Case Title: State v. Dahl

Citation: 

Docket Number: S50053

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  March 4, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
CHRISTINE DAHL,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC PR106249; CA A112549; SC S50053)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 3, 2003.
Jeffrey C. Dahl, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
petitioner on review.
Rolf Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With him on
the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Steven R. Evans, Judge pro tempore. 185 Or App 149, 57 P3d 965 (2002).
KISTLER, J.
The primary question that this case presents is whether
the state may rely on a statutory presumption to prove a traffic
violation.  We hold, as did the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, that it may do so and accordingly affirm the Court of
Appeals decision and the trial court's judgment.
A Portland police officer using "photo radar" (1)
determined that a car registered to defendant had exceeded the
speed limit.  Although the photo radar took a photograph of the
car and its driver, the officer did not stop the car or otherwise
determine the driver's identity.  Pursuant to ORS
810.439(1), (2) the state mailed a citation to defendant
alleging that she had committed a speeding violation, and
defendant asked for a hearing.
At the hearing, the state introduced evidence that "the
photo radar unit detected and photographed a dark maroon utility
vehicle with Oregon plate WVC313" exceeding the speed limit in
violation of ORS 811.123, that defendant was the registered owner
of that car, and that the state had mailed the citation to
defendant in compliance with ORS 810.439.  Beyond that, the state
did not offer any evidence that defendant was driving her car
when the violation occurred. (3)  The state relied instead on
the presumption in ORS 810.439(1)(b) to prove that defendant was
the driver.  That paragraph provides:
"A rebuttable presumption exists that the
registered owner of the vehicle was the driver of the
vehicle when the citation is issued and delivered as
provided in this section."
ORS 810.439(1)(b).  Defendant did not offer any evidence to rebut
the presumption; rather, she moved to dismiss the state's case at
the close of the evidence on the ground that due process
prevented the state from relying on the presumption to prove an
element of its case.  Without the presumption, defendant argued,
the evidence was insufficient to establish that she was the
driver.
The trial court rejected defendant's constitutional
challenges, found that defendant had committed the traffic
violation, and fined her $85.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals
rejected defendant's various challenges to the statutory
presumption and affirmed the judgment.  State v. Dahl, 185 Or App
149, 57 P3d 965 (2002).  We allowed review to consider the
recurring question whether the state may rely on a statutory
presumption to prove a traffic violation.  See State v. Clay, 332
Or 327, 331 n 4, 29 P3d 1101 (2001) (noting but not reaching
various challenges to using presumption in ORS 810.439(1)(b) to
prove traffic violations).
On review, defendant advances three reasons why the
trial court should have granted her motion to dismiss.  She
argues initially that no reasonable trier of fact could find on
this record that she was driving her car when the violation
occurred.  Alternatively, relying on state statutes and the Due
Process Clause, she argues that the state may not rely on a
presumption to prove an element of a traffic violation.  Finally,
defendant contends that, even if the state may rely on some
presumptions to prove traffic violations, this presumption
violates due process because the connection between the predicate
and presumed facts is too tenuous. (4)
Before addressing those issues, we begin by describing
the statutory background against which they arise.  The state
cited defendant for driving 11 miles faster than the speed limit
in an urban area.  See former ORS 811.123 repealed by Or Laws
2003, ch 819, §§ 19, 21 (describing traffic violation).  If the
allegations in the citation are true, defendant committed a Class
C traffic violation and was subject to a maximum fine of $150. 
See ORS 811.109(1)(b) (2001) amended by Or Laws 2003, ch 819 §, 17
(identifying different classes of violations); ORS 153.018(2)
(identifying maximum fines for violations).
Although a traffic violation is an "offense" within the
meaning of the criminal code, ORS 161.505, it is not a crime, ORS
161.515. (5)  A traffic violation is instead civil. (6)
Consistently with that designation, ORS chapter 153 provides that
only some criminal procedural rules will apply to violations. 
See ORS 153.030 (so providing).  More specifically, ORS
153.076(2) provides that the state has the burden of proving a
violation by only a preponderance of the evidence.
ORS 810.439 sets out additional procedures for issuing
citations and trying traffic violations based on "photo radar." 
If the state complies with certain specified conditions, ORS
810.439(1)(a) authorizes the state to issue a citation for
speeding to the registered owner of the car pictured in the
photograph.  ORS 810.439(3) requires the court to dismiss the
citation if the registered owner submits a "certificate of
innocence," stating that he or she was not driving when the
violation occurred, and a photocopy of his or her driver's
license.  Finally, ORS 810.439(1)(b) creates a "rebuttable
presumption * * * that the registered owner of the vehicle was
the driver of the vehicle when the citation is issued and
delivered as provided in this subsection."  Because that
presumption is the object of defendant's various challenges, we
examine it in greater detail.
In order to take advantage of the presumption, the
state must prove two predicate facts -- that the defendant is the
registered owner of the car and that the state "issued and
delivered" the citation in accordance with ORS 810.439.  See ORS
810.439(1)(b) (stating predicate for presumption); Clay, 332 Or
at 331 (discussing one predicate fact).  If the state proves
those predicate facts, then the statute provides that "a
rebuttable presumption" exists.  Beyond identifying the
presumption as "rebuttable," the statute does not define its
effect, and we turn to the customary method of statutory
interpretation to determine the legislature's intent.  See PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993)
(explaining statutory construction methodology).
We begin with the text and context of ORS
810.439(1)(b).  See PGE, 317 Or at 610-11 (explaining
methodology).  As noted, the text of that paragraph uses the
phrase "rebuttable presumption" but does not identify more
precisely what the legislature intended.  The phrase "rebuttable
presumption" can refer to more than one procedural device.  See
Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 308.03 (4th ed 2002)
(identifying differing theories of rebuttable presumptions).  It
can refer to the common-law view, which holds that "a presumption
disappears, or at least is reduced to an inference, in the face
of legally sufficient rebutting evidence."  Id.  Alternatively,
it can refer to the view, associated with Professor Edmund
Morgan, that a rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of
persuasion to the party against whom it is directed.  Id.
In this case, the context makes the legislature's
intent clear.  Context includes related statutes as well as "the
preexisting common law and the statutory framework within which
the law was enacted."  Denton and Denton, 326 Or 236, 241, 951
P2d 693 (1998).  Here, the context includes OEC 308.  That rule
adopts Morgan's view of rebuttable presumptions and provides
that, "[i]n civil actions and proceedings, a presumption imposes
on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving
that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than
its existence."
Another contextual source points in the same direction. 
In State v. Rainey, 298 Or 459, 462 n 2, 693 P2d 635 (1985), the
court noted that historically the legislature had distinguished
among conclusive presumptions, rebuttable presumptions, and
permissive inferences.  The court explained that, because the
legislature had omitted any reference to conclusive presumptions
in the evidence code, "the only presumption remaining [in the
Oregon Evidence Code] is one that is disputable or rebuttable
within the terms specified in  OEC 308."  Id.  The court thus
made clear that, in Oregon, OEC 308 defines the terms on which a
presumption may be rebutted in a civil action.
Reading ORS 810.439(1)(b) in context, we conclude that,
when the legislature referred to a "rebuttable presumption" in
that statute, it intended to refer to the procedural device
described in OEC 308.  It follows that, under ORS 810.439(1)(b),
once the state proves the predicate facts, the presumption shifts
the burden of persuasion (not just production) to the defendant
to prove that he or she was not driving when the violation
occurred.  OEC 308; see Massee and Massee, 328 Or 195, 203, 203 n
3, 970 P2d 1203 (1999) (describing effect of rebuttable
presumption in ORS 107.105(1)(f)). (7)
With that background in mind, we turn to defendant's
arguments.  Defendant begins her first argument by noting that
the court explained in Clay that "ORS 811.123 requires proof that
a particular person was speeding."  332 Or at 331 (emphasis in
original).  She argues that a reasonable trier of fact could not
infer from this record that she was the person driving her car. 
The Court of Appeals did not reach that issue because it held
that defendant had not preserved it.  Dahl, 185 Or App at 152 n
3.  We read the record differently.
In support of her motion to dismiss, defendant argued
to the trial court that the state had not introduced any evidence
that she was the driver.  We think that that argument was
sufficient to put the trial court on notice that, in defendant's
view, the state had to prove something more than that she was the
registered owner; it had to introduce some evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find that she was the person
driving the car.  See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343, 15 P3d 22
(2000) (explaining that, to preserve issue, party must provide
trial court with sufficient explanation to identify alleged
error).
Although defendant preserved the issue, the trial court
correctly denied her motion to dismiss.  To be sure, no evidence
identified defendant as the driver, but the trial court
reasonably could find that defendant was the registered owner of
the car and that the state issued and delivered the citation in
accordance with ORS 810.439.  If the court found those predicate
facts, then ORS 810.439(1)(b) directed it to find that defendant
was the driver unless she proved otherwise. (8)  See Clay, 332
Or at 332 (describing effect of presumptions).  Aided by the
presumption, the evidence was sufficient to avoid a motion to
dismiss.
Defendant raises a second issue.  Relying on state
statutes and the Due Process Clause, she argues that ORS
810.439(1)(b) improperly relieves the state of the burden of
proving an element of the traffic violation.  We begin with
defendant's statutory argument.  Defendant notes that ORS
153.076(2) puts the burden on the state "of proving the charged
violation by a preponderance of the evidence." (9)  She
contends that ORS 153.076(2) is inconsistent with and trumps ORS
810.439(1)(b).  The former statute, defendant argues, requires
the state to prove each element of the violation by a
preponderance of the evidence while the latter relieves the state
of that burden.  She concludes that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the former statute controls.
We question whether any conflict exists.  ORS
153.076(2) provides that the state must prove each element of a
traffic offense by a preponderance of the evidence.  ORS
810.439(1)(b) identifies a specific situation in which the burden
of persuasion shifts to the defendant.  The latter statute carves
out an exception to the former.  To the extent, however, that a
conflict exists, the specific statute controls over the general. 
See ORS 174.020(2) (so stating); Kambury v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 334 Or 367, 374, 50 P3d 1163 (2002) (explaining
methodology for resolving conflicting statutes).  The specific
exception set out in ORS 810.439(1)(b) thus applies despite the
state's general statutory obligation to prove a violation by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Defendant argues, somewhat obliquely, that the court's
decision in Rainey leads to a different result.  In Rainey, the
court held that the statutory requirement that the state prove
each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt was
inconsistent with and negated a statutorily based presumption. 
298 Or at 465.  That case, however, involved a consideration that
is absent here.  Rainey was a criminal case, and a different
resolution of the two statutes would have resulted in a due
process violation -- a problem that the court both noted and
carefully avoided.  See id. (citing State v. Stilling, 285 Or
293, 590 P2d 1223, cert den, 444 US 880 (1979), and Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 US 510, 99 S Ct 2450, 61 L Ed 2d 39 (1979)).  As we
explain below, the due process concern that drove the court's
statutory analysis in Rainey is absent here.
Relying on Sandstrom, defendant argues alternatively
that the Due Process Clause prevents the state from using a
rebuttable presumption to prove an element of a violation.  As
defendant notes, the trial court in Sandstrom instructed the jury
on a presumption that, at a minimum, shifted the burden of
production on an element of the charged crime to the defendant. 
442 US at 517-18.  The United States Supreme Court held that that
presumption was inconsistent with the requirement, grounded in
the Due Process Clause, that the state prove each element of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 523-24.
Sandstrom involved a crime, not a violation, and is not
on point.  The Due Process Clause requires the state to prove
each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, but that
requirement does not extend to civil actions, such as this one. 
See Lavine v. Milne, 424 US 577, 585, 96 S Ct 1010, 47 L Ed 2d
249 (1976) (explaining that, "[o]utside the criminal law area,
where special concerns attend, the locus of the burden of
persuasion is normally not an issue of federal constitutional
moment"); In re Winship, 397 US 358, 368, 90 S Ct 1068, 25 L Ed
2d 368 (1970) (holding that due process requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt applies to crimes and similar offenses). 
The Due Process Clause poses no impediment to shifting the burden
of persuasion to the defendant on one element of a traffic
violation.
Defendant advances a final argument.  She contends
that, even if the Due Process Clause does not prevent the state
from using some presumptions to prove violations, this
presumption violates due process because the connection between
the predicate fact (that defendant was the registered owner) and
the presumed fact (that defendant was driving) is too tenuous to
satisfy due process.  Relying on criminal cases, defendant argues
that the presumed fact must follow "more likely than not" from
the predicate fact.  She contends that the presumption in ORS
810.439(1)(b) does not satisfy that standard because some people
drive cars that they do not own.
Defendant uses the wrong constitutional standard.  The
United States Supreme Court has explained that "a criminal
statutory presumption must be regarded * * * as unconstitutional,
unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that
the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved
fact on which it is made to depend."  Leary v. United States, 395
US 6, 36, 89 S Ct 1532, 23 L Ed 2d 57 (1969) (emphasis added);
see Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 US 140, 167, 99 S Ct 2213,
60 L Ed 2d 777 (1979) (applying that standard to permissive
inferences in criminal cases).  The Court has applied a less
stringent standard in civil cases, however.  See Lavine, 424 US
at 585 n 10 (explaining distinction).  The Court thus reaffirmed
in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 US 1, 96 S Ct 2882, 49
L Ed 2d 752 (1976), that, to avoid a due process violation in a
civil case,
"'it is only essential that there shall be some
rational connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one
fact from the proof of another shall not be so
unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.'"
Id. at 28 (quoting Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 US
35, 43, 31 S Ct 136, 55 L Ed 78 (1910)).
In Usery, the Court upheld a rebuttable presumption
that a "coal miner with 10 years' employment in the mines who
suffers from pneumoconiosis will be presumed to have contracted
the disease from his employment."  428 US at 27.  In reaching
that conclusion, the Court accepted the defendant's argument that
the degree of exposure to coal dust was more relevant to the
likelihood of contracting pneumoconiosis than the length of
employment.  The Court held, however, that Congress could rely on
the latter factor to shift the burden of production to the
defendant.  It reasoned:
"In its 'rough accommodations,' Congress was
surely entitled to select duration of employment, to
the exclusion of the degree of dust exposure and other
relevant factors, as signaling the point at which the
[defendant] must come forward with evidence of the
cause of pneumoconiosis[.]"
Id. at 29-30 (citation omitted).
The presumption in ORS 810.439(1)(b) satisfies the
standard stated in Usery.  The legislature's determination that
the registered owner was driving his or her car is not "so
unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate."  See Usery,
428 US at 28 (stating standard).  Rather, it was rational for the
legislature to assume that registered owners commonly drive their
own cars.  As the state argues, without challenge by defendant,
of all the conceivable purposes for which a person might register
ownership of a vehicle in Oregon (including, for example, resale,
investment or display as a collector's item), use of the vehicle
for transportation exceeds all others.  To paraphrase Usery, the
legislature reasonably could select proof of ownership as the
point at which the burden shifts to the registered owner to prove
that he or she was not driving.  See id. at 29-30 (explaining why
Congress's choice was reasonable).  Having considered defendant's
statutory and constitutional arguments, we hold that the state
validly relied on the presumption in ORS 810.439(1)(b) to prove
that defendant committed a traffic violation.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. Photo radar is a system in which radar detects a person
driving in excess of a specified speed and a camera takes a
photograph of the speeding car.
2. ORS 810.439(1) provides that, in jurisdictions using
photo radar:
"(a) A citation for speeding may be issued on the
basis of photo radar if the following conditions are
met:
"(A) The photo radar equipment is operated by a
uniformed police officer.
"(B) The photo radar equipment is operated out of
a marked police vehicle.
"(C) An indication of the actual speed of the
vehicle is displayed within 150 feet of the location of
the photo radar unit.
"(D) Signs indicating that speeds are enforced by
photo radar are posted, so far as is practicable, on
all major routes entering the jurisdiction.
"(E) The citation is mailed to the registered
owner of the vehicle within six business days of the
alleged violation.
"(F) The registered owner is given 30 days from
the date the citation is mailed to respond to the
citation.
"(G) If the person named as the registered owner
of a vehicle in the current records of the Department
of Transportation fails to respond to a citation issued
under this subsection, a default judgment under ORS
153.102 may be entered for failure to appear after
notice has been given that the judgment will be
entered.
"(b) A rebuttable presumption exists that the
registered owner of the vehicle was the driver of the
vehicle when the citation is issued and delivered as
provided in this section.
"(c) A person issued a citation under this
subsection may respond to the citation by submitting a
certificate of innocence or a certificate of
nonliability under subsection (3) of this section or
may make any other response allowed by law."
3. Defendant did not attend the hearing but appeared
instead through her lawyer.  The officer accordingly could not
testify whether defendant appeared to be the driver pictured in
the photograph that the photo radar took.
4. In the Court of Appeals, defendant also argued that the
presumption violated her right against self-incrimination.  The
Court of Appeals rejected that argument.  Dahl, 185 Or App at
156-58.  Defendant does not pursue that issue on review, and we
decline to reach it.  ORAP 9.20(2).
5. ORS 161.505 provides that "an offense is either a
crime, as described in ORS 161.515, or a violation, as described
in ORS 153.008."  Not only does ORS 161.505 distinguish
violations from crimes, but violations do not come within either
of the definitions of "crime" set out in ORS 161.515.  See ORS
161.515 (defining "crime" as either an "offense for which a
sentence of imprisonment is authorized" or "a felony or a
misdemeanor").
6. On review, defendant does not argue that, although her
offense was nominally civil, it was criminal in nature.  See
State v. Selness/Miller, 334 Or 515, 536, 54 P3d 1025 (2002)
(analyzing similar issue under Article I, section 12, of Oregon
Constitution).
7. If the evidence already in the record permits a
reasonable trier of fact to find that the registered owner was
not driving, the presumption does not require the registered
owner to submit additional evidence.  Rather, the registered
owner may argue from the existing record that the trier of fact
should find that he or she was not driving.  The registered
owner, however, bears the risk of nonpersuasion on that issue
once the state proves the predicate facts.
8. Defendant does not argue that the evidence required the
trial court to find, as a matter of law, that she proved that she
was not the driver; indeed, defendant introduced no evidence to
rebut the presumption.  
9. ORS 153.030(1) provides that, with certain exceptions,
"the criminal procedure laws of this state applicable to crimes
also apply to violations."  Defendant argues that this subsection
makes a variety of state statutes and federal constitutional
rights applicable to violations.  We address in the text the
state statute that provides the strongest support for defendant's
position.  Although defendant argues that the phrase "criminal
procedure laws of the state" includes federal constitutional
rights, a federal constitutional right is not a criminal
procedure law of this state.