Case Title: State ex rel. Citizens for Responsible Green Government v. City of Green

Citation: 2018-Ohio-3489

Docket Number: 2018-1091

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Citizens for Responsible Green Govt. v. Green, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3489.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-3489 
THE STATE EX REL. CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE GREEN GOVERNMENT v. 
THE CITY OF GREEN ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Citizens for Responsible Green Govt. v. Green, Slip 
Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3489.] 
Elections—Mandamus—Laches bars relief requested due to relator’s failure to act 
with diligence in filing complaint 92 days before election—Cause 
dismissed. 
(No. 2018-1091—Submitted August 24, 2018—Decided August 30, 2018.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relator, Citizens for Responsible Green 
Government (“the committee”), seeks a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, 
city of Green, Green Finance Director Steven Schmidt, and the Summit County 
Board of Elections, to place a referendum on the November 6, 2018 general-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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election ballot.  For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss the complaint based on 
laches and deny the committee’s motion for leave to supplement the evidence. 
The evidence in the record 
{¶ 2} The present case arises from the efforts of Nexus Gas Transmission, 
L.L.C. (“Nexus”), to construct an interstate natural-gas pipeline system, which 
would run through the city.  On August 25, 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission issued a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Nexus, 
authorizing construction of an interstate natural-gas pipeline.  On September 19, 
2017, the director of the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency issued a Section 
401 Water Quality Certification for the project.  See Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1341. 
{¶ 3} Nexus sought to obtain easements and rights of way through the city 
to allow for construction of the pipeline.  But the city opposed the project.  The city 
appealed the director’s decision to the Environmental Review Appeals Commission 
and separately petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
to review the director’s issuance of the certification.  Green v. Ohio Environmental 
Protection Agency, 6th Cir. No. 17-4016. 
{¶ 4} Meanwhile, on October 2, 2017, Nexus filed in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio a complaint seeking an order of 
condemnation of permanent and temporary easements across multiple parcels of 
privately owned land.1  Nexus Gas Transm., L.L.C. v. Green, N.D.Ohio No. 5:17-
                                                 
1  
When any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot 
acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the 
compensation to be paid for, the necessary right-of-way to construct, operate, and 
maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the transportation of natural gas, * * * it may 
acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district 
court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located, 
or in the State courts. 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
3
cv-02062-JRA.  On December 28, 2017, the court ruled that Nexus had the right to 
condemn easements through the city and issued a preliminary injunction 
authorizing Nexus to immediately possess certain properties for the limited 
purposes of conducting environmental and other surveys.  The city appealed the 
district court’s judgment to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 5} The city entered into a settlement agreement with Nexus, effective 
January 31, 2018, to resolve the litigation.  In return for Nexus’s payment of 
$7,500,000, the city agreed, among other things, to grant Nexus easement rights 
across certain properties. 
{¶ 6} On February 5, 2018, the city’s mayor introduced Resolution No. 
2018-R09, captioned “A Resolution Approving a Settlement of Pending Litigation, 
Authorizing the Mayor to Enter Into a Settlement Agreement and Related 
Documents Thereto, And Declaring An Emergency.”  “Section One” of the 
resolution approved the settlement agreement, which was attached as an exhibit and 
incorporated by reference.  “Section Four” declared an emergency and provided 
that the resolution would become effective immediately if approved by three-
fourths of the city-council members. 
{¶ 7} On February 7, 2018, the resolution passed by a four-to-three vote.  
Because it failed to garner three-fourths of the votes, however, it did not pass as an 
emergency matter.  See Green Codified Ordinances 4.10(A) (“Each emergency 
resolution and ordinance shall contain a statement of the necessity for such 
emergency action, and its enactment shall require the affirmative vote of three-
fourths (3/4) of the members of Council”).  So City Council Clerk Molly Kapeluck 
crossed out the words “And Declaring an Emergency” from the title, as well as the 
                                                 
15 U.S.C. 717f(h). 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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whole of Section Four, before the appropriate officials signed to indicate passage 
of the resolution. 
{¶ 8} On March 8, 2018, the committee submitted 71 part-petitions to 
Finance Director Schmidt, calling for a referendum on Resolution No. 2018-R09.  
Attached to each part-petition was a copy of the resolution as introduced, not the 
certified version containing the clerk’s cross-outs.  The copy of the resolution 
appended to the referendum petition also did not include three other components 
that were part of the certified version: the signatures of the city-council president, 
the mayor, and the city law director; the roll-call tabulation of the votes of city-
council members; and the settlement agreement. 
{¶ 9} On April 19, 2018, the Summit County Board of Elections validated 
1,284 petition signatures.  Of those, however, it called into question the validity of 
49 signatures, leaving the final decision on those signatures to city council.  The 
parties do not dispute that even the lower figure of 1,235 signatures would be 
sufficient for the referendum to qualify for the ballot. 
{¶ 10} Once a county board of elections certifies a sufficient number of 
signatures, the auditor or clerk of the municipality certifies the sufficiency and 
validity of the petition to the board, for placement of the referendum on the ballot.  
R.C. 731.29.  In Green, the finance director, as the fiscal officer for the city, is the 
equivalent of the auditor.  Green Codified Ordinances 6.3(B). 
{¶ 11} On June 11, 2018, Schmidt sent a letter to the director of the board 
of elections declining to certify the petition because he deemed it “facially invalid 
and insufficient.”  Schmidt characterized the petition as misleading because the 
attached copy of the resolution differed from the certified version of the resolution 
in the ways described above.  He also suggested the possibility that the underlying 
ordinance was an administrative action and therefore not subject to referendum. 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
5
Procedural history 
{¶ 12} The committee commenced this suit for a writ of mandamus on 
August 6, 2018.  The committee requested a writ of mandamus to (1) compel 
Schmidt to certify the petition to the board of elections for inclusion of the 
referendum on the next general-election ballot and (2) compel the board to place 
the referendum on the ballot.  We imposed an expedited briefing schedule pursuant 
to S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08.  153 Ohio St.3d 1457, 2018-Ohio-3132, 103 N.E.3d 834. 
{¶ 13} The committee filed its merit brief on August 10, three days before 
respondents’ answer was due.  Because of the committee’s early filing, the city and 
Schmidt (collectively, “the city”) moved for additional time to submit briefs and 
evidence, which we granted.  After the city filed its merit brief, the committee filed 
a reply brief along with a motion for leave to submit three additional exhibits into 
evidence.  The city filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion on August 21. 
{¶ 14} We have also received a merit brief from the board of elections as 
well as an amicus brief in support of respondents from Nexus. 
Legal analysis 
{¶ 15} To prevail in this mandamus case, the committee must establish, by 
clear and convincing evidence, a clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear 
legal duty on the part of the city and/or the board of elections to provide that relief, 
and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. 
Ebersole v. Powell City Council, 149 Ohio St.3d 501, 2017-Ohio-509, 75 N.E.3d 
1245, ¶ 10.  Given the proximity of the November election, the committee lacks an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Greene v. 
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 121 Ohio St.3d 631, 2009-Ohio-1716, 907 
N.E.2d 300, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 16} The city and amicus curiae contend that the committee’s complaint 
is barred by the doctrine of laches.  Laches may bar relief in an election-related 
matter if the party seeking relief has failed to act with the “ ‘utmost diligence.’ ”  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
State ex rel. Monroe v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 137 Ohio St.3d 62, 2013-
Ohio-4490, 997 N.E.2d 524, ¶ 30, quoting State ex rel. Fuller v. Medina Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 221, 2002-Ohio-5922, 778 N.E.2d 37, ¶ 7.  The 
elements of a laches defense are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting 
a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, 
of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.  State ex rel. Carrier v. 
Hilliard City Council, 144 Ohio St.3d 592, 2016-Ohio-155, 45 N.E.3d 1006, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 17} As noted, Schmidt, Green’s finance director, declared the 
referendum petition “facially invalid and insufficient” on June 11, 2018.  The 
committee filed this mandamus complaint on August 6, 56 days later.  The 
committee denies that there was any unreasonable delay because, it suggests, June 
11 is not the date on which the lapse of time should begin to be measured.  The 
committee asserts that it sent a letter to the interim law director on July 30, asking 
him to file suit against Schmidt pursuant to R.C. 733.59, and that it promptly filed 
suit six days later, after the interim law director had failed to respond to the letter.  
But the committee does not explain why it waited seven weeks before sending the 
demand letter. 
{¶ 18} Alternatively, the complaint appears to suggest that the committee 
either was unaware of the June 11 letter until much later or was affirmatively misled 
into believing that the city might change its position.  The complaint alleges that 
“[a]t no time did the City of Green inform [the committee] that the City was 
refusing to advance the referendum to the Board of Elections for placement on the 
ballot.”  But although it is true that the committee was not copied as a recipient on 
Schmidt’s June 11 letter, there is no evidence, or even an allegation, to suggest that 
it was unaware of the city’s decision until some date closer to the filing of the 
January Term, 2018 
 
7
complaint.2  To the contrary, in its reply brief, the committee admits that it was 
aware of the decision “on or about June 13.” 
{¶ 19} But despite conceding its contemporaneous awareness of the city’s 
decision, the committee contends that its inaction should be excused because it 
“was also aware that [Interim Law Director William] Chris directed the law firm of 
Brennan, Manna, and Diamond [“BMD”] to review and update its legal opinion on 
July 2, 2018.  As demonstrated in [the committee’s] Merit Brief, the legal opinion 
of July 2, 2018 by [BMD] was severely flawed.”  None of this information is 
substantiated by the record.  The record includes a copy of a May 16, 2018 legal 
opinion that BMD submitted to the city; it is attached to the city’s press release 
announcing the decision not to certify the petition.  But there is no reference to a 
second legal opinion from BMD in relator’s complaint or merit brief, nor, more 
importantly, is there any evidence that the committee relied on the prospect of a 
second opinion when it delayed filing suit—much less evidence to establish the 
reasonableness of that delay. 
{¶ 20} To try to remedy the absence of any evidence of a second legal 
opinion from BMD, the committee on August 20, 2018, filed a motion for leave to 
an additional, unauthenticated exhibit (proposed Exhibit 11) into evidence.  That 
exhibit purports to show that on June 28, 17 days after the date of Schmidt’s letter, 
Councilman Matt Shaughnessy sent an e-mail to Interim Law Director Chris 
containing “an official demand for a legal opinion regarding the assumptions used 
in the [BMD] legal opinion” regarding the validity of the petition.  Chris responded 
on July 2, noting that he had shared the request with BMD over the weekend.  Chris 
                                                 
2 The evidence submitted by the city includes two newspaper articles, both dated June 13, providing 
comments on the rejection of the petition from the committee’s attorney, thereby demonstrating the 
committee’s constructive knowledge.  However, a newspaper article containing a purported 
statement from the agent of an adverse party is hearsay and may not be considered as evidence.  
State ex rel. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 128 Ohio 
St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-625, 943 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 30. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
also indicated that he had shared the substance of Shaughnessy’s e-mail with 
Roderick Linton Belfance, L.L.P., another law firm hired by the city to provide 
legal guidance on this matter, and that the Roderick firm continued to agree with 
the legal opinion provided by BMD.  In an e-mail dated July 10, Chris clarified that 
the Roderick firm did not prepare a supplemental written opinion. 
{¶ 21} These e-mails, even if admitted into evidence, would not rebut the 
city’s allegation of unreasonable delay on the part of the committee.  Contrary to 
the representation in the committee’s reply brief, there is no evidence that Chris 
“directed” BMD to “review and update its legal opinion.”  There is no evidence 
that the committee was aware of Councilman Shaughnessy’s June 28 demand letter 
at the time.  And there is no explanation for why the committee took no action to 
initiate a lawsuit between June 11 and June 28.  The insinuation that the committee 
was awaiting supplemental, possibly favorable legal guidance has no basis in fact. 
{¶ 22} More generally, the committee asserts that its delay was excusable 
because the exhibits in the case are voluminous and its attorney had to juggle this 
matter with other cases and priorities.  This assertion ignores the fact that a similar 
argument could likely be made in every election case and, if successful, would 
swallow the doctrine of laches. 
{¶ 23} In our view, the length of time between the city’s rejection of the 
petition and the filing of this suit was unreasonable, the committee was aware of its 
alleged injury during that time, and it has no reasonable excuse for its delay.  We 
turn, then, to the fourth element of the laches defense, the question of prejudice. 
{¶ 24} Generally, “the application of laches requires some sort of prejudice 
to the other party.”  State ex rel. Willke v. Taft, 107 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 
836 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 18. 
 
Normally, this prejudice in expedited election cases occurs because 
[the] relators’ delay prejudices [the] respondents by making the case 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
an expedited election case * * *, which restricts [the] respondents’ 
time to prepare and defend against [the] relators’ claims, or impairs 
boards of elections’ ability to prepare, print, and distribute 
appropriate ballots because of the expiration of the time for 
providing absentee ballots. 
 
Id.  By rule, an election matter is automatically expedited if filed within 90 days 
prior to the relevant election.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08(A)(1).  Here, the committee filed 
its complaint on the 92nd day before the election.  Because it filed before the date 
on which complaints are automatically expedited, the committee argues, laches 
cannot apply. 
{¶ 25} It is true that when a relator’s unreasonable delay in filing a 
mandamus case causes the matter to become an expedited election matter when 
filed, that delay is presumed to constitute prejudice for laches purposes.  State ex 
rel. Duclos v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 145 Ohio St.3d 254, 2016-Ohio-367, 
48 N.E.3d 543, ¶ 11.  But the committee cites no authority for the converse 
proposition: that laches cannot apply so long as the case is ultimately filed before 
Day 90.  To the contrary, laches is an equitable doctrine that may potentially apply 
to any mandamus claim; it is not a creature of election law.  State ex rel. Carver v. 
Hull, 70 Ohio St.3d 570, 577, 639 N.E.2d 1175 (1994) (“The question whether 
laches has barred a claim in mandamus rests in the court’s sound discretion”).  The 
prejudice that exists when unreasonable delay causes an election case to become 
expedited is merely one possible type of prejudice, not the only kind that may 
trigger laches. 
{¶ 26} The committee’s unreasonable delay and decision to file its 
complaint so close to the 90-day deadline have caused this case to become 
expedited.  The committee’s own complaint recognized the need for urgency 
caused by its delay in filing and expressly asked us to order “expedited 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
consideration of this important elections matter under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08.”  That 
we would expedite the case was entirely foreseeable; we routinely expedite election 
matters filed significantly further in advance of the election than was the complaint 
in this case.  See, e.g., State ex rel. McCann v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 153 
Ohio St.3d 1445, 2018-Ohio-2926, 102 N.E.3d 502 (complaint filed 105 days 
before election); State ex rel. Guest v. Husted, 153 Ohio St.3d 1436, 2018-Ohio-
2707, 101 N.E.3d 466 (complaint filed 137 days before election). 
{¶ 27} Today we conclude that prejudice exists for purposes of a laches 
analysis in election cases not only when the case is automatically expedited because 
the relator files the complaint after the 90-day cut-off, but also when the relator files 
the complaint so close in time to that deadline that expediting the proceedings 
becomes a practical necessity.  Although a laches defense “rarely prevails in 
election cases,” Duclos at ¶ 8, we conclude that laches bars the relief requested in 
this case due to the committee’s failure to exercise any diligence whatsoever.  We 
therefore dismiss the complaint and decline to address the merits of the issues 
presented therein. 
{¶ 28} We also deny the committee’s motion for leave to supplement the 
evidence.  As discussed above, proposed Exhibit 11 would not alleviate the laches 
problem.  The other two proffered exhibits (Exhibits 12 and 13) purport to be 
hyperlinks to YouTube videos of statements made by Mayor Gerard Neugebauer 
and former Law Director Diane Calta, respectively.  These exhibits have been 
proffered to address whether the underlying ordinance is legislative or 
administrative, a legal question we need not reach. 
Motion denied 
and cause dismissed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH and FISCHER, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, DEWINE, and DEGENARO, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
January Term, 2018 
 
11 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 29} Because we have never decided an election case based solely on a 
holding that having to defend the action on an expedited basis is per se prejudicial, 
and because there is no equity in denying the preeminent constitutional right of 
referendum when the respondent has not shown actual, material prejudice from any 
delay, I dissent. 
{¶ 30} “Expedited-election cases ‘implicate the rights of electors 
underlying the statutory time limits of R.C. 3505.01 and 3509.01.’ ”  Blankenship 
v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 567, 2004-Ohio-5596, 817 N.E.2d 382, ¶ 26, quoting 
State ex rel. Ascani v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections, 83 Ohio St.3d 490, 494, 700 
N.E.2d 1234 (1998).  We have therefore promulgated S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08 to require 
the expedited briefing of election cases that are filed within 90 days of the election 
in order to allow us to resolve these cases promptly and ensure that the statutory 
time limits for preparing and mailing ballots are respected.  See State ex rel. 
SuperAmerica Group v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Elections, 80 Ohio St.3d 182, 187, 685 
N.E.2d 507 (1997). 
{¶ 31} For this reason, we have recognized that “cases in which laches is 
dispositive generally involve prejudice to the respondents in their statutory 
obligation to absentee voters to have absentee ballots printed and ready for use.”  
State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 
1107, ¶ 14.  Tellingly, the lead opinion points to no decision from this court holding 
that prejudice is “presumed”—apparently, irrebuttably—solely from the fact that 
the action proceeded as an expedited election case.  Any such presumption conflicts 
with established caselaw that it is the respondent who has the burden to demonstrate 
material prejudice. 
{¶ 32} Importantly, when we have found a delay in bringing an election 
case to be prejudicial, the statutory deadline for having absentee ballots printed and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
ready for use had expired before the action could be decided.  E.g., State ex rel. 
Duclos v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 145 Ohio St.3d 254, 2016-Ohio-367, 48 
N.E.3d 543, ¶ 12; State ex rel. Chillicothe v. Ross Cty. Bd. of Elections, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 439, 2009-Ohio-5523, 917 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 17; Mason City School Dist. v. 
Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 107 Ohio St.3d 373, 2005-Ohio-5363, 840 N.E.2d 
147, ¶ 19; Blankenship at ¶ 26; see also State ex rel. Brinda v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 299, 2007-Ohio-5228, 874 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 13; State ex 
rel. Commt. for Charter Amendment, City Trash Collection v. Westlake, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 100, 2002-Ohio-5302, 776 N.E.2d 1041, ¶ 18-19. 
{¶ 33} In contrast, this case has been fully briefed well in advance of the 
deadline for preparing absentee ballots as required by the Uniformed and Overseas 
Citizens Absentee Voters Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973ff.  Pursuant to R.C. 3511.04(B), that 
deadline is 45 days before the general election, or September 22, 2018.  
Accordingly, because there is still time to decide this case on the merits without 
impeding respondent Summit County Board of Elections in its duty to prepare and 
mail absentee ballots, the purpose of S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08 “to give the Supreme Court 
adequate time for full consideration of the case” has been satisfied, notwithstanding 
any delay in the filing of the action. 
{¶ 34} It is true that we have sometimes indicated that the element of 
prejudice is satisfied when the delay causes the case to become an expedited 
election case pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08, which restricts the time the respondent 
has to prepare and defend the case.  E.g., Duclos at ¶ 11; State ex rel. Coughlin v. 
Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 136 Ohio St.3d 371, 2013-Ohio-3867, 995 N.E.2d 
1194, ¶ 11; Chillicothe at ¶ 17; State ex rel. Owens v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 130, 
2010-Ohio-1374, 926 N.E.2d 617, ¶ 19; State ex rel. Willke v. Taft, 107 Ohio St.3d 
1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 836 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 18.  But despite that language, in none of 
those cases did we conclude that laches barred relief based solely on a presumption 
that the procedural burdens imposed by expedited briefing were prejudicial.  These 
January Term, 2018 
 
13 
are either cases in which the deadline for preparing ballots had also passed—such 
as Duclos, on which the lead opinion relies as purportedly recognizing a 
presumption of prejudice—or cases in which the court held that the laches defense 
did not apply.  For example, the lead opinion relies on Willke for the proposition 
that having to defend an expedited election case is prejudicial, yet there we declined 
to apply laches, noting that the respondents had “assert[ed] no specific prejudice in 
their laches argument,” Willke at ¶ 19.  That case would have proceeded as an 
expedited election case in the best of circumstances. 
{¶ 35} We have also indicated that “ ‘for election cases, laches is not an 
affirmative defense, and [persons seeking relief] have the burden of proving that 
they acted with the requisite diligence.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  Smith v. Scioto Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 123 Ohio St.3d 467, 2009-Ohio-5866, 918 N.E.2d 131, ¶ 14, quoting 
State ex rel. Vickers v. Summit Cty. Council, 97 Ohio St.3d 204, 2002-Ohio-5583, 
777 N.E.2d 830, ¶ 13.  But the duty of “relators in election cases to act with the 
utmost diligence,” Blankenship, 103 Ohio St.3d 567, 2004-Ohio-5596, 817 N.E.2d 
382, at ¶ 19, is separate from the respondent’s burden to demonstrate that it has 
been prejudiced by the relator’s lack of diligence.  “ ‘[W]e generally require a 
showing of prejudice before we apply laches to bar a consideration of the merits of 
an election case.’ ”  Owens at ¶ 19, quoting Brinda, 115 Ohio St.3d 299, 2007-
Ohio-5228, 874 N.E.2d 1205, at ¶ 11.  The only party who can show prejudice is 
the respondent—“a party asserting a laches defense must demonstrate that it has 
been prejudiced by the other party’s delay.”  State ex rel. Davis v. Summit Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 137 Ohio St.3d 222, 2013-Ohio-4616, 998 N.E.2d 1093, ¶ 10.  And 
the prejudice must be material before laches will bar relief.  State ex rel. Rife v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 70 Ohio St.3d 632, 635, 640 N.E.2d 522 (1994); see 
also Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447, 455, 156 N.E.2d 113 (1959) (“in order to 
successfully prosecute a claim of laches, the person asserting the claim must show 
that he has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the adverse party in asserting 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
his rights”); State ex rel. Mallory v. Pub. Emp. Retirement Bd., 82 Ohio St.3d 235, 
244-245, 694 N.E.2d 1356 (1998) (laches is not a bar to a mandamus action when 
no evidence of material prejudice is presented). 
{¶ 36} Until today, we had never decided an election case based solely on 
the conclusion that having to defend the action on an expedited basis is per se 
prejudicial.  Rather, the fact that a case has proceeded on an expedited timeline does 
not, by itself, establish prejudice, and the respondent is required to show that the 
briefing schedule materially hindered its ability to prepare and defend against the 
action in some specific, concrete way.  This is a reason why a laches defense “rarely 
prevails in election cases,” Duclos, 145 Ohio St.3d 254, 2016-Ohio-367, 48 N.E.3d 
543, at ¶ 8. 
{¶ 37} This is not to say that the difficulties faced by the respondent in an 
expedited election case can never be prejudicial, but here, respondents city of Green 
and its finance director, Steven Schmidt, have failed to make that showing.  The 
only specific claim of prejudice is their assertion that relator, Citizens for 
Responsible Green Government, “prematurely filed its merit brief on Friday 
August 10, 2018 in an attempt to minimize the Respondents’ time to gather 
evidence and prepare a merit brief—gamesmanship that was self-evidently done to 
gain a strategic advantage.”  They explain that “[t]his tactic effectively reduced the 
City’s already short response time to one business day.”  However, we granted the 
city and Schmidt’s request for an extension of time, allowing them four additional 
business days to file these materials and alleviating any potential prejudice.  Now, 
having obtained that relief, they seek a duplicative remedy in laches, without 
providing any concrete details as to how their preparation and defense of the case 
has been materially affected.  Importantly, this case presents relatively 
straightforward issues regarding whether relator’s petition is sufficient and valid.  
None of these issues have required extensive discovery to defend, and there is no 
indication that the city and Schmidt were prevented from thoroughly presenting the 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
evidence, authority, and argument supporting their position in the time frame of an 
expedited election action. 
{¶ 38} Beyond relieving the lead opinion of the need to weigh the equities 
of each individual assertion of prejudice, the unintended consequences of the lead 
opinion are not immediately apparent.  The lead opinion concludes that having to 
defend an expedited election action by itself prejudices the respondent, and then it 
applies that conclusion to a case that was not automatically classified as an 
expedited election action by rule because it was filed on the 92nd day before the 
election.  That may seem close enough for the lead opinion, but there is no express 
limit to when this court can expedite an election case, and we have frequently 
expedited election matters filed further in advance of the election than this case.  
See, e.g., State ex rel. McCann v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 153 Ohio St.3d 
1445, 2018-Ohio-2926, 102 N.E.3d 502 (complaint filed on Day 105); State ex rel. 
Guest v. Husted, 153 Ohio St.3d 1436, 2018-Ohio-2707, 101 N.E.3d 466 (Day 
137).  The lead opinion’s conclusion presuming prejudice in cases filed “so close 
in time to [the 90-day] deadline that expediting the proceedings becomes a practical 
necessity,” lead opinion at ¶ 27, therefore has no limiting principle at all.  And even 
though laches is an equitable defense and necessarily fact-based, the lead opinion’s 
new per se prejudice rule would apply to all future expedited election cases, without 
regard for the equities and circumstances involved in each one. 
{¶ 39} We ought not bar review of election cases on the merits based on a 
judge-made presumption when the legislature, the final arbiter of public policy, has 
not established a specific limitations period for filing them.  Accordingly, 
“consistent with the ‘fundamental tenet of judicial review in Ohio’—‘that courts 
should decide cases on their merits,’ ” State ex rel. Voters First v. Ohio Ballot Bd., 
133 Ohio St.3d 257, 2012-Ohio-4149, 978 N.E.2d 119, ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. 
Becker v. Eastlake, 93 Ohio St.3d 502, 505, 756 N.E.2d 1228 (2001), I would reject 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
respondents’ laches defense and consider on the merits whether Schmidt abused his 
discretion in determining that the referendum petition was insufficient and invalid. 
_________________ 
David A. Mucklow, for relator. 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Peter W. 
Nischt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Summit County Board of 
Elections. 
Roderick Linton Belfance, L.L.P., William G. Chris, Lawrence R. Bach, 
and Todd A. Mazzolla, for respondents City of Green and Finance Director Steven 
Schmidt. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., James J. Hughes III, Frank L. Merrill, and Maria 
J. Armstrong, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae, Nexus Gas Transmission, 
L.L.C. 
_________________