Case Title: Michael Anthony Jones v. Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital Negligence

Citation: 

Docket Number: 33905

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2009-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
 
MICHAEL ANTHONY JONES, individually 
and as guardian ad litem for RHYS 
ALEXANDER JONES (DOB 8/20/99) and 
MOIRA   EIBHLIN JONES (DOB 7/04/02),       
 
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        Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondents,   
                                                          
 and                                                      
                                                          
LYNNE ROYER, as natural mother of LORI 
MARIE JONES,  deceased, and KIM 
ROYER, as step-father of LORI MARIE    
JONES, deceased, husband and wife, and 
HAROLD BOWERS,    
                                                          
        Plaintiffs-Cross Respondents,                  
                                                          
 v.    
                                                    
HEALTHSOUTH 
TREASURE 
VALLEY 
HOSPITAL,                  
                                                       
       Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant,     
                                                       
and                                                    
                                                       
ANESTHESIOLOGY CONSULTANTS OF 
TREASURE VALLEY, PLLC,  DEBORAH 
JENKINS, M.D., THOMAS LARK, M.D., 
B&B 
AUTOTRANSFUSION 
SERVICES, 
INC., 
an 
Idaho 
corporation, 
HAEMONETICS 
CORPORATION, 
a 
Massachusetts corporation; and JOHN DOES 
I through V,                             
                                                       
          Defendants.  
_______________________________________ 
 
LYNNE ROYER, as natural mother of 
LORIE MARIE JONES,    deceased,                  
                                                         
           Plaintiff-Appellant,                          
                                                         
Docket No. 33905 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Docket No. 33907 
 
 
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 and                                                     
                                                         
 MICHAEL ANTHONY JONES, individually 
and as guardian ad litem for RHYS 
ALEXANDER JONES (DOB 8/20/99) and 
MOIRA  EIBHLIN JONES (DOB 7/4/02), 
and KIM ROYER, as step-father of LORI 
MARIE JONES, deceased, and HAROLD       
 BOWERS,                                                 
                                                         
           Plaintiffs,                                   
                                                         
 v.                                                
                                                        
HEALTHSOUTH 
TREASURE 
VALLEY 
HOSPITAL,                   
                                                        
          Defendant-Respondent,                         
                                                        
and                                                     
                                                        
ANESTHESIOLOGY CONSULTANTS OF 
TREASURE VALLEY, PLLC,   DEBORAH 
JENKINS, M.D., THOMAS LARK, M.D., 
B&B   AUTOTRANSFUSION SERVICES, 
INC., 
an 
Idaho 
corporation,  
HAEMONETICS 
CORPORATION, 
a 
Massachusetts corporation, and JOHN DOES 
I through V,                              
                                                        
          Defendants.                                   
 
HAROLD BOWERS,                                           
                                                           
          Plaintiff-Appellant,                             
                                                           
and                                                        
                                                           
MICHAEL ANTHONY JONES, individually 
and as guardian ad litem for RHYS 
ALEXANDER JONES (DOB 8/20/99) and 
MOIRA    EIBHLIN JONES (DOB 7/4/02), 
LYNNE ROYER, as natural mother of LORI 
MARIE 
JONES, 
deceased, 
and 
KIM 
ROYER, as step-father of LORI MARIE 
JONES, deceased, husband  and wife,                 
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Boise, December 2008 
 
2009 Opinion No. 20 
 
Filed:  January 30, 2009 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Docket No. 33908 
 
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          Plaintiffs,                                      
                                                           
v.                                              
            
HEALTHSOUTH 
TREASURE 
VALLEY 
HOSPITAL,                  
                                                       
          Defendant-Respondent,                        
                                                       
and                                                    
                                                       
ANESTHESIOLOGY CONSULTANTS OF 
TREASURE VALLEY, PLLC,  DEBORAH 
JENKINS, M.D., THOMAS LARK, M.D., 
B&B   AUTOTRANSFUSION SERVICES, 
INC., 
an 
Idaho 
corporation, 
HAEMONETICS 
CORPORATION, 
a 
Massachusetts corporation, and JOHN DOES 
I through V,                             
                                                       
          Defendants.                                  
                                                       
                                                                                 
                                                                                 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 
County.  Hon. Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge. 
District court order granting summary judgment reversed and remanded. 
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis, Chtd., for appellants.  John Joseph Janis argued. 
Powers Thomson, P.C., Boise, for Respondents.  Raymond D. Powers argued. 
Comstock & Bush, Boise, for cross respondents, appellant Royer. 
Mahoney Law, PLLC, Boise, for cross respondents, appellant Bowers. 
__________________________________ 
BURDICK, Justice 
This case requires the Court to consider whether a hospital can be found vicariously 
liable for the negligence of an independently contracted cell saver technician under Idaho’s 
doctrine of apparent agency.  Appellants/Cross-Respondents Michael Anthony Jones, 
 
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individually and as guardian ad litem for Rhys Alexander Jones and Moira Eibhlin Jones; Lynne 
Royer, as natural mother of Lori Jones, deceased; and Harold Bowers, as natural father of Lori 
Jones, deceased (collectively Appellants), appeal from the district court’s award of summary 
judgment in favor of Respondent/Cross-Appellant Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital (TVH).  
TVH cross-appeals from the district court’s denial of discretionary costs.  We hold that a hospital 
may be found liable under Idaho’s doctrine of apparent authority for the negligence of 
independent personnel assigned by the hospital to perform support services. As such, we reverse 
the district court’s award of summary judgment and remand for a determination of whether 
Appellants presented sufficient evidence in support of their claim of apparent agency to survive 
summary judgment dismissal. Based on our ruling, we decline to consider TVH’s cross-appeal.   
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Sometime before August 2004, Lori Jones began seeing Dr. Timothy Doerr to treat her 
back problems.  Dr. Doerr recommended that Mrs. Jones undergo lumbar spine surgery, which 
would require a two to three day recovery stay in the hospital.  Dr. Doerr gave Mrs. Jones the 
option to have the surgery performed at either TVH or St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 
but recommended TVH because the patient-to-staff ratio was lower and because TVH had a 
private chef.  TVH is not a full service hospital, but rather a surgery center.  Both Mrs. Jones and 
her husband, Michael Jones, visited TVH, and ultimately chose to have the surgery performed 
there.   
Dr. Doerr elected to have Mrs. Jones’s blood “salvaged” during surgery, a process by 
which blood is collected from the patient intra-operatively and made available for reinfusion into 
the patient’s body using a cell saver machine.  Dr. Doerr issued an order for B&B 
Autotransfusion Services, Inc. to provide the cell saver machine and the cell saver technician for 
Mrs. Jones’s surgery.  During the applicable period in question, B&B performed all 
autotransfusion services for TVH pursuant to an independent contractor agreement.  Under this 
agreement, TVH was responsible for providing B&B with storage space for its cell saver 
machine as well as the autotransfusion supplies for surgery, and B&B was responsible for 
providing the cell saver technician and all disposable items related to autotranfusion.  TVH paid 
B&B a flat fee for its services, and then either billed the patient or the insurance company 
directly for the autotransfusion services performed by B&B.  Although the cell saver technicians 
were employees of B&B, TVH’s consent forms did not indicate their status as independent 
 
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contractors.   TVH furnished B&B’s cell saver technicians with hospital scrubs that all members 
of the surgical team were required to wear.  These scrubs contained no logos or other identifying 
information distinguishing between hospital employees and independent contractors.   
On August 2, 2004, Mrs. Jones underwent lumbar spine surgery at TVH.  Jeri Kurtz, a 
certified cell saver technician employed by B&B, operated the cell saver machine used during 
the surgery.  After Mrs. Jones’s blood had been collected, cleaned, and delivered into the 
reinfusion bag, Dr. Thomas Lark,1 the attending anesthesiologist, arranged for the reinfusion 
process to take place via gravity.  Shortly thereafter, Dr. Lark was temporarily relieved by 
another anesthesiologist Dr. Deborah Jenkins.2  In order to speed up the reinfusion process, Dr. 
Jenkins placed a “pressure cuff” around the bag.  The reinfusion bag contained a written warning 
that applying a pressure cuff could lead to death.  Both Ms. Kurtz and Dr. Lark noticed the cuff 
around the bag when they reentered the surgery room, but did nothing to remove it.  The pressure 
cuff eventually squeezed the air remaining in the bag into Mrs. Jones’s body, causing her to 
sustain a fatal air embolism.    Mrs. Jones was twenty-eight years old at the time of her death. 
  Appellants individually filed medical malpractice and wrongful death suits against 
various defendants, including TVH, claiming TVH was vicariously liable for the negligence of 
the two anesthesiologists and the cell saver technician under the theory of apparent agency.  
Before trial, TVH moved for summary judgment, claiming Appellants had failed to establish 
through expert testimony that TVH had breached the local standard of care for a hospital as 
required in Idaho.  Plaintiff Royer filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the 
issue of apparent agency, and Plaintiffs Jones and Bowers joined in this argument.  The district 
court determined that Idaho had not extended apparent agency liability to tort claims and, 
therefore, declined to grant Appellant’s motion for partial summary judgment.  Accordingly, the 
district court granted TVH’s motion for summary judgment.  Appellants appeal from this order.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard of 
review as was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.  See Cristo 
Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007).  Summary 
                                                 
1 Dr. Lark was employed by Anesthesiology Consultants of Treasure Valley, PLLC, an independent contractor 
providing anesthesiology services for TVH.   
 
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judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  I.R.C.P. 56(c).  “If there is no genuine issue 
of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.”  
Cristo, 144 Idaho at 307, 160 P.3d at 746 (quoting Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 47, 
44P.3d 1100, 1102 (2002).   
“It is axiomatic that upon a motion for summary judgment the non-moving party may not 
rely upon its pleadings, but must come forward with evidence by way of affidavit or otherwise 
which contradicts the evidence submitted by the moving party, and which establishes the 
existence of a material issue of disputed fact.”  Zehm v. Associated Logging Contractors, Inc., 
116 Idaho 349, 350, 775 P.2d 1191, 1192 (1998).  This Court liberally construes all disputed 
facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences drawn from the record will 
be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.  Cristo, 144 Idaho at 307, 160 P.3d at 746. If 
reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the 
evidence presented, then summary judgment is improper.  McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 
394, 64 P.3d 317, 320 (2003).   
III. ANALYSIS 
A. This Court previously extended the doctrine of apparent agency to tort claims in 
Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 708 P.2d 900 (1985).  
 
First, Appellants argue that the district court erred in determining that Idaho does not 
recognize the doctrine of apparent agency as a basis of liability for tort claims.  In support of 
their argument, Appellants direct this Court’s attention to Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 708 
P.2d 900 (1985).  In Bailey, this Court said:  
There are three types of agency, any of which are sufficient to bind the principal 
to a contract entered into by an agent with a third party, and make the principal 
responsible for the agent’s tortious acts, so long as the agent has acted within the 
course and scope of authority delegated by the principal.  The three types of 
agency are: express authority, implied authority, and apparent authority.   
109 Idaho at 497, 708 P.2d at 902 (emphasis added).  The district court determined that this 
language was merely dicta since Bailey was a breach of contract matter.  As such, the district 
court relied on Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 936 P.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1997), in which the 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Dr. Jenkins was employed by Medical Doctor Associates, Inc., a company that Anesthesiology Consultants of 
 
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Court of Appeals held that no appellate court in Idaho had ever applied the doctrine of apparent 
authority to create tort liability on the part of the principal.  Landvik, 130 Idaho at 59, 936 P.2d at 
702.  Based in part on this holding, the district court denied Appellants’ motion for partial 
summary judgment on the issue of apparent agency and subsequently awarded summary 
judgment in favor of TVH.   
In order to determine whether the district court erred, we find it necessary to review our 
decision in Bailey.  In that case, the buyer of a feed mill system brought breach of contract and 
defective construction and design claims against Stan Ness, d/b/a Feed-Rite Systems, Inc., 
seeking to hold Ness liable for $37,000.00 in damages to the system.  Comp. & Demand for Jury 
Trial; Amended Compl. & Demand for Jury Trial.3  The buyer also filed suit against Mix-Mill, 
Inc., a manufacturer of feed mill systems, claiming, among other things, that Mix-Mill was 
vicariously liable for Ness’s negligence in designing the defective feed system under the doctrine 
of apparent authority.  Id.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mix-Mill on 
the issue of apparent authority, and we reversed, holding that there was a factual dispute as to 
whether Ness had apparent authority from Mix-Mill to assist in designing the buyer’s feed 
system.  Bailey, 109 Idaho at 498, 708 P.2d at 903.  Thus, we not only recognized that tort 
liability could be imposed under the doctrine of apparent authority, but actually extended the 
doctrine of apparent authority to a tort claim in that case.  As such, Bailey holds that a principal 
can be held liable for an agent’s tortious acts under Idaho’s doctrine of apparent authority.   
TVH argues that Bailey is inapplicable because it dealt with “apparent authority” rather 
than “apparent agency.”  Specifically, TVH argues that apparent authority presupposes an 
existing agency relationship, whereas apparent agency does not.  However, there was no 
preexisting agency relationship in Bailey.  It was undisputed in that case that Ness was not an 
actual agent of Mix-Mill.  Bailey, 109 Idaho at 497, 708 P.2d at 902.  Furthermore, comment (a) 
to section 2.03 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency sets forth that apparent authority “does not 
presuppose the present or prior existence of an agency relationship,” but rather the doctrine can 
be applied to actors who appear to be agents but who actually are not.  Restatement (Third) of 
Agency § 2.03, comment (a) (2006).  Comment (b) to that section also explains that many 
                                                                                                                                                             
Treasure Valley subcontracted with to help fulfill its anesthesiology staffing obligations at TVH.   
3   To verify that the buyer did in fact bring a tort claim against Mix-Mill, we reviewed the buyer’s complaint and 
amended complaints.  
 
7
jurisdictions use the terms “apparent authority” and “apparent agency” interchangeably.  Id. at § 
2.03, comment (b).  Thus, our holding in Bailey applies to tort claims brought under the doctrine 
of apparent agency as well.    
Therefore, we agree with Appellants that the doctrine of apparent agency extends to tort 
claims in Idaho.     
B. The hospital may be found vicariously liable under Idaho’s doctrine of apparent 
authority for the negligence of independent personnel assigned by the hospital to 
perform support services.  
     Appellants argue that Ms. Kurtz was an apparent agent of TVH, and therefore the hospital 
should be held vicariously liable for her negligence attributable to Mrs. Jones’s death.  
“Generally, a principal is immune from liability for the negligence of ‘an independent contractor, 
or that of its employees, in the performance of the contracted services.’”  Estate of Cordero v. 
Christ Hosp., 958 A.2d 101, 104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (quoting Basil v. Wolf, 935 
A.2d 1154, 1169 (N.J. 2007)).   Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 409 (1965).  However, there are 
exceptions to the general rule, one being the exception at issue referred to as “apparent 
authority.”4  Under section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, liability is imputed to a 
principal “who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another which are 
accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the employer or by his 
servants . . . .”  Id. at § 429.  When determining liability in a situation such as this when an 
agency relationship is alleged, the Restatement (Second) of Torts defers to the Restatement of 
Agency.  Id. at § 429, comment c.  Section 2.03 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency defines 
“apparent authority” as “the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal’s legal 
relations with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act 
on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”  
Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 2.03 (2006).  The rationale for imposing liability under 
apparent authority is so “[a] principal may not choose to act through agents whom it has clothed 
with the trappings of authority and then determine at a later time whether the consequence of 
their acts offers an advantage.”  Id. at § 2.03, comment c.  
                                                 
4 Although Appellants argue that TVH is vicariously liable under the doctrine of “apparent agency,” we will refer to 
the doctrine as “apparent authority,” its formal title under the Restatement (Third) of Agency throughout the 
remainder of our opinion.  As set forth in Part III.A, “apparent authority” and “apparent agency” may be used 
interchangeably in this context when applying the Restatement (Third) of Agency.   
 
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Based on case law from the majority of jurisdictions that have extended apparent 
authority to medical malpractice claims, TVH argues that apparent authority does not extend 
beyond the hospital/physician context.  However, we see no reason why hospitals should be 
treated differently from any other entity for the purposes of imputing liability under the doctrine 
of apparent authority.  To begin with, there is nothing in the language from the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 429 or the Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 that suggests hospital 
liability is limited to the negligence of physicians.  In fact, comment (c) to Restatement (Third) 
of Agency § 2.03 sets forth that apparent authority applies to “any set of circumstances under 
which it is reasonable for a third party to believe that an agency has authority, so long as the 
belief is traceable to manifestations of the principal.”  Id. at § 2.03 (emphasis added).  
Furthermore, other jurisdictions have recognized that a hospital may be found vicariously liable 
for the negligence of other individuals performing support services necessary to complete the 
patient’s treatment.  In York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center, 854 N.E.2d 635 
(Ill. 2006), the Illinois Supreme Court stated:  
If . . . a patient does select a particular physician to perform certain procedures 
within the hospital setting, this does not alter the fact that a patient may 
nevertheless still reasonably rely upon the hospital to provide the remainder of the 
support services necessary to complete the patient’s treatment.  Generally, it is the 
hospital, and not the patient, which exercise control not only over the provision of 
necessary support services, but also over the personnel assigned to provide those 
services to the patient during the patient’s hospital stay.  To the extent the patient 
reasonably relies upon the hospital to provide such services, a patient may seek to 
hold the hospital vicariously liable under the apparent agency doctrine for the 
negligence of personnel performing such services even if they are not employed 
by the hospital. 
854 N.E.2d at 661–62 (emphasis added).  The Kentucky Court of Appeals also recognized that 
liability extends beyond the hospital/physician context, stating:  
[I]t appears to us that when a hospital has received a patient, under whatever 
circumstance, and has undertaken treatment, that patient is owed a duty by the 
hospital through its employees and staff, including independent staff personnel, to 
exercise appropriate care to provide for the patient's well-being and to promote 
his cure. A breach of this duty may expose the hospital to liability in tort. Any 
lesser rule would be insensible to the true role of a hospital as an institution in 
present day society. 
Williams v. St. Claire Med. Ctr., 657 S.W.2d 590, 597 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added).  In 
Williams, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s award of summary judgment 
in favor of the hospital, holding the appellant had presented sufficient evidence to survive 
 
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summary judgment dismissal of appellant’s claim that the hospital was vicariously liable for the 
negligence of a nurse anesthetists—a non-physician—under the doctrine of apparent authority.  
Id. at 596.   More recently, the Superior Court of New Jersey noted that courts of other 
jurisdictions recognize hospital liability under the doctrine of apparent authority when the 
“hospital has established and staffed facilities or departments through which patients receive 
specialized care from medical professionals with whom they do not have a prior or ongoing 
relationship–emergency rooms, operating rooms and anesthesiology and radiology departments.”  
Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hosp., 958 A.2d 101, 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) 
(emphasis added).   
TVH raises various arguments in opposition to this Court extending Idaho’s doctrine of 
apparent authority to medical malpractice claims in general.  First, TVH argues that the 
extension of apparent authority will defeat the purpose of Idaho’s Medical Malpractice Act 
(Act).  I.C. §§ 6-1001 to -1013.  TVH argues that although I.C. § 6-1012 mentions vicarious 
liability, the legislature did not contemplate that a hospital could be held vicariously liable for 
negligence committed by those not under the hospital’s control.  TVH contends that a more 
reasonable inference is that the legislature intended that a hospital could be held vicariously 
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior rather than the doctrine of apparent authority.  
However, there is no language in the statute limiting the basis from which vicarious liability 
claims may be made.  Idaho Code § 6-1012 states that a claimant may bring an action against a 
healthcare provider or any person5 vicariously liable for the provider’s negligence.  Although the 
term “vicarious liability” is not defined under the Act, it is defined generally as “[l]iability that a 
supervisory party bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate based on the 
relationship between the two parties.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 934 (8th ed. 2004).  Section 429 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposes tort liability to a principal under the 
doctrine of apparent agency, states as follows: 
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for 
another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being 
rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical 
harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the 
                                                 
5  The term “person” is not defined under I.C. § 6-1012.  The only other reference to “person” found in the statute is 
in regard to “injury to or death of a person.”  Although a hospital is not a natural person, it generally falls under the 
definition of “person” as “an entity . . . that is recognized by law as having the rights and duties as a human being.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary 1178 (8th ed. 2004).   
 
10
same extent as though the employer were supplying them himself or by his 
servants.    
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 (1965).  Pursuant to this section, the hospital’s liability 
arises out of the apparent agency relationship it creates with its independent contractor and thus 
falls under the definition of vicarious liability.  Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) of Agency 
specifically states that a principal is vicariously liable for a tort committed by an agent acting 
with apparent authority.  Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.08 (2006).  As such, we find that the 
extension of apparent agency to medical malpractice claims is consistent with the Act’s 
provision for vicarious liability.   
TVH also argues that if the Court extends the doctrine of apparent authority, plaintiffs 
will no longer have to prove that health care providers breached the applicable standard of care 
through expert testimony as required by sections 6-1012 and 1013 of the Act.  However, our 
extension of the doctrine does not change the standard for establishing negligence on the part of 
a healthcare provider; rather, it provides an additional basis from which the hospital’s liability 
can arise.  When a hospital is being sued in its capacity as an individual healthcare provider, the 
plaintiff is still required to prove that the hospital breached the applicable standard of care 
through expert testimony.  On the other hand, when a hospital is being sued in its capacity as the 
principal, the plaintiff is required to prove that the hospital’s agent is a healthcare provider as 
required under the statute, and that the agent breached the applicable standard of care. Thus, the 
hospital is held vicariously liable for its agent’s negligence to the same extent as if the hospital 
itself breached the standard of care under the Act.  Therefore, we find that our extension of 
apparent authority does not conflict with the Act’s standard for establishing negligence on the 
part of the healthcare provider.   
In addition, TVH argues that if the doctrine of apparent authority is extended to medical 
malpractice claims, it would effectively reinstate joint and several liability.  In support of its 
argument, TVH directs our attention to I.C. § 6-803, under which the Idaho legislature has 
limited the application of joint and several liability to two situations: 1) where a party was acting 
in concert with another, or 2) where a party was acting as an agent or servant of another party.  
I.C. § 6-803(3), (5).  In respect to the latter, TVH argues that the legislature only intended that 
joint and several liability be extended to actual agents.  However, the statute only requires that 
the person be “acting as an agent.”  I.C. § 6-803(5) (emphasis added).  Because the statute does 
not define “agent,” we must apply the plain meaning of the term.  This Court has recognized that 
 
11
there are three types of agency—express authority, implied authority, and apparent authority, see 
Bailey, 109 Idaho at 497, 708 P.2d at 902.   Therefore, the term “agent” encompasses express 
agents, implied agents, and apparent agents under Idaho law.  As such, we find TVH’s argument 
to be without merit.    
Based on our analysis set forth in Parts III.A and III.B, we hold that a hospital may be 
found vicariously liable under Idaho’s doctrine of apparent authority for the negligence of 
independent personnel assigned by the hospital to perform support services.   Therefore, we 
reverse the district court award of summary judgment in favor of TVH.    
C. Elements of apparent agency.   
The district court’s award of summary judgment was based on the incorrect legal 
conclusion that Idaho had not extended the doctrine of apparent authority to tort claims.  Because 
the parties stipulated that TVH was not negligent in its own right, the district court found no 
basis under Idaho law for which TVH could be held liable.  As such, the district court did not go 
on to analyze the facts of the case to determine whether Appellants had presented sufficient 
evidence for their claim of apparent authority against TVH  to submit to the jury.  Rule 56(c) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth that summary judgment shall be awarded “if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”  I.R.C.P. 56(c).  As such, we must remand the case back to the 
district court for a determination of whether or not the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, show that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
Appellants’ claim of apparent authority.   
Before we remand the case, however, we seek to clarify the elements that Appellants 
must establish in order to survive summary judgment dismissal.  The standard for apparent 
authority stated in section 2.03 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency and section 429 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts has two essential elements: 1) conduct by the principal that would 
lead a person to reasonably believe that another person acts on the principal’s behalf, i.e., 
conduct by the principal “holding out” that person as its agent; and 2) acceptance of the agent’s 
service by one who reasonably believes it is rendered on behalf of the principal. Estate of 
Cordero v. Christ Hosp., 958 A.2d 101, 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).     
 
12
TVH argues that we should affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment 
because Appellants have failed to establish any evidence of reliance in support of their claim of 
apparent authority.  However, the Restatement (Third) of Agency, which superseded the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency in 2006, only requires that Appellants establish Mrs. Jones 
reasonably believed that Ms. Kurtz was an agent of TVH.  Specifically, section 2.03 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency sets forth that a plaintiff is required to show a reasonable belief 
that the actor had authority to act on behalf of the principal that is traceable to the principal’s 
manifestations to the plaintiff.  Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 2.03 (2006).  The doctrine of 
agency by estoppel, on the other hand, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate justifiable reliance and 
a detrimental change in position.  Id. at § 2.05 and accompanying comments.  The Restatement 
(Second) of Agency did not distinguish between apparent authority and agency by estoppel; thus, 
most jurisdictions recognizing apparent authority as a basis for hospital liability under the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency require plaintiffs to demonstrate the more stringent element of 
reliance to establish liability.  However, as the Superior Court of New Jersey recently explained: 
There is a notable difference between sections 2.03 [of the Restatement (Third) of 
Agency] and 429 [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts] and the standard for 
apparent authority provided in section 267 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency (1958), which includes an element of reliance.  Reliance is an element of 
apparent authority under sections 2.03 and 429 only to the extent that it is 
subsumed in the requirement that the person accepting an agent’s services do so 
in the “reasonable belief” that the service is rendered in behalf of the principal. 
Estate of Cordero, 958 A.2d at 106, n.3.  Therefore, under the Restatement (Third) of Agency, a 
plaintiff is only required to prove reasonable belief, rather than justifiable reliance, to satisfy a 
claim of apparent authority.   
Furthermore, we find that a standard of “reasonable belief” rather than “reliance” more 
fairly comports with Idaho’s prior case law regarding apparent authority.  In Bailey v. Ness, 109 
Idaho 495, 708 P.2d 900 (1985), we stated that “[apparent authority] is created when the 
principal ‘voluntarily places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, 
conversant with the business usages and the nature of a particular business, is justified in 
believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority.’” 109 Idaho at 497, 708 P.2d at 
902 (citing Clements v. Jungert,  90 Idaho 143, 152, 408 P.2d 810, 814 (1965)) (italics provided, 
emphasis added).  Although the portions regarding “business usages” and “the nature of a 
particular business” are irrelevant to the case at hand, this language demonstrates that we have 
 
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only required that a person be “justified in believing” the agent was acting pursuant to existing 
authority, rather than relying on the agent’s services, in order to establish apparent authority.  We 
find no persuasive reasoning for adopting the more stringent standard of reliance for cases where  
the principal is a hospital.   
Therefore, we remand the case back to the district court for a determination of whether 
Appellants presented sufficient evidence in support of their claim of apparent agency against 
TVH to survive summary judgment dismissal based on the elements set forth above.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the district court’s award of summary 
judgment to TVH, and remand the case for a determination of whether Appellants presented 
sufficient evidence for their claim of apparent agency to survive summary judgment dismissal.  
Based on our holding, we decline to consider TVH’s cross-appeal regarding the district court’s 
dismissal of its request for discretionary costs.      
 
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.