Case Title: PARRISH v WITT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 1.3264 TN 'THE SUPKEME C O U K T 9F THE STATE OF MONTAHA 1976 SCOTT PARKLSH, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - LIODNEY TI. WITT and SHIRIAY VITT, Defendants and Respondents. A p p e a l from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Courlsel of Record: For Appellant: Hash, J e l l i s o n & O ' ~ r i e n , K a l i s p e l l , Montana Kenneth E. O'Brien argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana F'or Respondents : Warden, Walterskirchen & C h r i s t i a n s e n , K a l i s p e l l , Montana M e r r i t t N. \,Jarden argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana Submitted: August 31, 1976 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court . This i s an appeal from a directed verdict for defendants by the d i s t r i c t court, Flathead County. P l a i n t i f f Scott Parrish was v i s i t i n g the mobile home of Leo McDonald i n e a r l y April 1973, t o help a friend move her belongings. A s he walked t o the mobile home from h i s pickup, carrying a small c h i l d , a sudden r a i n began. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t a s he t r o t t e d up the wooden walkway leading t o the mobile home he slipped, s l i d two o r three f e e t , the walkway t a t ; e d , h i s foot became anchored and a s he twisted t o keep the child from harm, he f e l l , suffering a severe broken leg. P l a i n t i f f f i l e d a complaint which s e t out two claims f o r r e l i e f . The f i r s t named Rodney D. and Shirley W i t t , t h e owners of the mobile home court, a s defendants. The second named the McDonalds a s defendants. The second claim w a s s e t t l e d out of court and t r i a l was had on the f i r s t claim. That trial ended with a directed verdict f o r defendant owners. These defendants, M r . and Mrs. W i t t , a r e owners of t h e Greenwood Mobile Home Terrace near Whitefish, Montana. McDonalds were tenants, l i v i n g i n the newly constructed portion of the mobile home court. When McDonalds moved i n they brought with them a section of wooden walkway which they i n s t a l l e d i n f r o n t of the steps leading t o the mobile home. A s a courtesy t o the tenants, because the area would become muddy a s spring progressed, t h e manager of the mobile home court constructed and delivered addi- t ional walkway sections. When the sections were delivered t o the McDonald residence they were placed approximately i n l i n e with the other section of walkway but there was no attempt t o put them i n f i n a l position o r s t a b i l i z e them. This occurred four t o s i x weeks prior t o the accident. I n the time between the delivery of the additional walkway sections and the accident, p l a i n t i f f v i s i t e d t h e McDonald residence. Mrs. McDonald t e s t i f i e d she had noticed these additional sections were unstable and t h a t she had reported t h i s t o the court manager. The issue raised on appeal is whether the directed verdict was properly granted. I n Slagsvold v. Johnson, Mont . , 544 P.2d 442,443, 32 St. Rep. 1273, 1275, t h i s Court quoted with approval a prior case a s s t a t i n g the law of Montana on directed verdicts: '"* * * a s a general r u l e , the issues of negligence and contributory negligence must be decided by the jury under appropriate instructions * * * and the s e t t l e d r u l e is t h a t a case should not be taken from the jury unless it follows as a matter of law t h a t p l a i n t i f f cannot recover upon any view of the evidence, including the legitimate inferences t o be drawn from it; every f a c t w i l l be deemed proved which the evidence tends t o prove. "' Other cases have s e t out t h i s general proposition i n the form of three r u l e s : 1) The evidence introduced by the p l a i n t i f f w i l l be considered i n the l i g h t most favorable t o him. 2) The conclusions sought t o be drawn from the f a c t s must follow a s a matter of law. 3) Only the evidence of t h e p l a i n t i f f w i l l be considered. Hannifin v. Retail Clerks, 162 Mont. 170, 511 P. 2d 982; Mueller v. Svejkovsky, 153 Mont. 416, 458 P.2d 265; Pickett v. Kyger, 151 Mont. 87, 439 P.2d 57; Johnson v. Chicago, M. & S t . Paul Ry., 7 1 Mont. 390, 230 P. 52. The question Lhen becomes -- whether, considering only rhe p l a i n t i f f ' s evidence i n a l i g h t most favorable t o him, it rollows a s a matter of law from the f a c t s proven t h a t there is no duty running from the landlord t o the tenant's guest? This Court i n discussing l i a b i l i t y of t h e landlord f o r i n j u r i e s occurring on leased premises i n Gray v. Fox West Coast Service Corp., 93 Mont. 397, 18 P.2d 797, said: 11 I I n the case of i n j u r i e s t o t h i r d persons r e s u l t i n g from the condition o r use of these premises, it is a general r u l e t h a t prima f a c i e the breach of duty and therefore the l i a b i l i t y , is t h a t of t h e occupant.and not of the landlord, and t h a t i n order t o render the l a t t e r l i a b l e more must be shown than merely t h a t the premises on which o r from which the injury arose were leased t o him by another."' 2'0 avoid t h i s general r u l e p l a i n t i f f must show more, he must show t h a t he f a l l s within one of the exceptions t o t h i s r u l e . L n t h i s case p l a i n t i f f r e l i e s on the exception which holds the Lessor l i a b l e f o r repairs o r improvements which a r e negligently made. The elements which must be shown i n order t o f a l l i n t o t h i s exception a r e s e t out i n 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, $362, Negligent Repairs by Lessor: "A lessor of land who, by purporting t o make repairs on the land while it is i n the possession of h i s lessee, o r the negligent manner i n which he makes such r e p a i r s has, a s the lessee neither knows nor should know,made the land more dangerous for use o r given it a deceptive appearance of safety, is subject t o l i a b i l i t y f o r physical harm caused by the condition t o the lessee o r t o others upon the land with the consent of the lessee o r sublessee." L t is c l e a r t h a t t o find a duty on the p a r t of the landlord four elements must be present: 1) The landlord must make a negligent repair o r improvement. 2) That repair o r improvement must make the land more dangerous o r give a deceptive appearance of safety. 3) The lessee can neither know nor should he know of the danger. 4) There must be physical harm caused by the condition t o t h e lessee o r those on the land with h i s consent. Here, it i s c l e a r t h a t the evidence shows the lessee knew of the condition t h a t p l a i n t i f f claimed was dangerous. Even assuming t h a t the lessee did not know the condition was present, it is a t l e a s t arguable he should have discovered the dangerous condition i n the four t o s i x weeks a f t e r the new sections were delivered. Once the tenants knew of the condition they have the responsibility t o protect themselves and those who enter on t o the premises from harm. The l i a b i l i t y of the landlord remains only a s long a s the tenants had no knowledge of the danger, h i s duty was t o warn of the danger, and once the tenants knew of the danger the warning is no longer necessary. After tenants know of the danger, they have the duty t o e i t h e r make t h e premises safe o r t o warn. It i s from t h i s f a c t the conclusion t h a t the landlord had no duty running t o the p l a i n t i f f , follows as a matter of law. The d i s t r i c t court' s order directing a verdict f o r defendant owners i s affirmed. We concur: Justices