Case Title: In the Matter of H.M. (Anonymous) v. E.T. (Anonymous)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 48  
In the Matter of H.M. 
(Anonymous),
            Appellant,
        v.
E.T. (Anonymous),
            Respondent.
Peter J.W. Sherwin, for appellant.
David H. Tennant, for respondent.
New York County Lawyers' Association; New York City Bar
Association, amici curiae.
CIPARICK, J.:
This appeal presents the issue whether Family Court has
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a support petition
brought pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
("UIFSA") (Family Ct Act art 5-B) by a biological parent seeking
child support from her former same-sex partner.  We hold that
 
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Family Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction to hear such a
petition.
H.M. seeks child support from E.T.  According to H.M.'s
allegations, which we must take as true for present purposes, the
parties were involved in a romantic relationship in New York from
1989 through 1995, and cohabited during much, if not all, of that
period.  During the first year of their relationship, they
planned to conceive and raise a child together, discussing, among
other things, available methods of conception, child-rearing
practices, and whether the child would be raised as a sibling of
E.T.'s children from a prior relationship.  In 1993, after many
failed attempts, H.M. became pregnant by artificial insemination. 
E.T. performed the procedure by which H.M. was inseminated. 
H.M. gave birth to a son in September 1994.  E.T. was
present at the delivery and cut the umbilical cord, and the
parties shared the expenses associated with the conception and
birth of the child.  After the child's birth, both parties
participated in his care.  However, four months after the child
was born, E.T. ended the relationship.  H.M., a Canadian citizen,
moved into her parents' residence in Montreal with the child.  An
attempted reconciliation in 1997 failed, although E.T. continued
to provide H.M. with gifts for the child and monetary
contributions for the child's care at unspecified times after the
parties' separation.
In 2006, H.M. filed an application in Ontario, Canada,
 
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seeking a declaration of parentage and an order of child support
establishing monthly payments retroactive to the child's birth.
Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA),
H.M.'s application was transferred to Family Court, Rockland
County. 
At an appearance before a Family Court Support
Magistrate, E.T. moved to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional
grounds.  The Support Magistrate dismissed the petition, agreeing
with E.T. that no legal basis for jurisdiction existed.  H.M.
filed written objections to the Support Magistrate's order, and
Family Court subsequently reversed the order of dismissal and
ordered a hearing to determine whether E.T. should be equitably
estopped from denying parentage and support obligations.  
E.T. appealed.  The Appellate Division, with two
Justices dissenting, reversed and reinstated the Support
Magistrate's order dismissing the petition for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction (see Matter of H.M. v E.T., 65 AD3d 119 [1st
Dept 2009]). 
H.M. appeals as of right pursuant to CPLR 5601 (a) from
the Appellate Division order reinstating the Support Magistrate's
order of dismissal, and we now reverse.  
In 1996, the United States Congress required each state
to enact the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), to
ensure uniformity in interstate actions for the establishment,
enforcement, and modification of spousal and child support orders
 
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(see 42 USC § 666 [f]; Matter of Spencer v Spencer, 10 NY3d 60,
65 [2008]).  New York adopted UIFSA in 1997, designating Family
Court as our UIFSA "tribunal" (see Family Ct Act § 580-102 ["The
family court is the tribunal of this state."]).  With respect to
the law to be applied by Family Court, UIFSA states that 
"Except as otherwise provided by this
article, a responding tribunal of this state: 
(1) shall apply the procedural and
substantive law, including the rules on
choice of law, generally applicable to
similar proceedings originating in this state
and may exercise all powers and provide all
remedies available in those proceedings; and
(2) shall determine the duty of support and
the amount payable in accordance with the law
and support guidelines of this state"
(Family Court Act § 580-303 [emphasis added]).    
Article VI of the state Constitution establishes "[t]he
family court of the state of New York" (NY Const., art VI, § 13
[a]).  We have previously explained that Family Court is a court
of limited jurisdiction, constrained to exercise only those
powers granted to it by the state Constitution or by statute (see
Matter of Johna M.S. v Russell E.S., 10 NY3d 364, 366 [2008]). 
Thus, in addition to establishing Family Court, the Constitution
enumerates the powers thereof.  Among the "classes of actions and
proceedings" over which the Constitution grants Family Court
jurisdiction are proceedings to determine "the support of
dependents except for support incidental to actions and
proceedings in this state for marital separation, divorce,
annulment of marriage or dissolution of marriage" (NY Const., art
 
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VI, § 13 [b] [4]).  Article 4 of the Family Court Act more
specifically defines Family Court's role with respect to support. 
Specifically, of particular relevance here, article 4
of the Family Court Act, entitled "Support Proceedings,"
provides, among other things, that "the parents of a child under
the age of twenty-one years are chargeable with the support of
such child and, if possessed of sufficient means or able to earn
such means, shall be required to pay for child support a fair and
reasonable sum as the court may determine" (id. § 413 [1] [a]
[emphasis added]).   
Family Court indisputably has jurisdiction to determine
whether an individual parent -- regardless of gender -- is
responsible for the support of a child (see Family Court Act §
413 [1] [a]).  Moreover, statutory jurisdiction -- as Family
Court has  -- carries with it such ancillary jurisdiction as is
necessary to fulfill the court's core function (see Higgins v
Sharp, 164 NY 4, 8 [1900]; see also Loomis v Loomis, 288 NY 222,
224 [1942].  Thus, because Family Court unquestionably has the
subject matter jurisdiction to ascertain the support obligations
of a female parent, Family Court also has the inherent authority
to ascertain in certain cases whether a female respondent is, in
fact, a child's parent.  
Article 4 of the Family Court Act establishes the
public policy of the State in favor of obligating individuals,
regardless of gender, to provide support for their children.  The
 
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dissent argues that such relief can be afforded only in Supreme
Court, a court of original trial jurisdiction.  However, as the
two dissenting Justices below found, Family Court and Supreme
Court have co-extensive authority -- concurrent jurisdiction --
in relation to child support matters.  The Domestic Relations Law
and the Family Court Act are identical in the establishment of
statewide child support guidelines applicable to all child
support proceedings, whether brought initially in Family Court or
brought in Supreme Court as ancillary to a matrimonial action or
custody proceeding.  Moreover, under the guidelines adopted in
New York as the Child Support Standards Act (L 1989, ch 567),
both parents have an obligation to contribute to the economic
well-being of their children.  The relevant co-extensive statutes 
-- Family Court Act § 413 and Domestic Relations Law § 240 -- are
capable of being enforced in a fashion that does not disadvantage
a litigant in Family Court.
In short, because H.M. asserts that E.T. is the child's
parent, and is therefore chargeable with the child's support,
this case is within the Family Court's Article 4 jurisdiction. 
We have no occasion to decide whether it is also, as the Support
Magistrate and the Appellate Division dissent concluded, within
that Court's Article 5 jurisdiction.  Nor do we decide the merits
of H.M.'s support claim.  
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, with costs, and the case remitted to the Appellate
 
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Division for consideration of questions raised but not determined
on the appeal to that court.    
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Matter of H.M. v E.T.
No. 48
SMITH, J. (concurring in Debra H. v Janice R. and Matter of H.M.
v E.T.):
These two cases present (though neither majority
decision ultimately turns on) the question of whether a person
other than a biological or adoptive mother or father may be a
"parent" under New York law.  In Debra H. v Janice R., a
visitation case, a majority of the Court reaffirms the holding in
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Matter of Alison D. v Virginia M. (77 NY2d 651 [1991]) that New
York parenthood requires a biological or adoptive relationship,
though the majority also holds -- correctly in my view -- that we
should recognize Debra H.'s parental status under the law of
Vermont.  In H.M. v E.T., a child support case, the majority
holds -- again correctly in my view -- that Family Court has
jurisdiction of the case, and does not reach the Alison D.
question, while the dissent suggests that Alison D. requires
dismissal.
Though I concur with the result in both cases, and join
the H.M. v E.T. majority opinion in full, I would depart from
Alison D., both for visitation and child support purposes.  I
grant that there is much to be said for reaffirming Alison D.,
but I conclude that there is even more to be said against it.
I begin by expressing wholehearted agreement with much
of what the Debra H. majority opinion, and Judge Graffeo's
concurring opinion, say.  It is indeed highly desirable to have
"a bright-line rule that promotes certainty in the wake of
domestic breakups," and to avoid litigation "over parentage as a
prelude to further potential combat over custody and visitation"
(Debra H. majority op at 13-14).  There are few areas of the law
where certainty is more important than in the rules governing who
a child's parents are.  For that reason, I join the Debra H.
majority in rejecting the approach taken by the Alison D.
dissent, which favored a multi-factor test for parenthood "that
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protects all relevant interests" (77 NY2d at 662), and by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Matter of H.S.H.-K. (193
Wis2d 649, 658-659, 533 NW2d 419, 421 [1995]), which permitted a
party to establish a "parent-like relationship" by proving four
amorphous elements, including such things as "significant
responsibility for the child's care, education and development"
and "a bonded, dependent relationship" with the child.  The Debra
H. majority is quite right to see in these vague formulas a
recipe for endless litigation, which would mean endless misery
for children and adults alike.
These reasons lead the Debra H. majority and the H.M. v
E.T. dissent to follow Alison D. in concluding that women in the
position of Debra H. (putting aside her civil union with Janice
R.) and E.T. are not parents of their former lovers' children. 
But despite the high value I set on certainty and predictability,
I find this result unacceptable.  I would therefore adopt a
different "bright-line rule" -- one that includes these women and
others similarly situated in the definition of "parent".  
The position of Debra H. and E.T. is an increasingly
common one.  Each lived with her same sex romantic partner.  In
each case, while the couple was living together, the partner was
artificially inseminated with sperm from an unknown donor
(artificial donor insemination, or ADI) and gave birth.  Both
women in each case expected, and led the other to expect, that
both of them would be the child's parents.  Yet the Debra H.
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majority holds that Debra H. would never have become a parent
absent the civil union, while the H.M. v E.T. dissent implies
that E.T. never became a parent at all.  This approach not only
disappoints the expectations of the adults involved: much worse,
it leaves each child with only one parent, rendering the child,
in effect, illegitimate.
To put a large and growing number of our state's
children in that status seems wrong to me.  Each of these couples
made a commitment to bring a child into a two-parent family, and
it is unfair to the children to let the commitment go unenforced.
Nor can it be said that adoption by the non-biological parent --
an option available under Matter of Jacob (86 NY2d 651 [1995]) --
is an adequate recourse, for adoption is possible only by the
voluntary act of the adopting parent, with the consent of the
biological one.  To apply the rule of Alison D. to children
situated as are the children in these cases is to permit either
member of the couple to make the child illegitimate by her whim -
- as the facts of these two cases illustrate.
I have said that the interest in certainty is extremely
strong in this area; but society's interest in assuring, to the
extent possible, that each child begins life with two parents is
not less so.  That policy underlies the common law presumption of
legitimacy, "one of the strongest and most persuasive known to
the law" (Matter of Findlay, 253 NY 1, 7 [1930] [Cardozo, Ch.
J.]; see also Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 US 110, 125 [1989] [the
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strength of the presumption derives from "an aversion to
declaring children illegitimate . . . thereby depriving them of
rights of inheritance and succession . . . and likely making them
wards of the state"]).  The policy has been adopted as a matter
of statute in particular circumstances (Domestic Relations Law §§
24, 73) and, in one persuasively reasoned Appellate Division
case, has been adapted as a matter of common law to protect
children born by ADI (Laura WW. v Peter WW., 51 AD3d 211 [3d Dept
2008]).  I would apply the common law presumption to the facts of
these cases, and would hold that where a child is conceived
through ADI by one member of a same sex couple living together,
with the knowledge and consent of the other, the child is as a
matter of law -- at least in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances --the child of both. 
The rule I propose is clearly defined in at least one
respect: It would apply only to same sex couples -- indeed, only
to lesbian couples, because I would leave for another day the
question of what rules govern male couples, for whom ADI is not
possible.  This limitation may give some pause, for it seems
intuitively that all people, male and female, gay and straight,
should be treated the same way.  Yet it is an inescapable fact
that gay and straight couples face different situations, both as
a matter of law and as a matter of biology.  By the choice of our
Legislature, a choice we have held constitutionally permissible  
(Hernandez v Robles, 7 NY3d 338 [2006]), same sex couples in New
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York have neither marriage nor domestic civil unions available to
them.  And, pending even more astounding technological
developments than we have yet witnessed, it is not possible for
both members of a same sex couple to become biological parents of
the same child.  These differences seem to me to warrant
different treatment.  Indeed, different treatment already exists,
for both a statute (Domestic Relations Law § 73) and the common
law (Laura WW., 51 AD3d at 217) give a measure of protection to
the children of married opposite-sex couples who are conceived by
ADI.  The rule I propose would give the children of lesbian
couples similar, though not identical, protection.
In one respect, the rule I have suggested would come
closer to treating gay and straight couples alike than the more
flexible rules advocated or adopted in many writings, including
the Alison D. dissent, the Wisconsin decision in Matter of
H.S.H.-K., and Judge Ciparick's dissent today in Debra H..  Under
these approaches, the same sex partners of biological parents
would have an opportunity to become quasi-parents -- "de facto
parents", parents-by-estoppel, or persons "in a parent-like
relationship".  As to women in the situation of Debra H. and
E.T., I would drop all the hyphens and quotation marks, and call
them simply parents.
For these reasons, I would hold that Debra H. is M.R.'s
parent, and that E.T. is the parent of H.M.'s biological son. 
Therefore, in Debra H. v Janice R., I would not find it necessary
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to reach the effect of the Vermont civil union (although, since
the majority does reach it, I join in its resolution of that
question); and I would hold that Family Court has jurisdiction in
H.M. v E.T. not only on the narrow ground adopted by the
majority, but also on the ground that E.T. is the child's parent
and therefore "chargeable with the support of such child" within
the meaning of Family Court Act § 413 (1) (a).  
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Matter of H.M. (Anonymous) v E.T. (Anonymous)
No. 48 
JONES, J. (dissenting):
In this support petition brought under the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA") (Family Court Act art
5-B), H.M., the biological parent of a child born in September
1994, seeks to charge E.T., her former same-sex partner, with the
financial responsibility for the support of the child who was
planned, conceived and born during the couple's relationship, but
who never had any continuing relationship with E.T., who ended
the relationship with H.M. when the child was three months old. 
Because Family Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear
such a petition, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the
order of the Appellate Division.
It is well settled that "Family Court is a court of
limited jurisdiction that cannot exercise powers beyond those
granted to it by statute" (Matter of Johna M.S. v Russell E.S.,
10 NY3d 364, 366 [2008]; see Matter of Pearson v Pearson, 69 NY2d
919, 921 [1987]; Matter of Silver v Silver, 36 NY2d 324, 326
[1975]; Family Court Act § 115) or the State Constitution (see NY
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Const art VI, § 13).  In addition, Family Court has no general
equity jurisdiction; as such, it cannot grant equitable relief
(see Matter of Brescia v Fitts, 56 NY2d 132, 139 [1982]).
H.M. brought her petition pursuant to UIFSA and sought
a declaration of "parentage," a proceeding authorized by UIFSA. 
Family Court received the petition and is the "responding
tribunal" under UIFSA, which states, "a responding tribunal of
this state . . . shall apply the procedural and substantive law 
. . . generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in
this state and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies
available in those proceedings" (Family Court Act § 580-303 [1]). 
This rule is applicable to proceedings for the determination of
parentage under UIFSA (see Family Court Act § 580-701 [b]).  As
such, UIFSA does not supplant or otherwise make changes in the
procedural and substantive law of New York.
Under the clear and unambiguous language of the Family
Court Act--the statute defining the powers of Family Court--the
only proceeding "similar" to a proceeding for the determination
of "parentage" is the "Paternity Proceeding" under article 5,
which provides a vehicle for determining whether a male is the
father of a particular child.  The majority argues, though, that
Family Court has authority under Family Court Act article 4 to
hear H.M.'s support petition.  I disagree. 
Family Court Act § 413 (1) (a) provides:
"the parents of a child under the age of
twenty-one years are chargeable with the
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support of such child and, if possessed of
sufficient means or able to earn such means,
shall be required to pay for child support a
fair and reasonable sum as the court may
determine.  The court shall make its award
for child support pursuant to the provisions
of this subdivision" (emphasis added).
Although the term "parent" is not defined in the Family Court
Act, that term has been defined as follows:
"The lawful father or mother of someone.  In
ordinary usage, the term denotes more than
responsibility for conception and birth.  The
term commonly includes (1) either the natural
father or the natural mother of a child, (2)
either the adoptive father or the adoptive
mother of a child, (3) a child's putative
blood parent who has expressly acknowledged
paternity, and (4) an individual or agency
whose status as guardian has been established
by judicial decree" 
(Black's Law Dictionary, at 1222 [9th ed 2009] [emphasis added]). 
In addition, one may gain the status of a legal parent through
second-parent adoption (see Matter of Jacob, 86 NY2d 651 [1995])
or by entering a civil union or same sex marriage in a state with
laws providing that participants of such unions have parental
rights with respect to children either member or spouse becomes
the natural parent of during the course of the union.     
To be sure, Family Court may charge both men and women
with support obligations based on a biological or adoptive or
"guardianship by judicial decree" or other legal "parental"
connection to a child.  Charging support obligations to one with
such a legal relationship to a child is clearly within Family
Court's jurisdiction under article 4.  
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1 Specifically, H.M. asserts that E.T. is, or is estopped
from denying that she is, the child's "parent," and is therefore
chargeable with the child's support.
2 In this case, there is no allegation that, believing E.T.
to be a biological parent (or, for that matter, a parent by
virtue of adoption or a civil union), the child established a
parent/child bond that would be upset if E.T. were allowed to
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Here, however, H.M. seeks child support from a woman
with no biological or other legal connection to the child.1 
Accordingly, Family Court has no legal authority to address
H.M.'s petition under Family Court Act article 4.  In order for
Family Court to find that support obligations are chargeable to
E.T. under article 4, it would have to grant H.M. the type of
equitable relief that is beyond its jurisdiction.
My analysis is consistent with the holding in Matter of
Shondel J. v Mark D. (7 NY3d 320, 328 [2006] [respondent was
equitably estopped from denying paternity of petitioner mother's
child--for support purposes--because respondent "represented that
he was the father of the child, and [the child] justifiably
relied on this representation, changing her position by forming a
bond with him"]).  Shondel J. makes clear that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel is applicable, in the child support context,
only to preclude a party's reliance on genetic marker and DNA
testing to prove or disprove paternity when such an approach is
warranted to prevent disruption of an ongoing parent/child
relationship (see Family Court Act §§ 418 [a], 532 [1]; see e.g.
Shondel J., supra).2  Put differently, Family Court may apply the
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rely on DNA tests to show that she is not a parent, nor in any
event could the preclusion of genetic marker or DNA tests result
in a holding that E.T. is a support parent.
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doctrine of equitable estoppel only in the stated limited
circumstances as a means of granting relief it is statutorily
authorized to grant.
Finally, I note that, although Supreme Court would have
jurisdiction over H.M.'s equitable claim, that court is also
without authority to declare E.T. the child's parent on the basis
of equitable estoppel.  This is true in the visitation and
custody context (see Debra H. v Janice R., ___ NY3d ___ [decided
today]) as well as the child support arena where the standard for
determining who constitutes a support parent is no different than
the rule applied in Family Court.   
In reversing the Appellate Division's order, the
majority relies on an overly broad reading of Family Court Act
article 4 that is inconsistent with the Family Court's limited
subject matter jurisdiction and lack of equity jurisdiction. 
Further, the position taken by the majority here is inconsistent
with this Court's holding today in Debra H., supra, which
reaffirmed that Matter of Alison D. v Virginia M. (77 NY2d 651
[1991] [held that only a child's biological or adoptive parent
has standing to seek visitation against the wishes of a fit
custodial parent.  Stated differently, a known stranger to a
child--i.e., one with no biological, adoptive or other legal
relationship--cannot assert that he/she is a parent for
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visitation purposes]) is still good law.   
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent and would affirm
the order of the Appellate Division.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed, with costs, and case remitted to the Appellate
Division, Second Department, for consideration of issues raised
but not determined on the appeal to that court.  Opinion by Judge
Ciparick.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Smith and Pigott
concur, Judge Smith in a separate concurring opinion.  Judge
Jones dissents and votes to affirm in an opinion in which Judges
Graffeo and Read concur.
Decided May 4, 2010