Case Title: PHYLLIS L GRIFFITH V STATE FARM MUTUAL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 122286

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 14, 2005 
PHYLLIS L. GRIFFITH, Legal Guardian
for DOUGLAS W. GRIFFITH, a Legally
Incapacitated Adult, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122286 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, J.  
In this case, we consider whether the no-fault act, 
MCL 500.3101 et seq., requires defendant, a no-fault 
insurer, to reimburse plaintiff for her incapacitated 
husband’s food expenses. 
Because the food in this case is 
neither 
“for 
accidental 
bodily 
injury” 
under 
MCL 
500.3105(1) nor “for an injured person’s care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a), we hold that the 
expenses for it may not be recovered under those provisions 
 
 
                                                 
of the no-fault act. 
We thus reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On April 28, 1994, plaintiff’s sixty-three-year-old 
husband, Douglas Griffith,1 suffered a severe brain injury 
as a result of a motor vehicle accident. 
He received 
treatment at in-patient facilities and hospitals until 
August 1995, at which time he was transferred to a 
residence where he received twenty-four-hour nursing and 
attendant care. 
On August 6, 1997, Griffith returned home 
with plaintiff. 
He remains confined to a wheelchair and 
continues to require assistance with basic daily tasks such 
as eating and bathing. 
After the accident, defendant provided coverage as 
Griffith’s no-fault insurer. 
Until the time that Griffith 
returned home, the expenses that defendant covered included 
food expenses. 
After Griffith returned home, defendant 
denied plaintiff’s claim for Griffith’s food expenses, and 
plaintiff sued to recoup those expenses.2  The trial court 
ruled that Griffith’s food costs are an “allowable expense” 
1 
This 
opinion 
references 
Douglas 
Griffith 
as 
“Griffith” and Phyllis Griffith as “plaintiff.” 
2 Plaintiff’s complaint included claims for items other
than Griffith’s food, but those claims are not at issue in
this appeal. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) of the no-fault act and ordered 
defendant to pay a per diem food charge. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed.3
 The Court relied on 
Reed v Citizens Ins Co of America, 198 Mich App 443; 499 
NW2d 22 (1993), which held that a person receiving at-home 
care is entitled to room and board costs under MCL 
500.3107(1)(a) to the same extent that such costs would 
constitute an allowable expense if the injured person 
received the same care in an institutional setting. 
Thus, 
the panel concluded that, under Reed, Griffith’s food costs 
are an “allowable expense” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). 
Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal to 
this Court, which this Court denied.4
 Thereafter, this 
Court granted defendant’s motion for reconsideration and 
granted leave to appeal.5 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case requires us to determine whether an injured 
person’s food costs constitute an “allowable expense” under 
MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Issues of statutory interpretation are 
3 Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued August 16, 2002 (Docket No. 232517). 
4 468 Mich 946 (2003). 
5 469 Mich 1020 (2004). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
questions of law that this Court reviews de novo. 
Jenkins 
v Patel, 471 Mich 158, 162; 684 NW2d 346 (2004). 
III. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
When interpreting a statute, we must ascertain the 
legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the 
statutory language itself. 
Sotelo v Grant Twp, 470 Mich 
95, 100; 680 NW2d 381 (2004). 
When the language of a 
statute is unambiguous, the Legislature’s intent is clear 
and 
judicial 
construction 
is 
neither 
necessary 
nor 
permitted. Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 
312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). Because the role of the judiciary 
is to interpret rather than write the law, courts lack 
authority to venture beyond a statute’s unambiguous text. 
Id. 
Further, we accord undefined statutory terms their 
plain and ordinary meanings and may consult dictionary 
definitions in such situations. 
Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich 
572, 578; 683 NW2d 129 (2004). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Statutory Language and Legal Background 
MCL 500.3105(1) provides: 
Under 
personal 
protection 
insurance 
an 
insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental 
bodily injury arising out of the ownership,
operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of
this chapter. [Emphasis added.] 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
According to the plain language of MCL 500.3105(1), a no­
fault insurer is only required to pay benefits “for 
accidental bodily injury” arising out of an automobile 
accident. 
The no-fault act further restricts a no-fault 
insurer’s liability by defining the limited types of 
benefits that are payable “for accidental bodily injury 
. . . .”  MCL 500.3107(1)(a), the statutory provision at 
the center of this case, states: 
Except 
as 
provided 
in 
subsection 
(2),
personal 
protection 
insurance 
benefits 
are 
payable for the following: 
(a) Allowable expenses consisting of all 
reasonable 
charges 
incurred 
for 
reasonably
necessary products, services and accommodations
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation. [Emphasis added.] 
Thus, in addition to the requirement under MCL 500.3105(1) 
that benefits be “for accidental bodily injury,” MCL 
500.3107(1)(a) circumscribes benefits to those expenses 
consisting only of items or services that are reasonably 
necessary “for an injured person’s care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation.” 
Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have 
interpreted and applied the above statutes in cases 
involving claims for food or “room and board” expenses. In 
Manley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange, 127 Mich 
App 444, 448; 339 NW2d 205 (1983), rev’d 425 Mich 140 
(1986), the plaintiffs’ minor son suffered severe head 
5  
 
 
 
trauma in an automobile accident. 
He resided with the 
plaintiffs and received care from nurse’s aides. 
Id. at 
449. 
The plaintiffs sued the defendant no-fault carrier, 
seeking, among other things, reimbursement for his room and 
board costs. 
Id. at 448-449. 
The defendant insurance 
carrier argued that because the plaintiffs already had a 
legal duty to care for their child, room and board costs 
were not compensable. 
Id. at 451. 
The Court of Appeals 
rejected this argument, largely on the basis of a worker’s 
compensation case that distinguished between “ordinary 
household tasks” such as cleaning and washing clothes and 
nonordinary tasks such as “‘[s]erving meals in bed and 
bathing, 
dressing, 
and 
escorting 
a 
disabled 
person 
. . . .’” 
Id. at 452, quoting Kushay v Sexton Dairy Co, 
394 Mich 69; 228 NW2d 205 (1975). 
The panel concluded that the distinction between 
ordinary and nonordinary tasks could be reconciled with the 
language of MCL 500.3107(a), which then provided that 
“products, services, and accommodations not reasonably 
necessary for the injured person’s care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation are not ‘allowable expenses.’” 127 Mich App 
at 453. The Court reasoned: 
The 
necessity 
for 
the 
performance 
of 
ordinary household tasks has nothing to do with
the 
injured 
person’s 
care, 
recovery, 
or 
rehabilitation; such tasks must be performed
whether or not anyone is injured. 
6  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
This reasoning supports a generalization
concerning the circumstances in which a product,
service, or accommodation can fall within the
definition of “allowable expense.” 
Products, 
services, 
or 
accommodations 
which 
are 
as 
necessary for an uninjured person as for an 
injured person are not “allowable expenses.”
[Id. at 453-454 (emphasis added).] 
The panel then opined that food “is as necessary for an 
uninjured person as for an injured person” and thus would 
not ordinarily constitute an “allowable expense” under MCL 
500.3107 for an injured person cared for at home. 127 Mich 
App at 454. 
When Manley was appealed to this Court, we effectively 
vacated the Court of Appeals room and board analysis. 
Manley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange, 425 Mich 
140; 388 NW2d 216 (1986). 
We stated that the “question 
whether food, shelter, utilities, clothing, and other such 
maintenance expenses are an allowable expense when the 
injured person is cared for at home” had neither been 
raised before the trial court nor argued in the Court of 
Appeals. 
Id. at 152. 
Accordingly, this Court declined to 
address the issue and stated that the Court of Appeals 
analysis of the issue “shall not be regarded as of 
precedential force or effect.” Id. at 153. 
Justice Boyle issued a concurring and dissenting 
opinion, asserting that the room and board issue was 
properly before this Court because the Court of Appeals had 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
raised it sua sponte and discussed the issue in its 
opinion. 
Id. at 168 (Boyle, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
She could find “no principled basis” 
for 
distinguishing 
between 
food 
provided 
in 
an 
institutional setting and food provided at home, and 
concluded that the Court of Appeals “injured person vs. 
uninjured 
person” 
test 
was 
not 
only 
“unwieldy 
and 
unworkable” but that it effectively punished those who 
choose to care for injured family members at home. 
Id. at 
168-169. 
Justice Boyle opined that MCL 500.3107 imposes 
three requirements for “allowable expenses”: “1) the charge 
must be reasonable, 2) the expense must be reasonably 
necessary, and 3) the expense must be incurred.” 
425 Mich 
at 169. 
Thereafter, in Reed, the Court of Appeals adopted 
Justice Boyle’s Manley analysis. 
The insured in Reed had 
been severely injured in an auto accident. 
Reed, supra at 
445. 
The plaintiff, the insured’s mother, filed various 
claims against the defendant insurer and moved to amend her 
complaint to include a claim for room and board expenses. 
Id. at 445-446. 
The trial court denied the motion on the 
basis that such expenses were not recoverable under the no­
fault act. Id. at 446. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning as follows: 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We see no compelling reason not to afford
the same compensation under the act to family
members who provide room and board. 
Subsection 
1(a) does not distinguish between accommodations
provided by family members and accommodations 
provided by institutions, and we decline to read
such a distinction into the act. 
Moreover,
holding that accommodations provided by family
members is [sic] an “allowable expense” is in
accord with the policy of this state. 
Denying
compensation for family-provided accommodations 
while allowing compensation in an institutional
setting would discourage home care that is 
generally, 
we 
believe, 
less 
costly 
than 
institutional 
care. 
Irrespective 
of 
cost 
considerations, 
it 
can 
be 
stated 
without 
hesitation that home care is more personal than
that given in a clinical setting. . . . 
We hold that, where an injured person is
unable 
to 
care 
for 
himself 
and 
would 
be 
institutionalized 
were 
a 
family 
member 
not 
willing to provide home care, a no-fault insurer
is liable to pay the cost of maintenance in the 
home.
 [Id. at 452-453 (citations omitted;
emphasis added).] 
In addition to the above reasoning, the Court of Appeals 
relied on the notion that because the no-fault act is 
remedial in nature, it “must be liberally construed in 
favor of persons intended to benefit thereby.” Id. at 451. 
B. Interpretation of Statutory Language and
Application 
As 
previously 
stated, 
MCL 
500.3105(1) 
and 
MCL 
500.3107(1)(a) 
impose 
two 
separate 
and 
distinct 
requirements 
for 
“care, 
recovery, 
or 
rehabilitation” 
expenses to be compensable under the no-fault act. 
First, 
such expenses must be “for accidental bodily injury arising 
out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
motor vehicle . . . .” 
MCL 500.3105(1) (emphasis added). 
Second, these expenses must be “reasonably necessary . . . 
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” 
MCL 500.3107(1)(a). 
Defendant contends that MCL 500.3105(1) requires that 
allowable expenses be causally connected to a person’s 
injury. 
We agree. 
In fact, MCL 500.3105(1) imposes two 
causation requirements for no-fault benefits. 
First, an insurer is liable only if benefits are “for 
accidental bodily injury . . . .” “[F]or” implies a causal 
connection.6
 
“[A]ccidental 
bodily 
injury” 
therefore 
triggers an insurer’s liability and defines the scope of 
that liability. 
Accordingly, a no-fault insurer is liable 
to pay benefits only to the extent that the claimed 
benefits are causally connected to the accidental bodily 
injury arising out of an automobile accident. 
Second, an insurer is liable to pay benefits for 
accidental bodily injury only if those injuries “aris[e] 
out of” or are caused by “the ownership, operation, 
6 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997)
defines “for,” when used as a preposition, as “with the
object or purpose of,” “intended to belong to or be used in
connection with,” or “suiting the purposes or needs of.”
The definition offered by Justice Kelly—“‘by reason of’”—
also implies a causal connection. 
See post at 5. 
(Citation omitted.) 
10  
 
 
 
                                                 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle . . . .” 
It is not 
any bodily injury that triggers an insurer’s liability 
under the no-fault act. 
Rather, it is only those injuries 
that are caused by the insured’s use of a motor vehicle. 
In this case, it is uncontested that the insured’s 
injuries arose out of his use of an automobile. Therefore, 
to the extent that the insured’s injuries stem from an 
automobile accident, application of the second causal 
element noted above does not bar plaintiff’s claim. 
The first causal element, however, poses a problem for 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiff does not claim that her husband’s 
diet is different from that of an uninjured person, that 
his food expenses are part of his treatment plan, or that 
these costs are related in any way to his injuries. 
She 
claims instead that Griffith’s insurer is liable for 
ordinary, everyday food expenses. 
As such, plaintiff has 
not established that these expenses are “for accidental 
bodily injury . . . .”7 
7 Our dissenting colleagues fail to explain how they
avoid the causation requirement in MCL 500.3105(1). 
As we 
will explain, because plaintiff is not on a special diet,
his food expenses are not “for accidental bodily injury,”
and those expenses therefore are not recoverable in this
case. 
It is therefore not surprising that our dissenting
colleagues 
avoid 
developing 
their 
analysis 
of 
MCL 
500.3105(1), because their position is plainly inconsistent
with the unambiguous language of that provision. 
11  
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
Even if ordinary food expenses were compensable under 
§ 3105, an insurer would be liable for those expenses only 
if 
they 
were 
also 
“allowable 
expenses” 
under 
MCL 
500.3107(1)(a). 
This section provides that benefits are 
payable for “reasonably necessary products, services and 
accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation.” In other words, an insurer is liable only 
for the cost of “products, services and accommodations” 
“reasonably necessary” “for an injured person’s care, 
recovery, or rehabilitation.”8 
There is no dispute that Griffith is an “injured 
person.” 
Thus, the question is whether food is reasonably 
necessary for his “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” as an 
injured person. 
It is not contended here that the food 
expenses at issue are a part of the insured’s “recovery” or 
“rehabilitation.” 
Indeed, plaintiff does not allege that 
the food has special curative properties that might advance 
Griffith's recovery or rehabilitation. 
The key issue, 
8 In her concurring and dissenting opinion in Manley,
Justice Boyle read MCL 500.3107(1)(a) as imposing only
three requirements: “1) the charge must be reasonable, 2)
the expense must be reasonably necessary, and 3) the 
expense must be incurred.” 
425 Mich at 169 (Boyle, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addition to 
these requirements, however, the statute states that an
“allowable expense” must be “for” one of the following: (1)
an injured person’s care, (2) his recovery, or (3) his
rehabilitation. 
12  
 
 
                                                 
therefore, is whether the food expenses are necessary for 
Griffith’s “care.” 
Because “care” can have several meanings depending on 
the context in which it is used, the doctrine of noscitur a 
sociis is helpful in discerning the meaning of that term in 
this statute. This doctrine is premised on the notion that 
“the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends 
on context.” 
King v St Vincent’s Hosp, 502 US 215, 221; 
112 S Ct 570; 116 L Ed 2d 578 (1991).9
 Thus, under the 
doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “‘“a word or phrase is given 
meaning by its context or setting.”’” Koontz, supra at 318 
(citations omitted). 
As a general matter, “words and 
clauses will not be divorced from those which precede and 
those which follow.” Sanchick v State Bd of Optometry, 342 
Mich 555, 559; 70 NW2d 757 (1955). 
When construing a 
series 
of 
terms 
such 
as 
“care, 
recovery, 
or 
rehabilitation,” we are guided by the principle “that words 
grouped in a list should be given related meaning.” 
Third 
Nat’l Bank in Nashville v Impac Ltd, Inc, 432 US 312, 322; 
97 S Ct 2307; 53 L Ed 2d 368 (1977). 
9 See Koontz, supra at 318, quoting Brown v Genesee Co 
Bd of Comm’rs (After Remand), 464 Mich 430, 437; 628 NW2d
471 (2001), quoting Tyler v Livonia Schools, 459 Mich 382,
390-391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999) (“‘Contextual understanding of
statutes is generally grounded in the doctrine of noscitur 
a sociis: “[i]t is known from its associates,” see Black’s
Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 1060.’”). 
13  
 
 
 
       
                                                 
 
 
Generally, “care” 
means 
“protection; charge,” and 
“to make provision.” 
Random House Webster’s College 
Dictionary (2001). 
Thus, taken in isolation, the word 
“care” can be broadly construed to encompass anything that 
is reasonably necessary to the provision of a person’s 
protection or charge. 
But we have consistently held that 
“[c]ourts must give effect to every word, phrase, and 
clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would 
render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.” 
State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich 
142, 146; 644 NW2d 715 (2002). 
Therefore, we must neither 
read “care” so broadly as to render nugatory “recovery and 
rehabilitation” nor construe “care” so narrowly that the 
term is mere surplusage.10  “Care” must have a meaning that 
is 
related 
to, 
but 
distinct 
from, 
“recovery 
and 
rehabilitation.”11 
10 Our dissenting colleagues make the former error,
construing 
“care” 
so 
broadly 
that 
“recovery 
and 
rehabilitation” are mere surplusage. 
If “care” means, as
Justice 
Kelly 
contends, 
“‘the 
provision 
of 
what 
is 
necessary for the welfare and protection of someone,’” post
at 8, then “recovery and rehabilitation”—both of which are
certainly necessary for an injured person’s welfare—are
stripped of any meaning. 
11 See Sutherland Statutory Construction (6th ed, 2000 
rev), § 47.16, pp 265-267 (“[W]hen two or more words are
grouped together, and ordinarily have a similar meaning, 
but are not equally comprehensive, the general word will be
limited and qualified by the special word.” 
14  
 
 
 
 
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the 
statute does not require compensation for any item that is 
reasonably necessary to a person’s care in general. 
Instead, the statute specifically limits compensation to 
charges for products or services that are reasonably 
necessary “for an injured person’s care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
This context suggests 
that “care” must be related to the insured’s injuries. 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that the 
statute 
lists 
“care” 
together 
with 
“recovery” 
and 
“rehabilitation.” “Recovery” is defined as “restoration or 
return to any former and better condition, esp. to health 
from sickness, injury, addiction, etc.” 
Random House 
Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). 
“Rehabilitate” is 
defined as “to restore or bring to a condition of good 
health, ability to work, or productive activity.” 
Id. 
Both terms refer to restoring an injured person to the 
condition he was in before sustaining his injuries. 
Consequently, expenses for “recovery” or “rehabilitation” 
are costs expended in order to bring an insured to a 
condition of health or ability sufficient to resume his 
preinjury life. 
Because “recovery” and “rehabilitation” 
are necessary only when an insured has been injured, both 
terms refer to products, services, and accommodations that 
15  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
are necessary because of injuries sustained through the use 
of a motor vehicle. 
“Care” must have a meaning that is broader than 
“recovery” and “rehabilitation” but is not so broad as to 
render those terms nugatory. 
As noted above, both 
“recovery” and “rehabilitation” refer to an underlying 
injury; likewise, the statute as a whole applies only to an 
“injured person.” It follows that the Legislature intended 
to limit the scope of the term “care” to expenses for those 
products, services, or accommodations whose provision is 
necessitated by the injury sustained in the motor vehicle 
accident.12
 
“Care” 
is 
broader 
than 
“recovery” 
and 
“rehabilitation” because it may encompass expenses for 
products, services, and accommodations that are necessary 
because of the accident but that may not restore a person 
to his preinjury state. 
12 For instance, the cost associated with setting a
broken leg would be compensable under the term “recovery”
because it is necessary to return a person to his post­
injury health, and the cost of learning to walk on a
prosthetic 
leg 
would 
be 
recoverable 
under 
the 
term 
“rehabilitation” because it is necessary to bring the 
person 
back 
to 
a 
condition 
of 
productive 
activity.
Similarly, the cost of such items as a prosthetic leg or
special shoes would be recoverable under the term “care,”
even 
though 
the 
person 
will 
never 
recover 
or 
be 
rehabilitated 
from 
the 
injuries, 
because 
the 
cost 
associated with such products or accommodations stems from
the injury. 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Griffith’s food costs here are not related to his 
“care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” 
There has been no 
evidence introduced that he now requires different food 
than he did before sustaining his injuries as part of his 
treatment plan. While such expenses are no doubt necessary 
for his survival, they are not necessary for his recovery 
or rehabilitation from the injuries suffered in the 
accident, nor are they necessary for his care because of 
the injuries he sustained in the accident. 
Unlike 
prescription medications or nursing care, the food that 
Griffith consumes is simply an ordinary means of sustenance 
rather than a treatment for his “care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation.” In fact, if Griffith had never sustained, 
or were to fully recover from, his injuries, his dietary 
needs would be no different than they are now. 
We 
conclude, therefore, that his food costs are completely 
unrelated to his “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” and 
are not “allowable expenses” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).13 
13 Our dissenting colleagues do not pay sufficient
regard to the context in which the word “care” is used in
MCL 500.3107(1)(a). 
They do not give effect to the 
Legislature’s choice to use the term “care” in conjunction
with the terms “recovery” and “rehabilitation.” 
They also
fail to give effect to the statute’s specific reference to
“an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.”
As we have explained, this contextual background aids our
effort to discern the meaning of the term “care” as used in
the statute. 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
17  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
The parties focus on the distinction between food 
costs for hospital food and food costs for an insured 
Our dissenting colleagues would instead read the word
“care” in a vacuum, thereby allowing them to impose their
preferred meaning without attempting to discern the context
in which the Legislature used the term. 
Our dissenting
colleagues’ failure to read the word “care” in context
renders the word devoid of any definitional limit. 
Let 
there be no mistake—the implication of their interpretation
is that any expense that is necessary for a person’s
general “care” is recoverable, regardless of whether that
expense bears any causal relationship to an “accidental 
bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle 
. . . .”  MCL 500.3105(1). 
Because they would allow a
plaintiff to recover expenses for normal, everyday food
consumed at home that does not differ from what an 
uninjured person would eat, would they also allow recovery
of housing costs and expenses for clothing and toiletries,
where those expenses do not bear any causal relationship to
an accidental bodily injury? 
Justice Kelly seems to 
concede that she would require no-fault insurers to pay for
an injured person’s “shelter” where that expense bears no
causal relation to the injuries. Post at 15. 
It thus appears that Justice Kelly would essentially
invent a new entitlement system by converting our no-fault
law into a general welfare scheme. 
Her new scheme would 
pay all expenses of everyday life, such as mortgage
payments and grocery bills, for anyone who has been injured
in a motor vehicle accident, even where those expenses do
not arise from injuries sustained in the accident. Justice 
Kelly does not explain how she would pay for her newly
minted entitlement plan, but the effect of her position
would be to force Michigan citizens to make these general
welfare payments through increased mandatory insurance 
premiums. 
Perhaps Justice Kelly sincerely believes that 
our state’s citizens should bear this new financial burden,
but such a policy choice belongs to the legislative branch
of our government. In deciding the case before us, we must
honor the intent of the Legislature as reflected in the
current language of the no-fault act by applying the 
causation requirement embodied in the provisions at issue. 
18  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
receiving at-home care. 
Plaintiff contends that there is 
no distinction between such costs. We disagree. 
Food costs in an institutional setting are “benefits 
for accidental bodily injury” and are “reasonably necessary 
products, services and accommodations for an injured 
person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” 
That is, it 
is “reasonably necessary” for an insured to consume 
hospital food during in-patient treatment given the limited 
dining options available. Although an injured person would 
need to consume food regardless of his injuries, he would 
not need to eat that particular food or bear the cost 
associated with it. 
Thus, hospital food is analogous to a 
type of special diet or select diet necessary for an 
injured person’s recovery. 
Because an insured in an 
institutional setting is required to eat “hospital food,” 
such food costs are necessary for an insured’s “care, 
recovery, or rehabilitation” while in such a setting. Once 
an 
injured 
person 
leaves 
the 
institutional 
setting, 
however, he may resume eating a normal diet just as he 
would have had he not suffered any injury and is no longer 
required to bear the costs of hospital food, which are part 
of the unqualified unit cost of hospital treatment.14 
14 Our dissenting colleagues opine that the language of
the no-fault act does not distinguish between food expenses
Footnotes continued on following page. 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
This reasoning can be taken a step further when 
considering the costs of items such as an injured person’s 
clothing, toiletries, and even housing costs. 
Under 
plaintiff’s reasoning, because a hospital provided Griffith 
with clothing while he was institutionalized, defendant 
incurred in a hospital and food expenses at home. 
As we 
have explained, however, we believe this distinction arises
from 
the 
language 
in 
MCL 
500.3105(1) 
and 
MCL 
500.3107(1)(a). 
Food expenses in an institutional setting
are “benefits for accidental bodily injury,” and are 
“reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation,”
given the limited dining options available in hospitals. 
After all, an injured person is required to eat hospital
food precisely because his injuries require treatment in a
hospital. 
By contrast, a person who eats a normal diet at
home 
does 
not 
incur 
food 
expenses 
that 
meet 
the 
requirements of MCL 500.3105(1) and MCL 500.3107(1)(a). 
Justice Kelly also asks whether the majority is 
implying that hospital food expenses would be reimbursable
under MCL 500.3107(1)(a), but not under MCL 500.3105(1). 
We have stated clearly, however, that food costs in an
institutional setting are “benefits for accidental bodily
injury” and are “reasonably necessary products, services
and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery,
or rehabilitation.” 
See p 19 of this opinion. 
In other 
words, we have quoted the language from both statutory
provisions in saying that such expenses are recoverable. 
Finally, 
Justice 
Kelly 
expresses 
concerns 
about 
allowing recovery for food expenses in a hospital but not
at home. 
It is the prerogative of the Legislature,
however, to determine whether the no-fault act should be
amended to allow recovery of food costs that are unrelated
to an accidental bodily injury, taking into account policy
concerns such as those expressed by Justice Kelly and
competing considerations such as the increased costs of
premiums for this mandatory form of insurance coverage.
This Court lacks both the institutional capacity to weigh
the competing policy considerations and the constitutional
authority to amend the no-fault act. 
20  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
should continue to pay for Griffith’s clothing after he is 
released. 
The same can be said of Griffith’s toiletry 
necessities 
and 
housing 
costs. 
While 
Griffith 
was 
institutionalized, 
defendant 
paid 
his 
housing 
costs. 
Should defendant therefore be obligated to pay Griffith’s 
housing payment now that he has been released when 
Griffith’s housing needs have not been affected by his 
injuries? 
Under plaintiff’s reasoning, nothing would prevent no­
fault insurers from being obligated to pay for any expenses 
that an injured person would otherwise be provided in an 
institutional setting as long as they are remotely related 
to the person’s general care. 
Plaintiff’s interpretation 
of MCL 500.3107(1)(a) stretches the language of the act too 
far and, incidentally, would largely obliterate cost 
containment for this mandatory coverage. 
We have always 
been cognizant of this potential problem15 when interpreting 
the no-fault act, and we are no less so today. 
15 See, e.g., Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554,
607-611; 267 NW2d 72 (1978) (“In choosing to make no-fault
insurance compulsory for all motorists, the Legislature has
made the registration and operation of a motor vehicle
inexorably dependent on whether no-fault insurance is 
available at fair and equitable rates.”); Cruz v State Farm 
Mut Automobile Ins Co, 466 Mich 588, 597; 648 NW2d 591
(2002) (recognizing that, because no-fault coverage is 
mandatory, the Legislature has continually sought to make
it more affordable); Celina Mut Ins Co v Lake States Ins 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Moreover, in seeking reimbursement for food and other 
such quotidian expenses, plaintiff is essentially seeking a 
wage-loss benefit. 
Reimbursement for the value of lost 
wages, however, is specifically addressed elsewhere in the 
no-fault act. 
See MCL 500.3107(1)(b).16  See also Popma v 
Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 446 Mich 460, 463, 471; 521 NW2d 831 
(1994). 
Plaintiff’s construction of § 3107(1)(a) is 
strongly undermined by the Legislature’s express provision 
for, and limitation on, wage-loss benefits in § 3107(1)(b). 
Under MCL 500.3105 and MCL 500.3107(1)(a), defendant 
is not required to reimburse plaintiff for the food 
expenses at issue in this case. 
Such expenses are not 
necessary 
“for 
accidental 
bodily 
injury” 
under 
MCL 
500.3105. 
In addition, they are not “allowable expenses” 
Co, 452 Mich 84, 89; 549 NW2d 834 (1996) (“the no-fault
insurance system . . . is designed to provide victims with
assured, adequate, and prompt reparations at the lowest 
cost to both the individuals and the no-fault system” 
[emphasis added]); O’Donnell v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 404 
Mich 524, 547; 273 NW2d 829 (1979) (recognizing that the
Legislature had provided for setoffs in the no-fault act:
“Because the first-party insurance proposed by the act was
to be compulsory, it was important that the premiums to be
charged by the insurance companies be maintained as low as
possible. Otherwise, the poor and the disadvantaged people
of the state might not be able to obtain the necessary
insurance.”). 
16 This section provides, in part: 
Work loss consisting of loss of income from
work an injured person would have performed
during the first 3 years after the date of the
accident if he or she had not been injured. 
22  
 
 
 
 
under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) because food is not necessary for 
Griffith’s “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” under that 
subsection. 
Because the rule announced in Reed, supra, is 
contrary to the language of the above provisions, we 
overrule the Court of Appeals decision in Reed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We 
conclude 
that 
defendant 
is 
not 
required 
to 
reimburse plaintiff for Griffith’s food costs under MCL 
500.3105 and MCL 500.3107(1)(a) of the no-fault act. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PHYLLIS L. GRIFFITH, legal guardian
for DOUGLAS W. GRIFFITH, a legally
incapacitated adult, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122286 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 
I dissent from the majority’s holding that food 
expenses for plaintiff’s incapacitated husband are not 
“allowable expenses” for which plaintiff should be paid 
under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). 
Rather, consistently with 
Justice Boyle’s concurrence in Manley v Detroit Automobile 
Inter-Ins Exch,1 and with the Court of Appeals opinion in 
Reed v Citizens Ins Co of America,2 I would conclude that 
the reasonable charges incurred for plaintiff’s husband’s 
food while he is cared for at home are recoverable as 
1 425 Mich 140, 168-169; 388 NW2d 216 (1986)(Boyle, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
2 198 Mich App 443, 452-453; 499 NW2d 22 (1993). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“allowable expenses” under the statute. Therefore, I would 
affirm the Court of Appeals decision in this case. 
Under the statute, “allowable expenses” consist of 
all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably
necessary products, services and accommodations
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation. [MCL 500.3107(1)(a).] 
With this language, the Legislature provided a fairly broad 
definition of “allowable expenses” to encompass all the 
things that might reasonably be needed for an injured 
person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. 
As Justice 
Kelly notes in her dissent, “[i]t is difficult to deny that 
food is a product reasonably necessary for the care of an 
invalid, however narrowly ‘care’ is defined. 
Without 
nourishment, an injured person could not be restored to 
health and could not properly be cared for.” 
Post at 9. 
And, as stated by Justice Boyle, there is 
no principled basis for deciding that food 
provided to [the plaintiff’s husband] at home is
not as much an “allowable expense” as the food
provided in a licensed medical care facility.
Where 
a 
person 
who 
normally 
would 
require
institutional treatment is cared for at home in a 
quasi-institutional setting made possible by the
love and dedication of the injured victim’s 
family, the test for “allowable expenses” should
not differ from that set out in MCL 500.3107(a).
[Manley, supra at 168-169 (citations omitted).] 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the cost 
of plaintiff’s husband’s food is recoverable as “allowable 
2  
 
 
 
expenses” under the no-fault act, and I would affirm the 
Court of Appeals decision. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PHYLLIS L. GRIFFITH, legal guardian
for DOUGLAS W. GRIFFITH, a legally
incapacitated adult, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 122286 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
Today the Court reaches the extraordinary conclusion 
that food is not always necessary for an injured person's 
care. 
The Court concludes that food is “completely 
unrelated to [an injured person’s] ‘care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation’” if provided in a home, although it is both 
necessary and reimbursable if provided in an institution. 
Ante at 8. 
I disagree. 
The Court of Appeals decision that 
reached the opposite conclusion twelve years ago, Reed v 
Citizens Ins Co of America,1 was correct and should not be 
1 198 Mich App 443; 499 NW2d 22 (1993). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
overturned. 
It is obvious to me that food should continue 
to be an allowable expense under the no-fault act wherever 
provided as long as reasonably necessary to an injured 
person's care. 
THE NO-FAULT ACT 
We review issues of statutory construction de novo. 
Stewart v Michigan, 471 Mich 692, 696; 692 NW2d 376 (2004). 
In construing statutes, our purpose is to determine and 
implement the intent of the Legislature. 
Sanders v Delton 
Kellogg Schools, 453 Mich 483, 487; 556 NW2d 467 (1996). 
The act under review here was passed to provide 
benefits for victims of motor vehicle accidents without 
regard to who was at fault. 
Substituting for certain tort 
remedies that it abolished, the act created a comprehensive 
and expeditious benefit system 
through insurance.  Shavers v 
Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). 
This Court has determined that the Legislature intended the 
no-fault act to be construed liberally in favor of the 
insured.2 
Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 448 Mich 22, 28; 
528 NW2d 681 (1995). 
2 The majority’s decision today, taking food as it were
from the mouth of the injured insured convalescing at home,
is anything but a liberal construction in his favor. 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
MCL 500.3105(1)  
In 
this 
case, 
Mr. 
Griffith 
was 
injured 
in 
an 
automobile accident that rendered him unable to care for 
himself. He remains injured. 
Therefore, without contest, 
he satisfies the requirement of § 3105(1), and his insurer 
must pay him benefits. The issue here involves the meaning 
of “benefits.” 
Section 3105(1) requires: 
Under 
personal 
protection 
insurance 
an 
insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental
bodily injury arising out of the ownership,
operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of
this chapter. 
On its face, this section requires an insurer to pay 
benefits to its insured injured in a motor vehicle 
accident. 
The Legislature took pains to define at a 
different section of the statute what benefits must be 
paid. 
MCL 500.3107(1)(a).3
 As the majority observes, § 
3 In pertinent part, MCL 500.3107 provides: 
[P]ersonal protection insurance benefits are
payable for . . . 
(a) 
Allowable expenses consisting of all
reasonable 
charges 
incurred 
for 
reasonably
necessary products, services, and accommodations
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation. . . . 
(b) Work loss . . . . 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
3  
 
 
 
                                                 
3107(1)(a) is “the statutory provision at the center of 
this case.” 
Ante at 5. 
Because the Legislature defined 
“benefits” in § 3107(1)(a), it seems contradictory that it 
would have given “benefits” a different definition in § 
3105(1). 
Yet, the majority reads § 3105(1) to mean that the 
only benefits that a no-fault insurer is liable to pay are 
those 
“causally 
connected 
to 
the 
accidental 
bodily 
injury . . . .” Ante at 10. 
It is not Mr. Griffith's 
injury, it reasons, that occasioned his need for food. 
Hence the cost of his food is not a covered expense. 
The majority finds that § 3105 limits the benefits 
made available in § 3107, despite the fact that the courts 
have never before found such a limitation. 
The majority 
defines “for” in the phrase “an insurer is liable to pay 
benefits for accidental bodily injury” as meaning “‘with 
the object or purpose of,’” “‘intended to belong to or be 
used in connection with,’” and “‘suiting the purposes or 
needs of.’” Ante at 10 n 6. (Citation omitted.) From that 
it concludes that these definitions “imply” that the 
benefit an injured party seeks must be directly caused by 
(c) Expenses . . . reasonably incurred in
obtaining ordinary and necessary services in lieu
of those that, if he or she had not been injured,
an injured person would have performed . . . . 
4  
 
 
 
 
the injury. 
Not only is the majority’s reading of § 3105 
novel and unprecedented, it flies in the face of our time­
honored determination to liberally construe the no-fault 
act for the benefit of the insured. 
The word “for” in the English language has many 
nuances in its meaning. 
I feel confident that the 
Legislature added § 3107(1)(a) for the purpose of defining 
“benefits” in § 3105. On the basis of that belief, I find 
that the definition of “for” in § 3105 that best accords 
with the Legislature’s intent is “by reason of.” 
Random 
House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). 
Hence, § 3105 
should be read to mean that benefits are payable “by reason 
of” accidental bodily injury. 
Reading § 3105 in this way ensures that the only 
limitations placed on “benefits” for an insured injured in 
an 
auto 
accident 
are 
those 
clearly 
stated 
by 
the 
Legislature in § 3107. 
My belief is that, if the 
Legislature intended that the sole benefits payable for an 
insured’s injury were those directly arising therefrom, it 
would have said so. Also, it would not have required at § 
3107 payment for so broad a category as “all reasonable 
charges 
incurred 
for 
reasonably 
necessary 
products, 
services and accommodations for an injured person’s care, 
recovery, or rehabilitation.” 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
Additionally, the majority’s reading of the act is 
irrational. 
The majority believes that food provided in 
the hospital qualifies as a benefit under the act. 
However, under its reading of § 3105, food would be 
excluded: 
the need for it does not arise from the injury. 
The majority explains that, in an institution, one has 
little choice what food is served. But it fails to explain 
how that fact transforms hospital food into an expense 
arising from an accident. 
If the Legislature had intended, for example, that 
ground beef be compensable only if no other entrée were 
offered, it should have written something to make that 
clear. 
The majority will search in vain for some 
indication in the act that food, or any item, can qualify 
for “benefits for an accidental bodily injury” if furnished 
in the hospital but not at home. Absolutely nothing in 
either § 3105 or § 3107 allows for that distinction. 
The difficulty the majority has in providing a 
convincing answer to this question illustrates the weakness 
of its conclusion. 
Its reading of § 3105 is, at its 
foundation, unsound. 
The majority criticizes my analysis 
of § 3105(1) as inadequate and “undeveloped.” 
Ante at 12, 
n 7. It would be inadequate only if I agreed with the 
majority's choice to create two requirements where there is 
6  
 
 
 
 
only one in § 3105. 
I have taken my own analysis of § 
3105(1) to its logical conclusion. 
It is not the same 
analysis as the majority’s, but it is more faithful to the 
text of the statute. 
Contrary to Justice Corrigan’s 
belief, I have set forth a 
principled basis for my 
analysis. 
It includes a plain-language reading of §§ 
3105(1) and 3107(1)(a). 
MCL 500.3107(1)(a) 
The majority finds that Douglas Griffith fails to 
qualify not only under § 3105(1) but also under § 
3107(1)(a). 
In construing § 3107(1)(a), first it goes to 
the dictionary to interpret the meaning of “care.” 
As is frequently the case, here a dictionary alone 
does not clarify the Legislature's intent. 
“Care” has 
several definitions. 
The majority chooses “protection” or 
“charge” as the appropriate one. 
But the word can also be 
defined as “the provision of what is necessary for the 
welfare and protection of someone or something." 
Compact 
Oxford English Dictionary. 
It is clear that, when consulting a dictionary in 
performance of the interpretative task, one is normally 
required to make a choice among several definitions. It is 
nothing less than a pretense to maintain that, in enforcing 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
a statute “as written,” a court does not make definitional 
choices. 
The language of § 3107(1)(a) is broad. 
Yet, the 
majority ultimately limits the meaning of “care” to the 
care needed for recovery and rehabilitation, ascribing to 
it a restorative meaning. The logical consequence of using 
this restrictive definition demonstrates that it is poorly 
chosen. 
It reads “care” out of the sentence. 
Given that 
“recovery and rehabilitation” are in the sentence with 
“care,” the effect of the majority's choice of definitions 
turns “care” into a mere redundancy. 
This approach 
violates our obligation when interpreting statutes to try 
to give every word meaning and treat no word as surplusage. 
Altman v Meridian Twp, 439 Mich 623, 635; 487 NW2d 155 
(1992). 
My reading of the statute gives independent meaning to 
the word “care.” 
Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, 
the meaning of questionable words may be ascertained by 
reference to the meaning of other words associated with it. 
Applying this doctrine, “care” fits with “recovery” and 
“rehabilitation” when “care” is interpreted broadly to mean 
“the provision of what is necessary for the welfare and 
protection of someone.” 
The Legislature intended that an 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
injured 
person’s 
needs 
be 
furnished 
(“care”) 
until 
“recovery” has been accomplished through “rehabilitation.” 
In 
some 
cases, 
such 
as 
where 
a 
motorist 
is 
catastrophically injured, recovery and rehabilitation may 
not be an achievable goal. In these cases, the Legislature 
requires that the injured individual receive all products 
and services reasonably necessary for his or her continuing 
care. The act's comprehensive language demonstrates the 
Legislature's intent to ensure that benefits are provided 
in every instance where a motorist suffers injury. 
THE LEGISLATURE’S INTENTION WITH RESPECT TO FOOD 
It is difficult to deny that food is a product 
reasonably necessary for the care of an invalid, however 
narrowly “care” is defined. 
Without nourishment, an 
injured person could not be restored to health and could 
not properly be cared for. In fact, without it, a person's 
physical well-being would be immediately threatened. 
A 
finding that food is necessary for “care” accords with the 
purpose of the no-fault act: to provide benefits needed by 
someone injured in an automobile accident. 
There is a limitation on those benefits in the act: 
all benefits reasonably necessary. Given the wide variety 
of circumstances under which injured parties seek no-fault 
benefits, the act provides for wide latitude in determining 
9  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
what 
benefits 
are 
reasonably 
necessary 
in 
a 
given 
situation. 
Unfortunately, the majority limits the wide 
latitude provided by the Legislature by restrictively 
reading the word “care.” 
It 
is 
noteworthy 
that 
the 
Legislature 
did 
not 
expressly limit the expenses recoverable in no-fault cases 
to those that the injured person did not require before the 
injury. It could have included, but did not, a clause such 
as “benefits are payable except for those that were 
reasonably necessary for the care of the person before the 
injury.” 
It is the majority, not the Legislature, that 
writes this limitation into the act. 
The majority concludes that food is not necessary for 
the care of Mr. Griffith because he requires food, injured 
or not. 
It adds that food has nothing to do with an 
injured party's “care, recovery, or rehabilitation.”  It 
further reasons that food is not an allowable expense when 
consumed in the home, although it is an allowable expense 
in an institution.4 
4 The majority claims a distinction exists where an
injured person is required to eat hospital food because his
or her injuries require treatment in a hospital. This
ignores the closely related situation presented in this
case. A catastrophically injured individual remains injured
and continues to require institutional treatment, but does
not necessarily require the treatment in a hospital or
long-term care facility. 
10  
 
 
                                                 
 
This is not a reasonable construction of the statutory 
language. 
Nothing in the language of the no-fault act 
indicates that whether a home-based expense is allowable 
depends on whether an uninjured person has the same 
expense. 
The act’s language mandates that the appropriate 
question is whether the injured person reasonably incurred 
the questioned expense as part of his or her care, 
recovery, or rehabilitation. 
The logic in the majority’s reasoning is, charitably 
speaking, illusory. 
If an automobile accident victim is 
hospitalized, the reasonable cost of his or her food is a 
covered expense under § 3107(1)(a). 
If another automobile 
accident victim requires the same care, but receives it at 
home, the reasonable cost of his or her food likewise 
should be a covered expense under § 3107(1)(a). 
I agree with Justice Boyle’s partial concurrence in 
Manley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exch,5 and the Court 
of Appeals decision in Reed: 
no principled distinction 
justifies 
a 
holding 
that, 
where 
a 
patient 
is 
institutionalized, food is a reasonably necessary expense, 
but if he or she is home receiving the same care, it is 
not. 
Moreover, the plain language of the no-fault act 
makes no such distinction. 
5 425 Mich 140, 168; 388 NW2d 216 (1986). 
11  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
The majority claims that its ruling is necessary to 
keep down the cost of no-fault insurance. 
However, the 
record contains no evidence to support that claim. 
There 
is nothing to indicate that no-fault insurance has become 
unaffordable because of in-home food expenses that insurers 
until now have been required to provide to catastrophically 
injured policyholders.6 
The facts of Mr. Griffith’s case illustrate the 
complexity of the issue before us and why the Legislature 
could not have intended the interpretation made by the 
majority. 
Mr. Griffith is receiving one hundred percent 
institutional care, albeit in a home setting. 
He resides 
in his own home and is being cared for solely by medical 
6 The majority claims that my interpretation of the
statute is based on policy considerations. 
But, in this
case, I base my interpretation on the language found in the
no-fault act. 
The Legislature has already made the policy
decision. 
My construction of the statute is in accordance
with that decision. Nonetheless, policy considerations are
frequently appropriate. 
Certainly, the decision in this 
case has numerous policy implications. 
For example, the
majority appears concerned that no-fault costs be kept low.
This is a policy concern. 
In that regard, I fail to see
why my interpretation of the law, which has prevailed at
least since 1993, would increase current no-fault premiums.
One 
would 
expect 
that 
no-fault 
providers 
have 
been 
factoring the potential for these costs into their premiums
for years. 
Perhaps this state’s drivers can expect that
their premiums will decrease in response to the majority’s
opinion today. 
After all, Michigan drivers will no longer
be entitled to the same level of benefits that they have
paid for in premiums during the past twelve years. 
12  
 
 
professionals, his wife having been placed in a nursing 
home. 
Thus, family members play no role in cooking for 
Douglas Griffith or in providing his food. 
There is no 
evidence that his meals differ in any respect from those he 
earlier received in the hospital. 
Because food in both 
settings is necessary for his care, both should be 
compensable under the act. 
The only distinction between Mr. Griffith’s hospital 
care and his in-home care is the location at which he 
receives it. 
The language of the no-fault act does not 
limit expenses only to those incurred in a hospital 
setting. This is a new rule created by the Court. 
The majority attempts to buttress its interpretation 
by asserting that it has discerned the policy choice made 
by the Legislature. 
It insists that my reading is my own 
policy 
choice 
that 
cannot 
be 
accurate 
unless 
the 
Legislature amends the no-fault act. 
This is a logical 
fallacy that assumes the majority’s conclusion as its 
premise. 
Also faulty is the majority’s assertion that my 
reading of the statute “essentially invent[s] a new 
entitlement system.” Ante at 19 n 13. To the contrary, my 
13  
 
 
 
reading of the statute conforms with the law as interpreted 
for at least the past twelve years. 
The Court of Appeals made the same application. While 
the majority’s accusations and appeal to cost concerns 
create a rhetorical flourish, it is the majority, and not 
I, that advocates a drastic change in established law. 
Let there be no mistake in this: 
motorists, required 
to purchase no-fault insurance in order to drive in 
Michigan, now have one less resource available to them 
because of the majority’s restrictive reading of the no­
fault act. 
The majority holds that food, as a matter of 
law, 
is 
never 
reasonably 
necessary 
for 
one’s 
care, 
recovery, or rehabilitation outside a hospital. 
A proper reading of the text belies the majority’s 
conclusions. 
There is no need to require the Legislature 
to amend its decision that all expenses should be covered 
as long as reasonably necessary to an injured person’s 
care, recovery, and rehabilitation. 
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE MAJORITY’S DECISION 
The majority forces a harsh dilemma on insured 
individuals injured in automobile accidents: 
remain in an 
institution, 
if 
insurance 
coverage 
is 
available, 
or 
convalesce at home where they or others are burdened with 
the cost of their food. 
Unfortunately for impoverished 
14  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
families, the only choice may be to remain in institutional 
care.7 
Reed has been the rule of law in Michigan for twelve 
years. 
There are unacknowledged alarming implications in 
overruling it. 
If we apply the majority’s reasoning about 
in-home food, is shelter at home an allowable expense? An 
uninjured 
person 
requires 
shelter. 
The 
majority 
incentivizes no-fault insurers to refuse to reimburse these 
and other expenses in the future, even though they are 
without 
dispute 
reasonably 
necessary 
for 
an 
injured 
person’s care. 
The majority opines that reimbursement for in-home 
food is a form of wage-loss benefits. 
However, it is 
unable to substantiate that statement with a showing that 
any legislation equates wage-loss benefits with payment for 
care of the injured. 
Wage-loss benefits exist to replace 
lost income, not as reimbursement for expenses incurred. 
Furthermore, 
the 
no-fault 
act 
limits 
wage-loss 
benefits to three years. But the insurer’s obligation to 
provide for the care of an injured person can extend over 
7 Interestingly, although the majority expresses its
concern that costs for insurers be minimized, its decision
arguably helps to increase those costs. In the future, the
care of patients who remain institutionalized during the 
period they once might have returned home is likely to be
more expensive. 
15  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
the person’s lifetime. 
Therefore, equating the provision 
of food with wage loss is inaccurate. 
The Legislature 
struck a very definite compromise on the duration of wage­
loss benefits that stands in contrast to the lifetime care 
to which an injured person is entitled. 
The majority8 finds that §§ 3105 and 3107 “impose two 
separate and distinct requirements” before expenses are 
compensable under the act. 
It finds that Mr. Griffith’s 
expenses for in-home food fail to satisfy the requirements 
of both sections. They fail to satisfy § 3107 because they 
were not necessary for his care. 
They fail to satisfy § 
3105 because they were not caused by the accidental bodily 
injury. 
The majority informs us that Mr. Griffith’s food, when 
provided in the hospital, did satisfy § 3107. 
Are we to 
infer that the hospital food was nonetheless not a 
reimbursable expense because it did not satisfy § 3105?9 
8 Ante at 9. 
9 After quoting both statutory provisions relevant to
the present analysis, the majority concludes that hospital
food remains a covered expense. 
But merely quoting the
statutory language does not resolve the question. 
According to the majority, an injured person's food is
not “for” an accidental bodily injury because the need for
food was not caused by the automobile accident. 
By the
majority’s logic, even one who is hospitalized is not
entitled to food expenses because those expenses are as
Footnotes continued on following page. 
16  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
  
Clearly, the food was not an expense caused by the 
accidental bodily injury when furnished either in the 
hospital or at home. 
Finally, the majority makes no provision for those who 
in the past have incurred ongoing expenses and assumed 
ongoing 
burdens 
in 
reliance 
on 
the 
availability 
of 
reimbursements for in-home food. 
Because its holding is 
not limited to new cases, many whose caregivers are already 
receiving reimbursement for in-home food may be forced to 
return to institutional settings. 
CONCLUSION 
The majority’s conclusion is that food is unnecessary 
to one’s “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” outside an 
institution, although necessary inside an institution. 
It 
makes a distinction without a difference. 
Not only is it 
illogical, no statutory basis exists to distinguish the 
necessary to an uninjured person as to an injured person.
This logic is equally applicable regardless of the injured
person’s physical location. 
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I do not express
policy concerns about allowing recovery for food expenses
in a hospital, but not for the same costs at home. 
Rather, my concern is the lack of a logical basis for the
distinction the majority seeks to create. Instead of the
majority’s artificial distinction, I would apply the clear
language of § 3107(1)(a) and allow recovery for products
reasonably 
necessary 
to 
“an 
injured 
person’s 
care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.” I would not decide, as the
majority does, that as a matter of law at-home food 
expenses are never reasonably necessary to one’s care,
recovery, or rehabilitation. 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
reimbursability of the cost of institutional food from the 
reimbursability of the cost of in-home food. 
I would affirm the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals decisions and leave Reed intact. Regardless of the 
choice of meanings ascribed to the word “care,” the 
Legislature’s intent had to be that food is an allowable 
expense 
for 
injured 
automobile 
accident 
victims 
convalescing at home. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh 
18