Case Title: Huaman v. Aquino

Citation: 

Docket Number: 051798

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
CESAR DAVID HUAMAN 
 
v.  Record No. 051798 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
June 8, 2006 
ALDO HUAMAN AQUINO, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
Paul F. Sheridan, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in ruling that settlement proceeds from a lawsuit filed in 
Washington, D.C. that came into the testator’s estate should 
be distributed as personal property under the will. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
In 1999, Carmen Hilda Ore Aquino (“testator”) died 
testate and was survived by her six brothers.  After specific 
bequests, her will directed that her remaining real and 
personal property be shared equally among three of her 
brothers:  Carlos Manuel Ore Aquino, Virgilio Oscar Huaman 
Aquino, and Aldo Dionicio Huaman Aquino (“Carlos,” “Oscar,” 
and “Aldo”).  A residuary clause directed that the remainder 
of her estate be distributed “to [her] brothers in equal 
parts.”  The will designated two co-executors, her attorney 
Gracelia R. Helring (“Helring”) and her brother Cesar David 
Huaman Aquino (“Huaman”).1  The will was submitted to probate 
                     
1 The will erroneously referred to Huaman as the 
testator’s nephew, but it is undisputed by the parties that he 
is, in fact, one of the six surviving brothers.  Further, we 
 
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in Arlington County, Virginia, where Helring and Huaman 
qualified as co-executors of the estate. 
 
Two years prior to her death, the testator suffered 
serious injuries during an apartment building fire in 
Washington, D.C.  Thereafter, she was unable to care for 
herself, and spent the remainder of her life (when not 
hospitalized) with Huaman in Arlington, Virginia.  She filed a 
personal injury action in Washington, D.C. against the company 
that managed the apartment building seeking damages caused by 
the fire, however she died while the litigation was pending.  
After her death, the suit was amended to include both survival 
and wrongful death counts under the law of the District of 
Columbia.  The suit was settled, and the net proceeds of the 
settlement to the estate were $1,778,578. 
 
The sole dispute in this case arose when portions of the 
settlement proceeds were distributed from the estate.  The 
first distribution occurred in July to August 2000 when 
$100,000 distributions were paid equally to Oscar, Aldo, and 
Carlos, totaling $300,000 from the settlement proceeds.  
Huaman and Helring disagreed about the mode of distribution 
because Huaman maintained that the settlement proceeds should 
be shared equally among all the surviving siblings.  
                                                                
note that Huaman chose not to use “Aquino” during this appeal, 
and instead has identified himself by “Huaman” for clarity.  
We will do the same. 
 
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Nevertheless, he took no formal action because the siblings 
actually shared the initial distribution equally pursuant to 
an oral agreement.  Pursuant to the agreement, Oscar, Aldo, 
and Carlos each paid $50,000 to the other three siblings:  
Huaman, Franklin Gustavo Aquino (“Franklin"), and Rafael 
Javier Huaman Aquino (“Rafael”). 
 
The next distribution occurred during January and 
February 2003, when Helring paid $300,000 each to Oscar, Aldo, 
and Carlos, totaling $900,000 from the settlement proceeds.  
On this occasion, only Oscar paid half of his distribution, 
$150,000, to his brother Franklin.  Aldo and Carlos decided to 
keep their full distribution, and this dispute ensued.2 
 
Upon Huaman’s demand that Helring cease any further 
distributions from the estate, she filed a “Motion to Construe 
a Will” in the Circuit Court of Arlington County.  Huaman and 
Helring were the parties to that action.  The Honorable Joanne 
Alper entered an order on March 7, 2003, favoring Huaman’s 
interpretation of the will that each sibling should share the 
settlement proceeds equally pursuant to the residuary clause 
of the will.  Thereafter, Helring resigned as co-executor of 
the estate, and Huaman qualified as the sole executor.  
                     
2 No further distributions have been made from the 
settlement proceeds that remain in the estate. 
 
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Huaman sent demand letters to Oscar, Aldo, and Carlos 
notifying them of the court’s ruling and directing them to 
return their 2003 distributions to the estate for re-
distribution.  They did not reply.  Huaman then filed a Bill 
of Complaint against the other five siblings seeking a 
declaratory judgment regarding the interpretation of the will, 
imposition of a constructive trust upon the 2003 distributions 
paid from the estate, or alternatively judgment against 
Carlos, Oscar, and Aldo on the basis of unjust enrichment 
totaling $900,000. 
 
The Honorable Paul F. Sheridan vacated the March 7, 2003 
order entered by Judge Alper holding that the court had lacked 
jurisdiction because all necessary and indispensable parties 
were not before the court at the time.  Upon the arguments 
concerning the interpretation of the will, the trial court 
held that “the lawsuit that existed prior to [the testator’s] 
death and the settlement proceeds are personal property, 
governed by the [personal property paragraph] of the Will.”  
As a result, the trial court ordered that the settlement 
proceeds be shared equally among the three beneficiaries 
designated in the personal property clause:  Oscar, Aldo, and 
Carlos.  Huaman’s appeal to this Court is limited to one 
assignment of error:  whether the trial court erred when it 
held that the settlement proceeds, obtained after the death of 
 
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the testator, should pass to the beneficiaries according to 
the personal property clause rather than the residuary clause.  
II.  Analysis 
 
We note at the outset that the facts presented in this 
case create an uncommon scenario that would be impossible to 
duplicate under Virginia law governing personal injury 
actions.  It is well settled in the Commonwealth that an 
action for personal injury does not survive death, and our 
wrongful death statute creates a new right of action brought 
on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries, and not the estate.  
E.g., Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 1035, 154 S.E.2d 124, 
127 (1967); Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. Martin, 102 Va. 201, 
203, 45 S.E. 894, 894 (1903).  Our analysis in this case is 
affected by the law of the District of Columbia and no part of 
this opinion is intended to disturb the well-developed law 
pertaining to actions for personal injury and wrongful death 
in Virginia.   
 
There is only one matter to be resolved in this appeal:  
the proper distribution of the settlement proceeds that came 
into the testator’s estate several years after her death. 
During the course of the litigation below, none of the parties 
maintained that the settlement proceeds were improperly paid 
into the estate.  Additionally, the parties have relied solely 
upon Virginia law for the resolution of this matter.  
 
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Therefore, we are guided by familiar principles expressed in 
our case law.   
 
"The cardinal principle of will construction is that the 
intention of the testator controls; the problem is to 
ascertain it."  Gillespie v. Davis, 242 Va. 300, 303, 410 
S.E.2d 613, 615 (1991) (citing Clark v. Strother, 238 Va. 533, 
539, 385 S.E.2d 578, 581 (1989)).  The testator's intent 
should be determined from the language of the document, when 
possible.  Id. (citing Baker v. Linsly, 237 Va. 581, 585, 379 
S.E.2d 327, 329 (1989)).  The disagreement regarding the 
language of the will in this case centers upon whether the 
personal property clause or the residuary clause controls the 
distribution of the settlement proceeds. 
 
The trial court held that the third paragraph of the will 
controls the distribution.  It states in pertinent part: 
 
Personal property:  I give, devise and bequeath 
to my brothers, Carlos Ore Aquino, Oscar Huaman 
Aquino and Aldo Huaman Aquino, in equal parts, 
share and share alike, all the personal 
property I own or over which I have disposing 
power at the time of my death, including funds 
in any and all financial accounts. 
 
Huaman concedes that the settlement proceeds constitute 
personal property.  However, he argues the personal property 
clause does not control because the testator neither owned nor 
had power to dispose of such property, namely the proceeds, at 
 
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the time of her death – an express restriction of the personal 
property clause. 
 
Huaman argues that the residuary clause must control the 
distribution of the settlement proceeds.  It provides: 
 
All the rest residue and remainder of my 
estate, real, personal or mixed, of whatever 
nature and wherever situate, I give, devise and 
bequeath to my brothers in equal parts, share 
and share alike. 
 
By contrast, appellees maintain that the “cause of action” was 
personal property that the testator owned before her death; 
consequently, the distribution must be under the personal 
property paragraph. 
 
The provisions of this will are not ambiguous.  Thus, the 
resolution of this appeal centers upon whether the testator 
“owned” or had “power to dispose” of the personal property in 
question at the time of her death.  The trial court held that 
“[t]he cause of action predating the death of the Testator was 
an item of personal property she owned.”  We agree.  The 
testator’s personal injury claim was a chose in action, “a 
personal right not reduced into possession, but recoverable by 
a suit at law.”  First Nat'l Bank v. Holland, 99 Va. 495, 503-
504, 39 S.E. 126, 129 (1901); Richmond v. Hanes, 203 Va. 102, 
106, 122 S.E.2d 895, 898 (1961) (“a right to damages arising ex 
delicto is recognized as being a chose in action”).  A chose in 
action is intangible personal property.  E.g., Teed v. Powell, 
 
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236 Va. 36, 40, 372 S.E.2d 131, 134 (1988); Iron City Sav. Bank 
v. Isaacsen, 158 Va. 609, 628, 164 S.E. 520, 526 (1932).   
 
A chose in action is “owned” by the possessor of the 
right to recover, and generally such ownership can be 
bequeathed in a will.  See Teed, 236 Va. at 40, 372 S.E.2d at 
134 (testator’s security interest was chose in action passing 
under the will); Koss v. Kastelberg, 98 Va. 278, 281-82, 36 
S.E. 377, 378 (1900) (choses in action used in connection with 
testator’s business passed under the will).  Ordinarily, a 
personal injury action is an exception to this general rule 
because it expires at the moment a person bringing such action 
dies.  Richmond, 203 Va. at 106, 122 S.E.2d at 898.  However, 
in this instance the chose in action did not expire under the 
laws of the District of Columbia.  For this reason, the 
general rule, rather than the exception, is applicable here.  
This particular chose in action was “owned” at the moment of 
the testator’s death, and accordingly the proceeds derived 
from the action pass under the personal property clause to 
Carlos, Oscar, and Aldo. 
 
Huaman argues that a bequest of this sort is tantamount 
to an “assignment” of the personal injury action that violates 
Virginia law.  However, he failed to raise this argument in 
the trial court.  We will not consider matters raised for the 
 
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first time on appeal.  Rule 5:25; see also Cangiano v. LSH 
Bldg. Co., 271 Va. 171, 183, 623 S.E.2d 889, 896 (2006). 
III.  Conclusion 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the testator “owned” her 
personal injury action at the time of her death, that it was a 
chose in action that survived her death pursuant to the law of 
the District of Columbia, and the proceeds obtained from the 
settlement should pass under the personal property clause of 
her will.  Therefore, Carlos, Oscar, and Aldo are entitled to 
equal shares of the settlement proceeds.  We will affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed.