Case Title: Conway v. Gorczyk

Citation: 171 Vt. 374, 765 A.2d 463

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Conway v. Gorczyk (99-553); 171 Vt. 374; 765 A.2d 463 

[Filed 29-Sep-2000]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 20-Nov-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-553

Charles Conway	                                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Franklin Superior Court

John Gorczyk, Commissioner, 
Department of Corrections	                 May Term, 2000

Edward J. Cashman, J.

Charles Conway, Pro Se, Swanton, Plaintiff-Appellant.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, and David R. Groff, Assistant 
  Attorney General, Waterbury, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Dimotsis, D.J., 
          Specially Assigned

       SKOGLUND, J.   Vermont inmates serving terms of imprisonment may earn
  reductions in  their minimum and maximum terms by participating in
  treatment, educational or vocational training  programs offered by the
  Department of Corrections (DOC).  See 28 V.S.A. § 811(b). (FN1)  
  Petitioner Charles Conway was terminated from participation in the DOC's
  Cognitive Self Change  program.  The questions presented in this case are
  whether an inmate has a liberty interest in  participating in 

 

  rehabilitative programs that may result in sentence reduction, and if so,
  what procedural due process  must be afforded before decisions can be made
  that implicate the inmate's interest.  We affirm the  Franklin Superior
  Court's decision holding that no liberty interest is implicated.

       In 1997, petitioner Charles Conway began serving a three-to-five-year
  sentence at Northwest  State Correctional Facility for a conviction of
  lewd-and-lascivious behavior with a child.  That year,  he began
  participating in the correctional facility's Cognitive Self Change program. 
  As a participant  in the program, petitioner had the opportunity to earn up
  to ten days of discretionary good-time credit  per month.  See 28 V.S.A. §
  811(b) (inmate who participates in program may earn up to ten days 
  good-time credit per month) (emphasis added).  This was in addition to the
  five days of good-time  credit per month mandated by § 811(a).  See id. §
  811(a) (inmate shall earn five days good-time  credit "for each month
  during which the inmate has faithfully observed all the rules and
  regulations  of the institution") (emphasis added).  In 1998, three inmates
  alleged that petitioner had engaged in  sexual behavior and made
  inappropriate sexual comments to them.  Petitioner was notified of the 
  charges against him and was given an opportunity to address the allegations
  before the program's  treatment team.  The team determined that petitioner
  should be removed from the program for a  minimum of thirty days and
  provided petitioner with an assignment to complete prior to readmission 
  into the program.  Petitioner filed a V.R.C.P. 75 (Review of Governmental
  Action) claim in Franklin  Superior Court, seeking reinstatement into the
  program.  Petitioner alleged that he had a liberty  interest in the program
  because it afforded him the opportunity to earn good-time credits, and thus
  he  was entitled to procedural due process prior to being removed from the
  program.  Petitioner 

 

  argued that the hearing afforded by the team did not satisfy procedural due
  process  requirements, (FN2) and therefore his removal from the program
  violated his constitutional  rights. (FN3)  The court denied petitioner's
  motion for summary judgment and granted the motion  for summary judgment
  filed on behalf of DOC Commissioner John Gorczyk.  Petitioner appeals  from
  that decision.  We affirm.

       Courts "examine procedural due process questions in two steps:  the
  first asks whether there  exists a liberty or property interest which has
  been interfered with by the State; the second examines  whether the
  procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally
  sufficient."  Kentucky  Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson,