Case Title: Wilkes v. Hoaglund

Citation: 196 N.W.2d 475

Docket Number: 43212, 43254

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1972-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
196 N.W.2d 475 (1972) Gilbert J. WILKES, Respondent-Appellant, v. W. R. HOAGLUND, Commissioner of Public Safety of the State of Minnesota, et al., Appellants-Respondents. Nos. 43212, 43254. Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 7, 1972. *476 Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Frederick S. Suhler, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for appellants-respondents. Clinton W. Wyant, Aitkin, for respondent-appellant. Heard before KNUTSON, C. J., and MURPHY, OTIS, and PETERSON, JJ. PER CURIAM. Appeals by both parties from an order of the district court conditionally reversing an order of the commissioner of public safety discharging from service a highway patrolman. The appeals raise issues as to whether the findings and order of the commissioner are supported by the record and the more important question of whether, in proceedings by certiorari pursuant to Minn.St. 299D.03, subd. 11, the district court may modify an administrative order in lieu of affirming or reversing the same. The employee, Gilbert J. Wilkes, was a member of the Minnesota Highway Patrol for 8½ years prior to his dismissal. He was charged with neglect of duty[1] based on his failing to report for certain assigned duties in the Aitkin County area. Pursuant to Minn.St. 299D.03, subd. 10,[2] a hearing on the charge was held, after which the commissioner determined that the employee's conduct constituted neglect of duty warranting dismissal. There is no dispute about the facts. In his order, the commissioner concluded: On certiorari,[3] the district court determined that the action of the commissioner "was unreasonable and discriminatory, and is hereby conditionally reversed and the [patrolman], if he so elects, be reinstated to his duties as of July 15, 1971, unless at the pleasure of the Commissioner he is directed to report earlier." It is apparent that the court was persuaded that the action of the commissioner was unreasonably harsh, and his memorandum accompanying the order indicates that his object was to invite the commissioner to revise his decision or to accept the court's order, which would "in effect subject such patrolman to a four month period of suspension without pay, which may or may not in his discretion be sufficient in the premises." The facts in this case are similar to those dealt with in Webster v. Marshall, 270 Minn. 292, 133 N.W.2d 533 (1965), where the commissioner dismissed a highway patrolman because he continued in his employment as a part-time truckdriver for more than a year after all members of the highway patrol had been notified that driving a truck as outside employment was prohibited and after a specific rescission of his previous permission to accept such employment. The trial court found the commissioner's action to be arbitrary and unreasonable and directed that the employee should be suspended without pay for a 5-month period and thereafter reinstated. We reversed the trial court and sustained the holding of the commissioner to the effect that the conscious violation of the rule by the employee afforded a legal and substantial basis to dismiss him from the patrol force. The issues bearing upon the authority vested in the commissioner, and the nature and extent of the discretion which he may exercise in disciplinary matters, are fully discussed and the decisions relating thereto are gathered in Webster v. Marshall, supra. We noted that, notwithstanding the statute's apparent grant to the *478 court of authority to "modify" decisions of the commissioner, the exercise of such authority by the court in substituting its judgment for that of the commissioner "in matters relating to administrative policy collides with the provisions of the constitution dealing with the division of governmental powers. Minn.Const. art. 3, § 1 [citing cases]." 270 Minn. 295, 133 N.W.2d 535. We further observed (270 Minn. 296, 133 N.W.2d 536): While we can appreciate the trial court's feeling that the penalty imposed was indeed severe, we cannot say, on the basis of the record, that the commissioner's determination should be disturbed. The employee's failure to report for duty for a period of 2½ days is compounded by the false or incorrect statements in his workbook that he actually had performed his functions and duties during that period. He admits the breaches found by the commissioner. The commissioner did not have to accept as true his statement that his failure to report for duty resulted from confusion as to work schedules and that his entry of false or incorrect data as to miles traveled, speedometer readings, and work performed was the result of an honest mistake. We are controlled by what we have already said in Webster v. Marshall, supra, and conclude that the record reasonably supports the commissioner's decision. Reversed. [1] Minn.St. 299D.03, subd. 8, provides in part: "Causes for suspension, demotion, or discharge shall be: * * * * * "(2) Neglect of duty or wilful violation or disobedience of orders or rules." [2] Minn.St. 299D.03, subd. 10, provides: "The commissioner or his designated subordinate shall have power to compel the attendance of witnesses at any such hearing and to examine them under oath, and to require the production of books, papers, and other evidence at any such hearing, and for that purpose may issue subpoenas and cause the same to be served and executed in any part of the state. The employee accused shall be entitled to be confronted with the witnesses against him and have an opportunity to cross-examine the same and to introduce at such hearing testimony in his own behalf, and to be represented by counsel at such hearing. If the hearing is conducted by a designated subordinate of the commissioner such designated subordinate upon completion of the hearing shall forthwith transmit a transcript of the testimony of the hearing, together with his recommendations, to the commissioner. The commissioner, within 25 days after such hearing, shall render his decision in writing and file the same in his office. If after such hearing he finds that any such charge made against such state employee is true, he may punish the offending party by reprimand, suspension without pay, demotion, or dismissal." [3] Minn.St. 299D.03, subd. 11, provides in part: "Any state highway patrolman who is so suspended, demoted, or dismissed may have such decision or determination of the commissioner reviewed by a writ of certiorari in the district court of the county where such patrolman resides. If such decision or determination of the commissioner shall be finally rejected or modified by the court, the patrolman shall be reinstated in his position, and the commissioner shall pay to the patrolman so suspended out of the funds of the state the salary or wages withheld from him pending the determination of the charges or as may be directed by the court."