Case Title: Bland-Henderson v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 230327

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2024-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
 
TRAVIS BLAND-HENDERSON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 230327 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 June 20, 2024 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 19.2-295 gives a criminal defendant the right 
to request jury sentencing after the statutory deadline to make such a request has passed.  We 
also consider whether Code § 19.2-262.01 gives the court or counsel for either party the right, 
during voir dire, to inform the jurors as to the potential range of punishment faced by the 
criminal defendant, if it is known that the defendant will not be sentenced by the jury in the 
sentencing phase of the trial. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Travis Alexander Bland-Henderson was charged in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond with unlawfully possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a violent felony.  
The mandatory minimum sentence for the offense is five years, which is also the statutory 
maximum sentence for the offense.  Code §§ 18.2-308.2(A); 18.2-10(f). 
Bland-Henderson, who was to be tried by a jury, filed a “Notice of Demand for Jury 
Sentencing” pursuant to Code § 19.2-295.  Under that statute, the trial court will, by default, 
sentence a defendant in the sentencing phase of a criminal jury trial, unless the defendant 
requests jury sentencing.  Code § 19.2-295.  The statute further provides:  “[s]uch request for a 
jury to ascertain punishment shall be filed as a written pleading with the court at least 30 days 
2 
 
prior to trial.”  Id. (Emphasis added).  Bland-Henderson missed the statutory deadline to file his 
request for jury sentencing, filing his notice only 13 days before trial. 
The Commonwealth objected to Bland-Henderson’s request for jury sentencing as 
untimely.  Bland-Henderson acknowledged that he had filed the request late, but argued that his 
untimeliness did not eliminate his statutory right to be sentenced by the jury.  Bland-Henderson 
asserted that the correct remedy for his untimely request would not be to deny his request for 
jury sentencing, but rather to grant a potential motion from the Commonwealth for a 
continuance, if the Commonwealth needed time to prepare for the jury sentencing. 
The circuit court noted that Code § 19.2-295 states that the defendant “shall” file a 
request for jury sentencing “at least 30 days before trial.”  The circuit court inquired why failing 
to meet the deadline, which Bland-Henderson could have met, would give Bland-Henderson the 
right to a continuance, since “the statute says shall, it doesn’t say may.  Shall be done.  It’s a 
limit.  You don’t do it, you don’t get a jury sentencing.”  The circuit court pointed out that if 
defendants were afforded the right to arbitrarily file requests for jury sentencing after the 
statutory deadline, criminal proceedings would constantly be interrupted by requests for jury 
sentencing on the day of trial, resulting in thirty-day or more continuances to enable the 
prosecution to prepare for that mode of sentencing. 
The circuit court denied Bland-Henderson’s request for jury sentencing, and further 
explained that the Commonwealth had objected to jury sentencing, so Bland-Henderson could 
either go forward with judge sentencing, or Bland-Henderson could move for a continuance.  
Bland-Henderson did not move for a continuance at that point, and reiterated that even though he 
filed his request for jury sentencing late, jury sentencing remained “his statutory right.” 
3 
 
 
 Citing Code § 19.2-262.01, Bland-Henderson then argued that, even though the jury 
would not be doing the sentencing, he still had the statutory right to inform the jury panel about 
the mandatory minimum sentence that would be imposed following a guilty verdict.  The circuit 
court disagreed, and noted that Code § 19.2-262.01 permits voir dire on the potential range of 
punishment only for the purpose of determining whether a prospective juror “can sit impartially 
at sentencing.”  The circuit court asserted that voir dire on sentencing ranges was appropriate 
only when the jury was doing the sentencing, because, in such an instance, that line of 
questioning would be relevant to the potential jurors’ impartiality in sentencing the defendant.  It 
concluded that since Bland-Henderson was going to be sentenced by the court, voir dire 
concerning sentencing ranges would be “completely irrelevant” and would only serve to ask for a 
jury pardon.  Accordingly, the circuit court held that Bland-Henderson did not have the right to 
inform the jury regarding the mandatory minimum sentence for the offense. 
Thereafter, Bland-Henderson moved for a continuance; the circuit court denied the 
motion.  The trial proceeded, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty.  The circuit court 
sentenced Bland-Henderson to the mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ incarceration, 
with six months’ post-release supervision. 
 
Bland-Henderson appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.  He argued that the 
circuit court erred in ruling that the “shall” in Code § 19.2-295(A), regarding the timing of a 
criminal defendant’s request for jury sentencing, is mandatory.  He also argued that even if he 
had waived jury sentencing, he was still entitled to inform potential jurors of the mandatory 
minimum sentence for the offense. 
 
Regarding the nature of the word “shall” in Code § 19.2-295, the Court of Appeals noted 
that when the word “shall” in a statute is directed at public officers, it is generally deemed to be 
4 
 
directory instead of mandatory unless otherwise provided by the statute.  Henderson v. 
Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 250, 264-67 (2023).  As a “natural corollary” to this observation, 
the Court of Appeals created a presumption that the word “shall” means “must” “when the 
statute in question commands action by a private litigant, unless the context suggests otherwise.”  
Id. at 267 (emphasis added). 
 
The Court of Appeals applied this new presumption in its analysis of 
Code § 19.2-295(A), and held that the requirement that a defendant “shall” file a request for jury 
sentencing “at least 30 days prior to trial” was mandatory.  Id. at 267-68.  Because nothing 
suggested that this “shall” was merely directory, the Court of Appeals stated that the circuit court 
“did not err in concluding that it lacked discretion to permit a late filing.”  Id. at 268.  Thus, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court, ruling that the circuit court had “correctly concluded 
that Bland-Henderson waived his request for jury sentencing by failing to submit his demand at 
least 30 days before trial.”  Id. at 269. 
Regarding voir dire, the Court of Appeals stated that, under Code § 19.2-262.01, 
questioning potential jurors about sentencing ranges is proper only “to ascertain if the person or 
juror can sit impartially in the sentencing phase of the case.”  Id. (citing Code § 19.2-262.01) 
(emphasis in original).  Thus, the Court of Appeals held that if the jury would not be sentencing 
the defendant, voir dire on sentencing ranges is not permitted, since that line of questioning 
would be irrelevant and would only encourage jury nullification.  Id. (citing Rock v. 
Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 419, 431 (2023)).  It affirmed the circuit court on that issue also.  
Id. 
 
Bland-Henderson appeals.  We granted two assignments of error: 
1. The Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s denial of Mr. Bland-
Henderson’s request for jury sentencing. 
5 
 
 
2. The Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s prohibition of Mr. Bland-
Henderson from questioning the jury panel on the applicable punishment ranges. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
We review issues of statutory construction de novo.  Wright v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 
754, 759 (2009).  “When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain 
meaning of that language” and must “give effect to the legislature’s intention as expressed by the 
language used unless a literal interpretation of the language would result in a manifest 
absurdity.”  Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104 (2007). 
A. Request for Jury Sentencing 
Code § 19.2-295 provides that a criminal defendant who is found guilty in a jury trial 
shall be sentenced by the court, unless the defendant has requested jury sentencing.  The statute 
states that the defendant’s request for jury sentencing “shall be filed as a written pleading with 
the court at least 30 days prior to trial.”  Code § 19.2-295.  Bland-Henderson contends that the 
“shall” command in Code § 19.2-295, that instructs a defendant to file a request for jury 
sentencing at least 30 days prior to trial, is directory and not mandatory. 
As we have previously stated in Rickman v. Commonwealth, “a ‘shall’ command in a 
statute always means ‘shall,’ not ‘may.’”  294 Va. 531, 537 (2017).  This rule applies to all 
“shall” commands, regardless of whether the commands are directed at private litigants or at 
public officers.  See id. (stating that “[n]o litigant or court should willfully disregard” a “shall” 
command). 
While a “shall” command can be described as either mandatory or directory, this 
technical distinction does not change the meaning of the word “shall.”  Nor does this distinction 
6 
 
change the requirement that the individual addressed obey the command.  Instead, this 
distinction is simply a function of what consequence results if the command is not followed. 
A mandatory “shall” command “carries with it a specific, exclusive remedy,” while a 
directory “shall” command does not.  Id.  The nature of a particular “shall” command—whether 
mandatory or directory—depends entirely on the legislature’s intended meaning as discerned 
from “the nature, context, and purpose” of the relevant statute.  Huffman v. Kite, 198 Va. 196, 
202 (1956). 
We now consider the nature, context, and purpose of the disputed “shall” command in 
Code § 19.2-295(A).1  The statute establishes the default rule that the court will determine the 
defendant’s sentence but gives a criminal defendant the right to be sentenced by the jury, if the 
defendant so requests.  However, it requires that the defendant’s request for jury sentencing 
“shall be filed . . . at least 30 days prior to trial.”  Id.  Thus, while this statute grants a right to 
jury sentencing, it also qualifies that right by identifying the timeframe within which the right 
must be asserted. 
The “shall” command at issue in this case is directed at the defendant: the request for jury 
sentencing “shall” be filed “at least 30 days prior to trial.”  Id.  This “shall” command does not 
contain any exception for late filing, nor does the statute as a whole indicate that the defendant 
has any right to be sentenced by the jury if the request is filed beyond the statutory deadline.  
 
1 The statute provides: 
Within the limits prescribed by law, the court shall ascertain the term of 
confinement in the state correctional facility or in jail and the amount of fine, if 
any, when a person is convicted of a criminal offense, unless the accused is tried 
by a jury and has requested that the jury ascertain punishment.  Such request for a 
jury to ascertain punishment shall be filed as a written pleading with the court at 
least 30 days prior to trial. 
Code § 19.2-295(A) (emphasis added). 
7 
 
This “shall” command is mandatory in nature because if the defendant fails to request jury 
sentencing within the statutory timeframe for claiming that right, the statutory default applies—
the court shall sentence the defendant.  In other words, if the defendant does not request jury 
sentencing “at least 30 days prior to trial,” the defendant has waived the statutory right to jury 
sentencing.  Thus, the “shall” directed at the defendant in Code § 19.2-295(A) is mandatory. 
In this case, Bland-Henderson failed to comply with the mandatory “shall” command in 
Code § 19.2-295(A) by missing the statutory deadline to file his request for jury sentencing.  By 
filing late, he waived his statutory right to jury sentencing, just as the circuit court held.2  The 
Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the holding that Bland-Henderson waived his right to jury 
sentencing. 
However, we note that our reasoning differs with that of the Court of Appeals.  In its 
analysis, the Court of Appeals applied a newly created presumption that a “shall” command is 
mandatory when directed at private litigants.  We do not believe that application of such a 
presumption is warranted. 
Granted, “shall” commands addressed to public officers are typically deemed to be 
directory instead of mandatory, unless otherwise provided by the statute.  See Nelms v. Vaughan, 
84 Va. 696, 699-700 (1888) (stating that a statute that “direct[s] the mode of proceeding by 
public officers is to be deemed directory, and a precise compliance is not to be deemed essential 
to the validity of the proceedings,” unless the statute says otherwise).  But this is due to the 
practical effect of statutes that contain “shall” commands addressed to public officers, which 
 
2 While a criminal defendant waives the statutory right to jury sentencing by missing the 
deadline to file the request for jury sentencing, we note that Code § 19.2-295(A) does not 
prohibit the circuit court from exercising its discretion to grant a continuance in an appropriate 
case. 
 
8 
 
often do not provide specific, exclusive remedies for the public officer’s violation of the 
commands, and thus the court is charged with fashioning them.  Even with this prevalence of 
directory “shall” commands being directed at public officers, the nature of a particular “shall” 
command still depends upon the intended meaning of that word as used in the relevant statute. 
While “shall” commands addressed to public officers are often directory in nature, we do 
not believe that there is a correlating principle that a “shall” command addressed to a private 
litigant is presumptively mandatory.  Instead, the mandatory or directory nature of a particular 
“shall” command—both when addressed to a private litigant and when addressed to a public 
officer—depends upon the General Assembly’s intended meaning of that word, which is 
discerned from “the nature, context, and purpose” of the relevant statute.  Huffman, 198 Va. at 
202.  There is no presumption. 
In sum, the circuit court did not err in ruling that Bland-Henderson had waived his right 
to jury sentencing by failing to file his request at least 30 days prior to trial, and the Court of 
Appeals correctly affirmed that ruling.  While rejecting the view that there is a presumption as 
stated by the Court of Appeals, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals because the 
nature, context, and purpose of the relevant “shall” command in Code § 19.2-295, indicates that 
it is mandatory.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 See Rickman, 294 Va. at 542 (describing the right-result-different-reason doctrine). 
 
9 
 
B. Voir Dire on Sentencing Ranges 
 
Bland-Henderson argues that even when the jury is not sentencing the defendant, 
Code § 19.2-262.014 still gives the parties the statutory right to voir dire the jury panel about 
sentencing ranges.  We disagree. 
The first sentence of Code § 19.2-262.01 states that counsel for either party has the right 
to ask the jury panel “any relevant question to ascertain whether the juror can sit impartially in 
either the guilt or sentencing phase of the case.”  The third sentence then adds that counsel for 
either party “may inform” the jury panel about the potential range of punishment “to ascertain if 
the person or juror can sit impartially in the sentencing phase of the case.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
The plain language of this sentence clearly shows that the statutory purpose in allowing voir dire 
regarding the potential range of punishment is only to determine if the jurors can be impartial in 
the sentencing phase.  If the jury is not sentencing the defendant, voir dire questions about the 
potential sentence are irrelevant and serve no statutory purpose.  As the circuit court and Court of 
 
4 Code § 19.2-262.01 provides: 
In any criminal case, the court and counsel for either party shall have the right to 
examine under oath any person who is called as a juror therein and shall have the 
right to ask such person or juror directly any relevant question to ascertain 
whether the juror can sit impartially in either the guilt or sentencing phase of the 
case.  Such questions may include whether the person or juror is related to either 
party, has any interest in the cause, has expressed or formed any opinion, or is 
sensible of any bias or prejudice therein.  The court and counsel for either party 
may inform any such person or juror as to the potential range of punishment to 
ascertain if the person or juror can sit impartially in the sentencing phase of the 
case.  
(Emphasis added). 
 
10 
 
Appeals correctly noted, the only purpose of questioning a jury about sentencing ranges, when 
the jury will not be sentencing the defendant, would be to improperly invite jury nullification. 
Contrary to what Bland-Henderson argues, Code § 19.2-262.01 does not entirely abrogate 
our decision in Commonwealth v. Hill, 264 Va. 315, 319 (2002).  At the time Hill was decided, 
defendants in jury trials were always sentenced by juries.  Even so, we held that a defendant in a 
non-capital case did not have a constitutional or statutory right “to question a jury panel about 
the range of punishment that may be imposed upon the defendant.”  Id.  Hill explained that voir 
dire questions “must be relevant to the factors prescribed in Code § 8.01-358,” the statute 
governing voir dire.  Id.  These factors are (1) relationship to the parties, (2) interest in the cause, 
(3) formation of any opinions about the case, and (4) bias and prejudice.  Id.  “Questions about 
the range of punishment are not relevant” to these factors, and will “only result in speculation by 
jury panel members,” who would have no context about the facts of the case or the defendant’s 
criminal history.  Id. at 319-20.  This is still good law. 
Code § 19.2-262.01 abrogated Hill only to the extent that, now, voir dire questions 
related to a range of punishment are permissible—but only when the jury will be conducting 
sentencing and only for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether the potential jurors can 
impartially sentence the defendant.  Voir dire must still be relevant to the four factors listed in 
Hill (relationship to the parties, interest in the cause, formation of any opinions about the case, or 
known bias and prejudice), which notably are the same four factors that the second sentence of 
Code § 19.2-262.01 confirms as permissible lines of questioning.  If the jury is not sentencing 
the defendant, questions about the range of punishment are not relevant. 
Under Code § 19.2-262.01, there is no absolute right to voir dire jurors regarding 
potential sentencing ranges, since this line of questioning remains irrelevant and improper when 
11 
 
the jury will not be sentencing the defendant.  Because Bland-Henderson was not going to be 
sentenced by the jury, the circuit court correctly prohibited Bland-Henderson from questioning 
the jury panel about the mandatory minimum sentence.  The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed 
that decision. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the circuit court’s denial of Bland-
Henderson’s untimely request for jury sentencing because Bland-Henderson had waived his right 
to jury sentencing by missing the deadline to request it.  However, there is no presumption that 
“shall” commands directed at private litigants are mandatory.  Regarding voir dire, the Court of 
Appeals did not err in affirming the circuit court’s decision to prohibit Bland-Henderson from 
questioning the jury panel about the mandatory minimum sentence, because voir dire on 
sentencing ranges is irrelevant to a juror’s fitness to serve, when the jury will not be sentencing 
the defendant. 
Affirmed.