Case Title: People v. Martinez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84915, 84916

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
People v. 
Martinez, No. 84915 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket Nos. 84915, 84916 cons.-Agenda 
14-September 1998.
Opinion filed December 17, 1998.
JUSTICE NICKELS delivered the opinion of the 
court:
In these consolidated appeals, we address the issue of 
whether the period of a summary suspension under Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) 
section 11-501.1 (625 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 1996)) continues until 
the holder of the suspended license pays the required reinstatement fees. After 
separate stipulated bench trials, the circuit court of Du Page County found 
that the period of summary suspension does not end until the license holder pays 
the reinstatement fees and found each defendant guilty of driving while his 
license was suspended under section 6-303 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/6-303 (West 
1996)). Both judgments were affirmed by the appellate court. Martinez, 
294 Ill. App. 3d 419; Salazar, No. 2-96-0733 (unpublished order under 
Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted defendants' petition for leave to appeal. 166 
Ill. 2d R. 315. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Simon Martinez's privileges to operate a motor 
vehicle were summarily suspended for three months pursuant to section 11-501.1 
of the Code on August 17, 1995. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 1996). The 
"Confirmation of Statutory Summary Suspension" issued by the Secretary of State 
listed a provisional reinstatement date of November 17, 1995. Similarly, on May 
13, 1993, defendant Tomas Salazar's license was suspended for six months 
pursuant to section 11-501.1 of the Code. Salazar's provisional reinstatement 
date was November 13, 1993. Neither defendant paid the $60 reinstatement fee 
required by section 6-118 of the Code. On January 8, 1996, and April 12, 1995, 
respectively, Martinez and Salazar (collectively defendants) were each issued 
citations for driving with a suspended driver's license. 652 ILCS 5/6-303(a) 
(West 1996).
After a stipulated bench trial, Martinez was found guilty of 
driving while his driver's license was suspended, fined $150 and given one year 
of court supervision. Salazar was also convicted, fined $100 and received one 
year of conditional discharge. Defendants challenged their convictions in the 
appellate court arguing that their licenses were not suspended. Defendants 
contended that although neither of them had paid the reinstatement fee, the 
period of suspension automatically terminated at the provisional reinstatement 
date. The appellate court affirmed, finding that a summary suspension under 
section 11-501.1 continues until the license holder pays the reinstatement 
fee.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue presented by this case is whether a summary 
suspension under section 11-501.1 of the Code automatically terminates at the 
provisional reinstatement date or whether the suspension continues until the 
holder of the suspended license pays the reinstatement fees. Since the issue is 
one of statutory construction, our review is de novo. People v. 
Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996). "It is well settled that the court's 
role in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the intention of the 
legislature and that the language of the statute is the starting point of the 
court's analysis. [Citation.] Where the language of the statute is clear, it 
will be given effect without resort to other tools of construction. [Citation.] 
A court should not depart from the language of the statute by reading into it 
exceptions, limitations or conditions that conflict with the intent of the 
legislature. [Citation.]" Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 350-51 (1998). A court must consider all of the parts of the 
statute together. People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 357 
(1996).
A person is guilty of driving with a suspended driver's 
license if he "drives *** a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time 
when such person's driver's license *** is *** suspended." 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) 
(West 1996). Defendants stipulate that each of them was driving a motor vehicle 
on a highway of this state. However, defendants contend that neither was guilty 
of driving with a suspended license because the periods of their suspensions had 
terminated automatically at their respective provisional reinstatement 
dates.
Section 1-203.1 of the Code defines a statutory summary 
alcohol- or other drug-related suspension of driver's privileges as the 
"withdrawal by the circuit court of a person's license or privilege to operate a 
motor vehicle *** for the periods provided in Section 6-208.1." 625 ILCS 
5/1-203.1 (West 1996). Section 1-203.1 further states "[r]einstatement after the 
suspension period shall occur after all appropriate fees have been 
paid." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/1-203.1 (West 1996). When section 
1-203.1 is read in conjunction with section 6-208.1, the legislative intent is 
clear. Section 6-208.1(c) reads, "Full driving privileges may not be restored 
until all applicable reinstatement fees *** have been paid to the Secretary of 
State." 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(c) (West 1996). We find that the legislature intended 
that payment of the fees is a prerequisite to the reinstatement of driving 
privileges. Therefore, the period of statutory summary suspension continues 
until the fee is paid.
In challenging this interpretation, defendants rely on 
People v. Johnson, 115 Ill. App. 3d 987 (1983), and People v. 
Garbo, 288 Ill. App. 3d 519 (1997). In Johnson, the court found 
that because the Code defines a suspension as a temporary sanction, the 
legislature did not intend for a failure to pay the reinstatement fee to extend 
the suspension period. Relying on Johnson, the Garbo court 
found that the statutory summary suspension terminated automatically and that 
the payment of the reinstatement fee was not a prerequisite for reinstatement. 
Garbo, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 522-23. We reject the reasoning of 
Garbo. The Garbo court's reliance on Johnson is 
misplaced. Johnson was decided prior to the enactment of sections 
6-208.1 (period of statutory summary alcohol- or other drug-related suspension) 
and 1-203.1 (definition of statutory summary alcohol- or other drug-related 
suspension), the statutory sections at issue in both Garbo and the case 
at bar.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the period of 
statutory summary suspension continues until the reinstatement fee is paid. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the appellate court, which affirmed both 
defendants' convictions for driving with suspended drivers' 
licenses.
Appellate court judgments 
affirmed.