Case Title: State v. Droste

Citation: 1998-Ohio-182

Docket Number: 19970998

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DROSTE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Droste (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Statutes — Absent violation of a constitutional right, the violation of a statute 
does not invoke the exclusionary rule. 
Absent a violation of a constitutional right, the violation of a statute does not 
invoke the exclusionary rule. 
(No. 97-998 — Submitted May 12, 1998 — Decided August 19, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 96APC07-906. 
 
Late at night on February 24, 1996, towards the end of their shift, 
investigators Michael Betts and Philip Williams of the Ohio Department of Liquor 
Control were driving on State Route 315 in Columbus, Ohio, when a vehicle 
traveling at approximately ninety to one hundred miles per hour passed them.  The 
investigators observed the vehicle move from the center lane to the left lane 
without a turn signal, abruptly slow down for a vehicle in the left lane, then move 
back into the left lane without a turn signal.  The investigators continued to 
observe the vehicle while they reported their observations and location to the Law 
Enforcement Emergency Radio Network (“LEERN”), a city and state law 
enforcement radio system.  The vehicle slowed down for traffic in its path, and the 
investigators were able to note the vehicle’s license plate number and to positively 
identify the driver and the vehicle’s three other occupants. 
 
The vehicle then exited State Route 315 at Lane Avenue and stopped at a 
traffic light.  Just after the vehicle stopped at the light, the investigators received a 
communication over LEERN to request that they stop the vehicle and to tell them 
that a marked law enforcement car was on the way.  The investigators exited their 
vehicle and approached the other vehicle.  They identified themselves as police 
officers, and asked the driver for his name and identification.  The driver, Brian A. 
 
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Droste, appellee-defendant herein, stated his name and age.  Investigator Betts 
noted an odor of alcohol about Droste and asked him to exit the vehicle.  Betts 
observed that Droste needed to use the vehicle for support when he exited the 
vehicle.  Betts read Droste his Miranda rights and then asked Droste how much he 
had had to drink.  Droste responded that he had drunk several glasses of gin.  Betts 
determined that Droste was underage and arrested him for underage drinking. 
 
Meanwhile, Officer Lagore of the Columbus Police Department responded 
to a request he had received over LEERN to assist the liquor control investigators.  
Lagore himself did not make the original request of the investigators for assistance 
in stopping the vehicle.  Lagore arrived on the scene when Droste had exited the 
vehicle and the investigators had arrested him for underage drinking.  The liquor 
control investigators informed Lagore of their observations: the vehicle’s high rate 
of speed and the erratic driving and weaving.  Lagore asked Droste whether Droste 
had been driving the vehicle and Droste responded, “yes.”  Lagore could smell 
alcohol on Droste and asked whether Droste had been drinking.  Droste confirmed 
that he had been drinking earlier in the evening. 
 
Investigator Williams then performed a field sobriety test on Droste, under 
Lagore’s observation.  Droste performed poorly on these tests, and Lagore arrested 
him for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“OMVI”) 
and for reckless operation.  Lagore then transported Droste to Columbus police 
headquarters, followed by the two liquor control investigators, where Droste 
submitted to a breathalyzer test, resulting in a blood-alcohol content level of 0.124 
percent. 
 
Lagore charged Droste with operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol, a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) and (B)(2), and for 
reckless operation, a violation of Columbus City Code 2133.02(A) (later amended 
 
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to charge a violation of the comparable state statute, R.C. 4511.20).  Investigator 
Betts charged Droste with underage drinking, a violation of R.C. 4301.632. 
 
On April 9, 1996, Droste filed motions to suppress evidence and to dismiss 
the charges.  On June 26, 1996, the trial court denied both motions.  Droste pled 
no contest to one count of OMVI and to the count of reckless operation.  The trial 
court dismissed the remaining charges. 
 
Droste appealed the trial court’s decision, asserting that the liquor control 
investigators did not have jurisdiction to stop his vehicle, and therefore all 
evidence obtained subsequent to the traffic stop must be suppressed.  On April 1, 
1997, the court of appeals reversed the conviction. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Janet E. Jackson, Columbus City Attorney, Stephen L. McIntosh, City 
Prosecutor, and Brenda J. Keltner, Assistant City Prosecutor, for appellant. 
 
McCorkle & Minnillo and Christopher J. Minnillo, for appellee. 
 
D. Timothy Huey, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  The issues presented by this case are (1) 
whether liquor control investigators have the authority to stop an individual for 
violating traffic laws, and (2) if the liquor control investigators did not have the 
authority to make a traffic stop, must all evidence deriving from that stop be 
suppressed. 
 
R.C. 5502.61(C) and (D)1 set forth the authority granted by the legislature to 
liquor control investigators: 
 
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“(C)(1)  A liquor control investigator, on any retail liquor permit premises 
or any other premises where a violation of Title XLIII of the Revised Code or any 
rule adopted under it is occurring, has the authority vested in peace officers under 
section 2935.03 of the Revised Code to keep the peace and to enforce and make 
arrests for those violations.  A liquor control investigator may also execute search 
warrants and seize and take into custody any property relating to any of those 
violations. 
 
“(2)  A liquor control investigator who is on, immediately adjacent to, or 
across from a retail liquor permit premises and is performing investigative duties 
relating to that premises or who is on a tract of land that is not a liquor permit 
premises but where violations of Title XLIII of the Revised Code allegedly are 
occurring, or who is in view of a suspected violation of Title XLIII of the Revised 
Code, has the authority to enforce that title and sections 2903.12, 2903.13, 
2903.14, 2907.09, 2917.11, 2921.13, 2921.31, 2921.32, 2921.33, 2923.12, 
2923.121, 2925.11, 2925.13, and 4507.30 of the Revised Code if the offense is 
witnessed during an investigation of or the enforcement of an offense described in 
Title XLIII of the Revised Code.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
supersede or curtail local law enforcement authority. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(D)  A liquor control investigator may render assistance to a state or local 
law enforcement officer at that officer’s request or in an emergency.  A liquor 
control investigator who renders assistance authorized by this division to a state or 
local law enforcement officer shall be considered as performing services within 
the scope of the investigator’s regular employment. * * * ” 
 
Under the general rule of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, the expression of one or more items of a class implies that those not 
 
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identified are to be excluded.  Thomas v. Freeman (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 221, 224-
225, 680 N.E.2d 997, 1000; Indep. Ins. Agents of Ohio, Inc. v. Fabe (1992), 63 
Ohio St.3d 310, 314, 587 N.E.2d 814, 817; Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. 
Pub. Util. Comm. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 171, 28 OBR 262, 503 N.E.2d 167. 
 
In R.C. 5502.61(C), the General Assembly listed the specific criminal 
violations that it authorized liquor control investigators to enforce:  any violation 
under R.C. Title 43, and specific violations under R.C. Titles 29 and 45,2 if the 
investigators witnessed the commission of the offense during an investigation or 
the enforcement of an offense described in R.C. Title 43.  Traffic offenses (other 
than R.C. 4507.30), including the offense of OMVI (R.C. 4511.19) are not listed 
and therefore the General Assembly did not envision liquor control investigators 
routinely enforcing the traffic laws.  Additionally, in the case sub judice, the 
investigators were not in the process of investigating or enforcing an R.C. Title 43 
offense when they saw appellee driving erratically, and thus they did not have 
authority to stop him. 
 
We therefore conclude that the authority granted in R.C. 5502.61 to liquor 
control investigators to investigate and enforce offenses under R.C. Title 43 and 
certain offenses under R.C. Title 29 and Title 45 does not confer authority upon a 
liquor control investigator to stop a driver for violating traffic laws, if the 
investigator was not in the process of investigating one of the offenses listed in 
R.C. 5502.61.  See, generally, Cincinnati v. Alexander (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 248, 
254, 8 O.O.3d 224, 227, 375 N.E.2d 1241, 1245, and at syllabus; State v. Holbert 
(1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 113, 116-117, 67 O.O.2d 111, 113, 311 N.E.2d 22, 25, and 
at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
The General Assembly did provide a limited circumstance when liquor 
control investigators may involve themselves in the enforcement of other, non-
 
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listed offenses: when rendering assistance to state or local law enforcement 
officers or in an emergency.  R.C. 5502.61(D).  But in the case sub judice, there is 
no supportable evidence in the record to support the supposition that a state or 
local law enforcement officer did indeed request assistance or that the situation 
constituted an emergency.  At the suppression hearing, investigator Betts testified 
that he received a request over LEERN, but failed to identify just who made that 
request.  Also at the hearing, Officer Lagore testified that he definitely did not 
make the request.  Because there was no evidence in the record of the request for 
assistance coming from “a state or local law enforcement officer,” we cannot find 
that the investigators followed the authority provided in R.C. 5502.61(D). 
 
Having found that the liquor control investigators violated the statute 
granting them authority to stop and arrest appellee, we next consider whether the 
information they provided to Officer Lagore must be suppressed.  We have stated 
on many occasions that absent a violation of a constitutional right, the violation of 
a statute does not invoke the exclusionary rule.  Hilliard v. Elfrink (1996), 77 Ohio 
St.3d 155, 158, 672 N.E.2d 166, 169; Defiance v. Kretz (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 1, 
5-6, 573 N.E.2d 32, 36 (Alice Robie Resnick, J., dissenting); Kettering v. Hollen 
(1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 235, 18 O.O.3d 435, 437, 416 N.E.2d 598, 600. 
 
The record in the case sub judice reveals that appellee’s constitutional rights 
were not violated.  According to Betts’s testimony, Droste stopped on his own 
accord at the traffic light when he exited State Route 315.  Lagore testified that 
when he arrived on the scene, the liquor control investigators told him of the 
vehicle’s excessive speed and of Droste’s erratic driving and weaving.3  Lagore 
could smell alcohol on Droste.  Upon questioning by Lagore, Droste admitted that 
he had been driving the vehicle and that he had been drinking earlier in the 
evening.  Droste subsequently failed the field sobriety tests.  Based on the 
 
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foregoing facts, Lagore had probable cause to arrest Droste.  Thus, Droste’s rights 
under the Fourth Amendment were not violated, and the evidence should not be 
suppressed. 
 
We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial 
court’s conviction of appellee. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs separately. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
R.C. 5502.61 has been amended since the time of the stop and arrest that are 
the subject of the case sub judice.  Other than changing the designation of the 
paragraphs we are analyzing here, the changes to the statute do not affect our 
decision herein.  (146 Ohio Laws, Part III, 6022-6023.) 
2. 
The offenses listed in R.C. 5502.61(C)(2) are aggravated assault, assault, 
negligent assault, public indecency, disorderly conduct, falsification, obstructing 
official business, obstructing justice, resisting arrest, carrying concealed weapons, 
illegal possession of a firearm in a liquor permit premises, possession of drugs, 
permitting drug abuse, and committing prohibited acts involving a false or illegal 
identification card or driver’s license. 
3. 
The mere providing to a police officer of information upon which that 
officer will base and continue a criminal investigation and eventually file a 
criminal complaint is not an exercise of the authority “to keep the peace and to 
enforce and make arrests” as stated in R.C. 5501.61(C)(1).  Holbert, 38 Ohio St.2d 
at 117, 67 O.O.2d at 113-114, 311 N.E.2d at 25.  Thus, Officer Lagore could rely 
 
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on the information provided to him by the liquor control investigators to complete 
his investigation. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring.  I agree with the majority but take 
exception with the conclusion that there is no supportable evidence in the record 
that the situation facing the liquor control investigators constituted an emergency.  
The investigators observed the operator of a vehicle driving ninety to one hundred 
miles per hour and changing lanes recklessly.  Such behavior clearly was cause for 
alarm.  This evidence is sufficient to constitute an emergency situation and the 
investigators’ failure to act may have led to tragic consequences on the highway, 
especially in light of the fact that the defendant’s blood-alcohol content tested at a 
level of 0.124. 
 
R.C. 5502.61(D) authorizes a liquor control investigator to render assistance 
“at that officer’s request or in an emergency.”   Because the statute is written in 
the disjunctive, the investigator may give assistance in an emergency without also 
being requested to do so by an officer.  Although these investigators did receive a  
request over LEERN to stop the vehicle, this situation clearly constituted an 
emergency.  Therefore, I believe the investigators were authorized to make the 
stop.