Case Title: State ex rel. Harris v. Turner

Citation: 2020-Ohio-2901

Docket Number: 2019-1228

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Harris v. Turner, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2901.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-2901 
THE STATE EX REL. HARRIS, APPELLANT, v. TURNER, WARDEN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Harris v. Turner, Slip Opinion No.  
2020-Ohio-2901.] 
Habeas corpus—Inmate’s claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus—Court of 
appeals’ dismissal of complaint affirmed. 
(No. 2019-1228—Submitted February 25, 2020—Decided May 13, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Marion County, No. 9-19-25. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Lionel Harris, appeals the judgment of the Third District 
Court of Appeals dismissing his complaint for a writ of habeas corpus against 
appellee, Neil Turner, warden of the North Central Correctional Complex.  We 
affirm. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Background 
{¶ 2} In 1992, a Hamilton County jury found Harris guilty of aggravated 
murder and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison, with eligibility for parole 
in 20 years.  The Adult Parole Authority (“APA”) denied Harris parole in 2005, 
2011, and 2018. 
{¶ 3} In May 2019, Harris filed in the Third District a complaint for a writ 
of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from prison.  In August 2019, the Third 
District dismissed Harris’s complaint for failing to state a cognizable claim in 
habeas corpus. 
{¶ 4} Harris appealed, asserting six propositions of law.  He also filed two 
motions for judicial notice. 
Analysis 
{¶ 5} “To be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, a party must show that he 
is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty, R.C. 2725.01, and that he is entitled to 
immediate release from prison or confinement.”  State ex rel. Cannon v. Mohr, 155 
Ohio St.3d 213, 2018-Ohio-4184, 120 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 10.  “In general, habeas relief 
is available when the sentencing court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.”  Smith v. 
May, ___ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-61, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 14. 
Proposition of Law Nos. 1 and 2 
{¶ 6} In support of his first and second propositions of law, Harris asserts 
that the Third District erred in dismissing his complaint because his sentence is 
void, the APA lacked jurisdiction to extend his void sentence, and challenging a 
void sentence is cognizable in habeas corpus.  According to Harris, his sentence is 
void because the trial court failed to impose a statutorily mandated term.  In 1992, 
R.C. 2929.03(A) required a trial court to impose a life sentence “with parole 
eligibility after serving twenty years” for an aggravated-murder conviction.  
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 9.  Harris’s sentencing entry, 
however, states that he was sentenced to life imprisonment with “[e]ligibility for 
January Term, 2020 
 
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parole in twenty (20) years.”  (Emphasis added.)  Harris argues that there is a 
difference between the words “after” and “in” and that under the terms of his 
sentence, he was eligible for parole within 20 years of serving his life sentence, 
rather than after serving 20 years. 
{¶ 7} We find no difference between the sentence required by the statute 
and the sentence Harris received; therefore, as the Third District concluded, the 
alleged discrepancy between the trial court’s use of “in” and the statutory reference 
to “after” does not render Harris’s sentence void.  Regardless, in general, 
“ ‘sentencing errors are not jurisdictional and thus are not cognizable in habeas 
corpus.’ ”  Dunkle v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 148 Ohio St.3d 621, 2017-Ohio-551, 
71 N.E.3d 1098, ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. O’Neal v. Bunting, 140 Ohio St.3d 339, 
2014-Ohio-4037, 18 N.E.3d 430, ¶ 13.  And even if Harris could establish that his 
sentence is contrary to law, his remedy would be correction of his sentencing entry 
rather than his immediate release from prison, especially considering that his 
maximum sentence is life imprisonment. 
Proposition of Law No. 3 
{¶ 8} As Harris’s third proposition of law, he argues that the Third District 
misconstrued one of the allegations in his complaint and therefore applied the 
wrong standard of review in dismissing it.  Specifically, in his complaint, Harris 
alleged that the judgment of conviction in his case is not a final, appealable order 
pursuant to Crim.R. 32(C).  The Third District concluded that this claim “is not 
properly raised in an action for [a] writ of habeas corpus.”  On appeal, Harris asserts 
that he never alleged that the trial court’s failure to issue a final, appealable order 
entitled him to habeas relief.  Rather, he claims that he raised this issue to establish 
that he lacked an adequate remedy at law for the other claims in his complaint. 
{¶ 9} Even if Harris is correct—and he did not raise the lack of a final, 
appealable order as an independent ground for habeas relief—the fact that he raised 
one fewer basis for relief in his complaint than that identified in the Third District’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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decision does not undermine the appellate court’s conclusion that he failed to state 
a cognizable claim in habeas corpus. 
Proposition of Law No. 4 
{¶ 10} As his fourth proposition of law, Harris claims that the Third District 
lacked jurisdiction to dismiss his complaint because the court never served it on 
Turner and Turner never entered an appearance.  “But R.C. Chapter 2725 prescribes 
a summary procedure for instituting a habeas corpus action, which does not require 
service of the petition prior to dismissal if the petition does not contain a facially 
valid claim.”  State ex rel. Carrion v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 80 Ohio St.3d 637, 
638, 687 N.E.2d 759 (1998).  As noted above, the Third District dismissed Harris’s 
complaint because on its face, it failed to state a cognizable claim in habeas corpus. 
Proposition of Law Nos. 5 and 6 
{¶ 11} As his fifth and sixth propositions of law, Harris alleges that the 
Third District erred in summarily dismissing his complaint because he had included 
uncontested evidence demonstrating that (1) Judge Donald L. Schott, a retired judge 
who presided over Harris’s 1992 trial, did not have a certificate of assignment and 
(2) at the time of Harris’s trial, Judge Schott’s judicial commission included forged 
signatures and was therefore invalid.  According to Harris, absent a certificate of 
assignment or valid commission, Judge Schott was not an actual judge and lacked 
jurisdiction to render judgment. 
{¶ 12} With his complaint, Harris filed a letter from the Hamilton County 
Clerk of Courts confirming that Harris’s trial-court record does not contain an entry 
assigning Judge Schott to Harris’s case.  He also filed a report from a purported 
handwriting expert who compared the signature of the former governor on a 1982 
session law to that governor’s signature on Judge Schott’s 1982 commission.  The 
expert concluded that the signatures on the two documents were written by two 
different hands.  The expert did not conclude, however, that the governor’s 
signature on Judge Schott’s commission was forged.  Harris appears to have come 
January Term, 2020 
 
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to that conclusion based on his own speculation.  “Unsupported conclusions 
contained in a habeas corpus petition are not considered admitted and are 
insufficient to withstand dismissal.”  Chari v. Vore, 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 328, 744 
N.E.2d 763 (2001). 
{¶ 13} Moreover, “[l]ike other extraordinary-writ actions, habeas corpus is 
not available when there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”  In 
re Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Goeller, 103 Ohio St.3d 427, 2004-
Ohio-5579, 816 N.E.2d 594, ¶ 6.  “[A] claim of improper assignment of a judge can 
generally be adequately raised by way of appeal.”  State ex rel. Key v. Spicer, 91 
Ohio St.3d 469, 470, 746 N.E.2d 1119 (2001).  There is an exception to the 
adequate-remedy requirement: “ ‘when a court’s judgment is void because it lacked 
jurisdiction, habeas is still an appropriate remedy despite the availability of 
appeal.’ ”  Leyman v. Bradshaw, 146 Ohio St.3d 522, 2016-Ohio-1093, 59 N.E.3d 
1236, ¶ 9, quoting Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282 
(1995), overruled on other grounds, Smith, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-61, __ 
N.E.3d __, at ¶ 29.  But even if Judge Schott were somehow improperly assigned, 
“[i]n a court that possesses subject-matter jurisdiction, procedural irregularities in 
the transfer of a case to a visiting judge affect the court’s jurisdiction over the 
particular case and render the judgment voidable, not void.”  In re J.J., 111 Ohio 
St.3d 205, 2006-Ohio-5484, 855 N.E.2d 851, paragraph one of the syllabus; see 
also State v. Baumgartner, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-03-013, 2004-Ohio-3907, ¶ 11 
(“even if the certificate of assignment was entirely absent from a case record, it 
would not void the jurisdiction of the court or [the visiting judge’s] authority to 
issue judgments and orders”). 
{¶ 14} Harris has not alleged facts sufficient to establish that the trial court 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.  And because Harris had an adequate remedy to 
challenge the assignment of Judge Schott, the Third District correctly rejected this 
claim. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 15} Having rejected Harris’s propositions of law, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Motions for Judicial Notice 
{¶ 16} In December 2019, Harris filed a motion requesting that this court 
take judicial notice under Evid.R. 201(D) of the transcript of his 1992 sentencing.  
“Under Evid.R. 201, a court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts, ‘i.e., the 
facts of the case.’ ”  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Deters, 148 Ohio St.3d 
595, 2016-Ohio-8195, 71 N.E.3d 1076, ¶ 16.  Evid.R. 201 is not a mechanism to 
add to the record a transcript that an appellant failed to submit in the court below.  
A reviewing court generally may not add matter to the record before it and then 
decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.  See State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio 
St.2d 402, 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus.  Harris’s request 
is therefore denied. 
{¶ 17} In January 2020, Harris filed a second motion for judicial notice, 
requesting that this court take judicial notice of (1) the “demonstrably false” 
assertions in Turner’s merit brief, (2) the Third District’s alleged failure to resolve 
all the claims asserted in his habeas complaint, and (3) prison officials’ alleged  
retaliation against him.  But “[t]he only facts subject to judicial notice are those that 
are ‘not subject to reasonable dispute.’ ”  State ex rel. Arnold v. Gallagher, 153 
Ohio St.3d 234, 2018-Ohio-2628, 103 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 31, quoting Evid.R. 201(B).  
Harris requests us to take judicial notice of several disputed facts and legal 
conclusions.  We therefore also deny his second motion. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Lionel Harris, pro se. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Jerri L. Fosnaught, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
_________________