Case Title: Commonwealth v. Smith

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13403

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13403 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SAM SMITH. 
 
 
April 9, 2024. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Appeal from order of single justice.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Postconviction relief. 
 
 
 
The defendant, Sam Smith, stands convicted of murder in the 
first degree.  Currently before the court is the defendant's 
purported appeal from the judgment of a single justice of this 
court denying without a hearing his motion for reconsideration 
of the denial of a gatekeeper petition pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  But the denial of a gatekeeper petition is final and 
unreviewable.  See Commonwealth v. Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606, 
621 (2020).  The defendant nevertheless argues that his case 
falls outside this rule because a gatekeeper petition was 
unnecessary in light of this court's decision in Commonwealth v. 
Lee, 479 Mass. 558, 561 (2018).  We disagree, and so we dismiss 
this appeal. 
 
Background.  The defendant was convicted by a jury in 2001 
of murder in the first degree.  During jury empanelment, the 
Commonwealth challenged a prospective juror for cause on the 
purported ground of a perceived transgender identity.  Defense 
counsel interpreted this as a challenge based on the prospective 
juror's perceived homosexuality.  When the prosecutor reiterated 
that it was based on transgender identity, defense counsel said: 
"[T]he Commonwealth all but just admitted a Batson1 violation 
 
1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) ("the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential 
jurors solely on account of their race"); Commonwealth v. 
Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), 
2 
 
 
 
right here," and again, "The Commonwealth has all but admitted a 
Batson violation . . . ."  The original transcript of the 
proceeding incorrectly recorded these two statements as: "[T]he 
Commonwealth all but just admitted a challenge violation right 
here," and "The Commonwealth has all but admitted a violation 
. . . ." 
  
The trial judge refused to strike the prospective juror for 
cause, and the Commonwealth exercised a peremptory challenge, at 
which point defense counsel stated, "I'd like to put on the 
record that I'm beginning to see a pattern on the basis of the 
Commonwealth [sic] with the exclusion of a homosexual, white 
male.  So I want to put that on the record as well. . . .  For 
the court's consideration."   
      
In 2008, this court heard and decided the defendant's 
direct appeal and his appeal of the denial of his first motion 
for new trial. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 450 Mass. 395, 396, 
cert. denied, 555 U.S. 893 (2008).  In that decision, the court 
considered at length the defendant's arguments that the 
Commonwealth violated art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights, as well as the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, when it 
exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of the prospective 
juror's perceived sexual orientation or transgender identity.  
See id. at 404-407.  The court analyzed the record with specific 
reference to the rule of Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 
486, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), overruled in part by 
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 511 (2020).  See Smith, 
supra at 405-407.  It found that "defense counsel did not make 
an explicit objection to the challenge, and instead only 'put on 
the record' that she was 'beginning to see a pattern' of 
removing white male homosexuals."  Id. at 406.  The court 
concluded that "defense counsel neither objected to the 
prosecutor's challenge nor asserted that a pattern of improper 
exclusion actually had been established" and so did not "trigger 
an obligation on the judge's part to make a finding whether the 
presumption of propriety was rebutted."  Id.  Moreover, the 
court explained that "given the factual uncertainty in this case 
about what, if any, discrete 'grouping' the juror might fit 
into, it was not error" for the judge to fail to raise this 
issue sua sponte.  Id.  On this latter point, the court noted 
 
overruled in part by Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 511 
(2020) (holding art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights proscribes peremptory challenge based solely on 
prospective juror's membership in certain defined groups). 
3 
 
 
 
that the prosecutor and defense counsel disagreed about the 
basis for the challenge, and that apart from superficial 
observations about the prospective juror's appearance, the 
record supplied no more information as to whether the juror was 
homosexual or transgender.  Id. at 405-406.  The record 
therefore lacked clarity regarding "the juror's sex, 
transgendered status, and sexual orientation, as well as the 
motive or reason for the prosecutor's challenge."  Id. at 407.  
In light of these deficiencies in the record, the court declined 
to decide at that time whether it would violate art. 12 or the 
equal protection clause to strike a juror on the basis of sexual 
orientation or transgender identity.2  Id. at 405.  In the end, 
the court affirmed the defendant's conviction and the order 
denying his motion for new trial.  Id. at 410.  The defendant 
moved for rehearing, and the motion was denied.   
 
The defendant's appellate counsel represents that in 2011, 
the above-described error in the transcript was discovered.  In 
the Superior Court, the defendant filed a "motion for collateral 
relief"3 based on the error in the transcript.  In ruling on the 
motion, the Superior Court judge found that trial counsel had 
made a timely and explicit Batson objection.  Even so, she 
denied the motion because the issue was already addressed in 
this court's prior decision, and the change to the transcript 
did not affect the other factors in this court's analysis.   
 
In March 2013, a single justice of this court denied the 
defendant's resulting first gatekeeper petition, brought 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The single justice concluded 
 
2 In 2021, this court held "that a peremptory challenge 
based on a prospective juror's sexual orientation is prohibited 
by arts. 1 and 12 and the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."  Commonwealth v. Carter, 488 Mass. 191, 
201 (2021).  See Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 395 
(2018) ("where a juror's membership in a protected class is 
reasonably in dispute, trial judges, in performing the first 
step of the Batson-Soares analysis, ought to presume that the 
juror is a member of the protected class at issue").  In Carter, 
however, the court concluded as to a somewhat similar challenge 
that "there were insufficient facts in the record to reasonably 
establish [the prospective juror's] sexual orientation, and thus 
the defense did not satisfy its burden of production under the 
first step of the Batson-Soares inquiry with respect to that 
particular challenge."  Carter, supra at 204. 
 
3 This motion was treated as a second motion for new trial. 
4 
 
 
 
that despite an explicit Batson objection, the issue was not 
new, having been previously analyzed by the full court, and 
further, that the change to the transcript affected only one 
factor in the full court's analysis.  
 
Meanwhile, in the Superior Court, the defendant moved for a 
Batson hearing and then brought a third motion for collateral 
relief,4 which "repeat[ed] the request."  Both motions were 
denied by the Superior Court judge.   
 
Following these decisions, the defendant filed a second 
gatekeeper petition raising the same issue, and in December 
2014, a single justice of this court denied the petition.  The 
single justice concluded that the issue was not new, having been 
addressed on direct appeal, in the defendant's motions for new 
trial, and in the first gatekeeper petition.  Further, the 
single justice concluded that the issue was not substantial, 
given that the lack of clarity in the record did not support the 
necessity of a Batson hearing. 
 
In May 2018, this court decided Lee, 479 Mass. at 561, upon 
which the defendant relies to support the April 2022 motion for 
reconsideration at issue here.  In that motion, the defendant 
moved for reconsideration of the 2013 decision denying his first 
gatekeeper petition, in which he sought leave to appeal from the 
denial of his second motion for a new trial.  In denying the 
motion for reconsideration, a different single justice (the 
single justice who denied the first gatekeeper petition having 
retired) concluded that the issue was neither new nor 
substantial, and he found that the discrepancy in the transcript 
had not prevented the full court from addressing this issue.  
The single justice further concluded that the motion was 
untimely.  The defendant purports to appeal the denial of his 
motion on the ground that the transcript discrepancy deprived 
him of a review of his "whole case," as required by G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  See Billingslea, 484 Mass. at 617.    
 
Discussion.  We do not review the single justice's 
determination that this issue was not "new and substantial," and 
for his part, the defendant does not purport to appeal that 
determination.  See Billingslea, 484 Mass. at 621 ("The ruling 
of a single justice, acting as a gatekeeper, that the 
application does not present a new and substantial question is 
final and unreviewable by the full court").  Rather, we address 
the defendant's argument that he did not receive plenary review 
 
4 This motion was treated as a third motion for new trial.   
5 
 
 
 
and so was entitled to bypass the gatekeeper requirements of 
§ 33E, including the prerequisite that a single justice 
determine that his appeal raises an issue that is "new and 
substantial."  As noted supra, the defendant's argument is based 
on this court's decision in Lee, 479 Mass. at 561, which 
authorized the defendant in that case to bypass gatekeeper 
review under certain limited circumstances. 
 
 
But Lee's conclusion does not apply here.  On the contrary, 
permission to bypass the gatekeeper was expressly limited in Lee 
to "any issue that was not apparent from the transcript and 
could only be discovered from the audio recording of the 
proceedings."  Lee, 479 Mass. at 561.  Here, the issue was 
evident from the transcript.  The differences relied on by the 
defendant between the erroneous and corrected transcripts are 
two specific references to Batson.  Even without these 
corrections, however, it was plain that these statements 
referred to a potential violation under the Batson-Soares lines 
of cases, and indeed, this court analyzed the issue at length 
under those very rubrics.  See Smith, 450 Mass. at 404-407. 
 
In sum, this case presents "no reason to depart from our 
longstanding and well-established rule" that the decision of a 
gatekeeper pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is final and 
unreviewable.  See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 477 Mass. 1008, 
1008-1009 (2017).5   
 
 
Appeal dismissed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Eva G. Jellison for the defendant. 
 
Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
5 Consequently, we need not address the defendant's 
challenge to the single justice's determination that the motion 
was untimely.