Case Title: People v. Caballes

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91547

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 91547-Agenda 17-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ROY I. 							CABALLES, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 20, 2003.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Roy I. Caballes, challenges the procedures used by
police during a routine traffic stop. Defendant unsuccessfully
attempted to suppress evidence of marijuana found in the trunk of his
car after an alert by a drug-detection dog and was subsequently
convicted of one count of cannabis trafficking (720 ILCS 550/5.1(a)
(West 1998)). The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding that
reasonable articulable suspicion was not needed to conduct a canine
sniff and that defendant was unjustifiably detained by the police for
only a de minimis period of time. We reverse and hold that the trial
court should have granted defendant's motion to suppress based on
the unjustified expansion of the scope of the stop. See People v. Cox,
202 Ill. 2d 462 (2002).
BACKGROUND
	On November 12, 1998, Illinois State Police Trooper Daniel
Gillette stopped defendant on Interstate Route 80 in La Salle County
for driving 71 miles per hour in a zone with a posted speed limit of 65
miles per hour. Trooper Gillette radioed the police dispatcher that he
was making the traffic stop. On hearing Gillette's radio transmission
reporting the stop, Trooper Craig Graham of the Illinois State Police
Drug Interdiction Team announced to the dispatcher he was going to
meet Gillette to conduct a canine sniff. Gillette, however, did not
request Graham's assistance.
	Gillette approached defendant's car, informed him that he was
speeding, and asked for his driver's license, vehicle registration, and
proof of insurance. Defendant complied with Gillette's requests.
Gillette testified that while at defendant's car he noticed an atlas on
the front seat, an open ashtray, the smell of air freshener, and two
suits hanging in the back seat without any other visible luggage.
	Gillette then instructed defendant to reposition his car on the
shoulder of the road so the two vehicles would be out of traffic and to
come back to the squad car because it was raining. Defendant
complied, and Gillette told defendant he was only going to write a
warning ticket for speeding. Gillette then called the police dispatcher
to ascertain the validity of defendant's license and to check for
outstanding warrants.
	While waiting for the results of the license check, Gillette asked
defendant where he was going and why he was "dressed up."
Defendant replied that he was moving from Las Vegas to Chicago. He
was accustomed to being dressed up because he was a salesman,
although he was not currently employed. Gillette testified that
defendant continued to act nervous even after being told he was
receiving only a warning ticket. Gillette considered defendant's
continued nervousness unusual.
	Dispatch informed Gillette that defendant had surrendered a valid
Illinois license to Nevada, but the validity of his Nevada license was
not confirmed for two more minutes. After receiving that
confirmation, Gillette requested defendant's criminal history. He then
asked defendant for permission to search his vehicle, and defendant
refused to give consent.
	Gillette next asked defendant if he had ever been arrested, and
defendant responded that he had not. The dispatcher subsequently
reported that defendant had two prior arrests for distribution of
marijuana, and Gillette began to write the warning ticket. He was
interrupted by another officer calling him over the radio on an
unrelated matter. Gillette testified he was still writing the warning
ticket when Trooper Graham arrived with his drug-detection dog and
began walking around defendant's car. The dog alerted at defendant's
trunk in less than a minute. After Graham advised him of the alert,
Gillette searched defendant's trunk and found marijuana.
	Defendant was then arrested and taken to the police station,
where he signed the warning ticket. He was subsequently charged
with one count of cannabis trafficking (720 ILCS 550/5.1(a) (West
1998)).
	Defendant filed a motion to suppress the drugs found in the trunk
and to quash the arrest. The trial court denied the motion and found
defendant guilty after a bench trial. Defendant was sentenced to 12
years in prison and ordered to pay a street value fine of $256,136.
	Defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed, finding that
the police did not need reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the
canine sniff and that, although the criminal history check improperly
extended defendant's detention, the delay was de minimis. No.
3-99-0932 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). This
court granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315.
ANALYSIS
	On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to
suppress the evidence uncovered by the canine sniff. This court
recently decided a similar issue in People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462
(2002). In that case, we applied the two-part test adopted in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to
determine the overall reasonableness of the stop. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d  at
467. Although a traffic stop was not at issue in Terry, this court has
previously applied the principles of that case to routine traffic stops.
See People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 421-22 (1998) (citing
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047-52, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1218-22, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480-82 (1983), and Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 111-12, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 337-38, 98 S. Ct. 330, 334
(1977)). Accordingly, we will also apply the Terry test in this case.
We must consider: "(1) 'whether the officer's action was justified at
its inception' and (2) 'whether it was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' "
People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 518-19 (1999), quoting Terry,
392 U.S.  at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 905, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879. Here, it is
undisputed that the traffic stop was properly initiated. Thus, we need
only examine the second part of the Terry test, concerning the
reasonableness of the officer's conduct. The State bears the burden of
establishing that the conduct remained within the scope of the stop.
Cox, 202 Ill. 2d  at 467.
	In Cox, we concluded that evidence obtained by a canine sniff
was properly suppressed because calling in a canine unit unjustifiably
broadened the scope of an otherwise routine traffic stop into a drug
investigation. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d  at 469, 471. We emphasized that the
sniff was impermissible without " 'specific and articulable facts' " to
support the stopping officer's request for the canine unit. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d  at 470-71.
	Here, as in Cox, the State has not offered sufficient justification
for implementing a canine sniff. The police did not detect the odor of
marijuana in the car or note any other evidence suggesting the
presence of illegal drugs. See Cox, 202 Ill. 2d  at 469. Although
Officer Gillette did not actively summon Trooper Graham and his dog
for the purpose of conducting a canine sniff, as occurred in Cox, the
overall effect remains the same. As in Cox, the police impermissibly
broadened the scope of the traffic stop in this case into a drug
investigation because there were no specific and articulable facts to
support the use of a canine sniff. See Cox, 202 Ill. 2d  at 469.
	Moreover, the observations made by Officer Gillette during the
stop that (1) defendant said he was moving to Chicago, but the only
visible belongings were two sport coats in the backseat of the car, (2)
the car smelled of air freshener, (3) defendant was dressed for business
while traveling cross-country, even though he was unemployed, and
(4) defendant seemed nervous were insufficient to support a canine
sniff. The lack of visible luggage in the interior of the car may be
readily explained, since any personal items being transported could
have been stored in the trunk or shipped separately. While air
fresheners may be used to mask the odor of contraband, air fresheners
are also used in cars to mask other odors such as cigarette smoke. As
for defendant's choice of travel attire, we fail to see how his stated
preference for business clothing suggests any involvement in past or
present criminal activity. Also, the general allegation that defendant
appeared nervous, without more, cannot serve as a reasonable basis
for further detaining defendant. See People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236,
266-67 (2001).
	Finally, even when these factors are viewed together, they
constitute nothing more than a vague hunch that defendant may have
been involved in possible wrongdoing. Accordingly, we hold that the
trial court should have granted defendant's motion to suppress based
on the unjustified expansion of the scope of the stop.


CONCLUSION


	Here, as in Cox, 202 Ill. 2d  at 470-71, a canine sniff was
performed without " 'specific and articulable facts' " to support its
use, unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a
drug investigation. Under these circumstances, the trial court should
have granted defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained
after the police dog's alert.
	The judgments of the appellate court and the trial court are
reversed.
Judgments reversed.
	JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:
	With today's decision, the dicta in People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462
(2002), becomes the law. Because I strongly disagreed with the Cox
dicta, I dissent from the majority opinion.
	In Cox, this court upheld a suppression order on the basis that the
defendant had suffered an illegal detention. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d  at 469-70.
After so concluding, the court tacked on a gratuitous section that
concluded that the police may not conduct a canine sniff of a vehicle
unless they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the car's
occupants are possessing a controlled substance. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d  at
470-71. According to the Cox majority, Terry principles govern
whether the police may conduct a canine sniff of a lawfully detained
vehicle. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d  at 466-68.
	As I explained in my dissent, the section of the majority opinion
dealing with the canine sniff was dicta because the majority had
already concluded that the evidence had to be suppressed because the
defendant was subjected to an illegal detention. See Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 
at 478 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald and Garman, JJ.);
see also Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 470 (1997)
(generally, this court will not "engage in speculative analysis or ***
render an advisory opinion *** where, as in the instant case, such
analysis or opinion is not necessary for the disposition of the cause").
In the case before us, the Cox dicta supplies the sole support for the
majority's holding, and thus the dicta is now the law.
	Typically, having once voiced disagreement with an opinion, a
justice will follow the opinion in future cases because of stare decisis
considerations. I cannot do that with Cox because that case is wholly
incompatible with United States Supreme Court cases construing the
fourth amendment. This court is obligated to follow decisions of the
United States Supreme Court on questions of federal constitutional
law, and I cannot join an opinion that fails to do so.
	As I explained in Cox, under the Supreme Court cases, a canine
sniff is not a search. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,
148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983). In Cox, the
majority refused to acknowledge that a canine sniff is not a search and
failed to discuss City of Indianapolis or Place. If a sniff is not a
search, then the police do not need probable cause to conduct one.
Further, allowing a canine to sniff a vehicle that is already detained
does not transform the seizure into a fourth amendment search. The
Supreme Court made this plain in City of Indianapolis:
			"It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway
checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. [Citation.] The fact that officers walk a
narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of each car at the
Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform the seizure into
a search. [Citation.] Just as in Place, an exterior sniff of an
automobile does not require entry into the car and is not
designed to disclose any information other than the presence
or absence of narcotics. [Citation.] Like the dog sniff in
Place, a sniff by a dog that simply walks around a car is
'much less intrusive than a typical search.' [Citation.]" City
of Indianapolis, 531 U.S.  at 40, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 342-43,
121 S. Ct.  at 453.
	After ignoring the cases holding that canine sniffs are not
searches, the Cox majority held that sniffs were controlled by Terry
principles, even though the Supreme Court has made it clear that
Terry applies only to searches for weapons. It has never been
extended to general searches for incriminating evidence. As I
explained in Cox:
			"I also disagree with the appellate court's holding (and the
majority's apparent implied holding) that canine sniffs should
be considered limited investigatory stops governed by Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868
(1968). Terry allows the police to briefly detain an individual
when the officer 'observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot.' Terry, 392 U.S.  at 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at
911, 88 S. Ct.  at 1884. Additionally, the officer is allowed,
without a warrant, to conduct a careful limited search of the
person when his observations reasonably lead him to believe
that the person might be carrying a weapon. The purpose of
the 'frisk' is to allow the police, for their own safety and the
safety of others, to determine if the person is armed. Terry,
392 U.S.  at 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 90, 88 S. Ct.  at 1883. The
Court reached its decision by balancing the need to search
against the invasion the search entails. Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21,
20 L. Ed. 2d  at 905-06, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879-80, quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 940, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1735 (1967). As Professor
LaFave has noted, however, 'there is no search-for-evidence
counterpart to the Terry weapons search, permissible on only
a reasonable suspicion that such evidence would be found.'
4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure §9.5(g), at 300 (3d ed.
1996). See also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373,
124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 344, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1993) (sole
justification for a Terry frisk is the protection of the police
officer and others, not to gather evidence); People v.
Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d 257, 263 (1997) (same); Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328-29, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347, 356, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1154 (1987) (refusing to recognize an intermediate
type of search between a plain-view inspection and a
'full-blown search' that would merely require a reasonable
suspicion); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 247, 100 S. Ct. 338, 343 (1979) (Terry cannot be
understood to allow any search whatever for anything but
weapons); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 661, 109 S. Ct. 1402,
1414 (1989) (balancing test is appropriate only when
warranted by special needs beyond the normal need for law
enforcement). Thus, the majority's apparent belief that a
canine sniff for narcotics is a search that can be conducted on
an officer's mere reasonable suspicion impermissibly extends
Terry to general searches for evidence." Cox, 202 Ill. 2d  at
487-88 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald and
Garman, JJ.).
The majority's opinion is wholly invalid on this ground because the
Supreme Court requires probable cause for warrantless searches of
vehicles. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408, 414-15, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300 (1999). If a sniff is a
search, then the police cannot conduct one in the absence of probable
cause. Thus, in trying to restrict the authority of the police in a routine
traffic stop, the majority has unwittingly restricted a defendant's
fourth amendment rights by applying Terry to what the majority
believes to be a search for incriminating evidence.
	In another passage that bears repeating, I pointed out the
majority's dilemma:
			"In sum, the answer to the question of whether a canine
sniff is a search leads to two possible outcomes. If a sniff is
a search, then the police need probable cause to conduct one.
If a sniff is not a search, then neither the fourth amendment
nor article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution is
implicated. There simply cannot be a 'reasonable suspicion'
middle ground because the United States Supreme Court has
not expanded Terry to general searches for incriminating
evidence, as opposed to searches for weapons.
			The majority thus refuses to answer the threshold
question, because an answer cannot lead to its result. Instead,
the majority has issued a policy decision with no foundation
in the law." Cox, 202 Ill. 2d  at 489 (Thomas, J., dissenting,
joined by Fitzgerald and Garman, JJ.).
	In the case before us, the majority has not held that defendant's
vehicle was subjected to an illegal detention. Therefore, because the
police did not impermissibly extend the traffic stop to allow the canine
to sniff defendant's car, defendant's fourth amendment rights were not
violated. The canine sniff was not a search, and thus the police did not
need probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing before
conducting it. 
	As with Cox, this decision is wholly incompatible with United
States Supreme Court case law construing the fourth amendment and
is subject to reversal by that court. Accordingly, I cannot join in this
opinion, or in any other one that follows and applies the Cox rule.
	JUSTICES FITZGERALD and GARMAN join in this dissent.