Case Title: Luce v. Cushing

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Luce v. Cushing (2003-344); 177 Vt. 600; 868 A.2d 672

2004 VT 117

[Filed 02-Dec-2004]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2004 VT 117

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-344

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 2004

  Denise E. Luce	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Chittenden Family Court
                                       }	
  Jeffrey E. Cushing	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 495-6-00 CnDm

                                                Trial Judge: Linda Levitt

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Father appeals from a family court judgment awarding mother
  sole parental rights and responsibilities for the parties' two minor
  children and granting father visitation.  Father contends: (1) the court
  abused its discretion by awarding parental rights and responsibilities
  without making the requisite findings concerning the best interests of the
  children; (2) the court improperly refused to allow father to present
  evidence and cross-examine witnesses; and (3) the administrative judge
  erroneously denied father's motion to disqualify the trial judge.  We
  affirm.

       ¶  2.  This case presents a long and tortured factual and procedural
  history.  Events material to the resolution of the instant appeal may be
  summarized as follows.  Although never married, the parties are the parents
  of two minor children, born in March 1996 and December 1997.  Mother filed
  a parentage action in June 2000, seeking parental rights and
  responsibilities and child support. The following month, attorney Karen
  Shingler filed an appearance on behalf of father. Based on a personal
  friendship with attorney Shingler, Judge Levitt - who had previously heard
  several relief-from-abuse motions filed by the parties - recused herself.

       ¶  3.  The parties eventually stipulated to a temporary shared
  custody arrangement, and agreed to postpone the parentage hearing while
  they continued to mediate the matter.  In January 2001, however, mother
  filed a petition for relief from abuse, alleging that father had sexually
  abused the children.  Following a hearing, the court found that father had
  inappropriately touched the private parts of one of the children, and
  granted a final relief-from-abuse order, awarding mother sole parental
  rights and responsibilities and limiting father's parent-child contact to
  supervised visitation.  In March, attorney Karen Villemaire of Schoenberg &
  Associates entered an appearance on behalf of father, and the court granted
  attorney Shingler's motion to withdraw.  
     
       ¶  4.  In late March, father filed a V.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for
  relief from the abuse-prevention order.  At a hearing in May, the parties
  stipulated to an order in which father agreed to withdraw the Rule 60(b)
  motion, and the parties agreed that mother be awarded parental rights and
  responsibilities, that the parties submit to a forensic evaluation by Dr.
  Joseph E. Hasazi, and that "the award of parental rights and
  responsibilities to [mother] shall remain in effect unless Dr. Hasazi's
  report recommends that parental rights and responsibilities should switch
  to [father] or unless such report recommends that there be a significant
  change in the parental rights and responsibilities order," in which event
  the report would "be considered a material and unanticipated change in
  circumstances."  

       ¶  5.  A docket entry in late October 2001 indicates that the family
  court clerk asked the current presiding judge, Judge Kupersmith, whether
  Judge Levitt could preside over the case in light of attorney Shingler's
  withdrawal.  Judge Kupersmith directed the clerk to schedule a status
  conference with Judge Levitt to see if the parties objected.  There is no
  indication in the record that the status conference took place. The record
  is clear, however, that Judge Levitt explained at the next scheduled
  hearing in November that, in light of attorney Shingler's withdrawal, "the
  reason that I wasn't on this case is no longer in effect" and thus there
  was "no reason that I couldn't handle the case as part of . . .  regular
  Family Court business." Neither party objected to Judge Levitt's
  participation at that time, or at any point during the numerous subsequent
  proceedings over which she presided until January 2003 - some fourteen
  months later - when father filed a motion to disqualify Judge Levitt.  The
  basis of the motion and the administrative judge's ruling denying it will
  be discussed more fully below.   

       ¶  6.  Dr. Hasazi filed his report with the court in April 2002.  He
  did not conclude that father had sexually abused the children, but found
  rather that he had engaged in certain interactions  with the children that
  were "developmentally inappropriate." Based on his review of the case
  history, testing, and interviews, Dr. Hasazi recommended that mother retain
  parental rights and responsibilities and that father have parent-child
  contact for three to five days during each two week period, transitioning
  from supervised to unsupervised overnight visits.  

       ¶  7.  The court (Judge Levitt) presided over a three-day
  evidentiary hearing on the parentage action from March through May 2003. 
  In light of the parties' earlier stipulation and Dr. Hasazi's
  recommendation that mother retain custody, the court ruled that the only
  salient issue was parent-child contact. The court denied father's several
  requests to introduce evidence allegedly showing that mother was unfit to
  serve as the custodial parent because she had coached the children to make
  false accusations of abuse.  The court also sustained objections to
  attempts to cross-examine mother on the same issue.  The court issued a
  written decision in June.  Its key findings, which father has not
  challenged on appeal, include findings that, while father enjoys a close
  and loving relationship with the children, he has difficulty acting as a
  parent, setting limits and putting the interests of the children ahead of
  his own.  The court further found that the alleged inappropriate touching
  was not sexual in nature, but instead the result of father's lack of
  boundaries, and that father had benefitted from counseling in this regard.  
         
       ¶  8.  The court also found that father had been hypercritical of
  mother's parenting skills and unduly obsessive about the children's care,
  resulting in mother's feelings of anger toward father and her efforts to
  thwart his contact with the children.  The court found that mother is a
  good and adequate parent, provides the children with guidance, support and
  protection, and understands and meets their developmental, emotional, and
  physical  needs.  While mindful of mother's previously obstructionist
  actions toward father, the court found that the children's interests were
  best served by spending more time with mother than father. Accordingly, the
  court awarded mother parental rights and responsibilities, and ordered
  parent-child contact with father every other Wednesday afternoon through
  Monday morning, and alternating holidays.  This appeal followed. 

       ¶  9.  Father contends the court abused its discretion and abrogated
  its responsibility by basing the award of parental rights and
  responsibilities on the parties' stipulation and Dr. Hasazi's report,
  rather than on detailed findings concerning the best interests of the
  children under 15 V.S.A. § 665(b).  Father's argument is essentially
  twofold.   First, he asserts that the stipulation and order  were not
  intended to serve as a final determination of parental rights and
  responsibilities.  As noted, the stipulation and order provided that the
  agreed upon award of parental rights and responsibilities to mother would
  "remain in effect" unless Dr. Hasazi recommended otherwise. Father observes
  that the order incorporating the stipulation specifically provided that
  mother "is awarded temporary rights and responsibilities." (Emphasis
  added.)  The trial court acknowledged the temporary nature of the order
  pending the completion of Dr. Hasazi's evaluation, but also found that the
  parties plainly intended the award to become permanent and final absent a
  contrary recommendation by Dr. Hasazi.  As the court succinctly explained,
  "it was a temporary award to become final if the Hasazi report suggested
  that [mother] should . . .  retain parental rights."  The plain language of
  the stipulation and order amply supports the court's interpretation. See
  Lussier v. Lussier, 174 Vt. 454, 455,