Case Title: In re Meena H.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 13

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 13 
Docket: 
Ken-17-344 
Submitted 
On Briefs: January 11, 2018  
Decided: 
January 23, 2018 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE MEENA H. et al.  
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The mother of Meena H. and Blayne H. and the father of Blayne H. 
appeal from a judgment of the District Court (Waterville, Stanfill, J.) 
terminating their parental rights pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) 
and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2017).1  The mother challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the trial court’s finding of parental unfitness.2  Counsel for 
the father filed a brief indicating that there are no arguable issues with merit 
in this appeal and, by order signed September 26, 2017, we granted the father 
the opportunity to file a supplemental brief.  The father did not file any 
                                         
1  Meena’s biological father is unknown, was served with the petition to terminate parental 
rights by publication, and has never participated in this proceeding.  In its judgment, the court 
terminated the parental rights of the “[u]nknown genetic father.”  Blayne’s father did participate in 
this case.  The court terminated his parental rights to Blaine and also did so with respect to Meena 
“[t]o the extent [he] may have a parentage claim with regard to Meena.”   
2  Following the court’s judgment, the mother filed a motion for additional findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and a motion to amend the judgment, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b) and 59(e).  
The court denied the motion, stating that the findings made were sufficient and that the proposed 
findings, even those that were true and uncontroverted, were irrelevant to the court’s analysis.  On 
appeal, the mother does not challenge the court’s denial of her Rule 52(b) motion.  
 
2 
supplemental materials.  Concluding that the evidence supports the court’s 
findings, we affirm the judgment.   
[¶2]  The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother 
and Blayne’s father were unable to protect the children from jeopardy or take 
responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet 
their needs, and that the termination of their parental rights is in the 
children’s best interests.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii).  We 
review the factual findings supporting the determination of parental unfitness 
for clear error.  See In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, ¶ 3, 155 A.3d 430.  The court 
based its determination of unfitness on the following findings of fact.  
This case began in January 2016, but the family’s 
involvement with the Department started long before that.  
Blayne and Meena . . . were the subjects of petitions for child 
protective orders filed on December 4, 2013. . . .  The children 
remained in Department custody until the case was dismissed on 
October 2, 2015[,] after successful reunification with Mother . . . .  
Reunification with [Blayne’s father] was not pursued at [Blayne’s 
father’s] request as he did not wish to pursue anything but visits 
with Blayne. . . .   
 
. . . Very quickly after reunification [in 2015, the mother] 
became more disengaged . . . .  By January 27, 2016, [the mother’s] 
mental health had deteriorated so significantly that she was 
hospitalized at Maine General Hospital for almost a month and 
was completely unable to care for the children.  [Blayne’s father], 
although aware that [the mother] needed hospitalization, did not 
step up to protect the children or be their primary caretaker.  
 
 
3 
On January 28, 2016, the Department sought and this court 
granted a [preliminary protection order], bringing the children 
back into Department custody. . . .   
 
[The mother] has struggled with mental health issues 
resulting in multiple psychiatric hospitalizations since she was a 
teenager. . . .  She carries a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, 
which means she exhibits both a psychotic component and mood 
disorder.   
 
. . . [The mother’s] continued medication compliance has 
historically been a big issue.  When she is on her medications she 
generally does quite well.  When [the mother] is symptomatic, she 
experiences thought broadcasting and paranoia; she can be 
depressed, manic, and psychotic.  This can happen in a matter of 
days, and she is unable to care for herself or the children.   
 
. . . . 
 
. . . Although acknowledging that her actions contributed to 
[her children’s anger, anxiousness and behaviors], [the mother] 
does not squarely take responsibility for her role in the harm the 
children have suffered. . . .  [S]he does not understand the 
devastating impact that her spiraling mental health has had on 
these children.   
 
. . . . 
 
The second removal was devastating for the children.  When 
she came back into care in January 2016, Meena was much more 
anxious tha[n] she had been the first time.  She is parentified, and 
is always looking out for Blayne. . . .  Her compulsive behaviors 
have increased.  She has presented with somatic symptoms of 
anxiety. . . .   
 
Meena reported a lot of fighting between her mother and 
[Blayne’s father]. . . .  She reported that her mother “bopped” her 
in the mouth and she did not understand why. . . .   
 
4 
 
Blayne is younger and does not have as high a level of 
anxiety as Meena.  Blayne is angry and defiant and acts out 
aggressively.  He is diagnosed with an adjustment disorder.  He 
does not know what “home” is. . . .   
 
[The mother] has been stable since February 2017, but she 
has had periods of stability before. . . .  The court is very wary as to 
[the mother’s] ability to recognize any future mental health crisis 
and seek appropriate safety for the children.  When her disease 
flares up and is more active, she becomes paranoid, keeps the 
children close to her, will not ask for help, and is afraid someone 
will take the children. . . .   
 
With regard to [Blayne’s father], he did not participate in 
reunification services during the first case. . . .  He only began to 
participate in reunification services in the fall of 2016.  He has a 
history of domestic violence and was incarcerated . . . during this 
case. . . .   
 
. . . . 
 
[Blayne’s father] has no insight into the harm Meena and 
Blayne have suffered, what their needs are, or the impact of [the 
mother’s] mental illness.  He admits that [his] relationship with 
[the mother] had a history of being rocky and [a] history of 
domestic violence.  He denied that the domestic violence would 
have had any impact on the children because they were too 
young. . . .   
 
. . . . 
 
[The mother and Blayne’s father] clearly love the children, 
and the children clearly love them.  If Meena has a steady and 
predictable and consistent environment, she does well.  She 
becomes destabilized with change . . . .  In order to develop in a 
healthy manner, she needs safety, predictability, and security.  She 
especially needs permanency in the form of a regular, safe, and 
 
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stable support system. . . .  If returned to her mother, Meena would 
regress . . . .   
 
The impact on Meena of her chaotic life with [her mother] is 
obvious; it is profound and significant.  The impact on Blayne is 
less apparent.  However, the past is prologue, both for parents and 
for the children. . . .   
 
. . . [The mother] has worked very hard, especially in 2017, 
to address some of the many issues that existed in her case, and 
she has come a long way.  Despite all the wonderful progress [the 
mother] has made in reunification, however, the court is sadly 
persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that she does not 
have the ability to provide a consistent, safe, stable and 
predictable environment for Meena and Blayne, which is the 
environment these children must have.  With regard to [Blayne’s 
father], the court is likewise persuaded by clear and convincing 
evidence that he does not have the ability to provide a consistent, 
safe, stable and predictable environment for Meena and Blayne 
and cannot do so within a time reasonably calculated to meet 
their needs.   
 
The children are very fragile and highly anxious. . . .  If 
returned to [their] mother’s care, this court has no doubt that 
their mental and emotional health will decline no matter how well 
[the mother] does. . . .  In other words, [the mother] simply cannot 
protect the children from jeopardy or meet their needs without 
regard to how well she has done in her services. . . .  [T]his court is 
convinced that there will be another episode because that is the 
nature of [the mother’s] disease.   
 
. . . This case has been pending for well over [eighteen] 
months, and follows shortly after another episode of care for 
almost two years.  Reunification services have been provided for 
almost [three and one-half] years.  Permanency is of the utmost 
critical importance for these children, and they cannot get 
permanency in the form of a regular, safe, and stable support 
system with their parents.  
 
6 
 
(Citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).  
 
[¶3]  These findings are sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that 
the parents are unable to protect the children from jeopardy or take 
responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet the 
children’s needs.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  We therefore 
conclude that the court did not err when it determined that the parents are 
unfit pursuant to section 4055(1)(B)(2)(b).  See In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, 
¶ 3, 155 A.3d 430. 
[¶4]  Even though neither parent challenged the court’s finding that 
termination is in the children’s best interests, we also conclude that the court 
did not err or abuse its discretion in making that determination.  See In re 
Arturo G., 2017 ME 228, ¶ 11 n.3, --- A.3d ---.  The record supports the court’s 
conclusion that “termination will allow [the children] to heal, to grow and to 
thrive whereas a return to either parent will not.”   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
Elyse M. Apantaku, Esq., Schneider & Brewer, Waterville, for appellant mother 
 
Heidi M. Pushard, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant father 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Waterville District Court docket numbers PC-2016-5 and PC-2016-6 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY