Case Title: Dailey v. State

Citation: 828 So. 2d 340

Docket Number: 1992226

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
828 So. 2d 340 (2001)
Ex parte State of Alabama.
(Re Tchnavian Rolanda DAILEY v. STATE).
1992226.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 29, 2001.
*341 Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, asst. atty. gen., for petitioner.
Domingo Soto of Madden & Soto, Mobile, for respondent.
WOODALL, Justice.
Tchnavian Rolanda Dailey, the driver of a day-care van, was convicted of criminally negligent homicide, a violation of § 13A-6-4, Ala.Code 1975, after she left Demyreon Lindley, a three-year-old child, unattended in a closed van, ultimately causing his death. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed her conviction, concluding that the trial court had erred in granting the State's challenge for cause of prospective juror K.K. Dailey v. State, 828 So. 2d 337 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). We granted the State's petition for certiorari review to determine whether the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with this Court's holding in Evans v. State, 794 So. 2d 411 (Ala.2000). We reverse and remand.
The record includes the following relevant portion of the voir dire examination of prospective juror K.K.:
The State challenged K.K. for cause, and the trial judge granted the challenge over the objection of defense counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that "because there was no evidence of an absolute bias on the part of veniremember K.K. that would have disqualified her from serving on the jury, the trial court erroneously granted the State's challenge for cause." 828 So. 2d  at 340. The State, relying on Rule 45, Ala. R.App. P., and Evans v. State, argues that even if K.K.'s removal for cause was error, it was harmless error and therefore does not require a reversal.
We first consider whether the trial court erred in granting the State's challenge of K.K. for cause. Section 12-16-150, Ala.Code 1975, reads in pertinent part:
The Court of Criminal Appeals correctly stated the relevant test to be applied in qualifying a prospective juror in Minshew v. State, 542 So. 2d 307, 309 (Ala. Crim.App.1988):
"`The test to be applied [in qualifying a prospective juror] is probable prejudice. Probable prejudice for any reason disqualifies a prospective juror. Qualification of a juror is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and, on appeal, this court will look to the questions propounded and the answers given by the prospective juror to see if this discretion *343 was properly exercised.' Alabama Power Co. v. Henderson, 342 So. 2d 323, 327 (Ala.1977).
"`To justify a challenge of a juror for cause there must be a statutory ground..., or some matter which imports absolute bias or favor, and leaves nothing to the discretion of the trial court.' Nettles v. State, 435 So. 2d 146, 149 (Ala.Cr. App.), affirmed, Ex parte Nettles, 435 So. 2d 151 (Ala.1983).
In holding that the trial judge erred in granting the State's challenge of K.K., the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
828 So. 2d  at 340. We agree with this reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals; the trial court erred in granting the State's challenge of K.K. for cause. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in failing to perform a harmless-error analysis before reversing the trial court's judgment.
Rule 45, Ala. R.App. P., reads:
In Evans v. State, supra, the trial court had granted the State's challenge of a veniremember for cause based upon the fact that she was married to defense counsel's uncle. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court had erred in granting the challenge and that Evans's constitutional right to a fair trial had been violated. Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Evans's convictions. This Court held that the trial court had erred in granting the State's challenge for cause, but held that the error was "harmless error" under Rule 45, Ala. R.App. P. We reasoned in Evans that the defendant's constitutional rights had not been violated:
"Evans argues that the trial court's error in excusing [veniremember] E.F.W. violated his right to a trial by an impartial jury, a right guaranteed by Amendments 6 and 14 of the United States Constitution and § 6 of the Alabama *344 Constitution. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant's federal right to an impartial jury was not automatically violated merely by an erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 87-88 [, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 101 L. Ed. 2d 80] (1988); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 [, 120 S. Ct. 774, 145 L. Ed. 2d 792] (2000). As long as the jury that heard the case was impartial, the right guaranteed by the United States Constitution was not violated. See Ross, 487 U.S.  at 87-88 [, 108 S. Ct. 2273]. This rule would also apply to § 6 of the Alabama Constitution, which gives the defendant the right to a trial `by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense was committed.' The plain meaning of this language is that the defendant is entitled only to an impartial jury and that unless the defendant can show that a trial court's erroneous ruling during jury selection prevented the jury from being impartial, there is no violation of § 6."
794 So. 2d  at 414.
Here, Dailey has made no showing that her right to an impartial jury was probably injuriously affected by the trial court's error in removing K.K. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court's error in removing K.K. was not reversible, because, even with the error, Dailey had a fair trial with an impartial jury. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, HARWOOD, and STUART, JJ., concur.