Case Title: SAMPSELL v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-19

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
SAMPSELL v. STATE2001 WY 1217 P.3d 724Case Number: 00-19Decided: 02/02/2001
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2000

                                                                                                    
FEBRUARY 2, 2001

 
QUAY A. 
SAMPSELL,

Appellant

(Defendant), 

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

Representing 
Appellant:

            
G. Kevin Keller, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kimberly A. 
Baker, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Shawn Matlock, Student 
Intern. 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL and KITE, 
JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
The only 
claim of error advanced by Quay Sampsell (Sampsell) in this appeal is that the 
district court committed an abuse of discretion and transgressed the concept of 
proportionality in imposing sentence upon his conviction, pursuant to his pleas 
of guilty, of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b) (Lexis 1999).1  In both counts, Sampsell was charged 
with causing the death of the victim while driving under the influence of 
alcohol.  On each count, Sampsell 
was sentenced to a term of not less than six (6) years and not more than ten 
(10) years in the penitentiary, with an oral pronouncement that the two 
sentences should be consecutive.  
The sentences are within the statutory limits prescribed by the 
legislature for the charged offenses, and the district court neither committed 
an abuse of discretion nor imposed a disproportionate sentence in this 
instance.  We affirm the Judgment 
and Sentence of the Court.

[¶2]           
This 
statement of the issues is found in the Appellant's Brief:

I.          
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive 
sentence based on a presumption that the appellant "willfully" committed the 
crime of aggravated vehicular homicide.

This 
Statement of the Issue is found in the Brief of Appellee:

I.          
Whether the district court abused its discretion in sentencing appellant 
to consecutive terms of six (6) to ten (10) years for two counts of aggravated 
vehicular homicide, in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-106?

[¶3]           
On May 
13, 1999, Sampsell ran a flashing red light at the intersection of West College 
Drive and South Greeley Highway in Cheyenne.  He collided with another vehicle, and 
the driver and the passenger in that car both were killed.  At the time of the collision, Sampsell 
had a blood alcohol level of approximately .217.  He had spent the evening drinking with 
friends at a Cheyenne bar.  Charged 
with two counts, one for each of the victims, of aggravated vehicular homicide 
by causing the death of the victims while driving under the influence of 
alcohol, Sampsell entered a plea of guilty to each count at his 
arraignment.

[¶4]           
In 
providing a factual basis for his pleas of guilty, Sampsell advised the district 
court that he had been drinking at a Cheyenne bar.  He stated that he left, and did not 
remember how he arrived at the scene of the collision.  He stated that he ran a red light and 
struck the other vehicle.  He agreed 
that he drove his vehicle after consuming alcohol.  Through counsel, Sampsell told the 
district court that he would not disagree as to the evidence of the location of 
the collision, and he admitted the date.  
Sampsell's counsel also told the district court that Sampsell would not 
contest the evidence that his blood alcohol level was .217 at the time.  Sampsell also agreed that the collision 
caused the deaths of the two victims.

[¶5]           
After 
receiving a pre-sentence report, and hearing statements from Sampsell; a jail 
chaplain; a clinical psychologist; Sampsell's father; the parents of the male 
victim; the mother and stepfather of the female victim; and counsel for the 
defense and prosecution, the district court proceeded to impose sentence.  The district court 
said:

            
Having considered these things, I believe that the appropriate sentence 
is and the Court does hereby impose a sentence of no less than six years nor 
more than ten years on each of the two counts to be served consecutively, and 
Mr. Sampsell will be remanded to the custody of the sheriff for the execution of 
that sentence.

The 
Judgment and Sentence of the Court is silent as to whether the sentences were 
imposed to run consecutively or concurrently.  Our rule is clear with respect to such 
discrepancies:

We have 
held that, when a discrepancy exists between the oral pronouncement and the 
written order, the oral pronouncement prevails.  Lane v. State, 663 P.2d 175, 176 
(Wyo.1983).

Smith v. 
State, 985 P.2d 961, 963 (Wyo. 1999).  See 
also Van Riper v. State, 882 P.2d 230, 238 (Wyo. 
1994) (quoting Schuler v. State, 668 P.2d 1333, 1341 (Wyo. 
1983)); 
Christensen v. State, 854 P.2d 675, 678 (Wyo. 
1993) (quoting United States v. Pugliese, 860 F.2d 25, 30 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067 (1989)); 
Krow v. State, 840 P.2d 261, 265 (Wyo. 
1992); 
McGraw v. State, 770 P.2d 234, 235 (Wyo. 
1989); and 
Fullmer v. Meacham, 387 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Wyo. 
1964).  Sampsell has appealed from the Judgment 
and Sentence of the Court, and his stance in the appeal correctly assumes that 
the sentences were imposed to run consecutively.

[¶6]           
Sampsell 
points out that this Court has rejected the common-law view that a sentence is 
not subject to appellate review if it is within the minimum and maximum limits 
set by statute.  Wright v. 
State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Wyo. 
1983).  Two years later, the standard was 
explained in Volz v. State, 707 P.2d 179, 184 (Wyo. 
1985):

            
The standard this court follows on review of sentencing is well 
established.  This court will not 
reverse a sentence which is within the statutory limits absent a clear abuse of 
discretion.  Kallas v. State, 
Wyo., 704 P.2d 693 (1985); 
Wright v. State, Wyo. 703 P.2d 1102 (1985); 
Munden v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 621, 626 (1985); 
Young v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 1055, 1057 
(1985); Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 692 P.2d 911, 930 (1984); 
Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991, 1008 (1984); 
Ventling v. State, supra, 676 P.2d [573] at 574 [(Wyo. 1984)]; Eaton 
v. State, Wyo., 660 P.2d 803, 806 (1983); 
Taylor v. State, Wyo., 658 P.2d 1297, 1299 
(1983); Wright v. State, Wyo. 670 P.2d 1090, 1092 
(1983); Daniel v. State, supra, 644 P.2d [172] at 178 [(Wyo. 1982)]; 
Cyrus v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 900, 903 (1982); 
Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107, 1112 
(1981); Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378, 380 (1979); 
Hanson v. State, Wyo., 590 P.2d 832, 836 (1979); 
Smith v. State, Wyo., 564 P.2d 1194, 1202 
(1977); Daellenbach v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 679, 683 (1977); 
Bird v. State, 36 Wyo. 532, 257 P. 2, 3 (1927); 
State v. Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. 111, 253 P. 14, 16 
(1927).

            
This court in Ventling v. State, supra, reiterated the definition 
of "abuse of discretion" which applies to sentencing 
review:

            
""A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.  In determining whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.  An 
abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court 
under the circumstances.  * * 
*"'  Wright v. State, supra, 
670 P.2d  at 1092, quoting Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980)."  [Ventling], 676 P.2d  at 575.

            
While sentencing involves consideration of two broad categoriesthe 
circumstances surrounding the crime, and the character of the criminal, Young 
v. State, supra, 695 P.2d  at 1057; Ventling v. State, supra, 676 P.2d  
at 575after reviewing the record, we hold that the trial court gave proper 
consideration to both of these categories.

[¶7]           
Sampsell 
first argues that the sentences that were imposed demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion.  He contends that the 
prosecuting attorney and the district court judge focused on the willfulness of 
the offense, and points out that, of course, willfulness is not an element of 
the crime charged.  In pressing this 
argument, Sampsell relies upon an interpretation of the record that is different 
from our understanding.  We quote 
from the comments of the prosecuting attorney:

            
The conduct of Mr. Sampsell that night was willful, there's no other way 
to describe it, and it was incredibly reckless.  He chose to go out drinking that [night] 
with all of his friends from the base.  
He knew, like any law enforcement officer, he was indeed a security 
policeman at the base, about what the laws are and what they are not and how 
incredibly strict they are out at the base about drunk driving.  His friends knew that, so they had taken 
a designated driver that night when they went out to [the bar].  You don't see that in this pre-sentence 
report.  It's a very cold, sterile 
pre-sentence report.

            
And it's hard to try  I'm glad the families are here to give you a 
flavor of emotion of their children's lives, and the best I can do is try to 
help you understand the events of that night.

            
[The male victim's mother] indicated her son was at Perkins having dinner 
while Mr. Sampsell was getting drunk with friends at [the bar].  They went there, they drank for 
hours.  They had a designated 
driver, took him back to the base, but he wanted to party.  He wanted to go all the way down to Fort 
Collins, but he couldn't get anybody foolish enough to go out with.  They tried to get him to stay.  He chose to go, he chose to go back to 
[the bar], he chose to start drinking [their] massive, I believe, 25-ounce micro 
brews that by his count he pounded down eight or ten.  Blood alcohol tells us .21.  But we know he had been drinking 
continuously for at least five hours.

            
So he went back to [the bar] and continued to drink.  He was making a very willful, conscious 
and deliberate choice.  He drank 
there for several more hours, tried to pick up on a girl who turned him 
down.  This apparently angered 
him.  When everybody was leaving, 
they tried to et the keys away from him, but he would have nothing to do with 
that.  He tried to fight one 
individual that tried to get the keys from him, pushed his way out of the bar, 
jumped into his truck, not only sped away, he ran through, by the witnesses' 
descriptions, red lights, and he was trying to get away from the friends that 
were trying to help him.  He chose 
to drive east on Dell Range, not west, not back to the base, but he chose to 
race down the road driving his, as we have heard the description, this Dodge 
Dakota truck he was very proud of.  
But it was within moments to become a 3,000 plus pound projectile that 
smashed into the side of [the male victim's] car as he was innocently going 
through an intersection taking [the female victim] home.

            
* * *  That [the prosecuting 
attorney graphically described the collision] was the result of the willful and 
deliberate action of Mr. Sampsell.

            
* * *

            
* * *  But that's what you 
have to take into account, all of his willful, deliberate, reckless choices he 
made that night that we are now trying to hold him accountable 
for.

[¶8]           
The 
comments of the district court judge are also significant.  He responded to the prosecuting 
attorney's remarks by saying:

I think 
it's true what [the jail chaplain] has said here, * * * and [defense counsel], 
and Mr. Sampsell himself and others, Mr. Sampsell did not intentionally take the 
lives of [the male victim] and [the female victim], but he intentionally and 
willfully got into his truck.  And 
what makes it especially egregious, I believe, is that, as [the prosecuting 
attorney] indicated or according to the pr[e]sentence investigation report, Mr. 
Sampsell was repeatedly and specifically warned and admonished by his friends 
that he shouldn't drive.  And he was 
offered a place to stay, a place to sleep and sleep it off.  He rejected those offers, which, of 
course, is a result of the same alcohol that led to the recklessness of his 
conduct that killed these two people.

[¶9]           
The 
record is clear that the district court did not believe that Sampsell had 
willfully committed the homicides charged, but that it was focused on the 
willfulness of his conduct in driving his vehicle while intoxicated.  It is equally clear that in imposing the 
sentences in this case, the district court took into account the circumstances 
of the crime and Sampsell's character.  
The State points out that the maximum punishment provided in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-106 is twenty years, and the sentences should not be disturbed in the 
absence of an abuse of discretion.  
There was no abuse of discretion by the district court in this case, and 
we do not afford relief to a defendant unless the proper showing of abuse has 
been made.

[¶10]      Sampsell 
contends that "[i]ntertwined in this review is a proportional review of the 
actual sentence imposed as a violation of equal protection and the prohibition 
against cruel or unusual punishment."  
In pressing this argument, he relies upon Oakley v. State, 715 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Wyo. 1986).  Sampsell asserts that the sentences are 
unusually severe when compared to the sentences involved in other aggravated 
vehicular homicide cases.  In his 
appellate brief, he analyzes a number of our prior cases.2  His point of departure for the 
proportionality argument is language from Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3010-11, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983), quoted 
by this Court in Oakley, 715 P.2d at 1376-77:

"In sum, 
a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided 
by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the 
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same 
crime in other jurisdictions."

The 
State, in response, reminds this Court of the constraints we adopted in 
Oakley, 715 P.2d at 1379:

            
We will not engage in a lengthy analysis under all three of the 
Solem criteria, including a consideration of the sentences imposed on 
similarly situated defendants in this and other jurisdictions, except in cases 
where the mode of punishment is unusual or where the relative length of sentence 
to imprisonment is extreme when compared to the gravity of the offense (the 
first of the Solem criteria).  
Oakley's sentence does not merit that kind of in-depth Solem 
analysis, and the Solem opinion does not require that kind of analysis in 
a case such as this.

We have 
expanded upon Oakley in subsequent cases, saying:

            
However, this court has adhered to the rule that we will not undertake a 
lengthy analysis under all three of the Solem criteria "except in cases 
where the mode of punishment is unusual or where the relative length of sentence 
to imprisonment is extreme when compared to the gravity of the offense."  Oakley v. State, 715 P.2d 1374, 1379 
(Wyo.1986); Smith v. State, 922 P.2d  at 849.  Our rule is in accord with the approach 
taken by the United States Supreme Court in Harmelin v. Michigan, where 
the court concluded that the Solem proportionality analysis is 
appropriate only "in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime 
committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality."  
[Harmelin] 501 U.S. 957, 1005, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2707, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).

Dodge v. 
State, 951 P.2d 383, 385 (Wyo. 1997).  This application of Oakley is 
still followed by this Court.  
Suval v. State, 6 P.3d 1272, 1274 (Wyo. 
2000).

[¶11]      It is 
clear from the record that the mode of punishment imposed in this case is not 
unusual, and we are satisfied that the relative length of the sentence is not 
extreme in light of the circumstances disclosed by the record.  We see no occasion to deviate from what 
we said in Smith, 922 P.2d at 849-50:

There is 
no manifest abuse of discretion, suspicious procedural conduct, circumstances 
manifesting inherent unfairness or injustice, or conduct offensive to the public 
sense of fair play, as those factors are described in Wright [670 P.2d 1090].  It does not involve a mode of punishment 
that is unusual, nor is the relative length of sentence extreme when compared to 
the gravity of the offense, described in Oakley [715 P.2d 1374].

[¶12]      The 
Judgment and Sentence of the Court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

   1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b) 
provides:

            
(b)  A person is guilty of 
aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years, if:

            
(i)  While operating or 
driving a vehicle in violation of W.S. 10-6-103, 31-5-233 or 41-13-206, he 
causes the death of another person and the violation is the proximate cause of 
the death; or

            
(ii)  He operates or drives a 
vehicle in a reckless manner, and his conduct is the proximate cause of the 
death of another person.

   2Sampsell has included in this 
analysis:  Rogers v. State, 
971 P.2d 599 (Wyo. 
1999); Smith v. State, 922 P.2d 846 (Wyo. 
1996); Pearson v. State, 818 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 
1991); Whitfield v. State, 781 P.2d 913 (Wyo. 
1989); Volz, 707 P.2d 179; Hodgins v. State, 706 P.2d 655 (Wyo. 
1985); and Felske v. State, 706 P.2d 257 (Wyo. 
1985).