Case Title: Routh v. State, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Routh v. State, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div1998 WY 8952 P.2d 1108Case Number: 96-291Decided: 01/20/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
  

Claude V. ROUTH, Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Laramie County, Nicholas Kalokathis, J.

 

George Santini of Santini 
Law Offices, Terry W. Mackey of Hickey, Mackey, Evans, Walker & Stewart 
(argued), Cheyenne, Joel W. Howell, III, Jackson, MS, for 
Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General (argued), for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] The only issue before 
the Court in this case is whether, pursuant to the Constitution of the United 
States, full faith and credit must be afforded to a judgment entered in a 
Mississippi court against the Workers' Compensation Division (the Division), an 
agency of the State of Wyoming. Claude V. Routh (Routh) was injured in Wyoming 
in November of 1985 while working in covered employment under the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act. WYO. STAT. §§ 27-12-101 to -804 (1983). After 
receiving benefits in the form of temporary total disability payments and the 
payment of medical claims, while residing in Mississippi, Routh sued the 
Division in Mississippi. The Division did not appear, and a default judgment was 
entered in the Mississippi court in the gross amount of $1,923,400.501 with interest and costs. Routh 
filed the Mississippi Judgment in Wyoming, and the Division appeared to 
collaterally attack that judgment. The Division filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment in which it asserted lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
by the Mississippi court; sovereign immunity protecting it from the Mississippi 
action; and the proposition that under Wyoming law the Worker's Compensation Act 
provided the exclusive remedy. The district court entered an Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ruling that "the Defendant is entitled 
to summary judgment on all counts." There is no reversible error in the ruling 
of the district court, and the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is affirmed.

 

[¶2] In the Appellant's 
Brief, which Routh filed, the issue is stated as:

 

          
I. Is the judgment of the Mississippi Circuit Court entitled to full 
faith and credit in the courts of Wyoming?

 

In the Brief of Appellee, 
filed by the State of Wyoming, the issues are defined in this 
way:

 

          
A. Whether the mailing of checks and other correspondence to Claimant in 
Mississippi, in response to Claimant's applications for benefits and requests 
for information, constituted sufficient contacts with Mississippi to permit its 
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division (Division).

 

          
B. Whether the Mississippi court could exercise subject matter 
jurisdiction over a claim for workers' compensation benefits, and claims of 
emotional distress and bad faith stemming from the Division's administration of 
Claimant's application for benefits under the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act, 
where:

 

Claimant resided in and was employed in Wyoming when 
he suffered his work-related injuries;

 

          
Claimant suffered the work-related injuries in Wyoming; 
and

 

          
Claimant's employer was principally located in 
Wyoming.

 

          
C. Even assuming the State had waived its sovereign immunity, was the 
action was [sic] brought and judgment obtained against defendant in compliance 
with the mandatory provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act.

 

In Appellant's Reply Brief, 
Routh did not specify any issues, but stated these additional 
arguments:

 

I. 
Appellee had actual knowledge of the Mississippi court action and waived any 
defect in the giving of notice by its failure to file an answer or otherwise 
appear in the Mississippi court procedures.

 

II. The Mississippi court judgment is entitled to 
full faith and credit and is not subject to collateral attack in the present 
action.

 

[¶3] In November of 1985, 
Routh suffered a work-related injury while employed as a pipe fitter on a 
construction project in Lincoln County, and he reported the injury on November 
18, 1985. At the time of his injury, Routh was a resident of Wyoming, and he was 
employed here by a Wyoming employer. Following his report of the injury, Routh 
began to receive medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits under 
the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. WYO. STAT. § 27-12-101 to -804. He 
received temporary total disability benefits for various periods of time that 
totaled 391 days. While he was receiving benefits, Routh moved to Mississippi, 
and he continued to receive worker's compensation benefits for this work-related 
injury in that state.

 

[¶4] In 1987 and 1988, the 
Division received notice from Routh's treating physicians that he was at or 
approaching maximum medical improvement. The Division was not successful in 
obtaining from the treating physicians a rating of Routh's disability according 
to Wyoming's statutes, and it then requested that he come to Wyoming for an 
evaluation for permanent partial disability benefits. The Division arranged for 
a physical examination at the Gottsche Center in Thermopolis, and it paid for 
Routh's transportation and expenses for the trip from Mississippi to Wyoming in 
July of 1988. The examining physician in Wyoming rated Routh's permanent partial 
disability as 4% of the whole body.

 

[¶5] Routh never did file a 
claim with the Division for permanent partial disability at a 4% level or any 
other level. It appears that Routh decided that he was permanently totally 
disabled, and on February 8, 1990, he filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for 
the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi. He sought recovery of 
benefits under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, and also damages for the 
torts of bad faith and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Routh 
advised the Mississippi court that it had jurisdiction over the Division 
pursuant to service of process under Mississippi's long-arm statute. MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 13-3-57 (1972). The Division did not appear and answer in the case in 
Mississippi, and a default was entered. Later the Mississippi court entered a 
default judgment, acknowledging it was required to apply Wyoming law. The 
Mississippi court ruled that Routh was entitled to benefits under the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act and that he could recover damages for the torts of bad 
faith and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. A Judgment then was 
entered on August 19, 1992 in the Mississippi court against the Division in the 
total amount of $1,923,400.50.

 

[¶6] Routh then brought the 
Mississippi judgment to Wyoming, where on August 11, 1994 he enrolled it in the 
First Judicial District Court of the State of Wyoming, in and for Laramie 
County, pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. WYO. STAT. 
§ 1-17-701 to -707 (1988). The Division appeared in the Wyoming district court, 
and, after failing to secure relief by a motion to dismiss, presented a motion 
for summary judgment. The Division asserted as grounds for its motion the lack 
of personal jurisdiction over the Division by the court in Mississippi; the lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction by the court in Mississippi; the failure of Routh 
to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act; and the absence of any provision in the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act abrogating sovereign immunity with respect to the tort claims 
included in the Mississippi award.  
The district court granted the Division's motion for summary judgment, 
and Routh has taken this appeal from the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment.

 

[¶7] Article IV, Section 1 
of the Constitution of the United States2 requires that the final judgments 
and public acts of one state be afforded full faith and credit in every other 
state. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270, 100 S. Ct. 2647, 
2655, 65 L. Ed. 2d 757 (U.S.Dist.Col. 1980); We have captured this proposition by 
ruling:

 

The United States Supreme Court has held that full 
faith and credit "generally equires every State to give a judgment at least the 
res judicata effect which the judgment would be accorded in the State which 
rendered it." A foreign judgment will be enforced to its full extent regardless 
of any errors or irregularities it may contain.

 

Burlington Northern R. Co. 
v. Dunkelberger, 918 P.2d 987, 991, in which we quoted with approval from 
Marworth, Inc. v. McGuire, 810 P.2d 653, 655-56 (Colo. 1991). In Sandstrom v. 
Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 106 (Wyo. 1994), we also followed the Marworth opinion. 
Our statute defines a foreign judgment for purposes of registration 
as:

 

In 
this act, "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree, or order of a court of 
the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and 
credit in this state.

 

WYO. STAT. § 1-17-702 
(1988). A clear exception to the requirements of the full faith and credit 
clause of Constitution of the United States is the proposition that the foreign 
judgment must be valid and the court entering that judgment must have had 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S. Ct. 559, 564, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (U.S.Okla. 1980); 
International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Compensation 
and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (U.S.Wash. 
1945).

 

[¶8] One theory espoused by 
the Division, in this court and in the district court, is that the court in 
Mississippi never obtained personal jurisdiction over the Division. We review 
issues relating to personal jurisdiction as a matter of law. Global Shipping 
& Trading, Ltd. v. Verkhnesaldincky Metallurgic Co., 892 P.2d 143, 146 (Wyo. 
1995); Eddy v. Oukrop, 784 P.2d 610 (Wyo. 1989). The parties in their briefs 
have focused upon the issue of sufficient minimum contacts by the Division in 
Mississippi to satisfy the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. Due process must be satisfied even though 
technically valid service is obtained over the defendant.

 

[¶9] Of course, if valid 
service was not accomplished, there is no need to reach the minimum contacts 
requirement of the due process clause. We inquire initially then, whether the 
Division, as an agency of the State of Wyoming, falls within the provisions of 
the Mississippi statute relating to service upon nonresident defendants. Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 470 n. 12, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2181, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (U.S.Fla. 1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S.  at 290, 100 S. Ct.  at 563. The Mississippi statute, pursuant to which service was obtained 
and upon which jurisdiction over the Division depends, 
reads:

 

Any nonresident person, firm, general or limited 
partnership, or any foreign or other corporation not qualified under the 
Constitution and laws of this state as to doing business herein, who shall make a contract with a resident of this 
state to be performed in whole or in part by any party in this state, or who 
shall commit a tort in whole or in part in this state against a resident or 
nonresident of this state, or who shall do any business or perform any character 
of work or service in this state, shall by such act or acts be deemed to be 
doing business in Mississippi. Such act or acts shall be deemed equivalent to 
the appointment by such nonresident of the Secretary of State of the State of 
Mississippi, or his successor or successors in office, to be the true and lawful 
attorney or agent of such nonresident upon whom all lawful process may be served 
in any actions or proceedings accrued or accruing from such act or acts, or 
arising from or growing out of such contract or tort, or as an incident thereto, 
by any such nonresident or his, their or its agent, servant or employee. * * 
*

 

MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 
(1980) (emphasis added). In analyzing this statute, the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi has said:

 

There are two components of the state standard. 
First, the state's long-arm statute, as interpreted by the state courts, must 
apply. Second, its application in the particular case must comport with the due 
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment [sic]. Brown [v. Flowers 
Industries, Inc.], 688 F.2d [328] at 331-32 [(5th Cir. 1982)]; Terry [v. Raymond 
International, Inc.], 658 F.2d [398] at 401 [(5th Cir. 1981)]. Thus, the state 
standard, in referring to the power of state courts, incorporates elements of 
both state and federal law.

 

Sorrells v. R & R Custom 
Coach Works, Inc., 636 So. 2d 668, 671 (Miss. 1994), quoting, DeMelo v. Toche 
Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (5th Cir.(Miss.) 1983); see also, McDaniel 
v. Ritter, 556 So. 2d 303, 307-08 (Miss. 1989). Mississippi holds that this 
long-arm statute requires that at least one of its self contained conditions 
must be satisfied in order for it to be utilized. Sorrells, 636 So. 2d  at 671. In 
interpreting a statute, the law in Mississippi is very similar to our rule, and 
requires that the court interpret and apply the statute according to its plain 
meaning without relying upon any of the rules to aid statutory construction so 
long as the statute is not ambiguous. Chandler v. City of Jackson Civil Service 
Com'n, 687 So. 2d 142, 144 (Miss. 1997); State Tax Com'n v. Earnest, 627 So. 2d 313, 320 (Miss. 1993).

 

[¶10] The class of 
defendants who may be served under the Mississippi statute is clear and 
unambiguous. None of the descriptions of potential defendants listed in the 
statute would include another sovereign state such as Wyoming. A state simply is 
not a "nonresident person, firm, general or limited partnership, or any foreign 
or other corporation not qualified under the constitution and laws of 
[Mississippi]" to do business in Mississippi. We are satisfied that the only 
permissible interpretation of the Mississippi statute permitting service upon 
nonresident defendants does not support a conclusion that the statute authorized 
service upon the State of Wyoming. Service under the statute failing, the court 
in Mississippi had no personal jurisdiction over the Division in this case. In 
the absence of technically valid service, we have no occasion to consider 
whether the claimed sufficient minimum contacts would otherwise subject Wyoming 
to jurisdiction in Mississippi pursuant to the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States.

 

[¶11] In addition to a 
requirement of personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the absence of subject 
matter jurisdiction can render a judgment in a court of another state invalid. 
In Matter of Contempt Order Issued Against Anderson, 765 P.2d 933, 936 (Wyo. 
1988) (citations omitted), we said:

 

It 
is fundamental, if not axiomatic, that, before a court can render any decision 
or order having any effect in any case or matter, it must have subject matter 
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is essential to the exercise of judicial power. 
Unless the court has jurisdiction, it lacks any authority to proceed, and any 
decision, judgment, or other order is, as a matter of law, utterly void and of 
no effect for any purpose. Subject matter jurisdiction, like jurisdiction over 
the person, is not a subject of judicial discretion. There is a difference, 
however, because the lack of jurisdiction over the person can be waived, but 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be. Subject matter jurisdiction 
either exists or it does not and, before proceeding to a disposition on the 
merits, a court should be satisfied that it does have the requisite 
jurisdiction.

 

This language was quoted in 
United Mine Workers of America Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 
1283 (Wyo. 1989), and followed in, Boyd v. Nation, 909 P.2d 323, 325 (Wyo. 
1996); see also, Pawlowski v. Pawlowski, 925 P.2d 240, 243 (Wyo. 1996) (subject 
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties).

 

[¶12] Just as we review the 
lack of personal jurisdiction as a matter of law, we also review the question of 
subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of law. The question to be determined is 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court in Mississippi to resolve Routh's 
claim for benefits under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. WYO. STAT. § 
27-12-101 to -804; Pawlowski, 925 P.2d  at 242; Gookin v. State Farm Fire and 
Cas. Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1992). It is clear from the record, that 
following Routh's lead, the court in Mississippi determined that it should apply 
the law of Wyoming in its decision with respect to Routh's claim for permanent 
disability benefits under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. Not only does 
that approach comport with Mississippi law, but at the juncture of judgment, it 
became the "law of the case." The doctrine captured by the "law of the case" is 
that a trial court must adhere to its own prior rulings, adhere to the rulings 
of an appellate court, or perhaps follow the rulings of another court in the 
same case or a closely related case. Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Wyo. 1993), followed by, Claim of Moriarity, 899 P.2d 879, 887 
(Wyo. 1995). See also, Lyden By and Through Lyden v. Winer, 913 P.2d 451, 454 
(Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶13] The Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act provides the procedure to be followed when a claimant disputes 
a disability impairment rating for purposes of obtaining permanent disability 
benefits. Under the statute "[i]f the percentage of physical impairment is 
disputed, the division shall obtain a second opinion and if the ratings 
conflict, shall determine the award upon consideration of the initial and second 
opinion." WYO. STAT. § 27-14-405(e) (1987). If the claimant still is not 
satisfied with the award determined by the Division, the procedure for disputing 
the impairment rating and the award of permanent disability benefits is to 
pursue a contested case by seeking a referral to an independent hearing examiner 
for a formal hearing. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-602(b) (1987). In any such contested 
case, "[t]he hearing examiner has exclusive jurisdiction to make the final 
administrative determination of the validity and amount of compensation payable 
under [the worker's compensation] act." WYO. STAT. § 27-14-602(c) (1987); 
Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 240 
(Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶14] So far as this record 
reveals, the only physician who provided a physical impairment rating was the 
physician at the Gottsche Center who indicated that Routh's disability was 4% of 
the body as a whole. We do not know whether the Division was prepared to award 
permanent partial disability benefits at that level. We do know that the 
Division was advised by Routh's attorney to proceed no further. Instead of ever 
pursuing his remedies under the statute, Routh proceeded to file his complaint 
in the court in Mississippi.  
Obviously a direct action against the Division would not have been open 
to Routh in Wyoming. Under our law, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
at the point in time at which an objection is filed and the case is referred to 
the independent hearing examiner. It follows that under the correct application 
of Wyoming law, which the Mississippi court acknowledged was applicable, it did 
not have subject matter jurisdiction over Routh's claim for benefits under the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.

 

[¶15] The district court 
also ruled that Routh's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act would prevent the Mississippi court from 
exercising jurisdiction. The election of a court to decline jurisdiction on the 
basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is vested in the sound 
exercise of its discretion. Glover v. State, 860 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Wyo. 1993); 
Union Pacific Resources Co. v. State, 839 P.2d 356, 366 (Wyo. 1992). The 
doctrine of exhaustion has been articulated by this Court in this 
way:

 

The exhaustion doctrine applies where an agency alone 
has been granted or found to possess exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The 
purpose of the doctrine then is to avoid premature interruption of the 
administrative process where the agency has been created to apply a statute in 
the first instance.

 

People v. Fremont Energy 
Corp., 651 P.2d 802, 811 (Wyo. 1982), followed by, Rissler & McMurry Co. v. 
State, 917 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Wyo. 1996). In Wyoming, judicial action is withheld 
until the administrative process has run its course. Wagoner v. State, Dept. of 
Admin. and Information, 924 P.2d 88, 91 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶16] We have held above 
that Routh was required to present his claim for permanent partial disability 
benefits to the Division, and if no accord was reached, to seek a hearing. He 
was entitled to a second opinion with respect to his impairment rating pursuant 
to WYO. STAT. § 27-14-405(e). Assuming from his course of action that Routh 
would not be satisfied with a second physical impairment rating, the clear 
remedy was to seek a contested case hearing before an independent hearing 
officer. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-602(b).  
Under the law of Wyoming, only after Routh had pursued the contested case 
hearing would he have exhausted his administrative remedies, and he then would 
be entitled to judicial review in the state district court. WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-602(b).3

 

[¶17] We turn then to the 
tort aspects of Routh's judgment. The district court ruled that there is no 
provision in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, WYO. STAT. § 1-39-101 to -120 
(1988), which waives sovereign immunity with respect to these claims.  There is no question that the Division 
is an agency of the State of Wyoming. In Wyoming, sovereign immunity pertains in 
any suit against the state in which a state officer or agency is or will be 
required to use state property or funds to afford the relief demanded.  State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 548 
(Wyo. 1982). The Wyoming statute is a closed end waiver of immunity from 
liability, and an injured party who seeks recovery from an agency of the State 
of Wyoming must establish that the conduct complained of fits into a specific 
statutory waiver of immunity. Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1299 (Wyo. 
1990).

 

[¶18] The Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act waives sovereign or governmental immunity, but only for 
certain enumerated torts.  Harbel v. 
Wintermute, 883 P.2d 359, 363 (Wyo. 1994); Veile v. Board of County Com'rs of 
Washakie County, 860 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo. 1993); Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d  at 1299. Under this statute, immunity is the rule and liability has to be 
established by an exception. Vigil v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 524 (Wyo. 1994); 
Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Wyo. 1985). Standing as a statute that 
abrogates common law, our rule is that it is to be strictly construed. Weston 
County Hosp. Joint Powers Bd. v. Westates Const. Co., 841 P.2d 841, 847 (Wyo. 
1992); Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 956 (Wyo. 
1990).

 

[¶19] The Mississippi court 
obviously was concerned with the question of immunity as the following colloquy 
between court and counsel demonstrates:

 

          
THE COURT: Is there a Wyoming Law in regards to sovereign 
immunity?

 

[COUNSEL]: There are provisions in the Wyoming 
constitution that I do not have, simply allowing the state to administer its 
workers compensation program. The only thing I can offer you there, Your Honor, 
is the statute I cited saying as a result of providing the workers compensation 
benefits that the employer is statutorily immune from 
suit.

 

THE COURT: But you haven't answered my question. Is 
there Wyoming law regarding sovereign immunity?

 

          
[COUNSEL]: No, sir, there is not. * * *

 

(Emphasis added). Obviously 
if this latter answer had been furnished by a Wyoming lawyer to a Wyoming court, 
either the lawyer would be guilty of lying or of total 
incompetence.

 

[¶20] This is the premise 
for the assertion by the Division of constructive fraud on the part of Routh's 
Mississippi counsel that justifies a collateral attack upon the Mississippi 
judgment. Fraud may justify equitable relief from a judgment or decree where the 
prevailing party has prevented the unsuccessful party from having a fair 
submission of the controversy. Pike v. Markman, 633 P.2d 944, 948 (n. 1) (Wyo. 
1981). See also, Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 719 P.2d 234, 239 (Wyo. 1986). The 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS advises that a judgment may be avoided if the 
judgment was based on a claim that the party obtaining the judgment knew to be 
fraudulent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70(1)(b) (1980). One other 
commentator has suggested that fraud suffices to preclude the registration of a 
foreign judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. Sara L. 
Johnson, Validity, Construction, and Application of Uniform Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments Act, 31 A.L.R.4th 706, 755 (1984).

 

[¶21] The Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act articulates the law of Wyoming on the issue of sovereign 
immunity, and even a cursory examination of the Wyoming statutes and cases would 
serve to demonstrate that the legislature has chosen not to abrogate sovereign 
immunity for claims such as this. The statute provides:

 

(a) A governmental entity and its public employees 
while acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for 
any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112. Any immunity in 
actions based on a contract entered into by a governmental entity is waived 
except to the extent provided by the contract if the contract was within the 
powers granted to the entity and was properly executed. The claims procedures of 
W.S. 1-39-113 apply to contractual claims against governmental 
entities.

 

WYO. STAT. § 1-39-104(a) 
(1988). The Mississippi court erroneously concluded that Routh's complaint for 
the torts of bad faith and infliction of emotional distress was not barred under 
Wyoming's law of sovereign immunity. There is nothing in any section of the 
statute, WYO. STAT. § 1-39-105 through -112, which would serve to abrogate 
sovereign immunity for these claims. Under Wyoming law, the claim for bad faith 
and infliction of emotional distress against the state would 
fail.

 

[¶22] There is yet another 
premise for not honoring the judgment with respect to the tort claims. Pursuant 
to WYO. STAT. § 1-39-113 (1988), Routh was required to file a claim. That 
statute provides:

 

(a) No action shall be brought under this act against 
a governmental entity unless the claim upon which the action is based is 
presented to the entity as an itemized statement in writing within two (2) years 
of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause of action 
may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged 
act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged act, 
error or omission was:

 

          
  (i) Not reasonably 
discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

 

(ii) The claimant failed to discover the alleged act, 
error or omission within the two (2) year period despite the exercise of due 
diligence.

 

The failure to file a claim 
within the two year period serves as a bar to an action brought on that claim. 
Vigil, 887 P.2d  at 525; Ruppenthal v. State, By and Through Economic Development 
and Stabilization Bd., 849 P.2d 1316, 1320 (Wyo. 1993); Dye by Dye v. Fremont 
County School Dist. No. 24, 820 P.2d 982, 984 (Wyo. 1991). Routh did not even 
allege the filing of a claim in his Mississippi complaint, and under Wyoming law 
that would serve to justify dismissal of the complaint for the tort claims. In 
Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 414 (Wyo. 
1983), we articulated the rule that "in the absence of an allegation of the 
filing of such a claim the district court [does] not have jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of the action * * *." In Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 771 
(Wyo. 1993), we expanded the rule in Bell, and held that, "in order to invoke 
the jurisdiction of the district court, such an allegation must encompass a 
statement of the date the claim was filed * * *."

 

[¶23] We hold that the Order 
Granting Defendant's Motion Summary Judgment should be affirmed. This 
Mississippi judgment was not entitled to recognition in Wyoming because it was 
obtained without personal jurisdiction over the Division and without subject 
matter jurisdiction over the claim for worker's compensation benefits. Further, 
the State of Wyoming enjoys sovereign immunity, which we believe the Mississippi 
court would have recognized if it had not been mislead by counsel. The failure 
to follow the claims procedure in the Wyoming Governmental Claims statute also 
served to deprive the Mississippi court of jurisdiction over the tort claims. 
The judgment in favor of the Division stands.

 

          

 

          

FOOTNOTES

1Specifically, 
under the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act, the court awarded Routh permanent 
disability benefits from April 1990 until the date of the judgment in the amount 
of $40,544.14 and permanent and total disability benefits for the 
remainder of Routh's life in the amount of $322,856.36. With respect to the 
torts of bad faith and the infliction of emotional distress, the court awarded 
Routh $500,000 in actual damages, $60,000 in future medical benefits, and 
$1,000,000 in punitive 
damages.

 2Article 
IV, § 1 of the Constitution of the United States provides:

 

Full 
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be 
proved, and the Effect thereof.

  3In this 
instance, Routh was not seeking a supplemental award of worker's compensation 
benefits in a second and separate proceeding in Mississippi. Consequently, the 
application of the full faith and credit clause articulated in  Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270, 100 S. Ct. 2647, 2655, 65 L. Ed. 2d 757 (U.S.Dist. Col. 1980), is 
not pertinent here. The issue is not whether Routh could obtain worker's 
compensation benefits by a second action  in Mississippi, but instead is whether he 
properly obtained worker's compensation benefits under Wyoming 
law.