Case Title: In Interests of Wg

Citation: 349 N.W.2d 487

Docket Number: 

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1984-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
349 N.W.2d 487 (1984) In the Interests of W.G., S.G., D.G., W.G., K.G., J.G., and N.G., Children, J.G. and P.G., Appellants. No. 83-554. Supreme Court of Iowa. May 16, 1984. Rehearing Denied August 16, 1984. Gary K. Anderson of Anderson & Wheeler, Council Bluffs, for appellant father. Gregory L. Waggoner of Waggoner & Walters, Council Bluffs, for appellant mother. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Gordon E. Allen, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Brent D. Hege, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of Iowa. Considered by UHLENHOPP, P.J., and HARRIS, McCORMICK, McGIVERIN, and LARSON, JJ. HARRIS, Justice. This is a statutory proceeding seeking termination of parent-child relationships between natural parents and seven of their children. The district court determined the State established grounds for terminating the relationships. We affirm the district court and, so doing, we vacate a contrary decision of the court of appeals. The parents think this controversy centers on two beliefs held by the father and now also subscribed to by the mother. The father is committed to an agrarian lifestyle which, if not primitive, is at least starkly simple. And he states he strongly believes in corporal punishment in the rearing of his children. We wish to make it plain at the outset that we think neither of these views are at issue here. The parents' lifestyle is of concern here only if it appears to have adversely affected the children. The law clearly gives parents who are so inclined the right to inflict reasonable corporal punishment in connection with the rearing of their children. We *488 have always required the right to be exercised reasonably. In State v. Bitman, 13 Iowa 485, 486 (1862) we said: What is at issue here is cruelty to children. The evidence of its existence is overwhelming and the extent of it far exceeds what can be tolerated in a civilized society. The mother was born in 1942 and holds a college degree in home economics. She was an elementary school teacher in Wisconsin before and during the early years of her marriage. She and the father were married in 1968, and have since resided in Wisconsin. The father's farm background, and general outlook on life, were vastly different from the mother's. The father wrote the following in a letter: Eight children were born to the parents; the youngest is not involved in this proceeding. Six of these children were born on the farmstead. The mother also had two miscarriages, and another child who died at four weeks of age. The district court filed extensive findings of fact. On our de novo review we reach the same factual conclusions. Indeed, any close reading of the testimony of the parents discloses there is little disagreement about the material facts. They were developed at both the CHINA and termination hearings. As the district court's findings are both careful and perceptive, we quote from them the following, which we adopt as our own: The children were adjudicated in need of assistance in March 1981. Extensive agency efforts to improve the family situation were made both before and after the CHINA hearing. The efforts were to no avail. As stated by the district court: [The father] now feels more confident in his beliefs, and believes he has made no errors in the discipline of his children *489 or wife. In testimony [the father] espouses a sequential acceleration of consequences for effective discipline, to wit: In the past his discipline techniques have included: . . . . The mother, as a result of what one expert called the "classic" battered-woman syndrome[1] is now reconciled with her husband's theories of severe discipline. She states she now subscribes to them. Those views were described in the mother's testimony at the CHINA hearing as follows: Q. At what age did he start to initiate this behavior on the children? A. The youngest thatreal definite one that I could see was when [W.] was about, let's see, he was still sleeping. When they *490 were born they were placed in a dresser drawer because we didn't have a crib. He was less than three months old, he was still in the dresser drawer. I came in the house and my husband was talking on the phone and it always irritated him when there was any other noise. [W.] was missing. I went looking for him. He was in the closet with the heavy coat over top of him. The coat had fallen down. He was sweating and all red and coughing. This wasn't directly inflicted discipline by him but it was an attempt to keep the child quiet. .... At the termination hearing, the mother again described the father's discipline of the children: . . . . She also testified at length about the father's abuse against her. At the CHINA hearing she stated: The father's own testimony does not significantly contradict the foregoing description. In his own testimony, he stated: There is no need to extend this opinion by further references to the father's commitment to physical violence. We find that his stated belief in corporal punishment is a transparent rationalization for his brutality and cruelty. His angry outbursts, at best, had very little to do with directing his children's upbringing. They were almost entirely manifestations of his own passions. His claim of some lofty motive to direct his children in the right path is a sham. The impact of this violence upon the children has been vast. Again, we adopt the findings of the district court: . . . . The district court concluded the state established the grounds for terminating the parent-child relationships under both Iowa Code sections 232.116(3) (1983) (past physical abuse) and 232.116(5) (future harm). I. The general rules controlling our review are not in dispute and are well settled: Several previously enunciated principles have served to guide our examination of the record before us. Appellate review of proceedings to terminate a parent-child relationship is de novo; thus "it is our duty to review the facts as well as the law and adjudicate rights anew on those propositions properly preserved and presented to us." [Authority.] We accord weight to the fact findings of the juvenile court, especially when considering the credibility of the witnesses whom that court heard and observed firsthand, *492 but we are not bound by those findings. [Authority.] In the Interest of Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981). Under Iowa Code section 232.116(3), the court may order termination if it finds that one or both parents has physically abused the child, that the court has previously adjudicated the child in need of assistance after finding physical abuse, and that the parents were offered services to correct the situation which led to the abuse. "Physical abuse" is defined as "any nonaccidental physical injury suffered by a child as the result of the acts or omissions of the child's parent, guardian or custodian or other person legally responsible for the child." Iowa Code § 232.2(37). See also Iowa Code § 232.68(2) (definition of "child abuse"). Under Iowa Code section 232.116(5), the court may order termination if it finds that the child has been adjudicated in need of assistance, that the child's custody has been transferred from the parents for twelve months, and that, if returned to the parents' custody, the child will suffer harm in the manner specified in Iowa Code section 232.2(5). One of the harms specified in that section is physical abuse. See Iowa Code § 232.2(5)(b). II. The only question is whether there is clear and convincing evidence which establishes prior or probable future physical abuse of the children. We think both are conclusively established by the testimony of the two parents alone. The abuse we have identified relates mainly to past events. But a clear picture of probable future abuse also emerges from the testimony. The father testified that he will expect the children to contribute more and more to his enterprise as they grow older. In his case, however, this expected contribution is something quite beyond the efforts normally expected of members of a farm family. We know from the brutal and abusive treatment of his wife what will happen when a child fails, as a child inevitably would, to conform to his standards in performing farm duties. The children would seem to him to be "sabotaging" his farm. There would again be frequent and harsh beatings. This is the father's philosophy and he refuses to change it. We cannot submit the children to such a future. Most of the direct abuse was at the hand of the father. In a sense the question, as it relates to the mother, is more painful, but we think it is no less clear. The statute wisely provides that the relationship of both parents may be terminated upon a finding that either has abused or either is imminently likely to abuse the child. The mother testified she now subscribes to the father's views on what they consider to be appropriate child discipline. Hence, we are not faced with a claim that the mother was forced to choose between her husband and her children. We do not suggest the outcome would necessarily be different in such a case. To an abused child the blows are intolerable either way. The district court was correct in ordering termination. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED. [1] The syndrome was described in these terms: the mother struggled with simple decisions; she was complaint to authority; she transferred many of her dependency needs to the agencies in both Wisconsin and Iowa.