Case Title: Sophia Willis v. State of Indiana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49S02-0707-CR-295

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Robert D. King, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nicole M. Schuster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-0707-CR-295 
 
SOPHIA WILLIS, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division Room 16 
No. 49G16-0602-FD-022935 
The Honorable Danielle Gaughan, Commissioner 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0611-CR-982 
_________________________________ 
 
June 10, 2008 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
 
This case requires us to examine the balance that must be struck in determining when a 
parent’s use of physical force as a form of discipline crosses the line into criminal conduct.  We 
conclude the line was not crossed in this instance. 
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jun 10 2008, 2:54 pm
Background and Procedural History 
 
Sophia Willis is a single mother raising her eleven-year-old son, J.J., who has a history of 
untruthfulness and taking property belonging to others.  The events at issue in this case began at 
an elementary school Friday, February 3, 2006.  On that date J.J.’s fifth grade teacher, Ms. 
McCuen, saw J.J. giving a bag of women’s clothing to a classmate.  Finding this to be an “odd 
exchange,” Ms. McCuen contacted J.J.’s mother.  Tr. at 31.  Willis met with Ms. McCuen and 
identified the clothing as hers.   
 
Experiencing ongoing disciplinary problems with J.J., Willis sent him to her sister’s 
home over the next two days to ponder her options.  When J.J. returned on Sunday Willis had a 
long conversation with her son and questioned him about his conduct.  J.J. denied taking the 
clothing and instead concocted a story that shifted blame to other students.  Willis warned that if 
he did not tell the truth he would be punished.  J.J. again gave the same story.  In response Willis 
instructed J.J. to remove his pants and place his hands on the upper bunk bed.  J.J. complied, and 
Willis proceeded to strike him five to seven times with either a belt or an extension cord.1  
Although trying to swat J.J. on the buttocks, his attempt to avoid the swats resulted in some of 
them landing on his arm and thigh leaving bruises.  J.J. testified that during this exchange his 
mother was “mad.”  Tr. at 9.  Willis countered that she was not angry but “disappointed.”  Id. at 
59-60.  
 
 
The following Monday J.J. returned from gym class and asked to see the school nurse.2  
Showing the nurse the bruises, J.J. told her that he received a “whooping” from his mother 
“[b]ecause I had took some clothes and I had lied.”  Tr. at 8.  The nurse contacted child 
protective services that in turn contacted the Indianapolis Police Department.  Id. at 26.  
                                             
 
1 The evidence on this point is in conflict.  Willis testified she used a belt and introduced it as Defendant’s 
Exhibit C.  Tr. at 57.  J.J. testified that his mother used an extension cord.  Id. at 8.  For purposes of de-
termining guilt and imposing sentence, the trial court declared, “I think it wouldn’t matter if it was a belt 
or an extension cord.”  Id. at 65.  
 
2 According to J.J., Ms. McCuen noticed the marks on his arm as he was returning from gym.  Only then 
did he ask to see the nurse.  Ms. McCuen testified that her attention was drawn to J.J. upon his return 
from gym and she sent him to the nurse because “[h]e asked me if being hit with an extension cord was 
abuse.”  Tr. at 34.  
 
2
 
Willis was arrested and charged with battery as a Class D felony.3  After a bench trial she 
was found guilty as charged.  At the sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged that Willis 
was a single mother attempting to raise a sometimes rebellious son.  Tr. at 65 (The trial judge 
emphasized there were “obviously some disciplinary issues with regard to [J.J.]”); Id. at 75-76 
(“I know that you’ve been through a lot of things with your son. . . .  [T]here were issues [and] 
the teachers were concerned . . . .”).  Noting the uncertainty of the law in this area, the trial court 
also observed, “[T]his is a tough area of the law. . . .  Because you know that a person’s intent 
was not to do the wrong thing. . . .  I don’t have a good answer for you [as to where to draw the 
line]. . . .  I do believe that as the case law is written that the incident that was before [the court] 
rose to the level of D Felony, Battery on a Child.”  Tr. at 75-76.  Exercising its discretion to enter 
judgment of conviction as a Class A misdemeanor,4 the trial court sentenced Willis to 365 days 
in jail with 357 days suspended to probation. 
 
Contending that she had the legal authority to discipline her son, Willis appealed on 
grounds that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction.  Sympathizing with Willis’ 
argument that she is a single parent doing the best she can and acknowledging that this is a 
“closer case” than other reported Indiana decisions, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment 
of the trial court.  See Willis v. State, 866 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).  Having 
previously granted Willis’ petition to transfer, we now reverse the judgment of the trial court.  
Additional facts are set forth below as relevant. 
 
Discussion 
 
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a familial relationship with his 
or her child.  See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
                                             
 
3 Sometimes referred to as “battery on a child,” the statute provides that “[a] person who knowingly or 
intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class B mis-
demeanor,” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a), and the offense is a Class D felony “if it results in bodily injury to . 
. . a person less than fourteen (14) years of age and is committed by a person at least eighteen (18) years 
of age.”  I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(B).  
 
4 See I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b) (“Notwithstanding subsection (a) [setting forth the penalty for a Class D felony 
offense], if a person has committed a Class D felony, the court may enter judgment of conviction of a 
Class A misdemeanor and sentence accordingly.”). 
 
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205, 231-32 (1972).  This fundamental interest includes the right of parents “to direct the 
upbringing and education of children,” Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); 
see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14, including the use of reasonable or moderate physical force to 
control behavior.  See I.C. § 31-34-1-15(1) (Entitled “Circumstances Under Which a Child Is a 
Child in Need of Services,” the statute provides in part, “This chapter does not . . . [l]imit the 
right of a parent, guardian, or custodian of a child to use reasonable corporal punishment when 
disciplining the child.”).  However, the potential for child abuse cannot be taken lightly.  
Consequently, the State has a powerful interest in preventing and deterring the mistreatment of 
children.  See Prince v. Dep’t of Child Servs., 861 N.E.2d 1223, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“[A] 
parent’s right to her children is balanced against the State’s limited authority to interfere for the 
protection of the children.”); Parker v. Monroe County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 533 N.E.2d 177, 
179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (“Fundamental rights to family integrity protect the relationship 
between parent and child from state action; however, in the event of parental neglect, abuse, or 
abandonment, the State has a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of the child.”).  The 
difficult task of prosecutors and the courts is to determine when parental use of physical force in 
disciplining children turns an otherwise law-abiding citizen into a criminal.    
 
A parental privilege to use moderate or reasonable physical force, without criminal 
liability, was recognized at common law.  For example, Blackstone observed, “[B]attery is, in 
some cases, justifiable or lawful; as where one who hath authority, a parent or master, gives 
moderate correction to his child, his scholar, or his apprentice.”  William Blackstone, 3 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England 120 (Oxford reprint 1992).  A similar view 
has been expressed in this state’s jurisprudence.  See e.g., Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490, 26 N.E. 
777, 778 (1891) (“[F]ather has the right to administer proper and reasonable chastisement to his 
child without being guilty of an assault and battery, but he has no right to administer 
unreasonable chastisement, or to be guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment of his child . . . .”); 
Hornbeck v. State, 16 Ind. App. 484, 45 N.E. 620, 620 (1896) (“The law is well settled that a 
parent has the right to administer proper and reasonable chastisement to his child without being 
guilty of an assault and battery . . . .”). 
 
4
 
A number of jurisdictions have specifically codified a parental discipline privilege.5  
Although Indiana has not yet done so, our courts have construed Indiana Code section 35-41-3-
16 – the defense of legal authority – as including reasonable parental discipline that would 
otherwise constitute battery.  See Cooper v. State, 831 N.E.2d 1247, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).  
Over several decades our courts have addressed parental claims of legal authority.  See e.g., 
Johnson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 255, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Dyson v. State, 692 N.E.2d 1374, 
1376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Townsend v. State, 616 N.E.2d 47, 50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), rev’d on 
other grounds, 632 N.E.2d 727, 730-31 (Ind. 1994); Smith v. State, 489 N.E.2d 140, 141-42 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1986).  Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals has observed, there is still “precious little 
Indiana caselaw providing guidance as to what constitutes proper and reasonable parental 
discipline of children, and there are no bright-line rules.”  Mitchell v. State, 813 N.E.2d 422, 427 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004).  We agree.  And since adoption of the Criminal Code, this Court has not 
had the occasion to address the parental discipline privilege.  
 
As a matter of judicial declaration or legislative enactment, several jurisdictions have 
embraced some, parts, or all of either the Model Penal Code or the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts to identify permissible parental conduct in the discipline of children.  We think it helpful to 
take a look at these sources.  The Model Penal Code provides in relevant part that a parent’s use 
of force is justifiable if: 
  
(a) the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting 
the welfare of the minor, including the prevention or punishment 
of his misconduct; and 
 
(b) the force used is not designed to cause or known to create a 
substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily injury, 
                                             
 
5 Ala. Code § 13A-3-24(1) (2005); Alaska Stat. § 11.81.430(1)(a) (2006); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-
403(1) (2001); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-605(1) (Supp. 2007); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-703(1)(a) 
(2007); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-18(1) (2007); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 468(1) (2007); Guam Code. 
Ann. tit. 9, § 7.94 (2007); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 703-309(1) (1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 563.061(1) (1999); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-107 (2007); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1413 (1995); N.Y. Penal Law § 35.10 (Supp. 
2008); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-05(1) (Supp. 2007); Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.205(1) (2003); 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 509(1) (1998); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-18-5 (1998); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.61(a) 
(2003). 
 
6 The statute provides, “A person is justified in engaging in conduct otherwise prohibited if he has legal 
authority to do so.”  I.C. § 35-41-3-1.   
 
5
disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress or gross 
degradation.  
 
Model Penal Code § 3.08(1) (1985).  We make two observations.  First, the Code does not 
explicitly demand that the use of force be reasonable.  Second, under the Code, so long as a 
parent acts for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the child’s welfare (including the 
specific purpose of preventing or punishing misconduct), the parent is privileged in using force, 
unless the force creates a substantial risk of death or excessive injuries.  Neither of these two 
propositions finds support in Indiana’s common law.  We conclude therefore that the Model 
Penal Code is not a helpful source to inform our decision on the law in this area.    
 
 
In contrast, the Restatement provides, “A parent is privileged to apply such reasonable 
force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his [or her] child as he [or she] reasonably 
believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education.”  Restatement of the Law 
(Second) Torts, § 147(1) (1965).  We adopt the Restatement view.  Not only is it entirely 
consistent with the law in this jurisdiction, but also it provides guidance on the factors that may 
be considered in determining the reasonableness of punishment.  It reads: 
 
In determining whether force or confinement is reasonable for the 
control, training, or education of a child, the following factors are 
to be considered: 
 
(a) 
whether the actor is a parent; 
 
(b) 
the age, sex, and physical and mental condition of the child; 
 
(c) 
the nature of his offense and his apparent motive; 
 
(d) 
the influence of his example upon other children of the 
 
same family or group; 
 
(e) 
whether the force or confinement is reasonably necessary 
 
and appropriate to compel obedience to a proper command; 
 
(f) 
whether it is disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily
 
degrading, or likely to cause serious or permanent harm. 
 
 
6
Restatement, supra, § 150.  We hasten to add that this list is not exhaustive.  There may be other 
factors unique to a particular case that should be taken into consideration.  And obviously, not all 
of the listed factors may be relevant or applicable in every case.  But in either event they should 
be balanced against each other, giving appropriate weight as the circumstances dictate, in 
determining whether the force is reasonable.  
 
 
The defense of parental privilege, like self-defense, is a complete defense.  That is to say 
a valid claim of parental privilege is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.  I.C. § 35-
41-3-1.  In order to negate a claim of parental privilege, the State must disprove at least one 
element of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 
(Ind. 2000) (discussing the State’s burden in the context of an analogous self-defense claim); 
Tunstill v. State, 568 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind. 1991) (“Where the issue of self-defense is asserted 
by a defendant and finds support in the evidence, the State then has the burden of negating the 
presence of one or more of the necessary elements of the defense . . . .”).  Thus, to sustain a 
conviction for battery where a claim of parental privilege has been asserted, the State must prove 
that either: (1) the force the parent used was unreasonable or (2) the parent’s belief that such 
force was necessary to control her child and prevent misconduct was unreasonable.  See 
Restatement, supra, § 147.  The State may refute a claim of the defense of parental privilege by 
direct rebuttal or by relying upon the sufficiency of the evidence in its case-in-chief.  Brown v. 
State, 738 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind. 2000).  The decision of whether a claim of parental privilege 
has been disproved is entrusted to the fact-finder.  The standard of review for a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of parental privilege is the same as the standard for 
any sufficiency claim.  See Sanders v. State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. 1999).  We neither 
reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses.  Id.  If there is sufficient evidence of 
probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, the verdict will not be disturbed.  Id.  
 
 
Several of the factors suggested by the Restatement are helpful in evaluating the facts in 
this case.  Although we know that J.J. is an eleven-year-old male child, there is nothing in the 
record concerning his physical or mental condition.  In any event, “A punishment which would 
not be too severe for a boy of twelve may be obviously excessive if imposed upon a child of four 
or five.”  Restatement, supra, § 150 cmt. c.  As for the nature of the offense and J.J.’s apparent 
 
7
motive, the record is not clear as to why J.J. took his mother’s clothing to school and then lied 
about it.  That aside, most parents would likely consider as serious their eleven-year-old child’s 
behavior in being untruthful and taking property of others.  At the very least a parent might 
consider that such behavior could set the stage for more aberrant behavior later in life.  Willis 
expressed her concerns in this regard, “[H]e’s going to do it again . . . . [H]e’s already done it 
again . . . .  And I hate to say it, but I know my son will end up back in the court system.”  Tr. at 
75.  Comments to the Restatement provide, “[A] more severe punishment may be imposed for a 
serious offense, or an intentional one, than for a minor offense, or one resulting from a mere 
error of judgment or careless inattention.  The fact that the child has shown a tendency toward 
certain types of misconduct may justify a punishment which would be clearly excessive if 
imposed upon a first offender.”  Restatement, supra, § 150 cmt. c.  Clearly J.J. was not a first 
offender. 
 
Concerning whether the force Willis employed against J.J. was reasonably necessary and 
appropriate to compel obedience to her insistence that he tell the truth, again the Restatement is 
instructive.  “As in all cases in which the question arises as to whether there has been excessive 
means of carrying out the privilege [to use force], the actor is not privileged to use a means to 
compel obedience if a less severe method appears to be likely to be equally effective.”  
Restatement, supra, § 150 cmt. d.  The record shows that Willis has used progressive forms of 
discipline.  Typical punishment was to send J.J. to his room, ground him, or withhold privileges 
such as television, games, and time spent outdoors.  Tr. at 16-18, 43.  According to Willis, after 
grounding failed the last time J.J. was caught stealing, she decided harsher punishment – 
swatting with a belt – would be more effective.  As Willis explained, “I thought about it over the 
entire weekend and I even tried to talk to him again.  And he continued to lie. . . .  I didn’t know 
what else to do.”  Tr. at 75. 
 
 
Considering whether the punishment J.J. received was unnecessarily degrading, 
dispropotionate to the offense J.J. committed, or likely to cause J.J. serious or permanent harm, 
we make the following observations.  J.J. received five to seven swats on his buttocks, arm, and 
thigh for what many parents might reasonably consider a serious offense.  We find nothing 
particularly degrading about this manner of punishment.  Nor, in context, is it readily apparent 
 
8
 
9
that the punishment was disproportionate to the offense.  The question is whether the manner of 
punishment was “likely to cause [J.J.] serious or permanent harm.”  Restatement, supra, § 150(f).  
The best answer to this question is J.J.’s own testimony which indicated that the swats hurt “[f]or 
a minute” but did not hurt the next day when he returned to school.  Tr. at 10.  To be sure the 
bruising was still apparent, but there is no indication that the school nurse provided any medical 
attention or even suggested that medical attention was necessary.  In essence it appears from the 
record that the bruises were neither serious nor permanent.  This fact militates against a 
conclusion that the punishment was unreasonable.  See State v. Wilder, 748 A.2d 444, 455 (Me. 
2000) (concluding that to trigger criminal liability the physical harm caused by the parent’s use 
of force as a method of discipline must result in more than transient pain and minor, temporary 
marks or bruises); T.G. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 927 So.2d 104, 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2006) (Bruises are not necessarily indicative of excessive corporal punishment.).  
 
In response to a charge of battery, Willis raised the defense of parental discipline 
privilege.  Considering the totality of the circumstances, we are not persuaded that the State 
disproved the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  We therefore set aside Willis’ conviction.  
 
Conclusion  
 
We reverse the judgment of the trial court.  
 
Shepard, C.J. and Dickson and Boehm, JJ., concur. 
Sullivan, J., dissents with separate opinion. 
Sullivan, Justice, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
We see on appeal many cases of child abuse in which the parents claim that they 
were only disciplining their children, that they reasonably believed that the force they 
used was necessary to control their children or prevent misconduct.  By authorizing par-
ents to impose as much force they believe is necessary unless the State proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt that either (1) the force used was unreasonable; or (2) the parents’ belief 
was unreasonable, the Court increases the quantum of effort that the State will be re-
quired to expend in its efforts to protect children from abuse.  As such, the Court’s opin-
ion constitutes a change in our State’s policy toward child abuse.  Particularly given the 
commitment of time and resources that the legislative and executive branches have de-
voted to this subject for the last two decades and more, I believe that such a policy 
change should be made by the legislative and executive branches, not the judiciary. 
 
 
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