Case Title: P. v. McDermott

Citation: 

Docket Number: S016081

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 8/12/02 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S016081 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
MAUREEN MCDERMOTT, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. A810541 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
__________________________________ ) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Maureen McDermott of one count of murder 
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and one count of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, 
subd. (a)).  The jury found true special circumstance allegations that the murder 
was carried out for financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)) and by means of lying in 
wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)).  Defendant was sentenced to death.  This appeal is 
automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; Pen. Code, § 1239.) 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
On April 28, 1985, Stephen Eldridge was brutally stabbed to death in the 
home he shared with defendant, Maureen McDermott.  It was undisputed at trial 
that the actual killers were Jimmy Luna (a former coworker and personal friend of 
defendant’s) and two brothers whom Luna had hired for the murder, Marvi n and 
Dondell Lee.  The prosecution’s theory at defendant’s trial was that defendant had 
                                                 
1  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 
 
 
2
hired Luna to kill Eldridge so she could obtain sole ownership of a house she co-
owned with Eldridge and collect $100,000 under an insurance policy she had on 
Eldridge’s life.  Luna (who had pled guilty to first degree murder) and both 
Marvin and Dondell Lee (who had received complete immunity and were never 
charged with the murder) testified against defendant.  Defendant denied 
complicity in Eldridge’s murder. 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
At the time of Stephen Eldridge’s murder in 1985, defendant was 37 years 
old.  During the day, she worked as a registered nurse at a hospital (Los Angeles 
County-USC Medical Center), and in the evening she provided nursing care to Lee 
La Porte at his home.  Defendant shared a house in Van Nuys with Eldridge, a 27-
year-old, self-employed landscaper.  They owned the property as joint tenants.  In 
December 1984, defendant and Eldridge had each bought $100,000 in life 
insurance, designating each other as beneficiary.   
In early 1985, defendant’s relationship with Eldridge deteriorated.  Eldridge 
complained about the unkempt condition of the house and about defendant’s pets.  
Defendant was upset about Eldridge’s treatment of her pets and his plans to sell 
his interest in the house.  Near the end of February 1985, defendant discussed with 
Jimmy Luna, a hospital coworker and personal friend, a plan to kill Eldridge.  
Defendant told Luna that she had an insurance policy on Eldridge’s life and that 
she wanted him dead.  She offered Luna $50,000 to kill Eldridge, and he agreed.  
Defendant told Luna that she wanted Eldridge stabbed because a gun would make 
too much noise, and that she wanted the killing to look like a “homosexual 
murder” because she thought the police would not investigate the murder of a 
homosexual as vigorously as other killings.  To make the murder look like a 
 
 
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homosexual killing, defendant on different occasions suggested that Luna carve 
out the word “gay” on the body with a knife or cut off the victim’s penis.   
On three occasions in late February and early March of 1985, defendant 
arranged for Luna to be at the house she shared with Eldridge so Luna could kill 
Eldridge.  Each time, however, Luna became frightened and could not carry out 
the murder.  Defendant then suggested to Luna that he find someone to help him 
kill Eldridge, but she told him she did not want anyone but Luna to know of her 
involvement.   
In March 1985, Luna asked his friend Marvin Lee to help him commit the 
murder.  He told Marvin that an “organization” wanted someone killed, and he 
offered Marvin $3,000 to “watch [his] back.”  Marvin agreed.  In later 
conversations, Luna told Marvin that the intended victim was a homosexual and 
that Luna would castrate the victim to make it look like a “homosexual murder.”   
In the evening of March 21, 1985, Luna and Marvin knocked on the door of 
the house where defendant and Eldridge lived.  As Eldridge opened the door, Luna 
and Marvin forced their way inside.  Threatening Eldridge with a knife, Luna 
ordered him to crawl on his hands and knees into the bedroom and to lie facedown 
on the bed.  Luna then cut Eldridge on the buttocks with the knife and yelled 
homosexual epithets at him.  From another room, Marvin retrieved a two-foot-
long bedpost, with which Luna struck Eldridge on the head.  Eldridge jumped up 
and ran out of the house.  Luna and Marvin left.   
Los Angeles Police Officer David Yates, who was dispatched to investigate 
the attack on Eldridge, found him at the house dressed only in his underwear and 
covered in blood.  An ambulance took Eldridge to a hospital for treatment.   
The next day, defendant spoke on the telephone with Luna about the failed 
murder attempt, telling him, “we are going to have to do it again, and this time you 
can’t fail.”  After March 21 but before April 28, 1985, there were several 
 
 
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telephone conversations between defendant and Luna.  During one of these 
conversations, Marvin was with Luna, and he listened in as defendant discussed 
the murder plan and what they would do with the anticipated insurance proceeds.  
Defendant objected to Marvin’s participation in the planned murder; she said that 
if Marvin told anyone about it, that Luna would “have to kill that nigger too.”  
Luna assured her that Marvin was trustworthy and would not say anything.  
Marvin’s brother Dondell overheard part of this conversation when Marvin passed 
him the telephone.   
On the day of the murder, April 28, 1985, Luna met Marvin and Dondell 
Lee, and Luna offered Dondell money to help commit the murder.  Luna then 
made several telephone calls to defendant, during which defendant told Luna that 
she would leave a front bedroom window open for entry into the house and that 
Luna should tie her up and cut or hit her so she would look like a robbery victim.   
Around 8:15 p.m., Luna, Marvin, and Dondell entered the house through 
the front bedroom window.  Luna went down the hall to defendant’s bedroom, 
where defendant told him that Eldridge had not yet returned from a dinner 
engagement.  Defendant told Luna to cut her on the breast and inner thigh, which 
he did, to make it appear that Eldridge was killed when he came home while 
defendant was being robbed.   
Around 10:40 p.m., Eldridge came home.  When he entered the house, 
Dondell Lee met him with a rifle owned by defendant, but provided to him by 
Luna.  Marvin Lee then grabbed Eldridge by the neck in a chokehold and took him 
down the hall, where Luna repeatedly stabbed him until he slumped to the floor.  
Luna then returned to defendant’s bedroom, where he found defendant lying on 
the floor with a facial injury.  Defendant asked Luna how the injury looked, saying 
she had banged her head on a table in the bedroom.  As Luna and the two Lee 
 
 
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brothers were about to leave the house, Marvin Lee overheard defendant yell from 
the back bedroom not to forget to cut off Eldridge’s penis.  Luna did so.   
Los Angeles County Deputy Medical Examiner Susan Selser performed the 
autopsy.  She testified that Eldridge had been stabbed 44 times and that his penis 
was cut off postmortem.  Of the 44 stab wounds, 28 were independently fatal.   
On May 23, 1985, Luna was taken into custody for questioning, but he was 
released within 72 hours.  On July 2, 1985, he was arrested for the first degree 
murder of Eldridge.  In August 1985, defendant was also arrested.  She was 
charged with attempted murder, and murder and special circumstance allegations 
of murder for financial gain and lying in wait.  Marvin Lee, who was in custody 
for an unrelated offense, was granted immunity for the murder of Eldridge in 
exchange for his confession and truthful testimony.  In August 1986, Dondell Lee 
was granted immunity while in the custody of the California Youth Authority.  In 
July 1989, Luna entered into a plea agreement under which he pled guilty to first 
degree murder and agreed to testify truthfully in the prosecution of defendant. 
2.  Defense evidence 
The main theory of the defense at trial was that the prosecution had not 
proven its case against defendant.  Defense counsel cross-examined prosecution 
witness Luna for eight days, thoroughly challenging his veracity.  The defense also 
presented the testimony of five of Luna’s former coworkers from Los Angeles 
County-USC Medical Center that Luna was a habitual liar.   
Defense witness Dr. John Ryan, a pathologist, testified that—based on his 
review of the autopsy report—Eldridge’s stab wounds had been inflicted by two 
different weapons.   
 
 
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B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
At the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence that defendant had 
Luna beat up someone so she could obtain that person’s job. 
In April 1983, Dewayne Bell, John Phillips, and Philip La Chance worked 
alternating shifts at the La Porte residence as caretakers for the elderly Lee La 
Porte.  At that time, Bell had worked for the La Portes for five years.  While La 
Chance was in jail for driving under the influence, defendant temporarily assumed 
his caretaker duties.  Defendant told Luna that she wanted permanent employment 
with the La Portes, and she offered Luna money to injure Bell so she could take 
his job.  Luna later attacked Bell at his home, slashing Bell’s face, throat, and 
chest.  When Bell returned to his caretaker duties at the La Portes’ home, 
defendant had Luna repeatedly telephone the La Portes and make threats against 
Bell when Betty La Porte answered the phone.  As a result of these calls, Bell lost 
his job with the La Portes, and defendant took over Bell’s duties.   
2.  Defense evidence 
At the penalty phase, the defense presented testimony of defendant’s 
coworkers, her brother, prison guards, and a criminal justice expert. 
Dr. Philip Merritt, who had worked with defendant at the county hospital, 
described defendant as a compassionate and caring nurse.   
According to Carol Kelly, a nurse and defendant’s colleague at the hospital, 
defendant was a hard worker who was dependable and well liked by the patients 
and student nurses.   
Wayne McDermott, defendant’s brother, testified that defendant was very 
loving towards their mother, to whom she regularly sent money.  He expressed the 
hope that defendant not be given the death penalty.   
 
 
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Margaret Stokes, a deputy sheriff who worked at the Sybil Brand Institute 
for Women in Los Angeles, described defendant as a cooperative, sensitive, and 
caring person who had saved an inmate from choking.  In her view, defendant had 
adjusted well to incarceration.  Another deputy, Victoria Samaniego, mentioned 
that because of defendant’s reliability she had been made a jail trusty, and that she 
had never caused problems.   
Jerry Enomoto, a college professor, criminal justice consultant, and former 
director of the Department of Corrections, stated his opinion that defendant would 
adjust well in prison if sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.   
II.  JURY SELECTION ISSUES 
A.  Prosecutor’s Exercise of Peremptory Challenges 
Defendant contends she was denied both her state constitutional right to 
trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 16) and her federal constitutional right to equal protection (U.S. 
Const., 14th Amend.) because the prosecution impermissibly used its peremptory 
challenges to remove prospective jurors on the basis of race (see Batson v. 
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 84-89; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 
276-277).  We disagree. 
1.  Facts 
During the initial jury selection process, the defense excused 20, and the 
prosecution 18, prospective jurors on peremptory challenges.  The prosecution 
exercised six of its 18 peremptory challenges against Black prospective jurors, 
while the defense removed one Black prospective juror by peremptory challenge.  
The jury that was sworn included no Blacks.   
Immediately after the jury was sworn, the trial court recalled that one of the 
jurors had told the bailiff he had read a newspaper article about the case.  After 
 
 
8
inquiring into the matter, the trial court discharged this juror.  To select a 
replacement for the discharged juror, the court granted the defense one peremptory 
challenge and the prosecution two peremptory challenges. 
The first prospective juror called, James T., was Black.  After both sides 
passed for cause, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against him.  
The next prospective juror called, Gerald W., was also Black.  When the defense 
did not challenge him for cause, the prosecution immediately exercised its 
remaining peremptory challenge against Gerald W.  At that point, the defense 
accused the prosecution of exercising its peremptory challenges for the 
constitutionally impermissible purpose of eliminating prospective jurors because 
of their race.   
The trial court asked the prosecutor to give her reason for excluding 
Prospective Juror Gerald W., but the court stated it was not making a finding that 
the defense had established a prima facie case of racial motivation.  The 
prosecutor replied that Gerald W. had initially “said that he favored the death 
penalty only in situations if a person had a criminal record,” although the 
prosecutor acknowledged that Gerald W. had “changed his mind later.”  The 
prosecutor also asserted that on his questionnaire Gerald W. had said he was in 
favor “basically of rehabilitation and counseling before punishment such as the 
death penalty.” 
Defense counsel observed that the prosecutor had exercised eight of 20 
peremptory challenges against Black prospective jurors and that the jury as 
constituted did not include any Blacks.  Asserting that the prosecutor had used 
peremptory challenges to excuse Blacks who “were fundamentally pro prosecution 
on the death penalty issue,” defense counsel argued that exclusion based on race 
was the only explanation for the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges against 
Blacks.   
 
 
9
The trial court commented that although the jury as sworn included no 
Blacks, the prosecutor had earlier twice accepted a jury that included a Black juror 
whom the defense later peremptorily challenged.  The court then asked to see 
defense counsel’s copies of the questionnaires of the Black prospective jurors 
whom the prosecutor had excused by peremptory challenge, noting that counsel’s 
copies were more organized than the court’s.  As defense counsel handed the 
questionnaires to the court, the prosecutor made comments as to some of the 
excused Black prospective jurors.  Noting that Keia M. was only 19 years old, the 
prosecutor said she “didn’t feel she [Keia] was mature enough” to sit as a juror in 
this death penalty case because “her views were not thought out at all.”  As to 
Theola J., the prosecutor described her as “very, very stupid,” adding that “she 
couldn’t see herself ever giving the death penalty.”  Of Gilbert K. the prosecutor 
noted that he “stated that he would consider the death penalty if the crime was 
particularly brutal” but “he doesn’t want the death penalty unless the defendant 
would kill again in prison,” and the prosecutor “didn’t feel that was a realistic 
prospect for the defendant in this case.” 
The trial court said it might “be prepared to find a prima facie case” and 
would have to “go through each explanation to see if there is any reasonable basis 
for the exercise of the challenge.”  After a recess, the court stated:  “I think I have 
all the information I need.”  The court found that the defense had established a 
prima facie case, and said it was “looking at all the questionnaires of Black jurors 
who have been excused and listening to [the prosecutor’s] explanations and trying 
to see if there is a reasonable relationship between the reason for the excusal and 
the viewpoints of the jurors.” 
Asked by the trial court if she wanted to be heard any further, the 
prosecutor replied:  “I would like to say one more thing that in addition to the 
explanations which I have provided to the court with respect to each one of these 
 
 
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jurors which honestly wouldn’t have made any difference to me what their race 
was, given some of their views, I also took into account the fact that I believe that 
all these jurors weren’t necessarily opposed to the death penalty, but that I had a 
pool of jurors out in the audience who I thought were more in favor of the death 
penalty than these particular jurors.  And that it was no reason to keep them.  [¶]  I 
didn’t feel they would be good prosecution jurors on the issue of the death penalty.  
[¶]  And I would have preferred, frankly, to have a number of Black jurors on this 
case because of the fact that the defendant makes racist remarks which will be 
coming into evidence.  And that I have two Black prosecution witnesses Marvin 
Lee and Dondell Lee.  And that I would have liked to have some Black jurors.” 
The trial court remarked that at issue were the “death penalty views” of the 
prospective jurors, and it found a “reasonable relationship” between those views 
expressed either in the juror questionnaires “or orally by the prospective juror” and 
the prosecutor’s challenge to each of those jurors.  The court noted that in making 
this finding it had also taken into account that the prosecutor had twice earlier 
accepted the jury when it included one Black juror.  The court denied the defense 
motion. 
The jury selection process continued, and a twelfth juror, Harold O., was 
selected and sworn.  Thereafter, six alternate jurors were selected and sworn.  One 
of the alternates was Margaret C., a Black woman, who eventually served on the 
jury, replacing a juror excused during the trial. 
2.  Analysis 
“The exercise of peremptory challenges to eliminate prospective jurors 
because of their race violates the federal Constitution (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 
476 U.S. 79, 89) and the California Constitution (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 
Cal.3d 258, 276-277).”  (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 636, 663.)  A party 
 
 
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claiming an opponent improperly discriminated in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges must make a timely objection and demonstrate a strong likelihood that 
prospective jurors were excluded because of their race or other group association.  
(Id. at pp. 663-664; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 134-135.) 
This court has stated that a motion alleging discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges is untimely if “first asserted after the jury has been sworn.”  
(People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 179.)  We made that statement, 
however, in the context of a motion brought after all jury impanelment procedures 
had been concluded.  (Id. at pp. 178-179; see also People v. Perez (1996) 48 
Cal.App.4th 1310, 1314.)  As other courts have recognized, discriminatory motive 
may become sufficiently apparent to establish a prima facie case only during the 
selection of alternate jurors, and a motion promptly made before the alternates are 
sworn, and before any remaining unselected prospective jurors are dismissed, is 
timely not only as to the prospective jurors challenged during the selection of the 
alternate jurors but also as to those dismissed during selection of the 12 jurors 
already sworn.  (People v. Rodriguez (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1023; People v. 
Gore (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 692, 701-706; see also Morning v. Zapata Protein 
(USA), Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 128 F.3d 213, 215 [stating that a Batson challenge 
must “be raised, at the latest, before the venire is excused”]; Dias v. Sky Chefs, 
Inc. (9th Cir. 1991) 948 F.2d 532, 534 [stating that Batson challenge must “occur 
as soon as possible, preferably before the jury is sworn.”].)  Thus, it is more 
accurate to say that the motion is timely if made before jury impanelment is 
completed because “the impanelment of the jury is not deemed complete until the 
alternates are selected and sworn.”  (In re Mendes (1979) 23 Cal.3d 847, 853.)  
Here, the defense motion was timely because it was made before the alternate 
jurors were selected and sworn. 
 
 
12
The party, here defendant, who claims the opposing party has engaged in 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges bears the initial burden to establish a 
prima facie case—that is, to raise a reasonable inference that the opposing party 
has challenged the jurors because of their race or other group association.  (People 
v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1188, fn. 7.)  Here, the trial court found that the 
defense had established a prima facie case, and we assume that finding is 
supported by substantial evidence.  (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 384.) 
Once the trial court finds that the moving party has made a prima facie 
case, the burden shifts to the opposing party to provide an explanation for the 
peremptory challenges that is race or group neutral and related to the particular 
case being tried.  (People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 384; People v. Ervin 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 74-75.) 
Here, the prosecutor said she had peremptorily challenged the eight Black 
prospective jurors because their views on the death penalty were unfavorable to 
the prosecution.  Although the prosecutor also stated that one juror, Keia M., was 
immature, and that another, Theola J., was “very stupid,” the trial court understood 
that the overriding reason for challenging the eight prospective jurors was the 
attitude of each toward the death penalty.  The Attorney General agrees that the 
prosecutor challenged each of the eight Black prospective jurors for essentially the 
same reason, namely, that “t he prospective juror’s views and attitudes regarding 
the death penalty were adverse to the prosecution . . . .”   
A prospective juror’s views about the death penalty are a permissible race- 
and group-neutral basis for exercising a peremptory challenge in a capital case.  
(People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 724.)  When the trial court has found a 
prima facie case, and the party exercising the peremptory challenges has stated a 
race-neutral reason for each challenge, “the trial court must then decide . . . 
whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.”  
 
 
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(Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767; see also People v. Silva, supra, 25 
Cal.4th at p. 384.)  The trial court’s ruling on this issue is reviewed for substantial 
evidence.  (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 196.)  But we apply this 
deferential standard of review only when “the trial court has made a sincere and 
reasoned attempt to evaluate each stated reason as applied to each challenged 
juror.”  (People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 386; accord, People v. Fuentes 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 720; People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 167-168.) 
We consider each of the eight challenged jurors, taking them in the order in 
which the prosecutor challenged them. 
a.  Patricia M.  
On the jury questionnaire, in response to a question about her general 
feelings on the death penalty, Patricia M. wrote:  “If evidence is presented of one 
taking a life without justifiable cause—for example, molesting children or child 
abuse—I really have no problem with a guilty verdict—or where proof is shown 
where someone took anyone [sic] life just for thrills.”  She wrote that she had 
voted to reinstate the death penalty when it was on the ballot in 1978, and she 
stated that “the State should have the right to execute, depending on the 
circumstance, an individual who—unlawfully kills another human being, whether 
intentionally or not.”   
On voir dire, defense counsel asked what Patricia M.’s views would be on 
the appropriate penalty if she were to find defendant guilty of first degree murder 
with the special circumstance of lying in wait or financial gain.  She answered:  “I 
would probably be more apt to say life without the possibility of parole.”  Asked 
to explain, she said:  “Because to me it is death anyway.  You’re going to be 
confined and it said without any parole.  You’re going to die there anyway.  It is a 
slow death.” 
 
 
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Under questioning by the prosecutor, Patricia M. said that death was a more 
severe punishment than life imprisonment without parole.  Asked whether she 
would be more inclined to vote for life imprisonment without parole if the victim 
was not a child, she replied:  “Depending on the situation with her as to why—if in 
fact she killed the person.  It would be the involvement.  I’d have to hear the 
circumstances surrounding it.  But I don’t feel that I would be swayed one way or 
the other as to more for the death or more for imprisonment.”   
Asked whether a premeditated murder for financial gain was “the type of 
murder [she] would consider the death penalty for,” she replied, “Possibly.”  
Asked whether she felt the death penalty “really serves any purpose,” she replied, 
“Not really.”   
Having reviewed the record—especially Patricia M.’s view that the death 
penalty did not serve any purpose and her stated inclination to impose life 
imprisonment rather than death for a premeditated murder carried out for financial 
gain—we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that 
the prosecutor could reasonably view Brenda B. as unfavorable on the penalty 
issue and that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against her was based on her 
death penalty views and not on her race. 
b.  Gilbert K. 
On the jury questionnaire, in response to a question about his general 
feelings on the death penalty, Gilbert K. wrote:  “Necessary in some cases to 
protect the population, and society.”  Gilbert K. thought the state had the right to 
impose capital punishment for both intentional and unintentional killings.   
On voir dire, in response to a question whether he had strong feelings about 
the death penalty either way, Gilbert K. replied:  “No, I wouldn’t, especially I 
would say that I feel every case has its own merits, and depending on what the 
case is about and what is happening, I would decide from that point.”  The 
 
 
15
prosecutor asked Gilbert K. to rate his death penalty views on a scale of one to 10, 
“10 being somebody who would always impose it in a case of premeditated 
murder, an eye for an eye; you kill somebody, you get the death penalty; one let’s 
say being somebody who would never do so.”  Gilbert K. answered that he “would 
probably be somewhere around a four or five, depending on the case itself and a 
person is found guilty and circumstances involved in it.”  The prosecutor asked 
whether this meant Gilbert K. was “somebody who kind of leans away from the 
death penalty.”  Gilbert K. replied, “I find myself straddling the line basically at 
five until I hear the difference to persuade me either way or the other.”   
The prosecutor asked whether Gilbert K. could “think about any type of 
case just in the abstract that . . . in your mind would call for the death penalty.”  
He replied:  “Possibly a case where a person who could be found guilty or would 
be found guilty I would say was a person that could possibly want to commit 
murder again.  [¶]  That would make me think more about the death penalty.  [¶]  
A person that could possibly go back out and kill somebody else again or couldn’t 
be controlled to keep somebody from hurting again.”  The prosecutor reminded 
Gilbert K. that the alternative penalty was life imprisonment without parole, 
meaning that “the person would never come out of prison alive.”  Gilbert K. 
replied:  “But that person would be in prison with other people, and people are, 
even though they may be in prison, can be hurt in prison.” 
The prosecutor then asked Gilbert K. if he could see himself ever voting for 
the death penalty if he “did not feel that there was a chance that the person would 
kill again.”  Gilbert K. replied:  “If I did not feel the person would kill again, that’s 
very doubtful.  It is very doubtful.”  Asked to explain further, he added:  “Because 
of the fact that the person is to me is under total control or being controlled for the 
rest of their life.  [¶]  I don’t see the necessity to kill somebody for that. . . .  What 
I am just basically saying is depending on the circumstances and the circumstances 
 
 
16
of the case itself, if a person was found guilty of the crime, and I felt that they 
could not do anybody any other harm or that they were the type of person 
warranted any other harm, life in prison I think would fit.  [¶]  If a person was a 
person who I felt was dangerous to society or to themselves, or a type of person 
who without any thought or malice could hurt somebody at any time, I say that is 
the person who maybe would be a good candidate for the death penalty.”   
Under further questioning by the prosecutor, Gilbert K. modified his views.  
He said he could see himself voting to impose the death penalty on a defendant 
who would not likely kill again if the defendant was guilty of a premeditated 
murder by lying in wait or for financial gain and the crime was particularly brutal 
or cold-blooded or had been planned over a long period of time.   
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports 
the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor could reasonably view Gilbert K. as 
unfavorable on the penalty issue.  Because defendant apparently had no history of 
violence and did not personally commit the capital murder, the prosecutor had 
little basis to argue that defendant would kill again if sentenced to prison for life 
without parole.  Although Gilbert K. eventually said he could see himself voting to 
impose the death penalty on a defendant who was not likely to commit future 
violent acts, his earlier responses, questioning the need to execute someone who 
posed little or no threat of violence in prison, could be a matter of legitimate 
concern to the prosecutor in this case.  We see no basis to disturb the trial court’s 
finding that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against Gilbert K. was based on 
his death penalty views and not on his race. 
c.  Theola J. 
On the jury questionnaire, in response to a question about her general 
feelings on the death penalty, Theola J. wrote:  “Mixed.”  Asked during voir dire 
to explain what she had meant, she said:  “Well, I feel that I don’t think—just like 
 
 
17
if I have a chance to decide on that, I don’t think I would.”  Asked whether she 
meant she would have difficulty voting for the death penalty, she said:  “No, I 
wouldn’t have—after I see, you know, what everything that I listened to, you 
know.”  She said she would not automatically vote either for or against the death 
penalty, but instead would listen to any evidence presented on the issue of penalty.  
She said:  “I would have to hear.  I would have to make up my mind after I hear 
what’s presented before me.  I just couldn’t say right now, you know.  I couldn’t 
say one way or the other because like I said, mixed.  I don’t know really, you 
know. ” 
Asked by defense counsel whether she would be “somewhere in the 
middle” on a scale of one to 10, Theola J. answered in the affirmative.  Asked by 
the prosecutor whether she thought the State of California should have the right to 
execute somebody for a particular kind of murder, Theola J. said:  “Well, I think 
they should have that right.  I say under certain circumstances, I think.”  Asked to 
explain what circumstances would warrant the death penalty, she said:  “It would 
really have to be horrible. . . .  Some of the things that I might, you know, that a 
person what I believe just didn’t have a heart, you know, that would do something 
to somebody.  That’s the way I feel.” 
The prosecutor asked Theola J. whether she felt “that the state should have 
the right to execute somebody if they are found guilty of a first degree 
premeditated deliberate murder.”  Theola J. replied:  “No, I don’t think so.”  
Asked to explain, she said:  “Well, I would think that it could be another 
punishment, you know, maybe life or something.”  On further probing of her 
views by the prosecutor, Theola J. said:  “Well, like I said, maybe the state should 
have the right under certain circumstances, but some of them that I don’t think that 
I would think it was that—that they should have that right.”  Asked to explain 
what circumstances would warrant the death penalty, she said:  “Like I said 
 
 
18
before, it would have to be worse than death. . . .  It would have to be, like I said, a 
more—even though that’s violent, it would have to be a little more violent or 
something, I think.” 
At this point the trial court intervened and explained to Theola J. that under 
this state’s laws not every first degree murder qualifies for the death penalty, that a 
first degree murder with the special circumstances of financial gain or lying in 
wait did qualify for the death penalty, and that the jury would determine penalty 
only if it found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder 
with one or both of these special circumstances.  Theola J. indicated that she 
understood the court’s explanation, that it seemed different than what the 
prosecutor had asked her, and that she did not have any problem with the law as 
the court had explained it.  The court asked Theola J. whether she was “one of 
those persons who would never vote for the death penalty under those 
circumstance, under those conditions.”  She answered:  “No, I don’t think I would 
be one that would never vote for it.  I think I would vote for it.  But, like I said, I 
would have to hear.  They would have to convince me.  See, I would have to be 
convinced, you know, because I could say, well, I would decide, you know, I 
wouldn’t want this to happen or want this to happen, but my mind could change 
after hearing what I have to hear.  That’s the only way I could be convinced.” 
The prosecutor then asked whether Theola J. felt “that the state should have 
the right to execute somebody who has committed a premeditated, deliberate 
murder by lying in wait.”  Theola J. replied:  “Yes, I think so.”  Asked whether 
such a crime would be “horrible enough” to make the death penalty appropriate, 
Theola J. said:  “Yeah, I think so after I hear.  Like I said, it is really hard for me 
because I could say one thing and then after I hear it I could say maybe I shouldn’t 
have said that.  After I hear.  After you hear things and it’s been explained to you 
from A to Z, it is a lot better than just trying to say it now.  You know, I think the 
 
 
19
more I would hear about what happened then my decision could be, you know, I 
could decide for myself, you know, which way I would really feel.”   
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports 
the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor could reasonably view Theola J. as 
unfavorable on the penalty issue.  Although her responses were confused and 
inconsistent, and her final statements indicated neutrality on the death penalty, two 
of her answers could cause the prosecutor legitimate concern.  Most obviously, she 
said she did not think the state should have the right to impose the death penalty 
for a first degree premeditated deliberate murder, and she thought there could be 
another punishment, such as life imprisonment.  Although she modified or 
explained this view, she then said that to impose the death penalty “they”—by 
inference the prosecution—would have to convince her, suggesting that she might 
enter the penalty phase with something like a presumption in favor of the alternate 
penalty of life without parole.  In view of these responses, we see no basis to 
disturb the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against 
Theola J. was based on her death penalty views and not on her race. 
d.  Brenda B. 
On the jury questionnaire, in response to a question about her general 
feelings on the death penalty, Brenda B. wrote:  “In some cases I believe in the 
death penalty.  However, only when there can be no rehabilitation at all.”  She 
repeated this view on voir dire, stating:  “I believe that a person—if a person can 
be rehabilitated and if they’re truly sorry for what they did . . . .  I believe in giving 
them a chance to prove it.”  At one point she said she would automatically vote for 
life without parole, rather than death, if she was convinced the defendant could be 
rehabilitated.  Although she later retreated from this position somewhat, she 
continued to view the potential for rehabilitation as the most important 
consideration in determining penalty in a capital case.  Because defendant had no 
 
 
20
prior criminal record, the prosecutor might reasonably conclude that Brenda B.’s 
focus on rehabilitation made her an unfavorable jury for the prosecution on the 
penalty issue.  Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Brenda 
B.’s views on the death penalty, rather than her race, were the basis for the 
prosecution’s peremptory challenge. 
e.  Kathryn S. 
On the jury questionnaire, in response to a question about her general 
feelings on the death penalty, Kathryn S. wrote:  “I really don’t know for sure.  I 
have never really given it thought.”  On voir dire, the trial court asked if she had 
since given thought to the death penalty.  Kathryn S. said she had, adding:  “I 
don’t have any feelings one way or the other.”  Asked whether she believed there 
should be a law allowing for the death penalty, she said:  “I don’t know.  I really 
can’t say if there should be a law or there shouldn’t.” 
On voir dire by defense counsel, Kathryn S. said she would want to hear 
from defendant in making the penalty determination, but that she would not 
necessarily vote for death if defendant did not testify.  She said that on a scale of 
zero to 10, with zero being never voting to impose the death penalty and 10 being 
always voting to impose the death penalty, she would consider herself a five.   
The prosecutor asked Kathryn S. whether she thought the death penalty was 
“worse” than life without possibility of parole.  At first, Kathryn S. replied:  “I 
really can’t say.  I don’t know.  They are both bad.”  The prosecutor asked which 
of these punishments Kathryn S. would impose if she “wanted to punish 
somebody the worst that you possibly could.”  Kathryn S. said:  “Maybe I would 
say life in prison. . . .  So they could have a chance to think about what they did.”  
Asked again which punishment she would choose to punish someone “in the most 
harsh manner that you could,” Kathryn S. said:  “Life without possibility of 
parole.”  Asked why she would ever “give the death penalty,” Kathryn S. replied:  
 
 
21
“I don’t know that I would.  I mean I can’t say.  Why would I—I don’t know why 
I would ever give it or if I would.” 
After reviewing the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports 
the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor could reasonably view Kathryn S. as 
unfavorable on the penalty issue.  Although her responses generally indicated 
neutrality on the death penalty, she expressed considerable doubt that the death 
penalty was a harsher punishment than life in prison without possibility of parole 
and she could not explain why she would ever choose the death penalty over life 
without parole.  In view of these responses, we see no basis to disturb the trial 
court’s finding that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against Kathryn S. was 
based on her death penalty views and not on her race. 
f.  Keia M. 
On the jury questionnaire, in response to a question about her general 
feelings on the death penalty, Keia M. wrote:  “It depends on the case.”  On voir 
dire by the trial court, Keia M. said she did not have strong feelings either way 
about the death penalty and would not automatically vote either for or against it. 
On voir dire by defense counsel, Keia M. agreed that she was “right down 
the middle” on the death penalty and that on a scale of zero to 10 her views on the 
death penalty would be a five. 
The prosecutor on voir dire asked Keia M. if she had any thoughts on 
whether life in prison without possibility or death was “worse as a punishment.”  
Keia M. replied:  “I really don’t think one is worse than the other.  I can’t say that 
life imprisonment, in prison is worse than the death penalty, because I have never 
been in prison.  I mean, I don’t know the situation.  But I would think that there is 
no difference.  There is really not a difference.”  Asked which penalty she would 
choose if she “wanted to punish the person the most severely that [she] could,” 
Keia M. replied:  “The death penalty.”  She explained:  “You just go faster.  You 
 
 
22
don’t—well, not a lot of people think the way I do.  I think the more time you have 
here on this earth, the better it is, you know, no matter where you are.” 
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor 
could reasonably view Keia M. as unfavorable on the penalty issue.  Although her 
responses generally indicated neutrality on the death penalty, and although she 
eventually expressed the view that the death penalty was a harsher punishment 
than life in prison without possibility of parole, she nonetheless had expressed the 
view that there was really no difference between the two penalties in terms of 
severity.  Given this expression of opinion on an issue critical to penalty 
determination, we see no basis to disturb the trial court’s finding that the 
prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against Keia M. was based on her death penalty 
views and not on her race. 
g.  James T. 
On the jury questionnaire, in response to a question about his general 
feelings on the death penalty, James T. wrote:  “I have mixed feeling because my 
religious beliefs condem [sic] killing, yet I feel punishment should fit the crime.”  
On voir dire by the trial court, James T. said there was no conflict between his 
religious beliefs and state law allowing a jury to impose the death penalty and that 
he would not automatically vote either for or against it. 
On voir dire by the prosecutor, James T. said that the biblical command 
“Thou shalt not kill” applied to “everybody in society” but not to the state.  He 
affirmed again that voting as a juror to impose the death penalty would not conflict 
with his religious views.  He said that a murder deliberately planned for financial 
gain was the type of murder that could get his vote for the death penalty.  Asked 
whether he thought our society should have a death penalty, James T. replied:  “I 
think that society needs to be in a situation where they should not have a death 
penalty.  And that’s what I am just saying.  No one should kill another person, you 
 
 
23
know, to bring the situation up.”  The prosecutor then asked whether James T. 
would vote for the death penalty if it was on the ballot.  James T. answered:  “I 
would probably vote no. . . .  Because simply killing is wrong.” 
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor 
could reasonably view James T. as unfavorable on the penalty issue.  Although he 
consistently denied any conflict between his religious views and state law on the 
death penalty, James T. said he would vote against it if it appeared on the ballot 
because of his strongly held view that killing is wrong.  Given this expression of 
doubt about the moral legitimacy of the death penalty, we see no basis to disturb 
the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against James 
T. was based on his death penalty views and not on his race. 
h.  Gerald W. 
On the jury questionnaire, in response to a question about his general 
feelings on the death penalty, Gerald W. wrote:  “If someone purposely takes the 
life of another, I feel that they should be punished severely.  If accidental or 
without thought I feel they should go through some type of rehab & counseling for 
an extensive period of time.”  On voir dire by the trial court, Gerald W. said he 
would not automatically vote either for or against the death penalty. 
The prosecutor on voir dire asked Gerald W. whether he thought “that as a 
society we should even have the death penalty.”  Gerald W. replied:  “Yes, I 
believe that there are some murder cases that require the death penalty.  Because 
there are some people that just are killers.  Might have had, to me, a criminal life 
or scrapes with the law, you know.”  The prosecutor then asked how he would feel 
“if the person had not done it before.”  Gerald W. said:  “They would be in a 
different category.”  Asked whether his ability “to vote for the death penalty in a 
lot of ways would be determined by the person’s prior criminal record,” Gerald W. 
replied:  “It would have a lot to do with it.”  On further questioning, however, 
 
 
24
Gerald W. added that he could see himself voting for the death penalty when the 
person did not have a prior criminal record but committed “a very violent 
premeditated murder.”  Asked what kinds of things he would look for in making 
the penalty determination in that situation, Gerald W. said:  “The history of what 
the person was like prior to this murder.”  The prosecutor then asked this question:  
“Could you see yourself ever voting for the death penalty in a situation where you 
have already found the person guilty because they participated in the crime, but 
they weren’t the person who actually pulled the trigger and did the stabbing, 
whatever?”  Gerald W. replied:  “I don’t think so.”  He later said, however, that if 
three people agreed to commit a robbery and decided in advance to kill the 
robbery victim, he could vote for the death penalty for each of the participants 
because “one should not get off any lighter as far as sentencing or anything than 
the other because all three of them—to me, that would like they all shared equally 
in that crime.” 
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor 
could reasonably view Gerald W. as unfavorable on the penalty issue.  Although 
he indicated he was neutral on the death penalty, his answers suggested that in 
making the penalty determination he would be heavily influenced by the presence 
or absence of a prior criminal record and that at least initially he was not inclined 
to impose the death penalty on one who did not personally participate in the 
killing.  In the context of this case, where the defendant lacked a prior criminal 
record and did not directly participate in the killing, we see no basis to disturb the 
trial court’s finding that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against Gerald W. 
was based on his death penalty views and not on his race. 
 
 
25
3.  Defendant’s arguments 
Defendant argues that the trial court’s findings are not entitled to deference 
because the trial court did not make “ ‘a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate 
the prosecutor’s explanation.’ ”  (People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 718.)  
More particularly, defendant asserts the trial court reviewed jury questionnaires as 
to only seven of the eight Black prospective jurors that the prosecutor had excused 
by peremptory challenge.  We find the record on this point to be inconclusive.  
The trial court asked defense counsel for his copies of the questionnaires because, 
as the court said, they were better organized than the court’s, and the court 
mentioned seven of the eight prospective jurors by name, omitting the name of 
Patricia M.  But the trial court may have had its own copy of Patricia M.’s 
questionnaire already in hand, or defense counsel may have supplied the court 
with all eight questionnaires.  We note that the court later announced it had 
“look[ed] at all the questionnaires of Black jurors who have been excused.”  
Defense counsel did not challenge this statement.  On this record, we find no basis 
to conclude that the trial court failed to review the questionnaires and the voir dire 
responses of each of the eight prospective jurors. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court should have granted the defense 
motion because the prosecutor failed to give separate reasons for challenging each 
of the eight Black prospective jurors and because the trial court failed to make 
separate findings as to each challenged juror.  Although we agree that it is 
generally preferable to have individual reasons and individual findings for each 
challenged juror, we have never required them.  “When the prosecutor’s stated 
reasons are both inherently plausible and supported by the record, the trial court 
need not question the prosecutor or make detailed findings.”  (People v. Silva, 
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 386; see also People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 137, 
fn. 17.) 
 
 
26
Defendant next asserts that the prosecutor’s stated reasons for the 
challenges invited a comparison with the pool of remaining unselected prospective 
jurors.  The prosecutor said:  “I also took into account the fact that I believe that 
all these jurors weren’t necessarily opposed to the death penalty, but that I had a 
pool of jurors out in the audience who I thought were more in favor of the death 
penalty than these particular jurors.”  Defendant argues that in view of this 
statement it became necessary to undertake the comparison that the prosecutor 
invited. 
We note that at trial the defense did not suggest undertaking such a 
comparison, and indeed defendant’s trial attorney stated that at issue were the 
death penalty views of the challenged Black prospective jurors, not the views of 
prospective jurors who had not yet been called into the jury box.  The trial court 
indicated its agreement with this statement.  The defense did not protest when the 
trial court said it had reviewed the questionnaires and voir dire of the challenged 
jurors, without referring to the unselected jurors remaining in the jury pool.  
Because the trial court’s review of the questionnaires and voir dire of the 
challenged jurors showed that each had expressed views that the prosecutor could 
reasonably regard as unfavorable on the penalty issue, the trial court apparently 
concluded, with defense acquiescence, that there was no need to compare their 
expressed views with those of the remaining prospective jurors in the jury pool. 
Moreover, the comparison that defendant invites hardly seems feasible.  
Under the jury selection system that the trial court was using, the parties did not 
know the order in which prospective jurors in the jury pool would be called into 
the jury box.  The number of prospective jurors in the pool, and their identities, 
changed with the exercise of each peremptory challenge and the summoning of 
each prospective juror from the pool into the jury box.  Defendant has attempted to 
undertake a comparative analysis in his appellate brief, but it is inconclusive.  
 
 
27
Defendant does not dispute that at the time of each prosecution peremptory 
challenge against a Black prospective juror, there remained in the jury pool at least 
one prospective juror (and usually several) whom the prospector could reasonably 
regard as more favorable on the penalty issue, and that, during most of the time in 
question, the prosecutor had more remaining peremptory challenges than the 
defense.  Although the prosecutor could never be entirely certain that the 
challenged Black prospective juror would be replaced by a juror with more 
favorable penalty views, the prosecutor could reasonably have thought it more 
likely than not that this would occur. 
We conclude, therefore, that defendant has failed to demonstrate error in 
the trial court’s denial of his motion under Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 
and People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258. 
B.  Challenges to Prospective Jurors for Cause 
Defendant contends that during jury selection the trial court erred in 
overruling her “for cause” challenges to six prospective jurors and in granting the 
prosecution’s challenges to two prospective jurors. 
The same legal standard governs the inclusion or exclusion of a prospective 
juror.  (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 456.)  A trial court should sustain a 
challenge for cause when a juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair” 
the performance of the juror’s duties in accordance with the court’s instructions 
and the juror’s oath.  (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 853; People v. 
Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 727.)  On appeal, we will uphold a trial court’s 
ruling on a challenge for cause by either party “if it is fairly supported by the 
record, accepting as binding the trial court’s determination as to the prospective 
juror’s true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are 
conflicting or ambiguous.”  (People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 727; see 
 
 
28
also People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 
Cal.4th 83, 121; People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 456–457.) 
1.  Harold O. 
The trial court properly denied the defense challenge for cause to 
Prospective Juror Harold O.  On voir dire, Harold O. expressed strong feelings in 
favor of the death penalty, but he also said he would not automatically “go one 
way or the other” and would follow the law as instructed.  Although Harold O. at 
one point said he would automatically vote for death at the penalty phase unless 
evidence was introduced to convince him otherwise, the record shows that Harold 
O. mistakenly thought he was being asked for his views on the appropriate penalty 
if no evidence was introduced at the penalty phase.  When the trial court clarified 
the question, Harold O. assured the court that he would consider the evidence and 
mitigating factors.  The trial court impliedly resolved any conflicts or ambiguities 
in Harold O.’s responses by finding that his views on the death penalty would not 
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.  We will 
not disturb that finding, which is fairly supported by the record. 
2.  Mary F. 
The trial court properly denied the defense challenge for cause to 
Prospective Juror Mary F.  Although Mary F. said she favored the death penalty, 
she also said she would keep an open mind and would consider life without 
possibility of parole at the penalty phase.  The trial court impliedly resolved any 
conflicts or ambiguities in Mary F.’s responses by finding that her views on the 
death penalty would not prevent or substantially impair the performance of her 
duties as a juror.  We will not disturb that finding, which is fairly supported by the 
record. 
 
 
29
3.  Hilyard B. 
Prospective Juror Hilyard B. said he felt strongly that the death penalty 
should be imposed under certain circumstances, but he also said that he could set 
aside his personal feelings and follow the law as instructed, and that the 
appropriate sentence to be imposed would depend on the particular situation.  
Hilyard B. stated that although he would give greater weight to the circumstances 
of the crime and recent mitigating factors, he would consider other factors in 
aggravation and mitigation as well.  These responses do not show that the trial 
court erred in denying the defense challenge for cause. 
Hilyard B. did not answer questions in the juror questionnaire about how he 
had voted in elections; he explained that he considered that information personal 
and confidential.  We reject defendant’s argument that the trial court was required 
to excuse Hilyard B. because of his failure to answer these particular questions, or 
that defendant was denied a right to adequate voir dire.  Hilyard B. freely 
answered questions on voir dire about his death penalty views and his ability to 
obey the court’s instructions regarding penalty determination in a capital case.  
Thus, the defense had adequate opportunity to voir dire Hilyard B. in support of a 
challenge for cause.  (See People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 661 [stating that 
reversal of judgment is required only when voir dire was “so inadequate that the 
reviewing court can say that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair”].) 
4.  Katherine K. and Barbara M. 
As defendant concedes, Prospective Jurors Katherine K. and Barbara M. 
gave contradictory answers on voir dire.  When denying the defense challenges for 
cause, the trial court impliedly resolved those contradictions by finding that their 
views would not prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as 
jurors, and we will not disturb those findings, which are fairly supported by the 
record.  Although Barbara M. did not disclose in her juror questionnaire that her 
 
 
30
mother-in-law had been a murder victim 20 years earlier, she disclosed the 
information on voir dire, and the trial court considered it in denying the defense 
challenge for cause. 
5.  Richard R. 
The trial court properly denied the defense challenge for cause to 
Prospective Juror Richard R.  Although during voir dire Richard R. said he 
thought defense counsel was trying to influence the prospective jurors, he said he 
would not hold this against the defense and it would not affect his performance as 
a juror.  By denying the defense challenge for cause, the trial court impliedly 
found that Richard R.’s views would not prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror, and we will not disturb that finding, which is 
fairly supported by the record. 
6.  Scott M. and Beverly S. 
The trial court did not err in granting the prosecution’s challenges for cause 
to Prospective Jurors Scott M. and Beverly S.  As defendant recognizes, they made 
statements in their juror questionnaires that would disqualify them from serving as 
jurors in this case.  Although their later statements during voir dire may not have 
been disqualifying, the resolution of these conflicts and contradictions was the task 
of the trial court.  By granting the prosecution’s challenges for cause, the trial 
court impliedly found that these prospective jurors’ views would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors, and we will not 
disturb those findings, which are fairly supported by the record. 
C.  Double Jeopardy and Comment on Failure to Testify 
Immediately after the jury was sworn, the trial court recalled that one of the 
jurors, Fred L., had earlier told the bailiff about reading a newspaper article 
regarding the case.  The court, in the presence of the other jurors, inquired into the 
 
 
31
matter.  When the court asked whether the article had affected his ability to be fair 
to either side, Juror Fred L. responded:  “It would cause me to want the defendant 
to testify on her own behalf even though she constitutionally doesn’t have to, and 
that would lead me to be prejudiced against her.”  The court then asked, “In other 
words, you would expect if the defendant doesn’t take the stand and testify in her 
own behalf, you would hold it against her?”  Juror Fred L. replied, “Yes.”  After a 
sidebar discussion with the attorneys for both sides, the trial court discharged Fred 
L.  When the court then asked the remaining 11 jurors if any of them had read 
anything that would cause them to believe that they could not be fair, no one 
responded. 
Defendant contends that jeopardy attached when the 12 jurors were sworn, 
and that therefore the trial court proceedings after the discharge of Juror Fred L. 
violated her constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment to the federal 
Constitution to not be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense.  We have 
held that generally “where a court has indicated that a trial will be conducted with 
alternate jurors the impanelment of the jury is not deemed complete until the 
alternates are selected and sworn.”  (In re Mendes, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 853.)  
The trial court here indicated that there would be alternate jurors.  Defendant urges 
us to overrule Mendes because, according to defendant, it conflicts with the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Crist v. Bretz (1978) 437 U.S. 28, holding that 
jeopardy attaches when jurors are impaneled and sworn.  As the Attorney General 
notes, however, we were aware of and considered the high court’s decision in 
Crist when we decided In re Mendes, and we there concluded that our decision 
was not in conflict with Crist.  (In re Mendes, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 853-854.)  
We adhere to that view. 
We also reject defendant’s argument that the statements by Juror Fred L. and 
those the trial court made in the presence of the full jury constituted improper 
 
 
32
comments on defendant’s failure to testify.  Fred L. stated that based on the article 
he read, he would want defendant to testify “even though [defendant] 
constitutionally doesn’t have to,” and that would lead him “to be prejudiced 
against her.”  Defendant did not preserve the issue for appeal because she did not 
make a timely objection in the trial court.  (See People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
997, 1035.)  In any event, the specific contents of the article were not discussed in 
front of the other jurors but only in a sidebar conference with counsel, Juror Fred 
L.’s comment expressly recognized defendant’s constitutional right not to testify, 
and the trial court instructed the jury not to draw any inferences from a 
defendant’s failure to testify.  Accordingly, the statements in question were not 
constitutionally improper comments on defendant’s failure to testify. 
III.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Accomplice Corroboration 
Defendant contends she is entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the 
only evidence linking her to the crimes came from the uncorroborated testimony 
of accomplices James Luna and brothers Marvin and Dondell Lee.  As recited 
earlier, that testimony was as follows:  Defendant agreed to pay Luna $50,000 
from the proceeds of an insurance policy to kill victim Eldridge.  Defendant made 
arrangements for Luna and brothers Marvin and Dondell Lee to enter the house to 
kill Eldridge, for Luna to help her inflict some injuries on herself so it would 
appear that the killing occurred during a robbery, to kill Eldridge, and to cut off 
his penis to make the crime look like a “homosexual murder.” 
A conviction can be based on an accomplice’s testimony only if other 
evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense 
corroborates that testimony.  (§ 1111.)  The corroborating evidence may be 
circumstantial or slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone, 
and it must tend to implicate the defendant by relating to an act that is an element 
 
 
33
of the crime.  The corroborating evidence need not by itself establish every 
element of the crime, but it must, without aid from the accomplice’s testimony, 
tend to connect the defendant with the crime.  (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 
Cal.4th 1060, 1128.)  The trier of fact’s determination on the issue of 
corroboration is binding on the reviewing court unless the corroborating evidence 
should not have been admitted or does not reasonably tend to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the crime.  (People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 
20, 25.) 
Here, to corroborate the accomplice testimony, the prosecution presented 
independent evidence that defendant had a motive to kill Eldridge to obtain 
possession of the house they owned in joint tenancy and to obtain the proceeds of 
an insurance policy on Eldridge’s life.  The prosecution also presented 
independent evidence that defendant was present in the house when Eldridge was 
killed and that, although Eldridge was stabbed 44 times, defendant received only 
superficial wounds, casting doubt on the defense claim that she, like Eldridge, was 
a victim of a residential robbery.  The investigating detective concluded, based on 
the evidence at the crime scene, that there was a murder, not a robbery that led to a 
murder.  And the prosecution presented independent evidence that accomplice 
James Luna, who admitted stabbing Eldridge to death, was defendant’s coworker 
and personal friend.  Considered together, this evidence adequately corroborated 
the accomplice testimony.   
In addition, the prosecution introduced evidence that on the day before and 
the day of the murder there were 11 telephone calls between defendant and 
accomplice Luna collectively lasting more than 100 minutes, and that on the day 
after the murder there were six calls between them collectively lasting more than 
40 minutes.  Because evidence of the telephone communications was not the only 
corroborating evidence, we do not address defendant’s contention that the records 
 
 
34
of the telephone calls between defendant and accomplice Luna, considered in 
isolation, are insufficient corroboration of the accomplice testimony.  (See People 
v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1208, fn. 9.)  Meritless, too, is defendant’s 
assertion that the prosecutor stated in closing argument that the telephone records 
are the best corroborating evidence.  The prosecutor stated that the telephone 
records were the best evidence of a connection between defendant and accomplice 
Luna, while also noting that the records would require the testimony of a 
participant witness to give the telephone calls content. 
B.  Right to Speedy Trial 
In August 1985, defendant was arrested in Pennsylvania for the murder of 
Stephen Eldridge in California.  She was arraigned in Los Angeles, California, on 
January 10, 1986.  The preliminary hearing began on January 2, 1987, and ended 
on January 9, 1987.  On September 2, 1987, the prosecution filed an amended 
information charging defendant with attempted murder, solicitation of murder, and 
murder.  The amended information also alleged the special circumstances of 
murder for financial gain and murder by lying in wait.  Defendant was rearraigned, 
entered a plea of not guilty, and denied the special circumstance allegations.  
Later, the trial court dismissed the charge of solicitation of murder. 
Between defendant’s initial arraignment on January 10, 1986, and the 
commencement of jury selection on August 14, 1989, Defense Counsel Joe Ingber 
requested and was granted 25 motions for continuances; each time defendant 
waived her right to a speedy trial.  The continuances were based on Ingber’s trial 
commitments in other criminal cases, including capital cases, and the need to 
prepare for defendant’s trial.  The prosecutor, as early as December 1987, and on 
several occasions thereafter, expressed to the court her concern about the trial 
delay.   
 
 
35
Defendant contends she is entitled to a dismissal with prejudice because the 
delay of three years and eight months between her arraignment and the beginning 
of jury selection violated her constitutional right to a speedy trial.  In support, she 
cites the speedy trial provisions of the federal and state Constitutions.  (U.S. 
Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)  Her argument, however, addresses 
only the speedy trial provision of the federal Constitution.  
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that in 
“all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial . . . .”  
In Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, the high court announced a balancing test 
in determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth 
Amendment had been violated.  It identified four criteria to be considered:  (1) 
length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the 
right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.  (Id. at p. 530.) 
Here, defendant’s speedy trial claim fails under the third factor because she 
not only did not assert her speedy trial right in the trial court, but she repeatedly 
requested and obtained continuances and waived time for each continuance.  
(People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 633-634.)  Anticipating this conclusion, 
defendant argues that trial counsel Ingber provided ineffective assistance by 
requesting and agreeing to the continuances of the trial date. 
A defendant seeking to establish the incompetence of trial counsel must show 
both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance 
prejudiced the defendant’s case.  (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 158.)  
In assessing the adequacy of counsel’s performance, a court must indulge “a 
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 
considered sound trial strategy.’  [Citations.]”  (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 
 
 
36
466 U.S. 668, 689.)  If “ ‘the record contains no explanation for the challenged 
behavior, an appellate court will reject the claim of ineffective assistance ‘unless 
counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there 
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ”  (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 
349, 367.) 
Here, defendant fails to establish that trial counsel Ingber’s performance was 
deficient.  The record shows that Ingber needed continuances to prepare for the 
preliminary hearing as well as the trial, to seek or review discovery, and to await 
completion of accomplice Luna’s preliminary hearing.  The record belies 
defendant’s assertion that the only grounds for the continuances were Ingber’s 
commitments in other cases.  Although defendant asserts that Ingber intentionally 
delayed the trial to obtain a higher fee, the record does not support this assertion.  
Because defendant has not shown that trial counsel’s performance was deficient 
when measured against the standard of a reasonably competent attorney, we reject 
her claim that counsel’s requests for continuances denied her the right to effective 
assistance of counsel. 
C.  Conflict of Interest 
Defendant contends she was denied her Sixth Amendment right under the 
federal Constitution to be represented by counsel free of a conflict of interest.  We 
disagree. 
1.  Relevant facts 
On October 24, 1989, at the end of the first day of the prosecution’s case-in-
chief, Defense Counsel Ingber told the trial court that during a prosecution 
interview with accomplice James Luna four days earlier, Luna had mentioned 
having a “relationship” with Ingber.  Ingber expressed concern that the 
prosecution might call him as a witness in this case.  Ingber explained that in 
 
 
37
another case he had represented Randy Howard, who was Luna’s cellmate and 
sexual partner, but he had never represented Luna.  When the prosecutor agreed 
not to bring up the subject of Luna’s claimed relationship with Ingber during 
Luna’s direct examination, the trial proceedings continued. 
The prosecution’s direct examination of accomplice Luna began on 
November 1, 1989.  The next day, on cross-examination by defense cocounsel 
Burkow, Luna testified that he had a sexual relationship with cellmate Randy 
Howard from August 1985 until February 1988, and that he had told Howard of 
the March 1985 attempted murder and the April 1985 actual murder of Eldridge. 
On November 8, 1989, during a break in the cross-examination of Luna, and 
outside the jury’s presence, the prosecutor expressed her concern to the trial court 
about Defense Counsel Ingber’s prior representation of Randy Howard.  The 
prosecutor asserted that if Ingber had obtained confidential information from 
Howard that could be useful in the cross-examination of prosecution witness Luna, 
Ingber’s prior attorney-client relationship with Howard might preclude disclosing 
such information to his cocounsel, Burkow.  The prosecutor suggested that 
defendant waive any potential conflict of interest. 
Ingber then told the trial court that he had not told Cocounsel Burkow 
anything discussed with Howard.  Ingber added:  “I spoke with Mr. Luna myself 
prior to the time I represented Miss McDermott, discussing nothing about the case 
whatsoever, as a solicitous, gratuitous, favor on behalf of Mr. Howard to speak to 
Mr. Luna.  [¶]  That’s all of my relationship with Mr. Luna.”  In Ingber’s view, 
failing to disclose to cocounsel Burkow any information about Luna’s character 
received from Howard could not be detrimental to defendant.  The trial court 
disagreed, finding a potential conflict of interest.  The court then appointed Bruce 
Hill, an experienced criminal defense attorney, as independent counsel to consult 
with defendant. 
 
 
38
On November 20, 1989, in defendant’s presence, Attorney Hill told the trial 
court he had met with defendant for an hour and a half, 50 minutes of which were 
spent discussing the subject of the potential conflict of interest presented by 
Defense Counsel Ingber’s prior representation of Randy Howard in a different 
case.  When the court asked defendant whether she still wanted Ingber to represent 
her, she responded “Yes, I do, your honor.”  The court then asked defendant if she 
understood that because of the potential conflict she ran “the risk of a greater 
chance of conviction.”  Defendant replied, “Yes.”  Defendant also said she 
understood that in waiving her right to conflict-free counsel she was giving up her 
right to appeal on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to a 
claim of counsel’s potential conflict of interest.  The following colloquy then 
occurred: 
“THE COURT:  All right. 
“Having been advised of the right to be represented by an attorney free from 
conflict of interest, and having understood the dangers and disadvantages in being 
represented by an attorney with a conflict, do you specifically give up the right to 
be represented by an attorney who has no conflict of interest. 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do.” 
When the defense called Randy Howard as a witness, he testified that he had 
not told Counsel Ingber anything Luna had told him about the case.  Howard also 
said Luna had told him that defendant had hired Luna to kill someone to collect on 
an insurance policy. 
2.  Waiver of counsel’s conflict of interest 
The federal and state constitutional rights to the assistance of trial counsel 
(U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15) include the right to 
representation by counsel without any conflict of interest (People v. Jones (1991) 
 
 
39
53 Cal.3d 1115, 1133-1134).  When a trial court knows or should know of a 
possible conflict of interest between a defendant and defense counsel, the court 
must inquire into the circumstances and take appropriate action.  (People v. Frye 
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 999.)  Such action may include ascertaining whether the 
defendant wishes to waive the right to be represented by conflict-free counsel.  
Although a trial court may refuse to accept such a waiver (Wheat v. United States 
(1988) 486 U.S. 153, 162), it is not required to do so (People v. Carpenter (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 312, 375-376; People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 837).  The 
defendant’s waiver must be a knowing, intelligent act done with awareness of the 
circumstances and likely consequences, and it must be unambiguous.  (People v. 
Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 110.) 
Here, the record shows that the trial court fully informed defendant of the 
potential conflict of interest on the part of Defense Counsel Ingber and that 
defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily gave up her right to be 
represented by conflict-free counsel.  As discussed in detail above, the trial court 
appointed independent counsel to discuss with defendant the potential conflict of 
interest, advised defendant of her right to the appointment of different counsel at 
no expense to her, told defendant that her chances of being convicted were 
possibly greater if Ingber remained as her counsel, offered to address any 
questions or concerns defendant might have, and obtained an express statement 
from defendant waiving her right to conflict-free counsel.  We have in the past 
rejected the contention that the right to conflict-free counsel cannot be waived in 
capital cases.  (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 375-376.) 
D.  Effectiveness of Trial Counsel 
Citing to both the state and federal Constitutions, defendant contends she was 
denied her right to effective assistance of counsel at trial.  (U.S. Const., 6th 
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)  More specifically, she claims that her trial 
 
 
40
counsel failed to adequately investigate and prepare her case; failed to move at the 
close of the prosecution’s case for a judgment of acquittal and to object to the 
prosecution’s closing argument on the ground the accomplice testimony was not 
corroborated; did not present a coherent theory of the case; lacked basic trial 
skills; presented incomprehensible defenses; bolstered the prosecution’s theory of 
murder for financial gain; bolstered the testimony of accomplice Luna; used 
vulgar language; expressed personal opinions about defendant’s guilt; and 
conceded defendant’s guilt in closing argument. 
As we have explained, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that this 
deficient performance prejudiced defendant’s case.  (People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 
Cal.4th 130, 158.)  If counsel’s deficiencies were so severe as to result in a 
complete breakdown of the adversary process, prejudice is presumed.  (United 
States v. Cronic (1989) 466 U.S. 648, 656-657.)  Otherwise, the defendant must 
show prejudice “ ‘in the sense that it ‘so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result.’ ”  (People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 366.) 
We reject at the threshold defendant’s contention that she is entitled to a 
presumption of prejudice because her trial counsel’s deficiencies resulted in a 
complete breakdown of the adversarial process.  The record shows that defense 
counsel vigorously represented defendant and subjected the prosecution’s case to 
adversarial testing.  As just one example, defense counsel’s cross-examination of 
prosecution witness James Luna lasted eight days. 
1.  Claim that defense counsel failed to adequately investigate and 
prepare case 
In support of her claim that Defense Counsel Ingber failed to investigate and 
prepare the case, defendant points to Ingber’s involvement in trying other cases 
 
 
41
while representing her, his citation of a disapproved case in a motion, and his 
failure to timely review discovery by the prosecution.  Defendant also asserts that 
Ingber did not hire an investigator until May 1989 and did not conduct his first 
field investigation until June 1989, shortly before trial started in August 1989, that 
Ingber did not interview defense witnesses until the morning of their testimony, 
that some defense witnesses never spoke to Ingber or his cocounsel, Burkow, 
before testifying, and that Ingber did not ask for a continuance when accomplice 
James Luna agreed to testify against defendant one month before trial. 
As the Attorney General observes, the appellate record does not support 
many of these assertions.  To show when trial counsel Ingber hired an investigator 
and began the field investigation, defendant mistakenly relies on trial counsel’s 
funding requests.  But these requests only cover the period after the trial court 
appointed Ingber as defendant’s trial counsel.  The appellate record does not show 
what actions Ingber did or did not take during the long period before his 
appointment when Ingber represented defendant as retained counsel. 
Assuming trial counsel Ingber did not interview many defense witness until 
the day of their testimony, we are not persuaded this establishes deficient 
performance.  Experienced counsel may, for example, choose to rely on an 
investigator’s report or other form of written statements describing the witnesses’ 
anticipated testimony.  Because defendant has not shown that trial counsel Ingber 
failed to adequately investigate or prepare, defendant also has not shown show that 
counsel should have requested additional continuances. 
2.  Claim that defense counsel should have moved for judgment of 
acquittal or objected to prosecution’s closing argument 
Defendant faults trial counsel for not seeking a judgment of acquittal when 
the prosecution rested its case and for not objecting to the prosecutor’s closing 
argument on the ground that the accomplice testimony of James Luna, Marvin 
 
 
42
Lee, and Dondell Lee was not corroborated.  As discussed earlier, there was 
sufficient corroboration of the accomplice testimony.  Because a motion or 
objection on the ground now asserted by defendant would have been futile, trial 
counsel’s failure to move for acquittal or to object to the prosecutor’s argument 
was not deficient performance.  (People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 562.)  
3.  Claim that defense counsel did not have a coherent defense theory 
Defendant accuses her trial counsel of lacking a coherent defense theory, as 
shown, according to defendant, by counsel’s failure to establish that accomplice 
James Luna might have had a motive for the killing of Eldridge separate and apart 
from defendant’s.  Defendant is wrong.  The defense did present a coherent theory 
of the case, namely, that the prosecution could not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant had anything to do with the murder.   
4.  Claim that defense counsel lacked basic trial skills 
Defendant asserts that her trial counsel lacked basic trial skills.  In support, 
she points to a question by the prosecutor that she claims her counsel should have 
objected to as leading and as assuming facts not in evidence.  She then lists 29 
questions defense counsel asked accomplice Luna on cross-examination, claiming 
that these questions show that counsel was acting as “another prosecutor.”  Such 
matters as whether objections should be made and the manner of cross-
examination are within counsel’s discretion and rarely implicate ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 334.)  Here, as we 
pointed out earlier, defense counsel cross-examined accomplice Luna for eight 
days and vigorously attacked his credibility in closing argument.  The record 
belies defendant’s assertion that her trial counsel lacked basic trial skills. 
 
 
43
5.  Claim that defense counsel presented “incomprehensible defenses” 
In arguing that defendant’s trial counsel presented “incomprehensible 
defenses,” defendant points to (1) counsel’s attempt to establish that murder victim 
Eldridge received only superficial injuries in the earlier nonfatal attack on March 
21, 1985, and (2) counsel’s examination of Luna’s aunt, Alice Gonzales, eliciting 
her testimony that Luna was at home on April 28, 1985, when Eldridge was killed.  
As the Attorney General points out, evidence that Eldridge received only 
superficial injuries during the March 21 attack supported the defense argument 
that the attack was not an attempted murder, as the prosecution had argued, but 
instead was part of an attempted robbery.  In turn, this supported the defense 
argument that the later murder of Eldridge occurred during a residential robbery 
rather than, as the prosecution had argued, to obtain financial benefits for 
defendant.  The testimony of accomplice Luna’s aunt was offered not to exculpate 
Luna from the murder but to impeach Luna by showing that he had manipulated 
his aunt to induce her to lie on his behalf.  This was consistent with the defense 
strategy to portray Luna as an individual whose testimony completely lacked 
credibility. 
6.  Claim that defense counsel “bolstered” prosecution’s case 
Defendant accuses her trial counsel of bolstering the prosecution’s theory 
that defendant’s motive for Eldridge’s murder was financial gain, namely, 
obtaining the proceeds of the life insurance on Eldridge’s life and full title to the 
house they jointly owned.  In support, she cites trial counsel’s decision to call as 
witnesses Robin Tratner, Linda Gunderson, and Antoinette Garcia. 
Defense witness Robin Tratner was the custodian of records for the bank 
where defendant maintained an account.  Through direct examination of Tratner, 
defense counsel established that defendant did not have a negative bank balance 
during the first half of 1985, when Eldridge was killed.  Although Tatner testified 
 
 
44
on cross-examination that defendant had bounced over 100 checks in 1984, the 
defense succeeded in establishing that defendant’s financial situation had 
improved in 1985. 
Defense witness Linda Gunderson, a probate lawyer representing the family 
of murder victim Eldridge, testified that Eldridge’s heirs had filed a claim for the 
insurance proceeds under the policy that Eldridge had bought naming defendant as 
a beneficiary.  Defendant argues that her counsel’s decision to have Gunderson 
testify was a tactical blunder because it allowed the prosecution, during its 
rebuttal, to call as a witness defendant’s former attorney, Mitchell Egers, who 
testified that he had written a letter to the insurance company claiming that 
defendant was entitled to the proceeds of Eldridge’s life insurance as the 
beneficiary designated on the policy.  We do not agree that defendant was 
significantly harmed by Egers’s testimony, or that the testimony was inconsistent 
with defendant’s claim of innocence.  If, as defendant claimed, she was not 
involved in Eldridge’s murder, she would be entitled to claim the proceeds of his 
life insurance. 
Defense witness Antoinette Garcia was the sister of Phillip La Chance, who 
worked with defendant at the La Porte residence.  The defense called her as a 
witness to impeach La Chance’s testimony that defendant had asked him to steal 
Betty La Porte’s ring.  Garcia testified that La Chance was not working at the La 
Porte residence when, according to La Chance, defendant had asked him to steal 
the ring.  On cross-examination by the prosecution, Garcia said that La Chance 
told her that defendant and La Chance had taken Betty La Porte’s ring and had 
tried to sell it.  Whether Garcia’s testimony was detrimental to the defense is fairly 
debatable.  Although the prosecution’s cross-examination of Garcia produced 
further evidence that defendant had participated in the theft of the ring, that 
evidence was an out-of-court statement by La Chance, and Defense Counsel 
 
 
45
Ingber’s direct examination of Garcia successfully undermined La Chance’s 
credibility.  Because reasonable minds could differ on the value of Garcia’s 
testimony for the defense, we do not find that Defense Counsel Ingber performed 
deficiently by calling her as witness.  (See People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
p. 1065.) 
Defendant also faults trial counsel for calling as witnesses Randy Howard, 
Betty Jones, and Dondell Lee who, according to defendant, each gave testimony 
against her.  We reject defendant’s claim because she has not shown that there 
could be no satisfactory explanation for defense counsel’s actions.  (People v. 
Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 367.)  Howard testified that accomplice Luna told 
him defendant had hired Luna to kill someone for insurance money.  As the 
Attorney General notes, Howard’s testimony was consistent with Luna’s and was 
used by the defense in closing argument to show that because the source of the 
evidence was Luna himself, Luna’s testimony could not be independently 
corroborated.  As to Jones, her testimony that Luna told her defendant sometimes 
would pick Luna up in her car and go out for cocktails was not adverse to 
defendant, given that Luna and defendant were friends and coworkers.  Dondell 
Lee’s testimony that defendant describes as “the ‘lady’ told Luna to do this or 
that” might have been offered by defense counsel to show that accomplice Dondell 
and his brother Marvin, also an accomplice, had concocted a version of events that 
was not credible. 
7.  Claim that defense counsel used vulgar language and sexual 
innuendo 
Defendant accuses trial counsel of using vulgar language and sexual 
innuendo during the examination of Marvin Lee and Gary Venturini, thus 
rendering ineffective assistance.  We disagree. 
 
 
46
The defense played the tape of the July 12, 1985, police interview of 
accomplice Marvin Lee.  The tape apparently contained explicit sexual language, 
and the questions by defense counsel that defendant now claims were improper all 
related to that interview.  Having reviewed the record, we do not find that Defense 
Counsel Ingber performed deficiently by referring to and repeating some of the 
vulgar and offensive language used during the taped interview. 
Defendant next asserts trial counsel improperly asked Gary Venturini, who 
was murder victim Eldridge’s former lover, if Venturini’s relationship with 
another former lover was physical, and improperly elicited testimony that the other 
former lover had died of AIDS.  After the prosecution objected, defense counsel 
rephrased the question to delete any reference to the relationship being physical.  
Defense counsel could not have anticipated the testimony defendant now claims 
was offensive, that Venturini’s former lover had died of AIDS, because that 
statement was not responsive to defense counsel’s question, which made no 
reference to the death of the former lover.   
In neither of these incidents has defendant shown incompetent representation 
at trial.  In addition, defendant does not even attempt to show prejudice from the 
purportedly deficient performance. 
8.  Claim that defense counsel allowed witnesses to express personal 
opinions of defendant’s guilt 
Defendant faults her trial counsel for allowing three defense witnesses (Linda 
Gunderson, Curt Livesay, and Agnes Gordon) and two prosecution witnesses 
(Twyla Hacker and Carol Bond) to testify as to their opinion of her guilt.  The 
record does not support defendant’s claim. 
As mentioned previously, defense witness Linda Gunderson was the attorney 
for the family of murder victim Eldridge.  On cross-examination, the prosecution 
asked whether defendant, the beneficiary of the insurance policy taken out on 
 
 
47
Eldridge’s life, was disqualified from receiving the insurance proceeds because 
“she had, in your mind, murdered your client . . . .”  Gunderson never answered 
the question, however, because the trial court sustained defense counsel’s prompt 
objection, and the prosecutor ended her questioning.  Thus, contrary to defendant’s 
assertion, Gunderson expressed no opinion on defendant’s guilt. 
Defense witness Curt Livesay was the assistant district attorney in charge of 
determining whether the prosecution should seek the death penalty in special 
circumstance cases.  He testified about the terms of accomplice Luna’s plea 
agreement.  On cross-examination by the prosecution, Livesay explained that the 
purpose of the plea bargain was to have Luna tell the jury about defendant’s role 
in the killing, and that without the plea bargain Luna was certain to have invoked 
his right against self-incrimination.  Livesay did not give his personal opinion on 
defendant’s guilt, and defense counsel had a legitimate tactical reason for calling 
Livesay as a witness:  to attempt to undermine prosecution witness Luna’s 
testimony by showing that the prosecution had given him a favorable deal in 
exchange for his testimony against defendant.  In any event, defendant was not 
prejudiced.  Undoubtedly, the jury was aware that the prosecution, as the charging 
party, was convinced of defendant’s guilt. 
Defense witness Agnes Gordon was a police officer who spoke to defendant 
shortly after Eldridge’s murder, and she testified that defendant was not as upset 
after that murder as Gordon would have expected.  Contrary to defendant’s claim, 
she expressed no personal opinion on defendant’s guilt. 
Twyla Hacker, a friend of defendant’s, testified as a prosecution witness that 
police officers told her they thought defendant was guilty; contrary to defendant’s 
assertion, she expressed no opinion about defendant’s guilt. 
Prosecution witness Carol Stanford Bond, a friend of murder victim Eldridge, 
testified that she was not on friendly terms with defendant before the murder and 
 
 
48
that she liked defendant even less at the time of her trial testimony.  Contrary to 
defendant’s claim, Bond expressed no view of defendant’s guilt. 
9.  Claim that defense counsel conceded defendant’s guilt in closing 
argument 
Defendant accuses her trial counsel of conceding her guilt in closing 
argument, thereby rendering ineffective assistance.  We find no concession of guilt 
and no deficient performance in counsel’s argument to the jury. 
First, defendant asserts that defense counsel told the jury there was no 
defense.  That is not what defense counsel said, however.  The prosecution in its 
closing argument had attempted to ridicule the defense by characterizing as 
purported or attempted defenses the testimony about an AIDS death, about 
accomplice Luna having been at home during the murder, about the possibility of 
two knives being used in the killing, and about the insurance claim submitted by 
murder victim Eldridge’s family.  Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor had 
inaccurately characterized the defense.  Considering defense counsel’s argument 
as a whole, a reasonable juror would have understood that the defense theory was 
simply that the prosecution had failed to prove defendant’s involvement in the 
murder beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Second, defendant notes that at the outset of his argument to the jury, defense 
counsel thanked the jury for being attentive, regardless of how they voted.  
Defendant claims that by this statement defense counsel told the jury it did not 
matter how the jury voted on defendant’s guilt.  No reasonable juror would have 
so understood counsel’s statement, particularly when counsel thereafter proceeded 
to vigorously argue on defendant’s behalf that the prosecution had not established 
her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Third and last, defendant faults counsel for likening defendant’s decision not 
to testify at trial to a coach’s decisions in a football game.  What counsel said was 
 
 
49
that just as a football coach must decide which players to use during a football 
game, so also an attorney must use professional judgment to decide whether a 
defendant should testify.  There was a legitimate tactical purpose for this 
argument, which was to reduce the risk that the jury would draw some inference of 
guilt from defendant’s failure to testify. 
E.  Admission of Videotape 
The jury was shown an 18-minute videotape of the crime scene made by 
police officers shortly after they arrived there.  Defendant objected to the 
videotape as being more prejudicial than probative.  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  The 
videotape contained a 30-second view of the victim’s groin area showing that his 
penis had been cut off.  The trial court, after reviewing the tape in its entirety, 
ruled that it would admit the tape into evidence if the scene showing the victim’s 
genital area were to be shortened and if the sound, except for a portion recording 
the sound of barking dogs, were to be turned off.  Defendant contends that the tape 
was not shortened and that the sound was not turned off, so that the jury could 
hear police officers laughing in the background.  The Attorney General states that 
the prosecution turned off the videotape after a brief view of the victim’s mutilated 
groin.  The Attorney General also asserts that except for the segment recording the 
barking dogs, the sound portion of the video was not played. 
It is not necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties regarding what 
portions of the videotape were shown to the jury or whether the sound of the tape 
was turned on or off.  We have reviewed the entire videotape, including the audio 
portion, and find nothing in it that is unduly gruesome or inflammatory.  (See 
People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 171.)  It consists largely of exterior 
views of the house in which Eldridge was killed.  The portion depicting the 
house’s interior contains mostly views of the various rooms.  The portion showing 
the victim’s body is not particularly gruesome:  There is very little blood shown on 
 
 
50
or near the body.  In the portion of the tape showing the victim’s mutilated groin, 
no blood is apparent.  Although unpleasant, the image is not shocking.  The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the videotape.  (See People v. Scheid 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 20.) 
We see no reason to criticize the trial court for not watching the videotape 
again with the jury.  With respect to defendant’s claim that police officers could be 
heard laughing in the background, the sound of laughter can only be heard briefly, 
and it is not clear that the person laughing is a police officer.  Thus, the audio part 
of the videotape in which laughter may be heard would not have prejudiced the 
jury.   
F.  Admission of Prior Bad Acts Evidence 
Phillip La Chance, who had worked with defendant in caring for the disabled 
Lee La Porte, testified over defense objections to two prior instances of 
misconduct by defendant.  In the fall of 1984, probably during the months of 
September and October, defendant told La Chance she needed money to pay bills 
and discussed with him a plan to steal a ring from Betty La Porte so they could sell 
it.  Around the same time, defendant asked La Chance, who sometimes handled 
Betty La Porte’s banking matters, to get Lee La Porte to sign a check so they 
“could clear out the checking account.”  The prosecutor argued that the evidence 
was relevant to show not only defendant’s tendency to employ others to commit 
crimes for her but also her desperate need for money, which also led her in this 
case to arrange for Eldridge’s murder so she could collect on the insurance policy 
on his life.  The trial court instructed the jury that the evidence was admitted only 
for the purpose of establishing a possible motive for the murder of Eldridge, and 
not to prove that defendant had a bad character or a predisposition to commit 
crimes.   
 
 
51
Defendant contends the trial court violated her right to due process by 
admitting La Chance’s testimony because the evidence that she suggested to La 
Chance that they steal Betty La Porte’s ring and embezzle funds from the La 
Portes’ bank account had no logical tendency to show that defendant had Eldridge 
killed to get insurance proceeds and the house she held in joint tenancy with him. 
Generally, evidence of a defendant’s poverty or indebtedness is inadmissible 
to establish a motive to commit robbery or theft, “because reliance on poverty 
alone as evidence of motive is deemed unfair to the defendant, and the probative 
value of such evidence is considered outweighed by the risk of prejudice.”  
(People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 939.)  Evidence that a defendant 
committed other crimes may be admitted when relevant to establish a motive for 
the commission of the charged offense or a common plan or design (Evid. Code, 
§ 1101, subd. (b); People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 393-394), but only if the 
offenses share common features (People v. Ewoldt, supra, at pp. 402-403).  We do 
not need to decide here, however, whether the trial court erred in admitting the 
evidence because its admission did not prejudice defendant.  The testimony was 
relatively brief and the trial court limited its prejudicial impact by instructing the 
jury that the evidence was not admissible to prove bad character or predisposition 
to commit crimes.  (See People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637.) 
Defendant also argues that the trial court should have excluded La Chance’s 
testimony because he was an accomplice to the acts of misconduct about which he 
testified, and his testimony was not corroborated.  We disagree.  For purposes of 
the corroboration requirement, an accomplice is “one who is liable to prosecution 
for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in 
which the testimony of the accomplice is given.”  (§ 1111.)  Because La Chance 
had nothing to do with the earlier attempted murder and the later murder of 
Stephen Eldridge, the only crimes charged here, he could not be prosecuted for 
 
 
52
those crimes, and thus he was not an accomplice whose testimony required 
corroboration. 
Finally, defendant contends that La Chance’s testimony was inadmissible 
because his testimony about defendant’s plan to steal money from the La Portes’ 
bank account constituted the crime of solicitation to commit grand theft, an 
offense that must be proven either by the testimony of two witnesses, or by one 
witness whose testimony is corroborated.  (§ 653f, subd. (f).)  But the proof 
requirements of section 653f are inapplicable here.  For the prosecution offered La 
Chance’s testimony not to prove a violation of section 653f, but to show 
defendant’s tendency to have others commit crimes for her and to show her 
desperate need for money, evidence the prosecution argued was relevant in this 
case. 
G.  Cumulative Effect of Alleged Errors 
Defendant argues that her convictions for attempted murder and murder 
should be reversed because of the cumulative effect of the errors at the guilt phase.  
We disagree.  Whether considered separately or in combination, the few errors that 
occurred during the guilt phase of defendant’s trial, all of which we discussed 
earlier, did not prejudice defendant and therefore do not require reversal. 
IV.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Corroboration of Aggravating Evidence 
Accomplice James Luna testified as a prosecution witness at the penalty 
phase.  He said that defendant had asked him to beat up Dewayne Bell so she 
could replace Bell as a caretaker for Lee La Porte, an invalid.  Luna took two men 
with him to Bell’s apartment where they beat Bell and cut his face.  They fled 
when Bell started screaming.  Defendant contends the trial court should not have 
admitted Luna’s testimony because it was not corroborated. 
 
 
53
When, as here, the prosecution calls a witness to testify at the penalty phase 
about the defendant’s prior violent conduct, there must be corroboration of that 
testimony.  (People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 461.)  The jury was so 
instructed here.  As we have observed, corroborating evidence may be slight and 
entirely circumstantial.  (People v. Szeto, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 27.)  It must tend 
to implicate the defendant by relating to some act or fact that is an element of the 
crime, but it need not be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the crime.  
It is sufficient if it substantiates enough of the accomplice’s testimony to establish 
his credibility.  The finding of the trier of fact on the issue of corroboration is 
binding on a reviewing court unless the evidence should not have been admitted or 
it does not reasonably tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the 
crime.  (Ibid.) 
Here, Luna’s penalty phase testimony was adequately corroborated by the 
testimony of Dewayne Bell, who testified as a prosecution witness at the penalty 
phase.  Bell described the three individuals who attacked him as a Hispanic man 
and two Black men.  Bell recalled that defendant had previously introduced him to 
one of the Black men who had attacked him.  When Bell saw Luna in the 
courtroom, Bell recognized him as another person that defendant had introduced 
him to and he said that Luna “look[ed] similar” to the Hispanic individual who had 
attacked him.  Additional corroboration was provided by evidence of the plan’s 
success in having Bell replaced by defendant as caretaker of the invalid Lee La 
Porte:  After the attack on Bell, the La Portes discharged him and hired defendant. 
B.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct 
during her closing argument at the penalty phase by:  (1) using inflammatory 
epithets, (2) arguing the absence of mitigation evidence was aggravating, (3) 
implying defense counsel fabricated evidence, (4) making references to the Bible, 
 
 
54
(5) misstating the law, (6) misstating the evidence, (7) arguing defendant’s 
character as aggravating, (8) engaging in bad faith by arguing defendant would be 
dangerous in prison, (9) making a plea to impose the death penalty based upon gut 
instinct, and (10) asserting that defendant was more deserving of the death penalty 
because she is a woman.  At trial, defendant objected only to the first three of 
these claimed instances of prosecutorial misconduct. 
Generally, “ ‘a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial 
misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the same ground—the defendant 
made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to 
disregard the impropriety.’ ”  (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.)  This 
general rule, however, does not apply if a defendant’s objection or request for 
admonition would have been futile or would not have cured the harm caused by 
the misconduct; nor does it apply when the trial court promptly overrules an 
objection and the defendant has no opportunity to request an admonition.  (Ibid.)  
Defendant here fails to show that any of these exceptions applies to any of the 
seven instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct to which she did not object at 
trial.  Thus, she may not now raise these claims. 
Arguing that we should excuse her trial counsel from the legal obligation to 
object to prosecutorial misconduct, defendant cites our decision in People v. Hill, 
supra, 17 Cal.4th 800.  Defendant’s reliance on Hill is misplaced, however.  There 
the prosecutor subjected the defense “to a constant barrage of . . . unethical 
conduct, including misstating the evidence, sarcastic and critical comments 
demeaning defense counsel, and propounding outright falsehoods,” and the trial 
court consistently failed to curb the prosecutor’s excesses.  (Id. at p. 821.)  Such 
egregious conduct did not occur here.  
We also reject defendant’s claim that her trial counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct.  Because the record does not 
 
 
55
show the reasons for counsel’s actions, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance 
is more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding.  (People v. Mendoza 
Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.) 
1.  Epithets 
At the penalty phase, the prosecutor began her closing argument to the jury 
with these comments:  “The time has now arrived for us to . . . look exactly at 
what one human being did to another.  [¶]  And I use the term human being in a 
literal sense because I’m not so sure that Maureen McDermott really should be 
categorized as a human being.  [¶]  Because human beings have a heart and human 
beings have a soul.  And nobody with a heart and nobody with a soul could have 
done what Maureen McDermott has done in this case.” 
The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection that it was improper for 
the prosecutor to argue that defendant was not a human being.  The court 
explained that the prosecutor did not use the word “animal,” adding that “it’s 
proper for a prosecutor to argue what someone did was inhumane or inhuman.” 
As we have said, we do not condone the use of opprobrious terms in 
argument, but such epithets are not necessarily misconduct when they are 
reasonably warranted by the evidence.  (People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 
961; People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 180.)  Here, the prosecutor’s 
remarks, which the trial court understood as referring to conduct by defendant that 
was inhumane, did not exceed the permissible scope of closing argument in view 
of the evidence presented of, among other things, defendant’s deliberate and cold-
blooded planning of the killing of Stephen Eldridge.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Hawkins, supra, at p. 961 [finding no prosecutorial misconduct in describing the 
defendant as “coiled like a snake” and in comparing the act of sentencing 
defendant to life in prison as akin to “putting a rabid dog in the pound”]; People v. 
 
 
56
Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1249 [reference to the defendant as a “human 
monster” and a “mutation”].) 
Defendant also cites as improper the prosecutor’s comments in closing 
argument describing defendant as “a mutation of a human being,” a “wolf in 
sheep’s clothing,” a “traitor,” a person who “stalked people like animals,” and 
someone who had “resigned from the human race.”  Because defendant did not 
object to these remarks or request an admonition at trial, she may not now 
challenge these statements.  (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 820.)  
Moreover, when considered in the context of the planning and execution of 
Eldridge’s murder, these references are within the permissible bounds of 
argument, and in any event would not have had such an impact “as to make it 
likely the jury’s decision was rooted in passion rather than evidence.”  (People v. 
Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 537.) 
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by comparing 
her to a Nazi working in the crematorium by day and listening to Mozart by night.  
We find no misconduct in these remarks.  The prosecutor was not comparing 
defendant’s conduct in arranging Eldridge’s murder with the genocidal actions of 
the Nazi regime.  Rather, the prosecutor was arguing that human beings sometimes 
lead double lives, showing a refined sensitivity in some activities while 
demonstrating barbaric cruelty in others.  In the context of this case, where the 
evidence showed defendant to be both a caring and competent nurse and a person 
capable of plotting a brutal murder, the argument was appropriate. 
 
Finally, defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
comparing defendant to a germ, a mad dog, and a snake.  These remarks were a 
permissible form of argument designed to show the circumstances in which 
society may be justified in taking one life to protect the lives of others.  (People v. 
 
 
57
Hawkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 961; People v. Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 
537; People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1249.) 
 
2.  Alleged Davenport error 
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly argued that the absence of 
statutory mitigating factors made the crime more aggravated.  (See People v. 
Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290.)  Not so.  When the prosecutor 
discussed the statutory mitigating factors, she merely noted their absence in this 
case.  She did not argue that this absence transformed the mitigating factors into 
aggravating factors.  This argument was proper.  (People v. Millwee (1998) 18 
Cal.4th 96, 152; People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1064.) 
3.  Claim that prosecutor implied fabrication of evidence by defense 
counsel 
Defendant complains about a comment the prosecutor made in closing 
argument when, after urging the jury not to extend sympathy to defendant, the 
prosecutor said:  “It is the job of the defense attorneys in this case to create 
sympathy during this phase for Maureen McDermott just like in the guilt phase it’s 
their job to argue that she is not involved in these crimes.”  (Italics added.)  The 
trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection that the prosecutor’s use of the 
word “create” implied that defense counsel would present arguments without any 
evidentiary basis.  The court found nothing in the prosecutor’s comment 
suggesting fabrication of evidence by defense counsel for the purpose of 
portraying defendant as a person deserving of the jury’s sympathy.  We agree that, 
viewed in context, the prosecutor’s comment did not impugn the integrity of the 
defense. 
C.  Instruction on Accomplice Punishment 
At the guilt phase of the trial, the prosecutor told the jury that accomplices 
Marvin and Dondell Lee had received immunity from prosecution for the murder 
 
 
58
of Stephen Eldridge, and that accomplice James Luna agreed to a plea bargain 
under which, in return for his truthful testimony at defendant’s trial, he was to 
receive a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole for his role in 
Eldridge’s murder. 
At the penalty phase of the trial, over defense objection, the trial court 
granted the prosecution’s request to instruct the jury in this language:  “You may 
not consider either the punishment or absence of punishment for the following 
accomplices:  James Luna, Marvin Lee and Dondell Lee in determining the 
appropriate penalty for the defendant Maureen McDermott in this case.”  In 
discussing the matter with counsel for both parties, the trial court stressed that the 
instruction did not preclude defense counsel from mentioning the sentence or 
absence of sentence for any of the accomplices, but the court barred defense 
counsel from arguing to the jury that the punishment or the absence of punishment 
for the accomplices would justify leniency for defendant by not rendering a verdict 
of death against her. 
Defendant contends that this instruction was improper because:  (1) the 
instruction nullified the trial court’s instruction on sympathy as sympathy for 
defendant would “naturally” be aroused by the disparate punishment given the 
accomplices; (2) this court has never held that the defense may not ask a jury to 
show mercy to a defendant in light of the punishment given the accomplices; (3) 
the instruction was fundamentally unfair because the prosecutor at the guilt phase 
was allowed to argue the life sentence given to Luna and the complete immunity 
granted to both of the Lee brothers were morally justified; and (4) the instruction 
made the judgment of death arbitrary and capricious as well as unreliable in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  We disagree. 
We have consistently held that evidence of an accomplice’s sentence is 
irrelevant at the penalty phase because “it does not shed any light on the 
 
 
59
circumstances of the offense or the defendant’s character, background, history or 
mental condition.”  (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 63; see also People v. 
Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1183, fn. 26.)  Nothing in the challenged 
instruction precluded the jury from considering sympathy for defendant in 
deciding the appropriate punishment for her crimes.  Nor did the instruction 
nullify the standard instruction the court gave on sympathy, which provides that 
the jury may “consider sympathy or pity” for a defendant as a mitigating factor. 
Citing the high court’s decision in Parker v. Dugger (1991) 498 U.S. 308, 
defendant argues “evidence of disparity of sentencing is indeed mitigating 
evidence and closing argument which emphasizes the disparity is appropriate.”  
We rejected a similar contention in People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at page 63:  
“. . . Parker did not hold evidence of an accomplice’s sentence must be introduced 
in mitigation at the penalty phase, or that a comparison between sentences given 
codefendants is required.  [Citation.]  The Parker court merely concluded a 
Florida trial judge, in sentencing the defendant to death, had in fact considered the 
nonstatutory mitigating evidence of the accomplice’s sentence, as under Florida 
law he was entitled to do.  [Citation.]  Parker does not state or imply the Florida 
rule is constitutionally required, and California law is to the contrary; we have 
held such evidence irrelevant because it does not shed any light on the 
circumstances of the offense or the defendant’s character, background, history or 
mental condition.  [Citations.]” 
D.  Claim of Cumulative Error 
We reject defendant’s contention that the cumulative effect of errors at the 
penalty phase requires reversal of the death judgment.  As we have shown, there 
was no error. 
 
 
60
E.  Automatic Motion to Modify the Verdict 
“Under section 190.4, subdivision (e), a capital defendant is deemed to have 
automatically applied for a sentence modification.  In ruling on the application, the 
trial judge must independently reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances and determine whether, in the judge’s independent judgment, the 
weight of the evidence supports the jury verdict.”  (People v. Mincey, supra, 2 
Cal.4th at p. 477.) 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in considering the circumstances of 
the crimes and the assault on Dewayne Bell in ruling on the automatic motion to 
modify the verdict of death.  Defendant asserts that the trial court “did not 
appreciate the well-settled law regarding the accomplice corroboration rule.”  Not 
so.  Defendant’s argument assumes that her earlier contentions at both the guilt 
and penalty phases regarding accomplice corroboration were correct, and that the 
prosecution failed to present adequate corroborating evidence.  We have rejected 
those arguments.  The trial court’s statement on the record when it denied the 
motion shows that it independently reweighed the evidence and determined that 
the weight of the evidence supported the jury’s verdict.  (See People v. Rodrigues, 
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1196.)  No more was required. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
61
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. McDermott 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S016081 
Date Filed: August 12, 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Alan B. Haber 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Steffan Imhoff and Verna Wefald, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin 
Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez, Lori R. Mars, Susan Lee Frierson, John R. Gorey and 
G. Tracey Letteau, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Steffan Imhoff 
1307 Stratford Court 
Del Mar, CA  92014 
(858) 793-9097 
 
Verna Wefald 
35 South Raymond Avenue, Suite 420 
Pasadena, CA  91105 
(626) 432-5100 
 
G. Tracey Letteau 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2356