Case Title: Commonwealth v. Seino

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-10726

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-10726 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CARLOS A. SEINO. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     November 10, 2017. - May 8, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses, 
Assistance of counsel.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Witness, 
Expert.  Evidence, Expert opinion, Death certificate, Chalk 
drawing, Exculpatory.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Confrontation of witnesses, New trial, Assistance of 
counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 19, 2006. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Paul A. Chernoff, J. 
 
 
 
Brian J. Kelly for the defendant. 
 
Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  On the morning of August 3, 2002, the body of 
Daniel DeCosta was discovered on a walkway behind the public 
library in downtown Quincy.  The defendant, Carlos A. Seino, was 
indicted and ultimately convicted by a jury of murder in the 
2 
 
 
first degree on a theory of felony-murder and armed robbery in 
connection with DeCosta's death.  On appeal, the defendant 
claims that the trial judge committed reversible error by 
allowing the jury to be exposed to certain inadmissible hearsay 
and by allowing one of the substitute expert witnesses to 
testify to a match between the defendant's deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) profile and one obtained from the victim's clothing.  In 
addition he seeks a new trial, claiming that his trial counsel 
was ineffective and that government officials committed 
misconduct in the course of investigating and prosecuting him.  
After full consideration of the trial record and the defendant's 
arguments, we affirm the defendant's convictions and decline to 
grant extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving certain details for discussion of specific 
issues. 
 
In the spring of 2002, the defendant moved into an 
apartment with two roommates in Quincy.  However, by August of 
that year, the defendant was "weeks and weeks late" on the rent.  
On August 2, the defendant's roommate warned the defendant that 
he would be asked to move out if he did not pay the total amount 
that he owed by the following day.  The defendant paid a portion 
of the amount due to his roommate that evening before going out. 
3 
 
 
 
In the meantime, the victim spent several hours that night 
at a local Quincy bar, where he cashed two checks for a total of 
$6031 and put the money in his jeans pocket.  At the bar, the 
victim drank several beers, played Keno2 and darts, and 
socialized.  He appeared to be drunk as he bought drinks for 
patrons and "flaunt[ed]" his money such that one of his friends 
urged him to "put [it] away."  He spent approximately eighty 
dollars while at the bar that night. 
 
The defendant arrived at the bar at approximately midnight.  
He saw some people he knew and observed the victim (whom he did 
not know) staggering around with Keno tickets.  The defendant 
stayed for between twenty and thirty minutes, leaving at 
approximately 12:30 A.M.  The victim left the bar when it 
closed, around 1 A.M., traveling by foot. 
 
At approximately 1:30 A.M., the defendant woke up his 
roommate and gave him the remaining money owed in cash.  Later 
that morning, the roommate observed the defendant in front of 
                     
 
1 The bartender gave the victim one one hundred dollar bill, 
two fifty dollar bills, twenty twenty dollar bills, and three 
one dollar bills. 
 
 
2 Keno is a State lottery game in which a player wagers a 
bet, selecting up to twelve numbers from a field of eighty.  The 
lottery randomly selects and displays on a monitor twenty 
numbers, and the player wins prize money if one or more of the 
player's numbers are displayed.  961 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.58 
(1998). 
4 
 
 
the television listening to the Quincy public access channel, 
which was broadcasting the police scanner. 
 
The victim's lifeless body was discovered at approximately 
7 A.M. on a walkway behind the Quincy public library with 
contusions to his nose and the back of his head.  Although his 
wallet was still on his person, most of the cash he had had was 
missing.  Investigators took samples from the defendant's 
clothing, including a snippet from the left front jeans pocket 
and a snippet from the front of the victim's shirt, both of 
which had bloodstains.  The DNA extracted from the jeans pocket 
sample was a mixture that matched the DNA profiles of both the 
victim and the defendant.  The DNA extracted from the bloodstain 
on the victim's shirt matched the profile of the defendant 
alone. 
 
The defendant, who testified at trial, offered weak alibi 
evidence to demonstrate that he did not have the opportunity to 
commit the crime.3  Further, he suggested the existence of a 
third-party culprit and speculated that blood from a cut on his 
hand ended up on the victim's clothing via incidental contact at 
the bar. 
                     
3 The defendant testified that he visited several bars in 
succession after leaving the bar where the victim spent several 
hours.  However, even taking the defendant at his word, he could 
have done all that he claimed and still committed the crime. 
5 
 
 
 
Discussion.  In his direct appeal, the defendant asserts 
violations of his constitutional right to confront witnesses 
with respect to testimony regarding portions of the victim's 
autopsy report and death certificate, DNA charts used as chalks, 
and evidence of matching DNA profiles offered through a 
substitute expert witness.  Following oral argument, the 
defendant filed a motion for a new trial with this court, 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady violations, 
among other claims.  See G. L. c. 278, § 33E; Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  We examine each of the defendant's 
arguments in turn. 
 
1.  Autopsy and death certificate evidence.  During 
testimony by Dr. Richard Evans regarding the cause of the 
victim's death, the doctor, who did not perform the autopsy, 
referred to certain statements in the autopsy report and the 
death certificate -- documents that he did not author.  The 
defendant argues that it was a violation his right to confront 
witnesses to allow Evans to read in evidence what amounted to 
testimonial hearsay statements without the defendant having the 
ability to cross-examine the declarant, i.e., the medical 
examiner who created the documents.4  We agree.  However, we 
conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
                     
 
4 Hearsay is testimonial when a "reasonable person in [the 
declarant's] position would anticipate [it] would be used 
6 
 
 
As a general matter, a substitute medical examiner 
"may offer an opinion on the cause of death, based on his 
review of an autopsy report by the medical examiner who 
performed the autopsy and his review of the autopsy 
photographs, as these are documents upon which experts are 
accustomed to rely, and which are potentially independently 
admissible through appropriate witnesses." 
 
Commonwealth v. Reavis, 465 Mass. 875, 883 (2013).  Here, Evans 
reviewed the case folder of the medical examiner who performed 
the autopsy, which included the autopsy report, a toxicology 
report, handwritten notes and diagrams, and photographs.5  Beyond 
properly offering his opinion on the cause of death based on the 
case file and his examination, however, Evans went further, 
testifying as to statements contained in the autopsy report and 
the death certificate, namely, the length of the lacerations on 
the victim's head and the stated cause of death, respectively. 
 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights guarantee a 
criminal defendant's right to confront each of the government's 
witnesses.  See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 
309 (2009); Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 476 Mass. 725, 732 (2017).  
Thus, a judge at a criminal trial may not permit the 
introduction of testimonial hearsay without the defendant having 
                                                                  
against the accused in investigating and prosecuting a crime."  
See Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 480 (2010). 
 
5 As the chief medical examiner, Evans endorsed the autopsy 
report at the time it was written.  Moreover, he examined tissue 
from the victim's brain and memorialized his findings. 
7 
 
 
an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.  See Melendez-
Diaz, supra at 309, 311. 
Although Evans permissibly relied on the medical examiner's 
case folder to form his opinion as to the cause of the victim's 
death, it was error for him to testify to statements contained 
in that report and the death certificate, because the statements 
were testimonial hearsay and the person who created the 
documents was not available for cross-examination.  See 
Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 480, 483 (2010).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 592-593, cert. 
denied, 571 U.S. 865 (2013); Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 
744, 763 (2009). 
 
Because the defendant objected to the statements contained 
in the autopsy report and death certificate at the time of 
trial, we review the constitutional error to determine whether 
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Commonwealth v. 
Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 394 (2008). 
 
Review under this standard requires us to consider, among 
other factors: 
"[1] the importance of the evidence in the prosecution's 
case; [2] the relationship between the evidence and the 
premise of the defense; [3] who introduced the issue at 
trial; [4] the frequency of the reference; [5] whether the 
erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of 
properly admitted evidence; [6] the availability or effect 
of curative instructions; and [7] the weight or quantum of 
evidence of guilt." 
 
8 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 447 Mass. 546, 553 (2006). 
 
Here, the erroneously admitted statements from the death 
certificate and the autopsy report were of little, if any, 
consequence.  First, the improper testimony was cumulative of 
Evans's properly admitted opinion as to the cause of death.  
Evans opined as to the cause of death independently from what 
was on the death certificate.  See Commonwealth v. Scesny, 472 
Mass. 185, 198 (2015); Commonwealth v. Emeny, 463 Mass. 138, 
145-146 (2012).  Further, the statements regarding the length of 
the head lacerations had nothing to do with whether the 
defendant was the assailant:  they did not tend to incriminate 
the defendant, nor did they detract in any way from the 
defense's argument that he was not the assailant.  Finally, 
given the DNA evidence, discussed in more detail infra, together 
with the evidence of motive and opportunity, and taking 
everything into consideration, we conclude that the errors did 
not contribute to the guilty verdicts.  See Commonwealth v. 
Sinnott, 399 Mass. 863, 872 (1987). 
2.  DNA evidence.  At trial, the Commonwealth presented DNA 
evidence through three expert witnesses who gave opinions 
implicating the defendant in the killing.  The defendant 
challenges aspects of the testimony of all three. 
a.  Analysis of the evidence.  Red-brown stains found on 
the front left pocket of the victim's jeans and on the front of 
9 
 
 
the victim's shirt were determined to be bloodstains.  A snippet 
of each item was prepared for DNA analysis, and the resulting 
profiles were compared to the defendant's DNA profile when it 
was obtained in 2006.6 
The DNA profile from the bloodstain on the jeans pocket was 
developed at a Cellmark Diagnostics (Cellmark) laboratory in 
Maryland (Cellmark-Maryland).7  That laboratory's former 
director, Dr. Robin Cotton, testified that the DNA found on the 
jeans was a mixture of two profiles, that the victim was one 
potential contributor to the DNA sample, and that the second 
contributor was a man.8  When the defendant's DNA became 
available, an analyst from a Cellmark laboratory in Texas 
(Cellmark-Texas), Matthew DuPont, compared the profile from the 
jeans sample to the defendant's DNA profile and opined that the 
                     
 
6 In 2006, the defendant pleaded guilty to a machete attack 
and was required to submit a sample of his deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) for the Combined DNA Index System database. 
 
7 The State police crime laboratory has a contract with 
Cellmark Diagnostics (Cellmark), a private DNA-testing 
laboratory, under which Cellmark provides forensic DNA-testing 
services.  Cellmark has several locations across the United 
States and contracts with a number of law enforcement agencies 
throughout the country.  The DNA evidence in this case was 
processed and analyzed at the State police crime laboratory as 
well as in two different Cellmark laboratories. 
 
 
8 Cotton determined the second contributor was a man by 
subtracting the victim's profile and noting that the remaining 
DNA contained a Y-chromosome. 
10 
 
 
defendant was the second contributor.9  DuPont also testified to 
the statistical probability of such a match:  one in 17.34 
quadrillion of the African-American population, one in 1.854 
quintillion of the Caucasian population, one in 1.753 
quintillion of the Southwest Hispanic population, and one in 
2.475 quintillion of the Southeast Hispanic population. 
The sample from the victim's shirt was processed by the 
State police crime laboratory.  A representative from that 
laboratory, Laura Bryant, testified that the defendant's DNA 
profile matched the profile from the bloodstain on the victim's 
shirt.  Bryant also testified to the probability of a random 
match of the profiles of the DNA sampled from the victim's shirt 
and the defendant's DNA, concluding that the likelihood of a 
random, unrelated person having a DNA profile that matched the 
sample was about one in 1.79 quintillion of the Caucasian 
population, one in 16.74 quintillion of the African-American 
population, and one in 2.375 quintillion for the Hispanic 
population. 
                     
 
9 Although Laura Bryant, an analyst from the State police 
crime laboratory, testified that the results from the pocket of 
the victim's jeans were inconclusive as to whether it matched 
the defendant's DNA profile when she performed the analysis, the 
two laboratories used different tests on the same material.  
DuPont tested for two additional genetic locations using an 
amplification tool different from that used in Bryant's 
laboratory. 
11 
 
 
b.  Confrontation issues.  The defendant asserts that the 
Commonwealth violated his right to confront witnesses when 
Cotton and Bryant presented charts and when DuPont testified as 
to a comparison between the defendant's DNA profile and the 
profile developed from the bloodstain on the victim's jeans.  We 
find no reversible error. 
i.  Contested chalks.  At trial, Cotton and Bryant, neither 
of whom conducted the DNA analysis, opined as to their own 
conclusions regarding the DNA testing on the samples taken from 
the victim's jeans and shirt respectively.  The defendant 
concedes that the opinion testimony of these two expert 
witnesses based on the work of others in their laboratories was 
admissible.  See, e.g., McCowen, 458 Mass. at 483; Commonwealth 
v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 786 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 
990 (2011).  However, the defendant claims error in the experts' 
use of charts that contained test results obtained by other, 
nontestifying analysts. 
Both Cotton and Bryant used charts as chalks to explain 
their conclusions to the jury.  The charts contained data 
generated by other analysts and showed the raw data generated by 
the DNA tests:  numbers or letters assigned to genetic locations 
12 
 
 
and "spikes" from an electropherogram.10  Cotton used two DNA 
charts, one for the jeans sample and one for the victim's 
profile.  Referring to the charts, Cotton showed the jury where 
the genetic locations from the jeans sample matched the genetic 
locations from the victim's profile.  In addition, Cotton used 
data from an electropherogram to demonstrate to the jury how she 
had concluded that a second man had contributed DNA to the jeans 
sample.  For her part, Bryant guided the jury through each step 
of the comparison, pointing out on the chart generated from the 
shirt bloodstain the numbers that matched those on the chart 
generated from the defendant's DNA.  In less detail, she also 
described to the jury the results of several comparisons, 
referring each time to tables from the report. 
Similar to our conclusion with respect to the testimony of 
Evans discussed supra, it was improper for the Commonwealth to 
show the data the experts relied upon to the jury during direct 
examination without giving the defendant an opportunity to 
cross-examine those who obtained the results.  McCowen, 458 
Mass. at 483.  Because the defendant did not preserve an 
objection to the use of the charts, we review the error for a 
                     
 
10 An electropherogram is a plot of results created when an 
analyst conducts an electrophoresis test.  The plot resembles 
waves or peaks and allows analysts to visualize results. 
13 
 
 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.11  See 
Commonwealth v. Carmona, 428 Mass. 268, 271 (1998).  Under the 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice standard, we 
affirm flawed convictions only where we are "substantially 
confident that, if the error had not been made, the jury verdict 
would have been the same."  Commonwealth v. Ruddock, 428 Mass. 
288, 292 n.3 (1998).  See Commonwealth v. Montrond, 477 Mass. 
127, 134 (2017). 
We conclude that there was no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice because the charts did not taint the 
analysts' independent opinions, which, as discussed supra, were 
properly admitted.  McCowen, 458 Mass. at 484.  The expert's 
opinions were what mattered to the jury, who likely would have 
found the raw data incomprehensible without the accompanying 
expert testimony.  Barbosa, 457 Mass. at 792.  The DNA charts 
merely displayed genetic locations, not any information 
regarding a match or the statistical probability thereof.  
                     
 
11 The defendant argues that this issue was preserved based 
on Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 719 (2016), in which 
this court held that a defendant need not "object to the 
admission of evidence at trial where he or she has already 
sought to preclude the very same evidence at the motion in 
limine stage."  Grady has no retroactive application.  
Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 478 Mass. 443, 448 n.2 (2017).  In any 
case, even if Grady were retroactive, it would not apply here, 
where the defendant opposed the Commonwealth's motion in limine 
to substitute expert witnesses, not the charts containing the 
DNA results.  In fact, at trial the defendant objected only to 
the size of the charts, not their statistical contents. 
14 
 
 
Because the findings contained in the charts "had no meaningful 
probative value without [the] expert[s'] testimony, the 
erroneous admission of these underlying facts in evidence did 
not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice."  McCowen, supra.  See Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 
Mass. 189, 205-206 (2017); Barbosa, supra at 792-793.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 416 (2014) ("the 
admission in evidence of those [charts] did not so materially 
strengthen the Commonwealth's case as to create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice").  The error does not 
require reversal. 
 
ii.  Contested testimony.  The defendant contends that it 
was reversible error to allow DuPont of Cellmark-Texas to 
testify that the defendant's DNA profile matched one of the 
profiles developed from the DNA found on the victim's jeans.  
Citing Commonwealth v. Tassone, 468 Mass. 391, 402 (2014), the 
defendant argues that allowing DuPont to do so violated the 
defendant's confrontation rights because an analyst from 
Cellmark-Maryland rather than Cellmark-Texas developed the DNA 
profile from the jeans. 
 
In Tassone, the Commonwealth presented an expert from the 
State police crime laboratory, who testified regarding a match 
between DNA from the defendant and DNA from the crime scene.  
Id. at 401.  However, because a different laboratory did the 
15 
 
 
actual testing, and because the Commonwealth did not call an 
expert affiliated with that laboratory, we held that the 
defendant was "denied the opportunity to explore through cross-
examination whether the opinion [was] flawed."  Id. at 402.  
That was not the case here. 
Here, the jury heard from, and the defendant had the 
opportunity to cross-examine, Kristen Sullivan, the analyst from 
the State police crime laboratory who developed the defendant's 
DNA profile from a known sample; Cotton, the supervisor from the 
laboratory (Cellmark-Maryland) that developed the DNA profile 
from the red-brown stain on the victim's left front jeans 
pocket; and DuPont, the analyst from Cellmark-Texas, who 
compared the two profiles, and whose opinions regarding the 
match and the statistical analysis were his own.  There was no 
error.12 
 
3.  Motion for a new trial.  Following oral argument on his 
direct appeal, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, 
claiming, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel 
and Brady violations.  See G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
a.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
claims that his counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to 
                     
 
12 The defendant's further argument that it was error for 
DuPont to have relied on Cotton's or Bryant's testimony is 
unavailing; as we explained supra, the testimony from those 
experts was properly admitted. 
16 
 
 
object to the testimony of substitute witnesses, (2) waiving the 
presence of the defendant's DNA expert to observe the 
Commonwealth's DNA testing, (3) failing to call a pathologist or 
blood-spatter expert at trial, and (4) failing to challenge 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) evidence based on the general 
mishandling of DNA evidence at the State police crime 
laboratory.  The defendant also raises additional claims of 
ineffective assistance pursuant to Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 
Mass. 201, 208 (1981), namely, improperly stipulating to police 
diligence in the investigation; failing to investigate alibi 
witnesses in a timely way; and employing an investigator with a 
conflict of interest. 
 
Because the defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree, rather than evaluating claims of ineffective assistance 
under the traditional standard of Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 
Mass. 89, 96 (1974),13 we apply instead the more favorable 
standard of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether there was 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681-682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014).  See Commonwealth v. LaCava, 438 Mass. 708, 
                     
13 Under Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96-97 
(1974), the standard is whether an attorney's performance fell 
measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary 
fallible lawyer and, if so, whether such ineffectiveness has 
likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available 
substantial defense. 
17 
 
 
712-713 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Harbin, 435 Mass. 654, 
656 (2002).  That is, we determine whether defense counsel erred 
in the course of the trial and, if so, "whether that error was 
likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion."  Wright, supra 
at 682.  Under this standard, the defendant bears the burden of 
demonstrating both error and harm.  Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 
Mass. 658, 674 (2017).  Here, the defendant has not met his 
burden. 
 
i.  Substitute witnesses.  As in his direct appeal, the 
defendant claims in his motion for a new trial that it was error 
for certain substitute witnesses to testify to factual findings 
appearing in exhibits, chalks, and reports.  In his motion for a 
new trial, he shifts the focus of the blame from the trial judge 
to his trial counsel, claiming ineffective assistance where 
counsel failed to object to the testimony of the substitute 
witnesses.  We reviewed this claim in part 2.b, supra,14 and 
found that any erroneously admitted evidence that came in by way 
of substitute witnesses without objection did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Holley, 476 Mass. 114, 121 (2016). 
                     
 
14 As discussed in part 1, supra, trial counsel objected to 
the admission of statements contained in the autopsy report and 
death certificate.  Although the evidence was admitted 
erroneously, we concluded that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
18 
 
 
 
ii.  Waiver of presence of defendant's expert during DNA 
testing.  The defendant also claims his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to send an expert to the State police 
crime laboratory15 to observe the DNA testing performed by the 
Commonwealth that consumed the entirety of (i.e., exhausted) 
particular samples.16  We need not decide whether trial counsel 
erred because the defendant has failed to show that he was 
harmed.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 168 
(2010); Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 274 (1982). 
 
First, we note that in fact trial counsel had selected an 
expert to attend the testing; however, that expert had passed 
away before the testing could be performed.  At the time that 
defense counsel waived the presence of a defense expert, the 
defendant had been in custody for over one year and had an 
expectation that the DNA testing would be beneficial to him.  
Further, the State police crime laboratory was experiencing 
delays.  Thus, trial counsel's waiver of a defense expert's 
presence at the testing was tactical, and not "manifestly 
unreasonable when made."  Commonwealth v. Field, 477 Mass. 553, 
556 (2017). 
                     
 
15 As we discussed supra, three different laboratories were 
involved in the DNA testing at issue in this matter:  two 
Cellmark laboratories and the State police crime laboratory. 
 
 
16 Prior to performing testing that exhausts a sample, the 
Commonwealth must request authorization from the defendant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Mass. 706, 710 (2010). 
19 
 
 
Second, only three out of a total of eight samples were 
exhausted during testing.17  Of those three samples, none matched 
the DNA profile of the defendant.18  The only sample tested at 
the State laboratory that matched the DNA profile of the 
defendant, the bloodstain from the victim's shirt discussed 
supra, was not exhausted.  As the defendant has failed to 
demonstrate any prejudice as a result of not having his own 
expert present during the testing, there can be no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Alicea, 464 Mass. 837, 850-851 (2013). 
 
iii.  Failure to call particular expert witnesses.  In 
preparation for trial, defense counsel engaged both a 
pathologist and a blood spatter expert, both of whom assisted 
counsel in evaluating the Commonwealth's evidence and in 
preparing for cross-examination of the Commonwealth's experts.  
The defendant claims that his counsel's failure to call those 
experts to testify at trial constituted ineffective assistance.  
We disagree. 
 
The defendant asserts that the pathologist could have 
offered an alternative theory on cause of death, but he suggests 
                     
17 The three exhausted samples were a drop of blood from a 
railing and clippings from two of the victim's fingernails. 
 
 
18 The DNA from the blood from the railing did not match the 
defendant's DNA.  Neither of the fingernail clipping samples 
provided sufficient material to draw any conclusions. 
20 
 
 
no such alternative theory.  As for the blood spatter expert, 
the defendant claims that the expert could have explained that 
the defendant's blood on the victim's shirt was from the 
defendant's injured hand and was transferred there as the victim 
passed the defendant inside the bar.  The defendant fails to 
offer an expert affidavit, or anything else, to support this 
theory.  See Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 555-556 
(2010).  The defendant has failed, therefore, to meet his burden 
of showing ineffective assistance.19  See Alicea, 464 Mass. at 
850-851. 
 
iv.  Strategic choices regarding references to CODIS and 
the State police crime laboratory.  The defendant next claims 
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to attack the 
reliability of the Commonwealth's DNA evidence based on 
mismanagement at the State police crime laboratory.  We 
disagree. 
 
As we explained supra, after the victim was killed, several 
years passed before the Commonwealth focused on the defendant as 
a suspect.  The Commonwealth compared the defendant's DNA 
profile to crime scene samples after his DNA sample became 
available in CODIS as a result of a conviction in an unrelated 
                     
 
19 We further note that, through cross-examination of the 
Commonwealth's experts, trial counsel undermined the 
Commonwealth's cause-of-death theory and elicited evidence to 
support the defense's theory of how the defendant's blood was 
transferred to the victim. 
21 
 
 
crime.  Defense counsel sought to exclude any reference to the 
defendant's DNA profile being in the CODIS database so that the 
jury would not learn that the defendant had a conviction in an 
unrelated matter, or speculate about why the defendant's DNA had 
been entered into the database.  For its part, the Commonwealth 
was concerned that if the jury did not know the circumstances in 
which the police came to focus on the defendant, they might 
conclude that the Commonwealth had been unduly slow or 
inattentive during the investigation.  Ultimately, the parties 
compromised:  the Commonwealth would not reference CODIS, and 
the defendant would stipulate to police diligence in the 
investigation. 
Because trial counsel determined that it would be in the 
defendant's best interest for the jury not to hear about CODIS, 
this necessarily meant that she would not be able to elicit 
evidence regarding the alleged mismanagement of CODIS 
administration at the State police crime laboratory.  This was a 
reasonable strategic choice, and was therefore not ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  See Field, 477 Mass. at 556-557 (2017).  
See also Commonwealth v. Morgan, 453 Mass. 54, 60 (2009). 
 
v.  Moffett claims.  The defendant also argues that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the diligence 
of the police in their investigation; for failing to investigate 
the defendant's alibi witnesses in a timely way; and for using a 
22 
 
 
private investigator who had an alleged conflict of interest.  
None of these claims has merit. 
 
First, the defendant asserts that he disagrees now with the 
stipulation regarding diligent police work because the 
prosecution and the police withheld exculpatory information from 
the defense.  This argument is misplaced.  As discussed supra, 
trial counsel stipulated that law enforcement acted diligently 
over the four-year period between the death of the victim and 
the arrest of the defendant so that the jury would not learn 
that the defendant had been convicted of an unrelated crime.20  
This stipulation had nothing to do with the mishandling of 
allegedly exculpatory evidence (discussed further infra). 
 
Second, although the defendant claims that his trial 
counsel failed to seek out alibi witnesses in a timely way, his 
trial counsel disputes having been given a list of potential 
witnesses.  At any rate, as discussed supra, the defendant 
testified to his own movements that night, and the Commonwealth 
aptly pointed out that it was possible for the defendant to have 
done everything he claimed to have done and yet still have had 
the opportunity to kill the victim.  As the defendant does not 
say who his alibi witnesses would have been or how their 
testimony would have been exculpatory given his own testimony, 
                     
20 We note that trial counsel's stipulation came before the 
defendant could have learned of any alleged withheld or 
destroyed evidence. 
23 
 
 
he has not shown that their absence prejudiced him.  Cf. Morgan, 
453 Mass. at 61 (failure to "show how [a witness] could have 
aided" defendant's case fatal to defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance for failure to call witnesses). 
Third, the defendant claims that his counsel was 
ineffective for hiring an investigator who was a former Quincy 
police officer.  According to defense counsel's affidavit, the 
investigator was never employed by Quincy police in any 
capacity, and the defendant has failed to prove otherwise.  See 
Commonwealth v. Comita, 441 Mass. 86, 93 (2004).21 
 
b.  Alleged Brady violations.  The Commonwealth must 
disclose to the defense any material, exculpatory evidence over 
which the prosecution has control.  Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 
478 Mass. 369, 380 (2017).  See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.  This 
duty extends to evidence "in the possession of the police who 
participated in the investigation and presentation of the case."  
Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 407 (1992). 
The defendant claims that the Commonwealth violated his due 
process rights by failing to preserve investigator notes and by 
                     
21 Even accepting the defendant's allegation as true, there 
would be no conflict of interest.  See Commonwealth v. Stote, 
456 Mass. 213, 218 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Shraiar, 397 
Mass. 16, 20 (1986) ("It is the defendant's burden to prove an 
actual conflict of interest by presenting 'demonstrative proof 
detailing both the existence and the precise character of this 
alleged conflict of interest; we will not infer a conflict based 
on mere conjecture or speculation'"). 
24 
 
 
failing to disclose a photograph of his injured hand.  Where the 
defendant claims that the Commonwealth lost or destroyed 
evidence, he bears the initial burden of showing "a reasonable 
possibility, based on concrete evidence," that the evidence was 
exculpatory.22  Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Mass. 706, 718 
(2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Willie, 400 Mass. 427, 433 
(1984).  Here, he has failed to meet that burden.  See Williams, 
supra; Commonwealth v. Cintron, 438 Mass. 779, 784-785 (2003). 
 
i.  Notes.  A State police sergeant destroyed his 
handwritten notes of an interview with the defendant after 
preparing his police report.23  Although the defendant was 
necessarily aware of what took place during his interview, and 
was provided with a copy of the police report, he claims that he 
was deprived of the ability to mount a defense without the 
underlying notes.  The defendant has not made any showing, 
however, as to how the notes would have differed from the report 
or otherwise would have been exculpatory.  Further, the 
defendant had a full opportunity to cross-examine the sergeant 
                     
 
22 The defendant has not established that the police 
destroyed the notes or photograph "in bad faith or recklessly."  
Commonwealth v. Sanford, 460 Mass. 441, 450 (2011), quoting 
Williams, 455 Mass. at 718.  The defendant cannot, therefore, 
take advantage of the analysis more favorable to the defendant 
for such cases, which would require the Commonwealth to show 
that "the lost or destroyed evidence was not potentially 
exculpatory."  See Sanford, supra. 
 
23 The trooper destroyed the notes in the ordinary course of 
business and well before the defendant became a suspect. 
25 
 
 
about the notes, the report, and any potential discrepancies 
between the two.  The defendant has failed to carry his burden.  
See Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 420-421 (2000). 
 
ii.  Photograph.  As for the alleged photograph of the 
defendant's injured hand, the defendant has failed to 
demonstrate that such a photograph existed or that it would have 
been exculpatory.  See Comita, 441 Mass. at 93, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bernier, 359 Mass. 13, 15 (1971) (in motion for 
new trial, defendant bears burden of proving "facts that are 
'neither agreed upon nor apparent on the face of the record'"). 
 
At trial, the defendant testified that the police required 
him to "peel [his bandage] back so they could take a photograph" 
of his injured hand.  However, the prosecutor did not have such 
a photograph and stated that he was unaware of one.  The 
defendant alleges now that the Commonwealth has either withheld 
or destroyed the photograph. 
 
The defendant has made no showing, however, of what a 
photograph of his injured hand would have added to his case.  
The Commonwealth never disputed that the defendant's hand was 
injured:  indeed, two witnesses testified to observing the hand 
injury.  The defendant has thus failed to show that such a 
photograph, even assuming it existed, would have been 
exculpatory.  See Commonwealth v. Laguer, 448 Mass. 585, 595, 
598 (2007). 
26 
 
 
c.  Remaining Moffett claims.  Finally, the defendant's 
remaining Moffett claims are without merit.  There is no basis 
in the evidence that the police altered the crime scene or moved 
the victim's body as the defendant claims.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 581 (2002).  Nor is there evidence, 
beyond the defendant's bald assertion, that pictures of the 
crime scene were inaccurate due to renovations.  Finally, the 
defendant has presented no evidence of illegal surveillance 
while he was detained in the Norfolk County house of correction, 
or that any such illegal surveillance was relied upon at trial.  
See Comita, 441 Mass. at 93. 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
briefs and the entire record and discern no reason to reduce the 
degree of guilt or grant a new trial pursuant to our power under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
Motion for a new trial 
  denied.