Case Title: Interest of Clay

Citation: 246 N.W.2d 263

Docket Number: 2-59020

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1976-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
246 N.W.2d 263 (1976) In the Interest of Anthony Maurice CLAY, a child. No. 2-59020. Supreme Court of Iowa. October 20, 1976. Leslie Babich, of Allen, Babich & Bennett, Des Moines, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Stephen C. Robinson, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore R. Boecker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chester C. Woodburn, III, Asst. County Atty., for appellee. Heard by MOORE, C. J., and RAWLINGS, REES, REYNOLDSON and McCORMICK, JJ. RAWLINGS, Justice. Anthony Maurice Clay appeals from an order entered in juvenile division of the Polk District Court transferring alleged violation *264 of the law (a felony) to criminal division for appropriate action. Appeal dismissed. By petition filed in juvenile court Clay, age then 17, allegedly operated a motor vehicle without the owner's consent, Section 321.76, The Code 1975. After a contested juvenile hearing the cause was ordered transferred upon the State's motion. See Code § 232.62. The State now urges Clay's appeal from the transfer order be dismissed. In light of our disposition upon that premise no useful purpose will be served by alluding to contentions instantly voiced by Clay. I. The question posed is whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Notably, a juvenile court is a division of our unified "Iowa District Court". See Code § 602.1. See also §§ 231.1-231.4; 232.2(1). And, Code § 232.62 provides: "The criminal court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court over children less than eighteen years of age who commit a criminal offense." Furthermore, an order transferring a cause from one state court to another is ordinarily deemed interlocutory, therefore not final and appealable as of right. See Village of Niles v. Szczesny, 13 Ill. 2d 45, 147 N.E.2d 371, 372 (1958); 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 115f at 315. Our holding does not, however, rest upon the foregoing alone. Rather it is a factor considered in resolving the case at hand. II. Mindful thereof, we look now to finality of the involved transfer order. At the outset this apt statement in People v. Jiles, 43 Ill. 2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529, 530-531 (1969), is deemed persuasive: To us Jiles, supra, says an order transferring a juvenile proceeding to the criminal division for proper action, although critically important, is not per se a final adjudication. Rather, it takes on all the attributes of a preliminary procedural mechanism designed to protect the best interests of a juvenile and the public. See Code § 232.72. It does not in any respect constitute a determination as to guilt or innocence. Further in this vein the record clearly reveals no delinquency determination was ever made or entered, either independently or as an integral part of the instant transfer. Briefly stated, the involved order was not a final judgment from which appeal could be had as a matter of right. See In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Mo.1972); In re Becker, 39 Ohio St.2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158, 159 (1974); cf. Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 609, 93 S. Ct. 1151, 1154, 35 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1973); State v. Aumann, 236 N.W.2d 320 (1975). See generally In re Brown, 183 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1971). III. Although it would at first blush appear Code § 232.58 specifically permits *265 Clay's invocation of appellate review, we are not so persuaded. The cited statute provides: It could be reasonably argued the italicized first sentence of § 232.58, if lifted out of context, permits appeal from the transfer order. But this approach would run counter to well established principles. As articulated in Kelly v. Brewer, 239 N.W.2d 109, 113-114 (Iowa 1976): See also State v. Jennie Coulter Day Nursery, 218 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1974); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 46:05 (Sands 4th ed. 1973). Guided by the foregoing we are satisfied the General Assembly qualified the above noted first sentence of § 232.58 by this next following phraseology: "The procedure for such appeals shall be governed by the same provisions applicable to appeals from the district court." What then is the relevant procedure provided for appeals from the district court? Helland v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 601, 604 (1973) says: It therefore follows and this court concludes, the legislature did not intend, by enactment of § 232.58, an appeal as of right could be taken to the Supreme Court from any and every interlocutory order or decree entered in a juvenile court. Impractical consequences would attend a contrary interpretation. See Matter of Estate of Bliven, 236 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Iowa 1975); State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24, 36 (Iowa 1975). In the first place, incalculable fractionated appeals would be unduly fostered. See Forte v. Schlick, 248 Iowa 1327, 1332, 85 N.W.2d 549 (1957). Additionally, proceedings in both the juvenile and criminal divisions would be unavoidably delayed, thereby jeopardizing a just final disposition. Stated otherwise, permissive random appeals from a juvenile court transfer order would, in effect, subordinate the primary issue of guilt or innocence and defer its determination while intermediate problems were being resolved on review. This appeal must be dismissed and the cause remanded for further proceedings without prejudice to Clay's right to appropriately raise any issues attendant upon the aforesaid transfer in event of appeal from final judgment entered. We express no view, however, as to waiver thereof should a guilty plea be entered. See State v. Anthony, 239 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 1976). The stay order previously issued by this court is hereby set aside and annulled. APPEAL DISMISSED.