Case Title: Ruben Baez Godoy v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company

Citation: 2009 WI 78

Docket Number: 2006AP002670

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 78 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2670 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Ruben Baez Godoy, a minor, by his guardian ad 
litem, Susan M. Gramling, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, The 
Sherwin-Williams Company, American Cyanamid 
Company, Armstrong Containers, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Walter Stankowski, Wayne Stankowski and 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company, 
          Defendants, 
 
Acuity, 
          Intervenor-Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 239 
Reported at:  306 Wis. 2d 226, 743 N.W.2d 159 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 14, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 10, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Francis T. Wasielewski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence. 
 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join the 
concurrence. 
 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER, and GABLEMAN, JJ., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
2 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner briefs were by Peter 
G. Earle and Law Offices of Peter Earle, LLC, Milwaukee; and 
Jonathan D. Orent, Fidelma Fitzpatrick, and Motley Rice, LLC, 
Providence, R.I., and oral argument was by Peter G. Earle and 
Fidelma Fitzpatrick. 
 
For the defendants-respondents E.I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Company, The Sherwin-Williams Company, and Armstrong Containers, 
Incorporated, there were briefs by Paul E. Benson, Nathaniel 
Cade, Jr., and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee; Steven 
R. Williams, Joy C. Fuhr, R. Trent Taylor, and McGuire Woods 
LLP, Richmond, Va.; Timothy A. Bascom and Bascom, Budish, & 
Ceman, S.C., Wauwatosa; Robert P. Alpert, Jeffrey K. Douglass, 
and Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, Atlanta, Ga.; Jeffrey K. 
Spoerk, Christopher G. Meadows, Cheri L. Baden, and Quarles & 
Brady LLP, Milwaukee; and Robert S. Walker, Laura A. Meaden, 
Rebekah B. Kcehowski, and Jones Day, Pittsburgh, Pa., and oral 
argument by Joy C. Fuhr. 
 
For the defendant-respondent American Cyanamid Company, 
there was a brief by Richard W. Mark, Elyse D. Echtman, and 
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, New York, N.Y.; and Ralph 
A. Weber, Beth Ertmatinger Hanan, Daniel S. Elger, and Gass 
Weber Mullins LLC, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Richard W. 
Mark. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Stephanie A. Scharf, 
Sarah R. Marmor, and Schoeman, Updike, Kaufman & Scharf, 
Chicago, Ill.; and Colleen D. Ball, Wauwatosa, on behalf of The 
Product Liability Advisory Council. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by R. George Burnett, and 
Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry SC, Green Bay, on behalf of 
Miller Brewing Company, S.C. Johnson & Son, Wisconsin Knife 
Works, Midwest Food Processors Association, and Wisconsin Dairy 
Business Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Pelish and 
Thrasher, Pelish, Franti & Smith Ltd., Rice Lake, on behalf of 
the Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin and The Metropolitan 
Milwaukee Association of Commerce. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Gregory B. Conway and 
Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry SC, Green Bay, on behalf of 
Hydrite Chemical Co. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Rhonda L. Lanford and 
Habush Habush & Rottiers S.C., Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Association for Justice. 
 
 
 
2009 WI 78
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP2670  
(L.C. No. 
2006CV277) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ruben Baez Godoy, a minor, by his guardian ad 
litem, Susan M. Gramling, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, The 
Sherwin-Williams Company, American Cyanamid 
Company, Armstrong Containers, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Walter Stankowski, Wayne Stankowski and 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Acuity, 
 
          Intervenor-Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 14, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Ruben Baez 
Godoy, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
affirming the circuit court's order dismissing his defective 
design claims in strict liability and negligence against 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
2 
 
manufacturers of white lead carbonate pigment.1  The issue 
presented here is whether the circuit court correctly concluded 
that Godoy's complaint failed to state a claim of defective 
design where (1) the product is white lead carbonate pigment; 
(2) the alleged design defect is the presence of lead; and (3) 
the defendant manufacturers were manufacturers of white lead 
carbonate pigment.   
¶2 
We 
determine 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
concluded that the complaint failed to state claims of defective 
design.  A claim for defective design cannot be maintained here 
where the presence of lead is the alleged defect in design, and 
its very presence is a characteristic of the product itself.  
Without lead, there can be no white lead carbonate pigment.  We 
therefore conclude that the complaint fails to allege a design 
feature that makes the design of white lead carbonate pigment 
defective.  Accordingly, albeit with some clarification of the 
rationale, we affirm the court of appeals.2  
I 
¶3 
This is a review of the circuit court's dismissal of 
design defect claims.  Therefore, all facts and allegations in 
                                                 
1 See Godoy ex rel. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 2007 
WI App 239, 306 Wis. 2d 226, 743 N.W.2d 159, affirming a non-
final order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Francis 
T. Wasielewski, Judge. 
2 Godoy filed suit under theories of strict liability and 
negligence.  Our opinion today addresses only the defective 
design claims.  Other claims remain pending at the circuit court 
and are not affected by this interlocutory appeal. 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
3 
 
the complaint are presumed to be true.  These facts are 
primarily taken from Godoy's first amended complaint.3 
¶4 
Ruben Baez Godoy is a minor child who grew up in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  When he was approximately one year old, 
he lived in an apartment at 1502 West Windlake Avenue.  The 
surfaces of the apartment had been coated with paint containing 
white lead carbonate pigment.   
¶5 
Beginning in March of 1998 and for the duration of his 
tenancy, Godoy sustained lead poisoning.  The source of the lead 
poisoning was white lead carbonate pigment derived from painted 
surfaces, paint chips, paint flakes, and dust containing paint 
in his apartment. 
¶6 
The defendants in this case include E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Company, Armstrong Containers, the Sherwin-Williams 
Company, and American Cyanamid (collectively, "manufacturer 
defendants"). 
 
These 
defendants 
designed, 
manufactured, 
processed, marketed, promoted, supplied, distributed and/or sold 
white lead carbonate products used as a pigment in paints and 
coatings for residential use.  Godoy alleged that the intended 
purpose of white lead carbonate pigment was as an ingredient in 
paint.  Godoy is unable to identify the particular manufacturer 
of the white lead carbonate pigment present in the apartment.  
                                                 
3 The defendant manufacturers filed the motion to dismiss in 
response to Godoy's first amended complaint.  Godoy subsequently 
filed a second amended complaint adding party defendants.  
However, the substantive allegations remained unchanged.   
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Ingesting white lead carbonate pigment, like other 
products containing lead, can cause severe and permanent 
injuries 
including 
learning 
disabilities, 
decreased 
intelligence, deficits in neurophsychological functioning, coma, 
seizure, and death.  By the second half of the twentieth 
century, manufacturers and members of the scientific community 
acknowledged that lead is hazardous to human health and that 
children could get lead poisoning through exposure to paint 
containing lead.  Godoy alleges that the manufacturer defendants 
nonetheless promoted the use of white lead carbonate pigment in 
residential paints, marketing it as a safe product that fostered 
health and well-being.   
¶8 
Godoy filed suit alleging, among other things, that 
white lead carbonate pigment is defectively designed and that 
the defendant manufacturers are liable under theories of strict 
liability and negligence.  Although three of the manufacturer 
defendants designed and manufactured paint in addition to white 
lead carbonate pigment, Godoy filed suit against them in the 
capacity of white lead carbonate pigment manufacturers, not in 
the capacity of paint manufacturers.4   
¶9 
The manufacturer defendants responded by filing a 
motion to dismiss the defective design claims.  They argued that 
Godoy did not identify a legally cognizable design defect in 
white lead carbonate pigment and that, as a result, his 
                                                 
4 American Cyanamid is the only defendant white lead 
carbonate manufacturer that did not also manufacture paint.  For 
further discussion, see Part III.B below. 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
5 
 
complaint failed to state design defect claims upon which relief 
could be granted.5  The circuit court dismissed the design defect 
claims, concluding that "lead is an inherent characteristic of 
white lead carbonate," and that white lead carbonate pigment 
cannot be designed without lead.   
¶10 Godoy was granted permission to file an interlocutory 
appeal.  The court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit 
court, determining that a product cannot be said to be 
defectively designed when that design is inherent in the nature 
of the product so that an alternative design would make the 
product something else.  See Godoy ex rel. v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 2007 WI App 239, ¶¶4, 8, 306 Wis. 2d 226, 743 
N.W.2d 159.   
¶11 In its analysis, the court noted that Wisconsin has 
neither accepted nor rejected the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Product Liability.  Id., ¶8.  Nonetheless, the opinion stated 
that the Restatement (Third) could "illumine" its inquiry.  Id.  
The court quoted the definition of design defect from the 
Restatement (Third), and then applied the facts to that 
definition.  Id.  Unlike Wisconsin law, the Restatement (Third) 
                                                 
5 In the memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, the 
defendants advanced that "[t]o the extent that Plaintiff's 
claims rest on an allegation of a design defect, they should be 
dismissed because white lead carbonate is, by definition, made 
of lead, and can be made no other way. . . . A design defect 
claim aimed at a product such as white lead carbonate is not a 
complaint about a defect in the design of the product.  It is, 
rather, a complaint that it should be a different product 
altogether."  
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
6 
 
requires proof of a reasonable alternative design in design 
defect cases.  Id.  Noting that "there is no 'alternative 
design' to make white-lead carbonate without using lead," the 
court concluded that the Restatement (Third) "does not sanction 
imposing liability on the defendants."  Id. 
II 
¶12 Whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief 
can be granted is a question of law, which we review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, ¶12, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827.  A 
motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the claim.  Id.  
We accept as true both the facts in the complaint and the 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such facts.  Id.   
¶13 We construe the allegations liberally in favor of 
stating a cause of action.  Id.  However, legal inferences and 
unreasonable inferences need not be accepted as true.  Id.; 
Morgan v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 731, 275 N.W.2d 660 
(1979).  A claim will not be dismissed as legally insufficient 
unless it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot recover 
under any circumstances.  John Doe 1, 303 Wis. 2d 34, ¶12.  
III 
¶14 In order to provide context to our analysis and focus 
to our inquiry, we initially embark on two threshold areas: (a) 
an 
overview 
of 
the 
development 
of 
our 
strict 
liability 
jurisprudence; and (b) a determination of the product at issue 
in this case.  
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
7 
 
A 
¶15 Products 
liability 
law 
involves 
complex 
and 
continually 
evolving 
concepts 
regarding 
a 
manufacturer's 
responsibility for providing safe consumer products.6  Less than 
a century ago, products liability jurisprudence was firmly 
rooted in contract law, which frustrated recovery for many 
injured consumers.  See generally  David G. Owen, The Evolution 
of 
Products 
Liability 
Law, 
26 
Rev. 
Litig. 
955 
(2007).  
Manufacturers of defective products could claim lack of 'privity 
of contract' as a near-absolute defense to liability.  Id. at 
961-64.  By mid-century, courts began to respond to "ever-
growing pressure for protection of the consumer."  Id. at 966 
(quoting Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 Tex. L. Rev. 
44, 44 (1955)).  In 1963, the landmark case Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), declared that 
manufacturers of defective products could be held strictly 
liable in tort.   
¶16 Shortly 
thereafter, 
the 
American 
Law 
Institute 
introduced the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which included for 
the first time "Special Liability of Seller of Product for 
Physical Harm to User or Consumer."  See Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 402A (1965).  This section created a new rule of strict 
liability, holding sellers of defective products liable for 
                                                 
6 For an extensive discussion of the history of products 
liability, see David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products 
Liability Law, 26 Rev. Litig. 955 (2007) and Richard W. Wright, 
The Principles of Product Liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067 (2007). 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
8 
 
defective products even if "the seller has exercised all 
possible care in the preparation and sale of [the] product."  
Id. § 402A(2)(a); see also id. cmt. a.  The intended effect was 
to prevent manufacturers, who were in the best position to 
ensure the quality of their wares, from invoking inapt contract 
law defenses.  Manufacturers could be held strictly liable for a 
product defect even if they were not negligent.  Two years 
later, Wisconsin embraced Section 402A and strict liability7 in 
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).   
                                                 
7 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A clarified that 
strict liability "does not preclude liability based upon the 
alternative ground of negligence of the seller, where such 
negligence can be proved."  Id. cmt. a.  Our cases explain that 
negligence 
and 
strict 
liability 
are 
separate 
avenues 
of 
recovery.  Morden v. Cont'l AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶42, 235 
Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659.  Both causes of action require a 
plaintiff 
to 
prove 
that 
the 
product 
causing 
injury 
was 
"defective."  See Wis. JI——Civil 3200.  However, the elements of 
negligence 
and 
strict 
liability 
claims 
are 
substantively 
different.  A determination that a manufacturer is strictly 
liable for a defect is "completely independent of and irrelevant 
to" 
a 
determination 
that 
a 
defect 
was 
caused 
by 
the 
manufacturer's negligence.  Giese v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111 
Wis. 2d 392, 414, 331 N.W.2d 585 (1983).   
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
9 
 
 ¶17 By the 1990s, some commentators believed that it was 
necessary to revise the restatement to reflect developments in 
the law.  See Owen, supra, at 980.  In response, the American 
Law Institute introduced the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability in 1998.  One major innovation was that the 
Restatement (Third) split products liability into three distinct 
categories: manufacturing defects, design defects, and defects 
based on failure to warn.  See Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability § 2 (1998).  In defining these categories, 
the restatement eschewed the doctrinal labels "strict liability" 
and 
"negligence." 
 
Rather, 
the 
restatement 
defined 
the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Strict liability is based on Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A and focuses on the nature of the defendant's product, 
whereas liability in negligence "hinges in large part on the 
defendant's conduct under circumstances involving a foreseeable 
risk of harm."  Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 
¶55, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727.  To prevail under strict 
liability, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the product was in a 
defective condition when it left the possession or control of 
the seller; (2) it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer; (3) the defect was a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries 
or damages; (4) the seller engaged in the business of selling 
such a product; and (5) the product was one which the seller 
expected to and did reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition it was in when the seller 
sold it.  Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55 
(1967). 
Here, what is lacking in the strict liability for defective 
design claim is lacking in the negligent design claim as well.  
Neither claim alleges a design defect that is not characteristic 
of the product itself.  As such, neither alleges a design 
feature that makes the design of white lead carbonate pigment 
defective.   
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
10 
 
categories functionally, according to their required elements of 
proof.  Owen, supra, at 982. 
¶18 Although we have recognized that the Restatement 
(Third) may offer new insights into product liability, we have 
neither adopted nor rejected it in its entirety.8  Haase v. 
Badger Mining Corp., 2004 WI 97, ¶23, 274 Wis. 2d 143, 682 
N.W.2d 389.  Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
has remained the touchstone of our analysis for strict products 
liability.   
B 
¶19 The next threshold area of discussion requires that we 
pinpoint the product that is the subject of the design defect 
claims in this case.  The identity of the product is essential 
to an analysis of its design.  The circuit court and the court 
of appeals based their analyses on the design of white lead 
carbonate pigment, but Godoy argues that the product in question 
is actually residential paint pigment.   
¶20 An examination of the complaint, however, undermines 
Godoy's argument.  The complaint alleges that "[t]he white lead 
carbonate pigment designed . . . by the Industry Defendants was 
and is an inherently defective and unreasonably dangerous 
product."  The complaint states that defendant manufacturers are 
strictly liable because the defect existed "[a]t the time the 
                                                 
8 Recently, we stated that the Restatement (Third)'s 
definition of "defective design" is "fundamentally at odds with 
current Wisconsin products liability law."  Green, 245 Wis. 2d 
772, ¶72.    
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
11 
 
white lead carbonate left possession and control of the Industry 
Defendants[.]"  The complaint refers to "white lead carbonate," 
"white lead pigment," or "white lead carbonate pigment" dozens 
of times.9  The words "residential paint pigment" do not appear 
in the complaint.   
¶21 During the review of a motion to dismiss, the 
allegations in a complaint must be construed liberally in favor 
of stating a cause of action.  John Doe 1, 303 Wis. 2d 34, ¶12.  
Nonetheless, in a products liability case, the plaintiff must——
at minimum——identify the product alleged to be defective.  Doing 
so puts the defendant on notice and allows the defendant to 
begin building a defense.  See Midway Motor Lodge of Brookfield 
v. Hartford Ins. Group, 226 Wis. 2d 23, 35, 593 N.W.2d 852 (Ct. 
App. 1999) ("[T]he complaint must give the defendant fair notice 
of not only the plaintiff's claim but the grounds upon which it 
rests as well." (internal quotations omitted)).  A liberal 
pleading standard cannot transform a complaint regarding "white 
lead carbonate pigment" into one regarding "residential paint 
pigment." 
¶22  Further, in order to advance his claim, the product 
cannot be residential paint pigment because Godoy is proceeding 
under the Collins risk-contribution theory.  Normally, an 
injured plaintiff is required to identify the particular 
                                                 
9 The terms "white lead carbonate" or "white lead pigment" 
are found at least once and sometimes repeatedly in the 
following paragraphs of the first amended complaint: 9, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 36, 37, 
38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 46(a), 46(b), 46(c), and 46(d).  
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
12 
 
manufacturer of the product that caused the injury.  Collins v. 
Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 181-82, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).  
Under risk-contribution, however, the plaintiff is not required 
to identify the specific manufacturer when all similar products 
are fungible and identically defective.  Id. at 180, 194.   
¶23 We recently applied the risk-contribution theory to 
white lead carbonate pigment.10  Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. 
Mallett, 2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523.  In 
Thomas, we concluded that for the purposes of risk-contribution, 
white lead carbonate pigment is fungible, and all manufacturers 
of white lead carbonate pigment could be held jointly and 
severally liable for injuries caused by the product.  Id., ¶27.  
We have not, however, applied the risk-contribution theory to 
residential paint pigment. 
¶24 Nonetheless, Thomas provides little guidance for the 
issue we address in this case.  This case is about defective 
design claims and Thomas was based on failure to warn claims.  
The question of whether white lead carbonate pigment was 
defectively designed was not before the Thomas court.  All 
defective design claims had been dismissed at the circuit court, 
and that ruling was not appealed.  Thomas, 285 Wis. 2d 236, ¶181 
n.2 (Wilcox, J., dissenting). 
                                                 
10 In the present case, the court of appeals mistakenly 
stated that the product in Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 
2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523, was paint 
containing white lead carbonate.  See Godoy, 306 Wis. 2d 226, 
¶¶3, 5.  This statement misconstrues our holding in Thomas. 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
13 
 
¶25 Because Godoy cannot identify which defendant produced 
the defective product that caused his injury, he must proceed 
under the risk-contribution theory.  Godoy does not ask us to 
extend 
the 
risk-contribution 
theory 
to 
residential 
paint 
pigment.  He does not assert that all residential paint pigments 
are identically defective, which is a prerequisite of risk-
contribution.  Perhaps he does not assert that all residential 
paint pigments are identical because he cannot make such an 
assertion given that not all residential paint pigments contain 
lead, the alleged defect.  Accordingly, based on a review of the 
complaint, we determine that the product at issue is white lead 
carbonate pigment. 
IV 
¶26 Having examined these threshold matters, we now 
address the substantive issue before the court.  At issue is the 
narrow question of whether a complaint alleging strict liability 
and negligence for a defective design states a claim where (1) 
the product is white lead carbonate pigment; (2) the alleged 
design defect is the presence of lead; and (3) the defendant 
manufacturers 
were 
manufacturers 
of 
white 
lead 
carbonate 
pigment. 
¶27 Under Dippel and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
manufacturers of defective products can be liable for the 
injuries their products cause, regardless of the care taken by 
the manufacturer or the foreseeability of the harm:   
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
14 
 
One who sells any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
to 
the 
user 
or 
consumer . . . is liable for physical harm . . . if: 
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling 
such a product, and  
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition 
in which it is sold. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1).  Section 402A, along 
with its comments, defines what it means to be defective. 
 
¶28 Nonetheless, 
a 
determination 
that 
a 
product 
is 
defective is not identical to a determination that the product 
was defectively designed.  Put another way, the fact that a 
defect exists does not compel the conclusion that the source of 
the defect is the product's design.  This distinction makes a 
difference. 
¶29 The issue in this case is not whether white lead 
carbonate pigment is defective, but whether the source of the 
alleged defect is the product's design.  Wisconsin cases have 
discussed three categories of product defects——manufacturing 
defects, design defects, and defects based on a failure to 
adequately warn.  A product has a manufacturing defect when it 
deviates 
from 
the 
manufacturer's specifications, and that 
deviation causes it to be unreasonably dangerous.11  A product 
has a design defect when the design itself is the cause of the 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, 
Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 648-49, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973) (affirming a 
jury verdict that a wheel was defectively constructed because 
the wheel did not meet manufacturer specifications).   
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
15 
 
unreasonable danger.12  Finally, a product is defective based on 
a failure to adequately warn when an intended use of the product 
is dangerous, but the manufacturer did not provide sufficient 
warning or instruction.13  Although Section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) does not draw clear lines between these 
types of defects, the comments provide guidance, discussed 
below.  
¶30 Godoy's complaint does not identify a particular 
design feature that is alleged to be defective.  However, a fair 
reading of the complaint suggests that the alleged defect is the 
presence of lead.14    
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Green, 245 Wis. 2d 772 (concluding that latex 
gloves 
were 
defectively 
designed 
because 
they 
contained 
excessive levels of allergy-causing latex proteins, and because 
they were powdered, which increased the likelihood that the 
allergenic proteins would be inhaled); Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor 
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 346, 375, 360 N.W.2d 2 
(1984) (concluding that a car seat was defectively designed 
because it was not padded with energy-absorbing material).   
13 See, 
e.g., 
Schuh 
v. 
Fox 
River 
Tractor 
Co., 
63 
Wis. 2d 728, 737, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974) (concluding that a 
tractor could be unreasonably dangerous and defective when the 
manufacturer failed to adequately inform the consumer that 
engaging the clutch would not turn off the fan). 
14 At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the circuit 
court asked Godoy's counsel to identify the specific defect in 
the design of white lead carbonate pigment.  Godoy's counsel 
identified lead.  The exchange between Godoy's counsel, Mr. 
Earle, and the court was set forth in the transcript as follows: 
MR. EARLE: . . . This is a motion to dismiss.  There 
are fact questions about whether or not white lead 
carbonate is designed in a defective manner.   
THE COURT: There is no question that you can't design 
white lead carbonate without lead, is there?  
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
16 
 
¶31 Lead is a characteristic ingredient of white lead 
carbonate pigment.  By definition, white lead carbonate pigment 
contains lead.  Removing lead from white lead carbonate pigment 
would transform it into a different product.  Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that the design of white lead 
carbonate pigment is not defective.   
¶32 An analogy illustrates the distinction.  Foil can be 
made using ingredients other than aluminum——gold, for example——
but aluminum foil cannot be made without aluminum.  The presence 
of aluminum is characteristic of aluminum foil.  If aluminum 
posed a hidden danger that the ultimate consumer would not 
contemplate, a manufacturer might be liable based on the failure 
to adequately warn or other claims.  However, the manufacturer 
would not be liable based on the design of aluminum foil. 
¶33 The comments to Section 402A support our conclusion.  
Comment h lists four potential deficiencies that can result in a 
defective condition: foreign objects, deterioration before sale, 
the way in which the product was packaged or prepared, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
MR. EARLE: Right.  
THE COURT: That is the defect that you are claiming, 
the harmful defect, that is what makes white lead 
carbonate dangerous.  That is the defect in it, do you 
agree?  
MR. EARLE: I agree. 
THE COURT: There is no dispute about any of those 
facts. . . .  
 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
17 
 
"harmful ingredients, not characteristic of the product itself."  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, cmt. h.  It does not state 
that a defective condition can arise from harmful ingredients 
that are characteristic of the product.  See id.  However, if a 
manufacturer "has reason to anticipate that danger may result 
from a particular use . . . [the manufacturer] may be required 
to give adequate warning of the danger . . . and a product sold 
without such warning is in a defective condition."  Id.; see 
also id. cmt. j ("In order to prevent the product from being 
unreasonably dangerous, the [manufacturer] may be required to 
give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use.").   
¶34 This distinction is consistent with Wisconsin law.  
See Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 245 
Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727.  In Green, the plaintiff was a 
hospital worker who developed a severe allergy to latex.  Id., 
¶1  She brought suit against the manufacturer of latex gloves, 
alleging a defective design.  Id.  Notably, the plaintiff did 
not claim that latex gloves were defective because they 
contained latex.  The presence of latex is "characteristic" of 
latex gloves.  Rather, the plaintiff alleged that they were 
defective because (1) they contained excessive levels of latex; 
and (2) they were powdered, which allowed the latex to be 
airborne.  Id., ¶11.  In effect, she argued that the quantity of 
latex in the gloves was not characteristic of the product, and 
that a particular design feature, powder, made the gloves more 
dangerous.   
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
18 
 
¶35 Godoy argues that the defendants confuse barring a 
design defect claim based on characteristic ingredients with 
barring a claim based on the open and obvious danger doctrine.  
Under the open and obvious danger doctrine, a manufacturer is 
not liable for injuries when the danger posed by the product 
should have been apparent to the consumer.  See Tanner v. 
Shoupe, 228 Wis. 2d 357, 367, 596 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1999) 
("In 
order for a 
defective design to render a product 
unreasonably dangerous the defect must be hidden from the 
ordinary consumer, that is, not an open and obvious defect.").   
¶36 The doctrine is not applicable in this case.  Under 
the open and obvious danger doctrine, a manufacturer is not 
strictly liable when a knife cuts flesh, when an alcoholic 
beverage leads to intoxication, or when the flame on a gas stove 
burns the chef.  See Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 459; Greif v. 
Anheuser-Busch Cos. Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 100, 103 (D. Conn. 
2000).  Further, a Volkswagen driver who has been injured in a 
car accident cannot allege that the car was defectively designed 
because it was too small——any danger posed by its size should 
have been readily apparent.  Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 
225 N.W.2d 431 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 601 n.1, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975) 
(Heffernan, J., concurring).  Here, the danger is not readily 
apparent.  Godoy's complaint alleges that the dangerous quality 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
19 
 
of white lead carbonate pigment is hidden and that the average 
consumer would not contemplate the risk.15  
¶37 The 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
concluded 
that 
the 
complaint failed to state claims of defective design.  A claim 
for defective design cannot be maintained where the presence of 
lead is the alleged defect in design, and its very presence is a 
characteristic of the product itself.  Without lead, there can 
be no white lead carbonate pigment.  We therefore conclude that 
the complaint fails to allege a design feature that makes the 
design of white lead carbonate pigment defective. 
V 
¶38 We have thus determined that Godoy's defective design 
claims were properly dismissed.  However, we recognize that two 
areas of products liability law require further clarification 
given the arguments advanced by the parties interpreting the 
analysis of the court of appeals.  We take this opportunity to 
reaffirm that: (a) Wisconsin strict products liability law does 
not require a plaintiff to prove the feasibility of an 
alternative design; and (b) the substantial change defense is 
not a basis of our decision here and was not an alternative 
                                                 
15 Under Section 402A, manufacturers have an obligation to 
warn consumers about the hidden dangers of their products.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmts. h., i.  If the 
defendant manufacturers had reason to anticipate that white lead 
carbonate pigment would be dangerous for its intended use, that 
fact could give rise to a requirement to give adequate warning.  
Without such warning, white lead carbonate pigment could be 
considered "defective" under § 402A.  These legal and factual 
questions properly remain pending at the circuit court. 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
20 
 
basis of the decision of the court of appeals.  Substantial 
change is a fact-intensive inquiry which is generally not 
appropriate to decide on a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim.  We address these two issues in turn.   
A 
¶39 Godoy argues that the court of appeals' analysis was 
in error because it relied on the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability § 2(b), which Wisconsin declined to adopt in 
Green, 245 Wis. 2d 772, ¶74.  He asserts that the court of 
appeals circumvented the consumer contemplation test, the 
established test for a product defect under Wisconsin law, and 
instead 
substituted 
the 
Restatement 
(Third)'s 
reasonable 
alternative design requirement. 
¶40 This court recently reaffirmed that Wisconsin applies 
the consumer contemplation test to determine whether a product 
is defective under strict liability.  Id., ¶35.  "Defective," 
for purposes of the consumer contemplation test, means that the 
product is "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate 
consumer and unreasonably dangerous to that consumer."  Id., ¶29 
(quoting Beacon Bowl, Inc. v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 176 
Wis. 2d 740, 792, 501 N.W.2d 788 (1993)).   
¶41 The term 'defect' is not susceptible to any general 
definition.  Rather, the determination is made on a case-by-case 
basis relying on the ultimate consumers' expectations.  Sumnicht 
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 368, 360 
N.W.2d 2 (1984).  However, the fact that a defect exists does 
not compel the conclusion that the source of the defect is the 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
21 
 
product's design.  The question in this case is not whether 
white lead carbonate pigment is defective, but whether the 
source of the alleged defect is the product's design.   
¶42 The court of appeals concluded that the design could 
not be defective because there is no alternative design to make 
white lead carbonate pigment without using lead.  See Godoy, 306 
Wis. 2d 226, ¶8 ("[A]s we have seen there is no 'alternative 
design' to make white-lead carbonate without using lead.").  To 
the extent that the court of appeals relied on a reasonable 
alternative 
design 
requirement, 
the 
court's 
analysis 
was 
misguided.  
¶43 We have explained that although the feasibility of an 
alternative design can be considered when evaluating a design 
defect claim, it is not a requirement.  Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 
370-71.  In Sumnicht, we refused to require a plaintiff to prove 
that a safer alternative design was commercially available: 
A product may be defective and unreasonably dangerous 
even though there are no alternative, safer designs 
available. . . . The question is not whether any other 
manufacturer has produced a safer design . . . . 
Id. at 371; see also Green, 245 Wis. 2d 772, ¶73 (concluding 
that proof of a reasonable alternative design would "add[] an 
additional——and 
considerable——element 
of 
proof" 
to 
the 
analysis.)  
¶44 Godoy argues that it is inconsistent to reject a 
reasonable alternative design requirement and still maintain 
that characteristic ingredients of the product cannot support a 
claim for defective design.  Godoy asserts that our conclusion 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
22 
 
is analogous to imposing a reasonable alternative design 
requirement.  
¶45 Holding that the presence of an ingredient which is 
"characteristic of the product itself" is an improper basis for 
a defective design claim is not equivalent to imposing a 
reasonable alternative design requirement.  We do not require 
that a plaintiff affirmatively prove, through expert testimony, 
that an alternative design is commercially viable.  We do not 
impose an expensive burden and require a battle of the experts 
over competing product designs.  We simply acknowledge that some 
ingredients 
cannot 
be 
eliminated 
from 
a 
design 
without 
eliminating the product itself.  When the ingredient cannot be 
designed out of the product, the Restatement (Second) instructs 
that although other claims may be asserted, the proper claim is 
not design defect. 
B 
¶46 The manufacturer defendants also argue that Godoy 
cannot recover for a design defect because white lead carbonate 
pigment is substantially changed when it is integrated into 
paint.  Section 402A states that a product must reach the 
consumer 
"without 
substantial 
change" 
in 
order 
for 
the 
manufacturer to be strictly liable for an injury it causes.  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1)(b).  Our cases state 
that to succeed under the substantial change defense, the change 
must be both substantial and material.  Glassey v. Cont'l Ins. 
Co., 176 Wis. 2d 587, 601, 500 N.W.2d 295 (1993).  The purpose 
of this requirement is to protect a manufacturer from liability 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
23 
 
when the dangerously defective aspect of the product was altered 
or introduced after the product left the manufacturer's control. 
¶47 Defendant manufacturer American Cyanamid asserts that 
the "substantial change" defense was actually an alternative 
basis for the court of appeals' decision.  We do not find 
support for this assertion.  See Godoy, 306 Wis. 2d 226, ¶7.   
¶48 American Cyanamid cites to the court of appeals' 
opinion, which provides: "Here, consistent with Shawver, the 
white-lead carbonate had to be further processed by its 
integration into paint."  Id., ¶7.  It is a stretch to conclude 
from this citation that the court of appeals set forth an 
alternative basis for its dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint 
based on a substantial change defense.   
¶49 Likewise, the substantial change defense was not a 
basis for the circuit court's decision to dismiss Godoy's 
defective design claims.  The defendants' motion to dismiss did 
not argue that the claims should be dismissed because the white 
lead carbonate pigment experienced a substantial and material 
change after leaving the possession and control of the defendant 
manufacturers.  In fact, the circuit court record is devoid of 
any reference to substantial change. 
¶50 It is not surprising that substantial change was not 
discussed at the circuit court.  Often, the issue of whether 
there was a substantial and material change is a fact-intensive 
inquiry.  This type of inquiry may not be amenable to resolution 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
24 
 
on a motion to dismiss where the facts in the complaint are 
accepted as true.16    
¶51 In this case, Godoy's first amended complaint alleges 
that "[t]he white lead carbonate that the Plaintiff was exposed 
to was in substantially the same condition as it was before 
leaving the control of the Industry Defendants."  The complaint 
further alleges that "[a]t the time that the white lead 
carbonate left the possession and control of the Industry 
Defendants, it was a defective and unreasonably dangerous 
product[.]" 
¶52 For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the allegations 
of the complaint are taken as true and are to be liberally 
construed in favor of allowing a cause of action to be 
maintained.  John Doe 1, 303 Wis. 2d 34, ¶12.  Given the 
procedural posture of this case, we do not address the issue of 
whether as a matter of law the white lead carbonate pigment 
underwent a substantial and material change. 
¶53 Further, we emphasize that our decision here should in 
no way be interpreted to provide component manufacturers blanket 
                                                 
16 The very cases that American Cyanamid relies upon to 
advance its argument illustrate this point.  It cites to the 
following cases: Glassey v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 587, 
500 N.W.2d 295 (1993); Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., 2004 WI 97,  
274 Wis. 2d 143, 682 N.W.2d 389; Shawver v. Roberts Corporation, 
90 Wis. 2d 672, 280 N.W.2d 226 (1979); City of Franklin, 58 
Wis. 2d 641; Westphal v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 192 
Wis. 2d 347, 531 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1995).  None of these 
cases was decided at a motion to dismiss.  With the exception of 
Westphal, each case had been submitted to a jury.  Westphal was 
decided on summary judgment, after a record had been fully 
developed through discovery. 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
25 
 
immunity from liability.  Integration into another product does 
not shift responsibility from the manufacturer of a defective 
component to another party "who [is] in no position to detect 
the hidden defect."  City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck 
Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 649-50, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973).  We 
have stated: 
Where there is no change in the component part itself, 
but it is merely incorporated into something larger, 
and where the cause of harm or injury is found, as 
here, to be a defect in the component part, we hold 
that, as to the ultimate user or consumer, the strict 
liability standard applies to the maker and supplier 
of the defective component part.  Where the component 
part is subject to further processing or substantial 
change, or where the causing of injury is not directly 
attributable 
to 
defective 
construction 
of 
the 
component part, the result might be different. 
Id. at 649.  When component manufacturers introduce defective 
components into the stream of commerce, they may be held liable 
for resulting injuries under the particular circumstances of the 
case. 
VI 
¶54 We 
determine 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
concluded that the complaint failed to state claims of defective 
design.  A claim for defective design cannot be maintained where 
the presence of lead is the alleged defect in design, and its 
very presence is a characteristic of the product itself.  
Without lead, there can be no white lead carbonate pigment.  The 
complaint fails to allege a design feature that makes the design 
of white lead carbonate pigment defective.  Accordingly, albeit 
No. 
2006AP2670   
 
26 
 
with some modification in the rationale, we affirm the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
¶55 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. did not participate. 
No.  2006AP2670.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶56 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I write a 
concurrence separate from the lead opinion to address an issue 
neither raised nor advanced by the parties in this case.  
Instead, it is a policy determination advanced by Justice 
Prosser's concurrence below.  See Justice Prosser's concurrence 
(joined by Justices Ziegler and Gableman). 
¶57 The concurrence below mistakes judicial restraint for 
intransigence.  Challenging the lead opinion to "muster[] the 
intellectual firepower to defend" our reliance on the consumer 
contemplation test, the concurrence wants to square off and 
impose an agenda it seeks to advance.  See id., ¶109. 
¶58 Neither of the parties in this case has called upon 
the court to deviate from over 40 years of case law and adopt 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b).  In 
their brief, the defendant manufacturers disclaimed any reliance 
by the court of appeals on the Restatement (Third), arguing that 
"the Restatement (Third) of Torts was not briefed, discussed, or 
even mentioned by any party prior to the Court of Appeals' sua 
sponte discussion of it."1  Both parties agree that the consumer 
                                                 
1 The court of appeals discussed the Restatement (Third) in 
a single paragraph of its opinion.  See Godoy v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 2007 WI App 239, ¶8, 306 Wis. 2d 226, 743 
N.W.2d 159.  It prefaced its comments as follows: "Wisconsin has 
neither adopted nor rejected the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability (1998), . . . and we need not adopt it 
here[.]"  Id. (citation omitted). 
No.  2006AP2670.awb 
 
2 
 
contemplation test is the applicable test, and that it controls 
the outcome in this case.   
¶59 Judicial restraint is especially appropriate here 
because adopting the Restatement (Third)'s approach to product 
liability would be a sea change in Wisconsin law.  Over the last 
42 years since we adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, 
manufacturers of defective products can be held strictly liable 
even if they were not negligent.  See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 
Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).  "Defective," for 
purposes of the consumer contemplation test, means that the 
product is "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate 
                                                                                                                                                             
Further, contrary to the assertion in Justice Prosser's 
concurrence, the Restatement (Third) was not advanced as an 
alternative ground for recovery in Horst v. Deere & Co., 2009 WI 
75, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.  See Justice Prosser's 
concurrence, ¶81 n.2.  For a description of the negligible 
discussion 
of 
the 
Restatement 
(Third) 
in 
Horst, 
see 
__ 
Wis. 2d __, ¶84 (J. Crooks, concurring). 
Any doubt as to whether the plaintiffs in Horst advocated 
for the adoption of the Restatement (Third) is erased by a 
review of the oral arguments.  No attorney uttered the words 
"Restatement 
(Third)" 
at 
oral 
argument. 
 
In 
fact, 
the 
plaintiffs' attorney specifically disclaimed any reliance on a 
risk-utility test, which is one of the principles underlying the 
Restatement (Third).  He stated: "I didn't argue for the 
adoption of a risk-utility test[.]"  See Wisconsin Court System, 
Supreme 
Court 
Oral 
Arguments, 
http://wicourts.gov/opinions/soralarguments.htm 
(search 
"Party 
name" for "Horst"; then follow "Playback" link), at 26:35.  
Finally, 
Justice Prosser argues that the Restatement 
(Third) was briefed fully in a previous appeal to this court, 
Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 
629 N.W.2d 727.  Justice Prosser is correct.  The issue in 
Green, which was fully briefed and argued, was whether Wisconsin 
should adopt the Restatement (Third) § 2(b).  The majority of 
the court said no.  See id., ¶¶71-74. 
No.  2006AP2670.awb 
 
3 
 
consumer and unreasonably dangerous to that consumer."  Green v. 
Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, ¶29, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 
N.W.2d 727.  
¶60 Strict products liability focuses on the dangerous 
condition of the product rather than on the manufacturer's 
conduct.  Under the Restatement (Third)'s approach, however, 
strict liability for design defects is essentially eliminated.  
Instead, 
liability 
is 
predicated 
on 
the 
manufacturer's 
negligence.  See Restatement (Third) § 2 cmt. a (Liability 
"achieve[s] the same general objectives as does liability 
predicated on negligence.") (emphasis added).  The Restatement 
(Third) imposes liability "when the foreseeable risk of harm 
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design[.]"  Id. § 2(b). 
¶61 The 
Restatement 
(Third)'s 
approach 
remains 
controversial. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
George 
W. 
Conk, 
Punctuated 
Equilibrium: 
Why 
Section 
402A 
Flourished 
and 
the 
Third 
Restatement Languished, 26 Rev. Litig. 799 (2007); Frank J. 
Vandall & Joshua F. Vandall, A Call for an Accurate Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Design Defect, 33 U. Mem. L. Rev. 909, 922 
(2003); Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, the 
Third Restatement, and the Reinstatement of Liability Without 
Fault, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 889 (2005); James A. Henderson, Jr. & 
Aaron D. Twerski, A Fictional Tale of Unintended Consequences: A 
Response to Professor Wertheimer, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 939 (2005); 
William E. Westerbeke, The Sources of Controversy in the New 
No.  2006AP2670.awb 
 
4 
 
Restatement of Products Liability: Strict Liability Versus 
Products Liability, 8 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1 (1998-1999).   
¶62 Unlike the orientation of § 402A, which arose out of a 
concern for the protection of consumers, the orientation of 
Restatement (Third) reportedly emphasizes the protection of 
manufacturers.  One authority observes the elimination of the 
consumer 
contemplation 
test 
"from 
the 
products 
liability 
equation is highly significant, and symbolic of the orientation 
of the Third Restatement towards protecting manufacturers."  
Wertheimer, supra, at 927.  
¶63 Some jurisdictions that have adopted the Restatement 
(Third) are now back-tracking.  The current judicial trend 
appears to be a return to the pro-consumer policies of origin 
and reinstating strict products liability under § 402A.  See id. 
at 893. 
¶64 In advocating for this policy change, the concurrence 
in this case and the concurrence in Horst v. Deere & Co. 
(released today)2 eschew the role of an appellate court.  
Instead, they appear to act like legislators, advancing a policy 
initiative which they favor.  Typically, it is the role of the 
legislature to identify and enact policy initiatives.  Appellate 
courts, on the other hand, play a more restrained role.   
¶65 Courts decide cases and controversies.  A court 
depends upon the parties to identify and raise issues and to 
advocate for a position.  After considering the parties' briefs 
and arguments, the court renders a decision.   
                                                 
2 2009 WI 75, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. 
No.  2006AP2670.awb 
 
5 
 
¶66 By contrast, the concurrence here would toss stare 
decisis to the wind.   It would overrule or otherwise modify 
scores of cases which refer to or apply § 402A as the test for 
products liability.  These cases would no longer be guides and 
precedent for litigants and the courts.  Forty-two years of 
judicial analysis should not be thrown down the tubes without 
the benefit of briefing or argument by the parties.3 
                                                 
3 See, for example: 
 
• Tatera v. FMC Corp., 2009 WI App 80, __ Wis. 2d __, __ 
N.W.2d __ (publication decision pending); 
 
• Haase 
v. 
Badger 
Mining 
Corp., 
2004 
WI 
97, 
274 
Wis. 2d 143, 682 N.W.2d 389; 
 
• Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 245 
Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727; 
 
• Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 
2000) (applying Wisconsin law); 
 
• Morden v. Continental AG, 2000 WI 51, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 
611 N.W.2d 659; 
 
• Sharp ex rel. Gordon v. Case Corp., 227 Wis. 2d 1, 595 
N.W.2d 380 (1999); 
 
• Bittner v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 194 Wis. 2d 
122, 533 N.W.2d 476 (1995);  
 
• Westphal v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 192 
Wis. 2d 347, 531 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1995);  
 
• Sedbrook v. Zimmerman Design Group, Ltd., 190 Wis. 2d 14, 
526 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1994);  
 
• Estate of Cook v. Gran-Aire, Inc., 182 Wis. 2d 330, 513 
N.W.2d 652 (Ct. App. 1994);  
 
• Rogers v. AAA Wire Prods., Inc., 182 Wis. 2d 263, 513 
N.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1994);  
 
• Beacon Bowl, Inc. v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 176 Wis. 
2d 740, 501 N.W.2d 788 (1993);  
 
No.  2006AP2670.awb 
 
6 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
• Glassey v. Continental Ins. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 587, 500 
N.W.2d 295 (1993);  
 
• Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace and Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 
471 N.W.2d 179 (1991);  
 
• Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & Light Co., Inc., 162 Wis. 2d 1, 
469 N.W.2d 595 (1991);  
 
• Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 160 Wis. 2d 689, 467 
N.W.2d 518 (1991);   
 
• Rolph v. EBI Cos., 159 Wis. 2d 518, 464 N.W.2d 667 
(1991);  
 
• Kemp v. Miller, 154 Wis. 2d 538, 453 N.W.2d 872 (1990); 
 
• Estate of Schilling v. Blount, Inc., 152 Wis. 2d 608, 449 
N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1989);  
 
• Tony Spychalla Farms, Inc. v. Hopkins Agr. Chemical Co., 
151 Wis. 2d 431, 444 N.W.2d 743 (Ct. App. 1989);  
• St. Clare Hosp. of Monroe v. Schmidt, Garden, Erickson, 
Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 750, 437 N.W.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1989); 
 
• O'Brien v. Medtronic, Inc., 149 Wis. 2d 615, 439 N.W.2d 
151 (Ct. App. 1989);  
 
• Mulhern v. Outboard Marine Corp., 146 Wis. 2d 604, 432 
N.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1988);  
 
• Griffin v. Miller, No. 1986AP1562, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1987);  
 
• Van's Realty & Const. of Appleton, Inc. v. Blount Heating 
and Air Conditioning, Inc., No. 1985AP1812, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1986);  
 
• Clarke v. Flad & Assocs., No. 1984AP780, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1988);  
 
• Gonzalez v. City of Franklin, 128 Wis. 2d 485, 383 N.W.2d 
907 (Ct. App. 1986);  
 
• Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 
338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984);  
 
• Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 
(1984);  
 
• Burrows v. Follett and Leach, Inc., 115 Wis. 2d 272, 340 
N.W.2d 485 (1983); 
 
No.  2006AP2670.awb 
 
7 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
• Giese v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 331 
N.W.2d 585 (1983); 
 
• Krueger v. Tappan Co., 104 Wis. 2d 199, 311 N.W.2d 219 
(Ct. App. 1981); 
 
• Wangen 
v. 
Ford 
Motor 
Corp., 
97 
Wis. 2d 260, 
294 
N.W.2d 437 (1980); 
 
• Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 672, 280 N.W.2d 226 
(1979); 
 
• Priske v. General Motors Corp., 89 Wis. 2d 642, 279 
N.W.2d 227 (1979);  
 
• Black v. General Elec. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 195, 278 N.W.2d 
224 (Ct. App. 1979);  
 
• Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 275 
N.W.2d 641 (1979);  
 
• Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d 882, 
275 N.W.2d 915 (1979);  
 
• Keller v. Welles Dept. Store of Racine, 88 Wis. 2d 24, 
276 N.W.2d 319 (Ct. App. 1979);  
 
• Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233 
(1979);  
 
• Fonder v. AAA Mobile Homes, Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 3, 257 
N.W.2d 841 (1977);  
 
• Heldt v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 110, 240 N.W.2d 
154 (1976);  
 
• Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 
1976); 
 
• Barter v. General Motors Corp., 70 Wis. 2d 796, 235 
N.W.2d 523 (1975); 
 
• Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975); 
 
• Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 
69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975);  
 
• Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 Wis. 2d 728, 218 
N.W.2d 279 (1974); 
 
• City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales Inc., 58 
Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973); 
 
No.  2006AP2670.awb 
 
8 
 
¶67 As is, Justice Prosser's concurrence in this case and 
Justice Gableman's concurrence in Horst leave Wisconsin law 
unsettled.  Does Green remain Wisconsin law?  How are circuit 
courts and practitioners to grapple with the significance of the 
fact that in both this case and in Horst, an equal number of 
justices have voted to change Wisconsin law as have voted to 
uphold it?    
¶68 I am uncertain whether the Restatement (Third) should 
be adopted.  What I am certain of, however, is that rather than 
pushing a predetermined agenda, I would wait until the issue is 
raised by a party, and briefed and argued before this court. 
¶69 For 
the 
reasons discussed above, I respectfully 
concur.   
¶70 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
• Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 54 Wis. 2d 345, 195 N.W.2d 602 
(1972); 
 
• Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 186 
N.W.2d 258 (1971); 
 
• Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) 
(adopting the Restatement (Second) § 402A and strict 
products liability)
   
No.  2006AP2670.npc 
 
1 
 
¶71 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I join the lead 
opinion, but I write separately in response to Justice Prosser's 
concurrence.  Justice Prosser would have this court "acknowledge 
that the law has evolved and adopt Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability § 2(b) to analyze products liability claims 
alleging defective design."  Justice Prosser's concurrence, 
¶110.  
¶72 I emphasize that the parties in this case did not 
invite the court to adopt § 2(b) of the Restatement (Third).  
The briefing and arguments to the court of appeals and this 
court in this case did not address the implications of adopting 
that approach.  As the brief of defendants-respondents noted, 
"In short, the Restatement (Third) of Torts was not briefed, 
discussed, or even mentioned by any party prior to the Court of 
Appeals' sua sponte discussion of it."  Before this court, the 
parties vigorously disputed whether the court of appeals, in 
referring to § 2(b) in its ruling, had "essentially adopted" the 
provision and based its ruling on it, but no party advocated for 
its adoption.   
¶73 Because any consideration of such a fundamental change 
in Wisconsin law should not be done without a full and thorough 
briefing followed by oral arguments before this court, I believe 
we should decline to reach beyond the controversy the parties 
ask us to resolve to consider adopting an approach that no party 
has asked us to adopt.  The parties in this case argued that 
this case could be resolved on the basis of existing Wisconsin 
law, and we have done so.  We should address the question of 
No.  2006AP2670.npc 
 
2 
 
adopting Restatement (Third) § 2(b) when a case arises in which 
one of the parties asks us to do so and not before.  We need 
briefing and oral arguments before deciding to make a sea change 
in Wisconsin law——one that could result in throwing out forty-
two years of precedent beginning with Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 
2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). 
¶74 I therefore respectfully concur. 
¶75 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this concurrence. 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
 
¶76 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  This review 
involves 
defective 
design 
claims 
against 
manufacturer 
defendants.  While I agree with the lead opinion's decision to 
affirm the dismissal of these claims, I write separately to 
defend the merits of Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability § 2(b) (1998).  The lead opinion chastises the court 
of appeals for citing Restatement (Third), see lead op., ¶¶39-
42, and it tries to put as much distance between Restatement 
(Third) and Wisconsin products liability law as possible, see, 
e.g., lead op., ¶¶17-18, 39-45.  The purpose behind this 
criticism of Restatement (Third) is evident in Justice Bradley's 
concurring opinion.  Justice Bradley does not want to consider 
Restatement (Third); she wishes to bury it. 
¶77 In 2001 former Justice Diane S. Sykes wrote that 
Wisconsin was "seriously out of step with product liability law 
as it has evolved since this court adopted Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 402A [(1965)] in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 
155 N.W.2d 55 (1967)."  Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 
WI 109, ¶122, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727 (Sykes, J., 
dissenting).  Some members of this court would like to address 
this disparity.  Nonetheless, the issue might not have come up 
in this case had Justice Bradley not been so determined to 
discredit Restatement (Third) in her writings. 
¶78 The truth is, however, that the justification provided 
by the lead opinion for dismissing the plaintiff's defective 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
2 
 
design claim is strikingly similar to the analysis that would be 
employed under Restatement (Third).   
¶79 To illustrate, the lead opinion reasons that a claim 
for 
defective 
design 
cannot 
be 
maintained 
against 
the 
manufacturers of white lead carbonate pigment "where the 
presence of lead is the alleged defect in design, and its very 
presence is a characteristic of the product itself."  Lead op., 
¶2.  Specifically, the opinion states, "Without lead, there can 
be 
no white 
lead 
carbonate pigment."  Id.  Similarly, 
Restatement (Third) § 2(b) would not impose liability against 
the pigment manufacturers for defective design because it would 
be impossible for them to design white lead carbonate pigment 
without using lead, see id., and therefore, the plaintiff would 
be unable to submit evidence of a reasonable alternative design 
that, if adopted, would reduce or eliminate white lead carbonate 
pigment's potential dangers, see Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability § 2.  Although claiming not to "require that 
a plaintiff affirmatively prove . . . that an alternative design 
is commercially viable," see lead op., ¶45, the rationale 
employed by the lead opinion is ultimately tantamount to a 
conclusion that the plaintiff's claim must fail because he 
cannot establish a reasonable alternative design for white lead 
carbonate pigment.   
¶80 Despite the similarity of analysis, the lead opinion 
declares that "[t]o the extent that the court of appeals relied 
on 
a 
reasonable 
alternative 
design 
requirement 
[under 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
3 
 
Restatement (Third)], the court's analysis was misguided."  Id., 
¶42. 
¶81 The distinction between the analysis the lead opinion 
disparages and the analysis the lead opinion employs is too 
metaphysical to justify continuing disavowal of Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b).  Instead of 
denigrating Restatement (Third), I would adopt § 2(b) of 
Restatement (Third) for analyzing defective design claims1 and 
put Wisconsin back in step with the evolution of products 
liability law.2 
                                                 
1 Justice Bradley asserts that adopting Restatement (Third) 
of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b) for analyzing defective 
design claims would require that this court "overrule or 
otherwise 
modify 
scores 
of 
cases." 
 
Justice 
Bradley's 
concurrence, ¶66; Horst v. Deere & Co., 2009 WI 75, ¶133, __ 
Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (Bradley, J., dissenting).  The cases 
cited by Justice Bradley do not support her assertion.  See 
Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶66 n.3; see also Horst, __ 
Wis. 2d __, ¶133 n.2 (Bradley, J., dissenting).   
Most notably, all but six of the cases cited by Justice 
Bradley were decided before Restatement (Third) was published in 
1998.  See Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶66 n.3; see also 
Horst, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶133 n.2 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  
Therefore, there is no reason why this court would need to reach 
back to the cases decided before Restatement (Third) and 
overrule or otherwise modify their holdings.  Moreover, a large 
portion of the pre-Restatement (Third) cases cited by Justice 
Bradley do not mention Restatement (Second) or involve claims 
for defective design and would not be disturbed by the adoption 
of § 2(b) of Restatement (Third) for defective design claims.  
See Horst, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶104 n.9 (Gableman, J., concurring). 
2 Although the parties in this case did not rely upon 
Restatement (Third) to support their arguments, that did not 
prevent the lead opinion from seizing the opportunity to 
discredit Restatement (Third) and create roadblocks to its 
eventual adoption in Wisconsin.  If Restatement (Third) is not 
relevant to this dispute, then the lead opinion should not use 
six paragraphs addressing its substance.  See lead op., ¶¶39-45. 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
4 
 
I 
¶82 Restatement (Second) of Torts was promulgated by the 
American Law Institute (ALI) in 1965.  Section 402A, entitled 
"Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to 
User or Consumer," was actually approved in 1964. 
¶83 Section 402A was one of the most important and 
visionary sections of Restatement (Second).  William L. Prosser 
(1898-1972), the preeminent scholar in American tort law who 
served as sole Reporter for most of the work on Restatement 
(Second), inspired and helped codify this strict liability 
section.   
¶84 Section 402A reads as follows: 
 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective 
condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer or to his property is subject to liability 
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user 
or consumer, or to his property, if 
 
 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business 
of selling such a product, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
It should be noted that Restatement (Third) § 2(b) was 
discussed in some detail by the court of appeals when it decided 
this case.  See Godoy v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 2007 WI 
App 239, ¶8, 306 Wis. 2d 226, 743 N.W.2d 159.  Also, in their 
reply brief, the plaintiffs advanced Restatement (Third) as an 
alternative grounds for recovery in Horst, a case argued only a 
few months after the present case, and Restatement (Third) was 
discussed by an amicus brief in that case as well.  See Horst, 
__ Wis. 2d __, ¶102 n.8 (Gableman, J., concurring) (quoting the 
plaintiffs' reply brief).   Finally, Restatement (Third) § 2(b) 
was briefed fully in a previous appeal to this court.  See Green 
v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 
N.W.2d 727. 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the 
user or consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it is sold. 
 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies 
although 
 
 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible 
care in the preparation and sale of his product, and 
 
 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the 
product from or entered into any contractual relation 
with the seller. 
¶85 At the time that Section 402A was written and adopted, 
the law on products liability was largely undeveloped.  For 
instance, the third edition of Prosser's Handbook of the Law of 
Torts, published in 1964, contained no chapter on products 
liability, and only a brief section on "Sellers of Chattels: 
Strict Liability."  See id. at 672-85. 
¶86 The principal concern with Section 402A today is that 
it is outdated and no longer reflects the complexities that have 
developed in products liability law over the past 45 years. 
II 
¶87 In 1997, the ALI adopted Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability.  This limited, long-awaited undertaking 
represented 
"an 
almost 
total 
overhaul 
of 
Restatement 
(Second)['s]" products liability law.  Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability at 3.  The new Restatement split 
products liability into three distinct categories: manufacturing 
defects, design defects, and defects based on failure to warn.  
See id, § 2.  Each functional category now carries its own 
separate standard of liability.  See id. 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
6 
 
¶88 Sections 1 and 2 of Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability read as follows: 
§ 1.  Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor 
for Harm Caused by Defective Products 
One engaged in the business of selling or 
otherwise 
distributing 
products 
who 
sells 
or 
distributes 
a 
defective 
product 
is 
subject 
to 
liability for harm to persons or property caused by 
the defect. 
§ 2. Categories of Product Defect 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale 
or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, 
is defective in design, or is defective because of 
inadequate instructions or warnings.  A product: 
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the 
product departs from its intended design even though 
all possible care was exercised in the preparation and 
marketing of the product; 
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, 
or 
a 
predecessor 
in 
the 
commercial 
chain 
of 
distribution, and the omission of the alternative 
design renders the product not reasonably safe; 
(c) is 
defective 
because 
of 
inadequate 
instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of 
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or 
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a 
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, 
and the omission of the instructions or warnings 
renders the product not reasonably safe. 
¶89 The introduction to Restatement (Third) describes what 
necessitated such wholesale revision: 
In 1964 The American Law Institute adopted § 402A as 
part of the Restatement Second of Torts . . . .  The 
major thrust of § 402A was to eliminate privity so 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
7 
 
that a user or consumer, without having to establish 
negligence, 
could 
bring 
an 
action 
against 
a 
manufacturer, as well as against any other member of a 
distributive chain that had sold a product containing 
a manufacturing defect.  Section 402A had little to 
say about liability for design defects or for products 
sold with inadequate warnings.  In the early 1960s 
these areas of litigation were in their infancy. 
 
In restating the law of products liability more 
than a quarter of a century later, the [ALI] had 
before it thousands of judicial decisions that had 
fine-tuned the law of products liability in a manner 
hardly imaginable when Restatement Second was written.  
Issues that had not occurred to those members involved 
in drafting Restatement Second had become points of 
serious contention and debate in the courts.  What 
should be the governing standard for design and 
warning liability?   
Id. at 3 (emphasis added); see also Victor E. Schwartz, The Role 
of the Restatement in the Tort Reform Movement: The Restatement, 
Third, Torts: Products Liability: A Model of Fairness and 
Balance, 10 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 41, 42 (2000) ("Restatement 
(Second)'s Section 402[A] shed no light on what should be the 
legal standard for defect of design.  None of the cases cited in 
support of § 402[A] discussed design liability.  All of the 
cases concerned products that were mismanufactured.") (emphasis 
added). 
¶90 As defective design claims became more prevalent in 
the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the ALI came to realize 
"that § 402A, created to deal with liability for manufacturing 
defects, could not appropriately be applied to cases of design 
defects."  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 1 
cmt. a. (emphasis added).  This is because the consumer 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
8 
 
contemplation test,3 the test utilized by Restatement (Second) 
§ 402A, makes little or no sense in the context of defective 
design claims.4   
¶91 First, the test is amorphous and defies precise 
definition when used in a products liability case.  See W. Page 
Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 99, at 699 (5th ed. 1984) 
("The test can be utilized to explain most any result that a 
court or jury chooses to reach.  The application of such a vague 
concept does not provide much guidance for a jury.").   
¶92 Second, consumer expectations regarding how a product 
should be designed are "more difficult to discern than in the 
case of a manufacturing defect."  Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability § 2 cmt. a.  In fact, it is hard to imagine 
that ordinary consumers have any expectations regarding "the 
technical design characteristics of a product" other than the 
most basic expectation that the product be designed to work and 
to work safely.  See Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In 
Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 Wayne L. Rev. 1217, 
1236-37 (1993).   
¶93 Third, applying the consumer contemplation test to 
defective design claims runs the risk of labeling entire product 
                                                 
3 Specifically, the consumer contemplation test asks whether 
the product in question, when it left the manufacturer, was in a 
condition not contemplated by the ordinary consumer, Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. g. (1965), and whether the product 
was "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer," id. at cmt. i. 
4 A similar argument can be made for failure to warn claims. 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
9 
 
lines defective without ever considering the utility the 
products create for society.  See Keeton, supra, § 99, at 698-99 
("This test can result in the identification of products as 
being defectively dangerous that are clearly not, as when a new 
drug is a great boon to humanity but a few are victimized by a 
side effect or adverse reaction that was an unknowable risk[.]") 
(footnote and citation omitted).  Because a finding of liability 
for defective design has grave repercussions for the product at 
issue, courts should be required to consider not only the risks 
associated with the product but also the benefits.  See 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. a. 
("Some 
sort 
of 
independent 
assessment 
of 
advantages 
and 
disadvantages, to which some attach the label 'risk-utility 
balancing,' is necessary [to determine whether a product is 
defectively designed]."). 
¶94 The lead opinion's willingness to close the door on 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b) evinces 
a 
belief 
that 
there 
is 
no 
meaningful 
difference 
among 
manufacturing defects, design defects, and failure to warn 
defects——that 
one 
standard 
of 
liability 
fits 
all 
three 
categories. 
¶95 Most of the country has decided otherwise.  Wisconsin 
is now one of only six states that clings to the consumer 
contemplation test as the exclusive test for analyzing defective 
design claims.5   
                                                 
5 Alaska: Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 878 
(1979). 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
10 
 
III 
¶96 By 
separating 
the 
standards 
of 
liability 
for 
manufacturing defects, design defects, and failure to warn 
defects, Restatement (Third) § 2 offers significant improvements 
in products liability law.   
¶97 Restatement (Third) § 2(b) removes the focus of the 
inquiry in defective design cases from the ordinary consumer's 
expectations and shifts it to asking whether the product's 
design was reasonable.  See id., § 2 cmt. d. 
Whereas a manufacturing defect consists of a product 
unit's failure to meet the manufacturer's design 
specifications, a product asserted to have a defective 
design meets the manufacturer's design specifications 
but raises the question whether the specifications 
                                                                                                                                                             
Arkansas: Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 260 
F.3d 837, 846 (8th Cir. 2001); French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 
F.2d 295, 298 (8th Cir. 1981). 
Hawaii: Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1310-
11 (1997); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 
739 (1983). 
Nebraska: Kudlacek v. Fiat, 509 N.W.2d 603, 610 (1994). 
Oklahoma: Bishop v. Takata Corp., 12 P.3d 459, 461 (2000); 
Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d 1283, 1285 (1984).  
Justice 
Bradley's 
concurrence 
cites 
Professor 
Ellen 
Wertheimer's commentary in The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, 
the Third Restatement, and the Reinstatement of Liability 
Without Fault, 70 Brook L. Rev. 889, 893 (2005), for the claim 
that "[s]ome jurisdictions that have adopted the Restatement 
(Third) are now back-tracking."  Justice Bradley's concurrence, 
¶63.  However, a close look at Professor Wertheimer's assertion 
shows virtually no empirical support for the statement.  See 
Wertheimer, supra, at 934-37.  Without citation to courts that 
have 
actually 
retreated 
from 
their 
previous 
adoption 
of 
Restatement (Third), Justice Bradley's reliance on Professor 
Wertheimer's assertion is unpersuasive.   
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
11 
 
themselves create unreasonable risks.  Answering that 
question requires reference to a standard outside the 
specifications. 
Such a change in focus diminishes the likelihood that "strict 
liability 
will 
become 
absolute 
liability." 
 
Green, 
245 
Wis. 2d 772, ¶132 (Sykes, J., dissenting) ("[W]e must have some 
principled standards by which to evaluate product defectiveness 
in 
design . . . defect 
cases . . . . 
 
Evaluating 
design . . . defectiveness 
solely 
by 
reference 
to 
consumer 
expectations comes close to imposing absolute liability.").   
¶98 Restatement (Third)'s risk-utility balancing approach 
flows from the premise that risks must be foreseeable in order 
for the manufacturer to protect against them.  See Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b) (stating that a 
product "is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of 
harm" could have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a 
reasonable 
alternative design) (emphasis added).  Holding 
manufacturers 
liable 
for 
defective 
design 
based 
on 
"the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product" promotes 
efficient investment in product safety and avoids the risk of 
recklessly eliminating entire product lines as a result of a 
hidden or undiscoverable design risk.  Id., § 2 cmt. a. ("Most 
courts agree that, for the liability system to be fair and 
efficient, the balancing of risks and benefits in judging 
product design and marketing must be done in light of the 
knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably 
attainable at the time of distribution."). 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
12 
 
¶99 The fact that, under Restatement (Third) § 2(b), "a 
product is defective in design if the foreseeable risks of harm 
could have been reduced by a reasonable alternative design is 
based on the commonsense notion that liability for harm caused 
by product designs should attach only when harm is reasonably 
preventable."  Id., § 2 cmt. f. 
IV 
¶100 Despite the lead opinion's suggestion to the contrary, 
Restatement (Third) is not unfriendly to and does not impose 
unreasonable burdens upon plaintiffs making products liability 
claims.  See lead op., ¶¶42-43, 45.  It is true that to recover 
for defective design under Restatement (Third), most plaintiffs 
are 
required 
to 
submit 
evidence 
establishing 
that 
the 
manufacturer could have adopted a reasonable alternative design 
and that adopting the alternative design would have reduced or 
eliminated the harm posed by the product.  See Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b) & cmt. f.  However, 
the 
reasonable 
alternative 
design 
requirement 
is 
not 
as 
significant a barrier to recovery as the lead opinion suggests.  
See lead op., ¶¶42-43, 45. 
¶101 One of the lead opinion's primary gripes with the 
reasonable alternative design element under Restatement (Third) 
is that it will require an expensive "battle of the experts over 
competing product designs."  Id., ¶45.  Although a complex 
products liability case may result in a "battle of the experts," 
this is not likely to be caused by the plaintiff having to 
submit sufficient evidence of a reasonable alternative design.  
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
13 
 
Much of this evidence, where it exists, can be obtained through 
discovery.  Even if Wisconsin did not adopt Restatement (Third) 
§ 2(b) 
and 
incorporate 
its 
reasonable 
alternative 
design 
requirement into our defective design jurisprudence, a "battle 
of the experts" would likely remain the norm in complex products 
liability litigation. 
¶102 In some 
defective design cases, however, expert 
testimony would not be necessary, even if the plaintiff were 
required to present evidence of a reasonable alternative design.  
In particular, "[c]ases arise in which the feasibility of a 
reasonable alternative design is obvious and understandable to 
laypersons and therefore expert testimony is unnecessary to 
support a finding that the product should have been designed 
differently and more safely."  Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability § 2 cmt. f.6 
                                                 
6 Comment f. to Restatement (Third) § 2 continues with the 
following: 
For example, when a manufacturer sells a soft stuffed 
toy 
with 
hard 
plastic 
buttons 
that 
are 
easily 
removable and likely to choke and suffocate a small 
child who foreseeably attempts to swallow them, the 
plaintiff should be able to reach the trier of fact 
with a claim that buttons on such a toy should be an 
integral part of the toy's fabric itself (or otherwise 
be [ir]removable by an infant) without hiring an 
expert 
to 
demonstrate 
the 
feasibility 
of 
an 
alternative safer design.  Furthermore, other products 
already available on the market may serve the same or 
very similar function at lower risk and at comparable 
cost. 
 
Such 
products 
may 
serve 
as 
reasonable 
alternatives to the product in question. 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
14 
 
¶103 Furthermore, 
the 
actual 
burden 
of 
presenting 
sufficient evidence of a reasonable alternative design would 
require only that the plaintiff establish "the availability of a 
technologically feasible and practical alternative design that 
would have reduced or prevented the plaintiff's harm."  Id.  
Thus, for plaintiffs who do need the assistance of expert 
testimony, there would be no requirement that an expert 
undertake the expensive and time-consuming burden of producing a 
model of the proposed reasonable alternative design.  Id. 
¶104 In addition, Restatement (Third) does not require 
proof of a reasonable alternative design in all defective design 
cases.  Specifically, comment e. to Restatement (Third) § 2 
leaves 
open 
the 
possibility 
that, 
absent 
a 
reasonable 
alternative design, courts may hold products to be defectively 
designed if the danger posed by the product eclipses its social 
utility.  Id., § 2 cmt. e.7 ("[T]he designs of some products are 
so manifestly unreasonable, in that they have low social utility 
and high degree of danger, that liability should attach even 
absent proof of a reasonable alternative design."); see also 
id., § 2 cmt. b.  Furthermore, under Restatement (Third) § 3, 
circumstantial evidence may be sufficient in some cases to 
support a conclusion that a product was defectively designed 
                                                 
7 Comment e. to Restatement (Third) § 2 is sometimes 
referred to as "the "Habush Amendment" in recognition of ALI 
Advisory Committee member Robert L. Habush from Milwaukee.  See 
Victor E. Schwartz, The Role of the Restatement in the Tort 
Reform 
Movement: 
The 
Restatement, 
Third, 
Torts: 
Products 
Liability: A Model of Fairness and Balance, 10 Kan. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol'y 41, 45 (2000). 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
15 
 
without requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design, if 
the product fails to perform its intended function.  Id., § 3;8 
see also id., § 2 cmt. b.  Finally, under Restatement (Third) 
§ 4, absolute liability is imposed if the product's design is in 
violation of applicable product safety statutes or regulations.  
¶105 In sum, the lead opinion's fear of Restatement (Third) 
§ 2(b) and the reasonable alternative design requirement is 
exaggerated.   
V 
¶106 Under 
some 
circumstances, 
plaintiffs 
may 
find 
Restatement (Third) more favorable to their chances of recovery 
than Restatement (Second).  For example, manufacturer warnings 
can no longer inoculate the manufacturer from liability for the 
defect as was the case under Restatement (Second).  Id., § 2 
cmt. l. ("In general, when a safer design can reasonably be 
implemented and risks can reasonably be designed out of a 
product, adoption of the safer design is required over a warning 
that leaves a significant residuum of such risks."); James A. 
                                                 
8 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 3 
states the following: 
 
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the 
plaintiff was caused by a product defect existing at 
the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a 
specific defect, when the incident that harmed the 
plaintiff: 
 
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a 
result of product defect; and 
 
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the 
result of causes other than product defect existing at 
the time of sale or distribution. 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
16 
 
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Fictional Tale of 
Unintended Consequences[:] A Response to Professor Wertheimer, 
70 Brook. L. Rev. 939, 946 (2005) ("Several high-profile cases 
have taken this position much to the chagrin of manufacturers 
who sought to absolve themselves from liability because they had 
thoroughly 
warned 
against 
the 
dangers."). 
 
Similarly, 
Restatement (Third) does not recognize the "open and obvious 
danger" defense that manufacturers can use under Restatement 
(Second) to avoid liability for defectively designed products by 
making the product's dangerous conditions "open and obvious."  
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. d. 
("The fact that a danger is open and obvious is relevant to the 
issue of defectiveness, but does not necessarily preclude a 
plaintiff from establishing that a reasonable alternative design 
should have been adopted that would have reduced or prevented 
injury to the plaintiff."); see also Davis, supra, at 1236-37.  
Consequently, it is not hard to imagine that some plaintiffs' 
products liability claims would be treated more favorably under 
Restatement (Third) than under Restatement (Second). 
VI 
¶107 The two Reporters for Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability were Professors James A. Henderson, Jr. 
(Cornell Law School) and Aaron D. Twerski (Brooklyn Law School).  
See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability at XVII.  
In 1998, these distinguished scholars were lauded by Professor 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., then Director of the ALI, who noted 
that the ALI's Executive Committee had designated them "as joint 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
17 
 
holders of the R. Ammi Cutter Reporter's Chair, an honor 
reserved for [ALI] Reporters whose service is regarded as 
especially outstanding."  Id. at XVI. 
¶108 In 2005, Professors Henderson and Twerski penned an 
article answering Professor Ellen Wertheimer's critique of 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.  See Henderson 
& Twerski, supra.  In the course of that article, the professors 
observed that "Wisconsin has long been the lone star state in 
our products liability law, marching to its own, sometimes quite 
peculiar, drummer."  Id. at 940. 
¶109 The 
lead 
opinion 
restates 
Wisconsin's 
peculiar 
position on alleged design defects without mustering the 
intellectual firepower to defend it.  Wisconsin has every right 
to stand alone, but it should not do so unless its singular 
approach can be supported objectively and defended as sound. 
¶110 In this case, the court should acknowledge that the 
law has evolved and adopt Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability § 2(b) to analyze products liability claims alleging 
defective design.  Other features of Restatement (Third) should 
be considered in appropriate cases another day. 
¶111 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur. 
¶112 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
JUSTICE 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and JUSTICE MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this 
concurrence. 
 
No.  2006AP2670.dtp 
 
 
 
 
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