Case Title: State v. Dennis L. Richardson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1995AP000501-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
95-0501-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Dennis L. Richardson, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed: 
 
June 17, l997  
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
December 5, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
 
STANLEY A. MILLER 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Diane M. Nicks, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Robert N. Meyeroff, Milwaukee.
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-0501-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Dennis L. Richardson, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 17, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.  The petitioner, State of Wisconsin 
("State"), seeks review of a decision of the court of appeals, 
State v. Richardson, No. 95-0501-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1996), which reversed the judgment of the 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Stanley A. Miller, Judge.  A 
jury found the defendant-appellant, Dennis L. Richardson, guilty 
of five counts of second degree sexual assault of a child and 
one count of false imprisonment.  The court of appeals concluded 
that the circuit court had erroneously exercised its discretion 
in granting the prosecution’s motion in limine, which prevented 
Richardson from presenting a "frame-up" defense.  The court of 
appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a 
new trial.  We reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
On review, we consider (1) whether the "legitimate 
tendency" test set forth in State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 
N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1984), should be adopted for determining the 
admissibility 
of 
frame-up 
defense 
evidence, 
(2) 
whether 
Richardson's frame-up evidence was relevant pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 904.02 (1995-96)1 and Wis. Stat. § 904.01,2  and (3) 
whether the frame-up evidence should have been excluded under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.033 because the probative value of the evidence 
was substantially outweighed by the dangers of confusion of the 
issues and misleading the jury, and by considerations of undue 
delay and waste of time.
4  We conclude that there is no need to 
                     
1  Unless otherwise indicated, all future statutory references 
are to the 1995-96 volume.  Wis. Stat. § 904.02 provides: 
904.02 Relevant evidence generally admissible; 
irrelevant evidence inadmissible.  All relevant 
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the constitutions of the United States 
and the State of Wisconsin, by statute, by these 
rules, or by other rules adopted by the supreme 
court.  Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
2  Wis. Stat. § 904.01 states: 
904.01 Definition of "relevant evidence".  
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. 
 
3  Wis. Stat. § 904.03 states: 
904.03 Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds 
of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.  
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
4
   It is unclear whether the circuit court granted the 
State's motion in limine to exclude Richardson's frame-up 
evidence  because it found that the evidence was not relevant or 
because the probative value of the evidence was substantially 
outweighed, or both.  In its ruling on the State’s motion in 
limine, the circuit court stated: 
 
I think there is some evidentiary issues around number 
4 and around number 5.  I don’t think it’s relevance. 
 I don’t think the probative value of allowing that 
testimony in, as you have described it to me, would be 
outweighed by both.  It’s unreliable, and I don’t 
adopt the "legitimate tendency" test for admission of frame-up 
defense evidence, that the frame-up evidence is relevant 
pursuant to § 904.02 and § 904.01, and that the circuit court 
properly excluded the evidence under § 904.03 because the 
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by 
the dangers of confusion of the issues and misleading the jury 
and by considerations of undue delay and waste of time.
 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On December 9, 
1993, Richardson was charged in Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
with the December 4, 1993, sexual assault of fourteen-year-old 
Nicole K.  The amended information charged Richardson with five 
counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of false 
imprisonment. 
¶4 
Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine.  The 
motion in limine sought to exclude from evidence the telephone 
                                                                  
think it would be particularly illuminating for the 
jury. 
 
The court of appeals apparently concluded that the circuit court 
based its exclusion of the frame-up evidence on a finding that 
the evidence was not relevant: 
 
Because the trial court incorrectly decided that the 
testimony was not relevant, however, the parties did 
not fully address the considerations inherent in 
§ 904.03 nor did the court exercise the discretion its 
application requires. 
 
Richardson, unpublished slip op. at 5. We are unable to 
determine the basis for the circuit court's ruling.  Thus, we 
must make an independent determination of whether there were 
appropriate grounds to exclude the evidence.  State v. Pharr, 
115 Wis. 2d 334, 343, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983)("where the trial 
court fails to set forth its reasoning in exercising its 
discretion to admit evidence, the appellate court should 
independently review the record to determine whether it provides 
a basis for the trial court's exercise of discretion."); Hammen 
v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 791, 800, 275 N.W.2d 709 (1979)("this court 
will uphold a discretionary decision of the trial court if the 
record contains facts which would support the trial court's 
decision had it fully exercised its discretion."); see also 
State v. Peters, 192 Wis. 2d 674, 696, 534 N.W.2d 867 (Ct. App. 
1995); State v. Holt, 128 Wis. 2d 110, 124-25, 382 N.W.2d 679 
(1985).  
call from Richardson's estranged wife, Cindee Richardson, to 
Richardson’s divorce attorney, in 
which Cindee 
Richardson 
accused Richardson of having sex with a fourteen year old, two 
days prior to the assault of Nicole K.  The State also sought to 
exclude any reference to the fact that Richardson had obtained a 
restraining order against Cindee on the ground that the evidence 
was not relevant.
5 
¶5 
At the hearing on the motion in limine, it was 
established that at the time of the sexual assault Richardson 
and his estranged wife, Cindee Richardson, were in the process 
of divorcing and were in a dispute over the custody of their 
children.  Richardson had obtained a restraining order on 
December 2, 1993, barring Cindee Richardson from seeing the 
couple's children. 
¶6 
Richardson’s proposed theory of defense was that his 
estranged wife was "framing" him for this sexual assault because 
he had filed for divorce and had obtained a restraining order.  
Richardson claimed that Cindee Richardson had told his divorce 
attorney on December 2, 1993, that Richardson had sex with a 
fourteen year old.  Richardson asserted that this remark, made 
                     
5
  Richardson objected to the circuit court’s issuance of orders 
requested in Items 4 and 5 in the motion in limine.  
Specifically, Items 4 and 5 sought: 
4. An order excluding from evidence any statements 
made 
by 
the 
defendant’s 
estranged 
wife, 
Cindee 
Richardson, to the defendant’s attorney during the 
course of their divorce proceedings, including any 
allegations 
made 
by 
Cindee 
Richardson 
that 
the 
defendant had molested a young girl, on the ground 
that such evidence was hearsay.  Wis. Stats. § 908.02. 
 
5. An order excluding from evidence any reference to 
the fact that the defendant had sought and obtained a 
Child Abuse Injunction against his estranged wife, 
Cindee Richardson, during 
the pendency 
of 
their 
divorce, 
on 
the 
ground 
that 
such 
evidence 
was 
irrelevant.  Wis. Stats. § 904.02. 
prior to the alleged sexual assault on December 4, 1993, was 
evidence of the attempted frame-up by Cindee Richardson. 
¶7 
Richardson further asserted that actions by Nicole 
K.'s mother Mary K. supported his frame-up defense.  He pointed 
out that on the day of the alleged assault Mary K. had talked to 
Cindee Richardson.  In addition, Cindee Richardson gave Mary K. 
the telephone number of Richardson’s attorney.  Mary K. 
subsequently called Richardson’s attorney to report the sexual 
assault.  Mary K. denied making this telephone call until 
confronted with records from the telephone company. 
 
¶8 
In response to Richardson's arguments, the State 
pointed out the problems involved in admitting these items into 
evidence.  The State asserted that the defense would be unable 
to produce admissible evidence in support of his theory of 
conspiracy to fabricate between Cindee Richardson, Mary K., and 
Nicole K.  In addition, Cindee Richardson was not a witness in 
the trial or in any other way connected to the incident, and her 
motivations were not at issue in the sexual assault trial.  The 
State also contended that admitting the estranged wife’s 
statement 
would 
open 
the 
door 
to 
testimony 
from 
Cindee 
Richardson in which she would state her knowledge of at least 
three prior incidents of sexual contact between Richardson and 
young girls.  To prevent the trial from degenerating into a 
trial of multiple collateral issues, the State urged the circuit 
court to grant its motion in limine to exclude the evidence 
relating to the defendant’s frame-up evidence.  The circuit 
court granted the State’s motion in limine, and thereby excluded 
both Cindee Richardson’s statement to the divorce attorney and 
evidence of Richardson’s restraining order against his estranged 
wife.   
¶9 
At trial, it was established that Richardson had hired 
Nicole K., who lived on his block, to baby-sit for his two sons 
on December 4, 1993.  According to Nicole K.’s testimony, after 
she arrived at Richardson's house he showed her a bedroom and 
told her that she could sleep there if he was out late; he said 
he would sleep downstairs on the couch.  Nicole K. also 
testified that she did go to sleep in the bedroom that night, 
and that sometime after she fell asleep Richardson got into bed 
with her.  She further testified that he removed her bra and 
underwear and sexually assaulted her.  After Richardson fell 
asleep, Nicole K. dressed and ran home, but left her bra and 
underwear behind. 
¶10 Nicole K.'s twelve-year-old sister, Christine K., 
testified that Nicole K. arrived home at 2:15 a.m. on December 
5, 1993.  Christine described Nicole K. as running in the house, 
screaming and crying and shaking.  She stated that Nicole K. 
told her that Richardson had raped her.  Christine ran to her 
mother, Mary K., woke her and told her what had happened.  Mary 
K. then called the police and her husband. 
¶11 Mary K. testified about the emotional and physical 
trauma that Nicole K. experienced after the assault.  In 
addition to weekly counseling, Nicole K. needed emergency room 
and other medical treatment for vaginal bleeding, burning caused 
by the healing hymenal lacerations, bruised rectal tissue, and 
sharp stomach pains.  Medical treatments prescribed included 
special 
soaps 
for 
washing 
the 
injured 
genital 
areas, 
tranquilizers and sedatives. 
¶12 Sally Eiler, a nurse at the Sexual Assault Treatment 
Center, testified about the evidence taken from Nicole K. and 
the injuries to her vaginal area.  She found two fresh tears in 
the hymen, one on the left and another on the right side of 
Nicole K.'s vaginal opening.  Nurse Eiler also found a blood 
blister on the vaginal lip.  Nurse Eiler testified that these 
injuries were consistent with forceful trauma to the area and 
that pain would accompany the infliction of such injuries. 
¶13 City of Milwaukee Police Detective Dale Jackson was 
the officer who responded to Mary K.'s call to the police and 
who went to Richardson's residence.  He found one dildo in the 
night-stand, another on the floor next to the bed, and a 
vibrator in the closet.  He also found a pair of female 
underwear at the bottom of the bed next to the vibrator.  In a 
clothes basket, underneath a robe that had been worn by 
Richardson when detective Jackson first arrived at the house, 
the detective found Nicole K.'s bra. 
¶14 Richardson's 
bed-sheets, 
the 
victim's 
shirt, 
her 
bicycle shorts and a vaginal swab were all positive for semen.  
The semen was tested and the blood and enzyme markers were found 
to be consistent with those of Richardson.  Hairs that were 
consistent with Nicole K.'s hair and other hairs that were 
consistent with the defendant's hair were found in the bed-
sheets. 
¶15 Richardson denied having any sexual contact with the 
victim and insisted that he slept on the couch downstairs that 
night.  The jury, however, found Richardson guilty on all 
counts, and he was sentenced to a thirty-year prison term and 
consecutive probationary sentences.  The circuit court denied 
Richardson’s post-conviction motion for sentence reduction, and 
Richardson appealed from the judgment of conviction and the 
order denying sentence modification. 
¶16 In his appeal, Richardson argued that the circuit 
court had erroneously ruled on the motion in limine, thereby 
precluding him from presenting evidence of a conspiracy to frame 
him for the sexual assault.  The court of appeals agreed with 
Richardson in concluding that the circuit court had erroneously 
exercised its discretion in excluding the proffered testimony.  
The 
appellate 
court 
reversed 
Richardson’s 
conviction 
and 
remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.  The State 
petitioned for review and we granted the petition on May 7, 
1996. 
 
I. 
¶17 The first issue that we consider is whether the 
"legitimate tendency" test set forth in Denny should be adopted 
for determining the admissibility of frame-up defense evidence. 
 In Denny, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder 
following a jury trial.  The defendant argued that he was denied 
his constitutional right to present a defense when the circuit 
court refused to allow evidence suggesting that any one of a 
number of third parties had motive and opportunity to murder the 
victim.  Id. at 617.  The circuit court ruled that such evidence 
was irrelevant. 
¶18 The court of appeals in Denny affirmed the decision of 
the circuit court, but adopted a legitimate tendency test for 
allowing the introduction of third-party defense evidence.  The 
Denny court stated: 
 
In other words, there must be a “legitimate tendency” 
that the third person could have committed the 
crime.  . . .   The “legitimate tendency” test asks 
whether the proffered evidence is so remote in time, 
place or circumstances that a direct connection cannot 
be made between the third person and the crime.  Thus, 
as long as motive and opportunity have been shown and 
as long as there is also some evidence to directly 
connect a third person to the crime charged which is 
not remote in time, place or circumstances, the 
evidence should be admissible. 
Id. at 623-24 (citation omitted).  The State argues that this 
legitimate tendency test should be adopted in this case for 
evidence of frame-up defenses.  The State asserts that the 
legitimate tendency test would ensure that the jury's attention 
is not diverted to collateral issues.  
¶19 We see no reason to adopt the legitimate tendency 
test. Richardson's proposed defense alleged that the victim was 
lying in an effort to frame him, not that someone else had 
committed the crime.  Thus, Denny is not applicable to this 
case. In addition, we believe that, when properly applied, 
Wisconsin’s existing rules of evidence ensure that a the jury is 
not confused and that the attention of jurors is not diverted to 
collateral issues.  As there is neither a legal basis nor a 
compelling reason to apply the legitimate tendency test under 
the circumstances of this case, we hold that the legitimate 
tendency test is not applicable to the introduction of frame-up 
evidence.6 
 
II. 
¶20 The 
next 
issue 
that 
we 
consider 
is 
whether 
Richardson's frame-up evidence should have been excluded because 
it was not relevant.  Evidence that is relevant is generally 
admissible.  Wis. Stat. § 904.02.  Relevant evidence is evidence 
that has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more or less 
probable.  Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  Thus, we must determine (1) 
                     
6  We do not consider whether the "legitimate tendency" test is 
an appropriate standard for the introduction of third-party 
defense evidence.  
whether the frame-up evidence concerned a fact of consequence to 
the determination of the action, and (2) if it did concern such 
a fact whether it made the existence of that fact more or less 
probable. 
¶21 Elements 
of 
the 
charge 
are 
certainly 
facts 
of 
consequence to the determination of the action.  Richardson was 
charged and convicted of five counts of second degree sexual 
assault of a child pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2)7 and one 
count of false imprisonment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 940.30.8  
The elements of the sexual assault charge include having sexual 
contact with a person who has not reached the age of sixteen.  
The false imprisonment charge is composed of the intentional 
confinement or restraint of another without that person's 
consent. 
¶22 The premise for the proffered frame-up evidence was 
that Cindee Richardson, Nicole K., and Mary K. had conspired to 
fabricate the crime.  Thus, the proffered evidence was intended 
to suggest that Richardson did not engage in sexual contact with 
Nicole K. and that he had not confined or restrained her.  This 
evidence would have directly pertained to the elements of the 
charges and thus concerned a fact of consequence to the 
determination of this action. 
                     
7  Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) provides: 
(2) SECOND DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT.  Whoever has sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse with a person who 
has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of 
a Class C felony. 
 
8  Wis. Stat. § 940.30 provides: 
940.30 False imprisonment.  Whoever intentionally 
confines or restrains another without the person's 
consent and with knowledge that he or she has no 
lawful authority to do so is guilty of a Class E 
felony. 
¶23 We must next determine whether the proffered frame-up 
evidence would have had any tendency to make the consequential 
fact more or less probable.  If the evidence would have had any 
tendency to make it less probable that Richardson sexually 
assaulted and falsely imprisoned Nicole K., then it should not 
have been excluded by the circuit court on the basis of 
relevancy.  The "any tendency" standard reflects the broad 
definition of relevancy and the resulting low threshold for the 
introduction of evidence that the relevancy definition creates. 
¶24 The 
intention 
to 
broadly 
define 
relevance 
is 
illustrated by the Judicial Council note to Wis. Stat. § 904.02: 
"[t]he criterion of relevancy is whether or not the evidence 
adduced tends to cast any light upon the subject of the 
inquiry."  Judicial Council Committee's Note, W.S.A. 904.01 
(quoting Oseman v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 523, 526, 145 N.W.2d 766 
(1966)).  This court has also recognized that relevance is 
defined broadly. State v. Hungerford, 84 Wis. 2d 236, 257, 267 
N.W.2d 258 (1978), ("[t]he Judicial Council Committee's Note to 
sec. 904.01 indicates that the rule was intended to broadly 
define relevancy."); State v. Alles, 106 Wis. 2d 368, 381 n. 4, 
316 N.W.2d 378 (1982) ("[W]hile the evidence introduced at trial 
may not have been the most probative evidence available, it was 
nevertheless relevant.").  Thus, there is a strong presumption 
that proffered evidence is relevant. 
¶25 In light of the broad definition of relevance, we 
believe that the frame-up evidence would have had some tendency, 
however small, to make it less probable that Richardson sexually 
assaulted and falsely imprisoned Nicole K.  In other words, the 
frame-up evidence would have had some tendency to make the 
existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action less probable.  Thus, we hold that the circuit 
court should have ruled that the frame-up evidence was relevant. 
  However, not all evidence that is relevant should be admitted 
at trial. 
III. 
¶26 The last issue that we consider is whether the frame-
up evidence should have been excluded pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 
904.03 
because 
the 
probative 
value 
of 
the 
evidence 
was 
substantially outweighed by the dangers of confusion of the 
issues and misleading the jury and by considerations of undue 
delay and waste of time.  Evidence that is relevant and 
otherwise admissible may nevertheless be excluded under Wis. 
Stat. § 904.03.  The circuit court may exclude such evidence if 
the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  § 
904.03. 
¶27 Accordingly, we must first consider the relative 
probative value of the frame-up evidence.  The value of the 
proffered evidence is slight.  For the evidence to be compelling 
the jury must (1) believe that the ex-wife, the mother of the 
Nicole K., and Nicole K. all conspired to falsely incriminate 
Richardson, (2) overlook the physical evidence of the crime 
found at Richardson's house, (3) disregard the fact the semen 
consistent with Richardson's was found on Nicole K.'s shirt, 
shorts and a vaginal swab, and (4) believe that the injuries to 
Nicole K. were self-inflicted.  Based on these factors, we 
believe that, although relevant, the frame-up evidence is of 
little probative value. 
¶28 Next, we must determine whether that probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the dangers of confusion of the 
issues or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue 
delay and waste of time.  Because we have determined that the 
probative value of the frame-up evidence is relatively slight, 
it follows that the level of dangers and considerations needed 
to 
substantially 
outweigh 
that 
probative 
value 
is 
correspondingly lower. 
¶29 Allowing the introduction of the frame-up evidence 
would have would have lead to a substantial waste of time on 
collateral issues.  These collateral issues included whether 
Cindee Richardson made a remark to Richardson's divorce attorney 
about a sexual assault that Richardson allegedly committed, and 
whether the remark, if made, referred to a previous sexual 
assault of a fourteen year old by Richardson.  This could have 
also led to the introduction of the other acts evidence, 
previously held as inadmissible, to rebut the suggestion that 
the remark was fabricated.  The trial would likely have 
deteriorated into an airing of past disputes and problems 
between Richardson and his estranged wife.  Such a diversion 
would have distracted the jury from the central issue of 
Richardson's guilt or innocence.  Introduction of the frame-up 
evidence also presented the danger of confusing the jury's 
consideration of other evidence with a higher probative value.  
We believe these factors would have substantially outweighed the 
slight probative value of the frame-up evidence and that the 
evidence could have been excluded under Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  
Thus, we hold that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it excluded the frame-up evidence. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.