Case Title: In re M.J.R.B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 76A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-62 
No. 76A20 
Filed 11 June 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: M.J.R.B., Z.M.B., N.N.T.B., S.B.  
 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) and on writ of certiorari 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review orders entered on 12 November 2019 by 
Judge Karen Alexander in District Court, Craven County.  Heard in the Supreme 
Court on 17 February 2021. 
 
Peter M. Wood for respondent-appellant-father. 
 
Mercedes O. Chut for respondent-appellant-mother. 
 
Bernard Bush for petitioner-appellee Craven County Department of Social 
Services. 
 
J. Mitchell Armbruster for respondent-appellee guardian ad litem. 
 
 
BERGER, Justice. 
 
 
¶ 1 
 
On August 23, 2016, the Craven County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) 
filed petitions alleging that M.J.R.B., Z.M.B., and N.N.T.B. (collectively, the “older 
children”) were neglected and dependent juveniles.  DSS alleged, among other things, 
that on August 15, 2016, three-month-old M.J.R.B. tested positive for cocaine and 
THC.  The trial court ordered that the children be placed in DSS custody, and each 
parent was appointed a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) due to their mental health issues.  
IN RE M.J.R.B., Z.M.B., N.N.T.B., S.B.  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
On February 27, 2017, the trial court entered an order which adjudicated the older 
children as neglected and dependent.   
¶ 2 
 
On November 8, 2017, respondent-mother gave birth to S.B.  S.B. tested 
positive for cocaine at birth, and DSS filed a petition alleging that S.B. was a 
dependent juvenile.  S.B. was placed in nonsecure custody, and on February 20, 2018, 
the trial court entered an order adjudicating S.B. a dependent juvenile because the 
older children were in DSS custody and respondent-parents had made no progress 
toward reunification with them.  In addition, respondent-parents had not complied 
with mental health treatment recommendations, and respondent-mother admitted to 
consuming cocaine while she was pregnant with S.B.  
¶ 3 
 
After a hearing on July 20, 2018, the trial court ceased reunification efforts 
and changed the children’s permanent plan to adoption.  On August 2, 2018, DSS 
filed petitions to terminate respondent-parents’ parental rights in the minor children.  
Before the hearing began on July 2, 2019, respondent-father requested that his 
counsel and GAL be fired.  In addition, respondent-father requested that the hearing 
be suspended for two hours so he could take his medication.  Respondent-father made 
both of these requests outside of the presence of his attorney and GAL. The court 
denied both requests.  Prior to the start of the hearing, the attorney and GAL met 
with respondent-father, and no further motions were made.  
¶ 4 
 
On November 12, 2019, the court entered orders terminating respondent-
IN RE M.J.R.B., Z.M.B., N.N.T.B., S.B.  
2021-NCSC-62 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
parents’ parental rights to the older children pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), 
(2), and (6).  Respondent-parents’ parental rights to S.B. were terminated pursuant 
to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) and (6).  Respondent-parents appeal.  
I. 
Standard of Review 
¶ 5 
 
We review a district court’s adjudication under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) to determine whether the findings 
are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and 
the findings support the conclusions of law. Unchallenged 
findings of fact are deemed supported by competent 
evidence and are binding on appeal. Moreover, we review 
only those findings needed to sustain the trial court’s 
adjudication. The issue of whether a trial court’s findings 
of fact support its conclusions of law is reviewed de novo. 
However, an adjudication of any single ground for 
terminating a parent's rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) 
will suffice to support a termination order. 
  
In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 814–15, 845 S.E.2d 66, 70–71 (2020) (cleaned up). 
II. 
Respondent-Father’s Motion to Substitute Counsel and Motion to 
Continue 
¶ 6 
 
Respondent-father argues the trial court erred by failing to sufficiently inquire 
about his request for new counsel and a new GAL before the termination hearing 
began when neither his attorney nor his GAL were present.  Respondent-father 
further alleges that the trial court erred when it declined to postpone the hearing for 
two hours so respondent-father could take his medication.  We disagree.   
A. Motion to Substitute Counsel 
¶ 7 
 
Parents in a termination of parental rights proceeding have “the right to 
counsel, and to appointed counsel in cases of indigency, unless the parent waives the 
IN RE M.J.R.B., Z.M.B., N.N.T.B., S.B.  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
right.”  In re K.M.W., 376 N.C. 195, 208–09, 851 S.E.2d 849, 859 (2020).  In addition, 
“the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a parent who is incompetent in 
accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 17.”  N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.1(c) (2019).  “A parent 
qualifying for appointed counsel may be permitted to proceed without the assistance 
of counsel only after the court examines the parent and makes findings of fact 
sufficient to show that the waiver is knowing and voluntary.”  N.C.G.S. § 7B-602(a1) 
(2019).   
¶ 8 
 
Here, the trial court made the following relevant findings related to 
respondent-father’s request: 
Prior to the hearing in this matter, the Respondent Father 
made a motion to dismiss his attorney. The court finds good 
cause to deny this motion. Let it also be noted that both 
respondents appeared highly anxious at the start of the 
proceedings. This court noted their anxiety and frustration 
and privately requested the attending court bailiffs to show 
some flexibility with court decorum and not to immediately 
apprehend and or interrupt the respondents if there were 
angry outbursts from the respondents. Also, this court 
denied the respondents to discharge their counsel but told 
them they would be allowed to ask additional questions of 
witnesses personally if their attorney did not ask a 
question they wanted. Moving forward, the respondents 
appeared satisfied and comfortable with this ruling.  
¶ 9 
 
Respondent-father’s motions were made prior to the termination hearing and 
outside the presence of his attorney and GAL.  The trial court accommodated 
respondent-father with relaxed courtroom rules during this time.  After considering 
respondent-father’s request, the trial court found good cause to deny respondent-
IN RE M.J.R.B., Z.M.B., N.N.T.B., S.B.  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
father’s motion.  Once respondent-father’s attorney and GAL arrived at the hearing, 
they conferred with respondent-father and no further motions were made by 
respondent-father or his attorney.  Respondent-father presented no additional 
information, at trial or on appeal, to make a requisite showing of “good cause” to 
substitute counsel.   
¶ 10 
 
Because respondent-father made these motions prior to the hearing and 
outside the presence of counsel and his GAL, failed to present good cause to warrant 
removal of his attorney at the trial court, and did not renew these motions or 
otherwise address the matter when counsel arrived for the hearing, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent-father’s motion to substitute 
counsel.  
B. Motion to Continue  
¶ 11 
 
Respondent-father also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when 
it denied his request for a two-hour continuance to take his medication.   
Ordinarily, a motion to continue is addressed to the 
discretion of the trial court, and absent a gross abuse of 
that discretion, the trial court's ruling is not subject to 
review. If, however, the motion is based on a right 
guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions, the 
motion presents a question of law and the order of the court 
is reviewable. . . . Moreover, regardless of whether the 
motion raises a constitutional issue or not, a denial of a 
motion to continue is only grounds for a new trial when 
defendant shows both that the denial was erroneous, and 
that he suffered prejudice as a result of the error.  
IN RE M.J.R.B., Z.M.B., N.N.T.B., S.B.  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
In re A.L.S., 374 N.C. 515, 516–17, 843 S.E.2d 89, 91 (2020) (cleaned up).  Here, 
respondent-father has failed to show that the denial of his motion to delay the hearing 
was erroneous, or that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his motion.  
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent-father’s 
motion to continue. 
III. 
Respondent-Parents’ Parental Rights to the Older Children  
¶ 12 
 
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred when it terminated her 
parental rights because DSS did not make reasonable efforts to work with her, and 
there was no evidence of lack of fitness as of the termination hearing.  We disagree.  
A. Respondent-Mother’s Parental Rights 
¶ 13 
 
A court may terminate parental rights if grounds exist under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a), and the trial court determines that termination is in the best interest of the 
juvenile.  See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) (2019); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a).  Here, the trial 
court determined that grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother’s parental 
rights to the older children pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 (a)(1), (2), and (6).   
¶ 14 
 
Grounds for terminating a parent’s rights to a juvenile exist under N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1111(a)(2) when:  
The parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or 
placement outside the home for more than 12 months 
without showing to the satisfaction of the court that 
reasonable progress under the circumstances has been 
made in correcting those conditions which led to the 
removal of the juvenile. No parental rights, however, shall 
IN RE M.J.R.B., Z.M.B., N.N.T.B., S.B.  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
be terminated for the sole reason that the parents are 
unable to care for the juvenile on account of their poverty. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2019).   
¶ 15 
 
The trial court made the following unchallenged findings of fact:  
1. 
The Petitioner, the Craven County Department of 
Social Services, was granted custody of the [older children] 
by non-secure Custody Orders dated August 24, 2016, and 
subsequent orders in this matter . . . . 
. . . .  
14. 
Regarding the Respondent Mother's level of 
compliance with the orders of the court for her to facilitate 
reunification, [as stated earlier in the order]:  
a. 
The Respondent Mother failed to [s]ubmit to 
a full psychological assessment, to include a 
substance abuse assessment and a parenting 
capacity inventory, with an approved and licensed 
clinician. 
b. 
The Respondent Mother failed to submit to a 
domestic violence assessment and follow all 
recommendations. She appeared for the assessment 
with [respondent-father], and they refused to allow 
her to be interviewed without him present. As a 
result, the [a]ssessment could not be completed.  
c. 
The Respondent Mother failed to [s]ubmit to 
random drug screens immediately upon the request 
of the Craven County Department of Social Services. 
She submitted to an initial assessment for drug 
screen but failed to submit to subsequent drug 
screens. Drug screens were requested on 1/18/17, 
1/30/17, 2/16/17, 3/18/17, 3/14/17, 5/25/17, 6/5/17, 
6/27/17, 7/7/17, 3/13/18, 8/21/17, 1/24/17, 4/3/18, 
8/29/18, 5/12[/]17, 4/20/18, and she refused to submit 
to drug screens every time.  
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d. 
The Respondent Mother failed to submit to 
random pill counts and medication monitoring 
immediately upon the request of the Craven County 
Department of Social Services. 
e. 
The Respondent Mother failed to execute all 
necessary releases such that the Craven County 
Department of Social [Services] may access all 
medical, mental health and substance abuse records 
for the Respondent Parent, until December 2018. 
f. 
The Respondent Mother failed to attend 
parenting referral appointments on the following 
dates: 1/22/17, 3/22/17, 7/11/17, 1/13/18, 3/13/18, 
1/3/19. She started attending EPIC parenting 
classes in April 2018 but did not complete that 
parenting program. 
g. 
The Respondent Mother failed to make the 
Craven County Department of Social Services aware 
of her residence; however, she did maintain contact 
with the social workers to inquire about the minor 
children. The Social Worker testified that this was 
the Respondent Mother's one strength. 
h. 
The Respondent Mother failed to submit to a 
full 
psychological 
assessment 
and 
a 
recommendation from a mental health professional 
of safety and mental health stability of the 
Respondent Mother. The court ordered that visits 
would 
be 
suspended 
until 
the 
respondents 
submitted 
themselves 
for 
a 
mental 
health 
evaluation due to safety concerns. Therefore, no 
visitations or any other communication between the 
parents and minor children took place. The 
Respondent Parents made repeated requests to visit 
since 
that 
order 
of 
suspension. 
While 
the 
Respondent Parents have not caused or attempted 
to cause any bodily injury to Craven County 
Department of [S]ocial [S]ervices staff, they have 
made threats of bodily injury against the staff. As a 
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result, neither Respondent Parent has visited the 
minor children since September 16, 2016. 
. . . . 
100. The 
Respondent 
Parents' 
inability 
to 
make 
reunification efforts and their inability to care for the 
minor child is not caused by poverty. 
. . . . 
155. Independent of any other grounds found by this 
court, the parental rights of the Respondent Parents 
should be terminated due to the following grounds as set 
forth in North Carolina General Statutes, Sections 7B-
1111(a)(2):  
a. 
Respondent Parents have willfully left the 
juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home 
for more than 12 months without showing to the 
satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress 
under the circumstances has been made within 12 
months in correcting those conditions which led to 
the removal of the juvenile.  
¶ 16 
 
Because respondent-mother did not challenge these findings of fact, they are 
binding on appeal.  See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 
(1991).  These unchallenged findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusion of law 
that “grounds authorizing Termination of Parental Rights exist” pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).  Further, the trial court found that it was in the best 
interests of the older children that respondent-mother’s parental rights be 
terminated.  Accordingly, because the trial court’s findings of fact support its 
conclusion of law, the trial court did not err when it terminated respondent-mother’s 
IN RE M.J.R.B., Z.M.B., N.N.T.B., S.B.  
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parental rights to the older children pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).   
¶ 17 
 
Because grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights 
under (a)(2), we need not address the trial court’s order to terminate parental rights 
under subsections (a)(1), (a)(5), or (a)(6).  In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 815, 845 S.E.2d 66, 
71 (2020) (“an adjudication of any single ground for terminating a parent’s rights 
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) will suffice to support a termination order.”). 
B. Respondent-Father’s Parental Rights 
¶ 18 
 
The trial court terminated respondent-father’s parental rights to the older 
children under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 (a)(1), (2), (5), and (6).  With regard to section 
(a)(5), the trial court’s findings of fact relating to establishment of paternity were 
unchallenged by respondent-father.   
¶ 19 
 
A trial court may terminate the parental rights of a father under N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1111(a)(5) states:  
The father of a juvenile born out of wedlock has not, prior 
to the filing of a petition or motion to terminate parental 
rights, done any of the following: 
a. 
Filed an affidavit of paternity in a central 
registry maintained by the Department of Health 
and Human Services. The petitioner or movant shall 
inquire of the Department of Health and Human 
Services as to whether such an affidavit has been so 
filed and the Department's certified reply shall be 
submitted to and considered by the court. 
b. 
Legitimated 
the 
juvenile 
pursuant 
to 
provisions of G.S. 49-10, G.S. 49-12.1, or filed a 
IN RE M.J.R.B., Z.M.B., N.N.T.B., S.B.  
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petition for this specific purpose. 
c. 
Legitimated the juvenile by marriage to the 
mother of the juvenile. 
d. 
Provided substantial financial support or 
consistent care with respect to the juvenile and 
mother. 
e. 
Established paternity through G.S. 49-14, 
110-132, 130A-101, 130A-118, or other judicial 
proceeding. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) (2019).  
¶ 20 
 
Here, respondent-father does not challenge the findings of fact related to 
paternity, and therefore, they are binding on appeal. See Koufman, 330 N.C. at 97, 
408 S.E.2d at 731.  Further, respondent-father does not challenge the sufficiency of 
the grounds to terminate his parental rights to the older children pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5), or that termination was in the best interests of the older 
children.  Because respondent-father presents no challenge to the sufficiency of these 
grounds, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-father’s rights to 
the older children under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5).  
IV. 
Respondent-Parents’ Parental Rights to S.B. 
¶ 21 
 
The trial court’s order terminated respondent-parents’ parental rights to S.B. 
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), (5), and (6).  Again, respondent-father failed to 
challenge the sufficiency of any grounds for termination or the trial court’s best 
interests determination.  Therefore, we affirm the order terminating respondent-
IN RE M.J.R.B., Z.M.B., N.N.T.B., S.B.  
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father’s parental rights to S.B. under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5).   
¶ 22 
 
However, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred when it 
terminated her parental rights to S.B. under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) and (6).  
Specifically, respondent-mother contends that (1) termination was improper under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) because only 9 months elapsed between the placement by 
DSS and the filing of the termination petition, and (2) the trial court failed to make 
sufficient findings under the (a)(6) standard.  We agree. 
¶ 23 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) states: 
The parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or 
placement outside the home for more than 12 months 
without showing to the satisfaction of the court that 
reasonable progress under the circumstances has been 
made in correcting those conditions which led to the 
removal of the juvenile. No parental rights, however, shall 
be terminated for the sole reason that the parents are 
unable to care for the juvenile on account of their poverty. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). 
¶ 24 
 
The plain language of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) requires the trial court to look 
at the parent’s reasonable progress over a twelve-month period.  Because only nine 
months elapsed between the custody order for S.B. and the filing of the termination 
petition, this subsection is inapplicable.  Thus, the trial court erred in terminating 
parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). 
¶ 25 
 
Respondent-mother further contends that the trial court committed reversible 
error when it terminated her parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) because 
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the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact regarding the lack of 
alternative care arrangements, failed to identify the condition that rendered 
respondent-mother incapable of providing proper care, and failed to make a finding 
that the condition would persist for the foreseeable future.   
¶ 26 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) states:  
That the parent is incapable of providing for the proper 
care and supervision of the juvenile, such that the juvenile 
is a dependent juvenile within the meaning of G.S. 7B-101, 
and that there is a reasonable probability that the 
incapability will continue for the foreseeable future. 
Incapability under this subdivision may be the result of 
substance abuse, intellectual disability, mental illness, 
organic brain syndrome, or any other cause or condition 
that renders the parent unable or unavailable to parent the 
juvenile and the parent lacks an appropriate alternative 
child care arrangement. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2019).  
¶ 27 
 
After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the trial court has not made 
sufficient findings to support the termination of parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(6).  As respondent-mother notes, the trial court failed to find the absence of 
an acceptable alternative childcare arrangement, did not identify the condition that 
rendered respondent-mother incapable of parenting S.B., and did not address the 
issue of whether respondent-mother’s condition would continue for the foreseeable 
future.  Again, while there may be sufficient evidence in the record, the lack of 
sufficient findings compels us to vacate the order terminating parental rights to S.B., 
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and remand this matter back to the trial court for hearing additional evidence, if 
necessary, and entry of a new order. 
V. 
Conclusion 
¶ 28 
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied respondent-father’s 
request to substitute counsel and continue the case for respondent-father to take 
medication.  In addition, we affirm the orders terminating respondent-father’s 
parental rights to the minor children under N.C.G.S § 7B-1111(a)(5).  We further 
affirm the orders terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to the older 
children pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).  We vacate and remand the order 
terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to S.B. under N.C.G.S § 7B-
1111(a)(6) for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.