Case Title: D'Attilo v. Statewide Grievance Committee

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: connecticut

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Date: 2018-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
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DANIEL JACOB D’ATTILO ET AL. v. STATEWIDE
GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE ET AL.
(SC 20059)
Robinson, C. J., and Mullins, Sheldon, Keller and Bright, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff parents, individually and on behalf of their minor child, sought
a writ of mandamus compelling further action by the defendant local
grievance panels in connection with certain grievance complaints that
the plaintiffs had filed, which had been referred to the local panels by
the defendant Statewide Grievance Committee. In their complaints, the
plaintiffs alleged that seven attorneys had engaged in misconduct by
misappropriating funds from a settlement agreement in a previous medi-
cal malpractice action. The local panels found that there was no probable
cause to believe that five of those attorneys had engaged in unethical
conduct and, therefore, dismissed the grievance complaints against
them. The complaints against the remaining two attorneys, which were
found to be supported by probable cause, were referred back to the
Statewide Grievance Committee, which issued reprimands as to both
attorneys. While the grievance proceedings were still pending, the plain-
tiffs brought the present action, claiming that the local panels had
improperly dismissed the complaints against the five attorneys and seek-
ing independent review of all seven complaints by the trial court under
its inherent authority to oversee attorney conduct. The defendants subse-
quently filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted, conclud-
ing that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were neither
statutorily nor classically aggrieved by the actions of the defendants.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the action, from which
the plaintiffs appealed. Held that the trial court having fully addressed
in its memorandum of decision the arguments raised in this appeal, this
court adopted that concise and well reasoned decision as a proper
statement of the facts and the applicable law on the issues, and, accord-
ingly, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
Argued May 4—officially released July 31, 2018
Procedural History
Action seeking, inter alia, a writ of mandamus com-
pelling further action by the defendant grievance panels
in connection with the dismissal of certain grievance
complaints brought by the plaintiffs against their former
attorneys, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the
court, Sheridan, J., granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which
the plaintiffs appealed. Affirmed.
Howard Altschuler for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Jane R. Rosenberg, solicitor general, with whom, on
the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the
appellees (defendants).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The plaintiffs, Daniel Jacob D’Attilo,
Cathy M. D’Attilo, and Domenic D’Attilo,1 appeal2 from
the judgment of the trial court dismissing the present
action, which was brought against the defendants, the
Statewide Grievance Committee, the Fairfield Griev-
ance Panel (Fairfield panel), and the Stamford-Norwalk
Grievance Panel (Stamford panel),3 seeking a writ of
mandamus and injunctive relief in challenging their han-
dling of the plaintiffs’ grievance complaints against
seven attorneys. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that they
were statutorily and classically aggrieved by certain
decisions of those local panels dismissing their griev-
ance complaints against five of those attorneys, and
by certain other actions of the Statewide Grievance
Committee with respect to the proceedings against the
other two. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the
judgment of the trial court dismissing the present action
for lack of standing.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. On March 21, 2003, the plaintiffs
retained the law firm of Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder,
P.C. (Koskoff firm), to represent them in a civil action,
claiming that medical malpractice during Daniel’s birth
had left him disabled for life. In January, 2012, after a
jury had awarded the plaintiffs a verdict of $58.6 million,
the plaintiffs ultimately settled their medical malprac-
tice case for $25 million. In February, 2012, while still
represented by the Koskoff firm, the plaintiffs retained
the law firm of Day Pitney, LLP (Day Pitney), to advise
them on numerous financial and tax issues related to
the settlement. A dispute subsequently arose between
the plaintiffs and their attorneys from both firms con-
cerning the fees and expenses charged; the plaintiffs
claimed that the Koskoff firm attorneys defrauded them
and illegally misappropriated funds by retaining 28 per-
cent of the $25 million settlement in violation of the
10.64 percent fee cap set by General Statutes § 52-251c,
which governed their retainer agreement, as well by
charging more than $600,000 in litigation expenses for
which they had no original invoices or other proof of
validity. The plaintiffs further claimed that the Day Pit-
ney attorneys committed legal malpractice when they
set up a trust for Daniel in a way that caused him
to have to pay them $65,000 annually in trustee fees,
potentially for decades, including by the creation of a
foundation that would be funded by at least $5 million
upon Daniel’s death, to be controlled by the Day Pitney
attorneys or their successor, who would receive
‘‘unspecified legal fees ‘forever.’ ’’ In December, 2014,
the plaintiffs brought a civil action against the Koskoff
firm, Day Pitney, and seven individual attorneys at those
law firms alleging conversion, a violation of § 52-251c
(g), and statutory theft in violation of General Statutes
§ 52-564. In that action, the plaintiffs are seeking both
treble damages and the complete return of all legal fees
paid. That action remains pending.
In February, 2015, the plaintiffs filed grievance com-
plaints against five attorneys from the Koskoff firm
and two attorneys from Day Pitney, alleging that those
attorneys had committed numerous violations of the
Rules of Professional Conduct while representing them,
in particular the misappropriation of client funds. The
complaints against the Koskoff firm attorneys were
referred to the Fairfield panel, which, on July 17, 2015,
dismissed claims against William M. Bloss, James D.
Horwitz, and Joel H. Lichtenstein, but found probable
cause of unethical conduct against Kathleen L. Nastri
and Michael Koskoff. The complaints against the Day
Pitney attorneys, Keith Bradoc Gallant and Rebecca
Iannantuoni, were referred to the Stamford panel,
which dismissed them on August 26, 2015.
Because the Fairfield panel had found probable cause
to believe that Koskoff and Nastri had engaged in uneth-
ical conduct, it referred those grievances to the State-
wide Grievance Committee for further action. The chief
disciplinary counsel offered to settle the grievances in
exchange for a reprimand for failing to provide the
plaintiffs with a full accounting. Following several hear-
ings on the grievances, the Statewide Grievance Com-
mittee rejected the plaintiffs’ requests for a proposed
decision pursuant to General Statutes §§ 51-90g (f)4 and
51-90h (a) and (b),5 informing the plaintiffs that it no
longer issued proposed decisions, and stating that its
actions are ‘‘governed by the Practice Book rules and
not the General Statutes.’’ Ultimately, on November 18,
2016, the Statewide Grievance Committee issued a final
decision reprimanding Nastri for failing to keep billing
records and failing to explain to the plaintiffs that a
particular provision in the retainer agreement drafted
by Koskoff, which affected the applicability of the fee
cap statute, could be subject to different interpreta-
tions. On March 3, 2017, the Statewide Grievance Com-
mittee reprimanded Koskoff for failing to keep proper
records. Throughout these proceedings, the Statewide
Grievance Committee denied the plaintiffs’ attempts
to supplement the record, and the chief disciplinary
counsel refused their requests to submit certain evi-
dence unfavorable to the Koskoff firm attorneys.
While the grievance proceedings were pending, in
February, 2016, the plaintiffs brought this action seek-
ing a writ of mandamus and injunctive relief. In the
first count of the complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that
the decisions of the Fairfield panel and the Stamford
panel to dismiss the grievance complaints were void as
a matter of law because those local panels had failed
to forward the complaints to the Statewide Grievance
Committee, as required by Practice Book § 2-32 (i) (2),6
for further review pursuant to Practice Book § 2-34A
(b) (1).7 The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus direct-
ing the local panels to reissue their opinions, removing
the dismissals, and forwarding them and the case files
to the Statewide Grievance Committee. In the second
count of the complaint, the plaintiffs asked the trial
court to invoke its inherent authority to oversee attor-
ney conduct, enjoin the Statewide Grievance Commit-
tee from taking any further action, and to take control
of the pending grievance proceedings.
The defendants moved to dismiss the amended com-
plaint on February 19, 2016. The trial court held oral
arguments on the motion to dismiss on April 11, 2016.
On July 18, 2016, the trial court issued a memorandum
of decision granting the motion to dismiss, concluding
that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were
neither statutorily nor classically aggrieved, and ren-
dered judgment accordingly.8 This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court
improperly concluded that they, as complainants in an
attorney disciplinary proceeding, lack standing to seek
court intervention in those proceedings. The plaintiffs
claim, in particular, standing to address the Statewide
Grievance Committee’s deprivation of their statutory
rights under § 51-90g (a),9 which requires review of local
panels’ findings of lack of probable cause, and an
infringement of their statutory right to a proposed deci-
sion under §§ 51-90g (f) and 51-90h (a) and (b). The
plaintiffs further contend that the trial court improperly
declined to use its inherent power to intervene in the
disciplinary process, given the ‘‘deplorable’’ allegations
against the attorneys and the Statewide Grievance Com-
mittee. They argue that they are classically aggrieved
and statutorily aggrieved by implication.
Our examination of the record on appeal and the
briefs and arguments of the parties persuades us that
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Because the trial court’s memorandum of decision fully
addresses the arguments raised in the present appeal,
we adopt its concise and well reasoned decision as a
statement of the facts and the applicable law on the
issues. See D’Attilo v. Statewide Grievance Committee,
Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No.
CV-16-6065012-S, (July 18, 2016) (reprinted at 329 Conn.
632,
A.3d
[2018]). It would serve no useful pur-
pose for us to repeat the discussion therein contained.
See, e.g., Woodruff v. Hemingway, 297 Conn. 317, 321,
2 A.3d 857 (2010).
The judgment is affirmed.
1 We note that the present action was commenced on behalf of Daniel
Jacob D’Attilo, a minor child, by and through his parents, Cathy M. D’Attilo
and Domenic D’Attilo, as next friends. We further note that Cathy M. D’Attilo
and Domenic D’Attilo are also named as plaintiffs in their individual capacity.
For the sake of simplicity, we refer to these parties collectively as the
plaintiffs and to them individually by name.
2 The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appel-
late Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
3 In addition to the Statewide Grievance Committee, the Fairfield Panel,
and the Stamford Panel, the plaintiffs also named as defendants: Michael
P. Bowler, in his official capacity as statewide bar counsel; Eugene J. Riccio,
in his official capacity as counsel for the Stamford panel; Steven P. Kulas,
in his official capacity as counsel for the Fairfield panel; the Office of the
Chief Disciplinary Counsel; and Karyl L. Carrasquilla, in her official capacity
as chief disciplinary counsel. For the sake of convenience, we refer to these
parties collectively as the defendants and, where appropriate, individually
by title.
4 General Statutes § 51-90g (f) provides: ‘‘The subcommittee shall submit
its proposed decision to the State-Wide Grievance Committee, with copies
to the complainant and respondent. The proposed decision shall be a matter
of public record.’’
5 General Statutes § 51-90h provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Within fourteen
days of the issuance to the parties of the proposed decision, the complainant
and respondent may submit to the State-Wide Grievance Committee a state-
ment in support of, or in opposition to, the proposed decision. The State-
Wide Grievance Committee may, in its discretion, request oral argument.
‘‘(b) Within sixty days after the end of the fourteen-day period for the
filing of statements, the State-Wide Grievance Committee shall review the
record before the subcommittee and any statements filed with it, and shall
issue a decision dismissing the complaint, reprimanding the respondent,
imposing conditions in accordance with the rules established by the judges
of the Superior Court, directing the State-Wide Bar Counsel to file a present-
ment against the respondent or referring the complaint to the same or a
different reviewing subcommittee for further investigation and proposed
decision . . . .’’
6 Practice Book § 2-32 (i) provides: ‘‘The panel shall, within 110 days from
the date the complaint was referred to it, unless such time is extended
pursuant to subsection (j), do one of the following: (1) If the panel determines
that probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, it
shall file the following with the statewide grievance committee and with
the disciplinary counsel: (A) its written determination that probable cause
exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, (B) a copy of the complaint
and response, (C) a transcript of any testimony heard by the panel, (D) a
copy of any investigatory file and copies of any documents, transcripts or
other written materials which were available to the panel. These materials
shall constitute the panel’s record in the case. (2) If the panel determines
that no probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct,
it shall dismiss the complaint unless there is an allegation in the complaint
that the respondent committed a crime. Such dismissal shall be final and
there shall be no review of the matter by the statewide grievance committee,
but the panel shall file with the statewide grievance committee a copy of
its decision dismissing the complaint and the materials set forth in subsection
(i) (1) (B), (C) and (D). In cases in which there is an allegation in the
complaint that the respondent committed a crime, the panel shall file with
the statewide grievance committee and with disciplinary counsel its written
determination that no probable cause exists and the materials set forth in
subsection (i) (1) (B), (C) and (D). These materials shall constitute the
panel’s record in the case.’’
7 Practice Book § 2-34A (b) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘When, after a
determination of no probable cause by a grievance panel, a complaint is
forwarded to the statewide grievance committee because it contains an
allegation that the respondent committed a crime, and the statewide griev-
ance committee or a reviewing committee determines that a hearing shall be
held concerning the complaint pursuant to Section 2-35 (c), the disciplinary
counsel shall present the matter to such committee.’’
8 We note that, although the trial court addressed the substance of count
two of the complaint and, ‘‘in the exercise of its discretion, decline[d] to
invoke its inherent powers to displace the ongoing disciplinary process’’;
see Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 28, 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied,
541 U.S. 1073, 124 S. Ct. 2422, 158 L. Ed. 2d 983 (2004); it ultimately dismissed
that count of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to affirmatively request such relief.
9 General Statutes § 51-90g (a) provides: ‘‘The State-Wide Grievance Com-
mittee may designate at least three members of the committee, including
at least one-third who are not attorneys, to serve as a reviewing subcommit-
tee for each determination made by a panel on a complaint. The committee
shall regularly rotate membership on reviewing subcommittees and assign-
ments of complaints from the various judicial districts. The State-Wide
Grievance Committee or the subcommittee, if any, shall hold a hearing
concerning the complaint if the panel determined that probable cause exists
that the attorney is guilty of misconduct. If the grievance panel determined
that probable cause does not exist that the attorney is guilty of misconduct,
the committee or subcommittee shall review the determination of no proba-
ble cause, take evidence if it deems it appropriate and, if it determines that
probable cause does exist that the attorney is guilty of misconduct, shall take
the following action: (1) If the State-Wide Grievance Committee reviewed
the determination of the grievance panel it shall hold a hearing concerning
the complaint or assign the matter to a subcommittee to hold the hearing;
or (2) if a subcommittee reviewed the determination of the grievance panel
it shall hold a hearing concerning the complaint or refer the matter to the
State-Wide Grievance Committee which shall assign it to another subcommit-
tee to hold the hearing. The committee or subcommittee shall not make a
probable cause determination based, in full or in part, on a claim of miscon-
duct not alleged in the complaint without first notifying the respondent that
it is considering such action and affording the respondent the opportunity
to be heard. An attorney who maintains his office for the practice of law
in the same judicial district as the respondent may not sit on the reviewing
subcommittee for that case.’’