Case Title: In re S.G.S

Citation: 

Docket Number: 169A21

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-156 
No. 169A21 
Filed 17 December 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF:  S.G.S. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 29 
February 2021 by Judge J. Calvin Chandler in District Court, Brunswick County.  
This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 12 November 
2021, but was determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant 
to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Jane R. Thompson for petitioner-appellee Brunswick County Department of 
Social Services. 
 
Brian C. Bernhardt for appellee guardian ad litem. 
 
Sydney Batch for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-mother Sally C. has had a lengthy history of substance abuse.  On 
6 June 2009, S.G.S.1 was born to respondent-mother and the father, Sean S.2  After 
receiving a report that Sarah, who was nearly two years old, had been seen walking 
                                            
1 S.G.S. will be referred to throughout the remainder of this opinion as Sarah, which 
is a pseudonym used for ease of reading and to protect the juvenile’s privacy. 
2 Although the father was involved in the proceedings that led to the entry of the 
challenged termination orders, our opinion focuses upon the situation with respect to 
respondent-mother given that she is the only one of Sarah’s parents who has challenged the 
lawfulness of the trial court’s termination orders on appeal to this Court. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
around a parking lot without proper supervision at a time when respondent-mother 
appeared to be under the influence of an impairing substance, the Brunswick County 
Department of Social Services filed a petition on 21 March 2011 alleging that Sarah 
was a neglected and dependent juvenile and obtained the entry of an order placing 
Sarah in nonsecure custody.  On 19 April 2011, respondent-mother consented to the 
entry of an adjudication order signed by Judge Sherry Dew Tyler in which Sarah was 
found to be a neglected juvenile on the basis of respondent-mother’s substance abuse.  
In a separate dispositional order, Judge Tyler ordered respondent-mother to comply 
with her case plan, which required respondent-mother to obtain a substance abuse 
assessment and comply with all resulting recommendations, attend all substance 
abuse-related appointments and therapy sessions, participate in random drug 
screens, and take no medications that had not been prescribed for her.  As a result of 
the fact that respondent-mother had actively attempted to satisfy the requirements 
of her case plan, Sarah was returned to respondent-mother’s physical custody on 14 
June 2011.  On or about 27 September 2011, Judge Tyler signed an order returning 
Sarah to respondent-mother’s legal custody as well. 
¶ 2 
 
On 10 June 2012, respondent-mother was charged with driving while subject 
to an impairing substance and driving while license revoked.  Following a home visit 
conducted by two social workers on 19 June 2012, during which Sarah was outside 
the residence without proper supervision, respondent-mother was impaired, and 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
respondent-mother admitted that she had sold her prescription medications in 
exchange for care for Sarah, DSS filed a second petition alleging that Sarah was a 
neglected and dependent juvenile and obtained the entry of an order placing Sarah 
in nonsecure custody.  After respondent-mother acknowledged that she was unable 
to provide proper care for Sarah or identify anyone who could provide such care, 
Judge Tyler entered orders on 13 August 2012 finding Sarah to be a neglected 
juvenile and ordering respondent-mother to comply with the provisions of her case 
plan, which required respondent-mother to enter into a long-term in-patient 
substance abuse treatment facility, attend all substance abuse-related appointments 
and therapy sessions while awaiting admission to a long-term treatment facility, 
participate in random drug screens, refrain from taking any medications in the 
absence of a prescription, attend parenting classes and demonstrate the ability to use 
the skills that she had learned in those classes, and visit with Sarah. 
¶ 3 
 
Although respondent-mother refused to enter in-patient substance abuse 
treatment, she did agree to an alternative treatment proposal and was subsequently 
ordered to complete intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment.  In an order 
entered on 15 December 2012 following a review hearing held on 27 November 2012, 
Judge Tyler authorized Sarah’s trial placement in respondent-mother’s home.  On 17 
April 2013, Judge Tyler authorized Sarah’s return to respondent-mother’s custody. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 4 
 
On 13 January 2014, DSS filed yet another petition alleging that Sarah was a 
neglected and dependent juvenile and obtained the entry of an order taking Sarah 
into nonsecure custody, with the filing of this petition having been precipitated by 
respondent-mother’s 9 January 2014 arrest for possessing heroin, misdemeanor 
possession of controlled substances, driving while impaired, resisting a public officer, 
misdemeanor child abuse, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  On 26 March 2014, 
Judge Tyler (now Prince) entered an adjudication order finding that Sarah was a 
neglected and dependent juvenile based upon respondent-mother’s ongoing substance 
abuse problems.  In a separate dispositional order entered on the same day, Judge 
Prince ordered respondent-mother to work with DSS to develop an appropriate case 
plan, with the plan to which respondent-mother eventually agreed having required 
her to enter in-patient substance abuse treatment, attend substance abuse group 
meetings until she actually entered in-patient treatment, attend all recommended 
substance abuse-related appointments and therapy sessions following her discharge 
from in-patient treatment, participate in random drug screens, refrain from taking 
any medications other than those that had been prescribed for her, attend parenting 
classes and demonstrate the ability to use the skills that she had learned in those 
classes, visit with Sarah and attend the child’s medical and school-related 
appointments, provide financial support for Sarah, and seek employment following 
her release from in-patient treatment.  After respondent-mother tested positive for 
IN RE S.G.S. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the presence of drugs in April and May 2014, had been asked to leave the in-patient 
treatment facility, and was incarcerated during the months between August and 
December 2014, Judge Prince authorized DSS to cease making further efforts to 
reunify Sarah with respondent-mother and directed DSS to begin a trial home 
placement during which Sarah would live with her father. 
¶ 5 
 
In April 2015, respondent-mother was released from incarceration and the 
father relapsed.  On 20 May 2015, DSS filed a fourth juvenile petition in which it 
alleged that Sarah was a neglected and dependent juvenile in light of the fact that 
the father had left his employment and was having difficulties with substance abuse.  
On or about 26 June 2015, Judge W. Fred Gore entered an order changing the 
permanent plan for Sarah to one of guardianship or adoption and authorizing DSS to 
cease attempting to reunify Sarah with the father and prohibiting either parent from 
visiting with Sarah.  Subsequently, DSS learned that respondent-mother had 
relapsed. 
¶ 6 
 
After realizing that she was pregnant, respondent-mother entered a one-year 
residential substance abuse treatment program for pregnant women on 16 September 
2015.  In the meantime, Sarah was admitted to Holly Hill Hospital with a diagnosis 
of post-traumatic stress disorder, reactive attachment disorder, and alienation-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder.  On 4 February 2016, respondent-mother relinquished 
her parental rights in Sarah in favor of respondent-mother’s brother.  However, given 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
that respondent-mother’s brother was unable to adopt Sarah, Judge Gore made 
respondent-mother’s brother Sarah’s guardian on 2 September 2016. 
¶ 7 
 
At some point after 2 September 2016, respondent-mother regained physical 
custody of Sarah in violation of the guardianship order, at which point Sarah began 
missing school and respondent-mother refused to work with the personnel at Sarah’s 
school.  In the aftermath of an incident in which respondent-mother was found in an 
unresponsive condition by Sarah’s speech therapist, DSS filed a fifth petition alleging 
that Sarah was a neglected and dependent juvenile and obtained the entry of an order 
taking Sarah into nonsecure custody.  After a hearing held on 9 July 2019, Judge 
Gore entered an order on or about 31 July 2019 finding that Sarah was a neglected 
and dependent juvenile and terminating the brother’s guardianship.  Although 
respondent-mother entered into yet another case plan, pursuant to which she was 
obligated to address her substance abuse difficulties, emotional and mental health 
problems, deficient parenting skills, and housing and employment-related issues, on 
13 May 2019, her participation in substance abuse treatment became “stagnant” and 
the frequency of the treatment that she needed did not diminish.  As a result, Judge 
Gore entered an order on 18 December 2019 changing the permanent plan for Sarah 
to a primary plan of adoption and a secondary plan of guardianship and authorizing 
DSS to cease making any effort to reunify Sarah with either parent.  In the same 
month, respondent-mother was incarcerated yet again. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 8 
 
On or about 15 July 2020, DSS filed a petition alleging that respondent-
mother’s parental rights in Sarah were subject to termination on the basis of neglect, 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2019), and failure to make reasonable progress toward 
correcting the conditions that had led to Sarah’s removal from the family home, 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2),3 and that the termination of respondent-mother’s parental 
rights would be in Sarah’s best interests.4  The issues raised by the termination 
petition came on for hearing before the trial court at the 28 and 29 January 2021 
sessions of District Court, Brunswick County.  At the time of the termination hearing, 
respondent-mother remained incarcerated.  On 29 February 2021, the trial court 
entered an adjudication order finding that respondent-mother’s parental rights in 
Sarah were subject to termination on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), 
and failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that had 
led to Sarah’s removal from the family home, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).  On the same 
date, the trial court entered a dispositional order concluding that the termination of 
respondent-mother’s parental rights would be in Sarah’s best interests and 
                                            
3 Although DSS asserted that Sarah was a dependent juvenile as defined in N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-101(9), it did not expressly allege that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Sarah 
were subject to termination on the basis of dependency, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2019). 
4 In spite of the fact that the petition correctly listed Sarah’s name in the caption and 
although a copy of Sarah’s birth certificate was attached to the termination petition, DSS 
alleged in Paragraph 3 of the termination petition that the name of the child at issue in this 
case was S.K.L.  After recognizing this error, the parties executed a pre-hearing stipulation 
in which, among other things, they consented to an amendment to Paragraph No. 3 of the 
termination petition to correctly state Sarah’s name. 
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terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in Sarah.5  Respondent-mother 
noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the trial court’s termination order.6 
¶ 9 
 
Respondent-mother’s appellate counsel has filed a no-merit brief on her client’s 
behalf.  In that brief, respondent-mother’s appellate counsel identified a number of 
issues that could potentially provide a basis for challenging the lawfulness of the trial 
court’s termination order, including whether the trial court had erred by determining 
that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Sarah were subject to termination on the 
basis of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in determining that the termination of respondent-mother’s 
parental rights would be in Sarah’s best interests.  Ultimately, however, the 
respondent-mother’s appellate counsel concluded that there was no non-frivolous 
basis for challenging the lawfulness of the trial court’s determination that 
respondent-mother’s parental rights in Sarah were subject to termination on the 
                                            
5 In addition, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights in Sarah.  In view 
of the fact that the father has not sought appellate review of the trial court’s termination 
orders by this Court, we will refrain from discussing the provisions of the trial court’s 
termination orders as they relate to the father any further in this opinion. 
6 Although respondent-mother’s notice of appeal, which indicated that her appeal had 
been taken to the Court of Appeals rather than this Court, was defective, neither DSS nor 
the guardian ad litem has sought the dismissal of respondent-mother’s appeal or lodged any 
other challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction over this case.  As a result, we elect, in the exercise 
of our discretion, to treat the record on appeal as a petition seeking the issuance of a writ of 
certiorari and to allow that petition, Anderson v. Hollifield, 345 N.C. 480, 482 (1997) (holding 
that “an appellate court [has] the authority to review the merits of an appeal by certiorari 
even if the party has failed to file notice of appeal in a timely manner”), in order to reach the 
merits of respondent-mother’s challenge to the trial court’s termination orders. 
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basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1),7 and that, since the trial court’s 
termination orders contained findings of fact that were supported by the record 
evidence relating to the relevant dispositional factors delineated in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a) and since the trial court’s findings of fact provided adequate support for its 
dispositional decision,8 there was no non-frivolous basis for challenging the 
lawfulness of the trial court’s decision that the termination of respondent-mother’s 
parental rights would be in Sarah’s best interests.  Although respondent-mother’s 
appellate counsel communicated with respondent-mother for the purpose of advising 
respondent-mother that she had a right to file pro se written arguments for the 
                                            
7 Among other things, appellate counsel for respondent-mother noted that, while 
respondent-mother had experienced brief periods of sobriety and had plans to maintain 
sobriety and obtain employment, she remained incarcerated at the time of the termination 
hearing; had not successfully completed a number of court-ordered services, including 
substance abuse treatment; had regularly failed to submit to random drug screens and did 
not take her medications as prescribed; and had failed to show that she could provide proper 
care for Sarah despite completing parenting classes and having had the child returned, either 
legally or physically, to her custody on three different occasions. 
8 In concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the 
termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights would be in Sarah’s best interests, 
appellate counsel for respondent-mother pointed out that Sarah was two years old at the time 
that she had been initially removed from her parents’ custody; that she had been in 
respondent-mother’s custody on three different occasions after her initial removal from the 
family home; that Sarah had experienced eleven placements; that her mental health had 
deteriorated to the point that she had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder 
and reactive attachment disorder and had been committed to a mental health facility on one 
occasion; that, even though Sarah was not in a pre-adoptive placement at the time of the 
termination hearing, DSS believed that an adoptive home could be found for Sarah; that 
Sarah wanted to be adopted if she could not return to respondent-mother’s care; that, as a 
result of her incarceration, respondent-mother had not visited with Sarah for months as of 
the date of the termination hearing; and that respondent-mother had only visited Sarah 
sporadically before entering custody. 
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Court’s consideration and provided respondent-mother with the materials necessary 
to make such a filing, respondent-mother failed to submit any written arguments to 
the Court.  Both DSS and the guardian ad litem filed briefs expressing agreement 
with the conclusion reached by respondent-mother’s appellate counsel that the record 
did not disclose the existence of any arguably meritorious basis for challenging the 
lawfulness of the trial court’s termination orders in this case. 
¶ 10 
 
This Court independently reviews issues identified by counsel in a no-merit 
brief filed pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 3.1(e) for the purpose of determining if any of 
those issues have potential merit.  In re L.E.M., 372 N.C. 396, 402 (2019).  After a 
careful review of the issues identified in the no-merit brief filed by respondent-
mother’s appellate counsel in this case in light of the record and the applicable law, 
we are satisfied that the findings of fact contained in the trial court’s termination 
orders have ample record support and that the trial court did not err in the course of 
determining that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Sarah were subject to 
termination and that the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights would 
be in Sarah’s best interests.  As a result, we affirm the trial court’s orders terminating 
respondent-mother’s parental rights in Sarah. 
AFFIRMED.