Case Title: Cavanagh v. Cavanagh

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13222

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-08-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13222 
 
MICHAEL D. CAVANAGH  vs.  LYNN A. CAVANAGH. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     April 4, 2022. - August 8, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Divorce and Separation, Child support, Modification of judgment, 
Alimony, Separation agreement, Findings.  Statute, 
Construction.  Evidence, Conversation between husband and 
wife. 
 
 
 
Complaint for divorce filed in the Hampden Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on September 16, 2015. 
 
A complaint for modification, filed on March 31, 2020, was 
heard by Ellen M. Randle, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jeff Goldman (Emma Diamond Hall also present) for the 
mother. 
 
Ann E. Dargie for the father. 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This case arises out of a postdivorce dispute 
concerning child support and alimony, in which both parties 
sought a modification of the child support order issued as part 
2 
 
  
of the divorce judgment, and the mother sought alimony for the 
first time.  We are asked to determine whether a provision of 
the Alimony Reform Act (act), G. L. c. 208, § 53 (c) (2) 
(§ 53 [c] [2]), prohibits an award of alimony where child 
support has been ordered.  The parties also seek review of 
several conclusions of the Probate and Family Court judge as to 
the meaning of certain provisions in the judgment of divorce, 
which incorporated and merged the parties' separation agreement.  
We are also asked to determine whether the judge impermissibly 
exceeded the scope of the pretrial order, which, pursuant to 
Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 16, enumerated the issues to be decided at 
trial.  Finally, the parties dispute which of the father's 
sources of income and benefits properly constitute "gross 
income" for the purposes of calculating child support.  We hold 
that § 53 (c) (2) allows for the concurrent award of child 
support and alimony.  We also conclude that several of the 
judge's rulings related to the divorce judgment and calculation 
of child support constituted error requiring us to vacate 
certain portions of the judgment and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
 
Background.  We present the relevant facts and procedure as 
found by the Probate and Family Court judge, supplemented by 
undisputed facts in the record, and reserving certain facts for 
later discussion.  See Connor v. Benedict, 481 Mass. 567, 568 
3 
 
  
(2019).  Michael Cavanagh (father) and Lynn Cavanagh (mother) 
were divorced on November 7, 2016, after an approximately 
twenty-one year marriage.  During the marriage, the parties had 
three sons.  The two older sons currently are over the age of 
majority.  The oldest son graduated from college in May 2021.  
The middle son is a cadet at the United States Military Academy 
at West Point (West Point).  The youngest son, who is still a 
minor, attends a private preparatory school previously attended 
by the two older sons. 
Prior to and during the first year of the marriage, the 
father attended school to become a physician's assistant (PA).  
Before and during the marriage, the father incurred 
approximately $80,000 in educational debt.  During the first 
year of the marriage, the parties lived with the mother's 
parents before moving into a house purchased by the mother with 
her father.  The father was not able to be on the mortgage due 
to his debt.  The entirety of the father's debt was paid off 
during the marriage. 
 
The father has worked at an orthopedic surgical practice 
since in 1997.  He took a second job at a medical center in 
approximately 2012 for the purpose of financing the children's 
private school education.  Prior to and in the first years of 
the marriage, the mother worked as a teacher at a Catholic 
school.  After the birth of the parties' oldest son in 1999, the 
4 
 
  
mother left her job to remain home and care for him.  The mother 
continuously was out of the work force to raise the parties' 
three sons.1 
 
During the marriage, the parties enjoyed a comfortable, 
middle-class lifestyle.  They routinely bought used cars that 
were no older than two to three years at time of purchase, 
replacing them when they were no longer serviceable.  The 
parties took camping vacations using a recreational vehicle 
owned by the mother's parents three to four times per year, 
including an annual vacation to Disney World.  The parties had a 
pool built at the marital home, which home was kept in good 
repair.  All three sons attended a private Catholic school 
beginning in kindergarten.  The oldest son attended a private 
preparatory school from ninth through twelfth grades.  The 
middle son attended the private preparatory school from seventh 
through twelfth grades.  The youngest son was enrolled in third 
grade at the Catholic school at the time of the divorce. 
The mother returned to work as a teacher at the Catholic 
school in September 2016, approximately two months before the 
 
1 The mother briefly returned to the work force as a 
substitute teacher from November 2014 to around February 2015.  
At that time, the father was "gone early in the morning until 
night."  The mother was responsible for the children both in the 
morning before school and after they returned home from school; 
both parties participated in transporting their middle son to 
and from his various athletic obligations. 
5 
 
  
entry of the divorce judgment, and she continues to work there.  
The Catholic school provides services to local public school 
students.  The mother works at the Catholic school in two 
capacities:  as a teacher on behalf of the Catholic school and 
as a Title I program instructor on behalf of the local public 
school system.  The mother would like to work as a regular 
teacher for the public school system, where she believes she 
could earn more money, but she currently lacks the requisite 
credentials and lacks the financial resources necessary to 
obtain such credentials.  The judge found the mother's gross 
weekly income to be $719.24.  The father continues to work as 
the head PA at the orthopedic surgical practice and as a per 
diem PA at the medical center.  The judge found the father's 
gross weekly income to be $4,388. 
Pursuant to the divorce judgment, the mother received 
physical custody of the then-minor children, and the parties 
were to share legal custody.  The divorce judgment also provided 
that the father "shall be responsible for payment up to $20,000 
annually toward [the middle son's] tuition cost at [the private 
preparatory school] for his three years at the school . . . 
[and] shall contribute up to $20,000 per year toward an agreed 
upon prepatory [sic] school for [the youngest son]."  The mother 
was to "be responsible for the payment of [the youngest son's] 
tuition at [the Catholic school]."  The father was obligated to 
6 
 
  
pay $800 per week in child support for the parties' three 
children.2  The parties agreed, and the divorce judgment 
provided, that the father's job with the medical center would 
not be used to calculate either child or spousal support 
obligations in the future, in consideration of the father's 
obligation to contribute toward the cost of the children's 
education. 
Presently before this court are cross appeals from a 
judgment of modification on the father's complaint and the 
mother's counterclaim for modification of the child support 
order, and on the mother's counterclaim for alimony, legal fees, 
and a determination that the youngest son be permitted to 
continue attending the preparatory school at which he is 
enrolled.  In the year before trial, each party filed complaints 
for contempt against the other, related to the enrollment of the 
parties' youngest son at the private preparatory school 
previously attended by the parties' two older sons.  In July 
2020, the judge found the mother in contempt for unilaterally 
removing the youngest son from the Catholic school and enrolling 
him at the preparatory school despite the father's expressed 
disagreement with that decision.  The judge found that the 
 
2 The parties acknowledged that this was an upward deviation 
above the child support guidelines to account for the 
substantial costs the mother paid related to the middle son's 
athletic training. 
7 
 
  
father was not in contempt for failing to contribute to the 
costs of the youngest son's education at the preparatory school.  
The father brought a second complaint for contempt in September 
2020, alleging that, despite the judge's prior judgment of 
contempt against the mother, the mother had not withdrawn the 
parties' youngest son from the preparatory school. 
As relevant to these appeals, there was undisputed and 
uncontroverted testimony at trial that (1) in 2014, the father 
made public statements in front of the mother indicating that 
the parties' youngest son would be sent to the preparatory 
school for seventh grade; (2) at the time of the divorce, the 
mother thought the parties had agreed to send their youngest son 
to the preparatory school for seventh grade; (3) when it became 
apparent to the mother that the parties either no longer or 
never agreed to that course of action, she made significant 
efforts over a period of several months prior to the start of 
the youngest son's seventh grade year to engage the father in 
discussions to come to a mutual agreement as to the youngest 
son's schooling; (4) throughout that time, the father 
categorically refused to engage in any such discussions, stating 
that the only course of action he would accept would be to 
require the youngest son to continue attending the Catholic 
school and to make no contributions towards the youngest son's 
schooling for seventh and eighth grades.  A provision of the 
8 
 
  
divorce judgment requires that, in the event of a dispute 
concerning any provision of the divorce judgment, "the parties 
shall make a good faith effort to reach a mutual agreement." 
After a trial in 2021 on the parties' modification claims 
and on the second complaint for contempt filed by the father, 
the judge made the following rulings:  (1) the father is not 
obligated to contribute to the youngest son's education at the 
preparatory school; (2) the parties' two older sons are 
emancipated for child support purposes; (3) the father shall pay 
child support in the amount of $650 per week for the youngest 
son; (4) the father shall receive relief with respect to the 
child support reduction retroactive to the week of June 4, 2021, 
which was the week following the date the oldest son graduated 
from college; (5) the father shall not pay alimony to the 
mother; and (6) the parties are responsible for their own legal 
fees and costs.  The judge dismissed the father's complaint for 
contempt as duplicative of his earlier complaint.  The parties 
each appealed from the judgment of modification, and we granted 
the mother's application for direct appellate review. 
Discussion.  1.  Separation agreement and judgment of 
divorce.  Before addressing the issues raised on appeal, we must 
address an inadequacy in the record before us. 
While the parties and the judge below refer variously to 
the provisions of the judgment of divorce and the provisions of 
9 
 
  
the parties' separation agreement, we observe that the 
separation agreement expressly provided that it "shall be 
incorporated and merged into said judgment [of divorce] and 
shall not survive as an independent contract."  Thus, as of the 
entry of the divorce judgment, the separation agreement no 
longer has any independent legal effect.  Its terms have been 
merged with and superseded by the provisions of the judgment of 
divorce, whether all, some, or none of the provisions of the 
separation agreement have been incorporated into that judgment.3  
See Halpern v. Rabb, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 338-339 (2009).  See 
also Clement v. Owens-Clement, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 635 n.3 
(2020) (alimony provision in separation agreement did not 
survive but merged with divorce judgment). 
Our review of these appeals could have been hampered by the 
parties' failure to provide us with a copy of the divorce 
judgment or to indicate whether all provisions of the separation 
agreement were incorporated into the judgment.  Without the 
judgment of divorce, it was unclear to us whether all of the 
provisions of the separation agreement referenced by the judge 
and the parties were incorporated into the judgment of divorce, 
 
3 A judge may not approve and incorporate into a divorce 
judgment a separation agreement or provisions contained therein 
where the agreement as a whole or the relevant provisions are 
not "fair and reasonable" or are not "free from fraud and 
coercion."  Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 514 (1982), 
quoting Reeves v. Reeves, 318 Mass. 381, 384 (1945). 
10 
 
  
in which case they properly could be the subject of the action 
presently before us, or whether some may not have been 
incorporated, in which case those provisions would have no legal 
effect.4 
As an exercise of our discretion, we obtained the judgment 
of divorce from the Probate and Family Court and confirmed that 
all provisions of the separation agreement were incorporated and 
merged into the judgment of divorce.  Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a) (1) 
(D), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019).  We emphasize that 
this is not an action an appellate court is required to take.  
See id. ("The court may decline to permit the parties to refer 
to portions of the record omitted from the appendix, but the 
fact that parts of the record are not included in the appendix 
shall not prevent the court from relying on such parts").  It is 
the duty of the parties to provide "any parts of the record 
relied upon in the brief."  Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a) (1) (A) (v) 
(a).  We therefore caution that, in future cases involving a 
separation agreement that has been merged into a judgment of 
 
4 We note, however, that even where the provisions of a 
separation agreement "are merged and do not survive the divorce 
judgment, 'it is nevertheless appropriate for a judge to take 
heed of the parties' own attempts to negotiate terms mutually 
acceptable to them' when determining whether to modify" such 
judgment.  Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 535 (2015), quoting 
Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 302 (2009). 
11 
 
  
divorce, the parties should include the judgment in the record 
transmitted to this court. 
2.  Availability of concurrent child support and alimony 
under the act.  The parties both sought a modification of the 
child support order that issued as part of the divorce judgment, 
and the mother additionally sought alimony for the first time.  
The judge first calculated the appropriate amount of child 
support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines (May 2018) 
(guidelines), and in light of her earlier determination that the 
oldest and middle sons were emancipated.  The judge then 
determined that no alimony could be awarded to the mother for 
the sole reason that the judge had "considered all of [the 
father's] gross income in setting the child support order." 
The parties disagree about the interpretation and 
application of § 53 (c) (2) of the act.  Specifically, the 
mother argues that § 53 (c) (2) cannot be interpreted according 
to its plain language where such an interpretation would 
conflict with both other provisions of the statute and the 
expressed legislative purpose in enacting the act.  The father 
argues that, pursuant to the plain language of § 53 (c) (2), 
alimony is unavailable to the mother because child support has 
been ordered.  The father also argues that an award of alimony 
is based on a recipient's need for support, and the mother has 
no need for alimony so long as she is receiving child support. 
12 
 
  
Determinations as to whether and in what form and amount to 
award alimony generally are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  
See Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 247 (1987).  Questions of 
statutory interpretation, however, are considered de novo.  Boss 
v. Leverett, 484 Mass. 553, 556 (2020). 
"In interpreting the meaning of a statute, we look first to 
the plain statutory language."  Worcester v. College Hill 
Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 138 (2013).  G. L. c. 4, § 6.  "[W]e 
look not only to the specific words at issue but also to other 
sections [of the statute], and 'construe them together . . . so 
as to constitute an harmonious whole consistent with the 
legislative purpose.'"  Malloy v. Department of Correction, 487 
Mass. 482, 496 (2021), quoting Pentucket Manor Chronic Hosp., 
Inc. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 394 Mass. 233, 240 (1985).  "Where 
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is 
conclusive as to legislative intent. . . and the courts enforce 
the statute according to its plain wording . . . so long as its 
application would not lead to an absurd result" (quotations and 
citation omitted).  Worcester, supra.  Where there is doubt or 
ambiguity about the meaning of a statutory provision, the court 
may turn to extrinsic sources to determine legislative purpose 
and intent.  See Malloy, supra.  General Laws c. 4, § 6, 
provides that, as a general rule, "[w]ords and phrases shall be 
construed according to the common and approved usage of the 
13 
 
  
language."  However, the statute also provides that "[i]n 
construing statutes the following rules shall be observed, 
unless their observance would involve a construction 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the law-making body or 
repugnant to the context of the same statute."  Id.  Thus, as 
§ 6 makes clear, all rules of statutory construction serve the 
overarching principle that we "construe statutory language to 
effectuate legislative intent."  Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 489 
Mass. 589, 609 (2022).  See G. L. c. 4, § 6; Chin v. Merriot, 
470 Mass. 527, 532 (2015). 
a.  History of alimony and the act.  "The Alimony Reform 
Act of 2011, St. 2011, c. 124, [codified at G. L. c. 208, §§ 34, 
48-55,] changed the legal framework under which courts may award 
alimony when a marriage ends in divorce."  Zaleski v. Zaleski, 
469 Mass. 230, 231 (2014).  In Massachusetts, a court's 
authority to award alimony is statutory.  Id. at 233.  This 
authority "has existed in the Commonwealth since 1786."  Id. at 
233 n.8, citing St. 1785, c. 69.  Under the statute in effect 
prior to the act's enactment, the Legislature provided that 
"[u]pon a divorce or upon petition at any time after a divorce, 
the court may order either of the parties to pay alimony to the 
other."  G. L. c. 208, § 34, as amended by St. 1974, c. 565.  
Although this statute provided that judges had to consider 
certain factors in setting an alimony order, it included no 
14 
 
  
standard regarding types of alimony or permanency or 
modification of alimony orders.  See id.  See also Kindregan, 
Reforming Alimony:  Massachusetts Reconsiders Postdivorce 
Spousal Support, 46 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 13, 22-23 (2013).  As a 
result, judges had broad discretion to formulate alimony 
judgments, and alimony awards appeared to be somewhat 
unpredictable.  Id. at 23. 
The act was enacted after a task force of "legislators, 
lawyers and judges, along with representatives from the 
Massachusetts Bar Association, the Boston Bar Association, the 
Massachusetts Women's Bar Association and the American Academy 
of Matrimonial Lawyers, worked together monthly for more than a 
year, reviewing and redrafting [then] current alimony laws."  
Lawmakers See Support Broadening for Major Alimony System 
Changes, State House News Service, May 17, 2011.  It was 
intended to make alimony awards fairer and more predictable, 
while providing for some judicial discretion to tailor awards in 
the specific circumstances of a given case.  See Report of the 
Joint MBA/BBA Alimony Task Force, Alimony or Spousal Support 
Guidelines Where There Are No Dependent Children 1 (2010); 
McDonald, Alimony Reform Approved, Oct. 5, 2011, https://patch 
.com/massachusetts/milford-ma/alimony-reform-approved 
[https://perma.cc/9PMG-WGY9]; UPI, Reforms Make Mass. Alimony 
'More Fair,' Sept. 26, 2011, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US 
15 
 
  
/2011/09/26/Reforms-make-Mass-alimony-more-fair/63301317074885 
/?st_rec=5571549864000&u3L=1 [https://perma.cc/4AH4-GDZ4]; State 
House News Service (Sen. Sess.), July 28, 2011; Amendment Would 
Give Judges More Power Over Settled Alimony Cases, State House 
News Service, July 18, 2011. 
Passage of the act brought sweeping changes to 
Massachusetts alimony law.  In many ways, it provided clear 
guidance surrounding the award of alimony.  The act established 
four distinct types of alimony and set limits on the duration of 
all types.  St. 2011, c. 124, § 3, inserting G. L. c. 208, 
§§ 48-55.  General Laws c. 208, § 48, establishes the following 
four types of alimony: 
(1) "'General term alimony,' the periodic payment of 
support to a recipient spouse who is economically 
dependent"; 
 
(2) "'Rehabilitative alimony,' the periodic payment of 
support to a recipient spouse who is expected to become 
economically self-sufficient by a predicted time, such as, 
without limitation, reemployment; completion of job 
training; or receipt of a sum due from the payor spouse 
under a judgment"; 
 
(3) "'Reimbursement alimony,' the periodic or one-time 
payment of support to a recipient spouse after a marriage 
of not more than [five] years to compensate the recipient 
spouse for economic or noneconomic contribution to the 
financial resources of the payor spouse, such as enabling 
the payor spouse to complete an education or job training"; 
and 
 
(4) "'Transitional alimony,' the periodic or one-time 
payment of support to a recipient spouse after a marriage 
of not more than [five] years to transition the recipient 
16 
 
  
spouse to an adjusted lifestyle or location as a result of 
the divorce." 
 
 
The act sets forth specific standards for when an award of 
alimony must terminate, based on the type of alimony awarded and 
the length of the marriage.  G. L. c. 208, §§ 49-52.  Under the 
current framework, a judge is permitted to order alimony for "an 
indefinite length of time" only where such order is for general 
term alimony and where "the length of the marriage was longer 
than [twenty] years."  G. L. c. 208, § 49 (c). 
In fashioning an alimony award, "[a] judge must consider 
and weigh all the relevant factors [under G. L. c. 208, 
§ 53 (a)],[5] but where the supporting spouse has the ability to 
pay, 'the recipient spouse's need for support is generally the 
amount needed to allow that spouse to maintain the lifestyle he 
or she enjoyed prior to termination of the marriage'"6 (emphases 
 
5 General Laws c. 208, § 53 (a), provides: 
 
"In determining the appropriate form of alimony and in 
setting the amount and duration of support, a court shall 
consider:  [(1)] the length of the marriage; [(2)] age of 
the parties; [(3)] health of the parties; [(4)] income, 
employment and employability of both parties, including 
employability through reasonable diligence and additional 
training, if necessary; [(5)] economic and non-economic 
contribution of both parties to the marriage; [(6)] marital 
lifestyle; [(7)] ability of each party to maintain the 
marital lifestyle; [(8)] lost economic opportunity as a 
result of the marriage; and [(9)] such other factors as the 
court considers relevant and material" (emphasis added). 
 
6 In light of this case law, contrary to the implication 
made by the father, a recipient spouse's need is not defined as 
17 
 
  
added).  Young v. Young, 478 Mass. 1, 6 (2017), quoting Pierce 
v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 296 (2009).  See Zaleski, 469 Mass. at 
235-236.  "Absent good reason, in a long[-]term marriage, there 
is no justification for the life-style of one spouse to go down 
while the other remains high."  Goldman v. Goldman, 28 Mass. 
App. Ct. 603, 611 (1990).  "'[I]t is important that the record 
indicate clearly that the judge considered all the mandatory 
statutory factors,' and that the reason for her conclusion is 
apparent in her findings" (citation omitted).  Zaleski, supra at 
236, quoting Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 401 (1977). 
b.  Construction of § 53 (c) (2).  In one respect, the act 
has caused "serious problems of interpretation for the courts."  
Kindregan, 46 Suffolk U. L. Rev. at 39.  General Laws c. 208, 
§ 53 (c) (2), instructs:  "When issuing an order for alimony, 
the court shall exclude from its income calculation:  . . . 
gross income which the court has already considered for setting 
a child support order."  We agree that a plain language 
interpretation of § 53 (c) (2) whereby alimony is nearly 
absolutely prohibited where child support has already been 
awarded is untenable given that such an interpretation of 
§ 53 (c) (2) would conflict with other provisions of the act 
that indicate clear legislative intent to require a fact-
 
an amount required to maintain a former spouse at a subsistence 
level based on current reported expenses. 
18 
 
  
specific consideration of the parties' circumstances when 
determining whether and how to award alimony, § 53 (a), and to 
permit concurrent awards of alimony and child support, § 53 (g).  
We must construe § 53 (c) (2) in the context of these other 
provisions of the act, so that the act "constitute[s] a[] 
harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose."  
Malloy, 487 Mass. at 496. 
In creating four distinct types of alimony and providing a 
list of factors a judge must consider in deciding whether and 
how to award alimony to a former spouse, the act as a whole 
provides that a judge should tailor a decision whether or in 
what form and amount to award alimony to the specific 
circumstances of a particular family.  See G. L. c. 208, §§ 48-
53.  Section 53 (g) expressly contemplates an order of "alimony 
concurrent with or subsequent to a child support order" 
(emphasis added).  Section 53 (a) sets forth the factors judges 
must consider when determining whether or in what form and 
amount to award alimony.  Section 53 (a) does not permit judges 
to deny a request for alimony without making a fact-specific 
inquiry into the parties' circumstances, as evaluated through 
the application of these mandatory statutory factors.  Even a 
plain language interpretation of § 53 (c) (2) must take these 
additional relevant provisions into account. 
19 
 
  
Additionally, we note that it makes little sense to tie the 
availability of alimony to the provision of child support where 
child support and alimony serve distinct purposes:  child 
support is intended to provide financial support for children of 
the parties, whereas alimony is intended to provide financial 
support to an economically dependent former spouse.7  Compare 
G. L. c. 208, § 28, and White v. Laingor, 434 Mass. 64, 66 
(2001) (child support is for maintenance and benefit of 
children), with G. L. c. 208, § 48 (describing four types of 
alimony, all of which provide support for former spouse, making 
no mention of any child-care responsibilities of such former 
spouse).  The two also "stand[] on a different footing" where 
parties may validly bargain away their own right for support in 
the form of alimony, but "[p]arents may not bargain away the 
rights of their children to support" (citation omitted).  White, 
supra.  The Legislature has stated that it is "the public policy 
that dependent children shall be maintained as completely as 
possible from the resources of their parents."  G. L. c. 208, 
§ 28.  See White, supra.  We have stated that such policy "'will 
take precedence over the freedom of the parties to enter a 
 
7 For this reason, the father's argument that the mother can 
have no need for alimony so long as she receives child support 
is without merit. 
20 
 
  
binding contract' that could potentially jeopardize the 
children's interests" (citation omitted).  Id. 
We understand that, pursuant to the plain language of 
§ 53 (c) (2), income that has been used to calculate a child 
support order may not be used to calculate alimony.  However, we 
interpret this plain language in the context of the other 
provisions of the act, discussed supra.  Where, as here, a judge 
chooses to calculate child support and then denies alimony on 
the basis that § 53 (c) (2) prevents the use of the payor's 
income to calculate alimony, the judge has abused her discretion 
because she has failed to do the fact-specific analysis of the 
family's circumstances required by § 53 (a).  Therefore, in 
context, we read §§ 53 (a), (c) (2), and (g) together to require 
that a judge consider, under the statutory factors set forth in 
§ 53 (a), the equities surrounding an award where alimony is 
calculated first and where child support is calculated first. 
Thus, pursuant to the act, in cases where child support is 
contemplated, before a judge properly may exercise her 
discretion to decide whether and in what format and amount to 
award alimony, the judge must do the following: 
(1) 
Calculate alimony first, in light of the statutory 
factors enumerated in § 53 (a) and the principle that, 
with the exception of reimbursement alimony, the 
amount of alimony should be determined with reference 
21 
 
  
to the recipient spouse's need for support to allow 
the spouse to maintain the lifestyle enjoyed prior to 
the termination of the parties' marriage.  Young, 478 
Mass. at 6.8  Then calculate child support using the 
parties' postalimony incomes. 
(2) 
Calculate child support first.  Then calculate 
alimony, considering, to the extent possible, the 
statutory factors enumerated in § 53 (a).  We 
acknowledge that in the overwhelming majority of 
cases, the calculation of child support first will 
preclude any alimony being calculated in this step. 
(3) 
Compare the base award and tax consequences of the 
order that would result from the calculations in step 
(1) with those of the order that would result from the 
calculations in step (2), above.  The judge should 
then determine which order would be the most equitable 
for the family before the court, considering the 
mandatory statutory factors set forth in G. L. c. 208, 
 
8 General Laws c. 208, § 53 (b), provides: 
 
"Except for reimbursement alimony or circumstances 
warranting deviation for other forms of alimony, the amount 
of alimony should generally not exceed the recipient's need 
or [thirty to thirty-five percent] of the difference 
between the parties' gross incomes established at the time 
of the order being issued.  Subject to subsection (c), 
income shall be defined as set forth in the Massachusetts 
child support guidelines." 
22 
 
  
§ 53 (a), and the public policy that children be 
supported as completely as possible by their parents' 
resources, G. L. c. 208, § 28, and determine which 
order to issue accordingly.  Where the judge chooses 
to issue an order pursuant to the calculations in step 
(2) or otherwise that does not include any award of 
alimony, the judge must articulate why such an order 
is warranted in light of the statutory factors set 
forth in § 53 (a).9  Zaleski, 469 Mass. at 236, citing 
Rice, 372 Mass. at 401. 
 
9 Likely the only scenario where a judge may properly avoid 
articulating why alimony is not warranted where the judge denies 
alimony is where such denial is pursuant to a valid separation 
agreement, either independent from or as incorporated into a 
divorce judgment.  However, where a separation agreement 
providing that no alimony shall issue has been both incorporated 
and merged into a divorce judgment, a judge should first 
evaluate a later request for new or modified alimony under the 
"material change in circumstances" standard.  Chin, 470 Mass. at 
534.  If a material change in circumstances warranting a 
modification of the divorce judgment is found, the judge should 
then proceed according to the three-step framework outlined in 
this opinion. 
 
As discussed supra, the parties' separation agreement was 
incorporated and merged into the judgment of divorce.  Under the 
relevant provision, the parties waived only "past and present" 
alimony and "expressly reserve[d] the right for future alimony."  
Thus, a new award of alimony after the entry of the divorce 
would not require modification of the judgment and, therefore, 
does not require a finding of a material change in 
circumstances.  The judge in this case, therefore, should on 
remand proceed directly to the three-step framework outlined 
above. 
23 
 
  
We acknowledge that the judge in this case did not have the 
benefit of this decision when ruling on the mother's 
counterclaim for alimony.  However, where the judge did not 
consider an award where alimony was calculated before child 
support and denied alimony without considering the mandatory 
statutory factors set forth in § 53 (a), the judge abused her 
discretion. 
3.  The parties' obligations for the youngest son's 
schooling.  The mother contends that the judge erred in 
interpreting the language in the separation agreement providing 
that the father "shall contribute up to $20,000 per year toward 
an agreed upon preparatory school for [the youngest son]" to 
allow the father unilaterally to avoid any obligation to make 
such contribution by refusing to agree to any preparatory 
school, as such interpretation rendered the provision 
unenforceable.  She further argues that the language of the 
provision is ambiguous such that extrinsic evidence of the 
parties' understanding of its meaning should not have been 
excluded.  Specifically, the mother contends that she was 
prevented from testifying as to conversations she and the father 
had during the marriage concerning their agreement as to the 
youngest son's education plan, which informed their 
understanding of the meaning of the relevant provision of the 
separation agreement.  She argues that the term "preparatory 
24 
 
  
school" was understood to refer to the preparatory school 
attended by the parties' two older sons and to encompass the 
youngest son's attendance beginning in seventh grade and 
continuing through twelfth grade. 
The mother presented undisputed and uncontroverted 
testimony that in 2014, which was around the time the marriage 
broke down, the father made statements both to the mother and to 
third parties while at a function at the preparatory school that 
he would "have children consecutively at [the preparatory 
school] for [thirteen] years in a row."  The mother also 
presented undisputed and uncontroverted testimony that the 
youngest son finished sixth grade the same year the middle son 
graduated from the preparatory school.  The mother understood 
that the only way the father's statement could have been true 
was if the youngest son began attending the preparatory school 
in seventh grade, and as a result, she understood the father's 
statement to mean that the youngest son would begin attending 
the preparatory school in seventh grade. 
The father argues that where the separation agreement only 
obligates him to contribute to the youngest son's educational 
costs where the son is attending an "agreed upon preparatory 
school," the father properly may refuse to make such 
contributions where he disagrees with the school the youngest 
son is attending.  The father also contends that he never had an 
25 
 
  
obligation to pay for the youngest son's seventh and eighth 
grade years because the term "preparatory school" encompasses 
only grades nine through twelve and that he never agreed to send 
the youngest son to the preparatory school. 
We observe that the mother's undisputed and uncontroverted 
testimony at trial was that, prior to enrolling the youngest son 
at the preparatory school where the parties had sent their two 
older children, she made repeated attempts over a series of 
several months to negotiate an "agreed upon preparatory school" 
with the father, including sending "probably hundreds of 
emails," offering alternative preparatory schools to which they 
might send the youngest son, and offering to split the cost of 
the preparatory school at which she wished to enroll the 
youngest son.  The only option that the father was willing to 
agree to was keeping the youngest son enrolled at the Catholic 
school and contributing nothing to the youngest son's seventh or 
eighth grade schooling. 
Thus, the mother's undisputed and uncontroverted testimony 
shows that, in offering multiple alternatives and concessions 
beyond what was required in the divorce judgment, the mother was 
"mak[ing] a good faith effort to reach a mutual agreement" with 
the father as to the youngest son's schooling.  The father's 
actions, on the other hand, appeared to constitute a unilateral 
command where he categorically refused to discuss placing the 
26 
 
  
youngest child in any preparatory school for seventh or eighth 
grade, in contravention of both the terms of the divorce 
judgment and the parties' status as joint legal custodians of 
the youngest son.10 
As noted supra, where the parties' separation agreement was 
merged into the judgment of divorce, "it retains no independent 
legal significance apart from the judgment."  Cournoyer v. 
Cournoyer, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 305 (1996), quoting 
DeCristofaro v. DeCristofaro, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 231, 235 (1987).  
However, because a separation agreement is a contract, to the 
extent that a judgment incorporates the terms of a separation 
agreement, we may apply contract principles to the 
interpretation of the judgment.  See Bercume v. Bercume, 428 
Mass. 635, 641 (1999); Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 512-
513 (1982), citing G. L. c. 208, § 1A. 
The interpretation of the meaning of a term in a separation 
agreement or resulting divorce judgment is a question of law 
that we consider de novo.  See Lexington Ins. Co. v. All Regions 
Chem. Labs, Inc., 419 Mass. 712, 713 (1995).  Where the language 
is clear, it determines the agreement's or judgment's meaning, 
 
10 We do not, however, conclude that this record requires a 
finding that the father failed to engage in the requisite good 
faith effort to come to a mutual agreement, where the issue was 
not litigated at trial and where a rehearing might yield greater 
development of the record on the same. 
27 
 
  
but we may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' and the 
court's intent where the language is ambiguous.  Balles v. 
Babcock Power Inc., 476 Mass. 565, 571 (2017), citing 
EventMonitor, Inc. v. Leness, 473 Mass. 540, 549 (2016).  
Language in a separation agreement or resulting divorce judgment 
"is ambiguous when it can support a reasonable difference of 
opinion as to the meaning of the words employed and the 
obligations undertaken" (quotation omitted).  Balles, supra, 
quoting Bank v. Thermo Elemental Inc., 451 Mass. 638, 648 
(2008). 
To determine whether the disputed language is ambiguous, we 
look to the disputed language itself as well as to the text of 
the agreement or judgment as a whole.  Balles, 476 Mass. at 572.  
"Construction of an ambiguous judgment is much like interpreting 
other ambiguous written instruments, in that we are required to 
search the entire record for clues in attempting to divine the 
intentions of the parties and the court."  Jacobs v. Georgiou, 
922 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).  A separation agreement 
or resulting divorce judgment "should be construed in such a way 
that no word or phrase is made meaningless by interpreting 
another word or phrase."  Lexington Ins. Co., 419 Mass. at 713.  
Additionally, ambiguity in a written instrument should generally 
be construed against the party that drafted the ambiguous 
language.  Merrimack Valley Nat'l Bank v. Baird, 372 Mass. 721, 
28 
 
  
724 (1977) ("As a general rule, a writing is construed against 
the author of the doubtful language if the circumstances 
surrounding its use and the ordinary meaning of the words do not 
indicate the intended meaning of the language" [citation 
omitted]). 
Here, the judgment of divorce, incorporating the parties' 
separation agreement, provides that the father "shall be 
responsible for payment up to $20,000 annually toward [the 
middle son's] tuition cost at [a specific preparatory school] 
for his three years at the school . . . [and] shall contribute 
up to $20,000 per year toward an agreed upon prepatory [sic] 
school for [the youngest son]."  The judgment provides that the 
mother would "be responsible for the payment of [the youngest 
son's] tuition at [the Catholic school he was attending at the 
time of the divorce]."  It also provides that "[i]n the event of 
any dispute or disagreement concerning the performance, 
interpretation, meaning or application of the AGREEMENT, the 
parties shall make a good faith effort to reach a mutual 
agreement."  We conclude that certain of these provisions are 
ambiguous. 
The dispute turns on whether "preparatory school" 
encompasses seventh through twelfth grades or only ninth through 
twelfth grades, and further on whether it refers to the specific 
preparatory school previously attended by the parties' two older 
29 
 
  
sons.  The judge concluded that, where "there was and is no 
agreement between the parties that [the youngest son] attend the 
[preparatory school at which the mother enrolled him] for the 
2020/2021 and 2021/2022 academic years (7th and 8th grades), 
Father is not obligated to contribute up to $20,000 annually for 
the cost of [the youngest son's] attendance for those academic 
years pursuant to the terms of the parties' Separation 
Agreement." 
In light of the undisputed and uncontroverted testimony 
that the father absolutely refused to engage in discussions 
about a preparatory school for the youngest son for seventh and 
eighth grade while the mother engaged in extensive efforts to 
come to a mutual understanding with the father about the 
youngest son's education, the judge's ruling effectively 
interpreted both the disputed provision of the divorce judgment 
and the provision surrounding the resolution of disputes to be 
inoperative by permitting the father to avoid any obligation to 
contribute to the youngest son's schooling through a unilateral 
refusal to engage in any efforts to come to an agreement about 
such school, despite the seemingly mandatory "shall contribute" 
language and the requirement that the parties engage in good 
faith efforts to reach a mutual agreement where a dispute 
arises.  The effect of this interpretation is that any purported 
obligation of the father related to the youngest son's schooling 
30 
 
  
under the judgment is merely illusory.  See Shayeb v. Holland, 
321 Mass. 429, 432 (1947).  We will not interpret the judgment 
to render its language meaningless and unenforceable, and we 
conclude that the judge's interpretation was an abuse of 
discretion.  The only interpretation whereby all words and 
phrases have operative effect is as follows:  The father is 
obligated to contribute up to $20,000 annually for the cost of 
the youngest son's attendance at a preparatory school, presuming 
that both parties can and do agree on a choice of preparatory 
school, where both parties have an obligation to make a good 
faith effort to come to a mutual agreement.  In the event that 
the parties cannot agree despite such good faith efforts, the 
issue should be presented to the court for resolution.  As the 
parties' agreement is expressly contemplated by the judgment, 
and because the separation agreement did not survive the 
judgment of divorce, the parties' inability to come to an 
agreement about the youngest son's schooling may constitute a 
material change in circumstances warranting modification of the 
provision of the judgment relating to the youngest son's 
schooling.11  See Chin, 470 Mass. at 534-535 (when parties 
negotiate agreement that is "incorporated and merged" into 
 
11 "A change in a custody judgment, however, should be made 
pursuant to a complaint for modification under G. L. c. 208, 
§ 28."  Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 636 (2000). 
31 
 
  
divorce judgment, judgment is subject to modification based on 
material change in circumstances); Stansel, 385 Mass. at 515 
(party seeking modification of divorce judgment where separation 
agreement did not survive must demonstrate material change of 
circumstances since entry of earlier judgment). 
The record before us is insufficient to conclude that the 
term "preparatory school" as used in the divorce judgment 
referred to the specific preparatory school attended by the 
parties' two older sons, where other provisions of the judgment 
referred to the school expressly by name without reference to 
any agreement of the parties.  The difference between the 
provisions indicates that the choice of school for the youngest 
son was not intended to be settled by the divorce judgment.  
However, the mother's testimony suggests that the parties may 
have, at some point after the time of the divorce, agreed that 
the youngest son would attend the same preparatory school as his 
older brothers.  The testimony presented below regarding the 
father's disagreement appears to have been limited to a period 
of time beginning several years after the divorce.  On remand, 
the judge should seek to ascertain whether, after the divorce 
judgment and prior to the father's recent expressed 
disagreement, he ever agreed to a choice of preparatory school 
for the youngest soon.  Applying contract principles to the 
provisions of the divorce judgment that incorporated the 
32 
 
  
separation agreement, if an agreement was reached between the 
parties on this matter, then the father's later refusal may 
constitute a breach.  See Coviello v. Richardson, 76 Mass. App. 
Ct. 603, 609 (2010) ("A repudiation of a contract is a material 
breach . . .").  These issues should be developed on rehearing.12 
The remaining ambiguity in the provision is in whether the 
definition of "preparatory school" encompasses seventh through 
twelfth grades or only ninth through twelfth grades.  As 
discussed supra, the interpretation of the meaning of the 
provision is a question of law that we consider de novo.  See 
Lexington Ins. Co., 419 Mass. at 713.  Additionally, it is 
undisputed that the father, through counsel, drafted the 
separation agreement.  Therefore, such language will be 
construed in favor of the mother.  Merrimack Valley Nat'l Bank, 
372 Mass. at 724.  The mother testified that, to her, the term 
"preparatory school" included seventh and eighth grade.  This 
testimony was not disputed.  The mother's undisputed testimony 
was also that the father previously stated that they would have 
children at the preparatory school attended by the two older 
 
12 Additionally, we note that the divorce judgment provides 
that, if the parties "are unable to agree, the matter in dispute 
may be submitted to the Probate Court for resolution."  Here, 
the judge has already made a finding that it is in the youngest 
son's best interests to remain, at least through eighth grade, 
at the preparatory school where he is currently enrolled.  There 
is ample support for such a finding in the record. 
33 
 
  
sons "consecutively for [thirteen] years in a row."  As the 
middle son graduated from the preparatory school in 2020, and 
the youngest son was going into seventh grade in 2020, the only 
way this statement could have been true was if the youngest son 
attended the preparatory school beginning in seventh grade.  The 
parties had also unenrolled their middle son from the Catholic 
school after sixth grade and enrolled him in the preparatory 
school for seventh through twelfth grades.  Thus, the mother's 
understanding that the term "preparatory school" includes 
seventh and eighth grades was entirely reasonable.13  We 
therefore interpret "preparatory school" to mean a private 
school encompassing grades seven through twelve. 
The judge's determination that the father has no obligation 
to contribute to the youngest son's schooling until at least 
ninth grade and that the father has the right unilaterally to 
withhold agreement ever to send the youngest son to any 
preparatory school and thus avoid ever being obligated to 
contribute to the youngest son's schooling was an abuse of 
discretion. 
4.  Emancipation of the middle son.  The mother argues that 
the middle son's attendance at West Point does not constitute 
 
13 Were we to examine this provision under the more 
deferential abuse of discretion standard, the result would be 
the same, where the judge appeared to consider only the father's 
interpretation of the provision. 
34 
 
  
"entry into military service" such that the middle son is not 
emancipated for child support purposes.  The father argues that 
the middle son is emancipated where his needs are fully met by 
the military and where 38 U.S.C. § 1965(1)(D) provides that the 
term "active duty" for the purposes of Servicemembers' Group 
Life Insurance includes "full-time duty as a cadet . . . at the 
United States Military Academy."  "We review child support 
orders . . . to determine if there has been a judicial abuse of 
discretion" (citation omitted).  J.S. v. C.C., 454 Mass. 652, 
660 (2009). 
 
"[T]he Commonwealth has recognized that merely attaining 
the age of eighteen years does not by itself endow young people 
with the ability to be self-sufficient in the adult world."  
Eccleston v. Bankosky, 438 Mass. 428, 436 (2003).  Therefore, 
the Legislature has enacted a statute permitting postminority 
support for a limited number of years where the child is both 
"domiciled in the home of a parent" and "principally dependent 
upon said parent for maintenance."14  G. L. c. 208, § 28.  See 
Eccleston, supra at 435-436. 
 
14 General Laws c. 208, § 28, provides in relevant part: 
 
"The court may make appropriate orders of maintenance, 
support and education of any child who has attained age 
eighteen but who has not attained age twenty-one and who is 
domiciled in the home of a parent, and is principally 
dependent upon said parent for maintenance.  The court may 
make appropriate orders of maintenance, support and 
35 
 
  
 
Consistent with the parties' separation agreement, the 
divorce judgment provides that, for all provisions thereunder, 
including those related to child support, emancipation of the 
minor children occurs "upon the happening of any of" a number of 
enumerated events, including "[e]ntry into the military service 
of the United States."  As noted supra, it is well established 
that "[p]arents may not bargain away the rights of their 
children to support."  White, 434 Mass. at 66.  Additionally, 
G. L. c. 208, § 28, confers on the court the power to award 
support for a child who has attained the age of eighteen in 
certain circumstances.  "The parties, by [their] agreement, 
cannot deprive the court of this power."  Madden v. Madden, 359 
Mass. 356, 363, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).  Thus, the 
parties may not agree that a child is emancipated under 
conditions broader than those provided for by statute and 
thereby prevent the court from considering whether to award 
child support for a child who may otherwise receive support 
under the statute, as such agreement would amount to the 
 
education for any child who has attained age twenty-one but 
who has not attained age twenty-three, if such child is 
domiciled in the home of a parent, and is principally 
dependent upon said parent for maintenance due to the 
enrollment of such child in an educational program, 
excluding educational costs beyond an undergraduate 
degree." 
 
36 
 
  
bargaining away of the child's right to support.15  Therefore, 
whether the middle son is emancipated for child support purposes 
is governed not by the divorce judgment incorporating such 
agreement, but by G. L. c. 208, § 28, and depends on whether he 
is domiciled in the home of a parent and principally dependent 
on that parent for maintenance.  There is no record evidence of 
the middle son's domicil.  However, where we conclude that the 
middle son is not principally dependent on either parent, but 
instead is principally dependent on the United States military, 
the judge properly ruled that he was emancipated as of his entry 
at West Point.16 
 
15 Parents may bargain to provide support to their children 
in more circumstances than provided for by statute.  However, 
they cannot erode a child's statutory right to support by 
agreement.  White, 434 Mass. at 66. 
 
16 This determination would be unchanged were our analysis 
pursuant to the parties' separation agreement, as incorporated 
into the divorce judgment.  As discussed infra, entry into West 
Point is undoubtedly "[e]ntry into the military service of the 
United States."  The mother argues that the judgment is 
ambiguous where it contains provisions covering college and 
"entry into military service" but not attendance at a service 
academy.  We disagree.  First, as noted infra, service as a West 
Point cadet has always been considered "service in the army."  
United States v. Morton, 112 U.S. 1, 4 (1884).  Second, the 
terms of the judgment provide that emancipation occurs "upon the 
happening of any of the following" enumerated events.  
Therefore, the happening of a single enumerated event, 
regardless of whether any others have or have not occurred, is 
sufficient under this language to trigger emancipation pursuant 
to the divorce judgment, provided that the child is not 
emancipated earlier than he would otherwise be under G. L. 
c. 208, § 28. 
37 
 
  
 
The mother argues that attendance at West Point is akin to 
attendance at any four-year college or university with a full 
scholarship.  We disagree.  "[T]he obligations to the government 
that a cadet undertakes and the governmental control to which he 
subjects himself when he enters the [Military] Academy are fully 
consistent with emancipated status."  Dingley v. Dingley, 121 
N.H. 670, 673 (1981).  See Zuckerman v. Zuckerman, 154 A.D.2d 
666, 668 (N.Y. 1989) (parties' son became emancipated when he 
entered West Point).  But see Howard v. Howard, 80 Ohio App. 3d 
832, 835 (1992) (United States Coast Guard Academy cadet is "no 
different from any other college student on a full scholarship" 
and is not emancipated).  While it is true that a cadet's 
obligation to serve as a commissioned officer begins after 
graduation, see 10 U.S.C. § 7448, other military service 
obligations are carried out while a cadet attends West Point.  
For example, cadets agree to "at all times obey . . . the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice."  10 U.S.C. § 7446(d).  They 
"are trained in the duties of members of the [military]."  
Porath v. McVey, 884 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).  
Further, they "shall perform duties at such places and of such 
type as the President may direct."  10 U.S.C. § 7449(b).  See 
Porath, supra.  "[M]any aspects of a cadet's daily life are 
subject to governmental regulation and supervision; and the 
government provides for practically all of the cadet's material 
38 
 
  
needs."  Id.17  A letter provided to the parties by West Point 
states that "West Point falls under the Department of Defense 
rather than the Department of Education."  Where the benefits 
provided to a cadet are in exchange for military service, we 
cannot say that the support provided by West Point is equivalent 
to a college scholarship. 
The judge found that the middle son "has year-round 
obligations to the military and receives short periods of leave 
for holidays such as Christmas and Thanksgiving.  [He] 
additionally is granted four weeks of non-consecutive leave 
throughout the year."  The middle son receives a base pay, 
travel pay, and military health benefits.  The judge reasonably 
found that "all of [the middle son's] needs are met by his 
enrollment with the military."  West Point provided a letter to 
 
17 Federal law also provides that the "cadets of the United 
States Military Academy" are part of the "Regular Army," which 
"is the component of the Army that consists of persons whose 
continuous service on active duty in both peace and war is 
contemplated by law."  10 U.S.C. § 7075.  The Comptroller 
General has concluded that "it is well established that service 
. . . as a cadet at the Military Academy is considered service 
in . . . the Army, since such academ[y is an] integral part[] of 
[that] service[]."  Decision of the Comptroller General of the 
United States, B-195448, at 105-106 (Apr. 3, 1980) (Comptroller 
General), citing Morton, 112 U.S. 1, and others.  The 
Comptroller General also noted, "[W]e have construed service at 
the academies as active Federal service."  Comptroller General, 
supra at 106, citing 29 Com. Gen. 331 (1950), and others.  The 
United States Supreme Court concluded in 1884 that "cadets at 
West Point were always a part of the army" and "service as a 
cadet was always actual service in the army."  Morton, supra at 
4. 
39 
 
  
the parties explaining that, in all likelihood, they may not 
continue claiming their cadet child as a dependent on their tax 
returns where "the taxpayer must be able to show that he/she 
provided more than half of the dependent's support for the tax 
year.  After totaling Cadet pay, food, education, and room and 
board, the Army provides Cadets with more than $40,000 per year.  
In most circumstances, the financial support a Cadet received 
from parent(s) or guardian(s) does not exceed this amount."  
Thus, we conclude that the judge did not abuse her discretion in 
ruling that the middle son was emancipated on July 14, 2020, on 
his agreement to enter West Point.18 
5.  Computation of income.  The mother contends that the 
judge undercounted the father's gross income for the purposes of 
child support by excluding the father's receipt of interest, 
dividends, and capital gains on investments, and his in-kind 
income from his work as an instructor on wilderness medicine 
adventure trips.  The father argues that the judge properly 
excluded these items from the computation of the father's gross 
income where they do not represent regular sources of income.   
 
18 We stop short of holding that, as a matter of law, all 
cadets are emancipated for the purposes of child support.  As 
West Point acknowledges, "[i]n most circumstances," a cadet will 
receive more financial support from West Point than from parents 
or guardians.  Where West Point acknowledges the possibility -- 
however remote -- that a cadet may receive the majority of his 
or her financial support from a parent or guardian, so too do 
we. 
40 
 
  
The father further argues that the judge abused her discretion 
by including the following in her calculation of the father's 
gross income for purposes of child support:  income from his 
second job at the medical center and employer contributions to 
his retirement accounts and health savings account.  The father 
also argues that there is no support in the record for the 
judge's calculation of his income from the medical center.  We 
review for an abuse of discretion.  J.S., 454 Mass. at 660. 
"The method for calculating and modifying child support 
orders is governed by statute and by the guidelines."  Morales 
v. Morales, 464 Mass. 507, 509-510 (2013).  General Laws c. 208, 
§ 28, provides in relevant part: 
"In determining the amount of child support obligation or 
in approving the agreement of the parties, the court shall 
apply the child support guidelines . . . , and there shall 
be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of the order 
which would result from the application of the guidelines 
is the appropriate amount of child support to be ordered" 
(emphasis added). 
 
Thus, application of the guidelines is mandatory. 
Both the 2018 guidelines and the current 2021 guidelines 
provide that, for the purposes of calculating child support, 
"income is defined as gross income from whatever source, 
regardless of whether that income is recognized by the Internal 
Revenue Code or reported to the Internal Revenue Service or 
41 
 
  
state Department of Revenue or other taxing authority."19  Child 
Support Guidelines § I(A).  Public assistance benefits based on 
financial need are excluded.  Id.  The guidelines provide a 
nonexclusive list of sources of income, including in relevant 
part "salaries, wages, overtime and tips"; "bonuses"; "interest 
and dividends"; "capital gains in real and personal property 
transactions to the extent that they represent a regular source 
of income"; and "perquisites or in-kind compensation to the 
extent that they represent a regular source of income."  Id.  
The 2018 guidelines list also includes a catch-all provision of 
"any other form of income or compensation not specifically 
itemized above."  Child Support Guidelines § I(A)(29).20 
a.  Exclusions.  The judge expressly excluded for purposes 
of calculating child support "income and capital gains on 
Father's savings and 401K plan or Father's classes and trips 
through [the wilderness medicine adventure trips], as they do 
not 'represent a regular source of income.'"  Where the 
 
19 The 2018 guidelines in effect at the time of trial and 
the 2021 guidelines now in effect do not differ in the relevant 
portions of their definitions of "income."  See Child Support 
Guidelines § I(A) (Aug. 2021). 
 
20 The 2021 guidelines expand on this catch-all provision as 
follows:  "any other form of income or compensation not 
specifically itemized above, including, but not limited to, 
alimony consistent with Calvin C. v. Amelia A., 99 Mass. App. 
Ct. 714 (2021)."  Child Support Guidelines § I(A)(30) (Aug. 
2021). 
42 
 
  
guidelines provide that in-kind compensation may be considered 
part of a party's gross income only to the extent it represents 
a regular source of income, and where the judge reasonably 
concluded that the in-kind income received from the wilderness 
medicine adventure trips did not constitute a regular source of 
income,21 it properly was excluded. 
However, pursuant to the guidelines, "interests and 
dividends" are to be included without qualification in the 
calculation of gross income.  In other words, unlike in-kind 
compensation or capital gains in real and personal property 
transactions, "interests and dividends" need not be a regular 
source of income to be included in the calculation of a party's 
gross income.  In addition, capital gains need only be a 
"regular source of income" where they relate to "real and 
personal property transactions."  Therefore, to the extent that 
the "income and capital gains on Father's savings and 401K plan" 
included interest, dividends, and capital gains on transactions 
other than those related to real and personal property, the 
judge abused her discretion in excluding them from the 
 
21 The father testified that he tried to limit such trips to 
twice a year, that he went on a trip in March 2020, and that he 
was listed as an instructor for a trip scheduled for March 2022.  
Based on this testimony, the judge did not abuse her discretion 
in concluding that in-kind income from these trips was not a 
"regular source of income." 
43 
 
  
calculation of the father's gross income for purposes of 
calculating child support. 
b.  Income from second job.  The divorce judgment provided 
that income from the father's job at the medical center "shall 
not be utilized to calculate any future support obligations, 
whether child support or alimony."  As noted supra, "[p]arents 
may not bargain away the rights of their children to support."  
White, 434 Mass. at 66.  Thus, to the extent that this provision 
sought to preclude the use of the father's income from the 
medical center in future calculations of child support, it is 
void.  As a result, not only was it within the judge's 
discretion to use such income in calculating child support, but 
it also likely would have been an abuse of discretion to exclude 
it where it falls squarely within the category of "salaries, 
wages, overtime and tips," and where the judge concluded that it 
was not being used to contribute to the educational costs of any 
of the children.22  Additionally, the father's argument that 
 
22 The judge applied the "material and substantial change in 
circumstances" standard to modify the child support order.  
Although the correct result was reached, we note that under 
G. L. c. 208, § 28, "when a complaint seeking modification of a 
child support order is filed, modification is presumptively 
required whenever there is an inconsistency between the amount 
of child support that is to be paid under the existing support 
order and the amount that would be paid under the guidelines."  
Morales v. Morales, 464 Mass. 507, 511 (2013).  As the 
modification is only presumptive, the judge properly could have 
considered the father's other financial contributions (or lack 
thereof) to support the children.  Where, as here, the child 
44 
 
  
there is no record support for the judge's calculation of his 
medical center income is without merit, where the record reveals 
that the judge used the income he received from the medical 
center the previous year. 
c.  Employer contributions to retirement accounts.  Whether 
employer contributions to a retirement account count as income 
for the purposes of calculating child support appears to be a 
question of first impression in the Commonwealth.  Contrary to 
the father's argument, it is not dispositive that employer 
contributions to retirement accounts are not included in the 
nonexhaustive list of income sources provided in the guidelines, 
nor is the fact that such contributions may not constitute 
currently taxable income, where the guidelines expressly include 
in the definition of "income" that which may not be "recognized 
by the Internal Revenue Code or reported to the Internal Revenue 
Service or state Department of Revenue or other taxing 
authority."  Child Support Guidelines § I(A).  As noted supra, 
it is "the public policy of the Commonwealth . . . that children 
be supported as completely as possible from parental resources."  
White, 434 Mass. at 66.  Accordingly, the Child Support 
 
support order was inconsistent with the guidelines, the relevant 
provision of the divorce judgment was void, and the judge 
concluded that the father was not making contributions above and 
beyond the amount of court-ordered child support, the 
presumption that a modification is required likely would not 
have been overcome. 
45 
 
  
Guidelines provide an "expansive definition of 'income.'"  
Fehrm-Cappuccino v. Cappuccino, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 525, 529 n.7 
(2016). 
Several other States previously have considered the issue.  
Caskey v. Caskey, 206 N.C. App. 710, 714-720 (2010) (collecting 
cases).  The decisions are not uniform, with some States 
concluding that employer contributions to a retirement account 
constitute income for purposes of calculating child support and 
others concluding that they do not.  Id.  We find persuasive the 
conclusion of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania23 that "if we 
were to determine that an employer's matching contributions are 
not income, it would be possible for an employee to enter into 
an agreement with his employer to take less wages in exchange 
for a heightened matching contribution.  This would effectively 
permit an employee to shield his income in an effort to reduce 
his child support obligation."  Portugal v. Portugal, 798 A.2d 
246, 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).  Permitting such shielding of 
resources would violate the public policy of the Commonwealth.  
We therefore conclude that employer contributions to a 
retirement account constitute income for the purposes of 
calculating child support.  The judge did not abuse her 
 
23 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania "is one of two 
statewide intermediate appellate courts."  The Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania, https://www.pacourts.us/courts/superior-court 
[https://perma.cc/Z8T6-GULC]. 
46 
 
  
discretion in using such contributions to calculate the father's 
gross income.24 
d.  Employer contributions to health savings account.  
Health savings accounts are governed by Federal law.  See 26 
U.S.C. § 223.  A beneficiary may generally withdraw funds from a 
health savings account at any time for any purpose.  See 26 
U.S.C. § 223(d), (f).  It is true that funds withdrawn and used 
to pay for "qualified medical expenses" are not taxed as part of 
 
24 The father's argument that the use of such contributions 
to calculate child support constitutes an impermissible 
divestment of assets accrued following the divorce is without 
merit.  In the first instance, the case to which the father 
cites, Kuban v. Kuban, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 387, 387-388 (1999), 
concerned the division of property between divorcing spouses.  
As part of that division, the wife was awarded "fifty percent of 
the husband's pension fund as of October 1, 1989 . . . , plus 
'passive appreciation and investment experience' through June 1, 
1996," which was after the date of divorce.  Id. at 388.  The 
court's conclusion was correct that, in the context of the 
division of marital assets, contributions made after the 
dissolution of the marriage and resulting appreciation in value 
of the fund "are most closely akin to 'property interest 
acquired after the dissolution of the marital partnership'" 
(citation omitted), id. at 389, but it has no bearing on this 
case.  First, as noted supra, child support is a distinct 
concept, and is governed by distinct rules, from spousal support 
or spousal property division.  An individual is generally not 
entitled to a portion of a former spouse's postdivorce assets.  
Id.  However, because children have a right to an amount of 
support that is based on a parent's current income, G. L. 
c. 208, § 28, a child support order is subject to increase where 
a parent's income increases postdivorce.  Brooks v. Piela, 61 
Mass. App. Ct. 731, 734, 737-738 (2004).  Second, to the extent 
Kuban, supra at 388, addressed "passive appreciation and 
investment experience," new contributions made either by a party 
or by a party's employer are active, rather than passive, and, 
at the time of contribution, constitute income rather than an 
asset, as wages and salary do. 
47 
 
  
an individual's gross income, whereas funds withdrawn and used 
for ineligible expenses are treated as taxable income of the 
beneficiary and are further subject to a twenty percent tax 
penalty.  26 U.S.C. § 223(f)(1), (4).  However, although the tax 
implications may differ depending on the purpose of the 
withdrawal, funds generally may be withdrawn by the beneficiary 
at any time and for any purpose.  Employer contributions to a 
health savings account, like employer contributions to a 
retirement account, properly are considered part of an 
employee's compensation package.  See Hoegen v. Hoegen, 89 Mass. 
App. Ct. 6, 10 (2016).  Thus, they properly constitute "income" 
for the purposes of calculating child support, and the judge did 
not abuse her discretion in counting them as such. 
6.  Retroactive relief.  The father argues that relief with 
respect to the reduction in child support ordered by the judge 
should date back to the middle son's emancipation on July 14, 
2020, and not to the date of the oldest son's graduation from 
college on May 22, 2021.  He also argues that there is no 
support in the record for the date actually chosen for the 
retroactive reduction, which was June 4, 2021.  The mother 
argues that the father was obligated to pay child support for 
two children at least through the oldest son's graduation from 
college. 
48 
 
  
"Whether to give retroactive effect to a modification order 
is a decision within the discretion of the judge."  Boulter-
Hedley v. Boulter, 429 Mass. 808, 809-810 (1999).  The judge 
indicated that she was ordering "retroactive relief with respect 
to the child support reduction back to the week following the 
date the parties' oldest child graduated from college, namely, 
the week including June 4, 2021."  It was the mother's 
undisputed testimony at trial that the oldest son graduated from 
college on May 22, 2021.  Thus, although the judge stated that 
she would order a retroactive reduction in child support to the 
week following the oldest son's graduation, the date chosen 
appears to be two weeks after the graduation, and we can find no 
support in the record for that choice of date.  We therefore 
conclude that it was an abuse of discretion.  If the new child 
support order is to be given retroactive effect relative to the 
date of the oldest son's emancipation, it should be retroactive 
to the week immediately following Saturday, May 22, 2021, the 
date when the oldest son graduated from college and became 
emancipated.25 
 
25 We note that it would be an abuse of discretion to award 
relief retroactive to the date of the middle son's emancipation 
on July 14, 2020, where the current order provides for support 
of only one child, and the father was obligated to provide 
support for two children through the oldest son's graduation 
from college in May 2021.  Where we conclude that the parties 
had three unemancipated children until July 14, 2020, and then 
two unemancipated children until May 22, 2021, presumably the 
49 
 
  
7.  Findings beyond the scope of the pretrial order.  The 
judge's final pretrial order identified the following issues to 
be resolved at trial:  (1) the party's responsibility for the 
costs of the youngest son's attendance at preparatory school, 
including the one in which he is currently enrolled; (2) whether 
the father's income from his second job should be used to 
calculate a child support order; (3) whether the parties' middle 
son is emancipated for child support purposes; (4) the amount of 
child support to be paid by the father for the support of any 
unemancipated marital children; (5) legal fees; and (6) alimony.  
Thus, all the issues to be decided at trial related to the 
finances of the parties; child custody and parenting time were 
not among the issues to be decided. 
Rule 16 of the Massachusetts Rules of Domestic Relations 
Procedure, addressing pretrial procedure, provides in relevant 
part: 
"The court shall make an order which recites the action 
taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the 
pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any 
of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for 
trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements 
of counsel; and such order when entered controls the 
subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the 
trial to prevent manifest injustice." 
 
 
judge may calculate child support for two children and 
retroactively impose that amount for the period between the 
weeks of July 14, 2020, and May 22, 2021.  However, the judge is 
not required to do so.  Whelan v. Whelan, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 616, 
627 (2009). 
50 
 
  
"[O]nce the issues are defined in a final pretrial order, 
'they ought to be adhered to in the absence of some good and 
sufficient reason.'"  Slade v. Slade, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 376, 378 
(1997), quoting Monod v. Futura, Inc., 415 F.2d 1170, 1173 (10th 
Cir. 1969).  "The trial judge may alter the issues, modify the 
admissions or discharge [a] stipulation if satisfied that 
justice requires it."  Mitchell v. Walton Lunch Co., 305 Mass. 
76, 80 (1939). 
The mother argues that the judge abused her discretion by 
exceeding the scope of the pretrial order in finding that she 
disrupted the youngest son's relationship with the father by 
informing the son that the father refused to pay for preparatory 
school.  She also contends that there is no record evidence to 
support the finding.  The father argues that this finding was 
relevant to determining the mother's credibility and that, thus, 
the judge did not abuse her discretion.  We agree with the 
mother.  As the mother argues, the issue was neither enumerated 
in the final pretrial order nor naturally related to any of the 
issues that were enumerated, all of which concerned support and 
not custody or parenting time, nor do we see its relevance to a 
credibility determination.  Therefore, there was no "good and 
sufficient reason" warranting a departure from the pretrial 
order, and the judge's finding as to this matter was an abuse of 
discretion. 
51 
 
  
Additionally, the only evidence introduced on this issue at 
trial directly on this point was that the mother did not tell 
the youngest son of the father's unwillingness to pay for 
preparatory school and that the father told the youngest son 
that he could not attend the preparatory school.  It was the 
mother's undisputed testimony that, when the youngest son 
informed her that the father had told the youngest son he could 
not go to the preparatory school, the mother's only response was 
to say, "I'm communicating with your father."  There also was 
evidence of several alternative means by which the youngest son 
could have learned of his father's unwillingness to pay, 
including several visits to the child's home by the sheriff 
related to the mother being held in contempt for enrolling the 
youngest son at the preparatory school and the fact that the 
youngest son had to do summer homework for both the Catholic 
school and the preparatory school because it was unclear to 
which school he would matriculate in the fall.  Thus, the 
judge's finding also appears to be clearly erroneous.26  See 
Adoption of Gregory, 434 Mass. 117, 128 (2001). 
 
26 We also note that, even had the mother informed the 
youngest son of the father's decision, it is unlikely that such 
act would rise to the level of alienation or disruption of the 
youngest son's relationship with his father, where the father 
conceded at trial that he has categorically refused to 
contribute to the youngest son's educational costs for seventh 
and eighth grades and where he does not think the youngest son 
should attend -- at least for seventh and eighth grades, and 
52 
 
  
Although the finding does not appear to be relevant to any 
of the issues decided in this case, it is foreseeable that it 
may have an impact on any future dispute over child custody or 
parenting time, and we thus conclude that the finding should be 
vacated. 
8.  Spousal disqualification.  General Laws c. 233, § 20, 
First, provides in relevant part that "[e]xcept in a proceeding 
arising out of or involving a contract made by a married woman 
with her husband, . . . neither husband nor wife shall testify 
as to private conversations with the other."27  The mother argues 
that the spousal disqualification rule28 set forth in G. L. 
 
possibly longer -- the preparatory school attended by the two 
older sons.  Although the father may be entitled not to have his 
relationship with his children negatively affected by the 
mother's actions, he is not entitled to avoid or be shielded by 
the mother from the negative consequences of his own actions. 
 
27 The spousal disqualification also does not apply to 
paternity or child support proceedings under the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act, G. L. c. 209D, or in proceedings 
under G. L. c. 209C, which address the care and support of 
nonmarital children.  G. L. c. 233, § 20, First.  G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 16 (c).  There does not appear to be an analogous exception 
for child support proceedings relative to in-State married (or 
previously married) parties.  Although it was not raised by the 
parties, we question whether this framework may implicate equal 
protection principles, and we invite future litigants to present 
the issue when the opportunity arises. 
 
28 The mother's analysis tended to conflate spousal 
disqualification with spousal privilege.  "The spousal privilege 
is different from the rule of spousal disqualification . . . ."  
Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 Mass. 858, 859 n.3 (2010), cert. 
denied, 562 U.S. 1230 (2011).  Compare G. L. c. 233, § 20, First 
(spousal disqualification), with G. L. c. 233, § 20, Second 
53 
 
  
c. 233, § 20, does not apply where the dispute surrounds the 
parties' separation agreement, which is a contract.  
Alternatively, the mother argues that, if the spousal 
disqualification does apply as a general rule, it nevertheless 
does not attach to communications between the parties during the 
marriage that were not private.  The father argues that the 
court properly excluded the mother's testimony as to private 
conversations between the parties during the marriage.29  In 
light of our conclusions supra, as to the import of the 
 
(spousal privilege).  Only the disqualification is implicated 
here. 
 
29 The father also urges that the mother failed to preserve 
for appeal any objection to such exclusion.  We disagree.  
"Ordinarily, an offer of proof is required to preserve the right 
to appellate review of the denial of an offer to introduce 
evidence through the direct examination of a witness."  
Commonwealth v. Chase, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 578, 581 (1988).  Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 43 (c), 365 Mass. 806 (1974).  However, an offer of 
proof is not necessary where "there [is] no doubt what testimony 
would be given."  Commonwealth v. Caldron, 383 Mass. 86, 89 n.2 
(1981). 
 
Having reviewed the entirety of the trial transcript, we 
conclude that, as to the mother's proffered testimony about 
marital communications between the parties, the mother made 
sufficient offers of proof or the expected testimony was 
sufficiently obvious to preserve her right to appeal from the 
exclusion of such testimony.  The mother made multiple attempts 
to testify as to conversations with the father, including about 
the youngest son's schooling.  The mother's counsel also sought 
clarification from the court on the application of the 
disqualification.  Finally, the mother's counsel attempted to 
make an offer of proof as to conversations between the parties 
concerning a purported agreement about their respective 
responsibilities throughout the marriage whereby the father 
generated nearly all of the marital income. 
54 
 
  
provision of the separation agreement addressing the youngest 
son's schooling and as to the middle son's emancipation, either 
that were resolved in the mother's favor or for which party 
statements would not be dispositive, we need not address whether 
the judge abused her discretion in excluding specific statements 
of the father on the basis of spousal disqualification.  Because 
the issue will be relevant to the scope of evidence admissible 
on remand, however, we address whether the spousal 
disqualification applies here.  The interpretation of G. L. 
c. 233, § 20, is a question of law that we review de novo.  
Boss, 484 Mass. at 556.  See part 2, supra, for a discussion of 
the rules of statutory construction. 
As a general matter, we note that the spousal 
disqualification is not triggered unless the proffered 
statements were made during a private conversation between two 
people who were married to each other at the time the 
conversation took place.  G. L. c. 233, § 20, First.  Thus, the 
following discussion is only relevant to the extent that either 
party, on remand, seeks to introduce evidence relating to such 
private conversations. 
As discussed supra, the parties' separation agreement was 
merged into the judgment of divorce.  "[T]he merger of [a 
separation] agreement in a [divorce] judgment is a substitution 
of the rights and duties under the agreement for those 
55 
 
  
established by the judgment or decree."30  Bercume, 428 Mass. at 
641.  The provisions of the separation agreement do not survive, 
and the separation agreement loses all independent legal 
significance.  Id.  Heistand v. Heistand, 384 Mass. 20, 22 
(1981).  No action for breach of the separation agreement may be 
maintained.  Halpern, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 338-339.  However, 
acknowledging that a separation agreement that has been 
incorporated and merged into a judgment of divorce provides the 
content of the judgment, we concluded supra that contract 
principles apply to the interpretation of the judgment.  As 
noted in note 4, supra, we previously have stated that, even 
where a separation agreement merges with a judgment of divorce, 
a judge should "take heed of the parties'" negotiations when 
determining whether a modification of the judgment is warranted.  
See Chin, 470 Mass. at 535, quoting Pierce, 455 Mass. at 302.  
Thus, although no separate action may be maintained on a 
separation agreement that has merged with the judgment of 
divorce, it is not clear to us that an action, such as this, 
arising out of a divorce judgment that incorporated and merged 
the provisions of a separation agreement, does not in some 
capacity "involve" a contract made by spouses. 
 
30 "The general rule is that unless the parties intend 
otherwise, a separation agreement survives a judgment of divorce 
that incorporates the agreement by reference."  McManus v. 
McManus, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 864, 865 (2015). 
56 
 
  
Additionally, as we have previously observed, G. L. c. 233, 
§ 20, begins with the following statement:  "Any person of 
sufficient understanding, although a party, may testify in any 
proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before a person who 
has authority to receive evidence, except as follows . . . ."  
See Commonwealth v. Burnham, 451 Mass. 517, 520-521 (2008), 
quoting G. L. c. 233, § 20.  Thus, "[t]he general principle 
articulated at the beginning of § 20 is that any person may 
testify in any proceeding," and the spousal disqualification is 
itself an exception to this general principle.  Burnham, supra 
at 521.  We understand this language to evince a legislative 
intent to read broadly the exceptions to the spousal 
disqualification or, said differently, to interpret the spousal 
disqualification narrowly.  See Woods v. Executive Office of 
Communities & Dev., 411 Mass. 599, 605 (1992) ("where a 
provision, general in its language and objects, is followed by a 
proviso, . . . the proviso is to be strictly construed, as 
taking no case out of the provision that does not fairly fall 
within the terms of the proviso, the latter being understood as 
carving out of the provision only specified exception, within 
the words as well as within the reason of the former" [citation 
omitted]). 
Therefore, where we understand the current action to 
involve a contract made by the parties, such action falls within 
57 
 
  
the contract exception to the spousal disqualification such 
that, on remand, both parties shall be permitted to testify 
about private marital communications concerning the relevant 
provision of the separation agreement, as incorporated and 
merged into the judgment of divorce. 
Conclusion.  We affirm so much of the judgment as concerns 
the emancipation of the oldest and middle sons and the payment 
of each party's legal fees and costs.  The remainder of the 
judgment is vacated and remanded as follows: 
We vacate so much of the judgment as concerns (1) the 
denial of alimony; (2) the father's lack of obligation to 
contribute to the costs of the youngest son's attendance at the 
private preparatory school; (3) the exclusion from the 
calculation of the father's income any interest, dividends, and 
capital gains not related to real or personal property 
transactions, and any calculation of child support based on such 
erroneous exclusion; and (4) the calculation of the 
retroactivity of the child support reduction.  We vacate so much 
of the judge's rationale finding that the mother informed the 
youngest son that the father was unwilling to pay for the 
youngest son's education at the preparatory school, that the 
mother's actions have disrupted the youngest son's relationship 
with the father, and that the mother violated a clear and 
58 
 
  
unequivocal command when she enrolled the youngest son at the 
disputed preparatory school. 
On remand, the judge shall determine whether an alimony 
award is appropriate and, if so, in what form and amount, 
pursuant to the interpretation and procedure set forth in this 
opinion.  The judge shall also hold a new hearing to determine 
(1) whether the parties, at some point after the divorce but 
prior to the father's recent expressed disagreement, agreed that 
the youngest son would attend the same preparatory school as the 
two older sons; and (2) whether the father failed to engage in 
good faith efforts to agree to a preparatory school.  If the 
answer to either (1) or (2) is "yes," consistent with the legal 
conclusions in part 3 of this opinion, supra, the judge shall 
order that the father contribute up to $20,000 per year to the 
cost of the youngest son's attendance for grades seven through 
twelve at the preparatory school previously attended by the two 
older sons. 
A new child support order shall issue based on a 
recalculation of the amount pursuant to the 2021 Child Support 
Guidelines31 after any interest, dividends, and capital gains not 
 
31 A calculation pursuant to the 2018 Child Support 
Guidelines would likely result in an award that is inconsistent 
with the current guidelines and itself would be grounds for 
modification of the order.  G. L. c. 208, § 28 ("upon a 
complaint filed after a judgment of divorce, orders of 
maintenance and for support of minor children shall be modified 
59 
 
  
related to real or personal property transactions have been 
added to the calculation of the father's gross income.  To the 
extent the new calculation may result in an order for child 
support in an amount less than $800 per week, the judge shall 
reconsider the date of retroactive relief consistent with part 6 
of this opinion, supra.  Until a new child support order is 
issued, the existing child support provision in the judgment of 
modification dated July 14, 2021, shall remain in effect as a 
temporary order. 
So ordered. 
 
if there is an inconsistency between the amount of the existing 
order and the amount that would result from application of the 
child support guidelines").