Case Title: SPINNER v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-222

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
SPINNER v. STATE2003 WY 10675 P.3d 1016Case Number: 01-222Decided: 09/05/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

LANCE 
W. SPINNER,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
and Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Rebecca A. 
Lewis, Special Assistant Attorney General.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      In June 2001, a 
Campbell County jury found Lance Spinner (appellant) guilty of battery against a 
household member in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2003), a felony.  The 
district court sentenced appellant to a fifteen to twenty-four month prison 
term.  On appeal, appellant argues 
that the district court erred in allowing the State to introduce expert rebuttal 
testimony that amounted to improper character evidence, that in their trial 
testimony, officers attributed statements to appellant that were obtained in 
violation of appellant's Miranda rights, that the prosecutor improperly 
commented on appellant's pre-arrest silence, that the district court erred in 
allowing witness testimony regarding the alleged victim's hearsay statements 
pursuant to the excited utterance exception, that the district court erred in 
failing to bifurcate the proceedings concerning evidence of appellant's prior 
convictions, and that these claimed errors amounted to cumulative error 
requiring a reversal of appellant's conviction.  We reverse and remand for a new 
trial.

 

 

[¶2]      Appellant phrases 
the appellate issues as follows:

 

ISSUE 
I

 

Whether 
the trial court erred in allowing the testimony, on rebuttal, of the State's 
expert witness Michelle Daigle, as said testimony was used by the State as 
improper character evidence against appellant and it was not true rebuttal 
evidence?

 

ISSUE 
II

 

Whether 
appellant was timely advised of his Miranda rights, and whether 
statements made by appellant which were used against him, were in violation of 
his constitutional rights?

 

ISSUE 
III

 

Whether 
the prosecutor impermissibly commented on appellant's pre-arrest silence, 
solicited impermissible evidence of appellant's pre-arrest silence and argued 
appellant's guilt based upon appellant's pre-arrest silence, all in violation of 
appellant's constitutional rights?

 

ISSUE 
IV

 

Whether 
the district court erred by admitting prejudicial and improper hearsay, 
determining that such hearsay qualified as an "excited utterance" under W.R.E. 
803(2)?

 

ISSUE 
V

 

Whether 
appellant was denied due process when the court failed to bifurcate the domestic 
violence trial from the penalty phase, thus allowing the jury to hear about Mr. 
Spinner's two prior domestic violence convictions?

 

ISSUE 
VI

 

Because 
of the numerous errors made during appellant's trial, did cumulative error 
occur?

 

 

[¶3]      On January 19, 
2001, appellant and his girlfriend, Jessica Manke (Manke), shared a residence in 
Campbell County.  That evening, the 
two went to a party at Sean Eckenrod's (Eckenrod) residence.  Upon arriving at the party, appellant 
and Manke began arguing and raised mutual allegations of unfaithfulness.  Manke returned home and appellant 
remained at the party.  Around 4:00 
a.m. on January 20th, Eckenrod and appellant returned to appellant's 
residence, where appellant and Manke resumed arguing.

 

[¶4]      We will very 
generally refer to the witness testimony as to what occurred thereafter.  Eckenrod testified that during the 
argument, Manke twice initiated physical contact with appellant and also asked 
Eckenrod to "knock" appellant "out."  
According to Eckenrod, appellant ultimately turned and walked away from 
Manke, and Manke locked herself in the bathroom.  Eckenrod and appellant continued to 
converse, and Eckenrod left the residence by 5:30 a.m.

 

[¶5]      Appellant chose 
to testify at trial.  He testified 
that during the argument, Manke twice initiated physical contact with him and he 
"threw her off," he and Manke disturbed items in their bedroom as each wanted 
the other to leave the residence with their respective belongings, and Manke 
then "ran into the bathroom and locked the door."  According to appellant, Manke stated 
that she would not leave the residence and threatened suicide.  At some point, appellant heard glass 
"shattering" and unlocked the bathroom door with a kitchen knife.  He discovered the bathroom in disarray 
and Manke holding glass in her hands.  
Appellant removed the glass from Manke's hands, which appeared to be cut 
and scraped, and attempted to calm Manke.  
According to appellant, Manke then left the residence in her 
car.

 

[¶6]      Manke did not 
testify in person at trial.  
Instead, appellant's counsel played her taped preliminary hearing 
testimony to the jury.  In that 
testimony, Manke stated that she initiated physical contact with appellant 
during the argument, he "pushed" her away but did not otherwise initiate 
physical contact with her, and she locked herself in the bathroom.  According to Manke, she "popped a 
handful of sleeping pills" because she did not want appellant to leave and 
"punched out a picture frame."  
Appellant entered the bathroom and held her only "to keep me from hurting 
myself," and Manke left the residence for the Knigge residence because she 
wanted "sympathy."  At the Knigge 
residence, Manke told the police that appellant choked her, kicked her, and 
pulled her hair, but claimed at the preliminary hearing that she lied to the 
officer out of "[a]nger, frustration, and I was wanting to get Lance back," "it 
was revenge."

 

[¶7]      Lyle "Buzz" 
Knigge, and his girlfriend Mary Knigge, lived three trailers from appellant and 
Manke.  At approximately 7:00 a.m. 
on January 20th, while Buzz and Mary Knigge were sleeping, Manke 
entered the Knigge residence, "crying and screaming," through an unlocked patio 
door.  Buzz Knigge, awakened from a 
deep sleep, asked "What the hell is going on?," to which a "pretty upset" Manke 
replied "Lance just beat the shit out of me."  According to Mary Knigge, Manke came 
"running in" and appeared "scared," and told Mary Knigge that she and appellant 
"got in a fight" and appellant was "choking her."  Mary Knigge observed redness on Manke's 
neck, and an injury to her hand.  
Mr. Knigge called the police.

 

[¶8]      Officers Rebecca 
West and Chuck Deaton arrived at the Knigge residence shortly thereafter.  As the officers arrived, they 
encountered appellant as he proceeded towards the Knigge residence.  After some interaction, Officer West 
went inside the Knigge residence, while Officer Deaton remained outside with 
appellant.  Upon entering the 
residence, Officer West recalled that Manke was "real stiff" and "lethargic," 
"[a]lmost in shock," her voice was "scratchy and she kept having to clear her 
throat."  According to the officer, 
Manke's right hand was covered in blood, a couple of the knuckles swollen and 
bruised, her throat area was red, and she complained of a bruise on her arm and 
a knot on the left side of her forehead.

 

[¶9]      Officer West 
exited the residence, informed appellant that he was under arrest, and a 
struggle between appellant and the officers ensued.  At some point during the struggle, 
Officer West recalled appellant screaming "she's cheating on me, what was I 
supposed to do."  The officers 
subdued appellant and Officer Jason Marcus transported appellant to the 
detention center.  According to 
Officer Marcus, appellant again stated "What was I supposed to do?  She was cheating on me" during the 
transport.  Appellant also 
apparently stated that he had not done anything to warrant his 
arrest.

 

[¶10]   Manke informed an EMT who responded 
to the Knigge residence that she "had been hit with a fist to her head and 
shoulders, and that she had been choked."  
She also complained of neck, left clavicle, and right wrist pain, and 
tenderness in her lower back.  A 
nurse noted that Manke reported "right hand pain through glass frame.  Neck and back.  Fell into tub.  Choked.  Hit head."

 

[¶11]   Officer West went to appellant's 
residence and described the scene as follows:

 

As 
we go into the back in the main master bedroom, the place is destroyed.  There's blankets everywhere and the 
curtains were ripped off the windows.  
The clothes are ripped  thrown everywhere.  It's a complete mess.  The window above the bed has been 
shattered.  There's glass on the 
floor.

 

So 
we go in the bathroom and there's a picture frame that's wooden in the garbage 
can and also glass on the floor as well as in the garbage can.  There's a broken towel rack.  There's clothes and stuff strung all 
over the place in the bathroom.

 

Two 
days later, Manke's mother observed bruising on Manke's neck that "looked like 
from fingers."  However, when 
Officer West contacted Manke to take pictures of bruising, Manke replied that 
there was no bruising.

 

[¶12]   Appellant was charged with battery 
on a household member in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii), 
a felony.  In June 2001, a jury 
found him guilty of that offense, and the district court sentenced appellant to 
a fifteen to twenty-four month prison term.  Appellant appeals from that judgment and 
sentence.

 

 

 

[¶13]   Appellant argues that the 
prosecutor improperly commented on appellant's pre-arrest silence during opening 
statement, in questioning law enforcement officers during the prosecution's 
case-in-chief and rebuttal case, in cross-examining appellant, and during the 
prosecution's closing and rebuttal argument.  Appellant's trial counsel did not object 
to these alleged comments at trial.  
On appeal, it is therefore incumbent upon appellant to demonstrate plain 
error in that "the record clearly shows an error that transgressed a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a substantial right."  Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 
939 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶14]   The record clearly reflects what 
occurred at trial without resorting to speculation.  To accurately establish the context of 
the challenged statements, we quote extensively from the trial record.  The prosecutor made the following 
remarks during opening statement:

 

The 
police . . . [p]ulled up and Becky West sees this man, the defendant, 
approaching [the Knigge residence] quickly.  She intercepts him at the fence.  The defendant is just approaching the 
gateway to Buzz's yard when Becky West approaches him and intercepts 
him.

 

And 
she says, "Who are you, because we just got called to this 
disturbance."

 

She 
just wants to know his name.  Who 
are you?  The defendant refuses to 
give her his name.  She says, "Where 
do you live?"

 

The 
defendant refuses to even say where he lives.

 

He's 
asked several times by officers who he is, and never once for the simple request 
just to know who he is does he give them any information at 
all.

 

He's 
just trying to dodge around moving back and forth and trying to get closer and 
closer and closer to the inside of Buzz Knigge's house where Jessica had ran 
to.

 

In 
fact, at one point the officers are out there and he says he wants to go check 
on his car trying to go around.  
There's a back entrance to Buzz Knigge's house, ladies and gentlemen, 
back here.  The defendant tries to 
go around that way and they intercept and say, no, you need to stay right here 
until we figure out what's going on.

 

[¶15]   The prosecutor then elicited the 
following testimony from Officer West during the prosecution's 
case-in-chief:

 

A.  We got a report that the dispatcher said 
she received a 911 call from [the Knigge address] stating that there was a 
female there that had run from [appellant's address] because there had been a 
physical family fight between her and a male.

 

Q.  So when you pulled up to [the Knigge 
address], did you have any names at that point as to who was involved and in 
what?

 

A.  No, we did not.  The only name we had was that the victim 
was at Buzz Knigge's house.

 

Q.  Okay.  When you pulled up to [the Knigge 
address], do you see anything right on pulling up?

 

A.  Yeah.  As we were pulling up to the house, we 
noticed that there was a male dressed in jeans and a green long-sleeve shirt 
walking towards the trailer.  He's 
almost to the corner of the yard when we pull up in the drive 
there.

 

. 
. .

 

A.  As we're pulling in, he's still on the 
street and he crosses over and he's just about to the corner of the 
residence.  
. . .

 

. 
. .

 

Q.  When you see this male approaching [the 
Knigge address], what do you do?

 

A.  Well, I immediately  I was in the 
passenger's side.  I immediately get 
out of the patrol car.  Officer 
Deaton gets out shortly after me and we confront the male.  He's about to the gate.  He hasn't quite made it to the chain 
link gate.  Then at that time I 
asked him what his name was and if he lived there.  And he stated no, and he wouldn't tell 
me what his name was.

 

Q.  Let me slow you down here.  . . .

 

. 
. .

 

Q.  Okay.  So you asked him what his name was and 
he wouldn't give that to you? 

 

A.  No.  He told me he needed to go inside of the 
trailer and I asked him if he lived there and he told me no.  

 

Q.  What trailer is he saying that he needs 
to go inside of?

 

A.  Into Buzz's trailer there.  I knew that to be Buzz Knigge's house 
from prior contacts.

 

. 
. .

 

Q.  Okay.  What do you do at that 
point?

 

A.  After he wouldn't tell me who he was and 
why he needed to be in the trailer, I told him we received a report from this 
trailer and we were there investigating a 911 call and needed to know what was 
going on.  That's why it was 
important that we know who he was.

 

. 
. .

 

Q.  You were just investigating at that 
point?

 

A.  Yeah.  We hadn't even touched him at that 
point.  We weren't letting him in 
the gate.  He kept trying to get in 
the gate but, yeah, I told him I couldn't let him in the house until we knew 
what was going on.

 

Q.  What happens at that 
point?

 

A.  He was real nervous.  He was kind of bouncing off the sidewalk 
back and forth.  Wouldn't stand 
still.  Wouldn't answer.  Wouldn't tell Chuck [Deaton] who he 
was.  Wouldn't tell me who he 
was.  At one point he tried to walk 
around me and reach for the latch on the chain link gate and actually flipped 
the latch up.  At that point I 
grabbed the top of the gate and stood directly in front of 
him.

 

. 
. .

 

A.  I told him he wasn't going to go in 
until we found out what was going on inside.

 

Q.  What happens at that 
point?

 

A.  About that time is when he tells me 
fine, he's just going to go home.  
He won't tell us where home is.  
And Officer Marcus shows up about that time.

 

. 
. .

 

Q.  Is this male in the green shirt  let me 
 just to clear things up, were you able to get the name at some point of who 
the male in the green shirt was?

 

A.  Yeah, I  after I made an initial 
appearance on the deck and I just  I hadn't even crossed over the threshold of 
the trailer, I asked Buzz.  And the 
female later identified him that this was the guy.  And Buzz said, "Yeah, that's 
Lance."  And I confirmed with 
Jessica that that was Lance.  And 
then I stepped out and asked him if that was his name and he said it 
was.

 

Q.  Okay.  How many times before you actually found 
out from other people who he was?  
How many times had he refused to give you that 
information?

 

A.  I asked him three maybe four times, and 
I think that Officer Deaton asked him once or twice.

 

Q.  And until these people inside the 
trailer, inside Buzz's house, until they gave you his name, was the defendant 
ever cooperative in giving you his name?

 

A.  No, that was as much cooperation as he 
ever gave.

 

Q.  Let me ask you about his mood.  You said that he was kind of bouncing 
around.

 

A.  Yeah.  He was real  wouldn't stand still.  He wouldn't talk to us.  Real  just, yeah, just bouncing off the 
wall.  He was real hyped 
up.

 

. 
. .

 

Q.  Okay.  During this time when you were 
approaching with Lance Spinner, did you ever  did he ever say anything to you, 
to you two officers?

 

A.  While I'm  at what 
point?

 

Q.  Well, did he ever respond to any 
questions of yours?

 

A.  Not to mine, no.  He just refused to answer anything I had 
to say.

 

Q.  Okay.  Beyond the questions that you've already 
testified about that you asked him, his name and where he lived, did you ask him 
any other questions?

 

A.  I had asked him if his wife or 
girlfriend was inside the trailer and if they had had a fight.  And he responded no to both of those 
questions.

 

Q.  Did you, beyond asking him about that, 
did you ask him any other questions?

 

A.  I just asked him what he was doing down 
there and he wouldn't tell us.

 

The 
prosecutor queried Officer Jason Marcus in a similar 
manner:

 

Q.  Can you tell us  when you first saw 
this person you described as Lance Spinner, can you tell us what is his 
mood?

 

A.  He was very excited at that point.  I speak to Officer Deaton and he wants 
me to stay with the male, and he at that time wanted to get inside the fence 
area.

 

Q.  Who wanted to get inside the fence 
area?

 

A.  Lance Spinner.

 

Q.  How do you know 
that?

 

A.  He said he wanted to go in and see if 
his girlfriend was there.

 

Q.  And you said he was very excited.  Can you describe what was it about him 
that made you think he was excited?

 

A.  He was walking back and forth and 
attempted to get inside the fenced area.  
I told him that he needed to stay here and talk to me, and I tried to get 
his name at that point.  And he 
again tried to go inside the fenced area.  
I put my hand on his arm to stop him from going inside the fenced area 
just to see, you know, his name and other just general information I needed at 
that point.

 

Q.  When you asked him the first time for 
his name, what did he tell you?

 

A.  He didn't say anything.  He was very in tuned about just the 
front of the residence.  He was 
staring at the front door of the residence.

 

. 
. .

 

A.  Yes.  I put my hand on him to hold him  to 
stop from going inside the fenced area.

 

Q.  What happened at that 
point?

 

A.  At that time he again starts to pace and 
starts to go around the back of the residence saying he wants to see if his car 
is there.

 

Q.  Does he actually head off in some 
direction?

 

A.  Yes.  He goes toward the back of the residence 
along the side.

 

. 
. .

 

A.  At that time, again, you know, we got about 
to here.  I 
told him we needed to come back because I wanted to make sure the other officers 
were okay at that point.  And I told him just to stay over here by the 
front area of the home.  And asked him again what his name was.

 

Q.  Okay.  When you get him around to the back  to the 
front or the first gate where you saw him at and you asked him his name, what  
did he give you his name?

 

A.  No, he doesn't.  Again, he says that 
he just wants to see if she's in there.  And Officer Deaton then comes out to assist 
me at that point.

 

. . .

 

Q.  At any time before Officer West comes back 
outside, does he give you any of the information that you requested?

 

A.  No.

 

[¶16]   The prosecutor questioned Officer Jay 
Ostrem as follows regarding a phone conversation with appellant:

 

A.  I told him that I was Sergeant Ostrem with 
the police department; that I was returning his call, and I asked how I could 
help him.

 

Q.  What did he say?

 

A.  He wanted to know why officers had been in 
his house and who these officers were.

 

Q.  And what did you say?

 

A.  I told him that the officers were probably in 
his house because it was a crime scene.

 

Q.  Did he respond?

 

A.  He stated that he had been arrested at Buzz 
Knigge's, which would be down in the area of [the Knigge address] and 
[appellant] was living at [appellant's address].  

 

Q.  And what did you say in the next step of the 
conversation?

 

A.  Well, I asked him, "Where did you assault the 
girl?"

 

Q.  Was that exact language?

 

A.  Yes.

 

Q.  What did he say?

 

. . .

 

A.  He said, "In my house."

 

Q.  Was that it?

 

A.  Well, I told him, "Well, then it's a crime 
scene."

 

Q.  When you tell him that it's a crime scene, 
does he have any further explanation?

 

A.  Well, he seems fine with that.  And then asked who 
the officers were that were in the house. 

 

. . .

 

Q.  Sergeant Ostrem, did Mr. Spinner ever say 
anything exactly about the fight itself?

 

A.  No, he didn't.

 

Q.  Okay.  Did he ever question why it was a crime scene 
beyond what you told him?

 

A.  No. 

 

[¶17]   The prosecutor made the following 
remarks during closing and rebuttal argument:

 

What we do know with certainty is that [Manke] ran out of 
the house.  She 
was upset.  She 
was crying.  
She ran up to Buzz Knigge's house . . ..

 

. . .

 

The defendant not far behind because just as the police get 
there, the defendant is approaching Buzz's residence . . ..  He's moving 
straight across from [appellant's address] to [the Knigge address] and he wants 
to get in.

 

The police arrive.  They don't even know who is involved in it, 
yet, they don't know anything so they approach the defendant and they say, "Hey, 
what's your name?"  
He won't even give them that information.  They said, "Where do you live?"  He won't give them 
that information either.

 

He's agitated.  He's moving back and forth.  He's trying to get 
closer and closer to [the Knigge address].  And why, ladies and gentlemen?  Because he wants to 
get to the victim before the police do.  That's what makes sense from that 
pattern.

 

And why does he want to get to the victim before the police 
do?

 

Because he just attacked her.  He just caused the 
injury to her and he doesn't want to get in trouble again.

 

. . .

 

The defendant keeps trying to get around the officers.  In fact, he starts 
outside the gate, ladies and gentlemen, trying to get around them.  And as the officers 
are talking with him trying to get information from him, he repeatedly refuses 
to give any information.  He then tries to go around to the other 
side.  And 
around here, ladies and gentlemen, to the other door to get at [Manke].

 

The officers stop him.  Jason Marcus says, "No, you've got to stay 
over here."  
And by that time the defendant manages to sneak around and get inside 
Buzz Knigge's gate before the officers are able to slow him down and stop him 
from moving any further.  They even have to warn him, you know, if you 
don't stop that, you may be charged with interference.  He's that 
uncooperative.  
He's that excited.  He's that eager to get in with Jessica Manke 
and prevent her from hurting him.  Prevent her from calling the law on him and 
getting him the just reward that he deserves for what he just did to her.

 

                        
. . .

 

While speaking with Sergeant Ostrem, Sergeant Ostrem 
returns his phone call.  The defendant  he wants to know why officers 
were in his house, and Sergeant Ostrem returns the phone call and says, "Well, 
it's a crime scene."  

 

Defendant says, "I was arrested in front of Buzz Knigge's 
house." 

 

Sergeant Ostrem says, "Where did you assault the girl?"

 

Defendant says, ["]What?"

 

"Where did you assault your wife or girlfriend?"

 

Defendant says, "In my home."

 

And that is why it's a crime scene.  . . .

 

. . .

 

[Appellant's trial counsel] says that Sergeant Ostrem was 
trying to trip [appellant] up.  What story makes more sense to you?

 

Okay, ladies and gentlemen, we had Sergeant Ostrem testify 
that there was nothing more to the conversation.  No explanation of innocence by the 
defendant.  
That he wasn't injecting other things about protesting that Sergeant 
Ostrem had used the word "assault" with him.  But, ladies and gentlemen, when [appellant's 
trial counsel] says what story makes more sense to you, that's when you are to 
draw credibility  you have to think about who is more credible of a 
witness?

 

[¶18]   Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11 provides that 
no "person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case . 
. .."  In Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390-91 (Wyo. 
1995) (footnote omitted), we clearly and 
unequivocally held that pursuant to this constitutional provision, an 
individual's

  

constitutional right to silence exists at all times--before 
arrest, at arrest, and after arrest; before a Miranda warning and after it.  The right is 
self-executing.

 

            
Under the erroneous view that no constitutional right to pre-arrest 
silence exists, a citizen who stands mute in the face of accusatory 
interrogation about the crime during a law enforcement investigation and inquiry 
is without constitutional protection against law enforcement personnel who treat 
silence as probative evidence of guilt.  Law enforcement personnel can time the 
citizen's arrest to occur after the citizen stands mute in the face of the 
accusation.  
This practice, which encourages manipulative timing of arrests, does not 
serve the constitutional provision's purpose of protecting the right to silence 
during pre-arrest, accusatory interrogation by the state's agents.  Permitting 
prosecutorial use of that silence discourages a law enforcement system's 
reliance upon extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful 
investigation and, instead, encourages reliance upon compulsory 
self-disclosure.  
See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 1764 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964).

 

            
Since the right to remain silent is a self-executing right, an accused is 
presumed to be exercising the right by his silence, pre-arrest and pre-Miranda when questioned by the state's agents for 
purposes of a criminal investigation.  Accordingly, the prosecutorial use of the 
citizen's silence to infer the guilt of the citizen is constitutionally 
prohibited.

 

            
Prosecutorial violations are subject to the Clenin [v. State, 573 P.2d 844 (Wyo.1978)] rule's 
mandate that failure to respect the constitutional right of the citizen-accused 
not to have his silence called to the jury's attention will entitle the accused 
to a reversal of conviction.  Westmark v. 
State, 693 P.2d 220, 221-22 
(Wyo.1984), citing Clenin.   A reference 
to silence which is not a "comment" will not be reversed absent a showing of 
prejudice.  Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1382 
(Wyo.1981).

 

            
. . .

 

            
A comment upon an accused's silence occurs when used to the state's 
advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that 
the silence was an admission of guilt.

 

[¶19]   In analyzing right-to-silence cases, we 
consider "the entire context in which the statements were made" and we will "not 
take sentences and phrases out of context."  Robinson v. 
State, 11 P.3d 361, 373 (Wyo. 
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001).  We also evaluate

 

whether the prosecutor asked improper questions, whether he 
emphasized or followed up on the silence issue, and whether he attempted to 
exploit the issue in any way. 

 

Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 
45, ¶ 39, 43 P.3d 80, 96 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

[¶20]   We conclude that the totality of the 
prosecutor's remarks, particularly during opening statement, and the 
prosecutor's repeated, specific questions and resulting witness testimony during 
the prosecution's case-in-chief, amounted to a "comment" on appellant's 
pre-arrest silence, and necessarily affected appellant's substantial right to 
"not have his silence called to the jury's attention."1  The prosecutor 
began the trial with remarks that exploited anticipated evidence regarding 
appellant's pre-arrest silence in the face of questions by police officers, and 
the characterizations contained in those remarks created a clear inference 
before the jury that appellant's silence and lack of verbal cooperation were 
consistent with his guilt.2  The prosecutor stated that when Officer West 
arrived and intercepted appellant as he quickly approached the Knigge residence, 
she just wanted to know appellant's name, and appellant "refuse[d]" to provide 
it to her; that the officer then asked appellant where he lived (which, at 
trial, the prosecutor knew to be the alleged crime scene) and appellant 
"refuse[d] to even say where he lives;" and finally that appellant was "asked 
several times by officers who he is, and never once for the simple request just 
to know who he is does he give them any information at all." 

 

[¶21]   Having established this context and its 
accompanying inference in opening statement, the prosecutor proceeded to elicit 
testimony from several police officers regarding appellant's pre-arrest 
silence.  
Officer West first testified in response to a general question that 
appellant would not tell her his name.  However, the prosecutor revisited that 
testimony, repeatedly asked specific questions in that respect, and ultimately 
elicited a string of similar responses from the witness.3  At one point in 
questioning Officer West, the prosecutor even emphasized the extent of 
appellant's refusal to answer the officers' inquiries:

 

Q.  Okay.  How many times before you actually found out 
from other people who he was?  How many times had he refused to give you 
that information?

 

A.  I asked him three maybe four times, and I 
think that Officer Deaton asked him once or twice.

 

Q.  And until these people inside the trailer, 
inside Buzz's house, until they gave you his name, was the defendant ever 
cooperative in giving you his name?

 

A.  No, that was as much cooperation as he ever 
gave.

 

The prosecutor then asked similar, quite specific questions 
of Officer Marcus and, to some degree, Officer Ostrem.4

 

[¶22]   During closing and rebuttal argument, 
the prosecutor reiterated that "as the officers are talking with [appellant] 
trying to get information from him," appellant would not "even" provide his name 
or address to the officers and "repeatedly refuse[d]" to give them "any 
information."  
While these statements were somewhat more focused in conjunction with the 
prosecutor's argument that appellant was attempting to "get to the victim before 
the police" because "he just attacked her," to "prevent her from hurting him," 
and to prevent "her from calling the law on him and getting him the just reward 
that he deserves for what he just did to her,"5 evidence of 
appellant's silence was not meaningfully probative of that argument as opposed 
to the aforementioned inference; indeed, the substantive use of "silence" is generally of 
minimal probative value.  See, e.g., Combs v. 
Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 285 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035 (2000).6  Further, the officers testified extensively 
to other evidence regarding appellant's alleged demeanor, alleged conduct, and 
alleged purpose at the Knigge residence (Officer Marcus testified that appellant 
said that he wanted to "go in and see if his girlfriend was there") that formed 
a basis much more probative of the prosecutor's argument.  Lastly, in 
asserting that appellant's version of his conversation with Officer Ostrem was 
less credible than Officer Ostrem's version, the prosecutor stated that in 
talking with Officer Ostrem, there was "no explanation of innocence" by 
appellant.7 

 

[¶23]   The State contends that the instant 
case is indistinguishable from Lancaster in that 
appellant's silence regarding his name and address was "largely in response to 
questions that were not about the crime being investigated."  In Lancaster, 2002 WY 
45, ¶¶ 37 and 40, 43 P.3d  at 96 and 97, an officer testified that upon encountering Lancaster 
"walking along a dirt road in a rural area at about 6:00 a.m." and, knowing that 
police in nearby Casper were attempting to locate a murder suspect, the officer 
asked Lancaster if he was "okay" and whether everything was "all right."  According to the 
officer, Lancaster "ignored me or at least I felt he ignored me," "didn't 
respond to me at all," and the officer "felt that was suspicious."  Id., 2002 WY 
45, ¶ 37, 43 P.3d  at 96.  We concluded that Lancaster

 

was not a case where, faced with the accusations of 
investigating officers, the appellant made no response, only to have his silence 
used against him at trial as evidence of guilt.  Instead, the fact that the appellant 
initially ignored the officer and failed to respond to him was presented in 
direct testimony simply as part of the circumstances under which the officer 
first encountered the appellant.  It is significant that the questions and 
answers had nothing to do with the crime itself.  It is also significant that, unlike in Tortolito, the prosecutor did not mention in opening or 
argue in closing that the appellant's silence somehow proved guilt.

 

Id.

 

[¶24]   The circumstances of the instant case 
are distinguishable from those in Lancaster.  In the instant 
case, Officers West, Deaton, and Marcus responded to a scene that included the 
alleged victim and the alleged suspect.  At different times in the course of 
investigating that scene, the officers asked appellant to identify himself and 
his residence (at trial, the prosecutor, witnesses, and ultimately the jury were 
aware that appellant was the alleged suspect and that his residence was the 
alleged crime scene).  
The prosecutor's repeated use and characterization of that evidence 
throughout the trial transformed the instant case into much more than the brief 
testimony from one witness presented "simply as part of the circumstances under 
which the officer[s] first encountered" appellant.  Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 37, 43 P.3d  at 96.

 

[¶25]   Appellant also challenges portions of 
the prosecutor's cross-examination of appellant and a question posed to Officer 
West during the prosecution's rebuttal case.  While one might conceivably argue that such 
questioning was appropriate for limited impeachment purposes once appellant 
chose to testify, neither party specifically addresses that issue on 
appeal.  
Nevertheless, considering the facts of the instant appeal, we are 
concerned that to validate the prosecutor's remarks during opening statement and 
the questions posed, and the substantive testimony elicited, thereafter during 
the State's case-in-chief could place "substantial pressure" on a defendant "to 
waive the privilege against self-incrimination . . . at trial in order to 
explain the prior silence" and undermine one of the fundamental values 
surrounding the privilege.  Combs, 205 F.3d  
at 285.

 

Other Issues

 

[¶26]   Appellant asserts that the district 
court's failure to bifurcate the trial, and separately to consider evidence of 
his two prior convictions for battery against a household member, violated 
appellant's right to procedural due process.8  Appellant's trial 
counsel did not request a bifurcated trial.  Instead, appellant's trial counsel and the 
prosecutor stipulated to the jury at the end of the prosecution's case-in-chief 
that appellant had two prior battery convictions "against his former 
girlfriend," who was a household member, and then stipulated that the 
slightly-redacted judgment(s) and sentence(s) reflecting these prior convictions 
be introduced into evidence.  We anticipate that, on remand, appellant will 
raise this issue in the district court.

 

[¶27]   We first note that the United 
States Supreme Court has rejected the argument that due process requires a 
"two-stage jury trial . . . whenever a State seeks to invoke an 
habitual-offender statute."  Spencer v. State of 
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564-65, 87 S. Ct. 648, 17 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1967).  In Spencer, 385 U.S.  at 559, the petitioners claimed that "Texas' use of prior convictions in 
the current criminal trial of each petitioner was so egregiously unfair upon the 
issue of guilt or innocence as to offend the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . .."  
The United States Supreme Court found as follows:

 

To say the United States Constitution is infringed simply 
because this type of evidence may be prejudicial and limiting instructions 
inadequate to vitiate prejudicial effects, would make inroads into this entire 
complex code of state criminal evidentiary law, and would threaten other large 
areas of trial jurisprudence.  . . .

 

. . .

 

. . .  Two-part jury trials are rare in our 
jurisprudence; they have never been compelled by this Court as a matter of 
constitutional law, or even as a matter of federal procedure.  With recidivism the 
major problem that it is, substantial changes in trial procedure in countless 
local courts around the country would be required were this Court to sustain the 
contentions made by these petitioners.  This we are unwilling to do.  To take such a step 
would be quite beyond the pale of this Court's proper function in our federal 
system.  It 
would be a wholly unjustifiable encroachment by this Court upon the 
constitutional power of States to promulgate their own rules of evidence to try 
their own state-created crimes in their own state courts, so long as their rules 
are not prohibited by any provision of the United States Constitution, which 
these rules are not.

 

Id. at 562-69 (footnote omitted).  Indeed, the

 

question of whether a determination by the court or a jury 
of a second or previous conviction or at what stage for purposes of enhancing 
punishment raises no constitutional question.  It raises only a question of procedure.  In Spencer v. State of Texas, . . . the court recognized 
that whether the question is presented to the jury or the court, even though 
there is a potential for prejudice when presented to a jury, it deals with a 
rule of evidence, not a question of constitutional due process.

 

Munoz v. Maschner, 590 P.2d 1352, 1357-58 (Wyo. 1979).

 

[¶28]   Aside from appellant's argument that 
the district court's failure to bifurcate the proceedings violated his right to 
procedural due process, appellant makes no substantive argument regarding 
precisely what procedure should be utilized.  As a result, neither party has adequately 
briefed the issue and we will therefore only provide the following general 
guidance.  
First, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii) provide as follows:

 

(b)  A person is guilty of battery if he 
unlawfully touches another in a rude, insolent or angry manner or intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.

 

. . .

 

(f)  A household member as defined by W.S. 
35-21-102 who commits a second or subsequent battery against any other household 
member shall be punished as follows:

 

. . .

 

(ii)  A person convicted upon a plea of guilty or 
no contest or found guilty of a third or subsequent offense under this 
subsection against any other household member, after having been convicted upon 
a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of a violation of W.S. 
6-2-501(a), (b), (e) or (f), 6-2-502, 6-2-503, 6-2-504 or other substantially 
similar law of this or any other state, tribe or territory against any other 
household member within the previous ten (10) years is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than two (2) years, a fine of not more 
than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or both.

 

We have determined that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(f) does 
not "create a new offense," but is "merely a sentence enhancement provision 
rather than being a new independent battery against a household member' 
offense" and enhances "the punishment for individuals who commit simple assault 
or battery two or more times against household members."  Fall v. State, 963 P.2d 981, 984 (Wyo. 
1998).  It applies 

 

when the accused is presently accused of battering a 
household member and has previously been convicted one or more times of 
battering a household member.

 

Id.

 

[¶29]   Second, according to the United States 
Supreme Court,

 

[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000).  See also United 
States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1264-65 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 1166 (2002) and Joyner v. 
State, 2002 WY 174, ¶ 19 n.5, 58 P.3d 331, 337-38 n.5 
(Wyo. 2002).  In Jaramillo v. City 
of Green River, 719 P.2d 655, 659 (Wyo. 1986), a case involving a city ordinance that enhanced the 
penalty for driving while under the influence based on prior convictions, we 
held:

 

             
The rule in Wyoming is that unless a statutory right exists to have the 
question of prior convictions submitted to the jury, such as that encompassed in 
the Wyoming habitual criminal statutes, §§ 6-10-201 through 6-10-203, W.S.1977, 
the court rather than the jury can determine the question of prior 
convictions.  
Jaramillo contends, however, that there is language in State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, Wyo., 674 P.2d 732 (1983) which 
subjects the submission of prior convictions for driving while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor to the same requirements as the habitual 
criminal statute.  
The language upon which Jaramillo relies is:

 

". . . [T]he statutory requirement that the sentence to be 
imposed by the court be more severe as the number of prior convictions of the 
defendant increases makes the [D.W.U.I.] statute a habitual criminal act.  Before the sentence 
of a defendant can be enhanced under such act, he must have notice of the fact 
that such is contemplated.  Generally, the notice must be contained in 
the information or charge under which he is prosecuted.  Evans v. State, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1214 (1982). 
Section 6-10-203(a), W.S.1977 (1983 Replacement), provides:

 

            
(a) An information or indictment which charges a person as an habitual 
criminal shall set forth the charged felony and allege the previous 
convictions.'

 

"Although here we are not concerned with felonies, the 
reason upon which this section is predicated is pertinent to the requirement of 
similar notice in DWUI cases."  State ex rel. Motor 
Vehicle Division v. Holtz, supra, at 738.

 

             
Jaramillo is mistaken in his contention that this language brings this 
question within the statutory requirement that the issue be submitted to a 
jury.  In State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, supra, the court simply recognized that due process 
requires notice if a former conviction is to be used to enhance punishment.  Certainly the 
Wyoming habitual criminal statutes do not by their terms encompass misdemeanor 
convictions for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.  There is no 
indication in Holtz that the court could or would 
expand those statutes to encompass these misdemeanor offenses.  The ordinance of 
the City of Green River does not require a determination by the jury of the 
issue of prior convictions.  We hold that with respect to such sentence 
enhancement proceedings under the state statute or a similar city ordinance, 
unless the statutory language so requires, a right to a jury trial with respect 
to the existence of prior convictions does not exist.

 

Unlike the habitual criminal statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-501(f)(ii) does not expressly provide for a jury determination with respect 
to the existence of prior convictions.9

 

[¶30]   Appellant also raises three issues 
concerning the evidence admitted at trial.  Appellant first argues that the testimony of 
an expert witness during the prosecution's rebuttal case constituted improper 
character evidence.  
The witness, a licensed professional counselor, testified to her 
observations regarding "the patterns of behavior in abusive domestic 
relationships" and the resulting "cycle of violence."  The prosecutor 
utilized that testimony during his rebuttal closing argument.  Shortly after the 
jury trial of the instant case, we issued an opinion in Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, 33 P.3d 758 (Wyo. 2001), 
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1554 (2002).  On remand, the prosecutor, in offering and 
arguing inferences based on such testimony, and the district court, in 
evaluating the admissibility of the proposed testimony, should carefully apply 
the principles we established in Skinner.

 

[¶31]   Appellant next argues that "three (3) 
alleged admissions"10 officers attributed to appellant at trial were 
obtained in violation of appellant's Miranda 
rights.  
According to appellant, the statements were improperly admitted at trial 
because appellant allegedly made the statements after he was arrested for the 
instant offense and the record is silent as to whether anyone ever informed 
appellant of his Miranda rights; therefore, the 
statements appellant allegedly "made to any police officers or other authorities 
after he was in custody, should not have been admitted in evidence at 
trial."  
Appellant's trial counsel did not file a motion to suppress the three 
alleged statements nor did he otherwise object to their admission at trial.  Because the issue 
was not raised before the district court, we would have been constrained to the 
trial testimony in reviewing this issue.  Testimony at a suppression, or some other, 
hearing focused on the merits of this issue likely would specifically reveal 
whether, and if so, at what point in time, the officers informed appellant of 
his Miranda rights.  Without commenting on the validity of 
appellant's arguments, we expect that appellant's trial counsel will duly assess 
the merits of filing a motion to suppress the alleged statements.

 

[¶32]   Appellant also contends that the 
district court erred in admitting Buzz and Mary Knigge's testimony regarding 
Manke's statements upon entering their residence as excited utterances.  Should this issue 
arise on remand, we note that one key factual consideration in applying the 
excited utterance exception is what, precisely, constitutes the "startling event 
or condition" (based on the record before us, the "startling event or condition" 
appears to relate back to what allegedly occurred between appellant and Manke at 
their residence), and that we have previously found a "five-factor" test 
"useful" in evaluating the admissibility of evidence as an excited 
utterance.  Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 963 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶33]   The prosecutor impermissibly commented 
on appellant's pre-arrest silence, impermissibly solicited evidence of 
appellant's pre-arrest silence, and impermissibly argued appellant's guilt based 
upon appellant's pre-arrest silence.  We reverse and remand for a new trial.

 

FOOTNOTES

  
1"Any comment upon an accused's invocation of his 
constitutional right to remain silent is prejudicial error per se entitling the 
accused to an automatic reversal of the conviction."  Beartusk v. State, 6 P.3d 138, 144 (Wyo. 
2000).  See also Sturgis v. 
State, 932 P.2d 199, 205 (Wyo. 1997).

  
2The State does not argue that the prosecutor 
intended to, or did, limit the consideration of this evidence for a particular 
purpose (i.e., impeachment), and what occurred during opening statement and the 
prosecution's case-in-chief would substantially undermine such an argument.  

  
3Some of these responses were to general 
questions, but given the prosecutor's remarks during opening statement (Officer 
West having been present in the courtroom as the State's investigating officer) 
and the prosecutor's repeated, specific questions regarding appellant's silence, 
it would be quite difficult to find that these responses were 
unanticipated.  
The State presents no argument to the contrary.

  
4We do not mean to insinuate that the officers 
acted inappropriately in questioning appellant upon arriving at the Knigge 
residence.  It 
is the use, and characterization, at trial of evidence regarding appellant's 
silence in the face of that questioning that is at issue in this appeal.

  
5Appellant does not question the propriety of 
this argument.

  
6The context of the prosecutor's argument appears 
to enhance, rather than diminish, the inference created by the prosecutor's 
specific remarks on, and characterizations of, appellant's silence.

  
7The State devotes considerable argument to this 
particular statement.  
However, even in the context of the prosecutor's argument, this statement 
again appears to reinforce the totality of the remarks, questions, and testimony 
that occurred previously during the trial. 

  8In advancing this argument, appellant does not 
cite or refer to the Wyoming Constitution.  Interestingly, the State's response to 
appellant's argument fails to address the procedural due process issue at all.

  
9Any issue concerning whether appellant is 
entitled to a jury determination of any other fact that enhances the penalty 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(f)(ii) (i.e., whether the underlying 
offense that is to be tried to the jury was committed against a household 
member) is not presently before us.

  
10While appellant does not specifically identify 
two of the three alleged statements, we are able to discern the two unidentified 
statements from information contained in his appellate brief.  First, during the 
struggle between appellant and the officers at the Knigge residence, Officer 
West testified that appellant screamed that "she cheated on me or she's cheating 
on me, what was I supposed to do[?]"  Second, while Officer Marcus transported 
appellant to the detention center in a patrol vehicle, appellant allegedly 
stated "all of a sudden" and "out of the blue" "What was I supposed to do?  She was cheating on 
me."  Finally, 
Officer Ostrem testified that in response to his question regarding where 
appellant "assault[ed] the girl," appellant replied "In my house."