Case Title: State v. French

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LioRARY
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

No. 25253

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP HAWAI'I

 

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STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee,

 

WV

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MARY LOU FRENCH, Defendant -Appellant

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82 :OlWY Li aay 9002

 

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
(FC-CR NO. 01-12-0364 (3))

MEMORANDUM OPINION
and Duffy, 33.)

Levinson, Nakayama, Acobi

 

(By: Moon, C.I
Following a jury trial, defendant-appellant Mary Lou

French (Mary Lou), also known as Mary Lou Barr and Mary Low
Spradlin, appeals from the final judgment filed on dune 13, 2002,
in the Family Court of the Second Circuit, the Honorable Joseph
B. Cardoza presiding, convicting her of and sentencing her for

two counts of Custodial Interference in the First Degree, in

violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-726(1) (b)
(supp. 2000).? On appeal, Mary Lou claims that the trial court

erred by: (1) providing a prejudicially erroneous jury

 

HRS § 707-726 etates in relevant part that:
of cuntodial

 

(a) A person commits the offen
interference in the first degree i

bj ine person intentionally or knowingly takes,
entices, concesis, or detains  winor less than eleven years
Gl from that mincr's lawful custodian, knowing that the
person nad no right to do sol.)

 
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instruction regarding the “choice of evils" defense; (2) allowing
the prosecution to cross-examine herself and one of the defense
witnesses regarding certain matters that forced them to assert
their fifth amendnent privileges in front of the jury; and

(3) precluding two expert witnesses from testifying as to the
reasonableness of Mary Lou's beliefs regarding the likelihood
that her two adopted children were being sexually abused. For
the reasons discussed infra, we vacate the trial court’s June 13,
2002 judgment of conviction and sentence and remand for a new

trial.

 

BACKGROUND

on May 2, 2001, Mary Lou was charged by complaint with

 

two counts of Custodial Interference in the Firet Degree. The
prosecution alleged that, on January 7, 1999, Mary Lou
intentionally or knowingly took, enticed, concealed, or detained
her two minor adopted children, both under eleven years old, from
their adoptive father and lawful custodian, knowing that she had
no right to do so. Mary Lou waived her right to a preliminary
hearing and probable cause determination. ‘Trial commenced on
March 19, 2002

A. Trial

 

1. Prosecution Witnes!

 

games French (Jim) and ary Lou married on June 19,

1992 and adopted two children, Emily and Sarah, from China.

 
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Emily was born on September 23, 1994 and adopted at five-and-a-
half months of age in early 1995. Sarah was born on November 25,
1995 and adopted at seven months of age in the summer of 1996.
Jim filed for divorce in 1997, and, after a jury trial, the
Family Court of the Second Circuit issued a divorce decree on
March 31, 1998 (the divorce decree). The divorce decree granted
Jim and Mary Lou joint custody and control of Emily and Sarah,
and ordered Mary Lou to pay Jim sixty thousand dollars plus

attorney's fe

 

The divorce decree also set forth the following
parenting schedule, where Jim would have physical custody:
(3) for the firet three months following the divorce, one night
per week and two days of the week; (2) for months four until
month seven, two nights per week; and (3) from the seventh month,
three nights per week. Mary Lou complied with the terns of the
divorce decree from ite effective date of March 31, 1998 until
January 5, 1999, more than seven months later.

Pursuant to the divorce decree, Jim was scheduled to
have custody of the children from Friday, January 7, 1999 at 8:00
a.m. for two nights until Sunday at 8:00 a.m. Jim had made
arrangements to meet Mary Lou at the designated transfer site to
pick up the children. At @:00 a.m. on January 7, 1999, Mary Louw
Gid not appear with the children. Jim was not notified that Mary
Lou was going to keep the children, and he had not given her
permission to keep the children on that date or to take then out

of the state of Hawai'i.

 
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When Jim realized that Mary Lou was not going to bring
the children, he called her friends to find out if something was
wrong. Mary Lou's friends told him that they did not know where
she was. cim next went to the police and reported that Mary Low
had not cone to the transfer site. When he went to Mary Lou's
house, it appeared enpty, and a "Mrs. White” told him that she
had bought the property. dim aleo filed a report with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and contacted the National

center for Mi

 

ing and Exploited Children. That sane day, Jim
obtained a court order freezing all of Mary Lou's assets and
awarding him temporary custody of the children.

on ganuary 17, 2000, the Justice Department informed
im that Mary Lou and the children had been located in Costa
Rica. Thereafter, he traveled to Costa Rica and spent nine weeks
there before being informed that he had to return to the United
states.

At trial, the prosecution entered a videotape into
evidence showing the security gate at the Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX) on January 5, 1999, two days prior to
the arranged pick up date. Jim identified Mary Lou, the
children, and Dr. Strong (Maxy Lou's friend and the children’s
pediatrician) in the video. Jim also acknowledged that, on gune
19, 1992, he and Mary Lou had entered into a prenuptial
agreement, although Jim could not recall the terms of the

agreement.

 
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b. tests Sf andi Angevine

Dr. Sandi Angevine, a pediatrician at Keiser Permanente
(Kaiser), reviewed the medical records for the year 1998 for the
French children. She was one of several doctors who saw the
French children that year at Kaiser. Dr. Angevine testified that
there were no notations by any physician regarding possible
sexual abuse of the French children. There were also no
notations in the records of any parent's reporting suspected
sexual abuse. The recorde showed that, on September 23, 1998,
both children received vaccinations for Hepatitis A.

c. deposition of Donna Spradlin

A videotaped deposition of Donna Spradlin, Mary Lou's
sister-in-law, wae taken pursuant to Hawai‘ Rules of Penal
Procedure (HRPP) Rule 15 on March 1, 2002. The videotape, a

transcript of which was admitted into evidence, wi

 

shown to the
jury. Therein, spradiin testified to the following evente:

Shortly after the Prenches’ divorce, Mary Lou informed
her via telephone that she was unhappy with the family court’s
decision to award Jim joint physical custody of the children.
Nary Lou told Spradlin that she felt Jim was taking the childre:
in order to punish her and that she did not feel he was taking
care of them properly. Mazy Lou expressed concern that Jim was
abusing the children. She also complained that it was unfair
that she had to pay him $60,000 in light of the prenuptial

agreement.

 
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Sometime between March 31, 1998 and September 1, 1998,
Mary Lou told Spradlin that she had been researching the internet
in order to go “underground” and leave the country with her
children because she was unhappy with the custody situation. she
aleo told Spradlin that she sold her houses in maui and
california and placed her money in offshore accounts so it could
not be traced

on January 5, 1999, Spradlin and her husband met Mary
Lou and the children at LAX at 5:00 a.m, Mary Lou informed
Spradlin that she had $60,000 attached to her body with duct
tape. At that time, Mary Lou told the Spradiins that she would
probably never see them again because she would not be able to
get back into the country:

Later that day, the Spradlins took Mary Lou and the
children back to LAX where they met Dr. Strong, who was bringing
Mary Lou's airline tickets, After eating dinner at Denny's, the
spradiins took Mary Lou, Dr. Strong, and the children back to the
airport.

é. kestimony of Gil Torrez

FBI special agent Gil Torres (Agent Torrez) was the

legal attache assigned to the United States Bnbi

 

yy in the
Republic of Panama. On April 25, 2000, Agent Torrez was informed
that Mary Lou had been located in a hotel in Panama City. When
he met Mary Lou and the children at the office of Panamanian

National Police, he was given documents, including Costa Rican

 
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passports, airline tickets, and United states passports that
belonged to Mary Lou and the children. The Panamanian passports
bore Mary Lou's and the children’s photographs but did not bear
their true names. The tickets were for a flight originating in
Panama City, Panama, to Bangkok, Thailand, with a connecting
flight to Beijing, China. On April 26, 2000, Agent Torres
returned Mary Lou and the children to Miami, Florida, where Jim

met them.

 

Joy Shiabazian met the Frenches when she and her
husband were interested in adopting a child from China, At the
time of trial, Shiabazian had known the fanily for about six
years, and, after dim moved out of the house in Nay of 1997, she
saw Mary Lou and the children an average of two to three tines
per week. She witnessed several incidents with the children

one incident occurred in mid to late June of 1998, where Sarah
stripped naked and threw herself on the bed with her legs spread,
yelling “logs on my butt, logs on my butt.* When Mary Lou went
to pick her up, she was very atiff and rigid and cried for two
hours after that. Ancther incident occurred in which Shiabazian
was at the dining room table with Mary Lou when Smily pulled up
her dress and Mary Lou told her that such behavior was not
polite, Bnily responded, “[blut daddy shows me his pee pee.” In

another incident, Shiabazian tried to lock Emily out of the

 
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bathroom, and Emily said, "Oh, daddy does that with Sarah. He
takes Sarah into the bathroom and locks the door." on two or
three different occasions after the children returned from
spending time with Jim, Bmily was very uncharacteristically
remote, and, at one time, she hid behind the couch with her thumb
in her mouth.

b. testimony of Beverly James

Beverly James, @ clinical social worker who had written
books en child sexual abuse and childhood trauma, was called as
an expert witness to testify on several matters, discussed more
fully infra, in section I11.2.2. Upon the prosecution’s
objection to her testimony as an improper opinion of Mary Lou's
credibility, the trial court held a hearing outeide the jury’s
presence, The trial court determined that her testimony was
impermissible and precluded James from testifying.

c. testimony of Dr. Linda strong

At the prosecution's request, the trial court held a
hearing outeide the presence of the jury to address issues of Dr.
Strong asserting her fifth amendment righte regarding
elf-inerimination, A trial run of her proposed testimony was

held outside the pr

 

nce of the jury. Dr. strong refused to
answer questions about events that took place after October 1,
1998.

After hearing the proposed testimony, the court found

that events occurring from October 1, 1998 until January 7, 1999

 
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were relevant to Mary Lou's intent. The court permitted the
prosecution to ask Dr. Strong questions about events occurring
after October 1, 1998 and said she would have to assert her fifth
anendnent rights in front of the jury. The court found that, by
using the procedure, the prosecution was not being denied
meaningful cross-examination.

At trial, Dr. Strong testified that she was a
pediatrician at Kaiser Permanente from 1993 through 1998. she
first met Mary Lou at Kaiser and became Emily and Sarah‘s primary
care pediatrician from the tine that they arrived from China
until Dr, Strong left Hawai'i and moved to Washington in
september 1998. Dr. Strong and Mary Lou became good friends, and
she visited Mary Lou's house on Oi1i Road, Maui, many times.

In 1998, when Dr. Strong's seventeen and fifteen year-
old daughters baby-sat the French children, they called her on
several occasions with problens. They first called because Emily
wanted the babysitters to rub lotion on her buttocks as a

treatment for diarrhea when she did not have diarzhe

 

They also

yked them to kiss her butt and

 

reported that Sarah frequently
became insistent and hysterical when they refused.

br. Strong further testified that Jim had called her
several times wanting to know about how to treat Emily's rashes
and her lack of bowel movenents. He also had multiple questions
about her vaginal and anal area. Dr. Strong indicated that

although Jim's questions were normal, she was concerned because

 
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he had so many questions that did not coincide with what she
observed.

Dr. Strong stated she was uncomfortable about
contacting Child Protective Services (CPS) because she could not
predict what kind of action they would take. At times, she would
call about a suspicion, and CPS would innediately renove the
children from their hones. At other tines, she would make a
report and nothing would happen. According to Dr. Strong, she
Gid not inediately report the incidents with the French children
because, as a physician, she did not have enough physical
evidence to say that she was concerned, except for the "red
flags" indicating that the French children were being sexually
abused. Dr. Strong did call CPS and talked to an intake worker
about the red flags and stated that she was calling as a friend
due to her lack of evidence. The two decided to recommend the
French children for “play therapy*.*

in late September, before she left Maui, Dr. Strong had

 

a conversation with Mary Lou in which she explained that,
although ahe did not have any physical evidence, she knew the
children were being sexually molested by their father. Although

Dr. Strong was one hundred percent positive of her conclusions,

 

2 pr, Strong testified that “play therany” is used by an outside
specialist to prepare a report that assists her in determining how to treat
her patience. “In the procese, the children teke dolls and play with each
Ceher to see how they interact so the specialist can pick up cubtieties that
Say be clusive in a physical exam or during questioning of small children.

 

 

 

   

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she told Mary Lou that the allegation of sexual abuse would not
hold up in court.

on cross-examination, the prosecution questioned Dr.
Strong as to the events that occurred after October 1998,
including her involvement in Mary Lou's relocation to Costa Rica
Dr. strong asserted her fifth amendment right in response to all
questions regarding events between October 1, 1998 and January 7,
1999

4. testimony of Dr. Robert Geftner

Dr. Robert Geffner, a psychologist with extensive

training, education, and experience in the field of family

 

violence, wi

 

qualified as an expert in the following area!
child sexual abuse and family viclence, the interaction of child
sexual abuse and family violence with family custody proceedings,

and ‘the family court’e response to allegations of sexual abus

 

Dr. Geffner explained the child abuse acconmogat ion
syndrome and behavioral indicators, or red flage, of symptoms of
sexual abuse by children. He stated that there is almost no way
a person can know for sure that a particular person has sexually
abused a child. Dr. Geffner further explained that, in looking
for red flags, he locks at all the information, including whether
the child makes any statenents to anybody about the sexual abuse
If they have, then he locks at how they said it, what they said,
and how mich detail there was, as well as the context in which

they said it. He also looks for documented medical evidence, if

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any. The next step is to look at the alleged offender and
whether that person has confessed, whether they have control
issues, and what their characteristics are. Finally, he looks at
other people who have information and whether they have actually
seen the abuse occur or whether the child told them about it. In
the second step, he looks at indicators of the children
themselves, including behavior that involves, inter alia,
nightmares, trust issues, and depression.

Mary Lou made an offer of proof that Dr. Gefiner was
going to offer an opinion as to whether there were red flags in
the French case. The trial court ruled that Dr. Geffner could
not give such an opinion because fact witnesses could provide the
jury with evidence or facte and that it was up to the jury to
ultimately evaluate the credibility of the facts the way the fact

witnes!

 

would present it, The court held that allowing Dr.
Geffner to render such an opinion would be contrary to the
principles set forth in State v, Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 799 P.2d
48 (1990), and precluded him from testifying as to his opinion
about the existence of red flags in the French case.

e. testimony of Mary Low

Mary Lou testified that, after the divorce, the girls
started to exhibit bizarre behavior, which led her to suspect
sexual abuse. Mary Lou recalled that, when it was time for the
children to stay with Jim, Emily, who was three years old at the

time, went to her bed, whimpered, rolled up in a fetal position

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land sucked her thunb, After coaxing her out of bed, Emily stood
on top of the stairs and urinated down her legs, begging Mary Lou
not to make her go. She aleo recalled 2 time when Bmily, after
returning from a visitation with Jim, hid behind a chair and
sucked her thunb when Shiabazian and her daughter came to the
house. She further testified that, in April 1998, Sarah tock her
clothes off during dinner and, thereafter, proceeded to the
bedroom, where she threw herself on the bed, spread her legs, and
ineieted that lotion be applied to her butt. She said that Emily
always complained of diarrhea even though her stool was firm and
that Emily told Mary Lou that her father said she had diarrhea
land that he put medicine on her butt every day.

Dr. Strong advised Mary Lou to take the children to see
br. Marilyn Wright, a child psychiatrist. After two or three
vieits, Dr. Wright informed Mary Lou that she could no longer see
the chiléren because Jim had stormed into her office, demanding
to see her notes.

Mary Lou testified that she first became committed to
the idea of moving elsewhere in Septenber 1998, when Dr. Strong
expressed her suspicions that the children were being sexually
abused. The following month, when she went to visit Dr. Strong
in Washington, she decided to meet Dr. Strong at LAK on January

1999. Between September 1998 and January 1999, Mary Lou sold

 

her houses, liquidated her assets, and wired money to several

foreign banks. She decided to move to Costa Rica because the

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country had a child protective service that would protect her
childven in the event that she vas caught by the authorities.

Nary Lou testified that, when she made her decision to
leave, she was positive that Jim was sexually abusing the
children. Notwithstanding her suspicion and her decision to
nove, she continued to adhere to the visitation schedule set
forth in the divorce decree until she left on January 5, 1999.
she left the children with Jim while on her trip to Washington in
septenber 1998. Mary Lou further stated that, from September to
pecenber 1998, she never reported any sexual abuse allegation to
the police, CPS, or the family court. She explained that, when
she had previously reported physical abuse to the police, no

action was taken.

 

on January 3, 1999, Mary Lou wrote letters to
her family and her attorney explaining her decision to go
vunderground.”

nary Low testified that she and the children left Maus
on the evening of January 4, 1999, and arrived the next morning
in Los Angeles. ‘The Spradline met then at the airport and later
picked up Dr. Strong as well. On January 6, 1999, Mary Lou, Dr
strong, and the children flew to Costa Rica, Mary Lou stated
that she knew she was supposed to return the children to Jim on
sanuary 7, 1999, but that she had no intention of returning to
the United States.

Mary Lou admitted that she had a Hawai'i identification

card with her photograph, but that it had Dr. Strong's name and

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Sees

social security number on it. She also adnitted paying $16,000
for faleified Costa Rican passports.

Mary tou testified that, prior to her marriage to Jin,
she and Jim signed a prenuptial agreement. She stated that she
wanted the agreement because she had assets, whereas Jim had
filed for bankruptcy. She did not present the prenuptial
agreenent at the divorce proceedings because she did not find it
until after the proceedings were concluded. In September 1998,
during the hearing on her motion to enforce the prenuptial
agreenent, Mary Lou did not allege any sexual abuse but stated
that, at that time, she intended to gain sole custody of her
children. she stated that fanily court Judge Ronanchak refused
to reconsider the custody issue, and took the motion under
advisement. Mary Lou also testified that, sonetine during the
divorce proceedings, she learned that: (1) Judge Ronanchak’s
mother worked in the same office as Jim; (2) Judge Romanchak was
a season subscriber to the Maui symphony, where Jim worked; and
(3) Jim and Judge Romanchak were menbers of the same rotary club.
Mazy Low stated that, when she expressed her concerns about Judge
Ronanchak to her divorce attorney, he informed her that there was
no basis to have the judge disqualified.

on cross-exanination, the prosecution questioned Mary
Lou about what had happened to the money she transferred to
foreign banks. Mary Lou, on the advice of counsel, invoked her

fifth amendnent privilege to remain silent in front of the jury.

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B. dury Verdict and Sentence
The jury found Mary Lou guilty as charged on April 15,
2002. On June 13, 2002, Mary Lou was sentenced to: (1) probation
for a period of five years for each count; (2) a six month term
of inprisonnent; (3) two hundred hours of comunity service; (4)
a two hundred dollar Criminal Victim Compensation fee; (5) a one
hundred and fifty dollar probation service fee; and (6) a five
thousand dollar fine. Mary Lov filed a tinely notice of appeal

on August 8, 2002.

hen jury instructions or the omiesion thereof are at
the standard of review ie whether, when

 

 

 

 

fad and conesdered az a whole, the instructions given are
prejugiciaily insufficient, erfonecus, inconeiatent, or
hislesaing.

are a groune or fohatfivestively apne:
‘from ihe record ara whole that the error wae not
pretudiels

[e}rror is not to be viewed in isolation
and considered purely in the

Be examined in the light of
proceedings and given the effect which the whole
Fecord shows it eo be entitled. In that
Context, the real question becones whether there
{fra reasonable possibility that the efror may
have contributed to the conviction, If there is
uch a Fe

caee, then the error is not harm
Feasonable doubt, and the judgnent of conviction
on which it say have been basea must be set
seige.

State v. Valentine, 93 Hawai’

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (brackets in

    

 

 

 

199, 204, 998 P.2d 479, 484 (2000)

original) (emphasis added) .

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—_—_—SeSSeeSSSSsSsSSSSSSSsSMSSsSsSSFMeseF

ordinarily, instructions to which no objection was
nage at trial may not be Yaised ae error on appeal. Hawaii
Rules of Penal Procedure (RPP) Rule 30(e). An appellate
Court may presune that an instruction correctly stated the
Seu fad Ebjection to the allegedly erroneous instruction
wae made at trial. =~

ere an erroneous instruction affected the substantial
fights of a defendant, However, we say notice the error as
Splain error" and remand for corrective action

 

 

Sheet ane overcones the Presumption that the instructions
i =, such
oceans.
versal wiles ff iemative ‘ron the

Skate v. Pinero, 75 Haw. 262, 291-92, 859 P.2d 1369, 1374 (1993)
(citations, internal quotation marks, brackets, and footnote
omitted) (italicized emphasis in original) (underscored emphasis

added), disapproved of on other arounds by Raines v. state, 79

 

"4 219, 900 P.2d 1286 (1995).

B. aie

 

‘me admissibility of evidence requires different

standards of review depending on the particular rule of

evidence at iesue-
‘then application of a particular evidentiary
fule can yield ooly one correct result, the
Proper standard for eppeliate review io the
Pight/wrong standaré. However, the traditional
abuse of discretion standard should be applied
Ih the tase of those rules of evidence that
Fequire e "Judgment call" on the part of the
trial court,

State v. Cordeiro, 99 Hawai'i 390, 403-04, 56 P.34 692, 705-06,
reconsideration denied, 100 Hawai'i 14, 58 P.3d 72 (2002)
(citations omitted); State v. Ortiz, 91 Hawai'i 181, 1e9, 961

P.2d 1127, 1135 (1999).
c. Expert Witnesses
‘This court employs the right/wrong standard in

reviewing a challenges to a courts relevancy decision regarding

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the admissibility of expert witness testimony under Rule 702 of
the Hawai'i Rules of Evidence (HRE). State v, Vliet, 95 Hawai'i
94, 107, 18 P.34 42, 58 (2001). ‘The trial court’s determination
of the reliability of the expert witness’ testimony is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Id, at 108, 19 P.3d at 56. “An abuse
of diecretion occurs when the decisionmaker exceeds the bounds of
reason or disregards rules or principles of law or practice to
the substantial detriment of a party." Id, (quoting In_xe Water
ge Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i 97, 183, 9 P.3d 409, 495
(2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted) .

TIT. PESCUSSION
choice of Evile" Instruction

 

At trial, Mary Lou asserted the “choice of evils”
defense, pursuant to HRS § 703-302 (1993), which provides in
relevant part:

(2) conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to
void an inminent hare or evil to the acter er to-another ie
Justifiable provided that
(a) The harm or evil sought to be avoided by such
conduct ie greater than that sought to b
prevented by the law defining the offen
charged; and
(b) Neither ‘the Code nor other law defining the
offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing
‘ith the specific situation involved; and
(c) A legislative purpose to exclude the
Justification claimed does not otherwise
plainly appear:

 

 

 

(emphasis added.) On appeal, Mary Lou argues that the trial
court’s instruction on her “choice of evils" defense was
prejudicially erroneous in that it included inappropriate common
law considerations that placed undue burdens on her. In its
answering brief, the prosecution concedes that the instruction

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Se

given was erroneous, but argues that it was harmless and did not
contribute to Mary Lou's conviction because she failed to show
chat there was an imminent threat of harm.

‘The “choice of evils" instruction given to the jury in

the case at bar was identical to the instruction given in State

Mauma Lun: unga I), 90 Hawai'i 96, $76 P.2d 410 (App.
1998), aff'd ae modified by State v. Maumalunga (Maumalunga IL),
90 Hawai'i 58, 976 P.2d 372 (1998). In Maumalunga I, the

defendant had allegedly received an anonymous phone call,
informing him of a possible robbery at his workplace that
evening. He asserted the “choice of evile* defense for carrying
a gun to a gas station later that night. 90 Haw. at 98, 976 P.2d
at 42, The trial court instructed the jury that:

In order for the “choice of evile” defense to apply. four
conditions must be satiefied, First, the defendant must have reascnably
believed that there was no legs] altermative available to him. Second, the
Betendant must have reasonably believed that the harm sought to be prevented
Gas Imninent or ineediate. Third, the defendane’s conduct mst have been

jgned to-aciually prevent the threat ox areater barn. Fourth,
the harm cought to be avoided must have been greater than che harm sought £0
be prevented by the law defining the offense charged.

 

 
   

 

Id, at 105, 976 P.2d at 419 (italicized enphasis in original)
(underscored enphases added). The jury found the defendant
guilty of carrying a loaded firearm without a license, and the
defendant appealed.

on appeal, the Intermediate Court of App

 

8 (ICA)
majority noted that, although the defendant may have been
justified in taking the gun to work, there was no justification

for taking it to the gas station, as the ‘imminent threat” was of

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robbery at the workplace at 106, 976 P.2d at 420. ‘The ICA
majority concluded that, the instruction was erroneous inasmuch
as it “attempt [ed] to incorporate both statutory requirements and
case law considerations without distinguishing between the two.”
Id. In a concurring opinion, then Associate Judge Acoba agreed
with the majority that the instruction was erroneous, but noted
that the additional common law considerations placed undue
burdens on the defendant. id, at 113, 976 P.2d at 427.
Specifically, he noted that the additional requirement that "the
defendant must have believed that there was no legal alternative
available,” “places upon a defendant the burden of adducing
evidence that there was no ‘third alternative’ or, assuming the
existence of one, that such alternative was not ‘reasonably
available.'* Id, at 111, 976 P.2d at 425. Judge Acoba also
noted that, by adding the consideration that the conduct be
designed to “actually prevent the threat," the threshold is
raised from requiring the defendant to believe the conduct was
vneceseary,* to believing it was certain to avoid harm. Id. at
112, 976 P.2d at 426. Therefore, he opined that these two
considerations shift the burden from the prosecution to the
defendant. Ultimately, the majority held, and Judge Acoba
agreed, that the erroneous inetruction was harmless because the
defendant presented “no evidence" as to the necessity of his
conduct, thereby failing to satisfy an element of the “choice of

evils" defense. Id, at 107, 976 P.2d at 421. Although this

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See
court affirmed the result reached by ICA majority, we adopted the
rationale of Judge Acoba’s concurrence, stating that
the elenents of the choice of evile defense are set forth,
In their entirety, in the express language of [HRS
$'703-302) and do not include additional elements from the
Sconmon lew" formation . -.. because they were superseded
By the adoption of the Havai's’ Penal Code in 2973
nal | 90 Hawas's at 59, 976 P.2d at 373 (quotation marks
in original) (citations omitted).

In the inatant case, the prosecution argues that,

 

similar to Maumalunga I, the record is “totally devoid of any
evidence’ that Mary Lou believed her conduct was necessary due to
mminent harm, thereby failing to satisfy an element of the
wchoice of evils" defense. Consequently, the prosecution
contends the error was harmless. However, unlike in Maumalunsa
LL, there is evidence in thie case indicating that Mary Lou
believed there was an oncoing threat of sexual abuse any time the
children visited with their father. Her belief was supported by
the testimony of Shiabazian and Dr. Strong, as well as their
observations of the children’s behavior. Moreover, Mary Lou also
testified as to her belief that her conduct was necessary to
protect then from the continued and future harm by their father.
Therefore, based on the testimony adduced at trial, we cannot
conclude that there is "no evidence” as to the necessity of Mary
Lou's conduct or her belief that the harm was inminent.

Based on the record as a whole, we conclude that there
ie a reasonable possibility that Mary Lou was convicted by virtue

of the erroneous inetruction, which led the jurors to believe

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that her conduct was not justified because (1) Nary Lou did not
reasonably believe that there was “no legal alternative"
available to her, other than leaving the country without
notifying any authorities or (2) her conduct wae not “reasonably
designed to actually prevent the threat of greater harm.”
Accordingly, we hold that the erroneous instruction was

prejudicial.”

 

Consequently, we vacate Mary Lou's conviction and
sentence and remand this case for a new trial.
B. Remaining issues

In light of our decision to vacate the conviction and
remand for new trial, we need not address Mary Lou's remaining
contentions. We do go here, however, as guidance to the trial
court upon remand.

1. cro

 

examination of Dr. strong
Mary Lou contends that the trial court reversibly erred

by allowing the prosecution to crosi

 

amine Dr. Strong regarding
her involvement with Mary Lou's trip to Costa Rica in order to

impeach her credibility. Specifically, Mary Lou argues that the

 

> wary Lou alee argued that defense counsel provided ineffective
stance of counsel by, inter alia, failing to object to the erronecus

jolce of evile” instruction. Therefore, inasmuch as we determine that the
erroneous inetruction was predudicial, we need not eddrese Mary Lou's claim of
Ineffective assistance of counsel:

        

 

   

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SO

prosecution's use of specific instances of conduct was improper
under HRE Rule 608(b) (1993), which only allows use of such
conduct for impeachment purposes where the conduct is probative
of untruthfulness. The prosecution counters that Mary Lou's
reliance on HRB Rule 608(b) is misplaced, as HRE 609.1(a) allowed
the prosecution to attack Dr. Strong's credibility with evidence
of bias, interest, or motive, and that the questions regarding
the specific events were probative of Nary Lou's intent

RE 608(b) appli

 

to the admissibility of specific
instances of a witness’ conduct for the purpose of attacking the
witness’ credibility. HRE 609.1 (1993),* on the other hand,

relates to an attack on a witness’ credibility through evidence

 

of bias, interest, or motive. However, under HRE Rule 403, such
evidence may be excluded “if ite probative value ie substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . or needless

+ HRE mule 608(b) states that:

Specific instances of conduct. specific instances of
the contuct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking the
Witness’ credibility, if probative of untruthfulness, may be
Ynguired into on croes-examination of the witness and, in
the discretion of the court, may not be proved by extrinsic
evicence:

‘The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by
any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the
Witness’ privilege as:

With respect to matees

 

 

 

 

     

‘whieh relate only to credibility.
+ RE Rule 609.1 states that:

(a) _ Genarat rule. The credibility of a witness may
be attacked by evidence of bias, interest, or motive,

to) Extrinsic evidence of bias, interest, or motive.
Extrinsic evidence of a witness” bias, interest, or motive
Se not adnieeisie unl mination, ‘the matter
Se Brought to the att ‘and the witness
it efferdee an opportunity to explain or deny the matter

 

   
 

 

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presentation of cumulative evidence." Thus, a trial court must
exercise its discretion in permitting evidence under HRE Rule
609.1(b), but at the same time must balance the probative value
of the evidence with its prejudicial effect, pursuant to HRE Rule
403. State v. Balishisana, 63 Hawai'i 109, 124, 924 P.2d 1215,
1220 (1996).

In the instant case, the trial court engaged in a trial
run of Dr. Strong's testimony outside the presence of the jury to
determine when she would exercise her fifth amendment right to
remain silent. The trial court found that the events between
october 1, 1998 until January 7, 1999, including Dr. Strong's
participation in Mary Lou’s relocation to Costa Rica, were
relevant to the “interest, motive, [and] bias on the part of the

witnesi

 

‘The record demonstrates that Dr. Strong was called by
the defense to testify that, in her professional opinion as a

pediatrician, the children were being sexually abut

 

é by their
father, ‘The prosecution was, thus, entitled to attack her
credibility by eliciting evidence of her bias and interest in the
case as someone who aided Mary Lou in leaving the country. The
court properly balanced Mary Lou's right to have Dr. Strong
testity regarding her belief that the children were sexually
abused by their father against the requirenents for meaningful
cross-examination, including the prosecution's right to attack

her credibility regarding that opinion. Accordingly, the trial

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a

court did not abuse its discretion by permitting questioning that
required Dr. Strong to assert her fifth amendnent rights.
2. Cross-examination of Mary Lou

mary Lou contends that the trial court reversibly erred
by allowing the prosecutor to confront her about the whereabouts
of the money she wired to foreign banks in order to impeach her
credibility and by failing to follow the requirements of HRE Rule
523(b) when it forced her to assert her fifth amendment privilege
in front of the jury. The prosecution counters that such
questioning was proper under HRE Rule 609.1, rather than HRE Rule
608, as discuesed supra.

Because Mary Lou ie the defendant in this case, the
issues regarding her croes-examination involve additional

considerations. Thie court stated in State v, Culkin, 97 Hawai‘,

 

206, 35 P.3d 233 (2001), that:

A defendant who elects to testify in his ovn defense
ie subject to cross-exanination as to any matter pertinent
to, oF having # logical connection with the specific offen
for which he ie being tried. ia this regard, a defencent
ay be cross-examined on collateral matters Dearing upon his
Credibility, the sane se any other witness. [ERE] Rule
Goep) (1883) inctructe in relevant part that specific
Snetances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking the witness’ creaibility, if probative of
GnerutheWiness, nay be inguired into on cross-examination of
the witness and, im the discretion of the court, may Be
proved by extrinsic evidence. While HRE Rule 608 invests
Pee trial judge with diecretion to admit extrinsic evidence,
fhe HE Rule 403 balancing test will dictate exclusion of
ther extrineie evidence in certain cases

 

 

    

 

 

  

Jd. at 220-21, 35 P.3d at 247-48 (citations, internal quotation

marks, and brackets omitted). ‘This court also noted that:

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(tlhe risk of unfair prejudice occasioned by compelling
criminal defendant to invoke the fifth amendment. privilege
in front of jurors ie substantial: Generally, elsine of
privilege mist be mace outside of the presence of the jury
fh order to avoid the laysan’s natural first suggestion that
the resort to the privilege in each instance isa clear
confession of erine.

Id. at 222, 35 P.3d at 249 (internal quotation marke, citations,

 

and some brackets omitted) .
The prosecution argues that the questions regarding the
whereabouts of Mary Lou's money were not specific instances of
conduct probative of untruthfulness under HRE 608. Rather, they
were offered to show evidence of her interest in keeping Jim from
reaching her money under HRE 609.1. Mary Lou opened the door to
questions about her money when she testified on direct
examination that, when she decided to leave the country, she
Liguidated all her assets and when she answered on cross-
examination that she had wired the money to foreign banks. Upon.
defense counsel's objection to questions about Mary Lou's access
to her money in Costa Rica, the court overruled the objection,
stating that, “[t]he Court’s view is that [it] is proper grounds
for cross-examination. It is for the jury to decide.” Mary Lou
asserted her fifth anendnent right in response to questions
about: (1) money that wae wired to London; (2) money transferred
to the Cayman Islands; and (3) the final whereabouts of $350,000.
In response to several other questions about her money, Mary Lou

answered "I don’t remember” or “I don’t know." Based on the

 

record and Mary Lou’s varying responses, the trial court did not

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oo

abuse its discretion by permitting the prosecution's cross-
examination.
3. Admission of Expert Testimony
Mary ou contends that the trial court erred in
precluding: (1) Dr. Geffner from providing an expert opinion as
to whether he identified “red flags" with regard to the French
children and (2) Beverly James from testifying as to the

reasonableness of Mary Lou's belief that (a) Jim was sexually

 

abusing the children and (b) Mary Lou's conduct was necessary in
order to protect the children from further abuse.

RE Rule 702 (1993) governs the admi:

 

ion of expert.

testimony at trial:

1 scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
LLTaSice the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
To determine e fact in isgve, s witness qualified as an
Sipert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
SEG SSy"tectity‘ thereto in the form of an opinion or
Gthereige. In determining the & lance to the
Sree ee zace, the court may consider the trustworthiness
Ghe validity Of the scientific technique or mode of analys:
Cuployed by the proffered expert.

 

 

 

this court addressed the admissibility of expert
cestinony that divectly opined on the truthfulness of a victim's
testinony in State v. Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 799 P.2d 48 (2990).

patangan was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse of his seven:
year-old daughter. At txial, the prosecution presented Dr. Bond,
an expert in the field of clinical psychology with @ subspecialty
im the treatment of sexually abused children. Id, at 554-55, 799
P.2d at 50, Dr. Bond testified about: (1) what the complainant

had related to him regarding the incidents of sexual abuse;

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(2) the behavior of child sex abuse victine in general; and
(3) how he evaluates whether a child is telling the truth about
being sexually abused. id, Dr. Bond then implicitly testified
that the complainant was believable and that she had been abused
by the defendant. Id, The trial court adnitted the testimony
under State v. Kim, 64 Haw, 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1962), over the
objection of the defendant, Hatangan, 71 Haw. at 555, 799 P.24

at 50. This court overruled the trial court, stating that

sce the trier of fact by
jeertaining truth in relevant
Breas outeide the ken of ordinary laity. Specialized
Knowledge which ie the proper subject cf expert test imeny is
Knowledge not possessed by the trier of fact woo lacke the
expert’ tkill, experience, training, or education.

hough an expert's testisony on matters within the
Competence of the jurors say be relevant and helpful, the
poseibility that the jury say be unduly influencea by the
expert's opinion would mitigate against admission
Eclentitic and expert testimony, with their aura of special
Peliability and trustworthiness, courte the danger that the
triers of fact will abdicate. [their] role of critical
Abeesenent and surrender [] their own common sense in
weighing testimony.

‘Tee common experience of a jury, in most cas
provides a surticient basis for asseetnent of a witness’
Eredipility.. Thue, expert testimony on a witness’
credipility ie inappropriate

= the pertinent consideration is whether the expert
festinony will asset the jury without unduly prejudicing
the defendant.

‘Thus, while expert testimony explaining seeningly
bizarre behavior of ehild sex abuse victine Le helpful to
the jury and should be adnitved, conclusory opinions chet
Abuse did occur and that the child victim's report of abuse
is truthfol end believable is of no assistance to the jury.
and_therefore, should not be admitted, Such testinony ia

brecluded by JRE Rule 702
Once the jury hae learned the victin’s behavior
fron the evidence and has heard experes explain
why sexual abuse may cause delayed reporting,
Inconsistency, or recantation,

Expert teatinony a
providing a resource for

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

sith the crine havina occurred.
a aking the
thet es
oa ences and i

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a

Ja. at 556-58, 799 F.2d at 51-52 (citations, internal quotation
marke, and sone brackets omitted) (some brackets in original)
(emphases added) .

his court further noted that, “where the effect of the
expert’s opinion is the sane as directly opining on the
truthfulness of the complaining witness, such testimony invades
the province of the jury." Id, at 559, 799 P.2d at 52 (internal
quotation marke and citation omitted) .

Dr. Geffner’s testimony

 

In the inetant case, the trial court properly permitted
br. Geffner to testify as to what was meant by "red flags" and
how they are used as indicators of possible sexual abuse. The
trial court properly excluded testimony as to whether “red flags”

were present in the French c:

 

, noting that “the fact witnesses
can provide the jury with evidence or facts" and that Dr.
Geffner's conclusions that (1) one or more “red flags” were
present in the French children and (2) there was alleged sexual
abuse present was “contrary to the principles set forth in
patangan. ‘The trial court's exclusion of such testinony was
especially appropriate where Dr. Geffner had not interviewed any
of the Frenchee, nor had he zeviewed the tapes of the French
children's interviews with CPS. Moreover, Mary Lou and the other
defense witnesses testified as to signs of red flags based on the

children’s behavior. The jury was fully capable of drawing

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inferences from Dr. Geffner‘s testimony as to what amounted to a
red flag and the facts presented by the witnesses in concluding
whether sexual abuse occurred, Based on the foregoing analysis,
the trial court did not err in limiting Dr. Geffner‘s testimony.

b. Beverly Janes’ testimony

Mary Lou contends that the trial court erred in
precluding Beverly James from testifying because James’
“epecialized knowledge would have assisted the jury in
determining whether it was reasonable for Mary Lou to believe
that her conduct was necessary in order to prevent Jim from
further sexually abusing the children." Mary Lou argues that
such testimony would not have constituted a commentary on the

credibility of any witne

 

in the case and that her testimony wai
reliable because she was an expert in childhood trauma and sexual
abuse.

James, a clinical social worker who had written books
on child sexual abuse and childhood trauma, was asked to do
several evaluations in the Frenches’ divorce case. Mary Lou paid
James to evaluate the functioning of Mary Lou and Jim as parents,
to evaluate the functioning of the children, and to make
recommendations to the court.

Mary Lou made an offer of proof that the trial court
should permit James to: (1) give an expert opinion on whether the

information Mary Lou had prior to leaving with the children would

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a

cause a reasonable person to conclude that the children had been

sexually abused; (2) describe the functioning of the family court

 

on Maui; and (3) describe how the court would respond to an
allegation of child abuse after a hard-fought custody battle
The trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury
to determine whether James would be allowed to testify.
Thereafter, the court determined that James was an expert in the
field of childhood trauma and child sexual abuse. However, the
trial court precluded James from testifying for several reasons,
including: (1) she was not an expert in the practicality of
reporting allegations of child sexual abuse in a situation where

there bi

 

been a divorce decree; (2) her opinion of Jim's
parenting skills was not relevant to the issues before the jury:
(2) she did not indicate where she stood with respect to her

degree of certainty or probabiliti

 

of her opinion; (4) games’
database and her information did not address the relevant period
of the summer of 1998 because her role in the divorce case ended
in January of 1998; and (5) her testimony was an improper attempt
to assess the credibility and reliability of the witnesses under
Ratangan. Based on a careful review of the record and in light
of the trial court's consideration of the issues, the trial court
did not err in precluding James from testifying.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on our conclusion that the erroneous “choice of

evils” instruction was prejudicial, we vacate the trial court's

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June 13, 2002 judgment of conviction and sentence and remand this

case for a new trial

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 17, 2006.

on the brief!

James S, Tabe, WH
Deputy Public’ Defender,

 

for defendant -appel lant Rea Hine
Glenn Pesenhofer,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Fue Ours scr

for plaintiff-appellee

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