Case Title: Commonwealth v. Barillas

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12720

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12720 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TOMAS BARILLAS. 
 
 
 
Essex.     November 4, 2019. - March 6, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Cellular Telephone.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure.  
Search and Seizure, Search incident to lawful arrest, 
Inventory. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 4, 2017. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by James 
F. Lang, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal 
was allowed by Gaziano, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him. 
 
 
 
Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Matthew Spurlock, Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(Denise Regan, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also 
present) for the defendant. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Tomas Barillas, was arrested on 
outstanding warrants after police received a tip connecting him 
2 
 
 
to the murder of Jason Arias.  After conducting a patfrisk, 
police seized a cell phone from the pocket of the defendant's 
shorts.  At the Lynn police station, police learned that the 
cell phone belonged to the defendant's thirteen year old 
brother, James,1 who eventually consented to a search of the 
device.  Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress all 
evidence derived from the warrantless seizure and search of the 
cell phone under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  After an evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court 
judge allowed the defendant's motion on the grounds that the 
seized cell phone was not handled properly pursuant to a valid 
written inventory policy and that the police had conducted an 
investigatory search of the seized cell phone.  A single justice 
of this court granted the Commonwealth's application for leave 
to pursue an interlocutory appeal and ordered that the appeal be 
entered in this court.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as 
appearing in 474 Mass. 1501 (2016).  We affirm the motion 
judge's order allowing the motion to suppress. 
 
Background.  We summarize the judge's extensive factual 
findings and "supplement[], as relevant, with uncontroverted 
testimony implicitly or explicitly credited by the judge, in 
                     
 
1 A pseudonym. 
3 
 
 
support of his findings, after evidentiary hearings."  
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 482 Mass. 850, 852 (2019). 
 
On March 24, 2017, shortly after midnight, State police 
Trooper Matthew Wilson, a homicide investigator with the 
district attorney's office, was dispatched to investigate a 
fatal stabbing in Lynn.  Wilson worked in conjunction with a 
Lynn police detective, Lieutenant Thomas Reddy.  During the 
course of the investigation, Reddy and Wilson learned that the 
defendant had outstanding warrants in connection with three 
different criminal cases for larceny and drug offenses.  They 
located the defendant at his mother's two-family home. 
 
When the police arrived, the defendant's father, Eduardo, 
was outside.  He told the police that he had been trying to get 
the defendant or James to open the door.  The police also 
attempted to convince the defendant or James to answer the door.  
Eventually, James spoke to his father on the telephone and told 
his father that he wanted to come out but that the defendant 
would not let him.  The officers convinced James to come 
outside.  Once James was out of the home, the police entered and 
searched for the defendant.  Wilson found the defendant hiding 
under a tarp in a common basement. 
During the arrest, Wilson conducted a patfrisk of the 
defendant, seized a cell phone from the defendant's pocket, and 
transferred it to his own pocket.  Following the arrest, the 
4 
 
 
defendant was transported to the Lynn police station, where he 
was booked by Lynn police officers.  Eduardo agreed that he and 
James would come to the police station to be interviewed.  
Eduardo had his car there, so one of the officers asked him if 
he wanted to meet them at the station.  Eduardo hesitated, so 
the officers offered to transport Eduardo and James to the 
station. 
 
After arriving at the station, James and his father waited 
for about twenty minutes before Wilson and Reddy joined them in 
a large room used by the Lynn police detectives.  Wilson still 
had the seized cell phone in his pocket.  He had not 
relinquished the cell phone to the booking officer, nor had he 
filled out a State police custodial property inventory form. 
Wilson testified that the first question he asked James was 
whether he had a cell phone.  James replied that Wilson had his 
cell phone.  Confused by this remark, Wilson told James that he 
only had one cell phone and that he had taken it from the 
defendant.  Wilson took the cell phone out of his pocket and 
showed it to James.  James said, "That's my cell phone."  To 
test the veracity of this claim, Wilson asked him for the code 
to open the cell phone, and James provided it.  The code worked 
to unlock the device. 
 
Once an interview room was prepared to audio-visually 
record the interview, Wilson resumed questioning James about the 
5 
 
 
cell phone.  Eduardo remained with his son during the interview.  
Wilson asked James about a crack on the device, and James 
explained that one crack resulted from the telephone falling off 
a bunk bed and that the defendant had caused a second crack in 
the cell phone.  In response to further questions about the cell 
phone, James stated that he had received the cell phone about 
one year earlier, when it was new.  James provided the cell 
phone number.  He also identified the cell phone service 
provider and explained that his mother pays the telephone bills 
and that the defendant used the cell phone "very often" but not 
as often as he did.  Eduardo said that the defendant used 
James's cell phone "all the time." 
 
Wilson then presented a voluntary consent to search form 
from the Lynn police department.  James and Eduardo signed the 
form.  Another officer immediately conducted a "hand search" of 
the device, and within minutes discovered a video recording of 
the defendant talking about the crime.  A later forensic search 
revealed evidence of calls and text messages between the victim 
and the defendant on the night of the stabbing.  The police 
extracted the material and returned the device two days later to 
James's mother. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained from the cell phone.  The defendant's original 
motion challenged Wilson's search of the cell phone on the 
6 
 
 
grounds that the police did not have probable cause to search 
the cell phone and that no valid exception to the warrant 
requirement applied.  The motion also challenged James's consent 
to the search of the cell phone.  The Commonwealth did not 
dispute that it did not have probable cause to seize and search 
the cell phone. 
 
After two days of hearing, which were separated by one 
month and which focused primarily on James's consent to search 
the cell phone, the defendant filed an amended motion to 
suppress.  In the amended motion the defendant argued that the 
cell phone had not only been unlawfully searched, but that it 
had also been unlawfully seized.  The judge accepted the amended 
motion and conducted a third day of hearing.  The Commonwealth 
recalled Wilson.  The hearing focused on Wilson's seizure of the 
cell phone, and the Commonwealth submitted the State police 
inventory form without objection. 
 
The judge allowed the motion to suppress after concluding 
that Wilson had not seized the cell phone pursuant to a written 
inventory policy and that the police had made investigative use 
of the cell phone before obtaining consent to search it. 
The Commonwealth argues on appeal that the cell phone was 
properly seized during a search incident to arrest or pursuant 
to a valid inventory policy.  The Commonwealth also argues that 
James's assertion that the cell phone belonged to him 
7 
 
 
independently justified the officer's subsequent actions, 
including verifying his ownership of the cell phone and 
subsequent consent.  "In reviewing a decision on a motion to 
suppress, 'we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
absent clear error "but conduct an independent review of [the] 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law."'"  Commonwealth v. 
Ramos, 470 Mass. 740, 742 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Colon, 
449 Mass. 207, 214, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079 (2007).  The 
judge's ultimate findings and legal conclusions are subject to 
de novo review.  See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 403, 405 
(1999). 
 
The judge concluded that "it is clear for a number of 
reasons that Trooper Wilson did not seize the phone pursuant to 
the State Police written policy governing inventory seizures and 
searches of arrestees' property."  He found that the Lynn police 
policy applied but that even if the State police inventory 
policy had governed, Wilson had not adhered to it.  
Additionally, he concluded that Wilson made impermissible 
investigative use of the cell phone and, as a result, any 
evidence obtained from the later consensual search must be 
suppressed. 
 
1.  Search incident to arrest.  On appeal, the Commonwealth 
argues that Wilson seized the defendant's cell phone as a 
potential weapon during a search incident to arrest.  The 
8 
 
 
defendant notes, and we agree, that during the motion hearing 
the Commonwealth only "gestured briefly" toward the search 
incident to arrest doctrine, focusing instead on the inventory 
search exception.  Whether the Commonwealth adequately raised 
this argument is not dispositive of the motion in the 
circumstances of this case.  Whether the cell phone was seized 
under the search incident to arrest exception or whether it was 
seized pursuant to an inventory exception, the result is the 
same:  the seizure of the cell phone was proper but the search 
of the cell phone was not. 
 
Nevertheless, as law enforcement officers frequently 
encounter this situation, we take this opportunity to review the 
constraints of the search incident to arrest exception as 
applied to cell phones.  See G. L. c. 276, § 1.  "A search 
incident to a custodial arrest is well established as an 
exception to the warrant requirement under both the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14."  Commonwealth v. Mauricio, 477 Mass. 
588, 592 (2017).  "Under both Fourth Amendment and art. 14 
jurisprudence, the purpose of the search incident to arrest 
exception is twofold:  (1) to prevent the destruction or 
concealing of evidence of the crime for which the police have 
probable cause to arrest; and (2) to strip the arrestee of 
weapons that could be used to resist arrest or facilitate 
escape."  Id.  General Laws c. 276, § 1, specifically limits a 
9 
 
 
search incident to a lawful arrest to two types of property:  
"fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and other evidence of the 
crime for which the arrest has been made, . . . [and] weapons 
that the arrestee might use to resist arrest or effect his 
escape." 
 
As such, under the first exception set forth in the 
statute, if a police officer has reason to believe that a cell 
phone found on an arrestee might contain evidence of the crime 
of arrest, the officer may seize that cell phone and secure it 
until a valid search warrant is obtained.2  See Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) ("Our answer to the 
question of what police must do before searching a cell phone 
seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple -- get a 
warrant").  Here, where the arrest was based on outstanding 
warrants for larceny and drug offenses and not murder, the 
Commonwealth does not contend that there was reason to believe 
that the cell phone contained evidence of the offenses 
underlying the outstanding warrants. 
 
The Commonwealth focuses instead on the second property 
exception under G. L. c. 276, § 1, and argues that the cell 
phone was seized as a weapon.  Arguably, any hard object left in 
                     
 
2 In the circumstances of this case, we are not presented 
with the question whether any other exception to the warrant 
requirement applies, such as exigency. 
10 
 
 
the possession of a suspect who is being arrested and 
transported may be used as a weapon, and it is not unreasonable 
to remove the item from the person.  In Riley, 573 U.S. at 385, 
the United States Supreme Court considered "how the search 
incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones."  In 
reviewing the doctrine, the Court noted that "searches of a 
person incident to arrest, 'while based upon the need to disarm 
and to discover evidence,' are reasonable regardless of 'the 
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or 
evidence would in fact be found.'"  Id. at 386, quoting United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).  The Court 
recognized that "unknown physical objects may always pose risks, 
no matter how slight, during the tense atmosphere of a custodial 
arrest."  Riley, supra at 387.  However, "[o]nce an officer has 
secured a phone and eliminated any potential physical threats, 
. . . data on the phone can endanger no one," and accordingly, 
the Court limited the search of a cell phone as a weapon to an 
"examin[ation of] the physical aspects of a phone . . . say, to 
determine whether there is a razor blade hidden between the 
phone and its case."  Id.  Similarly, we held "that digital 
cameras may be seized incident to arrest, but . . . the search 
of data contained in digital cameras falls outside the scope of 
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement."  Mauricio, 477 Mass. at 594. 
11 
 
 
Thus, it was permissible to seize the cell phone as part of 
a search incident to custodial arrest.  See Commonwealth v. 
Alvarez, 480 Mass. 1017, 1018 (2018) (cell phone seized during 
valid search incident to arrest).3  The search of the content of 
the cell phone, whether seized as evidence or as a potential 
weapon or means of escape, presents a different question.  See 
Riley, 573 U.S. at 387 ("Digital data stored on a cell phone 
cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer 
or to effectuate the arrestee's escape"). 
 
2.  Inventory search.  The Commonwealth argues that 
Wilson's seizure of the cell phone was warranted under the State 
police inventory policy.  The defendant argues that the State 
police inventory policy cannot govern the inventory search of an 
arrestee in the custody of the Lynn police.  It appears that the 
significance of the dispute over which policy governs is rooted 
in the fact that the State police inventory policy authorizes 
the search and removal of any property from the clothing or 
                     
 
3 In some circumstances, where the cell phone may contain 
evidence of the crime for which the suspect is arrested, seizure 
of the cell phone may be warranted to prevent destruction of 
evidence on that ground.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cruzado, 
480 Mass. 275, 282-283 (2018) ("exigent circumstances" supported 
warrantless seizure of cell phone where police had probable 
cause to believe that it contained evidence of crime and because 
of "the risk of someone taking or tampering with [it]").  See 
also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 388 (2014) 
("[defendants] concede that officers could have seized and 
secured their cell phones to prevent destruction of evidence 
while seeking a warrant . . . [t]hat is a sensible concession"). 
12 
 
 
person of one who comes into the custody of the State police 
without specifying the appropriate time of seizure, while the 
Lynn police inventory policy provides more definitive guidance 
regarding timing (e.g., "as soon as is reasonably possible after 
arriving at the station"). 
 
We agree with the motion judge's ultimate finding that the 
Lynn police inventory policy applied in these circumstances.  
The defendant was arrested by at least one Lynn police officer, 
taken to the Lynn police station, and booked by the Lynn police.  
Wilson himself testified that the defendant was in Lynn police 
custody.  If, instead, we assumed that the State police policy 
applied, we would conclude as the motion judge did:  that 
neither policy was followed and that the police made 
investigative use of the cell phone. 
 
There is no dispute that "before a person is placed in a 
cell, the police, without a warrant, but pursuant to standard 
written procedures, may inventory and retain in custody all 
items on the person."  Commonwealth v. Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. 
537, 550, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942 (2002).  Inventory searches 
are intended to be noninvestigatory and are for the purpose of 
safeguarding the defendant's property, protecting the police 
against later claims of theft or lost property, and keeping 
weapons and contraband from the prison population.  See id. at 
550-551.  "This inquiry is fact driven, with the overriding 
13 
 
 
concern being the guiding touchstone of [r]easonableness" 
(quotations and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Abdallah, 
475 Mass. 47, 52 (2016).  An inventory policy "must be written" 
and "explicit enough to guard against the possibility that 
police officers would exercise discretion."  Commonwealth v. 
Rostad, 410 Mass. 618, 622 (1991). 
 
This court repeatedly has upheld the suppression of 
evidence where investigatory use is made of items seized for a 
purported inventory purpose.  See, e.g., Mauricio, 477 Mass. at 
596 (search of digital camera exceeded bounds of inventory 
search exception because it was investigatory in nature); 
Commonwealth v. White, 469 Mass. 96, 101-102 (2014) (while 
lawfully seized container could be opened in accordance with 
inventory policy, search warrant was required to examine pills 
for investigative purposes); Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. at 553-554 
(viewing information on front of bank card was permissible 
because it "declare[d] its nature to anyone at sight," but 
recording account numbers written on back of card made it 
impermissible investigative search). 
 
Here, had the cell phone been seized to be inventoried 
under the Lynn police inventory policy, it should have been 
promptly provided to the booking officer at the time of booking 
to be secured in a property envelope and stored in the 
appropriate property locker in accordance with the policy.  If 
14 
 
 
it is discovered that the property inventoried actually belongs 
to a third person, or if a third person claims the property, the 
inventory policy should provide guidance for determining the 
ownership of the item and the handling the item.  If the police 
want to search the inventoried property for evidence of a crime, 
they need to obtain consent from the appropriate person (as 
determined by the inventory policy) or a search warrant. 
The Commonwealth initially failed to introduce the 
appropriate governing inventory policy, the Lynn police 
inventory policy.4  The motion judge denied the Commonwealth's 
motion to reopen the evidence to introduce that policy, and the 
Commonwealth, appropriately recognizing that this was a matter 
committed to the discretion of the motion judge, does not 
challenge this ruling.  Although our analysis need go no 
further, we also address the failure to adhere to the State 
                     
 
4 The motion judge issued his decision allowing the motion 
to suppress on November 15, 2018.  On December 4, 2018, the 
Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider and reopen the 
evidence in order to "establish the inevitable discovery of the 
cell phone on the defendant's person at booking."  To support 
this argument, the Commonwealth attempted to introduce the Lynn 
police inventory policy.  In denying the motion, the judge 
reasoned that the additional evidence "would not alter the 
court's suppression ruling."  The judge concluded that the 
Commonwealth would not be able to establish that the eventual 
search of the cell phone was inevitable.  In other words, the 
Commonwealth may have been able to establish that the cell phone 
would have been inevitably seized but it would not have been 
able to establish that the search of the cell phone was 
inevitable, pursuant to the inventory policy or consent. 
15 
 
 
police policy and the investigatory use of the cell phone.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bishop, 402 Mass. 449, 451 (1988) (requiring 
exclusion of evidence that was seized during inventory search if 
search was not conducted pursuant to written inventory policy).  
See also J.A. Grasso, Jr., & C.M. McEvoy, Suppression Matters 
Under Massachusetts Law § 15-1 (2018) (Grasso & McEvoy) ("an 
inventory search . . . requires standard, written police 
procedures in order to limit police discretion to conduct a 
warrantless general search"). 
 
Once he seized the cell phone, Wilson placed the cell phone 
in his pocket and carried it with him after his arrival at the 
police station.5  He did not prepare the required custodial 
property inventory form, and he did not "properly secure the 
subject's property" as required by the State police policy or in 
a manner that would be expected if it were inventoried property.6  
                     
 
5 The judge found that Wilson was at the Lynn police station 
for "twenty minutes or so" before he went to speak with the 
defendant's brother and father.  The Commonwealth disputes this 
twenty-minute wait time.  This finding is supported by the 
record.  However, the specific wait time has no bearing on the 
subsequent investigative use Wilson made of the cell phone. 
 
 
6 The Commonwealth cites an Appeals Court case to support 
its argument that these "after-the-fact procedural deficiencies" 
cannot "void an otherwise valid inventory search."  See 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 51, 53, 55 (2014).  
However, as the Appeals Court carefully noted, "[w]here the 
validity of an inventory search itself is being challenged, 
there may well be situations where such noncompliance could play 
16 
 
 
See Grasso & McEvoy, supra at § 15-2(a) ("An inventory search is 
essentially a caretaking function and is non-investigatory"). 
 
Most significantly, as the motion judge describes, Wilson 
made investigative use of the cell phone.  He did so during his 
first conversation with James, after James told him that the 
cell phone seized from the defendant belonged to him; Wilson 
took the cell phone out of his pocket, showed it to the 
defendant's brother, and asked him for the cell phone's code.7  
He then entered that code to verify ownership of the cell phone.  
Wilson continued to make investigative use of the cell phone 
during the initial portion of the recorded interview when he 
held the cell phone and asked direct questions about its 
ownership and usage.  See Mauricio, 477 Mass. at 595-596 ("The 
Commonwealth argues that [the detective's] 'sole objective was 
to identify [the digital camera's] true owner.'  But this 
objective confirms rather than refutes the conclusion that the 
examination of the digital camera was an investigatory search 
rather than a benign inventory [search] . . ."). 
                     
an important factor in determining whether suppression was 
required."  Id. at 54 n.3. 
 
 
7 The judge observed that the conversation about the seized 
cell phone appears to have been unplanned and spontaneous.  
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Wilson 
intentionally withheld the cell phone from the inventory 
process. 
17 
 
 
 
Given these facts, we conclude that even if Wilson was, as 
it appears, at first only attempting to establish ownership of 
the cell phone, "the search exceeded the scope of and was 
inconsistent with the purposes underlying the inventory search 
exception to the warrant requirement, and is thus at odds with 
our law."8  Mauricio, 477 Mass. at 596.  See Vuthy Seng, 436 
Mass. at 554; Commonwealth v. Sullo, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 766, 772 
(1989) ("In making an inventory -- taking from the person, 
noting what is received, and placing it in safekeeping -- the 
police are to act more or less mechanically, according to a set 
routine, for to allow then a range of discretion in going about 
a warrantless search would be to invite conduct which by design 
or otherwise would subvert constitutional requirements"). 
 
We affirm the judge's order allowing the defendant's motion 
to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
8 In light of our resolution of the issues, we need not 
decide whether James's consent to the search of the cell phone 
that he shared with the defendant provided the police with 
authority to search the cell phone, or more particularly to 
search the areas of the cell phone that James told the police 
the defendant used.