Case Title: Goston v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lee GOSTON v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-440                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
              Opinion delivered September 30, 1996


1.   Criminal procedure -- speedy-trial motion properly denied --
     appellant tried within required twelve-month period. -- Where
     appellant conceded that 178 days had been properly excluded
     from the speedy-trial period because the parties were awaiting
     the results of appellant's mental examination to determine his
     competency to stand trial, appellant was instrumental in
     obtaining continuances that totaled an additional 290 days,
     and it was appellant who, on the day of trial, asked for
     another continuance and received it, thereby excluding another
     177 days under Ark. R. Crim. P. Rule 28.3(c), the sum total of
     these excludable periods, when deducted from the original 940-
     day period of delay, reflected that appellant was tried within
     295 days, well within the required twelve-month period.

2.   Criminal procedure -- excludable periods under Ark. R. Crim.
     P. 28.3(i) -- failure to set forth excludable periods in
     written order does not result in automatic reversal. --
     Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.3(I) provides that all
     excludable periods shall be set forth by the court in a
     written order or docket entry; however, a trial court's
     failure to comply with Rule 28.3(i) does not result in
     automatic reversal; where a case is delayed by the accused and
     that delaying act is memorialized by a record taken at the
     time it occurred, that record may be sufficient to satisfy the
     requirements of Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(i); a defendant may not
     agree with a ruling by the trial court and then attack that
     ruling on appeal. 

3.   Criminal procedure -- trial court noted in docket notations
     what time period was excluded from speedy-trial period --
     appellant cannot complain about delays he himself caused. --
     Where the trial court specifically noted in its docket
     notations that the time period did not apply to speedy trial
     because appellant was granted a continuance, and as to the
     other delays, the record clearly demonstrated that these were
     attributable to appellant or were legally justified, appellant
     could not complain about the delays he requested for
     psychiatric evaluations or continuances.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; John B. Plegge, Judge;
affirmed.
     Chris Tarver, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kent G. Holt, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     On April 13, 1993, appellant Lee Goston was arrested (and
bonded out the next day) for the aggravated robbery of One Bank in
Little Rock which occurred on March 29, 1993.  On July 14, 1993,
Goston requested a state mental health evaluation, which was
granted on July 20, 1993.  Goston had five other criminal cases
pending against him, and he asked that a full mental evaluation be
done in all the cases.  
     On October 4, 1993, another hearing was held for the purpose
of resetting a date for obtaining a report in this case, and the
parties agreed upon December 27, 1993.  The trial court noted that
all pending cases would be continued to the same date.  On
January 14, 1994, the State Mental Health Services filed its report
in this case, finding Goston competent to stand trial, and that
Goston did not lack the capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.  In conformity with the earlier
proceedings, the present case was continued further until the
remainder of Goston's evaluations were received by the court.  The
trial court actually held four hearings so as to check on the
progress of the evaluation reports and to determine when a trial
date could be set.  On March 7, 1994, the trial court held such a
hearing, but granted another evaluation at Goston's request, and
the court continued the case until April 25, 1994.  At the April 25
hearing, it was determined one evaluation was still out in a
separate pending case and both Goston and the prosecutor agreed
this case could not go forward; the court granted another
continuance until June 20, 1994.  On June 20 and on August 1, 1994,
Goston and the State again agreed to a continuance because an
evaluation in another pending case remained outstanding.  Finally,
on October 31, 1994, all evaluations had been completed and filed,
so the trial court set the present case for a jury trial to be held
on May 16, 1995.  
     On May 16, 1995, Goston asked for a dismissal, claiming his
speedy-trial rights had been violated.  After the trial court
denied his motion, Goston then moved for a continuance, stating
that, during one of his other cases tried only four weeks earlier,
he had caused a disturbance which had been witnessed by several of
the veniremen who were prospective jurors in the present case.  The
trial court granted Goston's continuance motion, agreeing he
probably could not receive a fair trial, considering his earlier
disruption, but, at the same time, it repeated its ruling that the
speedy-trial period had been tolled.  On June 26, 1995, the trial
court set a new trial date for November 9, 1995.
     Goston's jury trial commenced on November 9 when, again,
Goston moved that his case be dismissed for lack of a speedy trial. 
Once again, the trial court denied Goston's motion, and
subsequently Goston was convicted of aggravated robbery and theft
of property.  His only point on appeal is that his constitutional
right to a speedy trial had been violated; therefore, he is
entitled to dismissal of the charges against him.
     Goston, citing Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1(c) and 28.2(a), argues
these rules established that he was entitled to have his charges
dismissed because he was not brought to trial within twelve months
from when he was arrested on April 13, 1993.  He further argues
that, once he established that he was not tried within the twelve-
month period, the burden shifts to the State to show that any delay
was the result of Goston's conduct or was otherwise justified. 
Collins v. State, 304 Ark. 587,