Case Title: State v. Paterno

Citation: 309 N.W.2d 420

Docket Number: 65202

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1981-08-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
309 N.W.2d 420 (1981) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Charles Peter PATERNO, Appellant. No. 65202. Supreme Court of Iowa. August 26, 1981. *421 Paul Rosenberg of Rosenberg & Margulies, Des Moines, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Roxann M. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Dan L. Johnston, Polk County Atty., for appellee. Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and UHLENHOPP, McGIVERIN, LARSON, and SCHULTZ, JJ. UHLENHOPP, Justice. In this appeal we pass upon the validity of a search warrant. Some of the facts in the case relate to the issuance of the search warrant and some relate to the claims of defendant Charles Peter Paterno that the warrant was stale and that the applicant for the warrant intentionally withheld material information from the issuing judicial officer. Officer Craig Hamilton of the Des Moines Police Department Narcotics Bureau testified at a subsequent hearing that "we have been working on Charles Paterno since September 28, 1979. We have received numerous complaints. We have talked to people on the street reference Charles Paterno selling to juveniles, so forth." After the police had pursued the investigation for some time, Hamilton arranged for a female confidential informant to go to defendant's home at 3323 East 8th Street in Des Moines on the evening of June 19, 1979. Defendant testified at the subsequent hearing regarding those happenings: Q. Where were you sitting at this time? A. On my porch. Q. What did you say to her? A. Sure. . . . . Q. Took it out where? A. Out of the cupboard in the kitchen. Q. Did you show it to her? A. Yes. Q. Did you in fact flush some drugs down the toilet? A. Yes. Q. What did you flush down the toilet? A. The marijuana. After the informant left defendant's home, she reported these happenings to Hamilton. Hamilton took up this investigation with his superiors, and thereafter prepared and executed an affidavit for a search warrant. On June 21, 1979, he presented the affidavit to a judicial officer. In it he swore he had good reason to believe that personal property was being used or held at defendant's home (giving the address) so as to render that place subject to a search warrant; the property was used as a means to commit a public offense; the property was in possession of a person with intent to commit a public offense, or delivered to another for the purpose of concealing it; other property existed which was relevant and material as evidence in a criminal prosecution; the property was described as "marijuana, a schedule I controlled substance in violation of chapter 204.401 State Code of Iowa and any/all other controlled substances held in violation of chapter 204.401 State Code of Iowa"; the property was believed to be in the possession of Charles Paterno; Hamilton had observed a motor vehicle registered to Charles Paterno going to and from 3323 East 8th Street, and had seen Paterno go into that address on several occasions; Hamilton had that address under surveillance and observed foot and motor traffic to it on several occasions; Paterno paid for the utilities at that address as shown by checks at the light and water companies; on June 19, 1979, defendant introduced himself to an informant as Charles Paterno and *423 invited her into the house to get high; the informant observed marijuana and hash in the house; and Paterno offered an illicit drug to the informant. Hamilton swore to additional facts showing the reliability of the informant. The judicial officer found probable cause and issued a search warrant. Officers executed the warrant five days later, on June 26, 1981. See § 808.8, The Code 1979 ("A search warrant shall be executed within ten days from its date"). Hamilton's explanation of the five-day period was this: With regard to the execution of a search warrant counsel asked: Hamilton answered: Also: The search netted inter alia a scale with weight, a yellow smoking pipe, two sea-shell type smoking pipes, two glass smoking pipes, two containers of manitol, three one-gram bindles of cocaine, and three seven-gram packages containing cocaine. The county attorney charged defendant with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Defendant moved to suppress the items seized in the search, and the district court, after a hearing, overruled the motion. A jury found defendant guilty, and the trial court sentenced him. Defendant appealed, urging two contentions: the presence of marijuana and hash in defendant's home on June 19, 1979, did not give probable cause to believe that it would be there two days later when the warrant was issued or five days still later when the warrant was executed; and Hamilton obtained the warrant by intentional and material misrepresentation by failing to tell the judicial officer that defendant was alerted to the investigation and destroyed the contraband. I. Did probable cause exist to believe that a controlled substance was in the home on June 21 and 26? We described probable cause as follows in State v. Post, 286 N.W.2d 195, 199 (Iowa 1980) (citations omitted): See also State v. Bean, 239 N.W.2d 556, 559-60 (Iowa 1976) ("whether a person of reasonable prudence would believe a crime was being committed on the premises to be searched or evidence of a crime was being concealed there"). Time alone is not conclusive, Post, 286 N.W.2d at 201, and the staleness issue is resolved by consideration of all the factors present in the particular situation. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976); *424 Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 53 S. Ct. 138, 77 L. Ed. 260 (1932). The information presented to the judicial officer in this case dealt with the presence of controlled substances on a single instance; in such cases probable cause ordinarily does not continue for an extended period of time. Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860, 864 (5th Cir. 1973); W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7, at 684 (1978) ("a single instance of possession or sale of some form of contraband, will support a finding of probable cause only for a few days at best"). On the other hand, probable cause does not require absolute proof that the contraband was in the place in question at the very moment the warrant was issued and executed; such a rule would require an impossibility. LaFave, § 3.7, at 684. Upon review of this record, we conclude as the District Judge did at the suppression hearing that probable cause existed at the times of the issuance and execution of the warrant. We reject defendant's first contention. II. Did Hamilton obtain the search warrant by intentional or material misrepresentation? We stated in State v. Boyd, 224 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 1974): See also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2683-84, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 682 (1978). Under proper facts, a failure to disclose information to an issuing judicial officer can constitute misrepresentation. United States v. Lefkowitz, 464 F. Supp. 227, 233 (C.D.Cal.1979) ("provided that the omission produces the same practical effect as does an affirmative statement, i. e., that it leads to a misconception"); see also Cruse v. State, 584 P.2d 1141 (Alaska 1978). While we are limited to considering the facts presented to the issuing judicial officer in determining whether probable cause existed, State v. Rockhold, 243 N.W.2d 846, 848-49 (Iowa 1976), in determining whether misrepresentation was intentional or material the surrounding facts are relevant and may be considered. State v. Post, 286 N.W.2d 195, 201-02 (Iowa 1980). Hamilton knew the informer said that defendant was going to flush the marijuana down the stool, that defendant went upstairs with it, and that he returned with an empty baggie. Hamilton did not tell this to the judicial officer. But Hamilton had considerable information on the other side of the issue, running back in time, which he likewise did not tell the judicial officer. Moreover, with the prices of controlled substances as shown by the transactions in the decided cases, an inference is reasonable that defendant may have hidden rather than destroyed the marijuana; we are not impressed with his credibility. In addition, Hamilton testified regarding the facts as to the alleged destruction of the marijuana: Defendant has the burden of establishing intentional or material misrepresentation, by a preponderance of the evidence. Post, 286 N.W.2d at 201 (Iowa 1979). Upon consideration of all the relevant evidence on this issue, we again agree with the District Judge. Defendant has not established his contention of intentional or material misrepresentation. We thus uphold the judgment and sentence. AFFIRMED.