Case Title: State v. Lomax

Citation: 2007-Ohio-4277

Docket Number: 20060899

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Lomax, 114 Ohio St.3d 350, 2007-Ohio-4277.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. LOMAX, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Lomax, 114 Ohio St.3d 350, 2007-Ohio-4277.] 
Criminal procedure—Waiver of jury trial—R.C. 2945.05—Requirement that 
waiver be “in open court” explained. 
(No. 2006-0899 – Submitted March 13, 2007 – Decided September 5, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,  
No. C-040450, 166 Ohio App.3d 555, 2006-Ohio-1373. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. A waiver of the right to a trial by jury must not only be made in writing, 
signed by the defendant, and filed as a part of the record, but must also be 
made in open court.  (R.C. 2945.05, applied.) 
2. To satisfy the “in open court” requirement in R.C. 2945.05, there must be 
some evidence in the record that the defendant while in the courtroom and 
in the presence of counsel, if any, acknowledged the jury waiver to the 
trial court. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶1} 
We accepted this discretionary appeal of the state of Ohio to 
clarify the meaning of the “open court” requirement in R.C. 2945.05 and to 
determine the significance of written waivers with respect to the right to trial by 
jury. 
Case Procedure 
{¶2} 
Defendant-appellee, Keith Lomax, was indicted for murder in the 
death of Robert Christian.  After Lomax waived his right to a jury trial, the court 
proceeded with a bench trial, during which the following evidence was presented. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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On May 24, 2003, Lomax attended a family birthday party with his girlfriend, 
Brandy Tooson.  Robert Christian was also present.  At some time during the 
evening, Christian and Tooson got into a physical argument over a chair, resulting 
in Tooson’s ending up on the floor.  Accounts of how this happened vary; it is 
unclear whether Christian shoved Tooson or pulled the chair out from under her.  
Tooson’s cousin, who saw the incident, got involved by punching Christian in the 
face.  The other partygoers separated the two and encouraged Christian to leave 
the party.  At that point, Lomax, who had been outside, learned of the altercation 
and confronted Christian, asking, “Did you disrespect my woman?”  After a brief 
argument, the men separated. 
{¶3} 
Lomax went outside to his truck and then approached Christian 
and the crowd of people that had gathered around him.  Several witnesses testified 
that Lomax swung at Christian several times and walked away.  Christian then 
exclaimed that he had been stabbed.  Christian died later that night.  Lomax 
admitted stabbing Christian but claimed it was in self-defense.  Both he and 
Tooson testified that Christian had him in a chokehold, although no other witness 
mentioned a chokehold.  The court found Lomax guilty and sentenced him to 15 
years to life in prison. 
{¶4} 
On appeal, Lomax argued that his jury waiver was not properly 
executed and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a bench trial 
because the waiver was not “made in open court.”   Although he had signed a 
written waiver, Lomax argued that the trial court did not question him and merely 
noted that there would be a waiver of jury trial.  The court of appeals agreed with 
Lomax and reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the “mere mention in 
passing on the record that there was a jury waiver was not sufficient to comply 
with the ‘open court’ requirement of R.C. 2945.05.”  166 Ohio App.3d 555, 2006-
Ohio-1373, 852 N.E.2d 205, ¶ 36. 
January Term, 2007 
3 
{¶5} 
We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal.  In its proposition of 
law, the state seeks a ruling that the Constitution does not require a colloquy in 
open court in order for a jury waiver to be valid.  Lomax responds that Crim.R. 
23(A), R.C. 2945.05, and governing case law demand that for a proper waiver of 
the right to trial by jury, a defendant must sign a written statement, and the court 
must reaffirm the waiver in open court.  We are asked, therefore, to determine 
what effect a written waiver of the right to trial by jury has upon the requirement 
in R.C. 2945.05 that the waiver must be made in “open court.” 
Law and Analysis 
{¶6} 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees an 
accused the right to trial by jury.  Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), 391 U.S. 145, 88 
S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491.  Likewise, Section 5, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution states that the “right of trial by jury shall be inviolate.” However, 
Crim.R. 23(A)1 allows a defendant to waive his right to a trial by jury in serious 
offense cases provided that the waiver is made knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily, and in writing.  The General Assembly has set forth the manner in 
which a defendant may waive this right.  R.C.2945.05 states: 
{¶7} 
“In all criminal cases pending in courts of record in this state, the 
defendant may waive a trial by jury and be tried by the court without a jury. Such 
waiver by a defendant, shall be in writing, signed by the defendant, and filed in 
said cause and made a part of the record thereof. It shall be entitled in the court 
and cause, and in substance as follows: ‘I _____, defendant in the above cause, 
                                                 
1.  Crim.R. 23(A) provides: “In serious offense cases the defendant before commencement of the 
trial may knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive in writing his right to trial by jury. Such 
waiver may also be made during trial with the approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecuting attorney. In petty offense cases, where there is a right of jury trial, the defendant shall 
be tried by the court unless he demands a jury trial. Such demand must be in writing and filed with 
the clerk of court not less than ten days prior to the date set for trial, or on or before the third day 
following receipt of notice of the date set for trial, whichever is later. Failure to demand a jury trial 
as provided in this subdivision is a complete waiver of the right thereto.” 
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hereby voluntarily waive and relinquish my right to a trial by jury, and elect to be 
tried by a Judge of the Court in which the said cause may be pending. I fully 
understand that under the laws of this state, I have a constitutional right to a trial 
by jury.’ 
{¶8} 
“Such waiver of trial by jury must be made in open court after the 
defendant has been arraigned and has had opportunity to consult with counsel. 
Such waiver may be withdrawn by the defendant at any time before the 
commencement of the trial.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶9} 
Therefore, to be valid, a waiver must meet five conditions.  It must 
be (1) in writing, (2) signed by the defendant, (3) filed, (4) made part of the 
record, and (5) made in open court. 
{¶10} Four of these five points are not in issue.  Lomax signed a written 
waiver, which was filed on June 28, 2004, the first day of trial, and which was 
made a part of the record.2  A written waiver is presumptively voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent.  State v. Bays (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 19, 716 N.E.2d 
1126, citing United States v. Sammons (C.A.6, 1990), 918 F.2d 592, 597.  Lomax 
contends that his jury waiver did not satisfy the open-court requirement of R.C. 
2945.05.  Although he acknowledges that a trial court is not required to inform a 
defendant of all possible implications of waiver, State v. Green (2000), 90 Ohio 
St.3d 352, 367, 738 N.E.2d 1208, Lomax argues that the trial court did not inform 
him of anything.  The question, then, is whether this waiver was made in open 
court. 
{¶11} In State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 559 N.E.2d 464, we 
considered the type of colloquy required for a valid waiver of jury trial. Jells 
involved a defendant in a death-penalty prosecution who had signed a written 
                                                 
2.  The written waiver states, “I, Keith Lomax, Defendant in the above Cause, hereby knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily waive and relinquish my right to a trial by Jury, and elect to be tried 
by a Judge of the Court in which the said Cause be pending.  I fully understand that under the laws 
of this State, I have a constitutional right to a trial by jury.” 
January Term, 2007 
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waiver that conformed to the requirements of R.C. 2945.05.  The defendant 
argued that the following three-question inquiry conducted by the court was 
inadequate to determine the validity of the waiver: 
{¶12} “ ‘THE COURT: Reginald, is that your signature? 
{¶13} “ ‘THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is, sir. 
{¶14} “ ‘THE COURT: You did this of your own free will? 
{¶15} “ ‘THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did. 
{¶16} “ ‘THE COURT: Nobody forced you to do this? 
{¶17} “ ‘THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
{¶18} “ ‘THE COURT: All right. 
{¶19} “ ‘MR. HUBBARD [defense counsel]: I have witnessed his 
signature, your Honor. 
{¶20} “ ‘THE COURT: This will be made part of the record.’ ”  Id. at 25. 
{¶21} In upholding the defendant’s waiver, we held:  “There is no 
requirement in Ohio for the trial court to interrogate a defendant in order to 
determine whether he or she is fully apprised of the right to a jury trial. The 
Criminal Rules and the Revised Code are satisfied by a written waiver, signed by 
the defendant, filed with the court, and made in open court, after arraignment and 
opportunity to consult with counsel. See State v. Morris (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 
12, 14, 8 OBR 13, 15-16, 455 N.E.2d 1352, 1355. While it may be better practice 
for the trial judge to enumerate all the possible implications of a waiver of a jury, 
there is no error in failing to do so.”  Id. at 25-26, 8 OBR 13, 559 N.E.2d 464.  
Therefore, the judge in Jells satisfied the “open court” requirement by asking the 
defendant several questions on the record. 
{¶22} We considered a similar question in Bays, 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 716 
N.E.2d 1126.  The defendant in Bays had also signed a written waiver pursuant to 
R.C. 2945.05.  After the defendant’s counsel submitted the waiver, the trial judge 
engaged in the following exchange with the defendant:   
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{¶23} “ ‘JUDGE GRIGSBY: Now, Mr. Bays, I want to explain to you, 
you have a right to a Jury Trial of 12 people. That is your Constitutional right. If 
you sign this waiver of Jury Trial and begin the trial, there is no changing. You 
understand after a trial is begun, then you cannot go back and ask for a Jury? 
{¶24} “ ‘THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
{¶25} “ ‘JUDGE GRIGSBY: Do you understand that? 
{¶26} “ ‘THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
{¶27} “ ‘JUDGE GRIGSBY: Now, I want to ask you, you are not under 
any drugs or alcohol or anything like that this morning, are you? 
{¶28} “ ‘THE DEFENDANT: No. 
{¶29} “ ‘JUDGE GRIGSBY: This waiver must be made knowingly, and 
by that, I mean, you understand what you are doing. You are giving up your right 
to a Jury, and in a case like this, a Jury's verdict must be unanimous. In other 
words, if you convince, or your Counsel convinces one Juror not to convict you, 
there will at least be a mistrial and retrial. 
{¶30} “ ‘Do you understand you are giving up that right of the Jury? 
{¶31} “ ‘THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand that. 
{¶32} “ ‘JUDGE GRIGSBY: And is there any—well, just tell me why 
you want to give up the Jury. 
{¶33} “ ‘THE DEFENDANT: My Counsel feels it's best. 
{¶34} “ ‘JUDGE GRIGSBY: Now, are you doing this voluntarily, of 
your own free will? 
{¶35} “ ‘THE DEFENDANT: I don't know which way I want to go 
really. With the Jury, I don't figure it was a fair pick. 
{¶36} “ ‘JUDGE GRIGSBY: Well, regardless of whether you waive a 
Jury, whether it's this panel or another panel, are you giving up that right to a Jury 
Trial by your own volition? 
{¶37} “ ‘THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
January Term, 2007 
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{¶38} “ ‘JUDGE GRIGSBY: Then the rule says you must sign that in 
open Court. I'm going to give you an unsigned copy and I want you to read it. If 
you have any questions, now is the time to ask them.’ ”  87 Ohio St.3d at 18, 716 
N.E.2d 1126. 
{¶39} The defendant then signed another waiver, which the judge 
accepted. 
{¶40}  When Bays challenged the validity of his jury waiver, we stated:  
“[A] defendant need not have a complete or technical understanding of the jury 
trial right in order to knowingly and intelligently waive it.”  87 Ohio St.3d at 20, 
716 N.E.2d 1126.  “[I]f the record shows a jury waiver, the verdict will not be set 
aside except on a plain showing that the waiver was not freely and intelligently 
made.”  Id. at 19, 716 N.E.2d 1126. 
{¶41} The state points to State v. Pless (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 333, 658 
N.E.2d 766, as support for the argument that a colloquy is not required and that all 
that is required is a written waiver.  However, in Pless, we found the jury waiver 
invalid because although written, the waiver was never filed or made part of the 
record.  While there was evidence that the defendant signed a written jury waiver 
form in open court, in the presence of his attorneys, after engaging in a lengthy 
discussion with the trial judge, we held that strict compliance with the 
requirements of R.C. 2945.05 is necessary.  Contrary to the state’s argument, 
although we held that a written jury waiver as required by R.C. 2945.05 is 
necessary for a valid waiver, we did not hold that it is sufficient. 
{¶42} Considering the aforementioned cases, we conclude that a trial 
court does not need to engage in an extended colloquy with the defendant in order 
to comply with the statutory requirement that a jury waiver be made in open 
court.  There must be, however, some evidence in the record of the proceedings 
that the defendant acknowledged the waiver to the trial court while in the 
presence of counsel, if any.  Absent such evidence, the waiver does not comply 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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with the requirements of R.C. 2945.05 and is therefore invalid.  In both Jells and 
Bays, the “in open court” requirement was satisfied when the trial court inquired 
whether the defendant had voluntarily signed a jury trial waiver. 
{¶43} Applying this principle to the case at bar, we conclude that the 
judgment of the court of appeals must be affirmed.  Here, the trial transcript 
contains only one reference to the jury waiver:   
{¶44} “The court:  Okay.  I understand we are finally ready on the Lomax 
case. 
{¶45} “Since there’s going to be a jury waiver, does the State care to 
make an opening statement at this time?   
{¶46} “Ms. Burroughs:  Briefly.” 
{¶47} Aside from this passing reference to a jury waiver, the trial court 
did not address Lomax and have him acknowledge in the courtroom and in the 
presence of counsel that he was waiving his right to a jury trial.  In fact, the trial 
court’s comment indicating that there was “going to be a waiver” implies that the 
waiver had not yet occurred at the commencement of the trial.  Because there is 
no indication from the transcript, nor any other evidence in the record, that Lomax 
waived his right to a jury trial in open court, the requirements of R.C. 2945.05 
were not met in this case and the waiver must be deemed invalid. 
{¶48} We do not mandate magic words, or a prolonged colloquy, but 
simply what Ohio law intends — that a defendant while in the courtroom and in 
the presence of counsel, if any, acknowledge to the trial court that the defendant 
wishes to waive the right to a jury trial. 
Conclusion 
{¶49} We therefore hold that a waiver of the right to a trial by jury must 
not only be made in writing, signed by the defendant, and filed as a part of the 
record, but must also be made in open court.  To satisfy the “in open court” 
requirement in R.C. 2945.05, there must be some evidence in the record that the 
January Term, 2007 
9 
defendant while in the courtroom and in the presence of counsel, if any, 
acknowledged the jury waiver to the trial court.  We therefore affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip, R. 
Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Rubenstein & Thurman, L.P.A., Inc., and Scott A. Rubenstein, for 
appellee. 
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