Case Title: INGELS v MICKALSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13110 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE OF' MONTANA DONALD TNGELS and RONI'I'A XNGELS , P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, C U U D l k ANN MICKALSON and TERRANCE LEE MICKALSON, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellants : Small, Cummins and Hatch, Helena, Montana Carl Hatch argued, Helena, Montana Yor Respondents : Keller, Reynolds and Drake, Helena, Montana Herbert George argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: March 5, 1976 Filed: - 4 j ~ y . 5 1 6 Hon. Robert S. Keller, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison, delivered t h e Opinion of the Court: P l a i n t i f f s Donald and Bonita Ingels brought s u i t against defendants Claudia Ann and Terrance Lee Mickalson, t o e s t a b l i s h an easement across the r e a r portion of a l o t i n the City of Helena, which ~ i c k a l s o n s a r e purchasing. The claim i s predicated upon a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement, o r i n the a l t e r - n a t i v e , an easement by implication. The properties involved a r e l o t s 20 and 21 of Block 395, of Helena Townsite, located adjacent t o each other on West Lawrence S t r e e t i n t h e City of Helena; the Ingels a r e the owners of l o t 20, t h e l o t t o t h e e a s t , and ~ i c k a l s o n s a r e buying l o t 21 on a c o n t r a c t f o r deed. P r i o r t o April 1968, l o t s 20 and 21 belonged t o the same owner, and they were sold a t the same time, with l o t 20 being conveyed t o Ingels. By mesne conveyances, ~ i c k a l s o n s acquired, and entered i n t o possession o f , l o t 21 i n February 1973, (four years and t e n months a f t e r Ingels acquired t h e i r possession). The l o t s a r e bordered on the north by West Lawrence S t r e e t , and on t h e south by an a l l e y ; ~ n g e l s ' l o t i s 42 f e e t wide and 100 f e e t deep, and ~ i c k a l s o n s ' l o t appears t o be of t h e same dimensions, although not material here. O n t h e southeast corner of ~ n g e l s ' l o t i s a garage 23 f e e t long, with the back of t h e garage on t h e e a s t edge of t h e property l i n e , and t h e south s i d e of t h e garage i s immediately adjacent t o t h e a l l e y . The garage door f r o n t s t o t h e west. O n t h e southwest corner of Mickalsons' l o t i s a shed, and p r i o r t o April 1974, t h e r e was nothing between t h e garage on I n g e l s ' l o t and t h e shed on ~ i c k a l s o n s ' l o t . O n o r about April 5 , 1974, Mickalsons erected a fence on t h e property l i n e between t h e garage and t h e shed, t o connect with an e x i s t i n g fence t h a t had already been erected on t h e property l i n e between the two l o t s . Lngels :ontend t h a t they used heir sarage o n l y by J r i v i n g across t h e southeastern portion of ~ i c k a l s o n s ' l o t where t h e c l e a r space existed between ~ i c k a l s o n s ' shed and t h e i r garage; t h a t they have been doing t h i s ever s i n c e they acquired the property i n April 1968, and t h a t they had an zasement by prescription. In t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , Ingels contend ihey had an easement by implicai~ion; t h a t when t h e property was sold t o them i n 1968 by the owner of both l o t s , t h e position of the garage makes i t obvious t h a t the only way t o use t h e garage was t o come across the corner of the adjacent l o t , and t h a t s i n c e the owner of both l o t s sold l o t 20 t o Ingels, t h e r e was an implied easement t o use l o t 21 f o r access. The evidence of use of ~ i c k a l s o n s ' property by t h e LngeLs was i n dispute a t t h e t r i a l . Undisputed was t h e f a c t t h a t f o r a period of time varying from s i x weeks t o two and A h a l f months, near t h e end of t h e five-year period necessary ;u acquire a p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t (April 1968 t o April 1973), t h e Lngels did not use ~ i c k a l s o n s ' property f o r the reason t h a t JIie of t h e i r vehicles was parked i n f r o n t of t h e i r garage i n a of) time ;Late of d i s r e p a i r , and was not repaired f o r t h a t lengtd, blocking any use of l n g e l s l property by Ingels. A s f a t e would have it, t h i s was during the same period of time t h a t a r e a l t o r showed t h e adjoining l o t t o Mickalsons, and they acquired t h e i r property, i . e . , t h e r e was c e r t a i n l y no n o t i c e t o anyone a t t h a t time t h a t t h e lngels were using ~ i c k a l s o n s ' property. It was f u r t h e r undisputed t h a t t h e use of the property by t h e (ngels was not h o s t i l e , nor exclusive. Mickalsons t e s t i f i e d t h a t chey never saw t h e Ingels use t h e property a t any t i m e , but taking k g e l s ' testimony a t i t s b e s t , they got along exceptionally well with t h e various tenants of l o t 21, and the use of t h e c l e a r space kcween the shed and t h e garage was shared, i . e . , the tenants 7f l o t 21 would d r i v e across a portion of l o t 20 t o g e t t o the shed, and t h e Ingels drove across a portion 3.E l o t 2 1 !:u ger t o the garage. Thus, t h e use was n e i t h e r continuous, nor exclusive, Scott v. Weinheimer, 140 Mont. 554, 374 P.2d 91. The ~ n g e l s ' usage of t h e claimed right-of-way was not adverse and h o s t i l e , a s distinguished from permissive, Ewan v. Stenberg, M o n t . Y 541 P.2d 60, 32 St.Rep. 864; ~ e n g v. Bridges, 123 Mont. 95, The t r i a l judge so found and t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support h i s findings. There was no evidence offered i n support of an easement by implication, o t h e r than t h a t when the Ingels acquired t h e property, t h e garage was there. The Ingels c i t e , i n t h e i r b r i e f , 25 Am J u r 2d Easements and Licenses, $28, a portion of which i s quoted: "The b a s i s of t h e general p r i n c i p l e a s t o t h e impli- c a t i o n of an easement from a pre-existing use i s t h e presumed o r probable intention of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e conveyance, a s disclosed by a l l t h e circumstances surrounding t h e transaction. A presumption frequently invoked i s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s contracted with a view t o t h e condition of the property a s it a c t u a l l y was a t t h e time of t h e transaction. Whether an easement a r i s e s by implication, however, must depend upon such matters a s t h e extended character of the u s e r , the nature of t h e property, the r e l a t i o n of t h e separated p a r t s t o each, and t h e e x i s t i n g degree of n e c e s s i t y f o r 3iving such construction t o t h e conveyance a s w i l l give e f f e c t t o what may be supposed t o have been, considering the manner of use, t h e reasonable intendment of t h e p a r t i e s . I I Here, not only was t h e r e no such evidence, but t h e t r i a l ,judge personally viewed t h e premises. The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. T n . Robert S. Keller D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison. W e Concur: Justices.