Case Title: Quintero v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 603, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
ALFONSO QUINTERO, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 603, 2006 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID. No. 0411017521 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 5, 2007 
Decided:  October 1, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices constituting the court en banc. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 1st day of October 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Defendant-appellant Alfonso Quintero appeals his Superior Court 
conviction of Rape Third Degree.1  Quintero makes two arguments on appeal.  
First, he contends that the trial judge erred by allowing the arresting officer to 
testify about Quintero’s pedigree information because the office acquired that 
                                          
 
1 
11 Del. C. § 771(a)(1).  A person is guilty of rape in the third degree when the person 
intentionally engages in sexual intercourse with another person, and the victim has not reached 
his or her sixteenth birthday and the person is at least 10 years older than the victim. 
 
 2
information illegally.  Second, he contends that the trial judge abused his discretion 
by allowing trial counsel to withdraw after the verdict, but before sentencing. 
After consideration, we hold that the trial judge did not err by allowing the 
arresting officer to testify about Quintero’s pedigree information, because the 
officer already knew the critical information – Quintero’s date of birth.  Thus, 
repeating that information during routine booking questions did not implicate 
Miranda.2  Furthermore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing 
trial counsel to withdraw, because the decision was not unreasonable or capricious, 
nor did it violate Delaware Supreme Court Rule 26.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
(2) 
In early 2004, Quintero and Elizabeth Cazales began dating shortly 
after Cazales came to the United States from Mexico.  At that time, Quintero was 
28 years old and Cazales was only 15 years old.3  In March or April 2004, Quintero 
and Cazales had sexual relations in Quintero’s car, which resulted in Cazales’ 
pregnancy.  At trial, both Quintero and Cazales testified that they were in love and 
planned on officially getting married.  When Cazales became pregnant, Quintero 
began living with Cazales and her parents.  On January 1, 2005, Cazales gave birth 
to the couple’s son, Brian Quintero. 
                                          
 
2 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
3 
Cazales was born on August 25, 1988. 
 3
(3) 
According to the affidavit of probable cause accompanying the arrest 
warrant, on May 13, 2004, Cazales’s mother complained to the Wilmington Police 
that an older male had impregnated her daughter.  Cazales told the responding 
police officer that she was six weeks pregnant and identified Quintero as the father.  
On October 27, 2004, Detective Debra Holden of the Wilmington Police 
Department spoke with Cazales, who stated that she was then six months pregnant 
with Quintero’s child.  Holden investigated the incident, and on November 22, 
2004, obtained an arrest warrant for Quintero.  The affidavit of probable cause lists 
Quintero’s date of birth as October 31, 1975. 
(4) 
On December 13, 2004, a grand jury indicted Quintero on one count 
of Rape Third Degree, charging him with intentionally engaging in sexual 
intercourse with Cazales when she had not yet reached her sixteenth birthday and 
he was at least ten years older than she. 
(5) 
At trial, Holden testified that after arresting Quintero, she obtained 
pedigree information during the booking process, including his date of birth.  
When the prosecutor asked Holden for Quintero’s response to the date of birth 
question, defense counsel promptly objected on the basis that Quintero had not 
been given Miranda warnings when the officer obtained his date of birth.  The trial 
judge noted that “the case law seems to indicate that pedigree information does not 
 4
need Miranda,” and overruled Quintero’s objection.  On October 19, 2005, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict. 
(6) 
After Quintero’s conviction, his attorney moved to withdraw as 
counsel.  The trial judge granted the motion on September 11, 2006, and appointed 
a public defender.  On October 20, 2006, the trial judge then sentenced Quintero to 
two mandatory years in prison. 
(7) 
Quintero first argues that the trial judge erred when he allowed the 
arresting officer to testify to Quintero’s responses to booking questions.  
Specifically, Quintero contends that the officer should not have been able to testify 
about Quintero’s date of birth because the office obtained that information before 
giving Quintero Miranda warnings and that Quintero’s age is a necessary element 
of the charged offense.  We review a claim that the trial judge erred in applying the 
law de novo.4 
(8) 
Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized 
an exception to Miranda for booking-type information.5  The routine booking 
exception “exempts from Miranda’s coverage questions to secure the ‘biographical 
                                          
 
4 
Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1045 (Del. 2001). 
 
5 
Laury v. State, 260 A.2d 907, 908 (Del. 1969); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 
(1990). 
 
 5
data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.’”6  In Herring v. State, we 
held, “Pedigree information . . . falls within the ambit of booking-type information 
(words normally and reasonably related to police administrative concerns attendant 
to arrest and custody) contemplated by the Supreme Court of Delaware and the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”7  The routine booking exception, however, is 
not without limits.  The exception does not apply when the officer “seeks to elicit 
information that may incriminate.”8 
(9) 
In this case, we find that Holden asking Quintero his date of birth at 
booking falls squarely within the booking exception to Miranda.  The affidavit of 
probable cause attached to the arrest warrant lists Quintero’s date of birth, which 
clearly indicates that Holden had the incriminating information before she arrested 
and booked him.  Therefore, asking Quintero for his date of birth is the type of 
booking question reasonably designed to ensure that the officer had arrested the 
correct individual listed in the arrest warrant.  There is no reason to believe on 
these facts that the police officer asked the question about pedigree information 
during the booking process as a subterfuge to acquire incriminating information 
necessary to establish an element of the offense charged.  The police officer 
                                          
 
6 
Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601. 
 
7 
2006 WL 3062899, at*2 (Del.). 
 
8 
Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601. 
 6
already had the information.  The only rational conclusion on these facts is that the 
police officer asked the question as a matter of routine.  Quintero’s response in no 
way furthered the investigation. 
(10) Quintero next argues, relying on Supreme Court Rule 26(d), that the 
trial judge abused his discretion by allowing his counsel to withdraw after the jury 
returned a verdict, but before Quintero was sentenced.  We review the trial judge’s 
decision for abuse of discretion.9 
(11) Supreme Court Rule 26(d) provides: 
An attorney for a defendant in a criminal appeal . . . may withdraw 
only upon written motion and order of the Court, entered in the 
following circumstances:  
(i) Consent.  An attorney may be permitted to withdraw, after 
complying with paragraph (a) of this rule, at any time after other 
counsel has entered an appearance for the client. 
(ii) Non-consent.  Without the consent of the client, a privately 
retained attorney may be permitted to withdraw, after complying with 
paragraph (a) of this rule, on motion served upon the client with 
notice of a stated time for presentation thereof to the Court.10 
 
 
Rule 26(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
(1) every trial attorney . . . shall in every case in which the client has 
been convicted or adjudged delinquent . . .  
                                          
 
9 Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 762 (Del. 2006). 
 
10 Del. Supreme Ct. R. 26(a). 
 
 7
(i) Advise client.  Advise the client of any right to appeal, the possible 
grounds for appeal and counsel’s opinion of the probable outcome of 
an appeal; 
(ii) Docket appeal.  Docket an appeal whenever the client desires to 
appeal, whether or not the appeal appears meritorious; and 
(iii) Prepare documents.  Prepare and file all documents relating to the 
appeal, including those relating to the transcript as required by Rule 
9.11 
 
Subsection (a) makes clear that subsection (d) applies only upon conviction.  A 
conviction is not final until sentencing.12  Therefore, reliance on Supreme Court 
Rule 26 is misplaced. 
(12) We find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he 
allowed private counsel to withdraw and appointed new counsel for Quintero.  “An 
abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is based on ‘clearly 
unreasonable or capricious grounds.’”13  Before trial, Quintero’s original counsel 
arranged a plea carrying no minimum period of incarceration and a 
recommendation of probation.  Quintero rejected the plea.  After the jury found 
him guilty, Quintero wrote to defense counsel, accusing counsel of being 
                                          
 
11 
Del. Supreme Ct. R. 26(d). 
 
12 
Eller v. State, 531 A.2d 948, 950 (Del. 1987) (“The final judgment in a criminal 
proceeding is the date upon which “a sentence of specific severity has been pronounced.”). 
 
13 
Bultron, 897 A.2d at 762. 
 
 8
ineffective.14  Therefore, allowing defense counsel to withdraw was neither 
unreasonable nor capricious.  In addition, Quintero’s requested relief, remand the 
case for re-sentencing, is a futile exercise.  Quintero was sentenced to the statutory 
minimum of two years.15  Accordingly, we affirm. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                          
 
14 
Quintero told his counsel that he “did not have [Quintero’s] best interest in mind.”  In 
addition, Quintero suggested that defense counsel was ineffective and denied him of a fair trial.  
In the end, Quintero requested his file in order to obtain a “second opinion.” 
 
15 
11 Del. C. § 771 is a class B felony.  Class B felonies are punishable “not less than 2 
years up to 25 years to be served at Level V.”  11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2).