Case Title: Baldes v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0168

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
ALFRED LEE BALDES v.  THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 67Case Number: S-11-0168Decided: 05/15/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
ALFRED 
LEE BALDES,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County
The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
David 
Hooper and Katherine A. Strike, of Hooper-Strike Law Offices, LLC, Lander, 
WY.  Argument by Ms. 
Strike.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Amitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stewart M. 
Young, Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Joshua B. Taylor, 
Student Director; and Gregory Asay, Student Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Asay.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
HILL, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Alfred Lee Baldes 
(Baldes) appeals his conviction of two counts of third-degree sexual assault, 
contending insufficiency of the evidence and improper admission of W.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence.  We 
affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Baldes presents 
the following two issues:
 
            
1.  Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
sustain Alfred Baldes’ conviction, specifically there was insufficient evidence 
to prove that Mr. Baldes was in a position of authority and that sexual contact 
occurred, as required by W.S. § 6-2-303(a)(vi) and W.S. § 6-2-304(a)(iii), 
respectively.
 
            
2.  Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion 
when, following an improper Gleason 
analysis, it allowed the introduction of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence, specifically 
the testimony of J.G., which was ultimately not offered for its proper purpose 
by the State.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      Baldes was hired 
by Amedisys Home Healthcare in August of 2009 as a certified nursing assistant 
(CNA).  One of the clients served by 
Amedisys was K.S., recently deceased, a young man who suffered from Duchenne’s 
muscular dystrophy, a progressive muscle-weakening disease.  K.S. was confined to a wheelchair and 
was unable to independently perform many basic daily tasks due to his 
disability.  K.S. became a client of 
Amedisys in 2006, and Amedisys developed an individualized care plan with K.S. 
to provide the services he needed and specifically requested, including getting 
him out of bed in the morning, brushing his teeth, bathing him, washing his 
hair, and shaving him.  Despite his 
physical infirmities, K.S. exhibited no deficiencies in his mental faculties: 
 He graduated from high school, held 
a job at the local movie theater, and testified on his own behalf at 
trial.
 
[¶4]      Baldes was 
assigned to care for K.S. just after joining Amedisys in August of 2009.  Three days a week, as directed in K.S.’s 
care plan, Baldes gave K.S. a sponge bath, which included washing K.S.’s 
genitalia, perineum, and anal area.  
In mid-January of 2010, approximately five months after Baldes began 
working with K.S., Amedisys and law enforcement received a report alleging 
sexual abuse of K.S. by Baldes while Baldes was bathing 
K.S.
 
[¶5]      Baldes was 
charged with four counts of third-degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a) (LexisNexis 2011), which provides:
 
(a)  An 
actor commits sexual assault in the third degree if, under circumstances not 
constituting sexual assault in the first or second degree:
 
(i)  and 
(ii) 
Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 159 § 3.
 
(iii)  The 
actor subjects a victim to sexual contact under any of the circumstances of 
W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) 
or 6-2-303(a)(i) through (vii) without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim 
and without causing serious bodily injury to the victim.
 
“Sexual 
contact” is defined by statute as “touching, with the intention of sexual 
arousal, gratification or abuse, of the victim’s intimate parts by the actor, or 
of the actor’s intimate parts by the victim, or of the clothing covering the 
immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(vi) 
(LexisNexis 2011).  Baldes was 
charged with sexual assaults committed under the statutory circumstances set 
forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2011): “The actor is in a 
position of authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to 
cause the victim to submit.”  The 
term “position of authority” is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(iv) 
(LexisNexis 2011) to mean “that position occupied by a parent, guardian, 
relative, household member, teacher, employer, custodian or any other person 
who, by reason of his position, is able to exercise significant influence over a 
person.”
 
[¶6]      Two of the four 
counts were eventually dismissed, and Baldes was tried on two counts of sexual 
assault in the third degree.  The 
jury convicted him on both counts.  
This appeal followed.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence
 
[¶7]      In his first 
issue, Baldes contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to prove 
that he stood in a “position of authority” with respect to K.S. as contemplated 
by § 6-2-301(a)(iv).  
Additionally, he argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s finding that he had sexual contact with K.S., as defined by § 
6-2-304(a)(iii).  The State contends 
that the testimony presented by its witnesses was sufficient for the jury to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Baldes occupied a position of authority 
and had sexual contact with K.S.
 
[¶8]      When reviewing an 
appellant’s claims regarding sufficiency of the evidence, this Court examines 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.  Faubion v. State, 2010 WY 79, ¶ 12, 
233 P.3d 926, 929 (Wyo. 2010).  We 
accept all evidence favorable to the State as true and give the State’s evidence 
every favorable inference which can reasonably and fairly be drawn from it.  We disregard any evidence favorable to 
the appellant that conflicts with the State’s evidence.  Id.
 
Position 
of Authority
 
[¶9]      “'Position of 
authority’ means that position occupied by a parent, guardian, relative, 
household member, teacher, employer, custodian or any other person who, by 
reason of his position, is able to exercise significant influence over a 
person.”  § 6-2-301(a)(iv).  Baldes did not hold one of the specific 
positions of authority delineated in the statute, and the State prosecuted him 
as “any other person who, by reason of his position, is able to exercise 
significant influence over a person.”  
Baldes argues that, as a certified nurse assistant, he was not in a 
position of authority and did not have significant influence over K.S.  Rather, he was subordinate both to the 
registered nurses who supervised him and to K.S., who directed and controlled 
his own care.
 
[¶10]   This Court most recently addressed 
the “position of authority” provision in Faubion.  In contemplating the plain meaning of 
the term, we reviewed some general definitions:
 
It 
is helpful to look to Burton’s Legal Thesaurus, which defines authority as: 
“[J]urisdiction, legal power, legitimacy, prerogative, right to adjudicate, 
right to command, right to determine, right to settle issues, rightful power.” 
 Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed. 
(1979) defines authority as: “Permission. Right to exercise powers; to implement 
and enforce laws; to exact obedience; to command; to judge. Control over; 
jurisdiction.  Often synonymous with 
power.” ….
From 
these sources it is apparent that the legislature used the word 'authority’ to 
mean an externally granted power, not a self-generated control.  One in a position of authority is a 
person who acquires that status by virtue of society and its system of laws 
granting to him the right of control over another.
 
Id. 
¶ 17, 
233 P.3d  at 930 (quoting Scadden v. 
State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1042-43 (Wyo. 1987)).
 
[¶11]   In Faubion, we applied the aforementioned 
concepts in determining that a chiropractor held a position of authority, 
reasoning that chiropractic practice is governed by statute, there is a 
fiduciary or trust relationship between a patient and his healers, and 
chiropractors govern themselves by a variety of ethical codes.  Id. ¶ 18, 233 P.3d  at 931.  Although there are distinct differences 
between the job duties of a chiropractor and a certified nurse assistant, when 
we focus on the power and control aspects of those positions with respect to the 
clients or patients they serve, the same reasoning applies.  Power differentials exist in 
professional situations in which a service provider has knowledge, experience, 
and authority that the client seeks and needs from the provider.  In a situation involving a provider of 
medical services, a client may be rendered exceptionally vulnerable by the 
nature of the illness or disability for which he seeks 
services.
 
[¶12]   Here, the jury heard testimony from 
the Amedisys nurse manager, a registered nurse, that CNAs are subject to state 
statutes and ethical codes in their dealings with patients.  She explained to the jury that the 
position of CNA requires training, education, and certification through the 
State Board of Nursing, and that Baldes was a certified CNA.  Evidence was presented describing 
Baldes’ numerous responsibilities and the intimate services he provided as a CNA 
for K.S., including getting K.S. out of bed, bathing him, washing his hair, 
brushing his teeth, shaving him, dressing him, and putting him in his 
wheelchair.  Baldes was given access 
to K.S.’ home and all of his personal effects.  He often had unsupervised access to 
K.S.  The fact that Baldes was 
subordinate to and supervised by registered nurses does not vitiate the 
relationship of trust he held with respect to K.S., and the power arising from 
that relationship.  K.S. sought and 
needed specific nursing services.  
He depended upon trained medical services providers—CNAs—to perform those 
services properly and appropriately.  
But for Baldes’ certification as a CNA, he would not have had access to 
K.S., nor been able to command the trust and reliance that allowed him to exert 
a measure of control over K.S.  
Applying our standard of review to the evidence presented to the jury, we 
are satisfied that the jury could reasonably conclude Baldes, as a CNA, occupied 
a position of authority over K.S.
 
Sexual 
Contact
 
[¶13]   Baldes also challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence to prove “sexual contact” with K.S., as defined by § 
6-2-301(a)(vi).  Specifically, 
Baldes contends that the State failed to prove that he touched K.S. with “the 
intention of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse.”
 
[¶14]   The evidence showed that, for 
approximately five years, K.S. relied upon registered nurses and CNAs other than 
Baldes to bathe him.  K.S. testified 
that he had been assigned both male and female aides and was well aware of 
appropriate bathing procedures.  
K.S. could tell the difference between someone touching his genitalia 
merely to bathe him and someone touching him inappropriately.  Both the Amedisys nurse manager and 
Baldes’ CNA mentor described the proper procedures for giving a sponge bath and 
cleaning the perineum area.  The 
State presented evidence to the jury that Baldes did not follow, or quit 
following, proper procedures when bathing K.S.  At some point during the time he cared 
for K.S., Baldes quit covering up K.S. during his sponge baths and left K.S. 
exposed during the whole process.  
Baldes also quit wearing gloves and began contacting K.S.’s penis with 
his bare hands.  K.S. testified that 
Baldes massaged the tip of his penis in a circular motion with his thumb while 
he was bathing him.  At least twice 
when K.S. was lying on his side, Baldes reached between K.S.’s legs, pulled his 
penis through his legs toward his back, and moved his hand up and down on 
it.  These breaches of procedure, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State and in the context in which they 
occurred—washing K.S.’s intimate parts—indicate a disregard for nurse-patient 
boundaries and sexualization of the bathing process.  The evidence was sufficient for a 
reasonable juror to conclude that Baldes touched K.S. with the intention of 
sexual arousal or gratification.
 
W.R.E. 
404(b) Evidence
 
[¶15]   Baldes’ second issue involves the 
trial court’s ruling on W.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  “Generally, the standard of review of 
rulings under W.R.E. 404(b) is abuse of discretion.”  Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, 
¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, 340 (Wyo. 2002).  
The reviewing court should give considerable deference to the trial 
court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence.  Vigil v. State, 2010 WY 15, ¶ 11, 
224 P.3d 31, 36 (Wyo. 2010).  “[A]s 
long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court’s ruling, that 
ruling will not be disturbed on appeal.”  
Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, 
¶ 20, 142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 2006).
 
[¶16]   In Gleason we addressed the difficulties 
with Rule 404(b) evidence:
 
[B]ecause 
uncharged misconduct evidence carries an inherent danger for prejudice, we have 
also adopted a mandatory procedure for testing its admissibility: (1) the 
evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be 
relevant; (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially 
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the 
trial court must instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be 
considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted. Vigil, 926 P.2d  at 
357 (quoting United States v. Herndon, 
982 F.2d 1411, 1414 (10th Cir. 1992)). We do not apply this 
test on appeal; rather, it is intended to be conducted by the trial court.  Beintema v. 
State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Wyo. 
1997). Our role is to determine whether admission of the 
evidence was error. Id.; Spencer v. 
State, 925 P.2d 994, 997 (Wyo. 1996).
 
Id. 
¶ 18, 57 P.3d  at 332, 340 (footnote omitted).  We made clear that the trial court’s 
analysis of admissibility is to be reflected in the record.  Id. ¶ 30, 57 P.3d  at 
343.
 
Gleason 
Analysis
 
[¶17]   Baldes argues that the trial court 
did an improper or insufficient Gleason 
analysis prior to allowing the testimony of K.S., the victim in this matter, 
as well as L.N. and J.G., two other clients of Baldes’.  Baldes contends that the allegations of 
prior bad acts were different for all three of the aforementioned individuals, 
but the court considered all three witnesses together, in one discussion, and 
without careful and detailed consideration of the specific evidence that each 
would be presenting.
 
[¶18]   The district court conducted a 
hearing on the “State’s Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence Pursuant to 
W.R.E. 404(b).”  After hearing 
argument from the State and Baldes, the district court proceeded with its 
analysis of the evidence pursuant to Gleason.  At the outset, the judge stated, “ . . 
.  I’m going to talk about all three 
first and then differentiate between the three different witnesses . . . .”  The district court then conducted what 
it referred to as its “general Gleason analysis.”
 
[¶19]   The district court discussed how 
the proposed testimony indicated a particular mode of operation and a potential 
motive of sexual gratification, both of which the court found to be proper 
purposes for admitting the evidence.  
The court then evaluated the probative value of the evidence considering 
each of the factors that we set out in Gleason:
 
1.  How 
clear is it that the defendant committed the prior bad 
act?
2.  Does 
the defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering the prior bad 
acts evidence?
3.  Is 
other evidence 
available?
4.  Is 
the evidence unnecessarily cumulative?
5.  How 
much time has elapsed between the charged crime and the prior bad act?
 
Id. 
¶ 27, 57 P.3d  at 342.  Based 
upon its analysis, the court determined the proposed testimony probative of the 
issue of whether Baldes committed sexual assault.  The district court then turned to the 
issue of whether the evidence was more prejudicial than probative, again 
following the guidelines we set out in Gleason:  (1)  The reprehensible nature 
of the prior bad act; (2)  The sympathetic character of the alleged 
victim of the prior bad act; (3)  The similarity between the charged 
crime and the prior bad act; (4)  The comparative enormity of the 
charged crime and the prior bad act; (5)  The comparable relevance of 
the prior bad act to the proper and forbidden inferences; and 
(6)  Whether the prior act resulted in a conviction.  Id. ¶ 27, 57 P.3d 342-43.  Balancing those factors, the court 
determined that the probative value of the proposed testimony outweighed its 
prejudicial effect.
 
[¶20]   With that background, the district 
court considered the proposed prior bad act evidence that was to be offered by 
each witness and differentiating between them.  The record plainly demonstrates that in 
addition to considering the Gleason 
factors as they applied to the testimony of all three witnesses, the trial 
court analyzed the unique aspects of the proposed prior bad act testimony of 
each witness.  The court ultimately 
allowed K.S. and J.G. to testify and disallowed the testimony of L.N. explaining 
its rationale for each of those decisions.
 
[¶21]   The district court’s thorough 
analysis of the evidence fully satisfies the requirements of Gleason and indicates a legitimate basis 
for its rulings.  We will not 
disturb those rulings on appeal.
 
Purpose 
Served
 
[¶22]   At the Rule 404(b) hearing the 
district court ruled that it would allow the prior bad act testimony of J.G., 
one of Baldes’ clients, for the purpose of proving motive and modus 
operandi.  The court described its 
rationale as follows:
 
So 
in terms of the particular mode of operation and the allegations with respect to 
how the defendant utilized his position of authority to allegedly commit the 
crimes with which he is charged, I think, is the proper purpose; and a close 
part of that is also to prove motive, which is a proper purpose; that his motive 
here might have been sexual gratification rather than the delivery of proper 
medical care and procedures.
 
Baldes 
avers that J.G.’s testimony was significantly different than the State 
represented in its notice of intent to introduce evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 
404(b).  Baldes argues that J.G. did 
not testify as to facts showing that he experienced similar acts to K.S. to 
prove modus operandi, and there was no evidence presented by J.G. to show that 
Baldes was gratified or aroused to prove motive.  The State concedes that J.G.’s testimony 
was not identical to what the prosecutor expected to present, but that the 
testimony substantially conformed to the prosecutor’s expectations and the 
purpose for which it was admitted.  
We agree.
 
[¶23]   Like K.S., J.G. testified that he 
was incapacitated and needed assistance bathing and that Baldes had assisted 
him.  J.G.’s testimony painted a 
picture of a vulnerable person who, like K.S., had relied upon Amedisys to send 
trustworthy individuals into his home to help him with simple but quite personal 
tasks.  J.G.’s testimony showed a 
method of operation similar to that described by K.S.:  Baldes used his position of authority 
and a client’s vulnerability to build, then betray, a relationship of trust.
 
[¶24]   J.G.’s testimony also tended to 
show that Baldes’ improper conduct was sexually motivated.  J.G. testified that a number of CNAs had 
assisted him over a three-year period and that he had become familiar with the 
regular procedures followed by the other CNAs when they bathed him.  By demonstrating his familiarity with 
the practices of other CNAs, J.G. showed that he could differentiate between a 
standard bathing procedure and overt sexual acts.  Unlike K.S., J.G. did not testify that 
Baldes’ assault took two to three minutes, or that Baldes did not wear 
gloves.  However, J.G.’s description of the manner in 
which Baldes washed his intimate parts was similar to K.S.’s description—both 
used the word masturbate—tending to indicate Baldes’ conduct was sexually 
motivated.
 
[¶25]   In sum, J.G.’s testimony, though 
less detailed than the State expected, served the State’s stated purposes of 
introducing it:  to properly prove 
both Baldes’ modus operandi and motive.  
We uphold the trial court’s admission of this 
evidence.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶26]   This Court concludes that ample 
evidence was presented to prove that Baldes was in a position of authority over 
and had sexual contact with the victim, K.S.  Furthermore, the district court followed 
a proper Gleason analysis of the 
proffered Rule 404(b) evidence, and the evidence served the 
purpose 
for which it was admitted.  
Affirmed.