Case Title: THREE WAY, INC., a Wyoming Corporation V. BURTON ENTERPRISES, INC., a Wyoming Corporation; BURTON ENTERPRISES, INC., a Wyoming Corporation V. THREE WAY, INC., a Wyoming Corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0139

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
THREE WAY, INC., a Wyoming Corporation V. BURTON ENTERPRISES, INC., a Wyoming Corporation; BURTON ENTERPRISES, INC., a Wyoming Corporation V. THREE WAY, INC., a Wyoming Corporation2008 WY 18177 P.3d 219Case Number: S-07-0139, S-07-0140Decided: 02/21/2008
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
THREE 
WAY, INC., a Wyoming 
Corporation,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.BURTON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Wyoming 
Corporation,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
BURTON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Wyoming 
Corporation,Appellant(Defendant),v.THREE WAY, INC., 
a Wyoming Corporation,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from 
theDistrictCourtofJohnsonCounty

 
 

Case No. 
S-07-0139

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Christopher 
M. Wages and Greg L. Goddard of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Goddard.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Mark W. 
Gifford of Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Case No. 
S-07-0140

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Mark W. 
Gifford of Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Christopher 
M. Wages and Greg L. Goddard of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Goodard.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is a dispute 
in which, after a jury trial on some issues, and a bench trial on other issues, 
the district court ordered specific performance of a contract for the 
construction of certain water and sewer mains.  The plaintiff contractor (Three 
Way) sued for 
the value of its services or for specific performance of the contract.  The defendant owner (Burton) counterclaimed for 
breach of contract and breach of the warranty of workmanship.  After the jury found that Burton breached the 
contract, the district court found the contract to be unambiguous and ordered 
specific performance, rather than money damages.  Three Way appealed that decision.  Burton then cross-appealed, alleging that the 
jury had been improperly instructed and that the district court had erred in an 
evidentiary ruling.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Whether the district court's 
judgment and order should be summarily affirmed because of Three Way's 
non-compliance with W.R.A.P. 7.01(e)(2)?

 
 
2.   Whether the district court abused 
its discretion in denying Three Way's motion for leave to amend its 
complaint?

 
 
3.   Whether the district court abused 
its discretion when it granted, in part, Burton's motion in 
limine?

 
 
4.   Whether the district court erred as 
a matter of law when it denied Three 
Way's motion to affirm the jury's 
verdict?

 
 
5.   Whether the district court abused 
its discretion in instructing the jury as to Three 
Way's duty of 
workmanship?

 
 
6.   Whether the district court abused 
its discretion by admitting evidence of Three 
Way's claimed money 
damages?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Burton planned to develop property it owned in Buffalo, Wyoming.  
On April 8, 2003, Three Way submitted to Burton a bid for $353,604.30 for the 
construction and installation of certain water and sewer mains related to that 
development.  Burton did not accept that 
bid.  Instead, the parties entered 
into a written agreement whereby Three 
Way was to perform the work in 
exchange for the following consideration:

 
 
10.   Upon completion of the above 
described work by Contractor and when such work is approved by Owner and 
Engineer, Owner will convey the following described property to 
Contractor:

 
 
(a)   Lot 20 and Lot 19 of the Village West Estates Subdivision as 
described on Exhibit A;

 
 
(b)   Certain property in the City of 
Buffalo, Wyoming consisting of approximately 7.81 acres more particularly 
described as

 
 
See 
Exhibit B

 
 
(c)   A 20 foot easement along the 
East/West boundary of the South End of the Village West Estates Subdivision and 
Village West Mobile Home Park for future construction of a Sewer lift line in 
the Mobile Home Park Extension for the purpose of a future hook up to City 
sewer.  Easement will follow lot 
line to the South East manhole.

 
 
          
At such time and place as mutually agreed to by the parties in accordance 
with the terms of this agreement, Owner shall deliver to Contractor a good and 
sufficient deed, subject to all real estate taxes for 2003, exceptions, 
reservations, covenants, conditions, restrictions, easements, rights of way, 
reservations and rights of record and subject to any state of facts which would 
be disclosed by an accurate survey or physical inspection of the premises and 
subject to building, zoning, subdivision or other regulations of any private or 
governmental entity. [1]

 
 
. . . . 

 
 
12.   The above described property will 
be conveyed "as is," in its present condition.  There are no representations, covenants 
or agreements by Owner or between the parties with reference to the quality, 
condition, or status of the property except as specifically set forth in this 
Agreement, and any such warranties are hereby disclaimed.  Contractor is not relying upon any 
representations by Owner or Owner's agents as to any condition which Contractor 
deems to be material to Contractor's decision to enter into this 
Agreement.

 
 
[¶4]      In addition to 
the disclaimers contained in paragraph 12 as set forth above, the Agreement also 
provided as follows:

 
 
17.   This agreement contains the entire 
agreement between the parties.  All 
prior representations made in the negotiations of this sale have been 
incorporated herein, and there are no oral agreements or representations between 
the Owner, Contractor, or their agents to modify the terms and conditions of 
this agreement.  Contractor 
acknowledges and agrees that Contractor is not relying upon any representations 
of Owner or Owner's agents as to any condition of the property which Contractor 
deems to be material to Contractor's decision to enter into this Agreement.  This Agreement may not be modified 
except by a written instrument signed by each of the 
parties.

 
 
[¶5]      At the time the 
parties executed the agreement, Exhibit B was not attached.  Two weeks later, however, Burton provided Exhibit B, in the form of an Affidavit of 
Lot Division, splitting off the 7.81 acre parcel mentioned in the agreement from 
a smaller commercial lot retained by Burton.  Much of the present controversy was 
engendered by the fact that Exhibit B shows the 7.81 acres as a single 
undeveloped parcel, but Three 
Way contends that Burton had agreed to subdivide the parcel into 
seven developed lots, with a completed street access.

 
 
[¶6]      After work under 
the agreement had commenced, Burton proposed additional work for Three Way to 
perform.  Three Way agreed, and 
paragraph 10 of the agreement was amended, in pertinent part, to convey Lots 22 
and 24, rather than Lots 19 and 20, to Three 
Way as additional 
compensation.2  The language concerning the 7.81 acre 
tract was not amended.

 
 
[¶7]      As the project 
neared completion, high groundwater in the area caused excessive water to appear 
in valve boxes, requiring "trench plugs" or other remedial measures.  Each party considered those remedial 
measures to be the responsibility of the other.  A stalemate ensued, with Three Way refusing 
to fix the problem, and Burton refusing to convey the 7.81 acres.  This lawsuit 
followed.

 
 
[¶8]      Three Way fired 
the first volley in the litigation with the filing of a complaint on April 12, 
2005, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment.  Three Way sought monetary damages "in 
excess of $400,000.00," or alternatively, specific performance of the contract 
in the form of conveyance of the 7.81 acres.  Burton's counterclaim alleged breach of 
contract and breach of warranty, both based upon the valve box water problem. 
 On April 26, 2006, the district 
court set the matter for trial on July 17, 2006.

 
 
[¶9]      On May 26, 2006, 
Three Way filed a motion to amend its complaint, seeking 
now to allege reformation of contract, breach of the written contract, breach of 
an oral contract, unjust enrichment, fraud in the inducement, and promissory 
estoppel.  Generally, Three 
Way justified 
the motion on the ground that "[f]ollowing limited discovery in this matter, 
additional facts and evidence have surfaced, and Plaintiff needs to amend its Complaint in order to conform to the 
specific circumstances of this case."  Burton's objection to the motion argued 
(1) the motion did not comply with W.R.C.P. 7(b) because it did not state its 
supporting grounds with particularity; (2) the motion was occasioned by undue 
delay, bad faith, dilatory motive and undue prejudice; (3) the allegations of 
the amended complaint were inconsistent; (4) the allegations of the amended 
complaint were known to Three Way prior to its filing of the original complaint; 
and (5) the proposed amendment did not have substantial merit and Three Way had 
not come forward with convincing evidence supporting the new 
claims.

 
 
[¶10]   The district court held a pre-trial 
conference on June 12, 2006, at which time it denied both parties' motions for 
summary judgment and Three Way's motion to amend its complaint.  The pre-trial conference was not 
reported, so there is no transcript of the proceedings, but Three Way avers in 
its brief that its motion to amend was denied during that conference.  Likewise, the record contains no order 
denying the motion.  The only record 
of the denial and the rationale therefore is found in this sentence from the 
post-trial decision letter:  
"Plaintiff untimely requested permission to amend to plead fraud, but 
this was denied by the court."

 
 
[¶11]   The scheduled trial was to be 
bifurcated, in that the jury was to determine whether either party breached the 
contract, the value of Three Way's services, and the amount of Burton's damages if 
Three 
Way was found in breach.  Just before trial, Burton filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any 
evidence regarding (1) the monetary value of Three 
Way's services, and (2) Burton's alleged promise 
to subdivide and improve the 7.81 acre parcel.  Succinctly stated, Burton argued that the 
unambiguous contract provided neither for the payment of monetary compensation, 
nor for subdivision and improvement of the parcel.  The motion was heard on the first day of 
trial, with the district court denying the motion as to evidence of the monetary 
value of Three Way's services, but granting the motion as to 
evidence of any promise to subdivide and improve the 
parcel.

 
 
[¶12]   The jury returned a verdict on the 
third day of trial.  It answered 
three special interrogatories finding that (1) Three 
Way did not 
breach the contract; (2) Burton did breach the contract; and (3) the 
value of Three Way's services was $315,604.  Three Way then filed a motion asking the 
district court to affirm the verdict, seeking a judgment in the amount of 
$315,604.  Burton opposed that motion 
on several grounds:  (1) an unjust 
enrichment award is not available where a contract remedy exists; (2) the value 
amount did not discount the value of the two lots already conveyed to 
Three Way; and (3) specific performance of the contract 
should entail only the additional conveyance of the 7.81 acre parcel.  A bench trial on the equitable issues was 
held on September 19, 2006.

 
 
[¶13]   The district court's decision 
letter was filed on December 12, 2006.  Finding that a contract remedy 
existedconveyance of the 7.81 acre parcelthe district court declined to apply 
the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment.  
Instead, it concluded that specific performance of the contract was the 
appropriate remedy.  It therefore 
denied Three Way's motion to affirm the jury verdict.  A judgment to that effect was entered on 
April 27, 2007.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Whether 
the district court's judgment and order should be summarily affirmed 
because of Three 
Way'snon-compliance with W.R.A.P. 
7.01(e)(2)?

 
 
[¶14]   W.R.A.P. 7.01 provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows:

 
 
The 
brief of appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order 
indicated:

 
 
            
. . . . 

 
 
            
(e)     A 
statement of the case including:

 
 
                        
. . . .

 
 
(2)    A statement of the facts 
relevant to the issues presented for review with appropriate references to 
documents listed in the index of the transmitted record.

 
 
[¶15]   Burton cites Habco v. L & B Oilfield Serv., Inc., 
2006 WY 91, ¶ 3 n.1, 138 P.3d 1162, 1163 n.1 (Wyo. 2006), for the proposition 
that failure to abide by the requirements of W.R.A.P. 7.01(e)(2), such as by 
citation to hundreds of pages of the record, rather than citation to specific 
pages, may result in the summary affirmance of the district court's 
judgment.  While we continue to 
adhere to that precept, and while Three Way's brief does, indeed, lack 
precision in its citation to the record, we are not inclined in this case to 
take the drastic route of a summary affirmance, because we are readily able to 
discern the relevant facts from the record.

 
 
Whether 
the district court abused its discretion in denying Three Way's motion 
for leave to amend its complaint?

 
 
[¶16]   We review the denial of a motion 
for leave to amend a complaint under the following 
standards:

 
 
            
A motion to amend a pleading under W.R.C.P. 15(a) "shall be freely given 
when justice so requires."  However, 
a district court's decision to grant or deny a motion to amend is a matter best 
left to the judgment of that court and we will not reverse its decision absent 
an abuse of discretion.  Ekberg v. Sharp, 2003 WY 123, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 1250, 1253 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 

Ray v. 
St. Vincent Healthcare, Inc., 2006 
WY 98, ¶ 7, 139 P.3d 464, 466 (Wyo. 2006).  
We have defined an abuse of discretion in the context of the denial of a 
motion for leave to amend a complaint as follows:

 
 
A court 
abuses its discretion when it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances.  
Johnston v. Stephenson, 938 P.2d 861, 862 
(Wyo. 
1997).  The party who is attacking 
the trial court's ruling has the burden to establish an abuse of discretion, and 
the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it 
did.  Id.

 
 

Doenz v. 
SheridanCountyBd. of 
CountyComm'rs, 949 P.2d 464, 465 (Wyo. 1997).

 
 
[¶17]   As we noted in reciting the facts 
above, Three Way filed its motion for leave to amend its complaint 
thirteen months after the original complaint was filed, and only seven weeks 
before trial.  See supra ¶ 9.  The district court denied the motion on 
the ground that it was untimely.  
Because whatever hearing on the motion that took place was not reported, 
the record contains no facts from which we could determine that the district 
court abused its discretion in denying the motion.  The allegation contained in the motion 
that limited discovery had led to the discovery of "additional facts and 
evidence" is insufficient either to identify those facts and evidence, or to 
explain the long delay in their discovery.  
Furthermore, Burton's unrefuted response to the motion cites 
deposition testimony showing that Three 
Way was aware of these "additional 
facts and evidence" even before it filed its original complaint.  Three Way has failed to establish that 
the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for leave to 
amend its complaint.

 
 
Whether 
the district court abused its discretion when it granted, in part, Burton's motion in 
limine?

 
 
[¶18]   "The purpose of a motion in limine 
is to obtain the court's pretrial ruling on the admissibility of evidence."  Reichert v. Phipps, 2004 WY 7, ¶ 4 n.1, 
84 P.3d 353, 355 n.1 (Wyo. 2004).  
As with other evidentiary decisions, the question of whether or not to 
grant a motion in limine is left to the sound discretion of the district 
court.  Capshaw v. WERCS, 2001 WY 68, ¶ 5, 28 P.3d 855, 857 (Wyo. 2001).  Evidence 
that is not relevant may be found inadmissible via a motion in limine.  Id.

 
 
Such 
decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 
disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. . . .  Determining whether the trial court 
abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner. . . .

 
 
            
A trial court's evidentiary rulings "are entitled to considerable 
deference,"' and will not be reversed on appeal so long as "there exists a 
legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling. . . ."'

 
 

Armstrong 
v. Hrabal, 2004 
WY 39, ¶ 10, 87 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 16, 63 P.3d 875, 883 (Wyo. 2003).  The 
burden is upon the person losing the motion to establish an abuse of 
discretion.  Brown v. State, 2005 WY 37, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d 52, 56 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶19]   Burton's motion in 
limine sought to prevent the admission of any evidence either of the 
monetary value of Three Way's performance, or any alleged promise by 
Burton to 
subdivide and improve the 7.81 acre parcel.  The motion was heard on the first day of 
trial, with the first request being denied, and the second granted.  The motion hearing was not reported and 
nothing in the record tells us the reasons for the court's rulings.  It may be presumed, however, that the 
jury was allowed to determine the monetary value of Three Way's services 
in case the district court decided to award unjust enrichment damages.  Further, it may be presumed that 
evidence of the possible subdivision and improvement of the 7.81 acre parcel was 
found inadmissible because, if damages were limited to specific performance of 
the contract, those damages would be limited to conveyance of the 7.81 acre 
parcel "as is."

 
 
[¶20]   We have already concluded that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Three 
Way's motion 
for leave to amend its complaint.  
Consequently, the only trial issues were breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment.  The contract did not 
provide for the 7.81 acre parcel to be subdivided and improved, so that evidence 
was not relevant to the contract issue.  
Similarly, because the unjust enrichment damages were measured by the 
value of Three 
Way's services, such evidence was not relevant to 
that issue.  Therefore, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in granting Burton's motion in limine in that 
regard.

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred as a matter of law when it denied Three Way's motion 
to affirm the jury's verdict?

 
 
[¶21]   Three Way's motion to affirm the 
jury's verdict relied upon numerous Wyoming cases, citing the near sanctity of a 
jury's decision:  Knowles v. Corkill, 2002 WY 119, 
¶ 21, 51 P.3d 859, 865 (Wyo. 2002) (great deference given to a jury 
verdict); Francis v. Pountney, 972 P.2d 143, 146 (Wyo. 1999) (juries have great discretion in determining amount of 
damages to be awarded); John Q. Hammons, 
Inc. v. Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353, 1358 (Wyo. 1998) (where law provides no 
measure for quantifying damages, amount to be awarded within jury's discretion); 
Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc. v. Baker 
Hughes Tubular Servs., Inc., 812 P.2d 555, 558-59 (Wyo. 1991) (judgment 
notwithstanding jury verdict should be sparingly granted); Medlock v. Merrick, 786 P.2d 881, 884 
(Wyo. 1990) (jury verdict based upon sufficient evidence not to be overturned 
merely because appellate court would have concluded differently); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Admiral 
Beverage Corp., 638 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Wyo. 1982) (where more than one 
inference can be made from the evidence, the jury's choice is conclusive if 
supported by substantial evidence).

 
 
[¶22]   While this recitation of the law is 
correct, we must agree with Burton that it does not control the result in 
the present case.  This jury did not 
determine the amount of damages to be awarded to Three Way.  Rather, the jury determined the monetary 
value of Three 
Way's services.  
The district court was faced with a decision whether to award contract 
damages or, alternatively, to award damages for the value of Three Way's services 
under the equitable theory of unjust enrichment.  The jury merely was asked to determine 
the value of those services in case the district court pursued that latter 
course.  It did not.  Instead, it ordered specific performance 
of the contract.  Consequently, 
there was no monetary jury verdict to affirm, and the district court did not err 
as a matter of law in that regard.  
This issue was, in reality, a plea for the district court to apply the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment, rather than to enforce the contract.  Generally speaking, however, equitable 
remedies such as unjust enrichment are not available when an express contract 
exists.  Sowerwine v. Keith, 997 P.2d 1018, 1021 
(Wyo. 2000).3  In the instant case, the evidence 
revealed a fully integrated unambiguous contract, and that is what the district 
court rightly enforced.

 
 
Whether 
the district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury as to 
Three 
Way's 
duty of workmanship?

 
 
[¶23]   We review jury instruction issues 
under the following standard:

 
 
Jury 
instructions should inform the jurors concerning the applicable law so that they 
can apply that law to their findings with respect to the material facts, 
instructions should be written with the particular facts and legal theories of 
each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any one of several 
instructional options may be legally correct, . . . 

 
 

Wheaton v. 
State, 2003 
WY 56, ¶ 20, 68 P.3d 1167, 1176 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
            
When examining the propriety of jury instructions, this Court reviews 
whether the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately and clearly advise the 
jury of the applicable law.  The 
trial court is not obligated to give an instruction offered by a party as long 
as the jury is adequately instructed on the law as it pertains to that 
case.  The trial court's ruling on 
an instruction will not constitute reversible error absent a showing of 
prejudice, and prejudice will not be said to result unless it is demonstrated 
that the instruction confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper 
principles of law.  Sellers v. Dooley Oil Transport, 2001 WY 
44, ¶ 9, 22 P.3d 307, 309 (Wyo. 2001); Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1036 
(Wyo. 
1983).  The burden is on the 
appellant to show prejudicial error.  
Daley v. Wenzel, 2001 WY 80, ¶ 
29, 30 P.3d 547, 554-55 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 

Parrish 
v. Groathouse Constr., Inc., 2006 
WY 33, ¶ 7, 130 P.3d 502, 505 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶24]   This issue was raised by Burton in its 
cross-appeal.  As to the warranty of 
workmanship implied in any construction contract, the district court instructed 
the jury as follows:

 
 
            
Construction contracts contain an implied warranty that work will be 
performed in a skillful, careful, diligent, and workmanlike manner. 

 
 
The 
district court refused to give the following instruction proposed by Burton in its 
place:

 
 
            
Construction contracts contain an implied warranty that work will be 
performed in a skillful, careful, diligent, and workmanlike manner.  The contract is not performed until the 
work accomplishes the agreed result.  
Where the principal object of the contract is to obtain a result, the 
builder is required to accomplish that purpose or result.  This duty of workmanlike performance 
imposes a corollary duty to warn the owner of defects in a project which would 
be likely to cause the work to fail if the contractor knew or reasonably should 
have known of these defects.  When a 
contractor knows or should know of a defect, he does not perform his obligations 
in a workmanlike manner if he fails to notify the owner of the condition.  A contractor is not relieved of this 
duty to disclose even if the specifications themselves are defective.  Rather, the contractor must warn the 
owner of the defective specification.  
It is only when the owner instructs the contractor to continue according 
to the defective plans that the contractor will be immune from 
liability.

 
 
[¶25]   Burton contends that the workmanship 
instruction given by the district court provided no guidance to the jury as to 
the applicability of this implied duty to the facts of this case.  In particular, Burton alleges that, 
without being told about a contractor's duty to warn the owner about known 
defects in the plans or site conditions, the jury could not properly analyze the 
fact that, knowing early on in the project that the plans did not provide 
remediation for the groundwater problems, Three Way's president "kept [his] 
mouth shut about the problem." 

 
 
[¶26]   The first question that must be 
asked in deciding whether the jury should have been instructed as requested by 
Burton is 
whether the law supports the proposed instruction.  We have said the following about the 
duty of building and construction contractors:

 
 
            
Building and construction contracts contain a warranty either express or 
implied that the work will be sufficient for a certain purpose and will be 
performed in a skillful, careful, diligent, and workmanlike manner.  Matheson Drilling, Inc. v. Padova, Inc., 
5 P.3d 810, 812 (Wyo. 2000); Arch 
Sellery, Inc. v. Simpson, 360 P.2d 911, 912 (Wyo. 1961).  The contract is not performed until the 
work accomplishes the agreed result.  
Arch Sellery, 360 P.2d  at 912; 
see also     Kansas Turnpike Authority v. Abramson, 275 F.2d 711, 713 (10th Cir. 1960) (where the principal object of the contract is to 
obtain a result, the builder is required to accomplish that purpose or 
result).

 
 

Alpine 
Climate Control, Inc. v. DJ's, Inc., 2003 
WY 138, ¶ 12, 78 P.3d 685, 689 (Wyo. 2003).  Part of the duty of performing in a 
workmanlike manner is "the duty to warn the owner of defects in the project 
which would be likely to cause the work to fail if the contractor [knows] or 
reasonably should [know] of those defects."  Lewis v. Anchorage Asphalt Paving Co., 
579 P.2d 532, 533 (Alaska 1978); see also 41 Am. Jur. 2d Independent Contractors § 62 
(2005).  Two corollaries of this 
general rule have potential application to the case sub judice:  (1) a contractor is not responsible for 
defects in the owner's plans and specification in the absence of some negligence 
on the contractor's part; and (2) the contractor has a duty to warn the owner of 
defects in subsurface conditions, where the contractor knows or should know of 
the defective conditions.  Harris v. Williams, 679 So. 2d 990, 993 
(La. App. 1996); Parker v. Thornton, 596 So. 2d 854, 858 (Miss. 1992); Lewis, 579 P.2d  at 534; 13 Am. Jur. 2d 
Building and Construction Contracts 
§§ 30-31 (2000); Annotation, Duty of 
Contractor to Warn Owner of Defects in Subsurface Conditions, 73 A.L.R.3d 
1213 (1976 and Supp. 2007); S. Bernstein, Annotation, Construction Contractor's Liability to 
Contractee for Defects or Insufficiency of Work Attributable to the Latter's 
Plans and Specifications, 6 A.L.R.3d 1394 (1966 and Supp. 
2007).

 
 
[¶27]   Even if the proposed instruction 
was a correct statement of the law under the facts of this case, we must still 
determine whether Burton was prejudiced by the district court's 
refusal to give it.  We conclude 
that Burton has 
not met its burden of proving that prejudice resulted.  To begin with, the instruction that was 
given was not an incorrect statement of the law, and it was broad enough so as 
not to preclude Burton from presenting evidence, and arguing to 
the jury, that the duty of workmanship included the duty to warn as outlined 
above.  See supra ¶¶ 23-26.  Indeed, much of the trial was taken up 
by testimony about the two sides' knowledge of both the groundwater problem and 
the lack of any remediation in the plans.  
Furthermore, Burton's counsel conceded during oral argument 
that trial counsel was, indeed, able to contend during closing argument that the 
implied warranty of workmanship included the duty to warn.4  
Perhaps most importantly, a reading of the entire trial transcript 
reveals that neither defectthe groundwater problem and the lack of a 
remediation planwas known to Three 
Way but not known to Burton.  
In fact, the testimony suggests that the groundwater problem in the 
entire area was a patent defect, as opposed to some latent defect only 
discovered by Three 
Way upon beginning the project.  For these reasons, we conclude that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury as 
requested by Burton.

 
 
Whether 
the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Three Way's claimed 
money damages?

 
 
[¶28]   This issue, raised by Burton, is the "flip side" 
of the third issue, which was raised by Three 
Way.  See supra ¶¶ 2, 18-20.  Prior to trial, Burton filed a two-part 
motion in limine.  Burton 
sought to exclude evidence, first, of any alleged promise by Burton to subdivide and 
improve the 7.81 acre parcel, and second, of the monetary value of Three 
Way's 
services.  The district court 
granted the motion as to the 7.81 acre parcel.  That ruling was the subject of the third 
issue.  See supra ¶¶ 2, 18-20.  The district court denied the motion, 
however, as to the monetary value of Three Way's services.  That is the issue, part of Burton's cross-appeal, 
that we now address.

 
 
[¶29]   Because this is an issue involving 
the admission of evidence, the question once again is whether the district court 
abused its discretion.  Burton contends that, 
inasmuch as the contract provided for compensation only in the form of a land 
transfer, and not in the form of a money payment, the value of Three 
Way's services 
was not relevant.  Three Way 
responds that, because the issue of unjust enrichment remained "on the table," 
it was reasonable for the district court to allow evidence as to the value of 
its services, and to get the jury's opinion as to that 
value.

 
 
[¶30]   Succinctly stated, Burton's argument is that evidence of money amounts that 
Three Way had not been paid for work it performed 
prejudiced the jury against Burton, and resulted 
in the jury's conclusion that Burton, rather than Three 
Way, breached 
the contract.  We conclude that 
Burton has not 
proven such prejudice.  It is true 
that the jury found that Burton, not Three 
Way, breached the contract.  But the evidence was uncontroverted that 
Burton had not 
conveyed to Three Way the 7.81 acre parcel, which was its contract 
obligation.  To the contrary, there 
was considerable evidence that Three Way had not breached the contract, 
including, as noted above, that the groundwater problem was a patent defect, 
rather than a latent subsurface defect known only to Three 
Way, and that 
Burton, not 
Three 
Way, provided the plans and specifications that 
failed to deal with the groundwater problem.  See supra ¶ 27.  In the context of all the evidence, it 
is reasonable to conclude that the jury's decision as to breach was not swayed 
by the monetary evidence.  We give 
considerable deference to the district court's evidentiary rulings, reversing 
only if the district court could not reasonably conclude as it did, and only if 
there is a reasonable probability that, absent an erroneous ruling, the verdict 
might have been different.  Schmid v. Schmid, 2007 WY 148, ¶ 10, 166 P.3d 1285, 1288 (Wyo. 2007); McGhee v. 
Rork, 978 P.2d 577, 579 (Wyo. 1999).  Burton has not shown either that the district 
court's ruling was erroneous under the circumstances, or that the necessary 
prejudice resulted from such ruling.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶31]   The district court correctly 
resolved this case by relying upon the written contract of the parties, as 
proven at trial.  The district court 
did not abuse its discretion in considering the equitable option of unjust 
enrichment until such time as the evidence convinced it otherwise.  None of the questioned rulings by the 
district court evinced an abuse of discretion or were contrary to 
law.

 
 
[¶32]   We affirm.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Some of 
the quoted language was inserted by handwritten interlineation, but such does 
not affect any of the issues herein considered.

 
 

2The 
original written agreement did not mention Lot 
19.  The addition of Lot 19 is one of the interlineations mentioned in footnote 
1 above.  Apparently, the addition 
of Lot 19 was the compensation for the 
additional work, eventually resulting in the formal amendment, but with the 
change to Lots 22 and 24.

 
 

3Three Way 
relies upon Landeis v. Nelson, 808 P.2d 216, 217 (Wyo. 1991) for the proposition that unjust 
enrichment may be an alternative basis for recovery in a contract case.  However, while an express contract was 
alleged in Landeis, this Court's 
determination was based upon an "implied contract involved in unjust 
enrichment.'"  Id.; see also Id. at 219 (Thomas, J., specially 
concurring).

 
 

4The 
closing arguments were not reported, so there is no transcript from which we can 
determine how this issue was handled by either side.  It is, of course, the appellant's duty 
to bring a complete record to this Court, and Burton was the appellant in regard to this 
issue.  Seherr-Thoss v. Seherr-Thoss, 2006 WY 
111, ¶ 26, 141 P.3d 705, 717 (Wyo. 2006).