Case Title: St. Clair County v. Town of Riverside

Citation: 128 So. 2d 333

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1961-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
128 So. 2d 333 (1961)
ST. CLAIR COUNTY and State Highway Department
v.
TOWN OF RIVERSIDE.
7 Div. 507.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 25, 1961.
Starnes & Holladay, Pell City, for appellants.
Frank B. Embry, Pell City, for appellee.
SIMPSON, Justice.
The Town of Riverside (appellee) filed in the Circuit Court, In Equity, of St. Clair County, a bill, which as last amended, sought an injunction and a mandatory order against appellant, Honorable Sam Engelhardt, as Highway Director of the State of Alabama. The bill alleged that "the highway from Pell City to and through Riverside, known as Bankhead Highway No. 78, has been a public way and Street and Highway, within the corporate limits *334 of the Town of Riverside for more than thirty years used by the general public." The bill alleges that respondent "erected signs along said Street and Hiway" closing it and diverting traffic away from the use of said way, Street or Highway without notice to or knowledge of complainant. The bill prays that respondent be required to remove the signs and all obstructions from the highway and to cease and desist from obstructing Highway 78. This bill was amended on February 15, 1960 by having it sworn to and by asking for a temporary writ of injunction.
The road in question was formerly designated "old Bankhead 78", which ran through the Town of Riverside. Bankhead 78 was rerouted to the south some twenty-five years ago. The old route along with another paved road were used to connect Riverside with the relocated Highway 78. The Highway Department in the construction of Interstate 1-20, a limited access facility, erected barriers and closed old Bankhead 78 at a point near the northern right of way line of the new interstate facility. The other paved road from Riverside Road to the "new U. S. 78" was not interrupted. Appellant states that the closing of "old 78" was in accordance with the approved plans of the State Highway Department and of the U. S. Bureau of Public Roads.
The trial court granted the temporary injunction as prayed for. The basis of the court's findings was that the closed road which had served the inhabitants of the town for many years was a more convenient route of travel for the people of the town and some other parts of St. Clair County. Of consequence of which it ordered the appellant to open up the road and remove the obstructions and that "irreparable injury will be done to the complainant if a writ of injunction is not granted". It is to be noted that there are no claims and no findings of the court that in constructing the highway through the village the appellant acted beyond his authority or arbitarily, capriciously, or fraudulently in blocking said road.
1. Is an injunctive action properly maintained against the Highway Director of the State of Alabama in his official capacity?
2. (a) Does the State of Alabama, acting through the State Highway Department, have the authority to close an existing street or highway at a point where the existing highway intersects an interstate limited access facility?
(b) Does the Highway Department of the State of Alabama have the legal authority under Act 104, General Acts of Alabama 1956, page 148, to close one of the two highways leading into and through a municipality?
(c) Does the State of Alabama Highway Department have the legal authority under Act 104, supra, to close or vacate a highway which is also utilized as a city street?
1. Injunctive action may be maintained against a state official, if the official is acting beyond the scope of his authority or acting illegally, in bad faith, or fraudulently. A state's immunity from suit does not apply when "officers under a mistaken interpretation of the law acting in the name of the State commit acts not within their authority which are injurious to the rights of others." Curry v. Woodstock Slag Corp., 1942, 242 Ala. 379, 6 So. 2d 479, 480. Glass v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 246 Ala. 579, 22 So. 2d 13; Horn v. Dunn Brothers, Inc., 262 Ala. 404, 79 So. 2d 11; Finnell v. Pitts, 222 Ala. 290, 132 So. 2. In 49 Am.Jur., States, Territories, and Dependencies, pp. 308-310, the following observation is pertinent:
It seems, therefore, that the ultimate question is whether the bill alleges, and the proof shows, conduct which is beyond the scope of the Highway Director's authority, or is arbitrary.
2. (a) Does the State of Alabama acting through the State Highway Department have the authority to close an existing street or highway at a point where the existing highway intersects an interstate limited access facility?
The Constitution of Alabama 1901 (Amendment 11, Article 20, Amendment 21, Article 20A) gives the Highway Department the authority to engage in the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of public streets, highways and bridges in the State of Alabama. Scott v. Alabama State Bridge Corp., 233 Ala. 12, 169 So. 273; In Re Opinion of the Justices, 225 Ala. 460, 143 So. 900.
Title 23, § 3, Code of Alabama 1940 gives the Highway Department authority to make contracts or agreements to construct and maintain roads in the State which are in municipalities and serve as roads of connection in the state highway system.
Therefore, the Highway Department has authority to construct and maintain city streets if they are roads of connection within the state Highway system.
In Pruett v. Las Vegas, 261 Ala. 557, 74 So. 2d 807, 810 this Court thus construed the authority of the Highway Director in locating highways:
In its original brief appellee points out that the "rights of the citizens and those doing business in the Town of Riverside are involved and not some single individual." In this regard the Court in the Las Vegas case, supra, had this to say:
We do not think the effect of the above statement different when a group of citizens or taxpayers bring the action. The interest of the general public would continue to control.
In 25 Am.Jur., Highways, § 118, page 415 the following observation is made:
And in 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, § 83, Pocket Supplement, page 93:
In 39 C.J.S. Highways § 97, the following appears: "In the exercise of the police power, the state may change or alter public highways." In Alabama Great Southern Railway v. Denton, 239 Ala. 301, 195 So. 218, it was held that the State has plenary power to relocate highways.
And in 40 C.J.S. Highways § 179: "Where authority is conferred on the state highway officers to designate, locate, and alter roads of the * * * highway system, they may do so without consent of the local authorities."
2. (b) Does the authority to vacate, locate and construct highways extend to the blocking off of a city street?
Act 104, General Acts of Alabama 1956, page 148, approved February 9, 1956, was taken almost verbatim from the "Model Controlled-Access Highway Act". The Model Act has also been adopted either in whole or in part by some nineteen other states (Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming). Highway Research Bound Special Report 26; Expressway Law, pp. 69-75. The Declaration of Policy in the Model Act reads as follows:
The Declaration of Policy in the Alabama Act 104 reads as follows:
Pertinent sections of the Model Act and Alabama's Controlled Access statutes are compared to demonstrate the similarity of the two acts, to wit:
(Note) It should be noted that the provision for consent of local authorities as contained in Section 3 of the Model Act is not included in the Alabama Act. But we do not have before us any question of the validity, vel non, of our statute by this omission. Sibley v. Odum, 257 Ala. 292(6), 58 So. 2d 896.
Our research discloses that the courts generally have upheld the conduct of the road building authority when acting under similar laws where the conduct of the authority is not tainted with corruption, arbitrariness, or caprice. We will review some of these cases.
In City of Lakewood v. Thormyer, Ohio Com.Pl.1958, 154 N.E.2d 777, 783, an action by the City of Lakewood against the Highway Director, the Court construed the Highway Director's power and authority to relocate a highway through the City of Lakewood:
In Handlan-Buck Co. v. State Highway Commission of Missouri, Mo.1958, 315 S.W.2d 219, 223, the Court held that: "The power of establishing limited access state highways is of statewide concern. Its exercise affects the safety of all persons traveling upon the roads of this state. The state police power is in such a case superior to that of a municipality."
In Lehman v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 1959, 251 Iowa 77, 99 N.W.2d 404, the Court in construing a located access provision similar to the Model Act held that the designation of a limited access highway is a necessary police power.
The Delaware Court has given a liberal interpretation to its highway law as regards the discretionary power of the Highway Department in constructing highways through municipalities even though the statute requires consent of the municipality in certain instances. See Campbell v. Commissioners of Town of Bethany Beach, Del. 1958, 139 A.2d 493, 498; and Piekarski v. Smith, Del.1959, 153 A.2d 587.
The Missouri Supreme Court has ruled that the courts cannot enjoin highway construction where the Highway Commission has acted within its authority. The facts in the case of State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Elliott, Mo.1959, 326 S.W.2d 745, 750, were that a village sought to enjoin State construction, which had already begun, of an interstate route which would obstruct some of its public streets. The Village of Claycomo, Missouri has within its limits five public streets extending north and south. The east-west controlled access interstate route was to cut off three of these streets; grade separation structures were being built at the other two. The village alleged that the three dead-ended streets would be rendered useless as streets connecting the northern and southern parts of the village; that the action of the Commission in not providing overpasses or underpasses was "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable" and that fire protection facilities would be imposed for many residents. The Highway Commission alleged that to provide grade separations for the remaining three streets would cost in excess of $500,000 while saving only one or two blocks of travel either east or west for the residents of Claycomo to reach the two streets with grade separations. The Missouri Supreme Court held that this was not a case where the State Highway Commission has arbitrarily deprived one portion of the village of all access to another portion. The Court pointed out that there was no allegation of fact showing that the obstruction of access from one part of the village to the other imposed unreasonable burdens on the traveling public, or that the impairment of fire prevention efficiency was so extreme that the decision of the Commission not to build overpasses amounted to a manifest abuse of power. The Court said that constitutional and statutory powers to locate and design State Highways and to apportion highway funds are expressly and exclusively conferred upon the Commission and that this denies the Court the right, absent an allegation of fact showing bad faith or manifest abuse of authority, to enjoin the Commission in the construction of this highway. To hold otherwise, the Court concluded, would amount to judicial usurpation of an exclusively legislative function clearly beyond the powers of courts. State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Elliott, supra.
The year before the Missouri Court had held in Handlan-Buck Co. v. State Highway Commission of Missouri, supra, that the constitutional provision authorizing the State Highway Commission to limit access to the highways where public interest and safety may require is a grant of police power.
In the light of the considered cases, we are constrained to hold that the record before us fails to show manifest abuse of authority or arbitrariness of appellant as *340 would authorize the Court to invade this "quasi-legislative" domain. The Court is not a road builder and unless the highway director is guilty of the misconduct referred to hereinabovewhich is not shown the Court acts beyond its jurisdiction in intervening.
We must, therefore, conclude that the learned trial court erred to a reversal in granting the injunction.
Reversed and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and GOODWYN and COLEMAN, JJ., concur.