Case Title: In re Mackenzie P.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 130

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 130 
Docket: 
And-17-6 
Submitted 
On Briefs: June 14, 2017 
Decided: 
June 22, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE MACKENZIE P. et al. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
[¶1]  The mother of Mackenzie P. and Antonio P. appeals from a 
judgment of the District Court (Lewiston, Dow, J.) terminating her parental 
rights to her children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1), (B)(2)(a), 
(b)(i)-(ii) (2016).  She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the judgment and the court’s discretionary determination of the children’s 
best interests.  The mother also argues that she was deprived of due process 
because the court terminated her parental rights when the guardian ad litem 
(GAL) had not complied with 22 M.R.S. § 4005(1)(B) (2016).  Because the 
evidence supports the court’s findings and discretionary determination, and 
we conclude that the mother received due process, we affirm the judgment. 
 
[¶2]  Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the mother is unwilling and unable to 
protect the children from jeopardy and that these circumstances are unlikely 
 
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to change within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the children’s 
needs, she is unwilling and unable to take responsibility for the children 
within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet their needs, and 
termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests.  
See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii).  The court based these 
determinations on the following findings of fact.  
 
[¶3]  Although she succeeded in obtaining adequate and safe housing, 
the mother “failed to visit consistently with the children” and “regularly 
disappointed them by failing to appear at scheduled visits” in violation of the 
reunification plan she had agreed to with the Department of Health and 
Human Services.1  The mother’s behavior showed “a reckless disregard for the 
emotional health of [the] children” and—considering evidence that the 
mother could keep other appointments—“an unwillingness, not a mere 
inability,” to comply with the reunification plan.  Because the mother failed to 
comply with the reunification plan, she did not show progress in her ability to 
protect the children from unsafe people or supervise and care for them 
appropriately.  The children, now twelve and seven, have been out of the 
                                         
1  The mother acknowledged that she had been inconsistent in visiting the children and in other 
areas of the reunification plan for about fourteen out of the eighteen months that elapsed between 
the children entering Department custody and the termination hearing.  The record contains 
heartbreaking evidence of the children waiting for their mother to arrive at scheduled visits and 
being sad and disappointed time after time.   
 
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mother’s care for over two years and need “protection and permanency.”  The 
elder child is “[e]xhausted” by the failed reunification process and wishes to 
be adopted.  The younger child needs stability.  Both children have bonded 
with the foster parents, who are willing to adopt them.   
 
[¶4]  Given these and other findings of fact, all of which are supported 
by competent evidence in the record, the court adequately explained how the 
mother is unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children despite 
receiving eighteen months of reunification services and support from the 
Department.  Although, as she points out, the mother recently became more 
consistent in attending counseling and in making phone calls to the children, 
the court did not err in considering her lengthy history of unsuccessful 
reunification efforts.2  In re B.P., 2015 ME 139, ¶ 19, 126 A.3d 713 (explaining 
that there is a limited time available for reunification efforts and “[i]n setting 
[the statutory] clock, the Legislature has spoken in terms of days and months, 
rather than in years” (quotation marks omitted)).  Nor did the court err or 
                                         
2  Contrary to the mother’s contention, the Department’s decision to suspend visits with the 
children after the mother exhibited a pattern of nonattendance for the vast majority of these 
proceedings did not amount to a failure to facilitate reunification.  See In re Alexander D., 1998 ME 
207, ¶ 15, 716 A.2d 222 (“The mother’s engagement in court-ordered services had to be balanced 
against the Department’s efforts to protect the best interest of the children, and to complete the 
children’s transition into a permanent situation in a timely manner.”); see also In re Denise M., 
670 A.2d 390, 394 n.8 (Me. 1996) (“Although we find here no lack of good faith in the reunification 
effort, . . . [t]here is no [statutory] indication . . . that failure by the department to meet its 
reunification obligation will preclude termination of parental rights . . . if the [requisite] factual 
findings . . . are established by clear and convincing evidence.” (citation omitted)).  
 
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abuse its discretion in determining that termination of the mother’s parental 
rights with a permanency plan of adoption is in the children’s best interests.3  
See In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297. 
 
[¶5]  The mother also contends that the court violated her right to due 
process by ordering the termination of her parental rights when the GAL had 
exceeded the three-month period in which she was required to have in-person 
contact with the children and also filed a late report.  See U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, § 1; Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A; 22 M.R.S. § 4005(1)(B).  She argues that the 
GAL’s failure to fulfill these statutory duties prejudiced her.  The court, 
however, acted at the mother’s request to prevent any prejudice by excluding 
the GAL’s testimony and the untimely report at the termination hearing.  Cf. In 
re Kaleb C., 2002 ME 65, ¶ 4 n.2, 795 A.2d 71 (explaining that the GAL’s 
deficient performance did not affect the outcome of the termination 
proceedings).  The mother points to no concrete prejudice resulting from the 
                                         
3  The mother contends that the court abused its discretion in making its best interest 
determination because it improperly relied upon the opinions and fourth report of the GAL 
although it had excluded the GAL’s testimony and that untimely report.  We find this argument 
unpersuasive.  The findings the mother points to as stemming from the fourth report are supported 
elsewhere in the record, including the testimony of a caseworker and the GAL’s earlier, properly 
admitted reports.  To the extent that the findings supporting the court’s discretionary best interest 
determination are contradicted by other evidence in the record, it was “the trial court’s role to 
weigh and credit the evidence before it” and to accept and reject the evidence presented.  In re 
Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶ 35, 775 A.2d 1144.  
 
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court’s evidentiary rulings.4  Moreover, based on the court’s supported 
findings that the mother had failed to progress in reunifying with the children 
over a significant period of time and had exhibited “a reckless disregard” for 
the children’s emotional well-being, the court’s termination of the mother’s 
parental rights was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling government 
interest in achieving permanency for the children.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4003(4), 
4055(1)(B)(2)(b) (2016); In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 23-34, 889 A.2d 
297; In re Richard G., 2001 ME 78, ¶ 7, 770 A.2d 625. 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jeffrey S. Dolley, Esq., Dolley Law Firm, Lewiston, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2015-23 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
4  The mother also argues—paradoxically, see supra n.3—that the absence of testimony and 
recent reports of the GAL prejudiced her.  There is no indication that the admission of the fourth 
report, which contained the GAL’s most up-to-date observations and recommendations as to the 
children’s best interest, would have altered the outcome of these proceedings as it was consistent 
with testimonial and other evidence on which the court properly relied in reaching its unfitness and 
best interest determinations.