Case Title: Hickman v. Fruehauf Corp.

Citation: 386 Pa. Super. 455, 563 A.2d 155

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1989-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
386 Pa. Superior Ct. 455 (1989) 563 A.2d 155 Barbara HICKMAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Thomas Hickman, Deceased, and Barbara Hickman, in her own right v. FRUEHAUF CORPORATION, a corporation, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 28, 1989. Filed August 17, 1989. *456 Arthur L. Schwarzwaelder, Pittsburgh, for appellant. John A. Bacharach, Pittsburgh, for appellee. Before BROSKY, WIEAND and MELINSON, JJ. WIEAND, Judge: On June 28, 1983, Thomas Hickman took delivery of a used flatbed trailer which he had purchased from Fruehauf Corporation. At or about 6:20 a.m. on the following day, while carrying a load of steel, Hickman's tractor-trailer left the surface of Interstate Route 76 in the state of Indiana *457 and crashed. Hickman was killed. His widow, Barbara Hickman, commenced wrongful death and survival actions against Fruehauf Corporation, alleging that her decedent's fatal accident had been caused by a missing slider pin in the trailer. A jury returned a plaintiff's verdict awarding damages in the amount of Four Hundred Four Thousand ($404,000) Dollars, which the court reduced to Three Hundred Eighty-Two Thousand, Five Hundred ($382,500) Dollars to reflect No-fault benefits previously paid. Subsequently, delay damages were added in the amount of One Hundred Seventeen Thousand, Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven ($117,937) Dollars. After post-trial motions had been dismissed, judgment was entered. Fruehauf Corporation appealed. The case took almost five days to try. After the jurors had been deliberating for more than four hours, they informed the trial court that they were deadlocked. The trial court, in the presence of counsel for both sides, instructed the jury on the importance of trying to agree on a verdict. In so doing, the court referred, inter alia, to the expense of trial, saying: On appeal, Fruehauf Corporation argues that it was improper for the trial court, in urging the jury to agree on a verdict, to refer to the cost of litigation to the parties and the public. We disagree. It has long been the view in this Commonwealth that "[i]t is entirely proper for a trial judge, in an endeavor to prevent another long and expensive trial, to admonish a *458 jury as to the propriety and the importance of agreeing on a verdict." Commonwealth v. Ross, 190 Pa.Super. 145, 153, 152 A.2d 778, 782 (1959), quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 116 Pa.Super. 180, 189, 176 A. 246, 250 (1935). See also: Girard Trust Co. v. Page, 282 Pa. 174, 127 A. 458 (1925); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Pa. R.R., 253 Pa. 54, 97 A. 1051 (1916). But see: Miller v. Miller, 187 Pa. 572, 41 A. 277 (1898). Neither the parties nor our own research, however, has disclosed a Pennsylvania appellate court decision resolving the specific issue of whether it is error for a trial court to make reference to the cost of litigation to the parties and the public when giving a verdict-urging instruction to the jury. Nevertheless, the weight of authority in other jurisdictions is that such an instruction is appropriate. Anno., Verdict-Urging Instructions in Civil Case Stressing Desirability and Importance of Agreement, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281, 1305 (reviewing cases). We conclude that this is the better view and adopt it. The instructions of the trial court urging the jury to agree upon a verdict in the instant case were impartial and were not unduly coercive. We find nothing therein to suggest that the expense of a second trial would lie more heavily on the plaintiff than on the defendant. Appellant's second assignment of error pertains to the testimony of Dr. Dennis Guenther, who was called as an expert witness by the plaintiff. The defendant-appellant contends that his testimony on the issue of liability should have been excluded because it exceeded the scope of his written report. The proper inquiry in such a case Millard v. Nagle, Pa.Super. (J. 97010/88; filed June 2, 1989). See also: Painter v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 368 Pa.Super. 334, 534 A.2d 110 (1987). Our review of the record discloses no error or abuse of discretion and no unfairness in the trial court's ruling. That court, in its opinion responding to post-trial motions, satisfactorily answered appellant's argument in the following manner, which we adopt. Appellant's final contention is that delay damages should not have been awarded where, as here, neither party had delayed trial. It is now clear, however, that appellant's contention is without merit. Following the amendment of Pa.R.C.P. 238, the Superior Court held in Miller v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 381 Pa.Super. 236, 553 A.2d 443 (1989), that "where, as here, the defendant has not made the requisite settlement offer [pursuant to Rule 238(b)(1)] and the plaintiff has not caused delay of the trial, [as noted in Rule 238(b)(2)] the defendant is liable for delay damages." Id., 381 Pa.Superior Ct. at 240, 553 A.2d at 446. We perceive no valid reason for interpreting differently the *461 principles for awarding delay damages announced in Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehabilitation Center, 512 Pa. 60, 515 A.2d 1350 (1986). We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err when it awarded delay damages in this case where the defendant-appellant made no offer of settlement prior to trial. Judgment affirmed.