Case Title: Krey v. Schmidt

Citation: 170 Kan. 86, 223 P.2d 1015

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1950-11-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
170 Kan. 86 (1950)
223 P.2d 1015
DONALD KREY, a Minor, by his Father and Next Friend, Arcey Krey, Appellee,
v.
FRANCIS J. SCHMIDT, HAROLD POPP, doing business as H.M. Popp Truck Line of Hays, Kansas, and COMMERCIAL STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, of Fort Worth, Texas, Appellants.
No. 37,981

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 10, 1950.
Donald R. Newkirk, of Wichita, argued the cause, and S.R. Blackburn, Tudor W. Hampton, and Ed. R. Moses, of Great Bend, and Howard T. Fleeson, Homer V. Gooing, Wayne Coulson, Paul R. Kitch, and Dale M. Stucky, of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
Robert Garvin, Evart Garvin, and Morris Garvin, all of St. John, were on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WERTZ, J.:
Plaintiff, a minor, brought this action through his father to recover damages for personal injury caused by the negligent operation of defendant's truck, joining as parties defendant the driver, Schmidt, the owner, Popp, and the insurance carrier. Amendments were filed to the original petition to comply with portions of defendants' motion to make definite and certain sustained by the court. Subsequently defendants' motion to strike the amendments was overruled, whereupon defendants filed a motion denominated "Special Demurrer" moving to strike paragraph 8 (e) of the petition as amended, which motion also was overruled. Defendants appeal and urge that the court erred in overruling their special demurrer to that portion of plaintiff's petition as amended wherein a cause of action was attempted to be stated for willfullness for the reason that the petition failed to state facts constituting willfullness.
Pertinent parts of plaintiff's petition as amended read as follows:
The petition closed with a prayer for relief.
The special demurrer filed by defendants was in the following language:
Appellee challenges the right of appellants to be heard on this appeal, their contention being that the "Special Demurrer" is nothing more than a motion to strike, and that overruling of a motion to strike is not an appealable order under the provisions of G.S. 1935, 60-3302.
At the outset, we will consider whether the petition as amended states a cause of action without paragraph 8 (e)  that portion of the petition at which the special demurrer is lodged.
G.S. 1935, 60-704 provides in substance that (1) the petition must contain the name of the court and the county in which the action is brought, the names of the parties plaintiff and defendant, followed by the word petition; (2) a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action in short and concise language without repetition; and (3) a demand for the relief to which the party supposes himself entitled.
An examination of the petition as amended  deleting paragraph 8 (e)  discloses that it meets all the requirements of the above statute.
Inasmuch as appellee has stated a cause of action, the next question for determination is whether the pleading filed denominated "Special Demurrer" to paragraph 8 (e) of the petition as amended is such that a ruling thereon is appealable.
G.S. 1935, 60-3302 provides in part as follows:
Special demurrers are not looked upon with favor. They seldom have any real relation to the merits of the controversy. At most they go only to defects in form and add to the terms of a general demurrer a specification of the particular ground of exception. In some jurisdictions such demurrers have been abolished by statute. (41 Am. Jur. 438.)
The general rule seems to be that a demurrer will not lie to a single paragraph of a petition on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action if the pleading as a whole states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and a demurrer to a part of a cause of action or part of a petition will only be entertained when the imperfect part is so material that, being eliminated, *90 it leaves the pleading without a good cause of action. (41 Am. Jur. 454-5.)
Where a petition is in several paragraphs, negligence being alleged in more than one of such paragraphs, and a demurrer is interposed to question the sufficiency of only one of such paragraphs, the demurrer does not extend to the sufficiency of the remaining paragraphs not questioned. In the instant case it may be noted that paragraph 8 in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) and (f) alleges negligence sufficient to state a cause of action as against a demurrer even with subparagraph (e) deleted.
It may be stated that the special demurrer filed by appellants was nothing more than a motion to strike. Being treated as such, a motion to strike is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and ordinarily refusal to grant it will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that the trial court's discretion has been abused. In Estes v. Tobin Construction Co., 159 Kan. 322, 153 P.2d 939, we held that motions to strike and make definite and certain rest in the sound discretion of the trial court and rulings thereon are not appealable unless they affect a substantial right and in effect determine the action. See also in this connection Hendricks v. Wichita Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 157 Kan. 651, 143 P.2d 780; and Wharton v. Zenger, 162 Kan. 69, 174 P.2d 103.
The court in considering G.S. 1935, 60-3302 in the case of Whitlaw v. Insurance Co., 86 Kan. 826, 122 Pac. 1039, stated that an order overruling a motion to strike out portions of an answer which do not involve the merits nor determine the action is not appealable and can be reviewed in this court only after a final judgment in the action. The same rule has been adhered to in many cases since that decision.
In the case of Wigton v. Donnelly, 122 Kan. 796, 253 Pac. 400, and again in Redfield v. Chelsea Coal Co., 138 Kan. 373, 26 P.2d 579, we held that for an order striking certain allegations from a petition to be appealable, it must amount to the sustaining of a demurrer. And only recently in the case of Pulliam v. Pulliam, 163 Kan. 497, 183 P.2d 220, we held that rulings on motions to strike portions of a petition are not appealable unless they affect a substantial right and in effect determine the action.
In the instant case we find nothing to indicate that any substantial right of the appellants has been affected. Moreover, appellee has stated a cause of action against appellants in his petition exclusive of *91 paragraph 8 (e), and therefore sustaining the special demurrer would not involve the merits of nor determine the action and the order thereon is not reviewable in this court.
The appeal is dismissed.