Case Title: Rice v. Charles

Citation: 

Docket Number: 991880

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
JOHNNIE W. RICE, CO-ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF LEONA LYNN RICE, 
DECEASED, ET AL. 
 
v. Record No. 991880 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  June 9, 2000 
CLIFFORD ANTHONY CHARLES 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DICKENSON COUNTY 
Keary R. Williams, Judge 
 
 
 
In this wrongful death action, we address two separate 
issues: (1) whether the circuit court erred by striking the 
defendant’s contributory negligence defense because his 
testimony in support of that defense was not corroborated 
as required by Code § 8.01-397, and (2) whether the circuit 
court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion for a new 
trial on the issue of damages because the jury verdict was 
only for the exact amount of the decedent’s funeral 
expenses.  Finding no error with regard to the first issue 
but concluding that the jury verdict is inadequate as a 
matter of law, we will reverse in part, and affirm in part, 
the judgment of the circuit court. 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS 
Johnnie W. and Rita S. Rice (the Rices), co-
administrators of the estate of their daughter Leona Lynn 
Rice (Leona), filed a motion for judgment in the circuit 
court against Clifford Anthony Charles pursuant to 
Virginia’s Death by Wrongful Act statute, Code §§ 8.01-50 
through -56.1  They alleged that Leona died as a result of 
injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident in which she 
was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Charles.  At trial, 
Charles admitted that he was negligent and that his 
negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and 
Leona’s death.  However, Charles proceeded on a defense of 
contributory negligence. 
 
At the close of all the evidence, the Rices moved to 
strike the defense of contributory negligence on the basis 
that there was insufficient corroboration of Charles’ 
testimony, as required under Code § 8.01-397 (commonly 
referred to as the “dead man’s statute”).  The circuit 
court sustained the motion and thereafter submitted the 
case to the jury on the sole issue of damages.  The jury 
then returned a verdict for the Rices in the amount of 
$7,283.27 for “reasonable funeral expenses.”  That figure 
represented the exact amount of Leona’s funeral and related 
burial expenses2 incurred by the Rices.  The jury did not 
                     
1 The purpose of the Death by Wrongful Act statute is 
to compensate a decedent’s statutory beneficiaries for 
their loss resulting from the decedent’s death.  Wilson v. 
Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 1036, 154 S.E.2d 124, 128 (1967). 
 
2 The funeral home bill was $5,287.32, and the charge 
for the cemetery monument was $1,995.95, for a total of 
 
2
award any damages to the statutory beneficiaries, Leona’s 
parents and her older sister Beverly Rice McClanahan, for 
sorrow, mental anguish, and loss of solace.  See Code 
§§ 8.01-52 through -54. 
 
The Rices subsequently moved to set aside the verdict 
and to award a new trial on the issue of damages.  The 
basis of their motion was the fact that the jury had 
awarded damages only for funeral expenses.  The Rices 
argued that, by returning such a verdict, the jury 
disregarded the court’s instructions and the uncontroverted 
evidence.  The circuit court denied the motion and entered 
judgment for the Rices in accordance with the jury verdict.  
This appeal followed. 
In accordance with well-established principles, we 
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Rices, the prevailing parties at trial.  Morgen Indus., 
Inc. v. Vaughan, 252 Va. 60, 62, 471 S.E.2d 489, 490 
(1996); Besser Co. v. Hansen, 243 Va. 267, 269, 415 S.E.2d 
138, 139 (1992); Penn v. Manns, 221 Va. 88, 90, 267 S.E.2d 
126, 127 (1980).  On the evening of the accident, Leona and 
Charles planned to see a movie but decided to “go[] 
cruising around for a while” in Charles’ pickup truck 
                                                             
$7,283.27.  Hereinafter, the funeral and related burial 
expenses are referred to as “funeral expenses.” 
 
3
before the movie started.  During their drive, Leona and 
Charles saw J.D. Baker on a “four-wheeler” in a parking 
lot.  They stopped and asked Baker to go with them to the 
movie, and he agreed to do so.  Leona and Charles then 
followed Baker to his home where Charles and Baker 
subsequently decided to buy beer instead of going to a 
movie.  According to Charles, Leona heard the discussion 
about purchasing beer and did not object to the change in 
plans, but neither did she encourage or ask anyone to buy 
beer. 
 
Because all three of these individuals were under the 
age of 21 years and could not legally purchase alcoholic 
beverages, see Code § 4.1-305, they went to the home of 
Scott Mullins.  The parties stipulated that, upon arriving 
there, Charles asked Mullins to buy beer for him.  Mullins 
agreed to do so, but McClanahan, who was dating Mullins at 
that time, objected.  As a result, McClanahan and Mullins 
“got into an argument,” and Leona, Charles, and Baker left 
Mullins’ house while McClanahan and Mullins were still 
arguing.  According to McClanahan, Leona said that she was 
“going straight home.” 
 
Charles testified that Leona then got back in Charles’ 
truck, and, together with Baker, they proceeded to a local 
pharmacy where Charles talked to an individual who agreed 
 
4
to purchase two cases of seven-ounce bottles of beer for 
Charles.  After getting the beer and putting it in the back 
of the truck, Charles drove to Enochs Branch in Dickenson 
County, where he and Baker drank some of the beer and 
discussed where to go from there.3  Leona did not drink any 
beer.  Eventually, all three of them got back in Charles’ 
pickup truck.  Leona sat in the middle between Charles and 
Baker, and a case of beer was placed in the front 
floorboard.  Charles testified that he then drove toward 
Haysi, and that, while he was driving, and in Leona’s 
presence, Baker handed him additional beers to drink.  
According to Charles, Leona did not try to stop him from 
drinking, did not request to get out of the truck, and did 
not ask him to take her home, even though they drove by her 
house on the way to Haysi.  Although Leona had her 
learner’s permit, see Code § 46.2-334, she also did not 
offer to drive. 
 
Continuing, Charles testified that, just before the 
accident occurred, he stopped to use the bathroom and 
                     
3 Except for the stipulation regarding the events at 
Mullins’ house and McClanahan’s testimony about the same 
incident, the evidence concerning Charles’ and Baker’s 
purchase and consumption of beer before the accident as 
well as the details of how the accident occurred are found 
only in Charles’ testimony.  Baker did not testify at 
trial. 
 
 
5
noticed that he had a “buzz” and could feel the effect of 
the alcohol.  At that point, Charles had consumed five or 
six of the seven-ounce bottles of beer in slightly less 
than two hours, and he had not eaten lunch or dinner that 
day.  However, Charles stated that he had no trouble with 
his driving and did not believe that anyone would have 
considered him intoxicated.  Charles further testified that 
he thought Leona would have told him if she had been 
concerned for her safety. 
The accident occurred as Charles was coming into a 
“steep curve” too fast and lost control of his truck.  
Charles stated that he thought he had already driven 
through that curve.  The truck flipped, and Charles and his 
two passengers were thrown out of the truck.  When Charles 
found Leona after the accident, she was dead. 
 
Approximately an hour and a half after the accident, 
Charles’ blood alcohol content (BAC) measured .08 percent 
by weight by volume.4  A forensic toxicologist, whom Charles 
called to testify at trial, opined that Charles’ BAC at the 
time of the accident could have been as low as .07 percent 
or as high as .10 percent, and that a BAC in that range 
would have adversely affected Charles’ judgment, attention, 
 
6
concentration, and reaction time.  However, the 
toxicologist also testified that, considering Charles’ 
experience with drinking large quantities of alcohol, he 
would not likely have been “visibly drunk” to an objective 
observer. 
 
Charles and Leona had been dating more than a year at 
the time of her death and were engaged to be married.  
Charles testified that Leona had ridden with him many times 
when he was drinking and driving, and that they had argued 
about his drinking.  At Leona’s suggestion, Charles had 
entered a detoxification center a few months before the 
accident, but he had left the center before completing the 
detoxification program. 
Several witnesses testified about the impact of 
Leona’s death on her family.  A neighbor of the Rices 
established that Leona had a close relationship with her 
mother and that Leona’s death upset the Rices.  The 
neighbor added that Mrs. Rice continues to suffer because 
of the death of her daughter and is not dealing well with 
the loss.  One of Leona’s friends also testified that Leona 
had a good relationship with both McClanahan and Mrs. Rice, 
and that the family was “heartbroken” when Leona died. 
                                                             
4 Charles’ BAC was documented by a Certificate of 
Analysis from the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of 
 
7
 
Mrs. Rice testified that she had a “very special” 
relationship with Leona and that, when she learned of 
Leona’s death, she experienced “the awfullest feeling that 
any person can have.”  Mrs. Rice also stated that 
McClanahan and Leona were very close, and that Leona and 
Mr. Rice likewise had a good relationship. 
Mrs. Rice acknowledged that she did not encourage 
Leona’s relationship with Charles when the couple began 
dating.  Mrs. Rice also stated that Leona had told her 
about Charles’ drinking problem but had assured her parents 
that she would not ride in a car with someone who had been 
drinking. 
 
Mr. Rice also testified that he loved Leona very much, 
that he spent a lot of time outdoors with her, and that his 
entire family was very close.  He stated that he felt hurt 
and anger when he learned of Leona’s death, and that her 
loss will “hurt [him] all [his] life.”  Mr. Rice further 
testified that Leona’s death continues to affect his 
family, that his wife cries continuously, and that he has 
trouble dealing with his grief.  He also testified that 
McClanahan has changed since Leona’s death and is not as 
happy as she used to be. 
                                                             
Criminal Justice Services, Division of Forensic Science. 
 
8
McClanahan stated that she and Leona were close even 
though she was four years older than Leona, and that she 
still suffers over Leona’s death.  Leona had told her about 
Charles’ problem with drinking alcoholic beverages.  
Consequently, McClanahan had warned Leona not to ride with 
Charles after he had been drinking, and, according to 
McClanahan, Leona assured her that she would not do so.  
McClanahan related an incident just a few months prior to 
Leona’s death when Leona had asked to get out of a vehicle 
because other people had beer in the vehicle.5
ANAYLSIS 
 
This appeal presents two separate issues.  First, the 
Rices assign error to the circuit court’s denial of their 
motion for a new trial on the issue of damages.  In an 
assignment of cross-error, Charles asserts that the circuit 
court erred by striking his defense of contributory 
negligence because his testimony in support of that defense 
was not corroborated.  We will address the assignment of 
cross-error first. 
 
With regard to that issue, Charles contends that the 
circuit court erroneously required corroboration of all the 
                     
5 Leona’s driver’s education teacher also testified 
that he had instructed Leona’s class about “zero 
tolerance,” i.e., not to ride with a driver under the age 
of 21 who has consumed any alcohol. 
 
9
elements of his contributory negligence defense.  Instead, 
Charles claims that, under Code § 8.01-397, the court 
should only have required “that [his] account of the 
accident be supported or strengthened by the attendant 
circumstances or other testimony.” 
Elaborating, Charles argued orally that he had to 
prove three elements of his contributory negligence 
defense: (1) that Leona knew or should have known that it 
was dangerous to ride in a motor vehicle being driven by an 
individual who was or had been consuming alcoholic 
beverages; (2) that Leona knew or should have known that 
Charles was drinking on the evening in question and that 
his ability to drive was consequently impaired, and that 
she, nevertheless, voluntarily rode with him while he was 
driving his truck; and (3) that Leona’s presence in 
Charles’ truck at the time of the accident proximately 
caused her death.  Charles acknowledged that the “vast 
majority” of the evidence with regard to the second element 
came solely from his testimony.6  Nonetheless, he claims 
that, based on the stipulation regarding the events at 
Mullins’ house and McClanahan’s testimony, it is reasonable 
                     
6 Charles established the first element with evidence 
other than his testimony, and he admitted the third 
element, that his negligence proximately caused the 
accident and Leona’s death. 
 
10
to infer that Leona heard the discussion about purchasing 
beer and the argument that ensued between her sister and 
Mullins, and that she therefore knew Charles was going to 
drink and drive that evening.  This same evidence, 
according to Charles, also supports his testimony that he 
and Leona were together approximately an hour and one-half 
before the accident.  Finally, Charles posits that his BAC 
level corroborates the fact that he had consumed alcohol 
before the accident and that his ability to drive was 
impaired.  Thus, he claims that his testimony on this 
critical element of his defense was sufficiently 
corroborated.  We do not agree. 
Code § 8.01-397 provides that “[i]n an action by or 
against a person who, from any cause, is incapable of 
testifying . . . no judgment or decree shall be rendered in 
favor of an adverse or interested party founded on his 
uncorroborated testimony.”  The statute was designed, in 
part, “to prevent a surviving party from having the benefit 
of his own testimony where, by reason of the death of his 
adversary, the latter’s personal representative is deprived 
of the decedent’s version of the [facts].”  Haynes, Ex’x v. 
Glenn, 197 Va. 746, 752, 91 S.E.2d 433, 437 (1967). 
 
We do not question that certain aspects of Charles’ 
testimony concerning the events of the evening in question 
 
11
and the circumstances of the accident were corroborated by 
other evidence.  However, the critical inquiry is whether 
his testimony presented an essential issue that, if not 
corroborated, would defeat his contributory negligence 
defense.  See Hereford v. Paytes, 226 Va. 604, 608, 311 
S.E.2d 790, 792 (1984).  We have previously recognized, and 
we do so again in this appeal, that “it is impossible to 
formulate a fixed rule as to the corroboration necessary in 
every situation” because each case must be decided on its 
particular facts.  Id.
However, we have stated some general principles that 
are pertinent here.  “It is not necessary that the 
corroborative evidence should of itself be sufficient to 
support a verdict, for then there would be no need for the 
adverse or interested party’s testimony to be 
corroborated.”  Brooks, Adm’r v. Worthington, 206 Va. 352, 
357, 143 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1965) (citing Burton’s Ex’r v. 
Manson, 142 Va. 500, 509, 129 S.E. 356, 359 (1925); Davies 
v. Silvey, Adm’x, 148 Va. 132, 137, 138 S.E. 513, 514 
(1927); Clay v. Clay, 196 Va. 997, 1002, 86 S.E.2d 812, 815 
(1955)).  “Corroborating evidence tends to confirm and 
strengthen the testimony of the witness[,]” and it may come 
from other witnesses as well as from circumstantial 
evidence.  Hereford, 226 Va. at 608, 311 S.E.2d at 792.  It 
 
12
is not essential that a survivor’s testimony be 
corroborated on all material points.  Id.; Brooks, 206 Va. 
at 357, 143 S.E.2d at 845. 
The corroboration, to be sufficient under the statute, 
however, must at least tend, “in some degree, of its 
own strength and independently, to support some 
essential allegation or issue raised by the pleadings 
[and] testified to by the [surviving] witness . . . 
which allegation or issue, if unsupported, would be 
fatal to the case.” 
 
Hereford, 226 Va. at 608, 311 S.E.2d at 792 (quoting 
Burton’s Ex’r, 142 Va. at 508, 129 S.E. at 359).  (First 
emphasis added.)  Accord Diehl, Adm’x v. Butts, 255 Va. 
482, 489, 499 S.E.2d 833, 838 (1998). 
In the present case, we view these principles in the 
context of the necessary elements of Charles’ contributory 
negligence defense.  “[A] guest may be guilty of 
contributory negligence if [the guest] knows or reasonably 
should know that [the] driver had been drinking 
intoxicating liquor[7] to an extent likely to affect the 
manner of . . . driving and voluntarily continues as a 
passenger after a reasonable opportunity to leave the 
automobile.”  Meade v. Meade, 206 Va. 823, 827, 147 S.E.2d 
                     
7 While the term “intoxicating liquor” is not defined 
in the Code, it appears to encompass beer, as well as wine, 
spirits, alcohol, and other such substances.  See Code 
§ 4.1-100 (defining “[a]lcoholic beverages” as including 
all those substances, and further defining “[i]ntoxicated” 
with reference to “alcoholic beverages”). 
 
13
171, 174 (1966) (citing Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. 
Terrell, 149 Va. 344, 354-55, 141 S.E. 231, 235 (1928); 
Yorke v. Maynard, 173 Va. 183, 188, 3 S.E.2d 366, 369 
(1939); Bates, Adm’x v. Thompson, 200 Va. 501, 506, 106 
S.E.2d 728, 732 (1959)).  It is not sufficient merely to 
establish that the driver of an automobile has been 
drinking and that the passenger knew that fact.  Meade, 206 
Va. at 827, 147 S.E.2d at 174.  The evidence must also 
prove that the driver’s ability to operate the vehicle was 
impaired because of the consumption of alcoholic beverages, 
that the passenger knew, or in the exercise of ordinary 
care should have known, of the driver’s impaired ability, 
and that the passenger nevertheless entered or continued to 
ride in the vehicle.  Id.
Thus, we conclude that the question whether Leona knew 
or should have known that Charles’ ability to drive was 
impaired because of his consumption of beer and she, 
nevertheless, chose to continue to ride with him is the 
sole essential issue raised by Charles’ testimony regarding 
his contributory negligence defense, which, if unsupported 
by corroborating evidence, is fatal to his defense.  See 
Hereford, 226 Va. at 608, 311 S.E.2d at 792; see also 
Vaughn v. Shank, 248 Va. 224, 229, 445 S.E.2d 127, 130 
(1994) (holding that Code § 8.01-397 required corroboration 
 
14
of sole essential allegation on which claim was based); 
Ratliff, Adm’x v. Jewell, 153 Va. 315, 326, 149 S.E. 409, 
412 (1929) (“witness need not be corroborated on all 
material points, but must be supported on some essential 
fact whose establishment is necessary to sustain the 
judgment”).  We find no such corroborating evidence in the 
record. 
Even if we accept the stipulation and McClanahan’s 
testimony about the events at Mullins’ house as 
corroboration of Charles’ testimony that Leona knew about 
the plans to purchase beer, there nevertheless is not even 
a scintilla of evidence that “tends to confirm and 
strengthen” his assertion that Leona knew or should have 
known that his ability to drive was impaired.  Hereford, 
226 Va. at 608, 311 S.E.2d at 792.  Instead, we find 
evidence supporting a different conclusion.  Charles 
testified that, even though he felt a “buzz” when he 
stopped to use the bathroom, he did not have any trouble 
with his driving and did not believe anyone would view him 
as intoxicated.  Furthermore, the toxicologist stated that 
Charles’ degree of intoxication would not have been 
apparent to an objective observer because of his history of 
excessive drinking.  Thus, rather than having corroborating 
evidence that Leona knew that Charles’ ability to drive was 
 
15
impaired that evening, the record actually contains 
evidence indicating the opposite.  Nor is there evidence to 
corroborate Charles’ testimony that Leona voluntarily 
continued to ride in his truck with him even though she 
allegedly knew the extent of his drinking on that evening, 
and never asked to get out of the truck or to go home. 
Thus, we conclude that, while corroboration on all 
material points of Charles’ contributory negligence defense 
is not necessary, the essential issue raised by his 
testimony remains unsupported.  Hence, the circuit court 
did not err in striking Charles’ contributory negligence 
defense and submitting the case to the jury solely on the 
issue of damages.  Generally, when there is more than a 
scintilla of corroborating evidence, the question whether 
testimony has been sufficiently corroborated is an issue 
for the jury to resolve.  Brooks, 206 Va. at 357, 143 
S.E.2d at 845 (citing Timberlake’s Adm’r v. Pugh, 158 Va. 
397, 403, 163 S.E. 402, 404 (1932)).  However, for the 
reasons already stated, the circuit court correctly 
determined that Charles’ testimony was not corroborated as 
a matter of law.  See Whitmer v. Marcum, Adm’x, 214 Va. 64, 
68, 196 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1973)(“corroboration need not 
always present a jury issue”). 
 
16
 
Since Charles admitted his liability and the court 
properly struck his defense of contributory negligence, the 
only issue for the jury’s consideration was that concerning 
the question of damages.  Thus, we turn to the Rices’ 
assignment of error regarding the amount of damages 
awarded. 
The Rices argue that the jury verdict in the exact 
amount of Leona’s funeral expenses was inadequate as a 
matter of law because the verdict failed to compensate the 
statutory beneficiaries for the non-monetary elements of 
damage, such as sorrow, mental anguish, and loss of solace, 
despite uncontroverted evidence with regard to such 
damages.  In response, Charles contends that, because the 
jury was instructed that it “may” consider items of non-
economic damages but “shall” award damages for funeral 
expenses, the verdict is proper and supported by the 
evidence.8  We agree with the Rices. 
                     
8 The entire jury instruction on this issue states the 
following: 
 
If you find your verdict for the plaintiffs, then in 
determining the damages to which they are entitled, you may 
consider, but are not limited to, any of the following 
which you believe by the greater weight of the evidence 
were caused by the negligence of the defendant as damages 
suffered by the beneficiaries: 
 
(1) any sorrow, mental anguish, and loss of solace 
suffered by the beneficiaries.  Solace may 
 
17
 
In Bowers v. Sprouse, 254 Va. 428, 492 S.E.2d 637 
(1997), this Court held that “a jury award in a personal 
injury action which compensates a plaintiff for the exact 
amount of the plaintiff’s medical expenses and other 
special damages is inadequate as a matter of law, 
irrespective of whether those damages were controverted.”  
Id. at 431, 492 S.E.2d at 639.  Similarly, in Johnson, 
Adm’r v. Smith, 241 Va. 396, 403 S.E.2d 685 (1991), we 
examined the adequacy of a damage award in a wrongful death 
action.  In Johnson, the verdict represented only about two 
years of the decedent’s income for the widow, and only 
slightly more than one year of the decedent’s income for 
each of two children.  The verdict did not include any sum 
for sorrow, mental anguish, and solace for the decedent’s 
widow and children, nor any sum for the children’s lost 
services and protection.  Id. at 399, 403 S.E.2d at 686.  
We found that verdict “incomprehensible” and concluded that 
“the jury must have misconceived or misunderstood the facts 
                                                             
include society, companionship, comfort, 
guidance, kindly offices, and advise [sic] of the 
decedent. 
 
If you award damages, you may distribute these damages 
among Rita Sue Rice, Johnnie W. Rice, and Beverly Rice 
McClanahan. 
 
 
If you find your verdict for the plaintiff[s], you 
shall award damages for: 
 
18
or the law.”  Id. at 400-01, 403 S.E.2d at 687.  Accord 
Hall, Adm’x v. Hall, 240 Va. 360, 365, 397 S.E.2d 829, 832 
(1990). 
 
We reach the same conclusion in this case.  The jury 
verdict for the exact amount of Leona’s funeral expenses 
was inadequate as a matter of law because it failed to 
compensate her statutory beneficiaries for any other items 
of damage despite the fact that the court instructed the 
jury that Charles was liable for Leona’s death and any 
damages suffered by her parents and her sister.  By 
returning a verdict for only the amount of the funeral 
expenses, the jury demonstrated a misunderstanding of 
either the law or the facts, or both.  Furthermore, the 
evidence at trial clearly supported the conclusion that 
Leona’s statutory beneficiaries experienced sorrow, mental 
anguish, and loss of solace as a result of Leona’s death.  
Thus, they were entitled to compensation for these elements 
of damage.  See Bowers, 254 Va. at 431, 492 S.E.2d at 638. 
 
Our conclusion is not changed by the fact that the 
circuit court instructed the jury that it “shall award 
damages for . . . reasonable funeral expenses” but “may 
consider . . . any sorrow, mental anguish, and loss of 
solace suffered by the beneficiaries.”  (Emphasis added.)  
                                                             
(1) reasonable funeral expenses. 
 
19
We agree with Charles that this instruction is the law of 
this case because the circuit court gave it to the jury 
without any objection by the Rices, see King v. Sowers, 252 
Va. 71, 77, 471 S.E.2d 481, 484 (1996), and that the 
instruction does not incorporate the precise language of 
Code § 8.01-52.9  However, we do not accept Charles’ 
argument that the jury followed the instructions given to 
it and elected, as it was told it could by use of the term 
“may,” not to award any damages for non-economic losses. 
The damage instruction given to the jury in Bowers 
also used the term “may” with regard to the elements of 
damage to be considered by the jury.  254 Va. at 431 n.3, 
492 S.E.2d at 638 n.2.  Notwithstanding that fact, we did 
not approve the verdict, but instead concluded that the 
jury verdict for the exact amount of the plaintiff's 
medical expenses and other special damages in that case was 
inadequate as a matter of law.  Id. at 431, 492 S.E.2d at 
639.  Similarly, the use of the term “may” rather than 
“shall” with regard to damages for sorrow, mental anguish, 
                     
9 Code § 8.01-52 states that a verdict in a wrongful 
death action “shall include, but may not be limited to, 
damages for the following: 
1. Sorrow, mental anguish, and solace which may 
include society, companionship, comfort, guidance, 
kindly offices and advice of the decedent; 
. . . [and] 
4. Reasonable funeral expenses . . . . 
 
20
and loss of solace does not justify the jury’s failure in 
this case to compensate the statutory beneficiaries for any 
other items of damage. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court in part, reverse in part, and remand for a 
new trial solely on the issue of damages.  See Rawle v. 
McIlhenny, 163 Va. 735, 748, 177 S.E. 214, 220 (1934) (when 
evidence is insufficient to support verdict finding 
defendant not liable, new trial is limited to question of 
damages). 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   and remanded. 
 
21