Case Title: Jeannie Hefty v. Daniel R. Strickhouser

Citation: 2008 WI 96

Docket Number: 2006AP001094

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
2008 WI 96 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP1094 and 2006AP1956 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Jeannie Hefty d/b/a Heft-Kat Farm, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Daniel R. Strickhouser, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
ABC Insurance Company and ADM Alliance Nutrition 
Inc., 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 15, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael S. Gibbs   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Paul E. Benson, Joseph Louis Olson, and Michael Best & 
Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Paul E. Benson 
and Joseph Louis Olson. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Ward 
Richter, Sheila M. Sullivan, and Bell, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Sheila M. Sullivan. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 96
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
(L.C. No. 
2004CV146) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jeannie Hefty d/b/a Heft-Kat Farm, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel R. Strickhouser, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
ABC Insurance Company and ADM Alliance 
Nutrition Inc., 
 
          Defendants. 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished opinion and order of the court of appeals,1 which 
summarily reversed the Walworth County Circuit Court, Michael S. 
Gibbs, Judge.   
                                                 
1 Hefty v. Strickhouser, Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. May 23, 2007). 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
2 
 
¶2 
The case requires us to review two discretionary 
decisions of the circuit court.  Both decisions involve the 
circuit 
court's 
scheduling 
order, 
which 
incorporated 
by 
attachment a filing deadline for a summary judgment response 
that departed from the deadline in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).2  
Judge Gibbs issued a scheduling order that had a then-existing 
Walworth County local circuit court rule appended to it.  The 
rule required that a response to a summary judgment motion be 
filed and served within 20 days of service of the motion.  
Defendants ADM Alliance Nutrition, Inc. (Alliance) and Daniel 
Strickhouser3 filed a motion for summary judgment in accord with 
the court's scheduling order, but plaintiff Jeannie Hefty 
(Hefty) filed and served her response to the motion after the 
deadline.  As a result, the court struck her response, dismissed 
her complaint with prejudice, and granted summary judgment to 
Strickhouser as a sanction for noncompliance.  Hefty appealed. 
¶3 
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the 
circuit court did not properly exercise its discretion when it 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.08(2) reads: "Motion. Unless earlier 
times are specified in the scheduling order, the motion shall be 
served at least 20 days before the time fixed for the hearing 
and the adverse party shall serve opposing affidavits, if any, 
at least 5 days before the time fixed for the hearing." 
(Emphasis added.)   
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 
version, unless otherwise noted. 
3 Defendants Alliance and Daniel Strickhouser will be 
referred to collectively as "Strickhouser."  Daniel Strickhouser 
will be referred to individually as "Daniel Strickhouser" or 
"Mr. Strickhouser." 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
3 
 
failed to demonstrate on the record why deviation from the 
deadline 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.08(2) 
was 
necessary 
and 
appropriate, as required by the court of appeals' recent 
decision in Hunter v. AES Consultants, Ltd., 2007 WI App 42, 
¶15, 300 Wis. 2d 213, 730 N.W.2d 184 (holding that "with regard 
to scheduling orders, trial courts that deviate from the 
statutory time requirements for responding to a motion for 
summary judgment should explain on the record why that deviation 
is necessary and appropriate"). 
¶4 
We are asked to determine whether the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion when it: (1) issued a 
scheduling order with deadlines different from Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2) without expressly indicating its reasoning on the 
record; and (2) sanctioned Hefty for failing to comply with the 
scheduling order by striking her response, which ultimately 
resulted in the dismissal of her suit with prejudice and summary 
judgment to Strickhouser. 
¶5 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals, but on 
different grounds.  The circuit court was not required to 
demonstrate on the record why its scheduling order deviated from 
§ 802.08(2) to properly exercise its scheduling discretion under 
Wis. Stat. § 802.10.  However, the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by entering a scheduling order that 
incorporated a void local rule and by striking Hefty's response 
as a sanction for untimely filing, which ultimately resulted in 
dismissal of her complaint with prejudice and summary judgment 
to Strickhouser.  Accordingly, we affirm and remand. 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
4 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶6 
The facts giving rise to the underlying civil suit 
have little to do with the issues before us.  Nonetheless, they 
provide 
context 
and 
reveal 
the 
stakes 
involved 
in 
this 
procedural dispute. 
¶7 
Hefty owns a dairy farm in Elkhorn.  In 2000 she 
entered into a contract with defendant Alliance through its 
disclosed agent, Daniel Strickhouser, who was to provide 
services to Hefty as a dairy cow nutritionist.  Hefty engaged 
Mr. Strickhouser in this capacity for approximately two years.  
His advice regarding the management and control of feed and 
silage initially resulted in a large increase in milk production 
for Hefty's herd.  In November 2002, however, milk production 
fell, allegedly due to Mr. Strickhouser's rationing of food and 
other nutrients.  Hefty was forced to stop milking some of her 
herd to allow it to regain the strength and health necessary to 
maintain consistent milk production.  Because of this decreased 
milking, Hefty allegedly suffered financial losses. 
¶8 
On February 3, 2004, Hefty sued Mr. Strickhouser and 
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (ADM), Alliance's parent company, 
asserting a cause of action for negligence in providing dairy 
nutritionist services.  On July 14, 2005, Hefty amended the 
complaint to assert causes of action for negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, 
strict 
responsibility 
misrepresentation, 
intentional deceit misrepresentation, and breach of contract 
against Daniel Strickhouser, ADM, and Alliance.  The circuit 
court dismissed all causes of action against ADM and dismissed 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
5 
 
Hefty's breach of contract claim against Mr. Strickhouser.  
Alliance remained a defendant to all five causes of action in 
the amended complaint. 
¶9 
On July 19, 2005, Walworth County Circuit Judge James 
L. Carlson sent counsel for the parties an order for scheduling 
information under Wis. Stat. § 802.10(3).4  The order included a 
scheduling questionnaire that was to be completed by the parties 
and returned to the clerk of courts, who would then send copies 
to all the parties.  The order stated that "answers [to the 
questionnaire] will be referred to by the court in the setting 
of the time and date requirements mentioned in Wis. [Stat. 
§] 802.10(3)(a)."  The questionnaire included the question: "Do 
you intend to file a motion for judgment on the pleading under 
Wis. Stats. 802.03 or for summary judgment under Wis. Stats. 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.10(3), which deals with calendar 
practice, provides in pertinent part:   
Scheduling and planning.  Except in categories of 
actions and special proceedings exempted under sub. 
(1), the circuit court may enter a scheduling order on 
the court's own motion or on the motion of a party. 
The order shall be entered after the court consults 
with 
the 
attorneys 
for 
the 
parties 
and 
any 
unrepresented party. The scheduling order may address 
any of the following:   
. . . . 
(c)  The time to file motions.  
. . . .  
(h)  The 
appropriateness 
and 
timing 
of 
summary 
judgment adjudication under s. 802.08. 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
6 
 
802.08? 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
If 
yes, 
specify: 
_______________________________".   
¶10 Counsel for Strickhouser indicated on the completed 
form that he intended to file a motion for summary judgment by 
circling "Yes" and specifying "[m]otion for summary judgment" in 
the blank space. 
¶11 On August 3, 2005, Judge Gibbs entered a scheduling 
order, which was forwarded to counsel for the parties.  The 
order5 included several deadlines related to the case, including 
one for filing a motion for summary judgment.  The order 
indicated that a "[m]otion for judgment on pleadings/summary 
judgment must be filed by 02/01/2006."  Below this language, the 
following 
appears: 
"(SEE 
ATTACHED 
SHEET 
FOR 
MOTION 
PROC[E]DURE)".  The sheet attached to the scheduling order was 
part of then-existing Walworth County local circuit court rules.  
The attached rule was entitled "Standard Summary Judgment 
Procedure."  The fourth of seven points in the rule read:   
4. 
Upon service of the motion for summary 
judgment, within 20 days, any party opposing a pending 
motion shall serve and file: 
                                                 
5 The scheduling order appears to be a template word-
processed document that includes "blanks" that can be modified 
on a computer to tailor the template scheduling order to the 
procedural timing deadlines specified by the circuit court for a 
particular case.  All deadlines appear as underlined text.  Some 
blanks in Judge Gibbs' scheduling order, such as that for a 
motion for default judgment, were filled in with "n/a" to 
indicate that the deadline in question did not pertain to 
Hefty's case. 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
7 
 
a. 
A response to the moving party's Proposed 
Undisputed Facts[,] and  
b. 
A response to the moving party's Proposed 
Conclusions of Law, and  
c. 
A brief in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment, and  
d. 
Any supporting papers, pursuant to sec. 
802.08(3), Wis. Stats. that the party chooses to 
submit.   
¶12 The scheduling order stated that "[f]ailure to abide 
by this scheduling order may result in sanctions being imposed——
See [Wis. Stat. §§] 802.10(3)(d); 805.03; 802.10(7) and [Wis. 
Stat. ch.] 785." 
¶13 The record reflects that the parties exchanged barbs 
early in this litigation.  In a filing opposing Hefty's motion 
for leave to amend her first complaint, Strickhouser alleged 
that Hefty failed to provide the court or the defendants with a 
copy of the amended complaint.  In August 2005 Hefty filed a 
motion for sanctions against Strickhouser for failure to comply 
with discovery requests under Wis. Stat. § 804.12.  In September 
2005 Strickhouser filed a response opposing this motion and 
alleging 
that 
Hefty 
was 
similarly 
delinquent 
in 
meeting 
discovery 
deadlines. 
 
As 
noted 
above, 
Strickhouser 
was 
successful in moving the court to dismiss portions of Hefty's 
amended complaint. 
¶14 On February 1, 2006, Strickhouser filed a motion for 
summary judgment, which was served on Hefty via regular mail on 
February 6, 2006.  The notice of motion provided to Hefty 
indicated that the motion would be heard by Judge Gibbs on March 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
8 
 
13, 2006.  Pursuant to the rule attached to Judge Gibbs' August 
3, 2005, scheduling order, Hefty's response to the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment was due to be filed and served 20 
days after service, namely, by March 1, 2006.6  Hefty filed her 
response to Strickhouser's motion for summary judgment on March 
6, 2006.  She served it on Strickhouser via facsimile at 5:58 
p.m. that day.   
¶15 On March 9 Strickhouser filed a motion to strike 
Hefty's untimely summary judgment response papers.   
¶16 On March 13 Judge Gibbs held a hearing regarding 
Strickhouser's motions to strike Hefty's response papers and for 
summary judgment.  At the hearing, counsel for Hefty indicated 
that he "simply followed [Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)]" when he 
determined that the date he filed and served the response was 
                                                 
6 By its reference to the local rule, the scheduling order 
required Hefty to file and serve her response to Strickhouser's 
motion for summary judgment within 20 days of receiving it on 
February 6, 2006.  Ordinarily this deadline would have been 
February 27, taking into consideration that February 26 was a 
Sunday.  However, Hefty was entitled to three additional days to 
file and serve her response to Strickhouser's motion under Wis. 
Stat. § 801.15(5)(a) because Strickhouser's motion was served by 
mail.  Wisconsin Stat. § 801.15(5) provides in part: 
(5) Whenever a party has the right or is required 
to do some act or take some proceedings within a 
prescribed period after the service of a notice or 
other paper upon the party:  
(a) If the notice or paper is served by mail, 3 
days shall be added to the prescribed period. 
The parties appear to agree that Wis. Stat. § 801.15(5)(a) 
allowed Hefty until March 1 to file and serve her motion on 
Strickhouser. 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
9 
 
timely.  Judge Gibbs then commented that the "scheduling order 
dated August 3, 2005, has attached to it and very specifically 
outlines standard summary judgment procedures" including that a 
"response to the motion for summary judgment must be filed 
within twenty days."  Judge Gibbs also stated:  
We don't write [scheduling orders] for fun.  We 
don't write these for our health.  We write these to 
be followed.  There's a slight trend that I've noticed 
lately.  People don't follow scheduling orders and 
basically their arguments [are], well, nobody got 
hurt.  Well, that's not the reason we do it.  We do it 
for orderly administration of justice and this is 
clearly beyond the time of the——beyond the twenty 
days.  It's thirty-eight days, roughly.[7]  Well, with 
February in there, it's not quite so tight, but, ah, 
even still, I question whether it was five business 
days even, which is what the statute is going to 
require being scheduled for the 13th.   
¶17 Judge 
Gibbs 
then 
orally 
struck 
Hefty's 
summary 
judgment response papers and granted summary judgment to 
Strickhouser.  Judge Gibbs stated that "based on the failure to 
respond to [Strickhouser's motion], I will find that Defendants 
are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law."  In doing 
so, the circuit court refused to consider oral argument 
presented by counsel for Hefty addressing disputed issues of 
material fact with regard to her claims.  The court's decision 
was preceded by the following colloquy between Hefty's counsel 
and Judge Gibbs:   
                                                 
7 The circuit court's comment that Hefty took 38 days from 
the time she received the defendants' motion to file and serve 
her response was not correct.  Hefty's response was filed 28 
days after the motion was served, which was five days late.   
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
10 
 
COUNSEL:   
Your Honor, would you accept oral 
argument at this time in regards 
to 
[Strickhouser's] 
motion 
for 
summary judgment in light of the 
fact 
that 
you 
disregarded 
our 
paperwork?  I mean, ah, because 
the statute does allow for oral 
argument 
on 
summary 
judgment 
motions.   
THE COURT:   
Okay.  So you want me to consider 
what?  Everything that you would 
have submitted in writing?  That's 
your response.   
COUNSEL:   
I would certainly like a chance to 
make an argument regarding their 
motions in light of the fact that 
the Court isn't going to consider 
our paperwork.   
THE COURT:   
Well, what does that do?  That 
just 
gives 
you 
the 
right 
to 
basically read your paperwork into 
the record.   
COUNSEL:   
I have no intention of reading my 
entire paperwork into the record, 
but, Your Honor, the statute does 
[] allow for oral argument and I 
would 
ask 
the 
Court 
for 
an 
opportunity to do that. . . . 
¶18 Hefty's counsel proceeded to argue that genuine issues 
of material fact remained and that summary judgment was 
therefore inappropriate.  Judge Gibbs responded: "I'm going to 
refer you to the local rules, paragraph 4, under Standard 
Summary Judgment Procedures, which is a special attachment."  
The court then read the local rule at issue, which had been 
appended to the scheduling order, and concluded by saying, 
"[f]ailure to comply with these rules has left me with no 
factual issue to consider.  And I will grant summary judgment as 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
11 
 
requested finding there is no genuine issue of material fact 
that's been presented to me and that Defendants are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law."  
¶19 The court's March 13 oral ruling was formalized in a 
March 29 written order granting Strickhouser's motions to strike 
and for summary judgment, adopting Strickhouser's proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and dismissing Hefty's 
complaint with prejudice. 
¶20 On March 21 Hefty filed three motions: (1) a motion 
for enlargement of time to file a response to Strickhouser's 
motion for summary judgment; (2) a motion for relief from Judge 
Gibbs' March 13 order granting summary judgment to Strickhouser; 
and (3) a motion for reconsideration.  Hefty's counsel filed an 
affidavit in support of the first two motions, in which he 
stated that he was "aware that [the] Walworth County Circuit 
Court Rules for civil actions, in particular ¶ 2B Pretrial and 
Motion Proceedings, require a response to a motion in a civil 
case to be filed five days before the date of the motion 
hearing."  His affidavit also stated:  
Although I had in my file a copy of the Court's 
scheduling order, which required motions for summary 
judgment to be filed by February 1, 2006, I failed to 
fully review the notice accompanying that scheduling 
order entitled "STANDARD SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDURE."  
Thus, I did not realize that the Court's standard 
procedure required any opposition to the defendants' 
pending motion to be filed within 20 days.  
¶21 On April 7 Judge Gibbs held a hearing to address 
Hefty's March 21 motions.  At the hearing Judge Gibbs denied 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
12 
 
Hefty's three motions and reiterated that his scheduling order 
was "not put out for [his] health" and that it was issued "to 
insure the order of the operation of the Court."  A written 
order was entered on April 17 denying Hefty's three March 21 
motions.   
¶22 On May 2 Hefty filed a notice of appeal, No. 
2006AP1094, which appealed the circuit court's March 29 and 
April 17 orders.   
¶23 On May 10 Judge Gibbs ordered judgment in favor of 
Strickhouser.  On June 12 Hefty filed three additional motions, 
all related to the circuit court's May 10 judgment: (1) a motion 
for reconsideration; (2) a motion for relief from judgment; and 
(3) 
a 
motion 
for 
enlargement 
of 
time 
to 
respond 
to 
Strickhouser's motion for summary judgment.  On July 21 the 
circuit court denied Hefty's three June 12 motions.   
¶24 On August 8 Hefty filed a second notice of appeal, No. 
2006AP1956, to challenge the circuit court's May 10 and July 21 
orders.  The court of appeals consolidated the appeals on August 
16, 2006. 
¶25 On May 23, 2007, the court of appeals issued an 
unpublished opinion and order reversing summary judgment in 
favor of Strickhouser and remanding Hefty's case to the circuit 
court.  The court of appeals relied upon its recent decision in 
Hunter to support its conclusion that the circuit court erred in 
imposing a scheduling order at variance with Wis. Stat. § 802.08 
without a demonstrable exercise of discretion. 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
13 
 
¶26 Strickhouser petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted on September 13, 2007. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶27 This case involves the interpretation and application 
of statutes and local circuit court rules, which are questions 
of law we review de novo.  State v. Sorenson, 2000 WI 43, ¶15, 
234 Wis. 2d 648, 611 N.W.2d 240. 
¶28 This 
case 
also 
involves 
a 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
decisions 
to 
control 
its 
docket 
through 
a 
scheduling order, and to impose sanctions for an untimely filing 
in response to that order. "A discretionary decision will be 
sustained if the circuit court has examined the relevant facts, 
applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated 
rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge 
could reach."  Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 
273, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991) (citing Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 
400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)).  "The decision to impose 
sanctions 
and 
the 
decision 
of 
which 
sanctions 
to 
impose . . . are within a circuit court's discretion."  Indus. 
Roofing Servs., Inc. v. Marquardt, 2007 WI 19, ¶41, 299 
Wis. 2d 81, 
726 
N.W.2d 898 
(plurality 
opinion) 
(citation 
omitted); see also Sentry Ins. v. Davis, 2001 WI App 203, ¶19, 
247 Wis.2d 501, 634 N.W.2d 553. 
III. ANALYSIS   
¶29 This case requires us to explore the limits of circuit 
court discretion to manage the court's calendar.  It implicates 
scheduling orders, procedural statutes, local court rules, and 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
14 
 
sanctions for noncompliance.  The critical importance of circuit 
court 
discretion 
is 
pitted 
against 
other 
compelling 
considerations.  
¶30 Two discretionary decisions of the circuit court are 
at issue.  The first is the circuit court's decision to enter a 
scheduling order that included summary judgment deadlines for 
filing and service.  This decision is largely governed by Wis. 
Stat. §§ 802.10 and 802.08(2).  The second is the circuit 
court's sanction for violating the terms of its scheduling 
order, namely, the striking of Hefty's late response, which 
ultimately led to dismissal of her suit with prejudice and the 
grant of summary judgment to the defendants.  Sanctions for 
violation of a circuit court's scheduling order are provided by 
Wis. Stat. § 802.10(7). 
A.  Wisconsin Stat. § 802.10 
¶31 Wisconsin circuit courts have discretion to control 
their dockets.  This power is inherent to their function.8  It is 
                                                 
8 "Every court has inherent power, exercisable in its sound 
discretion, consistent within the Constitution and statutes, to 
control disposition of causes on its docket with economy of time 
and effort."  Latham v. Casey & King Corp., 23 Wis. 2d 311, 314, 
127 N.W.2d 225 (1964) (citation omitted); see also Lentz v. 
Young, 195 Wis. 2d 457, 465, 536 N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1995) 
("The filing of motions is a matter that directly impacts the 
trial court's administration of its calendar.  Trial courts have 
the inherent power to control their dockets to achieve economy 
of time and effort."); Rupert v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 138 Wis. 2d 
1, 7, 405 N.W.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1987) ("We recognize the trial 
court's inherent discretionary power to control its docket with 
economy of time and effort." (citing Latham, 23 Wis. 2d at 
314)).  
 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
15 
 
also granted by statute.  Wisconsin Stat. § 802.10 addresses 
"calendar practice" and provides that a circuit court "may enter 
a scheduling order on the court's own motion or on the motion of 
a party."  Wis. Stat. § 802.10(3).  "The order shall be entered 
after the court consults with the attorneys for the parties and 
any unrepresented party."  Id.  By its terms, the statute 
requires that the circuit court engage in some type of 
consultation before entering a scheduling order, although it 
does not define consultation or specify methodology.  Once the 
court has satisfied the consultation requirement, its scheduling 
order may address, as pertinent here, both "[t]he time to file 
motions" and "[t]he appropriateness and timing of summary 
judgment 
adjudication 
under 
s. 
802.08," 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.10(3)(c), (3)(h). 
¶32 Circuit courts engage in various types of consultation 
under Wis. Stat. § 802.10(3).  The primary example is a 
scheduling 
conference,9 
which 
differs 
from 
the 
pretrial 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.10 was created by supreme court 
order in 1975.  See S. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 634 (eff. Jan. 
1, 1976).  The statute has since been amended several times, and 
the scheduling conference procedure has persisted, although it 
is no longer explicitly part of Wis. Stat. § 802.10.  Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 802.10(3)(a) (1993-94) provided for a "scheduling 
conference" to address such matters as setting a date for the 
pretrial conference and trial, setting times for hearing on a 
motion for default judgment, completion of discovery, and 
service and hearing of motions at or prior to the pretrial 
conference.  Reference to a "scheduling conference" was removed 
from § 802.10 in 1995.  See S. Ct. Order 95-04, 191 Wis. 2d xxi-
xxiv (eff. July 1, 1995). 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
16 
 
conference outlined in § 802.10(5).10  A pretrial conference 
                                                                                                                                                             
Professor Charles Clausen and David Lowe explained the 
purposes behind the scheduling conference:   
[Scheduling 
conferences 
are] 
based 
on 
the 
practice of many federal district courts to call in 
the attorneys in an action shortly after commencement 
for a report on the status of the action and for the 
setting of dates.  This scheduling conference is 
essentially a "pre-pretrial."  The purpose of the 
scheduling conference is to get the litigation moving 
and keep it moving.  In probably the most significant 
change from the current practice, the new rules——most 
especially section 802.10——place the responsibility 
for moving the case on the court, as well as on the 
attorneys.   
At 
the 
scheduling 
conference, 
the 
attorneys 
should be sufficiently familiar with the case to form 
a realistic opinion as to the amount of time necessary 
to 
complete 
discovery 
and 
to 
discover 
whether 
impleader of third parties will probably be necessary.  
The judge's decision on dates for pretrial conference 
and trial will necessarily be predicated on the time 
required for discovery and impleader.   
At the conference, the judge issues a scheduling 
order reciting the dates established.  This order 
controls the course of the action and relief from it 
should not be granted lightly.  One of the primary 
goals of the rules is to establish a system in which 
lawyers and litigants may confidently expect their 
cases to move along apace.  The scheduling order is 
intended to provide the framework in which lawyers can 
realistically allocate time to the pretrial activities 
in each case. 
Charles D. Clausen & David P. Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of 
Civil Procedure Chapters 801-803, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 68 (1976). 
10 See Guelig v. Guelig, 2005 WI App 212, ¶34, 287 Wis. 2d 
472, 704 N.W.2d 916 (recognizing that "'[p]retrial conference' 
and 'scheduling conference' are legal terms of art that refer to 
different types of proceedings"). 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
17 
 
allows the court to "consider any matter that facilitates the 
just, 
speedy 
and 
inexpensive 
disposition 
of 
the 
action, 
including the matters under [Wis. Stat. § 802.10(3)]."  Wis. 
Stat. § 802.10(5).  The scheduling conference is essentially a 
"prepretrial" conference.  See Judicial Council Committee's 
Note, 1974, § 802.10, Stats. 
¶33 Scheduling conferences, although often informal and 
conducted off the record,11 provide parties the occasion to 
impact the court's scheduling of their litigation.  At the 
conference, parties can object to scheduling decisions that are 
viewed as inconvenient or unfair.  Scheduling becomes a 
collaborative process.12  In addition, the scheduling conference 
is likely to provide justification for future sanction if 
explicit, negotiated, and amicable deadlines are breached.  An 
attorney who has knowledge of deadlines because of active 
participation in a scheduling conference will have little excuse 
for tardiness and cannot reasonably claim ignorance.  A court's 
discretionary sanction for violation of a scheduling order is 
                                                 
11 A committee comment to the Wisconsin Judicial Benchbook 
notes that "[scheduling] [c]onference[s are] rarely held on 
[the] 
record 
unless 
[they 
are] 
highly 
complex 
matters."  
Wisconsin Judicial Benchbook: Civil, CV 4-4 (3d ed. 2007). 
We note that the Benchbook is not intended to stand as 
independent legal authority for any proposition of law, and we 
cite it merely as an informed and insightful discussion of 
practice. 
12 "[Wisconsin Stat. § 802.10] places the responsibility for 
moving a case on the court as well as the attorneys."  Judicial 
Council Committee's Note, 1974, § 802.10, Stats. 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
18 
 
generally well grounded when a scheduling conference has taken 
place at which all interested parties were present to be heard. 
¶34 A scheduling questionnaire is another form of circuit 
court consultation for devising scheduling deadlines.  A 
questionnaire may be used in place of a live conference (whether 
in person, by telephone, or by other electronic means) for the 
sake of convenience.  The questionnaire can be mailed, faxed, or 
e-mailed to parties and their attorneys and then returned to and 
filed with the court and forwarded to other parties.   
¶35 A scheduling questionnaire was used here.  An order 
for scheduling information13 and a scheduling questionnaire were 
mailed to attorneys for the parties on July 19, 2005.  The order 
for scheduling information was entered by Judge Carlson, not 
Judge 
Gibbs. 
 
The 
parties' 
attorneys 
completed 
the 
questionnaire, and it was filed in circuit court.  Judge Gibbs 
then entered a scheduling order on August 3, 2005.  The record 
is silent with regard to the judge's consideration of the 
completed 
questionnaires, 
but 
we 
infer 
that 
Judge 
Gibbs 
considered the questionnaires inasmuch as the scheduling order 
set a deadline of February 1, 2006, for a motion for summary 
judgment.  Strickhouser's completed questionnaire had indicated 
that he intended to file a motion for summary judgment.   
                                                 
13 The order referenced Wis. Stat. § 802.10(3)(c) in its 
caption.  The order stated that "[f]ailure to comply with this 
Order will subject that party to sanctions provided by Wis. 
Stat[. §] 805.03."    
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
19 
 
¶36 Hefty argues that the circuit court failed to properly 
"consult" with the parties before entering its scheduling order, 
as the scheduling questionnaire "can hardly be considered an 
adequate consultation as that process is contemplated in [Wis. 
Stat. § 802.10(3)]."  Hefty asserts that the questionnaire used 
was "preprinted" and "gave the parties no opportunity to address 
the [scheduling] issues in any depth."   
¶37 We disagree.  The scheduling questionnaire used by the 
circuit court was sufficient to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 802.10(3).   
The 
form 
was 
a 
convenient 
means 
to 
ascertain 
important 
scheduling information.  Although the form consisted of a single 
sheet, it addressed many of the basic scheduling questions faced 
by a circuit court attempting to accommodate the potentially 
complex timing needs of several parties and their counsel.  The 
form addressed such issues as joinder of parties, amendment of 
pleadings, the timing and length of a potential trial, the 
number of witnesses and expert witnesses expected to be called, 
the timing of discovery, the likelihood of motions for summary 
judgment and judgment on the pleadings, whether a jury trial is 
requested, and the option of alternative dispute resolution.  
Importantly, the form added: "[l]ist any other information 
pertinent to scheduling (for instance, times when you or key 
witnesses will not be available for trial due to vacations, 
etc.)" followed by three blank lines. 
¶38 Hefty's counsel filled in these blank lines with 
numerous 
dates 
that 
were 
inconvenient 
because 
of 
other 
obligations.  Hefty cannot now argue that the circuit court 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
20 
 
failed to properly consult with her in entering its scheduling 
order when: (1) the court ordered her to submit a scheduling 
questionnaire; (2) her counsel did so, even volunteering 
additional information to the court outside of the "standard" 
yes-or-no answers on the form; and (3) the court used the 
questionnaire to fashion its scheduling order.  The form stated 
that "[t]he answers [to the questionnaire] will be referred to 
by the court in the setting of the time and date requirements 
mentioned in Wis. [Stat. §] 802.10(3)(a)."  We find no erroneous 
exercise of discretion in the circuit court employing a 
scheduling questionnaire to create its scheduling order.  We 
perceive no attempt in the questionnaire to limit input from the 
parties. 
B.  Wisconsin Stat. § 802.08(2) 
¶39 This brings us to the validity of the scheduling 
order.  Judge Gibbs entered a scheduling order which attached a 
portion of the Walworth County Circuit Court Rules——Civil, 
relating 
to 
"Standard 
Summary 
Judgment 
Procedure." 
 
The 
attachment reads in part: "Upon service of the motion for 
summary judgment, within 20 days, any party opposing a pending 
motion shall serve and file: [responsive materials]."   
¶40 Hefty's counsel admittedly did not adhere to the 20 
day filing and service deadline in this local rule.14  Hefty 
                                                 
14 We note that Hefty's counsel complied with the summary 
judgment response service deadline that is generally applicable 
absent a contrary scheduling order.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 801.15 
and 802.08(2). 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
21 
 
argues, however, that the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion by entering a scheduling order that departed from 
the deadlines in Wis. Stat. § 802.08 without demonstrating 
reasons for the departure on the record.  See Hunter, 300 
Wis. 2d 213, 
¶15 
("[T]rial 
courts 
that 
deviate 
from 
the 
statutory time requirements for responding to a motion for 
summary judgment should explain on the record why that deviation 
is necessary and appropriate.").     
¶41 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.08(2) provides in pertinent 
part: "Motion. Unless earlier times are specified in the 
scheduling order, the [summary judgment] motion shall be served 
at least 20 days before the time fixed for the hearing and the 
adverse party shall serve opposing affidavits, if any, at least 
5 days before the time fixed for the hearing."  (Emphasis 
added.)   
¶42 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  By its plain 
language, Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) establishes a rule that a 
response15 to a motion for summary judgment is to be served at 
                                                 
15 We note that the statute includes the phrase "opposing 
affidavits." Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  These words have been 
construed to include all submissions made by an adverse party in 
response 
to a motion for summary judgment.  See David 
Christensen Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. Mehdian, 2006 WI App 
254, ¶¶13-14, 297 Wis. 2d 765, 726 N.W.2d 689 (referring to 
Mehdian's "submissions," not merely his "opposing affidavits," 
in applying Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)). 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
22 
 
least five days before the hearing on the motion.  However, a 
scheduling order may provide for an earlier deadline.   
¶43 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.08 ("Summary judgment") was 
created by supreme court order, effective January 1, 1976.  S. 
Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 630 (effective Jan. 1, 1976).  It has 
since 
been 
amended 
several 
times. 
The 
"[u]nless 
earlier 
times are specified in the scheduling order" language was added 
in 1992 as part of an overhaul of the statute.  See S. Ct. 
Order, 168 Wis. 2d xxi, xxi-xxiii (effective July 1, 1992).   
¶44 Prior to 1992, Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) read in part: 
"The [summary judgment] motion shall be served at least 20 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing.   The adverse party prior 
to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits."   Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08(2) (1989-90).  In practice, this rule proved to 
be unfair because the nonmovant could serve opposing affidavits 
the day before the hearing, giving the court and the movant 
minimal notice and opportunity to prepare.  In response, "a 
plethora of local court rules resulted."  Judicial Council Note, 
1992, § 802.08, Stats. (citing Cmty. Newspapers, Inc. v. West 
Allis, 158 Wis. 2d 28, 461 N.W.2d 785 (Ct. App. 1990)).  The 
problem was that these local rules created a serious lack of 
uniformity.  To remedy the situation, this court acted by 
amending § 802.08 to its current form.   The court made the 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
23 
 
change to "preclude such local rules and promote uniformity of 
practice."  Judicial Council Note, 1992, § 802.08, Stats.16 
¶45 Significantly, however, the court's 1992 amendment 
added 
the 
"[u]nless 
earlier 
times 
are 
specified 
in 
the 
scheduling order" provision to Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  S. Ct. 
Order, 168 Wis. 2d xxi, xxii (effective July 1, 1992).  Thus, 
the statute's plain language and the Judicial Council Note 
indicate 
that 
scheduling 
orders 
may 
trump 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  Judicial Council Note, 1992, § 802.08, Stats. 
("Courts may require earlier filing by scheduling orders, 
however."). 
¶46 By contrast, local circuit court rules may not trump 
the deadlines in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  This principle is 
undisputed.  See, e.g., David Christensen Trucking & Excavating, 
Inc. v. Mehdian, 2006 WI App 254, ¶13, 297 Wis. 2d 765, 726 
N.W.2d 689 (holding that a Marathon County local circuit court 
rule could not trump the deadlines of Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)); 
Ricco v. Riva, 2003 WI App 182, ¶¶25-26, 266 Wis. 2d 696, 669 
N.W.2d 193 (holding that the filing of an opposing affidavit was 
timely under Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), even though it did not 
satisfy a conflicting Waukesha County local circuit court rule).   
¶47 The difference between cases like David Christensen 
and Ricco and this case is that in this case we evaluate a 
scheduling order that implicitly incorporates a deadline from a 
                                                 
16 See Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2005 WI 
85, ¶77, 282 Wis. 2d 69, 698 N.W.2d 643 (Prosser, J., concurring 
in part, dissenting in part).  
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
24 
 
local court rule, not a local court rule standing alone.  The 
question is whether this difference is significant enough to 
change the outcome.   
¶48 Recognizing that a scheduling order's deadlines may 
supersede statutory deadlines, Hefty contends that the circuit 
court must explain on the record why its scheduling order 
deviates from Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  She relies on Hunter, 
where the court of appeals stated:  
[W]e hold that, with regard to scheduling orders, 
trial courts that deviate from the statutory time 
requirements for responding to a motion for summary 
judgment should explain on the record why that 
deviation is necessary and appropriate.  We appreciate 
that this places a burden on trial courts, but without 
this requirement courts could make an end-run around 
§ 802.08(2) and continue to enforce local rules 
through their scheduling orders. 
Hunter, 300 Wis. 2d 213, ¶15. 
¶49 We note that the language quoted above includes the 
word "should."  Id.  One might attempt to focus on this word and 
rationalize that the court of appeals' holding in Hunter is 
merely 
aspirational. 
 
However, 
such 
an 
effort 
would 
be 
disingenuous.  In the present case, the court of appeals said:   
In Hunter, we pointed out that Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2) grants courts the authority "to adjust the 
time requirements for filing responsive materials to 
suit the particulars of each case through their own 
scheduling orders."  Hunter, 2007 WI App 42, ¶42 
(emphasis added).  From this, we concluded that "when 
a trial court enters a scheduling order, it may, in 
the sound exercise of its discretion, deviate from the 
requirements of § 802.08(2) 'for cause shown and upon 
just terms.'"  Hunter, 2007 WI App 42, ¶14 (citing 
§ 802.08(2)). 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
25 
 
Hefty, Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956, unpublished order.  Thus, 
we are confronted head-on with the question of what explanations 
are 
required 
of a circuit court when it exercises its 
discretion, in a scheduling order, to depart from the deadlines 
in state law. Must the circuit court "explain on the record 
why" a deviation from the deadline in state law is "necessary 
and appropriate"?  Hunter, 300 Wis. 2d 213, ¶15. 
¶50 We think not.  The language from Hunter requiring a 
trial court to explain on the record why it has deviated from 
the scheduling deadlines in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) is hereby 
withdrawn. 
¶51 As noted above, the circuit court has authority to 
enter scheduling orders "after the court consults with the 
attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented party."  Wis. 
Stat. § 802.10(3).  A court's failure to "consult" with the 
parties before issuing a scheduling order is grounds for seeking 
relief from the order.  But after a party has consulted with the 
court, its objections to the order, if any, should be directed 
to the unreasonableness or inconvenience of one or more specific 
deadlines in the order.  The party should ask or move to have 
the deadline changed. 
¶52 Many scheduling orders come out of a scheduling 
conference at which the interested parties are present and 
participating.  Most of these conferences are informal and off 
the record.  In an atmosphere of accommodation and agreement, 
there is no discernible need to go on the record to explain 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
26 
 
scheduling decisions that are not in complete conformity with 
state law. 
¶53 A party who simply disagrees with a scheduling order 
from the outset or who later encounters changed circumstances 
may move the court for relief from the order.  The court's 
response to such a motion will normally require explanation, 
especially if the motion is not granted.  In the absence of some 
specific dispute, however, we see no need for the court to 
explain scheduling decisions on the record.  There is surely a 
presumption that a court is acting rationally and impartially in 
constructing a scheduling order.  There is no need for the court 
to go on the record to explain the fact that it deviated from a 
state rule to accommodate the needs of party A or to give party 
B the time to file a reply brief.  The time for the court to 
explain a scheduling decision is when it must resolve a dispute.  
Ideally, the court should be given the opportunity to explain 
its order or change its order before the order is violated. 
¶54 In this case, the record does not indicate why the 
scheduling order departed from Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) at the 
time the order was issued.  In other words, Judge Gibbs did not 
explain in August 2005 the reasons why he chose specific dates 
for the procedural deadlines in the order.  This is not unusual 
for a discretionary scheduling decision, which is not typically 
made on the record.  The lack of a record for the court's 
decision is not fatal.  See Kustelski v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 
194, ¶16, 266 Wis. 2d 940, 669 N.W.2d 780 ("[W]here a court 
fails to articulate the basis for a discretionary decision, [the 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
27 
 
reviewing] 
court 
may 
independently 
review 
the 
record 
to 
determine whether a proper basis exists."); State v. Pharr, 115 
Wis. 2d 334, 343, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983). 
¶55 If we had to go through an independent review, we 
would point to several factors.  First, the order for scheduling 
information 
alerts 
the 
parties 
that 
the 
answers 
in 
the 
scheduling questionnaire "will be referred to by the court in 
the setting of the time and date requirements mentioned in Wis. 
[Stat. §] 802.10(3)(a)."  Second, the scheduling order itself 
states 
that 
pursuant 
to 
the 
provisions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.10(3)(c) "and upon information provided by the parties," 
the court orders the following.  Third, the rule attached to the 
order provides for the filing of a reply brief, a contingency 
not mentioned in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  Finally, in hearings 
subsequent to Hefty's delinquency, the court relied on the 
"orderly administration of justice" and "order of the operation 
of the [c]ourt."   
¶56 Hence, we do not fault the court for issuing a 
scheduling order that departed from the deadline in Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2) without explaining its reasoning on the record. 
¶57 This, however, does not settle the issue.  In Hunter, 
the court of appeals held that the circuit court erroneously 
relied on a local rule to reject the Hunters' affidavits as 
tardy.  Hunter, 300 Wis. 2d 213, ¶12.  The court said:   
[T]he court's time requirements are not spelled 
out in the scheduling order itself.  Rather, the time 
requirements are laid out in an attachment to the 
order entitled "Standard Summary Judgment Procedure" 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
28 
 
that is a nearly verbatim recitation of the Walworth 
County Circuit Court Rules.  Therefore, the scheduling 
order, via the attachment, simply enforces the local 
rules.   Again, these rules are precluded as being in 
conflict with the uniform rule contained in Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2). 
Id., ¶13 (emphasis added). 
¶58 These passages raise questions about the validity of 
the local rule and the validity of a scheduling order that 
relies on that local rule. 
¶59 A circuit court has the authority to "adopt and amend 
rules governing practice in that court that are consistent with 
rules adopted under s. 751.12 and statutes relating to pleading, 
practice, and procedure."  Wis. Stat. § 753.35(1).  The clear 
implication of this statute is that local rules may not be 
inconsistent with state rules or statutes.  They may supplement 
state statutes and rules, but they may not supersede state 
statutes and rules. 
¶60 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.08 is the most prominent example 
of this tension.  Once again, this statute was amended in 1992 
in response to "a plethora of local court rules" concerning 
deadlines related to summary judgment.  Phelps v. Physicians 
Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2005 WI 85, ¶77, 282 Wis. 2d 69, 698 
N.W.2d 643 (Prosser, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(quoting Judicial Council Note, 1992, § 802.08, Stats.).  "The 
court made the change to 'preclude such local rules and promote 
uniformity of practice.'"  Id. (quoting Judicial Council Note, 
1992, § 802.08, Stats.) (emphasis added). 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
29 
 
¶61 In 2003 the court of appeals in Ricco had addressed 
the same Judicial Council note.  Ricco, 266 Wis. 2d 696, ¶25.  
The court stated: "Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), not the local rule, 
governs this issue [late filing].  The Wantz affidavit was 
timely."  Id., ¶26 (emphasis added).   
¶62 In 2006 the court of appeals in David Christensen held 
that "Marathon County local rule 4.20(1)(b) is precluded as 
being in conflict with the uniform rule contained in Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2)."  David Christensen, 297 Wis. 2d 765, ¶13 (emphasis 
added). 
¶63 Ricco and David Christensen help explain why the 
Hunter court wanted circuit courts to explain deviations from 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) on the record.  The court of appeals did 
not want circuit courts to make "end-run[s]" around § 802.08(2) 
by enforcing invalid local rules through scheduling orders.  
Hunter, 300 Wis. 2d 213, ¶15.  This is why the court of appeals 
determined that the scheduling order in the Hunter case "simply 
enforces the local rules."  Id., ¶13. 
¶64 We conclude that the portion of the Walworth County 
Circuit 
Court 
Rules——Civil 
that 
establishes 
a 
time 
for 
responding to a summary judgment motion that is different from 
the time set out in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) is invalid.  We need 
not rely solely on Ricco, David Christensen, and Hunter for this 
conclusion.  The Walworth County Circuit Court Rules, as revised 
in 
February 
2006, 
themselves 
state, 
under 
the 
heading 
"Adoption/Amendment 
of 
Court 
Rules," 
that: 
"These 
rules . . . are 
intended to supplement state statutes and 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
30 
 
Supreme Court Rules, and if in conflict therewith, shall be 
deemed void."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶65 Because the court's scheduling order attempted to 
apply a void rule by attaching it to the order, the scheduling 
order's deadline for responding to a motion for summary judgment 
was invalid. 
¶66 It is important to note that the circuit court could 
have imposed the same 20-day time frame for responding to a 
summary judgment motion by specifying the response time "in the 
scheduling order itself."  Hunter, 300 Wis. 2d 213, ¶13.  If the 
court had entered a notation on the face of the scheduling order 
that "materials opposing the motion for summary judgment shall 
be filed within 20 days after the motion is served," or words to 
that effect, the scheduling order would likely have been upheld. 
¶67 We have no reservations in requiring that a response 
time different from the response time in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) 
be specified in the scheduling order, directly below the 
deadline for filing a motion for summary judgment.  This 
requirement complies with a literal reading of Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2): 
"Unless 
earlier 
times 
are 
specified 
in 
the 
scheduling order."  Placement of the response time in the text 
of the scheduling order gives the clearest possible notice to 
the non-movant so that the non-movant can seek relief from the 
scheduling order promptly if the time to respond is deemed 
inadequate.  This placement avoids the necessity of the non-
movant poring over an elaborate local rule to find three key 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
31 
 
words: "within 20 days."  This placement also severs the court's 
scheduling date from a local rule that may be invalid. 
¶68 In Walworth County's case, there are at least two 
additional reasons why the response deadline should be specified 
in the text of the scheduling order.  Walworth County's rules 
have been and still are internally inconsistent with respect to 
summary judgment motions.  Compare Walworth Cty. Ct. R. 2. B. 
with Walworth Cty. Ct. R. 2. F. 4.17  Moreover, Walworth County 
amended its rules again in May 2007, so that rule 2. F. 4. now 
provides only "five (5) days" to respond to a motion for summary 
judgment.  We suspect that on occasion a party may seek 
additional time to respond and will ask that the additional time 
be specified in the scheduling order. 
¶69 To sum up, the circuit court properly exercised its 
discretion in entering a scheduling order that sought to set a 
20 day time period for responding to a summary judgment motion.  
However, the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
by relying on a void local rule to establish the time to respond 
and by failing to specify its time "in the scheduling order 
itself."  Hunter, 300 Wis. 2d 213, ¶13. 
C.  Sanction 
¶70 This brings us to the circuit court's exercise of 
discretion in sanctioning Hefty by striking her summary judgment 
                                                 
17 These rules can be retrieved online on the State Bar of 
Wisconsin's 
website 
at 
the 
following 
address:  
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Civil_rules 
(last 
visited July 2, 2008). 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
32 
 
response, 
which 
ultimately 
resulted 
in 
dismissal 
of 
her 
complaint with prejudice and granting of summary judgment to 
Strickhouser. 
¶71 It is well established that a trial court has both 
statutory and inherent authority to sanction a party for failing 
to obey a court order.  See Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 273-74; 
Belich v. Szymaszek, 224 Wis. 2d 419, 428, 592 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. 
App. 1999).  The circuit court's discretionary decision to 
sanction a party will be upheld if the court has examined the 
relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a 
demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach.  Indus. Roofing, 299 Wis. 2d 81, 
¶41 (citing Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 273).  The question is not 
whether this court would have granted the same sanction if it 
had decided the original matter; it is whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it made its decision.  
See Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 273 (citing Nat'l Hockey League v. 
Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976)). 
¶72 Violations of a circuit court's scheduling order are 
governed by Wis. Stat. § 802.10(7).  Wisconsin Stat. § 802.10(7) 
provides: "Sanctions.  Violations of a scheduling or pretrial 
order are subject to [Wis. Stat. §§] 802.05, 804.12 and 805.03."  
Section 805.03 permits discretionary sanctions and reads:   
For failure of any claimant to prosecute or for 
failure of any party to comply with the statutes 
governing procedure in civil actions or to obey any 
order of court, the court in which the action is 
pending may make such orders in regard to the failure 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
33 
 
as are just, including but not limited to orders 
authorized under s. 804.12(2)(a). 
¶73 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.03 is based on Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 41(b), and replaced former Wis. Stat. § 269.25.  
Judicial 
Council Committee's Note, 1974, § 805.03, Stats.  
Section 805.03 permits strong sanctions for three kinds of 
dilatory and evasive tactics: (1) failure to prosecute; (2) 
failure to comply with procedure statutes; and (3) failure to 
comply with any court order.  3A Jay E. Grenig, Wisconsin 
Practice: Civil Procedure § 503.1, at 12 (West, 3d ed. 2003).   
¶74 Under Wis. Stat. § 805.03, a court may make such 
orders "as are just," including dismissal of actions or entry of 
default judgment, where a party fails to obey any court order.  
Wis. Stat. § 805.03; see 3 Jay E. Grenig, Wisconsin Practice: 
Civil Procedure, § 210.7, at 376 (West, 3d ed. 2003).   
¶75 The 
circuit 
court 
sanctioned 
Hefty 
by 
granting 
Strickhouser's motion to strike Hefty's response.  It is clear 
from the record that the impetus for the circuit court's 
sanction was Hefty's untimely response.  The court commented 
during the April 7 motion hearing that it did not rule on the 
merits of Strickhouser's summary judgment motion because it was 
instead ruling on procedural grounds, namely, the untimely 
filing. 
¶76 Litigants 
are 
expected 
to 
follow 
circuit 
court 
scheduling orders.  Failure to do so is subject to sanction at 
the discretion of the circuit court.  Wis. Stat. § 802.10(7); 
Indus. Roofing, 299 Wis. 2d 81, ¶41.  We acknowledge that a 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
34 
 
circuit court has broad discretion to sanction a party for the 
failure to comply with a court order, including a scheduling 
order.  See Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 273.  There is no question 
that Hefty's counsel failed to fully review the court's 
scheduling order and that Hefty's untimely submission flowed 
directly from that deficiency.  Failure to fully review the 
scheduling order prevented Hefty from either challenging or 
complying with the order, instead of violating it.   
¶77 Nonetheless, as we concluded above, the circuit court 
incorporated, by attachment, a void local rule into its 
scheduling order.  The fact that the court's sanction was 
premised upon the violation of a deadline based upon a void 
local rule indicates that the court applied an improper standard 
of law.  Consequently, we cannot sustain the circuit court's 
sanction because it constituted an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.   
¶78 Overturning the circuit court's sanction on the 
circuit court's error of law obviates any need to review whether 
the sanction was "just" under Wis. Stat. § 805.03. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶79 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals, but on 
different grounds.  The circuit court was not required to 
demonstrate on the record why its scheduling order deviated from 
§ 802.08(2) to properly exercise its scheduling discretion under 
Wis. Stat. § 802.10.  However, the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by entering a scheduling order that 
incorporated a void local rule and by striking Hefty's response 
Nos. 2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956 
 
35 
 
as a sanction for untimely filing, which ultimately resulted in 
dismissal of her complaint with prejudice and summary judgment 
to Strickhouser.  Accordingly, we affirm and remand. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
Nos.  2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956.akz 
 
1 
 
¶80 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with much of the majority opinion, but I write separately 
because I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion 
that "the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by 
entering a scheduling order that incorporated a void local 
rule . . . ."  Majority op., ¶5.  
I 
¶81 I agree with a number of the majority's conclusions:  
To begin with, I agree with the majority's determination that 
"Wisconsin circuit courts have discretion to control their 
dockets."  Majority op., ¶31.  I further agree with the majority 
that "Wisconsin Stat. § 802.10 addresses 'calendar practice' and 
provides that a circuit court 'may enter a scheduling order on 
the court's own motion or on the motion of a party.'"  Id.  
¶82 We must be cognizant, however, of the fact that 
circuit courts are required to adequately manage a busy docket, 
and they need the discretion to render justice.  Circuit court 
judges are responsible for an enormous volume of cases.  In 
order 
to 
fairly, 
effectively, 
and 
efficiently 
administer 
justice, 
the 
judge 
needs 
the 
ability 
to 
set 
meaningful 
deadlines.  This court has acknowledged the value of timely 
processing cases at the circuit court level.  In fact, in 
addition to the requirement that circuit courts certify that 
they have no "matters awaiting decision beyond" the 90-day 
period, see SCR 70:36, this court also sets case processing 
guidelines for Wisconsin circuit court judges.  By way of 
example, the circuit court "case processing time standards" for 
Nos.  2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956.akz 
 
2 
 
a civil case such as this indicates that this case should be 
concluded within 360 days.  
¶83 For any number of reasons, this case was not concluded 
within 360 days.  The case at issue was filed February 3, 2004.  
The scheduling order was sent to counsel on August 3, 2005.  
Various motions for sanctions were filed by both parties.  On 
February 1, 2006, the defendants filed a notice of motion and 
motion for summary judgment.  Thereafter, the plaintiff's 
counsel failed to comply with the scheduling order, which 
incorporated the local rule on its face, when filing a response 
to the defendant's motion for summary judgment.  
¶84 I agree with the majority that "[t]he scheduling 
questionnaire used by the circuit court was sufficient to 
satisfy Wis. Stat. § 802.10(3)."  Majority op., ¶37.  I also 
agree with the majority that there is "no erroneous exercise of 
discretion 
in 
the 
circuit 
court 
employing 
a 
scheduling 
questionnaire to create its scheduling order."  Majority op., 
¶38.  Here, the court engaged in consultation with the parties 
through the scheduling questionnaire.    
¶85 The majority correctly states that Wis. Stat. § 802.08 
provides flexibility for a trial court to specify earlier times 
in the scheduling order.  This makes sense because trial courts 
need to be given broad discretion in how to handle their 
calendars and in how to properly address individual issues 
reflected in individual cases.  I agree with the majority that 
"the statute's plain language and the Judicial Council Note 
Nos.  2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956.akz 
 
3 
 
indicate 
that 
scheduling 
orders 
may 
trump 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.08(2)."  Majority op., ¶45. 
¶86 Correctly, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
recognizes 
that 
scheduling order deadlines may supersede statutory deadlines.  
Majority op., ¶48.  I agree with the majority opinion that the 
language in Hunter v. AES Consultants, Ltd., 2007 WI App 42, 300 
Wis. 2d 213, 730 N.W.2d 184, requiring a trial court to explain 
on the record its deviation from the scheduling deadlines, 
should be withdrawn.  Majority op., ¶50. 
¶87 I likewise agree with the majority that: 
There is surely a presumption that a court is acting 
rationally 
and 
impartially 
in 
constructing 
a 
scheduling order.  There is no need for the court to 
go on the record to explain the fact that it deviated 
from a state rule to accommodate the needs of party A 
or to give party B the time to file a reply brief.  
The time for the court to explain a scheduling 
decision is when it must resolve a dispute.  Ideally, 
the court should be given the opportunity to explain 
its order or change its order before the order is 
violated.   
Majority op., ¶53.   
II 
¶88 While I agree with much of the majority opinion, I 
disagree with the majority's conclusion that deadlines must be 
placed in the scheduling order before the judge's signature in 
order for those deadlines to be enforceable.  The majority 
states that "[i]t is important to note that the circuit court 
could have imposed the same 20 day time frame for responding to 
a summary judgment motion by specifying the response time 'in 
the scheduling order itself.'"  Majority op., ¶66.  The majority 
Nos.  2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956.akz 
 
4 
 
determines 
that 
the 
scheduling 
order 
only 
implicitly 
incorporated a void local court rule.  Majority op., ¶47.   
¶89 I part ways with the majority's determination that 
this scheduling order merely implicitly incorporates deadlines 
from a void local court rule.  In the case at issue, the 
scheduling order specifically stated the following: "Motion for 
judgment 
on 
pleading/summary 
judgment 
must 
be 
filed 
by 
02/01/2006."  Below this language the following language 
appears: "[SEE ATTACHED SHEET FOR MOTION PROCEDURE]."  It is 
undisputed that the parties in this case were provided with the 
scheduling order and the attached sheet.  The attached sheet for 
motion procedure is just over one page long.  It is also 
undisputed that counsel, who failed to meet the deadlines 
required in the scheduling order, also failed "to fully review 
the notice accompanying that scheduling order."     
¶90 I write separately because the majority's conclusion 
that the motion practice must be specified in the order itself 
is a distinction without a difference.  While placement of a 
response time in the text of the scheduling order may give clear 
notice to the parties, that notice is irrelevant if a party 
fails to carefully review the scheduling order.  Reading the 
order gives notice to the party whether the motion practice is 
in the first page or in the referenced attachment.  It seems 
curious to conclude that if the order has the same information 
printed in a page that precedes the circuit court judge's 
signature it is enforceable, but if the information appears on a 
Nos.  2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956.akz 
 
5 
 
clearly referenced attached sheet after the judge's signature, 
it is unenforceable.   
¶91 It is reasonable for a judge to expect that the 
parties to a lawsuit will adhere to a scheduling order.  Here, 
the scheduling order on its face puts the parties and counsel on 
notice of the court's expectations regarding the deadlines. 
III 
¶92 As a part of handling a busy calendar and giving 
parties their day in court, circuit court judges must possess 
sufficient discretion.  In a hectic schedule, it is imperative 
that the parties follow court orders.  When deadlines are 
disregarded a court calendar can quickly become unmanageable.  
One can imagine the repercussions from a circuit court judge's 
order only having meaning on occasion.  Judges must have the 
ability to make discretionary case-by-case distinctions and 
allowances in order for justice to be properly dispensed.   
¶93 I agree with much of the majority opinion, but I write 
separately because I respectfully disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that "the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by entering a scheduling order that incorporated a 
void local rule . . . ."  Majority op., ¶5.  
¶94 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
Nos.  2006AP1094 & 2006AP1956.akz 
 
 
 
1