Case Title: Baisley v. Missisquoi Cemetary Assoc.

Citation: 167 Vt. 473, 708 A.2d 924

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Baisley v. Missisquoi Cemetery Assoc.  (96-433); 167 Vt. 473; 708 A.2d 924

[Opinion Filed 23-Jan-1998]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 24-Mar-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 96-433

Tammy Baisley, et al.                       Supreme Court

                                            On Appeal from
     v.                                     Franklin Superior Court

Missisquoi Cemetery Association &           June Term, 1997
Robert Young, Sr.

Linda Levitt, J.

Timothy J. Ryan of Brown, Cahill, Gawne & Miller, St. Albans, for
  plaintiffs-appellants

Duncan Frey Kilmartin of Rexford & Kilmartin, Newport, for
  defendants-appellees

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   This wrongful death action was brought by the family and
  estate of Craig Baisley, a five-year-old boy who fell from a tree onto a
  metal spike fence, incurring injuries that resulted in his death.  The
  trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Missisquoi
  Cemetery Association (MCA) and its president, Robert Young, Sr., concluding
  that Craig was a trespasser to whom defendants owed no duty of care.  On
  appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in (1) holding that
  defendants owed no duty of care to plaintiffs' decedent, (2) denying
  partial summary judgment to plaintiffs on defendants' affirmative defenses,
  (3) refusing to compel discovery of a statement by defendants' sole
  employee against a claim of attorney-client privilege, and (4) barring
  plaintiffs from interviewing defendants' sole employee outside the presence
  of defendants' counsel.  We hold that defendants owed a duty of ordinary
  care to decedent, reverse the order of summary judgment on that issue, and
  do not reach the availability of defendants' defenses.  We affirm the
  orders denying discovery and the opportunity to interview defendants'
  employee without the presence of counsel.

 

       On the afternoon of October 22, 1991, five-year-old Craig Baisley
  followed his brother Jeffrey, Jr. and his friend Chris, both nine years
  old, to play in and around a nearby cemetery owned by MCA.  The two older
  boys were working on a ground fort north of the cemetery on the other side
  of some railroad tracks.  While working on the ground fort, they noticed
  the remnants of a tree house inside the cemetery.  After entering the
  cemetery and examining the tree house, they decided to build their own tree
  house in another tree.  They obtained a hammer from home and a ladder,
  which was lying in the railroad right-of-way north of the cemetery,
  apparently abandoned.  They chose a tree that stood immediately outside the
  cemetery, on land owned by neighbors Richard and Shelba Prive. 

       Between the cemetery grounds and the tree ran a metal fence along the
  boundary of the cemetery land.  The vertical bars of the fence were
  pointed, or "spiked."  The boys approached the fence and tree from inside
  the cemetery and placed the ladder over the fence and against the tree,
  enabling them to climb into the tree branches.  The tree branch on which
  Craig was standing broke, and he fell onto the spikes of the metal fence
  impaling himself.  He died shortly thereafter because of puncture wounds to
  his heart and lungs.

       Plaintiffs brought suit against MCA, its president, and the Prives,
  alleging defendants were negligent in allowing the hazardous condition
  caused by the tree and the fence.  The Prives eventually settled and were
  dismissed.  The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment, and the
  superior court granted the motion, holding that defendants owed decedent no
  duty of care because decedent was a trespasser on cemetery association
  land.  Plaintiffs' challenge to this holding is the main issue in this
  appeal.  Plaintiffs also ask us to rule that the affirmative defenses
  defendants have pled are not available, and grant plaintiffs partial
  summary judgment striking these defenses.      

       Two other issues arose in discovery.  Plaintiffs deposed the caretaker
  of the cemetery, Raymond Revoir, who is MCA's sole employee.  Revoir
  testified that he had worked for the cemetery association for fifteen
  years.  He stated that he had previously seen children 

 

  playing in the cemetery and had told them to go home, that he had seen
  remnants of an old tree house in the cemetery, and that he had seen a
  ladder on the railroad right-of-way several days before the accident. 
  Plaintiffs' attorney asked Revoir if he had spoken with defendants'
  attorney about the accident, to which Revoir answered affirmatively. 
  Defendants' attorney then asserted attorney-client privilege over the
  conversation between him and Revoir.  Plaintiffs moved for an order
  directing Revoir to answer the question, but the court ruled that the
  communication between Revoir and defendants' counsel was covered by MCA's
  attorney-client privilege.  Plaintiffs also moved to allow their counsel to
  interview Revoir outside the presence of defendants' counsel, but the court
  denied this motion on the basis that such an interview would be unethical.

                                     I.

       Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in granting summary
  judgment to defendants based on its conclusion that decedent was an
  undiscovered trespasser to whom defendants owed no duty of care.  Summary
  judgment is appropriate only where, taking the allegations of the nonmoving
  party as true, it is evident that there exist no genuine issues of material
  fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See
  Zukatis v. Perry, 165 Vt. 298, 300,