Case Title: Monell v. Boston Pads, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11661

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11661  
 
 
 
 
NESTO MONELL & others1  vs.  BOSTON PADS, LLC, & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 2, 2014. - June 3, 2015. 
 
Present:  Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Independent Contractor Act.  Broker.  License.  Real Property, 
License to sell.  Labor, Wages.  Massachusetts Wage Act. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 17, 2011. 
 
 
A motion for partial summary judgment was heard by Robert 
C. Cosgrove, J., and entry of final judgment was ordered by 
Edward P. Leibensperger, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Hillary Schwab (Brant Casavant with her) for the 
plaintiffs. 
                     
 
1 Jonathan Gibson, Rachael Butcher, Benjamin Smith, Lindsey 
Burnes, and Ann McGovern.  The plaintiffs sued on behalf of 
themselves and others similarly situated. 
 
 
2 Jacob Realty, LLC; NextGen Realty, Inc.; RentMyUnit.Com, 
Inc., doing business as Boardwalk Properties; Demetrios 
Salpoglou; and Yuan Huang. 
 
2 
 
 
Stephen M. Perry (Robert S. Kutner with him) for the 
defendants. 
 
Ian O. Russell & Nicole Horberg Decter, for Massachusetts 
Employment Lawyers Association & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
Philip S. Lapatin & Nathaniel F. Hulme, for Massachusetts 
Association of Realtors & another, amici curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  We granted the plaintiffs' application for 
direct appellate review to determine whether the independent 
contractor statute, G. L. c. 149, § 148B, which makes it a 
violation of the statute to fail "to properly classify an 
individual as an employee," applies to real estate salespersons 
licensed under, and affiliated with and working for a licensed 
brokerage firm pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 87RR.  A Superior 
Court judge concluded that the independent contractor statute 
did not apply in these circumstances to the salespersons in this 
industry.  We affirm. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the material undisputed 
facts.  The defendants Jacob Realty, LLC (Jacob Realty); NextGen 
Realty, Inc. (NextGen); and RentMyUnit.Com, Inc., doing business 
as Boardwalk Properties (Boardwalk Properties) (collectively, 
business entities), are licensed Massachusetts real estate 
brokerage firms that are in the business of renting and selling 
real estate in Massachusetts.3  The defendants Demetrios 
                     
 
3 The defendants deny that defendant Boston Pads, LLC, 
operates a real estate office and that it had any real estate 
3 
 
Salpoglou and Yuan Huang are members of Jacob Realty and 
shareholders of NextGen and Boardwalk Properties, and are 
involved in the operations of these business entities.  
Salpoglou serves as the broker of record for the business 
entities. 
 
The plaintiffs Nesto Monell, Jonathan Gibson, Rachael 
Butcher, and Lindsey Burnes were licensed real estate 
salespersons who worked for Jacob Realty under its real estate 
broker's license.  The plaintiff Ann McGovern was a licensed 
real estate salesperson who worked for NextGen under its real 
estate broker's license.  The plaintiff Benjamin Smith was a 
licensed real estate salesperson who worked for Boardwalk 
Properties under its real estate broker's license. 
 
Throughout the course of their relationship, the defendant 
business entities classified the plaintiffs as independent 
contractors.4  The defendant entities required the plaintiffs to 
                                                                  
agents associated with it.  The defendants contend that Boston 
Pads, LLC, is a professional consulting services firm that does 
not trade, lease, buy, or sell real estate for commissions.  For 
the purpose of this opinion, when we refer to the defendants or 
to the business entities, such references shall not include 
Boston Pads, Inc. 
 
 
4 The defendants assert that the business entities are 
legally distinct entities and that a salesperson associated with 
one business entity was not otherwise associated with another 
business entity.  This assertion has no bearing on the issues 
before us.  Therefore, we decline to address the point. 
 
4 
 
work sixty "front desk hours" during training5 and, thereafter, 
in some cases complete monthly "office hours" duty, which 
involved answering telephone calls from, and greeting, 
prospective clients.6  The salespersons were able to select the 
"office hours" that they wished to work.  The business entities, 
however, allowed salespersons only one shift change every two 
months. 
 
At the commencement of their relationship with the business 
entities, the plaintiffs signed nondisclosure, nonsolicitation, 
and noncompete agreements7 and were required to undergo a 
training program.  The business entities encouraged the 
plaintiffs to purchase a day planner and required them to obtain 
                     
 
5 During "front desk hours," the business entities asked 
salespersons to perform "warm calling," which included speaking 
with landlords, entering information into the business entities' 
database, and arranging times to meet with landlords to obtain 
keys and visit properties. 
 
 
6 Specifically, the training guide provided that during 
office hours shifts the salespersons were to answer the 
telephone, greet clients and landlords, take out the trash, 
update facsimiles, telephone landlords, acquire new listings, 
and answer agent telephone calls.  Under the guide, salespersons 
were prohibited during this time to schedule showings of 
available apartments for rent or property for sale. 
 
 
7 Various forms used by the business entities, including an 
application for employment, an equal opportunity statement, and 
an antiharassment policy, contained language referencing the 
salesperson's "employment" with the business entities.  The 
defendants admit that the various forms were used by them at one 
time or another, but make no admissions regarding whether the 
forms were used with the named plaintiffs. 
 
5 
 
a cellular telephone with a "617" area code,8 to adhere to a 
dress code, and to submit to various disciplinary actions if 
they did not meet their productivity goals. 
 
The defendant entities compensate their salespersons 
pursuant to a commission policy.  Under the policy salespersons 
are paid on a "commission-only basis" and expressly will not be 
treated as employees "with respect to compensation for taxes or 
any other purpose."  A commission is earned on completion by the 
salesperson of a rental or sales transaction involving a 
client's real estate.  The commission due to the salesperson 
usually amounts to a percentage (typically fifty per cent) of a 
transaction's gross commission, less any applicable deductions.9  
The business entities receive the balance as their portion of 
the fee charged to the client.  Commissions are paid "only when 
a transaction is completed in its entirety" as defined by the 
policy.  Pursuant to the policy, the business entities "will 
issue [a] Form 1099-MISC" to each salesperson and each 
                     
 
8 The business entities instructed salespersons on what 
information they must enter into their cellular telephones and 
on how they were to answer their telephones. 
 
 
9 Deductions include a monthly "desk fee" of fifty dollars 
for part-time salespersons and seventy-five dollars for full-
time salespersons.  For salespersons who elect to participate in 
a "farm program," whereby a contractor would manually update a 
salesperson's real estate listings on Web sites, a deduction of 
five dollars per day also is assessed.  There is a dispute in 
the record whether the plaintiffs were compelled to elect to 
join the farm program. 
 
6 
 
salesperson "agrees to provide [the business entities] with a 
signed W-9 [form]."  Thus, the plaintiffs were responsible for 
paying their own taxes. 
 
In 2011, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the 
defendants in the Superior Court.  As relevant here, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the independent 
contractor statute by misclassifying them as independent 
contractors when they actually were employees.10  On this count 
of the complaint, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary 
judgment, which the judge denied.  The judge then granted 
partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants.11  The judge 
determined that there is a conflict between the independent 
contractor and real estate licensing statutes insofar as a real 
estate salesperson would not be able to satisfy all three 
indicia of an independent contractor relationship while 
simultaneously complying with the real estate licensing statute.  
Based on his determination that the real estate licensing 
                     
 
10 The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants failed to 
pay them wages owed under G. L. c. 149, § 148; failed to 
compensate them in accordance with minimum wage laws pursuant to 
G. L. c. 151, § 20; and failed to pay them time and one-half for 
all hours worked over forty hours per week in violation of G. L. 
c. 151, § 1A.  The judge did not rule on these claims. 
 
 
11 The plaintiffs then filed an assented-to motion to 
dismiss the remaining counts of their complaint without 
prejudice should the judge's ruling be reversed on appeal, which 
was allowed. 
 
7 
 
statute was more recently amended and is more specific than the 
independent contractor statute, the judge concluded that, 
pursuant to statutory construction principles, the independent 
contractor statute did not control, meaning that the defendants 
did not fail properly to classify the plaintiffs as employees 
and therefore could not be liable for a violation of G. L. 
c. 149, § 148B. 
 
2.  Standard of review.  Summary judgment is appropriate 
where there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
See Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 
(1991); Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 
(2002).  Moreover, "[w]e exercise de novo review over questions 
of statutory construction."  Atlanticare Med. Ctr. v. 
Commissioner of the Div. of Med. Assistance, 439 Mass. 1, 6 
(2003).  Because the issue before us is one of statutory 
construction, we begin by providing an overview of the relevant 
statutes. 
 
3.  Statutory overview.  a.  Independent contractor 
statute.  The Commonwealth's wage laws are set forth in 
provisions in G. L. c. 149 (Wage Act).  Within the Wage Act is 
the independent contractor statute.  G. L. c. 149, § 148B.  
Effective July 19, 2004, the Legislature amended § 148B by 
8 
 
striking out its language and replacing it in its entirety.  See 
St. 2004, c. 193, § 26.  The statute has not since been amended. 
 
The independent contractor statute, states, in relevant 
part: 
 
"(a) For the purpose of this chapter and chapter 151[12] 
an individual performing any service, except as authorized 
under this chapter, shall be considered to be an employee 
under those chapters unless:-- 
 
 
"(1) the individual is free from control and direction 
in connection with the performance of the service, both 
under his contract for the performance of service and in 
fact; and  
 
 
"(2) the service is performed outside the usual course 
of the business of the employer; and, 
 
 
"(3) the individual is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, profession or 
business of the same nature as that involved in the service 
performed. 
 
 
"(b) The failure to withhold federal or state income 
taxes . . . shall not be considered in making a 
determination under this section. 
 
". . .  
 
 
"(d) Whoever fails to properly classify an individual 
as an employee according to this section and in so doing 
fails to comply, in any respect, with [G. L. c. 149], or 
[G. L. c. 151, § 1, 1A, 1B, 2B, 15, or 19], or [G. L. 
c. 62B],[13] shall be punished and shall be subject to all of 
the criminal and civil remedies, including debarment [from 
public bidding], as provided in [§ 27C] of this chapter.  
                     
 
12 General Laws c. 151 is known as the minimum fair wage law 
and has provisions pertaining to the minimum fair wage as well 
as overtime pay.  G. L. c. 151, §§ 1, 1A, 1B, 22. 
 
 
13 General Laws c. 62B sets forth the Commonwealth's wage 
withholding laws. 
 
9 
 
Whoever fails to properly classify an individual as an 
employee according to this section and in so doing violates 
[G. L. c. 152][14] shall be punished as provided in [G. L. 
c. 152, § 14,] and shall be subject to all of the civil 
remedies, including debarment [from public bidding], 
provided in [§ 27C] of this chapter. . . ." 
 
G. L. c. 149, § 148B. 
 
As noted above, the independent contractor statute was 
adopted as part of St. 2004, c. 193, which is entitled, "An Act 
further regulating public construction in the Commonwealth."  
The act's emergency preamble states the purpose of the act is 
"to regulate further public construction in the commonwealth."  
Id.  Although the statute was part of legislation making changes 
to the public construction industry, the Legislature kept it in 
c. 149, thus leaving it applicable to a wide range of 
industries.  See Lipsitt v. Plaud, 466 Mass. 240, 245 (2013) 
(since enactment of Wage Act in 1886, Legislature has broadened 
scope of employees covered).15 
 
We have stated that the purpose of the independent 
contractor statute is "to protect workers by classifying them as 
employees, and thereby grant them the benefits and rights of 
                     
 
14 General Laws c. 152 pertains to worker's compensation 
benefits. 
 
 
15 Under the Wage Act provisions in G. L. c. 149, the 
Legislature has also broadened the type of eligible compensation 
covered, extending coverage to commissions that are "definitely 
determined" and "due and payable."  Lipsitt v. Plaud, 466 Mass. 
240, 245 & n.8 (2013), quoting St. 1943, c. 467. 
 
10 
 
employment, where the circumstances indicate that they are, in 
fact, employees."  Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 
465 Mass. 607, 620 (2013), quoting Taylor v. Eastern Connection 
Operating, Inc., 465 Mass. 191, 198 (2013).  See Cumpata v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 164, 168 (D. 
Mass. 2000) ("Wage Act is meant to protect employees from the 
dictates and whims of shrewd employers").  Indeed, 
 
"[m]isclassification not only hurts the individual 
employee; it also imposes significant financial burdens on 
the Federal government and the Commonwealth in lost tax and 
insurance revenues.  Moreover, it gives an employer who 
misclassifies employees as independent contractors an 
unfair competitive advantage over employers who correctly 
classify their employees and bear the concomitant financial 
burden." 
 
Somers v. Converged Access, Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 593 (2009). 
 
To this end, the independent contractor statute 
"establishes a framework for determining whether a worker is an 
employee or an independent contractor."  Depianti, 465 Mass. at 
621.  The statute establishes a presumption that "an individual 
performing any service" is an employee.  Id.  See G. L. c. 149, 
§ 148B (a) ("an individual performing any service . . . shall be 
considered to be an employee").  Next, the statute "lays out 
three indicia [or factors] of an independent contractor 
relationship, all three of which must be established to rebut 
the presumption of employment."  Depianti, supra.  In 
interpreting the statute, we have stated that, "[i]n light of 
11 
 
the statute's broad remedial purpose, 'it would be an error to 
imply . . . a limitation where the statutory language does not 
require it.'"  Id., quoting Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 
697, 708 (2011). 
 
b.  Real estate licensing and registration scheme.  General 
Laws c. 112, §§ 87PP through 87DDD½, and G. L. c. 112, §§ 65A 
through 65E, set forth the licensing and registration provisions 
governing real estate brokers and salespersons.16  A real estate 
"broker," for purposes here, is defined as including: 
"any person who for another person and for a fee, 
commission or other valuable consideration, or with the 
intention or in the expectation or upon the promise of 
receiving or collecting a fee, commission or other valuable 
consideration, does any of the following: -- sells, 
exchanges, purchases, rents or leases, or negotiates, or 
offers, attempts or agrees to negotiate the sale, exchange, 
purchase, rental or leasing of any real estate, or lists or 
offers, attempts or agrees to list any real estate, or buys 
or offers to buy, sell or offers to sell . . . real 
estate." 
 
G. L. c. 112, § 87PP.  In contrast, a real estate "salesman" or 
salesperson is "an individual who performs any act or engages in 
any transaction included in the foregoing definition of a 
broker, except the completing of the negotiation of any 
agreement or transaction which results or is intended to result 
in the sale, exchange, purchase, renting or leasing of any real 
estate."  Id.  Both brokers and salespersons are required to be 
                     
 
16 Regulations governing real estate brokers and 
salespersons appear at 254 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 2.00 through 7.00 
(2013). 
12 
 
licensed.  G. L. c. 112, § 87RR.  "The examination for a 
[salesperson's] license shall be based upon the same general 
subject matter as for a broker's license, but shall be more 
elementary in nature."  G. L. c. 112, § 87SS. 
 
Real estate salespersons must conduct business with, or be 
affiliated with, a licensed broker.  G. L. c. 112, § 87RR.  See 
254 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.00(6) (1998) ("A licensed salesperson 
must be engaged by a licensed broker and a licensed salesperson 
shall not conduct his own real estate business").  A real estate 
salesperson may affiliate with only one broker.  G. L. c. 112, 
§ 87VV (when real estate salesperson affiliates with broker, 
salesperson "shall not act as [salesperson] for any other 
licensed broker while so affiliated, nor accept any valuable 
consideration for the performance of any act as a real estate 
[salesperson] from any person except the broker with whom he [or 
she] is affiliated").  Concerning the relationship between the 
broker and his or her affiliated salesperson, § 87RR provides in 
relevant part: 
 
"No [salesperson] may conduct or operate his [or her] 
own real estate business nor act except as the 
representative of a real estate broker who shall be 
responsible for the [salesperson] and who must approve the 
negotiation and completion by the [salesperson] of any 
transaction or agreement which results or is intended to 
result in the sale, exchange, purchase, renting or leasing 
of any real estate or in a loan secured or to be secured by 
mortgage or other encumbrance upon real estate.  No 
[salesperson] shall be affiliated with more than one broker 
at the same time nor shall any [salesperson] be entitled to 
13 
 
any fee, commission or other valuable consideration or 
solicit or accept the same from any person except his [or 
her]licensed broker in connection with any such agreement 
or transaction.  A [salesperson] may be affiliated with a 
broker either as an employee or as an independent 
contractor and may, by agreement, be paid as an outside 
salesperson on a commission-only basis, but shall be under 
such supervision of said broker as to ensure compliance 
with this section and said broker shall be responsible with 
the [salesperson] for any violation of [G. L. c. 112, 
§ 87AAA,] committed by said [salesperson]." 
 
Section 87AAA enumerates numerous grounds for the suspension, 
revocation, or refusal to renew the license of a broker or 
salesperson.  These grounds include a range of conduct, the 
prohibition of which is intended to promote fairness and 
integrity in real estate transactions.17  Id.  See 254 Code Mass. 
                     
 
17 The proscribed conduct is set forth in G. L. c. 112, 
§ 87AAA, as follows:  "(a) knowingly made any substantial 
misrepresentation; (b) acted in the dual capacity of broker and 
undisclosed principal in the same transaction; (c) acted for 
more than one party to a transaction without the knowledge and 
consent of all the parties for whom he [or she] acts; (d) 
failed, within a reasonable time, to account for or remit any 
moneys belonging to others which have come into his [or her] 
possession as a broker or [salesperson]; (e) paid commissions or 
fees to or divided the same with any person, who, being required 
to be licensed as a broker or [salesperson] in this or any other 
[S]tate, is not so licensed; (f) accepted, given or charged any 
undisclosed commission, rebate or profit on expenditures for a 
principal; (g) induced any party to a contract or lease relating 
to real estate to break the same when such action is effected 
for the personal gain of the licensee; (h) commingled the money 
or other property of his [or her] principal with his [or her] 
own; (i) failed to give to both the buyer and seller a copy of 
the purchase and sale agreement; (j) committed any act expressly 
prohibited in [§§ 87RR to 87CCC]; (k) affirmatively solicited 
for sale, lease, or the listing for sale or lease, of 
residential property on the grounds of alleged change of value 
due to the presence or the prospective entry into the 
neighborhood of a person or persons of another race, economic 
14 
 
Regs. § 3.00 (2005) (setting forth professional standards of 
practice as well as additional grounds for discipline). 
 
4.  Discussion.  In this appeal, we address the conflict 
between the independent contractor statute and the real estate 
licensing statute which, respectively, support the plaintiffs' 
claim that they are "employees" and the defendants' claim that 
the plaintiffs are or can be "independent contractors."  The 
plaintiffs rely on the independent contractor statute insofar as 
it creates a presumptive employee status that, in its 
application, includes real estate salespersons.  The defendants 
rely on the real estate licensing statute providing that a 
"[salesperson] may be affiliated with a broker either as an 
employee or as an independent contractor."  See G. L. c. 112, 
§ 87RR. 
 
"The general and familiar rule is that a statute must be 
interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature 
ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and 
approved usage of the language, considered in connection with 
the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be 
                                                                  
level, religion or ethnic origin or distributes, or causes to be 
distributed, material or makes statements designated to induce a 
residential property owner to sell or lease his [or her] 
property due to such change in the neighborhood; or (l) accepted 
from a prospective seller a net listing, an agreement to sell 
real estate for a stated price which authorized the broker to 
keep as commission any amount of money received from the sale of 
said real estate in excess of the stated price." 
 
15 
 
remedied and the main object to be accomplished."  Lowery v. 
Klemm, 446 Mass. 572, 576-577 (2006), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 
286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).  Clear and unambiguous language in a 
statute is conclusive as to legislative intent.  Commissioner of 
Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the 
County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 124 (2006).  In addition, "a 
remedial statute . . . should be given a broad interpretation 
. . . in light of its purpose . . . to 'promote the 
accomplishment of its beneficent design.'"  Seller's Case, 452 
Mass. 804, 810 (2008), quoting Neff v. Commissioner of the Dep't 
of Indus. Accs., 421 Mass. 70, 73 (1995).  In cases "[w]here two 
or more statutes relate to the same subject matter, they should 
be construed together so as to constitute a harmonious whole 
consistent with the legislative purpose."  Federal Nat'l Mtge. 
Ass'n v. Hendricks, 463 Mass. 635, 641 (2012), quoting Board of 
Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513-514 (1975). 
 
As an initial matter, there is no question that the 
independent contractor statute is a remedial statute.  See 
Depianti, 465 Mass. at 621.  It thus should be given a 
construction that furthers, not defeats, its purpose.  See id.  
The difficulty in seeking to construe it in harmony with the 
real estate licensing statute, however, is that the real estate 
licensing statute makes it impossible for a real estate 
salesperson to satisfy the three factors required to achieve 
16 
 
independent contractor status, all of which must be satisfied to 
defeat the presumption of employee status.  For instance, under 
the second factor of the independent contractor statute, the 
employer must prove that "the service [of the worker] is 
performed outside the usual course of the business of the 
employer."  G. L. c. 149, § 148B (a) (2).  Because under G. L. 
c. 112, § 87RR, "[n]o [salesperson] may conduct or operate his 
[or her] own real estate business nor act except as the 
representative of a real estate broker," an employer can never 
prove that the service is performed outside the usual course of 
the employer's business.  Under the express language of § 87RR, 
a salesperson is prohibited from performing any services other 
than as the broker's representative and as part of the broker's 
business.  Under the third factor of the independent contractor 
statute, the employer must prove that the worker "is customarily 
engaged in an independently established" business in the real 
estate industry.  See G. L. c. 149, § 148B (a) (3).  General 
Laws c. 112, § 87RR, however, prohibits a real estate 
salesperson from operating his or her own real estate business.  
Thus, compliance with this third factor also is not possible. 
 
The exclusion of real estate salespersons from independent 
contractor status clearly was not intended by the Legislature.  
While § 87RR expressly authorizes a real estate salesperson to 
affiliate with a broker as an employee, it also expressly 
17 
 
authorizes an association as an independent contractor.  See id. 
("A [salesperson] may be affiliated with a broker either as an 
employee or as an independent contractor . . ." [emphasis 
added]).  We cannot view this express language as superfluous.  
See Casa Loma, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 377 
Mass. 231, 234 (1979) ("It is a common tenet of statutory 
construction, that, wherever possible, no provision of a 
legislative enactment should be treated as superfluous"). 
 
Unlike the judge, we do not view the 2010 amendment to 
§ 87RR to be instructive in resolving the conflict.  The 2010 
amendment to § 87RR added language authorizing brokers and 
salespersons to enter into agreements whereby a real estate 
salesperson could be paid on a commission-only basis.  See St. 
2010, c. 307, § 1 (as applying to salespersons, adding in second 
paragraph, in third sentence, "and may, by agreement, be paid as 
an outside salesperson on a commission-only basis").  The judge 
concluded that, by virtue of this amendment and, in contrast, of 
the independent contractor statute being left intact, the 
Legislature intended that real estate salespersons qualify as 
independent contractors despite the inherent level of control 
brokers must exercise over them.  Although this interpretation 
is reasonable, it is not dispositive of the issue before us 
because when enacting St. 2010, c. 307, § 1, the Legislature 
could have deleted the reference in § 87RR that permits a real 
18 
 
estate salesperson to be affiliated with a broker either as an 
employee or an independent contractor.  The Legislature took no 
action regarding the nature of this affiliation.  Thus, the 
amendment does not reflect an affirmation that a real estate 
salesperson is an independent contractor.  It reflects an 
affirmation that the salesperson may be an independent 
contractor, but he or she also may be an employee.18  Where the 
Legislature left the reference in place regarding the nature of 
the affiliation, we conclude that the 2010 amendment simply was 
intended to address how a real estate salesperson, whether an 
employee or an independent contractor, could be paid, 
authorizing payment in the form of commissions only.19  The 
amendment cannot be said to speak to the nature of the 
affiliation between the broker and salesperson other than 
confirming the fact that the affiliation may be either as an 
employee or as an independent contractor. 
 
The judge's reliance on the familiar canon of construction 
providing that a specific statute, in this case § 87RR, controls 
                     
 
18 The defendants concede this point:  "It is true that the 
November 2010 amendment confirms the lawfulness of engaging 
licensed salespersons as employees, just as it is true that the 
amendment confirms the lawfulness of engaging them as 
independent contractors." 
 
 
19 The fact that a real estate salesperson may be paid in 
the form of commissions only and that commissions may be subject 
to the Wage Act does not negate the applicability of the 
independent contractor statute.  See note 15, supra. 
19 
 
over the provisions of a general statute, such as the 
independent contract statute, however, is appropriate here.  See 
TBI, Inc. v. Board of Health of N. Andover, 431 Mass. 9, 18 
(2000); Doe v. Attorney Gen. (No. 1), 425 Mass. 210, 215 (1997).  
As outlined earlier, real estate brokers are responsible for 
their affiliated salespersons' compliance with a broad range of 
statutory provisions and regulations.  No doubt this supervision 
and control has been required due in part to the difference in 
training and testing that is required of real estate brokers in 
comparison to salespersons.  It also necessarily is in place to 
protect the public, namely the consumers who are selling, 
purchasing, leasing, or renting real estate in a highly 
regulated field.  Despite that level of supervision and control 
mandated by law, § 87RR nevertheless expressly preserves a 
salesperson's ability to be affiliated with a broker as either 
an employee or an independent contractor.  Thus, it is § 87RR 
that controls in this instance, not the more general independent 
contractor statute.  Were we to conclude otherwise, we would be 
subjecting real estate brokerage firms to potential criminal 
penalties for misclassifying its real estate salespersons in a 
manner expressly authorized by the real estate licensing 
statute.  See G. L. c. 149, § 148B (d) (failure to properly 
classify individual as employee and to comply with other 
20 
 
provisions of Wage Act or Fair Minimum Wage Law subjects 
employer to criminal penalties). 
 
That being said, we underscore the limited nature of our 
holding.  The plaintiffs' complaint alleged four counts:  the 
first for misclassification under the independent contractor 
statute, G. L. c. 149, § 148B; the second for failing to make 
timely payment of wages and taking improper deductions, under 
G. L. c. 149, § 148; the third for failure to pay the State 
statutory minimum wage for all hours worked, in violation of 
G. L. c. 151, §§ 1 et seq.; the fourth for failure to pay time 
and one-half for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week, 
in violation of G. L. c. 151, § 1A.  See note 10, supra.  The 
judge granted summary judgment to the defendants only on the 
first count.  Following the judge's decision, the plaintiffs 
dismissed the remaining counts without prejudice in order to 
pursue this appeal. 
 
Because we agree with the Superior Court judge that the 
independent contractor statute does not apply to real estate 
salespersons, we conclude that the judge properly granted 
summary judgment on the first count:  the plaintiffs cannot 
prevail on a claim based on a statute that does not apply to 
them.  In reaching that conclusion, however, we take no position 
on whether the plaintiffs in fact are employees or independent 
contractors, or on how, in the absence of the framework 
21 
 
established by the independent contractor statute, it may be 
determined whether a real estate salesperson is properly 
classified as an independent contractor or employee.  Earlier 
proposed legislation specifically provided that "a [salesperson] 
or broker may be affiliated with a broker either as an employee 
or as an independent contractor, as determined by their written 
agreement and customary work practices."  St. 2008, c. 304, § 8.  
The Governor, however, disapproved this language, concluding 
that it "would allow real estate sales persons and brokers to 
rely on written agreements to avoid the classification rules for 
independent contractors."  See 2008 House Doc. No. 5075.  The 
statute ultimately enacted expressly stated that a commission-
only compensation structure may be established "by agreement."  
G. L c. 112, § 87RR.  It does not, however, indicate how a 
broker and real estate salesperson may create an independent 
contractor relationship, rather than an employment relationship. 
 
Because the plaintiffs based their argument on appeal on 
the contention that they are employees under the framework set 
forth in the independent contractor statute, they did not 
address how the court should determine the nature of their 
relationship if the court determines, as we have, that the 
framework does not apply.  In light of the potential impact of 
that issue on the real estate industry as a whole and its 
significant ramifications for real estate salespersons' access 
22 
 
to the rights and benefits of employment, we think it prudent to 
leave that issue's resolution to another day, when it has been 
fully briefed and argued.  Should the Legislature be so 
inclined, it may wish to clarify how a real estate salesperson 
may gain employee status under the real estate licensing 
statute. 
 
5.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
judge's order denying the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary 
judgment and granting partial summary judgment to the 
defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.