Case Title: State v. Jamale A. Bonds

Citation: 2006 WI 83

Docket Number: 2005AP000948-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 83 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP948-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jamale A. Bonds, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 287 Wis. 2d 829, 705 N.W.2d 906 
(Ct. App. 2005–Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 28, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Marshall B. Murray 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and BUTLER, JR., J.J., join the 
concurrence.   
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
CROOKS, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
WILCOX and PROSSER, J.J., join the 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Diana M. Felsmann, and oral argument by Jeremy C. Perri, 
assistant state public defenders. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Aaron 
R. O’Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2006 WI 83
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP948-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2003CM6071) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jamale A. Bonds, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.    We review the State's 
post-conviction amendment to a criminal complaint for battery in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1) (2003-04),1 as the amendment 
affects the basis for the allegation that Jamale Bonds is an 
habitual criminal.  In regard to habitual criminality, the 
complaint alleged three misdemeanor convictions.  The date of 
the prior convictions was misstated in the body of the 
complaint, but certified copies of the judgments of conviction 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
2 
 
were attached to the copy of the complaint that was given to 
Bonds.  Bonds pled not guilty and was convicted by a jury.  At 
sentencing, he did not admit the allegation of habitual 
criminality.  The State then changed the factual basis for its 
allegation that Bonds was a repeater and sought to prove a prior 
felony forgery conviction.  The State submitted a Consolidated 
Court Automation Programs (CCAP) report as proof of that 
conviction.  Bonds objected to amending the basis on which the 
State sought to prove habitual criminality and also asserted 
that the proof the State had submitted was insufficient to prove 
habitual criminality beyond a reasonable doubt.  The circuit 
court permitted the amendment, accepted the CCAP report as 
sufficient proof of habitual criminality, and sentenced Bonds as 
a repeater.  Bonds claims it was error to do so. 
¶2 
Four 
members 
of 
the 
court 
conclude 
that 
with 
sufficient proof, the State's post-conviction amendment of the 
basis 
for 
proving 
habitual 
criminality 
would 
have 
been 
permissible for two reasons:  (1) The complaint satisfied the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12 and of due process because 
Bonds had notice that he was being charged as an habitual 
criminal and of the potential maximum sentence he faced before 
he pled; and (2) Bonds was not prejudiced in making an 
intelligent plea as a result of the State's shift to a different 
prior 
conviction 
as 
the 
factual 
basis 
for 
its 
repeater 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
3 
 
allegation.2  However, a different majority of the court also 
concludes that the State's use of a CCAP report as evidence of 
Bonds's conviction does not constitute prima facie proof of that 
conviction and that Bonds did not waive his right to object to 
the State's use of the CCAP report.3  Accordingly, the court of 
appeals decision is reversed and the matter is remanded to the 
circuit court to vacate the enhancer portion of Bonds's 
sentence.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  Jamale Bonds was 
charged with battery as an habitual criminal, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19 and 939.62.  In the criminal complaint, the 
State alleged three prior misdemeanor convictions as the basis 
for the habitual criminality allegation:   
[T]he defendant is a repeater as defined in Wisconsin 
Statutes Section 939.62, in that the defendant was 
convicted of . . . (three misdemeanors) during the 
five year period immediately preceding the commission 
of 
the 
crime 
charged 
in 
this 
complaint, 
which 
conviction(s) remain[] of record and unreversed.  If 
this is found to be the case, the maximum term of 
imprisonment for this crime may be increased to not 
                                                 
2 Justices Jon P. Wilcox, N. Patrick Crooks, David T. 
Prosser and Patience Drake Roggensack form the majority for 
permitting a post-conviction amendment of the factual allegation 
in the complaint upon which the State alleged Bonds was an 
habitual criminal.   
3 Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justices Ann Walsh 
Bradley, Patience Drake Roggensack and Louis B. Butler, Jr. form 
the majority for concluding that a CCAP report is not sufficient 
to constitute prima facie proof of Bonds's prior conviction of a 
felony. 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
4 
 
more than 2 years, exclusive of other enhanced 
penalties charged herein.  
Criminal Complaint 1 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. July 29, 2003).  
The 
three 
prior 
misdemeanor 
convictions 
were 
described 
individually by:  the offense committed, the statute that was 
contravened, the county of conviction and the case number for 
each matter.  The date of the convictions was misstated in the 
body of the complaint; however, certified copies of the 
judgments of conviction were attached to the copy of the 
complaint that was given to Bonds.   
¶4 
Bonds pled not guilty, went to trial, and was 
convicted by a jury.  At sentencing, the State recommended that 
Bonds be sentenced to the maximum term for battery with an 
habitual criminality enhancer:  18 months initial confinement 
and six months extended supervision.  In support of its 
sentencing 
request, 
the 
State 
asked 
that 
the 
habitual 
criminality finding be based on a 1998 felony forgery conviction 
in lieu of the misdemeanor convictions that were alleged in the 
complaint.  Bonds did not admit to a prior conviction so the 
State presented a CCAP report that indicated he was convicted of 
felony forgery one day after the misdemeanor convictions set out 
in the complaint.  The sentencing transcript provides the 
following communication between the sentencing judge and the 
prosecutor about the amendment of the basis for habitual 
criminality 
that 
was 
alleged 
in 
the 
complaint 
and 
the 
calculations that bore on Bonds's repeater status: 
MR. RESAR: 
. . . I have copies of all the circuit 
court 
access 
records. 
 
I 
would 
ask 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
5 
 
specifically, either through these records 
or through the defendant's own admission 
that a finding be made that the defendant 
was convicted of a felony forgery and that 
that conviction took place on April 16th 
of 1998. 
THE COURT: 
That is the day after he was found guilty 
of the battery charge and bail jumping 
charge, misdemeanor charges.  Right? 
MR. RESAR: 
That is accurate.  But I just, I think 
that using the felony is a little cleaner 
and doesn't rely on the older misdemeanor 
that we need to piece together confinement 
time.  However, we still do need to rely 
on confinement time.  The State is asking 
the court to rely on that.  As the 
defendant was charged in this case on July 
29th, 2003.  So, we need at least 5 months 
at that point.  There is approximately 
five years and five months between the 
time the defendant was charged and the 
time the defendant was convicted of the 
felony forgery and that time, excludes 
that five year period excludes any time 
defendant spent in confinement.  There are 
records from the Milwaukee County Jail 
which have been shown to counsel, which 
establish that the defendant was in the 
custody of the Milwaukee County Jail 
between July 26th in 1999 and May 8th of 
2000.  That he was serving a sentence on 
those cases the court refers to. 
So, with that we know the defendant was in 
custody 
for 
nearly 
ten 
months, 
far 
surpassing the five months that would be 
required in order to establish habitual 
criminality enhancer in this case.  With 
that, I would ask that the court make 
those 
findings, 
either 
through 
those 
documents or through the defendant's own 
admission to the validity of the same. 
¶5 
Defense counsel objected to the State's amendment and 
asked the court to find that the habitual criminality allegation 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
6 
 
was defective for two reasons:  (1) the felony conviction was 
not alleged in the complaint; and (2) the State had not proved 
the felony conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.  The State 
responded that all that was required to advance on the habitual 
criminality enhancer was to allege prior to a plea that a person 
was an habitual criminal.  The State contended that the 
complaint 
was 
not 
required 
to 
specifically 
allege 
which 
conviction or convictions formed the basis for the habitual 
criminality allegation.  Additionally, the State contended that 
CCAP reports are sufficient proof. 
¶6 
CCAP is a case management system provided by Wisconsin 
Circuit Court Access program (WCCA).  It provides public access 
online to reports of activity in Wisconsin circuit courts for 
those counties that use CCAP.  Circuit court employees enter all 
CCAP data in the county where the case files are located, and 
the 
information 
feeds 
into 
the 
statewide 
access 
system.  
However, CCAP is a voluntary program, and only counties or 
divisions within a county that elect to use CCAP's case 
management system generate CCAP reports.   
¶7 
The WCCA website, through which all CCAP reports can 
be accessed by the public, asks all users of the system to read 
and accept the following agreement: 
WCCA is not the official Judgment and Lien 
Docket.  The official Judgment and Lien Docket is 
located in each county's Clerk of Circuit Court 
Office. 
The data available in the CCAP database is 
limited by: 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
7 
 
1. 
Some 
counties 
currently 
use 
CCAP 
for 
selected case types.  Portage has data only for 
Probate cases. 
2. 
Counties that are on CCAP began using it at 
different times and made independent decisions about 
the "backloading" of pre-CCAP cases. 
3. 
All the data in the CCAP database is entered 
in the individual counties where the case files are 
located.  Case information is updated hourly unless 
CCAP 
is 
performing 
periodic 
maintenance 
or 
experiencing technical problems.   
If you believe any of the data contained in this 
database is inaccurate, please contact the circuit 
court where the original record was created and filed.  
CCAP provides no warranties insuring the accuracy of 
the information contained in records available on 
WCCA, or that electronic mail sent via WCCA is 
delivered to, accessed by, or read by its intended 
recipient. 
Please indicate that you have read the above and 
agree to the use of WCCA subject to the above terms, 
and understand the limitations of the CCAP database. 
http://wcca.wicourts.gov/index.xsl (last visited June 24, 2006).  
¶8 
The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
criminal 
complaint gave Bonds notice that the State intended to ask the 
court to find that he is an habitual criminal because it alleged 
three prior misdemeanor convictions.  The court also concluded 
that the shift to a felony conviction as the grounds for a 
finding of habitual criminality did not prejudice him.  The 
court concluded that it could take judicial notice of the CCAP 
report of Bonds's conviction for felony forgery.4   
                                                 
4 We note that for the purposes of subtracting Bonds's time 
in confinement from the date of conviction for the forgery, the 
State submitted Milwaukee County Jail records.  The use of those 
records is not in dispute. 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
8 
 
¶9 
The circuit court sentenced Bonds to 18 months of 
confinement and six months of extended supervision.  At 
sentencing, the judge explained that the application of the 
repeater enhancer was supported by Bonds's forgery conviction.  
He told Bonds that although the forgery conviction occurred more 
than five years before the battery for which Bonds was being 
sentenced, 
the 
time 
Bonds 
was 
confined 
for 
the 
forgery 
conviction had to be subtracted from the time between the 
forgery conviction and the current charge of battery.  Doing so 
placed the forgery conviction within the applicable five-year 
period according to the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2).   
¶10 Bonds 
filed a 
motion for 
post-conviction 
relief 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 809.30 and 974.02, arguing that the 
court had improperly determined that he was an habitual criminal 
and requesting that his sentence be changed to nine months, the 
maximum penalty for a Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1) battery conviction.  
Bonds argued that he had been denied notice of the habitual 
criminality allegation because the State had not alleged the 
forgery conviction as its basis before his plea.  He also 
refined his argument that the State had not proved habitual 
criminality beyond a reasonable doubt, by asserting that the 
CCAP report was unreliable and insufficient to prove habitual 
criminality status.  The circuit court denied his motion. 
¶11 The court of appeals adopted the circuit court's 
reasoning as its own.  We review the court of appeals decision. 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
9 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶12 When we review the application of a statute to a set 
of facts to determine whether a penalty enhancer is valid, we 
are 
presented 
with 
a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently, without deference to previous court decisions.  
State ex rel. Bingen v. Bzdusek, 2002 WI App 210, ¶8, 257 
Wis. 2d 193, 650 N.W.2d 894; see also State v. Koeppen, 195 
Wis. 2d 117, 126, 536 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1995).  When we 
determine whether a defendant has received notice that the State 
intends to seek increased imprisonment, we independently review 
the notice that was given to determine whether it satisfies due 
process.  State v. Stynes, 2003 WI 65, ¶11, 262 Wis. 2d 335, 665 
N.W.2d 115.  
B. 
Increased Penalty for Habitual Criminality 
¶13 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62 allows increased penalties to 
be imposed on repeat criminals at the time of sentencing.  
Section 939.62 states in pertinent part: 
(1) If the actor is a repeater, as that term is 
defined in sub. (2), and the present conviction is for 
any crime for which imprisonment may be imposed, 
except for an escape under s. 946.42 or a failure to 
report 
under 
s. 
946.425, 
the 
maximum 
term 
of 
imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime may be 
increased as follows: 
(a) A maximum term of imprisonment of one year or 
less may be increased to not more than 2 years. 
. . .  
(2) The actor is a repeater if the actor was 
convicted of a felony during the 5-year period 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
10 
 
immediately preceding the commission of the crime for 
which the actor presently is being sentenced, or if 
the actor was convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 separate 
occasions during that same period, which convictions 
remain of record and unreversed.  . . .  In computing 
the preceding 5-year period, time which the actor 
spent 
in 
actual 
confinement 
serving 
a 
criminal 
sentence shall be excluded.   
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12 sets forth the statutory 
requirements for alleging and applying the repeater enhancer.  
It states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Whenever a person charged with a crime will 
be a repeater or a persistent repeater under s. 939.62 
if convicted, any applicable prior convictions may be 
alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or 
amendments so alleging at any time before or at 
arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea.  The 
court may, upon motion of the district attorney, grant 
a reasonable 
time 
to 
investigate 
possible 
prior 
convictions before accepting a plea.  If the prior 
convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by 
the state, he or she shall be subject to sentence 
under s. 939.62 unless he or she establishes that he 
or she was pardoned on grounds of innocence for any 
crime necessary to constitute him or her a repeater or 
a persistent repeater.  An official report of the 
F.B.I. or any governmental agency of the United States 
or of this or any other state shall be prima facie 
evidence 
of 
any 
conviction 
or 
sentence 
therein 
reported.  Any sentence so reported shall be deemed 
prima facie to have been fully served in actual 
confinement or to have been served for such period of 
time as is shown or is consistent with the report. 
The proper application of § 973.12 is at the center of Bonds's 
challenge to his sentence as a repeater. 
1. 
The parties' positions 
¶15 Bonds contends that the State improperly amended the 
complaint when it changed the factual basis of the repeater 
allegation 
from 
three 
misdemeanors 
to 
a 
felony 
forgery 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
11 
 
conviction.  Bonds supports this position with the following 
arguments:  (1) Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) unambiguously requires 
that prior convictions be alleged at or before the acceptance of 
any plea; (2) State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 907, 470 N.W.2d 
900 (1991), held that a repeater allegation cannot be added 
after a plea; and (3) even if the State was able to amend the 
complaint regarding the basis for the repeater allegation after 
a plea, Bonds was prejudiced and therefore, the State may not 
amend here. 
¶16 The State, on the other hand, argues that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12 does not bar all post-plea amendments of allegations of 
habitual criminality.  The State supports its position with the 
following arguments:  (1) modifications are permissible if the 
complaint gives the defendant notice of the potential maximum 
penalty to which the defendant could be subjected when pleading, 
such that the defendant would not be prejudiced in deciding how 
to plead; (2) the complaint gave Bonds adequate notice of the 
maximum penalty he faced at the time of his plea; and (3) Bonds 
was not prejudiced by the State's change in the factual basis 
for the repeater allegation. 
2. 
Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.12   
¶17 Although no amended complaint was actually filed in 
the circuit court, Bonds characterized the State's request to 
change the basis for proving habitual criminality as an untimely 
amendment of the complaint.  Therefore, in order to examine the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12 and how an amendment of the 
basis for habitual criminality set out in the complaint may 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
12 
 
affect the statute's requirements, we begin with Whitaker v. 
State, 83 Wis. 2d 368, 265 N.W.2d 575 (1978), which discussed 
amendments to charging documents in general.  Id. at 374.  
Whitaker did not concern a repeater enhancer, but rather it 
addressed an initial charge of party to the crime of theft that 
the State amended to robbery, after Whitaker's arraignment and 
plea of not guilty.  Subsequent to the amendment, Whitaker was 
again arraigned, this time on the amended information, and a new 
plea was taken.  Id. at 370-71.  We interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.295 in reaching our conclusion that there was no statutory 
bar to amending an information with leave of the court after 
                                                 
5 The version of the statute interpreted in Whitaker v. 
State, 83 Wis. 2d 368, 265 N.W.2d 575 (1978), is identical to 
the 2003-04 version.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.29 provides: 
(1) A complaint or information may be amended at 
any time prior to arraignment without leave of the 
court.   
(2) At the trial, the court may allow amendment 
of the complaint, indictment or information to conform 
to the proof where such amendment is not prejudicial 
to the defendant.  After verdict the pleading shall be 
deemed amended to conform to the proof if no objection 
to the relevance of the evidence was timely raised 
upon the trial.   
(3) Upon allowing an amendment to the complaint 
or indictment or information, the court may direct 
other amendments thereby rendered necessary and may 
proceed with or postpone the trial.   
Because 
the 
statute 
refers 
to 
both 
complaints 
and 
informations, and because informations are only required in 
felony cases, we conclude that the reasoning of Whitaker and all 
subsequent case law regarding the amendment of an information, 
can be analogously applied to all charging documents. 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
13 
 
arraignment so long as there was no prejudice to the defendant.  
Id. at 374.  We reasoned that the purpose of an information is 
to "inform the defendant of the charges against him," and that 
"[n]otice is the key factor."  Id. at 373 (citing La Fond v. 
State, 37 Wis. 2d 137, 144, 154 N.W.2d 304 (1967) (Heffernan, 
J., dissenting) and the Wisconsin Constitution, Art. I, sec. 7:  
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right 
. . . to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him.").  We explained that an amendment of an information before 
trial would not be prejudicial if a defendant's right to notice, 
right to a speedy trial, and right to prepare and present a 
defense to the criminal charges were not affected.  Whitaker, 83 
Wis. 2d at 374.   
¶18 In recent years, we have had occasion to determine the 
validity of various post-plea amendments relating to habitual 
criminality.  Those cases guide our analysis of whether the 
State's amendment in this case was permissible under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12 and constitutional due process requirements.   
¶19 In Martin, we consolidated two cases that raised the 
same issue.  Each defendant challenged the State's assertion of 
habitual criminality after a plea of not guilty to the charges 
at arraignment.  We interpreted Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) as 
prohibiting an amendment that alleged that the defendant was an 
habitual criminal where a defendant has been arraigned and has 
pled not guilty to an information that made no allegation that 
the defendant was a repeater.  Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 900.  We 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
14 
 
reviewed the legislative history6 and concluded that the language 
of the statute, coupled with that history, made clear that: 
[T]he 
legislature 
has 
established 
the 
time 
of 
arraignment and of any plea acceptance as the cut-off 
point after which time a defendant can no longer face 
exposure to repeater enhancement for the crime set 
forth in the charging document and pleaded to by the 
defendant at arraignment. 
Id. (emphasis in original).  
¶20 In weighing the meaning of the statute against the 
facts of the consolidated cases, we relied in part on the 
                                                 
6 We briefly list our conclusions from State v. Martin, 162 
Wis. 2d 883, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991), regarding the history of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12: 
(1) Initially, a repeater allegation was not considered 
essential to the substantive offense charged; rather, it was 
considered essential to "the information in order to secure the 
punishment provided for in case of a second offense and 
[repeater status had to] be alleged in the information."  Id. at 
897 (citation omitted). 
(2) Revisions 
to 
the 
statute 
in 
1919 
permitted 
investigation of a defendant's criminal record after conviction, 
even when the charging document had not alleged the defendant 
was a repeater.  Id. at 898.  At that time, the statute did not 
require notice to the defendant at arraignment.  Id. 
(3) The 
1949 
revisions 
to 
§ 973.12 
permitted 
the 
allegation of repeater status at any time before the execution 
of a sentence.  Id. 
(4) In 1965, § 973.12 was again amended, wherein the 
legislature eliminated "all references to a defendant's ability 
to demand a jury trial" on whether prior convictions existed.  
Id. at 899.  It also eliminated the language that allowed a 
court to make the repeater allegation at any time before 
sentencing; it required that the initial repeater allegations be 
made "before or at arraignment, and before acceptance of any 
plea."  Id. at 899-900.   
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
15 
 
reasoning of a prior decision, Block v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 205, 
210, 163 N.W.2d 196 (1968), in which we analyzed the 1965 
amendment to the repeater statute:  
Being a repeater is not a crime but may enhance 
the punishment of the crime for which the repeater is 
convicted.  The allegation of recidivism is put in the 
information 
in 
order 
to 
meet 
the 
due-process 
requirements of a fair trial.  When the defendant is 
asked to plead, he is entitled to know the extent of 
his punishment of the alleged crime, which he cannot 
know if he is not then informed that his prior 
convictions may be used to enhance the punishment.  
Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 900-01 (quoting Block, 41 Wis. 2d at 210 
(emphasis in Block)). 
¶21 Martin addressed 
when the 
initial allegation of 
habitual criminality must be made.  Here, there is no dispute 
that Bonds was alleged to be a repeater in the initial criminal 
complaint, in compliance with Martin.  The question we must 
decide is when can an amendment of the initial basis for proving 
habitual criminality that was alleged in the complaint be made.  
Subsequent to Martin, we have allowed some post-plea amendments 
of initial repeater allegations.  See State v. Gerard, 189 
Wis. 2d 505, 517-19, 525 N.W.2d 718 (1995); see also Stynes, 262 
Wis. 2d 335, ¶¶32, 34; State v. Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d 783, 792, 
549 N.W.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1996).   
¶22 In Gerard, we held that a criminal information that 
alleged habitual criminality could be amended, after the 
defendant had pled not guilty to the charges, but prior to the 
start of trial, to correct the number of years by which the 
defendant's sentence could be enhanced due to his status as a 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
16 
 
repeater.  Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d at 507-09.  We distinguished the 
facts of that case from those of Martin, noting that the 
complaint and information relating to Gerard's charges correctly 
alleged his repeater status and that a mere scrivener's error 
misstating the potential length of enhancement due to the 
penalty enhancer did not affect the sufficiency of the notice 
given to Gerard.  Id. at 512, 517-19.  We rejected Gerard's 
argument that he was prejudiced because at the time of 
arraignment, due to a clerical error, he thought that he was 
subject to three, rather than six, additional years in prison if 
convicted on one of the underlying counts.  Id. at 516-18.   
¶23 We were persuaded by three factual aspects of the case 
that caused us to conclude Gerard suffered no prejudice:  (1) 
Gerard discovered the error in the information and the complaint 
and brought it to the court's attention, so that he was fully 
aware of the actual sentence enhancement he faced, yet he failed 
to move to withdraw his plea; (2) Gerard did not assert that he 
was prejudiced by the court's decision to grant the State's 
motion to amend; (3) Gerard discovered the clerical error at the 
very early stages of the criminal proceedings, nine months 
before his trial.  Id. at 518-19.   
¶24 In Stynes, we held that a complaint that misstated by 
one day the date of one of the defendant's convictions provided 
adequate notice of convictions on which his repeater status was 
based, as it included descriptions of the offenses, stated the 
correct county in which the convictions occurred, and cited the 
case numbers for the convictions.  Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶32.  
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
17 
 
We determined that the error in the date "did not meaningfully 
change the basis" for Stynes's plea of not guilty.  Id., ¶34.  
Accordingly, we held that Stynes was not prejudiced because the 
amendment gave him notice of the prior convictions on which the 
repeater allegations were based, and therefore, we permitted an 
amendment of the date of conviction after Stynes pled.  Id. 
¶25 In Stynes, we also reviewed the court of appeals 
decision in State v. Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d 102, 477 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. 
App. 1991).  Wilks held that where the misstatement of a date of 
a prior conviction was significant enough to call into question 
whether the State was relying on a prior conviction that 
actually existed, the error could not be corrected without 
prejudice to a defendant who had pled no contest.7  See Stynes, 
262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶¶22-27.  We distinguished Wilks in Stynes 
because the information in Stynes misstated the date of one of 
the prior convictions by one day and there was no confusion 
about whether the alleged convictions actually existed.  Id., 
¶28.   
¶26 Further, in Stynes we relied on Gerard's reasoning 
that a statement of the number of years by which the sentence 
could be enhanced was not essential to a repeater allegation 
because there was no statutory requirement that the number of 
years by which the sentence could be enhanced be specified in 
                                                 
7 The day, month and year were incorrectly stated in the 
criminal complaint and no county of conviction was mentioned.  
State v. Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d 102, 105 n.3, 106, 477 N.W.2d 632 
(Ct. App. 1991). 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
18 
 
the charging document.  Id., ¶30.  We summarized the impact of 
Wilks and Gerard as follows:  
Wilks identified that the underlying policy of the 
notice required by Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) is to 
satisfy due process by assuring that the defendant 
knows the extent of the potential punishment at the 
time of the plea.  Gerard reiterated that "[d]ue 
process requires the defendant to be informed of his 
or 
her 
repeater 
status 
before 
pleading 
to 
the 
charges."   
Id., ¶31 (citations omitted); see also State v. Fields, 2001 WI 
App 297, ¶¶7-14, 249 Wis. 2d 292, 638 N.W.2d 897 (analyzing 
Martin and Gerard to conclude that the State's pre-plea 
submission of a certified copy of defendant's prior convictions 
constituted an amendment to the information, thereby curing the 
information's defects, because the defendant had adequate notice 
that he was being charged as a repeater). 
¶27 In Campbell, the court of appeals held that a post-
arraignment amendment to an information, to add a fourth 
misdemeanor to three initially alleged as the basis for the 
repeater 
enhancer, 
did 
not 
violate 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.12.  
Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d at 792.  Campbell argued that he was 
prejudiced by the amendment because there was a possibility that 
one of his prior misdemeanors would be reversed on appeal.  Id. 
at 792-93.  Therefore, he argued, in the event of such a 
reversal, the amendment to add a fourth misdemeanor affected his 
potential punishment because without it, there would be only two 
valid misdemeanors and the State could not prove repeater 
status. 
 
Id. 
 
Consequently, 
he 
argued, 
the 
amendment 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
19 
 
meaningfully changed the basis of his not guilty plea and should 
not have been permitted.  Id. at 793. 
¶28 The court of appeals responded to this theory by 
concluding that even if the court were to assume that a reversed 
prior conviction would change Campbell's status as a repeater 
under the three original misdemeanor charges, the amendment did 
not prejudice his ability to assess the potential maximum 
punishment he faced.  Id.  The court of appeals explained that 
the prejudice Campbell described is what he perceived to be the 
potential adverse effect of the amendment on his chances of 
defending against the penalty enhancer, but that did not affect 
his ability to evaluate the potential maximum punishment to 
which he could be subjected, either at arraignment or at the 
plea hearing.8  Id.   
¶29 Campbell relied on the reasoning of Martin and Gerard 
that the sufficiency of notice to a defendant of the potential 
maximum punishment he or she faces as a result of a repeater 
                                                 
8 We recognize that Campbell also involved a plea agreement 
made after Campbell's original arraignment. State v. Campbell, 
201 Wis. 2d 783, 786-87, 549 N.W.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1996).  In the 
original arraignment, Campbell stood mute and the court entered 
not guilty pleas.  Id. at 786.  Several weeks later, concurrent 
with the State's amendment of the complaint, Campbell reached a 
plea agreement in which he pled no contest to the underlying 
charges as a repeater.  Id. at 786-87.  Campbell challenged the 
amendment because it was made post-arraignment.  Id. at 792.  
The court in Campbell separately analyzed the effect of the 
post-arraignment amendment on his original not guilty plea, 
which is the part of Campbell that is applicable to the issues 
raised by Bonds, and on Campbell's plea agreement.  Id. at 792-
94. 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
20 
 
enhancer is the keystone to the permissibility of post-
arraignment amendments regarding repeater allegations.  Id. at 
791-92.  Since Campbell had notice of his potential maximum 
punishment for the crime and the penalty enhancer at the time of 
his plea, the amendment did not affect the sufficiency of the 
notice he had been given or violate Wis. Stat. § 973.12.  Id. at 
792.   
¶30 When considered together, this precedent establishes 
the following principles: 
(1) The purpose of the allegations of repeater 
status in a charging document is to provide the 
defendant with sufficient notice of the potential 
maximum penalty he faces in order that the defendant 
may make an informed plea.  Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d at 512 
n.6.; Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 900-01; Whitaker, 83 
Wis. 2d at 373. 
(2) If there has been no repeater allegation made 
prior to the court's acceptance of a plea, and the 
defendant 
does 
not 
re-plead 
after 
the 
charging 
document has been amended, sentence enhancement is not 
permissible upon conviction.  Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d at 
513-14; Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 902-03; Campbell, 201 
Wis. 2d at 791-92. 
(3) With leave of court, and after a plea has 
been accepted, charging documents that were sufficient 
before the plea was accepted may be amended with 
regard 
to 
the 
initial 
allegations 
concerning 
a 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
21 
 
defendant's repeater status so long as the defendant 
is not prejudiced by the amendment.9  Stynes, 262 
Wis. 2d 335, ¶¶31, 34; Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d at 509; 
Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d at 793. 
(4) When a post-plea amendment to allegations 
earlier made concerning a defendant's repeater status 
does not compromise the sufficiency of notice of the 
potential maximum sentence a defendant faces, no 
prejudice occurs.  Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶¶31-32; 
Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d at 516; Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d at 
793; Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d at 110.   
C. 
Bonds's Claim of Prejudice 
¶31 It is the State's burden to prove that Bonds was not 
prejudiced and Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) was satisfied through 
notice of sufficient allegations of the basis for charging 
habitual criminality.  Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶10.  When we 
apply the principles from Stynes, Gerard, Campbell and Wilks to 
the facts before us, we conclude that Bonds was not prejudiced 
by the State's post-conviction amendment of the original 
allegations in the complaint on which the State based its 
assertion of habitual criminality.  First, there is no dispute 
                                                 
9 In order to give sufficient notice of the potential 
maximum penalty that a defendant faces due to allegations of 
habitual criminality, a complaint must specify the date or dates 
of conviction, the substantive crime or crimes of which the 
defendant was convicted, and whether each conviction was a 
felony or a misdemeanor.  State v. Stynes, 2003 WI 65, ¶15, 262 
Wis. 2d 335, 665 N.W.2d 115 (citing State v. Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d 
505, 515-16, 525 N.W.2d 718 (1995)).  
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
22 
 
that Bonds's prior convictions made him a repeater.  Second, 
there is no dispute that Bonds was alleged to be a repeater 
before he pled, in compliance with § 973.12.  The complaint that 
was given to him before he pled to the battery charge attached, 
and incorporated by reference, certified copies of the judgments 
of conviction for three prior misdemeanors.  The specific crime 
that was committed, the statutory section that was violated, the 
case number for each matter, and the county of conviction were 
all set out in the complaint for each misdemeanor.  Third, Bonds 
suffered no prejudice when at sentencing, after he was convicted 
by a jury, the State amended the factual basis to a felony 
conviction that was sufficient to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 939.62, 
rather than relying on the three misdemeanor convictions listed 
in the criminal complaint.  The amendment did not prevent Bonds 
from meaningfully assessing the potential maximum penalty to 
which he could be subjected.  Under § 939.62(1)(a), whether the 
State 
proved 
his 
repeater 
status 
by 
three 
misdemeanor 
convictions or by one felony conviction, Bonds's potential 
maximum penalty was the same.  This is so because a battery 
conviction under Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1) is a Class A misdemeanor 
that has maximum imprisonment of nine months.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.51(3)(a).  Therefore, even with the repeater enhancement, 
Bond's maximum term of imprisonment for the battery conviction 
could not be increased to more than two years, regardless of 
whether the State relied on three misdemeanors or one felony.10   
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62(1)(a) provides:  "A maximum term 
of imprisonment of one year or less may be increased to not more 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
23 
 
¶32 We also are unpersuaded by Bonds's argument that he 
pled not guilty because he believed that he would not be 
sentenced as a repeater as the actual dates of the misdemeanor 
convictions occurred more than five years before he was charged 
with battery.  Any misstatement of dates listed in the body of 
the complaint was cured by the attachment of the certified 
copies of the judgments of conviction that were given to Bonds 
with the complaint.  As explained in Fields, 249 Wis. 2d 292, 
¶8, providing a defendant with a certified copy of his prior 
convictions constitutes an amendment to the charging document 
that cures prior defects in it.  Bonds acknowledges that he was 
incarcerated for ten months for the forgery conviction.  This 
period of time is not counted in the five-year period of time 
when assessing whether convictions fall within the requisite 
timeframe of five years.  Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2).  In addition, 
the "prejudice" that Bonds complains of is the adverse effect on 
a potential defense to the repeater allegation.  Campbell 
concludes this is insufficient to set aside an amendment to a 
repeater allegation because it does not affect a defendant's 
ability to assess the potential maximum sentence to which he may 
be subjected.  Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d at 793.  We agree with 
Campbell. 
D. 
Evidence of Habitual Criminality 
¶33 The second issue we address is whether the CCAP report 
offered by the State at sentencing is sufficient to constitute 
                                                                                                                                                             
than 2 years." 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
24 
 
prima facie proof that Bonds is an habitual criminal.  The 
parties agree that the State has the burden to prove Bonds's 
repeater status beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
1. 
The parties' arguments  
¶34 Bonds argues that the State failed to meet its burden 
because CCAP reports are unreliable as they do not even purport 
to accurately reflect official court records.  He reminds us 
that the CCAP user agreement explicitly states that CCAP reports 
should 
not 
be 
relied 
on 
as 
accurately 
representing 
the 
information provided.  Furthermore, Bonds argues that CCAP 
records do not constitute an "official report" of a government 
agency that would constitute prima facie evidence pursuant to 
the language of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).  Therefore, even absent 
an objection on his part to the evidence offered, the State did 
not meet its burden to prove a qualifying conviction.   
¶35 The State, on the other hand, argues that CCAP records 
should be considered official government reports pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) and the reasoning of State v. Farr, 119 
Wis. 2d 651, 350 N.W.2d 640 (1984), in which we suggested that a 
presentence report "may" constitute an "official report" where 
it contains the date of conviction for the previous offense.  
Id. at 658.  The State also contends that even if there are 
problems with using a CCAP report, Bonds waived his right to 
challenge the CCAP report as proof of his prior conviction 
because he did not specifically object to its use at sentencing.  
Therefore, we need not address whether CCAP records are adequate 
proof of a qualifying conviction.  The State relies on our 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
25 
 
decision in State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 649 
N.W.2d 263. 
 
2. 
Evidence presented  
¶36 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 973.12(1) 
directs 
that 
"[a]n 
official report of the F.B.I. or any other governmental agency 
of the United States or of this or any other state shall be 
prima facie evidence of any conviction or sentence therein 
reported."  We discussed the meaning of this language in Farr, 
119 Wis. 2d at 656-60.   
¶37 In Farr, we concluded that a probation report that did 
not state the dates of a defendant's prior convictions "left to 
conjecture whether any of them were within the previous five 
years."  Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 657-58.  We determined that such a 
report was not an official report of the type described in Wis. 
Stat. § 973.12(1).  Id. at 658.  We did not decide whether a 
presentence or probation report that had the proper information 
could serve as an official report, but we explained:  
To be an official report under sec. 973.12(1), Stats., 
on which reliance may be placed, the report must 
contain relevant information regarding the issue of 
repeater status and must specifically include the date 
of conviction for the previous offense.  . . .  The 
report in the present case did not contain such 
information and, therefore, could not be relied on for 
the penalty enhancement. 
Id. 
¶38 In Saunders, we reviewed the same statutory term, 
"official report," where a defendant challenged the State's use 
of an uncertified copy of a judgment of conviction, as failing 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
26 
 
to prove habitual criminality.  We concluded that although 
certified copies of judgments are sufficient to constitute prima 
facie evidence of habitual criminality, Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) 
does not require the State to use certified copies of prior 
judgments of conviction as the basis for enhanced penalties.  
Saunders, 255 Wis. 2d 589, ¶24.  
¶39 We also explained that before a circuit court may 
enhance a sentence, a criminal defendant's repeater status must 
be established.  We explained that repeater status can be proved 
with a variety of evidence.  Id., ¶26.  If the rules of evidence 
were to apply in proving prior convictions under § 973.12(1), 
those rules would require that the State use a certified copy of 
a judgment of conviction to satisfy its burden of proof.  Id., 
¶38.  However, the rules of evidence do not apply: 
Considering many factors, we conclude that the 
proceeding in which the state seeks to prove habitual 
criminality is, under Wisconsin's statutory scheme, 
more analogous to the sentencing process than to trial 
and, therefore, should be treated similarly in terms 
of evidentiary requirements.   
Id.   
¶40 We also held that just because the rules of evidence 
do not apply to documentary proof under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), 
the State is not relieved of its burden of proof.  Id., ¶47.  
Proof of prior convictions directly affects the sentence a 
criminal defendant may receive, and therefore, it affects a 
liberty interest.  Accordingly, proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is essential to the State's pursuit of additional punishment 
under Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  Id., ¶¶47-51.    
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
27 
 
¶41 In the course of our discussion, we drew several 
principles from our prior considerations of the proof of prior 
convictions:  (1) an admission by the defendant must contain 
specific references to the date of the conviction and any period 
of incarceration, if relevant to applying Wis. Stat. § 939.62, 
and must be made by the defendant, personally; (2) a certified 
copy of a judgment of conviction is evidence sufficient to prove 
prior convictions; (3) no decision had concluded that using an 
uncertified copy of the judgment of conviction or another type 
of report as evidence of prior convictions was prohibited.  Id., 
¶¶21-28.   
¶42 We reasoned that an uncertified copy of a judgment of 
conviction was being represented as an authentic copy of the 
original 
document, 
which 
we 
had 
previously 
concluded 
is 
sufficient proof of a prior conviction.  Id., ¶¶24-34.  We noted 
that certifying a record helps to insure its authenticity, but 
that an uncertified copy is not materially different from a 
certified copy, and is identical with the exception of an 
official stamp.  Id., ¶28.  The same information will be present 
in both documents.  "[L]ittle is gained by distinguishing 
between certified and uncertified prior judgments of conviction 
in this context."  Id., ¶28.  Accordingly, we concluded that an 
uncertified copy of a judgment of conviction can also serve "to 
prove prior convictions under Wis. Stat. § 973.12."  Id., ¶33.  
We noted that if an uncertified copy contains inaccurate 
information, the defendant should object and move the court to 
require the State to take remedial action, just as a defendant 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
28 
 
should do if a certified copy of a judgment contained a material 
error.  Id., ¶29.   
¶43 In Saunders, we also noted that Saunders had made no 
objection to the use of an uncertified copy of the judgment.  
Id., ¶62.  We concluded that his lack of an objection was 
significant because it showed Saunders "stipulated to the mode 
of proof employed by the State."  Id., ¶63.  However, we 
expressly concluded that this stipulation did not constitute a 
"'waiver' of the State's overall proof requirement."  Id.   
¶44 We established the following related principles with 
regard to proof of habitual criminality at sentencing:  (1) if 
the State fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant is a repeater, "then the sentencing court is without 
authority to sentence the defendant as a repeat offender," id., 
¶49; (2) when the State provides an official report that 
constitutes prima facie proof of a conviction pursuant to the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), a defendant's failure to 
object operates as a stipulation to the mode of proof that the 
State has chosen to use, id., ¶63; (3) a lack of an objection 
explicitly aimed at the mode of proof offered by the State does 
not relieve the State of 
its burden 
to 
prove habitual 
criminality beyond a reasonable doubt, id.   
¶45 It is important to note that one of the questions we 
addressed in Saunders was whether an uncertified copy of a 
judgment of conviction was what it purported to be, i.e., an 
authentic copy of the judgment of conviction.  Id., ¶28.  That 
question differs markedly from the question posed by a CCAP 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
29 
 
report.  With a CCAP report, the question is whether the report 
is an accurate narration of the judgment of conviction of a 
particular defendant, for a particular crime, on a particular 
date.  Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d at 127.   
¶46 According to the "Policy on Disclosure of Public 
Information Over the Internet" provided by the Director of State 
Courts, a CCAP report is provided through a public-access 
internet website containing open record information, the WCCA.  
The Director of State Courts explains: 
Because information in the CCAP database changes 
constantly, WCCA is not responsible for subsequent 
entries that update, modify, correct or delete data.  
WCCA is not responsible for notifying prior requesters 
of updates, modifications, corrections or deletions.   
http://wcca.wicourts.gov/index.xsl; choose "Public Records on 
the 
Internet" 
link, 
2.g. 
(last 
visited 
June 24, 
2006).  
Therefore, a CCAP report, by its own terms, is of questionable 
accuracy.  It is not the official record of a criminal case, as 
the clerks of court for 
each county 
are 
the 
officials 
responsible for those records.  Wis. Stat. § 59.40(2)(c).  And, 
a CCAP report is not a copy of the actual judgment of 
conviction.  Yet, it was offered to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that Bonds was convicted of felony forgery on a 
particular date.  The disclaimer with which a CCAP report is 
conditioned causes us to have reasonable doubt about its 
accuracy.     
 
¶47 Our concerns about the use of CCAP records to satisfy 
the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) do not affect our 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
30 
 
view that CCAP provides quality, immensely valuable, services to 
the citizens of Wisconsin and to those who work in the Wisconsin 
court system.  We agree with the concurrence/dissent, that the 
creation of CCAP has facilitated efficient use of court 
resources and greater access to court information by the public.  
Concurrence/Dissent, ¶112.  Although we have decided that a CCAP 
record is insufficient to establish prima facie proof that Bonds 
is an habitual criminal, our decision is driven in large part by 
the design of CCAP, which was not devised to afford proof of a 
factual proposition beyond a reasonable doubt.  CCAP was 
designed to assist the circuit courts in case management 
functions and to afford greater public access to the court 
system. 
 
CCAP 
has 
been 
extraordinarily 
successful 
in 
accomplishing these purposes. 
¶48 While Saunders clearly holds that documents other than 
a certified copy of a judgment of conviction may constitute an 
official report that would serve as prima facie proof of 
habitual criminality under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), only an 
uncertified copy of the judgment and a presentence report that 
lists the crime and the date of conviction have been held to be 
sufficient by a Wisconsin appellate court.  Saunders, 255 
Wis. 2d 589, ¶33; see also State v. Goldstein, 182 Wis. 2d 251, 
259, 513 N.W.2d 631 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Caldwell, 154 
Wis. 2d 683, 694-95, 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990).  And, as the 
court of appeals explained in Caldwell, one of the reasons for 
accepting that presentence report was the assurance of its 
accuracy 
because 
the 
investigating 
agent 
"expressly 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
31 
 
contemplated" the complaint's repeater allegation and the agent 
"verified" both the prior conviction and the date of conviction 
from sources other than the complaint.  Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d at 
694. 
¶49 Accordingly, we are persuaded that the reasoning of 
Saunders cannot be analogously applied to a CCAP report.  CCAP 
records are not like uncertified copies of judgments in that 
CCAP reports do not purport to be identical to the court 
records, as photocopies do.  The agreement to which all CCAP 
users are asked to adhere specifically warns that CCAP provides 
no warranty of accuracy for the data in its reports.  We cannot, 
under those circumstances, consider the contents of a CCAP 
report to rise to the level of reliability sufficient to 
establish prima facie proof that a defendant has a prior 
qualifying conviction.  In addition, Bonds did not stipulate to 
using a CCAP report as the "mode of proof" for habitual 
criminality.11  He asserted before the circuit court that the 
State had not proved habitual criminality beyond a reasonable 
doubt; he has continued to do so throughout the appellate 
                                                 
11 The concurrence/dissent is incorrect to assert that the 
repeater allegation is proved because of Bonds's "admission" in 
regard to a qualifying conviction.  Concurrence/Dissent, ¶111.  
Although we do not agree that Bonds admitted a prior felony 
conviction, we point out that in order for a defendant to admit 
a prior conviction for purposes of proving habitual criminality, 
the defendant's admission must contain specific reference to the 
date of the conviction and any period of incarceration.  State 
v. Zimmerman, 185 Wis. 2d 549, 557, 518 N.W.2d 303 (Ct. App. 
1994).  Bonds made no statement that could establish the date of 
a prior felony conviction.    
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
32 
 
process.  Therefore, we conclude that by relying solely12 on the 
CCAP report, and without other evidence that could prove Bonds's 
repeater status beyond a reasonable doubt, the State did not 
offer sufficient evidence to constitute prima facie proof that 
Bonds was an habitual criminal.  Accordingly, the State did not 
meet its burden to prove habitual criminality.   
 
3. 
Waiver 
¶50 It is undisputed that the State has the burden of 
proof with regard to the question of whether Bonds is a repeater 
and we have concluded that the State did not satisfy that burden 
because it relied solely on a CCAP report.  Therefore, in order 
for the State to have the power to sentence Bonds as a repeater, 
we would have to conclude that Bonds waived his right to 
challenge the evidence of habitual criminality because he did 
not object to using the CCAP report as the sole mode of proof in 
the circuit court.   
¶51 The State contends that we concluded in Saunders that 
an objection to the sufficiency of the evidence of habitual 
criminality must be made in the circuit court or it is waived.  
The State no doubt refers to the following passage: 
It would be an odd result if we were to preclude 
the state from offering an uncertified copy of a prior 
judgment of conviction when the defendant makes no 
objection to the submission of the document.  It is 
commonly understood that when evidence is submitted at 
trial, much less for sentencing, a defendant who 
                                                 
12 We do not exclude the use of a CCAP report as a tool to 
facilitate a review with the defendant at sentencing of 
defendant's past history of criminal convictions.   
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
33 
 
remains silent generally waives any objection to the 
submission of that evidence.  
Saunders, 255 Wis. 2d 589, ¶31.   
¶52 However, as we explained in ¶43 above, the State 
misunderstands the reason that we could have concluded waiver 
was present in Saunders.  In Saunders, the evidence offered, a 
copy of the judgment of conviction, was sufficient to constitute 
prima facie proof of habitual criminality.  Saunders offered no 
countering evidence.  Therefore, on the record in Saunders, the 
State did provide sufficient evidence to meet its burden of 
proof.13   
¶53 Here, the CCAP report was not sufficient to constitute 
prima facie proof of Bonds's repeater status.  Therefore, not 
making a specific objection when evidence that is insufficient 
to constitute prima facie proof of a prior qualifying conviction 
is presented is not a waiver.  Bonds did object to the 
sufficiency of the evidence the State presented, arguing that 
the 
State 
had 
not 
proved 
habitual 
criminality 
beyond 
a 
                                                 
13 As we explained in Saunders: 
The question ultimately becomes whether the state 
has 
submitted 
enough 
evidence 
to 
satisfy 
the 
sentencing judge beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant has the requisite number of qualifying prior 
convictions.  To answer this question the court must 
look to the totality of the post-trial evidence 
presented by the state, including copies of prior 
judgments 
of 
conviction, 
be 
they 
certified 
or 
uncertified.   
State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, ¶53, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 649 N.W.2d 
263.  
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
34 
 
reasonable doubt.  For the reasons explained above, a CCAP 
report does not come within our holding in regard to waiver set 
out in Saunders.  Because the only evidence submitted was the 
CCAP report, we conclude that Bonds's objection is sufficient to 
defeat the State's contention that he waived his objection to 
proving habitual criminality with a CCAP report.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the repeater portion of Bonds's sentence must be 
vacated.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶54 Four 
members 
of 
the 
court 
conclude 
that 
with 
sufficient proof, the State's post-conviction amendment of the 
basis 
for 
proving 
habitual 
criminality 
would 
have 
been 
permissible for two reasons:  (1) The complaint satisfied the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12 and of due process because 
Bonds had notice that he was being charged as an habitual 
criminal and of the potential maximum sentence he faced before 
he pled; and (2) Bonds was not prejudiced in making an 
intelligent plea as a result of the State's shift to a different 
prior 
conviction 
as 
the 
factual 
basis 
for 
its 
repeater 
allegation.  However, a different majority of the court also 
concludes that the State's use of a CCAP report as evidence of 
Bonds's conviction does not constitute prima facie proof of that 
conviction and that Bonds did not waive his right to object to 
the State's use of the CCAP report.  Accordingly, the court of 
appeals decision is reversed and the matter is remanded to the 
circuit court to vacate the enhancer portion of Bonds's 
sentence. 
No. 
2005AP948-CR   
 
35 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and remanded. 
 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶55 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the result reached by the court:  The repeater enhancement 
to the defendant's sentence must be vacated.  The State's 
significant amendment of the repeater allegation after a guilty 
verdict is prohibited by Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).   
¶56 I write separately to express my disagreement with the 
court's rewriting of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) to allow significant 
amendments to the charging documents after a guilty verdict.   
¶57 I also write separately to explain that CCAP data are 
not an official report under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) and 
therefore CCAP data alone are insufficient to make a prima facie 
case of repeater status required by Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).  
Furthermore, CCAP data are not sufficient for the State to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt the repeat offense allegation. 
I 
¶58 This court and the court of appeals have been chipping 
away for over a decade at the requirements in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12(1) (2003-04)1 that prior convictions forming the basis 
for sentence enhancement based on repeater status must be 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12(1) states in relevant part: 
Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a 
repeater or a persistent repeater under s. 939.62 if 
convicted, any applicable prior convictions may be 
alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or 
amendments so alleging at any time before or at 
arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea. 
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 
version. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
alleged in the complaint, information, or indictment before or 
at arraignment and before acceptance of any plea.   
¶59 I say, enough already.  The thrust of the statute is 
that the State must allege the prior offenses before the accused 
pleads.  If the State cannot figure out the prior offenses 
before a plea is accepted, the statute allows the court to give 
the district attorney a reasonable time to investigate prior 
offenses before the court takes the plea.  What else can the 
legislature say to require that the State make the allegations 
of prior offenses before the accused pleads?    
¶60 Previous cases have permitted the State to make minor 
amendments to its pleading alleging prior convictions in support 
of a repeat offender sentence enhancement slightly after 
arraignment and after a plea has been accepted.  Here, the court 
extends the rule of amendments and, for the first time, declares 
that the pleading may be significantly amended after the trial 
is complete and when the defendant does not admit to the 
allegations of habitual criminality. 
¶61 The present case differs significantly from the post-
State v. Martin/Robles, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991), 
line of cases, in which the court held that the State's post-
plea amendments did not violate Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).  In 
those cases, the court decided that even though the State 
complied with the statute, the court must nevertheless determine 
whether the amendment prejudiced the accused.  Considering 
prejudice is required whenever a State's pleading is amended. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶62 In the instant case the State did not comply with the 
statute.  No way!  After a jury trial, the State significantly 
changed the repeater allegation from three misdemeanors to one 
felony.  This fact pattern cannot be squeezed into the statute 
or prior case law. 
¶63 The case law has already accorded the State more than 
sufficient flexibility to be able to amend its pleading to 
allege properly a defendant's repeater status.  The State should 
not be able to completely revise the penalty enhancement 
allegation after the guilt phase of the trial is complete.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12(1) does not permit such an amendment.  
The legislature has established a rule.  A rule is a rule.  The 
rule should be followed. 
¶64 I divide this part of the opinion into three parts.  
First, I discuss the text and statutory history of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12(1).  Second, I discuss the case law and explain why 
this case can be distinguished from cases that interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 973.12(1) to permit the State's post-plea amendment.  
Third, I set forth my proposed approach to applying Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12(1). 
A 
¶65 I begin with the text of the statute.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 973.12(1) states that "any applicable prior convictions may be 
alleged 
in 
the 
complaint, 
indictment 
or 
information 
or 
amendments so alleging at any time before or at arraignment, and 
before acceptance of any plea." 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶66 The statute does not explicitly prohibit the State 
from alleging prior convictions after a plea is accepted.  
Rather, it sets forth when an allegation of prior convictions 
may be made: before arraignment and the acceptance of any plea.  
Because Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) does not clearly set forth an 
exclusive procedure by which to allege prior convictions, it 
could be interpreted to allow the State to allege prior 
convictions at other times. 
¶67 This court has, however, previously concluded that the 
statutory history does not support this reading of the statute.  
After an exhaustive discussion of the history of the predecessor 
to Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), in State v. Martin/Robles, 162 
Wis. 2d 883, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991), the court concluded that 
"[t]he statutory changes make clear that the legislature has 
established the time of arraignment and of any plea acceptance 
as the cut-off point after which time a defendant can no longer 
face exposure to repeater enhancement for the crime set forth in 
the charging document and pleaded to by the defendant at 
arraignment."2 
¶68 In the instant case, prior to the plea, the State 
alleged three misdemeanors as the factual basis for the 
                                                 
2 State 
v. 
Martin/Robles, 
162 
Wis. 2d 883, 
900, 
470 
N.W.2d 900 (1991) (emphasis omitted).   
In Martin/Robles, this court explained that prior to 1965, 
the statute permitted a repeater enhancer to a sentence at any 
time prior to the execution of the sentence.  In 1965, the 
statute was amended to create the current language of the 
relevant portion of the statute.  Id.; see § 2, ch. 422, Laws of 
1965; see also majority op., ¶19 n.6. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
defendant's repeater status.  In the complaint, the State did 
not allege any prior felony conviction as the factual basis for 
its repeater allegation.  By the time the State finally alleged 
the prior felony conviction (at the sentencing hearing), the 
defendant had been arraigned, plead not guilty, and been found 
guilty by a jury.   
¶69 In the instant case, in rejecting the defendant's 
objection to the State's shift to the felony conviction, the 
circuit court stated that "[t]he criminal complaint is a notice 
document to give the defendant notice . . . that the State 
intends to ask the [c]ourt to find that the defendant is a 
habitual criminal under the law."  This statement is, of course, 
not an accurate statement of the law.  Were this an accurate 
statement, the State would merely have to put forth in its 
complaint that it intended to seek repeater status under Wis. 
Stat. § 939.62.   
¶70 The State must do more than merely give notice that it 
will ultimately bring forth a showing of previous offenses 
justifying sentencing as a repeater.  The State must give notice 
so that an accused can determine the increase in penalty and 
determine whether the State can prove the particular prior 
convictions.  With this notice an accused can determine how to 
plead to the present offense.3  Depending on whether an accused 
thinks the State can prove the prior convictions, an accused may 
be more or less willing to enter a guilty plea to the present 
                                                 
3 State v. Stynes, 2003 WI 65, ¶34, 262 Wis. 2d 335, 665 
N.W.2d 115. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
charge or to seek a negotiated plea.  That is why the statute 
requires notice before the plea.  Without this notice an accused 
is deprived of the chance to meaningfully assess the likelihood 
of the State's ability to prove the prior conviction and does 
not have an adequate basis on which to enter his plea and 
prepare his defense.4   
¶71 It seems clear that the State's significant amendment 
of its pleadings after the jury verdict is not authorized by 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1). 
B 
¶72 In 
examining 
the 
case 
law 
applying 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.12(1), I begin with Martin/Robles, in which this court 
considered two cases regarding an amendment to a repeat offender 
allegation.  In one case, the defendant was arraigned and 
pleaded not guilty.  After the arraignment, but before trial, 
the State was granted leave to amend the complaint to add a 
repeater allegation.5  In the other case, the complaint also did 
not contain the repeater allegation.  In that case, the repeater 
allegation was added to the complaint on the first day of trial, 
but before the trial began.6 
                                                 
4 The criminal defense manual published by the State Bar of 
Wisconsin contains a long list of factors that affect a 
defendant's plea decision, some of which are relevant here.  The 
most relevant factor is the defendant's belief that he actually 
committed the act with which he was charged (in this case, 
whether the defendant was convicted of the prior offenses within 
the statutory time frame alleged by the State in the complaint).  
L. Michael Tobin & Patrick J. Devitt, Wisconsin Criminal Defense 
Manual §6.33 (4th ed. 2005). 
5 Martin/Robles, 162 Wis. 2d at 888-89. 
6 Id. at 890-91. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶73 In Martin/Robles, this court concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12(1) does not permit the addition of an allegation of 
repeat offender status after arraignment and acceptance of a 
plea when none was originally pleaded by the State.  The court 
also stated that proof of prejudice is irrelevant under 
§ 973.12(1).7  The court explained: 
[P]roof of prejudice is an irrelevant consideration 
under sec. 973.12(1), Stats.  The legislature has 
established a rule.  Regardless of the kind of plea 
entered 
in 
response 
to 
the 
charges 
alleged 
at 
arraignment, 
the 
defendant's 
plea 
will 
be 
more 
meaningful if he or she is aware of the extent of 
potential punishment which ensues from a conviction of 
the crime.8 
¶74 Notwithstanding the fact that the court held the State 
to the text of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) in Martin/Robles, the 
post-Martin/Robles case law suggests a view of the statute more 
lenient to the State.  In cases after Martin/Robles, the State 
pleaded repeater status before the arraignment and acceptance of 
the plea, but later sought to amend the repeater allegations. 
¶75 On several occasions, this court and the court of 
appeals have permitted post-plea amendments to the prior 
convictions alleged in a complaint in support of a repeat 
offender sentence enhancer as satisfying Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).  
While the cases ease the restrictions on amendments to the 
State's allegations of repeater status——a post-plea amendment is 
not a per se violation of the Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1)——the cases 
                                                 
7 Id. at 902-03. 
8 Id. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
can be distinguished from the instant case, in which the court 
keels over, bending backwards in favor of leniency to the State. 
¶76 In State v. Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d 505, 525 N.W.2d 718 
(1995), the complaint described the prior convictions but 
erroneously stated the penalty enhancer for one of the charges 
against the accused as six years when the maximum enhancement 
was only three years.  The accused pleaded not guilty.  Nine 
days after the plea was entered, and before trial, the accused 
moved to strike the enhancer on the basis of the error.  The 
State conceded the error and moved for leave to amend the 
information to correct the error; the motion was granted.  The 
accused was tried, convicted, and sentenced with the amended 
enhancer.  The accused appealed the sentence, arguing that the 
amendments 
to 
the 
penalty 
enhancer 
violated 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.12(1).9  This court unanimously affirmed Gerard's sentence.  
The court concluded that the mistake did not affect the 
sufficiency of notice and that the amendment complied with Wis. 
Stat.§ 973.12(1).10   
¶77 The Gerard court turned to the issue of prejudice, 
concluding that prejudice is always a consideration with regard 
to amending a charging document.11  Thus, even when the court 
concludes that the State's amendment is authorized by Wis. 
                                                 
9 State v. Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d 505, 509-11, 525 N.W.2d 718 
(1995). 
10 Id. at 512-14. 
11 Id. at 517 n.9. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
Stat.§ 973.12(1), the court must consider whether the defendant 
was prejudiced.   
¶78 In considering prejudice, this court emphasized that 
the accused, fully aware of the actual prison sentence he faced 
if convicted, failed to move to withdraw his not guilty plea and 
plead again.  The court therefore concluded that the accused was 
not prejudiced by the State's clerical error in stating the 
maximum penalty faced by the defendant.12 
¶79 The instant case is unlike Gerard in two important 
respects.  First, the amendment in Gerard was a correction of an 
error in calculating the maximum sentence resulting from the 
enhancement.  The State, presumably by clerical error or error 
in interpreting the law, overstated the accused's maximum 
exposure because of the enhancer as six years instead of three 
years.   
¶80 In the instant case, on the other hand, the State 
completely changed the basis of the sentence enhancer, dropping 
the 
three 
prior 
misdemeanors 
originally 
relied 
upon 
and 
replacing them with a felony conviction. 
¶81 Second, in the instant case, the amendment occurred 
after the verdict; it occurred at sentencing.  In Gerard, in 
considering prejudice, the 
court 
emphasized 
the 
accused's 
failure to move to withdraw his not guilty plea before 
sentencing so he could plead again.  The defendant in the 
instant 
case 
had 
already 
been 
tried 
and 
found 
guilty.  
Withdrawal of the plea is not an alternative here.  I need not 
                                                 
12 Id. at 517-18. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
reach the issue of prejudice here because I conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 973.12(1) does not allow the amendment. 
¶82 In State v. Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d 783, 549 N.W.2d 501 
(Ct. App. 1996), the State alleged three prior misdemeanor 
convictions for the repeat offender sentence enhancement.  A 
plea of not guilty was entered.  The accused and the State then 
entered into plea negotiations whereby the accused agreed to 
plead no contest to certain charges in exchange for other 
charges being dropped.  The State amended the information and 
added a fourth misdemeanor as part of the repeater enhancement 
because one of the misdemeanors was on appeal and the State 
wanted to be sure that if that conviction were reversed three 
convictions remained.  The amended information was filed and the 
accused entered a plea of no contest to the amended information, 
objecting to the amendment but stipulating to the facts of the 
four convictions.     
¶83 In other words, the accused in Campbell was allowed to 
withdraw his initial not guilty plea, the State was allowed to 
amend the information, and the accused was allowed to enter a 
new plea to the amended information.  Similarly, in State v. 
Fields, 2001 WI App 297, ¶¶2-3, 8, 11-14, 249 Wis. 2d 292, 636 
N.W.2d 897, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
held 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.12(1) was satisfied when the State amended the penalty 
enhancement before the plea of no contest was accepted.  In 
effect, a second arraignment occurred after the amendment. 
¶84 Even though the statutory requirements were met, the 
court of appeals in both Campbell and Fields (adhering to 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
Gerard's rule that prejudice is always a consideration with 
regard to amending a charging document) went on to determine 
that the accused was not prejudiced by the amendment.13   
¶85 Although both the instant case and Campbell involve a 
new allegation of a prior conviction, the two cases are easily 
distinguished.  Campbell addressed an amendment after the 
accused pleaded not guilty, and the accused was allowed to 
replead after the amendment.  In the instant case, however, the 
defendant does not have the option to replead. 
¶86 This court revisited Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) in State 
v. Stynes, 2003 WI 65, 262 Wis. 2d 335, 665 N.W.2d 115.  In 
Stynes, the complaint alleged prior convictions dated March 18, 
1998.  The accused's prior convictions were actually dated March 
17, 1998.  The accused pleaded not guilty and a jury found him 
guilty of all the charges.  After he was sentenced, the accused 
moved to have the enhanced sentence commuted because he was not 
provided notice of the prior convictions under § 973.12(1).  The 
circuit court denied the motion.  The court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court and reduced the defendant's sentence to a 
sentence without the penalty enhancement.14 
¶87 Observing that the "error of one calendar day did not 
mislead or confuse Stynes" and that the erroneous conviction 
date did not violate Wis. Stat.§ 973.12(1),15 this court reversed 
                                                 
13 State v. Fields, 2001 WI App 297, ¶13, 249 Wis. 2d 292, 
636 N.W.2d 897; State v. Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d 783, 790-93, 549 
N.W.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1996). 
14 Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶¶6-9. 
15 Id., ¶21. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
the court of appeals and held that the defendant was "provided 
with the information necessary to identify which of his prior 
convictions would be used to establish his repeater status."16  
¶88 In Stynes, this court made clear that an accused must 
be provided with information to identify which of his prior 
convictions would be used to establish repeater status.  It is 
clear in the instant case that the defendant was not provided 
notice of which of his prior convictions would be used to 
establish his repeater status because the only prior conviction 
relied upon by the State was not alleged until the sentencing 
hearing.   
¶89 In the instant case, the majority opinion makes much 
of the fact that the amendment after the jury verdict did not 
prevent the defendant from assessing his maximum potential 
penalty before he pleaded because the enhanced sentence was the 
same under the felony as it was under the three misdemeanors.17  
I disagree with the majority opinion.   
¶90 Part of an accused's calculus in determining how to 
plead includes a meaningful assessment of the maximum penalty to 
which he or she could be subjected as a result of the enhancer 
and a meaningful assessment of whether the State can prove the 
predicate prior convictions to justify an enhanced sentence.  
Thus, an accused might be relying on the fact that the State 
                                                 
16 Id., ¶32. 
17 Majority op., ¶31. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
cannot prove the alleged prior convictions at sentencing.18  When 
the State significantly amends the alleged prior convictions 
after a jury verdict, the State has altered the accused's 
assessment of the maximum penalty to which he or she could be 
subjected as a result of the penalty enhancement.       
¶91 State v. Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d 102, 477 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. 
App. 1991), differs from the other cases.  In Wilks, the court 
of appeals did not allow the State's amendment of the repeater 
allegation.  In Wilks, the State alleged a May 24, 1986 forgery 
conviction as the basis for the accused's repeater status.  The 
defendant pleaded no contest to the offense, believing that the 
                                                 
18 It is unclear in the instant case why the State switched 
from the misdemeanors to the felony.  One explanation at oral 
argument was that the State feared that its clerical error in 
the misdemeanor conviction date would cause it problems.  
Clearly, a total substitution of an offense creates more 
problems than a clerical error when certified copies of the 
conviction had been attached to the complaint. 
A reasonable inference is that both the State and the 
defendant had doubts about the State's ability to place the 
misdemeanors within the five-year statutory time period.  The 
misdemeanors were for crimes committed in 1997 with dates of 
conviction listed as April 15, 1998 and varying sentencing dates 
from April 15, 1998 to August 20, 1999.  The criminal complaint 
in the present case alleged that the defendant committed a 
battery on July 25, 2003.  
If the defendant doubted that the State could prove the 
repeater convictions, the defendant assessed the extent of the 
possible punishment in one way.  If the defendant concluded the 
State could prove the convictions, he assessed the extent of 
possible punishment another way.  Either assessment might affect 
his plea.  By the time the case came before this court, the 
State and defendant probably had determined whether the State 
could have proved the misdemeanors.   
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
State could not convict him as a repeater.19  During an 
adjournment before sentencing, and after the accused entered a 
no contest plea, the State conceded that the May 24, 1986, 
forgery conviction did not exist and instead moved to use a July 
3, 1985 forgery conviction as the basis for repeater status; the 
motion was granted.20      
¶92 The court of appeals in Wilks did not allow the State 
to correct the error.  Rather the court of appeals commuted the 
enhanced sentence, concluding that the accused did not have 
notice prior to the entering and acceptance of his plea of the 
prior conviction upon which the State would rely.21  The court of 
appeals in Wilks interpreted Martin/Robles "to bar post-plea 
repeater amendments which meaningfully change the basis upon 
which the defendant assessed the extent of possible punishment 
at the time of plea."22 
¶93 In Stynes, this court distinguished Wilks based on the 
obvious fact that the error in Stynes was a misstatement of the 
prior conviction by one day, whereas in Wilks there was no 
                                                 
19 State v. Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d 102, 110, 477 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. 
App. 1991). 
20 Id. at 105-06. 
21 Id. at 110, 112. 
22 Id. at 111 ("The supreme court has appropriately noted 
the due process considerations which underpin this portion of 
the repeater statute. The state's 'changing of the rules' after 
Wilks had pled offends these considerations."). 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
obvious connection between the date of the crime alleged and the 
date of the prior conviction the State ultimately relied upon.23 
¶94 The instant case is more like Wilks than it is like 
Stynes.  Unlike Stynes, in which the accused clearly had notice 
prior to trial of the prior convictions to be relied upon by the 
State, the accused in the instant case had no such notice.  
Prior to sentencing, there was no way for the defendant in the 
instant case to know that the State would rely on allegations of 
a prior felony conviction.   
¶95 Indeed, the notice in the instant case was probably 
less effective than the notice in Wilks.  In Wilks, the accused 
was at least aware that the State was going to rely on a prior 
forgery conviction, even though the year of the conviction was 
erroneous.  In the instant case, the State shifted from relying 
on three misdemeanors to relying on an unrelated felony.  
Surely, if the State cannot change from a felony listed in one 
year to a similar felony listed in another year, the State 
cannot 
change 
from 
three 
misdemeanors 
to 
a 
previously 
unmentioned felony.  
¶96 Because the defendant in the instant case was not 
informed of the prior offenses on which the repeat offender 
sentence enhancement ultimately relied, Stynes dictates that the 
defendant was not provided with adequate notice to satisfy Wis. 
Stat. § 973.12(1) or due process.  Stynes makes clear that an 
                                                 
23 Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶¶22-28 ("In the case at bar, 
however, there is no question that the State was intending to 
refer to Stynes' convictions that occurred on March 17, 1998, 
convictions that actually existed."). 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
accused has the right to have notice of the prior offenses upon 
which the State relies before the accused enters a plea.  
Without explanation or discussion, the majority abandons this 
rule. 
¶97 As I see it, allowing the State to change completely 
the factual basis for its repeater allegation during sentencing 
in the instant case "is yet another example of the lower burden 
this court places on the State when depriving a person of his or 
her liberty than it places on private litigants in civil 
actions."24  The State should not be permitted such leniency when 
the deprivation of a person's liberty is at stake.  As I stated 
in my concurring opinion in Stynes: 
This court's jurisprudence thus upsets a bedrock 
principle 
in 
our 
Constitution that because 
"the 
accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake an 
interest of immense importance" the burden on the 
State in a criminal prosecution is the highest burden 
required of any litigant and the margin of error 
allowed is the lowest.25 
C 
¶98 I therefore once again propose a bright-line rule 
adhering to the text of the statute and the case law.  If an 
accused pleads guilty or no contest, and the circuit court 
accepts that plea, if the State thereafter wants to amend the 
pleadings on the repeater enhancement, the circuit court shall 
                                                 
24 Id., ¶41 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (citing State v. 
Jennings, 2003 WI 10, ¶38, 259 Wis. 2d 523, 657 N.W.2d 393 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting)). 
25 Stynes, 
262 
Wis. 2d 335, 
¶42 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 
(1970)). 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
allow the amendment and allow the accused to replead.  If an 
accused pleads not guilty, the State may amend the charging 
document to accurately and precisely recite all predicate 
convictions, including the offenses of convictions alleged, 
whether the offense was a felony or misdemeanor, and the date of 
the conviction, prior to the impaneling of the jury and the 
start of a trial.  If the State amends the charging document, 
the circuit court shall allow the accused to replead.  If an 
accused pleads not guilty, the State may not amend its pleadings 
on the sentence enhancement after the impaneling of the jury and 
the start of trial.   
¶99 Such a rule would encourage the State to take great 
care in the charging documents, would assist accuseds in 
determining their plea, would reduce useless litigation, and 
would ensure that enhanced repeater sentences are based only on 
qualifying convictions.26  
¶100 From where I sit, it appears that prosecutors could 
avoid the "amendment problems" caused by repeater allegations by 
attaching, as standard practice, certified copies of prior 
judgments of conviction to the charging documents when repeater 
status is alleged.  Similarly, as I see it, circuit courts ought 
to make it standard practice not to accept a plea on a sentence 
enhancer 
without 
certified 
copies 
of 
prior 
judgments 
of 
conviction on record with the court.  
                                                 
26 See Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶37 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring). 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
¶101 In sum, I do not agree with the conclusion of the 
majority opinion that the State may just completely change the 
allegation of prior convictions at the sentencing phase of a 
trial.  The State's amendments after the jury verdict that 
occurred in the instant case are prohibited by Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12(1).  I therefore write separately. 
II 
¶102 I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority 
opinion that CCAP data are not an official report under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.12(1) and therefore are insufficient to make a prima 
facie 
case 
of 
repeater 
status 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.12(1).  Furthermore, the State has failed to prove 
repeater status under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  I rest my analysis on this court's opinion in State v. 
Saunders, 2002 WI 107, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 649 N.W.2d 263. 
¶103 Contrary to the statements in the majority opinion and 
Justice Crooks's concurrence/dissent,27 this court did not hold 
in Saunders that an uncertified copy of a prior judgment of 
conviction is an "official report" under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1). 
¶104 Similarly, I conclude that CCAP data are not an 
official report under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).  I agree with the 
majority opinion:  CCAP data alone are insufficient to make a 
prima facie case of repeater status as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12(1).28 
                                                 
27 See 
majority 
op., 
¶41; 
Justice 
Crooks's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶121, 123. 
28 See majority op., ¶49. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶105 Saunders held that an official report is not the only 
means available to the State to prove a defendant's repeater 
status.29  While an official report alone makes out a prima facie 
case of repeater status under § 973.12(1), other evidence may 
also suffice.  If the State chooses not to use an official 
report, "[t]he question ultimately becomes whether the state has 
submitted enough evidence to satisfy the sentencing judge beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant has the requisite number 
of qualifying prior convictions.  To answer this question the 
court must look to the totality of the post-trial evidence 
presented by the state, including copies of prior judgments of 
conviction, be they certified or uncertified."30   
¶106 Thus, 
in 
Saunders, 
the 
court 
considered 
the 
uncertified 
copy 
of 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction, 
defense 
counsel's representation that there was no dispute as to the 
fact that there was a judgment of conviction entered into the 
record, and the undated but otherwise accurate information in 
the presentence report.  The Saunders court therefore concluded 
that the State had presented sufficient evidence to prove the 
repeater allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.31 
                                                 
29 State 
v. 
Saunders, 
2002 
WI 
107, 
¶¶26, 
34, 
255 
Wis. 2d 589, 649 N.W.2d 263 ("Moreover, the portion of s. 
973.12(1) 
that 
speaks 
of 
official 
government 
reports 
constituting prima facie evidence of prior convictions supports 
the inference that the state may use other forms of evidence——
ones not entitled to prima facie deference——to meet its proof 
requirements under the subsection."). 
30 Saunders, 255 Wis. 2d 589, ¶53. 
31 Id., ¶¶59-69. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
¶107 In Saunders, Justice Bradley dissented and, in an 
opinion that I joined, concluded that the uncertified judgment 
of conviction was insufficient to prove repeater status.32 
¶108 In the instant case, I conclude that the CCAP data are 
insufficient evidence to prove the repeater allegations beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
¶109 For the reasons set forth, I concur. 
¶110 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion. 
 
                                                 
32 See id., ¶¶72, 85-95 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
¶111 N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  I join that portion of the majority 
opinion that concludes that Bonds was not prejudiced by the 
State's (State of Wisconsin) postconviction amendment adding the 
felony conviction.  Majority op., ¶31.  I write separately 
because I strongly disagree with the majority's determination 
that the State's use of a CCAP report offered to establish that 
Bonds had a felony conviction did not constitute prima facie 
evidence of that conviction.  The CCAP report was sufficient to 
make a prima facie case that Bonds had such a conviction and was 
an habitual criminal.  I also disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that Bonds did not, in effect, stipulate to the mode 
of proof utilized by the State——the CCAP report——since the 
record establishes that Bonds and his attorney conceded, for 
repeater purposes, the prior felony conviction of Bonds.  The 
State clearly met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
here.  In addition, the concession by Bonds, in the colloquy 
with the circuit court judge, that he had a felony forgery 
conviction amounted to an admission in regard to that qualifying 
conviction.  By refusing to accept the State's use of the CCAP 
record, the majority opinion undermines the confidence that the 
public now rightfully has in the accuracy of CCAP records.  For 
the reasons stated herein, I respectfully dissent from Section 
II – D of the majority opinion.   
 
 
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
I 
¶112 The Consolidated Court Automation Program (CCAP) was 
created in 1987 in an effort to provide automation in Wisconsin 
circuit courts.  CCAP develops, implements, and maintains court 
automated information systems for the Wisconsin Court System.   
The Wisconsin Court System has explained:   
CCAP represents a major undertaking by the Director of 
State Courts' Office, under the direction of the 
Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court, 
to 
automate 
the 
labor-
intensive and paper-based processes in the county 
trial courts.   It brings state-of-the-art computer 
technology and software to Wisconsin's circuit courts 
by developing hardware and software and providing 
training and technical support.  . . . CCAP is a 
state-initiated and funded program that supports joint 
state/county responsibility for the court system. 
¶113 In the 1999 "State of the Judiciary Address," the 
Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court hailed the fact 
that CCAP was "widely accepted across the state and is a model 
for other states."  The correctness of that statements is, I 
believe, beyond dispute.  This court has been justifiably proud 
of CCAP.  The Consolidated Court Automation Program has been, 
and continues to be, a top priority for the Wisconsin Court 
System.  Currently, CCAP employs 64 people, and in 2003-05, its 
budget was $20,802,000.1   
                                                 
1 Total expenditures on the Consolidated Court Automation 
Program (CCAP) since its inception amount to $116,048,078.  
Certainly, not all of these funds have been expended on the 
Wisconsin Circuit Court Access (WCCA) program website, since 
CCAP 
is 
responsible 
for 
meeting 
all 
of 
the 
information 
technology needs of the Wisconsin Court System.  Its mission 
includes "maintain[ing] reliable . . . data . . . ."  
http://wicourts.gov/about/organization/offices/ccap.htm 
(last 
visited June 24, 2006). 
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
¶114 The most public "face" of CCAP is the Internet-based 
Wisconsin Circuit Court Access (WCCA) program, which provides 
access to circuit court information for the public.  First 
implemented in 1999, WCCA was  
[c]reated in response to an increasing number of 
requests for court records from district attorneys, 
sheriffs' 
departments, 
and 
other 
court 
business 
partners.  Title companies, abstractors, members of 
the media and the general public have also benefited 
from WCCA.  Many have come to rely on WCCA as their 
primary means of accessing circuit court data.  
Wisconsin 
Circuit 
Court 
Access Oversight Committee, 
Final 
Report, March 2006, page 1.  "Maintaining public court records 
on the internet provides advantages to the public, to justice 
system agencies and to the courts."  Id.   
¶115 The WCCA website explains to users that it "provides 
public access to the records of the Wisconsin circuit courts for 
counties using the Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP) 
Case Management system. These records are open to public view 
under Wisconsin's 
Open 
Records law, 
sections 
19.31-19.39, 
Wisconsin Statutes."  The records maintained by CCAP are the 
records of the circuit courts.  The WCCA Oversight Committee 
noted that  
[e]rrors on the Wisconsin Circuit Court Access (WCCA) 
Internet Site result from an error in the underlying 
court record in the county responsible for the case.  
Errors are corrected when the case record is changed 
or updated by the court official responsible, usually 
the clerk of circuit court or circuit court judge 
The WCCA website explains: 
CCAP does not modify data contained on WCCA in any 
way. All the data in the CCAP database is entered in 
the individual counties where the case files are 
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
located. If you believe any of the data contained in 
this 
database 
is 
inaccurate, please contact the 
circuit court where the original record was created 
and filed. 
http://wcca.wicourts.gov/faqnonav.xsl;jsessionid=ACFFACB55745A61
712A03EFF70983E47.render12#Faq11 (last visited June 24, 2006). 
II 
¶116 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12(1) provides in relevant part: 
"An official report of the F.B.I. or any other governmental 
agency of the United States or of this or any other state shall 
be prima facie evidence of any conviction or sentence therein 
reported."  Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) (2003-04).2  This statutory 
language plainly states that an official government report 
serves as prima facie evidence of a conviction.  The majority 
has failed to articulate a satisfactory rationale for refusing 
to treat a CCAP record as an official government report.    
¶117 In State v. Farr, this court considered whether a 
presentence report that contained reference to a defendant's 
prior record met the status of an official report pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1).  State v. Farr, 119 Wis. 2d 651, 652, 
350 N.W.2d 640 (1984).  In construing the phrase "official 
report," this court explained: 
To be an official report under sec. 973.12(1), Stats.,  
on which reliance may be placed, the report must 
contain relevant information regarding the issue of 
repeater status and must specifically include the date 
of conviction for the previous offense.  . . . such 
official report must contain critically relevant facts 
to be acceptable for applying the repeater statute. 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes refer 
to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
Id. at 658.  Because the presentence report at issue in Farr 
"showed that the defendant had five prior felony convictions," 
but "did not provide the dates of conviction," this court 
determined 
it 
"could not 
be 
relied 
on for 
the penalty 
enhancement."  Id. at 657-58.   
¶118 In State v. Caldwell, the court of appeals applied 
Farr to uphold the sufficiency of a presentence report to 
constitute prima facie proof of the defendant's repeater status.  
State v. Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d 683, 695, 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 
1990).  As the presentence report contained specific information 
on the date of conviction of Caldwell's previous offense, the 
court held "the state proved repeater status by virtue of 
Caldwell's presentence report."  Id. at 693 (citing Farr, 119 
Wis. 2d at 658).  Similarly, in State v. Goldstein, the court of 
appeals cited Caldwell for the position that "a presentence 
report can qualify as an official report within the meaning of 
§ 973.12(1), Stats., if the report includes the date of 
conviction for the prior offense."  State v. Goldstein, 182 Wis. 
2d 251, 257, 513 N.W.2d 631 (Ct. App. 1994)(citation omitted).  
The court of appeals then determined that the presentence report 
in that case satisfied the proof requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12(1).  Id. at 259.   
 
¶119 In 2002 this court, again, had the opportunity to 
consider "how prior convictions are 'proved by the state' under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) (1999-2000) for sentence enhancement."  
State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, ¶2, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 649 N.W.2d 
263 (footnote omitted).  The Saunders court considered whether 
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
6 
 
an uncertified copy of a prior judgment of conviction may be an 
acceptable means of proving that a defendant is an habitual 
criminal under Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  Id., ¶3.   
 
¶120 The Saunders court concluded "that the rules of 
evidence do not apply to documentary evidence the state uses to 
prove the existence of prior convictions for repeater purposes," 
and that an uncertified copy of a judgment satisfied the 
statute.  Id., ¶¶52, 70.  Doing so, it explained that "[t]he 
plain language of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) . . . does not demand 
that prior convictions be proved through any specific method, 
such as the use of a certified copy of a judgment of 
conviction."  Id., ¶26.  In Saunders, this court did nothing to 
cast any doubt on either of the earlier court of appeals' 
decisions that considered the proof requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12(1). Id.  
¶121 The majority purports to apply the tests set forth by 
this court in Farr and Saunders to reject classifying a CCAP 
record as an official report, despite the fact that the 
decisions in those cases strongly support the recognition of a 
CCAP record as an official government report that constitutes 
prima facie evidence of prior convictions.  See majority op., 
¶42.  First, reports from CCAP are reports of the Wisconsin 
circuit courts, and as such, they are clearly official reports.  
They are no less "official" because they may be accessed 
electronically.  Second, CCAP reports meet the test set forth in 
Farr, as they "contain relevant information regarding the issue 
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
7 
 
of repeater status and . . . specifically include the date of 
conviction for the previous offense."  Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 658.   
¶122 The majority makes much of the fact that CCAP users 
are presented with a disclaimer that provides, in part, "'CCAP 
provides no warranties insuring the accuracy of the information 
contained in records available on WCCA. . . .'"  Majority op., 
¶7 (citation omitted).  The majority then concludes that, in 
light of the disclaimer, "a CCAP report, by its own terms, is of 
questionable accuracy."  Id., ¶46.   
¶123 The fact that CCAP records, available through WCCA, 
are preceded by a disclaimer does not indicate they are of 
"questionable accuracy."  Certainly the CCAP report meets the 
Saunders test of being "at least as reliable as a summary of the 
conviction in an official government report."  Saunders, 255 
Wis. 2d 589, ¶28.  As Saunders pointed out, even a certified 
copy of a judgment can contain errors.   
If 
an 
uncertified 
copy 
[of 
a 
judgment 
of 
conviction] contains inaccurate information about the 
prior conviction, the defendant should object to the 
accuracy of the document.  . . .  
After all, a defendant is always permitted to 
contest the authenticity or, more likely, the accuracy 
of even a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.  
Human beings complete these forms and, although we 
would hope that typographical errors within these 
important documents are rare, errors may nonetheless 
exist.  . . . Put simply, judicial personnel are not 
infallible.  Accordingly, even a certified copy of a 
document 
establishing 
a 
prior conviction 
may be 
rebutted, just as an inaccuracy in a presentence 
investigation report may be challenged. 
Id., ¶¶ 29-30 (footnote omitted)(emphasis in original).  There 
is no rational basis for this court to consider an uncertified 
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
8 
 
copy of a judgment of conviction, or a presentence report, to be 
an "official government report" and yet to disallow a CCAP 
report——a report of the Wisconsin circuit court system——from 
that classification.   
¶124 The majority seems stunned that the State would ask 
the circuit court to rely on a report of such "questionable 
accuracy."  "[A] CCAP report, by its own terms, is of 
questionable accuracy.  . . . Yet, it was offered to prove, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Bonds was convicted of felony 
forgery on a particular date."  Majority op., ¶46.  The majority 
then concludes that "[t]he disclaimer with which a CCAP report 
is conditioned causes us to have reasonable doubt about its 
accuracy."  Id.   
¶125 Yet, 
as 
noted 
above, 
any 
report 
may 
contain 
inaccuracies, just as any report may be challenged for accuracy.  
As Saunders explained:  
It would be an odd result if we were to preclude 
the state from offering an uncertified copy of a prior 
judgment of conviction when the defendant makes no 
objection to the submission of the document.  It is 
commonly understood that when evidence is submitted at 
trial, much less for sentencing, a defendant who 
remains silent generally waives any objection to the 
submission of that evidence. 
Saunders, 255 Wis. 2d 589, ¶31 (footnote omitted).  Saunders 
also addressed the issue of a stipulation to the mode of proof, 
as this court held that when the state provides an official 
report that constitutes "prima facie proof of a conviction 
pursuant 
to the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), a 
defendant's failure to object [to an inaccurate representation 
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
9 
 
in that proof] operates as a stipulation to the mode of proof 
that the State has chosen to use. . . ."  Majority op., ¶44 
(citing Saunders, 255 Wis. 2d 589, ¶63).   
¶126 In the initial complaint in this case, the State cited 
three criminal misdemeanor offenses supporting its habitual 
criminality allegation.  The misdemeanors included criminal 
damage to property, disorderly conduct, and battery.  The only 
time Bonds was convicted of forgery, a felony, was in 1998.   
¶127 Counsel for Bonds objected to the amendment of the 
complaint to substitute the felony conviction for the three 
misdemeanor convictions.  However, counsel did not object to the 
accuracy of the fact of the felony conviction, to the use of a 
CCAP record, nor to CCAP's record of the date of conviction.  In 
fact, counsel for Bonds referenced his own use of CCAP to verify 
dates of conviction and sentencing.  Counsel's objection was to 
the substitution of the felony for the misdemeanor offenses, 
which counsel suggested to the court created a defect in the 
complaint.   
MR. FUGLE (Counsel for Bonds):  Your Honor, I 
believe that the State's motion to essentially amend 
the complaint at this time is too late.  I believe 
that the reason the State wishes the Court to rely 
upon the felony conviction is they aren't able to 
prove the convictions they have alleged within the 
body of the complaint. 
The conviction dates for those were in April, 
April 15, 1998.  In the complaint they are alleged as 
being date of conviction of August 20, 1999.  Those 
are dates which, upon my review of the Wisconsin 
Circuit Court access program the date that Mr. Bonds 
was in fact sentenced on withheld sentence after a 
probation violation.  However, I think the complaint 
is in fact defective. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
10 
 
I think the State cannot, at this late juncture 
move to amend the complaint when it has found some 
other conviction that may in fact be relevant and 
therefore we are asking that the Court not only find 
the state has not met the burden in terms of proving 
this beyond a reasonable doubt, but also that they in 
fact have nothing to prove as the complaint, as it 
alleges habitual criminality is defective.  
¶128 The circuit court rejected the argument that the 
State's complaint was defective, explaining that there was no 
statutory requirement that the complaint list the particular 
crimes upon which a repeater charge would be based.  The State 
had fulfilled the statute's mandates, since it had successfully 
put Bonds on notice that he was being charged as a repeat 
offender. 
The 
State 
also 
satisfied 
the 
requirement 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62 that the defendant be convicted of a felony, 
or three misdemeanors, during the five-year period immediately 
preceding the commission of the crime for which Bonds was being 
sentenced. 
¶129 Bonds did dispute that the new offense fell within the 
five-year period within which he may be charged as an habitual 
criminal.  However, the dispute was not over the fact of any 
criminal convictions, or even the dates of those convictions.  
Rather, Bonds disputed the fact that the court tolled the ten 
months he was incarcerated from the five-year period.   
¶130 In fact, during the sentencing hearing Bonds, himself, 
made reference to his felony forgery conviction.  "THE COURT:  
They revoked you for absconding.  MR. BONDS:  I got found guilty 
for absconding, failure to see my parole officer.  And I got 
revoked for remainder of my sentence on the forgery case." 
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
11 
 
(Emphasis added.)  In fact, the circuit court expressly asked 
Bonds if it had misstated the facts. 
THE COURT:  . . . You are in prison now because 
of your behavior, because of the forgery, because of 
your prior record.  . . .  
The time you are serving right now is because of you. 
MR BONDS:  Well, Your Honor, I know I'm in this 
situation here.  What I say won't really matter to the 
Court. 
THE COURT:  What I'm saying is not true?  Tell 
me. 
MR. BONDS:  I know my predicament, my past.  What 
I went through.  I know the type of person I am.  The 
district attorney, no one in here knows what type of 
person I am but me.  I'm not a bad person.  I'm not.  
I don't go out and rob, steal, do none of that.  I 
don't have to do none of that.  Sending me to prison 
is just wasting tax payers money.   
THE COURT:  You don't have a conviction for 
robbery? 
MR. BONDS:  In '91.  I was 17 years old. 
THE COURT:  You said you don't rob people. 
MR. BONDS:  I was a juvenile.  It wasn't actually 
a robbery. I was party to a crime, P.T.A.C. 
THE COURT:  You were convicted of battery? 
MR. BONDS:  In the past, yes, I have. 
It is evident from the record here that Bonds was given ample 
opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the State's proof 
concerning his felony conviction.  In fact, not only did he fail 
to object to the accuracy of the CCAP record, he specifically 
referred to his felony conviction for forgery. 
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
12 
 
¶131 Counsel for Bonds did not deny the accuracy of the 
felony conviction either, but rather he in effect conceded it, 
as did Bonds.  At the sentencing hearing, his attorney stated: 
"[w]e are asking that the court consider less than the maximum 
sentence.  I think if the Court feels that prison time is 
necessary, that 12 months would be sufficient." (Emphasis 
added.) Yet the crime for which Bonds was convicted in this case 
was a Class A misdemeanor, which carries a maximum jail sentence 
of nine months.  It was only the habitual offender enhancer, 
under Wis. Stat. § 939.62, that allowed the court to increase 
the nine-month sentence to not more than two years.  Clearly, 
the 
attorney 
for 
Bonds 
acknowledged 
the 
felony 
forgery 
conviction and was not challenging the CCAP report or its 
accuracy.   
¶132 The CCAP record was an official report.  As an 
official report, the CCAP record constituted prima facie 
evidence.  Bonds' concession concerning the felony forgery 
conviction amounted to an admission in regard to that qualifying 
conviction, and also, in effect, was a stipulation to the mode 
of proof utilized by the State.  The concession by counsel for 
Bonds amounted to such a stipulation as well.  As the majority 
correctly reasons, when the State has made a prima facie showing 
of repeater status, the proof is then sufficient.  See majority 
op., ¶51.  In order to challenge proof that is sufficient, the 
majority recognizes that a defendant must object at sentencing, 
or he or she will have no basis for contending that the evidence 
was not sufficient on appeal.  See id.  Put another way, when 
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
13 
 
the state has provided prima facie proof of a qualifying prior 
conviction or convictions, in the absence of a challenge to the 
accuracy of that evidence, and where there are stipulations such 
as we have here, the state will have satisfied its burden to 
prove the prior conviction or convictions beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Saunders, 255 Wis. 2d. 589, ¶63.  
¶133  For 
the 
reasons 
stated 
herein, 
I 
respectfully 
dissent. 
¶134 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and DAVID T. PROSSER join this concurrence/dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP948-CR.npc 
 
 
 
1