Case Title: Ford v. City of Riverton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-196

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ford v. City of Riverton1996 WY 90919 P.2d 636Case Number: 95-196Decided: 06/27/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Vince FORD, d/b/a Fireworks Unlimited,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

CITY OF RIVERTON, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Fremont County, Nancy J. Guthrie

Vance Countryman 
of Hooper Law Offices, P.C., Riverton, for 
appellant.

Jane H. Juve, 
City Attorney, Riverton, for appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Vince Ford 
questions the City of Riverton's authority to regulate the sale of fireworks 
beyond its city limits and the assessment by the City of Riverton of a permit 
fee to engage in the sale of fireworks. We affirm the continuing vitality of 
Haddenham v. City of Laramie, 648 P.2d 551 (Wyo. 1982).

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Vince Ford, d/b/a 
Fireworks Unlimited (Ford), states the following issues for 
review:

Whether the City of 
Riverton can regulate the sale of fireworks within 1/2 mile of the corporate 
city limits of the City of Riverton.

Whether the fees imposed 
by the City of Riverton for its fireworks permit constitute a 
tax.

Whether Summary Judgment 
was properly entered regarding the finding that the fees imposed by the City of 
Riverton were not a tax.

[¶3]      The City of 
Riverton presents similar issues for review:

1.         
Whether the District Court was correct in finding that the 1995 
amendments to the Wyoming Fireworks Act did not repeal by implication those 
provisions of law which authorize a city to regulate respecting fireworks within 
a given distance of its corporate limits for the health, safety and welfare of 
its citizens.

2.         
Whether the District Court was correct in finding that the fee imposed by 
the City for a fireworks permit does not constitute a tax but rather is a 
regulatory measure for the City of Riverton in protecting the health, safety and 
welfare of the community.

3.         
Whether the District Court properly entered summary judgment in favor of 
the City on Issue 2.

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      Over the 1995 
Memorial Day weekend, Ford operated a fireworks stand within a half-mile of 
Riverton's city limits. During that weekend, two of Ford's employees received 
citations from Riverton's city police for selling fireworks without a permit. 
Hoping to continue his sales, Ford sought declaratory and injunctive relief from 
the district court, challenging the constitutionality of Riverton's city 
regulation of fireworks sales outside city limits. A temporary restraining order 
was entered that same day, June 1, 1995.

[¶5]      Ford filed an 
amended complaint on June 13, 1995, challenging Riverton's fees for electrical 
and sign permits as unauthorized taxation. No specifics are provided in the 
amended complaint with respect to the nature of the fees for electrical and sign 
permits nor whether any such fees were ever paid.

[¶6]      From an order 
entered June 1, 1995, it appears that Ford and Riverton stipulated that Ford 
would obtain the necessary permits, but the district court would hold the fees 
for those permits in escrow pending resolution of the matter. Ford and his 
employees then obtained the necessary city permits for the sale of fireworks at 
his old stand.

[¶7]      Summary judgment 
for Riverton was entered on June 26, 1995, and Ford filed this timely 
appeal.

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8]      Without deference 
to the findings of the district court's conclusions of law, we will affirm a 
summary judgment provided there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Martin v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange, 894 P.2d 618, 620 (Wyo. 1995) (citing Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d 701, 702 (Wyo. 1994)).

IV. 
DISCUSSION

[¶9]      We review whether 
Riverton has authority to regulate fireworks sales outside its boundaries but 
within a specific reasonable distance. Ford claims that amendments to Wyo. Stat. 
§ 35-10-205 (Cum.Supp. 1995), and the enactment of Wyo. Stat. § 35-10-208 
(Cum.Supp. 1995), repeal by implication Wyo. Stat. §§ 15-1-103(a) (1992) and 
15-3-202 (1992), and the authority glossed in Haddenham, 648 P.2d 551 for 
municipalities to regulate fireworks outside their city 
limits.

[¶10]   In Haddenham, we approved "the 
ability of a city to ordain [regulation of fireworks] for a distance of five 
miles beyond the city limits for health purposes." Id. at 556. Haddenham and its 
progeny tell a somewhat tortuous history of the relative capacities of 
municipalities, counties and the state to regulate fireworks sales. It is not 
necessary to recount each twist and turn of our prior consideration of these 
issues to support our current decision.

[¶11]   Repeals by implication, such as 
Ford urges upon us, are not favored and must be accompanied by a demonstration 
that the legislature, by later enacted statute, evinced "`an unequivocal purpose 
of effecting a repeal,'" manifested by a mutual repugnance of such force that 
the two cannot, logically, stand together. McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288, 293 
(Wyo. 1985) (quoting Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 73 (Wyo. 
1978)).

[¶12]   Nothing in the amended Wyo. Stat. § 
35-10-205 or the relatively newly enacted Wyo. Stat. § 35-10-208 does damage to 
the fundamental proposition of Haddenham that the sales and use, inter 
alia, of fireworks may be regulated by cities within five miles of the city 
limits. Furthermore, the only net change in Wyo. Stat. § 35-10-205 from the 
statute in effect at the time of Haddenham is that it expands the regulatory 
authority of cities to include Class "C" fireworks. There is no evidence that 
the legislature intended Wyo. Stat. § 35-10-205, as amended, to override Wyo. 
Stat. § 15-3-202 as it applies to the authority of cities to regulate fireworks 
within five miles of the city limits.

[¶13]   Riverton's authority to require 
permits, such as those at issue in this case, is regulatory in nature and 
necessarily arises from those powers expressly granted. Nation v. State ex rel. 
Fire Fighters Local 279, I.A.F.F., 518 P.2d 931, 933 (Wyo. 1974). There is a 
clear distinction between the exercise of taxing power and the imposition of a 
fee pursuant to regulatory or police power. 16 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of 
Municipal Corporations § 44.02, at 9 (3rd ed. 1994).

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶14]   The City of Riverton clearly has 
authority to regulate fireworks within five miles of its city limits, and the 
permit fee is not a tax so much as a nominal expression of the costs associated 
with such regulation. The decision of the district court is affirmed in all 
respects.