Case Title: In re Ryan W.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95/12

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2013-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
In Re Ryan W., No. 95, September Term, 2012, and In Re Ryan W., No. 101, September
Term, 2012.
FAMILY LAW - JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION - CHILDREN IN NEED
OF ASSISTANCE (CINA) - RESOURCES OF CINA - FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND
SURVIVOR’S DISABILITY INSURANCE (OASDI) BENEFITS - The juvenile court
had no subject matter jurisdiction over a local department of social services’ allocation of
a foster child’s federal OASDI benefits, where the department was appointed
representative payee by the Social Security Administration and applied the funds to
reimburse itself for current maintenance cost for the CINA.
FAMILY LAW - CHILDREN IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE - DUE PROCESS -
NOTICE OF OASDI BENEFITS RECEIVED - The Department of Social Services,
acting through a local branch, must notify at a minimum a foster child’s CINA counsel
whenever it applies to the Social Security Administration to be appointed representative
payee for a child’s federal OASDI benefits and whenever it receives those funds.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 802023006 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 95
September Term, 2012
&
No. 101
September Term, 2012
                                                                             
IN RE: RYAN W.
                                                                             
Barbera, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia 
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
*Bell, 
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Adkins, J. and Bell, C.J., (ret.) dissent.
                                                                             
Filed: September 26, 2013
* Bell, C.J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV,
Section 3A, he also participated in reaching the
decision in this case.
These combined cases  arose initially from a 16 June 2011 order entered by the
1
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as the juvenile court, directing the  Baltimore
City Department of Social Services (“the Department”) to hold in a constructive trust
funds the Department received, in its capacity as representative payee, from the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) on behalf of  Ryan W. (“Ryan”), a Child in Need of
Assistance (“CINA”).  Born on 26 February 1993, Ryan entered the care of the
Department at age 9 after a 4 June 2002 determination by the Circuit Court that he was a
CINA. That determination rested on allegations that his drug-addicted parents neglected
Ryan and his siblings.  Ryan’s parents died while he was in foster care.  The Department
filed an application with the SSA to be appointed his representative payee for Old Age
and Survivor’s Disability Insurance (“OASDI”) benefits to which Ryan was entitled
following his parents’ deaths.  After being appointed as Ryan’s representative payee by
the SSA, the Department received his benefit payments and applied them to reimburse
itself partially for the current cost of Ryan’s foster care.  Ryan challenged subsequently in
the Circuit Court this allocation of his benefit funds by filing a pleading styled as a
“motion to control conduct,” alleging that the Department failed to make an
individualized determination of what was in Ryan’s best interests in the application of the
proceeds and that the benefits should have been conserved instead for his use in
transitioning by age out of foster care.  The Circuit Court agreed with Ryan’s contentions,
  The first three questions presented to the Court infra are raised by Ryan W. in case No. 95. The
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fourth question urged upon us, whether sovereign immunity bars Ryan W.’s claims in No. 95, is
advanced by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services in No. 101.
leading to establishment of the constructive trust and subsequent appellate scrutiny of that
judgment.
We conclude that, under the Social Security Act and the Family Law Article of the
Maryland Code, a local department of social services, acting in the capacity as an
institutional representative payee appointed by the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration, has discretion to apply a CINA foster child’s OASDI benefits to
reimburse the Department for its costs incurred for the child’s current maintenance, but
must provide notice to the child and/or his or her legal representative that the Department
applied to the SSA and received such benefits on the child’s behalf.  Thus, we shall affirm
in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in No. 95 and
reverse that court’s judgment in No. 101.
RELEVANT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CONTEXT
Social Security Act and Federal Regulations
In 1939, Congress added OASDI to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et
seq., which provides for, among other things, monthly benefit payments to certain
members of a deceased wage-earner’s family.  Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., ___ U.S.
___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027, 182 L. Ed. 2d 887, 895 (2012).  A dependent child who
survives his wage-earning parent may be entitled to receive survivor’s benefits if the child
is unmarried and under the age of 18 (or 19 if attending school full time).  42 U.S.C. §
402(d).  “An applicant qualifies for such benefits if [he or] she  meets the Act’s definition
of ‘child,’ is unmarried, is below specified age limits (18 or 19) or is under a disability
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which began prior to age 22, and was dependent on the insured at the time of the
insured’s death.”  Astrue, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2027, 182 L. Ed. 2d at 895
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)).  The wages earned by the deceased parent prior to his or
her death determine the amount of the benefit.  Id.  
A representative payee may be appointed for a child entitled to OASDI benefits if
the Commissioner of the SSA determines that the interests of the beneficiary will be
served by doing so.  42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(1)(A).  “[E]very beneficiary has the right to
manage his or her own benefits.  However, some beneficiaries due to a mental or physical
condition or due to their youth may be unable to do so.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.2001(b)(1)
(emphasis added).  Generally, a representative payee is appointed for child beneficiaries
under the age of 18, unless the child “shows the ability to manage the benefits.”   20
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C.F.R. § 404.2010(b).  
Examples of situations allowing for direct payments to a child younger than 18 include:
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(1) Receiving disability insurance benefits on his or her own Social
Security earnings record; or
(2) Serving in the military services; or
(3) Living alone and supporting himself or herself; or
(4) A parent and files for himself or herself and/or his or her child
and he or she has experience in handling his or her own finances; or
(5) Capable of using the benefits to provide for his or her current
needs and no qualified payee is available; or
(6) Within 7 months of attaining age 18 and is initially filing an
application for benefits.
20 C.F.R. § 404.2010.  There is no evidence in this record that Ryan W. possessed an “ability to
manage the benefits.”
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The SSA aims to select “the person, agency, organization or institution that will
best serve the interest of the beneficiary” when appointing a representative payee.  20
C.F.R. § 404.2020.  In determining who will best serve the child’s interests, the SSA
considers: 
(a) The relationship of the person to the beneficiary; 
(b) The amount of interest that the person shows in the
beneficiary; 
(c) Any legal authority the person, agency, organization or
institution has to act on behalf of the beneficiary; 
(d) Whether the potential payee has custody of the
beneficiary; and 
(e) Whether the potential payee is in a position to know of and
look after the needs of the beneficiary. 
20 C.F.R. § 404.2020(a)-(e).  The SSA prioritizes also categories of persons or entities
whom the Administration prefers to appoint as a child’s representative payee:
(1) A natural or adoptive parent who has custody of the
beneficiary, or a guardian;
(2) A natural or adoptive parent who does not have custody of
the beneficiary, but is contributing toward the beneficiary’s
support and is demonstrating strong concern for the
beneficiary’s well being;
(3) A natural or adoptive parent who does not have custody of
the beneficiary and is not contributing toward his or her
support but is demonstrating strong concern for the
beneficiary’s well being;
(4) A relative or stepparent who has custody of the
beneficiary;
(5) A relative who does not have custody of the beneficiary
but is contributing toward the beneficiary’s support and is
demonstrating concern for the beneficiary’s well being;
(6) A relative or close friend who does not have custody of
the beneficiary but is demonstrating concern for the
beneficiary’s well being; and
(7) An authorized social agency or custodial institution.
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20 C.F.R. § 404.2021(c) (emphasis added).
The SSA provides beneficiaries with written notice that the Administration will
appoint a representative payee before the payee is appointed officially, 20 C.F.R. §
404.2030(a), and before certifying payment to the payee. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(E)(ii).  If
the beneficiary is “under age 15, an unemancipated minor under the age of 18, or legally
incompetent, [the] written notice goes to [the beneficiary’s] legal guardian or legal
representative.”  42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(E)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404.2030(a). 
The notice required by statute must include language explaining a beneficiary’s
right to appeal the appointment of a particular entity as the representative payee.  42
U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(E)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404.2030(a).  SSA regulations explicitly provide for
both administrative and judicial review of, among other things, “initial determinations”
made by the agency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.902.  “Initial determinations” are defined by
regulation (somewhat circularly) as decisions made by the SSA which are subject to
administrative and judicial review.  20 C.F.R. § 404.902.  The SSA’s decision of who will
serve as an OASDI beneficiary’s representative payee is listed as an example of an
“initial determination” and is thus subject to both administrative and judicial review.  20
C.F.R. § 404.902(q). 
Once appointed, a representative payee is required to use the benefit payments
solely for the beneficiary’s “use and benefit in a manner and for the purposes [the
representative payee] determines . . . to be in [the beneficiary’s] best interests.”  20 C.F.R.
§ 404.2035(a).  The SSA views costs associated with the beneficiary’s “current
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maintenance” to be valid expenditures satisfying the requirement that benefit payments be
applied “for the use and benefit” of the beneficiary and in line with his or her “best
interests.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.2040(a)(1).  “Current maintenance includes cost[s] incurred in
obtaining food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal comfort items.”  20 C.F.R. §
404.2040(a)(1).  For beneficiaries receiving institutional care because of a physical or
mental disability, the definition of “current maintenance” expands to include “the
customary charges made by the institution, as well as expenditures for those items which
will aid in the beneficiary’s recovery or release from the institution or expenses for
personal needs which will improve the beneficiary’s conditions while in the institution.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.2040(b)  (emphasis added).  Past debts of the beneficiary that arose
before the first benefit payment was made to the representative payee are not regarded as
a legitimate expenditure of benefit funds unless “the current and reasonably foreseeable
needs of the beneficiary are met.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.2040(d).  Conservation and
investment of benefit payments is required whenever there is a surplus after all required
uses of the payments are made.  20 C.F.R. § 404.2045(a).
Maryland’s Family Law Article and Related Regulations
The Family Law Article of the Maryland Code mandates that the Department of
Human Resources (“DHR”) provide “child welfare services” to foster children.  Md.
Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Fam. Law § 5-524.  When a foster child is unable to return
to his parent or guardian, DHR must “develop and implement an alternative permanent
plan for the child.”  Id. at § 5-524(3).  
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As a last resort, the Department will commit a child to foster care when no other
placements are viable, for which the Department is required to pay for the services a
foster care placement provides.  Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Fam. Law §
5-526(a)(1) (“The Department shall provide for the care, diagnosis, training, education,
and rehabilitation of children by placing them in group homes and institutions that are
operated by for-profit or nonprofit charitable corporations.”).  The Department is required
to reimburse these charitable corporations for the costs of services provided to the foster
children at a rate set by the Department and in line with the State budget.  Id. at §
5-526(b)(1).
All of a child’s resources, including “survivor’s disability insurance,” are subject
to allocation by the Department to reimburse itself for the “cost of care” of a foster child
in an out-of-home placement. COMAR 07.02.11.29(A), (K)(1). Subsection (K)(1) of this
regulation identifies explicitly “survivor’s disability insurance” as an example of
resources that may be tapped by the Department for self-reimbursement.  Foster children
over the age of 18 in an out-of-home placement, if entitled to survivor’s disability
benefits, may elect either to receive the payments themselves and then reimburse the
Department, or to have the Department appointed as the child’s representative payee for
the benefits (assuming that the SSA has made a determination that the Department is the
appropriate representative payee for the child).  Id. at (K)(2). 
The Department may use the child’s resources subject to the following priorities:
7
first, for the “cost of care;”  next, for the child’s “special needs;” and, finally, if any
3
resources remain, for “a savings account for future needs.”  Id. at (L).  Excess funds from
the child’s resources not utilized consistent with regulation by the Department before the
child leaves out-of-home placement must be returned to the child if he or she is 18 or
older, id. at (M)(1), or “transferred to the legal parent or guardian with whom the child
will reside,” if he or she is under 18 years old.  Id. at (M)(2).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Determination that Ryan was a CINA and the Statutory Framework for CINA
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as the juvenile court, determined that
Ryan W. was a CINA on 4 June 2002 when he was nine years old. The Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) of the Maryland Code, § 3-801 et seq., provides the
framework for determining whether a child is a CINA. When the Department learns that a
child is being abused or neglected, or suffers from a developmental disability or mental
disorder, and is not receiving proper care and attention to his or her needs, the particular
locality’s Department of Social Services may file a petition seeking a determination by
the respective juvenile court that the child is a CINA.  Md. Code (2001, 2006 Repl. Vol.)
CJP §§ 3-801(f), 3-809(a). Once a petition is filed, the juvenile court must hold an
adjudicatory hearing to determine if the facts alleged can be proven.  Md. Code (2001,
2006 Repl. Vol.) CJP §§ 3-801(c), 3-817(a) and (c).  If the allegations are proven to the
The “cost of care” includes “the board rate, clothing allowance, any medical care payments made
3
on behalf of the child, and any supplemental purchases made to meet the child’s special needs.” Id.
at (B).
8
satisfaction of the juvenile court, the court must determine whether the child needs
assistance and how the court should intervene “to protect the child’s health, safety, and
well-being.”  Md. Code (2001, 2006 Repl. Vol.) CJP §§ 3-801(m), 3-819(a)(1).  If the
court determines the child is in need of assistance, it may commit, among other things, the
child to the custody of the Department.  CJP § 3-819(b)(1)(iii). The Department must
establish then an out-of-home placement for the CINA in foster, kinship, group, or
residential treatment care. Md. Code (1984, 2012 Repl. Vol.) , Fam. Law §§ 5-501(m),
4
5-525(b)(1)(ii). Further, the Department must prepare a “permanency plan” that outlines
the goals aimed at a child’s exit from commitment to foster care. See CJP § 3-823(d). The
juvenile court must hold a hearing (called a “permanency planning hearing”) to determine
this plan initially, CJP § 3-823(b)(1), and must review the plan every six months until the
child exits the Department’s care.  CJP § 3-823(h)(1)(i).
Here, the Department filed a petition with the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on
23 January 2002, seeking a determination that Ryan was a CINA.  As a basis for the
determination sought, the Department cited Ryan’s mother’s drug abuse and his father’s
alcohol abuse, their failure to provide adequate food and clothing for their children, their
lack of supervision, and their failure to ensure the children attended medical appointments
and school on time.  Following a hearing, Ryan was placed in emergency shelter care by
order dated 13 February 2002, and was determined on 4 June 2002 to be a CINA and
committed to the custody of the Department.  As noted previously, Ryan was nine years
This section has not been amended since 2002 and is substantively the same as the controlling
4
provisions during the relevant time of the Department’s conduct in Ryan’s case.  
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old at that time. 
Post-CINA Determination Actions
Subsequent to his commitment to the Department’s custody,  Ryan was placed in
various group homes and non-relative foster homes.  The Department paid the cost of his
care.  Ryan’s mother died in August 2006. His father died in November 2008.  In June
2009, Ryan’s DSS-assigned caseworker at the time, Nathan Exom, submitted copies of
Ryan’s parents’ death certificates to the Department’s Foster Care & SSI Reimbursement
Unit (“Reimbursement Unit”).  In November 2009, the Reimbursement Unit filed an
application with the SSA seeking appointment as Ryan’s representative payee for his
Old-Age, Survivor’s and Disability Insurance (“OASDI”) benefits.   See 42 U.S.C. §
5
405(j)(1)(A); see also COMAR §§ 07.02.11.29(K) and (L) (providing that the
Department should seek all resources for which a child is eligible, including survivor’s
insurance benefits, and apply them to the costs of foster care).  The application was
approved shortly thereafter.  The Department provided no notice to Ryan, his CINA
counsel, or the juvenile court that it applied to be, and was approved as, Ryan’s
representative payee.  The SSA sent its required notice to the Department in its capacity
as Ryan’s legal guardian.  See 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(E)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404.2030(a).
A beneficiary child is entitled to OASDI benefits for each parent that dies.  Here,
Federal regulations allow payment to be made directly to a child who is under 18 if the child is
5
“[c]apable of using the benefits to provide for his or her current needs” and if “no qualified payee
is available.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.2010(b)(5).  Because Ryan W. was deemed incapable of managing
his own benefits, and because the Department was available to serve as his representative payee,
payments were not eligible to be made directly to Ryan W.  He does not contend otherwise here.
10
Ryan was entitled to benefits from both his mother and father.  The Department received
two lump sum payments for OASDI benefits covering the interim between the deaths of
Ryans’ parents and the filing of the application.  The Department received the first of
these payments on 13 November 2009, in the amount of $8,481, which covered the
benefits accrued between Ryan’s father’s death and the start of benefit payments
(November 2008 to November 2009), and represents the benefits to which Ryan was
entitled from his father’s wages.  The second lump sum payment, in the amount of
$11,647.50, was received on 15 December 2009, and covered the period August 2006 to
November 2008, representing the benefits to which Ryan was entitled based on his
mother’s wage earnings.  From December 2009 until February 2011, when Ryan turned
18, the Department received a monthly $771 OASDI benefit payment on Ryan’s behalf. 
Ultimately, as of the time of trial in this case, the Department received a total of
$31,693.50 in its capacity as Ryan’s representative payee for OASDI benefits and used
the entire amount to reimburse itself for some of the costs of Ryan’s foster care. 
In re Ryan W.
Ryan W., through counsel, filed, on 5 April 2011, with the juvenile court a
“motion to control conduct,” alleging that the Department, as Ryan W.’s representative
payee,  applied for and received his OASDI benefits without notifying the child or his
CINA attorney and misused the funds in violation of its statutory and fiduciary duties. 
Specifically, Ryan contended that the Department allocated improperly his benefits to
reimburse itself for the costs of his foster care, without an individualized determination as
11
to what other use of the funds might be in his best interests. See 42 U.S.C. 405(j)(1)(A)
(mandating that representative payees apply benefits to the best interests of the
beneficiary); see also 42 U.S.C. 405(j)(2)(C)(v)(III) (providing that representative payees
are fiduciaries of the beneficiary).   
6
After a hearing, the juvenile court determined that the Department violated Ryan
W.’s due process and equal protection rights by failing to notify him before applying his
OASDI benefits toward the current costs incurred by the Department on his behalf.  In its
order, dated 16 June 2011, the juvenile court required the Department to hold $31,693.50,
the total amount received by the Department on behalf of Ryan W., in a constructive trust
in his name, pending a permanency planning hearing.  The June 16 order also declared 
invalid COMAR §§ 07.02.11.29(K) and (L), which require the Department to seek
appointment as payee for all potential resources of a child committed to its care and
prioritize self-reimbursement for the child’s cost of care over the child’s individualized
needs, because they extended improperly the Department’s statutory authority under 42
U.S.C. § 405(j) (2012) and violated the fiduciary obligations the Department owed to the
Petitioner.  At the contemplated permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court
determined that the best use of the OASDI benefits would be to continue the trust and
Ryan argues also that the federal foster care and adoption assistance statutes, which provide
6
financial aid to state social services departments and require compliance with permanency planning
and other standards, support his claim that state departments of social services should consider foster
child’s needs in transitioning out of foster care as a top priority for allocating the child’s OASDI
benefits.  See 42 U.S.C. 675(1)(D), 675(5)(C) and (H).  These statutes, which contain permanency
planning requirements similar to those of Maryland, do not mandate that a child’s resources be
applied to transition services.  Rather, they require only that plans be made regarding a child’s
transition out of foster care.  See id.
12
prioritize Ryan W.’s education-related expenses; the court issued an order to that effect
on 15 July 2011.  The Department appealed. 
A panel of the Court of Special Appeals (“COSA”) reversed the juvenile court’s
order in part, concluding that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to order the creation of
a constructive trust, although maintaining that the Department reimburse Ryan W. in the
amount of $8,075.32 for benefits received on his behalf during a period in which the
Department incurred lower costs for his care.  In re Ryan W., No. 1503, 2012 WL
3847359 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 5, 2012); superseded on reconsideration by 207 Md.
App. 698, 56 A.3d 250 (2012).  
The Department filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the COSA to correct the
amount ordered reimbursed and, alternatively, to hold that the COSA’s rationale that “the
Juvenile Court is not . . . vested with broad equitable powers to supervise the Department
when it is acting in its role as representative payee for foster children committed to its
care” barred any order for reimbursement of the funds.  While that motion was pending,
counsel for Ryan W. filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, seeking review
of the original COSA decision.  On 21 November 2012, the COSA issued a reported
opinion on reconsideration reiterating its view that the juvenile court acted outside its
authority in establishing a trust, but reducing the amount to be reimbursed to Ryan from
$8,075.32 to $660.   In re Ryan W., 207 Md. App. 698, 756, 56 A.3d 250, 284 (2012). 
7
The COSA encouraged expressly, in its initial opinion, either party to submit a motion for
7
reconsideration of its initial opinion if the amount ordered to be reimbursed was incorrect.
According to the first COSA opinion, $8,075.32 was calculated to represent the amount the parties
(continued...)
13
Because it found that a constructive trust was an improper remedy, regardless of the
juvenile court’s authority, the COSA declined to decide the question of sovereign
immunity raised by the Department as a defense to the claims in Ryan W.’s action.  Id. at
758, 56 A.3d at 285. The Department petitioned this Court to review that determination,
arguing that funds for the constructive trust would have to come from the State Treasury
and the State’s sovereign immunity barred the relief sought. 
We granted the parties’ petitions for writs of certiorari. In re Ryan W., 429 Md.
528, 56 A.3d 1241 (2012); In re Ryan W., 430 Md. 11, 59 A.3d 506 (2013). The questions
presented for our consideration are:  
8
1. Did COSA err in holding that a local department of
social services has plenary authority to apply for and use a
foster child’s OASDI benefits without seeking an express
grant of authority from the juvenile court to exercise control
over the benefits and without providing the foster child with
notice and the opportunity to be heard?
2. Did the COSA err in rejecting the juvenile court’s
exercise of its authority in determining that a total of
$31,693.50 was to be conserved in Ryan’s best interests?
(...continued)
7
agreed should have been conserved for Ryan because it was received “at a time when it could not
be applied to cover costs of current care.”  That sum included $7,415.32 of the lump-sum benefits
the Department received initially, as well as $660, the latter being the difference between the actual
cost of care for May 2010 and the amount received in OASDI benefits for that month.  In re Ryan
W., 207 Md. App. at 67 n.30, 56 A.3d at 285 n.30.  The Department’s motion for reconsideration
stated that $7,478.32 was deposited into Ryan’s trust account in December 2011. The COSA, upon
reconsideration, determined that although this amount was $63 higher than what was conceded by
Department’s counsel previously, the original concession was in error because the higher calculation
was supported by an affidavit submitted in support of the Department’s motion for reconsideration. 
Id.  The $660 was not addressed in the motion, however, so the COSA ordered that sum to be paid
into Ryan’s trust account.  Id.
As alluded to earlier in this opinion at n.1, the first three questions were raised by Ryan W. in his
8
petition in Case No. 95.  The fourth question  was raised by the Department in Case No. 101.
14
3. Did the COSA err in upholding state practice and
regulations 
that 
require 
automatic, 
non-discretionary
application of all of a foster child’s OASDI benefits and that
are inconsistent with federal regulations requiring the proper
exercise of discretion as a representative payee?
4. Did the COSA err in directing the juvenile court, on
remand, to revise it’s monetary award against the State by
requiring the Department to deposit funds into a foster child’s
trust account because, as the COSA had already concluded,
the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to enter such an order and
because such an order is barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the juvenile court’s findings of fact in CINA proceedings under the
“clearly erroneous standard.”  In Re Shirley B., 419 Md. 1, 19, 18 A.3d 40, 53 (2011)
(citations omitted).  Therefore, the juvenile court’s factual findings will not be disturbed
“[i]f any competent material evidence exists in support of the trial court’s factual findings
. . . .”  Figgins v. Cochrane, 403 Md. 392, 409, 942 A.2d 736, 746 (2008). The juvenile
court’s conclusions of law are reviewed without deference.  In re Adoption/Guardianship
of Amber R., 417 Md. 701, 708, 12 A.3d 130, 134 (2011).  Errors of law are generally
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, unless the error is harmless.  In Re
Shirley B., 419 Md. at 19, 18 A.3d at 53.  Only where we find a “clear abuse of
discretion” will we disturb a lower court’s legally sound decision that is based upon
factual findings that are not “clearly erroneous.”  In Re Shirley B., 419 Md. at 19, 18 A.3d
at 53.
Ryan’s Appeal 
15
Ryan asks this Court to reverse the COSA’s determination that a local department
of social services possesses plenary authority to apply for and use a foster child’s OASDI
benefits, without seeking an express grant of authority from the juvenile court to exercise
control over the benefits. He asks further that we hold that a local department must
provide a foster child with notice and an opportunity to be heard before using a child’s
survivor’s benefits. Although we agree with the COSA that a local department of social
services need not seek permission from a juvenile court in order to exercise its statutory
and regulatory-guided discretion as a duly appointed representative payee in its use of a
foster child’s OASDI benefits, we agree with Ryan W. that due process requires that
notice be afforded at least to a CINA’s attorney when the Department applies to become a
payee and as benefits are received.
A. 
The Juvenile Court is without jurisdiction to direct the Department’s
allocation of OASDI benefits for which it is a duly appointed
representative payee by the SSA.
1.
The Social Security Act does not contemplate state court jurisdiction
over the allocation of OASDI benefits by a duly appointed
representative payee.
The Department argues that, because federal law governs the appointment of
representative payees and the allocation of OASDI benefits, see 42 U.S.C. 405(j), the
juvenile court is without authority to direct an approved representative payee how to
allocate a child’s benefits.  According to the Department, the proper forum for any
available remedy for Ryan’s claim lies in the federal administrative and judicial review
process.  Ryan counters that the juvenile court is a “court of competent jurisdiction” to
16
review SSA determinations.  See 42 U.S.C. 405(j)(1)(A) (“If the Commissioner . . . or a
court of competent jurisdiction determines that a representative payee has misused any
individual's benefit . . . the Commissioner of Social Security shall promptly revoke
certification for payment of benefits to such representative payee . . . and certify payment
to an alternative representative payee or, if the interest of the individual would be served
thereby, to the individual.”). We conclude that the juvenile court here did not have
jurisdiction over the disputes between Ryan and his representative payee regarding the
application of his OASDI benefit payments.  Rather, such disputes are for resolution
within the federal administrative process and subject to further federal judicial review.  
We look first to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution to
determine if state courts may exercise jurisdiction over this dispute, outside of the
statutorily-prescribed administrative process for reviewing SSA determinations.  “When
Congress is silent concerning [concurrent] state court jurisdiction over federal causes of
action, there is a ‘deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court
jurisdiction.’”  R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors' Alert, Inc., 382 Md. 689, 715, 857
A.2d 1, 16 (2004) (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459, 110 S.Ct. 792, 795, 107 L.
Ed. 2d 887, 894 (1990)).  This presumption, however, “can be rebutted by an explicit
statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.”  Gulf Offshore Co.
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478, 101 S. Ct. 2870, 2875, 69 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1981). 
The Social Security Act provides explicitly that an individual seeking review of a
17
decision made by the Commissioner may do so in a civil action, and that 
[s]uch action shall be brought in the district court of the
United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff
resides, or has his principal place of business, or, if he does
not reside or have his principal place of business within any
such judicial district, in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. 
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (emphasis added).  Thus, while Congress was silent as to whether
state courts have jurisdiction to review SSA determinations, it directs explicitly that
federal courts have jurisdiction over civil actions seeking review of the Commissioner’s
determinations.  The statutory language is expressed in mandatory terms that all such
actions be brought in a federal district court.   Id.; cf.  Tafflin,  493 U.S. at 460-61, 110 S.
9
Ct. at 796, 107 L. Ed. 2d 887 (finding that a federal statute creating a federal cause of action
did not exclude state courts from hearing the claims because the statute provided that such
claims “may” be brought in federal court).  Therefore, because Congress’s use of the
word “shall” suggests strongly that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is exclusive, we
determine that Maryland’s state courts are without concurrent subject matter jurisdiction
to adjudicate disputes over the allocation of a child beneficiary’s OASDI benefits by a
 In Tafflin, the Supreme Court analyzed a provision of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
9
Organizations (“RICO”) statute which created a cause of action for persons injured by a statutorily
enumerated prohibited activity.  That provision provided that “Any person injured in his business
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (emphasis added).  The Court
held that the provision granted federal courts jurisdiction over such causes of action, but did not
require that all such actions be brought exclusively in federal courts.  Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 460-61,
110 S. Ct. at 796, 107 L. Ed. 2d 887 (citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502,
507-508, 82 S.Ct. 519, 522, 7 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1962) (“The statute does not state nor even suggest that
such jurisdiction shall be exclusive. It provides that suits of the kind described ‘may’ be brought in
the federal district courts, not that they must be.”)). 
18
duly appointed representative payee.
Generally, federal law governs representative payees and their use of a child
beneficiary’s OASDI benefits.  See 42 U.S.C. 405(j); 20 C.F.R. § 404.2001. Once
appointed, a representative payee is required to use the benefit payments solely for the
beneficiary’s “use and benefit in a manner and for the purposes [the representative payee]
determines . . . to be in [the beneficiary’s] best interests.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.2035(a).  The
SSA considers costs associated with the beneficiary’s “current maintenance” to be valid
expenditures satisfying the requirement that benefit payments be applied “for the use and
benefit” of the beneficiary and in line with his or her “best interests.”  20 C.F.R. §
404.2040(a)(1).  “Current maintenance includes cost[s] incurred in obtaining food,
shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal comfort items.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.2040(a)(1). 
For beneficiaries receiving institutional care because of a physical or mental disability,
the definition of “current maintenance” is expanded to include “the customary charges
made by the institution, as well as expenditures for those items which will aid in the
beneficiary’s recovery or release from the institution or expenses for personal needs
which will improve the beneficiary’s conditions while in the institution.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.2040(b)  (emphasis added). The SSA Commissioner is responsible for promulgating
rules and regulations for implementing and executing the provisions of the Social
Security Act, in addition to monitoring payees. See 42 U.S.C. 405(a).  Because this
authority is vested solely with the Commissioner, the Maryland juvenile court does not
have authority under Maryland law to monitor the allocation of social security benefits by
19
a representative payee.  See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 2570 (2011)
(holding that the Supremacy Clause requires that “[w]here state and federal law directly
conflict, state law must give way”).
If a child beneficiary suspects misuse of his or her OASDI benefits by his or her
representative payee, the Social Security Act, as amended in 2004, provides the
beneficiary with avenues for federal administrative and judicial review. The 2004
amendments include more stringent monitoring of institutional representative payees’ use
of benefits, as well as broader avenues in which to seek remedy for misuse of benefits by
such institutional payees.  See Social Security Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
203, 118 Stat. 493, 493 (2004).  The amendment, as enacted, defines “misuse” as
occurring in any case in which the representative payee “receives payment under this title
for the use and benefit of another person and converts such payment, or any part thereof,
to a use other than for the use and benefit of such other person.”  Id. at sec. 101(a)(2), §
405(j), 118 Stat. at 495 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(9)).  
If a beneficiary is not satisfied with an initial determination made by the
Commissioner as to either misuse, eligibility for benefits, or the appointment of a
representative payee, the first step in the SSA’s internal review process is reconsideration. 
20 C.F.R. § 404.907.  The SSA provides written notice to all parties of its reconsidered
determination, and that decision is appealable to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). 
Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.922.  The decision of the ALJ is binding unless one of the parties
requests and receives review of the decision by the Appeals Council.  20 C.F.R. §§
20
404.967, 404.955(a).  The decision of the Appeals Council is reviewable in federal
district court, and if the Council declines to review a case, the ALJ’s decision is likewise
reviewable in a federal district court.  20 C.F.R. § 404.981.   
Notwithstanding these provisions, Ryan contends that the juvenile court had
subject matter jurisdiction over the Department’s allocation of his OASDI benefits
pursuant to the COSA’s 2001 decision in Ecolono v. Division of Reimbursements of
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 137 Md. App. 639, 769 A.2d 296 (2001).  In
Ecolono, the COSA determined that it had “subject matter jurisdiction to decide a dispute
between the beneficiary of social security benefits and his representative payee with
respect to the allocation of those benefits.”  137 Md. App. 639, 654, 769 A.2d 296, 305. 
At the time Ecolono was decided, the Social Security Act and implementing regulations
required only that the SSA provide restitution to a beneficiary for payee misuse if the
SSA had been negligent in appointing that payee, or if the SSA recovered the misused
funds from the payee.  See Social Security Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-203,
118 Stat. 493, 493 (2004).
The appellee in Ecolono argued that, because there was an administrative review
process for appointment of representative payees and a remedy for their breach of duty,
state courts were without jurisdiction to interfere with a representative payee's allocation
of social security benefits.  COSA rejected this argument, reasoning that “nothing in
federal law . . . indicate[s] an intent by Congress to limit interested parties to the federal
administrative and judicial review process and to prohibit State courts from exercising
21
jurisdiction . . . when the relief requested is not the removal of the payee but a
reallocation of the benefits.”  Id., 137 Md. App. at 654, 769 A.2d at 305.  Notably,
however, the 2004 amendments to the Social Security Act now permit the beneficiary to
recover full restitution from the SSA where an institutional representative payee misuses
the beneficiary’s funds.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.2041(a).  Therefore, unlike the cases relied
on by the COSA in Ecolono, see, e.g., Jahnke v. Jahnke, 526 N.W.2d 159, 163 (Iowa
1994) (“Although the federal government may prosecute a payee who converts a
beneficiary’s funds, there is no federal mechanism to prevent such a conversion from
occurring. Moreover, once the SSA pays the benefits to the proper representative payee, it
has no liability to the beneficiary for misuse of the payments.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
405(k) (1988))),  we are not presented with a scenario in which Ryan has no federal
10
Other states have struggled with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in state courts over disputes
10
regarding representative payees’ use of social security benefits. See Grace Thru Faith v. Caldwell,
944 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (finding state court jurisdiction over claims alleging
misuse of funds by representative payees and emphasizing that absent a showing that the SSA had
been negligent in appointing a representative payee, or alternatively, a showing that the payee’s
breach of duty incurred criminal violations, there was no federal remedy for beneficiaries whose
benefits had been misused); see also In re J.G., 186 N.C. App. 496, 508, 652 S.E.2d 266, 273 (2007)
(holding that state courts were allowed “to look into the expenditure of dependent social security
benefits when an interested party questions the propriety of those expenditures” and reasoning that
the trial court had properly acted within its “supervisory role[] in seeing to J.G.'s best interests” and
that the Keffeler II decision “acknowledged that it was not always appropriate to use all of a
juvenile's Social Security funds to reimburse itself, in particular in anticipation of ‘impending
emancipation.’” (quoting Keffeler II, 537 U.S. at 378-79, 123 S.Ct. at 1022, 154 L.Ed.2d at 981-82));
but see O’Connor v. Zelinske, 193 N.C. App. 683, 692, 668 S.E.2d 615, 620 (2008) (overruling the
holding in In re J.G. and reaffirming that the “courts of North Carolina . . . [do not] have the power
to determine that [the] defendant is misusing Social Security benefits paid to him on behalf of the
children and to direct that he account for them to some other person” (quoting Brevard v. Brevard,
74 N.C.App. 484, 488-89, 328 S.E.2d 789, 792 (1985)).  Both Jahnke and Grace Thru Faith were
decided before the 2004 amendments to the Social Security Act, and are therefore not persuasive
here.
22
remedy upon a finding that his representative payee allocated his funds in a manner
contrary to federal law and regulations. 
Because the 2004 amendments to the Social Security Act enhanced the monitoring
of institutional representative payees and made available federal remedies for misuse of
benefits, the rationale underlying the result in Ecolono and cases from other jurisdictions
which held that state courts possessed subject matter jurisdiction over disputes regarding
the allocation of benefits by representative payees no longer exists. The appropriate
forum for seeking review of disputes regarding SSA matters lies within the federal
administrative and court systems.  Accordingly, the juvenile court erred in directing the
Department to establish a constructive trust on Ryan’s behalf for funds it had received on
his behalf. Having determined that the exercise of discretion by a representative payee in
its use of a beneficiary’s OASDI benefits is reviewable only in the federal administrative
and judicial processes described in the applicable federal statute and regulations discussed
supra, we hold that a state court does not have jurisdiction to direct a representative payee
to allocate funds in a way that, while permitted under federal law, conflicts directly with a
valid exercise of the payee’s discretion under the federal law.   See Washington
11
Regarding the Department's compliance with federal law in its use of Ryan's benefit payments, the
11
COSA erred in its interpretation of the regulation permitting institutional costs to be considered
"current maintenance" by affording undue significance to certain facts within the illustration
provided in 20 C.F.R. 404.2040(b).  That illustration presents the following scenario:
An institutionalized beneficiary is entitled to a monthly Social
Security benefit of $320.  The institution charges $700 a month for
room and board.  The beneficiary's brother, who is the payee, learns
the beneficiary needs new shoes and does not have any funds to
(continued...)
23
Department of Social and Health Services v. Guardianship Estate of Danny Keffeler, 537
U.S. 371, 390, 123 S.Ct. 1017, 1028, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 972 (“Keffeler II”) (finding that the
anti-attachment provision in 42 U.S.C. 405(j) prohibits a state from directing a
representative payee, or a beneficiary, to pay their benefits over to the state).  Because we
conclude that Maryland state courts lack jurisdiction over disputes regarding a
representative payee’s allocation of OASDI benefits, we do not reach the issue of whether
the Department’s allocation of Ryan’s benefits complied with federal law, to the extent
that the COSA decided that question. 
2.
The Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland
Code does not grant to the juvenile court the authority to
consider and resolve disputes regarding the allocation or use
of OASDI benefits for CINA children.
(...continued)
purchase miscellaneous items at the institution's canteen.
The payee takes his brother to town and buys him a pair of shoes for
$29.  He also takes the beneficiary to see a movie which costs $3. 
When they return to the institution, the payee gives his brother $3 to
be used at the canteen. 
Although the payee normally withholds only $25 a month from
Social Security benefit for the beneficiary's personal needs, this
month the payee deducted the above expenditures and paid the
institution $10 less than he usually pays.
The above expenditures represent what we would consider to be
proper expenditures for current maintenance.
20 C.F.R. § 404.2040(b).  The COSA's second opinion implies that the regulation addresses
explicitly the issue of institutional charges in excess of the beneficiary's social security benefit
payments.  The regulation cited, however, does not clearly indicate that such a situation is pertinent
to the rule set forth in subsection (b).  Rather, the illustration provided does not indicate the total
income or assets of the institutionalized beneficiary.  Most likely, this information is left out because
the focus of the illustration is to provide examples of acceptable personal expenses that the
representative payee deems necessary, or at least is in line with the language of subsection (b).  See
id.
24
Ryan argues that the juvenile court, in directing the Department to conserve
benefits received already and spent on his behalf, acted within its statutory authority over
children deemed CINA and the Department as their fiduciary.  CJP § 3-802(c) (providing
that “the court may direct the local department to provide services to a child, the child’s
family, or the child’s caregiver to the extent that the local department is authorized under
State law”); see also CJP § 3-823(e) (providing for the juvenile court’s authority over the
child’s permanency plan, including transition needs); accord In re Damon M., 362 Md.
429, 436, 765 A.2d 624, 627-28 (2000) (“Services to be provided by the local social
service department and commitments that must be made by the parents and children are
determined by the permanency plan.”)  Ryan contends further that, because CJP § 3-821
permits the juvenile court to “direct, restrain, or control” the conduct of a person or entity
whenever the court finds that such conduct is not in the child’s best interests, the court
acted within its statutory authority.  The Department contends that the juvenile court
misinterpreted its authority to “control the conduct” of a party, and, alternatively, that the
“support” of a CINA should be interpreted as meaning “child support” only.
As a court of limited jurisdiction, the juvenile court may exercise only those
powers granted to it by statute.  In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 334, 783 A.2d 673, 689
(2001) (“[W]hen a court proceeds by way of a special statute rather than under its general
common-law authority, that court has only the powers given to it under the special
statute.”); see also Smith v. State, 399 Md. 565, 574, 924 A.2d 1175, 1180 (2007). 
Pursuant to the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, the
25
juvenile court possesses exclusive original jurisdiction over CINA petitions, CJP § 3-
803(a)(2), as well as concurrent jurisdiction over the “[c]ustody, visitation, support, and
paternity of a child whom the court finds to be a CINA.”  CJP § 3-803(b)(1)(i).
The Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article does not provide explicitly that the
juvenile court has jurisdiction to consider disputes in the allocation of federal OASDI
funds as to CINA persons.  In support of his position, Ryan argues that the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction over the Department’s use of benefits derives from the court’s powers
over the “support” of a CINA.  See CJP § 3-803(b)(1)(i); see also CJP § 3-819(c)(2)
(providing the juvenile court with powers to determine custody, visitation, support or
paternity of a CINA).  He contends that, because OASDI benefits are meant to replace the
“support” a child loses from his wage-earning parent(s) when the parent(s) die, O’Brien v.
O’Brien, 136 Md. App. 497, 510 n.5, 766 A.2d 211, 218 n.5 (2001), the juvenile court’s
power to determine support of a CINA allows it to “make orders regarding support” of a
CINA. 
In construing whether the term “support,” as used in CJP § 3-819, includes federal
survivor’s benefits, we must consider the use of the word in the context of the entire
CINA statute and the word’s “ordinary meaning, absent indications of a contrary intent by
the Legislature.”  In re Roger S., 338 Md. 385, 391, 658 A2d 696, 699 (1995) (internal
citations omitted); See also City of Baltimore Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Associates,
395 Md. 299, 318, 910 A.2d 406, 417-18 (2006) (“The plain language of a provision is
not interpreted in isolation. Rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole and
26
attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given
effect.”). 
We have held consistently that the CJP uses the term “support,” in regard to
CINAs, synonymously with “child support,” or the parental obligation to support a child
financially.  Although CJP § 3-819(c)(2) permits the juvenile court to determine support,
subsection (1) of § 3-819 provides that the court may order parents to “pay a sum in the
amount the court directs to cover wholly or partly the support of the child.”  CJP § 3-
819(l); see also Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.) Fam. Law § 5-203(b) (providing that 
“the parents of a minor child . . . are responsible . . . for the child’s support”).  Cases
involving the “support” of CINA children also illuminate the plain meaning of the term as
parental obligations to support their minor child.  See, e.g., Rosemann v. Salsbury,
Clements, Bekman, Marder & Adkins, LLC, 412 Md. 308, 319-20 (2010); In re Katherine
C., 390 Md. 554, 566-67 (2006); In re Joshua W., 94 Md. App. 486, 494-95 (1993). 
Because the Department was not collecting or applying for “child support” from the
Social Security Administration, we find no merit in Ryan’s “support” argument.   
Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article § 3-821 also does not provide authority for
the juvenile court to act as it did here.  CJP § 3-821 permits the juvenile court, where a
party is before the court otherwise properly, to “direct, restrain, or control” the conduct of
a person or entity whenever the court finds that such conduct is not in the child’s best
27
interests.   Although the juvenile court is empowered generally to issue orders to control
12
the conduct of the Department, it may do so only regarding issues over which it otherwise
has jurisdiction.  Here, the agency was not before the court properly because the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the particular dispute between Ryan and his
representative payee regarding the use of OASDI benefit payments.  The COSA held, and
we agree, that “a motion to control conduct is not a means by which a Juvenile Court may
expand its statutorily enumerated powers.”  In re Ryan W., 207 Md. App. at 756-57, 56
A.3d at 256.
3.
Because the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over this particular dispute, the Department’s sovereign
immunity defense is moot.
The Department, in No. 101, contends that the COSA erred in directing the
juvenile court, upon remand, to order that $660 be returned to Ryan because of an error in
the Department’s accounting for the costs of foster care in May 2010.   Because we
13
This authority is granted whenever the conduct at issue 
12
(1) Is or may be detrimental or harmful to a child over whom the
court has jurisdiction;
(2) Will tend to defeat the execution of an order or disposition
made or to be made under this subtitle; or
(3) Will assist in the rehabilitation of or is necessary for the
welfare of the child.
CJP § 3-821. 
The Department conceded in the trial court that $8,075.32 should have been conserved on
13
Ryan’s behalf ($7,415.32 of the lump sum retrospective OASDI benefits and $660 which
was the amount of benefits received in excess of the total costs of care for the month of May
(continued...)
28
determine that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the OASDI
benefits dispute, the COSA was not entitled to direct the Department to return the benefits
it had applied. We therefore decline to reach the Department’s sovereign immunity
defense because, without subject matter jurisdiction, the defense is moot.  We therefore
reverse the COSA’s judgment to the extent that it ordered that Ryan be reimbursed for
any of the OASDI benefit funds in dispute.
B.
The challenged COMAR regulations are valid and in accordance with
federal law and policy.
Ryan W. contends that COMAR 07.02.11.29(K) and (L) are invalid because they
require “automatic, non-discretion[ary] taking of OASDI benefits without considering
transition needs, among others.”  Specifically, he argues that, because the federal statute
and accompanying regulations require that funds be spent in accordance with a
beneficiary’s “best interests,” automatic application of a foster child’s benefits to the
costs of care violates federal law. In riposte, the Department contends that the COMAR
regulations are in accordance with federal law regarding a representative payee’s
allocation of benefits because the uses of the benefits prescribed in the COMAR sections
are permitted explicitly by the federal statute and regulations. 
(...continued)
13
2010).  Subsequently, both parties agreed this concession was a mistake of fact. The
Department noted in its motion for reconsideration before the COSA that, in December 2011,
$7,478.32 was deposited into Ryan’s Foster Care Trust Account because that total was not
permitted to be used for self-reimbursement because it was part of the lump-sum
retrospective benefits.  The remaining $660 has not been accounted for, and the COSA held
that the Department "remains obligated to conserve an additional $660 for Ryan W."  In re
Ryan W., 207 Md. App. at 758 n.30, 56 A.3d at 286 n.30.
29
SSA regulations mandate that all representative payees use the OASDI benefits
they receive “in a manner and for the purposes he or she determines, under the guidelines
in [subpart U of 20 C.F.R. § 404] to be in [the beneficiary’s] best interests.”  20 C.F.R. §
404.2035(a) (emphasis added).  Costs of a beneficiary’s “current maintenance,” which
includes “food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal comfort items,” are
considered by the SSA to be appropriate uses of benefit funds. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.2040(a)(1).  Additionally, institutional payees are permitted explicitly to use a
beneficiary’s OASDI benefits for “the customary charges made by the institution, as well
as expenditures for those items which will aid in the beneficiary's recovery or release
from the institution or expenses for personal needs which will improve the beneficiary's
conditions while in the institution.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.2040(b).  The Department was duly
appointed as representative payee by the SSA to receive OASDI benefit payments on
Ryan’s behalf, and thus was obliged to use the benefits according to federal regulations. 
Ryan argues that Maryland regulations, in requiring automatic allocation of funds,
are inconsistent with the discretionary nature of the allocation provisions in federal
regulations.  COMAR 07.02.11.29(K) provides:
(1) Other resources available for the child may be in the form
of cash assets, trust accounts, insurance (including survivor’s
disability insurance), or some type of benefit or supplemental
security income for the disabled child.
(2) While in out-of-home placement, if the child is 18 years
old or older and is the beneficiary of insurance or survivor’s
benefits, the child shall choose whether to:
(a) Receive benefits and pay the local department; or
(b) Designate the local department as the payee.
(3) The local department shall seek a representative payee for
30
an incompetent child 18 years old or older.
COMAR 07.02.11.29(L) provides:
The child’s resources shall be applied directly to the cost of
care, with any excess applied first to meeting the special
needs of the child, and the net excess saved in a savings
account for future needs. Any potential benefits from other
resources shall be pursued and made available if possible to
the local department as payee.
In Conaway v. Social Services Administration, 298 Md. 639, 471 A.2d 1058
(1984), we considered whether a representative payee could allocate a beneficiary’s
benefits towards the cost of caring for the beneficiary.  We determined that
reimbursement for the costs of providing foster care achieved by applying “current
benefits to the current costs of care” was an appropriate use of federal benefits by a duly
appointed representative payee.  Conaway, 298 Md. at 648-49, 471 A.2d at 1063.  We
addressed specifically the legitimacy of COMAR 07.02.11.29(L), which was
denominated as COMAR 07.02.11.07 at the operative time in Conaway:14
Article 88A,  60 authorizes various payment rates for foster
care; however, it does not delineate the source(s) of the funds
to be used. The State Director of Social Services is
responsible for administering these aspects of the foster care
program. Therefore, regulations about foster care payment
rates and the source of funds to make these payments are
necessary to carry out duties imposed by law. The regulation
at issue in this case has accomplished precisely that. COMAR
07.02.11.07 is entitled “Resources for Reimbursement
towards Cost of Care.” Federal benefits were paid to the State
and could have been used to pay for the cost of the child’s
care. These benefits were committed to the department for the
The differences between the prior version of the regulation and its current iteration are non-
14
substantive. 
31
child’s benefit. As resources that could offset the cost of care,
their use was a proper subject for regulation. Because these
regulations were within the statutory authority, they had the
force of law; thus, they provided an adequate legal basis for
the local department’s actions.
Id. at 644, 471 A.2d at 1060. 
In the present case, the juvenile court declared that subsections (K) and (L) of
COMAR 07.02.11.29 were invalid because of the conflict with federal law providing for
discretion to a representative payee in allocating a beneficiary’s OASDI benefits.  See 20
C.F.R. § 404.2035(a).  The Department applied for Ryan’s OASDI benefits on his behalf
as representative payee and used the benefits, pursuant to this state regulation (and
allowed by the federal statutes and regulations) to reimburse itself partially for the
expenses it incurred for Ryan’s foster care.  This practice is consistent with federal law,
which allows “current maintenance” and “customary charges” as appropriate
expenditures by institutional payees.  We agree with the COSA that the other contested
provision, COMAR 07.02.11.29(K)(2), “was not implicated in Ryan’s case as he was
under 18 [years old] when the Department became his representative payee and, in any
event, during proceedings before the Juvenile Court, a Department witness testified that
the regulation is not enforced.”  In re Ryan W., 207 Md. App. at 748, 56 A.3d at 280.
C.
Due Process requires, however, notice at least to a child’s legal
representative whenever the Department applies for and receives
OASDI benefits on the child’s behalf as his or her representative payee.
Ryan asks us to overturn the COSA’s holding that the Department’s failure to
provide notice or an opportunity to be heard did not violate his due process rights.  He
32
argues that the notice required to be given by the Commissioner is insufficient because, as
the federal regulations applied to Ryan’s situation, notice that the Department would
become his representative payee was provided only to the Department as his legal
guardian.  Ryan contends that the Department’s fiduciary obligations require it to notify a
child or his or her counsel upon receipt of benefits.15
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights (usually read in pari materia with the federal analogue),
prohibits the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.  Roberts
v. Total Health Care, Inc., 349 Md. 499, 509, 709 A.2d 142, 146-47 (1998) (“At the core
of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be  heard.”) (internal
citations omitted)).  Prior to considering whether an individual’s right to due process was
violated, we must determine first that “(1) State action has been employed (2) to deprive
that [individual] of a substantial interest in property.”  Id. at 510, 709 A.2d 142, 147. 
Here, the Department, a government actor, applied to be Ryan’s representative payee
(without notice to him or his CINA counsel) and used the OASDI benefits to reimburse
itself for the costs of his foster care (also without notice).  Because Ryan, like all OASDI
beneficiaries, has a property interest in his benefits, see Tucker v. Tucker, 156 Md. App.
484, 492-93, 847 A.2d 486, 490-91 (2004) (holding that a child’s social security benefits
belong to the child and should not be included in the parent’s “income” when determining
child support obligations), the Department’s actions implicate Ryan’s due process rights. 
In Maryland, a child who is the subject of a CINA proceeding is entitled to counsel through the
15
Office of the Public Defender.  CJP §§ 3-813 (a), (d)(1).
33
In determining what process is due, this Court will balance both the government
interests and the private interests affected.  Id. (citing Department of Transportation v.
Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 416-20, 474 A.2d 191, 203-05 (1984)). The U. S. Supreme Court
outlined three factors that courts should weigh in determining the process due in a given
situation under the Fourteenth Amendment:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 33 (1976). 
The Washington Supreme Court, in Guardianship Estate of Keffeler ex rel. Pierce
v. State, 151 Wash. 2d 331, 88 P.3d 956 (2004) (“Keffeler III”),  considered whether a
16
The Washington Supreme Court considered Keffeler III on remand from the U. S. Supreme
16
Court decision in Keffeler II.  See Washington State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. V.
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 123 S. Ct. 1017, 154 L. Ed. 2d 972 (2003)
(“Keffeler II”).  In Keffeler II, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Social Security Act
permitted a state institution, serving as representative payee for children in foster care, could
reimburse itself for a child’s cost of care.  The Court held that, because the Washington
Department of Social and Health Services (“DSHS”) was in lawful possession of the benefit
moneys in its capacity as a duly appointed representative payee and had used those funds in
accordance with federal regulations, its practice of self-reimbursement did not violate § 407
of the Social Security Act.  Id. at 390, 123 S.Ct. at 1025, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 972.  Further,
although declining to consider whether DSHS had violated § 405(j) by using the funds for
past care and for costs covered already by other federal assistance funds, the Supreme Court
recognized expressly that the Commissioner’s determination “that a representative payee
serves the beneficiary’s interest by seeing that basic needs are met,” rather than “maximizing
a trust fund attributable to fortuitously overlapping state and federal grants,” was subject to
judicial deference.  Id. at 390, 123 S.Ct. At 1028, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 989.  
34
Washington State department of social services violated children beneficiaries’ due
process rights when it used the benefits to reimburse itself for the costs of foster care. 
The court determined that “[t]he federal notice sent to beneficiaries and their guardians is
sufficient to fulfill any procedural due process rights the children may have” and that
“[a]ny potential private interest in additional notice is outweighed by the State’s interest
in efficient administration of its foster care program.” Keffeler III, 151 Wash. 2d at 345,
88 P.3d at 956.  The thrust of the court’s reasoning was that the risk of deprivation was
minimal because of the notice SSA provides before appointing a representative payee,
and again subsequently before certifying payment to that payee.  Id. at 344, 88 P.3d at
955.  Additionally, the court emphasized that additional procedures (other than the notice
provided already by the Commissioner in accordance with federal law) would be
unnecessary because “the identity of a representative payee does not influence eligibility
for benefits and all representative payees must use the benefits in accordance with federal
and state laws and regulations.”  Id. at 344, 88 P.3d at 955.
We disagree with the conclusions of the Washington Supreme Court in analyzing
the Mathews factors, as applied to the facts of the present case. See Keffeler III, 151
Wash. 2d 331, 345, 88 P.3d 949, 956 (finding that the Commissioner’s notice was
sufficient because there was only a minimum risk that childrens’ interest in their benefit
payments would be erroneously deprived, and because the state’s interests in
administrative efficiency outweighed the interests of the foster children in their benefits). 
The private interest at stake here is Ryan W.’s interest in the “free use of his social
35
security benefits.”  See McGrath v. Weinberger, 541 F.2d 249, 253-54 (10th Cir.1976). 
The notice provided by the Commissioner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(E)(ii) and 20
C.F.R. § 404.2030(a), before appointing a representative payee and before certifying the
first benefit payment, in cases like Ryan’s, goes directly to the representative payee (the
Department as Ryan’s legal guardian).  Because the representative payee – in this case,
the Department – has discretion in determining the proper allocation of a child's social
security benefits, the risk that the child might be deprived erroneously of his or her
interest in the benefits may also be substantial.  Contra Keffeler III, 151 Wash. 2d at 345,
88 P.3d at 956.  Congress recognized this risk when it amended the Social Security Act in
2004 to provide more remedies for payee misuse of benefits.  See Social Security
Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-203, 118 Stat. 493, 493 (2004) (adding federal
remedies for misuse and removing the negligence requirement for restitution of benefits
misused by institutional payees).  
Central to our earlier conclusion here, that an institutional payee may exercise its
discretion in allocating a child’s social security benefits without the supervision of the
juvenile court, is the presence of a federal administrative and judicial review process
which serves a checks-and-balances function required to prevent, and remedy, where
applicable, improper use of a child beneficiary’s social security benefits.  Without actual
and direct notice, however, a child beneficiary, through his legal representative, is
unlikely to know of and utilize timely the review process added by the 2004 amendments
to the Social Security Act.  See id.  If the beneficiary is neither aware that he or she is
36
entitled to benefits, nor that a representative payee is receiving and using those benefits
on his or her behalf, he or she is unlikely to benefit from the presence of an adequate
federal remedy to test perceived irregularities.  Because the juvenile court holds regular
hearings to review the permanency plan of every child committed to the Department, see
CJP § 3-823(h)(1)(i), and because the Department is required to submit its
recommendations for the child’s permanency plan prior to the hearing, see CJP § 3-
823(d), requiring the Department to provide notice to the child’s appointed legal
representative in the CINA proceeding that the Department has applied to the SSA to be
the payee of the child’s OASDI benefits and, if approved, is receiving the child’s social
security benefits on behalf of the beneficiary is not such a burden as to hinder
meaningfully the “[s]tate’s interest in efficient administration of its foster care system.”
Keffeler III, 151 Wash. 2d at 345, 88 P.3d at 956. 
We therefore conclude that the Department (or its local department of social
services) must notify a CINA, through his or her legal counsel, contemporaneously with
its application to be appointed as the child’s representative payee, that it has so applied. 
Further, when the Department receives benefit payments for the period since the last
permanency planning hearing, the child’s CINA attorney must be notified by the
Department of the amount and date of receipt.  The child’s attorney should be aware of all
a child’s resources, including OASDI benefits, in order to fulfill his or her duty in
advocating with the Department for the child’s best interests, which may include services
needed for transitioning out of foster care. The notice to be provided by the Department is
37
also for the purpose of allowing a child beneficiary, through his or her legal counsel, to
facilitate the child’s ability to seek federal administrative and/or judicial review of SSA
determinations and of the Department’s use of his or benefits.  This holding as to notice
should not be read to conflict with our earlier conclusion that the juvenile court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to direct the allocation of OASDI benefits.  Additionally, this
holding should not be construed to diminish the authority of the juvenile court in ordering
that a local department of social services provide services prescribed by Maryland law to
a child in foster care.  
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF
SPECIAL APPEALS IN CASE NO. 95
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN
PART, 
CONSISTENT 
W ITH 
THIS
OPINION; CASE REMANDED TO THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH
DIRECTIONS 
TO 
REVERSE 
THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR 
BALTIMORE 
CITY 
AND 
TO
DISMISS 
RYAN 
W.’S 
MOTION 
TO
CONTROL CONDUCT IN THE CIRCUIT
COURT; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE 
PAID 
TWO-THIRDS 
BY 
THE
DEPARTMENT 
AND 
ONE-THIRD 
BY
RYAN W.
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF
SPECIAL APPEALS IN CASE NO. 101
VACATED AND CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
DISMISS 
THE 
APPEAL 
AS 
MOOT;
COSTS IN BOTH COURTS TO BE PAID
BY THE DEPARTMENT.
38
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 95
September Term, 2012
&
No. 101
September Term, 2012
                                                                             
IN RE: RYAN W.
                                                                             
Barbera, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
*Bell, 
JJ.
                                                                             
Dissenting Opinion by Adkins,  J., which
Bell, C.J. (ret.), joins.
                                                                            
Filed:   September 26, 2013
*Bell, C.J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member 
of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
I disagree with the Majority’s analysis of the jurisdictional issue.  Ryan’s claims
against the Department arise from an alleged breach of fiduciary duty.  The Majority
concludes, however, that the appropriate forums for the resolution of such claims are “federal
administrative and court systems.”  Maj. Slip Op. at 23.  This may have been a proper
conclusion had Ryan sought restitution of the allegedly misused benefits from the Social
Security Administration (the “SSA”) by relying on the provisions in the Social Security Act
(the “Act”) and the underlying regulations.  But Ryan is not seeking restitution from the SSA. 
He sought to recover the allegedly misused funds by way of a common-law claim.  As a court
with supervisory authority over “support” of Ryan, a Child in Need of Assistance (“CINA”),
the juvenile court had jurisdiction to hear Ryan’s case.  
As the Majority acknowledges, “[w]hen Congress is silent concerning [concurrent]
state court jurisdiction over federal causes of action, there is a ‘deeply rooted presumption
in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction.’”  Majority Slip Op. at 17 (quoting R.A. Ponte
Architects, Ltd. v. Investors’ Alert, Inc., 382 Md. 689, 715, 857 A.2d 1, 16 (2004), in turn
quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459, 110 S. Ct. 792, 795 (1990)).  This presumption
can only “be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from
legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal
interests.”  Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478, 101 S. Ct. 2870, 2875
(1981).    
I submit that none of the three abovementioned rebuttals to the presumption of
concurrent state jurisdiction are present in this case.
In holding that federal courts enjoy exclusive jurisdiction, the Majority does not take
into account the crucial fact that Ryan’s claims are against the Department, not the SSA. 
Rather, the Majority treats the jurisdictional issue in this case as if the question were as to
which court had jurisdiction to review the SSA’s determination regarding an alleged misuse
of the benefits by a representative payee.  In answering this hypothetical question, instead of
the one presented in this case, the Majority offers several possible reasons for concluding as
it does without picking a favorite.
One such possibility the Majority considers is that the Social Security Act itself
reserves exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 18 (citing the “shall be
brought in the district court” language from 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).  According to the Majority,
“Congress’s use of the word ‘shall’ suggests strongly that the jurisdiction of the federal
courts is exclusive.”  Maj. Slip Op. at 18 (emphasis added).   Yet the Majority cites no case
1
That the phrase “shall be brought in the district court” necessarily carries a mandatory
1
connotation is not a foregone conclusion.  While there is no case interpreting the “shall”
language in the Social Security Act, it has been interpreted in other contexts.  For instance,
many federal courts have held that, in the context of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act” (“RCRA”), the “shall be brought” language “unambiguously demonstrates
that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over RCRA claims.”  See, e.g., Litgo New
Jersey Inc. v. Comm’r New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 2013 WL 3985003 (3d Cir.
2013).  Yet, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that the “shall
be brought in the district court” language in RCRA “does not affirmatively divest the state
courts of their presumptive jurisdiction.”  Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 612 (6th  Cir. 
1998); see also Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823, 110 S. Ct. 1566,
1569 (1990) (holding that the enforcement provisions of Title VII, which provide that federal
courts “shall have jurisdiction,” do not “expressly confine[] jurisdiction to federal courts or
oust[] state courts of their presumptive jurisdiction”). 
2
holding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a claim, not against the SSA, but
against a representative payee, and I have found none.  The only claim that is authorized by
the SSA for misuse of funds by a representative payee is a claim by a beneficiary against the
SSA for  recovery of those benefits.  I submit that the term “shall” in the Act refers to filing
a claim for judicial review of a decision made by the Commissioner of the SSA regarding
such a claim. 
A number of other states have found state court jurisdiction even with similar “shall”
language in place.  See Ecolono v. Div. of Reimbursements of Dep’t of Health and Mental
Hygiene, 137 Md. App. 639, 769 A.2d 296 (2001); Grace Thru Faith v. Caldwell, 944
S.W.2d 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Jahnke v. Jahnke, 526 N.W.2d 159 (Iowa 1994); In re
J.G., 652 S.E.2d 266 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).  The Majority distinguishes those cases only by 
pointing out that they were decided prior to the 2004 amendments to the Act:  
Because the 2004 amendments to the Social Security Act
enhanced the monitoring of institutional representative payees
and made available federal remedies for misuse of benefits, the
rationale underlying the result in Ecolono and cases from other
jurisdictions . . . no longer exists.  
Maj. Slip Op. at 23.  
But the lack of a Federal remedy was not the only, or even the primary, basis for these
cases.  For example, in Matter of Kummer, the New York appellate court was clear:
[I]t is our view that whether or not a Federal cause of action
exists is irrelevant.  The implication of a Federal cause of
action for breaches of Federal statutes is of importance in many
cases only because it furnishes the jurisdictional predicate for
3
access to the Federal courts . . . and not, as the administratrix
would have it, because absent such an implied Federal right of
action an injured party is without a remedy for wrongs
committed against him. 
Matter of Kummer, 93 A.D.2d 135, 160-61, 461 N.Y.S.2d 845, 861 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
(emphasis added).
The Kummer court distinguished cases involving the SSA’s actions or decisions:
The four cases cited by the administratrix dealt with eligibility,
the amount of benefits, whether Federal officials had appointed
an improper representative payee, and who should control the
funds as representative payee. Our case deals with the
representative payee's account, that is with the propriety of his
expenditures of benefits.
Matter of Kummer, 93 A.D.2d at 156, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
The Tennessee Court of Appeals also rejected an argument similar to the
Department’s here, concluding: 
Therefore, the federal statutes and regulations allow for claims
beyond those expressly provided for therein and contain no
language indicating an intent to preempt state court jurisdiction. 
Moreover, a state claim by a beneficiary for recovery of funds
misused by a payee does not conflict with the federal statutes
and regulations.  
Grace Thru Faith, 944 S.W.2d at 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
Our own intermediate appellate court concluded that the state had jurisdiction over
a similar claim, reasoning:
Regardless of the extent of the duty of the SSA to monitor the
expenditure of benefits by representative payees, we find
nothing in federal law to indicate an intent by Congress to
4
limit interested parties to the federal administrative and
judicial review process and to prohibit State courts from
exercising jurisdiction, in the case before us, when the relief
requested is not the removal of the payee but a reallocation of
the benefits. Consequently, we conclude that we have subject
matter jurisdiction to decide a dispute between the beneficiary
of social security benefits and his representative payee with
respect to the allocation of those benefits.
Ecolono, 137 Md. App. at 654, 769 A.2d at 305 (2001).  
 
 Before the 2004 amendments, the SSA reimbursed beneficiaries whose benefits had
been misused by their representative payees only if the SSA was negligent in appointing or
monitoring the representative payee.  The 2004 amendments to the Act expanded the remedy
to beneficiaries in cases where the representative payee was not an individual, unless that
individual  serves 15 or more beneficiaries. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(5).  In those types of misuse
cases, the SSA will make restitution to the beneficiary even in the absence of the SSA’s
negligence.  Id.  Neither before nor after the 2004 amendments, however, did the
representative payee provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 and 1383 give a private cause of action
to a beneficiary against the representative payee.  See Bates v. Northwestern Human Servs.,
Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 69, 98 (D.D.C. 2006) (denying a claim under the Act because “it is
clear that nothing in these statutes expressly states that a beneficiary may file a lawsuit
against a representative payee who has misused his or her benefits payments or otherwise
violated the terms of the representative payee provisions”). 
Notably, although denying Bates’ federal claim under the Social Security Act, the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of Bates’ common-law
5
claims for accounting and unjust enrichment against the representative payee.  Id.  at 102-03
(“The plaintiffs allege, and the defendants do not dispute, that (1) the defendants served as
the plaintiffs’ representative payees under the Social Security Act; (2) in that capacity, the
defendants received federal benefits intended for the plaintiffs; and (3) the defendants owed
a fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs as a result of their representative payee status. . . .These
allegations are more than sufficient to sustain a claim of unjust enrichment at the pleading
stage”).    
The Majority holds that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims such
as Ryan’s.  Applying the reasoning of Bates, I strongly disagree.  The Social Security Act
does not afford beneficiaries a private right of action against representative payees. This is
the nature of Ryan’s action—it is an attempt to recover allegedly misused benefits directly
from the Department.  Ryan’s “Motion for Order Controlling Conduct to Conserve Social
Security Survivor’s Benefits” is akin to an unjust enrichment claim under state law, and the
facts alleged suffice under the Bates standard for viable breach of fiduciary duty or unjust
enrichment claims.
Nor does the Act suggest that state law remedies against the representative payee are
precluded.  All that 42 U.S.C. § 405 has ever allowed a beneficiary to do is to seek to have
the SSA enforce the statutory provisions and assist with obtaining restitution of misused
benefits from the SSA.  This is where the need to exhaust the administrative remedies comes
in.  In order to have the SSA reimburse the representative payee’s misused benefits, the
6
beneficiary must follow the administrative process.   See Monet v. Mathews, 535 F. Supp.
2
2d 132, 134 (D.D.C. 2008) (outlining all of the prerequisite steps in the administrative review
process).  If, after having exhausted the administrative remedies, the beneficiary is
dissatisfied with the outcome, he can then seek judicial review of the SSA’s determination
in federal court.  In that instance, the beneficiary’s claim is not against the representative
payee.  Rather, it is for the judicial review of the SSA’s determination, and any recovery will
be from the SSA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action
. . . brought in the district court of the United States”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(9).
(“Decisions of the Commissioner of Social Security under this subsection shall be reviewable
by commencing a civil action in the United States district court”).
The failure of the Act to allow beneficiaries to bring direct claims against
representative payees in federal courts is the reason why the D.C. Federal District Court
dismissed a claim in which beneficiaries tried to do just that.  See Bates, 466 F. Supp. 2d at
98.  There, the Court dismissed certain counts against a representative payee alleging
The Department contends that the beneficiary must always seek resolutions of issues
2
pertaining to benefits—even after they have been paid and spent by a representative
payee—through the SSA.  This argument is unconvincing.  The Social Security Act expressly
refers to determinations of “a court of competent jurisdiction” with regard to misuse of
payments:  “If the Commissioner of Social Security or a court of competent jurisdiction
determines that a representative payee has misused any individual’s benefit paid to such
representative payee . . . , the Commissioner of Social Security shall promptly revoke
certification for payment of  benefits to such representative payee . . . .”  42 U.S.C. §
405(j)(1)(A). 
7
violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 and 1383 and their implementing regulations because, as the
court explained, “whether or not Congress intended to create a private right under the
representative payee provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 and 1383, there is no indication of
further congressional intent to fashion a privately enforceable remedy for such a right.”  
Bates, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 97.  Yet Bates, decided after the 2004 amendments to the Act,
allowed a common-law claim to proceed.  Id. at 102.  Although the 2004 amendments to the
SSA added a federal remedy against the Administration, it did not contain any language
suggesting that a direct action against the representative payee  in state court was prohibited. 
See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459, 110 S. Ct. 792, 795 (1990); see also Charles Dowd
Box Co., v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-508, 82 S. Ct. 519, 522-523 (“We start with the
premise that nothing in the concept of our federal system prevents state courts from enforcing
rights created by federal law.  Concurrent jurisdiction has been a common phenomenon in
our judicial history, and exclusive federal court jurisdiction over cases arising under federal
law has been the exception rather than the rule”).  As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]o
rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, the question is not whether any intent at all
may be divined from legislative silence on the issue, but whether Congress in its
deliberations may be said to have affirmatively or unmistakably intended jurisdiction to be
exclusively federal.”  Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 462, 110 S. Ct. at 797.
In sum, Ryan’s claim against the Department is a common-law cause of action for
unjust enrichment or breach of fiduciary duty that is not precluded by any provision of the
8
Social Security Act. 
Juvenile Court’s Supervisory Jurisdiction Over CINA Matters
The juvenile court is well suited to hear and adjudicate this matter.  At the time Ryan
became aware of the Department’s alleged misuse of his benefits, he was a Child in Need of
Assistance.  Then, and almost the entire time since he was found to be a CINA in 2002, Ryan
had been in the custody of the Department.  In accordance with Section 3-823 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code (“CJP”), Ryan and the Department
came before the juvenile court for regular CINA review hearings.  The purpose of those
hearings was for the juvenile court to ensure that the services the Department provided to
Ryan were consistent with his best interests.  See Md. Code (2002, 2013 Repl. Vol) CJP §
3-819(g).  
It was in that same juvenile court, which over the years presided over Ryan’s
numerous review hearings, that Ryan filed the “Motion for Order Controlling [the
Department’s] Conduct to Conserve Social Security Survivor’s Benefits.”  He asked the
juvenile court to order the Department to conserve in a trust account for Ryan’s future needs
the $31,693.30 in Social Security Old Age, Survivor, and Disability Insurance benefits that
it had received as Ryan’s representative payee from the SSA.
As Ryan and the amici correctly point out, the General Assembly has given
Maryland’s juvenile courts broad supervisory powers to protect the best interests of children
who were found CINA.  See CJP § 3-802.  Indeed, as we have explained:
9
In light of the [juvenile court] statute, and also in light of the
language of some of the cases, it has become the practice to
speak in terms of the juvenile court’s “jurisdiction.”  The
Constitution of Maryland, however, does not provide for a
separate juvenile court.  The Constitution provides that the
courts of general jurisdiction are the circuit courts.  Accordingly,
a juvenile court, despite the statutory language, is part of the
circuit court, and exercises the jurisdiction of that court.  
In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 311 n.2, 783 A.2d 673, 677 n.2 (2001) (emphasis in
original).  
 
There are also several statutory provisions that specifically address financial support
of CINA children and the juvenile court’s supervision of local departments of social services. 
First, CJP § 3-803, titled “Jurisdiction of court,” expressly states that juvenile courts have
“concurrent jurisdiction over:  (i) Custody, visitation, support, and paternity of a child whom
the court finds to be a CINA.”  CJP § 3-803(b)(1)(I) (emphasis added); see also CJP §
3-819(c)(2) (stating that the court may “[d]etermine custody, visitation, support, or paternity
of a child”).  This suggests that juvenile courts do indeed have the authority to resolve
disputes involving financial support to CINA children.
Juvenile courts also have broad supervisory power over the local departments of social
services, which sometimes, as in the present case, are entrusted with managing financial
resources of a child found to be a CINA.  Namely, CJP § 3-802(c) allows “the court [to]
direct the local department to provide services to a child . . . to protect and advance a child’s
best interests.”  Specifically with respect to a child’s property, CJP § 3-819(g) provides that
a guardian, including the local department, “has no control over the property of the child
10
unless the court expressly grants that authority.”  Accordingly, juvenile courts have broad
supervisory powers over the Department generally and its handling of a CINA child’s
property.
Despite these statutory provisions, the Court of Special Appeals held that the juvenile
court had no jurisdiction to hear Ryan’s claims.   In re Ryan W., 207 Md. App. 698, 757, 56
3
A.3d 250, 285 (2012).  The court reasoned that the “statutorily enumerated authority over
‘support’ of children declared CINA” does not include “the Department’s use of benefits it
had received on his behalf as a duly appointed representative payee.”  Id.  In the court’s view,
the term “support” only includes such obligations as  “child support.”  Id.  The intermediate
appellate court did not provide support or an explanation for this conclusion but moved on
to summarily conclude that, even if “support” encompassed more than “child support,” “the
Juvenile Court has [no] plenary equitable powers to order the Department to place monies
already collected and disbursed in a trust for the benefit of the CINA.”  Id.   
But that is not so.  Setting aside the statutory sources of the juvenile court’s specific
authority to oversee the issues relating to financial support of children in CINA cases and to
supervise the Department’s conduct in these cases, “[i]t is a fundamental common law
concept that the jurisdiction of [juvenile] courts is plenary so as to afford whatever relief may
be necessary to protect the [child’s] best interests.”  Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc.,
Yet, before holding that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction, the Court of Special
3
Appeals had resolved the case on its merits, at least in part. 
11
293 Md. 685, 702, 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 (1982).  The juvenile court, “acting under the State’s
parens patriae authority, is in the unique position to marshal the applicable facts, assess the
situation, and determine the correct means of fulfilling a child’s best interests.”  In re Mark
M., 365 Md. 687, 707, 782 A.2d 332, 343–44 (2001). 
While Ryan bounced from one group home to the next, sometimes staying at places
that allegedly lacked basic necessities but cost $6,000 a month, the Department used Ryan’s
social security benefits to reimburse itself for the cost of this care.  It is difficult to imagine
any court—other than the juvenile court— more familiar with Ryan’s circumstances and thus
in a better position to determine whether the Department’s use of the benefits in such a way
was in Ryan’s best interest.
Conclusion
In conclusion, because the Social Security Act does not preclude a common-law
action for unjust enrichment or breach of fiduciary duty against a representative payee, and
the juvenile court is authorized to adjudicate matters related to protecting the bests interests
of children designated CINA, I would allow Ryan’s action to go forward based on the
allegations plead. 
For these reasons, I most respectfully dissent.
Chief Judge Bell (ret.) authorizes me to state that he shares the views set forth in this
dissenting opinion. 
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