Case Title: State v. Bertram

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-K-2346

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1988-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
#28063-a-DG 
2018 S.D. 4 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
 
* * * * 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
RUSSELL RAY BERTRAM, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
* * * * 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
GREGORY COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN F. TRANDAHL 
Retired Judge 
* * * * 
 
MARTY J. JACKLEY 
Attorney General 
 
PAUL S. SWEDLUND 
MIKAL G. HANSON 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Pierre, South Dakota 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
 
 
and appellee. 
 
MICHAEL J. BUTLER  
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
 
and 
 
CLINT L. SARGENT 
RALEIGH E. HANSMAN of 
Meierhenry Sargent, LLP 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
 
 
 
Attorneys for defendant 
and appellant. 
* * * * 
 
ARGUED OCTOBER 4, 2017  
 
OPINION FILED 01/10/18 
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GILBERTSON, Chief Justice 
[¶1.] 
Russell Ray Bertram was convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to imprisonment for life in connection with the shooting death of his 
fiancée, Leonila Stickney.  Bertram appeals, arguing the circuit court violated his 
Sixth Amendment right of cross-examination by refusing to admit evidence that 
Bertram passed a polygraph examination for the purpose of impeaching another 
witness’s testimony.  Bertram also argues the circuit court improperly admitted 
character evidence used against him.  We affirm.   
Facts and Procedural History 
[¶2.] 
To escape abject poverty, Leonila Stickney came to the United States 
from the Philippines in 2004 as the 22-year-old, mail-order bride of 73-year-old 
David Stickney (“Stickney”).  In October of the same year, Stickney and Leonila had 
a son.  The three lived together in Bridgewater, where Leonila worked at a nursing 
home.  Every month, Leonila sent $300 of her earnings to help support her family 
still residing in the Philippines.1  In late 2008, Leonila left Stickney.   
[¶3.] 
After leaving Stickney, Leonila became involved with Russell Bertram, 
a 56-year-old, former law-enforcement officer.  At the time, Bertram was in 
bankruptcy and had debt exceeding $100,000.  In early 2009, several months after 
the relationship began, Bertram and Leonila visited an insurance agent and 
purchased a $750,000 life-insurance policy on Leonila for a term of five years.  
                                            
1. 
In addition to her mother and father, Leonila had three brothers and four 
sisters.   
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Bertram also purchased another $170,000 in life-insurance coverage on Leonila by 
mail.  Both policies listed Bertram as the sole beneficiary.   
[¶4.] 
Bertram and Leonila’s relationship continued throughout 2009.  
However, Bertram came to suspect that Leonila—who was still married to 
Stickney—was involved with another man.  In August and September 2009, 
Bertram discovered several late-night calls made from Leonila’s mobile phone.  On 
October 24, 2009, while accompanying Bertram on a roadside hunting trip in 
Gregory County, Leonila told Bertram that she was late menstruating that month.  
Bertram, who underwent a vasectomy in the late 1970s, responded by asking 
Leonila who she had been “messing around with.”  Unaware that Bertram was not 
able to father children, Leonila denied being unfaithful.   
[¶5.] 
During the hunting trip, Bertram and Leonila drove to a section-line 
road about seven miles north of Gregory.  After shooting his legal limit, Bertram 
placed his loaded shotgun into the cab of his truck without engaging the weapon’s 
safety.  Bertram swept the weapon across Leonila, and it discharged, striking 
Leonila in her torso.  The blast severed Leonila’s aorta from her heart.  Bertram 
called 911 and drove Leonila to the Gregory County Hospital.  At the hospital, 
Bertram spoke with Gregory County Sheriff Charlie Wolf and then left to show 
Deputy Sheriff Tim Drey the site of the shooting.  After returning, Bertram was 
informed that Leonila had died on the operating table.  Sheriff Wolf photographed 
Bertram’s vehicle, confiscated the shotgun, and released Bertram.   
[¶6.] 
Shortly after Leonila’s death, in June and July 2010, her estate 
learned of the life-insurance policies.  Stickney retained attorney Doug Dailey to 
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represent Leonila’s estate.  The estate challenged Bertram’s right to the insurance 
proceeds, arguing Leonila’s death was intentional.  Bertram’s attorney, Clint 
Sargent, sent a letter to the estate claiming that Bertram had passed a unilateral 
polygraph test administered by a former DCI agent.2  The estate decided to settle, 
citing a desire to avoid protracted litigation.  Bertram and the estate agreed that 
Bertram would retain $320,000 of the insurance proceeds plus $82,000 in interest 
and that the estate would receive the remaining $600,000.  The settlement 
agreement explicitly provided that the money Bertram was to receive from the 
larger policy (proceeds plus interest) was “for the benefit of Leonila D. Stickney’s 
family in the Philippines.”   
[¶7.] 
Initially, Leonila’s death was investigated as an accidental shooting.  
However, Sheriff Wolf soon began to suspect foul play.  Sheriff Wolf learned of 
several possible motives Bertram could have had for killing Leonila.  A series of text 
messages on Leonila’s phone, beginning several days before and ending the day of 
the shooting, indicated she was involved with another man, Nathan Meeter.  The 
messages also indicated that Leonila was pregnant with Meeter’s child and that she 
was considering leaving Bertram for Meeter.  Leonila’s autopsy confirmed that she 
was pregnant at the time of her death.  And in December 2009, Sheriff Wolf also 
learned that Bertram was the sole beneficiary of $920,000 in life-insurance policies 
on Leonila.  Sheriff Wolf enlisted the assistance of DCI agent Guy DiBenedetto.  
                                            
2. 
In the criminal investigation, DCI rejected the result of this polygraph test 
and asked Bertram to submit to another.  Bertram declined.  He eventually 
took another polygraph test after being imprisoned.  The result of that test 
was not disclosed.   
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Sheriff Wolf and Agent DiBenedetto interviewed Bertram on January 21, 2011.  
Adding to Sheriff Wolf’s suspicions, Bertram gave several varying accounts of the 
shooting.  And on January 14, 2014, Agent DiBenedetto visited Bertram’s residence 
for an additional interview.   
[¶8.] 
Bertram was not arrested until 2015.  On September 8, 2015, Bertram 
was indicted for first-degree murder for killing Leonila.  Prior to trial, the circuit 
court ruled on a number of preliminary motions.  Particularly relevant to this 
appeal, the court ruled the State would be permitted to introduce evidence that 
Bertram had multiple sexual encounters with an exotic dancer in September and 
October 2009 as well as with two other women on October 19 and 20, 2009.  The 
court also ruled Bertram would not be permitted to discuss his polygraph test.  But 
at trial, the State called Dailey as a witness to discuss the estate and Bertram’s 
settlement.  Dailey testified that in a phone conversation, he informed Sargent that 
the estate believed the entirety of the insurance proceeds should be paid into the 
estate.  According to Dailey, Sargent replied, “No way.”  Dailey also testified that 
Leonila’s estate decided to settle in order to avoid protracted litigation.  After the 
State’s examination of Dailey concluded, Bertram asked the court to reconsider its 
preliminary ruling and admit the letter sent from Sargent to Dailey that included 
the result of Bertram’s polygraph test.  The court declined.   
[¶9.] 
A jury convicted Bertram of first-degree murder, and the circuit court 
sentenced him to imprisonment for life.  Bertram appeals, raising the following 
issues:  
1. 
Whether the circuit court erred by refusing to admit 
Bertram’s polygraph evidence.   
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2. 
Whether the circuit court erred by admitting evidence of 
Bertram’s sexual liaisons with other women during his 
engagement to Leonila.   
Standard of Review 
[¶10.] 
“Our review of a circuit court’s evidentiary ruling follows a two-step 
analysis: ‘first, to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in making 
an evidentiary ruling; and second, whether this error was a prejudicial error that 
“in all probability” affected the jury’s conclusion.’”  State v. Martin, 2015 S.D. 2, ¶ 7, 
859 N.W.2d 600, 603 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Supreme Pork, Inc. v. Master 
Blaster, Inc., 2009 S.D. 20, ¶ 59, 764 N.W.2d 474, 491).   
Analysis and Decision 
[¶11.] 
1. 
Whether the circuit court erred by refusing to admit 
Bertram’s polygraph evidence.   
[¶12.] 
Bertram first argues the circuit court erred by excluding his polygraph 
evidence.  He contends that under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, he 
was entitled to present the result of his polygraph test as part of an effective cross-
examination.  The testimony that gave rise to this claim is as follows: 
[Dailey]:  I had a telephone call with attorney Clint Sargent on 
November 4th of 2010.  I know that we had some back and forth 
going on with regard to leaving messages and trying to get hold 
of each other.   
At that time, I advised Mr. Sargent that we believed that Mr. 
Bertram had intentionally killed Leonila and that he should not 
be entitled to any of the life insurance proceeds and asked for 
them to pay those over to the estate. 
[State]:  Did you ask—so, you asked Mr. Sargent to pay the 
Globe policy over to the estate or the New York Life?   
[Dailey]:  Just the life insurance policies in general.  I don’t 
think it was differentiated between the two or which one we 
wanted paid over at that time.  We were simply asking for all of 
the proceeds to be paid to the estate. 
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[State]:  Okay.  And, what was Mr. Sargent’s response to that? 
[Dailey]:  My notes have the quote of, “no way.” 
[State]:  So, that’s a direct quote from Mr. Sargent. 
[Dailey]:  According to my notes. 
[State]:  What did Mr. Sargent tell you about his reason for 
saying, “no way”? 
[Dailey]:  Just that they disputed that it was an intentional act. 
[State]:  And, did he say that the proceeds had another—. 
[Sargent]:  Your Honor, I’m just going to object.  If [the State] is 
going to ask about things we talked about, I have no objection to 
that.  But, I hope that then opens the door to everything that we 
talked about in that conversation. 
[Court]:  It does.  You may continue. 
After the State concluded its examination of Dailey, Bertram’s attorney asked the 
court to reconsider its preliminary ruling on the admissibility of his polygraph-test 
result:  
[Sargent]:  Your Honor, I request relief from the court’s order 
on motion in limine precluding evidence that Mr. Bertram 
passed a polygraph examination.  I think the State has opened 
the door by representing to this jury that the reasons that Mr. 
Stickney decided to settle this case were in large part just 
because he wanted to get out of the country and he wanted this 
over with fast. 
The last letter that I sent to Mr. Dailey that has been referenced 
here in the settlement negotiations included an explanation of 
the polygraph, what my intentions were if this went to civil 
litigation, and I believe that’s a fair area of cross-examination 
after the State has presented it to this jury that, “oh, they just 
wanted it over with to get out of the country.” 
I should be allowed to cross-examine that I had presented the 
strength of my case in defending these matters; that that was a 
critical part of what they considered in deciding whether to 
settle this case. 
I believe the State’s opened the door, and I ask permission to go 
into that; for that limited purpose.  And, the court can give a 
limiting instruction, telling the jury that they’re not to consider 
whether or not he actually passed the polygraph, but to consider 
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it as to the issue as to why the estate settled the claims against 
Mr. Bertram. 
Bertram’s attorney then made an offer of proof, asking the court to admit the letter 
sent from Sargent to Dailey that indicated Bertram had passed a polygraph test.  
During the offer of proof, Bertram’s attorney and the State both examined Dailey 
about the letter.   
[¶13.] 
Contrary to Bertram’s characterization of this issue, this is not a 
constitutional question—it is an evidentiary one.  The Sixth Amendment does not 
require a court to admit polygraph-test results into evidence.  See United States v. 
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1266, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1998) (holding 
Sixth Amendment not violated by per se rules prohibiting the admission of 
polygraph-test results).3  Thus, this issue simply involves an evidentiary ruling.  As 
                                            
3. 
In Scheffer, the United States Supreme Court considered “whether Military 
Rule of Evidence 707, which makes polygraph evidence inadmissible in court-
martial proceedings,” violates the Sixth Amendment.  523 U.S. at 305, 
118 S. Ct. at 1263.  The Supreme Court said: “A defendant’s right to present 
relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable 
restrictions.”  Id. at 308, 118 S. Ct. at 1264.  Thus, a per se rule that excludes 
polygraph evidence does not violate the Sixth Amendment so long as it is not 
“arbitrary” or “disproportionate to the purposes [it is] designed to serve.”  Id. 
(quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2711, 
97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987)).  The Supreme Court further held that “State and 
Federal Governments unquestionably have a legitimate interest in ensuring 
that reliable evidence is presented to the trier of fact in a criminal trial[,]” id. 
at 309, 118 S. Ct. at 1265, and that a per se rule excluding all polygraph 
evidence “is a rational and proportional means of advancing the legitimate 
interest in barring unreliable evidence[,]” id. at 312, 118 S. Ct. at 1266.  As 
the Supreme Court explained: 
Although the degree of reliability of polygraph evidence may 
depend upon a variety of identifiable factors, there is simply no 
way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph 
examiner’s conclusion is accurate, because certain doubts and 
uncertainties plague even the best polygraph exams.  Individual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . . ) 
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noted above, this Court reviews evidentiary rulings under the abuse-of-discretion 
standard.  Martin, 2015 S.D. 2, ¶ 7, 859 N.W.2d at 603.   
[¶14.] 
The question, then, is whether the letter including Bertram’s 
polygraph-test result was admissible under South Dakota’s rules of evidence.  As 
the State points out, this Court has consistently held that polygraph-test results are 
not admissible.  E.g., In re Fuller, 2011 S.D. 22, ¶ 25 n.4, 798 N.W.2d 408, 414 n.4; 
Sabag v. Cont’l S.D., 374 N.W.2d 349, 352 (S.D. 1985) (“In South Dakota criminal 
cases, polygraph results are not admissible evidence.”).4  This per se rule is based 
on evidentiary Rules 402 (relevancy), 403 (probative value), and 702 (expert-witness 
testimony)5:  
The rationale advanced for not admitting evidence of polygraph 
results, in civil or criminal cases, is that such evidence is 
irrelevant because of dubious scientific value [(Rule 402)], it has 
no “general scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate 
means of ascertaining truth or deception,” it is not reliable 
[(Rule 702)], it has no probative value, and it is likely to be given 
significant, if not conclusive weight by the jury, so that “the 
jurors’ traditional responsibility to collectively ascertain the 
facts and adjudge guilt or innocence is thereby preempted” 
[(Rule 403)].   
_______________ 
(. . . continued) 
jurisdictions therefore may reasonably reach differing 
conclusions as to whether polygraph evidence should be 
admitted. 
 
Id.  Thus, not even per se rules against admitting polygraph evidence violate 
the Sixth Amendment.  Id.   
 
4. 
South Dakota is not alone—“[m]ost States maintain per se rules excluding 
polygraph evidence.”  Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 311, 118 S. Ct. at 1266.   
 
5. 
These rules of evidence are codified at SDCL 19-19-402, -403, and -702, 
respectively.   
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Sabag, 374 N.W.2d at 353 (citations omitted) (first quoting State v. Green, 531 P.2d 
245, 251 (Or. 1975); and then quoting United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 
(8th Cir. 1975)).  This Court has strictly adhered to this rule.  See State v. Muetze, 
368 N.W.2d 575, 587-88 (S.D. 1985) (rejecting admission of polygraph-test results 
offered to impeach a witness’s testimony).   
[¶15.] 
Although Bertram acknowledges this Court’s per se rule against 
admitting polygraph-test results, he claims that “[u]ntil now, South Dakota has not 
had occasion to rule on polygraph admissibility when such evidence is offered to 
challenge witness credibility.”  But contrary to Bertram’s claim, this is not a case of 
first impression.  In Muetze, this Court considered the same question presented in 
this case: “whether [the result of] a polygraph examination . . . should have been 
admitted when offered by the defense as impeachment evidence.”  368 N.W.2d 
at 587.  The Court acknowledged “that polygraph results are admissible for some 
purposes” in other jurisdictions but held that those cases are “inapposite” because 
“[p]olygraph results are not admissible as evidence in South Dakota [c]ourts.”  Id. 
at 588.  Thus, when previously presented with the same argument that Bertram 
makes in this case, this Court held: “The trial court was correct in not allowing the 
rule against introduction of polygraph results to be circumvented in this way.”  Id.  
We reaffirmed this strict prohibition on admitting polygraph-test results in State v. 
Waff, 373 N.W.2d 18, 24-25 (S.D. 1985).  So under controlling precedent, the result 
of Bertram’s polygraph test was per se inadmissible.6   
                                            
6. 
We do not foreclose the possibility of reconsidering this per se rule in the 
future if presented with an appropriate case.  However, abandoning the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . . ) 
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[¶16.] 
Even so, Bertram argues his polygraph evidence was admissible under 
United States v. Tenorio, 809 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2015).  In that case, Tenorio 
consented to undergo a polygraph test after being accused of sexually abusing his 
16-year-old niece.  Id. at 1128.  In the course of the test, Tenorio confessed and 
wrote a letter of apology to the victim.  Id.  At trial, the prosecutor asked Tenorio 
about the letter, and Tenorio claimed that he was distraught during the test, that 
the polygrapher yelled at him, and that he only wrote what the polygrapher told 
him to write.  Id. at 1129.  Because Tenorio alleged he was coerced by the 
polygrapher, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to question Tenorio about the 
circumstances of the polygraph test, but the court gave a limiting instruction to the 
jury.  Id. at 1129-30.  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed.  The court held “that when the defendant opens the door to 
polygraph evidence, such as attacking the nature of a criminal investigation or 
asserting that testimony was coerced, polygraph evidence is admissible rebuttal 
evidence[.]”  Id. at 1130-31.   
[¶17.] 
Bertram’s reliance on Tenorio is misplaced.  The rule articulated in 
Tenorio applies “where polygraph evidence is not offered as scientific evidence,” id. 
at 1130; i.e., “where it is not offered to prove the truth of the polygraph result,” id. 
at 1131 (quoting United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 346 (4th Cir. 2009)).  Thus, in 
Tenorio, the relevant evidence was not the polygraph-test result itself but rather 
_______________ 
(. . . continued) 
per se rule against admitting polygraph-test results would require, at a 
minimum, strong evidence that the technology of polygraphs has advanced to 
such a degree that they are generally accepted as reliable in the scientific 
community.   
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the circumstances under which the test was administered.  The jury was not 
informed of the test result, and the trial court specifically instructed the jury not to 
speculate as to the result of the test.  Id. at 1130.  In contrast, Bertram seeks to 
introduce the result of his polygraph test instead of incidental information; he 
offered his polygraph-test result in order to prove that Leonila’s estate’s decision to 
settle was motivated by that result.   
[¶18.] 
Even if Bertram’s polygraph evidence did not implicate Rule 702’s 
reliability concerns, that evidence was still subject to “the general test of 
admissibility applicable to all proffered evidence.”  Waff, 373 N.W.2d at 24; see also 
Tenorio, 809 F.3d at 1131 (holding polygraph evidence not offered for its scientific 
value is still “subject to Rule 403’s probative value and prejudicial effect 
considerations”).  A “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.”  SDCL 19-19-403.  The circuit court excluded Bertram’s 
polygraph evidence after conducting a Rule 403 balancing.  In the court’s view, the 
probative value of the polygraph evidence was substantially outweighed by the 
“tremendous risk that the jury will speculate and only consider the evidence for the 
truth of the matter asserted, even if the court gives a limiting instruction.”  The 
court also correctly acknowledged that admitting the evidence “would allow 
[Bertram] to introduce evidence which is not admissible in South Dakota as direct 
evidence in [his] case in chief.”  See Muetze, 368 N.W.2d at 588.  The court’s 
determination is further supported by the fact that Bertram’s polygraph test was 
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unilateral—a “privately commissioned polygraph test, which [is] unknown to the 
government until after its completion, is of extremely dubious probative value[.]”  
United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1094 (8th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) 
(quoting United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1217 (6th Cir. 1995)).  So even 
under Tenorio, Bertram’s evidence is inadmissible.   
[¶19.] 
Finally, even if the court did err by excluding Bertram’s polygraph-test 
result, Bertram must also establish that such error was prejudicial.  Martin, 
2015 S.D. 2, ¶ 7, 859 N.W.2d at 603.  According to Bertram, the polygraph evidence 
was meant to rebut Dailey’s assertion that Leonila’s estate’s motivation for settling 
the civil action was to avoid protracted litigation.  But the estate’s motivation for 
settling the civil action is a collateral matter.  Bertram does not explain how the 
estate’s motivation for settling the civil action is relevant to the jury’s 
determination that he murdered Leonila.  Thus, the court’s exclusion of Bertram’s 
polygraph-test result did not “‘in all probability’ affect[] the jury’s conclusion.”  Id. 
(quoting Supreme Pork, 2009 S.D. 20, ¶ 59, 764 N.W.2d at 491).   
[¶20.] 
In light of the foregoing, the circuit court did not err in excluding 
Bertram’s polygraph evidence.  Even if this Court were to carve out an exception to 
the per se rule against admitting polygraph-test results, the court determined 
Bertram’s polygraph evidence was inadmissible under Rule 403.  And even if the 
court erred in its Rule 403 analysis, Bertram has not established prejudice.   
[¶21.] 
2. 
Whether the circuit court erred by admitting 
evidence of Bertram’s sexual liaisons with other 
women during his engagement to Leonila.   
[¶22.] 
Next, Bertram argues evidence of his sexual contact with other women 
immediately prior to Leonila’s death was irrelevant and improperly admitted under 
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SDCL 19-19-404(b).  The State responds that this evidence is relevant to 
establishing motive.  Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act 
is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular 
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”  SDCL 19-19-404(b)(1).  
However, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 
mistake, or lack of accident.”  SDCL 19-19-404(b)(2).  Thus, “[r]elevant other acts 
evidence is admissible for any purpose other than proving the character of the 
defendant or his propensity to act in conformity therewith.”  State v. Huber, 
2010 S.D. 63, ¶ 56, 789 N.W.2d 283, 301 (quoting State v. Janklow, 2005 S.D. 25, 
¶ 33, 693 N.W.2d 685, 697).   
[¶23.] 
The evidence at issue was relevant.  This Court has previously held 
that “a defendant is . . . not entitled to have the jury decide his case on a pretense 
that his behavior and feelings toward the victim are nothing but routinely warm 
and affectionate.”  Id. ¶ 57, 789 N.W.2d at 301-02 (quoting State v. Laible, 1999 S.D. 
58, ¶ 23, 594 N.W.2d 328, 335).  Evidence of infidelity is relevant “to explain . . . 
state of mind[] and to prove . . . motive, intent, and absence of accident.”  Id. ¶ 57, 
789 N.W.2d at 302.  At the January 28, 2016 motion hearing, the State explained 
the purpose for which it offered the evidence: 
[T]he purpose of this evidence is to show that Mr. Bertram had 
no attachment to Leonila, that his claim that he was in love with 
her, that he misses her to this day, that it was the best 
relationship he ever had, all those things that he would 
introduce into this record to show that this was an accident are 
contradicted by the way that he was living his life immediately 
prior to the murder. 
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The circuit court agreed that the evidence was relevant, noting: “Mr. Bertram has 
made statements that he was in the best relationship he had ever had so the sexual 
encounters with other women go to rebut that claim.”  This conclusion was not 
“outside the range of permissible choices[.]”  Martin, 2015 S.D. 2, ¶ 7, 859 N.W.2d 
at 603 (quoting Gartner v. Temple, 2014 S.D. 74, ¶ 7, 855 N.W.2d 846, 850).   
[¶24.] 
Even if the circuit court’s relevancy determination was an abuse of 
discretion, such error would be reversible only if it “‘in all probability’ affected the 
jury’s conclusion.”  Id. (quoting Supreme Pork, 2009 S.D. 20, ¶ 59, 764 N.W.2d 
at 491).  Bertram does not argue—nor does the record suggest—that the jury was so 
influenced.  Thus, even if the court erred, Bertram is not entitled to relief.   
Conclusion 
[¶25.] 
South Dakota’s per se rule against admitting polygraph-test results 
does not violate the Sixth Amendment.  The circuit court did not abuse its discretion 
either by excluding Bertram’s polygraph evidence or by admitting the State’s 
evidence of Bertram’s sexual liaisons with three other women in the days leading up 
to Leonila’s death.  Even if the court erred, Bertram has not established prejudice 
on either issue.  Therefore, reversal is not warranted.   
[¶26.] 
We affirm.   
[¶27.] 
ZINTER, SEVERSON, and KERN, Justices, and WILBUR, Retired 
Justice, concur. 
[¶28.] 
JENSEN, Justice, not having been a member of the Court at the time 
this action was submitted to the Court, did not participate.