Case Title: Curtatone v. Barstool Sports, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13027

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13027 
 
JOSEPH A. CURTATONE  vs.  BARSTOOL SPORTS, INC., & another.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     February 1, 2021. - June 14, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Electronic Surveillance.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss.  
Words, "Secretly." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 17, 2019. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Maureen B. Hogan, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Leonard H. Kesten (Deidre Brennan Regan also present) for 
the plaintiff. 
 
Aaron J. Moss, of California (Andrew F. Caplan also 
present) for the defendants. 
 
Esha Bhandari, Brian Hauss, & Katie Townsend, of New York, 
& Jessie J. Rossman, Ruth A. Bourquin, Rachel Davidson, & Bruce 
D. Brown, for American Civil Liberties Union & others, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Daniel J. Schneider, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
1 Kirk Minihane. 
2 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this appeal, we consider whether the 
defendants, Barstool Sports, Inc. (Barstool or Barstool Sports), 
and Kirk Minihane, acting as agent for Barstool, violated the 
Massachusetts wiretap act, G. L. c. 272 § 99 (act), by first 
recording a telephone conversation with the plaintiff, 
Somerville mayor Joseph Curtatone, under an assumed identity and 
then publishing that recording on the Internet on Barstool's Web 
log, or "blog."2  The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
on the ground that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, see Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 
365 Mass. 754 (1974), and a Superior Court judge allowed the 
motion.  The plaintiff appealed, and we transferred the case to 
this court on our own motion.  Concluding that the plaintiff has 
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cognizable cause of 
action because the telephone conversation at issue was not 
secretly recorded, as required under the act, we affirm the 
judge's decision to dismiss the complaint.3 
 
1.  Facts.  We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss 
under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) de novo, accepting as true all 
 
 
2 See Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 223 (2012) 
(defining "blog"). 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts, Inc., and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press, as well as the amicus brief of Daniel J. Schneider. 
3 
 
well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint, and drawing all 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.  See Rafferty v. 
Merck & Co., 479 Mass. 141, 147 (2018); Curtis v. Herb Chambers 
I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011). 
 
We summarize the factual allegations set forth in the 
complaint.  On May 29, 2019, the Boston Herald, a Boston daily 
newspaper, published an article criticizing the Boston Bruins 
hockey team and the National Hockey League for distributing 
Barstool Sports promotional towels to attendees in advance of a 
professional ice hockey game in Boston.  Barstool Sports is a 
corporation doing business in the Commonwealth that operates a 
blog with "a reputation for publishing crass content."  Two days 
later, Curtatone posted a statement on his social media Web page 
criticizing the Bruins' association with Barstool.  He wrote, 
"As a fairly rabid sports fan one of the more regrettable things 
I've seen is the attempt to disguise misogyny, racism & general 
right-wing lunacy under a 'sports' heading.  Our sports teams & 
local sports fans need to push back to stress that's not for 
us. . .  ."  In response to Curtatone's statement, Barstool's 
president, David Portnoy, accused Curtatone of being a 
"professional" and "legitimate" criminal on Portnoy's own social 
media Web page.  Using the same social media platform, Portnoy 
also accused Curtatone's family of engaging in rape, extortion, 
stabbing, and arson. 
4 
 
 
In light of this public dispute, Barstool employee Minihane 
attempted to interview Curtatone, identifying himself using his 
real name and affiliation, but he was unsuccessful.  Minihane 
then contacted a Somerville public information office employee, 
falsely identifying himself as Kevin Cullen, a reporter for the 
Boston Globe, the city's largest daily newspaper, and asked to 
interview Curtatone.  Curtatone agreed to an interview with 
Cullen, unaware that the interviewer would actually be Minihane. 
 
Minihane interviewed Curtatone via telephone on June 6, 
2019.  Minihane altered his normal speaking voice to sound like 
Cullen and maintained throughout the interview that he was 
Cu1len.  At the beginning of the call, Minihane asked Curtatone 
for his consent to "record" the interview, and Curtatone 
consented.  Minihane audio-video recorded his side of the 
conversation.  Barstool Sports then posted the recording on its 
blog. 
 
2.  Discussion.  Section 99 C of the act prohibits the 
"willful[] . . . interception of any wire or oral 
communication," by any person, except as specifically provided 
in a few narrow exceptions4 that neither party contends are 
relevant here.  See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 459 Mass. 289, 296-
 
 
4 Such as for employees of communications companies whose 
facilities transmit wire communications, financial institutions 
with their trading partners, and certain law enforcement 
actions.  See G. L. c. 272, § 99 D 1. 
5 
 
297 (2011).  Interception, as defined in the act, "means to 
secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear 
or secretly record the contents of any wire or oral 
communication through the use of any intercepting device by any 
person other than a person given prior authority by all parties 
to such communication."  G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4.  The act 
provides a cause of action for "[a]ny aggrieved person whose 
oral or wire communications were intercepted, disclosed or 
used . . . or whose personal or property interests or privacy 
were violated by means of an interception . . . against any 
person who so intercepts, discloses or uses such communications 
or who so violates his personal, property or privacy interest."  
G. L. c. 272, § 99 Q. 
 
The plaintiff's argument that Minihane violated the act is 
two-fold.  First, the plaintiff argues that the act requires 
that both parties to a conversation provide "actual consent" 
before a legal recording of that conversation may be made, 
consent that was impossible for Curtatone to provide here 
because he was unaware of the true identity of his interviewer.  
Second, the plaintiff contends that Minihane secretly heard and 
recorded the conversation because Curtatone believed that he was 
speaking with Cullen, rather than with Minihane.  In other 
words, in Curtatone's view, Minihane heard and recorded the call 
secretly because his identity was a secret.  Curtatone argues 
6 
 
that Barstool is liable insofar as it published the 
communication that Minihane is asserted to have intercepted 
illegally and while acting as Barstool's agent. 
 
"Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and 'the statutory 
language is the principal source of insight into legislative 
purpose.'"  AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Barnstable, 
477 Mass. 296, 300 (2017), quoting Bronstein v. Prudential Ins. 
Co., 390 Mass. 701, 704 (1984).  "Where the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to 
legislative intent" (quotation and citation omitted).  Worcester 
v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 138 (2013).  In such 
circumstances, "the sole function of the courts is to enforce 
[the statute] according to its terms."  Commonwealth v. Soto, 
476 Mass. 436, 438 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 
Mass. 555, 557 (2014). 
 
As we previously have articulated, the definition of 
interception provided in the act requires that an interception 
of the type prohibited must be "(1) secretly made and 
(2) without prior authority by all parties."  Commonwealth v. 
Boyarsky, 452 Mass. 700, 705 (2008).  See Commonwealth v. 
Jackson, 370 Mass. 502, 507 (1976).  If recordings are not made 
"secretly," they do not constitute an interception within the 
meaning of the act, and we need not reach the question whether 
7 
 
there was prior authority (i.e., consent) for the recording.  
See Jackson, 370 Mass. at 505-507.  See also Commonwealth v. 
Ennis, 439 Mass. 64, 69-70 (2003).  The initial question in this 
case is thus whether Minihane secretly recorded the challenged 
conversation. 
 
Because the act does not define the term "secretly," "we 
give the term its 'usual and accepted meaning,' as long as it is 
'consistent with the statutory purpose'" (alteration omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 372 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977).  "We 
derive the words' usual and accepted meanings from sources 
presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in 
other legal contexts and dictionary definitions."  Matta, supra, 
quoting Zone Book, Inc., supra.  See Modica v. Sheriff of 
Suffolk County, 477 Mass. 102, 104 (2017).  Dictionary 
definitions of a "secret" include "something kept hidden or 
unexplained," Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1122 (11th 
ed. 2020), "[s]omething that remains beyond understanding or 
explanation," The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1584 (5th ed. 2016), and "something that is studiously 
concealed," Black's Law Dictionary 1622 (11th ed. 2019).  In the 
act, the term "secretly" modifies the words "hear," "record," or 
"aid another to" hear or record, indicating that the act of 
hearing or recording is that which must be done secretly in 
8 
 
order for the interception to fall within the prohibited 
activity.  See G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4. 
 
With these definitions and this context in mind, it is 
readily apparent that the plaintiff's arguments are foreclosed 
by the plain meaning of the act.  Minihane did not secretly hear 
or record the challenged communication within the meaning of the 
act, because the plaintiff knew throughout the call that his 
words were being heard and recorded.  The identity of the party 
recording the communication or, indeed, the truthfulness with 
which that identity was asserted is irrelevant; rather, it is 
the act of hearing or recording itself that must be concealed to 
fall within the prohibition against "interception" within the 
act.  See Jackson, 370 Mass. at 507-508 (telephone calls 
permissibly recorded under act where, contrary to defendant's 
beliefs, victim's brother made recordings, rather than police).  
See also Commonwealth v. Hyde, 434 Mass. 594, 603-605 (2001) 
(countenancing no violation of act where recording party simply 
informs those involved of intention to tape record encounter, or 
even holds tape recorder in plain sight, regardless of 
identification).  The recording at issue was not made secretly 
and, therefore, there was no interception under the act. 
To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the plain 
meaning of the language, "we strive to make [the act] an 
effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and 
9 
 
sound reason and consistent with legislative intent."  
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 483 Mass. 123, 127 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 479 Mass. 527, 534, cert. denied, 139 
S. Ct. 276 (2018).  Here, the legislative intent, apparent both 
in the legislative history of the act and the act itself, 
concerns limiting "electronic eavesdropping," circumstances 
unlike those at issue here, in which a recording is made 
unbeknownst to the parties involved.  Ennis, 439 Mass. at 68.  
See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 445 Mass. 119, 126 (2005) ("the law 
bars all clandestine audio recording by private individuals"). 
The act was adopted in 1968 in direct response to "the 
commercial availability of sophisticated surveillance devices 
and the ease with which they facilitated surreptitious recording 
of private citizens" by private individuals and law enforcement 
alike.  Tavares, 459 Mass. at 294–295.  The language of the 
preamble of the act makes that clear:  in addition to concerns 
about the "layers of insulation" that organized crime 
organizations use to surround themselves in secrecy to carry out 
their illicit purposes, the preamble notes the legislative 
concern with surveillance by private individuals: 
"The general court further finds that the uncontrolled 
development and unrestricted use of modern electronic 
surveillance devices pose grave dangers to the privacy of 
all citizens of the [C]ommonwealth.  Therefore, the secret 
use of such devices by private individuals must be 
prohibited.  The use of such devices by law enforcement 
officials must be conducted under strict judicial 
10 
 
supervision and should be limited to the investigation of 
organized crime." 
 
G. L. c. 272, § 99 A.  See Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 
271, 275-282 & 280 n.7 (1981); Report of the Special Commission 
on Electronic Eavesdropping, 1968 Senate Doc. No. 1132, at 7-8, 
18–19.  These goals are unrelated to the facts at issue here, 
where the recording, but not the identity of the recorder, was 
known and agreed upon.  To the extent that the plaintiff claims 
that his privacy rights protected under the act were violated as 
a result of the recording, it is also relevant to note that the 
plaintiff, the mayor of a city of more than 80,000 people,5 
believed he was speaking on the record to a newspaper reporter, 
circumstances in which the Commonwealth's interest in protecting 
his privacy is significantly limited. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Because Minihane did not secretly record 
his conversation with the plaintiff, the challenged recording 
does not fall within the statutory definition of an 
"interception" within the meaning of the Commonwealth's wiretap 
act.  The plaintiff thus has not made factual assertions 
sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be 
granted. 
 
 
5 See United States Census Bureau, QuickFacts:  Somerville 
city, Massachusetts, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact 
/table/somervillecitymassachusetts,US/PST045219  
[https://perma.cc/YVG7-87MV]. 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.