Case Title: THE STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., ROBERT ERNEST BUNN, and COUNTY TITLE AGENCY, INC., a Wyoming corporation V. JULIE FREESE, in her official capacity as County Clerk for the County of Fremont, State of Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-28

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., ROBERT ERNEST BUNN, and COUNTY TITLE AGENCY, INC., a Wyoming corporation V. JULIE FREESE, in her official capacity as County Clerk for the County of Fremont, State of Wyoming2005 WY 100117 P.3d 1253Case Number: 05-28Decided: 08/23/2005

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 

THE 
STATE OFWYOMING, ex rel.,)

ROBERT 
ERNEST BUNN, and COUNTY

TITLE 
AGENCY, INC., a Wyoming corporation,

Appellants

(Petitioners),

 
 
v.

 
 

JULIE 
FREESE, in her official capacity as County

Clerk 
for the County of Fremont, State of Wyoming,

Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy Guthrie, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Edward 
G. Luhm of Scott, Selledy and Luhm, P.C., Worland, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

James 
Whiting, Deputy Fremont County Attorney, Lander, Wyoming

 
 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, the 
State of Wyoming ex. rel. Robert Ernest Bunn and County 
Title Agency, Inc. (Bunn), seeks review of an order of the district court that 
denied Bunn's Petition for Writ of Mandamus.  Bunn asked the district court to order 
Appellee, Julie Freese, CountyClerk of FremontCounty (Clerk), to file a document which she observed 
to be a document not eligible for recording under the governing Wyoming statute.  The district court declined to issue the 
writ.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      Bunn raises this 
single issue:

            
Whether a county clerk [may] refuse to record a previously recorded 
document to which has been added additional language?

The 
Clerk styles the issue thus:

            
Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to order the 
county clerk to record an altered document?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

 
 
[¶3]      Bunn is the 
President and Chief Executive Officer of County Title Agency, Inc. The purpose 
of that business is to act as an agent for title insurance companies and to 
assist in real estate closings, title searches, and other business transactions 
involving real property.  On May 5, 
2004, Bunn presented a document for recording and the Clerk did record it.  That document looked about like 
this:

 
 

AGREEMENT 
WITH PRIOR LIENHOLDER

UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Form RD 
1927-8                   
            
FORM APPROVED

(Rev. 
1-02)                                         
OMB NO. 0575-0147

Position 
5

WHEREAS 
               First 
Interstate Bank (called the "Mortgagees") is the holder of a certain  Mortgage   (called the "Security Instrument") 
recorded in Book No. ___________________ Page _____________, Of the 
______________________________ Records of Fremont   County;

 
 
On May 
6, 2004, Bunn offered the same document for recording, with the document number 
added.  The Clerk would not record 
it.  It looked about like 
this:

 
 

***  RERECORDED TO ADD DOCUMENT 
NUMBER

AGREEMENT 
WITH PRIOR LIENHOLDER

UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Form RD 
1927-8                               
FORM APPROVED

(Rev. 
1-02)                                         
OMB NO. 0575-0147

Position 
5

WHEREAS 
               First 
Interstate Bank (called the "Mortgagees") is the holder of a certain  Mortgage   (called the "Security Instrument") 
recorded in Book No. ___________________ Page _____________, Of the Document 
No. 12563B   Records of 
Fremont   County;

 
 
[¶4]      On May 20, 2004, 
the Clerk returned the second document to Bunn with a notation that "We cannot 
re-record the same document see attached letter."  The attached letter, with a date of 
March 5, 2004, contained this information:

 
 

TO:      All lending 
institutions, attorneys, title companies

FROM:  Julie 
A Freese, CountyClerk

RE:      Recording of 
Corrective Documents

December 
3, 2002, I issued a memorandum regarding a change in how our office would handle 
the recording of corrective documents.  
Following a work session with the county attorney's office and the county 
assessor's office, we determined that in order to correct any recorded document, 
the county clerk's office will need to have the following:

            
1)  A new document with the word "corrected" in the title of 
the document.  (i.e., Corrected 
Warranty Deed)

            
2)  A clear message of the correction.  (i.e., recording to correct legal 
description.  A reference to 
previous recording information would also make the record more 
clear).

            
3)  Original, notarized signatures of the grantors.

The 
basis for this determination is W.S. 34-1-119 "Only instruments which are 
originally signed documents or properly certified or authenticated copies 
thereof may be properly recorded."  
The county clerk office's acceptance of corrective deeds as we have 
recorded in the past, without proper execution, may not be sufficient to meet 
the requirements of state law to transfer the ownership of property.

Effective 
immediately, the county clerk's office will reject any document without 
original, notarized signatures.

 
 
[¶5]      After conducting 
a hearing on November 15, 2004, the district court issued an order on December 
28, 2004, wherein it concluded:  
"The document with the language ***RE-RECORDED TO ADD DOCUMENT NUMBER' 
and Document No. 1252638' is not 
an original signed document, properly certified or authenticated copy thereof 
pursuant to W.S. § 34-1-119, and therefore should not be 
recorded."

 
 
[¶6]      On January 7, 
2005, Bunn filed a notice of appeal in the district court seeking this Court's 
review of the district court's order.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Bunn contends 
that the district court misconstrued Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-119 (LexisNexis 
2005).  It 
provides:

 
 

§ 
34-1-119. Duties of county clerk generally.

            
The county clerk of each county within this state shall receive and 
record at length all deeds, mortgages, conveyances, patents, certificates and 
instruments left with him for that purpose, and he shall endorse on every such 
instrument the day and hour on which it was filed for record.  The county clerk shall not record any 
document until the address of the grantee, mortgagee or assignee of the 
mortgagee is furnished to the county clerk, but this requirement shall not 
affect the validity of the recording of any instrument.  Only instruments which are the 
originally signed documents or properly certified or authenticated copies 
thereof may be properly recorded.  A 
document is properly certified if in compliance with Rule 9021 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence 
or other applicable rule or statute.  
[Emphasis and footnote added.]

 
 
[¶8]      Bunn asserts that 
the central issue in his appeal is the construction of this statute.  Of course, our usual standard of review 
applies to such a process.  See In re Loberg, 2004 WY 48, ¶5, 88 P.3d 1045, ¶5 
(Wyo. 2004).2  In addition, we note that the office of 
the writ of mandamus is well defined by statute and usage.  "Mandamus is a writ issued in the name 
of the state to an inferior tribunal, a corporation, board or person commanding 
the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting 
from an office, trust or station."  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-30-101 -118 (LexisNexis 2005); also see 
In the Matter of the Board of County Commissioner, Sublette County, 2001 WY 91, ¶¶10-11, 33 P.3d 107, ¶¶10-11 (Wyo. 2001); 
and see generally State ex rel. Blonder 
v. Goodbrod, 77 Wyo. 126, 307 P.2d 1073, 1077-78 
(1957).

 
 
[¶9]      The essence of 
Bunn's contention is that the Clerk has a duty to file a document such as that 
he offered which "the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an 
office."  For this proposition he 
relies on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-402(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2005).  That subsection provides that a county 
clerk shall:

 
 

(vi) 
Have custody and keep all books, records, deeds, maps, papers and copies thereof 
deposited or kept in his office as required by law.  All deeds, mortgages, and other 
instruments in writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed in his office 
and left in his office shall be:

                        
(A) Recorded in distinct handwriting or by typing, photostating, 
photographing, printing or other reproduction, either in whole or in part, in 
suitable books;  or

                        
(B) Recorded on microfilm, microcards or other permanent record retention 
medium.  All reproduction processes 
shall be instituted and used pursuant to W.S. 9-2-413.  Maps may either be recorded as herein 
provided or if the copying is unlikely to provide a satisfactory record, the 
county clerk may keep the originals or tracings thereof, undamaged and unfolded 
and make prints available for public use.

 
 
[¶10]   Furthermore, Bunn contends that 
both the Clerk and the district court have misconstrued Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34-1-119.  He contends that a 
reading of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-1-113, 34-1-114, 34-1-115, 34-1-116, and 
34-1-126, give a meaning to the phrase "originally signed document" that belies 
the position taken by the Clerk.  We 
simply cannot agree.  Even if we 
were to rely only on dictionary definitions, we could not agree with Bunn's 
position.  "Originally," means: "adv 1 archaic  : by origin or derivation : from the first : inherently  2 : in the beginning : in the first 
place :  initially, primarily."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1592 (1986).  We conclude 
that the word "originally," as used in the phrase "originally signed document" 
takes its meaning from the word original as it is used in W.R.E. 1001(3):  "(3) Original.  An "original" of a writing 
or recording is the writing or recording itself or any counterpart intended to 
have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it."  Thus, we hold that the district court 
did not err as a matter of law in denying the writ of mandamus.  We further note that if we accepted 
Bunn's argument at face value, then it would open the door to the filing of mere 
"copies" of documents not intended to be eligible for "recording" under the 
recording statutes.  Finally, we 
note that Bunn's argument was not supported by pertinent authority nor was he 
able to articulate the manner in which he was harmed or damaged by the Clerk's 
action/inaction.  It appears that he 
can readily obtain an authenticated or certified copy of the document at issue 
and, after fully complying with the Clerk's March 5, 2004 letter, record 
it.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶11]   The district court's order denying 
the writ of mandamus is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

   1Rule 902. 
Self-authentication.

            
(a) Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to 
admissibility is not required with respect to the 
following:

(1) Domestic Public Documents Under Seal. -- 
A document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States, or of any 
state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or the 
Panama Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a 
political subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof, or an Indian 
tribe recognized by the United States, and a signature purporting to be an 
attestation or execution;

(2) Domestic Public Documents Not Under 
Seal. -- A document purporting to bear the signature in his official 
capacity of an officer or employee of any entity included in paragraph (1) 
hereof, having no seal, if a public officer having a seal and having official 
duties in the district or political subdivision of the officer or employee 
certifies under seal that the signer has the official capacity and that the 
signature is genuine.

(3) Foreign Public Documents. -- A document 
purporting to be executed or attested in his official capacity by a person 
authorized by the laws of a foreign country to make the execution or 
attestation, and accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of 
the signature and official position (A) of the executing or attesting person, or 
(B) of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and 
official position relates to the execution or attestation or is in a chain of 
certificates of genuineness of signature and official position relating to the 
execution or attestation.  A final 
certification may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, 
consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular 
official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the 
United 
States.  
If reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate 
the authenticity and accuracy of official documents, the court may, for good 
cause shown, order that they be treated as presumptively authentic without final 
certification or permit them to be evidenced by an attested summary with or 
without final certification.

(4) Certified Copies of Public Records. -- A 
copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a document 
authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a 
public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as correct by 
the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by 
certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying 
with any Act of Congress or rule prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to 
statutory authority.

(5) Official Publications. -- Books, 
pamphlets, or other publications purporting to be issued by public 
authority.

(6) Newspapers and Periodicals. -- Printed 
materials purporting to be newspapers or 
periodicals.

(7) Trade Inscriptions and the Like. -- 
Inscriptions, signs, tags, or labels purporting to have been affixed in the 
course of business and indicating ownership, control, or 
origin.

(8) Acknowledged Documents. -- Documents 
accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided 
by law by a notary public or other officer authorized by law to take 
acknowledgments.

(9) Commercial Paper and Related Documents. 
-- Commercial paper, signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto to the 
extent provided by general commercial law.

(10) Presumptions Under Acts of Congress or 
Statutes of Wyoming. -- Any signature, document, or 
other matter declared by Act of Congress or statutes of Wyoming to be 
presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic.

            
(b) Lack of Record. -- A 
written statement that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified 
tenor is found to exist in the records designated by the statement, 
authenticated as provided in subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this rule in the 
case of a domestic record, or complying with the requirements of subdivision 
(a)(3) of this rule for a summary in the case of a foreign record, is admissible 
as evidence that the records contain no such record or 
entry.

            
(c) Other Proof. -- This rule 
does not prevent the proof of official records or of entry or lack of entry 
therein by any other method authorized by law.

            
(d) Seal Dispensed With. -- In 
the event any office or officer, authenticating any documents under the 
provisions of this rule, has no official seal, and so certifies, then 
authentication by seal is dispensed with.

 
 

2                                   
Our standard of review with respect to the construction of statutes is 
well known.  In interpreting 
statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the legislature's 
intent.  All statutes must be 
construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all 
statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose must be 
considered and construed in harmony.  
Statutory construction is a question of law, so our standard of review is 
de novo.  We endeavor to interpret 
statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent.  We begin by making an inquiry respecting 
the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.  We 
construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia.   When a statute is sufficiently 
clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
words and do not resort to the rules of statutory construction.  Wyoming Board of Outfitters and Professional 
Guides v. Clark, 2001 WY 78, ¶12, 30 P.3d 36, ¶12 (Wyo.2001); Murphy v. State Canvassing Board, 12 P.3d 677, 679 (Wyo.2000).  Moreover, 
we must not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is 
susceptible of another interpretation.  
Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 413 (Wyo.1990) (citing  McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1283 
(Wyo.1980)).

Moreover, we will not enlarge, stretch, 
expand, or extend a statute to matters that do not fall within its express 
provisions.  Gray v. Stratton Real Estate, 2001 WY 125, ¶5, 36 P.3d 1127, ¶5 (Wyo.2001);  Bowen v. State, Wyoming Real Estate 
Commission, 900 P.2d 1140, 1143 
(Wyo.1995).

 
 
Board of County 
Commissioners of Teton County v. Crow, 2003 WY 40, ¶¶40-41, 65 P.3d 720, 
¶¶40-41 (Wyo.2003) (some internal citations omitted).