Case Title: State v. Igoe

Citation: 206 N.W.2d 291

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1973-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
206 N.W.2d 291 (1973) The STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John IGOE, Defendant and Appellant. Cr. No. 420. Supreme Court of North Dakota. February 27, 1973. Rehearing Denied April 13, 1973. *292 John Adams and Robert P. Brady, Asst. Attys. Gen., Bismarck, for plaintiff and respondent. Zuger, Bucklin & Zuger, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant. BURDICK, District Judge. This is an appeal from two jury verdicts of guilty and the judgment of conviction entered thereon in the trial of a criminal action in the district court of Burleigh County in June, 1971, and from the order denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The defendant, John Igoe, was tried upon five counts of an Indictment by a grand jury charging him with the sale of marijuana and the marijuana derivative THC. At the conclusion of the testimony, the state consented to a dismissal of the first three counts by reason of insufficient evidence. Count Four charged the defendant with having "Sold marijuana derivative, THC to Joe Peabody on or about August 1, 1970". Count Five charged the defendant with having "Sold marijuana to Karen Sprenger on or about August 1, 1970". The pertinent statute governing this charge was Chapter 19-03 of the North Dakota Century Code which has been superseded by the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (Chapter 19-03.1, N.D.C.C.). Section 19-03-28, N.D.C.C., provided as follows: While the defendant is charged with having "sold" marijuana to Karen Sprenger, the trial court instructed the *293 jury that "The term `sale' or `sold' includes any barter, exchange, or gift, or offer therefor, and each such transaction made by a person." This definition of "sale" or "sold" may not be strictly accurate, but it had the merit of informing the jury that a gift of marijuana is a violation of the statute. See State v. Dwyer, 172 N.W.2d 591 (N.D.1969). The defendant has made a number of specifications of insufficiency of the evidence and of errors of law. We shall deal first with the specifications of insufficiency of the evidence with respect to Count Five. At the trial, Karen Sprenger was called as a witness by the State. She testified that she had "tried" marijuana on different occasions by smoking and inhaling it, but denied having purchased marijuana from the defendant. At the trial, she was asked, "You are now testifying that John Igoe never gave you any marijuana?" She replied, "I can't remember of him giving me anything directly." This testimony leaves an inference that the defendant gave her marijuana indirectly. Other than this testimony of Karen Sprenger and her acknowledged testimony before the grand jury, there was no evidence adduced at the trial that would establish a delivery of marijuana by the defendant to Karen Sprenger on or about August, 1971. Claiming surprise, the State offered to introduce testimony given by the witness before the grand jury that indicted the defendant, "to refresh her recollection, if possible, in the first instance; and, if not, we wish it in for its value as substantive evidence." The grand jury was investigating drug violations in Burleigh County. Karen Sprenger had testified before the grand jury as follows: In the context of the inquiry then pending before the grand jury and the numerous questions with reference to marijuana put to Karen Sprenger at the trial, and her vigorous denial at the trial that the defendant had ever given or sold marijuana to her, it is reasonable to conclude that the foregoing testimony taken before the grand jury had reference to marijuana. At the trial, Karen Sprenger admitted giving the foregoing testimony, but stated that she was mistaken as to that testimony and that she was "confused" at that time. Accordingly, if the foregoing testimony given before the grand jury could be received as substantive evidence at the trial, there would be competent evidence to establish the guilt of the defendant. It would be within the province of the jury, as the trier of the fact, to determine whether Karen Sprenger testified to the truth before the grand jury or at the trial. The trial court ruled that her testimony before the grand jury could be used to refresh her recollection and for the purpose of impeachment, but not as substantive evidence. This state of facts raised the question of whether the testimony of the witness, Karen Sprenger, given before the grand jury can be used as substantive evidence where she testifies at the trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning her prior inconsistent testimony. The majority rule at common law has been that prior statements inconsistent with testimony of the declarant as a witness at the trial may be used to impeach the witness, but not as substantive evidence *294 of the facts stated. This Court has followed the majority rule. State v. Snavely, 189 N.W.2d 632 (N.D.1971); Grand Forks B & D Co. v. Implement Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 75 N.D. 618, 31 N.W.2d 495. The rule has been severely criticized by McCormick on Evidence, Sec. 39, pages 73 to 82. It has also been discarded by the Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 20. The United States Supreme Court has held that a state statute which provides that "evidence of a statement made by a witness is not inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with" a statute that requires that the witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the prior statement at some point in the trial, does not violate the defendant's right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489. In the light of the decision in Green, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States submitted to the United States Supreme Court a Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates. While the instant case was under consideration by this Court, the United States Supreme Court, by Order November 20, 1972, promulgated the Proposed Rules of Evidence as "Federal Rules of Evidence" for United States Courts and Magistrates to be effective July 1, 1973, unless abrogated by the Congress. Rule 801 of Federal Rules of Evidence reads as follows: The Advisory Committee Note with respect to Subdivision (d)(1) reads as follows: There appears to be a high probability that the Proposed Rules of Evidence will become effective as Federal Rules of Evidence on July 1, 1973. Because of the *297 desirability of having our rules of evidence compatible with those governing the Federal courts, and in the light of what now appears to us to be the sounder and preferable rule, we hold that a prior statement of declarant which is inconsistent with testimony of the declarant at the trial, the declarant being subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, is admissible as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Most of the lost protections in the use of out-of-court statements as substantive evidence are largely regained where the declarant is a witness and can be confronted and cross-examined. The danger of faulty reproduction is negligible where there is competent evidence to show that the statement is his or, as in the instant case, the witness admits that the prior statement is his. The declarant as a witness is also under oath and must now affirm, deny, or qualify the truth of the prior statement under the penalty of perjury. As stated in Green, supra, 399 U.S. 149, 159, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1935, "the very fact that the prior statement was not given under a similar circumstance may become the witness' explanation for its inaccuracyan explanation a jury may be expected to understand and take into account in deciding which, if either, of the statements represents the truth." Also, with respect to the value of cross-examination of the declarant as a witness as opposed to cross-examination at the time the out-of-court statement was made, the court in Green, supra, 399 U.S. 149, 161, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1936, observed that the question is "not whether one can somehow imagine the jury in `a better position,' but whether subsequent cross-examination at the defendant's trial will still afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement." We quote further with approval from Green, supra, 399 U.S. 149, 160, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1936: Accordingly, we hold that the testimony given by Karen Sprenger before the grand jury was not only admissible in evidence at the trial for the purposes of refreshing her recollection and impeaching her testimony, but it was also admissible as substantive evidence of the delivery of marijuana by the defendant to her as charged in Count Five. It was within the province of the jury, as triers of the fact, to determine whether her sworn testimony given before the grand jury was the truth or whether her sworn testimony given before the court at the trial was the truth. The verdict of guilty indicates that the jury believed she testified truthfully before the grand jury and not at the trial. This evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction under Count Five. However, counsel for the defendant contends that in advising the defendant not to testify in his own behalf, counsel relied upon the ruling by the trial court to the effect that the testimony given by Karen Sprenger before the grand jury *298 could not be considered as substantive evidence by the jury. In view of the record which shows no other substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt, there was no need for any refutation by the defendant. Under these circumstances, the interests of a fair trial and the interests of justice require a new trial on Count Five. Accordingly, as to Count Five, the judgment of the trial court and the order denying motion for new trial are reversed. Our ruling on the admissibility of the testimony given by Karen Sprenger before the grand jury renders moot other specifications of error asserted by the defendant with respect to Count Five. We have reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence under Count Four, in which the defendant is charged with the sale of marijuana to one Joe Peabody. The conviction on this charge is based upon insufficient evidence. The only evidence offered by the State with respect to Count Four consists of an inference to be drawn from the refusal of Joe Peabody to answer a direct question put to him by the prosecutor as to whether he had purchased marijuana from the defendant. Peabody claimed the privilege of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State argues that Peabody's response to the question could incriminate him only if he had purchased marijuana from the defendant, and therefore, by refusing to answer upon the claim of privilege, the jury was entitled to infer that he purchased marijuana from the defendant at the time in question. In a criminal prosecution, the refusal by a witness other than the accused to answer a question on the ground that his answer will tend to incriminate him cannot alone be made the basis of any inference by the jury, either favorable to the prosecution or favorable to the defendant. Billeci v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 184 F.2d 394, 24 A.L.R.2d 881. See also Annotation in 24 A.L.R.2d 895; 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, Sec. 56, n. 4; 98 C.J. S. Witnesses, Sec. 455, n. 29; West's Key, Witnesses 309; and 4 Jones on Evidence, Fifth Edition, Sec. 865. As to Count Four, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the order denying motion for new trial is affirmed. As to Count Five, this case is remanded for a new trial conformable to this opinion. STRUTZ, C. J., and ERICKSTAD, TEIGEN and KNUDSON, JJ., concur. WM. L. PAULSON, Justice, deeming himself disqualified, did not participate; EUGENE A. BURDICK, Judge of the Fifth Judicial District, sitting in his stead.