Case Title: CHARLES J. DEAN, JR. V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2004-SC-001054-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOT TO BE PUBLISI ED OPINION THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THERULES OF CIVIL PROCEDUREPROMULGATED BYTHE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDAND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USEDASAUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASE INANY COURTOF THIS STATE. CHARLES J . DEAN, JR . ~*uyrrmt (gourf of 2004-SC-001054-MR RENDERED : FEBRUARY 23, 2006 TiTO APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v . HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE 03-CR-003017 & 04-CR-003003 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE Appellant, Charles J . Dean, Jr ., entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence recovered during an allegedly illegal search by police and probation officers . Specifically, Appellant pled guilty to (1) Trafficking in a Controlled Substance (Cocaine) in the First Degree, (2) Possession of a Handgun by a Convicted Felon, (3) Illegal Possession of a Controlled Substance (Marijuana), and (4) Persistent Felony Offender in the Second Degree ("PFO II"), which was charged by a separate indictment . Subsequent to his guilty plea, Appellant was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment . The sole issue presented on appeal is whether evidence seized from the apartment in which Appellant was arrested was illegally obtained and should have been suppressed . He appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Ky . Const. § 110(2)(b) . Having found no error, we affirm Appellant's conviction . C APPELLANT I. Background As noted in the PFO indictment, Appellant had a lengthy criminal history prior to the arrest which led to these charges . Most recently, on June 7, 2002, Appellant had been convicted for Illegal Possession of a Controlled Substance (Cocaine) and Persistent Felony Offender in the First Degree, and was sentenced to probation on a ten year sentence . As a condition of his probation, Appellant was subject to the terms of a supervision agreement that placed certain limits on his civil rights, including those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution . Among these conditions were that Appellant was to allow his "probation/parole officer to visit [his] residence and place of employment at any time" and that a probation officer could perform a search without a warrant "[i]f reasonable suspicion exist[ed] to believe that an offender [was] in violation of a condition of supervision or the officer ha[d] possession of evidence of a violation of the terms and conditions of supervision ." Michael Havens of the Kentucky Division of Probation and Parole served as Appellant's probation officer from June 2002 until Appellant was arrested on October 2, 2003 . During that time, Appellant reported his home address as 729 Southwestern Parkway in Louisville, Kentucky. On August 21, 2003, Officer Havens received an anonymous letter concerning Appellant . The letter alleged that Appellant was "dealing in illegal drugs (crack cocaine)" and that he "spen[t] most of his time at 424 South 22nd Street in Louisville. . . ." Shortly after receiving the letter, Officer Havens requested that Louisville Metro Police investigate the allegations contained in the letter and the 424 South 22nd Street address was put under surveillance . On September 5, 2003, Louisville police reported to Officer Havens that no evidence of illegal activity had been observed at the address . In addition to the anonymous letter, Officer Havens testified that on at least two separate occasions while driving on 22nd Street, he had observed Appellant accept money in what appeared to be a hand-to-hand exchange with unknown individuals in vehicles . Officer Havens testified that he was unable to see what, if anything, Appellant gave to the person in the vehicle . Despite his observations of seemingly suspicious activity, however, Officer Havens did not stop to attempt to arrest Appellant or inform police of the transactions . Notably, Officer Havens was unable to recall with specificity when or where on 22nd Street the transactions had occurred . Nevertheless, in October 2003, Officer Havens placed Appellant's name on a list for Operation Night Vision, a joint program between the Department of Probation and Parole and the Louisville Metro Police Department to investigate weapons and narcotics complaints . Presumably based on the anonymous letter and his own observations, Officer Havens noted Appellant's address as 424'/2 South 22nd Street as Appellant's in the information that was provided for Operation Night Vision . Law enforcement officials neither sought nor procured an arrest warrant for Appellant or a search warrant for the 424'/ South 22nd Street property at any time during the investigative process . On October 2, 2003, Probation and Parole Officer Tracy Goins and several members of the Louisville Metro Police Department were assigned to an Operation Night Vision detail investigating Appellant . At approximately 9:30 p .m ., the officers arrived at 424'/ South 22nd Street . Officer Goins and a second officer knocked on a door at the address and were greeted by a woman who stated that although no one named Charles Dean lived in the building, a man named "Joe" lived in the apartment to the left . The two officers then knocked at the second door and announced their presence . After a short period of time, Appellant opened the door. According to Officer -3- Goins, the officers introduced themselves and asked Appellant if they could come in and talk with him . Officer Goins further testified, and the trial court found, that Appellant opened the door and allowed the officers to enter, consenting to their presence in his apartment. Appellant vigorously disputes the trial court's finding that he consented to the officer's entry, claiming police barged through the door without his consent after he had cracked it open to speak with them . Further, he specifically notes that the police failed to obtain his written consent pursuant to Department of Probation and Parole policy . As Officer Goins and her counterpart entered the apartment, they got the attention of the other officers who had accompanied them on the patrol, signaling for them to enter as well . Appellant argues that even if he had consented to the presence of the first two police officers, there was no testimony that suggested he had consented to the presence of the additional officers . Once inside the apartment, one of the new officers observed a small plastic bag of marijuana in plain view on top of a VCR and television . The officers also observed several personal items scattered throughout the apartment and saw a female adult, identified as Appellant's girlfriend, in the apartment's kitchen . Appellant was arrested and a further search of the apartment was conducted. During the search, police recovered 13 individually-wrapped pieces of crack cocaine and $200.00 in cash from a black "fanny pack," and a .32 caliber pistol from the drawer of an armoire . At some point, the police also obtained a copy of the lease for the premises which revealed Appellant as the lessee--Appellant testified that he leased the apartment for his girlfriend because he was married . Appellant was indicted on charges stemming from the contraband seized from his apartment . He subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence . On October 21, 2004, the Jefferson Circuit Court entered an Opinion and Order denying Appellant's motion . After the suppression hearing, the case was continued until October 27, 2004 so that a jury trial could be held . On that morning, the Appellant was arraigned on the PFO indictment, and he subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to the cocaine, marijuana, handgun, and PFO charges . Following his conditional guilty plea, Appellant waived his right to a separate sentencing proceeding and was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, in accordance with the Commonwealth's recommendation . Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress . II . Analysis In the opinion accompanying its order, the trial court noted two alternative rationales supporting its denial of the Appellant's suppression motion . The first of these rationales was that police had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the search of Appellant's apartment . The trial court noted several pieces of evidence, including the anonymous letter, Officer Havens' observations of Appellant on 22nd Street, and the statement of Appellant's neighbor that a man named "Joe" lived next door. Appellant notes several problems with the evidence relied on by the trial court . As to the letter, Appellant noted that it was "stale" information (over seven weeks old) at the time of his arrest . Moreover, Officer Havens had already referred the matter to the Louisville Metro Police Department and detectives had found nothing to corroborate the information provided by the anonymous informant . Similarly, Appellant noted the lack of specificity -5- in Officer Havens's testimony that he had observed Appellant in the vicinity of 22nd Street . Although Appellant's middle name is "Joseph," he also disputes that there was any evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that "Joe" was "a name by which [Appellant] was known ." Alternatively, the trial court found, based on Officer Goins's testimony, that the officers entered Appellant's apartment with his consent and that "the plain view and search incident to arrest doctrines justified the subsequent seizure of the drugs and the handgun ." Appellant argues that this finding of fact was not supported by substantial evidence and was, therefore, clearly erroneous . We disagree . "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." CR 52 .01 . Officer Goins clearly testified that Appellant allowed the officers to enter the apartment even though he did not consent to a search of the premises . Based on this testimony, the trial court concluded that "the officers entered the apartment with [Appellant's] consent." The court specifically noted in its opinion that it found Officer Goins's testimony more credible than that of Appellant . In light of this evidence, we are unwilling to disturb the finding of the trial court that Appellant consented to the request by police to enter the apartment . Having concluded that the trial court's finding of consent was supported by substantial evidence, it is unnecessary for us to reach the merits of Appellant's contention that police did not have a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the initial contact by police . By consenting to the officers' presence in the apartment, Appellant exposed marijuana to the plain view of the police . We have explained the "plain view" doctrine as follows : [T]he courts have allowed several exceptions for seizures without warrants-one of these being evidence found within "plain view." Several elements must exist for this exception to be allowed . First, the law enforcement officer must not have violated the Fourteenth Amendment in arriving at the place where the evidence could be plainly viewed . Second, "not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she must have a lawful right of access to the object itself." Finally, the object's "incriminating character must also be 'immediately apparent."' Hazel v . Commonwealth , 833 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Ky . 1992) (internal citations omitted) . In this case, all three requirements are clearly satisfied . The officers did not violate Appellant's constitutional rights by entering the apartment because he consented to the entry . The marijuana was clearly visible and was in the same room officers had been allowed to enter . Finally, the trial court found that the incriminating character of the marijuana was immediately apparent to the officer who noticed it . Taken together, these factors justify the seizure of the marijuana . Having seized the marijuana, police were justified in placing Appellant under arrest . Although at least one officer testified that the police intended to arrest Appellant for a violation of his probation agreement, namely a failure to accurately report his residence, this hypothetical situation is unimportant in light of the clear violation stemming from the drug possession . Likewise, the search of the apartment was also justified according to the terms of Appellant's supervision agreement, which he entered into as a condition of his probation . As noted above, a probation officer could perform a search without a warrant "[i]f reasonable suspicion exist[ed] to believe that an offender [was] in violation of a condition of supervision or the officer ha[d] possession of evidence of a violation of the terms and condition of supervision." We specifically acknowledged the appropriateness of such a practice in Coleman v . Commonwealth , 100 S .W .3d 745 (2002) . There we noted that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has thus held that a warrantless search of a probationer's residence is reasonable under the -7- Fourth Amendment when the search is supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation ." Id . at 752 (citing United States v . Knights , 534 U.S . 112, 122 S .Ct . 587, 593, 151 L .Ed .2d 497, 507 (2001)) . Having found marijuana in an apartment occupied and leased by Appellant, we conclude that, at that point, police clearly had reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal conduct in violation of his probation agreement . Likewise, the police were clearly entitled to perform a more thorough search of the premises according to the terms of Appellant's supervision agreement . Accordingly, the Jefferson Circuit Court correctly denied Appellant's suppression motion . The judgment of the trial court is affirmed . All concur. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Daniel T . Goyette Louisville Metro Public Defender 200 Advocacy Plaza 719 West Jefferson Street Louisville, Kentucky 40202 Elizabeth B . McMahon Assistant District Defender Office of the Jefferson District Public Defendant 200 Advocacy Plaza 719 West Jefferson Street Louisville, Kentucky 40202 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D . Stumbo Attorney General Gregory C. Fuchs Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204