Case Title: STATE v BUCKLEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13336 I N T H E S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE OF MONTANA 1976 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - GARY L Y N N B U C K L E Y , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert S. Keller, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Fennessey, Crocker & Harman, Libby, Montana David W. Harman argued, Libby, Montana Jean Ellison appeared, Libby, Montana Donald La Shaffer, Libby, Montana For Respondent: Robert La Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Lon J. Maxwell argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena , Montana William A. Douglas argued, County Attorney, Libby, Montana Submitted: October 12, 1976 Decided : DEC 1 5 1976 Filed : DEC 1.5 1946 M r . Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty, and sentence of 100 years i n the s t a t e prison of the d i s t r i c t court, Lincoln County. The essential facts began i n l a t e June 1975 and culminated with the homicide of James A. McIntyre on July 4, 1975. McIntyre, a newcomer t o Eureka, Montana, was working on a ranch i n the vicinity and staying a t the DeLong cabin near Glen Lake, with the consent of the owner. O n July 3, 1975, Gary Buckley also received permission from ~ e t o n g to stay a t h i s cabin, as he had done on another occasion. A t t h i s time Buckley was AWOL from the United States Marine Corps. McIntyre was never informed that Buckley had obtained permission t o stay a t the DeLong cabin and upon re- turning t o the cabin on July 3, 1975, he was surprised t o be met by him. They introduced themselves and McIntyre l e f t shortly thereafter. Believing Buckley t o be on the premises unlawfully, McIntyre and one Jay Allison went t o the local police t o inform them. That night McIntyre returned t o the cabin with a Lincoln County s h e r i f f ' s deputy i n McIntyre's truck. The deputy was dressed i n civilian clothes and was armed a t the time. After failing t o find Buckley, the deputy and McIntyre l e f t and rendezvoused with Allison and two other law enforcement officers. The officers returned t o Eureka, but McIntyre and Allison returned t o the cabin, searched the area again, and according t o Buckley, yelled threats directed a t him, i f he should be nearby, t o stay away o r he would be harmed. Buckley stated he observed a l l of these events from nearby where he was sleeping for the night because he feared for h i s l i f e and believed Allison and McIntyre were out to get him, McIntyre being Allison's hired gun, as a result of a falling out between Allison and Buckley. The r e s t of the episode comes from Buckley through h i s statement given a f t e r h i s a r r e s t and testimony a t t r i a l : O n the afternoon of July 4, 1975, Buckley was reading a book i n the DeLong cabin when he saw McIntyre's truck approach. The truck went slowly past the cabin, did not come into the driveway, and stopped 15 t o 20 yards past the cabin. Buckley, sensing danger, rose from h i s chair, got h i s <.44 magnum, and went t o the door. A s he went past the refrigerator, Buckley heard a noise behind him, outside the cabin. A s he turned, he saw McIntyre holding a r i f l e waist high. McIntyre leveled the r i f l e and shot a t Buckley, missing him. Buckley fired back, and missed McIntyre. McIntyre began running t o h i s truck, and Buckley continued shooting, wounding McIntyre, knocking hin t o the ground and causing him t o drop the r i f l e . Buckley continued t o walk toward McIntyre, who was lying s t i l l a t the time, and continued shooting, h i t t i n g McIntyre two more times and from less than seven and one-half feet away (as evidenced by powder burns). Finally, Buckley kneeled down and delivered the f a t a l shot t o McIntyre's head from less than a foot away. Buckley stated he acted from "instinct"; was i n a "subtle s t a t e of mind1'; a "subconscious s t a t e of mind"; and h i s action was l i k e the "wrath of God coming down on J i m McIntyre" a s he began shooting. He t e s t i f i e d he shot McIntyre i n the head t o put him out of h i s misery. - 3 - Buckley w a s convicted of deliberate homici'de, and sentenced t o 100 years i n prison. O n appeal defendant raises five issues for t h i s Court's review: F i r s t i s the withdrawal of the instruction on mitigated deliberate homicide a f t e r it was given t o the jury. This occurred when the jury, a f t e r retiring t o deliberate, asked for further instruction on the meaning of "extreme mental o r emotional stress". The d i s t r i c t court judge withdrew the instruction and instructed the jury that only deliberate homicide should be considered by it. Second did the d i s t r i c t court e r r i n failing t o dismiss the deliberate homicide charge on defendant's motion a t the close of t r i a l . Third, defendant believes any statements made by him a t the suppression hearing, concerning the voluntariness of h i s written statement, could not be used for impeachment by the state. Fourth i s whether the d i s t r i c t court erred i n admitting pictures of the deceased over the defendant's objection of irrelevant, gruesome, and prejudicial. F i f t h and finally, defendant questions the impartiality of the jury. H e argues h i s motion for a change of venue based upon p r e t r i a l publicity about the defenses raised should have been granted. It was denied a f t e r individual voir dire of the jurors a s to their knowledge of the case and the defenses to be raised. Defendant also argues the entire panel should have been dismissed because the d i s t r i c t court informed the jurors before the individual voir dire that a change of venue could be a frightful expense t o the people of Lincoln County. F i r s t , defendant objected t o the withdrawal of the instruction covering mitigated deliberate homicide on the grounds the s t a t e failed t o object t o the mitigated deliberate homicide instruction, that as a matter of law mitigated deliberate homicide should be considered as part of the case, and that other- wise the instructions were satisfactory for purposes of making a determination by the jury. The s t a t e and defendant agree State v. Thomas, 147 Mont. 325, 413 P.2d 315, and State v. Taylor, 163 Mont. 106, 515 P.2d 695, s e t forth the test t o be applied. Namely, the d i s t r i c t court's instructions must cover every issue or theory having support i n the evidence, and the inquiry of the d i s t r i c t court must only be whether o r not any evidence exists i n the record t o warrant an instruction on mitigated deliberate homicide. Therefore, we determine i f there was any evidence of ex- treme mental or emotional stress on the part of defendant pre- sented a t trial. W e find none. Defendant, himself, stated he was not i n shock but was i n a "subtle s t a t e of mind, a subconscious s t a t e of mind.'' He did not excitedly begin t o f i r e and continue i n the same manner, but slowly and deliberately walked, not ran, towards McIntyre. A t t h i s time he s t a t e s McIntyre was not struggling t o regain control of h i s r i f l e , but was lying there incapacitated. Nevertheless, Buckley shot him twice more from close range, and then knelt down and delivered the f a t a l shot t o the head, t o "put him out of h i s misery." This testimony is incredible. Defendant was not in extreme mental s t r e s s , but h i s actions were that of a slow, deliberate, calm, and cool k i l l e r . Thus, the d i s t r i c t court was correct i n finding there was no evidence of extreme mental or emotional stress. - 5 - A s t o the d i s t r i c t court's withdrawal of an instruction, State v. Jackson, 88 Mont. 420, 293 P. 309, s e t s out the proposition that it is prejudicial error t o withdraw a required instruction. A s for an improperly given instruction, not required by law, we adopt the rationale of the Supreme Court of Hawaii i n State v. O'Keefe, 45 Haw.368, 367 P.2d 91, 94, that a court has the power to, and may, correct errors i n its instructions by withdrawing, ex- plaining, o r correcting them. This is i n accord with the discretion granted a d i s t r i c t court i n instructing the jury a f t e r submission of the case by section 95-1913, R.C.M. 1947. Second, the d i s t r i c t court did not e r r i n denying defendant's motion t o dismiss the deliberate homicide charge for insufficiency of the evidence. Section 95-1909(i), R.C.M. 1947, states: "* * *the court may on its motion o r the motion of the defendant, dismiss the action * *' *.It (Emphasis supplied). The s t a t u t e definitely leaves t h i s determination within the discretion of the d i s t r i c t court, and its action w i l l not be dis- turbed on appeal unless there i s an abuse of that discretion. W e find no such abuse of discretion, since the s t a t e introduced evidence which tended t o prove a l l the elements of deliberate homicide. The fact that some of that evidence could be interpreted t o show mitigation does not t a i n t the decision of the d i s t r i c t court. The d i s t r i c t court properly l e f t it t o the jury t o decide whether the s t a t e ' s evidence was enough t o prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant sought t o have the d i s t r i c t court weigh the evidence presented, which is within the province of the jury, not the court. Third, defendant cites Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S,Ct. 967, 19 L ed 2d 1247, 1259, as authority that the prosecution cannot use defendant's testimony at a pretrial suppression hearing to impeach the defendant's credibility. Simmons made no such ruling. It held: "* * * when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may nottkreafter be admitted against him at trial in the issue of guilt, unless he makes no ob j ec tion." (Emphasis supplied) . In Simmons the suppression hearing testimony was used in the prosecution's case-in-chief to show ownership by the defendant of a suitcase containing incriminating evidence. In the instant case, the testimony was used on cross-examination to attack defendant's credibility, by showing he testified before to an entirely different account of the July 4, 1975 homicide, implicating someone other than himself. In no way did this address the guilt of defendant, in fact it spoke to another person committing the homicide. Only the credibility of the defendant was attacked. Defendant argues this Court should not follow Harris v . New York, 401 U . S . 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L ed 2 d 1, because that decision dealt with the Miranda right, and not the assertion of a constitutional right at the suppression hearing, as in this case. However, identical rationale, to guard against perjury, was followed by the United States Supreme Court in Walder v. United States, 347 U . S . 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L ed 503. There the Court allowed physical evidence (narcotics), unlawfully seized and inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief in another case against the same defendant, to be used on cross-examination and introduced to impeach the defendant' s direct examination testimony . Additionally, defendant argues his objection should have been sustained at the suppression hearing because the cross- examination was outside the scope, and such was prejudicial error, since this testimony was used at trial to impeach him. A close examination of the transcript does not bear this out. The testimony used at trial for impeachment purposes was that given by defendant on direct examination and examination by the court, and not cross- examination. Fourth, defendant alleges pictures of the deceased were erroneously admitted. In State v. Newman, 162 Mont. 450, 460, 513 P.2d 258 and State v. Bischert, 131 Mont. 152, 159, 308 P.2d 969, the Court set foeth the rule of law. In Newman the Court stated: 11 I I ~ * * * photographs stand on the same footing as diagrams, maps, plans, and the like, and as a general rule, whenever relevant to describe a a person, place, or thing, they are admissible for the purpose of explaining and applying the evidence and assisting the court and jury in understanding the case." "'Photographs that are calculated to arouse the sympathies or prejudices of the jury are properly excluded, particularly if they are not substantially necessary or instructive to show material facts or conditions. 20 Am.Jur.,Evidence, 5 729, p.609.' 11* * *the fact the photographs could tend to arouse sympathy in the minds of the jurors is not the only &&minative issue. the probative value of the photographs was never explained to the jury by the medical witness." In Newman the state's witnesses did not testify to the pictures except to lay the proper foundation through one witness, and then left alone. Such was not the case here. The probative value of the photographs was constantly explained to the jury throughout the trial. This was done ( 1 ) by the investigating officers t o demonstrate what they found upon arriving a t the scene; (2) by the witnesses who located the body a s t o where they found it and i n what position it was; (3) by a medical witness t o discuss the number of shots and the damage done; and (4) by defendant himself. The probative value of these photographs was extensively explained t o the court and jury, and such f a r outweighed t h e i r prejudicial effect. W e find no error. Finally, defendant contends a change of venue should have been granted due t o p r e t r i a l publicity and alternatively the e n t i r e panel of jurors should have been dismissed because the d i s t r i c t court commented t o the jury on the economical effect on the county i f a change of venue occurred. The basis of defendant's motion was p r e t r i a l publicity i n three newspapers, the Missoulian, the Daily I n t e r Lake, and the Western News, and a highly publicized poster circulated i n the area which described defendant and asked for information a s t o h i s whereabouts due t o h i s alleged part i n the homicide. A s for the newspaper a r t i c l e s , the defense was concerned the jury panel members had been Cmpaneled since September and would find particular interest i n any cases upon which they might s i t a s jurors. Furthermore, one of the three a r t i c l e s described with particularity that the defenses of a l i b i , insanity, and s e l f - defense were going t o be used by the defense. Defendant con- tended that such information would cause the jurors t o believe from the outset that defendant admitted the shooting, but was relying upon self-defense, which i n effect takes away the defense option of waiting t o see the s t a t e ' s proof before raising s e l f - defense. However, the d i s t r i c t court before seating the jurors performed an individual voir dire of each juror i n chambers as t o bias and knowledge of the case. Each juror seated stated he or she could render an impartial verdict based upon the evidence presented a t t r i a l . This procedure by the d i s t r i c t court is i n accord with precedent s e t by t h i s Court. State v. Sheerin, 12 Mont. 539, 31 P. 543; State v. Byrne, 60 Mont. 317, 199 P. 262; State v. Juhrey, 61Mont. 413, 202 P. 762; State v. White, 151 Mont. 151, 440 P.2d 269. W e find no error. The judgment is affirmed. W e Cancur: L Judge, kktting for M r . Justice Wesley Castles.