Case Title: Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati

Citation: 2006-Ohio-2625

Docket Number: 20050702 and 20050734

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 109 Ohio St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio-2625.] 
 
 
 
DOE, APPELLEE, v. ARCHDIOCESE OF CINCINNATI ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati,  
109 Ohio St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio-2625.] 
Statute of limitations — Sexual abuse of minors — A minor who is the victim of 
sexual abuse has two years from the date he or she reaches the age of 
majority to assert any claims against the employer of the perpetrator 
arising from the sexual abuse when at the time of the abuse, the victim 
knows the identity of the perpetrator, the employer of the perpetrator, and 
that a battery has occurred. (Doe v. First United Methodist Church 
(1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 N.E.2d 402, followed.) 
(Nos. 2005-0702 and 2005-0734 — Submitted  
January 25, 2006 — Decided May 31, 2006.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Shelby County,  
No. 17-04-10, 2005-Ohio-960. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A minor who is the victim of sexual abuse has two years from the date he or she 
reaches the age of majority to assert any claims against the employer of 
the perpetrator arising from the sexual abuse when at the time of the 
abuse, the victim knows the identity of the perpetrator, the employer of the 
perpetrator, and that a battery has occurred.  (Doe v. First United 
Methodist Church (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 N.E.2d 402, paragraph 
two of the syllabus, followed.) 
__________________ 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Today this court considers the issue of when a minor who is the 
victim of sexual abuse must assert claims against the employer of the perpetrator 
arising from the sexual abuse when at the time of the abuse, the victim knows the 
identity of the perpetrator, the employer of the perpetrator, and that a battery has 
occurred.  Although we acknowledge the complex emotional issues of plaintiffs 
who allege that they have been the victims of sexual abuse, we are constrained to 
follow the law as it exists today, and we must therefore reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals in this case. 
I.  Facts 
{¶ 2} Plaintiff-appellee, John Doe, is a former parishioner of St. Michael 
Church in Ft. Loramie, Shelby County, Ohio.  The church is owned and operated 
by defendant-appellant, the Archdiocese of Cincinnati at all times relevant to this 
lawsuit.  Doe is an adult male whose identity is being protected from the public, 
but was revealed to defendants. 
{¶ 3} Defendant-appellant 
Archbishop 
Daniel 
Pilarczyk 
became 
Archbishop of Cincinnati in 1982 and has served continuously in that position 
since then.  Defendant-appellant Father Thomas Hopp was an employee and agent 
of the archdiocese at all times relevant to this suit.  He was assigned by the 
archdiocese as pro-tem administrator of St. Michael in 1980 through 1981 and as 
pastor at St. Denis Church in Versailles from 1981 through 1983. 
{¶ 4} Doe alleges that he was molested by Hopp in approximately 1980 
through 1983, when he was about 12 to 15 years old.  Doe alleges that in April 
2002, he first learned that there were other victims of Hopp.  His complaint 
alleges that until that time, he had no reason to believe that the archdiocese and 
Pilarczyk had ever known about Hopp’s abuse. 
{¶ 5} On March 3, 2004, Doe filed a complaint against Hopp, the 
archbishop, and the archdiocese in the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas, 
January Term, 2006 
3 
alleging breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, liability of the archbishop and the 
archdiocese through respondeat superior, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and corrupt activities under R.C. 2923.31 et seq.  The complaint sought 
compensatory and punitive damages. 
{¶ 6} Pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the archdiocese and the archbishop 
filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Doe’s tort claims were barred by the 
applicable two-year statute of limitations and that his claim under R.C. 2923.31 
(the Ohio Corrupt Activities Act) was barred by the applicable five-year statute of 
limitations.  Hopp answered, denying the allegations of abuse.  The trial court 
dismissed Doe’s complaint, holding that Doe’s claims were barred by the relevant 
statutes of limitations. 
{¶ 7} The Court of Appeals for the Third District reversed the judgment 
of the trial court, remanded the cause, and certified the following question: 
“Where a complaint alleges with considerable particularity that due to recently 
discovered efforts of the church to conceal its involvement, the victim of sexual 
abuse by a priest did not until recently have sufficient knowledge to apprise him 
of independent claims against the church, are those allegations subject to a Civ.R. 
12(B) dismissal on the basis that under Doe [v. First United Methodist Church 
(1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 N.E.2d 402], notice of sexual abuse by a priest 
constitutes apprisal of the possibility of any other independent claims against the 
church as a matter of law, so that all relevant statutes of limitations against both 
the priest and the church are triggered by the sexual abuse?”   
{¶ 8} More succinctly stated, the narrow question we must consider is at 
what point a minor who is the victim of sexual abuse must assert claims against 
the employer of the perpetrator, when at the time of the abuse, the victim knows 
the identity of the perpetrator, the employer of the perpetrator, and that a battery 
has occurred. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 9} This cause is now before this court upon our determination that a 
conflict exists and upon our acceptance of a discretionary appeal. 
II.  History of Statutes of Limitation 
{¶ 10} Through statutes of limitations, the General Assembly limits the 
time within which various claims may be asserted in Ohio’s courts.  Vaccariello 
v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 380, 391-392, 763 
N.E.2d 160 (Stratton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  These statutes 
of limitations serve a gatekeeping function for courts by (1) ensuring fairness to 
the defendant, (2) encouraging prompt prosecution of causes of action, (3) 
suppressing stale and fraudulent claims, and (4) avoiding the inconveniences 
engendered by delay – specifically, the difficulties of proof present in older cases.  
Id.  See, also, O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp. (1983) 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 88, 4 OBR 
335, 447 N.E.2d 727. 
{¶ 11} A motion to dismiss based upon a statute of limitations may be 
granted when the complaint shows conclusively on its face that the action is time-
barred.  Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 376, 23 
O.O.3d 346, 433 N.E.2d 147, paragraph three of the syllabus.  In order for a court 
to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim that would entitle the plaintiff 
to relief.  O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 
242, 245, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753. 
III.  Doe v. First United Methodist Church 
{¶ 12} Twenty-three years have passed since the alleged abuse occurred 
in this case.  Thus, it is clear that unless an exception is applicable, Doe’s claims 
are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.  Doe contends that his claims 
were not subject to dismissal because he alleges that he did not know until April 
January Term, 2006 
5 
2002 that there were other alleged victims of Hopp, and thus, he did not discover 
the claims that he had until 2002. 
{¶ 13} This court discussed the application of the discovery rule to child-
sex-abuse cases in Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 
N.E.2d 402.  The court of appeals in this case noted that the parties agree that this 
court’s decision in First United Methodist Church controls.  However, the parties 
disagree over its effect. 
{¶ 14} In Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 
N.E.2d 402, we considered a case in which the plaintiff had filed a complaint 
against his church, his school district, and his high school choir director 
approximately 16 years after the alleged sexual abuse.  Plaintiff sought recovery 
against the school district for negligence in hiring and retaining the teacher and 
sought recovery against the church for its negligence in failing to protect the 
plaintiff from the teacher’s sexual misconduct.  Id. at 532, 629 N.E.2d 402. 
{¶ 15} The teacher, the church, and the school district filed Civ.R. 
12(B)(6) motions to dismiss the complaint, arguing that plaintiff’s claims were 
time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.  The defendants argued that 
the statute commenced to run at the time the alleged abuse occurred, while the 
plaintiff argued that the statute commenced to run when he “discovered” that his 
psychological problems had been caused by the sexual misconduct of his former 
teacher.  Id. at 532-533, 629 N.E.2d 402. 
{¶ 16} This court held, “A minor who is the victim of sexual abuse has 
one year from the date he or she reaches the age of majority to assert any claims 
against the perpetrator arising from the sexual abuse where the victim knows the 
identity of the perpetrator and is fully aware of the fact that a battery has 
occurred.”  Id., paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 17} We held that the facts and events triggering the one-year statute of 
limitations on the plaintiff’s claims for sexual abuse did not necessarily trigger the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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two-year period of limitations on plaintiff’s independent negligence claims 
against the church and school district. We noted, however, that the plaintiff had 
“never claimed or argued that his knowledge of the sexual abuse was insufficient 
to apprise him of the possibility that the church or the school district had been 
negligent in failing to protect him from [the allegedly abusive teacher].” Id. at 
539, 629 N.E.2d 402.  Thus, we concluded that we were “left to assume that the 
events that triggered the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery 
were no different from the events that triggered the two-year statute of limitations 
that applies to [the plaintiff’s] negligence causes of action against the church and 
the school district.”  Id. 
{¶ 18} In this case, however, Doe alleged in his complaint, “In April 
2002, Plaintiff first learned that there were other victims of Hopp.  Until that time, 
Plaintiff had no reason to believe that Defendants Archdiocese and Pilarczyk had 
ever known about Hopp’s abuse.  Until April 2002, Plaintiff’s knowledge of the 
abuse was insufficient to apprise him of the possibility that Defendants 
Archdiocese and Pilarczyk were negligent in failing to protect him, in failing to 
prevent further harm or in breaching a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff by failing to 
identify and assist him.” 
{¶ 19} Thus, because Doe made the “specific allegation” of insufficient 
knowledge, the court of appeals held that the two-year statute of limitations did 
not begin to run until the date that Doe allegedly learned that there might be other 
victims of Hopp, and the complaint was not subject to a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 
dismissal. 
{¶ 20} We disagree and conclude that First United Methodist Church is 
indistinguishable from this case.  In First United Methodist Church, the plaintiff 
knew the identity of the perpetrator and was fully aware that a battery had 
occurred at the time of the abuse.  In this case, the alleged abuse took place in or 
before 1983.  Doe reached the age of majority in 1986.  Doe concedes in his 
January Term, 2006 
7 
complaint that at all times since the alleged abuse, he knew the identity of the 
alleged perpetrator, knew that the alleged perpetrator was a priest of the 
Archdiocese of Cincinnati, and knew that a battery had occurred.  Although Doe 
alleged that he had insufficient knowledge of his claims until 2002, when he first 
learned that there might be other victims of Father Hopp, the identity of other 
victims is irrelevant to Doe’s claims because his claims are not dependent on 
other victims.  At the time of the alleged abuse, Doe knew the identity of the 
perpetrator, knew the employer of the perpetrator, and was fully aware of the fact 
that a battery had occurred.  Therefore, as in First Methodist Church, the statute 
of limitations began to run when Doe attained the age of majority. 
IV.  Discovery Rule 
{¶ 21} “Ordinarily, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations 
begins to run at the time the wrongful act was committed.”  Collins v. Sotka 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 506, 507, 692 N.E.2d 581.  Under the discovery rule, the 
statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff discovers or, through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered a possible cause of 
action.  See O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St.3d at 90, 4 OBR 335, 447 
N.E.2d 727.  For example, this court first recognized the discovery rule in the 
context of medical malpractice cases arising from claims that surgeons 
negligently left foreign bodies in their patients, causing injury.  See Melnyk v. 
Cleveland Clinic (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 198, 61 O.O.2d 430, 290 N.E.2d 916, 
syllabus. 
{¶ 22} Doe argues that the discovery-rule exceptions as discussed in 
Browning v. Burt (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993, Ault v. Jasko 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, Collins v. Sotka, 81 Ohio St.3d 506, 
692 N.E.2d 581, and Norgard v. Brush Wellman, 95 Ohio St.3d 165, 2002-Ohio-
2007, 766 N.E.2d 977, indicate that application of the discovery rule is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
appropriate in the present case.  We will address each case below, but we 
conclude that the discovery rule has no application here. 
{¶ 23} In Browning, this court considered the discovery rule after two 
patients filed actions alleging medical malpractice against two doctors and 
negligent credentialing against the hospital that had granted and continued their 
staff privileges.  The surgeries were performed from 1982 through 1986.  The 
issue was whether the actions were timely filed pursuant to the applicable statute 
of limitations.  The plaintiffs alleged that they were unaware of their injuries until 
viewing a television program in 1988 regarding the physicians’ surgical practices.  
Browning, 66 Ohio St.3d at 551, 613 N.E.2d 993.  This court held that the statute 
of limitations for negligent credentialing is triggered when the plaintiff “knows or 
should have discovered that he or she was injured as a result of the hospital’s 
negligent credentialing procedures or practices.”  Id., paragraph four of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 24} The plaintiffs knew they had had surgery and were having medical 
difficulties, but were unaware until much later of the abnormalities of the surgery 
or that the surgery itself was wrongful and had injured them.  In this case, at the 
time the injury occurred, Doe knew he was injured, knew the perpetrator, and 
knew the employer of the perpetrator.  Therefore, he was on notice to investigate 
possible tortious conduct of the archbishop and the archdiocese. 
{¶ 25} In Ault v. Jasko, this court considered a case in which a 29-year-
old plaintiff had sued her biological father, alleging that her father had sexually 
abused her, beginning when she was 12 years old.  This court held that the 
discovery rule applies in Ohio to toll the statute of limitations when a victim of 
childhood sexual abuse allegedly represses memories of that abuse until a later 
time.  Ault, 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, paragraph one of the syllabus.  
Further, the court held that the statute of limitations for sexual abuse in Ohio 
begins to run when the victim recalls or otherwise discovers that he or she was 
January Term, 2006 
9 
sexually abused or when, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the victim 
should have discovered the sexual abuse.  Id., paragraph two of the syllabus.  Doe 
did not allege that he had repressed his memory of the alleged abuse.  Thus, Ault 
is inapplicable to this case. 
{¶ 26} In Collins v. Sotka, a murder victim’s family brought a wrongful-
death action against the criminal defendant who had been convicted and 
sentenced for the murder.  This court held, “In a wrongful death action that stems 
from a murder, the statute of limitations begins to run when the victim’s survivors 
discover, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, 
that the defendant has been convicted and sentenced for the murder.”  Collins, 81 
Ohio St.3d 506, 692 N.E.2d 581, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Again, we hold 
that because Doe knew about the alleged abuse, knew the alleged perpetrator, and 
knew the employer of the alleged perpetrator from the time of the abuse, Doe 
knew or through the exercise of due diligence should have known of the possible 
claims against the archdiocese and archbishop at the time he attained the age of 
majority. 
{¶ 27} Finally, in Norgard v. Brush Wellman, Inc. this court considered a 
case in which an employee who had contracted chronic beryllium disease on the 
job filed an intentional-tort action against his employer.  Again, this court applied 
the discovery rule, holding, “A cause of action based upon an employer 
intentional tort accrues when the employee discovers, or by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the workplace injury and the 
wrongful conduct of the employer.”  Norgard, 95 Ohio St.3d 165, 2002-Ohio-
2007, 766 N.E.2d 977, syllabus.  Norgard is clearly distinguishable from this 
case.  Norgard was exposed to chemicals that were not known to cause harm at 
the time of his exposure.  Norgard did not identify the cause of his medical 
problems until much later.  By contrast, in this case, the injury manifested itself 
immediately, and Doe had a duty to diligently inquire into this matter. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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V.  Other Jurisdictions 
{¶ 28} The case certified to be in conflict with this case is Cramer v. 
Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 158 Ohio App.3d 110, 2004-Ohio-3891, 814 N.E.2d 
97.  In Cramer, parishioners brought claims in 2002 against the archdiocese, 
asserting causes of action for respondeat superior, negligent hiring, retention, or 
supervision, and injuries arising from sexual abuse in the 1950s and 1960s.  The 
First District Court of Appeals noted that the plaintiffs did not argue that they had 
repressed their memory of the abuse or were otherwise unable to assert their 
claims because of a psychological condition, as discussed in Ault v. Jasko, 70 
Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870.  Thus, the court looked to this court’s decision 
in Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 N.E.2d 402, and 
held that under Doe, the relevant inquiry is “whether the plaintiff’s knowledge of 
the sexual abuse was sufficient to apprise him of the possibility that the church 
had been negligent.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Cramer, 158 Ohio App.3d 110, 2004-Ohio-
3891, 814 N.E.2d 97, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 29} In Cramer, it was undisputed that the appellants were aware that 
the archdiocese had employed the priest and that the repeated assaults had all 
occurred on church property.  These facts alone were sufficient to put appellants 
on notice of the possibility that the archdiocese had been negligent.  Id.  In 
examining the same arguments presented by the plaintiff in this case, the First 
District held, “Given the appellants’ knowledge of the circumstances of the abuse, 
we hold that they had at the very least a duty to investigate the possibility that the 
Archdiocese was negligent or otherwise culpable.  Their failure to assert their 
claims against the Archdiocese until after the expiration of the statute of 
limitations was fatal to those claims.”  Id. at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 30} Except for the Third District, every Ohio appellate court to address 
this issue has held that if the plaintiff is aware of the abuse and knows the identity 
of the perpetrator, the statute of limitations for claims against a church or school 
January Term, 2006 
11 
arising out of a claim of abuse begins to run when the plaintiff reaches the age of 
majority.  See Doe v. Catholic Diocese of Cleveland, 158 Ohio App.3d 49, 2004-
Ohio-3470, 813 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 27 (in the absence of repressed memory, when the 
plaintiff knew the identity of her perpetrator, was aware that a battery had 
occurred, and knew that she could have taken legal action against the perpetrator, 
the limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff reaches 18 years of age); A.S. 
v. Fairfield School Dist., 12th App. No. CA 2003-04-088, 2003-Ohio-6260, 2003 
WL 22764383, ¶ 11(claims against high school for sex abuse by teacher were 
time-barred because both victims knew they had been sexually abused and both 
victims knew the perpetrator at the time of the abuse); Livingston v. Diocese of 
Cleveland (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 299, 303, 710 N.E.2d 330 (discovery rule did 
not apply to toll statute of limitations given that the victims did not repress 
memories of abuse); Scott v. Borelli (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 449, 453, 666 
N.E.2d 322 (cause of action accrued before plaintiff had full recollection of sexual 
abuse by psychologist, following Doe); Kotyk v. Rebovich (1993), 87 Ohio 
App.3d 116, 621 N.E.2d 897 (former altar boy’s lawsuit was time-barred because 
he discovered in counseling the significance of 1980 sexual abuse but waited to 
file his complaint for seven years). 
{¶ 31} In addition, a majority of jurisdictions outside of Ohio have held 
that the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff knows of the abuse 
and the identity of the perpetrator.  See Parks v. Kownacki (2000), 193 Ill.2d 164, 
179, 737 N.E.2d 287 (statute of limitations began to run when parishioner reached 
the age of majority, as she was aware at that time of injuries and that they were 
wrongfully caused, even though she did not connect her psychological injuries 
with the sexual abuse until the diocese contacted her 22 years later); Lovelace v. 
Keohane (Okla.1992), 831 P.2d 624, 628-630 (plaintiff’s multiple-personality 
disorder did not constitute a legal disability tolling the statute of limitations, nor 
did the discovery rule toll the statute of limitations); E.W. v. D.C.H. (1988), 231 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Mont. 481, 484, 754 P.2d 817 (discovery doctrine inapplicable when victim of 
sexual abuse always knew that she had been sexually abused); Meehan v. 
Archdiocese of Philadelphia (Pa.Super.2005), 870 A.2d 912, ¶ 19 (claims against 
archdiocese were time-barred when plaintiffs were aware that the archdiocese 
employed their abusers and that the abuses all occurred on church property); Mark 
K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (1998), 67 Cal.App.4th 603, 
612, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 (plaintiff’s claims against the church were time-barred 
because plaintiff knew that the priest was associated with the church, thereby 
obligating plaintiff to determine, as he would with any employer whose employee 
had injured him, whether the church shouldered some responsibility for the 
misconduct of its priest); Doe v. Archdiocese of Washington (1997), 114 Md.App. 
169, 183, 689 A.2d 634 (childhood sexual-abuse victim's cause of action against 
priests who allegedly abused him accrued, for statute-of-limitations purposes, on 
date he attained majority); ABC v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis 
(Minn.App.1994), 513 N.W.2d 482, paragraph two of the syllabus (claims against 
the archdiocese were barred by statute of limitations when commenced more than 
six years after the victim had reason to know of the abuse); Sanchez v. 
Archdiocese of San Antonio (Tex.App.1994), 873 S.W.2d 87 (discovery rule did 
not apply to claim for childhood sexual abuse when plaintiff knew of the abuse 
when it occurred);  Cassidy v. Smith (Colo.App.1991), 817 P.2d 555, 558 (statute 
of limitations began to run when plaintiffs achieved majority, as plaintiffs were 
aware of the wrongful nature of defendant’s acts, and they had sufficient 
knowledge concerning the existence of resulting psychological harm). 
{¶ 32} Finally, though addressing a criminal prosecution, the United 
States Supreme Court’s holding in Stogner v. California (2003), 539 U.S. 607, 
123 S.Ct. 2446, 156 L.Ed.2d 544, is relevant to the case before us.  In Stogner, the 
court considered a criminal statute enacted in 1993 permitting prosecution for 
sex-related child abuse after the prior limitations period expired if, inter alia, the 
January Term, 2006 
13 
prosecution begins within one year of a victim’s report to police.  A 1996 
amendment made clear that the statute revived causes of action barred by prior 
limitations statutes.  Id. at 609, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 156 L.Ed.2d 544.  The court held 
that a law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period 
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, Section 10(1), Article I, United States 
Constitution, when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution.  
Id. at 632-633, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 156 L.Ed.2d 544. 
{¶ 33} While the case before us today involves a civil statute, the 
reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in Stogner bears repeating.  
“Memories fade, and witnesses can die or disappear.  * * * Such problems can 
plague child abuse cases, where recollection after so many years may be 
uncertain, and ‘recovered’ memories faulty, but may nonetheless lead to 
prosecutions that destroy families. * * * Regardless, a constitutional principle 
must apply not only in child abuse cases, but in every criminal case.  And, insofar 
as we can tell, the dissent’s principle would permit the State to revive a 
prosecution for any kind of crime without any temporal limitation.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Id. at 631, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 156 L.Ed.2d 544. 
{¶ 34} In this case, the plaintiff alleges that he was abused from 
approximately 1980 through 1983, during which time he knew that the alleged 
perpetrator was a Catholic priest, and he knew that the alleged perpetrator was 
employed by the archdiocese.  Yet he contends that the statute of limitations 
should not have commenced until he learned in April 2002 of Hopp’s other 
alleged victims.  Through the exercise of reasonable diligence, Doe knew or 
should have known of the possible claims against the archbishop and archdiocese 
at the time he attained the age of majority.  Therefore, Doe’s tort claims against 
the archbishop and the archdiocese are barred by the applicable two-year statute 
of limitations. 
VI.  Ohio Corrupt Activities Act 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 35} Included in Doe’s complaint was a claim against the archdiocese 
based upon the Ohio Corrupt Activities Act, R.C. 2923.31 et seq.  The statute of 
limitations for an Ohio Corrupt Activity Act claim is governed by R.C. 
2923.34(K), which states, “[A] civil proceeding or action under this section may 
be commenced at any time within five years after the unlawful conduct terminates 
or the cause of action accrues or within any longer statutory period of limitations 
that may be applicable.”  Doe argues not that the pattern of corrupt activity upon 
which his claims are based is the sexual abuses by Hopp, but rather that “the 
actions and/or knowing omissions of Defendants Archdiocese and Pilarczyk 
facilitated Hopp’s conduct [or] prevented Plaintiff from seeking treatment or 
minimizing further harm.” 
{¶ 36} For the reasons that follow, we hold that the five-year statute of 
limitations began to run at the very latest when Doe reached the age of majority.  
We further hold that retroactive application of Ohio’s Corrupt Practices Act 
would violate Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which addresses 
retroactive laws. 
{¶ 37} The United States Supreme Court addressed statutes of limitations 
with regard to corrupt-activities claims in Rotella v. Wood (2000), 528 U.S. 549, 
120 S.Ct. 1075, 145 L.Ed.2d 1047.  Rotella alleged that the facility’s parent 
company and directors and various doctors and related business entities had 
conspired to keep him in a private psychiatric facility in 1985 and 1986 to 
maximize their profits.  Rotella filed suit in 1997 for civil damages under the 
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).  The court 
considered the issue of whether the limitations period is triggered in accordance 
with the “injury and pattern discovery” rule.  Id. at 551, 120 S.Ct. 1075, 145 
L.Ed.2d 1047.  The rule provides that civil RICO claims accrue “only when the 
claimant discovers, or should discover, both an injury and a pattern of RICO 
activity.” Id. at 553, 120 S.Ct. 1075, 145 L.Ed.2d 1047. 
January Term, 2006 
15 
{¶ 38} The court held: “In sum, any accrual rule softened by a pattern 
discovery feature would undercut every single policy we have mentioned [repose, 
elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for 
recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities].  By tying the start of the 
limitations period to a plaintiff’s reasonable discovery of a pattern rather than to 
the point of injury or its reasonable discovery, the rule would extend the potential 
limitations period for most civil RICO cases well beyond the time when a 
plaintiff’s cause of action is complete, as this case shows.  Rotella does not deny 
that he knew of his injury in 1986 when it occurred, or that his civil RICO claim 
was complete and subject to suit at that time.  But under Rotella’s rule, the clock 
would have started only in 1994, when he discovered the pattern of predicate acts 
(his assumption being that he could not reasonably have been expected to 
discover them sooner).  A limitations period that would have begun to run * * * 
eight years after a claim became ripe would bar repose, prove a godsend to stale 
claims, and doom any hope of certainty in identifying potential liability.  
Whatever disputes may arise about pinpointing the moment a plaintiff should 
have discovered an injury to himself would be dwarfed by the controversy 
inherent in divining when a plaintiff should have discovered a racketeering 
pattern that might well be complex, concealed or fraudulent, and involve harm to 
parties wholly unrelated to an injured plaintiff.”  Id. at 558-559, 120 S.Ct. 1075, 
145 L.Ed.2d 1047. 
{¶ 39} Doe alleges that the sexual abuse occurred more than 22 years ago.  
Under R.C. 2923.34(K) and the reasoning of Rotella, the five-year limitations 
period began no later than when Doe reached the age of majority.  Doe reached 
the age of majority in 1986.  Thus, the five-year limitations period expired in 
1991, approximately 15 years ago.  Accordingly, Doe’s claim against the 
archdiocese based upon the Ohio Corrupt Activities Act is barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
{¶ 40} In addition, the law does not permit retroactive application of the 
Ohio Corrupt Practices Act.  Ohio’s Corrupt Practices Act, R.C. 2923.31 et seq., 
became effective on January 1, 1986.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 5, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
1105, 1136.  Doe alleges that his injuries occurred between 1980 and 1983, but he 
did not file suit alleging violations of the Corrupt Practices Act until 2004.  R.C. 
1.48 provides: “A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless 
expressly made retrospective.”  Because the Revised Code is silent as to whether 
R.C. 2923.31 applies retroactively, we must presume that it applies only 
prospectively. 
{¶ 41} Accordingly, plaintiff’s corrupt-practices claim is barred both by 
the statute of limitations and by the ban on retroactive application found in 
Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
VII.  Equitable Estoppel 
{¶ 42} Doe claims that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should prevent 
the archdiocese from asserting the statute-of-limitations defense because the 
archdiocese fraudulently concealed facts from Doe that would have provided him 
with information to bring a claim against the archdiocese earlier.  In other words, 
Doe argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled because the defendants 
engaged in fraudulent concealment of plaintiff’s cause of action against the 
defendants.  Under the circumstances of this case, we disagree. 
{¶ 43} “The purpose of equitable estoppel is to prevent actual or 
constructive fraud and to promote the ends of justice. It is available only in 
defense of a legal or equitable right or claim made in good faith and should not be 
used to uphold crime, fraud, or injustice.”  Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Frantz 
(1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 555 N.E.2d 630. 
{¶ 44} Our sister court in New York recently considered whether 
equitable estoppel applied to toll the statutes of limitations for plaintiffs’ claims in 
an analogous case.  The court held, “A defendant/wrongdoer cannot take 
January Term, 2006 
17 
affirmative steps to prevent a plaintiff from bringing a claim and then assert the 
statute of limitations as a defense.  However, if the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
were to be applied as broadly as plaintiffs suggest, the statute of limitations would 
rarely be available as a defense.  Plaintiff’s proposed rule would revive any lapsed 
claim where the defendant inflicted some type of injury upon a knowing plaintiff 
but failed to come forward with further information about his or her wrongdoing. 
{¶ 45} “It is therefore fundamental to the application of equitable estoppel 
for plaintiffs to establish that subsequent and specific actions by defendants 
somehow kept them from timely bringing suit * * *.”  Zumpano v. Quinn 
(N.Y.2006), Slip Op. 01245, __ N.E.2d __, 2006 WL 395229. 
{¶ 46} In this case, there are no allegations of any misstatements by the 
archdiocese.  Doe does not allege in his complaint that he reported the abuse, 
made any inquiry, or had any other contact with the archdiocese.  Hence, Doe 
does not claim that he relied on any alleged misrepresentation. 
{¶ 47} We hold that Doe’s cause of action was not concealed from him — 
i.e., he knew or should have known all of the elements of potential causes of 
action against the archdiocese within two years after he reached majority.  Doe 
concedes in his complaint that he at all times knew the identity of his alleged 
perpetrator and knew the employer of his alleged perpetrator.  Thus, he had all of 
the facts necessary to investigate and prosecute his potential causes of action 
against the archdiocese. 
{¶ 48} As the New York Court of Appeals noted, “[O]ur holding here is 
in keeping with those in several other jurisdictions addressing similar issues (see 
e.g. Baselice v Franciscan Friars Assumption BVM Province, Inc., 2005 Pa Super 
246, 879 A.2d 270 [2005] [doctrine of fraudulent concealment inapplicable to toll 
the statute of limitations where plaintiff failed to allege any affirmative act of 
concealment causing him to delay bringing suit]; Doe v Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Detroit, 264 Mich.App. 632, 692 N.W.2d 398 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
[2004] [fraudulent concealment unavailable to toll the statute of limitations where 
plaintiff knew or should have known about his claims against defendants]; Mark 
K. v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles [67 Cal.App.4th 603], 79 
Cal.Rptr.2d 73 [1998] [finding estoppel by concealment inapplicable to toll the 
statute of limitations because plaintiff was aware of his injury, the priest's identity 
and his connection with the church]; Doe v. Archdiocese of Washington, 114 
Md.App.169, 689 A.2d 634 [1997] [statute of limitations was not tolled by the 
fraudulent concealment doctrine where plaintiff did not allege any acts subsequent 
to the abuse that prevented him from being aware of his claims]; compare 
Martinelli v Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F3d 409, 430 [2d 
Cir1999] [finding evidence to support the jury's determination that there was a 
fiduciary relationship between Martinelli and the Diocese and that the Diocese 
owed him a duty to investigate and to warn him in order to prevent harm] ). 
{¶ 49} “We conclude as we began: however reprehensible the conduct 
alleged, these actions are subject to the time limits created by the Legislature.  
Any exception to be made to allow these types of claims to proceed outside of the 
applicable statutes of limitations would be for the Legislature, as other States have 
done.” Zumpano, Slip Op. 01245, ___ N.E.2d ___, 2006 WL 395229. 
{¶ 50} Accordingly, we hold that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did 
not toll the statute of limitations for Doe’s claims. 
VIII.  Public-Policy Considerations 
{¶ 51} This court recognizes the difficult issues in any case of sexual 
abuse.  Yet Doe is essentially asking this court to extend the statute of limitations 
specifically for alleged victims of clergy sexual abuse.  The remedy Doe seeks 
requires a legislative response to create such an exception to our long-standing 
statutes of limitations.  The dissent of Chief Justice Moyer in Ault v. Jasko, 70 
Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, is on point with the situation we consider today:  
January Term, 2006 
19 
{¶ 52}  “The majority opinion announces a rule of law that would permit a 
person at any age after any lapse of time between the alleged sexual abuse and the 
revived memory of such abuse to sue the alleged abuser for money damages.  If 
that is to be the law of Ohio, it is the General Assembly that should declare it as 
such rather than this court.  * * * 
{¶ 53} “We simply do not have in the record in this case sufficient 
scientific, empirical or other information from which to craft a rule of law that 
will protect those accused of being abusers and those who have been abused or 
believe they have been abused as children.  The proper forum to determine such 
issues is in the General Assembly where all views, all relevant information, all 
scientific data, and all empirical studies can be presented, reviewed and debated 
by those who have an interest in the issue.”  Id. at 120, 637 N.E.2d 870 (Moyer, 
C.J., dissenting). 
IX.  Conclusion 
{¶ 54} Because we hold that Doe’s claims are barred by the relevant 
statutes of limitations, the certified question is answered in the affirmative, the 
judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
FRENCH, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
WHITMORE and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
 
BETH WHITMORE, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, 
J. 
 
JUDITH L. FRENCH, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for 
LANZINGER, J. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
FRENCH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 55} I respectfully dissent from Part VI of the majority opinion, which 
addresses Doe's allegations under the Ohio Corrupt Activities Act.  I agree with 
the dissent that R.C. 2923.34(K), which allows claims to be brought "within five 
years after the unlawful conduct terminates," does not prohibit Doe's claims that 
the appellants engaged in corrupt activities, apart from the sexual abuse, until 
2002.  However, I agree with the appellants that Doe has not pleaded those 
corrupt activities with particularity sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6), and for that reason, the corrupt-activities claims should be 
dismissed.  See Manogg v. Spangler (Apr. 19, 1994), Licking App. No. 93 CA 
106; Universal Coach, Inc. v. New York City Transit Auth., Inc. (1993), 90 Ohio 
App.3d 284, 291, 629 N.E.2d 28.  In all other respects, I concur in the majority 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 56} I dissent.  The plaintiff in this action is not asking for this court’s 
sympathy or for its tears.  He asks only for the recognition that he has stated a 
cause of action for which relief can be granted.  The law of this state as it 
presently stands allows him to bring a cause of action against the Archdiocese of 
Cincinnati.  The majority claims that it is “constrained to follow the law as it 
exists today”; in fact, the majority displays an active indifference to our own case 
law and to R.C. 2923.34(K). 
{¶ 57} The majority opinion answers a question completely different from 
the question certified by the Third District Court of Appeals. The question from 
the appellate court is: 
{¶ 58} “Where a complaint alleges with considerable particularity that due 
to recently discovered efforts of the church to conceal its involvement, the victim 
of sexual abuse by a priest did not until recently have sufficient knowledge to 
January Term, 2006 
21 
apprise him of independent claims against the church, are those allegations 
subject to a Civ.R. 12(B) dismissal on the basis that under Doe [v. First United 
Methodist Church (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 N.E.2d 402], notice of sexual 
abuse by a priest constitutes apprisal of the possibility of any other independent 
claims against the church as a matter of law, so that the relevant statutes of 
limitations against both the priest and the church are triggered by the sexual 
abuse?”  
{¶ 59} In other words, is a cause of action against the archdiocese for 
allowing or covering up sexual abuse by a priest subject to the same statute-of-
limitations triggering event as a cause of action against the priest himself for the 
sexual abuse?  Or are the separate causes of action against the distinct entities for 
distinctly different acts subject to different triggering dates? 
{¶ 60} In its attempt to be “succinct,” the majority rephrases the question 
and changes its meaning: “[A]t what point [must] a minor who is a victim of 
sexual abuse * * * assert claims against the employer of the perpetrator, when at 
the time of the abuse, the victim knows the identity of the perpetrator, the 
employer of the perpetrator, and that a battery has occurred.”  ¶ 8, supra.  The 
rephrasing leaves out an exceedingly important facet of the certified question that 
the “complaint alleges with considerable particularity” – at the point of the 
battery, the minor does not know the facts that are the basis of an independent 
claim against the archdiocese. 
{¶ 61} Although the sexual abuse is the sine qua non of this case, the 
additional knowledge about the archdiocese that the plaintiff gained in later years 
changed the nature of his experience.  To be victimized by the depravity of one 
fallen priest is its own tragedy, personal in nature, and seemingly random in 
incidence.  But to be victimized by a priest whom the archdiocese knew to be a 
serial sexual predator, and yet reassigned again and again to work in parishes, 
makes the plaintiff the victim of a well-thought-out conspiracy. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
{¶ 62} This court in First Methodist recognized that a plaintiff could have 
nonderivative causes of action for injuries caused by sexual assault by a church 
employee.  In First Methodist, the plaintiff “asserted independent claims against 
the church and school district arising from the alleged negligence of these 
defendants in failing to take some action to protect appellant from [the alleged 
predator’s] conduct.” First Methodist, 68 Ohio St.3d at 539, 629 N.E.2d 402.  
This court held that those claims were subject to their own triggering event for 
purposes of the statute of limitations: 
{¶ 63} “These claims are based upon the church’s and the school district’s 
own acts or omissions and have nothing to do with any theory of derivative 
liability. Thus, we recognize that the facts and events which triggered the statute 
of limitations on appellant's claims for sexual abuse did not necessarily trigger the 
R.C. 2305.10 two-year period of limitations on appellant's independent 
negligence claims against the church and the school district.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. 
{¶ 64} In First Methodist, however, this court noted that the plaintiff 
“never claimed or argued that his knowledge of the sexual abuse was insufficient 
to apprise him of the possibility that the church or the school district had been 
negligent in failing to protect him.” Id.  This court concluded that under those 
circumstances, it could only “assume that the events that triggered the one-year 
statute of limitations for assault and battery were no different from the events that 
triggered the two-year statute of limitations that applies to appellant's negligence 
causes of action against the church and the school district.” Id. 
{¶ 65} Here, the plaintiff in his complaint has made “with considerable 
particularity” the type of allegations that were missing in First Methodist.  He 
claims that he was not aware until 2002 of the archdiocese’s actions from which 
arose his claims for a breach of fiduciary duty and conspiracy. 
{¶ 66} Moreover, in First Methodist, the plaintiff did not allege an 
“alerting event” that notified him of the separate wrongdoing of the institutional 
January Term, 2006 
23 
defendants in that case.  In Browning v. Burt (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 
N.E.2d 993, we held that the triggering date for a claim against a hospital for 
negligent credentialing can be different from the triggering date for a claim of 
medical malpractice against the doctor whom the hospital negligently 
credentialed. Id. at 557, 613 N.E.2d 993.  In Browning, the plaintiffs sought relief 
from the hospital that had credentialed Dr. James Burt, infamously known as the 
“Love Doctor,” and Dr. Max Blue, two surgeons who performed experimental 
vaginal reconstructive surgeries on unwitting patients.  By 1987, each of the 
plaintiffs in Browning had known that her care had been deficient and that the 
doctors had committed malpractice.  But this court held that the alerting event as 
to claims against the hospital did not occur until October 1988, when the national 
television newsmagazine “West 57th Street” broadcast an exposé on Dr. Burt. Id. 
at 560, 613 N.E.2d 993.  Other former patients of Dr. Burt revealed that they 
suffered the same symptoms as the Browning plaintiffs and that the surgeries were 
unnecessary and experimental. Id.  This court held that the television program 
alerted the plaintiffs for the first time to the possibility that Drs. Burt and Blue 
“may have committed a number of harmful, improper or unwarranted surgeries 
upon a number of unsuspecting patients such that [the hospital’s] credentialing 
practices could reasonably be brought into question.” Id. at 561, 613 N.E.2d 993. 
{¶ 67} Thus, the court held in Burt that it was not the individual injury 
that triggered the statute of limitations.  Instead, the statute of limitations began to 
run with the alerting event that signaled the breadth of the wrongdoing by the 
hospital.  The underlying wrong committed by the direct tortfeasor did not start 
the statute running against the separate overseeing entity.  In this case, the 
majority says that “the identity of other victims is irrelevant to Doe’s claims 
because his claims are not dependent on other victims.”  To the contrary, in 
Browning, it was a media report of the claims of other victims that alerted the 
plaintiff of the hospital’s wrongdoing. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
{¶ 68} The decisions of this court since Browning have been consistent in 
their application of the discovery rule and in identifying alerting events to trigger 
the statute of limitations.  In Norgard v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 165, 
2002-Ohio-2007, 766 N.E.2d 977, syllabus, this court held that “a cause of action 
based upon an employer intentional tort accrues when the employee discovers * * 
* the workplace injury and the wrongful conduct of the employer.”  Norgard 
learned in 1992 that he had contracted chronic beryllium disease (“CBD”) from 
his contact with beryllium while employed at Brush Wellman.  It was not until 
October 1995, however, that Norgard learned through a newspaper article that 
“Brush Wellman had withheld information about the causes of beryllium-related 
diseases and the acceptable levels of beryllium to which an employee could be 
exposed without harm, that Brush Wellman knew that its air-sampling collections 
were faulty and inaccurate and that a large number of its employees were 
developing CBD, and that there might have been problems related to respiratory 
equipment and ventilation that led to unnecessarily elevated beryllium 
exposures.” Id. at ¶ 4.  Within two years of gaining that knowledge, Norgard filed 
an intentional-tort action against Brush Wellman. 
{¶ 69} The question in Norgard was whether the statute of limitations was 
triggered in 1992, when Norgard learned he had contracted CBD in the 
workplace, or in 1995, when he learned of Brush Wellman’s conduct.  The court 
noted that since the adoption of the discovery rule in O’Stricker v. Jim Walter 
Corp. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 4 OBR 335, 447 N.E.2d 727, “the court has 
reiterated that discovery of an injury alone is insufficient to start the statute of 
limitations running if at that time there is no indication of wrongful conduct of the 
defendant.” Norgard, 95 Ohio St.3d 165, 2002-Ohio-2007, 766 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 10.  
Instead, the court found that claims for an intentional tort “accrue only when the 
plaintiff acquires knowledge about the defendant above and beyond the injury 
itself.” Id. at ¶ 17.  Thus, the court held that the statute of limitations was 
January Term, 2006 
25 
triggered in 1995, when the plaintiff began to learn of Brush Wellman’s 
wrongdoing. Id. at ¶ 20. 
{¶ 70} The case before us is directly analogous to Browning and Norgard.  
As in those cases, the direct injury here, the sexual contact, was discovered before 
the plaintiff had gained knowledge of the wrongdoing of the defendant.  As here, 
news accounts alerted the plaintiffs in Browning and Norgard as to their claims.  
The discovery rule enunciated in O’Stricker and carried through Browning, 
Norgard, and other cases makes clear that a separate cause of action arises when a 
plaintiff discovers separate wrongdoing by a separate defendant. 
{¶ 71} In addition, the majority’s citation of Rotella v. Wood (2000), 528 
U.S. 549, 120 S.Ct. 1075, 145 L.Ed.2d 1047, regarding the triggering of the 
statute of limitations for the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”) claims, is irrelevant.  Rotella does reject the “injury 
and pattern” discovery rule.  But Rotella addressed the federal RICO statute, 
which “does not provide an express statute of limitations for actions brought 
under its civil enforcement provision.”  Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff 
Assoc., Inc. (1987), 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121.  The Ohio 
RICO statute adopts a specific statute of limitations that accounts for not just the 
injury, but also the pattern of illegal activity.  R.C. 2923.34(K) reads: 
{¶ 72} “Notwithstanding any other provision of law providing a shorter 
period of limitations, a civil proceeding or action under this section may be 
commenced at any time within five years after the unlawful conduct terminates or 
the cause of action accrues or within any longer statutory period of limitations 
that may be applicable.” 
{¶ 73} The Ohio statute is different from the federal statute, and Ohio’s 
statute of limitations is not focused on the injury but rather the unlawful activity 
of the defendant.  The plaintiff here alleges that the unlawful activity of the 
archdiocese continued until 2002.  Since procedurally this case is only at the stage 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, we must assume that the allegations of the plaintiff 
are true.  That is not to say that they are true or that the plaintiff will be able to 
proceed past the summary judgment level.  It is only to say that it is not too late to 
file a claim. 
{¶ 74} The plaintiff in this case is not asking for a special statute of 
limitations for alleged victims of clergy sexual abuse.  He asks only for us to 
apply this court’s own holdings to his case, as the court of appeals did.  To hold 
for the plaintiff here would not “extend the statute of limitations specifically for 
alleged victims of clergy sexual abuse,” as the majority asserts.  Instead, under the 
majority decision, the victims of childhood sexual abuse would be held to a 
different, higher standard than other plaintiffs.  Today’s holding makes 
inapplicable to alleged victims of clergy sexual abuse the discovery rule, the 
alerting-event concept, and the statute of limitations that the General Assembly 
specifically set forth within Ohio’s RICO statute. 
{¶ 75} In Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, 
paragraph one of the syllabus, this court applied the discovery rule “to toll the 
statute of limitations where a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses the 
memories of that abuse until a later time.”  The majority in this case cites the 
dissent in that case as authority that this case cries out for a legislative response.  
Yet somehow, the state survived this court’s decision in Ault.  The General 
Assembly, 12 years after the decision in Ault, has yet to act on repressed memory.  
As here, Ault was before us upon a motion to dismiss, and we accepted the 
allegations of the plaintiff as fact.  But the repressed-memory syndrome remains 
tough to prove. 
{¶ 76} Given this court’s decision today, any legislative response 
expanding the statute of limitations will come too late for this plaintiff.  The 
General Assembly cannot revive a statute of limitations once it has run.  This 
January Term, 2006 
27 
court is the single resort for this plaintiff.  Ohio law allows him to pursue his 
claim;  unfortunately, this court does not. 
 
WHITMORE, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
Kircher Law Office, L.L.C., and Konrad Kircher; and Anderson & 
Associates, P.A., and Jeffrey R. Anderson, for appellee. 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Mark A. Vander Laan, and Kirk M. Wall, for 
appellants Archdiocese of Cincinnati and Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk. 
Helmick & Hoolahan and Catherine G. Hoolahan, urging affirmance for 
amici curiae Leadership Council on Child Abuse & Interpersonal Violence and 
Theresa Bombrys. 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P., David J. Young, Philomena M. Dane, 
and Emily E. Root, urging reversal for amicus curiae Catholic Conference of 
Ohio. 
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