Case Title: Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility v. Nancy A. Schlieve

Citation: 2010 WI 22

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 22 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
1997AP3862-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Medicial Incapacity Proceedings 
Against Nancy A. Schlieve, Attorney at Law. 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility , 
n/k/a Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
     v. 
Nancy A. Schlieve, 
          Petitioner-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
MEDICAL INCAPACITY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SCHLIEVE 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 30, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 14, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the complainant-appellant there were briefs by Keith L. 
Sellen on behalf of the Office of Lawyer Regulation, Madison, 
and oral argument by Keith L. Sellen. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there were briefs by Nancy A. 
Schlieve, and oral argument by Nancy A. Schlieve. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 22
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  1997AP3862-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Medical Incapacity Proceedings 
Against Nancy A. Schlieve, Attorney at Law: 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 
n/k/a Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Nancy A. Schlieve, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 30, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding.   Reinstatement denied.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
appeals Referee Russell Hanson's report and recommendation that 
Attorney Nancy A. Schlieve's license to practice law in 
Wisconsin be reinstated.  The OLR argues the referee erroneously 
concluded Attorney Schlieve met her burden to show, by clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
convincing 
evidence, 
that 
her 
medical 
incapacity has been removed and that she is fit to resume the 
practice of law.   
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Because we conclude Attorney Schlieve has not met her 
burden under SCR 22.36(6) to show by clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence that she is currently fit to resume the 
practice of law, we deny the reinstatement petition.1  As 
discussed in paragraphs 26 through 32, infra, Attorney Schlieve 
shall pay costs, absent an evidentiary showing of hardship.  
¶3 
Attorney Schlieve received her Wisconsin law license 
in 1990.  On September 12, 1997, this court imposed conditions 
on 
her 
license 
directed 
toward 
her 
rehabilitation 
from 
alcoholism.  See In re Medical Incapacity Proceedings Against 
Schlieve, Case No. 96-3390-D, 212 Wis. 2d 693, 569 N.W.2d 593 
(Table) (1997).  In 1998 this court suspended her license due to 
her medical incapacity of alcoholism.  The suspension was 
imposed for an indefinite time.  See In re Medical Incapacity 
Proceedings Against Schlieve, 221 Wis. 2d 610, 585 N.W.2d 585 
(1998).  
¶4 
In October 2005 Attorney Schlieve suffered a relapse 
and received treatment for alcoholism.  In April 2006 Attorney 
Schlieve filed her petition seeking license reinstatement.  A 
number of events delayed the hearing on her petition, including 
a delay occasioned by Attorney Schlieve's trip to China to teach 
English.  The referee who had been initially appointed resigned 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.36(6) reads:  "The petitioner has the burden of 
showing by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the 
medical incapacity has been removed and that the petitioner is 
fit to resume the practice of law, with or without conditions." 
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
3 
 
from the case due to his retirement from the practice of law.  
Referee Russell Hanson was then appointed.   
¶5 
On September 11, 2007, the OLR moved to compel 
Attorney Schlieve to sign a medical release and respond to 
certain questions.  Referee Hanson ordered Attorney Schlieve to 
provide certain information and scheduled the reinstatement 
hearing for January 22, 2008.   
¶6 
Following 
the 
hearing, 
the 
referee 
recommended 
reinstatement with conditions.  In his report of May 28, 2008, 
the referee found: "It is troublesome that [Attorney Schlieve] 
continues to deny the severity of her alcoholism, but it is my 
understanding that that tends to be part of the alcohol 
syndrome."  He also found that Attorney Schlieve "obviously 
needs extensive retraining and legal education, which should be 
ordered."   
¶7 
The OLR appealed.  On December 11, 2008, this court 
ordered the referee to supplement his report to explain whether 
the requisites set forth in SCR 22.36(6) had been met, and to 
identify upon the existing record the specific facts supporting 
his legal conclusions.  In addition, the court ordered the 
referee to specify the conditions he would recommend be imposed 
upon the reinstatement of Attorney Schlieve's license. 
¶8 
On 
January 
12, 
2009, 
the 
referee 
filed 
his 
supplemental report and recommendation.  He stated it was clear 
Attorney Schlieve had suffered from a prolonged period of 
alcohol dependence, but it was also clear that more than two 
years had passed since her "last public abuse" of alcohol.  He 
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
4 
 
noted Attorney Schlieve had assumed responsible positions in her 
church and community and as an interpreter.  The referee found 
Attorney Schlieve was, and still is, being treated for her 
chemical dependency and therefore her symptoms no longer exist.  
He concluded Attorney Schlieve met her burden pursuant to 
SCR 22.36(6) to show by clear, satisfactory, and convincing 
evidence that her medical incapacity has been removed.  
¶9 
Referee 
Hanson 
was 
concerned, 
nonetheless, 
that 
Attorney Schlieve had not practiced law for over nine years.  He 
recommended as a condition of reinstatement that she be required 
to pass the state bar examination to determine her level of 
legal expertise and to be certain she would be able to 
adequately and properly serve the public.  He stated that if 
Attorney Schlieve would fail the exam, remedial coursework would 
be appropriate.  Also, the referee found the public would be 
served by requiring Attorney Schlieve to be mentored by 
competent attorneys for two years following her reinstatement.   
¶10 The parties filed supplemental briefs.  The OLR 
objects to reinstatement and argues:  (1) the referee erred in 
finding Attorney Schlieve has met her burden of showing by 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that her medical 
incapacity has been removed; (2) the referee's findings and 
conclusions fail to address Attorney Schlieve's noncompliance 
with the suspension order and her lack of honesty during the 
reinstatement process; and (3) the record shows Attorney 
Schlieve has not maintained competence in the practice of law.   
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
5 
 
¶11 The OLR contends the referee's supplemental findings 
do not resolve the referee's original concern that it was 
"troublesome [Attorney Schlieve] continues to deny the severity 
of her alcoholism."  The OLR claims the referee's use of the 
phrase, "her last public abuse of alcohol," is problematic.  The 
OLR asserts that Attorney Schlieve has not been forthright about 
the extent of her drinking, thereby failing to demonstrate 
sobriety.  The OLR contends the referee's supplemental findings 
do not address Attorney Schlieve's failure to acknowledge her 
drinking and diagnosis, or her significant risk of relapse.   
¶12 In addition, the OLR argues, the evidence indicates 
Attorney Schlieve is a secretive drinker and, even during her 
2005 relapse, her closest friends were unaware that her drinking 
was out of control.  The OLR states Attorney Schlieve's medical 
reports regarding her drinking are unreliable, because they are 
based solely on information she provided.  The OLR claims 
Attorney 
Schlieve 
minimizes 
the 
severity 
of 
her 
alcohol 
dependency and has failed to show that her medical incapacity 
has been removed.   
¶13 The OLR also contends Attorney Schlieve has not been 
candid during the reinstatement process and has failed to show 
she has maintained competence in the practice of law.  The OLR 
argues Attorney Schlieve failed to comply with the court's 
suspension order when she wrote a letter on behalf of a friend, 
in which she identified herself as an attorney.  The OLR claims 
the letter writing constitutes the practice of law during her 
suspension from practice. 
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
6 
 
¶14 The 
OLR 
asserts 
this 
court 
should 
not 
presume 
rehabilitation upon the expiration of a specified term of 
suspension, even where there is no evidence of intervening or 
subsequent misconduct.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Hyndman, 2002 WI 6, ¶4, 249 Wis. 2d 650, 638 N.W.2d 293.  
The OLR argues that the referee's findings fail to establish the 
medical incapacity has been removed but, rather, suggest a risk 
to the public remains.   
¶15 Attorney Schlieve responds the record establishes her 
medical incapacity has been removed and she is fit to resume the 
practice of law.  At the reinstatement hearing, Attorney 
Schlieve testified that after her law school graduation, she 
worked for a short time as a public defender and then entered 
private practice as a sole practitioner.  At the hearing, 
Attorney Schlieve did not dispute that she had not kept current 
with developments in the law since her license suspension.  
Attorney Schlieve testified she had not planned to return to the 
practice of law after her license suspension.  After the 
hearing, Attorney Schlieve submitted to this court a list of 
recent continuing legal education courses she has completed.  
The statement indicates that between August 2008 and April 2009, 
Attorney Schlieve attended numerous legal education programs on 
a variety of topics.   
¶16 Attorney Schlieve contends that according to supreme 
court rules, she does not need retraining before returning to 
practice because she has completed the requisite continuing 
legal education credits.  She states that if reinstated, she 
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
7 
 
will turn to other attorneys for assistance and says there is no 
need for a mentor.    
¶17 Attorney Schlieve relies on the testimony of Reserve 
Circuit Court Judge Thomas H. Barland, who appeared on her 
behalf 
at 
the 
reinstatement 
proceedings. 
 
Judge 
Barland 
testified 
he 
has 
been 
favorably 
impressed 
with 
Attorney 
Schlieve's activities during the previous three years, which 
include her trip to China to teach English.  Because of the many 
changes in the law since her license was suspended, however, 
Judge Barland believed Attorney Schlieve should have available a 
mentor, someone to whom she could turn to with questions; he 
stated he would be willing to serve on occasion in this 
capacity.  
¶18 Attorney Schlieve also relies on the testimony of two 
attorneys who testified to the effect that Attorney Schlieve 
knows she is unable to drink alcohol, that she attends AA 
meetings once a week, and that they are willing to assist and 
monitor her practice of law.  Attorney Schlieve further relies 
on the testimony of two friends, a nurse and an attorney, who 
support her petition, as well as the testimony of Attorney 
Schlieve's mother.  Attorney Schlieve's mother (with whom she 
lives) testified that Attorney Schlieve had not used alcohol in 
the 27 months since being treated in 2005.  Her mother further 
stated Attorney Schlieve suffers occasionally from anxiety, 
which is successfully treated with medication.   
¶19 Attorney Schlieve claims her medical records support 
her contention she is not chemically dependent.  She submits an 
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
8 
 
October 14, 1997, report containing an initial diagnostic 
impression of "Alcohol abuse in Early Partial Remission; Over-
the-counter Sleeping Pill Abuse; Over-the–Counter Diet Pill 
Abuse."  Additionally, Attorney Schlieve relies on a March 2007 
report of a clinical substance abuse counselor, which states 
Attorney Schlieve's alcohol abuse was "in full remission."  The 
report concluded there is no indication any treatment is needed 
and "her recovery is well underway and backed by continuing 
support in Alcoholics Anonymous." 
¶20 Attorney Schlieve contends she has not taken a drink 
since October 2005.  She denies she is a secretive drinker and 
contends there is no evidence to support this contention.  She 
says she has admitted to being alcohol dependent in the past, 
but her medical reports indicate she is not now chemically 
dependent.  She acknowledges she must continue to be vigilant 
against using alcohol.  She asserts that she did not deny she is 
an alcoholic but, rather, denied she has any medical incapacity 
at this time.   
¶21 A referee's findings of fact will not be overturned 
unless clearly erroneous.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 
718.  We independently review the referee's legal conclusions.  
Id.  When there is conflicting testimony, the referee, as finder 
of fact, is the ultimate arbiter of the weight and credibility 
of the evidence.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pump, 
120 Wis. 2d 422, 426, 355 N.W.2d 248 (1984).  Where more than 
one reasonable inference can be drawn from credible evidence, 
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
9 
 
the reviewing court must accept the inference drawn by the trier 
of fact.  Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 87 Wis. 2d 243, 
250, 274 N.W.2d 647 (1979).   
¶22 Supreme court rule 22.36(6) governs reinstatement 
following suspension due to medical incapacity.  It provides 
that the petitioner has the burden of showing by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that (1) the medical 
incapacity has been removed and (2) the petitioner is fit to 
resume the practice of law, with or without conditions.  Id.  
Both requirements are necessary for reinstatement following a 
suspension for medical incapacity.   
¶23 We conclude the referee's findings do not support a 
determination that Attorney Schlieve has met her burden under 
SCR 22.36(6) to establish by clear, convincing, and satisfactory 
evidence she is fit to resume the practice of law.  Whether the 
petitioner has demonstrated fitness to resume the practice of 
law presents a legal question we review de novo.  See Nottelson 
v. Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor, and Human Relations, 94 
Wis. 2d 106, 116, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980) (The question whether 
the facts, as found, fulfill a legal standard presents a 
question of law.).  We conclude the failure to establish the 
fitness 
component 
of 
SCR 
22.36(6) 
is 
dispositive 
here; 
therefore, it is unnecessary to resolve the parties' arguments 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
referee's 
remaining 
findings 
and 
conclusions.   
¶24 The term "fit," as used in 22.36(6) with the phrase 
"to practice law," encompasses more than the removal of a 
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
10 
 
medical incapacity or being in a physically, mentally, or 
morally sound state.  The term "fit" is sufficiently broad to 
imply a state of preparedness to render competent legal 
services; that is, to be prepared to provide the measure of 
expertise to ensure the attorney may be safely recommended to 
the community as a person to be consulted by and to represent 
others in legal matters.2   
¶25 Referee Hanson expressed his concern that Attorney 
Schlieve has been away from the practice of law for over nine 
years and needs "extensive retraining and legal education."  He 
stated that testing is needed to determine the level of Attorney 
Schlieve's legal expertise; he recommended she be required to 
pass the state bar examination and that she be mentored.  We 
conclude 
the 
referee's 
findings 
fail 
to 
identify 
clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Attorney Schlieve is 
sufficiently prepared to resume a law practice and be safely 
recommended to be consulted by and to represent individuals in 
                                                 
2 For example, in State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wis. Senate, 155 
Wis. 2d 94, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990), in discussing the level of 
professional competence necessary to perform legal tasks, the 
court states: "The rule does not purport to prohibit circuit 
courts from appointing attorneys other than those certified by 
the state public defender who the court may see fit to serve as 
the legal representative of an indigent criminal defendant."  
Id. at 104.  See also Matter of Admission of Blue Dog, 126 
Wis. 2d 136, 140-42, 375 N.W.2d 660, 663 (1985) (the evaluation 
of an applicant's qualification and fitness to practice law 
includes an evaluation of professional competence).  See also 
Black's Law Dictionary 637 (6th ed. 1990) ("Fit.  Suitable or 
appropriate.  . . . Adapted to, designed, prepared.")    
 
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
11 
 
legal matters.  Notwithstanding the updated continuing legal 
education information recently submitted, we are unpersuaded 
that Attorney Schlieve has met her burden under SCR 22.36(6) to 
establish she is currently fit to resume the practice of law.  
Consequently, 
we 
deny 
Attorney 
Schlieve's 
petition 
for 
reinstatement.     
¶26 On June 22, 2009, Attorney Schlieve filed a motion and 
affidavit objecting to costs.3  Attorney Schlieve argues that 
attorney fees are not properly chargeable.  She objects to the 
attorney fee statement as lacking specificity.  Attorney 
Schlieve argues the referee's excessive fees were caused by the 
OLR expanding the issues in the case, and the OLR has failed to 
show that the referee's fees are reasonable.   
¶27 In addition, Attorney Schlieve claims, it would be 
unfair to assess costs against her for the remand to Referee 
Hanson for his failure to meet statutory requirements in his 
report.  Attorney Schlieve also objects to charges for the 
referee's room, meals, and mileage.  She says Referee Hanson had 
less than 130 miles to travel and should not have been provided 
lodging.  Additionally, she complains the original referee 
resigned from the case which, she claims, required much of the 
work to be duplicated.  Attorney Schlieve contends that 
                                                 
3 The OLR seeks the imposition of costs, which as of July 
2008 amounted to $10,127.33.  On May 26, 2009, the OLR 
supplemented its statement of costs, seeking an additional 
$3,472 in appellate counsel fees and disbursements and $719.66 
incurred as a result of the referee's supplemental work, for a 
total of $14,318.99.   
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
12 
 
transcript costs should not be allowed because the transcripts 
were merely a convenience to the OLR to complete its post-
hearing brief and were unnecessary for the appeal.   Attorney 
Schlieve says the billings are excessive and, as a single mother 
who stays at home to care for her disabled child, her income is 
limited.  She contends the costs constitute more than two years 
of annual income, which would impose an undue burden on her.   
¶28 The OLR responds that under SCR 22.001(3),4 costs 
include compensation and necessary expenses for referees, as 
well as fees and expenses for counsel's representation.  The OLR 
says its billings are reasonable and ethical, the scope of a 
reinstatement proceeding is broad, and a record must be created 
to show a basis to determine whether an attorney is fit for 
practicing law.  The OLR asserts that while Attorney Schlieve 
objects to costs as lacking specificity, she has never requested 
an itemization that the OLR offered to provide.  The OLR 
contends that rather than forcing each member of the state bar, 
                                                 
4 SCR 22.001(3) provides:  
"Costs" means the compensation and necessary 
expenses of referees, fees and expenses of counsel for 
the 
office 
of 
lawyer 
regulation, 
a 
reasonable 
disbursement for the service of process or other 
papers, amounts actually paid out for certified copies 
of records in any public office, postage, telephoning, 
adverse 
examinations 
and 
depositions 
and 
copies, 
expert witness 
fees, witness fees and expenses, 
compensation and reasonable expenses of experts and 
investigators employed on a contractual basis, and any 
other costs and fees authorized by chapter 814 of the 
statutes. 
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
13 
 
in effect, to pay a share of costs in this matter, it is 
appropriate that Attorney Schlieve bear the costs.  
¶29 Supreme court rule 22.24 governs the assessment of 
costs in medical incapacity and reinstatement proceedings.5  See 
SCR 22.24(1).  Under SCR 22.24(1m), the court's general policy 
is to impose costs on the respondent.  To award less than full 
costs, the court must find "extraordinary circumstances."  Id. 
¶30 We 
are 
not 
persuaded 
that 
Attorney 
Schlieve's 
arguments establish extraordinary circumstances to justify the 
imposition of less than full costs.  The record fails to support 
the assertion that the OLR unnecessarily broadened the issues.  
The issues the OLR presented are related to the showing required 
under SCR 22.36(6).  Also, contrary to Attorney Schlieve's 
assertion, 
a 
transcript 
of 
the 
reinstatement 
hearing 
is 
                                                 
5 SCR 22.24 provides, in part:  Assessment of costs. 
(1) The supreme court may assess against the 
respondent all or a portion of the costs of a 
disciplinary proceeding in which misconduct is found, 
a medical incapacity proceeding in which it finds a 
medical incapacity, or a reinstatement proceeding and 
may enter a judgment for costs.  The director may 
assess 
all 
or 
a 
portion 
of 
the 
costs 
of 
an 
investigation when discipline is imposed under SCR 
22.09.  Costs are payable to the office of lawyer 
regulation. 
(1m) The court's general policy is that upon a 
finding of misconduct it is appropriate to impose all 
costs, including the expenses of counsel for the 
office of lawyer regulation, upon the respondent.  In 
cases involving extraordinary circumstances the court 
may, in the exercise of its discretion, reduce the 
amount of costs imposed upon a respondent.  . . .  
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
14 
 
necessary for an appeal, particularly here, where there is no 
stipulation of facts and the referee's findings are challenged.  
Attorney Schlieve fails to show the cost of the transcript 
constitutes an extraordinary circumstance.  Additionally, the 
referee's mileage, meals, and room costs appear reasonable and 
necessary under SCR 22.001(3).  Nothing in the record indicates 
they are extraordinary.   
¶31 Attorney Schlieve does not demonstrate an unnecessary 
duplication of effort by the referees or that a duplication of 
effort unreasonably increased the amount of costs.  The record 
indicates that due to Attorney Schlieve's trip to China, the 
reinstatement matter was put on hold.  It was during this delay 
that the first referee retired from law practice, requiring the 
appointment of a second referee.  Attorney Schlieve cannot 
reasonably fault the OLR or the referee for any delay occasioned 
as a result of her travel decision.   
¶32 With respect to hardship, it is premature to adjust 
the amount of costs based on Attorney Schlieve's claimed lack of 
income.  We direct Attorney Schlieve to work with the OLR to 
reach an agreement by which the cost assessment may be paid over 
time.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Konnor, 2005 
WI 37, ¶50, 279 Wis. 2d 284, 694 N.W.2d 376 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring) ("If a lawyer cannot pay the full costs immediately, 
an agreement may be reached to enable the lawyer to pay the 
costs over time.").  If such an agreement cannot be reached, or 
if Attorney Schlieve is impoverished to the degree she is unable 
to make any payments toward the cost assessment, she may seek 
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
15 
 
relief from the court.  We will address a motion premised on an 
indigency claim only after Attorney Schlieve has attempted in 
good faith to reach an agreement with the OLR on a payment plan. 
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, 
¶96, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  For these reasons, we 
conclude that Attorney Schlieve has failed to show extraordinary 
circumstances justifying a departure from the court's general 
policy to impose full costs.  See SCR 22.24(1m).  We extend the 
time to pay costs to 180 days to provide Attorney Schlieve 
additional time to attempt to work out an agreement with the 
OLR. 
¶33 IT IS ORDERED that the petition of Nancy A. Schlieve 
seeking reinstatement of her license to practice law in 
Wisconsin is denied. 
¶34 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 180 days of the date 
of this order, Nancy A. Schlieve pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding totaling $14,318.99, or 
reach an agreement with the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
regarding the payment of costs.  If such an agreement cannot be 
reached, or if Attorney Schlieve is impoverished to the degree 
she is unable to make any payments toward the cost assessment, 
she may seek relief from the court.  If the costs are not paid 
within the time specified and absent an evidentiary showing to 
this court of her inability to pay the costs within that time, 
the license of Nancy L. Schlieve to practice law in Wisconsin 
shall remain suspended until further order of the court. 
 
No. 
1997AP3862-D   
 
 
 
1