Case Title: PACK RIVER CO v YOUNG

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12348 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1973 T H E P A C K RIVER C O M P A N Y , a corpora t i o n , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, D O N A L D W. YOUNG, d/b/a F L A T H E A D LAKE REALTY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Emet Glore, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Mulroney, Delaney and Dalby, Missoula , Montana. Dexter L. Delaney argued, Missoula , Montana. For Respondent: Turnage and McNeil, Polson, Montana. C. B. McNeil argued, Polson, Montana. Submitted: May 30, 1973 Decided : JUN 1 5 1973 Filed: J U N 1 5 1973 M r , Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal by defendant Donald W, Young, d/b/a Flathead Lake Realty, from a summary judgment granted by the d i s t r i c t court of Lake County on June 20, 1972, i n favor of p l a i n t i f f The Pack River Company. O n o r about March 31, 1971, Young represented t o Pack Xiver t h a t he was t h e agent f o r the owners of c e r t a i n Flathead Lake property known a s the Bird Point property and t h a t he had a l i s t i n g from the owners f o r the s a l e of the property. O n March 31, 1971, Young, a s agent f o r the owners of the Bird Point property, prepared a Receipt and Agreement t o S e l l and Purchase, a copy of which was attached t o p l a i n t i f f ' s corn- f l 11 p l a i n t a s Exhibit A and incorporated by reference i n young's answer and cross complaint. Pursuant t o the Receipt and Agree- ment, Pack River deposited the sum of $5,000 with Young as earnest money. The Receipt and Agreement t o S e l l and Purchase contains a provision t h a t i f the s e l l e r does not approve the s a l e within ten days t h e earnest money would be returned t o the purchaser on demand. Neither Pack River nor Young have any copy of such Receipt and Agreement signed by the owners of the Bird Point property, On o r about April 19, 1971, Young, a s agent f o r the owners of the Bird Point property, prepared another Receipt and Agree- ment t o S e l l and Purchase, a copy of which was attached t o Pack River's complaint a s Exhibit "B" and incorporated by reference i n ~ o u n g ' s answer and cross complaint. This Receipt and Agreement r e f e r s t o the same Bird Point pr,operty,the same t o t a l considera- tion, and r e c i t e s the same earnest money payment of $5,000 by Pack River; i t d i f f e r s from Exhibit flAfl only i n the proposed down payment and payment schedule. Exhibit "B", l i k e Exhibit "A", contains a provision t h a t i f the s e l l e r does not approve the s a l e within ten days the earnest money was t o be returned t o the purchaser on demand, Neither Pack River nor Young have a copy of t h i s Receipt and Agreement signed by the owners of the Bird Point property a s sellers, O n M a y 27, 1971, Young prepared an Addendum t o Agreement, a copy of which was attached t o Pack River's complaint a s Exhibit "C" and incorporated by reference i n Young's answer and cross complaint. The Addendum states, i n part, that upon approval of a l l parties a t interest it shall be made a part of the April 19, 1971 agreement. Neither Pack River nor Young have any copy of such Addendum t o Agreement signed by the owners of the Bird Point property. O n July 13, 1971, and again on July 23, 1971, Pack River demanded that Young return the $5,000 earnest money pursuant t o Exhibits "A" and "B". In reply, Young demanded payment of $15,000 for a r e a l t o r ' s commission. The sole question on appeal is whether the d i s t r i c t court was correct i n granting Pack River's motion for summary judgment. I n i t s complaint Pack River seeks return of $5,000 earnest money deposited with Young a s a realtor and young's cross com- plaint seeks recovery of $15,000 a s a r e a l t o r ' s commission; therefore the pleadings of both parties established that both claims a r e based upon a proposed sale and purchase of r e a l estate. Section 13-606, W.C.M. 1947, provides i n pertinent part: "What contracts must be i n writing. The following contracts a r e invalid, unless the same, or some note o r memorandum thereof, be i n writing and sub- scribed by the party t o be charged, o r h i s agent: "5. A n a reement authorizing o r employing an agent or %rbker t o purchase or sell r e a l estate for compensation ox a commission. I I Section 74-203, R.C.M. 1947, provides: I1 Contract for sale of r e a l property. N o agreement for the sale of r e a l property, or any interest therein, i s valid, unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be i n writing and subscribed by the party t o be charged, or h i s agent, thereunto authorized, i n writing; but t h i s does not abridge the power of any court t o compel the specific performance of any agreement for the sale of r e a l property i n case of part performance thereof." Pack River as the movant for the summary judgment had the burden of proving there was no genuine issue of material fact. O n January 5 , 1972, the d i s t r i c t court ordered Young t o produce any and a l l written documents purporting t o establish him a s the agent for the owners of the Bird Point property; any and a l l written instruments t o support h i s claim of having a l i s t i n g for the s a l e of the property; and any copy of Exhibit I' 11 C signed by the owners of Bird Point property, Young did not produce any of the documents i n response t o the d i s t r i c t court's order, thus wholly failing t o meet the statutory requirements of the statute of frauds. This Court finds that the pleadings, answers t o interroga- tories, response t o order f o r production, and hearing on the motion for summary judgment satisfied Pack River's burden of establishing there was no genuine question a s t o any material fact. The d i s t r i c t court was correct i n granting judgment for Pack River a s a matter of law. Young failed t o establish by material and substantial evi- dence that there was a genuine issue a s t o material fact, Mager v. Tandy, 146 Mont. 531, 537, 410 P,2d 447. In h i s memorandum i n opposition t o motion for summary judgment, Young recited two arguments purporting to meet his burden of showing a genuine question as t o material fact. young's f i r s t argument was that there was a written memoran- dum of employment, which was Exhibit "C" attached t o Pack River's complaint and incorporated i n young's answer and cross complaint. In response t h i s t h i s argument, Pack River s t a t e s that Exhibit "C" on i t s face requires approval of a l l parties a t i n t e r e s t , including the owners of the Bird Point property, and that upon approval the Addendum shall be made a part of the April 19, 1971 agreement (Exhibit " E " ) . Although Young claimed under oath t o have a copy of the Addendum signed by the owners of the Bird Point property, none was ever produced. Concerning young's second argument, the record i s absolutely devoid of any pleading, interrogatory, deposition, o r any evi- dence which could be considered by the d i s t r i c t court t h a t there had been any performance o r p a r t performance of an alleged con- t r a c t of employment. Both the d i s t r i c t court memorandum and young's b r i e f on appeal contain a statement of counsel, unsup- ported by any pleadings o r evidence i n the record, t h a t there was a performance of the alleged contract. Young therefore wholly f a i l e d t o meet the requirements a s set f o r t h by t h i s Court i n Silloway v. Jorgenson, 146 Mont. 307, 310, 406 P.2d 167, t h a t the party opposing a motion f o r summary judgment must present material and substantial f a c t s i n proper form and t h a t mere conclusions w i l l not suffice, Young did not produce any pleading o r evidence t o support h i s argument and therefore Brown v. Thornton, 150 Mont. 150, 155, 432 P.2d 386, i s authority f o r affirming the summary judgment: "Plaintiff argues on appeal t h a t had he been allowed t o go t o t r i a l he would have presented further proof t h a t defendants were co-owners of the property and made an agreement t o pay f o r the materials. Notice was given and a hearing had before the motion f o r summary judgment was granted and again notice was given and a hearing had before lai in tiff's motion t o vacate judgment was denied. Nowhere i n the record is there any h i n t of t h i s further proof. When on the record there i s no genuine issue a s t o any material f a c t before the court t h e burden i s on the party opposing the motion f o r summary judgment t o present f a c t s of a material and substantial nature r a i s i n g a genuine issue. The t r i a l judge has no duty t o a n t i c i p a t e possible proof t h a t might be offered. To impose such a duty would be t o demand clairvoyance not ~ o s s e s s e d by even a t r i a l judge. Silloway v. Jorgenson, 146 Mont. 307, 406 P. 2d 167. * * * A s t o the requirement t h a t there be no genuine issue a s t o any material f a c t the granting of the motion f o r summary judgment was correct. 11 The favor order o of Pack q u r t granting summar judgment I " We Concur; \ Associate ~ustices.