Case Title: David Vinson, Jr. v. G & R Mineral Services, Inc. (Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court: CV-10-900862). Affirmed. No Opinion.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1120976

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2014-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 01/24/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1120976
____________________
David Vinson, Jr.
v.
G & R Mineral Services, Inc.
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
(CV-10-900862)
PARKER, Justice.
AFFIRMED.  NO OPINION.
See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(E), Ala. R. App. P.
Stuart, Bolin, Murdock, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.  
Moore, C.J., dissents.
1120976
2
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
Because I believe a genuine issue of material fact exists
as to whether G & R Mineral Services, Inc., was a "special
employer" of David Vinson, Jr., I respectfully dissent from
affirming the summary judgment in favor of G & R.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Vinson sought employment with G & R, a contractor who
provided services to Chemical Lime Company of Alabama
("ChemLine"), the operator of a lime quarry in Calera. G & R
directed 
Vinson 
to 
Diversified 
Sourcing 
Solutions, 
a
temporary-employment agency who employed Vinson and assigned
him to work for G & R at the Chemline "baghouse" to change out
lime filters. Vinson's first day at work was uneventful. On
the second day he inhaled lime dust, left early, was
hospitalized, and never returned to work.
Vinson sought and was awarded worker's compensation
benefits 
from 
Diversified. 
When 
Diversified's 
workers'
compensation carrier became insolvent, the Alabama Insurance
Guaranty Association assumed the responsibility of paying for
Vinson's care but eventually discontinued paying him benefits.
Vinson then sued G & R seeking worker's compensation benefits.
1120976
3
G & R's workers' compensation carrier convinced Vinson to
dismiss the action on the ground that Diversified, and not G
& R, had been Vinson's employer. Vinson then brought a
negligence action against G & R, who raised as a defense that
it was a "special employer" of Vinson and thus was immune from
liability for negligence. Vinson moved to strike the "special
employer" defense on the ground that it was inconsistent with
G & R's argument in the worker's compensation case that it was
not Vinson's employer. The trial court denied the motion to
strike and instead entered a summary judgment for G & R,
finding that Diversified was merely a temporary-employment
agency and that Vinson had an implied contract of special
employment with G & R that shielded G & R from liability for
torts. Vinson appealed the summary judgment to this Court.
II. Issue
The issue presented by this case is whether G & R was a
"special employer" of Vinson so that Vinson's exclusive
recourse for a job-related injury at G & R's work site was a
worker's compensation claim or whether he was solely an
employee of Diversified and was thus entitled to sue G & R in
negligence for his injuries.
1120976
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III. Analysis
Vinson argues that Diversified alone was his employer and
that he had not formed an implied contract with G & R as a
special employee. Alternately, Vinson argues that a genuine
issue of material fact exists as to whether G & R was his
special employer, thus precluding a summary judgment. 
An action brought under Alabama's Workers' Compensation
Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, is the exclusive remedy
for an employee's injuries sustained in the course of his or
her employment. § 25-5-53, Ala. Code 1975. An employee is a
"person in service of another under any contract of hire,
express or implied, oral or written," § 25-5-1(5), Ala. Code
1975 (emphasis added).
"'When a general employer lends an employee to
a special employer, the special employer becomes
liable for workmen's compensation only if
"'(a) the employee has made a contract of hire,
express or implied, with the special employer;
"'(b) the work being done is essentially that of
the special employer; and;
"'(c) the special employer has the right to
control the details of the work.'"
Terry v. Read Steel Prods., Inc., 430 So. 2d 862, 865 (Ala.
1983) (quoting 1C A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation
1120976
5
§ 48 (1980)). If all three criteria are satisfied, the
"special employer" may assert as a defense to a negligence
action the exclusivity provision of § 25-5-53. In this case no
dispute has arisen as to criteria (b) and (c). The only
contested factual issue at the summary-judgment stage and in
this appeal is whether Vinson had entered into an implied
contract of hire with G & R.
G & R argues that Diversified was a temporary-employment
agency, which did not employ Vinson to do work for it, but
instead assigned him to work on a contract basis for clients
to whom it provided employees. A worker employed by a general
employer that is "unambiguously [a] temporary employment
placement agenc[y]" "necessarily agrees to a contract of hire
with the special employer." G.UB.MK Constructors v. Garner, 44
So. 3d 479, 488 (Ala. 2010). The hourly fee G & R paid
Diversified for Vinson's services included a prorated payment
for the workers' compensation coverage Diversified carried. "A
worker should not be allowed to sue in tort the employer who
paid for his workers' compensation." Terry A. Moore, Alabama
Workers' Compensation § 5:49 (2013). However, in Lewis v.
Alabama Power Co., 83 So. 3d 560 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011), the
1120976
6
Court of Civil Appeals found that a factor weighing against a
special-employer relationship was that the defendant "was only
indirectly involved in the provision of workers' compensation
insurance." Id. at 567.
Vinson argues that G & R's insistence that it was not
Vinson's employer in the worker's compensation case creates a
genuine issue of fact as to whether it should be considered
Vinson's employer in this negligence case. I agree. 
G & R's workers' compensation insurance carrier, in
seeking dismissal of G & R in Vinson's worker's compensation
case, 
stated 
that 
Vinson 
had 
"no 
employer/employee
relationship" with G & R and that "Mr. Vinson was not an
employee of G & R Mineral Services." Further, G & R's  safety
officer 
in 
a 
letter 
to 
the 
Mine 
Safety 
and 
Health
Administration stated: "The miner, David Vinson, is an
employee of Diversified Sourcing Solutions, not G & R Mineral
Services. Diversified [is] paying Mr. Vinson's worker's
compensation benefits, not G & R." G & R's assertion that it
did not have an employment relationship with Vinson is
probative of the issue whether Vinson had an implied contract
of employment with G & R. As Vinson argued: "If it is not
1120976
7
obvious and unambiguous to G & R that Vinson was an
implied-contract employee, then how can G & R legitimately
assert that the implied contract for hire must have been
unambiguous and obvious to Vinson?" Vinson's reply brief, at
12.
Resolving 
all 
reasonable 
doubts 
in 
favor 
of 
the
nonmovant, as we must in reviewing a summary judgment, I would
conclude that G & R's opportunistic switch from nonemployer to
employer raises a factual question whether G & R was Vinson's
special employer. 
Additionally, Vinson's two days of employment before his
injury is ordinarily not sufficiently long to establish a
special-employer relationship, Garner, 44 So. 3d at 488, and
Diversified, not G & R, retained the right to terminate
Vinson's employment. "Obviously, the 'right to hire and fire'
is indicative of an employment relationship." 44 So. 3d at
489. Finally, Diversified arguably operated not as a mere
temporary-employment 
agency, 
but 
as 
a 
human-resources
subcontractor for G & R. Employees of a subcontractor who
perform work for another organization are not usually
considered special employees of the recipient company.
1120976
8
"[T]here is a point at which an entity that the contracting
parties attempt to cast as a general employer assumes such
duties as to become an independent contractor for provision of
services, not just laborers, and at that point its employees
do not impliedly contract with the 'special employer.'" Gaut
v. Medrano, 630 So. 2d 362, 368 (Ala. 1993).
Where 
fair-minded 
persons 
might 
draw 
different
conclusions from undisputed facts, the question is one for the
jury. One Justice stated this principle as follows:
"The 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
as 
to 
whether
[defendant] was a special employee ... is not a
question of pure law. It is [a] fact question if
from the evidence, even though it is undisputed,
reasonable persons might draw different conclusions
as to whether [defendant] was a special employee
....; such a fact question is for the jury. Only if
all 
reasonable 
persons 
would 
reach 
the 
same
conclusion would it be a question of law."
Rast Constr., Inc. v. Peters, 689 So. 2d 781, 786 (Ala. 1996)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). In this case, the facts, depending
upon the weight accorded to them and the inferences drawn from
them, might reasonably support a legal conclusion that G & R
was a special employer of Vinson or that it was not. In that
circumstance the issue is one for the jury and a summary
judgment is inappropriate. See Capital Alliance Ins. Co. v.
1120976
9
Thorough-Clean, Inc., 639 So. 2d 1349, 1350 (Ala. 1994)
(noting that, in evaluating a motion for a summary judgment,
"the court is to view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and to draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party").