Case Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Jerding

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-72

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Jerding1994 WY 10868 P.2d 244Case Number: 92-72Decided: 02/03/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming

STATE 
of Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellant 
(Petitioner Objector-Defendant),

v.

Bernard JERDING, Appellee (Respondent 
Employee-Claimant).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, Dan 
Spangler, J.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., 
Joe MacGuire, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Gerald W. Laska, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Susan Maher Guthrie, Casper, 
for appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and 
TAYLOR, JJ.

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant State 
of Wyoming, on behalf of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, appeals 
from the district court order which affirmed the hearing examiner's decision to 
deny the Division's petition to reopen the case of Appellee Bernard Jerding to 
terminate his worker's compensation benefits.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3]      The Workers' 
Compensation Division raised the following issues:

1. Whether the employee-claimant suffered a 
work-related injury on or about July 2, 1989, as defined in Wyoming Statute § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) (1986).

2. Whether an administrative determination of 
entitlement to benefits is subject to modification as a mistake, under Wyoming 
Statute § 27-14-605(a), when the original determination was based upon the 
claimant's fraudulent misrepresentation of essential 
facts.

3. Whether the four year modification period 
specifically set forth in W.S. § 27-14-605(a) is superseded by the language in 
Rule 60(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

After considering these 
issues, this Court determined that additional briefing and argument would help 
resolve this case. The parties were, therefore, ordered to submit additional 
briefing to address:

1. Whether, in light of the language of Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-606 (1991), there was a final determination made by the Worker's 
Compensation Division until a notice of, and an opportunity for, a hearing [was] 
afforded.

2. Whether an employer, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-601(k) (1991), can file a written objection to continued temporary total 
disability at any time.

3. Whether the Director of the Department of 
Employment is empowered to file a written objection, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-601(k) (1991), by Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-607 (1991).

4. Whether, under the circumstances of this case, a 
determination was made with respect to temporary total disability that would 
require compliance with Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a) (1991), in order to change the 
temporary total disability.

[¶4]      Mr. Jerding broke 
his neck on Sunday, July 2, 1989, in a diving accident at Pathfinder Reservoir. 
As a result of this injury, the Jerdings filed an employee's accident report and 
initial claim for benefits with the Workers' Compensation Division. The accident 
report disclosed that Mr. Jerding, a sales representative for Casper Equipment 
Rentals, Inc., and his family were "at Pathfinder Lake to discuss Wyoming well 
projection for Oryx Energy, specifically w/Bill Oldson. Bernard took a dive off 
a beach (surface); hit head on bottom of lake and broke his neck." Casper 
Equipment Rentals also filed an employer's report with the Workers' Compensation 
Division. It acknowledged that Mr. Jerding was a company employee for whom 
hazardous work premiums were paid but denied having any specific knowledge as to 
the July 2, 1989, events.

[¶5]      The Workers' 
Compensation Division made an "Initial Determination" on September 5, 1989, that 
it was "unable to pay any and all claims, until medical reports [were] received 
stating how the injury [was] related to [Mr. Jerding's] employment." Mr. Jerding 
protested this determination and solicited letters in support of his cause from 
Casper Equipment Rentals, Bill Oldson, and his physician. Casper Equipment 
Rentals expressed a belief that Mr. Jerding was taking care of company business 
and that he should be afforded coverage. Mr. Oldson confirmed that Mr. Jerding 
brought a sales proposal to his campsite on July 2, 1989, and asserted that they 
discussed business for approximately half an hour. Mr. Jerding's physician 
stated that Mr. Jerding had been in his constant care since the date of the 
accident and enclosed Mr. Jerding's operative reports. On the basis of this 
information, the Workers' Compensation Division made a "Final Determination" on 
September 18, 1989, that Mr. Jerding had sustained a compensable 
injury.

[¶6]      Mr. Jerding 
received worker's compensation benefits without any apparent interruption until 
September 11, 1991. On that date, the Workers' Compensation Division issued a 
"Determination of Disputed Claim." This document informed Mr. Jerding that the 
Workers' Compensation Division no longer believed that he had suffered a 
compensable injury as defined in Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (Supp. 1993).1 It also notified Mr. Jerding that 
all benefits would cease effective October 1, 1991, and apprised him of his 
right to have a hearing. Mr. Jerding invoked his right to have a hearing and 
moved for a more definite statement in preparation therefor. In response to an 
order which was subsequently issued, the Workers' Compensation Division 
clarified its position in relevant part as follows:

1. The Workers' Compensation Division appears to have 
made a mistake in this case in awarding benefits due to the fact that a review 
of the file indicates that the Employee/Claimant's injuries are not work-related 
and that any current claims are, therefore, not 
compensable.

2. The Division is requesting a modification in this 
case to terminate benefits for all future claims based upon the fact that such 
claims would not appear to be work-related and, therefore, not within the 
definition of injury. It is the Division's position that, as a governmental 
agency, it should not continue to pay claims that are not compensable simply 
because a mistake was made in assessing the validity of past 
claims.

[¶7]  A hearing was held on November 5, 1991, 
before a hearing examiner. Because the Workers' Compensation Division sought to 
modify and terminate Mr. Jerding's benefits on the basis of a mistake having 
been made, the hearing addressed the Division's ability to reopen the case under 
either Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(a) (1991) or W.R.C.P. 60(b).2 The Workers' Compensation 
Division's position, as reflected in its opening argument, was that, in light of 
this Court's subsequently issued opinion in State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division v. Mahoney, 798 P.2d 836 (Wyo. 1990), it mistakenly 
awarded benefits to Mr. Jerding. It argued that, like Ms. Mahoney, Mr. Jerding 
should have been denied benefits because his injury was incidental to 
recreational swimming rather than covered employment. It was during the Workers' 
Compensation Division's attempt to demonstrate that Mr. Jerding was injured 
while he was swimming for recreation that facts initially surfaced which serve 
as the basis for this appeal.

[¶8]      Mr. Jerding was 
the only witness to testify at the hearing. During the first part of the 
questioning by the Workers' Compensation Division, Mr. Jerding repainted the 
picture which had been previously painted in 1989. The original picture was one 
of Mr. Jerding and his family milling around Mr. Oldson's campsite to discuss 
business when Mr. Jerding decided to make the unfortunate dive into the 
reservoir. The following excerpts are illustrative:

Q. What happened after you 
gave your proposal to Mr. Oldson?

A. Well, I visited with him. And then he said, you 
know, it would be a little while before he could get back together with 
me.

So, we - I just hung around there on the beach for a 
while. And when it was time to go see Bill, you know, when I was gathering up 
everybody, I decided to cool off in the lake before I went up to visit with 
him.

That's when I broke my neck.

. . . 
.

Q. You wouldn't allege or 
indicate to me that at the time you were diving into the lake that was 
business-related, was it?

A. Well, the only reason I was out there was to meet 
with this man. And when I dove into the lake it was to cool off, to go up to his 
campsite.

. . . 
.

Q. All right. What happened 
after they pulled you out of the lake? Did somebody call an ambulance or 
something?

A. Well, I thought I had broken my shoulder bone 
because I couldn't move this side of my upper body here. And this arm, the only 
relief of pain was when this arm was held up, physically held up here. So, I 
thought I had broken something here. 

So, we loaded myself - well, I got helped into my 
truck, and we started down the highway toward the 
hospital.

[¶9]      As the result of 
further inquiry, the scene portrayed in the picture changed in kaleidoscopic 
fashion. It turned out that Mr. Jerding and his family, along with a family 
friend, left Casper for the reservoir around mid-day on July 2, 1989, towing the 
family's boat. Mr. Jerding delivered the proposal to Mr. Oldson and talked 
business with him for approximately one-half hour. Mr. Jerding, his family, and 
the friend then went boating and ultimately ended up on a beach on the other 
side of the reservoir. It was from this beach that Mr. Jerding dove into the 
reservoir and sustained his injury. Mr. Jerding estimated that the accident 
occurred within forty-five minutes of the time he left Mr. Oldson's campsite, 
while Mrs. Jerding asserted in the accident report that the accident occurred at 
approximately six o'clock in the evening, involving a time span of several 
hours. In any event, Mr. Jerding was pulled from the reservoir by his friend, 
transported across the lake by boat, and taken in his truck to receive medical 
attention.

[¶10]   The hearing examiner commented at 
length after hearing the evidence. His position was essentially that no evidence 
had been presented which the Workers' Compensation Division could not have 
discovered in 1989. He ruled that the Workers' Compensation Division failed to 
establish that a mistake of a material fact had been made or that any other 
ground for relief from finality existed as provided for in § 27-14-605(a) or 
W.R.C.P. 60(b). Accordingly, the hearing examiner issued an order which denied 
the Workers' Compensation Division's request to reopen the case and required the 
Division to continue providing Mr. Jerding with worker's compensation benefits. 
The district court affirmed this order after a judicial review, except on 
different grounds. The district court ruled that § 27-14-605(a) did not afford 
the relief requested by the Workers' Compensation Division, i.e., termination of 
benefits, and that the Division was time barred from reopening the case under 
W.R.C.P. 60(b). This appeal ensued.

[¶11]   The first issue we confront on 
appeal is whether the district court erroneously ruled that § 27-14-605(a) did 
not afford the relief requested by the Workers' Compensation Division. The 
district court relied upon Mini Mart, Inc. v. Wordinger, 719 P.2d 206 (Wyo. 
1986), to conclude that, under W.R.C.P. 60(b), a petition to reopen a case to 
terminate benefits must be made within one year of the award. Its reliance upon 
Mini Mart, Inc. was misguided as significant changes in the law have occurred 
since we decided that case.

[¶12]   Mini Mart, Inc. involved a petition 
to terminate worker's compensation benefits under either Wyo. Stat. § 27-12-606 
(1983)3 or W.R.C.P. 60(b). A Mini Mart 
employee filed the petition, asserting that a mistake made in her employer's 
accident report resulted in an erroneous award of benefits. The trial court 
decided that W.R.C.P. 60(b) governed the case, as § 27-12-606 spoke of 
"modification" rather than "termination" of benefits, and awarded the relief 
requested. We affirmed on appeal, stating:

Since an award of worker's compensation is a 
"judicial determination" pursuant to § 27-12-607,[4] we think the trial court was 
correct in determining that the action was one for relief from a judgment or 
order and should be decided under Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P.

719 P.2d  at 
208.

[¶13]   The entire Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act was repealed in 1986 and recreated as Wyo. Stat. §§ 27-14-101 
to -804 (1987). 1986 Wyo.Sp.Sess.Laws ch. 3. As part of the 1986 revision, 
worker's compensation decisions were entrusted to the executive branch of 
government. Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-606 (1991), which replaced § 27-12-607, now 
provides:

Each determination or award within the meaning of 
this act is an administrative determination of the rights of the employer, the 
employee and the disposition of money within the worker's compensation account 
as to all matters involved. No determination shall be final without notice and 
opportunity for hearing as required by this act.

Because an award of worker's 
compensation benefits is no longer a "judicial determination," we do not believe 
that, under the circumstances of this case, the modification or termination of 
such an award should be governed by the one-year statute of limitations 
contained in W.R.C.P. 60(b). The revised W.R.C.P. 60(b) recognizes that its 
terms may be superseded by specific legislation.

[¶14]   The Legislature has addressed the 
area presently under consideration in § 27-14-605(a), which 
provides:

(a) If a determination is made in favor of or on 
behalf of an employee for any benefits under this act, an application may be 
made to the division by any party within four (4) years from the date of the 
last payment for additional medical and disability benefits or for a 
modification of the amount of benefits on the ground of increase or decrease of 
incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud.

The debate in this case 
centers on whether the Workers' Compensation Division may petition under this 
reopening provision to terminate benefits awarded by mistake. In our quest to 
resolve this debate, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to 
the lawmakers' intent. Our effort to do so is governed by some well established 
rules of statutory construction. These rules were comprehensively reviewed in 
our recent case of Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish 
Commission, 845 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1993), and will be followed 
here.

[¶15]   The plain language of § 
27-14-605(a) grants any party - employee, employer, or the Workers' Compensation 
Division - a four-year window in which to petition to reopen a case for: (1) 
additional medical and disability benefits; or (2) modification of the amount of 
benefits because (a) of an increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the 
injury, or (b) a mistake or fraud has occurred. While a plain reading of this 
statute does not readily expose any glaring ambiguity, the facts of this case 
uncover a logical ambiguity which must be resolved. The logical ambiguity lies 
in the fact that the Legislature has created a vehicle whereby the Workers' 
Compensation Division, among others, may reopen a case on the grounds of mistake 
or fraud but has ostensibly limited the remedy available to that of 
"modification."

[¶16]   The term "modification" indicates a 
change or alteration, not obliteration or extinguishment. Defined as such, the 
term is appropriate for the lion's share of § 27-14-605(a) cases; i.e., 
petitions to increase or decrease compensation due to a change in condition 
arising solely from the injury. However, applying the same definition to cases 
in which the original award was made by mistake or procured by fraud is 
nonsensical. We perceive no public policy which favors the payment of any 
portion of an unjustified worker's compensation claim. The purpose of § 
27-14-605(a) is to balance the concept of finality with the desire to see that a 
claimant receives no less and no more than that to which he is lawfully 
entitled. See Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction Company, 668 P.2d 649 (Wyo. 1983) 
(discussing § 27-12-606); see generally 3 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION §§ 81.10, 81.51(a) & (b), & 81.52(b) (1989). Consistent 
with this purpose, we hold that the Workers' Compensation Division may petition 
to reopen a case under § 27-14-605(a) for the purpose of terminating worker's 
compensation benefits originally awarded by mistake or procured by fraud.5 

[¶17]   The second issue we confront on 
appeal is whether the hearing examiner erroneously ruled that the Workers' 
Compensation Division failed to present evidence indicating that a mistake had 
occurred or that other grounds existed to justify reopening the case under § 
27-14-605(a). We have stated that, in order to reopen a case under § 
27-14-605(a) because a mistake has been made, the mistake must be one of 
material fact. Prentice Clark House v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation 
Division, 701 P.2d 1162 (Wyo. 1985); Conn, 668 P.2d 649. Whether an injury is 
compensable is a question of fact. Western Power Service & Construction v. 
Van Matre, 657 P.2d 815 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶18]   A review of the record leads us 
ineluctably to the conclusion that the Workers' Compensation Division produced 
an abundance of evidence at the November 5, 1991, hearing to support its 
petition. We hold that the hearing examiner's actions were arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law when 
he denied the Workers' Compensation Division's petition to reopen this case. 
Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) (1990).

[¶19]   Reversed and remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Mr. Jerding's worker's compensation 
benefits should be terminated upon grounds of mistake.

 

THOMAS, Justice, dissenting.

[¶20]   I can readily agree with the 
determination by the majority that this case should be reversed and remanded. I 
analyze the statutes somewhat differently from the majority, however, and I 
would reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing with respect to whether Mr. 
Jerding's injury was one "arising out of and in the course of employment while 
at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer" 
or "incurred while at work in places where the employer's business requires an 
employee's presence and which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties 
incident to the business." WYO. STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) 
(1993).

[¶21]   The point of departure for my views 
is my agreement with the rationale employed in the majority opinion to reject 
the application of the one-year period of limitation set forth in WYO.R.CIV.P. 
60(b). Specifically, I look to WYO. STAT. § 27-14-606 (1991), also quoted in the 
majority opinion, which provides:

Each determination or award within the meaning of 
this act is an administrative determination of the rights of the employer, the 
employee and the disposition of money within the worker's compensation account 
as to all matters involved. No determination shall be final without notice and 
opportunity for hearing as required by this act. (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶22]   I cannot agree, however, in light 
of this statute, reliance by the majority upon WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a) (1991) 
is appropriate. That statute begins with this phrase, "[i]f a determination is 
made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any benefits under this act * * 
*." In my judgment, the invocation of that statutory provision has to depend 
upon a determination that has achieved at least administrative finality in light 
of the language of WYO. STAT. § 27-14-606. In this instance, the only hearing 
was the one out of which this appeal arises and which led to the following 
provisions in the Order Denying Objector-Defendant's Requested Relief and 
Directing Continued Payment of Benefits:

11. The Division's September 18, 1989, "FINAL 
DETERMINATION" constituted an administrative determination as to all matters 
involved, including but not limited to the matter of whether Employee-Claimant's 
July 2, 1989, broken neck constituted a compensable injury under the Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Act.

12. As such, the Division's September 18, 1989, 
decision was entitled to finality, from which the Division may seek relief 
pursuant to Section 27-14-605, W.S. 1986, or Rule 60(b), 
W.R.C.P.

I, therefore, would remand 
for a hearing on the question I have posed since the disposition by the hearing 
examiner was simply procedural.

[¶23]   As one tracks the handling of 
claims through what is now a rather convoluted statutory scheme, it is clear the 
statutory procedure was followed. Ultimately, the division denied further 
benefits, and Jerding requested the initial administrative hearing. While this 
outline of the statutory procedure for managing claims may be too cryptic, it 
provides that the initial filings by both the employee and the employer are made 
with the clerk of court of the county in which the accident occurred. WYO. STAT. 
§§ 27-14-502(a) (1991) and 27-14-506(a) (1991). An initial claim for temporary 
total disability benefits is to be filed with the clerk of court who is to 
transmit a copy to the division, and any subsequent claim is to be filed with 
the division. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-501(e) (1991). It appears administration of the 
claims is to be accomplished by the division.

[¶24]   The division makes the 
determination as to compensability, and notice is required to the employer, 
employee, and the clerk of court. Objections are required within ten days except 
that an employer objecting to a determination for continued temporary total 
disability is not subject to the ten-day requirement. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-601(d) 
(1991). The same exception is preserved in WYO. STAT. § 27-14-601(k)(1991), 
relating to a presumption of consent to the determination, and the last sentence 
of this statute is particularly telling:

If an objection is not filed by an employee, the 
division shall proceed in accordance with a determination of continued temporary 
total disability until such time as written objection may be filed by an 
employer. (Emphasis added.)

The division is afforded the 
rights of an employer in connection with claims:

The director or his designee may for any reason 
appear before the hearing examiner or in the district court and defend against 
any claim and shall in all respects have the same rights of defense as the 
employer. Failure to contest a claim does not constitute waiver by the director 
of his right to participate in further proceedings concerning the award where he 
does not appear and defend at the original hearing or 
trial.

WYO. STAT. § 27-14-607 
(1991).

This statutory language is 
still the same as it was when it was interpreted in Wyoming State Treasurer ex 
rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. Svoboda, 573 P.2d 417, 420 (Wyo. 
1978):

The division, by statute, is granted rights 
equivalent to those of an employer, which include the rights to challenge any 
claim or move to reopen any award.

[¶25]   In light of this statutory 
procedure which resulted in a purely procedural disposition by the hearing 
examiner, I would reverse and remand this case but, as I noted previously, for a 
hearing as to whether this was a covered injury within the meaning of WYO. STAT. 
§ 27-14-102(a)(xi). The information in this record makes it questionable whether 
Jerding could sustain his burden of proof on that issue, but it should be 
submitted to the finder of fact rather than a question of whether benefits can 
be terminated upon grounds of mistake or fraud. The latter issue is not really 
present in this case because of the fact that, in the absence of any hearing, 
there was no determination during the course of the administration of this claim 
that would satisfy WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a). 

 

Footnotes 

1 Section 27-14-102(a)(xi) provides in 
most relevant part:

(xi) "Injury" 
means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and 
includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out 
of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in 
places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and which 
subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the 
business.

2 Section 27-14-605(a) 
provides:

(a) If a 
determination is made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any benefits 
under this act, an application may be made to the division by any party within 
four (4) years from the date of the last payment for additional medical and 
disability benefits or for a modification of the amount of benefits on the 
ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon 
grounds of mistake or fraud.

Before its 
revision in 1992, W.R.C.P. 60(b) provided:

(b) Mistakes; 
inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. - On 
motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within one (1) year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court 
to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or 
proceeding as provided in sections 3-3801 [§ 1-16-401], 3-3805 [repealed, § 1, 
ch. 188, Laws 1977], and 3-3810 [§ 1-16-408], W.C.S. 1945, or to grant relief to 
a party against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without other service 
than by publication as provided in section 3-3802 [§ 1-16-402], as amended. 
Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills 
in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action.

3 Section 27-12-606 was repealed and 
recreated as § 27-14-605 in 1986 without significant textual 
revision.

4 Wyo. Stat. § 27-12-607 (1983) provided 
in pertinent part:

Every award 
within the meaning of this act [§§ 27-12-101 to -804] is a judicial 
determination of the rights of the employer, the employee and the disposition of 
money within the various accounts provided under this act as to all matters 
involved. Except as otherwise provided, the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
shall govern in matters before the courts of this state in reference to this 
act.

This statutory 
section was repealed and recreated as § 27-14-606 in 1986 with significant 
textual revision.

5 For many years prior to the 1986 
revision, the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act contained an express provision 
relating to the termination of benefits. This provision was last codified at 
Wyo. Stat. § 27-12-614 (1983) and provided in pertinent 
part:

The director 
may reopen any case in which an order of award has been made. He shall petition 
for the reopening of the case and file it with the court which granted the 
award, within thirty (30) days after the date on which he received the order of 
award. The petition must show probable cause for error in the amount of the 
award, the character of the award, or the grounds on which the award was made, 
and may specify as a reason for reopening the case existing evidence not given 
in the original hearing, showing the general nature and effect of such 
evidence.

The Legislature 
deleted this provision in 1986 without giving any explanation. While we do not 
understand why this was done, we have the responsibility to construe § 
27-14-605(a) in a reasonable and practical 
manner.