Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V DANIEL JESSE GONZALEZ

Citation: 

Docket Number: 120363

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 2, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 120363  
DANIEL JESSE GONZALEZ,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated  
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a); felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b),  
first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1);  
and arson of a dwelling house, MCL 750.72.  The Court of  
Appeals affirmed defendant’s first-degree murder convictions,  
but vacated the CSC I and arson convictions as predicate  
 
 
felonies for defendant’s felony-murder conviction.1
 This  
Court granted leave to appeal.  
We 
conclude 
that there was sufficient evidence to support  
defendant’s first-degree premeditated murder conviction. We  
further conclude that there was no evidence of an accomplice  
and thus the trial court did not err when it failed to give  
sua sponte a cautionary accomplice instruction under People v  
McCoy, 392 Mich 231; 220 NW2d 456 (1974).  Moreover,  
defendant’s attorney was not ineffective for failing to  
request the instruction.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment  
of the Court of Appeals.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Defendant’s conviction arises from the brutal rape and  
murder of the victim, Carol Easlick.  Testimony established  
that on the day of the offense, defendant and his friend,  
Woodrow Couch, visited the victim in her apartment.2  After a  
short stay, both men left the apartment.  Later in the day,  
defendant returned to the victim’s apartment alone.  While  
there, defendant raped the victim, battered her to death, and  
1Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued June 19, 2001 
(Docket No. 220715). The Court of Appeals explained that it 
was unclear whether the arson or CSC I conviction served as the  
predicate 
felony. 
 
However, 
because 
defendant 
ultimately 
faced 
life in prison without the possibility of parole, the panel 
thought it appropriate to vacate both convictions.  
2Couch was a key prosecution witness.  
2  
 
   
 
 
then set her corpse on fire.3  
Defendant was arrested and charged with first-degree  
premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a); first-degree felony  
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); first-degree arson of a dwelling  
house, MCL 750.72; and CSC I, MCL 750.520b(1).  Defendant  
denied involvement in the crime.  At the close of the proofs,  
before instructing the jury, the court asked both parties  
whether they wanted to comment or object to the proposed jury  
instructions. 
 
Defendant’s 
attorney 
responded, 
“other 
than 
the  
alibi, I find nothing objectionable.” 
Significantly,  
defendant’s 
attorney 
neither 
requested 
a 
cautionary  
instruction 
regarding 
accomplice 
testimony 
nor 
objected 
to 
the  
trial court’s failure to give sua sponte the cautionary  
instruction.  Defendant was convicted by a jury of all the  
charges.  
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising  
several claims: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support  
the 
first-degree 
premeditated 
murder 
conviction, 
(2) 
the 
trial  
court erred by failing to give sua sponte a cautionary  
instruction regarding accomplice testimony, (3) his attorney  
3Defendant gave two conflicting versions of what happened 
that day.  In his first statement to the police, defendant 
denied returning to the victim’s apartment after he and Couch 
left.  He also denied having sexual relations with the victim. 
In his second statement, defendant stated that he had  
consensual sex with the victim.  However, he claimed that she  
was alive when he left, and that Couch remained in the 
apartment with the victim.  
3  
 
  
was ineffective for failing to request the cautionary  
instruction, and (4) the convictions of both felony murder and  
CSC I violated his double jeopardy rights.  
The Court of Appeals vacated the arson and CSC I  
convictions, 
but 
affirmed 
the 
remaining 
convictions.  
Regarding 
defendant’s argument that the trial court erred when  
it failed to give sua sponte a cautionary instruction (and  
that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request  
one), the Court stated:  
Here, it is apparent that defendant’s theory 
of the case was that he did not commit the crimes  
and was not present during the commission of the 
crimes. In this regard, Couch’s testimony to this 
effect as well as his credibility was attacked by 
defense counsel during both cross-examination and 
closing arguments.  The instructions provided by 
the trial court properly presented the elements of 
the crimes and properly informed the jury as to 
what should be considered when determining the 
credibility of a particular witness. Further, DNA 
analysis of the sperm swabs taken from the victim’s 
vagina, rectum, and mouth established a match with 
defendant’s DNA and excluded Couch as a potential 
donor. Under these circumstances, the trial court 
did not err when it failed to provide cautionary 
instructions regarding accomplice testimony in this 
case. [Slip op at 2 (citations omitted).]  
Defendant applied for leave to appeal here, which was  
granted.4  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
“The test for determining the sufficiency of evidence in  
a criminal case is whether the evidence, viewed in a light  
4467 Mich 898 (2002).  
4  
  
 
  
most favorable to the people, would warrant a reasonable juror  
in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  “The standard of  
review is deferential: a reviewing court is required to draw  
all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in  
support of the jury verdict.”  People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392,  
399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).  
Whether a trial court’s failure to give sua sponte a  
cautionary instruction about accomplice testimony under McCoy  
was error is a question of law that we review de novo.  People  
v Hamilton, 465 Mich 526, 529; 638 NW2d 92 (2002).  
III. ANALYSIS  
A  
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient  
evidence to support his first-degree premeditated murder  
conviction. We disagree.  
To show first-degree premeditated murder, “‘[s]ome time  
span between [the] initial homicidal intent and ultimate  
action 
is 
necessary 
to 
establish 
premeditation 
and  
deliberation.’” People v Tilley, 405 Mich 38, 45; 273 NW2d  
471 (1979), quoting People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 161;  
229 NW2d 305 (1975).  The interval between the initial thought  
and ultimate action should be long enough to afford a  
reasonable person time to take a “second look.”  People v  
Vail, 393 Mich 460, 469; 227 NW2d 535 (1975), quoting People  
v Morrin, 31 Mich App 301, 328-330; 187 NW2d 434 (1971). See  
5  
 
 
 
 
also People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 733; 597 NW2d 73  
(1999)(applying 
a 
“second-look” 
analysis). 
Manual  
strangulation can be used as evidence that a defendant had an  
opportunity to take a “second look.”  Id.
 Moreover, a  
defendant’s attempt to conceal the killing can be used as  
evidence of premeditation. Id.  
In this case, there was evidence that the victim was  
manually strangled.  Also, there was evidence that the  
defendant attempted to conceal his crime by burning the  
victim’s body.  Viewing this evidence in a light most  
favorable to the prosecutor, we conclude there was sufficient  
evidence for the jury to convict defendant of first-degree  
premeditated murder. 
Accordingly, this conviction is 
affirmed. 
B 
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by  
failing to give sua sponte a cautionary instruction regarding  
accomplice testimony.  
As an initial matter, we conclude that defendant’s  
failure to either request a cautionary accomplice instruction  
or to object to the trial court’s failure to give one sua  
sponte, precludes defendant from seeking relief in the  
appellate courts.  
MCL 768.29 provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he  
failure of the court to instruct on any point of law shall not  
6  
 
 
be ground for setting aside the verdict of the jury unless  
such instruction is requested by the accused.”
 (Emphasis  
added).  MCR 2.516(C) further provides that “[a] party may  
assign as error the . . . failure to give an instruction only  
if the party objects on the record . . . .”  (Emphasis added).  
In this case, defendant neither requested a cautionary  
accomplice instruction nor objected to the court’s failure to  
give one.  Therefore, defendant is precluded from arguing that  
the 
omitted 
instruction 
was 
error. 
MCR 
2.516(C).  
Furthermore, because he failed to request the omitted  
instruction, defendant is not entitled to have the verdict set  
aside.  MCL 768.29. Consequently, defendant’s only remaining  
avenue for relief is for review under People v Grant, 445 Mich  
535; 520 NW2d 123 (1994).  
Because defendant failed to object to the omitted  
instruction, defendant’s claim of error was forfeited.  A  
forfeited, 
nonconstitutional error may not be considered by an  
appellate court unless the error was plain and it affected  
defendant’s substantial rights. Grant, supra at 552-553.  
Defendant 
maintains that the failure to give a cautionary  
accomplice instruction with regard to Couch’s testimony was  
plain error under McCoy, supra at 240, which held:  
For cases tried after the publication of this 
opinion, it will be deemed reversible error . . . 
to fail upon request to give a cautionary 
instruction concerning accomplice testimony and, if  
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the issue is closely drawn,[5] it may be reversible 
error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction 
even in the absence of a request to charge.”[6]  
We conclude that it was not error for the trial court to  
omit 
the 
cautionary 
accomplice instruction because there is no  
evidence that Couch, the alleged accomplice, was involved in  
the crimes at all.  Significantly, the DNA evidence excluded  
Couch as a potential donor of the sperm found on the victim.  
Moreover, the cautionary accomplice instruction would have  
been 
inconsistent 
with 
defendant’s 
theory. 
 
Defendant’s 
theory  
was that he neither committed the charged crimes, nor was he  
involved in any way.  In fact, defendant’s own attorney  
claimed that someone other than Couch committed the offense  
during his closing argument.7  
5An issue is “closely drawn” if its resolution depends on  
a credibility contest between the defendant and the  
accomplice-witness. McCoy, 
supra at 238-239; People v Tucker, 
181 Mich App 246, 256; 448 NW2d 811 (1989).  
6The latter half of this holding, commonly called the 
“closely drawn” rule, states that it may be an error requiring 
reversal for a court to fail to give sua sponte a cautionary 
instruction when the issue of defendant’s involvement is  
“closely drawn.”  This rule arguably conflicts with MCL 
768.29, which provides that a verdict may not be set aside 
because of an omitted instruction if the defendant failed to  
request the instruction.  However, for reasons discussed 
below, we conclude that there was no evidence of an accomplice 
in this case, and, therefore, McCoy’s “closely drawn” rule is 
not implicated.  For that reason, we do not reach the question  
whether McCoy conflicts with MCL 768.29.  
7Defendant’s attorney argued:  
I submit to you that there could be some 
unknown person that went in after [defendant] left,  
8  
 
 
For these reasons, it was not error for the trial court  
to fail to give sua sponte a cautionary instruction regarding  
accomplice 
testimony.  Because defendant cannot show error, he  
cannot demonstrate plain error that affected his substantial  
rights.  Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief for  
the forfeited claim. Grant, supra.  
C  
In a related argument, defendant claims that his trial  
counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to request a  
cautionary accomplice instruction.  
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel,  
defendant must show that his attorney’s conduct fell below an  
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness 
and 
that 
the  
representation 
so 
prejudiced defendant that he was deprived of  
a fair trial.  People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 390; 535 NW2d 496  
(1995)(opinion by BOYLE, J.).
 Moreover, courts will not  
second-guess matters of trial strategy.  People v Rice (On  
Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 444; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).  
Here, defendant is unable to demonstrate ineffective  
assistance of counsel.  As discussed above, a cautionary  
instruction regarding accomplice testimony was inappropriate  
because it was inconsistent with the evidence and it was  
after [Couch] left, and got mad at Carol and 
committed this crime and then left. [Emphasis 
added.]  
9  
 
inconsistent with defendant’s theory at trial. Further, it is  
reasonable to presume that the attorney’s failure to request  
the cautionary instruction was a matter of trial strategy.  In  
addition to its inconsistency with defendant’s theory, the  
instruction 
might 
have damaged defendant’s case inasmuch as it  
would have suggested to the jury that defendant was involved  
in the offense.  
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s attorney was  
not ineffective for failing to request the cautionary  
instruction.  
IV  
In sum, there was sufficient evidence to support  
defendant’s first-degree premeditated murder conviction.  
Additionally, the trial court did not err by failing to give  
sua sponte a cautionary accomplice instruction, nor was  
defendant’s attorney ineffective for failing to request one.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals.  
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Stephen J. Markman  
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ.  
We concur in the result only.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly  
10