Case Title: State v. Wineberg

Citation: 444 P.2d 787, 74 Wash. 2d 372

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1968-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
74 Wn.2d 372 (1968) 444 P.2d 787 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. WILLIAM J. WINEBERG, Individually and as Executor, et al., Appellants.[*] No. 39447. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. August 29, 1968. Moore, Walstead, Hallowell & Mertsching, Alan Hallowell, and Charles T. Mertsching, for appellant Wineberg. The Attorney General and Theodore O. Torve, Assistant, for respondent. NEILL, J. In this eminent domain proceeding by the State Highway Department, an order adjudicating public use and necessity was entered and the matter of damages for the taking came on for trial before a jury. Appellant Wineberg appeals from the verdict, judgment and decree of appropriation awarding him $23,000 for the taking of a part of his property and damages to the remainder of his property. Appellant owned lots 1 through 12 of block 110, lots 1 through 6 of block 120, and the abutting vacated portion of Linden Street lying between blocks 110 and 120, all in Parker's Addition to Kalama. Primary State Highway NO. 1 (PSH 1) runs parallel to the front of appellant's property. The highway was originally a 2-lane roadway and later widened to a 4-lane facility at grade with appellant's property. The highway was designated as a limited access highway in 1947. The original highway acquisition left an alley 20 feet in width between the state's right-of-way and appellant's property line as it paralleled the highway. From the time the highway was first constructed, the alley has been paved and improved and has since been used by appellant and his customers in parking and in passing between the highway and appellant's business property. The alley was separated from the highway by a concrete curb lying on the west boundary of the alley. To assist in understanding the issues raised we have set forth in the appendix two drawings. Figure 1 shows the property before condemnation. Figure 2 shows the property *374 as it will exist after condemnation and construction of the new lanes and frontage road. The trial court ruled that appellant's property was an entire, contiguous tract and that the proposed acquisition was a partial taking; that lots 1 through 12 of block 110 abutted on the alley and did not have direct access to PSH 1; and that the vacation of Linden Street carried out to the east boundary of the west half of blocks 110 and 120 (the east boundary of the highway), thus eliminating the alley in front of Linden Street and giving appellant access to PSH 1 from this portion of appellant's property. The state had previously purchased a portion of lots 1 through 6 of the east half of block 120, eliminating the alley in front of this portion of appellant's property, thus giving access to the highway as to lots 1 through 6, block 120. There was an "on-off" approach to PSH 1 in front of a service station on lot 12 and the vacated portion of Linden Street. The condemnation proceedings involved the taking of lot 12 of block 110, lots 1 through 6 of block 120 and the vacated portion of Linden Street. Thus, appellant is left with lots 1 through 11 of block 110. Following condemnation, Kingwood Street on which appellant's property abuts, instead of entering PSH 1 at grade at the point of intersection, will be closed at the highway. This closing still permits entry from Kingwood Street to a proposed 2-way frontage road in place of and substantially at the same location as the alley. Unlike the alley, however, the frontage road will continue from Kingwood Street past Linden Street, parallel to PSH 1, to an interchange, thus providing access from appellant's remaining property to PSH 1 at a point about 1,500 feet north of his remaining property. Appellant does not abut on any portion of Kingwood Street that will be closed, the closure occurring at the westerly side of intersection of Kingwood and the alley. Kingwood Street will maintain its access to all Kalama city streets as it did prior to the condemnation. Appellant's first assignment of error is that the trial court erred in ruling that the closure of Kingwood Street at *375 its intersection with PSH 1 was not a compensable item of damage. The jury was instructed: Relying upon Van Buren v. Trumbull, 92 Wash. 691, 159 Pac. 891 (1916), appellant contends that a private easement in a roadway exists in a grantee who purchases his lots with reference to a plat, even though the rights of the general public may be extinguished, and that the legislature cannot legislate so as to take away such right of easement without payment of just compensation. [1] A review of prior decisions by this court establishes: (1) a property owner must abut directly upon the portion of the roadway being vacated in order to be awarded compensable damages per se; (2) where the closure and the owner's property are separated by an intersecting street, compensation is usually denied; and (3) where the closure occurs within the same block but not directly in front of the property, the owner must show physical impairment of his access different in kind from that of the general public (i.e., if the impairment is merely an added inconvenience that is common to all travelers it cannot form the basis for payment of compensation). See, Capitol Hill Methodist Church of Seattle v. Seattle, 52 Wn.2d 359, 324 P.2d 1113 (1958); Kemp v. Seattle, 149 Wash. 197, 270 Pac. 431 (1928); Freeman v. Centralia, 67 Wash. 142, 120 Pac. 886 (1912); In re Fifth Ave. & Fifth Ave. South, Seattle, 62 Wash. 218, 113 Pac. 762 (1911); Sweeney v. Seattle, 57 Wash. 678, 107 Pac. 843 (1910); Smith v. Centralia, 55 Wash. 573, 104 Pac. 797 (1909); *376 Mottman v. Olympia, 45 Wash. 361, 88 Pac. 579 (1907); Ponischil v. Hoquiam Sash & Door Co., 41 Wash. 303, 83 Pac. 316 (1906). Also RCW 47.52.041 provides: Appellant's property does not abut directly on the portion of the roadway being closed. He has not shown that reasonable means of access have been obstructed nor that he has suffered special damage different in kind, and not merely degree, from that sustained by the general public. The vacated portion of Kingwood Street is not necessary for reasonable access to his property inasmuch as the streets physically surrounding his property have not been closed. Capitol Hill Methodist Church of Seattle v. Seattle, supra. In Van Buren v. Trumbull, supra, we held that a street vacation which eliminated the public easement did not deprive an abutting owner of his right of private easement in a case where, as here, the abutting owner acquires his land as part of and in reliance on a plat containing the street. If appellant were an abutting owner his argument might be convincing. But as we have indicated, appellant's property does not abut upon the closed street and the same rules should apply to deprivation of the private easement as apply to the public easement. Accordingly, we hold appellant's first assignment of error is not well taken. Appellant next assigns error to the trial court's ruling that as a matter of law appellant did not have direct access to PSH 1 from the southerly 25 feet of the property taken (lot 12) and from property not taken. It is not disputed that appellant is an abutting owner to PSH 1 with respect to block 120 and of vacated Linden Street and compensation was awarded for loss of direct access as to such property. For some years appellant apparently had indirect access from PSH 1 to his remaining property by use of the *377 alley to the "on-off" ramp in front of the service station. Appellant seeks to come within RCW 47.52.080 which provides: He cites Motoramp Garage Co. v. Tacoma, 136 Wash. 589, 241 Pac. 16, 42 A.L.R. 886 (1925) and earlier decisions for the familiar proposition that the fee title to streets, alleys and ways dedicated to the public remain in the adjoining landowners, subject to the right of the public to use them for travel and other limited uses. Appellant then contends that, because he owns fee title to the east half of the alley in block 110 and the state owns fee title to the west half of the alley in block 110, he and the state are "abutting" property owners within the meaning of the statute. Appellant therefore argues that he was entitled to have the jury determine his damages with regard to the deprivation of his rights of direct access between the remaining property and the existing highway. We do not agree. In Deaconess Hosp. v. State Highway Comm'n, 66 Wn.2d 378, 403 P.2d 54 (1965), the hospital sought to enjoin the construction of a limited access freeway in Spokane along Fourth Avenue, on which the hospital abutted, or anywhere else within 300 feet of the hospital. As the freeway was proposed by the state, Fourth Avenue would separate the hospital from the new freeway. The main ground on which the injunction was based was the state's alleged noncompliance with RCW 47.52.072, requiring notice to abutting property owners and affording them opportunity to be heard if an existing highway, road *378 or street is to be established as a limited access facility. The hospital contended that it would be an abutting owner to the new freeway, making the same argument as here made by appellant. In rejecting the hospital's contention, we stated at 403: [2] In the instant case, as in Deaconess Hospital, the complaining property owner is separated from the limited access facility by a public way. The fact that the separating public way in Deaconess Hospital was a street whereas in our case it is an alley is immaterial. We have previously held that for all practical purposes alleys are the same as roads, highways or streets. Burkhard v. Bowen, 32 Wn.2d 613, 203 P.2d 361 (1949). Furthermore, as in Deaconess Hospital, the public way on which appellant's property directly abuts "will be left open and free to traffic" and "all ingress and egress rights now vested in the... [appellant] relating to ... [the alley] will, so far as freeway construction is concerned, remain undisturbed." The fact that the alley is being converted to a frontage road is also immaterial as it merely continues a means of ingress and egress under a different nomenclature. The fact that Deaconess Hospital involved the application of the notice requirements of RCW 47.52.072 in an action to prevent the construction of a limited access facility, *379 whereas the present case involves the condemnation of property and the assessment of monetary damages under RCW 47.52.080, is an immaterial distinction. What is important is that both cases involve the definition of "abutting" property owner and that both sections of the statute are part of the same act. In both cases the question is: Is one an "abutting" property owner within the meaning of the statute if his property is separated from the limited access facility by another public way and if his access rights in the intermediate public way are not impaired by the limited access facility? It would be illogical and unreasonable to hold that such a property owner is not an "abutting" owner with respect to the notice requirements of RCW 47.52.072, but is an "abutting" owner with respect to the compensation provisions of RCW 47.52.080. As his next assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the state to present evidence in contradiction to their plans presented at the public use and necessity hearing. Appellant contends that the construction plans introduced at the public use and necessity hearing clearly showed: (1) that appellant's property from Kingwood Street north to the vacated portion of Linden Street abutted on PSH 1; (2) that the alley was entirely within the ownership of the state; and (3) that the west lot line of appellant's property was the east boundary line of the existing highway. Citing Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. Kenmore Properties, Inc., 67 Wn.2d 923, 410 P.2d 790 (1966), appellant argues that one of the main purposes of the hearing on public use and necessity is to provide the landowner with reasonably detailed information regarding the extent of the actual taking by the state and the construction plans so that he may properly prepare for the trial to assess his damages. Appellant further argues that the state, in its petition for an order of public use and necessity, asked to take his right of access, if any, and by introducing this exhibit indicated to appellant that he was an abutter on an existing state highway. Appellant thus concludes that to allow the state then to take the position *380 that there was no compensable loss of access rights as to the remaining property resulted in a fatal variance between the terms of the order of public use and necessity and the evidence presented to the jury in the trial for the assessment of damages. [3] The short answer to appellant's contentions regarding this assignment of error is that he does not show nor has he attempted to show that his interests were in any way prejudiced by the alleged ambiguities in the exhibit or that he relied to his disadvantage on such an interpretation of the exhibit. Appellant was as familiar with his own title as was the state. He could hardly be misled by this error in the state's first map. As his final assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing, over his objections, the state's expert appraisal witness to testify as to certain statements told to him by persons not appearing in court. These statements concerned the amount of gasoline sold by various gas stations in the Kalama area, the rent paid, and the type of business solicited and conducted. These statements were allowed on the premise that they were facts and circumstances going to make up his opinion as to the value of appellant's property. Appellant's position is that the testimony of the state's expert witness as to the gallonage being pumped at other service stations in the vicinity of appellant's service station constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence and that such evidence did not become admissible merely by classifying it as part of the expert's investigation. On the other hand, the state contends that this testimony was admitted to show the investigation and the basis for the expert's opinion as well as the details of a comparable sale. The state argues that the gallonage on sales at other service stations in the area formed an important part of the expert's comparison of property in forming his opinion. The state cites authority from other jurisdictions which allow an expert to testify as to facts obtained from hearsay sources. Such facts form the basis of his opinion and are normally gathered by experts in performing their professional activities. *381 Although there is a conflict of authorities, most jurisdictions, including Washington, hold that evidence of the price paid in voluntary sales of land similar to that taken at or near the time of the taking is admissible as independent evidence of the value of the land taken. 5 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 21.3 (rev. 3d ed. 1962) at 417. See Seattle & Montana Ry. v. Gilchrist, 4 Wash. 509, 30 Pac. 738 (1892); Port Townsend Southern R.R. v. Barbare, 46 Wash. 275, 89 Pac. 710 (1907); Finch v. Grays Harbor Cy., 121 Wash. 486, 209 Pac. 833, 24 A.L.R. 644 (1922); Valley Land Office, Inc. v. O'Grady, 72 Wn.2d 247, 432 P.2d 850 (1967). However, the use of such evidence as independent evidence of value is, of course, subject to the limitations of the hearsay and best evidence rules. As stated by Nichols, supra, at 431: Apparently only two jurisdictions allow hearsay evidence of comparable sale prices to be used by an expert as substantive evidence of the value of the property being condemned. State Highway Comm'n v. Greenfield, 145 Mont. 164, 399 P.2d 989 (1964); New Jersey Highway Authority v. Rue, 41 N.J. Super. 385, 125 A.2d 305 (1956) (based on a statute). A number of jurisdictions have held such evidence to be admissible, "not as direct evidence of the value of the property under consideration, but in support of, and as background for, the opinion testified to by an expert as to the value of the property taken." Nichols, supra, at 437. Annot. 95 A.L.R.2d 1217 (1964); Annot. 12 A.L.R.3d 1064 (1967). The rationale for allowing use of such evidence by expert witnesses is stated in State Highway Comm'n v. Parker, 225 Ore. 143, 160, 357 P.2d 548 (1960): A similar statement of the rationale is found in United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, in Aiken & Barnwell Counties, S.C., Tract No. D-308, 200 F.2d 659, 661 (4th Cir.1952): In Pierce Cy. ex rel. Bellingham v. Duffy, 104 Wash. 426, 429, 176 Pac. 670 (1918), we did hold that expert opinions were inadmissible and prejudicial where the opinions, as far as timber and improvements were concerned, were based on the opinions of other experts who were not called to testify. We there stated: On the other hand, in Bremerton School Dist. 100-C v. Hibbard, 51 Wn.2d 226, 229, 317 P.2d 517 (1957), we allowed the use of an expert's value opinion even though some of the factors on which the opinion was based could be characterized as hearsay in nature. We there stated: [4] These two decisions taken together provide the following rules: (1) an expert witness will not be allowed to testify to a valuation opinion which is not the product of *384 his independent judgment, but is merely another person's hearsay opinion which the witness has accepted as his own; but (2) an expert witness may, in the trial court's discretion, be allowed to testify to a valuation opinion even though some of the factors considered by the expert in reaching his opinion would be hearsay and inadmissible as independent evidence. We now hold that, when an expert is allowed to testify to a valuation opinion which is in part based on facts which would normally be hearsay and inadmissible as independent evidence, the trial court may in its discretion allow the expert to state such facts for the purpose of showing the basis of the opinion. The exclusion of such evidence, however, must be based on a sound exercise of discretion and not on an erroneous application of the hearsay and best evidence rules. See, United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, supra; United States v. Katz, 213 F.2d 799 (1st Cir.1954). In the instant case, the expert's opinion under consideration clearly comes within the holding of Bremerton School Dist. v. Hibbard, supra, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the expert to testify as to gasoline sales of service stations for the purpose of showing the basis of his opinion. Judgment is affirmed. FINLEY, C.J., HILL and HAMILTON, JJ., and LANGENBACH, J. Pro Tem., concur. *385 [*] Reported in 444 P.2d 787.