Case Title: Lakeside Ave. L.P. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision

Citation: 1999-Ohio-257

Docket Number: 19980187

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Lakeside Ave. L.P. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 85 Ohio St.3d 125, 1999-Ohio-
257.] 
 
 
 
 
LAKESIDE AVENUE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, APPELLANT, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY 
BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Lakeside Ave. L.P. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1999), 85 Ohio 
St.3d 125.] 
Taxation — Real property valuation — Complaint seeking decrease in valuation 
signed by partner of limited partnership owning property — Board of 
revision without jurisdiction to consider merits of complaint. 
(No. 98-187 — Submitted December 10, 1998 — Decided March 31, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 97-K-695. 
 
This appeal involves a real property valuation complaint filed with the 
Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (“BOR”) seeking a decrease in valuation for 
tax year 1994.  The complaint listed the owner of the property and complainant as 
Lakeside Avenue Limited Partnership (“Lakeside”).  The complaint was signed by 
Steven Kimmelman as “Partner.”  The Cleveland Board of Education filed a 
counter-complaint. 
 
The BOR considered the evidence and testimony presented but did not grant 
any change in valuation.  Lakeside filed an appeal with the Board of Tax Appeals 
(“BTA”).  Following this court’s decision in Sharon Village Ltd. v. Licking Cty. 
Bd. of Revision (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 479, 678 N.E.2d 932, the BTA sua sponte 
issued an order for Lakeside to show cause why it should not order the complaint 
filed on Lakeside’s behalf to be dismissed by the BOR.  As a result of the 
responses received from the parties, a hearing was scheduled by the BTA.  
However, the parties agreed to waive the hearing and to have the case decided 
upon the existing record, and stipulated the following: 
 
 
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1.  Legal title to the real property is in the name of Lakeside Avenue 
Limited Partnership. 
 
2.  Steven Kimmelman is a limited partner of Lakeside with a two-percent 
interest. 
 
3.  The sole general partner of Lakeside is Lakeside Avenue, Inc., an Ohio 
corporation. 
 
4.  Steven Kimmelman is not an officer, director, or shareholder of Lakeside 
Avenue, Inc. 
 
5.  Steven Kimmelman is not a lawyer. 
 
6.  Steven Kimmelman signed the valuation complaint. 
 
Also submitted were copies of Lakeside’s limited partnership agreement, 
the articles of incorporation of Lakeside Avenue, Inc., and a listing of its 
shareholders.  An affidavit signed by Steven Kimmelman stated that he signed the 
complaint “as a partner and owner of the property.” 
 
The BTA found that Kimmelman was not an “owner” (R.C. 5715.19[A][1]) 
or “a party affected” (R.C. 5715.13) and that, therefore, the BOR was without 
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the complaint.  Accordingly, the BTA 
remanded the cause to the BOR with instructions to dismiss the complaint. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Todd W. Sleggs & Associates, Todd W. Sleggs and Susan K. French-Scaggs, 
for appellant. 
 
William Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and David 
Lambert, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Cuyahoga County Board 
of Revision and Cuyahoga County Auditor. 
 
 
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Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker Co., L.P.A., and Karrie M. Kalail, 
for appellee Cleveland Board of Education. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In Sharon Village Ltd. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision (1997), 
78 Ohio St.3d 479, 678 N.E.2d 932, syllabus, we held that the preparation and 
filing of a real property valuation complaint with a board of revision on behalf of a 
taxpayer constituted the practice of law.  Because the tax agent who prepared and 
filed the complaint in Sharon Village was not an attorney, we affirmed the BTA’s 
decision that the board of revision lacked jurisdiction to hear the complaint. 
 
Lakeside contends that Sharon Village does not apply to this matter because 
the complaint was signed by a partner and owner of the partnership property, and 
not by an agent.  Lakeside argues that Kimmelman, as a limited partner, is an 
owner of the real property and acted as a taxpayer and owner of the partnership 
when he signed the complaint.  In making that argument, Lakeside attempts to 
meet the requirement of R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) that restricts the filing of a complaint 
to persons “owning taxable real property in the county.”  We disagree. 
 
In considering Lakeside’s contention, we must first determine whether 
Kimmelman, as a limited partner, is an owner of Lakeside’s real property.  
Lakeside’s contention that Kimmelman is an owner of its real property is based 
primarily upon R.C. 1775.05(A) and 1775.24(A).  R.C. 1775.05(A) provides that 
“[a] partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners 
a business for profit.”  R.C. 1775.24(A) provides that “[a] partner is co-owner with 
his partners of specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership.” 
 
Those statutes fail to provide support for Lakeside’s contention because 
they are taken from R.C. Chapter 1775, which is applicable to partnerships, and 
not to limited partnerships.  We are aware that R.C. 1775.05(B) provides that 
 
 
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certain of the provisions of R.C. Chapter 1775 are applicable to “limited 
partnerships except in so far as the statutes related to such partnerships are 
inconsistent herewith.”  However, the statutes from R.C. Chapter 1775 cited by 
Lakeside are inconsistent with the relevant statutes applicable to limited 
partnerships contained in R.C. Chapter 1782. 
 
R.C. 1782.24(A) permits a general partner of a limited partnership to 
possess all the rights and powers and liabilities of a partner in a partnership 
without limited partners; but no similar rights and powers are granted to limited 
partners in R.C. Chapter 1782.  See Evans v. Galardi (1976), 16 Cal.3d 300, 128 
Cal.Rptr. 25, 546 P.2d 313, in which the California Supreme Court stated, “This 
unwillingness on the part of the Legislature to grant the limited partner a property 
interest in the specific assets owned by the partnership, while at the same time 
providing for such an interest in the general partner, compels the conclusion that 
the limited partner has no interest in the partnership property by virtue of his status 
as a limited partner.”  Id. at 307, 128 Cal.Rptr. at 31, 546 P.2d at 319.  Thus, no 
ownership rights to Lakeside’s real property are granted to Kimmelman as a 
limited partner by any provision of R.C. Chapter 1782. 
 
Likewise, a review of Lakeside’s limited partnership agreement fails to 
substantiate Lakeside’s contention that Kimmelman is an owner.  In fact, Section 
6.2(a) of the limited partnership agreement specifically provides, “No Limited 
Partner shall have the right: (a) * * * to sign for or to bind the Partnership, such 
power being vested in the General Partner.” 
 
Thus, neither the limited partnership provisions of R.C. Chapter 1782 nor 
the contractual provisions of the limited partnership agreement grant Kimmelman 
the requisite interest to establish him as an owner of Lakeside’s real property. 
 
 
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Since Kimmelman was not an attorney and owned no interest in the real 
property, our decision in Sharon Village requires that the cause be remanded to the 
BOR for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.  Given our decision, we need not 
consider Lakeside’s contention that Kimmelman was a “party affected” within the 
meaning of R.C. 5715.13. 
 
Lakeside also contends that our decision in Sharon Village should not apply 
to its complaint that was filed before our decision in Sharon Village.  We disagree. 
 
In State ex rel. Bosch v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 94, 98, 1 OBR 
130, 133, 438 N.E.2d 415, 418, we stated that “[i]n the absence of a specific 
provision in a decision declaring its application to be prospective only, * * * the 
decision shall be applied retrospectively as well.”  We made no specific provision 
in Sharon Village for it to be applied only prospectively.  Therefore, Sharon 
Village is applicable to all complaints filed prior to and after the date of its 
announcement by this court. 
 
Finally, Lakeside contends that the dismissal of the complaint violates the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions and constitutes a taking.  We disagree and reject Lakeside’s 
contentions. 
 
In N. Olmsted v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 218, 
220, 16 O.O.3d 249, 250, 404 N.E.2d 757, 758, fn. 3,  we stated, “Due Process is 
not denied, however, when a person or entity is excluded as a party from a 
proceeding solely because of a failure to comply with statutes governing 
procedural requirements.”  The failure to invoke the jurisdiction of the BOR in 
this case was due to Lakeside’s failure to comply with the requirements set forth in 
R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) and not by actions of the state. 
 
 
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In Walston v. Nevin (1888), 128 U.S. 578, 582, 9 S.Ct. 192, 193, 32 L.Ed. 
544, 546, the court stated concerning equal protection of the law: “Whenever the 
law operates alike on all persons and property, similarly situated, equal protection 
cannot be said to be denied.” Lakeside presented no evidence that it was treated 
differently from any other limited partnership whose complaint was filed by a 
nonattorney. 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, the decision of the BTA was reasonable and 
lawful and is therefore affirmed. 
Decision affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur separately. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring.  I write separately to distinguish the 
case at bar from Worthington City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 156, 707 N.E.2d 499, decided today, in which I 
dissented in part.  In Worthington, my disagreement was because I would have 
found that if a taxpayer representing himself or herself has the right to file a 
complaint, as indicated by Sharon Village Ltd. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision 
(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 479, 678 N.E.2d 932, so should a board of education and a 
corporation representing themselves in a pro se capacity, because they fall within 
the statutory definition of “person” as used in R.C. 5715.19(A)(1).  See 
Worthington, 85 Ohio St.3d at 163-164, 707 N.E.2d at 505.  In Worthington, I 
emphasized that I would distinguish Sharon Village because it should be limited to 
third-party agents who have no connection with the landowner other “ ‘than 
 
 
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representation seeking tax reduction, to solicit and file applications pursuant to 
R.C. 5715.13 with a county board of revision.’ ”  Id., 85 Ohio St.3d at 165, 707 
N.E.2d at 505, quoting Krier v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1993), 100 Ohio 
App.3d 344, 351, 654 N.E.2d 122, 127. 
 
In this case, while I would find that a general partner should be permitted to 
file the valuation complaint pursuant to my analysis in Worthington, I agree with 
the majority’s conclusion that a limited partner, such as Kimmelman, may not.  As 
a limited partner, Kimmelman was not an owner of the partnership property 
because, as noted by the majority, no ownership rights are granted to a limited 
partner by R.C. Chapter 1782.  Therefore, he did not own taxable real property in 
the county as required by R.C. 5715.19(A)(1), nor did he fit within the statutory 
definition that would allow him to file on behalf of the partnership.  Accordingly, I 
agree with the Board of Tax Appeals’ decision that Kimmelman was not an owner 
and, thus, the BOR was without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the 
complaint. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion.