Case Title: EDGAR EDUARDO NAVA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0144

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
EDGAR EDUARDO NAVA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 46228 P.3d 1311Case Number: S-09-0144Decided: 04/20/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
EDGAR 
EDUARDO NAVA,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Scott 
Powers of Law Office of Scott Powers, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Anna C. Swain, Student 
Intern, Prosecution Assistance Program.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Edgar Eduardo 
Nava (the appellant) appeals from his conviction for felony possession of a 
controlled substance.  The appellant 
claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 
evidence found in his car during a traffic stop.  Specifically, he claims that he was 
subjected to custodial interrogation without first being given Miranda warnings and that his consent to 
the trooper's questioning and subsequent search of his vehicle was not 
voluntary.  Finding no error, we 
will affirm the decision of the district court. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.   
Whether the appellant should have been given Miranda warnings before the trooper 
asked any further questions after the initial traffic 
stop?

 
 
2.   Whether the appellant's consent to 
further questioning and to the search of his vehicle was given voluntarily? 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On October 
23, 2007, the appellant was stopped on Interstate 25 by a Wyoming Highway Patrol 
Trooper for speeding (81 mph in a 75 mph zone).1  The trooper approached the appellant's 
vehicle, advised him of the reason for the stop, and asked for his driver's 
license, insurance, and registration.  
As he approached the vehicle, the trooper noted that all of the vehicle's 
windows were rolled about half-way down and he could smell the overpowering odor 
of air freshener coming from the vehicle.  
He was also confronted with a strong odor of cologne and noticed a bottle 
of cologne located on the center console.  
As the appellant was searching for the requested information, the trooper 
observed that the appellant's hands were visibly shaking and he appeared 
extremely nervous.

 
 
[¶4]      The trooper asked 
the appellant to accompany him to the trooper's vehicle.  Upon exiting his vehicle, the appellant 
rolled up all of the windows.  
Inside the patrol car, the appellant remained "considerably nervous," 
with his legs constantly moving and his hands shaking.  This nervous behavior persisted through 
the entire stop.  When asked about 
the nature of his trip, the appellant responded that he and his girlfriend, who 
was the passenger in the vehicle, were travelling to St. Louis, Missouri, to 
visit his family.  However, a short 
time later, the appellant stated that he was going to Kansas City, 
Missouri.  The appellant also told 
the trooper that he was a firefighter and had finishedwork for the year 
because the fire season was over.  
The trooper asked the appellant if he had been watching the news, noting 
that about a quarter of California was reportedly on fire at the time.  The appellant did not respond to this 
comment.

 
 
[¶5]      The trooper 
issued a warning citation, returned the appellant's paperwork and told him he 
was free to go.  The appellant then 
exited the patrol car and started walking toward his vehicle.  At this time, the trooper exited his 
vehicle and asked the appellant if he could ask some more questions.  The trooper told the appellant that he 
did not have to answer any more questions, but the appellant, without 
hesitation, said it was "okay" for the trooper to ask more questions.   The trooper then told the appellant 
that he wanted to clarify where exactly he was going.  The appellant stated that he was going 
to St. Louis.  The trooper then 
asked the appellant if he had any marijuana, cocaine, or methamphetamine in his 
vehicle.  The appellant said no, and 
offered to allow the trooper to search his suitcase.  The trooper then asked if the appellant 
was carrying large amounts of cash, and the appellant responded that he had 
$1,500 in his pocket for gas money.  
The trooper then asked for permission to search the vehicle and the 
appellant told the trooper to go ahead.  Upon receiving permission to search, the 
trooper directed the passenger to exit the vehicle.  The trooper opened the suitcase the 
appellant specifically stated he could search, and underneath the clothes were 
several bags of high-grade marijuana.

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant was 
charged with one count of felony possession of a controlled substance, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009), and one 
count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009).  The appellant filed a motion to suppress 
evidence, which motion was denied.  
The parties subsequently entered into a conditional guilty plea 
agreement.  Pursuant to that plea 
agreement, the appellant entered a guilty plea on November 10, 2008 to Count II 
of the Information; Count I was dismissed.  
The district court imposed a sentence of three to five years 
incarceration, which sentence was suspended and the appellant was placed on 
supervised probation for a term of four years.  The appellant timely appealed from the 
judgment and sentence.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      The standard 
employed when reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress is 
well established:

 
 
            
When reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress 
evidence, we defer to the court's findings on factual issues unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 9, 97 P.3d 781, 784 
(Wyo. 2004).  We view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the district court's decision because it is in 
the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility, weigh the evidence and 
make the necessary inferences, deductions and conclusions.  Id.  The constitutionality of a particular 
search and seizure, however, is a question of law that we review de novo.  
Id.

 
 

Garvin 
v. State, 
2007 WY 190, ¶ 10, 172 P.3d 725, 728 (Wyo. 2007) 
(quoting Hembree v. State, 2006 WY 127, ¶ 7, 143 P.3d 905, 907 
(Wyo. 2006)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      In this appeal, 
the appellant claims that the search of his vehicle was illegal inasmuch as it 
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  Although the 
appellant mentions both our state and the federal constitutional provisions, and 
asserts that it "appears" that the Wyoming Constitution provides more protection 
than its federal counterpart, he fails to provide a "precise, analytically sound 
approach when advancing an argument to independently interpret the state 
constitution."  Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 484 (Wyo. 1999).  Thus, we find it unnecessary to conduct 
a separate analysis under Article 1, § 4.2

 
 
[¶9]      The appellant 
makes two arguments as to why the search of his vehicle was illegal.  First, he contends that after he was 
issued a warning citation and told he was free to leave, the trooper's further 
questioning resulted in custodial interrogation and he should have been 
"Mirandized" before being subjected 
thereto.3  Second, he argues that the search of his 
vehicle was improper inasmuch as his consent thereto was not 
voluntary.

 
 
[¶10]   With regard to when a suspect is 
subject to custodial interrogation, thus requiring Miranda warnings before further 
questioning, we have said the following:

 
 

Custodial 
interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers 
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom 
of action in any significant way.  Jelle 
v. State, 2005 
WY 111, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d 403, 408 
(Wyo. 2005).  In resolving the 
custodial status of a suspect we consider "whether a reasonable man in [the 
suspect's] position would have considered himself to be in police 
custody."  
Gompf 
v. State, 2005 
WY 112, ¶ 31, 120 P.3d 980, 988 
(Wyo. 2005). General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime is 
not "custodial interrogation," nor are statements volunteered freely without 
compelling influences.  
Id.  
We 
consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a suspect 
was in custody when questioned.  
Id.  
Several 
factors are relevant to the determination:

 
 

Among 
these are:  (1) whether a suspect is 
questioned in familiar or neutral surroundings; (2) the number of police 
officers present; (3) the degree of physical restraint and whether it is 
comparable to those associated with a formal arrest; and (4) the duration and 
character of the interrogation. 
 See 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel and Nancy J. King, Criminal 
Procedure § 
6.6(c) at 527 (2nd ed. 1999); see 
also Wunder [v. State], 
705 P.2d [333,] 335 [(Wyo. 1985)]. 

 Jelle, ¶ 
14, 119 P.3d  at 408.

 
 

Barnes 
v. State, 2008 
WY 6, ¶ 14, 174 P.3d 732, 
736-37 (Wyo. 2008).  We have 
also said that the following considerations may be relevant in some 
cases:

 
 

The 
nature of the interrogator, the nature of the suspect, the time and place of the 
interrogation, the progress of the investigation at the time of the 
interrogation, whether the suspect is informed that his detention would not be 
temporary, and the elapsed amount of time between questioning and the arrest may 
be important factors as well.  

 
 

Jelle 
v. State, 
2005 WY 111, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d 403, 408 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 

[¶11]   The appellant does not analyze 
whether the trooper's further questioning was custodial in nature using the 
above-listed factors.  Instead, he 
argues that it "appears that the [appellant] never truly felt that he was free 
to leave at any time after the issuance of the citation, especially true when 
the Trooper noted in his probable cause affidavit that he had already made up 
his mind that the [appellant] was transporting illegal drugs prior to following 
the [appellant] to the vehicle and requesting to ask additional questions." 
 Thisargument is inadequate 
for two reasons.  First, as noted 
above, we evaluate the nature of police interrogation using an objective 
"reasonable man" standard.  See supra ¶ 10.  Thus, the subjective beliefs or feelings 
of neither the trooper nor the appellant are relevant to the question of whether 
particular interrogation was custodial.  We have said "[t]he Court has been 
unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual 
motivations of individual officers and has held unanimously that [s]ubjective 
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment 
analysis.'"  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 10, 64 P.3d 700, 705 
(Wyo. 2003) (quoting Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996)); see also Marinaro 
v. State, 2007 
WY 123, ¶ 11 n.3, 163 P.3d 833, 
836 n.3 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

[¶12]   Secondly, our precedent on this 
issue leads us to conclude that the questioning here, under these circumstances, 
was not custodial in nature.  For 
example, in Jelle 
v. State, 
the 
defendant was suspected of providing lethal mushrooms to another individual 
resulting in that person's death.  
2005 WY 111, ¶ 3, 119 
P.3d. at 405.  The defendant was 
observed leaving a residence and then followed and stopped in an alley by a 
group of police officers in three vehicles.  Three of the four officers present 
questioned the defendant at different times concerning his involvement in 
providing the lethal mushrooms.  Id. at ¶¶ 5-10, at 406-07.  The questioning lasted approximately 
thirty minutes.  Id. at ¶ 11, at 407.  Additionally, although the officers 
stated that they told the defendant he was free to leave and did not have to 
answer questions, the defendant testified at the suppression hearing that the 
officers did not tell him he could leave, but instead specifically instructed 
him that he could not leave until they were done asking their questions.  Id.  

 
 
[¶13]   In concluding that no Miranda warning was required because the 
appellant was not in custody, we made a number of observations concerning the 
nature of the encounter.  Id. at ¶¶ 17-18, at 409-10.  We noted the following:  the encounter occurred in neutral 
territory, in an area where the appellant had been before and with which he was 
familiar, the appellant only noticed three officers at the scene, and at no time 
did the officers use "mass presence" to intimidate the appellant; no team or 
tandem interrogation took place; the questioning occurred in a public place in 
broad daylight; the appellant's car was not "blocked in" by the detectives' cars 
and he was able to drive away at the end of the encounter; the appellant was 
informed that he was not under arrest and that he did not have to talk to the 
officers; the detectives were in 
plain clothes and immediately identified themselves as police officers; the 
entire encounter lasted less than thirty minutes; there were no threats, raised 
voices, or weapons drawn; and the appellant was not arrested or restrained. 
 Id.

 
 
[¶14]   Comparing the facts and 
circumstance presented here to those described in Jelle leads us to conclude that a 
reasonable person in the appellant's position would not have considered himself 
in police custody.  When the trooper 
re-initiated questioning, the appellant had been advised he was free to go and 
was on his way back to his vehicle, the trooper was the only police officer 
present, the appellant was in no way restrained, the trooper informed the 
appellant that he did not have to answer additional questions, and the total 
time of questioning was relatively brief.  
Therefore, the trooper was not required to give Miranda warnings before further 
questioning.

 
 
[¶15]   We turn now to the appellant's 
second issue:  whether his consent 
to the search of his vehicle was valid.4  Although consent is a well-recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement, consent must be voluntary in order for it 
to be effective.  

 
 
[A] 
waiver of constitutional rights under our constitution must appear by clear and 
positive testimony, and, if a search or seizure is based upon the proposition 
that consent was given, there should be no question from the evidence that 
consent was "really voluntary and with a desire to invite search [or seizure], 
and not done merely to avoid resistance." Acquiescence and nonresistance have 
not been deemed sufficient under Wyoming law to establish consent. 

 
 

O'Boyle 
v. State, 
2005 WY 83, ¶ 38, 117 P.3d 401, 412 (Wyo. 2005) 
(citations omitted).  When 
addressing whether consent is voluntary under the Fourth Amendment, we have 
said:

 
 
In 
determining whether a warrantless search was justified by a valid consent, we 
inquire "into the voluntariness' of the consent in light of the totality of 
the circumstances'" of the particular case.  Some of the factors that a court may 
consider in determining whether the consent was voluntary include: the way the 
law enforcement officer phrased the request for permission to search; whether 
the officer told the individual that he could refuse the request; and the 
presence of other coercive factors.  We must consider all the circumstances 
surrounding the encounter to determine whether a reasonable person would have 
felt "free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter."  No single factor is 
determinative when we are ascertaining whether a seizure 
occurred.

 
 

Grant 
v. State, 
2004 WY 45, ¶ 22, 88 P.3d 1016, 1021 (Wyo. 2004) 
(citations omitted).

 
 
[¶16]   In this case, the trooper testified 
at the suppression hearing that when he asked the appellant if he could ask him 
more questions, the appellant immediately responded that it was "okay."  Also, the trooper testified that when he 
asked the appellant if he was in possession of any illegal drugs, the appellant 
responded in the negative and offered to allow the trooper to check his 
suitcase.  Then, when the trooper 
asked for permission to search, the appellant said "go 
ahead."

 
 
[¶17]   The appellant does not dispute the 
officer's testimony in this regard, but instead claims that "no reasonable 
person would have felt free to leave" under the circumstances and therefore his 
consent to the search of his vehicle could not have been voluntary.  To support this contention, he cites to 
O'Boyle v. State, where we found that 
a suspect's consent to search his vehicle was not voluntary.  2005 WY 83, ¶ 38, 117 P.3d  at 412. 
However, in O'Boyle, the officer 
asked more than thirty "intrusive" and "repetitive" questions largely unrelated 
to the traffic stop; there were two troopers and a drug dog on the scene; and 
O'Boyle was never informed he did not have to answer any of the questions or 
that he was free to leave.  Id. at ¶ 63, at 
419.

 
 
[¶18]   The State contends that because of 
the factual difference, O'Boyle 
should not control here, and instead argues that two recent cases are more 
on-point.  In the first case, Marquez-Guitierrez v. State, 2007 WY 155, 167 P.3d 1232 (Wyo. 2007), after two officers separately 
questioned the defendant and the driver of the vehicle about the nature of their 
trip, the driver was issued a warning ticket, his paperwork was returned, and he 
was told they could be on their way.  Id. at ¶¶ 6-8, at 1234.  As the driver was returning to his 
vehicle, the trooper stopped him and asked if he could ask a few more 
questions.  Id. at ¶ 9, at 1234.  The trooper asked if he could search the 
vehicle and told the driver that a dog would be there soon to "take a quick 
sniff" and then they would be on their way.  Id.  
The driver consented.  Id.  Approximately thirty-three minutes after 
the vehicle was pulled over, the drug dog arrived and indicated the presence of 
drugs in the vehicle.  Id. at ¶ 11, at 1235.  On appeal, we rejected the argument that 
the consent was not voluntary.  Id. at ¶¶ 23-24, at 1237.  To support our decision, we noted that 
the trooper told the appellant that he was free to go, that the trooper had 
returned the paperwork, that the trooper was easy-going and non-threatening, and 
that the driver had testified that he did not feel coerced or intimidated into 
giving consent.  Id. at ¶ 24, 
1237-38.

 
 
[¶19]   The other case cited by the State 
is Marinaro v. State, 2007 WY 123, 163 P.3d 833 (Wyo. 2007).  There, the driver was issued a warning 
ticket, his paperwork was returned, and he was told he could leave and to "have 
a safe trip."  Id. at ¶ 4, at 834.  The trooper radioed for assistance and a 
canine unit then re-approached the driver as he reached his car.  Id.  
The trooper asked if he could ask more questions, to which the driver 
assented, then the trooper asked more questions about the driver's travel 
plans.  Id.  After a few more questions, the trooper 
asked if the appellant had any drugs, guns, or cash in his vehicle.  Id. at ¶ 5, at 834.  The trooper asked if he could search the 
car and the driver consented and began opening the car's doors for the 
trooper.  Id.  
The driver then offered to, and opened the trunk, where two boxes of 
marijuana were discovered.  Id.  
Finding that the consent to the search was consensual, we noted that 
the driver was told he was free to go; his departure was not stopped by the 
uniform, gun, or flashing lights; the entire traffic stop was very brief; the 
trooper's conduct was professional, courteous, and completely non-coercive; and 
all of the appellant's consents were unhesitant and immediate.  Id. at ¶¶ 10-11, at 836.  Following these findings we 
stated:

 
 
The 
"coercive factors" present during this traffic stop are the same "coercive 
factors" that are present at every traffic stop: an armed and uniformed officer, 
plus the flashing lights on the patrol car.  If these factors were sufficient to 
invalidate the voluntariness of a consent, no consent would ever be 
voluntary.  Neither can these 
factors, alone, be seen as proving that the person stopped did not feel that he 
was free to go.  In the present 
case, for instance, the appellant knew that he was free to go because the 
trooper had told him he could go.

 
 

Id. 
at ¶ 11, at 836.  

 
 
[¶20]   Although these cases present slight 
factual variations from the present case, we find their similarities 
significant, and the reasoning utilized therein compelling.  Thus, after considering all of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the further questioning and subsequent search in 
this case, we find that the appellant voluntarily consented 
thereto.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   The appellant was not in police 
custody and therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings before further 
questioning after he received a warning citation and was told he was free to 
leave.  Also, no violation of the 
appellant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures occurred because the appellant voluntarily consented to the further 
questioning and subsequent search of his vehicle.  We affirm the decision of the district 
court.

 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1No 
video or audio recording of this traffic stop is available as the recording 
equipment was in for repair at the time.

 
 

2We 
have previously said in cases such as this, "we do not perceive any difference 
between the independent protection provided to [the appellant] under the Wyoming 
Constitution and that provided by the Fourth Amendment."  O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 45, 117 P.3d 401, 
414 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

3Miranda 
v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), requires that a 
person who is being questioned while in custody first be advised that he "has 
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a 
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if 
he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any 
questioning if he so desires."  Bhutto v. State, 2005 WY 78, ¶ 11, 114 P.3d 1252, 
1258 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2331, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 
(2000)).

 
 

4In 
many Fourth Amendment cases, our analysis includes a discussion of whether the 
officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying expanding the 
scope of questioning and eventual search of a vehicle.  See Marquez-Guitierrez v. State, 2007 WY 155, ¶¶ 15-21, 167 P.3d 1232, 1235-37 (Wyo. 
2007); Negrette v. State, 2007 WY 88, ¶¶ 19-22, 158 P.3d 679, 684-85 (Wyo. 
2007); O'Boyle, 2005 WY 83, ¶¶ 23-33, 117 P.3d at 
408-11; Damato, 2003 WY 13, ¶¶ 13-26, 64 P.3d  at 
706-10.  We find such an undertaking 
unnecessary here because the appellant does not argue that the trooper lacked 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, because of the limited scope of the 
questioning by the trooper, and because the appellant consented to the 
questioning and search.  See Marinaro, 2007 WY 123, ¶ 12, 163 P.3d  at 
836.