Case Title: Doe v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jane DOE v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.

95-682                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 5, 1996


1.   Appeal & error -- final, appealable judgment -- ARCP Rule
     54(b) allows interlocutory appeals under certain circumstances
     but not here. -- Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) allows
     interlocutory appeals under certain circumstances, but the
     supreme court ruled that those circumstances were not present
     here; by its express language, Rule 54(b) pertains to orders
     in which fewer that all claims or fewer than all parties are
     disposed of; the order in this case involved a ruling on a
     preliminary legal issue and did not dispose of one of several
     claims or one of several parties.

2.   Appeal & error -- final, appealable judgment -- Ark. R. App.
     P. 2 -- general rule of appealability -- circuit court's
     ruling was on preliminary matter. -- Under Ark. R. App. P. 2,
     for an order to be appealable, it must dismiss the parties
     from the court, discharge them from the action, or conclude
     their rights to the subject matter in controversy; the order
     must be of such a nature as not only to decide the rights of
     the parties but to put the court's directive into execution,
     ending the litigation or a separable part of it; the court's
     order in this case did not dismiss the parties from the court
     or conclude their rights to the subject matter in controversy; 
     the court's ruling was on a preliminary matter, unconnected
     with the merits of the litigation, and the order could not be
     considered as ending a separable branch of the litigation.

3.   Appeal & error -- final, appealable judgment -- supreme court
     declined to adopt amendment to Ark. R. App. P. 2 to allow
     appellant's interlocutory appeal -- considerations. -- The
     supreme court declined to adopt an amendment of Ark. R. App.
     P. 2 to allow appellant's interlocutory appeal where there was
     nothing to indicate that appellant would not or could not
     prosecute her action in the absence of anonymity, and she had
     the option to allow the issue to be decided on appellees'
     motion to dismiss; had the motion to dismiss been granted, a
     final order would have been in existence; the only showing
     before the appellate court was that it would be emotionally
     difficult for the appellant to pursue her lawsuit in her own
     name and that she would prefer not to do so; there was no
     showing that burdensome and meaningless litigation would
     result in the absence of an appeal.

4.   Appeal & error -- final, appealable order -- appeal was
     premature. -- The supreme court held that the appeal was
     premature and dismissed without prejudice.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; Marion Humphrey, Judge;
appeal dismissed.
     Duncan & Rainwater, by: Philip J. Duncan and Neil Chamberlin,
for appellant.
     Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by:  William H. Sutton and John
Dewey Watson, for appellee Union Pac. R.R. Co.
     Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by:  Tonia P. Jones and Will Bond,
for appellee Michael Ramone, D.O.
     Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, by:  Sammye L. Taylor and Troy A.
Price, for appellees MoPac Employees Health Ass'n and MoPac
Employees Health Ass'n Trust.

     Bradley D. Jesson, Chief Justice. February 5, 1996 *ADVREP1*






JANE DOE,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., ET
AL.,
                    APPELLEES,




95-682


APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. 94-2271,
HON. MARION HUMPHREY, JUDGE,




APPEAL DISMISSED.



                Bradley D. Jesson, Chief Justice



     
     This appeal is taken from the trial court's denial of the
appellant's motion to prosecute her lawsuit under the pseudonym
"Jane Doe."   We hold that the court's ruling is not a final,
appealable order.  Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.  
     The appellant visited the Oakwood Family Medical Center on
March 9, 1992, where she was examined by Michael Ramone, D.O.  The
Center purportedly was operated by Union Pacific Railroad Company,
the Missouri Pacific Employees Health Association and the
Association Trust.  According to her complaint, the appellant was
touched in an improper and sexually suggestive manner during the
course of the examination.  
     On March 4, 1994, the appellant filed suit against the
appellees seeking damages for negligence, medical malpractice,
outrage and invasion of privacy.  The caption to her complaint
contained the name "Jane Doe" as plaintiff, but listed all
defendants by name.  The appellant's true identity was furnished to
the appellees under separate cover.
     The appellees objected to the appellant's use of the pseudonym
and moved to dismiss the case.  The appellant asked the court for
leave to conceal her identity, citing the sensitive, private nature
of the allegations in the complaint.  The court denied the motion
and gave the appellant ten days to file an amended complaint in her
own name.  The appellant filed a subsequent motion which
incorporated a letter opinion from her psychologist.  The letter
stated that the appellant had been traumatized by the incident and
suffered various emotional problems as a result.  The trial court
reviewed the letter and considered the appellant's motion in light
of a number of federal court cases on the subject.  See, e.g., Doe
v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320 (11th Cir. 1992).  The court then denied the
motion, and entered an order finding that the appellant had not
shown that the information to be disclosed was of the utmost
privacy.  The following language, attempting to certify the case
for appeal, was also contained in the order:

     The Plaintiff's Motion for Certification for Appeal is
     granted.  This court's order with respect to the issue of
     the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Under Seal is
     final because the disclosure of the Plaintiff's identity
     would divest her of a substantial right and it would be
     beyond the power of this court to place her in her former
     condition.  There is no just reason to delay appeal of
     this issue and a potential injustice would be alleviated
     by an immediate appeal.



     The appellant argues first that the trial court's order is
appealable because it complies with ARCP Rule 54(b).  That rule
allows interlocutory appeals under certain circumstances, but those
circumstances are not present here.  By its express language, Rule
54(b) pertains to orders in which fewer that all claims or fewer
than all parties are disposed of.  The order in this case involves
a ruling on a preliminary legal issue.  It does not dispose of one
of several claims or one of several parties.
     Rather than analyze the appealability of the trial court's
order under Rule 54(b), we refer to Rule 2 of the Arkansas Rules of
Appellate Procedure.  That rule contains a list of the types of
orders from which an appeal may be taken.  We note at the outset
that Rule 2 does not expressly allow an appeal from a ruling which
denies a party the right to prosecute her case in anonymity.      
What might be termed the general rule regarding appealability is
stated in ARAP Rule 2(a)(2):

     (a) An appeal may be taken from a circuit, chancery or
     probate court to the Arkansas Supreme Court from:

     2. An order which in effect determines the action and
     prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken,
     or discontinues the action.

  

     We have interpreted this portion of Rule 2 to mean that, for
an order to be appealable, it must dismiss the parties from the
court, discharge them from the action, or conclude their rights to
the subject matter in controversy.  The order must be of such a
nature as to not only decide the rights of the parties, but to put
the court's directive into execution, ending the litigation or a
separable part of it.  Kelly v. Kelly, 310 Ark. 244,