Case Title: Pancratz Co., Inc. v. Kloefkorn-Ballard Construction/Development, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86-20

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pancratz Co., Inc. v. Kloefkorn-Ballard Construction/Development, Inc.1986 WY 137720 P.2d 906Case Number: 86-20Decided: 06/20/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
PANCRATZ COMPANY, INC., 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

KLOEFKORN-BALLARD 
CONSTRUCTION/DEVELOPMENT, INC., Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

J. Scott 
Burnworth of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, for appellant.

J. Patrick Hand 
of Hand, Hand & Hand, P.C., Douglas, and Kari Jo Taylor, University of Wyoming Law 
School Student, Laramie, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Pancratz 
Company, Inc., brought suit against appellee Kloefkorn-Ballard 
Construction/Development, Inc., to collect money appellant claimed appellee owed 
for construction work performed by appellant. Appellant's complaint was based on 
breach of an oral contract, and was later amended to include recovery based on 
quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. The only theory appellant pursues on 
appeal is quantum meruit.

[¶2.]     The trial court found 
generally that appellant failed to prove its claims and that appellant was "* * 
* entitled to judgment only in the admitted amount of liability, $927.45." From 
this judgment appellant brings this appeal and raises one 
issue:

"Did the District Court 
err in failing to award compensation to plaintiff on the basis of quantum meruit 
for the materials and services rendered by the plaintiff?"

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     Appellee was the 
general contractor on the construction of a gymnasium and a school building in 
Greybull, Wyoming. The installation of metal siding on 
the buildings was subcontracted to CGR Building Systems (CGR) for the agreed 
price of $52,000.

[¶5.]     When CGR was unable to 
complete the work, appellee suggested that CGR find another contractor to 
complete the work. CGR then contacted appellant, and appellant agreed to 
complete the work. Shortly thereafter, appellant became concerned about CGR's 
financial stability and contacted appellee to inform appellee of such concerns. 
Appellant claims appellee agreed to pay appellant directly for its work. 
However, testimony at trial by John Ballard, co-owner of Kloefkorn-Ballard, 
indicated that he told appellant: "* * * [W]e would do what we could to protect 
them [appellant] up to the amount that was left on CGR's 
contract."

[¶6.]     Appellant completed the 
work and sent an invoice to appellee for payment in the amount of $23,552.98. 
Appellee paid $10,000 to appellant. At trial, appellee admitted that there was 
$10,927.54 left to be paid on CGR's contract at the time appellant agreed to 
finish the work. Therefore, judgment was rendered for appellant in the amount of 
$927.45.

[¶7.]     The only issue raised 
by appellant is whether it was entitled to relief based upon quantum meruit for 
the work performed. Quantum meruit is defined as follows:

"Expression `quantum 
meruit' means `as much as he deserves' and it is an expression that describes 
the extent of liability on a contract implied by law. Nardi & Co., Inc. v. 
Allabastro, 20 Ill. App.3d 323, 314 N.E.2d 367, 370. An 
equitable doctrine, based on the concept that no one who benefits by the labor 
and materials of another should be unjustly enriched thereby; under those 
circumstances, the law implies a promise to pay a reasonable amount for the 
labor and materials furnished, even absent a specific contract therefor. 
Swiftships, Inc. v. Burdin, 
La. App., 338 So. 2d 1193, 1195. * * 
*" Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1119 (5th ed., 1979).

[¶8.]     The elements necessary 
to support a claim for relief based upon quantum meruit 
are:

1) Valuable services were 
rendered, or materials furnished,

2) to the party to be 
charged,

3) which services or 
materials were accepted, used and enjoyed by the party, 
and

4) under such 
circumstances which reasonably notified the party to be charged that the 
plaintiff, in rendering such services or furnishing such materials, expected to 
be paid by the party to be charged. Without such payment, the party would be 
unjustly enriched.

Montes v. 
Naismith & Trevino Construction Company, Tex.Civ.App., 459 S.W.2d 691 
(1970). See also, 21 Am.Jur.2d Pleading and Practice Forms (Rev), Restitution 
and Implied Contracts, Forms 42-59 (1972).

[¶9.]     The evidence indicates 
that appellant was hired by CGR, not appellee, to complete the work. No written 
document ever existed between appellant and appellee creating a contract or 
obligation. In a letter from appellee to CGR dated December 3, 1981, appellee 
stated that they would pay appellant directly and deduct the money from the 
amount owed under the CGR contract. The letter confirmed that appellant had been 
hired by CGR. Apparently appellant was aware of this letter since appellant 
introduced the letter into evidence at trial. It was noted at trial that 
appellant never wrote appellee any follow-up letters setting forth its 
understanding of the agreement. The only written document in the record between 
appellee and appellant was the invoice sent by appellant to appellee after the 
work was completed.

[¶10.]  Appellant contends, however, that 
appellee was enriched by appellant's work because without such work the school 
district might have deducted from the price paid to appellee the cost of 
completing the work, or appellee might not have been able to complete the CGR 
contract within the balance remaining on the contract ($10,927.54). Appellant 
fails to support such contention with any evidence in the record. To the 
contrary is the testimony of Mr. Ballard, who stated he felt the work done by 
appellant could have been completed for approximately 
$4,500.

[¶11.]  When reviewing cases on appeal we accept 
the evidence of the prevailing party as true, leaving out entirely the evidence 
presented in conflict therewith, giving every favorable inference which may 
fairly and reasonably be drawn from the prevailing party's evidence. Shanor v. 
Engineering, Inc. of Wyoming, Wyo., 705 P.2d 858 
(1985). The trial court's findings are presumed correct, and such findings will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless inconsistent with the evidence, clearly 
erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. M & M Welding, 
Inc. v. Pavlicek, Wyo., 713 P.2d 236 
(1986).

[¶12.]  The central issue to the disposition of 
this case is whether appellee was unjustly enriched by the work performed by 
appellant. Not only must we find enrichment, but such enrichment must be unjust. 
Bereman v. Bereman, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1155 (1982); Rocky Mountain Turbines, Inc. 
v. 660 Syndicate, Inc., Wyo., 623 P.2d 758 (1981); McGrath v. Hilding, 
41 N.Y.2d 625, 394 N YS.2d 603, 363 N.E.2d 328 (1977).

[¶13.]  The trial court found that appellant had 
failed to prove its claims. We think the trial court was correct. We are also 
unable to find appellant's claims substantiated by the record. On the contrary, 
we think the record supports appellee's position that there was no unjust 
enrichment.

[¶14.]  Having found no reversible error, the 
trial court's judgment is affirmed in all respects.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.