Case Title: Ruven George Seibert v. Phillip Macht

Citation: 2001 WI 67

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 67 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-3354-W 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ruven George Seibert,  
 
Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Phillip Macht, Director, Wisconsin Resource 
Center and Circuit Court for Outagamie County,  
 
Respondents.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 19, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 11, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie 
 
JUDGE: 
Dee R. Dyer 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-petitioner there were briefs 
by Gregory P. Seibold and Murphy & Desmond, S.C., Madison, and 
oral argument by Gregory P. Seibold. 
 
 
For the respondents the cause was argued by 
Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Joseph N. 
 
2 
Ehmann and Glenn L. Cushing, assistant state public defenders, on 
behalf of the Office of the State Public Defender. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Howard B. 
Eisenberg, Milwaukee. 
 
2001 WI 67 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-3354-W 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ruven George  
Seibert,  
 
          Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Phillip Macht, Director, Wisconsin  
Resource Center and Circuit Court for  
Outagamie County,  
 
          Respondents. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case presents two issues.  
The first issue is whether an indigent sexually violent person, 
as 
defined 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
Chapter 
980 
(1999-2000),1 
is 
constitutionally entitled to assistance of counsel in bringing 
his or her first appeal as of right from a denial of his or her 
petition for supervised release.  Because due process and equal 
protection concerns are implicated, we rule that an indigent 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes will 
be to the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
FILED 
 
JUN 19, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
2 
sexually 
violent 
person 
is 
constitutionally 
entitled 
to 
assistance of counsel in bringing a first appeal as of right 
from a denial of his or her petition for supervised release. 
¶2 
The second issue is whether there is ineffective 
assistance of counsel where appellate counsel filed an appeal 
from a petition for supervised release one day late.  On the 
unique facts of this case, we find that there was ineffective 
assistance of counsel where the notice of appeal for the denial 
of the petition for supervised release was filed one day late in 
circuit court.  Moreover, we find that under the United States 
Supreme Court's decisions in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 
(1963), Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and their 
progeny, the court of appeals cannot conduct an independent 
review 
for 
error 
where 
the 
individual 
lacks 
requested 
representation, whether that representation encompasses briefing 
on the merits or an Anders brief.2  Accordingly, we remand 
Seibert's cause to the court of appeals with instructions to 
appoint new appellate counsel who may submit either a brief on 
the merits or an Anders brief. 
                     
2 An Anders brief is submitted to an appellate court when 
counsel finds his or her client's case is "wholly frivolous, 
after a conscientious examination of it."  Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  In such a case, counsel may request 
permission to withdraw.  But counsel's request to withdraw must 
"be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record 
that might arguably support the appeal."  Id.  This brief is 
thus commonly referred to as an Anders brief.  After an Anders 
brief 
is 
submitted, 
the 
appellate 
court, 
"after 
a 
full 
examination of all the proceedings," determines "whether the 
case is wholly frivolous."  Id. 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
3 
¶3 
The petitioner, Ruven Seibert (Seibert), who was 
deemed a sexually violent person under Chapter 980, petitioned 
the Outagamie County Circuit Court, Dee R. Dyer, Judge, for 
supervised release and the circuit court denied his petition.  
The court of appeals subsequently dismissed Seibert's appeal as 
untimely.  Seibert v. Macht, No. 99-3354-W, unpublished slip op. 
at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2000).  Seibert then filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his right to 
effective assistance of counsel had been violated and requesting 
reinstatement of his right to appeal the denial of his petition 
for supervised release.  The court of appeals rejected his 
petition for writ of habeas corpus in an unpublished decision 
and order.  Id. at 9.  We accepted Seibert's pro se petition for 
review and appointed counsel.  For the following reasons, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the 
cause with instructions. 
I 
¶4 
The facts are undisputed.  In January of 1996, Seibert 
was deemed to be a sexually violent person under Chapter 980 and 
committed to the custody of the Department of Health and Human 
Services.  Seibert then petitioned the circuit court for 
supervised 
release. 
 
The 
State 
Public 
Defender's 
office 
appointed trial counsel to represent Seibert.  On November 16, 
1998, the circuit court denied Seibert's petition orally on the 
record and Seibert said, "Your Honor, I would like to appeal 
this decision."  The circuit court responded, "You may talk with 
[your trial counsel] about all of your appellate rights, Mr. 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
4 
Seibert."  The circuit court entered the order of judgment 
denying the petition on March 12, 1999.  Subsequent to the 
circuit court's ruling, trial counsel filed a Notice of Intent 
to Pursue Post-Judgment Relief, indicating that Seibert would 
appeal and requesting that the State Public Defender's office 
appoint appellate counsel to represent Seibert.   
¶5 
Just over one month later, on April 13, 1999, 
appellate counsel filed notice of appointment to represent 
Seibert.  On June 11, 1999——91 days after the entry of judgment 
in the Outagamie County Circuit Court——appellate counsel filed 
the notice of appeal in the circuit court, which was one day 
late.  See Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1).  Even though the notice of 
appeal was filed timely in the court of appeals for District III 
in Madison, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the 
appeal because appellate counsel had filed one day late in 
Outagamie County.  See Wis. Stat. § 809.10(1)(b).  Attempting to 
correct the problem, appellate counsel filed an amended notice 
of appeal on July 6, 1999, which indicated that she would be 
filing a no merit report per Anders and Wis. Stat. § 809.32.  
The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely per Wis. 
Stat. § 808.04(1). Seibert v. Macht, No. 99-1574, order (Wis. 
Ct. App. July 9, 1999).  Appellate counsel then filed another 
appeal, again indicating that she would be filing a no merit 
report.  The court of appeals responded as it did before, 
dismissing this second appeal as untimely. Seibert v. Macht, No. 
99-2046-NM, order (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1999). 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
5 
¶6 
Proceeding pro se, Seibert petitioned for habeas 
corpus relief in the court of appeals, which is the action 
presently before us.  His writ asserts that the assistance of 
counsel he received was ineffective and seeks reinstatement of 
his right to appeal the denial of his petition for supervised 
release.  Acknowledging appellate counsel's belated filing of 
the notice of appeal from the denial of his petition for 
supervised release, the court of appeals proceeded to conduct an 
independent review of the trial record of that action in the 
context 
of 
his 
habeas 
petition. 
Seibert, 
No. 
99-3354-W, 
unpublished slip op. at 3-9.  According to the court, this 
independent review revealed "that any potential appellate issue 
would lack arguable merit within the meaning of Anders."  Id. at 
2.  On this ground, the court concluded that the case was 
appropriate for summary disposition and denied Seibert's writ.  
Id. at 9. 
¶7 
We granted Seibert's petition for review on September 
6, 2000, and appointed counsel, directing the parties to address 
the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Penson v. Ohio, 
488 U.S. 75 (1988), and Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000). 
II 
 
¶8 
Seibert asks this court to determine whether he has a 
constitutional 
right 
of 
counsel 
on 
appeal 
and, 
if 
that 
constitutional right was violated, what is the appropriate 
remedy.  Thus, he presents us with two questions of law, which 
we undertake our review without deference to the decision of the 
court of appeals.  See State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
6 
Wis. 2d 615, 647, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998); State v. Harris, 199 
Wis. 2d 227, 237, 544 N.W.2d 545 (1996). 
¶9 
At the outset, we observe that the State and Seibert 
are in remarkable agreement on most aspects of this case.  Both 
the State and Seibert agree that the court of appeals did what 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
forbade 
in 
Penson 
by 
independently reviewing the record for reversible error when 
Seibert was not represented by counsel in the context of his 
habeas petition.  488 U.S. at 81-83.  Thus, the parties agree 
that the decision of the court of appeals must be reversed.  The 
State and Seibert are also in accord that Seibert has a 
statutory right of counsel per Wis. Stat. § 980.03(2)(a). 
¶10 Moreover, the State concedes, as Seibert advances, 
that Seibert has a constitutional right of counsel upon appeal, 
but the State urges us to acknowledge only his statutory right 
to counsel.  According to the State, we should decide this issue 
on 
the 
"narrowest 
possible 
grounds," 
and 
"not 
reach 
constitutional issues where the resolution of other issues 
disposes of an appeal."  State v. Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 
492, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997).  However, because an indigent 
defendant's right of counsel implicates equal protection and due 
process concerns, we reject the State's argument and acknowledge 
Seibert's constitutional right of counsel. 
¶11 The United States Supreme Court has termed the Sixth 
Amendment right of counsel as fundamental.  Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).  Thereafter, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the Sixth Amendment right of counsel applies to the states 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
7 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963).  On this score, the Supreme Court has 
noted:  
 
There is lacking that equality demanded by the 
Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals 
as 
of 
right, 
enjoys 
the 
benefit 
of 
counsel's 
examination into the record, research of the law, and 
marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the 
indigent, 
already 
burdened 
by 
a 
preliminary 
determination that his case is without merit, is 
forced to shift for himself. 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).  Although 
the 
states 
are 
not 
constitutionally 
required 
to 
provide 
appellate review of criminal convictions, where such review is 
afforded, it cannot discriminate against indigent individuals.  
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).  Discrimination 
against indigent individuals on appellate review implicates 
equal protection and due process concerns:  "[b]oth equal 
protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our 
entire judicial system——all people charged with crime must, so 
far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the 
bar of justice in every American court.'"  Id. at 17.  
Accordingly, as the Supreme Court made clear in its watershed 
Douglas decision, the right of counsel for indigent defendants 
is rooted not only in the Sixth Amendment, but in the Equal 
Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 372 U.S. at 356-58. 
¶12 As Douglas explained, the right of counsel flows along 
with the right of appeal.  Id. at 356.  In Wisconsin, the right 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
8 
of appeal from a criminal conviction is afforded to defendants 
by our state constitution.  See Wis. Const. art. I, § 21. In 
accordance with Griffin, then, we have previously noted that 
"[d]ue process requires that a criminal defendant receive 
effective assistance of appellate counsel in bringing the first 
appeal as of right."  State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 511-12, 
484 N.W.2d 540 (1992).  Although a sexually violent person, 
committed under Chapter 980, is not a criminal defendant, he or 
she has the same constitutional rights as a criminal defendant. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 980.05.  It therefore follows that an 
individual committed under Chapter 980 has a constitutional 
right of counsel in bringing his or her first appeal as of 
right, emanating from both the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause as well as the Sixth 
Amendment's right of counsel.3  This right of counsel encompasses 
the right to effective assistance of counsel.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); State v. Flores, 183 
Wis. 2d 587, 605, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994).  Consequently, we 
recognize Seibert's constitutional right of counsel——including 
the right to effective assistance of counsel——on his first 
appeal as a matter of right. 
III 
¶13 An appellant's indigence weighs heavily on his or her 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, raising 
                     
3 However, there is no constitutional right of counsel for a 
discretionary appeal.  See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 
  
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
9 
the specter of due process and equal protection violations.  The 
crux of the problem is that, as a practical matter, appointed 
counsel——conserving scarce public resources——is perhaps more apt 
to withdraw, finding the appeal frivolous, than counsel for a 
full-paying client.  See McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 
District I, 486 U.S. 429, 438 (1988) (noting that an Anders 
brief is "seldom, if ever, filed by retained counsel" but this 
fact 
does 
not 
compromise 
the 
principle 
of 
"substantial 
equality").  Regardless, where an indigent defendant has 
appointed counsel and desires to pursue his or her first appeal 
of right, there is a risk that he or she will not receive due 
process or equal protection of the law.   
¶14 To address this risk, the Supreme Court devised the 
Anders "prophylactic framework," which requires that appellate 
counsel seeking to withdraw after finding the individual's 
appeal frivolous submit a brief "referring to anything in the 
record that might arguably support the appeal."  Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  The 
Anders brief is intended "to vindicate the constitutional right 
to appellate counsel announced in Douglas."  Smith, 528 U.S. at 
273.  After appellate counsel submits an Anders brief requesting 
to withdraw because an appeal would be frivolous, it is the duty 
of the appellate court to conduct "a full examination of all the 
proceedings" and to determine if the appeal would indeed be 
wholly frivolous.  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  However, if the 
appellate court conducts this full examination where the 
appellant has no representation, even though the appellant has 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
10
requested representation, it violates the dictates of Douglas 
and the holding of Penson.  Penson, 488 U.S. at 86.  To be sure, 
there may be some redundancy inherent in the Anders prophylactic 
framework because both appellate counsel and the appellate court 
review the record.  But any such redundancy helps vindicate an 
indigent individual's constitutional right of counsel, thus 
outweighing the cost of the duplicative review.  The Anders 
brief, then, is a safe harbor when counsel believes that a brief 
on the merits is inappropriate and, as such, it endeavors to 
protect an indigent individual's right of counsel on appeal. 
¶15 In the present case, appellate counsel intended to 
file a no merit report per Anders, which would have preserved 
Seibert's right to counsel on appeal from the denial of his 
petition for supervised release.  Although the notice of appeal 
was filed timely with the court of appeals in Madison, it was 
not filed until one day late with the circuit court in Outagamie 
County.  The record here indicates that Seibert unequivocally 
desired to appeal the denial of his petition for supervised 
relief.  The State has not highlighted any fact that indicates 
otherwise.  As we have previously stated in accord with 
Strickland, "[i]n order to prove a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that his or her 
counsel performed deficiently and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense."  State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 
Wis. 2d 246, 253, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996); see Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (ruling that Strickland provides the 
analytical framework where counsel fails to file notice of 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
11
appeal).  In circumstances such as these, missing the deadline 
to file an appeal is deficient performance that denied Seibert 
the right to counsel.4  Id. at 253-54.   
¶16 Seibert's loss of the right to appeal from the denial 
of his petition for supervised release under these circumstances 
was prejudicial because "[a]ctual or constructive denial of the 
assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result 
in prejudice."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.  We recognize that 
many habeas corpus petitions asserting ineffective assistance of 
counsel may require an evidentiary hearing by a referee or 
circuit court for fact-finding, perhaps to ascertain whether the 
counsel's failure to file was due to instructions to that effect 
from his or her client.5  See Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 521 
(appellate court has authority to submit issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel to referee or circuit court for fact-
finding during habeas proceeding).  We therefore confine our 
                     
4 The schedule in Wis. Stat. § 809.32(2) conflicts with the 
schedule in Wis. Stat. § 808.04.  While we resolve this problem 
in footnote 8, we observe here that it may have been the source 
of confusion on the appeal from the denial of Seibert's petition 
for supervised release in this case. 
5 The State asked for this evidentiary hearing before the 
court of appeals as well. Seibert v. Macht, No. 99-3354-W, 
unpublished slip op. at 3-4 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2000).  
The court of appeals, in rejecting the State's argument, stated 
that "[a] remand is unnecessary.  At the end of the November 16, 
1998, hearing on Seibert's motion, Seibert stated on the record 
that he desired to appeal."  Id.  The court of appeals further 
noted that "[w]e are satisfied that the failure to file a 
requested notice of appeal in a timely fashion constitutes 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel."  Id. at 3. 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
12
holding on ineffective assistance of counsel to the facts of 
this case, which show that Seibert clearly expressed his desire 
to appeal from the denial of his petition for supervised release 
and the notice of appeal was filed timely with the court of 
appeals in Madison, but missed the deadline in Outagamie County 
Circuit 
Court 
by 
one 
day, 
which 
abrogated 
Seibert's 
constitutional right to assistance of counsel. 
¶17 But the court of appeals also violated Seibert's 
constitutional right to assistance of counsel when it conducted 
an independent review of the trial record for error in the 
context of his habeas proceeding, contrary to the Supreme 
Court's rulings in Douglas, Anders and their progeny.  In 
fashioning a remedy for Seibert, we turn to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Penson for guidance.  488 U.S. 75. 
¶18 In Penson, an indigent defendant, convicted of several 
counts of felonious assault, desired to appeal.  Id. at 77-79.  
The state appointed him appellate counsel.  Id. at 77.  His 
counsel, 
seeking 
to 
withdraw, 
filed 
a 
"Certification 
of 
Meritless Appeal and Motion" with the Ohio Court of Appeals, but 
did not include an Anders brief.  Id. at 77-78.  Nevertheless, 
the Ohio Court of Appeals granted counsel's motion to withdraw 
and then, without assistance of counsel for the petitioner, 
proceeded with its own examination of the record to determine 
whether the defendant received a fair trial or whether there 
were any prejudicial errors.  Id. at 79.  The court found 
"'several arguable claims,'" including plain error as to one 
count, which it reversed.  Id.  However, because the defendant 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
13
did not receive assistance of counsel upon appeal, the Supreme 
Court found the Ohio Court of Appeals' actions anathema to the 
Constitution, particularly as explained in its Douglas and 
Anders decisions.  Id. at 83-85.  In the present case, as 
acknowledged by the parties, the court of appeals' independent 
review of the record without the benefit of counsel is similar 
to the Ohio Court of Appeals' constitutionally infirm actions in 
Penson, and compels us to reverse. 
¶19 Penson, 
however, 
not 
only 
reiterates 
the 
constitutional imperatives regarding the right to appellate 
counsel outlined in Douglas and Anders, it is also instructive 
on the appropriate remedy when a court disregards those 
imperatives.  In Penson, the Supreme Court rejected the state's 
argument that the defendant needed to show "prejudice" under 
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.  In so doing, the Supreme Court stated 
that "it is important to emphasize that the denial of counsel in 
this case left petitioner completely without representation 
during the appellate court's actual decisional process.  This is 
quite different from a case in which it is claimed that 
counsel's performance was ineffective."  Penson, 488 U.S at 88. 
 As such, the denial of counsel in these circumstances gives 
rise to a "presumption of prejudice," rendering any actual 
finding of prejudice under Strickland superfluous.  Id. at 88-
89.  Accordingly, we find that Seibert, who clearly indicated 
his desire to pursue an appeal of the circuit court's order 
denying his petition for supervised release on the record, is 
not required to demonstrate prejudice at an evidentiary hearing. 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
14
 While the State urges us to subject Seibert to this procedural 
hurdle under Strickland, we note that Strickland is applicable 
only where an individual is represented by counsel.6  See Jenkins 
v. Coombe, 821 F.2d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding Strickland 
inapplicable where defendant had "no counsel or, at best, 
nominal counsel to represent his interests on the state 
appeal").  When the court of appeals independently reviewed the 
trial record for error in the context of Seibert's habeas 
                     
6 The State's evidentiary hearing would fail to address the 
constitutional violation that occurred in the context of 
Seibert's habeas petition:  the court of appeals' independent 
review of the record.  See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988).  
As the Supreme Court observed in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 
286 
(2000), 
"[t]he 
applicability 
of 
Strickland's 
actual-
prejudice prong to Robbins's claim of ineffective assistance 
follows from Penson, where we distinguished denial of counsel 
altogether on appeal, which warrants a presumption of prejudice, 
from mere ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, which 
does not." 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
15
proceeding, he was not represented by counsel, in violation of 
the commands of Douglas and Anders.7 
¶20 In light of the denial of counsel Seibert suffered, we 
decline to remand the present case to the circuit court for an 
evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel as 
requested by the State. Instead, we remand the present case to 
the court of appeals, which will appoint Seibert new appellate 
counsel and reinstate his right to appeal from the circuit 
court's denial of his petition for supervised release.  To 
secure Seibert's constitutional right of counsel on his first 
appeal as a matter of right, we adopt the prophylactic framework 
of Anders and its progeny for Chapter 980 cases.  Accordingly, 
appellate counsel may file a brief on the merits or an Anders 
                     
7 The Sixth, Second, Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of 
Appeals 
have 
found 
remand 
to 
the 
appellate 
court 
with 
instructions to appoint appellate counsel the appropriate remedy 
where the defendant's constitutional rights have similarly been 
infringed.  See Freels v. Hills, 843 F.2d 958, 963 (6th Cir. 
1988) (refusing to apply two-part Strickland test because "the 
obligation of advocacy required of counsel by Anders is of such 
a quality that it is not subject to waiver or excuse"); Jenkins 
v. Coombe, 821 F.2d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 1987) (cited above); 
Robinson v. Black, 812 F.2d 1084, 1086-88 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(asserting that case should be remanded to state supreme court 
and new counsel appointed where court found "that Anders' 
dictates were woefully unsatisfied" but not applying Strickland 
test to counsel's performance); Cannon v. Berry, 727 F.2d 1020, 
1021-24 (11th Cir. 1984) (asserting that requiring a defendant 
to 
show 
actual 
prejudice 
where 
appellate 
court 
reviewed 
defendant's trial record for errors and defendant lacked 
representation would lead to an erosion of Anders). 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
16
brief.8  We urge the court of appeals to provide flexibility in 
setting the briefing schedule.   
IV 
¶21 In conclusion, we recognize Seibert's constitutional 
right of counsel on his first appeal as a matter of right.  We 
find that his attorney's failure to timely file Seibert's notice 
of appeal ran afoul of Strickland under these extraordinary 
circumstances.  Moreover, we find that the court of appeals 
disregarded his constitutional right of counsel in the context 
of his habeas proceeding by independently reviewing the record 
for reversible error.  Accordingly, we adopt the prophylactic 
framework of Anders for Chapter 980 appeals in order to preserve 
Seibert's constitutional right of counsel on appeal. 
                     
8 As previously noted, the schedule set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.32(2), which provides 180 days to file a "no merit brief" 
after the trial transcript is served on the defendant conflicts 
with the schedule in § 808.04, which provides that an appeal 
from a civil judgment or order must take place within 45 or 90 
days.  This discord exists because a no merit brief is submitted 
on appeal from a criminal conviction.  However, Chapter 980 
proceedings are civil and, therefore, the schedule set forth in 
§ 808.04, which provides 45 or 90 days, applies.  See State v. 
Post, 
197 
Wis. 2d 
279, 
290-307, 
541 
N.W.2d 
115 
(1995) 
(explaining the Chapter 980 statutory scheme); Seibert v. Macht, 
No. 99-3354-W, unpublished slip op. at 3 n.2 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 
22, 2000).  We leave the issue of whether Chapter 980 appeals 
should be exempted from § 808.04 to the legislature.  We note 
that the Judicial Council is currently weighing legislation to 
amend § 808.04(3) to include Chapter 980 proceedings.  However, 
as the law currently stands, § 808.04 governs Chapter 980 
appeals, and counsel for an individual committed under chapter 
980 who wishes to appeal as a matter of right may either file a 
brief on the merits or an Anders brief. 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
17
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the court of appeals. 
 
No. 
99-3354-W 
 
 
1