Case Title: Casey v. Beeker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1190400

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2020-09-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: September 4, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2020
_________________________
1190400
_________________________
Laura Casey
v.
Chris "Chip" Beeker, Jr., Twinkle Andress Cavanaugh, and
Jeremy H. Oden, in their official capacities as
commissioners of the Alabama Public Service Commission
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-19-902205)
SELLERS, Justice.
Laura Casey appeals from a judgment entered by the
Montgomery Circuit Court in Casey's action against Chris
"Chip" Beeker, Jr., Twinkle Andress Cavanaugh, and Jeremy H.
1190400
Oden ("the commissioners"), in their official capacities as
commissioners of the Alabama Public Service Commission ("the
PSC").  In her complaint, Casey asserted that a gathering of
the commissioners at a public hearing held by the PSC in
November 2019 constituted a "meeting" under the Alabama Open
Meetings Act, § 36-25A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the Act"). 
She alleged that proper notice of the hearing was not given as
required by the Act and that she was prohibited from recording
the hearing in violation of the Act.  The trial court,
however, ruled that a "meeting" had not occurred at the
hearing and that the Act therefore does not apply.  We affirm.
Section 37-1-83, Ala. Code 1975, which is part of the
statutory scheme governing the PSC, requires the PSC to
investigate complaints of unfair utility rates.  It also
provides that "no order affecting such [utility] rates ...
shall be entered by the [PSC] without notice and a hearing." 
In addition, § 37-1-96, Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[n]o
order shall be made by the [PSC] affecting any rate or
service, except as otherwise specifically provided, unless or
until a public hearing has been held in accordance with the
provisions of [Title 37]."
2
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Two individuals, James Bankston and Ralph Phifer, filed
a complaint with the PSC regarding Alabama Power Company's
"capacity-reservation 
charges," 
which 
are 
purportedly 
aimed 
at
enabling Alabama Power to recover the costs associated with
serving the backup-power needs of customers with "onsite
interconnected generation."  Bankston and Phifer complained
specifically about charges levied against Alabama Power
customers who generate their own electricity through the use
of solar panels.  According to a representative of Alabama
Power, 
its 
capacity-reservation charges 
allow 
Alabama 
Power 
to
recover the cost of "reserving" backup electricity for
customers whose solar panels are not producing enough power. 
The Alabama Attorney General's Office and two nonprofit
organizations, G.A.S.P. and Energy Alabama, intervened in the
proceedings.  
On November 21, 2019, the PSC held a public hearing
regarding the capacity-reservation charges.  Pursuant to 
§ 
37-
1-89, Ala. Code 1975, the PSC appointed an administrative law
judge to preside over the hearing.  Notice of the hearing, in
the form of an order of the administrative law judge setting
a hearing date, was posted in advance on the PSC's Web site. 
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The hearing was widely attended. Although all three PSC
commissioners attended the hearing, affidavits submitted to
the trial court indicate that there was no prearranged plan to
have a quorum of the PSC present.
Casey, a resident of Shelby County, attended the PSC
hearing.  Using her cellular telephone, Casey began to record
the hearing.  The record suggests that she may have also
simultaneously "streamed" the hearing over the Internet. 
Before the hearing was over, the administrative law judge
stated:
"I continue to hear the chirping of an electronic
device.  It's annoying the heck out of me and it's
taking away my focus.  If anybody's streaming this
proceeding, shut it down right now.  We don't record
proceedings.  We don't stream live hearings here at
the Commission.  Any live streaming needs to be shut
down right now.  It's not permitted.  If that's what
I'm hearing, the chirping, that needs to stop ...."
Casey alleges that, after the administrative law judge's
comments, her cellular telephone was confiscated and she was
escorted out of the proceedings and was not allowed to return
until she agreed to stop recording.1
1Nothing in the appellate record indicates that the
"chirping" heard by the administrative law judge was coming
from Casey's phone.  The trial court did not determine that
Casey was disruptive, and the commissioners have abandoned any
reliance on that ground.  The Court also notes that the
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Section 36-25A-9, Ala. Code 1975, allows for civil
actions alleging violations of the Act.  Interested parties
can sue members of a governmental body, in their official
capacities, who remain in attendance at a meeting allegedly
held in violation of the Act.  Pursuant to that Code section,
Casey sued the commissioners, averring that they had violated
the Act by failing to give the notice called for by the Act
and by preventing Casey from recording the hearing.
The parties submitted legal briefs and documentary
evidence to the trial court.  After hearing arguments, but
without receiving any oral testimony, the trial court entered
a final judgment in favor of the commissioners.  In support of
its judgment, the trial court ruled that the Act did not apply
here because the gathering of the commissioners at the PSC
hearing was not a "meeting" that would trigger applicability
of the notice and recording provisions of the Act.  Casey
appealed.
parties have not pointed to any express statutory prohibition
on recording public hearings of the PSC.  Casey, however,
relies only on a provision of the Act allowing the recording
of meetings.  She has not pleaded any other legal basis
supporting her claim that she had a legal right to record the
PSC hearing. 
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The parties agree that this Court should apply a de novo
standard of review.  See Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Small, 829 So.
2d 743, 745 (Ala. 2002) ("[W]here there are no disputed facts
and where the judgment is based entirely upon documentary
evidence, no ... presumption of correctness applies [to the
trial court's judgment].").  See also Pitts v. Gangi, 896 So.
2d 433, 434 (Ala. 2004) (noting that questions of statutory
interpretation are subject to de novo review on appeal). 
Under the Act, Casey had the burden of demonstrating by a
preponderance of the evidence that a "meeting" occurred and
that the provisions of the Act were violated.  See §
36-25A-9(b), Ala. Code 1975 (stating in part that, at a
preliminary hearing on a complaint alleging a violation of the
Act, "the plaintiff shall establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that a meeting of the governmental body occurred and
that each defendant attended the meeting"); § 36-25A-9(e),
Ala. Code 1975 (requiring a trial court to enter a final
judgment against a defendant in an Open Meetings Act case
"[u]pon proof by a preponderance of the evidence of a
defendant's violation of [the Act]").
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Section 36-25A-1(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides, with some
exceptions not applicable here, that "no meetings of a
governmental body may be held without providing notice
pursuant to the requirements of Section 36-25A-3[, Ala. Code
1975]."  (Emphasis added.)  As for recording a meeting, § 36-
25A-6, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in part:
"A meeting of a governmental body, except while
in executive session, may be openly recorded by any
person in attendance by means of a tape recorder or
any other means of sonic, photographic, or video
reproduction provided the recording does not disrupt
the conduct of the meeting."
(Emphasis added.)
There is no dispute in this case that the PSC is a
"governmental body" under the Act.  See § 36-25A-2(4), Ala.
Code 1975 (defining "governmental body").  The dispute is
whether a "meeting" occurred during the PSC hearing.  On
appeal, Casey relies on 
the following definition of "meeting":
"(6) Meeting. a. Subject to the limitations
herein, the term meeting shall only apply to the
following:
"....
"3. The gathering, whether or not it
was 
prearranged, 
of 
a 
quorum 
of 
a
governmental body during which the members
of 
the 
governmental 
body 
deliberate
specific matters that, at the time of the
7
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exchange, the participating members expect
to come before the full governmental body
at a later date."
§ 36-25A-2(6)a.3., Ala. Code 1975.  In the present case,
whether a "meeting" occurred at the hearing depends on whether
the commissioners "deliberated" a matter at the hearing that
they expected to come before the PSC at a later date.  It is
not contested that the commissioners expected Alabama Power's
capacity-reservation charge to come before the PSC at a later
date.  Thus, whether a meeting occurred depends on whether the
commissioners "deliberated" that matter at the hearing. 2
Although the Act defines the term "deliberation," §
36-25A-2(1), Ala. Code 1975, Casey argues that this Court, in
determining whether the commissioners deliberated at the PSC
hearing, should not consult that definition.  Rather, she
asserts that we should apply Merriam-Webster's definition of
"deliberate," which is "to think about or discuss issues and
decisions 
carefully." 
 
Merriam-Webster's 
Collegiate 
Dictionary
329 (11th ed. 2020)  (emphasis added).  We disagree.  The Act
2In her complaint and in the trial court, Casey cited
additional definitions of "meeting" that are set out in §
36-25A-2(6)a., Ala. Code 1975, which refer to "prearranged"
gatherings of quorums but do not require deliberation.  On
appeal, Casey has abandoned reliance on those definitions.
8
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uses 
the 
terms 
"deliberative," 
"deliberate," 
and
"deliberation."  See § 36-25A-1(a), Ala. Code 1975 ("It is the
policy of this state that the deliberative process of
governmental bodies shall be open to the public during
meetings ...."); § 36-25A-2(6), Ala. Code 1975 (defining
"meeting" in part as a gathering of a quorum of a governmental
body where the members of the quorum "deliberate" a matter
they expect to come before the full governmental body); § 36-
25A-7(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975 (stating that, if, during an
executive 
session 
where 
litigation against 
a 
governmental 
body
is discussed with counsel, "deliberation begins among the
members of the governmental body regarding what action to take
relating to pending or threatened litigation based upon the
advice of counsel, the executive session shall be concluded
and the deliberation shall be conducted in the open portion of
the meeting or the deliberation shall cease").  Thus, among
other things, the Act is aimed at making the "deliberative
process" transparent and open to the public during "meetings,"
which include gatherings at which governmental bodies
"deliberate." 
 
It 
also 
requires 
transparency 
when
"deliberation" occurs during an executive session where
9
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litigation is discussed with counsel.  It is obvious to the
Court from the entirety of the Act and from the definition of
"deliberation" that that term refers to the act of
deliberating.  In other words, it defines what it means to
"deliberate."  Accordingly, the term "deliberate" should be
defined based on the statutory definition of "deliberation"
found in the Act.  Cf. State v. Schmid, 859 N.W.2d 816 (Minn.
2015) (construing the statutory term "take," which was not
expressly defined in the statute, according to the statutory
definition of "taking" that was set forth in the same
statutory scheme).  Indeed, Casey's argument on this point
conflicts with Swindle v. Remington, 291 So. 3d 439 (Ala.
2019), discussed more fully below, in which this Court
consulted the statutory definition of "deliberation" in
determining whether the members of a governmental body had
"deliberated" and had therefore held a "meeting."
"Deliberation" is defined in the Act as:
"An exchange of information or ideas among a quorum
of members of a subcommittee, committee, or full
governmental body intended to arrive at or influence
a 
decision 
as 
to 
how 
any 
members 
of 
the
subcommittee, committee, or full governmental body
should vote on a specific matter that, at the time
of the exchange, the participating members expect to
come before the subcommittee, committee, or full
10
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body immediately following the discussion or at a
later time."
§ 36-25A-2(1), Ala. Code 1975.  Two witnesses testified during
the PSC hearing.  The first, Natalie Dean, is a "regulatory
pricing manager" for Alabama Power.  She testified regarding
the purpose of the capacity-reservation charge, the amount of
the charge, how the charge is calculated, and the effect
solar-panel usage might have on Alabama Power's costs and its
ability to serve its customers.  Dean's testimony was provided
in response to questioning by Alabama Power, by the parties
who had initiated the proceedings, and by intervenors with
interests in the subject matter of the proceedings.
The other witness to testify was Karl Rabago, an expert
called by G.A.S.P., one of the intervenors in the proceedings. 
Rabago addressed the commissioners directly with a lengthy
summary of what appears to be previously given deposition
testimony.  According to Rabago, the capacity-reservation
charges "eliminate much of the savings that [solar] customers
expect to realize from their investments [in solar panels]"
and are "punitive, discriminatory, and unlawful."  None of the
other parties cross-examined Rabago.
11
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Nothing in the transcript of the hearing indicates that
the commissioners themselves participated in the exchange of
relevant and substantive information during the hearing. 
Rather, it appears that they listened passively to the
information provided by the parties in attendance.  At the
conclusion of the hearing, the administrative law 
judge stated
that the commissioners and the PSC staff members would
"evaluate ... the additional testimony that's been provided
today, and then a decision will be rendered at the appropriate
time ... at an open meeting of the [PSC]."
It is not contested that, at the hearing, information was
presented that was intended to influence the commissioners'
ultimate decision regarding the propriety of Alabama Power's
capacity-reservation charge.  The issue is whether that
information was exchanged "among" the commissioners.  § 36-
25A-2(1), Ala. Code 1975 (deliberation occurs when there is
"[a]n exchange of information or ideas among a quorum of
members").
Casey points to the first definition of "among" in
Merriam-Webster's dictionary, which is: "in or through the
midst of: surrounded by."   Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
12
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Dictionary 41 (11th ed. 2020).  Merriam-Webster provides the
following example of a specific use of the term "among" Casey
urges: "hidden among the trees."  Id.  Merriam-Webster also
provides another similar definition of "among": "in 
company or
association with," and gives "living among artists" as an
example of that usage.  Id.  According to Casey, the
commissioners "sat in the midst (the middle) of the parties'
exchange of ideas and information intended to influence the
[commissioners'] future vote."  In other words, Casey asserts
that the exchange of information and ideas "among a quorum" of
a governmental body means the exchange of information and
ideas in the quorum's presence.  She suggests that construing
the Act in any other way would allow members of governmental
bodies to avoid the application of the Act simply by remaining
silent at gatherings where information and ideas are 
presented
to them.3
3There is no discussion in Casey's appellate briefs of the
definitions 
of 
"meeting" 
that 
refer 
to 
"prearranged
gatherings" of quorums but that do not mention deliberation. 
We are not tasked in this case to decide whether, under those
definitions, a gathering such as Casey hypothesizes, where
members of a governmental body do not speak, could still be a
"meeting" under the Act.
13
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"Words used in a statute must be given their natural,
plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning ...."  IMED
Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346
(Ala. 1992).  In this Court's view, in the context in which
the term "among" is used in the statute, the ordinary and
commonly understood meaning is more closely embodied by
another definition of "among" provided by Merriam-Webster:
"through 
the 
reciprocal 
acts 
of." 
 Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary 41 (11th ed. 2020).  An example of a use
of that definition given by Merriam-Webster is: 
"quarrel among
themselves."  Another apt example given by counsel for the
commissioners during oral argument before this Court is: "a
discussion among the guests."
The Court is not writing on a clean slate with respect to
this issue.  In Swindle v. Remington, supra, the Court
considered whether a particular private gathering of 
the 
board
of the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Program
("PEEHIP") and PEEHIP staff members constituted a meeting
under the Act.  At a private "morning" session, a PEEHIP
budget shortfall was addressed, and PEEHIP staff members
recommended to the board that it fill the shortfall by
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increasing insurance premiums and spousal surcharges for
insurance coverage, which were matters the board was slated to
vote on at a later public "afternoon" session.  Although this
Court concluded that a meeting had indeed occurred at the
morning session, the act of providing information to the
PEEHIP board members during that session was not, by itself,
enough to establish that a meeting had occurred.  291 So. 3d
at 460 ("[D]uring the [private] session, [PEEHIP] staff
recommended the Board's adoption of the proposed increases. 
The primary question, however, is whether the Board engaged in
any 
specific 
'deliberation' 
regarding 
the 
staff's
recommendations.").  
There was more to the private morning session than just
the provision of information to the PEEHIP board.  There was
testimony that, during the morning session, "'various [Board]
members shared thoughts and views on the [matter to be voted
on later], through discussion, questioning and otherwise.'"
291 So. 3d at 443.  In concluding that "deliberation" had
occurred at the morning session, this Court observed:
"Board members asked questions about the proposals
[to be voted on during the afternoon session] and
... at least one member openly disagreed with the
recommendations and advocated for an alternative
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solution. ... [Two Board members] stated that the
members shared their 'thoughts and views' on the
proposed increases [in premiums and surcharges] and
... 
there 
was 
discussion 
about 
the 
staff's
recommendations.   Although the other Board members
provided statements alleging that they did not
exchange information or ideas during the meeting, it
is evident that the opinions of some of the Board
members were expressed during the morning session.
During both the morning and afternoon sessions, [one
Board member] advocated for the use of [a] trust
fund to fill the economic shortfall [facing PEEHIP's
budget]. ... [T]he chair of the Board, along with
PEEHIP officials, scheduled the morning session with
general knowledge of the proposals to be presented
by staff, and Board members asked questions
regarding 
the 
staff's 
proposals 
to 
increase
premiums, an item the members knew would be
considered for a vote later that day. In addition,
during the morning session, [one Board member] read
and 'someone mentioned' a recently enacted Senate
resolution that suggested that an increase in PEEHIP
premiums would be inappropriate in light of recent
legislation 
providing 
an 
increase 
in
public-education employees' salaries. This Court
therefore must conclude that, under these particular
circumstances, 'deliberation' occurred during the
morning session."
291 So. 3d at 461 (footnote omitted).  The Court in Swindle
also noted that questions asked by the members of a
governmental body could be posed in such a way as to
"influence those around him or her to vote a certain way." 
Id. at 460.  
Under the reasoning of Swindle, in order to prove that a
"meeting" occurred at the PSC hearing, Casey must demonstrate
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that the commissioners exchanged information and ideas with
each other and that their doing so was aimed at arriving at or
influencing the commissioners' ultimate decision on the
capacity-reservation charges.  In her appellate brief, Casey
points out that the commissioners sat at the bench during the
PSC hearing, that expert testimony regarding the capacity-
reservation charges was heard by the commissioners, that the
commissioners "could have asked questions" if they had wanted
to, and that one of the commissioners "instructed the public
to follow the [administrative law judge's] directions not to
record the hearing."  These facts are not sufficient to
establish that the commissioners deliberated and that a
meeting took place under the Act.4
The trial court did not err in determining that the
gathering of the commissioners at the November 21, 2019, PSC
4The Court does not hold that the members of a
governmental body necessarily have to address one another
directly in order to "deliberate."  As the Court acknowledged
in Swindle, the exchange of information and ideas among
members of a governmental body can be accomplished in other
ways.  The example given in Swindle was the posing of
questions by members that is intended to influence a vote. 
There could be other examples.  Nothing, however, in the
present case indicates that the commissioners exchanged any
relevant information, much less relevant ideas, during the
hearing.
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hearing was not a "meeting" under the Act.  Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Bolin, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ.,
concur.
Parker, C.J., concurs specially.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
Wise, J., recuses herself.
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PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring specially). 
I concur fully with the main opinion.  I write specially
to address a point argued by Laura Casey's counsel, at oral
argument before this Court, regarding the appropriateness of
applying a statutory definition of one form of a word to  
another form of that word used in the statute. 
The outcome in this case depends partly on whether the
Open Meetings Act's definition of the noun "deliberation" in
§ 36-25A-2(1), Ala. Code 1975, controls the meaning of the
verb "deliberate" in § 36-25A-2(6).  At oral argument, Casey's
counsel stated that there is "no legal authority that suggests
that when you have a statutorily defined noun, that you're
supposed ... to impose that definition on a verb." Because
counsel's improvident assertion relates both to an issue that
is pivotal to the case before us and to broader principles of
legal argument, I take this opportunity both to explore the
nature of "legal authority" and to point out the particular
authorities that support this Court's commonsense approach to
the linguistic question raised in this appeal.
I. Legal authorities in general
"In each case, [a court] must support its action by
reciting legal rules that mesh adequately with the existing
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order."  Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and 
Application of
Statutes 14 (1975).  Consequently, attorneys arguing before a
court present legal rules that favor their respective clients'
positions, in support of which they will find it necessary to
provide legal authority.  In this role, attorneys should
aspire to "recognize the existence of pertinent legal
authorities." 
Comment 
to 
Rule 
3.3, 
"Misleading 
Legal
Argument," Ala. R. Prof. Cond.5  Particularly in cases in
which this Court grants oral argument, it is typical for there
to be no statute or controlling precedent that squares neatly
with the facts and issues of the case at hand.  When faced
with this problem, attorneys must apply legal reasoning to
information from other sources.  To do so effectively,
attorneys must recognize the breadth of potential sources, as
well as their usefulness for persuasion.  In almost every
instance, there will be some legal authority that sheds light
on the issue before the Court.   
5I do not suggest that attorneys behave unethically by
failing 
to 
identify 
or 
acknowledge 
noncontrolling 
authorities,
but only that attorneys do have a duty to ensure the accuracy
of any representation that no legal authority exists that
supports a proposition that favors the opponent.  It is one
thing not to disclose noncontrolling authority that supports
one's opponent; it is quite another to affirmatively state
that such authority does not exist.
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Every legal authority has two characteristics that
determine its role in constructing an argument: type and
weight.  There are two types of legal authority: primary and
secondary.  In general, primary authority is law and official
interpretations of it, for example, constitutions, statutes,
local 
ordinances, 
executive 
orders, 
administrative
regulations, court rules, and judicial decisions.  Primary
authority includes all official pronouncements of a governing
body or individual that enact, interpret, or apply a law or
legal principle.  All primary authorities purport to be
binding on someone, or did at one time.6  All authorities that
are not primary are secondary authorities, that is, 
unofficial
commentary on the law.  For example, good attorneys are
familiar with their jurisdiction's leading treatises and
periodicals pertaining to their area of practice.  Other
secondary sources, such as practice manuals and desk books,
l e g a l  
d i c t i o n a r i e s  
a n d  
e n c y c l o p e d i a s ,
continuing-legal-education 
materials, 
and 
Internet 
sources 
can
6Plurality opinions, concurring opinions, dissenting
opinions, and dicta, though generally nonbinding in the sense
that they do not contain a court's holdings, are primary
authority because they are parts of official, binding
pronouncements. 
Unlike 
holdings 
in 
majority 
opinions, 
however,
they are persuasive rather than mandatory. See infra.
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inform attorneys' decisions of how to advise a client or build
an argument. 
Additionally, every authority has one of two weights:
mandatory or persuasive.  Mandatory authority is authority
that a court must follow.  Persuasive authority is authority
that a court need not follow but that may be used to persuade
the court.  Only primary authorities can be mandatory, and
primary authorities that are not mandatory are persuasive. 
All 
secondary 
authorities 
are 
persuasive 
authorities. 
Further, the weight of mandatory authorities does not vary: a
mandatory authority must be followed.  By contrast, some
persuasive authorities are more persuasive than others.  How
persuasive such an authority is depends on many factors, such
as the relevance of the commentary, the expertise of the
author, and the age of the source.  Particularly with respect
to persuasive primary authority (e.g., nonbinding judicial
statements), an authority's persuasive value is impacted by
the relative positions, within the judicial hierarchy or 
other
governmental structure, of the author and the decision-maker
being persuaded.  
Many 
attorneys 
seem 
to 
have 
little 
difficulty
ascertaining the weight of primary authority.  That is good,
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because legal arguments must cite applicable law, and legal
conclusions must follow from law and its principles. 
Consequently, no argument should rest solely on persuasive
authority if mandatory authority exists.  Put another way,
attorneys must acknowledge mandatory authorities, even if
persuasive authorities better support their arguments. 
Further, 
attorneys cannot 
depend 
solely 
on 
secondary 
authority
if there is primary authority available. 
Some attorneys, however, have the opposite habit: They
rely on primary authority to the near-total exclusion of
secondary authority.  Presumably, this habit has 
been fostered
by the case method of legal education, which has held
ascendancy in law schools across the nation for many decades,
since shortly after Harvard Law School Dean Christopher
Columbus Langdell introduced it in the latter half of the 19th
century.  See Marie Summerlin Hamm et al., The Rubric Meets
the Road in Law Schools: Program Assessment of Student
Learning Outcomes as a Fundamental Way for Law Schools to
Improve and Fulfill their Respective Missions, 95 U. Det.
Mercy L. Rev. 343, 354-57 (2018); David D. Garner, The
Continuing Vitality of the Case Method in the Twenty-First
Century, 2000 BYU Educ. & L.J. 307, 316-23 (2000); W. Burlette
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Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 48-53
(1997) 
(discussing 
Langdell's 
de-emphasis 
of 
secondary 
sources
in legal education).  As a result of Langdell's influence,
legal education places heavy emphasis on distilling and
synthesizing rules announced in judicial opinions.  Law
students may receive an introduction to secondary sources in
a first-year legal-research course, but they are 
rarely called
upon to use them in any other context.  This case-focused
approach has some benefits, such as teaching students to
"think like lawyers," see James R. Maxeiner, Educating Lawyers
Now and Then: Two Carnegie Critiques of the Common Law and the
Case Method, 35 Int'l J. Legal Info. 1, 1 (2007), but it also
conditions them to overlook -- and undervalue -- the wealth of
information that experts have already compiled and condensed
to aid understanding and guide research.  In addition, the
rise 
of 
electronic 
legal-research 
tools, 
with 
their
increasingly advanced search capabilities and (more recently)
artificial 
intelligence, 
has 
diminished 
the 
perceived value 
of
secondary sources, particularly as aids in finding primary
authority.  It is easy to be lulled into complacency by the
power of those tools and forget that the "universal search
box" does not have access to the universe of legal
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information.  No single method, industry practice, or tool
defines the outer limit of the source types that may inform
attorneys' arguments and help them fulfill their obligations
of effective advocacy and candor to the court. Although
attorneys are not expected to digest all possible sources that
may comment on a given issue, they would do well to draw on
the wide variety of credible authorities available to them --
especially when arguing appeals.
With this context in mind, I return to the legal issue at
hand.
II. Legal authorities on using definitions across word forms
A. Primary sources
An abundance of judicial decisions support the Court's
holding that "the term 'deliberate' should be defined based on
the statutory definition of 'deliberation' found in the [Open
Meetings] Act."  ___ So. 3d at ___.  For example, this Court's
handling of the word "deliberate" in Swindle v. Remington, 291
So. 3d 439 (Ala. 2019), is fully consistent with today's
holding.  Another supporting decision the Court cites is State
v. Schmid, 859 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 2015), in which the defendant
had been convicted under a Minnesota law that "state[d] that
a person may not 'take' deer without a license." Id. at 817. 
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The state's fish and game laws defined the noun "taking" but
not the verb "take." Id. at 820.  The court construed "take"
according to the definition of "taking": 
"'Taking,' as defined [by the statute], can be used
as a verb, noun, or adjective. When 'taking' is used
as a verb it has the same underlying definition as
the root verb 'take.' ...
"Further, when 'taking' is used as a gerund or
adjective, the difference is not definitional, but
syntactical. The verb form is an action performed by
a subject, modifiable by adverbs, while the noun
form identifies the action as the object of a verb,
modifiable by adjectives. Thus, when 'take' and
'taking' are used in the same context, they have the
same basic definition. They are merely different
syntactical forms of the same word."
Id. at 820-21 (citations omitted). 
Swindle and Schmid are far from the only cases that
support the Court's  application of a definition of a noun to
its verb form.  In an opinion construing Texas's Open Meetings
Act, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals responded skeptically
to the State's argument that the statutory verb "meeting" had
a different meaning from the defined noun "meeting." Texas v.
Doyal, 589 S.W.3d 136, 143 n.25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) ("It
could be argued that the verb 'meeting' would be the act of
holding a 'meeting' -- so that the noun definition would
inform the meaning of the verb.").  Additionally, decisions of
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the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the 11th Circuit indicate that it is appropriate
to impute the same essential meaning to different forms of the
same word or phrase that occur in the same legislation.  See,
e.g., Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 592 (2010) (declining
to interpret the noun "award" as having a different meaning
from the verb "award" because "[t]he transitive verb '"award"'
has a settled meaning in the litigation context"); Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 178 (1993) ("We conclude ... that
as both a noun and a verb in this subsection 'conduct'
requires an element of direction."); Janus Capital Grp., Inc.
v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011)
(explaining that pairing the verb "make" with a noun results
in a phrase approximately equivalent in meaning to the verb
form of the noun: "'To make any ... statement,' is thus the
approximate equivalent of 'to state.'"); United States v.
Caniff, 955 F.3d 1183, 1189 (11th Cir. 2020) (concluding that
the phrase "'to make any notice' simply means 'to notify'"). 
Similarly, the courts of this State have concluded that
the meaning of a noun informs the meaning of its verb form,
and vice versa.  See, e.g., Randolph v. Yellowstone Kit, 83
Ala. 471, 472, 3 So. 706, 707 (1888) (inferring meaning of
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noun "peddler" from verb "peddle"); Bank of Florala v. Smith,
11 Ala. App. 358, 359, 66 So. 832, 832 (1914) ("[T]he word
'mortgage,' when employed without qualification in [a
conveyance], whether as a verb or as a noun ..., ... is
construed to mean and accomplish what formal terms creating a
mortgage would have accomplished ...." (emphasis added)).
B. Secondary sources
Further support for the Court's use of the definition of
"deliberation" 
across 
word 
forms 
exists 
in 
secondary
authorities regarding principles of statutory interpretation. 
For 
example, 
a 
legislature 
communicates "according to 
accepted
standards of communication" existing at the time of the
enactment.  Dickerson, supra, at 11, 273.  Thus, courts
presume that the "drafters [of legislation] ... are ...
grammatical in their compositions." Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 140
(2012).  That is, ordinarily, "[w]ords are to be given the
meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them."
Scalia & Garner, supra, at 140; see Nielsen v. Preap, __ U.S.
__, __, 139 S. Ct. 954, 965 (2019) (applying this principle
and holding "that the scope of 'the alien' is fixed by the
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predicate 
offenses 
identified 
in 
[the 
preceding]
subparagraphs"). 
One remarkable characteristic of English grammar and
usage is that the same word can often function as many
different parts of speech.  See Bryan Garner, Garner's Modern
English Usage 416 (4th ed. 2016) ("Renaissance rhetoricians
called [this characteristic] enallage ..., and some modern
grammarians call it transfer: the ability of a word to shift
from one grammatical function to another.").  A word that is
normally a noun may serve as an adjective and vice versa. 
With only a slight change of spelling and sentence structure,
a noun becomes a verb.  Many such "functional shifts," also
called 
"semantic 
shifts," 
are 
possible 
and 
normally
acceptable.  See id. at 416-18.  Pertinently here, a noun may
be used as a verb.  Although stylistically legal-writing
experts tend to frown on such "nominalization" that creates a
"buried verb" or "zombie noun," their criticism inherently
recognizes 
that 
the 
two 
forms 
are 
functionally interchangeable
in relation to meaning.  See Bryan A. Garner, Garner's Modern
American Usage 120 (3d. ed. 2009); Modern English Usage,
supra, at 983; Jason Dykstra, To Verb or Not to Verb, 56
Advocate 49 (2013); Bryan A. Garner, Legal Writing in Plain
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English 38-39 (2001).  This interchangeability has given rise
to what one scholar has labeled the "Consistency Principle":
"When a word is used as both a noun and a verb in a single
statutory statement, that word should be construed similarly
in each instance." Alani Golanski, Linguistics in Law, 66 Alb.
L. Rev. 61, 94 (2002). 
III. Conclusion
From this brief survey, it is evident that a plethora of
legal authorities, both primary and secondary, support the
Court's use of the statutory definition of the noun 
"deliberation" to understand the meaning of its verb form
"deliberate."  More importantly, this case illustrates the
danger 
of 
attorneys 
assuming 
an 
overly 
restrictive
understanding of the scope of legal authority.  Attorneys
throughout the State would do well to both recognize and
employ the full range of sources at their disposal under the
rubric of "legal authority."
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SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result).
I do not believe that the plain-meaning rule can be used
in this case or that the main opinion's statement regarding a
definition of the word "among" found in Ala. Code 1975, §
36-25A-2(1), is required.  Instead, I believe that the
appellant, Laura Casey, has simply failed to prove that the
trial court erred, and I would decline at this time to further
address the proper meaning and application of the statutes at
issue in this appeal.  I thus concur in the result.    
The issue in this case is whether the Open Meetings Act,
Ala. Code 1975, § 36-25A-1 et seq. ("the Act"), governed the
Alabama Public Service Commission ("PSC") hearing at issue in
this case.  The Act applies to "meetings," and that term is
specifically defined in Ala. Code 1975, § 36-25A-2(6).  The
issue on appeal relates to one particular definition of the
word "meeting" provided in § 36-25A-2(6)a.3: 
"The gathering, whether or not it was prearranged,
of a quorum of a governmental body during which the
members of the governmental body deliberate specific
matters that, at the time of the exchange, the
participating members expect to come before the full
governmental body at a later date."
(Emphasis added.)
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To decide if the gathering at issue in this case by a
quorum of the members of the PSC -- i.e., the hearing -- was
a "meeting," we are called upon to determine what it means to
"deliberate." 
 
The 
parties 
offer 
various 
dictionary
definitions of the word, but I agree with the main opinion
that we should resort to the specific definition of the word
"deliberation" found in § 36-25A-2(1), which states, in
pertinent part:
"An exchange of information or ideas among a quorum
of members of a ... governmental body intended to
arrive at or influence a decision as to how any
members of the ... governmental body should vote on
a specific matter that, at the time of the exchange,
the participating members expect to come before the
... body immediately following the discussion or at
a later time."
(Emphasis added.)  As framed by the main opinion, the
determinative factor in deciding whether there was a
"deliberation" and thus a "meeting" concerns the meaning of
the word "among." 
The plain-meaning rule requires that "[w]ords used in a
statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and
commonly understood meaning."  IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g
Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992).  However, if
the text is ambiguous, then the plain-meaning rule does not
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apply, and this Court resorts to judicial construction to
determine its meaning.  See id. at 346 ("If the language of
the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial
construction and the clearly expressed intent of the
legislature must be given effect."), and Deutsche Bank Nat'l
Trust Co. v. Walker Cty., 292 So. 3d 317, 326 (Ala. 2019) ("If
the language of a statute is not 'plain' or is ambiguous, then
–- and only then -- may a court construe or interpret it to
determine the legislature's intent.").
The word "among," as the main opinion describes, is
capable of different meanings.  If "among" can mean both an
exchange "between" the members of the quorum and, alternately,
an exchange that occurs "in the midst of" or in the "company
of" the members, then there are different circumstances in
which a "deliberation" occurs and thus a "meeting" exists. 
Neither of the two competing definitions of the word "among"
advanced by the parties nor the resulting changes in meaning
of § 36-25A-2(1) and § 36-25A-2(6)a.3 are absurd; both are
reasonable readings.  
The context of the use of the word "among" does not, for
me, show a plain meaning.  The "exchange" may be "intended to
... influence a decision as to how any members ... should
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vote."  Certainly the members can act in the exchange with the
intent to influence each other, but this context does not
exclude nonmembers from participating in the exchange with the
intent to influence the members or indicate that members
solely are involved in that process.  Influence can be
attempted by nonmembers in "the company" of or "in the midst"
of the quorum just as well as by members between each other. 
This is neither unreasonable nor absurd and appears to be
precisely what was occurring in this case: dueling viewpoints
as to the propriety of a utility charge were being provided to
a quorum of the PSC with the apparent intent to influence that
body.  To me, the context does not show the sole meaning
selected by the main opinion.7  
Because the word "among" is reasonably susceptible to two
different definitions in this case, and because the different
definitions change the applicability of these Code sections,
its meaning is ambiguous and not "plain."  Because it is
ambiguous, the plain-meaning rule does not apply, and this
7This is not to say that merely because a word has more
than one definition it is ambiguous.  Here, § 36-25A-2(1) can
reasonably be read using either definition of the word
"among."  Nothing in the context suggests that a particular
definition is required or is exclusively the natural, plain,
ordinary, and commonly understood meaning.
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Court must resort to the rules of statutory construction to
determine its correct meaning. 
However, the parties generally argue on appeal that their
own respective proposed meaning of the word "among" is the
plain and ordinary meaning and thus do not provide the legal
analysis or theories of construction required to resolve the
ambiguity I see.  Casey does suggest in her brief that the
more narrow reading of the word "deliberation" actually
adopted by the main opinion "would thwart the Alabama public
policy of having the public have open access to the
deliberative process."  
Considering 
the 
legislative 
intent 
and
purpose of a statute is one method of statutory construction
when the plain-meaning rule does not apply: "'[When a court]
is called upon to construe a statute, the fundamental rule is
that the court has a duty to ascertain and effectuate
legislative intent expressed in the statute, which may be
gleaned from the language used, the reason and necessity for
the act, and the purpose sought to be obtained.'"  Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc. v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 296
(Ala. 1998) (quoting Ex parte Holladay, 466 So. 2d 956, 960
(Ala. 1985)).  
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However, the legislature has already stated the purpose
of the Act, and the setting in which the Act applies is more
limited than Casey suggests: "It is the policy of this state
that the deliberative process of governmental bodies shall be
open to the public during meetings as defined in Section
36-25A-2(6)."  
Ala. Code 1975, § 36-25A-1(a) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the stated purpose of the Act is not to provide the
public access to all facets of the "deliberative process"
generally, as Casey argues, but -- at least under the
circumstances addressed in this appeal -- to provide access to
only what the legislature has defined as a "meeting" in the
first place.  This restriction provided by § 36-25A-1(a),
which is not ambiguous, has thus limited the broad, general
public-policy consideration suggested by Casey as a basis for
rejecting the definition put forth by the PSC commissioners. 
There are numerous methods of statutory construction and
policy considerations that may lead a resolution of the proper
definition of "among" in different directions; I do not have
the benefit of further briefing or argument to engage in that
particular analysis when I must choose one reasonable
definition over another.
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Our caselaw indicates that I cannot provide such an
argument to reverse the judgment of the trial court because,
"when we are asked to reverse a lower court's ruling, we
address only the issues and arguments the appellant chooses to
present."  Hart v. Pugh, 878 So. 2d 1150, 1157 (Ala. 2003). 
I universally follow this caselaw to treat fairly all
litigants who come before this Court.  Further, given that
there might be other arguments to show an interpretation of
"among" different from that adopted in the main opinion, I
would not at this time issue a legal precedent definitively
determining the meaning of the word "among" without a more
comprehensive argument as to the proper construction of the
statutory language.
I note, however, that the main opinion's definition of
"meeting" renders a PSC hearing that is required by law to be
noticed and open to the public by different statutes8 to
nevertheless escape coverage under the Open Meetings Act. 
This is particularly troublesome to me.  In addition, the
result of the main opinion's holding in relation to other
gatherings of the members of governmental bodies when, unlike
8See Ala. Code 1975, §§ 37-1-83 and 37-1-96.
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in this case, the gatherings are not required by other laws to
be open to the public, is not clear.  Furthermore, the
interpretation 
provided 
in 
the 
main 
opinion 
creates
uncertainty as to when the Act would apply to some gatherings
of members of governmental bodies; specifically, gatherings
with no planned deliberation between the members of the quorum
and to which the Act would now not apply might be instantly
transformed into a "meeting" under the Act by a mere utterance
of one of the members.  The Open Meetings Act is a creature of
the legislature; given the posture of this case, its
importance to the public, and the concerns that are apparent
to me as a result of the main opinion's holding, I urge that
body to move expeditiously to resolve these issues and the
ambiguity presented in the Act.
38