Case Title: State v. Hacker

Citation: 2023-Ohio-2535

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535.] 
 
                                                                
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-2535 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HACKER, APPELLANT. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SIMMONS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535.] 
Criminal law—Sentencing—R.C. 2967.271—Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial—
Separation-of-powers doctrine—The Reagan Tokes Law is not void for 
vagueness, and it is not facially unconstitutional, because (1) it provides 
that offenders receive a hearing before the Department of Rehabilitation 
and Correction (“DRC”) may extend their prison sentence beyond the 
minimum but within the maximum term imposed by the trial court, (2) the 
right to a jury trial is not implicated since no determination by the DRC at 
the hearing changes the sentence range prescribed by the legislature and 
imposed by the trial court, and (3) the authority it gives the DRC to extend 
an offender’s prison sentence beyond the minimum but within the maximum 
range imposed by the trial court does not exceed the power given to the 
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executive branch of the government and does not interfere with the trial 
court’s discretion when sentencing the offender. 
(Nos. 2020-1496 and 2021-0532—Submitted January 11, 2023—Decided  
July 26, 2023.) 
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Logan County, No. 8-20-01, 2020-Ohio-
5048, and the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 109476,  
2021-Ohio-939. 
__________________ 
DETERS, J. 
{¶ 1} The “Reagan Tokes Law,” which became effective in March 2019, 
requires that for certain first- and second-degree felony offenses, a sentencing court 
impose on the offender an indefinite sentence consisting of a minimum and a 
maximum prison term.  There is a presumption that the offender will be released 
from incarceration after serving the minimum prison term.  But if that presumption 
is rebutted, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”) may 
maintain the offender’s incarceration up to the maximum prison term set by the trial 
court.  In these appeals, which we have consolidated for decision, appellants, 
Christopher P. Hacker (case No. 2020-1496) and Danan Simmons Jr. (case No. 
2021-0532), maintain that indefinite sentencing under the Reagan Tokes Law is 
unconstitutional because it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, the 
offender’s right to a jury trial, and procedural due process.  We disagree and 
therefore affirm the judgments of the Third and Eighth District Courts of Appeals. 
I.  The Underlying Cases 
A.  State v. Hacker 
{¶ 2} In December 2019, Hacker pled guilty to one count of aggravated 
robbery with a one-year firearm specification.  Because aggravated robbery is a 
first-degree felony offense, Hacker was subject to sentencing under the Reagan 
Tokes Law.  See 2018 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 201, effective Mar. 22, 2019.  Prior to 
January Term, 2023 
 
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sentencing, Hacker filed an objection to the imposition of an indefinite sentence 
and attached as support the decision of the Hamilton County Court of Common 
Pleas in State v. O’Neal, Hamilton C.P. No. B-1903562, 2019 WL 7670061 (Nov. 
20, 2019).  In O’Neal, the common pleas court declared the Reagan Tokes Law to 
be unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the separation-of-powers doctrine 
and procedural due process.  The First District Court of Appeals subsequently 
reversed the trial court’s judgment.  State v. O’Neal, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.  
C-190736, 2022-Ohio-3017.1 
{¶ 3} The trial court overruled Hacker’s objection and sentenced him to 
prison for a minimum term of six years and a maximum term of nine years for the 
felony offense.  The court also sentenced him to a mandatory one-year prison term 
for the firearm specification, to be served prior to the indefinite sentence.  The court 
imposed a $10,000 fine and ordered Hacker to pay court costs. 
{¶ 4} Hacker appealed to the Third District, which affirmed the trial court’s 
decision on separation-of-powers and due-process grounds.  2020-Ohio-5048, 161 
N.E.3d 112, ¶ 18, 23.  The court of appeals declined to consider Hacker’s contention 
that the Reagan Tokes Law violated his right to a jury trial, finding that he had 
waived that argument by not raising it in the trial court.  Id. at ¶ 17. 
B.  State v. Simmons 
{¶ 5} In December 2019, Simmons pled guilty to one count of having 
weapons while under a disability, one count of drug trafficking with a one-year 
firearm specification, and one count of drug possession.  Because the drug-
trafficking offense to which he pled guilty is a second-degree felony offense, 
Simmons was subject to sentencing under the Reagan Tokes Law.  At the 
sentencing hearing, however, the trial court noted that it had previously held the 
Reagan Tokes Law to be unconstitutional on the grounds cited by the Hamilton 
 
1. This court has accepted the defendant’s appeal in O’Neal, and the case is being held pending this 
court’s decision in these cases.  168 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2022-Ohio-3752, 196 N.E.3d 854. 
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County Court of Common Pleas in O’Neal, Hamilton C.P. No. B-1903562, 2019 
WL 7670061.  The court therefore imposed a definite sentence of four years for 
Simmons’s drug-trafficking offense. 
{¶ 6} The state appealed to the Eighth District.  That court concluded that 
the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional, reversed the lower court’s sentencing 
judgment, and remanded the case for resentencing.  2021-Ohio-939, 169 N.E.3d 
728, ¶ 23. 
II.  The Reagan Tokes Law 
{¶ 7} The Reagan Tokes Law provides for indefinite sentencing for 
offenders convicted of first- or second-degree felonies for which life imprisonment 
is not an available sentence (“eligible felonies”).  R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (2)(a).  
When sentencing an offender for an eligible felony, the trial court must choose a 
“minimum term” from a range of possible minimum prison terms.  Id.  For an 
eligible first-degree felony offense, the range for the minimum prison term is 3 to 
11 years; for an eligible second-degree felony offense, the range is 2 to 8 years.  Id.  
The minimum prison term chosen by the trial court dictates the maximum prison 
term, which must be one and a half times the minimum term.  Id.; R.C. 
2929.144(B)(1).  For example, if the court imposes a minimum prison term of four 
years, the maximum prison term will be six years. 
{¶ 8} R.C. 2967.271(B) lays out how the minimum and maximum prison 
terms affect the amount of time an offender sentenced under the Reagan Tokes Law 
will be incarcerated: “When an offender is sentenced to a non-life felony indefinite 
prison term, there shall be a presumption that the person shall be released from 
service of the sentence on the expiration of the offender’s minimum prison term or 
on the offender’s presumptive earned early release date, whichever is earlier” (the 
“presumption of release”).  The “presumptive earned early release date” is the date 
resulting from a reduction, if any, of the offender’s minimum prison term, R.C. 
January Term, 2023 
 
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2967.271(A)(2), on the recommendation of the director of the DRC for 
“exceptional conduct” or “adjustment to incarceration,” R.C. 2967.271(F)(1). 
{¶ 9} The presumption of release may be rebutted by the DRC 
 
only if the department determines, at a hearing, that one or more of 
the following applies: 
(1) Regardless of the security level in which the offender is 
classified at the time of the hearing, both of the following apply: 
(a) During the offender’s incarceration, the offender 
committed institutional rule infractions that involved compromising 
the security of a state correctional institution, compromising the 
safety of the staff of a state correctional institution or its inmates, or 
physical harm or the threat of physical harm to the staff of a state 
correctional institution or its inmates, or committed a violation of 
law that was not prosecuted, and the infractions or violations 
demonstrate that the offender has not been rehabilitated. 
(b) The offender’s behavior while incarcerated, including, 
but not limited to the infractions and violations specified in division 
(C)(1)(a) of this section, demonstrate that the offender continues to 
pose a threat to society. 
(2) Regardless of the security level in which the offender is 
classified at the time of the hearing, the offender has been placed by 
the department in extended restrictive housing at any time within the 
year preceding the date of the hearing. 
(3) At the time of the hearing, the offender is classified by 
the department as a security level three, four, or five, or at a higher 
security level. 
 
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R.C. 2967.271(C). 
{¶ 10} If the presumption of release is rebutted, the DRC may maintain the 
offender’s incarceration beyond the minimum prison term or, if applicable, the 
presumptive earned-early-release date for a “reasonable period * * * specified by 
the department” not to exceed the maximum prison term established under R.C. 
2929.144.  R.C. 2967.271(D). 
III.  Legal Analysis 
{¶ 11} Legislation is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality.  
Ohio Pub. Interest Action Group, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 43 Ohio St.2d 175, 331 
N.E.2d 730 (1975), paragraph four of the syllabus.  Because Hacker and Simmons 
raise facial challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law, the presumption of 
constitutionality may be overcome only if the law is unconstitutional in all 
instances.  Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 
1165, ¶ 37, citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 
L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).  The distinction between a facial challenge and an as-applied 
challenge is important, because a party bringing the latter need show only that the 
legislation is unconstitutional as applied to a specific set of facts.  Belden v. Union 
Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E.2d 629 (1944), paragraph six of the 
syllabus.  Conversely, in a facial challenge, if the law can be applied 
constitutionally in at least one instance, the challenge fails.  Salerno at 745. 
{¶ 12} Despite seeking to have the entire Reagan Tokes Law declared 
unconstitutional, Hacker and Simmons do not suggest that R.C. 2929.14 and 
2929.144, which establish a trial court’s power to impose indefinite sentences on 
offenders convicted of eligible felonies, violate any constitutional standard.  
Instead, they argue that R.C. 2967.271, which allows the DRC to maintain an 
offender’s incarceration beyond the minimum prison term imposed by a trial court, 
violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, procedural due process, and the right to 
a jury trial.  We consider each constitutional challenge in turn. 
January Term, 2023 
 
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A.  Separation of Powers 
{¶ 13} Hacker and Simmons each maintain that the Reagan Tokes Law 
violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because the DRC—part of the executive 
branch—has been given the authority to maintain an offender’s incarceration 
beyond the minimum prison term imposed by a trial court.  Hacker and Simmons 
reason that the power given to the DRC infringes on the authority of the judicial 
branch.  We disagree.  While the Reagan Tokes Law certainly demonstrates the 
interplay among the three branches of government, the authority given to the 
DRC—which is to be exercised within the bounds of the sentence imposed by the 
trial court—does not infringe on the power of the courts. 
{¶ 14} The separation-of-powers doctrine is “implicitly embedded in the 
entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the 
substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government.”  
S. Euclid v. Jemison, 28 Ohio St.3d 3d 157, 159, 503 N.E.2d 136 (1986).  The 
doctrine “requires that each branch of a government be permitted to exercise its 
constitutional duties without interference from the other two branches of 
government.”  State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 
N.E.2d 472, ¶ 56; see also State ex rel. Johnston v. Taulbee, 66 Ohio St.2d 417, 
423 N.E.2d 80 (1981), paragraph one of the syllabus (“The administration of justice 
by the judicial branch of the government cannot be impeded by the other branches 
of the government in the exercise of their respective powers”). 
{¶ 15} “What are legislative powers, or what executive or judicial powers 
[are], is not defined or expressed in the constitution, except in general terms.  The 
boundary line between them is undefined, and often difficult to determine.”  State 
ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Peters, 43 Ohio St. 629, 647, 4 N.E. 81 (1885).  But the 
boundaries of each branch’s power have been described in cases throughout the 
years.  Relevant here is the principle that the legislative branch “define[s] crimes,” 
“fixes the penalty,” and “provide[s] such discipline and regulations for prisoners, 
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not in conflict with the fundamental law, as the legislature deems best.”  Id.  Thus, 
with the Reagan Tokes Law, the General Assembly established indefinite 
sentencing for offenders convicted of eligible felonies and a scheme for offender 
discipline by the DRC.  The judicial branch determines whether a person is guilty 
of an offense and, after a finding of guilt, imposes a prison sentence within the 
bounds established by the legislature.  Id. at 647-648; see also State ex rel. Bray v. 
Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 132, 136, 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000).  And “[p]rison discipline 
is an exercise of executive power.”  Id.  The question is whether the discipline 
exercised by the DRC under the Reagan Tokes Law interferes with the judiciary’s 
authority to determine guilt and impose a sentence. 
{¶ 16} Once the trial court imposes minimum and maximum prison terms 
under R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) or (2)(a), the sentence for the offender has been set.  
“[D]efendants who have been sentenced under the Reagan Tokes Law have 
received the entirety of their sentences and the sentences have been journalized.”  
State v. Maddox, 168 Ohio St.3d 292, 2022-Ohio-764, 198 N.E.3d 797, ¶ 16.  If the 
DRC determines that the presumption of release has been rebutted, it may maintain 
the offender’s incarceration—but only within the bounds set by the trial court.  It 
does not impede the court’s exercise of its judicial powers. 
{¶ 17} Hacker and Simmons ground their separation-of-powers arguments 
in this court’s decision in Bray.  In that case, the court considered petitions for writs 
of habeas corpus filed by three offenders whose stated prison terms had been 
extended by the addition of “bad time” under former R.C. 2967.11.  Bray at 133.  
The statute at issue provided: “As part of a prisoner’s sentence, the parole board 
may punish a violation committed by the prisoner by extending the prisoner’s stated 
prison term for a period of fifteen, thirty, sixty, or ninety days in accordance with 
this section.”  Former R.C. 2967.11(B), 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10752, 11007.  A 
“violation” was defined as “an act that is a criminal offense under the law of this 
state or the United States, whether or not a person is prosecuted for the commission 
January Term, 2023 
 
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of the offense.”  Former R.C. 2967.11(A), 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, at 11007.  The 
court in Bray concluded that the “bad time” provision unconstitutionally allowed 
the executive branch to “try[], convict[], and sentenc[e] inmates for crimes 
committed while in prison.”  Id. at 136. 
{¶ 18} Hacker and Simmons argue that R.C. 2967.271 suffers from the 
same problems as the former bad-time law because it allows the DRC to try and 
convict prisoners for various infractions—including crimes—committed while 
incarcerated, see R.C. 2967.271(C), and to sentence them to a prison term that 
extends beyond their presumptive release dates. 
{¶ 19} But their arguments fail to account for this court’s discussion of 
Bray, 89 Ohio St.3d 132, 729 N.E.2d 359, in a case released less than two months 
after Bray was decided.  In Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 N.E.2d 1103 
(2000), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Singleton, 124 
Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, the state appealed the Sixth 
District Court of Appeals’ judgment granting a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner 
who had been sentenced to 30 days in a county jail for violating the conditions of 
his postrelease control.  The court of appeals had concluded that R.C. 2967.28—
the postrelease-control statute—violated the separation-of-powers doctrine and the 
Due Process Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions.  Woods at 507. 
{¶ 20} Under former R.C. 2967.28(B), 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, 7597, 
in effect in 2000, offenders convicted of first- and second-degree felony offenses, 
third-degree felony offenses in which physical harm was caused or threatened, or 
felony sex offenses, were subject to mandatory postrelease control.  Offenders 
convicted of other felony offenses were subject to postrelease control at the Ohio 
Parole Board’s discretion.  Former R.C. 2967.28(C), 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 
7597-7598.  And besides determining whether and how long an offender would be 
subject to postrelease control, the parole board had the authority to sanction 
offenders for violating the conditions of their postrelease control.  The possible 
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sanctions included a prison term not to “exceed nine months.”  Former R.C. 
2967.28(F)(3), 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 7601.  The statute further provided that 
“the maximum cumulative prison term for all violations * * * shall not exceed one-
half of the stated prison term originally imposed upon the offender as part of this 
sentence.”  Id. 
{¶ 21} The Sixth District concluded that R.C. 2967.28 violated the 
separation-of-powers doctrine because the powers given to the Adult Parole 
Authority (“APA”)—an executive-branch agency—“usurped judicial authority.”  
Woods at 511.  This court reversed, reasoning that the conditions of postrelease 
control—which include the period of control to which an offender would be 
subjected and the violations of which could lead to “essentially, ‘time and a 
half’ ”—were part of the sentence imposed by the trial court.  Id. 
{¶ 22} In arriving at this conclusion, this court distinguished Bray: 
 
While we acknowledged [in Bray] that prison discipline is a proper 
exercise of executive power, we concluded that trying, convicting, 
and sentencing inmates for crimes committed while in prison is not 
an appropriate exercise of executive power.  The commission of the 
‘crime’ actually resulted in an additional sentence being imposed by 
an administrator.  If an offense was serious enough to constitute an 
additional crime, and the prison authorities did not feel that 
administrative sanctions were sufficient (i.e., isolation, loss of 
privileges), the prison authorities should bring additional charges in 
a court of law, as they did before SB 2.  Accordingly, we held that 
R.C. 2967.11 violated the doctrine of separation of powers and is 
therefore unconstitutional. 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
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(Citation omitted.)  Woods, 89 Ohio St.3d at 512, 733 N.E.2d 1103.  The court 
further explained that “in contrast to the bad-time statute, post-release control is 
part of the original judicially imposed sentence” and that the power to determine 
the duration of postrelease control and the sanctions for an offender’s violation of 
postrelease-control conditions was consistent with the authority that had been 
delegated to the APA in the past under a prior system of parole.  Id.  Moreover, the 
court noted that the authority of the judiciary was not impeded by the APA’s 
performance of its disciplinary function.  Id. 
{¶ 23} The statutory scheme established in the Reagan Tokes Law is 
analogous to that in R.C. 2967.28.  Should the DRC determine that the presumption 
of release is rebutted as the result of an offender’s behavior during his incarceration, 
the additional time that the offender may have to serve is limited by the sentence 
that has already been imposed by the trial court.  R.C. 2967.271(D). 
{¶ 24} Hacker’s separation-of-powers argument is not limited to his 
challenge to the DRC’s authority to hold an offender beyond his presumptive 
minimum prison term.  He also maintains that the authority granted to the DRC 
director under R.C. 2967.271(F)(1) to recommend that an offender be released 
before he completes his minimum prison term constitutes executive-branch 
interference with the judiciary’s power.  We address this argument summarily.  
Hacker has no standing to challenge that provision of the Reagan Tokes Law, 
because he cannot demonstrate that he is aggrieved by it.  See State v. Grevious, __ 
Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-4361, __ N.E.3d__, ¶ 14 (“To have standing to challenge 
the constitutionality of a statute, a party must have a direct interest in the statute of 
such a nature that his or her rights will be adversely affected by its enforcement”).  
Indeed, Hacker and other offenders can only benefit from the DRC’s 
recommending that they be released before they have served their minimum prison 
terms. 
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{¶ 25} We conclude that allowing the DRC to rebut the presumption of 
release for disciplinary reasons does not exceed the power given to the executive 
branch and does not interfere with the trial court’s discretion when sentencing an 
offender.  Therefore, we hold that the Reagan Tokes Law does not violate the 
separation-of-powers doctrine. 
B.  The Right to a Jury Trial 
{¶ 26} Simmons protests that R.C. 2967.271 violates his right to a jury trial 
because the DRC is authorized to maintain his incarceration beyond the minimum 
prison term set by the trial court without any jury findings to support the extended 
incarceration.2 
{¶ 27} In support of his argument, Simmons directs us to a line of cases 
from the United States Supreme Court, beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).  In that case, the Supreme 
Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 490.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court determined that a statute that permitted the increase of the 
maximum term of imprisonment from 10 to 20 years when the trial judge—not a 
jury—found that the defendant had committed a crime with a racial bias violated 
the constitutional right to a jury trial.  Id. at 491-495.  “ ‘[I]t is unconstitutional for 
a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the 
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.’ ”  
(Brackets added in Apprendi.)  Id., quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 
252-253, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 
2. Hacker also raised the right-to-a-jury-trial issue, but because he did not preserve the issue below, 
he has waived it.  See State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986), fn. 1 (“a 
criminal defendant may not raise constitutional errors on appeal unless such were specifically found 
to have been raised below”). 
January Term, 2023 
 
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{¶ 28} But here, the “prescribed range of penalties” is determined upon the 
return of a guilty verdict—or, as in the cases before us, when the offender pleads 
guilty to the charged offenses.  Once an offender is found guilty of an eligible 
offense, the trial court has the discretion to sentence him to any minimum sentence 
within the appropriate range.  R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (2)(a).  And the maximum 
sentence is calculated based on that minimum sentence.  Id.; R.C.  2929.144(B)(1).  
Because no determination by the DRC regarding Simmons’s behavior while in 
prison will change the range of penalties prescribed by the legislature and imposed 
by the trial court, the right to a jury trial is not implicated. 
C.  Due Process 
{¶ 29} Both Hacker and Simmons contend that the Reagan Tokes Law 
violates offenders’ due-process rights.3  Their due-process challenges have two 
bases.  First, they claim that the law is unconstitutionally vague.  Second, they argue 
that the procedure provided by the law is insufficient to protect their rights.  The 
problem with their arguments, however, is that they each raise a facial challenge.  
As such, they must show that in all circumstances, offenders are denied notice and 
a hearing.  They have not made any such demonstration. 
1.  Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine 
{¶ 30} The vagueness claims challenge the adequacy of the notice given by 
the Reagan Tokes Law as to what conduct will trigger maintenance of an offender’s 
incarceration.  “[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute 
define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”  Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983).  Thus, the adequacy of notice is 
 
3. Neither Hacker nor Simmons has mounted a separate challenge under Ohio’s Due Course of Law 
Clause, Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution, so we confine our discussion to the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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evaluated from two perspectives: whether a person subject to the law can 
understand what is prohibited and whether those prohibitions are clear enough to 
prevent arbitrary enforcement. 
{¶ 31} Hacker and Simmons argue that R.C. 2967.271(C)(1)—which 
provides for a rebuttal of the presumption of release, in part, when the DRC 
determines that an offender’s “infractions or violations demonstrate that the 
offender has not been rehabilitated,” R.C. 2967.271(C)(1)(a), and when “the 
offender continues to pose a threat to society,” R.C. 2967.271(C)(1)(b)—does not 
give offenders adequate notice of what circumstances may result in the DRC’s 
maintaining their incarceration beyond the minimum prison term.  To succeed in 
challenging the Reagan Tokes Law, Hacker and Simmons must demonstrate “that 
the statute [is] so unclear that [they] could not reasonably understand that it 
prohibited the acts in which [they] engaged,” State v. Anderson, 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 
171, 566 N.E.2d 1224 (1991). 
{¶ 32} The phrases in the law highlighted by Hacker and Simmons must not 
be read in isolation.  The infractions or violations that may “demonstrate that the 
offender has not been rehabilitated” are those “that involved compromising the 
security of a state correctional institution, compromising the safety of the staff of a 
state correctional institution or its inmates, or physical harm or the threat of physical 
harm to the staff of a state correctional institution or its inmates, or * * * a violation 
of law that was not prosecuted.”  R.C. 2967.271(C)(1)(a).  This statutory provision 
puts offenders on notice about which acts are prohibited and may result in the 
rebuttal of the presumption of their release. 
{¶ 33} Simmons further protests that the DRC is given “unfettered 
discretion” to determine whether certain infractions warrant maintaining an 
offender’s incarceration.  Similarly, Hacker quotes the Hamilton County Common 
Pleas Court’s decision in O’Neal in support of his argument that the law “ ‘fails to 
provide a guideline as to how each consideration shall be weighed,’ ” id., Hamilton 
January Term, 2023 
 
15 
C.P. No. B-1903562, 2019 WL 7670061, at *7.  But the DRC is authorized to make 
similar determinations in other contexts.  See, e.g., Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-50(B) 
(giving a warden discretion to determine whether to allow an escorted visit to a 
dying relative or a private viewing to an offender “who [is] not likely to pose a 
threat to public safety”); Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-15(C)(1) (allowing a correctional 
institution to deny an application for visitation by a member of an inmate’s 
immediate family if “[t]he applicant’s presence in the institution could reasonably 
pose a threat to the institution’s security”).  Allowing the DRC some discretion does 
not, on its own, make the Reagan Tokes Law unconstitutionally vague. 
{¶ 34} Both Hacker and Simmons provide hypothetical situations in which 
an offender’s incarceration may be maintained beyond the minimum prison term 
for committing a minor infraction.  But while such situations—if they do occur—
may show that the Reagan Tokes Law is vague as applied, they do not satisfy the 
requirement in a facial challenge that the law be unconstitutional in all 
circumstances. 
2.  Procedural Due Process 
{¶ 35} In their procedural-due-process claims, Hacker and Simmons protest 
that the Reagan Tokes Law provides insufficient procedure to protect offenders’ 
rights.  “Due process under the Ohio and United States Constitutions demands that 
the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner where the state seeks to infringe a protected 
liberty or property interest.”  State v. Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 459, 668 
N.E.2d 457 (1996). 
{¶ 36} As an initial matter, the state argues that offenders do not have a 
liberty interest in not being held beyond the minimum prison term imposed by a 
trial court.  To be sure, this court has held that when the APA is vested with 
discretion whether to grant parole to an offender, the offender has “no expectancy 
of parole or a constitutional liberty interest sufficient to establish a right of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
procedural due process.”  State ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 
490, 633 N.E.2d 1128 (1994).  But here, the DRC’s discretion to maintain an 
offender’s incarceration beyond the minimum prison term imposed by the trial 
court is curtailed by R.C. 2967.271(B), which creates a presumption that an 
offender will be released at the completion of his minimum sentence.  The 
presumption can be rebutted based on the offender’s behavior while incarcerated.  
R.C. 2967.271(C).  The presumption of release creates an interest that entitles 
offenders to due-process protection.  See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 
94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (“the State having created the [statutory] 
right to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized 
for major misconduct, the prisoner’s interest has real substance and is sufficiently 
embraced within Fourteenth Amendment ‘liberty’ to entitle him to those minimum 
procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process 
Clause”). 
{¶ 37} Because a liberty interest is at stake in these cases, due process 
requires a hearing before offenders are deprived of that interest.  R.C. 2967.271(C) 
provides for a hearing: “The [DRC] may rebut the presumption [of release] only if 
the department determines, at a hearing, that one or more [statutorily identified 
circumstances] applies * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  Nevertheless, Hacker and 
Simmons maintain that the hearing provided for in R.C. 2967.271(C) is inadequate.  
They point to what they claim are shortcomings in the DRC’s Policy No. 105-PBD-
15, which sets forth the DRC’s standard procedure for conducting hearings as 
required by the statute.  See Additional Term Hearing 105-PBD-15 (Mar. 1, 2023) 
available at https://drc.ohio.gov/about/resource/policies-and-procedures/105-pbd-
parole-board/additional-term-hiring 
(accessed 
July 
19, 
2023) 
[https://perma.cc/SF9T-4GWJ], superseding Additional Term Hearing 105-PBD-
15 (Mar. 15, 2021), available at https://drc.ohio.gov/about/resource/policies-and-
January Term, 2023 
 
17 
procedures/parole-board/additional-term-hiring 
(accessed 
Mar. 
30, 
2023) 
[https://perma.cc/QA6B-DGNU]. 
{¶ 38} But recall that Hacker and Simmons each present a facial challenge 
to the Reagan Tokes Law.  Their challenges are to the law itself, not to the policies 
used by the DRC in furtherance of the law.  “A facial challenge to a legislative Act 
is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger 
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be 
valid.”  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697.  The fact that 
the law “might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of 
circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.”  Id. 
{¶ 39} For that reason, “[w]hen determining whether a law is facially 
invalid, a court must be careful not to exceed the statute’s actual language and 
speculate about hypothetical or imaginary cases.”  Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 132 
Ohio St.3d 167, 2012-Ohio-2187, 970 N.E.2d 898, ¶ 21, citing Washington State 
Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 
170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008).  It bears repeating that the Reagan Tokes Law provides 
the offender with a hearing before his incarceration is maintained.  So, it does not, 
by its terms, deprive an offender of “notice and an opportunity to be heard * * * at 
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d 455 
at 459, 668 N.E.2d 457.  Considering the DRC’s nonstatutorily mandated practices 
for conducting hearings would require this court to “exceed the statute’s actual 
language” and engage in “speculat[ion] about hypothetical or imaginary cases,” 
Wymsylo at ¶ 21.  And that is beyond the scope of a facial challenge.  See id.  
Constitutional challenges to the application of the DRC’s policies made under R.C. 
2967.271(C) would be subject to review as as-applied challenges, should the facts 
of a specific case so warrant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
{¶ 40} The Reagan Tokes Law is not void for vagueness.  And we also hold 
that it is not facially unconstitutional, because it provides that offenders receive a 
hearing before they may be deprived of their liberty interest. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 41} The Reagan Tokes Law carries a presumption of constitutionality, 
and to rebut that presumption in a facial challenge, Hacker and Simmons were 
required to demonstrate that “no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] 
would be valid,” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697.  They 
have not done so.  We therefore affirm the judgments of the Third and Eighth 
District Courts of Appeals that the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional. 
Judgments affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
BRUNNER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY, J. 
_________________ 
BRUNNER, J., dissenting. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
{¶ 42} In both of these cases, we were asked to consider the facial 
constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law (“RTL”).  I agree with several of the 
majority’s determinations in its analysis.  Because the RTL is, in my view, akin to 
Ohio’s former indefinite-sentencing scheme, I agree that the law does not violate 
the separation-of-powers doctrine.  I also agree that appellants, Christopher P. 
Hacker and Danan Simmons Jr., lack standing to challenge the Adult Parole 
Authority’s (“APA”) exercise of its discretion to recommend a person’s release 
from prison before the presumptive minimum sentence has been served, because 
they are not aggrieved by that provision of the RTL.  I share the majority’s view 
that the RTL does not violate the right to a jury trial, because nothing about the law 
permits a fact-finder other than a jury to find facts that increase the range of 
sentencing exposure of the defendant.  With respect to the majority’s overall due-
January Term, 2023 
 
19 
process analysis, I agree that appellants do have a protectable interest in their 
freedom after their presumptive minimum sentence has expired, and thus, I disagree 
with the contrary argument of appellee, the state of Ohio.  Similarly, I agree with 
the majority that a facial constitutional analysis involves a review of the law that is 
challenged, not the policies that may be adopted to enforce the law. 
{¶ 43} But I part ways with the majority in that I do not agree with its 
conclusions about procedural due process.  The procedures created by the RTL are 
insufficient in light of the gravity of the decision being made—whether to release 
a person from prison on his or her presumptive release date.  This imbalance facially 
violates offenders’ right to due process and is unconstitutional.  And because the 
unconstitutional portions of the RTL cannot be severed from the law without 
thwarting the intent of the legislature, I would invalidate as unconstitutional the 
entire RTL. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of Review on Facial Challenges 
{¶ 44} We have previously stated that “a facial constitutional challenge 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 132 Ohio 
St.3d 167, 2012-Ohio-2187, 970 N.E.2d 898, ¶ 20, citing State ex rel. Ohio 
Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Edn., 111 Ohio St.3d 568, 2006-
Ohio-5512, 857 N.E.2d 1148, ¶ 21.  But the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
“is an evidentiary standard that is poorly suited to the legal question whether a 
legislative enactment comports with the Constitution.”  State v. Grevious, __ Ohio 
St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-4361, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 48 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment 
only).  And “while the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard is something that we have 
rotely pasted into constitutional opinions, there is no indication that we actually use 
it.”  Id. at ¶ 63 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only).  I would steer parties—
and courts—away from reciting the inaccurate beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
when discussing constitutional challenges such as the RTL challenge and would 
instead adhere to the standard that reflects the reality of our review: 
 
The question of the constitutionality of every law being first 
determined by the General Assembly, every presumption is in favor 
of its constitutionality, and it must clearly appear that the law is in 
direct conflict with inhibitions of the Constitution before a court will 
declare it unconstitutional. 
 
Ohio Pub. Interest Action Group, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 43 Ohio St.2d 175, 331 
N.E.2d 730 (1975), paragraph four of the syllabus. 
{¶ 45} Regardless of whether the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” is 
invoked,  
 
[f]acial challenges to the constitutionality of a statute are the most 
difficult to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish 
that no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be 
valid.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 
95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).  If a statute is unconstitutional on its face, 
the statute may not be enforced under any circumstances.  When 
determining whether a law is facially invalid, a court must be careful 
not to exceed the statute’s actual language and speculate about 
hypothetical or imaginary cases.  Washington State Grange v. 
Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450, 128 S.Ct. 
1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008).  Reference to extrinsic facts is not 
required to resolve a facial challenge.  Reading [v. Pub. Util. Comm., 
109 Ohio St.3d 193, 2006-Ohio-2181, 846 N.E.2d 840,] ¶ 15. 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
21 
Wymsylo at ¶ 21.  As always, “ ‘[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, 
the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the 
language and design of the statute as a whole.’ ”  State v. Turner, 163 Ohio St.3d 
421, 2020-Ohio-6773, 170 N.E.3d 842, ¶ 18, quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 
486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988).  Questions of statutory 
interpretation are reviewed de novo.  State v. Pountney, 152 Ohio St.3d 474, 2018-
Ohio-22, 97 N.E.3d 478, ¶ 20. 
B.  The Reagan Tokes Law 
{¶ 46} The General Assembly enacted 2018 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 201 (“S.B. 
201”) to 
 
provide for indefinite prison terms for first or second degree 
felonies, with presumptive release of offenders sentenced to such a 
term at the end of the minimum term; to generally allow the 
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction with approval of the 
sentencing court to reduce the minimum term for exceptional 
conduct or adjustment to incarceration; to allow the Department to 
rebut the release presumption and keep the offender in prison up to 
the maximum term if it makes specified findings; to require the 
Adult Parole Authority to study the feasibility of certain GPS 
monitoring functions; to prioritize funding for residential service 
contracts that reduce homeless offenders; to name those provisions 
of the act the Reagan Tokes Law; [and other purposes of no 
consequence to this case]. 
 
To support these goals, S.B. 201 amended numerous provisions of the Revised 
Code in minor ways and made three major changes to the Revised Code that are 
relevant to the cases before us. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
{¶ 47} S.B. 201 inserted language into R.C. 2929.14 requiring courts 
sentencing offenders convicted of first- or second-degree felonies to impose an 
indefinite prison sentence consisting of a minimum and a maximum term.  R.C. 
2929.14(A)(1)(a), (A)(2)(a).  Specifically, for first-degree felonies, R.C. 
2929.14(A)(1)(a) now provides: 
 
For a felony of the first degree committed on or after March 
22, 2019, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term with a 
stated minimum term selected by the court of three, four, five, six, 
seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven years and a maximum term that is 
determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code, 
except that if the section that criminalizes the conduct constituting 
the felony specifies a different minimum term or penalty for the 
offense, the specific language of that section shall control in 
determining the minimum term or otherwise sentencing the offender 
but the minimum term or sentence imposed under that specific 
language shall be considered for purposes of the Revised Code as if 
it had been imposed under this division. 
 
As for second-degree felonies, the provision is identical except as to penalties: 
 
For a felony of the second degree committed on or after 
March 22, 2019, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term 
with a stated minimum term selected by the court of two, three, four, 
five, six, seven, or eight years and a maximum term that is 
determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code * * *. 
 
R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a). 
January Term, 2023 
 
23 
{¶ 48} The RTL also placed a new section, R.C. 2929.144, into Ohio’s 
criminal-sentencing scheme.  Under that section, the maximum sentence would be 
derived from the sentence for the crime by enhancing it by an additional 50 percent 
of the longest single sentence for the first- or second-degree felony imposed.  R.C. 
2929.144 provides: 
 
(A) As used in this section, “qualifying felony of the first or 
second degree” means a felony of the first or second degree 
committed on or after [March 22, 2019]. 
(B) The court imposing a prison term on an offender under 
division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code 
for a qualifying felony of the first or second degree shall determine 
the maximum prison term that is part of the sentence in accordance 
with the following: 
(1) If the offender is being sentenced for one felony and the 
felony is a qualifying felony of the first or second degree, the 
maximum prison term shall be equal to the minimum term imposed 
on the offender under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 
of the Revised Code plus fifty per cent of that term. 
(2) If the offender is being sentenced for more than one 
felony, if one or more of the felonies is a qualifying felony of the 
first or second degree, and if the court orders that some or all of the 
prison terms imposed are to be served consecutively, the court shall 
add all of the minimum terms imposed on the offender under 
division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code 
for a qualifying felony of the first or second degree that are to be 
served consecutively and all of the definite terms of the felonies that 
are not qualifying felonies of the first or second degree that are to be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
served consecutively, and the maximum term shall be equal to the 
total of those terms so added by the court plus fifty per cent of the 
longest minimum term or definite term for the most serious felony 
being sentenced. 
(3) If the offender is being sentenced for more than one 
felony, if one or more of the felonies is a qualifying felony of the 
first or second degree, and if the court orders that all of the prison 
terms imposed are to run concurrently, the maximum term shall be 
equal to the longest of the minimum terms imposed on the offender 
under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised 
Code for a qualifying felony of the first or second degree for which 
the sentence is being imposed plus fifty per cent of the longest 
minimum term for the most serious qualifying felony being 
sentenced. 
(4) Any mandatory prison term, or portion of a mandatory 
prison term, that is imposed or to be imposed on the offender under 
division (B), (G), or (H) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code or 
under any other provision of the Revised Code, with respect to a 
conviction of or plea of guilty to a specification, and that is in 
addition to the sentence imposed for the underlying offense is 
separate from the sentence being imposed for the qualifying first or 
second degree felony committed on or after the effective date of this 
section and shall not be considered or included in determining a 
maximum prison term for the offender under divisions (B)(1) to (3) 
of this section. 
(C) The court imposing a prison term on an offender 
pursuant to division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the 
Revised Code for a qualifying felony of the first or second degree 
January Term, 2023 
 
25 
shall sentence the offender, as part of the sentence, to the maximum 
prison term determined under division (B) of this section.  The court 
shall impose this maximum term at sentencing as part of the 
sentence it imposes under section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, and 
shall state the minimum term it imposes under division (A)(1)(a) or 
(2)(a) of that section, and this maximum term, in the sentencing 
entry. 
(D) If a court imposes a prison term on an offender pursuant 
to division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised 
Code for a qualifying felony of the first or second degree, section 
2967.271 of the Revised Code applies with respect to the offender’s 
service of the prison term. 
 
{¶ 49} Finally, the RTL enacted R.C. 2967.271, which explains under what 
circumstances an offender may be required to serve more than the imposed 
minimum sentence: 
 
(A) As used in this section: 
(1) “Offender’s minimum prison term” means the minimum 
prison term imposed on an offender under a non-life felony 
indefinite prison term, diminished as provided in section 2967.191 
or 2967.193 of the Revised Code or in any other provision of the 
Revised Code, other than division (F) of this section, that provides 
for diminution or reduction of an offender’s sentence. 
(2) “Offender’s presumptive earned early release date” 
means the date that is determined under the procedures described in 
division (F) of this section by the reduction, if any, of an offender’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
minimum prison term by the sentencing court and the crediting of 
that reduction toward the satisfaction of the minimum term. 
(3) “Rehabilitative programs and activities” means 
education programs, vocational training, employment in prison 
industries, treatment for substance abuse, or other constructive 
programs developed by the department of rehabilitation and 
correction with specific standards for performance by prisoners. 
(4) “Security level” means the security level in which an 
offender is classified under the inmate classification level system of 
the department of rehabilitation and correction that then is in effect. 
(5) “Sexually oriented offense” has the same meaning as in 
section 2950.01 of the Revised Code. 
(B) When an offender is sentenced to a non-life felony 
indefinite prison term, there shall be a presumption that the person 
shall be released from service of the sentence on the expiration of 
the offender’s minimum prison term or on the offender’s 
presumptive earned early release date, whichever is earlier. 
(C) The presumption established under division (B) of this 
section is a rebuttable presumption that the department of 
rehabilitation and correction may rebut as provided in this division.  
Unless the department rebuts the presumption, the offender shall be 
released from service of the sentence on the expiration of the 
offender’s minimum prison term or on the offender’s presumptive 
earned early release date, whichever is earlier.  The department may 
rebut the presumption only if the department determines, at a 
hearing, that one or more of the following applies: 
(1) Regardless of the security level in which the offender is 
classified at the time of the hearing, both of the following apply: 
January Term, 2023 
 
27 
(a) During the offender’s incarceration, the offender 
committed institutional rule infractions that involved compromising 
the security of a state correctional institution, compromising the 
safety of the staff of a state correctional institution or its inmates, or 
physical harm or the threat of physical harm to the staff of a state 
correctional institution or its inmates, or committed a violation of 
law that was not prosecuted, and the infractions or violations 
demonstrate that the offender has not been rehabilitated. 
(b) The offender’s behavior while incarcerated, including, 
but not limited to the infractions and violations specified in division 
(C)(1)(a) of this section, demonstrate that the offender continues to 
pose a threat to society. 
(2) Regardless of the security level in which the offender is 
classified at the time of the hearing, the offender has been placed by 
the department in extended restrictive housing at any time within the 
year preceding the date of the hearing. 
(3) At the time of the hearing, the offender is classified by 
the department as a security level three, four, or five, or at a higher 
security level. 
(D)(1) If the department of rehabilitation and correction, 
pursuant to division (C) of this section, rebuts the presumption 
established under division (B) of this section, the department may 
maintain the offender’s incarceration in a state correctional 
institution under the sentence after the expiration of the offender’s 
minimum prison term or, for offenders who have a presumptive 
earned early release date, after the offender’s presumptive earned 
early release date.  The department may maintain the offender’s 
incarceration under this division for an additional period of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
incarceration determined by the department.  The additional period 
of incarceration shall be a reasonable period determined by the 
department, shall be specified by the department, and shall not 
exceed the offender’s maximum prison term. 
(2) If the department maintains an offender’s incarceration 
for an additional period under division (D)(1) of this section, there 
shall be a presumption that the offender shall be released on the 
expiration of the offender’s minimum prison term plus the 
additional period of incarceration specified by the department as 
provided under that division or, for offenders who have a 
presumptive earned early release date, on the expiration of the 
additional period of incarceration to be served after the offender’s 
presumptive earned early release date that is specified by the 
department as provided under that division.  The presumption is a 
rebuttable presumption that the department may rebut, but only if it 
conducts a hearing and makes the determinations specified in 
division (C) of this section, and if the department rebuts the 
presumption, it may maintain the offender’s incarceration in a state 
correctional institution for an additional period determined as 
specified in division (D)(1) of this section.  Unless the department 
rebuts the presumption at the hearing, the offender shall be released 
from service of the sentence on the expiration of the offender’s 
minimum prison term plus the additional period of incarceration 
specified by the department or, for offenders who have a 
presumptive earned early release date, on the expiration of the 
additional period of incarceration to be served after the offender’s 
presumptive earned early release date as specified by the 
department. 
January Term, 2023 
 
29 
The provisions of this division regarding the establishment 
of a rebuttable presumption, the department’s rebuttal of the 
presumption, and the department’s maintenance of an offender’s 
incarceration for an additional period of incarceration apply, and 
may be utilized more than one time, during the remainder of the 
offender’s incarceration.  If the offender has not been released under 
division (C) of this section or this division prior to the expiration of 
the offender’s maximum prison term imposed as part of the 
offender’s non-life felony indefinite prison term, the offender shall 
be released upon the expiration of that maximum term. 
(E) The department shall provide notices of hearings to be 
conducted under division (C) or (D) of this section in the same 
manner, and to the same persons, as specified in section 2967.12 and 
Chapter 2930. of the Revised Code with respect to hearings to be 
conducted regarding the possible release on parole of an inmate. 
 
R.C. 2967.271 also includes provisions permitting a trial court to reduce an 
offender’s minimum sentence during the term of his or her imprisonment based on 
good behavior of the offender but only if a reduction is recommended by the Ohio 
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”).  R.C. 2967.271(F).4 
C.  The Reagan Tokes Law Does Not Violate an Offender’s Right to a Jury 
Trial 
{¶ 50} Both the United States Supreme Court and this court have explained 
that the historical role of the jury in finding facts necessary to convict or to increase 
a sentence range is protected by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
 
4. It is also noteworthy, though not directly relevant to the substantive analysis in this case, that the 
RTL also requires sentencing courts to notify the offender of the relevant provisions of the RTL.  
R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
Constitution.  See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 117, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 
L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (holding that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial was violated when the jury found that the defendant had used or carried a 
weapon but the sentencing judge found that the defendant had brandished the 
weapon and the court used its finding to justify increasing the defendant’s minimum 
prison sentence); Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168-172, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 
517 (2009) (holding that the considerations necessary to impose consecutive 
sentences on a defendant, despite the effect of increasing the total aggregate 
sentence, are the traditional and proper prerogative of the sentencing judge rather 
than the jury); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 
L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (holding that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial was violated by a trial judge’s finding additional facts by a preponderance of 
the evidence to justify sentencing the defendant within the statutory maximum but 
beyond the otherwise-applicable guideline range); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296, 303-304, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (holding that the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated when the trial judge, based on 
his own fact-finding that the defendant had acted with “deliberate cruelty,” 
sentenced the defendant to more than three years beyond the statutory maximum of 
the standard sentencing range); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588, 603-609, 122 
S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (holding that the trial judge’s fact-finding that 
was used to support imposing a sentence of death over the term of imprisonment 
that would otherwise have been imposed violated the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491-497, 
120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (holding that a trial judge’s finding that 
the crime committed by the defendant was racially motivated, in order to increase 
the sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum term, violated the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); State v. Hunter, 123 Ohio St.3d 
164, 2009-Ohio-4147, 915 N.E.2d 292, ¶ 34-39 (discussing Apprendi and its 
January Term, 2023 
 
31 
progeny with approval and noting that historically, a sentencing judge’s 
consideration of a defendant’s criminal record has not been deemed offensive to 
the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee); State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, abrogated in part by Ice (holding that a number 
of Ohio statutes requiring judicial fact-finding violated the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial).5 
{¶ 51} However, the statutory amendments enacted through the RTL do not 
require a judge or anyone else to make factual findings that alter the minimum or 
maximum range of sentences to be imposed on the defendant.  The RTL does not 
impact a defendant’s right to a jury trial during the guilt and sentencing phases of 
the trial.  If the jury convicts the defendant of a first- or second-degree felony, the 
trial judge imposes a sentence in the usual manner, selecting a sentence of two to 
eight years for a second-degree felony, R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a), or three to 11 years 
for a first-degree felony, R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a), and the RTL does not require any 
special fact-finding to support that sentencing choice.  The RTL then creates a 
presumptive minimum sentence, R.C. 2967.271(B), and a maximum sentence at 
150 percent of the minimum sentence, R.C. 2929.144(A)(1).6  That too requires no 
fact-finding—it is purely a matter of mathematics and statutory application.  The 
only situation in which fact-finding operates within the framework of the RTL is 
when, based on an offender’s behavior or security classification, the ODRC seeks 
to maintain custody of the offender beyond the expiration of the presumptive 
 
5. Some of the statutes severed or deemed unconstitutional in Foster were later reenacted by the 
General Assembly.  See State v. Hodge, 128 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-6320, 941 N.E.2d 768, 
superseded by statute as stated in State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 
659, ¶ 3-4, 19-23; 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86. 
 
6. For the sake of simplicity, I speak in terms of sentencing for a single qualifying felony offense.  
For cases in which multiple qualifying felony offenses are involved, the maximum sentence is 
calculated under R.C. 2929.144(B)(2) or (3) by adding 50 percent of the longest term for the single 
“most serious” felony for which the defendant is being sentenced. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
minimum prison term.  See R.C. 2967.271(C).  However, that process does not 
affect the minimum or maximum sentence imposed or the range that could have 
been imposed; it affects only the amount of time that the offender spends 
incarcerated within the range of the imposed minimum and maximum sentence.  
Thus, the RTL does not transgress the Apprendi line of cases. 
{¶ 52} It could be argued that R.C. 2967.271 encourages fact-finding by the 
ODRC to, in effect, alter a minimum sentence, because it permits a trial court to 
reduce an offender’s minimum sentence based on good behavior and on the 
recommendation of the ODRC.  See R.C. 2967.271(F).  However, as the majority 
determines here, it is not clear that Hacker, Simmons, or any other offender would 
have standing to challenge this provision, as there appears to be no injury or 
detriment to offenders because of it.  See State v. Bates, 167 Ohio St.3d 197, 2022-
Ohio-475, 190 N.E.3d 610, ¶ 20-22 (“It is fundamental that appeal lies only on 
behalf of a party aggrieved,” and thus, a “party aggrieved by a court’s error * * * 
must challenge it on direct appeal; otherwise, the sentence will be subject to res 
judicata”); Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-
Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27 (noting that the question of standing depends on 
whether the party has alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy).  
Rather, this provision appears to be a benefit to every offender sentenced for a 
qualifying felony offense since courts do not generally have the authority to reduce 
sentences (other than through certain statutory mechanisms like judicial release or 
the granting of some relief undermining the conviction).  See, e.g., State v. Smith, 
42 Ohio St.3d 60, 537 N.E.2d 198 (1989), paragraph one of the syllabus.  Thus, any 
possibility of a sentence reduction (however conditioned) is more beneficial than 
the status quo and therefore is of benefit to the offender.  No right to this benefit is 
being asserted by either Hacker or Simmons. 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
33 
D.  The Reagan Tokes Law Does Not Violate Separation of Powers 
{¶ 53} This court discussed the basis of the separation-of-powers doctrine 
in a similar case more than 20 years ago: 
 
This court has repeatedly affirmed that the doctrine of 
separation of powers is “implicitly embedded in the entire 
framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the 
substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state 
government.”  S. Euclid v. Jemison, 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 158-159, 
503 N.E.2d 136, 138 (1986); State v. Warner, 55 Ohio St.3d 31, 43-
44, 564 N.E.2d 18, 31 (1990).  See State ex rel. Ohio Academy of 
Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 475, 715 N.E.2d 
1062, 1085 (1999); State v. Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 463, 
668 N.E.2d 457, 465-466 (1996). 
“The essential principle underlying the policy of the division 
of powers of government into three departments is that powers 
properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly 
and completely administered by either of the other departments, and 
further that none of them ought to possess directly or indirectly an 
overruling influence over the others.”  State ex rel. Bryant v. Akron 
Metro. Park Dist., 120 Ohio St. 464, 473, 166 N.E. 407, 410 (1929).  
See also Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 377, 391-392 (1883); State 
ex rel. Finley v. Pfeiffer, 163 Ohio St. 149, 126 N.E.2d 57, paragraph 
one of the syllabus. 
 
State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 132, 134, 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000).  The 
separation-of-powers doctrine exists not to protect the powers of each branch of the 
government for the benefit of that branch but for the benefit of the people who rely 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
34 
on a government of checks and balances as a shield against the arbitrary use of 
power.  Id. at 135.  In Bray, we also discussed the role of the judiciary: 
 
In our constitutional scheme, the judicial power resides in 
the judicial branch.  Section 1, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.  
The determination of guilt in a criminal matter and the sentencing 
of a defendant convicted of a crime are solely the province of the 
judiciary.  See State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Peters, 43 Ohio St. 629, 
648, 4 N.E. 81, 86 (1885).  See also Stanton v. Tax Comm., 114 Ohio 
St. 658, 672, 151 N.E. 760, 764 (1926) (“the primary functions of 
the judiciary are to declare what the law is and to determine the 
rights of parties conformably thereto”); Fairview v. Giffee, 73 Ohio 
St. 183, 190, 76 N.E. 865, 867 (1905) (“It is indisputable that it is a 
judicial function to hear and determine a controversy between 
adverse parties, to ascertain the facts, and, applying the law to the 
facts, to render a final judgment”). 
 
Bray at 136. 
{¶ 54} In Bray, we confronted a facial challenge to the following statutory 
provision: 
 
“As part of a prisoner’s sentence, the parole board may punish a 
violation committed by the prisoner by extending the prisoner’s 
stated prison term for a period of fifteen, thirty, sixty, or ninety days 
in accordance with this section. * * * If a prisoner’s stated prison 
term is extended under this section, the time by which it is so 
extended shall be referred to as ‘bad time.’ ” 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
35 
Id. at 135, quoting former R.C. 2967.11(B), 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10752, 11007.  
We concluded that the so-called “bad time” statute was unconstitutional in that it 
violated the separation-of-powers doctrine because even though the statute 
provided that “bad time” was “part of a prisoner’s sentence,” it was actually an 
addition to the sentence and was therefore “no less than the executive branch’s 
acting as judge, prosecutor, and jury.”  Id.  We also distinguished prison discipline 
from the extension of a prison sentence for “bad time,” stating, “Prison discipline 
is an exercise of executive power and nothing in this opinion should be interpreted 
to suggest otherwise.  However, trying, convicting, and sentencing inmates for 
crimes committed while in prison is not an exercise of executive power.”  Id. at 
136. 
{¶ 55} The RTL is like the former “bad time” statute insofar as it permits 
the executive branch of the government, based on violations or crimes allegedly 
committed by an offender but never proved in a court of law, to impose a 
punishment on the offender.  See R.C. 2967.271(C)(1)(a), (b).  But it does differ 
from the former “bad time” statute in one vital respect: whereas the former “bad 
time” statute added time to an offender’s sentence beyond the sentence imposed by 
the trial court, the RTL operates within the confined range of the indefinite sentence 
imposed by the trial court.  See R.C. 2967.271.  In other words, under the RTL, if 
an offender is sentenced to a prison term of 8 to 12 years, the executive branch of 
the government may continue to hold the offender after the offender’s minimum 8-
year sentence based on the offender’s having committed certain violations or the 
offender’s security level, but it may not hold the offender past the expiration of the 
maximum 12-year sentence imposed by the court.  See R.C. 2967.271(C), (D)(1). 
{¶ 56} In this respect, the RTL is more analogous to the indefinite-
sentencing scheme that existed in Ohio before Senate Bill 2 (“S.B. 2”) took effect 
on July 1, 1996, and significantly changed Ohio’s criminal code.  See Am.Sub.S.B. 
No. 2, Sections 1 through 6, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136.  In the sentencing 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36 
scheme that existed before S.B. 2, many sentences were indefinite, composed of a 
minimum prison term (determined by the trial court based on statutory criteria) and 
a maximum prison term (set by statute based on the degree of the offense).  See 
former R.C. 2929.11(B), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 258, 143 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1308, 1433-
1434.7  Within the minimum and maximum sentence imposed by the trial court, the 
 
7. Former R.C. 2929.11(B), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 258, 143 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 1433-1434, provided: 
 
(B) Except as provided in division (D) or (H) of this section, sections 
2929.71 and 2929.72, and Chapter 2925. of the Revised Code, terms of 
imprisonment for felony shall be imposed as follows: 
(1) For an aggravated felony of the first degree: 
(a) If the offender has not previously been convicted of or pleaded guilty 
to any aggravated felony of the first, second, or third degree, aggravated murder 
or murder, or any offense set forth in any existing or former law of this state, any 
other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to any aggravated 
felony of the first, second, or third degree or to aggravated murder or murder, the 
minimum term, which may be imposed as a term of actual incarceration, shall be 
five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten years, and the maximum term shall be twenty-
five years; 
(b) If the offender has previously been convicted of or pleaded guilty to 
any aggravated felony of the first, second, or third degree, aggravated murder or 
murder, or any offense set forth in any existing or former law of this state, any 
other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to any aggravated 
felony of the first, second, or third degree or to aggravated murder or murder, the 
minimum term shall be imposed as a term of actual incarceration of ten, eleven, 
twelve, thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen years, and the maximum term shall be twenty-
five years; 
(2) For an aggravated felony of the second degree: 
(a) If the offender has not previously been convicted of or pleaded guilty 
to any aggravated felony of the first, second, or third degree, aggravated murder 
or murder, or any offense set forth in any existing or former law of this state, any 
other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to any aggravated 
felony of the first, second, or third degree or to aggravated murder or murder, the 
minimum term, which may be imposed as a term of actual incarceration, shall be 
three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years, and the maximum term shall be fifteen 
years; 
(b) If the offender has previously been convicted of or pleaded guilty to 
any aggravated felony of the first, second, or third degree, aggravated murder or 
murder, or any offense set forth in any existing or former law of this state, any 
other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to any aggravated 
felony of the first, second, or third degree or to aggravated murder or murder, the 
minimum term shall be imposed as a term of actual incarceration of eight, nine, 
ten, eleven, or twelve years, and the maximum term shall be fifteen years; 
(3) For an aggravated felony of the third degree: 
January Term, 2023 
 
37 
Ohio Parole Board had the authority to continue an offender’s term of 
imprisonment or to release the offender depending on a variety of factors, including 
the offender’s conduct while incarcerated.  See former R.C. 2967.13(A), 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 571, Section 1, 143 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6342, 6430; Foster, 109 
Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, at ¶ 34, abrogated in part by Ice, 
555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517; see also Diroll, Ohio Criminal 
Sentencing Commission, Thoughts on Applying S.B. 2 to “Old Law” Inmates, 
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/Sentencing/resources/general/SB2.pd
f (accessed July 15, 2023).  The parole board also had the authority to reduce an 
offender’s minimum sentence for good behavior or earned credit.  See former R.C. 
2967.19, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 571, Section 1, 143 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 6437; former 
R.C. 2967.193, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 571, Section 1, 143 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 6441.  
At no time during the long history of indefinite sentencing before S.B. 2 became 
effective did this court find that indefinite sentencing or the parole board’s 
 
(a) If the offender has not previously been convicted of or pleaded guilty 
to any aggravated felony of the first, second, or third degree, aggravated murder 
or murder, or any offense set forth in any existing or former law of this state, any 
other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to any aggravated 
felony of the first, second, or third degree or to aggravated murder or murder, the 
minimum term, which may be imposed as a term of actual incarceration, shall be 
two, three, four, or five years, and the maximum term shall be ten years; 
(b) If the offender has previously been convicted of or pleaded guilty to 
any aggravated felony of the first, second, or third degree, aggravated murder or 
murder, or any offense set forth in any existing or former law of this state, any 
other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to any aggravated 
felony of the first, second, or third degree or to aggravated murder or murder, the 
minimum term shall be imposed as a term of actual incarceration of five, six, 
seven, or eight years, and the maximum term shall be ten years; 
(4) For a felony of the first degree, the minimum term shall be four, five, 
six, or seven years, and the maximum term shall be twenty-five years; 
(5) For a felony of the second degree, the minimum term shall be two, 
three, four, or five years, and the maximum term shall be fifteen years; 
(6) For a felony of the third degree, the minimum term shall be two years, 
thirty months, three years, or four years, and the maximum term shall be ten years; 
(7) For a felony of the fourth degree, the minimum term shall be eighteen 
months, two years, thirty months, or three years, and the maximum term shall be 
five years. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38 
involvement in indefinite sentencing violated either the state or the federal 
Constitution.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Peters, 43 Ohio St. 629, 644-652, 
4 N.E. 81 (1885); see also, e.g., State v. Witwer, 64 Ohio St.3d 421, 428-429, 596 
N.E.2d 451 (1992); State v. Summers, 5th Dist. Stark No. 94-CA-0243, 1995 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 5986, *14 (Oct. 23, 1995); State v. Perkins, 93 Ohio App.3d 672, 685-
686, 639 N.E.2d 833 (8th Dist.1994). 
{¶ 57} Thus, while the RTL shares certain features with the former “bad 
time” statute that we concluded in Bray violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, 
the RTL lacks the critical feature of delegating the judicial guilt-finding and 
sentencing functions to the parole board.  Unlike the former “bad time” statute, 
under which time could be added to an offender’s sentence, under the RTL, the 
offender’s sentence is the sentence.  What the RTL allows is for a department of 
the executive branch of the government to decide when, within the range of the 
indefinite sentence, an offender has been rehabilitated enough (as reflected by the 
offender’s conduct and security level) to merit release.  While it is theoretically 
questionable whether a parole board should have this power or whether indefinite 
sentencing is an appropriate division of power between the judicial and the 
executive branches of the government, indefinite sentencing has a long history in 
Ohio and the United States, and it has not been invalidated as a violation of the 
separation-of-powers doctrine.  Nothing about the RTL justifies a different result 
here. 
E.  The Reagan Tokes Law Violates Procedural Due Process 
{¶ 58} Both the Ohio and United States Constitutions guarantee procedural 
due process.  Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16; Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, Section 1. 
 
While the Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force, 
Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993), 
January Term, 2023 
 
39 
paragraph one of the syllabus, the Due Course of Law Clause of 
Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution is more often than not 
considered the functional equivalent of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, State 
v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883,  
¶ 15.  But see Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, 
Ohio, 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122, ¶ 34 
(lead opinion) (noting that this court departed from the general rule 
in State v. Bode, 144 Ohio St.3d 155, 2015-Ohio-1519, 41 N.E.3d 
1156, ¶ 23-24). 
 
State v. Ireland, 155 Ohio St.3d 287, 2018-Ohio-4494, 121 N.E.3d 285, ¶ 37 (lead 
opinion).  It is therefore reasonable to rely on federal caselaw to establish a floor 
for what is fair, even while acknowledging that the Ohio Constitution may well 
require an elevated floor of due-process protection in some cases. 
{¶ 59} Due process can seem an imprecise concept at times, but it “requires, 
at a minimum, an opportunity to be heard when the state seeks to infringe a 
protected liberty or property right,” and that “opportunity to be heard must occur at 
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”  State v. Cowan, 103 Ohio St.3d 
144, 2004-Ohio-4777, 814 N.E.2d 846, ¶ 8, citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 
371, 377, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971), Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), and Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d at 459, 
668 N.E.2d 457.  “[F]reedom ‘from bodily restraint,’ lies ‘at the core of the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause.’ ”  Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 445, 131 
S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011), quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 
112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992).  The state has argued that the RTL 
sentencing scheme is like release on parole under Ohio’s former indefinite-
sentencing scheme and that no liberty interest is therefore implicated.  It is true that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
40 
“[t]here is a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one has, as in 
[revocation of] parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires,” as 
in “discretionary parole release from confinement” or parole eligibility.  (Emphasis 
deleted.)  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 
9, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979).  However, the United States Supreme 
Court has made clear that drawing that distinction must be done with caution, for 
freedom from restraint is a protectable interest for prisoners insofar as it may be 
violated by infringements that impose atypical and significant hardship or that 
affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 
484, 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), fn. 11.  Moreover, the RTL 
provides that “there shall be a presumption that the person shall be released from 
service of the sentence on the expiration of the offender’s minimum prison term or 
on the offender’s presumptive earned early release date, whichever is earlier.”  R.C. 
2967.271(B).  Thus, the RTL is different from the former Ohio parole system as 
the state has prescribed, under which no presumption or expectation of liberty had 
to be overcome.  Here, to the extent that the state would overcome such a 
presumption and alter the duration of an offender’s sentence to deprive the offender 
of physical freedom, I agree with the majority that due process must be required—
and a significant degree of procedural due process at that.  See majority opinion,  
¶ 35-38. 
{¶ 60} In evaluating procedural-due-process claims, both this court and the 
United States Supreme Court have generally applied the Mathews balancing test.  
See Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-4783, 979 N.E.2d 297, ¶ 28; 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18.  “Under the Mathews 
balancing test, a court evaluates (A) the private interest affected; (B) the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used; and (C) the 
governmental interest at stake.”  Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128, 135, 137 S.Ct. 
1249, 197 L.Ed.2d 611 (2017). 
January Term, 2023 
 
41 
{¶ 61} Freedom from imprisonment is perhaps the most basic and essential 
private interest and lies at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause.  Turner at 445.  Counterbalancing that, however, the government’s interest 
in protecting society from the depredations of criminals who are not yet 
rehabilitated is self-evident and strong.  With those considerations arguably 
balanced, the due-process issue in these cases collapses into a single question: 
Under the procedures established by the RTL, is there a risk of erroneously 
overcoming the presumption of release and unjustifiably depriving an offender of 
his or her liberty beyond the presumptive release date? 
{¶ 62} Under the RTL, an offender is presumed to be released upon the 
expiration of his or her minimum term.  R.C. 2967.271(B).  Yet the ODRC may 
rebut that presumption and continue the offender’s incarceration for “a reasonable 
period determined by the department * * * not [to] exceed the offender’s maximum 
prison term” if any of three findings are made.  R.C. 2967.271(D)(1).  The first 
possibility is a multipart finding that “the offender committed institutional rule 
infractions that” compromised the security of the institution, either compromised 
or threatened the safety of staff or inmates, or “committed a violation of law that 
was not prosecuted, and the infractions or violations demonstrate that the offender 
has not been rehabilitated,” R.C. 2967.271(C)(1)(a), and “[t]he offender’s behavior 
while incarcerated, including, but not limited to the infractions and violations 
specified [in R.C. 2967.271(C)(1)(a)] demonstrate that the offender continues to 
pose a threat to society,” R.C. 2967.271(C)(1)(b).  The second possibility is that 
“the offender has been placed by the department in extended restrictive housing at 
any time within the year preceding the date of the hearing.”  R.C. 2967.271(C)(2).  
And the third possibility is that “[a]t the time of the hearing, the offender is 
classified by the department as a security level three, four, or five, or at a higher 
security level.”  R.C. 2967.271(C)(3).  The ODRC is required to hold a hearing at 
which it may attempt to rebut the presumption based on such findings, R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
42 
2967.271(C), (D), and to give notice of the hearing to victims and certain court 
personnel (though not to the inmate), R.C. 2967.271(E), 2967.12, and Chapter 
2930.  The RTL does not specify the contents of (or the standards to be applied at) 
this hearing.8 
{¶ 63} Considering for the moment only the hearing at which the ODRC 
may attempt to rebut the presumption, it is particularly troubling, from the 
standpoint of avoiding fact-finder bias, that the entity that will seek to rebut the 
presumption of release is the same entity that will decide whether the presumption 
has, in fact, been rebutted.  See R.C. 2967.271(C).  Moreover, once the ODRC has 
judged its own submission and found the presumption to be rebutted, it has the 
discretion to decide whether it “may maintain the offender’s incarceration” for “an 
additional period” that “shall be * * * reasonable” but “shall not exceed the 
offender’s maximum prison term.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2967.271(D)(1).  
There is no statutory guidance whatsoever about what types of circumstances 
prompt the exercise of this discretion or what constitutes a “reasonable” “additional 
period” of incarceration.  And while there are provisions requiring notice to 
offenders regarding administrative procedures for determining classifications and 
rules infractions, see Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-53(B) and 5120-9-08(C), there is no 
provision requiring that offenders receive notice of a hearing pursuant to R.C. 
2967.271.  See R.C. 2967.271(E); see also R.C. 2967.12 (notice to law enforcement 
and victims); R.C. 2930.01 et seq. (victims’ rights).  Finally, while R.C. 2967.271 
indisputably requires a hearing, there is no provision requiring (or even permitting) 
the offender’s presence at the hearing.  These are obvious and significant defects. 
 
8. The state’s briefs include copies of procedures adopted by the ODRC for rules-infraction-board 
hearings and hearings pursuant to the RTL.  However, referring to extrinsic facts and changeable 
procedures that exceed the statutory language and do not have the force of law is not appropriate in 
resolving a facial constitutional challenge.  Wymsylo, 132 Ohio St.3d 167, 2012-Ohio-2187, 970 
N.E.2d 898, at ¶ 21. 
January Term, 2023 
 
43 
{¶ 64} Moreover, the three possibilities for rebutting an offender’s 
presumptive release date (demonstration of a lack of rehabilitation and continued 
threat to society, placement in extended restrictive housing, or high security level) 
are matters determined under other, separate hearing processes.  I proceed to 
determine whether those processes at all compensate for the absence of due-process 
provisions in R.C. 2967.271. 
{¶ 65} First, an inmate’s security level is initially determined by reception-
center institutions that collect information for the Bureau of Classification.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 5120-9-52.  Classification is accomplished by considering the 
following: 
 
(1) Nature or seriousness of the offense for which the inmate 
was committed; 
(2) Length of sentence for which the inmate was committed; 
(3) Medical and mental health status; 
(4) Previous experience while on parole, furlough, 
probation, post release control, administrative release or while under 
any other form of correctional supervision[;] 
(5) Nature of prior criminal conduct as shown by the official 
record; 
(6) Age of inmate; 
(7) Potential for escape; 
(8) Potential of danger to the inmate, other inmates, staff, or 
the community through the inmate’s actions or actions of others; 
(9) Availability of housing, work, and programming at the 
various institutions; 
(10) The physical facilities of an institution; [and] 
(11) Any other relevant information contained in the reports. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
44 
 
Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-52(C).  That classification is thereafter reviewed and 
revised periodically by a classification committee at the institution.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 5120-9-53.  The inmate receives 48 hours’ notice of such review, during 
which he or she may submit a written statement and may meet with at least one 
member of the committee.  Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-53(B).  The inmate may appeal 
the committee’s recommendation to the warden and may appeal the warden’s 
decision to the bureau.  Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-53(D). 
{¶ 66} Second, regarding restrictive housing and rule infractions, Ohio 
Adm.Code 5120-9-06 sets forth some 61 rules of inmate conduct that forbid a range 
of behavior, from homicide, hostage-taking, escape, assault, etc., to mundane and 
vaguely defined behavior such as “[b]eing out of place,” showing “[d]isrespect to 
an officer, staff member, visitor[,] or other inmate,” or even “[a]ny violation of any 
published institutional rules, regulations or procedures.”  Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-
06(C); see also, e.g., Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-25(F) (requiring inmates’ sideburns, 
beards, and moustaches to be clean and neatly trimmed).  An inmate may be “found 
guilty” of a violation of these rules based on “some evidence of the commission of 
an act and the intent to commit the act.”  Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-06(D). 
{¶ 67} Hearings on rule violations are held before the rules-infraction board 
(“RIB”), which consists of two ODRC staff members who have “completed RIB 
training” and who did not witness or investigate the alleged violation.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 5120-9-08(B).  Hearings are generally required to be held within seven 
business days of issuance of a conduct report, and an inmate receives 24 hours’ 
notice of the hearing.  Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-08(C).  Inmates are allowed to make 
a statement in their defense and may request witnesses, Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-
08(E)(2)(d), but that request may be denied if the witness-request form has not been 
completed or for reasons of relevancy, redundancy, unavailability, or security, Ohio 
Adm.Code 5120-9-08(E)(3).  The inmate may require the presence of the charging 
January Term, 2023 
 
45 
official.  Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-08(F)(5).  Witnesses are apparently not sworn 
but may be subject to discipline for presentation of false testimony.  See Ohio 
Adm.Code 5120-9-08(F)(1).  The inmate may not address or examine witnesses but 
may ask the chair of the board to do so.  Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-08(F)(2).  In the 
discretion of the board, the inmate charged may be excluded from the hearing 
during a witness’s examination if there is a risk of disturbance or of harm to the 
witness.  Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-08(F)(4).  The board may take testimony or 
evidence in person, by telephone, or by “any [other] form or manner it deems 
appropriate.”  Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-08(F)(6).  In the event that information from 
a confidential source is used, the inmate is prevented from being present while the 
board considers and evaluates that information.  Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-08(G).  
An inmate may be found guilty of a rule violation only if the two staff members 
who are presiding over the hearing agree; if they do not agree, a tie-breaking vote 
must be cast by a designee of the managing officer after reviewing the record of the 
hearing.  Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-08(K). 
{¶ 68} Finally, one possible outcome of a rule violation is the inmate’s 
placement in restrictive housing.  Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-08(L)(1).  An inmate 
may also be placed in restrictive housing pending an investigation or a hearing on 
an incident.  Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-10(B) and 5120-9-11.  The inmate may appeal 
a decision of an RIB panel to the managing officer, Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-08(O), 
and may further appeal to the chief legal counsel, Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-08(P). 
{¶ 69} These procedures, designed to process rules infractions and set 
security classifications within the ODRC, are likely sufficient for those purposes 
when the state’s interest in institutional security is great and the inmate’s interest in 
institutional privileges is comparatively less.  But the RTL uses the outcomes of 
these procedures for a far more constitutionally significant purpose—whether to 
release an inmate on his or her presumptive release date.  Thus, we must ask: Under 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
46 
these procedures, is there a risk of using this data to wrongly overcome the 
presumption of release and deprive an inmate of his or her liberty? 
{¶ 70} While any human endeavor is fallible and has some risk of error, 
certain safeguards have been judicially shown to produce reliable results for a fair 
process before deprivation of certain basic rights—among which is liberty of 
person, including freedom from unlawful restraint.  Important among these 
constitutional safeguards are notice, a meaningful hearing, the right to counsel, and 
the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.  United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145-46, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006); 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); 
State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. Cleveland, 141 Ohio 
St.3d 113, 2014-Ohio-4364, 22 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 34 (“the essence of due process is 
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard” [emphasis sic]), citing State v. 
Mateo, 57 Ohio St.3d 50, 52, 565 N.E.2d 590 (1991).  As the United States Supreme 
Court has carefully observed: 
 
In almost every setting where important decisions turn on 
questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront 
and cross-examine adverse witnesses.  E.g., ICC v. Louisville & N.R. 
Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93-94, 33 S.Ct. 185, 187-188, 57 L.Ed. 431 
(1913); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 
103-104, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 1180-1181, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963).  What 
we said in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-497, 79 S.Ct. 
1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959), is particularly pertinent here: 
“Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our 
jurisprudence.  One of these is that where governmental action 
seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action 
depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the 
January Term, 2023 
 
47 
Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has 
an opportunity to show that it is untrue.  While this is important in 
the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where 
the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory 
might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons 
motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or 
jealousy.  We have formalized these protections in the requirements 
of confrontation and cross-examination.  They have ancient roots.  
They find expression in the Sixth Amendment * * *.  This Court has 
been zealous to protect these rights from erosion.  It has spoken out 
not only in criminal cases, * * * but also in all types of cases where 
administrative * * * actions were under scrutiny.” 
 
(Ellipses sic.)  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-70, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 
287 (1970).  In fact, in the somewhat analogous context of a parole revocation, the 
United States Supreme Court has declared “the minimum requirements of due 
process” as “includ[ing]”: 
 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure 
to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard 
in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) 
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless 
the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing 
confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a 
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial 
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as 
to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. 
 
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48 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). 
{¶ 71} Yet, in both of the RTL’s statutory procedures as well as the other, 
administrative procedures on which the RTL relies, notice is minimal (measured in 
hours) or nonexistent, the rights to counsel and to confront witnesses are entirely 
absent, and the decision-making factfinder and the prosecutor are one and the same 
(i.e., the ODRC).  These shortcomings and shortcuts are perhaps permissible when 
the controversy at issue is merely the question of security level or restrictive 
housing—i.e., when the offender’s interest is a relatively minor matter of different 
institutional privileges and the state’s countervailing interest in maintaining 
institutional security is great.  But the absence of these procedural safeguards of 
fairness is far more significant when the interest at issue is the choice between 
incarceration and freedom.  The RTL, as presently constituted, facially violates 
offenders’ rights to procedural due process because it provides insufficient 
procedural guarantees to reduce the risk of an erroneous result, given the gravity of 
the interests affected.  Nelson, 581 U.S. at 135, 137 S.Ct. 1249, 197 L.Ed.2d 611 
(“Under the Mathews balancing test, a court evaluates (A) the private interest 
affected; (B) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the 
procedures used; and (C) the governmental interest at stake”). 
F.  Severability 
{¶ 72} The Revised Code instructs: 
 
If any provisions of a section of the Revised Code or the 
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the 
invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the 
section or related sections which can be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions are 
severable. 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
49 
R.C. 1.50.  We have previously explained how we weigh the propriety of severance: 
 
Three questions are to be answered before severance is appropriate.  
“ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable 
of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself?  
(2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope 
of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent 
intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out?  (3) Is 
the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the 
constitutional part from the unconstitutional part, and to give effect 
to the former only?’ ” 
 
Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, at ¶ 95, abrogated in 
part by Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517, quoting Geiger v. 
Geiger, 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 160 N.E. 28 (1927), quoting State v. Bickford, 28 
N.D. 36, 147 N.W. 407 (1913), paragraph 19 of the syllabus. 
{¶ 73} Simmons takes the position that if any part of the RTL is 
unconstitutional, there is cause to invalidate the entire act; Hacker does not address 
this issue.  The state argues that if portions of the RTL offend the Constitution, they 
may be severed. 
{¶ 74} Neither Hacker nor Simmons has challenged the constitutionality of 
the indefinite-sentencing structure set forth in R.C. 2929.14(A)(1) and (2), the 
method for calculating the maximum sentence set forth in R.C. 2929.144, the 
notification provisions in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c), the definitions set forth in R.C. 
2967.271(A), or the establishment of a presumptive minimum sentence as provided 
by R.C. 2967.271(B).  Hacker does challenge the constitutionality of the provisions 
in R.C. 2967.271(F) permitting a trial court to make a reduction in the minimum 
sentence based on an offender’s good behavior and the recommendation of the 
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50 
ODRC.  However, as mentioned above and found by the majority, it is not clear 
that Hacker (or any offender) would have standing to challenge those provisions, 
as there appears to be no injury or detriment to offenders because of the provisions, 
and, in fact, they benefit offenders.  See majority opinion at ¶ 24 Bates, 167 Ohio 
St.3d 197, 2022-Ohio-475, 190 N.E.3d 610, at ¶ 20-22; Ohio Pyro, 115 Ohio St.3d 
375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, at ¶ 27; see also supra at ¶ 52.  In short, all 
that has been challenged and all that the due-process analysis directly affects is the 
executive action involved in retaining an offender beyond a presumptive release 
date.  R.C. 2967.271(C) and (D) are therefore the only parts of the RTL that are 
unconstitutional as a due-process violation.  Yet, it is also necessary to invalidate 
R.C. 2967.271(E) and 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(ii), (iii), and (iv), as those provisions 
require notice of the substance of R.C. 2967.271(C) and (D) and cannot stand on 
their own.  See Foster at ¶ 95. 
{¶ 75} Clearly, the indefinite-sentencing provisions and the presumption of 
release at the expiration of the offender’s minimum sentence each “ ‘ “may be read 
and may stand by” ’ ” themselves, id., 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 
N.E.2d 470, at ¶ 95, quoting Geiger, 117 Ohio St. at 466, 160 N.E. 28, quoting 
Bickford, 28 N.D. 36, 147 N.W. 407, at paragraph 19 of the syllabus.  It is not 
necessary to insert words or terms to separate the constitutional part of a statute 
from the unconstitutional parts and to give effect to the former only.  Id.  Nothing 
about invalidating the language in R.C. 2967.271(C), (D), and (E) and 
2929.19(B)(2)(c)(ii), (iii), and (iv) would prevent a trial court from imposing an 
indefinite sentence when the minimum sentence is the presumed release date.  
However, without R.C. 2967.271(C), (D), and (E) and 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(ii), (iii), 
and (iv), there would be no mechanism for enforcing any sentence beyond the 
presumptive minimum and the maximum sentence would become merely symbolic.  
Accordingly, “ ‘ “the unconstitutional part [is] so connected with the general scope 
of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the 
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51 
Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out.” ’ ”  Foster at ¶ 95, quoting Geiger 
at 466, quoting Bickford at paragraph 19 of the syllabus. 
{¶ 76} The state suggests curing this problem by also striking the 
presumption of a minimum sentence.  But neither Hacker nor Simmons has 
challenged that provision, and more importantly, there is nothing apparently 
unconstitutional about designating the minimum sentence as the presumptive 
release date.  We may not arbitrarily strike a provision to make a statutory scheme 
work in the context of other stricken parts that violate offenders’ rights to 
procedural due process.  The state alternatively suggests that this problem could be 
cured by permitting standard parole procedures to operate in the context of 
indefinite sentencing.  However, there is nothing in the RTL that permits this.  
Creating a requirement such as this just to try to “fix” the now patchwork statutory 
scheme, even if well intentioned, would be a textbook example of judicial fiat. 
{¶ 77} Because of the basic due-process infirmity in the RTL, there remains 
no mechanism to enforce the maximum sentence and the intention of the legislature 
is largely thwarted.  The balance struck between flexibility on the maximum and 
flexibility on the minimum—as provided in R.C. 2967.271(F)—is destroyed by the 
unenforceability of those parts of the RTL that are unconstitutional.  Consequently, 
invalidating the entire RTL structure is the only legally justifiable course. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 78} The RTL is akin to Ohio’s former indefinite-sentencing scheme and 
consequently does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.  Hacker and 
Simmons lack standing to challenge the discretion granted to the APA to 
recommend their release before they have served their presumptive minimum 
sentences because they are not aggrieved by the RTL as to these circumstances.  
The RTL also does not violate the right to a jury trial, because nothing about the 
law permits a fact-finder other than a jury to find facts that increase the defendant’s 
sentencing-range exposure. 
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52 
{¶ 79} However, the RTL does facially violate offenders’ rights to 
procedural due process.  The procedures created by the RTL are insufficient in 
relation to the gravity of the decision being undertaken—determining whether to 
release an offender on his or her presumptive release date, affecting the offender’s 
personal liberty.  For this reason, the RTL facially violates offenders’ rights to 
procedural due process, requiring severance of certain provisions, without which 
the remaining language collapses in its operation, leaving part of the RTL 
meaningless and without a mechanism to implement it.  Therefore, the RTL is 
wholly unconstitutional.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the 
judgments of the Third and Eighth District Courts of Appeals upholding and 
applying the RTL as currently written. 
DONNELLY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Samuel C. Peterson, 
Deputy Solicitor General; and Eric C. Stewart, Logan County Prosecuting 
Attorney, for appellee in case No. 2020-1496. 
Triplett McFall Wolfe Law, L.L.C., Tina M. McFall, and Marc S. Triplett, 
for appellant in case No. 2020-1496. 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel 
T. Van and Tasha L. Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee in 
case No. 2021-0532. 
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant in case No. 2021-0532. 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel 
T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office in case No. 2020-1496. 
January Term, 2023 
 
53 
Steven L. Taylor, Legal Research and Staff Counsel, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association in case Nos. 2020-1496 and 
2021-0532. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant 
Public Defender, and Daniel S. Marcus, Supervising Attorney, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae The Ohio Public Defender in case No. 2020-1496. 
Mayle, L.L.C., Andrew R. Mayle, Benjamin G. Padanilam, and Ronald J. 
Mayle, urging reversal for amicus curiae Edward Maddox in case No. 2020-1496. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Samuel C. Peterson, 
Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney 
General Dave Yost in case No. 2021-0532. 
_________________