Case Title: Rodriguez v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 533, 2000

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ISRAEL L. RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 533, 2000
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN00-02-0709
§
§
Submitted: March 16, 2001
  Decided:
March  30, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices.
O R D E R
This 30th day of March 2001, upon consideration of the appellant’s
brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
In August 2000, a Superior Court jury found the defendant-
appellant, Israel L. Rodriguez, guilty of Assault in the First Degree.  The
Superior Court sentenced Rodriguez to ten years at Level V incarceration, to
be suspended after serving five years for five years at decreasing levels of
supervision.  This is Rodriguez’s direct appeal.
(2)
Rodriguez’s counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c). Rodriguez’s counsel asserts, based upon a
2
complete and careful review of the record, there are no arguably appealable
issues.  By letter, Rodriguez’s attorney informed him of the provisions of
Rule 26(c) and provided a copy of the motion to withdraw and the
accompanying brief.  Rodriguez also was informed of his right to
supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Rodriguez has raised several issues
for this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken
by Rodriguez’s counsel as well as the points raised by Rodriguez and has
moved to affirm the Superior Court’s decision.
(3)
The standard and scope of review applicable to the
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1
(4)
Rodriguez has enumerated six separate issues for the Court’s
consideration.  His six issues state two discernible claims.  First, Rodriguez
claims the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to sustain
                                                          
1Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
3
his conviction for various reasons.  Second, he claims his trial counsel was
ineffective. We find no merit to either claim.
(5)
The State’s evidence at trial reflected that on the morning of
November 2, 1999, Neal Davis was waiting for a bus at 3rd and Jackson
Streets in Wilmington.  Although legally blind, Davis has limited vision.  He
testified at trial that three other people also were waiting at the bus stop with
him that morning, including a young man with a skateboard.  As Davis stood
at the bus stop, he felt three or four small objects hit him, and he heard the
young man with the skateboard laughing.  Davis approached the young man
and asked him what he was doing.  The young man stated, “Get the f***
away from me” and counted to three.  Davis testified that the next thing he
remembered was waking up in the hospital about ten o’clock that evening
with a fractured skull, swelling of the brain, and several broken teeth.
(6)
The State also presented the testimony of Derek McManus.
McManus testified that he was walking near the bus stop at 3rd and Jackson
Streets on the morning of November 2, 1999.  He saw an older gentleman,
later identified as Davis, talking to a young man.  As Davis turned to walk
away, the young man picked up his skateboard and struck Davis in the back
of the head.  McManus testified that the young man then ran straight past
him.  Within moments, McManus provided a description of Davis’ assailant
4
to a meter reader who called the police.  The description of a white male
wearing a blue hooded sweatshirt and blue jeans, carrying a skateboard and a
backpack was broadcast over police radios.  Within minutes, officers
working about four blocks from the attack stopped a man, who turned out to
be Rodriguez, who generally fit the broadcast description.  Within thirty
minutes of the assault, McManus positively identified Rodriguez as the
assailant.
(7)
On 
appeal, 
Rodriguez 
argues 
about 
several 
alleged
inconsistencies in the record.  Rodriguez also argues about the failure to
conduct DNA testing on his skateboard.  Given the alleged inconsistencies
and the lack of DNA or other physical evidence to link him to the assault,
Rodriguez asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was the
assailant.  At trial, following the close of the State’s evidence, defense
counsel unsuccessfully moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.
(8)
On appeal, this Court makes a de novo determination,
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.2 In making its determination, the Court does not
                                                          
2Davis v. State, Del. Supr., 706 A.2d 523, 525 (1998).
5
distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.3  In this case, there
was no physical evidence implicating Rodriguez as the assailant.
Nonetheless, the record reflects that police stopped Rodriguez, who fit the
description of the perpetrator, within four blocks of the crime scene minutes
after Davis was attacked. An eyewitness to the attack testified unequivocally
at trial that Rodriguez was the attacker.
(9)
Although there was some discrepancy in the testimony
presented about whether Rodriguez was carrying a backpack when he was
stopped, it was entirely within the jury’s discretion to accept one witness’
testimony and reject any conflicting testimony.4  Under Delaware law, the
jury is the sole trier of fact, responsible for determining witness credibility,
resolving conflicts in the testimony, and drawing any inferences from the
proven facts.5  Based upon both the direct and circumstantial evidence in the
record, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the State, we conclude that a reasonable finder of fact
could conclude that Rodriguez was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first
degree assault in the attack on Davis.
                                                          
3Id.
4See Pryor v. State, Del. Supr., 453 A.2d 98, 100 (1982).
5Chao v. State, Del. Supr., 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (1992); Tyre v. State, Del. Supr., 412
A.2d 326, 330 (1980).
6
(10)
Rodriguez next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in
several respects, by failing to challenge “questionable” information
contained in the police report and for failing to challenge the whereabouts of
the alleged knapsack.  Claims of attorney error, however, will not be
considered for the first time on direct appeal.6
(11)
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded
that Rodriguez’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Rodriguez’s counsel has made a
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that
Rodriguez could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to
affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
The motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Randy J. Holland
Justice
                                                          
6Desmond v. State, Del. Supr., 654 A.2d 821, 829 (1994).