Case Title: School District v. Board of County Commissioners

Citation: 201 Kan. 434, 441 P.2d 875

Docket Number: 45,041

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1968-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
201 Kan. 434 (1968)
441 P.2d 875
SCHOOL DISTRICT No. R-6, Franklin County, Franklin, Nebraska, Appellant,
v.
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Smith County, Kansas, Appellee.
No. 45,041

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 8, 1968.
Lowell F. Hahn, of Phillipsburg, argued the cause, and Frank Hahn, also of Phillipsburg, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
W.R. Lutz, County Attorney, and T.D. Relihan, of Smith Center, were on the brief for the appellee. A.W. Relihan and Terry E. Relihan, of Smith Center, of counsel.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, J.:
This is an action by a School District in the state of Nebraska to recover money against the Board of County Commissioners of Smith County, Kansas, for the tuition of four students from Smith County who attended its high school in the school year 1964-1965.
The trial court determined the matter on a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant and appeal has been duly perfected.
*435 The primary question presented is whether there has been a sufficient compliance with K.S.A. 72-5707 (since repealed) to authorize recovery for tuition.
Briefly stated, the facts are that four students from Smith County, Kansas, attended the 1964-1965 school year in Franklin, Nebraska, pursuant to approval evidenced by certificates of registration issued in June, 1964, by the Smith County superintendent of schools. Although K.S.A. 72-5707 requires pupils desiring to attend a high school in an adjoining state to first make written application to their county superintendent, it is admitted that only oral applications were made by the students herein. The claim for tuition due the plaintiff school district was filed with Smith County in June, 1965, after the close of the school year, but payment has not been made. No levy or budget for high school out-of-state tuition was made by Smith County for the year 1965, because the high school tuition law authorizing such levy was repealed, effective May 1, 1965.
In addition to the basic facts above indicated, School District No. R-6, Franklin County, Franklin, Nebraska, (plaintiff-appellant) in its petition seeking recovery against the Board of County Commissioners, Smith County, Kansas, (defendant-appellee) alleged that by virtue of a reciprocal agreement by and between the schools of the states of Nebraska and Kansas, as authorized by the statutes of said states, the defendant was obligated to pay the plaintiff the sum of $3.00 per day on the basis of $15 per week for each day of attendance for each student authorized to attend the plaintiff's school.
The petition named the four students attending the plaintiff's school and attached an exhibit itemizing the account, alleging that a tuition claim in accordance therewith was filed with the county superintendent of schools of Smith County, Kansas, on or about the 9th day of June, 1965, and:
The petition then alleged the repeal of the high school finance and tuition law by the Laws of 1965, chapter 402, to take effect on May 1, 1965, which was after the close of the school year for which tuition herein is claimed. The petition concluded:
An answer was filed joining issues and demand was made for a jury trial.
While the record presented herein is scant, we think it sufficient to determine the appeal, particularly in view of the position taken by the respective parties.
It appears that after issues were joined, a request for admissions was filed. Thereafter the plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Affidavits were filed disclosing attendance of the students in the state of Nebraska in accordance with the facts heretofore set forth. It further appears from the record the superintendent of schools in Smith County made an affidavit fully disclosing the facts, but counsel for the defendant were instrumental in prevailing upon her to withhold her signature.
The four certificates of registration offered and received at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and pretrial conference were identical, except for the names of the students. They read:
"CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
*437 The journal entry recites:
The journal entry recites the trial court found:
The plaintiff concedes this case is governed by K.S.A. 72-5707. In pertinent part it provides:
It is readily apparent the foregoing statute requires the student or his parents to do only one act, that is, make a written application. The appellee contends failure to do so is fatal to the appellant's cause of action.
The additional provisions of the statute enjoin upon the county superintendent the duty to approve or deny the application, and if the county superintendent approves the application he must endorse his reasons and file a copy with the county treasurer of his county.
When a pupil in the state of Kansas desires to attend a high school in an adjacent county of this state, the provisions of K.S.A. 72-5706 are applicable. This statute and its predecessors, while *438 different in several respects from 72-5707, supra, have been before this court on several occasions. (Gridley Rural High-school Dist. v. Woodson County Comm'rs, 150 Kan. 704, 95 P.2d 972; Gridley High School Dist. v. Woodson County Comm'rs, 155 Kan. 407, 125 P.2d 383; and School District v. Clark County Comm'rs, 155 Kan. 636, 127 P.2d 418.)
The statute before the court in the first Gridley case (150 Kan. 704) was G.S. 1935, 72-3806, which provided in part:
In that opinion the court said the importance of filing in the home county was evident; that "The authorities of the home county, which is [are] to be charged with payment of the tuition, are entitled to know in advance what burden is thus to be imposed, in order that provision may be made to meet it." (p. 709.) There it was held the plaintiff could not recover on the ground that the evidence failed to show the requirements of the statute had been met. The briefs on file in the state library disclose the facts to be that the adjacent county district failed to return to the home district the application with the consent and approval of the adjacent district thereon.
Under 72-5707, supra, the same basic purpose is apparent  to allow the home district to know in advance what burden is to be imposed, in order that provisions may be made to meet such burden.
Here the fact that oral applications were filed with the Smith County superintendent, who then prepared the certificates of registration approving the out-of-state pupil attendance, constitutes notice to the county of the burden to be imposed upon it. Certainly it is not within the province of the children attending the high school in an adjacent county in Nebraska, or their parents, to inquire if the technical requirements of the statute have been met and followed by the officials over whom they have no control. A county should not be allowed to defeat a claim because of the lack of diligence of its own officials in following the applicable *439 statutes. The adjacent district in Nebraska was entitled to rely upon the certificates of registration from Smith County, which were presented to it by the children who were resident in Smith County. The defense that the claim of the plaintiff herein must fail simply because there was no written application is hypertechnical. In School District v. Clark County Comm'rs, supra, it was held the time prescribed by the statute within which to file approved applications with the county clerk was not mandatory but directory only, where the practical importance  that the taxing authority should know in advance what burden of tuition charges it must assume  was stressed. In the first Gridley case (150 Kan. 704) the court said:
It is to be noted sections 72-3013 and 72-3014, above referred to, require only that the student apply to the county superintendent, and not that the application be made to the home district and forwarded to the adjacent district for return by the adjacent district to the home district after approved. These sections were similar to K.S.A. 72-5707 presently before the court. Section 72-5707 requires only that the student make application to the county superintendent.
Notice to the county superintendent of the district in which the pupils reside is notice to the county where the students reside. Under the provisions of K.S.A. 72-5703 the county superintendent was obligated on or before the 25th day of July in each year to certify to the county commissioners, the county clerk and the county treasurer the total amount of money all the high schools entitled to participate under the provisions of the act were entitled to receive from such county, plus the total amount necessary to pay the tuition for students residing in that part of the county subject to the tax authorized by the act who attended high schools in adjoining counties or states.
It has been held when the interpretation of a statute, not penal in nature, according to the exact and literal import of its words would contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its enactment, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of the law. *440 (Clark v. Murray, 141 Kan. 533, 41 P.2d 1042; Higgins v. Cardinal Manufacturing Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456; Wolf v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association, 188 Kan. 694, 366 P.2d 219; and Barten v. Turkey Creek Watershed Joint District No. 32, 200 Kan. 489, 501, 438 P.2d 732.)
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, that the purpose or intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute, even though words, phrases or clauses at some place in the statute must be omitted or inserted. (Hunziker v. School District, 153 Kan. 102, 109 P.2d 115; Wolf v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association, supra; and Willmeth v. Harris, 195 Kan. 322, 326, 403 P.2d 973.)
If an adjacent school district, on the facts in the instant case, felt uncertain concerning the payment of tuition for students attending from an adjoining district where they were resident, the school district would probably decide not to accept such students in the future. Neither the county of the pupils' residence nor the school district refusing to accept the students would be penalized, but the students surely would be. Certainly this was not the intent of the legislature.
In the instant case each of the students was instructed by a statement on his certificate of registration issued by the Smith County superintendent of schools to "present this certificate to receiving school." Once this was done, the receiving school should be entitled to rely upon the fact that all necessary requirements had been met in Smith County, and that the tuition claim would be paid when presented in June after the close of the school year. It would be unconscionable to permit a county to defeat its just obligation to pay the tuition of students attending school in an adjacent district on the ground that its own officials did not properly perform their duties.
We hold the provision in 72-5707, supra, that "written application" be made by the pupil to the county superintendent to attend high school in an adjacent district in another state, is not a mandatory requirement but directory only. Oral application on the facts in this case was sufficient.
The appellee contends no provision was made in the budget for the payment of the tuition in question, nor was any levy ever made for the raising of funds for such purpose. It is said the general finding *441 of the trial court for the appellee constituted a determination by the court that the county had no right to pay the alleged claim of the appellant under the cash-basis and budget laws. (Citing, Gridley High School Dist. v. Woodson County Comm'rs, 155 Kan. 407, 125 P.2d 383.)
The appellee urged upon the trial court that no money had been budgeted by the county to pay this item.
The procedure in this matter is governed by the high school finance and tuition act. (K.S.A. 72-5701, et seq., subsequently repealed by the Laws of 1965, chapter 402.)
An examination of the sections of this act will reveal that the county superintendent was charged with the duty to prepare a tuition budget for students who attended (K.S.A. 72-5703, and see, K.S.A. 72-5707)  not those who might attend  school in the preceding year, and to certify the budget to the county clerk, county treasurer and county commissioners who are obligated to make a levy to pay it. Here the claim was filed on the 9th day of June, 1965, and the county budgets are prepared in August. Therefore, the county treasurer should have paid the high school on January 20, 1966. (K.S.A. 72-5705 [a].) The fact that the appellee has not done so does not relieve it of the duty to reimburse the appellant.
In this connection see K.S.A. 19-108 which authorizes county commissioners to levy and collect a tax sufficient to pay a judgment rendered against the Board of County Commissioners in an action prosecuted against it.
On the facts in the instant case, the repeal of the statute authorizing the payment of tuition claims, after such tuition has been earned, does not relieve the appellee from the payment of such tuition claims created and incurred while the statute was in force. Under K.S.A. 77-201, First, the repeal of a statute does not affect any right which accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, nor any proceeding commenced, under or by virtue of the statute repealed.
Under the foregoing statute the right of the appellant to recover tuition, which it acquired under and by virtue of K.S.A. 72-5707, is valid. (Tivis v. Hulsey, 146 Kan. 851, 73 P.2d 1111.)
If Gridley High School Dist. v. Woodson County Comm'rs, 155 Kan. 407, 125 P.2d 383, on the facts there confronting the court, be construed inconsistent with our decision herein, it is disapproved.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed with directions to enter judgment for the appellant.