Case Title: LINDA KUNSELMAN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0167

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
LINDA KUNSELMAN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 85188 P.3d 567Case Number: S-07-0167Decided: 07/21/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
LINDA 
KUNSELMAN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; 
David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Linda 
Kunselman entered a conditional plea of no contest to a charge of felony 
possession of methamphetamine.  She 
reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion to 
suppress the methamphetamine evidence seized during a search of her purse 
following a traffic stop.  In this 
appeal, Kunselman challenges the legality of the initial stop, her detention 
following the stop, and the search of her purse.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The issue 
presented for our review is:

 
 
Trooper 
Wrights [sic] estimate of the speed of Linda Kunselman's pickup truck on a 
Wyoming 
highway did not meet the requirements of probable cause or reasonable suspicion 
necessary for search, seizure or investigatory detention and any evidence 
obtained as a result of such search or seizure should be 
suppressed.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On September 29, 
2005, Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Gaylen Wright was patrolling on Interstate 
80 in LaramieCounty near the Antelope 
Truck Stop.  He observed a pickup 
truck operated by Kunselman traveling on the frontage road in excess of the 
posted speed limit and initiated a traffic stop.  As Trooper Wright approached the truck, 
he saw Kunselman rocking side to side inside the truck and fidgeting in her 
seat.  Upon contacting her, the 
trooper noticed that Kunselman's eyes were "pinpointed," her speech was 
extremely rapid, and she was generally jittery.  

 
 
[¶4]      Trooper Wright 
asked Kunselman for her driver's license, registration, and proof of 
insurance.  Kunselman did not have a 
driver's license and was unable to produce a current insurance card.  She did, however, provide a Colorado identification 
(ID) card and the vehicle's registration.  
After obtaining the documents, Trooper Wright returned to his patrol 
car.  Using the information from the 
ID card, Trooper Wright ran a NCIC check, which indicated that Kunselman did not 
have a valid driver's license.  The 
trooper proceeded to write tickets for no driver's license and no insurance, as 
well as warnings for speeding and a cracked windshield.  As he prepared the tickets, the trooper 
glanced toward the truck and noticed that Kunselman had resumed rocking from 
side to side.  

 
 
[¶5]      When Trooper 
Wright finished writing the citations, he contacted Kunselman and asked her to 
step to the back of the truck, where he handed her the citations and returned 
her ID card and registration.  At 
that point, which was approximately ten minutes into the stop, the trooper asked 
Kunselman if she had any questions.  
She replied, "No," and Trooper Wright told her, "Okay.  Then we're done."  Kunselman said, "okay" and then walked 
to the front of her truck.  

 
 
[¶6]      About ten seconds 
later, Trooper Wright asked Kunselman if he could ask her a few more questions, 
to which Kunselman replied, "Sure."  
Trooper Wright then asked her three times, "When was the last time you 
used illegal drugs?"  Kunselman 
twice denied using illegal drugs before responding, "Well, 1985."  As she responded to his questions, 
Trooper Wright noticed what appeared to be needle marks and scabs on Kunselman's 
arms.  The trooper then asked her if 
she had any drugs in her truck.  
When Kunselman denied having any drugs in the truck, the trooper asked if 
he could search her purse.  Without 
replying to his question, Kunselman began looking through her purse.  At that point, Trooper Wright suggested 
they move to the back of the truck where there was more 
room.

 
 
[¶7]      Trooper Wright 
dropped the tailgate on the truck and Kunselman started removing items from her 
purse.  About this time, a second 
trooper arrived at the scene.  
Trooper Wright again asked her if she had any illegal drugs.  This time, Kunselman responded that she 
had some marijuana.  When Trooper 
Wright asked about its location, Kunselman removed a small flowered purse from 
inside the larger one and stated, "It's in there."  Trooper Wright looked inside the purse 
and noticed some capsules and a plastic baggie containing a crystal-like 
substance. When asked about the substance, Kunselman admitted it was 
methamphetamine.  Later testing 
confirmed the baggie contained approximately thirteen grams of 
methamphetamine.  

 
 
[¶8]      Kunselman was 
arrested and initially charged with two crimes:  felony possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.  Kunselman filed a motion to suppress the 
methamphetamine, claiming it was the fruit of an illegal detention under both 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 4 
of the Wyoming Constitution.  After 
a hearing, the district court denied the motion.  Thereafter, pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Kunselman pled no contest to the felony possession charge, reserving 
her right to appeal the district court's suppression ruling, and the State 
dismissed the remaining charge. The district court sentenced Kunselman to a term 
of confinement of two to three years, but suspended execution of that sentence 
in favor of three years supervised probation.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      Our standard of 
review is well established:

 
 
When 
reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer 
to the court's findings on factual issues unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 9, 97 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004).  We view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's decision because it 
is in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility, weigh the evidence 
and make the necessary inferences, deductions and conclusions.  Id.  The constitutionality of a particular 
search or seizure, however, is a question of law that we review de novo.  Id.

 
 

Hembree 
v. State, 
2006 WY 127, ¶ 7, 143 P.3d 905, 907 (Wyo. 2006); see also Marinaro v. State, 2007 WY 123, 
¶ 7, 163 P.3d 833, 835 (Wyo. 2007); Grant 
v. State, 2004 WY 45, ¶ 10, 88 P.3d 1016, 1018 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   Kunselman contends that the traffic 
stop was neither justified at its inception nor reasonably limited in scope to 
the purpose of the stop, a traffic violation.  The State counters that Kunselman waived 
her right to challenge the legality of the initial stop because she failed to 
present that claim in the district court in the first instance.  The State also contends that Trooper 
Wright's drug-related questioning of Kunselman following the conclusion of the 
traffic stop was supported by both Kunselman's consent and the trooper's 
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.

 
 
[¶11]   We first consider Kunselman's claim 
that the initial traffic stop was illegal.  
Upon careful review of the record, we must agree with the State that 
Kunselman did not present this claim in the district court.  We have consistently held that a guilty 
plea or nolo contendere plea waives appellate review of all non-jurisdictional 
claims.  Morgan v. State, 2004 WY 95, ¶ 23, 95 P.3d 802, 808 (Wyo. 2004); Bailey v. 
State, 12 P.3d 173, 177 (Wyo. 2000); Smith v. State, 871 P.2d 186, 188 
(Wyo. 1994); Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1361-62 
(Wyo. 1993); Davila v. State, 831 P.2d 204, 205 
(Wyo. 
1992).  Constitutional challenges to 
pretrial proceedings, including claims of unlawfully obtained evidence, as in 
this case, fall into the category of non-jurisdictional claims which do not 
survive a valid guilty plea or nolo contendere plea.  The only exception to the waiver rule 
can be found in W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2), which "allows a defendant to plead guilty 
while reserving the right to seek review on appeal of any specified pretrial 
motion."  Bailey, 12 P.3d  at 177.  However, we have held that a conditional 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, while providing a mechanism for appellate 
review, does not provide carte 
blanche permission for an appellant to present any and all arguments on 
appeal.  Morgan, ¶¶ 24-25, 95 P.3d  at 808-09 
(citing Bailey, 12 P.3d at 177-78); 
see also Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶¶ 10-12, 
135 P.3d 620, 623-24 (Wyo. 2006); Lindsay 
v. State, 2005 WY 34, ¶¶ 16-17, 19 n.7, 108 P.3d 852, 856-57 n.7 (Wyo. 
2005).  Instead, an appellant may 
only argue those issues which were clearly brought to the attention of the 
district court.  Morgan, ¶ 24, 95 P.3d  at 
808-09.

 
 
[¶12]   In her motion to suppress and her 
argument at the suppression hearing, Kunselman focused on the scope and duration 
of the stop and the subsequent search of her purse.  She did not argue Trooper Wright lacked 
sufficient cause to perform a stop for speeding nor did she contest in any 
manner the reasonableness of the initial traffic stop.  In fact, in her motion to suppress, 
Kunselman acknowledged as a factual matter that Trooper Wright stopped her for 
exceeding the posted speed limit.  
Under our well-established precedent, Kunselman's conditional plea of no 
contest preserved only those issues raised in her suppression motion.  Kunselman did not contest the legality 
of the initial traffic stop in the district court and, accordingly, waived her 
right to make that argument on appeal.  
Morgan, ¶ 25, 95 P.3d  at 
809.  Consequently, we will not 
consider it.

 
 
[¶13]   We now turn to Kunselman's 
contention that Trooper Wright exceeded the constitutionally permissible scope 
of the stop by asking her about the presence of illegal drugs.  The problem with Kunselman's argument is 
that the challenged questioning occurred after her detention on the traffic 
violation had terminated.  Trooper 
Wright had returned Kunselman's ID card and other documentation, given her the 
citations and indicated that she could leave, thus concluding the traffic 
stop.  The propriety of any further 
interaction at that juncture depends on Kunselman's consent or the presence of 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  
O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, 
¶¶ 35, 48-49, 117 P.3d 401, 412, 414-15 (Wyo. 2005).

 

[¶14]   The district court determined that 
Kunselman voluntarily consented to further questioning and that the trooper's 
subsequent brief questioning was reasonable under all of the circumstances. 
Whether Kunselman voluntarily consented to the additional questioning is a 
question of fact which must be determined in light of the totality of the 
circumstances.  Grant, ¶ 22, 88 P.3d  at 1021.  Some of the factors which may be 
considered in assessing whether the consent was voluntary include: the way the 
request was phrased by the trooper, whether Kunselman knew she could refuse the 
request, and the presence of other coercive factors.  Marinaro, ¶ 10, 163 P.3d  at 835 (citing 
O'Boyle, ¶ 60, 117 P.3d at 418).  

 
 
[¶15]   The record discloses that: (1) the 
entire traffic stop was very brief, with the initial traffic detention lasting 
about ten minutes; (2) Kunselman remained in her vehicle while the trooper 
prepared the traffic citations; (3) she was not questioned concerning matters 
unrelated to the motor vehicle infractions; (4) Kunselman knew she was free to 
go at the time the request was made; (5) the trooper's conduct throughout the 
encounter was professional and neither threatening nor otherwise overbearing; 
and (6) Kunselman's consent to further questioning was unhesitant and 
immediate.  Under the totality of 
the circumstances, we have no trouble concluding that Kunselman's consent was 
voluntary.  We do not perceive 
Kunselman's consent as mere acquiescence to avoid resistance as condemned in O'Boyle.  In our view, a reasonable person in 
Kunselman's position would have felt free to refuse the trooper's request and 
proceed on her way.  Marinaro, ¶ 11, 163 P.3d  at 836.  Consequently, we cannot conclude that 
constitutional boundaries were transgressed in this instance.1

 
 
[¶16]   As a final matter, Kunselman claims 
that an illegal search of her purse occurred.  We disagree.  In response to questioning, Kunselman 
admitted having marijuana.  She then 
produced a small flowered purse and stated, "It's in there."  By handing the purse to Trooper Wright, 
Kunselman gave implicit consent for the trooper to look inside.  Furthermore, Kunselman's admission that 
the purse contained marijuana provided probable cause for the trooper to search 
it.  Keller v. State, 2007 WY 170, ¶ 15, 169 P.3d 867, 870 (Wyo. 2007); Vassar v. 
State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 19, 99 P.3d 987, 995 (Wyo. 2004).  We conclude that the trooper's search of 
Kunselman's purse was constitutionally reasonable under the 
circumstances.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   Kunselman waived her right to 
contest the validity of the initial traffic stop when she failed to present that 
issue to the district court.  We 
hold that Kunselman voluntarily consented to further questioning after the 
traffic stop was completed, and that the subsequent search of her purse was 
proper.  We, therefore, affirm the 
judgment and sentence of the district court.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Our 
conclusion that Kunselman consented to the additional questioning obviates the 
need to address the State's contention that the trooper had sufficient 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to question her about the presence of 
illegal drugs.