Case Title: In Interest of KMM

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-97-3

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
In Interest of KMM1998 WY 62957 P.2d 296Case Number: C-97-3Decided: 05/07/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Interest of KMM, Minor. RM, Appellant (Respondent),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, 
Appellee (Petitioner).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Natrona County, W. Thomas Sullins, J.

 

Spar L. Stormo, Casper, 
for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and Dan S. Wilde, 
Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

MACY, 
Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant RM (the father) appeals from the 
district court's order which terminated his parental rights to KMM (the 
child).

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] The father presents the 
following issues for our review:

 

1. Does the Wyoming Constitution require that . . . 
an attorney be appointed to represent an indigent parent whose parental rights 
are being terminated in all cases?

 

2. Does the Wyoming Constitution and the United 
States Constitution require that an attorney be appointed to represent the 
Appellant under the facts of this case?

 

3. Since the evidence against appellant was almost 
exclusively inadmissible hearsay did this amount to Plain 
Error?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶4] The child was born to 
the father and KMMM (the mother) on June 30, 1991. Soon after the child's birth, 
the Natrona County Department of Family Services began receiving child 
protection complaints against the child's parents. It received the first 
complaint on September 11, 1991. The complaint alleged that the home environment 
was filthy and that the mother did not check on the child even though the child 
was having trouble breathing. This complaint was substantiated as neglect, and 
the juvenile court gave legal custody of the child to the Department of Family 
Services, leaving physical custody with the parents.

 

[¶5] The Department of 
Family Services received another child protection complaint on June 18, 1992, 
which alleged a filthy home environment and the absence of food appropriate for 
a one-year-old child. This complaint was also substantiated as neglect, and the 
juvenile court awarded physical custody of the child to the maternal grandmother 
and left legal custody with the Department of Family 
Services.

 

[¶6] The child's physical 
custody was returned to the parents on November 20, 1992. On October 8, 1993, 
the Department of Family Services received a third child protection complaint 
against the parents. This complaint alleged that the home environment was 
filthy, that the child had not been fed, that the child was sleeping on a 
urine-soaked mattress, and that dirty clothes were piled to the ceiling. Once 
again, the complaint was substantiated as neglect. As a result, the juvenile 
court placed the child in the legal and physical custody of the Department of 
Family Services.

 

[¶7] The parents divorced in 
October of 1993. In June 1994, the child was placed with her aunt and uncle. In 
August of 1994, the Department of Family Services learned that the father had 
been accused of sexually abusing his girlfriend's five-year-old son. The father 
was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a minor, and he was placed on 
probation.

 

[¶8] On July 12, 1995, the 
father asked the Department of Family Services for permission to see the child. 
The Department of Family Services decided that supervised visitation would be 
allowed for one hour once a month. At the scheduled visits for August and 
September, the father was thirty minutes late, and the visits were canceled. The 
father was also late for the third scheduled visit, but the visit did 
occur.

 

[¶9] The father could not 
participate in any subsequent visits because he was incarcerated. He had failed 
to attend the ordered sex offender counseling, and his probation was, therefore, 
revoked. The father is serving a term of not less than three years nor more than 
seven years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.

 

[¶10] The Department of 
Family Services filed a petition on September 11, 1996, for termination of the 
father's parental rights. At a hearing on the matter, the district court made 
the following findings:

 

a) the [child], with a date of birth of June 30, 
1991, has been left in the care of another person without provision for the 
child's support from the absent parent, namely, [the father], for a period of at 
least one (1) year; b) that the [child] has been abused or neglected by the 
parent and efforts by the Department of Family Services have been unsuccessful 
in rehabilitating the family and the family has refused rehabilitative treatment 
and the child's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining 
with or returning to the parent; c) that the [father] is incarcerated due to a 
conviction of a felony, and is unfit to have the custody and control of the 
child; and, d) that the natural mother of the minor . . .  relinquished and voluntarily severed all 
parental rights and relationship to the [child].

 

[¶11] The district court 
terminated the father's parental rights and placed the child in the permanent 
care and control of the Department of Family Services so that she could be 
adopted or appropriately placed. The father appeals to this 
Court.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶12] The question at the 
root of the father's issues is whether he was entitled to be represented by 
court appointed counsel in the termination proceeding against him. The father 
wrote a letter to the district court in which he asked the court to appoint an 
attorney to represent him. The district court responded to the father by letter, 
stating: "If you desire specific relief from the Court, then it is necessary for 
you to bring a motion under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure requesting the 
same."1 Although the father filed various 
other motions throughout the proceedings, he did not file a motion for a court 
appointed attorney.

 

[¶13] This Court has 
previously held that a pro se litigant will be treated the same as he would be 
if he were represented by an attorney. LP v. Natrona County Department of Public 
Assistance and Social Services (Parental Rights of GP), 679 P.2d 976, 984 (Wyo. 
1984).

 

One has the right to appear pro se; but when a person 
chooses to do so, he must be held to the same standard as if he were represented 
by counsel. He cannot expect the court or the attorneys for other parties to 
present his case. He cannot be given an advantage by virtue of his pro se 
appearance, and he cannot be placed at a disadvantage thereby other than 
whatever disadvantage results from his decision to proceed without the 
assistance of counsel.

 

Johnson v. Aetna Casualty 
and Surety Company of Hartford, Connecticut, 630 P.2d 514, 517 (Wyo.), appeal 
dismissed and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1118, 102 S. Ct. 961, 71 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1981). 
Although this Court has indicated that a certain leniency is accorded to pro se 
litigants, the proper administration of justice requires reasonable adherence to 
the rules and requirements of the court.  
Apodaca v. Ommen, 807 P.2d 939, 943 (Wyo. 1991).

 

[¶14] The fact that the 
father filed several motions in this case convinces us that his failure to file 
a motion for a court appointed attorney was not the result of his inability to 
understand the procedural requirement, especially given the fact that the 
district court specifically informed him that such a motion was required. 
Instead, it appears that the father's failure to file the motion was a 
deliberate decision not to file one rather than being an inability to do 
so.

 

[¶15] Throughout the 
proceedings, the district court seemed to appreciate the difficulties the father 
was encountering by acting pro se and was as helpful as it was appropriate for 
the district court to be. We understand those difficulties as well. However, 
because the father did not make a formal motion for court appointed counsel, an 
order denying the motion does not exist, and it would be inappropriate for us to 
excuse the father's noncompliance with the applicable procedural 
rule.

 

[¶16] We remain committed to 
the rule that this Court will not apply different procedural standards for pro 
se parties than we do for represented parties. To condone a practice which 
permits parties to ignore the rules of procedure would defeat the purposes for 
the rules. Consequently, the father's failure to make a formal motion for a 
court appointed attorney is determinative in this case.

 

[¶17] 
Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Although 
a specific rule of civil procedure pertaining to court appointed attorneys does 
not exist, W.R.C.P. 7(b)(1) states that an application to the court for an order 
shall be made by a written motion.