Case Title: State v. Gonzalez

Citation: 2014 WI 124

Docket Number: 2012AP001818-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 124 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1818-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Ramon G. Gonzalez, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 349 Wis. 2d 789, 837 N.W.2d 178) 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 3, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
William W. Brash 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendant-appellant-petitioner, 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Kaitlin A. Lamb, assistant state public defender, with 
whom on the briefs was Andrea Taylor Cornwall, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 124
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP1818-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2006CF5455) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent   
 
 
v. 
 
Ramon G. Gonzalez,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner   
FILED 
 
DEC 3, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
Review of a decision of the court of appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. 
The question we consider in 
this case is whether Ramon Gonzalez's constitutional right not 
to be a witness against himself was violated when the court, 
over defense objection, asked in front of the jury that Gonzalez 
"display his teeth," and Gonzalez complied.  Gonzalez argues 
that he was compelled to be a witness against himself at trial 
because the teeth, which were platinum, were more than physical 
evidence——they conveyed a message to the jury because they give 
him a "fierce" appearance.  A witness had testified that the 
victim had identified one of his attackers as a fellow inmate 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
2 
 
with platinum teeth.  The circuit court1 ruling came after the 
prosecutor asked "for the jury's sake, that we show Mr. 
Gonzalez's dental work . . . so the witness can describe whether 
or not he has particular dental work."  Gonzalez was convicted 
of battery by a prisoner, as a party to a crime.   
¶2 
The question requires us to decide whether, in this 
case, teeth are the kind of evidence that implicates the Self-
Incrimination Clause.2  Gonzalez acknowledges that it is well 
                                                 
1 The jury trial was held in Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 
the Honorable William W. Brash III, presiding; Gonzalez's later 
motion for postconviction relief was denied by the Honorable 
David A. Hansher of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court.  In an 
unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed.  State v. 
Gonzalez, No. 2012AP1818-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
July 23, 2013). 
2 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, 
in 
pertinent 
part, 
"[n]o 
person . . . shall 
be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. V.  As will be discussed, 
the United States Supreme Court has interpreted that provision 
as prohibiting only "testimonial" communications:  
 
The term "privilege against self-incrimination" is not 
an 
entirely 
accurate 
description 
of 
a 
person's 
constitutional protection against being "compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."  
The word "witness" in the constitutional text limits 
the 
relevant 
category 
of 
compelled 
incriminating 
communications to those that are "testimonial" in 
character. 
 
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2000) (footnotes 
omitted).  Our discussion concerns what constitutes testimonial 
evidence for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause, and we 
rely on the tests provided in cases dealing with self-
incrimination.  We are aware that there are other cases in which 
courts determine what is testimonial, such as those involving an 
alleged Confrontation Clause violation.  See, e.g., State v. 
(continued) 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
3 
 
settled that the right against self-incrimination applies only 
to testimonial evidence, but he argues that in this case the 
physical evidence "had a 'testimonial' aspect because it 
revealed content——the 'fierce-looking' appearance of his teeth,"3 
and he says this fits within the category of cases where 
physical evidence has been held to have a testimonial aspect 
and, as a result, to fall under constitutional protection.  He 
argues in the alternative that even if it has no testimonial 
aspect, it was improperly admitted because it was not material, 
given that other evidence served the purpose of identification.  
The State argues that his platinum teeth were physical evidence 
that did not have a testimonial aspect, and were material to the 
identification of Gonzalez, which was central to the trial.   
¶3 
We hold that the evidence of his platinum teeth was 
physical evidence that did not have a testimonial aspect 
sufficient 
to 
implicate 
constitutional 
protections. 
 
The 
relevant question under the case law is whether the evidence in 
question expresses, makes use of, reveals, or discloses the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶37, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811 (stating 
that "not all hearsay implicates the Confrontation Clause's core, 
only that which is 'testimonial'") (citation omitted).  
   
3 Pet'r's Br. 9.   
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
4 
 
contents of the defendant's mind.4  Teeth do not do so.  We also 
hold that Gonzalez's teeth are material to identification 
because they are probative of Gonzalez's identity, which was a 
matter at issue.5  This case therefore fits squarely into the 
long-recognized category of cases involving the body as evidence 
and does not offend constitutional principles against self-
incrimination.  We affirm the court of appeals. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶4 
This case arises from an attack by multiple people on 
an inmate in the Milwaukee County Jail.  Gonzalez was among the 
inmates who were accused of attacking the victim.  He was 
charged with battery by a prisoner, as a party to a crime, and 
went to trial.  Challenging the identification of the accused as 
one of the attackers was the focus of the defense.  The victim 
was clearly reluctant to testify and repeatedly said so while 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 598 (1990)  
(quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 (1988)) 
(holding evidence not testimonial where defendant not "forc[ed] 
to express the contents of his mind"); Hubbell at 43 (holding 
evidence testimonial where defendant was improperly required "to 
make extensive use of" or reveal "the contents of his own mind" 
in identifying documents responsive to subpoena); Hutchison v. 
State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 179 (Tex. App. 2014) (holding that act of 
handing over keys was not testimonial in nature because it did 
not disclose the contents of defendant's mind); State v. Holmes, 
93 P.3d 212, 215 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (holding evidence 
testimonial if defendant is forced to disclose the contents of 
his mind or speak his guilt). 
5  State v. Becker, 51 Wis. 2d 659, 667, 188 N.W.2d 449 
(1971) (holding that evidence probative of a matter in issue is 
material). 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
5 
 
under oath; he claimed he was unable to identify his attackers.  
While video of the attack was shown to jurors, the defense 
disputed that the grainy video was sufficient to make an 
identification, and the State offered further evidence on that 
issue.  The jury heard the following during testimony about the 
identification of Gonzalez and his involvement in the beating: 
- An eyewitness, a deputy on duty at the jail, saw Gonzalez 
stomp on the victim during the fight.  
- Minutes after the attack, the victim of the assault told 
an investigating officer that one of the persons involved 
was from Cell 10. 
- While in the jail infirmary, the victim told a second 
investigating officer that the inmate in Cell 10 who had 
platinum teeth had hit and kicked him. 
- The victim also testified that he knew Gonzalez by the 
nickname "Platinum" because of his teeth. 
- Gonzalez was housed in Cell 10 and had platinum teeth. 
No evidence was introduced that any other inmate besides 
Gonzalez fit this description. 
¶5 
During 
the 
trial, 
Gonzalez 
objected 
to 
the 
prosecutor's 
request, 
during 
a 
witness's 
testimony, 
that 
Gonzalez reveal his teeth to the jury.  The circuit court 
overruled the objection.  Gonzalez complied, and the record 
reflects that he smiled at the jurors to show his platinum 
teeth.  Gonzalez's post-conviction motion for a new trial was 
denied, and the court of appeals affirmed the conviction on the 
grounds that the teeth were physical evidence, and thus 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
6 
 
Gonzalez's showing of his platinum teeth did not constitute the 
kind of compelled testimonial evidence the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions prohibit.  Gonzalez petitioned for 
review, which we granted.   
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶6 
The question we address is whether Gonzalez was 
compelled to provide the kind of evidence that is protected by 
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution6 and its 
corollary in the Wisconsin Constitution, which prohibit the 
State from compelling a defendant to be a witness against 
himself or herself.  Although this case does not arise from a 
suppression motion or motion in limine, it similarly presents a 
question of a constitutionally-based objection to the admission 
of certain evidence.  "Whether evidence should be suppressed is 
a question of constitutional fact. In reviewing questions of 
constitutional fact, we uphold a circuit court's factual 
                                                 
6 "The Fifth Amendment, which applies to the States by 
virtue 
of 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment, 
provides 
that 
'[n]o 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.' U.S. Const., Amdt. 5."  Maryland v. 
Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103 (2010) (internal citations omitted).  
The parallel provision in the Wisconsin constitution provides, 
"No person may be held to answer for a criminal offense without 
due process of law, and no person for the same offense may be 
put twice in jeopardy of punishment, nor may be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself."  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 8.  "Our interpretation of Article I, Section 8 
of the Wisconsin Constitution has generally been consistent with 
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution."  State v. Ward, 2009 WI 
60, ¶18 n.3, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236 (citations 
omitted). 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
7 
 
findings 
unless 
clearly 
erroneous, 
but 
we 
independently 
determine whether those facts meet the constitutional standard."  
State v. Samuel, 2002 WI 34, ¶15, 252 Wis. 2d 26, 643 N.W.2d 423 
(citations 
omitted) 
(evaluating 
a 
constitutionally-based 
challenge to the admission of certain evidence).  
III. 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
¶7 
The facts relevant to our discussion are not in 
dispute.  It is not disputed that the evidence in question was 
compelled by the circuit court; Gonzalez was ordered by the 
court in open court to display his teeth to the jury.  The 
dispute we address is solely one of law:  whether this is the 
kind of evidence that cannot be compelled without violating 
constitutional guarantees.  Gonzalez gives two reasons the 
evidence should not have been admitted.  After setting out 
briefly the relevant law, we will address the parties' arguments 
on those two points.  
A. 
The Self-Incrimination Clause And Body-As-Evidence Cases 
¶8 
The United States Supreme Court has, in cases in which 
the self-incrimination clause has been invoked, repeatedly 
recognized that certain distinguishing characteristics of a 
defendant may be used against him or her even if they are 
incriminating.  It summarized its interpretation of the self-
incrimination clause concisely in United States v. Hubbell prior 
to starting its analysis in that case: 
 
It is useful to preface our analysis of the 
constitutional issue with a restatement of certain 
propositions that are not in dispute. The term 
"privilege 
against 
self-incrimination" 
is 
not 
an 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
8 
 
entirely 
accurate 
description 
of 
a 
person's 
constitutional protection against being "compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 
 
The word "witness" in the constitutional text 
limits 
the 
relevant 
category 
of 
compelled 
incriminating 
communications 
to 
those 
that 
are 
"testimonial" 
in 
character. 
 
As 
Justice 
Holmes 
observed, there is a significant difference between 
the use of compulsion to extort communications from a 
defendant and compelling a person to engage in conduct 
that may be incriminating.  Thus, even though the act 
may provide incriminating evidence, a criminal suspect 
may be compelled to put on a shirt, to provide a blood 
sample or handwriting exemplar, or to make a recording 
of his voice.  The act of exhibiting such physical 
characteristics 
is 
not 
the 
same 
as 
a 
sworn 
communication by a witness that relates either express 
or implied assertions of fact or belief.  
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2000) (footnotes 
omitted). 
¶9 
In clarifying what constituted testimonial evidence, 
the United States Supreme Court has differentiated between 
"communications" from the defendant and "his body as evidence":  
"The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be 
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical 
or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an 
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."  
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763 (1966) (quoting Holt 
v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (emphasis added)).  "The 
distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different 
ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling 
'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes 
a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' 
does not violate it."  Id. at 764.  The Court has also described 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
9 
 
testimonial evidence as "knowledge of facts [compelled from the 
defendant] relating him to the offense," "his thoughts and 
beliefs" and "evidence of a testimonial or communicative 
nature."  Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210, 213 (1988).  
In keeping with this distinction, courts have held that there is 
no violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause where a defendant 
is compelled to show his or her body, or to display tattoos, 
scars, physique, or limbs.7 
¶10 However, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
recognized that some physical evidence has a sufficiently 
testimonial aspect to warrant Fifth Amendment protection.8  As we 
will explain, those cases arise when a particular piece of 
compelled 
physical 
evidence 
reveals 
the 
thoughts 
of 
the 
defendant and those thoughts are incriminating.  There are, 
                                                 
7 3 American Law Reports 4th 374, § 10[a] (1981), Propriety 
of requiring criminal defendant to exhibit self, or perform 
physical act, or participate in demonstration, during trial and 
in presence of jury (collecting cases where no violation of 
self-incrimination clause was found). 
8 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (framing 
the relevant question as whether the evidence in question "rises 
to the level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment" and stating that a compelled handwriting sample is 
not "deemed to be sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the 
privilege").  In Fisher, the Court stated that "[t]he act of 
producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has 
communicative aspects of its own . . . but the more difficult 
issues are whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are both 
'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for purposes of applying the 
Fifth Amendment." Id. at 410. It concluded that even conceding 
the existence of some testimonial aspects, the evidence was not 
testimonial enough to warrant Fifth Amendment protections.  Id. 
at 429-30.  
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
10 
 
then, two types of physical evidence: 1) physical evidence 
(including 
the 
body) 
that 
does 
not 
have 
a 
sufficiently 
testimonial aspect to warrant Fifth Amendment protection, and 2) 
physical evidence (including the body) that does have a 
sufficiently testimonial aspect to warrant such protection.       
B. 
Whether Gonzalez's Platinum Teeth Were Physical Evidence 
With A "Testimonial Aspect" 
¶11 Gonzalez's first argument is based on the proposition 
that physical evidence can nonetheless have a testimonial aspect 
that turns the evidence into the kind barred by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Such cases turn on 
the fact that the evidence in question in some way disclosed the 
contents of the defendant's mind.   
¶12 Gonzalez argues that his platinum teeth constitute the 
kind of physical evidence that has a "testimonial aspect" that 
conveys or communicates an additional message, and that evidence 
is therefore testimonial for purposes of Self-Incrimination 
Clause analysis.  He points to Pennsylvania v. Muniz, a case in 
which the United States Supreme Court considered whether the 
Self-Incrimination Clause barred use of several pieces of 
evidence obtained from the defendant following a drunk driving 
arrest.  The booking officer asked Muniz his "name, address, 
height, weight, eye color, date of birth, current age, and the 
date of his sixth birthday."  Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 
582, 590 (1990).   
¶13 As the lower court had found, "[b]oth the delivery and 
content of Muniz's answers were incriminating," as both tended 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
11 
 
to support the inference that Muniz was intoxicated.  Id.  The 
responses to all questions were spoken in a slurred manner, and 
Muniz was unable to give the date of his sixth birthday.  Id.  
But for purposes of Fifth Amendment analysis, the United States 
Supreme Court made a distinction between the manner in which 
Muniz answered questions, which it deemed a physical attribute, 
and the particular answer that revealed something about his 
thoughts——namely that he was so impaired that he was unable to 
perform the simple calculation of the date of his sixth 
birthday.  Thus, it held,  
 
Under Schmerber and its progeny . . . any slurring of 
speech 
and 
other 
evidence 
of 
lack 
of 
muscular 
coordination revealed by Muniz's responses to Officer 
Hosterman's direct questions constitute nontestimonial 
components of those responses. Requiring a suspect to 
reveal the physical manner in which he articulates 
words, like requiring him to reveal the physical 
properties of the sound produced by his voice, does 
not, 
without 
more, 
compel 
him 
to 
provide 
a 
"testimonial" response for purposes of the privilege. 
 
Muniz, 496 U.S. at 592 (citation omitted). 
 
¶14 In contrast, it held that Muniz's answer about his 
sixth birthday did constitute testimonial evidence, because in 
answering it, he was forced to disclose something about his 
mental faculties:  
Muniz was left with the choice of incriminating 
himself by admitting that he did not then know the 
date of his sixth birthday, or answering untruthfully 
by reporting a date that he did not then believe to be 
accurate (an incorrect guess would be incriminating as 
well as untruthful). The content of his truthful 
answer 
supported 
an 
inference 
that 
his 
mental 
faculties were impaired . . . . 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
12 
 
Id. at 599.   
¶15 Another case where physical evidence took on a 
testimonial aspect involved a subpoena for some tax documents 
that were later used as the basis for criminal charges.  What is 
significant for our purposes is the fact that the United States 
Supreme Court recognized that in some circumstances, compliance 
with a subpoena, which would ordinarily not implicate the Self-
Incrimination Clause, could have a "compelled testimonial 
aspect."  Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45.  In the context of a dispute 
over the terms of a grant of immunity, the Court noted that 
"[w]e have held that 'the act of production' itself may 
implicitly communicate 'statements of fact.'  . . . Moreover . . 
. [the custodian] may be compelled to take the witness stand and 
answer questions designed to determine whether he has produced 
everything demanded by the subpoena."  Id. at 36-37.  
¶16 As these two cases illustrate, the factual scenarios 
in which physical evidence has a "testimonial aspect" sufficient 
to implicate constitutional protections are quite limited and 
unusual.  Gonzalez cites only Muniz as an example of such a 
case; he argues that the platinum teeth evidence is like the 
sixth-birthday answer in Muniz in that both reveal too much—that 
both allow jurors to make improper negative inferences about the 
defendant.  In response, the State simply points to the 
similarities between the facts of this case and the extensive 
body-as-evidence case law. 
¶17 There is a crucial difference between the evidence in 
Muniz and the evidence here.  In Muniz, the inference that 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
13 
 
concerned the United States Supreme Court was an inference about 
the working of Muniz's mind that went directly to the crime of 
which he was accused: driving while intoxicated.  The evidence 
the Court found problematic in Muniz was problematic not because 
it supported a negative inference, but because the particular 
negative inference it supported was "that his mental state was 
confused," an inference about the contents of his mind that both 
parties acknowledged was incriminating in a drunk driving 
prosecution.  Gonzalez's display of his teeth did not disclose 
anything to the jury about his mental state or the content or 
workings of his mind.   
¶18 Likewise, in Hubbell, where physical evidence was 
found to have a testimonial aspect that brought it under the 
Fifth Amendment, the Court found it significant that "the 
prosecutor needed the [defendant's] assistance both to identify 
potential sources of information and to produce those sources" 
and this required the defendant to take "the mental and physical 
steps necessary to provide the prosecutor with an accurate 
inventory of the many sources of potentially incriminating 
evidence."  Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42 (emphasis added).  It 
therefore concluded that the defendant's "act of production had 
a testimonial aspect" that made the Fifth Amendment applicable.  
Id. at 45.   
¶19 The content or message he claims the teeth convey——
that he is tough and fierce (and therefore more likely to 
assault someone)——is not the type of disclosure that was 
problematic in Muniz; his teeth are not different from other 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
14 
 
non-testimonial physical evidence, such as tattoos,9 scars,10 
muscular arms,11 teeth,12 and results of an in-court test of 
defendant's eyes,13 that courts have deemed physical evidence 
whose compelled display violates no constitutional right——even 
though some of those physical characteristics might likewise 
carry 
negative 
connotations 
or 
communicate 
an 
image 
of 
                                                 
9 State v Rosthenhausler, 711 P.2d 625 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) 
(finding 
no 
constitutional 
violation 
where 
defendant 
was 
required to reveal tattoo). 
10 People v. Renfrow, 564 P.2d 411 (Colo. 1977) (finding no 
constitutional violation where defendant was required to reveal 
scar for purpose of corroborating identity).  
11 Doye v. State, 299 A.2d 117 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973) 
(finding no violation where trial court ordered defendant to 
roll up sleeve to display muscular arm after victim described 
rapist). 
12 Sholler v. Commonwealth, 969 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Ky. 1998) 
(finding no constitutional violation where court compelled 
display of teeth after witness testified on cross-examination 
that defendant spoke with a lisp and was missing a front tooth); 
Huff v. State, 452 So. 2d 1352, 1353 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) 
(finding no constitutional violation where court compelled 
display of teeth after a witness described a "big[] gap" in the 
robber's upper teeth). 
13 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that evidence gained 
during a compelled, in-court horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) 
test of the defendant's eyes conducted outside the presence of 
the jury was not testimonial (State v. Schmidt, 2012 WI App 137, 
345 Wis. 2d 326, 825 N.W.2d 521).  It has also held that an in-
court voice sample did not constitute testimonial evidence, 
State v. Hubanks, 173 Wis. 2d 1, 496 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1992), 
and that evidence of physical acts during field sobriety tests 
was not testimonial, State v. Babbitt, 188 Wis. 2d 349, 525 
N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994).        
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
15 
 
fierceness or toughness to some jurors.14  Nor is there use made 
by the prosecutors of Gonzalez that is comparable to the use 
made by the prosecutors of Hubbell's mind that rendered the 
physical evidence testimonial in that case.   
¶20 We therefore conclude that this is not a case in which 
physical evidence has a "testimonial aspect" that renders its 
use unconstitutional.15 
C. 
Whether The Display Of Gonzalez's Platinum Teeth Was 
Material 
¶21 Gonzalez's second argument is that the availability of 
other identification evidence renders the display of his teeth 
for 
such 
purpose 
immaterial, 
and 
therefore 
inadmissible.  
Gonzalez cites Schmerber for the proposition that the law 
permits "[defendant's] body as evidence" only "when it may be 
material."  Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763.  He argues that because 
other identification evidence existed, the display of his teeth 
was not for the purpose of identification, and therefore it was 
                                                 
14 There is no evidence in the record that such a meaning 
would necessarily be attached to platinum teeth.  We will accept 
for purposes of the argument that a negative inference would be 
drawn by jurors, but it is also possible that a juror who had 
never seen such teeth might have a neutral impression or merely 
find them silly.   
15 We recognize that the court of appeals reached a 
conclusion that is not consistent with our holding here when it 
considered this issue in a previous case.  See State v. Smith, 
No. 00-2947-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 
2001).  The opinion was not published, and online court records 
show that no petition for review was filed in that case.  
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
16 
 
not, as required, material.16  Specifically, he argues that 
"there was no need for the jury to determine whether Mr. 
Gonzalez in fact had platinum teeth,"17 because the victim had 
identified Gonzalez in court as the inmate he knew as 
"Platinum."   
¶22 Evidence is material if it is probative of a matter at 
issue.  State v. Becker, 51 Wis. 2d 659, 677, 188 N.W.2d 449 
(1971).   Evidence that is probative of a matter at issue can be 
excluded on certain grounds, including that it is cumulative of 
already presented evidence,18 but that decision is one the 
circuit court has discretion to make and is subject to highly 
deferential review on appeal.19 
                                                 
16 We note that Gonzalez did not make a contemporaneous 
objection to the relevance of the evidence, and he does not make 
a claim that the potential prejudice outweighs the evidence's 
probative value under Wis. Stat. § 904.03.   
17 Pet'r's Br. 9. 
18 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03 (2013-14).  All subsequent references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
19 "The question on appeal is . . .  whether the trial court 
exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted legal 
standards and in accordance with the facts of record."  State v. 
Wollman, 86 Wis. 2d 459, 464, 273 N.W.2d 225 (1979).  "An 
appellate court will not find an abuse of discretion if the 
record shows that the circuit court exercised its discretion and 
that there is a reasonable basis for the court's determination."  
State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 542, 363 N.W.2d 
419 (1985). 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
17 
 
¶23 Gonzalez's approach would appear to require us to hold 
that once any evidence serves the purpose of identification, any 
additional 
evidence 
offered 
to 
corroborate 
it 
would 
be 
immaterial.  This case turned on identification, and the State, 
which is held to a high burden of proof, was entitled to 
corroborate 
the 
identification 
of 
the 
defendant 
by 
any 
permissible means within the ordinary constraints of evidence 
law and subject to the discretion of the circuit court.  It is 
simply untenable to assert that a central piece of identifying 
evidence is not material in a case like this.  As the State 
notes, the relevance of the evidence was great in a case where 
"the identity of the assailant remained the central issue in 
dispute."  Given the heavy burden the State bears in a criminal 
prosecution, it is inappropriate to limit otherwise admissible 
evidence on the grounds claimed here. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶24 We hold that the evidence of Gonzalez's platinum teeth 
was physical evidence that does not have a testimonial aspect 
sufficient to implicate constitutional protections.   The 
relevant question under the case law is whether the evidence in 
question expresses, makes use of, reveals, or discloses the 
contents of the defendant's mind.   Teeth do not do so.  We also 
hold that Gonzalez's teeth are material to identification 
because they are  probative of Gonzalez's identity, which was a 
matter at issue.  This case therefore fits squarely into the 
long-recognized 
category 
of 
cases 
involving 
the 
body 
as 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
18 
 
evidence, and does not offend constitutional principles against 
self-incrimination.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 2012AP1818-CR 
 
 
1 
 
No.  2012AP1818-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶25 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join  
this opinion. 
¶26 I write separately because this is one of the first 
opinions written and mandated under a new procedure in this 
court for circulating and mandating opinions.  This case turns 
out to be a good case to test our new procedure:  It is a 
unanimous opinion presenting one issue. 
¶27 In keeping with this court's longstanding commitment 
to transparency and open government and "for the advice of 
counsel practicing in the Supreme Court and for information to 
the public,"1 this court has published its internal operating 
procedures 
since 
1984. 
This 
practice 
of 
openness 
and 
transparency should be continued.2      
¶28 The Internal Operating Procedures presently set forth 
our procedure for the preparation and mandate of a draft opinion 
as follows:     
II.F. ASSIGNMENT OF CASES . . . After the cases are 
assigned, the justice prepares a draft opinion for 
circulation to the court. 
G. OPINION  To place a draft opinion on the conference 
agenda, a justice must circulate his or her draft 
                                                 
1 Introduction, Wisconsin Supreme Court Internal Operating 
Procedures, printed in volume 6 of the Wisconsin Statutes (2011-
12), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/IOPSC.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2014).  
2 The present Internal Operating Procedures  "describe the 
manner in which the Supreme Court currently processes, considers 
and decides judicial matters brought to the court."  Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court 
Internal 
Operating 
Procedures, 
Introduction, 
available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/IOPSC.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2014). 
No.  2012AP1818-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
opinion at least seven calendar days prior to the 
conference. 
Justices 
are 
encouraged 
to 
submit 
objections or suggestions in writing to the author, 
with copies to all justices prior to the conference. 
The court considers each draft opinion carefully as to 
language and substance, and if there are any changes 
to be made that are of more than minimal importance, 
the opinion is recirculated and reconferenced. Any 
justice, whether in the majority or dissent, may at 
any time prior to the issuance of the mandate ask that 
an opinion be held and reconferenced.  
Each justice who elects to write an opinion concurring 
in or dissenting from the court's opinion ordinarily 
announces that intention at an opinion conference.  
The author of a concurring or dissenting opinion and a 
justice who has asked that an opinion be held should 
give first priority to the concurring or dissenting 
opinion and to the opinion being held.  Justices must 
circulate concurring or dissenting opinions and remove 
the hold on any opinion before circulating opinions in 
cases assigned to them.  Any justice may reconsider 
his or her vote on the court's decision or opinion 
until the decision is mandated. 
. . . .  
I. MANDATE  The court's decision in a case is mandated 
promptly upon approval of the opinion by the court and 
upon notification by the chief justice to the clerk.  
The court's opinion is issued simultaneously with any 
concurring or dissenting opinions.  
When a decision is ready to be mandated, the court's 
opinion, along with any concurring or dissenting 
opinions, is transmitted to the clerk's office where 
it is reviewed and assigned a public domain citation.  
The case name and number of opinions that are 
scheduled for release are ordinarily posted on the 
court's website two days prior to the scheduled 
release date.  On the day of mandate, the clerk's 
office telephones the attorneys for the parties, 
notifying them of the court's decision,3 releases the 
                                                 
3 In practice, the parties' attorneys are no longer notified 
by telephone now that opinions are posted to the court's 
website. 
No.  2012AP1818-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
opinion to the parties and makes copies of the opinion 
available for public inspection.  The opinion is also 
posted to the court's website.  The opinion remains 
subject to further editing and modification. The 
office of the clerk arranges for the publication of 
the final version of the opinion in the official 
publications. 
¶29 The new procedure was adopted on September 25, 2014, 
by a divided court.4  In adopting this new procedure, regrettably 
(in my opinion) the court did not consider the court's Internal 
Operating Procedures (published in volume 6 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes); did not give notice to or seek comments from the 
bench, bar, or public; and did not consult the practices of 
other state courts. 
¶30 A verbatim statement of the new procedure for opinion 
preparation and mandate is as follows: 
FIRST:  Within 10 days after the first circulation of 
a majority opinion, each justice shall declare by 
email to all justices participating in the case in one 
of four ways: (1) joining the opinion; (2) joining the 
opinion if specifically described changes are made; 
(3) concurring; or (4) dissenting.   
SECOND – MAJORITY OPINION:  Within 10 days of 
receiving 
a 
request 
for 
specifically 
described 
changes, the author of the majority opinion shall 
consult among members of the majority to determine 
whether some or all of the specifically described 
changes 
are 
acceptable. 
 
If 
some 
or 
all 
are 
acceptable, the majority opinion shall be revised and 
recirculated within 14 days after the initial 10 day 
consultation 
period. 
 
If 
some 
or 
all 
of 
the 
specifically described changes are not acceptable to 
the majority who support the first circulation, the 
justice whose changes were not accepted shall declare 
                                                 
4 Justices Crooks, Roggensack, Ziegler, and Gableman voted 
in favor of adopting this procedure.  Justices Bradley and 
Prosser and I dissented. 
No.  2012AP1818-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
by email that he or she joins the majority opinion, 
notwithstanding 
the 
lack 
of 
changes 
that 
were 
requested, or that he or she will write separately.  A 
justice who asked for changes in the majority opinion 
and does not join the majority opinion shall declare a 
concurrence or dissent and circulate his or her 
separate writing within 21 days of circulation of the 
revised majority opinion or the determination that the 
majority opinion will not be revised to meet his or 
her request whichever occurs first.  
SECOND – SEPARATE WRITINGS:  Whether concurring or 
dissenting, a justice who declares a separate writing 
in response to the first circulation of a majority 
opinion has 30 days after the justice's declaration to 
circulate his or her separate writing.  No new 
majority opinions shall be circulated by justices who 
are writing separately.   
THIRD:  Upon circulation of a separate opinion, the 
author of the majority opinion has 14 days in which to 
revise, and upon receipt of those revisions, dissents 
and concurrences have 14 days to respond to the 
majority's revision.  The revision of dissents and 
concurrences shall not create a new opinion, but shall 
respond only to revisions in the majority opinion.  
(In 
the 
past, 
some 
justices 
circulated 
cursory 
separate opinions in order to be able to circulate 
another majority opinion and then extensively revised 
the separate opinion, creating unnecessary delay.  We 
are attempting to prevent this delay-causing practice 
by limiting the revisions to separate opinions.) 
Upon 
recirculation 
of 
the 
majority 
opinion 
and 
recirculation of the separate writings, each justice 
shall, within 10 days, by email to all justices 
participating in the case make a final declaration of 
which opinion he or she is joining.  If during this 
process the opinion originally circulated as the 
majority opinion does not garner the vote of a 
majority of the court, it shall be referred to in 
separate writings as the "lead opinion."  If a 
separate writing garners the vote of a majority of the 
court thereby changing the mandate of the opinion, it 
shall be revised as the majority opinion within 14 
days of the vote of the court.  During that same 14 
day period, other separate writings shall be revised 
to indicate their status as concurrences or dissents 
to the new majority opinion.  The majority opinion and 
No.  2012AP1818-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
the separate writings shall be mandated upon final 
declaration. 
Within 5 days of mandate, the majority opinion shall 
be placed in the release drive; within 5 days after 
that event, the separate writings also shall be placed 
in the release drive for transmittal of all writings 
to the clerk's office for release to the public, 
unless release of separate writings is delayed as 
required by step "FOURTH" below.     
FOURTH:  If during the course of a separate writing, 
the author cites to a case then pending before us for 
which the opinion of the court has not been released, 
the majority opinion shall be released with the 
designation, "separate opinion(s) to follow," unless 
the citation can be replaced with ellipses in which 
case the separate opinion shall be released with the 
majority opinion and the ellipses shall be replaced 
with the omitted citation when the cited opinion is 
released.   There shall be no further changes to the 
separate writings after mandate.  Separate writings 
for which the citation cannot be replaced with 
ellipses shall be released when the then unreleased 
decision that was cited in the separate opinion is 
released.   
FIFTH:  No one justice may block the release of a 
majority opinion by a "Hold."  It shall take the 
affirmative vote of the majority of participating 
justices to block the release of a majority opinion.  
No one justice may tie together the release of two 
pending cases.  It shall take the affirmative vote of 
a majority of participating justices in each case to 
tie together the release of two pending cases.   
SIXTH:  Majority opinions assigned in September, 
October and November shall be circulated no later than 
January 31.  Majority opinions assigned in December, 
January and February shall be circulated no later than 
March 31.  Majority opinions assigned in March and 
April shall be circulated no later than May 31.   
There will be no court conferences on circulated 
opinions unless a majority of justices participating 
in the case request court conference on the circulated 
opinion(s) in that case.  
No.  2012AP1818-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
The times for responding to majority opinions first 
circulated after April 15 will need to be shortened 
from what is set forth above.  We will make a decision 
about what timelines are needed during April 2015 when 
we see how many opinions remain outstanding. 
There also may need to be some flexibility when 
applying this process to the opinions due by January 
31 and March 31.  Flexibility may be needed generally 
because this is a new process.  It is anticipated that 
if a justice has tried but cannot meet the expected 
deadlines, he or she will request an extension for a 
specified time so all will understand where the court 
is in opinion processing and release. 
¶31 The flow chart accompanying the narrative is as 
follows: 
The following is a flow chart representing the revised 
Opinion Preparation & Mandate proposal.  For clarity, 
the chart is broken into two separate pieces: the 
first, directly below, represents the process for 
initial circulations of all opinions; the second, on 
page two, represents the process from circulation of 
all opinions through revisions and mandate. 
No.  2012AP1818-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP1818-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP1818-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
General notes: 
All deadlines are calendar days. 
• 
The maximum time under this proposal from first 
circulation of a majority opinion to mandate is 107 
days.  This assumes that all maximum time is taken and 
each of the following occurs: 
• 
A Justice does not declare a concurrence or 
dissent 
until 
after 
the 
majority 
has 
been 
recirculated and incorporated suggested changes; 
and 
• 
The 
majority 
flips, 
triggering 
the 
additional 14 day revision period. 
• 
The five day periods for placing opinions in the 
Release Drive following mandate are for cite checking 
and spelling and grammar revisions. 
¶32 Key portions of the Internal Operating Procedures 
(which we have generally followed since before 1984 up until 
September 2014) are as follows:  All opinions were discussed in 
conference, often several times; any justice could ask that a 
draft opinion be held and reconferenced; and majority opinions 
would 
be 
released 
simultaneously 
with 
any 
concurring 
or 
dissenting opinions.   
¶33 The new procedure departs from our longstanding 
procedure for opinions and mandates in several important ways. 
Starting in September, draft opinions cannot be discussed at 
conference.  To hold a conference on a draft opinion, a vote of 
four justices is required.  No single justice can hold an 
opinion; a vote of four justices is required.  Furthermore, in 
certain circumstances a majority opinion may be released without 
being accompanied by a concurring or dissenting opinion; the 
drafted concurring and dissenting opinions must be released at a 
No.  2012AP1818-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
later date.  These provisions, as well as the short time periods 
allowed for separate writings, are unwelcoming to concurrences 
and dissents.     
¶34 Ambiguities and cracks in the process have already 
appeared.  Some were identified during the adoption of the new 
procedure, others not. 
¶35 Changing the ways the court does its business is 
important. 
 
Circumstances 
change, 
personnel 
changes, 
and 
technology changes.  Timely release of our opinions after oral 
argument is important for the litigants, for the bench and bar, 
for the public, and for this court.  We should not, however, 
sacrifice thoughtful discussion and careful collegial review of 
draft opinions just for the sake of speed.  For at least the 
last 50 years, cases heard from September 1 through June have 
been completed by June 30 (unless additional briefing was 
required), regardless of the procedure used for circulating and 
mandating opinions.   
¶36 Only time will tell whether this new procedure will 
produce thoughtful, precise opinions that are released more 
promptly, or whether it will even produce opinions that are 
released more promptly.  At this time, we are encountering the 
ambiguities and uncertainties of the procedure and the different 
timelines for numerous circulating opinions (some addressing 
similar issues).  Figuring out due dates and maintaining a flow 
chart for each draft opinion is unwieldy and difficult because 
of ambiguities in calculating time periods and numerous redrafts 
that are not accounted for in the narrative or flow chart.    
No.  2012AP1818-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶37 Changes in the newly adopted procedure are being 
requested 
and 
should 
be 
given 
serious 
consideration.  
Improvements may make this experimental new procedure more 
satisfactory.   
¶38 The court might even consider a simpler procedure to 
accomplish the goals of reducing conferences and establishing 
deadlines.  For example, there might be an initial conference 
discussion of a draft opinion to identify the areas of strength 
and weakness, to identify areas of agreement and disagreement, 
and to determine whether opinions involving the same legal 
issues need to be put on the same timeline for harmonization. 
Deadlines might be established at this conference for each 
opinion to fit the circumstances, such as the extent of 
revisions required, the number and approaches of separate 
writings, and the work of the court and the individual justices. 
¶39 There may be other and better suggestions for the 
court to consider.  
¶40 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
No.  2012AP1818-CR.ssa 
 
1