Case Title: Town of Killington v. State

Citation: 172 Vt. 182, 776 A.2d 395

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Town of Killington v. State (99-286); 172 Vt. 182; 776 A.2d 395

[Filed 20-Apr-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-286

Town of Killington	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Washington Superior Court

	
State of Vermont, 	                         September Term, 2000
Edward D. Haase, Commissioner of 
Taxes and Marc Hull, Commissioner 
of Education

David A. Jenkins, J.

Mark L. Sperry and Devin McLaughlin of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, for 
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, William E. Griffin, Chief Assistant 
  Attorney General, and Mary L. Bachman, Special Assistant Attorney General, 
  Montpelier, for Defendants-Appellants.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.   In this appeal concerning a transition provision of
  Vermont's school funding  law, we confront a familiar dispute in which one
  side claims the benefit of the common and ordinary  meaning of the
  statutory language, while the other side relies primarily on the
  legislative purpose of  the statute to give meaning to the term at issue. 
  The provision in question capped for a two-year  period the anticipated
  rapid rise in property taxes in the so-called "gold" towns resulting from
  the  passage of the Equal Educational Property Act of 1997 (hereinafter
  "Act 60").  The statute saved 

 

  appellee Town of Killington (FN1) approximately $1,200,000 in taxes for the
  first transition year  after Act 60 became law.  Killington claimed,
  however, that it was entitled to roughly $500,000 in  additional tax
  savings because the State applied an incorrect methodology in calculating
  Killington's  increase in municipal expenditure growth during the first
  transition year.  The superior court agreed,  ruling that the commonly
  understood meaning of the statutory term "municipal budget" required the 
  State to calculate Killington's municipal expenditure growth in terms of
  the increase in gross  expenditures rather than the increase in
  expenditures funded by taxes.

       The State of Vermont and the Commissioners of the Departments of
  Education and Taxes  ("the State") appeal the superior court's grant of
  summary judgment in favor of Killington.  We  reverse and enter summary
  judgment in favor of the State based on our conclusion that the court's 
  construction of the statutory provision at issue leads to an irrational
  result that is inconsistent with  the spirit of the law and the legislative
  intent underlying the provision.

       The fundamental purpose of Act 60 is "to make educational opportunity
  available to each  pupil in each town on substantially equal terms."  16
  V.S.A. § 4000(a).  The Legislature sought to  attain equal access to
  similar revenues per pupil through a combination of state block grants and 
  local education spending that would allow each school district to "have
  substantially equal capacity  to raise and provide the same amount per
  pupil on the local tax base."  16 V.S.A. § 4000(b).  Act 60  represented
  the Legislature's response to Brigham v. State, 166 Vt. 246,