Case Title: Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 29	
July 23, 2020	
715
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
ALBANY & EASTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
an Oregon corporation,
Respondent on Review.
v.
Michael MARTELL
and Cindy Martell, a married couple;
John Harcrow and Elaine Harcrow, a married couple;
Jeffrey Kaiser and Beyerly Kaiser, a married couple;
Joanne Fagan, an individual;
Ray McMullen and Michelle McMullen, a married couple;
Jeremy Orr and Karen Orr, a married couple;
Richard Hutchins and Jill Hutchins, a married couple;
Laura Mithoug, an individual,
Petitioners on Review.
(CC 13CV00291) (CA A161921) (SC S066941)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*	
Argued and submitted March 12, 2020.
Dan Armstrong, Heilig Misfeldt &Armstrong, LLP, Corvallis, 
argued the cause and filed the briefs for the petitioners on 
review.
Martin E. Hansen, Francis Hansen & Martin, LLP, Bend, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
Also on the briefs was Christopher J. Manfredi, Bend.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The 
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
______________
	
*  Appeal from Linn County Circuit Court, David E. Delsman, Judge. 298 Or 
App 99, 445 P3d 319 (2019).
716	
Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell
Case Summary: Since at least 1942, defendants and their predecessors have 
accessed their residential properties using a private roadway that crossed rail­
road tracks and land owned by plaintiff, Albany & Eastern Railroad Company 
(AERC). The railroad crossing was long believed to a public crossing. After deter­
mining that the crossing was actually private, plaintiff brought suit against 
defendants, seeking to quiet title in the disputed crossing and also alleging and 
seeking damages for trespass. Defendants asserted various affirmative defenses 
and counterclaims, including that they each had a prescriptive easement over 
the crossing because they and their predecessors had used the crossing openly, 
notoriously, and adversely to AERC and its predecessors for at least 10 continu­
ous years. The trial court held the common-law presumption of adversity applied 
and also that the residents had proved, by clear and convincing evidence, actual 
adversity and the other elements required to establish a prescriptive easement. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in concluding 
that the presumption of adversity applied, and held that there was no evidence 
that defendants’ use of the crossing was adverse to plaintiff’s interests. Held: Any 
subjective misunderstanding regarding the public or private nature of the cross­
ing does not affect the application of the presumption of adversity, and plaintiff 
did not present evidence of permissive use or other facts that would rebut that 
presumption. The trial court correctly applied the presumption of adversity to the 
facts here and, therefore, defendants established a prescriptive easement to use 
the crossing to access their properties.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit 
court is affirmed.
Cite as 366 Or 715 (2020)	
717
	
BALMER, J.
	
This case requires us to consider once again the cir­
cumstances in which one’s use of another’s property gives 
rise to a prescriptive easement. Following a bench trial, the 
trial court determined that the residents of a small neigh­
borhood (or their predecessors) who since 1942 have used a 
railroad crossing on a private roadway to access their homes 
had established a prescriptive easement over the crossing. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the residents 
could not take advantage of the “presumption of adversity” 
long recognized by this court because their use of the cross­
ing was not likely to put the landowner on notice of the 
adverse nature of the use. Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. 
Martell, 298 Or App 99, 108, 445 P3d 319 (2019). That court 
went on to consider whether, without the presumption, clear 
and convincing evidence at trial proved that the residents’ 
use of the crossing had been adverse and held that it did 
not. Id. at 109. For the reasons set out below, we conclude 
that the presumption of adversity applied to the residents’ 
claims and that no evidence rebutted that presumption. 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals 
and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
	
We take the facts from the trial court’s findings and 
the record. In 1910, the owner of an approximately 75-acre 
parcel of land on the west side of the South Santiam River 
in rural Linn County divided the parcel into two parts, 
deeding the north parcel to his daughter, Murray, and the 
south parcel to his son. The owner’s son sold his parcel to 
Sharinghousen in 1915.1 A road that is now Highway 20 has 
long passed through the two adjoining parcels in a north­
westerly direction. A private roadway allowed access to the 
two parcels from Highway 20. In 1928, Sharinghousen and 
Murray both sold strips of their property to the predecessor 
in interest of plaintiff Albany & Eastern Railroad Company 
(AERC) to enable the buyer to construct a railroad along 
the east side of, and parallel to, Highway 20. Murray’s deed 
	
1  The trial court and the Court of Appeals appear to have made a minor 
factual error in stating that Sharinghousen received his parcel from his father, 
the prior owner, in 1910. Documents in the record indicate that the prior owner 
deeded the land to his son, Strickler, and that Sharinghousen purchased the land 
from Strickler in 1915. The error is irrelevant to any issue in the case.
718	
Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell
retained an easement at the location of the private road­
way across the property she sold to the railroad that pro­
vided access to her property from Highway 20. The deed 
required the railroad to “construct and maintain a private 
grade crossing” for the private roadway across that land. 
Sharinghousen did not retain an easement, and his deed 
warranted that the property he transferred was free from 
all encumbrances. AERC’s predecessor presumably laid 
the tracks for the railroad along the land purchased from 
Sharinghousen and Murray and, as required by the deed 
from Murray, established a crossing across the tracks at the 
location of the easement.
	
In 1942, Sharinghousen divided the part of his par­
cel that was east of the railroad into eight lots and created 
the Country Lane neighborhood, the current residents of 
which are the defendants here. By 1953, three of the lots 
were occupied, and all eight lots were occupied by 1963. 
The trial court found that, since 1942, the owners and res­
idents of the Country Lane neighborhood “have regularly 
come and gone to and from their property across the rail­
road at the crossing located on the old Murray easement.” 
The trial court also found that the only means of access to 
the Country Lane lots was the crossing at the Murray ease­
ment. Two early residents testified that access across the 
tracks was never restricted and that they did not feel like 
they were trespassing or that they needed the railroad’s per­
mission to cross the tracks. The trial court further found 
that “from at least 1953 the railroad treated the crossing as 
a public crossing,” that the railroad always had maintained 
the crossing at its own expense, that at some point the rail­
road had installed crossbuck signs indicative of a public 
crossing, and that no “no trespassing” or “private crossing; 
access restricted” signs were ever installed.
	
AERC purchased the railroad in 2007 and the 
land underlying the tracks in 2012. After it purchased the 
land, AERC reviewed the property records and determined, 
according to the trial court, that “the old Murray easement/
Country Lane crossing did not provide deeded access to 
the Country Lane properties.” AERC attempted to negoti­
ate permits that would authorize use of the crossing by the 
Cite as 366 Or 715 (2020)	
719
residents in exchange for a permit fee and an annual main­
tenance fee, but those efforts were unsuccessful. In 2012, 
AERC posted new signs labeling the crossing as private and 
prohibiting trespassing across the tracks.
	
AERC then filed this action seeking to quiet title in 
the disputed crossing and also alleging and seeking dam­
ages for trespass. AERC named as defendants the residents 
of the eight homes on Country Lane. The residents asserted 
various affirmative defenses and counterclaims, includ­
ing that they each have a prescriptive easement over the 
crossing because they and their predecessors had used the 
crossing openly, notoriously, and adversely to AERC and its 
predecessors for at least 10 continuous years. The parties 
agreed that the residents had used the crossing for more 
than 10 years and that that use had been open, notorious, 
and continuous, and the only issue at trial was whether the 
use was “adverse or permissive.” The trial court held that, 
based on the evidence at trial, the “presumption of adversity 
applies in this case,” citing Feldman et ux. v. Knapp et ux., 
196 Or 453, 471, 250 P2d 92 (1952) (“[W]here a claimant has 
shown an open, visible, continuous, and unmolested use of 
land for the period of time sufficient to acquire an easement 
by adverse user, the use will be presumed to be under a claim 
of right.”). Separately from the application of the presump­
tion of adversity, the trial court found that the residents had 
proved, by clear and convincing evidence, actual adversity 
and the other elements required to establish a prescriptive 
easement.
	
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the 
trial court erred in following cases that allowed a “presump­
tion of adversity” based on longstanding open and notorious 
use. The presumption did not apply, the court held, because 
“ 
‘the nature of the land or the relationship between the par­
ties is such that the use of the owner’s property is not likely 
to put the owner on notice of the adverse nature of the use.’ 
” 
Albany & Eastern Railroad Co., 298 Or App at 108 (quoting 
Wels v. Hippe, 360 Or 569, 579, 385 P3d 1028 (2016), adh’d 
to as modified on recons, 360 Or 807, 388 P3d 1103 (2017) 
(emphasis in Albany & Eastern Railroad Co.)). The court 
then considered whether, in the absence of the presumption 
720	
Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell
of adversity, the residents had proved that “their use of 
the railroad crossing had been adverse or otherwise under 
a claim of right.” Albany & Eastern Railroad Co., 298 Or 
App at 109. The court held that “there was no evidence that 
defendants’ use of the crossing in any way interfered with 
AERC’s use of its property,” id. at 110, and similarly rejected 
the claim that the insurance and maintenance costs AERC 
incurred because of the residents’ use of the crossing demon­
strated any interference with AERC’s use. Id. On review, 
the parties reprise their arguments regarding what a claim­
ant must show to establish a prescriptive easement over a 
landowner’s property.
	
We begin with a brief review of the law of prescrip­
tive easements and the presumptions that have developed to 
apply that law. The equitable doctrine of prescriptive ease­
ments evolved to accommodate—and, when they conflict, to 
resolve—two groups of important but competing interests. 
The first includes the owner’s interest in controlling the use 
of his or her property. After all, as this court observed in 
Wels, “the doctrine permits one person to acquire an interest 
in land without paying the owner for it.” 360 Or at 578. For 
that reason, courts often say that prescriptive easements 
are not favored by the law. Id. (citing Wood v. Woodstock, 276 
Or 49, 56, 554 P2d 151 (1976)). But another important inter­
est is that “established patterns of land possession and use 
should be protected,” Wels, 360 Or at 577 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted), which a prescriptive easement 
does by “reward[ing] the long-time user of property[,] * 
* 
* 
fulfill[ing] expectations fostered by long use, and * 
* 
* con­
form[ing] titles to actual use of the property.” Restatement 
(Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 2.17 comment c (2000). As 
we stated in Wels, however, “not just any use will suffice to 
establish a prescriptive easement.” 360 Or at 577. Rather, 
the party asserting an easement “ 
‘must establish an open 
and notorious use of [the] land adverse to the rights of [the 
owner] for a continuous and uninterrupted period of ten 
years.’ 
” Id. (quoting Thompson v. Scott, 270 Or 542, 546, 528 
P2d 509 (1974)). A use is “adverse” if that use is “inconsistent 
with the owner’s use of the property or if it is undertaken 
not in subordination to the rights of the owner”; moreover, 
“[u]se by permission is not adverse.” Wels, 360 Or at 578-79.
Cite as 366 Or 715 (2020)	
721
	
Courts have long recognized the evidentiary diffi­
culties of determining whether a longstanding use of land 
was initially adverse and have used presumptions to aid in 
that task:
“The question whether a use was adverse, made pursuant 
to an implied servitude, or permissive, in the inception
is often difficult to answer, particularly in cases of long-
established uses where the original parties are not avail­
able to describe the circumstances of the initial use. Courts 
have developed a series of presumptions to assist in deter­
mining whether the use was permissive or prescriptive.”
Restatement § 2.16 comment g.
	
Over 120 years ago, we held, “as a general propo­
sition of law, that if there has been an uninterrupted user 
and enjoyment of an easement, in a particular way for more 
than ten years, it affords a * 
* 
* presumption of right in the 
party who shall have enjoyed it.” Coventon v. Seufert, 23 Or 
548, 550, 32 P 508 (1893); see also Feldman, 196 Or at 471 
(“The prevailing rule is that where a claimant has shown an 
open, visible, continuous, and unmolested use of land for the 
period of time sufficient to acquire an easement by adverse 
user, the use will be presumed to be under a claim of right.”). 
That general rule is consistent with the majority rule across 
the country:
“The majority of American states apply a presumption that 
an unexplained, open or notorious use of land, continued 
for the prescriptive period, is adverse, or made pursuant to 
an implied servitude. This presumption of prescriptive use 
gives effect to the idea that long-continued uses create expec­
tations of entitlement and favors existing users over newcom­
ers who would disrupt established neighborhood patterns of 
land use and access.”
Restatement § 2.16 comment g (emphasis added).
	
As we discuss in greater detail below, however, the 
presumption may not apply in some circumstances, and, 
even where it does apply, it can be overcome by evidence 
that the use was not adverse. In Wels, we stated that the 
presumption of adversity based on open and notorious use 
for the prescriptive period “applies in ordinary cases, in 
which the person claiming the easement by prescription is 
722	
Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell
a stranger to the landowner; under such circumstances, it 
makes sense to assume that obvious use of the owner’s prop­
erty is adverse to his or her rights.” 360 Or at 579. But we 
also described two situations in which the presumption does 
not apply: first, when “an owner supplies permission to use a 
road across the owner’s property,” id. (emphasis added), and, 
second, in “common road” cases, “when a claimant uses a 
road that the landowner constructed or that is of unknown 
origin,” id. Those exceptions, too, are consistent with the 
majority of other jurisdictions, which hold that “particular 
fact situations overcome the presumption of prescriptive 
use, creating a counter-presumption that the initial use was 
permissive.” Restatement § 2.16 comment g.
	
Here, the trial court concluded that the residents 
could rely on the presumption of adversity based on their 
and their predecessors’ open and notorious use of the cross­
ing since at least 1942 and because no evidence supported 
either the “permission” or “common road” exceptions that 
would overcome the presumption. The Court of Appeals, 
however, held that “the presumption is not as broadly appli­
cable as the trial court understood it to be,” Albany & Eastern 
Railroad Co., 298 Or App at 108, and instead concluded, cit­
ing Wels, that the presumption did not apply because “the 
nature of the railroad crossing at issue here was such that 
defendants’ use of that crossing was not likely to have put 
plaintiff on notice that the use was adverse.” Id. We turn to 
a closer examination of the circumstances in which the pre­
sumption of adversity does or does not apply to determine 
whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it did not 
apply here.
	
An adverse use “is a use made without the consent 
of the landowner, or holder of the property interest used, and 
without other authorization.” Restatement § 2.16 comment b. 
The Court of Appeals looked to our decision in Wels, where, 
as noted, we described the exceptions to the presumption of 
adversity. The first exception is where the landowner gives 
the user permission; in those circumstances, the use, by 
definition, cannot be adverse. Second, the “common road” 
exception recognizes that, when the landowner and the 
claimant (and perhaps other users) make use of a road that 
Cite as 366 Or 715 (2020)	
723
was constructed by the landowner or is of unknown origin, 
“ 
‘it is more reasonable to assume that the use was pursuant 
to a friendly arrangement between neighbors rather than to 
assume that the user was making an adverse claim.’ 
” Wels, 
360 Or at 579-80 (quoting Woods v. Hart, 254 Or 434, 436, 
458 P2d 945 (1969)).
	
The Court of Appeals did not disagree with the 
trial court’s finding regarding permissive use, which was 
that “there is no evidence in the record that the railroad 
granted permission to the Country Lane residents to use 
the crossing.” And the Court of Appeals also agreed with 
the trial court that the crossing was not a “common road,” 
unlike the road at issue in Wels: “There is no indication that 
the crossing at issue here was built to benefit the railroad 
and, unlike the traditional common road cases, the defen­
dants here are not incidental users of a roadway that was 
constructed by the railroad or is of unknown origin.” Albany 
& Eastern Railroad Co., 298 Or App at 109. Moreover, as 
noted, although the railroad constructed the “private grade 
crossing,” as agreed in its deed from Murray, the private 
roadway itself that provided access to Highway 20 already 
existed in 1928 when the railroad acquired the property. No 
party argues that the “common road” exception applies here.
	
Instead of relying on those longstanding exceptions 
to the presumption of adversity, the Court of Appeals stated 
that it would apply “the court’s rationale [in Wels] for those 
exceptions,” which it took to be that “in some cases, even 
those involving strangers to the landowner, ‘the nature of 
the land or the relationship between the parties is such that 
the use of the owner’s property is not likely to put the owner 
on notice of the adverse nature of the use.’ 
” Id. at 108 (quot­
ing Wels, 360 Or at 579) (emphases in Albany & Eastern 
Railroad Co.). The court went on to hold that “the nature of 
the railroad crossing at issue here was such that defendants’ 
use of that crossing was not likely to have put plaintiff on 
notice that the use was adverse.” Id. It stated that the “trial 
court’s express findings dictate that conclusion,” and quoted 
the following from the trial court opinion:
“ 
‘[I]t is clear that from at least 1953 the railroad treated 
the crossing as a public crossing. The railroad has always 
724	
Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell
maintained the crossing at its own expense. The railroad 
installed crossbuck signs indicative of a public crossing. 
There is no evidence that restrictive signs were installed 
such as “no trespassing” or “private crossing, access 
restricted.” Beginning in 1970 the crossing was erroneously 
listed as a public crossing by the United States Department 
of Transportation.’ 
”
Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the “nature 
of the railroad crossing” was such that the use of the cross­
ing by the residents was not likely to have put the railroad 
on notice that the residents’ use was adverse turned solely 
on the railroad’s mistake of historical fact that the crossing 
at the Murray easement was a “public crossing.”
	
We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion 
that the facts here preclude the application of the presump­
tion of adversity; on the contrary, the facts found by the 
trial court fully support the trial court’s holding that the 
presumption applies. We first consider those facts and then 
turn to the role, if any, of the mistaken belief that the cross­
ing was public.
	
The record shows that the 1928 deed from Murray 
to AERC’s predecessor required the railroad company to 
construct a “private grade crossing” across the tracks at the 
location of the existing road over which Murray retained an 
easement. The railroad company apparently built the cross­
ing when it laid the tracks at around that time, as required 
by the deed. As noted, the crossing was a private crossing 
for Murray.
	
There is no evidence in the record as to whether 
Sharinghousen, as well as Murray, used the crossing once 
the railroad was built and before 1942, although no other 
road or crossing would have given him access to his land east 
of the railroad tracks. As discussed, the trial court found 
that “[s]ince the creation and development of the Country 
Lane neighborhood”—in 1942, when Sharinghousen cre­
ated the development by dividing his property into eight 
lots—“residents have regularly come and gone to and from 
their property across the railroad at the crossing located 
on the old Murray easement.” Nor is there any dispute that 
the railroad company and Sharinghousen were “strangers,” 
Cite as 366 Or 715 (2020)	
725
rather than family members or neighbors who permitted 
each other to cross their land through a “friendly arrange­
ment.” Woods, 254 Or at 436.
	
The trial court also found that there was “no evi­
dence in the record that the railroad granted permission to 
the Country Lane residents to use the crossing.” The rail­
road never restricted the residents’ access across the tracks 
or posted no-trespassing signs. The trial court found that 
the residents and their predecessors “didn’t feel they were 
trespassing, nor did they feel they needed the railroad’s per­
mission to cross the tracks.” Evidence in the record supports 
the residents’ claim that Sharinghousen, the predecessor in 
interest of the properties that they now own, was using the 
crossing by 1942 and that he and the owners of the prop­
erty who purchased lots from him after that date (and their 
successors) have used the crossing continuously ever since. 
That open, notorious, and continuous use for more than 10 
years allows the residents to invoke the presumption that 
their use was adverse—that is, under a claim of right—to 
the landowner and thus to establish their right to prescrip­
tive easements.2 Wels, 360 Or at 577.
	
AERC argues, however, that because its predeces­
sor mistakenly believed that the crossing was “public,” the 
presumption of adversity cannot be invoked because the 
predecessor railroad could not have known that the resi­
dents’ use was under a claim of right. Similarly, the Court 
of Appeals appears to have relied almost entirely on that 
fact in holding that the presumption of adversity did not 
	
2  Because the parties agreed that the residents’ use of the crossing was “con­
tinuous” for decades, neither they nor the lower courts discussed the issue of 
whether use for the required time period can be established by adding together, 
or “tacking,” periods of ownership by different residents. For present purposes, 
it is enough to note that Oregon allows use by successive owners to be added 
together to meet the statutory time requirement. See Evans v. Hogue, 296 Or 745, 
755, 681 P2d 1133 (1984) (“The period of [adverse] possession may be completed 
by one possessor for the full statutory period or by a series of possessors in privity 
with each other under the doctrine of tacking.”); Feldman, 196 Or at 474 (“tack­
ing” doctrine applies in prescriptive easement cases; “if necessary, the adverse 
users of successive owners in privity might be tacked to complete the prescriptive 
right”). See also Restatement § 2.17 (“Periods of prescriptive use may be tacked 
together to make up the prescriptive period if there is a transfer between the 
prescriptive users of either the inchoate servitude or the estate benefited by the 
inchoate servitude.”).
726	
Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell
apply here.3 Because the railroad crossing was thought to 
be “public,” the court stated, the use of the crossing by the 
residents would not have “put the landowners on notice that 
they needed to take action to protect their interests against” 
the residents. Albany & Eastern Railroad Co., 298 Or App 
at 109.
	
There are two responses to that argument. First, 
even if the mistake regarding whether the crossing was 
“public” would make a difference in the application of the 
presumption—which we discuss in greater detail below—
the trial court findings indicate that that mistake likely did 
not arise until around 1953 and thus would have occurred 
after the prescriptive period of 10 years had run. The trial 
court found that the use began in 1942 and that “from at 
least 1953 the railroad treated the crossing as a public 
crossing.” The uncertainty as to the latter date appears to 
be based on the limited evidence available as to the date 
when the railroad began to treat the crossing as “public.” If 
that occurred in 1952 or 1953, then the prescriptive period 
already had run, and the residents’ prescriptive easements 
already had been established, before the crossing began to 
be treated, mistakenly, as “public.”
	
But even if the mistaken belief as to the “public” 
nature of the crossing began before the prescriptive period 
had run, we conclude that that mistake does not preclude 
the availability of the presumption of adversity on the facts 
here. We begin by reiterating several facts that undercut 
AERC’s argument. AERC’s predecessor knew from the 1928 
deed from Murray that it had agreed to construct a “pri­
vate grade crossing.” It also knew that the unpaved road 
where the crossing was constructed was a private road that 
existed before it acquired the strips of land from Murray 
and Sharinghousen and that none of the land at issue was 
owned by any public body. There is no evidence of any “pub­
lic” crossing, public right of way, or relevant public property 
	
3  As noted, the Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he trial court’s express find­
ings dictate [the] conclusion” that “the nature of the crossing at issue here was 
such that defendants’ use of that crossing was not likely to have put plaintiff on 
notice that the use was adverse.” Albany & Eastern Railroad Co., 298 Or App at 
108. The court then quoted facts found by the trial court, all of which relate to the 
misunderstanding from at least 1953 that the crossing was “public.” Id.
Cite as 366 Or 715 (2020)	
727
ownership in 1928, 1942, or at any time before 1953. No rea­
son has been offered as to why AERC’s predecessor would 
not have been on notice that the crossing was “private,” 
rather than public and that Sharinghousen and his succes­
sors in interest were using the crossing.
	
Moreover, the trial court did not accept AERC’s 
argument that the fact that its predecessor installed a 
“public” designation on the crossbuck constituted sufficient 
evidence that the landowner had granted permission to the 
general public (or some subset of the public) to use its land. 
Rather, the trial court found—and the Court of Appeals 
did not disagree—that there was no evidence that AERC’s 
predecessor ever gave permission to use the crossing to 
Sharinghousen, any person who purchased from him, any of 
the current residents, or the general public.4
	
 In these circumstances, to allow the mistaken 
belief of an historical fact—that the crossing was “public” 
rather than “private”—to interrupt a period of continuous 
use by the residents and their predecessors for almost 70 
years would fly in the face of the basic rules of prescriptive 
rights. As we said in Wels, the “principal justification” for the 
doctrine of prescription is that “established patterns of land 
possession and use should be protected and that a diligent 
occupant should be rewarded at the expense of a careless 
owner.” 360 Or at 577 (internal quotation marks and cita­
tion omitted); see also id. (“Prescription doctrine * 
* 
* penal­
izes the property owner who sleeps on his or her rights.”) 
(alteration in original; internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).5 Here, AERC’s predecessors failed, since at least 
	
4  The Court of Appeals framed the issue before it as whether the presump­
tion of adversity “is unavailable here, even though the claimants did not have 
permission for their use, and their dispute does not involve a common road * 
* 
*.” 
Albany & Eastern Railroad Co., 298 Or App at 101.
	
5  To be sure, as we emphasized in Wels, “the owner of land against whom a 
prescriptive easement is being claimed must have reason to know of the adverse 
use of his or her property before being held responsible for failing diligently 
to take action to protect it.” 360 Or at 577. That is the reason for the common
road exception: a claimant’s use of a road of unknown origin or built by the
landowner—along with use by the landowner or others—is unlikely to put the 
landowner on notice that the use is adverse or hostile to the landowner’s inter­
ests. AERC argues that the circumstances here are similar to those underlying 
the common road exception, but that is incorrect. AERC’s predecessor did not 
build the crossing for its own use and did not use the crossing at all, so the use 
728	
Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell
1942, and perhaps since 1928, to assert that Sharinghousen 
and those who purchased lots from him were trespassing 
when they used the crossing, to prevent them from using 
it, or to take any action of any kind to protect their right to 
prevent the unauthorized use of their land.6 That absence 
of any action by AERC’s predecessor continued after 1953, 
when the misunderstanding regarding the public status 
of the crossing apparently arose. AERC’s predecessor was 
a “careless owner” that slept on its rights. It was not until 
2012 that AERC sought to exercise its rights as the owner 
of the crossing, but by then the adverse use had continued 
for far longer than the prescriptive period, as the trial court 
found.
	
No Oregon case has considered whether a mistaken 
understanding by the claimant or the landowner that a 
crossing was “public” affects the presumption of adversity 
or other aspects of prescriptive rights, but other courts have 
stressed that the subjective beliefs and understandings 
of the parties generally are not relevant in determining 
whether a use is adverse. In Cardenas v. Kurpjuweit, 116 
Idaho 739, 779 P2d 414 (1989), the landowner argued that 
the claimant could not establish a prescriptive easement 
because the claimant believed, incorrectly, that the land 
that the claimant was crossing was public. The court stated 
that “[t]he subjective belief of the claimant is not controlling; 
rather, the focus is upon the nature of the use exercised by 
the claimant.” 116 Idaho at 740.7 Similarly, the Washington 
Supreme Court has held that whether a use is adverse does 
of the crossing by the residents and their predecessors was visible and apparent 
to all. Moreover, we agree with the trial court’s finding that the residents’ use, in 
fact, was adverse: crossing the tracks plainly created the possibility of a collision 
between a vehicle using the crossing and a train using the tracks; AERC and 
its predecessors incurred insurance premium costs to insure against possible 
harms; and AERC and its predecessors incurred maintenance expenses along 
the tracks and related to the crossing. 
	
6  Murray, too, as the owner of an easement by deed also could have prevented 
Sharinghousen and his successors from using the private crossing at the location 
of her easement, but there was no evidence that she did. 
	
7  See Restatement § 2.16 illustration 13 (“A, the owner of Whiteacre, used a 
road crossing Blackacre for access to Whiteacre for the prescriptive period believ­
ing that it was a public road. In the absence of other facts or circumstances, the 
conclusion would be justified that A’s use was adverse. A’s mistaken belief that 
the road was public is irrelevant.”).
Cite as 366 Or 715 (2020)	
729
not depend upon the subjective understandings of the par­
ties; rather, it “is to be measured by an objective standard; 
that is, by the objectively observable acts of the user and the 
rightful owner.” Dunbar v. Heinrich, 95 Wash 2d 20, 27, 622 
P2d 812 (1980).
	
Here, the “objectively observable acts of the user 
and the rightful owner” were that the residents openly and 
notoriously, and in full view of the rightful owner, continu­
ously used the crossing for decades. And here too, of course, 
it was always within the ability of the owner, had it been 
diligent, to review its own property deeds to confirm its 
ownership of the crossing, including the presence or absence 
of any recorded easements, and to take action to prevent 
the repeated trespass by Sharinghousen and those who 
purchased the residential lots from him. AERC’s predeces­
sors failed to do so. We conclude that any subjective misun­
derstanding regarding the public or private nature of the 
crossing does not affect the application of the presumption of 
adversity. Accordingly, whether one takes the initial period 
of the prescriptive use to begin in 1928, when the Murray 
crossing was established; in 1942, when the neighborhood 
was initially created; in 1953, when some of the homes were 
occupied; or in 1963, when all the homes were occupied, the 
prescriptive period would have been met, at the latest, by 
1973.
	
For the reasons explained above, we hold that the 
trial court correctly applied the presumption of adversity to 
the facts here. AERC did not present evidence of permis­
sive use or other facts that would rebut that presumption. 
We therefore conclude that each of the residents established 
a prescriptive easement to use the crossing to access their 
properties.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.