Case Title: Nevada v. Barren

Citation: 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 31

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
or

 

 

128 Nev,, Advance Opinion 3!
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

‘THE STATE OF NEVADA, No, 57115
Appellant,

ay FILED
GREGORY DEAN BARREN, JUN 28 201
Respondent.

 

Appeal from a district court order granting a petitiob for
writ of mandamus and directing the justice court to dismiss a criminal
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; Lee A. Gates, Judge.

Reversed and remanded,

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B.
Wolfson, District Attorney, Steven $. Owens, Chief Deputy District

Attorney, and J. Patrick Burns, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,
for Appellant.

Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Amy A. Feliciano, Deputy Public
Defender, Clark County,
for Respondent.

 

BEFORE CHERRY, C.J., PICKERING and HARDESTY, Ji.

OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

In this opinion, we address the applicability of NRS
62B.330(3)(¢)(2), a statutory provision that divests a juvenile court of
jurisdiction over a person who commits a class A or B felony between 16
and 18 years of age but is not identified until after reaching 21 years of

age. We conclude that this statutory provision governs jurisdiction over

12-20307

 
any proceedings initiated after the provision went into effect on October 1,
2009, regardless of when the offense was committed. See 2009 Nev. Stat.,
ch, 25, § 3, at 50-51; NRS 218D.330. Here, respondent Gregory Barren
A. and B felonies at 17 years of age but was not
identified until after reaching 21 years of age. Because NRS
62B.330(8)(0)(2) was in effect when the State initiated proceedings against
Barren, we conclude that the district court, not the juvenile court, has

allegedly committed cla

 

 

jurisdiction over his criminal case.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2005, a woman was kidnapped and sexually assaulted?
Police collected a sample of the offender's DNA from bodily fluid left at the
scene. Subsequently, the police entered the offender's DNA into the
Combined DNA Index System and, in July 2009, the system identified
Barren as the perpetrator. Barren was 17 years old when he allegedly
committed the offenses and 21 years old at the time he was identified. On
October 28, 2009, the State brought charges against Barren in justice

'Barren’s alleged crimes are not triable in justice court. See NRS
4.370(8). ‘Thus, if the juvenile court is divested of jurisdiction, the justice
court's role would be to hold a probable cause hearing. NRS 171.196. If
Barren waives this hearing, his alleged crimes will be tried in the district,
court, Id. If the hearing is not waived, and probable cause is found,
Barren’s alleged crimes would likewise be tried in the district court. NRS
171.206; see also Woerner v. Justice Court, 116 Nev. 518, 525, 1 P.3d 377,
381-82 (2000). Accordingly, throughout this opinion we refer to the
jurisdiction of the district court rather than the justice court,

 

 

*The documents containing the specific facts surrounding this
incident have been stricken from the record on appeal as they were never
filed in the district court. However, the stricken documents are irrelevant
to the disposition of this case.

 

 
court for first-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon, sexual

assault with the use of a deadly weapon, and attempted sexual assault

 

with the use of a deadly weapon. Each charge against Barren is a
category A or B felony if committed by an adult, NRS 200.20; NRS
200.366; NRS 193.330(1)(a)(1).

‘The justice court transferred the case to the juvenile court, but
the juvenile court found that it lacked jurisdiction over Barren’s case
because the State did not file a petition with the juvenile court before
Barron turned 21 years of age. Barren’s case was subsequently
transferred back to the justice court, The justice court concluded that it
had jurisdiction because of newly enacted NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2), @
provision which divests a juvenile court of jurisdiction over a person who
committed a category A or B felony between 16 and 18 years of age, but “is
not identified by law enforcement as having committed the offense until
the person reaches 21 years of age.” Specifically, the justice court
concluded that the statutory provision applied to the facts of Barren’s case,
and that “[alfter October 1, 2009, the Juvenile Court ‘does not have
jurisdiction’ over the persons described in NRS 62B.330(3)¢)(2).” ‘The
justice court further found that applying NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2) did not
constitute an ex post facto violation because based on Barren’s age, “he
would not have been subject to juvenile court jurisdiction [even] prior to
the [2009 amendment to NRS 62B.330].” “As a result, jurisdiction would
have defaulted to the adult trial court.” The justice court also noted that
even absent the 2009 amendments, the Nevada Constitution and caselaw

require that some court, district or juvenile, must always have jurisdiction

over a criminal defendant.

 

 
we ae

Subsequently, Barren filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
in the district court and requested that the district court order the justice
court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. After a hearing, the
Aistrict court granted Barren’s writ petition and remanded Barren's case
to the justice court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. ‘The district court
reasoned that NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2) could not apply retroactively, and if it
did, that retroactive application would constitute an ex post facto
violation, The State appeals.

DISCUSSION

This court “generally review(s] a district court’s grant or
denial of writ relief for an abuse of discretion.” Koller v. State, 122 Nev.
223, 226, 130 P.3d 653, 655 (2006). “However, when the writ involves
questions of statutory construction, including the meaning and scope of a
statute, [this court] review[s] the decision de novo.” Id. Because resolving
the issues in this appeal presents a question of law, the standard of review
is de novo. Paige v. State, 116 Nev. 206, 208, 995 P.2d 1020, 1021 (2000),

At the outset, we note that notwithstanding exceptions
inapplicable here, some court always has jurisdiction over a criminal
defendant. See NRS 171.010 (‘Every person, whether an inhabitant of
this state, or any other state, or of a territory or district of the United
States, is liable to punishment by the laws of this state for a public offense
committed therein, except where it is by law cognizable exclusively in the
courts of the United States.”); see also Castillo v. State, 110 Nev. 536, 542,

 

8In response to a motion from the State, this court has granted a
stay of the district court's order and the proceedings in the justice court
pending a resolution of this appeal

 
ne ae

 

874 P.2d 1252, 1257 (1994) (rejecting a defendant's claim that he was
“home free” from any court's jurisdiction), disapproved of on other grounds
by Wood v, State, 111 Nev. 428, 430, 892 P.2d 944, 946 (1995); D’Urbano v.
Commonwealth, 187 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Mass. 1963) (holding that “ItJhe

 

 

absence of valid juvenile procedures did not deprive the Superior Court of

jurisdiction” and noting that “[tJhe statute [did] not intend, for example,

 

that a person who committed murder at [16] and is apprehended at [23]
should be beyond the reach of criminal statutes"); State ex rel. Elliot v.
District Court, 684 P.2d 481, 485 (Mont. 1984)
Youth Court does not limit a district court's jurisdiction.”); Trujillo v
State, 447 P.2d 279, 280 (N.M. 1968) (explaining that the district court

 

TLlack of jurisdiction in

Jhad jurisdiction to try the defendant because he was over 21 years of age
Jand “the district court is one of general jurisdiction,” while the juvenile
court is limited, by statute, to persons less than 21 years of age); State v.
Hodges, 63 P.3d 66, 68-69 (Utah 2002) (noting that a statute that gave a
juvenile court jurisdiction in proceedings over a person younger than 21
years of age did “not limit the general grant of jurisdiction made to the
district court . . . 80 as to preclude its jurisdiction over proceedings against
[persons [21] years of age or older"); State v. Bradley, 580 P.2d 640, 642
(Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (‘Want of jurisdiction of the juvenile court merely
[precludes acts of that court. It does not invalidate an otherwise valid act
of the superior court which properly had jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the person.”). Thus, the issue on appeal is not whether a court has
jurisdiction over Barren, but rather, which court has jurisdiction over
Barren,

‘The Nevada Constitution grants the district court “original
jurisdiction in all cases excluded by law from the original jurisdiction of

 
justices’ courts” and “final appellate jurisdiction in ca

 

arising in Justice
Courts and such other inferior tribunals as may be established by law.”
Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6(1). ‘This court has explained that a district court
has jurisdiction over “all criminal cases except as otherwise provided by
law.” Battiato v. Sheriff, 95 Nov. 861, 362, 594 P.2d 1162, 1153 (1979).
Conversely, “the juvenile court system is a creation of statute, and it
possesses only the jurisdiction expressly provided for it in the statute.”
Kell v. State, 96 Nev. 791, 792-93, 618 P.2d 350, 351 (1980); see also State
v.Bill, 91 Nev. 275, 277, 534 P.2d 1264, 1265 (1975) (“The Juvenile Court
Act's grant of exclusive and original jurisdiction is limited...."). To
determine which court has jurisdiction in this instance, we examine the
statutory scope of a juvenile court's jurisdiction,

By statute, “the juvenile court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over a child living or found within the county who is alleged or
adjudicated to have committed a delinquent act.” NRS 62B.330(1)
(emphases added). NRS 62A.030(1)(b) defines a “child,” inter alia, as “[a]
person who is less than 21 years of age and subject to the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court for an unlawful act that was committed before the
person reached 18 years of age.” NRS 62B.330(3) limits the otherwise
broad definition of “delinquent act” by listing acts that are not considered
to be “delinquent acts” and are therefore not within the juvenile court's
exclusive original jurisdiction Significantly, as amended in 2009, NRS

‘Prior to the 2009 amendments, NRS 62B.330(3) excluded from the
juvenile court's jurisdiction cases involving a child who committed
(1) murder or attempted murder; (2) sexual assault, attempted sexual
assault, or an offense with the use or threatened use of a firearm, if the
person was at least 16 years of age and had already been adjudicated
continued on next page

 

 
}62B.330(3) expressly excludes from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction cases
such as Barren’s:
For the purposes of this section, each of the
following acts shall be deemed not to be a
delinquent act, and the juvenile court does not
have jurisdiction over a person who is charged
with committing such an act:

(@)A category A or B felony and any other
related offense arising out of the same facts as the
category A or B felony, regardless of the nature of
the related offense, if the person was at least 16
years of age but less than 18 years of age when the
offense was committed, and*

(2) The person is not identified by law
enforcement as having committed the offense until
the person reaches 21 years of age.

‘The parties dispute whether NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2) governs
jurisdiction in this case, because it did not go into effoct until after the
Jdate Barren allegedly committed the offenses, The relevant inquiry, thus,

is whether juvenile court jurisdiction is determined on the date when the

continued

delinquent for a previous felonious acti or (3) a felony resulting in death or
[substantial bodily harm if committed with a weapon at a school. See 2009
Nev. Stat., ch. 25, § 3, at 60-51. The 2009 amendments to NRS 62B.330(3)
Jdid not alter these exclusions. Because these acts are excluded from the
juvenile court's jurisdiction and they fall within the district court's original
jurisdiction, the district court has jurisdiction over these offenses even
lwhen they are committed by a child.

 

 
State initiated the proceedings or on the date when Barren allegedly
[committed the offenses.

‘The parties focus on whether NRS 62B.380(3)(e)(2) is
retroactive, but a retroactivity analysis is unnecessary because NRS
/62B.330(3)(0)(2) is a jurisdictional statute.* “[S]tatutes ‘conferring or
ousting jurisdiction’ that ‘speak to the power of the court rather than to
the rights or obligations of the parties’ generally do not raise concerns
about retroactivity.” Henry v. Ashcroft, 175 F. Supp. 24 688, 693,
(S.D.N.Y, 2001) (quoting Landgraf v, USI Film Products, 611 U.S, 244,
274 (1994)). Application of “a jurisdiction-conferring or jurisdiction-
stripping statute usually ‘takes away no substantive right but simply
.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 576-77 (2006) (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508

(1916)). “Present law normally governs in such situations because

 

[changes the tribunal that is to hear the ca

jurisdictional statutes ‘speak to the power of the court rather than to the
rights or obligations of the parties.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274 (quoting
Republic Nat. Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 100 (1992)

(Thomas, J., concurring). Thus, “no retroactivity problem arises because
ithe change in the law does not ‘impair rights a party possessed when he

We have previously held in regard to penal statutes that “the
{general rule is that the proper penalty is that in effect at the time of the
commission of the offense’ unless the Legislature demonstrates clear
legislative intent to apply a criminal statute retroactively.” State v. Dist.
Ct. (Pullin), 124 Nev. 564, 669, 188 P.3d 1079, 1082 (2008) (quoting
Sparkman _v. State, 95 Nev. 76, 82, 590 P.2d 151, 155-66 (1979)).
However, this principle is inapposite here because NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2)
does not impose a penalty: rather, it merely explains which court has
jurisdiction.

 

 
Jacted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties
}with respect to transactions already completed.” Id, at 577 (quoting
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).

Additionally, many courts have held that “(t]he jurisdiction of
the juvenile court does not depend on the defendant's age at the time the
criminal act was committed, but [on] his age at the time judicial
proceedings were initiated.”* State v, Godines, 236 P.3d 824, 829 (Or. Ct.
App. 2010) (second alteration in original) (quoting Delaney v. State, 648
P.2d 1302, 1303 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)); see also Boyett v, State, 487 S.W.24
357, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Pruitt v, Guerry, 170 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Va.

"Other courts have held that jurisdiction is determined by a
defendant's age at the time of the offense, see H.D. Warren & C.P. Jhong,
Annotation, Age of Child at Time of Alleged Offense or Delinquency, or at
of Legal Proceedings, as Criterion of Ji wv
89 ALR2d 506 (1963) (eollecting cases), but such cases are
distinguishable. For example, the Court of Appeals of Georgia concluded
that a defendant’s “age at the time of his adjudicatory hearing is not
determinative of the juvenile court's jurisdiction over him. Rather, his age
at the time of the offense controls.” In re J..D., 529 S.E.2d 377, 378 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2000), However, the statute upon which the court relied defined
“child” as “an individual under the age of 21” who committed an offense as
a juvenile. Id. (iting Ga. Code Ann. § 15°11-2(2)(B)). Because the
defendant was 17 years old at the time of the hearing, the court did not
address whether its holding would apply to a 21-year-old. Id. And, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that “fa] juvenile court may still
retain jurisdiction over a person who has committed a criminal offense
before the age of 18,” and that the age of the person at the time of the
offense controls jurisdiction. Whaley v, State, 974 A.2d 951, 963 n.19 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2009). However, the court found it significant that the
defendant was “still under the age of 21" at the time of the proceedings.
Id, It further noted that a juvenile court’s “jurisdiction continues until [al
person reaches 21 years of age.” Id,

 

 

 
1969); State v. Dion, 159 P.3d 404, 405 (Wash. 2007). For example, in

State v. Little, the Supreme Court of Oregon considered a statute which

  

provided “that a child may be remanded to the appropriate trial court for
disposition as an adult if at the time of the remand he is [16] ye:
or older.” 407 P.2d 627, 628-29 (Or. 1965) (internal quotations omitted).

3 of age

 

‘The defendant in that case argued that all offenders who committed

 

offenses before reaching 16 years of age should be treated “as delinquent

 

children instead of as criminals,” regardless of their age at the time of

remand. Id, at 629. The court held that determining a juvenile court's

 

jurisdiction based on the offender's age at the time of the offense “would
create an absurd result.” Id, at 630. Such a rule “would make it possible
for a person to commit any number of dangerous felonies a few days before
his sixteenth birthday and then, by evading arrest until he is [21], escape
both corrective measures as a juvenile and punishment as an adult.” Id,
(footnote omitted). Under such a rule, “a person [could] commit crimes
before his sixteenth birthday, happy in the knowledge that his worse fate,
if caught, [would] be a brief period of treatment as a delinquent child.” Id,
(also noting that “fijt [was] extremely unlikely that if the Assembly had
considered the precise problem [at issue], it would have intended to create
a hiatus in the law that could wholly frustrate the administration of
justice when a serious offense has been committed by a person below the
age for discretionary remand’).

Similarly, in State v. Hodges, the Supreme Court of Utah
analyzed whether a district court would have jurisdiction over a 21-year-
old defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the alleged offenses. 63
P.3d 66, 67-68 (Utah 2002). The statute at issue granted a juvenile court

exclusive jurisdiction over “a person younger than 21 years of age” who

 

 
violated a law as a juvenile, Id, at 68-69 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-
104(1)(a) (1996 & Supp. 2002)). ‘The court reasoned that based on the

 

statute, juvenile jurisdiction is determined “according to the age of those
persons at the time proceedings are commenced.” Id, at 69. To conclude
that the statute “gives the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over all
offenses committed by minors, regardless of the age of the person when
the proceedings are commenced, would render the language concerning
proceedings against persons younger than [21] years of age superfluous.”
Id, Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order that it had
jurisdiction over the proceedings. Id, at 70.

In Nevada, NRS 62B.410(2) limits a juvenile court's
jurisdiction to persons less than 21 years of age, and NRS 62B.330(1)
similarly limits the juvenile court to having jurisdiction over a “child,”
which NRS 624.030 defines, in relevant part, as “[a] person who is less
than 21 years of age.” Similar to the reasoning in Hodges, to conclude that
the Nevada Revised Statutes give “the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction
over all offenses committed by minors, regardless of the age of the person
when the proceedings are commenced, would render the language
concerning proceedings against persons younger than [21] years of age
superfluous.” 63 P.3d at 69. Moreover, from the very day it went into
effect, NRS_62B.330(3)(e) applied to offenses that had already been
committed, divesting a juvenile court of jurisdiction “if the person was at
least 16 years of age but less than 18 years of age, when the offense was
committed.” (Emphases added). Determining jurisdiction at the time of

the offense would “create an absurd result” contrary to the plain language
of NRS 62B.330(8)(e). Little, 407 P.2d at 630.

 

 

 
Based on these considerations, we conclude that jurisdiction in
this case is determined on the date when the State initiated proceedings
against Barren rather than the date when Barren allegedly committed the
offenses. At the time the State initiated the proceedings against Barren,
NRS 62B.330(8)(e)(2), the statute governing jurisdiction, was in effect, and
the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction.? Accordingly, we reverse the

district court's judgment and remand.

tn

 

J
Hardesty
We concur:
Choange os
Cherry
. -
Pickering

 

‘Barren argues that the State intentionally waited to file charges
until NRS 62B.330(8)(e)(2) went into effect. ‘There is insufficient evidence
in the record before us to support Barren’s argument. Additionally, as
discussed above, some court would have jurisdiction over Barren
regardless of when the State initiated proceedings.

*Although the parties argue whether retroactive application would
constitute an ex post facto violation, we need not reach that issue because
we conclude that a retroactive application of the statute is unnecessary.