Case Title: State ex rel. R.E.H. Co. v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1997-Ohio-382

Docket Number: 19942503

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-08-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
The STATE EX REL. R.E.H. COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. R.E.H. Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 352.] 
Workers’ compensation — Violation of a specific safety requirement — Shake-out 
machine which separates scraps of metal from sand not in compliance with 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-05(D)(1), when. 
(No. 94-2503 — Submitted May 20, 1997 — Decided August 6, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 93APD09-1339. 
 
In late 1988, appellee-claimant, Melvin K. Calhoun, was employed as a 
laborer for appellant R.E.H. Company.  One of his duties involved operating a 
shake-out machine which separated scraps of metal from sand.  The task required 
claimant to shovel a sand mixture onto the machine’s bed.  Once the machine 
started, sand and metal would be separated by a filtering screen, with the sand 
being vacuumed through a chute that deposited it in a pile adjacent to the machine. 
At the bottom of the twelve- to thirteen-inch chute was a blade, the function of 
which is not mentioned in the record. 
 
There were three ways to stop the machine.  On/off buttons were located on 
the machine approximately nine inches from the chute.  The operator could also 
unplug the machine from a wall outlet located nine to ten feet from the machine.  
Further, the machine could be disengaged by use of an on/off switch located at the 
wall receptacle.  R.E.H. also suggests that the power cord could be directly 
disconnected from the machine, but this cannot be verified from the record. 
 
At some point, claimant allegedly began to have problems with the on/off 
buttons on the machine.  As he stated in his affidavit: 
 
“Every day for approximately 2 months prior to the accident, I had been 
having trouble with the start button for the machine.  Most of the time it would not 
 
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start when pushed by finger.  I would have to use a pipe (metal bar) to hit and push 
the button in to get it to start.  It appeared to have a short in the electrical system 
because sometimes it would start, sometimes it wouldn’t start and on at least one 
occasion it started up on its own.  About a week before the accident occurred I 
informed the maintenance man of the problem.  He looked at the machine but 
could not immediately find the problem and he stated ‘the machine is just old, try 
to make do with it and I’ll look at it later.’ ” 
 
Claimant was performing his regular duties on December 19, 1988 when the 
machine, part way through its cycle, unexpectedly stopped.  What followed is best 
described in claimant’s own words: 
“At the time the accident occurred[,] the machine suddenly stopped.  I didn’t 
know whether it had jammed up or just quit running.  I pushed the off button.  I 
had my right hand resting on top of the chute while looking at the machine and 
down the chute while trying to determine what the problem was.  Suddenly, the 
machine jerked and started up on its own.  My right hand was jerked around and 
accidentally entered the chute.  That I was wearing work gloves — cuff type.  That 
I am not sure whether my glove was caught and forced my hand in or not.  My 
hand made contact with the blade of the machine at the bottom of the chute, 
resulting in the injury of record.  After I was caught in the machine for a couple of 
seconds, the machine suddenly stopped and I was able to jerk my hand free.  At 
the time I was caught by the blade I was approximately 1 1/2 feet away from the 
off & on buttons.  However, I would not have been able to reach them anyway 
because I would have had to reach across the front of my body with my left hand.” 
 
Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio allowed claimant’s workers’ 
compensation claim for “post-traumatic stress disorder, interior subluxation at 
right shoulder, traumatic arthritis at right shoulder and rotator cuff, tear of right 
 
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shoulder, amputation right middle finger, amputation right index finger[,] right 
shoulder.”  Claimant then filed for additional compensation, alleging that his 
employer had violated several specific safety requirements (“VSSR”).  A 
commission staff hearing officer, on June 22, 1992, made the following award: 
“* * * [T]he claimant’s injury was the result of the employer’s failure to 
supply means within easy reach to disengage the machine from its power supply as 
required by OAC 4121:1-5-05(D)(1), the Code of Specific Requirements of the 
Industrial Commission relating to ‘All Workshops and Factories.’ 
“* * *  
“Employer has raised several defenses, in regard to the alleged violation of 
OAC 4121:1-5-05(D)(1).  The defenses may be summarized on three points: 
“First, it is alleged [that] the employer did comply with the requirement in 
two ways:  the electrical plug and the on-off switch.  An electrical plug 9 to 10 feet 
from the spot claimant was working when injured is expressly held to be not 
within easy reach of the operator.  Based on the affidavit of claimant, it is found 
the on-off switch did not work reliably and that this inadequacy had been made 
known to the employer.  Consequently, the defective on-off switch is held not to 
be a means to disengage the machine from its power supply. 
“Second, employer argues [that] there is no proximate causal relationship 
between the violation and the injury for the reason [that] claimant’s injury 
happened so quickly that his ability to turn the machine off after it re-started 
would be irrelevant.  This argument assumes [that] the sole required function of a 
means to disengage from power is extraction from danger after it has commenced.  
Based on the affidavit of claimant, it is found [that] claimant did attempt to 
disengage the machine by hitting the off button before placing his hand into the 
machine.  The ability of an employee to render a machine safely inoperative before 
 
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putting himself into an area of danger is expressly found to be a function of the 
requirement that an employer supply a means to disengage.  Claimant’s inability to 
protect himself prior to reaching into the danger zone is thus a proximate cause of 
his injury. 
“Third, employer argues as a matter of credibility [that] the likeliest 
explanation of claimant’s injury is that the machine became stuck, claimant 
reached into it without shutting it off and ‘unstuck it.’  Assuming (as it was not 
shown) [that] the machine would re-start if a[n] obstruction were removed, 
claimant’s statements are found more credible primarily because [they were] given 
immediately after the incident, prior to obtaining counsel and most likely in 
ignorance of the legal implications.” 
 
R.E.H.’s request for a rehearing was denied: 
“The new evidence, the affidavit of Mr. Newman, was considered at this 
hearing.  His affidavit is found to be primarily cumulative evidence.  However, he 
does state [that] the power for the machine in question could also have been turned 
off by an on/off switch located on the wall about 9 feet from the machine.  This 
then is similar to the electrical plug previously considered and is not found to meet 
the requirements of the code for the same reason stated in the June 22, 1992 order 
in regards to the electrical plug.  In all other regards the order of June 22, 1992 is 
found [to be] correct and its findings and ruling are the findings and rulings of this 
order.  For the reasons stated in the June 22, 1992 order a violation of [Ohio 
Adm.Code] 4121:1-5-05(D)(1) is found.” 
 
R.E.H. filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin 
County, asserting that the commission abused its discretion in finding a VSSR.  
The court of appeals found that the order was backed by “some evidence” and 
denied the writ. 
 
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This cause is now before this court on appeal as of right. 
___________________ 
 
Kondritzer, Gold, Frank & Crowley Co., L.P.A., and Lane N. Cohen, for 
appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Yolanda L. Barnes, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellees Industrial Commission of Ohio and Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation. 
 
E. S. Gallon & Associates and Richard M. Malone, for appellee claimant. 
___________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  At issue is a single specific safety requirement.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-5-05 provides: 
“(D)  Machinery control. 
“(1)  Disengaging from power supply. 
“Means shall be provided at each machine, within easy reach of the 
operator, for disengaging it from its power supply. * * *” 
 
The commission, in assessing a violation, made several findings.  It found 
that the on/off switch on the machine was not an effective means of 
disengagement and had a known history of malfunction.  It further found that the 
two remaining means of shutoff — the wall plug and the on/off switch at the wall 
receptacle — were not within claimant’s easy reach.  For the reasons to follow, we 
affirm the court of appeals’ judgment. 
 
R.E.H. appears to argue that the switch malfunction is irrelevant since the 
other methods of disengagement were available.  That these two other means were 
nine to ten feet from claimant at the time that his hand was caught is also 
irrelevant according to R.E.H.  R.E.H. argues that once the machine was started, 
claimant was free to move about the room.  Therefore, claimant could have chosen 
 
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to stand within easy reach of the wall plug and on/off switch at the wall.  Because 
claimant chose not to position himself near these devices, R.E.H. contends that it 
cannot be held liable. 
 
R.E.H.’s logic is convoluted.  At its most abstract, R.E.H.’s position negates 
the need for any safety device.  If the claimant was required to be nine to ten feet 
from the machine while moving about the room, as R.E.H. advocates, there would 
be no hazard against which to protect.  It is self-evident that, generally, a claimant 
cannot be injured by a machine if he is not in contact with it.  More specifically, at 
the time the machine unexpectedly stopped, claimant had no choice but to be at the 
point of injury.  Claimant could not have effectively determined the cause of the 
machine’s stoppage from nine or ten feet away. 
 
The employer’s argument also implies that claimant was negligent in not 
unplugging the machine or using the on/off switch at the wall before inserting his 
hand into the chute.  This negligence, R.E.H. claims, bars a VSSR.  This argument 
is unpersuasive.  First, claimant should not be deemed negligent for failing to 
unplug the machine or use the wall on/off switch.  Claimant had already activated 
the stop button on the machine and assumed that the power was off. 
 
Second, employee negligence, where it exists, does not necessarily foreclose 
a VSSR.  A claimant’s actions bar a VSSR only where the claimant deliberately 
renders an otherwise complying device noncompliant.  State ex rel. Frank Brown 
& Sons, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 162, 524 N.E.2d 482.  In this 
case, the machine, at the point of injury, was not in compliance with the specific 
safety requirement at issue.  Claimant’s actions here are, therefore, immaterial. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ is hereby affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.