Case Title: State v. Juan Eugenio

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP001394-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1394-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Juan Eugenio,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  210 Wis. 2d 347, 565 N.W.2d 798 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLSIHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 25, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 9, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
David M. Bastianelli 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Eduardo M. Borda, Milwaukee. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Paul Lundsten, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No.  96-1394-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Juan Eugenio, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.    The defendant, Juan Eugenio, 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals1 
that affirmed the defendant's conviction for first-degree sexual 
assault of a minor.  The defendant argues that the circuit court 
erred in allowing the State to offer character evidence of a 
victim's truthfulness and in introducing evidence of the 
victim's prior consistent oral statements under the "rule of 
completeness." 
 
The 
defendant 
also 
asserts 
prosecutorial 
misconduct arising from the State's failure to encourage the 
victim to cooperate with a defense investigator prior to trial. 
 Because we determine that the circuit court properly admitted 
both the character evidence and the complete prior statements, 
                     
1 State v. Eugenio, 210 Wis. 2d 347, 565 N.W.2d 798 (Ct. 
App. 1997)(affirming order of Circuit Court for Kenosha County, 
David M. Bastianelli, Judge).   
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
2 
and because we discern no legal basis for a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I.   
¶2 
The defendant was charged with one count of first-
degree sexual assault of a child and one count of "threats to 
injure," contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(1)2 and 943.30(1),3 
respectively.  The charges arose from an incident four years 
earlier in the spring of 1991 in which the defendant allegedly 
sexually abused a six-year-old child, and then threatened to 
kill her if she told anyone. 
¶3 
As part of the pretrial investigation, the defendant's 
attorneys asked the victim's mother to allow the child to speak 
with a defense investigator.  The victim's mother contacted the 
                     
2  Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) provides: 
Sexual assault of a child.  (1) FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL 
ASSAULT.  Whoever has sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse with a person who has not attained the age 
of 13 years is guilty of a Class B felony. 
  
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the 
1991-92 volumes.  
3 Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1) provides in pertinent part: 
Threats to injure or accuse of crime.  (1) Whoever, 
either 
verbally 
or 
by 
any 
written 
or 
printed 
communication, maliciously . . . threatens or commits 
any injury to the person . . . of another, with intent 
thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage 
whatever, or with intent to compel the person so 
threatened to do any act against the person's will or 
omit to do any lawful act, is guilty of a Class D 
felony. 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
3 
district attorney's office, which arranged for the meeting to 
occur in that office.  At the scheduled meeting between the 
investigator and the child, an assistant district attorney 
neither actively encouraged cooperation with the defense nor 
discouraged such cooperation.  She advised the victim's mother 
that the defense investigator was present to elicit information 
from the child for later use in court.  The mother subsequently 
refused to allow her child to be questioned by the investigator, 
concluding that the investigator's purpose was to "mess up" her 
daughter. 
¶4 
The defendant then asked the circuit court to dismiss 
the case, asserting that the assistant district attorney's 
actions constituted prosecutorial misconduct.  The defendant 
claimed that under the standards of conduct adopted in State v. 
Simmons, 57 Wis. 2d 285, 203 N.W.2d 887 (1973), the assistant 
district 
attorney 
had 
a 
duty 
to 
encourage 
the 
victim's 
cooperation with the defense investigation.  The circuit court 
denied the request for dismissal. 
¶5 
At trial, the defense highlighted in its opening 
statement what it considered to be inconsistencies in the 
victim's statements and the defense's theory that the victim 
made those statements to get attention.  The defense continued 
this 
concentration 
on 
inconsistencies 
during 
its 
cross-
examination of the victim. 
¶6 
Considering defense counsel's assertions at opening 
statements to be an attack on the victim's character, the 
circuit court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1), allowed the 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
4 
State to rehabilitate the victim's character by offering the 
testimony of the victim's school counselor.  The counselor 
testified that in her opinion the victim was a truthful 
individual.  Based on the rule of completeness, the circuit 
court also admitted the highlighted inconsistent statements in 
their entirety. 
¶7 The jury subsequently convicted the defendant of 
sexually assaulting the victim, but acquitted him of the "threat 
to injure" count.  The circuit court then sentenced the 
defendant to 12 years in prison.  The defendant appealed the 
conviction. 
¶8  The court of appeals affirmed.  It concluded that the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the 
testimony concerning the victim's character for truthfulness. 
Next, the court of appeals determined that the victim's 
consistent oral statements were admissible under the rule of 
completeness as it exists in our common law.  Finally, the 
appellate court concluded that the circuit court had not erred 
in denying the defendant's motion based on prosecutorial 
misconduct since the assistant district attorney had not 
actively discouraged the victim's cooperation with the defense 
investigator and since no duty exists to actively encourage 
cooperation. 
 II. 
¶9 
The defendant first challenges the circuit court's 
admission of character testimony offered by the State to 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
5 
rehabilitate the truthfulness of the victim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 906.08(1).  Pursuant to that statute: 
 
the credibility of a witness may be attacked or 
supported by evidence in the form of reputation or 
opinion, but subject to these limitations:  a) the 
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness 
or untruthfulness, and b), except with respect to an 
accused who testifies in his or her own behalf, 
evidence of truthful character is admissible only 
after the character of the witness for truthfulness 
has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or 
otherwise. 
Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1). 
¶10 As a threshold matter, the parties dispute the 
standard of review by which we review a circuit court's 
determination that the character for truthfulness of a witness 
has been impugned in a manner sufficient for the party offering 
the witness to proceed under Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1).4  The 
defendant asserts that we review such issues as a matter of law, 
while the State would have us consider the decision as a mixed 
question of law and fact. 
¶11 A determination of whether a witness's character for 
truthfulness has been attacked in a manner sufficient to invoke 
Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1) necessarily requires a circuit court to 
weigh the impact of the proffered character allegations based on 
their content and the tenor with which they are offered.  Thus, 
such inquires are circumstance dependent.  See Federal Advisory 
                     
4 Except for minor textual differences and Wisconsin's 
broader allowance of character testimony where an accused 
testifies in his own behalf, Wis. Stat. § 906.08 and Federal 
Rule of Evidence 608 are identical.  
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
6 
Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 608; Charles Alan 
Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 6116, at 66-73 (1993).  Because we cannot suitably evaluate 
such factors based on a cold record, a circuit court's decision 
that a witness's character for truthfulness has been attacked is 
due the deference that this court normally awards evidentiary 
rulings.  See Michael R.B. v. State, 175 Wis. 2d 713, 723, 499 
N.W.2d 641 (1993). 
¶12 However, we are also cognizant that a proper exercise 
of discretion requires the circuit court to apply the correct 
standard of law to the facts at hand.  See State v. Pharr, 115 
Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983).  Because determination 
of the proper legal standard to be applied by circuit courts 
faced with possible character attacks on witnesses requires 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 906.08, we conduct that portion 
of our review of this case as a matter of law.  See McEvoy v. 
Group Health Coop. of Eau Claire, 213 Wis. 2d 507, 517, 570 
N.W.2d 397 (1997).  Accordingly, we determine that the issue in 
this case is a mixed question of fact and law and we turn to an 
examination of the facts and the proper test to be applied to 
those facts under Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1). 
¶13 During opening statements, defense counsel highlighted 
several inconsistent statements made by the victim concerning 
the circumstances surrounding her alleged sexual abuse by the 
defendant.  In concluding her opening arguments, defense counsel 
then stated that: 
 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
7 
[r]epeating a lie doesn't make it true.  You will hear 
all these different versions because every time she's 
told someone the story has changed.  What didn't 
change was the attention she got for telling the 
story, the excitement. . . . You will hear testimony 
that as a result of this disclosure police officers 
came to see her, social workers came to see her.  She 
went to court.  She met with victim witness people.  
She met with district attorneys.  You will hear that 
she received a great deal of attention for this 
disclosure. 
Defense counsel then focused her cross-examination of the victim 
on these same inconsistencies. 
¶14 Believing the defense counsel's tactics to be an 
attack on the character of the victim, the State offered the 
testimony of the victim's school counselor that the victim was a 
generally truthful individual.  After consideration, the circuit 
court allowed 
the 
witness 
to opine 
as to 
the victim's 
truthfulness based on Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1).  The circuit court 
made this ruling after finding that: 
 
the character has been attacked both in opening by 
defense counsel and in cross-examination, primarily 
opening, and I'm basing that on the following, not so 
much the questions being asked but on the opening it 
seemed to indicate certain improper motives dealing 
with her character, to get attention, etc., as it 
relates to making up or fabricating the story. . . . 
[T]herefore . . . the Court believes the character has 
been attacked and, consequently, would allow the basis 
of the opinion testimony. 
In making this determination, the circuit court relied upon 
State v. Eisenberg, 48 Wis. 2d 364, 180 N.W.2d 529 (1970). 
¶15 As noted above, Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1) will allow a 
witness's 
penchant 
for 
truthfulness 
to 
be 
the 
topic 
of 
rehabilitative evidence only when "the character of the witness 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
8 
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation 
evidence or otherwise."  Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1).  Application of 
this portion of the statute raises two legal questions.  First, 
do assertions about a witness's character made during opening 
statements 
constitute 
an 
attack 
on 
the 
character 
for 
truthfulness of the witness "by opinion or reputation evidence 
or otherwise?"  Second, assuming that the assertions made during 
opening 
statements 
can 
call 
a 
witness's 
character 
for 
truthfulness into question for Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1) purposes, 
what kind or degree of "attack" is necessary for the character 
of the witness to be implicated under Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1)? 
¶16 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 906.08(1) 
does 
not 
provide an 
exclusive list of the types of character attacks that fall 
within its bounds.  The statute merely notes that the attack 
must be made "by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise."  
There is no dispute that opening statements do not constitute 
"evidence" for purposes of the circuit court proceedings.  See 
Bridges v. State, 247 Wis. 350, 370, 19 N.W.2d 529 (1945); see 
also Wis. JI-Crim 157 (remarks of counsel not evidence); cf. 
Wis. JI-Crim 160 (closing arguments not evidence).  Accordingly, 
for an attorney's opening statements to implicate Wis. Stat. 
§ 906.08(1), it must fit within the term "otherwise," an 
undefined term. 
¶17 Character evidence concerning truthfulness is "offered 
as circumstantial evidence from which the jury may infer that 
subject witness' truthfulness (i.e. sincerity) at trial."  7 
Daniel N. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence § 608.1, at 296 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
9 
(1991).  While remarks of counsel during opening statements may 
not constitute evidence per se, such remarks about the character 
of a witness are assertions which reach the jury, who must then 
assess the character and credibility of the challenged witness. 
 To refuse to allow a witness whose character has been attacked 
in such a manner to be rehabilitated would give attorneys 
unbounded license.  See also People v. Whiters, 588 N.E.2d 1172, 
1174 (Ill. 1992)("To hold otherwise would enable the defendant 
to get away with using her opening statement to vilify the 
victim's character and thus poison the water without offering 
any supporting evidence."). 
¶18 Moreover, we note that courts have acknowledged that a 
character attack on a witness sufficient to invoke Wis. Stat. 
§ 906.08(1) may arise from the circumstances in which an attack 
on a witness is made.  See Blakely v. Bates, 394 N.W.2d 320 
(Iowa 1986).  Accordingly, where an attorney attacks the 
character for truthfulness of a potential witness in an opening 
statement, testimony presented to rehabilitate that witness may 
be appropriate.  See also United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 
522 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464 (11th 
Cir. 1986).  We turn then to an examination of the nature of a 
circuit court's evaluation of such attacks. 
¶19 It must be acknowledged from the beginning that Wis. 
Stat. § 906.08(1) is not intended to apply to a broad range of 
attacks on a witness's testimony.  It is a narrow rule designed 
to be invoked only in limited situations.  For instance, "proof 
that a witness made a prior inconsistent statement may show a 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
10
poor memory or inaccurate perception of events without impugning 
the witness' integrity or character for 'truthfulness.'"  7 
Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence, § 608.1 at 298 
(1991).  Thus, contradiction in testimony is not to be equated 
pro forma with an attack on character.  See United States v. 
Thomas, 768 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1985); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 
1135 (Utah 1989). 
¶20 However, the question of what constitutes a character 
attack under Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1) remains.  The defendant 
argues that the statute "does not call for the introduction of 
'truthful character' evidence if the evidence only shows that a 
witness is lying in the pending case or that the witness may 
have a motive to lie in the instant case."  Defendant's brief at 
9.  Rather, the defendant claims that Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1) 
rehabilitative testimony is allowable only where a witness's 
aggregate moral predisposition for untruthfulness is attacked.   
¶21 The State initially responds that "any time a party 
suggests that a witness is consciously lying . . . there is an 
unspoken assertion" that the witness has the character trait of 
untruthfulness.  State's brief at 10.  In the alternative, at 
oral argument the State agreed with the defense position that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 906.08(1) 
rehabilitative 
testimony 
is 
only 
allowable upon a general attack on the witness's character for 
truthfulness.  Thus, in essence we are left to consider whether 
it is enough to assert that a witness is lying in a specific 
instance, or whether the witness must be attacked as a "liar" 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
11
generally, and which of these scenarios happened in the case at 
bar. 
¶22 While we have not directly confronted this issue 
previously, the court of appeals in Anderson determined that 
whenever a circuit court "believes that the nature of the 
evidence and the tone of the examinations, when considered as a 
whole, are tantamount to an accusation that a witness is lying, 
the court may permit the introduction of supportive character 
evidence."  State v. Anderson, 163 Wis. 2d 342, 349, 471 N.W.2d 
279 (Ct. App. 1991).  Based on this language it is apparent that 
Anderson offers a rule that any time a witness is accused of 
lying in a particular instance, responsive evidence buttressing 
the witness's character for truthfulness is appropriate.  This 
broad rule has subsequently been applied in State v. Hernandez, 
192 Wis. 2d 251, 257, 531 N.W.2d 348 (Ct. App. 1995); see also 
State v. Rochelt, 165 Wis. 2d 373, 387, 477 N.W.2d 659 (Ct. App. 
1991). 
¶23 Upon review, we reject the broad "tantamount to an 
accusation that a witness is lying" test laid out by the court 
of appeals and overrule both Anderson and Hernandez.  An 
attorney may attack the veracity of a witness's statements, and 
the intent or motive 
with 
which 
the 
witness 
makes the 
statements, without calling into question the general character 
of a witness for truthfulness.  See United States v. Dring, 930 
F.2d 687, 690-92 (9th Cir. 1991)(distinguishing between direct 
attacks on testimony and indirect attacks on character for 
truthfulness); State v. Ross, 685 A.2d 1234, 1236-37 (N.H. 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
12
1996); Pierson v. Brooks, 768 P.2d 792 (Idaho App. 1989); State 
v. Carr, 725 P.2d 1287 (Or. 1986).   
¶24 Character is evinced by a pattern of behavior or 
method of conduct demonstrated by an individual over the course 
of time.  Thus, allegations of a single instance of falsehood 
cannot 
imply 
a 
character 
for 
untruthfulness 
just 
as 
demonstration of a single instance of truthfulness cannot imply 
the character trait of veracity.  Viewing the attack on a 
witness in its context, the circuit court must believe that a 
reasonable person would consider the attack on the witness to be 
an assertion that the witness is not only lying in this 
instance, but is a liar generally.  Only in such circumstances 
will rehabilitative evidence under Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1) be 
appropriate. 
¶25 Having narrowed the interpretation of the scope of 
evidence admissible under Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1), we reaffirm 
that the determination of whether the character of truthfulness 
of a witness is being challenged is a matter left to the proper 
discretion of the circuit court.  This determination is not 
dependent upon particular labels placed on witnesses or even 
express accusations of untruth.  Rather, the inquiry is to be 
conducted by the circuit court based on the substance of the 
character allegations offered and on the manner and tenor in 
which the attack on the witness's character for truthfulness is 
presented. 
¶26  Having established this method of evaluation, we next 
consider the circuit court's actions in this case.  The circuit 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
13
court admitted the rehabilitative character evidence based on 
its evaluation of the defendant's opening statement and its 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1), viewed in light of 
Eisenberg.  The circuit court apparently did not consider the 
broad test laid out in Anderson.   
¶27 This court handed down Eisenberg three years prior to 
this court's promulgation of the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence and 
their subsequent codification.  See Eisenberg, 48 Wis. 2d at 
378; Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d R171 (1973).  In 
Eisenberg, the circuit court determined that improper testimony 
by a witness about another witness's reputation for truth 
justified 
the 
State's 
attempts 
under 
the 
common 
law 
to 
rehabilitate that witness with additional character testimony.  
In Eisenberg the attack on the witness was an express attack on 
the witness's character for truthfulness, not a single instance 
of lying. 
¶28  As such, Eisenberg is consistent with our decision 
today.  Neither the circuit court's reference to Eisenberg nor 
its failure to apply the now-rejected test in Anderson creates 
an error of law requiring correction by this court.  The circuit 
court 
here 
determined 
that 
the 
victim's 
character 
for 
truthfulness was under attack through assertions that the victim 
repeatedly lied to gain attention.  Like the court of appeals, 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
14
we conclude this determination was not an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.5 
 III. 
¶29 The defense did not confine its attack on the victim 
to assertions of untruthfulness during opening statements.  The 
defense 
also 
extensively 
cross-examined 
the 
victim 
about 
perceived inconsistencies in her statements to other individuals 
about the abuse.  The highlighted inconsistencies addressed such 
factual issues as the time of year that the abuse occurred, the 
victim's grade in school at that time, and the circumstances 
leading up to the defendant's alleged abuse of the victim by the 
defendant.  In response, the circuit court permitted the State 
to offer the challenged statements in their entirety, to show 
consistency on significant factual issues.  The circuit court 
based 
its 
admission 
of 
the 
statements 
on 
the 
rule 
of 
completeness. 
¶30 The rule of completeness is codified at Wis. Stat. 
§ 901.07.  The statute provides that: 
 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof 
is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require 
                     
5 At oral argument, the defendant repeatedly alleged that 
the circuit court's ruling on this issue improperly bolstered 
the victim's allegations in a case almost entirely dependent 
upon the testimony of the respective parties.  While there was 
admittedly little corroborative evidence in this case, the 
admission of the Wis. Stat. § 906.08(1) character evidence at 
trial, a decision we have already ruled not error, was in direct 
response to defense counsel's character attack on the victim.  
To allow such character attacks to go unanswered would instead 
improperly bolster the case of the defendant.  The circuit 
court's ruling merely redressed the balance.  
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
15
the party at that time to introduce any other part or 
any other writing or recorded statement which ought in 
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. 
Wis. Stat. § 901.07.6  The statute codifies in part the earlier 
common law rule of completeness recognized by this court.  See 
State v. Hill, 30 Wis. 416, 421 (1872); Wisconsin Rules of 
Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R22 (1973).  While Wis. Stat. § 901.07 
references only written or recorded statements, the court in 
State v. Sharp, 180 Wis. 2d 640, 511 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1993), 
determined that a common law rule of completeness continues to 
exist for oral statements in Wisconsin.   
¶31 The defendant challenges the continuing validity of 
Sharp, claiming that one of the cases relied upon by Sharp, 
United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1987), has since 
been called into question by the federal courts.  The defendant 
also 
asserts 
that 
federal 
cases 
confining 
the 
rule 
of 
completeness to written and recorded statements, as it exists at 
FRE 106, should be persuasive precedent and that applying the 
rule to oral statements allows improper circumvention of the 
hearsay rule.   
¶32 While we agree with the end result reached by the 
court of appeals in Sharp, we apply different reasoning.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 901.07 applies to written and recorded 
statements.  See Wis. Stat. § 901.07.  However, the real 
question debated by the parties is whether any form of the 
                     
6 The terms of Wis. Stat. § 901.07 are identical to FRE 106.  
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
16
common law rule of completeness, which included oral statements, 
survived codification of Wis. Stat. § 901.07. 
¶33 We determine that we need not reach back to the common 
law rules of evidence for resolution of this inquiry.  The rule 
of completeness, as it has historically applied to oral 
statements under the common law, is encompassed within the 
bounds of the codified Wisconsin Rules of Evidence.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 906.11 states in pertinent part: 
 
(1) CONTROL BY JUDGE.  The judge shall exercise 
reasonable 
control 
over 
the 
mode 
and 
order 
of 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as 
to 
(a) 
make 
the 
interrogation 
and 
presentation 
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (b) 
avoid needless consumption of time, and (c) protect 
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. 
Wis. Stat. § 906.11(1).  With the substitution of the word 
"judge" for "court," the provision is identical to FRE 611(a). 
¶34 When examining the rule of completeness the federal 
courts have recognized that FRE 106 codifies only part of the 
rule of completeness—written and recorded statements.  See 
United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996).  
"Inherent within this concept [of the rule of completeness] is 
the notion that fairness should prohibit a party from presenting 
an inaccurate depiction of an event through the admission of 
partial evidence which is taken out of context."  171 F.R.D. 
330, 337 (1997). 
¶35 The rationale of the rule of completeness for writing 
is equally applicable to oral statements. 
 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
17
Where the examination concerns a writing or recorded 
statement, or part thereof, the procedures to be 
employed are set forth in W.S.A. 901.07.  It is for 
the trial judge to determine whether the additional 
material 
"ought 
in 
fairness" 
to 
be 
considered 
contemporaneously with the information conveyed by the 
proponent.  The judge may consider the adequacy of a 
delayed examination in forestalling the misimpression. 
. . . W.S.A. 901.07 allows the introduction of other 
parts of the writing or recorded statement, or 
additional writings or recorded statements, as long as 
the material is needed to provide the context. 
 
The contemporaneous admissibility of other parts of an 
oral conversation should be governed by the same 
standards.  The court's authority to make such orders 
is grounded in its power to control the mode and order 
of interrogation in order to effectively ascertain the 
truth, as provided in W.S.A. 906.11 
 
7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence § 107.1, at 32 
(1991). 
¶36 The federal courts have acknowledged that the rule of 
completeness is "'substantially applicable to oral testimony, as 
well' by virtue of Fed. R. Evid. 611(a), which obligates the 
court to 'make the interrogation and presentation effective for 
the ascertainment of the truth.'"  United States v. Mussaleen, 
35 F.3d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1994)(quoting United States v. 
Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 650 n.5 (2d Cir. 1989)); see Castro, 813 
F.2d at 576-77; United States v. Range, 94 F.3d 614, 621 (11th 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 
1993).  We agree and determine that FRE 611(a)'s state law 
equivalent, Wis. Stat. § 906.11(1), also encompasses the rule of 
completeness for oral statements. 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
18
¶37 The rule of completeness for written statements as set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 901.07 and the oral rule of completeness 
in Wis. Stat. § 906.11(1) are both designed to make the 
presentation of evidence fair and effective in order to 
ascertain the truth.  As noted by the United States Supreme 
Court in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 172 
(1988): 
 
In proposing Rule 106, the Advisory Committee stressed 
that it 'does not in any way circumscribe the right of 
the 
adversary 
to 
develop 
the 
matter 
on 
cross-
examination or as part of his own case.'  We take this 
to be a reaffirmation of the obvious: that when one 
party has made use of a portion of a document, such 
that misunderstanding or distortion can be averted 
only through presentation of another portion, the 
material required for completeness is ipso facto 
relevant and therefore admissible under Rules 401 and 
402. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
¶38 Thus, the need for completeness in order to avert 
distortion may "compel the judge to permit the presentation of 
additional testimony to tell the whole story that was partially 
told by the opposing party [as] an issue of logical relevance 
and fairness . . . ."  171 F.R.D. 330, 338 (1997).  Indeed, 
"[w]hile FRE 106 reaches only written or recorded statements, 
there is little doubt that a court can apply the underlying 
principle to oral statements as well.  Basic notions of 
relevancy embodied in FRE 401-403, coupled with the authority of 
the court to control the presentation of evidence in the 
interest of clarity and order under FRE 611, suggest as much."  
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
19
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 1 Federal 
Evidence § 45, at 250 (2d ed. 1994).7   
¶39  All relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise 
provided by law.  See Wis. Stat. § 904.02.  The critical 
consideration in rule of completeness cases is whether the part 
of the statement offered into evidence creates an unfair and 
misleading impression without the remaining statements.  Where a 
distortion 
can 
be 
averted, 
the 
material 
required 
for 
completeness is relevant to a fair representation.  Thus, the 
evidence is admissible unless otherwise proscribed by law. 
¶40 The defendant alleges that the hearsay rules block 
admittance of the evidence at issue here.  However, where the 
evidence is offered not to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted, but rather for some other purpose, such as providing a 
fair context on which the trier of fact can evaluate the 
evidence already offered by the opposing party, the evidence is 
by definition not hearsay.  See Dale A. Nance, A Theory of 
Verbal Completeness, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 825, 840-41 (1995).  In 
other cases, where the evidence may fall within the classic 
definition of hearsay, the circuit court in its discretion may 
determine whether the fairness requirement of the rule of 
                     
7  While the defendant is correct to assert that United 
States v. Bigelow, 914 F.2d 966 (7th Cir. 1990), refused to 
apply the rule of completeness for oral statements indicated in 
Castro, Bigelow did not reject Castro's holding.  Rather, the 
Bigelow court refused to admit an oral statement under the rule 
of completeness because such an admission would have adversely 
affected the right to a fair trial of a co-defendant.  See 
Bigelow, 914 F.2d at 972. 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
20
completeness 
outweighs 
the 
principles 
underpinning 
the 
exclusionary rules and permits the trier of fact to consider the 
additional offer of oral statements.  See id. at 839-41; Dale A. 
Nance, Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules Under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 51, 85-86 (1996); see 
also Rokus v. Bridgeport, 463 A.2d 252, 256 (Conn. 1983). 
¶41 The rule of completeness, however, should not be 
viewed as an unbridled opportunity to open the door to otherwise 
inadmissible evidence.  Under the rule of completeness the court 
has discretion to admit only those statements which are 
necessary to provide context and prevent distortion.  The 
circuit court must closely scrutinize the proffered additional 
statements to avert abuse of the rule.  As the court noted in 
Wikrent v. Toys R Us, Inc., 179 Wis. 2d 297, 309-10, 507 N.W.2d 
130 (Ct. App. 1993) overruled on other grounds, Steinberg v. 
Jensen, 194 Wis. 2d 439, 534 N.W.2d 361 (1995), "an out-of-court 
statement that is inconsistent with the declarant's trial 
testimony does not carry with it, like some evidentiary Trojan 
Horse, the entire regiment of other out-of-court statements that 
might have been made contemporaneously." 
¶42 Because we determine that the common law rule of 
completeness as applied to oral statements is codified as part 
of Wis. Stat. § 906.11, circuit courts confronted with such 
evidentiary issues need not retreat to the common law and should 
focus their analysis of the admissibility of oral rule of 
completeness evidence on the dictates of Wis. Stat. § 906.11.  
In this case the circuit court did not err in exercising its 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
21
discretion to admit the additional statements under the rule of 
completeness. 
IV. 
¶43 Finally, the defendant contends that the circuit court 
should have dismissed his case based on prosecutorial misconduct 
when the State failed to encourage the victim or her mother to 
cooperate with the defense investigation.  In support of his 
claim that the State is under a duty to encourage witness 
cooperation, the defendant points to our adoption in Simmons of 
Standard 3.1(c) of the American Bar Association Project for 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the 
Prosecution Function.  The standard provides that: 
 
A 
prosecutor 
should 
not 
discourage 
or 
obstruct 
communication 
between 
prospective 
witnesses 
and 
defense counsel.  It is unprofessional conduct for the 
prosecutor to advise any person or cause any person to 
be advised to decline to give the defense information 
which he has the right to give. 
Simmons, 57 Wis. 2d at 292 (quoting Standards Relating to the 
Prosecution Function and the Defense Function, Standard 3-
3.1(c)). 
¶44 In particular, the defendant focuses his reliance upon 
the commentary to the attached standard which indicates that: 
 
In the event a witness asks the prosecutor or defense 
counsel . . . whether it is proper for the witness to 
submit to an interview by opposing counsel or whether 
he is under a duty to do so, the witness should be 
informed that, although he is not under a legal duty 
to submit to an interview, it is proper and may be the 
duty of both counsel to interview all persons who may 
be witnesses and that it is in the interest of justice 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
22
that the witness make himself available for interview 
by counsel.   
Id. at 293. 
¶45 
Reading these provisions 
together, 
the 
defendant 
objects to the assistant district attorney's alleged statements 
to the victim's mother which led the mother to believe that the 
purpose for the defense interview of her daughter was to obtain 
inconsistent statements with which to attack the daughter's 
credibility at trial.  The defendant asserts that under the 
standard and its commentary the State was required to advise the 
victim's mother that the defense was obligated to interview the 
victim and that it is in the interests of justice that the 
victim make herself available to the defense. 
¶46 This court explicitly adopted the language of standard 
3.1(c) into the law of Wisconsin in State v. Simmons.  See 
Simmons, 57 Wis. 2d at 293.  In contrast, while we also 
referenced and quoted the official commentary to Standard 3.1(c) 
in Simmons, we did not expressly adopt that commentary in 
Simmons in the manner in which we adopted the standard itself.  
See id. at 292-93.   
¶47 While the defendant would have us conclude that our 
prior discussion of the commentary was in fact the equivalent of 
adopting that commentary, we decline to do so.  In rendering 
decisions this court examines a wide variety of learned legal 
sources not previously incorporated into the corpus of our law. 
 While such sources may provide guidance in particular cases, 
and may even be labeled "persuasive authority" on occasion, to 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
23
declare such sources the law of Wisconsin absent our express 
adoption would ascribe to these sources a superior status to 
which they are not entitled. See, e.g., Paulson v. Olson 
Implement Co., Inc., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 523-24, 319 N.W.2d 855 
(1982);  Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459, 155 N.W.2d 55 
(1967); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 196, 342 
N.W.2d 37 (1984). 
¶48 In 
the 
alternative, 
the 
defendant 
asks 
us 
to 
explicitly adopt the commentary to Standard 3.1(c) today and 
find in his favor on that basis.  We note, however, that the 
commentary that the defendant would have us adopt was modified 
in 1993.  The commentary as revised now reads in part: 
 
[T]he witness should be informed that there is no 
legal obligation to submit to an interview.  It is 
proper, however, and may be the duty of both counsel 
in certain cases to interview all persons . . . . 
Commentary to American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice, Prosecution Function Standards 3.1, at 50 (3d ed. 
1993). 
¶49 Thus, even were we to accept the defendant's argument 
and adopt the revised commentary, our result would be no 
different.  The revised commentary does not support the 
defendant's 
argument 
that 
prosecutors 
remain 
under 
an 
affirmative duty to encourage witnesses to participate or to 
inform witnesses that it is in the interests of justice that 
they make themselves available to the defense.  See Commentary 
to American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Prosecution Function Standards 3.1, at 50 (3d ed. 1993). 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
24
¶50 However, while we do not adopt the commentary, we note 
that prosecutors continue to be bound by the standard itself, as 
adopted in Simmons.  As the representative of the State, 
prosecutors are in a unique position to influence witnesses.  
Allowing prosecutors to discourage witnesses from communicating 
with the defense and from cooperating in the resolution of 
criminal matters would impede the efficient administration of 
justice in this state.  Prosecutors are in the business of 
justice, not in the business of convictions.8 
¶51 While prosecutors may not discourage witnesses from 
cooperating with the defense, they are also not under an 
affirmative legal duty to encourage such cooperation.  We did 
not in the past adopt the commentary to Standard 3.1(c).  
Because the commentary has been amended, it no longer supports 
the 
defendant's 
argument 
that 
prosecutors 
are 
under 
an 
affirmative duty to encourage witness cooperation in every case. 
 Accordingly, we determine that there was no prosecutorial 
misconduct 
and 
the 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
denied 
the 
defendant's motion for dismissal. 
V.   
¶52  Upon review we conclude that the circuit court did not 
err in admitting the disputed evidence.  The circuit court 
                     
8 The State acknowledged at oral argument that when a 
prosecutor is faced with a witness inquiry, it is appropriate 
for the prosecutor to present the witness with three options: to 
meet 
with 
the 
defense 
investigator, 
to 
meet 
with 
the 
investigator in the presence of someone from the prosecutor's 
office, or to decline to meet with anyone from the defense. 
No. 96-1394-CR 
 
25
determined that defense counsel's assertions during opening 
statements 
constituted 
a 
general 
character 
attack 
and 
appropriately allowed rehabilitative testimony under Wis. Stat. 
§ 906.08(1).  In addition, because Wis. Stat. § 906.11 codifies 
the rule of completeness as applied to oral statements, the 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
admitted 
the 
victim's 
disputed 
statements in their entirety to provide context.  Finally, 
because a prosecutor is under no legal duty to actively 
encourage participation of a witness in a defense investigation, 
and because the prosecutor here did not actively discourage the 
victim's cooperation, the defendant's claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct must fail.  Accordingly, the decision of the court of 
appeals is affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.