Case Title: Ercanbrack v. Judd

Citation: 524 P.2d 595

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1974-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
524 P.2d 595 (1974) William J. ERCANBRACK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ralph JUDD and Emma Judd, Defendants and Respondents. No. 13557. Supreme Court of Utah. July 2, 1974. J. Harold Call, Heber City, for plaintiff and appellant. Merlin R. Lybbert, of Worsley, Snow & Christensen, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents. ELLETT, Justice: This appeal raises the question of whether or not Grass Creek road has been abandoned by Summit County and, if it has not, whether the appellant is entitled to damages. For many years the Grass Creek road was a public way established by use and not by grant. Plaintiff and defendants own land abutting the road. Plaintiff bought his land in 1965, but his title comes through grantees from his father who for many years owned the land and used the road. Due to a landslide in the early 1950's and the failure of the county to keep the road in repair, the public departed from the road in places and traveled along an old abandoned railroad right of way. There was no objection by the railroad company to the use being made, and since *596 this deviation continued for more than ten years, that part of the railroad right of way which was used by the public became the Grass Creek road.[1] Mr. Judd placed a locked gate across the west end of the road in the year 1951 and gave keys to those who had occasion to use it. In 1958 he and others duly filed a petition with the Summit County Commission to abandon the road. At a formal hearing and after notice given according to law, the commissioners refused to abandon it and declared it to be a public road in Summit County. On February 7, 1966, Mr. Judd appeared personally before the county commission and requested that the road be abandoned and that he be allowed to restrict the use of the road as he might desire. Without any notice being given to anyone, the commission caused the following minute entry to be made: Mr. Judd thereafter changed the lock on the gate and caused the sheriff of the county to serve the following notice upon Mr. Ercanbrack: Mr. Ercanbrack had the use of another road leading out from his property, but a severe snowstorm caused this road to be impassable, and in order to rescue a small band of his sheep which was snowbound, he undertook to obtain a key from Mr. Judd. When he could not find Mr. Judd, he broke the lock and attempted to rescue his sheep via the Grass Creek road. He was unable to get through the deep snow, and 46 head of his sheep perished. It is for the loss of these sheep that he seeks damages. The trial court, sitting without a jury, ruled that Summit County abandoned the road sometime prior to 1966 and that the public abandoned it through a non-user for sometime prior thereto. He further found no causation as regards the death of the sheep and gave judgment for the defendants. Prior to 1963 the law regarding the abandonment of a highway was to be found in Section 27-1-3, U.C.A. 1953, which provided: The 1963 Legislature rewrote the highway code and enacted Chapter 39 of the 1963 Session Laws. Section 90 of that chapter and known in our code as 27-12-90, *597 Utah Code Annotated 1953 (Replacement Vol. 3), states as follows: The 1965 Legislature added five new sections without repealing any prior sections, which new sections set forth the procedure by which a county could abandon or vacate a road, to wit, Sections 27-12-102.1, 27-12-102.2, 27-12-102.3, 27-12-102.4, and 27-12-102.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (Replacement Vol. 3). The first of the new sections provides for vacating a road based upon a written petition of a landowner abutting on the road. The second deals with vacating a road without a written petition being filed. The other three sections so far as material read: Since there was no notice given to either the abutting landowners or the general public, the motion of the commissioner as approved was and is a nullity, and the public road will continue to be such until it is abandoned in accordance with the statutes. It is interesting to note that the plaintiff did not assert his rights as an abutting landowner to use the highway after the purported abandonment by the county[2] but only claimed the right as a member of the public. The evidence was not such as to compel the trial judge to find that it was the locked gate which caused the death of the sheep, and on that phase of the case the judgment is affirmed. As to the holding that Grass Creek road is abandoned, the judgment is reversed. No costs are awarded. *598 CALLISTER, C.J., and CROCKETT, J., concur. HENRIOD, J., does not participate herein. TUCKETT, Justice (concurring and dissenting): I concur in the decision of the majority insofar as it affirms the judgment of the lower court on the question of damages sustained by the plaintiff on his claim for the loss of certain sheep. I respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority decision which reverses the lower court on its determination that the Grass Creek road was not a public way. I particularly object to that portion of the decision which states that: The record shows and the court found that for approximately 40 years the defendants and their predecessors in interest had leased the right of way from the railroad company, and it thus appears that the railroad had no right to object nor to concur in the use of the right of way by members of the public. The record further shows that segments of the railroad right of way had been improved by defendants and their predecessors to enable them to use it as a private way. Defendants had the right to exclude the public from those segments of the right of way. Even though the defendant Ralph Judd and his father before him permitted others owning property in the area to use that portion of the right of way this does not support the majority's determination that the entire way was public. It should be noted that the majority opinion deals with rights of the railway company even though it was not made a party. [1] Section 27-12-89, U.C.A. 1953 (Replacement Vol. 3). [2] 39 Am.Jur.2d, Highways, Streets and Bridges, § 185; Hague v. Mill & Elevator Co., 37 Utah 290, 107 P. 249 (1910); Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah 127, 104 P. 117 (1909); Annotation in 150 A.L.R. 644.