Case Title: STATE v LEMMON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1984-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. 84-273 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1 9 8 4 STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respcndent, -VS- LEROY H. LEMMON, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL F R O M : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Fergus, The Honorable P e t e r L. Rapkoch, Judge presiding. C O U N S E L O F RECORD: For Appellant: Moses Law Firm, Bill..ings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Craig R. Buehler, County Attorney, Lewistown, Montana John R. Christensen, Deputy County Atty., Stanford, Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : Sept. 2 0 , 1984 Decided: December 1 3 , 1984 Clerk Mr. Justi.ce John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal by Leroy H. Lemmon from a judgment and sentence in the Tenth Judicial District Court, Fergus C0unt.y. On March 1, 1983, an information was filed alleging two c0unt.s of aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated kidnapping and one count of solicitation. One charge of aggravated assault and one charge of kidnapping were dropped. On February 23, 1984, after a two day jury trial, Lemmon was found guilty of the lesser-included misdemeanor offenses of simple assault and unlawful restraint. He was sentenced to two consecutive six-m0nt.h terms in the Fergus County jail with all but 90 days suspended. 1,emmon raises four issues on appeal: 1) the county attorney abused his prosecutorial discretion; 2) the evi.d.ence is insufficient to support the jury verdict because criminal. intent was not established and because Lemrnon's conduct was in connection with an arrest and authorized by statute; 3) the District Court's failure to give two proposed instructions was reversible error; and, 4) the sentence was excessive. Because no issue has merit the trial court judgment and sentence are affirmed. The crime occurred during what appellant's attorney characterizes as an "unfriendly divorce." Lemmon and the victim, divorced in August 1983 after a 20-year marriage. Lemmon considers it crucial to his defense that Koralyn Lemrnon.'~ attorney in the divorce proceedings was an assistant Deputy County Attorney. On February 13, 1983, the date of the crime, the couple were separated but both lived in Lewistown, Montana. On the 13th Koralyn Lemmon spent time with John Sweeting; the appellant was with Donna Myers. Sweeting and Myers had recently ended a personal and business re1 ationship. John Sweeting asked Koralyn Lemmon to retrieve a briefcase from appellant's truck which was locked and parked on a 1,ewistown street. She testified Sweeting led her to believe it was his briefcase. The briefcase actually belonged to Myers and contained paperwork concerning marj tal finances, allegedly threatening letters from Sweeting to Lemmon, and approximately 200 photographs of Meyers. Koralyn Lemon, using her key, unlocked the truck and took the briefcase. Though she was cited for misdemeanor theft the charge was later dropped. Returning to his truck, accompanied by Meyers, Lemmon realized the briefcase was gone and concluded his wife had taken it because no one had broken into the truck. Re claims these facts gave him reasonable grounds for concluding a felony had occurred. It is crucial to his defense that he was a member of the Ferqus County Sheriff's Posse. He and Meyers went to Koralyn Lemon's home. Koralyn Lemmon, hearing them drive up, tucked a gun into her waistband. Though their versions of the incident are very different, IleRoy and Koralyn Lemmon fought and he struck her on the head with the gun. She ended up in Lemrnon" truck bleeding, face down on the seat, her body on the floor, and her arms pinioned by Yeyers. Lemrnon characterizes this sequence as necessary force in the course of an arrest. He drove to the sheriff's department and spoke to the dispatcher, hut no sheriff was present or immediately available. His son arrived and was instructed to wait there. J,eaving the sheriff's department, Lemmon, Meyers, and Mrs. T,emmon, still held face down in the truck, drove around Lewistown looking for Sweeting and the briefcase. They found his vehicle and began a chase. The vehicles rammed together and gunshot was exchanged. The chase ended when Lemon's transmission caught fire; they then returned to the sheriff's department. The charges resulting from this incident were dropped. Z i t 9:00 p.m. the dispatcher located a sheriff who arrived at the station at 9: 15 p.m. When Lemmon returned to the station the sheriff assisted Mrs. Lemmon. She was taken to the hospital where she remained for two days. The briefcase was found on the roadside and returned to Myers. Sweeting left Lewistown and did not testify. Issue No. 1. - - Was there abuse of prosecutoria-l discretion? Lemon asserts ahuse of discretion hecause the county attorney did not act on complaints Lemon filed against Koralyn Lemon and the County Attorney's office was not disqualified although the deputy county attorney represented Koralyn Lemon in her divorce. T,emon is confusing two separate issues--abuse of prose~utoria~ discretion and denial of his motion to disqualify. Abuse - of Prosecutorial Discretion A claim of abuse of prosecutorial discretion is grounded on Fourteenth Amendment. The abuse of discretion issue was not raised at the tria.1 court and will not be considered here hased on section 46-20-702, MCA. Lemmon does not have the right to raise the issue and this Court does not have the record to review it. Section 46-20-702, MCA, states: "Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. No claim al-leging an error af f ecting iurisdictional or constitutional rights may be noticed on appeal, if the alleged error was not objected to as provided j . n 46-20-104, unless the defendant establishes that the error was prejudicial as to his guilt or punishment and that: "(1) the right asserted in the claim did not exist at the time of the trial. and. has been determined to be retroactive in its application; " ( 2 ) the prosecutor, the judge, or a law enforcement agency suppressed evidence from the defendant or his attorney that prevented. the claim from being raised and. disposed of; or "(3) material and controlling facts upon which the claim is predicated were not known to the defendant or his attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence." None of the exceptions apply to this situation. Therefore the issue will not be considered on appeal. We note in passing that even if the issue were raised at trial the appeal would be denied. Based on the facts in the record of this case Lemmon could not establish prosecutorial abuse. "In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion. Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, 'the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional. vj olationl so long as ' the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.' (Citing cases.)" Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978), 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604, 611. Eenial - of Motion - to Disqualify Lemmon moved to disqualify the Fergus County Attorney's office because a deputy county attorney, who office-shares with the county attorney in his private practice, represented Koralyn Lemmon in the divorce. If conflict were established there be a fair trial question but the District Court properly denied Lemon's motion to disqualify hecause these facts do not establish conflict of interest or abuse of discretion. Lemmon based his motion on DR 5-105(D): "If a 1-awyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm may accept or continue such employment." Kerely reciting a rule does not establish a violation. No evidence was introduced establishing conflict of interest. Tt was not established that the county attorney would have been disqualified from the criminal. prosecution of Lemmon if he had represented Koralyn Lemon in the divorce let alone that. the county attorney must be disqualifies because the deputy county attorney represented Mrs. Lemnon. We also note, in passing, that Canon. 5 concerns conflicts in representation not prosecution. Issue No. 2. Was there sufficient evidence to establish - - criminal intent or Lemon's defense of reasonable force in the course of a lawful arrest? Lemmon argues the evidence of intent was insufficient to support the verdj-ct and the evidence established a defense that he had reasonable grounds to arrest and his conduct was authorized by statute. The standard this Court uses in revi.ewi.ng the sufficiency of evidence in a jury trial is "it is well-established that questions of fact must be determined solely by the jury and that given a certain legal minimum of evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment." State v. Martinez (Mont. 1980), 613 P.2d 974, 980, 37 St.Rep. 982, 989. Applying this standard both arguments are entirely meritless. Intent Lemmon argues "evil. mind" is a necessary factor of intent and the statutory definitions of knowingly and. purposely a-re unconstitutional because they do not include the require~.ent of "evil mind." This Court has held. that, by definition, "knowingly" or "purposely" encompassed the necessary scienter. ' I [TI he necessary requirements for 'mens real and 'criminal. intent' are embodied in the use of the new language of the statute 'purposely' and 'knowingly.'" State v. Sharbono (1977), 175 Mont. 373, 392-393, 563 1?.2d Lemmon a.lso argues that evidence must prove he intended to "beat her, hit her, or strike her." While the record contains sufficient evidence to convince the jury this was his intent, the prosecution does not have to prove specific int.ent. This argument has also been addressed by this Court. "The fatal flaw in defendant's argument is that aggravated assault is not a specific intent crime. Aggravated assault is defined by section 45-5-202(1), MCA, as follows: "A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if h . e purposely or knowingly causes: "a) serious bodily injury to a-nother; [or] "b) bodily injury to another with a weapon . . ." The legislature did not intend to require any other mental state in addition to 'purposely' or 'knowingly.'" State v. Howard (Mont. 1981), 637 P.2d 15, 18, 38 St.Rep. 1980, Conduct Authorized 2 Statute Lemmon's argument that a statutory defense exists because he was a member of the Fergus County Sheriff's Posse is irrelevant. Vigilante days are over in Montana. His membership in the posse made him merel-y an auxiliary officer as defined by section 7-32-201(1), MCA: "'Auxj-liary Officer' means an unsworn, part-time, volunteer member of a law enforcement agency who may perform but is not limited to the performance of such functions as civil defense, search and. rescue, office duties, crowd and. traffic control and crime prevention activities." Auxiliary officers have very limited authority. Section 7-32-232, MCA, states: " (1 ) Auxiliary officers: " (a) are subordinate to full-time law enforcement officers; and " (b) may not serve unless supervised & 2 ful.1.-time law enforcement officer. "(2) No auxiliary officer may carry a weapon while on a sszned duty. " (Emphasis added. ) - - Section 7-32-233, MCA, states: "An auxiliary officer has only the arrest authority granted a private person in section 46-6-502 and 46-6-503." As an auxiliary officer's arrest authority is no greater than that of a private citizen, Lemmon's membership in the posse is irrelevant a.nd section 46-6-502, MCA, controls. Section 46-6-502 states: "A private person may arrest another when: "(1) he believes on reasonable grounds that an offense is being committed or attempted in his presence ; "(2) a felony has in fact been committed and he believes on reasonable qrounds that the person arrested has committed it; or "(3) he is a merchant, as defined in 30-11-.301, and has probable cause to believe the other is shoplifting in the merchant's store." Lemmon meets none of these criteria--no offense was committed in his presence, no felony was committed, and he is not a merchant. He had neither authority to arrest the victim nor reason to believe he did. Issue - - No. 3. Was the District Court's Refusal of L S u r y Tnstructions Reversible Error? Lernmon appeals the refusal of two proposed iury i-nstructions. In reviewing jury instruction "[tlhis Court must look at jury instructions as a whole to determine if they fully and fairly present the appl-icable law of the case.'' State v. Johnson (Mont 1982), 646 P.2d 507, 512, 39 St.Rep. 1014, 1020. Applying this standard the trial court correctly refused the proposed instructions. Instruction no. 16, on conjecture, although correct, was redundant. Instruction no. 38 is section 45-2-103(4) ( d ) , MCA. It does not state law applicab1.e to this case because Lernmon had no statutory defense and because the statute does not apply to this situation. Section 45-2-103 (4) (d) , MCA, deals with reliance on official interpretations by public officers or agencies. No such interpretation exists. Issue No. 4. Is the Sentence Excessive? - - "This Court has consistently held that if a sentence is within the limits provided by statute, it is not an abuse of discretion." State v. Garrido (Mont. 1981), 621 ~ . 2 d 1105, 1108, 38 St.Rep. 78, 80. Lernmon was convicted of simple assault and unlawful restraint, both punishable by up to six months in the county jail and a $500 fine (sections 45-5-201 (2) and 45-5-301 (2) ) . He was sentenced to two consecutive 6 month terms with all but 90 days suspended. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The judgment and sentence of the trial court is a£ f irmed. '; y L h . L y&Ji Justice We Concur: