Case Title: Commonwealth v. Miller

Citation: 

Docket Number: 061015

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 061015   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  April 20, 2007 
RONALD MILLER 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Frederick G. Rockwell, III, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in qualifying a witness to testify as an expert under the 
Sexually Violent Predators Act (the Act), Code §§ 37.2-900 
through -920.  We also consider whether the circuit court erred 
in concluding that the Commonwealth failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant is a sexually violent 
predator as defined by the Act. 
 
In 1994, Ronald Miller was convicted in the Circuit Court 
of Chesterfield County (circuit court) of forcible sodomy for 
conduct that occurred several years earlier.  Miller received a 
sentence of 55 years’ imprisonment, with 45 years suspended. 
 
While incarcerated for his 1994 conviction, Miller was 
convicted in the circuit court of two charges of forcible sodomy 
for conduct that occurred in October 1992.  The circuit court 
sentenced Miller for these convictions to a term of 30 years’ 
imprisonment, with 20 years suspended. 
 
2
 
Before Miller’s scheduled release from incarceration in 
January 2005, the Director of the Department of Corrections 
notified the Department’s Commitment Review Committee (CRC) that 
Miller qualified for review under the Act because he had been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense and had received a score 
of four on the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offender 
Recidivism (RRASOR).1  See former Code § 37.1-70.4(C) (Cum. Supp. 
2005).  The CRC completed an assessment of Miller and referred 
his case to the Office of the Attorney General. 
The Attorney General reviewed the CRC’s assessment, the 
results of Miller’s mental health examination, institutional 
history, treatment record, and criminal record.  Based on this 
information, the Attorney General determined that Miller 
qualified as a sexually violent predator under the Act.  The 
Attorney General (the Commonwealth) filed a petition in the 
                     
1 The Act was codified in §§ 37.1-70.4 through –70.19 until 
October 1, 2005, when it was repealed and recodified in §§ 37.2-
900 through –919.  Further amendments were made to these 
provisions in 2006.  However, neither party contends that the 
reformatting of these provisions has changed the operative terms 
and concepts that are dispositive in this appeal.  Prior to 
Miller’s release from prison, the predecessor version of Code 
§ 37.2-903 provided that prisoners incarcerated for a sexually 
violent offense were to be assessed and evaluated based on a 
testing instrument known as the RRASOR, which is used in 
predicting sex offender recidivism.  Under the then-applicable 
provision, prisoners who received a score of four or more on the 
RRASOR were to be referred to the CRC for further assessment.  
See former Code § 37.1-70.4 and former § 37.2-903(C) (Interim 
Supp. 2005).  For convenience of reference, the current Code 
references are used in the remainder of this opinion. 
 
3
circuit court requesting that Miller be civilly committed 
pursuant to the Act. 
 
The circuit court conducted a bench trial in which the 
expert witnesses presented by both parties diagnosed Miller with 
pedophilia.  The parties’ witnesses disagreed, however, 
regarding Miller’s risk of recidivism and whether Miller met the 
definition of a sexually violent predator under the Act. 
 
The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Anita L. Boss, 
a licensed clinical psychologist who qualified as an expert in 
forensic psychology, including sex offender evaluation, risk 
assessment, and treatment.  Dr. Boss completed a forensic 
evaluation of Miller, in which she conducted a clinical 
interview, gathered information from family members, and 
administered certain psychological tests. 
Dr. Boss testified that Miller had a pattern of sexual 
interaction with boys who were between four and five years old. 
She stated that Miller originally reported having sexually 
abused five victims but that during one evaluation interview, 
Miller estimated that he might have sexually abused various 
children a total of 100 times.  Dr. Boss also stated that Miller 
had a practice of “grooming” his child victims, using games and 
other methods to engage the victims’ interests. 
 
Dr. Boss testified that when Miller was 14 or 15 years of 
age, he sexually abused two of his siblings, twins, one male and 
 
4
one female, who were then four or five years old.  According to 
Dr. Boss, Miller reported that he encouraged the twins to play a 
“lollipop” game with his penis and had them perform oral sodomy 
on him.   
Dr. Boss stated that Miller reported he engaged another 
five year old boy in similar conduct, during a period when his 
mother was providing childcare services for the boy.  Miller 
also related to Dr. Boss an incident that occurred when Miller 
was 18 or 19 years old, involving another young boy for whom 
Miller’s mother was providing childcare services.  Dr. Boss 
stated that Miller described putting his hand on the young boy’s 
groin area while the boy was sleeping.  Miller also told Dr. 
Boss that he masturbated in private after abusing his child 
victims, which suggested to Dr. Boss that Miller fantasized 
about the victims. 
During her evaluation, Dr. Boss learned that Miller had 
worked as a public school bus driver and had transported 
children with special needs.  In addition to that job, Miller 
had worked at an amusement park for a few months one summer.  
Dr. Boss concluded that Miller’s employment history was 
significant because he chose employment that placed him in 
direct proximity to children. 
Miller was 28 years old when he committed the offense that 
resulted in his first conviction.  During this incident, Miller 
 
5
escorted a young boy at his mother’s day care center to use the 
bathroom.  While in the bathroom, Miller had the child perform 
oral sodomy on Miller. 
Dr. Boss testified that Miller’s later conviction for an 
offense that occurred in 1992 involved another five year old boy 
whom Miller was babysitting.  According to Dr. Boss, Miller 
reported that he was sitting on a couch with the child watching 
a movie when he felt a strong impulse to touch the child’s 
thigh, and that his hand had a “mind of its own.”  Miller 
eventually had the child perform oral sodomy on him.  Dr. Boss 
found Miller’s explanation significant because it showed denial 
on Miller’s part, blaming his hand rather than himself for his 
actions.  
Miller told Dr. Boss that he considered asking for help, 
but that he was concerned people would think he was “crazy.”  He 
described himself as a homosexual who was afraid to disclose his 
sexuality to his family and was afraid to seek the company of 
adult men.  However, Miller would not acknowledge to Dr. Boss 
that he was sexually interested in children. 
 
Addressing Miller’s behavior while incarcerated, Dr. Boss 
testified that Miller and another male inmate were found in a 
bathroom engaging in oral sodomy.  At the time of this incident, 
Miller said that the sexual conduct was consensual, but he later 
told Dr. Boss that he had been sexually assaulted. 
 
6
 
Dr. Boss further testified that Miller had completed a 
“sexual offender awareness program” during his incarceration.  
At the time Dr. Boss interviewed Miller, Miller was enrolled in 
a sex offender recidivism treatment program (SORT program) and 
had participated in that program at a “moderate” level. 
 
Dr. Boss diagnosed Miller with pedophilia, non-exclusive 
type, based on Miller’s attraction to male children and male 
adults.  She testified that according to the psychiatric 
definition of pedophilia, a person who has pedophilia 1) has 
“[r]ecurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, 
or behaviors involving sexual activities with prepubescent . . . 
children,” 2) has acted on these urges, causing distress or 
interpersonal difficulties, and 3) is at least 16 years old or 
five years older than the victim.  Dr. Boss concluded that 
Miller’s diagnosis of pedophilia satisfied the Act’s statutory 
definition of “mental abnormality,” and the separate definition 
of that term generally used by clinical psychologists and 
psychiatrists.  See Code § 37.2-900.  
 
Dr. Boss also diagnosed Miller with a personality disorder, 
not otherwise specified, and stated that Miller demonstrated 
avoidant, dependent, and depressive behavior.  According to Dr. 
Boss, the personality disorder traits exhibited by Miller show a 
“moderate correlation” with a risk of committing future 
 
7
offenses.  Dr. Boss added that Miller’s personality disorder 
might prevent him from seeking treatment. 
Dr. Boss administered to Miller a testing instrument known 
as the Static-99, which is used to predict sex offender 
recidivism.2  Miller received a score of four on that test.  In 
determining his score, Dr. Boss concluded that Miller did not 
have any victims who were “strangers” to him. 
 
Dr. Boss explained that Miller’s score placed him at a 
“medium-high” risk assessment level, with a 26 percent chance of 
recidivist behavior within five years, and a 31 percent chance 
of such behavior within ten years.  Dr. Boss acknowledged, 
however, that the Static-99 provides another table of risk 
percentages that takes into consideration a person’s age, in 
addition to his test score.  According to Dr. Boss, when 
Miller’s age of 42 was considered, the corresponding risk of 
recidivism was 13.8 percent, with a margin of error of eight 
percent. 
In addition, Dr. Boss conducted an assessment known as the 
Clinical Judgment to Sexual Violence Risk Assessment 20 (SVR-
20), which considers both risk factors and treatment factors.  
Dr. Boss’ assessment of Miller under the SVR-20 indicated that 
Miller’s deviant sexual interest in children correlated “very 
                     
2 Use of the Static-99 test is now specifically mandated by 
the Act.  See Code § 37.2-903(C). 
 
8
highly” with a risk of committing future sex offenses.  She 
further observed that Miller had additional risk factors for 
recidivism, including an escalating pattern of deviant sexual 
behavior, a lack of social support, and potential employment 
problems. 
Dr. Boss also testified that when a sex offender fails to 
comply with the conditions and requirements of a treatment 
program, the risk of committing future sexual offenses 
increases.  Dr. Boss concluded that Miller met the Act’s 
definition of a sexually violent predator. 
 
The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Maria S. 
Stransky, a certified sex offender treatment provider and the 
assistant director of the SORT program at the Brunswick 
Correctional Center.  Stransky testified that Miller began the 
SORT program in July 2001 but was terminated from the program in 
February 2005 because he did not progress in his treatment plan. 
 
Stransky stated that she has completed hundreds of 
actuarial risk assessments during the course of her career.  She 
evaluated Miller on the Abel Assessment, a test given to all 
SORT participants to determine their sexual interests and any 
changes in their sexual interests during treatment.  Based on 
Miller’s responses on the Abel Assessment, Stransky diagnosed 
Miller with pedophilia. 
 
9
 
Stransky administered to Miller the RRASOR, on which he 
received a score of four.  Stransky also administered the 
Static-99 test, assigning Miller one point for assaulting a 
victim who was a “stranger” to him.  She could not remember, 
however, which of Miller’s victims could be classified as a 
“stranger.” 
Stransky testified that if Miller had no victims who were 
“strangers” to him, he would have received a score of three on 
the Static-99, which placed Miller in the “medium low” risk of 
recidivism.  She also stated that a score of three on the 
Static-99 correlated with a 12 percent risk of recidivist 
behavior within five years.  After Stransky’s testimony, the 
Commonwealth rested its case. 
 
Miller presented Dr. Eileen P. Ryan, a licensed clinical 
psychiatrist, to testify as an expert in the field of forensic 
psychiatry.  Dr. Ryan is the medical director of the Institute 
of Law, Psychiatry, and Public Policy at the University of 
Virginia.  She has received specialized training in the 
evaluation and treatment of sex offenders and has been certified 
in Virginia since 1999 to treat sex offenders although she does 
not treat them as part of her employment. 
 
The Commonwealth objected to the qualification of Dr. Ryan 
as an expert contending, among other things, that Dr. Ryan was 
not “skilled in treatment” of sex offenders as required by Code 
 
10
§ 37.2-904, because she did not treat them as a part of her 
practice but was merely certified to do so.  The circuit court 
sustained the Commonwealth’s objection with regard to the issue 
of treatment but, over the Commonwealth’s objection, admitted 
Dr. Ryan as an expert on the diagnosis and risk assessment of 
sex offenders. 
 
Dr. Ryan testified that she evaluated Miller using 
actuarial instruments and clinical techniques.  Dr. Ryan 
concluded that Miller is a pedophile, which she indicated is a 
condition that meets the psychiatric definition of a “mental 
abnormality.”  Dr. Ryan also diagnosed Miller with avoidant 
personality disorder with dependent traits and stated that this 
diagnosis satisfied the psychiatric definition of a personality 
disorder.  Dr. Ryan concluded, however, that Miller does not 
suffer from a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” 
within the meaning of the Act, which provides different 
definitions of these terms from the psychiatric definitions.  
See Code § 37.2-900. 
 
Dr. Ryan stated that several factors lower Miller’s risk 
for recidivism, including the fact that he is not antisocial, is 
not psychopathic, and does not abuse drugs or alcohol.  Dr. Ryan 
testified that Miller’s two primary risk factors for recidivism 
were his diagnosis as a pedophile and his previous access to 
children.   
 
11
 
In a letter opinion, the circuit court held that the 
Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proving that Miller has 
a mental abnormality or personality disorder as defined by the 
Act, or that he is likely in the future to engage in sexually 
violent acts.  In its analysis, the circuit court discussed 
several factors.  The circuit court observed that Miller’s 
participation in the SORT program was rated as “moderate,” and 
stated that there was insufficient evidence to show that his 
failure to complete the program affected his likelihood of 
recidivism.  The circuit court also noted that Dr. Boss appeared 
confused regarding Miller’s conviction dates and that her 
apparent uncertainty about these dates could have impacted Dr. 
Boss’ scoring of the Static-99 test.  
 
Addressing Miller’s potential for recidivist behavior, the 
circuit court stated, “Miller never sought out his victims.  
Rather, all of his victims were children who he was familiar 
with and who were placed in his care, thus giving him an easy 
opportunity to offend.”  The circuit court concluded that 
because Miller is now a convicted sex offender, his 
opportunities to care for young boys “should decrease or become 
non-existent.”  The circuit court also found that there was no 
evidence demonstrating that Miller was likely to “begin seeking 
out victims.” 
 
12
 
The circuit court additionally held that even if it had not 
considered Dr. Ryan’s testimony, the Commonwealth’s evidence was 
insufficient to establish that Miller is a sexually violent 
predator as defined by the Act.  The circuit court based its 
rationale in part on Dr. Boss’ confusion about the chronology of 
Miller’s offense history and on the fact that Stransky 
acknowledged an error in her scoring of the Static-99 test.  The 
circuit court entered final judgment holding that Miller is not 
a sexually violent predator as defined by the Act.   
 
On appeal, the Commonwealth first argues that the circuit 
court erred in qualifying Dr. Ryan as an expert witness.  The 
Commonwealth asserts that Code § 37.2-904(B) establishes a two-
part standard under which a potential expert witness must 
demonstrate skill in both the diagnosis and the treatment of 
certain specified mental conditions.  The Commonwealth contends 
that the circuit court improperly disregarded the “treatment” 
component of this two-part standard by admitting Dr. Ryan to 
testify concerning the diagnosis of mental abnormalities and 
disorders, without requiring her also to show that she was 
skilled in the treatment of those conditions. 
In response, Miller argues that the circuit court did not 
err in qualifying Dr. Ryan as an expert witness under the 
statute.  According to Miller, the plain language of Code 
§ 37.2-904(B) did not require that Dr. Ryan be skilled in the 
 
13
treatment of the specified mental conditions before she could 
render a diagnosis and an assessment of his risk of committing 
future offenses.  We disagree with Miller’s arguments. 
 
A court’s admission of expert testimony is a matter 
committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and we 
generally will disturb a decision of this nature only when the 
court has abused its discretion.  Atkins v. Commonwealth, 272 
Va. 144, 153, 631 S.E.2d 93, 97 (2006); Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, 
Inc. v. Smiley Block Co., 250 Va. 161, 166, 458 S.E.2d 462, 465 
(1995).  However, when a statute designates express requirements 
for the qualification of an expert witness, the witness must 
satisfy those statutory requirements before testifying as an 
expert.  Atkins, 272 Va. at 153, 631 S.E.2d at 97; Commonwealth 
v. Allen, 269 Va. 262, 273, 609 S.E.2d 4, 11 (2005); see Hinkley 
v. Koehler, 269 Va. 82, 87, 606 S.E.2d 803, 806 (2005); Perdieu 
v. Blackstone Family Practice Ctr., Inc., 264 Va. 408, 419, 568 
S.E.2d 703, 709 (2002); Sami v. Varn, 260 Va. 280, 283-86, 535 
S.E.2d 172, 174-75 (2000). 
An expert may assist a defendant in civil commitment 
proceedings under the Act on subjects relating to the 
defendant’s mental health.  Code § 37.2-907(A).  Such an expert 
“shall be a licensed psychiatrist or a licensed clinical 
psychologist who is skilled in the diagnosis and treatment of 
 
14
mental abnormalities and disorders associated with sex offenders 
and who is not a member of the CRC.”  Id. 
We determine the meaning of this language from the express 
words contained in the statute.  Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 
Va. 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006); Alger v. Commonwealth, 
267 Va. 255, 259, 590 S.E.2d 563, 565 (2004); Tucker v. 
Commonwealth, 268 Va. 490, 493, 604 S.E.2d 66, 68 (2004); 
Williams v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 268, 271, 576 S.E.2d 468, 470 
(2003); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 266 Va. 260, 264, 585 S.E.2d 552, 
554 (2003).  When statutory language is unambiguous, we are 
bound by the plain meaning of that language and may not give the 
words a construction that amounts to holding the General 
Assembly did not mean what it actually stated.  Gunn v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 580, 587, 637 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2006); 
Alger, 267 Va. at 259, 590 S.E.2d at 565; Tucker, 268 Va. at 
493, 604 S.E.2d at 68; Williams, 265 Va. at 271, 576 S.E.2d at 
470; Caprio v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 507, 511-12, 493 S.E.2d 
371, 374 (1997).  
We conclude that the requirement in Code § 37.2-907(A), 
that an expert be “skilled in the diagnosis and treatment” of 
the specified mental conditions, is plain and unambiguous.  
Because this statutory requirement is stated in the conjunctive, 
any witness seeking to qualify as an expert under the statute 
must demonstrate skill in both the diagnosis and the treatment 
 
15
of the stated mental conditions.  By mandating that an expert 
demonstrate skill in both these areas, the General Assembly 
effectively has made skill in both capacities a threshold 
requirement for a witness to render an expert opinion whether a 
defendant is a sexually violent predator as defined by the Act.  
See Code §§ 37.2-904(B) and –907(A). 
In the present case, it is undisputed that Dr. Ryan did not 
meet the skill in “treatment” requirement of Code § 37.2-907(A), 
but had only demonstrated skill under the “diagnosis” component 
of the two-part statutory standard.  Thus, we conclude that the 
circuit court erred in qualifying Dr. Ryan to testify as an 
expert under the mandatory two-part standard of Code § 37.2-
907(A). 
The circuit court’s error in admitting Dr. Ryan’s testimony 
requires us to disregard her testimony, including the results of 
the tests she conducted, in our analysis of the sufficiency of 
the evidence.  Therefore, we restrict our analysis to the 
remaining evidence in the case, which was presented by the 
Commonwealth.  We turn to consider the circuit court’s holding 
that the Commonwealth’s evidence, standing alone, was 
insufficient to meet the Commonwealth’s burden of proof. 
The Commonwealth challenges the circuit court’s holding, 
contending that the testimony of Dr. Boss and Stransky satisfied 
the Commonwealth’s proof burden as a matter of law.  The 
 
16
Commonwealth also challenges the circuit court’s stated 
rationale, particularly the court’s finding that Miller was 
unlikely to commit future offenses of this nature because, as a 
convicted sex offender, his access to “young boys” should 
decrease.  The Commonwealth asserts that the evidence does not 
support this finding, because Miller’s status as a convicted sex 
offender is not a factor that lowers his risk of recidivism. 
 
In response, Miller argues that the circuit court did not 
err in determining that the Commonwealth’s evidence, standing 
alone, was insufficient to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that Miller is a sexually violent predator.  In support 
of his argument, Miller relies on the circuit court’s conclusion 
that Dr. Boss appeared confused on the subject of Miller’s 
previous offenses, and that Stransky incorrectly computed the 
score of one of the actuarial tests she administered to Miller.  
Miller also observes that the circuit court considered his level 
of participation in the SORT program and his opportunity and 
likelihood for recidivist behavior. 
 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we 
apply an established standard of review.  We will approve the 
circuit court’s holding unless it is plainly wrong or without 
evidentiary support.  See Code § 8.01-680. 
At trial, the Commonwealth was required to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that Miller is a sexually violent 
 
17
predator.  See Code § 37.2-908(C); Ellison v. Commonwealth, 273 
Va. 254, 260, 639 S.E.2d 209, 213 (2007); Shivaee v. 
Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 122, 613 S.E.2d 570, 576, cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 626 (2005); Allen, 269 Va. at 
275, 609 S.E.2d at 12; McCloud v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 242, 
256, 609 S.E.2d 16, 23 (2005).  Clear and convincing evidence is 
the degree of proof that affords the fact finder a firm belief 
or conviction concerning the allegations that a party seeks to 
establish.  This evidentiary standard describes an intermediate 
level of proof that exceeds the “preponderance” standard, but 
does not reach the level of certainty required in criminal cases 
of “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Grubb v. Grubb, 272 Va. 45, 54, 
630 S.E.2d 746, 751-52 (2006); Allen, 269 Va. at 275, 609 S.E.2d 
at 13. 
The term “sexually violent predator” is defined in Code 
§ 37.2-900.  To satisfy that definition, the Commonwealth was 
required to prove that 1) Miller was convicted of a sexually 
violent offense; and 2) due to a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder, Miller finds it difficult to control his 
predatory behavior, making him likely to engage in sexually 
violent acts in the future.  See Code § 37.2-900; Shivaee, 270 
Va. at 123, 613 S.E.2d at 576; McCloud, 269 Va. at 257, 609 
S.E.2d at 24.  
 
18
The evidence was undisputed that Miller’s convictions of 
forcible sodomy qualify as sexually violent offenses within the 
meaning of the Act.  See Code § 37.2-900.  The evidence also was 
undisputed that Miller is a pedophile. 
Dr. Boss’ testimony provided evidence that Miller’s 
diagnosis of pedophilia satisfied the Act’s statutory definition 
of “mental abnormality.”  Her testimony further showed that 
although Miller initially reported having sexually abused five 
young boys, Miller later estimated he may have sexually abused 
young boys as many as 100 times.  Paradoxically, however, Miller 
refused to acknowledge that he was sexually attracted to 
children. 
Dr. Boss’ testimony further showed that Miller’s 
personality disorder might prevent him from seeking treatment 
for his problems, and that his personality disorder traits 
showed a “moderate correlation” with the risk of committing 
future offenses.  Her testimony also established that Miller’s 
termination from the SORT treatment program increased his risk 
of committing future offenses.  Based on all these 
considerations, Dr. Boss concluded that Miller met the Act’s 
definition of a sexually violent predator. 
Although Dr. Boss and Stransky acknowledged that there were 
variables that could have affected the results of certain 
actuarial risk assessments they administered to Miller, the 
 
19
results reported by Dr. Boss and Stransky on these and other 
risk assessments nevertheless indicated that Miller posed a 
significant risk of committing future offenses.  In particular, 
the results of the SVR-20, performed by Dr. Boss, showed that 
Miller’s deviant sexual interest in children correlated “very 
highly” with a risk of committing future offenses. 
We hold that the above evidence, as a matter of law, 
provided clear and convincing proof that Miller is a sexually 
violent predator as defined by the Act.  Our conclusion is not 
altered by the circuit court’s finding that “[n]ow that Mr. 
Miller is a convicted sex offender his opportunities to care for 
young boys should decrease or become non-existent.”  That 
conclusion appears largely to have been based on Dr. Ryan’s 
testimony, which is no longer part of the record that we 
consider.  To the extent that this finding was not based on Dr. 
Ryan’s testimony, the finding was speculative in nature. 
Our view of the evidence also is not altered by the circuit 
court’s additional finding that “[n]o evidence was offered to 
indicate that Mr. Miller will have easy access to more potential 
victims after his release or to indicate that he is likely to 
begin seeking out victims.”  The Commonwealth was not required 
to prove that Miller would have “easy” access to future victims, 
or that Miller would “seek out” victims who were “strangers.”  
Instead, the Commonwealth had the burden of proving that because 
 
20
of a mental abnormality or personality disorder, Miller was 
likely to commit sexually violent offenses. 
Because the Commonwealth proved, as a matter of law, that 
Miller is a sexually violent predator as defined by the Act, the 
Commonwealth is entitled have final judgment entered to that 
effect.  The case must be remanded to the circuit court, 
however, for further determination under the Act whether Miller 
should be fully committed or placed on conditional release.  See 
Code § 37.2-908(D). 
For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment, enter judgment for the Commonwealth that Miller is a 
sexually violent predator as defined by the Act, and remand the 
case to the circuit court for further proceedings as directed in 
Code § 37.2-908. 
Reversed, judgment in part, and remanded.