Case Title: Gore v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC12-537

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-537 
____________ 
 
DAVID ALAN GORE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[April 9, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
David Alan Gore, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the summary 
denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
Fla. Const.  On February 28, 2012, the Governor signed a death warrant for Gore, 
with the execution scheduled for April 12, 2012.  Gore subsequently sought 
postconviction relief in the circuit court, presenting five claims.  On March 15, 
2012, the circuit court entered an order that summarily denied relief on all claims.  
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order of the circuit court.  We hold 
that the recent decision from the United States Supreme Court in Martinez v. Ryan, 
 
 
- 2 - 
No. 10-1001, 2012 WL 912950 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2012), does not provide Gore with 
any basis for relief in this Court. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On March 15, 1984, a jury found David Alan Gore guilty of the first-degree 
murder of Lynn Elliott.  The facts of the murder were stated in the opinion of this 
Court affirming the judgment and sentence of death on Gore‟s initial direct appeal:   
Gore and his cousin picked up fourteen-year-old [R.M.1] and 
seventeen-year-old Lynn Elliott who were hitchhiking to the beach.  
After the glove compartment in the pickup truck fell open and a gun 
became visible, Gore took the gun and held it to [R.M.‟s] head.  He 
grabbed the two girls‟ wrists and held them together.  Gore then said 
that they should take the girls to Gore‟s home.  He told the girls that if 
they said or did anything, they would be killed.  When they arrived at 
his home, the girls were handcuffed and taken into a bedroom.  The 
girls then were separated, and Lynn was tied up while [R.M.] was 
handcuffed.  Gore cut [R.M.‟s] clothes off of her and sexually 
assaulted her on three separate occasions.  [R.M.] testified that she 
heard noises in the other room after Gore had left her.  She heard Gore 
tell Lynn to shut up or he would kill her.  Gore also told [R.M.] to be 
quiet or he would slit her throat and that he would do it anyway.  Gore 
then put [R.M.] in the closet, and, after he left, she heard two or three 
shots.  Gore then came back into the room and put [R.M.] in the attic 
where she stayed until rescued by a police officer. 
Michael Rock, a fifteen-year-old boy, testified that on July 26, 
1983, while riding his bicycle in the area of Gore‟s home, he heard 
screaming and observed a naked girl running down the driveway 
being chased by Gore who was also naked.  He saw Gore catch up to 
her, drag her back to a palm tree, and shoot her twice in the head.  
Rock went home and told his mother, and she called the police.  The 
police arrived and surrounded Gore‟s home.  Lynn‟s body was found 
                                          
 
1.  Due to the fourteen-year-old‟s status as a surviving victim of sexual 
assault, we refer to her as R.M.   
 
 
- 3 - 
in the trunk of the car in the driveway.  Her arms and legs had been 
tightly bound with rope.  She had multiple abrasions on her body 
consistent with falling and being dragged.  The gun used to kill her 
was found in Gore‟s home. 
Gore was indicted for the first-degree, premeditated murder of 
Lynn Elliott, for the kidnapping of Lynn Elliott, for the kidnapping of 
[R.M.], and for three counts of sexual battery of [R.M.].  He was 
found guilty of all six counts.  After a jury recommendation of death, 
the trial court imposed the death sentence for the first-degree murder 
of Lynn Elliott and imposed life sentences for the other crimes. 
 
Gore v. State, 475 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 1985) (Gore I), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 
1031 (1986).   
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence.  
See id.  The Court subsequently affirmed the denial of Gore‟s initial rule 3.850 
motion for postconviction relief and denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  
See Gore v. Dugger, 532 So. 2d 1048, 1051 (Fla. 1988) (Gore II).  However, the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted Gore‟s 
federal petition for writ of habeas corpus and vacated his death sentence because 
the trial court had precluded Gore from presenting nonstatutory mitigating 
evidence in violation of Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987), and Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).  See Gore v. Dugger, 763 F. Supp. 1110, 1114, 1116 
(M.D. Fla. 1989) (Gore III), aff‟d, 933 F.2d 904, 905 (11th Cir. 1991) (Gore IV), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066 (1992).  After a resentencing proceeding, a jury 
unanimously recommended death, and the trial court followed that 
recommendation.  On appeal, this Court affirmed the sentence.  See Gore v. State, 
 
 
- 4 - 
706 So. 2d 1328, 1336 (Fla. 1997) (Gore V), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 892 (1998).  
This Court subsequently affirmed a postconviction court order that denied Gore 
relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and also denied a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus filed by Gore.  See Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 1257, 1277-
78 (Fla. 2007) (Gore VI), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1197 (2008).  On April 11, 2008, 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied a 
second federal habeas petition filed by Gore.  See Gore v. McDonough, No. 07-
22637-CIV-LENARD/TORRES (S.D. Fla. order filed Apr. 11, 2008). The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit subsequently denied Gore 
a “certificate of appealability,” see Gore v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 
No. 08-14060-P (11th Cir. order filed Sept. 9, 2008), and the United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari review, see Gore v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 2382 
(2009). 
Gore raised the following claims in his successive postconviction motion 
filed after issuance of the warrant: 
1. The clemency “update” process in this case was applied in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and corresponding provisions of the Florida 
Constitution. 
2. Florida‟s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because of the arbitrary and 
standardless power given to the Governor to sign death warrants. 
3. Newly discovered evidence establishes that Gore was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during his resentencing proceedings. 
4. Gore was denied the effective assistance of counsel during his 
 
 
- 5 - 
postconviction proceedings. 
5. Given the inordinate length of time that Gore has spent on death row, 
adding his execution to that punishment would constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
With regard to the first claim, Gore stated that his clemency “update” 
process was applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the 
United States and Florida Constitutions.  Although Gore first received a clemency 
proceeding in 1987, the clemency proceeding to which Gore‟s claim is directed 
occurred in 2012.  Subsequent to the 1987 proceeding, Gore‟s death sentence was 
overturned due to the refusal of the trial court to allow the presentation of 
mitigation evidence.  Gore contends that the clemency board‟s 1987 investigation 
was “hardly accurate” because it was devoid of mitigating evidence presented  
during his 1992 resentencing proceeding.  Gore stated that he learned of the 2012 
clemency proceedings only after his death warrant was signed and, therefore, was 
unable to present information on his own behalf.  Gore contends that the clemency 
process was one-sided because it included input from only the State, the victims, 
and the media, and therein denied his right to due process.  
In his second claim, Gore alleged that the Governor of Florida wields an 
arbitrary and standardless power to sign death warrants, thereby rendering the 
Florida capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional.   Gore notes that there are at 
least forty-two other death row inmates who are currently eligible for a death 
 
 
- 6 - 
warrant, and the only reason he was selected was because a newspaper editorial 
board expressed an interest in the execution of Gore.  
In his third claim, Gore alleges that newly discovered evidence establishes 
that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during his resentencing.  
Following the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals‟ affirmance in May 1991 of the 
federal district court order granting Gore relief from his death sentence, Robert 
Udell was appointed to represent Gore during his resentencing proceedings, which 
ultimately resulted in a unanimous jury recommendation of death.  During 
subsequent postconviction proceedings, Gore alleged that his resentencing counsel 
were ineffective.  During the 2003 evidentiary hearing, Udell testified with regard 
to his representation of Gore, which included a discussion of why certain decisions 
were made.  Thereafter, this Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief and 
concluded that penalty phase counsel were not deficient.   
Gore asserted that, unknown to postconviction counsel, the postconviction 
court, and this Court, Udell was not a credible witness.  In October 2009, Udell 
was disbarred from the practice of law by this Court.  Among other admissions, 
Udell admitted to submitting several affidavits and filing several motions for fees 
that contained false information about services performed for clients between 2005 
and 2008.  According to Gore, Udell‟s disbarment and his failure to be truthful 
indicate he is unable to be honest, even under oath.  Resentencing co-counsel 
 
 
- 7 - 
Jerome “Jay” Nickerson, who did not testify during the postconviction 
proceedings, informed current defense counsel that during the resentencing, Udell 
was responsible for preparing all mitigation other than mental health mitigation 
and rebuttal to the evidence in aggravation presented by the State.  However, when 
Nickerson arrived just before the penalty phase, he discovered that Udell had done 
nothing to prepare for the resentencing.  Udell had not spoken to, or met with, the 
mitigation witnesses, and he had not prepared for any of the evidence that the State 
intended to present.  Gore contended that because this Court relied so heavily on 
testimony from Udell during the postconviction evidentiary hearing, the prejudice 
analysis that this Court conducted with regard to Gore‟s ineffectiveness claims was 
flawed.  Gore requested an evidentiary hearing so he could establish that Udell‟s 
penalty phase representation was deficient.   
Fourth, Gore alleged that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel 
during his postconviction proceedings.  Resentencing co-counsel Nickerson did not 
testify during the evidentiary hearing because collateral counsel claimed that he 
was unable to locate Nickerson.  This Court stated that Gore‟s failure to produce 
Nickerson at the hearing contributed to the failure of Gore to satisfy the legal 
burden of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  In his successive motion, 
Gore contended that the failure of postconviction counsel to produce Nickerson 
during the collateral proceedings constituted deficient performance that prejudiced 
 
 
- 8 - 
Gore.  Because Gore‟s first opportunity to obtain review of resentencing counsel‟s 
effectiveness was during his postconviction proceeding, Gore asserted that 
collateral counsel owed him the duty of effective representation.   
In his final claim, Gore contended that, given the length of time he has 
already spent on death row, adding execution to that punishment would constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States Constitution and 
binding norms of international law.   
The circuit court held a hearing on the successive motion on March 13, 
2012.  After hearing legal arguments, and considering the motion and the State‟s 
response, the circuit court entered an order on March 15, 2012, summarily denying 
the successive motion.  On March 26, 2012, Gore filed his initial brief with this 
Court raising the same issues that were raised in his successive motion. 
ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
 
 
In Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000 (Fla. 2009), this Court articulated the 
standard of review of a summarily denied postconviction claim: 
A successive rule 3.851 motion may be denied without an 
evidentiary hearing if the records of the case conclusively show that 
the movant is entitled to no relief.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B). 
This Court reviews the circuit court‟s decision to summarily deny a 
successive rule 3.851 motion de novo, accepting the movant‟s factual 
allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record, and 
affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the movant 
is entitled to no relief.   
 
 
- 9 - 
 
Id. at 1005.  Because the circuit court summarily denied each of Gore‟s claims, the 
parameters articulated in Walton are applicable to each issue presented by Gore. 
Newly Discovered Evidence 
 
 
Gore contends that the 2009 disbarment of his penalty phase counsel, Robert 
Udell, constitutes newly discovered evidence, and that the circuit court erred when 
it denied this claim without an evidentiary hearing.  We disagree. 
To obtain relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must 
satisfy a two-prong test: 
First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the 
party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the 
defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of 
diligence.  Second, “the newly discovered evidence must be of such 
nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”  [Jones 
v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) (Jones II)].  Newly 
discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones II test if it 
“weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a 
reasonable doubt as to his culpability.”  Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 526 
(quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)).  “If the 
defendant is seeking to vacate a sentence, the second prong requires 
that the newly discovered evidence would probably yield a less severe 
sentence.”  Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 990 (Fla. 2009) (citing 
Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) (Jones I )). 
Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 18-19 (Fla. 2010).  We conclude that regardless of 
whether Gore can establish due diligence in discovering the disbarment of Udell, 
he cannot establish that the disbarment “would probably yield a less severe 
sentence.”  Id.  
 
 
- 10 - 
As a preliminary matter, Gore fails to demonstrate how the disbarment of 
Udell in 2009 for conduct that occurred from 2005 through 2008 establishes that he 
was ineffective during the resentencing trial in 1992.  The asserted attorney 
misconduct that occurred more than a decade after a resentencing proceeding, and 
had no relation whatsoever to a particular defendant, is not relevant to the 
representation of this defendant more than a decade before.  Therefore, we 
conclude that Udell‟s 2009 disbarment, which occurred seventeen years after the 
resentencing proceeding, is not the type of evidence that, if considered by a jury on 
retrial, would probably “yield a less severe sentence.”  Id.; see also Wyatt v. State, 
71 So. 3d 86, 100 n.14 (Fla. 2011) (noting that not all new evidence “is the 
equivalent of newly discovered evidence for the purposes of establishing a 
postconviction claim”). 
Furthermore, this Court has previously rejected a claim that Udell‟s 
disbarment constitutes newly discovered evidence for purposes of impeaching his 
postconviction evidentiary hearing testimony.  In Kearse v. State, No. SC11-244 
(Fla. Oct. 21, 2011) (75 So. 3d 1244) (table report), a capital defendant filed a 
successive rule 3.851 motion.  Kearse argued that his initial postconviction motion 
alleging ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel should be reexamined in 
light of newly discovered evidence that his trial counsel, Robert Udell, submitted 
false fee affidavits during the period of 2005 through 2008 and was disbarred for 
 
 
- 11 - 
this conduct in October 2009.  The circuit court summarily denied Kearse‟s 
successive motion.2 
 
On appeal, this Court unanimously affirmed the trial court‟s denial in a brief 
order that provided: 
Billy Leon Kearse filed a second successive postconviction 
motion in which he asserted that his prior claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel should be reexamined in light of newly 
discovered evidence about his trial counsel.  The postconviction court 
summarily denied the motion.  We hereby affirm the postconviction 
court‟s summary denial.  Because Kearse did not present any evidence 
that would probably result in a finding that trial counsel was 
ineffective, the postconviction court properly denied his newly 
discovered evidence claim as legally insufficient. 
Kearse v. State, No. SC11-244, order at 1.  We similarly conclude that the use of 
Udell‟s disbarment to impeach his credibility during Gore‟s initial postconviction 
proceeding after resentencing would not produce a different result with regard to 
the claim that penalty phase counsel were ineffective.  This Court, in affirming the 
denial of the rule 3.850 motion in Gore VI, held that the prejudice prong of 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), had not been satisfied.  
 
In his appeal from the circuit court‟s denial of his initial motion for 
postconviction relief after resentencing, Gore asserted that his penalty phase 
counsel were ineffective for: (1) calling witness Robert Stone, who testified with 
                                          
 
2.  The circuit court judge who presided over Kearse‟s successive 
postconviction proceeding also presided over Gore‟s current successive 
proceeding.   
 
 
- 12 - 
regard to parole possibilities; (2) failing to provide an expanded instruction on the 
cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor (CCP); (3) failing to discover 
and expose to the jury on cross-examination that the State‟s mental health expert 
charged more than $27,000 for his testimony; and (4) failing to discover and 
present witnesses who could testify to the mitigating circumstance that Gore 
suffered from neurologic disorders due to exposure to toxic chemicals used in 
citrus agriculture.3  In our decision affirming the denial of relief, this Court found 
that co-counsel Nickerson—not Udell—served as lead counsel during the 
resentencing and made the majority of strategic decisions.4  Most of the 
conclusions reached by this Court addressed conduct by Nickerson, and Udell‟s 
testimony during the evidentiary hearing with regard to the decisions of Nickerson 
was tangential at best.   
 
For example, with regard to the calling of witness Stone, we noted in Gore 
VI that the decision to do so was “made solely by Nickerson,” and this Court held 
that Nickerson had a strategic reason for his actions, despite Udell‟s testimony to 
                                          
 
3.  In his postconviction motion, Gore also claimed that his trial counsel 
were ineffective for failing to discover and present evidence that Gore was abused 
by his mother.  However, Gore subsequently withdrew this claim.   
4.  Consistent with this determination, on appeal Gore also contended that 
Udell was ineffective because he totally deferred to Nickerson during the 
resentencing proceedings.  See Gore VI, 964 So. 2d at 1273.  This Court held that 
the strategic decision of Udell “to defer on a limited basis to the apparent abilities 
of Nickerson” did not constitute deficient performance.  Id. 
 
 
- 13 - 
the contrary that “we all kn[e]w that Mr. Stone was not going to be friendly to 
David Alan Gore in his testimony.”  964 So. 2d at 1269.  Further, we concluded 
that even if Nickerson was deficient, “there was no prejudice.”  Id. at 1270.  The 
testimony of Udell played little to no role in our determination of this issue.  With 
regard to this claim, we stated “it appears that Gore‟s counsel should have located 
and presented evidence from Nickerson, as his testimony would have directly 
revealed his strategies in calling Stone.”  Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 
With regard to the failure to propose an expanded CCP instruction, we 
concluded that penalty phase counsel were not deficient because “Gore‟s counsel 
was not even required to initially object to this standard CCP instruction as this 
jury instruction was considered proper [at the time of Gore‟s resentencing 
proceedings].”  Id. at 1275.  We then held that Gore had failed to establish 
prejudice, concluding that “the jury would have returned a finding of CCP due to 
the overwhelming evidence of this aggravator.”  Id. at 1276.   
 
With regard to the failure to expose the State mental health expert‟s fee on 
cross-examination, we concluded that Gore had not met his burden of establishing 
ineffectiveness because “Udell cannot provide evidence about what Nickerson may 
have been thinking in his decisions, and Nickerson was not produced as a 
postconviction witness.”  Id. at 1271.  We then concluded that “Nickerson‟s 
decision to not impeach through questions targeted at financial bias can certainly 
 
 
- 14 - 
be viewed as „sound trial strategy.‟”  Id.  We also held that even if deficiency was 
established, Gore failed to demonstrate prejudice because the expert‟s “testimony 
was not essential to the trial court finding the existence of no statutory mitigators 
on resentencing.”  Id. at 1272.  The opinion provided: 
For example, Gore‟s argument that he was intoxicated by alcohol at 
the time of the incident was refuted by numerous other individuals, 
rather than just [the State expert].  At the resentencing, [R.M.] 
testified that Gore did not smell of alcohol, did not slur his words, did 
not have bloodshot eyes, and was in complete control.  Eyewitness 
Michael Rock testified that Gore did not stagger in the driveway when 
he ran after Elliot.  Detective Redstone, Captain Dubois, and Officer 
Raymond all testified that Gore had no signs of alcohol impairment at 
the time of arrest.  
Id.  Moreover, we concluded that even if the State expert had been impeached with 
financial bias, “a death sentence would have likely still resulted due to the strength 
of the six aggravators that were independently found.”  Id.  
 
Finally, with regard to the failure to present evidence of exposure to toxic 
chemicals, we held that the failure of penalty phase counsel to pursue this theory 
was not deficient: 
At the evidentiary hearing, Udell stated that it is dangerous to make 
tenuous arguments that sound only like “lawyer talk,” because the 
jury might punish that party for making a seemingly senseless 
argument.  Nickerson could have engaged in that thought process 
when he determined that he would not pursue this argument, but 
again, this was not confirmed because Nickerson did not testify at the 
evidentiary hearing.  
 
 
- 15 - 
Id. at 1274 (emphasis supplied).  We also concluded that Gore had not 
shown prejudice because 
extensive mitigation was already presented at the resentencing.  Even 
if the trial court at resentencing had found this one additional 
mitigating factor involving neurological disorders from citrus grove 
pesticide exposure, which is a tenuous theory at best, this would not 
have overcome the trial court‟s finding of six aggravating factors 
which, as previously described, are supported by strong evidence.  
 
Id. at 1275. 
 
 
Thus, our 2007 decision in Gore VI demonstrates that, as in Kearse, even if 
evidence of Udell‟s disbarment was introduced to impeach his testimony during 
the evidentiary hearing, this evidence is not of such a nature that it would probably 
produce a less severe sentence, or even a conclusion that penalty phase counsel 
were ineffective.  Such a conclusion is even stronger than it was in Kearse.  Here, 
this Court evaluated the ineffective assistance claims based upon attorney 
Nickerson‟s performance.  Accordingly, to the extent that Udell did testify, it 
contributed little to our ultimate determination as to Nickerson‟s actions during 
Gore‟s resentencing proceedings.  This is in contrast to Kearse, where Udell was 
the only attorney who represented Kearse and, therefore, testified during the 
evidentiary hearing to his own strategic decisions during Kearse‟s trial.5   
                                          
 
5.  Further, the evidentiary hearing on Kearse‟s postconviction motion, 
during which Udell testified, occurred in 2005—the same year that Udell engaged 
in misconduct by submitting false fee affidavits.  This is in stark contrast to the 
instant case where Udell testified years before engaging in the conduct that led to 
 
 
- 16 - 
 
The record conclusively demonstrates that Gore is not entitled to relief based 
upon a claim of newly discovered evidence, and we affirm the summary denial of 
this claim by the circuit court.   
Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel 
 
 
Gore next contends that during the initial collateral review proceedings, his 
postconviction counsel was ineffective for failure to locate penalty phase co-
counsel Nickerson and present his testimony.  Gore asserts that the recent decision 
of the United States Supreme Court in Martinez, 2012 WL 912950, creates a new 
and independent cause of action for ineffective assistance of collateral counsel in 
our state courts system.  While the decision in Martinez does contain expansive 
language, a proper analysis reveals that the Supreme Court specifically declined to 
address the issue of whether a constitutional right to effective assistance of 
collateral counsel exists:   
While petitioner frames the question in this case as a constitutional 
one, a more narrow, but still dispositive, formulation is whether a 
federal habeas court may excuse a procedural default of an 
ineffective-assistance claim when the claim was not properly 
presented in state court due to an attorney‟s errors in an initial-review 
collateral proceeding. 
                                                                                                                                        
his disbarment.  Thus, the argument that Udell‟s disbarment, or the dishonest 
conduct that led to his disbarment, is relevant to the testimony offered by Udell 
during the 2003 evidentiary hearing is even more tenuous here than it was in 
Kearse. 
 
 
- 17 - 
Id. at *3.  Even Justice Scalia in his dissent acknowledged that the majority chose 
to evade this issue.  See id. at *16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the reframing 
of the issue “avoid[ed] the Court‟s need to confront the established rule that there 
is no right to counsel in collateral proceedings”).  It appears that Martinez is 
directed toward federal habeas proceedings and is designed and intended to address 
issues that arise in that context.   
 
Here, Gore previously received full consideration of his ineffective 
assistance of penalty phase counsel claims in the postconviction court and a 
comprehensive review of those claims during his appeal before this Court.  Gore 
has received a full collateral review to which he is entitled in the Florida state 
courts system.  We hold that under the facts and circumstances of this case, 
Martinez provides Gore with no basis for relief in this Court. 
Even if the United States Supreme Court in Martinez had chosen to alter 
decades of precedent and hold that a claim of ineffective assistance of collateral 
counsel is now an independent, cognizable claim—which we conclude that it did 
not—Gore still could not establish that he is entitled to relief under Strickland due 
to the failure of collateral counsel to locate Nickerson.   As previously discussed, 
this Court and the trial court found that Gore failed to establish prejudice on his 
claims of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel.  Thus, even if collateral 
counsel had been deficient for a failure to locate and present Nickerson as a 
 
 
- 18 - 
witness during the evidentiary hearing, Gore cannot demonstrate that confidence in 
the outcome of the postconviction proceedings would have been undermined if 
Nickerson had testified.  Therefore, his claim of ineffective assistance of collateral 
counsel would not succeed.   
Gore‟s challenges to the effectiveness of his collateral counsel fail.  We 
affirm the summary denial of this claim.   
Clemency Process 
 
 
In his third challenge, Gore contends that the 2012 clemency proceeding that 
occurred in this case was applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation 
of United States and Florida Constitutions.  Gore asserts that although numerous 
individuals were informed of their right to participate in this crucial stage of the 
criminal proceedings, he was not.  Gore also contends that although the Governor 
may have considered the 2012 proceedings at issue to be an “update” to the prior 
clemency proceeding in 1987, that characterization ignores that Gore‟s 1984 death 
sentence was overturned subsequent to the 1987 proceedings.  According to Gore, 
the only arguably constitutionally valid penalty phase proceeding in this case 
occurred in 1992, but a full clemency proceeding did not follow this phase.  Gore 
contends that without notice, an opportunity to be heard, or presence of counsel, 
the 2012 clemency “update” did not comport with due process.   
 
 
- 19 - 
We disagree.  The Florida Rules of Executive Clemency expressly provide 
that “[t]he Governor has the unfettered discretion to deny clemency at any time, for 
any reason.”  Fla. R. Exec. Clem. 4 (emphasis supplied).  Further, this Court has 
repeatedly declined to interject itself into what is, under the Florida Constitution, 
an executive function.  For example, in Bundy v. State, 497 So. 2d 1209, 1211 
(Fla. 1986), a defendant under an active death warrant contended that he must be 
allowed time to prepare and present a second petition for clemency, even though 
he had already received an earlier clemency proceeding.  In denying relief, the 
Court noted the separation of powers issue that such a claim presented: 
In the death warrant authorizing appellant‟s execution, the governor 
attests to the fact that “it has been determined that Executive 
Clemency, as authorized by Article IV, Section 8(a), Florida 
Constitution, is not appropriate.”  It is not our prerogative to second-
guess the application of this exclusive executive function.  First, the 
principle of separation of powers requires the judiciary to adopt an 
extremely cautious approach in analyzing questions involving this 
admitted matter of executive grace.  Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 
312 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878, 98 S. Ct. 232, 54 L. Ed. 2d 159 
(1977).  As noted in In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor, 334 So. 
2d 561, 562-63 (Fla. 1976), “[t]his Court has always viewed the 
pardon powers expressed in the Constitution as being peculiarly 
within the domain of the executive branch of government.”  See also 
Ex Parte White, 131 Fla. 83, 178 So. 876 (1938). 
Second, the governor and cabinet held an earlier clemency 
hearing in relationship to appellant‟s conviction for the Tallahassee 
murders and found no basis on which to grant him relief.  We cannot 
say that the executive branch was required to go through the motions 
of holding a second proceeding when it could well have properly 
determined in the first that appellant was not and never would be a 
likely candidate for executive clemency. 
 
 
 
- 20 - 
Id. (emphasis supplied); see also Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 252-53 (Fla. 
2001) (relying on Bundy to reject capital defendant‟s claim that he was denied 
access to a second clemency process because he was not represented by counsel 
and he did not have an opportunity to present mitigating evidence).   
Here, Gore received a clemency proceeding in 1987.  He does not allege that 
this earlier proceeding was deficient.  Instead, he alleges that he is entitled to a full 
updated clemency proceeding because additional mitigation was revealed during 
his 1992 resentencing proceeding.  However, the Court has also rejected clemency 
challenges on this basis.   
In Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 24 (Fla. 2010), the defendant contended 
that “the clemency proceeding he was provided in 1987 was inadequate because it 
was held before the postconviction proceedings were concluded and before his 
mental health issues and life history were fully developed for consideration in the 
clemency process.”  In rejecting this claim, the Court noted that “no specific 
procedures are mandated in the clemency process and that Johnston [was] provided 
with the clemency proceedings to which he is entitled.”  Id. at 25-26.  We also 
declined to depart from our prior precedent in which we refused to second-guess 
the executive branch on matters of clemency.  See id. at 26.  This Court 
subsequently relied on Johnston when it rejected a capital defendant‟s claim that 
the death penalty in Florida is arbitrary and capricious because although the 
 
 
- 21 - 
defendant received a prior clemency proceeding, he did not have the opportunity to 
present additional information about his life in a more recent clemency proceeding.  
See Grossman v. State, 29 So. 3d 1034, 1044 (Fla. 2010) (“Grossman has not 
provided any reason why this Court should depart from its well-established 
precedent on this issue, and we thus deny relief on this claim.”). 
 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the circuit court properly denied 
this claim without an evidentiary hearing. 
Authority of the Governor to Sign Death Warrants 
 
 
Gore next contends that the allegedly arbitrary power of the Governor to 
sign death warrants renders the Florida capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional.  
Our analysis in the previous section applies equally to this claim.  The same 
principles—the Governor‟s unfettered discretion under the Florida Rules of 
Executive Clemency, see Fla. R. Exec. Clem. 4, and separation of powers 
concerns—arise again in the context of a claim that the Governor‟s decision to sign 
Gore‟s warrant was arbitrary and standardless.  As recently as last year, we 
rejected claims that because of the Governor‟s absolute discretion to sign death 
warrants, thereby deciding who lives and who dies, the death penalty structure of 
Florida violates the United States Constitution.  See Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 
551-52 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 998 (Fla. 2009)), cert. 
 
 
- 22 - 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1 (2011); see also Johnston, 27 So. 3d at 24 (rejecting a claim 
that Florida‟s clemency process is “arbitrary, lacks standards, [and] is one-sided”).   
Gore does not dispute that he is eligible for a death warrant, and the signed 
warrant expressly states that the Governor considered clemency and determined 
that it was not appropriate.  In light of the foregoing, and for the same reasons 
discussed in the prior issue, this claim also fails.   
Length of Time on Death Row 
 
 
Finally, Gore contends that because of the time that he has already spent on 
death row, adding execution to that punishment would violate the Eighth 
Amendment and its ban on cruel and unusual punishment, as well as the 
Fourteenth Amendment and “binding norms of international law.”  We reject this 
claim as both successive and without merit. 
 
Gore previously presented an unsuccessful challenge that extensive time 
spent on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment: 
Gore argues that his twenty-three years served on death row is 
cruel and unusual punishment, and violates both the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. This Court 
has consistently rejected the argument that serving time on death row 
is cruel and unusual punishment, regardless of the time served.  See 
Lucas v. State, 841 So. 2d 380, 389 (Fla. 2003) (holding that over 
twenty-five years on death row is not cruel and unusual punishment); 
Foster v. State, 810 So. 2d 910, 916 (Fla. 2002) (holding that twenty-
three years on death row is not cruel and unusual punishment).  
Gore‟s exercise of his constitutional rights through the appeal and 
postconviction process has prevented his death sentence from being 
executed, so he may not claim a constitutional violation due to his 
 
 
- 23 - 
length of time on death row.  See Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 437 
(Fla. 1998) (“[N]o federal or state courts have accepted [the] 
argument that a prolonged stay on death row constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment, especially where both parties bear responsibility 
for the long delay.”).  Therefore, Gore‟s claim is without merit. 
Gore VI, 964 So. 2d at 1276.  Since this Court‟s 2007 decision, we have repeatedly 
rejected similar challenges.  See, e.g., Johnston, 27 So. 3d at 27 (rejecting a claim 
that almost twenty-five years on death row constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment); Marek v. State, 8 So. 3d 1123, 1130-31 (Fla. 2009) (same for twenty-
five years on death row); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1085 (Fla. 2008) 
(same for twenty-three years on death row).  Moreover, on February 15, 2012, 
Robert Brian Waterhouse—an inmate who had been on death row for over thirty 
years—was executed.  Thus, relief is not warranted on this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
In accordance with our analysis above, we affirm the summary denial of 
relief by the circuit court.  We further hold that Gore is not entitled to relief from 
this Court under the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Martinez v. Ryan.  No motion for rehearing will be entertained by this Court.  The 
mandate shall issue immediately.   
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Indian River County,  
 
 
- 24 - 
Dan L. Vaughn, Judge - Case No. 83-361-CFA 
 
Martin J. McClain, Linda McDermott and John Paul Abatecola of McClain and 
McDermott, P.A., Estero, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia A. Terenzio and 
Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee