Case Title: Frazier Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, P.C. v. Boyce Trust 2350 (Opinion on Application)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 148931, 148932, 148933

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Decided June 3, 2015. 
 
 
Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, PC, brought an action for breach of contract in the 
Midland Circuit Court against Boyce Trust 2350, Boyce Trust 3649, and Boyce Trust 3650, after 
defendants failed to pay plaintiff in full for legal services its member lawyers had rendered.  The 
case was tried by a jury after defendants rejected a case evaluation of $60,000.  The jury found in 
plaintiff’s favor, and the trial court, Jonathan E. Lauderbach, J., entered a judgment of 
$73,501.90.  Defendants moved for a new trial, and plaintiff moved for case-evaluation sanctions 
under MCR 2.403(O), including a reasonable attorney fee under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b).  The trial 
court denied defendants’ motion for a new trial and granted plaintiff’s motion for case-evaluation 
sanctions, awarding plaintiff $80,434 in attorney fees, plus interest, and also allowed plaintiff to 
seek supplemental fees for time spent litigating the sanctions request.  Plaintiff sought 
$38,566.50 in such fees and the court awarded $21,253.60, plus interest, resulting in a total 
award of approximately $102,000.  Defendants appealed the judgment and both of the sanctions 
orders, and the appeals were consolidated.  The Court of Appeals, FITZGERALD and BORRELLO, 
JJ. (MURPHY, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), affirmed the judgment for plaintiff 
and partially affirmed the award of case-evaluation sanctions, but reversed the award to the 
extent it encompassed services related to the pursuit of case-evaluation sanctions and remanded 
to the trial court for recalculation of the award amount.  304 Mich App 174 (2014).  Plaintiff 
appealed in the Supreme Court, which ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the 
application for leave to appeal or take other peremptory action.  497 Mich 873 (2014). 
 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice MCCORMACK, the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
Plaintiff could not recover a reasonable attorney fee under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) for the 
legal services performed by its member lawyers in connection with its suit to recover unpaid 
attorney fees from defendants.  Because the requisite distinction in identity between plaintiff and 
its member lawyers was lacking, there was no attorney-client relationship from which an 
attorney fee could arise. 
 
 
1.  Under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b), if a party has rejected a case evaluation and the action 
proceeds to verdict, that party must pay the opposing party’s actual costs, including a reasonable 
attorney fee for services necessitated by the rejection of the evaluation, unless the verdict is more 
favorable to the rejecting party than the case evaluation.  The meaning of the phrase “attorney 
fee” was addressed in Omdahl v West Iron Co Bd of Ed, 478 Mich 423 (2007), which held that 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Corbin R. Davis 
the term “attorney” requires an agency relationship between an attorney and the client whom he 
or she represents and, with that relationship, separate identities between the attorney and the 
client.  Because, in the case of an individual attorney-litigant, the requisite distinction in identity 
between attorney and client is lacking, there is no attorney-client relationship from which an 
attorney fee may arise.  This rationale applied to and foreclosed plaintiff’s request for attorney 
fees under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b).  Although plaintiff, as a corporation, was a legal entity distinct 
from its shareholders, and although plaintiff used its member lawyers as agents to litigate its 
interests in this suit, plaintiff routinely identified itself as its attorney throughout the litigation, 
and the record betrayed no distinction between the firm and the member lawyers who appeared 
on its behalf.  This conflation of identity was consistent with MCR 2.117(B)(3)(b), under which 
the appearance of plaintiff’s member lawyers was tantamount to the appearance of every 
member of the firm.  There was also no indication that plaintiff’s member lawyers viewed or 
treated plaintiff as a client distinct from themselves.  The nature of the fee plaintiff sought, which 
was remuneration for the legal services that it was forced to direct to the instant suit rather than 
to its clients by virtue of the defendants’ rejection of the case evaluation, confirmed that 
plaintiff’s fee request was analogous to, and no more recoverable than, that of an individual 
attorney-litigant. 
 
 
2.  Michigan law does not prohibit a corporation such as plaintiff from representing itself.  
While a corporation generally may appear in court only through licensed counsel, and plaintiff, 
as a professional corporation, could only provide legal services through its duly licensed officers, 
employees, and agents under MCL 450.1285(1), those propositions limited, but did not 
eliminate, plaintiff’s ability to represent itself; nor did it mean that plaintiff necessarily entered 
into the sort of relationship with its member lawyers that would be sufficient to support the 
recovery of an attorney fee under Omdahl. 
 
 
3.  The holding in this case was not at odds with Kay v Ehrler, 499 US 432 (1991), which 
held that an attorney who successfully represented himself in a civil-rights action was not 
entitled to recover attorney fees under 42 USC 1988(b) as part of his costs.  Although some 
federal circuits have relied on a footnote in Kay to conclude that law firms represented by their 
own member lawyers may recover attorney fees for that representation, the footnote was 
nonbinding dictum that sought to reconcile an aspect of 42 USC 1988 with Kay’s central holding 
and was not applicable to the circumstances of this case. 
 
 
Court of Appeals judgment reversed in part; trial court order awarding attorney fee 
vacated; case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2015 State of Michigan 
FILED  June 3, 2015 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
FRASER TREBILCOCK DAVIS & 
DUNLAP PC, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
Nos. 148931; 148932; 
148933 
 
BOYCE TRUST 2350, BOYCE TRUST 
3649, and BOYCE TRUST 3650, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
 
MCCORMACK, J.  
 
Before us is whether the plaintiff law firm can recover, as case-evaluation 
sanctions under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b), a “reasonable attorney fee” for the legal services 
performed by its own member lawyers in connection with its suit to recover unpaid fees 
from the defendants, former clients of the firm.  Contrary to the determinations of the 
trial court and the Court of Appeals majority, we conclude it cannot.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the Court of Appeals in part, vacate the trial court’s award of a “reasonable 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
attorney fee” to the plaintiff under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b), and remand to the trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The plaintiff, Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, P.C. (“Fraser Trebilcock”), is a 
law firm organized as a professional corporation under the laws of Michigan.  Fraser 
Trebilcock provided legal services to the defendants, a group of trusts, in connection with 
the financing and purchase of four hydroelectric dams.  Dissatisfied with the 
representation they received, the defendants refused to pay the full sum of fees billed by 
Fraser Trebilcock.  To recover these unpaid fees, Fraser Trebilcock brought the instant 
suit against the defendants for breach of contract.  Pursuant to MCR 2.403, the matter 
was submitted for a case evaluation, which resulted in an evaluation of $60,000 in favor 
of Fraser Trebilcock.  Fraser Trebilcock accepted the evaluation, but the defendants 
rejected it.  The case proceeded to trial, resulting in a verdict for Fraser Trebilcock and a 
judgment totaling $73,501.90.   
Throughout the litigation of this breach-of-contract action, Fraser Trebilcock 
appeared through Michael Perry, a shareholder of the firm, and other lawyers affiliated 
with the firm (collectively, “member lawyers”).1  At no point did Fraser Trebilcock retain 
outside counsel, and there is no indication that the firm entered into a retainer agreement 
with its member lawyers or received or paid a bill for their services in connection with 
                                              
1 According to Fraser Trebilcock, all member lawyers of the firm, including its 
shareholders, are salaried employees of the firm. 
 
 
 
3 
the litigation.  On its pleadings, Fraser Trebilcock identified the firm itself as “Attorneys 
for Plaintiff.”  
After receiving the verdict, the parties filed posttrial motions: the defendants 
moved for a new trial, and Fraser Trebilcock moved for case-evaluation sanctions under 
MCR 2.403(O), seeking to recover, inter alia, a “reasonable attorney fee” under 
MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) for the legal services performed by its member lawyers—including 
the litigation of these posttrial motions.  The trial court denied the defendants’ motion for 
a new trial, and granted Fraser Trebilcock’s motion for case-evaluation sanctions, ruling 
in particular that Fraser Trebilcock could recover an attorney fee as part of its sanctions.  
The court recognized that an individual litigant (including one who is an attorney) cannot 
recover attorney fees for engaging in self-representation, but, relying on certain language 
from Kay v Ehrler, 499 US 432; 111 S Ct 1435; 113 L Ed 2d 486 (1991), concluded that 
this prohibition did not extend to a corporation such as Fraser Trebilcock seeking to 
recover a fee for legal services performed by its member lawyers.  After an evidentiary 
hearing, the court awarded Fraser Trebilcock $80,434 in attorney fees, plus interest—
roughly two-thirds of the amount of fees the firm had requested—and also permitted 
Fraser Trebilcock to seek supplemental fees for additional time spent litigating the 
sanctions request.  Fraser Trebilcock requested $38,566.50 in such fees, of which the 
court awarded $21,253.60, plus interest—resulting in a total award of approximately 
$102,000, 
pre-interest, 
as 
a 
“reasonable 
attorney 
fee” 
sanction 
under 
MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b).  
The defendants appealed the judgment and each of the two sanctions orders.  In a 
split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in all respects but one, 
 
 
 
4 
reversing the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Fraser Trebilcock for time spent 
pursuing its request for case-evaluation sanctions.  See Fraser Trebilcock Davis & 
Dunlap PC v Boyce Trust 2350, 304 Mich App 174; 850 NW2d 537 (2014).  The panel 
unanimously agreed on this reversal,2 but divided over whether the remainder of the trial 
court’s fee award under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) could stand.  After surveying Michigan and 
federal authority, the Court of Appeals majority upheld the trial court’s determination 
that Fraser Trebilcock could recover attorney fees for the legal services performed by its 
member lawyers in the breach-of-contract action, despite caselaw establishing that an 
individual attorney-litigant may not recover such fees for self-representation.  Like the 
trial court, the majority relied significantly on certain language from the United States 
Supreme Court in Kay, as well as federal authority interpreting that language.  Chief 
Judge MURPHY disagreed with the majority’s reasoning on this point, concluding instead 
that Michigan authority precluding an award of attorney fees to an individual attorney-
litigant—most notably, Omdahl v West Iron Co Bd of Ed, 478 Mich 423; 733 NW2d 380 
(2007)—extended to and foreclosed Fraser Trebilcock’s request for fees.3 
The defendants then filed the instant application for leave to appeal, seeking this 
Court’s review of the Court of Appeals majority’s partial affirmance of the fee award to 
                                              
2 The panel also unanimously rejected the defendants’ challenges to the trial court’s 
exclusion of certain proposed testimony and its refusal to give a certain jury instruction. 
3 The Court of Appeals majority also affirmed the trial court’s assessment of the 
reasonableness of Fraser Trebilcock’s requested fees.  In light of his determination that 
no such fees could be awarded, Chief Judge MURPHY did not join this portion of the 
majority’s opinion. 
 
 
 
5 
Fraser Trebilcock.4  Fraser Trebilcock cross-appealed, challenging the Court of Appeals’ 
partial reversal of the fee award.  We denied leave as to Fraser Trebilcock’s cross-appeal, 
and ordered oral argument on the defendants’ application.  See Fraser Trebilcock Davis 
& Dunlap PC v Boyce Trust, 497 Mich 873 (2014).  For the reasons set forth below, we 
agree with the defendants that Fraser Trebilcock cannot recover a “reasonable attorney 
fee” under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) for the legal services performed by its member lawyers 
in connection with the instant suit.  Accordingly, in lieu of granting the defendants’ 
application, we reverse the Court of Appeals in part and vacate the trial court’s attorney-
fee award to Fraser Trebilcock. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Our disposition of this fee dispute turns on the proper interpretation of 
MCR 2.403(O), which this Court reviews de novo and under the same principles that 
govern the construction of statutes.  See McAuley v Gen Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 
518; 578 NW2d 282 (1998).  Namely, the court rule is to be interpreted according to its 
plain language, “ ‘giving effect to the meaning of the words as they ought to have been 
understood by those who adopted them.’ ”  Id., quoting Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 
474, 481; 189 NW2d 202 (1971).  Unless expressly defined, “[e]very word or phrase 
of . . . [the] court rule should be given its commonly accepted meaning[.]”  Id. 
 
 
                                              
4 The defendants did not challenge the Court of Appeals’ unanimous affirmance of the 
trial court’s handling of certain trial-related matters, or the majority’s affirmance of the 
trial court’s fee-reasonableness determination.  Accordingly, these matters are not before 
us. 
 
 
 
6 
MCR 2.403(O) provides, in relevant part: 
(1) If a party has rejected an evaluation and the action proceeds to 
verdict, that party must pay the opposing party’s actual costs unless the 
verdict is more favorable to the rejecting party than the case evaluation. 
However, if the opposing party has also rejected the evaluation, a party is 
entitled to costs only if the verdict is more favorable to that party than the 
case evaluation. 
*   *   * 
(6) For the purpose of this rule, actual costs are 
(a) those costs taxable in any civil action, and 
(b) a reasonable attorney fee based on a reasonable hourly or daily 
rate as determined by the trial judge for services necessitated by the 
rejection of the case evaluation. 
For the purpose of determining taxable costs under this subrule and 
under MCR 2.625, the party entitled to recover actual costs under this rule 
shall be considered the prevailing party. 
As a general matter, the purpose of MCR 2.403(O) “is to encourage settlement by 
plac[ing] the burden of litigation costs upon the party who insists upon trial by rejecting a 
proposed mediation award.”  Watkins v Manchester, 220 Mich App 337, 344; 559 NW2d 
81 (1996) (quotation marks omitted); see Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519, 527-528; 751 
NW2d 472 (2008).  “Although one of the aims of the mediation rule is to discourage 
needless litigation, the rule is not intended to punish litigants for asserting their right to a 
trial on the merits.”  McAuley, 457 Mich at 523.  Nor is it “designed to provide a form of 
economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys or to produce windfalls.”  Smith, 
481 Mich at 528.  Correspondingly, the “reasonable attorney fee” authorized under 
MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) is not punitive but “compensatory in nature.”  McAuley, 457 Mich 
at 520.   
 
 
 
7 
The parties do not dispute that Fraser Trebilcock is entitled to recover, as case-
evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O), the “actual costs” of its breach-of-contract 
action against the defendants, which proceeded to trial as a result of the defendants’ 
rejection of the case evaluation.  The question before us is whether such costs include a 
“reasonable attorney fee” for the legal services performed by Fraser Trebilcock’s member 
lawyers over the course of that action.  According to the defendants, this cannot be, 
because Fraser Trebilcock’s self-representation did not give rise to an “attorney fee.”  We 
agree. 
This Court most recently addressed the commonly accepted meaning of the phrase 
“attorney fee” in Omdahl, explaining:  
“Attorney” is defined as a “lawyer” or an “attorney-at-law.”  
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001).  The definition of 
“lawyer” is “a person whose profession is to represent clients in a court of 
law or to advise or act for them in other legal matters.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  And the definition of “attorney-at-law” is “an officer of the court 
authorized to appear before it as a representative of a party to a legal 
controversy.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Clearly, the word “attorney” connotes 
an agency relationship between two people.  “Fee” is relevantly defined as 
“a sum charged or paid, as for professional services or for a privilege.”  Id.  
[Omdahl, 478 Mich at 428.] 
At issue in Omdahl was whether an individual attorney-litigant could recover attorney 
fees for the representation he provided to himself in the successful pursuit of a claim 
under the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq., which provides that if a 
person prevails in an action under that statute, “the person shall recover court costs and 
actual attorney fees for the action.”  MCL 15.271(4).  Looking to the above definitions, 
this Court concluded that there were no such attorney fees for the individual attorney-
litigant to recover.  As this Court explained, the “plain and unambiguous meaning of the 
 
 
 
8 
term ‘attorney’ ” requires “an agency relationship between an attorney and the client 
whom he or she represents” and, with that relationship, “separate identities between the 
attorney and the client.”  Omdahl, 478 Mich at 428 n 1, 432.  And see id. at 430 n 4 
(“[B]oth a client and an attorney are necessary ingredients for an attorney fee award.”).  
Because, in the case of an individual attorney-litigant, the requisite distinction in identity 
between attorney and client is lacking, there is no attorney-client relationship from which 
an “attorney fee” may arise, id. at 432—an outcome this Court deemed consistent with 
decisions by “[t]he courts of this state as well as the federal courts,” which “have, in 
deciding cases of this sort, focused on the concept that an attorney who represents 
himself or herself is not entitled to recover attorney fees because of the absence of an 
agency relationship.”  Id. at 428-429.5    
We agree with the defendants that this same rationale applies to the instant case, 
and is fatal to Fraser Trebilcock’s request for attorney fees under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b).  
Fraser Trebilcock does not challenge the commonly accepted meaning of “attorney fee” 
set forth in Omdahl, nor do we see any reason to assign that phrase a different meaning 
under the plain language of MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b).6  Instead, Fraser Trebilcock focuses on 
                                              
5 This Court also noted that, while the OMA expressly permits recovery of only “actual” 
attorney fees, Omdahl’s fee request did not fail because of that term or any distinction 
there may be between it and “reasonable”; rather, Omdahl could not recover fees for his 
self-representation because of the absence of the attorney-client relationship that inheres 
in and is necessary to an “attorney fee.”  See Omdahl, 478 Mich at 430 n 4. 
6 MCR 2.403 provides no express definition of “attorney fee.”  While 
MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) specifies that any “reasonable attorney fee” awarded as a case-
evaluation sanction must be “based on a reasonable hourly or daily rate as determined by 
the trial judge for services necessitated by the rejection of the case evaluation,” nothing in 
this language purports to supplant or modify the commonly accepted meaning of 
 
 
 
 
9 
distinguishing that precedent from the instant case, contending that Omdahl and its ilk do 
not foreclose the request for fees in this case because, unlike an individual attorney-
litigant, an incorporated law firm such as Fraser Trebilcock enjoys an identity distinct 
from its member lawyers; thus, when those lawyers appeared on behalf of Fraser 
Trebilcock in the underlying breach-of-contract action, the agency relationship necessary 
to give rise to an “attorney fee” was present.   
There is no dispute that Fraser Trebilcock, as a corporation, is a legal entity 
distinct from its shareholders.  See, e.g., Bourne v Muskegon Circuit Judge, 327 Mich 
175, 191; 41 NW2d 515 (1950).  There is also no dispute that Fraser Trebilcock used its 
member lawyers as agents to litigate its interests in the instant suit; indeed, there is no 
other way the firm could act on its own behalf.  See generally Mossman v Millenbach 
Motor Sales, 284 Mich 562, 568; 280 NW 50 (1938) (recognizing that a corporation can 
“only act through its agents”).  These facts alone, however, do not mean that the firm and 
its member lawyers necessarily enjoyed separate identities as client and attorney for the 
purposes of that litigation, such that the agency relationship between them would be 
sufficient to give rise to an “attorney fee” under Omdahl.  To the contrary, we see no 
                                              
“attorney fee” quoted above, or to suggest that such a fee can be awarded under 
MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) in the absence of the type of attorney-client relationship discussed 
in Omdahl.  To the contrary, in concluding that such a relationship was necessary for a 
fee award under the OMA, this Court relied in part on authority interpreting the “attorney 
fee” available under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b).  See Omdahl, 478 Mich at 431 (explaining 
that its interpretation of “attorney fee” was supported by Watkins, 220 Mich App 337, 
which held that an individual attorney-litigant may not recover a “reasonable attorney 
fee” for self-representation under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) and which likewise “focused on 
the availability of any attorney fees when the [attorney-client] agency relationship was 
missing”).   
 
 
 
10 
more of that relationship here than when an individual attorney engages in self-
representation.  For instance, Fraser Trebilcock routinely identified itself as its attorney 
throughout the litigation, and the record betrays no distinction in that regard between the 
firm and the member lawyers who physically appeared on its behalf—a conflation of 
identity consistent with our court rules, which make clear that the appearance of Fraser 
Trebilcock’s member lawyers was tantamount to “the appearance of every member of the 
firm,” MCR 2.117(B)(3)(b).  Nor is there any indication that those member lawyers 
viewed or treated the firm as a client distinct from themselves.  The nature of the fee 
sought by Fraser Trebilcock further confirms this analogy to an individual attorney-
litigant; like such a litigant, the firm is seeking to recover for the legal services that it was 
forced to direct to the instant suit rather than to its clients, by virtue of the defendants’ 
rejection of the case evaluation.  As recognized in Omdahl, an individual attorney-litigant 
typically cannot seek such remuneration as an “attorney fee”—a general rule to which 
MCR 2.403(O)(b)(6) provides no exception.  See McAuley, 457 Mich at 520 (explaining 
that the compensatory nature of an attorney-fee award under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) “is 
illustrated by the well-established body of law holding that a litigant representing himself 
may not recover attorney fees as an element of costs or damages under either a statute or 
a court rule”).  We are not convinced that the outcome should be any different for Fraser 
Trebilcock here. 
In sum, while we acknowledge that Fraser Trebilcock is a legally distinct 
corporate entity, we do not find that status sufficient to distinguish the representation it 
provided to itself through its member lawyers from the self-representation at issue in 
Omdahl, such that Fraser Trebilcock may recover a “reasonable attorney fee” under 
 
 
 
11 
MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) for its member lawyers’ services.  In resisting this conclusion, 
Fraser Trebilcock stresses that a corporation, unlike an individual, may only appear in 
court through licensed counsel.  We agree with this general proposition, see, e.g., Detroit 
Bar Ass’n v Union Guardian Trust Co (On Reconsideration), 282 Mich 707, 711; 281 
NW 432 (1938), and further recognize that, as a professional corporation, Fraser 
Trebilcock may only provide legal services through its duly licensed “officers, 
employees, and agents,” MCL 450.1285(1).  Contrary to Fraser Trebilcock’s suggestion, 
however, Michigan law does not prohibit a corporation from representing itself.  See 
MCL 450.681 (“It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary association to 
practice or appear as an attorney-at-law for any person other than itself in any court in 
this state or before any judicial body, or to make it a business to practice as an attorney-
at-law, for any person other than itself, in any of said courts . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
That the corporation may only do so through an appropriately licensed agent limits, but 
does not eliminate, this ability; nor does it mean that a corporation necessarily enters into 
the sort of relationship with its agent sufficient to support recovery of an attorney fee 
under Omdahl.  And as discussed above, we fail to see such a relationship in Fraser 
Trebilcock’s self-representation here. 
According to Fraser Trebilcock, this conclusion is at odds with the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kay, which this Court discussed favorably in Omdahl.  In 
Kay, an attorney successfully represented himself in a civil-rights action challenging the 
constitutionality of a state statute; he sought attorney fees under 42 USC 1988(b), which 
provides that the trial court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”  The United States Supreme Court 
 
 
 
12 
unanimously affirmed the lower courts’ rejection of this claim, citing the well-established 
“proposition that a pro se litigant who is not a lawyer is not entitled to attorney’s fees,” 
Kay, 449 US at 435, and concluding that the outcome should be no different for 
individual attorney-litigants seeking fees under § 1988.  As noted in Omdahl, the Kay 
Court supported this conclusion in part with its observation that “the word ‘attorney’ 
assumes an agency relationship, and it seems likely that Congress contemplated an 
attorney-client relationship as the predicate for an award under § 1988.”  Id. at 435-436 
(footnote omitted).  Fraser Trebilcock stresses, however, that the Kay Court 
immediately—and critically, for the purposes of its claimed fees—qualified this 
observation with the following footnote: 
Petitioner argues that because Congress intended organizations to 
receive an attorney’s fee even when they represented themselves, an 
individual attorney should also be permitted to receive an attorney’s fee 
even when he represents himself.  However, an organization is not 
comparable to a pro se litigant because the organization is always 
represented by counsel, whether in-house or pro bono, and thus, there is 
always an attorney-client relationship.  [Id. at 436 n 7.]   
As summarized by the Court of Appeals majority in this case, some federal 
circuits have relied upon this footnote in Kay to conclude that law firms represented by 
their own member lawyers can recover attorney fees for that representation.7  Fraser 
Trebilcock urges us, like the Court of Appeals majority, to do the same.  We, however, 
                                              
7 See Treasurer, Trustees of Drury Indus, Inc Health Care Plan & Trust v Goding, 692 
F3d 888, 898 (CA 8, 2012), cert den 133 S Ct 1644 (2013); Baker & Hostetler LLP v US 
Dep’t of Commerce, 473 F3d 312, 325 (CA DC, 2006); Bond v Blum, 317 F3d 385 (CA 
4, 2003); Gold, Weems, Bruser, Sues & Rundell v Metal Sales Mfg Corp, 236 F3d 214, 
218-219 (CA 5, 2000). 
 
 
 
13 
do not find Kay’s nonbinding dictum instructive here, and decline to follow suit.  As 
discussed, we fail to see a meaningful distinction under Michigan law between Fraser 
Trebilcock’s request for attorney fees under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) and that of an 
individual attorney-litigant; Kay’s passing commentary on fee requests by organizations 
under 42 USC 1988 does not convince us otherwise.  This commentary sought to 
reconcile Kay’s central holding—that individual attorney-litigants may not recover fees 
for self-representation—with Congress’s apparent intent that unspecified “organizations” 
be able to recover fees for representation provided by pro bono or in-house counsel under 
§ 1988.  Nothing in this dictum suggests that it was intended to reach beyond this limited 
task of interpretive reconciliation, let alone that it was meant to affirmatively distinguish 
an individual attorney-litigant from a law firm seeking fees for the representation it 
provided to itself through its member lawyers—a distinction we particularly hesitate to 
read into Kay’s footnote, given the overall thrust of the opinion.   
Nor do we see a good fit between the circumstances expressly contemplated in this 
dictum and those presently before us.  Kay’s footnote spoke to the attorney-client 
relationship that may arise between an organization and its in-house or pro bono counsel.  
Hoping to duck under Kay’s umbrella, Fraser Trebilcock likens the member lawyers who 
appeared on its behalf to such in-house counsel, but we find this characterization inapt.  
As Kay’s dictum reflects, the relationship between an organization and its in-house 
counsel is typically one of attorney and singular client; the attorney is employed by the 
organization in order to provide legal services to the organization.  There is no indication, 
however, that Fraser Trebilcock enjoyed this same type of relationship with its member 
lawyers in the instant suit—namely, that these lawyers were employed by and affiliated 
 
 
 
14 
with the firm to provide legal services to the firm as a distinct and exclusive client, rather 
than to provide such services on behalf of the firm to its clients.  Whether and under what 
circumstances a law firm may recover fees for representation provided to it by in-house 
counsel is not before us, and we decline to reach that question here.  For present 
purposes, it is enough to say that, to the extent Kay can be read to recognize the existence 
of an attorney-client relationship between a law firm and its in-house counsel, this 
recognition does nothing to further Fraser Trebilcock’s request for fees here. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Fraser Trebilcock cannot recover 
a “reasonable attorney fee” under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) for the legal services performed 
by its member lawyers in connection with the instant suit.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
Court of Appeals in part, vacate the trial court’s award of a “reasonable attorney fee” to 
Fraser Trebilcock under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b), and remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
Bridget M. McCormack  
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein