Case Title: In re Children of Jamie P.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 85

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 85 
Docket: 
Ken-19-502 
Submitted 
On Briefs: May 28, 2020 
Decided: 
June 9, 2020 
Revised: 
June 23, 2020 
 
Panel: 
GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILDREN OF JAMIE P. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  A mother and father appeal from a consolidated judgment of the 
District Court (Augusta, Rushlau, J.) terminating their parental rights to their 
three children.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2020).  Both 
parents argue that the Department of Health and Human Services did not 
present sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could find that they are 
parentally unfit and contend that the court abused its discretion in finding that 
termination was in the children’s best interests.  The father also contends that 
the trial court abused its discretion by engaging in improper sua sponte 
questioning of witnesses pursuant to Maine Rule of Evidence 614.  We affirm 
the judgment.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
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[¶2]  In February 2019, the Department petitioned to terminate the 
parents’ parental rights as to all three children.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2020).  
The trial court (Rushlau, J.) held a two-day hearing, from July 11 to July 12, 2019, 
on the Department’s petition.  Both parents were present at the hearing and 
represented by counsel.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4054 (2020).   
[¶3]  In a judgment dated November 21, 2019, the trial court terminated 
the parents’ parental rights with regard to all three children.  See id. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii).  The trial court found by clear and convincing 
evidence that each parent is unwilling or unable to protect the children from 
jeopardy and that these circumstances are unlikely change within a time which 
is reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs, and that each parent has 
been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children within a time 
which is reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs.  See id. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  The trial court also found by clear and convincing 
evidence that termination of the parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best 
interests.  See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).  Its findings were supported by competent 
evidence in the record.  In re Child of Carl D., 2019 ME 67, ¶ 4, 207 A.3d 1202.  
[¶4]  The trial court’s judgment contained the following findings 
regarding the mother’s fitness:  
 
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After [the twins] were born in 2015 . . . there were a series of events 
which led both to legal proceedings and made the family situation 
unstable.  On August 14, 2015, [the father] filed a complaint for 
protection from abuse . . . .  He claimed that [the mother] had 
physically abused him and threatened to kill both him and the 
children.  He received a temporary and then a final protection 
order.  Although the final order was originally to remain in effect 
until September 4, 2017, the complaint was dismissed, and the 
order terminated on [the father’s] motion on May 13, 2016.  Four 
months later [the father] returned to the same court and filed 
another complaint for protection from abuse . . . .  He once again 
described domestic violence by [the mother], including violence in 
the presence of the children.  [The father] once again received a 
protection order.  Once again [the father] returned to court within 
a few months and moved for dismissal of the complaint. . . .  
Meanwhile [the mother] had been prosecuted for the criminal 
conduct committed against [the father] . . . .  She ultimately pleaded 
guilty to Domestic Violence Terrorizing . . . .   
 
DHHS was involved with the family between 2015 and 2017.  
The primary purpose of their involvement was apparently to 
ensure that [the father] and the children were not living with [the 
mother]. . . .  DHHS began a more significant involvement in June 
2017.  [A caseworker] visited the . . . home of [a family member] . . . 
and found that [the parents] were living there with all three 
children. . . .  During the visit, [the father] told the caseworker about 
[the mother’s] violence against him . . . .  
 
During the [termination] hearing [the father] confirmed . . . 
that [the mother] had engaged in repeated violence against him 
throughout this entire period.  He also confirmed that she had 
threatened to kill the children. . . .  It is clear that [the mother] 
engaged in significant domestic violence against [the father] for 
several years and that when the children are in [the father’s] 
presence they are exposed to this violence.   
 
. . . .  
 
 
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. . . DHHS’s Rehabilitation and Reunification Plan signed by 
[the mother] on January 19, 2018, described a series of steps [the 
mother] needed to take in order to make progress toward 
reunification.  One step was to complete a batterers intervention 
program (BIP).  Other steps included being employed, having 
stable housing, and developing an effective mental health 
treatment and medication program.  While [the mother] has been 
working to some extent on all these issues, she has made relatively 
little progress.  She began a BIP in Lewiston but . . . failed to 
complete the program. . . .  Her housing situation was erratic for 
many months, and included “couch surfing,” camping out in a tent 
for a period of time, and a stay in a homeless shelter. . . .  She worked 
for brief periods for several different employers. . . .  [The mother] 
engaged with [a counselor] at Kennebec Behavioral Health for 
many months . . . .  However, [the mother’s] progress was regularly 
disrupted for a variety of reasons. . . .  [The counselor] saw no 
progress at all in one important area, which was [the mother] 
gaining insight on how to avoid conflict with others . . . .     
 
 
DHHS arranged for [the mother] to have a trial placement 
with the twins in August of 2018. . . .  A few days later [the mother] 
drove her car with the twins as passengers.  They were in ordinary 
seat belts.  [The mother] failed to secure them in child safety seats. 
. . .  [The mother] drove through a stop sign . . . and collided with 
another vehicle.  Both vehicles were damaged and [the mother’s] 
was [totaled].  The twins had medical evaluations and some 
treatment but fortunately neither child was seriously injured.  
However, the emotional effect of the crash on the twins, and 
indirectly on [the older child], was significant.  
 
[¶5]  The court’s supported evidentiary findings as to the father’s 
parental fitness are as follows:  
[The father] was the target of multiple acts of physically violent 
behavior by [the mother] over a period of years.  [The mother] also 
threatened violence against both him and against the children.  
Initially he acted responsibly to protect the children when he 
 
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obtained a protection order in 2015.  Several months later he had 
the protection order terminated.  His reason was that it was too 
difficult for him to take care of the children on his own.  Within a 
short time, [the mother] engaged in more violent behavior.  [The 
father] again acted responsibly by obtaining a second protection 
order.  Once again, he had the order terminated.  Once again, he 
allowed [the mother] to have access to the children.  He was then, 
once again, the target of [the mother’s] violent behavior . . . .  
 
. . . [I]n June 2017, [the father] told the DHHS caseworker that 
he was overwhelmed by the responsibilities of being a parent of 
three children. . . .  He terminated both protection orders and 
allowed [the mother] access to the children because he was 
incapable of providing appropriate care on his own.  The testimony 
of [a family member] showed that as early as 2015 she and other 
family members were caring for the children for various periods of 
time . . . .   
 
After DHHS placed the children with [a family member] in 
June 2017, [the father] had an opportunity to, at minimum, help 
provide care for [the oldest child].  He was not successful even in 
that limited role.  [The family member] asked him to leave.  He 
became homeless . . . . 
 
The jeopardy order agreed to by [the father] emphasized his 
failure to protect the children from [the mother’s] violent behavior.  
However, it also described [the father’s] own unsafe behavior in 
leaving the children unsupervised despite their age and 
developmental needs . . . .  The twins were only 2 1/2 years old and 
incapable of protecting themselves from harm. . . .  [The oldest 
child] was placed with [the father] on a trial basis in August 2018.  
[The father] had a lapse in judgment in the fall of that year when he 
entered the vacant home of [the mother’s] family to remove some 
personal possessions. . . .  DHHS temporarily interrupted the trial 
placement.   
 
There was a far more serious event in January 2019.  The 
father] planned to pick up [the oldest child] at school in Augusta.  
 
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He did not appear. . . .  [The oldest child] was upset and concerned 
that [the father] had been in a car crash. . . .  The trial placement 
was terminated.   
 
. . . .  
 
[The father’s] situation deteriorated significantly between 
the end of the trial placement and the date of the [termination] 
hearing.  He was evicted from his apartment. . . .  After the eviction 
he began living with a man he knew only as “Q.” . . .  
 
. . . [The father] was charged with drug possession as a result 
of an encounter with a Gardiner police officer . . . .  [The officer] 
found [the father] unconscious and slumped over in the front seat 
of his car in a parking lot.  It was 3:00 a.m.  There was a plate next 
to [the father] with a substance the officer identified as 
methamphetamine. . . .  The resulting criminal case was pending at 
the time of the hearing . . . .  
 
[¶6]  The court also made the following supported findings regarding the 
best interests of the children:  
Since the placement, the twins have been with [a family 
member] for all but the few days of the trial placement with [the 
mother]. . . .  She has provided them with a safe and stable home for 
the majority of their lives, and they are thriving in that 
environment. . . .  [N]either parent has made progress toward 
creating a home where the twins will be protected from harm.  [The 
father’s] life has deteriorated.  It is in such disarray that he could 
not figure out how to have visits with the twins, and visits were 
suspended . . . . 
 
[The oldest child] has done relatively well in his most recent 
placement.  His life has been disrupted since 2015 by repeated 
changes in residence including the trial placement with [the father] 
which ended abruptly after several months.  It has been difficult for 
him to make progress, although the care provided by [a family 
 
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member], and by the current foster family, has been of great 
benefit.  His recent contact with the parents has not been beneficial. 
. . .  [The oldest child] has expressed the desire to reunite with [the 
father].  There is no indication of a similar desire as to [the mother].  
[The father] has encouraged [the oldest child] to believe 
reunification is possible. . . .  Whatever capacity [the father] once 
had to provide a safe home for [the oldest child] is not in existence 
now.  
 
[¶7]  Based on these supported findings, the trial court concluded that 
the parents were unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy and 
that these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time calculated to meet 
the children’s needs, and that the parents have been unwilling or unable to take 
responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet the 
children’s needs.  22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  The court also concluded 
that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the best interest of each 
child.  22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).  The mother and father each filed a notice 
of appeal.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2020); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
1. 
Parental Unfitness 
[¶8]  On appeal, both parents contend that the record contains 
insufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that they were unfit to 
parent the children.  Contrary to their contentions, the record indeed contains 
 
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sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings as to both grounds of 
parental unfitness with regard to each parent.  “We review the court’s findings 
of fact for clear error and the court’s ultimate determination that termination 
of the parental rights is in the child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.”  
In re Child of Olivia F., 2019 ME 149, ¶ 5, 217 A.3d 1106.  “We will affirm an 
order terminating parental rights when a review of the entire record 
demonstrates that the trial court rationally could have found clear and 
convincing evidence in that record to support the necessary factual findings as 
to the bases for termination.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  “A court need find 
only one of four statutory grounds of parental unfitness to find that a parent is 
unfit to parent his or her child.  Where the court finds multiple bases for 
unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the alternative bases is supported by clear 
and convincing evidence.”  Id. ¶ 6 (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted); 
see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b) (2020).  “[T]he court must examine from the 
child’s perspective—not the parent’s—the time within which the parent can 
take responsibility for a child and protect that child from jeopardy.”  In re 
Children of Tiyonie R., 2019 ME 34, ¶ 6, 203 A.3d 824.   
a. 
As to the Mother 
 
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[¶9]  The mother argues that “she has continuously moved forward 
towards reunification,” and that her good faith efforts at rehabilitation and 
reunification are fatal to the Department’s petition.  However, competent 
evidence in the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the mother is 
unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy and that these 
circumstances are unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to 
meet the children’s needs, as well as its conclusion that the mother has been 
unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children within a time 
reasonably calculated to meet their needs.  22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).   
 
[¶10]  Here, the mother, despite repeated efforts, failed to complete any 
of the goals set forth in her rehabilitation and reunification plan.  She failed to 
complete a BIP program; her housing and employment situations were 
unstable at best; her relationship with the children’s father remained volatile 
and continued to involve encounters with law enforcement; her work with 
counselors plateaued, and she terminated her relationship with her longtime 
counselor prior to the termination hearing.  These facts, supported by record 
evidence, suggest that the mother was unable or unwilling to take 
responsibility for the children and unable or unwilling to protect the children 
from jeopardy.  22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).   
 
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[¶11]  Furthermore, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that 
what little progress the mother did make occurred at such a slow pace that 
circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to 
meet the children’s needs.  22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  She was not 
close to completing treatment for her domestically violent behavior, and at the 
termination hearing she categorically denied committing any such behavior—
even in the face of overwhelming contradictory evidence.  Over a two-year 
period during which the mother had access to support services she failed to 
make progress.  The mother’s contention that she has “continuously moved 
towards reunification” is not supported by the record.  Rather, the record 
supports the trial court’s conclusion to the contrary—that the mother is 
unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy, and has been 
unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children in a time reasonably 
calculated to meet their needs.   
b. 
As to the Father 
 
[¶12]  The father also argues that the record evidence is insufficient to 
support the trial court’s finding that he is also unfit to parent the children 
because he is unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy and 
 
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take responsibility for the children in a time reasonably calculated to meet their 
needs.   
 
[¶13]  Contrary to the father’s contentions, the record supports the trial 
court’s findings on both grounds.  The Department’s involvement originally 
stemmed from concern that the father could not keep the children away from 
the mother and the domestic violence that was endemic to the relationship 
between the mother and the father.  Competent record evidence demonstrates 
that the father has not separated from the mother.  Furthermore, the father’s 
circumstances—apart from his relationship—have deteriorated significantly 
since 2017.  He has experienced periods of homelessness.  He does not 
currently have an apartment or suitable housing for any of the children.  His 
relationships with family members who had previously assisted with childcare 
and housing are broken.  The circumstances of his recent arrest and the abrupt 
end of the trial placement with the oldest child suggest that he continues to 
struggle with substance abuse.  
2. 
Children’s Best Interests  
[¶14]  Both parents also argue on appeal that the record contains 
insufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that termination was in the 
children’s best interests.  The father contends that the absence of identified 
 
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adoptive homes for the children requires that we vacate the trial court’s 
termination order.  Contrary to the parents’ contentions, the record is sufficient 
to support the trial court’s finding that termination of each parent’s parental 
rights is in the children’s best interests, and the identification of adoptive 
homes is not a prerequisite to a finding that termination is in the children’s best 
interests.  In re Children of Meagan C., 2019 ME 129, ¶ 20, 214 A.3d 9.  “We 
review the court’s ultimate conclusion regarding the best interest of the child 
for an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given [to] 
them, through the trial court’s lens.”  In re Child of Carl D., 2019 ME 67, ¶ 5, 207 
A.3d 1202 (quotation marks omitted.)  
 
[¶15]  The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination 
of each parent’s parental rights would facilitate permanency and stability and 
therefore be in the children’s best interests.  The two youngest children had 
been living with a family member almost exclusively for more than two years, 
and the same family member served as caregiver even before that placement 
became official.  The family member, however, was not a permanency option.  
Neither parent had made any progress toward establishing a situation that 
could accommodate the two youngest children permanently.  The mother’s 
brief trial placement with the two youngest children ended when she crashed 
 
13 
her car with the two toddlers secured only by adult seat belts.  The father had 
not been able to arrange a safe place even for supervised visits with the 
children.  
 
[¶16]  The record also supports the trial court’s conclusion that 
termination was in the best interest of the oldest child.  The oldest child was 
particularly negatively affected by the frequent and abrupt changes in 
residences and caregivers.  He expressed no desire to reunite with his mother.  
Although he expressed a preference to reunite with the father, the sudden 
termination of his trial placement with the father had derailed the oldest child’s 
progress for some time thereafter.  The father continued to foster in the oldest 
child unrealistic expectations of reunification, but visits with the child were not 
beneficial to the child.  The father did not possess the means by which to 
provide a safe or supportive home for the oldest child, nor did it appear he 
would obtain those means in a time reasonably calculated to meet the oldest 
child’s needs.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest.  
B. 
Trial Court’s Questioning of Witnesses  
[¶17]  The father argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court 
abused its discretion by engaging in sua sponte questioning of witnesses at the 
 
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termination hearing, the extent and nature of which “suggested a posture of 
advocacy and a retreat from impartiality.”  However, contrary to the father’s 
contentions, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court with 
regard to its examination of witnesses at the termination hearing, and the trial 
record does not suggest any such “retreat from impartiality.” 
 
[¶18]  “Subject to the obvious caveat to maintain judicial impartiality, and 
not to assume the posture of an advocate, a presiding justice may interrogate 
witnesses.”  State v. Colomy, 407 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Me. 1979) (citation omitted) 
(quotation marks omitted); see M.R. Evid. 614.  “So long as the trial judge 
intervenes for the purpose of clarifying testimony, saving time, or preventing a 
miscarriage of justice, he must be allowed considerable latitude in his 
questioning.”  State v. Greenwood, 385 A.2d 803, 804 (Me. 1978).  “The 
paramount concern [regarding judicial interrogation] has been that the judge 
not participate in any manner from which the jury may infer that he endorses 
the cause of one side.”  State v. Pickering, 491 A.2d 560, 564 (Me. 1985).  
Therefore, where there is no jury, “this concern is absent.”  Id.  Where a party 
does not preserve his objection to a line of questioning by bringing it to the 
attention of the court in a timely manner, we review for obvious error.  See State 
v. Haycock, 296 A.2d 489, 492 (Me. 1972).   
 
15 
 
[¶19]  Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in questioning the 
father or any other witness pursuant to Rule 614.  Although the Department 
and the parents were both represented by experienced counsel, the long and 
convoluted path of the Department’s involvement with the children created 
challenges in bringing out a coherent chronology through witness testimony.  
In its role as factfinder, the court questioned several witnesses at length.  Its 
questions were limited to attempts to clarify and bring out facts key to its 
ultimate findings and judgment.  Cf. Greenwood, 385 A.2d at 804 (holding that a 
court’s questioning of a witness was improper where the questions were “only 
marginally helpful in ascertaining the facts” and focused on impeaching a key 
witness).  Furthermore, the record does not suggest that the court’s questioning 
of the father, in particular, was improper or revealed a retreat from 
impartiality.  The court questioned other witnesses at similar length, and its 
interrogation of the father was focused primarily on evidence of the mother’s 
behavior.  The court’s participation in the questioning of witnesses at the 
termination hearing was not improper.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶20]  The trial court did not clearly err in finding by clear and convincing 
evidence that the mother and father were each unable or unwilling to protect 
 
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the children from jeopardy or take responsibility for the children within a time 
reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs.  Nor did the trial court 
commit clear error or abuse its discretion in determining that termination was 
in each child’s best interest.  See In re M.B., 2013 ME 46, ¶ 37, 65 A.3d 1260.  
Finally, the trial court did not commit obvious error in its questioning of 
witnesses.  See Haycock, 296 A.2d at 492.  
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrew Wright, Esq., Brunswick, for appellant mother 
 
David Paris, Esq., Bath, for appellant father 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Augusta District Court docket number PC-2017-31 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY