Case Title: Terreros v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 435, 2022

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2024-01-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOSE TERREROS, 
§ 
 
§ 
 
No. 435, 2022 
          Defendant Below,  
§  
          Appellant, 
§  
 
Court Below: Superior Court         
 
§ 
 
of the State of Delaware  
          v. 
§ 
 
§  
 
Cr. ID No. N1911014417 
 (N) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: October 25, 2023 
 
 
Decided: 
January 18, 2024 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and 
GRIFFITHS, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. REVERSED AND 
REMANDED. 
 
Elliot M. Margules, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, 
for Appellant Jose Terreros. 
 
Andrew J. Vella, Esquire, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, 
for Appellee State of Delaware.  
 
 
LEGROW, Justice:
 
1 
 
In 2019, Andrea Casillas-Ceja (“Casillas”) left her children in the care of her 
boyfriend, Jose Terreros.  When Casillas returned home, her four-year-old daughter, 
J.S., informed her that Terreros had licked her vagina.  Casillas immediately told 
Terreros to leave the home and called the police.  A few days later, Casillas accessed 
the internet search history on Terreros’s phone, which he had left at her house.  
Within the phone’s internet history, Casillas observed several web searches that the 
State contended were evidence of his guilt.  Specifically, Terreros had searched how 
long saliva and fingerprints stay on bodies and clothes and whether police can detect 
if a little girl has been raped. 
Investigators obtained a warrant to search Terreros’s phone based on 
Casillas’s observations.  Although the only nexus between the alleged crime and the 
phone was Terreros’s internet history, the warrant authorized police to search 
Terreros’s messages, messaging apps, photos, videos, internet search history, GPS 
coordinates, and incoming and outgoing calls.  The warrant did not identify any dates 
limiting the scope of the search.  Terreros moved to suppress the fruits of the search, 
arguing that the warrant was a general warrant that authorized a search of far more 
data than police had probable cause to search.   
After the Superior Court denied Terreros’s motion, finding that the warrant 
was neither general nor overbroad, the State introduced the web searches at 
Terreros’s trial for Rape First Degree, Sexual Abuse of a Child in the First Degree, 
 
2 
 
and Dangerous Crime Against a Child.  Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict 
finding Terreros not guilty of Rape First Degree but guilty of the other two counts.   
Following the verdict, Terreros moved for judgment of acquittal, contending 
that the verdicts were inconsistent, and that this inconsistency violated the 
protections afforded within Article I, Section 4 of the Delaware Constitution.  The 
Superior Court denied Terreros’s motion but did not specifically address his state 
constitutional claim. 
Terreros now appeals his convictions, arguing that the Superior Court abused 
its discretion in refusing to suppress the internet search history and erred in denying 
the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.  Because the warrant constituted a general 
warrant, we REVERSE and REMAND the Superior Court’s denial of Terreros’s 
Motion to Suppress.  Because both the Superior Court and the State did not address 
the state constitutional aspect of Terreros’s inconsistent-verdicts argument, we 
REMAND the Superior Court’s denial of Terreros’s Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal for further consideration of the constitutional issues raised therein.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2019, Terreros lived with Casillas, their two children, and three of 
Casillas’s children from another relationship.1  On November 19, 2019, Casillas and 
 
1 App. to Opening Br. at A249; A269; A350 (Trial Tr.). 
 
3 
 
Terreros spent the day at a farm in Pennsylvania with all the children.2  That night, 
Casillas went to the local 7- Eleven to buy water for Terreros.3  Terreros later stated 
that Casillas was likely gone for no more than five to ten minutes.4  When Casillas 
returned, J.S., her four-year-old daughter, told her that Terreros had licked her 
“cola,” which was the word she used to mean vagina.5  Casillas immediately took 
her children outside and told Terreros to leave the house.6  Terreros left the home as 
requested.7  Casillas called the police and took J.S. to a hospital where she was 
examined by a forensic nurse.  J.S. also provided a recorded statement at the 
children’s advocacy center (“CAC”).8  
A few days later, after police interviewed Terreros in connection with J.S.’s 
statement, Terreros called Casillas and asked her to call his supervisor from his 
phone, which he had left at their home.9  Casillas agreed to do so.  After making that 
call, Casillas looked through Terreros’s internet search history and found—in 
Spanish—searches translating to “how to detect if a little girl has been raped,” “how 
 
2 Id. at A282; A352 (Trial Tr.). 
3 Id. at A272–73 (Trial Tr.). 
4 Id. at A354 (Trial Tr.). 
5 Id. at A272-73 (Trial Tr.). 
6 Id. at A273; A276; A356 (Trial Tr.). 
7 Id. at A273; A356 (Trial Tr.). 
8 Id. at A273 (Trial Tr.). 
9 Id. at A275-76 (Trial Tr.). 
 
4 
 
long saliva stays on a body,” and “how long fingerprints stay on 
clothes/sheets/blankets.”10  Casillas reported this finding to police, and Officer Jay 
Davidson obtained a warrant for Terreros’s cell phone based on what Casillas saw.11  
The warrant application stated, in pertinent part: 
Your affiant was advised by [Casillas] that she responded to [her front 
yard] where she located [Terreros’s cell phone].  [Casillas] advised that 
she proceeded to check the search history and found pornography, a 
search of how to detect if a little girl has been raped, how long saliva 
stays on the body, and a search of how long fingerprints stay on 
clothes/sheets/blankets.12 
 
The application sought a search warrant for dates between “11/19/19-
11/23/19.”13  The application and affidavit, attached to the warrant, sought 
authorization to search “[a]ny and all messages, any and all messaging apps, all 
search history, all photographs, videos, GPS coordinates, incoming and outgoing 
calls from November 18, 2019, to November 23, 2019.”14 
 
On November 23, 2019, the Justice of the Peace Court approved a warrant to 
search the following data on Terreros’s phone, “[a]ny and all messages, any and all 
messaging apps, all search history, all photographs, videos, GPS coordinates, 
incoming and outgoing calls used or intended to be used for Rape 2nd by person of 
 
10 Id. at A122 (Warrant Application); App. to Opening Br. at A276–82 (Trial Tr.). 
11 Id. at A119 (Warrant). 
12 Id. at A122 (Warrant Application). 
13 Id.  
14 Id. at A120 (Warrant Application and Affidavit). 
 
5 
 
Authority.”15  The warrant the court approved did not contain any temporal 
limitation. 
In December 2019, Detective Steven Burse of the New Castle County Police 
Department used Cellebrite software to extract and search the data on Terreros’s 
phone.16  The resulting download included 29 gigabytes of videos, pictures, audio 
files, search history, and GPS coordinates.17  The extraction included more than 
3,000 videos and more than 60,000 pictures.18  
On February 17, 2020, Terreros was indicted on one count each of Unlawful 
Sexual Contact First Degree, Sexual Abuse of a Child by a Person in a Position of 
Trust, Authority, or Supervision Second Degree, and Dangerous Crime Against a 
Child.19 
On March 3, 2020, the State provided Terreros with requested discovery, 
including the extraction report from the cell phone search.20  The report included 
internet searches from November 20 and 22 and 1,031 GPS coordinates.21  The 
internet searches, in Spanish, matched those that Casillas had reported seeing. 
 
15 Id. at A119 (Warrant). 
16 Id. at A212; A286–88 (Trial Tr.). 
17 Id. at A215–17 (Trial Tr.). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at A1 (Superior Court Docket); Superior Court D.I. 3 (Indictment). 
20 App. to Opening Br. at A14 (DOJ Discovery Response Letter). 
21 Id. at A16–20 (Extraction Report). 
 
6 
 
In March 2021, Terreros moved to suppress the fruits of the search, arguing 
that the warrant lacked sufficient particularity as to the types of data it authorized 
police to search and that it lacked any temporal limitation.22  Terreros likened this 
search to the “top-to-bottom” cell phone search warrants that this Court previously 
has found to be lacking in particularity.23  The State’s response to the Motion to 
Suppress maintained that the warrant contained a temporal limit and a sufficient 
nexus existed between the probable cause alleged in the affidavit and the categories 
of data for which the warrant authorized a search.24 
While the Motion to Suppress was pending, the State re-indicted Terreros on 
May 10, 2021, charging him with one count each of Rape First Degree, Sexual Abuse 
of a Child by a Person in a Position of Trust or Authority or Supervision in the First 
Degree, and Dangerous Crime Against a Child.25  
The Superior Court held a hearing on the Motion to Suppress in June 2021.26  
Terreros made the same arguments as contained in his Motion, but the State shifted 
its position, contending that although the warrant authorized a search of “any and all 
messages” and “any and all messaging apps,” police did not actually conduct a 
 
22 Id. at A103 (Motion to Suppress). 
23 Id. at A110 (Motion to Suppress). 
24 Id. at A159 (State’s Response to Motion to Suppress). 
25 Id. at A4 (Superior Court Docket); id. at A11–13 (Re-Indictment). The Re-Indictment did not 
affect Terreros’s arguments in the Motion to Suppress or the State’s response to that motion. 
26 Id. at A171 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
 
7 
 
search of Terreros’s e-mails, Facebook, or Instagram, and the warrant therefore was 
not as broad as it appeared on its face.27  The State also represented to the court that 
the absence of any temporal limitation on the face of the warrant was not relevant to 
evaluating the warrant’s breadth because Cellebrite, the software used to conduct the 
extraction, limited the extraction to the dates listed on the affidavit and application.28 
The court ultimately denied Terreros’s Motion to Suppress, finding that the 
warrant was not a general warrant because it limited the search to specific categories, 
did not allow a search of “contacts, e-mails, Facebook, Instagram, or any financial 
information,” and Cellebrite limited the extraction temporally.29 
 
27 Id. at A192–93 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
28 Id. at A195 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). Throughout the trial court proceedings and this appeal, 
the parties used the terms “extraction,” “extraction report,” and “search” interchangeably.  This 
lack of precision contributed to some of the confusion and misunderstanding in this case.  To 
clarify, as we understand it, Cellebrite software (and similar tools) allows law enforcement to 
engage in a number of steps to analyze digital data.  See Taylor v. State, 260 A.3d 602, 610 (Del. 
2021); United States v. Jean-Claude, 2022 WL 2334509, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2022).  First, 
using the software, law enforcement “extracts” all or nearly all of the data in a digital device to 
create a forensic copy of the data.  The forensic image is not limited to certain categories of data 
or to particular time periods.  Next, law enforcement uses software to analyze the forensic image 
and separate data into different categories.  Finally, law enforcement creates an “extraction report,” 
which is formatted so that it can be accessed and read without Cellebrite software.  This extraction 
report can be limited to particular categories of data and particular dates. See e.g. Jean-Claude, 
2022 WL 2334509, at *18.  According to Cellebrite’s website, investigators can conduct a 
preliminary extraction that “allows access to the device” and later conduct a “selective extraction” 
that allows investigators to target specific applications or categories of data on the device.  Ori 
Nurick, The Solution That Changed Modern Digital Investigations Forever, Cellebrite Blog (Aug. 
4, 
2021), 
https://cellebrite.com/en/the-solution-that-changed-modern-digital-investigations-
forever/.   With this understanding, we assume that the parties’ reference to the cell phone’s 
extraction is actually to the “extraction report” generated by law enforcement and later provided 
to Terreros. 
29 App. to Opening Br. at A207–08 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
 
8 
 
Terreros’s trial began on July 26, 2021, and lasted until July 29.30  At trial, 
J.S. testified to what she told her mother on November 19, 2019.31  The CAC 
interviewer, Amy Kendall, testified about her interview with J.S., and the State 
played portions of that interview for the jury.32  Next, Casillas testified about her 
relationship with Terreros, what J.S. told her that Terreros had done, and the search 
history she found on his phone.33   
The State then admitted Terreros’s search history with the assistance of a court 
interpreter.34  The interpreter testified that Terreros had made the following internet 
searches: “what time does it take for the markers or traces in saliva to be erased,” 
“how the rape of a female child is detected,” “what are the possibilities that they can 
get fingerprints or print from a piece of clothing,” “how long will a fingerprint last,” 
“what is a fingerprint,” and “what are the possibilities that fingerprints are taken off 
of a piece of clothing.”35 
 
30 Id. at A7 (Superior Court Docket). 
31 Id. at A249 (J.S. Direct Exam.). 
32 Id. at A255 (Kendall Direct Exam.). 
33 Id. at A270–78 (Casillas Direct Exam.). 
34 Id. at A292–94 (Lane Direct Exam.). 
35 Id. 
 
9 
 
Testifying in his own defense, Terreros admitted to making the internet 
searches but explained that he did so to better understand the allegations against 
him.36  Terreros also denied ever having sexual contact with J.S.37 
On July 30, the jury returned its verdict.  The jury found Terreros guilty of 
Sexual Abuse of a Child by a Person in a Position of Trust or Authority or 
Supervision in the First Degree and Dangerous Crime Against a Child.38  The jury, 
however, acquitted Terreros of the Rape First Degree count.39   
A week later, Terreros filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, arguing that 
the jury’s verdict was inconsistent because, in order to convict him of Child Sexual 
Abuse, the jury would have had to find that he engaged in sexual intercourse with 
J.S.  By finding him not guilty of Rape First Degree, Terreros argued that the jury 
implicitly found that he had not engaged in sexual intercourse with J.S.40  This was 
so, Terreros contended, because the only element of those offenses actually in 
dispute was whether he engaged in sexual intercourse with J.S.41  Additionally, 
 
36 Id. at A356 (Terreros Direct Exam.). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at A1 (Superior Court Docket). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at A405 (Motion for Judgment of Acquittal). 
41 Id. Rape First Degree encompasses the following conduct, “when the person intentionally 
engages in sexual intercourse with another person and any of the following circumstances exist . . 
.  The victim has not yet reached that victim’s twelfth birthday, and the defendant has reached that 
defendant’s eighteenth birthday.” 11 Del. C. § 773(a)(5).   Sexual Abuse of a Child by a Person in 
a Position of Trust, Authority or Supervision in the First Degree includes the following conduct, 
 
10 
 
because the Dangerous Crime Against a Child count relied on the jury finding 
Terreros guilty of either Rape First Degree or Child Sexual Abuse, he argued that 
the court also must enter a verdict in his favor on that count.42 
Terreros argued that, at common law, inconsistent verdicts were set aside, and 
because Article I, Section 4 of the Delaware Constitution provides jury trial rights 
that are substantially similar to those at common law, his inconsistent verdicts must 
be set aside.43  Terreros reasoned that even if the inconsistency was the result of juror 
lenity, a phenomenon recognized under federal law, because juries were not allowed 
to exercise lenity at common law, his verdict violated the Delaware Constitution.44 
The State, in its Response to the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, failed to 
engage with Terreros’s arguments rooted in the Delaware Constitution, and instead 
only addressed whether the verdicts were, in fact, inconsistent, and, if so, whether 
the inconsistency was the type prohibited by a line of cases referred to as “Johnson-
 
“A person is guilty of sexual abuse of a child by a person in a position of trust, authority or 
supervision in the first degree when the person . . .  Intentionally engages in sexual intercourse 
with a child who has not yet reached that child’s own sixteenth birthday and the person stands in 
a position of trust, authority or supervision over the child, or is an invitee or designee of a person 
who stands in a position of trust, authority or supervision over the child.” 11 Del. C. § 778(1).    
42 App. to Opening Br. at A404 (Motion for Judgment of Acquittal). Dangerous Crime Against a 
Child means “any criminal sexual conduct against a minor under the age of 14 years as defined in 
§§ 770-773, § 777A, §§ 778 through 778A, or §§ 1108 through 1112B of this title.”  11 Del. C. 
§ 777(a). 
43 App. to Opening Br. at A415 (Motion for Judgment of Acquittal). 
44 Id. at A416–15 (Motion for Judgment of Acquittal). 
 
11 
 
Priest,” which are the primary Delaware authorities addressing inconsistent verdicts 
for predicate-compound offenses.45 
In denying Terreros’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, the Superior Court 
likewise focused its analysis on Terreros’s argument under the Johnson-Priest line 
of cases. Although the Superior Court cited Delaware case law, the precedent on 
which it relied did not address Terreros’s argument that the Delaware Constitution 
affords broader protections against inconsistent verdicts than those set forth in either 
federal precedent or previous Delaware decisions.46  The Superior Court agreed with 
Terreros that the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent, but it denied Terreros’s Motion 
for Judgment of Acquittal because it held that Rape First Degree and Child Sexual 
Abuse are not predicate-compound crimes under the Johnson-Priest line of cases, 
and Terreros’s acquittal on the Rape First Degree charge therefore did not negate his 
conviction for the Child Sexual Abuse charge.47  Accordingly, applying a different 
line of cases known as “Powell-Tilden,” which applies outside of predicate-
compound offenses, the Superior Court held that Terreros’s Child Sexual Abuse 
 
45 Id. at A438–40 (Response to Motion for Judgment of Acquittal) (citing Johnson v. State, 409 
A.2d 1043 (Del. 1979); Priest v. State, 879 A.2d 575 (Del. 2005)). 
46 State v. Terreros, 2021 WL 5577253, at *4–6 (Del. Super. Nov. 29, 2021). 
47 Id. at *6 (Del. Super. Nov. 29, 2021) (citing Johnson, 409, A.2d 1043; Priest, 879 A.2d at 587).  
 
12 
 
conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, and the jury’s inconsistency 
therefore could be explained by mistake or lenity.48 
Terreros timely filed this appeal, arguing that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion when it denied his Motion to Suppress and erred when it denied his 
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.49  Terreros advances the same arguments on 
appeal that he did in the trial court: (i) the cell phone search warrant was a general 
warrant because it is not sufficiently particular; and (ii) his inconsistent verdicts 
offend Article I, Section 4 of the Delaware Constitution. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion.50  
We will reverse the trial court’s factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous.51  
The trial court’s legal conclusions, including those addressing constitutional issues, 
are reviewed de novo.52 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the warrant constituted a 
general warrant and all the evidence seized from Terreros’s phone therefore should 
 
48 Terreros, 2021 WL 5577253, at *6 (citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66 (1984); 
Tilden v. State, 513 A.2d 1302, 1306–07 (Del. 1986)). 
49 Opening Br. at 2. 
50 Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 515 (Del. 2006). 
51 Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1172 (Del. 2010). 
52 Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118, 123 (Del. 2001). 
 
13 
 
have been suppressed in its entirety.  Accordingly, the Superior Court abused its 
discretion when it denied Terreros’s Motion to Suppress.  We also conclude that 
Terreros properly raised the argument that his inconsistent verdicts violated Article 
I, Section 4 of the Delaware Constitution, and we cannot fairly consider that novel 
argument until the State engages with the issue and the trial court addresses it.  We 
therefore reverse and remand this action for proceedings consistent with this 
Opinion. 
A. 
The warrant was general and the evidence seized under it should have 
been suppressed. 
We begin our analysis with an overview of the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity requirement and how its contravention produces general warrants.  We 
next consider how the warrant here failed in several respects to meet the particularity 
requirement.  We then turn to the only remedy that adequately addresses the effects 
of a general warrant—full suppression.  Finally, we conclude that the court’s 
decision not to suppress the fruits of the warrant did not constitute harmless error 
beyond a reasonable doubt.   
1. 
The Particularity Requirement and General Warrants 
It is axiomatic that the United States and Delaware Constitutions provide 
protections to those whose property is subject to an investigatory police search.  
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution contains the 
following protections: 
 
14 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.53 
Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution provides substantially the 
same protections:  
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant 
to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without 
describing them as particularly as may be; nor then, unless there be 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.54 
Both constitutions require that a warrant be supported by probable cause and 
describe the places and things to be searched with particularity.55   
A warrant application must contain sufficient facts—viewed under the totality 
of the circumstances56—to allow a neutral magistrate to conclude that there is a “fair 
probability” both that a crime has been committed and that evidence of that crime 
 
53 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
54 Del. Const. Art. I § 6. 
55 Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781, 786 (Del. 2003).  Additionally, 11 Del. C. § 2306 provides that 
“[t]he application or complaint for a search warrant shall be in writing, signed by the complainant 
and verified by oath or affirmation. It shall designate the house, place, conveyance or person to be 
searched and the owner or occupant thereof (if any), and shall describe the things or persons sought 
as particularly as may be, and shall substantially allege the cause for which the search is made or 
the offense committed by or in relation to the persons or things searched for, and shall state that 
the complainant suspects that such persons or things are concealed in the house, place, conveyance 
or person designated and shall recite the facts upon which such suspicion is founded.” 
56 Stafford v. State, 59 A.3d 1223, 1229 (Del. 2012) (“‘[t]he probable cause standard is incapable 
of precise definition . . . because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the 
circumstances.’ The substance of all probable cause definitions, however, is a ‘reasonable ground 
for belief of guilt,’ which must be particular to the person seized.”). 
 
15 
 
will be found in the particular place identified in the warrant.57  The probable cause 
requirement mandates that the “affidavit in support of the search warrant must, 
within the four corners of the affidavit, set forth facts adequate for a judicial officer 
to form a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and the property to 
be seized will be found in a particular place.”58  The four-corners test requires that 
the probable cause finding be supported only by those facts set forth within the 
warrant affidavit or application.59   
It is undisputed in this case that the warrant contained probable cause for the 
reviewing judicial officer to conclude that a crime—rape—had occurred.  Our focus 
then shifts to the “place” to be searched and whether the affidavit articulates 
sufficient probable cause to conclude that evidence will be found in that particular 
location, i.e., whether the affidavit identifies a nexus between the evidence sought 
and the place to be searched.60  In its most basic form, an affidavit must point not 
only to the evidence to be seized and the place to be searched, but also the reason 
why the affiant believes such evidence will be found in the place to be searched.61 
 
57 State v. Holden, 60 A.3d 1110, 1114 (Del. 2013). 
58 LeGrande v. State, 947 A.2d 1103, 1107 (Del. 2008). 
59 Valentine v. State, 207 A.3d 566, 570 (Del. 2019). 
60 Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 812 (Del. 2000); Blount v. State, 511 A.2d 1030, 1033 (Del. 
1986). 
61 11 Del. C. § 2306. 
 
16 
 
Here, the affidavit and application contained sufficient facts to allow a 
magistrate to conclude that evidence, specifically Terreros’s internet search history 
in the days shortly after the alleged rape, would be found in a search of his phone.  
Terreros effectively conceded as much.62  But probable cause alone does not satisfy 
constitutional or statutory law with respect to searches.  The warrant also must 
satisfy the particularity requirement, which is fundamental and performs its own 
work in protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures.63  To pass 
constitutional muster, the warrant itself must describe the things to be seized and the 
places to be searched with particularity such that “nothing is left to the discretion of 
the officer executing the warrant.”64  A warrant that fails to conform with the 
particularity requirement is unconstitutional.65 
Insufficiently particular warrants fall into two categories.66  The first such 
category is a general warrant, which allows law enforcement to conduct an 
 
62 Opening Br. at 7 (“The affidavit does not state, or allow for an inference, that there would be 
any relevant evidence on the phone other than the suspicious searches which occurred after 
November 19, 2023.”). 
63 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967). 
64 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004). 
The United States Supreme Court does not foreclose the ability of warrants to incorporate 
supporting documents by reference, but the warrant must use appropriate words of incorporation 
to do so. Id. at 557–58.  
65 Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, n.5 (1984) (citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 
485 (1965)). 
66 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment 
categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one ‘particularly describing the place to 
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ The manifest purpose of this particularity 
 
17 
 
indiscriminate search.67  The second category is an overbroad warrant.  An 
overbroad warrant explicitly allows investigators to search places and things when 
no probable cause exists to search them.68   
Although the line between these two warrant categories at times can be thin, 
the distinction often turns on whether the warrant allows investigators to conduct an 
“exploratory rummaging,” 69 which is indicative of a general warrant, or allows 
police to search in specified places or for specified items more broadly than the 
articulated probable cause, which is an overboard warrant.70  Distinguishing between 
the two categories of warrants is essential because each carries its own remedy.  All 
fruits of a general warrant must be suppressed in their entirety, whereas an overbroad 
warrant, the less constitutionally offensive of the two, can be redacted as to the 
portions of the search for which no probable cause exists.71 
 
requirement was to prevent general searches. By limiting the authorization to search to the specific 
areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search 
will be carefully tailored to its justifications and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging 
exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit. Thus, the scope of a lawful search is 
‘defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that 
it may be found.’”). 
67 Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 292 (Del. 2016). 
68 Id. at 296. 
69 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443, 467 (1971)) (“General warrants of course, are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 
‘(T)he problem (posed by the general warrant) is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, 
exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings. . . . (The Fourth Amendment addresses the 
problem) by requiring a ‘particular description’ of the things to be seized.’”). 
70 United States v. Yusef, 461 F.3d 374, n.19 (3d Cir. 2006). 
71 United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 758 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 
18 
 
These principles do not change or disappear when the “place” to be searched 
or “evidence to be seized” is digital in nature.72  To the contrary, in Riley v. 
California,73 the United States Supreme Court recognized that the immense amount 
of digital information stored on cell phones creates privacy issues to which Fourth 
Amendment principles must be applied.74  To address these privacy concerns, the 
Riley court clarified that, absent exigent circumstances, police must obtain a warrant 
to search a phone’s digital contents, rejecting the argument that police could search 
the data contained in a cell phone that was seized incident to a lawful arrest.75 
Four years after Riley, in Carpenter v. United States,76 the United States 
Supreme Court held that law enforcement must obtain a warrant to acquire an 
extended period of an individual’s cell-site location information, even though law 
enforcement obtained the location records from a third-party cell phone company.77  
The Court explained that permitting police to obtain an individual’s cell phone 
location history without a warrant and thereby track a person’s movements over an 
 
72 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401–02 (2014) (Requiring a warrant to search the digital 
contents of a cell phone absent exigent circumstances). 
73 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
74 Id. at 394–97. 
75 Id. at 401. 
76 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ---, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018). 
77 Id. at 2217. 
 
19 
 
extended period78 contravenes the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections.79  In so 
holding, the Supreme Court held that an individual maintains a privacy interest in 
“the record of his physical movements as captured through [cell-site location 
information],” even when that information is shared with or stored by the phone 
carrier.80   
With that foundation, we turn to this Court’s previous consideration of the 
particularity requirement as applied to digital data.  On three occasions in the past 
seven years, our Court has held that warrants to search digital data constituted 
general warrants for purposes of the particularity requirement.   
In Wheeler v. State, this Court had its first opportunity to consider the 
particularity requirement as applied to warrants to search digital data.81  There, 
police were investigating witness tampering allegations relating to the defendant’s 
communications with individuals he had previously victimized.82  Although the 
 
78 The cell-site information that law enforcement obtained in Carpenter included 127 days of 
location history from one wireless carrier and two days of location history from a second carrier.  
See id. at 2212. 
79 Id. at 2218. 
80 Id at 2217.  But see Hudson v. State, --- A.3d ---, 2024 WL 91187 (Del. Jan. 9, 2024) (holding 
that Carpenter’s reasoning is not applicable to warrants for cell tower “dumps,” which provide 
information regarding all the cell phones that utilized particular cell towers in “an extremely 
limited and specific window of time, and for a limited geographic area.”) 
81 Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 302.  This Court previously had considered digital search warrants in 
Bradley v. State, 51 A.3d 423 (Del. 2012) and Fink, 817 A.2d 781, but not as applied to the 
particularity requirement. 
82 Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 287–89. 
 
20 
 
warrant application and affidavit only contained probable cause to support a search 
for physical communications in the form of letters, notes, and books, the warrant 
allowed for a sweeping search of “any and all data” stored on “any personal 
computer,” “any digital or optical device,” “any cellular telephone,” and “any digital 
camera.”83   
In Wheeler, we recognized that the vast amount of information stored on 
digital devices presents “unique challenges in satisfying the particularity 
requirement.”84  Although we acknowledged the difficulty that affiants may face 
when crafting a search warrant that satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s requirements, 
we also firmly upheld the importance of preventing general searches.85   In striking 
a balance between the two, we eschewed a “hyper technical” test and instead 
announced that law enforcement must provide a description of the items to be search 
and seized that is as specific as possible at the current investigative juncture.86   
Ultimately, we concluded that where law enforcement can obtain “a more 
precise description of the alleged criminal activity that is the subject of the warrant, 
such information should be included in the instrument, and the search and seizure 
should be appropriately narrowed to the relevant time period so as to mitigate the 
 
83 Id. at 289. 
84 Id. at 299. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 300–01. 
 
21 
 
potential for unconstitutional exploratory rummaging.”87  We further held that the 
Wheeler warrant failed the particularity requirement because it did not contain 
sufficient probable cause to support the authorized searches of all digital content.88  
In other words, the warrant lacked a sufficient nexus between the types of digital 
media to be searched and the investigation’s current evidence of criminal activity. 
Two years later, in Buckham v. State,89 we considered whether a search 
warrant for the defendant’s phone constituted a general warrant.  The Buckham 
investigators had been looking for GPS evidence of Buckham’s whereabouts during 
a six-week period.90  Rather than authorizing a search for GPS data during that time 
period, the warrant allowed police to search for “[a]ny and all store[d] data contained 
within the internal memory of the cellular phones.”91  We concluded that although 
the affidavit provided probable cause to search the phone for GPS data, a search of 
any other digital data lacked probable cause. 92  In other words, we held that the 
affidavit did not provide a sufficient nexus between the articulated probable cause 
and the authorization to search the defendant’s call-log, photos, and text messages.  
 
87 Id. at 301; 305. 
88 Id. at 306. 
89 185 A.3d 1 (Del. 2018). 
90 Id. at 5. 
91 Id. at 6. 
92 Id. at 19. 
 
22 
 
We described this warrant as containing a “mismatch between the scope of the 
warrant and the probable cause.”93 
Most recently, in Taylor v. State,94 we considered whether a warrant that 
allowed investigators to search “any/all data stored by whatever means . . . of said 
cellular telephone, to include but not limited to registry entries, pictures, 
photographs, images, audio/visual recordings, multi-media messages, web browsing 
activities, electronic documents, location information . . . and any other 
information/data pertinent to this investigation within said scope,” violated the 
particularity requirement.95  There, the defendant was charged with murder, robbery 
and firearm-related offenses in connection with a gang killing.96 
In Taylor, we reiterated the Wheeler rule: a warrant must “describe the items 
to be searched for and seized with as much particularity as the circumstances 
reasonably allow and is no broader than the probable cause on which it is based.”97  
We held that the Taylor warrant did not meet the particularity requirement because, 
like the warrants at issue in Wheeler and Buckham, it “authorized ‘a top-to-bottom 
search’ of ‘[a]ny and all store[d] data’ of the digital contents of the devices” and 
 
93 Id. at 20. 
94 260 A.3d 602 (Del. 2021). 
95 Id. at 609. 
96 Id. at 604–10. 
97 Id. at 615. 
 
23 
 
“used the open-ended language ‘including but not limited to’ to describe the places 
to be searched.”98  Ultimately, we concluded that the warrant “allowed investigators 
to conduct an unconstitutional rummaging through all of the contents of Taylor’s 
smartphones to find whatever they decided might be of interest to their 
investigation.”99  In all three cases, we held that the warrant constituted a general 
warrant and that all the evidence seized therefrom should have been suppressed.100 
Taken together, Wheeler, Buckham, and Taylor instruct that reviewing courts 
should consider whether the warrant’s explicit language and its practical effect allow 
law enforcement to search categories of digitally stored information that lack a 
sufficient nexus to their investigation.  Here, although the warrant identified 
categories of digital evidence to be searched, rather than referring to “any and all” 
data, it constituted a general warrant because the listed categories comprised almost 
all of the phone’s data and only one of those categories was supported by the 
probable cause articulated in the affidavit. 
2. 
The warrant here constituted a general warrant. 
Terreros argues that because the affidavit and application provided probable 
cause only as to his phone’s internet search history over the course of a few days, 
 
98 Id. (quoting Buckham, 185 A.3d at 18–19). 
99 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 615. 
100 Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 307; Buckham, 185 A.3d at 20; Taylor, 260 A.3d at 618–19. 
 
24 
 
the warrant was a general warrant because it authorized the search of “nearly the 
entire phone.”101  Terreros also contends that the lack of any temporal limitation on 
the warrant’s face supports his position that it was a general warrant, and that the 
trial court erred in relying on the State’s inaccurate representations that the search 
was limited to the dates listed in the affidavit.102  In response, the State contends that 
this was not a general warrant because “it limited the categories of data to be 
searched and, when read in a common-sense way . . . had a temporal limit.”103  The 
State does not, however, even attempt to argue how any category of data, other than 
Terreros’s search history and GPS information, was supported by probable cause.104 
We agree with Terreros; the Superior Court abused its discretion when it 
found that the warrant was not a general warrant.  The Superior Court distinguished 
this warrant from those in Wheeler and Buckham because, it held, the warrant for 
Terreros’s phone identified specific categories of data, did not authorize a search of 
“any and all” categories of data, and excluded categories such as contacts, e-mail, 
social media, and financial information.105  The court also found that, although the 
 
101 Opening Br. at 2. 
102 Id. at 12. 
103 Answering Br. at 11. 
104 Id.  Recall, the warrant authorized police to extract and search “Any and all messages, any and 
all messaging apps, all search history, all photographs, videos, GPS coordinates, incoming and 
outgoing calls used or intended to be used for Rape 2nd by person of authority.”  App. to Opening 
Br. at A119 (Warrant). 
105 Id. at A207 (Suppression Hearing Tr.).  We issued our decision in Taylor, 260 A.3d 602, one 
week after the Superior Court held the suppression hearing.  App. to Opening Br. at A170 
 
25 
 
body of the warrant contained no temporal limitation, the extraction and search were 
temporally limited by Cellebrite, the third party company whose software law 
enforcement uses to conduct cell phone extractions and searches.106  The court noted 
that this “neutral third party extraction” was one of “two factors weighing against 
suppression” on the issue of the temporal limitation.107  The other factor on which 
the court relied was Terreros’s failure to identify authority supporting his argument 
that the evidence falling within the appropriate time frame should be suppressed 
along with evidence falling outside the appropriate time frame.108 
a. 
The warrant was not particular regarding the categories of 
data to be searched. 
Although the warrant for Terreros’s phone did not go so far as to authorize a 
search of “any and all data,” that was, in effect, what the warrant permitted law 
enforcement to extract and search.  In other words, this warrant gave police the 
authority to conduct an indiscriminate search through Terreros’s cell phone.  The 
State argues that this warrant is distinguishable from those in Wheeler, Buckham, 
and Taylor because it specified the types of data that law enforcement could search 
 
(Suppression Hearing Tr.).  The parties and Superior Court therefore could not rely on that decision 
to guide their arguments and analysis. 
106 Id. at A208 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at A208–09 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
 
26 
 
in Terreros’s phone.  But the distinction the State identifies does not come close to 
addressing the warrant’s constitutional infirmities. 
The Fourth Amendment demands a nexus between the probable cause 
articulated in the affidavit and each place to be searched.109  Even the State conceded 
that the affidavit does not provide facts sufficient to conclude that any evidence of 
the alleged crime would be found in Terreros’s messages, messaging apps, photos, 
videos, or call logs.110  And although the State contends otherwise, there are no facts 
contained in the affidavit that set forth probable cause to believe that Terreros’s GPS 
data would contain evidence of a crime.111  Accordingly, the affidavit only contained 
a nexus between the crime and Terreros’s internet history, but the warrant allowed 
police to search nearly every category of data on the cell phone.  Our Constitution 
does not allow that type of “exploratory rummaging” through digital data.112  
 
109 Dorsey, 761 A.2d at 812; Blount, 511 A.2d at 1033. 
110 The State conceded this at oral argument and during the suppression hearing.  Oral Argument 
at 33:35-34:16; App. to Opening Br. at A193 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
111 App. to Opening Br. at A121–22 (Warrant Application).  Additionally, although the affidavit 
states that J.S.’s mother found “pornography” in addition to the other searches in Terreros’s 
history, this is not an argument on which the State ever relied as creating a nexus between the facts 
in the affidavit and probable cause to search Terreros’s photos and videos.  In fact, the State 
appears to have abandoned the allegation that J.S.’s mother found pornography on Terreros’s 
phone and reported it to police. App. to Opening Brief at A155 (State’s Response to Motion to 
Dismiss). 
112 Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467). 
 
27 
 
To juxtapose, in Thomas v. State,113 we recently held that the Superior Court 
did not abuse its discretion when it found that a warrant obtained in a stalking 
investigation was overbroad but not general because it identified the specific types 
of data to be searched, all of those categories were supported by probable cause, the 
warrant did not contain the “including but not limited to” language, and it identified 
a temporal limitation.114  Critically, we also held that the phone was an 
instrumentality in the stalking crime, and unlike Wheeler, Buckham, and Taylor, the 
investigators in Thomas did not have a more precise description of the place to be 
searched when applying for the warrant.115  We reiterated the United States Supreme 
Court’s distinction between a general and an overbroad warrant: 
Between a general warrant, which is invalid because it vests the 
executing 
officers 
with 
unbridled 
discretion 
to 
conduct 
an exploratory rummaging through [the defendant's] papers in search 
of criminal evidence, and an overly broad warrant, which “describe[s] 
in both specific and inclusive general terms what is to be seized,” but 
“authorizes the seizure of items as to which there is no probable cause 
...” [A]n overly broad warrant can be redacted to strike out those 
portions of the warrant that are invalid for lack of probable cause, 
maintaining the remainder of the warrant that satisfies the Fourth 
Amendment. In contrast, the only remedy for a general warrant is to 
suppress all evidence obtained thereby.116  
 
 
113 Thomas v. State, --- A.3d ---, 2023 WL 6379829 (Del. Oct. 2, 2023). 
114 Id. at *14 (Del. Oct. 2, 2023). 
115 Id. 
116 Yusef, 461 F.3d at n.19. 
 
28 
 
Here, even though the warrant identified specific categories of data, rather 
than referring to “any and all data,” each category was preceded by “any and all” 
language with no temporal limitation.  The identified categories also constitute a 
large portion of the total extractable data on the cell phone.  Finally, the investigators 
had a more precise description of the places to be searched than was provided in the 
warrant.117  Based on the facts in the affidavit, there was no probable cause to believe 
that any type of data on Terreros’s phone would yield seizable evidence other than 
his internet search history.   
The warrant here is closer to Buckham than it is to Thomas because “the scope 
of the warrant so far outruns [the] probable cause finding—and is so lacking in 
particularity relative to that probable cause finding.”118  In essence, the warrant 
authorized the very type of unbounded fishing expedition that the particularity 
requirement is intended to prevent. 
b. 
The warrant contained no temporal range. 
Like Wheeler, Buckham, and Taylor, this warrant contained no temporal 
limitation, “despite relevant dates being available to the police.”119  Here too, this 
 
117 Thomas, 2023 WL 6379829, at *14. 
118 Buckham, 185 A.3d at 18. 
119 Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 304; Buckham, 185 A.3d at 19; Taylor, 260 A.3d at 611. 
 
29 
 
warrant is distinguishable from the one in Thomas, which provided a temporal 
limitation, even though the timeframe was broader than necessary.120 
We know investigators had “a more precise description” of the temporal 
period that should be applied to the search because the affidavit included date 
limitations,121 albeit inconsistent ones.122  At the suppression hearing, the State 
sought to blame the missing timeframe in the warrant on the authorizing 
magistrate,123 although nothing in the record supports that premise.  The State also 
argued that this omission was inconsequential because the supporting application 
and affidavit included the relevant temporal limitation.124  But the State failed to 
carry its burden of showing that the temporal limitation included in the warrant’s 
supporting documents was incorporated by reference into the warrant itself.   
The State’s reliance on the dates in the application and affidavit fails for two 
reasons.  First, the United States Supreme Court has confirmed that, “[t]he Fourth 
Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting 
documents.”125  The Court then explained that a warrant may incorporate other 
 
120 Thomas, 2023 WL 6379829, at *15. 
121 App. to Opening Br. at A120; A122 (Application and Affidavit). 
122 The application and affidavit included two different temporal limitations: one from November 
18 to November 23 and one from November 19 to November 23. Id. 
123 Id. at A195 (Suppression Hearing Tr.) (“It’s an omission essentially of the date.  I’m unaware 
of when it was taken out.  The allegation is that the JP court took it out.”). 
124 Id. at A194 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
125 Groh, 540 U.S. at 557. 
 
30 
 
documents by reference when “the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, 
and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant.”126  Here, although the 
application and affidavit were attached to the warrant when the JP Court received it, 
the warrant itself did not use explicit language incorporating the affidavit.  To be 
sure, the warrant specified that it relied “[u]pon the annexed affidavit and 
application” and identified the cell phone to be searched as the one “described in the 
annexed affidavit and application.”  There is, however, no indication on the face of 
the warrant that it intended to incorporate any other information contained in the 
application.127  The record also lacks evidence that the application and affidavit 
accompanied the signed warrant when it was transmitted to law enforcement. 
Second, the State did not even argue incorporation by reference on appeal.128  
The State’s brief is devoid of any mention of incorporation by reference or the case 
law supporting it.  Instead, the State simply stated that the temporal limitation “was 
clearly set forth in the body of the affidavit of probable cause.”129  We are unwilling 
to adopt an argument that the State did not advance on appeal or in the trial court. 
 
126 Id. at 557–58.  Circuit courts have explained that supporting documents “accompany” a warrant 
when they are “attached” to it such that they are “physically connected so that they constitute one 
document.” United States v. Williamson, 1 F.3d 1134, n.1 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
127 App. to Opening Br. at A119 (Warrant). 
128 Oral Argument (23:22-23:47; 29:50-30:07). 
129 Answering Br. at 13. 
 
31 
 
c. 
The Superior Court’s holding relied on the State’s 
misrepresentations. 
Compounding the troubling aspects of this case, the trial court’s reasoning in 
denying the Motion to Suppress relied on multiple misstatements by the State. 130  
During the suppression hearing, the State consistently represented to the court that 
Cellebrite, a company that produces software used to perform cell phone extractions, 
was a neutral third-party that could limit the search’s temporal scope to the dates 
contained in the application.131  This is manifestly incorrect; the extraction and 
search were conducted by law enforcement using Cellebrite software.  The State 
now concedes as much on appeal.132  But the damage was done during the 
suppression hearing when the court ultimately concluded that “the cell phone 
company understood that there was a temporal limitation.”133  To the contrary, the 
record does not show that law enforcement applied any temporal limitation during 
the search.134 
The court also found that the warrant was not general because it did not 
authorize a search of Terreros’s email or his social media accounts like Instagram 
 
130 This Court does not ascribe to any of these statements an intent on the State’s part to mislead 
the trial court.  Nonetheless, the confusion created by the State’s lack of clarity leaves the warrant 
impossible to uphold on this record. 
131 App. to Opening Br. at A195–196 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
132 Answering Br. at 13. 
133 App. to Opening Br. at A201 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
134 Id. at A16–101 (Extraction Report). 
 
32 
 
and Facebook.135  This conclusion was based on the State’s representations regarding 
the extraction data, not what the four corners of the warrant authorized.136  The 
warrant expressly authorized a search of “any and all messaging apps,” which would 
include Instagram, Facebook, and other social media applications that include 
messaging capabilities.  In fact, the court specifically inquired whether e-mail and 
social media were included under the “messaging app” category, but the court 
ultimately adopted the State’s representation that, because data from those apps was 
not part of the extraction report, they were not included under that category.137  
The trial court’s conclusion cannot be sustained because the warrant’s four 
corners authorized a search of Terreros’s messages, including social media data, and 
it is the warrant’s scope—and not the search’s results—that must be evaluated under 
the Fourth Amendment.  Moreover, although the State represented to the Superior 
Court that officers did not search Instagram or Facebook,138 the extraction report 
included data from Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp.139  Specifically, the 
 
135 App. to Opening Br. at A119 (Warrant); Id. at A207 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
136 Id. at A192–93 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
137 Id. at A196; A207 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
138 Id. at A193 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
139 Id. at A213 (Extraction Report). 
 
33 
 
extraction report included 154 Facebook chat messages, 7 Instagram chat messages, 
and 2888 WhatsApp messages.140 
3. 
The fruits of the search should have been suppressed. 
To reiterate, the only nexus between Terreros’s cell phone and the alleged 
rape was the internet search history that Casillas saw on the phone shortly after the 
incident occurred.  A warrant that met constitutional particularity requirements 
would have authorized a search of Terreros’s internet history during the handful of 
days between the alleged crime and when Casillas reviewed the phone’s search 
history.  Instead, the warrant permitted law enforcement to search nearly every major 
category of data contained within the phone without regard to date. 
To borrow Terreros’s analogy, if law enforcement submits an affidavit with 
sufficient facts to support a search of one closet in one room of a house, a warrant 
authorizing a search of the entire house does not become sufficiently particular 
because it identifies each individual room in the house rather than saying “any and 
all rooms.”  But that is effectively what law enforcement did here by substituting the 
“any and all data” language found lacking in Buckham with a list of all major 
categories of data on the phone.  This is the very exploratory rummaging that the 
founders intended to prohibit under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
140 Id. 
 
34 
 
Because we have previously made clear that the evidence seized under a 
general warrant must be suppressed in its entirety,141 we now hold that the Superior 
Court abused its discretion when it denied Terreros’s Motion to Suppress.  The 
warrant at issue was not merely overbroad, and so the motion to suppress should 
have been granted, even as to the small amount of evidence for which there was 
probable cause to search. 
4. 
The State failed to prove harmless error beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Finally, the State has not carried its burden of demonstrating that the 
evidence’s admission was harmless.  The State bears the burden of proving harmless 
error,142 and in this case the State must show that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt because the error violated Terreros’s constitutional rights.143  In 
order to conclude that the improper admission of evidence constituted harmless 
error, we must have no “reasonable fear that injustice occurred that might have 
influenced the trial.”144  If the unconstitutionally admitted evidence was “critical,” 
we cannot conclude that the State met its burden on harmless error.145 
 
141 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 617–18 (“There is no room, however, for limited suppression of evidence 
seized under a general warrant.”). 
142 Fowler v. State, 194 A.3d 16, 23 (Del. 2018); Dawson v. State, 608 A.2d 1201, 1204 (Del. 
1992). 
143 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 618; Fowler, 194 A.3d at 23; Dawson, 608 A.2d at 1204. 
144 Fowler, 194 A.3d at 23. 
145 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 618. 
 
35 
 
 
Here, although Casillas testified to the contents of Terreros’s search history, 
her testimony was bolstered by the admission of the data confirming those searches 
and their contents.146  Had the State been unable to introduce the search history, 
Casillas likely would have been subject to a more rigorous and effective cross-
examination without exhibits to corroborate her testimony.147  We also note that the 
inconsistent verdicts here are evidence that the jury may have viewed this as a close 
case.  For those reasons, we cannot conclude that the introduction of Terreros’s 
search history was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. 
We must remand so that the State and the trial court can respond to and 
resolve Terreros’s state constitutional argument. 
Terreros properly raised his inconsistent verdicts argument in the trial court 
and on appeal.  The State, however, did not engage with the substantive issues in 
either forum.  In the Superior Court, the State only addressed whether Terreros’s 
charges fell within the Johnson-Priest line of cases or instead could be upheld as an 
exercise of jury lenity under Powell-Tilden.  On appeal, the State repeated those 
arguments and asserted—incorrectly—that Terreros did not properly preserve his 
 
146 App. to Opening Br. at A276 (Casillas Direct. Exam.). 
147 We do not address Terreros’s argument that the mother’s testimony would have been excluded 
absent the corroborating internet searches.  The trial court may address that evidentiary issue if it 
is raised during retrial. 
 
36 
 
separate constitutional argument.148  At oral argument, the State conceded that it had 
not properly briefed the issue.149 
In Ortiz v. State150 we held that “[t]he proper presentation of an alleged 
violation of the Delaware Constitution should include a discussion and analysis of 
one or more of the criteria set forth in” Jones v. State151 or other applicable criteria.152  
The non-exhaustive Jones criteria include: textual language, legislative history, pre-
existing state law, structural differences, matters of particular state interest or local 
concern, state traditions, and public attitudes.153 
Here, Terreros properly presented to the trial court his argument that 
inconsistent verdicts violate Article I, Section 4 of the Delaware Constitution.  In his 
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, Terreros identified the textual language in Article 
I, Section 4, Delaware precedent, precedent from other jurisdictions, and common 
law history.154  In response, the State identified federal and state precedent affirming 
factually inconsistent verdicts produced by jury lenity, without addressing whether 
 
148 Answering Br. at 21–22. 
149 Oral Argument (39:20-40:17; 40:51-41:50; 42:30-42:58). 
150 Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285 (Del. 2005). 
151 Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 864–65 (Del. 1999). 
152 Ortiz, 869 A.2d at n.4. 
153 Jones, 745 A.2d at 864–65. 
154 App. to Opening Br. at 415–417 (Motion for Judgment of Acquittal). 
 
37 
 
consistent verdicts were a fundamental feature of the common law when the 
Delaware Constitution was adopted.155 
The trial court’s holding denying Terreros’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
mirrored the State’s briefing and did not address the Delaware  constitutional issues 
Terreros raised.156  Because Terreros’s argument is premised on the fact that the 
Delaware Constitution affords broader protections than those permitted by federal 
courts, the trial court must engage in an analysis under our state constitution once it 
has the benefit of briefing from both sides.157 
To properly address the important issues raised by a non-frivolous and novel 
argument based on the Delaware Constitution, this Court requires adversarial 
briefing.  The adversarial process faltered here because the State failed to engage 
with the issue in the trial court and on appeal.  The trial court’s analysis is also 
fundamental to helping the parties develop the issues and allowing this Court to 
provide a comprehensive analysis.  “In short, the important state constitutional claim 
[that Terreros] has raised deserved full and fair consideration by the trial court in 
this case.”158 
 
155 Id. at A435–41 (State’s Response to Motion for Judgment of Acquittal). 
156 Terreros, 2021 WL 5577253, at *2. 
157 Garnett v. State, --- A.3d ---, 2023 WL 6987145, at *14 (Del. Oct. 24, 2023); Juliano v. State, 
254 A.3d 369, 372 (Del. 2020); Dorsey, 761 A.2d at 820. 
158 Davis v. State, 2023 WL 7382873, at *4 (Del. Nov. 8, 2023). 
 
38 
 
Accordingly, we remand this issue to the trial court for further consideration 
of the constitutional issues raised by Terreros’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.159   
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Superior Court erred in denying Terreros’s 
Motion to Suppress.  Accordingly, we REVERSE Terreros’s convictions.  We 
REMAND this case to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this Opinion.  Jurisdiction is not retained. 
 
 
159 We leave to the trial court’s discretion how to structure briefing and oral argument after remand.  
Although we have held that Terreros is entitled to a new trial because the evidence obtained from 
the unconstitutional warrant should have been suppressed before trial, we also have remanded for 
further proceedings regarding the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, since the resolution of that 
motion may affect whether Terreros can be retried on the Child Sexual Abuse and Dangerous 
Crimes Against a Child counts. See, e.g. State v. Halstead, 791 N.W.2d 805, 816 (Iowa 2016).