Case Title: All Cycle, Inc. v. Chittenden Solid Waste District

Citation: 164 Vt 428, 670 A.2d 800

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
ALL_CYCLE_V_CHITTENDEN_SOLID_WASTE_DIST.94-511; 164 Vt 428; 670 A.2d 800

[Opinion Filed 20-Oct-1995]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 14-Dec-1995]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 94-511


 All Cycle, Inc.                                   Supreme Court

                                                   On Appeal from
     v.                                            Chittenden Superior Court

 Chittenden Solid Waste District                   May Term, 1995



Merideth Wright, J.

       Christopher D. Roy and Marc B. Heath of Downs, Rachlin & Martin,
  Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

       John L. Franco, Jr., of McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan, Burlington, for
  defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       ALLEN, C.J.  Plaintiff All Cycle, Inc. appeals from the Chittenden
  Superior Court's dismissal of its three-count complaint, which alleged that
  the defendant Chittenden Solid Waste District's waste management scheme
  violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.  Plaintiff
  requested injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief.  We reverse, except
  for the court's dismissal of injunctive relief in Count I, which we affirm.

       Defendant is a union municipal district organized under 24 V.S.A.,
  Chapter 121. Pursuant to the Solid Waste Management Ordinance, enacted by
  defendant on June 24, 1992, all waste haulers operating in the District
  must obtain a license that requires haulers to comply with all ordinances
  and regulations enacted by the District.  Violations of the licensing
  conditions may result in civil or criminal penalties.  The Solid Waste
  Management Plan, adopted by

 

  defendant on March 24, 1993 and subsequently approved by the State,
  required all licensees to dispose of solid waste collected in the District
  at a single designated landfill.  This type of regulatory scheme is
  commonly called flow control.  From January 2, 1993 through the
  commencement of this litigation, the District had designated only the
  landfill on Redmond Road in Williston for disposal of District waste.  The
  District owned and operated the Redmond Road landfill and charged haulers
  who disposed of waste at the facility a processing or "tipping" fee of
  $74.20 per ton.

       On June 30, 1993 the District enacted the Solid Waste Management Fee
  Ordinance, which taxed all solid waste collected in the District on the
  basis of weight.  The Fee Ordinance became effective on August 30.  The
  District assessed a management fee at $17.60 per ton and included it in the
  Redmond Road landfill's per ton tipping fee.  The Fee Ordinance required
  haulers to weigh their loads, using only approved scales, both immediately
  before and after disposing of their loads.  The District owns three scales,
  the one at the entrance to the Redmond Road landfill and two others, one in
  South Burlington and the other in Williston.  The parties dispute whether
  use of the scales, other than the one at the Redmond Road landfill, was
  feasible while flow control was in effect.  The District alleged in its
  affidavits that procedures exist for obtaining approval for the use of
  scales other than those owned by the District.

       On May 16, 1994, in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1682-83 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held
  unconstitutional a flow control scheme similar to the District's Waste
  Plan.  On June 7, 1994, the District responded to the Carbone decision by
  issuing draft amendments to its Waste Plan which said that Carbone would
  "mak[e] it difficult to require private haulers who serve District member
  municipalities to use the District transfer station and the designated
  disposal facility."

       Plaintiff filed its complaint on June 8, 1994, alleging that the
  District's waste management scheme was unconstitutional and requesting
  damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to plaintiff, the Waste Plan and
  Fee Ordinance violated the Commerce Clause of the United States
  Constitution, which prohibits states from discriminating against or
  improperly

 

       burdening interstate commerce.  Count I of the complaint sought
  injunctive and declaratory relief with regard to defendant's Waste Plan. 
  Count II sought injunctive and declaratory relief with regard to the
  defendant's collection of the management fee, which plaintiff alleged was
  unconstitutional whether it was collected in conjunction with or
  independently of the Waste Plan. Count III sought monetary damages under 42
  U.S.C. § 1983, calculated as a refund of the allegedly excessive tipping
  fees that resulted from the District's landfill monopoly and the management
  fees that were collected pursuant to the Fee Ordinance.  Plaintiff also
  presented a motion for class certification pursuant to V.R.C.P. 23(a), in
  which it sought to represent a class of approximately twenty-five haulers
  licensed in the District.  On June 22, the District Board formally ratified
  the District manager's decision to suspend enforcement of flow control
  until Congressional authorization of flow control regulation by the states.

       Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked subject
  matter jurisdiction under V.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) because Counts I and II were
  moot.  Defendant also argued that Counts II and III failed to state a cause
  of action and should be dismissed under V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Because
  affidavits had been submitted with the complaint and defendant's motion,
  the superior court informed the parties that it would treat the motion to
  dismiss as one for summary judgment.

       Prior to the scheduled hearing on defendant's motion, plaintiff filed
  a request for a temporary restraining order (TRO).  In deciding plaintiff's
  request for a TRO, the superior court noted that defendant had committed to
  suspend enforcement of its flow control scheme pending this litigation and
  ordered defendant to publicize its nonenforcement policy to the town and
  waste haulers within its jurisdiction.  The court otherwise denied
  plaintiff's request for a TRO.  On August 9, 1994, the court dismissed
  without prejudice all counts of plaintiff's complaint.

       Because the court treated defendant's motion to dismiss as one for
  summary judgment, we review its decision by applying the legal standards
  developed under V.R.C.P. 56. Cavanaugh v. Abbott Laboratories, 145 Vt. 516,
  520,