Case Title: Bedingfield v. Jefferson County

Citation: 527 So. 2d 1270

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1988-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
527 So. 2d 1270 (1988)
Hoyt BEDINGFIELD, Jr., in his capacity as the acting director of finance of the City of Birmingham, et al.
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY, et al.
87-316.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 20, 1988.
Donald V. Watkins of Watkins, Carter & Knight and Joe R. Whatley, Jr., of Falkenberry & Whatley and David A. Sullivan and Samuel Fisher, Birmingham, for appellants.
Edwin A. Strickland, Birmingham, for appellees.
Guy Larry Tipton, Birmingham, for amicus curiae Alabama AFL-CIO and the public employees local union No. 1317, Laborers Intern. Union of North America.
William R. Tillery, Birmingham, for amicus curiae Birmingham Area Chamber of Commerce.
Frank C. Ellis, Jr., of Wallace, Ellis, Head & Fowler, Columbiana, for amicus curiae Shelby County.
BEATTY, Justice.
This is an appeal by Hoyt Bedingfield, Jr., as acting director of finance of the City of Birmingham, and the City of Birmingham from a judgment upholding a Jefferson County ordinance, specifically Ordinance No. 1120, establishing an occupational tax. We affirm.
The action was filed on October 19, 1987, and was consolidated for trial with the case of Carolyn Phillips, et al. v. Jefferson County Commission.
Ordinance No. 1120 levies a license or privilege tax on natural persons engaged in any vocation, occupation, calling, or profession who are not required by law to pay any license or privilege tax to the state or county. This tax was promulgated by Jefferson County under the authority of Act *1271 No. 406, approved September 7, 1967, Acts of Alabama 1967, at 21-23. Pertinent sections thereof are quoted below:
Allegations of unconstitutionality made below were denied by the defendants. Following discovery, testimony taken in open court, and stipulation, the Jefferson Circuit Court upheld the ordinance, and this appeal followed. Because a number of issues are presented here, we shall treat them seriatim.
Did Act No. 406 manifest a legislative intent to authorize Jefferson County to levy an occupational tax?
Plaintiffs' argument here is multifaceted. First, they contend that the stated purpose of the Act is to authorize a tax only upon "certain businesses," and not "occupations." Further, plaintiffs argue that § 6 of Act No. 406 does not permit a privilege tax "which is in excess of the rate of license or privilege tax levied by the largest municipality of the County on the same or similar type of business activity," meaning that Jefferson County could not implement the Act by levying a tax in excess of that which had been levied by Birmingham. Because Birmingham had no such privilege tax in 1967, plaintiffs argue, any county tax under Act No. 406 would offend the Act. Finally, according to plaintiffs, the county's own implementation of the Act when it was enacted in 1967, as only a licensing code authorizing licensing of certain businesses, gives weight to the limiting nature of Act No. 406.
*1272 We must respectfully reject these arguments. While we are mindful that taxing statutes are to be strictly construed, State v. Seals Piano Co., 209 Ala. 93, 95 So. 451 (1923), it does not offend that principle to uphold this statute. Indeed, the express language of the Act authorizes the county "to levy a business or privilege tax upon any business, vocation, occupation, calling or profession." When the intention of the legislature is so apparent from the face of a statute that there can be no question as to its meaning, there is no room for construction. American Institute of Psychotherapy v. Alabama Board of Examiners in Psychology, 410 So. 2d 54 (Ala.1982). Thus, § 4 is to be read as authorizing a privilege tax "upon any person for engaging in any business [or occupation]."
Municipal licensing authority has existed at least since the Code of 1907, see Code of 1975, § 11-51-90. Birmingham originally adopted its licensing code as early as 1916, and in 1967 it had an extensive catalog of business categories subject thereto. However, it was not until 1970 that Birmingham itself adopted Ordinance No. 70-76, providing for a license fee for occupations and professions. Given the fact that Birmingham had possessed the authority under state law to impose an occupational privilege tax since 1907, it is clear that by § 6 of Act No. 406 the legislature, cognizant of that power, decided to restrict the county's authority to a maximum as established by Birmingham's occupational privilege tax. It is a fundamental principle that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is presumed to have full knowledge and information on prior and existing law on the subject of the statute. Ex parte Love, 513 So. 2d 24 (Ala. 1987). Thus, we cannot agree with plaintiffs that Act No. 406 required Jefferson County to implement its authority contemporaneously thereunder, or lose it altogether. The Act itself contains no such limiting language. True, Jefferson County did not implement the "occupational" aspect of the statute until 1987. Nevertheless, the authority to do so continued.[1]
Finally, we are not persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that, in construing Act No. 406, this Court should defer to the county's alleged contemporaneous interpretation of the Act. Because we do not find the Act doubtful in its meaning, we need not resort to an alleged contemporaneous interpretation by the county.
Is Act No. 406 unconstitutional as violating limitations on local legislation as explained in Peddycoart v. City of Birmingham, 354 So. 2d 808 (Ala.1978)?
According to plaintiffs, Act No. 406 violates the mandate of Peddycoart in two respects: (1) the general laws of Alabama have preempted the field of license and privilege taxation to prevent reliance upon local legislation, and thus Act No. 406 violates Section 105 of the Constitution; and (2) the population classification of Act No. 406 (500,000 or more), which makes it a "bracket bill," lacks a reasonable relationship with the statute's purpose.
Commenting upon Peddycoart in Freeman v. Purvis, 400 So. 2d 389 (Ala.1981), this Court stated:
Act No. 406 was approved in 1967, well before the date of the Peddycoart decision of January 13, 1978, and, as a general law of local application, was validated by Amendment 389 even though it was not advertised under Section 106 of the Constitution of 1901.
Even under pre-Peddycoart standards, Act No. 406 must survive a constitutional attack based on a supposed lack of relationship between its purpose and the expressed population classification. As observed in Dearborn v. Johnson, 234 Ala. 84, 173 So. 864 (1937), on that subject, much is left to legislative discretion in fixing that classification and in recognizing that purpose. In Couch v. Rodgers, 253 Ala. 533, 45 So. 2d 699 (1950), this Court reviewed a number of its decisions that had upheld "bracket bills" of substantial minimum, but no maximum, population classifications:
"....
"In the Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 511, 31 So. 2d 721, we were responding to a legislative inquiry as to a proposed act applicable to counties of 400,000 population or more according to the last or any subsequent federal census, which would require the payment to such counties of a license tax of one cent on each gallon of gasoline. We thought there was a reasonable relation of the subject matter of the Act to counties of such population because we thought that in large counties the load of traffic on the highways by reason of such population justified the legislature in providing additional income in order to take care of its effect."
*1274 It is clear from the terms of Act No. 406 that its purpose was to provide more populous counties with a source of revenue by authorizing them to impose a privilege or license tax. The record establishes, if common sense does not, that needs and demands for services made upon county governments keep pace with urbanization and increases in population, necessitating new opportunities for revenue. It follows that populous counties experience greater demands for costly services than those sparsely populated. In this case, therefore, the requisite relationship was established. Peddycoart, supra.
Is Act No. 406 unconstitutional under § 105, Constitution of 1901?
Plaintiffs maintain that Act No. 406 is unconstitutional under Section 105, Constitution of 1901. The pertinent part of that section states that "[n]o special, private, or local law ... shall be enacted in any case which is provided for by a general law." Plaintiffs reason that Act No. 406 is infirm under that provision because of the prior enactment of Article I, Chapter 20, Title 51, Code of 1940, now Article II, Chapter 12, Title 40, Code of 1975, which provides:
Section 40-12-40, Code of 1975.
Act No. 406, as we have stated, is a general law, not a local law; thus Section 105 is inapplicable.
Finally, plaintiffs contend that Act No. 406 fails for want of an express provision therein for the collection of an occupational tax. Plaintiffs argue further that a reading of Act No. 406 to so provide would violate Section 104(15) of the Constitution of 1901, which prohibits the enactment of a local law "[r]egulating either the assessment or collection of taxes."
For the reasons previously discussed, Act No. 406 is a general, not a local, law; hence, this provision, Section 104(15), is inapplicable. And, as the trial court found:
Moreover, the grant of authority to "levy a license or privilege tax upon any person" in § 4 of Act No. 406 was in itself authority to collect such a tax. Cf., Syracuse Trust Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 13 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup.Ct.), affirmed, 258 A.D. 17, 15 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1939); to "levy" is to "collect" a tax. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) at 816.
Let the judgment be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, SHORES and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
[1]  By stipulation, it was established that, while Birmingham itself adopted its license code as early as 1916, and possessed an extensive license code in 1967, it did not establish its occupational tax until 1970.