Case Title: State v. Larry A. Tiepelman

Citation: 2006 WI 66

Docket Number: 2004AP000914-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 66 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP914-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Larry A. Tiepelman, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 179 
Reported at: 286 Wis. 2d 464, 703 N.W.2d 683 
(Ct. App. 2005–Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 9, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Richland   
 
JUDGE: 
Edward E. Leineweber 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Suzanne L. Hagopian, assistant state public defender. 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent, 
there 
was 
a 
brief 
by 
Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2006 WI 66
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP914-CR  
(L.C. No. 
1996CF7) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Larry A. Tiepelman, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 9, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Larry A. Tiepelman (Tiepelman) 
seeks review of a published court of appeals' decision1 affirming 
a circuit court's judgment of conviction and postconviction 
order that denied his motion for resentencing.  Tiepelman's 
motion was based on his claim that the circuit court relied on 
inaccurate information at his sentencing hearing.  The issue 
before this court is whether, on a motion for resentencing based 
on 
the 
circuit 
court's 
alleged 
reliance 
on 
inaccurate 
                                                 
1 State v. Tiepelman, 2005 WI App 179, 286 Wis. 2d 464, 703 
N.W.2d 683.   
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
2 
 
information, a defendant must prove that the circuit court 
actually relied on the inaccurate information, or that the court 
prejudicially relied on the inaccurate information. 
¶2 
We hold that in a motion for resentencing based on a 
circuit court's alleged reliance on inaccurate information, a 
defendant must establish that there was information before the 
sentencing court that was inaccurate, and that the circuit court 
actually relied on the inaccurate information.  Here, the court 
of appeals applied the wrong test——prejudicial reliance2——when it 
affirmed the circuit court.  We must, therefore, reverse that 
affirmance, and withdraw any language in State v. Montroy, 2005 
WI App. 230, 287 Wis. 2d 430, 706 N.W.2d 145, State v. Groth, 
2002 WI App 299, 258 Wis. 2d. 889, 655 N.W.2d 163, State v. 
Suchocki, 208 Wis. 2d. 509, 516, 561 N.W.2d 332 (Ct. App. 1997), 
State v. Coolidge, 173 Wis. 2d 783, 496 N.W.2d 701 (Ct. App. 
1993), and State v. Littrup, 164 Wis. 2d 120, 473 N.W.2d 164 
(Ct. App. 1991), to the contrary.   
¶3 
Only after the defendant meets this burden to show 
that 
the 
sentencing 
court 
actually 
relied 
on 
inaccurate 
information, does the burden then shift to the state to 
establish that the error was harmless.   
¶4 
Here the parties agree, as does this court, that there 
was inaccurate information actually relied on by the circuit 
                                                 
2 Whether the test is actual reliance or prejudicial 
reliance is significant.  Obviously, establishing prejudicial 
reliance presents a far more difficult barrier for a defendant 
to overcome than establishing that the circuit court actually 
relied on inaccurate information at sentencing. 
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
3 
 
court at sentencing.  It seems clear that the parties also agree 
that the issue of harmless error was not developed to the degree 
necessary to assist this court in resolving that issue, and 
since they also agree that this matter should be remanded for 
resentencing, it is appropriate that, under such circumstances, 
we accept their stipulation.  We, therefore, reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand this case to the 
circuit court for resentencing.3  
 
                                                 
3 In a letter dated March 31, 2006, the State of Wisconsin 
wrote to the court to inform it that the parties had reached an 
agreement that Tiepelman should be resentenced.  The letter 
reads, in relevant part: 
The 
State 
and 
Mr. 
Tiepelman 
have 
already 
concurred on the principal issue in this case:  the 
defendant's burden when claiming that the circuit 
court 
imposed 
a 
sentence 
based 
on 
inaccurate 
information.  Although I recognize that the court can 
disregard concessions or stipulations on legal issues, 
I urge the court not to do so.  I believe the burden 
on which the State and Mr. Tiepelman have agreed 
represents 
the 
correct 
statement 
of 
the 
two 
conflicting standards found in Wisconsin case law.   
The remaining issue concerns the matter of the 
State's obligation to prove harmless error once the 
defendant satisfies his or her burden.  In the briefs 
in this court, the parties have presented differing 
declarations of the harmless-error standard.  ... I 
concluded that the harmless-error issue in the context 
of a claim like Mr. Tiepelman's implicates additional 
tests and issues that neither the State nor Mr. 
Tiepelman addressed in the briefs in this court or in 
the court of appeals.  Consequently, in my view, the 
harmless-error issue is not developed at this point to 
a degree that would usefully assist the court in 
dealing with this issue. 
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
4 
 
I 
¶5 
On December 17, 1996, Tiepelman was convicted of one 
count of theft by false representation as a repeat offender, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 943.20(1)(d) and 939.62 (1995-96).  
Following his conviction, the circuit court withheld sentence 
and placed Tiepelman on probation for 16 years.  On April 21, 
2003, Tiepelman's probation was revoked, and he returned to the 
circuit court for sentencing. 
¶6 
On September 5, 2003, the Richland County Circuit 
Court, Judge Edward E. Leineweber presiding, held a sentencing 
hearing, resulting in the imposition of an indeterminate 
sentence of 12 years imprisonment.  In reaching its sentencing 
decision, the circuit court considered Tiepelman's presentence 
investigation report (PSI), which had correctly documented his 
criminal background.  However, when referring to the PSI, the 
circuit court mistakenly stated that the PSI showed "something 
over twenty prior convictions at the time of the commission of 
this offense back in [November] 1995."  While the PSI had shown 
20 charged offenses as of November 1995, it had also accurately 
reflected that only five of those offenses had resulted in 
convictions as of that date.   
¶7 
Tiepelman 
filed 
a 
postconviction 
motion 
seeking 
resentencing, arguing that the circuit court violated his right 
to due process, because the circuit court relied on inaccurate 
information 
about 
Tiepelman's 
criminal 
record. 
 
At 
the 
postconviction hearing, Judge Leineweber again presiding, the 
circuit court acknowledged that the reference to "over twenty 
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
5 
 
prior convictions" was wrong.  However, the court stated that 
there had not been reliance on an inaccuracy that was material, 
because Tiepelman conceded the pertinent underlying conduct, 
and, therefore, the circuit court denied Tiepelman's motion for 
resentencing.  State v. Tiepelman, 2005 WI App 179, ¶5, 286 Wis. 
2d 464, 703 N.W.2d 683.   
¶8 
Tiepelman appealed the denial, and the court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court.  Citing Groth and Littrup, 
the court of appeals set forth Tiepelman's burden as "showing, 
by clear and convincing evidence, both the inaccuracy of some 
information and that the sentencing judge prejudicially relied 
on the inaccurate information."  Id., ¶7.  As the State of 
Wisconsin (State) had conceded that Tiepelman had met his burden 
of showing the inaccuracy of the information, the court of 
appeals stated "[t]he dispositive issue here is the second 
prong:  Did Tiepelman meet his burden of showing prejudicial 
reliance?"  Id. (emphasis omitted).  Based largely on statements 
made by the circuit court during the motion hearing, the court 
of appeals held that Tiepelman had failed to prove prejudicial 
reliance, and therefore affirmed the circuit court's denial of 
the 
motion 
for 
resentencing 
and 
Tiepelman's 
conviction.  
Tiepelman petitioned for review of the decision of the court of 
appeals, and his petition was accepted. 
II 
¶9 
A defendant has a constitutionally protected due 
process right to be sentenced upon accurate information.  State 
v. Johnson, 158 Wis. 2d 458, 468, 463 N.W.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1990) 
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
6 
 
(citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972)).  
Whether a defendant has been denied this due process right is a 
constitutional issue that an appellate court reviews de novo.  
Coolidge, 173 Wis. 2d at 789.   
¶10 A defendant's right to be sentenced upon accurate 
information was first set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).  Townsend held 
that a sentence based on "assumptions concerning . . . [a 
person's] criminal record which were materially untrue . . . is 
inconsistent with due process of law, and such a conviction 
cannot stand."  Id. at 741.  The Court specifically noted that 
the sentence in question was "within the limits set by the 
statute" and therefore not "unduly severe."  Id.   
It is not the duration or severity of this sentence 
that renders it constitutionally invalid; it is the 
careless or designed pronouncement of sentence on a 
foundation so extensively and materially false, which 
the prisoner had no opportunity to correct by the 
services which counsel would provide, that renders the 
proceedings lacking in due process.  
Id.   
¶11 This due process right to be sentenced upon accurate 
information was further developed by the United States Supreme 
Court in Tucker, 404 U.S. 443.  During Tucker's sentencing 
proceeding, the sentencing judge had "conducted an inquiry into 
the respondent's background, and, the record shows, gave 
explicit attention to the three previous felony convictions the 
respondent had acknowledged."  Id. at 444 (emphasis added) 
(footnote 
omitted). 
 
However, 
it 
was 
later 
conclusively 
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
7 
 
determined that two of the defendant's prior convictions were 
constitutionally invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963), having "resulted from proceedings in which the 
respondent had been unrepresented by counsel, and that he had 
been neither advised of his right to legal assistance nor did he 
intelligently and understandingly waive this right to the 
assistance of counsel."  Tucker, 404 U.S. at 445 (internal 
quotations omitted) (footnote omitted).   
¶12 The Tucker Court emphasized that the record made 
"evident that the sentencing judge gave specific consideration 
to 
the 
respondent's 
previous 
convictions 
before 
imposing 
sentence upon him."  Id. at 447 (emphasis added).  As two of 
those convictions were determined to be invalid, the United 
States Supreme Court remanded the case to the circuit court for 
reconsideration of Tucker's sentence.  Id. at 449.  The Court 
reasoned:  
For if the trial judge in 1953 had been aware of the 
constitutional 
infirmity 
of two 
of the 
previous 
convictions, 
the 
factual 
circumstances 
of 
the 
respondent's background would have appeared in a 
dramatically 
different 
light 
at 
the 
sentencing 
proceeding.  Instead of confronting a defendant who 
had been legally convicted of three previous felonies, 
the judge would have been dealing with a man who 
beginning at age 17, had been unconstitutionally 
imprisoned for more than ten years, including five and 
one-half years on a chain gang. 
Id. at 448 (footnote omitted).  While not explicitly addressing 
the issue of harmless error, the Court stated that "the real 
question here is . . . whether the sentence in the 1953 federal 
case might have been different if the sentencing judge had known 
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
8 
 
that at least two of the respondent's previous convictions had 
been unconstitutionally obtained."  Id.  (footnote omitted).   
¶13 The actual reliance standard was subsequently followed 
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Welch v. Lane, 738 
F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1984).  In that case, "[a]lthough the 
prosecutor told the court quite clearly that petitioner had been 
convicted of robbery in 1976, [during the defendant's sentencing 
hearing] the sentencing judge said that petitioner had been 
convicted of armed robbery, a Class X offense under Illinois 
law."  Id. at 864 (emphasis in original).  In explaining his 
decision to sentence Welch to the maximum allowable term, the 
judge stated:  "The jury found the defendant guilty of three 
Class X offenses and a significant factor in the Court's 
determination of the sentence here is that this defendant has 
within the past ten years been convicted of the offense of armed 
robbery which is an offense of the same magnitude . . . of which 
he is now convicted."  Id. 
¶14 Lane articulated the Townsend/Tucker test as requiring 
that a sentence be "set aside where the defendant can show that 
false information was part of the basis for the sentence.  The 
two elements of that showing are, first, that information before 
the sentencing court was inaccurate, and second, that the 
sentencing court relied on the misinformation in passing 
sentence."  Id. at 865.  Whether the court "actually relied" on 
the incorrect information at sentencing was based upon whether 
the court gave "explicit attention" or "specific consideration" 
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
9 
 
to it, so that the misinformation "formed part of the basis for 
the sentence."  Id. at 866.   
¶15 An examination of case law in Wisconsin reveals that, 
although the actual reliance standard was properly formulated, 
initially, the court of appeals began to stray from that 
standard in some cases by requiring the proof of prejudicial, 
rather than actual reliance.   
¶16 In Johnson, 158 Wis. 2d 458, the defendant requested 
resentencing, based upon allegations that the court had relied 
on erroneous information at his sentencing.  Specifically, 
Johnson challenged "the court's statement that it was aware of 
the severe emotional damage and the 'suffering' incurred by the 
victims," because he claimed that "one of the victims was not 
emotionally damaged," by Johnson's repeated sexual assaults.  
Id. at 468. 
¶17 The court of appeals in Johnson correctly articulated 
the standard, stating "a defendant who requests resentencing 
based on inaccurate information must show both that the 
information was inaccurate, and that the court actually relied 
on the inaccurate information in the sentencing."  Id. (citing 
Lane, 738 F.2d at 865).  Because the court concluded that 
Johnson had failed to prove that the information on the victim's 
emotional damage was inaccurate, he "failed to carry his burden 
of establishing that the trial court improperly relied on 
erroneous information."  Id. at 469. 
¶18 Just one year later, in Littrup, 164 Wis. 2d 120, 
defendant Littrup challenged the accuracy of the state's PSI, 
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
10 
 
claiming "that alleged inaccuracies in it violated his due 
process rights by influencing the sentence of the trial court."  
Id. at 128 (footnote omitted).  The defendant argued that he did 
not need to show prejudice to establish a due process violation, 
relying on State v. Skaff, 152 Wis. 2d 48, 58, 447 N.W.2d 84 
(Ct. App. 1989).  The court of appeals rejected Littrup's 
position, distinguishing the facts of his case from those in 
Skaff.  In Skaff, the court of appeals held that the defendant 
need not show prejudice from a PSI to prevail on a claim, 
because the court concluded the circuit "court's blanket policy 
of 
refusing 
to 
allow 
defendants 
to 
read 
their 
PSI[s]" 
constituted a due process violation in and of itself.  Littrup, 
164 Wis. 2d at 127 (citing Skaff, 152 Wis. 2d at 58).   
¶19 Noting that there were "no cases in Wisconsin dealing 
with the proper burden of proof for claims of due process 
violations in the sentencing process," the court of appeals 
determined that on due process claims based on reliance on 
misinformation, the clear and convincing evidence burden of 
proof applied to sentence modification claims based upon the 
existence of a "new factor."4  Id. at 131 (citing State v. 
Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 8-9, 434 N.W.2d 609 (1989)).  The court 
of appeals then held that: 
                                                 
4 In State v. Franklin, this court defined "new factor" to 
be "'a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of 
a sentence, but not known to the trial judge at the time of 
original sentencing.'"  State v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 434 
N.W.2d 609 (1989) (citation omitted).   
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
11 
 
to establish a due process violation in the sentencing 
process, a defendant has the burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence both the inaccuracy 
prong and the prejudice prong of the due process test.  
Only after the defendant meets that burden does the 
burden of persuasion to establish harmlessness rest 
with the state.  
Id. at 132 (citing Skaff, 152 Wis. 2d at 58).  Since the 
decision was published, Littrup has been cited numerous times by 
the court of appeals for the proposition that a defendant must 
show 
prejudicial 
reliance 
on 
inaccurate 
information 
in 
sentencing to be resentenced on that basis.  See, e.g., Montroy, 
287 Wis. 2d. 430, ¶8; Groth, 258 Wis. 2d 889, ¶22; Suchocki, 208 
Wis. 2d. at 516.   
¶20 In State v. Lechner, this court considered a due 
process challenge to a sentence based upon the alleged reliance 
on inaccurate information in the defendant's PSI.  State v. 
Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 419, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998).  Lechner 
pled no contest to second-degree reckless homicide, homicide by 
intoxicated use of a vehicle, causing great bodily harm by 
intoxicated use of a vehicle, and two counts of second-degree 
recklessly endangering the safety of another.  Id. at 399-400.  
The circuit court sentenced Lechner to the maximum sentence on 
each count, running consecutively, for a total sentence of 30 
years in prison.  Id. at 400.  Lechner challenged the sentence, 
arguing that the PSI contained inaccurate information regarding 
the number of his prior convictions.  Id. at 419.  The parties 
agreed that the PSI incorrectly listed four prior criminal 
convictions, when the defendant actually had three prior 
arrests, but only one prior criminal conviction.  Id. at 419-20.   
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
12 
 
¶21 In its consideration of whether Lechner was entitled 
to resentencing, this court adopted the test set forth in 
Johnson, stating:  "A defendant who requests resentencing due to 
the circuit court's use of inaccurate information at the 
sentencing hearing 'must show both that the information was 
inaccurate and that the court actually relied on the inaccurate 
information in the sentencing.'"  Id. at 419 (quoting Johnson, 
158 Wis. 2d at 468).  Although this court recognized that the 
PSI did contain inaccurate information, after examining the 
record, it concluded that the circuit court did not actually 
rely on the inaccurate information in arriving at the sentence 
imposed.  Id. at 419-20. 
¶22 Later that same year, the court of appeals seemed to 
apply the correct test in State v. Anderson, 222 Wis. 2d 403, 
588 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1998).  In Anderson, the defendant pled 
no contest to two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a 
child and two counts of causing mental harm to a child.  Id. at 
404.  At the sentencing hearing, defendant's counsel advised the 
court that Anderson objected to portions of the PSI.  Among 
other things, Anderson argued "that the victims' statements were 
partially inaccurate, and that information derived from police 
reports was later determined to be untrue."  Id. at 405.  
Moreover, "[c]ounsel stated that the PSI did not disclose that 
some of the PSI's [more serious] allegations of sexual abuse had 
been investigated and found to be baseless."  Id.  In addition 
to a due process challenge based on the circuit court's alleged 
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
13 
 
reliance on inaccurate information, Anderson also alleged his 
counsel had been ineffective in handling the sentencing. 
¶23 Although it did not discuss Lechner, the court of 
appeals in Anderson did cite Johnson for the proposition that a 
defendant must show that specific information was inaccurate and 
"that the court actually relied upon the inaccurate information 
in sentencing."  Id. at 408 (citation omitted).  However, in its 
reasoning, 
the 
Anderson 
court 
came 
perilously 
close 
to 
conflating its analysis of the due process challenge with the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which does require a 
showing of prejudice.  Id. at 410.  
¶24 In 2002, the court of appeals returned to the 
requirement of "prejudicial reliance" in its decision in Groth, 
258 Wis. 2d 889.  Defendant Groth was convicted of second-degree 
reckless homicide while armed with a dangerous weapon.  During 
his sentencing hearing, the prosecutor made repeated references 
to Groth's history of violence, including statements that Groth 
"beats up women who are pregnant."  Id., ¶16 (emphasis omitted).  
Groth moved for resentencing, arguing his sentence had been 
based on inaccurate information.  The prosecutor later conceded 
that, although Groth did have a history of domestic violence, he 
could not "'find any factual basis for the representation that 
the defendant beats 'pregnant women.''"  Id., ¶18.   
¶25 Citing Littrup, the court of appeals set forth the 
requirement that a defendant must establish "inaccuracy of the 
information and prejudicial reliance by the sentencing court——by 
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
14 
 
clear and convincing evidence."5  Id., ¶22.  The Groth court 
determined, however, that "[n]otwithstanding the postconviction 
court's disclaimer of reliance on the inaccurate information 
about beating pregnant women, we conclude . . . that the record 
establishes a very strong likelihood that the sentencing court 
did indeed rely on the information."  Id., ¶27.  Therefore, the 
court concluded, Groth had satisfied his burden, and in turn, 
"the State [had] not established that the error was harmless."  
Id.  (citing Anderson, 222 Wis. 2d at 411). 
III 
¶26 We hold that the correct standard was set forth by 
this court in Lechner, in which the court held:  "A defendant 
who requests resentencing due to the circuit court's use of 
inaccurate information at the sentencing hearing 'must show both 
that the information was inaccurate and that the court actually 
relied on the inaccurate information in the sentencing.'"  
Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 419 (quoting Johnson, 158 Wis. 2d at 
468).  Once actual reliance on inaccurate information is shown, 
the burden then shifts to the state to prove the error was 
harmless.  As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in 
Lane:  
                                                 
5 There is nothing in State v. Johnson, 158 Wis. 2d 458, 463 
N.W.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1990), State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 
576 N.W.2d 912 (1998), nor Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 
1984), which indicates whether the defendant's burden of proof 
is clear and convincing evidence.  Therefore, we do not decide 
that issue.   
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
15 
 
A convicted offender does not have a constitutional 
right to a particular sentence available within a 
range of alternatives, but the offender does have a 
right to a fair sentencing process——one in which the 
court goes through a rational procedure of selecting a 
sentence based on relevant considerations and accurate 
information. 
Lane, 738 F.2d at 864-65 (emphasis in original).   
¶27 Moreover, requiring a defendant to prove prejudicial 
reliance when there was inaccurate information relied upon at 
sentencing would effectively eliminate the state's burden of 
proving that 
such 
error 
was harmless.  
If 
reliance is 
prejudicial, by definition it cannot be harmless.  Therefore, 
requiring a defendant to establish prejudicial rather than 
actual reliance, before the burden shifts to the state to prove 
the error was harmless, is illogical. 
¶28 Applying the correct standard to this case, Tiepelman 
must establish two things:  that some of the information 
presented was inaccurate, and that the sentencing court actually 
relied on that misinformation in reaching its determination in 
regard to the sentence imposed.  Here, since the State concedes 
that the information was inaccurate, the first prong is 
satisfied.   
¶29 In this case, the record makes it clear that the 
sentencing 
court 
specifically 
considered 
the 
inaccurate 
information in its decision.  During the proceeding, the court 
referred to the contents of the PSI, stating:   
Mr. Tiepelman, at the time of the commission of this 
offense, had a long pattern of similar offenses——or at 
least offenses of dishonesty, theft, false pretenses, 
et cetera.  I counted something over twenty prior 
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
16 
 
convictions at the time of the commission of this 
offense back in 1995.  They include numerous issuance 
of worthless checks, they include other forgeries, 
thefts by false representation, several——more than one 
forgery, looks like a couple of forgeries, couple of 
thefts by false representation, theft in a business 
setting, again, worthless checks.  A well-established 
pattern of criminal behavior dealing with theft and 
false representation, issuance of worthless checks, 
prior to the commission of this offense. 
¶30 We are satisfied, based on the record and on the 
stipulation of the parties, that Tiepelman met his burden of 
showing that the circuit court actually relied on inaccurate 
information in reaching its decision on sentencing, thus meeting 
the requirements of the second prong of the test.  We disagree 
with the circuit court's determination that the inaccurate 
information was not "material."6  It was.  Having met the burden 
of establishing that there was actual reliance on inaccurate 
information, as noted previously, the burden then shifts to the 
State to prove that the error was, nonetheless, harmless.  
However, in the State's letter, it was indicated that "a claim 
like Mr. Tiepelman's implicates additional tests and issues that 
neither the State nor Mr. Tiepelman addressed in the briefs in 
this court or in the court of appeals."  Because the issue of 
harmless error was neither fully argued nor fully briefed by the 
parties to the degree that would allow this court to resolve the 
issue, we decline to address it further here.   
 
                                                 
6 By use of the word "material," the circuit court appeared 
to indicate that it did not actually rely on the inaccurate 
information. 
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
17 
 
IV 
¶31 We hold that in a motion for resentencing based on a 
circuit court's alleged reliance on inaccurate information, a 
defendant must establish that there was information before the 
sentencing court that was inaccurate, and that the circuit court 
actually relied on the inaccurate information.  Here, the court 
of appeals applied the wrong test——prejudicial reliance——when it 
affirmed the circuit court.  We must, therefore, reverse that 
affirmance, and withdraw any language in Montroy, 287 Wis. 2d 
430, Groth, 258 Wis. 2d. 889, Suchocki, 208 Wis. 2d. 509, 
Coolidge, 173 Wis. 2d 783, and Littrup, 164 Wis. 2d 120, to the 
contrary.  Only after the defendant meets this burden to show 
that 
the 
sentencing 
court 
actually 
relied 
on 
inaccurate 
information, does the burden then shift to the state to 
establish that the error was harmless.  Here the parties agree, 
as does this court, that there was inaccurate information 
actually relied on by the circuit court at sentencing.  It seems 
clear that the parties also agree that the issue of harmless 
error was not developed to the degree necessary to assist this 
court in resolving that issue, and since they also agree that 
this 
matter 
should 
be 
remanded 
for 
resentencing, 
it 
is 
appropriate under such circumstances that we accept their 
stipulation.  We, therefore, reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals and remand this case to the circuit court for 
resentencing. 
No. 
2004AP914-CR   
 
18 
 
By the court. —— The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and this matter is remanded to the circuit court for 
resentencing.   
 
 
 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶32 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(dissenting).   The 
majority opinion clarifies that the test to be met by a 
defendant in a challenge to a sentence that was allegedly based 
on inaccurate information is whether the circuit court actually 
relied on inaccurate information in its sentencing decision.  
Majority op., ¶2.  I agree with the majority opinion's 
conclusion.  However, the majority opinion then accepts the 
parties' stipulation that the sentencing court did actually rely 
on inaccurate information.  Majority op., ¶4.  The majority 
opinion goes on to relate that because "[i]t seems clear that 
the parties also agree that the issue of harmless error was not 
developed to the degree necessary to assist this court in 
resolving that issue" and because the parties agree the matter 
should be remanded for re-sentencing, it is appropriate to 
reverse a published court of appeals decision, with no further 
analysis of the issues that are presented.  Majority op., ¶4.   
¶33 When we overturn a published decision of the court of 
appeals, we must do so based on an error of law that actually 
requires reversal, not based on a stipulation between the 
parties.  To do as the majority opinion does here is to place 
the stipulation of parties to litigation above a decision 
rendered by constitutional officers, the elected judges of the 
circuit court and the court of appeals.  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court has no power to overturn a judicial decision based on an 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
agreement between the parties to litigation.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.18 (2003-04).1   
¶34 Instead of proceeding as set out in the majority 
opinion, I would apply the test of actual reliance to the facts 
of the case, as provided by the record before us.  My 
application of that test to the record and to the arguments 
provided in the parties' briefs leads me to conclude that 
Tiepelman has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that 
the circuit court actually relied on inaccurate information.  
Furthermore, even if I were to assume, arguendo, that the 
circuit court did so rely, I conclude that such an error was 
proved to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, I 
would affirm the court of appeals, and I respectfully dissent 
from the majority opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶35 The majority concludes that "the record makes it clear 
that the sentencing court specifically considered the inaccurate 
information in its decision."  Majority op., ¶29.  It bases this 
statement on the sentencing transcript, which reveals that the 
circuit court stated during the sentencing that Tiepelman had 
more than twenty prior convictions.  Majority op., ¶29.  It then 
concludes that, based on the court's reference to an incorrect 
number of convictions and the stipulation of the parties, 
Tiepelman has met his burden to establish actual reliance on 
inaccurate information.  Majority op., ¶30.   
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
¶36 The record contains a thorough exposition of the 
circuit court's reasoning for its sentencing decision, wherein 
the court cited its considerations.  At sentencing, the circuit 
court said: 
In looking at those factors in Mr. Tiepelman's 
case, first the seriousness of the offense, it is a 
substantial theft.  The original check written by Mr. 
Tiepelman on his employer's account was——it's all 
documented in the PSI and in the record here——was over 
some $24,000.  The amount which the Community First 
Bank, who took the loss, is currently out has been 
established by earlier proceedings at $9,341.46.   
As I recall, Mr. Tiepelman took a substantial 
portion of the proceeds and bought snowmobiles with it 
at Viteznik's.  It is not a theft which by anybody's 
account can be considered a minor offense.  It was 
premeditated, it was somewhat sophisticated, and it 
was obviously an out and out theft of significant 
proportions.   
I believe that it is the highest category of 
theft that was in the criminal code at the time, that 
is, exceeding $2,500, so the only thing you can say 
about it is that this category of theft was intended 
to reach any amount of felony theft, no matter how 
large, above $2,500.  And it's certainly possible, 
theoretically possible, to steal an awful lot more 
than twenty-four- or twelve- or $9,000, but by, I 
think, anybody's account, to do somebody out of over 
$9,000 is a substantial theft. 
Turning to the character of the offender, I have 
to agree with . . . all of the various people who were 
interviewed for the purposes of the pre-sentence 
investigation who reported numerous small and large 
thefts, 
dishonesties, 
false 
identifications, 
in 
dealing with Mr. Tiepelman.  Mr. Tiepelman, at the 
time of the commission of this offense, had a long 
pattern of similar offenses——or at least offenses of 
dishonesty, theft, false pretenses, et cetera.  I 
counted something over twenty prior convictions at the 
time of the commission of this offense back in 1995.  
They include numerous issuance of worthless checks, 
they 
include 
other 
forgeries, 
thefts 
by 
false 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
representation, several——more than one forgery, looks 
like a couple of forgeries, couple of thefts by false 
representation, theft in a business setting, again, 
worthless checks.  A well-established pattern of 
criminal 
behavior 
dealing 
with 
theft 
and 
false 
representation, issuance of worthless checks, prior to 
the commission of this offense.   
There also is a record of assaultive offenses.  
Although I agree . . . that that is not the primary 
characteristic of Mr. Tiepelman, but nor can it be 
ignored.  He has a conviction for battery, apparently 
to his now ex-wife.  He has a conviction for violating 
the no contact provision.  He has various bail and 
bond violation convictions, again dealing with the 
violation of the restrictions against having contact 
with his wife.  So he is properly characterized as 
assaultive and a domestic abuser, at least to that 
extent.   
Mr. Tiepelman, having accumulated this record, 
has absolutely no credibility with this Court.  . . .  
Mr. Tiepelman takes the tack today in explaining his 
record——which is a pretty standard approach to take, 
but given Mr. Tiepelman's record it is all the more 
breathtaking in its sillyness [sic], and that is that 
it's someone else's fault that I've committed all 
these offenses.  I haven't gotten the help that I've 
needed.  It's the Department of Corrections' fault 
because they didn't prohibit me from having a checking 
account.  It's someone else's fault in my past for not 
getting me the help I needed. 
I believe that Mr. Tiepelman can stop himself any 
time he wants to, and he chooses not to be honest, 
chooses not to be law abiding. He is a criminal 
thinker from way back.  Now, it's true that counseling 
might help, but this is not a mental disease or 
defect.  Has not been asserted as such anywhere during 
the course of these proceedings.  It's a character 
defect. 
Mr. Tiepelman has no moral compass that I could 
discern.  . . .  Mr. Tiepelman is conning when he gets 
up in the morning, he's conning as he goes through the 
day, he's conning before he falls asleep at night if 
he thinks there's any advantage he can gain from it, 
if there's any benefit he can accrue to himself.  
. . . I believe that Mr. Tiepelman is a significant 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
risk to the public.   . . .  So the offense is 
serious; Mr. Tiepelman has very little positive going 
for him with respect to character, and he presents an 
ongoing risk to the public.   
There is an issue in Mr. Tiepelman's sentencing 
scenario which calls for punishment, as well as 
sending a message of deterrence to others, but to me 
the 
most 
significant 
factor 
is 
Mr. 
Tiepelman's 
character and the ongoing danger he presents to the 
public, as well as the seriousness of the offense.  
. . .  I am sentencing him in light of his conduct 
since the offense.  I'm also primarily sentencing him 
for the flat out theft that got him convicted.   
¶37 The 
circuit 
court 
identified 
Tiepelman's 
overall 
pattern of behavior, the seriousness of the immediate offenses, 
and his conduct since the conviction of the immediate crimes as 
the factors that most influenced its decision.  Although the 
circuit court referred to an incorrect number of convictions, 
the correct number of convictions, as well as other criminal 
conduct that did not result in convictions, were accurately 
represented in the presentence investigation report (PSI).  The 
court used the PSI in sentencing Tiepelman.  The PSI reveals the 
following:  (1) the offenses for which he was sentenced began 
with a series of transactions in 1995 to buy two snowmobiles 
with bad checks; (2) Tiepelman blamed the crime on his emotional 
state that resulted from his divorce and the death of his father 
and on his desire to have nice things; (3) the First Community 
Bank's representative stated that the bank wished to recover the 
funds paid out for those bad checks, but that Tiepelman had not 
followed 
through 
on 
his 
restitution 
obligation 
while 
on 
probation.   
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶38 The PSI shows that Tiepelman has an extensive adult 
record, both before and after the convictions that were the 
subject of the sentencing, including:  (1) a 1988 charge of 
issuing a worthless check for which a bench warrant was issued 
because Tiepelman did not appear; (2) a 1990 charge of issuing a 
worthless check, which was subsequently dismissed; (3) a 1990 
charge of issuing a worthless check, for which Tiepelman was 
convicted; (4) a 1990 charge of issuing a worthless check, for 
which charges were dismissed; (5) 1991 charges of battery, 
disorderly conduct, bail jumping, bond violation and violating a 
no contact provision that were dismissed for a plea to a charge 
of issuing a worthless check; (6) a 1991 issuing a worthless 
check charge, for which the disposition remained unknown; (7) 
1991 
convictions 
of 
forgery, 
felony 
theft 
and 
false 
representation; (8) a 1992 conviction of disorderly conduct and 
dismissal of a count of battery and consolidation of a bond 
violation charge; (9) a 1995 conviction of issuing worthless 
checks; (10) a 1995 conviction of theft in a business setting; 
(11) a 1995 conviction of theft and false representation with an 
habitual 
criminality 
enhancer; 
(12) 
2001 
convictions 
of 
disorderly conduct with an habitual criminality enhancer; (13) a 
2002 no contest plea to speeding; and (14) two pending counts of 
issuing worthless checks with habitual criminality enhancers.  
The PSI also relayed information about Tiepelman's periods of 
incarceration for the above listed convictions, problems that he 
had with his correctional programming and family and social 
issues that pertained to his criminality.  
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
¶39 In his postconviction motion, Tiepelman challenged the 
sentence because of the circuit court's reference to an 
inaccurate number of Tiepelman's convictions.  Tiepelman alleged 
that: 
Nothing in the record, including the presentence 
report (PSI), supports the court's statement that Mr. 
Tiepelman had "something over twenty prior convictions 
at the time of the commission of this offense back in 
1995."  Although the PSI lists some twenty prior 
charges, it shows only nine of the charges resulted in 
criminal convictions. . . . 
The court sentenced Mr. Tiepelman with the belief that 
his 
prior 
record 
consisted 
of 
twice 
as 
many 
convictions than is correct.  Moreover, the court's 
belief that he had been convicted of battery and 
various bond violations can only be characterized as 
aggravating, not mitigating, factors.  The state 
cannot prove the error was harmless. 
¶40 Because of Tiepelman's postconviction motion, the 
circuit court had the opportunity to review its sentencing 
decision, including its misstatements and the information the 
court relied on for the sentence it chose.  The circuit court's 
statements are instructive: 
In 
addressing 
the 
sentencing 
decision, 
in 
exercising the sentencing decision, in performing the 
sentencing function at that time, the Court addressed 
the 
three 
primary factors or characteristics in 
sentencing: 
 
the 
character, 
seriousness 
of 
the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the need 
for the protection of the public, and those points are 
separately addressed in the transcript.   
In the analysis of the character of the offender, 
the Court did note 20 prior convictions which is 
concededly in error in that it's nine or ten, 
depending on how you want to count the read-in, and I 
don't really recall and I'm not suggesting in the 
record that that was misspeaking on my part referring 
to the 20 entries or whether or not I was actually 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
mistaken as to the number of convictions at that 
point.  I will note that neither M[r]. Tiepelman [n]or 
Ms. Oliveto spoke up and said that's not correct.  So 
how that was understood at the time that's not clear 
either, but it is clear, first of all, that the 
sentence was, sentencing determination was based on 
factors that went considerably beyond whether there 
was ten or twenty convictions and addressed the other 
matters which are appropriate to being addressed in 
sentencing, and the transcript of course sets forth 
exactly what was discussed at that point.   
The behavior both before and since the original 
probation disposition was addressed particularly . . . 
in the arguments and . . . in my sentencing comments I 
say, ". . . I am sentencing him in light of his 
conduct since the offense.  I'm also primarily 
sentencing him for the flat out theft that got him 
convicted."   
So I believe that the defense in its argument in 
support of its motion wants to focus upon the ten 
versus twenty convictions and not consider the other 
factors 
that 
are 
appropriate 
to 
a 
sentencing 
determination, which were specifically addressed and 
weighed 
as 
well 
. . . 
[t]hese 
[other 
charges] 
apparently were dismissed for whatever reason but the 
record reflects that many of them were dismissed as 
part of a disposition which occurred on a couple of 
different 
occasions, 
but 
the conduct 
itself was 
conceded both at the time of the original sentencing 
and again today, and all of that conduct, even if the 
defendant was not specifically convicted for those 
offenses, is certainly appropriately considered by the 
Court.  So the defense, as I say, in its argument 
focuses in and accentuates the 10 versus 20, or nine 
and a read-in versus 20, without regard to the other 
issues.   
I believe, frankly, there is an issue as to 
whether or not this information was inaccurate in any 
substantial sense.  . . . I simply do not believe that 
the, whether it's ten or twenty, when the conduct is 
conceded and in light of the other——well, whether it's 
10 or 20, when the conduct's conceded amounts to 
inaccuracy in any material sense and, secondly, in 
light of the other factors which the court analyzed in 
length in its sentencing decision, I do not believe 
that 
the 
defense 
has 
established 
by 
clear 
and 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
convincing evidence either the inaccuracy or that it 
was relied on in imposing the sentence so the motion 
to vacate the sentence and resentence Mr. Tiepelman is 
denied. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶41 Sentencing is a decision within the discretion of the 
circuit court and appellate review will set aside a sentence 
only when there has been an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
State v. Patino, 177 Wis. 2d 348, 384, 502 N.W.2d 601 (Ct. App. 
1993).  In reviewing whether a circuit court has misused its 
sentencing discretion, we presume that the circuit court acted 
reasonably.  State v. J.E.B., 161 Wis. 2d 655, 661, 469 N.W.2d 
192 (Ct. App. 1991).  A sentencing court misuses its discretion, 
as a matter of law, when it sentences in contravention of a 
defendant's due process rights.  See State v. Coolidge, 173 
Wis. 2d 783, 788-89, 496 N.W.2d 701 (Ct. App. 1993).  We review 
this constitutional issue independently.  Id.   
B.  Sentencing 
¶42 When 
sentencing 
a 
defendant, 
the 
circuit 
court 
considers three main factors:  (1) the seriousness of the 
offense of conviction, (2) the character of the defendant and 
(3) the public's need for protection from the defendant.  State 
v. Larsen, 141 Wis. 2d 412, 427, 415 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1987).  
It is permissible for the sentencing court to consider criminal 
conduct that has not resulted in a conviction, in evaluating a 
defendant's character.  State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 126, 
452 N.W.2d 377 (1990).  However, a sentence may not be based on 
the violation of a constitutional right.  J.E.B., 161 Wis. 2d at 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
663.  A convicted defendant has a due process right to be 
sentenced based on accurate information.  Townsend v. Burke, 334 
U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948). 
C. 
Actual Reliance 
¶43 I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that a 
defendant who claims that inaccurate information was used in his 
sentencing must prove by clear and convincing evidence that:  
(1) the information was inaccurate and (2) the circuit court 
actually relied on inaccurate information.  Majority op., ¶26.  
Once a defendant does so, the burden shifts to the State to show 
that the error was harmless.  State v. Marsh, 177 Wis. 2d 643, 
653, 502 N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. 1993).  A convicted defendant is 
not required to prove that the circuit court prejudicially 
relied on inaccurate information.  Majority op., ¶27. 
¶44 Here, the circuit court's commentary about Tiepelman's 
overall 
pattern 
of 
behavior, 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
crime, 
Tiepelman's conduct since the commission of the crimes for which 
he was being sentenced and his credibility before the court were 
not erroneous factual statements, but rather, they were taken 
from 
the 
PSI 
and 
are 
not 
challenged 
in 
this 
review.  
Furthermore, at the hearing 
on Tiepelman's 
postconviction 
motion, the circuit court was very direct in explaining that it 
did not rely on Tiepelman having twenty convictions when it made 
its sentencing decision.  The circuit court said: 
In the analysis of the character of the offender, 
the Court did note 20 prior convictions which is 
concededly in error in that it's nine or ten, 
depending on how you want to count the read-in . . . . 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
The behavior both before and since the original 
probation disposition was addressed particularly . . . 
in the arguments and . . . in my sentencing comments I 
say, ". . . I am sentencing him in light of his 
conduct since the offense.  I'm also primarily 
sentencing him for the flat out theft that got him 
convicted."  
[I]n light of the other factors which the court 
analyzed in length in its sentencing decision, I do 
not believe that the defense has established by clear 
and convincing evidence either the inaccuracy or that 
it was relied on in imposing the sentence so the 
motion to vacate the sentence and resentence Mr. 
Tiepelman is denied. 
¶45 In so explaining, the circuit court said it did not 
actually rely on Tiepelman having twenty convictions, but 
rather, the court was concerned with his character as evidenced 
by his continuing criminal conduct.  The circuit court was in 
the best position to evaluate its sentencing decision and what 
it actually relied upon.  Based on my review of the information 
in the record, unlike the majority, I am satisfied that 
Tiepelman has not met his burden of showing, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the circuit court actually relied on 
inaccurate information in reaching its sentencing decision.   
D. 
Harmless Error 
¶46 However, even if I were to assume actual reliance on 
inaccurate information, arguendo, I would continue to dissent 
from the majority opinion's assumption that the error was not 
harmless, which conclusion is based on the stipulation of the 
parties rather than on an application of the law to the record 
before us.   
¶47 We have explained that for an error to affect the 
substantial rights of a party and warrant reversal, it must be 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the result of the 
proceeding would not have been the same absent the error.  State 
v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶46, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  
This is a test that we have concluded is based on Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶¶44-
46.  It is also asserted that the test was established in Neder 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 
¶51 (Crooks, J., concurring).  We have earlier articulated the 
test for harmless error as "whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed" to the outcome.  State 
v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).  We 
explained that a "reasonable possibility" under Wisconsin law is 
the equivalent of "reasonable probability" in United States 
Supreme Court parlance.  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶41.  The 
specific wording of the test has been a matter of dispute on 
this court for some time.  Id., ¶52 n.1, (Crooks, J., 
concurring).   
¶48 I note that the doctrine of harmless error applies to 
sentencing decisions.  Marsh, 177 Wis. 2d at 653-55.  Wisconsin 
courts have applied harmless error in a sentencing context, 
basing their analyses on whether the alleged errors affected the 
ultimate sentence that was imposed.2  State v. Anderson, 222 
Wis. 2d 403, 410-411, 588 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1998) (concluding 
                                                 
2 Federal courts have also applied harmless error analysis 
to sentencing decisions.  See United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 
400, 417 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Paulus, 419 F.3d 693, 
699-700 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Williams, 298 F.3d 
688, 693 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Smith, 218 F.3d 777, 
783 (7th Cir. 2000).  
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
13 
 
that the circuit court relied on errors in the PSI that the 
State had not proved there was "no reasonable probability that 
the error contributed to the outcome"); Marsh, 177 Wis. 2d at 
653-55 (concluding that the circuit court's forceful assertion 
that the inaccurate information did not affect its sentencing 
decision was dispositive in determining that the claimed error 
was harmless).   
¶49 Although 
reliance 
on 
inaccurate 
information 
in 
sentencing can constitute a due process violation, the presence 
of inaccurate information at sentencing does not fall within the 
limited class of errors that are "so intrinsically harmful as to 
require automatic reversal . . . without regard to their effect 
on the outcome."  See Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶37 (citing 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 7).  In other words, sentencing where 
inaccurate information has been presented is not a "structural 
error," one that automatically warrants reversal without regard 
to the influence of the error on the process.3   
¶50 However, based on my review of the statements of the 
circuit court presented by the record of Tiepelman's sentencing 
and the hearing on his postconviction motion, I conclude it does 
not matter which test for harmless error is used, the result is 
                                                 
3 Structural errors are "defect[s] affecting the framework 
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in 
the trial process itself."  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶37, 
254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (citation omitted).  As we noted 
in Harvey, if the defendant had counsel and an impartial 
adjudicator, "there is a strong presumption that any other 
constitutional errors that may have occurred are subject to 
harmless-error analysis."  Id. (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 
570, 579 (1986)).  We identified errors in this limited class in 
Harvey.  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶37. 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
14 
 
the same:  it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
circuit court would have given Tiepelman the same sentence if 
the erroneous reference to twenty convictions had not been a 
part of the court's narration at sentencing.  Therefore, 
Tiepelman suffered no prejudice because his substantial right to 
be sentenced based on correct information was not affected.  
When an error is committed that is not structural error and the 
defendant suffers no prejudice, the error is harmless.  Koffman 
v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ¶51, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201.   
¶51 In addition, there is no basis for accepting the 
assistant attorney general's assertion that harmless error has 
not been adequately briefed.    Majority op., ¶30.  The State 
argued below that if there were error, it was harmless, and it 
briefed the harmless error issue for this court.  See State's 
brief, pp. 17-22.  Tiepelman anticipated the State's harmless 
error argument in his brief in chief, pp. 24-29, and he 
responded to the State's argument in his brief in reply, 
Tiepelman's brief in reply, pp. 3-6.  A harmless error analysis 
can be done on the record before us and the briefing of the 
parties.   
¶52 The State's brief relied heavily on the sentencing 
transcript and the court's explanation of the sentence at the 
hearing on Tiepelman's postconviction motion, as quoted at 
length above.  I agree with the State's brief that "the 
transcript 
all but 
. . . 
speaks 
for 
itself" 
as to the 
harmlessness of the court's misstatement of fact.  I have 
examined the sentencing and conclude that if the court actually 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
15 
 
relied on its statement that Tiepelman had twenty convictions, 
it did not do so to Tiepelman's prejudice and therefore any 
error was harmless.  I come to this conclusion because of the 
direct and clear statements from the circuit court at the 
sentencing: 
[T]o me the most significant factor is Mr. Tiepelman's 
character and the ongoing danger he presents to the 
public, as well as the seriousness of the offense.  I 
am sentencing him in light of his conduct since the 
offense.  . . .  I'm also primarily sentencing him for 
the flat out theft that got him convicted. 
¶53 Furthermore, 
the 
legislature 
has 
directed 
the 
appellate courts of Wisconsin not to overturn earlier court 
decisions if the claimed of error is harmless.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.18(1).  Section 805.18(1) provides: 
The court shall, in every stage of an action, 
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or 
proceedings which shall not affect the substantial 
rights of the adverse party.4 
Section 805.18(1) is made applicable to criminal cases by Wis. 
Stat. § 972.11(1).  While I agree with the majority opinion that 
a convicted defendant has a due process right to be sentenced 
based on accurate information, majority op., ¶10, we are not 
free to ignore Wisconsin statutes for the convenience of the 
parties.  See Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶39.  Accordingly, unless 
                                                 
4 We note that the federal harmless error rule, Rule 52(a) 
of 
the 
Federal 
Rules 
of 
Criminal 
Procedure, 
contains 
substantially similar language, and that federal harmless error 
review also addresses the protection of "substantial rights."  
See Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶36 (discussing Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)). 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
16 
 
the alleged error was prejudicial to Tiepelman, the sentencing 
cannot be set aside.   
¶54 And finally, the decision of the majority also 
contravenes the spirit, if not the letter, of Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.18.  Section 809.18 provides: 
The dismissal of an appeal by the appellant or by 
agreement of the parties or their counsel does not 
affect the status of a lower court decision . . . . 
¶55 The stipulation that the majority opinion accepts does 
not result in a complete dismissal of the proceedings before us 
because we clarify that the prejudicial reliance test the court 
of appeals applied is not the correct test.  Majority op., ¶2.  
However, it does result in a partial dismissal of the review 
because the majority opinion overturns the sentence of the 
circuit court, which was affirmed by the court of appeals.  The 
majority opinion does so based solely on the stipulation of the 
parties, which requested this court to assume both actual 
reliance on inaccurate information by the circuit court and that 
such error was not harmless.  When the majority opinion permits 
two 
private 
parties 
to 
overturn 
the 
decisions 
of 
two 
constitutionally established courts, it operates outside of its 
statutory and constitutional authority.    
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶56 In sum, while I agree with the majority opinion's 
conclusion that actual reliance is the test to be met by a 
defendant in a challenge to a sentence that was allegedly based 
on 
inaccurate 
information, 
I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's sweeping acceptance of the parties' stipulations that 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
17 
 
result in reversal of the sentencing decision of the circuit 
court, which decision was affirmed by the court of appeals.  My 
application of the test of actual reliance to the record and to 
the arguments provided in the parties' briefs leads me to 
conclude that Tiepelman has not shown by clear and convincing 
evidence that the circuit court actually relied on inaccurate 
information.  Furthermore, even if I were to assume, arguendo, 
that the circuit court did so rely, I conclude that such an 
error was proved to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Therefore, I would affirm the court of appeals. 
¶57 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from 
the majority opinion.   
 
No.  2004AP914-CR.pdr 
 
 
 
1