Case Title: DANIEL v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-45

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
DANIEL v. STATE2003 WY 13278 P.3d 205Case Number: 02-45, 02-46, 02-47Decided: 10/23/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

 

JOHN 
DANIEL,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Marion 
Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender.  
Argument by Ms. Yoder.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Hugh Kenny,* Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Kimberly A. Baker, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Mr. 
Kenny.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

* 
Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel filed by Mr. Kenny on June 2, 
2003

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
After 
his first trial ended in mistrial, the second trial of Appellant John Daniel 
resulted in conviction on two counts of first-degree sexual assault.  His habitual criminal status was 
determined, and he was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences.  Daniel filed a notice of appeal, but the 
appellate process was delayed for almost two and one half years, initially 
because of the court reporter's tardy submission of trial transcripts from both 
trials, then because of post-trial proceedings inquiring about the consequences 
for such delay.  Daniel contends 
that his convictions should be reversed for this delay, insufficient evidence, 
shackling during his trial, and ineffective assistance of counsel.  He also challenges the constitutionality 
of imposition of two consecutive life sentences.

   

[¶2]           
We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Daniel 
presents this statement of the issues:

 

1.  Has the extraordinary delay in the 
docketing of this matter deprived appellant of his right to a meaningful 
appeal?

 

2.  Was 
there sufficient evidence of appellant's violation of each element of W.S. § 
6-2-302 to sustain two convictions for first degree sexual 
assault?

 

3.  Was 
appellant properly sentenced to serve two, consecutive life sentences or was the 
trial court limited to the assessment of "a" life sentence under the habitual 
criminal statute, W.S. § 6-10-201?

 

4.  Has 
appellant been rendered effective assistance of counsel 
below?

 

5.  Whether 
the practice of noticeably restraining the defendant at jury trial violates 
constitutional rights?

 

The 
State rephrases the issues as:

 

1.  Whether 
the delay in docketing has deprived appellant of a meaningful 
appeal?

 

2. 
Whether sufficient evidence supports appellant's convictions for first degree 
sexual assault?

 

3.  Whether 
the district court erred in sentencing appellant?

 

4.  Whether 
appellant received effective assistance of counsel?

 

5.  Can 
the unchallenged shackling of appellant during trial as a security measure due 
to his recent history of violence in pre-trial detention, where the jury was not 
aware of the shackling, give rise to a constitutional 
violation?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
At 
approximately 4:30 a.m. on January 14, 1999, the forty-year-old female victim 
arrived at a Casper, Wyoming, hospital and reported that she had been physically 
and sexually assaulted for many hours that immediately preceding night.  The victim had been taken to the 
hospital by Daniel who pointed out bruising on the victim's head to a 
nurse.  The victim had extensive 
bruising, ligature marks on her ankles and wrists, and medical testing indicated 
seminal fluid from vaginal sexual intercourse but seminal fluid was not found 
which could confirm the victim's report that she had been subjected to multiple 
episodes of anal penetration.  No 
DNA testing was performed.  A 
medical examination of the victim did not indicate any trauma to either the 
vaginal or anal areas.  The pubic 
area was shaved, but that condition did not appear recent to either the 
examining physician or nurse. 

 

[¶5]           
The 
victim first reported that a white male with brown hair had attacked her by 
railroad tracks, had tied her up, shaved her pubic area, physically and sexually 
assaulted her, and left her there.  
She freed herself from her restraints, walked part of the way to the 
hospital and then was given a ride.  
The victim made the same statement at the police department; but when a 
police search did not indicate any evidence of the crime at that location, the 
victim told police that Daniel had sexually assaulted her at his apartment. The 
victim took police to the apartment and identified Daniel as her attacker.  He was arrested at that time. 

 

[¶6]           
Police 
obtained a warrant to search Daniel's apartment and found evidence in the 
apartment and outside garbage containers corroborating the victim's account of 
her attack, including an electric razor, a bra, string in the bedding, and 
sheets that appeared to be stained with blood.  The victim related that she and her 
boyfriend had met Daniel for the first time at a bar on the evening of January 
13.  Videotape from the bar 
confirmed that all three had been at the bar that evening, and Daniel and the 
victim had left the bar together, followed seconds later by her boyfriend. 
Medical testing indicated seminal fluids consistent with Daniel's blood 
type.  Based on the victim's account 
of the attack, Daniel was charged with three counts of first degree sexual 
assault, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(i) or (ii), and one count 
of kidnapping in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(a)(i)(ii)(iii) and 
(b)(i).  The State also sought 
habitual criminal status under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201 based upon Daniel's 
prior felony convictions.  

 

[¶7]           
Both 
sides filed pretrial motions, and hearings were held and rulings made on those 
motions.  At the end of one hearing, 
defense counsel requested that the court remove arm and leg restraints from 
Daniel during trial.  The trial 
court deferred to court security's decision that arm restraints could be 
removed, but leg restraints would remain during trial.  The trial court agreed to revisit the 
issue if Daniel decided to testify.  
Daniel did not testify at trial. 

 

[¶8]           
Trial 
began on July 19, 1999, and, at the close of the State's case, the court granted 
the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on one count of first degree 
sexual assault.  The remaining three 
counts were deliberated upon by the jury, which hung.  The trial court declared a mistrial, and 
trial was rescheduled for one month later.  
Defense counsel filed a motion for appointment of a public defender 
because Daniel had no funds to pay for counsel; however, the trial court denied 
that motion.  At the second trial, 
the victim's account of her attacks varied considerably from her previous 
statements to police and testimony at the first trial.  The State indicated that inconsistencies 
were caused by brain damage the victim suffered from a 1992 car accident.  Despite the inconsistencies, the second 
jury convicted on the two counts of first degree sexual assault but was unable 
to reach a verdict on the kidnapping charge.  The trial court declared a mistrial on 
that charge, accepted the verdict, and proceeded to the habitual criminal status 
phase of the trial. 

 

[¶9]           
After 
hearing that Daniel had been convicted of grand theft from a person in 1990 and 
twice convicted of burglaries in 1991 and 1993, the jury deliberated and 
returned a verdict finding Daniel to be a habitual criminal.  The court proceeded immediately to 
sentencing, and Daniel was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences.  Notice of appeal was filed on September 
14, 1999; however, the court reporter received numerous extensions to file the 
trial transcript and did not certify completion until November 13, 2000.  It was then learned that transcripts of 
motion hearings reported by another court reporter had not been prepared. The 
district court clerk did not certify that the transcripts had been filed until 
February 1, 2001.   Appellate 
counsel filed motions to dismiss for lack of prosecution, arguing that Daniel 
had been denied his rights to due process and speedy appeal.  Appellate counsel also requested that 
the transcripts from the first trial be prepared and filed.  This Court ordered that the first 
trial's transcripts be filed and, after they were produced, this appeal was 
docketed in this Court on March 1, 2002, almost two and one half years after 
notice of appeal was filed.  

 

[¶10]      This 
Court noted that Daniel had been shackled during his trial and remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Daniel's constitutional rights had been 
violated because of the shackling.  
The trial court determined that the evidence showed that the leg 
restraints could not be seen or heard by the jury during trial, the jury did not 
view Daniel while he was shackled, and that no constitutional violation or 
prejudice occurred.  Supplemental 
briefing by both parties was submitted on this 
determination.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶11]      During 
a pretrial hearing, the court denied the defense's request that Daniel not be 
shackled during his trial although it agreed that it might revisit the issue if 
Daniel desired to testify.  The 
record did not indicate whether shackling occurred, and this Court remanded for 
a determination of whether Daniel had been shackled during his trial. The 
district court held an evidentiary hearing on May 30, 2002, and issued its order 
on June 12, 2002.  At the time of 
that hearing, the district court was without benefit of this Court's opinions in 
Asch v. State, 2003 WY 18, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2003); Urbigkit v. State, 
2003 WY 57, 67 P.3d 1207 (Wyo. 2003); and Simmons v. State, 2003 WY 
84, 72 P.3d 803 (Wyo. 2003).1

  

[¶12]      
Asch 
held 
that a defendant has a constitutional right to be free from shackles or other 
restraints except in extraordinary circumstances.  Asch, ¶57. Unless compelling 
necessity demands restraint, shackling or other bonds violates a defendant's 
right to a fair and impartial trial as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution, id., and Art. 1, §§ 6 and 
10 of the Wyoming Constitution.  
See Asch, ¶57.   
Asch held that it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to 
require a defendant to be shackled or otherwise physically restrained in the 
courtroom during a jury trial "unless the State has first moved that such 
measures be utilized, the court has heard such motion, and after allowing the 
defendant an opportunity to contest the motion, the court has stated on the 
record the compelling reasons justifying the measures." Id. at ¶62. "At 
such hearing, the State has the burden of establishing the necessity for 
particular restraints and that such restraints are the least drastic effective 
measures available."  Id. 
"The trial court must consider alternatives and may not rely blindly on the 
judgment of correctional officers." Id. In exercising discretion, the 
court should consider at least the following factors: 

The 
seriousness of the present charge against the defendant; defendant's temperament 
and character; his age and physical attributes; his past record; past escapes or 
attempted escapes, and evidence of a present plan to escape; threats to harm 
others or cause a disturbance; self-destructive tendencies; the risk of mob 
violence or of attempted revenge by others; the possibility of rescue by other 
offenders still at large; the size and the mood of the audience; the nature and 
physical security of the courtroom; and the adequacy and availability of 
alternative remedies.

 Id.

 

[¶13]      
Asch 
determined that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the defendant 
to be shackled in the courtroom throughout his trial without first requiring the 
State to justify such restraints on the record. Id. at ¶65. However, in 
Urbigkit, we reached a different decision based on the different 
circumstances of that case.  
Urbigkit was accused of numerous counts of aggravated assault and 
attempted murder following a violent gun battle with police.  Before trial, Urbigkit requested trial 
without shackling.  A pretrial 
hearing was held, and, although this Court determined that the specific 
requirements of Asch were not met by the district court during that 
hearing, and although the circumstances present there came "uncomfortably close" 
to violating Asch, we were able to determine from the record that the 
district court had determined that compelling reasons existed for the use of 
restraints during trial and, therefore, did not abuse its discretion.  Urbigkit, 
¶24.

 

[¶14]      
This 
case appears to be most similar to the facts in Asch.  The evidentiary hearing established 
that Daniel was shackled during his trial without benefit of a pretrial hearing 
for the State to establish justification for shackling and, thus, an abuse of 
discretion occurred.  Asch, 
¶65.  Although Asch held that 
a defendant's right to a fair trial was not adequately protected by a rule that 
required him to prove actual prejudice from in-court shackling, and further 
determined that the inherently prejudicial procedure of shackling during trial 
was an unacceptable risk to the presumption of innocence, ¶59, this Court stated 
that the pretrial hearing requirement of determining whether extraordinary 
circumstance warranted shackling would apply in future cases. ¶62.  Daniel was tried several years before 
the Asch opinion was published, thus necessitating a post-trial 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Daniel's constitutional rights had been 
violated by his having been shackled without benefit of a pretrial hearing and 
in view of the jury.

 

[¶15]      Generally, 
an error that violates a constitutional right of the accused is presumed to be 
prejudicial, unless the reviewing court is able to declare its belief that the 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Harlow v. State, 2003 WY 47, ¶43, 
70 P.3d 179, ¶43 (Wyo. 2003).  
Although many states have found that a trial court's abuse of discretion 
in allowing shackling is not harmless error, others, including Washington whose 
law was heavily relied upon in Asch, have found that such an error is 
harmless where there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.  State v. Finch, 975 P.2d 967, 
1006-07 (Wash. 1999) (collecting cases).  
Washington has also held that shackling is harmless error when the jury 
never saw the defendant in shackles and the defendant failed to show he was 
prejudiced in any way.  Id. 
at 1006 (citing State v. Hutchinson, 959 P.2d 1061 (Wash. 
1998)).    In Daniel's 
case, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to hold a pretrial 
hearing on whether shackling for trial was appropriate; however, a post-trial 
ruling held that the jury did not view or hear the defendant in shackles during 
trial.  If this ruling is supported 
by the evidence, then these circumstances demonstrate that Daniels was not 
prejudiced by shackling during trial.  
Under these circumstances, we hold that a trial court's abuse of 
discretion in allowing shackling without following the principles of Asch 
is subject to harmless error review.    

 

[¶16]      On 
direct appeal, the State has the burden of proving that the constitutional 
errors below were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Gentry v. State, 806 P.2d 1269, 
1272 (Wyo. 1991).  Because the State 
was without benefit of our Asch opinion, its argument was limited to 
Daniel's failure to show prejudice; however, Harlow held that we have 
discretion to overlook the government's failure to argue harmlessness in an 
appropriate case.  Harlow, 
¶¶44-46.  In deciding whether 
to exercise that discretion, a reviewing court may consider such factors as the 
length and complexity of the record, whether the harmlessness of the error is 
certain or debatable, and whether a reversal would result in protracted, costly, 
and futile proceedings in the trial court.  
Id.  

 

[¶17]      In 
this case, the record of the two trials reveals nothing concerning the 
prejudicial effect of Daniel's shackling.  
The record from the evidentiary hearing is brief and limited to the 
shackling issue so it is not lengthy or complex.  The harmlessness of the error is certain 
based on evidence indicating that procedures were in place to prevent the jury 
from viewing the shackles, those procedures were utilized, an in-court 
demonstration during the evidentiary hearing indicated that the jury could not 
see the shackles from the jury box, and the trial court determined that the 
shackling was not viewed or heard by the jury.  Finally, we find that reversing and 
remanding for retrial would result in protracted and costly proceedings that 
would ultimately prove futile for Daniel.

 

[¶18]      We 
must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that no reasonable possibility 
exists that the shackling contributed to the jury's determination of guilt.  See Harlow, ¶47.  The trial court's factual findings 
regarding whether the jury viewed Daniel in shackles will be upheld unless 
clearly erroneous.  Daniel disputes 
the trial court's finding that the jury did not view or hear his shackles and 
contends that he testified at the evidentiary hearing that the jury twice viewed 
him in shackles as he was brought into the courtroom and, throughout the trial, 
the jury could hear his shackles when he moved. A defense investigator testified 
at the evidentiary hearing that Daniel walked in front of the jury on one 
particular occasion; however, that witness could not recall if this occurred 
during the first trial that ended in mistrial or the second that ended in a 
guilty verdict.  The State presented 
evidence at the evidentiary hearing showing that the trial court's trial 
procedure was to seat the defendant before the jury was brought into the 
courtroom, and witnesses had no recollection that this procedure varied in 
Daniel's case.  A demonstration 
during the evidentiary hearing indicated that Daniel's shackles could not be 
seen once the jury was seated in the jury box.  Based on this evidence, the trial court 
found that no direct evidence established that the jury saw or heard Daniel's 
shackles, and our review indicates these finding are supported by the evidence 
in the record.

 

[¶19]      The 
state of the evidence as shown by the evidentiary hearing and the mistrials 
declared in the first trial and on the kidnapping count in the second trial 
convince us beyond a reasonable doubt that no reasonable possibility exists that 
the shackling contributed to the jury's determination of guilt.  We find that the trial court's abuse of 
discretion in allowing the shackling of Daniel during trial is harmless error. 

 

 

 

[¶20]      Daniel 
contends that the district court properly granted a judgment of acquittal on the 
third count of first degree sexual assault because of the unreliability of the 
victim's testimony, but erred in refusing to grant a judgment of acquittal on 
the remaining counts.  Daniel 
contends that, despite trial counsel's failure to renew that motion at the close 
of the defense's presentation of evidence, sufficient evidence does not exist to 
sustain his convictions on the two counts of first degree sexual 
assault.

 

[¶21]      Our 
standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence challenges 
is:

 

This 
Court assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough 
to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State.  We will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our 
only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury 
actually did.  

 

Robinson 
v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 
(Wyo. 1995) (citing Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 761 (Wyo. 
1995)).

 

[¶22]      Daniel 
contends that the record shows that a comparison of the victim's several 
statements to police and her testimony from both trials reveals that she has 
told a fantastic, self-contradictory story that is internally inconsistent and 
patently unbelievable.  
Additionally, he claims that the disinterested expert witnesses could not 
confirm that the victim's injuries were caused by sexual assault as opposed to 
consensual sexual intercourse and testified that a blood type inconsistent with 
either the victim's or Daniel's blood type was found on the victim's 
underwear.  Noting that the jury 
failed to believe the victim when she claimed that she had been kidnapped, 
Daniel asks this Court to find that the victim's testimony itself creates 
reasonable doubt, and the jury's verdict was the result of speculation.  

 

[¶23]      The 
record shows that the victim's testimony was self-contradictory; however, those 
inconsistencies were argued to the jury by counsel in closing argument.  Inconsistencies and contradictory 
testimony are relevant to the weight and credibility of the witness and, 
therefore, it is the jury which must assess those matters as the trier of 
fact.  Trujillo v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 578 (Wyo. 1994).  This 
Court cannot reweigh the evidence or reexamine the credibility of the witnesses. 
Id.; Pisano v. State, 828 P.2d 666, 669 (Wyo. 1992).  We must assume that the jurors believed 
only the evidence adverse to the defendant.  Walston v. State, 954 P.2d 987, 
988-89 (Wyo. 1998).

 

[¶24]      Viewed 
in the light most favorable to the State, the record shows that physical 
evidence corroborated the victim's version of events that her injuries were 
received when sexually assaulted.  
Pictures demonstrated and medical personnel testified that she had 
suffered injuries from physical restraint and battery, and the police found her 
bra, a string consistent with string that she claimed was used to tie her hands 
and feet, and bloodstained sheets.  
Medical tests indicated the presence of fluids consistent with the 
defendant's blood type.  An expert 
testified that a blood type not belonging to Daniel was found on the victim's 
underwear but could not determine if that different blood type result was caused 
by fluid from another person or by bacterial, soil, or a detergent 
contaminant.  Although this evidence 
was all consistent with the defense theory that consensual sexual intercourse 
had occurred and the victim was beaten by her boyfriend later that night, the 
jury was solely responsible for that determination. The conviction is supported 
by sufficient evidence.

 

 

Legality 
of Imposing Two Consecutive Life Sentences 
Under The Habitual Criminal Statute

 

[¶25]      Daniel 
challenges the imposition of two consecutive life sentences under the habitual 
criminal statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201 (LexisNexis 2003),2 on two grounds: first, that the 
statutory language does not permit more than one sentence enhancement, and 
second, that the imposition of two consecutive life sentences is cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.

 

[¶26]      Since 
our decision in Rich v. State, 899 P.2d 1345 (Wyo. 1995), the law has 
been settled that life sentences for a fourth and fifth felony are required 
under § 6-10-201, when a defendant is adjudicated a habitual criminal.  Id. at 1347.  Rich upheld the trial court's 
decision to impose three consecutive life sentences for first degree sexual 
assaults constituting distinct crimes.  
Daniel contends, however, that Rich is distinguishable from his 
convictions arising out of just one sexual assault occurrence.  He contends that the disproportionate 
harshness of two consecutive sentences to life is demonstrated because he is 
ineligible for parole3 although this is his only violent 
felony conviction, and this disproportionality constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment.  The State contends that 
we have previously decided that the portion of the habitual criminal statute 
enhancing a sentence to ten to fifty years for two prior convictions is not 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and that reasoning 
applies to a sentence enhancement of life imprisonment, citing Oakley v. 
State, 715 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1986).

 

[¶27]      In 
Oakley, we considered the several decisions by the United States Supreme 
Court addressing when sentence enhancement constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment to arrive at our decision that § 6-10-201(b)(i) does not violate the 
Eighth Amendment.   The Court 
recently reviewed this same jurisprudence in its latest consideration of this 
issue in connection with California's "three strikes law,"  statutory schemes that are "designed to 
increase the prison terms of repeat felons."  Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1182, 155 L. Ed. 2d 108 (2003).  
Ewing had been convicted of felony grand theft in excess of $400 for 
stealing three golf clubs; however, because he had previously been convicted of 
three burglaries and a robbery, all considered serious or violent felonies, the 
three strikes law applied and Ewing was sentenced to 25 years to life.  Id. at 1183-85.  

 

[¶28]      
Ewing 
resulted 
in a majority decision that California's three strikes law constitutionally 
addresses recidivism without violating the Eighth Amendment ban of cruel and 
unusual punishment.  Id. at 
1190. However, the Court's analysis for arriving at that conclusion garnered 
only plurality support, and its application of those principles relied upon in 
Ewing are unclear enough to have caused the Court to reject the opinion 
that its case law was clear or consistent enough to be clearly established 
federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1173, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). The Court did find that it was clearly 
established that a gross disproportionality principle does apply to sentences 
for terms of years;4 however, the precise contours of 
that principle "are unclear, applicable only in the exceedingly rare' and 
extreme' case."  Id.  The Court held that Lockyer was 
not one of those exceedingly rare or extreme cases.  Id.

 

[¶29]      Lockyer 
stole about $150.00 worth of videotapes and was convicted of two counts of petty 
theft.  He had previously been 
convicted of three counts of residential burglary, which California's three 
strikes law considers "serious or violent" felonies, and which made him eligible 
for sentence enhancement.  Lockyer 
received two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life imprisonment, 
although he will be eligible for parole in about fifty years.  Lockyer, 123 S. Ct.  at 
1169-71.

 

[¶30]      In 
both Ewing and Lockyer, the Court considered its previous 
decisions in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 
(1983), and Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 114 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991).  Rummel 
held that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit a state from sentencing a 
three-time offender to life in prison with the possibility of parole for the 
justified purpose of addressing recidivism.  Ewing, 123 S. Ct.  at 1185.   In another recidivism case, 
Solem found that a life sentence without possibility of parole for a 
seventh nonviolent felony was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment's proscription 
against sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.  Ewing, at 1186. Harmelin 
held that a life sentence without possibility of parole was not grossly 
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment although the first time offender was 
convicted only of possessing 672 grams of cocaine and was not the subject of a 
recidivism statute.  Ewing, 
at 1186. Based on this precedent, Ewing and Lockner gleaned 
that its guiding principles for deciding whether a sentence of twenty-five years 
to life for stealing three golf clubs or videotapes required the threshold 
determination of whether the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to 
an inference of gross disproportionality.  
Ewing, 123 S. Ct.  at 1188-90.  
Neither contention of an Eighth Amendment violation survived the Court's 
threshold determinations and both enhanced sentences were upheld.  Id. at 1190; Lockyer, 123 S. Ct.  at 1175-76.  

 

[¶31]      
In 
considering this precedent as well as our own established in Oakley and 
Rich with respect to the facts of this case, we first find that, 
contrary to his assertions, Daniel has been convicted of two distinct sexual 
assaults permitting imposition of consecutive life sentences under the habitual 
criminal statute.   We have 
said that "[i]n appeals alleging imposition of multiple sentences for a single 
act, the focus is on those facts proven at trial."  Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, 
¶25, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶25 (Wyo. 2001) (citing Rouse v. State, 966 P.2d 967, 
970 (Wyo. 1998)).  The ultimate 
question is whether those facts reveal a single criminal act or multiple 
distinct offenses against the victim.  
Id. Where the acts required for the commission of one offense are 
a necessary and indispensable precursor to commission of a second offense, the 
offenses merge for purposes of sentencing. Id. Such merger is mandatory 
where the second offense cannot be committed absent commission of the first 
offense.  
Id.

  

[¶32]      The 
evidence showed that Daniel subjected the victim to both vaginal and anal sexual 
penetration and these acts constitute separate, forcible sexual intrusions on 
the victim.  See Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-302 (LexisNexis 2003).  
Proof of different facts was required to establish the elements of each 
crime, creating a record showing that Daniel's convictions were for separate and 
distinct crimes.  It was, therefore, 
appropriate for the district court to consider Daniel's convictions as separate 
and distinct crimes for the purpose of imposing consecutive life sentences 
pursuant to the habitual criminal statute.  

 

[¶33]      Daniel's 
Eighth Amendment violation claim requires that we examine the gravity of the 
offense compared to the harshness of the penalty.  Daniel's two first degree sexual assault 
convictions followed a history of felony convictions.  Wyoming's habitual criminal statute is 
long-standing and serves to address recidivism by simply removing from society 
those members who have proved themselves incapable of conforming to the laws by 
virtue of multiple, previous felony convictions.  Our review of Wyoming legislation 
indicates that the habitual criminal statute, § 6-10-201, is directed at repeat 
offenders of violent crimes and § 6-2-306 imposes a life sentence for those with 
two previous first degree sexual assault convictions.  The sentence enhancement under the 
sexual assault statute does not apply to Daniel, but from this scheme, we see 
that the legislature enacted § 6-10-201 with the intent of removing from society 
those recidivists who continue to commit felonies and the legislature has 
further acted to incapacitate those recidivists with three first degree sexual 
assault convictions by imposing life sentences under § 6-2-306.  

 

[¶34]      Daniel, 
a felony recidivist, now stands convicted of two violent felonies as defined by 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(xii) (LexisNexis 2003),5 namely, first degree sexual 
assault, and, because of his criminal history, Daniel was properly subjected to 
a life sentence in furtherance of the legislative goal of halting 
recidivism.  We hold that his two 
consecutive life sentences for his convictions is not a rare case where the 
crimes compared to the penalty are grossly disproportionate.  No violation of the Eighth Amendment's 
ban against cruel and unusual punishment has occurred.

 

 

Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel.

 

[¶35]      Daniel 
compares the quality of his representation in the first trial that resulted in a 
hung jury and that quality in the second trial by the same trial counsel and 
contends that a variety of errors in both resulted in a failure to achieve an 
acquittal.  He claims that after the 
verdict, trial counsel failed to present any argument to the jury or court on 
his behalf, thereby causing his habitual criminal conviction and immediate 
imposition of two consecutive life sentences.  He also claims that his counsel 
interfered with his efforts to procure trial transcripts for an appeal in 
violation of rules of professional conduct.  The State contends that defense 
counsel's decisions must be considered either sound trial strategy, within the 
range of professionally competent assistance, or lacking in prejudicial 
effect.

 

[¶36]      Our 
standards for reviewing ineffectiveness claims are well-established and require 
the dual showings that counsel's performance was deficient and that any 
deficiencies resulted in prejudice to the accused.  Miller v. State, 942 P.2d 1108, 
1109 (Wyo. 1997).  Daniel's 
contention that it was ineffective assistance to permit his shackling during 
trial has been addressed and found to have been harmless error, and he cannot 
sustain his allegations of prejudice.  
He next addresses several errors that he categorizes as a failure to 
adequately investigate and establish his defense, first noting that that defense 
failed to present witnesses who could have supported Daniel's theory of 
consensual sexual intercourse.  

 

[¶37]      He 
claims that the victim returned to her home that evening and her boyfriend, who 
has a history of domestic violence against the victim, inflicted the 
injuries.  He contends that an 
investigation should have been conducted to see if neighbors heard her return 
home that night and the boyfriend should have testified.  Daniel concedes that he is conjecturing 
that this favorable testimony existed and, therefore, we do not further consider 
these contentions.  

 

[¶38]      Daniel 
next claims that counsel did not request a reasonable time for continuance 
between the first and second trials in order to gain time to subpoena witnesses 
helpful to the defense, obtain and review the victim witness' sworn and 
contradictory statements in writing, and otherwise fully and adequately prepare 
for the second trial.  The two 
notably absent defense witnesses were a state crime lab expert, Reugotske, who 
testified in the first trial that the victim was likely intoxicated on that 
evening and related its possible effect on her memory of events, and the 
maintenance man, Mr. Beltran, for Daniel's apartment building, whose testimony 
about the layout and wall thickness of Daniel's apartment cast doubt on the 
victim's claims that she screamed for help and whose testimony noted the absence 
of headboards or footboards on Daniel's bed although the victim had claimed that 
she had been tied to them.  An 
expert from the Wyoming Crime Lab, forensic chemist Kathryn Hollenbach, had 
testified for the defense in the first trial that blood evidence suggested that 
a perpetrator other than Daniel existed.  
Both of these experts gave the same testimony at the second trial in the 
State's case-in-chief and were subject to cross-examination.  These and other changes in the witness 
list cause Daniel to assert that these changes were the difference between the 
first trial resulting in a hung jury and the second trial resulting in 
conviction.  The State contends that 
Reugotske's and Hollenbach's testimony remained just as advantageous to the 
defense; that Beltran's testimony was cumulative to photos and videotape of the 
apartment and one neighbor's testimony describing that she did hear the victim 
talking inside the apartment; and that the defense gained the additional 
advantage of cross-examining State experts to produce favorable evidence for the 
defense.  

 

We 
examine the conduct of defense counsel in light of all the circumstances in 
determining whether the identified acts or omissions fall outside the ambit of 
professionally competent assistance, bearing in mind the function of counsel is 
to make the adversarial testing process work in every case.  We do not evaluate the efforts of 
counsel from a perspective of hindsight but, rather, we endeavor to reconstruct 
the circumstances surrounding counsel's challenged conduct and evaluate the 
professional efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time.  We invoke a strong presumption that 
counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all decisions within 
the bounds of reasonable professional judgment. The burden is upon the defendant 
to overcome this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, the challenged 
action or failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial 
strategy.

 

Dudley 
v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1181 (Wyo. 1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  Daniel has not met his burden of showing 
that the change in the defense counsel's witness list was deficient.  We consider the changes to have been 
tactical decisions that are beyond our review, and we find that counsel did not 
act deficiently.  
Id.

 

[¶39]      Daniel 
saves his harshest criticism for trial counsel's performance at the habitual 
criminal proceedings.  Trial counsel 
was unable to persuade the trial judge not to proceed immediately on the evening 
that the jury returned its conviction, waived the defense's opening argument, 
did not stipulate to Daniel's prior convictions, and defendant did not testify 
although once his prior convictions were made known to the jury, no reason 
remained for Daniel not to testify.   
He further alleges that trial counsel failed to request a presentencing 
investigation report as required by W.R.Cr.P. 32(a), and failed to object to the 
harshness of imposition of two life sentences either at sentencing or 
afterwards.  The record reflects 
that Daniel's assertions are correct; however, as the State argues, Daniel's 
waiver of his right to testify is on the record, and no prejudice occurred 
because, under the habitual criminal statute as we have just interpreted it, the 
trial court had no choice but to impose two life sentences.  

 

[¶40]      Finally, 
Daniel contends that trial counsel interfered with his efforts to secure the 
transcript from the court reporter by writing to the court that she had never 
ordered a complete set of trial transcripts.  Daniel characterizes counsel's 
confession to failing to timely and properly prosecute his appeal as a breach of 
loyalty to him; however, as our next discussion indicates, the delay of appeal 
was not prejudicial, and we do not find that trial counsel's deficiencies in 
this respect prejudiced him.

 

 

Delay 
of Appeal

 

[¶41]      Daniel 
filed his notice of appeal in September of 1999 and ordered a transcript of the 
report of proceedings.  Defense 
counsel approved several extensions requested by the court reporter but, after 
learning that motions hearings and transcripts of the first trial had not been 
reported, moved to have a new trial granted for an insufficient record.  These motions were denied, and Daniel 
contends that the almost thirty-one month delay denied his right to a speedy 
appeal in violation of his right to due process guaranteed by Art. 1, § 6 of the 
Wyoming Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution, and requires reversal of his convictions and dismissal of 
the charges against him.

 

[¶42]      The 
United States Constitution does not require the states to provide convicted 
defendants a right to appellate review. Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 
1558 (10th Cir. 1994); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 302 (5th 
Cir. 1980).  While the right to a 
speedy appeal is not contemplated in the Sixth Amendment, federal courts have 
held that undue delay in processing an appeal may rise to the level of a 
violation of due process. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 94 F.3d 204, 206-07 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hawkins, 78 F.3d 348, 
350 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 
1158 (1st Cir. 1995); Harris, 15 F.3d  at 1557; United States v. 
Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1990); Simmons v. 
Reynolds, 898 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1990); Rheuark, 628 F.2d  at 302; 
see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 105 S. Ct. 830, 834, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1985) (if state has created appellate courts as integral part of system 
for adjudicating guilt or innocence, procedures used in deciding appeals must 
comport with demands of due process and equal protection). 

 

[¶43]      To 
determine whether an inordinate delay denies due process, most courts have 
adopted a modified version of the test formulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), analogizing to the 
violation of speedy trial rights. Harris, 15 F.3d at 1558-59; 
Rheuark, 628 F.2d  at 303; Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 783 
(Ind. 1997). The four-prong test examines the length of the delay, the reason 
for the delay, the defendant's diligence in pursuing the right to appeal, and 
the prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2192; Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1990); Rheuark, 628 F.2d  at 303 
n.8. The length of the delay acts as a triggering mechanism, meaning that unless 
the delay is unreasonable under the circumstances, there is no necessity to 
inquire further. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690-91, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992); Barker, 407 U.S.  at 
530, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192. In extreme circumstances, an inordinate delay may give 
rise to a presumption of prejudice. Doggett, 505 U.S.  at 655-57, 112 S. Ct.  at 2692-93 (cited in Smith, 94 F.3d at 209).    

 

[¶44]      The courts have 
recognized that an appeal that is inordinately delayed is as much a "meaningless 
ritual" as an appeal that is adjudicated without the benefit of effective 
counsel or a transcript of the trial court proceedings. Smith, 94 F.3d  at 
207 (quoting Harris, 15 F.3d at 1558).  Among the circumstances that can lead to 
a deprivation of due process are excessive delays in furnishing transcripts to 
be used on appeal.  Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d  at 1158; 
DeLancy v. Caldwell, 741 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1984); Rheuark, 628 F.2d  at 302. If the threshold showing of inordinate delay is not 
established, it is generally unnecessary to inquire into the remaining 
Barker factors.  Harris, 
15 F.3d  at 1559-60.  The fourth 
Barker factor, prejudice, is to be assessed in light of the interests 
that the right to a speedy disposition of an appeal is intended to protect. 
These interests are: (1) preventing oppressive incarceration pending 
appeal; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of a convicted person awaiting the 
outcome of an appeal; and (3) limiting the possibility that the grounds for 
appeal or defenses in case of reversal and retrial might be impaired.   Harris, 15 F.3d  at 1559; 
Rheuark, 628 F.2d  at 303 n.8.

 

[¶45]      We 
agree with the federal courts that an excessive delay in the resolution of an 
appeal, other than appeals involving the unusual circumstances of capital crime, 
can give rise to a cognizable claim of denial of due process. We further 
conclude that the factors set forth in Barker, as adapted by 
Harris and Rheuark, are appropriate for evaluating such claims. 
Applying these factors here, we perceive no due process violation in the 
resolution of defendant's appeal.  

 

[¶46]      As 
Daniel points out, the time for resolution of his appeal will exceed three 
years. The amount of time involved in preparing and transmitting the record was 
longer than it should have been and does reach the levels that have been 
considered excessive or inordinate for purposes of assessing whether a due 
process violation has occurred. See DeLancy, 741 F.2d  at 1248 (court 
reporter's three-year refusal to provide transcript could support defendant's 
claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if application of Barker factors 
established a due process violation); Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d  at 1158 
(although reporter's failure to provide transcripts for nearly two years was a 
significant delay, defendant suffered no prejudice and thus did not establish 
due process violation); Rheuark, 628 F.2d  at 302-03 (court would assume 
without deciding that delay of nearly two years in preparation of transcript 
exceeded the limits of due process). 

 

[¶47]      The 
total time for resolving defendant's appeal rises to the level of "inordinate 
delay" that has been recognized as necessitating inquiry into the remaining 
Barker factors. See Simmons, 898 F.2d  at 868 (six-year delay in 
resolving appeal, resulting in significant prejudice to defendant, deprived him 
of his due process right to a speedy appeal); Hawkins, 78 F.3d  at 351-52 
(four-year delay by clerk's office in processing appeal was inordinate, but 
defendant's due process rights were not violated because he was not prejudiced 
by the delay); Smith, 94 F.3d  at 207-08 (three-year delay in resolving 
appeal was sufficient to require inquiry into additional Barker factors); 
Harris, 15 F.3d  at 1560 (delay beyond two years in adjudicating direct 
criminal appeal is presumptively excessive, thus requiring consideration of 
additional factors). 

 

[¶48]      We 
see inordinate delay here, and the State concedes that we should follow 
Harris v. Champion, and presume that the delay was excessive, and thus, 
consider the remaining Barker factors.  In regard to the second Barker 
factor -- the reason for the delay -- we note that at least some of the delay 
was attributable to defendant's amendment of his original designation of record 
and his supplemental designation of an additional transcript some nine months 
after the original designation; however, we will not decide today whether delay 
caused by a court reporter and a court-appointed attorney shall weigh against a 
defendant.   Considering the 
third Barker factor, we conclude that defendant timely asserted his right 
to a speedy appeal, having raised the issue during the course of his attempts to 
obtain the transcripts.  However, 
defendant is unable to show prejudice resulting from the delay, the fourth 
Barker factor, and thus cannot establish a due process violation. See 
Hawkins, 78 F.3d at 351-52; Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d  at 1158.  

 

[¶49]      Incarceration 
is not "oppressive" and thus does not support a claim of prejudice under 
Barker, if the absence of a meritorious appeal establishes that the 
defendant is rightfully incarcerated. See Hawkins, 78 F.3d  at 351.  Here, Daniel has not established any 
basis for reversal of his conviction or reduction of his two consecutive life 
sentences prison term. He is thus rightfully incarcerated, and there will be no 
retrial at which potential defenses might have been compromised by the 
delay.  Finally, defendant does not 
establish that he has suffered anxiety or concern beyond that normally 
accompanying a pending appeal. Daniel's claim fails because we find that he 
suffered no prejudice and, in these circumstances, any delay in the resolution 
of his appeal has not violated his right to due process.  People v. Rios, 43 P.3d 726, 
733-34 (Colo. App. 2001).

 

[¶50]      
Finding 
no error, the order of conviction and sentence is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Because we reversed on other grounds in Simmons, this Court made 
no decision regarding shackling; however, we reiterated that the principles of 
Asch applied upon retrial.  

 

2§ 
6-10-201. "Habitual criminal" defined; penalties.

(a) 
A person is an habitual criminal if:

            
(i) He is convicted of a violent felony; and

(ii) He has been convicted of a felony on two (2) or more previous 
charges separately brought and tried which arose out of separate occurrences in 
this state or elsewhere.

(b) 
An habitual criminal shall be punished by imprisonment 
for:

(i) 
Not less than ten (10) years nor more than fifty (50) years, if he has two (2) 
previous convictions;

            
(ii) Life, if he has three (3) or more previous convictions. 

 

3§ 
6-10-301. Life imprisonment without parole.

            
(a) Pursuant to article 3, section 53 of the Wyoming constitution, a 
sentence of life imprisonment without parole is created for specified crimes 
designated in the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982.

            
(b) A person sentenced to life imprisonment without parole shall not be 
eligible for parole and shall remain imprisoned under the jurisdiction of the 
department of corrections during the remainder of his life unless pardoned by 
the governor.

            
(c) A sentence specifically designated as a sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole is not subject to commutation by the governor.  A sentence of life or life imprisonment 
which is not specifically designated as a sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole is subject to commutation by the governor.  A person sentenced to life or 
life imprisonment is not eligible for parole unless the governor has commuted 
the person's sentence to a term of years.

 

4Ewing 
noted that this 
principle applied to the death penalty, and that the success of capital 
punishment proportionality challenges is not rare.  Ewing, 123 S. Ct.  at 
1185.

 

5 
(a) As used in W.S. 6-1-101 through 6-10-203 unless otherwise 
defined:

            
****

            
(xii) "Violent felony" means murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual 
assault in the first or second degree, robbery, aggravated assault, aircraft 
hijacking, arson in the first or second degree or aggravated 
burglary[.]