Case Title: Prindle v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-27

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Prindle v. State1997 WY 113945 P.2d 1180Case Number: 97-27Decided: 09/17/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

THOMAS JAMES PRINDLE, 

Appellant (Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

The STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County 

 The 
Honorable Arthur T. Hanscum, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna 
Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Michael Dinnerstein, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid 
Program; Arturo A. Aguilar and Kevin Sullivan, Student Interns, Wyoming Defender 
Aid Program.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Kimberly A. Baker-Musick, Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice. 

[¶1]      Thomas James 
Prindle (Prindle) appeals from his grand larceny (auto theft) conviction, 
raising issues concerning jury selection, unfairly prejudicial evidence, 
erroneous instructions to the jury and prosecutorial misconduct. After reviewing 
the record, we find Prindle received a fair trial. We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant Prindle 
presents the following statement of the issues:

1. Did the court deprive the appellant of his 
fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial by refusing to excuse a juror 
for cause who was clearly biased?

2. Did the court deprived [sic] the appellant of his 
due process right to a fair trial by refusing to bar evidence that he fled from 
the police even though it was more prejudicial than probative, by improperly 
drawing the jury's attention to that evidence by giving an instruction on flight 
over defense counsel's objection, and by failing to explain to the jury that 
there may have been reasons for the appellant's flight fully consistent with 
innocence of the crime with which the appellant was 
charged?

3. Did the prosecutor deprive the appellant of a fair 
trial by improperly arguing during his summation matters that were never 
introduced into evidence at trial?

[¶3]      Appellee State 
replies with these issues:

I. Whether the district court abused its discretion 
when it refused to dismiss a juror for cause?

II. Whether the district court abused its discretion 
when it allowed evidence of appellant's flight from 
police?

III. Whether the district court erred in instructing 
the jury?

IV. Whether statements made by the prosecutor during 
closing argument deprived appellant of a fair trial?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      At 2:00 p.m. on 
May 18, 1996, the victim went into Foster's Country Corner, in Laramie, Wyoming, 
to play pool, leaving her keys in her car. At 6:00 p.m. she discovered that her 
car was missing, and the police were notified. At approximately 10:00 p.m. on 
that same night, Nebraska law enforcement personnel were alerted that a possible 
drunk driver was headed east on Interstate 80 near Ogallala, Nebraska. Deputy 
Sheriff Cochran observed Prindle driving on the interstate at a speed of 
thirty-five miles-per-hour in an area where the posted speed limit was 
sixty-five miles-per-hour. The vehicle Prindle was driving was weaving within 
the traffic lane.

 

[¶5]      When Prindle 
pulled into a rest area, Deputy Cochran followed him and activated his flashers. 
Prindle then pulled further into the rest area, and Deputy Cochran followed. 
When Deputy Cochran exited his vehicle and approached Prindle, Prindle drove 
away, leading the deputy and other officers on a high speed chase. Prindle 
eventually flipped his car and was apprehended. A video device in Deputy 
Cochran's car captured the chase on tape. Upon running a check on the license 
plates on the car Prindle was driving, Deputy Cochran learned it had been 
reported stolen from Laramie, Wyoming.

 

[¶6]      Prindle was 
charged with stealing the victim's car, in violation of WYO. STAT. § 6-3-402(a) 
and (c)(i). Before trial, Prindle filed a motion in limine to prevent the use of 
the video tape from Deputy Cochran's car as evidence. Prindle argued that the 
tape was more prejudicial than probative. The trial court, however, disagreed, 
denied Prindle's motion in limine, and allowed the tape to be introduced into 
evidence.

 

[¶7]      At trial Prindle 
challenged a venireperson for cause because her father was in the F.B.I. for 
twenty-five years, her brother-in-law was a Texas police officer, and she had 
been a robbery victim. The trial court denied Prindle's challenge for cause, and 
Prindle used a peremptory challenge to remove her from the jury panel. Prindle 
used all of his peremptory challenges during panel 
selection.

 

[¶8]      The jury found 
Prindle guilty of larceny, and the judge subsequently sentenced Prindle to no 
less than five years and no longer than nine years, with credit for time served 
in the Albany County Detention Center. Prindle timely filed this 
appeal.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Failure to dismiss a potential 
juror

 

[¶9]      Prindle contends 
he did not receive a fair trial by a fair and impartial jury because a potential 
juror was biased against him, and he was forced to use one of his peremptory 
challenges when the trial court refused to dismiss the juror for cause. Article 
1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution provides, in pertinent part, "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to . . . a speedy trial 
by an impartial jury. . . ." Further, a potential juror may be challenged for 
cause if that person "has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused, or is biased or prejudiced for or against the 
accused." WYO. STAT. § 7-11-105(a)(ii) (1997).

The test to be applied in determining whether a 
prospective juror should be dismissed for cause is whether that person would 
render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented at trial and 
the instructions given by the court. Munoz v. State, 849 P.2d 1299, 1302 
(Wyo. 1993). Whether a juror is biased is a question of fact for the trial 
judge. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 
1000 (Wyo. 1984). A trial judge's decision will only be reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Munoz, 849 P.2d  at 
1302.

Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 1996). There is no abuse of 
discretion where the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did. Schwenke v. State, 768 P.2d 1031, 1035 
(Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶10]   Prindle claims that the potential 
juror should have been dismissed for cause because her father was in the F.B.I. 
for twenty-five years, her brother-in-law was a police officer in Texas, and she 
had been the victim of a crime. The court denied Prindle's challenge for cause, 
and Prindle was forced to use one of his peremptory challenges to remove the 
potential juror in question. However, when asked, defense counsel passed the 
jury for cause. When a defendant passes a jury panel for cause, he waives his 
claim to reversible error. Kerns, 920 P.2d  at 635; Munoz v. State, 849 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1993). Prindle cannot establish reversible error by the 
district court because he accepted the jury as it was impaneled. Therefore, we 
need not consider whether the district court abused its discretion when it 
refused to dismiss the potential juror for cause.

 

The video taped evidence

 

[¶11]   Prindle claims the video-taped 
evidence of his flight from police was improperly admitted because the potential 
for unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. Wyoming Rule 
of Evidence 403 provides:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.

 

[¶12]   The balancing test required by Rule 
403 is assigned to the sound discretion of the trial court. Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 1305 
(Wyo. 1991). An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. Pearson v. State, 811 P.2d 704, 707 
(Wyo. 1991). A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner 
exceeding the bounds of reason or commits an error of law under the 
circumstances. Id. The ultimate issue 
becomes whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. Id. The appellant has the burden of 
demonstrating that an abuse of discretion took place. Id. When appealing from a Rule 403 
decision to admit evidence, the appellant must show that the evidence had little 
or no value and it was extremely inflammatory or introduced solely for the 
purpose of inflaming the jury. Jennings, 806 P.2d  at 
1305.

 

[¶13]   Prindle filed a motion in limine 
before trial, seeking to preclude the State from showing the video tape which 
captured the high-speed chase in Nebraska. He claimed that the video tape would 
inflame and impassion the jurors, that it was highly prejudicial, cumulative, 
and that any probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect. Immediately before trial, the court held a hearing to address the motion 
in limine.

 

[¶14]   In response to Prindle's arguments, 
the State explained that it intended to use the tape to illustrate that Prindle 
fled from police, thereby making the tape probative as to his consciousness of 
guilt. The State also noted that when he was arrested, Prindle told the officers 
another person had been in the car with him, thus insinuating that someone else 
stole the car, but got out before the chase-ending crash. The State asserted the 
video tape was relevant to rebut Prindle's defense because it showed that 
Prindle was the sole occupant of the vehicle.

 

[¶15]   Finding that the video tape was 
probative both with respect to flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt and 
as to the substantive matter of the criminal charge, the trial court ruled that 
the State could introduce the video tape into evidence. In doing so, the trial 
court specifically weighed the probative value of the tape against its 
prejudicial effect and found the probative value substantially outweighed any 
danger of unfair prejudice. No further objection was made, and the video tape 
was played for the jury.

 

[¶16]   On appeal, Prindle again argues 
that the video tape was improperly admitted into evidence. In response, the 
State relies on cases from this Court to argue that since the tape showed 
Prindle fleeing from a law enforcement officer, it was evidence of consciousness 
of guilt. See e.g., Baier v. State, 
891 P.2d 754, 760 (Wyo. 1995); Gentry v. 
State, 806 P.2d 1269, 1275 (Wyo. 1991). However, we find that Prindle's 
claim that another person, purportedly the thief, was in the car with Prindle 
and escaped gives the video tape substantial probative value in this case. It 
was apparently clear from the video tape that no one exited the vehicle at the 
time Prindle claimed to have lost his passenger. We cannot say that the trial 
court abused its discretion when it determined the video tape was more probative 
than prejudicial. The admission of the evidence was not 
error.

 

Jury instruction on flight

 

[¶17]   Prindle claims the trial court 
erred when it gave jury instruction number 15, concerning flight from law 
enforcement. We will not rule jury instructions defective absent a showing of 
prejudice and that the instructions confused or misled the jury as to the proper 
principles of law. Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1035 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶18]   At the jury instruction conference, 
Prindle objected to the instruction offered by the State concerning flight as 
evidence of consciousness of guilt. Prindle argued that the instruction was 
being used to bolster the State's case and that there was no evidence that 
Prindle fled from Albany County. Prindle also argued that his flight could have 
been due to consciousness of guilt of another crime, unrelated to knowing the 
vehicle he was driving was stolen.

 

[¶19]   The trial court noted that Prindle 
may have fled because he was driving drunk and without a license, rather than 
because he was driving a stolen vehicle. The trial court ruled that it would 
allow both counsel to argue their positions concerning what Prindle's flight 
from the officer did or did not show, adding language to the State's proposed 
instruction which allowed both counsel to argue their positions. The instruction 
given as Instruction No. 15 provided:

A defendant's flight from law enforcement authorities 
may be considered as a circumstance to be evaluated with other factors as 
tending to show a consciousness of guilt on the part of a defendant of criminal 
misconduct. Flight by itself is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the 
defendant for the charged offense and may be considered as merely a circumstance 
to be considered with other factors in reaching a decision as to the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant.

 

[¶20]   Although the above instruction is 
not as clear as it could be, it is a correct statement of the law. See Baier v. State, 891 P.2d  at 760; Gentry, 806 P.2d  at 1275. While Prindle 
does not appear to complain that a flight instruction was given, he complains 
that his explanation of the flight was not properly integrated into the 
instruction. However, we find no indication in the record that Prindle offered 
any such instruction for the trial court's consideration. Our cases have 
mandated an instruction on the main defense of the defendant when such an 
instruction has been offered. Benson v. 
State, 571 P.2d 595, 599 (Wyo. 1977) (explanation of possession of recently 
stolen property is deserving of a jury instruction, if offered); Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 
1970); State v. Hickenbottom, 63 Wyo. 
41, 69, 178 P.2d 119, 131 (Wyo. 1947). It is not error where, as here, the 
defendant does not offer an instruction on the main theory of the defense. Benson, 571 P.2d  at 
599.

 

[¶21]   Prindle was given the opportunity 
to explain his position to the jury, and the jury was allowed to make its own 
determination, based on the facts presented and a proper jury instruction. We 
can find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to give the 
instruction concerning flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt under these 
circumstances.

 

The prosecutor's comments

 

[¶22]   Finally, Prindle contends that the 
prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument, thereby denying him 
his constitutional right to a fair trial. Prindle claims that the prosecutor 
testified as an unsworn witness to facts which were not introduced into 
evidence. However, defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's comments, 
thereby waiving all but plain error. Taul 
v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 658 (Wyo. 1993). To invoke the plain error doctrine, 
the record must be clear as to the incident alleged as error, a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law must have been violated, and that violation must have 
adversely affected a substantial right of the accused, resulting in material 
prejudice. Warhawk v. State, 849 P.2d 1326, 1327 (Wyo. 1993). "Plain error is difficult to find in closing argument, 
lest the trial court becomes required to control argument because opposing 
counsel does not object." Taul, 862 P.2d  at 659.

 

[¶23]   We have previously reminded 
litigants:

In presenting a closing argument, the prosecutor is 
entitled to reflect upon the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from 
that evidence in order to assist the jury in its function. . . . The purpose of 
closing argument is to give both the prosecution and defense counsel the 
opportunity to explain the significance of the evidence and how it should be 
viewed. . . . Finally, we have previously said that the scope of permissible 
argument, as well as the injury caused by misconduct, are best determined by the 
trial judge.

Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Jeschke v. State, 642 P.2d 1298, 1301-02 
(Wyo. 1982)).

 

[¶24]   A review of the record discloses 
the following comments during closing arguments, first, by defense 
counsel:

In fact, there has been no evidence presented that he 
even had the opportunity to steal the car. There was no evidence presented he 
was ever in Albany County. [The victim] testified, she testified she didn't - 
she didn't know who took the car. She didn't see it driven away, didn't see the 
driver, didn't know who took it, didn't know exactly what time it was gone. She 
was out at Fosters where a lot of people come and go. No one noticed anything 
suspicious.

 

If a man as big as Tom Prindle carrying a suitcase 
and a duffle bag, and that's what Officer Cochran testified was in the car that 
were belongings belonging to Tom, a man walking around with a suitcase and a 
duffle bag going through the parking lot, rummaging around, was doing that, 
don't you think somebody would have noticed that activity out there at Fosters? 
Don't you think that would have attracted some attention?

 

[¶25]   In response to that argument, the 
prosecutor offered the following rebuttal:

Defendant talked about opportunity. Do we have 
opportunity here to take this vehicle? Oh, yeah. We had plenty of opportunity. 
It was easy for the Defendant to gain access to the vehicle. He didn't have to 
make a big show of it.

 

He didn't have to break a window to get in, to jimmy 
rig the car or anything like that, no, the keys were in it. You heard [the 
victim] testify to that. The keys weren't in her purse, she left them in the 
vehicle, and those keys, of course, were found with the vehicle back in 
Nebraska; so it was easy for him to go through with big bags through the area of 
Fosters.

 

We've been to Fosters. Some of us have, maybe some of 
us haven't. That's a motel type of complex, and people are constantly carrying 
bags in and around that parking lot. And actually there are a lot of 
out-of-state travelers that are in that parking lot, too, and those people took 
no mind of who got into [the victim's] car. They didn't know [the victim], 
didn't know what she drove. The opportunity was there. It was 
easy.

 

[¶26]   We cannot say that the prosecutor 
went beyond the reasonable scope of a closing argument when he asked the jury to 
rely on its experience that people carry bags in and around a motel parking lot 
and that people may not have noticed who got into the victim's car. Since the 
prosecutor did not violate an unequivocal rule law, no plain error occurred. 
Prindle's main defense was that someone else stole the car from that parking lot 
and that he was not alone in the car. Prindle was able to present that defense 
to the jury. However, the State presented abundant evidence, including a 
video-taped recording of the car and subsequent chase and testimony from the 
officers involved that they did not see and were not able to find the "partner" 
Prindle claimed jumped out of the car. The jury, as the fact-finder, apparently 
did not believe Prindle's defense.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶27]   The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it refused to dismiss a juror for cause, admitted videotaped 
evidence which was relevant to the case and instructed the jury on the law of 
flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The prosecutor did not violate an 
unequivocal rule of law when he commented on the fact that people carrying bags 
are a common occurrence in motel parking lots. Therefore, we affirm the judgment 
and sentence against the appellant in this case.