Case Title: VERNON McKENNEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-207

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
VERNON McKENNEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 129165 P.3d 96Case Number: 06-207Decided: 08/09/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 

VERNON 
McKENNEY,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Mike 
Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Cara Boyle Chambers, 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Vernon 
McKenney entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of possessing a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver, a felony.  He reserved the right to appeal the 
district court's denial of his motion to suppress the marijuana seized during a 
search of his vehicle following a traffic stop.  Finding that the search was proper, we 
affirm.

 
 

STATEMENT 
OF THE ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      McKenney presents 
the following issues for our review:

 
 
I.  Does the smell of raw marijuana alone 
create probable cause to search a vehicle[?]

 
 
II.  Was the trial court's finding that a 
traffic stop on I-80 at night creates and [sic] "exigency" sufficient to justify 
a warrantless search error[?]

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On March 7, 2006, 
Uinta County Deputy Sheriff Thomas Clark and his drug detection dog were 
participating in drug interdiction efforts on Interstate 80 east of Evanston, Wyoming.  
Around 8:30 p.m., Deputy Clark encountered McKenney's vehicle, a Subaru 
Outback bearing South 
Dakota license plates.  A check on the license plate number 
indicated the plates were registered to a 1968 Oldsmobile.  Believing the Subaru was displaying 
improper plates, Deputy Clark initiated a traffic stop. 

 
 
[¶4]      As Deputy Clark 
was attempting to obtain McKenney's driver's license, vehicle registration, and 
proof of insurance, he detected a strong odor of "fresh, unsmoked, raw 
marijuana" emanating from the Subaru.  
After another failed attempt to match the license plates to the Subaru, 
Deputy Clark asked McKenney to step out of the vehicle and stand by its rear 
bumper.  About that time, Deputy 
Shane Roitz arrived at the scene.  
Deputy Roitz confirmed the smell of marijuana in McKenney's vehicle.  Deputy Clark informed McKenney that both 
he and Deputy Roitz detected the odor of marijuana in the Subaru and, 
consequently, he had probable cause to search the vehicle.  The ensuing search resulted in the 
discovery of 32 pounds of marijuana. 

 
 
[¶5]      McKenney was 
arrested and charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to deliver, a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2007).  McKenney sought 
to suppress the marijuana evidence under both the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, claiming among 
other things (1) the odor of raw marijuana did not provide probable cause for 
the search and (2) the search was per se unreasonable because it was conducted 
in the absence of exigent circumstances.  
After a hearing, the district court denied McKenney's motion to 
suppress.  Thereafter, McKenney 
entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge, reserving the right to 
challenge the denial of his suppression motion, and was sentenced to 30 to 72 
months imprisonment.  This appeal 
followed.  

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      The standard 
employed by this Court for reviewing a district court's suppression ruling is 
well known:

 
 
When 
reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer 
to the court's findings on factual issues unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 9, 97 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004).  We view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's decision because it 
is in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility, weigh the evidence 
and make the necessary inferences, deductions and conclusions.  Id. 
The constitutionality of a particular search or seizure, however, is a question 
of law that we review de novo.  Id.

 
 

Hembree 
v. State, 2006 
WY 127, ¶ 7, 143 P.3d 905, 907 (Wyo. 2006).  See also Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶ 9, 135 P.3d 620, 623 (Wyo. 2006); Gompf v. 
State, 2005 WY 112, ¶ 14, 120 P.3d 980, 984-85 (Wyo. 2005); Lindsay v. State, 2005 WY 34, ¶ 12, 108 P.3d 852, 855 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Probable 
Cause

 
 
[¶7]      McKenney faults 
the district court's determination that probable cause existed justifying the 
search of his vehicle.  McKenney 
contends the odor of raw marijuana, standing alone, was insufficient to create 
probable cause to believe marijuana was currently present in his vehicle.  

 
 
[¶8]      Probable cause 
justifying a search of a vehicle is established if, under the totality of the 
circumstances, there is a fair probability that the car contains contraband or 
evidence of a crime.  Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 21, 99 P.3d 987, 996 (Wyo. 2004) (citing United 
States v. Downs, 151 F.3d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1998)); Gilkison v. State, 404 P.2d 755, 757-58 
(Wyo. 
1965).  The facts and circumstances 
supporting a determination of probable cause "need not rise to the level of 
proof of guilt, nor even to the level of prima facie evidence of guilt."  Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 518 
(Wyo. 
1989).

 
 
[¶9]      This Court has 
accepted that an odor, standing alone, can supply probable cause.  Rideout v. State, 2005 WY 141, ¶ 17, 122 P.3d 201, 205-06 (Wyo. 2005).  We 
see no reason to afford less weight to one's use of the sense of smell than to 
other senses when looking to probabilities.  Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court points out that an odor sufficiently distinctive to identify a 
forbidden substance might be evidence of the most persuasive character.  Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 68 S. Ct. 367, 368-69, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948).  

 
 
[¶10]   McKenney suggests the odor of raw 
marijuana is not distinctive enough to establish probable cause.  We disagree.  As stated by LaFave, it is "generally 
accepted that the smell of marijuana in its raw form or when burning is 
sufficiently distinctive to come within the rule of the Johnson case.  Consequently, the courts have found 
probable cause to search when the distinctive odor of marijuana is emanating 
from a particular place."  2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(b), at 310-11 
(4th ed. 2004).  See generally Donald M. Zupanec, M.A., 
J.D., Annotation, Odor of Narcotics as 
Providing Probable Cause for Warrantless Search, 5 A.L.R.4th 681 
(1981).  

 
 
[¶11]   In the instant case, although 
Deputy Clark could not explicitly describe the smell of raw marijuana, he 
testified marijuana has a distinctive smell that cannot be compared to any 
other.  Deputy Clark testified he 
identified the smell emanating from McKenney's vehicle as "fresh, unsmoked, raw 
marijuana" from his experience and training in law enforcement with raw 
marijuana, particularly his extensive drug interdiction training and his 
training working with drug dogs.  
While this alone would be enough to establish probable cause to search 
the vehicle, Deputy Clark's identification of the smell as marijuana was 
confirmed by Deputy Roitz.  The 
olfactory perception of two trained law enforcement officers is certainly enough 
to establish a "fair probability that the car contains contraband or evidence of 
a crime."  Under the circumstances, 
we find probable cause did exist to support a search of McKenney's 
automobile.

 
 
Exigent 
Circumstances

 
 
[¶12]   McKenney questions whether the 
district court correctly found that the circumstances of the stop constituted 
exigent circumstances supporting the search of his automobile.  His issue, however, is based on an 
incorrect premise.  Although the 
district court ruled that exigent circumstances were required along with 
probable cause, no such requirement exists.  The search was conducted pursuant to the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement.  The "automobile exception" is more 
properly defined as "a search and/or seizure of an automobile upon probable 
cause."  Vassar, ¶ 13, 99 P.3d  at 993.  No further exigent circumstances are 
required.  See generally Callaway v. State, 954 P.2d 1365, 
1369-70 (Wyo. 1998); Nielsen v. State, 599 P.2d 1326 
(Wyo. 1979); Gilkison v. State, 404 P.2d 755 
(Wyo. 1965); State v. Kelly, 38 Wyo. 455, 268 P. 571 
(1928).  We find ourselves once 
again ruling "[t]he order of the district court that the automobile exception 
requires a separate finding of exigency in addition to a finding of probable 
cause is squarely contrary' to the United States Supreme Court's holdings in [Maryland v.] Dyson, [527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 2014, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999) (per curiam)], [United 
States v.] Ross, [456 U.S. 798, 809, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2164-65, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982)], and [Pennsylvania v.] Labron[, 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam)] and to our holdings in Borgwardt [v. State, 946 P.2d 805, 807 (Wyo. 1997)] and Gronski [v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 564-65 
(Wyo. 
1996)]."  State v. Williams, 2004 WY 53, ¶ 22, 90 P.3d 85, 92, (Wyo. 2004).1  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶13]   Under the circumstances of this 
case, the detection of an odor sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden 
substance by a qualified person is sufficient, standing alone, to establish 
probable cause for a search of an automobile.  The district court's order denying 
McKenney's motion to suppress is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1McKenney 
failed to present a Wyoming Constitutional analysis, let alone an analysis that 
would persuade us to alter current Wyoming precedent.  McKenney attempted to 
correct this omission in his reply brief.  Needless to say, McKenney's 
reply brief is completely improper, and this Court has not considered it.  Budd-Falen Law Offices, P.C. v. Rocky 
Mountain Recovery, Inc., 2005 WY 77, ¶¶ 14-17, 114 P.3d 1284, 1288-89 (Wyo. 
2005); Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 
44 n.6, 98 P.3d 857, 874 n.6 (Wyo. 2004); W.R.A.P. 
7.03.