Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans

Citation: 2000-Ohio-227

Docket Number: 20000348

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans, 89 Ohio St.3d 497, 2000-Ohio-227.] 
 
 
 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. EVANS. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 497.] 
Judges — Misconduct — Six-month stayed suspension — Judicial candidate 
fails to maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office — Failing to 
have campaign committee file required contribution and expenditure 
statements with clerk of court — Knowingly or with reckless regard 
publishing information concerning an opponent that would be deceiving 
or misleading to a reasonable person. 
(No. 00-348 — Submitted May 23, 2000 — Decided August 30, 2000.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 99-01. 
 
On September 20, 1999, relator, Disciplinary Counsel filed a five-count 
amended complaint against respondent, Judge David T. Evans of Gallipolis, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0021152.  Respondent answered, and the matter was 
heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of 
the Supreme Court.  The panel considered stipulations of fact and of violations of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct, testimony submitted at the hearing, and numerous 
letters attesting to respondent’s character and standing in the community.  Counts 
II, IV, and V were dismissed by the relator. 
 
Respondent became an attorney in 1975.  He practiced law for twenty-
three years as a sole practitioner.  In 1982, respondent was elected to the 
Republican Party’s central committee in Gallia County.  Thereafter, he served ten 
years as the chairman of the executive committee, resigning in 1994.  In that 
capacity, he helped select candidates for campaigns and advised them on their 
responsibilities. 
 
 
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In late 1997, respondent decided to run for a vacant seat on the Fourth 
District Court of Appeals.1  Respondent’s neighbor and friend, Curtis “Chuck” 
Gilliam, assisted him during his primary campaign.  Gilliam’s friend, Roger 
Watson, a Guyan Township trustee in Gallia County, also worked on respondent’s 
campaign.  Watson suggested to Gilliam that he would be willing to construct 
political signs for respondent’s campaign if the lumber would then be donated to 
his township after the election.  Gilliam relayed this proposal to respondent.  
Respondent, who was pleased that the proposal involved free labor for the 
preparation of his four-by-four-foot and four-by-eight-foot campaign signs, told 
Gilliam to go ahead and take responsibility for the sign preparation.  The source 
of the free labor turned out to be jail inmates on work release and welfare 
recipients assigned to work for the township. 
 
Respondent testified that he was not present at the township garage when 
work on the signs was performed.  However, Gilliam visited the garage on at least 
three occasions.  On his third visit to the garage, Gilliam became concerned about 
rainwater in the garage and the lack of space.  Gilliam discussed his concerns with 
respondent, and as a result of this conversation, respondent arranged for the sign 
preparation to move to a larger, private warehouse in Gallipolis.  The sign 
preparation continued at this new location for approximately two weeks. 
 
Gilliam met Watson and four workers on the first day the Gallipolis 
warehouse was used.  Thereafter, during the two-week period when work was 
performed at that location, Gilliam would stop by the warehouse three or four 
times a week and would stay approximately fifteen minutes.  On one occasion 
respondent visited the Gallipolis location and met some of the workers, all of 
whom were clad in street clothes. 
 
Philip Bailey, the only full-time township employee, also worked on the 
signs.  Bailey used the township truck to transport the inmates and welfare 
workers to and from the warehouse.  Watson and Gilliam also transported the 
 
 
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workers to and from the warehouse.  On at least two occasions, Gilliam picked up 
a worker at his residence and then stopped near the courthouse in Gallipolis while 
the worker went and got two additional workers.  On the second occasion that 
Gilliam provided transportation to the workers, he dropped off two workers 
outside the jail attached to the courthouse.  Gilliam asserted that it was then that 
he realized some of the workers were inmates. 
 
Gilliam asserted that he then advised respondent that inmates were 
preparing signs at the warehouse.  Respondent asserted that this was the first time 
he learned that inmates were working on his signs.  Respondent ordered that the 
work be halted immediately.  No further work was done on his signs until after 
the primary, when a college student completed the signs at the warehouse.  
However, respondent used the signs that had been completed thus far in his 
campaign.  On April 22 and June 2, 1998, the respondent’s campaign filed 
campaign finance reports with the board of elections that did not mention the 
contribution of the township facilities or the labor provided by jail inmates or 
welfare workers in the construction of the campaign signs. 
 
Respondent admitted that his lack of close supervision of Gilliam’s 
activities relating to the construction of the signs violated Canon 7(B)(1) of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct (a judicial candidate shall maintain the dignity 
appropriate to judicial office).  Respondent also admitted that the failure to report 
the contributions by the township for the use of the township garage and the value 
of the labor of the inmates and welfare workers was a violation of Canon 7(C)(9) 
(the campaign committee of a judicial candidate shall file a copy of all 
contribution and expenditure statements specified in R.C. 3517.10[A] with the 
clerk of court). 
 
In mitigation, respondent expressed regret.  In addition, he stated that he 
did not include the value of the free labor or the use of township property in the 
campaign financial reports because he did not know how to do so.  He stated that 
 
 
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he had tried to ameliorate the problem by having his counsel write to the Scioto 
County Board of Elections for advice on how to report those contributions.  
However, the panel and the board found that this letter was sent only after 
respondent had received a draft complaint from Disciplinary Counsel stating 
proposed charges against him based on the failure to report these contributions. 
 
Also during respondent’s primary campaign, respondent used literature, 
print, radio, and television advertisements, and telephone scripts that stated that he 
was “Endorsed by Southern Ohio’s Top Prosecutors and Sheriffs!”  At the time 
the advertisements were created and distributed, only five of the fourteen sheriffs 
and three of the fourteen county prosecuting attorneys in the Fourth Appellate 
District had endorsed or supported respondent. 
 
In June 1998, Judge Milton Nuzum and Judge Marshall Brown Douthett, 
who had been respondent’s primary opponents, filed a grievance with the Board 
of Commissioners under Gov.Jud.R. II(5) (fast-track campaign-violations 
review).  In July 1998, Judges Nuzum and Douthett filed a motion with the board 
to refer the matter to relator for investigation.2  In September 1999, respondent 
filed a civil complaint against Judges Nuzum and Douthett, among others.  One 
count of this complaint alleged that Judges Nuzum and Douthett had libeled and 
slandered respondent and had intentionally filed false allegations with the Board 
of Commissioners.  Two months later, at his disciplinary hearing, respondent 
conceded that his exaggeration of his endorsements was a violation of Canon 
7(B)(1) (a judicial candidate shall maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial 
office), and yet at the same time he testified that he was entitled to maintain his 
civil suit against the judges for falsely accusing him in their grievance filed with 
the Board of Commissioners. 
 
In mitigation, respondent testified that he regretted the exaggeration and 
that when it was brought to his attention before the primary that there was some 
difficulty with it, he changed his telephone and radio scripts to state that he was 
 
 
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endorsed by “many of Ohio’s top sheriffs and prosecutors.”  The postprimary 
printed ads were also changed. 
 
In addition to the stipulated violation, the panel also found that 
respondent’s endorsement language violated Canon 7(E)(1) (a candidate “shall 
not knowingly or with reckless regard * * * publish * * * information concerning 
a judicial candidate or an opponent, either knowing the information to be false or 
with reckless disregard of whether or not it was false or, if true, that would be 
deceiving or misleading to a reasonable person”). 
 
The panel found several aggravating circumstances, most notably 
respondent’s actions in admitting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct yet 
proceeding with a lawsuit against Judges Douthett and Nuzum.  The panel stated 
that while respondent signed and testified to admissions of ethical violations at the 
time of the hearing, he also believed that he had the right to pursue civil litigation 
against the judges for “intentionally fil[ing] false charges,” charges that the panel 
regarded as now admitted.  The panel thus concluded that there was a serious 
question as to respondent’s sincerity and candor in his admissions.  The panel 
found that the other actions that respondent claimed to be mitigating, i.e., 
changing his ads and consulting the board of elections about reporting 
contributions, were taken only in response to notice of a complaint to be filed 
against him rather than as a result of any recognition of wrongdoing on his part.  
Moreover, the panel believed that the modified ads were just as inaccurate and 
misleading to a reasonable person as the original statement. 
 
The panel recommended a six-month stayed suspension.  The board, 
however, recommended a six-month suspension without a stay.  The board stated 
that it based its recommendation on respondent’s proven knowledge of the 
improper activity, the lack of timely, good faith mitigation, and the initiation and 
continuation of a civil action against the judges who filed the original grievance 
 
 
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against him.  Moreover, the board determined that respondent showed no remorse 
for his violations. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Don C. Iler Co., L.P.A., and Don C. Iler; Buckley, King & Bluso and John 
A. Hallbauer, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  We adopt the board’s findings and 
conclusions that respondent violated Canon 7(B)(1), (C)(9), and (E)(1).  However, 
after thoroughly considering the evidence in this case, we adopt the panel’s 
recommended sanction rather than the board’s recommended sanction. 
 
When deciding what sanction to impose, we consider the duties violated, 
respondent’s mental state, the injury caused, the existence of aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances, and applicable precedent.  Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Bunce (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 112, 115, 689 N.E.2d 566, 568; Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Brown (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 316, 320, 720 N.E.2d 525, 528.  With 
respect to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances, we are guided by the 
recent Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, Section 10, Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions.  Ohio Official Reports, June 19, 2000, Advance Sheets, xix. 
 
One aggravating circumstance listed in Section 10 of these guidelines is 
the refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct.  Section 
10(B)(1)(g).  Like the board, we believe that this aggravating circumstance is 
present here.  Although respondent admitted that his misleading endorsement 
statements violated Canon 7(B)(1), he filed a civil lawsuit against the judges who 
had initiated a grievance against him based in part on the endorsements.  This 
action was still pending at the time of the disciplinary hearing.  The existence of 
 
 
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this lawsuit contrasts with respondent’s admissions that his campaign 
endorsements were misleading.  Instead, it supports a finding that despite his 
stipulated admissions, respondent did not really believe that his conduct was 
wrong.  The board was justified in finding this to be an aggravating circumstance.  
However, respondent now asks this court to allow him to avoid responsibility for 
his actions and blames his predicament on his prior counsel.  He asserts that the 
civil suit was not instigated by him, but rather by his attorneys from the law firm 
of Chester, Wilcox & Saxbe, a firm, he asserts, that was disqualified from 
representing him due to a conflict of interest.  We reject respondent’s attempt to 
escape responsibility for the filing of the lawsuit. 
 
Respondent, as the client, made the ultimate decision as to whether a 
lawsuit should be filed.  In this regard, we note that respondent is not a typical 
client.  He has been an attorney for over twenty-five years, and now serves as a 
judge on the Fourth District Court of Appeals.  Moreover, due to his many years 
of service as a Republican Party’s central committee executive chairman, he is 
well versed in the mechanics of operating a political campaign.  He is aware of, or 
should be aware of, the rules governing campaign advertising.  Thus, we find that 
this after-the-fact attempt to disclaim responsibility is further proof that 
respondent still does not acknowledge his wrongful conduct. 
 
We also question respondent’s asserted lack of knowledge as to the source 
of the free labor used in the preparation of his campaign signs. The stipulations 
reveal that respondent knew that the labor for the signs was being provided in 
exchange for the lumber being donated to Guyan Township and that the signs 
were being constructed at the Guyan Township garage.  The stipulations also 
reveal that respondent’s good friend and neighbor, Gilliam, was put in charge of 
this campaign detail.  Gilliam visited the work sites on several occasions and even 
transported workers at times.  Respondent himself visited the workers at the 
warehouse on one occasion.  Thus, it strains credibility to argue that the source of 
 
 
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this free labor was realized only when jail inmates were actually shuttled to the 
jail.  However, at the very least, even assuming respondent did not know that jail 
inmates and welfare workers prepared his signs, we find that respondent’s failure 
to investigate the source of the free labor or supervise Gilliam’s activities in the 
construction of the signs violated Canon 7(B)(1). 
 
Additionally, the failure to report the free contributions once he learned of 
them violated Canon 7(C)(9).  This canon is designed to mandate the disclosure of 
all contributions by judicial candidates and to make such information accessible 
to the public by requiring the information to be filed with the clerk of court in 
each county in the district.  While respondent claims that he immediately halted 
the sign preparation as soon as he learned the source of the labor, he made no 
attempt to determine what he should report as contributions until he received 
relator’s draft complaint after the general election was over.  Even then, upon 
receiving no response to his letter to the board of elections, respondent took no 
further action.  The responsibility of reporting contributions is respondent’s, not 
the board of elections. 
 
In mitigation, we note the absence of a prior disciplinary record and 
consider the nine letters offered in support of respondent’s character and 
reputation.  We also consider this misconduct to be isolated, arising only in the 
context of respondent’s political campaign. 
 
As applicable precedent, we consider other cases involving election 
campaign violations.  See, e.g., In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against 
Hildebrandt (1997), 82 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 675 N.E.2d 889 (inaccurate disparaging 
campaign statements justified a six-month stayed suspension); In re Complaint 
Against Harper (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 211, 673 N.E.2d 1253 (a misleading 
disparaging television campaign advertisement justified only a public reprimand 
in light of Judge Harper’s many years of distinguished public service).  See, also, 
In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Burick  (1999), 95 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 
 
 
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705 N.E.2d 422; In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Roberts (1996), 81 
Ohio Misc.2d 59, 675 N.E.2d 84 (misleading campaign advertisements 
concerning endorsements justified a public reprimand and/or fine).3 
 
In light of the seriousness of respondent’s misconduct and the aggravating 
circumstances, we believe that a six-month stayed suspension is an appropriate 
sanction.  Therefore, respondent is hereby given a six-month stayed suspension.  
Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
KARPINSKI, Brogan and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, ACTING C.J., and CHRISTLEY, J., concur in part and dissent in 
part. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
 
JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District, sitting for 
MOYER, C.J. 
 
DIANE KARPINSKI, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for 
DOUGLAS, J. 
 
JAMES A. BROGAN, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for 
PFEIFER, J. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
The Fourth District incorporates fourteen counties in the southeast 
part of the state: Pickaway, Ross, Highland, Adams, Pike, Scioto, Jackson, 
Lawrence, Vinton, Hocking, Gallia, Meigs, Athens, and Washington. 
 
2. 
This case results from this investigation. 
 
3. 
The sanction of a fine is available in fast-track campaign-violations 
review cases pursuant to Gov. Jud.R. II(5)(E)(1)(c).  A fine is not a permissible 
sanction in a regular disciplinary proceeding.  Gov.Bar R. V(6)(B). 
__________________ 
 
 
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CHRISTLEY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  While I 
concur in the majority’s adoption of the board’s findings and conclusion that the 
respondent violated Canon 7(B)(1), 7(C)(9), and 7(E)(1), I respectfully dissent as 
to the lesser sanction imposed. 
 
The board had it right.  Thus, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
RESNICK, ACTING C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  The aggravating factors present in this case warrant 
the sanction recommended by the board.  I, therefore, respectfully dissent. 
 
CHRISTLEY, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.