Case Title: State v. Epps

Citation: 

Docket Number: 44A14

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
 
NO. COA 13-258 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 15 October 2013 
 
 
SHEENA MOODY WARD, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Wake County 
No. 11 CVD 4051 
LUIS ENRIQUE CARMONA, 
Defendant/Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
JUSTIN MICHAEL WARD, 
Third-Party Defendant 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by plaintiff and third-party defendant from judgment 
entered 6 August 2012 and order entered 9 August 2012 by Judge 
Christine M. Walczyk in Wake County District Court.  Heard in 
the Court of Appeals 26 August 2013. 
 
E. Gregory Stott for plaintiff-appellant and third-party 
defendant-appellee. 
 
Orlando L. Rodriguez for defendant/third-party plaintiff-
appellee. 
 
 
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.  
 
 
Sheena Moody Ward (“Plaintiff”) appeals from judgment 
entered 6 August 2012 and order entered 9 August 2012 in Wake 
-2- 
 
 
County District Court.  The 6 August 2012 judgment dismissed 
Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice upon a jury verdict finding 
both defendant and third party defendant negligent.  The 9 
August 2012 order denied Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.  
Plaintiff argues: (i) the jury’s verdict was contrary to the 
greater weight of the evidence and the law; (ii) the jury’s 
verdict was inconsistent and therefore erroneous as a matter of 
law; (iii) the judgment was erroneous because it was based upon 
an erroneous verdict; and (iv) the trial court erred in denying 
Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.  Upon review, we find no 
error.   
I. Factual & Procedural History 
 
Justin Michael Ward (“Justin” or “Third Party Defendant”) 
lives in Raleigh with his mother, Plaintiff.  On 5 January 2011, 
Justin was driving Plaintiff’s 1991 Mercedes sedan when he was 
in an accident with a van driven by Luis Enrique Carmona 
(“Defendant”).  At about 3:00 P.M., Justin drove with his friend 
Joey Love (“Joey”) to Village Grill to pick up their friend 
Meredith Vehik (“Meredith”).  Third Party Defendant drove Joey 
and Meredith to Duffy’s Restaurant and Tavern, where Justin 
drank a beer, and then to Brown’s Billiards (“Brown’s”), where 
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he had another beer.  At 5:40 P.M., he left Brown’s to take 
Meredith to her home.  
 
Shortly after leaving Brown’s, Justin turned right onto 
Spring Forest Road in Raleigh.  He drove east on Spring Forest 
Road toward the intersection with Departure Drive.   
 
Departure Drive runs north and south across Spring Forest 
Road.  Spring Forest Road is straight and mostly level for over 
100 yards before and after the intersection.  It has two through 
lanes and one left turn lane on both its east and west bound 
sides.  At the intersection, both sides of Spring Forest Road 
have a traffic signal.  The signals are synchronized so that 
green lights are exhibited to motorists on Spring Forest Road 
when red lights are shown to motorists on Departure Drive, and 
vice versa.  Each side also has a green turn arrow to indicate 
right-of-way for left turns.  When the traffic signal displays a 
green circular signal but the left turn arrow is not lit, 
drivers turning left must yield to oncoming traffic on Spring 
Forest Road. 
 
Justin testified to the following at trial.  He was 
traveling eastbound on Spring Forest Road and intended to turn 
left onto Departure Drive.  As he approached the intersection, 
the traffic signal displayed a green circular signal, but the 
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left turn arrow was not lit.  Justin drove into the left turn 
lane and put on his left turn signal.  He continued into the 
intersection and then stopped.  Justin waited for a break in 
westbound traffic to allow a left turn onto Departure Drive.  
His view of westbound traffic on Spring Forest Road was 
unobstructed. 
 
As Justin waited for a chance to turn left, the Spring 
Forest Road traffic signal turned red.  To prevent his vehicle 
from impeding traffic traveling on Departure Drive, Justin 
believed he needed to complete his turn onto Departure Drive and 
continue through the intersection.  He saw one vehicle traveling 
in the opposite direction on Spring Forest Road stop at the 
intersection.  He did not see any other vehicles traveling 
westbound on Spring Forest Road.  Justin started to turn left 
onto Departure Drive.  His vehicle was hit immediately by a 1999 
Plymouth van, driven by Defendant, that was headed west on 
Spring 
Forest 
Road. 
 
Justin’s 
vehicle 
spun 
270 
degrees 
counterclockwise into the middle of the intersection.  The front 
end of the vehicle was crumpled and the passenger door was bent.  
Justin alleged he suffered serious and permanent bodily injuries 
in the accident. 
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Defendant testified to the following at trial.  On 5 
January 2011, Defendant was driving his van from his home to his 
part-time job with United Parcel Service.  He was driving west 
on Spring Forest Road at the speed limit of forty-five miles per 
hour.  He approached the intersection with Departure Drive.  He 
noticed Justin’s vehicle in the eastbound left turn lane with 
its 
left 
turn 
signal 
on. 
 
When 
Defendant 
reached 
the 
intersection, the traffic signal was green.  As he passed 
through the intersection, Justin’s vehicle turned directly in 
front of him.  Defendant turned toward the right in an attempt 
to avoid a collision but struck Justin’s vehicle less than two 
seconds later.  
 
On 15 March 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint against 
Defendant in Wake County District Court.  Plaintiff alleged 
Defendant’s negligence caused the accident.  Plaintiff requested 
the monetary value of damages to her vehicle and litigation 
expenses.  
 
On 26 May 2011, Defendant filed an answer and third-party 
complaint against Justin.  Defendant denied negligence and 
alleged that Justin’s negligence caused the accident.  Defendant 
made claims against Justin for contribution and indemnification.  
-6- 
 
 
 
Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant on 31 May 2011.  Third 
Party Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim for personal 
injuries against Defendant. 
 
On 16 August 2011, all parties voluntarily agreed to 
stipulations.  The stipulations stated that if Justin was found 
negligent and a proximate cause of the accident, his negligence 
would be imputed to Plaintiff.  This result would bar any future 
claims brought by Third Party Defendant or Plaintiff against 
Defendant.  
 
At 
trial, 
Plaintiff’s 
counsel 
introduced 
written 
interrogatories taken from Defendant prior to trial.  In one 
response, 
Defendant 
wrote 
“as 
I 
was 
approaching 
to 
the 
intersection, the light turned yellow when I was approximately 
eight (8) feet away.”  In response, Defendant testified at trial 
that the traffic signal was green as he approached the 
intersection, but he had assumed it turned yellow as he passed 
through the intersection. 
 
Plaintiff’s counsel called George Stephenson (“George”) to 
rebut Defendant’s testimony.  Prior to the accident, George was 
traveling west on Spring Forest Road in the right lane.  George 
testified that as he approached the intersection with Departure 
Drive, the traffic light was red.  He came to a stop behind 
-7- 
 
 
another car that was stopped at the intersection.  He saw a 
Plymouth van moving fast pass him in the left lane of westbound 
Spring Forest Road.  The van did not slow as it entered the 
intersection and struck the Mercedes.  
 
 The following issues were submitted to the jury: (i) was 
the 
property 
of 
Plaintiff 
damaged 
by 
the 
negligence 
of 
Defendant; (ii) was the property of Plaintiff damaged by the 
negligence of Third Party Defendant; and (iii) what amount is 
Plaintiff entitled to recover for property damages.  On 22 May 
2012, the jury found that both Defendant and Third Party 
Defendant were negligent and that Plaintiff was not entitled to 
recover damages.  Judgment was entered to this effect on 31 May 
2012 and amended on 6 August 2012. 
 
On 12 June 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion: (i) for a new 
trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) of our Rules of Civil Procedure1; 
and (ii)  for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b).  
                     
1 Rule 59(a)(7) allows a new trial for “[i]nsufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the verdict or [a] verdict . . . contrary to 
law”  N.C. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7).   
 
Plaintiff’s motion provides the following reasons for a new 
trial: (i) the verdict is inappropriate; (ii) the verdict is 
inconsistent and contrary to case law; and (iii) the verdict is 
contrary to the greater weight of the evidence presented at 
trial. 
-8- 
 
 
Plaintiff’s motion was denied on 9 August 2012.  Plaintiff filed 
notice of appeal on 31 August 2012. 
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the instant case 
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(c) (2011).  A party must 
file and serve notice of appeal “within thirty days after entry 
of judgment.”  N.C. R. App. P. 3(c)(1).  If a party makes a 
timely motion for relief under Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, “the thirty day period for taking appeal is tolled as 
to all parties until entry of an order disposing of the motion.”  
N.C. R. App. P. 3(c)(3).   
 
In the instant case, Plaintiff filed a timely Rule 59 
motion.  Plaintiff’s motion was denied on 9 August 2012.  She 
filed timely notice of appeal on 31 August 2012.  
 
“There was sufficient evidence, in law, to support the 
finding of the jury, and when this is the case and it is claimed 
that the jury have given a verdict against the weight of all the 
evidence, the only remedy is an application to the trial judge 
to set aside the verdict for that reason.” Pender v. N. State 
Life Ins. Co., 163 N.C. 98, 101, 79 S.E. 293, 294 (1913). “We 
will not review [the trial judge’s] ruling upon such a motion, 
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except where it clearly appears that there has been a gross 
abuse of his discretion.”  Id. 
 
“We cannot interfere with the jury in finding facts upon 
evidence sufficient to warrant their verdict.”  West v. Atl. 
Coast Line R.R. Co., 174 N.C. 125, 130, 93 S.E. 479, 481 (1917). 
 
“[A]n 
appellate 
court’s 
review 
of 
a 
trial 
judge’s 
discretionary ruling either granting or denying a motion to set 
aside a verdict and order a new trial is strictly limited to the 
determination of whether the record affirmatively demonstrates a 
manifest abuse of discretion by the judge.”  Worthington v. 
Bynum, 305 N.C. 478, 482, 290 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1982).   
III. Analysis 
 
To establish negligence in North Carolina, a party must 
show: “(1) a legal duty; (2) a breach thereof; and (3) injury 
proximately caused by the breach.”  Bridges v. Parrish, ___ N.C. 
___, ___, 742 S.E.2d 794, 796 (2013) (quoting Stein v. Asheville 
City Bd. of Educ., 360 N.C. 321, 328, 626 S.E.2d 263, 267 
(2006)).  Where a plaintiff fails “to exercise due care for his 
or her own safety, such that the plaintiff’s failure to exercise 
due care is a proximate cause of his or her injury,” their 
negligence is contributory.  Love v. Singleton, 145 N.C. App. 
488, 491–92, 550 S.E.2d 549, 551 (2001) (quotation marks and 
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citation omitted).  Contributory negligence acts “as a complete 
bar to a plaintiff’s recovery.”  Id.    
 
“It is the jury’s function to weigh the evidence and to 
determine the credibility of witnesses.” Anderson v. Hollifield, 
345 N.C. 480, 483, 480 S.E.2d 661, 664 (1997).  “In weighing the 
credibility of the testimony, the jury has the right to believe 
any part or none of it.”  Brinkley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
271 N.C. 301, 305, 156 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1967).  A jury verdict 
should be set aside on the weight of the evidence only in 
“exceptional situations where the verdict is contrary to the 
evidence presented and will result in a miscarriage of justice.” 
In re Will of Buck, 350 N.C. 621, 628, 516 S.E.2d 858, 862 
(1999).   
 
Plaintiff first argues that the jury’s verdict was contrary 
to the greater weight of the evidence.  Upon review, we find 
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that both 
Defendant and Third Party Defendant were negligent. 
 
There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding 
that Defendant was negligent.  Defendant testified that he was 
driving and that he struck Plaintiff’s car.  George testified 
that Defendant entered the intersection after the traffic signal 
had turned red.  Defendant concedes in his brief that there was 
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sufficient evidence to present the jury with the question of his 
negligence. 
 
There was also sufficient evidence for the jury to find 
Third Party Defendant negligent.  Justin testified that before 
he began his turn, the traffic signal turned red.  He testified 
that his view of oncoming traffic on westbound Spring Forest 
Road was unobstructed.  He also testified that his car was 
struck by Defendant’s van immediately after Justin began his 
left turn.  Defendant testified he was traveling at forty-five 
miles per hour and was entering the intersection when Third 
Party Defendant began his turn.  Defendant estimated Third Party 
Defendant began his turn less than two seconds before the 
accident. 
Drivers approaching an intersection have a duty “to 
maintain a lookout and to exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances.”  Hyder v. Asheville Storage Battery Co., 242 
N.C. 553, 557, 89 S.E.2d 124, 128 (1955).  Failure to do so “is 
likely to endanger the safety of persons and property.”  N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 20-4.23(a)(2) (2011).   
 
When drivers approach a green traffic signal at an 
intersection they must keep “a reasonable lookout for vehicles 
in or approaching the intersection at excessive speed.”  Hyder, 
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242 N.C. at 557, 89 S.E.2d at 128.  They have a duty to 
“anticipate and expect the presence of others.”  Id.  Drivers 
“cannot go forward blindly even in reliance on traffic signals.”  
Id.  Furthermore, “[a]ny person who undertakes to drive a motor 
vehicle upon a highway must exercise reasonable care to 
ascertain that such movement can be made in safety before he 
turns to the right or left from a direct line.”  Wiggins v. 
Ponder, 259 N.C. 277, 279, 130 S.E.2d 402, 404 (1963) (emphasis 
added); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-154(a) (2011). 
 
Third 
Party 
Defendant 
concedes 
that 
he 
entered 
the 
intersection against a red traffic signal.  However, he argues 
that having entered the intersection while the light was green, 
he was entitled to proceed through the intersection once it 
turned red.  He cites to language from this Court that a yellow 
light “affords those who have entered or are entering on the 
green light the opportunity to proceed through the intersection 
before the crossing traffic is invited to enter.”  Sayre v. 
Thompson, 1 N.C. App. 517, 520, 162 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1968).  
That language applies, however, only where the driver has 
properly entered the intersection during a green light.  “[I]f 
faced with a green light a driver is warranted in moving into 
the intersection, unless the circumstances are such as to 
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indicate caution to one of reasonable prudence.”  Id. at 519, 
162 S.E.2d at 118 (emphasis added). In the present case, as 
Third Party Defendant was required to yield to oncoming traffic, 
the jury could have found that Third Party Defendant was 
negligent in entering the intersection at a time when he could 
not properly complete his turn.  The jury may also have found 
that Third Party Defendant was negligent in turning in front of 
Defendant without keeping a proper lookout.  Id. at 520, 162 
S.E.2d at 118 (“[T]he duty rests upon [the driver] to maintain a 
reasonable 
and 
proper 
lookout 
for 
other 
vehicles 
in 
or 
approaching the intersection.”); see also Hyder, 242 N.C. at 
557, 89 S.E.2d at 128.  There was sufficient evidence to support 
an inference by the jury that Third Party Defendant was 
negligent. 
 
Prior to trial, all parties agreed to a stipulation that if 
Third Party Defendant was found negligent and a proximate cause 
of the accident, his negligence would be imputed to Plaintiff.  
Consequently, sufficient evidence was presented to support the 
jury’s finding that Plaintiff is barred from recovery due to 
contributory negligence.2 
                     
2 We note that in a case with similar facts, this Court found 
both parties contributorily negligent as a matter of law.  See 
Dawkins v. Benton, 16 N.C. App. 58, 190 S.E.2d 853 (1972).  Our 
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Plaintiff next contends that the jury’s verdict was 
inconsistent and therefore erroneous as a matter of law.  Upon 
review, we find the jury’s verdict was consistent. 
 
Plaintiff and Defendant make competing claims as to the 
color of the traffic signal at the time Defendant entered the 
intersection.  However, the jury’s verdict aligns with a 
consistent view of the evidence.  Third Party Defendant concedes 
the traffic signal was red when he entered the intersection.  As 
both parties were driving in opposite directions on the same 
road, it is entirely consistent for the jury to find that 
Defendant entered the intersection after his traffic signal 
turned red and that Plaintiff either negligently entered the 
intersection on a green circular signal when he could not 
complete the turn or failed to keep a proper lookout.  Thus, a 
finding that both parties were negligent is consistent and 
supported by sufficient evidence. 
 
Plaintiff next argues the judgment was erroneous because it 
was based upon an erroneous verdict.  Because we find the jury’s 
findings were supported by sufficient evidence and consistent, 
we decline to set aside the trial court’s judgment. 
                                                                  
standard for evidence of negligence is lower in the present 
case, as we only have to find evidence sufficient to warrant a 
jury verdict. 
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For similar reasons, we decline to set aside the trial 
court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we find 
NO ERROR. 
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge ELMORE concur. 
Report per Rule 30(e).