Case Title: Knight v. Environmental Quality Council of State of Wyo.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90-154

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Knight v. Environmental Quality Council of State of Wyo.1991 WY 8805 P.2d 268Case Number: 90-154Decided: 01/23/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
Edward 
KNIGHT,

 Appellant (Petitioner),

 

v.

 

ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY COUNCIL OF the STATE OF WYOMING, Aspens 
Water and Sewer District (Aspens I) and Teton Pines Water and Sewer District 
(Aspens II),

Appellees 
(Respondents).

 

Appeal from 
the District Court, Teton 
County, D. Terry 
Rogers, J.

 

James K. 
Lubing of Goody and Lubing, Jackson, for appellant.

 

Terri A. 
Lorenzon, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee Environmental Quality Council; 
Blair J. Trautwein of Hathaway, Speight, Kunz, Trautwein and Barrett, Cheyenne 
and Larry L. Jorgenson, Jackson, for 
appellees Aspens Water and Sewer Dist. and Teton Pines Water and Sewer 
Dist.

 

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

 

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

 

[¶1]  An adjacent neighbor's objection to the 
Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality's approval of a planned sewer 
disposal system for a community association creates this appeal. The neighbor, 
present appellant, was a protestant in the administrative hearings and then 
petitioner on appeal to the district court. Appellant now appeals to this court 
from the state agency approval of a deep well injection for the system effluent. 
We affirm the administrative agency action in approval of the construction and 
operation of the proposed system.

 

[¶2]  The Environmental Quality Council (EQC) 
approved plans for two separate sewer districts, Aspens Water and Sewer District 
and Teton Pines Water and Sewer District (Sewer Districts). The Sewer Districts 
joined together to establish a general sewer treatment system to serve 
approximately 400 households and 1,500 people in the suburban "rural" Teton 
County, Wyoming area in the vicinity of Jackson, Wyoming. Present appellant, 
Edward Knight (Knight), participated in the initial administrative hearings and 
objected to the application before approval by the EQC on September 
4, 1989. Knight 
raised objection for only the method used for clear liquid disposition. Knight 
then appealed to the district court for its review of the approval of the deep 
well process. The district court affirmed the EQC decision with a comprehensive 
and detailed judgment and order on May 9, 
1990. We also 
affirm for the same reasons stated by the district court in its appellate 
review.

 

[¶3]  Knight frames his issues as:

 

I. Whether 
the Supreme Court is required to give any deference to the decision of the 
District Court as to questions of law or fact.

II. Whether 
the failure of the EQC [Environmental Quality Council] to consider alternatives 
under the belief that they were restricted to "on-site" disposal constitutes 
reversible error due to an erroneous interpretation of the authority of the 
County 
Commissioners to so 
restrict the EQC and the DEQ [Department of Environmental 
Quality].

III. 
Whether the granting of the injection well permit violates the express terms of 
the Water Quality Rules and Regulations of the Environmental Quality 
Act.

 

The Sewer 
Districts respond as follows:

 

I. The EQC 
acted properly in approving the District's UIC permit application. Their 
decision was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion and was 
supported by substantial evidence.

A. The 
doctrine of pre-emption is not applicable to this case.

B. EQC's 
decision was to either approve or disapprove underground injection. It did not 
have the authority within the context of a contested case hearing on an 
application for a UIC permit to direct other methods of 
discharge.

C. EQC can 
properly take into account the position of the county commissioners as an 
institutional factor.

D. 
Aspens/Pines demonstrated consideration of alternatives to the Environmental 
Quality Council, including discharge directly into the Snake 
River and 
transporting the effluent to the Town of Jackson via 
pipeline. The best management alternative is underground 
injection.

E. 
Petitioner's contention that the EQC determined the 
County 
Commissioners pre-empted 
EQC authority to consider off-site alternatives based on assumptions with no 
record support.

II. The 
treated effluent (Class I Domestic Water) that will be injected into the ground 
water is not waste and is not pollution.

 

The EQC 
otherwise defines the issues as:

 

I. Whether 
the Supreme Court is required to give any deference to the decision of the 
District Court as to questions of law or fact.

II. Did the 
EQC erroneously interpret the law applicable to issuance of UIC Permit # 
89-014.

a. The 
record does not support Petitioner's contention that the EQC determined the 
County 
Commissioners preempted 
the EQC's authority.

b. The Law 
applicable in this case is contained in the Wyoming Water Quality Standards and 
Regulations.

c. The 
County Commissioners' endorsement was an institutional factor to be 
considered.

III. Does 
the granting of the injection well permit, violate[] the express terms of the 
Water Quality Rules and Regulations of the Environmental Quality 
Act.

a. The 
treated effluent that will be injected is not waste and is not 
pollution,

b. Issuance 
of the permit is consistent with protection of water quality under 
Wyoming law and 
federal law. 

c. 
Statutory Construction.

 

[¶4]  Actually, the issues comprehensively 
addressed and assiduously advanced on appeal are:

 

1. 
Contended acceptance by the state agency of a county commissioner veto - the 
local government preemption and veto issue.

2. Legal 
and factual sufficiency of the application and proof to justify agency decision 
authority for a deep well injection from the sewer plant instead of the other 
alternative dispositions which included aeration and evaporation, transfer 
approximately nine miles to the Jackson sewer plant or direct open pipe flow 
into the Snake River which flows through the area into Idaho - the sufficiency 
of the evidence issue.

 

[¶5]  Teton 
County is no 
longer rural where adequate acreage of fee land is available for development. 
Suburbanization activities first resulted in individual well and septic systems 
for the acreage properties which then led to the organization of two sewer 
districts and their activities to develop community sewer disposal systems or, 
in some cases, to also develop water systems. The total system involves 
approximately 400 homes and 1,500 inhabitants in a rather confined area. The 
plans for the trunk line system and central plant created no serious controversy 
about the construction of the system until an issue was raised about what would 
be done with the purified water which flowed out of the plant after completed 
treatment and solid material removal.

 

[¶6]  Like most developmental activities in 
that community, each available option was approved by someone and highly 
contested by others dependent on the particular effect. The town showed no 
special interest in having the additional volumes of water flow into its plant 
and it mattered little since the outflow would reach the same river system. A 
number of miles of piping and consequent right-of-way denigration of the area 
would be required.

 

[¶7]  The second choice was to dispose of the 
purified water by open pipe outflow into the Snake 
River, which was 
upstream from Jackson and an 
area of heavy activity in fishing and white water rafting. A large contingent of 
people who would object were probably responsible for the defined and strongly 
stated views of the Teton Board of County Commissioners. A third choice was a 
deep well injection system for disposal into the glacially created alluvial 
subsurface strata. The fourth choice was the creation of large aeration and 
evaporation ponds, but no particular support developed considering the land 
usage required for the open ponds or olfactory results which might 
follow.

 

[¶8]  Knight, down flow from the community 
system and its septic plant, argued diligently for anything but deep well system 
disposition since he used a well to supply potable household water. As an 
alternative, he suggested the system be designed to send the residual product 
back up to the highest elevations of the community system ownership in order to 
flow underground under their land before reaching where these neighbors would be 
living. A general flow rate of approximately fifteen feet a day was indicated in 
some of the technical data. This recommendation involved piping the water uphill 
to run underground through the subdivision. Lacking reasoned support for that 
uneconomic idea, anything, except deep well disposition, was found to be 
preferable to him.

 

[¶9]  The record leaves no doubt about the 
Teton Board of County Commissioners' objection to the open pipe river flow into 
a scenic river where boaters and fishermen would pass. Knight argues that the 
EQC permitted this advice and attitude of county officials to act as a veto and 
then preempt the ultimate decision. Additionally, Knight contends that the 
disposal well would violate express terms of the Environmental Quality Act by 
allowing injection of the treated product into the usable aquifer and, 
"[t]herefore, the orders of the EQC and of the District Court are invalid and 
must be reversed, * * *."

 

[¶10]  Defined physical facts structure our 
review of the EQC decision. Within that mountain confined alluvial valley of 
limited acres of private land and growing population, there were only the four 
basic ways to dispose of the treated and purified water that would flood from 
the $3.5 million plant. First, everyone agreed that the plant was appropriate 
and necessary for maintenance of the health of the inhabitants of the area. 
Since what then went into the plant would inevitably come out in some form, 
there were only the four opportunities for purified water 
disposition:

 

1. Up into 
the air by aeration and evaporation by settling ponds; or

2. Down 
into the subsurface aquifers to flow underground which would ultimately reach 
the river; or

3. Pipe 
across the valley into the Town of Jackson where it 
could be run through its plant and then to flow back into the river valley 
system downstream; or

4. Pipe out 
of the area to the Snake 
River for 
in-stream flow.

 

[¶11]  Alternatively, a fifth opportunity would 
be to do nothing and not use the sewer plant. This was one solution that no one 
assumed to be appropriate.1

 

[¶12]  This inquiry of up, down or across faced 
all the professional planners and designers who became involved in the planning 
for the federally financed local community sewer waste disposal 
system.

 

[¶13]  We have read the record with care and do 
not find the contended legal error of the EQC in factually permitting the county 
commissioners to make the decision. Their view was considered, but not deemed 
preclusive by the membership of the EQC. In first decision, we find nothing 
reflecting that the EQC yielded unduly to the political pressures applied by the 
county commissioners which would constitute making an arbitrary and unfounded 
decision. A significant view was considered in taking into account what is in 
the nature of governmental regulatory agencies.

 

[¶14]  The second argument asserts, as a matter 
of law, that the clean water effluent, even if qualified to be Class I Domestic 
Use Water and consequently potable, was still a polluted effluent and under no 
circumstances could be injected into the subsurface strata where it would become 
part of the potable water supply for downstream users.

 

[¶15]  A telling argument was made by the EQC 
and the Sewer Districts in response that all septic systems, unless evaporative 
which would go into the air, ultimately flow the effluent into the downstream 
water system so that only those persons resident at the top of the mountains are 
not reusing water which has been previously used and, by the time the water 
reaches the ocean, used many times. The question was not reuse, but proper 
clean-up and treatment.2

 
[¶16]  Addressing that second argument, there 
is nothing factually presented which demonstrates arbitrary or capricious 
administrative agency action. We do understand the argument that the sewer 
treating plant outflow is water that has been previously "used" and then 
treated. We, however, can accept the technical conclusion of the EQC that if it 
is Class I water and appropriate for use, it is not a "pollutant" when injected 
into subsurface strata. The water has to go somewhere and, clearly, Knight would 
not want aeration and evaporation ponds large enough to handle that volume in 
close proximity to his residence. We cannot say that, as a matter of law, the 
EQC abused its discretion or that rejection of the direct flow into the river 
was sufficiently inappropriate so as to render the decision arbitrary and 
capricious.

 

[¶17]  What is strange about all of this is 
that inevitably the plant system was absolutely necessary for the health of the 
entire area and its $3.5 million construction benefited every rural residence by 
improving the water which is used for households where wells continue to be the 
source, whether downstream from the residents or at higher elevation. Creation 
of the sewer districts and construction of the modern plant providing for 
effective treatment of the residential sewer added immeasurably to the 
environment for the health. In fact, the injection did not change the 
disposition - it only assured cleanliness and safety.

 

[¶18]  The district court, in a comprehensively 
stated and completely researched decision, analyzed and determined:

 

1. In his 
brief, Petitioner raised three issues: I) Whether the EQC failed to consider 
alternatives under the belief that they were restricted to "on-site" disposal 
constitutes reversible error due to an erroneous interpretation of the authority 
of the County Commissioners to so restrict the EQC and the DEQ; II) whether the 
granting of the injection well permit, violates the express terms of the Water 
Quality Rules and Regulations of the Environmental Quality Act; and III) whether 
the Order of the EQC following the May 17, 1989 hearing is void due to the 
failure of the agency to give full thirty-days notice of the hearing to 
Petitioner and the general public. It should be noted that Petitioner abandoned 
issue number III at the time of the oral argument.

2. 
Petitioner also alleges in his Petition for Review: (1) The decision of the EQC 
was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not in accordance with 
law; (2) the decision is violative of Petitioner's right to due process of law; 
(3) the procedures utilized in the subject hearing and decision are not in 
accordance with law; and (4) the decision is not supported by substantial 
evidence.

3. The 
burden of proving arbitrary, illegal or fraudulent administrative action is on 
the complainant, and this burden includes not only the clear presentation of the 
question, but also placement of evidence in the record to sustain the 
complainant's position. Wyoming 
Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432 (Wyo. 1974). The 
Court's power to review agency actions to determine if they are arbitrary, 
capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion calls for an examination 
of whether the agency's decision is based on a consideration of relevant factors 
and whether it is rational. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. 
Envtl. Quality Council, 590 P.2d 1324 (Wyo. 
1979).

4. A 
District Court reviewing an agency action will not substitute its judgment for 
that of the board or commission. Shenefield v. Sheridan County 
School Dist. No. 1, 544 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 
1976).

5. The 
District Court sits as an intermediate appellate court with power only to review 
actions taken by administrative tribunals, and it is not within the prerogatives 
of this Court to substitute its judgment for administrative authority, or to 
perform duties assigned by law to administrative boards, committees and 
officers. McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 
1980).

6. This 
Court cannot substitute its opinion as to the weight and credibility of evidence 
for that of the EQC. Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 642 P.2d 773 
(Wyo. 
1982).

7. The 
ultimate weight to be given evidence before the EQC as a trier of fact is to be 
determined by that agency in light of the expertise and experience of its 
members in such matters. Telstar Communications, Inc. v. Rule Radiophone Serv., 
Inc., 621 P.2d 241 (Wyo. 
1980).

8. 
Administrative appeals of this nature are confined to the administrative record. 
Tri-County Elec. Ass'n v. City of Gillette, 525 P.2d 3 (Wyo. 
1974).

9. An 
administrative decision is to be reversed only for errors of law, including the 
lack of substantial evidence to support it. Shenefield v. 
Sheridan County 
School Dist. No. 1, 544 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 
1976).

10. Courts 
may set aside an action of an administrative agency only where its action is 
arbitrary or fraudulent or where there is an illegal exercise of discretion. 
Wyoming 
Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432 (Wyo. 
1974).

11. The 
terms "abuse of discretion," "arbitrary," and "capricious" are frequently used 
interchangeably. Arbitrary and capricious actions are ways to abuse discretion. 
Judicial discretion is "a composite of many things, among which are conclusions 
drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard 
to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously." Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894 (Wyo. 1986); 
Intervenor Vandehei Developers v. Public Service Comm'n, [790] P.2d [1282] 
(Wyo. 
1990).

12. Abuse 
of discretion has been explained as follows: "A court does not abuse its 
discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under 
the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, 
the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it 
did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by 
the court under the circumstances." Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Service 
Comm'n of Wyoming, 713 P.2d 240 (Wyo. 1986); 
Intervenor Vandehei Developers v. Public Service Comm'n, [790] P.2d [1282] 
(Wyo. 
1990).

13. The 
Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act provides that it is the duty of the Court reviewing 
an agency action to determine if the decision was supported by substantial 
evidence. § 16-3-114 W.S. 1977, as amended. "Substantial evidence is such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion; it may be less than the weight of the evidence but cannot be 
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence." 
Wyoming Insurance 
Dept. v. Avemco Insurance Co., 726 P.2d 507 (Wyo. 1986); 
Intervenor Vandehei Developers v. Public Service Comm'n, [790] P.2d [1282] 
(Wyo. 
1990).

14. 
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds would accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion. Southwest 
Wyoming 
Rehabilitation 
Center v. 
Employment Security Comm'n of Wyoming, 781 P.2d 918 (Wyo. 1989); 
Intervenor Vandehei Developers v. Public Service Comm'n, [790] P.2d [1282] 
(Wyo. 1990). In 
determining whether that quantum of evidence is present, all of the evidence on 
the record, both that which supports and that which conflicts with the agency's 
decision must be reviewed, and the Court must determine whether the agency could 
reasonably conclude what it did. The standard requires more than a mere 
scintilla of evidence, more than a mere suspicion that a certain fact exists. 
However, once that measure of evidence has been found to exist, the possibility 
of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from a body of evidence does not prevent 
a finding that the conclusion drawn by the administrative agency was supported 
by substantial evidence. Burlington Northern 
Railroad Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of Wyoming, 698 P.2d 1135 (Wyo. 1985); 
Intervenor Vandehei Developers v. Public Service Comm'n, [790] P.2d [1282] 
(Wyo. 
1990).

15. The 
Courts will defer to the experience and expertise of the agency in its weighing 
of the evidence and will disturb its decisions only where it is clearly contrary 
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence on the record. Cody Gas Co. v. Public 
Service Comm'n of Wyoming, 748 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 
1988).

 

THE COURT 
MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

 

1. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by virtue of Rule 12.03   
W.R.A.P.

2. Aspens 
Water and Sewer District ("Aspens I") and Teton Pines Water and Sewer District 
("Aspens II"), Respondents herein, are sewer districts formed in accordance with 
the statutory provisions of the State of Wyoming. Both districts are public 
governmental entities, each with a board of directors elected by the residents 
of the respective districts.

3. On 
January 19, 
1989, 
Respondents filed an application for approval of an underground waste water 
injection well with the Department of Environmental Quality, hereinafter 
referred to as "DEQ."

4. Prior to 
making application to DEQ for the well permit, the districts (Respondents) after 
initially considering some ten alternatives, went through a procedure whereby a 
total of five alternatives were discussed in the facility's plans submitted as 
part of the application for the well permit.

5. DEQ 
proposed that the permit requested by applicants be issued and public notice of 
such was apparently provided according to law. Several protests to the issuance 
of the permit were received by the DEQ, including one from Petitioner, Edward 
Knight.

6. A public 
hearing was held in Teton 
County, 
Wyoming on 
May 17, 
1989 before a 
panel of members of the EQC. The applicants (Respondents) and DEQ were 
represented by counsel, and several protestants, including Petitioner, were 
present, and were represented by David Adams, a 
Wilson, 
Wyoming area 
resident.

7. On 
September 14, 1989 the EQC issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order wherein it determined that the applicants had met their burden of 
demonstrating that the permit meets all statutory and regulatory requirements 
imposed by the State of Wyoming, and ordering that the injection well permit as 
revised by the Order, be issued by DEQ.

8. The 
Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proof in this 
matter.

9. At the 
hearing conducted by the EQC on May 17, 
1989, several 
witnesses testified on behalf of Respondents in this matter, including persons 
with engineering backgrounds, and a hydro geologist. Petitioner and those 
persons objecting to the issuance of the permit merely cross-examined the 
applicant's witnesses and presented no evidence of their own at the hearing in 
opposition to the issuance of the permit.

10. This 
Court is satisfied that the EQC's action was not arbitrary or capricious nor an 
abuse of discretion and that it was in accordance with law; the decision was not 
violative of the Petitioner's right to due process of law; the procedures 
utilized in the administrative hearing and decision were in accordance with law; 
and the decision was supported by substantial evidence.

11. The EQC 
gave proper consideration to the application and to the position taken by the 
Board of County Commission[er]s of Teton 
County and the 
EQC did not fail to properly consider the alternatives.

12. The 
granting of the injection well permit was in accordance with the express terms 
of the Water Quality Rules and Regulations of the Environmental Quality 
Act.

 

[¶19]  We agree and adopt the findings and 
decision provided by the first judicial appeal, affirm the district court and 
approve the decision of the EQC.

 

[¶20]  Affirmed.

 

Footnotes

 

1 Dean R.R. Hamilton, in an earlier era at the University of Wyoming Law 
School who taught contracts among other subjects, defined this factual situation 
as, "it all depends on whose ox is being gored."

2 The stridency of the objection by Knight is not clarified by 
justification in view of the provision of the order which assured him both sewer 
system disposition and system water connection. The Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order of the EQC included:

19. In order to facilitate waste treatment in the area of the Aspens and 
the Teton Pines development, the Applicants proposed that the Aspens/Teton Pines 
wastewater treatment and water supply systems be supplemented to provide for an 
eight inch water line from the main Aspens/Teton Pines water distribution line 
to the boundary of the property described as the Hardeman 80 acres, and to 
provide for an eight inch line for wastewater from the Aspens/Teton Pines 
wastewater treatment plant to the property boundary of the Hardeman 80 acres. 
These lines will also service the Ed Knight property. A map showing this 
property is attached as Appendix C to this order, which map is incorporated 
herein by reference. The Applicants will provide up to twenty-eight free 
hook-ups for the Hardeman property and one free hook-up for Mr. Knight, with the 
limitation that such users will have to provide their own distribution and 
collection systems, and will have to pay their reasonable share of operating and 
maintenance costs for the applicable Aspens/Teton Pines plant 
facility.