Case Title: Jones v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 48, 2016

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DANIEL D. JONES, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 48, 2016 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID Nos. 1212012398, 
§  1212013888, 1212018608, 
§  1310006358 and 1310006438 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 17, 2016 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: May 16, 2016 
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 16th day of May 2016, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the State’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Daniel Jones, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief.  The State has filed a 
motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the 
face of Jones’ opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
affirm. 
 (2) 
The record reflects that Jones pled guilty on December 31, 2013 
to three counts of Burglary in the Second Degree, three counts of Burglary in 
the Third Degree, and one count of Theft from a Senior.  The State moved to 
 
2 
declare Jones to be a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).  After a 
presentence investigation, the Superior Court declared Jones to be a habitual 
offender as to two of his convictions for second degree burglary.  Because 
second degree burglary is defined as a “violent felony,”1 the Superior Court 
imposed the statutory maximum term of incarceration of eight years for each 
of those convictions as required by Section 4214(a).2  In total, the Superior 
Court sentenced Jones to thirty-five years at Level V incarceration, to be 
suspended after serving nineteen years in prison for decreasing levels of 
supervision.  Jones did not appeal.     
(3) 
On August 10, 2015, Jones filed his first motion for 
postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  Although 
Jones’ motion listed three grounds for relief, all three grounds challenged the 
legality of his habitual offender sentence for second degree burglary.  The gist 
of Jones’ argument in the Superior Court was that the classification of second 
degree burglary as a violent felony violated his constitutional right to due 
process.  The Superior Court summarily dismissed Jones’ motion.  This 
appeal followed. 
                                                 
1 11 Del. C. § 4201(c) (2015). 
2 Id. § 4214(a) (providing that the minimum habitual offender sentence shall be the 
statutory maximum if the felony forming the basis of the State’s motion to declare a 
defendant to be a habitual offender is defined as a “violent felony” under § 4201(c)). 
 
3 
(4) 
In his opening brief, Jones asserts the same argument that he 
raised below; namely, that the classification of second degree burglary as a 
violent felony violates due process.  The State has moved to affirm the 
Superior Court’s judgment on several alternative grounds.  First, the State 
asserts that Jones’ motion was properly dismissed because his claim of an 
illegal sentence is not cognizable under Rule 61, which provides a procedure 
to challenge the legality of a conviction or a capital sentence.3  Second, the 
State asserts that, even if Jones’ motion was properly filed under Rule 61, the 
motion was procedurally barred as untimely under Rule 61(i)(1).4  Finally, the 
State asserts that Jones’ claim of an illegal sentence fails on its merits. 
(5) 
After careful consideration of the parties’ filings and the record 
on appeal, we agree with the State’s position that Jones’ arguments 
challenging the legality of his habitual offender sentence were not properly 
raised in a Rule 61 motion.  Rule 61 establishes the procedure for a convicted 
defendant in the State’s custody “to set aside the judgment of conviction or a 
sentence of death on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction or on any 
other ground that is a sufficient factual and legal basis for a collateral attack 
                                                 
3 Wilson v. State, 2006 WL 1291369, *2 (Del. May 9, 2006) (noting that Rule 61(a)(1) 
allows a defendant to seek to “set aside the judgment of conviction or a sentence of death” 
and holding that defendant’s sentencing claims were not cognizable under Rule 61). 
4 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (2016) (providing that a motion for postconviction relief 
may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final or more than 
one year after a retroactive right is first recognized). 
 
4 
upon a criminal conviction or a capital sentence.”5  Jones was not sentenced 
to death, and his Rule 61 motion did not challenge any criminal conviction.  
His motion only challenged the legality of his habitual offender sentence.  
Such a claim is properly considered under Superior Court Criminal Rule 
35(a), not Rule 61.6    
(6) 
Even if Rule 61 did apply, however, it is clear that Jones’ motion 
was untimely under Rule 61(i)(1) and that he failed to overcome this 
procedural bar under Rule 61(i)(5) by pleading a claim that the Superior 
Court lacked jurisdiction or a claim that he was actually innocent or that a 
new, retroactive rule of constitutional law rendered his convictions invalid.7 
(7) 
Moreover, even if Jones’ claims had been properly raised in a 
motion to correct his sentence under Rule 35(a), the request for relief had no 
merit.  Jones contends that, under Johnson v. United States,8 his enhanced 
sentence as a habitual offender violated due process because second degree 
burglary is not a violent felony.  The United States Supreme Court held in 
Johnson that the language defining a violent felony in 18 U.S.C. § 
                                                 
5 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
6 Priest v. State, 2015 WL 7424860, *1 (Del. Nov. 20, 2015). 
7 See Turnage v. State, 2015 WL 6746644 (Del. Nov. 4, 2015) (holding in part that the 
defendant’s Rule 61 motion, which was filed after the rule was amended on June 4, 2014, 
was untimely under Rule 61(i)(1) and the defendant failed to overcome the procedural bar 
by pleading a claim under Rule 61(i)(5)). 
8 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 
5 
924(e)(2)(B) 
of 
the 
federal 
Armed 
Career 
Criminal 
Act 
was 
unconstitutionally vague.9  Because the language at issue in Johnson does not 
appear in Delaware’s habitual offender statute, 11 Del. C. § 4214, this Court 
has held that the holding of Johnson does not apply under Delaware law.10 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
9 Id. at 2563. 
10 Anderson v. State, 2015 WL 9283845, at 2 (Del. Dec. 18, 2015).