Case Title: In re Charlisse C.

Citation: 45 Cal. 4th 145 original opinion

Docket Number: S152822

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 10/30/08 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re CHARLISSE C., a Person Coming 
) 
Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
) 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
) 
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 
) 
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S152822 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B194568 
SHADONNA C., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Respondent; 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CK49216 
 
 
) 
CHILDREN’S LAW CENTER, 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
Objector and Appellant. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
 
We granted review in this case to determine whether the juvenile court 
correctly disqualified the Children’s Law Center of Los Angeles (CLC) from 
representing Charlisse C., a minor, in this dependency action.  CLC is a publicly 
funded, nonprofit law office that represents parties in the Los Angeles County 
Juvenile Dependency Court.  It currently comprises three units:  a core unit, 
known as Unit 1, and two conflict units, known as Units 2 and 3.  Unit 3 
undertook to represent Charlisse in this action, which arose when a juvenile 
 
2
dependency petition was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 
alleging in part that Charlisse was at substantial risk of being abused or neglected 
due to the emotional and mental health problems of her mother, Shadonna C.  
Shadonna is a former client of CLC’s Unit 1 (or its predecessor).  Although 
finding no actual conflict of interest and no improper disclosure of confidential 
information, the juvenile court, citing Castro v. Los Angeles County Bd. of 
Supervisors (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1432 (Castro) and People v. Christian (1996) 
41 Cal.App.4th 986 (Christian), found that an erosion of the ethical screens 
separating CLC’s units created a structural conflict of interest warranting CLC’s 
disqualification.  In a divided decision, a majority of the Court of Appeal reversed 
the disqualification order.  For reasons set forth below, we conclude the trial court 
applied the wrong legal standard in ordering CLC’s disqualification and therefore 
abused its discretion.  We remand the matter for further consideration in 
accordance with the standards this opinion sets forth.  
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
On July 26, 2006, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and 
Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition alleging that six-day-old Charlisse came 
within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction for two reasons:  (1) she was at substantial 
risk of suffering serious physical harm because the “emotional/mental health 
condition” of her 19-year-old mother, Shadonna, “at times ha[d] interfered with 
[Shadonna’s] ability to provide regular care, supervision and a home” (see § 300, 
subd. (b)); and (2) Charlisse’s sister, Donna, had been abused or neglected by 
Shadonna and there was substantial risk that Charlisse would also be abused or 
neglected (see § 300, subd. (j)).  Regarding the latter allegation, the petition 
explained that Donna, who was born when Shadonna was 14 years old, is  
                                                 
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 
Code. 
 
3
a former juvenile court dependent and that the dependency ended with Donna’s 
adoption by her grandmother.  A simultaneously filed detention report noted that 
Shadonna is “a former foster youth” with a “history of behavioral problems.”
 
At the detention hearing on July 26, 2006, the juvenile court appointed a 
CLC attorney to represent Charlisse.  CLC is a publicly funded, nonprofit legal 
services organization that the County of Los Angeles created in 1989 to provide 
statutorily required legal representation to parents and children in the dependency 
court.2  (Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1436.)  It initially operated under a 
1990 agreement with the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (Board) 
requiring CLC to maintain a structure that enabled it to “represent as many as 
three separate parties in a dependency proceeding, even if they [had] conflicting 
interests.”  (Ibid.)  The 1990 agreement also required CLC to follow specified 
operating rules and procedures, including the following:  (1) CLC’s staff attorneys 
had to “be organized into three separate offices of comparable quality,” each with 
“its own separate administrator” with “full case management authority over all 
cases assigned to that office”; (2) “[e]ach office [had to] maintain separate case 
files,” and staff attorneys assigned to one office could not “have access to the case 
files of [another] office”; (3) “[a]ttorneys [could] not be transferred between 
offices”; and (4) CLC “corporate officers [could] promote, discipline, or dismiss a 
staff attorney only upon the recommendation of that attorney’s office 
administrator.”  In Castro, the Court of Appeal rejected the claim that CLC’s 
separate offices could not represent separate parties with potentially adverse 
interests in a single dependency proceeding, reasoning in part that CLC had “been 
structured so its attorneys and its separate groups [had] no contact with one 
another,” and that its “structures . . . reinforce[d]” the ethical duty of CLC’s 
                                                 
2  
CLC was initially called Dependency Court Legal Services, Inc.  For 
simplicity, we will refer to it as CLC. 
 
4
attorneys not to violate their clients’ confidences or compromise their legal 
interests.  (Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1442.)   
 
In July 2005, CLC began providing legal services under an agreement with 
California’s Administrative Office of the Courts.  At about the same time, CLC 
reorganized its three offices into three litigation units:  a “core” unit, known as 
Unit 1, and two “conflict” units, known as Units 2 and 3. 
 
The CLC attorney the juvenile court appointed to represent Charlisse was 
with Unit 3.  Shadonna, represented by a non-CLC attorney, objected to the 
appointment, asserting that she had been “a CLC client of [U]nit [1] when she was 
a child” and that a conflict of interest existed because, in light of CLC’s structural 
changes, its three units were “operating as one firm.”  The court, noting that it had 
appointed Unit 3, rather than Unit 1, to represent Charlisse, found no “factual 
conflict,” but left open the possibility that Shadonna could file a recusal motion 
and “make a record that, factually, the current structure of CLC violates” the 
structure Castro approved.   
 
Three weeks later, Shadonna moved to disqualify CLC and Unit 3 from 
further representation of any party.  In her moving papers, she asserted that she 
became a dependent child in December 2001 after her mother died, that CLC’s 
Unit 1 represented her when she was a dependent child, that Unit 1 later 
represented her again as a parent when her first child was detained in June 2002, 
that she received reunification services through December 2003 in connection with 
her first child, and that her first child was adopted and jurisdiction was terminated 
in February 2005.3  She then argued that because CLC’s prior representation of 
her substantially related to CLC’s current representation of Charlisse, 
                                                 
3  
Shadonna did not submit a declaration regarding her former representation 
by CLC, arguing that the circumstances of that representation were “subject to 
judicial notice from the Court’s own records.”  The juvenile court declined 
Shadonna’s request for judicial notice of the relevant facts, finding it 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
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disqualification was appropriate unless CLC showed that “it complie[d] with the 
structure set forth in Castro.”  She further argued that CLC’s “current structure” 
did not comply with Castro, that “[t]here ha[d] been no attempt to maintain ethical 
walls among [CLC’s] three units,” and that the ability of CLC’s administration “to 
dictate policy, hire, fire, set salaries, and interfere with the assignment of cases 
create[d] a de facto conflict of interest for every client with an adverse interest to 
another client within the organization.” 
In support of her motion, Shadonna submitted declarations from Kenneth 
Sherman, Anne Fragasso, Allen Korenstein, and Angela Pierce di Donato, all 
former CLC employees.  Sherman joined CLC in 1990 as a senior trial attorney 
and, in September 1997, became director of the office now known as Unit 2.  He 
stated generally that after Miriam Krinsky became CLC’s executive director in 
April 2002, she “repeatedly violated the ethical walls” separating CLC’s units.4  
Specifically, he stated: 
1.  In January 2003, Krinsky tried to convince him, one of his attorneys, 
and one of his supervisors to “quash” a subpoena for a DCFS employee in a case 
Sherman’s office was handling, because Krinsky was concerned “it would not 
look good if it appeared that [CLC] was not cooperating with” DCFS. 
2.  In early 2003, Krinsky asked fact-specific questions of an attorney in 
Sherman’s office who was representing a dependent child.  It was clear from the 
nature of the questions that Krinsky knew many of the facts of the case.  Sherman 
later discovered that the head of Unit 1 represented a sibling with a conflicting 
interest. 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
“unnecessary” to grant the request.  Nevertheless, CLC does not contest 
Shadonna’s factual assertions regarding its former representation of her.   
4  
In December 2006, Krinsky resigned from her position as CLC’s executive 
director. 
 
6
3.  In June 2003, “it was discovered” that Krinsky “surreptitiously had 
[CLC’s] computer administrator put her email address on each of the intraoffice 
confidential emails of the three law firms.  These intraoffice email lists were 
intended to be distribution lists for the staff within each office in order to ensure 
that there was no breach of confidentiality when information about cases was 
transmitted within the office. . . .  When [Krinsky] was informed of the breach of 
confidentiality and how this act could endanger the viability of the corporation, 
she relented and permitted the three firms to maintain intraoffice confidential 
email address lists.” 
4.  In fall 2003, Krinsky imposed a policy requiring her approval before a 
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 affidavit of prejudice could be used on a 
“blanket” basis or in a “class of cases” to disqualify a judicial officer.  She 
suspended the policy about a year later when Sherman provided her with an 
opinion on the policy from an “ethics expert.” 
5.  In spring 2005, when an attorney left Sherman’s office, Krinsky 
transferred one of the former attorney’s cases to Unit 1.  Krinsky felt it was not 
necessary to provide the client with notice and an opportunity to be heard, or to 
obtain a court order permitting the substitution, because CLC was counsel for the 
children.  More generally, Krinsky pursued transferring cases at will among the 
three firms. 
6.  Krinsky “indicated” to Sherman “[m]any times . . . that she felt that the 
interests of the organization as a whole [were] paramount to the interests of the 
law firms.”  
Fragasso was a CLC employee from 1999 until the middle of 2005.  At 
some point, she was a director of one of CLC’s three firms.  Like Sherman, 
Fragasso discussed (1) the policy Krinsky instituted in 2003 regarding blanket 
disqualification of judges, (2) Krinsky’s addition of herself in 2003 to each firm’s 
intraoffice e-mail address list without informing the firm directors, and (3) 
Krinsky’s view in 2005 that cases could be transferred to Unit 1 without giving 
 
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clients notice and an opportunity to be heard or obtaining a court order.  
According to Fragasso, regarding the last issue, Krinsky stated that as executive 
director, she had authority “to create whatever structure” she deemed appropriate.  
Fragasso also stated that when she refused to transfer cases without speaking to 
her clients in confidence and obtaining both their approval and a court order, 
Krinsky removed her as a law firm director. 
Korenstein worked for what is now CLC Unit 2 from May 2004 through 
March 2006.  He stated that he had “witnessed the transfer of a CLC [Unit] 2 
secretary to CLC [Unit] 1 without, to [his] knowledge any conflict checks and/or 
screens.”  He also stated that once, when he asked the head of his unit to “approve 
funding for an expert psychologist to review [a] case and possibly testify in court,” 
Unit 2’s head told him “to forward [the] request to” the “head of CLC [Unit] 1.” 
Di Donato was a Unit 2 attorney from December 1996 until January 2005.  
She stated that Krinsky came into her office one evening after entering Unit 2 
through a locked door that was not open to the public.  She told Krinsky she “was 
working on a difficult case that needed more attention.”  Krinsky asked questions 
“about the facts of the case,” “the client,” “what was going on in court,” and “what 
work [di Donato] was doing on” the case.  When di Donato decided to leave CLC 
in November 2004, she wanted to keep 15 cases.  Krinsky said the cases belonged 
to CLC and that she would decide which cases di Donato could take.  After di 
Donato explained the facts of each case to Krinsky, Krinsky permitted di Donato 
to keep only two child clients. 
With these declarations, Shadonna submitted a copy of the revised 
operating procedures CLC adopted in October 2005 (Revised Operating 
Procedures), which stated in relevant part:  “1.  CLC[’s] staff will continue to be 
assigned by CLC’s executive leadership to a core unit or such other conflict unit or 
units as CLC may choose to maintain over time (currently denoted as CLC [Units] 
1, 2, and 3).  The conflict unit or units will handle cases with siblings where 
conflicts of interest are present (‘conflict cases’) — to be denoted on CLC’s file 
 
8
and records as conflict cases — as well as any other nonconflict cases that may 
previously or in the future be assigned to that unit. . . .  Any determination that a 
conflict exists in a given case will be made only after consultation with, and 
approval by, a supervisor, as set forth in CLC’s conflict policy.  [¶] 2.  Each of 
CLC’s units will operate pursuant to the procedures set forth herein to ensure that 
ethical walls for handling conflict cases within CLC remain in place and are 
honored at all times.  Any questions or concerns that these procedures do not 
adequately preserve the separateness of conflict cases or that these procedures are 
not being complied with shall be directed to CLC’s Executive Director or the 
appropriate unit head.  [¶] 3.  Each CLC unit shall have a unit head.  The conflict 
unit head(s) shall ensure that conflict case files and all confidential case 
information relating to conflict cases assigned to a given unit are maintained by 
that unit, remain separate from the case files and confidential case information of 
the core firm and any other conflict unit(s), and cannot be accessed by any staff 
outside the conflict unit.  The conflict unit(s) head(s) and any other conflict unit 
supervisors shall supervise, direct and coordinate the day-to-day representation 
and case-related decision making in regard to conflict cases and conflict clients 
assigned to that unit and will be the final decision-maker in regard to those case-
specific issues.  [¶] 4.  [CLC’s] practice for promoting, terminating or disciplining 
CLC lawyers or staff members is unchanged.  The CLC Executive Director or his 
or her designee will remain the final decision-maker after considering a 
recommendation from the unit head or supervisor of that staff member, along with 
the basis for that recommendation.  In evaluating that recommendation, the CLC 
Executive Director will not have access to conflict unit case files, or any conflict 
unit client confidential information.  [¶] 5.  No attorney shall have access to the 
case files or confidential client information relating to any clients of other units in 
conflict with that attorney’s clients.  [¶] 6.  Where no conflict of interest or ethical 
concerns exist, cases may be reassigned within CLC, and in particular from the 
conflict unit(s) to the core firm.  [¶] 7.  CLC’s executive leadership shall be 
 
9
responsible for hiring and training staff attorneys and for assigning them, as 
appropriate and consistent with the Board’s restructuring plan, to the core firm or 
conflict unit(s).  All attorneys and staff shall receive training regarding the 
necessity of maintaining client confidences.  [¶] 8.  CLC will continue to remain 
counsel for all clients assigned to CLC.  To ensure that the appropriate staff 
member receives notices, pleadings, and other information relating to clients, 
individual attorneys within CLC will serve as the responsible attorney — the 
attorney of record — for cases assigned to that attorney.  If those individual 
attorneys leave CLC’s employ or change courtrooms or caseloads, a notice will be 
filed with the court and sent to all critical persons and entities, designating the new 
responsible attorney of record within CLC.  As noted above, the conflict unit 
head(s) will maintain ultimate and final responsibility for the supervision, 
direction and coordination of case-related decision making in regard to conflict 
cases and conflict clients assigned to that unit and will be the final decision-maker 
in regard to those case-specific issues.” 
 
In opposition to the motion, CLC argued that Shadonna’s evidentiary 
showing was insufficient to warrant disqualification and that CLC’s structure and 
operating procedures closely complied with the standards set forth in Castro and 
several other decisions, including Christian and City and County of San Francisco 
v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 839 (Cobra).  CLC submitted 
declarations from Krinsky explaining that when CLC shifted its focus from 
representing both parents and children to representing only children, its tripartite 
structure of three semi-autonomous divisions became outdated and unnecessary.  
Thus, in early 2005, CLC’s board of directors decided to begin “ ‘moving CLC to 
a unified and more cohesive organizational structure.’ ”  The Revised Operating 
Procedures were later adopted to “implement” a “gradual shift . . . toward a more 
unified organizational structure with a ‘core firm’ and ‘conflict units.’ ”  
 
In her declarations, Krinsky stated that CLC strictly adhered to its Revised 
Operating Procedures and enforced existing ethical walls, and that she was 
 
10
unaware “of any material breaches” of CLC’s Revised Operating Procedures, 
ethical walls, or conflicts policy.  She denied that she or other executive officers, 
attorneys, or staff from Unit 1 had access to case files in Units 2 and 3; that Unit 1 
leadership and attorneys had access to client confidential information relating to 
cases of Units 2 and 3; that she had ever used a key to access the office spaces of 
Units 2 and 3 or any confidential case files;5 that she had received any confidential 
information relating to, or exercised any control over, this case; that she had ever 
“forced any CLC lawyer to discuss a conflict case or reveal client confidential 
information”; that CLC’s “executive leadership” had any involvement in case-
specific decisions of Units 2 and 3 or supervision of cases assigned to those units; 
or that attorneys working in Units 2 and 3 needed approval from her or from Unit 
1 before paying ordinary trial expenses, such as the costs of retaining expert 
witnesses.  She also stated that extraordinary expenses for Units 2 and 3 might 
need her approval in order to ensure that CLC operated within its budgetary 
limitations, but that in evaluating an extraordinary expense request, neither she nor 
her staff had inquired into the specific facts of any case or obtained confidential 
information.   
 
Regarding some of the other specific charges detailed in the declarations 
Shadonna submitted, Krinsky explained that she added her name to the intraoffice 
e-mail list of all CLC units in June 2003 “in order to be kept apprised of general 
office email discussions of events, issues of common concern, or other non-case 
specific matters.”  She also stated that when concern was raised “that these email 
groups might on occasion also include emails relating to case-specific and 
confidential information, [she] immediately directed that a client confidential 
email group be created for each unit, without [her] inclusion in those groups, and 
informed [CLC’s] staff that all client confidential and case specific email 
                                                 
5  
Krinsky stated she did “not know” whether she had a key to the offices of 
Units 2 and 3. 
 
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communication should occur on that email group.”  Krinsky also stated that she 
had “no recollection” of a meeting in early 2003 during which, according to 
Sherman’s declaration, she asked fact-specific questions of one of Sherman’s 
lawyers, and that she had “no specific recollection” of the conversation that, 
according to di Donato, occurred in di Donato’s office.  She did recall what she 
described as “a late-night ‘rapport-building’ conversation” with di Donato.  She 
acknowledged having had conversations with di Donato concerning which cases di 
Donato could take with her when she left CLC, but denied that any “client 
confidential information was ever passed to” her during those conversations.   
Krinsky also acknowledged that CLC had once adopted a policy regarding “the 
exercise of blanket peremptory challenges that were not tethered to a particular 
case,” but stated that the policy (1) “made clear that it in no way constrained the 
exercise of decisionmaking in individual cases and that those decisions remained 
the prerogative of individual attorneys, under the supervision of their unit heads,” 
and (2) “clearly precluded the sharing of any confidential or case specific 
information with the Executive Director or among unit heads.”  She also declared 
that the policy had been put “in abeyance.”  
 
Regarding employment practices, Krinsky stated that “[a]s was the case 
under” the operating procedures Castro reviewed, under CLC’s Revised Operating 
Procedures, she, as CLC’s executive director, had (1) “final authority, upon the 
recommendation of the CLC Unit Heads, with regard to promoting, terminating, or 
disciplining CLC[’s] lawyers or staff members,” (2) “authority over CLC[’s] 
budget and how funds get allocated in relation to CLC[’s] operating costs,” and (3) 
“authority over hiring decisions, and assignment of lawyers to particular CLC 
units.”  Krinsky also acknowledged that secretaries were moved between units, but 
stated that this practice predated her employment as executive director and that she 
directed that secretaries be advised of the need to preserve client confidences.  
 
CLC also submitted declarations from its unit heads, David Estep, Marc 
Leftwich, and Ivy Carey.  Estep, who headed Unit 1, which formerly represented 
 
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Shadonna, denied that he, the executive officers, or any Unit 1 attorney had access 
to files of cases assigned to Units 2 and 3.  He also stated that Krinsky had 
underscored the need to ensure that secretaries were advised of and abided by the 
rules for preserving client confidences and maintaining ethical walls, and that CLC 
strictly enforced ethical walls separating Units 1, 2, and 3, and the executive 
leadership.  Finally, he stated that one of his “role[s]” as unit head was to “ensure 
that no attorneys or staff from” Units 2 and 3 “have access to the case files and 
client confidential information relating to cases assigned to” Unit 1, and that he 
neither was “aware” of nor “believe[d]” there had been any “material breaches of 
CLC Operating Procedures, CLC’s ethical walls, or the CLC conflicts policy.”   
Leftwich, who headed Unit 2, and Carey, who headed Unit 3, made similar 
statements.  Leftwich also stated that he had complete autonomy in funding 
ordinary trial expenses consistent with the limitations of the Unit 2 budget.  As to 
Korenstein’s statement that he was once directed to forward a request for expert 
witness funding to the head of Unit 1, Leftwich noted Korenstein’s failure to 
identify the case or client involved and stated his (Leftwich’s) recollection that 
“the request was for an extraordinary expense and that the decision not to hire this 
particular expert witness was made independent of cost and based on strategic 
reasons related to the specifics of the case and discussed only with and among 
[Unit 2] attorneys and supervisors.”  Carey stated that she opposed the 
disqualification motion as head of Unit 3, no one had pressured her to do so, and 
she had “full autonomy with regard to representing” Charlisse. 
 
The juvenile court granted the disqualification motion.  In the court’s view, 
the key issue was whether CLC’s current structure “either inherently or in practice 
violates the ethical walls that Castro mandated to be in place in order to allow an 
umbrella organization to represent more than one party in a pending lawsuit.”  
Finding the declarations supporting the disqualification motion to be “more 
persuasive than the opposition motion,” the court explained:  “I get the impression 
that CLC says one thing and does something else.  [¶] They have established a 
 
13
structure which they claim they strictly adhere to, but the underlying facts suggest 
otherwise.”  The court noted that it was basing its decision on “the whole picture, 
. . . taking all of the declarations together,” but that two things in particular 
“jumped out” of the record:  (1) Sherman’s “allegations or assertions” that Krinsky 
“went into their computer system without getting permission or consent in order to 
get access to confidential communications that were being circulated in each 
office”; and (2) a “subtle change” since Castro in CLC’s rules regarding certain 
employment decisions.  Regarding the latter, the court reasoned that whereas the 
operating rules at issue in Castro permitted promotion, discipline, and termination 
to be initiated only by the chief attorney of each CLC unit, the Revised Operating 
Procedures, although possibly “ambiguous,” “seem[ed] to imply that the executive 
director could initiate” these actions and had “assumed the responsibility or the 
authority to fire or promote, etcetera.”  Finally, although acknowledging CLC’s 
point that there had “been no evidence presented of any specific breach of 
confidentiality in any particular case,” the court stated:  “The courts seem to be 
really concerned about, in addition, the appearance of conflict.  And it seems to 
me that in the consolidation of all of the cases into one core unit and the practice 
that’s been presented in the declarations, . . . the ethical walls may have been 
breached.”  Summarizing, the court explained that it was disqualifying CLC based 
on “a violation . . . of the Castro and Christian safeguards regarding conflict of 
interest in representing multiple parties in the same action.”6  
 
During subsequent hearings related to a requested stay of its 
disqualification order, the court reiterated the basis of its ruling.  It explained that 
“no specific — to this case — conflict [had been] raised in terms of the divulgence 
of any confidential or privileged communication” and “no evidence [had been]  
                                                 
6  
After stating and explaining its tentative ruling, the court offered to hold an 
evidentiary hearing to give CLC an opportunity “to [flesh] out further the 
declarations and cross-examine the declarants.”  CLC declined the offer. 
 
14
presented of an actual factual conflict,” and that it based the disqualification order 
on its finding of “a Castro type [structural] conflict” created by “a gradual erosion 
of [CLC’s] ethical walls” that precluded CLC from “represent[ing] more than one 
party to a lawsuit.” 
 
A divided Court of Appeal, producing three separate opinions, reversed the 
disqualification order.  In the lead opinion, Justice Mosk asserted that the Castro 
factors are not dispositive here because Castro involved concurrent 
representation — i.e., CLC’s simultaneous representation of multiple parties in a 
single proceeding — whereas this case involves successive representation — i.e., 
CLC’s representation of a party whose interests are adverse to a former CLC 
client.  Instead, Justice Mosk reasoned, on the facts here, whether disqualification 
is warranted turns on the likelihood “that confidential information relating to 
[Shadonna’s] prior representation by [CLC’s] Unit 1 would be shared with or be 
readily accessible to [Charlisse’s] current attorney in . . . Unit 3.”  In Justice 
Mosk’s view, because Shadonna’s evidence failed to establish such a likelihood, 
disqualification was unwarranted.  Moreover, Justice Mosk explained, the record 
did not warrant disqualification even under Castro.  In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Armstrong “agree[d] with” Justice Mosk’s “analysis of the facts with 
reference to Castro” and with his conclusion that the evidence “cannot be read to 
support a finding that CLC meaningfully departed from the practices approved in 
Castro and operated as one law firm.”  Thus, in Justice Armstrong’s view, because 
“CLC operated as three separate law firms,” disqualification was improper.  In 
dissent, Presiding Justice Turner argued that the juvenile court “reasonably could 
have found” from the evidence that “while [CLC] represented” Shadonna, “the 
ethical restrictions imposed on a nonprofit legal services corporation recognized in 
Castro . . . were materially violated and, under established successive 
representation rules, disqualification was warranted.” 
 
We then granted the petitions for review of Shadonna and Charlisse.  
 
15
DISCUSSION 
 
 
“A trial court’s authority to disqualify an attorney derives from the power 
inherent in every court ‘[t]o control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its 
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a 
judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto.’  [Citations.]”  
(People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 
20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145 (SpeeDee Oil).)  “Generally, a trial court’s decision on a 
disqualification motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  [Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 
1143.)  As to disputed factual issues, a reviewing court’s role is simply to 
determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact; 
“the reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for . . . express or implied 
[factual] findings [that are] supported by substantial evidence.  [Citations.]”  
(Ibid.)  As to the trial court’s conclusions of law, however, review is de novo; a 
disposition that rests on an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion.  
(Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712; People v. Superior 
Court (Humberto S.) 43 Cal.4th 737, 742.)  The trial court’s “application of the 
law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.”  (Haraguchi, supra, 
at p. 712.)   
 
Conflicts of interest commonly arise in one of two factual contexts:  (1) in 
cases of successive representation, where an attorney seeks to represent a client 
with interests that are potentially adverse to a former client of the attorney; and (2) 
in cases of simultaneous representation, where an attorney seeks to represent in a 
single action multiple parties with potentially adverse interests.  The primary 
fiduciary value at stake in each of these context differs, and the applicable 
disqualification standards vary accordingly.  In successive representation cases, 
“the chief fiduciary value jeopardized is that of client confidentiality.”  (Flatt v. 
Superior Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275, 283 (Flatt).)  Therefore, the disqualification 
standards we have developed for such cases focus on the former client’s interest 
 
16
“in ensuring the permanent confidentiality of matters disclosed to the attorney in 
the course of the prior representation.”  (Ibid.)  In simultaneous representation 
cases, “[t]he primary value at stake . . . is the attorney’s duty — and the client’s 
legitimate expectation — of loyalty, rather than confidentiality.”  (Id. at p. 284.)  
Because a conflict involving an attorney’s duty of loyalty is “[t]he most 
egregious” kind of conflict, the disqualification standards we have developed for 
simultaneous representation cases are “more stringent” than those that apply in 
successive representation cases; “[w]ith few exceptions, disqualification [in a case 
of simultaneous representation] follows automatically, regardless of whether the 
simultaneous representations have anything in common or present any risk that 
that confidences obtained in one matter would be used in the other.  [Citation.]”  
(SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1147.)  This strict rule recognizes that “[a] 
client who learns that his or her lawyer is also representing a litigation adversary, 
even with respect to a matter wholly unrelated to the one for which counsel was 
retained, cannot long be expected to sustain the level of confidence and trust in 
counsel that is one of the foundations of the professional relationship.  All legal 
technicalities aside, few if any clients would be willing to suffer the prospect of 
their attorney continuing to represent them under such circumstances.”  (Flatt, 
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 285, italics omitted.) 
 
In light of these principles, we conclude the juvenile court here applied an 
incorrect legal standard in disqualifying CLC.  As explained above, the juvenile 
court stated it was ordering disqualification based on CLC’s failure to observe the 
structural safeguards discussed in Castro and Christian.  However, unlike the case 
now before us, which involves successive representation — i.e., CLC’s proposed 
representation of a client, Charlisse, whose interests arguably are adverse to a 
former CLC client, Shadonna — Castro and Christian involved “conflicts arising 
 
17
from simultaneous representation.”7  (Cobra, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 849, italics 
added.)  Because Castro and Christian involved simultaneous representation, the 
disqualification standards they applied necessarily were different from — and 
more stringent than — the standards that govern the successive representation case 
now before us.  Accordingly, as the lead opinion here observed, the factors 
emphasized in Castro and Christian are not necessarily dispositive in this case, 
and the juvenile court’s finding that CLC did not observe some of the safeguards 
Castro and Christian discussed does not automatically warrant disqualification.  
The juvenile court committed legal error — and thus, abused its discretion — in 
concluding otherwise.8 
 
Where, as in this case, the potential conflict arises from an attorney’s 
successive representation of clients with potentially adverse interests, and the 
primary value at stake is therefore client confidentiality, the correct legal standard 
generally requires disqualification of the attorney if “the [former] client 
demonstrate[s] a ‘substantial relationship’ between the subjects of the antecedent 
                                                 
7  
Castro addressed a challenge to CLC’s ability simultaneously to represent 
in a single action multiple parties with potentially adverse interests.  (Castro, 
supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1434.)  In Christian, on appeal from his criminal 
conviction, the defendant argued that a conflict of interest existed between his 
codefendant’s trial attorney, who was a deputy public defender, and his own trial 
attorney, who was a member of the alternate defender’s office (ADO), because the 
ADO was “a branch of” the county public defender’s office and was under the 
public defender’s supervision.  (Christian, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 989-992.) 
8  
In reaching this conclusion, we express no opinion as to whether a failure to 
observe one or more of the structural safeguards Castro discussed would require 
CLC’s disqualification in a simultaneous representation case.  We note, however, 
that although Castro discussed the existence of certain structural safeguards as one 
of many factors in its analysis, it did not purport to establish a bright-line test of 
disqualification based on those safeguards or suggest that disqualification would 
be necessary absent one of those safeguards.  On the contrary, it “emphasized that 
rulings on disqualifications must proceed according to the circumstances of each 
case, in light of several competing interests.”  (Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 
1441.) 
 
 
18
and current representations.”  (Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 283.)  Through the rule 
of “vicarious disqualification,” we have generally extended this rule to require 
disqualification of a disqualified attorney’s entire law firm.  (Speedee Oil, supra, 
20 Cal.4th at p. 1153.)  Thus, “[w]hen a conflict of interest requires an attorney’s 
disqualification from a matter, the disqualification normally extends vicariously to 
the attorney’s entire law firm.  [Citation.]”   (Id. at p. 1139.)  “The rule of 
vicarious disqualification is based upon the doctrine of imputed knowledge,” 
which posits that the knowledge of one attorney in a law firm is the knowledge of 
all attorneys in the firm.  (Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 
1324, 1333.)  By “recogniz[ing] the everyday reality that attorneys, working 
together and practicing law in a professional association, share each other’s, and 
their clients’, confidential information” (SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 
1153-1154), the vicarious disqualification rule “safeguards clients’ legitimate 
expectations that their attorneys will protect client confidences.  [Citation.]”  (Id. 
at p. 1139.) 
 
CLC does not dispute that a substantial relationship exists between the 
subjects of the former and current representations at issue here.  Accordingly, for 
purposes of analyzing this case, we assume that the Unit 1 attorney who formerly 
represented Shadonna has a disqualifying conflict of interest.  Thus, the only 
question here is whether, under the vicarious disqualification rule, that 
disqualifying conflict of interest requires disqualification of all other CLC 
attorneys, including the Unit 3 attorney the juvenile court appointed to represent 
Charlisse. 
 
In answering this question, we begin by noting that there are court-created 
limitations to the vicarious disqualification rule, which itself was “judicially 
created.”  (Cobra, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 848.)  As here relevant, California courts 
have generally declined to apply an automatic and inflexible rule of vicarious 
disqualification in the context of public law offices.  Instead, in this context, courts 
have looked to whether the public law office has adequately protected, and will 
 
19
continue to adequately protect, the former client’s confidences through timely, 
appropriate, and effective screening measures and/or structural safeguards.   
 
For example, in City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2004) 122 
Cal.App.4th 17, 27 (Santa Barbara), where an attorney representing homeowners 
in litigation against the City of Santa Barbara left her private law firm and joined 
the city attorney’s office, the court held that the attorney’s disqualifying conflict of 
interest did not warrant recusal of the entire city attorney’s office in light of 
“screening measures established by the city attorney” that were “both timely and 
effective in protecting the [homeowners’] confidences.”  In Chadwick v. Superior 
Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 108, 119, where an attorney left a county public 
defender’s office and joined the local district attorney’s office, the court held that 
because screening measures had “sufficiently isolated” the attorney “from the 
prosecution of his former clients,” his disqualifying conflict of interest did not 
warrant disqualifying the entire district attorney’s office from prosecuting cases in 
which he had represented the defendants.  And in Love v. Superior Court (1980) 
111 Cal.App.3d 367, 374, where a public defender’s legal research assistant 
became an attorney and joined the major crimes section of the local district 
attorney’s office, the court held that only the attorney and the other lawyers in his 
section were disqualified from prosecuting a defendant for whom the attorney had 
worked while at the public defender’s office; the other attorneys in the district 
attorney’s office, who had no “working relationship” with the attorney in question, 
were not.  (See also In re Charles L. (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 760, 765 [declining to 
impute confidential knowledge of one attorney in county district attorney’s office 
to entire staff, given “the size and structure of the organization” and “no evidence 
that information concerning [defendants] flows freely within the district attorney’s 
office”]; People v. Pineda (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 860, 865 [“absen[t] . . . some 
affirmative showing that a particular deputy public defender has acquired 
confidential adverse information about a defendant from the files or other 
employees of the office, any claim of conflict of interest would be groundless”]; 
 
20
cf. Chambers v. Superior Court (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 893, 903 [reversing 
disqualification order in part because private law firm representing plaintiffs had 
“undertaken sufficient protective measures to screen” former government attorney 
“from any participation” in action against the state].) 
 
Courts have cited several considerations in declining to apply an automatic 
and inflexible rule of vicarious disqualification in the context of public law 
offices.  Summarizing some of these considerations, the court in Santa Barbara 
explained:  “Unlike their private sector counterparts, public sector lawyers do not 
have a financial interest in the matters on which they work.  As a result, they may 
have less, if any, incentive to breach client confidences.  [Citation.]  Public sector 
lawyers also do not recruit clients or accept fees.  As a result, they have no 
financial incentive to favor one client over another.  [Citation.]  [¶]  . . . 
[V]icarious disqualification in the public sector context imposes different burdens 
on the affected public entities, lawyers and clients.  Most frequently cited is the 
difficulty public law offices would have in recruiting competent lawyers.  Private 
sector law firms may hesitate to hire a lawyer from a public law office, to avoid 
being disqualified in future matters involving that office.  Individual lawyers may 
hesitate to accept public sector jobs, to avoid limiting their future opportunities in 
the private sector.  [Citation.]  Clients whose interests are adverse to a public 
entity could be deprived of their chosen counsel, or find it difficult to retain 
counsel at all, particularly in highly specialized areas of the law.  [Citation.]  
Public entities may face the same difficulty and be forced to avoid hiring lawyers 
with relevant private sector experience.  Disqualification increases costs for public 
entities just as it does for private sector litigants.  When a public entity is involved, 
these higher costs raise the possibility that litigation decisions will be driven by 
financial considerations rather than by the public interest.  [Citation.]”  (Santa 
Barbara, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 24-25.)  Moreover, public law offices 
often have “a special area of expertise not generally shared by the litigation bar.”  
(Id. at p. 23, fn. 1.)  “In light of these considerations, courts have more readily 
 
21
accepted the use of screening procedures or ethical walls as an alternative to 
vicarious disqualification in cases involving public law offices.”  (Id. at p. 25.)  As 
the Christian court put it, “in the public sector, in light of the somewhat lessened 
potential for conflicts of interest and the high public price paid for disqualifying 
whole offices of government-funded attorneys, use of internal screening 
procedures or ‘ethical walls’ to avoid conflicts within government offices . . . have 
been permitted.  [Citations.]”  (Christian, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 998.) 
 
Courts have also held, however, that where the attorney with the actual 
conflict has managerial, supervisorial, and/or policymaking responsibilities in a 
public law office, screening may not be sufficient to avoid vicarious 
disqualification of the entire office.  For example, in Younger v. Superior Court 
(1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 892, 894-897, where an attorney representing a criminal 
defendant became the assistant district attorney in a county district attorney’s 
office, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
disqualifying the entire district attorney’s office.  The appellate court reasoned 
that, despite “steps . . . taken to insure that [the assistant district attorney] ha[d] no 
contacts with the prosecution of any of his [former] clients,” two aspects of his job 
duties created “an appearance of possible impropriety” that rendered the trial 
court’s decision “reasonable”:  (1) his attendance at weekly meetings of the 
office’s executive staff, which meant he could, even “quite innocently,” participate 
in formulating prosecutorial policies that might affect the office’s prosecution of 
his former clients; and (2) his membership on the office’s promotions committee, 
which might impact how attorneys in the office handled cases against his former 
clients.  (Id. at pp. 896-897.) 9  Similarly, in People v. Lepe (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 
685, 689, where an attorney representing criminal defendants became the District 
                                                 
9  
In Cobra, supra, 38 Cal.4th at page 850, we observed that although the 
Legislature, by statute, had “superseded” Younger’s holding, “the concerns” the 
Younger court “expressed about conflicted heads of public law offices . . . have 
not lost their relevance.”  (Fn. omitted.) 
 
22
Attorney for Imperial County, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court had 
not abused its discretion in disqualifying the entire district attorney’s office, 
reasoning:  “As the deputies are hired by [the district attorney], evaluated by 
[him], promoted by [him] and fired by [him], we cannot say the office can be 
sanitized such to assume the deputy who prosecutes the case will not be influenced 
by the considerations that bar [the district attorney] himself from participation in 
the case.” 
 
In Cobra, we recently reviewed and applied these principles in affirming an 
order disqualifying the entire San Francisco City Attorney’s Office from 
representing the City and County of San Francisco (City) in the City’s civil 
lawsuit against a company the city attorney, before his election, had represented in 
connection with substantially related matters.  (Cobra, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 
843.)  We noted that the city attorney had taken “measures to screen himself from 
the case to the extent that it could involve [his] former client.”  (Id. at p. 844.)  
Citing Santa Barbara and Chadwick, we also noted that “California courts have 
upheld the ethical screening of” a disqualified attorney “within the government 
office to protect confidences the attorney obtained from the former client in a prior 
representation” that preceded the attorney’s employment with the “government 
law office.”  (Cobra, supra, at p. 853.)  However, we found those decisions 
inapposite because, in each case, “the attorney who was subject to ethical 
screening was simply one of the attorneys in the government office, not . . . the 
City Attorney under whom and at whose pleasure all deputy city attorneys serve.”  
(Ibid.)  In explaining why, on the facts presented, ethical screening was 
insufficient to prevent disqualification of the entire public law office, we stated:  
“Individuals who head a government law office occupy a unique position because 
they are ultimately responsible for making policy decisions that determine how the 
agency’s resources and efforts will be used.  Moreover, the attorneys who serve 
directly under them cannot be entirely insulated from those policy decisions, nor 
can they be freed from real or perceived concerns as to what their boss wants.  The 
 
23
power to review, hire, and fire is a potent one.  Thus, a former client may 
legitimately question whether a government law office, now headed by the client’s 
former counsel, has the unfair advantage of knowing the former client’s 
confidential information when it litigates against the client in a matter 
substantially related to the attorney's prior representation of that client.”  (Id. at pp. 
853-854.)  Finally, “[p]ublic perception that a city attorney and his deputies might 
be influenced by the city attorney’s previous representation of the client, at the 
expense of the best interests of the city, would insidiously undermine public 
confidence in the integrity of municipal government and its city attorney's office.”  
(Id. at p. 854.)   
 
Although we affirmed the trial court’s broad disqualification order in Cobra 
on the facts there presented, we noted that “ethical screening might suffice to 
shield a senior supervisory attorney with a personal conflict and thus avoid 
vicarious disqualification of the entire government legal unit under that attorney’s 
supervision.”  (Cobra, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 850, fn. 2.)  We explained that, in 
ruling on a disqualification motion involving this situation, a trial court should 
make “a factual inquiry” into the supervisor’s (1) “actual duties . . . with respect to 
those attorneys who will be ethically screened,” and (2) “responsibility for setting 
policies that might bear on the subordinate attorneys’ handling of the litigation.  In 
addition, the trial court should consider whether public awareness of the case, or 
the conflicted attorney’s role in the litigation, or another circumstance is likely to 
cast doubt on the integrity of the governmental law office’s continued 
participation in the matter.”  (Ibid.) 
 
The approach the decisions discussed above have taken with respect to 
public law offices is the approach the juvenile court should have taken here in 
 
24
deciding whether to disqualify CLC.10  In other words, the juvenile court should 
have determined whether CLC has adequately protected, and will continue to 
adequately protect, Shadonna’s confidences through timely, appropriate, and 
effective screening measures and/or structural safeguards.  This approach is 
appropriate with respect to CLC because, as the court in Castro explained in 
declining to apply to CLC the strict vicarious disqualification rule that applies to 
private law firms in simultaneous representation cases:  “Unlike a private law 
firm, [CLC] is a nonprofit corporation.  It is a creation of a public entity, the 
Board.”  (Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1442.)  It “represents clients who 
cannot and do not pay for services rendered on their behalf.  A third party, the 
[B]oard, funds [CLC], and clients do not pay for the services the law firm renders.  
Hence no client becomes ‘more important’ than some other client, and no [CLC] 
lawyer has any ‘obvious financial incentive’ to favor one client over another.  
Quite the opposite is true; because a third party pays, the attorney has every 
incentive to devote his or her entire efforts on behalf of the client.”  (Id. at p. 
1441.)  Thus, as the lead opinion here explained, whether CLC’s disqualification 
is warranted turns on the likelihood that the Unit 3 attorney the juvenile court 
appointed to represent Charlisse has obtained or will acquire, either intentionally 
or inadvertently, confidential information CLC acquired through Unit 1’s prior 
representation of Shadonna. 
However, we do not agree with the lead opinion that the evidentiary burden 
on this issue falls on Shadonna as the party seeking disqualification.  Instead, the 
burden is on CLC to show that, through timely, appropriate, and effective 
screening measures and/or structural safeguards, the confidential information 
acquired during Unit 1’s prior representation of Shadonna has been, and will be, 
                                                 
10  
These decisions belie the assertion of Shadonna and counsel for Charlisse 
that an inquiry into the existence and adequacy of screening in a public law office 
is inconsistent with relevant California precedent. 
 
25
adequately protected during Unit 3’s proposed representation of Charlisse.11  This 
burden properly falls on CLC because it has unique access to the relevant 
information.12  (Cf. In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 
572, 596 [attorney resisting disqualification “has the burden of showing” effective 
screening of employee with confidential information from former employment]; 
Higdon v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1667, 1680 [party resisting 
disqualification has “the burden to show that effective screening” of disqualified 
attorney “has taken place”]; see also U.S. v. Goot (7th Cir. 1990) 894 F.2d 231, 
235, fn. 8 [law office resisting disqualification must establish that “ ‘infected’ 
attorney” has been sufficiently screened]; Schiessle v. Stephens (7th Cir. 1983) 
717 F.2d 417, 421 [same]; State v. Pennington (N.M.Ct.App. 1993) 851 P.2d 494, 
501 [“state has the burden to establish that staff members working on the 
prosecution have been effectively screened from contact with the disqualified staff 
member”]; State v. Tate (Tenn.Crim.App. 1995) 925 S.W.2d 548, 557 [“burden of 
proof must rest upon the state to establish that appropriate screening measures 
have been taken”].)   
It is unclear from the record here whether, under the proper standards, the 
juvenile court would have disqualified CLC.  On the one hand, it is significant that 
the juvenile court found no evidence “of any specific breach of confidentiality in 
                                                 
11  
We speak here only of the burden as to protection of the former client’s 
information.  It remains the former client’s burden to show both the fact of the 
former representation and the existence of a substantial relationship between the 
former and current representations.  (Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 283.)  We 
disapprove People v. Pineda, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d 860, to the extent it suggests 
the burden is on the party seeking disqualification to show that actual information 
sharing has occurred. 
12  
In addition, this allocation of burden will minimize the discovery issues 
that, according to Shadonna and counsel for Charlisse, the Court of Appeal’s lead 
opinion would create by placing the burden on the party seeking disqualification.  
In any event, the discovery issues involved in applying this approach seem no 
greater than those involved in the juvenile court’s approach, i.e., determining the 
extent of CLC’s adherence to the structural safeguards Castro discussed.   
 
26
any particular case,” “no evidence . . . of an actual factual conflict,” and “no 
specific — to this case — conflict raised in terms of the divulgence of any 
confidential or privileged communication.”  On the other hand, potentially 
significant evidentiary omissions exist in the record that make it inadvisable to 
make a disqualification determination in the first instance on appeal.  For example, 
the record contains no evidence as to whether Shadonna’s former Unit 1 attorney 
is still with that unit, has transferred to another unit, or has left CLC altogether.13  
Nor is there any evidence as to whether the Unit 3 attorney who proposes to 
represent Charlisse now either was with CLC when Unit 1 represented Shadonna 
or was with Unit 1 at some point.  Notably, neither attorney submitted a 
declaration with factual information relevant to Shadonna’s disqualification 
motion.14  Because the parties and the juvenile court focused on the wrong legal 
standards, and because the rules we discuss here are new in some respects (e.g., 
regarding placement of the evidentiary burden), “[w]e cannot foreclose the 
possibility that further information was available, but not presented, at the time the 
[juvenile] court ruled upon the motion.”  (People v. Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 
81.)  Accordingly, the prudent course is to remand the matter to the juvenile court 
for rehearing of the disqualification motion, rather than to decide the matter on the 
existing state of the evidentiary record.  (Ibid; see also Richards v. CH2M Hill, 
Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 824 [“proper course” is to remand for application of 
“new” standard “to the facts of this case”]; Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 
20 Cal.4th 785, 803 [remand for further factfinding appropriate where trial court’s 
                                                 
13  
As previously noted, CLC’s original operating procedures provided that 
“[a]ttorneys may not be transferred between offices.”  The Revised Operating 
Procedures now in effect contain no similar prohibition, and instead provide that 
“CLC’s executive leadership shall be responsible for . . . assigning” staff attorneys 
“to the core firm or conflict unit(s).” 
14  
As we have noted in a related context, “[s]worn representations have been 
held to be effective in assuring the court that insulation of prior confidential 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
27
application of incorrect legal standard keeps it from resolving factual disputes]; 
Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank (1979) 23 Cal.3d 442, 454 [remand 
proper where trial court’s ruling “rested upon [an] erroneous legal basis” and thus 
“constituted an abuse of . . . discretion”].)  On remand, the parties may present 
additional evidence on the issues involved.15 
DISPOSITION 
 
Because, as explained above, the juvenile court applied the wrong legal 
standards and reconsideration of the disqualification motion is therefore 
appropriate, the Court of Appeal’s judgment reversing the disqualification order is 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
communications from present representation has occurred and will continue to 
occur.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1002.) 
15  
In noting information that is absent from this record, we are not holding 
that the missing information is either necessary or determinative in every case.  
Nor are we holding that the evidence here regarding CLC’s structure, its structural 
safeguards, and its general compliance or noncompliance with those safeguards, is 
not relevant or significant.  We are simply identifying information that may be 
important in determining whether the former client’s confidential information has 
been, and will continue to be, adequately protected.  As case law suggests, other 
information — such as the former attorney’s supervisorial duties — may also be 
important. 
 
28
affirmed with directions to remand this action to the juvenile court for a hearing on 
Shadonna’s disqualification motion in accordance with the views expressed in this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Charlisse C. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 149 Cal.App.4th 1554 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S152822 
Date Filed: October 30, 2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Stanley Genser, Temporary Judge* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, Rex S. Heinke and Seth M.M. Stodder for Objector and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
John Cahill, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Minor. 
 
William Wesley Patton as Amicus Curiae. 
 
 
 
*Pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Rex S. Heinke 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld 
2029 Century Park East, Suite 2400 
Los Angeles, CA  90067-3012 
(310) 229-1000 
 
John L. Dodd 
John L. Dodd & Associates 
17621 Irvine Boulevard, Suite 200 
Tustin, CA  92780 
(714) 731-5572 
 
John Cahill 
Law Offices of John Cahill 
2550 Hollywood Way, Suite 202 
Burbank, CA  91505-5016 
(818) 565-0440