Case Title: DOUG JONES and DAVID DUNBAR V. JOHN SCHABRON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
DOUG JONES and DAVID DUNBAR V. JOHN SCHABRON2005 WY 65113 P.3d 34Case Number: No. 04-103Decided: 06/08/2005
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

DOUG JONES 
and DAVID DUNBAR,       

Co-Personal 
Representatives of the)

Estate of 
Joshua Douglas Jones,   

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs) ,          

v.         

JOHN 
SCHABRON, Personal Representative     

of the 
Estate of Nicholas James Schabron,

Appellee 
(Defendant) .         

Appeal from theDistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge
 
    

Representing 
Appellants:

C. M. Aron 
of Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellee:

John A. 
Sundahl and Isaac N. Sutphin of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. 
Sundahl.
   

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and KAUTZ, 
D.J.

KAUTZ, District Judge.
 
 

[¶1]      Appellants, Doug 
Jones and David Dunbar (collectively Jones), are the personal representatives of 
the estate of Joshua Jones.  Joshua 
Jones was killed in a tragic accident south of Laramie during the late night hours of 
September 16, 2001, when a vehicle driven by Nicholas Schabron was hit head-on 
by an intoxicated Clinton Haskins (Haskins).  Joshua Jones, Nicholas Schabron, and six 
other members of the University of Wyoming track team were killed in the 
accident.  Haskins was the only 
survivor.  The estate of 
Nicholas Schabron is represented by its personal representative, John Schabron 
(Schabron).
    
         

[¶2]      Jones filed a 
wrongful death claim against Schabron, contending that Nicholas Schabron was 
negligent in causing the death of Joshua Jones.  The theory of his case was essentially 
this:  There 
were eight persons riding in the vehicle driven by Nicholas Schabron; Nicholas 
Schabron should have been able to perceive that Haskins was driving in his lane 
of travel some 2.5 seconds before the collision, and that Nicholas Schabron' s 
reaction time to these circumstances was excessively slow (i.e., had he taken 
evasive action one-half second earlier, the collision could have been avoided); 
that Nicholas Schabron did not apply the brakes before the accident; and that, 
if either vehicle had been two feet further to the left, then the accident would 
not have occurred.
    
            
               
            
           
           
             
               

[¶3]      The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Schabron.  Jones appeals from that order, 
contending that it was error for the district court to grant summary judgment 
where the precise facts of this case are not known.  We will affirm.
  

ISSUE

[¶4]      Jones states the 
following issue:

Whether it 
is error to grant summary judgment in a head-on-collision vehicular accident 
where the precise facts are not known.

Schabron 
rephrases the issue as:

Whether 
speculation or possibility is sufficient to avoid summary judgment in a 
negligence action.

FACTS

[¶5]      In the early 
morning hours of September 16, 2001, Clinton Haskins was driving southbound from 
Laramie on U.S. 
Highway 287 in his 1995 Chevrolet 3500 crew cab dual wheel pickup.  Nicholas Schabron was driving northbound 
in a 1990 Jeep Wagoneer on that same highway.  Joshua Jones, Shane Shatto, Kyle 
Johnson, Cody Brown, Morgan McLeland, Justin Lambert Belanger, and Kevin 
Salverson rode with Nicholas Schabron.  
Haskins crossed over the centerline of the highway and hit Schabron's 
vehicle head-on, killing all eight occupants.
           
     

[¶6]      Before the 
collision, Haskins rounded a left-hand curve.  At an unknown point, he crossed into the 
northbound lane.  Nicholas Schabron 
was just entering the curve in the northbound lane.  He attempted to avoid Haskins by 
steering sharply to the left, leaving approximately 77 feet of yaw marks.  There is no evidence that Haskins made 
any attempt to avoid the collision.  
The vehicles hit passenger front corner to passenger front corner, 
overlapping approximately 18 inches.  
At the point of collision, Haskins' vehicle was headed straight south 
down the northbound lane, while Nicholas Schabron's vehicle was angled to the 
left.   The accident occurred 
entirely in Nicholas Schabron's lane of travel.  At impact, Haskins' pickup was traveling 
approximately 76 miles per hour and Nicholas Schabron's Jeep was traveling 
approximately 62 miles per hour.  
The posted speed limit where the accident occurred is 65 miles per 
hour.  Both vehicles suffered 
extensive damage to the front and down the right side.  The heavier pickup ripped off the entire 
right side of the Jeep, tore off the top and rear tailgate, and ripped through 
the passenger seats.  Joshua Jones 
and the other six passengers were torn from the interior of the Jeep and thrown 
to their final resting positions along the roadside.  Nicholas Schabron was found dead in the 
Jeep, in his seat, with his seatbelt on.  
Haskins was the only survivor.  
Nicholas Schabron did not have any alcohol in his system.  Haskins' blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.16.
      

[¶7]      On February 7, 
2002, Haskins pleaded guilty to eight counts of aggravated vehicular 
homicide.  He was sentenced to serve 
eight concurrent terms of 14 to 20 years.  
See   State v. Haskins , AlbanyCounty Criminal Action No. 6738.  Jones 
claimed that Nicholas Schabron was negligent because:
      
 

         1.  
He should have acted 
and reacted differently to the imminent threat of a collision with 
Haskins.
             
  

         2.  
He violated a 
heightened duty of care applicable to designated drivers.
          

         3.  
He should not have had 
seven passengers in a vehicle designed for five passengers.
             

         4.  
He did not have enough 
seatbelts for the number of passengers.
          

         5. 
He did not require his 
passengers to wear seatbelts.
        

         6.  
Failure to comply with 
W.S. § 31-5-202 which requires drivers to 
             
pass oncoming traffic on the right.
            
    

                    7.   
Failure 
to comply with W.S. § 31-5-301 which requires 
drivers   

                         
to limit 
their speed to what is reasonable and prudent under the 

                         
conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards

                                 
             
         then existing. 1  

[¶8]      The district 
court granted Schabron's Motion for Summary Judgment.  It held that Schabron did not have a 
duty to require adult passengers to wear seatbelts.  It did not address whether Schabron had 
a heightened duty as a designated driver or if Schabron had a duty to only carry 
the number of passengers the vehicle design intended because Jones did not 
provide any authority to support these claims.  The district court determined that the 
remaining claims were related to duties to use ordinary care and to maintain a 
proper lookout.  It then determined that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to 
whether Schabron breached those duties.
   
             
 

STANDARD OF REVIEW
  

[¶9]      
      When we review a summary judgment, we have 
before us the same materials as did the district court, and we follow the same 
standards which applied to the proceedings below.  The propriety of granting a motion for 
summary judgment depends upon the correctness of the dual findings that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of an 
asserted cause of action or defense.  
We, of course, examine the record from a vantage point most favorable to 
that party who opposed the motion, affording to that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences that fairly may be drawn from the record.  If the evidence leads to conflicting 
interpretations or if reasonable minds might differ, summary judgment is 
improper.  That standard of review 
is refined somewhat when applied to a negligence action.  Summary judgment is not favored in a 
negligence action and is, therefore, subject to more exacting scrutiny.   Woodward v. Cook Ford Sales, Inc., 
927 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Wyo. 1996).  We have, however, affirmed summary 
judgment in negligence cases where the record failed to establish the existence 
of a genuine issue of material fact.  
See Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405 (Wyo. 1997) 
(failure to establish duty); Popejoy v. Steinle, 820 P.2d 545 (Wyo. 1991) 
(failure of proof of underlying claim of a joint venture); MacKrell v. Bell 
H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776 (Wyo. 1990) (failure of proof of defendant's duty); 
DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986) (cause element was pure 
speculation); and Fiedler v. Steger, 713 P.2d 773 (Wyo. 1986) (failure to 
establish cause in a medical malpractice action).  See McMackin v. Johnson County 
Healthcare Center, 2003 WY 91, ¶¶8-9, 73 P.3d 1094, ¶¶8-9 (Wyo. 
2003).Abraham v. 
Great Western Energy, LLC, 2004 WY 
145, ¶12, 101 P.3d 446, ¶12 (Wyo. 2004).

 

[¶10]               
After a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, 
the opposing party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial 
showing there are genuine issues of material fact.  Wyo.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Hyatt v. Big Horn 
Sch. Dist. No. 4, 636 P.2d 525, 528 (Wyo. 1981).  The opposing party must affirmatively set 
forth material, specific facts in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, 
and cannot rely only upon allegations and pleadings. . ., and conclusory 
statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's 
burden.Downen v. 
Sinclair Oil Corporation, 887 P.2d 515, 519 (Wyo. 1994) (some citations 
omitted).

 
   

[¶11]   The evidence opposing a prima facie 
case on a motion for summary judgment "must be competent and admissible, lest 
the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely eviscerated by plaintiffs 
proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or wishful 
speculation."  Campbell v. 
Studer, Inc., 970 P.2d 389, 392 (Wyo. 1998) 
(quoting Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Company, 939 P.2d 233, 236 
(Wyo. 
1997)).  Speculation, conjecture, 
the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even probability are insufficient 
to establish an issue of material fact.  
Connely v. McColloch, 2004 WY 5, ¶37, 83 P.3d 457, ¶37 (Wyo. 
2004); O'Brien v. Hunt, 464 P.2d 306 (Wyo. 1970); Tower v. Horn, 
400 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 
1965).
  

DISCUSSION

[¶12]   The only issue argued in Jones' 
brief is whether they presented evidence from which a jury could conclude that 
Nicholas Schabron failed to maintain a proper lookout or act reasonably to avoid 
Haskins.  Jones did not present any 
argument or authority on his claims that Nicholas Schabron had a heightened duty 
of care, that he negligently had too many passengers in his vehicle, that he did 
not have enough seat belts, or that he failed to require use of seatbelts.  Consequently, we will not address those 
issues.In 
countless decisions this court has warned litigants "[i]n the presentation of an 
appeal to our court, it is inadequate simply to allude to an issue or identify 
only a potential issue."  Kipp v. 
Brown, 750 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Wyo. 1988).  Further, we have reminded 
litigants:

[I]t is not the function of this court to frame appellant's 
argument or draw his issues for him.This court 
consistently has refused to consider positions which are not supported by cogent 
argument or pertinent authority.  We are not required 
to consider on appeal grounds which were neither presented to * * * nor passed 
upon [by the trial court].Hance v. 
Straatsma, 721 P.2d 575, 577-78 (Wyo. 1986) (citations 
omitted).Saldana v. 
State, 846 P.2d 604, 622 (Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶13]   The trial court properly concluded 
that, as a matter of law, Nicholas Schabron had a duty to use ordinary care and 
a duty to maintain a proper lookout when driving.  These are duties always imposed upon 
automobile drivers.  Fegler v. 
Brodie, 574 P.2d 751, 755 (Wyo. 1978).  Drivers must:

 exercise 
a diligence commensurate with hazards disclosed under surrounding circumstances, 
and the lookout which ... is ... most effective in the light of all present 
conditions and those reasonably to be anticipated.

Downtown 
Auto Parts, Inc. v. Toner, 2004 WY 
67, ¶6, 91 P.3d 917, 919, ¶6 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Feltner v. Bishop, 348 P.2d 548, 
549-50 (Wyo. 1960)).

  
    

[¶14]   For purposes of summary judgment, 
Schabron established that at the time of the crash:

              
1.  N 
icholas Schabron was driving entirely within his lane on the 
highway.

              
2.  
He was driving within the speed limit.

              
3.  
He 
had no alcohol in his system.

              
4.   
He attempted to swerve to avoid the collision.

              
5.  
Haskins was entirely in the wrong lane on the 
highway.

              
6.   
Haskins' blood alcohol content was 0.16.

              
7.  
Haskins was driving 11 miles per hour over the speed 
limit.

              
8.   
Haskins made no effort to avoid the crash.

 
       

[¶15]   These facts, standing alone, were 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case that Nicholas Schabron did not fail 
to act reasonably or maintain a proper lookout, and that he was not 
negligent.  Furthermore, Nicholas 
Schabron was presumed to have exercised due care.  We recognize a presumption that in the 
absence of an eyewitness to the accident or other evidence sufficient to dispel 
or rebut the presumption, the decedent, acting on the instinct of 
self-preservation, was exercising ordinary care.  DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 
187 (Wyo. 
1986).  The burden then shifted to 
Jones to present specific facts showing Nicholas Schabron was negligent.  The record fails to 
include any such facts.
       

[¶16]   To counter Schabron's motion for 
summary judgment, Jones presented deposition testimony from an accident 
reconstruction engineer, Mr. Alcorn.  
In that deposition, Jones' counsel asked Alcorn if he agreed 
that:

Mr. 
Schabron was basically able to perceive Mr. Haskins['] vehicle in his   "his" being Schabron's lane -- about 2 
½  seconds before the impact;  he had about one-to 
one-and-a half second reaction time to sort out what he was seeing[.]
      
         

[¶17]   Alcorn responded that he did not 
disagree with counsel's proposition.  
Later, Alcorn testified that a prudent driver has a normal reaction time 
of 1.5 seconds.  Jones argues that these facts, together with 
the relative positions of the vehicles when they collided, could support a jury 
conclusion that Schabron could have and should have avoided the crash by 
reacting sooner.
   
            
            
      

[¶18]   Alcorn's testimony (or 
non-disagreement with counsel's testimony) that Nicholas Schabron could see 
Haskins in his lane 2.5 seconds before the accident is a conclusion, based upon 
an assumption that Haskins actually was in Nicholas Schabron's lane 2.5 seconds 
before the crash.  Conclusions and 
assumptions, even if presented by an expert witness, are insufficient to oppose 
a motion for summary judgment.  A 
party may not rely upon conclusions nor can they be employed in disposing of a 
motion for summary judgment.   
Campbell, 970 P.2d  at 394.
    

[¶19]   Jones did not present any evidence 
indicating when Haskins crossed over into the northbound lane of the 
highway.  He may have been in that 
lane for a long time, or he may have crossed over the instant before the 
crash.  There is no evidence indicating when Nicholas Schabron could have 
recognized danger, and thus no evidence that he negligently failed to avoid 
danger.
    
           
       

[¶20]   The total lack of evidence about when 
Haskins actually was in the northbound lane and could have been observed 
eliminates the arguments that Nicholas Schabron drove too fast for conditions or 
failed to pass oncoming traffic on the right.
      
             
            
        

[¶21]   Commenting on the entire accident, 
Alcorn stated that:

There is no 
evidence on the ground, in the vehicle, or from any witnesses that will tell 
anyone how long it took Nick Schabron to respond to the presence of Haskin's 
(sic) vehicle driving on the wrong side of the road ....   It is unknown when the Haskin's 
(sic) pickup moved onto the wrong side of the road, and it is sheer speculation 
and guess to assume that Nick Schabron had more time to react and take evasive 
action than he actually undertook, based upon the physical evidence. 2

 

[¶22]   A duty to take evasive action does 
not arise until a driver knows or should know that the oncoming traffic will or 
has crossed into the wrong lane.  
American Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Robbins, 945 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo.App.E.D. 1997).  A driver 
may presume that on-coming traffic will obey the law and drive in its own 
lane.  O'Malley v. Eagan, 2 P.2d 1063, 1068 (Wyo. 1931).
 

[¶23]   Reviewing the evidence, and lack of 
evidence, presented on the issue of summary judgment, the trial court correctly 
found that Jones failed to present facts from which a jury could 
conclude that Nicholas Schabron was negligent.  The trial court 
held:

A person, 
no doubt, could create many "what if" scenarios that, in hindsight, might have 
prevented this tragic incident.  
But, negligence and proximate cause are never presumed from the happening 
of an accident, and mere conjecture cannot form the basis of liability.  Vasquez v. Wal-Mart, 913 P.2d 441, 443 (Wyo. 1996); Downen v. Sinclair Oil 
Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 520 (Wyo. 1994); 
Dewald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 652 (Wyo. 
1986);  Apperson v. Kay, 546 P.2d 995, 998 (Wyo. 1976).  Guesswork is not a substitute for 
evidence or inference, and inference cannot be based on mere possibility.   Forbes Co. v. MacNeel, 382 P. 2 56, 57 (Wyo. 1963); Wright v. Conway, 242 P. 1107, 1111 (Wyo. 1926).  General or conclusory allegations cannot 
establish a genuine issue of material fact.  Tidwell v. HOM, Inc., 896 P. 2 
1322, 1324-25 (Wyo. 1995).
 

[¶24]   The record supports the trial 
court's conclusion.  One must guess, 
or speculate, or surmise in order to conclude that Nicholas Schabron was 
negligent.  The facts presented by 
Jones are not facts, but conclusions without any factual basis.  Consequently, the district court's 
decision granting summary judgment to Schabron is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1  .Jones' complaint alleged 
only that Nicholas Schabron was negligent in the manners listed above as 1, 3, 
and 4.  In opposition to Schabron's 
motion for summary judgment, Jones argued that Nicholas Schabron was negligent 
in the additional manners noted above.

2  .Jones 
asserts that the trial court should have disregarded this portion of the 
expert's statement because Alcorn offered only conclusions and not facts.  We agree that portions of this statement 
are conclusions.  However, those 
conclusions are based upon facts that Alcorn observed: no eyewitnesses, no 
evidence on the ground.