Case Title: Ramirez v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 72/18

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2019-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Edinson Herrera Ramirez v. State of Maryland, No. 72, September Term, 2018 
 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL – PERFORMANCE PRONG – 
DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE – PREJUDICE PRONG –PRESUMPTION OF 
PREJUDICE – In this burglary case, where prospective juror disclosed during voir dire 
that he had been victim of burglary and that he believed that that would affect his ability to 
be fair and impartial, and where petitioner’s trial counsel did not ask follow-up questions 
of prospective juror, move to strike prospective juror for cause based on response to “crime 
victim” question, or exercise peremptory challenge against prospective juror, Court of 
Appeals concluded that petitioner had proven deficient performance, i.e., petitioner’s trial 
counsel’s performance fell below objective standard of reasonableness. 
 
Court held that, in assessing petitioner’s allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
court should presume that trial counsel’s performance prejudiced petitioner only if: (1) 
petitioner was actually denied assistance of counsel; (2) petitioner was constructively 
denied assistance of counsel; or (3) petitioner’s counsel had actual conflict of interest.  
Absent these three circumstances, presumption of prejudice does not apply, and petitioner 
must prove prejudice. That said, Court held that petitioner failed to prove prejudice, as, at 
trial, State offered strong direct and circumstantial evidence of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 72 
 
September Term, 2018 
______________________________________ 
 
EDINSON HERRERA RAMIREZ 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
*Greene 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Booth 
Wilner, Alan M. (Senior Judge, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
McDonald, J., concurs and dissents. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: July 12, 2019 
 
*Greene, J., now retired, participated in the 
hearing and conference of this case while an 
active member of this Court; after being recalled 
pursuant to the Md. Constitution, Article IV, 
Section 3A, he also participated in the decision 
and adoption of this opinion. 
Circuit Court for Carroll County 
Case No. 06-K-05-033033   
Argued: June 7, 2019  
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2019-07-12 14:44-04:00
Under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 21 
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, a defendant in a criminal case has “a right to 
effective assistance of counsel.”  Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 355, 362, 168 A.3d 1, 9, 
13 (2017) (citation omitted).  In a petition for postconviction relief, a petitioner may 
contend that he or she is entitled to a new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.  See id. at 349, 168 A.3d at 5.  A petitioner has received ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel where trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and prejudiced him or her.  
See id. at 355, 168 A.3d at 9.  Generally, a petitioner has the burden to prove both deficient 
performance and prejudice.  See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).  There 
are, however, circumstances under which “a presumption of prejudice is appropriate[,]” 
which obviates the need for “inquiry into the [] conduct of the trial.”  Id. at 660. 
This case requires us to determine whether trial counsel’s conduct fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, and, if so, whether a presumption of prejudice 
applies, or whether the petitioner must prove prejudice, where he alleges that trial counsel’s 
conduct resulted in structural error.1 
In the Circuit Court for Carroll County, the State, Respondent, charged Edinson 
Herrera Ramirez, Petitioner, with several crimes that arose out of an armed robbery.  
                                              
1A structural error is an error that inheres in the trial’s structure—i.e., “the 
framework within which the trial proceeds”—and that “affect[s] the trial from beginning 
to end, and necessarily render[s it] fundamentally unfair.”  Redman v. State, 363 Md. 298, 
303 n.5, 768 A.2d 656, 659 n.5 (2001) (cleaned up).  Meanwhile, a trial error is “an error 
in the trial process itself”—i.e., “an error [that] occur[s] during the presentation of the case 
to the jury[.]”  Id. at 303 n.5, 768 A.2d at 659 n.5 (cleaned up).  On direct appeal, a 
structural error always warrants reversal of the defendant’s convictions, and cannot be 
deemed harmless.  See id. at 303 n.5, 768 A.2d at 659 n.5. 
 
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During voir dire, the circuit court asked the prospective jurors whether they, their relatives, 
or their close friends had ever had experiences as victims of crime, defendants, or witnesses 
in criminal cases that would “affect[ their] ability to render a fair and impartial verdict[.]”  
Juror 27 answered that, approximately a year-and-a-half earlier, his apartment had been 
“broken into[.]”  The circuit court asked whether “that experience[ would], in any way, 
affect [his] ability to render a fair and impartial verdict in this case[.]”  Juror 27 responded: 
“I believe it would.”  Trial counsel did not ask Juror 27 any follow-up questions, or request 
that the circuit court do so.  Juror 27 did not respond to any other questions during voir 
dire.  
Trial counsel did not move to strike Juror 27 for cause based on his response to the 
“crime victim” question, but rather moved to strike another prospective juror, Juror 25, for 
cause on the ground that his “home was broken into” and his “response as to whether it 
would affect them was, I believe it would.”  Juror 25, however, had not responded to any 
questions during voir dire.  In addition to failing to move to strike Juror 27 for cause based 
on his response to the “crime victim” question, trial counsel did not exercise a peremptory 
challenge with respect to Juror 27, who was seated as a juror.  After the jury had been 
selected and the circuit court dismissed the prospective jurors who had not been seated, 
trial counsel advised the circuit court that Juror 27 “just vehemently started shaking his 
head and just looked right at [her] with not a very pleasant face.”  At that time, trial counsel 
moved to strike Juror 27, stating that the juror was not “happy about the fact that he’s sitting 
on [the] jury[.]”  The circuit court reserved ruling on the motion to strike Juror 27 to “see 
how he [would] react[] during the course of the trial.”  The circuit court stated that it was 
 
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up to trial counsel whether to re-raise the issue.  Trial counsel did not renew the motion to 
strike Juror 27, or otherwise raise any issue as to Juror 27 after moving to strike him 
following jury selection.  
The jury found Ramirez guilty of eleven charges.  After an unsuccessful direct 
appeal, Ramirez petitioned for postconviction relief, contending that trial counsel engaged 
in ineffective assistance of counsel by not moving to strike Juror 27 for cause based on his 
response to the “crime victim” question and by not using a peremptory challenge against 
Juror 27.  The circuit court denied the petition.  Ramirez appealed, and the Court of Special 
Appeals affirmed.  Ramirez filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court 
granted. 
Before us, Ramirez asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and that the presumption of prejudice applies because trial counsel caused 
structural error—namely, the seating of a biased juror.  The State responds that trial 
counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, that this 
case’s circumstances fall outside of the ones under which the presumption of prejudice 
applies, and that Ramirez has failed to prove prejudice.  
We hold that Ramirez has proven that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, 
but has not established prejudice.  Ramirez’s trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness because, during voir dire, she failed to ask any follow-up 
questions, move to strike for cause, or use a peremptory challenge against a juror who 
indicated that he had previously been the victim of a burglary, and that he believed that 
that would affect his ability to be fair and impartial.  In assessing a petitioner’s allegation 
 
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of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, a court should presume that trial counsel’s 
performance prejudiced the petitioner only if: (1) the petitioner was actually denied the 
assistance of counsel; (2) the petitioner was constructively denied the assistance of counsel; 
or (3) the petitioner’s counsel had an actual conflict of interest.  Absent these three 
circumstances, the presumption of prejudice does not apply, and the petitioner must prove 
prejudice. 
Ramirez does not contend that this case involves any of the circumstances under 
which the presumption of prejudice applies; and, upon independent review, we are satisfied 
that the presumption of prejudice does not apply here.  Accordingly, Ramirez has the 
burden of proving both deficient performance and prejudice.  That said, we conclude that 
Ramirez has not proven prejudice, given that the State offered strong—indeed, 
overwhelming—direct and circumstantial evidence of his guilt. 
BACKGROUND 
Jury Selection 
On July 12, 2005—i.e., the first day of trial—fifty-one prospective jurors appeared 
before the circuit court.  During voir dire, the circuit court asked the prospective jurors: 
“Have you[,] or any member of your family or close friends[,] ever been victims of a crime, 
accused of a crime[,] or a witness in a criminal case[,] and that experience affects your 
ability to render a fair and impartial verdict?”  Multiple prospective jurors, including Juror 
27, responded.  The following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: What is your experience, please? 
 
JUROR [] 27: I had an apartment that was broken into about a year-and-a-
 
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half ago. 
 
THE COURT: All right. Would that experience, in any way, affect your 
ability to render a fair and impartial verdict in this case? 
 
JUROR [] 27: I believe it would.  
 
Trial counsel did not ask Juror 27 any follow-up questions, or request that the circuit court 
do so.  Juror 27 did not respond to any other questions during voir dire.  
After the circuit court finished asking questions of the prospective jurors, the court 
asked counsel whether they would move to strike any prospective jurors for cause, and the 
following exchange occurred: 
[RAMIREZ’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: Juror No. 25: Their home was broken 
into.  Their response as to whether it would affect them was, I believe it 
would. 
 
THE COURT: State’s position? 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: No objection. 
 
THE COURT: We’ll strike, then. 
 
THE CLERK: Number 25? 
 
[RAMIREZ’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: That is No. 25.  
 
Contrary to Ramirez’s trial counsel’s statement, Juror 25 had not stated that his or her 
residence had been broken into.  In fact, Juror 25 had not responded to any questions during 
voir dire.  
After the circuit court ruled on the motions to strike for cause, the circuit court 
stated: “If we run out, we can go with what we have and bring some more people tomorrow. 
. . . Tomorrow, we’ll bring in another panel to try and [v]oir [d]ire them and then . . . try to 
 
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pick additional jurors.”  
The parties also had the opportunity to exercise peremptory challenges against 
prospective jurors.  Ramirez was permitted ten peremptory challenges.2  Ultimately, 
Ramirez’s trial counsel exercised peremptory challenges against nine prospective jurors; 
in other words, there was one peremptory challenge left after jury selection.  When trial 
counsel was given the opportunity to use a peremptory challenge as to Juror 27, she stated 
that Juror 27 was “[a]cceptable.”  Once twelve jurors were seated, trial counsel stated: “The 
array is acceptable to the Defense.”  
The courtroom clerk swore the jury, and the circuit court dismissed the prospective 
jurors who had not been seated.  Immediately afterward, trial counsel requested a bench 
conference, which the circuit court granted.  At the bench conference, the following 
exchanged occurred: 
[RAMIREZ’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: As to Juror [] 27, who is the young man 
that is seated in the yellow shirt, I would ask that he be stricken for cause.  
Upon the Court excusing the [prospective] jurors[ who had not been 
seated], he just vehemently started shaking his head and just looked 
right at me with not a very pleasant face.  I don’t think [that] he’s happy 
about the fact that he’s sitting on this jury, and I think that that would be 
sufficient to ask [that] he be stricken for cause. 
 
THE COURT: Well, it also should be noted that there was a lot of glee from 
those who made it out without being chosen.  Go ahead.  Do you wish to 
respond? 
                                              
2A defendant is permitted ten peremptory challenges where the highest maximum 
sentence to which a defendant is subject on any single count is at least twenty years of 
imprisonment, but less than life imprisonment.  See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 
(1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.) § 8-420(b); Md. R. 4-313(a)(3).  The State charged Ramirez with 
robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree burglary, the maximum sentence for 
each of which is twenty years of imprisonment.  See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 
2012 Repl. Vol.) §§ 3-403(b), 6-202(c). 
 
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[PROSECUTOR]: I would -- I didn’t see that.  It’s a situation where I would 
defer. 
 
[RAMIREZ’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: I’m sorry? What ... 
 
THE COURT: Well, I’m gonna reserve on that. We have two alternates.  
We’ll entertain that issue and see how he reacts during the course of the trial. 
 
[RAMIREZ’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: Thank you, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: I’ll leave it to the Defense to re-raise ... 
 
THE CLERK: I’m sorry. 
 
THE COURT: ... the issue. 
 
THE CLERK: I’m -- I’m sorry, I didn’t pick it up ... 
 
THE COURT: I’ll deny it at this time. 
 
* * * 
 
THE COURT: The State is -- I mean, the Defense is to bring it back up before 
the jury retires if there -- if they still wanna go and raise the issue.  
 
(Emphasis added) (ellipses in original) (paragraph break omitted).  Trial counsel did not 
renew the motion to strike Juror 27 for cause, or otherwise raise any issue as to him after 
moving to strike him for cause.  
Trial Testimony 
At trial, as a witness for the State, Linda Hidey testified that, in the summer of 1999, 
she and her husband, Rodney Hidey, had a house built at 3112 Ridge Road in Westminster. 
For “a couple of months[,]” Ramirez worked on the construction of the house.  On multiple 
occasions during that period, Ms. Hidey talked to Ramirez, who, according to her, “spoke 
perfect English.”  One day, Ms. and Mr. Hidey drove a safe to the construction site, and 
 
- 8 - 
Ramirez helped move the safe into the area that would become the house’s basement.  
Starting from the time when the house was being built, the safe “was covered[,]” such that 
“no one would have known what it was.”  The safe’s existence was not well-known, and 
Ms. and Mr. Hidey did not talk about the safe because they did not want to “ever [] let other 
people know about it.”  
In November 1999, Ms. and Mr. Hidey moved into the house.  Ultimately, Ms. and 
Mr. Hidey had three minor children, who lived with them.  
On or about September 6, 2004, Ms. and Mr. Hidey and their children returned home 
from a trip.  On the way home, Ms. Hidey listened to a voicemail in which an employee of 
a security company informed her that an alarm in the house had gone off on September 4, 
2004.  Ms. and Mr. Hidey found that a basement window was unlocked.  
On October 11, 2004, at approximately 10 p.m., Ms. Hidey was at the house with 
her three children.  Her two sons, ages three and five at the time, were in their bedrooms 
on the second floor.  Her daughter, age six at the time, was asleep on the couch in the family 
room on the first floor.  No one else was in the house; Mr. Hidey was away from home, 
attending a meeting.  
While Ms. Hidey was at the top of the stairs, she saw two men enter the house.  One 
man had a “small build[,]” was wearing gloves and a green ski mask, and had a revolver 
with “a very long barrel” pointed at Ms. Hidey.  The other man had “a stocky build,” was 
“probably” 5'10" or 5'11", was wearing gloves and an orange ski mask, and had a sawed-
off shotgun pointed at Ms. Hidey.  Ms. Hidey testified that Ramirez’s “physical appearance 
matche[d] that of the man [in] the orange [ski] mask” “[i]n reference to his build[,] and 
 
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based on what he was wearing that evening[,] his height[, a]nd his weight.”  The man in 
the orange ski mask never said anything loud enough for Ms. Hidey to hear his voice.  
The man in the green ski mask asked Ms. Hidey: “Where’s the money?”  Ms. Hidey 
reached into her pockets to retrieve the cash that she had on her.  The man in the green ski 
mask said: “I don’t want your money[.  W]here’s the real money?”  The man in the green 
ski mask told Ms. Hidey to come downstairs, and she obeyed. The man in the green ski 
mask again asked Ms. Hidey: “Where’s the money?”  The man in the orange ski mask 
whispered in the ear of the man in the green ski mask.  The man in the green ski mask 
asked Ms. Hidey: “Where’s the safe?”  Ms. Hidey responded that the safe was in the 
basement.  The man in the green ski mask said: “Show me[.]”  Ms. Hidey went downstairs 
and showed the men where the safe was.  
The man in the green ski mask told Ms. Hidey to open the safe.  Ms. Hidey 
responded that she did not know the combination.  The man in the orange ski mask again 
whispered in the ear of the man in the green ski mask.  The man in the green ski mask 
asked Ms. Hidey: “[W]here’s your husband?”  Ms. Hidey responded that Mr. Hidey was 
at a meeting.  The man in the green ski mask said: “I believe her[.]  I believe [that] she 
doesn’t know the combination[.] . . . [W]e’ll just wait for him[.]”  Ms. Hidey and the men 
went back upstairs.  While waiting for Mr. Hidey to return home, the man in the green ski 
mask told Ms. Hidey to remain calm, and that, if she did not cooperate, and if Mr. Hidey 
did not cooperate when he came home, they would kill Ms. and Mr. Hidey, their daughter, 
and their two sons.  
Ms. Hidey heard the chime that the security system made whenever a car pulled into 
 
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the driveway.  The man in the green ski mask told Ms. Hidey to sit on the couch in the 
family room and not move, and she obeyed.  The man in the green ski mask went into the 
dining room, and the man in the orange ski mask went into the kitchen and crouched out 
of sight of the exterior door.  Mr. Hidey entered the house through that door.  The man in 
the orange ski mask jumped out and pointed the shotgun at him.  Mr. Hidey went into the 
dining room, where the man in the green ski mask pointed the revolver at him.  Ms. Hidey 
“heard a big scuffle,” but could not see it.  The men led Mr. Hidey into the family room.  
The man in the green ski mask told Ms. and Mr. Hidey and their daughter to sit on the 
floor, and they complied.  The man in the green ski mask said to Mr. Hidey: “Don’t be 
stupid. . . . Where’s the safe? . . . . Let’s go, you’re gonna open the safe.”  
The men, Ms. and Mr. Hidey, and their daughter went to the basement and 
approached the safe.  The man in the green ski mask said: “Open the safe[.]”  Mr. Hidey 
tried to open the safe, then tried to grab the shotgun from the man in the orange ski mask. 
The man in the orange ski mask bludgeoned Mr. Hidey with the shotgun, and the man in 
the green ski mask shot Mr. Hidey with the revolver.  Mr. Hidey fell to the floor, saying 
that he had been hit, meaning that he had been shot.   
The man in the green ski mask again told Mr. Hidey to open the safe.  Mr. Hidey 
resumed trying to open the safe, but he had difficulty because he was shaking and bleeding 
profusely from head wounds.  The man in the green ski mask told Mr. Hidey: “You have 
five minutes[,] or . . . we’re gonna kill you[.]”  Mr. Hidey kept trying to open the safe.  The 
man in the green ski mask told Mr. Hidey: “You have three minutes.”  Mr. Hidey said: “I 
can’t do it. . . . I’m shaking[.]  I’m bleeding[.]  I can’t even think[.]”  Ms. Hidey asked Mr. 
 
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Hidey: “Can you tell me the combination so I can open it?”  Mr. Hidey did so, and Ms. 
Hidey opened the safe, which contained approximately $80,000 in cash.  The men put the 
cash into a pillowcase.  The man in the orange ski mask tied Ms. Hidey and her daughter 
to an exercise machine in the basement, tied up Mr. Hidey while he was lying on the floor, 
and the men left.  Mr. Hidey got himself untied and called 911.  
As a witness for the State, Mr. Hidey’s testimony was essentially the same as Ms. 
Hidey’s.  Mr. Hidey testified that, in the summer of 1999, the house at 3112 Ridge Road 
was being built.  For approximately two months during that time, Ramirez worked for Mr. 
Hidey.  On multiple occasions during that period, Mr. Hidey talked to Ramirez, and “could 
communicate with him perfectly fine.”  One day, Ms. and Mr. Hidey bought a safe and 
drove it to the construction site. Ramirez helped Mr. Hidey move the safe into the area that 
would become the house’s basement.  Ramirez and Mr. Hidey dug a hole, put the safe into 
it, and covered the safe with plastic, cardboard, and tape so that there was “no way [that] 
you could tell [that] it was a safe.”  Aside from Ms. and Mr. Hidey and Ramirez, no one 
was present when the safe was placed.  Mr. Hidey believed that he had never told anyone 
about the safe’s existence, though he acknowledged that it was possible that he once spoke 
to an employee of a concrete company about the safe.  
On or about September 6, 2004, Mr. Hidey listened to a voicemail in which an 
employee of a security company informed him that an alarm in the house had gone off on 
September 4, 2004.  Mr. Hidey checked the basement window, and saw that it was 
unlocked.  
On October 11, 2004, at approximately 10 p.m., Mr. Hidey came home from a 
 
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meeting.  Mr. Hidey entered the house through the kitchen, and saw Ms. Hidey and their 
daughter in the family room.  A 5'11" man in an orange ski mask appeared and pointed a 
sawed-off shotgun at Mr. Hidey.  The man in the orange ski mask never said anything.  Mr. 
Hidey testified that the man in the orange ski mask was “the same height” as, and had “the 
same build” as, Ramirez.  Additionally, the man in the orange ski mask had dark-brown 
eyes and a unibrow that “exactly” matched Ramirez’s.  
Mr. Hidey entered the dining room, and a “[s]kinny” man of “average height” in a 
green ski mask pointed a .22 caliber revolver at him.  Mr. Hidey said: “Hey, what’s going 
on here?”  The man in the green ski mask said: “Get back in the f[***]ing kitchen.”  The 
man in the orange ski mask pointed the shotgun at Mr. Hidey again.  Mr. Hidey put his 
hands up and went into the family room.  The man in the green ski mask asked either 
whether there was a safe in the house, or where the safe was.  Mr. Hidey responded: “[W]e 
don’t have a safe[.]”  At the time, Mr. Hidey did not know that Ms. Hidey had shown the 
safe to the men.  After Mr. Hidey realized as much, he, Ms. Hidey, their daughter, and the 
men went to the basement and approached the safe.  
Mr. Hidey attempted to open the safe but could not.  Mr. Hidey “lunged at” the man 
in the orange ski mask and grabbed the shotgun.  A struggle ensued.  The man in the orange 
ski mask “regain[ed] control of the [] shotgun[,]” and then used it to hit Mr. Hidey’s head, 
shoulders, and back.  Mr. Hidey’s head started bleeding.  The man in the green ski mask 
shot Mr. Hidey’s left inner thigh and again told him to open the safe.  Mr. Hidey could not 
open the safe because blood was getting in his eyes and on the safe.  Ultimately, Ms. Hidey 
opened the safe, which contained approximately $80,000 in cash.  The man in the orange 
 
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ski mask put the cash into a pillowcase, then tied Ms. Hidey and their daughter to an 
exercise machine, made Mr. Hidey lie on the floor, and tied his hands and feet together.  
After the men left, Mr. Hidey got himself untied and called 911.   
As a witness for the State, Larry Fincham3 testified that, in summer 2004, he 
encountered an acquaintance named Jerry Burkett.  Fincham asked Mr. Burkett if he knew 
anyone whom he “could get some work from.”  Mr. Burkett introduced Fincham to 
Ramirez, who had a painting business.  Ramirez, Fincham, and Mr. Burkett did painting 
jobs together.  
On September 4, 2004, Fincham and Mr. Burkett went to a Big Lots, where Mr. 
Burkett bought two Halloween masks.  Mr. Burkett told Fincham that he and Ramirez 
wanted to burglarize a particular house on Ridge Road.4  Ramirez told Fincham that “he 
knew that there was a safe in the floor[,] and that . . . the owner who live[d] there [did] not 
believe in banks.”  Ramirez also said: “I need money.  I know the money’s there.”  Mr. 
Burkett responded: “[H]ow can you be sure of that?” Ramirez said that he “knew [that] the 
man had that kind of money in his house.”  
Later on that date, Mr. Burkett wiped off a crowbar and a saw and put them, as well 
as the two Halloween masks, into a duffel bag.  Mr. Burkett told Fincham that he and 
                                              
3Fincham was not charged in connection with the October 11, 2004 armed robbery. 
That said, at trial, during Fincham’s testimony, the circuit court admitted into evidence a 
letter that the prosecutor prepared, stating that Fincham would not be convicted of a 
September 4, 2004 attempted burglary if he testified truthfully.   
4Fincham testified that Mr. Burkett said that he and Ramirez “want[ed] to burglarize 
this house . . . on 27[.]”  Mr. Hidey testified that the front of the house at 3112 Ridge Road 
faces Maryland Route 27.   
 
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Ramirez “wanted to be dropped off” and picked up after an hour.  With Mr. Burkett and 
Ramirez as passengers, Fincham drove Mr. Burkett’s truck up Ridge Road toward 
Taylorsville.  Fincham pulled over, and Mr. Burkett and Ramirez took the duffel bag, 
exited Mr. Burkett’s vehicle, and ran toward a wooded area.  Fincham drove to a 7-Eleven, 
and, sometime afterward, drove down Ridge Road toward Westminster.  Fincham saw Mr. 
Burkett and Ramirez, and pulled over to pick them up.  Mr. Burkett told Ramirez: “I told 
you there was an alarm in there.”  Mr. Burkett said that, when they had opened a window, 
an alarm went off, and they fled.  
Approximately two or three days later, while Ramirez, Fincham, and Mr. Burkett 
were together, Ramirez once again said that “he knew [that] there was money in the man’s 
safe because he didn’t believe in banks.”  Ramirez and Mr. Burkett “wanted [Fincham] to 
drive the get[]away car[,] and then they [were] talking about . . . shotguns and [] pistols.”  
Fincham left because he did not want anything to do with an armed robbery.   
As a witness for the State, Naomi Burkett,5 Mr. Burkett’s wife, testified that, in 
summer 2004, Ramirez, Fincham, and Mr. Burkett did painting jobs together.  On the 
evening of September 4, 2004, Mr. Burkett left the Burketts’ residence with a duffel bag 
of tools, and Fincham drove away with Ramirez and Mr. Burkett in Ms. Burkett’s vehicle. 
Later that night, Ramirez, Fincham, and Mr. Burkett returned to the Burketts’ residence, 
                                              
5Ms. Burkett was charged in connection with the October 11, 2004 armed robbery.  
Ms. Burkett and the State entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which she pled guilty 
to robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to rob with a dangerous weapon, and first-
degree assault, and the State recommended a sentence of five years of imprisonment.  One 
condition of the plea agreement was that Ms. Burkett testify against Ramirez and Mr. 
Burkett.  
 
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and “talk[ed] about robbing this place[,] and they didn’t do it because . . . the people weren’t 
home[,] and there was security on the whole building.”  Ms. Burkett testified that Ramirez 
said that he had worked in the house and put a safe in it, and that he knew that there was 
“a lot of money” in the safe.  In subsequent days, Ramirez “kept saying [that] he needed 
money[,] and [that] he knew [that] they had a lot of money there.”   
A few weeks before October 11, 2004, Mr. Burkett asked Ramirez to bring a 
shotgun to the Burketts’ residence so that he could saw it off.  Ramirez brought a pump-
action shotgun to the Burketts’ residence, and Mr. Burkett sawed it off.  Approximately a 
week before October 11, 2004, Ramirez and Mr. Burkett gave Ms. Burkett an orange ski 
mask and asked her to sew it because the eyeholes were too big.  Ms. Burkett complied, 
and gave the orange ski mask to Ramirez.   
At some point, Mr. Burkett asked Ms. Burkett to buy a handgun for him.  On 
October 4, 2004, Ms. Burkett bought a .22 caliber revolver and ammunition.  On October 
6, 2004, Ms. Burkett took possession of the revolver and ammunition.  Afterward, Ms. 
Burkett gave the revolver and ammunition to Mr. Burkett.  
On the night of October 11, 2004, Mr. Burkett put the revolver, the ammunition, 
and a green ski mask into a pillowcase.  Mr. Burkett asked Ms. Burkett to drive him to 
Ramirez’s residence, and she did so.  Ramirez—who had a sawed-off shotgun and the 
orange ski mask that Ms. Burkett had sewn—exited his residence and “said [that] he 
couldn’t get a driver.”  Mr. Burkett asked Ms. Burkett to drive Ramirez’s vehicle.  With 
Mr. Burkett and Ramirez as passengers, Ms. Burkett drove Ramirez’s vehicle up Ridge 
Road, and dropped them off in the area of a house.  Ramirez gave Ms. Burkett a walkie-
 
- 16 - 
talkie.  Mr. Burkett and Ramirez took the guns and the pillowcase, exited Ramirez’s 
vehicle, and put on the ski masks.  Ms. Burkett drove away.  Approximately forty-five 
minutes later, Ramirez used the walkie-talkie to tell Ms. Burkett: “[P]ick us up. . . . We 
shot somebody[.]”  Ms. Burkett picked up Mr. Burkett and Ramirez across the street from 
the house on Ridge Road.  Mr. Burkett said that he and Ramirez had “left the tool bag 
behind, but he said [that] he wasn’t worrying about it because there [were] no fingerprints 
on the tools.”  
Ms. Burkett drove Mr. Burkett and Ramirez back to Ramirez’s residence.  There, 
the Burketts and Ramirez removed cash from the pillowcase and counted it.  Ms. Burkett 
testified that the pillowcase had contained approximately $80,000 in cash.  
As a witness for the State, Gail Vollmer testified that, in February 1996, she met 
Ramirez, and, at some point, they began dating.  When Ms. and Mr. Hidey were having a 
house built, Ramirez told Vollmer that there would be a safe in the house.  In late October 
2004, on Vollmer’s behalf, Ramirez made a $2,000 down payment on a car.  In January 
2005, Ramirez telephoned Vollmer and, without specifying a date, said: “[T]hey’re saying 
that I was involved in this . . . robbery[,] but that was the night [that] me and you went to 
the casino.”  Ramirez and Vollmer had gone to a casino many times before. Vollmer told 
Ramirez: “I don’t remember [the] dates [when] I went to the casino.”  Ramirez responded: 
“[Y]ou gotta just go in and tell them what you know. . . . [T]ell the truth[,] and I’m not 
gonna get mad at you either way.  If you don’t remember, you don’t remember.” Without 
explaining how she learned that the armed robbery had occurred on October 11, 2004, 
Vollmer testified that she reviewed her credit card receipts and checking account records, 
 
- 17 - 
but could not determine whether she had gone to the casino on October 11, 2004.  
As a witness for the State, David Santana testified that, on December 3, 2004, 
Ramirez telephoned him from Canada and asked him to retrieve cash that Ramirez had 
hidden and send the funds to him.  Ramirez told Santana that he had hidden the cash in a 
box underneath some rocks near a particular trail that is in or near Harpers Ferry, West 
Virginia.  Santana found the box, which contained $9,850 in cash.  
As a witness for the State, Trooper First Class David Kitzinger of the Maryland 
State Police testified that, on October 12, 2004, he responded to the crime scene at 3112 
Ridge Road.  Trooper First Class Kitzinger recovered a green ski mask in a culvert or ditch 
by the side of Ridge Road.  The circuit court admitted the green ski mask into evidence 
during Trooper First Class Kitzinger’s testimony.  Previously, Ms. Burkett testified that 
the green ski mask in evidence belonged to Mr. Burkett; Ms. Hidey testified that the green 
ski mask in evidence “look[ed] like the” one that one of the robbers had worn; and Mr. 
Hidey testified that the green ski mask in evidence “look[ed] exactly like” the one that one 
of the robbers had worn, as he recognized a “white thread” and a part near an eyehole that 
had been “sewn shut[.]”   
As a witness for the State, Trooper First Class Eric Workman of the Maryland State 
Police testified that, on January 5, 2005, he met with Mr. Burkett.  Afterward, Trooper First 
Class Workman went to a residence in Westminster, looked under a shed on the property, 
and recovered a box, which contained a revolver.  The circuit court admitted the revolver 
into evidence during Trooper First Class Workman’s testimony.  Previously, Ms. Burkett 
testified that the revolver in evidence was the one that she had bought for Mr. Burkett; Ms. 
 
- 18 - 
Hidey testified that the revolver in evidence “look[ed] like the” one that the man in the 
green ski mask had carried; and Mr. Hidey testified that the revolver in evidence “look[ed] 
very similar, if not the exact same” as the one that the man in the green ski mask had 
carried.  The parties stipulated that the revolver in evidence was operable.  
As a witness for the State, Trooper James Mayo of the Maryland State Police 
testified that, on October 12, 2004, he responded to the crime scene at 3112 Ridge Road. 
Trooper Mayo recovered a duffel bag behind a group of mailboxes.  The duffel bag 
contained two Halloween masks, two crowbars, a grinder, an extension cord, a hammer, 
and a chisel.  The circuit court admitted the duffel bag into evidence during Trooper Mayo’s 
testimony.  Previously, Ms. Burkett testified that the duffel bag in evidence belonged to 
Mr. Burkett, and Fincham testified that the duffel bag in evidence was the one that Mr. 
Burkett had put a crowbar, a saw, and two Halloween masks into on September 4, 2004.  
As a witness for the State, Corporal Diane Conaway of the Carroll County Sheriff’s 
Office testified that, on January 6, 2005, she and other law enforcement officers executed 
a search warrant at the Burketts’ residence.  Corporal Conaway found a saw and an orange 
ski mask.  The circuit court admitted the saw and the orange ski mask into evidence during 
Corporal Conaway’s testimony.  Previously, Ms. Burkett testified that the saw in evidence 
belonged to Mr. Burkett, and that he had used it to saw off the shotgun.  Ms. Burkett also 
testified that the orange ski mask in evidence belonged to Mr. Burkett, and that she had 
sewn and given to Ramirez a “similar” orange ski mask.  
Verdicts and Direct Appeal 
On the last day of trial, at 2:58 p.m., the jury retired to deliberate.  The jury did not 
 
- 19 - 
submit any notes during deliberations.  At 5:54 p.m., the jury returned to the courtroom.  
The jury found Ramirez guilty of all eleven charges—i.e., two counts each of 
robbery with a dangerous weapon, robbery, and first-degree assault, and one count each of 
first-degree burglary, conspiracy to rob with a dangerous weapon, use of a handgun in the 
commission of a crime of violence, possession of an unregistered firearm,6 and theft of 
property with a value of at least $500.  Ramirez appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals 
affirmed his convictions.  See Ramirez v. State, 178 Md. App. 257, 292, 941 A.2d 1141, 
1161 (2008).  Ramirez filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court denied.  See 
Ramirez v. State, 410 Md. 561, 979 A.2d 708 (2009). 
Petition for Postconviction Relief 
On May 14, 2014, Ramirez petitioned for postconviction relief, contending, among 
other things, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by refraining 
from either moving to strike Juror 27 for cause based on his response to the “crime victim” 
question, or by exercising a peremptory challenge as to Juror 27.  On February 3, 2015, the 
circuit court conducted a hearing on the petition for postconviction relief.  
At the hearing, as a witness for the State, Ramirez’s trial counsel testified that, on 
the first day of trial, she arrived at the courthouse early and obtained a list with each 
prospective juror’s name, age, occupation, and marital status.  Trial counsel made notations 
as to any prospective jurors who were lawyers or members of law enforcement agencies.  
Ramirez and his trial counsel met in private, and she provided her “impression of the 
                                              
6At the sentencing proceeding, the State dismissed the charge for possession of an 
unregistered firearm.  
 
- 20 - 
overall jury pool[.]”  Trial counsel explained the jury selection process, including the 
number of peremptory challenges that were available.  Trial counsel asked him to tell her 
if he felt that any particular prospective juror should not be seated—whether he had “had 
contact with” the prospective juror, or he simply had “a hunch that” he did not “like” the 
prospective juror.  During voir dire, Ramirez and his trial counsel discussed motions to 
strike for cause and peremptory challenges.   
Ramirez’s trial counsel could not “remember exactly what” Juror 27 had said during 
voir dire, but she remembered that “[t]here had been an incident in [his] background that 
had caused [him] to not answer the question as to being fair and impartial as forcefully as 
[she] would have liked to see before seating” him.  In other words, what Juror 27 “said [] 
gave an indication that perhaps he needed to be . . . looked at more closely with respect to 
whether or not [he] could be fair or impartial.”   
On October 29, 2015, the circuit court issued an opinion and order denying the 
petition for postconviction relief.  The circuit court concluded that Ramirez’s trial counsel’s 
performance was reasonable, and, alternatively, it did not prejudice him.  The circuit court 
explained that Ramirez had not identified any evidence that Juror 27 “showed bias[,]” and 
had “instead [] offered mere conjecture.”  The circuit court declined to “speculate that the 
outcome would have been different had Juror [] 27 not been on the jury.”  
Remand 
Ramirez appealed.  On March 13, 2018, the Court of Special Appeals issued an 
order remanding the case to the circuit court with instruction to determine whether the trial 
transcript was accurate in indicating that Ramirez’s trial counsel had moved to strike Juror 
 
- 21 - 
25—as opposed to Juror 27—for cause.  On March 22, 2018, the circuit court judge who 
presided at the postconviction hearing issued an order, stating that he had reviewed the trial 
transcript and listened to an audio recording of the relevant portions of the trial, and found 
that the trial transcript was accurate in indicating that trial counsel moved to strike Juror 
25—as opposed to Juror 27—for cause.   
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals 
On June 18, 2018, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s 
judgment, holding that it did not err in denying the petition for postconviction relief.  See 
Edinson Herrera Ramirez v. State, No. 2342, Sept. Term, 2015, 2018 WL 3025900, at *1 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 18, 2018).  The Court of Special Appeals concluded that 
Ramirez’s trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by refraining 
from moving to strike Juror 27 for cause based on his response to the “crime victim” 
question, or not using a peremptory challenge as to Juror 27.  See id. at *6.  The Court of 
Special Appeals determined that trial counsel’s performance was reasonable, stating: 
To be sure, trial counsel admitted at the post[]conviction hearing that Juror 
[] 27’s answer to the [] “crime victim” question was troubling; however, she 
explained that it was not the answer that she found troubling as much as the 
fact that the juror did “not answer the question...as forcefully as [she] would 
have liked.”  Given [] that Juror [] 27 gave no response to other pertinent 
questions, namely, whether he could decide a burglary case on the evidence 
and whether there was “any reason” he could not be fair or impartial, it is 
entirely possible that trial counsel ultimately discounted Juror [] 27’s less-
than-forceful response to the [“]crime victim[”] question.  Moreover, trial 
counsel did ultimately challenge Juror [] 27 after he expressed displeasure at 
having been selected as part of the jury.  That trial counsel was willing to 
challenge Juror [] 27 for that reason, but not for his response to the [“]crime 
victim[”] question, suggests that his answer to the [“]crime victim[”] 
question was not overly consequential in light of the surrounding 
circumstances. 
 
- 22 - 
Furthermore, trial counsel testified that a great number of factors went 
into her decision to challenge potential jurors, including their age and 
occupation, whether they had a background in law enforcement or as an 
attorney, and whether Ramirez had any personal feelings about a particular 
juror.  Trial counsel also testified that, as prospective jurors were removed 
for cause or pursuant to a peremptory [challenge], the number of 
[prospective] jurors dwindled to the point that there was a possibility that the 
parties would run out of prospective jurors and be forced to come back the 
next day with a fresh pool of [prospective] jurors.  Given that St. Mary’s 
County is one of the smaller counties in Maryland, it is possible that a fresh 
jury pool would have resulted in a selection of prospective jurors who were 
even less desirable than Juror [] 27.  Although that factor is not, by itself, the 
most compelling justification for failing to strike Juror [] 27, it is indicative 
[] that trial counsel’s decision not to [move to] strike Juror [] 27 was affected 
by a myriad of factors and competing interests.  In short, we cannot say that 
trial counsel’s decision not to [move to strike] Juror [] 27 was constitutionally 
ineffective based solely on [his] response to the [“]crime victim[”] question. 
Finally, the record makes plain that Ramirez was actively involved in 
the voir dire process, including the decision to challenge (or not challenge) 
prospective jurors.   
 
Id. (ellipsis in original) (citations omitted). 
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that, even if trial counsel’s performance 
were deficient, it did not result in prejudice.  See id.  The Court of Special Appeals rejected 
Ramirez’s contention that a presumption of prejudice applied because trial counsel’s 
performance resulted in structural error.  See id. at *8.  The Court of Special Appeals 
pointed out that Ramirez had not identified any binding cases that stood for the proposition 
that “the presumption of prejudice” applied to “situations where courts have found there to 
be a ‘structural error’ (and thus prejudice presumed) following a direct appeal[.]”  Id. at 
*7.  The Court of Special Appeals determined that Ramirez had failed to prove prejudice, 
explaining: 
Other than Juror [] 27’s response to the [] “crime victim” question, which, as 
previously discussed, may not have been overly consequential under the 
 
- 23 - 
circumstances, Ramirez has provided no evidence or argument to suggest 
that he was prejudiced by Juror [] 27’s presence on the jury.  In fact, Ramirez 
seems to suggest that Juror [] 27’s response to the [“]crime victim[”] question 
constituted per se proof that [Juror 27] was irrevocably biased and, as a 
result, was automatically disqualified as a prospective juror.  That 
proposition, however, is not consistent with the law regarding jury selection 
in Maryland, as bias is a question of fact [that is] to be decided by the trial 
[court], [which], pursuant to [its] discretion, determines whether a cause for 
disqualification exists.  In short, Ramirez’s general claim that the seating of 
a “biased” juror somehow tainted the jury, while conceivable, is insufficient 
to show that the inclusion of Juror [] 27 undermined the proper functioning 
of the adversarial process or created a substantial likelihood of a different 
result. 
 
Id. at *9 (citations omitted). 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
On December 7, 2018, Ramirez filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the 
following four issues: 
[1.] Did the [Court of Special Appeals] err when it held that a structural error 
did not occur when a biased juror was not stricken from the jury by his trial 
counsel[?] 
 
[2.] Did the [Court of Special Appeals] err when it held that[,] even if a 
structural error occurred[,] Ramirez was not prejudiced? 
 
[3.] Was [] Ramirez denied effective assistance of counsel []? 
 
[4.] Did the [Court of Special Appeals] err when[,] as support for its 
decision[,] it used the number of prospective jurors in St. Mary’s County 
when trial in this case was held in Carroll County? 
 
On February 22, 2019, this Court granted the petition.  See Ramirez v. State, 462 Md. 557, 
201 A.3d 1229 (2019).  We answer the questions in the negative and affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Special Appeals.    
 
- 24 - 
DISCUSSION 
The Parties’ Contentions 
Ramirez contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
by failing to either move to strike Juror 27 for cause based on his response to the “crime 
victim” question, or use a peremptory challenge as to Juror 27.  Ramirez points out that 
Juror 27 answered that he had been a victim of a burglary, and that he (Ramirez) was 
charged with first-degree burglary.  Ramirez argues that his trial counsel’s performance 
was deficient because allowing the seating of a biased juror cannot be sound trial strategy.  
Ramirez asserts that the presumption of prejudice applies because his trial counsel caused 
structural error.  Ramirez contends that, even if the presumption of prejudice does not 
apply, the record demonstrates prejudice because Juror 27 stated that he believed that his 
experience as a victim of a burglary would affect his ability to be fair and impartial.  
Ramirez argues that there was a significant possibility that the trial’s outcome would have 
differed if Ramirez’s trial counsel had peremptorily challenged Juror 27.7   
The State responds that Ramirez’s trial counsel did not provide ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The State contends that Ramirez has not rebutted the presumption 
that trial counsel’s decision not to move to strike Juror 27 for cause based on his response 
to the “crime victim” question, or to use a peremptory challenge as to Juror 27, was based 
                                              
7Ramirez also maintains that the Court of Special Appeals erred in observing in its 
opinion “that St. Mary’s County is one of the smaller counties in Maryland[.]”  Ramirez, 
2018 WL 3025900, at *6.  Ramirez correctly points out that he was tried in the Circuit 
Court for Carroll County.  Ramirez provides data from United States Census Bureau that 
indicates that, in 2005, Carroll County’s population was more than 70,000 higher than St. 
Mary’s County’s.   
 
- 25 - 
on trial strategy.  The State argues that Ramirez has failed to prove that the circuit court 
would have granted a motion to strike Juror 27 for cause based on his response to the “crime 
victim” question.  The State asserts that this case’s circumstances fall outside of the ones 
under which the presumption of prejudice applies, and that Ramirez has failed to prove 
prejudice.   
Standard of Review 
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a petition for postconviction relief, an appellate 
court reviews for clear error the trial court’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference 
the trial court’s conclusions of law, including a conclusion as to whether the petitioner 
received ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Newton, 455 Md. at 351-52, 168 A.3d at 7. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Generally 
As it is well known, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the 
Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test for resolving a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The first prong is known as “the performance prong[,]” and the second prong is 
known as “the prejudice prong[.]”  Newton, 455 Md. at 356, 168 A.3d at 9 (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 
To satisfy the performance prong, a petitioner “must show that counsel’s 
performance was deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed [] by the Sixth Amendment.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  More specifically, a petitioner “must show that counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing 
professional norms.”  Id. at 688.  The Supreme Court set forth a presumption that counsel’s 
 
- 26 - 
performance was not deficient, stating: 
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made 
to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct 
from counsel’s perspective at the time.  Because of the difficulties inherent 
in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under 
the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 
strategy.  There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any 
given case.  Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a 
particular client in the same way. . . . [C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment. 
 
Id. at 689-90 (cleaned up). 
To satisfy the prejudice prong, a petitioner “must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so 
serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”  Id. at 
687.  More specifically, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  In State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 86-87, 204 A.3d 139, 154 (2019), 
this Court explained: “We have interpreted reasonable probability to mean ‘there was a 
substantial or significant possibility that the verdict . . . would have been affected.’”  
(Quoting Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 426, 578 A.2d 734, 739 (1990)) (emphasis in 
original).  In Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96, the Supreme Court explained how to assess 
prejudice as follows: 
[A] court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the 
 
- 27 - 
evidence before the . . . jury.  Some of the factual findings will have been 
unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were affected will have 
been affected in different ways.  Some errors will have had a pervasive effect 
on the inferences [that were] to be drawn from the evidence, altering the 
entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect.  
Moreover, a verdict [that is] only weakly supported by the record is more 
likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record 
support.  Taking the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due account 
of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making the 
prejudice inquiry must ask if the [petitioner] has met the burden of showing 
that the decision [that was] reached would reasonably likely have been 
different absent the errors. 
 
The Presumption of Prejudice Generally 
Generally, where a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, “the burden 
rests on” him or her to satisfy both the performance prong and the prejudice prong.  Cronic, 
466 U.S. at 658.  However, “[i]n certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is 
presumed.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.  For example, “prejudice is presumed when 
counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Additionally, 
“[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is [] presumed to 
result in prejudice.  So are various kinds of [S]tate interference with counsel’s assistance.”  
Id. (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 & n. 25).  In Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60—which the 
Supreme Court issued on the same date as Strickland—the Supreme Court offered specific 
examples of circumstances under which the presumption of prejudice applies, stating: 
Most obvious, of course, is the complete denial of counsel.  The 
presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that 
a trial is unfair if the [petitioner] is denied counsel at a critical stage of [the] 
trial.  Similarly, if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to 
meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth 
Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively 
unreliable.  No specific showing of prejudice was required in [a certain case] 
because the petitioner had been denied the right of effective cross-
 
- 28 - 
examination[,] which would be constitutional error of the first magnitude[,] 
and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it. 
Circumstances of that magnitude may be present on some occasions 
when[,] although counsel is available to assist the [petitioner] during trial, 
the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide 
effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate 
without inquiry into the [] conduct of the trial. 
 
(Cleaned up). 
In Bowers, 320 Md. at 425, 578 A.2d at 738, this Court stated: “[P]utting aside those 
few situations in which prejudice is presumed (actual or constructive denial of counsel and 
actual conflict of interest), the [petitioner] must show that the particular [] unreasonable 
errors of counsel [] had an adverse effect on the defense.”  (Cleaned up).   
In Walker v. State, 391 Md. 233, 252, 892 A.2d 547, 558 (2006), this Court rejected 
a petitioner’s contention that prejudice should have been presumed because, after the 
petitioner failed to appear for trial, his trial counsel “decided essentially to remain silent, 
to protect the record as best as he could under the circumstances, to participate minimally, 
and to argue jury nullification[.]”  This Court was unpersuaded that the petitioner’s “trial 
counsel, although present in the courtroom, failed to subject the State’s case [] to 
‘meaningful adversarial testing,’ thereby warranting a presumption of prejudice.”  Id. at 
247, 892 A.2d at 555.  This Court held that the petitioner’s trial “counsel’s conduct was 
not so antithetical to effective assistance that the Cronic presumption of prejudice should 
apply.  Moreover, his conduct did not amount to the complete failure of representation at 
every aspect of the trial proceeding[.]”  Walker, 391 Md. at 252, 892 A.2d at 558.  This 
Court explained that “the Supreme Court has made clear that the Cronic exception to the 
general rule requiring proof of prejudice based on deficient performance is a very narrow 
 
- 29 - 
exception, and that[,] for the exception to apply, [counsel]’s failure must be complete.”  
Walker, 391 Md. at 247, 892 A.2d at 555 (cleaned up).  This Court summarized the 
Supreme Court’s case law regarding the presumption of prejudice as follows: 
[In Cronic, t]he [Supreme] Court identified three situations implicating the 
right to counsel that involved circumstances [that were] so likely to prejudice 
the [petitioner] that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is 
unjustified.  The first situation was where the [petitioner] was completely 
denied counsel.  Complete denial of counsel includes, for example, when 
counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the [petitioner] 
during a critical stage of the proceeding.  The second situation warranting a 
similar presumption of prejudice was if counsel entirely fails to subject the 
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing[,] because this results in 
an adversary process itself that is presumptively unreliable.  The final 
situation was . . . where the [petitioner] faces circumstances in which it is not 
likely that any attorney could provide effective assistance.  With the 
exception of these three situations, a [petitioner] must articulate how 
specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of 
guilt, i.e., the [petitioner] must prove [] prejudice. 
 
Walker, 391 Md. at 246-47, 892 A.2d at 554-55 (cleaned up) (emphasis added). 
Structural Error and the Presumption of Prejudice 
Redman v. State, 363 Md. 298, 303, 768 A.2d 656, 658-59 (2001) was the first case 
in which this Court addressed both structural error and ineffective assistance of counsel.  
In Redman, id. at 301, 768 A.2d at 657, a petitioner’s trial counsel “was unaware that[ the 
p]etitioner, who was charged with first[-]degree murder and subject to the death penalty, 
had an automatic right to remove the case to another county.”  In a postconviction 
proceeding, the petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, and contended “that 
prejudice should [have been] presumed because the right of removal is a fundamental 
right[,] or qualifies as a structural error [that is] not susceptible to establishing prejudice.”  
Id. at 303, 768 A.2d at 659 (footnote omitted).  The petitioner relied on Arizona v. 
 
- 30 - 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1991), in which the Supreme Court held that the 
admission of a coerced confession is subject to the doctrine of harmless error—i.e., that 
the admission of a coerced confession is a trial error rather than a structural error.  See 
Redman, 363 Md. at 303, 768 A.2d at 659. 
In Redman, id. at 303 n.5, 768 A.2d at 659 n.5, this Court stated that the “[p]etitioner 
[was] inappropriately scrambling the eggs of” Fulminante and Strickland, as Fulminante 
“was a refinement of the federal harmless error analysis[,]” whereas Strickland “involved 
an evaluation of counsel’s performance and an assessment of prejudice.”  This Court 
concluded that the petitioner’s “[c]ounsel’s error in [Redman was] not the type in which 
prejudice will be presumed.”  Redman, 363 Md. at 313, 768 A.2d at 664. 
Similarly, in Newton, 455 Md. at 357, 347, 168 A.3d at 10, 4, this Court rejected a 
petitioner’s contention that prejudice should have been presumed because there had 
allegedly been a structural error—namely, the petitioner’s counsel had “consent[ed] to the 
presence of an alternate juror during deliberations.”  This Court found instructive the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017), stating: 
In Weaver, the petitioner argued that the presumption of prejudice due 
to a structural error—a violation of her public-trial right—satisfied [the] 
prejudice prong. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that the 
petitioner must still show [] prejudice.  Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1911.  The 
Court explained that “the reasons an error is deemed structural may influence 
the proper standard used to evaluate an ineffective-assistance claim premised 
on the failure to object to that error.”  Id. at 1907.  It assumed, without 
reaching the issue, that the prejudice prong could be satisfied if the attorney’s 
errors were “so serious as to render [the] trial fundamentally unfair”—the 
third category of structural error.  Id. at 1911. 
The Weaver Court explained that[,] even though a public-trial 
right violation requires automatic reversal on direct appeal, it is still 
analyzed under the Strickland framework when raised as part of an 
 
- 31 - 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.  Citing finality interests, the Court 
noted that[,] if a new trial is granted on direct appeal, “there may be a 
reasonable chance that not too much time will have elapsed for witness 
memories still to be accurate and physical evidence not to be lost.”  Id. at 
1912.  In addition, reviewing courts are in a better position to instruct trial 
courts on facts and legal principles to consider on remand.  Id.  
Postconviction courts, by contrast, assess ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claims through the Strickland lens and do not address the merits of particular 
trial court errors.  The Weaver Court reasoned that these differences justify 
imposing a higher standard for granting a new trial when a defendant raises 
a structural error on postconviction, rather than on direct appeal.  Id.; see also 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94[] (“The [Strickland] standard [] reflects the 
profound importance of finality in criminal proceedings.”). 
Applying Weaver, we conclude that[,] to succeed on his ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim, [the petitioner] must establish Strickland’s 
deficient performance and prejudice prongs. 
 
Newton, 455 Md. at 356-57, 168 A.3d at 9-10 (emphasis added) (some alterations in 
original). 
Analysis 
Upon a careful review of the record, we conclude that Ramirez has proven deficient 
performance, but has not proven prejudice.  We will address the performance prong first.8 
The background that is relevant to the performance prong is as follows.  During voir 
dire, the circuit court asked the prospective jurors whether they, their relatives, or their 
                                              
8In Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, the Supreme Court explained: “[T]here is no reason 
for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both components of the 
inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”  In certain prior cases, this 
Court has disposed of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by addressing only the 
prejudice prong.  See, e.g., Newton, 455 Md. at 366, 168 A.3d at 15.  Here, because 
Ramirez has failed to prove prejudice, we need not address the performance prong; 
nonetheless, we do so in the interest of making clear the precise nature of Ramirez’s trial 
counsel’s errors.  Given that Ramirez alleges structural error and that he is entitled to a 
presumption of prejudice, it is necessary to review the nature of trial counsel’s deficient 
performance. 
 
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close friends had ever had experiences as victims of crime, defendants, or witnesses in 
criminal cases that would “affect[ their] ability to render a fair and impartial verdict[.]”  
Juror 27 answered that, approximately a year-and-a-half earlier, his apartment had been 
“broken into[.]”  The circuit court asked whether “that experience[ would], in any way, 
affect [his] ability to render fair and impartial verdict in this case[.]”  Juror 27 responded: 
“I believe it would.”  Ramirez’s trial counsel did not ask Juror 27 any follow-up questions, 
or request that the circuit court do so.  Juror 27 did not respond to any other questions 
during voir dire.  
Ramirez’s trial counsel did not move to strike Juror 27 for cause based on his 
response to the “crime victim” question, but moved to strike Juror 25 for cause on the 
ground that his “home was broken into” and his “response as to whether it would affect 
them was, I believe it would.”  Juror 25, however, had not responded to any questions 
during voir dire.  The circuit court granted the motion to strike Juror 25 for cause.   
Ramirez was permitted ten peremptory challenges.  Ultimately, Ramirez’s trial 
counsel exercised nine peremptory challenges.  When trial counsel was given the 
opportunity to exercise a peremptory challenge as to Juror 27, she stated that Juror 27 was 
“[a]cceptable.”  Once twelve jurors were seated, Ramirez’s trial counsel stated: “The array 
is acceptable to the Defense.”   
After the courtroom clerk swore the jury and the circuit court dismissed the 
prospective jurors who had not been seated, Ramirez’s trial counsel requested a bench 
conference, which the circuit court granted.  At the bench conference, trial counsel advised 
the circuit court that, after it dismissed the prospective jurors who had not been seated, 
 
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Juror 27 “just vehemently started shaking his head and just looked right at [her] with not a 
very pleasant face.”  Trial counsel moved to strike Juror 27 on the ground that he was not 
“happy about the fact that he’s sitting on [the] jury[.]”  The circuit court reserved ruling on 
the motion to strike Juror 27 to “see how he [would] react[] during the course of the trial.”  
The circuit court stated that it was up to trial counsel whether to re-raise the issue.  Trial 
counsel did not renew the motion to strike Juror 27, or otherwise raise any issue as to him 
after moving to strike him.   
Before issuing its opinion, the Court of Special Appeals remanded this case to the 
circuit court with instruction to determine whether the trial transcript was accurate in 
indicating that Ramirez’s trial counsel moved to strike Juror 25—as opposed to Juror 27—
for cause based on his response to the “crime victim” question.  The circuit court issued an 
order, stating that it had reviewed the trial transcript and listened to an audio recording of 
the relevant portions of the trial, and found that the trial transcript was accurate in indicating 
that Ramirez’s trial counsel had moved to strike Juror 25—as opposed to Juror 27—for 
cause based on his response to the “crime victim” question.9   
Viewed together, these circumstances make inescapably clear that Ramirez’s trial 
counsel intended to move to strike a prospective juror for cause based on the prospective 
juror’s response to the “crime victim” question, but inadvertently moved to strike Juror 25 
for cause, when Juror 25 had not responded to the “crime victim” question.  By contrast, 
                                              
9Similarly, in its brief, the State advises that employees of the Carroll County State’s 
Attorney’s Office listened to an audio recording of voir dire, and stated that the trial 
transcript was accurate in indicating that Juror 27—as opposed to Juror 25—had responded 
to the “crime victim” question. 
 
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Juror 27 stated that his home had been broken into, and that he believed that that would 
affect his ability to be impartial; yet, trial counsel did not move to strike Juror 27 for cause 
based on his response to the “crime victim” question.  Rather, inexplicably, trial counsel 
moved to strike Juror 25—who had not answered any questions during voir dire—for cause 
on the ground that he had stated that his home had been broken into, and that he believed 
that that would affect his ability to be impartial.  Given that the circuit court has advised 
that the relevant portions of the trial transcript are accurate, it is not possible to conclude 
that trial counsel’s failure to move to strike Juror 27 for cause was based on trial strategy.  
It would be illogical to conclude that trial counsel moved to strike Juror 25 for the response 
to the “crime victim” question that was given by Juror 27, but refrained from moving to 
strike Juror 27 for cause based on trial strategy.  Indeed, one plausible explanation for trial 
counsel’s motion to strike Juror 25 for cause is that she misattributed Juror 27’s response 
to the “crime victim” question to Juror 25, and made the motion to strike for cause with 
respect to the wrong prospective juror.  This circumstance would clearly not constitute trial 
strategy. 
We are satisfied that Ramirez has met the burden to prove that his trial counsel’s 
performance was deficient.  No reasonable lawyer in Ramirez’s trial counsel’s position 
would have, as she did, refrained from asking or requesting any follow-up questions of 
Juror 27, refrained from moving to strike him for cause based on his response to the “crime 
victim” question, and refrained from exercising a peremptory challenge as to Juror 27.  
Trial counsel moved to strike for cause Juror 25 based on a purported response to the “crime 
victim” question that was the same as that given by Juror 27.  This circumstance 
 
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demonstrates that trial counsel was of the view that Juror 27’s response to the “crime 
victim” question warranted a motion to strike for cause.  Yet, trial counsel allowed Juror 
27 to be seated without any follow-up inquiry, motion to strike for cause, or peremptory 
challenge.  From our perspective, this conduct “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
We do not endorse the State’s contention that Ramirez’s trial counsel “may have 
determined” that Juror 27 “was acceptable” because “he did not respond affirmatively to 
other questions [that were] designed to ferret out bias based on the nature of the offense[s.]” 
Ostensibly, the State is referring to the circuit court’s questions regarding whether any 
prospective juror knew “of any reason why he or she could not be a juror and decide a case 
in which the defendant is charged with [f]irst[-d]egree [b]urglary and related charges based 
solely upon the evidence[,]” or knew “of any reason, [] whatsoever, why he or she could 
not decide a case involving these particular offenses and discharge his or her duty as juror 
fairly and impartially and based solely on the evidence[.]”  Simply put, the circumstance 
that Juror 27 did not respond to either of these questions does not constitute evidence that 
Ramirez’s trial counsel exercised trial strategy by not moving to strike Juror 27 for cause 
based on his response to the “crime victim” question. 
We can also quickly dispose of the State’s argument that Ramirez’s trial “counsel 
could reasonably have decided not to use her last peremptory challenge against” Juror 27 
because that would have resulted in Juror 43 being seated.  During voir dire, Juror 43 
disclosed that she had read about the armed robbery of Ms. and Mr. Hidey in newspapers; 
that she had done business with Mr. Hidey; that, five-and-a-half years earlier, she had 
 
- 36 - 
“walked in on an attempted burglary of [her] home”; that “the impound lot that [her] 
husband and [she] own . . . ha[d] been burglarized several times”; and that these 
circumstances would “[p]ossibly” affect her ability to be fair and impartial.  Ramirez’s trial 
counsel made a motion to strike Juror 43 for cause, which the circuit court denied.  Juror 
42 was the last prospective juror to be seated as a juror, and Ramirez’s trial counsel 
exercised a peremptory challenge against Juror 43 as an alternate juror.  
These circumstances do not establish that Ramirez’s trial counsel compared Jurors 
27 and 43, viewed Juror 27 as “the lesser of two evils,” and refrained from exercising a 
peremptory challenge against the juror on that basis.  The record demonstrates that trial 
counsel moved to strike Juror 25 for cause based on an alleged response to the “crime 
victim” question that Juror 25 never gave.  It is conceivable that, at the time that trial 
counsel began exercising peremptory challenges against prospective jurors, she was under 
the mistaken impression that the circuit court had already stricken for cause the prospective 
juror who had disclosed that he believed that his experience as a victim of a burglary would 
affect his ability to be fair and impartial.  In other words, trial counsel may have refrained 
from using a peremptory challenge as to Juror 27 because she was unaware of Juror 27’s 
responses to the “crime victim” question—not because she wanted to avoid allowing Juror 
43 to be seated. 
The State’s theory—i.e., that Ramirez’s trial counsel refrained from exercising a 
peremptory challenge against Juror 27 because she wanted to avoid allowing Juror 43 to 
be seated—is pure speculation.  At the postconviction hearing, trial counsel did not testify 
that she refrained from using her last peremptory challenge on Juror 27 because she wanted 
 
- 37 - 
to avoid allowing Juror 43 to be seated.  Instead, trial counsel testified that she remembered 
that “[t]here had been an incident in [Juror 27’s] background that had caused [him] to not 
answer the question as to being fair and impartial as forcefully as [she] would have liked 
to see before seating” him, and that what Juror 27 “said [] gave an indication that perhaps 
he needed to be . . . looked at more closely with respect to whether or not [he] could be fair 
or impartial.”  In short, trial counsel’s testimony did not indicate in any way that her failure 
to use a peremptory challenge as to Juror 27 was a matter of trial strategy.  Nor did trial 
counsel’s testimony indicate that her failure to move to strike Juror 27 for cause based on 
his response to the “crime victim” question was a matter of trial strategy. 
Ramirez’s trial counsel’s performance was not salvaged by the motion to strike 
Juror 27 after the jury was sworn.  The motion to strike Juror 27 was based on his demeanor 
upon not being dismissed, not his response to the “crime victim” question.  By the time 
that the jury was sworn, it was too late for trial counsel to move to strike Juror 27 for cause 
based on his response to the “crime victim” question, as she had already stated that the jury 
was acceptable.  “Generally, a party waives his or her voir dire objection going to the 
inclusion or exclusion of a prospective juror (or jurors) or the entire venire if the objecting 
party accepts unqualifiedly the jury panel (thus seated) as satisfactory at the conclusion of 
the jury-selection process.”  State v. Stringfellow, 425 Md. 461, 469, 42 A.3d 27, 32 (2012) 
(citation omitted). 
Unlike the Court of Special Appeals, we do not attach significance to the 
circumstance that “the record makes plain that Ramirez was actively involved in [] voir 
dire[], including the decision to challenge (or not challenge) prospective jurors.”  Ramirez, 
 
- 38 - 
2018 WL 3025900, at *6.  It is the responsibility of defense counsel, not the defendant, to 
identify which prospective jurors to challenge.  Indeed, nearly all defendants are laypeople, 
and a number of them have never witnessed a trial before.  We decline to hold it against a 
petitioner who alleges ineffective assistance of counsel that he or she did not direct his or 
her trial counsel to challenge a particular prospective juror.10 
Having addressed the performance prong, we turn to the prejudice prong.  We hold 
that, in assessing a petitioner’s allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, a court 
should presume that trial counsel’s performance prejudiced the petitioner only if: (1) the 
petitioner was actually denied the assistance of counsel; (2) the petitioner was 
constructively denied the assistance of counsel; or (3) the petitioner’s counsel had an actual 
conflict of interest.  Absent these three circumstances, the presumption of prejudice does 
not apply, and the petitioner must prove prejudice. 
As a threshold matter, we cannot conclude that trial counsel’s failure to ask follow-
                                              
10As to the issue of the Court of Special Appeals’s reference to St. Mary’s County, 
in assessing trial counsel’s performance during voir dire, we do not take into account the 
population of the county in which the trial occurred.  The Court of Special Appeals 
reasoned: “Given that St. Mary’s County is one of the smaller counties in Maryland, it is 
possible that a fresh jury pool would have resulted in a selection of prospective jurors who 
were even less desirable than Juror [] 27.”  Ramirez, 2018 WL 3025900, at *6 (citation 
omitted).  As Ramirez notes, the Court of Special Appeals referred to the wrong county, as 
he was tried in the Circuit Court for Carroll County.  A particular county’s population is 
not material to an assessment of trial counsel’s performance during voir dire.  Regardless 
of a county’s population, a trial court is obligated to procure enough prospective jurors to 
constitute a jury, while allowing the parties the opportunity to move to strike prospective 
jurors for cause and/or use peremptory challenges.  See Md. R. 4-312(a)(2).  Indeed, here, 
after the circuit court ruled on the motions to strike for cause, the circuit court stated: “If 
we run out, we can go with what we have and bring some more people tomorrow. . . . 
Tomorrow, we’ll bring in another panel to try and [v]oir [d]ire them and then . . . try to 
pick additional jurors.”   
 
- 39 - 
up questions, move to strike, or peremptorily challenge Juror 27 caused structural error, 
i.e., error that rendered Ramirez’s trial fundamentally unfair.  To be sure, Juror 27’s 
response—that he believed that his experience as a victim of burglary would affect his 
ability to render a fair and impartial question—merited, at a minimum, follow-up questions 
by trial counsel.  Trial counsel’s failure to take any action whatsoever with respect to Juror 
27 was conduct that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  It is far from clear, 
however, that this conduct resulted in structural error.  Not every claim with respect to the 
failure to strike or challenge an allegedly biased juror will result in a determination that a 
trial was fundamentally unfair.  And, even if we were to determine structural error, that 
would not relieve Ramirez of the obligation to prove prejudice when alleging the 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1912; Newton, 455 Md. at 
357, 168 A.3d at 10.11 
The Supreme Court’s opinions in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, and Cronic, 466 U.S. 
                                              
11We note that, in Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2001), a case 
which at first blush appears comparable to this one, the Sixth Circuit, in actuality, applied 
the presumption of prejudice based on case law pertaining to direct appeal.  To be sure, the 
facts of Hughes are similar to this case.  And, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the 
presumption of prejudice was applicable because “[t]he ‘presence of a biased juror cannot 
be harmless; the error requires a new trial without a showing of actual prejudice.’”  Hughes, 
258 F.3d at 463 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 
2000)).  In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit relied on Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 
1110.  Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1110, was a direct appeal case that involved allegations of 
error by a trial court—not a postconviction proceeding that involved allegations of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, like Hughes and this case.  Moreover, Hughes was 
issued in 2001, prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Weaver.  Supreme Court and 
Maryland case law make clear that, in the event of structural error, the doctrine of harmless 
error does not apply on direct appeal; but, in an ineffective assistance of counsel case, the 
petitioner must still prove prejudice.  See Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910, 1913; Newton, 455 
Md. at 357, 347, 168 A.3d at 10, 4; Redman, 363 Md. at 303 n.5, 768 A.2d at 659 n.5.  
 
- 40 - 
at 658-62, establish that the presumption of prejudice applies only under three 
circumstances.  First, “[a]ctual . . . denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is [] 
presumed to result in prejudice.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.  Actual denial of the 
assistance of counsel occurs where “counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from 
assisting the [petitioner] during a critical stage of the proceeding.”  Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 
n.25 (citations omitted).  Second, “constructive denial of the assistance of counsel 
altogether is [] presumed to result in prejudice.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.  Constructive 
denial of the assistance of counsel occurs where, even though counsel was neither absent 
nor prevented from assisting the petitioner during a critical stage of the proceeding, the 
circumstances still amount to a denial of the assistance of counsel.  For example, 
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel occurs where “counsel entirely fails to 
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing[.]”  Cronic, 466 U.S. at 
659.  Third, “prejudice is presumed when counsel [was] burdened by an actual conflict of 
interest”—i.e., when “counsel actively represented conflicting interests[.]”  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 692 (cleaned up).  In Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-62 & n.24-31, the Supreme Court 
discussed at length its prior cases involving the presumption of prejudice.  It is reasonable 
to infer that, if the presumption of prejudice applied under any circumstance other than the 
above-discussed three, the Supreme Court would have stated as much in its thorough 
discussion of the presumption of prejudice in Cronic. 
This Court has recognized that, in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, and Cronic, 466 U.S. 
at 658-62, the Supreme Court set forth the limited circumstances under which the 
presumption of prejudice applies.  For example, in Bowers, 320 Md. at 425, 578 A.2d at 
 
- 41 - 
738, this Court stated: “[P]utting aside those few situations in which prejudice is presumed 
(actual or constructive denial of counsel and actual conflict of interest), the defendant must 
show that the particular and unreasonable errors of counsel ‘actually had an adverse effect 
on the defense.’”  (Quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).  Similarly, in Walker, 391 Md. at 
247, 892 A.2d at 555, this Court explained that, “[w]ith the exception of the[] three 
situations” that the Supreme Court identified in Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-62, “a defendant 
must articulate ‘how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of 
guilt,’ i.e., the defendant must prove [] prejudice.”  (Quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.26). 
Consistently, this Court has also recognized that the Strickland and Cronic 
presumption of prejudice does not apply simply because the petitioner alleges that his or 
her trial counsel caused structural error.  For example, in Redman, 363 Md. at 303, 313, 
768 A.2d at 659, 664, this Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that prejudice should 
have been presumed because his counsel caused a structural error by failing to advise him 
of his right to have the case removed to another county.  This Court explained that the 
“[p]etitioner [was] inappropriately scrambling the eggs of” the Supreme Court’s case law 
regarding structural error and the Supreme Court’s case law regarding ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Id. at 303 n.5, 768 A.2d at 659 n.5. 
In Newton, 455 Md. at 357, 347, 168 A.3d at 10, 4, this Court rejected a petitioner’s 
contention that prejudice should have been presumed because his counsel had caused 
structural error by consenting to the presence of an alternate juror during deliberations.  
This Court observed that, in Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1911, the Supreme Court held that, “even 
though a public-trial right violation requires automatic reversal on direct appeal, it is still 
 
- 42 - 
analyzed under the Strickland framework when raised as part of an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim.”  Newton, 455 Md. at 356, 168 A.3d at 9.  This Court also noted that, in 
Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1912, the Supreme Court explained that there is “a higher standard 
for granting a new trial when a defendant raises a structural error on postconviction, rather 
than on direct appeal.”  Newton, 455 Md. at 357, 168 A.3d at 10. 
In Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910, the Supreme Court made clear that the distinction 
between structural errors matters only on direct appeal—not in a postconviction 
proceeding.  The Supreme Court observed: 
Despite its name, the term ‘structural error’ carries with it no talismanic 
significance as a doctrinal matter.  It means only that the government is not 
entitled to deprive the defendant of a new trial by showing that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, in the case of a structural error 
where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, 
the defendant generally is entitled to automatic reversal regardless of the 
error’s [] effect on the outcome. 
 
Id. (cleaned up) (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court also explained: “When a structural 
error is preserved and raised on direct review, . . . a new trial generally will be granted as 
a matter of right.  When a structural error is raised in the context of an ineffective-assistance 
claim, however, finality concerns are far more pronounced.”  Id. at 1913.  The case law of 
both the Supreme Court and this Court demonstrates that a petitioner is not relieved of his 
or her burden of proving prejudice simply because he or she alleges that his or her trial 
counsel caused structural error. 
Ramirez does not contend that this case involves any of the circumstances under 
which the presumption of prejudice applies; and, upon independent review, we are satisfied 
that the presumption of prejudice does not apply here.  Specifically, there was no “[a]ctual 
 
- 43 - 
or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether[,]” and Ramirez’s trial counsel 
was not “burdened by an actual conflict of interest.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (citation 
omitted).  Accordingly, like most petitioners who allege ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Ramirez has the burden of proving both deficient performance and prejudice.  See Cronic, 
466 U.S. at 658. 
Although we are satisfied that Ramirez has met the burden to prove that trial 
counsel’s performance was deficient, we conclude that he has not met the burden to prove 
that his trial counsel’s performance was prejudicial.  In other words, Ramirez has failed to 
show that “there was a substantial or significant possibility that the verdict[s were] 
affected” by his trial counsel’s conduct.  Syed, 463 Md. at 86-87, 204 A.3d at 154 (cleaned 
up). 
As the Supreme Court explained in Strickland, id. at 696, “a verdict [that is] only 
weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with 
overwhelming record support.”  In other words, generally, a petitioner fails to prove that 
his or her trial counsel’s performance prejudiced him or her where, at trial, the State offered 
strong evidence of the petitioner’s guilt.  For example, in Syed, 463 Md. at 97, 204 A.3d 
at 160, this Court held that the petitioner had not met the burden to prove that his trial 
counsel’s failure to call a potential alibi witness prejudiced him.  This Court explained: 
“[T]he State’s case against [the petitioner] could not have been substantially undermined 
merely by the alibi testimony [] because of the substantial direct and circumstantial 
evidence pointing to [the petitioner]’s guilt.”  Id. at 97, 204 A.3d at 160.  Similarly, in 
Walker, 391 Md. at 256, 892 A.2d at 560-61, this Court determined that the petitioner had 
 
- 44 - 
not established ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s minimal 
participation at trial, explaining: “[T]he case against [the petitioner] was built upon 
substantial documentary and testimonial evidence.  Here, the record reflects no defense 
[that the petitioner] could have asserted if counsel had behaved differently.”12 
Here, the State offered both strong direct evidence and circumstantial evidence of 
Ramirez’s guilt.  Indeed, there was overwhelming evidence that Ramirez was the man with 
an orange ski mask and a sawed-off shotgun, who, on October 11, 2004, together with the 
man with a green ski mask and a revolver, robbed Ms. and Mr. Hidey of approximately 
$80,000 that had been in a safe in the Hideys’ house.  The State’s evidence demonstrated 
that Ramirez was aware of the presence of the safe at the Hideys’ house; he planned and 
attempted an unsuccessful burglary of the Hideys’ house on September 4, 2004; he 
executed the October 11, 2004 armed robbery; he was seen with the $80,000 from the safe 
after the armed robbery; and he sought to create a false alibi. 
Specifically, the State’s evidence established that, years before the October 11, 2004 
armed robbery, Ramirez knew not only that the Hideys’ house contained the safe, but also 
that the safe contained a large amount of cash.  The State also offered overwhelming 
evidence that, on September 4, 2004—i.e., a month and a week before the October 11, 
2004 armed robbery—Ramirez and Mr. Burkett attempted to enter the Hideys’ then-
                                              
12The principle that strong or overwhelming evidence of guilt undermines the 
likelihood of proof of prejudice in the Strickland analysis is well-established.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696; Syed, 463 Md. at 97, 204 A.3d at 160; Walker, 391 Md. at 
256, 892 A.2d at 560-61.  This principle is distinct from a harmless-error analysis, which 
would be conducted on direct appeal.  
 
- 45 - 
unoccupied house through a window, but fled upon hearing an alarm, and returned on 
October 11, 2004 and committed the armed robbery.   
Ms. Burkett’s testimony demonstrated that, after the September 4, 2004 attempted 
burglary, Ramirez and Mr. Burkett prepared for the October 11, 2004 armed robbery.  Ms. 
Burkett testified that she served as the getaway driver for the October 11, 2004 armed 
robbery, that she dropped Ramirez and Mr. Burkett off in the area of a house on Ridge 
Road, and that Ramirez and Mr. Burkett exited the vehicle, with guns and a pillowcase and 
put on the ski masks.  Later, Ms. Burkett picked up Mr. Burkett and Ramirez, and Mr. 
Burkett said that they had left their tool bag behind.   
The testimony of both Ms. Hidey and Mr. Hidey was consistent with Ms. Burkett’s 
testimony that Ramirez was the man with an orange ski mask and a sawed-off shotgun in 
their home.  Also, the testimony of Ms. and Mr. Hidey indicated that they knew the sound 
of Ramirez’s voice, and that the man in the orange ski mask avoided letting Ms. and Mr. 
Hidey hear his voice because he was afraid that they would recognize it. 
The State offered multiple pieces of physical evidence that corroborated Ms. 
Burkett’s testimony that Ramirez and Mr. Burkett were the two men who committed the 
robbery at Mr. and Ms. Hidey’s house on October 11, 2004.  There was the orange ski 
mask that was found at the Burketts’ residence; Ms. Burkett testified that the orange ski 
mask in evidence belonged to Mr. Burkett, and that she had sewn and given to Ramirez a 
“similar” orange ski mask.  There was the green ski mask that was found by the side of 
Ridge Road; Ms. Burkett testified that the green ski mask in evidence belonged to Mr. 
Burkett, and both Ms. Hidey and Mr. Hidey testified that the green ski mask in evidence 
 
- 46 - 
looked like the one that one of the robbers had worn.  There was the revolver that Trooper 
First Class Workman found in a box under a shed after meeting with Mr. Burkett; Ms. 
Burkett testified that the revolver in evidence was the one that she had bought for Mr. 
Burkett, and both Ms. Hidey and Mr. Hidey testified that the revolver in evidence looked 
like the one that the man in the green ski mask had carried.  There was the duffel bag that 
was found near the Hideys’ house; Ms. Burkett testified that the duffel bag in evidence 
belonged to Mr. Burkett, and Fincham testified that the duffel bag in evidence was the one 
that Mr. Burkett had put a crowbar, a saw, and two Halloween masks into on September 4, 
2004.  
Ms. Burkett testified that, after the October 11, 2004 armed robbery, Ramirez had a 
pillowcase with $80,000 in cash.  Vollmer’s, Ramirez’s girlfriend’s, testimony constituted 
evidence that, after being accused of participating in the October 11, 2004 armed robbery, 
Ramirez attempted to fabricate an alibi.   
In sum, the State offered strong direct and circumstantial evidence of Ramirez’s 
guilt, including extremely inculpatory testimony not only by both victims (Ms. and Mr. 
Hidey), but also by the getaway driver (Ms. Burkett).  The strength of the State’s case 
against Ramirez leads to the conclusion that there is no substantial or significant possibility 
that the outcome of the trial would have been different had Juror 27 not served on the jury.  
Tellingly, the jury did not submit any questions during deliberations, deliberated for less 
than three hours, and found Ramirez guilty of all eleven charges.  These circumstances 
support our determination that the State’s evidence was strong—indeed, overwhelming—
and that there is no substantial or significant possibility that the outcome of the trial would 
 
- 47 - 
have been different but for Juror 27’s presence on the jury. 
Significantly, Ramirez fails to marshal even a colorable argument that he was 
prejudiced.  Indeed, both on brief and at oral argument, Ramirez’s postconviction counsel 
seemed to take the position that Juror 27’s response to the “crime victim” question, without 
more, conclusively establishes that Juror 27’s presence on the jury was prejudicial.  In his 
brief, Ramirez’s postconviction counsel argues that Ramirez “was ‘guilty from the start’ 
when [Juror 27] was seated.”  Similarly, at oral argument, after being asked what 
circumstances showed that, but for Juror 27’s presence on the jury, the trial’s outcome 
would have differed, Ramirez’s postconviction counsel stated that “the ‘but for’ is really 
just the seating of the juror.”  In making this assertion, Ramirez’s postconviction counsel 
essentially conflates the performance prong and the prejudice prong—i.e., he essentially 
presumes that, because Ramirez’s trial counsel erred, that error must have been prejudicial. 
A “court does not presume [that a petitioner] suffered prejudice” simply because the 
court has concluded that the petitioner’s counsel’s “performance was deficient[.]”  Syed, 
463 Md. at 87, 204 A.3d at 154 (citation omitted).  “In other words, [not] every mistake 
made by trial counsel . . . cause[s] prejudice[.]”  Id. at 87, 204 A.3d at 154 (citations 
omitted).  The question is whether there is “a substantial or significant possibility that the 
verdict[s were] affected” by the petitioner’s counsel’s error.  Id. at 87, 204 A.3d at 155 
(cleaned up).  “It is not enough for the [petitioner] to show that the errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.  Virtually every act or omission of 
counsel would meet that test[.]”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (citation omitted).  Here, 
Ramirez has failed to meet the burden to prove that there is a substantial or significant 
 
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possibility that his trial counsel’s failure to challenge Juror 27 affected the verdicts. 
For the above reasons, Ramirez has failed to prove prejudice.  Thus, as the circuit 
court and the Court of Special Appeals concluded, Ramirez’s allegation of ineffective 
assistance of counsel fails. 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY 
COSTS. 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 72 
 
September Term, 2018 
______________________________________ 
 
EDINSON HERRERA RAMIREZ 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
*Greene 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Booth 
Wilner, Alan M. (Senior Judge, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion  
by McDonald, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: July 12, 2019 
 
*Greene, J., now retired, participated in the 
hearing and conference of this case while an 
active member of this Court; after being recalled 
pursuant to the Md. Constitution, Article IV, 
Section 3A, he also participated in the decision 
and adoption of this opinion. 
Circuit Court for Carroll County 
Case No. 06-K-05-033033   
 
Argued: June 7, 2019  
As the Majority Opinion explains, in a postconviction case, the evaluation of a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel has two parts:  (1) Was counsel’s performance 
deficient? and (2) Was the defendant prejudiced?1 
Deficient Performance 
I agree with the Majority Opinion’s analysis of the first issue in this case.  See 
Majority slip op. at 31-38.  The performance of defense counsel was deficient when she 
did not move to strike for cause a prospective juror who admitted that he could not be fair 
and impartial.  It is quite clear that defense counsel would have had no difficulty excluding 
that prospective juror on that ground.  The trial judge granted her motions to strike other 
prospective jurors for similar reasons.  (The State’s Attorney appropriately expressed no 
opposition).  Defense counsel evidently had no tactical reason for wanting this admittedly 
biased individual to sit on the jury.  She belatedly and unsuccessfully tried to have him 
struck from the jury for a different and less compelling reason.  In her testimony during the 
postconviction hearing in the Circuit Court, she did not recall any specific reason for 
leaving that individual on the jury.  
Prejudice 
I disagree with the Majority Opinion’s analysis of the second issue. 
As the Majority Opinion indicates, not every error that falls under the rubric of 
“structural error” involves the type of prejudice that merits postconviction relief.  In 
Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017), the Supreme Court recognized 
                                              
1 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 
 
- 2 - 
that the concept of “structural error” encompasses at least three categories of errors, not all 
of which necessarily involve harm to a defendant.  However, the Court also noted that the 
effects of some structural errors are so difficult to measure that it is impossible to show that 
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  And some structural errors – such 
as denial of counsel or the failure to give a reasonable doubt instruction – alone render a 
trial “fundamentally unfair.”   
The Supreme Court recognized in Weaver that the prejudice inquiry with respect to 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel ultimately depends on “the fundamental 
fairness of the proceeding.”  Id. at 1911 (quoting Strickland).  Ineffective assistance of 
counsel that renders a trial fundamentally unfair is not only structural error, but also is 
prejudicial by definition.2   
An indispensable element of a fair trial is an impartial arbiter.  This Court has opined 
that the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Constitution is a “promise that a defendant’s 
fate will be determined by an impartial fact finder who depends solely on the evidence and 
argument introduced in open court.”  Williams v. State, 394 Md. 98, 106 (2006); see also 
Smith v. Philips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (“Due process means a jury capable and willing 
                                              
2 In Weaver, the Supreme Court held that the particular structural error at issue did 
not fall into the category of those that are fundamentally unfair and thus did not entail a 
presumption of prejudice in the postconviction proceeding.  137 S. Ct. at 1912-14.  In that 
case, the trial court had closed the courtroom during jury selection, which violated the 
defendant’s right to a public trial.  The Court concluded that a public trial violation does 
not necessarily render the trial fundamentally unfair, at least when it occurs during jury 
selection.  (The Court suggested that the result might be different in other situations – e.g., 
if the courtroom had been closed during testimony by the prosecution’s main witness). 
 
- 3 - 
to decide the case solely on the evidence before it”).  It has long been held, and perhaps 
goes without saying, that a biased jury “violates even the minimal standards of due 
process.”  Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).  One could fill pages with quotations 
from every court in the country expressing the principle that an impartial jury is one of the 
most basic and essential elements of our criminal justice system and that the presence of a 
biased individual on a jury deprives a defendant of that right.   
Had defense counsel moved to exclude this biased juror for cause and the trial court 
seated the juror in the face of that objection, any ensuing conviction would clearly have 
been reversed on direct appeal on the basis that the defendant had been denied the right to 
an impartial jury.  Williams, 394 Md. at 109-17 (reversing conviction and remanding for 
new trial for violation of right to impartial jury because juror failed to disclose that she was 
related to employee of prosecutor’s office).  But when defense counsel fails to raise such 
an issue during voir dire, the claim would likely be defeated on direct appeal due to waiver 
or non-preservation.  A postconviction claim based on counsel’s defective performance is 
the only way to vindicate this fundamental constitutional right. 
Courts have not hesitated to grant postconviction relief when it is established that 
the jury that returned the conviction included a biased member.  See, e.g., Wolfe v. Brigano, 
232 F.3d 499, 503 (6th Cir. 2000) (granting postconviction relief and reversing murder 
conviction due to presence of biased jurors because “[f]ailure to remove biased jurors taints 
the entire trial”); Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (granting 
postconviction relief and reversing murder conviction due to presence of biased juror 
because “[t]he bias or prejudice of even a single juror would violate [the defendant]’s right 
 
- 4 - 
to a fair trial”). 
In my view, an error by counsel that deprives a defendant of the right to an impartial 
jury results in a fundamentally unfair trial and is necessarily prejudicial.  In a federal 
postconviction case with facts very similar to this one, the Sixth Circuit reversed a 
conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Hughes v. United States, 258 
F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2001).  In Hughes, a prospective juror in a federal theft and firearms 
prosecution admitted that she did not think she could be fair to the defendant based on her 
personal relationship with local police officers.  Defense counsel did not move to strike for 
cause or exercise a peremptory strike and, as a result, the admittedly biased prospective 
juror was selected as a juror.  The Sixth Circuit held that there was prejudice because the 
defense counsel’s inaction had effectively waived the defendant’s “basic Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by an impartial jury.”  258 F.3d at 463.  
The Majority Opinion seems to hold that a defendant who has been found guilty by 
a jury that includes an admittedly biased juror must have evidence of prejudice beyond the 
biased individual’s presence on the jury.  The Majority Opinion does not suggest how a 
defendant could do so.  As in most other jurisdictions,3 our rules preclude testimony from 
jurors concerning their deliberations.  See Maryland Rule 5-606(b).  A petitioner in Mr. 
Ramirez’s shoes would face the same roadblock even if all of the jurors who had professed 
bias during the jury selection process had been seated on the jury. 
 
The Majority Opinion concludes with a sort of harmless error argument based on its 
                                              
3 See, e.g., Federal Rule of Evidence 606. 
 
- 5 - 
evaluation of the strength of the evidence at trial.  Majority slip op. at 43-46.  The logic 
seems to be that, if the evidence is strong enough, it does not matter whether one is tried 
by an impartial tribunal.  Not even the State makes such an argument.  We should not adopt 
such a principle.