Case Title: Ackison v. Anchor Packing Co.

Citation: 2008-Ohio-5243

Docket Number: 20070219 and 20070415

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Ackison v. Anchor Packing Co., 120 Ohio St.3d 228, 2008-Ohio-5243.] 
 
 
ACKISON, APPELLEE, ET AL., v. ANCHOR PACKING  
COMPANY ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Ackison v. Anchor Packing Co., 120 Ohio St.3d 228, 2008-Ohio-5243.] 
Litigation — Asbestos-related tort claims — R.C. 2307.91, 2307.92, and 2307.93 
— Applicability of legislative amendments requiring that plaintiffs file 
certain qualifying medical evidence to claims pending in courts before 
effective date — Application of amendments to pending claims is not 
unconstitutionally retroactive. 
(Nos. 2007-0219 and 2007-0415 — Submitted November 28, 2007 — Decided 
October 15, 2008.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Lawrence County,  
No. 05CA46, 2006-Ohio-7099. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The requirements in R.C. 2307.91, 2307.92, and 2307.93 are remedial and 
procedural and may be applied without offending the Retroactivity Clause 
of the Ohio Constitution to cases pending on September 2, 2004. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we conclude that requirements in R.C. 2307.91, 
2307.92, and 2307.93 pertaining to asbestos-exposure claims are remedial and 
procedural and may be applied without offending the Retroactivity Clause of the 
Ohio Constitution to cases pending on September 2, 2004. 
I 
{¶ 2} In May 2004, Linda Ackison, widow and administrator of the 
estate of Danny Ackison, filed suit against her husband’s former employer and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
multiple other defendants alleging that her husband’s illness and death were 
caused by long-term exposure to asbestos in his workplace.  Although Ackison 
advanced other claims in her complaint, the only cause of action at issue in this 
appeal is her claim for nonmalignant asbestosis. 
{¶ 3} On September 2, 2004, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292 (“H.B. 292”) 
became effective.  150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3970.  This legislation extensively 
revised state laws governing asbestos litigation and was in response to the 
legislative finding that “[t]he current asbestos personal injury litigation system is 
unfair and inefficient, imposing a severe burden on litigants and taxpayers alike.”  
H.B. 292, Section 3(A)(2), 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3988. 
{¶ 4} Among other sections, this bill enacted R.C. 2307.91 (definitions), 
2307.92 (requirements for prima facie showing of physical impairment in certain 
asbestos claims), and 2307.93 (filing of reports and test results showing physical 
impairment; dismissals).  These provisions establish certain threshold 
requirements.  Among these requirements are that no person shall bring or 
maintain certain kinds of asbestos claims (including claims alleging a 
nonmalignant condition) without filing with the court certain qualifying medical 
evidence of physical impairment, and that such evidence must be supported by the 
written opinion of a competent medical authority stating that the claimant’s 
exposure to asbestos was a substantial contributing factor to his medical 
condition.  R.C. 2307.92.  The claim of any plaintiff who does not file the 
required preliminary medical evidence and physician’s statement is to be 
administratively dismissed “without prejudice” with the court retaining 
jurisdiction, meaning that a plaintiff would not be barred from reinstating the 
claim in the future when and if the plaintiff could meet the threshold evidentiary 
requirements.  R.C. 2307.93(C).  The legislation also provides that the threshold 
evidentiary requirements and administrative-dismissal provision be applied to all 
January Term, 2008 
3 
asbestos cases pending in Ohio courts, regardless of whether they were filed 
before or after the effective date of H.B. 292.  R.C. 2307.93(A)(2) and (3). 
{¶ 5} The trial court determined that the revised asbestos legislation 
applied to Ackison and that the legislation did not impair any substantive rights so 
as to violate Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  The trial court also 
administratively dismissed Ackison’s claims because Ackison had failed to file 
the statutorily required documentation. 
{¶ 6} Ackison appealed the trial court’s ruling.  The court of appeals 
reversed and reinstated the case.  In its opinion, the court of appeals held that the 
retroactive application to Ackison’s claim of the H.B. 292 evidentiary 
requirements was unconstitutional.  The court stated that because Ackison’s suit 
had been filed prior to the effective date of the statutory changes, she had a vested 
substantive right to pursue recovery for her husband’s illness and death under the 
statutes that were in effect at the time her complaint was filed. 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals certified that its decision conflicted with three 
cases from the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, each of which held that 
retroactive application of the H.B. 292 standards was not unconstitutional.  See 
Wilson v. AC & S, Inc., 169 Ohio App.3d 720, 2006-Ohio-6704, 864 N.E.2d 682; 
Staley v. AC & S, Inc., Butler App. No. CA2006-06-133, 2006-Ohio-7033; and 
Stahlheber v. Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, LTEE., Butler App. No. CA2006-06-
134, 2006-Ohio-7034. 
{¶ 8} We accepted jurisdiction and recognized the conflict on the 
following question:  “Can R.C. 2307.91, 2307.92, and 2307.93 be applied to cases 
already pending on September 2, 2004?”  Ackison v. Anchor Packing Co., 113 
Ohio St.3d 1465, 2007-Ohio-1722, 864 N.E.2d 652, 113 Ohio St.3d 1464, 2007-
Ohio-1722, 864 N.E.2d 651. 
II 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶ 9} The essential question in this case is whether R.C. 2307.91, 
2307.92, and 2307.93 can validly be applied to Ackison’s claims or whether these 
statutory provisions are unconstitutionally retroactive. 
{¶ 10} The Ohio Constitution provides that the “general assembly shall 
have no power to pass retroactive laws * * *.”  Section 28, Article II, 
Constitution.  Yet “retroactivity itself is not always forbidden by Ohio law.  
Though the language of Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution provides 
that the General Assembly ‘shall have no power to pass retroactive laws,’ Ohio 
courts have long recognized that there is a crucial distinction between statutes that 
merely apply retroactively (or ‘retrospectively’) and those that do so in a manner 
that offends our Constitution.”  Bielat v. Bielat (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 350, 353, 
721 N.E.2d 28. 
A 
{¶ 11} Guided by R.C. 1.48, which provides that a statute is presumed to 
apply prospectively unless expressly declared to be retroactive, this court has 
developed a two-part inquiry to determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally 
retroactive.  We recently summarized this test as follows: 
{¶ 12} “First, the reviewing court must determine as a threshold matter 
whether the statute is expressly made retroactive. [State v.] LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 
[178, 2002-Ohio-4009], 772 N.E.2d 1172, citing Van Fossen [v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co. (1988)], 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, at paragraphs one and 
two of the syllabus.  The General Assembly’s failure to clearly enunciate 
retroactivity ends the analysis, and the relevant statute may be applied only 
prospectively. Id.  If a statute is clearly retroactive, though, the reviewing court 
must then determine whether it is substantive or remedial in nature. LaSalle [96 
Ohio St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-4009], 772 N.E.2d 1172.”  State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio 
St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, 871 N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 10. 
January Term, 2008 
5 
{¶ 13} In this case, the General Assembly expressly directed that the 
prima facie filing requirements at issue apply to cases pending on – and thus filed 
before – the effective date of the legislation.  R.C. 2307.93(A)(2) and (3).  
Because the General Assembly so specified, we must next consider “whether the 
statute is substantive, rendering it unconstitutionally retroactive, as opposed to 
merely remedial.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Bielat, 87 Ohio St.3d at 353, 721 N.E.2d 28, 
citing State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 410-411, 700 N.E.2d 570. 
B 
{¶ 14} In determining whether a statute is substantive or remedial, we 
have established the following parameters:   
{¶ 15} “A statute is ‘substantive’ if it impairs or takes away vested rights, 
affects an accrued substantive right, imposes new or additional burdens, duties, 
obligation[s], or liabilities as to a past transaction, or creates a new right. * * * 
Conversely, remedial laws are those affecting only the remedy provided, and 
include laws that merely substitute a new or more appropriate remedy for the 
enforcement of an existing right.”  Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 411, 700 N.E.2d 570, 
citing Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 107, 522 N.E.2d 489.  “Further, while we 
have recognized the occasional substantive effect, we have found that it is 
generally true that laws that relate to procedures are ordinarily remedial in 
nature.”  Id. 
{¶ 16} We have previously concluded that R.C. 2307.92 and 2307.93 “do 
not relate to the rights and duties that give rise to this cause of action or otherwise 
make it more difficult for a claimant to succeed on the merits of a claim.  Rather, 
they pertain to the machinery for carrying on a suit.  They are therefore 
procedural in nature, not substantive.”  Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Bogle, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 455, 2007-Ohio-5248, 875 N.E.2d 919, ¶17.  We reiterate today that the 
requirements in R.C. 2307.92 and 2307.93 are remedial and procedural in nature 
and are, therefore, not unconstitutionally retroactive. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶ 17} As we have previously recognized, these two statutes establish “a 
procedural prioritization” of asbestos-related cases.  Id. at ¶ 16.  “Simply put, 
these statutes create a procedure to prioritize the administration and resolution of 
a cause of action that already exists.  No new substantive burdens are placed on 
claimants * * *.”  Id.  Instead, the enactments “merely substitute a new or more 
appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an existing right.”  Cook, 83 Ohio 
St.3d at 411, 700 N.E.2d 570. 
III 
{¶ 18} Despite our conclusions in Bogle, Ackison argues that various 
provisions of H.B. 292 are unconstitutional as applied to her claim because they 
impair vested rights and affect accrued substantive rights by altering substantive 
common-law rules pertaining to asbestos claims.  Because Ackison asserts an “as 
applied” challenge to the statute, she “bears the burden of presenting clear and 
convincing evidence of a presently existing set of facts that make the statutes 
unconstitutional and void when applied to those facts.”  Groch v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 181, citing 
Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 38, 
and Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 329, 28 O.O. 295, 55 
N.E.2d 629, paragraph six of the syllabus. 
{¶ 19} Ackison’s chief argument in this regard is that before the 
enactment of H.B. 292, asbestos-related conditions were compensable under Ohio 
law when there was merely an alteration of the lungs (such as “pleural 
thickening”), irrespective of whether any impairment or disease had developed.  
Assuming for purposes of argument that the common law can be sufficiently 
settled to give rise to a vested right to its application, we must find, in order to 
accept her argument, that common-law liability existed in Ohio for asymptomatic 
pleural thickening at the time Ackison’s claim was filed. 
January Term, 2008 
7 
{¶ 20} Before the enactment of H.B. 292, there was no statewide standard 
for what constituted an “injury” giving rise to an asbestos claim.  Indeed, this 
court did not address that question when it reviewed former R.C. 2305.10 with 
respect to when an asbestos claim accrues.  O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp. 
(1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 4 OBR 335, 447 N.E.2d 727.  Although this court held in 
O’Stricker that an asbestos plaintiff’s cause of action arises “upon the date on 
which the plaintiff is informed by competent medical authority that he has been 
injured, or upon the date on which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, he 
should have become aware that he had been injured, whichever date occurs first,” 
id. at 91, 4 OBR 335, 447 N.E.2d 727, the court did not define what constitutes an 
injury in an asbestos-exposure claim.  Only two Ohio appellate court decisions 
address the issue. 
{¶ 21} In Verbryke v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1992), 84 Ohio 
App.3d 388, 616 N.E.2d 1162, the Sixth District Court of Appeals stated that 
“pleural plaque or pleural thickening is an alteration to the lining of the lung.  
Accordingly, pleural plaque or thickening meets the definition of ‘bodily harm,’ 
which is a subspecies of ‘physical harm’ and thus satisfies the injury requirements 
of Sections 388 and 402A of the Restatement [of the Law 2d, Torts (1965)].”  Id. 
at 395, 616 N.E.2d 1162.  This principle was later cited approvingly by the Eight 
District Court of Appeals in In re Cuyahoga Cty. Asbestos Cases (1998), 127 
Ohio App.3d 358, 364, 713 N.E.2d 20. 
{¶ 22} The Verbryke court’s analysis was predicated upon a reading of 
several sections of the Restatement of Torts together (Sections 388, 402A, 7, and 
15), with the conclusion that impairment to the body consists of an “alteration to 
the structure of the body even though no other harm is caused.”  Verbryke, 84 
Ohio App.3d at 395, 616 N.E.2d 1162 (citing Comment a to Section 15 of the 
Restatement).  In doing so, the Verbryke court rejected the analysis of a Maryland 
court that reached the opposite conclusion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶ 23} In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong (1991), 87 Md.App. 699, 591 
A.2d 544, reversed in part on other grounds (1992), 326 Md. 107, 604 A.2d 47, 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the Restatement did not 
support the conclusion that pleural plaque and pleural thickening alone were 
sufficient to constitute harm.  Id. at 732-735, 591 A.2d 544.  The Maryland court 
noted that Section 15 of the Restatement was inapposite “because it broadly 
defines bodily harm only in the context of an action based on the intentional tort 
of battery.”  Id. at 735, 591 A.2d 544.  Indeed, Section 15 of the Restatement 
relates to harm caused by intentional torts. 
{¶ 24} We determine that the Maryland court’s approach is the better-
reasoned one.  The Verbryke court’s incorporation of Section 15 into its chain of 
logic incorrectly imputed intentional-tort principles into an analysis of negligence.  
Thus, the Verbryke decision is based upon a faulty interpretation of the 
Restatement – an interpretation that also has been rejected by courts in other 
states.  In fact, the latest draft of the Restatement offers the following comment to 
Section 4, which defines physical harm:  “ ‘Bodily harm’ is employed to mean 
physical impairment to the human body and includes physical injury, illness, 
disease, and death.”  (Emphasis added.)  Proposed Final Draft No. 1, Restatement 
of the Law 3d, Torts (Apr. 6, 2005), Section 4, Comment a.  A Reporter’s Note 
contains the following discussion specifically related to asbestos claims: 
{¶ 25} “An unfortunate and aberrational exception to the [general 
tendency] of small or trivial harms [to remain unlitigated] explained in this 
Comment is asbestos claims by plaintiffs who suffer no clinical symptoms but 
who have abnormal lung X-rays, a condition known as pleural plaque. These 
claims exist only because of the massive number of such claimants and the 
efficiencies of aggregating such claims to make them economically viable for 
litigation. Some courts have responded by requiring that an asbestos plaintiff 
prove the existence of clinical symptoms before sufficient bodily injury exists. 
January Term, 2008 
9 
See, e.g., In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563 (D. Haw. 1990) 
(pleural plaque does not constitute legally cognizable injury); Owens–Ill. v. 
Armstrong, 87 Md.App. 699, 591 A.2d 544 (1991) (pleural scarring does not 
entail physical harm that is compensable in tort), aff'd in relevant part, 326 Md. 
107, 604 A.2d 47 (1992); Giffear v. Johns–Manville Corp., 429 Pa.Super. 327, 
632 A.2d 880 (1993) (pleural plaque is not a legally cognizable injury). * * * But 
see Gideon v. Johns–Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir.1985) 
(applying Texas law) (cause of action accrued when plaintiff suffered pleural 
plaque).”  Reporter’s Note, Tentative Draft, Restatement of Torts 3d, Section 4, 
Comment c. 
{¶ 26} The Verbryke court’s holding that pleural thickening alone is 
sufficient to constitute an injury was not the common law of this state such that 
Ackison had a vested right to its application in her case.  This court has never held 
that asymptomatic pleural thickening is, by itself, sufficient to establish a 
compensable injury for asbestos exposure.  Verbryke and Cuyahoga Cty. Asbestos 
Cases, 127 Ohio App.3d 358, 713 N.E.2d 20, are the only two appellate decisions 
that have addressed the issue in Ohio, but those decisions rest on a misreading of 
the Restatement.  Accordingly, we conclude that Ackison has not established that 
the settled common law in Ohio permitted tort recovery for asymptomatic pleural 
thickening in asbestos exposure cases prior to the enactment of H.B. 292. 
{¶ 27} Moreover, with respect to this case specifically, although there was 
evidence of pleural thickening in Mr. Ackison’s lungs, he had not been diagnosed 
with any asbestos-related illness or impairment.  The provisions of H.B. 292 at 
issue here did not prevent Ackison from pursuing her claim.  Although the 
legislation caused a hold to be placed on the claim, the hold did not by itself 
extinguish the claim.  Thus, Ackison has failed to carry her burden of proving that 
the statute was unconstitutional and void when applied to the facts of this case. 
IV 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
{¶ 28} Ackison’s remaining arguments generally relate to the definition of 
certain terms in R.C. 2307.91, as enacted by H.B. 292.  First, Ackison claims that 
the definition of “competent medical authority” contained in R.C. 2307.91(Z) 
substantively alters evidentiary requirements for asbestos claims.  (See Appendix 
for text of R.C. 2307.91(Z).) 
{¶ 29} Before the enactment of R.C. 2307.91, the term “competent 
medical authority” was not defined by either statute or case law.  By choosing to 
define that term, the legislature did not take away Ackison’s right to pursue her 
claim.  Nor did the definition alter the quantum of proof necessary for a plaintiff 
to prevail in an asbestos-related claim.  Rather, it merely defined the procedural 
framework by which trial courts are to adjudicate such claims.  The definition of 
competent medical authority pertains to the witness’s competence to testify and is, 
in essence, more akin to a rule of evidence.  As such, it is procedural in nature.  
Compare Denicola v. Providence Hosp. (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 115, 11 O.O.3d 
290, 387 N.E.2d 231 (new statute defining qualifications of expert witnesses in a 
medical claim is procedural rather than substantive).  Therefore, the definition 
does not alter a vested substantive right possessed by Ackison; she did not have a 
vested right to have the undefined term remain undefined. 
{¶ 30} Second, Ackison contends that the statutory changes affected her 
accrued substantive rights in that they altered the substantive elements of 
causation that must be established to recover on a claim.  Specifically, Ackison 
takes exception to the requirement in R.C. 2307.92 that a claimant provide prima 
facie evidence that the claimant’s exposure to asbestos was a “substantial 
contributing factor” to the claimant’s medical condition. 
{¶ 31} R.C. 2307.91(FF) defines “substantial contributing factor” as 
follows: 
{¶ 32} “ ‘Substantial contributing factor’ ” means both of the following: 
January Term, 2008 
11 
{¶ 33} “(1) Exposure to asbestos is the predominate cause of the physical 
impairment alleged in the asbestos claim. 
{¶ 34} “(2) A competent medical authority has determined with a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that without the asbestos exposures the 
physical impairment of the exposed person would not have occurred.” 
{¶ 35} Ackison contends that the requirement that exposure to asbestos be 
the “predominate cause” of the alleged impairment is a departure from the 
common-law standard for proximate cause in tort.  Specifically, Ackison contends 
that the General Assembly’s choice of the word “predominate” requires a plaintiff 
to prove that all other potential causes of injury are insignificant, thereby altering 
the common-law standard for proximate causation in asbestos claims. 
{¶ 36} The General Assembly’s choice of the word “predominate” in R.C. 
2307.91(FF)(1) is indeed perplexing.1  The word “predominate” is a verb, but it is 
used in that subsection as an adjective.  As a result, it is susceptible of more than 
one meaning and is therefore ambiguous.  “ ‘The object of judicial investigation 
in the construction of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the 
law-making body which enacted it.’ Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 
64 N.E. 574, paragraph one of the syllabus.  This court may engage in statutory 
interpretation when the statute under review is ambiguous.”  Tomasik v. Tomasik, 
111 Ohio St.3d 481, 2006-Ohio-6109, 857 N.E.2d 127, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 37} In construing such a statute, we are guided by the principles of 
construction found in R.C. 1.49, which states: 
{¶ 38} “If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of 
the legislature, may consider among other matters: 
                                                 
1. The phrase “predominate cause” is not a phrase common to Ohio law.  It does appear to be 
common in cases within at least one nearby jurisdiction; yet, even in those cases, it is regarded as 
either less demanding than or equal to proximate cause.  See, e.g., Morgan v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. 
(C.A.6), 229 F.3d 1153 (applying Tennessee law); Doe v. Rogers (Jan. 31, 1997), Tenn. App. No. 
03A01-9606-CV, 00212, 1997 WL 36834.  Significantly, this issue is largely left undiscussed in 
the briefs or the parties and their amici. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
{¶ 39} “(A) The object sought to be attained; 
{¶ 40} “(B) The circumstances under which the statute was enacted; 
{¶ 41} “(C) The legislative history; 
{¶ 42} “(D) The common law or former statutory provisions, including 
laws upon the same or similar subjects; 
{¶ 43} “(E) The consequences of a particular construction.” 
{¶ 44} Following these principles, we observe that one possible 
construction of the word “predominate” is the adjective “predominant,” which is 
an apparent variation.  See Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal 
Usage (2d Ed.1995) 682.2  But interpreting the term in that way would alter the 
common-law element of proximate causation and render the statute 
unconstitutionally retroactive in this case.  R.C. 1.47 states: 
{¶ 45} “In enacting a statute, it is presumed that: 
{¶ 46} “(A) Compliance with the constitutions of the state and of the 
United States is intended.” 
{¶ 47} Accordingly, we will not construe the term predominate, as used in 
R.C. 2307.91(FF)(1), to mean predominant.  Doing so would render the provision 
unconstitutionally retroactive, contrary to the guideline in R.C. 1.47(A).  
Furthermore, we observe that the General Assembly, in enacting this 
comprehensive reform legislation, was careful to make substantive changes 
prospective only.  See, e.g., R.C. 2307.96(C).  Thus, it does not appear to us that 
the General Assembly intended a substantive change by using the term 
“predominate.” 
                                                 
2. Indeed, Garner observes that “predominate” is a “needless variant” of the word “predominant.”  
Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2d Ed.1995) 682.  Such variant forms, he 
observes, “lead not to precision in technical writing but to uncertainties about authorial intention.”  
Id. at 583.  This observation is consistent with our finding that the use of “predominate” in R.C. 
2307.91(FF)(1) is ambiguous. 
January Term, 2008 
13 
{¶ 48} Rather than impose a construction that results in unconstitutional 
application, we construe the statute to be consistent with the common law.  The 
phrase “predominate cause” contained in R.C. 2307.91(FF)(1) must be read in 
pari materia with R.C. 2307.91(FF)(2) because both are elements of the statutory 
definition of “substantial contributing factor.”  R.C. 2307.91(FF)(2) requires that 
a competent medical authority determine that “without the asbestos exposures the 
physical impairment of the exposed person would not have occurred.”  This 
requirement is, in essence, a “but for” test of causation, which is the standard test 
for establishing cause in fact.  See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc. 
(1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 82, 84-85, 671 N.E.2d 225.  Cause in fact is distinct from 
proximate, or legal, cause.  Once cause in fact is established, a plaintiff then must 
establish proximate cause in order to hold a defendant liable.  See id. at 86, 671 
N.E.2d 225, citing Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts (5 Ed.1984) 265-266.  See 
also Prosser & Keeton, id., at 272-273. 
{¶ 49} When R.C. 2307.91(FF)(1) and (2) are read in pari materia, it 
appears that the two subsections were intended to require that asbestos exposure 
be a significant, direct cause of the injury to the degree that without the exposure 
to asbestos, the injury would not have occurred.  Thus, the statute reflects the 
common-law requirement that asbestos exposure be both a cause in fact and the 
direct cause of the plaintiff’s illness.  This is an embodiment of the common law, 
not an alteration of it.  Because we hold that R.C. 2307.91(FF) does not alter the 
common law that existed at the time Ackison filed her claim, the statute is not 
unconstitutionally retroactive and may be applied to her pending claim. 
{¶ 50} Ackison also contends that R.C. 2307.91(FF) alters the standard of 
causation for asbestos-exposure cases specifically, as established in Horton v. 
Harwick Chem. Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 679, 653 N.E.2d 1196.  We disagree.  
Horton addressed a multidefendant situation, in which the issue was the degree of 
exposure to the product of a particular defendant that the plaintiff must prove to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
avoid summary judgment.  We held that in such a multidefendant asbestos case, 
the plaintiff has the burden of proving both exposure to each defendant’s product 
and that the product was a “substantial factor” in causing the plaintiff’s injury.  Id. 
at paragraph one of the syllabus.  We further held that in proving that the product 
was a substantial factor in causing his injury, the plaintiff “need not prove that he 
was exposed to a specific product on a regular basis over some extended period of 
time in close proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked.”  Id. at paragraph 
two of the syllabus (declining to follow Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. 
(C.A.4, 1986), 782 F.2d 1156). 
{¶ 51} However, Horton did not address the issue here, which is whether 
exposure to asbestos was “the predominate cause of the physical impairment” 
without which “the physical impairment * * * would not have occurred.”  R.C. 
2307.91(FF).  The Horton inquiry, rather, pertained to determining which 
exposure to a particular defendant’s asbestos-containing product, in a case 
involving multiple defendants, was sufficient to hold that defendant legally 
responsible. 
{¶ 52} Consequently, there is no inconsistency between R.C. 2307.91(FF) 
and the substantive law as set forth in Horton.  The provisions of H.B. 292 at 
issue address only the prima facie showing of whether a plaintiff’s claimed 
injuries are genuinely asbestos-related.  The provisions do not involve the more 
detailed inquiry of whether a particular defendant’s product is the cause of the 
plaintiff’s illness.  The definition of “substantial contributing factor” does not 
alter the proof necessary to establish particular causation by a particular defendant 
when the trier of fact reviews the merits of a claim.  Therefore, the definition does 
not affect accrued substantive rights. 
{¶ 53} Finally, Ackison takes exception to the definition of the term 
“substantial occupational exposure” contained in R.C. 2307.91(GG), which states: 
January Term, 2008 
15 
{¶ 54} “ ‘Substantial occupational exposure to asbestos’ means 
employment for a cumulative period of at least five years in an industry and an 
occupation in which, for a substantial portion of a normal work year for that 
occupation, the exposed person did any of the following: 
{¶ 55} “(1) Handled raw asbestos fibers; 
{¶ 56} “(2) Fabricated asbestos-containing products so that the person was 
exposed to raw asbestos fibers in the fabrication process; 
{¶ 57} “(3) Altered, repaired, or otherwise worked with an asbestos-
containing product in a manner that exposed the person on a regular basis to 
asbestos fibers; 
{¶ 58} “(4) Worked in close proximity to other workers engaged in any of 
the activities described in division (GG)(1), (2), or (3) of this section in a manner 
that exposed the person on a regular basis to asbestos fibers.” 
{¶ 59} Ackison argues that the statutory definition of “substantial 
occupational exposure” is a legislative attempt to adopt the so-called Lohrmann 
test, 782 F.2d 1156, which this court specifically rejected in Horton.  If this claim 
is true, then the provision could not be retroactively applied without offending the 
Constitution.  Ackison fails to demonstrate how this definition affects her claim.  
The requirement of showing “substantial occupational exposure” applies only to 
claims alleging lung cancer caused by exposure to asbestos when the victim is a 
smoker and to wrongful-death claims, neither of which is the case here.  See R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1)(c)(i) and (D)(1)(c)(i).  In any event, we disagree that the definition 
is an adoption of the Lohrmann test. 
{¶ 60} The Lohrmann test was specifically directed at the merits of an 
asbestos claim.  In sum, it holds that in order to establish causation, “there must 
be evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over some 
extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked.”  
Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1162-1163. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
{¶ 61} While H.B. 292 defined the term “substantial occupational 
exposure” in R.C. 2307.91(GG), the bill simultaneously enacted R.C. 2307.96.  
The latter provision legislatively adopted the Lohrmann test as a substantive 
requirement for proving an asbestos-related claim.  R.C. 2307.96(B); H.B. 292, 
Section 5, 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3992-3993.  The General Assembly expressly 
acknowledged that its specific intent was to adopt the Lohrmann test and that 
doing so was contrary to our syllabus language in Horton.  Id.  Consequently, the 
General Assembly explicitly made that provision prospective only, reflecting the 
substantive nature of the change.  R.C. 2307.96(C).  Because the General 
Assembly confined its adoption of the Lohrmann test to the prospective 
provisions of R.C. 2307.96, we cannot conclude that its simultaneous adoption of 
R.C. 2307.91(GG) was substantive in nature.  The definition, as it relates to the 
“procedural prioritization” of asbestos claims, Bogle, 115 Ohio St.3d 455, 2007-
Ohio-5248, 875 N.E.2d 919, ¶16, does not alter the substantive law of causation 
in the same vein as the adoption of R.C. 2307.96.  We conclude that R.C. 
2307.91(GG) is consistent with common law and not unconstitutionally 
retroactive. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 62} For the reasons expressed herein, we hold that the requirements in 
R.C. 2307.91, 2307.92, and 2307.93 pertaining to asbestos-exposure claims are 
remedial and procedural and may be applied without offending the Retroactivity 
Clause of the Ohio Constitution to cases pending on September 2, 2004.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., 
concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissents without opinion. 
January Term, 2008 
17 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents with opinion. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 63} How does Danny Ackison fit into asbestos-litigation reform?  Do 
one man’s injuries matter in the midst of a crusade? 
Background 
{¶ 64} The General Assembly, deciding that a crisis existed in Ohio 
regarding the administration of claims for alleged injuries caused by exposure to 
asbestos, radically changed the nature of asbestos litigation with 2003 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292, 150 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3970 (“H.B. 292”).  In Norfolk S. 
Ry. Co. v. Bogle, 115 Ohio St.3d 455, 2007-Ohio-5248, 875 N.E.2d 919, ¶2, this 
court set forth the General Assembly’s stated motivation behind the bill:  
{¶ 65} “Based on its belief that ‘[t]he current asbestos personal injury 
litigation system is unfair and inefficient, imposing a severe burden on litigants 
and taxpayers alike,’ the General Assembly enacted H.B. 292. H.B. 292, Section 
3(A)(2), 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3970, 3988. By the end of 2000, ‘over six 
hundred thousand people [had] filed asbestos claims’ nationwide, and Ohio had 
‘become a haven for asbestos claims and, as a result, is one of the top five state 
court venues for asbestos filings.’ Id. at Section 3(A)(3)(a) and (b), 150 Ohio 
Laws, Part III, 3989. The General Assembly further noted that in Cuyahoga 
County alone, the asbestos docket increased from approximately 12,800 cases in 
1999 to over 39,000 cases by October 2003. Id. at Section 3(A)(3)(e), 150 Ohio 
Laws, Part III, 3989.  Eighty-nine percent of claimants do not allege that they 
suffer from cancer, and ‘[s]ixty-six to ninety per cent of these non-cancer 
claimants are not sick.’ Id. at Section 3(A)(5), 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3990.” 
{¶ 66} That Ohio is in the “top five” of claims filed should not be 
surprising: Ohio was in the top five most populous states from the start of World 
War II until the 1970 census (and was seventh in the 2000 census) and has 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
historically been a center for industry.  Nonetheless, the General Assembly has 
declared a crisis, and since the crisis lies in the number of cases pending in Ohio 
courts, the crisis cannot be lessened unless the number of pending cases is 
dramatically reduced.  The crisis cannot go away unless cases go away, unless 
people go away.  The people who must go away include plaintiffs with cases that 
were viable before September 4, 2004; H.B. 292 requires it.  But this court does 
not have to let it happen. 
{¶ 67} H.B. 292 changes the law so that people who had viable claims 
before its passage no longer have viable claims afterward.  It achieves its end by 
changing the substance of what constitutes a valid injury, altering the nature of the 
medical proof necessary to prove a claim, modifying what constitutes causation in 
an asbestos-exposure claim, and essentially overruling this court in establishing 
new requirements for the extent of exposure to asbestos that is necessary to prove 
a claim.  There is no way around it: H.B. 292 places new, substantive burdens on 
people with asbestos-exposure claims. 
{¶ 68} The General Assembly, at least, offered a lifeline to claimants 
whose cause of action arose before the date of the passage of H.B. 292.  Pursuant 
to R.C. 2307.93(A)(3), the requirements of H.B. 292 do not apply if they impair 
the substantive rights of the plaintiff and that impairment “is otherwise in 
violation of Section 28 of Article II, Ohio Constitution.”  The majority, however, 
cuts that lifeline today for all plaintiffs. 
The Injury 
{¶ 69} The scapegoat of H.B. 292 is the injury generally known as pleural 
thickening, an alteration to the lining of the lungs that can be asymptomatic.  
Claimants with this injury are part of the so-called “ ‘[s]ixty-six to ninety per cent 
[of claimants who] are not sick.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Bogle, 115 Ohio St.3d 455, 
2007-Ohio-5248, 875 N.E.2d 919, at ¶ 2, quoting H.B. 292, Section 3(A)(5), 150 
Ohio Laws, Part III, 3990.  Contrary to the General Assembly’s and the majority’s 
January Term, 2008 
19 
characterization, however, in Ohio a person who has suffered an alteration to the 
lining of his lungs is indeed sick.  In Cuyahoga County, where 39,000 cases were 
pending when H.B. 292 was enacted, the Eighth District Court of Appeals court 
held over a decade ago that “in Ohio the asbestos-related pleural thickening or 
pleural plaque, which is an alteration to the lining of the lung, constitutes physical 
harm, and as such satisfies the injury requirement for a cause of action for 
negligent failure to warn or for a strict products liability claim, even if no other 
harm is caused by asbestos.” In re Cuyahoga Cty. Asbestos Cases (1998), 127 
Ohio App.3d 358, 364, 713 N.E.2d 20.  That holding is no trifle — it is the law in 
the Ohio appellate district where the vast majority of asbestos cases are litigated, 
it was never appealed to this court, and no Ohio appellate court has ever held 
differently.  The court in In re Cuyahoga Cty. Asbestos Cases also held that 
plaintiffs’ “knowledge that they possess nondysfunctional asbestos-related 
changes in their lungs places them on sufficient notice to start running the statute 
of limitations time-clock.” 127 Ohio App.3d at 364-365, 713 N.E.2d 20. 
{¶ 70} The alleged litigation crisis exists because Ohio has recognized 
that asbestos-related pleural thickening is an injury, and had recognized it as an 
injury when Ackison was first diagnosed in 2000, when he died in 2003, and 
when his estate filed its lawsuit in April 2004.  But the only way for H.B. 292 to 
alleviate the asbestos litigation crisis is not only to stop recognizing pleural 
thickening as an injury, but to declare that it was not an injury after people like 
Ackison had already sought redress for it.  H.B. 292 stepped back in time, 
requiring certain claimants with matters pending on the effective date of the 
statute to establish a prima facie showing that the claimant suffered from a newly 
defined injury.  That injury found its basis in tests and procedures that plaintiffs of 
Danny Ackison’s era had no reason to undergo. 
{¶ 71} After the enactment of H.B. 292, a plaintiff who seeks 
compensation for previously recognized nonmalignant injuries from asbestos 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
exposure is required to provide the trial court with very specific and detailed 
information, above and beyond anything previously required.  That information is 
not designed for those plaintiffs to prove the injury for which they have already 
sued, but to prove a different injury.  Specifically, R.C. 2307.92(B) requires that a 
prima facie showing shall include all of the following minimum requirements: 
{¶ 72} “(3) A diagnosis by a competent medical authority, based on a 
medical examination and pulmonary function testing of the exposed person, that 
all of the following apply to the exposed person:   
{¶ 73} “(a) The exposed person has a permanent respiratory impairment 
rating of at least class 2 as defined by and evaluated pursuant to the AMA guides 
to the evaluation of permanent impairment. 
{¶ 74} “(b) Either of the following:   
{¶ 75} “(i) The exposed person has asbestosis or diffuse pleural 
thickening, based at a minimum on radiological or pathological evidence of 
asbestosis or radiological evidence of diffuse pleural thickening.  The asbestosis 
or diffuse pleural thickening described in this division, rather than solely chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, is a substantial contributing factor to the exposed 
person's physical impairment, based at a minimum on a determination that the 
exposed person has any of the following:   
{¶ 76} “(I) A forced vital capacity below the predicted lower limit of 
normal and a ratio of FEV1 to FVC that is equal to or greater than the predicted 
lower limit of normal;  
{¶ 77} “(II) A total lung capacity, by plethysmography or timed gas 
dilution, below the predicted lower limit of normal;   
{¶ 78} “(III) A chest x-ray showing small, irregular opacities  (s, t) graded 
by a certified B-reader at least 2/1 on the ILO scale. 
{¶ 79} “(ii) If the exposed person has a chest x-ray showing small, 
irregular opacities (s, t) graded by a certified B-reader as only a 1/0 on the ILO 
January Term, 2008 
21 
scale, then in order to establish that the exposed person has asbestosis, rather than 
solely chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, that is a substantial contributing 
factor to the exposed person's physical impairment the plaintiff must establish that 
the exposed person has both of the following:   
{¶ 80} “(I) A forced vital capacity below the predicted lower limit of 
normal and a ratio of FEV1 to FVC that is equal to or greater than the predicted 
lower limit of normal; 
{¶ 81} “(II) A total lung capacity, by plethysmography or timed gas 
dilution, below the predicted lower limit of normal.” 
{¶ 82} When Ackison’s widow filed her claim, there was no requirement 
that her husband have “a permanent respiratory impairment rating of at least a 
class 2 as defined by and evaluated pursuant to AMA guides to the evaluation of 
permanent impairment.”  But under H.B. 292, any claimant with nonmalignant 
asbestos-related disease whose impairment does not reach the class 2 stage as 
defined by the AMA guides has his claim administratively dismissed. R.C. 
2307.93(A)(3)(c). 
{¶ 83} Prior to H.B. 292, a plaintiff would have to prove that he was 
exposed to the product, that the product injured him, and that those injuries 
affected his life.  Was that an unreasonable standard?  Or is it a standard that we 
would place on any plaintiff for any injury? 
{¶ 84} The majority writes that in Ackison’s case, “[a]lthough the 
legislation caused a hold to be placed on the claim, the hold did not by itself 
extinguish the claim.”  True.  But claimants like Danny Ackison will not get a 
chance to avail themselves of R.C. 2307.93(A)(3)(c)’s “come back when you’re 
sicker” provision.  Danny Ackison will not be getting sicker.  And he will never 
have the opportunity to vindicate his rights that existed on the day he learned that 
his workplace exposure to asbestos had made him sick.  H.B. 292 established that 
Ackison’s compensable harm was no longer a compensable harm. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
Competent Medical Authority 
{¶ 85} The majority claims that the term “competent medical authority” 
was not defined by either statute or case law before the enactment of R.C. 
2307.91.  The majority writes that “[b]y choosing to define that term, the 
legislature did not take away Ackison’s [executor’s] right to pursue her claim.  
Nor did the definition alter the quantum of proof necessary for a plaintiff to 
prevail in an asbestos-related claim.  Rather, it merely defined the procedural 
framework by which trial courts are to adjudicate such claims.”  That is a bit like 
saying that the Blitzkrieg was merely Germany’s way to define its border with 
Poland. 
{¶ 86} The definition of “competent medical authority” adds requirements 
for proof of an injury claim.  The majority does not set forth these specific 
requirements in its opinion, allowing it to more easily make the statement “The 
definition of competent medical authority pertains to the witness’s competence to 
testify and is, in essence, more akin to a rule of evidence.”  R.C. 2307.91(Z) 
provides that a “competent medical authority” must meet the following 
requirements: 
{¶ 87} “(1) The medical doctor is a board-certified internist, pulmonary 
specialist, oncologist, pathologist, or occupational medicine specialist. 
{¶ 88} “(2) The medical doctor is actually treating or has treated the 
exposed person and has or had a doctor-patient relationship with the person. 
{¶ 89} “ * * * 
{¶ 90} “(4) The medical doctor spends not more than twenty-five percent 
of the medical doctor’s professional practice time in providing consulting or 
expert services in connection with actual or potential tort actions, and the medical 
doctor’s medical group, professional corporation, clinic, or other affiliated group 
earns not more than twenty percent of its revenues from providing those 
services.” 
January Term, 2008 
23 
{¶ 91} R.C. 2307.91(Z) has nothing to do with the competence of 
physicians to testify, as a rule of evidence might.  No matter the expertise or 
experience of the doctor, if the doctor is not the claimant’s treating physician, or if 
he makes too much money consulting with tort victims, he may not testify on 
behalf of the claimant. 
{¶ 92} R.C. 2307.91(Z) is a special rule for asbestos plaintiffs only and is 
designed to attack the way their cases are brought.  It changes the type of 
evidence necessary to prosecute a claim.  It requires Danny Ackison, a dead man, 
to find an internist, pulmonary specialist, oncologist, pathologist, or occupational 
medicine specialist to become his treating physician.  Without that relationship, 
there is no claim.  No statute or rule of evidence anywhere approaching that kind 
of evidentiary requirement existed at the time Ackison filed his claim.  It adds an 
element to proving a claim that for Ackison is impossible to achieve.  That 
requirement kills his cause of action by redefining it into oblivion. 
Substantial Contributing Factor 
{¶ 93} R.C. 2307.92 requires a claimant to provide prima facie evidence 
that the claimant’s exposure to asbestos was a “substantial contributing factor” to 
the claimant’s medical condition; R.C. 2307.91(FF) defines “substantial 
contributing factor” as including both of the following factors: 
{¶ 94} “(1) Exposure to asbestos is the predominate cause of the physical 
impairment alleged in the asbestos claim. 
{¶ 95} “(2) A competent medical authority has determined with a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that without the asbestos exposures the 
physical impairment of the exposed person would not have occurred.” 
{¶ 96} The majority saves the General Assembly from itself, finding that 
interpreting the term “predominate cause” in the way the General Assembly 
obviously intended “would alter the common-law element of proximate causation 
and render the statute unconstitutionally retroactive in this case.”  The General 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
Assembly could not have meant to do that, the majority concludes.  Latching on 
to the idea that the grammatically shaky word “predominate” might or might not 
mean “predominant,” the majority finds that the word is ambiguous and decides 
to interpret the statute in a manner “consistent with the common law.”  To do so, 
it excises “predominate” from the statute: 
{¶ 97} “[W]e observe that the General Assembly, in enacting this 
comprehensive reform legislation, was careful to make substantive changes 
prospective only. * * * Thus, it does not appear that the General Assembly 
intended a substantive change by using the term ‘predominate.’ ”   
{¶ 98} So much for the vital skepticism underlying the separation of 
powers.  The majority imputes constitutional motives to the General Assembly 
even though the General Assembly’s true motives were revealed in the language 
the majority has seen fit to remove.  I would find  R.C. 2307.91(FF) 
unconstitutional. 
Substantial Occupational Exposure 
{¶ 99} The majority is correct that the term “substantial occupational 
exposure” in R.C. 2307.91(GG) applies only to lung cancer claims brought either 
by wrongful-death claimants or by claimants who smoked.  Instead of ignoring 
the definition of “substantial occupational exposure” as irrelevant to this cause of 
action, however, the majority grants the phrase its imprimatur. 
{¶ 100} R.C. 2307.91(GG) sets forth specific requirements for the 
claimant’s length of exposure to asbestos and the types of exposure necessary to 
state a claim: 
{¶ 101} “(GG) ‘Substantial occupational exposure to asbestos’ means 
employment for a cumulative period of at least five years in an industry and an 
occupation in which, for a substantial portion of a normal work year for that 
occupation, the exposed person did any of the following: 
{¶ 102} “(1) Handled raw asbestos fibers; 
January Term, 2008 
25 
{¶ 103} “(2) Fabricated asbestos-containing products so that the person 
was exposed to raw asbestos fibers in the fabrication process; 
{¶ 104} “(3) Altered, repaired, or otherwise worked with an asbestos-
containing product in a manner that exposed the person on a regular basis to 
asbestos fibers; 
{¶ 105} “(4) Worked in close proximity to other workers engaged in any 
of the activities described in division (GG)(1), (2), or (3) of this section in a 
manner that exposed the person on a regular basis to asbestos fibers.” 
{¶ 106} This court held in Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp. (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 679, 653 N.E.2d 1196, paragraph two of the syllabus, that “[a] 
plaintiff need not prove that he was exposed to a specific product on a regular 
basis over some extended period of time in close proximity to where the plaintiff 
actually worked in order to prove that the product was a substantial factor in 
causing his injury.”  In so holding, we specifically disapproved the test 
enumerated in Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (C.A.4, 1986), 782 F.2d 
1156.  “Under the Lohrmann test, to escape summary judgment a plaintiff must 
present evidence of ‘exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over some 
extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked.’ ” 
Horton, 73 Ohio St.3d at 681, 653 N.E.2d 1196, quoting Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 
1162-1163. 
{¶ 107} The majority argues that since the General Assembly did not 
expressly adopt the Lohrmann test in regard to R.C. 2307.91(GG), the statute did 
not violate the Constitution.  However, the requirements of R.C. 2307.91(GG) are 
even more stringent than the Lohrmann test. 
{¶ 108} The majority writes that since the General Assembly made it 
known that it intended to adopt the Lohrmann test in R.C. 2307.96 and expressly 
made it prospective in R.C. 2307.96(C), “we cannot conclude that its 
simultaneous adoption of R.C. 2307.91(GG) was substantive in nature.”  The 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
majority seems to say that R.C. 2307.91(GG) is not substantive because in R.C. 
2307.96(C), the General Assembly admitted it was altering a substantive 
requirement, whereas it did not make such an admission in regard to R.C. 
2307.91(GG).  In other words, if R.C. 2307.91(GG) were substantive, the General 
Assembly would surely admit to it. 
{¶ 109} But the requirements of R.C. 2307.91(GG) are indeed 
substantive – they kick certain plaintiffs out of the courthouse.  A claimant cannot 
make a claim for wrongful death or lung cancer without proving five years of 
exposure to asbestos.  Prior to H.B. 292, there was nothing remotely like that 
requirement in the law.  A person with four and a half years of exposure could 
state a claim prior to the passage of H.B. 292; now that same person would have 
no claim.  In Horton, this court “decline[d] to establish a formulaic approach in an 
area which defies that kind of analysis.”  Id., 73 Ohio St.3d at 687, 653 N.E.2d 
1196.  Today, the majority finds that the General Assembly’s adoption of a 
formulaic approach does not constitute a substantive change in the law. 
{¶ 110} The majority says that a retroactive adoption of the Lohrmann 
test would be a substantive change.  However, in R.C. 2307.91(GG) adopts a 
more stringent version of the Lohrmann test, and the majority calls that change 
merely procedural.  Why?  No reason is given. 
The Past and Future of Asbestos Litigation in Ohio 
{¶ 111} Appellants submit that there are potentially 200,000 asbestos 
claimants in Ohio, about a fivefold increase from the time H.B. 292 was passed.  
Even if this court were to find its retroactive application unconstitutional, H.B. 
292 would still be applicable to all of those new cases, and thus the vast majority 
of all cases.  H.B. 292 would not go away. 
{¶ 112} Further, could it be that the General Assembly’s declaration of an 
asbestos-litigation crisis is overblown?  This court, speaking through its Chief 
Justice and senior staff, thought so around the time the bill was passed: 
January Term, 2008 
27 
{¶ 113} “Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas Moyer, in a letter to 
the bill’s sponsor, Rep. Scott Oelslager, a Canton Republican, said the judicial 
system was being administered ‘very efficiently.’ 
{¶ 114} “Doug Stephens, director of the Supreme Court’s judicial 
services, said asbestos cases are not bogged down. 
{¶ 115} “ ‘They do a good job of moving cases through the system,’ 
Stephens said. ‘We have not received complaints that the asbestos docket is 
holding anybody up.’ ” Brown, Measure Aims to Halt Asbestos-Exposure Suits; 
Proof-of-Injury Requirement May Clear Half of Cases, Cleveland Plain Dealer 
(Dec. 12, 2003) A1. 
{¶ 116} The fact is that the judicial system on its own, and especially in 
Cuyahoga County, has found a way to effectively administer asbestos litigation.  
Prioritization of claims already occurred long before H.B. 292; In re Cuyahoga 
Cty. Asbestos Cases, decided a decade ago, characterized the trial court’s method 
of prioritizing of asbestos claims as a “traditional exercise of the court’s authority 
to control its docket.” Id., 127 Ohio App.3d at 366, 713 N.E.2d 20.  Three visiting 
judges currently sit in Cuyahoga County to preside over asbestos cases 
exclusively.  There is no reason to believe that the most injured plaintiffs are not 
getting redress the most swiftly. 
{¶ 117} This court’s job in this case is not to fix a crisis declared by the 
General Assembly; our duty is to determine what is right for Danny Ackison 
under the Ohio Constitution.  Our role in this state is to protect the rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution, not to guide along what might or might not be a 
good legislative idea.  This court’s complicity with the General Assembly when it 
violates the Constitution is not judicial restraint; it is doing the work of the 
legislature from the bench. 
__________________ 
Appendix 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
{¶ 118} R.C. 2307.91(Z) reads as follows: 
{¶ 119} “Competent medical authority” means a medical doctor who is 
providing a diagnosis for purposes of constituting prima-facie evidence of an 
exposed person’s physical impairment that meets the requirements specified in 
section 2307.92 of the Revised Code and who meets the following requirements: 
{¶ 120} “(1) The medical doctor is a board-certified internist, pulmonary 
specialist, oncologist, pathologist, or occupational medicine specialist. 
{¶ 121} “(2) The medical doctor is actually treating or has treated the 
exposed person and has or had a doctor-patient relationship with the person. 
{¶ 122} “(3) As the basis for the diagnosis, the medical doctor has not 
relied, in whole or in part, on any of the following: 
{¶ 123} “(a) The reports or opinions of any doctor, clinic, laboratory, or 
testing company that performed an examination, test, or screening of the 
claimant’s medical condition in violation of any law, regulation, licensing 
requirement, or medical code of practice of the state in which that examination, 
test, or screening was conducted; 
{¶ 124} “(b) The reports or opinions of any doctor, clinic, laboratory, or 
testing company that performed an examination, test, or screening of the 
claimant’s medical condition that was conducted without clearly establishing a 
doctor-patient relationship with the claimant or medical personnel involved in the 
examination, test, or screening process; 
{¶ 125} “(c) The reports or opinions of any doctor, clinic, laboratory, or 
testing company that performed an examination, test, or screening of the 
claimant’s medical condition that required the claimant to agree to retain the legal 
services of the law firm sponsoring the examination, test, or screening. 
{¶ 126} “(4) The medical doctor spends not more than twenty-five per 
cent of the medical doctor’s professional practice time in providing consulting or 
expert services in connection with actual or potential tort actions, and the medical 
January Term, 2008 
29 
doctor’s medical group, professional corporation, clinic, or other affiliated group 
earns not more than twenty per cent of its revenues from providing those 
services.” 
__________________ 
Motley Rice, L.L.C., and John J. McConnell Jr.; Young, Reverman & 
Mazzei Co., L.P.A., Richard E. Reverman, and Kelly Thye, for appellee. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Richard D. Schuster, Nina I. 
Webb-Lawton, and Michael J. Hendershot, for appellants H.B. Fuller Co., 
Industrial Holdings Corp., Union Carbide Corp., Amchem Products, Inc. and 
Certainteed Corp. 
 
Bunda, Stutz & DeWitt, P.L.L., and Rebecca C. Sechrist; Schiff Hardin, 
L.L.P., and Robert H. Riley, for appellant Owens-Illinois, Inc. 
 
Gallagher Sharp, Kevin C. Alexandersen, John A. Valenti, Colleen A. 
Mountcastle, and Holly Olarczuk-Smith, for appellants Beazer East, Inc. and 
Ingersoll-Rand Co. 
 
Blank Rome, L.L.P., Michael L. Cioffi, and William M. Huse, for 
appellant Honeywell International, Inc. 
 
David L. Day, L.P.A., and David L. Day, for appellant John Crane, Inc. 
 
Tucker, Ellis & West, L.L.P., Henry E. Billingsley II, Carter E. Strang, 
Rachel McQuade, and Halle M. Herbert, for appellants BOC Group, Inc., f.k.a. 
Airco, Inc., Hobart Brothers Co., and Lincoln Electric Co. 
 
Oldham & Dowling and Reginald S. Kramer, for appellants General 
Electric Co. and CBS Corp., a Delaware corporation, f.k.a. Viacom, Inc., 
successor by merger to CBS Corp., a Pennsylvania corporation, f.k.a. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp. 
 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Bruce P. Mandel, and Kurt S. Siegfried, for 
appellant Ohio Valley Insulating Co., Inc. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
 
Eagen & Wykoff Co., L.P.A., Thomas L. Eagen Jr., and Christine Carey 
Steele, for appellant International Minerals and Chemical Corp. (Mallinckrodt). 
 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Timothy M. Fox, Charles R. Janes, James N. 
Kline, Kurt S. Siegfried, Robert E. Zulandt III, and Sally A. Jamieson, for 
appellant Georgia-Pacific L.L.C., f.k.a. Georgia-Pacific Corp. 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy, and Marc J. 
Jaffy, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio AFL-CIO. 
 
Brickler & Eckler, L.L.P., Kurtis A. Tunnell, and Anne Marie Sferra, 
urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Manufacturers’ Association, National 
Federation of Independent Business/Ohio, Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Ohio 
Alliance for Civil Justice, and Ohio Chemistry Technology Council. 
 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, and 
Christopher E. Appel, urging reversal for amici curiae American Insurance 
Association, National Federal of Independent Business Legal Foundation, 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, National Association of 
Manufacturers, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, Property 
Casualty Insurers Association of America, and American Chemistry Council. 
______________________