board of commissioners from raising defenses that 
they did not raise in the previous mandamus action involving different relators.  
Moreover, the statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09(E), which is one of the 
defenses raised in this case, bars relators’ takings claim.  Therefore, we deny the 
writ. 
{¶ 39} We need not address the parties’ other claims, e.g., lack of 
standing, ownership of the subject property, judicial estoppel, abandonment by 
the railway of its right-of-way, which are rendered moot as a result of our holding. 
Writ denied. 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, SADLER, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
LISA L. SADLER, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for 
O’DONNELL, J. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 40} I dissent from this court's decision to deny the requested writ of 
mandamus. 
{¶ 41} Today, the majority opinion denies the writ of mandamus based on 
the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.  I dissent because there has 
been a continuous violation, which tolls the running of the statute of limitations. 
{¶ 42} The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has 
recognized a continuous-violation doctrine that tolls the running of the statute of 
limitations.  See Hensley v. Columbus (C.A.6, 2009), 557 F.3d 693, 697.  The 
majority opinion correctly notes that "courts have been extremely reluctant to 
apply this doctrine outside the context of Title VII," LRL Properties v. Portgage 
Metro Hous. Auth. (C.A.6, 1995), 55 F.3d 1097, 1105, fn. 3, but without 
acknowledging that “[n]o opinion has articulated a principled reason why the 
continuing-violation doctrine should be limited to claims for deprivations of civil 
rights and employment discrimination.”   Natl. Parks Conservation Assn., Inc. v. 
Tennessee Valley Auth. (C.A.6, 2007), 480 F.3d 410, 416-417.  I would apply the 
continuing-violation doctrine in this case.  See Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Geauga Cty. 
(C.A.6, 1997), 103 F.3d 516 (discussing continuing-violation doctrine in case 
involving takings claim and due-process claims for deprivations of liberty and 
property). 
{¶ 43} A “ ‘continuous violation’ exists if: (1) the defendants engage in 
continuing wrongful conduct; (2) injury to the plaintiffs accrues continuously; and 
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(3) had the defendants at any time ceased their wrongful conduct, further injury 
would have been avoided.”  Hensley, 557 F.3d at 697. 
{¶ 44} The evidence establishes that wrongful conduct has continued 
beyond the 2003 date when the recreational trail was opened to the public.  For 
example, in 2005, Erie MetroParks installed permanent wooden benches on 
relators the Charville trusts’ and the Steiners’ properties and constructed a car 
turnaround on the Charville trusts’ property;  since November 2007, the park 
district has mowed, driven vehicles, removed debris, and otherwise exercised 
dominion and control over the portions of the trail on relators’ properties; the park 
district installed a bulletin board and a sign on relator Meyer’s property and signs 
on relators the Steiners’ property; the park district has also applied herbicide on 
the trail to control weeds, which has harmed relator Hildebrand’s organic produce 
farm;  in 2008, the park district went through relators the Nickolis’ property and 
chainsawed and removed trees that had fallen across part of the trail;  also in 
2008, the park district destroyed barricades erected by relator Johnston on her 
property; and in April 2009, the park district reopened the recreational trail on the 
Charville trusts’ and Hildebrand’s properties.  It is beyond dispute that Erie 
MetroParks and its board of commissioners continue to exercise dominion and 
control over the portions of the trail on relators’ private properties and continue to 
preclude relators from exercising control over those portions. 
{¶ 45} Second, as the previous examples establish, injury to relators 
continued to accrue after the recreational trail was opened to the public. 
{¶ 46} Third, if the park district and its board of commissioners ceased 
exercising control and stopped public use of the portion of the recreational trail on 
relators’ property, further injury to relators could be avoided. 
{¶ 47} The majority erroneously relies on Ohio Midland, Inc. v. Ohio 
Dept. of Transp. (C.A.6, 2008), 286 Fed.Appx. 905, and Broom v. Strickland 
(C.A.6, 2009), 579 F.3d 553, to hold that the continuing-violation doctrine is 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
inapplicable here.  In Midland, 286 Fed.Appx. at 912-913, the court emphasized 
that its refusal to compel the Ohio Department of Transportation to rebuild a 
bridge ramp was based on the fact that one alleged constitutional violation had 
occurred rather than “a series of repeated constitutional violations.”  In Broom, 
579 F.3d at 555-556, the inmate challenged the state’s adoption of the lethal-
injection protocol in death-penalty cases rather than continual unlawful acts.  In 
contrast to these cases, relators have established that the park district and its board 
of commissioners have engaged in a series of discrete acts that have damaged 
relators’ property in new and different ways than the opening of the trail to the 
public in 2003.  Contrary to the various acts of wrongful conduct described above, 
the majority opinion concludes that "the claimed interference with relators' 
property rights emanate from one event — Erie MetroParks' construction of the 
recreational trial."  (Emphasis sic.)  That conclusion is not supported by the 
record. 
{¶ 48} We have held that when a trespass is continuing rather than 
permanent, the expiration of the statute of limitations is tolled.  Sexton v. Mason, 
117 Ohio St.3d 275, 2008-Ohio-858, 883 N.E.2d 1013, ¶ 45, 54.  A defendant’s 
ongoing conduct or retention of control is dispositive.  Id. at ¶ 45.  Here, the park 
district continues to exercise ongoing control over relators’ property by 
maintaining the recreational trail, which indicates that the statute of limitations 
should be tolled. 
{¶ 49} Applying a continuing-violations rule to toll the running of the 
statute of limitations would not render R.C. 2305.09(E) meaningless, as Erie 
MetroParks argues, because the statute would still apply in certain situations.  For 
example, when a taking is temporary or has been completed, the limitations 
period of R.C. 2305.09(E) would not be tolled even under the continuing-
violations doctrine.  See, e.g., Hensley, 557 F.3d at 697-698. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
{¶ 50} I conclude that R.C. 2305.09(E) does not bar relators’ mandamus 
action. This court has long acknowledged that property rights “are among the 
most revered in our law and traditions” and “must be trod upon lightly, no matter 
how great the weight of other forces.”  See Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 
353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, ¶ 34 and 38, and cases cited therein.  By 
ignoring this precedent here, the majority unfairly eviscerates these rights. 
{¶ 51} Because relators have established that the board of park 
commissioners has taken their private property for public use as a recreational 
trial, they are entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel Erie MetroParks and its 
board to commence appropriations proceedings to compensate them for the 
taking.  Because the majority does not so hold, I dissent. 
___________________ 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, L.L.P., Bruce L. Ingram, Joseph R. 
Miller, and Thomas H. Fusonie, for relators. 
Porter, Wright, Morris, & Arthur, L.L.P., and Thomas A. Young; and 
Tomino & Latchney, L.L.C., and John D. Latchney, for respondents. 
______________________