Case Title: Huerta v. Flood

Citation: 103 Ariz. 608, 447 P.2d 866

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1968-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
103 Ariz. 608 (1968) 447 P.2d 866 C. Lawrence HUERTA, Petitioner, v. Al J. FLOOD, Justice of the Peace, West Phoenix Precinct, Maricopa County, Arizona, Respondent. No. 9378. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. November 22, 1968. *609 Jack C. Cavness, Harry A. Stewart, Jr., and Leon S. Jacobs, Phoenix, for petitioner. Robert K. Corbin, Maricopa County Atty., by Stephen A. Gerst and Jerry M. Stewart, Deputy County Attys., Phoenix, for respondent. UDALL, Vice Chief Justice. The petitioner, C. Lawrence Huerta, seeks from this Court a writ of prohibition against the Justice of the Peace of the West Phoenix Precinct, Maricopa County, from proceeding further in the pending criminal matter of State v. Huerta. Petitioner, an incumbent judge of the Superior Court, Maricopa County, has been charged in six counts of violating A.R.S. § 13-1021 which reads: The petitioner has sought a writ of prohibition on several grounds, one of which is the averred unconstitutionality of A.R.S. § 13-1021. Since the question of constitutionality is dispositive of the case before us we shall not discuss the other issues raised by the petitioner. Similar, but not identical statutes have been upheld in other jurisdictions, see e.g., Section 104.31, Florida Statutes,[1] which *610 was upheld in other jurisdictions, see e.g. Section 104.31, Florida Statutes,[1] which was upheld by the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Stuler, Fla., 122 So. 2d 1. See also United States of America v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 50 S. Ct. 167, 74 L. Ed. 508; In the Matter of Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 1 S. Ct. 381, 27 L. Ed. 232; Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 281 Mass. 253, 183 N.E. 495, 85 A.L.R. 1141. The reason or justification for the type of legislation, generally, is readily seen. As is pointed out in Kaplan's "The Law of Civil Service, Chapter 12, such statutes seek to maintain "reasonable neutrality of public employees," to prevent public employees from engaging in "pernicious political activities inimical to the public interest and to protect the public itself from the impositions of political organizations which might be tempted to coerce political action of public employees." Many years ago, then Chief Justice Waite of the United States Supreme Court put it this way: We find no difficulty in holding that the purpose behind such legislation as A.R.S. § 13-1021 is constitutional; our difficulty lies in finding that certainty or specificity in the new crime here created which is required by the hallowed rule of construction that "* * * a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess *611 at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322. See also State v. Miller, 100 Ariz. 288, 413 P.2d 757 and cases therein cited. A.R.S. § 13-1021 prescribes that "no public officer or public employee of the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision shall * * * indirectly * * * ask * * * any officer or employee * * *, over which he has direct supervision, to pay, lend, or contribute * * * anything * * * of value to any party, committee, organization, agency or person for political purposes." In its attempt to curb corrupt practices in politics has this statute gone so far as to shackle the fundamental right of certain of its citizens to engage in political activities? Has it now become a crime for a school principal who is head of one of the political subdivisions of this state to "ask" a school employee if he would like to circulate literature for a candidate to a political office not in any way connected to the school system? Is it now a crime and a felony for an incumbent legislator to "ask" his secretary if she would mind driving two blocks out of her way to drop some political letters by the post office on her way home? Without dwelling further on parenthetical questions it is not hard for one to imagine a multiplicity of situations where a public officer or employee might, in all innocence, "indirectly" * * * "ask" * * * "something of value" for some "political purpose." We have held that the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended. State v. Miller, supra; State v. Curry, 97 Ariz. 191, 398 P.2d 899. A study of the legislative history of A.R.S. § 13-1021 reveals that the word "ask" did not appear in the original bill. As originally proposed the bill stated, "No person shall directly or indirectly coerce or attempt to coerce * * *" Thus the legislative intent is clear that in the act as passed they intended to prohibit not only coercion and attempts to coerce, but also commandments and mere askings. The more ordinary meanings of "ask" are to inquire, to speak or utter a question, to call on for an answer. "Ask" implies no more than the putting of a question. See Webster's New International Dictionary, Third Edition. Thus where we readily acknowledge a compelling public interest in prohibiting public officers or employees from coercing or commanding other public officers or employees into making political contributions we do not believe the legislature can constitutionally, broadly restrict the right of one individual to ask or inquire of another if he would like to make a political contribution. It's an old cliche that "there's no harm in asking." We quote with approval the language of the Supreme Court of California in Fort v. Civil Service Commission of County of Alameda, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d 385. Aside from the vagueness and uncertainty of the statute, the apparent infringement on fundamental political rights *612 and freedom of speech, A.R.S. § 13-1021 may be unconstitutional for yet another reason, the degree of punishment. It will be noted that the complaint filed against the petitioner described the crime set out in the statute as a felony, and the punishment prescribed by the statute clearly shows that the legislature intended it to be a felony since the punishment could extend to three years imprisonment in the state prison, a fine of not to exceed $5,000 or both. The classification distinguishing a "felony" from a "misdemeanor" is set out in A.R.S. § 13-103: Section 13-1021, A.R.S., as amended, makes no provision for imprisonment in the county jail. In Section 13-1645, A.R.S., the statute provides: It is argued by the respondents that a violation of the statute could be treated as a felony or misdemeanor, according to the gravity of the offense. This argument, however, is entirely repudiated by the sections of the Criminal Code which makes the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. Under the Arizona law it is impossible for one convicted of a violation of § 13-1021, to be sentenced for a misdemeanor, since the punishment provides for imprisonment in the state prison, by a fine not to exceed $5,000, or both. In Fort v. Civil Service Commission of Alameda County, supra, the California court clearly stated that a statute which is partially valid and partially invalid cannot stand: See also, In re Blaney, 30 Cal. 2d 643, 184 P.2d 892. In this case the close relationship of employer and employee, working together in the same office, could, by the commission of a minor infraction, have the offense magnified to the full scale of a felony that might bring punishment of three years in the penitentiary, a fine of $5,000, or both. A careful study of the statute shows clearly that the law is vague and uncertain, and that to endeavor to enforce it would deprive the petitioner of equal protection of the law. The minor nature of the offense, if it can be called an offense, is entirely out of proportion to the gravity of the punishment that could be inflicted upon the alleged offender. We conclude that Section 13-1021 of Arizona Revised Statutes, as amended, is *613 unconstitutional and void. The writ of prohibition heretofore granted is made permanent. I concur with the majority both in their view that the Statute A.R.S. § 13-1021 tends to deny political rights and that what is sought to be forbidden is so vaguely expressed that men of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at the intended meaning. "Anything of value" necessarily includes labor and services. So, a public officer such as the governor, for example, cannot seek re-election without incurring the risk that anything he might say or do in directing his campaign will be construed as a command or an asking. If his directions reach or are relayed to a public employee who is a volunteer worker in the campaign, and who is employed in a department over which he has direct supervision, then he has violated the Act. Nor can his wife, relatives or friends act for him since this is "indirectly" doing what the statute forbids. A.R.S. § 13-1021 is so inartfully drawn that the literal language provokes the possibility that any public officer bona fide engaging in election activities can be accused of a felony. I am of the opinion that the Act unconstitutionally curtails the right to engage in political activities. A rule of law frequently applied by courts is that where there are valid and invalid parts in the same section, paragraph or even sentence of an Act, the valid parts may stand and the invalid parts may be rejected. We said in State v. Coursey, 71 Ariz. 227, 225 P.2d 713: Conceivably, the members of this court might, by striking out words believed to be intrinsically objectionable and defining others so as to limit their operational effect, salvage a part of the Act. But, this presents the question whether the court should undertake what is in the end a legislative responsibility, that is the designing of a law with such clarity that reasonable men may know what conduct must be avoided. Here, the language of the Act so obscures the reach and scope of the legislative intent in certain areas that I am unsure just exactly what conduct was meant to be prohibited. It is clear that whatever conduct was intended to be prohibited is punishable by confinement in the state prison. Rather than embark on such a perilous voyage with human liberties as the stakes, I join with the majority in their belief that the entire Act should be stricken. [1] The pertinent part of Section 104.31, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides: "Political activities of state, county and municipal officers and employees. "(1) No officer or employee of the state, or of any county or municipality thereof, except as hereinafter exempted from provisions hereof, shall * * * "(b) directly or indirectly coerce or attempt to coerce, command or advise any other officer or employee to pay, lend or contribute any part of his salary, kickback any sum of money, or anything else of value to any party, committee, organization, agency or person for political purposes, * * *."