Case Title: Kennedy v. State

Citation: 280 N.E.2d 611

Docket Number: 1069S237

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
280 N.E.2d 611 (1972)
Paul Thomas KENNEDY, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 1069S237.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
March 24, 1972.
*612 Ronald V. Aungst, Lyons, Aungst, Guastella & Allen, Valparaiso, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., William F. Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., M. Daniel Friedland, Indianapolis, of counsel, for appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.
This is an appeal by Paul Thomas Kennedy, appellant (defendant below), from a conviction for first degree murder. Appellant was indicted by the Porter County, Indiana, Grand Jury on November 30, 1961. Appellant sought a change of venue which was granted and venue was changed to LaPorte County. December 19, 1961, appellant appeared in court with counsel and pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Two days later the trial court appointed three psychiatrists to examine the appellant. On March 12, 1962, a hearing was held to determine if the appellant had sufficient mental competency to assist in his own defense and thus to stand trial. The court found that appellant did not have sufficient comprehension to understand the nature of the criminal charges against him, and ordered appellant committed to the Norman M. Beatty Memorial Hospital on March 14, 1962.
Approximately six and a half years later on September 11, 1968, the superintendent of the Norman M. Beatty Memorial Hospital certified to the LaPorte Superior Court at Michigan City that appellant was competent to stand trial. Appellant was transferred to the LaPorte County jail for the purpose of standing trial. October 25, 1968, appellant appeared in court and again entered a plea of not guilty along with his special plea of insanity. Once again appellant was examined by three psychiatrists concerning his sanity. Trial by jury commenced on April 8, 1969, and on April 23, 1969 the jury returned a verdict of murder in the first degree finding the appellant should suffer death. On May 21, 1969, the trial court pronounced judgment and sentenced appellant to death by electrocution. *613 Appellant filed a motion for a new trial which was denied and this appeal followed.
Appellant contends that the method by which the trial judge examined some of the expert psychiatric witnesses whose testimony was favorable to the appellant was prejudicial; that the judge did not examine these witnesses in an impartial manner but actually cross-examined these witnesses in a highly argumentative tenor. It is contended that the judge thereby abandoned his role as the impartial arbiter of the trial and assumed the role of prosecutor; that due to the closeness of the issue of insanity such conduct was highly prejudicial to the appellant.
The issue of insanity was indeed close. The crime took place in 1961 but appellant was not considered sufficiently competent to stand trial until 1968. The interim was spent in the maximum security section of Norman M. Beatty Memorial Hospital during which time the appellant received over sixty electro-shock treatments. Although the evidence as to sanity was conflicting it was the opinion of four of the five psychiatrists who examined appellant that he was insane at the time the crime was committed. It was also shown that a short time before the crime occurred appellant's family had sought the advice of a Catholic priest who worked at Beatty Hospital concerning their difficulties with appellant and the priest advised them that the appellant needed psychiatric help before he killed himself or someone else. There was lay testimony going both ways concerning the apparent state of mind of appellant in and around the time when the crime was committed.
It is apparent from a review of the evidence on the issue of insanity that the testimony of the expert witnesses was extremely important to the adjudication of this cause. The impression these witnesses made on the jury could very well be the difference between the jury's finding the appellant sane and finding him insane.
It was during the trial judge's examination of Doctor Hill, one of the court appointed psychiatrists, that the exchange took place which is the basis for the contention of prejudicial conduct. The following is the judge's examination and defense counsel's objection thereto.
It is clear from the method in which the trial judge examined this witness that he had serious doubts as to the witness' credibility. The examination is done in a highly argumentative fashion approximating the typical attempt at cross-examination and impeachment. The judge indicates by his conduct an attempt to show that the witness has changed his mind between the time of his initial report and his testimony at trial. As the twenty-four eyes and the twenty-four ears of the ever watchful jury follow this dialogue, how can they help but form the impression that the judge accepts this evidence with a great deal of disbelief?
There were several other incidents of improper judicial intervention in the trial. None of the remaining occurrences were objected to and it is the State's contention they are therefore waived. However, the task of this Court must be to insure justice and due process. Wilson v. State (1943), 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848, involved a situation where the alleged error was not contained in the motion for new trial. This Court there stated:
A fair trial by an impartial judge and jury is an essential element in due process. See Art. 1, §§ 12 and 13 of the Constitution of Indiana. Also, an attorney would be reluctant to object to the judge's questioning as it then would appear to the jury that the defense and the court were in direct conflict thus doing further damage to defendant's cause.
In the examination of another court appointed psychiatrist the trial judge again took on the appearance of an advocate. The following is the court's examination of Doctor Schmitt.
Then upon cross-examination of this witness by the defense the following exchange occurred.
The following occurred during the Court's examination of Dr. Berkson, a psychiatrist and a defense witness.
Much of the foregoing clearly appears to be an attempt to impeach the expert witnesses who testified favorably for the defense. It also gives the impression that the judge doubts the credibility of these witnesses; this being done in the presence of the ever watchful jury. The judge has lost his appearance of impartiality. He has removed his robes and donned the cap of the prosecutor. This is especially serious in light of the fact that no such impeaching type of examination was conducted during the testimony of the one psychiatrist favoring the state's position.
Another occasion in which the court attempted to impeach a witness occurred during the examination by a defense witness concerning certain line-up identifications. Certain State's witnesses had testified that they had identified defendant at a line-up. In an attempt to attack the credibility of this line-up identification, the defense introduced as a witness an attorney who had been deputy prosecutor at the time and who had been present at the line-up. He testified that defendant was clearly the tallest man in the line-up, the only one dressed in work type clothing, and no one else was within fifteen years of his age. After both the direct examination by the defense and the cross-examination by the state the judge conducted the following examination.
Such an extensive attempt at impeachment was clearly improper.
It is true that a trial judge may in any case, within reasonable limits, interrogate a witness. However, this should never be done in a manner which would improperly influence the jury. Dombkowski v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 32, 230 N.E.2d 602; Rhodes v. State (1930), 202 Ind. 159, 172 N.E. 176. The purpose of the judge's discretionary power to examine witnesses is to be an aid to the jury in its fact finding duties, however this must be done in an impartial manner so that the judge does not improperly influence the jury with his own contentions. Thomas v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 447, 229 N.E.2d 722; Dombkowski v. State, supra. Care should be exercised to avoid indirect expression of opinion by the trial judge, and it is improper for the trial judge to ask questions which are reasonably calculated to impeach or discredit the witness or his testimony. Canon 8 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Ethics reads in part:
A jury of laymen will often have an awesome respect for the institution of the American trial judge. This can lead them *621 to accord great and perhaps decisive significance to the judge's every word and intimation. It is therefore essential that the judge refrain from any actions indicating any position other than strict impartiality.
Although most likely inadvertent, the trial judge in the case at bar appears to have abandoned his position of impartiality and neutrality, which, especially in light of the closeness of the insanity issue, was extremely detrimental to appellant's cause. This being so, the necessity for a new trial is manifest. The judgment is reversed and appellant's prayer for a new trial is granted.
Judgment reversed.
DeBRULER, GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.
ARTERBURN, C.J., concurs in result.