Case Title: State ex rel. Wagers v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1332

Docket Number: 19992235

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Wagers v. Indus. Comm., 93 Ohio St.3d 218, 2001-Ohio-1332] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. WAGERS, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Wagers v. Indus. Comm. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 218.] 
Workers’ compensation — Effect of retirement on claim for temporary total 
disability compensation — Wage-loss compensation denied when 
claimant’s diminished earnings lacked the necessary causal relationship 
to his industrial injury. 
(No. 99-2235 — Submitted May 30, 2001 — Decided September 26, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 98AP-1573. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant-claimant Jesse Wagers was a police officer for the 
village of Lockland.  On January 16, 1995, claimant wrote to his supervisor, 
seeking an exemption from a village residency ordinance, stating: 
 
“I am specifically requesting that the residency exemption be granted for 
[a] 24 month period.  Prior to the expiration of that exemption, I will then retire as 
a Police Officer when my calculated 27 year eligibility requirement for retirement 
has been met.” 
 
The village council responded favorably: 
 
“Lt. Jesse Wagers is hereby granted an exemption from the residency 
requirement * * *  for a period of 24 months from the effective date of this 
ordinance.  This exemption is conditioned upon the requirement that before the 
expiration of that period of exemption[,] Lt. Wagers will retire from the Village of 
Lockland Police Department.” 
 
On April 26, 1996, claimant was injured in a work-related motor vehicle 
accident, and a workers’ compensation claim was allowed.  Thereafter, claimant 
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received temporary total disability compensation (“TTC”).  On June 14, 1996, 
claimant returned to work at his former position without restriction. 
 
In the months after his return, claimant performed all of his regular duties. 
Claimant also requested—and was granted—permission to work considerable 
overtime.  In addition, claimant also worked as a member of the Hamilton County 
SWAT Team. 
 
On December 5, 1996, claimant informed his chief that effective January 
3, 1997, he would be retiring.  Claimant indeed retired on that date, and worked a 
couple of jobs thereafter—a short stint with United Dairy Farmers and a later 
custodial/maintenance job. 
 
In 1998, surgery related to claimant’s original industrial injury prevented 
him from performing his custodial/maintenance duties for approximately two 
months.  Claimant moved appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio for TTC over 
the period, as well as wage-loss compensation for periods when he had been 
working for less than he had made as a police officer. 
 
A district hearing officer denied both requests, writing: 
 
“The salient facts related to [the] denial [of TTC] are as follows: 
 
“[T]he claimant took a non-disability, regular and voluntary retirement 
from his position with the subject employer as a police officer on 1-3-97.  This 
finding is based upon the claimant’s testimony at hearing, as well as upon his 
letter to the employer (12-5-96), and the letter from the employer dated 4-3-98. 
 
“Prior to the claimant’s voluntary retirement, he sustained an injury 
resulting in a period of disability.  The claimant returned to work on 6-14-96 after 
this disability.  The Hearing Officer finds, based upon testimony at hearing from 
the chief of police of the employer and from the financial director from the 
employer, that the claimant returned to his former position of employment, 
without any restrictions.  The record from the employer indicates that the claimant 
returned to [full-time] employment, often working substantial overtime without 
January Term, 2001 
3 
restriction.  The record clearly and unequivocally reflects that claimant did not 
seek light duty when he returned to work in 1996, nor did he allege any need for 
said light duty when he returned to work on 6-14-96.  The claimant’s conduct 
upon returning to work on 6-14-96 demonstrates a clear ability to perform his 
regular job duties as a police officer without restriction. 
 
“At hearing, the claimant, through counsel, argued that his retirement was 
not voluntary and that it had a disability component.  Specifically, the claimant 
felt he could no longer perform his duties as a police officer and as a 
consequence, he had to quit that employment.  The Hearing Officer does not find 
the claimant’s testimony at hearing to be persuasive.  The Hearing Officer finds 
that this testimony stands in stark contrast to the documentary record in file 
relating to the claimant’s retirement.  In none of the correspondence between the 
claimant and the employer, up to the time of his retirement, does the claimant 
make any reference to any inability to perform his job duties or any restrictions 
arising from the present claim which would preclude him from performing his job 
duties as a police officer.  The Hearing Officer finds [the] record to be clear and 
unambiguous regarding the claimant’s voluntary retirement as a police officer.  
The Hearing Officer similarly finds that the claimant was fully capable of 
performing all of the job duties [of] a police officer at the time of his retirement. 
 
“The record further demonstrates that the claimant returned to 
employment with a different employer after his voluntary retirement as a police 
officer.  The record reflects that the claimant returned to employment in the 
capacity of a maintenance worker.  The Hearing Officer finds, based upon 
evidence in the file and evidence adduced at [the] hearing, that this was not light 
duty work.  The work consisted of cutting grass, painting and general 
maintenance duties. 
 
“Based upon * * * the foregoing findings, the Hearing Officer finds that 
the claimant’s request for payment of Temporary Total Disability Compensation 
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is barred by his voluntary retirement * * *.  This conclusion is based upon the 
above stated findings concerning his retirement, as well as upon the decisions of 
the Ohio Supreme Court * * *. 
 
“[The facts as to the denial of wage-loss compensation are:] 
 
“It is the further finding and order of the Hearing Officer that the 
claimant’s request for an award of working wage loss benefits [should] similarly 
be denied. 
 
“The hearing officer finds, in the present claim, that the claimant’s request 
for an award of working wage loss benefits be denied based upon the claimant’s 
voluntary retirement from the position of police officer * * *. 
 
“* * * 
 
“In the present claim, the claimant did return to [full-time] work without 
restriction as a police officer.  The claimant voluntarily retired from that 
employment.  The Hearing Officer does not find that disability or work 
restrictions had anything to do with his retirement in the present claim.  
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that the job restrictions stated 
on the claimant’s C-140 are reliable or credible.  The Hearing Officer does not 
find that claimant has established new and changed circumstances causing him to 
be placed under job restrictions preventing him from returning to the former 
position of employment long after his [voluntary] retirement. 
 
“Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds in the present claim, that the 
claimant was able at all times after his [voluntary] retirement to perform fully and 
without restriction his former job position.  The Hearing Officer therefore finds 
and concludes that the claimant has not established any entitlement to any 
working wage loss benefits based upon the foregoing findings.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
A staff hearing officer affirmed and further appeal was 
refused. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying 
both wage-loss compensation and TTC.  The court of appeals disagreed and 
denied the writ, prompting this appeal to this court as of right. 
 
Claimant seeks wage-loss compensation from March 1, 1997 through 
February 27, 1998.  He wants TTC from March 9, 1998 to May 4, 1998.  The 
commission denied both requests and the court of appeals concurred.  Three 
questions are now presented.  As to the contested TTC, we must determine: (1) 
Does “some evidence” support the conclusion that claimant voluntarily retired 
from his former position of employment? and, if so, (2) Does that retirement bar 
TTC? Turning to wage loss, we must again ascertain the presence of “some 
evidence.”  For the reasons to follow, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
 
1.  Voluntary retirement–some evidence 
 
Ample evidence supports the commission’s decision in this regard.  
Claimant’s January 16, 1995 letter—written nearly fifteen months before his 
accident—outlined a January/February 1997 retirement date.  Even on the date of 
injury, his physician, Dr. Henry R. Van Loveren, remarked that claimant planned 
to retire in less than a year.  Claimant’s entreaty to regard other contrary evidence 
more favorably fails.  The commission is the ultimate arbiter of evidentiary 
weight and credibility.  State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio 
St.3d 167, 31 OBR 369, 509 N.E.2d 946. 
 
2.  Voluntary retirement—effect 
 
Having determined that claimant voluntarily retired, we must determine 
the effect of the retirement on his claim for TTC.  After the briefing in this case 
was finished, State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 376, 732 
N.E.2d 355, was issued; this decision modified the voluntary-abandonment 
doctrine on which claimant’s TTC denial had been premised.  Baker was released 
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to return to his former position after his work injury.  He returned and later quit to 
take a better job.  When Baker’s injury later prevented him from performing the 
duties of his new job, he sought TTC. 
 
Before Baker, TTC would have been denied.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1985), 29 Ohio App.3d 145, 29 OBR 
162, 504 N.E.2d 451; State ex rel. Rockwell Internatl. v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 40 
Ohio St.3d 44, 531 N.E.2d 678; State ex rel. McGraw v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 56 
Ohio St.3d 137, 564 N.E.2d 695.  Baker, however, held that changing jobs no 
longer constituted voluntary abandonment sufficient to preclude TTC.  It stressed 
that departure from the former position of employment for another job did not 
equate to an abandonment of the entire labor market, which would indeed bar 
TTC.  Accordingly, we ruled: 
 
“When a claimant who is medically released to return to work following 
an industrial injury leaves his or her former position of employment to accept 
another position of employment, the claimant is eligible to receive temporary total 
disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.56(A) should the claimant 
reaggravate the original industrial injury while working at his or her new job.”  
Baker, syllabus. 
 
We recognize that claimant technically did not “leav[e] his or her former 
position of employment to accept another position of employment.”  Claimant did 
not leave his well-paying law enforcement job so that he could work at United 
Dairy Farmers or as a custodian.  He retired because he was eligible and because 
continued employment would violate a village ordinance.  That he found other 
employment later does not transform the motivation for his retirement. 
 
Baker, however, stressed the difference between a claimant who leaves his 
or her former position of employment and one who deserts the entire labor 
market, and there is no evidence that this claimant ever intended the latter when 
he left the police force.  To the contrary, claimant promptly obtained other work.  
January Term, 2001 
7 
Accordingly, in this instance, Baker preserves claimant’s TTC eligibility.  Since 
the evidence establishes that claimant was unable to work over the period in 
question due to his prior industrial injury, TTC is payable. 
 
3.  Wage loss 
 
The commission’s order is, at times, confusing, but close examination 
reveals that wage-loss compensation was not denied because the commission 
considered voluntary retirement to be a per se bar.  It denied wage-loss 
compensation because the circumstances following claimant’s injury—including 
those surrounding his retirement—established that claimant’s diminished earnings 
lacked the necessary causal relationship to his industrial injury.  State ex rel. 
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Morse (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 210, 215, 648 N.E.2d 
827, 831-832.  Claimant was released to return to work without restriction in 
1996.  Claimant worked considerable overtime thereafter and eventually left for 
reasons unrelated to his injury.  Taken together, the commission concluded that 
there was no injury-related factor/restriction that forced claimant to gravitate 
toward lesser-paying employment.  Claimant suffered a wage loss because he 
chose a job that paid less.  It is that simple.  Wage loss was never intended as an 
income supplement for people who make less in retirement than they did before.  
As such, the commission did not abuse its discretion in denying wage-loss 
compensation. 
 
That portion of the court of appeals judgment that upheld TTC denial is 
reversed, and a writ of mandamus is issued ordering the commission to pay 
claimant temporary total compensation from March 9, 1998 to May 4, 1998.  The 
balance of the judgment is affirmed. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
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DOUGLAS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and would reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
RESNICK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
Harris & Burgin and Karen P. Weisensel, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Dennis L. Hufstader, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Gary E. Becker and Brian P. Perry, for 
appellee village of Lockland. 
__________________