Case Title: NATHAN HANS SWAIN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0280

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
NATHAN HANS SWAIN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 142220 P.3d 504Case Number: S-08-0280Decided: 11/19/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
NATHAN 
HANS SWAIN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; 
David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender 
Program

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Nathan 
Hans Swain appeals the district court's order denying him credit for time served 
on three separate probation revocation actions.  Swain also appeals his conviction for 
indirect criminal contempt arising from his failure to comply with the district 
court's order requiring him, as a condition of probation, to attend and complete 
an inpatient substance abuse treatment program.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
conclude Swain is entitled to additional credit against his sentence, and that 
his conviction for indirect criminal contempt cannot stand.  We reverse and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Swain presents 
the following issues:

 
 
I.          
Did the trial court err by imposing an illegal 
sentence?

 
 
II.         
Did the trial court err by violating Appellant's due process rights by 
imposing contempt sanctions after improper service, failing to inform Appellant 
of the consequences of his plea and subjecting Appellant to double 
jeopardy?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In January 2007, 
Swain pled guilty to felony battery against a household member in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007).  He was sentenced to three to five years 
in prison, with credit for 275 days of presentence confinement.  Execution of that sentence was 
suspended, and he was placed on four years of supervised probation.  

 
 
[¶4]      Between October 
2007 and August 2008, the State filed three separate revocation petitions 
because Swain violated the terms of his probation.  The first revocation petition alleged 
that Swain had used marijuana and absconded from supervision.  Swain was arrested on October 15, 2007, 
and subsequently admitted the allegations contained in the petition.  On January 10, 2008, the district court 
revoked and reinstated his probation.  
A condition of that probation required Swain to successfully complete the 
program at the Cheyenne Transitional Center.  

 
 
[¶5]      Swain never 
reported to the program and absconded from supervision, prompting the filing of 
the second probation revocation petition.  
He was arrested on March 20, 2008.  
As before, Swain admitted to violating the terms of his probation.  On July 3, 2008, the district court 
again revoked and reinstated Swain's probation.  As a condition of that probation, the 
district court ordered Swain to "report directly to and be placed in and 
successfully complete the Transitions Residential Program," an inpatient 
substance abuse treatment program.  

 
 
[¶6]      Swain also failed 
to report to that program, and the State's third revocation petition 
ensued.  Swain was arrested on 
August 7, 2008.  At his initial 
appearance on August 21, the district court advised Swain it was considering 
charging him with indirect criminal contempt for his alleged failure to abide by 
the order requiring him to attend and complete the Transitions Residential 
Program.  On August 27, the district 
court issued an order to show cause in the underlying criminal case requiring 
Swain to appear before the court on September 4 and show cause why he should not 
be held in indirect criminal contempt for violating its order.  

 
 
[¶7]      At the September 
4 hearing, Swain's counsel implored the district court to drop the contempt 
charge, but the district court declined to do so.  The district court, however, continued 
the contempt hearing, as well as the revocation hearing, until September 18 to 
allow counsel additional time to prepare a defense.  During the September 18 hearing, Swain 
admitted failing to report to the inpatient treatment program as ordered, 
thereby providing a factual basis for both the probation revocation and the 
criminal contempt charge.  The 
district court revoked Swain's probation and reinstated the underlying 
three-to-five-year prison sentence, with the original presentence credit of 275 
days.  The district court denied 
credit against that sentence for the time Swain served pending resolution of the 
three probation revocation actions.  
The district court also found Swain in indirect criminal contempt and 
sentenced him to sixty days in jail, with credit for fourteen days served 
between September 4 and September 18. 
The district court ordered that the underlying prison sentence be served 
consecutively to the sixty-day contempt sentence.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Sentencing 
Credit

 
 
[¶8]      Swain contends 
his sentence is illegal because the district court did not give him credit for 
the time he served in the Laramie County Detention Center on the three probation 
revocation actions.  A sentence that 
does not include proper credit constitutes an illegal sentence.  Whether a sentence is illegal is a 
question of law, which we review de 
novo.  Beyer v. State, 2008 WY 137, ¶ 7, 196 P.3d 777, 780 (Wyo. 2008); Manes v. 
State, 2007 WY 6, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 179, 181 (Wyo. 2007).   

 
 
[¶9]      Our recent 
decision in Jackson v. State, 2009 WY 
82, 209 P.3d 897 (Wyo. 2009), governs our disposition of Swain's claim.  In Jackson, we held that the time spent in 
custody awaiting disposition of probation revocation proceedings must be 
credited against the probationer's underlying sentence if the incarceration is 
directly attributable to the underlying criminal conviction, overruling Halbleib v. State, 7 P.3d 45 (Wyo. 2000) 
(denying credit on the grounds that pre-revocation confinement is due solely to 
acts or omissions constituting the violation of the conditions of probation and 
can never be directly attributable to the underlying offense).  Jackson, ¶¶ 10-12, 209 P.3d  at 
900-01.  In reaching this result, we 
stated:

 
 
[T]here 
are situations where the incarceration is directly attributable to the act that 
violates the conditions of probation rather than the underlying criminal 
charge.  The most obvious are those 
situations where a defendant is arrested and charged with committing a new 
crime.  But there are also 
circumstances where a defendant is alleged to have violated probation conditions 
by committing acts that are not otherwise criminal.  For example, probationers are frequently 
barred from leaving a defined geographic location, drinking alcohol, contacting 
the victim of the underlying crime, and so on.  Violating these conditions may be the 
direct cause of the probationer's detention, but it is indisputable that the 
State would be unable to incarcerate the probationer for these acts absent the 
conviction for the underlying crime.  
Under those circumstances, we are forced to conclude that pre-revocation 
incarceration is attributable to the underlying crime.

 
 

Id., 
¶ 11, 209 P.3d  at 900.  

 
 
[¶10]   We concluded in Jackson that credit was warranted 
because the sole reason for Mr. Jackson's detention was the allegation he 
violated the conditions of his probation.  
Mr. Jackson was not charged with a separate criminal offense as a result 
of the facts alleged in the petition, and the only allegation resolved in the 
State's favor supporting the probation revocation was that Mr. Jackson absconded 
from supervision.  Under the 
specific facts of the case, we determined the time Mr. Jackson was detained 
pending resolution of the probation revocation proceedings was a direct result 
of the underlying criminal conviction, and he was entitled to credit for the 
time incarcerated against his minimum and maximum sentence on the underlying 
sentence.  Id., ¶ 14, 209 P.3d  at 
901.

 
 
[¶11]   In the instant case, like Jackson, the sole basis for Swain's 
detention in each of the revocation proceedings was the accusation he had 
violated one or more conditions of his probation.  No additional criminal charges were 
filed against Swain based on the alleged violations, and the justification for 
revoking probation was basically that Swain absconded from supervision and 
failed to report to and complete the Cheyenne Transitional Center's program and 
the Transitions Residential Program.  
Without doubt, the State could not have arrested and detained Swain for 
these acts absent his conviction for the underlying crime.  Under the circumstances, we must also 
conclude the time Swain spent in custody pending resolution of the three 
revocation proceedings was directly attributable to his underlying battery 
conviction and, consequently, he is entitled to credit against the underlying 
three-to-five-year prison sentence.  
Accordingly, we reverse his sentence and remand the matter to the 
district court with instructions to give Swain credit against his minimum and 
maximum sentence for the pre-revocation incarceration time.1 

 
 
Criminal 
Contempt Conviction

 
 
[¶12]   Swain mounts several challenges to 
the validity of his conviction for indirect criminal contempt.  However, our focus is on a procedural 
error in the contempt proceeding, which we conclude requires reversal of that 
conviction.

 

[¶13]   The power to punish for contempt is 
inherent in all courts of general jurisdiction in Wyoming.  Skinner v. State, 838 P.2d 715, 723 
(Wyo. 1992); Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336, 343 (Wyo. 1989); Horn v. 
District Court, Ninth Judidical District, 647 P.2d 1368, 1374-75 (Wyo. 
1982).  Contempts of court are 
classified as either civil or criminal in nature and, within each 
classification, either as direct (committed in the court's presence) or indirect 
contempt (committed outside of the hearing or view of the judge).  A civil contempt is remedial; the 
penalty serves to enforce compliance with a court order or to compensate an 
injured party.  Horn, 647 P.2d  at 1372-73.  In essence, the contemnor carries the 
keys of his prison in his own pocket, and can obtain release by complying with 
the order of the court that sent him there.  Connors, 769 P.2d  at 343.  A criminal contempt, on the other hand, 
is punitive in character; the penalty serves to vindicate the authority of the 
court and does not terminate upon compliance with a court order.  Horn, 647 P.2d  at 1373.  While a judgment of civil contempt is 
conditional and may be lifted when the disobedience ends, punishment for 
criminal contempt is unconditional and fixed.  In essence, criminal contempt is "a 
crime in every fundamental respect," and a conviction for criminal contempt is 
indistinguishable from an ordinary criminal conviction.  Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201, 88 S. Ct. 1477, 1481-82, 20 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1968); Skinner, 838 P.2d  at 722 n.5.   

 
 
[¶14]   The nature of the contempt charged 
governs the conduct of, and the procedures to be followed in, a contempt 
proceeding.  Nearly a century ago, 
the United States Supreme Court addressed the differences between a proceeding 
instituted and tried as a criminal contempt and a proceeding for civil contempt 
in Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range 
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797 (1911).  In Gompers, two significant principles of 
law emerged: (1) proceedings in civil contempt are between the original parties 
and are merely a facet of the original cause of action  they are instituted, 
tried and treated as a part of the main case; and (2) a criminal contempt 
prosecution is between the public and the contemnor and is a separate and 
independent proceeding from, and is not a part of, the original case in which 
the contempt arose  it is instituted, tried and treated as a distinct criminal 
action.  Id. at 444-51, 31 S. Ct.  at 499-502.  The Gompers "independent and separate 
proceeding" rule for indirect criminal contempts has been universally followed 
over the intervening years.  See Bray v. United States, 423 U.S. 73, 75, 
96 S. Ct. 307, 309, 46 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1975); Matter of Hipp, Inc., 895 F.2d 1503, 
1509-10 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Peterson, 456 F.2d 1135, 1139 (10th Cir. 1972); In Re Mowery, 169 P.3d 835, 841 (Wash. 
App. Div. 1 2007); Bryant v. Howard Cty. 
Dep't of Social Services ex rel. Costley, 874 A.2d 457, 466-67 (Md. App. 
2005); People v. Budzynski, 775 N.E.2d 275, 280-81 (Ill. App. 4 Dist. 2002); State v. Roberts, 515 A.2d 799, 803-04 
(N.J. App. 1986); see also 17 Am. 
Jur. 2d Contempt § 145 (2004); 7A 
Federal Procedure Lawyers Ed. Contempt § 17:9 (2005); 17 F.R.D. 167, 
171-72 (1955).

 
 
[¶15]   This Court endorsed the independent 
and separate proceeding rule in Garber v. 
United Mine Workers of America, 524 P.2d 578, 579-80 (Wyo. 1974).  In Garber, we set aside for lack of 
jurisdiction a criminal contempt order issued against several subpoenaed 
witnesses who had failed to appear for a hearing on an employer's complaint for 
a temporary injunction against a union arising out of a labor dispute.  The order to show cause issued to the 
nonappearing witnesses was filed in and bore the same caption as the original 
action seeking the injunctive relief.  
Five of the alleged contemnors were served a copy of the show cause order 
and appeared at the contempt hearing without an attorney.  Although the district court queried them 
about their understanding of the nature of the proceedings, no response was 
solicited or received, and they were not advised of the nature of the charges 
against them.  The district court 
questioned them and found each guilty of contempt.  Each were fined $50.00 and sentenced to 
thirty days in the county jail, with both the fine and jail sentence suspended 
on the condition that they obey the law and orders, mandates, and subpoenas 
issued by any court of general jurisdiction for one year.  In the course of setting aside the 
contempt order, we noted that the alleged contemnors would have been informed of 
the criminal nature of the action through the title of the cause had the 
contempt matter been properly pursued as an independent action.  We observed: 

 
 
As 
was said in 1911 in Gompers v. Buck's 
Stove & Range Co., [221 U.S. 418, 446, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797], the 
matter should show the court or the public as a party.  This is more than a mere matter of form, 
it advises the defendant that it is a charge and not a suit. . . .  Proceedings in criminal contempts are 
independent criminal actions and should be conducted accordingly. 

 
 

Id. 
at 579.

 
 
[¶16]   In United Mine Workers of America Local 1972 v. 
Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1283-84 (Wyo. 1989), this Court held the 
criminal contempt orders issued against two unions and ninety union members for 
violating a permanent injunction null and void for want of jurisdiction because 
the contempt matter was not instituted and conducted as an independent action 
apart from the original cause in which the preliminary injunction issued and the 
contempt arose.  We 
stated:

 
 
Our 
analysis of W.R.Cr.P. 41(b)[2] [predecessor to W.R.Cr.P. 42] and [the 
cases of Garber and Tracy, Green & Co. v. Warner, 704 P.2d 1306 (Wyo. 1985)3] leads us to conclude the district 
court failed to follow the necessary procedure in issuing the contempt citations 
to the individual contemnors and the union contemnors.  This was, as we have found, a criminal 
contempt proceeding and should have been conducted as an independent criminal 
action.  It was not, and the 
district court, therefore, never obtained jurisdiction to proceed.  We hold the contempt orders against the 
individuals and the unions null and void.

 
 

Id. 
at 1284.  We reiterated this holding 
three years later in Crites v. 
Alston, 837 P.2d 1061, 1072 (Wyo. 1992).

 
 
[¶17]   Over the intervening years, we have 
not overruled or limited the "separate and independent proceeding" requirement 
espoused in these cases for indirect criminal contempt actions.  That requirement leads to the problem in 
this case.  Here, the criminal 
contempt against Swain was not pursued as an independent criminal action.  From the filing of the order to show 
cause to the entry of the order of contempt against Swain, the criminal contempt 
action proceeded as an aspect of the underlying criminal case in which the 
contempt arose, bearing the same docket number as that case.  This procedural misstep under existing 
law mandates a conclusion that the jurisdiction of the district court to proceed 
on the contempt action was never properly invoked.  Accordingly, we must declare the 
contempt order against Swain null and void.4  UMWA Local 1972, 774 P.3d  at 1284.  Having concluded the order of contempt 
cannot stand, we find it unnecessary to address Swain's asserted errors.5

 
 
[¶18]   As a final matter, we would be 
remiss in not noting the days Swain served in the Laramie County Detention 
Center on the criminal contempt action.  
Because this matter is being remanded, we simply reiterate for the 
district court's consideration what we said in Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491, 498 n.10 
(Wyo. 1990), concerning sentencing credit:

 

 
[W]e 
would follow generally the standard developed by III ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice . . . 18.307-08 [(2d ed. 1980)]:

 
 

Standard 
18-4.7. Credit for pretrial 
confinement

 
 
(a) 
Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term should be given to a 
defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for 
which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a 
charge is based. This should specifically include credit for time spent in 
custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, pending the resolution 
of an appeal, and prior to arrival at the institution to which the defendant has 
been committed. 

(b) 
Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term should be given to a 
defendant for all time spent in custody under a prior sentence if the defendant 
is later reprosecuted and resentenced for the same offense or for another 
offense based on the same conduct. In the case of such a reprosecution, this 
should include credit in accordance with paragraph (a) for all time spent in 
custody as a result of both the original charge and any subsequent charge for 
the same offense or for another offense based on the same conduct. 

(c) 
If a defendant is serving multiple sentences, and if one of the sentences is set 
aside as the result of direct or collateral attack, credit against the maximum 
term and any minimum term of the remaining sentences should be given for all 
time served since the commission of the offenses on which the sentences were 
based. 

(d) 
If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later prosecuted on another 
charge growing out of conduct which occurred prior to arrest, credit against the 
maximum term and any minimum term of any sentence resulting from such 
prosecution should be given for all time spent in custody under the former 
charge which has not been credited against another sentence. 

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   We hold Swain is entitled to credit 
against his penitentiary sentence for the time he was detained pending 
resolution of the three probation revocation proceedings.  We also hold Swain's conviction for 
indirect criminal contempt cannot be sustained because the district court lacked 
jurisdiction over the contempt action.  
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Given the facts of this case, we deem it appropriate for the district 
court, rather than this Court, to determine in the first instance the amount of 
credit to be awarded against Swain's sentence.

 
 

2Rule 41(b) provided in relevant part:

(b)  Disposition on notice and hearing.  A 
criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule [summary 
disposition] shall be prosecuted on notice.  The notice shall state the time and 
place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, 
and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged 
and describe it as such.  The notice 
shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the 
defendant, or on application of the prosecuting attorney, or of an attorney 
appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order 
of arrest. 

 
 
 
 

3In Tracy, Green & Co., we 
reversed a criminal contempt conviction because the district court failed to 
comply with the notice requirement of W.R.Cr.P. 
41(b).

 
 

4We are mindful that W.R.Cr.P. 41(b) was amended in 1992 to its present 
form found in W.R.Cr.P. 42.  
However, we see nothing in the language of Rule 42 which would mandate a 
different result.

 
 

5We note that Swain's improper service and double jeopardy claims are 
raised for the first time in this appeal.  
While Swain broached the inadequate plea advisement complaint in the 
district court, he did not buttress it with a cogent legal argument.  We find it appropriate under the 
circumstances for these claims to be resolved in the first instance by the 
district court should a proper proceeding in law for criminal contempt be 
instituted against Swain.