Case Title: Swisher v. Brown

Citation: 402 P.2d 621

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1965-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
402 P.2d 621 (1965) Paul W. SWISHER as Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Colorado, the State of Colorado Department of Agriculture, et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. Otis P. BROWN and George Russ, Defendants in Error. No. 21510. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. June 7, 1965. *622 Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Clifton A. Flowers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Russell P. Kramer, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiffs in error. Gelt & Grossman, Denver, for defendants in error. MOORE, Justice. We will refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court where the plaintiffs in error were defendants and the defendants in error were plaintiffs. The action was brought by the plaintiffs for a declaratory judgment with reference to the constitutionality of the Colorado Agricultural Marketing Act of 1939 (C.R.S. '53, 7-3-1 to 23). The amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs contains three separately stated claims. The first claim involves an attack upon the constitutionality of the Colorado Marketing Act as a whole. The second claim is an attack upon certain marketing orders which were entered by the defendant Swisher pursuant to the authority vested in him under the statute, in so far as such orders purported to impose restrictions upon the production and marketing of lettuce. The third claim consists of an attack upon the provisions of a specific Marketing Order which purported to require the destruction or discing of a part of the 1962 lettuce crop. The defendants filed their answer in which the issuance of the Marketing Orders by the defendant Swisher was admitted; the contention that the statute is unconstitutional was denied; and it was affirmatively alleged that "plaintiffs will in fact benefit from compliance with said orders, but defendants admit that if said orders are unconstitutional and void, immediate and irreparable injury would result therefrom." The parties stipulated that the cause would first be submitted to the trial court *623 upon the questions of law raised by the first statement of claim. In this connection the trial court in its findings made the following statement: The trial court aptly summarized the issues framed by the pleadings with reference to the first claim as follows: "Plaintiffs further allege that at the time of the commencement of the action they had lettuce of first grade quality in their fields ready to cut, pack, sell and market and had purchasers willing, ready and able to purchase said lettuce; that they have expended large sums of money in the growing and producing of said lettuce and getting the same ready for market, and that the defendants are attempting *624 to enforce the marketing order and orders subsequently adopted thereunder, and are attempting to force plaintiffs to disc up and otherwise destroy a percentage of their lettuce crop as well as dictate to them on what days and hours they can cut, harvest and ship the remainder of their lettuce, and allege that the statute under which the defendants purport to act is unconstitutional, null and void; and further allege that if they are required to abide by the orders issued by defendants, plaintiffs will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, and that plaintiffs have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law. It is then alleged that the marketing act is unconstitutional for numerous reasons, which, briefly stated are that the act attempts to delegate legislative power to an individual, that is, the defendant Swisher; that the act constitutes an unlawful attempt to delegate legislative power to administrative agencies and without prescribing appropriate, adequate or any standards that are to govern the defendants in the exercise of the power attempted to be conferred; that the act confers upon defendant Swisher absolute, autocratic and arbitrary powers to impose requirements, conditions, duties and burdens upon persons in the lettuce industry wholly without regard to any compliance with any legislative standard and without regard for public interest, health, peace, safety and general welfare; that the authority delegated to defendant Swisher is not a reasonable exercise of the police powers and discloses no reasonable relationship to the public health, safety, welfare or morals; that said act attempts to vest in the defendant power to take property of the plaintiffs and other persons in the agricultural industry without due process of law and without just compensation; that the act empowers the defendants, and especially the defendant Swisher, to preclude plaintiffs and others engaged in the production of agricultural products from engaging to the best of their abilities in a useful, necessary and lawful business pursuit, all without corresponding benefit or any benefit to the public; that the statutory provisions and authority delegated to defendant Swisher are indefinite, ambiguous and incapable of achieving any lawful purpose; and that Section 7-3-16, C.R.S.1953, delegated to the defendant Swisher, acting through his Board of Control, the power to legislate criminal and penal statutes. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in this case are voluminous and indicate a very thorough study on the part of the court concerning the issues of law which are involved. The ultimate conclusion of the trial court was that " * * * as a matter of law the Marketing Act of 1939, as amended, is, in the particulars hereinabove stated, unconstitutional and void. * * *" The court entered an injunction enjoining and restraining the defendants from enforcing or attempting to enforce the Act. *625 We first address ourselves to consideration of the principal ground upon which the trial court reached the above stated conclusion. The Conclusions of Law which it entered points up the crucial question in the following way: From what has been said above, it is readily apparent that a narrow question has been submitted to this court for determination. The question as to whether any of the marketing orders are within the coverage of the statute was expressly reserved for future consideration by the trial court. In this connection it is pertinent to note that the trial court proceeded first to determine the constitutionality of the act of the legislature reserving all questions involving the propriety of orders issued thereunder until after constitutionality had been determined. We have on numerous occasions stated that the reverse order should have been followed. In Lipset v. Davis, et al., 119 Colo. 335, 203 P.2d 730, we held that no inquiry should be made concerning the constitutionality of a statute if the controversy can be decided on other grounds. To like effect is Flanders v. Pueblo, 114 Colo. 1, 160 P.2d 980; State of Colorado ex rel. Cruse v. American Can Company, 117 Colo. 312, 186 P.2d 779; and Kelley v. South Jeffco Metropolitan Recreation and Park District, 155 Colo. ____, 395 P.2d 210. The Marketing Act was adopted under the police power of the state and the general assembly declared that the conditions to which reference was made "vitally concern the health, peace, safety and general welfare of the people of this state." Admittedly, statutes regulating agriculture may be adopted as an exercise of the police power. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940. This court has approved the rule announced in Nebbia v. New York, supra, in the case of Zeigler v. People, 109 Colo. 252, 124 P.2d 593, from which we quote the following: In Oberst v. Mays, 148 Colo. 285, 365 P.2d 902, this court upheld a statute regulating agriculture in the public interest, and the heavy burdens imposed by the act in an effort to prevent soil erosion were upheld. The Supreme Court of the United States in Lincoln Federal Labor Union, etc. v. Northwestern I. & M. Co., 335 U.S. 525, 69 S. Ct. 251, 93 L. Ed. 212, made the following pertinent statement which seems to reflect the modern trend of decisions: Regulations imposed by a state in the exercise of its police power, when reasonable and adapted to the scope and objects sought to be accomplished, are not rendered unconstitutional even though private property is thereby injured or destroyed without the payment of compensation. Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664, 77 A.L.R.2d 1344. The reason for this is that, " * * * [i]f the legislative act is within the police power of the state, then the rights of the *626 individual which may be affected thereby must give way to the superior rights of the public, and he cannot complain that his property is taken without due process of law or without compensation first paid to him. * * *" Agricultural Prorate Commission of California v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 2d 550, 55 P.2d 495. The rule is aptly stated in 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Sec. 266, as follows: The Marketing Act, (C.R.S.1963, 7-3-3) in subsection 3 thereof, contains a statement of the purposes of the statute, as follows: The trial court found that the Marketing Act is unconstitutional and void because it amounts to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and lacks adequate standards. The determinations in these respects are necessarily interrelated, since one depends upon the other. Perhaps more accurately, only one question is presented. Regulation through administrative agencies is an accepted part of our legal system. The existence of such agencies and their powers arise from the increased functions of our various governments, the complexity of modern social, economic, and industrial systems, the inability of the legislatures or the courts to perform these functions directly, the necessity for constant supervision by experts and specialists in difficult and complicated fields, and the need for flexibility in the application of regulatory measures to meet constantly changing conditions. Certainly, there can be no serious question as to the power of the legislature to delegate responsibility for the administration of the Agricultural Marketing Act to the Commissioner of Agriculture. The constitutional question raised is whether, in delegating such authority, the legislature completed its job of making the law by establishing a definite plan or framework for the law's operation. The legislature does not abdicate its function when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and the scope of his authority. In our complex economy, that indeed is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892. *627 As a general rule for determining constitutionality of delegation of authority by the legislature, this court has approved the statement contained in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693, 694, 12 S. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294, which reads: See Hazlet v. Gaunt, 126 Colo. 385, 250 P.2d 188; Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755. The application of this well established general rule to a particular statute or a particular factual situation requires a determination as to whether the legislature has provided sufficient standards for the guidance of the administrative agency in the exercise of power conferred upon it by the legislature. It is not necessary that the legislature supply a specific formula for the guidance of the administrative agency in a field where flexibility and adaption of the legislative policy to infinitely variable conditions constitutes the essence of the program. The modern tendency is to permit liberal grants of discretion to administrative agencies in order to facilitate the administration of laws dealing with involved economic and governmental conditions. In other words, the necessities of modern legislation dealing with complex economic and social problems have led to judicial approval of broad standards for administrative action, especially in regulatory enactments under the police power. With respect to such types of legislation, detailed standards in precise and unvarying form would be unrealistic and more arbitrary than a general indefinite standard. In Hazlet v. Gaunt, supra, we approved the statement found in 11 Am.Jur., page 957, section 240, as follows: The following pertinent language is to be found in Ginsberg v. Centennial Turf Club, 126 Colo. 471, 251 P.2d 926: To like effect is the opinion of this court in Cooper Motors v. Board of County Commissioners, 131 Colo. 78, 279 P.2d 685. The trial court in considering the point under discussion made the following pertinent comment: "The difficulty of determining the validity of the marketing act is that the decisions of the courts of other states are not in accord on the question. Some states have held delegations of power such as we have here to be unconstitutional, while other states hold them to be constitutional. A decision on the question, either way, can be supported by respectable precedent. * * * The courts are far from agreement on what is an adequate *628 standard, some taking a narrow view and some the opposite. * * *" We have read opinions from twenty-one states which have upheld marketing acts comparable to the one adopted in Colorado. In six states we have found decisions which have held such acts, in certain particulars, to be unconstitutional. The great weight of authority seems to uphold marketing acts which are framed in language similar to that found in the Colorado law. In Rohrer v. Milk Control Board, 322 Pa. 257, 186 A. 336, we find the following: Whether any particular marketing order is reasonable and adapted to the scope and objects sought to be accomplished must frequently be determined on factual considerations. Prompt hearing and determination of pertinent facts is essential to a proper disposition of issues of this kind. As stated in People v. Albrecht, 145 Colo. 202, 358 P.2d 4: In the instant case no evidence was taken, and the conclusions of the legislature concerning the need for remedial action must be accepted at face value. The Marketing Act of 1939 is not unconstitutional upon its face, and the trial court erred in entering the judgment voiding the Act. The judgment is reversed.