Case Title: Mitchell v. Brooks

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1170490

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: March 22, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2018-2019
____________________
1170490
____________________
Teresa Elizabeth Mitchell and Steve E. Allen, as personal
representatives of the Estate of Gayron E. Brooks, deceased
v.
David A. Brooks
Appeal from Marshall Circuit Court
(CV-16-900251)
MITCHELL, Justice.
This case contests the validity of a property deed that
was executed by Gayron E. Brooks in the weeks before her death
from lung cancer.  The deed conveyed her house in Boaz to her
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husband of 18 years, David A. Brooks.  Following Gayron's
death, her adult children, Teresa Elizabeth Mitchell and 
Steve
E. Allen, as personal representatives of Gayron's estate, sued
David in the Marshall Circuit Court.  Teresa and Steve
alleged, among other things, that David held a dominant
position over Gayron and that he had unduly influenced her to
sign the deed.
After a four-day nonjury trial, the trial court entered
a judgment in favor of David.  This appeal followed.  For the
reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
Teresa and Steve are Gayron's only children, both from
her first marriage.  In April 1996 –– some time after her
first marriage had ended –– Gayron purchased a house and
approximately nine acres in Boaz that she titled solely in her
name.  Gayron thereafter used the Boaz house as her primary
residence.
On April 11, 1997, Gayron married David.  They thereafter
resided in the Boaz house together until Gayron's death.  A
prenuptial agreement executed by Gayron and David provided
that all real or personal property owned by either party
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before the marriage was to remain his or her separate
property. 
 
The 
prenuptial agreement also 
specifically 
provided
that the parties did not intend for the agreement "to limit or
restrict in any way the right and power to receive any such
transfer or conveyance from the other."
In January 2001, Gayron executed a will giving David the
right to live in the Boaz house following her death until such
time as he remarried or otherwise began living with another
woman; at that time, or upon David's death, the Boaz house
would become the property of Teresa and Steve.  In November
2007, Gayron had a different attorney prepare a draft of a new
will that contained a substantially similar provision, giving
David a limited right to live in the Boaz house following her
death.  Gayron, however, never executed that will.  
On May 14, 2015, Gayron was diagnosed with end-stage lung
cancer and given a prognosis of approximately six months to
live.  She elected not to pursue traditional chemotherapy and
radiation 
treatments 
and 
instead 
pursued 
alternative
treatments at a clinic in Mexico.  She also began estate
planning in earnest and decided to sell the successful mulch
business that she owned and at which David worked.  In
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approximately July 2015, David located a buyer willing to pay
$1,425,000 for the business.  Gayron, however, decided instead
to sell the business to Steve for $1,000,000, to be paid in
monthly installments.  David testified that it was around this
same time that Gayron separately told both Steve and him that
David would receive the Boaz house after her death. 1
On July 27, 2015, Gayron, upon the recommendation of her
accountant Jerry Rowe, met with Charles Hare, an attorney who
had previously assisted her with legal matters related to the
mulch business.  Hare testified that Gayron told him at that
meeting that she wanted to execute a new will but that she did
not know yet what dispositions she wanted to make. 
Ultimately, Hare stated, they agreed that Gayron would revoke
the January 2001 will that day –– which she did –– and that
she would finalize and execute a new will after she returned
from an upcoming trip to Mexico. 
Gayron met with Hare again in mid-September 2015.  Rowe,
David, and Steve were also at this meeting.  Both Hare and
Rowe testified at trial that Gayron stated during this meeting
1Steve acknowledged that at some point he told David that
Gayron wanted David to have the Boaz house, but he testified
that he did so just to "get [David] off my back."
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that she wanted David to have the Boaz house.  They both
stated, however, that Gayron still was not ready to finalize
her estate arrangements.  Hare testified that in all of his
conversations with Gayron she consistently said that "she
wanted to be fair to David" but that she did not want her
assets to eventually go to his children from a previous
marriage.  Hare also testified that Gayron generally did not
like to talk about estate planning when David was present and
that, when David was around, she would steer the conversation
toward business matters.
Teresa testified that, around this same mid-September
time frame, she was also having discussions with Gayron about
Gayron's estate planning and that Gayron would sometimes
instruct Teresa to write notes regarding their conversations. 
Teresa stated that at other times she would write notes of her
own accord following her discussions with Gayron.  In one
undated note, which Teresa said was written during this time
frame and which Teresa captioned, "Notes from Teresa to Mom,"
Teresa wrote:  "If David is going to get the house (& land it
sits on) please have it put in writing that Steve or I get
first chance at buying it if he decides to sell it."  In
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another undated note, which Teresa said was written at this
same approximate time, Teresa wrote:  "Mom said if David gets
home you get 17 acres deeded to you."2  Yet another note,
which Teresa remembered writing during this time at Gayron's
direction, stated:  "Mom wants David to have:  1. House & land
it sits on [and] 2. Land on Legion Rd (16+ acres)."  In a
final note, which Teresa stated was probably written closer to
the end of September, Teresa wrote that David had told Gayron
that he did not want the Boaz house because of the upkeep
associated with the property; that Gayron was relieved and had
stated that she would instead give the house to Teresa; and
that David was satisfied with her giving the house to Teresa. 
At trial, David denied ever telling Gayron that he did not
want the Boaz house.
Beginning in September 2015, Gayron started receiving in-
home visits from hospice.  Hospice records from this period
show that Gayron repeatedly expressed agitation regarding her
estate planning and the discord it was causing within her
family.  On September 28, 2015, Gayron discussed her concerns
with Amanda Hollingsworth, a hospice social worker, during a
2Gayron and David owned a 17-acre parcel of property
adjacent to the 9-acre parcel on which the Boaz house sat.
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private meeting.  Hollingsworth's notes from that meeting
indicate that Gayron was worried about what she was going to
do with her estate and whether she was going "to ruin her
family by leaving them the amount of money that she would be
leaving them."  Hollingsworth further noted that Gayron stated
that "she did not mind that her husband have the house, but
she did not want him to have all the land."  Hollingsworth
wrote that she encouraged Gayron to speak with an attorney. 
Gayron told Hollingsworth that she would be meeting with Hare
soon.
Subsequently, on October 1, 2015, Gayron went to Hare's
office with Teresa and Steve to finalize a new will.  Hare
testified that they talked about her assets and that Gayron
again expressed that she wanted to take care of David but that
she did not want her assets ultimately to go to David's
children.  Hare testified that, after much discussion about
the Boaz house, Gayron eventually decided that she would let
David live in the house for one year after her death and that
Teresa and Steve would take ownership of the house after the
expiration of that one-year period.3  In accordance with
3Hare also noted that, at one point, he and another
attorney in his law firm met with Gayron away from Teresa and
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Gayron's desire, Hare prepared a will providing that, upon
Gayron's death, David would receive "the right to live in and
enjoy [the Boaz house] for a period of one (1) year after
[Gayron's] death," so long as he agreed to pay the necessary
taxes and insurance premiums and to reasonably maintain the
property during that year.  Gayron executed the new will that
same day.
Hare, Teresa, and Steve all testified at trial that
Gayron became emotional after executing the new will and that
she did not want to go home to David but wished to check into
the hospice facility.4  Teresa accordingly took Gayron to the
hospice facility, where Gayron was admitted.  Hospice records
indicate that Gayron told Hollingsworth at that time that she
had changed her will and that she was afraid that David would
be upset when he found out.  Gayron explained to Hollingsworth
that she just wanted to "stay for a few days to allow him to
calm down."  Gayron also told Hollingsworth that she did not
Steve.  Hare stated that Gayron told them during that meeting
that Teresa and Steve were not pressuring her to leave them
assets and that they had accompanied her to Hare's office only
to assist with communication because her voice was weak.
4Gayron had previously been admitted to the hospice
facility for a brief stay on September 23, 2015.
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want David to visit but that he could receive information
about her condition.  
Notwithstanding Gayron's desire to avoid speaking with
David, Hollingsworth encouraged Gayron to let David know that
she was all right.  David testified that Gayron, in fact,
telephoned him later that night and told him that she had been
to see Hare and that she was at the hospice facility.  Gayron
eventually allowed David to visit, and, on October 6, 2015,
she was discharged and David took her home.  David testified
that he did not thereafter attempt to discuss with Gayron her
October 1 meeting with Hare because he assumed any changes she
had made to her estate plan were in accordance with her
previously expressed wishes, including her alleged desire for
him to receive the Boaz house.
For the next month, David continued to care for Gayron at
their home, administering her various medications and
assisting her with meals and other aspects of daily living. 
Hospice personnel continued to make regular home visits at
least weekly, and their records contain no indication that
David mistreated Gayron.  One nurse who regularly visited, in
fact, testified that David was an "excellent" caregiver. 
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Throughout October, Gayron's condition was relatively stable
and the discord within the family lessened to some degree.  
On the night of November 4, 2015, however, Teresa and
Steve visited Gayron and David and an argument ensued.  At
trial, Teresa acknowledged that she was upset with David that
night and that Gayron, at some point during the argument,
defended David, saying that he had been good to her.  David
testified that, after Teresa and Steve left, Gayron was still
emotional and that she eventually volunteered to him that he
was not going to like what was in her will.  David stated
that, when he asked Gayron what she meant, she told him for
the first time that he was not getting the Boaz house.  He
then stated that he told her that he thought she wanted him to
have the house and that she replied that she did.
The next day, November 5, 2015, David contacted a local
attorney, George Barnett, to talk about, as David described it
in an affidavit, "Gayron having made a will that did not
reflect what she had stated on several occasions were her
intentions of giving me the house."  Barnett advised David
that, if Gayron wished to leave him the Boaz house but her
will did not reflect that wish, she could transfer the house
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to him by deed instead.  Barnett advised David to discuss that
possibility with Gayron.  David stated that Gayron agreed that
she wanted to transfer the Boaz house to him by deed and told
him to have Barnett make the necessary arrangements.
On November 7, 2015, Steve was visiting Gayron and David
when Gayron began writing out a list of how she wanted things
handled after her death.  On that list, she included the names
of potential pallbearers as well as songs she wanted sung at
her funeral.  She also made three columns –– one each for
David, Teresa, and Steve –– and listed property she presumably
wanted each of them to have after her death.  The items in
Teresa's column included "jewelry, Jeep, Nissan, [and] cash";
the items in Steve's column included the mulch business, with
instructions that his monthly payments for the business were
to be paid into the "joint account";5 and the items in David's
column included the house, trucks, tractors, and the "joint
account."  When this list was introduced at trial, nobody
disputed that it was in Gayron's handwriting, and Steve even
acknowledged being present when Gayron wrote it.  Steve also
testified, however, that he thought Gayron was writing the
5The only evidence in the record of a joint account is a
bank account that Gayron shared with David.
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list merely to appease David because she had already
memorialized her wishes in the October 2015 will.6
The next day, November 8, 2015, Teresa went to visit
Gayron and David, and, according to David, Gayron shared with
her the list Gayron had made the previous night.  Teresa
subsequently took Gayron to Steve's house so that they could
talk together; it appears that at least one other family
member was present.  Neither Teresa nor Steve remembered
specifics of this conversation with Gayron.  
They acknowledged
at trial, however, that they wanted to talk to Gayron without
David present and that they probably talked about estate
matters.  Steve also testified that Gayron became upset during
their conversation.  Teresa brought Gayron back to the Boaz
house approximately two hours later, and, David testified,
Gayron was angry and agitated upon her return, stating that
"they made me feel like an idiot."  David testified that he
asked Gayron what was wrong, and she told him that, while they
were talking at Steve's house, somebody had said, "I thought
6After this litigation commenced, Teresa produced another
undated list that she had found in Gayron's papers after her
death containing three similar columns.  On this list,
Teresa's column listed "jewelry, Jeep, [and] Nissan"; Steve's
column listed "business"; and David's column listed "house,
trucks, [and] tractors."
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Teresa was going to get the house."  David testified that this
comment "kind of humiliated [Gayron] and made her feel really
stupid.  They made her feel like why are you even here,
basically, this is supposed to be settled."
On November 10, 2015, David returned to Barnett's law
office with the list Gayron had written on November 7 and
information about the Boaz house and property, so that Barnett
could prepare a deed.7  Barnett agreed to prepare the
requested documents and made arrangements to come to the Boaz
house the next day so Gayron could execute the documents.  
On November 11, 2015, Barnett arrived at the Boaz house
for Gayron to execute the deed and other documents.  At trial,
Barnett testified that, when he met Gayron, she confirmed that
she had made the November 7 list and that she wanted to deed
the Boaz house to David.  Barnett further testified that he
explained to Gayron the documents that he had prepared, that
he was confident that she understood them, and that she did
7David told Barnett that Gayron also wanted (1) to revoke
a power of attorney that she had executed in favor of Steve
before she and David went to Mexico for medical treatment; (2)
to execute a new power of attorney in favor of David; and (3)
to execute a deed conveying to David 15 acres that she owned
in Winston County, even though the 15-acre Winston County
property would become David's upon Gayron's death pursuant to
the terms of her October 2015 will.
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not appear to be under any "duress or constraints."  Gayron
executed the deed conveying the Boaz house to David, and that
deed was recorded at the courthouse the next day.
On November 16, 2015, Gayron's condition deteriorated and
extended family members began arriving at the Boaz house,
believing that her death was imminent.  At some point during
that day, Steve learned from Hare that Gayron had executed a
deed conveying the Boaz house to David.  Steve testified that
he then asked Gayron about it, and she denied executing such
a deed.  He stated that she eventually told him that she
remembered "signing something, but I don't know what it was." 
Thirteen days later, on November 29, 2015, Gayron died.
On June 15, 2016, Teresa and Steve sued David, alleging
that Gayron lacked the capacity to convey the Boaz house at
the time she executed the deed in favor of David.  Teresa and
Steve further alleged that Gayron had executed the deed only
because David exercised undue influence over her at that time. 
Teresa and Steve accordingly requested that the trial court
declare the deed void.  
Following the completion of discovery, Teresa and Steve
moved for a summary judgment on their undue-influence claim,
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alleging that the undisputed evidence established (1) that
David and Gayron had been in a confidential relationship and
(2) that David was the dominant party in that relationship. 
Teresa and Steve further argued that a presumption of undue
influence exists when those two factors are established; that
David was unable to establish that the conveyance of the Boaz
house was nevertheless fair, just, and equitable; and that
they were entitled to a summary judgment.  On August 16, 2017,
the trial court, after considering David's response and the
evidentiary submissions that accompanied both parties'
filings, denied Teresa and Steve's summary-judgment motion.
The case proceeded to trial, and, over four days ending
August 29, 2017, the trial court received evidence without a
jury on Teresa and Steve's claims.  On September 21, 2017, the
trial court entered an order detailing its findings of fact
and concluding that Teresa and Steve had failed to prove that
the deed conveying the Boaz house to David "was the product of
undue influence or that Gayron Brooks lacked the mental
capacity to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and
effect of her act in executing the subject statutory warranty
deed."  The trial court further concluded that Gayron's
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conveyance of the Boaz house to David "was fair, just, and
equitable in all respects."  Accordingly, the trial court
entered a judgment against Teresa and Steve and in favor of
David.  
Teresa and Steve subsequently moved the trial court,
pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., to alter, amend, or
vacate that judgment.  After conducting a hearing on that
motion, however, the trial court took no further action, and
on January 21, 2018, the motion was denied by operation of law
pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.  On February 26, 2018,
Teresa and Steve filed their notice of appeal to this Court.
Standard of Review
This case was decided by the trial court without a jury. 
This Court has described the standard of review it applies to
a judgment entered following a nonjury trial at which the
court hears oral testimony:
"'[W]hen 
a 
trial 
court 
hears 
ore 
tenus
testimony, its findings on disputed facts are
presumed correct and its judgment based on those
findings will not be reversed unless the judgment is
palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust.'  Philpot
v. State, 843 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala. 2002).  '"The
presumption of correctness, however, is rebuttable
and may be overcome where there is insufficient
evidence presented to the trial court to sustain its
judgment."'  Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So. 2d 1083,
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1086 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Dennis v. Dobbs, 474 So.
2d 77, 79 (Ala. 1985)).  'Additionally, the ore
tenus rule does not extend to cloak with a
presumption 
of 
correctness 
a 
trial 
judge's
conclusions of law or the incorrect application of
law to the facts.'  Id."
Fadalla v. Fadalla, 929 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2005).  
Notwithstanding the fact that the appealed judgment was
entered following a nonjury trial at which ore tenus evidence
was presented, Teresa and Steve argue that the judgment should
be afforded no 
presumption of correctness because, they argue,
the facts in this case are essentially undisputed.  See, e.g.,
Carter v. City of Haleyville, 669 So. 2d 812, 815 (Ala. 1995)
(explaining that, even though the judgment being appealed was
entered following a nonjury trial, the presumption of
correctness typically afforded the findings underlying such
judgments was inapplicable because the facts were not in
dispute and the appeal focused on the application of the law
to those facts).  We disagree.  A review of the trial
transcript 
reveals 
that 
numerous 
material 
facts 
were
disputed.8  Therefore, the ore tenus rule cloaks the trial
court's findings of fact with a presumption of correctness. 
8The trial court correctly noted at the conclusion of the
trial that, although "[t]he issues are very well defined ...,
[t]he facts are very much in dispute, heavily in dispute."
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See also Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So. 2d 408, 410 (Ala. 1986)
("The ore tenus rule is grounded upon the principle that when
the trial court hears oral testimony it has an opportunity to
evaluate the demeanor and credibility of witnesses."). 
Nevertheless, although we must presume that the trial court's
findings of fact are correct, to the extent we are reviewing
the trial court's conclusions of law or its application of law
to the facts, we make no such presumptions; rather, that
review is de novo.  Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So. 2d 1083, 1086
(Ala. 2005). 
Discussion
Steve and Teresa challenge the trial court's judgment
only as it relates to their undue-influence claim.  They have
not challenged the trial court's conclusions regarding
Gayron's mental capacity at the time she executed the deed
conveying the Boaz house to David.  
This Court has long recognized the hallmarks of undue
influence:
"Undue influence is variously defined as
influence that dominates the grantor's will and
coerces it to serve the will of another,  Adair v.
Craig, 135 Ala. 332, 33 So. 902 (1902); influence
which renders the grantor the passive agent of the
dominating will of another, Cox v. Parker, 212 Ala.
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35, 101 So. 657 (1924).  In determining dominance,
however, it is not a question whether the party knew
what he was doing, had done, or proposed to do, but
how the intention was produced.  Wooddy v. Matthews,
194 Ala. 390, 69 So. 607 (1915)."
Wyatt v. Riley, 292 Ala. 277, 282, 293 So. 2d 288, 291 (1974);
see also Donald v. Donald, 270 Ala. 483, 486, 119 So. 2d 909,
912 (1960) ("[I]nfluence in order to be undue must be such as
to destroy free agency and substitute the will of another for
that of the party nominally acting.").
Where a party seeks to have an inter vivos9 gift
invalidated because of undue influence by the grantee, the
parties' respective burdens are as follows:
"A plaintiff seeking to invalidate an inter
vivos gift on grounds of undue influence must
produce evidence that the donor and the donee were
in a confidential relationship and that the donee
was the dominant party in the relationship. 
Chandler v. Chandler, 514 So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Ala.
1987).  If the plaintiff makes out such a prima
facie case, the donee must either refute the proof
that he was the dominant party in a confidential
relationship or show that the transaction was 'fair,
just, and equitable in every respect.'  Brothers v.
Moore, 349 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (Ala. 1977).  The law
raises a presumption of undue influence when an
inter vivos gift is made to the dominant party in a
9Inter vivos is a Latin phrase that translates as "between
the living."  Black's Law Dictionary 949 (10th ed. 2014),
defines the phrase as "[o]f, relating to, or involving
property conveyed not by will or in contemplation of an
imminent death, but during the conveyor's lifetime."  
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confidential relationship.  As this Court stated in
Hutcheson v. Bibb, 142 Ala. 586, 587, 38 So. 754,
754 (1905):
"'In 
transactions 
inter 
vivos, 
where
confidential relations exist between the
parties, the law raises up the presumption
of undue influence, and puts upon the
donee, when the dominant party in the
transaction, the burden of repelling such
presumption by competent and satisfactory
evidence; and this is usually done by
showing that the [donor] had the benefit of
competent and independent advice of some
disinterested third party.'"
Beinlich v. Campbell, 567 So. 2d 852, 853-54 (Ala. 1990)
(footnote omitted).  Thus, Teresa and Steve had the initial
burden of making a prima facie case both that Gayron and David
were in a confidential relationship and that David was the
dominant party in that relationship.  Once that showing was
made, the burden shifted to David to produce either (1)
evidence refuting their claim and establishing to the
reasonable satisfaction of the court that he was not the
dominant party in a confidential relationship or (2) clear and
convincing evidence that the conveyance of the Boaz house to
him by Gayron was fair, just, and equitable in all respects. 
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We first note that "[t]he relation of husband and wife is
per se a confidential relation," Rash v. Bogart, 226 Ala. 284,
287, 146 So. 814, 816 (1933), and David does not dispute that
he was in a confidential relationship with Gayron.  See also
§ 30-4-9, Ala. Code 1975 ("The husband and wife may contract
with each other, but all contracts into which they enter are
subject to the rules of law as to contracts by and between
persons standing in confidential relations.").  Accordingly,
Teresa and Steve's initial burden was only to make a prima
facie case that David was the dominant party in his
relationship with Gayron when Gayron executed the deed
conveying the Boaz house to him.  See Beinlich, 567 So. 2d at
854 (reversing a summary judgment because a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether the defendants were the
dominant parties in a confidential relationship with the
grantor "at the time the gift ... was made").  
Teresa and Steve clearly met this burden.  They presented
evidence at trial, much of it undisputed, indicating that, on
November 11, 2015, Gayron was heavily dependent on David for
her day-to-day needs.  That evidence included David's
testimony and discovery responses acknowledging that, in the
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days and weeks leading up to and including November 11, he
assisted Gayron with her daily activities and was her primary
caregiver –– managing her meals, medication, and appointments
–– and assisted her with her personal, legal, and financial
affairs by helping to pay bills and otherwise to manage the
household.  Moreover, hospice records from November 10, 2015,
indicate that Gayron needed assistance with activities of
daily living such as mobility, bathing, dressing, and
toileting, and that she was "dependent in all [instrumental
activities of daily living]."  This evidence is sufficient to
create a prima facie case that David was the dominant party in
the relationship.  See, e.g., Hayes v. Apperson, 826 So. 2d
798, 804 (Ala. 2002) (noting this Court's numerous cases
holding that the fact that a party "controls the personal,
business, and household affairs" of another party is evidence
of a dominant and controlling influence).  But "this evidence
does not establish [the grantee's] dominion and 
control beyond
doubt."  Killough v. DeVaney, 374 So. 2d 287, 289 (Ala. 1979). 
Rather, it merely shifts the burden to David to refute the
evidence indicating that he was the dominant party.  
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In its judgment, the trial court held that David had
successfully established that he was not the dominant party in
his relationship with Gayron, citing the following facts in
support of its conclusion:
"[A]fter Gayron Brooks was diagnosed with terminal
lung cancer in May of 2015 and given approximately
six months to live, she herself chose to forego
[sic] conventional treatment for cancer.  However,
she later chose to seek unconventional treatment for
her cancer in Mexico and traveled there on two
separate occasions.  Gayron Brooks made the decision
to sell the family mulch business ... to her son
Steve for [$1,000,000] with no down payment,
although David Brooks, who had worked for years
building up the business and the cash reserves, had
negotiated a sale of the business to a third party
for the sum of [$1,425,000], most of which was to be
paid in a lump sum at closing.  At or prior to the
time of the sale of the mulch business, Gayron
Brooks transferred the sum of $572,000 from the
business account to which David Brooks had access
into a personal account to which only Gayron had
access.  And a final but not the only other example,
on November 7, 2015, Gayron, in the presence of
David and her son Steve, wrote out a list of certain
items of property she owned and to whom she wanted
to have that property [sic].  Among other items,
Gayron designated the house to go to husband David,
with no conditions or limitations attached. ...  The
very next day after this list was composed,
plaintiff daughter Teresa transported Gayron by
automobile to plaintiff son Steve's house where
Gayron spent some two plus hours with her children. 
David Brooks was well aware of the plan to drive
Gayron over to Steve's house, but he made no effort
to prevent or interfere with Gayron leaving."  
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The trial court further noted the existence of additional
evidence indicating that Gayron wanted David to receive the
Boaz house after her death, including writings and statements
of Gayron's that were made outside David's presence.  In his
brief to this Court, David counters Teresa and Steve's
argument that he was the dominant party by essentially relying
on the same evidence cited in the trial court's order.
Teresa and Steve argue that the evidence relied on by the
trial court indicating that David was not the dominant party
is largely so remote in time that it is irrelevant.  We agree
that the evidence of Gayron's independence and 
business acumen
from years before she was diagnosed with lung cancer are of
minimal value when determining whether David was in a dominant
position over her when she conveyed the Boaz house to him on
November 11, 2015.10  We disagree, however, that evidence from
the days surrounding November 11 is totally irrelevant when
making the determination whether David was the dominant party
over Gayron on November 11 when she executed the challenged
deed.  Evidence of Gayron's independence and/or David's
10Such evidence might be of more relevance if there was an
allegation that David was the dominant party in the marriage
relationship even before Gayron became ill, but no such
allegation has been made.
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domination from the period surrounding November 11 is
certainly "relevant evidence" as defined by Rule 401, Ala. R.
Evid., because it tends to make it more or less probable that
David was the dominant party over Gayron on November 11. 
Ultimately, it is up to the fact-finder –– in this case the
trial court –– to weigh each item of evidence and to decide
the probative value it should be given.  Garth v. Foster, 608
So. 2d 726, 727 (Ala. 1992).  Of course, direct evidence from
the date in question will generally be the most probative, but
evidence from the surrounding dates can also have probative
value as determined by the fact-finder.  See also Jones v.
Moore, 295 Ala. 31, 36, 322 So. 2d 682, 686 (1975) (rejecting
the appellant's argument that only those in attendance when a
challenged deed was executed were qualified to testify
regarding 
the 
grantor's competency because 
"such 
precision" 
is
not required under our caselaw).
In this case, the trial court heard and considered
evidence from which it could have concluded that David was not
the dominant party in his relationship with Gayron at the time
she deeded the Boaz house to him.  The undisputed evidence
indicated that Gayron struggled with what to do with her
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estate and worried about the effect her decisions would have
on her family.  With regard to the Boaz house, there is
evidence indicating that Gayron changed her mind multiple
times and that, on at least some occasions, she indicated that
she wanted David to have the house.  This is evident from her
January 2001 will and from the testimony of David and others,
including Hare and Rowe.  It is also evident from the
testimony of Teresa and Hollingsworth, who notably testified
that Gayron expressed that desire to them outside David's
presence.  Barnett also testified that he saw no indications
that Gayron was under "duress or constraints" when she
executed the challenged deed on November 11.11  Finally, the
trial court heard David's testimony indicating that Gayron's
family generally had unrestricted access to her.  In that
vein, the trial court heard testimony indicating that, on
November 7, 2011 –– just four days before Gayron executed the
challenged deed –– Teresa took Gayron to Steve's house to
11The only other evidence in the record concerning
Gayron's state on November 11 is a list of medications she was
taking on that date.  There is no evidence, however, as to the
side effects of those medications or how Gayron typically
reacted to them. 
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discuss her estate plans away from David and that David made
no effort to stop them or to otherwise intervene.
The trial court had evidence before it from which it
could have concluded that, on November 11, 2015, although
Gayron was terminally ill and dependent on David for her care,
he was not the dominant party over her such that her will was
replaced with his own.  Moreover, that same evidence supports
the conclusion that Gayron's intent for David to have the
house came from Gayron herself and was not the product of
domination by David.
It is clear that the trial court carefully considered the
narrative put forth by Teresa and Steve (i.e., that Gayron
deeded the Boaz house to David only because he was, at the
time she executed the deed, the dominant party over her and
could impose his will upon her) and the narrative put forth by
David (i.e., that, notwithstanding the terms of her October
2015 will, Gayron again changed her mind and decided to deed
the Boaz house to him after becoming upset with Teresa and
Steve on multiple occasions in early November 2015) and, based
on all the evidence presented, concluded that the narrative
offered by David was more credible.  The trial court's
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judgment in favor of David based on those facts is not
palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust.  Accordingly, the
judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed. 12
Conclusion
Teresa and Steve sued David alleging that the property
deed Gayron executed 18 days before her death was the result
of David's undue influence.  During a nonjury trial at which
ore tenus evidence was presented, Teresa and Steve presented
evidence sufficient to make a prima facie case that David was
the dominant party in a confidential relationship with Gayron
at the time Gayron executed the challenged deed.  David,
however, submitted evidence from which the trial court could,
and in fact did, find that David had rebutted the presumption
of dominance raised by Teresa and Steve's evidence.  The trial
court accordingly entered judgment in favor of David and
against Teresa and Steve.  There is sufficient evidence in the
record to support the trial court's findings, and its judgment
12The evidence in the record is sufficient to support the
trial court's conclusion that David was not the dominant party
in his relationship with Gayron at the time she conveyed the
Boaz house to him.  This holding makes it unnecessary to
review the trial court's conclusion that the transaction was
fair, just, and equitable.  We accordingly pretermit any
discussion of the parties' arguments on that point.
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based on those findings is not palpably erroneous or
manifestly unjust.  The judgment is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.
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