Case Title: TEFFT v TEFFT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80-074

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-74 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 BEVERLY J. TEFFT, Petitioner and Appellant, ALFRED E. TEFFT, Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: ~istrict Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade. Honorable Joel G . Roth, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Randono and Donovan, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Smith, Baillie & Walsh, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on briefs: February 5, 1981 - Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. O n February 27, 1980, the D i s t r i c t Court entered a decree which dissolved t h e marriage of p e t i t i o n e r and respon- d e n t , e s t a b l i s h e d c h i l d custody and c h i l d support, divided t h e r e a l and personal property comprising t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e and ordered t h a t each p a r t y pay h i s o r her a t t o r n e y fees. This decree was amended March 25, 1980, and from t h a t amended order, p e t i t i o n e r appeals. Beverly and Alfred T e f f t married on November 20, 1965. Alfred, a widower, had four c h i l d r e n from h i s p r i o r marriage. These c h i l d r e n were adopted by Beverly following t h e marriage. Beverly and Alfred had no o t h e r children. Beverly i s a tenured teacher working a t Charles M. Russell High School i n Great F a l l s , Montana. H e r income f o r 1978 w a s approximately $15,000. Alfred is a v i c e p r e s i d e n t of t h e Cogswell Agency, an e s t a b l i s h e d insurance firm i n Great F a l l s . H i s income f o r 1978 from t h i s firm w a s approxi- mately $34,250. A t t h e t i m e the decree was entered t h e ages of t h e four c h i l d r e n were: Gregory, 21; T e r r i e , 19; Tracy, 18; and K r i s t i e , 17. The decree granted custody of Kristie t o Beverly. The c o u r t ordered Alfred t o pay $200 per month c h i l d support f o r K r i s t i e , Tracy and T e r r i e . The decree recognized t h a t T e r r i e suffered from a learning d i s a b i l i t y which slowed her educational process. A l f r e d ' s o b l i g a t i o n t o support t h e t h r e e daughters extended u n t i l each was graduated from high school o r otherwise became emancipated. The decree f u r t h e r provided t h a t Alfred could apply h i s daughters' s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s on his support o b l i - The decree ordered t h a t Beverly was e n t i t l e d t o use of t h e family home u n t i l t h e t h r e e daughters w e r e graduated from high school o r otherwise became emancipated. The home and furnishings were then t o be sold and t h e n e t proceeds divided equally. N o s p e c i f i c provision was made regarding mortgage payments during t h e interim. The remaining r e a l and personal property (with t h e ex- ception of s p e c i f i e d family heirlooms conceded t o Alfred) were valued by t h e D i s t r i c t Court and divided on a 50-50 b a s i s . Certain investment p r o p e r t i e s acquired during t h e marriage were ordered t o be sold a s soon a s p o s s i b l e and t h e n e t proceeds divided equally. Attorney f e e s were made t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of each party. Motions t o a l t e r o r amend t h e decree were f i l e d by both p a r t i e s . The D i s t r i c t Court amended t h e o r i g i n a l decree. The amending order eliminated A l f r e d ' s o b l i g a t i o n of support f o r t h e a d u l t daughters, T e r r i e and Tracy. The order increased t h e monthly support o b l i g a t i o n f o r Kristie t o $250. Alfred could apply Kristie's s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s toward h i s support o b l i g a t i o n . The s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s of T e r r i e and Tracy were ordered t h e i r own property, and t h e two were advised t o apply f o r t h e b e n e f i t s i n t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l names. The amending order a l s o a l t e r e d t h e o r i g i n a l decree by allowing Alfred t o pay Beverly half of t h e value placed on t h e investment p r o p e r t i e s i n s t e a d of s e l l i n g the p r o p e r t i e s and dividing t h e proceeds. Under t h i s amendment Beverly was given a judgment of $17,346.50 f o r her i n t e r e s t i n t h e investment p r o p e r t i e s . The following i s s u e s a r e d e a l t with on appeal: 1. Whether p e t i t i o n e r ' s motion t o a l t e r o r amend t h e o r i g i n a l decree was timely heard a s prescribed by ~ u l e 59 (d) (g) , M.R.Civ.P.? 2. Whether t h i s appeal i s limited s o l e l y t o t h e m a t t e r s d e a l t with i n t h e amending order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court because t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s n o t i c e of appeal only designated t h e amending order and n o t t h e o r i g i n a l decree? 3 . Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by n o t awarding c h i l d support f o r T e r r i e and Tracy, ages 1 9 and 18, respectively? 4. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n allowing a $200 per month c r e d i t a g a i n s t c h i l d support f o r s o c i a l s e c u r i t y payments received? 5. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o properly value the investment p r o p e r t i e s i n the m a r i t a l e s t a t e ? 6. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by e f f e c t i n g a 50- 50 property d i s t r i b u t i o n of the m a r i t a l e s t a t e ? 7. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n n o t awarding - . a t t o r n e y f e e s t o the p e t i t i o n e r ? The f i r s t two procedural i s s u e s must be addressed a t t h e o u t s e t . Rule 59 (g) , M.R.Civ.P., s t a t e s t h a t motions t o amend a judgment must be heard and determined within t h e same t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s which apply t o motions f o r new t r i a l . Rule 59 (d) , X.R.Civ.P. , sets f o r t h those t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s . This provision s t a t e s : "Hearing on t h e motion s h a l l be had within 10 days a f t e r it has been served . . . except t h a t a t any time a f t e r t h e n o t i c e of hearing on t h e motion has been served t h e c o u r t may i s s u e an order continuing t h e hearing f o r n o t t o exceed 30 days. I n case t h e hearing i s continued by t h e c o u r t , i t s h a l l be t h e duty of t h e c o u r t t o hear t h e same a t t h e e a r l i e s t p r a c t i c a b l e d a t e t h e r e a f t e r , and t h e c o u r t s h a l l r u l e upon and decide t h e motion within 15 days . . . " I f the motion i s n o t noticed up f o r hearing and no hearing i s held thereon, it s h a l l be deemed denied a s of the e x p i r a t i o n of the period t i m e within which hearing i s required t o be held under t h i s Rule 59." I n t h e case a t bar, p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d and served a motion t o amend on March 6, 1980. Because s e r v i c e was accomplished by mail, an a d d i t i o n a l t h r e e days must be added t o t h e t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s s e t f o r t h i n Rule 59 (d) . Rule 6 (e) , M.R.Civ.P. Therefore, t h e hearing on t h i s motion t o amend was e i t h e r required t o be held within 13 days, commencing on March 7 , 1980, o r was required t o be continued by t h e c o u r t within 13 days, commencing with March 7, 1980. O n March 18, 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court, sua sponte, entered an order s e t t i n g a hearing d a t e on p e t i t i o n e r ' s motion t o amend ( a s well as respondent's motion t o amend of March 7, 1980) f o r March 21, 1980. This order was f i l e d on March 19, 1980, which was t h e l a s t day of t h e 13-day period. The c o u r t ' s order of March 18, 1980, c o n s t i t u t e s a continuation of t h e hearing d a t e on t h e motions t o a l t e r o r amend. That order d i d set a hearing d a t e within t h e 30-day period required by Rule 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P. The District Court then r u l e d on t h e motions t o a l t e r o r amend within f i v e days following t h e hearing. Therefore, the D i s t r i c t Court' s a c t i o n s regarding t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s motions t o a l t e r o r amend t h e o r i g i n a l decree comply with t h e s t a t u t o r y time requirements set f o r t h i n Rule 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P. The amend- i n g order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s v a l i d . Respondent's second procedural i s s u e concerns t h e scope of t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s n o t i c e of appeal. O n April 11, 1980, p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d a n o t i c e of appeal s t a t i n g t h a t ". . . Beverly J. T e f f t . . . hereby appeals . . . from the d e c i s i o n of Judge J o e l G. Roth dated March 2 4 , 1980, amending h i s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree." Re- spondent argues t h a t t h i s appeal must be l i m i t e d s o l e l y t o i s s u e s a r i s i n g from t h e D i s t r i c t Court's amending order because Rule 4 ( c ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., provides t h a t : "The n o t i c e of appeal . . . s h a l l designate t h e judgment o r order appealed from." Respondent contends t h a t t h e amending order and o r i g i n a l decree i n t h i s a c t i o n are n e c e s s a r i l y s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t ; thus respondent argues t h a t a s p e c i f i c n o t i c e of appeal from t h e o r i g i n a l decree i s required before review of t h a t decree i s possible. Respondent's contention ignores t h e interdependent nature of the amending order and t h e o r i g i n a l decree. F i n a l i t y of the o r i g i n a l judgment must await a determination by t h e lower c o u r t regarding motions t o amend o r a l t e r . This i s evidenced by Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., which suspends t h e running of t h e t i m e within which an appeal must be taken, while a motion t o alter o r amend a judgment i s being considered. The intertwinement of an amending order and an o r i g i n a l judgment n e c e s s i t a t e s review of a l l i s s u e s con- tained i n both; thus an appeal from e i t h e r incorporates a l l i s s u e s of both f o r review. This holding i s i n keeping with t h e philosophy of modern a p p e l l a t e p r a c t i c e t h a t t e c h n i c a l d e f e c t s of procedure should not bar a p a r t y from access t o t h e c o u r t s . J . C . Penney, Inc. and F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Employment Security Division (1981) , - Mont. - I - P.2d -- , 38 St.Rep. 694. The s i t u a t i o n involving an appeal from an amending o r d e r , a s i s the case here, must be distinguished from s i t u a t i o n s where a p a r t y appeals from one order i n a series of s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t orders, o r from one p a r t of a d i v i s i b l e judgment. This Court has previously held t h a t a f a i l u r e t o designate a l l orders o r t h e e n t i r e judgment i n such s i t u a t i o n s l i m i t s t h e reviewing c o u r t s o l e l y t o t h e matters designated i n t h e appeal notice. S t a t e v. odd C1945), 117 Mont. 80, 158 P.2d 299; Sperling v. Calfee (1888), 7 Mont. 514, 19 P. 204. However, an amending order and an o r i g i n a l judgment cannot be viewed as s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t o r d i v i s i b l e and, t h e r e f o r e , t h i s r u l e cannot be applied i n t h e case a t bar. P e t i t i o n e r ' s n o t i c e of appeal i s s u f f i c i e n t t o preserve a l l i s s u e s f o r review. P e t i t i o n e r ' s next i s s u e on appeal concerns t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s termination of c h i l d support f o r t h e two a d u l t daughters, Terrie and Tracy. P e t i t i o n e r contends t h a t such a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s e r r o r on the p a r t of t h e lower court. However, i n Chrestenson v. Chrestenson (1979), Mont. - , 589 P.2d 148, 36 St.Rep. 103, t h i s Court determined - t h a t a p a r e n t ' s l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n under Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and s t a t u t o r y provisions terminated when a c h i l d became an a d u l t . The Chrestenson c o u r t f u r t h e r noted t h a t t h i s d e t e r - mination d i d n o t c o n t r a d i c t s e c t i o n 48-330(3), R.C.M., 1947, (now s e c t i o n 40-4-208, MCA) which allows: " p a r t i e s t o agree i n w r i t i n g o r expressly provide i n t h e decree of d i s s o l u t i o n f o r termination of c h i l d support a t an agreed upon age o r time." Chrestenson a t 150. I n t h e case a t b a r , t h e p a r t i e s d i d n o t reach any agreement. I n t h e o r i g i n a l decree of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, respondent Alfred T e f f t was ordered t o pay $200 per month f o r each of h i s t h r e e daughters, who were still r e s i d i n g a t t h e family home with p e t i t i o n e r Beverly T e f f t . This support o b l i g a t i o n was t o end when each g i r l completed high school. ~ o l l o w i n g t h e hearing regarding t h e motions t o amend, the ~ i s t r i c t Court a l t e r e d i t s f i n d i n g s , conclusions, and decree by terminating the support o b l i g a t i o n a s t o ~ e r r i e and Tracy. These daughters w e r e 19 and 18, r e s p e c t i v e l y , a t t h e t i m e t h e o r i g i n a l decree w a s entered. Since no agreement between t h e p a r t i e s e x i s t e d regarding support f o r these a d u l t c h i l - dren, the D i s t r i c t Court w a s merely conforming i t s o r i g i n a l decree with t h e law espoused i n Chrestenson. This p o r t i o n of t h e order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. P e t i t i o n e r next contends t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n allowing respondent, Alfred T e f f t , t o apply s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s received by him on behalf of K r i s t i e , the minor c h i l d , toward h i s support obligation. The District Court ordered Alfred t o pay $250 per month f o r K r i s t i e . The s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s receivable on behalf of K r i s t i e amounted t o approximately $200 per month. Thus, i n e f f e c t , t h e c o u r t ' s order required Alfred t o pay only $50 per month c h i l d support from h i s own funds. Section 40-4-204, MCA, s e t s f o r t h r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s a c o u r t must look t o i n determining c h i l d support. The f a c t o r s a r e : " ( 1 ) t h e f i n a n c i a l resources of t h e c h i l d ; " ( 2 ) t h e f i n a n c i a l resources of t h e c u s t o d i a l parent; " ( 3 ) t h e standard of l i v i n g t h e c h i l d would have en- joyed had t h e marriage n o t been dissolved; " ( 4 ) t h e physical and emotional condition of t h e c h i l d and h i s educational needs; and " ( 5 ) t h e f i n a n c i a l resources and needs of the noncus- t o d i a l parent. " The lower c o u r t heard testimony from both Beverly T e f f t and Alfred T e f f t . Evidence e x i s t e d (although n o t extensive) regarding t h e f a c t o r s set f o r t h above. The D i s t r i c t Court's order acknowledged t h a t t h e s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s were t h e property of K r i s t i e . The c o u r t determined t h a t Kristie needed $250 support each month, and t h a t $200 of such amount would be supplied by her own f i n a n c i a l resources. Although Alfred T e f f t has an income of more than $34,000 a year and pays only $50 per month c h i l d support, t h i s f a c t alone is n o t determinative t h a t t h e lower c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . The need of t h e c h i l d , a s w e l l a s t h e noncustodial p a r e n t ' s a b i l i t y t o pay, must be considered. Section 40-4- 204, MCA. W e cannot say t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s - c r e t i o n and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e order of support i s affirmed. P e t i t i o n e r s p e c i f i e s s e v e r a l e r r o r s regarding t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s v a l u a t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e f o r purposes of d i s t r i b u t i o n . A f t e r c a r e f u l review, w e f i n d t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n disposing of t h e m a r i t a l estate. The decree provides t h a t t h e family residence on 1017 Durange, Great F a l l s , Montana, was t o be used by Beverly and t h e t h r e e daughters u n t i l t h e youngest w a s graduated from high school o r otherwise became emancipated. Upon such oc- currence, t h e home and f u r n i s h i n g s w e r e t o be s o l d a s soon a s p o s s i b l e and t h e n e t proceeds divided equally. N o o r d e r w a s made regarding t h e $250 monthly mortgage payment. Under t h e decree Alfred has no o b l i g a t i o n t o make t h e payment. Beverly, who l i v e s i n t h e home, w i l l s a t i s f y t h i s o b l i g a t i o n thereby b u i l d i n g f u t u r e e q u i t y f o r Alfred. Such an arrangement w i l l r e s u l t i n an i n e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of a s s e t s a t t h e t i m e of s a l e and cannot be sustained. Regarding A l f r e d ' s investments, t h e D i s t r i c t Court made t h e following f i n d i n g s , p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s decision: A s s e t Current Amount N e t Market Owed Value Value Thereon 40 A c r e s Acquired From Amer- $ 2,500 i c a n Montana Land American Montana Land 1/6th Unknown Unknown Unknown I n t e r e s t Command P a r t n e r s 1/7th $ 6,500 I n t e r e s t W e s t American Lands Inc. . $12,285 $12,285 None 1/7th I n t e r e s t The D i s t r i c t Court o r i g i n a l l y ordered t h a t t h i s property, along with a l l o t h e r investment property, be s o l d and t h e proceeds divided equally. I n i t s order amending t h e decree, t h e District Court a l t e r e d t h i s and ordered t h a t Alfred pay t o Beverly half of t h e equity. The c o u r t f a i l e d t o d e t e r - mine a value f o r one of t h e p r o p e r t i e s . Thus the v a l u a t i o n on which t h e d i s p o s i t i o n i s based i s inadequate, and t h i s cause must be remanded. Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), - Mont. , 607 P.2d 102, 37 St.Rep. 247. Additionally, problems a r i s e regarding t h e c o u r t ' s determination of A l f r e d ' s equity i n these p r o p e r t i e s , thus c r e a t i n g problems i n t h e n e t worth determination. Alfred t e s t i f i e d twice i n t h i s matter. I n December 1979, Alfred s t a t e d he owned a 1/6th i n t e r e s t i n a corporation denomi- nated named American Montana Land. This corporation purchased 250 a c r e s of r e c r e a t i o n a l land. Alfred t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e corporation owed $26,500 on t h e property. H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e corporation had deeded 40 a c r e s of t h e land t o him i n d i v i d u a l l y . Alfred f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d he d i d n ' t know i f any encumbrances, o t h e r than the one on t h e e n t i r e t r a c t , e x i s t e d on t h i s 40-acre parcel. Alfred s a i d he d i d n ' t know what comparable land i n t h e same a r e a was s e l l i n g f o r b u t speculated t h a t h i s p a r c e l was worth $2,000-$3,000. he c o u r t accepted t h i s valuation, placing a $2,500 value on t h e 40 acres. The c o u r t a l s o found t h a t A l f r e d ' s 1/6th i n t e r e s t i n t h e corporation had an unknown value. When Alfred t e s t i f i e d i n January 1980, s e v e r a l a s p e c t s of t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n had changed. The corporation which owned the 250 a c r e s of r e c r e a t i o n a l land was now c a l l e d West American Land Corporation. Alfred d i d n o t explain t h e change i n corporation ownership, b u t apparently West American Land Corporation succeeded t o the i n t e r e s t of American Montana Land. H i s i n t e r e s t i n West American Land was 1/7th. NO mention w a s made of t h e 40-acre t r a c t of land deeded t o him. Alfred estimated t h a t t h e corporation land had no equity. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e $26,500 encumbrance o r i g i n a l l y t e s t i f i e d t o , Alfred s t a t e d t h a t t h e land was pledged a s s e c u r i t y f o r a $60,000 note a t a l o c a l bank. The record i s unclear on whether A l f r e d ' s 40-acre t r a c t i s so encumbered. However, t h e r e apparently i s an $86,500 d e b t a g a i n s t t h e corporate land. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t A l f r e d ' s i n t e r e s t i n the W e s t American Lands Corp. had no value because t h e value of t h e land did n o t exceed t h e amount of i t s encumbrance. I n making t h i s determination t h e c o u r t considered t h e $60r000 note t o be a l i a b i l i t y of t h e corporation. The problem r e s u l t i n g from t h i s , i s t h a t the $60,000 borrowed by West American Land was used a s investment funds i n A l f r e d ' s l a t e s t e n t e r p r i s e , Command P a r t n e r s , franchise. Alfred t e s t i f i e d t h a t he and s i x o t h e r people contributed $6,500 each toward t h e purchase p r i c e of t h e f r a n c h i s e p l u s t h e $60,000 obtained by pledging t h e r e c r e a t i o n a l land. I n t h e D i s t r i c t Court's findings, however, t h i s $60,000 was n o t added a s equity; although it was c a l c u l a t e d a s a l i a b i l i t y i n valuing t h e corporate stock of West American Land. The c o u r t found t h a t A l f r e d ' s i n t e r e s t i n Command P a r t n e r s was only $6,500. From t h i s testimony it i s apparent t h a t a t r u e n e t worth of t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s was not made. Encumbrances on t h e varying p r o p e r t i e s were n o t c l e a r l y distinguished, nor was t h e proper equity i n t h e s e proper ties calculated. P e t i t i o n e r d i d n o t seek a maintenance award, b u t only an e q u i t a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n of the m a r i t a l e s t a t e . The D i s t r i c t Court found, regarding t h e r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n s of both Beverly and Alfred, t h a t : " . . . the needs of t h e p a r t i e s with regard t o s h e l t e r , food, clothing, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , u t i l i t i e s , and t h e normal expenses of l i v i n g a r e r e l a t i v e l y equal . . . t h e P e t i t i o n e r Beverly and Respondent Alfred have an equal opportunity f o r t h e f u t u r e a c q u i s i t i o n of in- come and c a p i t a l a s s e t s but t h e Court f i n d s t h a t Respondent Alfred i s p r e s e n t l y earning over twice t h e amount of t h e income of P e t i t i o n e r Beverly and w i l l probably continue t o do so . . . t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of t h e P e t i t i o n e r Beverly and t h e Respondent Alfred t o t h e family u n i t a r e equal." Beverly c u r r e n t l y earns approximately $15,000 per year. She i s paying $250 per month f o r mortgage payments on t h e house. Three c h i l d r e n s t i l l r e s i d e a t t h e family residence. These c h i l d r e n do n o t have regular employment, thus r e q u i r - i n g some f i n a n c i a l help. Alfred i s obligated t o pay support f o r only one of t h e children. Reality d i c t a t e s t h a t under t h e s e conditions Beverly would have a very poor opportunity f o r t h e f u t u r e a c q u i s i t i o n of c a p i t a l assets and income. O n t h e other hand, Alfred earns approximately $34,000. H e has been receiving annual r a i s e s of approximately $2,000 per year. H i s p o s i t i o n i n t h e e s t a b l i s h e d insurance firm, Cogswell Agency, i s secure. H i s only personal o b l i g a t i o n v i a t h i s d i s s o l u t i o n i s c h i l d support of $50 per month. Clearly, Alfred has f a r g r e a t e r opportunity f o r f u t u r e a c q u i s i t i o n of c a p i t a l a s s e t s and income. Mont.- I n l i g h t of Smith v. Smith (1981), - , 622 P. 2d 1022, 38 St.Rep. 146, t h i s 50-50 d i s t r i b u t i o n cannot stand. The c o u r t ' s finding t h a t both p a r t i e s have equal access t o t h e f u t u r e a c q u i s i t i o n of c a p i t a l i s c l e a r l y erroneous and a n abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . Z e l l v. Z e l l (1980), - Mont. - I L a s t l y , p e t i t i o n e r contends t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n n o t awarding her a t t o r n e y f e e s . Regarding a t t o r n e y f e e s , t h e D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t : "Although P e t i t i o n e r Beverly seeks her a t t o r n e y f e e s herein, t h e Court f i n d s t h a t upon consid- e r a t i o n of t h e income of P e t i t i o n e r Beverly and t h e property d i s t r i b u t i o n ordered herein, t h a t each p a r t y i s a b l e t o pay his/her own a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s and i s responsible f o r his/her own a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and c o s t s incurred herein." Based on t h i s finding t h e D i s t r i c t Court ordered each p a r t y t o pay h i s o r her own a t t o r n e y fees. P e t i t i o n e r argues t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court's improper determination of n e t worth and improper property d i s t r i b u t i o n n e c e s s i t a t e s r e v e r s a l of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s decision n o t t o award a t t o r n e y f e e s t o Beverly T e f f t . I n l i g h t of t h i s C o u r t ' s decision t o remand regarding t h e i s s u e s of m a r i t a l e s t a t e n e t worth and d i s t r i b u t i o n , we believe it b e s t t o vacate the order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court regarding a t t o r n e y f e e s and leave it t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t as t o whether modification of t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s order i s necessary following rehearing i n accordance with t h i s opinion. I n summary we a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s decree a s it r e l a t e s t o c h i l d support. W e reverse t h e D i s t r i c t Court on (1) f a i l u r e t o s p e c i f i c a l l y provide f o r payment of t h e home mortgage, ( 2 ) f a i l u r e t o value a l l m a r i t a l a s s e t s , ( 3 ) f a i l u r e t o properly c a l c u l a t e n e t worth, and, ( 4 ) f a i l u r e t o consider t h e husband's considerably g r e a t e r opportunity f o r accumulation of f u t u r e a s s e t s . The matter i s remanded f o r hearing i n accordance with t h i s opinion. We concur: