Case Title: Emmett v. Warden (order)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 031201

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
VIRGINIA:
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme 
Court Building in the City of Richmond, on Thursday, the 
3rd day of March, 2005. 
 
Christopher Scott Emmett, 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
  against  
Record No. 031201 
 
Warden of the Sussex I 
 State Prison, 
 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
Upon a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Upon a Rehearing 
 
 
In a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the 
petitioner, Christopher Scott Emmett, claimed, among other 
things, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel 
in his capital murder trial because his trial counsel failed 
to object to a penalty phase verdict form.
1  Relying on this 
Court’s decision in Atkins v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 160, 510 
S.E.2d 445 (1999), Emmett asserted that the verdict form was 
incomplete because it did not include an option requiring a 
sentence of life imprisonment upon a finding that the 
Commonwealth had proven neither the “future dangerousness” 
nor the “vileness” aggravating factor.  Applying the two-
part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984), we concluded, in an order dated June 4, 
2004, that trial counsel’s performance was deficient by 
failing to object to an incomplete verdict form but that 
Emmett suffered no prejudice because the jury found that the 
                     
1 This Court previously affirmed Emmett’s convictions 
for robbery and capital murder and upheld the sentence of 
death.  Emmett v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 364, 569 S.E.2d 39 
Commonwealth had proven both aggravating factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
2  Thus, the jury would not have had any 
occasion to consider imposing the mandatory sentence of life 
when neither aggravating factor was established.  We 
subsequently granted a petition to rehear filed by the 
respondent, Warden of the Sussex I State Prison (Warden), on 
the question whether trial counsel’s performance was 
deficient.
3
 
At issue in Emmett’s habeas petition and in this 
rehearing is the following penalty phase verdict form 
provided to the jury: 
VERDICT FORM 
 
 
(The foreperson should initial the line for each 
finding made unanimously by the jury.) 
 
(1)  We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found 
the defendant guilty of capital murder in the 
commission of robbery of John Fenton Langley and 
 
___ a) find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
    after consideration of his prior history 
    that there is a probability that he 
    would commit criminal acts of violence 
    that would constitute a continuing 
    serious threat to society; 
 
 
  
and/or 
 
 
 
    b) find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
 
 
    his conduct in committing the offense 
              is outrageously and wantonly vile, 
              horrible or inhuman in that it involved 
                                                             
(2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 929 (2003). 
2 The June 4, 2004 order also disposed of Emmett’s 
other claims and dismissed his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
 
3 The order granting the Warden’s petition for 
rehearing stated that the judgment rendered on June 4, 2004 
was “set aside.” 
 
 
2
 
        
___ 1)  depravity of mind; 
 
 
 
and/or 
 
 
 
___ 2)  aggravated battery to the victim 
 
 
 
and having considered the evidence in mitigation 
 
 
of the offense, unanimously fix his punishment 
 
 
at death. 
 
 
 
 
Signed______________________, foreperson  
 
 
 
or 
 
(2)  We, the jury, on the issue joined, having  
found the defendant guilty of capital murder 
in the commission of robbery of John Fenton 
Langley and 
 
 
 
___    a) find beyond a reasonable doubt 
 
 
 
   that after consideration of his prior 
 
 
 
   history that there is a probability 
   
 
 
   that he would commit criminal acts of 
 
 
 
   violence that would constitute a  
 
 
 
   continuing serious threat to society; 
 
  
  
and/or 
 
b) find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that his conduct in committing the 
offense is outrageously or wantonly 
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it 
involved 
 
 
 
___     1)  depravity of mind; 
 
 
 
and/or 
 
 
 
___     2)  aggravated battery to the victim 
 
 
 
and believe from all the evidence, including the  
 
 
evidence in mitigation, that the death penalty is  
 
 
not justified, fix his punishment at: 
 
 
 
___  
   a) imprisonment for life; 
 
 
 
or 
 
 
 
___  
   b) imprisonment for life and a fine 
 
 
 
 
   of ____________, an amount not to  
 
 
 
 
   exceed $100,000.00. 
 
 
 
 
Signed _____________________, foreperson 
 
3
 
 
The Warden argues that this verdict form paralleled the 
trial court’s sentencing instructions
4 and provided a 
“simple decisional tree” allowing the imposition of either a 
life sentence or a death sentence if the jury found one or 
both aggravating factors but leaving only the option of a 
                     
4 The trial court instructed the jury that the 
Commonwealth had to prove at least one of the aggravating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt before a sentence of death 
could be imposed for Emmett’s conviction of capital murder.  
The court further instructed the jury about its sentencing 
options: 
 
If you find from the evidence that the 
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
both of these circumstances, then you may fix the 
punishment of the defendant at death.  But if you 
nevertheless believe from all the evidence, 
including evidence in mitigation, that the death 
penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the 
punishment of the defendant at: 
(1)  Imprisonment for life; or 
(2)  Imprisonment for life and a fine 
 
. . . 
 
If you find from the evidence that the 
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
either of these circumstances, then you may fix 
the punishment of the defendant at death.  But if 
you believe from all the evidence, including 
evidence in mitigation, that the death penalty is 
not justified, then you shall fix the punishment 
of the defendant at: 
 
(1)  Imprisonment for life; or 
(2)  Imprisonment for life and a fine 
 
. . . 
 
If the Commonwealth has failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of these 
circumstances, then you shall fix the punishment 
of the defendant at: 
 
(1)  Imprisonment for life; or 
(2)  Imprisonment for life and a fine 
. . . 
 
4
life sentence with or without a fine if the jury found 
neither aggravating factor.  According to the Warden, the 
verdict form followed the format of the statutory verdict 
form set out in Code § 19.2-264.4(D).  Thus, argues the 
Warden, Emmett’s trial counsel could not have been 
ineffective for failing to object to a verdict form that 
this Court had previously upheld when challenged in Roach v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 336, 468 S.E.2d 98, 105, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 951 (1996); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 
Va. 222, 244-45, 427 S.E.2d 394, 408-09, cert. denied, 510 
U.S. 848 (1993); and Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 
412-13, 422 S.E.2d 380, 396-97 (1992), cert. denied, 507 
U.S. 1043 (1993).
5
 
By comparing the verdict form used in Atkins with the 
one given to the jury in Emmett’s sentencing proceeding, it 
is evident that both verdict forms omitted the provisions 
required by Code § 19.2-264.4(D)(2).
6  Contrary to the 
                                                             
 
5 The Warden also argues that this Court ignored this 
binding precedent upholding use of the statutory verdict 
form when we decided Powell v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 512, 
552 S.E.2d 344 (2001).  However, the omission in the verdict 
form in Powell was different than the one at issue in the 
present case.  Thus, the Warden’s arguments as to our 
decision in Powell are not pertinent, and we do not address 
them. 
 
6 The sentencing option required by the version of Code 
§ 19.2-264.4(D)(2) in effect during Atkins’ trial provided: 
 
 
 
“We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found 
the defendant guilty of (here set out statutory 
language of the offense charged) and having considered 
all of the evidence in aggravation and mitigation of 
such offense, fix his punishment at imprisonment for 
life. 
 
5
Warden’s argument, Emmett’s verdict form cannot be read 
otherwise.  Thus, as in Atkins, the verdict form used in 
Emmett’s sentencing proceeding, as a whole, was incomplete. 
 
Since we decided Atkins more than two years before the 
commencement of Emmett’s trial and since the verdict form 
used in Emmett’s sentencing proceeding had the same omission 
as the verdict form at issue in Atkins, we conclude that the 
representation provided to Emmett by his trial counsel “fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687.  Reasonably competent counsel would have 
objected to a verdict form that did not comport with the 
holding in Atkins and the requirements of Code § 19.2-
264.4(D)(2).  See Green v. Warden, 264 Va. 604, 609, 571 
S.E.2d 135, 138 (2002).  Thus, Emmett has satisfied the 
“performance prong” of the two-part test set forth in 
Strickland. 
That conclusion does not end the inquiry.  To prevail 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Emmett must 
                                                             
 
 
Signed__________________foreman” 
 
Code § 19.2-264.4(D)(2) (1995 & Supp. 1997). 
 
Atkins submitted “a proper verdict form” under Code  
§ 19.2-264.4(D), but the trial court refused to give it to 
the jury.  Atkins, 257 Va. at 178, 257 S.E.2d at 456.  That 
form included the provisions of Code § 19.2-264(D)(2). 
 
In 2003, after this Court’s decision in Powell, the 
General Assembly amended Code § 19.2-264.4(D)(2) to add the 
option of a life sentence and a monetary fine.  Acts 2003, 
chs. 1031 and 1040.  Even though the amendment occurred 
after Emmett’s trial, the verdict form used in his 
sentencing proceeding included this option, which was 
consistent with the provisions of Code § 18.2-10 (monetary 
 
6
also show that the “deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  To satisfy the 
“prejudice prong” of the Strickland two-part test, Emmett 
“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 694. 
Emmett, however, argues that the omission in the 
verdict form at issue is a “structural error” and thus not 
subject to the Strickland prejudice analysis.
7  As the 
Supreme Court of the United States has explained, a 
structural error is a “defect affecting the framework within 
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the 
trial process itself.”  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 
310 (1991); accord Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 
(1999); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 
(1997).  Such errors “infect the entire trial process,” 
thereby requiring “automatic reversal of [a] conviction.”  
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993).  They 
“necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair.”  Rose v. 
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986). 
“If [a] defendant had counsel and was tried by an 
impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that 
any other errors that may have occurred are subject to 
harmless-error analysis.”  Id. at 579; accord Neder, 527 
U.S. at 8.  Thus, the Supreme Court has found an error to be 
                                                             
limits of fine for conviction of felony). 
7 We did not decide in Atkins whether the omission in 
the verdict form was subject to a harmless-error analysis. 
 
7
“structural” and not subject to harmless-error analysis in a 
“very limited class of cases.”  Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468; 
accord Neder, 527 U.S. at 8.  See, e.g., Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993) (constitutionally 
deficient reasonable-doubt instruction to jury); Vasquez v. 
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986) (systematic exclusion 
of grand jurors who were of defendant’s race); Waller v. 
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (denial of the right to a public 
trial); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) 
(infringing the right of self-representation during trial); 
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978) 
(improperly requiring counsel to represent co-defendants 
despite timely objection stating conflict of interest); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (denial of 
the right to counsel in criminal cases); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 
U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (denial of right to have an impartial 
trial judge). 
Similarly, we have found structural error in a narrow 
class of cases.  For example, in a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, we held that a jury instruction stating that the 
jury shall find the defendant guilty if the Commonwealth 
failed to prove each of the elements of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt was not subject to the Strickland prejudice 
analysis.  Green, 264 Va. at 611-12, 571 S.E.2d at 140; see 
also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (prejudice is presumed in 
certain Sixth Amendment contexts such as actual or 
 
8
constructive denial of assistance of counsel altogether).  
Because of the constitutionally erroneous jury instruction, 
we could not “determine whether, but for counsel’s deficient 
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different because there was no ‘result,’ i.e., no verdict of 
guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt.”  Green, 264 Va. at 611, 
571 S.E.2d at 140. 
In contrast, the Supreme Court has applied the 
harmless-error analysis to a broad range of constitutional 
errors.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16-17 
(2003) (trial court failed to instruct on all of the 
statutory elements of a capital murder offense); Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993) (use for impeachment 
purposes of a defendant’s post-arrest silence after 
receiving Miranda warnings); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 
U.S. 738, 752-54 (1990) (unconstitutionally vague jury 
instruction regarding an aggravating factor in the 
sentencing phase of a capital murder case); Carella v. 
California, 491 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1989) (jury instruction 
contained conclusive presumptions as to the elements of the 
charged crime); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258 
(1988) (admission of psychiatric testimony at the sentencing 
phase of a capital murder case in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 
501-04 (1987) (element of the offense misstated in a jury 
instruction); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579-80 (1986) 
(jury instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proof 
 
9
to the defendant on the issue of malice); Crane v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986) (erroneous exclusion of the 
defendant’s testimony as to the circumstances surrounding 
his confession); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 
(1986) (restricted the defendant’s right to cross-examine a 
witness to show bias in violation of the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117 
(1983) (denial of a defendant's right to be present during a 
juror’s communication with the trial judge); United States 
v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (prosecutor’s improper 
comment on the defendant’s failure to testify at trial in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1982) 
(statute improperly precluded jury instruction on lesser-
included offense in a capital murder case); Kentucky v. 
Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789-90 (1979) (trial court failed to 
instruct the jury on presumption of innocence); Moore v. 
Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (admission of corporeal 
identification evidence in violation of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 
231-32 (1973) (admission of co-defendant’s out-of-court 
statement in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372 (1972) 
(admission of defendant’s confession obtained by an 
undercover police officer in violation of Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 
42, 52-53 (1970) (admission of evidence obtained in 
 
10
violation of the Fourth Amendment); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 
U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970) (denial of the assistance of counsel at 
a preliminary hearing in violation of the Sixth Amendment).
8
The decision in Neder is especially instructive in 
explaining what constitutes a structural error.  The trial 
error at issue there was a jury instruction that omitted an 
element of the charged offense.  527 U.S. at 8.  The Supreme 
Court found that, “[u]nlike such defects as the complete 
deprivation of counsel or trial before a biased judge, an 
instruction that omits an element of the offense does not 
necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or 
an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.”  
Id. at 9.  The Supreme Court further explained that its 
holding was consistent with its decision in Sullivan v. 
Louisiana.  Id. at 10.  The trial court in Sullivan gave the 
jury a defective “reasonable doubt” instruction that 
                     
8 This Court has likewise applied the harmless-error 
analysis to a broad range of constitutional errors.  See, 
e.g., Dearing v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 671, 674, 536 S.E.2d 
903, 904 (2000) (admission of co-defendant’s statement to 
police); Lilly v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 548, 551, 523 S.E.2d 
208, 209 (1999) (admission of confession by accomplice who 
refused to testify at trial in violation of defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness); Jenkins v. 
Commonwealth, 254 Va. 333, 336, 492 S.E.2d 131, 132 (1997) 
(admission of expert opinion concerning an ultimate fact at 
issue); Hewitt v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 621, 622-23, 311 
S.E.2d 112, 113-14 (1984) (denial of defendant’s right to 
cross-examine a witness for bias in violation of defendant’s 
right to confront his accuser); Yager v. Commonwealth, 220 
Va. 608, 614, 260 S.E.2d 251, 255 (1979) (failure to 
instruct the jury regarding the presumption of innocence); 
Reid v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 790, 795-96, 195 S.E.2d 866, 
870-71 (1973) (admission of defendant’s silence in violation 
of his right to remain silent); Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 
209 Va. 412, 416, 164 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1968) (admission of 
defendant’s statement in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 
 
11
violated the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to 
have the charged offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
508 U.S. at 277-78.  The error was not subject to harmless-
error analysis because it “ ‘vitiate[d] all the jury’s 
findings.’ ”  Id. at 281.  In contrast, the jury instruction 
error at issue in Neder did not “ ‘vitiate all the jury’s 
findings.’ ”  Neder, 527 U.S. at 11 (quoting Sullivan, 508 
U.S. at 281).  The same rationale applies to the omission in 
the verdict form at issue in this case.  It did not “vitiate 
all the jury’s findings,” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281, 
specifically the findings that the Commonwealth had proven 
both aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Thus, the omission in the verdict form at issue was not 
a structural error.  Accordingly, the well-established 
prejudice analysis set forth in Strickland is applicable to 
Emmett’s claim.  Applying that analysis, we once again 
conclude that Emmett has failed to show that “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Because 
the jury found that the Commonwealth had proven both 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, it had no 
reason or occasion to consider the option of a life sentence 
with or without a fine mandated when the Commonwealth proves 
neither aggravating factor. 
For these reasons, we reinstate our order dated June 4, 
                                                             
384 U.S. 436 (1966)). 
 
12
2004, and dismiss Emmett’s petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
_______________ 
 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding with 
respect to petitioner’s claim (I)(C) of his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  Following our rehearing in this 
case, the majority correctly concludes that petitioner’s 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
incomplete verdict forms given to the jury at the penalty 
determination phase of petitioner’s capital murder trial.  
As a result, “[t]he jury was presented with a confusing 
situation in which the trial court’s instructions and the 
form the jury was given to use in discharging its 
obligations were in conflict.”  Atkins v. Commonwealth, 257 
Va. 160, 179, 510 S.E.2d 445, 457 (1999).  In Atkins, we set 
aside the sentence of death imposed by the jury and remanded 
the case to the trial court for a new penalty proceeding.  
Id.  In my view, the same result should obtain in the 
present case. 
 
Applying the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984), the majority holds that petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate prejudice under the circumstances of this case 
because there is not a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have 
 
13
been different.  The thrust of the majority’s reasoning to 
support this holding is that because the jury found “both 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, it had no 
reason or occasion to consider the option of a life 
sentence with or without a fine mandated when the 
Commonwealth proves neither aggravating factor.” 
“[I]t is materially vital to the defendant in a 
criminal case that the jury have a proper verdict form.”  
Atkins, 257 Va. at 178, 510 S.E.2d at 456.  The prejudice 
which the majority finds lacking in the present case 
occurred the moment that petitioner’s jury was permitted to 
determine whether a sentence of death or life would be 
imposed under circumstances we have condemned in Atkins. 
While it may not be reasonable to require a perfect 
trial in all cases, a death case is materially different 
from all other criminal cases.  Surely, the government does 
not afford an accused a fair trial when his counsel is 
ineffective and the jury is permitted to impose a sentence 
of death in a situation where the verdict forms are 
incomplete. 
 
For these reasons, I would vacate petitioner’s 
sentence of death and remand the case to the trial court 
for a new sentencing hearing.*
                     
*Because I would conclude that petitioner was actually 
 
14
 
 
 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
  Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia Leas Harrington, Clerk 
                                                             
prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance under the 
more exacting standard of Strickland, I express no opinion 
on whether the failure to provide the jury with complete 
verdict forms was also a “structural error” for which 
prejudice would be presumed. 
 
15