Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Childress

Citation: 364 Md. 48

Docket Number: 

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court for Prince George's County
Case No. CAE99-14713
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 22
September Term, 1999
_________________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
JAMES F. CHILDRESS
_________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Rodowsky, Lawrence F.
  (retired, specially assigned), 
JJ. 
_________________________________________
Opinion by Rodowsky, J.
Dissenting and Concurring Opinion by Cathell,
J; Raker, J. joins
_________________________________________
Filed: April 19, 2001
This is the second time in which the instant Petition for Disciplinary Action has been
before this Court.  It charges the respondent, James F. Childress (Childress), with having
violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 8.4(d), prohibiting engaging "in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."  The charges stem from Childress's
having been found guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
Southern Division, of having violated 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (1994), proscribing interstate travel
with intent to engage in a sexual act with a minor.  We referred the disciplinary charges to
Judge G.R. Hovey Johnson of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County for hearing.
Because of a drafting error in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) as it was in effect at the time of the conduct
criminally charged against Childress, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed his conviction.  Childress v. United States, 104 F.3d 47 (4th Cir. 1994).  Thereafter,
Judge Johnson reported to us that Childress had violated MRPC 8.4(d) because his conduct
violated 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), notwithstanding that Childress's conviction had been reversed.
Judge Johnson reasoned that the reversal had been on technical grounds unrelated to the facts
of the case.  
In Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Childress, 360 Md. 373, 758 A.2d 117 (2000)
(Childress I), we held that Judge Johnson erred, inasmuch as Childress's acts "did not
constitute a crime under federal law at the time he committed them," based on the Fourth
Circuit's decision.  Id. at 382, 758 A.2d at 121.  We re-referred the matter, however, to Judge
Johnson with the request that he consider whether the facts presented to him constituted a
crime under either of two statutes, Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), § 3-831 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ), prohibiting, inter alia, acts by an adult which
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render a child in need of supervision, or Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-370 (1996), the catch line
description of which is, "Taking indecent liberties with children."
  On re-referral Judge Johnson
found that Childress had violated both statutes and, thereby, MRPC 8.4(d).  The matter is now
again before us on exceptions by Childress to Judge Johnson's findings and, if the disciplinary
charge is sustained, for imposition of an appropriate sanction.
The criminal charges involved Childress's conduct during the years 1993 through 1995
which we described in Childress I as follows:
"During that time Respondent used his home computer to communicate with
individuals he believed to be young girls via 'chat rooms' located on America
Online [(AOL)].   The girls Respondent targeted were generally between the ages
of thirteen and sixteen years old.  During some of these conversations,
Respondent would ask whether the person was interested in meeting and having
sex.  For the purpose of convincing the girls to meet him, Respondent would
frequently represent that he was younger than his actual age, stating that he was
twenty-four years old rather than his actual age of thirty-two.  He was able to
persuade five young girls to meet with him.  These meetings would generally
occur in a public place in the Washington D.C. area.  On one occasion,
Respondent met two girls at the Village Center in Columbia, Maryland.  The
three drove around in Respondent's car.  Respondent also met with a thirteen-
year-old girl on three separate occasions in the Manassas, Virginia area.  The
two drove around and talked.  During the meetings with the girls, no sexual
contact ever took place and Respondent did not engage in any conversations of
a sexual nature."
360 Md. at 377, 758 A.2d at 119 (footnote omitted).    
An undercover FBI Special Agent had posed as a fourteen year old girl in an AOL chat
room using the screen name "'ONE4FUN4U'" and arranged to meet Childress at the
Montgomery Mall in Bethesda, Maryland.  In their Internet conversations, Childress described
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in lurid detail the sexual activity in which he desired to engage with the putative fourteen year
old when they met.  At their meeting Childress was arrested.
At the hearing before Judge Johnson that formed the record for Childress I, Bar
Counsel's case consisted of a stipulation of basic facts and excerpts from the testimony of four
witnesses at the federal criminal trial, that of Childress himself, two FBI agents, and a
psychiatrist, Susan Fiester, M.D.   In their investigation federal agents obtained from
Childress's hard drive or from disks the verbatim texts of many of his chat room conversations.
These texts formed the basis for much of the examination of witnesses at the federal trial.  At
the hearing on re-referral Bar Counsel introduced no additional evidence to that presented for
Childress I.  In his report to us in this matter, Childress II, Judge Johnson rests his finding of
conduct violative of the Virginia statute exclusively on the testimony concerning a thirteen
year old female who used the pseudonym or screen name "JRB,"
 and he rested his finding of
conduct violative of the Maryland statute solely on the evidence concerning a fifteen year old
female who used the screen name "TINA97."  
I
The Maryland statute, CJ § 3-831(a), is part of the subtitle, "Juvenile Causes."  The
section reads:
"It is unlawful for an adult wilfully to contribute to, encourage, cause or tend to
cause any act, omission, or condition which results in a violation, renders a child
delinquent, in need of supervision, or in need of assistance."
In Childress I, we specifically directed Judge Johnson's attention to that portion of CJ
§ 3-831(a) dealing with a child "in need of supervision" by referring to the definition of that
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phrase found in CJ § 3-801(f).  Childress I, 360 Md. at 386 n.8, 758 A.2d at 124 n.8.  More
particularly, footnote 8 in Childress I, drew attention to the third of four types of conduct
which may give rise to a finding that a child is in need of supervision.  The full text of CJ § 3-
801(f) is set forth below.
"'Child in need of supervision' is a child who requires guidance, treatment, or
rehabilitation and:
"(1)
Is required by law to attend school and is habitually truant;
"(2)
Is habitually disobedient, ungovernable, and beyond the control of
the person having custody of him;
"(3)
Deports himself so as to injure or endanger himself or others; or
"(4)
Has committed an offense applicable only to children."
TINA97, the subject of the finding that Childress violated CJ § 3-831, was born
December 7, 1979.  She engaged in chat room conversations with Childress from a computer
located in her parents' home in Maryland.  Childress used the screen name, "Fearlessss."  There
were several chat room conversations during which Childress stated that if he and TINA97 met
and she liked him, they could be "physically intimate."  In those conversations Childress
consistently stated that he would allow TINA97 to "set the limits" because she was younger.
In one conversation Childress suggested that the two could have "physical fun" if they were
attracted to each other.  In or about late February 1995 Childress met with TINA97 at a
delicatessen in the greater Baltimore metropolitan area.  TINA97 had told Childress that she
would have her mother drop her off and pick her up.  She also stated that she would bring a
friend along.  Childress discouraged TINA97 from bringing her friend because then there could
be "no intimacy."
   Nevertheless, TINA97 brought to the meeting a female friend who was
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approximately sixteen and a half years old.  The three apparently engaged in benign
conversation, and no sexual contact occurred.
Judge Johnson reports to us that, on re-referral, Bar Counsel argued that Childress had
encouraged young teenage girls "to discuss sexual matters, agree to have sex, and then meet
with [him] in person," thereby placing "the girls vulnerable to injury, danger or abuse."
Referring to the conversation between TINA97 and Childress at which their meeting was
arranged, Judge Johnson concluded that "Childress did in fact commit an act which encouraged
TINA97 to be in need of supervision, especially in light of the fact that Childress does not
dispute the two actually met in person."
The burden on Bar Counsel in a disciplinary proceeding is to prove the violation of a
Model Rule of Professional Conduct by clear and convincing evidence.  This standard of proof
is not heightened to proof beyond a reasonable doubt where Bar Counsel's theory of the case
is that a Rule of Professional Conduct has been violated by conduct which constitutes a crime,
although there has been no criminal conviction.  See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Garland,
345 Md. 383, 390, 692 A.2d 465, 468 (1997); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Proctor, 309
Md. 412, 418, 524 A.2d 773, 776 (1987).  Here, the evidence was not sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that Childress violated CJ § 3-831(a).  
We said in Childress I that "the harm, or potential harm, in a stranger soliciting sex over
the Internet to young girls, after imploring them to keep the meeting a secret from their
parents, is patent."  Childress I, 360 Md. at 386, 758 A.2d at 123.  It is also clear that Childress
caused TINA97 to meet with him.  We shall assume that, by meeting Childress, TINA97
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"[d]eport[ed her]self so as to ... endanger [her]self."  CJ § 3-801(f)(3).  Specifically, we assume
that the degree of danger in the one meeting satisfies the danger element of the statute, even
though the meeting was arranged for and held in a public place, TINA97 was accompanied by
a slightly older female friend, and TINA97 apparently planned an exit strategy by announcing
in advance that her mother was furnishing her transportation.  We also assume that proof of one
meeting resulting from the chat room conversations satisfies the "[d]eports [her]self" element
of CJ § 3-801(f)(3), inasmuch as "deports" means to "behave," "demean," or "conduct" oneself
and thus carries a connotation of some regularity of conduct.  Webster's Third New
International Dictionary at 605.
Nevertheless, there is no evidence in this case, at least to the clear and convincing
evidence standard, that TINA97 was "a child who requires guidance, treatment or
rehabilitation,"
 meaning guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation by the State.  That finding is
required in order to sustain a determination that a child is one in need of supervision.  CJ § 3-
801(f).  That additional element is made more meaningful by considering the disposition
alternatives that may result from a finding that a child is in need of supervision.  
There are two priorities that govern making a disposition, public safety and "a program
of treatment, training, and rehabilitation best suited to the physical, mental, and moral welfare
of the child consistent with the public interest."  CJ § 3-820(b).  Further, § 3-820(c)(1)
provides:
"In making a disposition on a petition, the court may:
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"(i)
Place the child on probation or under supervision in his own home
or in the custody or under the guardianship of a relative or other fit person, upon
terms the court deems appropriate;
"(ii)
[Commit the child to the custody of a public or private agency];
or
"(iii)
Order the child, parents, guardian or custodian of the child to
participate in rehabilitative services that are in the best interest of the child and
the family."
In Simpson v. State, 55 Md. App. 240, 461 A.2d 74 (1983), an adult male was charged
with rendering two minor females delinquent by furnishing them beer in his home.  The Court
of Special Appeals reversed the conviction because a delinquent act was defined to be one
which would be a crime if committed by an adult.  Id. at 243-44, 461 A.2d at 76.  As an
additional ground for reversal the court held that "the statement of facts failed to show and the
trial court did not find that either child required guidance, treatment or rehabilitation."  Id. at
244, 461 A.2d at 76.  In the case before us, the findings, and indeed, the record, furnishes no
information on whether TINA97 "require[d] guidance, treatment or rehabilitation."  We know
nothing about her home environment.  There is no indication that she was actually adjudicated
CINS.  On the record before us it is at least equally as probable that, when the FBI investigated
TINA97's association with Childress, TINA97's parents or guardian responded appropriately
as it is probable that the parents or guardian were indifferent. 
Accordingly, we cannot say that Childress's conduct rendered TINA97 a child in need
of supervision in violation of CJ § 3-831(a), and Childress's exception to that finding of
violation is sustained.  
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II
The hearing judge found that there was clear and convincing evidence that Childress, by
his chat room exchanges with JRB, a thirteen year old, violated Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-370A(4).
That statute provides:
"Taking indecent liberties with children. -- A.  Any person eighteen
years of age or over, who, with lascivious intent, shall knowingly and
intentionally: 
....
"(4) Propose to [any] child [under the age of fourteen years] the
performance of an act of sexual intercourse or any act constituting an offense
under § 18.2-361 ... shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony."
Section 18.2-361 prohibits "any person" from "carnally know[ing] ... any male or female person
by the anus or by or with the mouth."
  There is no construction of § 18.2-370A(4) in a reported
Virginia case.
Childress claims that he never intended actually to have sex with any of the teenage girls
with whom he communicated via the Internet and met in person.  He claims the
communications and meetings were all part of an admittedly sexual fantasy upon which he
never would have acted.  Thus, he does not challenge Judge Johnson's finding of a "lascivious
intent."
  His exceptions attack the sufficiency of the evidence to show (A) whether he knew that
JRB was thirteen years of age and (B) whether he "[p]ropose[d]" an act of sexual intercourse
as the quoted term arguably is construed by the Virginia courts.   
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A
While using the screen name "Fearlessss," Childress encountered JRB in a chat room.
Childress told JRB that he was "interested in having sex with a younger girl."  JRB told
Childress that she was a thirteen year old female.  On February 25, 1994, Childress asked JRB,
through some form of electronic communication, "WHAT is your 'limit' with a guy??  where
do u stop his hands or mouth?  im older, so i also need to know age limit for being with a man."
On February 28, 1994, Childress asked, "i like energetic, passionate sex.  What do you look
like, and how often have you had sex??"  Childress met JRB in person on three occasions.  The
first meeting occurred on April 9, 1994, the second during the first week of June of 1994, and
the final meeting occurred on June 5, 1994.  During these meetings they drove around the
greater Fairfax and Mannassas, Virginia area.  Childress did not touch JRB or suggest while
they were together in person that they have sex.  During a chat room conversation that occurred
after one of the in-person meetings, Childress told JRB, "I only touch if signal lights are
green."  In a subsequent e-mail correspondence sent before a later meeting,  JRB told Childress
that if he "still wanted to, now it would be okay with her." Prior to the FBI investigation, in-
person meetings between the two ceased for reasons that do not affirmatively appear in the
record. 
Childress's exception concentrates upon the degree of knowledge of JRB's age that is
required for a violation of the Virginia statute.  He argues that he "did not know, and could not
have known, the age of JRB when the computer communications at issue took place."  He
posits that "JRB could well have been a 55-year-old man instead of a 13-year-old girl."
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Judge Johnson concluded:
"[A] plain reading of the Virginia statute in question does not require actual
knowledge of the child's age.  The unambiguous language of this section reflects
that the words 'knowingly and intentionally' refer to the act of proposing an act
of sexual intercourse and do not refer to whether the person committing the act
has actual knowledge of the child's age." 
This is a strict liability interpretation of the Virginia statute.  Indeed, Judge Johnson equated
this statutory crime to statutory rape in Virginia which does not require knowledge of a
victim's age, by citing to Rainey v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 892, 193 S.E. 501 (1937). 
On the other hand, under an alternative and not unreasonable interpretation of the
statute, it would require that the accused be on notice that the victim is under age fourteen.  In
this case there is evidence that JRB told Childress that she was thirteen years of age.  Thus,
under either of the above-discussed interpretations of the Virginia statute, Childress's
exception would be overruled.  
Childress, however, argues that the statute requires that the accused actually know the
child's age with certainty.  He submits that inasmuch as one person ordinarily does not know
whether the representations concerning personal history that may be made by another person
in a chat room conversation are true, he cannot have violated the Virginia statute. 
Although we have no guidance directly on point from the Virginia courts, it is clear that
Virginia is a common law jurisdiction that has strong ties to the common law tradition. 
Virginia Code Ann. (1994 Repl. Vol.), § 1-10 provides:
"The common law. — The common law of England, insofar as it is not
repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this
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Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of
decision, except as altered by the General Assembly."
In Foster v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306, 31 S.E. 503, 504 (1898), the Virginia
Supreme Court explained:
"Consequently, the common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant
to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this State, or has not
been modified by our written law, is in full force in this State, and constitutes
the rule of decision on all subjects, whether of a civil or criminal nature."
See also Long v. Vlasic Food Prods. Co., 439 F.2d 229, 231 (4th Cir. 1971) ("[W]here there
is no Virginia law in point, the English common law applies.  Virginia courts have applied [§
1-10] to justify reliance on contemporary as well as preenactment common law doctrines");
Chandler v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 882 F. Supp. 533, 534 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("In
Virginia, the common law remains in force except where it is changed by statutory or
constitutional law"). 
The Virginia Supreme Court frequently looks to the common law to determine the
substantive elements of criminal offenses.  See, e.g., Tarpley v. Commonwealth, 2001 Va.
LEXIS 31 at *9 (relying upon common law definition of the crime of larceny);
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 256 Va. 514, 506 S.E.2d 312, 314 (1998) (same); Campbell v.
Commonwealth, 246 Va. 174, 431 S.E.2d 648, 652 (1993) (relying upon the common law to
determine whether actual harm or prejudice to the rights of another is an element of the crime
of forgery of public records); Wackwitz v. Roy, 244 Va. 60, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864 (1992)
(concluding that suicide "remains a common law crime in Virginia"); Weishaupt v.
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847, 852 (1984) (relying upon the common law to
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determine, in context of prosecution for rape, whether a wife separated from her husband was
in a different position than a wife living with her husband).  Virginia Code Ann. § 18.2-370A(4)
should be construed against this background.  
The degree of knowledge which Childress argues to be essential to satisfying the state
of mind requirement of the Virginia statute is well out of the mainstream of the common law.
R.M. Perkins, Criminal Law at 775 (2d ed. 1969) (emphasis in the original) (footnotes
omitted), explains:  
"'Absolute knowledge can be had of very few things,' said the
Massachusetts court [in Story v. Buffam, 90 Mass. 35, 38 (1864)], and the
philosopher might add 'if any.'  For most practical purposes 'knowledge' 'is not
confined to what we have personally observed or to what we have evolved by our
own cognitive faculties.'  Even within the domain of the law itself the word is not
always employed with exactly the same signification.  Suppose a man has been
told that a certain bill of exchange is a forgery and he believes the statement to
be true.  Does he have knowledge of this?  Obviously not if the purpose of the
inquiry is to determine whether he is qualified to take the witness stand and
swear that the instrument is false; but if he passes the bill as genuine he will be
uttering a forged instrument with 'knowledge' of the forgery if his belief is
correct.  The need, therefore, is to search for the state of mind, or states of
mind, which the courts have spoken of as 'knowledge' for the purpose of a
particular case."
It would seem to be extraordinarily unusual for the legislative body in a common law
jurisdiction to create a crime which requires a scienter element that would be impossible to
prove objectively in most cases.
Another common law concept, wilful blindness, also appears to have application in this
situation.  As defined by 1 W.R. LaFave & A.W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.5,
at 306-07 (1986) (quoting G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 157, 159 (2d ed.
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1961), one engages in "'wilful blindness,'  'where it can be said that the defendant actually
knew,'" when that person "'has his suspicion aroused but then deliberately fails to make further
inquiries because he wishes to remain in ignorance.'"       
Subsection A(5) of the Virginia statute has been applied in Bloom v. Commonwealth,
34 Va. App. 364, 542 S.E.2d 18 (2001).  That subsection, in context, reads:  
"Any person eighteen years of age or over, who, with lascivious intent,
shall knowingly and intentionally
....
"(5)
Entice, allure, persuade, or invite any [child under the age of
fourteen years] to enter any vehicle, room, house, or other place, for any of the
purposes set forth in the preceding subdivisions of this section ... shall be guilty
of a Class 6 felony."
Bloom, a twenty-eight year old male, communicated with a thirteen year old female
over the Internet.  The victim's mother complained to the police who logged onto the Internet
using the victim's screen name to send a message to Bloom.  He proposed that they meet and
have sexual relations.  A specific time and place were established, and the defendant was
arrested when he arrived.  On appeal of his conviction for attempting to violate subsection A(5)
of the Virginia statute, Bloom claimed that he could not properly "be convicted because it was
impossible to entice a child to engage in sexual acts when he communicated with" a detective
and not the victim.  Bloom, 542 S.E.2d at 21.  The court found that it was sufficient that
"defendant thought he was communicating with a young girl with whom he intended to have
sexual relations."
  Id. at 22.  The court rejected Bloom's impossibility defense to the attempt
crime, reasoning that "[i]f the defendant intends to violate the law and, but for some
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impediment, would complete the unlawful act, then he is guilty of the attempted crime."  Id.
Thus, in Bloom the court applied "knowingly" in the introduction to all subsections of § 18.2-
370A to include that which had been represented to Bloom in the Internet communication.
Although the argument that certain knowledge is required was not made in Bloom, the result
in that case seems to be inconsistent with the construction of § 18.2-370A's "knowingly"
requirement that Childress advances. 
For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the Supreme Court of Virginia would
construe § 18.2-370A(4) not to require the prosecution to prove that the accused knew with
certainty that the victim was under the age of fourteen.
B
Childress also argues that he did not "[p]ropose" sexual intercourse to JRB as the quoted
word is used in § 18.2-370A(4).  The argument is based entirely on the applicability to this
case of the holding in Ford v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 224, 391 S.E.2d 603 (1990).  Ford
is inapplicable.  
That case was a prosecution for solicitation of oral sodomy under Va. Code Ann.
§ 18.2-29, which reads:  "'Any person who commands, entreats or otherwise attempts to
persuade another person to commit a felony, shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.'"  Ford, 391
S.E.2d at 604.  In Pederson v. City of Richmond, 219 Va. 1061, 254 S.E.2d 95 (1979), the
Supreme Court of Virginia had construed § 18.2-29 to require that the act of solicitation "be
done with the intent 'to induce another to act.'"  Ford, 391 S.E.2d at 604.  Ford approached two
female college students who were seated in the front seat of an automobile, with the driver's
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window open, while the vehicle was standing in the drive-through service lane of a fast food
restaurant.  Ford mumbled something, causing the driver to ask Ford what he wanted.  In
language less eloquent then we use here Ford replied that he wanted to perform cunnilingus on
the driver.  The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed Ford's conviction, finding that his
"statements were no more than the expression of his own desire and did not constitute a
command, entreaty or attempt to persuade" either occupant of the automobile to engage in oral
sodomy.  Id. at 605.  
Ford is inapplicable because, as Judge Johnson concluded, § 18.2-370A(4) makes
criminal the mere act of proposing sexual intercourse where the one to whom the proposition
is submitted is a child under fourteen years of age.  In any event, there was sufficient evidence
to prove that Childress intended to induce JRB to consent.  Childress consistently maintained
at his criminal trial that he would not actually have had sexual intercourse with JRB or any of
the other victims, but he acknowledged that having a young girl meet with him after he had
proposed intimacy increased the reality of his fantasy.  Finally, there was evidence that JRB
was persuaded.  Childress testified that "she gave me the green light before we met."
We overrule Childress's exceptions to the finding of violation of the Virginia statute
and, as a result, we overrule his exception to the finding that he violated MRPC 8.4(d).
III
Bar Counsel recommends that we suspend Childress for one year and that his
readmission be conditioned upon payment of costs, continued psychiatric treatment, and
quarterly reports from the treating psychiatrist to Bar Counsel for a period of two years
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following the termination of his suspension.  Childress, arguing that he has been rehabilitated,
submits that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction.  We have frequently followed Bar
Counsel's recommended sanction and, as explained below, we perceive no reason to reject the
substance of that recommendation in this case.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Middleton, 360 Md. 34, 50, 756 A.2d 565, 574 (2000); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Kolodner, 321 Md. 545, 546-47, 583 A.2d 724, 725 (1991); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Sinclair, 299 Md. 644, 650, 474 A.2d 1338, 1341 (1984).
The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public and preserve public
confidence in the legal system, not to punish the errant attorney.  Garland, 345 Md. at 397,
692 A.2d at 472.  Nevertheless, concepts of general and specific deterrence are consistent
with the primary goal of disciplinary proceedings.  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Protokowicz, 329 Md. 252, 262-63, 619 A.2d 100, 105 (1993); Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 355, 587 A.2d 511, 521 (1991); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Alison, 317 Md. 523, 540-41, 565 A.2d 660, 668 (1989).  In Proctor, supra, we quoted what
Judge Digges said for the Court in Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 549,
318 A.2d 811, 814 (1974):
"'A court has the duty, since attorneys are its officers, to insist upon the
maintenance of the integrity of the bar and to prevent the transgressions of an
individual lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute. 
 
Disciplinary
procedures have been established for this purpose, not for punishment, but
rather as a catharsis for the profession and a prophylactic for the public ....'"
Proctor, 309 Md. at 419, 524 A.2d at 776.
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Here, Childress's misconduct seriously undermined public confidence in the legal
profession.  The public is becoming increasingly aware that preying by adults on children via
the Internet is a grave social problem.  Imposition of a penalty more significant than a
reprimand is needed to deter similar future conduct by this respondent and to serve notice on
the members of the Bar at large that this type of conduct by an officer of this Court will not
be tolerated. 
In addition to the harm caused by Childress's conduct, we must also consider certain
circumstances, present in this case, that mitigate the sanction.  Childress has been a member
of the Bar for more than ten years and this is the first disciplinary proceeding initiated against
him.  Further, from his arrest in 1995, Childress has acknowledged that his conduct was
inappropriate and expressed remorse.  He began weekly psychiatric counseling in June 1995
and was medicated.  By December 1999 both therapies could be considerably reduced. 
Doctor 
Susan 
Fiester, 
a 
board-certified 
psychiatrist, 
testified 
in 
the 
criminal
proceedings and also before Judge Johnson.  She stated that at various times throughout his life
Childress has suffered from major depressive episodes and, since age eleven, continually
suffered from obsessive compulsive disorder.  During the period of the chat room
conversations he was also suffering from tinnitus, a ringing in the ears.  The most significant
part of Dr. Fiester's testimony described the progress that Childress has made and his
compliance with a program to prevent future misconduct.
Fiester labeled Childress's treatment a "rousing success."  She described him as "a
different person" in comparison to when she first met him.  There has been a "tremendous
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decrease in his obsessive-compulsive symptoms" but she admitted that Childress "still has a
few anxieties."  She opined that there was "an insignificant risk" that Childress would again
engage in behavior similar to that underlying the charges before us.  Fiester also explained that
Childress does not meet the DSM-IV criteria for pedophilia or any other sexual disorder.
Childress is now married and, according to all the testimony, engaged in a normal and
healthy sexual relationship with his wife.
Apparently because of the relatively recent advent of the Internet technology we have
not found a disciplinary action precedent involving sexual chat room conversations with minors
followed by in-person meetings.  There are numerous cases in which attorneys engaged in
sexual misconduct with children which provide some guidance as to the appropriate sanction
to impose here.  
In Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mitchell, 308 Md. 653, 655, 521 A.2d 746, 748
(1987), we followed Bar Counsel's recommendation and indefinitely suspended an attorney
who had been convicted of a second degree sexual offense because he performed sexual acts
on a thirteen year old boy.  There the evidence showed that the attorney was a "compulsive
homosexual pedophiliac" and, despite extensive treatment, his behavior proved to be "impulsive
and beyond his power to control."  Id. at 654, 521 A.2d at 747.  
Cases from other jurisdictions involving sexual misconduct by attorneys with minors
include:  In re Safran, 18 Cal. 3d 134, 133 Cal. Rptr. 9, 554 P.2d 329, 329-30 (1976)
(attorney convicted of molesting child under eighteen, order suspending him from practice for
three year period stayed, placed on probation under "intense supervision" of State Bar for that
- 19 -
period); In re Conn, 715 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ind. 1999) (attorney suspended for minimum of
two years subsequent to conviction for sexual exploitation of minors with right to seek
reinstatement at end of two year period); In re Wells, 572 N.E.2d 1290, 1293 (Ind. 1991)
(lawyer who met with male high school students in his office on a Saturday night, conversed
with them about sexual matters, showed them a videotape depicting men and women engaged
in sex acts, and touched young men between the ages of sixteen and eighteen suspended for
three years); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Blazek, 590 N.W.2d 501,
504 (Iowa 1999) (indefinite suspension with no possibility of reinstatement for two years for
attorney who sexually assaulted eleven year old nephew); In re Herman, 108 N.J. 66, 527 A.2d
868, 871 (1987) (attorney suspended for three years for sexual assault of ten year old boy);
In re Wong, 275 A.D. 1, 710 N.Y.S.2d 57, 61 (2000) (attorney publicly censured for his pre-
admission sexual touching of a ten year old female); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. King,
37 Ohio St. 3d 77, 523 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1988) (attorney suspended for one year for engaging
in sexual relations with fifteen year old girl).  Unlike the cited cases, Childress did not sexually
touch the victims involved in this case.  
In light of all of the circumstances, including the recommendation of Bar Counsel, we
shall order that James F. Childress be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in this
State, without the right to apply for the termination of the suspension for a period of one year
from the effective date of this suspension.  Any application for termination of the suspension
shall address Childress's then current psychiatric evaluation and describe any psychiatric
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treatment since the hearing before Judge Johnson.  This suspension shall take effect thirty days
from the date this opinion is filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY
ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF
THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND
RULE 16-715(c) FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT
IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
AGAINST JAMES F. CHILDRESS.
Dissenting and Concurring Opinion by Cathell, J.;
- 21 -
I agree with the majority’s determination that Childress has violated MRPC 8.4(d),
based upon the applicability of the Virginia statute.  I disagree with the majority’s holding that
Childress did not violate the provisions of CJ section 3-831.  I also disagree with the sanction
imposed in this case.
In respect to CJ section 3-831, the majority holds, in effect, that the evidence did not
support a finding that Childress had performed acts rendering the child there at issue in need
of supervision.  The majority states: “Nevertheless, there is no evidence in this case, at least
to the clear and convincing evidence standard, that TINA97 was ‘a child who requires guidance,
treatment or rehabilitation.’”  Accordingly, says the majority, a determination that she needed
supervision could not be made.
My disagreement is simple and, I believe, self-evident.  In my view, a child fifteen years
of age or younger, who engages over the Internet with older men, or with total strangers for
that matter, for the purpose of exploring the possibility of meeting and becoming sexually
intimate with that stranger, is in need of guidance.  I simply cannot comprehend how any person
can conclude otherwise.
My greatest disagreement, however, is with the majority’s position in respect to the
sanctions imposed, even for the one violation the majority has determined occurred.  Today
the majority says that an adult sexual predator who has used the Internet as a means to entice
young females away from their homes and families to meet with him for sexual purposes, and
has actually met with those young girls for sexual purposes, is, or may be after a period of
suspension, fit to practice law and has not engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration
-2-
of justice.  The majority, given that the oft-stated primary function of attorney disciplinary
proceedings is to protect the public, in essence holds that it is more important to protect the
general public in respect to their money matters, than in respect to their children.  
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603, 541 A.2d 966 (1988), we
disbarred an attorney for embezzling over $200,000 from his firm.  In Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Hollis, 347 Md. 547, 702 A.2d 223 (1997), we disbarred an attorney for
misappropriating over $80,000.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. White, 328 Md. 412,
614 A.2d 955 (1992), an attorney misappropriated approximately $14,000 of a client’s money.
Although he replaced the money prior to any complaints being filed against him, we still had
him disbarred.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 710 A.2d 926
(1998), a reciprocal case, we disbarred an attorney for misappropriating $14,000 and for other
acts of fraud relating to money.  We disbarred the attorney in Attorney Grievance Commission
v. Williams, 335 Md. 458, 644 A.2d 490 (1994), for several infractions, including the
misappropriation of $4,966.40.  In Fellner v. Bar Association, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729
(1957), we disbarred an attorney for using slugs in place of quarters in parking meters.  
Steal money, you are disbarred.  Steal a quarter’s worth of parking time and you are
disbarred.  Forever steal a child’s innocence and you’re suspended.  In my view, the Court has
a serious problem with its priorities.  I would disbar the respondent.   
1 When referring to hearings in this matter, I refer to both the original hearing, and the
hearing on remand.  
-3-
Items admitted into evidence before the trial court in this disciplinary proceeding1 were
excerpts from the testimony of the respondent in his criminal case, United States v. Childress
(CRDKC 95-0213); a transcript of the testimony of FBI special agent Patricia Ferrante’s
testimony in that case; excerpts of the testimony of FBI special agent Mark Pollitt’s testimony
in that case; a transcript of the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiester’s testimony in that case;
Stipulated Findings of Fact; and summaries of FBI interviews.  
In the original hearing, the trial court, based upon the evidence submitted to it, made the
following findings, especially relevant, I believe, to the matter of sanctions: (1) respondent was
arrested in the Montgomery Mall by federal agents and charged with Interstate Travel with
Intent to Engage in a Sexual Act with a Minor; (2) he was found guilty of that offense in a jury
trial in a federal court; (3) he received a sentence of five months and a substantial fine and an
extensive period of supervised probation; and (4) that the conviction was overturned on a
technicality (i.e., Congress had made an inaccurate statutory reference).
Additionally, the trial court made the following findings in respect to the actual conduct
of respondent: (1) between 1993 and April of 1995, he used his home computer to
intentionally communicate over the Internet with females he believed to be under the age of
consent, and who were previously unknown to him; some of these communications involved
graphic conversations regarding sex, i.e., orgasms, etc; (2) he would represent that he was
younger than his actual age, for example that he was twenty-four when he was actually in his
2 This finding is based on respondent’s statements and the statements of the young girls.
It would be speculation to suggest that both he and the minor girls had reasons not to admit to
having sex, even if it had occurred.  His reason is obvious.  One could speculate that the minor
girls would not want their parents to know of any sexual acts that did occur.  What is clear is
that he met with the girls, and they, with him, for sexual purposes, and that he made sure that
he was in possession of safe sex-devices when meeting with the girls.     
-4-
thirties; and (3) that he would ask females who he thought to be minors, and in most cases were
minors, if they wanted to meet with him for the purposes of having sex.  If the female, who he
believed to be a female, and who he believed to be under the age of consent, indicated that she
wanted to have sex with him, he would arrange a meeting.  The trial court’s findings also
included that he actually met with at least five of these females whom he believed to be, and
were, females of minor age and whom he had made arrangements to meet for sexual purposes.
On at least one occasion, he drove from his home in Virginia to the Village Center in
Columbia, Maryland, and met with two of such children.  On three other occasions, he met with
a child whom he had arranged to meet for sexual purposes knowing she was only thirteen years
of age.  
There was no evidence that actual sexual activities took place on any of the occasions;2
the respondent denied any sexual activity, as did the young girls.  At all times, however, when
he was to meet with the children, he especially arranged to take with him a “safe-sex kit.” It
contained condoms, dental dams, latex gloves, alcohol, and hydrogen peroxide.  The trial court
found, and respondent “testified he would fantasize about minor females and sought them out
via the Internet because they were ‘non-judgmental’ and less likely to carry STD’s.”
-5-
At the first hearing, the trial court found that there was clear and convincing evidence
that respondent committed criminal acts under the federal statute, when crossing state lines
into Maryland with the intent to commit a sexual act with a minor, even if the sexual act was
not consummated.  Because the conviction of the federal violation was reversed due to a
technical mistake in the drafting of that statute, we remanded the case to the hearing judge for
further consideration as to whether respondent had committed other criminal offenses or
sanctionable acts.  
There are additional cases indicating the types of sanctions we have imposed for
conduct I believe to be less egregious than the conduct in the present case.  In Attorney
Grievance Commission v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 667 A.2d 659 (1995), we suspended an
attorney for six months for willful failure to file tax returns.  In Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Gilbert, 365 Md. 249, 252, 739 A.2d 1, 3 (1999), we suspended an attorney
for thirty days for possession of crack cocaine.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Garland, 345 Md. 383, 692 A.2d 465 (1997), we suspended an attorney indefinitely (with
right to reapply after six months) for failure to report to court-ordered DWI clinic.  In
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Protokowicz, 329 Md. 252, 619 A.2d 100 (1993), we
suspended an attorney indefinitely (with right to reapply after one year) for breaking and
entering.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Lazerow, 320 Md. 507, 578 A.2d 779
(1990), we disbarred an attorney for misappropriation of a home purchaser’s money.  In
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Greenspan, 313 Md. 180, 545 A.2d 12 (1988), we
suspended an attorney for six months for making false representations to savings and loan
-6-
institution.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Proctor, 309 Md. 412, 524 A.2d 773
(1987), we suspended an attorney for one year for possession of controlled dangerous
substances.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Silk, 279 Md. 345, 369 A.2d 70 (1977),
we disbarred an attorney for misappropriation or embezzling funds of a “Fathers Club.”  In
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Hirsch, 274 Md. 368, 335 A.2d 108 (1975), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1012, 95 S. Ct. 2638, 45 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1975), we disbarred an attorney for bribery.
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811 (1974), we
disbarred an attorney for willful evasion of income taxes.  And last, but not least, in Attorney
Grievance Commission v. Fellner, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957), we disbarred an
attorney for inserting slugs into parking meters.  Respondent’s misconduct is far more serious
than the types of misconduct next above mentioned.  
In my view, this Court should recognize by sanction, as well as words, the very real
dangers inherent in the use of the Internet by sexual predators, and at least act to ensure, as far
as possible, that these predators are not attorneys.  Respondent’s conduct is, in my view, more
serious, and much more dangerous to the public, than income tax evasion, making false
statements, embezzlement of a civic club’s funds, simple possession of controlled dangerous
substances, using slugs in parking meters, and the like.
The act of a man in his thirties, trained in the law, using the Internet to attempt to
arrange criminal sexual liaisons with minor children, then crossing state lines to meet girls he
believes to be under the age of consent, or who are juveniles, and who, for the most part are
under the age of consent, or are minors, for the purpose of furthering criminal activity of a
-7-
sexual nature, of necessity, involves the attempt to commit base and vile acts of depravity.
More important, in my view, his conduct in contacting the juvenile girls and enticing them to
meet with him for sexual purposes, constituted acts that helped place the girls in need of
guidance, in respect to the very real dangers the majority, by its words, if not its sanction,
acknowledges are created by this Internet facilitated “grave social problem.”  
In Walker v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2001) [No. 51, 2000 Term, filed
March 8, 2001], this Court recently upheld the felony conviction and sentencing of a twenty-
nine year old man for having sex with a fourteen-year-old girl when the man had a legitimate
“mistake of age” defense: the girl had told him she was seventeen, she was working in the same
store he worked in and the store had a minimum age requirement of seventeen.  In the case sub
judice, Childress actively sought out girls under the age of consent.  His situation involved no
mistake, it was intentional.  Yet he can, after a period of time, move to have his suspension
lifted.  I fail to see “justice” in a system that sustains the felony conviction of a person who
engages in sex with a person he genuinely, but mistakenly, believes is of age, yet declines to
disbar a lawyer/sexual predator who intentionally and knowingly seeks out children under the
age of consent, or who are minors, for sexual purposes.  Something is seriously out of kilter
when such a situation is permitted to exist.         
In Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 587, 632 A.2d 797, 805 (1993), in affirming a
statutory conviction under Article 27, section 673, we noted that the statute was “designed to
protect young persons from the dangers of sexual exploitation by adults, loss of chastity,
3 I would, had I been on the Court at that time and agreed with the majority opinion, have
included that “pregnancy” was also a concern of boys, at least should be a concern of boys, as
well as a concern of the parents of boys.
-8-
physical injury, and, in the case of girls, pregnancy.”3  In Owens v. State, 352 Md. 663, 680-81,
724 A.2d 43, 51-52 (1999), Judge Chasanow, writing for the majority, recently stated: “Indeed,
it is hard to imagine when a defendant, necessarily four years older than the victim under §
463(a)(3), would be ‘morally blameless’ when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with a
child as young as age 13.”  In the present case, unlike Garnett and Owens, where mistake of
age was an issue, there is no mistake.  Childress was, in fishing vernacular, trolling on the
Internet for only one species of fish — female children either under the age of consent or
juveniles in obvious need of guidance that would make them aware of the dangers Childress,
and others like him, presented.  He found them, arranged meetings, took steps to consummate
the end result of his illegal activities, but failed (perhaps) for reasons unknown, to have sexual
intercourse, or engage in sexual acts with the girls.  He was nonetheless hunting for legally
forbidden fruit.  The hunting itself, in my view, sufficiently warrants the sanction of
disbarment. 
 
I know of no person that would, under present day circumstances, say that respondent’s
conduct is less serious than putting quarter slugs in parking meters.  Yet, respondent receives
a sanction that permits, or may permit him to return to the practice of law.  He has, in my
opinion, already brought great shame to the profession of law.  If sexual predators, especially
those actively seeking to sexually abuse children, are permitted to be members of our
4  I realize that there is no evidence that he was successful in his endeavor to have sexual
relationships with children.  The evidence is, nonetheless, clear that such relationships were
intended by the respondent.  The mere fact that he made no “kill” should not be considered as
a mitigating factor.  Even a lion, I am told, misses in four out of five hunts.  Nonetheless, the
lion remains a lion.  Childress remains a sexual predator.  With the majority’s action, a sexual
predator who preys on young girls may, all too soon, again be a practicing lawyer.    
5 Had I the opportunity, I would have voted to disbar the attorney in Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Mitchell, 308 Md. 653, 521 A.2d 746 (1987), who had been convicted of a
second degree sexual offense for performing sexual acts on a thirteen-year-old boy.  The
present case is the second case in which this Court has imposed less than the maximum
sanction of disbarment of an attorney who has sexually preyed upon children.  This case, like
Mitchell, will, regrettably, subsequently be used to justify lessor sanctions in similar cases in
the future.
-9-
profession, it will be difficult to continue to maintain, as we have for centuries, that we are an
honorable profession.  Respondent shamed our profession.  The majority, in my view,
perpetuates that shame with the imposition of what, under the circumstances, is a lenient
sanction.    
In my view of the present world we live in, sexual predators who are permitted to remain
as attorneys potentially are more damaging to the image of the profession and more dangerous
to the public,4 than most of those we have disbarred, and all of those on whom we have imposed
lesser sanctions.5  This case involves an adult’s repeated attempts to engage in improper and
sometimes illegal and criminal sexual activity with children.  Now is the time to say that there
are certain sexual practices involving children that will forever bar a person from membership
in the heretofore honorable profession of law.
Respondent’s 
misconduct 
seriously 
undermined 
public 
confidence 
in 
the 
legal
profession.  The public is becoming increasingly aware that adults preying on children via the
-10-
Internet is a grave social problem.  Imposition of a sanction more significant than an indefinite
suspension for a period of one year is needed to deter similar future conduct by this
Respondent and to serve notice on the members of the Bar that this type of conduct by an
officer of this Court will not be tolerated.
With its lenient sanction, the majority equates the attempts of respondent to illegally
sexually prey upon young children, with an attorney who was suspended for consensually
spanking adult women.  See Attorney Grievance v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 624 A.2d
503 (1993).  In other words, attempts to corrupt children are no more serious than spanking
consenting adults and are no more serious than putting twenty-five cent slugs in parking
meters.
I would disbar him in a second. 
Judge Raker joins in the views expressed herein.