Case Title: New Jersey v. Twiggs

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of
the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.)

                        State v. Gary Twiggs (A-51-16) (077686)
            State v. James E. Jones & Likisha Jones (A-63/64/65-16) (077964)

Argued January 29, 2018 -- Decided June 19, 2018

TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court.

        The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (the Code) contains a tolling provision that
delays the start of the clock on the statute of limitations “when the prosecution is supported
by physical evidence that identifies the actor by means of DNA testing . . . until the State is
in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA . . . evidence necessary to establish
the identification of the actor by means of comparison to the physical evidence.” 
N.J.S.A.
2C:1-6(c). These consolidated appeals hinge on whether the provision applies when a DNA
identification does not directly identify the defendant but rather begins an investigative chain
that leads to the defendant. A separate issue in State v. Jones is whether the indictment on
the conspiracy count survives under a “continuing course of conduct” analysis.

        State v. Twiggs: On June 16, 2009, a detective responded to a robbery call and met
with S.T. (the victim) and defendant Gary Twiggs, who stated they had been robbed by a
white male wearing a mask, later identified as Dillon Tracy. A police officer took the mask
for DNA analysis. In July 2014, police collected DNA from Tracy. His DNA matched the
sample found on the mask. Tracy later confessed, implicating Twiggs. Based on Tracy’s
testimony, police arrested Twiggs for conspiracy and the robbery, and a grand jury returned
an indictment. Twiggs moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the claim was barred
by the general criminal statute of limitations, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(b)(1). The State responded
that the DNA exception within 
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) tolled the statute of limitations. The trial
court found the DNA-tolling provision inapplicable and dismissed the indictment. A divided
panel of the Appellate Division affirmed. 
445 N.J. Super. 23, 36 (App. Div. 2016). The
State filed a notice of appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 2:2-1(a)(2).

        State v. Jones: On August 15, 2002, ten-year-old Iyonna Jones found a note from her
mother, Elisha Jones -- intended for Iyonna’s aunt, Likisha Jones -- explaining that Iyonna’s
nine-year-old sister, Jon-Niece Jones, had stopped breathing and that Elisha went to “tak[e]
care of it.” Likisha called her brother, James Jones, telling him that there was a family
emergency. James and Iyonna’s uncle, Godfrey Gibson, traveled to Elisha’s home. Upon
their arrival, Elisha packed a plastic bin and garbage bag in the rear of Gibson’s car. James,
Gibson, and Elisha drove to a wooded area in Upper Freehold, New Jersey. Elisha took the
bin into the woods. A few days later at a family meeting, everyone present made a compact
to keep the incident secret and to answer any inquiries as to Jon-Niece’s whereabouts with
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“she’s with her father.” Nearly four months later, Elisha died. Years later, in March 2005, a
hunter found a child’s skeletal remains. In July 2012, Iyonna provided information relating
to the disappearance of Jon-Niece. Law enforcement compared Iyonna’s DNA and the DNA
of Jon-Niece’s father, Jamal Kerse, to the DNA generated from the skeletal remains. In
January 2013, a grand jury returned an indictment, charging James, Likisha, and Gibson with
third-degree conspiracy, as well as substantive tampering, obstruction, and hindering
charges. James and Likisha moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing expiration of the
applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division
reversed the denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss the tampering, obstruction, and
hindering charges; affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the conspiracy charge; and
remanded for resentencing on the conspiracy charge. 
445 N.J. Super. 555, 560 (App. Div.
2016). The Court granted the State’s petition and defendants’ cross-petitions for
certification. 
230 N.J. 361 (2017); 
230 N.J. 374 (2017); 
230 N.J. 375 (2017).

HELD: The DNA-tolling exception applies only when the State obtains DNA evidence that
directly matches the defendant to physical evidence of a crime. In Jones, the State presented
sufficient evidence of a continuing course of conduct to survive the motion to dismiss.

1. If the State does not file charges against an individual within the relevant statutory
timeframe, the statute of limitations serves as an absolute bar to the prosecution of the offense.
The DNA-tolling exception tolls the statute of limitations if the State’s prosecution of an
individual, “the actor,” is “supported by” DNA evidence that matches, or “identifies,” the actor
to physical evidence within its possession. 
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). Because of its unique nature,
DNA testing has become a widespread and standard practice in identifying criminal
perpetrators that courts have accepted as scientifically reliable and admissible in criminal trials
against defendants to whom the DNA matched. 
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) permits tolling when
identification is achieved directly by DNA evidence rather than DNA evidence in addition to
other means. It is apparent that the Legislature intended the provision to apply to the sole actor
whom the DNA distinctly identifies. (pp. 22-25)

2. Nothing in the legislative history of the tolling statute calls into question the plain-language
reading identified above. Under the State’s interpretation, the tolling provision would apply
even when the primary evidence used to support its prosecution of a defendant is not the DNA
evidence but rather a statement by a third party. Such evidence is the very kind of stale
evidence the criminal statutes of limitations operate to guard against. The statute of limitations
is not intended to assist the State in its investigations; it is intended to protect a defendant’s
ability to sustain his or her defense. Unlike other forms of evidence, DNA evidence can never
become stale. For the DNA-tolling provision to apply, the State must have DNA evidence that
establishes a direct link between physical evidence already within its possession and the
defendant it seeks to prosecute. (pp. 26-31)

3. The DNA evidence obtained from the physical evidence in Jones -- the remains --
established no link beyond a familial connection to Iyonna and Kerse. That evidence
certainly did not directly implicate defendants as perpetrators of the substantive crimes

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charged. The implication came only through third-party testimony, which 
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-
6(c) does not operate to preserve. Without the exception, the statute of limitations expired.
The judgment of the Appellate Division reversing the trial court’s denial of defendants’
motion to dismiss the indictment on the substantive charges is affirmed. (pp. 31-32)

4. In Twiggs, a grand jury indicted Twiggs based primarily on Tracy’s confession and his
subsequent implication of Twiggs as a co-conspirator in the armed robbery. There exists no
direct link between the DNA extracted from the physical evidence and Twiggs. Unless DNA
evidence establishes a direct identification to the defendant charged, the mere existence of
DNA evidence in a case cannot work to toll general statutes of limitations. The State argues
that the reading of the term “defendant” to include principals and accomplices for purposes
of the No Early Release Act (NERA) in State v. Rumblin, 
166 N.J. 550 (2001), should apply
to the DNA-tolling context. NERA uses the term “actor” in a wholly distinct framework to
achieve underlying policy goals separate from those of the DNA-tolling provision. NERA is
not influenced by stale-evidence concerns because it is triggered only after a defendant’s trial
or guilty plea. In contrast, the DNA-tolling provision creates an exception at the front end of
the judicial process by permitting criminal prosecutions outside of the generally prescribed
statute of limitations. The discussion of “actor” in Rumblin to include principals and
accomplices under NERA is simply inapplicable to the DNA-tolling provision. In Twiggs,
the DNA-tolling exception does not apply. The judgment of the Appellate Division
affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment against Twiggs is affirmed. (pp. 33-36)

5. As to the motions to dismiss the conspiracy count of the indictment in Jones,
“[c]onspiracy is a continuing course of conduct” that terminates, for statute of limitations
purposes, when (1) “the crime or crimes which are its object are committed,” or (2) “the
agreement that they be committed is abandoned by the defendant and by those with whom he
conspired.” 
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(f)(1). In Grunewald v. United States, the Supreme Court
stressed a “vital distinction” “between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main
criminal objectives of the conspiracy,” which extend the conspiracy and toll the statute of
limitations, and “acts of concealment done after these central objectives have been attained,
for the purpose only of covering up after the crime.”