Case Title: Quimby v. Myers

Citation: 179 Vt. 611, 2005 VT 123, 895 A.2d 128

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Quimby v. Myers (2004-236); 179 Vt. 611; 895 A.2d 128

2005 VT 123

[Filed 09-Nov-2005]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 20-Jan-2006]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT 123

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-236

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 2005

  Michael Quimby	                	    }	APPEALED FROM:
                                        }
                                        }
       v.	                            }	Lamoille Superior Court
                                        }	
  Gaye Schaufus Myers	                }
                                        }	DOCKET NO. 158-8-00 Lecv

                                          Trial Judge: John P. Meaker

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  This case-before us for a second time-involves a protracted
  dispute between a former couple over the assets of their alleged
  partnership in a horse farm business. (FN1)  In this second appeal,
  defendant Gaye Schaufus Myers contends the trial court erred in: (1)
  denying her motion for summary judgment, which was based on the statute of
  frauds, and later permitting the jury to determine that real property to
  which she held exclusive title was a partnership asset despite the absence
  of a writing transferring title to the partnership; (2) failing to conduct
  an accounting and judicial dissolution of the partnership taking into
  account the partners' capital contributions; and (3) dismissing her
  counterclaim for unjust enrichment.  In a cross-appeal, plaintiff Michael
  Quimby contends the court erred in: (1) dismissing a fraudulent conveyance
  claim; (2) failing to award pre-judgment interest; and (3) denying his
  motion for attorney's fees.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand
  for further proceedings consistent with the views set forth below.
 
       ¶  2.  The material facts may be briefly summarized.  Ms. Myers was
  the sole owner of a sixty-acre wooded lot in the Town of Lowell.  In 1994,
  she began a personal relationship with Mr. Quimby. Quimby claims that he
  and Myers entered into an oral agreement in which he agreed to sell his
  house and use the proceeds to construct a pole barn and apartment on the
  Lowell property for use in a business to breed and sell horses.  Although
  Quimby claims to have invested about $30,000 from the sale, the evidence at
  trial showed that he gave Myers two checks from the proceeds totaling
  $19,000.  Quimby further testified that he and Myers entered into  a "50/50
  agreement" under which, if the relationship ended, "we'll sell, we'll
  split, and we'll be gone." Thereafter, Myers brought a number of her horses
  to the property, and Quimby claims that together they acquired several more
  and that he used his income to pay for the cost of feed, utilities, and
  taxes.  Quimby acknowledged that although he pressed Myers "to give me
  something in writing" she refused, and that he consequently threatened to
  sue under the "original agreement" for "[h]alf of everything.  Half of the
  house, barn, half of the horses that we had acquired."     

       ¶  3.  The parties' relationship ended in 1999.  In August 2000,
  Quimby filed a complaint against Myers, seeking a dissolution of the
  partnership, an accounting, and enforcement of the oral agreement to sell
  the property and divide the proceeds equally upon the dissolution of the
  parties' relationship.  The court denied Quimby's motion for writ of
  attachment and, thereafter, granted Myers's motion for summary judgment,
  ruling that the oral agreement for reimbursement of the proceeds that
  Quimby had allegedly invested in the business was invalid under the statute
  of frauds, 12 V.S.A. § 181(5). (FN2)  In Quimby v. Schaufus, No. 2001-528,
  slip op. at 2 (Vt. June 27, 2002) (unreported mem.), however, we reversed
  the judgment, holding that an agreement for repayment of money, even if it
  requires liquidation of real property, does not require a writing.  See
  Cameron v. Burke, 153 Vt. 565, 571-72, 572 A.2d 1361, 1365 (1990) (statute
  of frauds does not apply to promise to repay debt from proceeds of resale
  of land, which does not create interest in property within the statute). 
  We also noted that material issues remained in dispute concerning Quimby's
  allegation that the parties had an oral agreement to operate a business,
  and his claim for an accounting.  Quimby, No. 2001-528, slip op. at 2; see
  Harman v. Rogers, 147 Vt. 11, 14-15,