Case Title: Gill v. Wilke

Citation: 253 Ind. 576, 255 N.E.2d 662

Docket Number: 768S120

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1970-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
253 Ind. 576 (1970)
255 N.E.2d 662
GILL
v.
WILKE.
No. 768S120.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed March 4, 1970.
William N. Mills, Bangs, Mills & Rollo, of Huntington, for appellant.
*577 Owen W. Crumpacker, Harold Abrahamson, Kenneth D. Reed, Richard P. Komyatte, and Crumpacker & Abrahamson, all of Hammond, for appellee.
No petition for rehearing filed.
JACKSON, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Wabash Circuit Court entered after the court sustained appellee's demurrer to a cross complaint filed by appellant, and the appellant refused to plead over.
The factual situation as disclosed by the pleadings and the record herein is that at all times herein mentioned appellant has been a resident of Wabash County, Indiana. On the 4th day of February, 1955, appellant and appellee were joined as co-defendants in an action instituted in the Lake Circuit Court by one Norbert Hutmacher on a personal check issued by appellee Wilke, endorsed by appellant Gill and cashed by Hutmacher. Payment on the check was stopped by appellee Wilke. The record and pleadings further disclose that on the 28th day of July, 1961, in the Lake Circuit Court, the plaintiff Norbert Hutmacher and the appellee Martha Wilke, both in person and by counsel, came before that court and plaintiff Hutmacher dismissed his cause of action therein against the appellee Wilke, and thereafter immediately took judgment against the above named appellant, Raymond Gill, in the total sum of $1091.90. This sum is made up of the amount of the check, $595.00; interest at 6% from August 9, 1954, to date of judgment, 7-28-61, and attorneys' fees of $250.00, with all costs to be taxed against defendant Gill. Thereafter, on the 14th day of September, 1961, plaintiff Hutmacher assigned said judgment to appellee Wilke.
On the 18th day of March, 1967, appellee Wilke filed a complaint in proceedings supplementary to execution in the Wabash Circuit Court. The complaint was based on the judgment obtained by Hutmacher against the appellant Gill in the Lake Circuit Court, and thereafter assigned by plaintiff Hutmacher to appellee and former co-defendant Wilke.
The appellant was ordered to appear and answer as to his *578 assets and on August 15, 1967, appellant was ordered by the Wabash Circuit Court to pay the sum of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) per month on said judgment.
Thereafter, on May 31, 1968, appellant Gill filed a cross-petition or complaint for temporary and permanent injunction in the Wabash Circuit Court to enjoin collection of the judgment.
In order that the issues involved in this action be clearly delineated the writer is including herein the pertinent parts of the complaint supplemental, the cross complaint, demurrer and ruling thereon.
The judgment of the Lake Circuit Court, in pertinent part, is as follows:
The complaint in proceedings supplementary to execution, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
The cross-petition reads as follows:
The demurrer to appellant's cross-petition reads as follows:
The record further discloses (p. 18 transcript) that on June 21, 1968, the entry of June 14, 1968, was amended to read "Defendant files Exhibits A and B as a part of his Complaint, to-wit:".
Exhibit A is a copy of the judgment heretofore shown as appearing at page three in the manuscript with certification that it is full, true, correct and complete by the Clerk of the Lake Circuit Court (pp. 19 & 20 of transcript).
Exhibit B is a photo copy of summons and clerk's certificate to Exhibit B, summons issued by clerk Lake Circuit Court to Sheriff of Wabash County for service on Raymond Gill, 722 Congress Street, Wabash, Indiana, and return thereon by Sheriff of Wabash County, Indiana (pp. 22-24 transcript).
The record further discloses the court sustained appellee's demurrer and on June 28, 1968, appellant refused to plead over and judgment was rendered for appellee.
The only question properly before us at this time is did the trial court commit reversible error in sustaining the appellee's demurrer to the appellant's cross-petition?
We start with the proposition that a demurrer admits as true the allegations of the pleading to which it is addressed: Hancock County REMC v. City of Greenfield (1970), 253 Ind. 402, 254 N.E.2d 865; McCray Memorial Hospital v. Hall (1967), 141 Ind. App. 203, 226 N.E.2d 915; Wolf v. Forcum (1959), 130 Ind. App. 10, 161 N.E.2d 175; Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis (1953), 232 Ind. 551, 114 N.E.2d 873. Moreover, where there has been no motion to require the complaint to be made more specific, the complaint will be liberally construed in favor of its validity. Hancock County REMC v. City of Greenfield, supra; Automobile Underwriters, *583 Inc. v. Smith (1960), 131 Ind. App. 454, 166 N.E.2d 341; Budkiewicz v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry. Co. (1958), 238 Ind. 535, 150 N.E.2d 897; Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis, supra.
The appellee's demurrer alleges that the appellant's cross-petition fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the reason that the cross-petition presents a collateral attack against a judgment which, the appellee contends, is regular on its face.
Although the general rule is that a judgment which is regular on its face is not subject to collateral attack, Winstead v. Koonce (1961), 241 Ind. 440, 172 N.E.2d 859; an exception to the rule exists where, as here, the complaint alleges that the judgment was procured by fraud. Glansman v. Ledbetter (1921), 190 Ind. 505, 130 N.E. 230; Frankel v. Garrard (1903), 160 Ind. 209, 66 N.E. 687. However, the law is equally clear that the party seeking to attack the judgment must allege that he has a meritorious defense to that judgment. Cantwell v. Cantwell (1957), 237 Ind. 168, 143 N.E.2d 275; Meyer v. Wilson (1906), 166 Ind. 651, 76 N.E. 748; Woods v. Brown (1883), 93 Ind. 164.
Carefully considering the pleadings and the record herein we must and do conclude that the cross-petition does state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and to withstand the demurrer.
Paragraph 7 of the appellant's cross-petition alleges that the judgment of the Lake Circuit Court was procured by fraud in that Norbert Hutmacher and the appellee fraudulently joined the appellant, at that time a resident of Wabash County as a party defendant to the action in the Lake Circuit Court for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the appellant as a non-resident defendant. Moreover, paragraph 9 of the appellant's cross-petition alleges a meritorious defense to the contested judgment of the Lake Circuit Court by alleging *584 that the judgment wrongfully awarded Norbert Hutmacher attorney fees which were to be paid by the appellant. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 19-12-109, provides that a holder or payee of a check who successfully sues and recovers may recover interest and attorney fees from the maker of the check who wrongfully stopped payment. In the case at bar, the appellant was not the maker of the check, but the payee. Furthermore, the appellant did not stop payment on the check. Therefore, the appellant could not, under the statute, have been assessed attorney fees. By alleging in the cross-petition that he was wrongfully assessed attorney fees by the judgment of the Lake Circuit Court, the appellant adequately alleges a meritorious defense to that judgment.
Thus, since the appellant's cross-petition alleges both that the judgment of the Lake Circuit Court was procured by fraud and that the appellant has a meritorious defense to that judgment, we hold that the appellant's cross-petition states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with instructions to overrule the appellee's demurrer and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Hunter, C.J., Arterburn and DeBruler, JJ., concur; Givan, J., dissents with opinion.
GIVAN, J.
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The majority cite authority for the proposition that a judgment which is regular on its face is not subject to collateral attack. In my opinion these authorities are correct and should govern in this case. The exceptions to this rule set out in the majority opinion I do not believe are well taken under the facts of this case. The majority contend that there is an allegation *585 of a meritorious defense to the judgment in that the appellant raises the question concerning attorneys' fees.
It is my belief that Burns' Ind. Stat. XX-XX-XXX is applicable to the appellant in this case. As an indorser the appellant accepts the tenor of the instrument which included the obligation for attorney fees under the statute. See Burns Ind. Stat. 19-3-414 and 19-3-417 and the comments to the official text thereunder.
There is nothing in the record indicating that appellant had any other claim to a meritorious defense.
I would, therefore, affirm the trial court.
NOTE.  Reported in 255 N.E.2d 662.