Case Title: Retirement Board of Stoneham v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12098

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12098 
 
RETIREMENT BOARD OF STONEHAM  vs.  CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT 
APPEAL BOARD & another.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 5, 2016. - December 22, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Retirement.  Municipal Corporations, Retirement board.  Public 
Employment, Retirement.  Contributory Retirement Appeal 
Board. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
February 6, 2014. 
 
 
The case was heard by Robert L. Ullmann, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Douglas S. Martland, Assistant Attorney General, for 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Board. 
 
Thomas F. Gibson for Christine DeFelice. 
 
Michael Sacco for the plaintiff. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Christine DeFelice. 
2 
 
 
LOWY, J.  This case requires us to answer two questions:  
(1) whether a municipal retirement board possesses absolute 
discretion to terminate a part-time employee's membership in a 
retirement system to which that board has granted the employee 
membership; and (2) even if such a board does not have the power 
to terminate a part-time employee's membership, whether a 
"separation from [an employee's] service" under G. L. c. 32, § 3 
(1) (a) (i), occurs when a part-time employee working two jobs 
for the same municipal employer ceases to work only one of those 
jobs.  We answer both questions in the negative and reverse the 
judgment of the Superior Court. 
 
Background.  Christine DeFelice began working on a part-
time basis for the Stoneham school department (department) in 
November, 2000.  In April, 2001, she took on a second part-time 
job with the department to fill a temporary vacancy, increasing 
her weekly workload from nineteen and one-half hours per week to 
over thirty hours per week for the ensuing nine weeks.  At the 
end of the nine-week period, DeFelice continued to work for the 
department on a part-time basis until at least June, 2009, only 
occasionally working more than nineteen and one-half hours per 
week.2 
                                                          
 
 
2 It is not clear when DeFelice's employment with the 
department ended.  At oral argument, DeFelice's counsel 
indicated that DeFelice was no longer employed with the 
department.  The last date of employment clearly referred to by 
3 
 
 
In 2009, DeFelice sought retroactive membership in the 
Stoneham retirement system as an employee of the department, 
based on the nine-week period in 2001 during which she worked 
over thirty hours per week.  Under the membership eligibility 
criteria for part-time employees established by the Stoneham 
retirement board (board) that were in effect during 2001, 
Stoneham employees were eligible for membership in the 
retirement system if they were scheduled to work more than 
thirty hours per week for a period of more than seven days.3  
Initially, the board denied DeFelice's membership application, 
because her increase in hours was temporary.  In August, 2010, 
the board reconsidered its position and granted DeFelice 
retroactive membership in the Stoneham retirement system for the 
nine-week period in the spring of 2001, but denied her 
membership for the subsequent time during which she remained a 
part-time employee of the department.  The board concluded that 
DeFelice was not eligible following the nine-week period because 
her weekly hours did not continue to satisfy the criteria. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Division of Administrative Law Appeals is June 4, 2009.  
Because of the result we reach in this case, the date her 
employment with the department ended is not material. 
 
 
3 The board has since changed its eligibility requirements 
so that, as of April, 2010, non-full-time employees must be 
"permanently employed" for at least twenty hours per week and 
earn at least $5,000 annually in order to qualify for 
membership. 
4 
 
 
DeFelice appealed from the board's determination, seeking 
membership for the years she continued to work for the 
department as a part-time employee.4  The Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Board (CRAB) assigned the case to the division of 
administrative law appeals (DALA).  DALA determined that, once 
the board granted DeFelice membership, it could not unilaterally 
terminate her membership status.  DALA concluded that the 
statute governing membership in a public retirement system 
precluded the board, in the absence of statutorily specified 
exceptions, from terminating the membership of individuals who 
had been granted membership and continued working for the same 
municipal employer.  The board objected, arguing that it 
possessed authority to terminate the membership of non-full-time 
employees who failed to satisfy its membership criteria.  CRAB 
adopted DALA's factual findings and affirmed its decision.  The 
board sought review pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  A judge in 
the Superior Court reversed CRAB's decision, and DeFelice 
appealed.  We transferred the case here by our own motion, and 
now reverse the judgment of the Superior Court. 
 
Statutory scheme.  Massachusetts law permits a municipality 
to establish a contributory retirement system for the 
municipality's employees.  See G. L. c. 32, § 20 (4).  The law 
                                                          
 
 
4 The parties acknowledged during oral argument that 
DeFelice's benefit, upon her retirement, would be proportional 
to the service she provided as a part-time employee. 
5 
 
further provides for the establishment of municipal retirement 
boards to manage the retirement systems in a manner consistent 
with applicable laws.  G. L. c. 32, § 20 (4) (b), (5) (b).  
Municipal retirement boards have the power to make rules and 
regulations "consistent with law," subject to approval by the 
public employee retirement administration commission.  G. L. c. 
32, § 20 (5) (b). 
 
General Laws c. 32, § 3 (2), sets forth various criteria 
that establish "eligibility" for membership in a retirement 
system.  For example, individuals who are "employees," and 
therefore "regularly employed,"5 are generally eligible for 
membership.  G. L. c. 32, § 3 (2) (a) (x).  However, municipal 
retirement boards possess "full jurisdiction" to determine the 
eligibility of "part-time, provisional, temporary, temporary 
provisional, seasonal or intermittent employment or service of 
                                                          
 
 
5 An "employee," as applicable to this case, is a person 
"who is regularly employed in the service of," and "whose 
regular compensation . . . is paid by," the Commonwealth or a 
political subdivision of the Commonwealth.  G. L. c. 32, § 1.  
See Retirement Bd. of Concord v. Colleran, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 
486, 489 (1993) (town employee was "regularly employed" during 
three-year period in which she continuously worked three hours 
per day).  The board does not dispute that DeFelice was 
regularly employed throughout her employment with the 
department. 
 
6 
 
any employee in any governmental unit."6  G. L. c. 32, 
§ 3 (2) (d). 
 
Satisfying the eligibility criteria for membership does not 
automatically confer membership upon an employee.  See G. L. 
c. 32, § 1 (defining "member" as "any employee included in" 
retirement system [emphasis added]).  See also Manning v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 255 
(1990) (non-full-time employee was not member of retirement 
system in absence of determination by pertinent retirement 
board).  Relevant to this case, an employee who is eligible to 
become a member, but who fails or chooses not to do so, "may 
apply for and be admitted to membership if [the employee is] 
under the maximum [entry] age for [the employee's] group on the 
date of [the employee's] application; provided, that during [the 
employee's] present period of service [the employee] had 
previously been eligible for membership" (emphasis added).  
G. L. c. 32, § 3 (3).  In other words, the employee must have 
continued working for the same municipal employer between the 
time the employee became eligible for membership and the time 
the employee submitted the late application for membership. 
 
Once an eligible employee is included in a city or town's 
retirement system, that employee becomes a "member" of the 
                                                          
 
 
6 In this opinion, we refer to such employees as "non-full-
time employees," and employees falling outside of the scope of 
this provision as "full-time employees." 
7 
 
system.  G. L. c. 32, § 1.  There are two types of membership: 
"member in service" and "member inactive."  G. L. c. 32, 
§ 3 (1) (a).  A member in service, the only membership type 
relevant in this case, is "[a]ny member who is regularly 
employed in the performance of [the member's] duties."  G. L. 
c. 32, § 3 (1) (a) (i).  Once designated a member in service, 
the member remains a member in service "until [the member's] 
death or until [the member's] prior separation from the service 
becomes effective by reason of [the member's] retirement, 
resignation, . . . removal or discharge from [the member's] 
office," or another statutorily specified circumstance.7  Id. 
 
Standard of review.  Because this case involves the meaning 
of G. L. c. 32, § 3, a pure question of law, we exercise de novo 
review of CRAB's interpretation.  Rotondi v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 644, 648 (2012).  See Rosing v. 
Teachers' Retirement Sys., 458 Mass. 283, 290 (2010).  Still, in 
reviewing CRAB's decisions, courts "typically defer to CRAB's 
expertise and accord '"great weight" to [its] interpretation and 
application of the statutory provisions it is charged with 
                                                          
 
 
7 The remaining statutory circumstances include effective 
prior separation from the member's service by reason of "failure 
of re-election or reappointment . . . or by reason of an 
authorized leave of absence without pay other than as provided 
for in this clause."  G. L. c. 32, § 3 (1) (a) (i). 
8 
 
administering'" (citation omitted).8  Weston v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Bd., 76 Mass. App. Ct. 475, 479 (2010).  "We . 
. . will reverse only if [CRAB's] decision was based on an 
erroneous interpretation of law or is unsupported by substantial 
evidence."  Foresta v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 453 
Mass. 669, 676 (2009).  See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (c), (e). 
 
Discussion.  The first question before the court is whether 
the board's authority under § 3 (2) (d) to determine the 
eligibility of non-full-time employees, such as DeFelice, 
supersedes the provision in § 3 (1) (a) (i) establishing that 
the status of a member in service "shall continue as such until 
[the member's] death or until [the member's] prior separation 
from the service becomes effective by reason of" one of the 
statutory circumstances.  Second, if the board did not have the 
absolute discretion to terminate DeFelice's membership, we must 
                                                          
 
 
8 Both CRAB and the board argue that their respective 
interpretations of § 3 are entitled to deference.  As 
Massachusetts courts have recognized CRAB's role in 
administering G. L. c. 32, and the value of its expertise in the 
complicated area of retirement law, we afford greater weight to 
CRAB's interpretation in this case.  See, e.g., Weston v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 76 Mass. App. Ct. 475, 479 
(2010); Namay v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 19 Mass. 
App. Ct. 456, 463 (1985).  Because "eligibility" is also used in 
§ 3 regarding membership criteria that fall outside of the 
board's "full jurisdiction" under § 3 (2) (d), adopting the 
board's interpretation could have limiting effects on the 
meaning of "eligibility" in circumstances outside the board's 
jurisdiction.  See Commonwealth v. Hilaire, 437 Mass. 809, 816 
(2002) ("When the Legislature uses the same term in the same 
section, . . . the term should be given a consistent meaning 
throughout"). 
9 
 
determine whether DeFelice was nonetheless separated from her 
service as a result of a "removal or discharge" under § 3 (1) 
(a) (i) when she stopped working the second job that increased 
her weekly hours to a level that initially qualified her for 
membership. 
 
1.  Interpretation of eligibility.  The first question is 
whether the board possessed discretion to terminate DeFelice's 
membership when she ceased to satisfy the board's eligibility 
requirements, even after it had granted her retroactive 
membership, effective April 23, 2001.  The board contends that 
its "full jurisdiction" under § 3 (2) (d) means that it 
possesses an "absolute" power to determine the eligibility of 
non-full-time employees -- notwithstanding the proscription of 
§ 3 (1) (a) (i) -- that once a member is afforded "member in 
service status," that status "shall continue" until the employee 
dies or one of the specified circumstances leads to the 
employee's "separation from . . . service."  The board argues 
that the "more specific" authority it possesses over the 
eligibility of non-full-time employees supersedes § 3 (1) (a) 
(i). 
 
CRAB argues that the board's jurisdiction over eligibility 
means only jurisdiction to set initial eligibility criteria.  
The board's authority, CRAB contends, does not include the 
ability to revoke the membership of employees once granted, 
10 
 
because § 3 (1) (a) (i) specifies the circumstances pursuant to 
which membership can be terminated. 
  
The language of the statute is the starting point for all 
questions of statutory interpretation.  Rotondi, 463 Mass. at 
648, quoting Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37 
(1977).  The effect given to statutory language should be 
consistent with its plain language.  See id., citing Sullivan v. 
Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).  Courts must look to the 
statutory scheme as a whole.  See Commonwealth v. Raposo, 453 
Mass. 739, 745 (2009). 
 
We accept CRAB's interpretation, because (1) it is 
consistent with the statute's plain language, (2) it is 
consistent with use of "eligibility" as applied to full-time 
employees in the same subsection of § 3, and (3) it avoids an 
unnecessary conflict between § 3 (1) (a) (i) and § (3) (2) (d). 
 
First, the plain language of the statute supports CRAB's 
interpretation.  Section 3 (1) (a) (i) specifies the 
circumstances in which a member's status as a "member in 
service" may be terminated.  The statute explicitly defines 
"member" as "any employee included in" the applicable retirement 
system.  G. L. c. 32, § 1.  The definition of employee does not 
distinguish between full-time and non-full-time employees.  See 
id.  A member in service is "[a]ny member who is regularly 
employed in the performance of [the member's] duties," and a 
11 
 
member's status as a member in service "shall continue" until 
the occurrence of a statutorily specified event (emphasis 
added).  G. L. c. 32, § 3 (1) (a) (i).  Section 3 (1) (a) (i) 
applies to members, who may be full-time employees eligible for 
membership pursuant to statutory criteria, or non-full-time 
employees eligible pursuant to the action of a local retirement 
board under § 3 (2) (d).  See G. L. c. 32, §§ 1 and 3 (1) (a) 
(i), (2) (a) and (d).  The statutorily enumerated events 
supporting the termination of a member's status as a member in 
service do not include a member's subsequent failure to satisfy 
the eligibility criteria that led to that member's admission.  
See G. L. c. 32, § 3 (1) (a) (i).  Accordingly, § 3 (1) (a) (i) 
limits the board's authority over the continuing membership of 
non-full-time employees. 
 
Second, limiting the board's power to the task of 
establishing only the initial eligibility criteria of non-full-
time employees avoids interpreting the term "eligibility" 
inconsistently within § 3.  Section 3 (2) is titled "Eligibility 
for Membership,"9 and § 3 (2) (a) sets forth twelve circumstances 
establishing a full-time employee's eligibility for membership 
in a retirement system.  Once a full-time employee becomes 
                                                          
 
 
9 Although a heading does not conclusively determine a 
statute's proper interpretation, it may nonetheless be a 
relevant factor.  Cf. Davis v. School Comm. of Somerville, 307 
Mass. 354, 358-359 (1940) (rejecting interpretation based on 
heading, where heading conflicted with statutory language). 
12 
 
eligible under § 3 (2) (a) and then becomes a member in service, 
that employee's status as a member in service "shall continue" 
until one of the statutorily specified events occurs.  See G. L. 
c. 32, § 3 (1) (a) (i).  Because the statutorily specified 
events do not include a subsequent failure to satisfy the 
eligibility criteria, a member's status as a member in service 
continues even if the member ceases to satisfy the criteria that 
initially qualified the member for admission into the retirement 
system. See id.  Therefore, in § 3 (2) (a), "eligibility" must 
refer only to whether an employee satisfies criteria for 
membership prior to the employee becoming a member.  See G. L. 
c. 32, § 3 (1) (a) (i), (2) (a).  Eligibility as used in 
§ 3 (2) (d), a different paragraph of the same subsection, 
should not be given a different meaning.  Commonwealth v. 
Hilaire, 437 Mass. 809, 816 (2002). 
 
If eligibility means an individual's initial qualification, 
the provisions of § 3 (1) (a) (i) do not conflict with the 
board's "full jurisdiction" under § 3 (2) (d).  The conflict 
only arises if one accepts the board's definition that its "full 
jurisdiction" over eligibility necessarily encompasses something 
more than the eligibility determination prior to the non-full-
time employee's admission to membership.  Because such an 
interpretation is not required by the statutory language and 
would create an unnecessary conflict between § 3 (1) (a) (i) and 
13 
 
§ 3 (2) (d), we decline to adopt it.  See Raposo, 453 Mass. at 
745 (courts must read statutory terms harmoniously); Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 325 Mass. 
386, 389 (1950) (rejecting statutory construction that would 
"bring two provisions of our own statutes into unnecessary 
conflict"). 
 
The board possesses full jurisdiction to determine when 
non-full-time employees become eligible for membership in the 
Stoneham retirement system.  See G. L. c. 32, § 3 (2) (d).  Once 
the board confers membership, however, it cannot override the 
explicit statutory mandate governing the duration of membership.  
See G. L. c. 32, § 3 (1) (a) (i).  See also Galenski v. Erving, 
471 Mass. 305, 311 (2015), quoting Cioch v. Treasurer of Ludlow, 
449 Mass. 690, 699 (2007) ("[A] municipality may not enact a 
bylaw, policy, or regulation that is inconsistent with State 
law"). 
 
 Lexington Educ. Ass'n v. Lexington, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 
752 (1983), is an example of the limitations on a municipality's 
otherwise broad discretion in light of an explicit statutory 
requirement.  In that case, the statute at issue required 
municipalities participating in an applicable health insurance 
program to "purchase certain group insurance 'covering 
employees,'" and defined "employee" to include any person 
working at least twenty hours per week for a municipality.  Id. 
14 
 
at 750-751, citing G. L. c. 32B, §§ 2 (d), 3.  Municipalities 
had the authority to make a "final" determination of a person's 
eligibility to participate in the insurance program.  See 
Lexington Educ. Ass'n, supra at 752.  The Appeals Court 
invalidated a municipality's rule that limited participation to 
employees working at least twenty-five hours per week, because 
the statute required municipalities to include individuals 
working at least twenty hours per week.  Id.  Similarly, the 
board's authority to determine when non-full-time employees may 
become members in the Stoneham retirement system cannot 
supersede § 3 (1) (a) (i)'s requirements regarding the duration 
of membership.10 
 
The Manning decision, upon which SRB relies for support, is 
not analogous to this case.  In that case, the Appeals Court 
held that a non-full-time employee did not automatically become 
a member of a retirement system pursuant to § 3 (2) (a), and the 
retirement board had not made any determination pursuant to 
                                                          
 
 
10 The board relies on Shea v. Selectmen of Ware, 34 Mass. 
App. Ct. 333, 335-337 (1993), in which the Appeals Court upheld 
the authority of a municipality to terminate the ability of 
employees working under twenty hours per week to participate in 
the same type of health insurance plan at issue in Lexington 
Educ. Ass'n, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 749.  However, that statute 
contained no language comparable to § 3 (1) (a) (i), requiring 
that the municipality "shall continue" providing insurance to 
such employees until the occurrence of statutorily specified 
events.  See G. L. c. 32, § 3 (1) (a) (i); Shea, supra (nothing 
in text, purpose, or legislative history supported determination 
that municipality's decision to provide insurance was 
irreversible). 
15 
 
§ 3 (2) (d) that the employee was eligible to become a member.  
Manning, 29 Mass. App. Ct. at 254-255.  Unlike the retirement 
board in Manning, the board granted DeFelice membership because 
it determined that she satisfied its eligibility requirement, 
based on the board's interpretation of its own rule. 
 
CRAB also points out that permitting municipal retirement 
boards unilaterally to terminate a non-full-time employee's 
membership in a retirement system would subject such employees 
to a high degree of uncertainty.  Indeed, if the board possessed 
the breadth of discretion it claims, non-full-time employees 
could lose their membership status whether they decreased their 
hours voluntarily or involuntarily, or whenever the board alters 
the criteria to exclude some non-full-time employees who had 
previously been granted membership.  We do not believe that the 
Legislature intended to subject non-full-time employees to this 
level of unpredictability.  See G. L. c. 32, § 3 (1) (a) (i) 
(status of member in service "shall continue" until specified 
events [emphasis added]).  See also Galenski, 471 Mass. at 309, 
quoting Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609 (1983) ("The word 
'shall' is ordinarily interpreted as having a mandatory or 
imperative obligation").  Instead, by establishing the authority 
of municipal retirement boards to determine the eligibility of 
non-full-time employees at the outset, the Legislature gave such 
boards ample power to manage participation by non-full-time 
16 
 
employees in municipal retirement systems.  See G. L. c. 32, § 3 
(2) (d). 
 
Municipal retirement systems may well place systemic strain 
on municipal budgets.  The existing legislative framework 
provides a means for municipalities to address budget issues 
prospectively by controlling when and how non-full-time 
employees may, if at all, become members of the retirement 
systems.  Broader public policy decisions concerning municipal 
pensions rest with the Legislature. 
 
2.  Interpretation of separation from service.  The board 
argues that, even if it does not have the authority to revoke a 
non-full-time employee's membership once granted, DeFelice was 
"removed" when she stopped working her second job at the end of 
the 2000-2001 school year.11  The board contends that "removal" 
is a statutorily specified circumstance under § 3 (1) (a) (i), 
meaning that it had the authority to terminate DeFelice's 
membership.  As the facts are not in dispute, the question turns 
on the interpretation of § 3 (1) (a) (i).  We again start with 
the language of the statute, giving due weight to CRAB's 
expertise. 
                                                          
 
 
11 Although the board raised this issue below, CRAB did not 
address it.  We resolve the issue because, as the facts are 
undisputed, the parties raise an important matter of pure 
statutory interpretation. 
17 
 
 
Section 3 (1) (a) (i) provides that a member's status as a 
"member in service" continues until the member's "prior 
separation from the service becomes effective by reason of," 
among other things, "removal or discharge."  The operative event 
is the separation from service.  Id.  A "removal or discharge" 
in and of itself does not terminate an individual's member in 
service status.  See id. 
 
DeFelice remained in service even after she stopped working 
her second job after the 2000-2001 school year.  "Service" is 
generally defined, with no distinction between full-time and 
non-full-time employees, as "service as an employee in any 
governmental unit for which regular compensation is paid."  
G. L. c. 32, § 1.  Following the nine-week period establishing 
her eligibility, DeFelice remained "in service" of the 
department in a non-full-time capacity for at least several 
years.  See id.  Therefore, the statutory requirements for 
terminating membership were not satisfied because no "prior 
separation from [DeFelice's] service" had occurred.  See G. L. 
c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (1) (a) (i). 
 
The board's reliance on Retirement Bd. of Attleboro v. 
School Comm. of Attleboro, 417 Mass. 24 (1994), is misplaced.  
That case involved another provision of G. L. c. 32 containing 
18 
 
the phrase "removal or discharge."  Id. at 26-27.12  To give 
effect to both terms, we concluded that a "removal" must mean 
"something less than a complete termination of the employment 
relationship" for purposes of certain procedural protections 
owed to members in service.  Id. at 27.  Unlike § 3 (1) (a) (i), 
however, the provision in that case did not hinge upon whether 
there had been a separation from service.  Compare G. L. c. 32, 
§ 3 (1) (a) (i) (member in service status "shall continue" until 
member's "prior separation from the service becomes effective by 
reason of," among other things, "removal or discharge"), with 
Retirement Bd. of Attleboro, 417 Mass. at 25 n.3 ("The removal 
or discharge of [certain] member[s] in service . . . shall not 
become effective unless and until a written notice thereof 
containing a fair summary of the facts . . . has been filed with 
the board").  Section 3 (1) (a) (i) is not satisfied even if 
DeFelice was "removed" when she stopped working her second job 
at the end of the 2000-2001 school year, because there was no 
separation from service that became "effective by reason of" 
that removal. 
 
Conclusion.  The board established a low threshold for 
membership in its retirement system and decided DeFelice 
satisfied that threshold when it granted her membership.  
                                                          
 
 
12 The language at issue in Retirement Bd. of Attleboro, 
supra, no longer appears in G. L. c. 32, § 16. 
19 
 
DeFelice continued working for the department after she received 
membership.  Therefore, she became a "member in service" and her 
status as such "shall continue" until her death or a separation 
from service pursuant to one of the statutorily specified 
circumstances in G. L. c. 32, § 3 (1) (a) (i).  Because she 
continued working for the same governmental employer, although 
at reduced hours, there was no "separation from [her] service."  
See id.  As a result, DeFelice remained a member in service 
during her continued part-time employment following the 2000-
2001 school year, and was eligible to apply for retroactive 
membership.  See G. L. c. 32, § 3 (3) (allowing employee to 
obtain membership after date on which employee first became 
eligible during "present period of service" and if employee 
satisfies applicable age requirement). 
 
We conclude that CRAB reasonably interpreted § 3.  We 
reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.  A new judgment is 
to be entered affirming the decision of CRAB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.