Case Title: Ayers v. Cleveland

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1047

Docket Number: 2018-0852

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Ayers v. Cleveland, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1047.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-1047 
AYERS, APPELLANT, v. THE CITY OF CLEVELAND ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Ayers v. Cleveland, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1047.] 
Political-subdivision 
liability—Former 
R.C. 
2744.07(A)(2), 
now 
R.C. 
2744.07(B)—The right to indemnification set forth in R.C. 2744.07 may be 
asserted only by an employee of a political subdivision—Court of appeals’ 
judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2018-0852—Submitted June 12, 2019—Decided March 25, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 105074,  
2017-Ohio-8571. 
__________________ 
 
FISCHER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we consider whether a judgment creditor may proceed 
directly against a political subdivision under R.C. 2744.07.  Because we conclude 
that the right to indemnification set forth in R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) (relevant statutory 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
language now in R.C. 2744.07(B)1) may be asserted only by an employee of a 
political subdivision, we conclude that a judgment creditor may not proceed 
directly against a political subdivision under that statutory provision. 
I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} After more than a decade of imprisonment, appellant, David Ayers, 
prevailed on federal habeas corpus claims and was released from prison in 2011.  
He then filed a complaint in federal district court asserting civil-rights violations 
against appellee the city of Cleveland; two of its police detectives, Michael Cipo 
and Denise Kovach; and others.  The court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Cleveland and dismissed all claims Ayers raised against the city. 
{¶ 3} After a trial that involved only claims against Cipo and Kovach, the 
jury returned a verdict in Ayers’s favor finding that Cipo and Kovach had violated 
Ayers’s federal constitutional rights.  The district court entered a judgment against 
the detectives in the amount of $13,210,000 and later increased the amount by 
awarding costs and attorney fees.  The detectives twice offered to assign to Ayers 
any indemnification claims that they might have against the city in exchange for an 
agreement by Ayers to forgo collection efforts against the detectives personally.  
Ayers rejected each offer. 
{¶ 4} Cleveland did not actively seek to indemnify the detectives, and the 
detectives did not seek to enforce any rights to indemnification by the city.  Cipo 
passed away before paying any amount to Ayers, and Ayers made no claim against 
Cipo’s estate.  Kovach, represented by David M. Leneghan, a lawyer retained for 
Kovach by Cleveland, filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy 
court discharged Kovach’s personal liability on the judgment. 
                                                     
 
1.  The applicable provision in this case is former R.C. 2744.07(A)(2), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 106, 149 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 3500, 3515-3516.  After the court of  appeals issued the decision on appeal, the 
General Assembly, in 2018 Sub.S.B. No. 239 (effective Oct. 29, 2018), amended R.C. 2744.07 so 
that the relevant provisions are now in R.C. 2744.07(B). 
January Term, 2020 
 
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{¶ 5} After the bankruptcy proceedings were completed, Ayers filed a 
motion with the federal district court to reinstate his indemnification claim against 
Cleveland.  The district court initially granted Ayers’s motion to reinstate the claim, 
but it later vacated its order and dismissed the claim for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction after deciding that the state courts were best positioned to determine 
whether indemnification is available. 
{¶ 6} Ayers then filed the underlying action in Cuyahoga County Common 
Pleas Court against Cleveland, Leneghan, and appellee Joseph Scott, an attorney 
who represented both Cleveland and the officers in the prior proceedings.  Against 
Cleveland, Ayers asserted claims of statutory indemnification pursuant to R.C. 
2744.07(A)(2), tortious interference with the enforcement of a judgment, breach of 
contract, abuse of process, unjust enrichment, specific performance, and civil 
conspiracy.  Against the attorneys, he asserted claims of tortious interference with 
the enforcement of a judgment, aiding and abetting, abuse of process, and civil 
conspiracy.  The trial court granted Leneghan’s motion to dismiss the abuse-of-
process claims against him, but it denied his request to dismiss the remaining 
claims. 
{¶ 7} After discovery, the parties filed limited motions for summary 
judgment on the threshold issue whether Ayers is entitled to seek indemnification 
from Cleveland pursuant to R.C. 2744.07(A)(2).  In his motion for partial summary 
judgment, Ayers asserted that R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) affords him relief.  In the joint 
motion for partial summary judgment of Cleveland and Scott, they primarily 
asserted that Ayers lacks standing to bring an indemnification claim against 
Cleveland under R.C. 2744.07(A)(2).  (For purposes of this opinion, Cleveland and 
Scott will be referred to collectively as “Cleveland” from this point forward.)  The 
common pleas court granted Ayers’s motion for summary judgment after 
concluding that R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) requires Cleveland to indemnify the officers 
and pay the judgment.  The court dismissed Ayers’s other claims as moot. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 8} The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed in a two-to-one 
decision.  2017-Ohio-8571, 99 N.E.3d 1269, ¶ 50.  The majority concluded that 
Ayers, as a judgment creditor, does not have standing to bring a private cause of 
action against the city to enforce the city’s obligations to its employees.  Id. at ¶ 28.  
It concluded that Ayers’s claims “are not within the zone of interest intended to be 
protected or regulated by R.C. 2744.07(A)(2).”  Id. at ¶ 31.  The court further held 
that a private cause of action by a judgment creditor does not arise by implication 
of R.C. 2744.07(A)(2), the purpose of which is not to benefit third parties injured 
by the acts of a state employee but to shield the employee from financial ruin that 
may result from an act the employee committed in good faith within the scope of 
employment.  Id.  The court remanded the cause to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
{¶ 9} Judge Kilbane dissented.  She wrote that the plain intent of R.C. 
2744.07(A)(2) is to satisfy judgments when persons have been injured as a result 
of a municipal employee’s actions committed in good faith and in the course and 
scope of employment.  Id. at ¶ 61 (Kilbane, J., dissenting).  She added that a third 
party has standing to enforce a city’s duty to pay a judgment when there is no 
dispute regarding an employee’s statutory right to indemnification.  Id. at ¶ 56.  
Finally, she concluded that Ayers, as a judgment creditor, is the real party in interest 
and has standing to assert the officers’ statutory rights to indemnification against 
Cleveland.  Id. 
{¶ 10} This court accepted jurisdiction over Ayers’s first proposition of law 
only: “[R.C.] 2744.07(A)(2) reflects the legislature’s intent to permit a judgment 
creditor to proceed directly against an indemnitor.”  See 153 Ohio St.3d 1467, 2018-
Ohio-3450, 106 N.E.3d 65. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 11} As set forth in R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), the general rule in Ohio is that 
political subdivisions are not liable in damages in civil actions: 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
 
Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a political 
subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, 
or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission 
of the political subdivision or an employee of the political 
subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary 
function. 
 
R.C. 2744.02(B) provides five exceptions to this general rule and makes political 
subdivisions liable in those specific instances.  None of the R.C. 2744.02(B) 
exceptions apply in this case. 
{¶ 12} Although political subdivisions are not liable for the actions of 
employees like those in this case, pursuant to R.C. 2744.07, political subdivisions 
are required to indemnify employees in certain instances.  At the relevant time 
period, R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) provided: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this division, a political 
subdivision shall indemnify and hold harmless an employee in the 
amount of any judgment, other than a judgment for punitive or 
exemplary damages, that is obtained against the employee in a state 
or federal court or as a result of a law of a foreign jurisdiction and 
that is for damages for injury, death, or loss to person or property 
caused by an act or omission in connection with a governmental or 
proprietary function, if at the time of the act or omission the 
employee was acting in good faith and within the scope of 
employment or official responsibilities. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
(Emphasis added.)  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 106, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3500, 3515-
3516.  This provision in R.C. 2744.07 has since been amended, but, as relevant to 
this case, the current version of the statute contains no significant differences. 
{¶ 13} In this case, Kovach never asserted her right to indemnification.  
Instead, it is Ayers who seeks to assert the officer’s right to indemnification.  The 
issue in this case is thus whether a judgment creditor may enforce the 
indemnification provision of R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) or whether that provision may be 
asserted only by an employee. 
A.  The parties’ arguments 
{¶ 14} Ayers argues that the text of R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) permits a judgment 
creditor to proceed directly against a political subdivision.  He further argues that 
this interpretation of the statute is supported by its legislative history; comports 
with the legislature’s intent and with the common practice of political-subdivision 
indemnification; protects public employees; provides a form of public insurance; 
promotes judicial economy; and avoids unfairness, gamesmanship, and injustice.  
Finally, he argues that he has third-party standing to enforce the indemnification 
provision of R.C. 2744.07(A)(2). 
{¶ 15} Cleveland counters that the text of R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) clearly and 
unambiguously limits indemnification rights to employees.  It further asserts that 
its interpretation is supported by other statutes, that there is no need to consider 
legislative history because the statute is not ambiguous, and that Ayers’s arguments 
based on legislative history are unconvincing.  It also argues that adopting Ayers’s 
position would nullify R.C. Chapter 2744’s immunity scheme by making political 
subdivisions directly liable for damages in circumstances in which that Chapter 
otherwise says that they should not be directly liable. 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
B.  R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) does not permit a judgment creditor to proceed directly on 
an indemnification claim against a political subdivision 
{¶ 16} At the outset of our analysis, we emphasize the limited nature of the 
precise issue before the court.  The parties have raised numerous arguments that are 
based on the facts of this case, including regarding whether Kovach’s bankruptcy 
proceedings were related to Cleveland’s legal strategy to avoid paying the judgment 
against the officers and whether Cleveland may use a ruling in its favor in this case 
to its future advantage.  In its opinion below, the Eighth District emphasized that 
its decision was limited strictly to the statutory-interpretation question that has now 
been appealed to this court.  The Eighth District explained that Ayers’s other claims 
against Cleveland had not yet been litigated and that these fact-based arguments 
should not be addressed until the parties have had an opportunity to develop and 
litigate them on remand.  For this reason, we focus solely on the issue whether a 
judgment creditor may proceed directly against a political subdivision under R.C. 
2744.07(A)(2), and we note that any remaining issues preserved by the parties may 
be addressed in any further proceedings that may occur below. 
{¶ 17} The primary goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the 
legislature’s intent, and in determining the legislature’s intent, we first look to the 
plain language of the statute.  State v. Gordon, 153 Ohio St.3d 601, 2018-Ohio-
1975, 109 N.E.3d 1201, ¶ 8.  “When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we apply 
the statute as written.”  Id., citing Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio 
St. 3d 106, 2006-Ohio-954, 846 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 52, citing State ex rel. Savarese v. 
Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 
(1996). 
{¶ 18} In reviewing the plain language of R.C. 2744.07(A)(2), it is clear 
that a political subdivision must indemnify an employee in the amount of any 
judgment qualifying under the statute.  A relevant consideration in applying this 
statute is who qualifies as an “employee.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 19} The definition of “employee” is contained in R.C. 2744.01(B):  
“ ‘Employee’ means an officer, agent, employee, or servant, whether or not 
compensated or full-time or part-time, who is authorized to act and is acting within 
the scope of the officer’s, agent’s, employee’s, or servant’s employment for a 
political subdivision.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 20} Ayers clearly does not qualify as an employee under the statute.  The 
issue, then, is whether Ayers, as a third-party judgment creditor, may assert an 
employee’s indemnification rights when proceeding directly against a political 
subdivision under R.C. 2744.07(A)(2). 
{¶ 21} R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) provides that a political subdivision “shall 
indemnify and hold harmless an employee.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, the right of 
indemnification is personal to the employee.  The limited nature of this 
indemnification right is underscored by what the statute does not say.  For example, 
the statute does not provide that a political subdivision shall indemnify any 
judgment against an employee.  Nor does the statute provide that a third party may 
enforce this right of indemnification on behalf of an employee.  Based on the 
unambiguous language of the statute, which serves only to indemnify an employee 
and does not vest any rights in third parties connected to the employee, we conclude 
that R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) does not permit a judgment creditor to proceed directly 
against an indemnitor. 
{¶ 22} Our conclusion is further supported by a prior decision of this court 
in which we explained that indemnification is a personal right rather than a right 
that may be enforced by a third party.  See Worth v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 32 Ohio 
St.3d 238, 240, 513 N.E.2d 253 (1987).  In Worth, this court explained: 
 
Indemnity arises from contract, either express or implied, 
and is the right of a person, who has been compelled to pay what 
another should have paid, to require complete reimbursement.  
January Term, 2020 
 
9
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Trowbridge (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 11, 70 
O.O.2d 6, 321 N.E.2d 787, paragraph two of the syllabus.  In 
general, to indemnify is to make whole and has been defined to mean 
to save harmless by giving security for the reimbursement of a 
person in case of anticipated loss, as by execution and delivery of a 
bond.  See, generally, 41 American Jurisprudence 2d (1968) 687, 
Indemnity, Section 1. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. 
{¶ 23} Ayers argues that Worth is inapposite and that this court should not 
apply the definition of “indemnify” from that decision because that definition is 
limited to the context of contract law.  This argument is unavailing.  While the 
Worth decision does note that the concept of indemnification arises from contract 
law, the court set forth in that decision a general definition of “indemnity” that is 
applicable in this case.  As this court explained in Worth, indemnification exists to 
“make whole” the person who is indemnified.  Id.  In other words, indemnification 
does not exist to benefit a third party. 
{¶ 24} Finally, we note that limiting the right of indemnification under R.C. 
2744.07(A)(2) to employees is consistent with the overarching framework of 
political-subdivision liability in Ohio.  As this court has explained, political 
subdivisions are generally shielded from liability for the acts of their employees 
and exceptions to that general rule must be specifically set forth in statute.  Wilson 
v. Stark Cty. Dept. of Human Servs., 70 Ohio St.3d 450, 452, 639 N.E.2d 105 
(1994).  R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) provides for a political subdivision to indemnify only 
employees of the political subdivision.  Because the statute does not specifically 
provide for a third-party to enforce an employee’s right of indemnification against 
a political subdivision, we may not read that provision into the statute. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
{¶ 25} We 
accordingly 
hold 
that 
under 
R.C. 
2744.07(A)(2), 
indemnification by a political subdivision is a personal right of a particular 
employee.  Based on the plain language of that statute, the personal right of 
indemnification may be asserted only by the employee and it may not be asserted 
by a judgment creditor. 
C.  The issue of third-party standing is not properly before the court in this appeal 
{¶ 26} Ayers further argues that even if R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) permits only 
employees to seek indemnification, he still has third-party standing to enforce the 
statute under the facts of this case. 
{¶ 27} This third-party-standing argument is not properly before the court 
in this appeal.  The argument goes beyond the interpretation of R.C. 2744.07(A)(2), 
which is the discrete legal issue raised in Ayers’s proposition of law that this court 
accepted for review.  Moreover, while the Eighth District rejected Ayers’s third-
party-standing argument, that argument was not raised in Ayers’s memorandum in 
support of jurisdiction.  For these reasons, we decline to address this argument on 
the basis that it is beyond the scope of this appeal. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 28} Because we conclude that the right to indemnification set forth in 
R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) may be asserted only by an employee of a political subdivision 
as specifically set forth in that statute, we hold that a judgment creditor may not 
proceed directly against a political subdivision under that statutory provision.  We 
accordingly affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, DEWINE, and DONNELLY, JJ., 
concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
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STEWART, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 29} I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that 
R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) (now R.C. 2744.07(B)2) reflects the legislature’s intent to 
permit a judgment creditor to proceed directly against a political-subdivision 
indemnitor.  I disagree with the majority’s holding that under the statute, only 
employees can invoke a political subdivision’s obligation to indemnify the amount 
of a judgment awarded against the employees. 
{¶ 30} R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) is limited to a small and very specific class of 
judgments.  As this case demonstrates, a judgment creditor is in the best position to 
assert the rights created by this statute.  See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Edn., 
544 U.S. 167, 181, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005).  When applying a 
statute, courts must presume that the General Assembly intended a just and 
reasonable result.  R.C. 1.47(C); see State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Cincinnati, 76 
Ohio St.3d 540, 543-544, 668 N.E.2d 903 (1996) (R.C. 121.22, Ohio’s “Sunshine 
Law,” cannot be interpreted in a manner that circumvents the purpose of the statute, 
which is to prohibit secret deliberations of elected officials).  Instead of a just and 
reasonable interpretation of R.C. 2744.07(A)(2), the majority’s decision renders the 
statute meaningless. 
{¶ 31} We determine legislative intent by considering the language of the 
statute and the purpose to be accomplished.  Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 129 
Ohio St.3d 153, 2011-Ohio-2723, 950 N.E.2d 938, ¶ 12.  R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) 
provides that “a political subdivision shall indemnify and hold harmless an 
employee in the amount of any judgment * * * that is obtained against the employee 
* * *.”  The purpose of the statute is to pay qualifying judgments obtained against 
employees of a political subdivision so that employees are not burdened by those 
judgments.  There is no dispute that the judgment in this case qualifies under the 
                                                     
 
2. The statutory provisions at issue in this case in former R.C. 2744.07(A)(2), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 106, 
149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3500, 3515-3516, now appear in R.C. 2744.07(B). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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statute, and there is no dispute that the persons against whom appellant, David 
Ayers, obtained that judgment were employees of appellee the city of Cleveland.  
The only question, then, is how is the political subdivision’s indemnification 
obligation invoked?  The majority leaves this question unanswered.  This is 
problematic for the reasons that follow. 
{¶ 32} R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) does not contain any language establishing a 
procedure for an employee to invoke the city’s indemnification obligation.  The 
Ohio General Assembly clearly knows how to establish such procedures.  See, e.g., 
R.C. 9.87(E) (establishing the procedure for invoking indemnification for 
judgments against state officers and employees incurred in the performance of 
official duties); R.C. 9.871(C) (establishing the procedure for invoking 
indemnification for the cost of legal representation of employees of the Department 
of Rehabilitation and Correction in connection with the dismissal or acquittal of 
criminal charges for actions that occurred within the course and scope of 
employment); R.C. 120.41(B)(2) (establishing the procedure for invoking 
indemnification for public defenders in connection with malpractice actions).  
Without statutory language setting forth a procedure, there is no clear intent by the 
legislature to limit initiating the city’s indemnification obligation to only 
employees.  See Griffith v. Aultman Hosp., 146 Ohio St.3d 196, 2016-Ohio-1138, 
54 N.E.3d 1196, ¶ 28 (declining to impose a requirement that a patient seeking a 
medical record under R.C. 3701.74 state a reason for the request because the statute 
had no such requirement); see also State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-
Ohio-7565, 103 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 28 (this court may not restrict, qualify, narrow, or 
enlarge the General Assembly’s wording when construing the meaning of a statute). 
{¶ 33} In the absence of a statutory procedure, and as the majority suggests 
by reference, majority opinion at ¶ 22, a political subdivision could fulfill its 
indemnification obligation by reimbursing an employee who pays a judgment.  
However, requiring the employee to first pay the judgment and then seek 
January Term, 2020 
 
13 
reimbursement does not indemnify or hold the employee harmless.  In reality, a 
great deal of harm could befall an employee who would be required to first pay a 
judgment from his or her personal resources before eventually recovering the 
amount from the political subdivision.  See, e.g., Dixon v. Holden, 923 S.W.2d 370, 
378 (Mo.App.1996) (reasoning that by enacting a statute creating a fund to defend 
and pay judgments against state employees, the legislature intended to protect them 
as much as possible from the rigors of litigation and that requiring an employee to 
pay from his or her pocket prior to being made whole would defeat that purpose).  
Moreover, R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) is not worded to indemnify employees for losses 
they suffer as a result of paying a judgment.  The statute indemnifies employees 
against the judgment itself.  The difference is significant and cannot be ignored.  
See Henderson-Achert Lithographic Co. v. John Shillito Co., 64 Ohio St. 236, 254-
255, 60 N.E. 295 (1901) (discussing the essential difference between 
indemnification against loss and indemnification against liability). 
{¶ 34} Under the majority’s decision, the only other option would be for an 
employee to invoke his or her clear right to have the political subdivision pay the 
judgment.  Either one of these options could have taken place here but did not, thus 
vesting the employees against whom the judgment was rendered with the ultimate 
authority over whether the judgment was paid.  This cannot be what the legislature 
intended.  Additionally, as the majority notes, “The detectives twice offered to 
assign to Ayers any indemnification claims that they might have against the city in 
exchange for an agreement by Ayers to forgo collection efforts against the 
detectives personally.  Ayers rejected each offer.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 3.  Noting 
these facts begs a key question: Why did the detectives not simply invoke their right 
to have the city pay the judgment?  If they had done so, as the majority holds only 
they could do, the city would have had to pay the judgment and there would be 
nothing left for Ayers to collect from the detectives.  Thus, the offer to assign any 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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claims the employees “might have [had] against the city” in exchange for a 
forbearance of collection efforts is suspect. 
{¶ 35} The majority’s interpretation of the statute—that only the employee 
can seek indemnification—disregards the statutory language that requires the 
political subdivision to pay the judgment against the employee.  The statute cannot 
be applied in a way that subjects employees to financial ruin or that allows 
employees to control whether a legally qualifying judgment is paid.  The language 
of R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) establishes that its purpose is to satisfy judgments that result 
from a political subdivision’s employee’s conduct committed in good faith and 
within the scope of employment and thereby to protect employees by indemnifying 
and holding them harmless from the burdens of those judgments. 
{¶ 36} The trial court did not err when it ruled that Ayers could proceed 
against the city for indemnification for the judgment obtained against the 
employees.  I would hold that the political subdivision’s obligation to pay the 
judgment can be enforced when a qualifying judgment is obtained against an 
employee and the judgment creditor proceeds against the political subdivision for 
payment of the judgment.  This interpretation satisfies the purpose of R.C. 
2744.07(A)(2).  Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
_________________ 
 
Law Office of Michele L. Berry and Michele Berry; and Loevy & Loevy, 
Scott Rauscher, Anand Swaminathan, Debra Loevy, Matthew Topic, and Daniel 
Twetten, for appellant. 
 
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Robert M. Wolff, and Inna Shelley; and Barbara 
A. Langhenry, Cleveland Director of Law, and Mark V. Webber, Assistant Director 
of Law, for appellee city of Cleveland. 
 
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Robert M. Wolff, and Inna Shelley, for appellee 
Joseph Scott. 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
 
Latham & Watkins, L.L.P., Samuel B. Isaacson, and Alex Grabowski; and 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., and Kathleen M. Brinkman, urging 
reversal for amici curiae Ohio law professors Avidan Cover, Llewellyn Gibbons, 
Doron Kalir, Andrew Pollis, Cassandra Burke Robertson, John Sahl, and Rachel 
Smith. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Arthur J. 
Marziale Jr., Nick A. Soulas Jr., and Amy L. Hiers, Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorneys, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys 
Association. 
 
Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., and Frank H. Scialdone, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
_________________