Case Title: STATE v LEISTIKO

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1978-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
N o . 13802 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1978 THE STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs- WILLIAM LEISTIKO, Defendant and Respondent. For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Allen B. Chronister, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Ronald W. Smith, County Attorney, argued, Havre, Montana For Respondent : Morrison, E t t i e n and Barron, Havre, Montana Robert Morrison argued, Havre, Montana Submitted: March 1 0 , 1978 - 1978 Decided : - --- Filed: 3 '978 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B . Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court: The S t a t e of Montana brings t h i s appeal pursuant t o section 95-2403, K.C.M. 1947, from the order of the D i s t r i c t Court, H i l l County, granting defendant's motion t o suppress evidence seized i n the search of h i s home under a search warrant. O n August 27, 1976, Paula Kirchgasler (informant) went t o the Havre police department t o f i l e a complaint concerning an a s s a u l t against her t h a t occurred the previous night. The alleged a s s a i l a n t was a t h i r d party, not the present defendant. During the course of questioning concerning the a s s a u l t the informant revealed information concerning drug use and possession by c e r t a i n Havre residents. This questioning was undertaken by Officer Stremcha of the Havre police department. As a r e s u l t of t h i s discussion and the information revealed by the informant, an application f o r a search warrant was prepared seeking authoriza- t i o n t o search a residence occupied by defendant. Officer Stremcha and the informant went before J u s t i c e of Peace Stallcop. A t t h i s time J u s t i c e of Peace Stallcop requested c e r t a i n additions be made t o the application f o r the search warrant pertaining t o the alleged offense. He placed the informant and Officer Stremcha under oath and asked them i f the statements included i n the application were true and conducted no further examination i n t o the statements allegedly made by the informant and made no inquiry as t o her i d e n t i t y o r the b a s i s for her claim. The search warrant was issued and the search was conducted by Havre police. Drugs were recovered and defendant was arrested. A n Information was f i l e d on August 30, 1976, charging defendant with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with i n t e n t t o s e l l i n v i o l a t i o n of section 54-133.1, R.C.M. 1947. On January 24, 1977, a motion t o suppress evidence was f i l e d on behalf of defendant and hearing was held before Hon. B. W. Thomas on February 16, 1977. On April 5 , 1977, the court granted the motion t o suppress. There was no showing t h a t anv examination was made of the informant before the issuing j u s t i c e of peace on matters which would r e l a t e t o her r e l i a b i l i t y o r c r e d i b i l i t y . The single issue on appeal is whether the D i s t r i c t Court properly granted defendant's motion t o suppress. The i n s t a n t case involves the two pronged t e s t a s s e t out i n Aguilar v. Texas, (1964), 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L ed 2d 723 and S p i n e l l i v. United S t a t e s , (1969), 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L ed 2d 637. I n h i s memorandum t o the order suppressing the evidence, Judge Thomas held t h a t the application met the f i r s t t e s t of Aguilar and S p i n e l l i i n t h a t the a f f i d a v i t contained "some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant con- cluded t h a t the narcotics were where [slhe claimed they were." However, the a f f i d a v i t did not meet the second t e s t i n t h a t it did not contain s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s from which a judge could "assess the c r e d i b i l i t y of the informant or the r e l i a b i l i t y of her in- formation.'' Although the informant appeared personally before J u s t i c e of Peace Stallcop, no information was contributed toward the determination of probable cause, other than t h a t contained i n the a f f i d a v i t of Officer Stremcha. The record c l e a r l y establishes t h a t the only information before the j u s t i c e of peace was t h a t contained i n the statement of f a c t s given by Officer Stremcha i n h i s a f f i d a v i t i n support of the search warrant. Our inquiry must therefore be limited t o the four corners of the a f f i d a v i t . P e t i t i o n of Gray, (1970), 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532; S t a t e v. Bently, (1970), 156 Mont. 129, 477 P.2d 345. It cannot be disputed t h a t hearsay information may be considered t o e s t a b l i s h probable cause. S t a t e v. Paulson, (1975), 167 Mont. 310, 538 P.2d 339; Draper v. United S t a t e s , (1959), 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L ed 2d 327. But when k a r s a y informa- t i o n forms the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a finding of probable cause and the issuance of a search warrant, the two pronged t e s t s e t out i n Aguilar must be applied and s a t i s f i e d : "* * * the magistrate must be informed of [ f i r s t ] some of t h e underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded t h a t the narcotics were where he claimed they were, a n d a n d ] some of the under- lying circumstances from/the o f f i c e r concluded t h a t the informant * * * was 'credible' o r h i s information ' r e l i a b l e ' ." 378 U.S. 114. I n the i n s t a n t case the f i r s t p a r t of the t e s t i s not a t issue; however, the second part is a t issue. The second p a r t of the Aguilar-Spinelli t e s t mandates t h a t the existence of probable cause be established only through a credible informant with r e l i a b l e information. The magistrate must be informed of some underlying circumstances which demonstrate t h a t c r e d i b i l i t y o r r e l i a b i l i t y . The a f f i d a v i t must s e t f o r t h the underlying circumstances necessary t o enable the magistrate independently t o judge the v a l i d i t y of the informant's conclusion and the a f f i a n t must support h i s claim t h a t the informant was credible o r h i s information r e l i a b l e . Aguilar v. Texas, supra; S p i n e l l i v. United S t a t e s , supra; United States v. Goldstein, (9th C i r . The a f f i d a v i t of Officer Stremcha, who was not present on August 23, 1976, when the informant allegedly entered defendant's residence and saw the contraband drugs, was based on information supplied by informant. I n the instant case a f f i a n t s t a t e s t h a t he believes the informant i s r e l i a b l e based on the candor of her statements and the detailed knowledge of defendant and defenda n t ' s residence, which her statements contained. There were no f a c t s s t a t e d t o show informant was known t o the o f f i c e r , o r t h a t the o f f i c e r had had any past o r s u f f i c i e n t dealings with informant upon which t o base a belief t h a t the information was r e l i a b l e o r t r u t h f u l . Nor does t h i s Court have any statement of corroborative f a c t s known o r discovered. Here, no f a c t s whatever a r e given, only a f f i a n t ' s ultimate conclusions t h a t he beljwes informant was r e l i a b l e . The second part of the Aguila-Spinelli t e s t cannot be s a t i s f i e d with statements which a r e a t b e s t conclusory. S t a t e ex r e l . Townsend v. D i s t r i c t Court, (1975), 168 Mont. 357, 361, The S t a t e attempted t o b o l s t e r the application f o r search warrant by a personal appearance of the informant before the j u s t i c e of peace. I n S t a t e v. Thomson, (1976), 169 Mont. 158, 162, 545 t h i s Court held t h a t o r a l testimony from an informant could be used t o t e s t h i s r e l i a b i l i t y where the a f f i d a v i t was other- wise s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h probable cause. I n t h i s case, no t e s t f o r r e l i a b i l i t y was made. No e f f o r t was made by the j u s t i c e of peace t o inquire i n t o f a c t s beyond the statements appearing i n the application. The following testimony during the hearing on the motion t o suppress evidence reveals J u s t i c e of Peace s t a l l c o p ' s statements: "A. [ I ] asked them, [Stremcha and informant], questions concerning the statements t h a t were made i n the application f o r the search warrant t o determine whether o r not they knew what was i n the application and t h a t they were willing t o swear t h a t the statements i n the application were the t r u t h . "Q. I n questioning the informant and M r . Stremcha, did you seek any information out side of the face of the document t o find probable cause? A . No. I merely inquired t o the matters s e t f o r t h i n the application. "Q. D o you r e c a l l any specific questions t h a t you asked her r e l a t i v e t o the substance of the applica- t i o n and the f a c t s t h a t were s e t f o r t h ? A . No. I don't r e c a l l specific questions.'' Neither the application nor the questions asked by J u s t i c e of Peace Stallcop s a t i s f y the requirements f o r establishing j u s t i f i a b l e reliance on the statements of informant. N o evidence was offered t h a t i n the past she had given accurate information of criminal a c t i v i t y . N o evidence was presented by the police which would indicate t h a t the information supplied was accurate. N o attempt was made t o e s t a b l i s h the informant as an upstanding o r believable c i t i z e n . I n t h i s case, we a r e dealing with the rules pertaining t o a mere "informant", not a "citizen-informant" . This d i s t i n c t i o n is c l e a r l y s e t f o r t h by t h e California court i n People v. Smith, (1976), 132 Cal.Rptr. 397, 553 P.2d 557, 560: "'A "citizen-informant" is a c i t i z e n who purports t o be the victim of or t o have been the witness of a crime who is motivated by good citizenship and a c t s openly i n a i d of law enforcement. * * * It is reasonable f o r police o f f i c e r s t o a c t upon the reports of such an observer of criminal a c t i v i t y . * * * A "citizen-informant" is distinguished from a mere informer who gives a t i p t o law enforcement o f f i c e r s t h a t a person is engaged i n the course of criminal conduct. * * * Thus, experienced s t o o l pigeons o r persons criminally involved o r disposed a r e not regarded a s "citizen-informants" because they a r e generally motivated by something other than good citizenship. * * *' * * * The designation ' c i t i z e n - informant' i s j u s t a s conclusionary a s the designation 'reliable-informant.' I n e i t h e r case the conclusion must be supported by f a c t s s t a t e d i n the affidavit." 553 P.2d 560. See Aguilar v. Texas supra. The record here reveals the informant c l e a r l y did not qualify a s a "citizen-informant" . F i r s t , the a f f i a n t police o f f i c e r had had p r i o r contact with informant, but did not advise J u s t i c e of Peace Stallcop of t h i s f a c t . Second, the informant had contact with the Havre police department and the county attorney's o f f i c e on more than ten occasions prior t o August 27, 1976. Third, informant was a convicted felon a t the time the application was made and believed the police were aware of that fact. Fourth, three felony charges had been made against informant prior t o August 27, 1976. The record before Justice of Peace Stallcop contained nothing by which he could independently judge the r e l i a b i l i t y of the information. The D i s t r i c t Court held the essential f a c t s were not present before Justice of Peace Stallcop and the application was therefore insufficient t o j u s t i f y the issuance of a search warrant. W e agree. The judgment of the District Court i s affirmed. ,' Justice W e Concur: Chief Justice u J w & d M*U Hon. Alf e B. Coate, D i s t r i c t Judge, s k d n g with the Court.