Case Title: Jones v. Murphy

Citation: 172 Vt. 86, 772 A.2d 502

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jones v. Murphy  (2000-067); 172 Vt. 86; 772 A.2d 502

[Filed 02-Mar-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 2000-067

Julie Jones                                       Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
   v.	                                          Orange Family Court

Richard J. Murphy                                 October Term, 2000

Alan W. Cook, J.

Karen Miller of Miller & Tonelli, Randolph, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Peter M. Nowlan of Nowlan & Meyer, Randolph, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Defendant Richard Murphy appeals a parentage order
  finding him to be  the biological father of Eric Jones, the youngest son of
  plaintiff Julie Jones.  Defendant asserts that  the Orange Family Court was
  without jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's parentage complaint against 
  him because: 1) a final divorce judgment between plaintiff and her
  ex-husband Jeffrey Jones had  determined that Mr. Jones had parental rights
  and responsibilities for Eric; 2) a subsequent  "amended" divorce order, in
  which plaintiff and Mr. Jones acknowledged that he was not Eric's 
  biological father, was without effect because it was issued after the
  expiration of the nisi period, and  was neither an amendment to the
  original judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 59(e), nor relief from the  judgment
  pursuant to V.R.C.P. 60(b); and 3) the compelling public interest in the
  finality of paternity  determinations requires us to apply the doctrine of
  res judicata to the facts of this case.

 

       We reject defendant's assertion that res judicata applies to this
  case, but nonetheless reverse  the trial court's order of parentage,
  finding defendant to be the biological father of Eric Jones,  because it
  conflicts with an existing judgment of the Orange Family Court which found
  Mr. Jones  responsible for Eric's support.

I.	Background

       Eric Jones was born on May 16, 1997.  At the time of his conception
  and birth, Eric's mother,  plaintiff Julie Jones, was married to Jeffrey
  Jones.  Mr. Jones was designated the father on Eric's  certificate of
  birth.  In August 1998, the Joneses obtained a final divorce order which
  granted the  parties "shared legal rights and responsibilities for their
  minor children," including Eric. 

       In September 1998, plaintiff, defendant and Mr. Jones underwent
  genetic testing which  determined the possibility of defendant's paternity
  to be 99.998%.  Mr. Jones's probability of  paternity was 0%.  On September
  29, 1998, Julie and Jeffrey Jones entered into an "amended final 
  stipulation," in which they acknowledged the fact that Mr. Jones is not
  Eric's biological father.  One  day later, plaintiff filed a complaint for
  parentage against defendant.

       Neither plaintiff nor Mr. Jones moved to amend the original August 21,
  1998 divorce order  within the ninety day nisi period, which expired in
  November 1998.  Instead, in December 1998, the  Jones's final divorce order
  was amended pursuant to the September 29, 1998 stipulation of the parties 
  to reflect the fact that "recent testing" had established that Mr. Jones is
  not the biological father of  Eric, and he is therefore "granted no
  parental rights and responsibilities with respect to Eric." The  Jones's
  final divorce order was amended by the same assistant judge who issued the
  original August  1998 divorce order pursuant to the parties' first
  stipulation.

       In response to the complaint of parentage made against him, defendant
  moved for summary  judgment, contending that the Orange Family Court was
  without jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's  parentage complaint because
  plaintiff and Mr. Jones were bound by the August 1998 divorce decree  in
  which they had agreed to shared legal rights and responsibilities for their
  minor children, including  Eric.  The court denied defendant's motion. 
  Defendant then stipulated to a final order of parentage  finding him to be
  the father of Eric, while preserving his argument that the court was
  without 

 

  jurisdiction to enter the judgment of parentage.

       Defendant contends on appeal that: (1) the Orange Family Court was
  without jurisdiction to  consider plaintiff's parentage complaint against
  defendant because no relief from the original divorce  decree in the matter
  of Jones v. Jones had been obtained; and (2) res judicata bars plaintiff
  from  filing a complaint of parentage against defendant. 

II.  The Divorce Decree

       In February 1998, Julie Jones filed an action for divorce from Jeffrey
  Jones with the Orange  Family Court.  In the complaint for divorce, Ms.
  Jones alleged that Eric Jones, and his brother Evan  Jones, were born of
  the marriage.  In June 1998, a child support order was entered by the
  family  court in the matter of Jones v. Jones.  Jeffrey Jones was found to
  be the obligor for both children.  On  August 21, 1998, the family court
  issued a final order in the matter of Jones v. Jones, which was  signed by
  Donald Hisey, assistant judge for Orange Country.  The final order
  provided, in relevant  part:

               PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
               1.  The parties shall be granted shared legal rights and 
          responsibilities for their minor children, Evan Parker Jones, 
          d.o.b. July 24, 1996 and Eric M. Jones, d.o.b. May 16, 1997.

       Within a short time after the final uncontested divorce hearing,
  plaintiff and Mr. Jones   underwent genetic testing.  As a result,
  plaintiff and Mr. Jones entered into an amended stipulation in  which
  plaintiff acknowledged that Mr. Jones was not Eric's biological father, and
  relieved him of  parental rights and responsibilities for Eric.  Although
  the Joneses entered into the stipulation on  September 29, 1998, and Julie
  Jones filed a complaint of parentage against defendant one day later,  the
  Jones's original divorce judgment was not amended to reflect the stipulated
  agreement until  December 4, 1998, more than ninety days after the original
  divorce order of August 21, 1998.

       A trial court's jurisdiction to amend a divorce decree is ordinarily
  limited to the nisi period.   Downs v. Downs, 150 Vt. 647, 647, 549 A.2d 1382, 1382 (1988) (mem.) (no jurisdiction to issue an  amended order after
  the decree had become absolute).  In Vermont, the nisi period is three
  months  from the entry of the order. 15 V.S.A. § 554.  The nisi period for
  the Jones's divorce order expired

 

  in November 1998. After the expiration of the nisi period, the parties may
  move to alter or amend the  judgment pursuant to 60(b) of Vermont's Rules
  of Civil Procedure.  Cameron v. Cameron, 150 Vt.  647, 648, 549 A.2d 1043,
  1043-44 (1988) (mem.).  Rule 60(b) allows a party to obtain relief from a 
  final judgment for reasons of, inter alia, mistake, newly-discovered
  evidence, and equitable  considerations. V.C.R.P. 60(b).  Neither party to
  the divorce sought to amend the original judgment  order under either Rule
  60(b) or 59(e). (FN1)  Therefore, the December 4, 1998 amended order is a 
  nullity. (FN2)   

III.  Res Judicata

       Although we accept defendant's view that the August 21, 1998 divorce
  order in Jones v.  Jones was not properly amended, we do not agree that res
  judicata insulates defendant from a  parentage action by plaintiff.  First,
  defendant was not a party to the Jones's divorce action.  See  Opland v.
  Kiesgan, 594 N.W.2d 505, 510 n.7 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (putative father
  "cannot assert  res judicata or collateral estoppel because he was not a
  party to or the privy of a party to the divorce  action"); Annotation,
  Effect, in Subsequent Proceedings, of Paternity Findings or Implications in 
  Divorce or Annulment Decree or in Support or Custody Order Made Incidental
  Thereto,78 A.L.R.3d  846, 852 (1977) ("[P]aternity findings or implications
  in a divorce decree . . . are not binding on a  stranger to the divorce
  action in a later proceeding between the stranger and a husband or wife.").

       Second, as defendant concedes in attacking the validity of the
  December 1998 "amended"  final order, relief from the August 1998 original
  divorce judgment may be sought under V.R.C.P.  60(b).  A direct attack on a
  judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) cannot be barred on res judicata  grounds. 
  "The doctrine of 'res judicata does not preclude a litigant from making a
  direct attack  [under Rule 60(b)] upon the judgment before the court which
  rendered it.'" Dixon v. Pouncy,