Case Title: Anderson v. South Lincoln Special Cemetery Dist. ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of South Lincoln Special Cemetery Dist.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Anderson v. South Lincoln Special Cemetery Dist. ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of South Lincoln Special Cemetery Dist.1999 WY 9972 P.2d 136Case Number: 98-16Decided: 01/29/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

Leon 
E. ANDERSON, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

The SOUTH LINCOLN SPECIAL CEMETERY DISTRICT, By and 
Through the BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the SOUTH LINCOLN SPECIAL CEMETERY DISTRICT; 
and Marta Gunter, individually and in her official capacity, Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

                                 

Appeal from the District Court, Lincoln County, John 
D. Troughton, J.

 

   

     Richard Beckwith of 
Greenhalgh, Beckwith, Lemich and Stith, P.C., Rock Springs, Wyoming, for 
Appellant.

      William H. Twichell, 
Pinedale, Wyoming, for Appellee South Lincoln Special Cemetery 
District.

      Dennis W. Lancaster of 
Phillips & Lancaster, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming, for Appellee Marta 
Gunter.

 

     Before LEHMAN, 
C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* JJ.

    * 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument; retired 11/2/98.

 

     TAYLOR, 
Justice, Retired.

   [¶1]     When his contract for employment as 
superintendent of the South Lincoln Special Cemetery District was not renewed, 
appellant, Leon E. Anderson (Anderson), brought this action against appellees, 
the South Lincoln Special Cemetery District by and through the Board of Trustees 
(the Board) and individual Board member Marta Gunter (Gunter). In a multi-count 
complaint, Anderson claimed wrongful termination; breach of the covenants of 
good faith and fair dealing; denial of procedural and substantive due process; 
and tortious interference with his employment contract by Gunter. Summary 
judgment in favor of appellees disposed of all claims. We 
affirm.

 

                               
I. ISSUES

 

    [¶2]  Anderson submits the following statements 
for review:

 

            I.  Did the district court err when it ruled 
as a matter of law that the appellant was an employee at 
will?

 

II. Did the district court properly address 
plaintiff's assertion that the written agreement of February, 1994, was 
supported by consideration?

 

III.  Did 
the district court err when it ruled as a matter of law that the appellee 
District did not breach the covenants of good faith and fair dealing when it 
terminated the appellant?

 

A.  Were 
there questions of material fact regarding the existence of a special 
relationship between the appellant and appellee District?

 

B.  Were 
there questions of material fact regarding the bad faith motives of the 
appellees in terminating the appellant?

 

IV. Did the district court err when it ruled as a 
matter of law that appellee Gunter enjoys immunity from liability for tortiously 
interfering with the appellant's employment contract?

 

            V.  Did the district court err when it ruled 
as a matter of law that appellant had no property interest in his employment?

 

    [¶3]  The Board responds:

 

            I.  Did the district court err when it ruled 
as a matter of law that the appellant was an employee at 
will?

 

II. Did appellee District according to Mariano & 
Associates, P.C. v. Board of County          Commissioners 
of Sublette County, 737 P.2d 323 (Wyo. 1987) have the right to terminate 
the revocable oral employment 
contract and/or not renew the written agreement of February, 
1994?

 

   

III.  Did 
the district court properly address appellant's assertion that the written 
agreement of February, 1994, was wholly unsupported by 
consideration?

 

            IV.   Did the district court err when it 
ruled as a matter of law that the appellee District did not breach the covenants of good faith and fair 
dealing when it terminated the appellant?

 

A.  Are 
there questions of material fact regarding the existence of a special 
relationship between the appellant and appellee District?

 

B.  Are 
there questions of material fact regarding alleged bad faith motives of appellee 
District in terminating the appellant?

 

C.  Are 
there questions of material fact regarding alleged bad faith motives of appellee 
Gunter in terminating the appellant?

 

D.  Does 
appellant need to establish a question of material fact that the termination 
occurred as a means to avoid payment of benefits already earned under the 
contract of employment to prevail on the tort theory?

 

V.  Did 
the district court err when it ruled as a matter of law that appellee Gunter 
enjoys immunity from liability for tortiously interfering with the appellant's 
employment contract?

 

VI. Did the district court err when it ruled as a 
matter of law that appellant had no property interest in his 
employment?

 

   [¶4]   Gunter 
responds:

 

            1) Whether the district 
court's award of summary judgment in favor of appellee Gunter is 
supported legally by the facts, the 
record and the law.

 

                               
II. FACTS

 

   [¶5]     In October of 1979, Anderson was hired 
as the superintendent of the South Lincoln Special Cemetery District. At the 
Board meeting, when his prospective employment was discussed, Anderson was told 
by the chairman that as long as he did a good job, he would be there for as long 
as he wanted. Although no written contract was executed, Anderson maintains the 
chairman's statement bestowed employment which could be terminated only for cause. Anderson admits, however, 
he knew at the time he was hired that one board could not bind future 
boards.

 

   [¶6]     The terms of Anderson's employment were 
not again discussed until 1993 when the Board decided to update its policies and 
make the superintendent position "contractual." The minutes of the Board meeting 
of May 1993 reflect the submission of a draft of the updated policies and 
Anderson's contract by the Board's attorney. In the minutes of the Board meeting of 
September 1993, Anderson confirmed that his contract modifications had been 
incorporated into the current draft.

 

   [¶7]     The written contract encompassed a 
one-year term of at-will employment beginning July 1, 1994 and ending June 30, 
1995.  Termination prior to the 
contract's expiration date required thirty days written notice, and if early 
termination was initiated by the Board, Anderson was entitled to sixty days 
compensation. Anderson never informed the Board that he believed he was not an 
at-will employee during the contract discussions.

 

   [¶8]     In February 1994, the Board sent 
Anderson a copy of the contract for his signature. The contract was accompanied 
by a letter which stated he must sign and return the contract before the Board 
meeting in March, or the Board would begin a search for his replacement prior to 
finalizing the budget in May.  
Anderson signed and returned the contract.

 

   [¶9]     February 1994 also heralded the 
appointment of Gunter, Anderson's former mother-in-law, to the Board. The past 
relationship between Anderson and Gunter was fraught with animosity, and the 
hostilities did not diminish after Gunter's appointment. According to Anderson, 
Gunter used her power as a Board member to further her repeated threats that she 
would "run [Anderson and his family] out of town * * *." As examples 
of Gunter's harassment, Anderson points 
to a Board investigation, initiated by Gunter, of a party Anderson hosted for 
his crew members.  He also alleges 
Gunter made frequent visits to the District's cemeteries; and on one occasion, 
followed Anderson's current wife.

 

   [¶10]  In May 1995, the Board notified Anderson 
that his contract would not be renewed for the next year, and his employment 
would terminate at the expiration of his contract. Anderson subsequently filed 
this action, maintaining he was wrongfully terminated without cause due to 
Gunter's personal vendetta against him. Upon appellees' motion for summary 
judgment, the district court determined that Anderson was an at-will employee 
throughout his employment; there was no 
special relationship with his employer on which to base a good faith claim; and 
that Gunter, as a member of the Board, was entitled to governmental immunity. 
This timely appeal followed.

 

                        
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

   [¶11]  Summary judgment is appropriate when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and, therefore, the prevailing party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Kirkwood v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., 937 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1997); W.R.C.P. 56(c).  
When reviewing a summary judgment, this court must view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit 
of all favorable inferences that may 
fairly be drawn from the record. Kirkwood, 937 P.2d  at 208; Garcia v. Lawson, 
928 P.2d 1164, 1166 (Wyo. 1996). Where no genuine issues of material fact exist 
and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary 
judgment is affirmed. Treemont, Inc. v. Hawley, 886 P.2d 589, 592 (Wyo. 1994). 
Summary judgment will be affirmed " '[if] the judgment against the appellant is 
sustainable on any basis * * *.' "  Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 341 
(Wyo. 1986) (quoting Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration Corp., 665 P.2d 452, 456 
(Wyo. 1983)).

 

                            
IV. DISCUSSION

 

     A. WRONGFUL 
TERMINATION

 

   [¶12]  Anderson insists that the assurances 
made by the Board's chairman in 1979 changed his status from employment at-will 
to an employment that could be terminated only for cause. He claims that because 
this agreement was in effect at the time of the 1994 written contract, 
additional consideration was required before the written contract could 
effectively return his status to an employee at-will.

 

   [¶13]  Summary judgment was granted on the 
basis that the 1979 oral representations, as a matter of law, were not 
sufficiently explicit to modify Anderson's employment from an at-will status. 
Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 218 (Wyo. 1994) ("a 
claim by an employee that the employer promised 'permanent' employment does not alter the at 
will presumption without * * * explicit language in the contract of employment 
stating that termination may only be for cause.").  We need not reach this issue, however, 
because even if there was an oral contract between Anderson and the 1979 Board, 
the parties clearly did not intend the agreement to bind later 
boards.

 

   [¶14]  In Wyoming, employment is at-will which 
may be terminated at any time for any or no reason, unless an express or implied 
contract establishes employment that may only be terminated for cause. Davis v. 
Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Wyo. 1997); Brodie v. General 
Chemical Corp., 934 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wyo. 1997); Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1996). An express oral contract may be interpreted as a 
matter of law when the terms are shown without conflict in the evidence. Wilder, 
868 P.2d  at 218. In this case, the sworn testimony unquestionably demonstrates 
the mutual understanding of the parties to limit the duration of their alleged 
contract to the term of the 1979 Board.

 

    [¶15] Anderson's deposition 
reveals the following:

 

            Q. And when you were 
hired there were six members on the board that were elected to 
that position; is that 
correct?

 

            A. This is 
correct.

 

            Q. And those board 
members changed at every election, basically, didn't they?

   

            A. Approximately every 
two years three of them come up for election, yes.

 

            Q. You knew this was a 
governmental entity you were working for when you became employed by 
that;

            is that 
correct?

 

            A. This is 
correct.

 

            Q. And did you know of 
any limitations a governmental entity has as far as entering into 
contracts?

 

            A. I know one board 
cannot obligate another board.

 

            Q. You knew that when 
you were employed initially; is that correct?

 

            A. This is 
correct.

 

   The deposition testimony of the 
1979 Board's chairman echoes Anderson's understanding:

 

            If you 
mean, give him [Anderson] a term, I don't think so; but I would say we probably 
said as long as the board there - 
we know, we been on boards before, we knew we couldn't empower another 
board to do what we'd done, you 
know. He was probably told that as long as he did the job he would 
be continually employed. That's all 
I can tell you.

 

Thus, it is clear the 
parties understood that if they had an agreement, it expired upon the election 
of a new board, an event which occurred at least every two 
years.

 

   [¶16]  Further, Anderson admits he did not 
discuss employment terms with a later Board until the contract discussions in 
1993 and 1994. Therefore, Anderson cannot show his status was anything other 
than at-will when he signed the 1994 written contract.  Since his employment status was not 
modified by the terms of the 1994 
contract, no additional consideration was required to give effect to the written 
agreement. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 219.

 

   [¶17]  The unambiguous language of the 1994 
contract clearly stated that Anderson remained an employee at-will for one year. 
The only change in the terms of his employment from 1994-95 was additional 
notice and pay should the Board terminate Anderson without cause prior to the 
expiration of his contract. There is no 
evidence that the Board breached these terms, and no evidence of an implied or 
express promise that the contract would be renewed. Consequently, the Board was 
under no obligation to continue Anderson's employment, and his claim for 
wrongful termination must fail as a matter of law.

 

     B. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING

 

   [¶18]  Similarly, Anderson's claim that he has 
presented factual issues regarding a breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is without merit. In recognizing a limited tort claim for breach of 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts, we 
have repeatedly stressed that only in rare and exceptional cases is a duty 
created which gives rise to tort liability. Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d 273, 277 (Wyo. 1997); Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 712 (citing Wilder, 868 P.2d at 
221); Garcia v. UniWyo Federal Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 646 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

            A showing 
is required that a special relationship of trust and reliance exists between 
the particular employee seeking 
recovery and the employer. * * * Trust and reliance may be found 
by the existence of separate 
consideration, common law, statutory rights, or rights accruing 
with longevity of 
service.

 

Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 221. A 
long employment relationship, alone, is not enough to create the required 
special relationship.  Garcia, 920 P.2d  at 646.

 

   [¶19]  Anderson does not allege separate 
consideration or a violation of rights existing under common law or 
statute.  Neither does he claim the 
Board failed to renew his contract for the purpose of avoiding responsibilities 
or obligations due him. Instead, Anderson maintains that because his job duties 
exceeded those of a "mere employee," his position should be likened to a "chief 
executive officer" commanding a special relationship of trust and 
reliance.

 

   [¶20]  Ironically, Anderson supports this 
argument by referring to the duties enumerated in the 1994 contract; the same 
document clearly designating his at-will status. A fundamental limitation on 
implied covenants is that they cannot create duties that supersede the express 
provisions of a written contract. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 221. Thus, whether 
Anderson was a "chief executive officer" or a "mere employee," the failure to 
renew his contract was neither unlawful nor violative of community 
standards.

 

     C. IMMUNITY-TORTIOUS 
INTERFERENCE

 

   [¶21]  Anderson asserts that there is a 
question of fact as to whether Gunter's machinations to terminate his employment 
were outside the scope of her duties as a Board member, precluding the district 
court's application of governmental immunity as a matter of law. Again, we need 
not reach this question because, even 
were we to assume that Anderson is correct, he simply cannot present a valid 
claim against Gunter for tortious interference with a 
contract.

 

   [¶22]  To prevail on a claim of tortious 
interference with a contract, the claimant must show the claimed interference 
was improper, and induced or caused a breach or termination of the relationship 
or business expectancy. Examination Management Services, Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 697 (Wyo. 1996); Ames v. 
Sundance State Bank, 850 P.2d 607, 611 (Wyo. 1993).  Because there was no breach of the 
contractual terms, and Anderson had no legitimate expectancy that the contract 
would be renewed, Anderson's claim against Gunter for interference with the 
contract must fail.

 

     D. DUE PROCESS 
CLAIM

 

   [¶23]  Finally, the district court correctly 
ruled as a matter of law that Anderson failed to demonstrate a violation of 
substantive or procedural due process. A claimant must show a property interest 
in his employment, which may arise when sources such as state statutory law, 
regulations, or the terms of employment create a "legitimate claim of 
entitlement" to certain benefits of employment. City Council of Laramie v. 
Kreiling, 911 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Wyo. 1996). As an employee at-will under a 
contract terminating on a specific date, Anderson had no legitimate claim of 
entitlement in continued employment with the South Lincoln Special Cemetery 
District, and, therefore, was not denied 
either substantive or procedural due process.

 

                             
V. CONCLUSION

 

   [¶24]  As a matter of law, Anderson was an 
at-will employee at the time he entered into the 1994 written employment 
contract, and, therefore, the contract continuing his at-will status was 
supported by sufficient consideration. Since Anderson failed to show any breach 
of his employment contract or implied covenant, summary judgment in favor of the South Lincoln 
Special Cemetery District and Marta Gunter is affirmed.