Case Title: State v. Gregory

Citation: 348 N.C. 203

Docket Number: 19A97

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 19A97
FILED: 8 MAY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
WILLIAM CHRISTOPHER GREGORY
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Freeman, J.,
on 7 November 1996 in Superior Court, Davidson County, upon a
jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder on
the theory of premeditation and deliberation and under the felony
murder rule.  Defendant’s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals
as to his appeal of additional judgments was allowed by the
Supreme Court on 18 July 1997.  Heard in the Supreme Court
10 February 1998.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by William P.
Hart, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
J. Clark Fischer for defendant-appellant.
MITCHELL, Chief Justice.
On 4 January 1993, defendant was indicted by the Davie
County Grand Jury for first-degree murder, felonious breaking and
entering, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
inflicting serious injury.  He was tried capitally in August 1994
and found guilty of all charges.  The jury recommended a sentence
of death for the murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced
defendant accordingly.  The trial court also sentenced defendant
to imprisonment for the other crimes.
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On appeal, this Court found error and remanded for a
new trial.  State v. Gregory, 342 N.C. 580, 467 S.E.2d 28 (1996). 
Venue was subsequently changed to Davidson County.  Defendant was
retried capitally at the 28 October 1996 Criminal Session of
Superior Court, Davidson County.  The jury found defendant guilty
of all charges and, after a separate capital sentencing
proceeding, recommended a sentence of death for the first-degree
murder conviction.  The trial court sentenced defendant to death
for the murder and to consecutive terms of imprisonment of twenty
years for felonious assault and ten years for felonious breaking
and entering.  Defendant appeals to this Court as of right from
the sentence of death.  His motion to bypass the Court of Appeals
on his appeal of the remaining convictions was allowed by this
Court on 18 July 1997.
The State’s evidence tended to show inter alia that on
10 August 1992, seventeen-year-old Evette Howell lived with her
parents in Mocksville, along with her fifteen-year-old brother,
Fonzie, and her eighteen-month-old son, Xavier.  Evette’s parents
left for work shortly before 7:00 a.m.  Shortly after 8:00 a.m.,
Evette was found dead in the middle of her bed.  Her body was
partially covered with a bedsheet, and a fired handgun lay next
to her body.  Her infant son was found alive and lying next to
her in the bed.  Evette had been killed by a small-caliber
gunshot wound to the left side of her head.
In the next bedroom, Fonzie was found lying on the
floor, bloody.  One fired shell casing and two unfired bullets
were lying next to him on the floor.  Fonzie was taken to the
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emergency room at Baptist Hospital.  He arrived in a coma and was
placed on a ventilator and a feeding tube.  He spent the next six
weeks in the intensive care unit and another fifteen months
undergoing intensive medical treatment.
Defendant, William Christopher Gregory, had been
Evette’s boyfriend for some three years and was the father of
Evette’s child.  In June 1992, after the last of many breakups
with defendant, Evette came home with a black eye.  The morning
of Evette’s murder, defendant and his cousin Gabe Wilson went to
Evette’s house with a shotgun, shells, and duct tape.  When they
arrived at the home, defendant got out of the car with a
screwdriver, a hammer, and the duct tape.  Defendant told Wilson
he was going to kidnap Evette and that if Fonzie got in the way,
he was going to kill him.  Defendant broke into the house,
yelling for Wilson to follow him.  Defendant went into Evette’s
parents’ room and took a .25-caliber automatic handgun. 
Defendant then went into Evette’s bedroom and shut the door. 
Wilson heard Evette yell, “Fonzie, Fonzie.”  As Wilson began to
exit the house, he heard a gunshot.  Wilson was outside when he
heard Fonzie say, “You got me Chris, you got me.”  He immediately
heard another gun shot.  Within a couple of minutes, defendant
came out of the house and told Wilson that he had shot Evette and
had then gone into Fonzie’s room.  Defendant’s gun jammed, so he
hit Fonzie over the head several times.  He unjammed the gun,
shot Fonzie in the face and then took the gun to Evette’s room
and put it on the bed beside her.  Defendant told Wilson that
Evette and Fonzie were both dead.
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Upon leaving, defendant drove to his grandfather’s
house and told him that he had just shot Evette and Fonzie Howell
and that Wilson had nothing to do with the shooting.  Defendant,
Wilson, and defendant’s grandmother then went to the Davie County
Jail, where defendant told Detective Allan Whitaker he had shot
two people.  Defendant was taken into custody and advised of his
Miranda rights at 9:25 a.m. on 10 August 1992.  Defendant signed
a waiver of rights form and gave a statement to Detective
Whitaker, which he signed after it was reduced to writing.
By assignment of error, defendant contends that the
trial court committed prejudicial error when it denied his motion
to suppress the initial statements he made to Detective Whitaker
shortly after he shot Evette and Fonzie Howell.  Defendant
further contends that he was in custody when he gave his initial
statements and had not been advised of his Miranda rights prior
to giving those statements.  These contentions are without merit.
This Court has consistently held that the rule of
Miranda applies only where a defendant is subjected to custodial
interrogation.  State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 661, 483 S.E.2d
396, 405, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997). 
As we discussed in Gaines, “the definitive inquiry is whether
there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement
of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”  Id. at 662, 483
S.E.2d. at 405; see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318,
128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994).  The United States Supreme Court has
held that Miranda warnings are not required “simply because the
questioning takes place in the station house, or because the
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questioned person is one whom the police suspect.”  Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 719 (1977).
In the present case, defendant was not restrained or
confined in any way.  Defendant went to the jail entirely of his
own volition, not at the request of any law enforcement officer. 
Without any questioning by officers, he stated he had just shot
two people.  Nothing in the record indicates that, at any time
prior to his initial statements to Detective Whitaker, defendant
had any reason to believe that he was not free to go at any time
he wished.  This assignment of error is overruled.
By another assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court did not properly exercise its discretion because
it summarily denied his motion for individual jury voir dire. 
Defendant argues that because of an absence of findings of fact
showing the trial court’s rationale for denying the motion, the
trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion.  We do not
agree.
“In capital cases the trial judge for good cause shown
may direct that jurors be selected one at a time, in which case
each juror must first be passed by the State.  These jurors may
be sequestered before and after selection.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1214(j) (1997).  A trial court’s ruling on the issue of
individual voir dire will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion.  State v. Short, 322 N.C. 783, 788, 370 S.E.2d 351,
354 (1988).
Counsel for the defense, when arguing in support of
this motion before the trial court, produced absolutely no
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evidence or argument as to why jurors should be questioned by
individual voir dire.  In fact, while discussing the motion
before the trial court, defense counsel expressly acknowledged
that there had been “a change of venue granted in this case and I
do not imagine that the publicity in Davidson County is anywhere
near the publicity in Davie County concerning these matters.” 
Defendant has failed to identify any possible particular harm
resulting from his having been required to question each of the
prospective jurors in the presence of the other jurors. 
Therefore, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying his motion for individual
jury selection.  State v. Jones, 336 N.C. 229, 261, 443 S.E.2d
48, 64, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1003, 130 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1994). 
This assignment of error is overruled.
By another assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court committed error by overruling his objection to
parts of the prosecutor’s closing argument and by failing to
intervene ex mero motu during another portion of the closing
argument made by the prosecutor.
Defendant points to three arguments of the prosecutor
during the guilt phase.  First, counsel for defendant argued in
his closing that the jury should find defendant guilty of second-
degree murder.  Then the prosecutor argued to the jury that
defendant’s tactic was to concede guilt to most, but not all, of
the charges.  Thus, the focus would be on reasonable doubt of
premeditation and deliberation.  The prosecutor rhetorically
asked the jury, “He hasn’t pled guilty to those three things, has
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he?  Not a one of them.”  Defendant objected, and the trial court
overruled the objection.  There was no criticism of defendant for
failing to plead guilty.  Instead, the prosecutor was simply
replying to the argument defense counsel had used.  This was a
proper argument.
Defendant also contends the prosecutor raised
speculative and irrelevant legal concerns to the jury, whose sole
task at that point was to determine guilt or innocence.  The
prosecutor said to the jury, “Secondly, . . . you have heard all
the evidence, now.  If [defendant] had filed some motion to
suppress this statement . . . [defendant objected and was
overruled] and the Judge had suppressed this statement for some
reason, what evidence would the State have to connect [defendant]
to this case?  Only Gabe Wilson.  Deals have to be cut.”
Defendant contends that by making these remarks, the
prosecutor improperly commented on defendant’s exercise of his
right to fully and vigorously defend himself against the criminal
charges in his case.  We disagree.  The prosecutor was rebutting
the assertion made by defense counsel in closing arguments that
State’s witness Gabe Wilson was not believable because he was 
the beneficiary of an unnecessarily lenient plea bargain with the
State.  Defendant’s assertion to the jury made it necessary for
the prosecutor to reply and explain the State’s rationale for
entering into a plea agreement with Wilson.  The prosecutor
explained his reason in hypothetical terms and did not tell the
jury that defendant had made any motion to suppress his
statements.  The prosecutor’s argument was a proper response to
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the argument made by defense counsel.  See State v. Perdue, 320
N.C. 51, 61, 357 S.E.2d 345, 352 (1987); State v. Abdullah, 309
N.C. 63, 72-73, 306 S.E.2d 100, 106 (1983). 
Defendant’s final challenge to the prosecutor’s closing
argument concerns a comment to which defendant did not object at
trial.  The prosecutor said in referring to defendant’s statement
to Detective Whitaker, “Now, you know, I’m sorry [defendant] did
not read his statement.  Maybe I ought to be over to his table
and let him look at State’s Exhibit 52 in this courtroom and take
the next hour reading it.  And then tell you what he thinks about
it.”
While defendant did not object at trial, he now argues
that this was such an obviously improper comment on his right not
to testify that the trial court should have intervened ex mero
motu.  The law in this area is well settled.
A criminal defendant cannot be compelled
to testify, and any reference by the State
regarding his failure to do so violates an
accused’s constitutional right to remain
silent.  Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
[14 L. Ed. 2d 106,] reh. denied, 381 U.S.
957[, 14 L. Ed. 2d 730] (1965).  Well before
Griffin, N.C.G.S. 8-54 provided that the
failure of a defendant to testify creates no
presumption against him. We have interpreted
this statute as prohibiting the prosecution,
the defense, or the trial judge from
commenting upon the defendant’s failure to
testify.  See, e.g., State v. Bovender, 233
N.C. 683, 65 S.E.2d 323 (1951) [overruled on
other grounds by State v. Barnes, 324 N.C.
539, 380 S.E.2d 118 (1989)]; State v.
Humphrey, 186 N.C. 533, 120 S.E. 85 (1923). 
A nontestifying defendant, however, has the
right upon request to have the trial court
instruct the jury that his failure to testify
may not be held against him.  Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 [, 67 L. Ed. 2d 241]
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(1981); State v. Leffingwell, 34 N.C. App.
205, 237 S.E.2d 550 (1977).
State v. Randolph, 312 N.C. 198, 205-06, 321 S.E.2d 864, 869
(1984).  This Court has also determined:
When the State directly comments on a
defendant’s failure to testify, the improper
comment is not cured by subsequent inclusion
in the jury charge of an instruction on a
defendant’s right not to testify.  Rather,
this Court has held the error may be
cured by a withdrawal of the remark or
by a statement from the court that it
was improper, followed by an instruction
to the jury not to consider the failure
of the accused to offer himself as a
witness.
[State v.] McCall, 286 N.C. [472,] 487, 212
S.E.2d [132,] 141 [(1975)].  We consistently
have held that when the trial court fails to
give a curative instruction to the jury
concerning the prosecution’s improper comment
on a defendant’s failure to testify, the
prejudicial effect of such an uncured,
improper reference mandates the granting of a
new trial.
State v. Reid, 334 N.C. 551, 556, 434 S.E.2d 193, 197 (1993)
(citations omitted).  However, “[c]omment on an accused’s failure
to testify does not call for an automatic reversal but requires
the court to determine if the error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 557, 434 S.E.2d at 198; see N.C.G.S. §
15A-1443(b) (1997).
Upon reviewing the record, it is clear that the
prosecutor was not commenting on defendant’s decision not to
testify, but simply refuting the claim by the defense that
Detective Whitaker’s notes and recording of defendant’s statement
were inaccurate.  “Since defendant made no objection during
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closing arguments, he must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s
closing arguments amounted to gross impropriety.”  State v.
Rouse, 339 N.C. 59, 91, 451 S.E.2d 543, 560 (1994), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 832, 133 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1995).  The prosecutor’s comment
was an isolated comment and not an extended reference to
defendant’s exercise of his right not to testify.  Therefore, the
trial court did not err by failing to intervene on its own
motion.  See id. at 96, 451 S.E.2d at 563; State v. Taylor, 337
N.C. 597, 614, 447 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1994); State v. Randolph, 312
N.C. at 206-07, 321 S.E.2d at 870.  This assignment of error is
overruled.
In another assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court committed prejudicial error by giving an improper
peremptory instruction on the statutory mitigating circumstance
of defendant’s age, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7) (1997), which
allowed the jury to improperly disregard a proven and
uncontradicted statutory mitigating circumstance.  Defendant
orally requested a peremptory instruction on the statutory
mitigating circumstance regarding his age at the time of the
crime.  The State conceded that all of the evidence showed
defendant was eighteen when he committed the murder.  The trial
court gave the peremptory instruction on that circumstance. 
Defendant did not object to the peremptory instruction or request
any clarification for the jury.  Defendant thus waived appellate
review of this issue.  State v. Allen, 339 N.C. 545, 554-56, 453
S.E.2d 150, 155-56 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396; N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2).  
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Our review of this issue is limited to review for plain error. 
Allen, 339 N.C. at 555, 453 S.E.2d at 155.  The trial court’s
instruction is in accord with the pattern jury instructions that
have been approved by this Court.  State v. Simpson, 341 N.C.
316, 348-49, 462 S.E.2d 191, 210 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1161, 134 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1996).  Therefore, we find no plain
error.  This assignment of error is overruled.
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
Having concluded that defendant’s trial and separate
capital sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error, we
turn to the duties reserved by N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(d)(2)
exclusively for this Court in capital cases.  It is our duty in
this regard to ascertain (1) whether the record supports the
jury’s findings of the aggravating circumstances on which the
sentence of death was based; (2) whether the death sentence was
entered under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other
arbitrary consideration; and (3) whether the death sentence is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(d)(2).  After thoroughly examining the record,
transcripts, and briefs in the present case, we conclude that the
record fully supports the aggravating circumstances found by the
jury.  Further, we find no indication that the sentence of death
in this case was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary consideration.  We must turn
then to our final statutory duty of proportionality review.
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In the present case, defendant was convicted of
premeditated and deliberate first-degree murder.  The jury also
found defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill inflicting serious injury and felonious breaking
and entering.  The jury found as an aggravating circumstance that
the murder for which defendant stands convicted was part of a
course of conduct in which defendant engaged and which included
the commission by defendant of other crimes of violence against
another person or persons.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11).  Of the
twenty mitigating circumstances submitted, one or more jurors
found the following:  (1) defendant had no significant history of
prior criminal activity, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(6); (2) the
offenses were committed while defendant was under the influence
of mental and emotional disturbance; (3) the capacity of
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired;
(4) defendant had shown remorse for the offenses he committed;
(5) defendant offered no resistance upon arrest and confessed
shortly after the offenses; (6) at an early stage in the
investigation, defendant admitted his guilt and gave a statement
concerning his involvement in the crime; (7) defendant had no
prior record for violence; and (8) defendant’s father was in
prison from the time defendant was age one until age nine.
In our proportionality review, it is proper to compare
the present case with other cases in which this Court has
concluded that the death penalty was disproportionate.  State v.
McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 240, 433 S.E.2d 144, 162 (1993), cert.
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denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994).  We have found
the death penalty disproportionate in seven cases.  State v.
Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319
N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341
S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines,
345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C.
570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325
S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163
(1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983);
State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).  We
conclude that this case is not substantially similar to any case
in which this Court has found the death penalty disproportionate.
This case has several features which distinguish it
from the cases in which we have found the death penalty to be
disproportionate.  They are:  (1) defendant killed a seventeen-
year-old female victim in her home; (2) the victim , a young
woman defendant had a relationship with for several years, was
the mother of his infant son; (3) defendant assaulted with the
intent to kill the victim’s fifteen-year-old brother; and
(4) defendant knew each of the victims and their family.  We find
it significant that in none of the cases in which this Court has
found the death penalty disproportionate were there multiple
victims or multiple major felonies committed during the crime.
We also compare this case with the cases in which we
have found the death penalty to be proportionate.  Although we
review all of the cases in the pool of “similar cases” when
engaging in our statutorily mandated duty of proportionality
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review, we have previously stated, and we reemphasize here, that
we will not undertake to discuss or cite all of those cases each
time we carry out that duty.  State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 81,
301 S.E.2d 335, 356, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 177
(1983).  Here, it suffices to say we conclude that the present
case is more similar to certain cases in which we have found the
sentence of death proportionate than to those in which we have
found the sentence of death disproportionate.
After comparing this case carefully with all others in
the pool of “similar cases” used for proportionality review, we
conclude that it falls within the class of first-degree murders
for which we have previously upheld the death penalty.  For the
foregoing reasons, we conclude that the sentence of death entered
in the present case is not disproportionate.
Having considered and rejected all of defendant’s
assigned errors, we hold that defendant’s trial and capital
sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error.  Therefore,
the verdict and sentence of death entered against defendant must
be and are left undisturbed.
NO ERROR.