Case Title: State v. Delaney

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-580

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-580


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             Washington Superior Court
Robert D. Delaney
                                             February Term, 1991



John P. Meaker, J.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and William E. Griffin, Chief
   Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant

James P. W. Goss and Peter W. Hall of Abell, Kenlan, Schwiebert & Hall,
   P.C., Rutland, for defendant-appellee



PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson and Morse, JJ., and Cheever, Supr. J.,
          and Peck, J., (Ret.), Specially Assigned


     GIBSON, J.   The State, which seeks specific performance of an alleged
contract to sell certain land formerly owned by defendant, appeals from
summary judgment in his favor and the denial of its motions for summary
judgment and a preliminary injunction.  Defendant cross-appeals the denial
of his motion for sanctions.  We affirm.
                                   I.
     Defendant is trustee for a group of individuals who, in the summer of
1988, put up for sale a 3,135-acre parcel of land adjoining Willoughby
State Forest.  During the fall of 1988 and winter of 1989, the Nature
Conservancy made three different offers for the land, all of which were
rejected.  The Nature Conservancy was acting, at least in part, as an agent
for the State.
      On January 30, 1989, defendant's broker told John Roe, director of
land protection at the Nature Conservancy, that the land was to be sold to
the Dotolis for $1.2 million on February 1, 1989.  This information was
passed on to State officials and, in response, Governor Kunin telephoned
defendant that same evening.  She confirmed that the price was $1.2 million
and requested defendant not to sell the property to a third party because
the State wanted to purchase it.  Defendant declined the governor's request,
stating that he "was not interested in that because [he] didn't believe the
state was in a position to consummate any kind of a deal" in the time before
the scheduled sale to the Dotolis.
     At about that time, the Nature Conservancy decided it would advance
the purchase money for the property if the Legislature adopted a resolution
in support of the purchase.  With this in mind, the governor decided to
sponsor such a resolution and, on January 31, again telephoned defendant,
this time reading the text of the draft resolution to him.  The draft stated
that it was the intention of the State to appropriate $750,000 toward the
purchase price of the land, but did not set forth the full purchase price.
Defendant suggested that a reference to the full purchase price be added so
there would be no misunderstanding.  This was done.
     A few hours later, defendant called the governor's office and left a
message to the effect that the governor was "off the hook for another week."
In response, the governor called defendant, and according to her affidavit,
defendant "offered and agreed to give the State of Vermont until February 8,
1989 to commit to the purchase of the property at the agreed upon price.  In
that same conversation, [defendant] stated that he had always preferred to
sell the property to the State."  Defendant's recollection of the conver-
sation is somewhat different.  In his deposition, he stated that he told the
governor that the State "had another week to do whatever they wanted to do"
and that "[i]f they had a viable contract I saw that was right I told her I
would consider it."  The joint resolution passed the Senate on January 31,
1989 and the House on February 3, 1989.
     On February 2, the Nature Conservancy telefaxed a signed purchase and
sale agreement to defendant.  The next day, John Roe telephoned defendant on
behalf of the Nature Conservancy to discuss the document.  Defendant said
that, although the document looked perfectly acceptable, he wanted to speak
with a real estate attorney before giving final approval.  After being
pressed for an appointment to sign the document, defendant said he would
check his partners' schedules and call back on Monday, February 6.
Defendant did not indicate there was any change in the February 8 deadline.
     On February 6, defendant called the Nature Conservancy, reached Robert
Klein, its Vermont director, and informed him that the property was being
sold to the Dotolis.  After Klein expressed surprise, defendant voiced
several objections to the Nature Conservancy's proposed purchase and sale
agreement.  Klein said they could all be accommodated.  Defendant neverthe-
less ended the conversation and, by letter dated February 6, informed the
governor that the property was being sold to a third party, "even though the
Nature Conservancy seemed to have everything pretty well in line to be able
to go to contract tomorrow."
     The State immediately initiated this suit and filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction, seeking to restrain defendant from selling the
property to the Dotolis.  The State argued it had entered into a binding
contract to purchase the property from defendant prior to the agreement
between defendant and the Dotolis.  The trial court denied the motion,
holding that the State had not established a reasonable likelihood of
prevailing on the merits.  The State's motion for reconsideration was also
denied, and the sale from defendant to the Dotolis was completed.  Subse-
quently, the State requested specific performance under several contractual
theories, both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and defendant
filed a motion for sanctions.  The court denied the State's motion for
summary judgment, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and
denied defendant's motion for sanctions.
     On appeal, the State argues that the court erred in its summary
judgment rulings. (FN1) Defendant cross-appeals the denial of sanctions.
                                    II.
     The State advances two contractual arguments: (1) its part performance
of an offer from defendant created an option contract for sale of the
property, and (2) it entered into a contract for sale of the property with
defendant before defendant sold the property to the Dotolis. (FN2) We are not
persuaded by either argument and conclude that the trial court did not err
by granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and denying the State's
motion for summary judgment.
     Initially, we set out the law applicable to both arguments.  Summary
judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, after giving
the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences to the opposing party.
Toys, Inc. v. F.M. Burlington Co., ____ Vt. ___, ___, 582 A.2d 123, 125
(1990); V.R.C.P. 56(c).  Where both parties seek summary judgment, each
party receives this benefit when the opposing party's motion is being
considered.  Toys, Inc., ___ Vt. at ___, 582 A.2d  at 125.  On appeal, the
same summary judgment standard serves as our standard of review.  Cavanaugh
v. Abbott Laboratories, 145 Vt. 516, 520,