Case Title: Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Sharp

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and T.P. Spoon
v. Jonathan SHARP and Aristea Sharp

96-1096                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered October 9, 1997


1.   Motions -- directed verdict -- standard of review. -- The
     standard of review of the denial of a motion for a directed
     verdict is whether the jury's verdict is supported by
     substantial evidence; substantial evidence is defined as
     evidence of sufficient force and character to compel a
     conclusion one way or the other with reasonable certainty; it
     must force the mind to pass beyond suspicion or conjecture;
     when determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the supreme
     court reviews the evidence and all reasonable inferences
     arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the party on
     whose behalf judgment was entered; the weight and value of
     testimony is a matter within the exclusive province of the
     jury. 

2.   Negligence -- prima facie case -- how established. -- To
     establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must
     show that damages were sustained, that the defendant breached
     the standard of care, and that the defendant's actions were
     the proximate cause of the damages. 

3.   Negligence -- railroad breached standard of care -- failed to
     maintain proper lookout. -- Appellee's theory of negligence
     that the railroad failed to maintain a proper lookout under
     Ark. Code Ann.  23-12-907(a)(1) (1987) was supported by
     substantial evidence where the train's engineer testified that
     he could not see appellee's van, and that he did not know that
     the train had struck the van until the brakeman brought it to
     his attention; from this testimony a jury could have concluded
     that the railroad breached the standard of care by failing to
     keep a proper lookout for vehicles entering the crossing. 

4.   Negligence -- proximate cause -- definition of. -- Proximate
     cause is that which in a natural and continuous sequence,
     unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
     injury, and without which the result would not have occurred;
     proximate causation is usually an issue for the jury to
     decide, and when there is evidence to establish a causal
     connection between the negligence of the defendant and the
     damage, it is proper for the case to go to the jury; proximate
     causation becomes a question of law only if reasonable minds
     could not differ.      

5.   Witnesses -- experts -- jury not bound to accept opinion
     testimony as conclusive. -- The jury is not bound to accept
     the opinion testimony of experts as conclusive. 

6.   Negligence -- appellee's damages and railroad's actions --
     substantial evidence of causal connection presented. -- Where
     appellee presented evidence that the railroad might have been
     negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout, the jury could
     have concluded that if the railroad had kept a proper lookout,
     it could have either stopped prior to colliding with
     appellee's van or sounded earlier warnings to notify him of
     the impending danger; appellee presented substantial evidence
     of a causal connection between his damages and the railroad's
     actions.

7.   Negligence -- substantial evidence presented that railroad
     breached standard of care -- breach was proximate cause of
     appellee's injuries -- case properly submitted to jury. --
     Where appellee presented substantial evidence that the
     railroad breached its standard of care, and that this breach
     was the proximate cause of his injuries, the supreme court
     affirmed the trial court's decision to submit the case to the
     jury for resolution.

8.   Jury -- instructions -- Sudden Emergency instruction applied
     in pre-Wiles cases -- this such a case. -- Although Wiles v.
     Webb, 329 Ark. 108, 946 S.W.2d 685 (1997), abolished the use
     of the Sudden Emergency instruction in all future cases, it
     remained applicable to cases, such as this one, that were
     tried before the Wiles decision was handed down on June 16,
     1997; in "pre-Wiles" cases, the old rule that the Sudden
     Emergency instruction may not be given where there is any
     evidence that the party requesting the instruction was
     negligent in creating the emergency situation is applicable.

9.   Appeal & error -- giving or failing to give instruction --
     party must object thereto at time instruction given. -- No
     party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an
     instruction unless he objects thereto before or at the time
     the instruction is given, stating distinctly the matter to
     which he objects and the grounds of his objection. 

10.  Appeal & error -- giving of instruction -- appellant's
     objection timely -- grounds for objection stated -- issue
     properly preserved for review. -- Where the appellant
     railroad's initial objection to the giving of the Sudden
     Emergency instruction was a verbatim recitation of the notes
     commenting on AMI 614, the railroad enumerated evidence of
     appellee's negligence, thereby apprising the trial court that
     the instruction should not be given because there was evidence
     that the appellee was negligent in creating the emergency
     situation, and only after considering the railroad's
     references to evidence of appellee's negligence did the trial
     court overrule the objection, the issue was properly preserved
     for appeal.

11.  Jury -- Sudden Emergency instruction -- some evidence of
     negligence existed -- instruction should not have been given -
     - trial court reversed. -- The Sudden Emergency instruction
     should not have been given under the "pre-Wiles" rule because
     there was some evidence from which a jury could have concluded
     that appellee was negligent in creating the emergency
     situation; the trial court erred when it gave the Sudden
     Emergency instruction; trial court's ruling was reversed.

12.  Appeal & error -- closing argument -- appellant failed to ask
     for affirmative relief -- issue not preserved for appeal. --
     Where appellant objected during appellee's closing argument
     that appellee's counsel had mistated the law, but did not ask
     the court for a limiting instruction or to instruct the jury
     on the federal definition of locomotives or the method by
     which the train must sound its whistle, the issue was not
     preserved for review; in order to preserve this issue for
     appeal, the attorney must ask for and be denied affirmative
     relief such as a mistrial or a limiting instruction. 

13.  Railroads -- Highway Safety Act -- negligence claims --
     participation required to trigger federal preemption. --
     Negligence actions are preempted by the Highway Safety Act
     because 23 C.F.R.  646.214(b)(3) and (4) remove the
     railroad's decision-making authority to determine what type of
     warning devices are needed at a particular crossing; by
     providing funds the federal government has implicitly approved
     the states' improvement plans and their determinations of
     whether a particular crossing requires automatic gates and
     lights under 23 C.F.R.  646.214(b)(3); the fact that federal
     funds participated in the installation of the warning devices
     legally presupposed that the Secretary approved and authorized
     the expenditure, which in turn legally presupposed that the
     Secretary determined that the safety devices installed were
     adequate to their task; once warning devices paid for with
     federal funds are installed and operating, the railroad's
     common-law duty of care ceases, and it is entitled to the
     benefit of federal preemption. 

14.  Railroads -- appellee's claim preempted by federal law --
     summary judgment affirmed. -- There was no error in the trial
     court's finding that federal funding of improvements at the
     crossing pursuant to the Highway Safety Act preempted
     appellee's claim that the railroad was negligent in failing to
     install adequate warning devices; by providing federal funds,
     FHWA implicitly determined that the Arkansas State Highway
     Commission's plan for the installation of crossbucks at the
     street crossing was adequate to its task pursuant to 23 C.F.R.
      109(e), 630.114(b), and 646.214(b); the trial court's
     ruling that appellee's claim that the railroad failed to place
     adequate warning devices at the crossing was preempted by
     federal law was affirmed.

15.  Railroads -- Highway Safety Act -- claims that railroad
     negligent in failing to maintain warning devices at crossing
     not preempted. -- The Highway Safety Act does not preempt
     claims that a railroad was negligent in failing to maintain
     warning devices at a crossing; 23 C.F.R.  646.214(b) deals
     with the design and installation of new warning devices, not
     the maintenance of those devices; thus, while the Highway
     Safety Act preempts a claim that the railroad failed to
     install adequate warning devices, it does not preempt a claim
     that the railroad was negligent in failing to maintain the
     warning devices implicitly approved by the FHWA.

16.  Motions -- directed-verdict motion properly granted --
     appellee failed to present proof on railroad's negligence. --
     The trial court properly granted the railroad a directed
     verdict on appellee's claim that the railroad was negligent in
     failing to maintain the crossbucks at the street crossing
     where appellee failed to present any proof that the railroad
     was negligent in this respect; the trial court's ruling was
     affirmed.


     Appeal from Lee Circuit Court; Harvey L. Yates, Judge;
reversed and remanded on direct appeal; affirmed on cross appeal.
     William H. Sutton, Frederick S. Ursery , Scott H. Tucker, &
Clifford W. Plunkett, for appellants.
     Epley, Epley & France, Ltd., by:  Lewis E. Epley, Jr. and Tim
S. Parker, for appellees.
     Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association, by:  Henry C. Kinslow,
amicus curiae.
     Barrett & Deacon, by:  J.C. Deacon and D.P. Marshall, Jr.,
amicus curiae, for Association of American Railroads, on cross-
appeal.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.
     This is a negligence action involving a collision at a
railroad crossing in Marianna.  The appellants, Union Pacific
Railroad Company and T.P. Spoon ("the railroad"), appeal a jury
verdict rendered against them.  The appellees, Jonathan and
Aristea Sharp ("Sharp"), cross-appeal the trial court's entry of
partial summary judgment in favor of the railroad on the issue of
whether the railroad placed adequate warning devices at the
crossing.  We reverse the jury verdict, and affirm the partial
summary judgment. 
     On February 15, 1993, Jonathan Sharp was driving a van owned
by his mother, Aristea Sharp, when he collided with a Union
Pacific train at the Louisiana Street railroad crossing in
Marianna.  The accident occurred in the afternoon, and the
streets were wet from an earlier rain.  Union Pacific's train was
being pulled by two locomotives.  The lead locomotive was
operated by engineer T.P. Spoon who was on the right side of the
train and brakeman Steve Tyler who was on the left side of the
train where the impact occurred.  The second locomotive was
unoccupied.  The only warning device at the railroad crossing was
a single crossbuck which was installed in the early 1980's
pursuant to a safety program funded by the federal government.   
     Sharp filed a negligence action against the railroad
alleging that it failed to place adequate warning devices at the
crossing, failed to maintain the warning devices, failed to
properly sound audible warnings, and failed to keep a proper
lookout for vehicles entering the crossing.  Prior to trial,
the court granted the railroad partial summary judgment on the
issue of whether it placed adequate warning devices at the
crossing because it found that the claim was preempted by federal
law.  The case proceeded to trial on Sharp's remaining negligence
theories.
     At trial, Sharp admitted that he was aware of the railroad
crossing because he had passed over it four or five times the day
of the accident.  Sharp, however, claimed that he did not know
that a train was entering the crossing at the time of the
accident because his view was obstructed, and the train failed to
sound its audible warning devices.  Sharp further explained that
he applied his brakes when he saw the train approximately sixty-
two feet from the crossing, but that he was unable to stop before
the front end of his van collided with the left side of the
train.  In contrast, the train operators testified that they
sounded the whistle in a series of two long, one short, and one
long blasts, and that they were unable to see Sharp's vehicle
prior to impact.  
                          Direct Appeal
                 I.  Sufficiency of the Evidence

     For its first argument on appeal, the railroad asserts that
the trial court erred when it denied its motion for a directed
verdict on Sharp's negligence claim.  Our standard of review of
the denial of a motion for a directed verdict is whether the
jury's verdict is supported by substantial evidence.  Ouachita
Wilderness Institute, Inc. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997); Balentine v. Sparkman, 327 Ark. 180, 937 S.W.2d 647
(1997).  Substantial evidence is defined as "evidence of
sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one way or
the other with reasonable certainty; it must force the mind to
pass beyond suspicion or conjecture."  Esry v. Carden, 328 Ark.
153, 942 S.W.2d 846 (1997).  When determining the sufficiency of
the evidence, we review the evidence and all reasonable
inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the
party on whose behalf judgment was entered.  Id.  In such
situations, the weight and value of testimony is a matter within
the exclusive province of the jury.  Id.
     To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff
must show that damages were sustained, that the defendant
breached the standard of care, and that the defendant's actions
were the proximate cause of the damages.  See Ouachita
Wilderness, supra; Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. v. Allen,
326 Ark. 1023, 934 S.W.2d 527 (1996).  The parties do not contest
that Sharp suffered damages as a result of the collision.  Hence,
the relevant inquiry on appeal is whether Sharp presented
substantial evidence that the railroad breached the standard of
care, and that this breach was the proximate cause of his
damages.
                A. Breach of the Standard of Care
     At trial, Sharp argued that the railroad was negligent in
failing to keep a proper lookout and failing to properly sound
its audible warnings.  Because the jury rendered a general
verdict of negligence, it is impossible to determine whether the
jury found that the railroad was negligent in one or both
respects.  Hence, we must affirm if there is sufficient evidence
to support either theory of negligence.
     Sharp's first theory of negligence was that the railroad 
failed to maintain a proper lookout under Ark. Code Ann.  23-12-
907(a)(1) (1987) which states that:
     It shall be the duty of all persons running trains in
     this state upon any railroad to keep a constant lookout
     for all persons, including licensees and trespassers,
     and property upon the track of any and all railroads. 
During Sharp's case-in-chief, the train's engineer, T.P. Spoon,
testified that he could not see Sharp's van, and that he did not
know that the train had struck the van until the brakeman brought
it to his attention.  We find that from this testimony, a jury
could have concluded that the railroad breached the standard of
care by failing to keep a proper lookout for vehicles entering
the Louisiana Street crossing.  Because we find that Sharp
presented substantial evidence that the railroad was negligent in
failing to maintain a proper lookout, it is unnecessary to
address whether he presented substantial evidence that the
railroad was also negligent in failing to properly sound its
audible warnings.  
                     B.  Proximate Causation
     The railroad next argues that the trial court should have
granted a directed verdict because there was insubstantial
evidence that the railroad's negligence was the proximate cause
of Sharp's injuries.  We have previously defined proximate cause
as "that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred."  Ouachita, supra;
Craig v. Traylor, 323 Ark. 363, 915 S.W.2d 257 (1996).  Proximate
causation is usually an issue for the jury to decide, and when
there is evidence to establish a causal connection between the
negligence of the defendant and the damage, it is proper for the
case to go to the jury. Ouachita, supra; Tyson Foods Inc. v.
Adams, 326 Ark. 300, 930 S.W.2d 374 (1996); McGraw v. Weeks, 326
Ark. 285, 930 S.W.2d 365 (1996).  In other words, proximate
causation becomes a question of law only if reasonable minds
could not differ.  Ouachita, supra; Tyson, supra.    
     As mentioned previously, Sharp presented evidence that the
railroad might have been negligent in failing to keep a proper
lookout.  The jury could have concluded that if the railroad had
kept a proper lookout, it could have either stopped prior to
colliding with Sharp's van or sounded earlier warnings to notify
Sharp of the impending danger.  The railroad argues that Archie
Burnham's testimony unequivocally established that the train
could not have stopped when it was first able to see Sharp's
vehicle.  We, however, have previously explained that the jury is
not bound to accept the opinion testimony of experts as
conclusive. Dixon Ticonderoga Co. v. Winburn Title Mfg. Co., 324
Ark. 266, 920 S.W.2d 829 (1996); Burns v. State, 323 Ark. 206,
913 S.W.2d 789 (1996); Bowen v. State, 322 Ark. 483,