Case Title: Commonwealth v. Woods

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12324

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12324 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  THOMAS A. WOODS. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     April 5, 2018. - August 7, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Grand Jury.  Evidence, Testimony before grand jury.  
Practice, Criminal, Grand jury proceedings.  Witness, Self-
incrimination. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 5, 2006.  
 
 
Following review by this court, 466 Mass. 707 (2014), a 
motion for a new trial was heard by Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J.  
 
 
A request for leave was allowed by Lowy, J., in the Supreme 
Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
 
Myles D. Jacobson for the defendant. 
 
Carolyn A. Burbine, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Thomas A. Woods, appeals from 
the denial of his motion for a new trial.  In 2009, the 
defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and 
sentenced to life in prison.  On direct appeal, he challenged 
2 
 
 
the admission of his grand jury testimony -- later used as 
substantive evidence at trial -- arguing that it was illegally 
obtained, because he was not informed before testifying either 
that he was a target of a grand jury investigation, or that he 
had a right against self-incrimination.  The court concluded 
that the trial judge did not err in finding that the defendant 
was not a target of the grand jury when he was called before the 
grand jury to testify, and affirmed his conviction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 709, 716-720, cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2855 (2014) (Woods I).  In doing so, the 
court also announced a prospective rule, pursuant to its 
superintendence authority, requiring that grand jury witnesses 
who are targets or likely targets of a criminal investigation be 
given self-incrimination warnings before testifying.  Id. at 
719-720.  
 
Following Woods I, the defendant moved for a new trial, 
contending that facts not before the trial judge or this court 
during his direct appeal establish that the defendant was a 
target of a grand jury investigation; accordingly, the defendant 
argued, his grand jury testimony was improperly admitted, and he 
deserved a new trial.  The motion judge, who was not the trial 
judge, disagreed, concluding that although the new facts raised 
in the defendant's motion establish that he was a target of the 
investigation, this court's holding in Woods I "was not 
3 
 
 
dependent on the finding that the defendant was not a target."  
The defendant then filed a petition before a single justice of 
the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, asking that 
his appeal from the denial of his motion be considered by the 
full court.  The single justice granted the petition in March, 
2017, concluding that it "present[ed] a new and substantial 
question which ought to be determined by the full court."  G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.   
 
For the reasons that follow, we discern no error in the 
motion judge's conclusion, and affirm the denial of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial.   
 
Background.  The facts underlying the defendant's 
conviction of murder in the first degree are fully set forth in 
Woods I, 466 Mass. at 709-712.  We review only those facts 
pertinent to the defendant's postconviction proceedings.   
 
1.  Grand jury investigation.  In February, 2006, the 
defendant appeared as the fifth witness to testify before a 
grand jury investigating the December, 2005, shooting death of 
Paul Mullen in Brockton.  Prior to testifying, the defendant had 
been interviewed by police twice.  Four witnesses testified 
before the grand jury prior to the defendant, and two of those 
witnesses -- David Sheff and Nicole Derochea -- stated that they 
had had heard, secondhand, that the defendant had threatened to 
shoot the victim before the killing occurred.  When the 
4 
 
 
defendant appeared to testify, he was not informed that he was a 
target of the investigation or that he had a right against self-
incrimination.  In his grand jury testimony, he provided an 
exculpatory version of events on the night of the shooting, and 
explained certain inconsistencies between this version of events 
and what he had said during his prior interviews with police.  
At the end of a nine-month investigation that involved 
approximately forty witnesses and generated 1,700 pages of 
transcripts, the grand jury returned an indictment against the 
defendant in October, 2006.   
 
2.  Defendant's pretrial motion in limine.  In March, 2009, 
the defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude his grand jury 
testimony from use at his trial,1 arguing that he was "not 
informed that [he] was a target of the grand jury investigation" 
or that he could exercise his right not to testify.  The motion 
stated the date of the defendant's grand jury appearance 
(February 10, 2006).  The Commonwealth sought to introduce that 
testimony in order to illustrate "wide-ranging inconsistencies 
and implausibilities in [the defendant's] account[]" of the 
night of the shooting.  See Woods I, 466 Mass. at 712 ("His 
                     
 
1 The motion was also directed at the defendant's prior 
statements to police, but the defendant raises no claim of error 
with respect to those statements.  
5 
 
 
grand jury testimony was admitted in evidence  . . . to 
illustrate his conflicting stories and outright lies").   
 
 
3.  Commonwealth's pretrial motion in limine.  On April 24, 
2009, the Commonwealth filed its own motion in limine seeking to 
admit evidence of prior bad acts by the defendant.  The motion 
described the testimony of five grand jury witnesses, including 
Derochea, who were expected to testify at trial regarding 
threats made by the defendant against the victim.  The 
Commonwealth attached to the motion the transcripts of the five 
witnesses' testimony.  It is not clear from the record, however, 
the form in which those transcripts were presented -- 
specifically, whether the attachments clarified the date of each 
witness's testimony -- because those attachments were not 
included with the Commonwealth's motion as part of the instant 
record.2   
 
4.  Pretrial hearing on the motions.  On April 27, 2009, 
the trial judge held a hearing on both motions.  Defense counsel 
reiterated the position that the defendant's testimony was 
involuntary because he was a target of the investigation but did 
not receive "any warnings that he didn't have to submit to that 
                     
 
2 We can nevertheless conclude that the Commonwealth 
provided these transcripts to the trial judge because the 
Commonwealth's motion stated that the grand jury transcripts for 
the witnesses were attached and, at the hearing on the motion, 
the Commonwealth asked the judge to impound those attachments.  
 
6 
 
 
questioning or that he could assert his Fifth Amendment 
privilege."3  He argued that the issue was "whether or not the 
government was under any obligation to inform [the defendant] he 
was the target of the investigation and . . . that he had a 
Fifth Amendment privilege."  Counsel acknowledged that he 
"ha[d]n't found a state case directly on point," and stated that 
his argument was based on his own practical experience, having 
never witnessed a situation where a grand jury target was not 
informed of that status or given warnings before testifying.  
Before asking the Commonwealth for its position, the trial judge 
likewise stated, "I didn't realize this was an issue, so I 
haven't researched the law on it.  I know in the federal system 
                     
 
3 Defense counsel's pretrial argument that the defendant was 
a target was based solely on the defendant's own grand jury 
testimony:  "[I]f you read [the defendant's grand jury 
testimony], it's abundantly clear that he was a target . . . .  
[H]e is being confronted by the prosecutor in a way that is 
designed to further build the case against him that they already 
have, in their mind, made. . . .  It's not a well, what 
happened, what did you see, and what did you do; it's a 
confrontational interview or interrogation in front of the grand 
jury where he's not represented by counsel.  And he's clearly 
the target of the investigation at that point."  The prosecutor 
responded that he had taken the same approach to examining the 
defendant as he had with other grand jury witnesses who had 
provided inconsistent statements to police, and that such "a 
vigorous examination of a witness [in] a grand jury 
investigation . . . doesn't make the person a target at the time 
of the examination."  At the hearing, the trial judge indicated 
that he agreed with the Commonwealth:  "[W]hen I read the grand 
jury, it didn't jump out to me that he was a target. . . .  I 
got the impression, clearly, that they felt he knew more than he 
was saying, and that was the gist of the question[ing]."     
7 
 
 
if somebody's going to be a target, they're told.  But I haven't 
researched this whole issue, but I will."     
 
The trial judge asked the prosecutor, who had also been 
responsible for the grand jury investigation:  "At the time -- 
if you can say this, because it would change the whole way that 
I'd have to view this, in your opinion, was [the defendant] a 
target of the investigation when you brought him to the grand 
jury?"  The prosecutor replied that although the defendant's 
inconsistencies in his earlier statements to police made him "a 
person of interest" -- "[t]here were things that weren't adding 
up . . . that he seemed to know a lot more than he was letting 
on.  And so that was the nature of our inquiry with [the 
defendant]" -- the Commonwealth did not consider him a "target" 
until additional "witnesses came in and testified about 
threatening statements . . . that [the defendant] had made to 
[the victim], and additional information was gathered about [the 
defendant] as the investigation went on in subsequent months 
leading up to [the] October" indictment.  The prosecutor added 
that had the defendant been a target, he would have received a 
letter informing him of that status.   
 
On May 6, 2009, the trial judge issued an oral ruling 
denying the defendant's motion.  He found that "[b]ased upon the 
evidence before [him], the defendant . . . was not a target, but 
[the Commonwealth] believed that he knew more than he told and 
8 
 
 
he was not being fully truthful."4  The judge also found that the 
defendant was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, 
threatened, coerced, or offered false promises when appearing 
before the grand jury, and "was treated appropriately," such 
that his testimony was free and voluntary under the totality of 
the circumstances.   
 
5.  Defendant's direct appeal.  At trial, the jury found 
the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.  On direct 
appeal, he continued to press his objection to the introduction 
of his grand jury testimony, arguing that it infringed on his 
"federal and state law rights against compelled self-
incrimination."  We rejected the argument that self-
incrimination warnings were legally required at the time, thus 
upholding the trial judge's denial of the defendant's motion in 
limine.  Woods I, 466 Mass. at 716-720.  We discerned no error 
in the trial judge's finding that the defendant was not a 
                     
4 As for what the trial judge had before him when making 
this determination, it appears from the available record that 
the judge had received the date and transcript of the 
defendant's own grand jury testimony, established through the 
defendant's motion in limine and the submission of the 
transcript of the defendant's testimony.  In addition (albeit in 
connection with the Commonwealth's separate motion to admit 
evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts), the trial judge had 
received the transcripts of five additional grand jury witnesses 
(including Nicole Derochea); however, because the Commonwealth's 
attachments are not a part of the instant record, we cannot 
discern how informed the judge might have been as to the content 
and date of each of those five witness's testimony.   
9 
 
 
target, and added that "[e]ven if the defendant were a 'target,' 
the Commonwealth was under no obligation to warn him of that 
status" under Federal or State law.  Id. at 717, citing United 
States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188-190 (1977), and 
Commonwealth v. D'Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 743 (1999).   
We then "consider[ed] for the first time" what we perceived 
as "the defendant's separate argument that the Commonwealth must 
advise targets or potential targets of the grand jury's 
investigation of their right not to incriminate themselves."  
Woods I, 466 Mass. at 717-718.  Concluding that a grand jury 
summons "is a form of compulsion," we "adopt[ed] a rule that 
where, at the time a person appears to testify before a grand 
jury, the prosecutor has reason to believe that the witness is 
either a 'target' or is likely to become one, the witness must 
be advised, before testifying, that (1) he or she may refuse to 
answer any question if a truthful answer would tend to 
incriminate the witness, and (2) anything that he or she does 
say may be used against the witness in a subsequent legal 
proceeding" (footnote omitted).  Id. at 719-720.5  We clarified 
                     
 
5 The court adopted the United States Attorney's Manual 
definition of "target," as "a person as to whom the prosecutor 
or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him or her to 
the commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the 
prosecutor, is a putative defendant."  Commonwealth v. Woods, 
466 Mass. 707, 716, 719 n.12 (2014) (Woods I), quoting United 
States Attorneys' Manual § 9-11.151 (2009). 
   
10 
 
 
that the rule is nonconstitutional and therefore "is only 
required to be applied prospectively."  Id. at 720.   
 
6.  Motion for a new trial.  The defendant subsequently 
moved for a new trial, where he focused primarily on refuting 
the trial judge's factual determination that he was not a target 
of the investigation.6  The defendant attached the grand jury 
testimony of the four witnesses who had testified before the 
defendant during the grand jury investigation, but whose 
testimony was largely unknown to the trial judge, and therefore 
was not a part of the record in Woods I.7  Two of those witnesses 
-- Sheff and Derochea -- testified to hearsay statements they 
had heard about threats the defendant had made against the 
victim before the shooting.  The motion judge agreed that the 
grand jury testimony of these two witnesses constituted 
"substantial evidence" linking the defendant to the crime, thus 
                     
 
6 The defendant contended that the trial judge's finding 
that the defendant was not a target resulted from ineffective 
assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.  The 
defendant separately argued that he was "deprived of a fair 
opportunity for proper application of the Humane Practice Rule," 
but he does not continue to pursue that claim before us.  
  
 
7 The defendant submitted the grand jury testimony of the 
four witnesses who had testified at the grand jury prior to his 
own testimony, including David Sheff and Derochea, with his 
motion for a new trial.  Although the trial judge had received 
Derochea's testimony in some manner (as part of the 
Commonwealth's motion in limine to admit prior bad act evidence, 
see note 4, supra), it does not appear that the transcripts of 
the testimony of Sheff and the other two witnesses were provided 
to the trial judge. 
11 
 
 
rendering him "a target or potential target of the 
investigation."  The judge declined to grant the defendant a new 
trial on that basis, however, concluding that this court's 
decision in Woods I was not dependent on the factual finding 
that the defendant was not a target of the investigation.   
 
Discussion.  A single justice's determination that a 
petition raises a "new and substantial question" under G. L. 
c. 277, § 33E, is "final and unreviewable."  Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 437 Mass. 1008, 1008 (2002).  We review the denial of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial for "a significant error of 
law or other abuse of discretion" (citation omitted). 
Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 441 (2006).  The 
defendant argues that the motion judge made such an error in 
concluding that this court's decision in Woods I upholding the 
admission of the defendant's grand jury testimony did not depend 
on the factual finding that the defendant was not a target of 
the investigation.  The motion judge did not err. 
 
First, the language of Woods I makes clear that the motion 
judge was correct.  On direct appeal, the defendant raised the 
very same legal argument that he puts before us now:  because he 
was a target of the grand jury, he was entitled to self-
incrimination warnings.  The court specified in Woods I, 466 
Mass. at 717, that "[e]ven if the defendant were a 'target,' the 
Commonwealth was under no obligation to warn him of that status" 
12 
 
 
(emphasis added).  Likewise, addressing "the defendant's 
separate argument" regarding self-incrimination warnings, the 
court acknowledged that it was considering the issue "for the 
first time" -- meaning that nothing prior to Woods I required 
self-incrimination warnings as a matter of law.  Id. at 717-718.  
In other words, just as the Commonwealth was under no obligation 
to warn the defendant of his target status, even if he were a 
target, so too was the Commonwealth under no obligation at that 
time to advise the defendant of his right against self-
incrimination.  The court adopted that very requirement in the 
defendant's case, and stated that it was to apply only 
prospectively, "to grand jury testimony elicited after the 
issuance of the rescript in [that] case."  Id. at 720.  Thus, 
irrespective of the defendant's target status, he was not 
entitled to the new rule.8   
                     
 
8 Notwithstanding the language of Woods I, the defendant 
suggests in a single sentence of his brief that he is entitled 
to the retroactive benefit of the Woods I rule, based on the 
court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 667 
(2005).  See Commonwealth v. Candelario, 446 Mass. 847, 859 
(2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 714 n.1 
(2000) (single sentence stating claim with citation 
"[in]adequate for appellate consideration" under Mass. R. A. P. 
16 [a] [4], as amended, 367 Mass. 921 [1975]).  He expands on 
this argument somewhat in a postargument letter prompted by a 
question during oral argument concerning Adjutant's potential 
application.  In Adjutant, the court announced a new common-law 
rule of evidence, and concluded that the defendant should be 
given the benefit of the new rule -- thus entitling her to a new 
trial -- because the defendant had alleged the error and argued 
for the new rule on direct appeal.  Adjutant, supra, citing 
13 
 
 
As the motion judge recognized, the sole difference between 
the defendant's argument on direct and his argument on 
collateral review is the factual basis for his claim that he was 
a target:  now, in addition to his own testimony, he offers the 
testimony of the four witnesses who appeared before him during 
the grand jury investigation (and whose testimony the motion 
judge deemed "substantial evidence" establishing that the 
defendant was a target).  At the core of the defendant's instant 
argument are the dual suggestions that, had the trial judge been 
made aware that two witnesses (Sheff and Derochea) testified at 
the grand jury before the defendant did, regarding prior threats 
the defendant had made against the victim, the trial judge (1) 
would have found that the defendant was a "target" by the time 
he testified, and (2) would have granted on that basis the 
                     
Commonwealth v. Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 721 n.10 (2004), cert. 
denied, 544 U.S. 930 (2005).  Adjutant is inapposite because 
that case involved a defendant's direct appeal, whereas this 
case involves the defendant's postconviction proceedings.  The 
defendant offers no authority to support the claim that he is 
entitled to the retroactive benefit, on collateral review, of a 
nonconstitutional rule first announced in his direct appeal, 
where the court specified that the rule would apply "only . . . 
to grand jury testimony elicited after the issuance of the 
rescript in [Woods I.]"  Woods I, 466 Mass. at 720.  We likewise 
reject the defendant's related assertion that the Woods I rule 
is in fact constitutional, not procedural, on the ground that it 
is "based in" the constitutional protection against self-
incrimination.  See id. at 720 ("This rule is not a new 
constitutional rule, but rather an exercise of our power of 
superintendence").   
14 
 
 
defendant's motion to exclude the defendant's grand jury 
testimony.   
We are in no position to engage in such speculation.  
First, the fact that the motion judge concluded, based on this 
new testimony, that the defendant was a target does not 
automatically establish that the trial judge would have reached 
the same conclusion.  Both Sheff and Derochea's testimony 
involved hearsay, and this may well have affected the weight 
that the trial judge would have assigned their testimony when 
determining whether it constituted "substantial evidence" that 
the defendant was a target when he testified.9  It was not until 
after the defendant testified that the grand jury heard from 
additional witnesses who described hearing the defendant's 
threats firsthand.   
Second, even assuming that the trial judge would have 
concluded based on this additional testimony that the defendant 
was a target, we cannot say that he would have excluded the 
defendant's grand jury testimony on that basis.  The defendant 
focuses extensively, and exclusively, on the trial judge's 
comment at the motion in limine hearing that the defendant's 
                     
 
9 In ruling on the defendant's pretrial motion in limine, 
the trial judge rejected the defendant's argument (which he 
continues to argue before us) that the defendant's own grand 
jury testimony, and the nature of the prosecutor's questioning, 
also demonstrate that he was a target.  See note 3, supra.   
15 
 
 
status as a target "would change the whole way that [he would] 
have to view this" issue.  What the defendant omits is the trial 
judge's additional comment, made at the very outset of the 
hearing, that he had not yet researched the law regarding the 
defendant's position that target warnings were required.  As our 
above discussion makes clear, had the trial judge done so, he 
would have discovered that such warnings were not legally 
required at that time, and thus the Commonwealth's failure to 
provide the defendant with such a warning did not preclude them 
from using that testimony at trial.   
Conclusion.  We decline to grant the defendant a new trial 
on collateral review based on an alleged violation of a right 
that simply did not exist at the time of his trial.10  We affirm 
the denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.   
                     
 
10 In light of our conclusion that the Woods I rule did not 
hinge on the defendant's target status, we need not address the 
defendant's related arguments that the trial judge's finding 
that the defendant was not a target was the product of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or 
both.