Case Title: Kauders v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12883

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-01-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12883 
 
CHRISTOPHER P. KAUDERS & another1  vs.  UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 
& another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 10, 2020. - January 4, 2021. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.3 
 
 
Arbitration, Appeal of order compelling arbitration, 
Appropriateness of judicial proceedings, Confirmation of 
award.  Uniform Arbitration Act.  Contract, For services, 
Offer and acceptance, Arbitration. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 12, 2016. 
 
 
A motion to compel arbitration was heard by Douglas H. 
Wilkins, J.; a motion for reconsideration, filed on November 28, 
2018, was heard by him; and a motion to confirm the arbitration 
award was also heard by him. 
 
 
 
Felicia H. Ellsworth for the defendants. 
 
W. Paul Needham for the plaintiffs. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
                     
 
1 Hannah Kauders. 
 
 
2 Rasier, LLC. 
 
3 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
Bruce H. Stern, of New Jersey, Jeffrey R. White, of the 
District of Columbia, Kathy Jo Cook, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. 
Powers, Kristie A. LaSalle, Lauren G. Barnes, & Michael J. 
McCann for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys & another. 
 
Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
 
Archis A. Parasharami, of the District of Columbia, 
& Steven P. Lehotsky for the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States of America. 
 
Karla Gilbride, of the District of Columbia, Rhea Ghosh, of 
New York, & Stuart Rossman for Public Justice, P.C., & another. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Plaintiffs Christopher Kauders and Hannah 
Kauders commenced a lawsuit against defendants Uber 
Technologies, Inc., and Rasier, LLC (collectively, Uber),4 in the 
Superior Court, claiming, among other things, that three Uber 
drivers, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 98A, refused to provide 
Christopher Kauders with rides because he was blind and 
accompanied by a guide dog.  Each of the plaintiffs registered 
with Uber through its cellular telephone application (app).  
Citing a provision in its terms and conditions, Uber sought to 
compel arbitration.  The plaintiffs opposed arbitration on 
various grounds, including that there was no enforceable 
arbitration agreement.  The judge granted Uber's motion, and the 
parties arbitrated their dispute in early 2018.  On June 4, 
2018, the arbitrator issued findings and a decision, ruling in 
favor of Uber on all of the plaintiffs' claims. 
                     
 
4 Rasier, LLC, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Uber 
Technologies, Inc. 
3 
 
On June 25, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit issued a decision in Cullinane v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2018) (Cullinane II), concluding 
that Uber's registration process did not create a contract 
because it did not provide reasonable notice to users of the 
terms and conditions.  Several months later, after Uber moved to 
confirm the arbitration award, the judge who had granted the 
motion to compel arbitration allowed a motion for 
reconsideration and reversed his earlier decision, concluding 
that there was no enforceable contract requiring arbitration.  
In this appeal, Uber contends that the judge had no choice but 
to confirm the arbitration award once the plaintiffs failed to 
challenge the award within thirty days. 
We conclude that the issue of arbitrability5 was preserved 
for appeal.  We also conclude that Uber's terms and conditions 
did not constitute a contract with the plaintiffs.  The app's 
registration process did not provide users with reasonable 
notice of the terms and conditions and did not obtain a clear 
manifestation of assent to the terms, both of which could have 
been easily achieved.  Indeed, a review of the case law reveals 
that Uber has no trouble providing such reasonable notice and 
                     
 
5 We use the term "arbitrability" to refer to the legal 
determination as to whether an enforceable arbitration agreement 
exists. 
4 
 
requiring express affirmation from its own drivers.  Here, in 
remarkable contrast, both the notice and the assent are obscured 
in the registration process.  As a result, Uber cannot enforce 
the terms and conditions against the plaintiffs, including the 
arbitration agreement at issue here.6 
1.  Background.  We recite the undisputed facts as alleged 
in the complaint and as alleged by the parties in their filings 
on Uber's motion to compel arbitration. 
a.  Uber's registration process.  Uber describes itself as 
a technology company that allows its users to request 
transportation services from drivers in their geographic area 
through its app.  Before they can request trips, users must 
register with Uber.  Users can register by means of their 
cellular telephones by using the app. 
Christopher Kauders's registration process via the app 
involved three steps, with each step involving a separate 
screen.  The first screen was titled "CREATE AN ACCOUNT."  This 
title appeared in a gray bar at the top of the screen.  The rest 
of the screen was a dark color.  In the middle of the screen, 
there was white text that stated, "We use your email and mobile 
                     
6 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys and the American 
Association for Justice; the New England Legal Foundation; the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America; and Public 
Justice, P.C., and the National Consumer Law Center. 
5 
 
number to send you ride confirmations and receipts."  Below the 
text, a keypad appeared by which the user could enter the 
required information.  On this screen, the user was required to 
enter an e-mail address, a mobile telephone number, and a 
password.  Once the user entered this information, a button in 
the top right corner of the screen that stated "NEXT" was 
enabled.  All of the information was provided on a single 
screen; there was no need for the user to scroll to review any 
information.  The user was required to press (or "click") "NEXT" 
to move to the second screen. 
The second screen was titled "CREATE A PROFILE."  The title 
again appeared in a gray bar at the top of the screen.  On this 
screen, which has a similar dark background, the user was 
required to enter a first and last name and had the option to 
add a photograph.  In the middle of this screen, white text 
stated, "Your name and photo helps your driver identify you at 
pickup."  As with the first screen, a keypad appeared with which 
the user could enter the requested information.  Also like the 
first screen, a button in the top right corner that stated 
"NEXT" was enabled once the user entered the required 
information. 
The third screen was titled "LINK PAYMENT."  Like the first 
two screens, the third screen had a dark background with a gray 
bar across the top.  Under the gray bar, there was a white, 
6 
 
rectangular field in which the user was required to enter a 
credit card number.  Under the box, white, boldface text stated 
"scan your card" and "enter promo code."  In the middle of the 
screen, below the word "OR" in white text, there was a large, 
dark button labeled "PayPal" that provided another mechanism for 
entering payment information.7 
At the bottom of the screen, there was white text that 
stated, "By creating an Uber account, you agree to the Terms & 
Conditions and Privacy Policy."  This text was oddly divided 
into two parts.  The first part of the sentence, which informed 
the user, "By creating an Uber account, you agree to the," was 
far less prominently displayed than the words "Terms & 
Conditions and Privacy Policy," which followed.  The second part 
of the sentence -- "Terms & Conditions and Privacy Policy" -- 
was in a rectangular box and in boldface font.  According to 
Uber, this presentation was used to indicate that the box was a 
clickable hyperlink.  If a user clicked this box, the user would 
be taken to a screen that contained other clickable buttons, 
labeled "Terms & Conditions" and "Privacy Policy."  Once at this 
linked screen, if the user clicked the "Terms & Conditions" 
button, the terms and conditions would appear on the screen. 
                     
 
7 PayPal is an Internet payment service.  See Cullinane II, 
893 F.3d at 58 n.5, citing United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 
374, 377 n.1 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1053 
(2010). 
7 
 
If the user interacted with the rectangular field at the 
top of the third screen, a number keypad appeared in the bottom 
half of the screen.  The user could use the number keypad to 
enter credit card information.  Once this keypad appeared, the 
white text and the link from the bottom of the screen moved to 
the middle of the screen between the rectangular box and the 
keypad.  After a user filled in the credit card information, a 
button labeled "DONE" became clickable in the top right corner.  
Once the user clicked "DONE," the user completed the account 
creation process. 
Using this process, Christopher Kauders registered with 
Uber through the app on June 27, 2014.  He used a cellular 
telephone to do so.  Hannah Kauders registered with Uber 
sometime around October 2015.8 
 
b.  Uber's terms and conditions.9  Uber's terms and 
conditions are extensive and far reaching, touching on a wide 
                     
 
8 There is nothing in the record indicating that Hannah 
Kauders's registration process differed in any way from the 
process described above.  We therefore assume that both 
plaintiffs registered with Uber through the same process. 
 
 
9 Because the plaintiffs registered at different times, and 
because of when the alleged incidents occurred, there are 
multiple versions of the terms and conditions in the record 
before us.  Our discussion of the terms and conditions focuses 
on the version that was in effect when Christopher Kauders first 
registered with Uber through the app, as this version would have 
been the version that would have been available to Christopher 
Kauders had he attempted to review them during the registration 
8 
 
variety of topics.  Uber can amend the terms and conditions 
whenever it wants and without notice to the users that have 
already agreed to them.  In fact, under the terms and 
conditions, the burden is on the user to frequently check to see 
if any changes have been made.10  Yet, even if a user somehow 
detects a change, there is no way for the user to object to or 
contest any of the changes, as the changes are automatically 
binding on the user. 
 
The terms and conditions contain numerous provisions, many 
of which are extremely favorable to Uber.  There is a broad 
limitation of liability provision.  This provision purports to 
release Uber from all liability for 
"ANY INDIRECT, PUNITIVE, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, INCIDENTAL, 
CONSEQUENTIAL OR OTHER DAMAGES OF ANY TYPE OR KIND 
(INCLUDING PERSONAL INJURY, LOSS OF DATA, REVENUE, PROFITS, 
USE OR OTHER ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE).  [UBER] SHALL NOT BE 
LIABLE FOR ANY LOSS, DAMAGE OR INJURY WHICH MAY BE INCURRED 
BY YOU . . . .  YOU EXPRESSLY WAIVE AND RELEASE [UBER] FROM 
ANY AND ALL ANY [sic] LIABILITY, CLAIMS OR DAMAGES ARISING 
                     
process.  Most of the provisions discussed above appear in each 
of the versions in the record. 
 
10 We note that the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit has held that a provision in terms of use 
providing for unilateral changes without notice to the other 
parties is unenforceable.  See Douglas v. United States Dist. 
Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 
2007) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Talk America, Inc. v. 
Douglas, 552 U.S. 1242 (2008) ("a party can't unilaterally 
change the terms of a contract; it must obtain the other party's 
consent before doing so. . . .  Even if [a user's] continued use 
of [a] service could be considered assent, such assent can only 
be inferred after he received proper notice of the proposed 
changes"). 
9 
 
FROM OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THE THIRD PARTY 
TRANSPORTATION PROVIDER." 
As the judge below recognized, this provision "totally 
extinguishes any possible remedy" against Uber.11 
 
Uber also seeks to separate itself entirely from the 
drivers providing the ride services.  The terms and conditions 
state in capital letters: 
"[UBER] DOES NOT PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, AND 
[UBER] IS NOT A TRANSPORTATION CARRIER.  IT IS UP TO THE 
THIRD PARTY TRANSPORTATION PROVIDER, DRIVER OR VEHICLE 
OPERATOR TO OFFER TRANSPORTATION SERVICES WHICH MAY BE 
SCHEDULED THROUGH USE OF THE APPLICATION OR SERVICE.  
[UBER] OFFERS INFORMATION AND A METHOD TO OBTAIN SUCH THIRD 
PARTY TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, BUT DOES NOT AND DOES NOT 
INTEND TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION SERVICES OR ACT IN ANY WAY 
AS A TRANSPORTATION CARRIER, AND HAS NO RESPONSIBILITY OR 
LIABILITY FOR ANY TRANSPORTATION SERVICES PROVIDED TO YOU 
BY SUCH THIRD PARTIES." 
The terms and conditions also include a strict no-refund 
policy.  They disclaim all warranties "to the maximum extent 
permitted by law," including any warranties as to the 
"reliability, safety, timeliness, [or] quality" of any services 
Uber provides.  There is also a broad indemnification provision, 
under which a user must indemnify Uber for all costs Uber incurs 
arising out of a user's "violation or breach of any term of this 
Agreement or any applicable law or regulation," "violation of 
                     
 
11 The judge also held that this provision was unenforceable 
insofar as it released or waived the right to recover the type 
of statutory damages sought by Christopher Kauders.  This part 
of the order is not before us in this appeal. 
10 
 
any rights of any third party," or the "use or misuse of the 
Application or Service."12 
A user must also provide Uber with "whatever proof of 
identity [it] may reasonably request."  Uber can monitor user 
access to or use of its service or the app, and it can provide 
law enforcement or a government agency with whatever user 
information it chooses.  Additionally, a user cannot "use the 
Service or Application to cause nuisance, annoyance or 
inconvenience." 
The "Dispute Resolution" section appears near the end of 
the terms and conditions.  It provides that "any dispute, claim 
or controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement 
. . . will be settled by binding arbitration."  The terms and 
conditions describe the procedures to be used in the 
arbitration.  The terms and conditions also mandate that "[t]he 
arbitrator's award damages must be consistent with the terms of 
the 'Limitation of Liability' section above as to the types and 
the amounts of damages for which a party may be held liable."  
                     
 
12 Uber invoked the indemnification provision in this case.  
In arbitration, Uber brought a counterclaim for breach of 
contract against the plaintiffs, alleging that they committed a 
breach of the terms and conditions by commencing a lawsuit and 
pursuing litigation in court against Uber.  Through this 
counterclaim, Uber sought to recover the "substantial 
unnecessary costs and fees" it incurred litigating the 
plaintiffs' lawsuit. 
11 
 
If Uber makes changes to the dispute resolution section, the 
user has thirty days in which to object to the changes.13 
 
c.  Procedural history.  The plaintiffs filed a complaint 
in the Superior Court in Suffolk County in 2016.  They alleged 
that Uber, through its drivers, unlawfully discriminated against 
Christopher Kauders on the basis that he is blind and 
accompanied by a guide dog.  Uber moved to compel arbitration in 
June 2017, relying in part on a Federal District Court decision 
in Cullinane that held that Uber's terms and conditions, and 
specifically the arbitration provision, were enforceable.  See 
Cullinane vs. Uber Techs., Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 14-14750-
DPW (D. Mass. July 11, 2016) (Cullinane I).14  The plaintiffs 
opposed arbitration on various grounds, including that the terms 
and conditions were not enforceable against them because they 
neither received adequate notice of the existence of the terms 
                     
 
13 These terms and conditions are apparently not uncommon in 
similar online contracts.  See, e.g., Benoliel & Becher, The 
Duty to Read the Unreadable, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 2255, 2265-2266 
(2019) (identifying common provisions); Hartzog, Website Design 
as Contract, 60 Am. U. L. Rev. 1635, 1642 (2011) (same).  This 
is true even though some of these provisions have been held to 
be unlawful or unenforceable.  See, e.g., Douglas, 495 F.3d at 
1066.  See also Preston, "Please Note:  You Have Waived 
Everything":  Can Notice Redeem Online Contracts?, 64 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 535, 555 (2015) ("Wrap contracts frequently include 
disclaimers that actually are unenforceable, and that the 
drafters know are unenforceable, but are included anyway"). 
 
 
14 As explained infra, this decision would later be reversed 
by the First Circuit. 
12 
 
and conditions nor assented to them.  The Superior Court judge 
granted Uber's motion to compel, omitting any discussion or 
analysis of the contract formation issue.15 
 
The case proceeded to arbitration in early 2018, and the 
arbitrator issued the decision on June 4, 2018.  Although the 
arbitrator concluded that Christopher Kauders was the victim of 
discriminatory acts by the drivers, the arbitrator, relying on 
agency principles, ruled for Uber on all of the plaintiffs' 
claims because the drivers were independent contractors, not 
employees, of Uber, and therefore, Uber was not liable for the 
drivers' actions.  The plaintiffs did not attempt to vacate or 
modify the arbitrator's award under G. L. c. 251, §§ 12-13. 
On June 25, 2018, the First Circuit reversed the District 
Court's ruling in Cullinane I and held that the same 
registration process at issue here did not create an enforceable 
contract under Massachusetts law between Uber and its users as 
to the terms and conditions.  See Cullinane II, 893 F.3d at 64.  
Specifically, the First Circuit held that Uber failed to provide 
users with adequate notice of the existence of the terms and the 
hyperlink to those terms.  Id.  Despite the relevance of this 
                     
 
15 The judge also explicitly "retain[ed] jurisdiction to 
consider whether any eventual arbitration award should preclude 
further litigation in this case, or whether it should be 
affirmed or vacated pursuant to G. L. c. 251." 
13 
 
decision to this case, the plaintiffs did not raise it with the 
judge until months later. 
 
On September 4, 2018, Uber filed a motion to confirm the 
arbitrator's award, and the plaintiffs submitted a one-paragraph 
response to Uber's motion arguing that they "were forced to 
arbitration over their objections."  On October 25, 2018, at the 
hearing on the motion to confirm, the plaintiffs reiterated 
their prior arguments against arbitration and raised the First 
Circuit's decision in Cullinane II for the first time.  In 
response, the judge indicated to the plaintiffs that they would 
need to file a motion for reconsideration or a motion to vacate 
to pursue these arguments further.  The judge did not rule on 
Uber's motion to confirm at that time but instead invited and 
scheduled briefing on the plaintiffs' forthcoming motion.  The 
plaintiffs then filed a motion for reconsideration seeking to 
have the court vacate the July 2017 order compelling 
arbitration. 
On January 2, 2019, over six months after the arbitrator 
issued his award, the judge granted the plaintiffs' motion and 
vacated the earlier order compelling arbitration on the ground 
that there was no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.  The judge 
first observed that the original order failed to address the 
contract formation argument even though the plaintiffs had 
raised it in their opposition to the motion to compel.  The 
14 
 
judge then concluded that, in light of the Appeals Court's 
decision in Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 575-
577 (2013), S.C., 478 Mass. 169 (2017), cert. denied sub nom. 
Oath Holdings, Inc. v. Ajemian, 138 S. Ct. 1327 (2018),16 and the 
First Circuit's recent decision in Cullinane II, the original 
order compelling arbitration was error and that no enforceable 
contract existed.  As a result, the judge allowed the 
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, denied Uber's motion to 
compel arbitration, and denied Uber's motion to confirm the 
award.17 
 
2.  Discussion.  Uber raises three issues on appeal.  
First, it argues that we should reverse the judge's order 
denying Uber's motion to confirm because the plaintiffs did not 
challenge the arbitrator's award within the thirty-day time 
frame as required by G. L. c. 251, § 11.  Second, Uber argues 
that the judge lacked the authority to reconsider the earlier 
ruling because there was no change in fact or law that triggered 
the ability to reconsider the earlier ruling.  Finally, Uber 
                     
 
16 In Ajemian, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 575-577, the Appeals 
Court analyzed whether a forum selection clause and a clause 
limiting the statute of limitations period for bringing claims 
against Yahoo!, Inc., were enforceable.  The court concluded 
that nothing in the record before it established that the terms 
of service were either reasonably communicated or accepted.  Id. 
at 576. 
 
 
17 Uber appealed, and we transferred the case to this court 
sua sponte. 
15 
 
argues that we should reverse the judge's order denying Uber's 
motion to compel because the terms and conditions were an 
enforceable contract between the parties.  We address each issue 
in turn, ultimately concluding that the arbitrability issue was 
properly preserved for appeal here.  We further conclude that 
Uber's terms and conditions did not constitute an enforceable 
contract. 
 
a.  Motion to confirm the arbitration award.  Uber argues 
that the judge erred by denying its motion to confirm the 
arbitration award.  It contends that when the plaintiffs failed 
to move to vacate the award within thirty days, the judge had no 
choice but to confirm the award.  Whether the arbitration award 
should have been confirmed and whether the statutory time frames 
in the Massachusetts Arbitration Act (MAA or the act)18 for 
postaward challenges apply to the issue of arbitrability in the 
circumstances here -- where the plaintiffs originally challenged 
arbitrability and lost but did not revisit the issue in the 
thirty-day period after the award -- are questions of statutory 
interpretation, which we review de novo.  Dorrian v. LVNV 
Funding, LLC, 479 Mass. 265, 271 (2018).  To answer these 
                     
 
18 The official title of G. L. c. 251 is the "Uniform 
Arbitration Act for Commercial Disputes."  See St. 1960, c. 374, 
§ 1.  We refer to this chapter, as do the parties, as the 
Massachusetts Arbitration Act or the MAA. 
16 
 
questions, it is necessary to go step by step through the MAA 
and consider its over-all structure and purpose. 
General Laws c. 251 governs the enforceability and 
interpretation of arbitration agreements.  Pursuant to § 2, a 
party can file a motion for an order compelling arbitration.  
See G. L. c. 251, § 2.  The trial court judge must then 
determine whether an enforceable agreement to arbitrate exists.  
If the judge denies a motion to compel arbitration, the act 
permits the moving party to take an interlocutory appeal from 
that order.  G. L. c. 251, § 18 (a) (1).19  On the other hand, if 
the court grants the motion and compels arbitration, that order 
is not immediately appealable.  See School Comm. of Agawam v. 
                     
 
19 General Laws c. 251, § 18, provides: 
 
"(a) An appeal may be taken from: 
 
"(1) an order denying an application to compel arbitration 
made under [§ 2 (a)]; 
 
"(2) an order granting an application to stay arbitration 
made under [§ 2 (b)]; 
 
"(3) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an 
award; 
 
"(4) an order modifying or correcting an award; 
 
"(5) an order vacating an award without directing a 
rehearing; or 
 
"(6) a judgment or decree entered pursuant to the 
provisions of this chapter.  Such appeal shall be taken in 
the manner and to the same extent as from orders or 
judgments in an action." 
17 
 
Agawam Educ. Ass'n, 371 Mass. 845, 847 (1977) ("The legislative 
purpose [of G. L. c. 150C] is clear that an arbitration 
proceeding should not be delayed by an appeal when a judge has 
concluded that there is an 'agreement to arbitrate' . . . .  The 
issue of arbitrability under the terms of an agreement may be 
preserved and raised subsequently in a proceeding seeking to 
vacate the arbitrator's award"); Old Rochester Regional 
Teacher's Club v. Old Rochester Regional Sch. Dist., 18 Mass. 
App. Ct. 117, 118 (1984) (same).20  Instead, a party wishing to 
challenge an order compelling arbitration must wait until the 
arbitration is completed and the award is confirmed before 
challenging the order compelling arbitration on appeal.  See 
G. L. c. 251, § 18 (a) (3), (6).21  See also Weston Sec. Corp. v. 
Aykanian, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 72, 76 (1998) (party can challenge 
order compelling arbitration on appeal under § 18). 
                     
 
20 General Laws c. 150C, §§ 1-16, the statute governing 
arbitration agreements in collective bargaining agreements, 
contains statutory provisions that are very similar to those 
provisions in the MAA.  Our courts have interpreted the 
analogous provisions of G. L. c. 150C to those of G. L. c. 251 
that are at issue in this case on several occasions.  See, e.g., 
School Comm. of Agawam, 371 Mass. at 847; Old Rochester Regional 
Teacher's Club, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 118.  These decisions are 
instructive as we interpret the MAA in this case. 
 
 
21 The list of orders in § 18 from which an appeal can be 
taken under the MAA is exhaustive; there is no right to appeal 
from any order not listed.  See Old Rochester Regional Teacher's 
Club, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 118. 
18 
 
This dichotomy, allowing interlocutory appeals of orders 
denying a motion to compel arbitration but precluding such 
appeals of orders compelling arbitration, reflects the act's 
preference for expeditious arbitration once an initial decision 
on arbitrability is made.  The MAA "expresses a strong public 
policy favoring arbitration as an expeditious alternative to 
litigation for settling commercial disputes."  Miller v. Cotter, 
448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007), quoting Home Gas Corp. of Mass., Inc. 
v. Walter's of Hadley, Inc., 403 Mass. 772, 774 (1989).  See 
also Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Malacaria, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 
184, 192 (1996), quoting Lawrence v. Falzarano, 380 Mass. 18, 28 
(1980) ("The overriding purpose behind the [MAA] is to provide 
for the expeditious resolution of disputes through a method 'not 
subject to delay and obstruction in the courts'"). 
 
Once the arbitration is completed and the arbitrator issues 
an award, the MAA sets the procedure for limited judicial review 
of the award itself.  Either party can move to vacate, modify, 
or correct the award.  G. L. c. 251, § 11.  More specifically, 
§ 11 provides that "[u]pon application of a party, the court 
shall confirm an award, unless within the time limits 
hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying 
or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed 
as provided in [§§ 12 and 13]."  Both §§ 12 and 13 require that 
19 
 
any challenge be brought within thirty days of receipt of the 
award.  G. L. c. 251, §§ 12 (b), 13 (a). 
Section 12 (a) provides the grounds for vacating an award, 
and § 13 (a) provides the grounds for modifying or correcting an 
award.  These grounds focus on problems with the arbitration and 
the award itself, such as fraud, partiality of the arbitrator, 
or miscalculations of figures, and not with whether the order 
compelling arbitration was appropriate.  See G. L. c. 251, 
§§ 12 (a) (1)-(5) (grounds for vacating award), 13 (a) (1)-(3) 
(grounds for modifying or correcting award).  The statutory 
language of § 12 is clear on this issue:  the court shall only 
vacate an arbitration award on arbitrability grounds if "there 
was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely 
determined in proceedings under [§ 2] and the party did not 
participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the 
objection" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 251, § 12 (a) (5).  Here, 
the issue was adversely determined in proceedings under § 2.  
Consequently, the plaintiffs could not have moved to vacate the 
award on the issue of arbitrability because the issue had 
already been decided against them. 
The act, as explained above, does not envision relitigation 
of the arbitrability issue in the trial court after the award is 
issued because it will further delay final resolution.  Rather, 
it preserves the issue of arbitrability for the appellate courts 
20 
 
after confirmation of the award.  Consequently, the judge should 
have confirmed the arbitration award while expressly stating 
that the issue of arbitrability was preserved. 
 
Although somewhat unclear, Uber appears to contend further 
that once the plaintiffs agreed to participate in the 
arbitration they were bound to raise the arbitrability issue 
again within the thirty-day time frame or that issue could not 
be raised on appeal.  For support, Uber relies on language in 
various Federal cases that have wrestled with the question 
whether participation in arbitration binds plaintiffs who have 
previously challenged arbitrability to the procedural rules set 
out in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).  See, e.g., MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. v. Exalon Indus., Inc., 138 F.3d 426, 
429-431 (1st Cir. 1998); Professional Adm'rs, Ltd. v. Kopper-Glo 
Fuel, Inc., 819 F.2d 639, 642-643 (6th Cir. 1987).  As our 
statute contains different language, expressly precluding a 
second arbitrability challenge if it was previously adversely 
determined, we do not consider participation in the arbitration 
process as requiring revisitation of the arbitrability issue 
within the thirty-day time period.  That issue is preserved for 
appeal. 
 
b.  Motion for reconsideration.  Further complicating the 
procedural posture of this case is the judge's allowance of a 
motion for reconsideration on his original order compelling 
21 
 
arbitration six months after the award and several months after 
Uber filed its motion to confirm the award.  We review a 
decision on a motion for reconsideration for abuse of 
discretion.  See Piedra v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 39 Mass. App. Ct. 
184, 188 (1995). 
Uber argues that the judge abused his discretion in 
granting the motion for reconsideration because there was no 
change in fact or law and the motion for reconsideration was 
untimely.  As a general matter, it is well established that a 
judge retains discretion to reconsider prior rulings and correct 
errors at any time until a final judgment is entered, regardless 
of whether there has been a change in fact or law.  See, e.g., 
Hebert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 439 Mass. 387, 
401 (2003); Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 242 (1991); 
Genesis Tech. & Fin., Inc. v. Cast Navigation, LLC, 74 Mass. 
App. Ct. 203, 206 (2009).  We therefore reject Uber's arguments 
that the judge lacked the ability to reconsider his earlier 
ruling absent a change in law or fact. 
The issue of untimeliness is more complicated.  In 
evaluating whether the judge abused his discretion here, we 
recognize that the unique history of this case put the judge in 
a difficult position.  The issuance of Cullinane II, a relevant 
and significant decision, after the parties completed 
arbitration but before Uber moved to confirm the award, 
22 
 
understandably led the judge to question whether the original 
ruling compelling arbitration was correct.  At this point, 
however, the arbitration had been completed.  Indeed, by the 
time it was brought to his attention and decided, six months had 
passed.  Although a judge ordinarily may reconsider a prior 
decision until a final judgment, once the order to compel 
arbitration had been issued and the arbitration commenced, the 
arbitration should have continued without further involvement by 
the judge.  The statute contemplates an initial decision by the 
judge and then expeditious arbitration for the reasons discussed 
above.  We have made clear that we do not want judges injecting 
themselves once the arbitration has commenced.  See, e.g., 
School Comm. of Agawam, 371 Mass. at 847.  See also Cavanaugh v. 
McDonnell & Co., 357 Mass. 452, 457 (1970) ("arbitration, once 
undertaken, should continue freely without being subjected to a 
judicial restraint which would tend to render the proceedings 
neither one thing nor the other, but transform them into a 
hybrid, part judicial and part arbitrational"). 
At the time the judge decided the motion for 
reconsideration, he was even further constrained by statute.  
General Laws c. 251, § 11, expressly provides that "[u]pon 
application of a party, the court shall confirm an award, unless 
within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for 
vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case the 
23 
 
court shall proceed as provided in [§§ 12 and 13]." (emphasis 
added).  The use of "shall" is mandatory.  Katz, Nannis & 
Solomon, P.C. v. Levine, 473 Mass. 784, 791 (2016) ("shall 
confirm" in § 11 "carries no hint of flexibility" [citation 
omitted]). 
Uber applied to confirm the award, and the plaintiffs had 
not, within thirty days, presented any grounds for vacating, 
modifying, or correcting the award.  Moreover, as described 
above, § 12 (a) (5) also clearly precluded the plaintiffs from 
raising the issue of arbitrability again with the trial court, 
instead leaving that issue for appeal.  In these circumstances, 
Uber was entitled to confirmation of the award, rather than a 
revisiting and unsettling of the order compelling arbitration by 
the trial court and the delay that accompanied that review.  
Requiring the judge to confirm the award in these circumstances 
results in an expeditious confirmation of the arbitration award 
that may be challenged on appeal.22  We therefore conclude that 
allowing the motion for reconsideration was an abuse of 
discretion.23 
                     
 
22 In confirming the award, the judge could also have 
expressed his reservations, highlighting the issue on appeal 
despite the statutory constraints on his own ability to fix the 
problem. 
 
 
23 In the instant case, however, the only significance of 
allowing the motion for reconsideration is that it essentially 
made Uber the appealing party, rather than the plaintiffs.  As 
24 
 
c.  Enforceability of the terms and conditions.  As 
described above, the enforceability of an arbitration agreement 
will often be decided by the trial court judge in the first 
instance and then reviewed on appeal.  Because we conclude that 
the judge abused his discretion in granting the plaintiffs' 
motion for reconsideration, we ordinarily would remand the case 
to the Superior Court for further proceedings.  In this case, 
the judge, upon remand, would be required to confirm the award, 
while at the same time ruling that the issue of arbitrability 
would be preserved for appeal.  The plaintiffs would then 
undoubtedly appeal on that ground, and the case would be right 
back before us. 
It makes little sense to delay appellate review of the 
order compelling arbitration in these circumstances.  The 
parties have fully briefed and argued that issue, and it is one 
that the plaintiffs are entitled to have reviewed by an 
appellate court.  In the interests of judicial economy, 
therefore, in lieu of a remand, we turn to the major online 
contract formation issue before us:  whether Uber's terms and 
conditions constitute an enforceable contract with the 
plaintiffs. 
                     
previously explained, the plaintiffs could still appeal the 
issue of arbitrability. 
25 
 
 
i.  Legal standard for online contract formation.  As the 
online contract here includes an arbitration agreement, we first 
recognize that the FAA establishes a "liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements."  Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. 
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).  But "this 
policy [does not] override[] the principle that a court may 
submit to arbitration only those disputes . . . that the parties 
have agreed to submit" and "courts may [not] use policy 
considerations as a substitute for party agreement" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Granite Rock Co. v. International Bhd. 
of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 302-303 (2010).  Indeed, "[t]he FAA 
reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter 
of contract."  Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 
67 (2010).  "When deciding whether the parties agreed to 
arbitrate a certain matter . . . courts generally . . . should 
apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of 
contracts."  First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 
938, 944 (1995).  See Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 
110, 119 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Whether or not the parties have agreed 
to arbitrate is a question of state contract law"); Chelsea 
Square Textiles, Inc. v. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co., 189 F.3d 289, 
295-296 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[W]hile . . . the FAA preempts state 
law that treats arbitration agreements differently from any 
other contracts, it also preserves general principles of state 
26 
 
contract law as rules of decision on whether the parties have 
entered into an agreement to arbitrate" [quotation, citation, 
and footnote omitted]).24  With these principles in mind, we turn 
to the enforceability of the online contract under Massachusetts 
law. 
 
We have not previously considered what standard a court 
should use when considering issues of contract formation for 
online contracts.  That being said, the fundamentals of online 
contract formation should not be different from ordinary 
contract formation.  See, e.g., Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 
F.3d 1029, 1034 (7th Cir. 2016).  The touchscreens of Internet 
contract law must reflect the touchstones of regular contract 
law. 
In evaluating whether provisions in an online agreement 
were enforceable, the Appeals Court in Ajemian used a 
reasonableness standard, focusing on whether the contract 
provisions at issue "were reasonably communicated and accepted."  
Ajemian, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 574.25  Under this standard, for 
                     
 
24 The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated:  "We 
do not suggest that a state court is precluded from announcing a 
new, generally applicable rule of law in an arbitration case.  
We simply reiterate here what we have said many times before -- 
that the rule must in fact apply generally, rather than single 
out arbitration."  Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. v. Clark, 137 S. 
Ct. 1421, 1428 n.2 (2017). 
 
 
25 We note that Ajemian involved a forum selection clause.  
Ajemian, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 575-576.  As we have explained 
27 
 
there to be an enforceable contract, there must be both 
reasonable notice of the terms and a reasonable manifestation of 
assent to those terms.  See id. at 574-575, quoting Specht v. 
Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 120.  See also Conroy & Shope, Look Before 
You Click:  The Enforceability of Website and Smartphone App 
Terms and Conditions, 63 Boston Bar J. 23, 23 (Spring 2019) 
(Conroy & Shope) ("This two-part test is consistent with the 
approach taken by other courts around the country"). 
 
We conclude that this two-prong test, focusing on whether 
there is reasonable notice of the terms and a reasonable 
manifestation of assent to those terms, is the proper framework 
for analyzing issues of online contract formation.  Setting out 
these general fundamental contract principles is not, however, 
the difficult part of analysis.  "The trick here is to know how 
to apply these general principles to newer forms of contracting" 
                     
elsewhere, forum selection clauses must meet higher standards 
than other contractual provisions.  See, e.g., Cambridge Biotech 
Corp. v. Pasteur Sanofi Diagnostics, 433 Mass. 122, 130 (2000) 
(forum selection clause only enforced if fair and reasonable).  
We only adopt the reasoning of Ajemian to the extent it requires 
reasonable notice of the terms of a contractual provision and 
reasonable manifestation of assent to those terms.  We do not 
require that the notice be "conspicuous," as required for 
certain types of contractual provisions or as required by other 
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 
66, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2017) (under California law, user must have 
"[r]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract 
terms"). 
28 
 
over the Internet.  Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1034.  We elaborate 
more on each prong infra.  We also emphasize that the burden of 
proof on both prongs is on Uber, the party seeking to enforce 
the contract.  See Canney v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 353 
Mass. 158, 164 (1967). 
A.  Reasonable notice.  The first prong requires that the 
offeree receive reasonable notice of the terms of the online 
agreement.  Where the offeree has actual notice of the terms, 
this prong is satisfied without further inquiry.  Miller, 448 
Mass. at 680 (party bound by terms of contract regardless of 
whether party actually read terms).  Actual notice will exist 
where the user has reviewed the terms.  It will also generally 
be found where the user must somehow interact with the terms 
before agreeing to them. 
 
Absent actual notice, the totality of the circumstances 
must be evaluated in determining whether reasonable notice has 
been given of the terms and conditions.  See Sgouros, 817 F.3d 
at 1034-1035 (discussing reasonable notice, and relevant 
considerations, in context of contracting over Internet).  This 
is "clearly a fact-intensive inquiry."  Meyer v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2017).  See Sgouros, supra.  It 
includes consideration of the form of the contract.  See, e.g., 
Polonsky v. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 334 Mass. 697, 701 
(1956) (terms may not be enforceable where document containing 
29 
 
or presenting terms to offeree does not appear to be contract); 
Sgouros, supra at 1035 (discussing how contracting over Internet 
is different from paper transactions and how reasonable users of 
Internet may not understand that they are entering into 
contractual relationship).  In determining whether the notice is 
reasonable, the court should also consider the nature, including 
the size, of the transaction, whether the notice conveys the 
full scope of the terms and conditions, and the interface by 
which the terms are being communicated.  Sgouros, supra at 1034 
(in case involving contracting for credit scores over Internet, 
"we might ask whether the web pages presented to the consumer 
adequately communicate all the terms and conditions of the 
agreement").  For Internet transactions, the specifics and 
subtleties of the "design and content of the relevant interface" 
are especially relevant in evaluating whether reasonable notice 
has been provided.  Meyer, supra at 75.  See Nicosia v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016). 
In examining the interface, we evaluate the clarity and 
simplicity of the communication of the terms.  Does the 
interface require the user to open the terms or make them 
readily available?  How many steps must be taken to access the 
terms and conditions, and how clear and extensive is the process 
to access the terms?  See Cullinane II, 893 F.3d at 62, quoting 
Ajemian, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 575 (court should consider "the 
30 
 
language that was used to notify users that the terms of their 
arrangement . . . could be found by following the link, how 
prominently displayed the link was, and any other information 
that would bear on the reasonableness of communicating [the 
terms]").  Ultimately, the offeror must reasonably notify the 
user that there are terms to which the user will be bound and 
give the user the opportunity to review those terms. 
 
B.  Reasonable manifestation of assent.  When considering 
whether the user assented to the terms of the online agreement, 
we consider the specific actions required to manifest assent.  A 
user may be required to expressly and affirmatively manifest 
assent to an online agreement by clicking or checking a box that 
states that the user agrees to the terms and conditions.  See, 
e.g., Emmannuel v. Handy Techs., Inc., 442 F. Supp. 3d 385, 389 
(D. Mass. 2020) (user required to affirmatively indicate assent 
by clicking "Accept" button); Covino v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 
406 F. Supp. 3d 147, 152-153 (D. Mass. 2019) (enforcing 
agreement where user checked box acknowledging agreement with 
terms and conditions set forth in offeror's contract of 
carriage); Wickberg v. Lyft, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 3d 179, 181 (D. 
Mass. 2018) (screen required user to click box indicating that 
he "agree[d] to Lyft's terms of services" before he could 
continue with registration process).  These are often referred 
to as "clickwrap" agreements, and they are regularly enforced.  
31 
 
See Conroy & Shope, supra at 23.  See also Ajemian, 83 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 576; Wickberg, supra at 184; Note, The Electronic 
"Sign-in-Wrap" Contract:  Issues of Notice and Assent, the 
Average Internet User Standard, and Unconscionability, 50 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 535, 539 (2016) ("Clickwrap contracts require 
Internet users to affirmatively click 'I agree' when assenting 
to the terms and conditions on a website or making online 
purchases").  As one court has observed, "[w]hile clickwrap 
agreements . . . are not necessarily required . . . , they are 
certainly the easiest method of ensuring that terms are agreed 
to."  Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 237-238.  These are the clearest 
manifestations of assent. 
Requiring a user to expressly and affirmatively assent to 
the terms, such as by indicating "I Agree" or its equivalent, 
serves several important purposes.  It puts the user on notice 
that the user is entering into a contractual arrangement.  This 
is particularly important regarding online services, where 
services may be provided without requiring compensation or 
contractual agreements, and the users may not be sophisticated 
commercial actors.  Without an action comparable to the 
solemnity of physically signing a written contract, for example, 
we are concerned that such users may not be aware of the 
implications of their actions where agreement to terms is not 
expressly required.  See Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1035 ("a person 
32 
 
using the Internet may not realize that she is agreeing to a 
contract at all, whereas a reasonable person signing a physical 
contract will rarely be unaware of that fact"); Moringiello, 
Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 
1307, 1316 (2005) ("In contract law, a written signature 
provides the traditional evidence of assent because when we are 
asked to sign something, we are conditioned to think that we are 
doing something important").  Requiring an expressly affirmative 
act, therefore, such as clicking a button that states "I Agree," 
can help alert users to the significance of their actions.  
Where they so act, they have reasonably manifested their assent. 
Where no such express agreement is required by the offeror, 
we must turn to other less obvious manifestations of assent to 
the terms.  This makes the task of the court more difficult.  
See Cullinane II, 893 F.3d at 62 ("We note at the outset that 
Uber chose not to use a common method of conspicuously informing 
users of the existence and location of terms and conditions:  
requiring users to click a box stating that they agree to a set 
of terms, often provided by hyperlink, before continuing to the 
next screen").  In these cases, courts must again carefully 
consider the totality of the circumstances, and assent may be 
inferred from other actions the users have taken.  Where the 
connection between the action taken and the terms is unclear, or 
where the action taken does not clearly signify assent, it will 
33 
 
be difficult for the offeror to carry its burden to show that 
the user assented to the terms. 
 
ii.  Application.  Turning first to whether the plaintiffs 
had reasonable notice of the terms and conditions, we begin with 
the form and nature of the transaction.  Users are registering 
through an app that will connect drivers and riders for future 
short-term, small-money transactions.  The registration process 
expressly explained:  "We use your email and mobile number to 
send you ride confirmations and receipts"; and "Your name and 
photo helps your driver identify you at pickup."  Reasonable 
users may not understand that, by simply signing up for future 
ride services over the Internet, they have entered into a 
contractual relationship.  See, e.g., Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1035 
(signing up for credit-score information over Internet not 
obviously contractual).  It is qualitatively different from a 
large business deal where sophisticated parties hire legal 
counsel to review the fine print.  It is also not comparable to 
the purchase or lease of an apartment or a car, where the size 
of the personal transaction provides some notice of the 
contractual nature of the transaction even to unsophisticated 
contracting parties. 
It is also by no means obvious that signing up via an app 
for ride services would be accompanied by the type of extensive 
terms and conditions present here.  Among those terms are those 
34 
 
that indemnify Uber from all injuries that riders experience in 
the vehicle, subject riders' data to use by Uber for purposes 
besides transportation pick-up, establish conduct standards for 
riders and other users, and require arbitration.  Indeed, 
certain of the terms and conditions may literally require an 
individual user to sign his or her life away, as Uber may not be 
liable if something happened to the user during one of the 
rides. 
In these circumstances, we must carefully consider the 
interface and whether it reasonably focused the user on the 
terms and conditions.  That notice was essentially as follows.  
At the bottom of one screen in Uber's registration process, the 
following language appeared:  "By creating an Uber account, you 
agree to the Terms & Conditions and Privacy Policy."  This text 
was divided into two parts, with the first part -- describing 
the consequences of creating an account -- being less 
prominently displayed than the link to the terms and conditions 
and the privacy policy.  The app also contained a button that 
led to a link to the terms and conditions.  The question then 
becomes whether this type of notice was reasonable, particularly 
given the nature of the online transaction and the scope of the 
terms and conditions. 
The notice of the terms was not reasonable for several 
reasons.  Importantly, the interface did not require the user to 
35 
 
scroll through the conditions or even select them.  The user 
could fully register for the service and click "done" without 
ever clicking the link to the terms and conditions.  The 
connection between the creation of the account and the terms and 
conditions was also somewhat oddly displayed in the two-part 
format, with the significant information (i.e., that by creating 
the account, the user expresses his or her agreement) being 
displayed less prominently than other information. 
This is in striking contrast to the interface of the app 
provided to drivers by Uber, as demonstrated by the case law.  
Our review of numerous cases demonstrates that Uber required its 
drivers, before signing up, to review the terms and conditions 
by clicking a hyperlink.  For example, in one case involving the 
driver registration process in June 2014, the Uber app there 
carefully required drivers to consider the terms and conditions.  
See Singh v. Uber Techs., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 656, 661 (D.N.J. 
2017), vacated on other grounds, 939 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019).  
"When [the driver] logged on to the Uber App with his unique 
user name and password, he was given the opportunity to review 
the [agreement] by clicking a hyperlink to the [agreement] 
within the Uber App."  Id.  "To advance past the screen with the 
hyperlink and actively use the Uber App, [the driver] had to 
confirm that he had first reviewed and accepted the [agreement] 
by clicking 'YES, I AGREE.'  After clicking 'YES, I AGREE,' he 
36 
 
was prompted to confirm that he reviewed and accepted the 
[agreement] for a second time."  Id.  The app was also designed 
to allow the drivers ample time to review the terms and 
conditions.  Id. (driver accepted terms three months after terms 
first made available for review).  See Capriole vs. Uber Techs., 
Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 1:19-cv-11941-IT (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 
2020) (registration required clicking "YES I AGREE" at least 
twice and informed registrant that "[b]y clicking below, you 
represent that you have reviewed all the documents above and 
that you agree to all the contracts above"); Okereke vs. Uber 
Techs., Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 16-12487-PBS (D. Mass. June 
13, 2017) (same). 
The contrast between the notice provided to drivers and 
that provided to users is telling.  As Uber is undoubtedly 
aware, most of those registering via mobile applications do not 
read the terms of use or terms of service included with the 
applications.  See, e.g., Conroy & Shope, supra at 23 ("Most 
users will not have read the terms and, in some instances, may 
not have even seen the terms or any reference to them").  See 
also Ayres & Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer 
Contract Law, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 547-548 (2014) (describing 
empirical evidence showing number of Internet users who read 
terms is "miniscule"); Tentative Draft Restatement of the Law of 
Consumer Contracts, Reporters' Introduction (Apr. 18, 2019) 
37 
 
("The proliferation of lengthy standard-term contracts, mostly 
in digital form, makes it practically impossible for consumers 
to scrutinize the terms and evaluate them prior to manifesting 
assent").  Yet the design of the interface for the app here 
enables, if not encourages, users to ignore the terms and 
conditions.  See Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1035 (interface misleading 
user about existence of contractual terms weighed against 
enforcing terms). 
We also consider the specific placement in the app of the 
link to the terms and conditions.  On all three screens that a 
user was required to fill out, the top of the screen was where 
the user was required to focus and fill in information.  It was 
not until the third screen that any reference to the terms and 
conditions appeared.  The hyperlink to the terms and conditions 
was also at the very bottom of this "LINK PAYMENT" screen.  The 
purpose of the screen, as indicated by the title at the top, was 
for the user to enter payment information.  The place to enter 
that information -- a white field set apart against a dark 
background -- was at the top of the screen.  Under that field, 
there were two separate pieces of text in boldface, white font 
that related to the payment purpose of the screen.  There was 
also a large button in the middle of the screen that provided 
another mechanism through which a user could link a payment.  
Nothing about this third screen, therefore, conveyed to a user 
38 
 
that he or she should open a link that would reveal an extensive 
set of terms and conditions at the bottom of the screen to which 
the user was agreeing.  As discussed previously, the statement 
explaining the connection between creating the account and 
agreeing to the terms, which would encourage opening and 
reviewing the terms, was displayed less prominently than the 
other information on the screen. 
 
Similarly, the title of the screen, as well as much of the 
information on the screen, focused on payment information, not 
the terms and conditions.  Other words on the screen also 
appeared as prominently as the link, if not more so.  For 
example, the phrases "scan your card" and "enter promo code" 
appeared to be in boldface as well as the same size as the link.  
Further, the PayPal button appeared in the middle of the screen 
in a different color and in what appeared to be a larger box 
than the terms and conditions link.  Put succinctly, "the 
presence of other terms on the same screen with a similar or 
larger size, typeface, and with more noticeable attributes 
diminished the hyperlink's capability to grab the user's 
attention."  Cullinane II, 893 F.3d at 64. 
 
We also observe that a user could complete the "LINK 
PAYMENT" screen and the account creation process without ever 
focusing on the link or the notice on the screen.  Uber relies 
on the fact that the notice of and the link for the terms and 
39 
 
conditions "fall[] directly in the middle of the screen, where 
any reasonable user's eyes would naturally be drawn."  This 
assertion is contradicted by Uber's own evidence, however, which 
shows that the notice and link only appear in the middle of the 
screen if the user interacts with the field where the user can 
enter credit card information and the number keypad appears.  
The limited record before us indicates that, unless this 
happens, the notice and link for the terms and conditions remain 
at the very bottom of the screen, while the white credit card 
field remains at the top and the PayPal button remains in the 
middle of the screen, where (as Uber puts it) "any reasonable 
user's eyes would naturally be drawn." 
Moreover, while the record does not explain what happens if 
the user clicks "scan your card" or the PayPal button in the 
middle of the screen, it seems likely that, in either situation, 
the terms and conditions notice and link either remain at the 
bottom of the screen or disappear from view altogether.  So, if 
a user uses either of these features rather than clicking the 
white box to enter a credit card number, the user may never even 
see the notice and the link at the bottom of the screen.26  The 
                     
 
26 For this reason, so-called "browsewrap" agreements have 
been held to be unenforceable.  See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & 
Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014).  A "browsewrap" 
agreement is an agreement where "website terms and conditions of 
use are posted on the website typically as a hyperlink at the 
bottom of the screen."  Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. 
40 
 
user's attention is simply never directed to the notice and the 
link; it is instead directed at the white rectangular box or the 
number keypad. 
In sum, we do not consider the notice provided by this 
interface reasonable.  In such a transaction, a user may 
reasonably believe he or she is simply signing up for a service 
without understanding that he or she is entering into a 
significant contractual relationship governed by wide-ranging 
terms of use.  Instead of requiring its users to review those 
terms and conditions as it appears to do with its drivers, Uber 
has designed an interface that allows the registration to be 
completed without reviewing or even acknowledging the terms and 
conditions.  In these circumstances, Uber has failed to show 
that it provided the plaintiffs with reasonable notice of the 
terms and conditions. 
As we conclude that there was not reasonable notice of the 
terms, a contract cannot have been formed here.  We nonetheless 
                     
Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd, 380 Fed. Appx. 22 (2d 
Cir. 2010).  These agreements are often unenforceable because 
there is no assurance that the user was ever put on notice of 
the existence of the terms or the link to those terms.  See, 
e.g., Nguyen, supra at 1178-1179 ("where a website . . . 
provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take any 
affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity 
of the hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on -- 
without more -- is insufficient to give rise to constructive 
notice. . . .  [T]he onus must be on website owners to put users 
on notice of the terms to which they wish to bind consumers"). 
41 
 
observe that the interface here also obscured the manifestation 
of assent to those terms.  The interface did state in one 
sentence broken into two parts, one more prominent than the 
other, "By creating an Uber account, you agree to the Terms & 
Conditions and Privacy Policy."  The words "Terms & Conditions 
and Privacy Policy" were more prominently displayed than what it 
meant to create the account.  Uber claims this highlights the 
terms and conditions.  A reasonable alternative interpretation 
is that it downplays the legal significance of creating the 
account. 
What is clear is that a user could create an account 
without ever affirmatively stating that he or she agreed to the 
terms and conditions, or even opening those terms and 
conditions.  Instead, the final step in the process was to input 
payment information and click "DONE."  "DONE" is also different 
from, and less clear than, other affirmative language such as "I 
agree."  Furthermore, there was nothing stating that "DONE" 
itself signified either creation of an account or acceptance of 
the terms.  See Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236-237 ("Nothing about the 
'Place your order' button alone suggests that additional terms 
apply, and the presentation of terms is not directly adjacent to 
the 'Place your order' button so as to indicate that a user 
should construe clicking as acceptance").  The connection 
between the action and the terms was thus not direct or 
42 
 
unambiguous.  Uncertainty and confusion in this regard could 
have simply been avoided by requiring the terms and conditions 
to be reviewed and a user to agree.  By obscuring this process, 
the app invited questions about whether the interface was 
designed to enable a user to sign up for services without 
requiring him or her to understand that he or she was 
contractually bound.  See Wilson v. Huuuge, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 
3d 1308, 1317 (W.D. Wash. 2018), aff'd, 944 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 
2019) ("The fact is, [the offeror] chose to make its Terms non-
invasive so that users could charge ahead to play their game.  
Now, they must live with the consequences of that decision"). 
 
Again, Uber's own registration process for its drivers 
stands in striking contrast.  As demonstrated by the case law, 
after clicking "'YES, I AGREE,' [the driver] was prompted to 
confirm acceptance a second time.  On the second screen, the App 
state[d]:  'PLEASE CONFIRM THAT YOU HAVE REWIEWED ALL THE 
DOCUMENTS AND AGREE TO ALL THE NEW CONTRACTS'" (citations 
omitted).  Okereke, supra.  Additionally, in that case "Uber 
received an electronic receipt following [the driver's] 
acceptance" and "[t]he receipt only could have been generated by 
someone using [the driver's] unique username and password and 
hitting 'YES, I AGREE' twice when prompted by the Uber App."  
Id.  Other cases involving the driver registration process for 
Uber describe similar registration processes.  See, e.g., 
43 
 
Capriole, supra (registration required clicking "YES I AGREE" at 
least twice and informed registrant that "[b]y clicking below, 
you represent that you have reviewed all the documents above and 
that you agree to all the contracts above"); Singh, 235 F. Supp. 
3d at 661 (same).  Clearly, Uber knows how to obtain clear 
assent to its terms.  We therefore conclude that there was no 
reasonable manifestation of assent here. 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude 
that there was no enforceable agreement between Uber and the 
plaintiffs, and therefore the dispute was not arbitrable.  The 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.