Case Title: Nuspl v. Nuspl

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-191

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Nuspl v. Nuspl1986 WY 89717 P.2d 341Case Number: 85-191Decided: 04/10/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
John J. NUSPL, Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Martha Marie NUSPL, 
Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from 
DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Rex O. Arney, of 
Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for 
appellant.

No appearance 
for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal invokes the 
propriety of taking judicial notice of the cost of raising a child to justify a 
modification order increasing support payments as a matter of evidence and 
exercised discretion. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

[¶2.]     Martha Nuspl, appellee, 
and John Nuspl, appellant, were divorced in Wyoming in 1976. The divorce decree granted 
custody of the couple's three children, then ages eight years, six years, and 
eight months, to appellee and ordered child support in the amount of $125 per 
month per child. At the time the decree was entered appellant earned 
approximately $17,800 a year, and appellee was not 
working.

[¶3.]     A petition for 
modification of the decree filed by the mother in March, 1985, sought an 
increase in child support. In addition, the petition asked for two other 
modifications: allowing her to claim the children as dependents for income tax 
purposes, and requiring the father to share that cost of the children's medical 
expenses which was not covered by insurance. A hearing was held in July, 1985, 
with the parents as the only witnesses. The mother, who has not remarried, 
testified that she and the children had moved to Texas, where she obtained a teaching job. She 
also testified with regard to the expenses for raising the children, emphasizing 
the increase from the time of the divorce. In support of this testimony, she 
introduced an exhibit detailing her monthly expenses which showed that the 
expenses exceeded her monthly net income by approximately $40: $1,834 income 
(including the $375 received for child support) and $1,872 expenses. Her 
evidence further showed that the father's annual gross income increased from 
$17,000 to $38,000 in the past nine years.

[¶4.]     The father testified as 
to his income and expenses by stating that his expenses were approximately 
$2,475 and his "take home" income was $2,100 per month. He also had an income 
tax refund of approximately $2,800 from the 1984 tax year. His expenses were for 
his second wife and their two young children.

[¶5.]     From this evidence, the 
trial judge found that there had been "a tremendous increase" in both the 
father's earnings and the cost of living from then to now, which, together with 
the children being older, created a change of circumstances. The judge concluded 
that there had "been material changes of circumstances," and accordingly 
modified the child support obligation. In making this modification, the trial 
court stated that both parties were in the same situation. "Nobody can afford 
it, but the fact of the matter is, there are children and they require support." 
The court ordered a decree modification whereby each party would contribute to 
the children's support amounts directly proportional to parental incomes. 
Appellant, earning $38,000 per year, would contribute 38/60, while appellee, 
earning $22,000, would contribute 22/60. The court applied these fractions to 
what it determined to be the cost of raising children, i.e., $400 per month for 
one child, $600 for two children, and $700 for three. The final result was that 
appellant was ordered to pay $475 each month while there were three minor 
children, $380 while there were two, and $250 while there was one minor child.1 The court also held each party 
liable for one-half any medical expenses not covered by insurance, and that 
appellee could claim two of the children for income tax 
purposes.

[¶6.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues in his appeal from this modification:2

"1. Did the trial court 
err in taking judicial notice of studies showing the cost of supporting 
children?

"2. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion in granting Defendant's Petition to modify the child 
support provisions of the Decree of Divorce?"

JUDICIAL 
NOTICE

[¶7.]     The father asserts that 
the trial court unacceptably took judicial notice of unspecified studies to 
ascertain the cost of raising children.

[¶8.]     In arriving at his 
decision, the trial judge stated: "I have tried to figure this out by looking at 
different studies around * * *." He then recalled that the cost of raising 
children was as stated above. Counsel for appellant requested a citation of the 
studies upon which the trial court relied, since none were introduced in 
evidence, and the trial judge responded that he was not sure that there was any 
particular one upon which he had relied, although there was a study by the 
Agriculture Department and the State of Wyoming showing the cost to be $400 for 
a single child.

[¶9.]     Rule 201, W.R.E., 
governs the taking of judicial notice of adjudicative facts. It provides that a 
court may take judicial notice even if not requested, and may do so at any stage 
of the proceeding. Subsection (b) limits judicial notice:

"Kinds of facts. - A judicially noticed 
fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned."

Subsection (d) 
also operates to limit judicial notice in that it provides the opportunity for a 
party to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of 
the matter noticed.

[¶10.]  Concerning this opportunity for notice, 
Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence § 58, p. 449 (1977) 
states:

"* * * The question 
always to be answered is whether the court has in fact embodied in its findings 
or opinion an adjudicative fact not found in or supported by the formal evidence 
in the case, and if so, whether the fact in question is a fact properly 
noticeable."

[¶11.]  There is no doubt that, in this case, the 
trial judge embodied in his findings and opinion the cost of raising a child. 
Neither party introduced evidence concerning the average cost of raising a 
child, yet the court modified the support payments based on the "fact" that it 
costs $400, $600 and $700 to raise one child, two and three children, 
respectively. The question is whether that fact should be properly noticed under 
the Wyoming Rules of Evidence.

[¶12.]  The advisory comment to Rule 201, F.R.E. 
(the same as Rule 201, W.R.E.), describes the proper circumstances for taking 
judicial notice. In order to dispense with the usual method of establishing 
adjudicative facts, introducing evidence ordinarily consisting of the testimony 
of witnesses, judicial notice dispenses of this process as unnecessary. The 
comment goes on to note that "[a] high degree of indisputability is the 
essential prerequisite." Louisell and Mueller, supra, § 57, p. 439, in speaking 
of this indisputability requirement and facts readily verifiable, notes 
that:

"A major risk when the 
trial judge resorts to outside sources to verify facts is that he may choose to 
decide the whole dispute on the basis of his own independent research. * * * 
[S]uch procedure should be discouraged, at least until the parties are given 
ample opportunity to examine the sources in question before the judge formulates 
his own opinions and to present arguments upon the meaning of such sources and 
suggest additional sources."

[¶13.]  The fact noticed in the present case was 
the "cost" of raising one, two and three children. We do not think it arguable 
that this "fact" can be generally known within the jurisdiction of the trial 
court, and because such cost varies widely, depending on a myriad of 
circumstances, we do not find that it is a fact capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned. The cost of raising these children is subject to reasonable dispute; 
it is not capable of accurate determination by resort to any study. The cost of 
raising a child is the heart of the controversy in support proceedings, and it 
will vary in each case depending upon the child's health, educational needs, 
age, and a host of other circumstances including, specifically, the economic 
circumstances of the parents.

[¶14.]  Even though the "average cost" of raising 
a child was disclosed in studies relied on by the trial court in this case, 
taking judicial notice of such cost created two problems. First, the risk of the 
trial court deciding the whole dispute on the basis of his research, without 
allowing the parties opportunity to attack the accuracy or relevance of the 
studies, became real. The second problem springs from the first. In determining 
the dispute on the basis of the studies, the trial court failed to consider all 
of the circumstances unique to this case.

[¶15.]  We note the case of Martin v. Brasseaux, 
La. App., 422 So. 2d 548 (1982), where the Louisiana Court of Appeal rejected the 
trial court's determination of a support award based solely on the court's 
judicial notice of the cost of raising a child. That court 
stated:

"There is no authority 
whatsoever to support the proposition that a trial court may take judicial 
notice of the costs of supporting a child. * * * [P]laintiff, in an action for 
child support, has the burden of proving what the needs of the child are by a 
preponderance of the evidence." 422 So. 2d  at 553 asterisk.

Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 376 A.2d 1085 
(1977), draws an appropriate distinction. There the trial court had properly 
taken judicial notice that the children were four and one-half years older since 
the original decree, and that there had been inflation. However, it was not 
proper to judicially notice that there were commensurately greater costs for 
clothing and maintenance. The case held that this was true because it is 
arguable whether a child's expenses increase commensurately with age (albeit not 
a very valid argument in the real world of teen-age children in modern society). 
The vice of the argument is a mathematical formula approach, not specifically 
related to existent factors of the individual case.

[¶16.]  The foregoing cases support our 
conclusion that it was improper to take judicial notice of the cost of raising a 
child. Whether it costs $700 to support three children is a question subject to 
dispute, since the answer is obviously variable and dependent upon many 
circumstances.

ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION

[¶17.]  Appellant further claims that the trial 
court abused its discretion in granting appellee's request for modification. 
There is no dispute with the court's determination that there was a substantial 
or material change in circumstances. Instead, appellant contends that when it 
ordered the increase in support the trial court failed to consider his ability 
to pay, as well as other circumstances.

[¶18.]  Section 20-2-113, W.S. 1977, 1985 
Cum.Supp., allows for modification of custody and support orders.3 For modification to be warranted, 
it must be established that there has been a substantial or material change in 
circumstances which outweighs society's interest in applying the doctrine of res 
judicata. Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 
638 P.2d 156 (1981). The party seeking the modification has the burden of 
proving that a substantial or material change has occurred subsequent to the 
decree. Cubin v. Cubin, Wyo., 685 P.2d 680, 684 (1984). See Johnson v. 
Johnson, 717 P.2d 335 (1986). Decisions regarding child support rest largely 
within the discretion of the district court; we will not disturb these decisions 
unless there is grave abuse of that discretion or violation of some legal 
principle. Harrington v. Harrington, Wyo., 660 P.2d 356, 360 
(1983).

[¶19.]  In the present case, the trial court 
found that there were substantial changes which justified a modification. 
Appellant agrees that there have been numerous changes. The children are nine 
years older, and two of them are now teen-agers; the cost of living has 
increased over the past nine years; appellant's income has more than doubled 
since the divorce. In light of the above, appellant does not contest the trial 
court's finding that there has been a substantial change of circumstances, but 
he contends against the modification on an asserted inability to 
pay.

[¶20.]  In custody and support proceedings, the 
paramount concern of the court is the child's welfare. Bereman v. Bereman, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1155, 1160 (1982). This 
statement is tempered, however, by the acknowledgment that

"* * * it is imprudent to 
contend that, when the question involves support payments, the matter should be 
decided without consideration of the paying parent's ability to pay, the 
recipient's spending habits, and all other surrounding circumstances. * * * 
Child support cannot be determined in a vacuum." Mentock v. Mentock, supra, 638 P.2d  at 158.

See also, Redman 
v. Redman, Wyo., 
521 P.2d 584, 587 (1974), and Manners v. Manners, Wyo., 706 P.2d 671 
(1985).

[¶21.]  It must be recognized that determination 
of amounts of child support where a change of circumstance exists invokes 
consideration of all of the circumstances including: (a) reasonable needs of the 
children; (b) reasonable contributory ability and responsibility of the father; 
and (c) reasonable contributory ability and responsibility of the mother. See 
Redman v. Redman, supra; Bereman v. Bereman, supra; and Manners v. Manners, 
supra. Voluntary assumption of an additional obligation by remarriage or debt 
incurrence does not necessarily constrain responsibility to children of the 
prior marriage. See Booker v. Booker, Wyo., 626 P.2d 561 (1981); Rubeling v. Rubeling, Wyo., 406 P.2d 283 
(1965).

[¶22.]  In regard to the last cited case, it is 
not intended to re-emphasize the accomplishment of the impossible as a rational 
obligation but in all respects to recognize that less than adequate income 
requires mutual compromise.

[¶23.]  Ascertainment of that compromise rests in 
the sound discretion of the trial court in consideration of all the proper and 
relevant circumstances. Macy v. Macy, Wyo., 
714 P.2d 774 (1986).

[¶24.]  Since we reverse because of the noticed 
cost of raising children, it is not anticipated that any claim by appellant of 
the prior abuse of discretion by the court will reoccur on 
rehearing.

[¶25.]  Appropriately noted is the comment of the 
court: 

"* * * [I]t is obvious 
that these people are in the same condition as probably ninety percent of the 
people in the country * * *. Nobody can afford it, but the fact of the matter 
is, there are children and they require support."

This statement 
indicates that the court did consider both parties' ability to support the 
children and did not assume that 100 per cent of the needed support could be 
provided. It recognized that under the current status neither party could afford 
to support the three children. Merely operating under a monthly deficit is not 
enough, however, to free appellant from an increase in his support obligation. 
Just as we have stated that the needs of the children, and not the standard of 
living desired by the custodial parent, are at issue in determining the proper 
amount of child support, Harrington v. Harrington, supra, we also believe that 
the noncustodial parent's desired standard of living cannot determine his 
ability to pay. However, capacity to contribute must be recognized as a physical 
fact and a legal requirement.

[¶26.]  The most difficult decision resulting 
from this appeal involves the remedy to be fashioned by this court. We are not 
interested in disinterring the conflict within this court found in Mentock, 
supra. See also, Macy v. Macy, supra.

[¶27.]  The father lives in Idaho, the mother 
lives in Texas, and the jurisdiction is situate in Sheridan, located in the far 
northeast corner of Wyoming. Furthermore, we do not know whether a "change in 
circumstance" has occurred since July, 1985, or nine months 
ago.

[¶28.]  We expressly do not hold that the record 
is insufficient under the purview of Mentock, Manners, Booker, and Harrington, 
for a decision on the record by the trial court, and will leave the resolution 
of the case to the evidentiary discretion of the trial court as may be invoked 
by the litigants after remand. As a matter of example, but certainly not a 
directive, if litigants desire additional record information, affidavits, 
depositions or Rule 31, W.R.C.P. written questions might be 
used.

[¶29.]  On the record before this court, a change 
of circumstances has been demonstrated by the mother and acknowledged by the 
father.

[¶30.]  In the absence of agreement between the 
participants, the court, by exercise of its discretion and in consideration of 
the needs of the children, and in conjunction with the capacity and ability of 
each parent to pay, will have to accommodate those obviously increased 
needs.

[¶31.]  Reversed and 
remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1 The court deviated 
slightly from applying these fractions to the cost of raising children, since 
38/60 would have placed appellant's obligations at $443, $380 and $253 a 
month.

2 Appellee was not 
represented in the appeal, as her trial counsel withdrew by permission of the 
trial court after appellant filed his notice of appeal. Although appellee 
attempted to file a brief she was late in doing so under Rule 5.06, W.R.A.P. The 
case was submitted by appellant, with oral argument, as provided in Rule 5.11, 
W.R.A.P., which states in part:

"When the party holding 
the negative has failed to file and serve his brief as is required by these 
rules, and the brief of the party holding the affirmative has been duly filed 
and served within the time required, the party holding the affirmative may 
submit the case, with or without oral argument, and the other party shall not be 
heard. * * *"

3 Section 20-2-113, W.S. 
1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., provides in part:

"* * * On the petition of 
either of the parents, the court may revise the decree concerning the care, 
custody and maintenance of the children as the circumstances of the parents and 
the benefit of the children requires."