Case Title: SOUTHEASTERN TIDEWATER PROJECT v. Bade

Citation: 435 S.E.2d 131

Docket Number: 921407

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1993-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
435 S.E.2d 131 (1993)
SOUTHEASTERN TIDEWATER OPPORTUNITY PROJECT, INC., et al.
v.
Paul F. BADE.
Record No. 921407.

Supreme Court of Virginia.
September 17, 1993.
E. Wayne Powell, Richmond, for appellants.
Jeremiah A. Denton, III, Virginia Beach, for appellee.
Present: All the Justices.
HASSELL, Justice.
In this appeal of a judgment in favor of a plaintiff who had filed a defamation action against defendants who enjoyed a qualified privilege, we consider whether the plaintiff proved malice by clear and convincing evidence.
Plaintiff, Paul F. Bade, was employed as the comptroller for the Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Project, Inc. ("STOP"). L. Louise Lucas served as executive director of STOP. As comptroller, Bade reported to Lucas and, on certain occasions, to the STOP board of directors.
Before Bade was hired as the comptroller, STOP had experienced budget deficits and fiscal problems, primarily within STOP's Head Start program. STOP received a major portion of its revenue from the Department of Health and Human Services, *132 a federal agency. This agency had designated STOP as a "high risk" grantee because of STOP's fiscal problems within the Head Start program.
On February 12, 1990, Lucas terminated Bade's employment by delivering to him a letter stating, in part:
Bade filed an action against Lucas and STOP, alleging that this letter, copies of which were sent to the chairman of the STOP board of directors and placed in the personnel file, was defamatory because he had not violated the law nor had he submitted false information. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Bade in the amount of $100,000. We awarded the defendants an appeal from the judgment.
The defendants contend that Lucas' letter to Bade is a communication that is qualifiedly privileged, that Bade failed to prove common law malice by clear and convincing evidence, and that Bade failed to prove the falsity of the statements in the letter. Admitting that the letter is qualifiedly privileged, Bade, however, argues that he proved common law malice by clear and convincing evidence, as well as the falsity of the statements in the letter. Because we disagree that Bade offered sufficient proof of defendants' common law malice, we do not consider the adequacy of Bade's proof on the issue of falsity.
The parties agree that the letter Lucas sent to Bade is a qualifiedly privileged communication because the letter was written in the context of his employment relationship. See Chesapeake Ferry Co. v. Hudgins, 155 Va. 874, 906, 156 S.E. 429, 441 (1931). However, "[a] qualified privilege is lost if a plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defamatory words were spoken with common-law malice." Smalls v. Wright, 241 Va. 52, 55, 399 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1991); see Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 154, 334 S.E.2d 846, 854 (1985).
We have stated that common law malice is "behavior actuated by motives of personal spite, or ill-will, independent of the occasion on which the communication was made." Smalls, 241 Va. at 55, 399 S.E.2d  at 808 (quoting Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 18, 325 S.E.2d 713, 727, cert. denied sub nom. Fleming v. Moore, 472 U.S. 1032, 473 U.S. 905, 105 S. Ct. 3513, 105 S. Ct. 3528, 87 L. Ed. 2d 643, 87 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890, 107 S. Ct. 291, 93 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)); Crawford & Co. v. Graves, 199 Va. 495, 499, 100 S.E.2d 714, 717 (1957). We observed in Preston v. Land, 220 Va. 118, 255 S.E.2d 509 (1979):
Id. at 120-21, 255 S.E.2d  at 511 (quoting Chesapeake Ferry Co. v. Hudgins, 155 Va. 874, 904, 156 S.E. 429, 439 (1931) (emphasis in original)).
We have also discussed the degree of proof required to constitute clear and convincing evidence.
Oberbroeckling v. Lyle, 234 Va. 373, 379, 362 S.E.2d 682, 685 (1987); Fred C. Walker Agency, Inc. v. Lucas, 215 Va. 535, 540-41, 211 S.E.2d 88, 92 (1975).
Bade, in support of his argument that he had proven common law malice by clear and convincing evidence, contends that the termination letter was a subterfuge to divert the STOP board of directors' attention from Lucas' alleged lack of management ability. Bade says that this theory is supported by evidence that Lucas' predecessor had been terminated because of financial management problems, that Lucas had been reprimanded for failing to improve STOP's financial condition, and that a copy of the termination letter was sent to the chairman of STOP's board of directors. Bade also contends that the letter was unnecessarily insulting, that the letter utilized stronger language than necessary, and that the letter was intended to hurt Bade. We disagree with Bade.
The evidence of record reveals that Bade simply failed to establish common law malice by clear and convincing evidence. The record lacks sufficient evidence from which we can infer, by the clear and convincing standard, that Lucas' behavior was actuated by any sinister or corrupt motive. Smalls, 241 Va. at 55, 399 S.E.2d  at 808. Furthermore, the communication was not made "with such gross indifference and recklessness as to amount to a wanton or wilful disregard" of Bade's rights. Preston, 220 Va. at 120-21, 255 S.E.2d  at 511.
We will reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter final judgment in favor of STOP and Lucas.
Reversed and final judgment.