Case Title: People v. Wellington

Citation: 633 P.2d 1390

Docket Number: 81SA135

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1981-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
633 P.2d 1390 (1981) The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Cynthia WELLINGTON, Defendant-Appellee. No. 81SA135. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. September 14, 1981. R. Dale Tooley, Dist. Atty., Brooke Wunnicke, Chief Appellate Deputy Dist. Atty., O. Otto Moore, Asst. Dist. Atty., Denver, for plaintiff-appellant. No appearance for defendant-appellee. HODGES, Chief Justice. This is an appeal by the district attorney from a judgment granting defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint charging the defendant with obtaining a narcotic drug by means of fraud and deceit, a felony. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that section 12-22-319, C.R.S. 1973 is unconstitutional. We reverse the judgment and order that the charge be reinstated. The trial court erred in holding that section 12-22-319, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 5) (narcotic statute), and section 12-22-126, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 5) (1980 Supp.) (drug statute), prohibit identical offenses while providing different penalties and therefore, the defendant was denied equal protection and due process of the law. The narcotic statute provides: The drug statute states that: This court has consistently held that an equal protection and due process question *1391 arises only where different statutes provide different penalties for the same conduct. People v. Burns, 197 Colo. 284, 593 P.2d 351 (1979); People v. Czajkowski, 193 Colo. 352, 568 P.2d 23 (1977); and People v. Hulse, 192 Colo. 302, 557 P.2d 1205 (1976). Here, the statutes do not proscribe the same conduct. The defendant was charged with a violation of section 319, which requires that a narcotic drug [see section 12-22-301(16), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 5) for definition of narcotic drug] be procured by the means prohibited by that statute. In contrast, section 126 does not require that the drug [see section 12-22-102(11), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 5) (1980 Supp.) for definition of drug] procured by illegal means be a narcotic drug. The general assembly has the power to create and define crimes, subject only to the limitations of the constitution. These limitations were clearly and succinctly stated in People v. Czajkowski, supra, in which we addressed a similar challenge with respect to the "theft of auto parts" statute. We set forth therein that: The general assembly has determined that obtaining a "narcotic drug," as defined by section 12-22-301(16), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 5) (a felony) has more adverse social consequences than obtaining a "drug," as defined by section 12-22-102(11), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 5) (1980 Supp.) (a misdemeanor). The defendant has not established that these classifications are arbitrary or unreasonable or that they fail to bear a reasonable relationship to the public policy to be achieved. Where a single transaction may violate two criminal statutes, it is well settled that no constitutional proscription exists which prohibits a district attorney from exercising his prosecutorial discretion in determining under which statute to prosecute. People v. Hulse, supra; People v. Fowler, 183 Colo. 300, 516 P.2d 428 (1973); People v. James, 178 Colo. 401, 497 P.2d 1256 (1972). There is no merit in the trial court's ruling that section 12-22-319, C.R.S. 1973 violates the constitutional guarantees of equal protection or due process. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and it is ordered that the charge be reinstated.