Case Title: Paul A. Weimer v. Country Mutual Insurance Company

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP001440

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1440 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Paul A. Weimer, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Country Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Traceland Landscape, Design Construction 
Company, Ronald E. Trace, United States Fidelity 
& Guaranty Company, Dynaweld Trailer Company, 
Royal Insurance Company of America, General 
Motors Corporation, Wisconsin Physicians Service 
Insurance Corporation, BBB Insurance Company, 
General Casualty Company of Illinois, Frederick 
R. Ross, Eugene Sheets, George Meyer and Keith 
Jurkowski,  
 
Defendants. 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
211 Wis. 2d 845, 565 N.W.2d 595 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997) 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 20, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 6, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
William F. Hue 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
BABLITCH, J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Larry B. Brueggeman, Hope K. Olson and Previant, 
Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee and 
oral argument by Larry B. Brueggeman. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by James J. Jacobson, Robert M. Piette and Piette & 
Jacobson, Milwaukee and oral argument by James J. Jacobson. 
 
No. 96-1440 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1440  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Paul A. Weimer,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Country Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Traceland Landscape, Design Construction  
Company, Ronald E. Trace, United States  
Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Dynaweld  
Trailer Company, Royal Insurance Company  
of America, General Motors Corporation,  
Wisconsin Physicians Service Insurance  
Corporation, BBB Insurance Company,  
General Casualty Company of Illinois,  
Frederick R. Ross, Eugene Sheets, George  
Meyer and Keith Jurkowski,  
 
          Defendants.  
FILED 
 
MAR 20, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  Plaintiff Paul A. Weimer 
("Weimer") 
and Defendant 
Country 
Mutual Insurance Company 
("Country Mutual") separately petition this court for review of 
a published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming in part 
and reversing in part the judgment of the circuit court. The 
                     
1 Weimer v. Country Mut. Ins. Co.,  211 Wis. 2d 845, 565 
N.W.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1997). 
No. 96-1440 
 
2 
Jefferson County Circuit Court, Honorable William F. Hue 
presiding, concluded that Weimer cannot "stack"2 two separate 
Country Mutual insurance policies insuring two separate vehicles 
where both vehicles are involved in the same accident.  Citing 
Agnew v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Wis. 2d 341, 441 
N.W.2d 222 (1989), the circuit court determined that Wis. Stat. 
§ 631.43(1) (1993-94)3 does not void the "other insurance" 
provisions4 of the insurance policies that limit Country Mutual's 
liability, because the two separate policies do not insure 
against the "same loss."  It is the court of appeals' 
affirmation of this issue from which Weimer appeals.   
¶2 
The circuit court also determined that Country Mutual 
"tendered" the limits of its liability to Weimer by letters 
dated October 3, 1990, and February 4, 1991.  The circuit court 
therefore concluded that pursuant to language in the insurance 
                     
2 "Stacking refers to a situation where an insured attempts 
to collect reimbursement for the same loss under multiple 
policies."  Carrington v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 169 
Wis. 2d 211, 223, 485 N.W.2d 267 (1992) (citing Tahtinen v. MSI 
Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 158, 159 n.1, 361 N.W.2d 673 (1985)). 
3 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes will be to 
the 1993-94 volumes unless otherwise noted. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 631.43(1) states in relevant part: 
When 2 or more policies promise to indemnify an 
insured against the same loss, no 'other insurance' 
provisions of the policy may reduce the aggregate 
protection of the insured below the lesser of the 
actual insured loss suffered by the insured or the 
total indemnification promised by the policies if 
there were no 'other insurance' provisions.  
 
4 An "other insurance" provision in an insurance policy 
"limit[s] the insurer's liability if other collectible insurance 
exists."  John H. Mathias, Jr. et al, Insurance Coverage 
Disputes, § 8.02 at 8-9 (1997). 
No. 96-1440 
 
3 
policies, which relieves Country Mutual of liability for 
interest on the entire judgment if it tenders its policy limits, 
Country Mutual is liable to pay interest only on its policy 
limits of $100,000 from the date of the verdict until the date 
Country Mutual satisfies the judgment.  The court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court on this issue, holding Country Mutual 
did not tender the limits of its liability and is consequently 
liable for interest on the entire judgment pursuant to the terms 
of the insurance policies.  It is the court of appeals' reversal 
of this issue from which Country Mutual appeals. 
¶3 
We conclude that the two separate Country Mutual 
policies for the two insured vehicles involved in the accident 
do not insure against the "same loss" because the dump truck and 
the trailer do not present the same risks.  Therefore Wis. Stat. 
§ 631.43(1) does not void the provisions of the insurance 
policies limiting Country Mutual's liability to $100,000.5  We 
                     
5 We point out that effective July 15, 1995, Wis. Stat. 
§ 631.43(3) was amended by 1995 Wisconsin Act 21, § 1 to provide 
additional exceptions to Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1).  One such 
exception was created by 1995 Wis. Act 21, § 4 in Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(f): 
A policy may provide that regardless of the number of 
policies involved, vehicles involved, persons covered, 
claims made, vehicles or premiums shown on the policy 
or premiums paid the limits for any coverage under the 
policy may not be added to the limits for similar 
coverage applying to other motor vehicles to determine 
the limit of insurance coverage available for bodily 
injury or death suffered by a person in any one 
accident. 
 
If the language of Wis. Stat. § 631.43 (1995-96) were applicable 
in the present case, it would not void the provisions of the 
insurance 
policies 
limiting 
Country 
Mutual's 
liability to 
$100,000 for bodily injury, regardless of whether the separate 
policies covered the "same loss." 
No. 96-1440 
 
4 
further conclude that Country Mutual tendered its policy limits 
to Weimer by letters dated October 3, 1990, and February 4, 
1991.  Accordingly, Country Mutual has no liability for post-
judgment interest.  
I. 
¶4 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Weimer 
suffered bodily injury as a result of a motor vehicle accident 
which occurred on April 20, 1990.  Ronald Trace ("Trace"), who 
was driving a dump truck with an attached trailer, crossed over 
the center line of a highway and collided with the vehicle 
driven by Weimer.  On April 16, 1992, Weimer commenced an action 
against several parties, including Trace and Country Mutual as 
the insurer of the dump truck and trailer. 
¶5  Country Mutual insures the dump truck and the trailer 
under a business automobile policy.  The declarations page of 
the insurance policy lists the dump truck and the trailer as 
owned vehicles of Trace, in addition to five other vehicles.  
Trace pays a separate premium for insurance coverage for each of 
the seven vehicles insured.  The declarations page also provides 
that the liability limits for bodily injury are $100,000 for 
each person and $300,000 for each accident. 
¶6 
On October 3, 1990, Country Mutual forwarded a letter 
to Weimer offering its policy limits of $100,000 in full 
settlement of his claim against Country Mutual and its insured, 
Trace.  In a letter dated October 4, 1990, Weimer rejected 
Country Mutual's offer, indicating that the potential negligence 
of other defendants was being evaluated.  Country Mutual sent a 
No. 96-1440 
 
5 
second letter to Weimer on February 4, 1991, acknowledging 
Weimer's rejection of its offer and stating that Country 
Mutual's offer of its policy limits of $100,000 in full 
settlement was still in effect. 
¶7 
On June 21, 1995, Country Mutual brought a motion for 
declaratory judgment that its limit of liability for Weimer's 
bodily injury was $100,000.6  On October 10, 1995, the circuit 
                     
6 The relevant language of the insurance policies issued to 
Weimer by Country Mutual states: 
OTHER INSURANCE: 
 . . .  
 
2. 
When two or more policies cover on the same 
basis,  
either excess or primary, we will pay only our  
share.  Our share is the proportion that the 
limit  
of our policy bears to the total of the limits of 
all the policies covering on the same basis. 
 
OUR LIMIT OF LIABILITY: 
1.   Regardless of the number of covered autos,  
insureds, claims made or vehicles involved in the  
accident, our limit of liability is as follows: 
 
a. 
The most we will pay for all damages  
resulting from bodily injury to any one 
person caused by any one accident is the 
limit of Bodily Injury Liability shown in 
the declarations for "Each Person." 
 
b.  Subject to the limit of Each Person the most  
we will pay for all damages resulting from  
bodily injury caused by any one accident is  
the limit of Bodily Injury Liability shown 
in  
the declarations for "Each Accident." 
 
No. 96-1440 
 
6 
court granted Country Mutual's motion, concluding that the 
policy insuring the dump truck and the policy insuring the 
trailer do not insure against the same loss.  Therefore, the 
circuit court reasoned, Wis. Stat. § 631.43 is inapplicable, and 
the provisions of the insurance policies limiting liability for 
bodily injury to $100,000 per person are valid and enforceable. 
¶8 
 A jury trial commenced on October 2, 1995.  A special 
verdict was returned on October 18, 1995, wherein the jury found 
Trace 75 percent causally negligent and Weimer 25 percent 
causally negligent.  The jury awarded Weimer total damages of 
$813,805.50.  In an order dated March 7, 1996, the circuit court 
granted judgment on the verdict against Trace and Country Mutual 
in the amount of $610,354.35.  The circuit court affirmed its 
non-final order for declaratory judgment and found Country 
Mutual liable to Weimer for its policy limits of $100,000 
"together with taxable costs and interest as allowed by law." 
¶9 
At the request of the parties, a hearing was held on 
March 14, 1996, to clarify the March 7 order with respect to the 
interest payable by Country Mutual in accordance with the 
language of the insurance policy.7  Weimer argued that Country 
                                                                  
The declarations page states that the limit of bodily injury 
liability is $100,000 for each person and $300,00 for each 
accident. 
 
7 The supplemental payments clause of Country Mutual's 
insurance policy issued to Trace states, in relevant part: 
In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay for 
the insured: 
 
 . . .  
 
5.   All interest accruing after the entry of the  
No. 96-1440 
 
7 
Mutual was liable for the interest on the entire judgment, not 
limited to Country Mutual's policy limits.  Weimer asserted that 
Country Mutual's act of forwarding letters offering its limits 
of liability did not constitute "tender" and therefore Country 
Mutual is not relieved of its obligation to pay interest on the 
entire judgment per the policy.  Country Mutual, on the other 
hand, asserted that because its written offers to pay its 
liability limits did constitute "tender" it was not liable for 
any interest on any portion of the judgment, including its 
policy limits.  The circuit court held that Country Mutual was 
liable only for the interest on its policy limits of $100,000 
from the date of the verdict until the $100,000 was paid to 
Weimer.  Weimer appealed. 
¶10 In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed in 
part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court.  
The court of appeals affirmed that portion of the circuit 
court's decision limiting Country Mutual's liability for damages 
to $100,000.  The court of appeals concluded that the insurance 
policies covering the dump truck and the trailer do not insure 
against the same loss.  As such, Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) does not 
void the provisions of the insurance policies limiting Country 
Mutual's liability to $100,000 for Weimer's bodily injury.   
¶11 The court of appeals reversed that portion of the 
circuit court's decision holding that Country Mutual is liable 
only for post-verdict interest on $100,000.  The court of 
appeals determined that Country Mutual did not tender its policy 
                                                                  
judgment in a suit we defend.  Our duty to pay   
interest ends when we pay or tender our limits of 
liability. 
No. 96-1440 
 
8 
limits.  Based upon the language of the insurance policies, 
therefore, the court of appeals concluded Country Mutual is 
liable to pay interest on the entire amount of the judgment 
until it pays its policy limits to Weimer. 
II. 
 
¶12 Weimer asserts that Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) voids the 
language of the insurance policies limiting Country Mutual's 
liability to $100,000 for Weimer's bodily injury.  "The 
construction of insurance contract provisions and statutes are 
questions of law which this court reviews de novo."  West Bend 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Playman, 171 Wis. 2d 37, 40, 489 N.W.2d 915 
(1992) (citing Martin v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 146 Wis. 2d 
759, 766, 433 N.W.2d 1 (1988)). 
 
¶13 The relevant language of Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) states 
that where "2 or more policies . . . indemnify an insured 
against the same loss, no 'other insurance' provisions of the 
policy may reduce the aggregate protection of the insured." 
(emphasis supplied).  Hence, we must discern whether two 
policies exist in the present case and, if so, whether they 
insure Trace against the same loss. 
 
¶14 The declarations page of the policy issued by Country 
Mutual indicates that Trace has only one policy number covering 
the seven insured vehicles.  However, Trace pays a separate 
premium for each of the seven insured vehicles, including the 
dump truck and the trailer involved in the accident.  Payment of 
separate premiums is the equivalent of having separately issued 
policies.  See Burns v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 
No. 96-1440 
 
9 
574, 578, 360 N.W.2d 61 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Citizens Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Turner, 220 N.W.2d 203, 204-05 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1974)); Schult v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 195 Wis. 2d 231, 237, 536 
N.W.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1995).  "[W]here a single insurance 
contract incorporates indemnity coverage for two vehicles, 
charging separate unit premiums, the insurer has issued two 
policies within the meaning of sec. 631.43, Stats." Krause v. 
Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 161 Wis. 2d 711, 715, 468 N.W.2d 755 
(Ct. App. 1991) (citing Burns, 121 Wis. 2d at 576-79).  Thus 
where one policy covers two or more vehicles, Wis. Stat. 
§ 631.43(1) voids insurance provisions that limit liability for 
the same loss "when more than one premium has been paid."  
Schult, 195 Wis. 2d at 240 (emphasis supplied). Trace therefore 
has two insurance policiesone for the dump truck and one for 
the trailerin accordance 
with the 
relevant 
language of 
§ 631.43.    
 
¶15 Having concluded that there are two separate insurance 
policies covering the dump truck and the trailer, we must 
consider whether those policies insure Trace against the "same 
loss."  Weimer argues that the premium paid for the dump truck 
and the premium paid for the trailer separately insure Trace 
against the damages for bodily injury resulting from the April 
20, 1990, accident.   Both vehicles were involved in the 
accident and were operated in tandem to cause one bodily injury; 
therefore, both policies insured against the same loss, Weimer 
contends.   Country Mutual, on the other hand, argues that the 
policies do not insure Trace against the same loss because the 
dump truck presents one type of risk and the trailer presents 
No. 96-1440 
 
10
another type of risk.  Country Mutual contends that although 
both vehicles were involved in the accident, each vehicle is 
insured against distinct losses; therefore, the policies do not 
insure against the same loss.  We conclude, as did the circuit 
court and the court of appeals, that the policies covering the 
dump truck and the trailer do not insure Trace against the "same 
loss." 
¶16 In affirming the judgment of the circuit court, the 
court of appeals relied upon this court's decision in Agnew, 150 
Wis. 2d 341, wherein we discussed the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 631.43(1) to an insured's multiple insurance policies with the 
same insurer.  Our decision in Agnew was not based upon the 
consideration of an "other insurance" provision in an insurance 
policy as is presented here. See id. at 344.  However, our 
interpretation of what constitutes coverage for the "same loss" 
is applicable to the present case. 
¶17 In Agnew the insured had three separate policies of 
insurance on three separate vehicles.  Each of the three 
policies contained a "drive-other-car" provision which stated 
that coverage does not apply to bodily injury arising out of the 
use of a vehicle other than the insured vehicle.  Each policy 
also contained an "other insurance" provision which limited the 
insurer's liability to $25,000 for bodily injury to each person 
regardless of the number of insured vehicles involved in the 
accident.  The plaintiff was injured in an accident involving 
one of the insured's vehicles and sought to stack or aggregate 
the insurance policies covering each of the insured's three 
vehicles. 
No. 96-1440 
 
11
 
¶18 We concluded in Agnew that a determination whether two 
policies insure against the same loss must be made on a case-by-
case basis.8  See id. at 349 (quoting Wood v. American Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 148 Wis. 2d 639, 651, 436 N.W.2d 594 (1989), 
overruled on other grounds, Matthiesen v. Continental Cas. Co., 
193 Wis. 2d 192, 202, 532 N.W.2d 729 (1995)).  In holding that 
Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) did not void the "drive-other-car" 
provisions of the policies in that instance, we determined that 
while the three policies did indemnify the insured against a 
loss, they did not indemnify the insured against the same loss. 
  See Agnew, 150 Wis. 2d at 349. 
¶19 Separate policies insure against the same loss if "the 
risk of injury that [one] policy covers does not increase with 
the number of policies that have been issued to cover that 
person or property."  Id. at 349 (emphasis supplied).  See also, 
7 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3D, 
§ 101:3 at 101-11 (1997) ("'[T]he risk' can be understood as the 
type of loss which the insurer agrees to compensate.").  The 
three policies at issue in Agnew did not provide "multiple 
protections against the same risk" because the three policies 
each covered separate vehicles and therefore insured against 
different losses.  Agnew, 150 Wis. 2d at 349. 
 
[E]ach policy insures against a different loss and 
only one policy insures the insured against the loss 
incurred.  Each [insurance] policy insures against 
liability arising from the operation of the vehicle 
                     
8 In holding that a case-by-case analysis is required, we 
recognized that "the applicability of sec. 631.43(1) does not 
turn 
on 
the 
distinction 
between 
liability 
and 
indemnity 
insurance contracts."  Agnew v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 150 
Wis. 2d 341, 348, 441 N.W.2d 222 (1989). 
No. 96-1440 
 
12
specified in the policy owned by the policyholder.  
Thus under this part of each policy in this case only 
the policy covering the [vehicle involved in the 
accident] covered liability incurred by reason of 
operation of [that vehicle]. 
Id.  
¶20 The fact that only one of the insured's vehicles was 
involved in the accident in Agnew does not alter our analysis.  
In the present case, the Country Mutual policies do not insure 
Trace against the same loss because the risks accompanying the 
dump truck are not the same as the risks accompanying the 
trailer. Hence, our analysis of the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 631.43(1) hinges upon whether the separate insurance policies 
insure a particular vehicle against the same risk, not whether 
the particular injury resulting from the accident involved two 
insured vehicles. 
¶21 Although both vehicles were involved in the accident 
in present case, there are numerous instances in which losses 
may occur where the vehicles are operated independently.  For 
example, the dump truck may often be driven without the trailer, 
or any trailer, being attached.  Any loss incurred in an 
accident resulting from the negligent operation of the dump 
truck in such an instance would not be covered by the Country 
Mutual policy insuring the trailer.  Similarly, there are 
instances where the trailer presents risks independent of the 
dump truck.  For example, the trailer may be negligently parked, 
resulting in bodily injury to an individual whose vehicle comes 
in contact with the trailer.  Such injury would not be covered 
by the policy insuring the dump truck.  Moreover, there are 
instances where each vehicle presents independent risks even 
where the two vehicles are being operated in tandem.  If the 
No. 96-1440 
 
13
dump truck is pulling the trailer, it is possible that the 
trailer could break free and cause injury.  In that instance, 
the policy insuring the dump truck would not cover the injury 
caused by the trailer.  Thus the risks that accompany the dump 
truck are not the same risks that accompany the trailer.   
¶22 Country Mutual argues that permitting Trace to recover 
the limits of liability under both policies would allow him to 
obtain increased unpurchased liability insurance.  It is evident 
from reviewing the listed premiums on the declarations page of 
the insurance policy that the policies do not insure against the 
same loss, and that the limits of liability clause was 
apparently taken into consideration in setting premiums for 
coverage.  The risk assumed by an insurer is the "type of loss 
which the insurer agrees to compensate."  Russ & Segalla 
§ 101:3, at 101-11.  Therefore, it would seem likely that if one 
insurer is providing coverage under two policies covering the 
same loss or risk and establishing the same limits of liability, 
the amount of the premiums would be the same or similar.  Here, 
however, the annual premium for the policy insuring the dump 
truck is almost 13 times more than the annual premium for the 
policy insuring the trailer.9   
¶23 Weimer argues that a determination that the policies 
do not cover the same loss would be inconsistent with the 
reasonable expectation of an insured that each vehicle is 
separately insured for the full $100,000 policy limits.  We 
agree with Weimer to the extent that "the law of contracts 
                     
9 The total annual premium for the dump truck was $771.20, 
and the total annual premium for the trailer was $60.30. 
No. 96-1440 
 
14
attempts the realization of reasonable expectations" of the 
parties at the time they entered into the insurance policy.  
John H. Mathias, Jr. et al., Insurance Coverage Disputes, § 7.01 
at 
7-3 
(1997). 
 
If 
possible, 
however, 
this 
reasonable 
expectation should be inferred "solely from the language of the 
contract itself."  Id.   
 
¶24 Weimer accurately cites language from the insurance 
policies which states that Country Mutual "will pay all sums the 
insured 
legally 
must 
pay 
as 
damages 
because 
of 
bodily 
injury . . . to which this insurance applies."  However, this 
language must be analyzed in conjunction with the provisions in 
the policies stating that "[r]egardless of the number of covered 
 . . . vehicles involved in the accident, our limit of liability 
is . . . the limit of Bodily Injury Liability shown in the 
declarations for 'Each Person.'"  The unambiguous language of 
the insurance policy, read in its entirety, evinces that the 
"other insurance" provision in the policy would put a reasonable 
insured on notice that coverage is limited when multiple insured 
vehicles are involved in one accident. 
 
¶25 In sum, we conclude that the insurance policies issued 
by Country Mutual do not insure Trace against the same loss 
because the risks accompanying the dump truck are distinct from 
the risks accompanying the trailer.  This determination is 
consistent with what a reasonable insured would expect from the 
language of the policy as read in its entirety. 
III. 
No. 96-1440 
 
15
¶26 Country Mutual asserts that pursuant to the relevant 
provisions in the insurance policies, it is not liable to pay 
any interest on the judgment because it "tendered" the limits of 
its liability.  The interpretation of language in an insurance 
policy 
is 
governed 
by 
"general 
principles 
of 
contract 
construction."  Kuhn v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 Wis. 2d 50, 60, 
532 N.W.2d 124 (1995)(citing Lambert v. Wrensch, 135 Wis. 2d 
105, 115, 399 N.W.2d 369 (1987)).  The construction of a written 
contract is generally a question of law; therefore, our 
interpretation of the insurance policy provision at issue is 
reviewed de novo.  See Lambert, 135 Wis. 2d at 115.  
¶27 Our determination whether Country Mutual is liable for 
interest on the judgment is made in consideration of the 
specific language used in the provisions of the insurance 
policies.  See McPhee v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 
669, 672-73, 205 N.W.2d 152 (1973).  The relevant portion of the 
supplemental payments clauses in the insurance policies states 
that Country Mutual will pay for "[a]ll interest accruing after 
the entry of the judgment;" however, the "duty to pay interest 
ends" when Country Mutual "tender[s] [its] limits of liability." 
  
¶28 We first consider the language of the policies stating 
that Country Mutual will pay "[a]ll interest."  This court has 
previously determined that "[t]he phrase 'all interest' does not 
connote the thought of some interest, or part of the interest on 
the judgment, but rather all interest on the judgment, whatever 
its amount in relation to the policy limits."  Id. at 677 
(citations omitted).  Thus the insurance policies would impose 
No. 96-1440 
 
16
liability on Country Mutual to pay post-judgment interest on the 
entire amount of the judgment, not limited to its $100,000 
policy limits, if Country Mutual did not tender its policy 
limits.   
¶29 Having determined Country Mutual is potentially liable 
for interest on the entire judgment, we next consider whether 
Country Mutual has "tendered" its policy limits, thereby 
relieving it of liability for such interest. Country Mutual 
argues that the letters sent to Weimer offering its policy 
limits of $100,000 in full settlement of all claims against 
Country Mutual and its insured constituted "tender" thereby 
releasing Country Mutual of any obligation to pay interest.  In 
contrast, Weimer argues that the letters offering the policy 
limits do not meet the common legal meaning of "tender" because 
the offer was not unconditional and the money was never placed 
outside the control of Country Mutual.  Therefore, he asserts, 
the language of the policies provides that Country Mutual is 
liable for interest on the entire judgment.   
¶30 When interpreting language in an insurance contract, 
we  must give the terms used in the policy their "'common and 
ordinary meaning which they have in the minds of the average 
lay[person].'"  Kremers-Urban v. American Employers Ins. Co., 
119 Wis. 2d 722, 741, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984) (citation omitted). 
 "The language of an insurance policy should be interpreted to 
mean what a reasonable person in the position of the insured 
would have understood the words to mean."  Kuhn v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 193 Wis. 2d 50, 60, 532 N.W.2d 124 (1995). 
No. 96-1440 
 
17
¶31 In the present case, the court of appeals correctly 
stated that a court may find guidance in construing the common 
meaning of an insurance policy term by looking to a definition 
of the term in a recognized dictionary.  See Holsum Food v. Home 
Ins. Co., 162 Wis. 2d 563, 568-69, 469 N.W.2d 918 (Ct. App. 
1991).  Having said this, however, the court of appeals 
proceeded to cite language from Black's Law Dictionary to 
support the well-known legal construction of the word "tender." 
  
¶32 Since our goal is to determine the ordinary, common 
meaning of a word as understood by a reasonable insured, 
guidance is more appropriately sought in a non-legal dictionary. 
 See id at 569 (citing Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary to define term in an insurance policy); Just v. Land 
Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 745, 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990) 
(same).  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1849 (3d ed. 1992), defines "tender" as: 
 
1.  A formal offer, as:  a.  Law.  An offer of money 
or service in payment of an obligation.  . . .  2.  
Something, 
especially 
money, 
offered 
in 
payment. 
 . . .  To offer formally:  tender a letter of 
resignation.  See Synonyms at offer. 
See 
also 
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International 
Dictionary, 
unabridged, 2355 (1981) (defining tender as "a proffer of 
money . . . in 
satisfaction 
of 
an 
obligation 
or 
condition 
arising from a relationship between parties"). 
 
¶33 Based upon the dictionary definition of the word 
"tender," 
we 
conclude 
the 
letters 
from 
Country 
Mutual 
constituted tender of its policy limits.  The offer was formal 
in the sense that it was presented to Weimer in writing and 
No. 96-1440 
 
18
signed by counsel for Country Mutual.  Furthermore, offer of 
payment was extended in accordance with Country Mutual's 
obligations under the insurance policies.  Because the letters 
constitute tender of Country Mutual's policy limits, Country 
Mutual is not liable to pay any post-judgment interest in 
accordance with the terms of the insurance policy. 
 
¶34 The language of the letters offering payment of 
Country Mutual's policy limits upon release of itself and its 
insured does not constitute a conditional provision that would 
negate our determination that Country Mutual tendered its policy 
limits.  Such language requiring release of an insured for 
settlement is an integral part of Country Mutual's duty to 
defend Trace.  Thus "Wisconsin cases indicate that an insurance 
company has more than a passive rolethat is, in some 
circumstances at least, it has an affirmative duty to seize 
whatever reasonable opportunity may present itself to protect 
its insured from excess liability."  Alt v. American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340, 350, 237 N.W.2d 706 (1976).  See also 
Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin Insurance Law § 8.2, at 237 (3d 
ed. 1990) ("An insurance company has a duty to . . . do all that 
is reasonably necessary to protect its insured from any 
liability in excess of policy limits.")  Failure to include 
language requesting release of Trace may subject Country Mutual 
to a claim of bad faith.  See Alt, 71 Wis. 2d at 350. 
 
¶35 Moreover, our interpretation of the term "tender" is 
not altered by this court's decision in Estreen v. Bluhm, 79 
Wis. 2d 142, 255 N.W.2d 473 (1977).  The court of appeals relied 
upon language in Estreen to support its determination that 
No. 96-1440 
 
19
tender of money occurs only where the offeror relinquishes 
control and places the money beyond its own use.  We are not 
persuaded that our decision in Estreen is applicable to this 
case because the facts and law presented in Estreen are 
distinguishable.    
 
¶36 Estreen involved an action for specific performance of 
land contracts.  In Estreen, this court recognized that the real 
estate transaction was equitable in nature, and therefore "[t]he 
allowance of interest . . . is a matter within the discretion of 
the court."  Id. at 156 (citation omitted).  Estreen did not 
involve the interpretation of the term "tender" in an insurance 
policy provision.  Moreover, the facts in Estreen are distinct 
because in that case, the offeror merely stated at the closing 
conference that the funds were "available and ready to be paid." 
 Id. at 157.   
 
¶37 Accordingly, we conclude that Country Mutual tendered 
its policy limits thereby relieving it of liability to pay any 
post-judgment interest pursuant to the provisions in the 
insurance policy.10   
 
IV. 
¶38 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) does not void 
the "other insurance" provisions of Country Mutual's insurance 
policies because the policy covering the dump truck and the 
                     
10 We recognize that other courts have apparently reached a 
contrary conclusion in interpreting whether an insurer has 
tendered its policy limits.  See, e.g., Knippen v. Glens Falls 
Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Petry v. Richard, 532 
So. 2d 286 (Ct. App. La. 1988).  We do not find these decisions 
persuasive and are not bound by their authority. 
No. 96-1440 
 
20
policy covering the trailer do not insure against the "same 
loss."  Therefore, under the provisions of the insurance 
policies, Country Mutual's liability for Weimer's bodily injury 
resulting from the accident at issue is limited to $100,000.  We 
further conclude that Country Mutual tendered its liability 
limits by letters dated October 3, 1990, and February 4, 1991, 
offering $100,000 in full settlement of all claims against 
Country Mutual and its insured.  As such, Country Mutual is not 
liable for any interest accruing after entry of the judgment. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part.
No. 96-1440.ssa 
 
1 
¶39 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (Dissenting).   I 
dissent because I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1)(1993-94) 
permits the plaintiff to stack the liability policy for the 
defendant-insured's truck and the liability policy for the 
defendant-insured's trailer when both are driven together and 
cause bodily injury.  
¶40 Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) provides that stacking is 
permitted when an insured has two or more insurance policies 
protecting against the same loss.  See Agnew v. American Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Wis. 2d 341, 349, 441 N.W.2d 222 (1989).  The 
question presented is whether the two liability policies fall 
within the statutory phrase "the same loss."   
¶41 The majority opinion concludes that stacking is not 
permitted because the liability policies for the truck and the 
trailer do not insure against the "same loss," that is, the same 
risk of loss.  According to the majority opinion, the risks 
accompanying the truck are distinct from the risks accompanying 
the trailer.  See Majority op. at 13, 15.  
¶42 Under the majority opinion, the truck by itself is 
insured for $100,000/$300,000; the trailer by itself is insured 
for $100,000/$300,000; but when the truck and trailer are used 
together, 
the 
defendant-insured's 
coverage 
is 
limited 
to 
$100,000/$300,000.   
¶43 I disagree with the majority opinion.  In my view, the 
majority opinion's reasoning runs counter to common sense and to 
the "same loss" language set forth in Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1).  
As Judge Dykman stated in his dissent in the court of appeals, 
No. 96-1440.ssa 
 
2 
"[M]ost people would conclude that the time when liability 
coverage on a trailer is most needed is when it is being pulled 
by one's motor vehicle."  Weimer v. County Mut. Ins. Co., 211 
Wis. 2d 845, 868 (Ct. App. 1997) (Dykman, J., dissenting).   
¶44 In this case the defendant-insured paid separate 
premiums for liability coverage for the truck and for the 
trailer.  Each policy insured against liability for bodily 
injury arising from the operation of the vehicle specified in 
the policy owned by the defendant-insured.  In light of the two 
separate liability policies, the defendant-insured and the 
insurer 
could 
presumably 
foresee 
that 
the 
trailer 
would 
sometimes be hitched to the truck.  Because both vehicles were 
being operated at the time of the accident and both vehicles 
caused bodily injury, I conclude that each policy insured 
against the same loss and stacking is permitted.  
¶45 Furthermore, the majority opinion's reliance on Agnew 
to support its interpretation of the "same loss" language is 
misplaced.  In Agnew the plaintiff attempted to stack separate 
liability limits of three vehicles, but only one vehicle was 
involved in the accident.  The Agnew court held that each policy 
insured against a different loss (namely the loss caused by each 
car) and that only one policy insured the insured against the 
loss incurred.  See Agnew, 150 Wis. 2d at 349.  Because only one 
policy promised to indemnify the insured against the loss 
incurred, the court concluded that Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) did 
not apply.  See Agnew, 150 Wis. 2d at 351. In the case at bar, 
No. 96-1440.ssa 
 
3 
in contrast to the Agnew case, both of the defendant-insured's 
vehicles were involved in the accident.  
¶46 If stacking had been permitted in Agnew, the insured 
would have obtained increased unpurchased liability coverage for 
operation of the car involved in the accident.  The court 
stated, "It does not make sense to conclude that the legislature 
intended sec. 631.43(1) to allow the insured in this case to 
aggregate the three policies to provide insurance protection 
that the policyholder did not purchase."  Agnew, 150 Wis. 2d at 
350-51.  
¶47 The case at bar is very different.  In this case the 
policyholder purchased separate insurance for the operation of 
each vehicle.  Both insured vehicles were involved in causing 
the bodily injury.  I conclude that in this case both policies 
insured against the same loss and that Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) 
permits stacking the two liability policies. 
¶48 For the foregoing reasons I dissent. 
¶49 I am authorized to state that Justice William A. 
Bablitch joins this opinion.