Case Title: Zylstra v. Boise State University

Citation: 

Docket Number: 41421

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2014-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 41421 
 
 
SAMUEL J. ZYLSTRA, 
 
       Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF IDAHO and BOISE STATE 
UNIVERSITY, 
 
      Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants 
_________________________________________ 
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Boise, September 2014 Term 
 
2014 Opinion No. 112 
 
Filed: October 29, 2014 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
    
    
     
 
 
 
Appeal from the district court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State 
 
of Idaho, Ada County.  Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge. 
 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.  Costs on appeal are 
 
awarded to respondents. 
 
 
Geoffrey D. Swindler Spokane, WA and James F. Whitehead, Seattle, WA, 
 
attorneys for appellant.  James F. Whitehead argued. 
 
 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, Boise, attorneys for respondents.  Phillip J. Collaer 
 
argued. 
________________________________ 
 
WALTERS, J. pro tem 
This is an action for recovery of damages against the State of Idaho. The district court 
dismissed the action on motion of the State for summary judgment. We affirm. 
I.  NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was brought under the Idaho Tort Claims Act asserting negligence by a public 
university in allowing a student-athlete to return to competition after sustaining a head injury.  
Plaintiff, Samuel Zylstra (Zylstra), was a student and wrestler at Boise State University (BSU). 
Zylstra brought suit against BSU and the State of Idaho (hereinafter referred to collectively as 
BSU) alleging that BSU employees negligently allowed him to continue wrestling after he was 
injured during the first day of a two-day tournament. On motion by BSU, the district court 
granted summary judgment on the issue of causation, but denied summary judgment as to BSU’s 
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statute of limitations arguments. Notwithstanding the denial in part, the partial grant of summary 
judgment provided adequate grounds to dismiss Zylstra’s action. Before this Court, Zylstra 
appeals the district court’s decision to strike two expert affidavits offered in opposition to BSU’s 
summary judgment motion and also alleges judicial bias. BSU cross-appeals the district court’s 
denial of summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue. 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Zylstra enrolled as a student at BSU in 2007. Shortly after enrolling, he successfully tried 
out for BSU’s wrestling team. He attended BSU and competed as a wrestler from 2007 to 2010. 
For each year that he was an active member of the wrestling team, Zylstra signed liability 
waivers releasing BSU from any claims for damages or injuries sustained while participating in 
athletics. On February 26-27, 2010, Zylstra and the BSU wrestling team competed at the Pac-10 
wrestling championships in Davis, California. During his first match on February 26, 2010, 
Zylstra suffered what would later be diagnosed as a concussion when his head was slammed to 
the mat by his opponent. In response to the possible head trauma, BSU coaches called a timeout 
so that athletic trainer, Andy Chorn (“Chorn”), could assess the presence and severity of any 
injuries and determine whether it was safe for Zylstra to continue the match. The parties disagree 
about whether Zylstra briefly lost consciousness during the event. Upon being approached by 
Chorn, Zylstra complained that his head hurt. During the 90-second injury timeout, Chorn 
conducted neurological testing checking for eye motility, double vision, ringing in the ears, and 
sensitivity to light. According to Chorn, all testing was negative, a concussion was not detected, 
Zylstra’s dizziness cleared immediately, and Zylstra indicated that he was fine and wished to 
continue. Based on these findings, Zylstra was permitted to return to competition, completing 
two matches that first day, as well as two more the following day.1 Zylstra ultimately placed fifth 
in the tournament, qualifying him for the NCAA Championships. 
On March 10, 2010, still suffering from persistent headaches and other concussive 
symptoms, Zylstra was examined by team physician, Scot Scheffel, M.D. in Boise, Idaho. Dr. 
Scheffel opined that Zylstra suffered a “significant concussion” at the Pac-10 tournament and 
indicated that he would not medically clear Zylstra to wrestle in the NCAA Championships. The 
                                                 
1  Immediately following the completion of Zylstra’s first match and over the course of the next two days, Chorn re-
assessed Zylstra multiple times. All tests returned negative for a concussion, but Zylstra persisted in his complaint of 
a headache. After the second day of the tournament concluded, on the evening of February 27, 2010, Zylstra ate, 
socialized, and behaved normally with his parents and teammates, although he contends he did not feel well.     
 
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parties disagree about the degree to which these concussion-related symptoms impacted Zylstra’s 
daily life and ability to function in the weeks and months following the tournament. 
On October 22, 2010, Zylstra filed a notice of claim with the Idaho Secretary of State’s 
office, and he filed an initial complaint initiating this lawsuit in district court on February 21, 
2012. On April 12, 2013, BSU filed a motion to compel challenging the sufficiency of Zylstra’s 
expert disclosures and answers to expert-related written discovery. On May 9, 2013, the district 
court held a hearing on the motion to compel. While the court refrained from formally granting 
BSU’s motion to compel, the district judge found that BSU was entitled to full and complete 
discovery responses.   
On June 4, 2014, BSU filed a motion for summary judgment on two issues, statute of 
limitations and causation. On July 1, 2013, Zylstra filed his opposition to BSU’s motion for 
summary judgment, supported by various affidavits. On July 15, 2013, BSU filed a motion to 
strike the affidavits of expert witnesses Dr. Epperson and Dr. Brzusek, as well as certain lay 
witnesses. On August 8, 2013, the district court held a hearing addressing both BSU’s motion to 
strike and motion for summary judgment. Regarding the motion to strike, the court granted 
BSU’s motion as to the expert witnesses and granted in part and denied in part as to the lay 
witnesses. As to BSU’s summary judgment motion, judgment was entered against Zylstra on the 
element of causation, but was denied as to the statute of limitations issue. 
On August 12, 2013, prior to a final judgment being entered against him, Zylstra filed a 
motion for continuance and reconsideration. In this motion, Zylstra sought reconsideration of the 
decision striking his expert affidavits, as well as an order re-instating his case and setting a new 
trial date. BSU formally opposed this motion on August 14, 2013, and the motion was heard and 
denied on October 10, 2013. 
Final judgment was entered against Zylstra on August 15, 2013. Zylstra timely filed his 
notice of appeal on September 13, 2013, and BSU timely filed its notice of cross-appeal on 
September 17, 2013. 
III.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. 
Whether the district court abused its discretion in granting BSU’s motion to strike two 
expert affidavits offered by Zylstra in opposition to BSU’s summary judgment motion. 
2. 
Whether the presiding district court judge was impartial and disinterested in the outcome 
of the case and, if not, whether this alleged bias warrants reversal.    
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3. 
Whether the district court erred in finding a disputed issue of material fact regarding 
Zylstra’s competency and sanity for statute of limitations and tolling purposes. 
IV.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. 
Motions to Strike 
“Summary judgment proceedings are decided on the basis of admissible evidence.”  
Campbell v. Kvamme, 155 Idaho 692, 696, 316 P.3d 104, 108 (2013). Hence, “[t]he admissibility 
of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment is a threshold matter to be addressed before applying the liberal construction 
and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of 
material fact for trial.” Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 271, 281 P.3d 103, 108 (2012). 
“This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard when determining whether testimony offered 
in connection with a motion for summary judgment is admissible.” Gem State Ins. Co. v. 
Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 15, 175 P.3d 172, 177 (2007). “A trial court does not abuse its 
discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of 
discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an 
exercise of reason.” O’Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 
(2008) (citing West Wood Invs., Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 82, 106 P.3d 401, 408 (2005)). 
B. 
Judicial Bias 
“Whether it is necessary for a judicial officer to disqualify himself in a given case is left 
to the sound discretion of the judicial officer himself.” Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 
Idaho 107, 113, 233 P.3d 38, 44 (2009) (citing Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 206, 731 P.2d 192, 
201 (1986)). The legal standard for abuse of discretion is outlined in section IV(A), supra. With 
the exception of jurisdictional issues, “[a]n argument not raised below and not supported in the 
briefs is waived on appeal.” Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 432, 436, 247 P.3d 659, 663 (2011) 
(citing Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512, 181 P.3d 435, 438 (2007)). 
V.  ANALYSIS 
A. 
The District Court Did Not Err in Striking the Affidavits of Drs. Epperson and 
Brzusek Offered by Zylstra in Opposition to BSU’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On the deadline established for filing dispositive motions, BSU filed a motion for 
summary judgment on the issues of statute of limitations and causation. Zylstra timely filed an 
opposition, which included, inter alia, affidavits from experts Dr. Epperson and Dr. Brzusek. 
BSU moved to strike the affidavits of Drs. Epperson and Brzusek, contending that the experts 
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were offering testimony that had not been previously disclosed despite written discovery requests 
and an admonishment from the court regarding the need to fully respond to the same. The district 
court agreed with BSU’s position as to the expert witnesses, striking the affidavits of Drs. 
Epperson and Brzusek. The district court specifically found that the opinions offered were new 
and untimely, being submitted after the close of discovery and disclosed for the first time in 
opposition to a summary judgment motion. Furthermore, the district court found that Zylstra was 
on clear notice of his obligation to provide these opinions to BSU prior to the close of discovery 
and the dispositive motions filing deadline.  
On appeal, Zylstra essentially argues that the opinions of Dr. Epperson were not new in a 
“legally significant way” because the October 2010 claim letter submitted to BSU, Dr. 
Epperson’s December 2011 report, and Zylstra’s April 8, 2013 expert disclosures all put BSU on 
sufficient notice of what his opinions regarding causation would be. Zylstra challenges the 
district judge’s characterization of the disclosures as being general in nature, instead stating they 
were “very specific about Dr. Epperson’s opinions on causation, [specifically] that it was likely 
[Zylstra] had suffered additional injuries after suffering the first concussion and that those 
injuries caused substantial further damages.” Zylstra also points to statements made by BSU’s 
counsel during the May 9, 2013 hearing on BSU’s motion to compel as support for his 
contention that BSU understood the scope of Dr. Epperson’s expected testimony.   
As to Dr. Brzusek, Zylstra argues that while his written opinions were not available at the 
time BSU’s motion for summary judgment was filed, his expected testimony as described in the 
April 8, 2013 disclosures was sufficient and was further fleshed out in a supplemental disclosure 
served on April 29, 2013. Zylstra also asserts that Dr. Brzusek’s scheduled examination of 
Zylstra could not be arranged until June 10, 2013 (six days after the dispositive motions filing 
deadline), a fact which Zylstra recalls (although not captured on the transcript) was “brought to 
the court’s and defense counsel’s attention during the [May 9, 2013] hearing.” Regardless, 
Zylstra contends that Dr. Brzusek’s opinion was not new because it was “consistent with the 
views of Dr. Epperson on causation and did not . . . differ[] in any material respect from the 
opinions . . . described in [Dr. Epperson’s] report and in the [l]ist of experts[,] . . . which defense 
counsel seemed to acknowledge were sufficient and understandable.” 
Zylstra goes on to argue that he reasonably believed discovery had not closed based on 
“an implicit agreement” between counsel, and that, in the absence of an exact deadline issued by 
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the district court at the May 9, 2013 motion to compel hearing, his supplementation of expert 
disclosures was “seasonable” as ordered. Zylstra also points to the district court’s closing 
comments at the motion to compel hearing wherein BSU was instructed to “go through the 
discovery [it] has” and that if it “want[s] to renew [its] motion . . . [it] needs to set out exactly 
what it is that’s missing.” Zylstra argues this statement gave rise to his reasonable expectation 
that if BSU had “any concerns about the scope and extent of expert disclosures, there would at 
least be another [m]otion to [c]ompel before [Zylstra] would face a motion to strike his experts’ 
opinions.” Lastly, and in the alternative, Zylstra contends that even if the affidavits were 
considered to provide new information, “they were provided a full three months before trial,” 
thereby causing no prejudice to BSU. For all of these reasons, Zylstra seeks reversal of the 
district court’s decision to strike the affidavits of Drs. Epperson and Brzusek, arguing the 
presiding judge ignored applicable legal principles and that the decision was not the product of 
an exercise of reason. Thus, he brings this appeal based on the district court’s alleged abuse of 
discretion. 
Zylstra does not challenge the first prong of the test for abuse of discretion, 
acknowledging that “the judge announced at the end of the summary judgment hearing that the 
issue was one of discretion.” Therefore, at issue on appeal are the second and third prongs, 
specifically whether the presiding district court judge: (1) failed to act within the appropriate 
boundaries of her discretion and (2) failed to reach the decision striking the expert affidavits 
through an exercise of reason. For the reasons outlined in greater detail below, this Court holds 
that the district court properly exercised its discretion in striking the affidavits of Dr. Epperson 
and Dr. Brzusek. 
Before analyzing the decision to exclude expert testimony and the decision to grant 
summary judgment in favor of BSU, it is important to understand more clearly the underlying 
facts of the case and the way in which discovery proceeded. More specifically, the timeline 
surrounding the parties’ protracted exchange of expert-related written discovery, as well as the 
dates established in the district court’s July 13, 2012 Order Governing Proceedings and Setting 
Case for Trial (“Scheduling Order”), provide crucial context for understanding the district 
court’s exercise of reason in its decision granting BSU’s motion to strike the expert affidavits of 
Drs. Epperson and Brzusek. The Scheduling Order established, inter alia, the following 
deadlines: a trial date of September 30, 2013; disclosure of plaintiff’s experts by April 3, 2013; 
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initiation of all discovery by June 2, 2013; and, a dispositive motions filing deadline of June 4, 
2013. While the Scheduling Order permitted the parties to adjust the expert and discovery-related 
deadlines by stipulation, the same order specifically and emphatically stated that the dispositive 
motions filing deadline could only be altered by the court. 
On April 12, 2013, BSU filed a motion to compel challenging the sufficiency of Zylstra’s 
April 8, 20132 expert disclosures and answers to expert-related written discovery served by BSU. 
On May 9, 2013, the district court held a hearing on the motion to compel. BSU brought its 
motion on dual grounds, based on its understanding that the level of detail and specificity 
required for expert disclosures was subject to the interpretation of the presiding district court 
judge.3 The presiding judge provided clarity at the May 9, 2013 hearing, stating her 
interpretation that while neither the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Scheduling Order 
affirmatively require the same level of detail as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, BSU’s 
discovery requests4 specifically and timely sought the same relevant expert-related information. 
While the court refrained from formally granting BSU’s motion to compel, citing a need 
for more specific information regarding the precise information that was missing for each 
corresponding expert, the district judge expressly found that the requests were proper, the 
sought-after information was crucial for the case’s preparation for trial, BSU was entitled to full 
and complete responses, and to the extent Zylstra had not provided such answers to date, answers 
or supplements needed to be provided seasonably. In providing guidance to the parties, the court 
stated, “[Y]ou can’t just say here’s the general subject matter. You’ve got to disclose the actual 
opinions they’re going to testify to.” Since a formal ruling was not entered, the court invited 
BSU to renew its motion at a future date if Zylstra’s responses remained lacking sufficient detail. 
In addition to the merits of the motion to compel, BSU posed a hypothetical to the court 
revealing its underlying motive in filing the motion, namely its concern that Zylstra’s lack of 
complete, timely, and definitive expert-related disclosures would have a downstream impact on 
                                                 
2  While Zylstra’s expert disclosures were due on or before April 3, 2013 under the terms of the Scheduling Order, 
the parties stipulated to a brief extension to April 8, 2013.   
3  BSU argued that while certain district judges mirror the federal approach in interpreting Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(4), and thus require certain automatic and detailed expert disclosures, others do not and instead 
require the parties to specifically ask for the desired information in the form of discovery requests.  
4  Specifically at issue were Zylstra’s responses to BSU’s Interrogatory No. 4 and Request for Production No. 1. 
Read together, these requests sought information about any experts Zylstra intended to call as witness at trial, 
including: the subject matter of the testimony; the facts the expert would rely upon; any and all opinions to which 
the expert was expected to testify; a comprehensive curriculum vitae for each witness; and, any pertinent reports 
generated, including a list of the materials relied upon in generating said reports. 
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both the dispositive motions filing deadline and the September 30, 2013 trial date. BSU clearly 
articulated its concern and opinion that if expert opinions were not disclosed prior to the June 4, 
2013 dispositive motions filing deadline, any opinions not previously disclosed should not be 
permitted either in support or in opposition of a contemplated summary judgment motion. In 
fact, BSU stated its intent to move to strike such opinions should they be provided in response to 
any contemplated summary judgment motion by BSU. While the district court refused to “rule in 
a vacuum,” it stated that it would have to be “an extraordinary situation” to allow parties to 
untimely provide or change expert opinions in a manner that would prejudice the other side. 
Based on the court’s review of the expert disclosures and its finding that “many of them are 
couched in terms of possible [opinions]” and fail to present actual opinions held to a reasonable 
degree of certainty, the court cautioned Zylstra as follows: “[A]t this point if you’re anticipating 
using them as an expert and you’ve identified them, you should have known what their expert 
opinion is, and . . . that should have been disclosed because [it] was requested in [an] 
interrogator[y] and [a] request for production.” 
The hypothetical scenario posed by BSU proved to be prophetic.  On June 4, 2013, BSU 
filed a motion for summary judgment on two issues, statute of limitations and causation, arguing 
that Zylstra: (1) failed to file timely notice of this lawsuit with the State and (2) failed to produce 
expert opinion demonstrating that the decision to allow Zylstra to continue wrestling was the 
cause of his alleged damages. On July 1, 2013, Zylstra filed his opposition to BSU’s motion for 
summary judgment, supported by various affidavits, including those from Drs. Epperson and 
Brzusek. On July 15, 2013, BSU filed a motion to strike the affidavits of expert witnesses Dr. 
Epperson and Dr. Brzusek, as well as lay witnesses Dale Dolifka, Jeff Dolifka, Stephanie 
Zylstra, and Helen Zylstra. As to the expert witnesses, BSU asserted that the opinions of Drs. 
Epperson and Brzusek were untimely, being disclosed for the first time as attachments to 
Zylstra’s July 1, 2013 opposition to summary judgment. As to the lay witnesses, BSU contended 
that portions of their affidavits contained inadmissible hearsay or required expertise. Given these 
deficiencies, BSU argued these affidavits should be stricken, either in whole or in part.    
On August 8, 2013, the district court held a hearing addressing both BSU’s motion to 
strike and motion for summary judgment. Regarding the motion to strike, the court: (1) granted 
BSU’s motion as to the expert witnesses, finding the opinions to be newly and untimely 
disclosed and (2) granted in part and denied in part as to the lay witnesses, excluding the portions 
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identified as hearsay or requiring expertise, but allowing the witnesses to testify about their 
personal observations of Zylstra’s behavior. The court’s decision to strike portions of the lay 
witness affidavits is not at issue on appeal. In striking the expert affidavits, the court squarely 
rejected Zylstra’s arguments that the opinions provided were not new because BSU was aware 
that Drs. Epperson and Brzusek would opine regarding causation and that given Dr. Epperson’s 
December 2011 report and the April 2013 disclosures, BSU should have known what this 
testimony would be, specifically that BSU coaches caused Zylstra harm by allowing him to 
continue wrestling after the injury timeout. The court found these opinions to be new because, 
prior to Zylstra’s July 1, 2013 opposition to summary judgment, BSU had not been provided 
with definitive opinions held to a reasonable degree of medical certainty from either expert.   
As to Dr. Brzusek, the court found that despite a generalized subject matter disclosure 
and a short statement regarding his expected testimony if called to testify, his actual opinions 
were not formally disclosed prior to July 1, 2013. The court found significant that BSU timely 
filed its summary judgment motion on the last possible day for submitting dispositive motions 
under the Scheduling Order and that Dr. Brzusek met with and examined Zylstra for the first 
time six days after the dispositive motion was filed. As to Dr. Epperson, the court found that his 
opinions were new because (1) his December 2011 report presented a generalized discussion of 
causation, but did not contain an actual opinion regarding the same and (2) his July 1, 2013 
affidavit exceeded the scope of causation in that it contained support for Zylstra’s incapacity 
arguments relevant to the tolling issue also raised in BSU’s motion for summary judgment. The 
substance and tone of the December 2011 report was generalized and speculative in nature, even 
expressing Dr. Epperson’s need to gather additional information before being able to render a 
definitive opinion.5 The district court observed at the August 8 hearing, “Nowhere in that initial 
                                                 
5 The pertinent findings of Dr. Epperson’s 24-page report are as follows: 
 
Zylstra sustained a head trauma [on] 2/26/10 during a Pac-10 regional wrestling 
tournament at the University of California at Davis. There was retrograde amnesia, loss of 
consciousness and post-traumatic amnesia. . . .  
He may have sustained additional concussions when he was put back into matches in a 
state of post-traumatic amnesia. Further information would be helpful, but prolonged post-
traumatic amnesia for four months suggests the likelihood of subsequent concussions. The 
significant current brain dysfunction deficits also suggest more than one concussion. 
. . . 
I believe these [cognitive and emotional] problems stem from his concussion or multiple 
concussions. There was no evidence of such problems before his head injuries. There was no 
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report . . . does Dr. Epperson state that his opinion regarding subsequent concussions is made 
with a reasonable degree of medical probability or even something somewhat similar.” The court 
also found significant that almost all of the “additional information” considered by Dr. Epperson 
in generating his untimely affidavit was in existence and could have easily been made available 
to him prior to the close of discovery and the passage of the dispositive motions filing deadline. 
In striking the two expert affidavits, the district court stated, “[T]his is precisely the 
concern that BSU had at the May 9th hearing. It is precisely the harm that BSU [was] trying to 
avoid and they articulated that concern. [Zylstra] was on very clear notice that [this] was an 
issue.” The court went on: 
Counsel for BSU specifically discussed his concern that if BSU files a motion for 
summary judgment based on failure to prove a prima facie case and [then] Mr. 
Zylstra proceeds to file new expert opinion disclosures based on that motion, such 
opinions should be stricken. He put everybody on notice that that’s exactly what 
he would do. 
 
In its concluding remarks regarding the two stricken affidavits, the district court summarized:  
 
[I]n the face of an express warning issued by this Court [at the May 9th hearing], 
at [that] point [Zylstra] had an opportunity to immediately seasonably supplement 
those [disclosures]. The information upon which Dr. Epperson relied could have 
been looked at and immediately have an update of his expert opinion. That did not 
happen. . . . [Dr.] Brzusek . . . could have immediately had an examination and 
supplemented that. Neither thing was done. Instead, [Zylstra] waited until the 
motion was filed and at that time sprang new and different opinions on [BSU]. 
For that reason, I strike both affidavits.   
 
After addressing the motion to strike, the district court addressed BSU’s summary 
judgment motion. On the issue of causation, judgment was entered against Zylstra. However, 
with respect to BSU’s contention that Zylstra’s delay in filing his claim was inexcusable, 
summary judgment was denied. Regarding causation, namely whether BSU’s decision to allow 
Zylstra to continue wrestling after the injury timeout caused damages, the district court ruled that 
Zylstra failed to make a prima facie showing. The court specifically found that Dr. Epperson’s 
December 2011 report failed to opine to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that BSU’s 
decision caused plaintiff’s alleged injuries and that the remaining opinions discussed Zylstra’s 
symptoms only generally, failing to directly establish causation. Without an expert opinion 
rebutting the opinion of BSU’s expert on the element of causation, the district court found in 
                                                                                                                                                             
evidence of an underlying progressive condition that would have resulted in these problems if the 
head traumas had not occurred. There was no evidence of other causation. 
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favor of BSU on summary judgment. Based upon Zylstra’s failure to formally raise the issue on 
appeal, he does not appear to contest that, in the absence of affidavits from his causation experts, 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment against him on the issue was proper. 
On the issue of statute of limitations and tolling, and BSU’s contention that Zylstra’s 
delay in filing his claim was inexcusable, summary judgment was denied. BSU challenges this 
ruling on cross-appeal, as addressed in section V(C), infra.   
On August 12, 2013, prior to a final judgment being entered against him, Zylstra filed a 
motion for continuance and reconsideration. Specifically, Zylstra sought reconsideration of both 
the district court’s decision striking the affidavits of Drs. Epperson and Brzusek, as well as its 
related decision granting summary judgment in favor of BSU on causation. In addition, Zylstra 
sought an order re-instating his case and setting a new trial date. BSU formally opposed this 
motion on August 14, 2013, and the motion was heard and denied on October 10, 2013. At the 
October 10, 2013 hearing, Zylstra articulated his understanding that the parties had an “implicit 
agreement” to extend discovery beyond the deadline contained in the Scheduling Order, that the 
district court was made aware of Zylstra’s need to conduct additional, planned discovery at the 
May 9, 2013 hearing on BSU’s motion to compel, and that the court’s silence somehow acted as 
a formal grant of this contemplated extension. In addition, Zylstra persisted in his argument that 
Dr. Epperson’s December 2011 report put BSU on sufficient notice regarding what his ultimate 
expert opinions would be. 
In considering these arguments during the October 10, 2013 hearing, the district court 
took a brief recess to listen to the recording of the May 9, 2013 hearing, so as to verify the 
accuracy of Zylstra’s representations regarding the disclosures allegedly made at the hearing. 
After a thorough review of the recording, the district court found Zylstra’s recollection to be 
inaccurate and unsupported by the record. Specifically, the court found that no specific 
statements or dates regarding outstanding expert discovery were shared by Zylstra with BSU or 
the court. In response, Zylstra expressed concern that if such statements and disclosures failed to 
appear in the record, the recording device possibly may have prematurely shut-off or his 
statements may have been lost due to technical difficulties related to his telephonic appearance. 
The court found these concerns to be unfounded, reasoning that because the recording continued 
uninterrupted beyond the conclusion of the hearing and into the next matter immediately 
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following on the court’s calendar, it was highly unlikely that Zylstra’s counsel brought anything 
to the court’s attention that was left uncaptured by the recorder. 
Setting aside these “lost” or disputed disclosures, the district court found that because a 
formal stipulation between BSU and Zylstra regarding an extension to the discovery deadline 
was never entered, as required under the Scheduling Order, Zylstra had no reasonable 
expectation of the dates being extended. Specifically, the district court admonished counsel for 
Zylstra at the October 10, 2013 hearing regarding Zylstra’s motion for continuance and 
reconsideration: 
And, furthermore, [counsel], you had discovery deadlines. You . . . had a request 
from over a year before asking you for the opinions. And if what you’re 
suggesting is that you intended to wait until after discovery was closed to 
potentially -- because I can tell you [that your co-counsel] was very clear [about 
conducting additional expert discovery], [he said, “W]e may.[”] He did not say[, 
“We] will[,”] and neither did you. 
. . . 
No matter what, you should have had your expert opinions prepared and provided 
to opposing counsel prior to that discovery deadline. This . . . wasn’t new 
information. It wasn’t something that couldn't have been done prior to . . . the 
June 2nd cutoff. There’s no reason it couldn't have been done. You had over a 
year to do it. 
 
For these reasons, the district court found Zylstra was on clear notice of his obligation to provide 
complete expert-related discovery responses prior to the June 2, 2013 discovery cut-off, 
especially given the long-established June 4, 2013 dispositive motions filing deadline and 
September 30, 2013 trial date. As such, Zylstra’s motion for continuance and reconsideration 
was denied. 
 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26 “requires that parties seasonably supplement their 
discovery responses to any question directly addressed to ‘the identity of each person expected to 
be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which the person is expected to 
testify, and the substance of the person's testimony.’” Duspiva v. Fillmore, 154 Idaho 27, 34, 293 
P.3d 651, 658 (2013) (quoting I.C.R.P. 26(e)(1)(B)). “If a party fails to seasonably supplement 
the responses as required in this Rule 26(e), the trial court may exclude the testimony of 
witnesses or the admission of evidence not disclosed by a required supplementation of the 
responses of the party.” I.R.C.P. 26(e)(4). “[Rule 26] unambiguously imposes a continuing duty 
to supplement responses to discovery with respect to the substance and subject matter of an 
expert's testimony where the initial responses have been rejected, modified, expanded upon, or 
13 
 
otherwise altered in some manner.” Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 89, 813 P.2d 897, 
900 (1991) (citing Zolber v. Winters, 109 Idaho 824, 829–30, 712 P.2d 525, 530–31 (1985)). 
“In general, Rule 26 of the Idaho rules, like its federal analogue, was designed to promote 
candor and fairness in the pre-trial discovery process.” Radmer, 120 Idaho at 89, 813 P.3d at 
900. “Typically, failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 results in exclusion of the proffered 
evidence.” Id. (citing Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir.1977)). Concerns are 
heightened when expert testimony is involved. Radmer, 120 Idaho at 89, 813 P.3d at 900 
(quoting Advisory Committee Notes, FED. R. CIV. P. 26.). However, “[w]hether to exclude 
undisclosed expert testimony pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(e)(4) is committed to the sound discretion 
of the trial court.” Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 180, 219 P.3d 1192, 1196 (2009). 
Returning to the facts of this case, and given that Drs. Epperson and Brzusek were 
identified as expert witnesses, the intensified concerns regarding undisclosed expert opinion are 
triggered here. The record establishes that Zylstra was on clear notice of his obligation to 
produce sufficiently detailed expert-related discovery responses and that those responses needed 
to be provided before the close of discovery and the dispositive motions filing deadline. The 
choice to exclude was left to the district court’s sound discretion, which it properly exercised. 
First, and Zylstra does not contest this on appeal, the court recognized its discretion at the 
conclusion of the hearing on BSU’s motion to strike and motion for summary judgment. Second, 
the court acted consistently and within the boundaries of its discretion. Rule 26 states that “the 
trial court may exclude the testimony” of an expert not properly disclosed. I.R.C.P. 26(e)(4). The 
“may” in Rule 26 gives the trial court the ability to weigh the prejudice of undisclosed testimony 
versus the value of the testimony. In weighing the prejudice to BSU against the value to Zylstra, 
the Court stated, “It is precisely the harm that BSU [was] trying to avoid and they articulated that 
concern. [Zylstra] was on very clear notice that [this] was an issue.” Thus, the trial court acted 
within the bounds of its discretion.  
Third, the court reached its conclusion through the exercise of reason—in deciding to 
strike the two affidavits, the court reasoned that: (1) definitive opinions for Drs. Epperson and 
Brzusek were submitted for the first time after the close of discovery and only in opposition to a 
summary judgment motion; (2) Zylstra knew he needed to supplement his expert-related 
responses prior to the close of discovery and the passage of the dispositive motions filing 
deadline; and, (3) no good cause existed for the delay. Specifically, the district court found that 
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Zylstra’s pre-July 1, 2013 disclosures regarding Drs. Epperson and Brzusek were more properly 
categorized as general subject matter disclosures, not definitive opinions, as they were not stated 
to a reasonable degree of certainty and failed to contain factual or scientific support. Based upon 
this Court’s review of the April 8, 2013 disclosures, the April 29, 2013 supplement to the same, 
Dr. Epperson’s 2011 report, and the two affidavits at issue, the district court’s findings are 
supported by the record.   
BSU served timely and straightforward discovery requests on Zylstra, and the district 
court provided clear guidance regarding Zylstra’s need to respond to the same at the May 9, 2013 
hearing on BSU’s motion to compel. Rule 26(b) requires more than placing an opponent “on 
notice” of what your expert is “likely” to testify to “if asked” his opinion. Almost all of the 
arguments advanced by Zylstra to the district court and to this Court on appeal reveal Zylstra’s 
fundamental misunderstanding regarding his burden of proving each element of the negligence 
claim he brought against BSU. The district court attempted to point this out, advising Zylstra that 
BSU did not have an affirmative duty to develop the opinions of Zylstra’s experts through 
depositions or other written discovery tools.6 The district court found BSU’s expert-related 
discovery requests to be legitimate and deserving of complete and timely responses. Zylstra had 
the burden of timely establishing those opinions and theories, and the factual and scientific bases 
of the same, so that BSU had a reasonable opportunity to challenge, test, and respond to said 
opinions prior to the dispositive motions filing deadline and trial. Zylstra’s argument on appeal 
regarding his belief that BSU would file an additional motion to compel prior to filing a 
summary judgment motion (and related motion to strike) again improperly shifts this burden of 
production. Zylstra was on clear notice of his need to fully respond to BSU’s expert-related 
discovery requests prior to the close of discovery. The burden to provide all of the information 
BSU requested for each of Zylstra’s experts rested on Zylstra’s shoulders alone. 
                                                 
6  At the October 10, 2013 hearing on Zylstra’s motion for reconsideration, in response to arguments from Zylstra’s 
counsel that BSU could have deposed Zylstra’s experts if BSU had any question as to their opinions, the district 
court stated: 
 
So -- and it also concerned me because the other reason that was given was that, well, [BSU] could 
have deposed the experts. Well, what would [BSU] depose them on? I agree with counsel [for 
BSU]. What would [they] depose? It’s a fishing expedition[.] There’s nothing there to tell them 
what they should be d[e]sposing. And they’re not required to depose. Not required. The burden’s 
on the plaintiff. 
15 
 
Furthermore, this Court holds that the district court properly considered and rejected 
Zylstra’s arguments regarding an alleged scheduling misunderstanding, “an implicit agreement” 
between the parties to extend discovery, and alleged technical difficulties with recording 
equipment during the motion to compel hearing. These arguments are specious. The record is 
devoid of any indicia of unfinished business or technical recording difficulties, most notably any 
unnatural breaks or awkward pauses in the flow of conversation. To the contrary, the hearing at 
issue concluded, as expected, with Zylstra’s counsel timely announcing, “Goodbye.”  
For all of these reasons, the district court did not err in striking the affidavits of Zylstra’s 
proposed experts, Drs. Epperson and Brzusek. As such, the decision to strike the affidavits is 
affirmed. Further, Zylstra does not appear to contest that, without the support of affidavits from 
his experts, the district court’s grant of summary judgment against him on the issue of causation 
was proper.   
B.  
The Issue of Judicial Bias Was Not Preserved for Appeal. 
 
On appeal, Zylstra argues that the district court judge failed to be impartial and 
disinterested in the outcome of the case and that this alleged bias warrants reversal. However, 
Zylstra never entered an objection or filed a motion for disqualification during the pre-trial 
proceedings. In the absence of a motion for disqualification, this Court will not review this issue 
on appeal. See, e.g., McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 396–97, 64 P.3d 317, 322–23 (2003) 
(declining to review the issue of disqualification where no motion to disqualify was found in the 
record); Minor Miracle Prods., LLC v. Starkey, 152 Idaho 333, 337, 271 P.3d 1189, 1193 (2012) 
(citing Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 563, 568, 249 P.3d 362, 367 (2011)). 
“As we noted in Doe, ‘[b]ecause the question of a recusal under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) is committed 
to the discretion of the trial judge, absent some objection at trial, there was no decision by the 
trial court that can be reviewed and no factual record was developed from which grounds for 
disqualification can be discerned.’” Minor Miracle, 152 Idaho at 337, 271 P.3d at 1193 (quoting 
Doe, 150 Idaho at 568, 249 P.3d at 367)). Such is the case here. We therefore decline to reach the 
merits of this issue on appeal.   
C.  
The Issue Raised by BSU on Cross-Appeal Need Not Be Addressed. 
 
The district court denied summary judgment to BSU on the issue of whether Zylstra 
should be time-barred from prosecuting the lawsuit. The district court found that Dr. Epperson’s 
December 2011 report and the lay witness affidavits provided by Zylstra’s friends and family 
16 
 
created disputed issues of fact as to Zylstra’s competency and ability to function, including 
timely filing a lawsuit, following the incident, thus precluding summary judgment on the issue. 
Given that BSU prevailed on the issue of causation, which triggered dismissal of the entire case, 
it appears that this cross-appeal was submitted primarily as a defensive measure. Because the 
statute of limitations issue is moot in the absence of BSU liability, we decline to reach the merits 
of the cross-appeal in this opinion. McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 815, 
135 P.3d 756, 761 (2006) (“[Maverik] also cross-appealed, contending that the district court 
erred in overruling objections to evidence offered by the Plaintiffs in opposition to [Maverik's] 
motion for summary judgment. Our ruling upholding that grant of summary judgment renders 
the issues raised in the cross-appeal moot.”); Staggie v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., Inc., 110 
Idaho 349, 351 n.1, 715 P.2d 1019, 1021 n.1 (Ct. App. 1986) (“As a defensive measure, the 
hospital cross-appealed from that part of the judgment dismissing the third-party complaint 
against [the third-party defendant]. Because the third-party complaint is moot in the absence of 
hospital liability, we need not address the cross-appeal in this opinion.”).  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to BSU. 
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.