Case Title: West Flagler Associates, Ltd. v. DeSantis

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC2023-1333

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2023-1333 
____________ 
 
WEST FLAGLER ASSOCIATES, LTD., et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
RON D. DESANTIS, etc., et al., 
Respondents. 
 
March 21, 2024 
 
SASSO, J. 
Petitioners—two companies and one individual involved in 
Florida’s gaming industry—have filed this petition for a writ of quo 
warranto challenging a gaming compact between the State and the 
Seminole Tribe.  Petitioners argue that a sports betting provision 
contained in the compact violates article X, section 30 of the Florida 
Constitution, which limits the expansion of casino gambling in the 
state to the citizens’ initiative process.  Framed as it is, the petition 
presents nothing other than a challenge to the substantive 
constitutionality of the law ratifying the compact.  But quo warranto 
 
- 2 - 
 
is not, and has never been, the proper vehicle to obtain a 
declaration as to the substantive constitutionality of an enacted 
law.  For that reason, we deny the petition because the relief that 
Petitioners seek is beyond what the writ of quo warranto provides. 
I. 
In 2021, Governor DeSantis entered into a gaming compact 
with the Seminole Tribe pursuant to the federal Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2018), and as 
contemplated by section 285.712(1), Florida Statutes (2023).  The 
Florida Legislature subsequently ratified the compact pursuant to 
section 285.712(2), Florida Statutes.  Among other forms of gaming, 
the compact authorizes mobile sports betting by which participants 
may place sports wagers with the Seminole Tribe through a mobile 
device.  Participants may be physically located anywhere in Florida 
when they place a wager, not only on tribal lands.  Then, regardless 
of where the bets are placed, the wagers are “deemed” to occur on 
tribal lands. 
Petitioners, West Flagler Associates, Ltd., Bonita-Fort Myers 
Corporation d/b/a Bonita Springs Poker Room, and Isadore 
 
- 3 - 
 
Havenick, filed this petition for a writ of quo warranto challenging 
the compact.  Petitioners argue that the Governor and the 
Legislature exceeded their constitutional authority by enacting the 
compact because the mobile betting provisions violate article X, 
section 30 of the Florida Constitution, which limits the 
authorization of casino gambling to the citizens’ initiative process.  
For relief, Petitioners request a declaration from this Court that the 
implementing law is unconstitutional1 and ask that we enjoin the 
Seminole Tribe from continuing to operate mobile sports betting. 
 
In response, Respondents set forth several reasons why the 
compact is consistent with article X, section 30.  But as a threshold 
matter, Respondents argue there are reasons other than on the 
merits for why this Court should deny the petition for quo warranto.  
 
 
1.  Petitioners request this Court to declare that: (1) 
Respondents’ respective conduct in executing the compact and 
enacting and signing the implementing law exceeded their authority 
under the Florida Constitution to the extent that they permitted off-
reservation sports betting throughout the state; (2) a voter-approved 
constitutional amendment initiated by a citizens’ petition is the 
exclusive means by which off-reservation sports betting can be 
authorized in Florida; and (3) such a voter-approved constitutional 
amendment is necessary for those portions of the compact and 
implementing law to be valid in this state. 
 
- 4 - 
 
To that end, Respondents say we should (1) deny the petition on a 
discretionary basis because Petitioners waited too long to seek 
relief; (2) deny the petition because the Seminole Tribe, who 
Respondents argue is an indispensable party, has not been joined 
to this action; (3) recede from our precedent that is inconsistent 
with the original conception of quo warranto, which functioned 
primarily to oust individuals who had no title to state power from 
the use of that power and limited who could bring an action to the 
Attorney General; (4) at a minimum recede from those cases which 
have determined that citizens and taxpayers have standing to bring 
quo warranto actions; and (5) deny the petition because Petitioners 
seek a declaration as to the substantive constitutionality of an 
enacted law. 
Respondents’ last argument is dispositive and renders the 
others unnecessary.  As we will explain, we agree with Respondents 
that quo warranto is not a substitute for what Petitioners seek—
declaratory and injunctive relief as to the substance of the law 
ratifying the gaming compact.  It is that argument to which we now 
turn. 
 
- 5 - 
 
II. 
Our authority to issue the extraordinary writ of quo warranto 
is derived from section 3(b)(8) of article V of the Florida 
Constitution, which authorizes this Court to issue writs of quo 
warranto to state officers and state agencies.  Meaning “by what 
authority,” quo warranto is a common law remedy that was 
historically used to “test the right of a person to hold an office of 
franchise or exercise some right or privilege the peculiar powers of 
which are derived from the state.”  State v. Gerow, 85 So. 144, 145 
(Fla. 1920). 
Quo warranto’s earliest application was narrow in scope and 
limited by its common law background.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Landis v. Prevatt, 148 So. 578, 579 (Fla. 1933) (“The action in the 
nature of quo warranto is a common-law remedy, its office and 
scope depending upon the use and limitations authorized by the 
common law and statute laws of England, as they existed as of the 
date that they were adopted, by the laws of this state, in the 
absence of statutory modification.”).  But over time, the use of the 
writ has drifted from its common law moorings.  Since those early 
 
- 6 - 
 
days, this Court has shifted its focus in quo warranto cases to 
question whether a state officer has “improperly exercised a power 
or right derived from the State.”  See, e.g., Fla. House of 
Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 607 (Fla. 2008).  Through 
this lens, this Court has used the writ to test separation of powers 
issues, especially where one branch sues another, to settle claims 
over entitlement to an office, and to resolve disputes over the 
procedural mechanics of government. 
Relying on this Court’s more expansive view of quo warranto, 
Petitioners contend that the writ may be employed to provide the 
relief they seek, arguing “the Governor and Legislature exceeded 
their powers in authorizing off-reservation sports betting.”  This 
would be an appropriate use of the writ, Petitioners argue, because 
this Court has used the writ to determine whether the Governor 
and the Legislature “improperly exercised” their respective 
authority. 
The problem with Petitioners’ claim becomes apparent when 
we differentiate their specific argument from their more general 
statements.  Petitioners argue that the “improper exercise” of power 
 
- 7 - 
 
includes an officer transgressing constitutional limits on the 
officer’s authority, so it follows that the Legislature’s enactment of a 
substantively unconstitutional law, and the Governor’s agreement 
to a substantively unconstitutional compact, is an improper 
exercise of both powers.  In other words, Petitioners argue the 
Governor and Legislature “improperly exercised” their respective 
authority because the substance of the compact, reflected in 
sections 285.710(3)(b)-(14) and 849.142, Florida Statutes (2023), 
the implementing laws, is inconsistent with article X, section 30. 
This is problematic because however far afield from its original 
function the current use of quo warranto has wandered, this Court 
has never permitted use of the writ in the manner which Petitioners 
seek—to address the substantive constitutionality of an enacted 
law.  See, e.g., Chiles v. Phelps, 714 So. 2d 453, 457 (Fla. 1998) 
(“We have stated that under ordinary circumstances, the 
constitutionality of a statute should be challenged by way of a 
declaratory judgment action in circuit court.”).  Furthermore, we 
have made clear that the writ of quo warranto is not a substitute for 
 
- 8 - 
 
declaratory and injunctive relief.  See Detzner v. Anstead, 256 So. 
3d 820, 823 (Fla. 2018). 
Undiscouraged, Petitioners argue their challenge fits within 
existing boundaries, pointing to Chiles.  In that case, this Court 
entertained a writ of quo warranto sought by the Governor and an 
abortion clinic against legislative officers, including the House 
Speaker and the Senate President, seeking to challenge the 
Legislature’s override of two vetoed bills.  714 So. 2d at 456.  We 
allowed the quo warranto challenge to proceed, even though “under 
ordinary circumstances, the constitutionality of a statute should be 
challenged by way of a declaratory judgment action in circuit 
court.”  Id. at 457.  But Chiles was a challenge to the authority of 
the Speaker of the House and the Senate President to allow their 
respective bodies to vote on vetoed bills at a regular session even 
though a previous special session had been held after the Governor 
had vetoed the bills.  Id.  It was not a challenge as to whether the 
statutes at issue substantively conflicted with the constitution.  So 
that broad statement in Chiles cannot be read as an indication that 
 
- 9 - 
 
this Court is willing, under certain circumstances, to examine the 
substantive constitutionality of a law via quo warranto. 
 
Similarly, Petitioners rely on Florida House of Representatives 
v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, to support their position that the compact 
may be challenged through quo warranto.  But though that case 
involved the applicability of the writ of quo warranto to a gaming 
compact in Florida, it does not set forth a general rule that gaming 
compacts may be challenged through quo warranto actions.  
Instead, that case involved the specific question of whether the 
Governor had authority to bind the state to a compact without 
ratification by the Legislature.  See id. at 609 (“The issue is whether 
. . . the Governor . . . had constitutional authority to execute the 
Compact without the Legislature’s prior authorization or, at least, 
subsequent ratification.”).  That factual background distinguishes 
the case from Petitioners’ challenge here, as Petitioners challenge 
the substance of the agreement reached by the Governor and 
ratified by the Legislature rather than the bare ability to act. 
 
- 10 - 
 
III. 
 
Ultimately, the relief that Petitioners seek is beyond what quo 
warranto provides.  We have never used the writ to test the 
substantive constitutionality of a statute, and we decline 
Petitioners’ implicit invitation to expand the scope of the writ here.  
To do so would serve as an affront to an essential feature of quo 
warranto—that it is used to challenge the authority to exercise a 
state power rather than the merits of the action.  In addition, 
considering Petitioners’ request here would undermine the 
structure of article V of the Florida Constitution, which 
circumscribes our ability to review the substantive constitutionality 
of a statute and commits that review, in the first instance, to the 
trial courts.  And because we reach our decision today based on 
existing limits to the scope of quo warranto, we similarly decline 
Respondents’ invitation to reexamine precedent. 
The petition is denied. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and 
FRANCIS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result. 
 
 
- 11 - 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Original Proceeding – Quo Warranto 
 
Raquel A. Rodriguez of Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, Miami, 
Florida, Sammy Epelbaum of Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, 
Miami, Florida, Hala Sandridge of Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, 
Tampa, Florida, and Chance Lyman of Buchanan Ingersoll & 
Rooney PC, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Petitioners, West Flagler Associates, Ltd., a Florida Limited 
Partnership, Bonita-Fort Myers Corporation, a Florida 
Corporation d/b/a Springs Poker Room, and Isadore Havenick 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor 
General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, 
Daniel William Bell, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Christopher J. 
Baum, Senior Deputy Solicitor General, and Myles S. Lynch, 
Assistant Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Respondents, Ron Desantis, in his capacity as Governor of 
the State of Florida, Paul Renner, in his capacity as Speaker of 
the Florida House of Representatives, and Kathleen 
Passidomo, in her capacity as President of the Florida Senate 
 
Todd K. Norman of Nelson Mullins, Orlando, Florida, Olivia R. 
Share of Nelson Mullins, Orlando, Florida, and Beverly A. Pohl of 
Nelson Mullins, Boca Raton, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae No Casinos, Inc. 
 
Barry Richard of Barry Richard Law Firm, Tallahassee, Florida; and 
Joseph H. Webster of Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Walker, LLP, 
Washington, District of Columbia, 
 
for Amici Curiae Seminole Tribe of Florida