Case Title: 20 Thames Street LLC v. Ocean State Job Lot of Maine 2017, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 55

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 55 
Docket: 
Cum-19-282 
Argued: 
March 3, 2020 
Decided: 
May 5, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, and CONNORS, JJ.* 
 
 
20 THAMES STREET LLC et al. 
 
v. 
 
OCEAN STATE JOB LOT OF MAINE 2017, LLC 
 
 
CONNORS, J. 
[¶1]  The issue presented in this appeal is whether the court hearing a 
commercial forcible entry and detainer action has jurisdiction to award 
lease-based attorney fees.  Ocean State Job Lot of Maine 2017, LLC, appeals from 
a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) in which the 
court vacated an award of attorney fees to Ocean State entered by the District 
Court in the Business and Consumer Docket (Mulhern, J.).  The Superior Court 
concluded that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award 
lease-based attorney fees upon finding for Ocean State on a commercial forcible 
                                         
*  Although Chief Justice Saufley participated in the appeal, she resigned before this opinion was 
certified. 
 
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entry and detainer action brought by 20 Thames Street LLC and 122 PTIP LLC 
(collectively, 20 Thames).  We affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In August 2017, Ocean State rented a commercial retail space in 
Falmouth from Louis Vinios, trustee of Falmouth Realty Associates.  20 Thames 
subsequently purchased the property from Vinios and assumed the lease with 
Ocean State.  Less than two months later, 20 Thames filed in the District Court 
(Portland) its complaint for forcible entry and detainer, alleging that Ocean 
State breached the terms of the lease and 20 Thames was entitled to possession.  
The matter was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket.  After a 
three-day trial, the court (Mulhern, J.) found in favor of Ocean State, 
determining that it had not violated the lease.  Upon Ocean State’s petition, and 
after receiving affidavits from the parties, the court awarded Ocean State costs 
and $206,076 in attorney fees based on the following lease provision: 
In the event either party hereto initiates litigation to enforce the 
terms and provisions of this Lease, the non-prevailing party in such 
action shall reimburse the prevailing party for its reasonable 
attorney’s fees, filing fees, and court costs. 
 
 
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[¶3]  20 Thames appealed to the Superior Court.  See 14 M.R.S. § 6008(1) 
(2018).1  That court (Warren, J.) affirmed the judgment for Ocean State on the 
complaint and the award of costs, but vacated the attorney fee award because 
it concluded that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to award lease-based 
attorney fees. 
[¶4]  Ocean State timely appealed, challenging the Superior Court’s 
decision vacating the award of attorney fees.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2018); 
M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶5]  Title 14 M.R.S. § 6017 (2018) governs the forcible entry and 
detainer process for commercial leases.  The question is whether the statute 
confers on the District Court the authority to award lease-based attorney fees.  
This question relating to the scope of the District Court’s jurisdiction may be 
raised at any time in the proceedings, whether by a party or by the court.  See 
Jensen v. Jensen, 2015 ME 105, ¶ 11, 121 A.3d 809; Warren v. Waterville Urban 
Renewal Auth., 290 A.2d 362, 365 (Me. 1972).  Thus, we will not disregard the 
issue as unpreserved or waived. 
                                         
1  20 Thames also appealed to us, but we dismissed its appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
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[¶6]  Ordinarily, “litigants bear their own attorney fees in the absence of 
statutory authority or a contractual provision.”  Soley v. Karll, 2004 ME 89, ¶ 10, 
853 A.2d 755.  In the context of a forcible entry and detainer action, claims for 
breach of contract may not be asserted unless authorized by the statute.  
M.R. Civ. P. 80D(g) (“Forcible entry and detainer actions shall not be joined with 
any other action, nor shall a defendant in such action file any counterclaim.”); 
see also Bureau v. Gendron, 2001 ME 157, ¶ 9, 783 A.2d 643.  Such additional 
claims are disallowed because “[t]he judicial power in a forcible entry and 
detainer action—a summary proceeding to determine who has a right to 
immediate possession of real property to the exclusion of another—is purely 
statutory in origin.”  Rubin v. Josephson, 478 A.2d 665, 667 (Me. 1984); see also 
Tozier v. Tozier, 437 A.2d 645, 647 (Me. 1981).  Because contractual attorney 
fees are not available in a forcible entry and detainer action absent statutory 
authorization, the question is whether the statute here provides authority for 
the District Court to award those lease-based fees.2 
                                         
2  Title 14 M.R.S § 6017 (2018) does not supply a basis for the award of statutory attorney fees.  
Cf. 14 M.R.S. §§ 6004-A(2), 6010, 6014(3) (2018) (allowing an award of attorney fees in a residential 
forcible entry and detainer matter to a party whose opponent fails to make a good-faith effort to 
mediate; to a tenant from a perpetrator of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking; or to a 
landlord if an action alleging an illegal eviction was not brought in good faith and was frivolous or 
intended only to harass). 
 
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[¶7]  Ocean State argues that the attorney fees are statutorily authorized 
either (A) as “arrears” that may be awarded pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 6017(6), or 
(B) as an “offsetting claim[]” that may be considered by the District Court 
pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 6017(2)(A). 
[¶8]  In examining the statute de novo, Thornton Acad. v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 
21, 2019 ME 115, ¶ 5, 212 A.3d 340, we construe its terms “to give effect to the 
Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute,” Packgen, Inc. v. Bernstein, Shur, 
Sawyer & Nelson, P.A., 2019 ME 90, ¶ 20, 209 A.3d 116 (quotation marks 
omitted).  We interpret the statute in the context of the entire statutory scheme, 
see id. ¶ 21, and give the statute’s words “their plain, common, and ordinary 
meaning, such as people of common intelligence would usually ascribe to 
them,” Thornton Acad., 2019 ME 115, ¶ 5, 212 A.3d 340 (quotation marks 
omitted).  In doing so, we will “avoid[] results that are absurd, inconsistent, 
unreasonable, or illogical.”  Packgen, 2019 ME 90, ¶ 21, 209 A.3d 116 (quotation 
marks omitted).  Only if the statute is “susceptible of different meanings” and 
therefore ambiguous, id. (quotation marks omitted), will we look to extrinsic 
indicia of legislative intent, such as the legislative history of the statute, to 
ascertain the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute, see id.; see also In re 
Child of Nicholas P., 2019 ME 152, ¶ 32, 218 A.3d 247. 
 
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A. 
Arrears 
[¶9]  “The District Court has jurisdiction to hear, decide and award rent 
and arrears allegedly owing, regardless of the amount.”  14 M.R.S. § 6017(6) 
(emphasis added).  Ocean State contends that the separation of the terms “rent” 
and “arrears” means that “arrears” can include sums owed by a party apart 
from rent, including attorney fees.  This interpretation is not consistent with 
the plain meaning of the term “arrears,” however, which is defined as “[a]n 
unpaid, overdue debt or unfulfilled obligation.”  Arrears, American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2016); see also Arrear, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining an “arrear” as “[a]n unpaid or overdue 
debt”).  Here, 20 Thames was not behind in its payment of Ocean State’s 
attorney fees before any attorney fees were awarded.  To interpret the statute 
to include attorney fees incurred in the litigation as “arrears allegedly owing” 
would be inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the term.  14 M.R.S. 
§ 6017(6). 
B. 
Offsetting Claims 
[¶10]  The commercial forcible entry and detainer statute further 
provides that, “[i]n addition to deciding the right of possession, the District 
Court shall also decide the amount of rent owed, if disputed.  In establishing the 
 
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amount of rent owed, the District Court may consider offsetting claims to the 
extent appropriate.”  Id. § 6017(2)(A) (emphasis added).  Ocean State contends 
that a claim for attorney fees under a lease is an “offsetting claim” when the 
tenant prevails. 
[¶11]  “Offset” is defined as “to balance, complement, counteract, 
compensate for, etc.”  Offset, Webster’s New World College Dictionary (5th ed. 
2016); see also Offset, Black’s Law Dictionary (defining “offset” as “[t]o balance 
or calculate against; to compensate for”).  If the tenant prevails and no rent or 
arrears are owed, there is nothing to “offset.” 
[¶12]  In sum, the forcible entry and detainer action is a summary 
proceeding, narrowly defined by statute and constrained by rules of court.  
Section 6017 authorizes only a narrow category of claims outside possession to 
be pursued in the action.  Under the plain language of section 6017, a contract 
claim for attorney fees not incurred until and through the litigation does not fall 
into this category. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
Seth W. Brewster, Esq. (orally), Ryan P. Dumais, Esq., and Micah A. Smart, Esq., 
Eaton Peabody, Portland, for appellant Ocean State Job Lot of Maine 2017, LLC 
 
Eben M. Albert, Esq., Glenn Israel, Esq. (orally), and David A. Soley, Esq., 
Bernstein Shur, Portland, for appellees 20 Thames Street LLC and 122 PTIP LLC 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number AP-2018-47 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY