Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabroff

Citation: 2009-Ohio-4205

Docket Number: 20090467

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabroff, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4205.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-4205 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. SABROFF. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabroff,  
Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4205.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Multiple violations of the Disciplinary Rules and the 
Rules of Professional Conduct — Felony conviction — Failure to 
cooperate in the disciplinary process — Disbarment is the presumptive 
sanction for misappropriating client funds and practicing law while under 
suspension. 
(No. 2009-0467 — Submitted April 21, 2009 — Decided August 27, 2009.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 08-074. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Brett M. Sabroff, Attorney Registration No. 0018933, 
with a registration address in Mayfield Heights, Ohio, was admitted to the 
practice of law in Ohio in 1977.  The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
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Discipline has recommended that this court permanently disbar respondent, based 
on findings that he misappropriated clients’ funds, settled a client’s claim without 
her consent, failed to maintain all client funds in an attorney trust account, 
commingled client and personal funds in his trust account, practiced law while 
under suspension, and failed to cooperate in the efforts to investigate his 
misconduct.  We agree that respondent committed professional misconduct as 
found by the board and that permanent disbarment is the appropriate sanction for 
his misconduct. 
{¶ 2} Relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent with violations 
of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, the Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) requirement that attorneys 
cooperate in investigations of misconduct, and the duties of a suspended attorney 
specified in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E).  When service could not be perfected at the 
address on file for respondent with the Office of Attorney Services or at a last 
known address, the board served the complaint on the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(11)(B) (providing that the Clerk is the agent for service 
of process when the whereabouts of Ohio lawyers are unknown).  Respondent 
failed to answer the complaint, and pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F), relator 
moved for default.  A master commissioner appointed by the board granted the 
motion, making findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the recommendation that 
respondent be permanently disbarred.  The board adopted the master 
commissioner’s findings of misconduct, conclusions of law, and recommendation. 
Misconduct 
Count I – The Sebolds’ Grievance 
{¶ 3} In July 2001, Mikki and Mark Sebold engaged respondent to 
represent them in their person-injury claims arising from an automobile accident.  
On respondent’s recommendation, the Sebolds received treatment for their 
injuries from Dr. Albert Musca.  Respondent settled their claims and presented the 
January Term, 2009 
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Sebolds with a settlement statement reflecting that he had withheld part of their 
share to pay Dr. Musca for their medical treatment.  However, respondent did not 
pay the Sebolds’ medical bills, nor did he retain these funds for their benefit in his 
attorney trust account.  In January 2007, the Sebolds received collection notices 
for their unpaid medical bills, and respondent informed them that he had signed 
an agreement with Dr. Musca to be responsible for the medical bills.  Respondent 
could not produce a copy of this agreement, did not pay Dr. Musca, and did not 
reimburse the Sebolds. 
{¶ 4} We accept the board’s findings that respondent misappropriated 
the Sebolds’ funds and violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting conduct that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law), 9-102(B)(3) (requiring a 
lawyer to maintain complete records and appropriate accounts), and 9-102(B)(4) 
(requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver funds in the lawyer's possession to 
which the client is entitled). 
Count II – Failure to Cooperate 
{¶ 5} In September 2007, relator sent a letter of inquiry to the respondent 
regarding the Sebolds’ allegations.  Although respondent signed the certified mail 
return receipt, he did not respond to relator’s inquiry.  In November 2007, relator 
sent a second letter of inquiry to respondent.  Respondent provided a response to 
the second letter of inquiry, but he failed to address fully the specific allegations 
in the Sebolds’ grievance.  In April 2008, relator subpoenaed respondent to appear 
for a deposition at relator’s office in Columbus, Ohio.  At respondent’s request, 
relator rescheduled the deposition for 9:00 a.m. on June 19, 2008, in Cleveland, 
Ohio, based on respondent’s assertion that he could not physically travel to 
Columbus.  At 7:46 a.m. on the day of the deposition, respondent left a telephone 
message at relator’s office in Columbus explaining that he had suffered a physical 
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injury that morning that prevented his appearance at the deposition.  Relator and 
respondent agreed that respondent would contact relator when he had sufficiently 
recovered to sit for the deposition.  Respondent failed to reschedule the 
deposition. 
{¶ 6} We accept the board’s findings that respondent violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice) and 8.4(h) (prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law) and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 
Count III – The Forgus Grievance 
{¶ 7} In August 2002, Erica Forgus hired respondent to represent her in a 
personal injury claim resulting from an automobile accident in Ohio.  At the time, 
Forgus resided in Illinois, but in June 2004, she moved to Switzerland.  
Respondent filed a complaint on her behalf in the Portage County Court of 
Common Pleas in 2003, but in September 2005, the month before trial, he decided 
to voluntarily dismiss the complaint.  Although he wrote Forgus a letter and left 
her a telephone message seeking her input, he nonetheless voluntarily dismissed 
the complaint without waiting for her response or her consent.  At that point, 
Forgus had already purchased a transatlantic plane ticket so that she could appear 
at trial. 
{¶ 8} Fifteen days later, respondent received a settlement offer and 
contacted Forgus, recommending that she accept it.  Forgus did not accept the 
offer at that time and told respondent that they would discuss it further when she 
arrived in Ohio the following week.  Contrary to her directive, respondent 
accepted the settlement offer.  Further, he forged Forgus’s name on the settlement 
check, and on October 4, 2005, he deposited the funds into his attorney trust 
account.  Respondent then prepared a settlement statement reflecting his 40-
percent contingency fee of $7,000, expenses in the amount of $1,511.26, and a 
disbursement of $9,000 to Forgus.  After he arrived two and one-half hours late 
January Term, 2009 
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for a meeting scheduled with Forgus and argued with her, she refused to sign the 
settlement statement.  Respondent subsequently mailed a check for $9,000 to 
Forgus at her parents’ address.  After he realized that he had failed to deduct 
funds to pay her medical expenses from her share of the settlement, respondent 
stopped payment on the check on November 17, 2005, promising to issue a new 
one after he had paid her medical bills. Records from respondent’s attorney trust 
account show that it often had a balance of less than $9,000 during the time 
respondent retained Forgus’s money. 
{¶ 9} After hearing nothing from respondent, Forgus contacted the 
Beachwood Police Department, which launched a criminal investigation.  
Respondent pleaded guilty to one count of theft as a fifth-degree felony and paid 
restitution to Forgus in April 2007 as a condition of his agreement to plead to a 
reduced charge. 
{¶ 10} We accept the board’s findings that respondent misappropriated 
Forgus’s money and violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 7-
101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from prejudicing or damaging his client during 
the course of the professional relationship), 9-102(B)(3), and 9-102(B)(4). 
Count IV – Felony Conviction 
{¶ 11} On November 1, 2006, the state of Ohio indicted respondent on 
fourth-degree-felony charges of theft, forgery, and uttering a forged document 
based on his forging Forgus’s signature on her settlement check, cashing it, and 
misappropriating those funds.  The court set the case for trial on April 9, 2007, but 
respondent arrived late.  After the jury had been impaneled, the parties negotiated 
a plea agreement.  The state amended the complaint to charge respondent with 
one count of theft as a felony of the fifth degree.  Respondent pleaded guilty to 
that charge, and the court dismissed the forgery and uttering charges.  The court 
delayed sentencing for a month and ordered respondent to pay restitution of 
almost $12,000 in four days. 
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{¶ 12} At his sentencing hearing, respondent admitting using cocaine and 
marijuana after his plea hearing, resulting in his failing a court-ordered drug test.  
He also admitted paying the restitution late.  The court sentenced respondent to 
community control, in-patient drug treatment, and community service.  In 
addition, the court ordered respondent not to practice law. 
{¶ 13} We accept the board’s findings that respondent violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act that 
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness), 8.4(c) (prohibiting 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d), and 
8.4(h). 
Count V – Practicing Law while under Suspension 
{¶ 14} On October 23, 2007, this court imposed an interim suspension on 
respondent following his felony conviction for theft.  In re Sabroff, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 1435, 2007-Ohio-5636, 875 N.E.2d 98.  Notwithstanding his suspension 
from the practice of law, less than a month later, respondent sent a letter to the 
Cleveland Heights Municipal Court on behalf of his son, who had been charged 
with a traffic violation.  Respondent used letterhead referring to himself as 
“Attorney and Counselor at Law,” and in the letter, he entered a plea of not guilty, 
waived all statutory time requirements, and sought the scheduling of a pretrial 
hearing.  After relator apparently contacted respondent inquiring whether he had 
practiced law with a suspended license, respondent sent a letter to the municipal 
court explaining that he had “decided to withdraw as counsel” for his son because 
of “a plethora of physical problems.” 
{¶ 15} We accept the board’s finding that respondent violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in 
violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction) and Gov.Bar 
R. V(8)(E) (requiring a lawyer to notify opposing counsel and the court of his 
disqualification to practice law). 
January Term, 2009 
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Count VI – Commingling Client and Personal Funds 
{¶ 16} Between December 1, 2004, and February 28, 2006, respondent 
maintained an attorney trust account at Huntington National Bank and used it to 
pay his cable, credit card, telephone, and electric bills, insurance premiums, 
college tuition, and his attorney registration fee, and he wrote numerous checks 
out of this account made payable to “Cash.”  The words “IOLTA [Interest on 
Lawyers Trust Accounts] ACCOUNT” appear on the front of the checks in bold 
letters.  During this same time period, respondent deposited checks received for 
settling the personal-injury claims of clients into this same account. 
{¶ 17} We accept the board’s finding that respondent violated DR 1-
102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(6), and 9-102(A) (requiring all funds of clients paid to a 
lawyer to be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts containing no 
funds belonging to the lawyer). 
Sanction 
{¶ 18} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider a 
number of factors, including the duties the lawyer violated, the lawyer's mental 
state, and sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 
96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  Because each disciplinary 
case is unique, we are not limited to the factors specified in the rule but may take 
into account “all relevant factors” in determining what sanction to impose.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). 
{¶ 19} Respondent’s failure to cooperate in the investigatory process 
prevents us from determining whether his health issues and chemical dependency 
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mitigate his misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g).  Regarding 
aggravating factors, we accept the board’s findings that respondent acted with a 
dishonest or selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed 
multiple offenses, failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process, and refused to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), 
(c), (d), and (e).  We also accept the finding that respondent has not made 
restitution to the Sebolds for the funds stolen from them and that he paid 
restitution to Forgus only after being ordered to do so as a condition of his plea 
agreement.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(i). 
{¶ 20} The primary purpose of the disciplinary process is to protect the 
public from lawyers who are unworthy of the trust and confidence essential to the 
attorney-client relationship and to allow us to ascertain the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-
6510, 858 N.E.2d 368, ¶ 10.  Respondent’s misappropriation of his clients’ funds, 
his felony conviction, his dishonesty, his settlement of a personal-injury claim 
against the express instructions of his client, his forgery of a client’s signature on 
the settlement check, his practice of law with a suspended license, his failure to 
notify the municipal court of his disqualification from practice, his commingling 
of personal and client funds, his engagement in a pattern of misconduct, and his 
failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process demonstrate that he is no longer fit 
to practice law. 
{¶ 21} We have previously explained that “misappropriation of client 
funds carrie[s] a ‘presumptive sanction of disbarment.’ ” Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. 
v. Kafantaris, 121 Ohio St.3d 387, 2009-Ohio-1389, 904 N.E.2d 875, ¶ 14, 
quoting Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-2490, 769 
N.E.2d 816, ¶ 15.  Similarly, “ ‘permanent disbarment is an appropriate sanction 
for conduct that violates DR 1-102 and results in a felony conviction.’ ”  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Stern, 106 Ohio St.3d 266, 2005-Ohio-4804, 834 N.E.2d 
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351, ¶ 8, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 51, 52, 
693 N.E.2d 1078.  Further, “ ‘[t]he normal penalty for continuing to practice law 
while under suspension is disbarment.’ ” Disciplinary Counsel v. Frazier, 110 
Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-4481, 853 N.E.2d 295, ¶ 54, quoting Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Allison, 98 Ohio St.3d 322, 2003-Ohio-776, 784 N.E.2d 695, ¶ 12, and 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mbakpuo, 98 Ohio St.3d 177, 2002-Ohio-7087, 781 
N.E.2d 208, ¶ 13.  See also Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wootton, 110 Ohio St.3d 
179, 2006-Ohio-4094, 852 N.E.2d 175, ¶ 10 (disbarring attorney for theft of his 
clients’ funds, dishonesty, financial harm to his clients, and the failure to 
cooperate). 
{¶ 22} Respondent has not challenged the board’s findings of misconduct 
or the recommended sanction of permanent disbarment.  Based on respondent’s 
conduct and our precedent, respondent is hereby permanently disbarred from the 
practice of law in the state of Ohio. 
{¶ 23} Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jonathan Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert G. Berger, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
______________________