Case Title: Brittany L. Noffke v. Kevin Bakke

Citation: 2009 WI 10

Docket Number: 2006AP001886

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 10 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP1886 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Brittany L. Noffke, by her guardian ad litem, 
Mart W. Swenson, Thad Noffke and Tina Kropelin, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Kevin Bakke and American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Holmen High School, Holmen Area School District 
and Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Gundersen Lutheran Health Plan, Inc., and Atrium 
Health Plan, Inc., 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
2008 WI App 38 
Reported at: 308 Wis. 2d 410, 748 N.W.2d 195 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 27, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 8, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse   
 
JUDGE: 
Dale Pasell   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
filed by Tracy N. Tool and Bye, Goff, Rohde & Skow, Ltd., River 
Falls, and Mart W. Swenson and Laman & Swenson Law Office, Eau 
Claire, and oral argument by Tracy N. Tool. 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Kara M. Burgos, James S. Naugler, and Moen Sheehan 
Meyer, Ltd., La Crosse, and oral argument by James S. Naugler. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Peggy 
E. Van Horn and the Law Offices of Thomas P. Stilp, Brookfield, 
and oral argument by Peggy E. Van Horn. 
 
 
2009 WI 10
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP1886  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV760) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Brittany L. Noffke, by her guardian ad litem, 
Mart W. Swenson, Thad Noffke and Tina Kropelin, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Kevin Bakke and American Family Mutual 
Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Holmen High School, Holmen Area School District 
and Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Gundersen Lutheran Health Plan, Inc., and 
Atrium Health Plan, Inc., 
 
          Defendants. 
 
FILED 
JAN 27, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.   
 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
2 
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.  This is a review of a 
published court of appeals' decision1 that affirmed in part and 
reversed in part the decision of the La Crosse County Circuit 
Court, Dale T. Pasell, Judge.  The circuit court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants and thus granted immunity to 
both 
Kevin 
Bakke 
(hereinafter 
"Bakke") 
and 
the 
"school 
district," which includes Holmen High School, the Holmen Area 
School District, and Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company.  
When Brittany Noffke (hereinafter "Noffke") appealed, the court 
of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit 
court's decision to grant summary judgment.  The court of 
appeals concluded that while the school district was immune from 
liability, Bakke was not entitled to such immunity.  Both Bakke 
and Noffke petitioned this court for review, which we granted.  
We agree with the circuit court's decision and therefore affirm 
in part and reverse in part the court of appeals' decision. 
¶2 
This case presents the following three issues:  First, 
is Bakke immune from a negligence suit arising out of an 
incident 
that 
occurred 
while 
he 
was 
participating 
as 
a 
cheerleader at Holmen High School?  We conclude that, pursuant 
                                                 
1 Noffke v. Bakke, 2008 WI App 38, 308 Wis. 2d 410, 748 
N.W.2d 195.  
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
3 
 
to Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4m)(a) (2005-06),2 Bakke is immune from 
liability because he was participating in a recreational 
activity that includes physical contact between persons in a 
sport involving amateur teams.  Second, did the circuit court 
err when it concluded as a matter of law that Bakke was not 
reckless?  We conclude that the circuit court did not err when 
it concluded as a matter of law that Bakke was not reckless.  
Third, we must determine whether Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) provides 
the school district with immunity for the alleged negligent acts 
of the cheerleading coach.  We conclude that the school district 
is immune because no ministerial duty was violated by the 
cheerleading coach and there was no known and compelling danger 
that gave rise to a ministerial duty. 
I. FACTS 
¶3 
The facts are not disputed by either party.  Noffke 
was a varsity basketball cheerleader.  On December 17, 2004, in 
the 
"Commons" 
of 
Holmen 
High 
School, 
Noffke 
fell 
while 
practicing a cheerleading stunt before a basketball game.  The 
stunt was performed without any mats.  Tragically, Noffke fell 
backward, her head struck the tile floor, and she was injured.   
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated.  The text of 
both Wis. Stat. §§ 895.525(4m)(a) and 893.80(4) can be found in 
¶¶14 and 40, respectively. 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
4 
 
¶4 
Three cheerleaders were involved in this "post-to-
hands" stunt.  These participants had not previously performed 
this stunt together.  Noffke was the "flyer," i.e., the person 
who stands on the shoulders of the "base."  The base is not 
involved in this litigation.  Bakke was the "post."  
¶5 
By way of background, the post helps the flyer get 
into position on the base and initially supports most of the 
flyer's weight until her feet are secured on the base's 
shoulders.  The post may also serve as the spotter after the 
flyer is on the base.  Once Noffke was on the base and Bakke let 
go of her, Bakke was to go behind the base, but in this case, 
Bakke moved to the front.  As a result, when Noffke fell 
backward, no one was there to prevent her injury.  In addition, 
her cheerleading coach, a Holmen Middle School teacher, was 
approximately ten feet away supervising another group of 
cheerleaders and thus was unable to prevent Noffke's fall.   
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
Noffke brought suit against Bakke for negligently 
failing to properly spot Noffke, and she also sued the school 
district alleging that the school's cheerleading coach was 
negligent by failing to provide a second spotter and failing to 
require the use of mats. 
¶7 
Bakke moved for summary judgment asserting that he was 
immune from liability by virtue of Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4m)(a).  
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
5 
 
The school district moved for summary judgment asserting that it 
was immune from liability by virtue of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Bakke and 
the school district, and thus, both were provided immunity. 
¶8 
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in 
part the circuit court's decision.  It concluded that Bakke was 
not entitled to immunity because cheerleading does not involve 
the type of physical contact that the legislature sought to 
immunize from negligence lawsuits.  The court of appeals, 
however, affirmed the circuit court's decision to grant the 
school district immunity. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
Whether the circuit court properly granted summary 
judgment is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. 
Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 
816 (1987).  This court applies the same standards as the 
circuit 
court. 
Verdoljak 
v. 
Mosinee 
Paper 
Corp., 
200 
Wis. 2d 624, 
630, 
547 
N.W.2d 
602 
(1996). 
 
Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law that this court reviews 
de novo while benefiting from the lower courts' analyses.  Megal 
Dev. Corp. v. Shadof, 2005 WI 151, ¶8, 286 Wis. 2d 105, 705 
N.W.2d 645. 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
6 
 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶10 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 895.525(4m)(a) and 893.80(4).  "[T]he purpose of statutory 
interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it 
may be given its full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. This court begins statutory 
interpretation with the language of a statute.  Id., ¶45.  If 
the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry and give the language its "common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id.  A dictionary may be utilized to 
guide the common, ordinary meaning of words.  Id., ¶53; State v. 
Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499-500, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998).   
¶11 The context and structure of a statute are also 
important to the meaning of a statute.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46.  "Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in the 
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results."  Id.  The "[s]tatutory language is read 
where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in order 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
7 
 
to avoid surplusage."  Id.  "A statute's purpose or scope may be 
readily apparent from its plain language or its relationship to 
surrounding or closely-related statutes——that is, from its 
context or the structure of the statute as a coherent whole."  
Id., ¶49. 
¶12 "'If this process of analysis yields a plain, clear 
statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute 
is applied according to this ascertainment of its meaning.'"  
Id., 
¶46 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
If 
statutory 
language 
is 
unambiguous, we do not need to consult extrinsic sources of 
interpretation.  Id.  "'Statutory interpretation involves the 
ascertainment of meaning, not a search for ambiguity.'"  Id., 
¶47 (citation omitted).  "[A] statute is ambiguous if it is 
capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons 
in two or more senses."  Id.  The test for ambiguity keeps the 
focus on the text of the statute, and as a result, a 
disagreement about the statutory meaning is not enough to render 
a statute ambiguous.  Id.  The test inquires whether "'well-
informed persons should have become confused,'" i.e., does the 
language reasonably give rise to different meanings.  Id. 
(citation omitted).  
A. Bakke's immunity from negligence  
¶13 Whether Bakke is immune from liability in the case at 
hand involves the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4m)(a) 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
8 
 
as 
that 
statute 
relates 
to 
the 
allegations 
of 
Bakke's 
negligence.  We first address the language of the statute in 
order to determine if Bakke is qualified to receive immunity 
from a negligence suit arising out of an incident that occurred 
while he was participating as a cheerleader at Holmen High 
School.  Noffke argues that Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4m)(a) provides 
immunity only to those persons who are competing in a contact 
sport.  As a result, she asserts that cheerleading is neither 
competitive nor a contact sport, and thus, Noffke argues that 
Bakke is not entitled to immunity.  Bakke argues that the plain 
language of the statute renders him immune from negligence 
because cheerleading involves physical contact between persons.  
We agree with Bakke and conclude that pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.525(4m)(a), Bakke is immune from liability because of the 
statute's plain language.  Bakke was participating in a 
"recreational activity" that includes "physical contact between 
persons in a sport involving amateur teams[.]" 
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.525(4m)(a) provides immunity 
from negligence actions for participants in a recreational 
activity that involves physical contact between persons in a 
sport involving amateur teams.  Subsection (4m)(a), Liability of 
Contact Sports Participants, provides: 
A participant in a recreational activity that 
includes physical contact between persons in a sport 
involving 
amateur 
teams, 
including 
teams 
in 
recreational, 
municipal, 
high 
school 
and 
college 
leagues, may be liable for an injury inflicted on 
another participant during and as part of that sport 
in a tort action only if the participant who caused 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
9 
 
the injury acted recklessly or with intent to cause 
injury. 
¶15 For those recreational activities that do not involve 
physical contact, no immunity from negligence actions exists 
under the statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4).  A recreational 
activity is defined as: 
In this section, "recreational activity" means any 
activity undertaken for the purpose of exercise, 
relaxation 
or 
pleasure, 
including 
practice 
or 
instruction 
in 
any 
such 
activity. 
"Recreational 
activity" 
includes 
hunting, 
fishing, 
trapping, 
camping, bowling, billiards, picnicking, exploring 
caves, nature study, dancing, bicycling, horseback 
riding, 
horseshoe-pitching, 
bird-watching, 
motorcycling, 
operating 
an 
all-terrain 
vehicle, 
ballooning, curling, throwing darts, hang gliding, 
hiking, 
tobogganing, 
sledding, 
sleigh 
riding, 
snowmobiling, skiing, skating, participation in water 
sports, weight and fitness training, sight-seeing, 
rock-climbing, cutting or removing wood, climbing 
observation towers, animal training, harvesting the 
products of nature, sport shooting and any other 
sport, game or educational activity. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.525(2).  
¶16 Therefore, to obtain the benefit of immunity, a 
defendant must be (1) participating in a recreational activity; 
(2) that recreational activity must include physical contact 
between persons; (3) the persons must be participating in a 
sport; and (4) the sport must involve amateur teams.  In this 
case, there is no dispute that cheerleading is a recreational 
activity.  Noffke asserts that "Bakke's reliance on this statute 
is misplaced because he and Noffke were not engaged in a contact 
sport involving competitive teams." (Emphasis added.)  We 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
10 
 
address Noffke's two arguments regarding contact sports and 
competition in ¶¶24-34.   
¶17 However, we note here that cheerleading, as discussed 
in ¶32, is a sport because a sport is "[a]n activity involving 
physical exertion and skill that is governed by a set of rules 
or customs;"3 and cheerleaders are on amateur teams because a 
team is "[a] group organized to work together"4 and cheerleaders, 
as provided in the spirit rules, are a group dedicated to 
leading fan participation and taking part in competitions.   
¶18 Accordingly, the central question to be answered in 
this case is whether cheerleading involves "physical contact 
between persons."  While it is undeniable that cheerleaders 
touch one another, i.e., they have physical contact with one 
another during the course of their activity, we utilize a 
dictionary to guide our interpretation and ensure that we have 
accurately defined the common, ordinary phrase at issue: 
"physical contact."  See Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 
47, 61, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995) (stating that this court may 
consult a dictionary for the common meaning of a word).  
Reliance on a dictionary, however, does not render a word or 
phrase ambiguous.  Sample, 215 Wis. 2d at 499-500. 
                                                 
3 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
1742 (3d ed. 1992).  While this definition states that a sport 
is "often undertaken competitively," the definition does not 
require competition. 
4 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
1842 (3d ed. 1992).   
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
11 
 
¶19 The American Heritage Dictionary is frequently relied 
upon by courts.  Id. at 500.  It defines "contact" as follows: 
"1.a. A coming together or touching, as of objects or surfaces. 
b. 
The state 
or 
condition of touching or of immediate 
proximity[.]"  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 406 (3d ed. 1992).  The same dictionary defines 
"physical" as follows: "1.a. Of or relating to the body as 
distinguished from the mind or spirit . . . b. Involving or 
characterized by vigorous bodily activity: a physical dance 
performance."  Id. at 1366 (italics omitted).   
¶20 As evident from the record, cheerleading involves a 
significant amount of physical contact between the cheerleaders 
that at times results in a forceful interaction between the 
participants.  The record contains the 2004-05 spirit rules of 
the National Federation of State High School Associations.  
Pages 37 through 62 contain pictures illustrating the spirit 
rules that govern the various stunts.  Every picture but one 
shows at least two cheerleaders in contact with one another.   
¶21 The text of the spirit rules also supports the 
determination that cheerleading involves a significant amount of 
contact between cheerleaders.  For example, rule one, section 
seven of the definition section describes a "pendulum."  A 
pendulum is "[a] stunt in which the top person in a straight 
body position falls forward and/or backward away from the 
base(s) to a horizontal position to catchers while maintaining 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
12 
 
constant hands-to-feet/legs contact with the base(s)."5  In the 
"General Risk Management" section of the spirit rules, rule two, 
section six, article seven provides that "[d]ismounts from 
multi-base stunts to a cradle must be cradled by at least two 
catchers and an additional head and shoulders catcher/spotter."6 
¶22 In addition to the physical contact discussed above, 
some of the stunts performed by the cheerleaders produce a 
forceful interaction between the participants.  For example, 
rule two, section 2.12.3, "Tosses," provides four situations 
where one cheerleader is tossed up into the air and then caught 
by 
those 
same 
cheerleaders 
who 
originally 
tossed 
the 
cheerleader.  An illustration of another toss, the "Basket Toss 
to Original Bases With Spotter" is provided on page 57.  This 
illustration reveals that multiple cheerleaders toss another 
cheerleader high up into the air——at least a full body length 
above the catchers' heads——and then catch the cheerleader on the 
way down. 
¶23 Accordingly, 
cheerleading 
involves 
a 
significant 
amount of contact among the participants that at times can 
                                                 
5 Physical contact between cheerleaders is also evident from 
other parts of the definition section: section three entitled 
"Dismounts," section five entitled "Extended Stunts," section 
nine 
entitled 
"Pyramid 
(Mount)," 
section 
eleven 
entitled 
"Suspended Stunts," and section twelve entitled "Pop-Sweep-
Toss." 
6 Physical contact between cheerleaders is also evident from 
other parts of the "General Risk Management" section: section 
eight entitled "Pendulums/Flatbacks," section nine entitled 
"Pyramids/Mounts," section eleven entitled "Suspended Splits," 
and section twelve entitled "Tosses." 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
13 
 
produce a forceful interaction between the cheerleaders when one 
person is tossed high into the air and then caught by those same 
tossers.  As a result, we conclude that cheerleaders are immune 
from 
negligence 
actions 
because 
they 
participate 
in 
a 
recreational activity that includes physical contact between 
persons in a sport involving amateur teams. 
1. Noffke's argument regarding physical contact 
¶24 Noffke argues that cheerleading does not give rise to 
the type of physical contact contemplated by the legislature.  
Specifically, Noffke asserts that the type of physical contact 
contemplated by the legislature must be more than the incidental 
contact that takes place in cheerleading.  Noffke relies on the 
title of subsection (4m) for her argument, which provides: 
"Liability of contact sports participants."  The court of 
appeals accepted Noffke's argument and further relied on the 
dictionary definition of "contact sport."  It determined that 
"'contact sport' is normally used to describe sports in which 
opposing players make aggressive and sometimes injury causing 
contact, such as football and hockey."  Noffke v. Bakke, 2008 WI 
App 38, ¶16, 308 Wis. 2d 410, 748 N.W.2d 195 (relying on 
Webster's New College Dictionary for a definition of "contact 
sport").  However, interpreting the statute in this manner is 
not persuasive for three reasons. 
¶25 First, reliance on the title for this interpretation 
is 
problematic. 
 
The 
"titles 
to 
subchapters, 
sections, 
subsections, paragraphs and subdivisions of the statutes and 
history notes are not part of the statutes."  Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
14 
 
§ 990.001(6).  In addition, a title may not be used to alter the 
meaning of a statute or create an ambiguity where no ambiguity 
existed.  Estate of Reichenberger v. Binder, 272 Wis. 176, 179, 
74 N.W.2d 740 (1956).  Therefore, reliance on the title is not 
persuasive. 
¶26 Furthermore, even if we looked to the title, it does 
not provide clear guidance.  The dictionary uses football, 
hockey, and boxing as examples of contact sports.  See The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 406 (3d ed. 
1992).  However, subsection (4m)——as both parties and the court 
of appeals have asserted——was passed in response to Lestina v. 
West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 176 Wis. 2d 901, 501 N.W.2d 28 
(1993).  In Lestina, this court concluded that negligence was 
the appropriate standard of care to govern the conduct of soccer 
match participants.  Id. at 903.  We doubt the legislature 
passed a statute in the wake of Lestina and then only protected 
aggressive contact sports such as football, hockey, or boxing.  
Relying on the title in this case requires this court to make a 
policy decision that is more appropriately performed by the 
legislature.  Instead, we conclude that the plain language of 
the statute provides the answer.  We give due respect to the 
legislature's decision to provide immunity to persons who 
participate in recreational activities that include physical 
contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams. 
¶27 Second, the language of the statute does not restrict 
its application to only "aggressive" sports such as football 
hockey, or boxing.  Rather, the statute encompasses any 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
15 
 
recreational activity that includes physical contact between 
persons in a sport involving amateur teams.  If the legislature 
intended such a narrow construction, the legislature could have 
clearly placed such a restriction in the text of the statute.7   
¶28 Third, Noffke's interpretation——that the statute does 
not apply to "incidental" contact but only to aggressive, 
competitive contact——would be difficult to apply and creates 
uncertainty.  How much aggressive competitive contact is 
required for a sport to fall within that interpretation?  The 
purpose behind Wis. Stat. § 895.525, is to decrease uncertainty. 
(1) Legislative purpose. The legislature intends 
by this section to establish the responsibilities of 
participants in recreational activities in order to 
decrease 
uncertainty 
regarding 
the 
legal 
responsibility for deaths or injuries that result from 
participation in recreational activities and thereby 
to help assure the continued availability in this 
state 
of 
enterprises 
that 
offer 
recreational 
activities to the public. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.525(1). 
                                                 
7 See 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland 
Statutes and Statutory Construction (7th ed. 2007) (§ 46:3, 
"'Expressed' intent," stating "[w]hat a legislature says in the 
text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the 
legislative intent or will"; § 46:6, "Each word given effect," 
stating "it is also the case that every word excluded from a 
statute must be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose"; 
§ 47:23, "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius," stating "where 
a form of conduct, . . . there is an inference that all 
omissions 
should 
be 
understood 
as 
exclusions"; 
§ 47:38, 
"Insertion of words," stating "[i]n construing a statute, it is 
always safer not to add to or subtract from the language of a 
statute unless imperatively required to make it a rational 
statute"). 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
16 
 
¶29  Unlike Noffke's requirement that a sport must involve 
a requisite amount of aggressiveness in order to qualify for 
immunity, the plain meaning of the words chosen by the 
legislature lends certainty regarding the legal responsibilities 
and liabilities of those who participate in recreational 
activities. 
2. Noffke's argument that competition is required 
¶30 Noffke argues that subsection (4m)(a) applies only to 
competitive team sports.  In support of this argument, Noffke 
relies on the portion of subsection (4m)(a) that states, 
"recreational activity that includes physical contact between 
persons in a sport involving amateur teams."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.525(4m)(a) (emphasis added).  To not require competition, 
Noffke argues, would render this portion of the statute 
superfluous.   
¶31 We 
disagree 
with 
Noffke's 
assertions 
for 
three 
reasons.  First, no competition requirement exists in the 
statute.  If the legislature sought to require competition, it 
could have used the word "competition."  To assert that such a 
requirement exists because the word "teams" is plural, elevates 
one letter in the statute to an absurd importance that would 
change the entire scope and application of the statute, which 
seems unlikely because the legislature could have easily used 
the word "competition" to clearly articulate such a requirement.8  
                                                 
8 In any event, cheerleaders often engage in competition 
with the opponent's cheerleaders not only during a game but also 
during organized competitions. 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
17 
 
While the legislature's use of a plural form is generally 
significant, in this case we decline to conclude that the use of 
the plural form dictates that the statute requires competition 
between two teams. 
¶32 Second, no surplusage exists because the words of the 
statute are not ignored by our interpretation.  Physical contact 
between persons takes place in cheerleading.  Cheerleading is a 
sport because a sport is "[a]n activity involving physical 
exertion and skill that is governed by a set of rules or 
customs,"9 
and 
construing 
the 
word 
"sport" 
to 
exclude 
cheerleading in this case is inconsistent with the purpose of 
the statute, which is discussed in ¶28.10  Cheerleaders are on 
amateur teams because a team is "[a] group organized to work 
together"11 and cheerleaders, as provided in the spirit rules, 
are a group dedicated to leading fan participation and taking 
part in competitions. 
                                                 
9 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
1742 (3d ed. 1992).   
10 While the question of whether cheerleading is a sport has 
apparently "been a matter of public debate," the parties in this 
case focus their arguments on whether cheerleading entails the 
type of physical contact contemplated by the statute and whether 
the statute requires competition.  If the central issue was that 
cheerleading is not a sport, there would be no need to devote so 
much time to "contact."  Because of the parties' focus and 
because construing sport to exclude cheerleading would defeat 
the purpose of the statute, as shown by its plain language, we 
conclude 
that 
cheerleading 
is 
a 
sport 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.525(4m)(a).      
11 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
1842 (3d ed. 1992).   
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
18 
 
¶33 Third, 
inserting 
a 
competition 
requirement 
would 
produce inconsistent results.  For example, assuming that 
immunity is not afforded because cheerleaders do not compete 
when cheering at a basketball game, would they then receive 
immunity, perhaps the very next day, when competing against 
other teams at a cheerleading competition?  Similarly, under 
Noffke's analysis, when a hockey or football team practices but 
is not in competition with another team there is no immunity, 
but when that team plays a game the players receive immunity.  
Perhaps 
such 
inconsistent 
applications 
could 
be 
why 
the 
legislature specifically chose not to insert a competition 
requirement into this statute. 
¶34 Accordingly, we conclude that cheerleaders are immune 
from 
negligence 
actions 
because 
they 
participate 
in 
a 
recreational activity that includes physical contact between 
persons in a sport involving amateur teams.  However, we 
encourage the legislature to once again review this important 
statute and consider our interpretation and application to the 
facts of this case and how the statute may apply to such school 
team sports as golf, swimming, or tennis.   
B. Recklessness 
¶35 The second issue we must address regarding Bakke's 
liability is whether the circuit court erred when it concluded 
as a matter of law that Bakke was not reckless.  If he was 
reckless, Bakke is not entitled to immunity under the terms of 
the statute.  Noffke argues that recklessness is a question of 
fact the jury must resolve, and she argues that in this case 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
19 
 
Bakke knew he was a spotter responsible for Noffke's safety, 
Bakke heard others yelling at him to get behind Noffke, and he 
failed to take the appropriate position.  Bakke, on the other 
hand, argues that his conduct, which consisted of "mere 
inadvertence, 
lack 
of 
skillfulness 
or 
failure 
to 
take 
precautions," 
does 
not 
rise 
to 
the 
increased 
level 
of 
recklessness.  We agree with the circuit court and conclude that 
the record does not support a claim that Bakke was reckless. 
¶36 "Recklessness 'contemplates a conscious disregard of 
an unreasonable and substantial risk of serious bodily harm to 
another.'"  Werdehoff v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 229 Wis. 2d 489, 
507, 600 N.W.2d 214 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Kellar v. Lloyd, 180 
Wis. 2d 162, 184, 509 N.W.2d 87 (Ct. App. 1993)).  The jury 
instruction committee provides: 
A participant acts recklessly if (his) (her) 
conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of 
another.  It occurs where a participant engages in 
conduct under circumstances in which (he) (she) knows 
or a reasonable person under the same circumstances 
would know that the conduct creates a high risk of 
physical harm to another and (he) (she) proceeds in 
conscious disregard of or indifference to that risk. 
Conduct which creates a high risk of physical harm to 
another 
is 
substantially 
greater 
than 
negligent 
conduct.  Mere inadvertence or lack of skill is not 
reckless conduct. 
Wis JI——Civil 2020. 
¶37 The circuit court concluded that a finder of fact 
could not find any evidentiary support "that reflected anything 
beyond a lack of skill, inadvertence or simple negligence, that 
this was not a conscious disregard for the safety of the 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
20 
 
plaintiff."  We agree with the circuit court's conclusion.  
Bakke went in front of the base instead of to the back, and when 
people yelled at him to get to the back he froze and did not 
move fast enough.  The record is simply devoid of anything that 
would indicate that Bakke consciously disregarded the risk of 
serious bodily harm to Noffke.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
circuit court did not err when it concluded as a matter of law 
that Bakke was not reckless. 
C. Immunity of the school district 
¶38 Next, we must determine whether Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
provides the school district with immunity for the alleged 
negligent acts of the cheerleading coach.  Noffke asserts that 
the cheerleading coach's cloak of immunity is removed by either 
of the following exceptions: (1) she violated a ministerial duty 
imposed by law; and (2) cheerleading involves a known and 
compelling danger that gives rise to a ministerial duty.   
¶39 Noffke argues that the cheerleading coach violated a 
ministerial duty because the coach, as Noffke asserts, did not 
provide a spotter and mats as required by the spirit rules.  In 
addition, Noffke argues that even if the coach did not violate a 
ministerial duty imposed by the spirit rules, the coach violated 
a ministerial duty that arose out of the known and compelling 
danger of allowing cheerleaders to perform a stunt for the first 
time without safety precautions.  The school district, on the 
other hand, argues that no ministerial duty was violated because 
the school board did not officially adopt the spirit rules, the 
spirit rules were not violated, and no known and compelling 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
21 
 
danger existed.  We conclude that the school district is immune 
because no ministerial duty imposed by law was violated and 
there was no known and compelling danger that gave rise to a 
ministerial duty. 
¶40 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(4) provides: 
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
¶41 This statute provides broad immunity from suit to 
municipalities and their officers and employees.  Lodl v. 
Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶20, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 
N.W.2d 314.  It immunizes against liability for "legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial, and quasi-judicial acts, which have 
been collectively interpreted to include any act that involves 
the exercise of discretion and judgment."  Id., ¶21. 
¶42 However, no immunity against liability exists for 
those acts associated with: (1) the performance of ministerial 
duties imposed by law; (2) known and compelling dangers that 
give rise to ministerial duties on the part of public officers 
or employees; (3) acts involving medical discretion; and (4) 
acts that are malicious, willful, and intentional.  Id., ¶24.  
Noffke argues that the first two exceptions apply to the case at 
hand. 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
22 
 
 
1. Ministerial duty imposed by law 
¶43 The first exception arises out of a recognition that 
discretionary acts are immune whereas ministerial acts are not 
protected by immunity.  Id., ¶25.  "A ministerial duty is one 
that 'is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the 
performance of a specific task when the law imposes, prescribes 
and defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with 
such 
certainty 
that 
nothing 
remains 
for 
judgment 
or 
discretion.'"  Id., ¶25 (citing Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 
Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976)).   
¶44 For example, in Lodl, the plaintiff asserted that the 
police officer had a ministerial duty to manually control 
traffic at an intersection where traffic lights were no longer 
working.  Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶¶6-8, 27.  This court 
concluded 
that 
the 
applicable 
statute 
and 
the 
police 
department's policy did not confer a ministerial duty on the 
police officer to manually direct traffic.  Id., ¶¶27-28.  The 
statute at issue did not direct the officer to perform manual 
traffic control in any specific situation, and the policy only 
described manual traffic control procedures if the officer 
decided to manually control traffic.  Id.  Neither the statute 
nor the policy eliminated the officer's discretion as to when or 
where to undertake manual traffic control.  Id., ¶¶28-31. 
¶45 In the case at hand, the spirit rules do not eliminate 
the cheerleading coach's discretion.  Moreover, the school 
district 
did 
not 
officially 
adopt 
the 
spirit 
rules.  
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
23 
 
Nonetheless, Noffke asserts that the spirit rules required the 
cheerleading coach in this case to provide a spotter and mats.  
We disagree with Noffke's interpretation.  The spirit rules 
leave a coach's discretion intact; they do not impose the type 
of ministerial duty that Noffke asserts because the spirit rules 
lack the absolute, certain, and imperative direction that 
prescribes and defines the time, mode, and occasion for the 
action's performance with such certainty that nothing remains 
for judgment or discretion. 
¶46 First, the portion of the spirit rules that governs 
"Coaches' Responsibilities" specifically states: "The following 
guidelines have been developed and reviewed to serve as a useful 
reminder of basic procedures for coaching spirit squads."  
(Emphasis added.)  In addition, the relevant portions of the 
"Coaches' Responsibilities" do not confer a ministerial duty 
upon the coach.  Each relevant portion gives the coach 
discretion.  
For 
example, the "Coaches' Responsibilities" 
provides, "[a]ll spirit activities should be held in a location 
suitable for spirit activities with the use of mats, free of 
obstructions, and away from excessive noise or distractions."  
In addition, the "Coaches' Responsibilities" also provides that 
"[p]roper progression, spotting techniques and matting should be 
used until stunts are mastered."  Neither of these rules confers 
an "absolute, certain and imperative" duty upon the coach.  
Rather, the tone is suggestive, which is evident from the use of 
language such as "should be" rather than the mandatory word 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
24 
 
"shall."  Moreover, each rule gives the coach discretion as to 
when and where spotting or matting would be appropriate. 
¶47 Second, the "General Risk Management" section also 
fails to confer an "absolute, certain and imperative" duty.  
Section four, article one of the spirit rules states that 
"[s]potters are required until a stunt (mount, pyramid, toss, 
tumbling skill) is mastered," but article six states that "[a] 
spotter is required for stunts in which the supporting arm(s) of 
the base(s) is fully extended above the head . . . ."  In this 
case, the post-to-hands stunt does not even require a spotter 
because the base's hands are not fully extended above the head.  
In addition, while the cheerleaders in this case had not 
performed this stunt together, the record reflects that they had 
performed more difficult stunts, Noffke thought it was a "medium 
easy" stunt, both Noffke and Bakke thought they could do the 
stunt, Bakke was a trained spotter, and the coach knew that "the 
level of difficulty they were used to was much higher."  
Therefore, the rules do not clearly mandate that a spotter was 
necessary, and thus, no ministerial duty imposed by law exists. 
¶48 However, even if the spirit rules were interpreted as 
mandating a spotter in this case, the cheerleading coach did 
provide a spotter——Bakke.  The spirit rules define a spotter as 
"a person who is in direct contact with the performing surface 
and may help control the building of, or dismounting from, a 
stunt.  This person(s) shall not provide the primary support, 
meaning the stunt or pyramid would remain stable without the 
spotter(s)."  In this case, Bakke was on the ground, he assisted 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
25 
 
in the building of the post-to-hands, and the stunt could remain 
stable without Bakke.  Bakke was not the base, but rather, he 
served as the spotter to the stunt even though that stunt did 
not require a spotter.   
¶49 Noffke argues that the rules impose a ministerial duty 
upon the coach to make sure the spotter is in the right position 
in order to be considered a spotter.  However, we do not 
interpret this provision as conferring an "absolute, certain and 
imperative" duty on the coach.  While it is true that Bakke 
should have been standing in the back instead of the front, he 
was there as a spotter.  Only two persons are required for this 
stunt, but the coach, as a safety precaution, required an extra 
person to be present and serve as an extra spotter. 
¶50 Noffke 
also 
argues 
that 
the 
cheerleading 
coach 
violated a ministerial duty by failing to provide matting as 
required by the rules.  We, however, disagree because any 
matting provision in the rule gives the cheerleading coach 
discretion and thus does not confer a ministerial duty.  The 
comment to rule two, situation ruling 2.1.4, situation B, 
provides 
that 
"[s]tunting 
should 
be 
performed 
only 
on 
appropriate 
surfaces 
where 
there 
is 
adequate 
space 
and 
lighting."  As stated above, the "Coaches' Responsibilities" 
provides, "[a]ll spirit activities should be held in a location 
suitable for spirit activities with the use of mats, free of 
obstructions, and away from excessive noise or distractions."  
We do not interpret these provisions to prescribe and define the 
time, mode, and occasion for matting with such certainty that 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
26 
 
nothing remains for judgment or discretion.  In fact, these 
stunts would ultimately be performed without mats during a 
basketball game. 
¶51 Accordingly, we conclude that the spirit rules provide 
the cheerleading coach with a significant amount of discretion.  
The spirit rules provide discretion rather than conferring any 
absolute, certain, imperative, and therefore ministerial duty. 
2. Ministerial duty arising out of a known and compelling 
danger  
¶52 Noffke also argues that cheerleading, under the facts 
of this case, is a known and compelling danger that gives rise 
to a ministerial duty.  This exception to immunity arises out of 
the theory that a known and compelling danger may be so 
dangerous that a public officer has a duty to act.  Lodl, 253 
Wis. 2d 323, ¶¶33-34; Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 
Wis. 2d 81, 95-96, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999). 
[A] public officer's duty is ministerial where a 
danger is known and of such quality that the public 
officer's duty to act becomes absolute, certain and 
imperative . . . .  Stated otherwise, where a public 
officer's duty is not generally prescribed and defined 
by law in time, mode, and occasion, such that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion, circumstances may 
give rise to such a certain duty where . . . the 
nature of the danger is compelling and known to the 
officer and is of such force that the public officer 
has no discretion not to act. . . . 
Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶34 (quotations and citations omitted). 
¶53 This exception arose out of Cords v. Anderson, 80 
Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977).  In Cords, the plaintiffs 
fell into a steep, 90–feet-deep gorge while walking on a state 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
27 
 
park trail, which did not have any warning signs.  Id. at 534-
35, 541-42.  The plaintiffs sued the park manager for failing to 
post warning signs even though he knew of the hazard.  This 
court concluded that the known and compelling danger gave rise 
to a ministerial duty requiring the manager to post warning 
signs or advise his superiors of the hazardous condition.  Id. 
at 541-42.  A ministerial duty arose because the danger was so 
clear and so absolute.  Id. at 542. 
¶54 The court of appeals most recently applied the known 
and compelling danger exception in Voss v. Elkhorn Area School 
District, 2006 WI App 234, 297 Wis. 2d 389, 724 N.W.2d 420.  In 
Voss, students were learning about the effects of alcohol by 
wearing "fatal vision goggles."  Id., ¶2.  When the goggles are 
worn, the situation is meant to replicate a .10 blood alcohol 
concentration.  Id.  While wearing the goggles, the teacher had 
students perform exercises such as walking in a straight line, 
shooting a ball at a garbage can, and standing on one leg.  Id., 
¶3.  While participating in these exercises some of the students 
lost their balance, slipped or stumbled.  Id.  In addition to 
the above exercises, the teacher also arranged the classroom 
desks into three rows and instructed students to walk in between 
the rows and recover a tennis ball thrown by the teacher.  Id., 
¶4.  During this particular exercise, some of the students 
collided and slid on the floor.  Id., ¶6.  Even after these 
initial problems, the exercise continued and one of the students 
tripped and hit her mouth on a desktop.  Id.  As a result of her 
injuries, the student lost one tooth, fractured others, and 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
28 
 
ultimately had to have multiple root canals and crown work done 
on her teeth.  Id., ¶¶7-9. 
¶55 The court of appeals concluded that the known and 
compelling danger exception applied and thus precluded immunity.  
Id., ¶20.  The court of appeals reasoned that despite the 
obvious hazards and knowledge of previous students falling, the 
teacher continued the exercise and took no precautions to 
minimize or prevent injury.  Id., ¶19.  Additionally, the court 
of appeals reasoned that in Voss, the teacher had only one 
reasonable choice to prevent or minimize danger, which was to 
stop the activity.  Id., ¶20.  The court of appeals contrasted 
the teacher's choice with the scenario that the police officer 
faced in Lodl.  Recall that in Lodl, the police officer was 
called out to an intersection where traffic lights were no 
longer working.  Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶¶6-8.  This court 
concluded 
that 
"[w]hile 
the 
circumstances 
posed 
by 
the 
uncontrolled intersection were certainly known and dangerous, 
the situation nonetheless allowed for the exercise of the 
officer's discretion as to the mode of response."  Id., ¶46.  As 
a result, the police officer did not have a ministerial duty to 
perform manual traffic control.  Id.  Rather, he could have 
chosen to control traffic with portable signs, flares, or 
flashing squad lights.  Id., ¶47.   
¶56 In the case at hand, the danger does not give rise to 
a ministerial duty because there is no known and compelling 
danger of such force that the time, mode, and occasion for 
performance is evident with such certainty that nothing remains 
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
29 
 
for the exercise of discretion.  Noffke and Bakke were 
performing a stunt that was less difficult than what they had 
performed in the past.  Bakke was a trained spotter.  Noffke and 
Bakke thought they could safely perform the stunt.  Unlike in 
Cords where the situation was so compellingly dangerous and 
known that the park manager had no choice but to put up a sign 
or warn his superiors, the danger in the case at hand was not so 
compellingly dangerous as to remove all discretion.  Moreover, 
unlike in Voss where only one action could have been taken, the 
cheerleading coach in this case had a wide range of acts that 
could have been used to prevent injury.  In fact, the coach did 
exercise her discretion and provided a spotter in order to help 
prevent injury. 
¶57 Again, Noffke argues that the coach did not act 
appropriately because she did not provide mats even though Bakke 
and Noffke had never before performed the stunt together.  This 
assertion, however, sets forth a negligence argument rather than 
an argument that the danger gave rise to a ministerial duty.  
The immunity defense assumes negligence.  Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 
¶17.  While arguably mats should be provided when cheerleaders 
are attempting any stunt for the first time, this is not 
relevant to our known and compelling danger analysis.  As 
discussed before, mats were not a requirement.  Here, the danger 
was not so known and compelling that the coach had no choice and 
no discretion but to provide mats for the cheerleaders.  
No. 
2006AP1886   
 
30 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶58 Accordingly, we conclude that (1) pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 895.525(4m)(a), Bakke is immune from liability because 
he was participating in a recreational activity that includes 
physical contact between persons in a sport involving amateur 
teams; (2) the circuit court did not err when it concluded as a 
matter of law that Bakke was not reckless; and (3) the school 
district is immune because no ministerial duty was violated by 
the cheerleading coach and there was no known and compelling 
danger that gave rise to a ministerial duty. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
No.  2006AP1886.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶59 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I concur 
in the court's mandate but write separately to set forth a 
different analysis of the question whether cheerleading is a 
"sport involving amateur teams" for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.525(4m)(a). 
¶60 The majority opinion resolves this vexing issue of 
statutory interpretation in one short paragraph, relying on 
dictionary definitions of the key statutory words "sport" and 
"teams."1  Dictionaries may aid the court in determining the 
meaning of statutory words.  But they do not in the present 
case.  Dictionaries usually furnish more than one meaning to a 
word, and a court has to be careful not to select a friendly 
definition it likes from the many offered without explaining its 
choice.  Thus resort to a dictionary can be, as Justice Scalia 
has written of the use of legislative history, "the equivalent 
of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads 
of the guests for one's friends."2  
¶61 The dictionary definitions of "sport" and "teams" do 
not demonstrate whether cheerleading is "a sport involving 
amateur teams" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4m).  The 
dictionaries suggest that the words "sport" and "team" each 
connote an element of competition that may or may not be present 
in cheerleading.  "Sport" is defined as "[a]n activity involving 
physical exertion and skill that is governed by a set of rules 
                                                 
1 See majority op., ¶17.   
2 Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
No.  2006AP1886.ssa 
 
2 
 
or customs and often undertaken competitively"3 or as "a game or 
contest esp. when involving individual skill or physical prowess 
on which money is staked."4  "Team" is defined as "[a] group on 
the same side, as in a game,"5 or as "a number of persons 
selected to contend on one side in a match (as in cricket, 
football, rowing, or a debate)."6  These definitions plainly 
suggest that team sports involve competition. 
¶62 Connoting competition, the definitions of "sport" and 
"team" yield equivocal results when applied to an activity such 
as cheerleading.  Although organized cheerleading competitions 
do exist,7 cheerleaders traditionally have not participated in 
organized competition and now do so only sometimes.  Indeed, the 
                                                 
3 American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1742 
(3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter American Heritage].   
4 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2206 (1961) 
[hereinafter Webster's]. 
5 American Heritage, supra note 3, at 1842.  American 
Heritage denotes this particular definition of "team" as 
applicable in the context of "Sports & Games."  Id.  This 
sports-specific definition of "team" is the most relevant 
definition for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4m), which 
refers specifically to sports teams and not to teams generally.     
Inexplicably, the majority opinion skips over American 
Heritage's sports-specific definition of "team" in favor of an 
alternative definition that obviously is meant to apply in 
broader contexts: "a group organized to work together: a team of 
engineers."  Id. (italics in original).  See also majority op., 
¶17 (quoting this definition in part).   
6 Webster's, supra note 4, at 2346. 
7 See World Cheerleading Association, 2007-2008 WCA National 
Champions, at http://www.cheerwca.com/2007-champions-results.htm 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2009).   
No.  2006AP1886.ssa 
 
3 
 
cheerleading squad at issue in the present case apparently did 
not participate in any organized cheerleading competitions.8  
Consequently, it is unclear whether cheerleading is "often 
undertaken competitively"9 or constitutes "a game or contest."10  
Nor is it clear whether a cheerleading squad may be considered 
"[a] group on the same side, as in a game,"11 or "a number of 
persons selected to contend on one side in a match."12   
¶63 This court ordinarily gives statutory language "its 
'common, ordinary, and accepted meaning.'"13  The dictionary 
definitions of "sport" and "team" do not demonstrate whether it 
is the common, ordinary, and accepted practice to regard 
cheerleading as a "sport involving amateur teams."  At best, the 
dictionaries demonstrate only that the statutory words "sport" 
and "team" can be used in reference to cheerleading and 
                                                 
8 See majority op., ¶3 (stating only that Noffke was a 
varsity basketball cheerleader; not mentioning any sort of 
organized cheerleading competitions).    
9 American Heritage, supra note 3, at 1742.   
10 Webster's, supra note 4, at 2206. 
11 American Heritage, supra note 3, at 1842.   
Although a cheerleading squad obviously represents "a group 
on the same side," it is uncertain whether a cheerleading squad 
is "in a game" any more than the fans are.  The squad in the 
present case cheers at high school basketball games.  It could 
reasonably be stated that these basketball games involve only 
two teams (the ones that play basketball), not four teams as the 
defendants might appear to argue. 
12 Webster's, supra note 4, at 2346. 
13 Majority op., ¶10 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.   
No.  2006AP1886.ssa 
 
4 
 
cheerleading squads, not that it is the common, ordinary, and 
accepted practice to use these words in such a manner.  As 
Justice Scalia has written, a court must not overlook "the 
distinction between how a word can be used and how it ordinarily 
is used" when interpreting statutory text.14  
¶64 It is hardly surprising that the dictionaries do not 
definitively determine whether cheerleading constitutes a "sport 
involving amateur teams."  Whether cheerleading should be 
considered a team sport has been a matter of public debate.  
Just this last September, a Washington Post article stated that 
"cheerleading is not officially considered a sport at most high 
schools and universities" and that "cheerleading in most states 
is not considered a sport; it's an 'activity' such as chess club 
and debating."15  It would be very odd if the high schools, 
universities, and states that do not consider cheerleading a 
sport could discover the error of their ways simply by 
consulting a dictionary.   
¶65 As I see this case, the statute's phrase "a sport 
involving amateur teams" must be interpreted in light of the 
legislature's 
express 
purpose 
of 
"decreas[ing] 
uncertainty 
regarding the legal responsibility for deaths or injuries that 
result from participation in recreational activities and thereby 
                                                 
14 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
15 Rooting for Safety, Washington Post, Sept. 9, 2008, at 
HE01.   
No.  2006AP1886.ssa 
 
5 
 
to help assure the continued availability in this state of 
enterprises that offer recreational activities to the public."16  
¶66 The application of Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4m) would be 
fraught with uncertainty if competition were taken to be the 
essence of a "sport involving amateur teams" under the statute.  
As the majority opinion points out,17 a cheerleading squad may 
cheer at a basketball game one day but then compete in an 
organized cheerleading contest the next.  The statute's purpose 
of decreasing uncertainty would not be furthered if the 
statutory phrase "sport involving amateur teams" imposed a 
requirement of competition on cheerleading limiting the scope of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4m). 
                                                 
16 Wis. Stat. § 895.525(1).   
See also Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State Div. of 
Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶92, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 
N.W.2d 184 
(2006) 
(construing 
the 
statute's 
terms 
to 
be 
consistent with its express purpose); State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 
80, ¶39, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203 (2004) ("We therefore 
turn to an analysis of the purpose[] . . . of the statute to 
determine the interpretation that gives the statute its intended 
effect."). 
17 Majority op., ¶33.   
No.  2006AP1886.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶67 Accordingly, because cheerleading can be construed as 
"a sport involving amateur teams" and such construction furthers 
the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 895.525, I conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.525(4m)(a) covers high school cheerleaders.  For the 
reasons set forth, I write separately.   
¶68 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2006AP1886.ssa 
 
1