Case Title: A.P. v. State Dept. of Health and Human Services, Div. of Public Assistance and Social Services ex rel. B.L.S.

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-92-2

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
A.P. v. State Dept. of Health and Human Services, Div. of Public Assistance and Social Services ex rel. B.L.S.1993 WY 41849 P.2d 703Case Number: C-92-2Decided: 03/19/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
A.P., 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND 
SOCIAL SERVICES, ex rel., B.L.S., a minor child, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff). 

Appeal from District 
Court, Sheridan County, James N. Wolfe, J.

A.P., pro 
se.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen. and Michael L. Hubbard, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and URBIGKIT, J. 
(Retired).

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal is 
from a judgment and order declaring AP the natural father of the child (BLS); 
against AP and in favor of the Department of Family Services (DFS) in the amount 
of $2,646.03 for Aid to Families with Dependent Children and medical care 
provided on behalf of his child BLS which AP is to repay at the rate of $25.00 
per month; requiring AP to pay child support of $100.00 to $300.00 per month, 
depending on the level of his income, such child support payments to continue 
until BLS is emancipated. The question here presented is whether the procedure 
followed in the district court was adequate to guard the interests of the 
appellant (AP).

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      AP did not 
present a formal statement of the issues in his brief. We perceive, 
nevertheless, the issue presented to be his claim that he was prejudiced by the 
failure of the district court to strictly adhere to statutorily required 
procedures. The appellee, State of Wyoming, contends that AP failed to carry his 
burden of establishing prejudicial error.

[¶4]      A complaint was 
filed by DFS on October 22, 1990, seeking to establish AP as the natural father 
of BLS and to require past and future support for the child. AP answered on 
January 30, 1991, denying the gravamen of that complaint. By order entered on 
February 15, 1991, the district court appointed counsel, at the expense of DFS, 
to represent AP. By order entered on March 18, 1991, the district court 
appointed a guardian ad litem for BLS, directed genetic testing of AP to 
determine the probability of his being the father of BLS, and scheduled an 
informal hearing for April 17, 1991. The record does not reflect whether that 
informal hearing ever took place.

[¶5]      On September 20, 
1991, the attorney appointed to represent AP asked to withdraw asserting that 
his representation of AP had been rendered unreasonably difficult by AP and that 
AP had fired him. The district court did not enter an order permitting counsel 
to withdraw. The record reflects that AP's counsel wrote to AP on September 17, 
1991, and informed AP that the genetic testing established that the probability 
of his being the father of BLS was 99.96 percent certain. He advised AP that his 
choices were:

1. Visitation and child 
support (easy to achieve); or

2. Custody of [BLS] (very 
difficult to obtain).

AP's response, 
filed in the record on September 20, 1991, was cast in fairly strong 
language:

  I wager that I absolutely have no 
possibility of accomplishing success with you for my attorney. To the very best 
of my knowledge you have seriously weakened my case. I should not have to 
babysit my attorney, and hold his hand to make sure that things get done. I was 
counting on you to pursue and to follow threw [sic]. I realize that at times 
"things get pretty hectic." Things are going to get a hell of a lot more hectic. 
I could not count on you in the past - what will happen in the future. . . 
.

I do not know why an 
attorney would intimidate the State's Officials for something totally out of the 
state[']s control. It was not right, and I certainly did not appreciate the 
letter I received from one of them of which was indirectly detrimental to my 
character.

On more than one occasion 
you have screwed up my case, a case that was once very strongly fortified. 
Moreover, your poor advice draws me to believe that you are clearly not looking 
out for my best interest. In fact you disclosed confidential information to the 
plaintiff that will most likely lead my case into default.

Furthermore, it is not my 
intention to be represented as a discourteous analtentative rectal-section; I do 
not want to come across to The Judge that way, at all.

I insist that you file 
motion for a sufficiently competent replacement attorney - immediately, before 
you further impede your personal liability. If you do not file the motion: I 
will; I will word things appropriately; you will have one hell of a lot of 
explaining to do.

[¶6]      By order entered 
on October 7, 1991, the district court set the matter for hearing to be held on 
October 30, 1991. On October 28, 1991, the attorney for DFS stipulated that the 
guardian ad litem could withdraw as attorney for BLS. On October 30, 1991, the 
guardian ad litem filed a motion to withdraw. The district court did not grant 
the motion for AP's attorney to withdraw, nor did it grant the motion for the 
guardian ad litem to withdraw. On the contrary, the district court went ahead 
with the hearing scheduled for October 30, 1991. AP did not appear at that 
hearing, and the district court entered default in favor of DFS. AP asked to be 
relieved of that default because he had failed to appear due to a "calendaring 
problem," i.e., he had calendared the hearing for October 31, 1991, rather than 
for October 30, 1991. In addition, he claimed he did not know that the October 
30, 1991 hearing could potentially be dispositive of the litigation in this 
matter. On April 14, 1992, the district court entered a judgment and order 
declaring AP to be the natural father of BLS; entered judgment against him and 
in favor of DFS in the amount of $2,646.03, to be paid in $25.00 per month 
installments; and requiring payment of child support of not less than $100.00 
nor more than $300.00 per month.

[¶7]      Wyoming statutes 
establish the procedural requirements for a matter such as this. DFS may bring 
an action as was done here to determine the existence of the father child 
relationship with respect to a child who has no presumed father. W.S. 14-2-104 
(Supp. 1992). This action was filed by DFS within the statute of limitations. 
W.S. 14-2-105 (Supp. 1992). Wyoming Statute 14-2-107 (1986) further 
provides:

The child shall be made a 
party to the action. If he is a minor he shall be represented by his guardian or 
a guardian ad litem appointed by the court. The child's mother or father may not 
represent the child as guardian or otherwise. The natural mother, each man 
presumed to be the natural father under W.S. 14-2-102 and each man alleged to be 
the natural father may be made parties and shall be given notice of the action 
in a manner prescribed by the court and an opportunity to be heard. The court 
may align the parties.

All of these 
procedural requirements were followed. All matters determined by the district 
court were authorized by the statutes. W.S. 14-2-106 (1986) and W.S. 14-2-113 
(1986 and Supp. 1992). Counsel was appointed for AP as required by W.S. 14-2-116 
(Supp. 1992).

[¶8]      We are well aware 
that failure to adhere to the procedural requirements of these statutes may 
cause a judgment rendered under them to be void. Matter of TLB, 771 P.2d 811 
(Wyo. 1989). This case did slip into disarray when AP wrote the September 20, 
1991 letter to his attorney and then failed to appear at the hearing scheduled 
by the district court. Nonetheless, we are comfortable that AP had notice of the 
hearing, an opportunity to be heard, and was accorded the process due under all 
the circumstances of this case. That he was not heard is attributable only to 
himself. The result achieved was appropriate. The district court did not err, 
under the circumstances of this case, in entering default against AP, nor did it 
abuse its discretion in refusing AP relief from that default. See Throndset v. 
L.L.S., 485 N.W.2d 775 (N.D. 1992); Mendocino County on Behalf of Bartlow v. Ted 
S., 217 Cal. App. 3d 1202, 266 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1990); County of Hennepin v. 
Brinkman, 378 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1985); Thomas v. Fey, 376 N.W.2d 266 (Minn.App. 
1985); State v. Beauchamp, 473 So. 2d 323 (La. App. 1985); 14 C.J.S. Children 
Out-of-Wedlock § 121 (1991).

[¶9]      The judgment of 
the district court is affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J. (Retired), files a 
dissenting opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, Retired, 
dissenting.

[¶10]   This is the state family service 
agency's effort to find a parent and through a determination of parentage 
action, to help defray the taxpayers' burden in maintenance of the aid to 
dependent children program. The goal is appropriate and the need is 
significant.

[¶11]   However, the alleged father 
suffered a judgmental conclusion without the barest semblance of due process. 
Both the judiciary and society can do better than this by providing reasonable 
due process in a litigative campaign of this character. My view is not 
outlandish, since a representative of the Attorney General's office, in 
representation of the Department of Family Services (DFS) on appeal, confessed 
error, which was subsequently withdrawn and other counsel was then involved to 
provide a formula to justify this abysmal denial of fundamental and 
well-determined rights by contention of the absence of prejudice. There cannot 
be prejudice as an issue within the processes existent here when there were no 
litigative rights provided.

[¶12]   The scenario of events in this 
litigation is near unbelievable, but certainly confused, regarding what occurred 
within the steps taken by the trial court for disposition of this determination 
of parentage action. The majority opines the issue to be for appellant: "That he 
was [not] prejudiced by the failure of the district court to strictly adhere to 
statutorily required procedures." Clearly, prejudicial error is the sole 
interest invoked in examination by the majority, which, as we shall see from 
what occurred, simply means that this court determines that rights for a hearing 
and trial can be disregarded if the trial court first, and the appellate court 
thereafter, determines the case without either evidence or hearing to be one of 
a clear fact of parentage. 

[¶13]   When all else fails, justice and 
the law are better served if we simply look specifically at the occurrence of 
events in a chronological outline.

[¶14]   October 22, 1990: A complaint was 
filed by DFS alleging assignment of rights to support payments from the mother 
of the minor child, BLS, and requesting a determination of parentage against 
appellant. BLS was born on December 17, 1988. When the mother, DAS, applied for 
public assistance benefits, the state was given the assignment of rights. 
Claimed in the proceedings was a determination of parentage, repayment of AFDC 
benefits then totaling $4,371, and medical expenses in the amount of $2,372.06, 
as well as a request for future support in an amount of at least $200 per 
month.

[¶15]   January 17, 1991: Service of the 
summons was made.

[¶16]   January 30, 1991: An answer, in 
essence, of general denial was filed pro se.

[¶17]   January 30, 1991: A motion for 
appointment of counsel was filed.

[¶18]   February 8, 1991: An order setting 
the motion for appointment of counsel hearing on for February 15, 1991 was 
entered.

[¶19]   February 15, 1991: Counsel "A" was 
appointed to represent appellant (putative father).

[¶20]   March 7, 1991: Counsel "A" moved to 
withdraw and requested the appointment of other counsel to be putative father's 
counsel as a substitute. I will designate appellant's counsel as Counsel "B" to 
avoid embarrassment to the attorney.

[¶21]   March 7, 1991: An order was entered 
permitting Counsel "A" to withdraw and appointing Counsel "B" as a 
substitute.

[¶22]   March 11, 1991: Counsel "B" filed a 
motion for informal hearing, appointment of guardian ad litem, and genetic 
testing.

[¶23]   March 18, 1991: An order was 
entered directing genetic testing, appointment of a guardian ad litem, who was 
local attorney J. John Sampson, and scheduling an informal hearing.

[¶24]   September 20, 1991: Counsel "B" 
moved to withdraw on the basis of disagreement and dispute with appellant 
(putative father).

[¶25]   October 7, 1991: An order was 
entered setting a hearing on the motion for leave to withdraw as attorney for 
putative father and for an informal hearing to be held on the 30th day of 
October, 1991. The order included the foregoing in its terms: "If counsel desire 
that the proceedings be reported, such arrangements should be made with the 
Court Reporter at least three (3) days prior to the date of the hearing." 
(Emphasis in original.) Counsel were advised of the order by copies in their box 
at the courthouse and a copy, according to the record, was sent to 
appellant.

[¶26]   October 28, 1991: A stipulation and 
motion was filed by counsel for the State, which stated:

COMES NOW the Plaintiff 
State of Wyoming and offers to stipulate to the withdrawal of J. John Sampson as 
Guardian Ad Litem and to the withdrawal of [Counsel "B"] as Attorney for 
Defendant, and the Plaintiff waives its appearance at the hearing as to the 
motions for withdrawal of these persons.

The Plaintiff State 
hereby moves for a continuance of the informal hearing in this matter until such 
time as the questions of representation of the Defendant [AP] and guardianship 
ad litem of [BLS] can be settled.

[¶27]   October 30, 1991: The guardian ad 
litem, J. John Sampson, moved to withdraw on the basis that he would assume the 
duties as a county court judge on November 1, 1991. The motion was dated October 
24, 1991, but filed October 30, 1991.

[¶28]   October 30, 1991: (Taken from the 
billing statement subsequently authorized for payment by the trial court for 
Counsel "B," since there is no record of what occurred on the date, except from 
that statement and from allegations by appellant.) Court appearance, motion and 
informal hearing. To be repetitive, there is no record of the events, who was 
present, or what occurred, and no order was entered and no evidence was 
introduced into the record.1 Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-108 (Cum.Supp. 
1992), entitled "Informal hearing; refusal of witnesses or parties to testify; 
testimony of physician; * * *," provides:

(a) As soon as 
practicable after an action is brought to declare the existence or nonexistence 
of the father and child relationship, an informal hearing shall be held. The 
court may order that the hearing be held before a referee. The public is barred 
from the hearing. A record of the proceeding shall be kept.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶29]   We know from the billing statement 
that Counsel "B" appeared at the trial court on October 30 and that appellant 
did not. No record was kept, no documentation is available as to what occurred, 
and no order was entered as a result of the session.

[¶30]   However, something else did happen. 
On November 5, 1991, (according to appellant, by direction of the trial court), 
a motion for relief from default was filed by Counsel "B" who had been 
discharged. Obviously, this was done at the request of appellant and, reason 
would say, in accord with the direction of the trial court to appellant. That 
motion stated the following:

[AP] respectfully moves 
this Court to relieve him from his default in failure to appear at the hearing 
scheduled on the 30th of October, 1991 at 1:30 p.m.

In support of this 
Motion, [AP] shows the Court:

1. [AP] had fired his 
attorney on the 19th of September, 1991 (see letter attached to Motion for Leave 
to Withdraw).

2. [AP] was served with 
the Motion for Leave to Withdraw as attorney for Defendant and the Order Setting 
the Motion to Withdraw for hearing.

3. [AP] did not 
understand that the Order Setting the Motion for Leave to Withdraw might result 
in a resolution of the support and custody aspects of his case. He thought the 
only matter at issue was his continued representation by [Counsel 
"B"].

4. [AP] has been informed 
of the Court's decision regarding the support, custody, and visitation issues; 
specifically, that the Court will deny his claim for custody or 
visitation.

5. [AP]'s failure to 
appear was due to excusable neglect and inadvertence for the following 
reasons:

A. Although he intended 
to attend the hearing, he made a clerical error in calendaring the date and 
time. He calendared the hearing for the 31st of October instead of the 
30th.

B. Because [AP] had fired 
his attorney, he did not ask his attorney what might happen at the "informal 
hearing" portion of the October 30, 1991 hearing, nor was he warned by his 
attorney.

WHEREFORE, [AP] requests 
that he be relieved of his default, and that the informal hearing be continued 
to a date he may attend. In the alternative, he asks that, pending retention of 
new counsel to pursue his custody/visitation claim, he be allowed reasonable 
visitation of at least every other weekend with his son, [BLS].

Respectfully submitted 
this 4th day of March, 1991.

/s/

[Counsel "B"]

Attorney at 
Law

[Address 
stated]

[¶31]   November 15, 1991: An order was 
filed denying the motion for relief. The following was entered: 

[¶32]   The above-entitled matter having 
come before the Court upon Defendant's Motion For Relief From Default and the 
Court having considered such Motion finds that the Motion should be 
denied.

[¶33]   IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion For Relief From 
Default be and the same is hereby denied.

DATED this 15 day of November, 
1991.

[¶34]   February 10, 1992: A motion was 
entered requesting an order approving attorney's fees, which included, in 
statements: "That the case is concluded and nothing further remains to be 
done." (Emphasis added.) The billing entries which were attached, stated the 
following dates and events on or after October 30, 1991:     

[Time] 

10-30-91 Court 
appearance - motions and informal hearing                  
0.50 

10-31-91 
Unpleasant conf. with client re: missed court date                   
0.40 

10-31-91 
Preparation of Motion for relief from default                             
0.60 

10-31-91 
Telephone conf. with Kinnison [State's attorney]                      
0.10 

11-04-91 
Revision of Motion, call to Kinnison                                           
0.25

 11-18-91 Office conf. with client                                                     
0.25

 02-10-92 Preparation of Motion and Order 
for Attorney's Fees             
0.60

[¶35]   February 10, 1992: An order was 
entered approving the fees for Counsel "B."

[¶36]   March 25, 1992: A notice of filing 
the paternity evaluation report was made. This is the only documentary 
information that was ever made part of the record in this proceeding. The 
paternity report was obviously not filed of record with the alleged informal 
hearing on October 30, 1991. The mailing certification for the notice of filing 
the paternity evaluation shows that it was sent to Counsel "B" for appellant, 
but no copy was furnished to appellant himself.

[¶37]   April 14, 1992: A judgment was 
ordered and entered without further proceedings, hearing, or advice to 
appellant, where discharged appellant's counsel appeared, which stated in 
initial sentence:

This matter having come 
on regularly before this court upon the COMPLAINT filed by the State of Wyoming, 
and the Order for Setting; and the Plaintiff appearing, by and through 
[state's attorney], and [Counsel "B"] appearing; the Court proceeded to hear the 
matter[.]

(Emphasis 
added.)

The judgment was 
approved as to form by the discharged counsel and no record is found which in 
any way indicates that notice of the prospect of entry of a final judgment was 
forthcoming had been given to appellant. There is no order setting any hearing 
after the October order setting the motion and pretrial hearing held on October 
30, 1991.

[¶38]   April 14, 1992: An affidavit of 
mailing by the district court clerk stated in part:

2. That on the 14 
day of April, 1992, I caused to be mailed, by first class United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, true and correct copies of the Judgment and Notice 
of Right to Hearing, to the last known address of the Judgment 
debtor[.]

[¶39]   There is no notice of right to 
hearing contained in the record. Obviously, the certificate of mailing submitted 
to appellant the judgment which had been entered without his knowledge and in 
absence of his opportunity to appear or have a hearing, but in the presence of 
his discharged counsel.

[¶40]   April 29, 1992: Responsive to this 
state of the record, appellant filed his motion for relief from judgment, 
stating in full:

     [AP] respectfully 
moves the Court to relieve him from the Judgement [sic] and Order entered on 
April 14, 1992.

[¶41]   In support of this motion [AP] 
shows the Court:

1. [AP] was not served a 
notice of the Court's order Denying Motion For Relief From Default, enter[ed] on 
November 15, 1991; therefore, the defendant [AP] was unaware of the Court's 
decision to enter default despite the fact that it is not Lawfully possible to 
default while being represented by an "attorney" whom signed a Judgement [sic] 
and Order Five and [a] half months later without notifying the defendant that 
there would be a kangaroo court session on the 14th day of April.

2. [AP] also shows the 
Court that [Counsel "B"] is negligent: [Counsel "B"] refuses to represent his 
client, has misled his client and neglected to investigate the effect that the 
third cousin relationship between [AP] and [DAS] would have on the outcome of 
the "HLA Blood Test," of which according to The Genetic Counselors, (whom 
[Counsel "B"] never bothered to contact): "That is something which should 
have definitely been brought up." Another reputable source indicates that 
"Third cousin relatives have anywhere from a 12.5 to a 25 percent chance of 
having the exact same genetic makeup."

3. [AP] furthers that the 
Court has pursued no "Uniform Operation of General Law," during the 
mockery.

4. Furthermore, [AP] 
awaits the Court's answer to the Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Attorney For 
The Defendant.

WHEREFORE, [AP] asks that 
the Court attempt to be fare [sic], and pursue Law and Order; there of relieving 
him from an unjust Judgement [sic] and providing him with his Constitutional 
rights.

Respectfully submitted 
this 29th day of April, 1992.

(Emphasis in 
original.)

[¶42]   April 29, 1992: A notice of appeal 
was filed, pro se, by the defendant, which stated in detail:

     The Defendant, [AP], 
hereby serves notice of Appeal onto these matters: Order Directing Genetic 
Testing done on March 18, 1991; Motion For Second Order Directing Genetic 
Testing entered the 21st of June, 1991; Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Attorney 
For Defendant submitted the 20th day of September; Order Denying Motion For 
Relief From Default done on the 15th of November, 1991; Judgement [sic] And 
Order entered on the 14th day of April, 1992; Motion For Relief From Judgement 
[sic] submitted the 28th of April, 1992.

[¶43]   In support of this Appeal, [AP] 
shows the Court of Appeals:

1. The District Court has 
violated his Constitutional rights:

A. "The Right of Accused 
to Defend".

B. The "Right to 
Counsel."

C. The "Right to Pursue 
Law and Order."

D. The "Right To 
Trial."

2. The District Court has 
pursued an "Unusual" deliberation within the events of 
circumstances.

A. The Court did not 
answer Motions.

B. The Court denied 
reasonable justifiable motions.

C. The Court's 
proceedings were not appropriately executed.

D. The Court wrongfully 
discriminates against the defendant.

     WHEREFORE, [AP] 
requests that a Transcript be prepared and submitted with the accompany of a 
brief onto The Court of Appeals where this matter shall be investigated and 
rendered unjust.

Respectfully submitted, 
(without counsel), on this 29th day of April.

[¶44]   May 5, 1992: After the appeal was 
filed in response to the motion for relief for the non-noticed entry of the 
judgment, an order of denial was entered which stated:

The above-entitled matter 
having come before the Court upon the Motion For Relief From Judgment filed 
herein by the Defendant and the Court having reviewed such motion as well as the 
file and being fully advised in the premises finds that the Defendant was 
represented by competent counsel during all proceedings and the Judgment And 
Order entered in this matter on April 14, 1992, was proper and such motion 
should be denied.

IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion 
For Relief From Judgment be and the same is hereby denied.

 [¶45]  This is all the record there is. There is 
no testimony. There is no documentation of proof except the one paternity 
report. There is no notice to the appellant of any proceedings which were held 
after he had requested substitution of counsel and his counsel had moved to 
withdraw. There was no participation in any fashion by the guardian ad litem 
following his commencement of duties as county judge on November 1, 1991. There 
was no actual participation permitted by appellant after his contact with the 
trial judge on October 31, 1991.

[¶46]   Frankly, I do not find that this 
record, in any way, accurately supports the statement of the majority of only 
"the failure of the district court to strictly adhere to statutorily required 
procedures." It seems clear, beyond question, that there was never any factual 
hearing of any kind, at any time, in the progress of this proceeding. There is 
no proof of any kind in this record regarding the proper amounts for which 
appellant, even if he should have been determined to be the father, should be 
liable for retroactive re-payments to the state agency. Absolutely no protection 
was afforded by the statutorily provided and jurisdictionally required guardian 
ad litem for the minor. With the motion of counsel for appellant to withdraw and 
the filing of a stipulation in accord therewith by opposing counsel, some action 
was required of the trial court, even if it should have been a denial of some 
kind - for good cause shown.2 The participation by Counsel "B," 
after moving to withdraw, in approving the final judgment as to form without 
requesting or demanding some evidentiary hearing is beyond comprehension. The 
requirements of statute, not only that a guardian ad litem be appointed, but 
that the alleged father be given an opportunity to appear; defend with counsel; 
that a hearing be held; and, a record of the proceedings kept, have each and all 
been ignored.

[¶47]   We come to the subject which this 
author discussed in associative context regarding DNA proof of identity. Rivera 
v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 945 (Wyo. 1992). The assumption upon which the unproven, 
non-foundational paternity report came to be filed in this record and upon which 
this court now makes its decision as stated in the report to be "An untested 
random man of the North American Caucasian population," showing a combined 
paternity index of 2,786 to 1. If a trial had revealed, as appellant contends in 
briefing and argument, but not by trial pursuit since he was denied a trial, 
that neither he nor the natural mother were North American Caucasians, but 
rather, in part, Native American and also revealed that the mother and the 
putative father were related by blood, then we would have a report which has 
some factual relevance to this case. As it is, in essence, it has absolutely 
none.3 There is no foundation provided in 
determined facts in this record upon which any valid expert analysis can be 
reliably presented.

[¶48]   If any sense, whatsoever, can be 
made out of all of this, it is that, by virtue of appellant's misunderstanding 
the date set for determination of change of counsel and informal conference, he 
created a status of default which then eliminated all of his rights for a trial 
or evidentiary hearing pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-112 (Cum. Supp. 1992), 
including a right to a jury determination. The record contains no information 
regarding the income of appellant, although he alleges in documents that he was 
a student, and contains no information regarding the requirements for support 
or, for that matter, employment of the mother of the involved child. Certainly, 
there is nothing contained within this record that reveals that it is in the 
best interest of this unrepresented minor to be "adopted" by 
appellant.

[¶49]   Lacking a hearing or evidentiary 
trial, evidence, legal representation, or a guardian ad litem, I fail to see any 
way that we can characterize this status of the record as a failure to strictly 
adhere, or to consider that prejudicial error becomes the test where this court 
has no facts, evidence, or hearing upon which it can determine anything. This 
was not justice. If appellant is determinably the father, it should be done in 
accordance with law. This appeal will badly serve the stature of Wyoming law or 
this court's obligation to assure equal protection, due process, and access for 
every litigant who comes to the courthouse door to seek justice. See Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 6, due process of law; art. 1, § 8, courts open to all; art. 1, § 9, 
trial by jury inviolate; and art. 1, § 36, rights not enumerated reserved to 
people.

[¶50]   Consequently, I 
dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellant contends, and 
it does not appear to be of record in any way, that he had miscalendared the 
date and expected to appear on October 31, which he did. He states at that time 
that the trial court advised him to file a motion for relief from 
default. What we do know is that no order was entered by the trial court 
accepting the withdrawal of Counsel "B" or counsel who acted as guardian ad 
litem for the minor child. We judicially notice that Judge Sampson assumed the 
position as county judge on November 1, 1991 and, consequently, could not have 
legally been involved in any further pursuit in the case. Nothing indicates that 
he did appear at the motion hearing/informal conference held as a matter of a 
relatively few minutes on October 30.

2 The only good cause 
shown that I can find from this record to justify denying the litigant an 
opportunity for another attorney, where this level of dissatisfaction had 
developed, is the adamancy of the alleged putative father when he denies 
parentage.

3 Perhaps it can be 
understood why counsel for the State confessed error in statement:

The 
court below erred in making and entering said order for the reason that 
subsequent to the withdrawal of the child's initial guardian ad litem, J. John 
Sampson, in October, 1991, no replacement was ever appointed to represent the 
child's best interest in the proceedings or in negotiating the agreement which 
the court adopted in its paternity decree.

[It 
is hard for me to understand what agreement is referred, other than the 
possibility that discharged appellant's counsel, the court and counsel for the 
State made some agreement in the absence of appellant.]

This court has previously 
ruled directly on point, holding that orders not complying with the mandates of 
statutes respecting the determination of paternity W.S. 14-2-101 et seq., in 
this respect are void. See Matter of TLB, 771 P.2d 811 (Wyo. 1989) and Matter of 
TRG, 665 P.2d 491 (Wyo. 1983).