Case Title: Marshall v. Montgomery Cty. Children Serv. Bd.

Citation: 2001-Ohio-209

Docket Number: 20000865

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Marshall v. Montgomery Cty. Children Serv. Bd., 92 Ohio St.3d 348, 
2001-Ohio-209.] 
 
 
 
MARSHALL, APPELLANT, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES 
BOARD, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Cite as Marshall v. Montgomery Cty. Children Serv. Bd. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
348.] 
Juvenile law — Child abuse — Political subdivision tort liability — Within the 
meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) and 2744.03(A)(6)(c), R.C. 2151.421 
does not expressly impose liability for failure to investigate reports of 
child abuse. 
(No. 00-865 — Submitted December 13, 2000 — Decided July 25, 2001.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 17856. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) and 2744.03(A)(6)(c), R.C. 2151.421 
does not expressly impose liability for failure to investigate reports of 
child abuse. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  On October 2, 1996, Rozanne Perkins beat her two-and-a-
half-year-old son Davon on the head.  He died of his injuries the next day.  Prior 
to the murder of her son, Perkins had a substantial history of abusing her children 
beginning in 1985.  From 1985 to 1995, Perkins had four other children in 
addition to Davon. During the same time period, but prior to the birth of Davon, 
Montgomery County Children Services Board (“CSB”) responded to numerous 
complaints regarding Perkins’s abuse of her children. Perkins was alcohol- and 
drug-dependent.  CSB ultimately removed all four of Perkins’s children from her 
custody and control. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
CSB received the first report of abuse of the Perkins’s children in 1985, 
when it was alleged that Perkins was slapping her three-month-old child, Ebony.  
In 1987, a report was made to CSB alleging that Perkins had abandoned and 
physically abused two of her children, Ebony and Gary.  However, CSB was 
unable to substantiate the claims.  In 1988, CSB once again received allegations 
that Perkins had abandoned her children; however, CSB has no record of any 
charges of abuse then.  CSB assisted the paternal grandmother, Doris Harris, to 
obtain custody of Ebony and Gary.  Perkins did not appear at the hearing to 
contest custody. 
 
In August 1992, Perkins was once again referred to CSB, this time for 
beating her son Dorian with a belt and striking him in the eye. CSB then assigned 
a caseworker to the Perkins family on an ongoing basis.  Perkins admitted to the 
CSB caseworker that she had beaten the child with the belt but stated that she 
“wouldn’t do it anymore as long as the child didn’t cry anymore.”  Due to the 
severity of the abuse, CSB removed Dorian from his mother’s custody to the 
custody of his aunt, Ruby Perkins.  CSB determined that in order to regain 
custody of her children, Perkins must attend parenting and chemical dependency 
classes and submit to a psychological review.  Perkins failed to comply with the 
requirements of the chemical-dependency program. 
 
CSB continued to work with Perkins over a fourteen-month period, during 
which Perkins gave birth to yet another child, Darian.  A toxicology screen 
performed shortly after Darian’s birth indicated that the child was born alcohol-
dependent and also tested positive for narcotics.  CSB concluded that Darian had 
been heavily exposed to a variety of drugs and alcohol prior to his birth.  As a 
result, CSB removed Darian from Perkins’s custody and placed him with Robin 
Marshall, Darian’s paternal aunt.  None of Perkins’s children was returned to her. 
 
During this time period, CSB had a policy of closing all cases where no 
child remained in the home, even if CSB was aware that the mother was pregnant 
January Term, 2001 
3 
with another child.  Prior to closing the case file, CSB became aware that Perkins 
was pregnant with a fifth child.  Because no children remained in Perkins’s home, 
CSB closed the file even though Perkins was pregnant, had a history of abusing 
her children, and Perkins was suspected of still being dependent on alcohol and 
drugs.  On October 14, 1993, Perkins’s caseworker pointed out in her final report 
that Perkins was “approximately 4-5 months pregnant.”  In addition the 
caseworker reported, “I would not be surprised in the least if the Agency receives 
a referral on her for a drug exposed infant when she delivers in February or 
March.” 
 
Also during this time, CSB had a classification system for the cases that 
were reported.  The priorities were listed as levels one through four.  A level-one 
priority was the most critical and level four was the least critical.  A level-one 
priority required CSB to make contact with the child within one hour of the 
report.  A level-two priority required CSB to make contact with the child within 
twenty-four hours.  A level-three priority required CSB to initiate a case within 
twenty-four hours and make contact with someone familiar with the case, not 
necessarily the parent or child victim.  CSB established no minimum response 
time for a level-four priority, and the priority level could change depending upon 
the information gathered.  The levels CSB assigned to cases could be altered once 
a review of any existing record indicated that based upon an existing history, the 
case required a higher level of priority. 
 
Perkins gave birth to her fifth child, Davon, on February 2, 1994.  CSB 
received no reports from the hospital that Davon was alcohol- or drug-dependent.  
On October 24, 1994, CSB received a report from Danny McLemore, Perkins’s 
boyfriend and Davon’s father, requesting that CSB check on the child due to the 
mother’s substance-abuse problem.  CSB assigned the case as a level-three 
priority, which required that contact be made with someone familiar with the case 
within twenty-four hours.  The caseworker assigned to the case reviewed the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
records that CSB maintained regarding Perkins and was aware that Perkins had a 
history of substance abuse and that four of her children had been removed from 
her home.  Despite Perkins’s history, CSB made no changes to the level of 
priority of the McLemore complaint concerning Davon. 
 
The CSB caseworker assigned to investigate the complaint concerning 
Davon attempted to contact Perkins through an unannounced home visit on 
October 25, 1994.  However, no one was home, and a contact letter was left 
requesting that Perkins contact CSB.  The caseworker made additional attempts to 
contact Perkins on November 14, and December 1, 1994, and January 10, 1995, 
each time leaving a note requesting Perkins to contact CSB.  Perkins failed to 
respond. Contrary to the requirements of a level-three priority, the caseworker did 
not attempt to contact any other persons during this time period. 
 
On April 19, 1995, nearly six months after McLemore’s complaint, CSB 
made contact with Perkins.  The caseworker’s report indicated that Perkins denied 
any substance abuse.  The caseworker also found that Perkins’s house was clean 
and that Davon did not appear to be neglected.  Based upon the caseworker’s 
home visit the case was closed. 
 
On October 6, 1995, the Dayton Police Department arrested Perkins for 
domestic violence.  Perkins attempted to stab McLemore while he was driving, 
forcing him to pull the car off the road in order to disarm Perkins.  Davon was a 
passenger in the rear seat of the car during this altercation.  Perkins was later 
charged with child endangering as a result of this incident. 
 
During this time, CSB and the Dayton Police Department (“DPD”) had an 
agreement that DPD would report to CSB all complaints that DPD received of 
child abuse, child neglect, and child endangering.  DPD placed all of the reports 
that it received into a box located in the detective section of DPD.  Every morning 
a CSB employee would retrieve the reports that DPD had placed in the box.  CSB 
immediately investigated all criminal charges of child endangering that were 
January Term, 2001 
5 
received.  Due to her altercation with McLemore, Perkins was arrested and 
charged with domestic violence and child endangering.  However, contrary to the 
agreement between DPD and CBS, DPD did not place any reports of Perkins’s 
arrest for child endangering in the box for CSB retrieval. 
 
CSB had no further referrals of this case until October 2, 1996, the day 
that Davon was beaten to death by his mother. 
 
On October 1, 1997, Marshall, Davon’s paternal aunt and administrator of 
his estate, appellant, filed a wrongful death action against CSB, Helen Jones, 
Director of CSB, Montgomery County, the city of Dayton, and an unnamed 
Dayton police officer.  The complaint alleged that CSB, appellee, knew or should 
have known about the previous acts of violence perpetrated by Perkins against her 
children.  The complaint further alleged that appellee negligently failed to 
investigate and negligently failed to remove Davon from Perkins’s custody and 
that its negligence was the proximate cause of Davon’s death.  In addition, the 
complaint alleged that the city of Dayton, through DPD and its unnamed police 
officer, negligently failed to report the arrest of Perkins for domestic violence and 
child endangering. 
 
Appellee, Montgomery County, Jones, and Dayton filed motions for 
summary judgment, which were granted June 10, 1999.  Appellant appealed the 
summary judgment in favor of CSB and Dayton.  The Court of Appeals for 
Montgomery County affirmed the trial court’s decision.  In response to 
appellant’s motion to certify a conflict, the court of appeals certified a conflict 
between its judgment in favor of CSB and Rich v. Erie Cty. Dept. of Human 
Resources (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 88, 665 N.E.2d 278; Crago v. Lorain Cty. 
Commrs. (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 24, 590 N.E.2d 15; Sprouse v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of 
Edn. (Mar. 12, 1999), Lucas App. No. L-98-1098, unreported, 1999 WL 128636; 
Reed v. Perry Cty. Children’s Serv. (June 29, 1993), Perry App. No. CA-429, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
unreported, 1993 WL 274299.  This cause is now before this court upon our 
determination that a conflict exists. 
 
The certified question is: 
 
“For the purposes of the immunity exceptions in R.C. 
2744.02(B)(5) and R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c), does R.C. 2151.421 expressly 
impose liability on political subdivisions and their employees for failure to 
investigate child abuse?” 
 
We answer the certified question in the negative.  While the statutes at 
issue in this case are the same as those interpreted in Campbell v. Burton (2001), 
92 Ohio St.3d 336, ___ N.E.2d ___, the issue is whether R.C. 2151.421 expressly 
imposes liability for a failure to investigate as opposed to a failure to report as in 
Campbell.  The duty to investigate reported child abuse or neglect is required by 
R.C. 2151.421(F)(1), which states: 
 
“Except as provided in section 2151.422 of the Revised Code, the public 
children services agency shall investigate, within twenty-four hours, each report 
of known or suspected child abuse or child neglect and of a known or suspected 
threat of child abuse or child neglect that is referred to it under this section to 
determine the circumstances surrounding the injuries, abuse, or neglect or threat 
of injury, abuse, or neglect, the cause of the injuries, abuse, neglect, or threat, and 
the person or persons responsible. * * * The public children services agency shall 
submit a report of its investigation, in writing to the law enforcement agency.”  It 
is clear that CSB had a duty pursuant to R.C. 2151.421 to investigate reports of 
known or suspected child abuse within twenty-four hours. 
 
In order to determine the liability of a political subdivision pursuant to the 
Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, a three-tiered analysis of R.C. Chapter 
2744 is required.  We have set forth this analysis in Cater v. Cleveland (1998), 83 
Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 697 N.E.2d 610, 614, and in Campbell v. Burton (2001), 92 
Ohio St.3d 336, ___ N.E.2d ___.  We will not repeat that discussion here. 
January Term, 2001 
7 
 
R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) provides: 
 
“In addition to the circumstances described in divisions (B)(1) to (4) of 
this section, a political subdivision is liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or 
property when liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a 
section of the Revised Code * * *.  Liability shall not be construed to exist under 
another section of the Revised Code merely because a responsibility is imposed 
upon a political subdivision or because of a general authorization that a political 
subdivision may sue and be sued.” 
 
Similar to the exception to political subdivision immunity found in R.C. 
2744.02(B)(5), R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c) provides that an employee of a political 
subdivision is immune from liability unless “[l]iability is expressly imposed upon 
the employee by a section of the Revised Code.” 
 
The court of appeals found that within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) 
and 2744.03(A)(6)(c), R.C. 2151.421 does not expressly impose liability for 
failure to investigate allegations of abuse.  We agree with the court of appeals but 
arrive at our conclusions by way of a slightly different analytical approach. 
 
In Campbell, supra, we held that R.C. 2151.99 imposes a criminal penalty 
for failure to report, pursuant to R.C. 2151.421(A)(1), known or suspected child 
abuse.  We determined that within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) and 
2744.03(A)(6)(c), the term “liability” refers to either civil or  criminal liability.  
However, in contrast to its imposition of a penalty for failure to report, R.C. 
2151.99 does not impose a penalty for failure to investigate, pursuant to R.C. 
2151.421(F)(1), reports of child abuse or neglect.  Therefore, within the meaning 
of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) and 2744.03(A)(6)(c), R.C. 2151.421 does not expressly 
impose liability for failure to investigate reports of child abuse.  Accordingly, 
even if it failed to investigate a report, appellee is insulated from liability by 
sovereign immunity. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
We find this troubling in light of the potential for a political subdivision to 
entirely disregard affirmative duties and yet avoid liability under the cloak of 
sovereign immunity.1 However, we are confined to review the law based upon the 
issues presented in this appeal. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur separately in 
judgment. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in judgment.  R.C. 2151.421 does not expressly 
impose liability upon a political subdivision or its employee, within the meaning 
of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) and 2744.03(A)(6)(c), for failure to investigate reports of 
child abuse.  I therefore join the syllabus and judgment of the majority.  While 
doing so, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in 
Campbell v. Burton (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 336, ___ N.E.2d ___. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
D.K. Wehner and Thomas J. Replogle, for appellant. 
 
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Marcell N. Dezarn, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
__________________ 
                                                          
 
1. 
For comparison to another statute that imposes a duty but does not impose liability, see 
Butler v. Jordan (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 354, ___ N.E.2d ___.