Case Title: Ex Parte State

Citation: 926 So. 2d 367

Docket Number: 1031511

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
926 So. 2d 367 (2005)
Ex parte State of Alabama.
(In re James Dwight McKISSACK
v.
STATE of Alabama).
1031511.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 4, 2005.
Troy King, atty. gen., and Michael Billingsley, Robin Blevins Scales, and John M. Porter, asst. attys. gen., for petitioner.
Lindsey Mussleman Davis of Holt, Mussleman, Holt & Morgan, Florence, for respondent.
Thomas W. Sorrells, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Alabama District Attorneys Association, in support of the petitioner.
HARWOOD, Justice.
On September 14, 2004, this Court granted the petition of the State of Alabama for a writ of certiorari to examine the argument by the State that the Court of Criminal Appeals had erred in reversing the trial court's judgment convicting James Dwight McKissack of murder, see Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-6-2(a)(1), and sentencing him to life imprisonment. In its opinion, McKissack v. State, 926 So. 2d 361 (Ala.Crim.App.2004), the Court of Criminal Appeals set out the following facts:
926 So. 2d  at 361-63. After the trial court denied his motion to preserve, McKissack petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to order the district attorney to preserve the grand-jury testimony at issue, but that court denied the petition without an opinion on February 19, 2002. McKissack v. State (No. CR-01-1053), 854 So. 2d 1232 (Ala.Crim.App.2002)(table).
In addressing McKissack's argument on direct appeal that the trial court erred in failing to preserve the grand-jury testimony in question, the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized the general rule that grand-jury proceedings are not discoverable by the defense:
926 So. 2d  at 363. We note that the State has cited in its brief to this Court many cases in addition to Steward v. State, 55 Ala.App. 238, 314 So. 2d 313 (Ala.Crim.App. 1975), that stand for the principle that, in the absence of a statutory provision, preservation of grand-jury testimony is not required. See, e.g., State v. Sharp, 893 So. 2d 566 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Robinson v. State, 865 So. 2d 457 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003); and Stallworth v. State, 868 So. 2d 1128 (Ala.Crim.App.2001)(opinion on return to second remand).
However, the Court of Criminal Appeals also recognized that the general rule governing the secrecy of grand-jury proceedings is subject to a limited exception upon a defendant's showing of a "particularized need," as discussed in Arthur v. State, 711 So. 2d 1031, 1078-79 (Ala.Crim. App.1996), aff'd, 711 So. 2d 1097 (Ala.1997):
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that a defendant cannot make the showing required by Millican v. State, 423 So. 2d 268 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), until after a witness has testified at trial. However, the court recognized that
926 So. 2d  at 365. The Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that although preservation of grand-jury testimony is not required, it is allowed, and it cited Ala.Code 1975, § 12-17-275, which provides:
The court then concluded that if a trial court was authorized to order the inspection of grand-jury proceedings after a witness had testified at trial, logically it was authorized to order the preservation of the grand-jury proceedings and to make the records so created available to the defense under the appropriate circumstances, as, for example, when a defendant made the required showing under Millican. This Court need not reach the basic question of whether a trial court can order the preservation of grand-jury testimony under certain circumstances because, even accepting that premise, we conclude that no reversible error occurred when the trial court here refused to order the preservation of grand-jury testimony under the circumstances of this case. The Court of Criminal Appeals based its conclusion that reversible error occurred on the following findings:
926 So. 2d  at 365.
We disagree with the conclusion of the Court of Criminal Appeals that McKissack made the required showing of the likelihood of inconsistencies between the grand-jury testimony of the medical examiner (also referred to as the coroner) and/or the investigator and their trial testimony. After a careful examination of the record, we agree with the factual analysis presented by Judge Shaw in his dissenting opinion in McKissack:
926 So. 2d  at 365-66.
The copy of the indictment in the record lists as the "State Witnesses" who appeared before the grand jury only "Inv. Keith Terry, Florence Police Dept." The State made that point to the Court of Criminal Appeals in its application for rehearing and reiterated it in both its petition for the writ of certiorari and the supporting brief, stating in each that "[t]he indictment reflects that Investigator Terry was the only witness to testify before the grand jury during these proceedings." (Petition, p. 4; State's brief, p. 2.) At no point, before either the Court of Criminal Appeals or this Court, has McKissack argued that the medical examiner did testify before the grand jury. Therefore, we rely on the only evidence on point in the recordthe above-quoted endorsement on the indictmentand conclude that the medical examiner did not testify before the grand jury. That being the case, the absence of an order to preserve his grand-jury testimony is academic.
Concerning the investigator, Keith Terry, McKissack argued initially before the trial judge, in the presence of the prosecutor, only that "there's some testimony that came out of the preliminary hearing by the investigator that we have concerns about." McKissack's main focus *374 was on the possibility of testimony by the medical examiner, or someone else, inconsistent with opinions the medical examiner had expressed to McKissack's counsel during private discussions. During a later ex parte conference between the trial judge and McKissack's counsel in the judge's chambers, fully taken down by the court reporter and conducted with the apparent consent of the prosecutor, the following took place:
At trial, Terry testified that a day or two after the crime he returned to the crime scene accompanied by three agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and one of their "explosive-detection dogs." The ATF agents supplied a metal detector. McKissack had earlier told Terry that the revolver had been fired several times during the time the group engaged in "Russian roulette" and that McKissack had thrown the spent shell casings from those firings into the nearby woods. Terry testified that he and the agents searched a fairly extensive area, using "the dog first, the metal detector and then your eyes." They found no shell casings. The next day he arranged to meet McKissack and his attorney at the scene so McKissack could point out where he had thrown the shell casings. Terry then searched the area identified by McKissack, accompanied by other officers, but found no shell casings. During cross-examination by McKissack's attorney at trial, the following exchange took place:
At no time did McKissack's attorney suggest to the trial judge that Terry's trial testimony was in any way inconsistent with what he might have said in his testimony before the grand jury. As Judge Shaw noted in his dissenting opinion, Terry's trial testimony was entirely consistent with his earlier testimony at the preliminary hearing.
Moreover, we see no basis for McKissack's attorney to have apprehended that Terry would testify differently before the grand jury than he had at the preliminary hearing concerning the search using the metal detector. If in fact he was being untruthful at the preliminary hearing concerning the use of the metal detector, the natural expectation would be that he would simply "stick to his story" before the grand jury. Certainly the fact that his testimony at trial was consistent with his preliminary-hearing testimony did not serve in any way to indicate the likelihood that he testified differently before the grand jury. Therefore, we find no basis for the conclusion by the Court of Criminal Appeals that McKissack "established that there was a genuine concern that there could be inconsistencies between the grand jury testimony and the trial testimony of. . . the investigator." 926 So. 2d  at 365. That prong of the "preliminary showing" not having been established, no error, and certainly no reversible error, can be predicated on the failure of the trial judge to order that Terry's testimony before the grand jury be preserved.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.[*]
NABERS, C.J., and SEE, LYONS, WOODALL, STUART, SMITH, BOLIN, and PARKER, JJ., concur.
[*]  Note from the reporter of decisions: On July 29, 2005, on remand from the Alabama Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, without opinion (CR-02-1845). On August 19, 2005, that court denied rehearing, without opinion. On October 14, 2005, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's certiorari petition, without opinion (1041829).