Case Title: Butler v. Halstead By and Through Colley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-188

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Butler v. Halstead By and Through Colley1989 WY 71770 P.2d 698Case Number: 88-188Decided: 03/17/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
JUDY 
BUTLER, GLENN DODGION, BRIAN LEE BUTLER, AMANDA COLLEEN BUTLER, AND KAYLA DAWN 
BUTLER, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

 
 
v.

 
 
JORDAN JODY 
HALSTEAD, A MINOR BY AND THROUGH HIS NEXT FRIEND, GUARDIAN, CONSERVATOR, AND 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM, ALICE IONE COLLEY, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 
R.E. 
Rauchfuss, Beech Street Law Office, Casper, for appellants.

 
 
Jeffrey A. 
Tennyson, Daniel M. Hesse, and Robert N. Williams, Jackson, for appellee.

 
 
Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
BROWN, J., Retired.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The only question to be 
resolved in this case is whether a decedent's mother and siblings are included 
in the statutory phrase "every person for whose benefit such action is brought," 
found in § 1-38-102(c), W.S. 1977, thus permitting them to join in an action for 
wrongful death, brought pursuant to § 1-38-101, W.S. 1977, when the decedent 
leaves a surviving child. The district court, relying upon Wetering v. Eisele, 
682 P.2d 1055 (Wyo. 1984), ruled, in a declaratory judgment 
action, that the surviving child "is the only person for whose benefit an action 
can be brought for the wrongful death of the father * * *." We conclude that the 
determination of the district court is erroneous, and we reverse the Order and 
Judgment.

 
 

[¶2.]     The appellants state 
the issues in their appeal in this way:

 
 
"1. Whether 
Jordan Jody Halstead is the only 
person for whose benefit an action can be brought for the wrongful death of Jody 
Glenn Dodgion.

 
 
"2. Whether 
Judy Butler, Bryan Lee Butler, Amanda Colleen Butler and Kayla Dawn Butler, the 
decedent's mother, brother and sisters, are retroactively precluded and barred 
from participating in the wrongful death action by the birth of an illegitimate 
child to the deceased six months after his death.

 
 
"3. Whether 
the trial court's decision violates the constitutional rights of the deceased 
and his mother, brother and sisters."

 
 
The brief 
on behalf of the appellee adjusts the issues, stating them as 
follows:

 
 
"1. Is the 
sole natural child of a decedent the only proper person for whose benefit a 
wrongful death action can be brought for the wrongful death of the decedent to 
the exclusion of the mother and half-siblings of the 
decedent.

 
 
"2. Did the 
appellants provide this court with a basis for deciding the constitutional 
issues raised in Appellants' brief when the issues have not been cogently or 
adequately argued or briefed on appeal or to the trial 
court.

 
 
"3. Did the 
Trial Court's decision to follow existing Wyoming law and preclude the half brothers and 
half sisters as well as the mother of the decedent from joining as claimants in 
a wrongful death action for the death of decedent with the decedent's son 
violate the constitutional rights of such persons."

 
 

[¶3.]     Jody Glenn Dodgion, the 
decedent, died from injuries received in a motor vehicle accident. At the time 
of his death, he was survived by his mother, a half brother, and two half 
sisters. Subsequently, a baby boy was born to a girl who had enjoyed an intimate 
relationship with the decedent prior to his death. The parties do not question 
that the boy is the natural son of the decedent. A little more than seven months 
after the birth of the boy, a declaratory judgment action was commenced, by and 
through his next friend and guardian (appellee), seeking a determination by the 
court that he was the only person who could bring an action for the wrongful 
death of the decedent. The mother and siblings of the decedent (appellants) were 
the defendants in the declaratory judgment action.

 
 

[¶4.]     The case came on before 
the district court upon the appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, which the 
court granted. It concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact and 
that the effect of this court's decision in Wetering, 682 P.2d 1055, was that if 
a child survives, that surviving child is the only person for whose benefit the 
wrongful death action authorized by § 1-38-101 may be brought. The trial court 
ruled that it was bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and that the mother and 
siblings would not be permitted to participate in the wrongful death action. 
There is no assertion that the mother of the surviving child should be included 
among those for whose benefit the action may be brought.

 
 

[¶5.]     In Wetering, the 
court's opinion suggested that in Jordan v. Delta Drilling Company, 541 P.2d 39, 78 
A.L.R.3d 1215 (Wyo. 1975), and Saffels v. 
Bennett, 630 P.2d 505 (Wyo. 1981), the court may have written too 
much. It now appears that the same suggestion would pertain with respect to 
Wetering.

 
 

[¶6.]     A brief summary may be 
in order. In all three cases, the court was analyzing the legislative 
adjustments which had been made to §§ 1-38-101 and 1-38-102. The effort was to 
determine, in the absence of any statutory indication, those persons who could 
participate in and benefit from an action for wrongful death. In 
Jordan, the court held that an 
acknowledged child whose parents had not been married could recover for the 
wrongful death of a father. In Saffels, the court held that an ex-wife could 
not. In Wetering, the court held that a brother and the sisters of the decedent 
could participate in the action when the decedent was survived by his father, 
mother, four sisters, and a brother. We quoted § 2-4-101(c) and said that the 
persons identified in the quoted provisions were among the persons for whose 
benefit the action could be brought. We went on to say in Wetering, 682 P.2d at 
1062:

 
 
"* * * This 
does include the surviving brother and sisters in this instance because the 
decedent did not leave a wife or children surviving. We further hold that the 
wrongful death action now is brought by the personal representative in his 
capacity as administrator of the decedent's estate. In this instance the 
judgment is not subject to payment of debts because of the specific provisions 
of § 1-38-102(b), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1983), but if the decedent had left no 
father and mother surviving the proceeds of the judgment could be utilized to 
satisfy debts of the decedent. We further hold that distribution of the proceeds 
of the judgment is controlled by § 1-38-102(c), and not by § 2-4-101, W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1983), because the specific must govern over the 
general."

 
 

[¶7.]     Section 2-4-101, W.S. 
1977, establishes the rules of intestate succession in Wyoming. The district 
court interpreted what was said in Wetering as limiting those who could 
participate in a wrongful death action to those who would be entitled to receive 
the property of the particular decedent's estate in accordance with § 2-4-101. 
The perception of the district court is understandable, but it is not what the 
court intended. The awkward language is obiter dictum. The rule of stare decisis 
limits Wetering to the facts there which were that those persons for whose 
benefit the action could be brought all were identified in § 2-4-101(c)(ii). The 
logic of referring only to § 2-4-101(c) must be denied when the other provisions 
of § 2-4-101 are considered because of the number of varying circumstances that 
are contemplated.

 
 

[¶8.]     Perhaps the court would 
have been wiser to, in effect, provide an advisory opinion in Wetering. At that 
time, confronted by the tempering that Saffels provided for the wide ranging 
suggestion in Jordan in terms of who might 
participate, the court's concern was to endeavor to provide a manageable 
definition in the absence of legislative assistance.

 
 

[¶9.]     We now hold that the 
persons for whose benefit a wrongful death action is brought are all of those 
persons identified in § 2-4-101. Whether any such recoveries will be subject to 
the payment of debts will be controlled by the provisions of § 1-38-102(b), and 
the distribution of any proceeds will be controlled by § 1-38-102(c), not by § 
2-4-101. This approach will make the persons for whose benefit a wrongful death 
action may be brought identical to those identified in Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986), who may be entitled to recover for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. In that case, we mentioned specifically spouses, children, 
parents, and siblings. We do note that § 2-4-101(c)(iii) would encompass 
grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins. In our judgment, extending to those 
related persons the opportunity to participate in a wrongful death action does 
not unduly extend the class of persons for whose benefit such actions may be 
brought to the point that it would be unmanageable.

 
 

[¶10.]  The resolution of the first issue in 
favor of the appellants makes any consideration of the constitutional problem 
unnecessary. The order and judgment of the district court is reversed, and the 
case is remanded with instructions to enter an order and judgment consistent 
with the court's opinion.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., 
concurred in the result only.

 
 

BROWN, J., 
Retired, filed a dissenting opinion.

 
 

BROWN, Justice, 
Retired, dissenting.

 
 

[¶11.]  If stare decisis1 is a viable doctrine in Wyoming, this case should 
be affirmed.

 
 

[¶12.]  Since the 1973 amendment, Wyoming's wrongful death 
statute has had a tortured history. Before the 1973 amendment, the wrongful 
death statute provided in part:

 
 
Every such 
action shall be brought by, and in the name of, the personal representative of 
such deceased person; and the amount 
received in every such action shall be distributed to the parties and in the 
proportions provided by law, in relation to the distribution of personal estates 
left by persons dying intestate. In every such case, the jury shall give 
such damages as they shall deem fair and just. The court or jury may consider, 
as elements of damages, the amount the survivors failed or will fail, by reason 
of the death, to receive out of the decedent's earnings, any other pecuniary 
loss directly and proximately sustained by the survivors by reason of such death 
including funeral expenses, and further the court or jury may add, as an element 
of damage, a reasonable sum for the loss of the comfort, care, advice and 
society of the decedent. The amount so recovered shall not be subject to any 
debts or liabilities of the deceased; provided, that every such action shall be 
commenced within two (2) years after the death of such deceased 
person.

 
 
W.S. 1-1066 
(1957) (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶13.]  After the 1973 amendment, the wrongful 
death statute provided in part:

 
 
    (a) Every such action shall 
be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of the deceased 
person.

 
 
    (b) If the deceased left a husband, wife, child, 
father or mother, no debt of the deceased may be satisfied out of the 
proceeds of any judgment obtained in any action brought under the provisions of 
this section.

 
 
    (c) The court or jury, as 
the case may be, in every such action may award such damages, pecuniary and 
exemplary, as shall be deemed fair and just. Every person for whose benefit such action 
is brought may prove his respective damages, and the court or jury may award 
such person that amount of damages to which it considers such person 
entitled, including damages for loss of probable future companionship, 
society and comfort.

 
 
    (d) Every such action shall 
be commenced within two (2) years after the death of the deceased 
person.

 
 
W.S. 
1-38-102 (Cum.Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶14.]  In Jordan v. Delta 
Drilling Company, 541 P.2d 39 (1975), this court held that an acknowledged child 
whose parents had not been married could recover for the wrongful death of a 
father. With reference to the 1973 amendment to the wrongful death statute, the 
court said:

 
 
This 
amendment omitted any reference to distribution of the proceeds to survivors 
under the law of this state with respect to the estates of those persons dying 
intestate and did not restrict the action to heirs of the decedent as the 
original act did.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
* * * The 
legislature, by amendment deleting any reference to the laws of distribution of 
a decedent's estate, has eliminated any question of a relationship between 
heirship and entitlement to damages.

 
 

Id. at 42-43 
(footnote omitted).

 
 

[¶15.]  In Saffels v. Bennett, 630 P.2d 505 
(Wyo. 1981), 
the court held that an ex-wife could not recover for the wrongful death of her 
former husband. The court said:

 
 
     The legislative 
history of § 1-38-102(b) reflects the intention of the legislature to not stray 
from the traditional rule of beneficiary dependence to the extent propounded by 
appellant and suggested in the dissent hereto. As originally introduced, 
subsection (b) provided:

 
 
"If the 
deceased left a husband, wife, child, father, mother, brother, sister, or child 
or children of a deceased child, no debt of the deceased may be satisfied out of 
the proceeds of any judgment obtained in any action brought under the provisions 
of this section."

 
 
The House 
Judiciary Committee recommended deletion of the words "brother, sister, or child 
or children of a deceased child," and the bill was so 
amended.

 
 

[¶16.]  The legislative intention thus expressed 
was to limit the recipients of benefits to be derived from the 
statute.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"* * * The 
word `every' means each (individual or part) of a class or group whether definite or 
indefinite in number, without exception. * * *" (Emphasis in original.) State ex 
rel. Pierce v. Kundert, 4 Wis.2d 392, 90 N.W.2d 628, 630 (1958). 

 
 
"`* * * The 
word "every" emphasizes fact that all individuals of a class or group are 
included whether definite or indefinite in number.'" (Emphasis in original.) 
Reich v. Dietz School Dist. No., 16 of GrantCounty, 79 N.D. 261, 55 N.W.2d 638, 641, 
642 (1952).

 
 
     The words "every person" cannot be interpreted to have 
the effect of creating a new class of persons and a cause of action that did 
not previously exist. A more reasonable interpretation would seem to be that 
"every person" means all, each, every person within a class or group; the class 
or group being that class set out in the subsection. This class has heretofore 
had a cause of action under the Wrongful Death Act.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
The 
legislature did not intend to add other classifications of persons who could 
recover under the Wrongful Death Act when the designation "every person" was 
used.

 
 

Id. at 509-10 
(emphasis added and footnote omitted).

 
 

[¶17.]  In Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055 
(Wyo. 1984), 
the court held that a brother and sisters of the decedent could participate in a 
wrongful death action when the decedent was survived by his father, mother, four 
sisters and a brother. In Wetering, the decedent was unmarried and had no 
children. The court, therefore, said that W.S. 2-4-101 (Cum.Supp. 1983 (now Cum. 
Supp. 1987)) determined who were the intended beneficiaries of a wrongful death 
action. The court stated:

 
 

[W]e hold 
that in adopting § 1-38-102(c), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1983), the legislature did 
not intend to change the persons for whose benefit an action in wrongful death 
could be maintained. Prior to the adoption of the statute in 1973 the decedent's 
heirs at law in accordance with the intestacy statutes were the intended 
beneficiaries of a 
wrongful death action. Section 1-1066, W.S. 1957; Booth v. Hackney, supra; [516 P.2d 180 (Wyo. 1973)] Muir v. Haggerty, 77 
Wyo. 280, 314 P.2d 948 (1957); Coliseum Motor 
Co. v. Hester, supra, [43 Wyo. 298] 3 P.2d 
[105] at 112 [1931]; and Tuttle v. Short, supra [42 Wyo. 1, 288 P. 524 
(1930)]. Since no provision which has the 
effect of adjusting that rule can be found in the statute, the reference to 
every person for whose benefit such action is brought must continue to invoke 
the intestacy provisions of the probate code. The applicable provision in 
this instance is found in § 2-4-101, W.S. 1977 (Cum. Supp. 1983), as 
follows:

 
 
"(c) Except 
in cases above enumerated, the estate of any intestate shall descend and be 
distributed as follows:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(ii) If 
there are no children, nor their descendents, then to his father, mother, 
brothers and sisters, and to the descendents of brothers and sisters who are 
dead, the descendents collectively taking the share which their parents would 
have taken if living, in equal parts."

 
 

[¶18.]  We now hold that the persons for whose 
benefit the action is brought are identified in the quoted provision of § 
2-4-101, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1983). This 
does include the surviving brother and sisters in this instance because the 
decedent did not leave a wife or children surviving.2

 
 
Wetering, 
682 P.2d  at 1061-62 (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶19.]  Wetering clearly says that the intended 
beneficiaries in wrongful death actions are determined with reference to the intestacy law as set out in W.S. 2-4-101 
(Cum.Supp. 1983, now Cum.Supp. 1987). In that case, since the decedent left no 
spouse or children, W.S. 2-4-101(c)(ii) kicked in and the intended beneficiaries 
were the father, mother, brothers and sisters.

 
 

[¶20.]  In the case before us, the decedent was 
survived by a child. Therefore, W.S. 2-4-101(c)(i) should apply and the other 
provisions of W.S. 2-4-101 are not applicable. The scholarly and distinguished 
district judge disagreed with Saffels and Wetering but felt compelled by stare 
decisis to follow those cases. He ruled, therefore, that the child of the 
decedent was the sole heir and, in these circumstances, the only intended 
beneficiary of the wrongful death action. The district court's ruling is not 
only consistent with Saffels and Wetering, but stare decisis mandated such a 
ruling.

 
 

[¶21.]  The majority now says that the intended 
beneficiaries in a wrongful death action are not limited by the intestacy 
provisions of the probate code and now encompass all those identified in W.S. 
2-4-101, which, I assume, includes remote relatives provided for in subsection 
W.S. 2-4-101(c)(iii).

 
 

[¶22.]  The holding here is contrary to Wetering, 
and the majority should say so and specifically overrule Wetering rather than 
say that the district judge may have been mislead by 
dicta.

 
 
     A statement of the law 
that conflicts with the view of a judge or an attorney may be decisive unless it 
can be avoided. Labeling the statement a dictum is one simple means of evasion * 
* *.

 
 
Comment, 
Dictum Revisited, 4 Stan.L.Rev. 509 (1952).

 
 

[¶23.]  The rule on intended beneficiaries in a 
wrongful death action has been changed by the majority opinion. I cannot say 
that the court's present interpretation of the wrongful death statute is 
irrational. In fairness, however, to lawyers who have advised clients and judges 
who have relied on Saffels and Wetering, the rule in this case should be made 
prospective.

 
 

[¶24.]  However, I would affirm the case on the 
basis of stare decisis.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Black's Law 
Dictionary 1261 (5th ed. 1979) defines stare decisis as:

 
 
To abide by, or adhere 
to, decided cases.

 
 
Policy of courts to 
stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point. Neff v. George, [1936] 364 Ill. 306, 4 N.E.2d 388, 390, 391. Doctrine that, when court has once laid down a principle 
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that 
principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the 
same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. Horne v. 
Moody, Tex.Civ.App. [1940], 146 S.W.2d 505, 509, 510.

 
 

2 W.S. 2-4-101 
(Cum.Supp. 1987) (emphasis added) sets out the rule of descent as 
follows:

 
 
(a) Whenever any 
person having title to any real or personal property having the nature or legal 
character of real estate or personal estate undisposed of, and not otherwise 
limited by marriage settlement, dies intestate, the estate, shall descend and be 
distributed in parcenary to his kindred, male and female, subject to the payment 
of his debts, in the following course and manner:

 
 
(i) If the intestate 
leaves husband or wife and children, or the descendents of any children 
surviving, one-half (1/2) of the estate shall descend to the surviving husband 
or wife, and the residue thereof to the surviving children and descendents of 
children, as hereinafter limited;

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
(c) Except in cases 
above enumerated, the estate of any intestate shall descend and be distributed 
as follows:

 
 
(i) To his children 
surviving, and the descendents of his children who are dead, the descendents 
collectively taking the share which their parents would have taken if 
living;

 
 
(ii) If there are no 
children, nor their descendents, then to his father, mother, brothers and sisters, 
and to the descendents of brothers and sisters who are dead, the descendents 
collectively taking the share which their parents would have taken if living, in 
equal parts;

 
 
(iii) If there are no 
children nor their descendents, nor father, mother, brothers, sisters, nor 
descendents of deceased brothers and sisters, nor husband nor wife, living, then 
to the grandfather, grandmother, uncles, aunts and their descendents, the 
descendents taking collectively, the share of their immediate ancestors, in 
equal parts.