Case Title: Althouse v. State.

Citation: 111 Haw. 35

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

---000---

 

RAYMOND IRA ALTHOUSE, Petitioner-Appellant.

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent~Appellee

i 9002

No. 25168

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
(8.2.P. NO, 98-01) al

  

JUNE 16, 2006
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND ACOBA, JJ.

BND INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE FOLEY,
ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.

Defendant-Appellant Raymond Ira Althouse (hereinafter
“althouse”] appeals from the third circuit court's! June 10, 2002
order partially granting and partially denying his Hawai'i Rules
of Penal Procedure [hereinafter "HRPP”) Rule 40 petition. on
appeal, Althouse argues that: (2) the circuit court erred by
failing to grant that portion of his HREP Rule 40 petition
requesting @ declaration that any minimum term hearing be held
after the expiration of the fifteen-year mandatory minimum
sentence of incarceration entered pursuant to Hawai'i Revised
Statutes [hereinafter HRS") § 706-6601 (1993); and (2) the

) the Honorable Greg K. Nakamura presided.
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circuit court erred by failing to grant his motion for an order
staying any minimum term hearing pending resolution of the
present appeal.

Based upon the following analysis, we affirm the third
circuit court's June 10, 2002 order.

1. BACKGROUND

on February 5, 1997, the third circuit court filed a
judgment convicting Althouse of the offense of second degree
murder and sentencing him to life imprisonment with a mandatory
minimum term of fifteen years, pursuant to HRS $ 706-660.1.

on June 13, 1997, the Hawai's Paroling Authority
(hereinafter “HPA”] conducted a hearing at which the murder
victim's parents provided testimony. At the hearing Althouse vas
not represented by counsel because his court-appointed attorney
failed to attend. Accordingly, the witnesses were not subjected
to cross-examination. Althouse protested by refusing to
participate in the hearing without the aid of counsel. The HPA
thereafter tacked an additional fifteen-year minimum term of
incarceration onto the circuit court’s fifteen-year mandatory
minimum sentence.

on March 8, 1999, Althouse filed an HRPP Rule 40
petition, in forma pauperis, arguing that: (1) he was illegally
being held in custody based on the HPA’s lack of jurisdiction in

Light of the third circuit court's imposition of a fifteen-year

 

mandatory minimum sentence of incarceration, pursuant to HRS §

706-660.

 

(2) the HPA had no jurisdiction to fix a minimum term
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of imprisonment while he was subject to the third circuit court's
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence based on Hawai'i

Administrative Rules § 23-700-21; and (3) the HPA improperly and

 

illegally allowed the taking of witness testimony on June 13,
1997, despite the fact that he had requested legal counsel to
assist him at the hearing and that legal counsel did not attend
the hearing.

At a hearing held on July 7, 2000, the court indicated
that it was “concerned about the lack of a record with respect to
what occurred before the Hawaii Paroling Authority(.]" The court
thereafter suggested 2 continuance in order to facilitate a more
complete record. It was subsequently revealed that the lack of
an adequate record regarding the HPA proceedings was caused by a
defect in the audio tapes used to record those proceedings.
transcripts of the June 13, 1997 hearing were thus unavailable
because the audiotape recording of the hearing did not contain
any sound.

on December 18, 2001, Althouse filed a motion
requesting that the circuit court invalidate the HPA’s minimum
term of incarceration and order @ new minimum term hearing.

on April 12, 2002, the court partially granted
Althouse’s motion agreeing that he was entitied to representation
at the June 13, 1997 hearing. The court thus invalidated the
minimum term of incarceration imposed by the HPA and ordered the
HPA to conduct a new minimum term hearing. However, the court

denied Althouse’s motion with respect to his assertion that HRS §
 

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706-660.1 precluded the conmencenent of the new minimum term
hearing pricr te the expiration of the minimum sentence entered
by the circuit court. The court concluded that HRS § 706-660:1
“does not require that the mandatory minimum term expires first
before the paroling authority proceeds to set a minimum term of
imprisonment {.1"

on June 3, 2002, Althouse filed a motion requesting
that the court order a stay on the new minimum term hearing
pending appeal. He then filed a timely notice of appeal on June
17, 2002.

on June 26, 2002, the circuit court filed an order
denying Althouse’'s motion for stay.

HT, STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have previously set forth the following principles

With respect to questions involving statutory interpretation:
*(Z)he interpretation of @ statute... is @ question of

reviewable de nove.” gxate'v, Arete, 4 liawai't 1, 10, 528

852 (2896) (quoting State v Camara, #1 Hawai's 324,
826.24 1225, 1240 (1996) (citations omitted) }

‘ee
Sate vs Tovemura, "80 Hawai't 6, 18, 804 P.2a 893, 903 (199s)
Wiaa, 73 Hawai'i 1, 3, 897'P.24 $38, 930" (1995); State w

‘Srace via,
Rakata, Fe Hawai'i 360, 365, 878 P.2a'699, Tbe (2994)

    

 

 

2 + 84 Hawas"t 138, 144, 931 P.20 $80,
BBG (1997). (some brackets aaded and sone in original) (; s]ee alga State
Ex Sote, 8 Hawes's 229, 236, 933 F.2d 66, 73 (2957). Purthecwore, cue
‘statutory construction is guided by established rules:

 

 

When construing # statute, our forenost obligation ie to ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the legisiature, which ss te
be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute
Atself. ‘And! we mst read statutory language in the context of the
entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with if3
porpose

When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or
indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a
statute, an ambiguity existe...

Th conetruing an ambiguous statute, “[tJhe meaning of the

 

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lanbiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which
the anbiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in
order to ascertain their true meaning.” HRS § 1-15(1), {{1993)]
Moreover, the courts may Fesort to extrinsic aids in determining
Tegislative intent. One avenue Ss the use of degislarive nistory
as'an interpretive tool.

Mawai'i at 148, 931.24 at $90 (quoting State v. Tovonura, 60
Hawai's' 8, 18-19, 904 P.2a 893, 903-0¢ (1995]] (Brackets and eilipses
points in original) (fcotnate omitted). This court may alse consider
Ritjne reason and spirit of the law, ond the couse which induced the
legislature to enact it to discover its true meaning.” HRS § I~
3512) ‘stave in pari materia, or upon the sane subject matter,
ahail be construed with reference to each other. ‘What ie clear in one
Statute may ue called upon in aid to explain wnat is douseful in
another." HRS § 1-16 (1983)

 

 

  

 

State v. White, 110 Hawai'i 79, 83, 129 P.3d 1107, 1111 (2006)
(citations omitted) (alterations in original) (ellipses points in
original).

XII, pIscussrow

Althouse initially contends that the trial court erred
When it failed to grant his motion requesting that any minimum
term hearing be conducted after the expiration of the fifteen-
year mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the circuit court. He
specifically argues that, pursuant to the plain language of HRS §
706-660.1, the HPA was jurisdictionally barred from conducting
HRS § 706-669 proceedings to determine a minimum term of
imprisonment until after the expiration of the fifteen-year
mandatory minimum sentence entered by the circuit court.

HRS § 706-660.1 provides, in relevant part, the
following:

$706-660.1 Sentence of seprisonnent for use of a fireara,
seniautouatic firears, or automatic firears ina felony. il) h
Person convicted of # felony, nhere the person had'e firentm in

the person’ s possession or threatened ite use or used the firearm
nile engaged in the commission of the felony, whether the firearm

 

 
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was loaded or not, and whether operable or not, may in addition to
the indeterninate tern of imprisonment provided for the grade of
Offense be sentenced to a mandatory minimum tora of inprisenment
without posesbiiity of parole ex probation the Length of which
Shall be as. follow
is)" for murder in the second degree and attempted murder
un the second degree-up to fifteen

 

 

 

 
 

wo)
fe)
(3) _ For a class C felony-up to three years.
‘The sentence of Imprisonment for a felony involving the use of a
Pitusa as provided tn this tubscetion shall not -be-subiecs tothe
Procedure for determining sinimun term of imprisonment prescribed

der section 106-669; provided Jarther that a pereen apo is
impiisoned ine correctional institution os provided in this

a hi

 

spuaieiee! oe
(Emphases added.)

Althouse’s point of error is premised upon a mistaken
construction of the afore-emphasized language contained in HRS §
706-660.1.

Referring to other statutory provisions in pari
materia,’ we note that the plain language of HRS $ 706-669(1)
(1993) requires that “the Hawaii paroling authority shall, as
soon as practicable but no later than six months after commitment:
ko the custody of the director of the department of {public
safety] hold a hearing, and on the basis of the hearing make an
order fixing the minimum term of imprisonment to be served before
the priscner shall become eligible for parole.” (Emphases
added.) (Brackets in original.) The HPA was thus statutorily

required to conduct @ minimum term hearing prior to the

 

+ Seg White, 110 Hawas's at 83, 129 P.36 at 1112 ("Lawe da park
uateria, or Spon the gone subject matter, shall be construed with reference to
each other."]" (Quotation marks omitted.) (Citation omitted.)

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expiration of the court's mandatory minimum sentence.

Althouse attempts to avoid the dispositive effect of
the foregoing provision by asserting that “[ulnder the express,
language of Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-660.1, Appellant is not subject
to the authority, jurisdiction or procedures of the HPA to set a
minimum term within six months after the conmitment to’ the
custody of the director of the department of public safety.”
However, Althouse misreads the plain language of the statute.

RS § 706-660. provides that it is the “sentence of
imprisonment” (emphasis added) -- not Althouse -- that is exenpt
from “the procedure for determining minimum term of imprisonment
prescribed under section 706-669."

Reinserting the appropriate subject component of the
statutory provision, it is clear that, rather than imposing 4
jurisdictional bar on the HPA, the foregoing language merely
clarifies that the sentencing court's imposition of a mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment for a criminal defendant who uses 2
firearm in the commission of a felony is @ procedure separate and
distinct from the HPA's determination of a minimum term of
incarceration. In other words, HRS § 706-660.1(1) instructs the
sentencing court to impose a mandatory minimum term of
incarceration where a criminal defendant used a firearm in the
connission of a felony, and the sentencing court, in imposing the
mandatory minimum tern, is not “subject to the procedure for
determining minimum tezm of imprisonment prescribed under section

706-669," which governs the HPA's imposition of a minimum term of
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incarceration.
That interpretation is further buttressed by the
relevant, concomitant legislative history. HRS § 706-660.1 was
originally proposed as House Bill No. 3196-76 and subsequently
enacted as part of Act 204 in 1976. 1976 Haw. Sess. L. Act 204,
§ 3 at 493-94, In a conmittee report on House Bill No. 3196-76,
the legislature spoke in terms of an exemption from the procedire
of the board of paroles and pardons,’ as opposed to a
jurisdictional bar:
tn addition, your Committee recommends an enendnent that the
Eiteae be afenutad fron the proceaure. for ceteenining minimum
fern cf inprisomert and that" the convicted Gefencant small become

Subject to the parole procedure upon the expiration of the above=
Stated minimum tern of imprisonment.

 

 

 

Hse. Stand. Comm, Rep. No. 492-76, in 1976 House Journal, at 1490
(emphasis added) .

Additionally, the statutory instruction that “a person
who is imprisoned in a correctional institution . . . shall
become subject to the parole procedure as prescribed in section
706-670 only upon the expiration of the term of mandatory
imprisonment,” HRS § 706-660.1(2), does not support Althouse’ s
argument. To the contrary, the foregoing provision merely
explains that the HPA has no authority to grant parole prior to
the expiration of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the
circuit court. In that regard, we have previously commented as

follows:

>the board of paroles and pardons war reconstituted as the HPA in
1976, Sag 1976 Haw. Sete, L. Act 92, §§ 1-10 at 145-49,

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Seer eins Ce SL METER HLS hb cs
Fea Nera nae wr
pera
face eda, #7 How’ 1, 11, 980 0.26 1201, 1201 (88
(emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Brantley, 99 Hawai'i 463, 56 P.3d 1252 (2002).
the custody of the director of the department of [public

intends to require che court in cesses of felonies where © firearm
was used to Impose 5 mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.

 

 

Sen. Conf. Conm. Rep. No. 34-76, in 1976 Senate Journal, at 684
(emphasis added). That statement logically implies that the
legislature contemplated concurrent impositions of minimum terms
of incarceration by both the circuit court and the HPA, the

lengths of which may differ. Although we have previously made

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clear that the HPA may not give effect to a minimum term of
incarceration that is shorter than a mandatory minimum sentence
Amposed by the sentencing court, the legislative history
indicates that the HPA is not precluded from imposing a minimum
term that is longer. ‘Thus, in cases where the HPA imposes a
minimum term longer than the mandatory minimum term imposed by
the sentencing court, the HRS § 706-669 hearing must necessarily
take place prior to the expiration of the sentencing court's
mandatory minimum term insofar as the hearing must, by statutory
mandate, be held within six months of the defendant's commitment
to the custody of the director of the department of public
safety.

Therefore, we hold that (1) HRS § 706-669 required the
HPA to conduct its minimum term hearing within six months of
Althouse’s commitment to the custody of the director of the
department of public safety, and (2) that the HPA was not
jurisdictionally barred by HRS § 706-660.1(1) from fulfilling its
statutorily imposed duty.

‘That conclusion also disposes of Althouse’ s second

point of error.‘ Therein, he argues that the circuit court erred

 

+ We note that Althouse’s notice of appeal is technically defective
with respect to'his second point of error. In perticular, Althouse’s notice
Of appeal does not identify the court’ s “Order Denying Petitioner's Motion For
Of New Minimum Term Hearing Pending Appeal Of Courts Decision” as a
'e from which his second point of error is derived. Indeed, Althouse’ s
Rotice of appeal could not have identified the court's order denying his
motion for stay inasmuch as the aforesais order was filed after Althouse’ ¢
Rotice of appeal
Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (hereinafter “HRAP") Rule
1c) (2) (20021 "unambiguously states that [t]he notice of appeal shall
designate the juagnent, order, or part thereof and the court er agency
(Sent ined...)

 

 

 

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by denying his motion to stay the HPA's minimum texm hearing

pending appeal, as follows:

‘The arguments raised by Appellant in the previous
section of this Opening Brief are jurisdictional in nature. In
SESEAED Rbpetiant argues that the HPA lacks jurisdiction to
cesence BPEChinun term Rearing until the expiration of the
Sendatory minimum term of imprisonment

‘BARobion te Seay should have been granted besed on
the points and authorities set forth in the previous section.

s(.ssconténued)
appeaied ftom. h copy of the judgnent or order, shall be attached 29 an
septate tre pithcuse foiled to designate the order denying his motion for
see iSo’failed co attach that order a= an exhibit. Consequently,
stays. be 2lfSu'to comply with WRAP Rule 3(c) (2) with respect to his second
point of error on appeal

seyeneeebeas, HRAP Rule 3(a} states that che “{fJailure of an
appellant toltate any seep other than the timely filing of a notice of apes!
appellant Gece the valisity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action
Coes net ane TSte Rourt dene sppropriate, and may include dismissal of the
Speci. Pfurthermore, we have previously stated that

 

 

the requirement that the notice of appeal designate the judgment
tee TP LEereoe appealed from is not jurisdictsensl.  Yoshiseki w
GESSeptsai so sow. 2, 2, 427 P20 845, 946 (196717 Credit.
Hide Heine eiliians, $1 Haw. 325, 328, 460 F.2d 762, 760
Be eae ccotes chat "a mistake in designating the
[igonone, or in-designating the part appealed from if only a part
judgment oka: Mancuig not result in loss of the appeal as long as
be OUStSPetSG’ appeal from a specific Judgment can be fairly
{hetied' trom the notice and the appellee is not misled by the
seers ee cone’ Process Pcrice 1203.18 (2975). In the
meeeeASances ef this case no single order embraces all of the
SHESSEEE"Ehe pareses, and the final judgment must be viewed 202
seeeee eS Ge the several orders which became final and appealabie
Beene entry of the judgment and order of condemnation on
SESay er tbre. the notice of appeal filed by appellant, on
Zebrusty' 18, 1976 faitay infers an intent to appeal from that
seereet ye ok orders. There st no showing of any misleading of the
SCREe Eateiee to their detriment. Me conclude thet wo should
Giereghed tne Gate by which the judgment appealed from is
SeeEgeatea'Th the notice of appeal. The notice is sufficient in
$eE28cag cinely filed te bring the appeal before us.

 

 

 

coun Lulu v. Midkitt, 57 Raw. 273, 275-76, 554 F.2d 293, 235
tise

‘herefore, although we perceive @ technical lack of compliance
with RAP Rule Ste] ia), we decline to excise Alenouse's second point of error
TEERIEA? Ethie notice cf appeal mat timely filed and there is no indication
that any party suffered prejudice.

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Insofar as we have concluded that Althouse’s first point of error

 

is without merit, his second point of error is equally

unavailing.
IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we affirm the third

circuit court’s June 10, 2002 order.

On the briefs:

Darien W. L. Ching, Mia Heaamenn

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

for Respondent-Appellee Sessa Ci o

State of Hawai'i

Lisa W. Teomaca, Deputy
Attorney General, fpr DI ON
Respondent-Appediee di: Ip Ei

State of hawt R.