Case Title: Clark v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Clark v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.1997 WY 50934 P.2d 1269Case Number: 96-169Decided: 04/02/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

In the Matter of the Worker'S Compensation Claim of: 

 

Judith L. CLARK, an employee of Holiday 
Inn,  

Appellant(Petitioner-Claimant), 

 

v. 

 

STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION DIVISION,  

Appellee(Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Laramie County 

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Robin Sessions Cooley of Bishop & Cooley, LLC, 
Cheyenne.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. Hill, Attorney General, and Jennifer A. 
Evans, Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY and LEHMAN, 
JJ., and HARTMAN, District Judge.

 

LEHMAN, Justice.

 [¶1]      Appellant Judith 
L. Clark appeals the determination by the Office of Administrative Hearings 
(OAH) denying her claims for total disability or loss of earnings 
benefits.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Appellant poses 
the following issues:

I. Whether the hearing examiner's findings were 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with the law 
where he made medical findings and conclusions he was not qualified to 
make[.]

II. Whether substantial evidence exists to support 
the hearing examiner's findings that the employee-claimant was not entitled to 
an additional award for loss of earning capacity due to her work-related 
injury[.]

 

Appellee Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division (Division) states the issue as:

Whether the Office of Administrative Hearings denial 
of Claimant's application for permanent total disability or loss of earnings 
benefits is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with 
law.

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      On February 5, 
1994, Clark was injured while working as a housekeeper at the Holiday Inn. The 
Division paid Clark temporary total disability benefits; and, based on an 
independent medical evaluation performed by Dr. Victoria Vernon, the Division 
granted Clark a 66 percent physical impairment award. Subsequently, Clark 
submitted a claim to the Division for a 100 percent disability award or, in the 
alternative, a loss of earnings award.

 

[¶5]      The Division 
authorized James Hardway to perform a vocational evaluation. As a result of the 
evaluation, which concluded that Clark had suffered no loss of earning capacity, 
the Division denied Clark's claim for additional benefits. Clark objected and 
requested a hearing before the OAH. At that hearing, Clark presented evidence 
from Roger L. Grimm, another vocational evaluation specialist, to contradict 
Hardway's evaluation. On February 16, 1996, the hearing examiner issued an Order 
Denying Benefits from which Clark now appeals.

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶6]      Our review of 
agency action is governed by W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) (1990), which 
provides:

(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and 
when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant issues of law, 
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it 
cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error. The reviewing court shall:

* 
* * * * *

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

* 
* * * * *

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

See also 
W.R.A.P. 12.09.

 

DISCUSSION

Abuse of 
Discretion

 

[¶7]      The record 
contains conflicting medical evidence regarding the extent of Clark's 
impairment, specifically between Dr. Vernon's expert opinion and the American 
Medical Association, Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (Guides) upon which a doctor relies in 
determining a permanent physical impairment rating. Clark claims that the 
hearing examiner's findings were arbitrary and capricious, arguing that the 
examiner exceeded his discretion in analyzing Dr. Vernon's testimony. This court 
has often stated that "`[t]he extent and degree of disability are questions of 
fact.'" Gilstrap v. State ex rel. 
Worker's Compensation Div., 875 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Leonard v. McDonalds, 746 P.2d 1261, 1262 (Wyo. 1987)). The hearing examiner, as the trier of fact, is 
responsible for determining relevancy, assigning probative value and ascribing 
the relevant weight given to medical testimony. Matter of Worker's Compensation Claim of 
Thornberg, 913 P.2d 863, 867 (Wyo. 1996). Ambiguities in evidence trigger 
the process of weighing the evidence and assessing the credibility of the 
witness. Latimer v. Rissler & McMurry 
Co., 902 P.2d 706, 711 (Wyo. 1995). As we have previously 
stated:

The fact finder was left with weighing these 
opinions, and to do so he had to consider (1) the opinion, (2) the reasons, if 
any, given for it, (3) the strength of it, and (4) the qualifications and 
credibility of the witness[es] expressing it.

Thornberg, 913 P.2d  at 868. Accord Matter of Krause, 803 P.2d 81, 83 
(Wyo. 1990); Rice v. State, 500 P.2d 675, 676 (Wyo. 1972).

 

[¶8]      The hearing 
examiner did not "revamp and revise" Dr. Vernon's medical tests, as Clark 
contends. Instead, the hearing examiner appropriately engaged in the process of 
evaluating the relative value of Dr. Vernon's testimony. For example, the 
hearing examiner evaluated the reason Dr. Vernon gave in determining that Clark 
suffered a 66 percent permanent physical impairment:

[According to the Guides] [i]f a 20% variation in the 
readings exists, then one may assume the patient is not exerting full effort. If 
there is suspicion or evidence the subject is exerting less than maximal effort, 
the grip strength measurements are invalid for estimating impairment (Exhibit 
E). In this case, the grip strength tests performed by Dr. Vernon (12, 9, 10, 7, 
and 8) have a variation of approximately 33%. This is a clear indication Clark 
did not exert full effort on the grip strength test. Accordingly, Dr. Vernon 
should not have considered the grip strength loss and Clark's physical 
impairment rating should have been 56%. This is 10% less than the amount awarded 
and paid.

Order Denying Benefits, 
Findings and Conclusions ¶ 9. The trier of fact may disregard an expert opinion 
if he finds the opinion unreasonable or not adequately supported by the facts 
upon which the opinion is based. Krause, 803 P.2d  at 83; cf. Rice, 500 P.2d  at 676. In evaluating the 
medical testimony, the hearing examiner found error within the facts upon which 
Dr. Vernon's opinion was based. Thus, the hearing examiner was well within his 
discretion when he assigned less weight to that testimony.

 

[¶9]      Furthermore, the 
hearing examiner did not deny Clark an additional award because she had already 
received more impairment benefits than she was entitled to receive; rather, he 
denied additional benefits because Clark failed to establish by a preponderance 
of evidence that she had suffered total permanent disability or loss of earning 
capacity. Because the hearing examiner concluded that Clark did not exert full 
effort during Dr. Vernon's testing, he assigned less probative value to Dr. 
Vernon's testimony and to other expert testimony which was primarily based on 
Clark's performance of other physical tests.

 

Substantial 
Evidence

 

[¶10]   When reviewing an agency's findings 
of fact, this court applies the substantial evidence standard. W.S. 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(E).

Our task is to examine the entire record to determine 
if substantial evidence exists to support the hearing examiner's findings. We 
will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing examiner if his 
decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.

Matter of Workers' Compensation Claim of 
Fansler, 914 P.2d 156, 158 (Wyo. 
1996) (quoting Romero v. Davy McKee 
Corp., 854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1993)). Accordingly, "we examine only the 
evidence which favors the prevailing party, allowing every favorable inference, 
while omitting consideration of any conflicting evidence." Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 
882 P.2d 873, 876 (Wyo. 1994) (citing 
Matter of Injury to Carpenter, 736 P.2d 311, 312 (Wyo. 
1987)).

 

[¶11]   Clark argues that substantial 
evidence does not exist to support the hearing examiner's finding that she 
suffered no impairment of earning capacity because the examiner did not consider 
all of the factors enumerated in State ex 
rel. Workers' Compensation Div. v. White, 837 P.2d 1095 (Wyo. 1992), i.e., 
(a) physical impairment - the nature and extent of injury; (b) the worker's age; 
(c) the worker's education; (d) ability to continue pre-injury employment; (e) 
post-injury employment prospects; (f) pre-injury earnings; and (g) post-injury 
earnings.

No single factor of those listed above is 
determinative of the extent or existence of loss of earning capacity. They are 
all evidence to be considered together with all of the other facts and 
circumstances in determining whether a loss of earning capacity in fact occurred 
and, if so, the percentage of loss.

Id. at 
1097. In that regard, the hearing examiner specifically 
found:

Clark has failed to establish, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, her entitlement to a loss of earnings award based upon the factors 
enumerated in White. Clark is 43 
years old and has a high school education with limited on-the-job training. She 
is unable to return to her pre-injury employment because of the injury to her 
nondominant hand. Clark's physical impairment is substantial and does limit her 
ability to perform some types of employment. However, there are a number of jobs 
available within Clark's community that she can perform. All of them pay as much 
or more than her employment at the time of the injury. Considering all of these 
factors and taking into consideration that Clark has already received a physical 
impairment award which appears to be 10% greater than the amount [she is] 
entitled to under the Guides, this 
Office is not persuaded that Clark is entitled to any additional award for 
permanent partial disability.

Order Denying Benefits, 
Findings and Conclusions ¶ 27. Regarding Clark's physical impairment, the 
hearing examiner additionally stated:

Clark's physical impairment is to her nondominant 
hand. While Clark's physical impairment does affect her ability to find 
employment, it does not preclude her from working. There are many individuals in 
our society who are gainfully employed in various occupations who only have the 
use of one hand. With the proper motivation and assistance, Clark can be one of 
them.

Order Denying Benefits, 
Findings and Conclusions ¶ 25.

 

[¶12]   The hearing examiner considered 
Clark's age, her level of education and her limited job training. He also 
observed, however, that:

According to Mr. Hardway, there are many jobs 
available within the job market that can be done one-handed, particularly when 
the person has the use of his/her dominant hand as Clark does. Additionally, 40 
to 50% of all jobs are unskilled and can be performed by a person with average 
or less than average mental ability.

Order Denying Benefits, 
Findings and Conclusions ¶ 11. While the hearing examiner concluded that Clark 
could not return to her pre-injury employment, he found that Clark had many 
post-injury employment prospects and that her post-injury earning potential was 
equivalent to or greater than her pre-injury earnings:

Taking into consideration Clark's transferable skills 
and applying her physical limitations, it was determined that Clark was 
qualified for employment as a cashier, sale demonstrator/promotor, hotel clerk, 
and as a driver. These are unskilled entry level positions and pay between $4.89 
and $6.73 an hour. Since Clark's pre-injury wage was $4.25 an hour, there is no 
loss of earnings capacity. Mr. Hardway contacted the Human Resource Director at 
the Holiday Inn and was advised the physical demands for the hotel clerk 
position were within Clark's physical limitations.

Order Denying Benefits, 
Findings and Conclusions ¶ 10.

 

[¶13]   Clark participated in two 
vocational evaluations. Mr. Hardway's evaluation determined that Clark had 
suffered no loss of earning capacity, and Mr. Grimm's concluded Clark suffered a 
100 percent loss of earnings. In such an instance, the role of this court is 
well defined:

It is the rule "that where the evidence justifies 
either of two reasonable inferences, one favorable to the party having the 
burden of proof and the other favorable to his opponent, the trier of the facts 
should be allowed to determine which, if either, of the two inferences is more 
reasonable or probable, and make his finding accordingly."

Matter of Fansler, 914 P.2d  at 159 (quoting White v. Maverick Production 
Co., 63 Wyo. 452, 182 P.2d 818, 822 (Wyo. 1947)). Even if it were a close 
question, we would rely upon the decision of the hearing examiner because "[o]ur 
deference for findings of fact is reserved for the fact-finder." Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Western Gas 
Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 870 (Wyo. 1990).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶14]   The hearing examiner did not abuse 
his discretion in evaluating the medical testimony presented. The evidence 
establishing that Clark suffered no loss of earning capacity is sufficient such 
that a reasonable mind might accept it in support of the hearing examiner's 
conclusions. Accordingly, the Order Denying Benefits is 
affirmed.