Case Title: State v. Raber

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5636

Docket Number: 2011-1383

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Raber, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5636.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-Ohio-5636 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. RABER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Raber, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5636.] 
(No. 2011-1383—Submitted August 21, 2012—Decided December 5, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Wayne County, 
No. 10CA0020, 2011-Ohio-3888. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. A trial court lacks authority to reconsider a final judgment in a criminal case. 
(State ex rel. White v. Junkin, 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 338, 686 N.E.2d 267 
(1997), and State ex rel. Hansen v. Reed, 63 Ohio St.3d 597, 589 N.E.2d 
1324 (1992), followed.)    
2. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution protects against the imposition of multiple criminal 
punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings.  (Hudson v. 
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), and 
United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318 (6th Cir.2007), followed.)    
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} Kyle Raber appeals from a judgment of the Ninth District Court of 
Appeals that affirmed his classification as a Tier I sex offender based on his guilty 
plea to one count of sexual imposition.  At issue is whether the trial court retained 
authority to classify him as a Tier I sex offender more than a year after the entry 
of a final judgment of conviction for a sexually oriented offense. 
{¶ 2} R.C. 2950.03(A)(2) directs a trial court to notify a sex offender of 
the duty to register as a sex offender at the time of a sentencing for a sexually 
oriented offense.  However, pursuant to R.C. 2950.01(B)(2)(a), one who commits 
a sexually oriented offense is not a sex offender—and has no duty to register—if 
the offense involved “consensual sexual conduct or consensual sexual contact” 
with a victim over 18 years old who is not under the custodial authority of the 
perpetrator. 
{¶ 3} At sentencing on November 26, 2008, the parties disputed whether 
the sexually oriented offense at issue here involved consensual activity.  The court 
afforded the state an opportunity to demonstrate a lack of consent, but the state 
failed to do so, and the trial court subsequently sentenced Raber but did not order 
him to register as a sex offender.  Notably, the trial court did not have a duty to 
order Raber to register as a sex offender pending its determination as to the 
consensual nature of the conduct, and having entered its judgment without the 
registration requirement, it implicitly incorporated into the judgment a finding 
that Raber has no duty to register. 
{¶ 4} The court therefore lacked authority to reopen its sentencing to 
reconsider its prior judgment or to find the sexual activity to be nonconsensual 
and classify Raber as a Tier 1 sex offender more than a year after it had imposed 
its original sentence.  In addition, because sex-offender registration is now 
punitive in nature, double jeopardy protections barred the court from subsequently 
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classifying Raber as a Tier I sex offender at a new proceeding held more than a 
year after its original sentence. 
{¶ 5} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 6} On February 18, 2008, 18-year-old Kyle Raber and his 18-year-old 
former girlfriend engaged in consensual intercourse in her bedroom.  Raber then 
asked her for anal sex.  Although she denied his request, he proceeded. 
{¶ 7} A Wayne County grand jury indicted him on April 4, 2008, on one 
count of sexual battery, a felony of the third degree, and on October 28, 2008, 
Raber pled guilty to an amended count of sexual imposition, a third-degree 
misdemeanor. 
{¶ 8} At the sentencing hearing held on November 26, 2008, the parties 
disputed whether the misdemeanor conviction for sexual imposition required 
Raber to register as a sex offender, because R.C. 2950.01(B)(a) does not require 
registration if the offense involved consensual sexual activity with another over 
the age of 18.  At the sentencing hearing, only hearsay statements of Raber’s 
former girlfriend were presented on the issue of consent.  The parties agreed to 
brief the sex-offender-registration question, and the trial court took the matter 
under advisement.  However, the parties never submitted briefs on the issue, and 
on December 1, 2008, the court entered judgment, sentencing Raber to 60 days in 
jail (30 of them suspended), imposing a $500 fine, and ordering two years of 
community control.  Significantly, the court did not classify Raber as a sex 
offender and did not provide him with notice of a duty to register as a sex 
offender. 
{¶ 9} Thereafter, on October 19, 2009—more than 10 months after 
entering its judgment of conviction—the trial court, sua sponte, scheduled a 
hearing for November 18, 2009.  No transcript of this hearing appears in the 
record.  The next day, however, the judge inexplicably transferred the matter to a 
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different judge, who presided over an evidentiary hearing on March 2, 2010, to 
determine whether Raber should be classified as a sex offender subject to Tier I 
registration.  At that hearing, the victim testified that she had consented to vaginal 
sex but not to anal intercourse.  The second trial judge then found the sexual 
conduct to be nonconsensual and classified Raber as a Tier I sex offender subject 
to registration, and at another hearing on April 13, 2010, the court provided notice 
of Raber’s Tier I classification, and the court journalized its judgment the next 
day, more than 14 months after the original sentencing. 
{¶ 10} On August 6, 2010, the trial court released Raber from the two-
year term of community control earlier imposed. 
{¶ 11} Raber appealed his Tier I classification to the Ninth District Court 
of Appeals, claiming that his December 2008 conviction was a final order, and 
therefore, the court had no jurisdiction in 2010 to hear and decide the sex-offender 
registration issue.  The court rejected these arguments, holding that an order 
classifying a sex offender constitutes a separate judgment from the underlying 
conviction and sentence, and therefore, the trial court had not modified a final 
order when it imposed sex offender registration 14 months after it had sentenced 
him.  State v. Raber, 9th Dist. No. 10CA0020, 2011-Ohio-3888, ¶ 7-8.  The court 
also concluded that Raber had forfeited any argument that the classification as a 
Tier I sex offender violated due process and prohibitions against double jeopardy 
and self-incrimination, because he failed to assert those claims in the trial court.  
Id. at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 12} Raber now appeals to this court, urging that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to modify his conviction and sentence, which, he asserts, became a 
final judgment when the state failed to appeal.  He notes that the court of appeals 
relied on caselaw construing the imposition of sex-offender registration pursuant 
to Megan’s Law, which is a civil, remedial law, but he maintains those cases do 
not apply to the classification of a sex offender pursuant to current R.C. Chapter 
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2950, which this court has now held to be punitive.  State v. Williams, 129 Ohio 
St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 16.  Further, Raber contends that 
his classification as a Tier I sex offender deprived him of due process by 
reopening a final judgment and that it violated the prohibition against double 
jeopardy by imposing additional punishment at a subsequent proceeding. 
{¶ 13} The state claims that Raber agreed to delay the determination of 
whether he should be classified as a sex offender to a later time and that he 
benefited from this delay by not having to register. It also argues that any error is 
harmless, because “even Raber agrees that he should have been adjudicated a sex 
offender” and because a lack of consent is inherent in a guilty plea to sexual 
imposition.  Lastly, the state asserts that the trial court had jurisdiction to correct 
the “clerical omission in the prior order” and impose sex-offender registration, 
and it maintains that there is no violation of due process or the prohibition against 
double jeopardy, because the court had authority to correct this omission. 
{¶ 14} Accordingly, the issue becomes whether the trial court had 
authority to classify Raber as a sex offender 14 months after entering its judgment 
of conviction. 
Law and Analysis 
S.B. 10 
{¶ 15} In January 2008, 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“S.B. 10”) took 
effect.  It repealed Ohio’s prior sex-offender-classification scheme and replaced it 
with a three-tiered system classifying sex offenders automatically, based on the 
offense of conviction: an adult Tier I offender is required to register with the 
county sheriff every year for 15 years; an adult Tier II offender is required to 
register every 180 days for 25 years; and a Tier III offender is required to register 
every 90 days for life. R.C. 2950.01(E) through (G), 2950.06(B), and 2950.07(B).  
S.B. 10 requires sex offenders to personally register in the county or counties in 
which they reside, attend school, and work. R.C. 2950.04(A)(2). 
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{¶ 16} R.C. 2950.03(A)(2) directs the trial court to notify a sex offender 
of the duty to register at sentencing for a sexually oriented offense, providing:    
 
Regardless of when the person committed the sexually 
oriented offense or child-victim oriented offense, if the person is 
an offender who is sentenced on or after January 1, 2008 for any 
offense, and if division (A)(1) [offenders already under 
confinement] of this section does not apply, the judge shall provide 
the notice to the offender at the time of sentencing. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 17} Notably, however, R.C. 2950.01(B)(2) states that a person who 
commits a sexually oriented offense is not a sex offender 
 
if the offense involves consensual sexual conduct or consensual 
sexual contact and either of the following applies: 
(a) The victim of the sexually oriented offense was 
eighteen years of age or older and at the time of the sexually 
oriented offense was not under the custodial authority of the person 
who is convicted of, pleads guilty to, has been convicted of, has 
pleaded guilty to, is adjudicated a delinquent child for committing, 
or has been adjudicated a delinquent child for committing the 
sexually oriented offense. 
(b) The victim of the offense was thirteen years of age or 
older, and the person who is convicted of, pleads guilty to, has 
been convicted of, has pleaded guilty to, is adjudicated a 
delinquent child for committing, or has been adjudicated a 
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delinquent child for committing the sexually oriented offense is not 
more than four years older than the victim. 
 
If the offender is not a sex offender pursuant to R.C. 2950.01(B), there is no duty 
to register. 
{¶ 18} In this case, at the November 26, 2008 sentencing hearing, the state 
failed to prove the lack of consent to the sexual activity, nor did it file a 
supplemental brief pointing to evidence in the record demonstrating a lack of 
consent.  The court thereafter entered a judgment of conviction without finding 
Raber to be a sex offender subject to Tier I registration and without notifying him 
of a duty to register, presumably on its determination that no duty existed based 
on the sexual activity’s being consensual. 
{¶ 19} A presumption of regularity attaches to all judicial proceedings.  
See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 157 Ohio St. 175, 183, 105 N.E.2d 259 (1952); State 
v. Sweet, 72 Ohio St.3d 375, 376, 650 N.E.2d 450 (1995); State v. Robb, 88 Ohio 
St.3d 59, 87, 723 N.E.2d 1019 (2000).  Here, the record is silent regarding the 
trial court’s reasoning for not classifying Raber as a sex offender subject to 
registration in its judgment of conviction, and therefore “[t]here is no showing of 
irregularity to contradict the presumption of regularity accorded all judicial 
proceedings.”  Sweet, 72 Ohio St.3d at 376. 
Reconsideration of Final Judgments 
{¶ 20} We have previously recognized that “trial courts lack authority to 
reconsider their own valid final judgments in criminal cases.” State ex rel. White 
v. Junkin, 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 338, 686 N.E.2d 267 (1997), citing State ex rel. 
Hansen v. Reed, 63 Ohio St.3d 597, 589 N.E.2d 1324 (1992).  And although trial 
courts retain continuing jurisdiction to correct a void sentence and to correct a 
clerical error in a judgment, State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St. 3d 353, 
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2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 19, neither of those exceptions to the general 
rule applies here. 
{¶ 21} The trial court had no mandatory duty to impose sex-offender 
registration after determining the sexual activity to be consensual and considering 
the ages of those involved.  The state fails to demonstrate a clerical mistake, 
which, as we explained in Cruzado, “ ‘refers to a mistake or omission, mechanical 
in nature and apparent on the record, which does not involve a legal decision or 
judgment.’ ” Id. at ¶ 19, quoting State v. Brown, 136 Ohio App.3d 816, 819–820, 
737 N.E.2d 1057 (3d Dist.2000). Nothing in the record demonstrates error by the 
trial court in failing to classify Raber as a sex offender in its original judgment of 
conviction. 
Double Jeopardy 
{¶ 22} This court had previously upheld the prior sex-offender registration 
statutes enacted by the General Assembly against constitutional challenge.  In 
State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 528, 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000), we held that 
because Megan’s Law did not impose punishment, it necessarily did not violate 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  And in State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 
N.E.2d 110, we concluded that sex offender registration remained a civil, 
remedial regulatory scheme notwithstanding amendments to Megan’s Law 
enacted by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5, effective July 31, 2003, that increased burdens on 
sex offenders, because the amended statute did not impose criminal punishment.  
Id. at ¶ 39, 43. 
{¶ 23} However, in Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 
N.E.2d 1108, we determined that the registration duties imposed by S.B. 10 could 
no longer be considered civil in nature, holding that “R.C. Chapter 2950 is 
punitive.” Id. at ¶ 16.  And In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 
N.E.2d 729, stands for the proposition that S.B. 10 violates Ohio’s constitutional 
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prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by imposing an automatic, 
lifetime requirement of sex-offender registration and notification on certain 
juvenile offenders. Id. at ¶ 86.  Thus, our cases hold that S.B. 10 imposes 
additional criminal punishment on those convicted of sexually oriented offenses. 
{¶ 24} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects against the imposition of multiple criminal 
punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings.  Hudson v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997); United States v. 
Husein, 478 F.3d 318, 338 (6th Cir.2007).  As the United States Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit has explained, “If a defendant has a legitimate expectation of 
finality, then an increase in that sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy 
clause.”  United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C.Cir.1987). 
{¶ 25} Although we have recognized that “[w]here * * * the sentence 
imposed was unlawful and thus void, there can be no reasonable, legitimate 
expectation of finality in it,”  State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-
1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 36, the judgment of conviction entered in this case is 
neither unlawful nor void.  And although trial courts “possess inherent authority 
to correct errors in judgment entries so that the record speaks the truth,”  State ex 
rel. Fogle v. Steiner, 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 163-164, 656 N.E.2d 1288 (1995), the 
decision not to classify Raber as a Tier I sex offender is not a clerical error. 
{¶ 26} Accordingly, Raber had a legitimate expectation of finality in his 
sentence when the trial court entered its judgment of conviction on December 1, 
2008, and the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited the trial court 
from reopening this case, conducting a separate trial to determine whether the 
sexual activity at issue here was consensual, and classifying Raber as a sex 
offender subject to Tier I registration. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 27} The trial court lacked authority to reopen this case to reconsider 
the final judgment it had entered, and the protections against double jeopardy 
barred it from classifying Raber as a Tier I sex offender more than a year after it 
imposed sentence.  Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents. 
____________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 28} As a matter of law, the sexually-oriented offense for which Kyle 
Raber was convicted was nonconsensual.  For that reason, the trial court had no 
business engaging in an evidentiary hearing on the issue of consent. 
{¶ 29} Raber was convicted of sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 
2907.06(A)(1), which prohibits sexual contact if “[t]he offender knows that the 
sexual contact is offensive to the other person * * * or is reckless in that regard.”  
There is no factual scenario that is consistent with both a conviction under that 
subsection and an exception to the definition of sex offender, contained in R.C. 
2950.01(B)(2), for cases of consensual sexual contact.  Accordingly, the 
imposition of sex-offender registration duties was a statutorily mandated 
requirement in this case.  But the trial court failed to do what the law required it to 
do. 
{¶ 30} Instead, the trial court and the prosecutor got distracted by defense 
counsel’s argument that, because the victim had consented to some sexual contact 
with Raber, the consent-exception to the registration requirement was triggered.  
Both accepted the defense’s erroneous proposition that the state had the burden to 
prove not only that the contact was offensive (in order to secure the conviction) 
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but that it was also nonconsensual (in order to secure the registration). Offensive 
contact is, by its nature, nonconsensual.  The exception was wholly inapplicable. 
{¶ 31} Even if the exception had been applicable, the trial court acted 
unreasonably by continuing the case for consideration of the consent issue.  The 
evidence in the record at the time of sentencing demonstrated that Raber anally 
raped the victim.  At sentencing, Raber admitted that he committed the sexually-
oriented offense because he had gotten “mad.”  There was no need for an 
evidentiary hearing because the factual issue of consent, or lack thereof, was 
clear. 
{¶ 32} The trial court ultimately did what was required by law: impose 
registration.  We should affirm. 
{¶ 33} I dissent.   
____________________ 
 
David T. Eager and David M. Todaro, for appellant. 
 
Jason B. Desiderio, for appellee. 
________________________________