Case Title: OMNIPLEX World Services Corp. v. US Investigations Services, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 042287

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ., 
and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
OMNIPLEX WORLD SERVICES CORPORATION 
 
v.  Record No. 042287     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
September 16, 2005 
US INVESTIGATIONS SERVICES,  
INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jonathan C. Thacher, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the provisions of a 
non-competition contract are overbroad and unenforceable. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Omniplex World Services Corporation (Omniplex) is a 
highly specialized employment agency that provides a variety 
of security services to government and private sector 
customers.  In August 2003, Omniplex prevailed in its bid to 
provide staffing for a government agency, referred to as a 
"Sensitive Government Customer" or "SGC," in a project 
entitled "Project Eagle."  Staffing of this project required 
that personnel have a "Top-Secret" security clearance 
validated by the SGC, regardless of the function performed. 
 
At the time Omniplex won the bid, Kathleen M. Schaffer 
was working on Project Eagle as an employee of MVM, Inc., 
another staffing company.  Upon learning that MVM no longer 
had the contract to staff Project Eagle, Schaffer sent out 
applications for employment to various staffing agencies, 
 
2
including The Smith Corporation.  Before receiving a response 
from The Smith Corporation, Schaffer was offered continued 
employment at Project Eagle by Omniplex.  On August 26, 2003, 
Schaffer signed a one-year employment agreement with Omniplex.  
The agreement provided for a $2,000 bonus and included a non-
competition provision.  That provision stated in pertinent 
part: 
Employee hereby covenants and agrees that, 
immediately following any termination of 
employment from OMNIPLEX that occurs before 
the expiration of the Term, . . . Employee 
shall not for the remainder of the Term (i) 
accept employment, become employed by, or 
perform any services for OMNIPLEX's Customer 
for whom Employee provided services or for any 
other employer in a position supporting 
OMNIPLEX's Customer, if the employment or 
engagement requires Employee to possess the 
same level of security clearance Employee 
relied on during his employment with OMNIPLEX, 
. . . . 
 
Schaffer worked for Omniplex in general administrative 
security support, monitoring alarms and intrusion detection 
systems at the SGC's general headquarters, an overt location. 
 
On October 23, 2003, The Smith Corporation responded to 
Schaffer's earlier employment application and offered her a 
position as an administrative assistant for the SGC at a 
covert location.  This position required her to arrange 
travel, including obtaining visas and passports and offered a 
higher hourly wage than Schaffer was currently earning.  
 
3
Schaffer accepted the offer and, on November 4, 2003, resigned 
from Omniplex and returned the $2,000 bonus. 
 
Omniplex filed a three-count motion for judgment claiming 
that Schaffer breached her employment contract, that The Smith 
Company and U.S. Investigation Services, Inc., the parent 
company of The Smith Company (collectively "USIS"), tortiously 
interfered with Schaffer's employment contract, and that 
Schaffer and USIS engaged in a conspiracy to injure Omniplex's 
business in violation of Code § 18.2-499.  Omniplex sought 
injunctive relief and $1,350,000 in damages.  The trial court 
denied Omniplex's motion for a temporary injunction. 
Following an ore tenus hearing, the trial court struck 
Omniplex's evidence, concluding that the non-compete provision 
of Schaffer's employment agreement was overbroad.  Based on 
this conclusion, the trial court entered an order dismissing 
all three counts of Omniplex's motion for judgment.  We 
awarded Omniplex an appeal.  
DISCUSSION 
The standards we apply in reviewing a covenant not to 
compete are well established.  A non-competition agreement 
between an employer and an employee will be enforced if the 
contract is narrowly drawn to protect the employer's 
legitimate business interest, is not unduly burdensome on the 
employee's ability to earn a living, and is not against public 
 
4
policy.  Modern Env'ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 263 Va. 491, 493, 
561 S.E.2d 694, 695 (2002); Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 
580-81, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (2001).  Because such restrictive 
covenants are disfavored restraints on trade, the employer 
bears the burden of proof and any ambiguities in the contract 
will be construed in favor of the employee.  Id. at 581, 544 
S.E.2d at 678.  Each non-competition agreement must be 
evaluated on its own merits, balancing the provisions of the 
contract with the circumstances of the businesses and 
employees involved.  See Modern Env'ts, 263 Va. at 494-95, 561 
S.E.2d at 696.  Whether the covenant not to compete is 
enforceable is a question of law which we review de novo.  
Simmons, 261 Va. at 581, 544 S.E.2d at 678; Motion Control 
Sys., Inc. v. East, 262 Va. 33, 37, 546 S.E.2d 424, 426 
(2001). 
These standards have been developed over the years to 
strike a balance between an employee’s right to secure gainful 
employment and the employer’s legitimate interest in 
protection from competition by a former employee based on the 
employee's ability to use information or other elements 
associated with the employee's former employment.  Worrie v. 
Boze, 191 Va. 916, 927-28, 62 S.E.2d 876, 882 (1951).  By its 
very name, a covenant not to compete is an agreement to 
prevent an employee from engaging in activities that actually 
 
5
or potentially compete with the employee's former employer.  
Thus, covenants not to compete have been upheld only when 
employees are prohibited from competing directly with the 
former employer or through employment with a direct 
competitor.  Compare Motion Control Sys., 262 Va. at 37-38, 
546 S.E.2d at 426 (covenant not to compete restricting 
employment with motor manufacturers that did not manufacture 
motors similar to employer overbroad because covenant did not 
protect against competition), and Richardson v. Paxton Co., 
203 Va. 790, 795, 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962)(covenant not to 
compete that restricted former employee, who sold specific 
supplies and services, from working for any employer involved 
with any kind of supplies, equipment, or services in the same 
industry overbroad because covenant encompassed business for 
which employer did not compete), with Blue Ridge Anesthesia 
and Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick, 239 Va. 369, 373, 389 
S.E.2d 467, 469 (1990)(non-competition agreement reasonable 
because restriction protected against direct competition by 
prohibiting former employees from employment with another 
company in a position selling similar medical equipment to 
that sold by former employer), and Roanoke Eng'g Sales Co. v. 
Rosenbaum, 223 Va. 548, 553, 290 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1982)(non-
competition covenant reasonable because employment restriction 
limited to activities similar to business conducted by former 
 
6
employer).  The restriction in this case is not limited to 
positions competitive with Omniplex. 
Under the provision at issue, Schaffer is prohibited from 
performing "any services . . . for any other employer in a 
position supporting OMNIPLEX's Customer."*  (Emphasis added.)  
This provision precludes Schaffer from working for any 
business that provides support of any kind to the SGC, not 
only security staffing businesses that were in competition 
with Omniplex.  Thus, for example, the non-competition 
agreement precludes Schaffer from working as a delivery person 
for a vendor which delivers materials to the SGC if such 
security clearance was required to enter an SGC installation 
even though the vendor was not a staffing service competing 
with Omniplex.  Because the prohibition in this non-
competition provision is not limited to employment that would 
be in competition with Omniplex, the covenant is overbroad and 
unenforceable.  Motion Control Sys., 262 Va. at 37-38, 546 
S.E.2d at 426; Richardson, 203 Va. at 795, 127 S.E.2d at 117. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE KEENAN and JUSTICE KINSER 
join, dissenting. 
                                                 
 
* It is uncontested that the "customer" referred to in the 
non-competition provision is the SGC. 
 
7
 
The trial court found that the restrictive covenant at 
issue in this case was overly broad because it had no 
geographic specification, in effect a worldwide covenant.1  Not 
commenting on the trial court's rationale, the majority holds 
that the covenant is unreasonable because it does not limit 
the prohibited positions to those of direct competition.  
Under the specific facts of this case, I cannot agree with 
either view and therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
The majority cites Motion Control Systems, Inc. v. East, 
262 Va. 33, 37-38, 546 S.E.2d 424, 426 (2001), and Richardson 
v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 795, 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962), 
to support its holding that the noncompete provision is 
overbroad because the contract restriction is not limited to 
employment that would be in competition with Omniplex.  
Neither of these cases, or any others, however, establish a 
rule that noncompete provisions are per se unenforceable if 
they fail to limit the restriction to those positions in 
direct competition with the former employer.  Rather, in each 
case we held that under the facts of that case, the 
restrictive covenant at issue "imposed restraints that 
                                                 
1 The noncompetition agreement also contains a provision prohibiting Schaffer from 
providing "security or security support services . . . within a fifty (50) mile radius of the site 
or location which Employee primarily provided services during . . . Omniplex employment."  
Apparently, the trial court did not rule on the applicability of this provision and it is not before 
us in this appeal.   
 
8
exceeded those necessary to protect [the former employer's] 
legitimate business interests."  Motion Control, 262 Va. at 
38, 546 S.E.2d at 426.  See also Richardson, 203 Va. at 795, 
127 S.E.2d at 117 ("Such restraint is unreasonable in that it 
is greater than is necessary to protect Paxton in his 
legitimate business interest, and it is unreasonable from the 
standpoint of Richardson because it is unduly harsh on him in 
curtailing his legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood. Thus 
it cannot be enforced."). 
 
In a more recent case, Modern Environments, Inc. v. 
Stinnett, 263 Va. 491, 494-95, 561 S.E.2d 694, 695-96 (2002), 
we affirmed our view that a court may not determine the 
enforceability of a restrictive covenant which prohibits a 
former employee from working for a competitor in any capacity, 
by the language of the covenant alone.  Surveying precedent, 
we noted that we have "not limit[ed] [our] review to 
considering whether the restrictive covenants were facially 
reasonable."  Id. at 494, 561 S.E.2d at 696.  Rather, we have 
"examined the legitimate, protectable interests of the 
employer, the nature of the former and subsequent employment 
of the employee . . . and the nature of the restraint in light 
of all the circumstances of the case."  Id. at 494-95, 561 
S.E.2d at 696. 
 
9
 
These considerations form the basis of the three-part 
test we use to determine the validity of restrictive 
covenants: 
 
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the 
employer, reasonable in the sense that it is no 
greater than necessary to protect the employer in 
some legitimate business interest? (2) From the 
standpoint of the employee, is the restraint 
reasonable in the sense that it is not unduly 
harsh and oppressive in curtailing his legitimate 
efforts to earn a livelihood? (3) Is the 
restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a 
sound public policy? 
 
Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 580-81, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678 
(2001).  In examining the reasonableness of the restrictive 
covenant with regard to the interests of the employer, 
employee, and the public at large, we pay particular attention 
to the duration, function, and geographic reach of the 
covenant.  Id. at 581, 544 S.E.2d at 678.  We consider the 
reasonableness of the covenant on the facts of each particular 
case.  Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 238 Va. 171, 
174, 380 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1989).  The employer seeking to 
enforce the restrictive covenant bears the burden of proving 
that the restraint is reasonable in light of those facts.  
Simmons, 261 Va. at 581, 544 S.E.2d at 678.  We review the 
record de novo to determine whether Omniplex has met its 
burden.  Id. 
 
10
 
Omniplex argues that it has a legitimate business 
interest in retaining employees who hold the necessary top-
level security clearance during the first year of its contract 
with the SGC.  Neither the trial court nor the majority found 
that Omniplex' stated interest was not a legitimate business 
interest, but Schaffer argues on brief that retaining 
employees is not a legitimate business interest because this 
Court has never recognized it as such.  Such an argument 
misinterprets the applicable law in this case. 
Unlike courts of other jurisdictions, we have never 
established discrete categories of legitimate business 
interests which may be the subject of a restrictive covenant.  
Instead, we have placed the burden on the employer to show 
that the restrictive covenant is designed to protect an 
important business interest particular to that employer.  See 
Modern Environments, 263 Va. at 495, 561 S.E.2d at 696 
(conclusory statement that restrictive covenant protects a 
legitimate business interest, without explaining that 
interest, is insufficient).  Even so, we have recognized 
Omniplex' stated business interest in an analogous context. 2  
See Therapy Services v. Crystal City Nursing Center, 239 Va. 
                                                 
2 See generally Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 792, 127 S.E.2d 113, 115 
(1962) (finding noncompete agreement to be unreasonably restrictive to protect employer's 
business interest, but not disputing employer's asserted business interest in retaining 
salespeople). 
 
11
385, 388, 389 S.E.2d 710, 711-12 (1990) (recognizing a 
company's "legitimate interest in protecting its ability to 
maintain professional personnel in its employ, thus enabling 
it to provide the services required under its contracts").3  
The record in this case reflects that Omniplex has shown it 
has a legitimate business interest in retaining "cleared" 
employees like Schaffer during the first year of the Project 
Eagle contract. 
 
At trial, Michael M. Wines, Omniplex' vice president of 
security services, explained that as part of the SGC's bidding 
process, a staffing company must describe the steps that it 
will take to maintain a stable workforce and ensure that the 
project will be adequately staffed.  Once awarded the Project 
Eagle contract, Omniplex was required to report staffing 
levels and plans for future staffing to the SGC on a regular 
basis.  In the past, the SGC has cancelled contracts when a 
company could no longer provide sufficient "cleared" staff. 
 
Wines described the impact on Omniplex when a cleared 
employee departs suddenly: 
[Y]ou have an employee that has institutional 
knowledge, has the clearance, has goodwill with the 
client, the client has a comfort level with them 
. . . . 
                                                 
3 The noncompete provision in Therapy Services was contained in a contract between 
the staffing company and the client and was not a part of an employment contract.  See 239 
Va. at 387, 389 S.E.2d at 711. 
 
12
 
But . . . it also creates . . . a serious 
concern about contract performance . . . 
[especially] in the first year [of a contract].  As 
a first-year, a new contractor [is] trying to 
establish goodwill with the client, . . . a stable 
workforce, [and] ensure the client that they made 
the right selection. 
 
. . . . 
 
[W]hen [our employee is] working for us today, and 
the very next day they're [sic] working for one of 
our competitors in the same facility, supporting the 
same client[,] [t]he client starts to question our 
ability to retain employees. 
 
Wines noted that while turnover is inevitable in any company, 
Omniplex has particular concerns about other staffing 
companies "poaching"4 employees with top security clearances:  
"[M]any times our competitors are willing to pay additional 
funds for an employee [who is] not qualified for a position 
just because the employee has a clearance."  He testified that 
on a former contract, a competitor of Omniplex "poached five 
[out of eight] people in one day."  Wines noted that if a 
similar situation occurred on Project Eagle, "the only way 
[Omniplex] would be able to meet [its] contractual 
                                                 
4 Wines distinguished the problem of "poaching" from the industry practice of hiring 
the incumbent workforce at a site when a staffing company takes over a contract from an 
outgoing security firm.  When Omniplex was awarded the Project Eagle contract, it offered 
higher salaries and benefits to the incumbent workforce at the Project Eagle site.  Wines 
testified that this practice is necessary as the incoming staffing company is required to assume 
contractual duties almost immediately, and the company is not allowed to submit an employee 
for a security clearance until after that company is awarded the contract.  Because the security 
clearance process takes an average of 12 months, it is unlikely that the contractor could 
provide enough cleared staff for the crucial first year of the contract without hiring the 
incumbent employees. 
 
13
requirements would be forcing our existing staff to work 
overtime." 
 
USIS has the same concerns.  Peter F. Waldorf, an 
operations director for USIS, agreed that it is "very 
important for [USIS] to provide an adequate amount of 
cleared staff to [its] government customers."  Waldorf 
also agreed that adequate staffing was a particularly 
important concern to the SGC, and that a government 
contractor such as USIS must maintain adequate staffing 
levels to be viable.  Anthony Gallo, president of USIS 
professional services division, testified that in order 
to protect USIS' business interests, Schaffer was 
required to sign a noncompete5 agreement similar to that 
which she signed with Omniplex upon accepting employment.6  
Gallo testified this was necessary "to demonstrate to 
your customers that your company has the capacity to 
maintain a stable workforce . . . ." 
                                                 
5 The USIS noncompete provision reads in pertinent part: 
Employee agrees that during his or her term of employment and for a 
six (6) month period commencing on the last day of Employee's 
employment with Company, whether terminated for cause or otherwise, 
he or she may not without Company permission, directly or indirectly, 
(a) 
[provide] services similar to those provided by the Company to 
any Customer; or 
(b)  
assist any . . . enterprise in bidding, soliciting or procuring 
services similar to those provided by the Company to its Customers; 
. . . . 
6 Significantly, the USIS covenant is longer in duration than that of Omniplex, and 
prohibits employment with any entity serviced by USIS during the former employee's term of 
employment. 
 
14
 
In order to protect its interest in maintaining a 
stable, qualified workforce during the crucial first year 
of the Project Eagle contract, Omniplex required each of 
its employees to sign a restrictive covenant prohibiting 
employment with any firm which supports the SGC, within a 
year from the first day of service with Omniplex, but 
only if such employment requires the same security 
clearance the SGC required.  Omniplex argues that this 
restrictive covenant is narrowly tailored to protect its 
legitimate business interest during the contract's first 
year.  I agree with Omniplex and would find that the 
restrictive covenant, as drawn in this case, is a 
reasonable protection of Omniplex' legitimate business 
interest to maintain a sufficient number of "cleared" 
employees during Project Eagle's first year. 
 
Omniplex' success on Project Eagle is dependent upon 
its ability to retain "cleared" employees during the 
first year of the contract.  The restrictive covenant 
commits an Omniplex employee only during the first year 
of employment and places no restrictions on an employee 
who leaves to take another position after that time.  For 
one year after beginning employment with Omniplex, 
Schaffer was prohibited from working anywhere in the 
world for any independent contractor of the SGC if the 
 
15
new position required her SGC security clearance.  In 
this case, the restriction on Schaffer would last only 
nine and one-half months. 
This Court has noted that 
 
[i]n determining the reasonableness and 
enforceability of restrictive covenants, trial 
courts must not consider function, geographical 
scope, and duration as three separate and distinct 
issues.  Rather, these limitations must be 
considered together. 
 
Simmons, 261 Va. at 581, 544 S.E.2d at 678.  In my view, 
the trial court and the majority place undue and 
exaggerated emphasis on the covenant's lack of geographic 
restriction and lack of prohibited competitive 
activities, respectively.  Both failed to give due weight 
to the other narrow aspects of the restriction.  As noted 
above, the covenant applies only to employment with 
entities servicing the SGC in positions which require 
Schaffer's top-level security clearance.  Schaffer is 
otherwise free to work for any other employer at any 
location in the world.  She can work for any competitor 
of Omniplex, even one providing services to the SGC, so 
long as a lower security clearance is used (subject to 
other provisions of the noncompetition agreement).  The 
record contained no evidence that Schaffer's work skills 
could only be used at the SGC as opposed to other 
 
16
potential employers.  Considering all these factors in 
context, the fact that the restrictive covenant does not 
contain a geographic limitation or a list of prohibited 
competitive positions does not make it overly broad. 
The majority holds the noncompetition agreement is 
overbroad because it bars Schaffer from "perform[ing] any 
services for OMNIPLEX' customer."  Such a restriction, the 
majority argues, would "preclude[] Schaffer from working as a 
delivery person for a vendor which delivers materials to the 
SGC if such security clearance was required to enter an SGC 
installation even though the vendor was not a staffing service 
competing with Omniplex."  Even if the majority's analysis of 
the restrictive covenant is correct on this point, the 
possible prohibition on Schaffer's employment as an SGC 
delivery person is not overly broad. 
Omniplex has a well-defined, vital business interest in 
prohibiting Schaffer from seeking other employment using her 
particular security clearance.  Without the ability to enforce 
the narrowly drawn restriction, Omniplex' legitimate business 
interest may be vitiated.  While it seems unlikely that 
Domino's Pizza or UPS would need a top level security 
clearance employee to deliver a pizza or a package to an SGC 
site, I would not find a restrictive covenant with such an 
effect to be overly broad under the specific facts of this 
 
17
case.  As noted above, the restrictive covenant at issue is 
limited to only one entity, the SGC, and only in the first 
year of the contractual relationship.  That leaves the rest of 
the world's entities for the pizza or package delivery person 
to service.  Considering all the circumstances, the covenant 
is reasonable. 
 
In addition, this Court has upheld restrictive covenants 
which lack a geographic restriction.  In Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 
800, 805-07, 263 S.E.2d 430, 433-34 (1980), we affirmed the 
trial court's decision to enforce a restrictive covenant which 
prohibited a former accounting firm partner from performing 
services for any client of the partnership.  The covenant in 
that case did not contain a geographic restriction, but rather 
centered on contact with former clients.  Id. at 807, 263 
S.E.2d at 434.  Like the enforceable restrictive covenant in 
Foti, Schaffer's noncompete agreement is client-specific, 
rather than geographically based.   Schaffer's contract is 
much more narrowly drawn than the one in Foti, because the 
restrictive limit goes to only one Omniplex client and not to 
any others. 
 
Similarly in Advanced Marine Enterprises v. PRC Inc., 256 
Va. 106, 111, 127, 501 S.E.2d 148, 151, 160 (1998), we upheld 
a noncompete agreement which prohibited a former employee from 
competing with the employer within 50 miles of any of the 
 
18
employer's offices.  We noted that even though the employer 
had 300 offices worldwide, the geographic restriction was 
reasonable because other elements of the restriction were more 
narrowly tailored.  Id. at 119, 501 S.E.2d at 155. 
 
In addition to considering the other narrowly tailored 
aspects of the restrictive covenant, I believe that our fact-
specific inquiry requires us to consider the nature of the 
employer's business in determining whether any geographic 
restriction is necessary.  I agree with the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that 
[w]ith respect to the territory to which the 
restriction should apply, the rule has always been 
that it might extend to the limits wherein the 
plaintiff's trade would be likely to go. The changes 
which have marked the course of judicial decisions 
in modern times seem to consist in conforming the 
application of the rule to the constant development 
of the facilities of commerce and the enlargement of 
the avenues of trade. 
 
National Homes Corp. v. Lester Indus., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 
1025, 1034 (W.D. Va. 1968) (citation omitted), aff'd in part 
and rev'd in part, 404 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1968).  See, e.g., 
West Publ'g Corp. v. Stanley, No. 03-5832, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 448, at *32 (D. Minn. 2004) (restrictive covenant 
lacking geographic limitation was "reasonable in light of the 
national, and . . . international, nature of internet 
business"). 
 
19
Omniplex and its competitors service government agencies 
both nationally and overseas.  A particular government client 
may have contracts with multiple staffing companies for its 
various locations.  A security clearance specific to such a 
client is a valuable asset and renders an employee vulnerable 
to "poaching" by a competitor, who also has a contract with 
that government client.  Without its worldwide scope as to the 
single client, SGC, the restrictive covenant could not protect 
Omniplex' interest in protecting its workforce during the 
crucial first year on Project Eagle. 
Likewise, limiting those positions an employee can take 
after leaving Omniplex does not sufficiently protect Omniplex' 
interest in maintaining adequate staffing.  If Omniplex 
restricted Schaffer's subsequent employment by the tasks she 
performed, she would have no incentive not to use her valuable 
SGC specific security clearance to obtain other employment 
serving the SGC. 
The restrictive covenant at issue in this case, when 
viewed in the context of the facts of this record, meets the 
three-part test for the validity of such covenants 
particularly for purposes of sufficiency on a motion to strike 
the evidence.  The contractual restraint has been amply 
demonstrated to be reasonable, even essential, to protect 
Omniplex' contractual interests with the SGC.  The restraint 
 
20
is no greater than necessary to protect that interest, 
particularly when drawn for such a short period of time and 
without restriction on Schaffer's freedom to seek employment 
providing services to any employer in the world except one 
working at the SGC and requiring her level of security 
clearance. 
For these same reasons, it cannot be said the restrictive 
covenant is unduly harsh in limiting Schaffer's ability to 
earn a livelihood.  Finally, the restraint is reasonable from 
a public policy standpoint.  When drawn as narrowly as in this 
case, the restrictive covenant safeguards the ability in 
unique economic circumstances for an employer to maintain the 
contracts that enable it to be a viable entity, particularly 
in the areas of national security and defense.  Accordingly, I 
would reverse the judgment of the trial court and therefore 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.