Case Title: HAWKEYE-SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY v. Tupper

Citation: 380 P.2d 31

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1963-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
380 P.2d 31 (1963) HAWKEYE-SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY and Carroll S. Jones, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Clinton S. TUPPER and Industrial Commission of Colorado, a corporation, Defendants in Error. No. 20201. Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc. March 25, 1963. Wormwood, O'Dell & Wolvington, William P. DeMoulin, Denver, for plaintiffs in error. Haney & Howbert, Byron L. Akers, Jr., Robert L. Russel, Colorado Springs, for defendants in error. HALL, Justice. The parties appear here in the same order as in the trial court. We refer to Jones as the employer, to Hawkeye-Security Insurance Company as the insurance carrier, to Tupper as the claimant, and to the Industrial Commission as the commission. On March 7, 1961, claimant suffered compensable injuries to his left foot which necessitated amputation of the left leg six and one-fourth inches below the knee. On May 1, 1961, he was fitted with a prosthetic leg and on that date began wearing it and was, on May 13, 1961, "capable of returning to work, at least on a somewhat limited basis." The insurance carrier admitted liability and offered to pay and is willing to pay to claimant compensation at the maximum *32 weekly rate for 139 weeks as provided by CRS '53, 81-12-4, which provides: The * * * Medical testimony offered by the claimant was to the effect that claimant "had a normal recovery, * * * somewhat faster than the average"; that on May 1, 1961, he was wearing his prosthetic leg, was doing very well and able to return to work; On June 30, 1961, the referee entered his order directing the insurance carrier to pay temporary disability through April 30, 1961, and: The insurance carrier contends that claimant's rights to permanent disability are limited, as provided by 81-12-4, supra. It had the order of award reviewed by the referee, the commission and the district court. All affirmed the order. The employer and his insurance carrier are here by writ of error seeking reversal, contending that the commission's award of June 30, 1961, is erroneous, and that under the statute claimant is entitled to compensation for 139 weeks at the maximum rate of permanent disability. Only one question is presented for our consideration, and that is whether claimant under the facts as presented may be awarded compensation in excess of that provided by 81-12-4. Claimant contends that the commission in its discretion may make an award as provided in 81-12-9, and this even though 81-12-9 at the outset provides that: It is difficult to conceive of a situation more clearly covered by 81-12-4 than is that of claimant. One might conclude that the statute was written for the express purpose of defining the rights and duties of the parties before us. If it does not cover claimant's situation, then it does not cover any specific injury and is meaningless and a nullity. The statute is not ambiguous or indefinite. It needs no interpretation or construction. Nearly all compensation acts have provisions for "scheduled injuries" similar to 81-12-4. The general rule governing cases such as we have here is stated in 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 306, p. 1104: And, § 310, page 1118: Here, the injured member is claimant's leg. There is no proof of injury to any other member of claimant's body nor is there any proof of injury to claimant's leg above the point of amputation. In Cresson Consol. Gold Min. & Mill. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 90 Colo. 353, 9 P.2d 295, the claimant suffered injuries which resulted in the amputation of the little finger of his left hand, and amputation of his index, middle and ring fingers of his right hand. The commission awarded claimant compensation based upon a finding of 25% disability as a working unit under 4452, C.L.1921, as amended by Laws 1929 (substantially the same as 1960 Perm.Supp., CRS, 81-12-9). This award was affirmed by the district court and here reversed. It was there said: In Great American Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Co., 114 Colo. 91, 162 P.2d 413, the court had occasion to apply this statute in a case involving an accident alleged to have resulted in "total blindness of one eye." We there said: In Arkin v. Industrial Commission, 145 Colo. 463, 358 P.2d 879, it was said: Counsel for claimant rely on Leyden Co. v. Buddy, 98 Colo. 452, 56 P.2d 52, and contend that the holding therein is inconsistent with the holdings in the cases referred to above and that Leyden lays down the proper rule and if applied to this case would demand an affirmance. We find nothing in Leyden that is inconsistent with the foregoing cases. In Leyden, claimant did not suffer any of the scheduled losses set forth in 81-12-4. He suffered an injury to his right leg and also to his right arm. The referee found that these injuries caused 50% disability of "right leg at the ankle" and 35% of "right arm at the wrist." There is no provision in 81-12-4 for loss of an arm at the wrist or of a leg at the ankle. There is provision for loss of "a hand at the wrist," and for loss of a "foot at the ankle." Claimant, in Leyden, did not bring himself within the terms of 81-12-4. His injuries, as found by the commission, did not involve the loss of any "member," are not covered by 81-12-4 and, not being specified therein, are not among those excepted in 81-12-9, which excepts those covered by 81-12-4. Certainly Tupper suffered the "loss of a leg at or above the knee, where the stump remains sufficient to permit the use of an artificial limb." He was supplied with an artificial limb and he was using it within two months of his injury. He comes squarely within the terms of 81-12-4 and is expressly excluded from 81-12-9. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to order the commission to vacate its award and to award claimant compensation as provided by 81-12-4. MOORE, J., not participating.