Case Title: State v. James R. Thiel

Citation: 2003 WI 111

Docket Number: 2001AP001589-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 111 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1589-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
James R. Thiel,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  258 Wis. 2d 981, 654 N.W.2d 94 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 30, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse   
 
JUDGE: 
Dale T. Pasell   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Bruce J. Rosen, Susan C. Blesener, and Pellino, Rosen, Mowris 
& Kirkhuff, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Bruce J. Rosen. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Daniel 
J. O'Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 111 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1589-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99-CF-503) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
James R. Thiel,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.    This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 that reversed a 
decision of the Circuit Court for La Crosse County, Dale T. 
Pasell, Judge.   
¶2 
The defendant, Dr. James R. Thiel (Thiel), was 
convicted of seven counts of sexual exploitation by a therapist 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2).2 
 
Following 
his 
                                                 
1 State v. Thiel, No. 01-1589, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2002).  
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
2 
 
conviction, 
Thiel 
claimed 
that 
his 
trial 
counsel 
was 
constitutionally inadequate.  After a two-day Machner hearing,3 
Judge Pasell concluded that Thiel's counsel's performance did 
not meet constitutional standards and that Thiel was entitled to 
a new trial. 
¶3 
The State appealed.  The court of appeals found that 
while Thiel's counsel may have been deficient in a few 
instances, any deficient performance was not prejudicial to 
Thiel's defense, and the court reversed the circuit court's 
decision.  State v. Thiel, No. 01-1589-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶¶25-26, 28, 33-34 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2002).  Judge Charles 
Dykman dissented, writing: "Was this a fair trial?  When a trial 
judge answers that question "no," and there are facts and 
evidence to support that answer, appellate courts should only in 
a rare case reverse that answer."  Id., ¶41 (Dykman, J., 
dissenting). 
¶4 
This is a unique, subtle, and difficult case in which 
the credibility of the complaining witness was central to the 
jury's 
verdict. 
 
Thiel's 
trial 
counsel 
often 
performed 
effectively.  However, he failed to use a great deal of 
available evidence to impeach the State's chief witness because 
of inadequate trial preparation.  We conclude that counsel's 
performance was deficient in several respects and that the 
                                                 
3 Under State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979), a hearing may be held when a criminal 
defendant's trial counsel is challenged for allegedly providing 
ineffective assistance.  At the hearing, trial counsel testifies 
as to his or her reasoning on challenged action or inaction. 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
3 
 
cumulative effect of the deficiencies prejudiced Thiel's defense 
to an extent that it undermines our confidence in the outcome of 
the trial.  Because we find that Thiel received constitutionally 
inadequate representation, we reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals and remand the matter to the circuit court for a new 
trial. 
I 
¶5 
The relevant facts are as follows.  On August 19, 
1999, JoAnn P. (JoAnn) reported to the City of La Crosse Police 
Department that she had engaged in sexual relations with her 
psychiatrist, Dr. James Thiel.  JoAnn told Lieutenant Michael 
Brohmer (Lt. Brohmer) that she had seen Thiel professionally 
from August 1994 through July 1999, with a break between 1995 
and 1997.  She told Lt. Brohmer that the relationship became 
sexual in May 1997 and continued until she ended it in February 
1999.  JoAnn asserted that the sexual contact took place not 
only during her office appointments but also at Thiel's home in 
La Crosse.  According to JoAnn, she and Thiel met regularly——as 
often as three or four times a week. 
¶6 
JoAnn alleged that she disclosed the full nature of 
her relationship to a friend in the spring of 1999.  The friend, 
Brian Ekern (Ekern), an assistant district attorney for Vernon 
County, testified that he counseled JoAnn to discontinue the 
sexual relationship and informed JoAnn that Thiel was committing 
a crime by engaging in a sexual relationship with her.  On the 
eve of Thiel's trial, it was disclosed that Ekern and JoAnn had 
been involved in their own sexual relationship.  
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
4 
 
¶7 
Even after JoAnn discontinued her sexual relationship 
with Thiel, she continued to see him for therapy.  JoAnn's last 
appointment with Thiel took place July 30, 1999.  At that 
appointment, she asked for Thiel's assistance in filing for 
government disability benefits.  When Thiel refused, JoAnn 
became angry and claimed that she had a sample of his semen.  
JoAnn brought a semen sample with her when she reported her 
complaint against Thiel to Lt. Brohmer a few weeks later.  
Initially, JoAnn resisted providing the sample for testing, but 
by the end of the meeting, which included the intervention of 
the district attorney's office, she acquiesced.  Brohmer sent 
the sample to the state crime laboratory for DNA testing. 
¶8 
Based on JoAnn's report and the physical evidence she 
provided, 
Thiel 
was 
charged 
with 
two 
counts 
of 
sexual 
exploitation by a therapist contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2).4  
The police arrested Thiel and took a blood sample for comparison 
with the physical evidence provided by JoAnn.  When the DNA test 
results came back, they showed that Thiel was not the source of 
the semen.  At a December meeting with police and a La Crosse 
                                                 
4 At 
the 
times 
relevant 
to 
this 
action, 
Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2) provided: 
Any person who is or who holds himself or herself 
out to be a therapist and who intentionally has sexual 
contact with a patient or client during any ongoing 
therapist-patient or 
therapist-client relationship, 
regardless of whether it occurs during any treatment, 
consultation, interview or examination, is guilty of a 
Class C felony.  Consent is not an issue in an action 
under this subsection. 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
5 
 
County deputy district attorney, JoAnn admitted that the sample 
was not Thiel's and that she had lied about the sample's origin.  
It is unclear whether JoAnn had advance warning of either the 
general subject matter of the meeting or the DNA test results.  
JoAnn explained that she had submitted false evidence because 
she hoped it would force Thiel to confess. 
¶9 
On September 1, 1999, Thiel waived his preliminary 
examination.  On October 4, the State filed an eight-count 
information, alleging seven counts of sexual exploitation by a 
therapist and one count of intimidation of a victim.  The 
information was filed before the state crime laboratory had 
completed work on the semen sample.  The eighth count of the 
information was dismissed on November 17. 
¶10 On December 15 the State filed a motion for a 
continuance based on the crime lab results that excluded the 
defendant.  This delayed the scheduled date of trial from 
January 10, 2000, to March 1, 2000, with jury selection 
scheduled for February 28. 
¶11 On January 13, 2000, Thiel retained Attorneys John 
Brinckman and Margarita Van Nuland who served as his counsel at 
trial.  The two attorneys were retained 46 days before trial was 
scheduled to begin.  In late February, the March 1 trial date 
was rescheduled.  Judge Pasell later wrote: 
On February 24, 2000, four days before trial, the 
State filed and scheduled for hearing the same day 
another motion for continuance.  It also filed a 
motion for the admission of "other acts" evidence.  
Those motions were served on Thiel on that day.  Over 
Thiel's objection, the trial was continued again for 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
6 
 
an additional week to allow for a hearing on the 
"other acts" motion prior to jury selection.  On March 
3, 2000, the "other acts" motion was heard, and two of 
the five other acts sought to be admitted by the State 
were ruled admissible.   
¶12 Thiel's first attorney, Roger LeGrand, had asked for 
an early trial on October 19, 1999.  He opposed the continuance 
on December 15.  Thiel's new attorney opposed the delay in the 
March 1 trial.  Thiel was concerned that the State would locate 
some of his former patients who might corroborate JoAnn's 
account through "other acts" testimony, and so he insisted that 
the trial not be delayed.  Thiel's trial attorneys abided by his 
wishes and did not seek a continuance of the trial, even though 
one attorney informed Thiel that he could use more time to 
prepare.  Ultimately, after the Machner hearing, Judge Pasell 
found that "[t]his was a case where counsel went to trial before 
counsel was ready to try the case."   
¶13 The trial began on March 14, 2000, and lasted three 
days.  The prosecution presented JoAnn's testimony against 
Thiel, 
including 
her 
description 
of 
Thiel's 
unclothed 
appearance, her description of the inside of Thiel's house, and 
her description of Thiel's personal habits.  The prosecution 
also presented Ekern, who corroborated that JoAnn confided in 
him about the relationship.  There were two "other acts" 
witnesses.  The first, Thiel's ex-wife, who had once been his 
patient, testified that her sexual relationship with Thiel began 
before their professional relationship had ended, and she 
corroborated, in some respects, JoAnn's description of Thiel's 
unclothed physical appearance and his personal habits.  The 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
7 
 
second witness, another of Thiel's former patients, also 
testified regarding sexual contact with Thiel during a therapy 
session.  In addition, Dr. David Metzler, a psychiatrist who had 
seen JoAnn after she discontinued her treatment with Thiel, 
testified as an expert during the prosecution's rebuttal.  He 
contended that a psychiatrist should document any contact with 
patients that occurs outside of an appointment.  During Dr. 
Metzler's testimony, the court indicated that Dr. Metzler should 
confine his testimony to standards that physicians might employ, 
rather than his own personal practice.  Thiel's trial counsel 
made one objection to a portion of Dr. Metzler's testimony, but 
did not move to strike any of it. 
¶14 The defense presented witnesses who testified that it 
was implausible that Thiel was carrying on an extensive 
relationship with JoAnn.  Thiel's former girlfriend testified 
about her frequent unannounced visits to Thiel's house and said 
that there was never any indication that Thiel could be spending 
significant amounts of time with another woman.  A business 
manager and receptionist from Thiel's office testified that 
neither had observed any inappropriate or suspicious interaction 
between JoAnn and Thiel. 
¶15 Thiel also testified, stating that at no time did he 
have any inappropriate relationship with JoAnn.  The defense 
theory was that JoAnn's accusation was in retaliation for 
Thiel's refusal to assist her in obtaining disability benefits.  
Thiel 
further 
explained 
that 
the 
details 
JoAnn 
provided 
regarding the interior of his house could have been gathered by 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
8 
 
JoAnn when she showed 
up 
at his 
residence 
three 
times 
unannounced or if she entered his house when he was not there.  
He testified that such entry was possible because he generally 
left his house unlocked. 
¶16 After a jury found Thiel guilty of all seven counts of 
sexual exploitation by a therapist,5 he retained new counsel and 
filed a motion for a new trial on the basis that his trial 
counsel was ineffective.  He alleged numerous deficiencies, 
including that his counsel failed to file a motion under 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(3) that may have permitted the introduction 
of some of JoAnn's medical history,6 that trial counsel failed to 
                                                 
5 Thiel was sentenced to concurrent four-year prison terms 
on three counts and to concurrent ten-year probation terms 
following his release from prison on the remaining counts. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.11(3) provides: 
(3)(a) In a prosecution under s. 940.22 involving 
a therapist and a patient or client, evidence of the 
patient's or client's personal or medical history is 
not admissible except if: 
1. The defendant requests a hearing prior to 
trial and makes an offer of proof of the relevancy of 
the evidence; and 
2. The court finds that the evidence is relevant 
and that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial 
nature. 
(b) The court shall limit the evidence admitted 
under par. (a) to relevant evidence which pertains to 
specific information or examples of conduct.  The 
court's order shall specify the information or conduct 
that is admissible and no other evidence of the 
patient's or client's personal or medical history may 
be introduced. 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
9 
 
adequately investigate the underlying case against Thiel, and 
that trial counsel performed inadequately during trial. 
¶17 The 
circuit 
court 
heard 
two 
days 
of 
testimony 
regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  At the 
conclusion of this evidence, the circuit court issued a 24-page 
opinion concluding that Thiel was entitled to a new trial 
because 
his 
trial 
counsel's 
performance 
fell 
below 
constitutionally accepted standards.  The court of appeals 
reversed.  Thiel petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted. 
II 
¶18 Criminal defendants are constitutionally guaranteed 
the right to counsel under both the United States Constitution 
and the Wisconsin Constitution.  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 7.7  The right to counsel includes the 
right to effective assistance of counsel.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 
466 
U.S. 
668, 
686 
(1984) 
(citing 
McMann 
v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)); State v. Trawitzki, 
2001 WI 77, ¶39, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801.  In order to 
find that counsel rendered ineffective assistance, the defendant 
must show that trial counsel's representation was deficient.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) Violation of the terms of the order is 
grounds for a mistrial but does not prevent the 
retrial of the defendant. 
7 The standard for determining whether counsel's assistance 
is effective under the Wisconsin Constitution is identical to 
that under the federal Constitution.  See State v. Sanchez, 201 
Wis. 2d 219, 235-36, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996).   
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
10 
 
Strickland, 446 U.S. at 687.  The defendant must also show that 
he or she was prejudiced by the deficient performance.  Id. 
¶19 Counsel's conduct is constitutionally deficient if it 
falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.  Id. at 
688.  When evaluating counsel's performance, courts are to be 
"highly deferential" and must avoid the "distorting effects of 
hindsight."  Id. at 689.  "Counsel need not be perfect, indeed 
not even very good, to be constitutionally adequate."  State v. 
Williquette, 180 Wis. 2d 589, 605, 510 N.W.2d 708 (1993). 
¶20 In order to demonstrate that counsel's deficient 
performance is constitutionally prejudicial, the defendant must 
show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  The focus of this inquiry is not 
on the outcome of the trial, but on "the reliability of the 
proceedings."  State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 642, 369 
N.W.2d 711 (1985). 
¶21 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents 
a mixed question of law and fact.  Trawitzki, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 
¶19.  This court will uphold the circuit court's findings of 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  Findings of fact 
include "the circumstances of the case and the counsel's conduct 
and strategy."  State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 514 n.2, 484 
N.W.2d 540 (1992).  Whether counsel's performance satisfies the 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
11 
 
constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is 
a question of law, which we review de novo.  Id. 
¶22 Thiel asks this court to modify the foregoing standard 
of review and, as a matter of policy, announce a rule that 
appellate courts accord some degree of deference to a trial 
judge's assessment of counsel's deficient performance and the 
prejudicial effect of counsel's errors.  He reasons that trial 
judges have a unique vantage point on these issues, having heard 
all the evidence and observed the conduct and demeanor of the 
witnesses, counsel, and members of the jury——both at trial and 
at the postconviction hearing. 
¶23 We decline this invitation.  Since the Strickland 
decision, this court has consistently held that "[t]he ultimate 
determination of whether counsel's performance was deficient and 
prejudicial to the defense are questions of law which this court 
reviews independently."  State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 128, 
449 N.W.2d 845 (1990) (citing State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 
634, 
369 
N.W.2d 711 
(1985)); 
see 
also 
Trawitzki, 
244 
Wis. 2d 523, ¶19.  To the extent that a trial judge wishes to 
introduce into the record factual determinations that require 
consideration on appeal——such as assessments of credibility and 
demeanor——the judge should articulate these findings of fact in 
his or her decision.  On review, appellate courts must be 
sensitive to these findings and not exclude them, either 
expressly or impliedly, from an analysis of deficiency and 
prejudice, unless they are clearly erroneous. 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
12 
 
¶24 In 
our 
review 
of 
Thiel's 
claim 
of 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we grant deference only to the circuit 
court's findings of historical fact.  We review de novo the 
legal questions of whether deficient performance has been 
established and whether it led to prejudice rising to a level 
undermining the reliability of the proceeding.8 
III 
¶25 After two days of testimony regarding the performance 
of Thiel's trial counsel, the circuit court found that counsel's 
actions were deficient in four primary areas.  First, counsel 
did not adequately read and review the discovery materials that 
had been provided by the prosecution, and the overlooked 
materials 
contained 
potentially 
important 
information 
for 
Thiel's 
defense. 
 
Second, 
counsel 
did 
not 
conduct 
any 
significant independent investigation into the underlying facts 
of the case or the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses.  
Third, 
counsel 
failed 
to 
file 
a 
motion 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(3) that would have allowed the defense to 
offer evidence of the complaining witness's prior personal and 
                                                 
8 Thiel argues for the first time in his reply brief to this 
court that, as an alternative resolution to his appeal, this 
court may order a new trial in the interest of justice.  See 
State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 171-72, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996).  
The circuit court, at the end of its order granting Thiel a new 
trial, cited Hicks and may have suggested, according to Thiel, 
that the real controversy had not been fully tried or that 
justice had miscarried.  We conclude that the issue of whether 
Thiel is entitled to a new trial under Hicks is not properly 
before this court and has not been fully briefed and argued by 
the opposing parties. 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
13 
 
medical history.  Fourth, counsel did not move to strike the 
testimony of Dr. Metzler, a motion that the court would have 
granted because no offer of proof was made to demonstrate 
community 
standards 
for 
a 
psychiatrist's 
documentation 
practices.  The court then concluded that these deficiencies 
unconstitutionally prejudiced Thiel. 
¶26 Before reaching these conclusions, the circuit court 
made extensive findings of fact.  First, Thiel's counsel had 
police reports and medical notes in his possession prior to 
trial but never read parts of this discovery and did not 
adequately review other documents.  The court found that counsel 
did not read the medical notes of Drs. Metzler and Stwertka.  
These medical reports included the following information: 
1. 
The 
complainant 
discussed 
her 
complaint 
against Thiel with Dr. Metzler in a therapy session on 
August 31, 1999, and maintained her lie that she had 
obtained a sample of Thiel's semen 16 months earlier. 
2. 
The complainant told Dr. Metzler that she 
was "enraged" that Thiel would not support her 
disability claim and threatened him with the semen 
evidence. 
3. 
The complainant told Dr. Metzler that she 
had met with Thiel on August 22, 1999, three days 
after she had gone to the La Crosse police with her 
story. 
4. 
The 
complainant 
told 
Dr. 
Stwertka 
on 
September 2, 1999, that she had been unemployed for a 
period of three to four years. 
The counsel who failed to read these reports was the attorney 
assigned the responsibility of handling any cross-examination of 
Dr. Metzler.   
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
14 
 
¶27 The court indicated that counsel did not adequately 
review the police reports.  The police reports included the 
following information: 
 
1. 
The complainant told Lt. Brohmer that Thiel 
lived at 2002 Adams Street, although his actual 
address was 2006 Adams Street. 
 
2. 
The complainant told Lt. Brohmer that she 
believed Thiel's house was the third house from the 
corner.  In fact, it was the second house from the 
corner. 
 
3. 
The complainant told the authorities that 
she had confided in her husband about her relationship 
with Thiel on June 11, 1999, the day her husband 
returned from Bosnia.  However, the complainant's 
husband reported to police that he did not learn about 
the relationship until July 16, 1999, following a 
meeting with Thiel. 
 
4. 
Ekern told police in a taped interview on 
February 4, 2000, that he first learned from the 
complainant of the claims of assaults by Thiel 
"shortly before, I think she reported it."  He went on 
to say, "You know, I guess I don't even know.  Might 
(inaudible) a year ago."  He also stated that the 
complainant had called him about this information at 
his office. 
¶28 Second, counsel did not do any significant independent 
investigation in several areas.  The court found that: 
 
1. 
Counsel 
conducted 
only 
perfunctory 
interviews with Lt. Brohmer and Ekern. 
 
2. 
Counsel made no effort to speak with the 
complainant. 
 
3. 
Counsel made no effort to interview the 
husband of JoAnn, who was listed as a witness for the 
defense. 
 
4. 
Counsel did not go either to Thiel's office 
or to his house where the acts purportedly occurred.   
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
15 
 
 
5. 
Counsel 
made 
no 
effort 
to 
interview 
neighbors 
to 
determine 
if 
they 
had 
seen 
the 
complainant or the complainant's vehicle at Thiel's 
house. 
 
6. 
Counsel did not check the Consolidated Court 
Automation Programs (CCAP) or make any open records 
requests on the background of any persons who were to 
testify. 
 
7. 
Counsel made no attempt "to independently 
show 
that 
the 
corroborations 
offered 
by 
the 
complainant did not pan out." 
 
8. 
Counsel made no attempt to obtain telephone 
records between the complainant and Ekern. 
 
9. 
Counsel 
did 
not 
discover 
that 
the 
complainant did not have a driver's license during the 
time that she reportedly drove more than 100 times to 
Thiel's house. 
 
¶29 The circuit court found that "the facts set forth 
above were either provided to defense counsel in the form of 
discovery, or were readily available through an appropriate 
investigation."  The court set out in its opinion how each piece 
of information would have helped impeach the complaining witness 
by showing the motivation for her complaint, her lies before 
trial, her inconsistent statements before and at trial, the lack 
of corroboration of her story, the inconsistency in testimony of 
other witnesses, and the possible inadmissibility of the 
testimony of Brian Ekern. 
¶30 Third, 
counsel 
did 
not 
file 
a 
motion 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(3) that, if granted, would have allowed the 
defense to present evidence of the complainant's prior personal 
and medical history.  The court added that all statements made 
to Dr. Metzler and another doctor concerning JoAnn's allegations 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
16 
 
against Thiel would have been admitted, given that they were 
highly probative of the complainant's truthfulness and not 
prejudicial because they would not have gone to her medical 
condition.  Counsel not only failed to file this motion but also 
misinterpreted the statute to mean that if the defense did not 
file the motion, then neither party could introduce evidence of 
the complainant's personal or medical history. 
¶31 Fourth, counsel failed to strike the testimony of Dr. 
David Metzler even though the evidence, according to the circuit 
court, "was inadmissible, and would properly have been stricken 
if such a motion had been made." 
¶32 Based on our review of the record, none of these 
findings of fact is clearly erroneous.  Therefore, we accept 
these findings as true and apply them to the legal standards 
articulated 
under 
Strickland. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Smith, 
207 
Wis. 2d 258, 266, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997) (citing Pitsch, 124 
Wis. 2d at 633-34; Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2)). 
IV 
¶33 We turn now to whether Thiel's counsel's performance 
was deficient based upon the factual findings of the circuit 
court.  We find that several aspects of counsel's performance 
fell below objective standards of reasonableness and were 
deficient as a matter of law. 
¶34 Three considerations are worth noting at the outset.  
First, the critical evidence against Thiel was the complainant's 
testimony.  There was no physical evidence and no witness to the 
alleged acts.  The testimony of Brian Ekern involved prior 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
17 
 
consistent statements of the complainant supporting her story.  
"Other acts" testimony lent credibility to the complainant's 
accusations.  With this in mind, JoAnn's credibility was the 
essential consideration for the jury, and it was strengthened by 
Ekern's testimony.   
¶35 Second, we acknowledge the circuit court's factual 
finding that Thiel objected to any continuance despite the fact 
that counsel advised Thiel that he could use more time.  From 
the beginning of the prosecution, Thiel urged his attorneys to 
try the case quickly.  Counsel had approximately 60 days to 
prepare for trial.  The defendant's demand for a speedy trial 
did not absolve counsel of the responsibility to be prepared for 
trial. 
¶36 Third, Thiel had three attorneys.  Only one was 
spotlighted at the Machner hearing.  We acknowledge that the 
narrow focus of the post-trial record may give a distorted 
perception of the whole proceeding.   
¶37 Turning to counsel's performance, we first recognize 
that counsel's failure to review certain portions of the 
discovery provided by the prosecution——especially Dr. Metzler's 
medical reports——was deficient performance as a matter of law.  
In a felony case where the client potentially faces significant 
prison 
time, 
it 
falls 
below 
objective 
standards 
of 
reasonableness to fail to read all portions of discovery that 
may have the potential to educe information that is either 
beneficial or damaging to the client's cause. 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
18 
 
¶38 We can perceive no strategic or tactical advantage for 
a criminal defense attorney not to read discovery provided by 
the prosecution that may yield exculpatory evidence.  The 
discovery documents in this case could have contained, and did 
contain, information that would have benefited Thiel's defense.  
Unread discovery not only provided critical information directly 
but also provided insight into other facets of the case that 
deserved more thorough investigation. 
¶39 Second, as noted, we accept as true the circuit 
court's 
findings 
that 
counsel 
failed 
to 
independently 
investigate certain lines of inquiry.  Trial counsel did not 
attempt to interview several of the prosecution's primary 
witnesses, did not investigate JoAnn or other witnesses on CCAP 
or through open records requests, did not discover that JoAnn 
did not have a driver's license even though she claimed to drive 
often to Thiel's house, conducted only "perfunctory" interviews 
with Lt. Brohmer and Ekern, did not obtain JoAnn's phone 
records, did not independently attempt to show that the 
complainant's story did not "pan out" (such as interviewing 
Thiel's neighbors to see if they had ever seen JoAnn at Thiel's 
house), and did not himself visit the office or house where the 
events in question allegedly took place. 
¶40 Whether trial counsel's failure to investigate these 
matters is deficient performance requires careful analysis.  
Some of counsel's failures to investigate cannot easily be 
separated from the failure to read the discovery.  Under 
Strickland, 
"counsel 
has 
a 
duty 
to 
make 
reasonable 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
19 
 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
691 (emphasis added).  For example, defense counsel cannot claim 
to have decided strategically to forgo interviewing a particular 
witness if counsel has not read the police report relating to 
that witness, because that would not be an informed decision.  
Therefore, if we find that counsel's decision not to fully 
investigate was the result of not reading discovery, then the 
decision not to investigate is itself deficient, because it was 
not reasonable. 
¶41 Most of counsel's failures to investigate cannot be 
attributed to a failure to master the discovery documents.9  As 
we understand the record, the La Crosse police failed to 
disclose two pieces of information in discovery.  First, on 
August 27, 1999, Lt. Brohmer had the complainant's husband drive 
the complainant to Thiel's house in an effort to verify the 
address.  The complainant had difficulty in locating Thiel's 
house.  Second, Lt. Brohmer also interviewed one or more 
neighbors of Thiel to determine whether any neighbors recalled 
seeing the complainant at Thiel's house.  None did.  This 
                                                 
9 For example, at the Machner hearing, trial counsel 
testified that his decision not to attempt to interview JoAnn or 
her husband before trial was that it was his practice to cross-
examine 
the 
complaining 
witness 
without 
having 
met 
the 
individual before.  Given that trial counsel's usual mode of 
operation in this regard developed from experiences outside of 
this case, nothing in the discovery materials, indeed nothing 
intrinsic 
to 
this 
case, 
would 
have 
likely 
changed 
this 
reasoning. 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
20 
 
information was notable because of complainant's claims that she 
visited Thiel's house more than 100 times. 
¶42 After reporting this information in his decision, 
Judge Pasell wrote: "Neither the complainant's difficulty in 
locating the house, nor the lack of any recollection of the 
neighbors of seeing the complainant at Thiel's home are 
contained in reports that were available to the defense."  He 
added: "This information might properly have been disclosed to 
the defense as exculpatory under the discovery demand that had 
been filed." 
¶43 We agree with the court that this information should 
have 
been 
disclosed 
to 
the 
defense 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(h) ("Any exculpatory evidence").  Had 
this information been disclosed, the complainant's misstatement 
of the number and location of Thiel's house might have appeared 
more significant.  Counsel might have been more inclined to 
visit the house, interview the neighbors, and ask more probing 
questions of Lt. Brohmer during his "perfunctory" interview. 
¶44 In any event, we cannot find that counsel's failure to 
investigate is derivative of a failure to read and absorb all 
the discovery documents.10  Hence, we must determine whether 
these 
instances 
fell 
below 
an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness in a more general sense.  In other words, was it 
                                                 
10 While it is evident that the transcript of Ekern's 
interview with police might spark curiosity about the timing of 
when JoAnn revealed to Ekern the nature of her relationship with 
Thiel, trial counsel appears to have read this portion of the 
discovery. 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
21 
 
unreasonable not to perform certain investigations in this case?  
In answering this question, it is important to remember that 
Strickland informs us that "counsel is strongly presumed to have 
rendered adequate assistance" and that we are to "apply[] a 
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgment."  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 690-91.  Also, "a defendant who alleges a failure to 
investigate on the part of his or her counsel must allege with 
specificity what the investigation would have revealed."  State 
v. Leighton, 2000 WI App 156, ¶38, 237 Wis. 2d 709, 616 
N.W.2d 126.  If we decide that the decision not to investigate 
is unreasonable, we must find that trial counsel's performance 
is deficient.  See Brown v. Sternes, 304 F.3d 677, 692 (7th Cir. 
2002); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1236 (9th Cir. 2002). 
¶45 Thiel is asking us to look back on counsel's pretrial 
performance to find that there were specific things that counsel 
should have done to prepare for trial.  This is a difficult 
assessment 
given 
that 
there 
is 
a 
broad 
spectrum 
of 
representation and preparation that will be deemed sufficient.  
However, under the facts of this case, counsel's lack of any 
significant independent investigation falls outside of this wide 
spectrum. 
¶46 The 
credibility 
of 
the 
complaining 
witness 
was 
paramount to this case.  In this situation, trial counsel was 
aware of the need to locate any evidence or information to 
impeach the complainant's testimony, regardless of what was 
found in the discovery.  The case was a classic instance of the 
"he-said-she-said" dilemma.  By the time that trial counsel 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
22 
 
became involved, JoAnn had already demonstrated a propensity for 
lying, 
and 
counsel's 
failure 
to 
delve 
further 
into 
the 
circumstances of the charges and the background of Thiel's 
accuser is objectively unreasonable.  This investigation should 
have included inquiry into additional documents and persons that 
could either corroborate or dispel her allegations, especially 
Ekern, who was slated to offer a prior consistent statement of 
the complainant. 
¶47 Thiel has pled with the required specificity what a 
more thorough investigation would have uncovered.  See Leighton, 
237 Wis. 2d 709, ¶39.  For example, a simple background check 
would have revealed that JoAnn had no driver's license, even 
though she claimed to have driven to Thiel's house more than 100 
times.  Taking the time to visit Thiel's neighbors would likely 
have revealed to trial counsel that none of the neighbors 
recalled seeing JoAnn, even though her alleged visits occurred 
three or four times a week.  
¶48 In addition, a more thorough interview with Ekern 
might have revealed that JoAnn first told Ekern about her sexual 
relationship with Thiel only a short time before she reported it 
to the police.  This might have prevented Ekern from testifying 
to JoAnn's prior consistent statement or made it easier to 
expose some inconsistencies in his trial testimony. 
¶49 The police report indicated that JoAnn informed Ekern 
about the alleged sexual relationship in a telephone call to 
Ekern's office.  Counsel did not take any cue from this 
reference to a critical telephone call.  Thiel's postconviction 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
23 
 
counsel produced telephone records revealing that approximately 
44 telephone calls were placed from the complainant's phone to 
Ekern, either at his office or at his residence, between July 
26, 1999, and January 31, 2000.  These phone records, showing 
calls at critical points in the proceedings, put a different 
light on the relationship between JoAnn and Ekern and were 
probably inconsistent with Ekern's trial testimony.   
¶50 The failure to undertake any independent investigation 
was deficient.  It shows how counsel lacked initiative to 
develop Thiel's case and instead assumed a more reactive role to 
the development of evidence related to the competing accounts of 
JoAnn's relationship with Thiel.  Under the specific facts of 
this case, we conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for 
Thiel's counsel not to pursue further evidence to impeach JoAnn 
in the aftermath of her lie regarding the semen evidence and to 
contradict her version of events. 
¶51 Third, 
counsel's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(3) reflects a failure either to research or 
correctly interpret relevant portions of the law.  The circuit 
court found that counsel interpreted this statute as allowing 
the defense to prevent the State from presenting evidence of the 
complaining witness's prior personal or medical history if the 
defense did not file a motion under § 972.11(3).  This is an 
unreasonable view of this statute, as the statute does not 
preclude the state from offering relevant and not overly 
prejudicial evidence.  Although counsel claimed that the failure 
to file the motion was for strategic reasons, the strategy was 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
24 
 
based on an erroneous view of the law and ultimately barred 
Thiel from presenting information contained in JoAnn's medical 
records.  By contrast, counsel's lapse did not hinder the 
prosecution's ability to present JoAnn's personal or medical 
records.  Thus, counsel's failure to understand the statute and 
his concomitant failure to file a motion under its provisions 
were deficient as a matter of law. 
¶52 Finally, the circuit court noted trial counsel's 
failure to move to strike the testimony of Dr. Metzler.  The 
court noted that it would have granted such a motion had one 
been made.   
¶53 The court's conclusion needs to be put in context.  
During the presentation of Thiel's defense, Thiel testified that 
the complainant had come to his house three times uninvited.  
Thiel was unable to show that he made any record of these visits 
in his patient records.  On rebuttal, the State called Dr. 
Metzler, who testified that a psychiatrist should document any 
contact with a patient that occurs outside the office: 
 
[Prosecutor]: If you were provided——excuse me.  
If one of your patients called you at your home, would 
you document that in the patients (sic) chart? 
 
[Dr. Metzler]: Yes. 
 
[Prosecutor]: Why? 
 
[Dr. Metzler]: Because 
each 
contact 
with 
a 
patient, the general standard is to document that. 
 
[Prosecutor]: If it happened more than once, if 
it happened several times, would it not be, would it 
be the practice also to document that? 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
25 
 
 
[Dr. Metzler]: That's correct. 
¶54 During 
this 
portion 
of 
Dr. 
Metzler's 
rebuttal 
testimony, Thiel's counsel did not object.  However, the circuit 
judge intervened and asked if this statement and others like it 
represented Dr. Metzler's personal opinion.  Dr. Metzler 
indicated that it was his personal opinion. 
¶55 On cross-examination, Thiel's counsel did an able job 
of exposing the deficiency that Dr. Metzler's statements did not 
represent 
a 
standard 
in 
the 
community 
of 
practicing 
psychiatrists.  He did not, however, move to strike Dr. 
Metzler's opinion testimony.   
¶56 Trial counsel did not know what Dr. Metzler would 
testify to as an expert.  He was not given nor did he ask for an 
offer of proof or summary of Dr. Metzler's intended testimony 
before trial.  Because Dr. Metzler was a rebuttal witness, 
however, and because of trial counsel's competent cross-
examination, we cannot conclude that counsel's performance in 
not 
moving 
to 
strike 
Dr. 
Metzler's 
testimony 
was 
constitutionally deficient.  Counsel's lack of preparation to 
deal with this expert witness was part of a larger pattern of 
inadequate pretrial preparation. 
¶57 In sum, we support the circuit court's conclusion that 
these aspects of counsel's performance fell below the standard 
expected of a reasonable attorney.  Counsel was deficient in his 
(1) failure to read discovery materials; (2) failure to 
undertake any independent investigation regarding JoAnn's and 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
26 
 
other witnesses' credibility and accounts of relevant events; 
and (3) misunderstanding and thus misapplication of § 972.11(3). 
V 
¶58 We now address Strickland's prejudice prong.  To find 
prejudice, we must find that the effect of these multiple 
deficiencies prejudiced Thiel and undermined confidence in the 
outcome of the trial.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Johnson, 
153 Wis. 2d at 129. 
¶59 This court has never specifically addressed the issue 
of how to calculate prejudice arising from multiple deficiencies 
by 
trial 
counsel 
when 
the 
specific 
errors, 
evaluated 
individually, 
do 
not 
satisfy 
the 
prejudice 
standard 
in 
Strickland.11  Several circuits of the United States Court of 
Appeals have addressed the appropriateness of looking at the 
cumulative effect of multiple instances of deficient performance 
by counsel when assessing prejudice.  The consensus appears to 
hold that when a court finds numerous deficiencies in a 
counsel's performance, it need not rely on the prejudicial 
effect 
of 
a 
single 
deficiency 
if, 
taken 
together, 
the 
deficiencies establish cumulative prejudice.  See Washington v. 
Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Evaluated 
                                                 
11 In State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 449 N.W.2d 845 
(1990), this court implied that multiple deficiencies be looked 
at collectively in an analysis of prejudice.  We remarked, 
"Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, we do not 
find that any of the alleged areas of deficient performance 
singly or jointly caused prejudice to the defendant."  Id. at 
134 (emphasis added). 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
27 
 
individually, these errors may or may not have been prejudicial 
to Washington, but we must assess 'the totality of the omitted 
evidence' 
under 
Strickland, 
rather 
than 
the 
individual 
errors."); Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1439 (9th Cir. 1995).12  
                                                 
12 See also Gonzales v. McKune, 247 F.3d 1066, 1078 n.4 
(10th Cir. 2001), vacated in part on rehearing en banc by 
Gonzales v. McKune, 279 F.3d 922 (10th Cir. 2002); Turner v. 
Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 457 (9th Cir. 1998) ("When an attorney has 
made a series of errors that prevents the proper presentation of 
a defense, it is appropriate to consider the cumulative impact 
of the errors in assessing prejudice."); Wade v. Calderon, 29 
F.3d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1120 
(1995); Rodriguez 
v. Hoke, 
928 F.2d 
534, 
538 
(2d 
Cir. 
1991)("Since Rodriguez's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel can turn on the cumulative effect of all of counsel's 
actions, all his allegations of ineffective assistance should be 
reviewed together."). 
The Seventh Circuit has been perhaps the most pronounced in 
advancing the view that counsel's errors should be combined to 
determine if the prejudice prong of the Strickland test is met.  
See Hough v. Anderson, 272 F.3d 878, 891 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001); 
Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2000); 
Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1995) ("In 
addition, [Williams] must be able to demonstrate that the 
complained of deficiency resulted in prejudice.  . . .  In 
making this showing, a petitioner may demonstrate that the 
cumulative effect of counsel's individual acts or omissions was 
substantial enough to meet Strickland's test."); Drake v. Clark, 
14 F.3d 351, 356 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The cumulative effect of 
individual acts or omissions 'may be substantial enough to meet 
the Strickland test.'") (quoting United States, ex rel. Kleba v. 
McGinnis, 796 F.2d 947, 958 (7th Cir. 1986)); Kubat v. Thieret, 
867 F.2d 351, 370 (7th Cir. 1989).  As a result, federal 
district courts in Wisconsin have followed this approach.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Mosiman, 604 F. Supp. 1003, 1008 (E.D. 
Wis. 1985) ("Although each allegation of attorney incompetence 
is examined individually, the cumulative impact of the incidents 
is also to be considered.") (citing Crisp v. Duckworth, 743 F.2d 
580, 583 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
28 
 
Although some circuits have decided to the contrary,13 we adopt 
the reasoning of the courts that have held that prejudice should 
be assessed based on the cumulative effect of counsel's 
deficiencies. 
¶60 This 
approach 
is 
sensible 
and 
in 
accord 
with 
Strickland.  See Gonzales v. McKune, 247 F.3d 1066, 1078 n.4 
(10th Cir. 2001) ("Strickland . . . makes it clear that all acts 
of inadequate performance may be cumulated in order to conduct 
the prejudice prong.").  Just as a single mistake in an 
attorney's 
otherwise commendable representation 
may 
be so 
serious as to impugn the integrity of a proceeding, the 
cumulative effect of several deficient acts or omissions may, in 
certain instances, also undermine a reviewing court's confidence 
in the outcome of a proceeding.  Therefore, in determining 
                                                                                                                                                             
Other 
courts, 
while 
not 
directly 
holding 
that 
the 
cumulative effect of multiple deficiencies must be weighed 
together to determine prejudice, have intimated that such an 
analysis is proper.  See, e.g., Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 
557, (6th Cir. 2000) ("Because the individual claims of 
ineffectiveness alleged by [the defendant] are all essentially 
meritless, [she] cannot show that the cumulative error of her 
counsel rendered him ineffective."); Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 
163, 180 (3d Cir. 1999); McNeil v. Cuyler, 782 F.2d 443, 451 (3d 
Cir. 1986) ("Upon reviewing the cumulative effect of these 
actions and omissions, however, we do not think there is a 
'reasonable probability' that without them, the result of the 
trial would have been different."). 
13 See Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852 (4th Cir. 1998) 
("To the extent this Court has not specifically stated that 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, like claims of trial 
court 
error, 
must 
be 
reviewed 
individually, 
rather 
than 
collectively, we do so now."); Girtman v. Lockhart, 942 F.2d 
468, 474-75 (8th Cir. 1991). 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
29 
 
whether a defendant has been prejudiced as a result of counsel's 
deficient performance, we may aggregate the effects of multiple 
incidents of deficient performance in determining whether the 
overall impact of the deficiencies satisfied the standard for a 
new trial under Strickland. 
¶61 Lest 
there be 
any 
misunderstanding, 
a 
convicted 
defendant may not simply present a laundry list of mistakes by 
counsel and expect to be awarded a new trial.  A criminal 
defense attorney's performance is not expected to be flawless.  
The Sixth Amendment does not demand perfection.  There is "a 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance."  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689.  Moreover, in most cases errors, even unreasonable 
errors, will not have a cumulative impact sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, especially if 
the evidence against the defendant remains compelling.  Finally, 
each alleged error must be deficient in law——that is, each act 
or 
omission 
must 
fall 
below 
an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness——in order to be included in the calculus for 
prejudice. 
¶62 As the preceding discussion indicates, whether the 
aggregated errors by counsel will be enough to meet the 
Strickland prejudice prong depends upon the totality of the 
circumstances 
at 
trial,14 
not 
the 
"totality 
of 
the 
                                                 
14 In most case, the prejudice prong will depend upon the 
"totality of the evidence" at trial.  There are some cases, 
however, in which this phrase fails to capture the problem of 
defenses not raised and evidence not introduced. 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
30 
 
representation" provided to the defendant.15  Thiel, No. 01-1589, 
unpublished slip op., ¶1.  The fundamental purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is not 
to assess the overall performance of counsel but to ensure that 
the adversarial process functions fairly and reliably.  As the 
Supreme Court put it: 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel is 
recognized not for its own sake, but because of the 
effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive 
a fair trial.  Absent some effect of challenged 
conduct on the reliability of the trial process, the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated. 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).  This inquiry 
directs analysis on the issue of prejudice to the effect of 
deficient performance on the overall reliability of the trial.  
                                                 
15 According to Strickland: 
In making this determination [of prejudice], a 
court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider 
the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.  
Some of the factual findings will have been unaffected 
by the errors, and factual findings that were affected 
will have been affected in different ways.  Some 
errors will have had a pervasive effect on the 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the 
entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an 
isolated, trivial effect.  Moreover, a verdict or 
conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more 
likely to have been affected by errors than one with 
overwhelming record support.  Taking the unaffected 
findings as a given, and taking due account of the 
effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a 
court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the 
defendant has met the burden of showing that the 
decision reached would reasonably likely have been 
different absent the errors. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695-96 (1984). 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
31 
 
This is a substantively different focus from an overall 
assessment of an attorney's performance. 
¶63 Under the facts set forth by the circuit court, and 
under our de novo review of trial counsel's performance, there 
are three aspects of counsel's performance that we found 
deficient.  Based on our review of the effect of Thiel's 
counsel's various errors, we doubt whether any of counsel's 
deficiencies individually prejudiced Thiel to such a degree as 
to warrant a new trial.  However, we need not look at the 
prejudice of each deficient act or omission in isolation, 
because we conclude that the cumulative effect undermines our 
confidence in the outcome of the trial. 
¶64 First, we look to trial counsel's failure to read all 
discovery.  The circuit court found that counsel had not read 
the reports of Drs. Metzler and Stwertka. 
 
1. 
The defense theory was that the complainant's 
accusation was in retaliation for Thiel's refusal to assist her 
in obtaining disability benefits.  One medical report quoted 
JoAnn as being "enraged" that Thiel had not helped her file for 
disability and admitting that she threatened Thiel with physical 
evidence in retaliation.  These statements explicitly supported 
the defense theory in the complainant's own words.  Another 
medical report quoted JoAnn as saying that she had not been 
employed for a period of three or four years.  This statement 
might have aided JoAnn's disability claim, but it was directly 
contrary to testimony she gave at trial.  Counsel was not able 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
32 
 
to use this information to impeach the complainant because he 
had not read the documents. 
 
2. 
Dr. Metzler's report showed that JoAnn continued 
to lie about the semen while she was in therapy, after she had 
gone to the police.  Her statement could have been used to show 
an additional lie and to impeach her explanation that her false 
evidence was simply a ruse to elicit a confession from Thiel.  
The circuit court observed, "the fact that in a confidential 
setting [JoAnn] was lying to a therapist who was trying to help 
her was potentially powerful.  The same is true of her 
statements to Metzler about obtaining the semen from Thiel some 
16 months before her conversation with [Thiel] on August 31, 
1999."  Counsel could not use this information because counsel 
had not read the report. 
 
3. 
JoAnn told the police she was afraid of Thiel, 
yet she met with him after she filed her complaint.  The fact 
that this meeting occurred is also contained in a police report.  
This incident was not exploited by counsel at trial.  Reliance 
on the medical report for impeachment would have been safer than 
reliance on the police report, if counsel was familiar with the 
police report. 
 
4. 
The fact that counsel never read the medical 
reports may explain why 
counsel 
did 
not 
try 
harder to 
investigate Wis. Stat. § 972.11(3) and why the State was free to 
produce Dr. Metzler as a rebuttal witness without fear of cross-
examination that would embarrass the complainant. 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
33 
 
¶65 Thiel also alleges that trial counsel did not read or 
absorb all the police reports.  While this clearly constitutes 
deficient performance, if true, it is not easy to determine the 
extent of any prejudicial effect on Thiel's defense, because it 
is difficult to discern what trial counsel read and did not use 
as opposed to what he did not read at all.  For example, the 
circuit court noted that counsel did not bring out at trial that 
JoAnn misidentified Thiel's address.  On the basis of the 
appellate record, we cannot be sure that trial counsel did not 
review this material and merely decide not to employ it as a 
matter of strategy.  Thus, without specifics as to what trial 
counsel overlooked, we cannot find that this failure had a 
negative impact to Thiel's defense. 
¶66 Second, we look to the impact of counsel's failure to 
independently 
investigate 
the 
underlying 
facts 
of 
the 
complainant's account.  The evidence not discovered because of 
counsel's failure to investigate reasonable lines of inquiry was 
relevant and potentially very helpful to Thiel's defense. 
¶67 For example, Brian Ekern was presented to the jury as 
an officer of the court.  He provided a critical "prior 
consistent statement" allegedly made by JoAnn about the alleged 
sexual relationship.  This statement was purportedly made before 
JoAnn had developed a motive to falsely accuse Thiel.   
¶68 A prior consistent statement is admissible in evidence 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a)2. 
 
This 
evidentiary 
rule 
provides: 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
34 
 
 
A statement is not hearsay if: 
 
(a) Prior statement by witness.  The declarant 
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the 
statement is: 
 
. . . .  
 
2. Consistent with the declarant's testimony and 
is offered to rebut the express or implied charge 
against 
the 
declarant 
of 
recent 
fabrication 
or 
improper influence or motive. . . .  
¶69 The complainant told police that she disclosed her 
sexual relationship with Thiel to Ekern in February 1999.  At 
trial, however, she testified that she made the disclosure in 
1998.  The next day she changed her testimony claiming that she 
made the disclosure in 1999.  The "prior consistent statement" 
to Ekern was admitted, over objection, on the assumption that 
this disclosure was made in February 1999, six months before 
JoAnn went to the police.  The admissibility of this evidence 
would be questionable if the disclosure were not made to Ekern 
until late July 1999. 
¶70 There is a good deal of evidence in the record now to 
suggest that Ekern did not receive this information until July 
26, 1999.  Thiel's counsel failed to pin down the date that 
Joann told Ekern the whole story of the alleged assaults.  Thus, 
counsel failed to prevent the admission of what is arguably 
hearsay evidence.  In addition, greater investigation on this 
point might have unearthed damaging phone records that could 
have been used to impeach Ekern's testimony at trial. 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
35 
 
¶71 There appears to be little evidence that counsel 
conducted an investigation to disprove JoAnn's version of events 
and to catalog all of JoAnn's inconsistencies for impeachment.  
A more extensive interview with Lt. Brohmer might have revealed 
that JoAnn had difficulty directing Brohmer to Thiel's house and 
that Thiel's neighbors did not recall seeing JoAnn or her car at 
Thiel's house.  That information would have been very damaging 
to the complainant.  Given the inconsistencies and discrepancies 
that counsel could have found that would have further impeached 
and undermined the credibility of the State's witnesses, 
counsel's 
failure 
to 
investigate 
significantly 
undermined 
Thiel's defense in this case, in which the credibility of the 
complainant was paramount. 
¶72 Third, counsel's failure to move to admit evidence 
under Wis. Stat. § 972.11(3) did not add much to the negative 
impact that resulted from the failure to read medical records in 
the discovery.  The principal benefit that Thiel would have 
realized from a timely motion to offer the notes was the 
introduction of the same evidence that he was alleged not to 
have read.  On the other hand, Dr. Metzler was not called in the 
State's case-in-chief.  He would have been a riskier rebuttal 
witness for the State if the defense had been able to use him to 
bring out damaging material in the medical reports.  At bottom, 
counsel's failure with respect to § 972.11(3) did not materially 
increase the prejudice to Thiel's defense. 
¶73 Finally, we do not include counsel's failure to strike 
Dr. Metzler's testimony as part of our calculation of prejudice.  
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
36 
 
No doubt, striking Dr. Metzler's testimony would have been of 
some assistance to Thiel.  Dr. Metzler's testimony permitted the 
inference that if JoAnn had in fact come to Thiel's home three 
times for professional reasons as he claimed, he would have 
documented the visits in JoAnn's records.  His failure to 
provide such documentation implied an impropriety in these 
visits.  Nonetheless, trial counsel softened the impact of this 
inference on cross-examination.  Counsel elicited from Dr. 
Metzler that there were in fact no standards in the psychiatric 
community about documenting patient visits.  Thus, any negative 
impact to Thiel was mitigated by trial counsel's cross-
examination.  Inasmuch as we do not find deficient performance 
in counsel's failure to move to strike the testimony, this 
incident is not considered in the calculation of prejudice. 
¶74 Overall, counsel's objectively unreasonable failures 
seriously affected his ability to impeach the credibility of the 
complainant and some of the State's witnesses.  It also weakened 
his ability to protect Thiel's credibility.  The cumulative 
result of these failures was to keep from the jury important, 
additional discrepancies in JoAnn's account of the alleged 
encounters as well as discrepancies in her discussions with 
other persons. 
¶75 At the trial, in the absence of the jury, Judge Pasell 
sparred with defense counsel, who wanted to inquire about the 
source of the semen: "What's the relevance of that?" the judge 
asked.  "It's conceded that she lied, it's conceded that she 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
37 
 
gave false evidence, it's conceded that this was not Mr. Thiel's 
semen."   
¶76 The court's quick assessment on the second day of 
trial highlights the issue in this case.  The State argues that 
counsel's errors did not amount to prejudice because the jury 
already realized that the complainant was a liar.  The court of 
appeals declared that: "It is true that credibility was the 
issue, but the jury had that well laid out before them.  We see 
no prejudice in counsel's failure to pursue opportunities to 
present such cumulative credibility evidence."  Thiel, No. 01-
1589, unpublished slip op., ¶26. 
¶77 After trial, after the Machner hearing, the circuit 
court saw it differently, saying:  
In this case, the victim's credibility was vital. 
. . .   
 . . . The credibility of the complainant was 
critical to the State's presentation.  It was subject 
to 
attack 
with 
readily 
available 
information.  
Although the jury was aware of some information 
impeaching 
her 
credibility, 
the 
other 
evidence 
developed 
at 
the 
postconviction 
hearing 
was 
of 
sufficient quantity and persuasiveness to put into 
question the reliability of the proceedings held in 
this trial. 
¶78 The nature of the credibility evidence in this case 
cannot 
be 
characterized 
as 
merely 
cumulative. 
 
We 
find 
instructive on this matter Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620 
(7th Cir. 2000), a decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals 
concerning 
a 
Wisconsin 
case 
that 
had 
denied 
an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim largely on grounds that 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
38 
 
omitted evidence of additional alibi witnesses was merely 
cumulative.  We find the following reasoning particularly 
relevant to assessing Thiel's claim: 
The impact of three more witnesses corroborating 
Washington's alibi would not have been "cumulative" as 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals believed.  Evidence is 
cumulative when it "supports a fact established by 
existing evidence," Black's Law Dictionary 577 (7th 
ed. 1999), but Washington's whereabouts on the day of 
the robbery was far from established——it was the issue 
in the case.  The fact that [another witness] had 
already 
testified 
to 
facts 
consistent 
with 
Washington's alibi did not render additional testimony 
cumulative. 
 
Indeed, 
the 
additional 
testimony . . . would have added a great deal of 
substance and credibility to Washington's alibi. 
Id. at 634. 
¶79 As in Washington, the veracity of JoAnn's claims of 
sexual relations with Thiel was not established to such a degree 
that additional evidence could not have further undermined her 
credibility and generated reasonable doubt as to Thiel's guilt.  
While much of the State's evidence at trial was strong, the 
evidence of Thiel's guilt was not beyond dispute.  Moreover, 
additional credibility evidence might have affected the number 
of charges on which Thiel was convicted.  We are concerned about 
underestimating 
the 
importance 
of 
cumulative 
credibility 
evidence in a case that depends so heavily on the credibility of 
the complainant.  We agree with the circuit court that 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
39 
 
credibility was the issue upon which a reasonable doubt turned.16  
In this case, there was no physical evidence of the alleged 
sexual encounters, nor did any of the supportive witnesses who 
testified present evidence regarding their observation, direct 
or indirect, of the alleged encounters.  Rather, the State's 
witnesses all served to bolster or otherwise credit JoAnn's 
version of the facts.  The unreasonable errors that disabled 
Thiel's counsel from presenting material, discrediting facts 
pertinent to JoAnn's account of the alleged encounters shakes 
our confidence in the result of this proceeding.17 
¶80 Finally, the State has outlined many aspects of 
Thiel's 
counsel's 
performance 
that 
were 
reasonable 
and 
                                                 
16 In State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 369 N.W.2d 711 
(1985), we noted that an error that went to the defendant's 
credibility, when his credibility was the "central issue in 
th[e] case," satisfied the Strickland test for prejudice, even 
though there was sufficient evidence in the case to sustain the 
conviction.  Id. at 644-46. 
17 The State points to State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, 244 
Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801, to support its argument that 
evidence related to credibility should be deemed cumulative in 
this 
case. 
 
In 
Trawitzki, 
we 
rejected 
the 
defendant's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim by holding that the 
failure to put on cumulative evidence in the form of prior 
convictions of witnesses did not create a reasonable probability 
of a different outcome.  Id., ¶¶43-45.  Unlike Trawitzki, where 
the jury was aware of the witnesses' involvement in the crime 
that was the subject of the trial and where there existed solid 
evidence 
from 
other 
sources 
sufficient 
to 
support 
the 
conviction, the credibility of the State's witnesses was at the 
core of this case and constituted the totality of the evidence 
against Thiel.  See also State v. Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 237, 
548 N.W.2d 69 (1996) (finding error not to be prejudicial where 
the 
evidence 
against 
the 
defendant 
was 
"overwhelmingly 
probative" of his guilt). 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
40 
 
effective.  Our review of the record confirms these actions.  
Thiel does not contend, nor do we, that counsel performed poorly 
in all portions of his representation or that no evidence was 
presented in support of Thiel's case.  But the State's 
observation misses the point, and it shows the danger in the 
court of appeals' "totality of the representation" standard for 
determinations of prejudice under Strickland.  As we explained 
above, the proper inquiry for assessing prejudice is not the 
totality of counsel's performance, but rather the effect of 
counsel's acts or omissions on the reliability of the trial's 
outcome.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  The key question in 
Thiel's case is whether the evidence that was omitted or not 
made fully available to the jury due to the deficiencies in 
counsel's performance undermined confidence in the outcome of 
the case, given the totality of the evidence that was adduced at 
his trial.  We conclude that it has. 
VI 
¶81 For the reasons discussed, we hold that Thiel's trial 
counsel was deficient in (1) failing to read all discovery 
materials; (2) in not undertaking any independent investigation 
regarding 
JoAnn's 
credibility 
when 
discrediting 
JoAnn was 
crucial 
to 
Thiel's 
defense; 
and 
(3) 
by 
misunderstanding 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(3) and failing to file a motion under that 
provision.  While none of these deficiencies, standing alone, 
would 
have 
caused 
prejudice 
sufficient 
to 
undermine 
our 
confidence in the outcome of the trial, given the totality of 
the circumstances at trial, we find that the cumulative effect 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
41 
 
of these failures undermines our confidence in the outcome of 
the trial.  We are sufficiently persuaded that the reliability 
of this proceeding is suspect and that, but for the numerous, 
unreasonable errors of Thiel's counsel, there is reasonable 
probability 
that 
the 
result 
would 
have 
been 
different.  
Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals decision and we 
remand this matter to the circuit court for a new trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No. 01-1589-CR 
 
 
 
1