Case Title: Ebert v. Ebert

Citation: 232 Kan. 502, 656 P.2d 766

Docket Number: 54,198

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1983-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
232 Kan. 502 (1983)
656 P.2d 766
VIRGINIA ANN EBERT, Appellant,
v.
PATRICK C. EBERT, Appellee.
No. 54,198

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 14, 1983.
Dorothy L. Thompson, of Everett, Seaton, Knopp & Thompson, of Manhattan, argued the cause, and Donn J. Everett, of the same firm, was with her on the brief for appellant.
Anne B. Miller, of Miller, Ball & Miller, of Manhattan, argued the cause, and Paul E. Miller, of the same firm, was with her on the brief for appellee.
Donna M. Dill, of Schroeder, Heeney, Groff & Hiebert, a Professional Association, of Topeka, was on the brief amicus curiae for the Kansas Civil Liberties Union.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
This is an action wherein plaintiff-wife, Virginia Ann Ebert, seeks damages for physical injuries which she alleges were intentionally inflicted upon her by defendant-husband, Patrick C. Ebert, during the course of their marriage. The trial court dismissed the claim herein on the grounds of interspousal tort immunity. Plaintiff appeals therefrom.
The trial court's decision and the parties' briefs were all filed prior to this court's decision in Stevens v. Stevens, 231 Kan. 726, 647 P.2d 1346 (1982), which substantially altered the existing Kansas law. In Stevens we held:
*503 The holding of Stevens would clearly be controlling herein and require reversal unless tempered in some manner. Defendant-husband therefore urges that we:
1. Reconsider Stevens;
2. Limit Stevens to its facts; or
3. Apply Stevens prospectively.
Defendant first contends the holding and rationale of Stevens were erroneous and should be reconsidered. The public policy arguments advanced by defendant-husband were considered in Stevens and rejected. The argument is then made that any alteration in interspousal immunity is a matter reserved for legislative determination. We do not agree. The interspousal immunity doctrine was judicially created and, in Kansas, is not the subject of statutory law. It is therefore appropriate for this court to make alterations to said doctrine. E.g., Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21 (1969). See also Annot., Interspousal Tort Immunity, 92 A.L.R.3d 901, § 18.
In Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972), the Indiana Supreme Court responded to the contention the doctrine of interspousal immunity was within the province of the legislature and therefore not subject to judicial abrogation as follows:
We conclude recognition of the intentional tort exception to interspousal immunity is sound law and we adhere thereto.
Defendant-husband next argues Stevens should be limited to its facts. Stevens was a wrongful death action brought by two children against their stepmother for the death of the children's father. We held that a claim based on the wife's intentional shooting of her husband could be maintained by the deceased's children, as such an action could have been brought by the husband had he survived. Defendant-husband in the case before *504 us seeks to limit the holding of Stevens to wrongful death actions on the basis that only in such cases is there no marriage left to preserve. We do not agree.
The parties herein were married on December 22, 1980. Six months later plaintiff-wife brought an action for divorce which was later amended to include the claim herein for damages inflicted by intentional torts. Multiple incidents are alleged to have been involved, the same occurring both prior to and subsequent to the filing of the divorce action. Substantial injuries are claimed including a broken toe, broken ribs, facial lacerations, etc.  all allegedly intentionally inflicted by the defendant-husband. The personal injury claim was dismissed by the trial court on September 25, 1981. In dismissing the tort claim, the trial court stated:
Less than a year later, intentional torts were indeed excepted from the interspousal immunity doctrine by our decision in Stevens. We fail to see the logic in subjecting a person to civil liability for intentional injury to his or her spouse only if the spouse dies from the injury. As noted in Stevens:
We decline to limit the interspousal immunity intentional tort exception to wrongful death actions.
*505 Finally, defendant urges that Stevens should be applied only prospectively. Defendant does not contend that he was relying on interspousal immunity as enunciated in Fisher when he allegedly beat his wife in a drunken rage. Indeed, that would be a difficult proposition to sell.
Batteries committed by one spouse upon the other were not lawful acts prior to the Stevens decision as such deeds have long been criminally culpable. Stevens merely adds possible civil liability in damages for such already wrongful acts.
Defendant's argument is basically that it is just not fair to apply Stevens retrospectively. We do not agree.
No argument has been advanced which leads us to believe that either public policy or the interests of justice would be better served if the intentional tort exception to interspousal immunity created in the Stevens decision were to be afforded only prospective application. We, therefore, decline to so hold.
The judgment of the trial court dismissing plaintiff's intentional tort claim is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
SCHROEDER, C.J., dissenting.