Case Title: Haven Center, Inc. v. Town of Bourne

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13198

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13198 
 
THE HAVEN CENTER, INC., & another1  vs.  TOWN OF BOURNE & 
another.2 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     March 9, 2022. – July 28, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Marijuana, Recreational.  Municipal Corporations, Marijuana, By-
laws and ordinances, Home rule.  Constitutional Law, Home 
Rule Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
January 4, 2019. 
 
 
Following transfer to the Superior Court Department, the 
case was heard by Thomas J. Perrino, J., on a motion for summary 
judgment, and a motion for reconsideration was considered by 
him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted applications for direct 
appellate review. 
 
 
Benjamin E. Zehnder for the plaintiffs. 
Robert S. Troy for the defendants. 
 
 
 
1 MacArthur Park Place LLC. 
 
2 Board of selectmen of Bourne. 
2 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  Chapter 94G of the General Laws, which codifies 
portions of the 2016 ballot initiative that legalized the sale 
and use of recreational marijuana in the Commonwealth,3 gives 
individual cities and towns the power to ban recreational 
marijuana establishments from the community.  See G. L. c. 94G, 
§ 3 (a) (2).  In the present case, the town of Bourne (town) 
adopted such a ban, and the plaintiffs, The Haven Center, Inc. 
(Haven), and MacArthur Place LLC (MacArthur) (collectively, 
plaintiffs),4 contend that this ban was adopted improperly.  For 
the reasons that follow, we conclude that the town's ban is 
valid. 
Background.  The following facts are drawn from the 
parties' statements of material facts, which were filed jointly 
and are undisputed.  In June 2016, the town issued a letter 
indicating its continuing support for Haven's operation of a 
medical marijuana treatment center (MMTC).5  Shortly thereafter, 
Haven received a provisional certificate of registration from 
 
 
3 See Regulation and Taxation of Marijuana Act, St. 2016, 
c. 334, § 5, codified at G. L. c. 94G, §§ 1 et seq.; CommCan, 
Inc. v. Mansfield, 488 Mass. 291, 292 (2021).  See also St. 
2017, c. 55, §§ 20-43 (amending G. L. c. 94G). 
 
4 Haven is a company seeking to operate a retail 
recreational marijuana establishment in the town, and MacArthur 
is the entity that has leased Haven space to do so. 
 
5 The town first issued a letter of support in October 2015. 
3 
 
the Cannabis Control Commission (commission) to operate an MMTC 
in the town. 
In November 2016, a ballot measure authorizing the 
legalization of adult-use recreational marijuana, Question 4, 
passed Statewide; however, a majority of the town's voters voted 
"no."  Six months later, in May 2017, the town meeting6 voted to 
impose a temporary moratorium on recreational marijuana 
establishments either until November 30, 2018, or until the town 
adopted zoning bylaw amendments to regulate such establishments, 
whichever occurred first. 
In October 2018, two bylaw amendments were presented at 
another town meeting.7  The first, article 14, was a proposal to 
amend section 3.1 ("Public Safety and Good Order") of the town's 
general bylaws by prohibiting all commercial recreational 
 
6 A town meeting is a "gathering of a town's eligible 
voters" to vote to matters of town business.  Citizens Guide to 
Town Meetings, at 1, https://www.sec.state.ma.us/cis/cispdf 
/Guide_to_Town_Meetings.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECZ4-WWT6].  The 
town has a quorum requirement of 125 registered voters to begin 
any annual or special town meeting, and 100 registered voters to 
maintain the meeting after a quorum has been established.  Town 
of Bourne Bylaws, at x, https://www.townofbourne.com/sites/g 
/files/vyhlif7346/f/uploads/21_town_bylaw_thru_2021_stmatm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3KRZ-GAZA]. 
 
7 Previously, two bylaw amendments, one amending the zoning 
bylaw and one amending the general bylaws, had been presented to 
the voters at a town meeting in March 2018.  Both of these 
proposed bylaw amendments would have banned all commercial 
recreational marijuana establishments from the town.  Each bylaw 
amendment failed to garner the necessary votes to pass. 
4 
 
marijuana establishments within the town.  The second, article 
15, proposed amendments to the town's zoning bylaw that would 
regulate recreational marijuana use and establishments.  As a 
proposed amendment to a general bylaw, article 14 required a 
simple majority vote and was passed.  As a proposed amendment to 
a zoning bylaw, article 15 required a two-thirds majority vote 
and, having failed to receive the necessary votes, did not 
pass.8,9 
Beginning in April 2018, and during the time that articles 
14 and 15 were presented and voted on, Haven was negotiating a 
proposed host community agreement for a medical and recreational 
marijuana establishment and cultivation and processing center 
with the town administrator.  Haven also signed a lease with 
MacArthur to rent property located in the town.  However, one 
month after article 14 was adopted, in November 2018, the town 
administrator informed Haven that the town could no longer work 
with Haven to establish a recreational marijuana establishment. 
 
8 See G. L. c. 40A, § 5. 
 
9 In October 2019, the issue of recreational marijuana arose 
again.  Another bylaw amendment, article 10, which proposed to 
amend the zoning bylaw and regulate recreational marijuana by 
adopting zoning restrictions on recreational marijuana and 
requiring approval by special permit, was presented before the 
town meeting.  A motion was made to postpone indefinitely the 
vote on article 10.  That motion passed.  At another town 
meeting, a motion was brought to repeal article 14.  The motion 
failed. 
5 
 
The plaintiffs commenced this action in the Land Court 
seeking, among other remedies, a declaratory judgment that 
article 14 was invalid.  The action was transferred to the 
Superior Court, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  A judge in the Superior Court denied the motion for 
summary judgment, denied the plaintiffs' motion for 
reconsideration, and subsequently entered summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants.  The plaintiffs appealed from the 
judgment, and we granted the parties' applications for direct 
appellate review before this court. 
Discussion.  General Laws c. 94G, § 3 (a) (2), permits 
cities and towns to adopt ordinances and bylaws that limit or 
ban recreational marijuana establishments within the city or 
town, subject to certain voting and other procedural 
requirements that vary depending on whether a majority of the 
municipality's voters voted "yes" or "no" on Question 4, and 
whether the ban is adopted before or after December 31, 2019.  
See G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (e).  According to guidance issued by the 
commission, under this provision of the statute, "[i]f a 
municipality voted no on [Question 4], then the governing body 
[could] limit or ban the number of marijuana establishment[s] 
. . . by passing a bylaw or ordinance prior to December 31, 
6 
 
2019."10  Cannabis Control Commission, Guidance for 
Municipalities Regarding Marijuana for Adult Use, at 9 (January 
2018).  Citing the commission's guidance, the town contends that 
article 14 was authorized by G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a) (2), because 
the town previously had voted "no" on Question 4 and, therefore, 
article 14 was properly adopted by a majority vote at the 
October 2018 town meeting. 
The plaintiffs posit, however, that article 14 is void 
under the Home Rule Amendment, which grants municipalities broad 
authority to enact local ordinances as long as such action is 
"not inconsistent" with Massachusetts laws or the Declaration of 
Rights.11  See West St. Assocs. LLC v. Planning Bd. of Mansfield, 
488 Mass. 319, 321-322 (2021).  The plaintiffs argue that 
article 14 should be treated as a zoning bylaw and that, as 
such, article 14 is inconsistent with the requirements under the 
 
10 "The interpretation of a statute by the agency charged 
with primary responsibility for administering it is entitled to 
substantial deference" (citation omitted).  Mendes's Case, 486 
Mass. 139, 143 (2020).  Here, the commission's guidance is a 
reasonable interpretation of G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a) (2), and the 
plaintiffs do not challenge it. 
 
 
11 As codified, the Home Rule Amendment provides in relevant 
part that "[a]ny city or town may, by the adoption, amendment or 
repeal of local ordinances or by-laws, exercise any power or 
function which the general court has power to confer upon it, 
which is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted 
by the general court."  Art. 2, § 6, of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 89 of the 
Amendments. 
7 
 
Zoning Enabling Act, G. L. c. 40A, §§ 5-6.  The plaintiffs also 
argue that article 14 is inconsistent with other provisions in 
G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a), in particular, those that prohibit 
"unreasonably impractical" bylaws and municipalities from using 
zoning bylaws to prevent the conversion of an MMTC to a 
recreational marijuana establishment. 
We review the plaintiffs' claims on a de novo basis.  See 
Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 792 (2018), quoting 
Kiribati Seafood Co. v. Dechert LLP, 478 Mass. 111, 116 (2017). 
1.  Treatment of article as zoning bylaw.  The plaintiffs 
contend that, although the town characterizes article 14 as an 
amendment to a general bylaw, it is instead an amendment to the 
zoning bylaw because it prohibits a particular use of land, 
specifically for recreational marijuana establishments.  The 
adoption and amendment of zoning ordinances are governed by 
G. L. c. 40A, §§ 5-6, which provide certain protections to 
preexisting land uses and establishes procedural requirements 
for voting on zoning bylaws.12  According to the plaintiffs, 
because the town did not adopt article 14 pursuant to these 
 
12 Among other things, G. L. c. 40A, § 5, requires that a 
municipality seeking to adopt or amend a zoning bylaw hold a 
public hearing prior to a vote and adopt the bylaw by a two-
thirds majority vote rather than a simple majority.  Moreover, 
§ 5 prohibits the reconsideration of a zoning bylaw that has 
been acted on unfavorably within two years, unless recommended 
by the planning board. 
8 
 
procedural requirements,13 it is inconsistent with these 
provisions and therefore violates the Home Rule Amendment.  We 
disagree. 
We begin by observing that G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a), permits 
cities and towns to "adopt ordinances and by-laws that impose 
reasonable safeguards on the operation of marijuana 
establishments," that limit the number of such establishments, 
or that even prohibit them altogether, without specifying that 
these provisions must take the form of zoning ordinances or 
bylaws.  The only reference to zoning ordinances or bylaws in 
this section of the statute appears in § 3 (a) (1), which 
provides that zoning ordinances or bylaws shall not operate to 
prevent conversion of MMTCs to recreational marijuana 
establishments or to limit the number of recreational marijuana 
establishments to less than the minimum number set out in the 
statute.  The fact that the Legislature specifically referred to 
zoning ordinances or bylaws in this one instance, but not 
elsewhere, indicates that municipalities may otherwise properly 
regulate or prohibit recreational marijuana establishments 
through general bylaws as well as zoning bylaws.  See CommCan, 
Inc. v. Mansfield, 488 Mass. 291, 296-297 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 439 Mass. 826, 833 (2003) ("where the 
 
13 It is undisputed that the town did not treat article 14 
as an amendment to the zoning bylaw. 
9 
 
[L]egislature has carefully employed a term in one place and 
excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded" 
[alteration omitted]).  Therefore, to the degree that the town 
was acting pursuant to this power to prohibit recreational 
marijuana establishments by means of a general bylaw amendment 
when it adopted article 14, the article presumptively is valid 
and the plaintiffs "bear a heavy burden in demonstrating that 
[the town exceeded its] statutory authority" (citation omitted).  
Springfield Preservation Trust, Inc. v. Springfield Library & 
Museums Ass'n, 447 Mass. 408, 418 (2006). 
Nevertheless, even where a municipality properly exercised 
its police powers to regulate a local activity through its 
general bylaws, a particular ordinance may still be deemed to be 
a zoning regulation subject to the requirements of G. L. c. 40A 
in light of its "nature and effect," Rayco Inv. Corp. v. 
Selectmen of Raynham, 368 Mass. 385, 392 (1975), and "the 
historical context in which it [has] been enacted," Lovequist v. 
Conservation Comm'n of Dennis, 379 Mass. 7, 14 (1979).  The mere 
fact that a bylaw regulates land use does not automatically mean 
that it is a zoning bylaw.  See id. at 12.  Rather, in 
determining whether a bylaw should be viewed as a zoning bylaw, 
we consider factors such as whether other municipalities have 
adopted similar bylaws as zoning bylaws, and whether the 
municipality whose bylaw is being scrutinized previously has 
10 
 
regulated the topic at hand through "comprehensive" zoning 
ordinances.14  Rayco Inv. Corp., supra at 392-393.  Lovequist, 
supra at 13-14.  Other factors include whether the bylaw is 
intended to "prohibit or permit any particular listed uses of 
land," and whether the dominant purpose of the bylaw pertains to 
interests typically addressed by the zoning process, including, 
but not limited to, "the character of the community and the 
compatibility of nearby land uses."  Lovequist, supra. 
With regard to the first factor, the parties have not 
presented any evidence concerning what other municipalities have 
done in similar circumstances.  In any event, this factor has 
little significance here because G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a) (2), 
authorizes municipalities to ban recreational marijuana 
establishments by either a general or a zoning bylaw, as we have 
discussed supra. 
Addressing the second factor (i.e., whether the town 
previously adopted a comprehensive zoning scheme involving the 
same subject matter), the plaintiffs point to the temporary 
moratorium on the use of land or structures for recreational 
 
14 In certain circumstances, whether the municipality 
previously has regulated the topic at hand through 
"comprehensive" zoning ordinances independently may determine 
whether a bylaw has the "nature and effect" of a zoning bylaw.  
Rayco Inv. Corp., 368 Mass. at 392-394 (discussing circumstance 
in which viewing bylaw as exercise of "municipal police power" 
would frustrate Zoning Enabling Act). 
11 
 
marijuana establishments that the town adopted as a zoning bylaw 
in May 2017.  However, standing alone, a single eighteen-month 
moratorium that merely postponed such uses and provided neither 
conditions nor requirements for approval of recreational 
marijuana establishments can hardly be said to be a 
comprehensive zoning scheme on this subject.  Compare Rayco Inv. 
Corp., 368 Mass. at 392-393 (town bylaw limiting maximum number 
of trailer park licenses should be viewed as zoning regulation 
where previous zoning bylaw "cover[ed] this subject in a 
comprehensive fashion," including setting "conditions and 
requirements for approval" of trailer parks); Spenlinhauer v. 
Barnstable, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 134, 139-142 (2011) (general 
ordinance limiting off-street parking in single-family residence 
zones was invalid because it was not promulgated in accord with 
G. L. c. 40A, where town already had adopted "comprehensive" 
zoning bylaw that "regulate[d] off-street parking at almost any 
conceivable location and use").  We therefore conclude that the 
town did not have a history of comprehensively regulating 
recreational marijuana establishments through zoning bylaws. 
Finally, with regard to the remaining factors, the dominant 
purpose of article 14, as stated therein, was to exercise the 
power to ban all recreational marijuana establishments from the 
town pursuant to G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a) (2).  The bylaw says 
nothing about the use of land for such establishments, the 
12 
 
compatibility with nearby uses, or the character of the 
community.  Certainly, article 14 indirectly had the effect of 
prohibiting the use of land in the town for recreational 
marijuana establishments, and the character of the community may 
well have figured in the decisions of town meeting members who 
voted for article 14.  But the fact that article 14 "simply 
overlap[s] with what may be the province of a local zoning 
authority" does not mean that this bylaw must "be treated as [a] 
zoning enactment[] which must be promulgated in accordance with 
the requirements of G. L. c. 40A."  Lovequist, 379 Mass. at 14. 
In sum, our analysis of the foregoing factors does not 
demonstrate that article 14 must be treated as a zoning bylaw.  
In light of that conclusion, as well as our conclusion that 
G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a) (2), permits municipalities to prohibit 
recreational marijuana establishments through general bylaws as 
well as zoning bylaws, we hold that article 14 is not a zoning 
bylaw and that it is not subject to the requirements of G. L. 
c. 40A. 
2.  Consistency of article with G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a).  The 
plaintiffs argue further that article 14 is void under the Home 
Rule Amendment because it is inconsistent with a provision in 
G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a) (1), prohibiting zoning ordinances that 
prevent MMTCs from converting to recreational marijuana 
13 
 
establishments.  Specifically, the statute states that a city or 
town may adopt ordinances and bylaws that 
"govern the time, place and manner of marijuana 
establishment operations and of any business dealing in 
marijuana accessories, except that zoning ordinances or by-
laws shall not operate to:  (i) prevent the conversion of a 
medical marijuana treatment center licensed or registered 
not later than July 1, 2017 engaged in the cultivation, 
manufacture or sale of marijuana or marijuana products to a 
marijuana establishment engaged in the same type of 
activity under this chapter" (emphases added). 
 
G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a) (1).  We previously have observed that 
"the purpose of th[is] provision is to make it easier for 
medical marijuana dispensaries to convert to retail marijuana 
sales."  CommCan, Inc., 488 Mass. at 296. 
As an initial matter, we note that the provision cited by 
the plaintiffs only prohibits zoning bylaws that prevent 
conversion of MMTCs to recreational marijuana establishments, 
and it does not apply to article 14 because we have concluded 
that article 14 is not a zoning bylaw.  But more fundamentally, 
it is important to recognize that G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a) (1) and 
(a) (2), concern two different types of bylaws.  Section 
3 (a) (1) authorizes municipalities to adopt bylaws that "govern 
the time, place and manner of marijuana establishment 
operations."  G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a) (1).  Section 3 (a) (2) 
authorizes municipalities to adopt bylaws that "limit the number 
of marijuana establishments," G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a) (2), or 
"prohibit the operation of [one] or more types of marijuana 
14 
 
establishments within the city or town," G. L. c. 94G, 
§ 3 (a) (2) (i).  Because article 14 does not merely regulate 
the time, place, and manner of recreational marijuana 
establishment operations, but bans them entirely, it is subject 
to the requirements of § 3 (a) (2) rather than those of 
§ 3 (a) (1). 
Finally, the plaintiffs assert that article 14 violates the 
requirement in G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a), that the bylaws adopted by 
cities and towns must not be "unreasonably impracticable."  
Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that article 14's outright 
ban on recreational marijuana establishments, without the 
protections for existing structures, uses, or permits that would 
otherwise be required for zoning bylaws under G. L. c. 40A, § 6, 
is impracticable because it has created an unreasonable risk for 
investors.  But as we already have discussed at length, G. L. 
c. 94G, § 3 (a) (2) (i), explicitly authorizes municipalities to 
adopt such a ban.  This specific authorization supersedes any 
contrary interpretation that might be drawn from the more 
general requirement that bylaws must not be unreasonably 
impracticable.  See TBI, Inc. v. Board of Health of N. Andover, 
431 Mass. 9, 18 (2000), quoting Risk Mgt. Found. of Harvard Med. 
Insts., Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 407 Mass. 498, 505 (1990) 
("It is a basic canon of statutory interpretation that 'general 
statutory language must yield to that which is more specific'"). 
15 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, we hold that article 
14 is valid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.