Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF BRADLEY M. DALE V. S & S BUILDERS, LLC, and STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0145

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF BRADLEY M. DALE V. S & S BUILDERS, LLC, and STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2008 WY 84188 P.3d 554Case Number: S-07-0145Decided: 07/18/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF BRADLEY M. 
DALE,Appellant(Petitioner),v.S & S BUILDERS, 
LLC,Appellee(Employer),andSTATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Lynn Boak, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  

 
 
Representing Appellee 
S&S Builders, LLC:

J. Stan Wolfe, 
Gillette, Wyoming. 

 
 
Representing 
AppelleeState of Wyoming ex 
rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div.:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. 
Radosevich, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, JJ., and GUTHRIE, D.J.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Bradley M. Dale 
appeals from the district court's order affirming the Office of Administrative 
Hearings (OAH) denial of his claim for worker's compensation benefits related to 
an infection in his right knee.  
Contrary to Mr. Dale's contention, the OAH did not commit a fundamental 
error by comparing his testimony during two parts of the contested case 
hearing.  In addition, the OAH 
decision was supported by substantial evidence.  We affirm. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Dale presents 
two issues on appeal:

 
 
1.         
Are the Hearing Examiner's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
denying benefits arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of 
discretion?

 
 

2.                  
Was 
it a fundamental error for the hearing examiner to acknowledge that due to his 
prescription medication the Appellant "was not always coherent in his testimony" 
and recess the hearing, then make ultimate findings of fact in which 
discrepancies in the Appellant's testimony between the first segment and the 
second segment of the hearing were used?

 
 
Although 
phrased somewhat differently, the issues presented by S & S Builders, LLC 
(Employer) and State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division (State) are substantially the same as Mr. 
Dale's.

 
 
FACTS

            

[¶3]      In the summer 
of 2004, Mr. Dale worked for Employer as a truck driver and heavy equipment 
operator.  Mr. Dale had a history of 
serious problems with, and extensive medical treatment to, his right knee 
including at least fourteen surgeries and three total knee replacements.  Because of his knee problems, Mr. Dale 
was restricted from performing manual labor for Employer.        

 
 
[¶4]      On August 4, 
2004, Mr. Dale's supervisor, Rick Potter, directed him to "baby sit" a silica 
fume concrete pour on a bridge outside of Laramie, Wyoming.  
The pour had been completed the night before, but it needed to be watched 
to ensure the concrete remained moist while it cured.  Mr. Dale was using a water truck to keep 
the concrete moist and he filled the truck from the river below the bridge.  When the truck was full, he climbed to 
the top to disconnect the hose.  As 
he was climbing back down, he slipped and injured his right knee.  He claimed that the slip caused severe 
pain, swelling and a minor scrape on his knee.   

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Dale 
consulted several different physicians over the next few months because of his 
pain and concern that he had loosened his knee prosthesis when he slipped on 
August 4, 2004.  None of the 
physicians' records referenced a scab or wound on his knee until he saw Kirk 
Kindsfater, M.D. in early November 2004.  
Dr. Kindsfater cultured the wound and referred Mr. Dale to a wound care 
clinic.  The results of the culture 
were positive for a staphylococcus aureus (staph) infection.  David Cobb, M.D., a wound care 
specialist, immediately hospitalized Mr. Dale and began aggressive treatment to 
counter the infection.  While he was 
in the hospital, Mr. Dale filled out a report of injury, indicating that he had 
injured his right knee when he slipped on the truck on August 4, 2004.    

 
 
[¶6]      The State 
initially opened a case for the injury.  
The Employer, however, objected and the State apparently later joined in 
that objection.  The OAH convened a 
contested case hearing on February 16, 2006, and, after Mr. Dale's direct 
testimony, continued the hearing because the hearing examiner was concerned 
about Mr. Dale's ability to proceed.     

 
 
[¶7]      After the second 
part of the hearing on June 14, 2006, the OAH issued a denial of Mr. Dale's 
claims, ruling that he had not met his burden of proving the infection was 
causally related to his work-related injury on August 4, 2004.  Mr. Dale filed a petition for review 
with the district court, and the district court affirmed the OAH decision.  Mr. Dale then appealed to this 
Court.    

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      When we consider 
an appeal from a district court's review of an administrative agency's decision, 
we give no special deference to the district court's decision.  Instead, "we review the case as if it 
had come directly to us from the administrative agency.'"  Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d 163, 166 (Wyo. 2002), quoting French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 
1027 (Wyo. 1998).  Our review is 
governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114 (c) (LexisNexis 2007).  

 
 
[¶9]      In Newman, we attempted to clarify the 
standards of review applicable to administrative cases in order to dispel the 
general confusion in our case law regarding the application of the very specific 
statutory language in § 16-3-114(c)(ii).  
That statutory provision states:

 
 
   (c) To the extent necessary to 
make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action.  In making the following 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it 
cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

            
(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed;  and

            
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

                        
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

                        
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

                        
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;

                        
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law;  or

                        
(E) Unsupported by substantial 
evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute. 

 
 
Section 16-3-114(c) 
(emphasis added).  We remarked that 
the arbitrary or capricious standard and the substantial evidence tests had been 
muddled in cases when agency decisions are reviewed.  The blurring of these concepts had "led 
to the citation of every possible administrative review standard in a scattergun 
effort to hit the target."   Newman, ¶ 8, 49 P.3d  at 166.  Moreover, the case law had failed to 
give separate effect to the distinct standards of review stated in § 
16-3-114(c). 

 
 
[¶10]   We attempted to provide guidance as 
to when the different standards should be applied.  Newman's salient teachings 
included:

 
 
            
[W]e hold the substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of 
review in appeals from WAPA contested case proceedings when factual findings are 
involved and both parties submit evidence.  
We further hold, when only the party with the burden of proof submits 
evidence in the contested case proceeding and that party does not ultimately 
prevail, the arbitrary or capricious standard governs the judicial review of 
that agency decision.

 
 
Despite this holding, 
even if the factual findings are found to be supported by substantial evidence, 
the ultimate agency decision could still be found to be arbitrary or capricious 
for other reasons.  The arbitrary or 
capricious standard works as a "safety net" to catch agency action which 
prejudices a party's substantial rights or which may be contrary to the other 
WAPA review standards yet is not easily categorized or fit to any one particular 
standard.  Section 
16-3-114(c)(ii);  Community Savings and Loan Association of 
College Station, Texas v. Vandygriff, 630 S.W.2d 457, 459 n. 3 (Tex. App. 
1982).  

 
 

Id., ¶¶ 22-23, 49 P.3d  at 
171-72 (footnote omitted).  We noted 
that identification of the correct standard of review is important because, 
although both the substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious standards 
require review of the entire record, they compel the reviewing court to apply 
different tests to the record.  
Id., ¶ 19, 49 P.3d  at 170.  

 
 
[¶11]   The substantial evidence test is 
described as:

 
 
"In reviewing findings 
of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether there is substantial 
evidence to support an agency's findings.  
If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot 
properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency and must uphold the 
findings on appeal.  Substantial 
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of 
the agency's conclusions.  It is 
more than a scintilla of evidence."  

 
 

Id., ¶ 12, 49 P.3d  at 168, 
quoting State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety and Comp. Div. v. Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Wyo. 
2001) (citations omitted).  In 
addition, we explained in Newman, ¶ 
26, 49 P.3d  at 173, that in conducting a substantial evidence review of the 
record,  

 
 
the deference that 
normally is accorded the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the 
administrative agency, and we do not adjust the decision of the agency unless it 
is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence on record. This 
is so because, in such an instance, the administrative body is the trier of fact 
and has the duty to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of 
witnesses.  

 
 

See 
also, 
City of Casper v. Wyo. Dep't of 
Employment, 851 P.2d 1, 3 (Wyo. 1993); Board of Trustees of Laramie County School 
Dist. No. 1 v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1178 (Wyo. 1976).  

            
 

[¶12]   We also held that the arbitrary and capricious standard 
is appropriate to review evidentiary issues when only the party with the burden 
of proof submitted evidence and did not prevail.  The arbitrary and capricious test 
requires the reviewing court to review the entire record to determine whether 
the agency reasonably could have made its finding and order based upon all the 
evidence before it.  Newman, ¶ 19, 49 P.3d  at 170.  The arbitrary and capricious standard is 
more lenient and deferential to the agency than the substantial evidence 
standard because "it requires only that there be a rational basis for the 
agency's decision."  Id.  

 
 
[¶13]   We determined that the arbitrary 
and capricious standard should apply when there is no disputed evidence on an 
issue because the substantial evidence test is awkward when applied to a finding 
for the non-burdened party.  
Id., ¶ 21, 49 P.3d  at 171.  In Newman, we referred to a Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court case, Russell v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal 
Board (Volkswagon of America), 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 436, 550 A.2d 1364, 1365 (1988) because it had grappled with the same problem.  The court in Russell rightly pointed out that: 

 
 
where the burdened 
party is the only party to present evidence and does not prevail before the 
agency, the "substantial evidence"  
test falters.  If no evidence 
was presented to support the prevailing party, there is no evidence upon which 
to apply the "substantial evidence" test: i.e., it is impossible to find 
substantial evidence to support a position for which no evidence was 
introduced.  

 
 

Newman, ¶ 21, 49 P.3d  at 171 
(quoting Russell, 550 A.2d at 
1365-66).  

 
 
[¶14]   The Russell court stated, and we quoted in 
Newman, that in cases where the 
prevailing party presented no evidence, "the appropriate scope of review . . . 
is whether the agency erred as a matter of law or capriciously disregarded 
competent evidence."  Newman, ¶ 21, 49 P.3d  at 171.  Partially relying on Russell's reasoning, we concluded it was 
appropriate to apply the "arbitrary or capricious" language from our own 
statutory standards in such situations.  
Id., ¶ 22, 49 P.3d  at 171.  

 
 
[¶15]   The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
since noted the difficulty in following that approach and decided that the 
exception created in Russell, which 
hinged application of the "capricious disregard of the evidence" standard of 
review on whether the non-burdened party presented evidence, is not necessary 
because that standard could apply in any case, as it was a subset of 
Pennsylvania's statutory requirement that the agency decision must be in 
"accordance with law."  Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers' 
Compensation Appeal Board (Marlowe), 812 A.2d 478, 488 n. 13 (Pa. 2002).  

 
 
[¶16]   Application of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review to basic evidentiary issues has also caused 
problems for Wyoming courts.  It is often difficult to determine 
whether both parties or only the party with the burden of proof presented 
evidence.  This is especially true 
when the respondent party does not present a case at the contested case hearing, 
but, instead, relies upon cross examination of the other party's witnesses to 
defeat the claim.  Moreover, it can 
be confusing and cumbersome to apply different standards of review to what are 
essentially evidentiary questions.

 
 
[¶17]   The case at bar clearly illustrates 
these difficulties.  The parties 
submit that the applicable standard of review is the arbitrary and capricious 
standard because the dispositive ruling by the hearing examiner was that the 
claimant did not meet his burden of proof.   They refer to Boyce v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2005 WY 9, ¶ 6, 105 P.3d 451, 454 (Wyo. 2005) to support 
their positions.  Boyce has been misconstrued as holding 
that, in all cases where the hearing examiner rules that the claimant failed to 
meet his burden of proof, the arbitrary and capricious standard applies.  In fact, we applied the arbitrary and 
capricious standard in Boyce because 
the OAH decision was based on a misapplication of the law.  Id., ¶ 6, 105 P.3d  at 454.   The hearing examiner had concluded 
the claimant was required to present expert medical testimony to establish that 
her work conditions "materially or substantially" contributed to her 
injury.  Id., ¶ 9, 105 P.3d  at 454.  Because Ms. Boyce did not present expert 
testimony using that precise terminology (her doctors testified her work 
"aggravated" her condition), the hearing examiner concluded she had not 
satisfied her burden of proof.  
Id.  
We used the arbitrary and capricious standard because the underlying 
problem was that the OAH misapplied the law and that error led to an arbitrary 
finding that the claimant had not met her burden of proof.  The Boyce decision does not, therefore, 
support use of the arbitrary and capricious standard anytime the hearing 
examiner couches his ruling in terms that the claimant failed to meet his burden 
of proof.

 
 
[¶18]   Since then, we have, in some cases, 
perpetuated the confusion by relying on Boyce as authority to apply the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review to evidentiary determinations simply 
because the hearing examiner's ultimate ruling was that the party with the 
burden of proof did not satisfy it.  
See, e.g., State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & 
Comp. Div. v. Slaymaker, 2007 WY 65, 156 P.3d 977 (Wyo. 2007); Spletzer v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 90, 116 P.3d 1103 (Wyo. 2005) and Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2005 WY 148, 123 P.3d 143 (Wyo. 2005) (referring to both the substantial 
evidence and arbitrary and capricious standards of review); David v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2007 WY 22, 151 P.3d 280 (Wyo. 2007) (applying arbitrary 
and capricious standard because the hearing examiner ruled the claimant had not 
met his burden of proof).  

 
 
[¶19]   While our analysis in Newman was, and continues to be, 
supported by credible authorities, the difficulty we have had in consistently 
applying the standards convinces us that we need to further refine our standards 
of judicial review for agency actions.  
We will, however, remedy this problem differently than the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court did in Leon.  

 
 
[¶20]   The judicial review provision of 
the federal Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706,1 is similar to § 16-3-114(c).  Historically under the federal act, the 
arbitrary and capricious standard was used to review informal 
adjudications.  33 Fed. Prac. & 
Proc., Judicial Review § 8334.  Friends of the Bow v. Thompson, 124 F.3d 1210, 1214-17 (10th Cir. 1997), demonstrates the traditional use of 
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in adjudicative contexts.  In that case, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in 5 U.S.C. § 
706 to review an agency's decision after an informal proceeding involving a 
timber sale.  See also, Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971).  On the other 
hand, the substantial evidence standard has traditionally been applied to review 
evidentiary findings after formal, trial-type agency proceedings.  33 Fed. Prac. & Proc., Judicial 
Review §§ 8333.  

 
 
[¶21]   Section 16-3-114(c)(ii) provides 
only one evidentiary standard of review.  
Under the plain language of the statute, reversal of an agency finding or 
action is required if it is "not supported by substantial evidence."  Because contested case hearings under 
Wyoming's 
Administrative Procedures Act, are formal, trial-type proceedings, use of the 
substantial evidence standard for review of evidentiary matters is more in 
keeping with the original intent of the drafters of the administrative 
procedures act.  33 Fed. Prac. & 
Proc., Judicial Review §§ 8333, 8334.  

 
 
[¶22]   Thus, in the interests of 
simplifying the process of identifying the correct standard of review and 
bringing our approach closer to the original use of the two standards, we hold 
that henceforth the substantial evidence standard will be applied any time we 
review an evidentiary ruling.  When 
the burdened party prevailed before the agency, we will determine if substantial 
evidence exists to support the finding for that party by considering whether 
there is relevant evidence in the entire record which a reasonable mind might 
accept in support of the agency's conclusions.  If the hearing examiner determines that 
the burdened party failed to meet his burden of proof, we will decide whether 
there is substantial evidence to support the agency's decision to reject the 
evidence offered by the burdened party by considering whether that conclusion 
was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record as a 
whole.  See, Wyo. Consumer Group v. Public Serv. Comm'n 
of Wyo., 882 P.2d 858, 860-61 (Wyo. 1994); Spiegel, 549 P.2d  at 1178 (discussing 
the definition of substantial evidence as "contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence").  If, in the 
course of its decision making process, the agency disregards certain evidence 
and explains its reasons for doing so based upon determinations of credibility 
or other factors contained in the record, its decision will be sustainable under 
the substantial evidence test.  
Importantly, our review of any particular decision turns not on whether 
we agree with the outcome, but on whether the agency could reasonably conclude 
as it did, based on all the evidence before it.  

 
 
[¶23]   The arbitrary and capricious 
standard remains a "safety net" to catch agency action which prejudices a 
party's substantial rights or which may be contrary to the other W.A.P.A. review 
standards yet is not easily categorized or fit to any one particular 
standard."  Newman, ¶ 23, 49 P.3d  at 172.  Although we explained the "safety net" 
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard in Newman, we will refine it slightly here 
to more carefully delineate that it is not meant to apply to true evidentiary 
questions.  Instead, the arbitrary 
and capricious standard will apply if the hearing examiner refused to admit 
testimony or documentary exhibits that were clearly admissible or failed to 
provide appropriate findings of fact or conclusions of law.  This listing is demonstrative and not 
intended as an inclusive catalog of all possible circumstances.  Id. 

 
 
[¶24]   There will be times when the 
arbitrary and capricious standard appears to overlap with some of the other 
standards.  For example, a decision 
against the great weight of the evidence might properly be called arbitrary or 
capricious in everyday language.  
However, the words "arbitrary" and "capricious" must be understood in 
context as terms of art under the administrative review statute and should not 
be employed in areas where the more specifically defined standards provide 
sufficient relief.  

 
 
[¶25]   In summary, while we believe Newman was analytically correct and 
supported by relevant authorities, application of the different standards of 
review to evidentiary matters proved confusing and led to arguably inconsistent 
decisions.  Thus, we take this 
opportunity to diverge somewhat from Newman in order to simplify the process 
of determining the proper standard of review for both litigants and courts.   In the future, we will apply the 
substantial evidence standard anytime we are reviewing an evidentiary 
issue.  

 
 
[¶26]   As always, we review an agency's 
conclusions of law de novo, and 
"[w]e will affirm an agency's legal conclusion only if it is in accordance with 
the law.'"  Diamond B Servs., Inc. v. Rohde, 2005 WY 
130, ¶ 12, 120 P.3d 1031, 1038 (Wyo. 2005), quoting DC Prod. Serv. v. Wyo. Dep't of Empl., 
2002 WY 142, ¶ 7, 54 P.3d 768, 771 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶27]   In this case, Mr. Dale challenges 
the hearing examiner's evidentiary determination on disputed evidence that his 
staph infection was not caused by a work related injury. Consistent with our 
discussion above, we will review that factual determination for substantial 
evidence, or, in other words, for relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might 
accept in support of the hearing examiner's decision.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶28]   
In order to facilitate the discussion and ensure that we focus only 
on appropriate evidence in reviewing the OAH decision, we will consider Mr. 
Dale's issues in reverse order.

 
 
1.         
Hearing Procedure            
  

 
 
[¶29]   The OAH initially convened the 
contested case hearing on February 16, 2006.  At the conclusion of Mr. Dale's direct 
testimony, the hearing examiner expressed concern about his ability to continue 
with the hearing.  The hearing 
examiner remarked that he "became concerned about halfway through Mr. Dale's 
testimony" that Mr. Dale's pain was making him unable "to adequately proceed and 
testify in this matter."  He 
expressed concern that Mr. Dale would not be able to accurately answer 
questions.  All of the parties 
agreed with the hearing examiner, and the hearing was continued until June 14, 
2006.    

 
 
[¶30]   At the June 14th hearing, Mr. Dale stated that he felt a lot 
better than he had at the prior hearing.  
The hearing examiner ruled that he could have another opportunity to 
testify in direct examination:  

 
 
I would note that when 
we suspended the proceedings in February, Mr. Santini had just finished his 
direct of Mr. Dale.  However, the 
State has indicated that it doesn't object to additional evidence.  And given the passage of time and the 
events of that day, I will give Mr. Santini another bite if he feels that there 
is anything else he wishes to ask his client before we proceed to 
cross-examination.  

 
 
Mr. Dale then 
testified briefly on direct examination.      

 
 
[¶31]   On appeal, Mr. Dale claims that the 
hearing examiner committed fundamental error by comparing his testimony in the 
first segment of the hearing to his testimony in the second segment.  An example of the hearing examiner's 
reliance on the discrepancies in Mr. Dale's testimony is:  "Dale's description of the scrape was 
not clear and Dale changed his testimony between the first hearing and the 
second hearing in this matter.  Dale 
initially testified there was no blood when he observed the scrape, but later 
changed his testimony stating he observed a small amount of blood."    

 
 
[¶32]   Mr. Dale suggests that the hearing 
examiner violated his due process rights by failing to strike his testimony in 
the first segment of the hearing from the record and allowing him to start 
over.  He analogizes to the 
situation in deShazer v. State, 2003 
WY 98, ¶ 25, 74 P.3d 1240, 1250-51 (Wyo. 2003).  In that case, we ruled the district 
court had violated the criminal defendant's due process rights when it failed to 
suspend the trial and order a mental competence evaluation when there were 
indications he was not competent to proceed.  In deShazer, the defendant was entitled to 
the protection of the competence statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-11-301 through 
7-11-307 (LexisNexis 2007).  There 
are, however, no comparable statutes which require competency evaluations in 
 workers' compensation cases.  

 
 
[¶33]   As Employer points out, Mr. Dale 
did not request that his testimony from the first part of the hearing be struck 
from the record.  Instead, he 
accepted, without objection, the hearing examiner's invitation to continue his 
direct examination at the second segment of the hearing.  As we have stated previously: 

 
 
[a] party is obligated 
to object at the agency level to the administrative tribunal's procedure so that 
the tribunal will have an opportunity to correct its errors.  Wright [v. State ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division], 
983 P.2d [1227,] 1231 [(Wyo. 1999)].  If a party has an opportunity to object 
to the administrative tribunal's procedural rulings and fails to do so, it 
waives its right to challenge the administrative tribunal's procedure on 
appeal.  Id.

 
 

Amoco Prod. Co. v. 
Wyo.State Bd. Of Equalization, 
7 P.3d 900, 906 (Wyo. 2000).  Mr. Dale 
was given an ample opportunity to be heard and, in the absence of an objection, 
he waived his right to contest the hearing examiner's procedural ruling.  Because both segments of the hearing 
were part of the evidentiary record, the hearing examiner appropriately referred 
to both and noted inconsistencies in Mr. Dale's testimony.    

 
 
[¶34]   Moreover, we do not believe that 
Mr. Dale was prejudiced by the hearing examiner considering both portions of the 
hearing in reaching his decision.  
While the hearing examiner did note some minor discrepancies in Mr. 
Dale's testimony, especially regarding the circumstances of how he scraped his 
knee and the extent of his August 4, 2004, injury, those discrepancies were not 
the sole or even primary reason for the hearing examiner's decision.  As will be explained in detail below, 
the record includes substantial other evidence to support the agency 
decision.  

 
 
2.         
Work-Related Injury

 
 
[¶35]  The claimant has the burden of proving 
each of the essential elements of his claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Borchert, 994 P.2d 959, 963 (Wyo. 2000).  As a 
part of that burden, the claimant must prove a causal connection exists between 
a work-related injury and the injury for which worker's compensation benefits 
are being sought.  That 
determination involves a question of fact.  
Taylor, ¶ 9, 123 P.3d  at 146; 
Morgan v. Olsten Temp. Servs., 975 P.2d 12, 16 (Wyo. 1999).

 
 
[¶36]   The dispositive findings of fact 
contained in the OAH order state:

 
 

32.         
This Office finds Dale 
did not meet his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, his 
November 2004 right knee infection and subsequent treatment was directly related 
to his August 4, 2004 injury.  
Dale's description of the scrape was not clear and Dale changed his 
testimony between the first hearing and the second hearing in this matter.  Dale initially testified there was no 
blood when he observed the scrape, but later changed his testimony stating he 
observed a small amount of blood.  
When Dale informed his employer he had hurt his right knee he only 
mentioned the twisting and pain and made no mention of the scrape.  Potter testified he saw Dale in the late 
afternoon of August 4, 2004 and knew Dale's right knee was hurting, but observed 
no evidence of blood in the area of Dale's right knee.

 
 

33.         
Dale underwent 
numerous medical examinations from August 20, 2004 until November 5, 2005.  The physicians' notes of Dale's numerous 
examinations provide [a] very detailed explanation of Dale's physical 
examinations and in none of the notes are there any indication[s] of a scab or 
scrape on Dale's right knee.  
Further, the fluid drained from Dale's knee in September 2004 was 
negative for infection.  
Additionally, Dale informed both Dr. Kindsfater and Dr. Cobb the scrape 
of his right knee occurred approximately two weeks before his November 5, 2004 
examination.

 
 

34.         
Dr. Basta wrote a 
December 16, 2004 letter to the Division indicating Dale had a scrape on his 
right knee when examined on August 20, 2004, but admitted she had no 
recollection of the scrape and Dr. Basta's statement may have been based upon 
something Dale told her when Dale requested Dr. Basta to write the letter.  Dr. Co[bb] testified he believed Dale's 
infection was related to the August 2004 work injury, but admitted his testimony 
was speculative and only based upon Dale's history of the scrape waxing and 
waning.  Dr. Co[bb] admitted he had 
no objective evidence relating Dale's infection to the August 4, 2004 
injury.  Dr. Kindsfater testified he 
did not believe Dale's infection was related to the August 4, 2004 work 
incident.  Dr. Kindsfater based his 
opinion on the timing of the infection and Dale's own admission he had scraped 
his right knee only two weeks before the November 5, 2004 examination.  

 
 

35.         
Based upon Dale's 
inability and inconsistency in describing the scrape, the lack of any notation 
of the scrape in any medical reports prior to November 5, 2004, the September 
2004 tests showing no knee infection, Dale's statement [to] two of his doctors 
that he had scraped his knee only two weeks before the November 5, 2004 
examination and the clear testimony of Dr. Kindsfater, this office must find 
Dale has failed to meet his burden of proof  to show his right knee infection was 
related to his August 4, 2004 injury.        

 
 
We review the entire 
record to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the hearing 
examiner's evidentiary finding that Mr. Dale's staph infection was not related 
to his August 4, 2004, work related injury.  

 
 
[¶37]   
Both Mr. Dale and his supervisor, Mr. Potter testified that he 
reported an injury to his right knee on August 4, 2004.  Mr. Dale testified that he injured his 
knee while climbing down from the top of the water truck.  He claimed that he scraped his 
knee.  During both parts of the 
hearing, Mr. Dale testified that the scrape was minor, although his description 
of the injury varied a little from the first to the second part of the 
hearing.  At the first part of the 
hearing, he testified there was no blood; during the second part of the hearing, 
he stated there was a small amount of blood.    

 
 
[¶38]   Mr. Potter testified that Mr. Dale 
had simply told him that he had slipped and bumped his knee while climbing down 
the ladder.  He was not aware that 
Mr. Dale had also scraped the knee.  
Thus, it was undisputed that Mr. Dale slipped climbing off the truck, 
striking his right knee against something and that he reported the injury to 
Employer on August 4, 2004.2  What was in dispute was whether he 
scraped his knee on that day and whether that same scrape became infected with 
staph.  

 
 
[¶39]   Mr. Dale continued to have problems 
with his knee through the late summer and fall of 2004; however, he testified 
the scrape did not bother him very much.  
He explained that the scab would "go away" and then return.  Mr. Dale testified that his real concern 
was the condition of his prosthetic implant.  

 
 
[¶40]   Mr. Dale went to Harlan Ribnik, 
M.D.'s office on August 20, 2004.  
Dr. Ribnik was a pain consultant whom Mr. Dale had been seeing for 
continuing pain in his right knee.  
Dr. Ribnik's medical records indicate that the examination of his 
extremities that day did not reveal any changes from his June 25, 2004, 
examination.  No scrape or wound was 
noted on his knee.  At the contested 
case hearing, Mr. Dale testified that often his knee was not actually examined 
in Dr. Ribnik's office.      

 
 
[¶41]   On September 28, 2004, he saw Jean 
Basta, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon.  
Dr. Basta's medical records indicate that she conducted a thorough 
examination of Mr. Dale's right knee.  
She did not, however, document any wound or scrape on the knee.  Dr. Basta was concerned that Mr. Dale 
had loosened the prosthesis and ordered further tests.  One of the tests involved withdrawing 
synovial fluid and testing it for infection.  The results of that test were 
negative.     

 
 
[¶42]   Mr. Dale again visited Dr. Ribnik's 
office on October 15, 2004.  The 
notes from that visit indicate that Mr. Dale had been experiencing worsening 
pain since he fell from a water truck.  
Although the notes state that Mr. Dale was physically examined, there was 
no reference to a scrape, abrasion or wound on his right knee.    

 
 
[¶43]   On November 5, 2004, Mr. Dale saw 
Dr. Kindsfater.  His notes stated 
that Mr. Dale suffered from chronic knee pain attendant to his prior surgeries 
and that "a slip at work in August . . .  injured this knee and has exacerbated his 
symptoms to some degree."  Also, for 
the first time, there was a mention of a wound on the 
knee:

 
 
            
CLINICAL FINDINGS:        On exam 
today [Mr. Dale] is a pleasant gentleman.  
He actually has an eschar3 over the distal portion of one of 
his old wounds.  He says he scraped 
this a couple of weeks ago.  It was 
just a superficial scrape but now it has turned into rather a full thickness 
skin lesion with an eschar.  I can 
express just a little bit of goopy type pus from underneath this.  There is a mild surrounding erythema but 
nothing seems to be affecting the knee or deeper tissues.  I did go ahead and culture this .  .  
. .   

 
 
(footnote added).  Because the doctor was concerned about 
the scab, he referred Mr. Dale to a wound care clinic.       

 
 
[¶44]   Mr. Dale saw David K. Cobb, M.D. at 
the Wound Healing Clinic associated with the PoudreValleyHospital in Fort Collins, Colorado on November 9, 2004.  A patient intake form indicated that Mr. 
Dale said he had had the scrape for two weeks.  By the time Mr. Dale saw Dr. Cobb, the 
results of the culture had been returned and indicated he had a staph 
infection.  Dr. Cobb immediately 
admitted Mr. Dale to the hospital for aggressive treatment of his 
infection.  A bone scan performed in 
the hospital indicated that the infection may have invaded the tibia bone.    

 
 
[¶45]   Dr. Basta's deposition testimony 
was admitted into evidence at the contested case hearing.  She provided no opinion on the cause of 
Mr. Dale's right knee infection.  
Dr. Basta was questioned about a letter she wrote to the State on 
December 16, 2004, stating that Mr. Dale had a skin lesion on his knee as a 
result of an injury on August 10, 2004.  
However, on cross-examination she confirmed that the notes from her 
September 28, 2004, examination of Mr. Dale did not mention a skin lesion.  Dr. Basta also admitted she could not 
remember if she had actually seen the skin lesion.     

 
 
[¶46]   Dr. Kindsfater also testified by 
deposition at the hearing.  Dr. 
Kindsfater testified that he observed a scab or eschar on Mr. Dale's right knee 
on November 5, 2004.  He stated that 
Mr. Dale told him he had scraped his knee "a couple of weeks ago. And he said 
initially it was just a superficial scrape, but then it turned into more than 
that as time went on."  Dr. 
Kindsfater testified that he believed the fall in August probably exacerbated 
his symptoms, but that it was unlikely that the knee prosthesis had been 
loosened.  He also testified that he 
"would not expect that to cause deep infection."  With regard to the wound, he 
stated:  "It's my recollection, I 
think that when he got the scrape on his wound was --- I don't believe that it 
was at the time that he slipped.  I 
thought it was later.  But I'm not 
sure about that."      

 
 
[¶47]   Dr. Cobb's deposition testimony was 
also admitted into evidence at the contested case hearing.  Dr. Cobb testified Mr. Dale told him 
that he had scraped his knee getting out of a truck in August, and that "it 
sounded as if it had been a waxing and waning process that had developed into 
this or evolved into this wound that was not healing."  Dr. Cobb also testified that, based upon 
the history Mr. Dale had given him, "over the preceding few weeks, the process 
had been that of progressive worsening."  
Dr. Cobb testified that Mr. Dale's description of an injury that waxed 
and waned over time was consistent with an indolent type of staph 
infection.  When specifically 
questioned about the origin of Mr. Dale's staph infection, Dr. Cobb testified as 
follows:

 
 

Q.                
How can you tell in 
Mr. Dale's case whether that infection you saw in November of 2004 was of recent 
origin versus something that has been there a longer period of 
time?

 
 

A.                 
Define longer period 
of time.

 
 

Q.                
Let me say from August 
of 2004 versus mid-October 2004?

 
 

A.                 
Well, that's -- 
admittedly, that is very inexact.  
And I can't claim to have a corner on truth about this; however, I do 
think that the fact that the bone scan showed up positive -- showing up positive 
in early November, to me, would be more suggestive that the infection had been 
there in some form or fashion for at least a period of multiple weeks if not a 
few months . . . . as opposed to having had this indolent infection just develop 
a couple of weeks before.  

 
 
[¶48]   On cross-examination, Dr. Cobb 
acknowledged that Mr. Dale's patient intake form indicated that he had received 
the scrape approximately two weeks before and had been treating it with hydrogen 
peroxide.  Dr. Cobb also stated that 
the only source of information he had about the relationship between the August 
injury and the November infection was the history Mr. Dale provided.  Finally, he 
testified:

 
 

Q.    
Doctor, in terms of 
when the wound occurred, based on your objective findings, we'd be asking you to 
speculate, correct?

 
 

A.     
I think so.  

 
 
[¶49]   It is abundantly clear from the 
parts of the record described above that the evidence in this case was extensive 
and complex.  There was evidence 
indicating that the wound occurred as Mr. Dale contended in August 2004.  However, there was also evidence, 
especially the medical evidence from doctors Ribnik, Basta, and Kindsfater, 
indicating that he did not have a wound during the late summer and early fall of 
2004.  It was the hearing examiner's 
responsibility to determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the 
evidence, including that obtained from medical experts.  Id., ¶ 16, 123 P.3d  at 148; Morgan, 975 P.2d  at 16.  The hearing examiner weighed the 
evidence and concluded  there was no 
causal connection between the August 4, 2004, work related injury and the staph 
infection diagnosed in November 2004.  

 
 
[¶50]   Mr. Dale claims that the hearing 
examiner improperly discounted Dr. Cobb's testimony that he believed the 
infection was causally related to the August 4, 2004, injury.  "[A] hearing examiner is entitled to 
disregard an expert opinion if he finds the opinion unreasonable, not adequately 
supported by the facts upon which the opinion is based, or based upon an 
incomplete and inaccurate medical history provided by the claimant."  Taylor, ¶ 15, 123 P.3d  at 148.   See also, Franks v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2002 WY 77, ¶ 18, 46 P.3d 876, 879-80 (Wyo. 2002);  Clark v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 934 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Wyo. 1997).  The hearing examiner had a justifiable 
basis for refusing to accept Dr. Cobb's opinion.  Dr. Cobb admitted that he had to 
speculate in order to opine that the staph infection was caused by the August 4, 
2004, work related injury.  
Moreover, he conceded that he relied solely on the history Mr. Dale 
related in reaching that conclusion and that Mr. Dale's intake form indicated he 
had only had the wound for two weeks prior to his appointment with Dr. 
Cobb.   Those factors, coupled 
with the fact that, until Dr. Kindsfater examined Mr. Dale on November 5, 2004, 
none of the health care providers who had examined him since August had even 
mentioned a wound, supports the hearing examiner's decision.  

 
 
[¶51]   After examining the conflicting and 
contradictory evidence, we conclude that there is substantial evidence, or 
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept, to support the hearing 
examiner's decision that there was no causal connection between Mr. Dale's staph 
infection diagnosed in November, 2004 and his August 4, 2004, work related 
injury.  The hearing examiner, 
therefore, properly denied Mr. Dale's claim.  

 
 
[¶52]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

15 U.S.C. §706 
states:

 
 
   To the extent necessary to 
decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The 
reviewing court shall--

   (1) compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

   (2) hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to 
be--

       
(A) arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

       
(B) contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

       
(C) in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right;

       
(D) without observance of 
procedure required by law;

       
(E) unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or 
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; 
or

       
(F) unwarranted by the 
facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing 
court.

   In making the foregoing 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it 
cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.

 
 

2The record also contains evidence 
regarding another work-related injury on August 30, 2004.  Mr. Dale apparently hyper-extended his 
knee that day.  There is no 
indication that the August 30th  incident had any effect on the right knee 
scrape or infection.  

 
 

3An eschar is "a dry crust or scab."   Webster's Third New Int'l 
Dictionary 775 (2002).