Case Title: State v. Cooper

Citation: 2004-Ohio-6553

Docket Number: 20031637

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Cooper, 104 Ohio St.3d 293, 2004-Ohio-6553.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. COOPER, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Cooper, 104 Ohio St.3d 293, 2004-Ohio-6553.] 
Criminal law — Multiple counts — R.C. 2941.25(A) — Acts are not allied 
offenses of similar import, when. 
(No. 2003-1637 — Submitted September 29, 2004 — Decided December 15, 
2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Crawford County, No. 3-02-02, 2003-
Ohio-4236. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
R.C. 2941.25(A) applies when the state obtains multiple convictions 
arising out of the same conduct of a defendant that can be construed to 
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import. 
2. 
Where the state has not relied upon the same conduct of the defendant to 
support a conviction for the offense of involuntary manslaughter involving 
child endangering and a separate conviction for child endangering, the 
defendant may be convicted of both crimes and sentenced on each. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶1} 
The issue for resolution in this appeal arises from the peculiar facts 
of this case in which the trial court held and the court of appeals agreed that based 
on our decision in State v. Rance (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699, 
James A. Cooper’s separate convictions for involuntary manslaughter and for 
child endangering constituted allied offenses of similar import and that, therefore, 
he could only be sentenced on the greater offense.  The state contends that the 
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2 
trial court erred and seeks clarification of Rance and a reversal of the decision 
reached by the court of appeals. 
{¶2} 
Here, we are called upon to revisit the allied-offense statute, R.C. 
2941.25, and to clarify the law in the context of the facts of this case.  After 
careful review, we have determined that the state presented evidence of two 
separate acts of child endangering—one involving slamming the infant’s head 
against an object, as a predicate offense to the act of involuntary manslaughter, in 
violation of R.C. 2903.04, and the other involving shaking the infant, in violation 
of R.C. 2919.22.  The jury returned verdicts finding Cooper guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter, involving one offense of child endangering, and a separate and 
distinct act of child endangering.  Therefore, as explained below, we conclude 
that these acts are not the “same conduct * * * constitut[ing] two or more allied 
offenses of similar import” within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(A) and, thus, do 
not involve analysis under State v. Rance. 
{¶3} 
On February 22, 2001, Cooper telephoned for emergency 
assistance and reported that Jordan McElhatten, his 18-month-old stepson, had 
fallen down a flight of stairs at his home and was having difficulty breathing.  
When the ambulance crew arrived, they found only Cooper and Jordan in the 
home and transported both to the Galion Community Hospital. 
{¶4} 
Upon assessment of Jordan’s injuries in the emergency room, the 
medical team life-flighted Jordan to the MetroHealth Medical Center in 
Cleveland.  There, Dr. Dennis Super, a pediatrician in the intensive-care unit, 
determined that Jordan had elevated intracranial pressure, or swelling of the brain.  
At trial, Dr. Super stated that Jordan had sustained one of the worst head injuries 
he had seen in his 18 years at that hospital and that the injuries were not, in his 
view, consistent with a fall down a padded flight of stairs.  In his testimony, Dr. 
Super stated that the elevated intracranial pressure could have been caused by 
either a severe blow to the head or being shaken.  Because of his suspicions, he 
January Term, 2004 
3 
consulted Dr. Thomas L. Steinemann, an ophthalmologist.  Dr. Steinemann found 
a “massive intraocular hemorrhage” in Jordan’s right eye and “multiple areas of 
retinal hemorrhages” in the left eye and concluded that his findings were 
consistent with shaken-baby syndrome, rather than a fall down a flight of stairs. 
{¶5} 
In determining how to alleviate the swelling in Jordan’s brain, Dr. 
Judith Simon, a neuroradiologist, examined Jordan’s CT scans.  She testified that 
injuries as severe as Jordan’s were typically seen in victims of high speed 
automobile accidents or falls from great heights and would not be typical of a fall 
down a flight of stairs.  The CT scans revealed that the entire right side of 
Jordan’s brain swelled, indicating that he had sustained a serious blow to the right 
side of his head.  Dr. Roseanna Lechner, a neurosurgeon, completed several 
surgical procedures, including removal of part of Jordan’s skull to alleviate the 
pressure by giving the brain more room to swell. 
{¶6} 
None of these efforts, however, proved successful, and as a result, 
doctors disconnected Jordan’s life support.  Cuyahoga County Deputy Coroner 
William Bligh-Glover performed an autopsy, which revealed that Jordan had 
bruises all over his body, but particularly on his face and head, which the coroner 
determined had been inflicted at the same time as the brain injuries. 
{¶7} 
The coroner further testified that Jordan “had injuries to all the 
layers of the organs in the head,” and he opined that Jordan’s head and brain 
injuries could be attributed to either vigorous shaking or slamming the child 
against a hard surface.  The autopsy report stated that Jordan died by homicide 
and noted the cause of death as “[b]lunt impacts to [the] head with soft tissue and 
brain injuries.” 
{¶8} 
Members of the Galion Police Department arrested Cooper, and 
the Crawford County Grand Jury returned a two-count indictment against him: the 
first for involuntary manslaughter with child endangering as the predicate felony 
offense and the second for child endangering in violation of R.C. 2919.22.  The 
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court conducted a jury trial, which resulted in convictions on both counts.  Cooper 
argued that the two convictions constituted allied offenses of similar import under 
R.C. 2941.25. The trial court agreed and imposed sentence on only the conviction 
for involuntary manslaughter.  Cooper appealed both convictions, and the state 
cross-appealed the trial court’s ruling regarding allied offenses. 
{¶9} 
The appellate court affirmed Cooper’s convictions and, relying on 
State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699, upheld the trial court’s allied-
offense ruling.  The state now appeals from that determination, arguing that 
involuntary manslaughter and child endangering are not allied offenses of similar 
import. 
{¶10} The cause is now before this court upon our acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶11} In State v. Rance, we held that the prohibition against cumulative 
punishments contained in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 52 
S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306, does not apply where the General Assembly clearly 
intended to impose cumulative punishment.  Rance, at paragraph three of the 
syllabus.  In determining legislative intent, we stated:  
{¶12} “We discern the General Assembly's intent on this subject through 
review of Ohio's multiple-count statute, R.C. 2941.25. If the court’s sentencing of 
Rance accords with the multiple-count statute, that harmony with the legislative 
intent precludes an ‘unconstitutional’ label. See Albernaz [v. United States 
(1981)], 450 U.S. [333] at 344, 101 S.Ct. [1137] at 1145, 67 L.Ed.2d [275] at 285; 
[State v.] Bickerstaff [1984], 10 Ohio St.3d [62] at 65-66, 10 OBR [352] at 355-
356, 461 N.E.2d [892] at 895-896. This court has stated that Ohio’s multiple-
count statute ‘is a clear indication of the General Assembly’s intent to permit 
cumulative sentencing for the commission of certain offenses.’  Id. at 66, 10 OBR 
at 356, 461 N.E.2d at 896, fn. 1. 
January Term, 2004 
5 
{¶13} “[I]f a defendant commits offenses of similar import separately or 
with a separate animus, he may be punished for both pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(B). 
State v. Jones (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 12, 13-14, 676 N.E.2d 80, 81.” Rance, 85 
Ohio St.3d at 635-636, 710 N.E.2d 699. 
{¶14} In this case, then, we look to R.C. 2941.25 to determine whether 
cumulative punishment is authorized.  Ohio’s multiple-count statute provides:  
{¶15} “(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or 
information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be 
convicted of only one. 
{¶16} “(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more 
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses 
of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to 
each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and 
the defendant may be convicted of all of them.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶17} Accordingly, a court need only engage in the allied-offense 
analysis when the same conduct, or single act, results in multiple convictions.  We 
emphasized that point in State v. Logan (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 128, 14 
O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345: “In addition to the requirement of similar import 
of the crimes committed, the defendant, in order to obtain the protection of R.C. 
2941.25(A), must show that the prosecution has relied upon the same conduct to 
support both offenses charged.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶18} We further elaborated in State v. Jones (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 12, 
14, 676 N.E.2d 80, where we stated:  
{¶19} “This court has generally not found the presence or absence of any 
specific factors to be dispositive on the issue of whether crimes were committed 
separately or with a separate animus. * * * Instead, our approach has been to 
analyze the particular facts of each case before us to determine whether the acts or 
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animus were separate. See State v. Nicholas (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 435, 613 
N.E.2d 225, 229; State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884, 
899-900; State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 33, 559 N.E.2d 464, 475; 
Newark v. Vazirani (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 81, 83-84, 549 N.E.2d 520, 522; State 
v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 262, 552 N.E.2d 191, 199.”1  
{¶20} In Logan, we held that an offender must demonstrate the state’s 
reliance on the same conduct to prove multiple charges before gaining the 
protection of R.C. 2941.25.  Therefore, before we examine the facts of this case 
under R.C. 2941.25 and Rance, we must determine whether the state proved that 
Cooper committed two distinct acts of child endangering  – one as a predicate for 
involuntary manslaughter, which resulted in Jordan’s death, and a separate act 
which did not result in death.  In our analysis, we necessarily review the evidence 
that the state presented in this regard at trial. 
{¶21} At trial, the state presented evidence that Jordan had suffered 
several blunt impacts to the head and also exhibited signs of shaken-baby 
syndrome.  The autopsy report noted that Jordan died as result of “[b]lunt impacts 
to [the] head with soft tissue and brain injuries.”  The autopsy report detailed two 
skull fractures, a bruise on the left forehead, another bruise below the chin, an 
abrasion on the right forehead, a bruise on the right cheek, another bruise on the 
right forehead, and one bruise under the scalp, between the scalp and skull.  These 
injuries culminated in the coroner’s conclusion that Jordan sustained blunt trauma 
to the head, causing his death by homicide. 
{¶22} At trial, Jordan’s mother, Patricia McElhatten, testified that Jordan 
had no bruises on his chin or neck when she last saw him on February 22, 2001. 
                                                          
 
1. We note that Rance overruled Newark v. Vazirani(1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 81, 549 N.E.2d 520, on 
other grounds.  85 Ohio St.3d at 638, 710 N.E.2d 699. 
 
January Term, 2004 
7 
{¶23} Also, Dr. Bligh-Glover, the deputy coroner, testified extensively 
regarding the injuries inflicted upon Jordan.  He opined that Jordan had both coup 
and contrecoup contusions over many surfaces of his brain.  The doctor explained 
that coup contusions appear on the brain directly under the point of impact when 
there is a direct blow to the head.  Contrecoup contusions, however, occur on the 
side of the brain directly opposite of the point of impact because the brain is 
suspended in fluid and will press up against the opposite side of the skull before 
moving back to the side where the impact occurred.  Dr. Bligh-Glover explained 
how the injuries to Jordan’s brain could have occurred:  
{¶24} “The type of injuries that I saw on Jordan could have occurred in 
two ways.  The first part is the shaking of the shaken baby syndrome.  When you 
shake a kid very vigorously – and kids’ heads, as I said, are heavy.  Their necks 
are weak.  And the head bounces back and forth and gives this 
acceleration/deceleration in the skull. 
{¶25} “Then, finally, there is the impact phase.  When the shaking is 
finished, the baby is limp and unconscious and lands against a hard surface.” 
{¶26} Further, Dr. Steinemann, an ophthalmologist, examined Jordan 
and, based on the massive intraocular hemorrhage in the right eye and the 
multiple areas of retinal hemorrhages in the left eye, found that these injuries were 
“consistent with shaken baby syndrome.”  And Dr. Bligh-Glover testified that 
“retinal hemorrhaging in the pattern that [he] saw in Jordan McElhatten, 
throughout the back of the retina, is considered to be pathognomonic, proof 
positive, of shaken impact syndrome.” 
{¶27} The state claimed in its opening statement and presented evidence 
at trial that Cooper had committed two acts of violence against Jordan –slamming 
his head against a hard surface and shaking him.  The state offered separate 
medical testimony as to each act.  Dr. Bligh-Glover’s testimony and the autopsy 
report proved that Cooper caused Jordan’s death by either striking him or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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slamming him against a hard object.  The testimony offered by Doctors Super, 
Steinemann, and Bligh-Glover proved that Cooper endangered Jordan’s life by 
vigorously shaking him. 
{¶28} Based on the foregoing, the record reflects that the state presented 
evidence at trial demonstrating that Cooper committed two separate acts, 
slamming Jordan against a hard surface and shaking him; accordingly, the state 
did not rely on the same conduct to prove two offenses.  Additionally, the court 
instructed the jury to consider the evidence pertaining to each count separately.  
The jurors returned verdicts finding Cooper guilty of both offenses. 
{¶29} Here, Cooper’s convictions did not originate from a single act, but 
rather, in accordance with the evidence, from his separate acts of slamming 
Jordan against a hard surface, which provided the basis of the underlying offense 
of child endangering in connection with the involuntary manslaughter conviction, 
and shaking Jordan, as a separate count of child endangering.  Our decision does 
not alter our holding in Rance, because Rance is not implicated by the facts of this 
case. 
{¶30} Therefore, we hold that R.C. 2941.25(A) applies when the state 
obtains multiple convictions arising out of the same conduct of a defendant that 
can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import.  
Where the state has not relied upon the same conduct of the defendant to support 
a conviction for the offense of involuntary manslaughter involving child 
endangering and a separate conviction for child endangering, the defendant may 
be convicted of both crimes and sentenced on each. 
{¶31} The judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and this cause is 
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with our opinion. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissents. 
January Term, 2004 
9 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent and would dismiss the appeal as 
improvidently allowed. 
__________________ 
Stanley Flegm, Crawford County Prosecuting Attorney, and Clifford 
Murphy, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
John Spiegel, for appellee. 
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