Case Title: State ex rel. WHIO-TV-7 v. Lowe

Citation: 1997-Ohio-271

Docket Number: 19952224

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. WHIO-TV-7 v. Lowe et al. 
The State ex rel WDTN-TV-2, Appellant, v. Lowe et al., Appellees. 
[Cite as State ex rel. WHIO-TV-7 v. Lowe (1997), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
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Public records -- Information that a criminal prosecutor has disclosed to 
defendant for discovery purposes pursuant to Crim.R. 16 is not 
thereby subject to release as a “public record” pursuant to R.C. 
149.43. 
 
 
Information that a criminal prosecutor has disclosed to the defendant for 
discovery purposes pursuant to Crim.R. 16 is not thereby subject to release as a 
“public record” pursuant to R.C. 149.43. 
- - -  
 
(Nos. 95-2224 and 95-2356 -- Submitted September 10, 1996 -- Decided 
January 22, 1997.) 
 
In Mandamus. 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 15450. 
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These two cases arise out of the same circumstances.  In case No. 95-2224, 
relator WHIO-TV-7 filed in this court an original action in mandamus.  In case 
No. 95-2356, appellant WDTN-TV-2 appealed the decision by the Montgomery 
County Court of Appeals denying appellant’s complaint in mandamus. 
 
On July 18, 1995, Therressa Jolynn Ritchie reported to a Dayton, Ohio 911 
operator that her four-year-old daughter Samantha was missing.  The local media, 
including both relator and appellant in the cases sub judice, extensively covered 
the disappearance.  On July 22, 1995, law enforcement investigators found 
Samantha’s body in a water-filled pit on the grounds of an abandoned foundry 
near her neighborhood.  On August 3, 1995, Therressa Jolynn Ritchie and Ernest 
Vernell Brooks were arrested on various charges involving Samantha.  On August 
31, 1995, the Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted Ritchie for murder, gross 
abuse of a corpse, tampering with evidence, inducing a panic, and making a false 
alarm.  The grand jury indicted Brooks for gross abuse of a corpse, tampering with 
evidence, and obstructing justice.  On September 14, 1995, Brooks pled guilty to 
the three felony counts for which he had been indicted. 
 
On August 10, 1995, counsel for appellant WDTN-TV-2 wrote a letter to 
respondent-appellee Ronald Lowe, Sr., Chief of the Dayton Police, requesting that 
he grant appellant access to any and all “public records concerning the Therressa 
Jolynn Ritchie case * * * including, but not limited to:  incident reports; relevant 
written or recorded statements of witnesses or defendants; written or recorded 
summaries of any oral statements made by witnesses or defendants; the prior 
criminal records of the defendants or witnesses; any tangible objects, documents 
or photographs; and any results of any mental examinations performed on the 
defendants, including polygraph results.”  On August 28, 1995, WDTN-TV-2 filed 
in the Montgomery County Court of Appeals a complaint for a writ of mandamus 
requesting that the court compel appellee Lowe to release the records.  On 
September 20, 1995, the court of appeals granted the motions of both the 
Montgomery County Prosecutor and Ritchie to intervene as party respondents.  
The court of appeals granted WHIO-TV-7’s motion to participate as an amicus 
curiae.  On November 2, 1995, the court of appeals denied the application for a 
writ of mandamus.  On November 17, 1995, WDTN-TV-2 appealed that decision 
to this court.  The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
The companion case, No. 95-2224, presents similar facts.  On September 15, 
1995, counsel for relator WHIO-TV-7 requested respondent Ronald Lowe, Sr., 
Chief of the Dayton Police, to permit the inspection and copying of any written or 
recorded statements made by defendants Brooks and Ritchie, any written 
summaries of any oral statements made by the defendants, any photographs, any 
police reports, any result or reports of physical or mental examinations or 
scientific tests, and a list of names and addresses of all witnesses in the matter.  On 
September 20, 1995, counsel for WHIO-TV-7 and counsel for WDTN-TV-2 made 
the same request of Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecutor, and 
David M. Franceschelli, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney.  On November 1, 1995, 
WHIO-TV-7 filed in this court a complaint in mandamus requesting that the court 
compel respondents Lowe, Heck, and Franceschelli to release the records. 
 
At this time, respondents-appellees have released only the following 
documents: 
 
(1)  Dayton police arrest report for Therressa J. Ritchie with her Social 
Security Number redacted; 
 
(2)  Arraignment information sheet for Ritchie with her Social Security 
Number and “remarks for arraignment” redacted; 
 
(3)  Dayton police arrest report for Ernest Vernell Brooks with his Social 
Security Number redacted; 
 
(4) Arraignment information sheet for Brooks with his Social Security 
Number and “remarks for arraignment” redacted; 
 
(5)  Arrest record for Ritchie with her Social Security Number displayed; 
and 
 
(6)  Arrest record for Brooks with certain unspecified information redacted 
but with his Social Security Number displayed. 
 
On January 17, 1996, this court in case No. 95-2224 granted respondent 
Ritchie’s motions to intervene and to consolidate the two cases.  
 
The parties agree that certain requested information does not exist.  The 
parties now agree that the records sought “consist of the following described 
documents, to the extent that the same have been disclosed to either counsel for 
Ritchie or to counsel for Brooks, or both, pursuant to Crim.R. 16(B)”: 
 
(1)  Written or recorded statements made by Ritchie and/or Brooks; 
 
(2)  Written summaries of any oral statements made by Ritchie and/or 
Brooks; 
 
(3)  Photographs; 
 
(4)  Police reports in addition to the redacted arrest reports and arraignment 
information sheets described above; 
 
(5)  Results or reports of physical or mental examinations and scientific tests 
made in connection with this matter; and 
 
(6)  A list of the names and addresses of all witnesses. 
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Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Robert E. Portune, Thomas L. Czechowski 
and Linda S. Holmes, for relator in case No. 95-2224.  
 
Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling, Andrew C. Storar and Michael W. Sandner, 
for appellant WDTN-TV-2 in case No. 95-2356. 
 
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Carley J. Ingram, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents Heck and 
Franceschelli in case No. 95-2224, and appellee Montgomery County Prosecutor’s 
Office in case No. 95-2356. 
 
J. Anthony Sawyer, Director of Law, for respondent Lowe in case No. 95-
2224, and appellee Lowe in case No. 95-2356. 
 
Bieser, Greer & Landis, Michael W. Krumholtz and David P. Williamson, 
for intervening respondent Ritchie in case No. 95-2224, and appellee Ritchie in 
case No. 95-2356. 
- - -  
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  This case presents the issue of whether 
information that the criminal prosecutor has disclosed to the defendant for 
discovery purposes pursuant to Crim.R. 16, and therefore ordinarily would not be 
considered to be work product or trial preparation materials, is precluded from 
release to the public pursuant to the public records doctrine. 
 
Appellant and relator argue that because the prosecution has already 
disclosed to the defendant the subject information pursuant to the criminal 
discovery rules, the information cannot be deemed “work product” and thus is 
subject to release pursuant to Ohio’s public records doctrine, R.C. 149.43.  
Appellees and respondents contend that simply because the prosecutor discloses 
information to the defendant pursuant to Crim.R. 16(B), that information does not 
automatically become disclosable to the public pursuant to R.C. 149.43.  All 
parties cite our decision in State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 
420, 639 N.E.2d 83, paragraphs three and five of the syllabus, in support of their 
assertions. 
 
Crim.R. 16(B) requires the prosecuting attorney to disclose certain 
information to the criminal defendant upon the defendant’s request.  This evidence 
includes any statement of the defendant or co-defendant, the defendant’s prior 
record, and documents and tangible objects, any reports of examination and tests, 
any witness names and addresses and their criminal records, and any evidence 
favorable to the defendant.  Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(a) through (f).  The prosecutor must 
also allow for the defendant’s in camera inspection of any witness’s statement.  
Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(g). 
 
The purpose behind the Rules of Criminal Procedure “is to remove the 
element of gamesmanship from a trial.”  State v. Howard (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 
328, 333, 10 O.O.3d 448, 451, 383 N.E.2d 912, 915.  As such criminal discovery 
is a matter solely between the prosecutor and the defendant.  See, generally, 
Lakewood v. Papadelis (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 511 N.E.2d 1138, 1140.  The 
rules governing discovery do not envision a third party’s access to the information 
exchanged.  As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated 
in United States v. Anderson (C.A. 11, 1986), 799 F.2d 1438, 1441: 
 
“Discovery is neither a public process nor typically a matter of public 
record.  Historically, discovery materials were not available to the public or press.  
See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-34, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 2207-08, 
81 L.Ed.2d 17[, 26-27] (1984) (pretrial interrogatories and depositions ‘were not 
open to the public at common law’); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 
396, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2914, 61 L.Ed.2d 608[, 632] (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring) 
(‘[I]t has never occurred to anyone, as far as I am aware, that a pretrial deposition 
or pretrial interrogatories were other than wholly private to the litigants.’).  
Moreover, documents collected during discovery are not ‘judicial records.’  
Discovery, whether civil or criminal, is essentially a private process because the 
litigants and the courts assume that the sole purpose of discovery is to assist trial 
preparation.  That is why parties regularly agree, and courts often order, that 
discovery information will remain private.  Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective 
Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L.Rev. 1, 15 (1983). 
 
“If it were otherwise and discovery information and discovery orders were 
readily available to the public and the press, the consequences to the smooth 
functioning of the discovery process would be severe.  Not only would voluntary 
discovery be chilled, but whatever discovery and court encouragement that would 
take place would be oral, which is undesirable to the extent that it creates 
misunderstanding and surprise for the litigants and the trial judge.  Litigants 
should not be discouraged from putting their discovery agreements in writing, and 
district judges should not be discouraged from facilitating voluntary discovery.” 
 
We agree with the foregoing that discovery should be encouraged and that 
public disclosure would have a chilling effect on the parties’s search for and 
exchange of information pursuant to the discovery rules. 
 
By contrast, the purpose of Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, is to 
expose government activity to public scrutiny, which is absolutely essential to the 
proper working of a democracy.  White v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1996), 76 
Ohio St.3d 416, 420, 667 N.E.2d 1223, 1226-1227; see State ex rel. Natl. 
Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 81, 526 N.E.2d 786, 788.  
However, there are certain governmental activities that would be “totally frustrated 
if conducted openly.”  Press-Enterprise Co. v. California Superior Court (1986), 
478 U.S. 1, 8-9, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 2740, 92 L.Ed.2d 1, 10.  Criminal discovery is 
one of those governmental activities that would be frustrated if subjected to the 
required disclosure contemplated by R.C. 149.43.  If all information exchanged is 
subject to complete public disclosure, then parties may cease open exchange.  This 
would thwart entirely the objective of removing “the element of gamesmanship 
from a trial.”  Howard, 56 Ohio St.2d at 333, 10 O.O.3d at 451, 383 N.E.2d at 915.  
We therefore hold that information that a criminal prosecutor has disclosed to the 
defendant for discovery purposes pursuant to Crim.R. 16 is not thereby subject to 
release as a “public record” pursuant to R.C. 149.43. 
 
Relator also argues that the records must be released because of the public’s 
First Amendment right to information regarding the trial. In Seattle Times Co. v. 
Rhinehart (1984), 467 U.S. 20, 27, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 2204, 81 L.Ed.2d 17, 23, the 
United States Supreme Court considered a trial court’s protective order prohibiting 
the litigants from publishing, disseminating, or using certain information obtained 
through pretrial discovery in any way except where necessary to prepare for trial.  
The Supreme Court noted that the danger of abusing the liberal pretrial discovery 
rules by publicly releasing information that is irrelevant and could be damaging to 
reputation and privacy is great and thus the court held that the governmental 
interest in preventing such abuse is substantial.  Id. at 34-35, 104 S.Ct. at 2208-
2209, 81 L.Ed.2d at 28.  The court also noted that pretrial discovery is not a public 
component of a trial and any controls on the discovery process do not prevent the 
public dissemination of information gathered through means other than discovery.  
Id. at 33-34, 104 S.Ct. at 2207-2208, 81 L.Ed.2d at 27.  Accordingly the court held 
that the limitation on “‘First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary 
or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved,’” id. 
at 32, 104 S.Ct. at 2207, 81 L.Ed.2d at 26, quoting Procunier v. Martinez (1974), 
416 U.S. 396, 413, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1811, 40 L.Ed.2d 224, 240, and thus the 
protective order did not violate the First Amendment. 
 
The foregoing reasoning supports both a protective order as considered in 
Seattle Times Co. and this court’s denial of a writ of mandamus prohibiting public 
dissemination of information exchanged through pretrial discovery in the case sub 
judice.  Accordingly, appellant’s and relator’s First Amendment rights have not 
been violated by denial of access to the information in question. 
 
For the above reasons, the writ of mandamus is denied in case No. 95-2224 
and the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in case No. 95-2356. 
 
 
 
 
 
Writ of mandamus denied in case No. 95-2224 
 
 
 
 
 
and judgment affirmed in case No. 95-2356. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
STRATTON, J., concurs separately. 
The State ex rel WDTN-TV-2. Appellant, v. Lowe et al., Appellee. 
 
STRATTON, J., concurring.  The court’s decision today strikes a careful 
balance between the public’s right to know and the need to guard the fundamental 
integrity and fairness of a trial for both the defendant and the state. 
 
Appellant and relator focus on the jury process and the curative powers of a 
judge to correct pretrial publicity problems generated by publicizing the discovery 
records at issue, such as the use of voir dire and venue changes to keep the jury 
pool untainted.  However, a more serious issue which affects the integrity of the 
trial itself, and which no judicial order can cure, is the tainting of witness 
testimony from witness exposure to the publicized information.  
 
During trial, witnesses are separated to keep their testimony untainted, 
prevent collusion, or prevent unintended, subconscious shading of their testimony 
because of other knowledge gained about the case.  If a witness learns through the 
media of the confession of a defendant, statements by other witnesses, test results, 
or expert witness reports, the witness’s testimony may become tainted and 
unreliable.  Witnesses may not only use the publicized information to consciously 
bolster the prosecution’s or defense’s case, but also may be subconsciously 
influenced by this information so as to shade their testimony as a result of 
perceptions and beliefs newly formed from exposure to the publicized information.  
Once a witness is tainted, the problem cannot be reversed.  The court correctly 
struck a balance between the public’s right to know and the integrity of the trial 
itself.