Case Title: Caldwell v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 190541

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Goodwyn, Mims, Powell, Kelsey, and McCullough, JJ., and Russell and Millette, 
S.JJ. 
 
CANDACE RENE CALDWELL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 190541 
 
 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 April 9, 2020 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
In this appeal we consider whether the circuit court, and the Court of Appeals in 
affirming the circuit court’s judgment, erred as a matter of law in convicting appellant of 
defrauding a hotel restaurant when she obtained food from the restaurant without paying.  For the 
reasons stated herein we are of the opinion that there was error and will reverse the conviction. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Candace Rene Caldwell (“Caldwell”) was indicted pursuant to Code § 18.2-188, which, 
under subsection (b)(2), makes it unlawful for any person who “without paying therefor, and 
with the intent to cheat or defraud the owner or keeper to . . . obtain food from a restaurant or 
other eating house.”  Caldwell was tried without a jury and found guilty as charged by the Circuit 
Court of Rockbridge County of the Class 1 misdemeanor.  The circuit court sentenced Caldwell 
to thirty days in jail with all but four days suspended, imposed eight dollars of restitution plus 
court costs, and ordered that Caldwell shall not go onto the property of the innkeeper at any time. 
The evidence at trial established that in March 2017 Caldwell gave a ride to two hikers 
emerging from the Appalachian Trail to escape an approaching storm.∗  The hikers asked 
                                                          
 
∗ The facts herein are taken from a Statement of Facts, which reflects that a written Joint 
Stipulation of Mark Arnn’s account of the events was entered into evidence at trial in lieu of his 
live testimony. 
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Caldwell if she would drive them to a nearby hotel.  She obliged and took them to the Country 
Inn & Suites of Lexington (the “hotel”) because she had a discount coupon for that business, 
which she gave to the hikers to use.  During the drive to the hotel, the hikers agreed that they 
would help Caldwell move some items from her home to a storage unit the next day.  The hikers 
registered as guests at the hotel, which included a complimentary breakfast.  Caldwell and one of 
the hikers, Mark Arnn, agreed they would meet at the hotel the following morning.  When Arnn 
went downstairs from his hotel room the next morning he saw Caldwell waiting in the restaurant 
area and they ate breakfast together.  Arnn stated that he “may have specifically invited her to eat 
breakfast,” but he was “not sure exactly what [he] said to her.”  While they ate breakfast, it was 
agreed that the two hikers would walk to Caldwell’s house later that morning to help her move 
some items and, in return, she would drive them to Waynesboro so they could resume hiking the 
trail from there.  When Arnn finished eating, he left Caldwell at the table and returned to his 
room. 
Thereafter, a member of the hotel’s kitchen staff approached Caldwell and asked her to 
stop by the front desk to pay eight dollars for her meal.  Caldwell did not pay, but approached the 
hotel’s desk manager, who testified that Caldwell demanded to know why she had to pay for her 
breakfast.  The manager informed Caldwell that “if you are not a guest in the hotel then this is 
what we require.”  She described that Caldwell began screaming that “it didn’t matter because 
they were going to throw the food out anyways.”  The manager again asked Caldwell to pay the 
eight dollars.  Caldwell refused to pay and asked the manager for the telephone number to the 
hotel’s corporate office.  The manager agreed that she could give Caldwell the corporate number, 
but told Caldwell that she still needed to pay for the meal or the manager would have to call the 
police.  Caldwell did not pay, but started backing out of the hotel while continuing to yell at the 
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manager.  Another person noted Caldwell’s license plate number as she drove away from the 
hotel. 
The hotel manager further testified, when asked whether someone who was not a 
registered guest could eat breakfast at the hotel, that “[y]ou’re not supposed to.  I guess there’s 
nothing written that says you can’t.”  She added that the hotel discourages non-overnight guests 
from eating breakfast but will serve them if they pay the cost of breakfast. 
Deputy Dylan Welsh of the Rockbridge County Sheriff’s Office testified that he received 
a call from the hotel about an “unpaying customer who had eaten breakfast and then fled the 
scene.”  Deputy Welsh located Caldwell’s home through DMV records associated with the 
license plate number.  He testified that Caldwell did not deny eating the breakfast but did not 
believe that she needed to pay for it. 
Caldwell testified that Arnn, who was a guest of the hotel, did “in fact” invite her to have 
breakfast with him in the hotel restaurant.  The court allowed Caldwell’s testimony as evidence 
of her state of mind with regard to her intent, but sustained the Commonwealth’s hearsay 
objection to what Arnn said.  The court limited the defense to Arnn’s stipulated statement, which 
was that he may have invited her to breakfast, but was not sure.  Continuing, Caldwell explained 
that after the staff member told her she had to pay for the breakfast, she engaged in conversation 
with the desk manager in an effort to resolve the dispute.  Caldwell said that she told Deputy 
Welsh that she offered to pay for the meal and that a surveillance video of her conversation with 
the manager would confirm that. 
During its rebuttal, the Commonwealth recalled the hotel manager and the deputy, both 
of whom testified that they had no recollection that Caldwell either offered to pay for the meal or 
said that she had made the offer.  Deputy Welsh further testified that although there was no audio 
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to the surveillance video of Caldwell and the manager, one could clearly see Caldwell “being 
aggressive, very inappropriate, and ‘shaking her hand at [the manager].’”  The Commonwealth 
argued that this testimony rebutted Caldwell’s testimony that she calmly and politely addressed 
the manager and offered to pay for her meal. 
In closing arguments, Caldwell contended that there was no evidence that she intended to 
defraud the hotel at the time she ate the breakfast.  She added that seeking out the 
manager at the front desk rather than simply leaving the premises indicated a lack of the 
requisite intent to defraud the hotel. 
The Commonwealth argued there was no evidence that Caldwell was invited to breakfast 
and that Caldwell’s “causing a scene” and leaving the hotel when the manager stated that she 
would call the police was evidence from which the court could infer Caldwell’s intent to defraud.  
The Commonwealth further argued that Caldwell was not a guest and could not expect to eat a 
free breakfast.  The judge found Caldwell guilty, stating: 
If you had paid that eight-dollar bill, when they said, ‘Ma’am, 
you’re not supposed to be eating here,’ this would’ve been done 
and gone away.  And I think that’s the point at which the evidence 
turns against you, is that maybe you really didn’t understand, 
although I believe any reasonable person would have, but maybe 
you didn’t understand exactly that you couldn’t just be invited by a 
guest.  But once you were told, and you still didn’t pay, I think it’s 
clear at that point. You got the benefit of breakfast and refused to 
pay for it. 
 
Caldwell appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the plain language 
of Code § 18.2-188(b)(2) requires proof of specific intent to defraud at the time the benefit is 
received; that is, when she ate the breakfast, not after.  She submitted that the Court of Appeals 
had previously considered the import of the specific intent requirement of Code § 18.2-188 in its 
unpublished opinion in Morton v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0864-98-4, 1999 WL 1129728 
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(July 20, 1999), which, by implication, adopted this Court’s construction in Cunningham v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 399, 402 (1978), of the phrase “intent to defraud” as used in a larceny 
by false pretenses statute, to require a finding of intent at the moment of obtaining the benefit.  
Caldwell argued that not only was the Commonwealth’s evidence insufficient to prove she 
possessed the intent to defraud at the time she obtained the breakfast, but the circuit court’s 
ruling also demonstrated that the court did not conclude that Caldwell possessed the intent to 
defraud at that requisite time.  Therefore, argued Caldwell, the circuit court erred as a matter of 
law and her conviction should be overturned. 
The Commonwealth argued that it was proper for the circuit court to infer the requisite 
intent from all of Caldwell’s actions and statements.  The Court of Appeals agreed, reciting that 
“intent is the purpose formed in a person’s mind at the time an act is committed.  Intent may, and 
often must, be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, including the actions and 
statements of the accused.”  Johnson v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 79, 100 (2008) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 256 Va. 514, 519 (1998)).  The court further stated that “[t]he 
statements and conduct of an accused after the events that constitute the charged crime may also 
be relevant circumstantial evidence of intent.”  Simon v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 194, 206 
(2011).  The Court of Appeals denied Caldwell’s appeal by unpublished per curiam order, 
holding that: 
The trial court’s comments reflect that it did not think it reasonable 
for appellant to believe that she could partake in the hotel breakfast 
for free.  However, even if appellant believed she could enjoy 
breakfast at the hotel for free, the trial court concluded that 
appellant possessed the requisite intent because appellant was 
informed by hotel staff that she was required to pay for the 
breakfast as she ate yet refused to do so.  Thus, the record supports 
the trial court’s conclusion that appellant obtained the benefit, 
breakfast, without paying, and acted with the requisite intent.  The 
Commonwealth’s evidence was competent, was not inherently 
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incredible, and was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that appellant was guilty of defrauding an innkeeper. 
 
 
Caldwell v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0827-18-3 (January 17, 2019).  A three-judge panel of 
the Court of Appeals upheld the per curiam ruling “for the reasons previously stated” and 
without additional comment.  Caldwell v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0827-18-3 (April 15, 
2019). 
 
We granted Caldwell this appeal.  As she did in her appeal to the Court of Appeals, 
Caldwell charges the circuit court with erring as a matter of law by improperly convicting her 
under Code § 18.2-188 because the court did not find that she possessed the intent to defraud the 
hotel restaurant at the time she obtained the benefit.  Caldwell also contends that the Court of 
Appeals committed the same error of law in affirming the circuit court’s judgment and by not 
finding that the circuit court’s error of law constituted reversible error. 
 
Caldwell maintains that Code § 18.2-188(b)(2) is a specific intent statute, which makes it 
essential that a court find that the individual charged under the statute possess the intent to cheat 
or defraud the innkeeper at the time food is obtained.  Relying on Cunningham and Morton, she 
submits that the statutory language “to obtain food” unambiguously means at the time she ate the 
breakfast.  She argues that the circuit court therefore committed errors of law when it applied an 
objective or reasonable person standard and when it concluded that Caldwell’s intent was evident 
only after she had obtained the food and was told she had to pay for it. 
At oral argument, Caldwell did not dispute the law upon which the Commonwealth bases 
its argument and acknowledged that it is permissible for a court to determine mens rea by 
inferring it from all the facts and circumstances of a case.  However, argued Caldwell, the circuit 
court’s ruling foreclosed any such inference in this case. 
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Reiterating that Code § 18.2-188(b)(2) is a specific intent statute, Caldwell posits that, 
even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the court’s ruling 
that “maybe [Caldwell] really didn’t understand . . . [b]ut once [she] was told, and [she] still 
didn’t pay, I think it was clear at that point” and “[t]hat’s the point at which the evidence turn[ed] 
against [Caldwell]” clearly demonstrates that the court did not find the essential element of 
specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt:  that Caldwell possessed the intent to cheat or defraud 
the hotel restaurant at the time she obtained the food.  Caldwell concludes that her conviction 
must be overturned. 
 
We agree. 
 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
This case presents the Court with its first occasion to construe Code § 18.2-188(b)(2).  It 
is well-settled that issues of statutory interpretation are pure questions of law that this Court 
reviews de novo.  Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104 (2007).  
“When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that 
language.”  Id.  For statutory language to be found unambiguous, the text must not be 
“understood in more than one way or refer[] to two or more things simultaneously [or] . . . [be] 
difficult to comprehend, [be] of doubtful import, or lack[] clearness or definiteness.”  See 
Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227 n.8 (2006) (citation omitted). 
Code § 18.2-188(b)(2) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, without 
paying therefor, and with the intent to cheat or defraud the owner or keeper to . . . [o]btain food 
from a restaurant or other eating house.”  The word “obtain” is not defined in the statute and, 
thus, must be given its plain, ordinary meaning.  Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 237 
(2013) (citation omitted).  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1559 (1993), defines 
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obtain as “to gain or attain possession or disposal of usually by some planned action or method.”  
It is not ambiguous.  Likewise, we find the phrase “to obtain food” to be plain and unambiguous.  
Applying this plain language, we conclude that Caldwell “obtain[ed] food,” as that phrase is used 
in the statute, at the time she gained possession of the breakfast with the intent to eat it. 
Obtaining food from a restaurant or other eating house, however, is but one of the 
essential elements of the statutory crime at issue.  The Commonwealth was also required to 
prove that Caldwell did not pay for the food and that she obtained the food with the intent to 
cheat or defraud the owner or keeper.  It is undisputed that Caldwell did not pay for the breakfast 
that she consumed at the hotel.  Thus, the remaining element of the crime we must address is 
whether there was proof of Caldwell’s intent to defraud or cheat the hotel restaurant. 
We have held that: 
[W]here a statute makes an offense consist of an act combined 
with a particular intent, such intent is as necessary to be proved as 
the act itself, and it is necessary for the intent to be established as a 
matter of fact before a conviction can be had.  Surmise and 
speculation as to the existence of the intent are not sufficient, and 
‘no intent in law or mere legal presumption, differing from the 
intent in fact, can be allowed to supply the place of the latter.’ 
 
 Dixon v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 380, 382 (1955) (quoting Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 
767, 770 (1922)).  Further, “we review factfinding with the highest degree of appellate 
deference” and do not ask whether this Court “believes that the evidence at the trial established 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 236, 248 (2016) 
(citations omitted).  “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  Id.  In addition, 
because the appellant was convicted by a circuit court sitting without a jury, the circuit court’s 
judgment is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be disturbed on appeal 
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unless it is “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”  King v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 
601, 604 (1977); Code § 8.01-680.  However, “it is just as obligatory upon the appellate court, to 
set aside . . . the judgment of a court, when it is, in its opinion, contrary to the law and evidence, 
and therefore plainly wrong, as it is to sustain it when the reverse is true.”  Bland v. 
Commonwealth, 177 Va. 819, 821 (1941). 
Having established that to “obtain food” as used in the statute unambiguously refers to 
when the food is possessed with the intent to eat it, coupled with the statute’s equally plain 
language that requires “the intent to cheat or defraud the owner or keeper to . . . [o]btain food 
from a restaurant or other eating house,” we conclude that Code § 18.2-188(b)(2) required proof 
that Caldwell had the intent to cheat or defraud the hotel restaurant at the time she gained 
possession of the food. 
However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and 
giving the highest deference to the circuit court’s factual findings, we cannot say that any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime at issue beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Rather, the circuit court’s finding – that maybe Caldwell did not understand 
that she could not just be invited by a guest, but when she was told she had to pay for the food 
and did not, that was “the point at which the evidence turned against” her and it “was clear at that 
point” – reflects the exact opposite:  that the court had reasonable doubt as to Caldwell’s intent to 
defraud at the time she gained possession of the food.  Such “surmise and speculation” by the 
court as to the existence of Caldwell’s intent to defraud or cheat is insufficient, and “no intent in 
law or mere legal presumption, differing from the intent in fact, can be allowed to supply the 
place of the latter.”  See Dixon, 197 Va. at 382.  Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the 
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circuit court’s finding of guilt, and the Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming that conviction, are 
contrary to the law and evidence and therefore plainly wrong. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
dismiss the indictment. 
Reversed and dismissed.