Case Title: Crossan v. Travelers Insurance Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 163-2015

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2015-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CHARLES J. CROSSAN, §
§ No. 163, 2015
Plaintiff Below- §
Appellant, § — Court Below: Superior Court
§ ofthe State of Delaware in and
v. § for New Castle County
§
TRAVELERS INSURANCE § — C.A.No. NI3C-06-258
COMPANY, §
§
Defendant Below- §
Appellee. §

Submitted: October 28, 2015
Decided: November 17, 2015

Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER

On this 17* day of November 2015, it appears to the Court that:

(1)Plaintiff-Below/Appellant Charles J. Crossan appeals from a Superior Court
Order dismissing his Declaratory Judgment Complaint against Travelers Insurance
Company. The case arises from a personal injury Crossan sustained while
constructing a garage. In a prior proceeding before the Industrial Accident Board
(“IAB”), the Board found that Crossan was an employee when injured and was
entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. The Travelers policy involved in the
Declaratory Judgment action from which this appeal is taken is a homeowners policy

covering the property upon which the garage is located. Crossan raises one claim on
appeal, which has two parts. He contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed
his complaint because: (1) workers’ compensation exclusions found in the Travelers
homeowners insurance policy are ambiguous and inapplicable; and (2) the doctrine
of collateral estoppel is inapplicable to the IAB’s factual determination that Crossan
was an employee at the time he was injured. We find no merit to Crossan’s appeal
and affirm.

(2) On May 23, 2010, Crossan was constructing a garage on Anthony
‘Chambers’ property. While Crossan walked across a plank that was used on the
scaffolding, the plank failed. He fell approximately seven feet to the ground resulting
in an injury to his right ankle.

(3) On March 4, 2011, Crossan filed a petition with the IAB against Apex
Contracting (“Apex”), a sole proprietorship owned by Chambers, to determine what
‘compensation was due for the injuries he sustained. At the IAB hearing, he testified
that he quit a full-time job with another company to start working for Apex. He
stated that his primary job with Apex was to construct Chambers’ garage, but he also
completed other jobs at Chambers’ direction. Crossan testified that he worked six to
seven days a week, and was paid $15 per hour.

(4)In contradiction, Chambers testified that Crossan and others worked on his

garage for free. Chambers stated that Apex had no employees, only accepted jobs he
could do by himself, and that he used subcontractors on a limited basis. Additionally,
his wife, Melissa Chambers, testified that Apex did nothave a workers’ compensation
insurance policy. The IAB concluded that Crossan was, in fact, an employee of
‘Apex. Further, the IAB determined that his injury was work related, and that Crossan
‘was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits from Apex.

(5) On January 2, 2012, Crossan filed suit against the Chambers alleging that
his injuries were caused by negligence on their part and that they were strictly liable
for his injury due to their failure to have workers’ compensation insurance. The
‘Chambers owned a homeowners policy through Travelers at the time of the injury,
but Travelers refused coverage for Crossan’s claim because the policy excluded
coverage where the injured person was eligible to receive benefits under workers’
compensation law.

(6) On April 25, 2013, the Chambers assigned their interest in their Travelers
homeowners policy to Crossan. The Crossan v. Chambers' action was stayed while
Crossan pursued this declaratory judgment action against Travelers. Crossan
contended in the Travelers declaratory judgment action that the exclusions relied
upon by Travelers in its denial of coverage were inapplicable, ambiguous and/or

against public policy. In addition, Crossan argued that the IAB’s determination as to

" Crossan v. Chambers, C.A. No, N12C-01-002, at 1-2 (Del. Super. Sept. 13,2013) (ORDER).
3
the status of his employment at the time of the injury did not preclude him, under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, from asserting contrary factual allegations in the
Chambers case, i., that he was not an employee at the time of his injury.

(7) Based upon the evidence presented, the trial court ruled that the relevant
policy language was clear and unambiguous, and given the IAB ruling that Crossan’s
injuries were compensable under workers’ compensation law, the Travelers workers’
compensation exclusions applied. This appeal followed.

(8)“We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo." “We also
exercise de novo review of the conclusions of law made in interpreting insurance
ccontracts.”> “[W]hen the language of an insurance contract is clear and unequivocal,
a party will be bound by its plain meaning because creating an ambiguity where none

exists could, in effect, create anew contract with rights,

 

ities and duties to which
the parties had not assented.”

(9) “Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, if @ court has decided an issue
of fact necessary to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the issue in
‘a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case."* “Collateral

‘estoppel extends not only to issues decided by courts, but also to issues decided by

 

2 Pac. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut, In. Co., 956 A.2d 1246, 1254 (Del. 2008).

"Md

* Rhone Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co.,616 A.2d 1192, 1195-96 (Del. 1992).
* Messick w. Siar Emer., 655 A.24 1209, 1211 (Del. 1995).

4
administrative agencies acting in a judicial capacity where the parties had an
‘opportunity to litigate.”

(10) Crossan’s claim is unavailing. First, the homeowners policy is
unambiguous. The policy clearly states that personal liability and medical payments
do not apply to bodily injury when the injured person is eligible to receive benefits
under any workers’ compensation law. The plain meaning of the policy language is
not susceptible to another reasonable interpretation.

(11) Second, Crossan’s assertion that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does
not apply to this matter lacks merit. Crossan testified at the [AB hearing that he
‘worked full-time for Apex. The IAB concluded that he was an Apex employee
despite Chambers’ assertion that he was not. The IAB determined that Crossan was
an employee, which is exactly what Crossan sought while in front of the IAB. The
trial court was correct when it found that Crossan was collaterally estopped from
relitigating whether or not he was an employee.

(12) Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that the unambiguous
language of the Travelers policy excluded Crossan’s injuries because he was eligible

to recover under the workers’ compensation law as an employee of Apex.

7
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:

lily

stice