Case Title: North Highland Inc. v. Jefferson Machine & Tool Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP000643

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 75 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP643 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
North Highland Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jefferson Machine & Tool Inc. and Steven M. 
Homann, 
          Defendants, 
Frederick A. Wells, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 369 Wis. 2d 223, 880 N.W.2d 182 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 17, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
William F. Hue 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J. dissents (opinion filed). 
R.G. BRADLEY J. dissents, joined by KELLY, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there was a brief 
by Kyle B. Hanson and Hanson Law Group, LLP, Barrington, and 
oral argument by Kyle B. Hanson. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Bruce A. 
Schultz, Vincent J. Scipior, and Coyne, Schultz, Becker & Bauer, 
S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Bruce A. Schultz. 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 75
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2015AP643 
(L.C. No. 
2012CV125) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
North Highland Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jefferson Machine & Tool Inc. and Steven M. 
Homann, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Frederick A. Wells, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Petitioner, North Highland, 
Inc., seeks review of an unpublished per curiam opinion of the 
court of appeals affirming a circuit court grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Frederick A. Wells ("Wells").1  The court of 
                                                 
1 N. Highland Inc. v. Jefferson Mach. & Tool Inc., No. 
2015AP643, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2016) 
(affirming judgment and order entered by the circuit court for 
Jefferson County, William F. Hue, J., presiding). 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP643 
 
2 
 
appeals determined that the circuit court properly entered 
summary judgment in favor of Wells.  It concluded that North 
Highland failed to present evidence sufficient to support either 
its claim of conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty or its claim 
of misappropriation of a trade secret.  N. Highland Inc. v. 
Jefferson Mach. & Tool Inc., No. 2015AP643, unpublished slip 
op., ¶¶11, 26 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2016). 
¶2 
North Highland contends that the court of appeals 
erred and that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor.  
It alleges that Wells conspired to breach a fiduciary duty that 
Dwain Trewyn ("Trewyn"), a former North Highland employee, owed 
to the company.  North Highland further contends that Wells 
misappropriated a trade secret in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 134.90 (2013-14) (Uniform trade secrets act).2 
¶3 
In this review of a grant of summary judgment, we 
examine the conspiracy and misappropriation claims through the 
lens of sufficiency of evidence.  We determine that North 
Highland has not met its burden to show that there exists a 
genuine 
issue 
of 
material 
fact 
as 
to 
either 
claim.  
Consequently, due to insufficiency of evidence, both of North 
                                                                                                                                                             
Because the court of appeals opinion is an unpublished per 
curium, it provides neither precedential nor persuasive value.  
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.23(3)(b). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2015AP643 
 
3 
 
Highland's claims fail to survive Well's summary judgment 
motion.3 
¶4 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Frederick Wells.4 
                                                 
3 In its petition for review, North Highland framed the 
issues as a question of whether it could maintain suit against 
Wells for any of the following:  (a) conspiracy with Trewyn to 
violate Trewyn's breach of fiduciary duties to North Highland, 
(b) aiding and abetting Trewyn's breach of fiduciary duties to 
North Highland, (c) interference with Trewyn's contractual or 
fiduciary obligations to North Highland, or (d) for interference 
with North Highland's prospective contract with another person.  
In its brief, it asserts that the circuit court incorrectly 
dismissed these claims on the basis of claim preclusion. 
We observe, as did the court of appeals, that the 
evidentiary record in this case is incomplete.  North Highland 
asks this court to reverse the circuit court's decision 
dismissing its claims against Wells, yet the hearing transcripts 
setting forth the circuit court's oral ruling are not in the 
record before us.  Additionally, the only claim set forth above 
that North Highland has briefed or argued before this court is 
its conspiracy claim against Wells.  Without evidence or 
argument, we do not address the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment on the aiding and abetting or interference claims. 
4 Although we affirm the court of appeals determination that 
North Highland's claim for misappropriation of a trade secret 
fails for lack of evidence, we do so with a different focus on 
the inquiry.  The court of appeals focused on whether there was 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a bid amount constitutes 
a trade secret.  See N. Highland Inc. v. Jefferson Mach. & Tool 
Inc., No. 2015AP643, ¶¶25 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2016) 
(determining that North Highland "fails to explain to this court 
why its bid amount constitutes 'information' as that term is 
used in Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1)(c).).    
(continued) 
No.  2015AP643 
 
4 
 
I 
 
¶5 
This review originates from a lawsuit North Highland 
brought against Frederick Wells, Dwain Trewyn, Bay Plastics, 
Inc., and Jefferson Machine & Tool Inc. ("Jefferson Machine"). 
¶6 
Wells is the owner of Bay Plastics, a distributer of 
customized plastic parts that it purchased from vendors.  One of 
its vendors was North Highland, a small manufacturing company.  
Trewyn was an employee of North Highland with job duties that 
included submitting quotes and obtaining business for the 
company.5 
¶7 
When Wells decided that he wanted to form a company to 
manufacture the parts Bay Plastics sold, he asked Trewyn to be 
his partner in the new business.  While Trewyn was still 
employed at North Highland, he and Wells formed their new 
                                                                                                                                                             
In contrast, the focus of our inquiry addresses whether 
there is sufficient evidence to show misappropriation.  Because 
our determination that there is insufficient evidence to show 
misappropriation is dispositive, we need not further address the 
court of appeals' per curium disposition of this claim. 
Likewise, 
because 
our 
determination 
that 
there 
is 
insufficient evidence to support a claim for conspiracy to 
breach a fiduciary duty is dispositive, we need not reach North 
Highland's argument that the circuit court erred in determining 
that its civil conspiracy claim is barred under the doctrine of 
claim preclusion. 
5 As set forth more fully below, Trewyn filed a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petition, which ultimately led to a settlement 
agreement dismissing North Highland's claims against Trewyn with 
prejudice.  See infra ¶17. 
No.  2015AP643 
 
5 
 
manufacturing company, Jefferson Machine.6  Wells owned 75 
percent of Jefferson Machine and Trewyn owned 25 percent. 
¶8 
The underlying dispute arose when both North Highland 
and 
Jefferson 
Machine 
submitted 
confidential 
bids 
on 
a 
manufacturing project for Tyson Foods Inc. ("Tyson").7  North 
Highland alleges that while Trewyn was still its employee, he 
formulated confidential bids for both North Highland and 
Jefferson Machine, the company he co-owned with Wells. 
¶9 
Jefferson Machine was awarded the Tyson project, but 
its contract was cancelled after North Highland threatened to 
seek an injunction, blocking the performance of the contract.  
Ultimately, neither Jefferson Machine nor North Highland was 
awarded the Tyson contract. 
¶10 North Highland subsequently filed a lawsuit against 
Trewyn, Jefferson Machine, Wells, and Bay Plastics.  In its 
amended complaint, North Highland alleged that:  (1) the 
defendants misappropriated trade secrets; (2) Trewyn breached 
his fiduciary duties to North Highland and that the other 
defendants conspired with Trewyn in the breach of those duties; 
(3) Trewyn breached his contract with North Highland; and (4) 
the defendants interfered with Trewyn's contract with North 
Highland. 
                                                 
6 Trewyn did not have a non-compete agreement with North 
Highland. 
7 The Tyson project was for the manufacture of 3,000 
stainless steel trolley assemblies for use in food production. 
No.  2015AP643 
 
6 
 
¶11 The 
affidavits 
on 
file 
demonstrate 
that 
during 
litigation, both Wells and Trewyn repeatedly testified at their 
depositions that Wells had no knowledge that Trewyn was bidding 
on behalf of North Highland.  For example, Wells testified: 
Q:  Did you know that [Trewyn] was doing bidding on 
behalf of North Highland to some customers—— 
A:  No. 
Q:  ——from September to December of 2011? 
A:  No. 
¶12 Wells also repeatedly testified that he had no 
knowledge that Trewyn was bidding specifically on the Tyson 
project for North Highland.  For example, he testified: 
Q:  Did you know that [Trewyn] submitted a bid for 
trolleys to Tyson? 
A:  No, I did not. 
Q:  Did you know that [Trewyn] submitted any other 
bids to Tyson for trolleys? 
A:  Any other bids? 
Q:  On North Highland's behalf. 
A:  No. 
¶13 Trewyn similarly testified that Wells had no knowledge 
Trewyn was bidding on the Tyson project for North Highland: 
Q:  And [Wells] knew about your work with Tyson, for 
example? 
A:  I didn't discuss Tyson stuff with him, no. 
 . . .  
Q:  Did you tell [Wells] that you had submitted the 
bid [for North Highland] in Exhibit 1? 
No.  2015AP643 
 
7 
 
A:  No. 
Q:  Why not? 
A:  Because there was really no reason to discuss that 
with him. 
 . . .  
Q:  Is there any reason why you didn't mention your 
work on the trolleys at North Highland to [Wells]? 
A:  There was no reason to. 
Q:  You didn't think it was important? 
A:  No. 
¶14 In addition, Wells repeatedly denied that he formed 
Jefferson Machine to compete against North Highland: 
Q:  Did you understand that Jefferson Machine & Tool 
was a competing business of North Highland? 
A:  No, no, not necessarily. 
 . . .  
Q:  But you knew when you started Jefferson Machine & 
Tool that it would be a competing business to North 
Highland? 
A:  I did not know that, no.8 
¶15 Wells further testified that he left the bidding at 
Jefferson Machine up to Trewyn: 
Q:  When [Trewyn] was doing bids for you at Jefferson 
Machine & Tool, did you leave quoting entirely up to 
him? 
A:  Yes. 
                                                 
8 As set forth above, Wells asserts that he formed Jefferson 
Machine in order to manufacture the parts that Bay Plastics 
sold.  See supra ¶7. 
No.  2015AP643 
 
8 
 
Q:  And you didn't have any oversight over his 
bidding, right? 
A:  No. 
Q:  Did you ever ask him about how he formulated bids? 
A:  No, I did not. 
Q:  So you just left quoting at Jefferson Machine & 
Tool up to [Trewyn]? 
A:  Yes. 
¶16 The circuit court granted in part and denied in part 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment.  Pursuant to the 
circuit court order, Bay Plastics was dismissed as a party from 
the lawsuit and the trade secret and contract claims were 
dismissed with prejudice.  The breach of fiduciary duty and 
conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty claims remained. 
¶17 Two days before trial on the fiduciary duty claims, 
Trewyn filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.  In response, 
North Highland filed an adversary claim against Trewyn arguing 
that its state law claims were non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.  
Ultimately, North Highland and Trewyn entered into a settlement 
agreement that dismissed North Highland's claims against Trewyn 
with prejudice.  The settlement allowed North Highland to 
maintain its state law claims against Wells and Jefferson 
Machine. 
¶18 Wells moved to dismiss the remaining claims against 
both him and Jefferson Machine, arguing that a litigant may not 
maintain a derivative conspiracy claim when it has settled and 
dismissed all claims against the actual tortfeasor.  The circuit 
No.  2015AP643 
 
9 
 
court granted Wells' motion to dismiss.  North Highland appealed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision, 
naming 
Wells 
as 
the 
only 
respondent.9 
¶19 The court of appeals issued a per curium opinion 
affirming the circuit court order.  It determined that the 
circuit court properly entered summary judgment in favor of 
Wells because North Highland failed to set forth any facts 
establishing 
there 
was 
a 
conspiracy. 
 
N. 
Highland, 
No. 
2015AP643, 
unpublished 
slip 
op., 
¶¶16-17. 
 
Likewise, 
it 
determined that North Highland did not meet its burden of 
establishing that the amount of its bid for the Tyson project 
constituted a trade secret.  Id., ¶26. 
II 
¶20 In this case we are asked to review the court of 
appeals' decision affirming the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Wells.  We review a decision granting 
summary judgment independently of the determinations rendered by 
the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Lambrecht v. Estate 
of 
Kaczmarczyk, 
2001 
WI 
25, 
¶21, 
241 
Wis. 2d 804, 
623 
N.W.2d 751. 
¶21 On review, we apply the same two-step analysis the 
circuit court applies pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  It 
provides that the "judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
                                                 
9 Given that the claims against Jefferson Machine were 
dismissed and not raised on appeal, we are not reviewing any 
claims that may apply to Jefferson Machine. 
No.  2015AP643 
 
10 
 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  We examine the record in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party.  Lambrecht, 241 Wis. 2d 804, 
¶3 (citation omitted). 
¶22 "The mere allegation of a factual dispute will not 
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary 
judgment."  Helland v. Kurtis A. Froedert Mem'l Lutheran Hosp., 
229 Wis. 2d 751, 756, 601 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1999).  A party 
opposing a motion for summary judgment must demonstrate that 
there exists a genuine issue of material fact.  Id.  "It is not 
enough 
to 
rely 
upon 
unsubstantiated 
conclusory 
remarks, 
speculation, or testimony that is not based upon personal 
knowledge."  Id. (citation omitted).10 
                                                 
10  The reliance Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent places 
on Leske v. Leske, 197 Wis. 2d 92, 97-98, 539 N.W.2d 719 
(Ct. App. 1995), is misguided.  Leske is distinguishable 
from the facts of this case because the moving party 
apparently submitted no material in support of its motion 
beyond a statement that the plaintiff lacked evidence. 
The dissent further misreads Leske, stating that "[if] a 
movant's submissions do not establish by undisputed facts 
that the nonmoving party has no claim or defense, the 
movant has failed to meet its burden.  Roggensack, C.J., 
dissent, ¶94 (citing Leske, 197 Wis. 2d at 96-97).  Quite 
the contrary, Leske instructs that "the moving party need 
not support its motion with affidavits that specifically 
negate the opponent's claim."  197 Wis. 2d at 97 (quotation 
and citations omitted). 
No.  2015AP643 
 
11 
 
¶23 Finally, a claim for conspiracy to breach a fiduciary 
duty requires a more stringent test than whether a reasonable 
inference may be drawn from the facts.  Maleki v. Fine-Lando 
Clinic Chartered, S.C., 162 Wis. 2d 73, 84, 469 N.W.2d 629 
(1991).  To prove a conspiracy, a plaintiff "must show more than 
a mere suspicion or conjecture that there was a conspiracy or 
that there was evidence of the elements of a conspiracy."  Id.  
In order to sustain a jury verdict of conspiracy, there "must be 
a quantum of evidence that the trial judge can conclude leads to 
a reasonable inference of conspiracy."  Id. at 85.  If 
circumstantial evidence supports equal inferences of lawful or 
unlawful action, then the conspiracy is not proven and the case 
should not be submitted to the jury.  Id. 
III 
 
¶24 We address first North Highland's claim that Wells and 
Trewyn conspired to breach a fiduciary duty that Trewyn owed to 
North Highland. 
 
¶25 Civil conspiracy involves "a combination of two or 
more persons by some concerted action to accomplish some 
unlawful purpose or to accomplish by unlawful means some purpose 
not in itself unlawful."  City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 
2005 WI App 7, ¶25, 278 Wis. 2d 313, 691 N.W.2d 888 (citation 
omitted).  A civil conspiracy claim has three elements:  (1) the 
formation and operation of a conspiracy; (2) a wrongful act or 
acts done pursuant to the conspiracy; and (3) damage resulting 
No.  2015AP643 
 
12 
 
from the act or acts.  Onderdonk v. Lamb, 79 Wis. 2d 241, 247, 
255 N.W.2d 507 (1977).11 
¶26 North Highland, therefore, has the burden to "set 
forth specific evidentiary facts that are admissible in evidence 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" of such overt 
acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.  Buckett v. Jante, 
2009 WI App 55, ¶29, 316 Wis. 2d 804, 767 N.W.2d 376 (citations 
omitted).  To survive summary judgment, "there must be facts 
that show some agreement, explicit or otherwise, between the 
alleged 
conspirators 
on 
the 
common 
end 
sought 
and 
some 
cooperation toward the attainment of that end."  Augustine v. 
Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith, 75 Wis. 2d 207, 216, 249 
N.W.2d 547 (1977). 
¶27 Additionally, "[t]o prove a conspiracy, a plaintiff 
must show more than a mere suspicion or conjecture that there 
was a conspiracy or there was evidence of the elements of a 
conspiracy."  Maleki, 162 Wis. 2d at 84.  "[I]f circumstantial 
evidence supports equal inferences of lawful action and unlawful 
action, then the claim of conspiracy is not proven."  Allen & 
                                                 
11 "[T]here is no such thing as a civil action for 
conspiracy."  Singer v. Singer, 245 Wis. 191, 195, 14 N.W.2d 43 
(1944).  Instead, there is only an action for damages caused by 
acts pursuant to a conspiracy, but none for the conspiracy 
alone.  Id.  Thus, "[i]n a civil action for damages for an 
executed conspiracy, the gist of the action is the damages."  
Id.  "It is only the existence of overt acts which is critical, 
in order that damages occur, not the actionability of overt acts 
themselves."  Radue v. Dill, 74 Wis. 2d 239, 244, 246 N.W.2d 507 
(1976). 
No.  2015AP643 
 
13 
 
O'Hara, Inc. v. Barrett Wrecking, Inc., 898 F.2d 512, 516 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (applying Wisconsin law). 
¶28 North Highland cannot sustain this burden because it 
points to no evidence that Wells was aware that Trewyn 
formulated both Jefferson Machine's and North Highland's bid on 
the Tyson project.  If Wells was not aware that Trewyn had 
allegedly breached his fiduciary duty to North Highland, Wells 
could not take overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.  
See, e.g., Bruner v. Heritage Companies, 225 Wis. 2d 728, 736, 
593 N.W.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1999) ("In short, a civil conspiracy 
entails two or more persons knowingly committing wrongful 
acts."). 
¶29 However, North Highland contends that the evidence 
submitted to the circuit court on summary judgment is sufficient 
to allow a reasonable inference that Wells conspired with 
Trewyn.  It asserts that the evidence demonstrates that there 
was a conspiracy because:  (1) Wells and Trewyn combined to form 
Jefferson Machine and compete against North Highland; (2) Wells 
purchased the manufacturing space and equipment and materials 
necessary 
for 
the 
Tyson 
project; 
(3) 
Wells 
incorporated 
Jefferson Machine; and (4) Wells told Trewyn that he should bid 
on the Tyson project. 
¶30 Based on this evidence of Wells and Trewyn's working 
relationship at Jefferson Machine, an inference may be drawn 
that Trewyn shared his knowledge of the Tyson bid with Wells.  
However, the unrebutted deposition testimony supports the 
opposite conclusion.  There is no evidence of the formation and 
No.  2015AP643 
 
14 
 
operation of a conspiracy.  In his deposition, Wells repeatedly 
denied that he formed Jefferson Machine to compete against North 
Highland: 
Q:  Did you understand that Jefferson Machine & Tool 
was a competing business of North Highland? 
A:  No, no, not necessarily. 
 . . .  
Q:  But you knew when you started Jefferson Machine & 
Tool that it would be a competing business to North 
Highland? 
A:  I did not know that, no. 
¶31 Wells also repeatedly testified that he had no 
knowledge that Trewyn was bidding specifically on the Tyson 
project for North Highland.  For example, he testified: 
Q:  Did you know that [Trewyn] submitted a bid for 
trolleys to Tyson? 
A:  No, I did not. 
Q:  Did you know that [Trewyn] submitted any other 
bids to Tyson for trolleys? 
A:  Any other bids? 
Q:  On North Highland's behalf. 
A:  No. 
¶32 As set forth more fully above, Trewyn similarly 
testified that Wells had no knowledge Trewyn was bidding on the 
Tyson project for North Highland.  He stated that he did not 
discuss his work on the Tyson project with Wells and that he did 
not tell Wells that he submitted a bid for North Highland.  When 
No.  2015AP643 
 
15 
 
asked "why not?," Trewyn responded that "there was really no 
reason to discuss it."  See supra, ¶13. 
¶33 Not only is the first element of a conspiracy not met, 
there is no evidence that Wells told Trewyn to bid on the 
Jefferson Machine project.  Indeed, Wells testified to the 
contrary during his deposition: 
Q:  When [Trewyn] was doing bids for you at Jefferson 
Machine & Tool, did you leave quoting entirely up to 
him? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  And you didn't have any oversight over his 
bidding, right? 
A:  No. 
Q:  Did you ever ask him about how he formulated bids? 
A:  No, I did not. 
Q:  So you just left quoting at Jefferson Machine & 
Tool up to [Trewyn]? 
A:  Yes. 
¶34 Without any contradictory evidence in the record, 
North's Highland's allegation that Wells and Trewyn conspired to 
breach a fiduciary duty claim is speculative at best.  However, 
speculation is insufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact on summary judgment.  Helland, 229 Wis. 2d at 756.  
Additionally, on a claim for conspiracy, a reasonable inference 
must be supported by a quantum of the evidence.  Maleki, 162 
Wis. 2d at 85. 
¶35 North Highland has produced no evidence that Wells and 
Trewyn entered into an agreement, explicit or otherwise, to 
No.  2015AP643 
 
16 
 
conspire to breach Trewyn's fiduciary duty to North Highland.  
There is no evidence that Wells knowingly intended to compete 
with North Highland for the Tyson project, let alone by improper 
means.  North Highland makes arguments aplenty in support of its 
position, but arguments are not facts. 
¶36 Accordingly, we determine that North Highland has 
failed to provide sufficient evidence to support its conspiracy 
to breach a fiduciary duty claim. 
IV 
¶37 For the same reasons that North Highland's conspiracy 
to breach a fiduciary duty claim fails, it also cannot succeed 
on its claim that Wells misappropriated a trade secret in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 134.90. 
¶38 According to North Highland, its confidential bid 
amount on the Tyson project constitutes "information" under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 134.90(1)(c)(1)-(2). 
 
Pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 134.90(1)(c), a trade secret is defined as a specific type of 
information: 
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, 
pattern, 
compilation, 
program, 
device, 
method, 
technique or process to which all of the following 
apply: 
 
1. The information derives independent economic 
value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally 
known 
to, 
and 
not 
being 
readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons 
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure 
or use. 
 
2. The information is the subject of efforts to 
maintain its secrecy that are reasonable under 
the circumstances. 
No.  2015AP643 
 
17 
 
¶39 The court of appeals observed that as the party 
seeking trade secret protection, North Highland has the burden 
of establishing that its bid amount for the Tyson project 
constitutes a trade secret.  N. Highland Inc. v. Jefferson Mach. 
& Tool Inc., No. 2015AP643, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Apr. 28, 2016) (citing Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 
of Wis., 106 Wis. 2d 142, 146, 316 N.W.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1981), 
aff'd, 110 Wis. 2d 530, 329 N.W.2d 178 (1983)).  However, we 
need not wade into the discussion addressing whether a bid 
amount constitutes a trade secret, and, if so, under what 
circumstances.  Even if North Highland could present evidence 
that its bid amount constitutes "information" as that term is 
used 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 134.90(1)(c), 
it 
has 
not 
provided 
sufficient evidence demonstrating misappropriation. 
¶40 Wisconsin Stat. § 134.90(2) provides that a person may 
not use or disclose a trade secret when it was acquired through 
improper means: 
Misappropriation.  No person, including the state, may 
misappropriate or threaten to misappropriate a trade 
secret by doing any of the following: 
(a) Acquiring the trade secret of another by 
means which the person knows or has reason to 
know constitute improper means. 
(b) Disclosing or using without express or 
implied consent a trade secret of another if the 
person did any of the following: 
1. Used improper means to acquire knowledge 
of the trade secret. 
2. At the time of disclosure or use, knew or 
had reason to know that he or she obtained 
No.  2015AP643 
 
18 
 
knowledge of the trade secret through any of 
the following means: 
a. Deriving it from or through a person 
who utilized improper means to acquire 
it. 
b. Acquiring it under circumstances 
giving rise to a duty to maintain its 
secrecy or limit its use. 
c. Deriving it from or through a person 
who owed a duty to the person seeking 
relief to maintain its secrecy or limit 
its use. 
d. Acquiring it by accident or mistake. 
¶41 It is apparently undisputed that Trewyn formulated the 
confidential bids for the Tyson project on behalf of both North 
Highland and Jefferson Machine.  However, the parties dispute 
whether Wells was aware that Trewyn had access to North 
Highland's confidential bid amount at the same time he was 
formulating 
Jefferson 
Machine's 
bid. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 134.90(2)(b)2.  According to North Highland, it is reasonable 
to infer from Trewyn's testimony that he told Wells he was 
bidding on the Tyson contract and that Wells aided Trewyn in 
breaching his fiduciary duty to North Highland. 
¶42 Contrary to North Highland's assertions, the evidence 
in the record fails to establish that Wells had knowledge of, 
let alone "acquired," "disclosed," or "used" the bid amount.12  
                                                 
12 Chief Justice Roggesack's dissent maintains that the 
circuit court improperly granted summary judgment because Wells 
"failed to make a prima facie showing of sufficient undisputed, 
material facts . . . ."  Roggensack, C.J., dissent, ¶48. 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP643 
 
19 
 
Indeed, North Highland has not alleged in its amended complaint 
that 
Wells 
personally 
acquired, 
disclosed 
or 
used 
North 
Highland's bid amount in any way.  There are simply no facts or 
reasonable inferences derived from the facts to support such an 
allegation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rather than offering disputed facts, however, the dissent 
creates its own facts that are unsupported by the evidentiary 
record. 
For example, the dissent asserts that Wells "knew that the 
company he and Trewyn owned were making use of North Highland's 
bid information, but he thought North Highland had no right to 
object to this."  Id., ¶109.  To the contrary, Wells denied any 
knowledge of North Highland's bid information:   
Q:  This is Exhibit 3.  It is a quote from Dwain 
Trewyn on North Highland's behalf to Tyson for 
trolleys, right? 
A:  Yes. 
. . .  
Q:  And you didn't know about either Exhibit 1 or 
Exhibit 3? 
A:  Yes, I did not know about these. 
Q:  And just like for Exhibit 1, you didn't think to 
ask? 
A:  No, I did not ask. 
Again, the dissent tells the reader only part of the story, 
leaving the reader not merely ill-informed, but misinformed.  
Resting its analysis and conclusion on only a cherry-picked 
portion of the testimony about whether Trewyn had a non-compete 
agreement 
with 
North 
Highland, 
together 
with 
unsupported 
inferences, the dissent asserts that "Wells knew that the 
company he and Trewyn owned were making use of North Highland's 
bid information."  C.J. Roggensack, Dissent, ¶109. 
No.  2015AP643 
 
20 
 
¶43 As set forth above, both Wells and Trewyn repeatedly 
testified that Wells had no knowledge that Trewyn was also 
bidding on behalf of North Highland.  There is also no evidence 
in the record that Trewyn disclosed the bid amount to Wells.  
Given the unrebutted testimony that Wells was unaware that 
Trewyn formulated North Highland's bid on the Tyson project, we 
determine that North Highland has failed to meet its burden of 
providing sufficient evidence of misappropriation. 
V 
¶44 In sum, we determine that North Highland has not met 
its burden to show that there exists a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether Wells and Trewyn conspired to breach a 
fiduciary duty.  The evidence of record is insufficient to 
support a conspiracy claim. 
¶45 We likewise conclude that North Highland has not met 
its burden of demonstrating that there exists a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding its claim that Wells misappropriated a 
trade secret.  Again, the evidence of record fails to support 
such a claim.  Consequently, both of North Highland's claims 
fail to survive Well's summary judgment motion. 
¶46 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Frederick Wells. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶47 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
review before us arises from summary judgment.  I conclude that 
defendants,1 as the moving party to whom summary judgment was 
granted, failed to make a prima facie showing of sufficient 
undisputed, material facts that North Highland Inc.'s bid to 
construct and supply Tyson Foods, Inc. with 3,000 trolleys, (the 
Trolley Contract) did not meet the definition of a trade secret 
as set out in Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1)(c), which Fredrick A. Wells 
(Wells) and Jefferson Machine & Tool, Inc. (Jefferson Machine) 
misappropriated.  Leske v. Leske, 197 Wis. 2d 92, 96-97, 539 
N.W.2d 719 (1995). 
¶48 Defendants also failed to make a prima facie showing 
of sufficient undisputed, material facts that Wells, Jefferson 
Machine and Dwain D. Trewyn (Trewyn) did not obtain or use North 
Highland's Trolley Contract bid information contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 134.90(2).  Id.  Accordingly, I conclude that summary 
judgement was improperly granted dismissing North Highland's 
claim for trade secret misappropriation against Wells and 
Jefferson Machine.    
¶49 And finally, I conclude that claim preclusion cannot 
be applied against North Highland based on the Stipulation and 
Order that dismissed Trewyn from this lawsuit.  Therefore, I 
would reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand 
                                                 
1 Initially Dwain D. Trewyn, Frederick A. Wells and 
Jefferson Machine & Tool, Inc. were defendants.  On this review, 
only Wells and Jefferson Machine remain. 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
2 
 
for a jury trial of North Highland's claim against Wells and 
Jefferson Machine for misappropriation of a trade secret.2  
I.  BACKGROUND 
1.  Parties 
¶50 The Trolley Contract to fabricate and deliver 3,000 
stainless steel twin trolley assemblies for Tyson's Council 
Bluff, Iowa facility is central to this dispute.   
¶51 Trewyn worked for North Highland as a salesman until 
the end of December 2011.  As part of his job, he bid, sometimes 
referred to as "quoted," on potential contracts for work that 
North Highland hoped to obtain.   
¶52 Trewyn agreed to be subject to the confidentiality 
restrictions contained in North Highland's Associate Handbook.  
It provided in relevant part:  
[D]o not discuss confidential business with anyone who 
does 
not 
work 
for 
North 
Highland 
Inc. 
 
Such 
confidential information includes, but is not limited 
to . . . pending projects and proposals, pricing or 
costing information . . . .  Anyone who discloses 
trade secrets or confidential business information 
will be subject to disciplinary action, up to and 
including termination of employment and legal action, 
even if he/she does not actually benefit from the 
disclosed information.[3]  
                                                 
2 Although I do not address North Highland's breach of 
fiduciary duty claim, a reversal by this court would abrogate 
the court of appeals' decision in full.  Blum v. 1st Auto & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶46, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78 
("Unless this court explicitly states otherwise, a court of 
appeals opinion overruled by this court no longer retain[s] any 
precedential value.").  Therefore, all North Highland's claims 
against Wells would be available for trial upon remand.  Id.  
3 R. at 187:6.   
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
3 
 
¶53 In September of 2011, Wells incorporated Jefferson 
Machine.  Trewyn and Wells were the sole shareholders, with 
Wells owning 75% and Trewyn owning 25%.  Wells and Trewyn also 
were the sole employees of Jefferson Machine.   
¶54 This lawsuit arose out of actions of Trewyn, while he 
was employed by North Highland, and of Wells, who knew that 
Trewyn was a salesman for North Highland at the time Trewyn and 
Wells prepared the Trolley Contract bid for Jefferson Machine 
that competed with North Highland's bid.  A lengthy deposition 
was taken of Wells by an attorney for North Highland.  The 
quotes below are from that deposition, Record 47, unless 
indicated otherwise.4   
2.  Bidding process 
¶55 On November 11, 2011, Tyson sent a RFQ (request for 
quotes) on the Trolley Contract to a number of businesses.  
North Highland was on the RFQ list.  Jefferson Machine was not.5  
Bids ("quotes") were not accepted by Tyson Foods unless the 
bidder was on Tyson's list of authorized bidders.   
¶56 However, on December 1, 2011, Trewyn faxed Jefferson 
Machine's bid on the Trolley Contract to Tyson.  On the cover 
sheet of the bid Trewyn said, "I received permission to quote 
                                                 
4 Affidavit of Vincent J. Scipior, made in Support of 
Defendants Frederick A. Wells, Bay Plastics Inc., and Jefferson 
Machine & Tool Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment.  Vincent 
Scipior is an attorney for the defendants.   
5 R. at 76:4. 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
4 
 
the trolley assy's from Ray R.  I hope that is not a problem."6  
Wells was aware of this.  At his deposition, Wells testified: 
Q 
And Dwain was the one who got the opportunity for 
Jefferson Machine & Tool to bid on the trolley 
contract? 
A 
Yes.[7] 
¶57 Trewyn and Wells8 developed Jefferson Machine's bid on 
the Trolley Contract.  Wells testified: 
Q 
That's Exhibit 5.  That is Dwain's quote on 
Jefferson 
Machine 
& 
Tool's 
behalf 
for 
the 
trolleys. 
A 
Okay. 
Q 
Do you remember that? 
A 
Yes, Dwain put this together. 
Q 
And Dwain told you about it? 
A 
Yes.[9] 
¶58 It is undisputed that Trewyn was an employee of North 
Highland when he and Wells submitted Jefferson Machine's bid.10  
Wells knew that Trewyn was employed at North Highland at that 
time.  He testified: 
                                                 
6 R. at 65:6. 
7 R. at 47:15-16. 
8 Wells had a sample trolley made at Tyson's request, and he 
purchased the equipment necessary to perform the Trolley 
Contract.   
9 R. at 47:20. 
10 Jefferson Machine's bid, R. at 65:7.   
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
5 
 
Q 
Do 
you 
remember 
when 
you 
got 
the 
trolley 
contract? 
A 
I don't recall the date. 
Q 
It was in December of 2011, right? 
A 
I believe so. 
Q 
Do you know when Dwain quit his job at North 
Highland? 
A 
In December, end of December. 
Q 
The end of December? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
After Jefferson Machine & Tool got the trolley 
contract? 
A 
Yes.[11] 
¶59 Wells also acknowledged that he knew that Jefferson 
Machine was a competing business of North Highland.  He 
testified: 
Q 
So Jefferson Machine & Tool was a competing 
business of North Highland? 
A 
It's the American way.  You can compete.  There's 
competitors all up and down the highway here for 
machine 
houses, 
injection 
molders, 
vacuum 
formers, fabricators.  Look in the phone book. 
Q 
So you'd like to change your answer, yes, they 
are competing businesses? 
A 
They could be.[12] 
¶60 However, we can infer from Wells' testimony that he 
believed 
he 
and 
Trewyn 
could 
use 
North 
Highland's 
bid 
                                                 
11 R. at 47:11. 
12 R. at 47:9. 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
6 
 
information because Trewyn did not have a non-compete agreement 
with North Highland.  He testified: 
Q 
Did you think that North Highland had any right 
to have its employees not compete with them at 
the same time as they were employed at North 
Highland?  
A 
Say that again. 
Q 
Did you think that North Highland had any right 
to have its employees not compete against them 
while they were still employed at North Highland? 
A 
There was no non-compete form with them. 
. . . . 
Q 
And the reason why you think they don't have that 
right is because they didn't have an express non-
compete clause in their employment contract? 
A 
Yes.13 
¶61 Wells was actively involved in bidding on the Trolley 
Contract.  He testified:  
Q 
This is Exhibit 2.  I'm going to show you email 
6.  That is an email from Gordon Slothower to you 
and Dwain, right? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
And the email right on the top, it starts, 
"Attached is the revised," do you see where I'm 
pointing to? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
Why was he giving you a revised trolley drawing? 
A 
I don't know.  He copied me on whatever he sent 
to Dwain. 
                                                 
13 R. at 47:12. 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
7 
 
. . . . 
Q 
Well, when you're putting together the quote, the 
number, how much you would bid on the trolley 
contract, how would you formulate the number? 
A 
By the quotes on the raw material and the 
machining time and the assembly time to put the 
part together. 
. . . . 
Q 
For the trolley contract at Jefferson Machine & 
Tool, were you aware that Tyson asked for samples 
of the trolleys to be created? 
A 
Yes.14 
¶62 Jefferson Machine underbid North Highland and was 
awarded the Trolley Contract.  This lawsuit followed.  North 
Highland claimed for misappropriation of trade secrets, alleging 
that Trewyn took its Trolley Contract bid and Wells, who had 
reason to know that it was improper for Trewyn to disclose and 
use North Highland's bid, aided and abetted Trewyn and Jefferson 
Machine in the misappropriation of North Highland's trade 
secret.  A jury trial was demanded in the complaint.  
¶63 The 
circuit 
court 
granted 
summary 
judgment 
to 
defendants, dismissing the complaint.  The court of appeals 
affirmed, based on its conclusion that North Highland had not 
proved that a bid was the type of information set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 134.90(1)(c).  North Highland Inc. v. Jefferson Mach. & 
Tool Inc., No. 2015AP643, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
April 28, 2016).  The court of appeals opined, "As the party 
seeking trade secret protection, it is North Highland’s burden 
                                                 
14 R. at 47:19-27. 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
8 
 
to establish that the amount of its bid for the Tyson project 
constitutes a trade secret."  Id., ¶26 (citing Wisconsin Elec. 
Power Co. v. PSC, 106 Wis. 2d 142, 146, 316 N.W.2d 120 (1981), 
which 
interpreted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.205(2)(1975) 
and 
not 
§ 134.90).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶64 Whether a bid is a trade secret because it is a 
compilation of costs, labor and profit that has independent 
economic value from not being generally known to or readily 
ascertainable by proper means by competitors, and for which 
reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy were taken, presents 
questions of fact.  Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 147 Wis. 2d 
842, 849, 434 N.W.2d 773 (1989).   
¶65 Wisconsin Stat. § 134.90 is Wisconsin's enactment of 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  Id. at 851.  Sub section (7) 
provides: 
UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION.  This section shall 
be applied and construed to make uniform the law 
relating to misappropriation of trade secrets among 
states enacting substantially identical laws.   
We have recognized and followed the statutory directive for 
Wisconsin's enactments of uniform laws in other decisions.  For 
example in Estate of Matteson, we said, 
The purpose of uniform laws is to establish both 
uniformity of statutory law and uniformity of case law 
construing 
the 
statutes, 
ensuring 
certainty 
and 
guidance to litigants who rely on courts to interpret 
uniform statutes in a predictable and consistent 
manner.   
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
9 
 
Estate of Matteson v. Matteson, 2008 WI 48, ¶42, 309 Wis. 2d 
311, 749 N.W.2d 557.   
¶66 It is the majority view of those courts that have 
considered the standard of review that whether a trade secret 
exists is a question of fact.  See, e.g., All West Pet Supply v. 
Hill's Pet Products, 840 F. Supp. 1433, 1437-38 (D. Kan. 1993); 
Network Telecommunications, Inc. v. Boor-Crepeau, 790 P.2d 901, 
902 (Colo. App. 1990); Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal 
Products Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1063 (2d Cir. 1985).  
¶67 In order to provide the benefits of the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act to Wisconsin litigants, Wisconsin courts should 
employ the majority interpretation for the standard of review 
accorded to trade secret claims.  Accordingly, I conclude that 
whether a trade secret exists under Wis. Stat. § 134.90 is a 
question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact.    
¶68 We 
independently 
review 
whether 
North 
Highland's 
complaint was properly dismissed on summary judgment.  Burbank 
Grease Services, LLC v. Sokolowski, 2006 WI 103, ¶6, 294 Wis. 2d 
274, 717 N.W.2d 781.  In order to affirm summary judgment 
dismissing North Highland's trade secret claim, we would be 
required to conclude that the defendants made a prima facie 
showing of sufficient, undisputed material facts that North 
Highland's bid for the Trolley Contract was not a trade secret, 
which 
Wells, 
Jefferson 
Machine 
and 
Trewyn 
did 
not 
misappropriate.  Leske, 197 Wis. 2d at 97-98.  "A statement that 
the plaintiff lacks evidence is insufficient" to meet the moving 
party's burden at summary judgment.  Id. at 97. 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
10 
 
¶69 Here, the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 134.90 is 
intertwined with summary judgment.  The interpretation and 
application of a statute present questions of law that we review 
independent of the decisions of the court of appeals and circuit 
court, but benefitting from their discussions.  State v. Duchow, 
2008 WI 57, ¶11, 310 Wis. 2d 1, 749 N.W.2d 913 (citing Marder v. 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 
Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110).  
¶70 And finally, whether claim preclusion was correctly 
applied by the circuit court is a question of law for our 
independent review.  Lindas v. Cady, 183 Wis. 2d 547, 552, 515 
N.W. 458 (1994).  
B.  Trade Secret 
1.  General principles 
¶71 Trade secret law in Wisconsin is established by Wis. 
Stat. § 134.90.  Section 134.90 made significant changes in 
trade secret law from that which was formerly set out in Wis. 
Stat. § 943.205(2) (1975).  For example, Wisconsin courts 
interpreted § 943.205(2) (1975) by following Restatement (First) 
Torts § 757, cmt. b (1939).  See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. 
Norse Chemical Corp., 33 Wis. 2d 445, 147 N.W.2d 527 (1967) and 
Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 84 Wis. 2d 202, 267 
N.W.2d 242 (1978).    
¶72 The Restatement (First) of Torts § 757, cmt. b (1939) 
engrafted a "continuous use requirement" onto the statutory 
definition of trade secret, as did Wisconsin's appellate courts.  
For example, Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 106 Wis. 2d at 147-48, 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
11 
 
directed that in order to find protection under Wisconsin's 
trade secret law a party must show that the information does not 
relate "to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the 
business, as, for example, the amount or other terms of a secret 
bid for a contract," but rather the information must be 
"continually used in the operation of the business."  Id. at 
147-48 (quoting Restatement of Torts (First) § 757, cmt. b 
(1939)).   
¶73 In Corroon v. Hosch, 109 Wis. 2d 290, 295, 325 N.W.2d 
883 (1982), we affirmed that Wisconsin's former trade secret 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.205(2) (1975), incorporated the 
definition of Restatement (First) Torts § 757, cmt. b (1939).  
Many other states did the same before the Uniform Trade Secret 
Act was promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission.  See Richard 
F. Dole, Jr., The Contours of American Trade Secret Law:  What 
Is and What Isn't Protectable as a Trade Secret, 19 (SMU Sci. & 
Tech. L. Rev. 89) (2016).   
¶74 However, the continuous use doctrine no longer affects 
trade secret law in Wisconsin.  This is so because in 1986, 
Wisconsin enacted the Uniform Trade Secret Act.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 134.90 (1986).  Section 134.90 created a new definition of 
trade secret that changed the Restatement's definition in part 
because § 134.90 eliminated the continuous use requirement from 
trade secret law.  Minuteman, 147 Wis. 2d at 852-53 (citing 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, sec. I, comment, 14 U.L.A. 543 
(1985)).   
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
12 
 
¶75 In Minuteman, we carefully examined the Uniform Trade 
Secret Act as set out in Wis. Stat. § 134.90, and explained that 
by enacting § 134.90, Wisconsin "created a new definition of 
trade secret."  Id.  We addressed specific provisions of Wis. 
Stat. § 134.90 in order to emphasize that in addition to 
adopting a new definition of trade secret, legal principles that 
may have affected trade secret law in the past were no longer 
applicable in Wisconsin.  We identified § 134.90(6) as we 
explained that trade secret law had been changed significantly.  
Subsection (6) provides: 
(6) Effect on other laws. . .  (a) Except as provided 
in par. (b), this section displaces conflicting tort 
law, restitutionary law and any other law of this 
state providing a civil remedy for misappropriation of 
a trade secret.   
Id. at 852 (footnote omitted).   
¶76 Because we had employed Restatement (First) of Torts' 
definition of trade secret in Corroon and Wis. Stat. § 134.90 
changed the definition of trade secret, we directed that "[t]he 
test established in Corroon [] is [] no longer the legal 
standard" for determining what may qualify as a trade secret.  
Id. at 852.  We explicitly provided that the definition of trade 
secret no longer has a continuous use requirement.  Id. at 852-
53.  
2.  Bid as a trade secret 
¶77 We have not considered whether a bid may be found to 
be a trade secret since Wisconsin enacted the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act.  Other states that have enacted the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act have litigated whether bids for prospective work 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
13 
 
qualify as trade secrets.  And, numerous courts have concluded 
that a confidential bid is a trade secret.  USA Power, LLC v. 
PacifiCorp, 372 P.3d 629 (Utah 2016) is a recent example.  In 
USA Power, a region served by the utility, PacifiCorp, was in 
need of additional power generation.  USA Power was aware of the 
opportunity to design and construct an additional facility, and 
it spent two years and nearly $1 million studying, purchasing 
consultant's advice and formulating how and where to construct 
such a facility.  Id. at 638.    
¶78 USA 
Power 
disclosed 
its 
development 
plans 
to 
PacifiCorp under a confidentiality agreement when PacifiCorp was 
a potential purchaser of USA Power's development plan for the 
power generation facility.  Id.  After USA Power's disclosure, 
PacifiCorp terminated its negotiations to purchase USA Power's 
development plan and issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for 
development of a power generation facility sufficient to serve 
the region's need.  Id.   
¶79 USA Power bid in response to the RFP, but PacifiCorp 
submitted its own competing bid.  PacifiCorp's proposal was very 
similar to the bid for development of a power generation 
facility that USA Power had disclosed to PacifiCorp earlier.  
Id.  When PacifiCorp selected its own bid, USA Power sued, 
claiming its bid was a trade secret created through its years of 
study, which PacifiCorp misappropriated.  Id.   
¶80 The jury agreed with USA Power.  On motions after 
verdict, the court concluded that because PacifiCorp knew all 
the components of USA Power's development plan it could 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
14 
 
anticipate its bid and make that bid a "price to beat."  Id. at 
654-55.  As the court explained, "It can hardly be argued that, 
in a bidding contest, for one competitor to have access to 
another 
competitor's 
internal 
financial 
calculations—
calculations that will certainly bear upon that competitor's 
ultimate 
bid—would 
have 
obvious 
value. 
 
Such 
financial 
information is a paradigmatic example of a trade secret."  Id. 
at 655.  In upholding the jury's finding that USA Power's bid 
was a trade secret, the court held "there was sufficient 
evidence in the record from which the jury could infer that a 
trade secret existed."  Id.   
¶81 In Ovation Plumbing, Inv. v. Furton, 33 P.3d 1221 
(Colo. 
Ct. 
App. 
2001), 
a 
jury 
found 
that 
a 
plumbing 
subcontractor's bid was a trade secret.  Furton appealed 
claiming that a bid does not qualify as a trade secret.  Id. at 
1223.  The appellate court relied on the definition of trade 
secret under the Colorado statute, Colorado's enactment of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  Id.   
¶82 The 
court 
began 
by 
pointing 
out 
that 
"[w]hat 
constitutes a trade secret is a question of fact."  Id. at 1224.  
Therefore, it considered whether sufficient evidence had been 
presented to the jury from which it could have found that the 
bid was a trade secret.  Id.   
¶83 There was testimony, "both direct and circumstantial" 
that the bid had value to Ovation because it was not known by 
Ovation's competitors.  Id. at 1225.  Although it was not "clear 
from the record whether Furton copied Ovation's bid documents or 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
15 
 
merely 
used 
information 
that 
he 
took 
from 
the 
documents[,] . . . it [was] clear from the record that Furton 
did not have permission to access [Ovation's bid documents]."  
Id.  After so concluding, the court affirmed the jury's verdict.  
Id. at 1225-26.   
¶84 In 
CDC 
Restoration 
& 
Const., 
LC 
v. 
Tradesmen 
Contractors, LLC, 369 P.3d 452 (Utah Ct. App. 2016), a concrete 
contractor sued Tradesmen, the employer of a former employee, 
Paul Carsey.  It also sued Carsey, and Keith Allen, all for 
misappropriation of trade secret under Utah's enactment of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  The suit claimed misappropriation of 
CDC Restoration's bid for a Kennecott project for repair and 
restoration work.  Id. at 455.   
¶85 CDC Restoration did business with Kennecott under a 
Preferred Provider Agreement (PPA), a confidential document that 
set forth CDC Restoration's rates for work, pricing information 
for hourly employees and hourly rates for use of various types 
of equipment.  Id.  Carsey had been a CDC Restoration foreman 
for a number of years.  Id.  He regularly delivered confidential 
information to Kennecott for CDC Restoration, but he never 
signed a confidentiality agreement.  Id.   
¶86 In mid-2005, Keith Allen, who was then a subcontractor 
at Kennecott, met with Carsey to discuss forming a company to do 
work at Kennecott.  Later in 2005, while he was employed by CDC 
Restoration, Carsey and Allen became co-owners of a new company, 
Tradesmen.  Id.  At that time, Allen was a subcontractor for 
Kennecott who supervised CDC Restoration's work there.  Id.  As 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
16 
 
part of Allen's work for Kennecott, he had access to CDC 
Restoration's pricing information for its ongoing projects at 
Kennecott.  Id.   
¶87 In late 2005, Kennecott opened a competitive bidding 
process on a project known as E-Bay.  Id.  Carsey and another 
CDC 
Restoration 
employee, 
Ralph 
Midgley, 
developed 
CDC 
Restoration's bid for E-Bay.  Shortly before the bid was 
submitted to Kennecott, Carsey told Midgley to increase the bid 
price because more hours of labor were needed than had been 
calculated initially.  Midgley did so.  Id.  
¶88 In the meantime, Carsey and Allen put together a bid 
on Kennecott's E-Bay project for Tradesmen, which they submitted 
after CDC Restoration submitted its bid.  Id. at 456.  Tradesmen 
underbid CDC Restoration and got the contract.  Id.   
¶89 CDC Restoration sued Tradesmen, Carsey and Allen, 
alleging "misappropriation of trade secrets for improper use of 
its labor and equipment rates and bid information."  Id.  The 
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all 
claims.  Id.  The court of appeals concluded that the record 
contained "enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material 
fact to preclude summary judgment regarding CDC's claim for 
misappropriation of bid information."  Id.   
¶90 A jury trial was held, and CDC Restoration prevailed.  
Id.  Again, review was sought.  The court of appeals reasoned 
that misappropriation of trade secrets had two elements:  a 
finding that the bid was a trade secret and a finding that the 
bid had been misappropriated.  Id.   
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
17 
 
¶91 In order to satisfy the first element, the court held 
that there must have been proof from which the jury could have 
found:  (1) the bid had independent economic value that was 
"attributable to the independent efforts of the one claiming to 
have conceived it," and was not readily ascertainable by others, 
id. at 457-58; and (2) reasonable efforts had been taken to 
maintain the bid's secrecy.  Id. at 458.  The court affirmed the 
jury's finding that the bid was a trade secret, as that term is 
defined in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  Id.  The court also 
affirmed 
the 
jury's 
finding 
that 
the 
bid 
had 
been 
misappropriated within the definitions in the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act.  Id. at 460.   
¶92 In sum, each of these courts reasoned that whether a 
confidential bid is a trade secret is a question of fact.  
However, each court also concluded that sufficient evidence had 
been presented to prove that the confidential bid at issue was a 
trade secret under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  
3.  North Highland's claim 
¶93 In this review of the court of appeals' decision that 
affirmed the dismissal of North Highland's claim, it is 
important to remember that we are at the summary judgment stage, 
not after a trial, because the analyses are very different at 
those two different stages.   
¶94 Upon review of summary judgment, we begin by testing 
the legal sufficiency of the complaint.  As we have explained, 
"Every decision on a motion for summary judgment begins with a 
review of the complaint to determine whether, on its face, it 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
18 
 
states a claim for relief."  Hoida, Inc. v. M & I Midstate Bank, 
2006 WI 69, ¶16, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17 (citing Westphal 
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 WI App 170, ¶9, 266 Wis. 2d 569, 669 
N.W.2d 166).  "If it does, we examine the answer to see if 
issues of fact or law have been joined."  Id.  Next, we consider 
"the moving party's affidavits [or other submissions] to 
determine whether they establish a prima facie case for summary 
judgment."  Id.  If a movant's submissions do not establish by 
undisputed facts that the nonmoving party has no claim or 
defense, the movant has failed to meet its burden.  Leske, 197 
Wis. 2d at 96-97.  
¶95 Therefore, when defendants move for summary judgment 
dismissing plaintiff's claims, the burden of proof is on the 
defendants to have proved sufficient undisputed, material facts 
in the submissions in support of their motion that establish a 
prima facie showing from which the circuit court is required to 
conclude that plaintiff's claims must be dismissed.  Id. at 97-
98.   
¶96 Although 
the 
movant 
is 
not 
required 
to 
submit 
affidavits, the movant must make submissions sufficient to 
"demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."  
Id. at 97.  Stated otherwise, the movant has the burden to 
demonstrate a basis in the record that shows the plaintiff lacks 
evidence to support the claim made.  Id. at 97-98.  It is only 
after the movant has made a prima facie showing for dismissal of 
the nonmoving party's claim, that the burden shifts to the 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
19 
 
nonmoving party to provide submissions opposing the submissions 
of the movant.  Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶16.    
¶97 Leske involved a claim of misappropriation of a 
"'program designed to establish a business to manufacture, 
distribute, and sell ice for commercial use in Dane County and 
the surrounding area,'" which Leske claimed was a trade secret 
that defendants misappropriated.  Leske, 197 Wis. 2d at 95. Id. 
at 96.  The issue presented on appeal was whether the circuit 
court properly granted summary judgment dismissing the trade 
secret misappropriation claim.  Id. at 96.15   
¶98 The court of appeals began by examining the complaint.  
The court concluded the complaint stated a claim for violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 134.90, Wisconsin's trade secret law, which the 
answer denied.  Id. at 96.  The court then examined the 
submissions by defendants in support of their motion for summary 
judgment.  Id. at 96-97.  The court explained that defendants' 
understanding of their burden as the movants for summary 
judgment was not correct because defendants asserted that "we 
should immediately review the plaintiff's material to determine 
whether he produced evidence in support of his claims."  Id. at 
97.  In reversing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment 
to defendants, the court explained, "[t]he defendants must 
demonstrate that the claimed trade secrets do not meet the 
definition of trade secret."  Id. at 98.  Although the 
                                                 
15 This is the same issue, at the same stage of the 
proceedings, as has been presented by North Highland in the case 
now before the court. 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
20 
 
defendants did make submissions in support of their motion, 
those submissions were insufficient to make a prima facie 
showing that plaintiff's claimed trade secret did not meet the 
definition of a trade secret.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment.  Id. at 
99. 
¶99 Given the required summary judgment methodology, I 
begin by examining the complaint.16  North Highland asserted a 
claim for trade secret misappropriation.17  In support of its 
claim, North Highland asserted that one of Trewyn's duties at 
North Highland was to formulate North Highland's bid for the 
Tyson Foods Trolley project.18  North Highland alleged that 
Trewyn and Wells "aided and abetted each other" in illegal acts 
that damaged North Highland.19  North Highland's bid on the 
Trolley project was secret.20  Knowing the amount and/or the 
terms of North Highland's bid "would allow one to bid slightly 
below the known bid."21  The bidding process on the Trolley 
project was secretive.22   
                                                 
16 I refer to the complaint, even though there is an amended 
complaint in the record because the two documents do not differ 
in regard to the allegations relating to North Highland's trade 
secret claim.   
17 Complaint, see pp. 6-7.  
18 Complaint, ¶¶7-9. 
19 Complaint, ¶6. 
20 Complaint, ¶¶16, 17. 
21 Complaint, ¶18.  
22 Complaint, ¶19.   
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
21 
 
¶100 North Highland had a confidentiality policy that was 
expressly set out in its Associate Handbook.23  Trewyn agreed to 
comply 
with 
the 
confidentiality 
policy 
of 
the 
Associate 
Handbook.24  Trewyn disclosed North Highland's trade secrets to 
defendants.25  That disclosure permitted defendants to bid 
slightly more favorable terms on the Trolley project and were 
thereby awarded the project.26  The defendants had reason to know 
that 
Trewyn's 
disclosing 
North 
Highland's 
bid 
and 
their 
subsequent use of it to North Highland's disadvantage was 
improper.27   
¶101 I conclude that the allegations in the complaint are 
sufficient to state a claim for trade secret misappropriation.   
¶102 My review of the answer of Wells and Jefferson Machine 
shows they denied the allegations in the complaint, generally 
based on insufficient knowledge to admit or deny.28  Therefore, 
the answer is sufficient to join issues of fact and law in 
regard 
to 
North 
Highland's 
claim 
for 
trade 
secret 
misappropriation.   
                                                 
23 Complaint, ¶11. 
24 Complaint, ¶21.   
25 Complaint, ¶20. 
26 Complaint, ¶20. 
27 Complaint, ¶¶22, 23.  
28 Answer, ¶¶1-19.  Although Trewyn is no longer a party, 
his Answer, too, was sufficient to join issues of law and fact.   
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
22 
 
¶103 I 
next 
review 
Wells 
and 
Jefferson 
Machine's 
submissions in support of their motion for summary judgment that 
requested 
dismissal 
of 
North 
Highland's 
trade 
secret 
misappropriation claim to determine if they established a prima 
facie defense.  Id. at 98.  Wells and Jefferson Machine 
submitted the affidavit of one of their attorneys, Vincent J. 
Scipior.29  He attached copies of depositions of Fred Wells and 
Dwain Trewyn.  He also attached North Highland's answers to 
Wells' and Jefferson Machine's First Set of Interrogatories and 
Request for Production, Tyson Foods' original specifications and 
drawings for the trolleys, and page 6 of North Highland's 
Associate Handbook.   
¶104 The defendants' brief before us is based on the 
attachments to the Scipior affidavit.  Defendants argue in their 
brief that North Highland's bid on the Trolley Contract was not 
a trade secret under Wisconsin law.30  They assert that a bid is 
not similar to the types of information listed in Wis. Stat. 
§ 134.90(1)(c).  They also argue because the bid was not for 
continuous or repeated use, it cannot fall within the statutory 
definition of trade secret.  They assert, "One of the 
fundamental tenets of trade secret law is that information 
relating to a single event in the conduct of business is not 
                                                 
29 R. at 47. 
30 Resp. Br. 39-45. 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
23 
 
protected," for which proposition they cite Wisconsin Elec. 
Power Co.31   
¶105 Wisconsin Elec. Power was issued by the court of 
appeals in 1981; it interprets Wis. Stat. § 943.205(2) (1975).  
It was issued before Wisconsin adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act, Wis. Stat. § 134.90.   
¶106 Furthermore, the continuous use requirement relied on 
in defendants' brief was specifically removed from Wisconsin's 
trade secret law by Minuteman, a 1989 decision grounded in 
Wisconsin's 
enactment 
of 
the 
Uniform 
Trade 
Secrets 
Act.  
Minuteman, 147 Wis. 2d at 852-53.   
¶107 There is no citation to Minuteman in defendants' 
brief.  Furthermore, and much more troubling, there is no 
citation to Minuteman in the majority opinion even though North 
Highland clearly makes a claim for misappropriation of trade 
secret.   
¶108 Minuteman is our thorough explanation of the changes 
brought about by Wisconsin's enactment of the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act.  Instead of citing Minuteman, the defendants cite 
cases from other jurisdictions, many of which were issued by 
jurisdictions that had not enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act.32   
¶109 Wells also argues that "North Highland has not 
presented 
sufficient 
evidence 
to 
support 
a 
trade 
secret 
                                                 
31 Resp. Br. 42.  
32 Resp. Br. 43.  
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
24 
 
misappropriation claim against [him.]"33  Wells asserts that he 
did not "use" North Highland's bid information, so he could not 
have misappropriated it.34  Evidence of misappropriation of trade 
secret information does not have to be direct evidence.  
Circumstantial evidence must also be considered in determining 
whether Wells has established a prima facie defense.  See 
Gagliano & Co. v. Openfirst, 2014 WI 65, ¶32, 355 Wis. 2d 258, 
850 N.W.2d 845.  Here, Wells' own deposition testimony of record 
defeats his ability to establish a prima facie defense.  For 
example, Wells was actively involved in bidding on the Trolley 
Contract: 
Q 
This is Exhibit 2.  I'm going to show you email 
6.  That is an email from Gordon Slothower to you 
and Dwain, right? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
And the email right on the top, it starts, 
"Attached is the revised," do you see where I'm 
pointing to? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
Why was he giving you a revised trolley drawing? 
A 
I don't know.  He copied me on whatever he sent 
to Dwain.[35] 
Wells' involvement in the bidding is further demonstrated; for 
example, he testified: 
                                                 
33 Resp. Br. 45. 
34 Resp. Br. 45-46. 
35 R. at 47:19. 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
25 
 
Q 
What did you know about the trolley contract in 
November of 2011? 
A 
We had an opportunity to quote on it. 
Q 
And you were in conversation with Tyson personnel 
about that quoting? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
And in December of 2011 you were also still 
communicating with Tyson and with Dwain about the 
trolley contract? 
A 
Dwain was talking with Tyson on the trolley 
contract. 
Q 
And you were talking with Dwain? 
A 
About the trolley contract? 
Q 
Yes. 
A 
Yes.[36] 
Furthermore, Wells knew that the company he and Trewyn owned 
were making use of North Highland's bid information, but he 
thought North Highland had no right to object to this.  He 
explained: 
Q 
Did you think that North Highland had any right 
to have its employees not compete with them at 
the same time as they were employed at North 
Highland?  
A 
Say that again. 
Q 
Did you think that North Highland had any right 
to have its employees not compete against them 
while they were still employed at North Highland? 
A 
There was no non-compete form with them. 
. . . . 
                                                 
36 R. at 47:10-11. 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
26 
 
Q 
And the reason why you think they don't have that 
right is because they didn't have an express non-
compete clause in their employment contract? 
A 
Yes.[37] 
¶110 When 
considering 
the 
entirety 
of 
defendants' 
submissions, I conclude that they do not provide sufficient 
undisputed, material facts to preclude the bid from meeting the 
definition 
of 
a 
trade 
secret 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 134.90(1)(c) or to preclude the finding that Wells had "reason 
to know"38 that he used North Highland's bid without the consent 
of North Highland after obtaining it through improper means, 
contrary to § 134.90(2).   
¶111 My 
conclusion 
is 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 134.90(1)(c), which provides: 
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, 
pattern, 
compilation, 
program, 
device, 
method, 
technique or process to which all of the following 
apply:   
1.  The information derives independent economic 
value, actual or potential, from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic 
value from its disclosure or use. 
2.  The information is the subject of efforts to 
maintain its secrecy that are reasonable under the 
circumstances.   
                                                 
37 R. at 47:12. 
38 "Reason to know" is the Wis. Stat. § 134.90(2) standard 
that Wells' submissions must be sufficient to set aside in 
regard to misappropriation.  As the quotes above show, he has 
not done so.    
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
27 
 
¶112 In order to satisfy 
Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1)(c)'s 
criteria and be found to be a trade secret, the bid:  (1) must 
be 
information 
that 
is 
a 
compilation; 
(2) 
must 
derive 
independent economic value from not being generally known by 
competitors; (3) amount presented to Tyson must not be generally 
known or readily ascertainable by proper means; (4) must have 
been subject to reasonable efforts under the circumstances to 
protect its secrecy.   
¶113 It is undisputed, as explained by Wells, that the bid 
is information assembled as a compilation39 of "quotes on raw 
material and the machining time and the assembly time to put the 
part together."40  And as Wells further acknowledged, the amount 
of a bid is not shared with others:  
Q. 
The only person you would disclose how much you 
were bidding was the customer? 
A. 
Correct.41   
The reason for not sharing bid information is self-apparent:  if 
competitors knew the amount of North Highland's bid, that amount 
becomes the "price to beat."  USA Power, 373 P.3d at 654-55.  
However, whether North Highland took reasonable efforts under 
the circumstances to protect the bid's secrecy, is a question of 
fact.  Minuteman, 147 Wis. 2d at 849.    
                                                 
39 A 
compilation 
is 
an 
assemblage 
or 
gathering.  
Compilation, Roget's Thesaurus, 51 St. Martin's Press (1965).   
40 R. at 47:19. 
41 R. at 47:28.  
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
28 
 
¶114 The court of appeals assigned the burden of proof to 
North Highland in response to defendants' motion for summary 
judgment.  North Highland, No. 2015AP643, ¶11 ("[W]e agree with 
Wells that summary judgment is appropriate because North 
Highland has failed to establish that there is sufficient 
evidence to support the claim.").  While North Highland has the 
burden of proof at trial, it was error to assign the burden to 
North Highland on defendants' summary judgment motion when the 
defendants did not meet their obligation to make a prima facie 
showing that North Highland's bid did not meet the statutory 
definition of trade secret or that defendants did not have 
reason to know they obtained or used North Highland's bid 
information improperly.  Leske, 197 Wis. 2d at 97-99 ("The 
defendants mistakenly assert that it is Thomas's burden to 
establish that he took reasonable precautions [to maintain 
secrecy].  While this would be true at trial, on summary 
judgment the moving defendants must establish that Thomas did 
not take reasonable steps.").   
¶115 The court of appeals also erred when it relied on 
Wisconsin Elec. Power, which provides an interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 943.205(2) (1976).  That statute no longer has any 
relevance to trade secret law.  Minuteman, 147 Wis. 2d at 852-
53.42   
¶116 Furthermore, the court of appeals appeared not to 
recognize that the determination of whether a bid is a trade 
                                                 
42 Minuteman v. Alexander, 147 Wis. 2d 842, 434 N.W.2d 773 
(1989), is not addressed by the court of appeals.   
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
29 
 
secret as set out in Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1)(c) is a question of 
fact.  Id. at 849, 854; Ovation, 33 P.3d at 1224; USA Power, 372 
P.3d at 655.  Similarly, if the jury determines that the bid is 
a trade secret, it also will be required to determine whether 
defendants misappropriated it.  Minuteman, 147 Wis. 2d at 854-
55.  Both are factual findings under the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act, and as we implied in Minuteman, they are factual findings 
under § 134.90(1).  
C.  Claim Preclusion 
¶117 The court of appeals chose not to address claim 
preclusion.  North Highland, No. 2015AP643, ¶11.  However, 
defendants continue to argue that North Highland's claim for 
misappropriation of trade secret is barred by claim preclusion 
because of the Stipulation and Order that dismissed Trewyn from 
this lawsuit.  They assert that the circuit court correctly held 
that claim preclusion bars North Highland's claims.43  
¶118 "Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of the same 
claim when:  (1) there is an identity of parties or their 
privies in a prior lawsuit; (2) there is an identity of claims 
for relief that were brought, or should have been brought; and 
(3) a final judgment on the merits in a court of competent 
jurisdiction resolved the first lawsuit."  Mrozek v. Intra 
Financial Corp., 2005 WI 73, ¶28, 281 Wis. 2d 448, 699 N.W.2d 54 
(citing Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶21, 279 Wis. 2d 520, 
                                                 
43 Resp. Br. 17-26. 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
30 
 
694 N.W.2d 879; Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 
541, 551, 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995)).    
¶119 Wells 
and 
Jefferson 
Machine 
create 
a 
bootstrap 
argument 
under 
which 
they 
assert 
that 
North 
Highland's 
misappropriation of trade secret claim is precluded.  First, 
they contend that due to its Stipulation with Trewyn, North 
Highland cannot proceed on its conspiracy claim against them.  
They cite numerous cases on which I do not comment because I 
address only the misappropriation of trade secret claim.  Then 
defendants bootstrap North Highland's trade secret claim as a 
"matter[] arising out of the same facts and occurrences," 
concluding 
that 
all 
claims 
against 
them 
are 
precluded.44  
Although the language "arising out of the same facts and 
occurrences" is claim preclusion language, Wells and Jefferson 
cannot meet the three necessary elements to support dismissal of 
all claims under claim preclusion.   
¶120 First, neither Wells nor Jefferson Machine was a party 
to Trewyn's Stipulation, which was entered into during Trewyn's 
bankruptcy action.  To the contrary, the Stipulation provides:  
"All rights are reserved by North Highland, Inc. to any claims 
made against joint or several tortfeasors, including Frederick 
Wells and Jefferson Machine & Tool Inc.  North Highland, Inc.'s 
cause of action remains against all non settling tortfeasors."   
¶121 Second, the defendants are not privies of Trewyn.  As 
we have explained, "[p]rivity exists when a person is so 
                                                 
44 Resp. Br. 23. 
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
31 
 
identified in interest with a party to former litigation that he 
or she represents precisely the same legal right in respect to 
the subject matter involved."  Pasko v. City of Milwaukee, 2002 
WI 33, ¶16, 252 Wis. 2d 1, 643 N.W.2d 72.  The burden of proving 
the elements of claim preclusion is on the party asserting 
dismissal of claims based on claim preclusion.  Id.   
¶122 Although Trewyn was obligated to make certain payments 
to North Highland under the Stipulation, Wells and Jefferson 
Machine were not similarly obligated.  For example, if Trewyn 
defaulted on the payments due under the Stipulation, the 
obligation for payment could not be enforced against Wells or 
Jefferson Machine.  Wells and Jefferson are not privies of 
Trewyn.    
¶123 Here, Trewyn, Wells and Jefferson Machine are alleged 
to be joint tortfeasors.  North Highland sued each of them 
individually for misappropriation of trade secrets.  The 
Stipulation and release entered with Trewyn is similar to 
releases that often are used when there is a settlement with one 
tortfeasor and the lawsuit continues against the remaining 
tortfeasors.45   
¶124 Third, there was no final judgment on the merits of 
the trade secret action against Wells and Jefferson Machine at 
the time that the circuit court dismissed all claims against 
them based on claim preclusion.  Accordingly, claim preclusion 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 
N.W.2d 106 (1963).   
No.  2015AP643.pdr 
 
32 
 
has 
no 
application 
to 
North 
Highland's 
trade 
secret 
misappropriation claim against Wells or Jefferson Machine.    
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶125 I conclude that defendants, as the moving party to 
whom summary judgment was granted, failed to make a prima facie 
showing of sufficient undisputed, material facts that North 
Highland's bid to construct and supply Tyson with 3,000 
trolleys, did not meet the definition of a trade secret as set 
out in Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1)(c), which Wells and Jefferson 
Machine misappropriated.  Leske, 197 Wis. 2d at 96-97. 
¶126 Defendants also failed to make a prima facie showing 
of sufficient undisputed, material facts that Wells, Jefferson 
Machine and Trewyn did not obtain or use North Highland's 
Trolley 
Contract 
bid 
information 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 134.90(2).  Id.  Accordingly, I conclude that summary judgment 
was improperly granted dismissing North Highland's claim for 
trade secret misappropriation against Wells and Jefferson 
Machine.    
¶127 And finally, I conclude that claim preclusion cannot 
be applied against North Highland based on the Stipulation and 
Order that dismissed Trewyn from this lawsuit.  Therefore, I 
would reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand 
for a jury trial of North Highland's claim against Wells and 
Jefferson Machine for misappropriation of a trade secret.  
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶128 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
circuit court's dismissal of North Highland, Inc.'s complaint 
against Frederick Wells reflects an improperly narrow conception 
of what constitutes a "trade secret" as well as a misapplication 
of the doctrine of claim preclusion.1  Because I conclude that a 
confidential bid can be a trade secret and that an adversary 
action in Dwain Trewyn's federal bankruptcy proceedings does not 
necessarily preclude North Highland's claims against Wells in 
state court, I would reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and therefore respectfully dissent.  Additionally, I 
would remand to the circuit court for a jury trial; material 
                                                 
1 Unfortunately, the court conducts its review of this case 
without the benefit of the circuit court's reasoning on the 
dispositive decisions.  Although the record includes the circuit 
court's orders resolving the relevant motions for summary 
judgment and dismissal, those orders merely state the court's 
conclusions with a note that the orders were entered "[f]or the 
reasons stated on the record."  But the transcripts of the 
relevant hearings are absent from the record on appeal. 
The appellant has the initial responsibility to request 
transcripts for the record, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.11(4)(a), 
and any other party also has the opportunity to request that 
transcripts 
be 
included 
in 
the 
record, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.11(5).  Appellate counsel for each party have a 
responsibility 
to 
identify 
all 
transcripts 
necessary 
for 
appellate review. 
When the record on appeal lacks transcripts relevant to the 
circuit court's orders under review and the circuit court has 
not issued a written order explaining the reasons for its 
decision, appellate courts do not receive sufficient information 
to review the case in its entirety.  Although I conduct my 
review in this opinion because the case raises questions of law 
and we do have the circuit court's conclusions, a future 
appellate court may not have sufficient information to proceed 
if appellate counsel fail to satisfy their responsibilities 
under the Wisconsin Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
2 
 
factual disputes remain on North Highland's trade secret 
misappropriation claim,2 and the circuit court should restore its 
earlier ruling that North Highland's claims against Wells for 
civil conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting 
breach of fiduciary duty, and interference with contract survive 
a motion for summary judgment. 
I 
A 
¶129 Historically, Wisconsin has held that "[w]hether a 
trade secret exists is a mixed question of fact and law.  Once 
the historical facts are found by the circuit court, whether 
those facts meet the legal standard is a question of law which 
we review without deference to the circuit court's decision."  
B.C. Ziegler & Co. v. Ehren, 141 Wis. 2d 19, 26, 414 N.W.2d 48 
(Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted) (citing Corroon & Black-
Rutters & Roberts, Inc. v. Hosch, 109 Wis. 2d 290, 294, 325 
N.W.2d 883 (1982)).  Notwithstanding Wisconsin's adoption of a 
version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), I would not 
cast this standard aside. 
¶130 In Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 147 Wis. 2d 842, 434 
N.W.2d 773 (1989), this court properly acknowledged that when 
the legislature adopted the UTSA, it replaced the common law 
definition of "trade secret" with the statutory definition in 
                                                 
2 Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent comprehensively sets 
forth facts from the record, which, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment (here, North 
Highland), show genuine issues of material fact properly 
resolved at trial. 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
3 
 
Wis. Stat § 134.90(1)(c).  Minuteman, 147 Wis. 2d at 851-52.  
Accordingly, the six-factor test from Corroon & Black-Rutters & 
Roberts, Inc. v. Hosch, 109 Wis. 2d 290, 325 N.W.2d 883 (1982), 
no longer set the standard for determining the existence of a 
trade secret, although the test continues to offer "helpful 
guidance in deciding whether certain materials are trade 
secrets" under the statute.  Minuteman, 147 Wis. 2d at 851-53. 
¶131 The Minuteman court, however, did not discuss whether 
the statutory abrogation of the common law definition of "trade 
secret" had a similar impact on the standard of review in trade 
secret cases.  Instead, the Minuteman court set forth a standard 
of review before discussing Wis. Stat. § 134.90: 
The construction of a statute or the application 
of a statute to a particular set of facts is a 
question of law. Bucyrus–Erie Co. v. ILHR Dept., 90 
Wis. 2d 408, 417, 280 N.W.2d 142 (1979).  This court 
decides questions of law without deference to the 
circuit court's determination.  Ball v. Dist. No. 4, 
Area Bd. of Vocational, Technical & Adult Education, 
117 Wis. 2d 529, 537, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984).  This 
court, however, accepts the circuit court's findings 
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Section 
805.17(2), Stats. 
Minuteman, 147 Wis. 2d at 853.  Although the Minuteman court did 
not specifically identify the "mixed" standard of review derived 
from Corroon & Black, its statement of separate standards for 
statutory interpretation, on the one hand, and circuit court 
findings 
of 
fact, 
on 
the 
other, 
suggests 
an 
implicit 
acknowledgement of the mixed nature of the questions raised in 
trade secret cases. 
¶132 Among state and federal courts interpreting various 
enactments 
of 
the 
UTSA, 
the 
majority 
of 
jurisdictions 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
4 
 
characterize the existence of a trade secret as a "question of 
fact."  See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, 
Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 723 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The existence of a 
trade secret ordinarily is a question of fact."); Ovation 
Plumbing, Inc. v. Furton, 33 P.3d 1221, 1224 (Colo. App. 2001) 
("What constitutes a trade secret is a question of fact."); see 
also 1 Melvin F. Jager, Trade Secrets Law § 5.2, at 5-4 (2016) 
("In the view of the majority, the existence of a trade secret 
is considered to be a 'question of fact.'").  But the reasons 
for treating the existence of a trade secret as purely a 
question of fact are not clear.  The Fifth Circuit has suggested 
that because "[t]he term 'trade secret' is one of the most 
elusive and difficult concepts in the law to define" the 
question therefore "is of the type normally resolved by a fact 
finder after full presentation of evidence from each side."  
Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 288-
89 (5th Cir. 1978).  Other jurisdictions seem to repeat the 
standard with a quotation or citation but no analysis, and 
following those citations to the principle's source reveals 
nothing more than an ostensible truism——also devoid of analysis.3 
                                                 
3 For example, working backward from Ovation Plumbing, Inc. 
v. Furton, 33 P.3d 1221, 1224 (Colo. App. 2001), the Colorado 
Court of Appeals successively cited the following cases for the 
principle that "[w]hat constitutes a trade secret is a question 
of fact":  Gold Messenger, Inc. v. McGuay, 937 P.2d 907, 911 
(Colo. App. 1997); Network Telecomms., Inc. v. Boor-Crepeau, 790 
P.2d 901, 902 (Colo. App. 1990); Mulei v. Jet Courier Serv., 
Inc., 739 P.2d 889, 893 (Colo. App. 1987), rev'd on other 
grounds 771 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); Porter Indus., Inc. 
v. Higgins, 680 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Colo. App. 1984); Telex Corp. 
v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 928 (10th Cir. 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
5 
 
¶133 Wisconsin's mixed standard of review in trade secret 
cases therefore represents the minority approach.  1 Jager, 
supra, § 5.2, at 5-6 to 5-7.  Nevertheless, the legislature's 
1986 adoption of the UTSA in no way necessitates rejection of 
our standard of review in the same way it required us to 
acknowledge the abrogation of the common law definition of 
"trade secret."  Indeed, the existence of a statutory definition 
of "trade secret" suggests that Wisconsin should retain its more 
nuanced standard.  As the Minuteman court recognized when it 
first interpreted Wis. Stat. § 134.90, the construction of a 
statute and its application to historical facts presents a 
question of law for appellate courts to review independently.  
Minuteman, 147 Wis. 2d at 853; see also World Wide Prosthetic 
Supply, Inc. v. Mikulsky, 2001 WI App 133, ¶10, 246 Wis. 2d 461, 
631 
N.W.2d 253 
("Resolution 
of 
this 
appeal 
requires 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 134.90(4), a question of law we 
review de novo.").  Trade secret cases no doubt turn on subtle 
questions of fact, such as, "Did the information derive 
independent economic value from its nondisclosure?  Was the 
information subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its 
secrecy?"  But no less than any other statute, it is the court's 
                                                                                                                                                             
1975).  The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Telex Corp. merely states 
that "what constitutes a trade secret . . . is a question of 
fact for the trial court."  510 F.2d at 928.  In turn Telex 
Corp. refers to Kodekey Electronics, Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486 
F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1973), which offers no more justification 
for the standard than the fact that trade secrets are a 
"nebulous concept," id. at 453-55 & n.3, the same unsatisfying 
reasoning articulated in Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, 
Inc., 569 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1978). 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
6 
 
responsibility to say what § 134.90 means——as the question 
raised by North Highland in this case illustrates.4 
B 
¶134 North Highland argues that the circuit court and court 
of appeals erred by failing to conclude that a confidential bid 
may satisfy the definition of "trade secret" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 134.90.  Because the plain language of § 134.90 supports North 
Highland's broad interpretation of "trade secret," I would 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand for the 
circuit 
court 
to 
consider 
North 
Highland's 
trade 
secret 
misappropriation claim under the proper standard of law. 
¶135 Assessment of Wis. Stat. § 134.90 begins with its 
text.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 
58, ¶¶44-51, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Section 134.90(1) 
defines "trade secret" as follows: 
(c)  "Trade secret" means information, including 
a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
                                                 
4 This court's fundamental responsibility to interpret a 
Wisconsin statute also means Wis. Stat. § 134.90(7) does not 
mandate the jettisoning of our uniquely descriptive phrasing of 
the standard of review.  Subsection (7) dictates that Wis. Stat. 
§ 134.90 "shall be applied and construed to make uniform the law 
relating to misappropriation of trade secrets among states 
enacting substantially identical laws."  In articulating the 
standard of review, however, we do not "apply" or "construe" any 
of the statute's language.  Instead, the standard of review 
implicates the perspective from which the court approaches the 
statute before even considering its text.  Joining other 
jurisdictions in repeating by rote that "the existence of a 
trade secret is a question of fact" risks putting before the 
finder of fact matters of statutory interpretation——questions of 
law——properly reserved for the court. 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
7 
 
method, technique or process to which all of the 
following apply: 
1.  The information derives independent economic 
value, actual or potential, from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic 
value from its disclosure or use. 
2.  The information is the subject of efforts to 
maintain its secrecy that are reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
North Highland's claim therefore turns on whether a confidential 
bid constitutes "information" within the meaning of this 
section.  To answer that question, I consider the plain meaning 
of the word "information," as well as the effect, if any, of the 
"including" clause that follows it in paragraph (c). 
¶136 Dictionary definitions of "information" suggest that 
the term encompasses a broad class of knowledge.  
See 
Information, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 901 (5th ed. 2011) ("Knowledge or facts learned, 
especially about a certain subject or event."); Information, 
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International 
Dictionary 
1160 
(1986) 
("knowledge of a particular event or situation"; "facts or 
figures ready for communication or use").  These definitions 
indicate that "information" consists of facts, figures, or 
general knowledge regarding a particular subject matter and 
capable of practical application or use.  Given the breadth of 
the term's scope, a business might possess any number of pieces 
of "information" that it wishes to protect, and a confidential 
bid price certainly consists of a figure that a business 
develops and communicates for the practical purpose of securing 
a contract. 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
8 
 
¶137 Despite the broad reach of the term "information," 
Wells points to the remainder of the definition of "trade 
secret": 
 
"information, 
including 
a 
formula, 
pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique or process."  
Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1)(c) (emphasis added).  Wells argues that  
State 
v. 
Popenhagen, 
2008 
WI 
55, 
309 
Wis. 2d 601, 
749 
N.W.2d 611, and Village of Hobart v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of 
Wisconsin, 2007 WI App 180, 303 Wis. 2d 761, 736 N.W.2d 896, 
hold that when a list introduced by "including" follows a 
general term, the list limits the scope of the general term to 
items similar in nature to those listed.  Popenhagen, 309 
Wis. 2d 601, ¶¶46-48; Oneida Tribe, 303 Wis. 2d 761, ¶9.  The 
ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction discussed in 
those cases, however, does not invert the plain meaning of the 
term "including" in Wis. Stat. § 134.90 because the canon "has 
traditionally required the broad catchall language to follow the 
list of specifics."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading 
Law 202 (2012).  Rather, "[f]ollowing the general term with 
specifics . . . mak[es] 
doubly 
sure 
that 
the 
broad 
(and 
intended-to-be-broad) 
general 
term . . . include[s] 
the 
specifics," meaning the "including" phrase serves a "belt-and-
suspenders function" in the statutory text.  Id. at 204.  This 
construction of "including" also comports with the canon that 
presumes the use of "including" does not create an exhaustive 
list but merely an exemplary one.  Id. at 132-33.  Accordingly, 
formulas, patterns, compilations, programs, devices, methods, 
techniques, 
and 
processes 
are 
not 
the 
only 
types 
of 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
9 
 
"information" that may satisfy the definition of "trade secret" 
in Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1). 
¶138 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1) also 
defeats Wells's argument that the definition of "trade secret" 
includes a "continuous use" requirement.  Wisconsin courts 
defining "trade secret" at common law held that "[a] trade 
secret is a process or device which is continually used in the 
operation of the business and thereby differs from secret 
information which may refer only to an isolated transaction."  
Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 106 Wis. 2d 142, 148, 
316 N.W.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1981) (internal quotation mark omitted) 
(quoting Future Plastics, Inc. v. Ware Shoals Plastics, Inc., 
340 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (D.S.C. 1972)).  The court of appeals 
even went so far as to observe that a trade secret "differs from 
other secret information in a business . . . in that it is not 
simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the 
conduct of the business, as, for example, the amount or other 
terms of a secret bid for a contract."  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. b 
(1939)).  As already noted, the 1986 adoption of the UTSA 
abrogated the more restrictive common law definition of "trade 
secret."  Minuteman, 147 Wis. 2d at 851-52.  Because the 
language in Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1) does not include a continuous 
use requirement in the definition of "trade secret," it should 
not be judicially imposed here.5 
                                                 
5 Confirming 
this 
plain 
meaning, 
an 
explanatory 
note 
accompanying the enactment of Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1) quotes from 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
10 
 
¶139 Wisconsin Stat. § 134.90(7) also commands courts to 
apply and interpret § 134.90 in a manner that will "make uniform 
the law relating to misappropriation of trade secrets among 
states enacting substantially identical laws."  Refusing to 
graft a renewed "continuous use" requirement onto the definition 
of "trade secret" aligns with other jurisdictions, which already 
protect some types of business information as trade secrets, 
even if used only for a short period of time——or just once, in 
the case of a confidential bid.  See, e.g., Economy Roofing & 
Insulating Co. v. Zumaris, 538 N.W.2d 641, 646-47 (Iowa 1995) 
(holding that 
complaint alleging misappropriation 
of "bid 
information" and "bid estimates" properly stated claim because 
"information" included "such [business] matters as maintenance 
of data on customer lists and needs, source of supplies, 
confidential costs, price data and figures" (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting US West Commc'ns, Inc. v. Office of Consumer Advocate, 
498 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa 1993))); B & G Crane Serv., L.L.C. v. 
Duvic, 2005-1798, p. 7-8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/5/06), 935 
So. 2d 164, 168-69 ("[W]hile under the employ of [plaintiff], 
[defendant] . . . wrongfully 
misappropriated 
[plaintiff's] 
confidential 
pricing 
and 
bid/quote 
information . . . , 
terminated 
his 
employment 
with 
[plaintiff] 
and 
                                                                                                                                                             
a report by the national conference of commissioners on uniform 
state 
laws, 
which 
observed 
that 
the 
UTSA's 
recommended 
definition of "trade secret" "contains a reasonable departure 
from the Restatement of Torts (first) definition which required 
that a trade secret be 'continuously used in one's business.'"  
1985 Wis. Act. 236, § 6 note. 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
11 
 
immediately . . . began unlawfully using that information to 
compete with [plaintiff] in attempt to win bids."); USA Power, 
LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20, ¶69, 372 P.3d 629 ("It can hardly 
be argued that, in a bidding contest, for one competitor to have 
access to another competitor's internal financial calculations——
calculations that will certainly bear upon that competitor's 
ultimate 
bid——would 
have 
obvious 
value. 
 
Such 
financial 
information is a paradigmatic example of a trade secret."); cf. 
Ovation Plumbing, 33 P.3d at 1224 ("declin[ing] to adopt a per 
se rule that a bid on a contract cannot be a trade secret as a 
matter of law"). 
¶140 Categorically excluding confidential bids from trade 
secret protection contradicts the legislature's decision to 
bring all "information" within the definition of "trade secret," 
provided the other statutory parameters are met: 
Almost any subject matter may be a trade secret, 
including a secret formula or process, computer 
software, digital databases, the passcode for a 
website, 
biotechnology, 
mechanical 
configurations, 
information relating to the finding and extraction of 
oil and gas, plans, layouts and design drawings, 
recipes, 
boat 
hull 
molds, 
customer 
lists, 
instructional materials, internal business practices, 
manufacturing 
cost 
data, 
sales 
histories 
and 
forecasts, 
materials 
and 
plans 
for 
advertising, 
marketing, 
and 
distribution, 
and 
membership 
and 
employee information.  Even religious material is 
eligible for trade secret protection. 
3 Louis Altman & Malla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition, 
Trademarks and Monopolies § 14:14, at 160 (4th ed. 2016) 
(footnotes omitted).  Applying "information" to a broad spectrum 
of facts, figures, and knowledge, does not, however, infinitely 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
12 
 
expand the scope of trade secret protection.  After all, any 
individual piece of "information" satisfies the definition of 
"trade secret" only if it also meets the independent economic 
value and secrecy requirements in Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1)(c)1 and 
2. 
¶141 In this case, the parties focused their arguments on 
the threshold question of whether a confidential bid can be 
"information."  Because I conclude, as a matter of law, that a 
confidential bid certainly constitutes "information" within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 134.90, I would reverse the decision 
granting summary judgment to Wells on North Highland's trade 
secret misappropriation claim, and I would remand the matter to 
the circuit court for a jury trial on the remaining factual 
issues, 
including 
whether 
North 
Highland 
took 
reasonable 
measures to maintain the bid's secrecy and whether Wells 
misappropriated North Highland's bid. 
II 
¶142 The circuit court also ruled that claim preclusion 
barred North Highland's claims against Wells.  I disagree.  
Courts apply the doctrine of claim preclusion to prevent 
"vexatious, repetitious and needless claim[s]" between the same 
parties on the same causes of action when another court has 
previously entered a final judgment on the merits.  See N. 
States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550, 525 N.W.2d 723 
(1995) (quoting Purter v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 682, 690 (3d Cir. 
1985)).  Claim preclusion promotes finality in litigation and 
prevents a party from repeatedly filing the same cause of action 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
13 
 
against the same defendant where that lawsuit has already 
resulted in "a final judgment on the merits in a court of 
competent jurisdiction."  Id. at 551.  "Key objectives of the 
doctrine of claim preclusion are to promote judicial economy and 
to 'conserve the resources the parties would expend in repeated 
and needless litigation of issues that were, or that might have 
been resolved in a single prior action.'"  Mrozek v. Intra Fin. 
Corp., 2005 WI 73, ¶28, 281 Wis. 2d 448, 699 N.W.2d 54 (quoting 
Hanlon v. Town of Milton, 2000 WI 61, ¶20, 235 Wis. 2d 597, 612 
N.W.2d 44).  "The question of whether claim preclusion applies 
under a given factual scenario is a question of law that this 
court reviews de novo."  Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Arby Constr., 
Inc., 2012 WI 87, ¶30, 342 Wis. 2d 544, 818 N.W.2d 863 (quoting 
N. States Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d  at 551). 
¶143 The factual scenario presented here involves not only 
North Highland's state court claims against Trewyn, Jefferson 
Machine & Tool Inc., and Wells but also a separate adversary 
proceeding 
by 
North 
Highland 
against 
Trewyn 
in 
federal 
bankruptcy court challenging the dischargeability of Trewyn's 
debt to North Highland.  Ultimately, North Highland settled the 
dischargeability issue in bankruptcy court on its merits.  
Shortly after the settlement in that adversary proceeding, North 
Highland and Trewyn entered a stipulation in the state court 
case dismissing Trewyn alone but reserving North Highland's 
claims against Wells.  Pursuant to this stipulation, the circuit 
court dismissed Trewyn from the case, ordering that the "matter 
shall proceed as between all remaining parties."  None of the 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
14 
 
stipulations or orders dismissing Trewyn from the state or 
federal court proceedings affected claims against Wells; rather, 
those claims were expressly reserved.  None of the stipulations 
or orders adjudicated the merits of North Highland’s claims——
against any party——for trade secret misappropriation, civil 
conspiracy to breach fiduciary duties, aiding and abetting 
breach of fiduciary duties, or interference with contractual 
obligations. 
¶144 Claim preclusion applies where there is "(1) an 
identity between the parties or their privies in the prior and 
present suits; (2) an identity between the causes of action in 
the two suits; and, (3) a final judgment on the merits in a 
court of competent jurisdiction."  Id., ¶35 (quoting N. States 
Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 551).  The absence of any element 
renders the doctrine inapplicable.  See N. States Power Co., 189 
Wis. 2d at 551.  Under the circumstances presented in this case, 
there is clearly no identity of parties or final judgment on the 
merits. 
¶145 There is no identity of parties because Wells was not 
a party to the bankruptcy proceeding involving Trewyn, which 
precipitated the settlement between North Highland and Trewyn 
leading to the dismissal of Trewyn alone as a party in this 
case.  It remains uncontroverted that Trewyn and Wells are not 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
15 
 
privies.6  Wisconsin has long held that claim preclusion is 
unavailable if the parties are not the same.  See Bentson v. 
Brown, 191 Wis. 460, 461-62, 211 N.W. 132 (1926).  Here, North 
Highland wishes to proceed against Wells, not Trewyn; absent 
privity between the two defendants, Trewyn's dismissal from the 
case presents no bar to North Highland proceeding against Wells, 
an entirely distinct party.  
¶146 Furthermore, there is no final judgment on the merits.  
Instead, Trewyn and North Highland settled the issue of whether 
any debt Trewyn may owe North Highland was dischargeable in 
bankruptcy, and this settlement included North Highland's 
agreement not to maintain suit against Trewyn.  The settlement 
agreement dismissing the adversary proceeding in bankruptcy 
court, which led to the stipulated dismissal of Trewyn in the 
state court proceedings, does not even come close to an 
"adjudication 
on 
the 
merits 
by 
a 
court 
of 
competent 
jurisdiction."  As this court explained in Mrozek v. Intra 
Financial Corp., 2005 WI 73, 281 Wis. 2d 448, 699 N.W.2d 54, a 
bankruptcy judgment may be a "final judgment on the merits" 
                                                 
6 A "privy" refers to "[a] person having a legal interest of 
privity in any action, matter, or property; a person who is in 
privity with another."  Privy, Black's Law Dictionary 1394 (10th 
ed. 2014).  Privity can arise from various relationships.  Id. 
(listing six types of privity).  "The term also appears in the 
context of litigation.  In this sense, it includes someone who 
controls a lawsuit though not a party to it; someone whose 
interests are represented by a party to the lawsuit; and a 
successor in interest to anyone having a derivate claim."  Id.  
There is no indication that Trewyn and Wells maintain any 
relationship of this sort relative to the present litigation. 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
16 
 
sufficient to satisfy the third prong under the claim preclusion 
doctrine, but only when the subject of the pending lawsuit was a 
"core proceeding" resolved by the bankruptcy court.  Id., ¶¶29-
31.7  Regardless of the core versus non-core distinction, the 
bankruptcy court involved here did not litigate the subject of 
North Highland's lawsuit against Wells.  Nor does it appear from 
this record that the bankruptcy court litigated the subject of 
North Highland's trade secret case against Trewyn.  There was no 
bankruptcy court judgment on the merits of the pending lawsuit 
or on the facts underlying North Highland's civil suit.  Rather, 
Trewyn and North Highland reached a settlement agreement, 
entered into a covenant not to sue, and stipulated to the 
dismissal of North Highland's adversary bankruptcy claim and 
distinct state court claims against Trewyn.  Like the entry of a 
guilty plea disposing of a criminal case, which this court held 
did not satisfy the "actually litigated" requirement for issue 
preclusion to apply,8 the settlement agreement does not satisfy 
the "judgment on the merits" requirement of claim preclusion 
because the settlement effected compromise without a judgment on 
the merits.  
                                                 
7 But see Matrix IV, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust 
Co. of Chi., 649 F.3d 539, 549-52 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting a 
split of authority on the core versus non-core reasoning). 
8 See Mrozek v. Intra Fin. Corp., 2005 WI 73, ¶21, 281 
Wis. 2d 448, 699 N.W.2d 54 (observing that the guilty plea 
"inquiry is not the same as a fully litigated trial between 
adversarial parties resulting in the fact-finder determining 
that the facts prove" the allegations). 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
17 
 
¶147 Of 
course, 
litigation 
in 
bankruptcy 
courts 
can 
preclude claims in subsequently filed lawsuits.  See, e.g., 
Matrix IV, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chi., 
649 F.3d 539, 542, 547-52 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that claim 
preclusion barred plaintiff's subsequent RICO and common law 
fraud action against same defendants involved in bankruptcy case 
where plaintiff fully "litigated and lost the very same fraud 
claims").  But the settlement here was unlike the cases applying 
claim preclusion following bankruptcy litigation.  Indeed, some 
courts adopt a unique approach for determining whether claim 
preclusion should bar an action when the previous claim occurred 
in a bankruptcy court.  One court explained why:   
"Because 
a 
'bankruptcy 
case' 
is 
fundamentally 
different from the typical civil action, however, 
comparison of a bankruptcy proceeding with another 
proceeding is not susceptible to the standard [claim 
preclusion] 
analysis." 
 
Rather, 
a 
court 
must 
"scrutinize the totality of the circumstances in each 
action and then determine whether the primary test 
of . . . essential 
similarity 
in 
the 
underlying 
events[] has been satisfied."  Also, the court must 
"properly tailor[]" the claim preclusion doctrine to 
the "unique circumstances that arise when the previous 
litigation took place in the context of a bankruptcy 
case."  Ultimately, "a claim should not be barred 
unless the factual underpinnings, theory of the case, 
and 
relief 
sought 
against 
the 
parties 
to 
the 
proceeding are so close to a claim actually litigated 
in the bankruptcy that it would be unreasonable not to 
have brought them both at the same time in the 
bankruptcy forum." 
Haskell v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 355 B.R. 438, 449 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2006) (citations and quoted sources omitted; fourth 
alteration in original).   
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
18 
 
¶148 Here, the claims North Highland pursues against Wells 
were not "actually litigated" in the bankruptcy case——Wells was 
not even involved in the bankruptcy proceeding.  Nor would it 
have been reasonable or possible for North Highland to litigate 
its claims against Wells within Trewyn's bankruptcy proceeding.  
North Highland's agreement to forgo its state court lawsuit 
against a bankruptcy debtor whose obligations were dischargeable 
does not bar it from pointing the finger at Trewyn to establish 
a conspiracy with Wells, even though Trewyn cannot be held 
legally liable should the jury find in North Highland's favor. 
¶149 The absence of a judgment on the merits also defeats 
Wells's argument that dismissal of North Highland's underlying 
claims against Trewyn precludes North Highland from proving that 
Wells is liable under a "derivative" theory such as conspiracy 
or aiding and abetting.  Although Wells cites several cases from 
other jurisdictions for the proposition that dismissal of a 
tortfeasor 
precludes 
further 
proceedings 
against 
other 
defendants 
on 
derivative 
liability 
theories, 
those 
cases 
featured actual resolution of the underlying cases on the 
merits, unlike the settlement at issue here.9  Wisconsin has long 
                                                 
9 See Discon Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 86 F. Supp. 2d 154, 165-66 
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (district court previously dismissed underlying 
alleged violation of Sherman Act); Barrios v. Paco Pharm. 
Servs., Inc., 816 F. Supp. 243, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting 
conspiracy claim precluded after considering and rejecting 
merits of claim against alleged co-conspirator); Richard B. 
LeVine, Inc. v. Higashi, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 244, 253-54 (Ct. App. 
2005) (holding that derivative liability precluded "where 
plaintiff has already arbitrated or litigated against the direct 
tortfeasor and lost" (emphasis added)).   
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
19 
 
recognized a plaintiff's ability to settle a claim with one 
joint tortfeasor while continuing to pursue a claim against 
another.  See Imark Indus., Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 148 
Wis. 2d 605, 621-22, 436 N.W.2d 311 (1989) (citing Pierringer v. 
Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963); Loy v. Bunderson, 
107 Wis. 2d 400, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)).  Because Wisconsin law 
contemplates continued proceedings after a plaintiff settles 
with an alleged joint tortfeasor, Trewyn's dismissal does not 
preclude a full hearing on the merits of North Highland's 
conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and interference claims against 
Wells.10 
¶150 Trewyn's settlement with North Highland as part of 
bankruptcy proceedings in federal court and the subsequent 
dismissal of North Highland's state-court claims against Trewyn 
                                                 
10 North Highland also directs our attention to Muchow v. 
Goding, 198 Wis. 2d 609, 623, 544 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1995), to 
argue that a settlement does not give rise to claim preclusion.  
But the cited portion of Muchow discusses the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, now known as issue preclusion.  See Paige 
K.B. ex rel. Peterson v. Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 219, 594 
N.W.2d 370 (1999).  "Issue preclusion addresses the effect of a 
prior judgment on the ability to re-litigate an identical issue 
of law or fact in a subsequent action."  Mrozek, 281 
Wis. 2d 448, ¶17.  The doctrine precludes subsequent litigation 
only on questions of fact or law actually litigated in previous 
proceedings.  Id. 
Since Wells has focused his argument for dismissal on a 
theory of claim preclusion, I will not discuss issue preclusion 
in great detail.  I do note, however, that the doctrine likely 
would not bar North Highland's claim against Wells because the 
extent of Wells's alleged liability to North Highland was never 
actually 
litigated 
during 
the 
federal 
dischargeability 
proceedings or as part of Trewyn's stipulated dismissal from 
this state-court action. 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
20 
 
do not extinguish North Highland's previously-filed lawsuit 
against Wells in state court.  These circumstances satisfy 
neither the elements of claim preclusion nor the objectives 
underlying the doctrine.  Holding that the settlement of North 
Highland's adversary claim in Trewyn's bankruptcy proceeding 
precludes 
North 
Highland's 
claim 
against 
Wells 
could 
unnecessarily relieve jointly responsible tortfeasors from their 
legal obligations based on a dismissed defendant's fortuitous 
bankruptcy filing. 
III 
¶151 In sum, I conclude that a confidential bid can be a 
trade 
secret. 
 
I 
would 
reverse 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
determination otherwise and remand to the circuit court because 
the record contains material disputed issues of fact for a jury 
to resolve on whether Wells violated trade secret law.  Further, 
the circuit court erred in concluding that North Highland's 
action against Wells was barred under claim preclusion based on 
the compromise reached between North Highland and Trewyn 
resolving the adversary claim North Highland asserted in 
Trewyn's bankruptcy proceeding, which ultimately led to the 
dismissal of Trewyn alone from the state court case.  I would 
reverse the circuit court's dismissal of this case and remand 
for a jury trial on North Highland's conspiracy, aiding and 
abetting, and interference with contract claims against Wells 
because the circuit court previously determined that material 
issues of disputed facts exist with respect to those claims. 
¶152 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
21 
 
¶153 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY 
joins this dissent. 
No.  2015AP643.rgb 
 
1