Case Title: COOPER v. TOWN OF PINEDALE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
COOPER v. TOWN OF PINEDALE2000 WY 621 P.3d 1197Case Number: 98-291Decided: 03/30/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
A.L. COOPER; KAY BUSTON; 
RICHARD L. STOTT; VERNON T. DELGADO; HARRY P. SCHRIVER; ROBERT CARMEAN; RALPH 
ALLEN STEELE; PHIL GABARDI; DENNIS DAVISON; and P.J. PAULOS, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs), v.TOWN OF PINEDALE, Appellee (Defendant).

* This case was originally 
assigned to Justice Thomas on February 16, 1999, for the rendering of a 
proffered majority opinion. This case was reassigned to Justice Hill on December 
16, 1999. Justice Hill distributed a proffered opinion to the Court on March 9, 
2000.

Appeal from the District 
Court of Sublette County, Honorable Nancy Guthrie, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellants:John S. Mackey, 
Pinedale, WY; and Philip White Jr., Laramie, WY. Argument presented by Mr. 
White.Representing Appellee:Van Graham of Mason & Graham, 
Pinedale, WY. Argument presented by Mr. Graham.Representing Amicus Curiae 
Wyoming Association of Municipalities:Kathleen A. Hunt of Lewis & 
Hunt, LLC, Laramie, WY.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1] The 
Appellants, taxpayers and water service purchasers (collectively Cooper), 
challenge the authority of the Town of Pinedale (Town) to borrow money from the 
State of Wyoming for the purpose of reconstructing the municipal water system. 
The district court ruled that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-103(a)(xlii) (Michie 
1997)1 was a specific statute affording 
such authority to the Town, and it also ruled that the question had become moot 
because of the construction of the water system. We hold that the matter had not 
become moot, but we agree with the district court that the Town possessed the 
authority to act under the circumstances of this case. We affirm the Order of 
the district court granting a summary judgment in favor of the 
Town.

ISSUES

[¶2] This 
Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of 
Appellants:

I. Did the trial court 
err in its determination that the matter was moot:

a) when, under the law, a 
municipal obligation entered into without observance of statutory and 
constitutional requirements is void ab initio;

b) where there is no 
evidence in the record that the Town has already imposed all water assessments 
necessary to meet its repayment obligations under the loan, and thus a judgment 
declaring the Town is without authority to impose those assessments would be 
effective and enforceable;

c) when there is no 
evidence in the record to indicate that the state loan has been advanced to or 
spent by the Town of Pinedale;

d) where the trial court 
improperly took "judicial notice" of a water project and thereby decided an 
issue of fact;

e) when it was the Town 
that delayed a decision by insisting on oral argument instead of a ruling on the 
briefs, and by taking several months to modify the promissory 
note.

II. Did the trial court 
err in ruling that Wyoming Statutes did not require approval at an election 
before the Town Council could legally enter into a binding indebtedness for this 
loan[?]

III. Did the trial court 
err in ruling that under Wyoming law a mere resolution of the Town Council, 
rather than an ordinance, was sufficient to legally authorize Town officials to 
incur a $1,171,500 debt by signing the note, mortgage and other documents 
evidencing the loan? Was passage of a motion sufficient to modify the 
note?

IV. Do the Wyoming 
Constitution Art. 16 § 4 and W.S. § 15-7-109 require approval at an election of 
Town of Pinedale residents to legally enter into this indebtedness, in that the 
Town has mortgaged not just the new pipeline to be constructed with the loan, 
but all of the Town's existing water facilities and water rights as 
well?

[¶3] This 
Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellee:

I. Whether the trial 
court erred in finding the appellants' action moot?

II. Whether the trial 
court erred in ruling that the promissory note executed by the Town of Pinedale 
in favor of the State of Wyoming is not a bond requiring an 
election?

III. Whether the trial 
court erred in ruling that the Town of Pinedale could become a party to a 
promissory note by authority of a resolution?

IV. Whether the 
constitutional issue raised by appellants can be raised for the first time on 
appeal?

[¶4] The Wyoming 
Association of Municipalities, as amicus curiae, accepts the statement of the 
issues set forth in Appellee's brief. The Reply Brief of Appellants raises no 
new issues.

FACTS

[¶5] The Wyoming 
Legislature passed an Omnibus Water Bill in 1996 that authorized a grant and a 
loan to the Town of Pinedale for the construction of a new municipal and 
domestic water supply. The legislation provided for a grant of up to 
$2,378,500.00 and a loan of up to $1,171,500.00. On April 29, 1996, the State's 
Water Development Commission (the Commission) sent the Town's mayor, Miriam 
Carlson (Carlson), a project agreement, promissory note, mortgage, and 
assignment and pledge of revenues. An accompanying letter instructed Carlson to, 
among other things, ". . . have the Town Council pass a resolution consistent 
with the wording in the Assignment and Pledge form." One week later, the Town 
Council passed the required resolution, and Carlson executed the 
documents.

[¶6] Cooper 
filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on July 2, 1997, asking the district 
court to declare that the Town had no authority to enter into the loan 
agreement. Cooper argued that the Town violated the Wyoming Constitution and 
state statutes by entering into the loan without voter approval. Amid extensive 
briefing and motion practice, the parties entered into negotiations. As a result 
of the negotiations, the Town persuaded the Commission to modify the promissory 
note to specify that the Town would pay the note only with water revenues. On 
February 3, 1998, the Town Council passed a resolution to approve the 
modification.

[¶7] The parties 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On July 30, 1998, the parties 
stipulated that no constitutional issues remained, and the only unresolved 
issues were: 

9.1 whether the note is a 
bond requiring an election pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 15-7-102(b) and Wyo. Stat. 
§§ 22-21-101 et seq., or whether the Town of Pinedale could enter into the 
indebtedness without an election pursuant to its authority under Wyo. Stat. § 
15-1-103(a)(xlii); and

9.2 whether the actions 
taken by the Town of Pinedale could be taken pursuant to resolutions rather than 
pursuant to ordinances.

[¶8] The 
district court heard oral arguments on the respective motions for summary 
judgment on July 31, 1998. In ruling in favor of the Town's motion for summary 
judgment, the court concluded that the case was moot, reasoning that work had 
already begun on the project, expenses incurred, and that no matter the outcome, 
an election could not change those facts. The court went on to provide 
alternative findings on the merits, which also favored the 
Town.

[¶9] Cooper 
filed a Motion to Reconsider and/or Alter or Amend Order, which the district 
court denied. Cooper filed a timely Notice of Appeal to this Court. After 
receiving the appellate briefs of both parties, we granted the petition of the 
Wyoming Association of Municipalities to file a brief amicus 
curiae.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶10] Our 
standard when reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment is found in 
W.R.C.P. 56 and Cities Serv. Oil & Gas v. State, 838 P.2d 146, 150 (Wyo. 
1992). In accordance with the cited rule, we will affirm a summary judgment if 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. We will examine the record from 
the point of view most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment and 
give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that we may fairly draw 
from the record. Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc. 934 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo. 
1997). In the case before us, the parties have agreed that no material facts are 
in dispute. We, therefore, have only to determine whether the district court 
properly granted summary judgment as a matter of law. Cities Serv. Oil & 
Gas, 838 P.2d  at 150.

[¶11] Because 
the parties' arguments depend upon conflicting interpretations of statutes, a 
review of our rules of statutory construction is also in order. Our controlling 
consideration in interpreting statutes is the intent of the legislature. Wright 
v. State ex rel. Workers Safety, 952 P.2d 209, 213 (Wyo. 1998). To ascertain 
that intent, we construe statutes in pari materia with other statutes. Corkill 
v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 445 (Wyo. 1998). When possible, we will harmonize 
statutes relating to the same subject matter. Gerstell v. Dept of Revenue & 
Taxation, 769 P.2d 389, 394 (Wyo. 1989). Accordingly, we apply the rule that a 
specific statute will govern over a general statute. Id.

[¶12] As another 
preliminary matter, we recall a prior discussion relating to the powers of 
cities and towns:

Before reviewing and 
discussing the various statutory provisions which we consider applicable to the 
facts of this appeal, it is necessary to review some general principles of law 
regarding the powers of a municipal corporation to 
legislate.

[¶13] It is 
settled that municipal corporations are creatures of the legislature and thereby 
subject to statutory control. 2 McQuillin Mun Corp (3d Ed), § 4.03, p. 8; 
Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Rawlins, Wyo. 510 P.2d 301 (1973). Thus, the 
legislature, except as limited by the Wyoming Constitution, may confer on 
municipal corporations such authority as it considers proper, and municipalities 
can exercise only those powers which are expressly or impliedly conferred. 2 
McQuillin, supra, §§ 10.08 and 10.09, p. 755; City of Buffalo v. Joslyn, Wyo., 
527 P.2d 1106 (1974); Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, Teton County, 
Wyo., 463 P.2d 26 (1969); May v. City of Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300 
(1942); Edwards v. City of Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110, 111, 114 P. 677 (1911). We 
have recognized in the past that the powers of a municipality are not 
necessarily limited to those expressly conferred but that a municipality may 
also exercise powers fairly and necessarily implied from the grant contained in 
the statute or constitutional provision. Whipps v. Town of Greybull, 56 Wyo. 
355, 109 P.2d 805, 146 ALR 596 (1941).

[¶14] Coulter v. 
City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888, 894-95 (Wyo. 1983).

DISCUSSION

Mootness

[¶15] We must 
first decide whether the district court erred in determining that the matter was 
moot. A case is `moot' "[w]hen the determination of a matter is sought which, if 
provided, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy[.]" 
McLain v. Anderson, 933 P.2d 468, 472 (Wyo. 1997). While this Court has not yet 
expressly delineated the standard for reviewing a claim of mootness, the general 
rule is that a finding of mootness is reviewed de novo because it is a question 
of law. Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 89 F.3d 128, 132 (2nd Cir. 
1996).

[¶16] The 
district court raised the issue of mootness on its own motion. In its order, the 
court said:

At the time of the 
hearing the Pinedale water project . . . was already under construction and at 
least partially completed. During oral arguments the Court questioned counsel 
for both parties as to the Court's ability to finally determine the rights of 
the parties as is required in a declaratory judgment action. The Court was 
concerned that a judgment for Plaintiffs would require an election. If that 
election failed the loan from the state to the Town of Pinedale would not just 
vanish, nor would the water project either complete itself or undo itself. More 
litigation would be required to determine the disposition of numerous matters if 
such events transpired.

[¶17] The 
district court went on to say, "[a]lthough this matter is one of great public 
interest and importance this controversy was presented to the Court at such a 
late stage of the water project as to render any decision of the Court in favor 
of Plaintiffs moot." The court concluded its discussion of mootness by 
saying:

Even if this controversy 
was not moot at the time it was filed it has since become moot with the start of 
construction on the water project itself sometime this year. The Court takes 
judicial notice [that] construction on the water project is visible in 
Pinedale.

[¶18] In the 
trial court's explanation of its holding, we find reason to reverse. The court 
expressed concern that should an election fail, "[m]ore litigation would be 
required to determine the disposition of numerous matters[.]" That line of 
reasoning seems to confuse inconvenience with impossibility. In addition, the 
indebtedness incurred in furtherance of the project is still extant, and the 
Appellants will be required to assist in the repayment of that debt through 
higher water costs. Clearly, they are being, and will continue to be, harmed by 
any illegality which might exist as the result of the Town's actions. We, 
therefore, hold that a decision in this case would be effectual, and the 
district court erred in finding it moot.

Election 
Requirement

[¶19] Before 
beginning our analysis, we need to review the relevant statutory scheme in 
effect at the time Cooper filed this action. Title 15 sets forth general and 
specific provisions relating to the powers, rights, duties, and obligations of 
cities and towns. The provisions relevant to this proceeding are found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 15-1-103 (Michie 1997):

(a) The governing bodies 
of all cities and towns may:

. . . 
.

(x) Borrow money on the 
credit of the corporation for corporate purposes as allowed by the constitution 
and the laws and issue warrants and bonds therefor in such amounts and forms and 
on such conditions as they determine;

. . . 
.

(xlii) Take any action 
necessary to acquire any needed or useful property, or to construct, maintain, 
repair or replace any lawful improvement, development, project or other activity 
of any kind, or to participate, join or cooperate with other governments or 
political subdivisions, or departments or agencies thereof, for which funds may 
be borrowed from, granted or made available in whole or in part, on a matching 
basis or otherwise, by the United States of America or the state of Wyoming, or 
any subdivision, department or agency of either[.]

[¶20] More 
specifically, Chapter 7 of Title 15 establishes the parameters of a city's or 
town's authority in relation to public improvements, including water 
systems:

(a) In addition to all 
other powers provided by law, any city or town may make public improvements as 
follows for which bonds may be issued to the contractor or be sold as provided 
in this chapter to:

. . . 
.

(ii) Establish, 
construct, purchase, extend, maintain and regulate a system of water works, for 
the purpose of supplying water for extinguishing fires and for domestic, 
manufacturing and other purposes. To carry out this power, or to prevent 
pollution or injury to the streams, springs or source of supply of its water 
works, ditches or reservoirs, any city or town may go beyond its corporate 
limits and take, hold and acquire property. . . . Jurisdiction of a city or town 
shall extend up and along the stream or source of supply for the entire distance 
occupied by such water works, ditches or reservoirs. Cities or towns may enact 
ordinances and make all necessary rules and regulations for the government and 
protection of their water works, ditches and reservoirs, and fix water rates and 
provide for their collection. All water rent collected except the amount 
required to pay the expense of maintaining, extending and improving the water 
works, shall become a part of the water bond fund, and be applied only to the 
payment of the principal and interest of the bonds issued for the construction, 
purchase, maintaining or extension of the water works;

(iii) Take any action 
necessary to establish, purchase, extend, maintain and regulate a water system 
for supplying water to its inhabitants and for any other public purposes, 
including:

(A) Condemnation of 
property;

(B) Prescribing and 
regulating of rates for the use of water; and

(C) Enacting ordinances 
for their enforcement and collection.

. . . 
.

(xiv) Take any action 
necessary to acquire any needed or useful property, or construct, maintain, 
repair or replace any lawful improvement, development, project or other activity 
of any kind or to participate, join or cooperate with other governments or 
political subdivisions, departments or agencies thereof, for which funds may be 
borrowed from the United States of America or the state of Wyoming, or any 
subdivision, department or agency of either[.]

[¶21] To provide 
for the financing of water and other public improvement projects, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 15-7-102 (Michie 1997) authorizes a city or town to issue bonds subject 
to certain limitations:

(a) A city or town may 
borrow money and issue bonds in either coupon or registered form to any amount 
not exceeding the limitation provided in W.S. 15-7-109 for the purposes 
enumerated in this article. . . .

(b) No bonds may be 
issued for the purposes provided in this article until the proposition to issue 
them has been submitted to and approved by the qualified electors of the city or 
town at an election which shall be called, conducted, canvassed and returned in 
the manner provided for bond elections by the Political Subdivision Bond 
Election Law, W.S. 22-21-101 through 22-21-112.

[¶22] Finally, 
the Political Subdivision Bond Election Law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-21-101 
through 22-21-112, sets forth the means and manner in which a city or town shall 
hold an election for the approval of any bond issues. However, the provisions of 
the Political Subdivision Bond Election Law are only applicable when an election 
is required by law. Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1119 (Wyo. 1977); Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 22-21-101 (Michie 1997). In other words, the Political Subdivision 
Bond Election Law does not establish when an election is required; instead, it 
sets forth "uniform procedures to be followed when an election is required prior 
to issuance of bonds of any sort." Frank, 572 P.2d  at 1119. (Emphasis in 
original.)

[¶23] Because 
Title 15 contains no definition of "bond," Cooper seeks to incorporate the 
following definition found in § 22-21-102:

(a) As used in this 
chapter:

. . . 
.

(ii) "Bond" means any 
bond, note, certificate of indebtedness, coupon, or other obligation for the 
payment of money, issued by any political subdivision, including any bond 
payable from taxes, revenues or other sources.

[¶24] Having 
secured a broad definition of "bond," Cooper argues that §§ 15-7-102(b) and 
15-7-101(a)(ii) mandate an election for prior approval of the indebtedness 
entered into by the Town in this instance. The Town, naturally, disagrees with 
Cooper, insisting that the indebtedness is not a "bond," rather, it is a loan. 
Furthermore, the Town points out that § 15-1-103(a)(xlii) specifically 
authorizes "any action necessary" for any lawful improvement for which funds 
have been made available, in whole or in part, by the State of Wyoming. The Town 
contends that in order for this provision to have meaning, even if the 
promissory note is considered a "bond," no election is required when the funds 
for the improvement are derived from the State.

[¶25] Initially, 
we must determine what the legislature meant by a "bond" since elections are 
only required pursuant to § 15-7-102(b) for the issuance of "bonds" and nothing 
else. Our review of the relevant statutes leads to a rejection of Cooper's 
attempt to import the definition of "bond" found in the Political Subdivision 
Bond Election Law into Title 15 for two reasons. First, the definition of "bond" 
formerly found at § 22-21-102 is specifically limited by its terms to "as used 
in this chapter" - the Political Subdivision Bond Election Law. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 22-21-102(a) (Michie 1997). Furthermore, we noted as long ago as 1977 that the 
Political Subdivision Bond Election Law is applicable only if some other 
statutory provision requires an election in the first instance. Frank, 572 P.2d  
at 1119. Cooper's position, in effect, seeks to bootstrap an election 
requirement per Title 15 through the use of the definition found in the 
Political Subdivision Bond Election Law, which is not applicable unless Title 15 
requires an election. Such a twisting of the statutes would clearly run against 
the legislature's intent since, if the legislature had desired, it could have 
easily made the definition of "bond" found in the Political Subdivision Bond 
Election Law applicable outside the scope of that particular law. It chose not 
to do so and, indeed, the definition was specifically limited to that law. 
Therefore, we must turn elsewhere to determine what the legislature meant when 
it used the term "bond" in Title 15.

[¶26] Since 
"bond" is not defined in Title 15 and there is no other definition of the term 
appropriate to its context in that title located elsewhere in our statutes, we 
look to other sources. Black's Law Dictionary contains general and specialized 
definitions of "bond":

Bond. A long-term, 
interest-bearing debt instrument issued by a corporation or governmental entity 
usually to provide for a particular financial need; especially, such an 
instrument in which the debt is secured by a lien on the issuer's 
property.

[¶27] "Typically 
debt securities are notes, debentures, and bonds. Technically a `debenture' is 
an unsecured corporate obligation while a `bond' is secured by a lien or 
mortgage on corporate property. However, the word `bond' is often used 
indiscriminately to cover both bonds and debentures. . . . A `bond' is a long 
term debt security while a `note' is usually a shorter term obligation. Bonds 
are historically bearer instruments, negotiable by delivery, issued in multiples 
of $1,000 with interest payments represented by coupons that are periodically 
clipped and submitted for payment." Robert W. Hamilton, The Law of Corporations 
in a Nutshell 128 (3d ed. 1991).

[¶28] Municipal 
Bond. A bond issued by a nonfederal government or governmental unit, such as a 
state bond to finance local improvements. The interest received from a municipal 
bond may be exempt from federal, state, and local taxes. Often shortened (in 
plural) to municipals; munies. -- Also termed municipal 
security.

[¶29] Black's 
Law Dictionary 172 (7th ed. 1999). A definition for "promissory note" can also 
be located in the same source:

[¶30] 
[Promissory] Note. A written promise by one party (the maker) to pay money to 
another party (the payee) or to bearer. A note is a two-party negotiable 
instrument, unlike a draft (which is a three-party instrument). - Also termed a 
promissory note.

[¶31] Black's 
Law Dictionary 1085.

[¶32] There is 
no dispute that the indebtedness at issue in this case fits within the ordinary 
definition of a promissory note: It clearly is a "two-party negotiable 
instrument." On the other hand, the Town's indebtedness does not appear to fit 
the definition of "bond": It is not a bearer instrument, negotiable by delivery 
with interest payments represented by coupons. Furthermore, we should also 
consider the following:

[¶33] State and 
local governments issue long-term municipal bonds to finance capital 
expenditures on projects where the benefits accrue for more than one year. 
Issues for public purposes range from the construction of schools, hospitals, 
highways, and utility plants to expenditures for equipment, police cars, and 
pollution control facilities. . . .

[¶34] Municipal 
bonds exhibit the same basic features as other long-term fixed-income 
securities, except that the issuer can be any state or local government or one 
of their political subdivisions. Each issue specifies a final maturity when the 
entire principal borrowed is repaid. Even though the final principal payment may 
be scheduled for 30 years after the original issue date, most municipals are 
offered as serial bonds, where a portion of the total principal matures each 
year. The size of each periodic interest payment is determined by a set coupon 
rate indicating the percentage of the bond's par value that is paid annually to 
bondholders. While this rate is stated as an annual percentage, most municipal 
bonds pay coupon interest semiannually equal to one half of the annual coupon 
rate. Finally, each underlying bond carries a market yield or price that is 
determined by prevailing market conditions. Bonds sold at par carry a price 
stated at 100 percent with the market rate of interest equal to the bond's 
coupon rate. A bond is sold at a discount when the quoted price is less than 100 
percent of par, such that the effective market yield exceeds the bond's coupon 
rate. A premium bond, in contrast, is priced above 100 percent of par and 
carries a market yield below the associated coupon rate.

[¶35] Municipal 
bonds are generally classified as either general obligation or revenue bonds, 
depending on how the issuer commits to raising funds to repay principal and 
interest. In fact, many municipals are of neither type in a pure sense but 
rather hybrids that incorporate features of each.

[¶36] General 
obligation bonds typically finance essential public-purpose expenditures for 
education, roads, water treatment facilities, and other general community 
services. Principal and interest payments are secured by the issuer's full 
faith, credit, and taxing authority. Thus, a governmental unit pledges to raise 
taxes, if necessary, to meet debt service requirements. This is the strongest 
commitment a municipal borrower can make. The likelihood of default is thus 
typically low depending on the viability of the issuer's tax base and ability to 
increase tax collections.

[¶37] General 
obligation bonds exhibit two characteristics that differentiate them from other 
municipals. First, voters within the issuer's jurisdiction generally must 
approve any new bond offering. This derives from the government's authority to 
raise taxes in support of the debt service as voters essentially ratify a 
possible tax increase. Second, there is no direct association between who uses 
the facility financed and who pays for it. School bonds represent a common 
example. Principal and interest payments are covered by property taxes, so that 
all property owners in the community finance the schools rather than just those 
families with children in school. Not surprisingly, voter approval limits the 
volume of new issues because many individuals prefer not to pay more in taxes 
for many projects or purposes. . . .

[¶38] State and 
local governments issue revenue bonds to finance projects that produce specific 
revenues that are, in turn, used to make principal and interest payments. 
Hospital revenue bonds represent one example, where the bond proceeds finance 
the expansion of hospital facilities and equipment. Debt service is secured by 
anticipated user fees and related hospital revenues. Unlike general obligations, 
revenue bonds do not require voter approval and there are few restrictions 
regarding the amount of revenue debt that can be issued. Because each bond is 
backed by a specific revenue source, default risk varies with the strength and 
predictability of the underlying revenue stream. Some revenue bonds thus exhibit 
low risk, while others are extremely risky. Investors should carefully review a 
revenue bond prospectus, however, because it is often difficult to determine 
which entity and what revenues actually support debt 
service.

[¶39] Revenue 
bonds are generally referred to by the source of revenues pledged against debt 
service. Public-purpose revenues can be classified as user fees (water, sewer, 
hospital, and electric fees), tolls (transportation charges), or special 
assessments (university and housing revenues). Private-purpose revenues 
typically consist of lease payments from private firms that use facilities 
leased from municipalities.

[¶40] Dennis E. 
Logue, Handbook of Modern Finance § A6.05[1], [3]-[4] pp. A6-9 to A6-12 (2000 
Ed.); See also 1 M. David Gelfand, State & Local Government Debt Financing, 
Chapter 2 passim (1999). Another source defines municipal bonds 
thus:

A municipal bond is an 
agreement by a municipal corporation to pay to the holder of the bond a certain 
specified amount at a designated future time, and to pay interest annually or 
semiannually. Public bonds constitute contracts.

[¶41] In its 
ordinary commercial sense, a municipal bond is a negotiable bond issued by a 
municipal corporation to secure its indebtedness. The term itself imports a 
municipal debt or obligation; and, in legislative usage, it ordinarily connotes 
bonded indebtedness. Municipal bonds are evidences of indebtedness intended for 
sale in the market with the object of raising money for municipal improvements, 
the expense of which is beyond the immediate resources of reasonable taxation, 
and payment of which necessarily or logically should be distributed over a 
period of years.

[¶42] 64A 
C.J.S., Municipal Corporations § 1645, p. 210 (1999). A further characteristic 
common to municipal bonds is that the interest bondholders receive is exempt 
from federal income

[¶43] The 
indebtedness the Town has incurred here has none of the traditional indicia of a 
municipal bond: There are no multiple investors, no prospectus, no coupon rate 
or market yield or rate, and no tax exemptions for interest payments exist. The 
question we must confront, then, is whether the legislature intended for "bond" 
to mean that term in a broad, generic sense; or, did the legislature intend for 
"bond" to have a more specific, technical or commercial meaning? We conclude the 
latter.

[¶44] First, if 
we were to accept Cooper's position that a broad meaning should be ascribed to 
the word "bond" in Title 15, then it is difficult to imagine what purpose § 
15-1-103(a)(xlii) could serve. That subsection provides specific authority for a 
municipality to "take any action necessary" to construct any lawful improvement, 
development, project or other activity such as the water system in this case 
when funds are available from a federal or state governmental source on a grant 
or loan basis. If the term "bond" included such means of financing within its 
ambit, then it would have not been necessary for the legislature to add that 
particular provision since "bonds" are already specifically authorized under § 
15-7-102(a). Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 612 (Wyo. 1998) (No statute should 
be interpreted so that any portion of it would be rendered meaningless.). 

[¶45] 
Furthermore, amendments to Title 15, enacted after this action was begun, 
support the narrow, technical definition for a "bond." While these amendments 
are not applicable in this case, they may be useful in illuminating the 
legislature's intent. In 1999, the legislature amended § 15-1-103(a)(xlii) by 
making it subject to a new subsection:

(d) Before the governing 
body of a city or town enters into an agreement to borrow money from the United 
States of America or from the state of Wyoming, or from any subdivision, agency 
or department of either, to fund a public improvement project to be repaid 
solely from revenues generated by the enterprise with which the financed project 
is associated, the proposal to enter into the loan agreement shall be submitted 
to and approved by the electors of the city or town in the same manner and 
pursuant to the same procedures as provided for bond issues under the Political 
Subdivision Bond Election Law, if the total amount to be borrowed for the 
project exceeds the greater of:

(i) Five million dollars 
($5,000,000.00); or

(ii) An amount calculated 
by multiplying the number of individuals to be served by the proposed public 
improvement project times one thousand two hundred dollars 
($1,200.00).

[¶46] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 15-1-103(d) (LEXIS 1999). Simultaneously, the legislature also amended § 
15-7-102 by adding a new subsection:

(c) Notwithstanding any 
provision of W.S. 22-21-101 through 22-21-112, for purposes of this section, 
where repayment of funds borrowed from the United States of America or from the 
state of Wyoming, or from any subdivision, agency or department of either, is to 
be made solely from revenues generated by the enterprise with which the financed 
public improvement project is associated and where security for the loan is 
restricted to a claim on the revenues generated from the enterprise with which 
the proposed public improvement project is associated and to the assets of that 
enterprise, any document evidencing the agreement to repay the borrowed funds 
shall not be considered a bond and no election shall be 
required.

[¶47] 1999 Wyo. 
Session Laws, Ch. 107, Section 1. These amendments clarify whether or not a loan 
from a governmental agency should be considered a "bond" within the context of 
Title 15.

[¶48] Clearly, 
the answer is "no;" otherwise, there would be no need for these provisions which 
treat such loans separately from "bonds."

[¶49] We can 
find further, though circumstantial, evidence that the legislature did not 
intend for these types of loans to be considered as "bonds" through the language 
of the act approving this project. Throughout the enabling legislation for the 
project at issue here, the legislature uses the word "shall" repeatedly: The 
Wyoming water department commissioner shall contract with the municipality for 
the "design, construction and operation of the project;" the State of Wyoming 
shall lend to the Town $1,171,500.00 for the project; the Town shall offer 
security for the project loan; the Town shall establish a sinking fund for 
repair and maintenance of the project; and, all payments on the project loan 
shall be paid into a water development account. 1996 Wyo. Session Laws, Ch. 59; 
see Appendix. It is clear from reading the legislation, that the implementation 
of the project is absolutely contemplated. There are no provisions for an 
election, nor is the loan and grant authorized therein contingent upon any 
event.

[¶50] Taking the 
language and statutory scheme of Title 15, along with the subsequent legislative 
amendments thereto and the language of the legislation authorizing the project, 
we can only conclude that the legislature did not intend for the type of 
financing at issue here to be considered a "bond" under the provisions of that 
title. Therefore, since the loan for this project is not a "bond," there is no 
statutory requirement for an election prior to the Town's incurring the 
debt.

Resolution versus 
Ordinance

[¶51] Cooper 
argues that the Town was required to pass an ordinance authorizing the debt, 
rather than doing so with a resolution. Similarly, he contends that the 
modification of the promissory note was likewise invalid because it was 
accomplished through resolution and not the passage of an ordinance. Cooper 
bases his argument on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-114(a) (Michie 1997), which states 
that: "[a]ll municipal legislation shall be by ordinance, unless provided 
otherwise by law[.]" In addition, he notes that before an ordinance can become 
effective, it must be published in a local newspaper or posted for ten days in 
the city clerk's office. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-116 (Michie 1997). Cooper 
contends that since the Town neither published nor posted its action regarding 
the debt, the resolution cannot in any way be considered an ordinance and, 
hence, the Town's approval of the debt was void.

[¶52] Our 
statutes do not define "legislation" as that term is used in § 15-1-114(a). 
However, other authorities have considered what that term means in the context 
of the difference between resolutions and ordinances:

A resolution in effect 
encompasses all actions of the municipal body other than ordinances. Whether the 
municipal body should do a particular thing by resolution or ordinance depends 
on the forms to be observed in doing the thing and on the proper construction of 
the charter. In this connection it may be observed that a resolution deals with 
matters of a special or temporary character; an ordinance prescribes some 
permanent rule of conduct or government, to continue in force until the 
ordinance is repealed. An ordinance is distinctively a legislative act; a 
resolution, generally speaking, is simply an expression of opinion or mind or 
policy concerning some particular item of business coming within the legislative 
body's official cognizance, ordinarily ministerial in character and relating to 
the administrative business of the municipality.

[¶53] 5 Eugene 
McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, Nature and Operation of Ordinances § 15.02 P. 59 (3rd Ed. 1996). In this case, the signing of the loan agreement by the city 
does not constitute a permanent act or a rule of general applicability. Indeed, 
given the mandatory language used by the legislature in approving the 
appropriation of funds for the project, it is arguable that the Town had little 
choice in deciding whether to enter into the debt. In that situation, a 
resolution is clearly appropriate since the actual signing of the debt 
instrument is strictly a ministerial act.

[¶54] 
Furthermore, in Thomas v. Jultak, 231 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1951), this Court 
considered whether or not the City of Cheyenne could vacate a portion of an 
alley. The City had effectuated its vacation of the alley through a resolution 
of the city council subsequently signed by the mayor. In the course of decision 
we stated:

We may incidentally 
mention that whether or not the alley was vacated by resolution rather than 
ordinance makes no difference in the absence of a statute to the 
contrary.

[¶55] Thomas, 
231 P.2d  at 981 (citations omitted). The legislature has specifically authorized 
the Town to incur debt based on funds provided by other governmental agencies. 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-103(a)(xlii) (LEXIS 1999). However, it has not required a 
concomitant obligation to do so exclusively through an ordinance. The 
legislature has required that other acts by municipalities be accomplished by 
ordinance only. See, e.g., § 15-1-103(a)(viii) (appropriation of money). Under 
these circumstances, we can only conclude that absent a specific requirement 
that it act by ordinance, the Town could act by 
resolution.

Constitutional 
challenge

[¶56] Cooper 
argues that the loan violates Wyoming Constitution Article 16, Section 4, which 
provides:

No debt in excess of the 
taxes for the current year shall, in any manner, be created by any county or 
subdivision thereof, or any city, town or village, or any subdivision thereof in 
the State of Wyoming, unless the proposition to create such debt shall have been 
submitted to a vote of the people thereof and by them 
approved.

[¶57] Cooper 
initially raised this argument before the trial court. However, Cooper expressly 
stipulated during the proceeding below that:

Based upon said 
Modification of Promissory Note, [Cooper] and [the Town] have resolved all 
issues raised in the pleadings having to do with whether the indebtedness 
required an election pursuant to the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming.

[¶58] The 
parties stipulated that the only remaining, unresolved issues were whether the 
loan was a "bond," and whether the Town's approval of the loan required an 
ordinance rather than just a resolution. The trial court only considered and 
decided the latter two issues, not the constitutional 
question.

[¶59] Our 
general rule is that we will not consider issues not raised in the court below. 
WW Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 1998). There 
are only two exceptions to that rule: when the issue raises jurisdictional 
questions or it is of such a fundamental nature that it must be considered. Id.; 
Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 447 (Wyo. 1993). We do not believe that whether 
or not the loan violates a constitutional provision constitutes an issue of such 
fundamental nature that we must resolve it. See WW Enterprises, Inc., 956 P.2d  
at 356 (substantive due process claim not raised below and not considered on 
appeal). Cooper voluntarily entered into a stipulation below disposing of this 
issue. It would be unfair to the trial court, the Town, and the interests of 
justice for us to consider this issue now. It only makes sense that parties be 
held to their agreements.

CONCLUSION

[¶60] We find 
that the district court erred in concluding that this matter was moot, and that 
portion of its Order is vacated. However, based on the statutory language, 
construction, and subsequent legislative amendments thereto, we conclude that 
the indebtedness incurred by the Town was not a bond and, hence, no election was 
required. It is also clear that the Town could appropriately enter into the 
indebtedness through a resolution rather than an ordinance. Finally, we decline 
to consider Cooper's constitutional argument based on his explicit agreement to 
abandon that claim below.

[¶61] The 
district court's Order is vacated in part and affirmed in 
part.

APPENDIX

[¶62] CHAPTER 
59

[¶63] OMNIBUS 
WATER BILL-CONSTRUCTION

[¶64] Original 
Senate File No. 32

[¶65] AN ACT 
relating to water development projects; authorizing construction of designated 
water projects; describing projects; specifying terms and conditions of funding 
for projects; providing restrictions relating to sales of water and operation of 
projects; providing appropriations; modifying project descriptions, terms or 
appropriations for various prior projects including the Deer Creek Project, 
Sheridan Area Water Supply Project, Big Horn Rural Water Supply Project, Buffalo 
Municipal Reservoir Project, Buffalo Hydropower Project, Goshen Pump Station 
Project, Cheyenne Stage I Pipeline Project, Greybull Valley Dam and Reservoir 
Project, Basin Area Water Supply Project, Big Piney Water Supply Project, 
Gillette Madison Well Field Expansion Project, Laramie Water Supply Project, 
Natrona County Regional Water Supply Project, Gillette Fort Union Well Field 
Project, Laramie Rehabilitation Project, the Natrona County Regional 
Rehabilitation Project and the Wind River Indian Reservation Project; providing 
definitions; and providing for an effective date.

[¶66] Be It 
Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Wyoming:

[¶67] Section 1. 
Definitions.

[¶68] (a) As 
used in this act:

[¶69] (i) 
"Commission" means the Wyoming water development 
commission;

[¶70] (ii) 
"Sponsor" means the municipality, conservancy district, irrigation district, 
water district, improvement and service district, water and sewer district, 
watershed improvement district or joint powers board that will receive funding 
for one (1) or more of the projects identified in section 3 or 4 of this 
act;

[¶71] (iii) 
"Water development account I" means the account created by W.S. 
41-2-124(a)(i);

[¶72] (iv) 
"Water development account II" means the account created by W.S. 41-2-124(a)(ii) 

[¶73] Section 2. 
General authorization.

[¶74] (a) The 
commission shall contract with each sponsor identified in this act for the 
design, construction and operation of the project in a manner consistent with 
this act and to administer the contract on behalf of the state of 
Wyoming.

[¶75] (b) Upon 
execution of the contract outlined in subsection (a) of this section, the 
sponsor may design, construct and operate the project in a manner consistent 
with the terms and conditions outlined in the contract.

[¶76] Section 3. 
Level III construction projects-new development.

[¶77] [GENERAL 
CONDITIONS]

[¶78] (a) Except 
as otherwise specifically provided, each Level III new development construction 
project identified in this section shall be subject to the following general 
conditions:

[¶79] (i) Each 
sponsor shall offer security for the project loan as deemed adequate and 
acceptable to the attorney general;

[¶80] (ii) The 
commission shall establish repayment schedules for project loans in accordance 
with the conditions prescribed in this section;

[¶81] (iii) Each 
sponsor shall establish a sinking fund for repair and maintenance of the project 
as deemed appropriate by the commission;

[¶82] (iv) Each 
sponsor shall supervise design and construction of the project and submit all 
requests for payment to the commission for approval;

[¶83] (v) 
Sponsors shall not make construction funding commitments until after the 
commission has reviewed and approved construction budgets and construction 
plans;

[¶84] (vi) The 
commission shall make payments directly to the sponsors;

[¶85] (vii) The 
sponsor shall be responsible for operation and maintenance of the 
project;

[¶86] (viii) The 
sponsor is responsible for all project expenditures in excess of the total 
project appropriation;

[¶87] (ix) If 
the commission determines that any sponsor has, without good cause, abandoned 
completion of the project, that sponsor, in addition to being required to repay 
the loan, shall be obligated to immediately repay the full amount of all grant 
funds actually expended plus interest as established by the state auditor in an 
amount equal to the interest that would have accrued on the expended grant funds 
in the water development account from the date of 
expenditure;

[¶88] (x) 
Principal and interest payments made in repayment of loans shall be deposited in 
water development account I;

[¶89] (xi) There 
shall be no lease, sale, assignment or transfer of ownership of water from the 
project for purposes other than the designated project purpose without prior 
written approval of the commission and the state engineer or board of control. 
If such a transaction is approved, the revenues generated by the lease, sale, 
assignment or transfer of ownership of water from the project shall be utilized 
to retire principal on the project loan. After that loan is paid in full, the 
sponsor shall receive a proportionate share of the revenues generated by the 
lease, sale, assignment or transfer of ownership of water from the project equal 
to the percentage of the project loan and the state of Wyoming shall receive a 
proportionate share of the revenues generated by the lease, sale, assignment or 
transfer of ownership of water from the project equal to the percentage of the 
project grant;

[¶90] (xii) 
There shall be no lease, sale, assignment or transfer of ownership of any 
project until the project loan is paid in full, and until prior written approval 
is obtained from the commission. If these conditions are met, the sponsor shall 
receive a proportionate share of the revenues generated by the lease, sale, 
assignment or transfer of ownership of the project equal to the percentage of 
the project loan and the state of Wyoming shall receive a proportionate share of 
the revenues generated by the lease, sale, assignment or transfer of ownership 
of the project equal to the percentage of the project grant. Before the sponsor 
may lease, sell, assign or transfer ownership of the project, the state of 
Wyoming shall be given a one (1) year first right of refusal option to purchase 
the sponsor's interest in the project for an amount equal to the principal, 
interest, maintenance and replacement costs incurred by the sponsor at the date 
the option is exercised;

[¶91] (xiii) 
After the project loan is paid in full, the sponsor may purchase the position of 
the state of Wyoming, as described in paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this 
subsection, for the amount of the project grant plus the interest that would 
have accrued on the grant amount in the water development account from the date 
the project was substantially completed as defined by the commission. The 
interest that would have accrued on the grant amount shall be established by the 
state auditor;

[¶92] (xiv) Any 
revenues generated by the state from the lease, sale, assignment or transfer of 
ownership of any project or project water shall be deposited in water 
development account I.

[¶93] [NEW 
DEVELOPMENT CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS]

[¶94] * * 
*

[¶95] (f) 
Project-Pinedale Water Supply Project:

[¶96] (i) 
Project sponsor: Town of Pinedale;

[¶97] (ii) 
Project purpose: Municipal and domestic water supply;

[¶98] (iii) 
Project description: Transmission pipelines and appurtenances necessary to make 
the project function in the manner intended;

[¶99] (iv) Total 
project budget: Three million five hundred fifty thousand dollars 
($3,550,000.00);

[¶100] (v) 
Project loan: The state of Wyoming shall loan to the sponsor from water 
development account I through the commission for the design, permit procurement, 
project land procurement, construction engineering and construction of the 
project an amount not to exceed one million one hundred seventy-one thousand 
five hundred dollars ($1,171,500.00) or thirty-three percent (33%) of the actual 
development costs, whichever is less, for a term of twenty (20) years from the 
date the commission determines project benefits accrue to the sponsor, unless 
the sponsor commits to install water meters in which case the term of the loan 
shall be thirty (30) years, at an annual rate of four percent 
(4%);

[¶101] (vi) 
Project grant: The state of Wyoming shall grant to the Sponsor from water 
development account I through the commission for the design, permit procurement, 
project land procurement, construction engineering and construction of the 
project an amount not to exceed two million three hundred seventy-eight thousand 
five hundred dollars ($2,378,500.00) or sixty-seven percent (67%) of the actual 
development costs, whichever is less;

[¶102] (vii) 
Appropriation: There is appropriated from water development account I to the 
commission three million five hundred fifty thousand dollars ($3,550,000.00) or 
as much thereof as is necessary to carry out the purpose of this subsection. 
Unexpended funds appropriated under this subsection shall revert to water 
development account I on July 1, 1999.

* * 
*

[¶103] Section 
23. This act is effective immediately upon completion of all act necessary for a 
bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

[¶104] Approved 
March 18, 1996.

Footnotes

1 The 
statutes applicable to this matter were the subject of significant amendments 
after this action was filed. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references 
are to the version of the statute in effect at the time this matter 
arose.