Case Title: State v. Hoffman

Citation: 171 Kan. 116, 229 P.2d 768

Docket Number: 38,273

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1951-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
171 Kan. 116 (1951)
229 P.2d 768
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant,
v.
HARRY H. HOFFMAN, Appellee.
No. 38,273

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 7, 1951.
John R. Alden, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Harold R. Fatzer, attorney general, John Fontron, county attorney, and Fred C. Preble, of Hutchinson, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
No appearance was made for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WEDELL, J.:
This was a prosecution under what is commonly referred to as the demand portion of our embezzlement statute, G.S. 1949, 21-545, which reads:
Four counts of the amended information were framed in a similar manner. We need, therefore, consider only the first count. It reads:
Defendant's motion to quash the amended information which the district court sustained was:
The exact theory upon which the court sustained the motion is not reflected by the record. Appellee has filed no brief. Appellant contends the question is whether it is possible to commit a public offense in Kansas under the demand portion of this statute where an agent converts funds of his principal to his own use in this state and a demand for the delivery thereof is made on the agent in another state. We do not think the real question presented is whether it is possible to state a public offense under those circumstances but rather whether this particular information actually charges such an offense.
The theory upon which the district court sustained the motion to quash not being disclosed by the record we shall briefly consider the state's contention as stated. If the question presented to the district court was that stated by appellant we unhesitatingly say an accused cannot flee from this state, thereby preventing service of demand on him within the state, and thus circumvent prosecution for embezzlement under this portion of the statute. If an accused were permitted to do so he could easily nullify the true purpose and intent of the statute by flight from the state.
*118 True, we have held a demand is a prerequisite to a prosecution under this portion of the statute. (State v. Rush, 138 Kan. 465, 469, 26 P.2d 581; State v. Evans, 143 Kan. 29, 53 P.2d 789; State v. Rehg, 157 Kan. 203, 215, 139 P.2d 838, and cases therein cited.) In State v. Rush, supra, we also said the essence of the offense denounced by the concluding portion of the statute was the failure or refusal to pay or to deliver to the principal, on demand, money or property coming into the hands of the agent by virtue of his employment.
The effect of a demand outside of the state presents a question of first impression in this state. None of our previous cases dealt with such a demand. There is respectable authority that proof of demand is not necessary where a defendant has become a fugitive from the state and that in such a situation the state may prove the conversion otherwise than by demand and refusal. (Kossakowski v. The People, 177 Ill. 563, 53 N.E. 115 and Agar v. State, 176 Ind. 234, 94 N.E. 819, in which are cited cases from various other jurisdictions; Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th ed., § 493.) In such cases it is held the venue may be laid in the state and county where the accused was under obligation to account. In the instant case we need not determine whether a demand was necessary as it was made.
It is true that in State v. Evans, supra, we said:
The foregoing statement in the Evans case does not purport to preclude a prosecution in this state when the accused has filed its jurisdiction. In the Evans case the accused was under duty to account in Montgomery county and a formal demand was there made on him and refused. It was held that a mere previous request of the defendant in Grant county where he resided "to tell and itemize what [he] had done with that money" did not deprive the district court of Montgomery county of jurisdiction.
We think where an accused has fled from this state, making a demand on him within it impossible, the venue may be laid in the *119 county of this state where it was his duty to account and where he breached that duty. Whether the venue might also be laid in some other county of this state, under the provisions of G.S. 1949, 62-407, which reads,
need not be determined now.
We now turn to the amended information to determine whether in view of the foregoing conclusion the information charges a public offense was committed in Reno county. We think it does not. The information does not actually allege the accused came into possession of the funds in Reno county on or about the sixth day of June, 1949. Of course, the funds actually may not have come into his possession in that county and this may account for a failure to so allege. But irrespective of where the funds may have come into his possession the information fails to allege the accused was under obligation to account for the balance due in Reno county, when under his agency agreement he was required to account and that he breached his duty to do so. The information appears to allege the offense was committed in the state of California on August 26, 1949, the date on which the demand was there made. The demand although otherwise a prerequisite to a prosecution under the statute does not determine venue where the defendant by fleeing from the state makes service of demand on him within this state impossible. We think the motion to quash was properly sustained.
The judgment is affirmed.