Case Title: People v. Smith

Citation: 566 P.2d 364

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1977-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
566 P.2d 364 (1977) The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerry Roger SMITH a/k/a Roger Don Yates, Gary Lee Williams, Donald L. Shirer, and James Lincoln Crall a/k/a Lincoln Fredrick Black, Defendants-Appellees. No. 27326. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. July 11, 1977. R. Dale Tooley, Dist. Atty., Brooke Wunnicke, Chief Appellate Deputy Dist. Atty., Thomas P. Casey, Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for plaintiff-appellant. Douglas John Traeger, Kenneth L. Keene, Jr., Denver, for defendant-appellee Gary Lee Williams. J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., David K. Rees, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for intervenor. GROVES, Justice. Defendants were charged in an eight-count indictment. Three of these charges were under section 42-5-102, C.R.S.1973. The district court declared this statute to be unconstitutional. We reverse. Section 102 provides: One defendant was charged under this section with feloniously altering an automobile engine which was the property of another. All three defendants were charged with feloniously selling automobile parts from automobiles which were the property of others. Without amplifying upon its reasons, the district court ruled that section 102 be "declared unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the Law." The defendant Williams was the only appellee to file a brief. His principal argument in support of the district court's ruling reads as follows: With one exception which will be mentioned later, the constitutional issues are identical with those addressed by us in People v. Czajkowski, et al, Colo., 568 P.2d 23, announced contemporaneously with this opinion. For the reasons there stated (relating to section 42-5-104, C.R.S.1973), we hold that section 102 also constitutes a reasonable classification and that there may be prosecutions under section 102 irrespective of the general theft statutes. The one exception noted above is the fact that section 104 applies to auto parts having a value of more than $20, whereas section 102 relates to automobiles and automobile equipment irrespective of value. So far as the issue of unconstitutionality is concerned, the exception is immaterial. The general theft statutes are of general proscription, prohibiting a broad category of activity. Hucal v. People, 176 Colo. 529, 493 P.2d 23 (1971). In contrast, section 102 is not aimed at the general thief, but instead at the person who "buys, sells, exchanges, trades, receives, conceals, or alters the appearance of an automobile, or any automobile part . . . ." This is a statute dealing with those who seek to aid a thief. Its purpose is to curb the trafficking of stolen automobiles and stolen automobile parts. Such being the purpose, the legislature correctly perceived that there was no need to fix a value of the particular property involved. As in Czajkowski, supra, the defendant Williams contends that, when the various crimes of theft were consolidated into the general theft statute, section 102 was not repealed because of legislative oversight. Disposition of this point has been made in Czajkowski. It is argued that the district attorney acted arbitrarily and capriciously in choosing not to dismiss the charges under section 102 in the light of the general theft statutes. Again, we addressed ourselves to this question in Czajkowski and found it to have no merit. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the three counts of the indictment relating to section 102. ERICKSON and CARRIGAN, JJ., dissent.