Case Title: Marsicovetere v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles

Citation: 172 Vt. 562, 772 A.2d 540

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Marsicovetere v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (99-477); 172 Vt. 562; 772 A.2d 540

[Filed 12-Apr-2001]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 1999-477

                             JANUARY TERM, 2001

Brian R. Marsicovetere 	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Washington Superior Court
                                       }	
Department of Motor Vehicles	       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 720-12-98 Wncv

                                                Trial Judge: David Jenkins

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Appellant Brian Marsicovertere appeals a denial of a refund of the
  motor vehicle purchase and  use tax he paid under 32 V.S.A. § 8903(b).  The
  denial was made because his request for a refund  came after the statute of
  limitations had tolled under 12 V.S.A. § 517.  The superior court granted
  the  State's summary judgment motion, concluding that 12 V.S.A. § 517 did
  apply and barred the refund  at the time appellant had made his request. 
  Appellant argues the statute does not apply to  administrative proceedings
  conducted by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and, even if it  did,
  the statute of limitations should be applied prospectively. We affirm. 

       On August 5, 1997, appellant registered his vehicle at the DMV in
  Vermont.  He paid $631.75  purchase and use tax pursuant to 32 V.S.A. §
  8903(b).  On September 23, 1998, appellant requested  a refund because
  sales tax on the vehicle had been previously paid to a state other than
  Vermont.  A  taxpayer may recoup any sales tax paid to Vermont, provided
  the taxpayer can show adequate proof  that he has already paid sales tax to
  another state that is equal to or greater than that paid in Vermont.  Id. §
  8914; see also id. § 8911(9).  Appellant requested the refund one year, one
  month and eighteen  days after the vehicle was registered.  The DMV denied
  the refund on September 25, 1998 because  the appellant did not provide
  enough information to determine how much out-of-state sales tax had  been
  paid.  Appellant appealed the decision and a hearing was conducted on
  October 27, 1998.   Although appellant submitted the correct information at
  the hearing, showing he had paid $1,468.46  in sales tax to New York, the
  hearing examiner denied the refund of $631.75.  The basis for the  second
  denial was that the request was outside the one year statute of limitations
  period provided for  under 12 V.S.A. § 517.

       Appellant appealed to the superior court, which heard his case in
  September 1999.  The court  concluded that 12 V.S.A. § 517 did apply to the
  vehicle purchase and use tax. Section 517 states:  "[a]n action to recover
  money paid under protest for taxes shall be commenced within one year after 

 

  the cause of action accrues, and not after."  The court found that § 517
  governed administrative  proceedings by the Agency of Transportation that
  arise when a taxpayer has paid a tax under protest.  The court noted that
  provisions of a general statute of limitations may apply to administrative 
  proceedings.  Further, the court agreed with the hearing examiner's finding
  that the statute of  limitations began to run once the taxpayer had the
  right to bring an action, which in this case  followed the payment of the
  tax on August 5, 1997.    

       Appellant argues that the one year statute of limitation under 12
  V.S.A. § 517 should not be  applied to the purchase and use sales tax
  refund statute, 32 V.S.A. § 8914.  He points out that the  language of the
  refund statute does not refer to a statute of limitations.  It states that,
  "[a]ny  overpayment of [the motor vehicle purchase and use] tax as
  determined by the commissioner shall be  refunded."  32 V.S.A. § 8914.  In
  the absence of a specifically designated period, appellant claims, it  is
  unfair to apply § 517 because taxpayers have not been given adequate notice
  that their claims to a  refund are time-barred.  Appellant supports his
  argument by pointing to other statutes that designate  specific periods
  after which a refund is precluded, e.g., 32 V.S.A. § 9245 (meals and rooms
  tax; three  year period); id. § 7488(a) (estate and gift taxes; three year
  period); id. § 5292(a) (assessment and  collection; 2 month period from
  specific date).  He contends that because these statutes have time  limits
  embodied in the language of the statutes, and § 8914 omits such language,
  the legislature,  therefore, did not intend the refund statute to contain a
  specific limit. 

       We cannot agree with this analysis.  As the State argues in response,
  the presence of specific  limitations in selected statutes compared to the
  omission of one in the refund statute, § 8914, does  not demonstrate an
  affirmative decision by the Legislature to make purchase and use refunds 
  available at any time.  The State cites several tax statutes that similarly
  do not include specific  statutes of limitation on refunds or claims.  See,
  e.g., 32 V.S.A. § 7819 (cigarettes and tobacco  products); id. § 8101 (tax
  imposed on property, business or corporate franchises of railroad, 
  steamboat, car companies, etc.); 30 V.S.A. §  22 (public service taxes). 
  It argues that the legislature  understood that the limitations period in §
  517 is the general rule, applicable to tax statutes unless a  more or less
  restrictive time frame was made specifically applicable.  

       We find this reasoning compelling based on the legislative goal to
  curtail delayed requests for  refunds beyond a reasonable period.  This is
  especially true for the application of § 517 to refund  claims from the
  purchase and use tax, 32 V.S.A. § 8903(b).  Otherwise, the Legislature
  would not  have mentioned § 517 when it passed remedial legislation
  providing for refunds under Act 223 of  1994. (FN1)  The 1993-94
  Legislature purposely exempted refunds between August 31, 1980 and 
  December 31, 1995 from § 517, stating "Notwithstanding the provisions of 12
  V.S.A. § 517, any tax  collected under 32 V.S.A. Chapter 219. . . shall be
  refunded by the commissioner of motor vehicles."  1993, No. 223 (Adj.
  Sess.), § 3.  The direct reference to § 517 demonstrates that the
  legislature was  aware of the potential bar to refund claims posed by § 517
  during the period of 1980-1995.  Thus,

 

  it acted to prevent the application of § 517 to that specific time period. 
  It is reasonable to conclude  that the Legislature was aware that claims
  filed after 1995 would be subject to the general statute of  limitation in
  § 517.

       Appellant next argues that if § 517 applies, then the use of the term
  "action" in the statute  indicates that the commencement of a court action
  is required to toll the one year statute and not an  administrative
  proceeding by the DMV.  We find that where § 517 states "[a]n action to
  recover  money paid under protest for taxes," the term "action" applies
  equally to DMV administrative  proceedings and court actions.  Under the
  laws relating to motor vehicles, an aggrieved taxpayer may  not bring an
  action directly to the superior court because it does not have jurisdiction
  over the claim  at that point.  23 V.S.A. § 105(b).  As a condition
  precedent, a taxpayer must exhaust all remedies  before appealing to the
  superior court to have a DMV decision reviewed.  See Weinberger v. Salfi,