Case Title: Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S45547

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  September 14, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

LOIS STRANAHAN,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.

FRED MEYER, INC.,a Delaware corporation,
	Petitioner on Review.
(CC 9110-06504; CA A88372; SC S45547)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 5, 1999.
	Charles F. Hinkle, of Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.
	Gregory Kafoury and Mark McDougal, Portland, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  Gregory Kafoury filed the brief.
	Mark A. Anderson, Portland, filed a brief for amicus curiae ACLU of Oregon.
	Eli D. Stutsman, Portland, filed a brief for amicus curiae
Progressive Campaigns, Inc.
	Linda K. Williams, Portland, filed a brief for amicus curiae
AFL-CIO of Oregon.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	Van Hoomissen, J., concurred and filed an opinion.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,
	 Robert W. Redding, Judge.
	 153 Or App 442, 958 P2d 854 (1998).
    **Leeson and Riggs, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
		GILLETTE, J.
		The underlying issue in this false arrest case is
whether this court's decision in Lloyd Corporation v. Whiffen,
315 Or 500, 849 P2d 446 (1993) (Whiffen II), correctly states the
law of Oregon under Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution, (1) with respect to the right of initiative
petitioners to utilize private property over the objection of the
property owner.  A majority of the Court of Appeals, considering
itself bound by that precedent, concluded that it does. 
Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 153 Or App 442, 451, 958 P2d 854
(1998).  For the reasons that follow, we now conclude that
Whiffen II does not state correctly the law of Oregon on that
subject.  We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
		We take our statement of facts from the Court of
Appeals' majority opinion and the record, omitting those facts
that relate to issues other than the one that is central to the
case on review:
	"Plaintiff Lois Stranahan brought this action for
false arrest against defendant Fred Meyer, Inc. (Fred
Meyer) * * *. * * *
	"* * * * *
	"Stranahan has long been a political activist in
Oregon, and has promoted her political beliefs through
use of the initiative process.  This political activity
has often involved gathering signatures to put the
initiatives she supports on the ballot. * * * At the
time of the incident at issue in the present case,
Stranahan was gathering signatures to put initiatives
on the ballot concerning sales taxes and the rights of
initiative petitioners.  Fred Meyer, a chain of
shopping centers, maintains that it has a right to
exclude initiative petitioners such as Stranahan from
its shopping centers and its property surrounding those
shopping centers.
	"On October 11, 1989, Stranahan and another
signature-gatherer * * * were arrested for trespassing
outside a Fred Meyer shopping center at Southeast 82nd
and Foster, in Portland.[ (2)]  This litigation stems from
that arrest."
Id. at 444.							
		Stranahan's actions throughout her petitioning
activity and the ensuing arrest were peaceful.  She had
notified Fred Meyer management that she would be soliciting
signatures, and she had been doing so for several hours at
the time of her arrest.  In the course of being arrested,
Stranahan suffered physical injuries.  She later filed this
false arrest action against Fred Meyer, maintaining that she
had a state constitutional right to be on Fred Meyer's
property for the purpose of soliciting signatures, that her
arrest therefore was unlawful, and that Fred Meyer should be
required to respond in damages for the injuries that she had
sustained.  For its part, Fred Meyer argued that Stranahan
had no such constitutional right and, therefore, that it was
entitled to have her arrested for trespass when she refused
to leave the premises after having been directed to do so by
Fred Meyer personnel.
		At the time when Stranahan was arrested, a number
of legal proceedings had grown out of the efforts of various
private property owners in Oregon, including Fred Meyer, to
prevent petitioning activity on their property.  To place
the trial of Stranahan's action in context, we set out that
procedural history here.  
		The first legal proceeding took place in 1984,
when Fred Meyer obtained a restraining order that prevented
a group of petitioners from soliciting signatures at its
stores.  Two years later, Fred Meyer obtained final
judgments in two separate cases that also stated that Fred
Meyer had a right to bar petitioning activity at its stores.
		In February 1988, the Court of Appeals issued a
decision that called the judgments in the earlier Fred Meyer
cases into question.  In Lloyd Corporation v. Whiffen, 89 Or
App 629, 634, 750 P2d 1157 (1988) (hereafter "the Court of
Appeals' decision in Whiffen I"), the Court of Appeals held
that a broadly worded injunction that prevented petitioning
activity inside Lloyd Center, a large shopping center in
Portland, implicated the petitioners' rights of free
expression under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon
Constitution. (3)  The court further held that, although the
owner of Lloyd Center could not ban such activity outright,
it could adopt reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations relating to that activity.  Id. at 638-39.
		Fred Meyer then sought to determine whether that
decision -- which, as noted, involved a large shopping
center -- applied to its stores.  It did so by filing a
complaint for an injunction against Lloyd Marbet, a
petitioner who often worked with Stranahan on behalf of an
organization known as the Coalition for Petition Rights
(Coalition).  On May 5, 1988, the trial court in the Marbet
case held that the Court of Appeals' decision in Whiffen I
did not apply to Fred Meyer stores and, accordingly,
enjoined Marbet and all other persons petitioning with him
from soliciting signatures on Fred Meyer's property.  The
Marbet case later was held in abeyance, pending this court's
review of the Court of Appeals' decision in Whiffen I.
		Meanwhile, on May 4, 1988, other petitioners from
the Coalition, including Stranahan, were cited for
trespassing on Fred Meyer's property when they refused to
leave a Fred Meyer store after being directed to do so.  At
Stranahan's trial on that trespass charge in July 1988, the
court ruled that the Court of Appeals' decision in Whiffen I
did not apply to the Fred Meyer store at issue.  Stranahan
and the other petitioners thereafter were convicted of
trespass.
		In June 1988, in light of Fred Meyer's action
against Marbet and the criminal case against Stranahan, the
Coalition filed an action against Fred Meyer, seeking to
enjoin Fred Meyer from prohibiting petitioning activity at
its stores.  A trial court rejected the Coalition's request,
ruling that the Court of Appeals' decision in Whiffen I did
not apply to Fred Meyer's stores.  At about the same time,
two additional trial courts in two other cases similarly
ruled that the Court of Appeals' decision in Whiffen I did
not apply to Fred Meyer's stores. (4)
		In May 1989, this court affirmed the Court of
Appeals' decision in Whiffen I.  Lloyd Corporation v.
Whiffen, 307 Or 674, 773 P2d 1294 (1989) (hereafter "Whiffen
I").  However, the court did not reach the issue whether an
injunction barring the petitioners from soliciting
signatures inside Lloyd Center violated their free
expression rights under Article I, section 8.  Rather, the
court addressed the case on what it characterized as
"subconstitutional" grounds, 307 Or at 680, concluding that
principles of equity required that the petitioners be
allowed to solicit signatures inside Lloyd Center, so long
as they did so reasonably, quietly, and peaceably, and
without substantially interfering with the owner's
commercial enterprise.  Id. at 686-87.  The court further
held that the trial court could issue an injunction imposing
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
petitioning activity inside Lloyd Center.  Id. at 687-88. 
We discuss the reasoning set out in Whiffen I in greater
detail later in this opinion.
		Five months after this court's decision in Whiffen
I, a petitioner was acquitted of trespassing on Fred Meyer's
property, following a trial judge's ruling that she was
within her rights to refuse to leave the property when asked
to do so.  Stranahan again was arrested that same month, on
October 11, 1989, giving rise to the case at bar.  At that
time, the Marbet case still was pending.  In February 1990,
the trial court in the Marbet case reaffirmed its earlier
ruling that Whiffen I did not apply to Fred Meyer stores and
entered a declaratory judgment stating that Fred Meyer had a
legal right to remove initiative petitioners from its
stores.
		At about that same time, the Court of Appeals
reversed the earlier trespass convictions of Stranahan and
others, which had arisen from their petitioning activity at
a Fred Meyer store.  See State v. Cargill, 100 Or App 336,
786 P2d 208 (1990) (so ruling).  Analyzing the case under
Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, the Court
of Appeals concluded that it was "implicit" in that section
"that the people must have adequate opportunities to sign
the petitions that are necessary for them to act as
legislators."  Id. at 343.  The Court of Appeals then held:
"Article IV, section 1, * * * prohibits using a
criminal prosecution to prevent the people from
collecting signatures on initiative and referendum
petitions in areas that have replaced traditional
forums for the collection of signatures, so long as
there is no substantial interference with the owner's
use of the property for business or other purposes."
Id. at 348.  This court affirmed by an equally divided
court.  State v. Cargill, 316 Or 492, 851 P2d 1141 (1993).
		Meanwhile, in response to this court's decision in
Whiffen I, the owner of Lloyd Center had adopted time,
place, and manner restrictions that limited petitioning
activity inside Lloyd Center.  A group of petitioners
attempted to solicit signatures outside the scope of those
restrictions, and the owner responded by seeking an
injunction.  A trial court issued the injunction, and, in
June 1991, the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that
the restrictions were reasonable.  Lloyd Corporation v.
Whiffen, 107 Or App 773, 813 P2d 573 (1991).  In March 1993,
this court affirmed in part and reversed in part, reasoning 
that the right to initiate laws and constitutional
amendments under Article IV, section 1, implicitly included
the right to solicit signatures for initiative petitions in
the common areas of large shopping centers such as Lloyd
Center.  Whiffen II, 315 Or at 514.  We discuss the Whiffen
II decision in greater detail later in this opinion.
		Shortly after issuing Whiffen II, this court
decided State v. Dameron, 316 Or 448, 853 P2d 1285 (1993),
which involved a criminal defendant who had been convicted
of trespass after soliciting signatures outside a Fred Meyer
store that was located inside a privately owned shopping
center.  The Court of Appeals had reversed the conviction,
reasoning that the defendant's actions constitutionally were
protected under Cargill.  This court affirmed the decision
of the Court of Appeals, holding that the state had not
proved that the Fred Meyer store at issue was different in
character from a large shopping center such as Lloyd Center. 
Id. at 461-62.
		The trial in Stranahan's false arrest action
against Fred Meyer commenced in February 1995.  At trial,
Fred Meyer introduced evidence that, in its view,
demonstrated that the store at issue bore characteristics
that distinguished it from a large shopping center.  Both
parties also introduced a number of appellate decisions into
evidence, including Cargill, Whiffen II, and Dameron.  
		At the close of evidence, Fred Meyer moved for a
directed verdict on the ground, inter alia, that the store
at issue had not been opened to the public for petitioning
purposes under Cargill and Dameron.  The trial court denied
that motion, concluding that the store fit within the facts
of Cargill and Dameron, and, therefore, that Stranahan had a
right to solicit signatures on the privately owned sidewalk
outside the store.  The court later instructed the jury to
that effect and further instructed that Fred Meyer had a
right to direct Stranahan to leave its premises, but did not
have a legal right to have her arrested for trespass after
she refused to do so.
		The jury returned a substantial verdict in
Stranahan's favor, including punitive damages totaling $2
million, which the trial court later reduced to $375,000. 
Stranahan appealed that reduction to the Court of Appeals,
and Fred Meyer cross-appealed, contending, inter alia, that,
under Whiffen II and Dameron, it had a right to prohibit
petitioning activity at the store in question, because that
store was different in character from a large shopping
center.  
		A divided, en banc Court of Appeals affirmed on
Fred Meyer's cross-appeal, specifically ruling that the
trial court had not erred in denying Fred Meyer's multiple
motions for a directed verdict. (5)  Stranahan, 153 Or App at
454-62.  The majority reasoned, in part, that the Fred Meyer
store at issue was similar in character to the Fred Meyer
stores involved in Cargill and Dameron, and that, like the
owner of Lloyd Center in Whiffen II, Fred Meyer had extended
a broad invitation to the public to shop there.  It
followed, in the majority's view, that Fred Meyer had not
established that Stranahan's petitioning activity was
unlawful, rendering baseless its defense to her claim of
false arrest.  Id. at 455.  One judge concurred in the
result, contending that the critical fact under Whiffen II
was that Fred Meyer had invited the public to its stores for
its own commercial business advantage.  Id. at 477-78
(Leeson, J., pro tempore, concurring).  Four judges
dissented, asserting that, because the evidence did not
demonstrate an intent on Fred Meyer's part to invite the
public to do anything other than purchase consumer goods at
the store in question, that store was not subject to
Stranahan's right to solicit signatures under Article IV,
section 1.  Id. at 497 (Landau, J., dissenting).
		Fred Meyer petitioned for review, contending,
inter alia, that Article IV, section 1, does not create a
right to solicit signatures for initiative petitions on
private property and, consequently, that Whiffen II was
decided incorrectly and should be overruled. (6)  We allowed
review to consider that issue.
		We first note that, before this court's decision
in Whiffen II, there had been a long history of federal
constitutional litigation pitting the rights of persons
engaging in political activity, such as petitioning, against
the rights of private property owners.  See Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 US 501, 505-09, 66 S Ct 276, 90 L Ed 265 (1946)
(holding that Jehovah's Witness who had been convicted of
trespassing after refusing to stop distributing religious
literature on sidewalk of "company town" could not be denied
the right to express her freedom of religion and freedom of
the press under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, (7) simply because a single company held legal
title to the entire town); Food Employees v. Logan Plaza,
Inc., 391 US 308, 318-19, 88 S Ct 1601, 20 L Ed 2d 603
(1968) (extending Marsh rationale to peaceful union
picketing activity outside shopping center; holding that
shopping center was "functional equivalent[]" of business
district in company town); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 US
551, 561-64, 567-69, 92 S Ct 2219, 33 L Ed 2d 131 (1972)
(retreating from "functional equivalency" discussion in
Logan Plaza; confining Logan Plaza to its facts; holding
that shopping center owner could prohibit political handbill
distributions on its property); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 US 507,
520-21, 96 S Ct 1029, 47 L Ed 2d 196 (1976) (rejecting
contention that First Amendment required that union members
protesting labor practices at employer's warehouse be
permitted to picket employer's retail store located inside
privately owned shopping center); Pruneyard Shopping Center
v. Robins, 447 US 74, 80-88, 100 S Ct 2035, 64 L Ed 2d 741
(1980) (sustaining decision of California Supreme Court
under California Constitution and holding that unwanted,
reasonable petitioning activity in privately owned shopping
center neither violated shopping center owner's right to
free speech under First Amendment nor effected taking
without just compensation under Fifth Amendment (8)). 
		The foregoing Supreme Court cases can be
summarized as follows.  First, in determining whether the
First Amendment protects petitioning or other political
activity on private property, the test is not whether that
property amounts to the "functional equivalent" of a public
forum.  Rather, a court must determine whether, under the
facts of the particular case, it could be said that state
action implicating the First Amendment has occurred. 
Hudgens, 424 US at 520-21; Tanner, 407 US at 562-63. 
Second, although the First Amendment generally is not
implicated when persons engage in petitioning or other
political activity inside privately owned shopping centers,
certain state constitutional provisions might mandate that
such activity be permitted.  Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447
US at 81.  Finally, where such state constitutional
provisions exist, the property owner's rights under the
First and Fifth Amendments might or might not be implicated,
depending on the facts of the particular case.  Id. at 82-88.
		The foregoing Supreme Court decisions provided the
background against which this court has addressed the issue
whether the Oregon Constitution requires permitting 
petitioning activity inside privately owned shopping
centers, even when the owner objects to such activity.  This
court first addressed that issue in Whiffen I, which, as
noted earlier, involved petitioning activity inside Lloyd
Center.  In that case, the trial court had entered an
injunction that had restrained the petitioners from
"entering upon [the owner's] private property to exercise
their expressions of opinion or to gather signatures in the
initiative and referendum process without [the owner's]
permission or consent."  307 Or at 677 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  The Court of Appeals had reversed,
reasoning that the injunction violated the petitioners'
rights to free expression under Article I, section 8, of the
Oregon Constitution, but that those rights constitutionally
could be subjected to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.  Id.  
		In affirming the Court of Appeals' decision on
different grounds, this court avoided the constitutional
issue.  Rather, this court reasoned on a "subconstitutional"
basis, id. at 680, that the equitable determination whether
an injunction should be entered required a balancing of the
interests involved -- specifically, the public interest
implicated in the people's power of initiative and
referendum under Article IV, section 1, and the owner's
interest in preventing injury to its commercial enterprise. 
Id. at 684-85.  The court concluded that, under application
of those equitable principles, the petitioners could not be
enjoined from entering Lloyd Center because "[t]he
solicitation of signatures of patrons does not in and of
itself constitute substantial interference" with the owner's
commercial enterprise.  Id. at 687.  In reaching that
conclusion, the court emphasized that the process of
signature solicitation was a "fundamental principle of the
Oregon government," id. at 684, and that the public policy
behind that process "limits equitable enforcement of [the
owner's] preferred total exclusion of signature solicitors." 
Id. at 687.  Thus, although it did not base its decision on
either Article I, section 8, or Article IV, section 1, the
court did highlight the political importance of the ability
to solicit signatures for initiative petitions.
		As noted earlier, following this court's decision
in Whiffen I, the owner of Lloyd Center adopted a number of
restrictions limiting the ability of initiative petitioners
to solicit signatures inside Lloyd Center.  The owner's
effort to enforce those restrictions led to this court's
decision in Whiffen II.  The trial court in that case had
issued an injunction in favor of the owner of Lloyd Center,
and the Court of Appeals had affirmed, concluding that the
rules adopted were reasonable.  Before this court, the owner
contended that requiring it to allow petitioning activity on
its private property violated the takings, free expression,
and free speech provisions of the state and federal
constitutions.  The owner also contended that neither
Article I, section 8 or 26, (9) nor Article IV, section 1,
granted to the petitioners the right to solicit signatures
inside a privately owned shopping center over the owner's
objection.  Whiffen II, 315 Or at 503-04.
		The Whiffen II court began its analysis by disposing of
the owner's contentions that compelling it to provide a forum for
petitioning activity constituted a taking under either the state
or federal constitutions.  After assuming that the takings
analysis under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon
Constitution, (10) would be the same as the analysis under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the court applied
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 US at 82-85, and concluded that no
"taking" of a constitutional dimension had occurred.  Whiffen II,
315 Or at 505-07.  The court similarly disposed of the owner's
assertion of its rights to free expression and free speech under
Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, and the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, again applying a
federal constitutional analysis to both provisions and
concluding, under Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 US at 85-88,
that no constitutional violations had occurred.  Whiffen II, 315
Or at 507-09.
		The court then turned to the issue whether the
initiative and referendum provisions of Article IV, section 1, of
the Oregon Constitution, which the people originally adopted by
legislative referral in 1902, conferred a right to solicit
signatures for initiative petitions "on private property to which
the public had been invited."  Id. at 510.  The court began by
noting that, although the United States Supreme Court had
concluded in Tanner that the First Amendment did not confer such
a right, the Court also expressly had stated in Pruneyard
Shopping Center that Tanner did not "limit the authority of [a]
[s]tate to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to
adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive
than those conferred by the Federal Constitution."  Id. at 510
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court then agreed with
the holding in Marsh -- a case decided under the First Amendment
-- that "[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights
of those who use it."  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
		Next, the court held in summary fashion that "persons
may seek signatures in the common areas of the Lloyd Center,
subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions."  Id.
at 511.  As support for that holding, the court cited Oregon's
longstanding tradition of facilitating the process of signature
solicitation, reiterating the statement in Whiffen I that such
activity is a "fundamental principle of the Oregon government." 
Id. at 512 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).  The
court also noted its agreement with the Court of Appeals' holding
in Cargill, 100 Or App at 348, that Article IV, section 1,
implicitly required that persons have adequate opportunities to
sign initiative petitions.  Whiffen II, 315 Or at 512.  Finally,
the court cited Pruneyard Shopping Center and Marsh -- again,
both First Amendment cases -- as support for its holding that
Article IV, section 1, permits petitioning activity inside
privately owned shopping centers, even over the owner's
objection.  Id. at 513-14.  The court concluded its decision by
reviewing the time, place, and manner restrictions imposed by the
owner of Lloyd Center, striking the restrictions that it found
"unduly restrictive" of the petitioners' right to solicit
signatures, absent a showing that interference with the owner's
commercial enterprise was so substantial as to place an
"unreasonable burden" on the owner.  Id. at 515-19.  		
		Shortly after deciding Whiffen II, this court decided
Dameron, 316 Or 448, which, as noted earlier, overturned the
trespass conviction of a criminal defendant who had solicited
signatures outside a Fred Meyer store that was located inside a
privately owned shopping center.  The issue in that case was
whether the defendant unlawfully had remained on the premises
within the meaning of ORS 164.245(1) (1993) and ORS
164.205(3)(b), (11) after being directed to leave by a person in
authority.  The Court of Appeals had reversed the defendant's
conviction, reasoning that the defendant had engaged in
constitutionally protected activity under Cargill.  316 Or at
455-56.  On review, in affirming the Court of Appeals' decision,
this court did not revisit its holding in Whiffen II.  Indeed,
the court concluded that, in light of the defendant's right under
Article IV, section 1, to solicit signatures in the common areas
of privately owned shopping centers (as set out in Whiffen II),
the state bore the burden of proving that "the direction to leave
the premises was lawful, i.e., that the defendant had no legal
right to ignore the direction to leave."  Id. at 460.  The court
then held that, because the state had failed to prove that the
Fred Meyer store in question was different in character from a
large shopping center, the state had not met its burden of
proving that Fred Meyer lawfully had requested the defendant to
leave the premises.  Id. at 461-62.
		This court's decisions in Whiffen II and, to a lesser
extent, Dameron, lead us to the present case.  As can be seen
from the foregoing case law summary, unless Whiffen II was
wrongly decided or, if correctly decided, is distinguishable in
some way, the Court of Appeals majority correctly ruled on Fred
Meyer's cross-appeal in this case.  Before this court, Fred
Meyer's principle contention is that Whiffen II -- specifically,
its Article IV, section 1, analysis -- was decided incorrectly
and, therefore, should not be followed.  We turn to that issue,
but begin with some preliminary observations concerning the
methodology to be used when this court is asked to reconsider a
constitutional decision.
		The question is one of stare decisis, a doctrine that
attempts to balance two competing considerations.  On one hand is
the undeniable importance of stability in legal rules and
decisions.  That consideration applies with particular force in
the arena of constitutional rights and responsibilities, because
the Oregon Constitution is the fundamental document of this state
and, as such, should be stable and reliable.  On the other hand,
the law has a similarly important need to be able to correct past
errors.  This court is the body with the ultimate responsibility
for construing our constitution, and, if we err, no other
reviewing body can remedy that error.  See Hungerford v. Portland
Sanitarium, 235 Or 412, 415, 384 P2d 1009 (1963) ("[t]he pull of
stare decisis is strong, but it is not inexorable"). 
		We repeat a further observation concerning the doctrine
of stare decisis made nearly a half century ago, but equally apt
today:
	"'"A deliberate or solemn decision of a court or judge,
made after argument of a question of law fairly arising
in a case, and necessary to its determination, is an
authority, or binding precedent, in the same court or
in other courts of equal or lower rank, in subsequent
cases, where 'the very point' is again in controversy;
but the degree of authority belonging to such a
precedent depends, of necessity, on its agreement with
the spirit of the times or the judgment of subsequent
tribunals upon its correctness as a statement of the
existing or actual law, and the compulsion or exigency
of the doctrine is, in the last analysis, moral and
intellectual, rather than arbitrary or inflexible."'"
Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran, 203 Or 489, 528, 280 P2d 301
(1955) (quoting State v. Mellenberger, 163 Or 233, 259, 95 P2d
709 (1939)), overruled in part on other grounds by Hungerford,
235 Or at 414 (emphasis added). 
		Consistent with the foregoing, we remain willing to
reconsider a previous ruling under the Oregon Constitution
whenever a party presents to us a principled argument suggesting
that, in an earlier decision, this court wrongly considered or
wrongly decided the issue in question.  We will give particular
attention to arguments that either present new information as to
the meaning of the constitutional provision at issue or that
demonstrate some failure on the part of this court at the time of
the earlier decision to follow its usual paradigm for considering
and construing the meaning of the provision in question.  With
those considerations in mind, we turn to Fred Meyer's arguments
respecting the alleged defects in this court's decision in
Whiffen II.
		Fred Meyer argues, inter alia, that this court departed
from its well-established methodology for construing
constitutional provisions when it decided Whiffen II.  Fred Meyer
cites Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992), as
setting out the proper methodology for constitutional
interpretation and notes the absence of that case from the
court's discussion in Whiffen II.  Fred Meyer asserts that, when
the correct methodology is followed, it becomes clear that
Whiffen II was decided incorrectly.  
		As a preliminary matter, we note that, when construing
provisions of the Oregon Constitution, it long has been the
practice of this court "to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the framers [of the provision at issue] and of the
people who adopted it."  Jones v. Hoss, 132 Or 175, 178, 285 P
205 (1930); see also Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or
297, 304, 736 P2d 173 (1987) (demonstrating that framers' intent,
rather than isolated evidence of historical practices, governs
constitutional interpretation).  To ascertain that intent, this
court has stated:
"There are three levels on which [the] constitutional
provision [at issue] must be addressed:  Its specific
wording, the case law surrounding it, and the
historical circumstances that led to its creation."
Priest, 314 Or at 415-16.  
		Priest, which involved interpretation of an original
constitutional provision, was decided almost a year before this
court's decision in Whiffen II.  Fred Meyer correctly notes that,
although Priest represented this court's first clear statement of
a methodology for ascertaining the intent of the framers and the
people, the court long had followed a similar approach when
interpreting other original provisions of the Oregon
Constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Kessler, 289 Or 359, 614 P2d
94 (1980) (analyzing wording, historical background, and relevant
cases pertaining to right to bear arms set out in Article I,
section 27).  Further, before this court's decision in Whiffen
II, this court had applied a Priest-like analysis in cases
involving constitutional provisions and amendments that, like the
initiative and referendum provisions of Article IV, section 1,
were adopted by legislative referral.  See, e.g., State v.
Gortmaker, 295 Or 505, 668 P2d 354 (1983) (examining wording and
history surrounding grand jury provisions adopted by legislative
referral as Article VII (Amended), section 5).
		Fred Meyer also is correct that, in Whiffen II, this
court made no attempt to ascertain the intent of the people when
they adopted the initiative and referendum provisions of Article
IV, section 1.  Neither did the court adhere to its usual
methodology of examining the text, history, and case law
surrounding an original constitutional provision, or one adopted
by legislative referral, when it analyzed Article IV, section 1. 
The court instead concluded in summary fashion that Article IV,
section 1, required that initiative petitioners be allowed to
solicit signatures in the common areas of privately owned
shopping centers, even when the owner objects.  Whiffen II, 315
Or at 511.  In its limited analysis, the court also relied to a
significant degree on the United States Supreme Court's decisions
in Marsh and Pruneyard Shopping Center, both of which were
decided under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 
		In short, Fred Meyer's criticism of the Whiffen II
decision -- specifically, the failure of that decision to follow
this court's established methodology for ascertaining the
intended meaning of a constitutional provision -- is well taken. 
We therefore will reexamine the issue presented, viz., whether
Article IV, section 1, confers the right to solicit signatures
for initiative petitions on private property over the owner's
objection.
		Before doing so, however, we take this opportunity to
clarify the interpretive methodology that is applicable here.  As
noted, before Whiffen II was decided, this court had set out in
Priest a methodology for interpreting original constitutional
provisions, which it generally also had followed in the past when
construing constitutional provisions adopted by legislative
referral.  However, shortly after deciding Whiffen II, two other
decisions of this court set out a slightly different methodology
for interpreting constitutional provisions and amendments adopted
by initiative petition.  First, in Roseburg School Dist. v. City
of Roseburg, 316 Or 374, 378, 851 P2d 595 (1993), the court
stated:
		"In interpreting a constitutional provision
adopted through the initiative process, our task is to
discern the intent of the voters.  The best evidence of
the voters' intent is the text of the provision itself. 
* * * The context of the language of the ballot measure
may also be considered; however, if the intent is clear
based on the text and context of the constitutional
provision, the court does not look further. * * *"
(Citations and footnote omitted.)  A year later, in Ecumenical
Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551, 559, 871
P2d 106 (1994), the court reiterated the above-quoted methodology
from Roseburg School Dist. and added that, "[i]f the intent of
the voters is not clear from the text and context of the
initiated constitutional provision, the court turns to the
history of the provision."  Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or at 559
(footnote omitted).  The court also noted that caution must be
used before ending the analysis at the first level, viz., without
considering the history of the constitutional provision at issue. 
Id. at 559 n 7; see also Coultas v. City of Sutherlin, 318 Or
584, 590, 871 P2d 465 (1994) ("It is an unusual case in which the
text and context of a[n initiated] constitutional provision
reflect the intent of the voters so clearly that no alternative
reading of the provision is possible.").
		Here, Fred Meyer argues that we should follow the
methodology set out in Priest to determine whether Article IV,
section 1, confers a right to solicit signatures for initiative
petitions on private property over the owner's objection. 
However, because the initiative and referendum provisions of
Article IV, section 1, were adopted pursuant to legislative
referral, rather than as part of the original Oregon
Constitution, we conclude that we should apply the methodology
set out for initiated constitutional provisions and amendments in
Roseburg School Dist. and, more specifically, in Ecumenical
Ministries.  We make that distinction because of the inherent
difference between original constitutional provisions and those
later adopted or amended by legislative referral or initiative
petition.  As to the former, the drafters of the constitution
crafted those provisions and submitted them to the people for
approval without the benefit of an existing constitutional
framework.  In contrast, provisions or amendments created through
either legislative referral or initiative petition are adopted by
the people against the backdrop of an existing constitutional
framework.  It follows that, with respect to the latter
provisions, it is the people's understanding and intended meaning
of the provision in question -- as to which the text and context
are the most important clue -- that are critical to our
analysis. (12)  We therefore proceed to analyze the relevant parts
of Article IV, section 1, under the methodology set out in
Roseburg School Dist. and Ecumenical Ministries.  See generally
OEA v. Roberts, 301 Or 228, 231, 721 P2d 833 (1986) (applying
methodology similar to Ecumenical Ministries to part of Article
IV, section 1, amended by legislative referral in 1968). (13)
		As always, we begin with the text of the constitutional
provision at issue.  Article IV, section 1, provides, in part:
		"(1) The legislative power of the state, except
for the initiative and referendum powers reserved to
the people, is vested in a Legislative Assembly,
consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
		"(2)(a) The people reserve to themselves the
initiative power, which is to propose laws and
amendments to the Constitution and enact or reject them
at an election independently of the Legislative
Assembly.
		"(b) An initiative law may be proposed only by a
petition signed by a number of qualified voters equal
to six percent of the total number of votes cast for
all candidates for Governor at the election at which a
Governor was elected for a term of four years next
preceding the filing of the petition.
		"(c) An initiative amendment to the Constitution
may be proposed only by a petition signed by a number
of qualified voters equal to eight percent of the total
number of votes cast for all candidates for Governor at
the election at which a Governor was elected for a term
of four years next preceding the filing of the
petition.
		"(d) An initiative petition shall include the full
text of the proposed law or amendment to the
Constitution.  A proposed law or amendment to the
Constitution shall embrace one subject only and matters
properly connected therewith.
		"(e) An initiative petition shall be filed not
less than four months before the election at which the
proposed law or amendment to the Constitution is to be
voted upon.
		"(3)(a) The people reserve to themselves the
referendum power, which is to approve or reject at an
election any Act, or part thereof, of the Legislative
Assembly that does not become effective earlier than 90
days after the end of the session at which the Act is
passed.
		"(b) A referendum on an Act or part thereof may be
ordered by a petition signed by a number of qualified
voters equal to four percent of the total number of
votes cast for all candidates for Governor at the
election at which a Governor was elected for a term of
four years next preceding the filing of the petition. 
A referendum petition shall be filed not more than 90
days after the end of the session at which the Act is
passed.
		"(c) A referendum on an Act may be ordered by the
Legislative Assembly by law. * * *
		"(4)(a) Petitions or orders for the initiative or
referendum shall be filed with the Secretary of State.
The Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for the
manner in which the Secretary of State shall determine
whether a petition contains the required number of
signatures of qualified voters. * * *
		"(b) Initiative and referendum measures shall be
submitted to the people as provided in this section and
by law not inconsistent therewith."
		Some significant points can be drawn from the foregoing
text.  First, Article IV, section 1, specifically defines the
"initiative power" as the power to propose laws and
constitutional amendments and to enact or reject them, and the
"referendum power" as the power to approve or reject any bill
passed by the legislature that meets certain criteria.  Or Const,
Art IV, §§ 1(2)(a) and (3)(a).  Second, the manner of exercising
such power is by circulating and filing a petition, signed by a
requisite number of voters.  Or Const, Art IV, §§ 1(2)(c) and
(3)(b).  Third, Article IV, section 1, sets out requirements for
such petitions respecting content, signature requirements, and
filing.  Or Const, Art IV, §§ 1(2)(b) to (e), (3)(b), and (4)(a). 
However, nothing in the text speaks to the act of soliciting
signatures for an initiative petition, let alone suggests that
petitioners have a constitutional right to engage in such
activity on private property over the owner's objection.
		The current wording of Article IV, section 1, was
adopted by the people in 1968, pursuant to legislative referral. 
Before 1968, Article IV, section 1, provided, in part:
		"The legislative authority of the state shall be
vested in a legislative assembly, consisting of a
senate and house of representatives, but the people
reserve to themselves power to propose laws and
amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject
the same at the polls, independent of the legislative
assembly, and also reserve power at their own option to
approve or reject at the polls any act of the
legislative assembly.  The first power reserved by the
people is the initiative, and not more than 8 per cent
of the legal voters shall be required to propose any
measure by such petition, and every such petition shall
include the full text of the measure so proposed. 
Initiative petitions shall be filed with the secretary
of state not less than four months before the election
at which they are to be voted upon.  The second power
is the referendum, and it may be ordered (except as to
laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the
public peace, health, or safety) either by the petition
signed by 5 per cent of the legal voters, or by the
legislative assembly, as other bills are enacted. 
Referendum petitions shall be filed with the secretary
of state not more than 90 days after the final
adjournment of the session of the legislative assembly
which passed the bill on which the referendum is
demanded. * * * The style of all bills shall be:  'Be
it enacted by the people of the state of Oregon.' * * *
The whole number of votes cast for justice of the
supreme court at the regular election last preceding
the filing of any petition for the initiative or for
the referendum shall be the basis on which the number
of legal voters necessary to sign such petition shall
be counted.  Petitions and orders for the initiative
and for the referendum shall be filed with the
secretary of state, and in submitting the same to the
people he, and all other officers, shall be guided by
the general laws and the act submitting this amendment,
until legislation shall be especially provided
therefor."
Or Const, Art IV, § 1 (1902).  That wording was adopted as a
constitutional amendment that was referred to the people by the
legislative assembly in 1902. (14)  See generally Ecumenical
Ministries, 318 Or at 554-55 (setting out original and amended
versions of constitutional provision at issue as part of textual
analysis).
		As can be seen, the 1968 amendment restructured Article
IV, section 1, and made a few changes, such as altering the
signature requirements and imposing a single-subject limitation
on initiated laws and constitutional amendments.  See generally
Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 272, 959 P2d 49 (1998) (one
purpose of the 1968 amendment was to "'clean-up' parts of the
constitution, by repealing obsolete provisions and by combining
the various initiative and referendum powers held by the people
into one part of the constitution").  However, the 1968 amendment
did not purport to alter the nature of the people's power of
initiative and referendum, which had been in existence since
1902.  See generally State v. Campbell/Campf/Collins, 265 Or 82,
89, 506 P2d 163 (1973) ("The explanation of the 1968 amendment in
the official Voters' Pamphlet indicates that there was no
intention in the drafting of the amendment to change the role of
the legislature in connection with the exercise by the people of
the initiative and referendum.").  As was true after the 1968
amendment to Article IV, section 1, nothing in the text of the
1902 version spoke to the right of petitioners to solicit
signatures on private property over the owner's objection.  See
generally id. at 89-90 (court analyzed Article IV, section 1,
under 1902 version of that section, assuming that 1968 amendment
made no substantive change with respect to legislature's
authority in connection with initiative and referendum).
		Our first level of analysis under Ecumenical Ministries
also includes relevant case law interpreting Article IV, section
1.  See Coultas, 318 Or at 589-90 (examining earlier case law
construing initiated constitutional amendment in question). (15) 
That case law helps to define the parameters of the nature of the
rights conferred by the initiative and referendum provisions of
Article IV, section 1.  For example, as its text demonstrates,
the purpose of those provisions was to grant to the people the
right to propose and reject legislation and to propose
constitutional amendments, as well as to authorize the
legislature to enact procedural regulations respecting the
process.  See, e.g., Rose v. Port of Portland, 82 Or 541, 552,
162 P 498 (1917) (Article IV, section 1, confers the "unfettered"
right to initiate and enact laws or constitutional amendments,
except to extent that the people themselves have limited it),
overruled in part on other grounds by State ex rel Heinig v.
Milwaukie et al, 231 Or 473, 479, 373 P2d 680 (1962); State ex
rel. Carson v. Kozer, 126 Or 641, 644, 270 P 513 (1928) (Article
IV, section 1, created "two law-making bodies, the legislative
assembly on the one hand and the people on the other, which in
the exercise of the legislative powers are coequal and co-ordinate"); Kalich v. Knapp, 73 Or 558, 581, 142 P 594, 145 P 22
(1914) (on rehearing) (in adopting Article IV, section 1, the
people compelled the legislature "to share its powers of
legislation with that of the people publicly expressed through
the initiative").  Additionally, the right conferred by Article
IV, section 1, encompasses the right to vote on a proposed law or
constitutional amendment submitted by initiative petition or
referral.  See State ex rel. v. Snell, 168 Or 153, 159, 121 P2d
930 (1942) ("The right of the people of the state * * * to vote
upon any measure passed by the legislature is reserved to them by
§ 1 of article IV of the Oregon constitution."); Loe v. Britting,
132 Or 572, 578, 287 P 74 (1930) (Article IV, section 1, confers
political right to vote on laws and constitutional amendments
proposed by initiative petition).
		This court's Article IV, section 1, jurisprudence also
has addressed petitioning activities, in particular, the
solicitation of signatures.  In Campbell/Campf/Collins, 265 Or
82, the court addressed the question whether a statute banning
payment of persons who solicit signatures for initiative
petitions contravened Article IV, section 1.  The petitioners had
argued that the statute severely hampered the "exercise" of their
rights under Article IV, section 1, which -- they contended --
included a broad ability to solicit signatures.  Id. at 90.  The
court first noted, as have we, that Article IV, section 1, was
"silent as to the means of securing signatures."  Id.  The court
then analyzed whether the statute at issue was a "reasonable
regulation which facilitates the proper exercise of the
initiative and referendum" or whether, instead, "by placing undue
burdens on that exercise," the statute was inconsistent with the
people's reservation of the initiative and referendum power. (16) 
Id.  The court rejected the petitioners' contention that the
statute unduly had burdened their ability to solicit signatures
and, accordingly, upheld the statute. (17)  See also generally State
ex rel. v. Snell, 155 Or 300, 308-09, 60 P2d 964 (1937)
(demonstrating that Article IV, section 1, encompasses right to
sign initiative petition and have signature counted by Secretary
of State).
		Similar to the petitioners in Campbell/Campf/Collins,
Stranahan contends in this case that Article IV, section 1,
confers an unfettered right to solicit signatures, even on
private property over the owner's objection.  However, although
Campbell/Campf/Collins arguably reinforces the proposition that
the right conferred by Article IV, section 1, encompasses a right
to solicit signatures for initiative petitions, it also
demonstrates that that latter right is not so broad or unlimited
as the petitioners in that case, or Stranahan in this one,
suggest.  Indeed, in Campbell/Campf/Collins, 265 Or at 90, the
court declined to hold that Article IV, section 1, encompassed a
constitutional right to pay for signature solicitation, in light
of the fact that the constitution was silent in that regard.  
See also Loe, 132 Or at 577 (court declined to adopt reading of
Article IV, section 1, unsupported by its wording, viz., that
right to vote on initiative petition was limited to taxpaying
citizens).
		In sum, the case law demonstrates that Article IV,
section 1, confers an unfettered right to propose laws and
constitutional amendments by initiative petition, and to approve
or reject such proposed laws or amendments through the voting
process.  The case law also fairly can be read to hold that the
power conferred by Article IV, section 1, encompasses that which
is necessary to its exercise, such as the ability to solicit
signatures for initiative petitions and the ability to sign such
petitions.  However, nothing in the case law suggests, much less
requires, an affirmative answer to the issue before us here.
		As can be seen from the foregoing, nothing in the text 
or case law surrounding Article IV, section 1, demonstrates that,
in adopting its initiative and referendum provisions, the people
intended to require private property owners to permit petitioning
activity on their property.  However, because, as the Whiffen II
court noted, such activity arguably could be viewed as an
integral part of the people's power of initiative and referendum
under Article IV, section 1, and in light of this court's
reluctance to end the interpretative analysis under Ecumenical
Ministries prematurely, we also shall examine the history of the
initiative and referendum provisions of Article IV, section 1. 
See Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or at 559 n 7 (noting that
"caution is required in ending the analysis before considering
the history of an initiated constitutional provision").  Such
history includes "sources of information that were available to
the voters at the time the measure was adopted and that disclose
the public's understanding of the measure."  Id. at 560 n 8. (18)
		As noted, the initiative and referendum provisions of
Article IV, section 1, originated as a resolution in the
Legislative Assembly that was referred to the people.  That
resolution was approved successively by the Legislative Assembly
in 1899 and again in 1901, and was submitted to the people for a
vote at the June 1902 general election.  There is no material in
the 1899 or 1901 session laws, or in any objective information
that might have been provided to the voters in the Voters'
Pamphlet for the 1902 election, that assists our determination of
the scope of the people's power to initiate laws and
constitutional amendments.  See Armatta, 327 Or at 271 (noting
lack of statements in June 1902 Voters' Pamphlet concerning
proposed amendment to Article IV, section 1).  Similarly, as to
the 1968 amendment to Article IV, section 1, there is no
historical information that speaks to the issue before us here. 
See id. at 272 (summarizing part of May 1968 Voters' Pamphlet);
Campbell/Campf/Collins, 265 Or at 87, 89 (purpose of 1968
amendment was to change basis for signature requirements and to
provide more time for signature certification).  Neither have we
found any other objective materials circulated to the public at
large before the adoption of the initiative and referendum
provisions of Article IV, section 1, that assist our
interpretation of that provision.  See LaGrande/Astoria v. PERB,
284 Or 173, 184 n 8, 586 P2d 765 (1978) (demonstrating that
statements circulated to public at large can be indicative of
intended meaning of measure at issue).			
		In sum, after considering the text, the relevant case
law, and the history of the initiative and referendum provisions
of Article IV, section 1, we have found nothing to support the
conclusion set out in Whiffen II, viz., that persons soliciting
signatures for initiative petitions may do so on certain private
property over the owner's objection.  We therefore hold that
Article IV, section 1, does not extend so far as to confer that
right.  The contrary holding of Whiffen II was error, and it is
disavowed. (19)  
		We now turn to the case at hand.  Here, the legal
premise underlying Stranahan's false arrest action against Fred
Meyer is that she was within her rights under Article IV, section
1, to solicit signatures on Fred Meyer's private property, even
over its objection.  At trial, Fred Meyer moved for a directed
verdict, in part on the ground that it had a legal right to
direct Stranahan to leave its premises and, on her failure to do
so, to have her arrested for trespass.  In light of our
conclusion that, in those circumstances,  Article IV, section 1,
does not confer the broad right asserted by Stranahan, we hold
that Fred Meyer was entitled to a directed verdict on that
ground.  We reverse the contrary holding of the Court of Appeals
and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
		VAN HOOMISSEN, J., concurring.
		The issue on review in this tort action for false
arrest is whether plaintiff, Stranahan, had a state
constitutional right to collect initiative petition signatures at
the Fred Meyer store on Southeast 82nd Avenue and Foster Road in
Portland.  Defendant, Fred Meyer, argues that it cannot be held
liable for that tort because Stranahan was committing criminal
trespass at the time of her arrest. (20)  Stranahan argues that she
was not committing criminal trespass at the time of her arrest
because, she asserts, she had a right under Article IV, section
1, of the Oregon Constitution (21) to enter and remain on Fred
Meyer's property to collect signatures for an initiative
petition.  She relies on Lloyd Corporation v. Whiffen, 315 Or
500, 849 P2d 446 (1993) (Whiffen II).  Fred Meyer responds that
Whiffen II is distinguishable because that case concerned a
substantially larger and more complex regional shopping center
than its property here.  
		Fred Meyer argues in the alternative that Whiffen II
should be overruled.  The majority addresses that latter argument
and concludes that this court was incorrect in holding, in
Whiffen II, that persons who gather signatures for initiative
measures have a constitutional right to engage in that activity
in the common areas of large regional shopping centers, subject
to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.  As a
consequence, the majority holds that Fred Meyer was entitled to a
directed verdict on Stranahan's false arrest claim.  Although I
agree with that disposition of the false arrest claim, I do not
agree with the majority's analysis.  In particular, I conclude
that the holding in Whiffen II is distinguishable and, therefore,
does not control this case.  The court's proper disposition of
this case, then, is to explain why Whiffen II does not control
here, not to overrule the constitutional holding of that case.  I
do not join in the majority's unnecessary decision to overrule
Whiffen II.  
		The precise issue in Whiffen II was the extent to which
members of the public have the right to solicit initiative petition signatures at the Lloyd Center in Portland.  The Lloyd
Center is a regional shopping mall that houses over 100
separately owned retail stores and 100 professional and business
offices.  Five public streets cross the property and at least six
other public streets run partly into and around it.  The Lloyd
Center contains a substantial amount of common space, including
walkways, flower gardens, benches, information kiosks and open
seating areas where the public can gather.  See Lloyd Corporation
v. Whiffen, 307 Or 674, 677-78, 773 P2d 1294 (1989) (Whiffen I)
(describing the Lloyd Center property); Lloyd Corporation v.
Whiffen, 89 Or App 629, 631, 750 P2d 1157 (1988) (same).
		In Whiffen II, the property owner made two primary
arguments.  First, the owner insisted that being compelled to
provide a forum for petitioners on its own private property
amounted to a "taking" as contemplated by the state and federal
constitutions.  Second, the owner contended that the compulsion
violated the state and federal free speech rights of the owner's
tenants.
		Rejecting both of those arguments, this court found a
right to gather initiative petition signatures on at least some
private property, i.e., in "the common areas of large shopping
centers," to be "implicit" in the initiative provisions of
Article IV, section 1.  Whiffen II, 315 Or at 512.  According to
the Whiffen II court, because access to people is the "life
blood" of the initiative power, the Oregon Constitution must be
read to permit the solicitation of initiative petition signatures
at some locations that happen to be private property, subject to
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.  Id. at 511-13. (22) 
The Whiffen II court did not hold that those who solicit
initiative petition signatures have an unlimited right to engage
in that activity on private property.  Instead, it narrowly
circumscribed the right that it recognized.
		The court relied on Marsh v. Alabama, 326 US 501, 66 S
Ct 276, 90 L Ed 265 (1946), in which the United States Supreme
Court held that a Jehovah's Witness had a First Amendment right
to distribute religious literature on a sidewalk in a "company
town" that was wholly owned by a local corporation.  The Marsh
Court based its holding on the fact that the corporation that
owned the town essentially had invited the public to treat
portions of the town as public property:
	"The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do
his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it.  Thus, the
owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes
and railroads may not operate them as freely as a
farmer does his farm.  Since these facilities are   
built and operated primarily to benefit the public and
since their operation is essentially a public function,
it is subject to state regulation."
Id. at 506 (emphasis added; citation omitted).  After quoting
from Marsh, the court concluded that the right to solicit
initiative petition signatures on private property is limited to
"the facts of [Whiffen II], which involve the common areas of a
large shopping center such as the Lloyd Center."  Whiffen II, 315
Or at 514; see also Clackamas Town Center Assoc. v. Wolf, 315 Or
557, 559, 849 P2d 477 (1993) (describing Clackamas Town Center as
"a large shopping center similar to the Lloyd Center").
		Under Whiffen II, the scope of the right to solicit
initiative petition signatures on private property is determined
by the scope of the property owner's invitation to the public. 
If a property owner invites the public to treat its property, or
portions thereof, as public property, then members of the public
who enter that property enjoy the same statutory and
constitutional rights that they enjoy while using public
property.  As this court observed in Huffman and Wright Logging
Co. v. Wade, 317 Or 445, 459 n 11, 857 P2d 101 (1993), the result
in Whiffen II turned in large part on the unique history of the
initiative right in Oregon and the fact that the property in
Whiffen II was open to broad public use.  The broad public use
analysis relied on an express or clearly implied invitation from
the owner of the Lloyd Center to the public not only to shop, but
to congregate in the shopping center for a variety of business,
social, and recreational activities.  For example, Lloyd Center
invited the public to attend a multiple-screen motion picture
theater, to skate at an ice-skating rink, to view artwork, to
obtain services at a number of professional offices, (e.g.,
lawyers, physicians, dentists), to attend meetings at designated
meeting rooms, and to stroll or rest on multi-tiered walkways
that linked dozens of unrelated retail businesses.
		Turning to the facts of this case, the question is
whether Stranahan had a right to be on Fred Meyer's private
property for the purpose of collecting initiative petition
signatures, such that Fred Meyer's order to her to leave the
property was not lawful.  I conclude that Fred Meyer's private
property at issue here is significantly different from the
private property at issue in Whiffen II. (23)  The property at issue
bears none of the characteristics of a town square.  The space in
the store is devoted to Fred Meyer's retail sales.  The property
also contains a restaurant and coffee shop, and persons who have
purchased food or drink items may consume those items at tables
in the restaurant and socialize in that context.  However, the 
public invitation that the property implies is limited to
ordinary commercial business, and does not include community
socialization or recreational activities apart from the owner's
retail business and that of its tenants. 
		On this record, I conclude that the focus of
defendant's invitation to the public -- commercial activity -- 
distinguishes this case from Whiffen II.  Defendant's use of a
"one-stop shopping center" marketing concept has not transformed
its private property into a large regional shopping center like
the Lloyd Center or the Clackamas Town Center.  The record does
not support a finding that defendant expressly has invited the
public to assemble on any portion of its private property for
noncommercial purposes.  Rather, the scope of defendant's
invitation to the public is to shop for and to purchase its
merchandise and that of the independent businesses on its
property. 
		An issue substantially similar to the one decided in
Whiffen II was addressed recently by the Supreme Court of
Washington.  In Alderwood Assoc. v. Wash. Envir. Council, 96 Wash
230, 635 P2d 108 (1981), that court held that the initiative
provision of that state's constitution protected the right of
initiative petitioners to gather signatures on the private
property of a regional shopping center, which had become "the
functional equivalent of a downtown area or other public forum." 
Id. at 244; 635 P2d at 116.  In Waremart v. Progressive
Campaigns, Inc., 139 Wash 2d 623, 989 P2d 524 (1999), property
owners asked the Washington Supreme Court to overrule Alderwood. 
The court declined to do so, stating:
	"[W]e are not inclined to overturn Alderwood because
the 'doctrine [of stare decisis] requires a clear
showing that an established rule is incorrect and
harmful before it is abandoned.'  Waremart has not met
this substantial burden[.]"
Id. at 634, 989 P2d at 530 (citation omitted).  The Washington
court went on to conclude that the Waremart store in question was
not the functional equivalent of a downtown area or other public
forum and, therefore, that the petitioners in that case enjoyed
no state constitutional right to gather signatures on Waremart's
private property.  Waremart, 139 Wash 2d at 637, 989 P2d at 531. 
That is precisely the approach I would take in this case. 
Accordingly, although I disagree with the majority's analysis, I
concur in the majority's disposition of plaintiff's false arrest
claim.

1. 	The text of Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution, which enumerates the people's powers of initiative
and referendum, is set out post.  Any use of the terms
"initiative petition" or "initiative petitioners" in this opinion
encompasses both the people's powers of initiative and
referendum.

2. 	The Court of Appeals characterized the Fred Meyer store
at issue in this case as a "large[] shopping center" that, in
addition to having its own various consumer departments, had
tenant businesses that provided, among other things, banking
services, shoe repair, and dry cleaning.  Stranahan, 153 Or App
at 454.

3. 	Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:
	"No law shall be passed restraining the free
expression of opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever;
but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of
this right."

4. 	More specifically, the court in one case held, as in
the Marbet case, that no Fred Meyer store was bound by the Court
of Appeals' decision in Whiffen I.  The court in the other case
held, in a more limited fashion, that the Court of Appeals'
decision in Whiffen I did not apply to the Fred Meyer store in
question.

5. 	The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision to reduce Stranahan's punitive damages award and
remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict. 
Stranahan, 153 Or App at 471.  In light of our conclusion,
discussed post, that Fred Meyer should have prevailed on its
cross-appeal, we do not address the punitive damages issue.

6. 	We note that Fred Meyer first raised the issue that
Whiffen II was decided incorrectly in its petition to this court. 
Before the trial court and the Court of Appeals, which are bound
to follow decisions of this court and have no ability to overrule
such decisions, Fred Meyer argued instead that it should prevail
under Cargill, Whiffen II, and Dameron, based on factual
differences between the store in question and the shopping center
and Fred Meyer stores at issue in those cases.  Fred Meyer raises
that argument in the alternative before this court.

7. 	The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part:  "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press    
* * *."

8. 	The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part:  "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." 

9. 	Article I, section 26, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part: 
 "No law shall be passed restraining any of
the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a
peaceable manner to consult for their common good * * *."

10. 	Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides in part:
11. 	ORS 164.245(1) (1993) provided:
	"A person commits the crime of criminal trespass
in the second degree if the person enters or remains
unlawfully in or upon premises."
ORS 164.205 provides, in part:
	"As used in ORS 164.205 to 164.270, except as the
context requires otherwise:
	"* * * * *
	"(3) 'Enter or remain unlawfully' means:
	"* * * * *
	"(b) To fail to leave premises that are open to
the public after being lawfully directed to do so by
the person in charge[.]"

12. 	We continue to emphasize that, in either case, our
focus must be on the intent of the enactors of the provision at
issue.  See Jones, 132 Or at 175 (court's longstanding practice
in constitutional interpretation is "to ascertain and give effect
to the intent of the framers [of the provision at issue] and of
the people who adopted it") (emphasis added).

13. 	We recognize that, on a few recent occasions, this
court has elected to analyze constitutional provisions adopted by
legislative referral under the Priest methodology.  See State v.
Baker, 328 Or 355, 359, 976 P2d 1132 (1999) (interpreting right
to waive jury trial under Article I, section 11); State ex rel
Caleb v. Beesley, 326 Or 83, 87, 949 P2d 724 (1997) (interpreting
single-subject provision of Article IV, section 1(2)(d)).  It
does not appear that the difference in methodology led to a
difference in outcome in those cases.  On reflection, however,
for the reasons set out in the text above, we will in this case
and in future cases apply the methodology set out in Roseburg
School Dist. and Ecumenical Ministries to constitutional
provisions and amendments adopted by legislative referral.

14. 	The original version of Article IV, section 1, adopted
as part of the original Oregon Constitution, provided:
	"The Legislative authority of the State shall be
vested in the Legislative Assembly, which shall consist
of a Senate, and a House of Representatives.  The style
of every bill shall be 'Be it enacted by the
Legislative Assembly of the State of Oregon,' and no
law shall be enacted except by bill."
Or Const, Art IV, § 1 (1859).

15. 	The first level of analysis also includes context,
including related constitutional provisions that were in place
when the provision in question was adopted.  See Comeaux v. Water
Wonderland Improvement Dist., 315 Or 562, 569, 847 P2d 841 (1993)
(considering such context when interpreting initiated
constitutional amendment).  However, we have not identified any
such provision that could be said to shed light on the rights of
initiative petitioners.

16. 	The 1902 version of Article IV, section 1, itself, as
well as this court's case law, clarifies that legislation of some
sort was required to provide the procedures by which the
initiative and referendum power conferred under Article IV,
section 1, could be exercised.  See ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 30-31) (quoting 1902 version of Article IV, section 1); State ex
rel. Carson, 126 Or at 644 (so stating).

17. 	The court noted that the statute at issue could be read
to prohibit only payment for signature-gathering activity or also
to prohibit payment for assisting an initiative campaign in some
other form.  Campbell/Campf/Collins, 265 Or at 94-95.  Because
the latter interpretation likely would have placed an undue
burden on the petitioners' ability to engage in the initiative
and referendum process, the court construed the statute to avoid
that result, citing the principle of construction that regulatory
legislation should be construed "in favor of the people's
exercise of th[eir] rights [under Article IV, section 1]."  Id.
at 95.  That principle is not applicable here, where we are
construing not a regulatory statute, but Article IV, section 1,
itself.

18. 	Amicus curiae Progressive Campaigns urges that we
consider, as part of the history of the initiative and referendum
provisions of Article IV, section 1, the methods of signature
solicitation practiced immediately after the adoption of those
provisions in 1902.  We decline to do so, because such practices
are not relevant to ascertaining the people's intent when they
adopted the initiative and referendum process.  See generally
Ester v. City of Monmouth, 322 Or 1, 10 n 5, 903 P2d 344 (1995)
(stating that subsequently enacted, related legislation is not
evidence of people's intent in adopting initiated constitutional
provision); Oregonian Publishing Co., 303 Or at 304
(demonstrating that framers' intent, rather than isolated
evidence of historical practices, governs constitutional
interpretation).

19. 	Although Stranahan does not assert it, certain of the
parties amici urge this court to "expand" (their term) the
Whiffen II decision on the basis of Article I, section 8, of the
Oregon Constitution.  Any such analysis would require this court
to follow the analytical construct set out in Priest, 314 Or 411,
because Article I, section 8, is a part of the original
constitution.  Amici make no attempt to follow that (or any
other) methodology, arguing instead for the outcome that they
wish to see on policy grounds.  However, as this court has
attempted to explain in both the Priest and Ecumenical Ministries
contexts, we are not free to interpret the constitution in any
way that might seem to us to be sound public policy.  Any
analysis must begin with the constitution's own words.  Lacking
any assistance from amici in that respect, we decline to
undertake on our own an effort to determine whether there is a
basis for a different decision under Article I, section 8, than
the one that we announce here under Article IV, section 1.

20. 	A person commits criminal trespass in the second degree
if that person fails to leave premises that are open to the
public after being lawfully directed to do so by the person in
charge.  ORS 164.245; ORS 164.205(3)(b).

21. 	Article IV, section 1, provides in part:
		"(1) The legislative power of the state, except
for the initiative and referendum powers reserved to
the people, is vested in a Legislative Assembly,
consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
		"(2)(a) The people reserve to themselves the
initiative power, which is to propose laws and
amendments to the Constitution and enact or reject them
at an election independently of the Legislative
Assembly.
		"(b) An initiative law may be proposed only by a
petition signed by a number of qualified voters equal
to six percent of the total number of votes cast for
all candidates for Governor at the election at which a
Governor was elected for a term of four years next
preceding the filing of the petition.
	"(c) An initiative amendment to the Constitution may be
proposed only by a petition signed by a number of qualified
voters equal to eight percent of the total number of votes cast
for all candidates for Governor at the election at which a
Governor was elected for a term of four years next preceding the
filing of the petition."

22. 	In Whiffen I, 307 Or at 684-85, this court stated:
	"One can hardly deny that the statutes recognize a
right to sign petitions or to seek the signatures of
others and a strong public interest in facilitating
that process.
		"* * * * *
	"Shopping malls have become part of American life. 
Large numbers of the public gather there.  Although
plaintiff tries to cloak a public mall as a private
place, it is the antithesis of a private place."

23. 	The Court of Appeals recently determined that Whiffen
II did not entitle initiative petition circulators to gather
signatures on the sidewalk outside of defendant's store at
Southeast 39th Avenue and Hawthorne Boulevard in Portland.  Fred
Meyer, Inc. v. Klein Campaigns, Inc., 168 Or App 259, 5 P3d 1194
(2000).