Case Title: State v. Fletcher

Citation: 348 N.C. 292

Docket Number: 117A96

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 117A96
FILED: 9 JULY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ANDRE LAGUAN FLETCHER
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Warren, J., at
the 29 January 1996 Criminal Session of Superior Court,
Rutherford County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree
murder.  Defendant’s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to
additional judgments for first-degree burglary and robbery with a
dangerous weapon was allowed 19 December 1996.  Heard in the
Supreme Court 17 November 1997.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by David Roy
Blackwell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the
State.
Ann L. Hester for defendant-appellant.
PARKER, Justice.
Defendant was indicted 7 September 1994 for first-
degree murder, first-degree burglary, and robbery with a
dangerous weapon.  In January 1996 he was tried capitally and
found guilty of first-degree murder upon theories of (i) malice,
premeditation, and deliberation and (ii) felony murder.  He was
also found guilty of first-degree burglary and robbery with a
dangerous weapon.  Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the
jury recommended a sentence of death for the murder, and the
trial court entered judgment accordingly.  For the first-degree
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burglary conviction, the trial court entered a consecutive
sentence of imprisonment for fifty years, and for the robbery
conviction, a consecutive sentence of forty years.  We find no
error meriting reversal of defendant’s convictions.  However, for
the reasons stated herein, we conclude that defendant is entitled
to a new capital sentencing proceeding.
On 17 August 1994 Georgia Ann Dayberry Hamrick
(“victim”), eighty-three, was battered and knifed to death in her
home in Spindale, Rutherford County, North Carolina.  The State’s
evidence tended to show that defendant broke into the victim’s
home, beat her to find out where her valuables were, and then cut
her throat.  He took several rings, two of which he sold over the
next couple of days for $250.00 and $60.00.
In the early morning hours of Wednesday, 17 August,
during a summer rainstorm, defendant pulled out the top corner of
the front storm door of the victim’s house, breaking the pane of
glass, and kicked in the wooden door to get inside.  Defendant
awakened the victim and, taking her into the various rooms of her
house, battered her over the head to force her to give him money
and jewelry.  Blood drops stained the dining room table and
floor, and blood spatter stained the dining room curtains and
walls.  The kitchen cabinets and walls also bore blood spatter,
and a large amount of blood was pooled on the kitchen floor and
table.  The victim attempted to defend herself against the blows
but was overpowered.  Defendant then cut the victim’s throat with
a kitchen knife, exposing and lacerating the jugular vein, and
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left the house.  The victim, still alive, was able to move down
the hall to her bedroom, where she collapsed in a chair and died.
Searches of defendant’s house, located about two
hundred yards from the victim’s house, produced from defendant’s
closet a pair of wet Fila tennis shoes whose soles were
consistent with shoe prints, in both dust and blood, found in the
victim’s house and on her front door.  A pawn ticket for $60.00,
dated Thursday, 18 August, was found in the purse of defendant’s
girlfriend, Lisa Hill.  The ticket was for a diamond and sapphire
ring that the victim’s family members testified had belonged to
the victim.  A second of the victim’s rings was found behind the
television in defendant’s house.  A search of defendant’s car
produced a small silver sewing kit that had belonged to the
victim.
Upon interrogation, defendant revealed that in the
early morning hours of 17 August, he remembered waking up in his
house and sitting and looking at ten or twelve rings, not knowing
where they came from.  He also said that, at that time, he could
see in his mind a white woman with a knife, as if he were having
some type of vision.  He told the police that he was scared
because he did not know where the rings came from.  He also told
the police that on 18 August he and Hill sold one of the rings to
a jewelry store and pawned another at a pawn shop.  The police
recovered these two rings, and the victim’s family members
testified that they had belonged to the victim.  As for the rest
of the rings, defendant said he put some of them in a trash can
in a convenience store restroom and some more in a gutter behind
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a shop in town.  The police recovered six rings from the restroom
and three more from the gutter where defendant had indicated. 
Police confirmed that all the rings belonged to the victim.
Defendant presented evidence that despite his
possession of the victim’s rings there was not enough evidence
linking defendant to the burglary and murder; he also presented
evidence that the crimes were committed by a person who was seen
around the time of the crimes by various eyewitnesses and whom
the police never found.  Defendant’s clothes and shoes, seized
from his home, did not produce any evidence of microscopic glass
fragments expected to be left from the breaking of the glass in
the front storm door, nor did the clothes or shoes test positive
for human blood.  None of the fingerprints and palm prints found
in the victim’s home matched defendant’s.  The Fila shoe prints
found in the victim’s home, while not inconsistent with a pair of
Filas owned by defendant, did not reveal any of the
characteristic nicks and cuts present on defendant’s shoes.
A witness who lived in the victim’s neighborhood
testified that during the storm on the night of the murder she
saw a man in a yellow raincoat walk by her house in the direction
of the victim’s house and that a short time later she heard some
loud “pops” coming from that direction.  She testified that the
man’s appearance was not consistent with that of defendant. 
Another witness testified that she saw a man in the neighborhood
who was wearing a yellow raincoat, acting very suspiciously and
driving a white Grand Am.  She also testified that the man’s face
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and general appearance were inconsistent with defendant’s
appearance.
In short, defendant’s argument at trial was that no
conclusive blood, hair, fiber, or glass evidence was found on
defendant’s clothes, in his car, or in his house; and no evidence
was presented by the State regarding the identity of the man in
the yellow raincoat.
PRETRIAL ISSUES
Defendant first contends that the trial court
erroneously admitted into evidence defendant’s statements
produced as a result of custodial interrogation and the stolen
property recovered as a result of information provided in those
statements, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the North
Carolina Constitution.  Specifically, defendant asserts (i) that
the Spindale Police stopped him without reasonable suspicion and
arrested him without probable cause and (ii) that as a result of
the illegal seizure and unlawful arrest, special agents of the
State Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”) obtained incriminating
statements from him and statements that led to the recovery of
stolen property.  These statements and the property, defendant
contends, were the fruits of an illegal seizure and should not
have been admitted at trial.  We disagree with defendant.
Evidence presented at the suppression hearing
concerning the facts and circumstances surrounding defendant’s
detention and arrest are as follows.  At 9:03 p.m. on 18 August
1994, Spindale Police Officer Chris Justice responded to a report
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of an automobile breaking and entering at the Uptown Beauty Salon
located on Main Street in Spindale.  When Officer Justice arrived
there at 9:09 p.m., Ms. Patsy Hodge reported that she had been
inside the salon having her hair done and that when she left she
discovered that someone had broken out the right window of her
vehicle.  Ms. Derlene Watson, the proprietor of the beauty salon,
told Officer Justice that while the salon staff had been working
on Ms. Hodge’s hair, Ms. Watson had seen a tall black male
wearing a white t-shirt and dark colored pants walking back and
forth on the sidewalk in front of the salon, “just acting
suspicious to her.”  While at the salon, Officer Justice also
spoke with Mr. Ray Sprouse, a local resident who told Justice he
had seen a black male pick up a cement block from in front of a
building and walk back toward the beauty salon and then, about a
minute later, saw the same man run down an adjacent alleyway. 
After talking with Ms. Hodge, Ms. Watson, and Mr. Sprouse,
Officer Justice broadcast a description to other officers on his
walkie-talkie of a black male wearing a white t-shirt and dark
pants who had fled on foot down the alley.
Within five minutes of Officer Justice’s broadcast of
the description, Spindale Police Officer Glen Harmon saw a person
fitting the description in front of the Methodist Church on Main
Street, roughly two blocks from the beauty salon, walking toward
the rear of the church with a soft drink in his hand.  Officer
Harmon met the person, the defendant, at the back gate of the
church and told him that he fit the description of a suspect in a
vehicle breaking and entering that had just occurred uptown and
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that defendant “needed to just stay right there for a second”
while he radioed Officer Justice to come.  Officer Harmon then
told defendant that he needed to search him for weapons and asked
defendant if he was carrying any weapons.  Defendant said he had
no weapons and had nothing to do with a breaking and entering;
then, beginning to get upset, defendant emptied his pockets and
threw the contents on the ground, saying, “Search me, search me.” 
Officer Harmon recognized defendant as a suspect in the Hamrick
murder which had occurred the day before.
At this point at 9:15 p.m., Officer Justice arrived; he
too recognized defendant as a suspect in the murder case. 
Officers Harmon and Justice put defendant in the back of a patrol
car and radioed for another officer to pick up Ms. Watson from
the beauty shop and bring her to the Methodist Church to see if
she could identify defendant as the person she had observed
outside her shop.  It took “several minutes” for Ms. Watson to be
brought to the Methodist Church.  When she arrived the officers
shined a flashlight on defendant in the back of the patrol car,
and she identified defendant as the person she had seen going
back and forth in front of the salon.  Defendant then remained in
the back of the patrol car at the Methodist Church for about
thirty more minutes while the officers conferred with the
Assistant Chief of Police on what to do with defendant since he
was also a suspect in the Hamrick murder case.
At 10:11 p.m. Officer Justice drove the patrol car with
defendant in the backseat back to the beauty shop area so that
Mr. Sprouse could see if defendant was the person he had seen
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pick up the cement block and then later run through the alley. 
Defendant was kept in the backseat of the patrol car, and the
officers shined a flashlight on him so that Mr. Sprouse could
identify him.  Mr. Sprouse could not identify defendant’s face
but did indicate that defendant’s clothes were of the same type
as the clothes on the person he had seen.  Defendant was then
told he was under arrest and was transported to the police
station, arriving there at 10:37 p.m.
Defendant was booked at the station, and his clothes
were taken for possible evidence of glass fragments from the
automobile window.  Defendant was then transported at about 11:00
p.m. to a magistrate and charged with breaking and entering a
motor vehicle.  The magistrate, who was the same magistrate who
had earlier that evening issued a warrant for police to search
defendant’s house for evidence in the Hamrick murder
investigation, set bond in the amount of $100,000 on the breaking
and entering charge.  Defendant was then fingerprinted and taken
to the Rutherford County jail, arriving sometime between 11:30
p.m. and 12:00 a.m.  At 1:20 a.m. SBI Special Agents Bruce Jarvis
and Andy Cline questioned defendant about evidence linking
defendant to the Hamrick murder; it was during this questioning
that defendant made the statements which he now contends should
have been suppressed.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in
concluding that Officer Harmon possessed sufficient factual
justification for detaining defendant as defendant walked past
the Methodist Church.  In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d
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889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court recognized the right
of a law enforcement officer to detain a person for investigation
of a crime without probable cause to arrest him if the officer
can point to specific and articulable facts that, with inferences
from those facts, create a reasonable suspicion that the person
has committed a crime.  State v. Lovin, 339 N.C. 695, 703, 454
S.E.2d 229, 234 (1995).  As the United States Supreme Court has
stated:
“The Fourth Amendment does not require a
policeman who lacks the precise level of
information necessary for probable cause to
arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and
allow a crime to occur or a criminal to
escape.  On the contrary, Terry recognizes
that it may be the essence of good police
work to adopt an intermediate response.”
State v. Jackson, 302 N.C. 101, 105, 273 S.E.2d 666, 670 (1981)
(quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612,
616-17 (1972)).
Here, Officer Justice received information from Ms.
Watson that around the time that the automobile was broken into,
a tall black male with dark pants and a white t-shirt had been
acting suspiciously nearby; Officer Justice also received
information from Mr. Sprouse that, at about the same time, a
black male wearing dark pants and a white t-shirt had picked up a
cement block and walked toward the location of the automobile and
then, moments later, had run down an alleyway.  Officer Harmon
received a transmission from Officer Justice to be on the lookout
for a tall black male wearing a white t-shirt and black pants who
was seen on foot at a certain location and moving in a certain
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direction.  Officer Harmon saw a person fitting the description
just moments later and within two blocks of the location
specified.
We hold from these facts that the proximity in time and
location and the accuracy of the physical description of the
race, gender, and clothing of the suspect gave the officers
reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop of defendant. 
See State v. Lovin, 339 N.C. at 703-04, 454 S.E.2d at 234
(reasonable suspicion existed, even though there was no witness
to crime itself, where police had description of person seen
driving victim’s car as having “a lot of hair,” a gold watch and
large frame glasses; information about where the car was headed;
and information that the person acted suspiciously); State v.
Rinck, 303 N.C. 551, 558-60, 280 S.E.2d 912, 919-20 (1981)
(reasonable basis for directing defendants to stop existed where,
while there was no witness to the homicide, two men were seen
acting suspiciously at victim’s house late at night and, within
about thirty minutes of the homicide, were seen walking along the
road within two hundred feet of victim’s house); State v. Buie,
297 N.C. 159, 162, 254 S.E.2d 26, 28 (reasonable grounds to stop
defendant where woman reported intruder in motel room at 4:10
a.m. and gave description to police of a black male wearing dark
clothing, approximately 5’ 11” tall and weighing about 190
pounds, and where twenty minutes after the report and five to ten
minutes after a radio transmission of the description, an officer
saw defendant near the scene of the crime, wet, as if he had been
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running or perspiring heavily, and wearing a gold-colored leisure
suit), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 971, 62 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1979).
Defendant next argues that even if the initial stop was
properly and lawfully based on reasonable suspicion, the nature
and length of the detention of defendant, that is, secured in a
patrol car from shortly after 9:15 p.m. until 10:11 p.m.,
exceeded the permissible scope of an investigative stop without
probable cause.  We disagree with defendant’s argument and hold
that the length and nature of the detention was reasonable since
probable cause was in fact established shortly after the stop.
The Fourth Amendment requires that an investigatory
stop be brief and that officers pursue an investigation in a
diligent and reasonable manner to confirm or dispel their
suspicion quickly.  United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686,
84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 615-16 (1985).  Defendant notes that absent
probable cause to arrest, the United States Supreme Court has
never permitted a detention as intrusive as the hour-long
detention of defendant in the patrol car.  In this case, however,
the officers diligently and reasonably pursued the investigation
and quickly succeeded in receiving confirmation of defendant’s
identity, which raised the level of suspicion that defendant
committed the breaking and entering from reasonable suspicion to
probable cause.
At or slightly after 9:15 p.m., defendant was made to
sit in the patrol car.  He was not handcuffed.  The record shows
that defendant sat in the patrol car for a short period of time,
“several minutes,” while the officers waited for Ms. Watson to
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arrive and identify defendant.  When Ms. Watson arrived, she
identified defendant as the person she had seen in front of the
beauty shop.  We conclude that the identification made by
Ms. Watson, in conjunction with Mr. Sprouse’s description,
provided the officers with probable cause to believe that
defendant was the person who committed the breaking and entering
of Ms. Hodge’s vehicle.
The existence of probable cause depends upon
“whether at that moment the facts and
circumstances within [the officers’]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing that the
[suspect] had committed or was committing an
offense.”
State v. Bright, 301 N.C. 243, 255, 271 S.E.2d 368, 376 (1980)
(alterations in original) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91,
13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 145 (1964)).  Mr. Sprouse’s information about a
black male wearing dark pants and a white t-shirt who picked up a
cement block and walked toward the beauty shop and then later ran
down an alley strongly links a person of that description to the
crime; Ms. Watson’s information about seeing a black male in a
white t-shirt and dark pants acting suspiciously in front of her
shop links that person to the person seen by Mr. Sprouse at about
the same time; defendant, who fit the description, was then
stopped within two blocks of the crime scene and fifteen minutes
of the report of the crime; finally, Ms. Watson’s identification
of defendant as the person she saw in front of her shop completed
the link between defendant specifically and the breaking and
entering.
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We have compared the facts and circumstances of this
case to the facts and circumstances in other cases on this issue;
and we conclude that when the officers received the confirmation
of Ms. Watson’s identification, they possessed reasonably
trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief
that defendant had committed the breaking and entering and that
there was thus probable cause to arrest defendant.  This Court
has previously held that an officer was provided with probable
cause prerequisite to a lawful arrest based on “the proximity of
defendant to the location where the offenses were committed and
the similarity of defendant’s appearance to the description which
had been reported to the police.”  State v. Wrenn, 316 N.C. 141,
147, 340 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1986).  In Wrenn this Court held that
probable cause existed where a burglary report was received at
3:24 a.m. describing the suspect as a white male dressed in dark
clothing, possibly wearing a knit hat and armed with a handgun,
and where approximately two minutes after receiving the call, an
officer saw a vehicle being driven by a white male wearing dark
clothing.  See also State v. Joyner, 301 N.C. 18, 21-22, 269
S.E.2d 125, 128-29 (1980) (probable cause to arrest existed where
burglary/rape victim described suspect as black male with facial
hair, wearing a toboggan and a green or blue jogging suit with
white stripes, and where an officer saw the defendant, who
matched the description, three and a half blocks from the crime
scene and seven to ten minutes after the commission of the
offenses); State v. Bright, 301 N.C. at 255-56, 271 S.E.2d at 377
(probable cause existed based on abduction victim’s description
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of the abductor and his vehicle, combined with information from
bowling alley employees that the defendant matched the
description and was seen in the bowling alley prior to the
abduction, and observation by officers that the defendant and his
vehicle matched the victim’s descriptions); State v. Tippett, 270
N.C. 588, 595, 155 S.E.2d 269, 274-75 (1967) (probable cause to
arrest existed where burglary victim described suspect as a
barefooted white male, not a blond, wearing rough work clothes,
and where police, upon arriving at the scene at 1:19 a.m., saw a
barefooted male who eluded them and then later, at 3:00 or 3:30
a.m., was seen hiding behind a bush two blocks from the scene of
the crime).
Finally, defendant argues that the statements he made
to the SBI agents and the property recovered based on those
statements should not have been admitted since they were fruits
of the illegal seizure or unlawful arrest.  Since we have held
that there was no illegal seizure or unlawful arrest, this
argument necessarily fails.  State v. Lovin, 339 N.C. at 704, 454
S.E.2d at 235.
Defendant next contends that the trial court
erroneously admitted into evidence other statements and evidence
procured by the SBI after defendant invoked his constitutional
right to remain silent, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Defendant’s
argument cannot succeed, however, since the record discloses that
defendant never requested that interrogation cease.
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Pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L. Ed. 2d
378 (1981), the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require that
during custodial interrogation, if the individual “indicates in
any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.”  Miranda,
384 U.S. at 473-74, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723; Edwards, 451 U.S. at
482, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 384.  A defendant may terminate custodial
interrogation by indicating in any manner that he wishes to
remain silent.  State v. Murphy, 342 N.C. 813, 823, 467 S.E.2d
428, 434 (1996).
In this case at the end of the first portion of
defendant’s interrogation, at about 4:00 a.m. on 19 August 1994,
defendant made a statement that after he had gotten some sleep he
would be willing to take the officers to the place where he had
thrown some purses he had stolen from breaking into vehicles. 
The agents concluded the interview and returned defendant to his
cell.  Shortly thereafter, the agents learned that other officers
had recovered two additional rings which belonged to the victim,
one from defendant’s home and the other from a pawn shop.  At
4:20 a.m. they resumed their interrogation of defendant,
whereupon defendant made the second portion of his statement.
Defendant asserts that his statement to the officers
that he would show them where the purses were once he had gotten
some sleep constituted an invocation of his constitutional right
to have the interrogation cease.  At the hearing on the motion to
suppress, the trial court found the following facts:  defendant
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received his Miranda warnings and willingly spoke with the
agents, he voluntarily signed the interview sheet and Miranda
form, he did not appear intoxicated or under the influence of
drugs or alcohol, the agents concluded the first portion of the
interview at approximately 4:00 a.m., within twenty minutes the
agents learned that other officers recovered rings belonging to
the victim, the agents then resumed their interview of defendant,
the interview continued until 6:10 a.m., defendant remained alert
and at times emotional, and defendant did not ask for an attorney
and did not ask that the interview end.
These findings are binding since they are supported by
competent evidence in the record, State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549,
581-81, 304 S.E.2d 134, 152 (1983); and we agree with the State
that the trial court committed no constitutional error in
admitting the evidence from defendant’s second statement.  In
State v. Murphy this Court concluded that the defendant invoked
his Fifth Amendment right to silence when he stood up and stated,
“I got nothing to say.”  State v. Murphy, 342 N.C. at 822, 467
S.E.2d at 433.  We reasoned that
the defendant’s conduct, in abruptly standing
up, combined with his unambiguous statement,
“I got nothing to say,” were clear indicators
that he wished to terminate the interrogation
and invoke his right to remain silent.  The
defendant similarly had indicated a desire to
end two prior interrogations by standing
up. . . .  Finally, the fact that the
interrogating officers immediately ceased the
interrogation and took the defendant to be
“booked” makes it equally clear that the
officers understood that the defendant was
terminating the interrogation and invoking
his right to remain silent.
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Id. at 823, 467 S.E.2d at 433-34.  Here, by contrast, and
contrary to defendant’s arguments, defendant made no statement or
gesture suggesting that he wished the interrogation to cease. 
His statement to the officers that he would be willing to take
them to where he had discarded some stolen property after he had
gotten some sleep was not an invocation of his Fifth Amendment
rights.  Thus, it was not error for the trial court to admit into
evidence defendant’s subsequent statement or the fruits of that
statement.
JURY SELECTION
Defendant next assigns error to the trial court’s
supervision of jury voir dire, specifically contending that the
trial court (i) failed to prohibit the State from staking out
prospective jurors with respect to whether they could vote for
the death penalty in this case, (ii) failed to prohibit the State
from staking out prospective jurors with respect to whether they
could weigh aggravating circumstances more heavily than
mitigating circumstances, and (iii) prohibited defendant from
asking questions of a prospective juror permitted by the United
States Constitution under Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119
L. Ed. 2d 492 (1992).  Defendant contends that the trial court’s
conduct in these three instances permitted the State to select a
jury that would tend to disregard mitigating evidence and
automatically vote for the death penalty.
Defendant’s arguments concerning jury selection are not
persuasive.  The trial court properly controlled voir dire
questioning during jury selection, did not allow the prosecutor
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to stake out prospective jurors, and did not deny defendant the
opportunity to question a prospective juror in accordance with
Morgan.  We have previously outlined the fundamental law on jury
selection:
“The primary goal of the jury selection
process is to ensure selection of a jury
comprised only of persons who will render a
fair and impartial verdict.”  State v.
Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 247, 415 S.E.2d 726,
731 (1992).  Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1214(c), counsel may question prospective
jurors concerning their fitness or competency
to serve as jurors to determine whether there
is a basis to challenge for cause or whether
to exercise a peremptory challenge.  N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1214(c) (1988).  The trial judge has
broad discretion to regulate jury voir dire. 
State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 268, 439 S.E.2d
547, 559, cert. denied, [513] U.S. [891], 130
L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994).  “In order for a
defendant to show reversible error in the
trial court’s regulation of jury selection, a
defendant must show that the court abused its
discretion and that he was prejudiced
thereby.”  Id.  The right to an adequate voir
dire to identify unqualified jurors does not
give rise to a constitutional violation
unless the trial court’s exercise of
discretion in preventing a defendant from
pursuing a relevant line of questioning
renders the trial fundamentally unfair. 
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 730 n.5,
119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 503 n.5 (1992); Mu’Min v.
Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 425-26, 114 L. Ed. 2d
493, 506 (1991).
State v. Fullwood, 343 N.C. 725, 732-33, 472 S.E.2d 883, 886-87
(1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1997). 
The trial court may refuse to allow counsel to ask questions that
use hypothetical evidence or scenarios to attempt to “stake-out”
prospective jurors and cause them to pledge themselves to a
particular position in advance of the actual presentation of the
evidence.  State v. Larry, 345 N.C. 497, 509, 481 S.E.2d 907,
-19-
914, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1997); State
v. Robinson, 339 N.C. 263, 271-73, 451 S.E.2d 196, 202 (1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995).
In the instant case during jury selection, the trial
court overruled defendant’s objection to the following question
when asked of three prospective jurors by the prosecutor:
Assuming that you were on a jury which has
found the defendant guilty of First Degree
Murder, if that jury then at the sentencing
phase, finds the existence of aggravating
factors and finds that those factors outweigh
any mitigating factors, and further finds
that the aggravating factors are sufficiently
substantial so as to call for the imposition
of the death penalty, could that be your
verdict in this case which would result in a
judgment of death being imposed?
Defendant did not object when the question was asked of thirty-
three other prospective jurors.  This question by the prosecutor
simply attempts to determine from the jurors whether they can
follow the law in imposing the death penalty.  The question does
not presume evidentiary facts, nor does it require that the
jurors pledge themselves to a position under any given set of
evidentiary facts.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in overruling defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s question.
The prosecutor was also permitted to ask the jurors the
following question:
Q.
There are a couple of other things I’d
like to talk about and make sure that
everybody understands the concept about the
sentencing phase.  We’ve talked about these
aggravating and mitigating factors that you
may hear evidence about.  Aggravating factors
are set out by the legislature, there’s a
green book that we all read and there are
only eleven possible aggravating factors that
-20-
the state can rely on in any capital case.  I
believe that if we get to that stage in this
case that we may have evidence of two
aggravating factors.  The legislature has
also set out a listing of mitigating factors,
but the last one of those is any other factor
that the jury considers to be or to have
mitigating value; so there literally is an
unlimited number of mitigating factors and I
would predict that if we get into a
sentencing phase in this case that there may
be many mitigating factors submitted for your
consideration by the defense but the state
will be limited by the law to only two in
this particular case.  So, as we all talked
earlier, that’s why we’re talking about this
concept of the weight or the significance
that one factor might have.  Do all of you
agree that, just hypothetically, one factor
might have more weight or substance or
importance than two or more of another
factor, does everybody understand that
concept?  If you don’t, please raise your
hand and I’ll try in my inarticulate way to
explain it, does everybody understand that?
(Affirmative responses.)
Q.
Is there any one of you jurors who feels
like that if one side or the other has a
greater number, simply more factors than the
other side that side would necessarily have
more weight or would be the winning side,
does anybody feel that way?
(Negative responses.)
Q.
In other words, does everyone agree that
it might be possible that there might be two
aggravating circumstances and that those
might yet outweigh or be more significant and
more substantial than a greater number of
mitigating circumstances?  Everybody agree
with that concept, that that’s possible?
(Affirmative responses.)
Later, the prosecutor asked another panel of prospective jurors,
“[D]o all of you understand that this is not a numbers game, that
just because one side might get ten and another side might only
-21-
have two, it’s the weight and the significance and the substance
of the factors that count, does everybody understand that
concept?”  These inquiries by the prosecutor do not, as defendant
contends, stake the jurors to the proposition that they would
weigh aggravating circumstances more heavily than mitigating
circumstances.  Rather, the questions ask the jurors if they can
weigh the significance of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances rather than the relative number of aggravators and
mitigators.  As such, the questions simply ask the jurors if they
can follow the long-settled law.  See State v. Goodman, 298 N.C.
1, 34-35, 257 S.E.2d 569, 590 (1979) (“It must be emphasized that
the deliberative process of the jury envisioned by [N.C.G.S. §]
15A-2000 is not a mere counting process. . . .  Nuances of
character and circumstance cannot be weighed in a precise
mathematical formula.”).  We note also that defendant did not
object to these questions from the prosecutor.  The trial court
did not err by not intervening ex mero motu.
The defense attempted to ask prospective juror Rowlette
the following question after the juror had indicated he thought
the death penalty would be appropriate if a murder was heinous:
Q.
So if the state proved an aggravating
factor or more than one aggravating factor
and if the state proved that one of the
aggravating factors in this case was
especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel,
that is an aggravating factor; and then if
the defendant introduced evidence of a
mitigating factor or factors and you were
sitting on the jury and you found those, and
in the third step if you were on this jury
and your jury found that the aggravating
factor or factors outweighed the mitigating
factors, we’re still going along with this
-22-
hypothetical, and then if you finally came to
that last step that the Judge just outlined
and you were weighing whether the aggravating
factors outweighed the mitigating factors and
also you were deciding whether the
aggravating factors, when taken into
consideration and along with the mitigating
were sufficiently substantial to call for the
death penalty, that’s a lot of words, but if
you were to do that, if you were called to do
that and the aggravating factor that you had
found was heinous, atrocious and cruel, would
you automatically vote for the death penalty?
The trial court disallowed the question on the grounds that it
improperly created a hypothetical scenario positing a specific
finding of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating
circumstance, such that the question would tend to stake the
juror to a certain position under that set of facts.  The trial
court correctly determined that this question is impermissible. 
“‘Counsel should not fish for answers to legal questions before
the judge has instructed the juror on applicable legal principles
by which the juror should be guided. . . .  Jurors should not be
asked what kind of verdict they would render under certain named
circumstances.’”  State v. Robinson, 339 N.C. at 273, 451 S.E.2d
at 202 (quoting State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 682, 268 S.E.2d
452, 455 (1980)).  In Robinson the defendant attempted to ask
prospective jurors if they would be able to follow the trial
court’s instructions and weigh aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and still consider life imprisonment as an option
even though defendant had a previous conviction for first-degree
murder.  Id. at 272, 451 S.E.2d at 201-02.  We concluded that the
question in Robinson attempted to “‘stake out’ the jurors as to
their answers to legal questions before they are informed of
-23-
legal principles applicable to their sentencing recommendation.” 
Id. at 273, 451 S.E.2d at 202.  Our analysis in Robinson is
equally applicable here:
The question posed [in Robinson] does not
amount to a proper inquiry as to whether the
juror could follow the law as instructed by
the trial judge.  Rather, the question is an
attempt to determine whether or not a juror
will be unable to consider a life sentence
once he or she learns that defendant had been
convicted of a prior murder.
Id. (citation omitted).  Here, defendant has attempted to find
out from the juror what verdict the juror would render given the
finding of a particular aggravating circumstance.
Defendant contends that his question to the juror
constituted a proper attempt, pursuant to Morgan v. Illinois, 504
U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, to determine whether the juror would
automatically vote for the death penalty without regard for
mitigating circumstances.  But Morgan does not require that
defendant be allowed to ask a juror what his or her position
would be given a particular aggravating circumstance.  State v.
Kandies, 342 N.C. 419, 441, 467 S.E.2d 67, 78, cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 167 (1996); State v. Lynch, 340 N.C. 435,
452, 459 S.E.2d 679, 686 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1143, 134
L. Ed. 2d 558 (1996).
Moreover, even if we did not hold that this particular
question by defense counsel crossed the line from a proper Morgan
inquiry as to whether a juror would automatically vote for the
death penalty to an improper stake-out question, defendant could
establish neither prejudice nor a violation of fundamental
-24-
fairness.  The trial court allowed defendant’s challenge for
cause to remove prospective juror Rowlette after subsequent
questioning exposed this juror’s possible inability to be
impartial and consider mitigating circumstances.  Thus, defendant
was not forced to accept an undesirable juror.  See State v.
Miller, 339 N.C. 663, 681, 455 S.E.2d 137, 147, cert. denied, 516
U.S. 893, 133 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1995).
In sum, we hold that the trial court committed no error
in its supervision of jury voir dire which would have resulted in
a jury biased in favor of the death penalty.
Defendant next assigns error to the trial court’s
overruling of defendant’s objections to the State’s impermissible
use of peremptory challenges to strike from the jury three black
prospective jurors, Greene, Hudson, and Watkins, solely on
account of their race.  Article I, Section 26 of the Constitution
of North Carolina prohibits the use of peremptory challenges for
racially discriminatory reasons, Kandies, 342 N.C. at 434, 467
S.E.2d at 74, as does the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986).
In Batson the United States Supreme Court established a
three-part test to determine if the prosecutor has engaged in
impermissible racial discrimination in the selection of jurors. 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405
(1991).  First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case
that the prosecutor has exercised a peremptory challenge on the
basis of race.  Id.  Second, once the prima facie case has been
-25-
established by the defendant, the burden shifts to the State,
which, in order to rebut the inference of discrimination, must
offer a race-neutral explanation for attempting to strike the
juror in question.  Id.; State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 668, 483
S.E.2d 396, 408, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177
(1997).  The explanation must be clear and reasonably specific,
but “‘need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a
challenge for cause.’”  State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 498, 391
S.E.2d 144, 151 (1990) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 90 L. Ed.
2d at 88).  In stating the race-neutral reason for the peremptory
challenge, the prosecutor is not required to provide an
explanation that is persuasive or even plausible.  The issue at
this stage is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s
explanation; and unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in
the explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. 
State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 209-10, 481 S.E.2d 44, 57, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1997).  Our courts also
permit the defendant at this point to introduce evidence that the
State’s explanations are merely a pretext.  State v. Gaines, 345
N.C. at 668, 483 S.E.2d at 408; State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1,
16, 409 S.E.2d 288, 296 (1991).
Third, and finally, the trial court must make the
ultimate determination as to whether the defendant has carried
his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.  Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. at 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405; State v. Gaines,
345 N.C. at 668, 483 S.E.2d at 408.  As this determination is
essentially a question of fact, the trial court’s decision of
-26-
whether the prosecutor had a discriminatory intent is to be given
great deference and will be upheld unless the appellate court is
convinced that the trial court’s determination is clearly
erroneous.  Kandies, 342 N.C. at 434-35, 467 S.E.2d at 75. 
“‘Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.’” 
State v. Thomas, 329 N.C. 423, 433, 407 S.E.2d 141, 148 (1991)
(quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 84 L. Ed.
2d 518, 528 (1985)).
With respect to prospective juror Greene, defendant
makes four arguments--one on procedural grounds and three of a
more substantive nature--that the trial court erred when it
failed to find that the State’s peremptory strike was the result
of purposeful discrimination.  First, defendant contends that the
trial court erroneously concluded its analysis upon finding that
the State’s proffered reason was race-neutral and failed to
address the ultimate question of whether defendant had proven
racial discrimination.  Defendant argues that under these
circumstances, there is no factual finding by the trial court on
the ultimate issue, and thus no factual finding which is entitled
to deferential review by this Court.  We conclude, however, that
in all practicality, the trial court made a sufficient ultimate
determination, finding no purposeful racial discrimination, when
it denied defendant’s Batson motion and entered the conclusion of
law that the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing Mr. Greene, his
expressed lack of confidence in the court system and his prior
record, were “race-neutral and sufficient to justify the
-27-
peremptory challenge.”  This conclusion by the trial court
effectively reached the ultimate issue:  whether there was
purposeful racial discrimination in the peremptory strike of
Mr. Greene.  We cannot say that the trial court’s determination
was clearly erroneous.  State v. Lyons, 343 N.C. 1, 14, 468
S.E.2d 204, 210, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 167
(1996).
Second, defendant argues that the trial court erred
when it did not find racial discrimination in the strike of
prospective juror Greene in that it did not discount the
persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s explanation as to Mr. Greene
in light of the impermissibly race-based rationale given for
prospective juror McKinney, the other black male in the same jury
panel.  The first jury panel at defendant’s trial consisted of
nine white prospective jurors and three African-American
prospective jurors, two of whom were male.  The prosecutor
proposed to accept the black female juror but exercised his first
two peremptory challenges to strike the only two black males,
Mr. Greene and Mr. McKinney.  Defendant made a Batson objection
to the two strikes; and the trial court found a prima facie case
of potential racial discrimination, requiring that the State
explain its rationale for excusing the two.  The prosecutor
offered in explanation that Mr. Greene “said that he thought that
the criminal justice system was flawed” and that “he expressed
serious reservations about the system and indicated that he
thought in many instances it was unfair and I believe he stated
that it would be difficult for him to be a part of this system
-28-
although he could do so, and he stated more than once that he
wants to change the system.”  This explanation is sufficiently
supported by the record in the exchange that took place between
the prosecutor and Mr. Greene after Greene indicated he had been
a defendant in a DWI case:
Q.
The jury is a very integral part of the
system and the whole system breaks down
without jurors, is there any one of you that
holds such negative feelings about the court
system that you feel like you just could not
in good faith and good conscience be a part
of this process?  Mr. Greene, do you have
such feelings as that?
A.
I feel that the justice system is unfair
and I have felt that way for some time but I
can’t change it, but I’ve seen things in the
past that leads me to believe that the
justice system is unfair.
Q.
Mr. Greene, would your beliefs in that
regard do you think interfere with your
ability to be a fair and impartial juror in
this case?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
You don’t think--
A.
No.
Q.
Do you harbor some prejudice or ill
feeling about the court system and the people
who work in it?
A.
I just want it to change so it’s more
fair.
In its findings of fact, the trial court stated:  “The Court
finds that Mr. Greene has previously been convicted of a
misdemeanor and expressed a significant degree of dissatisfaction
with the court system.  The Court would characterize [Mr.
Greene’s] expressed attitude towards the court system as
-29-
hostile.”  The court concluded that the reasons given to excuse
Mr. Greene, his expressed lack of confidence in the court system
and his prior record, were racially neutral and sufficient to
justify the peremptory challenge.
With respect to prospective juror McKinney, however,
the State’s explanation for its strike was as follows:
Your Honor, the state would excuse
Mr. McKinney primarily because of his
acknowledgment in [sic] an association that
associates in many instances with being anti-
law enforcement and which to my knowledge
sponsors and funds a legal defense fund which
frequently files briefs in death penalty
cases.  This man claims to be a member of
that organization [namely, the NAACP] and
says that it does not take any position on
the death penalty and I take issue with that
and that is my reason for excusing him from
the jury. . . .  He’s a member of an
organization which I strongly associate with
being anti-state and anti-death penalty.
The trial court made the following findings of fact with respect
to prospective juror McKinney:
12.  After being asked to articulate race
neutral reasons for excusing the jurors, the
state indicated that Mr. McKinney would be
excused because he was a member of the
National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) which, according to
the state, had filed amicus briefs and
otherwise opposed the death penalty.
13.  During voir dire, Mr. McKinney indicated
that he did not know the position of the
NAACP regarding the death penalty and that he
did not personally oppose the death penalty.
14.  When asked to articulate a race neutral
reason to excuse Mr. McKinney, the prosecutor
did not immediately offer said reason, but
supplied his rationale only after studying
Mr. McKinney’s juror information sheet at
length.
-30-
The trial court concluded that the prosecutor’s professed reason
to excuse Mr. McKinney was “not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of discrimination nor was it race neutral,” and that
it “appeared to the Court to be somewhat pretextual and an after
thought.”  The trial court thus proposed to discard the entire
jury panel as the proper means of remedying the discriminatory
use of this peremptory challenge.  The State at this point
elected to withdraw its challenge of Mr. McKinney, and so
accepted him as a juror.  The court then concluded that the
State’s withdrawal of its challenge remedied the Batson violation
with respect to the strike of Mr. McKinney.
Relying on Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 327, 357
S.E.2d 792, 795 (1987), defendant argues that in light of the
finding of racial discrimination in the strike of Mr. McKinney,
the trial court erred in not finding racial discrimination in the
strike of Mr. Greene as well.  Defendant contends the finding of
racial discrimination as to Mr. McKinney diminished the
persuasive value of the State’s explanation as to Mr. Greene. 
From the record in this case, we cannot say that the trial court
failed to consider the impermissible strike in evaluating the
challenge to Mr. Greene.  First, the trial court appears to have
considered the State’s explanations as to Mr. Greene and Mr.
McKinney together, as evidenced by defendant’s unified objection
to the strikes and the trial court’s single order on the matter. 
Second, the prima facie case as to Greene and McKinney was not
particularly strong, given that one black prospective juror from
the first panel was in fact already accepted and placed on the
-31-
jury.  Finally, the trial court may well have discounted the
persuasiveness of the explanation as to Mr. Greene to the extent
warranted by the rejected explanation as to Mr. McKinney. 
Peremptorily striking a prospective juror based upon membership
in the NAACP has been held to be race-neutral and not
unconstitutionally discriminatory.  See United States v. Payne,
962 F.2d 1228, 1233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 909, 121
L. Ed. 2d 229 (1992).  The trial judge’s determination as to the
McKinney strike was predicated as much upon the manner in which
the explanation was made as upon the substance of the
explanation.  When asked to articulate his race-neutral reason,
the prosecutor could not do so immediately, but had to study
Mr. McKinney’s juror information sheet at length before supplying
his rationale, making the explanation appear to the court to be
“somewhat pretextual and an after thought.”  There was no similar
hesitation with respect to prospective juror Greene.  For these
reasons, given the strength of the rationale for striking
Mr. Greene, we conclude that the trial court did not commit clear
error in finding no intentional racial discrimination in the
strike of Mr. Greene.
Defendant next argues as to the strike of prospective
juror Greene that the prosecutor asked black prospective jurors
questions designed to provoke disqualifying responses while not
asking such questions of white prospective jurors and that this
disparate examination was a basis for finding intentional racial
discrimination.  Specifically, defendant contends that the
prosecutor directed multiple questions to Mr. Greene involving
-32-
whether he thought the criminal justice system was “unfair” or
did not treat people the way they should be treated.  After a
thorough review of the record, we conclude that the prosecutor
questioned many prospective jurors, irrespective of race, on
their beliefs and feelings about the fairness of the judicial
system.  The questions were often varied in form, but the same
basic information was sought in each case.  The trial court did
not commit clear error on this ground.  Disparate questioning of
prospective jurors does not necessarily give rise to Batson
error.  Thomas, 329 N.C. at 432, 407 S.E.2d at 147-48.
Finally, as to the strike of prospective juror Greene,
defendant argues that the State accepted other jurors, who were
white, even though they expressed some reservations about the
fairness of the judicial system, yet struck Greene.  Defendant
contends that differentiation shows purposeful racial
discrimination.  The acceptance by the State of white prospective
jurors similarly situated to black prospective jurors who have
been peremptorily stricken is a factor to be considered in
determining whether there has been purposeful racial
discrimination.  Kandies, 342 N.C. at 435, 467 S.E.2d at 75;
Robinson, 330 N.C. at 19, 409 S.E.2d at 298.  But defendant’s
approach in this argument, like that taken by the defendants in
both Robinson and Porter, 326 N.C. at 501, 391 S.E.2d at 152,
“involves finding a single factor among [the] several articulated
by the prosecutor . . . and matching it to a passed juror who
exhibited that same factor.”  Robinson, 330 N.C. at 19, 409
S.E.2d at 298.  As we have said previously, “This approach ‘fails
-33-
to address the factors as a totality which when considered
together provide an image of a juror considered . . . undesirable
by the State.’”  Id. (quoting Porter, 326 N.C. at 501, 391 S.E.2d
at 152).  For these reasons we are unable to conclude that the
trial court committed clear error in not finding that prospective
juror Greene was peremptorily stricken for impermissible racially
discriminatory reasons.
Defendant next contends, with respect to the State’s
peremptory strikes of prospective jurors Hudson and Watkins, that
the trial court erred in concluding that defendant had not
established a prima facie case of racial discrimination by giving
too much weight to the presence of black jurors already on the
jury.  Defendant argues specifically that the trial court’s
methodology was flawed in that it ignored all factors other than
the number of black jurors remaining on the jury.
Our cases have held that one of the factors which a
court must consider in determining whether intentional
discrimination is present in a particular peremptory strike is
whether the State has accepted any black jurors.  State v.
Kandies, 342 N.C. at 435, 467 S.E.2d at 75; State v. Smith, 328
N.C. 99, 121, 400 S.E.2d 712, 724-25 (1991).  “[O]ne factor
tending to refute a showing of discrimination is the State’s
acceptance of black jurors.”  Thomas, 329 N.C. at 431, 407 S.E.2d
at 147.  In the present case the State had accepted two black
jurors when the prosecutor peremptorily challenged a black
prospective juror, Mrs. Hudson.  Defendant’s Batson objection, in
its totality, contained the following argument:  “As to one of
-34-
    Note that the State attempted to strike Mr. McKinney, but
1
reinstated him on the jury after the trial court found purposeful
the jurors that’s been excluded, that’s Mrs. Hudson, the
defendant objects at this point to her under the Batson case.  At
this point he’s peremptorily excluded three jurors, now two of
which are black.  That’s the extent of my argument.”  The court,
in ruling that defendant had not made out a prima facie case with
this argument, responded:
The Court will find that we had a Batson
hearing yesterday.  At that point the
prosecution was required to state race
neutral reasons for excusing a juror. 
Pursuant to that hearing one juror
[Mr. Greene] was excused after proper reasons
were given.  At this point the prosecution
has accepted two black jurors [this includes
Mr. McKinney], has excused one; if
Mrs. Hudson is excused, that will be two out
of four.  I do not find that this raises the
presumption required to make the prosecution
state its reasons.  There are sufficient
black jurors remaining on the panel.  I will
also note for the record, however, that
Mrs. Hudson’s answers to the questions are
part of the record.  She’s indicated
ambivalence towards the death penalty which
may not rise to the level requiring the Court
to excuse her for cause.  The court has no
doubt that if required to state a reason, the
prosecution would be able to present a race
neutral reason for excusing Mrs. Hudson. 
However, I’m not going to require him to do
that because I do not formally find that at
this point there is a pattern that requires
that he do so.
This review of the record reveals that, first, defendant’s
objection itself was couched in terms of the number of black
prospective jurors the prosecution had attempted to strike; so
the court was merely responding in terms of the number of black
jurors already seated on the jury.   Second, it is manifest from
1
-35-
racial discrimination in his strike, thus remedying the
violation.  This is why the State’s argument that it had accepted
two out of three black prospective jurors is not inconsistent
with defendant’s argument that the State attempted to strike two
of three black prospective jurors.
the rest of the court’s response that it did not ignore all
factors other than the number of blacks on the jury panel.  Thus,
with respect to prospective juror Hudson, we cannot say that the
trial court committed clear error in not finding a prima facie
case of racial discrimination.
Likewise, with prospective juror Watkins, the defense
objected to the State’s peremptory strike and offered the
following rationale for its objection:  “The objection is based
on the fact that this is, it’s obvious that this is a systematic
exclusion of black jurors and he continues to do it, black male
jurors.”  The following colloquy then took place between the
court and defense counsel:
THE COURT:  All right, there are two
black jurors in the pool already seated, one
who is male.  I’m going on memory here,
correct me if I’m wrong; is this the third
[black juror] that will be excused?
MR. WILLIS:  I believe it is the third.
THE COURT:  If Mr. Watkins is excused,
[the prosecutor] would have excused three out
of five [black jurors], that’s beginning to
get to be a little bit troublesome, but the
ruling of the Court will be that that’s not
sufficient to create a prima faci[e] showing
of discrimination pursuant to Batson [v.]
Kentucky.
Again, the defense invited the trial court’s numerical analysis
by alleging that the prosecution was carrying out a systematic
exclusion of black jurors.  While such an analysis is not
-36-
dispositive, neither is it impermissible; this Court has on a
number of occasions utilized a numerical or statistical analysis
in determining whether a prima facie case of racial
discrimination in jury selection exists.  See State v. Ross, 338
N.C. 280, 285, 449 S.E.2d 556, 561-62 (1994) (minority acceptance
rate of 66% failed to establish prima facie case of
discrimination); State v. Allen, 323 N.C. 208, 219, 372 S.E.2d
855, 862 (1988) (minority acceptance rate of 41% failed to
establish prima facie case of discrimination), sentence vacated
on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1021, 108 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1990); State
v. Abbott, 320 N.C. 475, 481-82, 358 S.E.2d 365, 369 (1987)
(acceptance rate of 40% failed to establish prima facie case of
discrimination).  In this case, at this point in jury selection,
out of five prospective black jurors, two had been seated on the
jury.  In sum, we cannot say that the trial court committed clear
error in finding no prima facie case of racial discrimination as
to prospective jurors Hudson and Watkins.
Defendant next argues that the trial court should have
considered the third step in the Batson analysis and found that
the peremptory strike of both Hudson and Watkins was purposefully
racially discriminatory.  However, as the trial court found no
prima facie case of discrimination as to this juror and as we
have already found no error in that determination, we have no
need to proceed to this issue.  State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453,
463, 496 S.E.2d 357, 363 (1998); State v. Williams, 343 N.C. 345,
359, 471 S.E.2d 379, 386-87 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
136 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1997).  The trial court in this case, as in
-37-
Williams and Smith, explicitly ruled that defendant failed to
make a prima facie showing:  “I do not find that this raises the
presumption required to make the prosecution state its
reasons. . . .  I’m not going to require [the prosecutor] to
[present race-neutral reasons for excusing Mrs. Hudson] because I
do not formally find that at this point there is a pattern that
requires that he do so.”  The prosecutor then requested that the
trial court allow him to state his reasons for the challenge: 
“We’d like to do so though if the Court has no objection. . . . 
Just for the record.”  Thus, the analysis, which we applied in
State v. Lyons, 343 N.C. at 11-12, 468 S.E.2d at 208, and in
State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 93, 443 S.E.2d 306, 312 (1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995), has no
application here, where the trial court specifically ruled that
there was no prima facie case of discrimination.
GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE
Defendant next argues that the trial court committed
prejudicial constitutional error in failing to intervene ex mero
motu to correct the State’s improper comment on defendant’s
failure to testify at trial.  Defendant takes exception to the
following language from the prosecutor’s closing argument:
That’s what happened.  Somebody just pulled
that [storm] door open.  Now do we know what
happened to that glass?  We don’t.  It’s one
of the many, many unanswered things about
what happened there in that house that night. 
Two people know what happened in that house
that night.  One of them is dead.  The other
one is sitting right here.  So I don’t know.
I wish I could answer all these
questions.  There are a bunch of them.  I’m
-38-
going to talk about some of them.  But to
think that we’re going to come in here and be
able to prove to you every single little
teeny tiny fact of what happened is
ridiculous, members of the jury.  I hate to
tell you this, but people don’t go kicking
down folks’ doors and slitting their throats
in front of a crowd of witnesses.  It just
doesn’t happen.
The prosecutor later argued:
By the very nature of coming in here and
sitting here and pleading not guilty, the
State has to prove everything and that’s what
[defendant] Mr. Fletcher has done.  He’s hid
behind this presumption of justice for as
long as he can.  But it’s gone now.  Stripped
away by the proof in this case, but we had to
prove it to you, and we did.
Finally, at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued:
[Nonstatutory mitigating circumstance n]umber
10, the defendant, Andre Fletcher, has no
recollection of committing the crime for
which he has been convicted.  I urge you to
absolutely reject that statement and write
“No” beside it.  There is no evidence before
you of what Mr. Fletcher remembers or does
not remember at this moment in time.
Preliminarily, we note that defendant in this case did not object
to any of these arguments; and where a defendant fails to object,
an appellate court reviews the prosecutor’s argument to determine
whether the argument was “so grossly improper that the trial
court committed reversible error in failing to intervene ex mero
motu to correct the error.”  State v. Williams, 317 N.C. 474,
482, 346 S.E.2d 405, 410 (1986).  As we stated previously, “only
an extreme impropriety on the part of the prosecutor will compel
this Court to hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in
not recognizing and correcting ex mero motu an argument that
defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when
-39-
originally spoken.”  State v. Richardson, 342 N.C. 772, 786, 467
S.E.2d 685, 693, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 160
(1996).
A criminal defendant may not be compelled to testify,
and any reference by the prosecutor to a defendant’s failure to
testify violates the defendant’s constitutional right to remain
silent.  State v. Baymon, 336 N.C. 748, 758, 446 S.E.2d 1, 6
(1994).  A prosecutor may, however, properly argue the failure of
the defendant to produce evidence.  State v. Richardson, 342 N.C.
at 785-86, 467 S.E.2d at 693; State v. Young, 317 N.C. 396, 415,
346 S.E.2d 626, 637 (1986).  In this case the prosecutor’s
remarks were directed toward defendant’s failure to offer
evidence to rebut the State’s case, not at defendant’s failure to
take the stand himself.  The comments are not comparable to
comments that have been held improper by this Court and the
United States Supreme Court.  In Griffin v. California the
prosecutor argued to the jury, “The defendant certainly knows
[the details of the crime]. . . .  These things he has not seen
fit to take the stand and deny or explain.”  Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 610-11, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 107-08
(1965).  In State v. Reid the prosecutor said, “The defendant
hasn’t taken the stand in this case.”  State v. Reid, 334 N.C.
551, 554, 434 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1993).  Defendant argues that the
comments made by the prosecutor in this case are similar to those
made in Baymon, where we held that the trial court erred in
failing to grant the defendant’s request for a mistrial.  Baymon,
336 N.C. at 757-59, 446 S.E.2d at 6.  The prosecutor there had
-40-
said, “We don’t know how many times the child was [sexually
assaulted or abused]. . . .  The defendant knows, but he’s not
going to tell you.”  Id. at 757, 446 S.E.2d at 6.  We reasoned
that “[t]he implication left by the prosecutor’s argument was
that defendant knows he is guilty of these and perhaps more
assaults, but he is hiding behind his right not to take the stand
to avoid admitting it so the jury must decide how many assaults
actually occurred.”  Id. at 758, 446 S.E.2d at 6.  This case is
distinguishable from Baymon in that here the prosecutor made no
reference, direct or indirect, as to defendant’s failure to say
anything.  The comment that “the other one is sitting right
there” is merely an argument that defendant is in fact the
killer.  The argument concerning unanswered questions recognizes
that the jury might have some unanswered questions which do not
prevent the jury from finding defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.  Similarly, the argument that defendant pled
not guilty and thereby required the State to prove the case, read
in context, is an argument that the State has done what the State
was required to do and that based on the evidence presented,
defendant’s presumption of innocence has been overcome.  These
arguments were not so grossly improper as to manifest extreme
impropriety.  State v. Randolph, 312 N.C. 198, 206, 321 S.E.2d
864, 869-70 (1984).  The trial court did not err in failing to
intervene ex mero motu.
-41-
SENTENCING PROCEEDING
Defendant brings forth several issues for review with
respect to his capital sentencing proceeding, but we need focus
on only two of defendant’s contentions.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erroneously
failed to submit to the jury the statutory mitigating
circumstance that the capital felony was committed while
defendant was under the influence of a mental or emotional
disturbance, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(2) (1997), and that he is,
therefore, entitled to a new sentencing proceeding.  Defendant
did not request the submission of the (f)(2) mitigating
circumstance at his sentencing proceeding; but where evidence is
presented at a capital sentencing proceeding that may support a
statutory mitigating circumstance, the trial court has no
discretion as to whether to submit the circumstance.  State v.
Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 44, 446 S.E.2d 252, 276 (1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1134, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995).  The trial court
must submit the circumstance if it is supported by substantial
evidence.  State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 398-99, 462 S.E.2d
25, 44-45 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110, 134 L. Ed. 2d 482
(1996).  Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 
State v. Fullwood, 329 N.C. 233, 236, 404 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1991). 
In sum, the test for sufficiency of evidence to support
submission of a statutory mitigating circumstance is whether a
juror could reasonably find that the circumstance exists based on
the evidence.  McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed.
-42-
2d 369 (1990); State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 394, 428 S.E.2d
118, 142, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993).
In the present case defendant presented evidence from
Dr. Anthony Sciara, a psychologist who evaluated defendant a
number of times between his arrest and trial.  Sciara testified
that defendant “tends to distort his perceptions and at times may
even be out of touch with reality” and that under times of
stress, “he may actually not perceive reality correctly and may
deal with the world inappropriately.”  Sciara’s testing indicated
that defendant was in a “stress overload” situation at the time
of trial and that it is likely that he had been in a chronic
stress overload situation “for a very long time.”  Sciara
indicated that his findings from psychological testing were
consistent with defendant’s records beginning ten years before
the murder, when defendant was ten years old.  Sciara also found
that defendant was abusing marijuana and, at times, cocaine. 
Sciara testified that the best indicator of violent behavior in a
person is a history of violence, of which defendant had none. 
Sciara testified that in defendant’s case,
[t]o do the killing as indicated[,] something
very different would have had to [have] gone
on.  He would have had to be in a very
psychotic state or really out of it on drugs. 
Either one of those might have led to this
behavior, because then the predictions of
doing the consistent thing that he did would
be out the window.
The State contends, citing State v. Geddie, 345 N.C.
73, 102-03, 478 S.E.2d 146, 161 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1997), that there is no evidence in the
-43-
record that defendant was stressed, on drugs, or otherwise out of
touch with reality at the time of the killing.  In Geddie this
Court upheld the trial court’s failure to submit the (f)(2)
mitigator where defendant’s psychologist “diagnosed defendant as
a substance abuser and antisocial person,” but “never testified
to any mental disorder or emotional disturbance at the time of
the killing.”  Id. at 103, 478 S.E.2d at 161.  In this case,
however, a juror could reasonably find from Dr. Sciara’s
testimony that, at the time of the killing, defendant was under
the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance.  First,
Sciara testified that under times of stress, defendant might not
perceive reality correctly and that it was likely that defendant
had been in a stress-overload situation for a very long time
based on his environment and psychological problems.  Second,
given defendant’s lack of any violent history, Sciara testified
that defendant would have had to have been “in a very psychotic
state or really out of it on drugs” to attack and kill in the
manner in which the victim was killed.  We hold that this
testimony is sufficient to link defendant’s mental and emotional
state to the time of the killing and that a reasonable juror
could conclude from this evidence that defendant was under the
influence of a mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the
killing.  For this reason the trial court’s failure to submit the
(f)(2) mitigating circumstance to the jury was error.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erroneously
failed to submit to the jury the statutory mitigating
circumstance that defendant had no significant history of prior
-44-
criminal activity, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1).  As above,
defendant’s failure to request the submission of the (f)(1)
mitigating circumstance does not discharge the trial court from
its duty to submit the circumstance if the evidence is sufficient
for a juror to reasonably find that the circumstance exists. 
State v. Jones, 346 N.C. 704, 715, 487 S.E.2d 714, 721 (1997). 
The length of a defendant’s criminal history, by itself, is not
determinative for purposes of submitting the (f)(1) mitigator. 
“When the trial court is deciding whether a rational juror could
reasonably find this mitigating circumstance to exist, the nature
and age of the prior criminal activities are important, and the
mere number of criminal activities is not dispositive.”  Geddie,
345 N.C. at 102, 478 S.E.2d at 161.  In State v. Jones this Court
held that the trial court erred in not submitting the (f)(1)
circumstance where the defendant’s criminal history consisted of
four counts of misdemeanor larceny and two or three felony
larceny charges and where there was no evidence presented at
trial suggesting that defendant had committed any violent crimes
prior to killing the victim.  Jones, 346 N.C. at 716, 487 S.E.2d
at 722.  Our analysis in Jones emphasizes that the defendant’s
prior convictions consisted of property crimes rather than
violent crimes.  In that case we cited a number of cases in which
we had previously held that similar histories permitted a
rational juror to find as a mitigating circumstance that
defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
Id.  A common theme in those cases is the predominantly
nonviolent nature of the prior crimes.  State v. Ball, 344 N.C.
-45-
290, 310, 474 S.E.2d 345, 357 (1996) (the defendant had a history
of drug use and a conviction for robbery; a conviction for
felonious assault, after which altercation he took the victim to
the emergency room; and three convictions for forgery), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1997); State v. Rowsey,
343 N.C. 603, 619-20, 472 S.E.2d 903, 911-12 (1996) (the
defendant had illegally possessed marijuana and a concealed
weapon; had been convicted of two counts of larceny, fifteen
counts of injury to property, and an alcoholic beverage
violation; and at the time of the trial, had been charged with
five counts of felony breaking and entering and felony larceny
offenses), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1997);
State v. Buckner, 342 N.C. 198, 234, 464 S.E.2d 414, 434-35
(1995) (the defendant had seven breaking and entering
convictions; a common law robbery conviction in which defendant’s
co-conspirator, not the defendant, was the instigator or main
actor; and a drug-trafficking conviction), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1996); State v. Lloyd, 321 N.C. 301, 313,
364 S.E.2d 316, 324 (the defendant had two felony convictions
which occurred almost twenty years previously and seven
alcohol-related misdemeanor convictions), sentence vacated on
other grounds, 488 U.S. 807, 102 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1988); see also
State v. Williams, 343 N.C. 345, 371-72, 471 S.E.2d 379, 393-94
(1996) (the defendant’s record consisted of convictions for
misdemeanor larceny, two counts of misdemeanor breaking and
entering, two counts of misdemeanor larceny, misdemeanor
possession of stolen property, carrying a concealed weapon,
-46-
possession of a weapon of mass destruction, uttering forged
papers, misdemeanor assault on a female, and misdemeanor assault
with a deadly weapon), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d
618 (1997); State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1, 56, 463 S.E.2d 738, 767
(1995) (the defendant had convictions for driving while impaired,
assault, communicating threats, escape, nonfelonious breaking and
entering, receiving stolen goods, possessing a stolen vehicle,
and possessing stolen credit cards), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197,
134 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1996); State v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470, 504, 461
S.E.2d 664, 681 (1995) (witnesses testified that the defendant
used drugs extensively and had been incarcerated previously),
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1123, 134 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1996); State v.
Quick, 337 N.C. 359, 362, 446 S.E.2d 535, 537 (1994) (the
defendant had used drugs illegally and had been convicted of
larceny, receiving stolen goods, and forgery); State v. Mahaley,
332 N.C. 583, 597, 423 S.E.2d 58, 66-67 (1992) (the defendant had
no record of criminal convictions, and her prior criminal
activities consisted of using illegal drugs and stealing money
and credit cards to support her drug habit), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1995); State v. Turner, 330 N.C.
249, 257, 410 S.E.2d 847, 851 (1991) (the defendant had been
convicted of misdemeanor offenses of receiving stolen goods,
larceny, assault with a deadly weapon, and worthless check; the
defendant’s nonadjudicated acts included illegal possession of
marijuana, theft when the defendant was a juvenile, sale of
marijuana, and possession of a sawed-off shotgun).
-47-
In the present case the evidence tended to show that
defendant had a history of stealing since he was a child and that
he had been convicted of the following offenses since 1990:  two
counts of felonious breaking and entering, three counts of
felonious larceny, felonious possession of stolen property,
misdemeanor breaking and entering, five counts of misdemeanor
larceny, and assault on a female.  While it is fair to say that
defendant stole from others for most of his life and that in
recent years he seems to have supported himself largely by
stealing and occasionally selling drugs, no testimony was
presented that the breaking and enterings and larcenies were
connected to any violent behavior.  The breaking and entering and
larceny charges appear to have involved only unoccupied vehicles;
there was no evidence prior to the killing of the victim in this
case that defendant broke into anyone’s home.  Numerous witnesses
testified that defendant’s larcenous history is devoid of any
violence, aggressive or physical behavior, or even confrontation
with the victims of the larcenies.  The State urges that a total
life of crime such as defendant’s forbids the submission of the
(f)(1) mitigator to the jury and proffers language from our
opinion in State v. Sidden, in which we held it was not error not
to submit the (f)(1) mitigator where
[t]he evidence showed the defendant had
been dealing in the illegal sale of alcohol
and drugs all his adult life.  This evidence
of constant criminal activity culminating in
the murder of Garry Sidden, Sr. was such that
the jury could not reasonably find that the
defendant had no significant history of prior
criminal activity.
-48-
State v. Sidden, 347 N.C. 218, 232, 491 S.E.2d 225, 232 (1997). 
But our holding in Sidden was predicated upon the additional fact
that the defendant there had committed the murder of Garry
Sidden, Sr. prior to the two murders for which he was being tried
and sentenced.  Id.  This prior murder qualified as the “prior
criminal activity” for purposes of the other two murders.  Id.
Defendant’s history of prior criminal activity is less
significant than that of criminal defendants in prior cases in
which this Court has held that the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance
should not be submitted to the jury.  See State v. Daughtry, 340
N.C. 488, 522, 459 S.E.2d 747, 765 (1995) (the defendant often
beat the murder victim, shot an acquaintance in the leg, and was
convicted of driving under the influence and assault inflicting
serious injury with a large stick), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1079,
133 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1996); State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 157, 451
S.E.2d 826, 850 (1994) (the defendant had three prior violent
felony convictions:  two counts of felonious assault and one
count of robbery), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169, 132 L. Ed. 2d 873
(1995); State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. at 44, 446 S.E.2d at 276 (the
defendant had been convicted in 1978, 1982, and 1984 of assault
with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury); State v. Sexton,
336 N.C. 321, 375, 444 S.E.2d 879, 910 (the defendant was
convicted for two counts of assault on a female, one of which
involved choking a female less than one year before the
strangulation of the murder victim; moreover, the defendant
testified that he did not remember choking the assault victim, a
circumstance strikingly similar to his professed lack of memory
-49-
about the details of the strangulation of the murder victim),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1006, 130 L. Ed. 2d 429 (1994); State v.
Jones, 336 N.C. 229, 247, 443 S.E.2d 48, 56 (the defendant had
six or seven times broken into the same convenience store where
the murder occurred and had stolen various items from the store
and had broken into a pawn shop and stolen several guns, one of
which he used to kill the victim), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1003,
130 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1994); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. at 119, 443
S.E.2d at 326 (the defendant had been involved in crime since
adolescence; sometimes earned $4,000 to $5,000 per week selling
drugs; had been convicted of the robbery of a business and two of
its employees; and in the murder for which he was being
sentenced, had come from Maryland to sell drugs and commit a
robbery).
Given the largely nonviolent nature of defendant’s
prior criminal activities, we conclude that a juror could
reasonably have concluded that defendant had no significant
history of prior criminal activity.  For this reason the trial
court erred by failing to submit the (f)(1) mitigating
circumstance for the jury’s consideration.
The trial court’s error in failing to submit statutory
mitigating circumstances where there is sufficient evidence “‘is
prejudicial unless the State can demonstrate on appeal that it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  Jones, 346 N.C. at
717, 487 S.E.2d at 722 (quoting Quick, 337 N.C. at 363, 446
S.E.2d at 538).  Here, the State is not able to demonstrate that
the failure to submit either the (f)(2) or the (f)(1) mitigators
-50-
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  As to the (f)(2)
mitigator, that defendant was under the influence of a mental or
emotional disturbance, we cannot conclude that, had this
mitigating circumstance been submitted to the jury, no juror
would have found its existence; nor can we conclude with
certainty “‘that had this statutory mitigating circumstance been
found and balanced against the aggravating circumstances, the
jury would still have returned a sentence of death.’”  Quick, 337
N.C. at 363, 446 S.E.2d at 538 (quoting Mahaley, 332 N.C. at 599,
423 S.E.2d at 67-68).  As to the (f)(1) mitigator, that defendant
had no significant history of prior criminal activity, we note
that one or more jurors found as a nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance that “[t]he violent nature of the crime for which
the defendant has been convicted is completely out of character
with his prior behavior.”  Given this recognition by one or more
members of the jury of defendant’s previously nonviolent
character, it is reasonably likely that had they been permitted
to consider whether his criminal history was significant, one or
more jurors would have found this statutory mitigating
circumstance as well.  For these reasons defendant is entitled to
a new capital sentencing proceeding.
We conclude that the guilt-innocence phase of
defendant’s trial was free from prejudicial error.  However, we
also conclude that the trial court committed reversible error
during the sentencing proceeding by failing to submit the (f)(1)
and (f)(2) mitigating circumstances.  Therefore, we vacate
-51-
defendant’s death sentence and remand for a new capital
sentencing proceeding.
NO ERROR IN GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE; DEATH SENTENCE
VACATED; REMANDED FOR NEW CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING.
====================
Chief Justice MITCHELL dissenting.
In the present case, the State peremptorily challenged
two of the three black venire members from the first panel of
twelve prospective jurors.  The State exercised its first two
peremptory challenges against two black prospective jurors,
Mr. Greene and Mr. McKinney.  Defendant objected, and the trial
court conducted a hearing pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986) (Equal Protection Clause), and
State v. Crandell, 322 N.C. 487, 501, 369 S.E.2d 579, 587 (1988)
(Article I, Section 26 of the Constitution of North Carolina).
The trial court found, inter alia, that defendant is a
black man, that the victim was a white female, and that the
venire contained “very few blacks.”  The trial court concluded
that defendant had established a prima facie case of racial
discrimination in the exercise of the State’s peremptory
challenges and required the State to present racially neutral
reasons for its peremptory challenges of Mr. Greene and
Mr. McKinney.  The trial court concluded that the reasons given
by the State for excusing Mr. Greene were racially neutral and
therefore sufficient to justify the peremptory challenge.  Based
on proper findings of fact, however, the trial court concluded
that the State’s professed reason for excusing Mr. McKinney was
“not sufficient to overcome the presumption of discrimination nor
was it race neutral” and that it appeared to the trial court to
be “somewhat pretextual and an afterthought.”  The trial court
then proposed to remedy the discriminatory use of this peremptory
challenge by excusing the entire initial jury panel of twelve. 
The State, however, chose to withdraw its peremptory challenge of
prospective juror McKinney and to allow him to be seated as a
juror, rather than have the trial court excuse the entire panel. 
For the following reasons, I believe that the trial court reached
the correct conclusion in deciding to excuse the entire panel,
but erred when it changed its ruling in response to the State’s
withdrawal of its peremptory challenge of juror McKinney.
In State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 433 S.E.2d 144
(1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994),
the trial court concluded that a Batson violation had occurred. 
The defendant sought to have the violation corrected by
requesting that the trial court seat the three black jurors the
State had removed by peremptory challenges.  The trial court
declined to seat these jurors and ordered that the jury selection
process begin anew with an entirely new panel of prospective
jurors.  Id. at 235, 433 S.E.2d 158-59.  On appeal to this Court,
the defendant argued that the trial court had erred in applying
this remedy for the Batson violation.  We rejected the
defendant’s argument.
In McCollum, we noted that the Supreme Court of the
United States had, in Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24, 90 L. Ed. 2d
at 90 n.24, expressly declined to express a view on whether the
more appropriate remedy for racial discrimination in jury
-53-
selection was to discharge the venire and select a new jury from
a new panel or to disallow the discriminatory challenges and
resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors
reinstated.  McCollum, 334 N.C. at 235, 433 S.E.2d at 159. 
However, we then went on to state the following:
We believe that the better practice is
that followed by the trial court in this
[McCollum] case, and that neither Batson nor
Powers [v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d
411 (1991),] requires a different procedure. 
We recognize and endorse the equal protection
right of prospective jurors explained in
detail in Powers.  However, we conclude that
the primary focus in a criminal case --
particularly a capital case such as this --
must continue to be upon the goal of
achieving a trial which is fair to both the
defendant and the State.  To ask jurors who
have been improperly excluded from a jury
because of their race to then return to the
jury to remain unaffected by that recent
discrimination, and to render an impartial
verdict without prejudice toward either the
State or the defendant, would be to ask them
to discharge a duty which would require near
superhuman effort and which would be
extremely difficult for a person possessed of
any sensitivity whatsoever to carry out
successfully.  As Batson violations will
always occur at an early stage in the trial
before any evidence has been introduced, the
simpler, and we think clearly fairer,
approach is to begin the jury selection anew
with a new panel of prospective jurors who
cannot have been affected by any prior Batson
violation.
McCollum, 334 N.C. at 236, 433 S.E.2d at 159.  We then concluded
that even if we assumed arguendo that the trial court had erred
by failing to seat the prospective jurors who had been improperly
excused, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. 
We said that this was so because the trial court’s action had
provided the defendant with exactly that which he was entitled to
-54-
receive -- trial by a jury selected on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
Id.
I wish to make it clear here that I do not intend to
imply any criticism of the learned trial court.  Clearly, it was,
and we are, dealing here with an area of the law in which the
Supreme Court of the United States has not yet given us clear
guidance.  The trial court did the best it could when faced with
this situation not of its making.  However, based upon the
reasoning of this Court in McCollum, as quoted above, I now
conclude that the only remedy for a Batson violation which will
both be practical and ensure a fair trial is to “begin the jury
selection anew with a new panel of prospective jurors who cannot
have been affected by any prior Batson violation.”  Id. 
Accordingly, I believe that defendant is entitled to a new trial
as a matter of both federal and state constitutional law.  For
this reason, I respectfully dissent.
====================
Justice FRYE dissenting in part.
As the majority correctly indicates, the use of
peremptory challenges for racially discriminatory reasons
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986).  The North Carolina Constitution,
Article I, Section 26, also prohibits the exercise of peremptory
strikes solely on the basis of race.  State v. Ross, 338 N.C.
280, 284, 449 S.E.2d 556, 560 (1994).  Unfortunately, the trial
court’s handling of defendant’s Batson challenges in this case
-55-
circumvented the procedures established by the United States
Supreme Court and this Court to avoid racial discrimination in
the selection of a jury.
The Supreme Court enunciated the procedure that a trial
court must utilize when a defendant objects to a prosecutor’s use
of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors of the
defendant’s race.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at
87-88.  This Court has frequently reiterated this procedure. 
See, e.g., State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 497, 391 S.E.2d 144,
150 (1990).  First, a defendant must make out a prima facie case
of racial discrimination, which he may do by showing:
(1) he is a member of a cognizable racial
minority, (2) members of his racial group
have been peremptorily excused, and
(3) racial discrimination appears to have
been the motivation for the challenges.
Id.  But see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411
(1991) (modifying Batson by holding that a defendant has standing
to object to racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
even if there is not racial identity between defendant and the
excused juror); State v. Beach, 333 N.C. 733, 430 S.E.2d 248
(1993).  If the defendant succeeds in establishing a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a race-
neutral reason for each challenged peremptory strike.  State v.
Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 16, 409 S.E.2d 288, 296 (1991).  The
rebuttal must be clear, reasonably specific, and related to the
particular case to be tried.  Id. at 17, 409 S.E.2d at 297.  The
defendant also “has a right of surrebuttal to show that the
prosecutor’s explanations are a pretext.”  Porter, 326 N.C. at
-56-
497, 391 S.E.2d at 150.  Finally, “[o]nce the State gives an
explanation for its peremptory challenges, the trial court then
determines ‘whether the defendant has carried his burden of
proving purposeful discrimination.’”  State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1,
20-21, 478 S.E.2d 163, 173 (1996) (quoting Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405 (1991)), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1997).  The procedure used by
the trial court in this case cut short the inquiry required to
establish whether the State’s given reasons were
nondiscriminatory.
The majority concludes that the trial court correctly
determined that defendant had not established a prima facie case
of racial discrimination in the peremptory challenges of two
black prospective jurors, Mrs. Hudson and Mr. Watkins.  I
disagree.
At the time of the peremptory challenges of Mrs. Hudson
and Mr. Watkins, the State had already peremptorily challenged
two of three black venire members from the first panel of
prospective jurors.  The prosecutor exercised his first two
peremptory challenges against two black prospective jurors,
Mr. Greene and Mr. McKinney.  Defendant objected.  The trial
court conducted a Batson hearing and found, inter alia, that 
defendant is a black man, that the victim was a white female, and
that the venire contained “very few blacks.”  Concluding that
defendant had established a prima facie case of racial
discrimination in the exercise of the State’s peremptory
challenges, the trial court required the State to come forward
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with race-neutral reasons for the strikes.  The trial court
concluded that the reasons given to challenge Mr. Greene were
race-neutral and sufficient to justify the peremptory challenge. 
However, as to Mr. McKinney, the trial court concluded that the
proffered reason for the strike was not race-neutral and appeared
to be pretextual.  The trial court concluded that the entire jury
panel should be discarded to remedy the discriminatory use of a 
peremptory challenge.  The State chose to withdraw its challenge
of juror McKinney rather than discard the entire jury panel.
Following the State’s peremptory challenge of the next
black prospective juror, Mrs. Hudson, defendant again objected. 
After noting that a Batson hearing had previously been conducted,
the trial court stated:
At this point the prosecution has accepted
two black jurors, has excused one; if
Mrs. Hudson is excused, that will be two out
of four.  I do not find that this raises the
presumption required to make the prosecution
state its reasons.  There are sufficient
black jurors remaining on the panel.
(Emphasis added.)  The trial court declined to find that
defendant had made a prima facie case of racial discrimination in
the State’s peremptory challenge of Mrs. Hudson.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the
trial court was correct in this ruling.  The trial court found
that the prosecutor had “accepted” the seating of two black
jurors and had excused one; however, the State “accepted” juror
McKinney only after the court decided to remedy the racial
discrimination by dismissing the entire jury panel.
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Likewise, when Mr. Watkins was subsequently
peremptorily challenged, the State had exercised peremptory
challenges against four of five black jurors, even though it
ultimately “accepted” two of five.  In response to defendant’s
Batson objection, the trial court again noted that two black
jurors in the pool had been seated.  The trial court then stated
that while it was “a little bit troublesome” that three out of
five black jurors would have been excused by the State, it would
not find that defendant had made out a prima facie case of
discrimination under Batson.
I believe that the trial court erred in both instances
by ignoring the State’s prior attempt to exercise a peremptory
challenge in a racially discriminatory manner and focusing
instead on the number of black jurors seated.  This evidence of
purposeful discrimination is especially significant in light of
the circumstances of this case, where defendant is a black man
charged with the murder of an elderly white woman.  Such
circumstances make this a case especially “susceptible to
racially discriminatory jury selection.”  State v. Thomas, 329
N.C. 423, 431, 407 S.E.2d 141, 147 (1991).
The majority finds it unnecessary to address
defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to make findings
under the third step of the Batson analysis because of its
conclusion that the trial court did not err in finding no prima
facie case of discrimination.  However, I believe that defendant
sufficiently raised “an inference of purposeful discrimination,”
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88, such that the trial
-59-
court should have proceeded to conduct a further inquiry.  The
trial court should have made findings and conclusions as to
whether the State’s reasons were legitimate and race-neutral or
pretextual and discriminatory.  In this case, the trial court
failed to “rule[] on the ultimate question of intentional
discrimination.”  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d at
405.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the trial
court erred by concluding that defendant failed to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination as to the peremptory
challenges of prospective jurors Hudson and Watkins.  I would
therefore remand this case to the trial court for a hearing on
the Batson issue.  If the State’s articulated reasons for the
challenges are determined to be race-neutral, defendant is
entitled to produce evidence to rebut the State’s reasons and
prove that the State engaged in purposeful racial discrimination. 
If defendant can meet this burden, then he must be awarded a new
trial.
Justice WHICHARD joins in this dissenting opinion.