Case Title: State ex rel. Charvat v. Frye

Citation: 2007-Ohio-2882

Docket Number: 20062275

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Charvat v. Frye, 114 Ohio St.3d 76, 2007-Ohio-2882.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CHARVAT, APPELLEE, v. FRYE, JUDGE, APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Charvat v. Frye,  
114 Ohio St.3d 76, 2007-Ohio-2882.] 
Court of appeals’ judgment granting petition for writ of procedendo affirmed — 
Trial court erred in staying case alleging violations of the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 until plaintiff registered his telephone 
numbers on the national do-not-call list. 
(No. 2006-2275 ─ Submitted May 23, 2007 ─ Decided June 27, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 06AP-100, 2006-Ohio-5947. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment granting a writ of procedendo to 
compel a common pleas court judge to proceed in a civil case.  Because the judge 
erroneously stayed the case, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Philip J. Charvat, resides with his family at their home in 
Westerville, Ohio.  In 2004, Charvat received telemarketing calls for satellite 
transmission services that were made on behalf of Dish TV Now, Inc. (“Dish 
TV”) and Echostar Satellite, L.L.C. (“Echostar”).  According to Charvat, each of 
these telephone calls began with a prerecorded message, and no one in his family 
had given the callers express permission to place the calls. 
{¶ 3} In 2004, Charvat filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court of 
Common Pleas against Dish TV and other entities.  The case was assigned to 
appellant, Judge Richard A. Frye, of the common pleas court.  In his second 
amended complaint, Charvat sought money damages, a declaratory judgment, and 
injunctive relief against Dish TV and Echostar for alleged violations of the 
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Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Section 227, Title 47, U.S.Code, the 
Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, R.C. Chapter 1345, and administrative rules 
adopted pursuant to those laws for the nine telemarketing calls made on behalf of 
Dish TV and Echostar to the Charvat home in 2004.  Charvat set forth 66 counts 
in the second amended complaint.  In December 2005, Judge Frye denied 
Charvat’s motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed Charvat’s 66th 
cause of action. 
{¶ 4} On December 16, 2005, Judge Frye issued a journal entry ordering 
Charvat to show cause why the case should not be stayed until Charvat submits an 
affidavit attesting that he has registered his telephone numbers on the national do-
not-call registry. 
{¶ 5} Charvat submitted a timely response to Judge Frye’s show-cause 
order in which he specified by affidavit that (1) he had not registered either of his 
home telephone numbers with the national do-not-call registry, (2) he did not 
intend to register his telephone numbers on the national do-not-call registry in the 
future, and (3) he did not oppose all forms of telemarketing; e.g., he welcomed 
telemarketing calls concerning life insurance, school products, and market 
research. 
{¶ 6} On December 28, 2005, Judge Frye stayed the case and removed it 
from the active docket.  Judge Frye noted that the case would be returned to the 
court’s active docket if Charvat registered his home telephone numbers on the 
national do-not-call list. 
{¶ 7} Shortly thereafter, Charvat filed a petition in the Court of Appeals 
for Franklin County for a writ of procedendo to compel Judge Frye “to proceed to 
schedule and preside over a jury trial” in the civil case.  The court of appeals 
granted the writ. 
{¶ 8} In his appeal as of right, Judge Frye asserts that the court of 
appeals erred in granting the writ of procedendo. 
January Term, 2007 
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Motion to Dismiss 
{¶ 9} Before addressing the merits of Judge Frye’s appeal, we briefly 
consider Charvat’s motion to dismiss this appeal. 
{¶ 10} Charvat asserts that Judge Frye’s proposition of law does not 
comply with S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(2)(B)(4), which requires that an appellant’s merit 
brief contain “[a]n argument, headed by the proposition of law that appellant 
contends is applicable to the facts of the case and that could serve as a syllabus for 
the case if appellant prevails.  See Drake v. Bucher (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 37, at 39 
[34 O.O.2d 53, 213 N.E.2d 182].  If several propositions of law are presented, the 
argument shall be divided with each proposition set forth as a subheading.” 
{¶ 11} Judge Frye’s proposition arguably fails to contain the facts that he 
alleges compel the conclusion that the court of appeals erred in determining that 
he abused his discretion in staying the underlying case.  Nevertheless, the judge’s 
brief includes headings and subheadings to his proposition of law that presented 
the legal issues in this case in a sufficient, concise manner.  See State ex rel. 
Morgan v. New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 
1208, ¶ 23 (relator’s failure to designate propositions of law in her merit brief did 
not warrant dismissal of the case, because she included argument in headings that 
served the purpose of presenting the legal issues in a sufficient, concise manner 
that did not substantially disregard S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(2)(B)(4)). 
{¶ 12} Therefore, we deny Charvat’s motion to dismiss this appeal, 
because Judge Frye sufficiently complied with S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(2)(B)(4). 
Procedendo:  General Requirements 
{¶ 13} To be entitled to the requested writ of procedendo, Charvat was 
required to establish (1) a clear legal right to have Judge Frye proceed to the 
merits and try Charvat’s civil case and (2) the lack of an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Weiss v. Hoover (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 
530, 531-532, 705 N.E.2d 1227.  Judge Frye does not contend that Charvat has an 
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adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge the indefinite stay of 
the civil case, so the dispositive issue is whether Charvat established the 
remaining requirement for the writ. 
{¶ 14} We have held that “ ‘[a] writ of procedendo is appropriate when a 
court has either refused to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed 
proceeding to judgment.’ ”  State ex rel. CNG Financial Corp. v. Nadel, 111 Ohio 
St.3d 149, 2006-Ohio-5344, 855 N.E.2d 473, ¶ 20, quoting Weiss, 84 Ohio St.3d 
at 532, 705 N.E.2d 1227.  A lower court’s refusal or failure to timely resolve a 
pending case is the error that procedendo was created to rectify.  See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Rodak v. Betleski, 104 Ohio St.3d 345, 2004-Ohio-6567, 819 N.E.2d 703, ¶ 
16. 
{¶ 15} More pertinently, the requirements for a writ of procedendo are 
met if a judge erroneously stays a proceeding.  State ex rel. Watkins v. Eighth 
Dist. Court of Appeals (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 532, 535, 696 N.E.2d 1079 (“a writ 
of procedendo will issue to require a court to proceed to final judgment if the 
court has erroneously stayed the proceeding”). 
{¶ 16} “The determination of whether to issue a stay of proceedings 
generally rests within the court’s discretion and will not be disturbed absent a 
showing of an abuse of discretion.”  State ex rel. Verhovec v. Mascio (1998), 81 
Ohio St.3d 334, 336, 691 N.E.2d 282.  A court abuses its discretion, however, 
when it acts in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner.  State ex 
rel. Worrell v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 112 Ohio St.3d 116, 2006-
Ohio-6513, 858 N.E.2d 380, ¶ 10. 
Erroneous Stay of Civil Case 
{¶ 17} Judge Frye stayed Charvat’s civil case, which alleged violations of 
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”) and the Ohio 
Consumer Sales Practices Act (“CSPA”), unless and until Charvat registers his 
January Term, 2007 
5 
home telephone numbers on the national do-not-call list.  For the following 
reasons, Judge Frye abused his discretion by doing so. 
{¶ 18} We have already observed that “[i]n response to the burgeoning 
use of telephone solicitations to market goods and services in the United States, 
and the concomitant frustration of the American public, Congress passed the 
TCPA in 1991.”  Charvat v. Dispatch Consumer Servs., Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 505, 
2002-Ohio-2838, 769 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 18.  The TCPA “places restrictions on using 
automatic dialers and prerecorded messages for telemarketing; it also prohibits 
sending advertisements by fax.”  Annotation, Validity, Construction and 
Application of Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C.A. § 227) (1996), 
132 A.L.R.Fed. 625, 1996 WL 593629.  More pertinently to Charvat’s claims in 
his underlying civil case, the TCPA generally prohibits telemarketers from 
initiating “any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or 
prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the 
called party.”  Section 227(b)(1)(B), Title 47, U.S.Code.  The TCPA also 
authorized the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to establish a 
national do-not-call list.  Section 227(c)(3), Title 47, U.S.Code. 
{¶ 19} In 2003, the FCC and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
adopted rules that created the national do-not-call registry.  See Section 
64.1200(c)(2), Title 47, C.F.R., and Section 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B), Title 16, C.F.R.  
“The national do-not-call registry is a list containing the personal telephone 
numbers of telephone subscribers who have voluntarily indicated that they do not 
wish to receive unsolicited calls from commercial telemarketers.”  Mainstream 
Marketing Servs., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm. (C.A.10, 2004), 358 F.3d 1228, 
1234.  “Before the 2003 amendments, both the FCC and the FTC had only a 
company specific do-not-call regulation, meaning that it was up to the consumer 
to request each individual telemarketer not to call them again.”  Pridgen, 
Consumer Protection and the Law (2006), Section 12:51. 
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{¶ 20} As specified by the FCC in adopting the do-not-call registry, the 
commission provided consumers with several options to control telemarketing 
calls: 
{¶ 21} “A national do-not-call registry that is supplemented by the 
amendments made to our existing rules will provide consumers with a variety of 
options for managing telemarketing calls.  Consumers may now:  (1) place their 
number on the national do-not-call list; (2) continue to make do-not-call requests 
of individual companies on a case-by-case basis; and/or (3) register on the 
national list, but provide specific companies with express permission to call 
them.”  In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991 (2003), 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 2003 WL 21517853, ¶ 26.  
Consumers have “the opportunity to determine for themselves whether or not they 
wish to receive telephone solicitation calls in their homes.”  Id. at ¶ 29. 
{¶ 22} As the court of appeals observed, nothing in either the TCPA or 
the rules adopted thereunder by the FCC requires a consumer to register telephone 
numbers on the national do-not-call list as a condition of maintaining a private 
cause of action for violation of the TCPA.  Nor does Judge Frye cite any specific 
case so holding.  Instead, Judge Frye asserts that the stay is supported by his right 
to manage the court docket and by public policy because the stay will be lifted 
when Charvat registers his home telephone numbers on the do-not-call list, thus 
preventing future lawsuits alleging harm caused by the telemarketers’ 
noncompliance with the TCPA. 
{¶ 23} To be sure, trial courts have inherent power to manage their own 
dockets.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 111 Ohio 
St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-5339, 855 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 18.  Nonetheless, this precedent 
does not authorize courts to create conditions in legislative enactments that do not 
exist.  Ewing v. California (2003), 538 U.S. 11, 27, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 
January Term, 2007 
7 
108.  Nor may we add or delete words in construing a statute. State ex rel. Russo 
v. McDonnell, 110 Ohio St.3d 144, 2006-Ohio-3459, 852 N.E.2d 145, ¶ 50. 
{¶ 24} Congress and the FCC have already resolved the pertinent policy 
issues by giving consumers the option of registering their telephone numbers on 
the national do-not-call registry.  Registration is not a prerequisite to a consumer’s 
maintaining an action for violations of the TCPA, and Judge Frye erred in making 
it one. 
{¶ 25} Although Judge Frye has also noted that Charvat has filed 
numerous lawsuits under the TCPA in recent years, there is no evidence that any 
of these cases have been frivolous.  In fact, the evidence establishes that Charvat 
has been successful in all but one of nearly 60 lawsuits filed in the Franklin 
County Municipal and Common Pleas Courts.  Judge Frye lacked any authority to 
prevent Charvat from proceeding with his claims based upon his judicially created 
condition that Charvat register his telephone numbers. 
{¶ 26} Finally, notwithstanding Judge Frye’s argument to the contrary, his 
reliance on the common-law principle of volenti non fit injuria (a person is not 
wronged by that to which he consents) and that an injured party must mitigate his 
damages is misplaced.  There is no duty to mitigate in TCPA cases.  See, e.g., 
Manufacturers Auto Leasing, Inc. v. Autoflex Leasing, Inc. (Tex.App.2004), 139 
S.W.3d 342, 347-348 (defendant in TCPA case did not have duty to mitigate its 
damages by using statutory method to request defendant to stop transmitting 
unsolicited facsimile ads instead of simply collecting the ads and suing). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 27} Based on the foregoing, Judge Frye abused his discretion by 
judicially creating a registration prerequisite and staying Charvat’s civil case until 
he registers his home telephone numbers on the national do-not-call list. That 
requirement is not warranted under the applicable statutes and rules promulgated 
thereunder.  The court of appeals properly granted Charvat the requested writ of 
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procedendo to compel Judge Frye to lift the stay and proceed with the case.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Ferron & Associates, L.P.A., John W. Ferron, and Lisa A. Wafer, for 
appellee. 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Robert E. 
Williams and Patrick J. Piccininni, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
______________________