Case Title: New Prospect Drilling Co. v. First Commercial Trust, N.A. as Administrator of the Estate of Jolene Marie Jones, Deceased

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
NEW PROSPECT DRILLING CO. v. FIRST COMMERCIAL
TRUST, N.A. as Administrator of the Estate of
Jolene Marie Jones, Deceased

97-615                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered April 9, 1998


1.   Evidence -- expert testimony -- provisions of Ark. R. Evid.
     702. -- Arkansas Rule of Evidence 702 provides that if
     scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
     assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
     determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
     knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
     testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

2.   Evidence -- expert witnesses -- trial court's discretion. --
     Whether a witness may give expert testimony rests largely
     within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that
     determination will not be reversed absent an abuse of
     discretion; on appeal, the appellant must demonstrate that the
     trial court has abused its discretion.

3.   Evidence -- expert witnesses -- opinion testimony by police
     officers allowed. -- Where an officer investigates a vehicle
     accident, observes sufficient relevant evidence such as skid
     marks, debris from the vehicles, position of the vehicles, or
     makes other observations, and where he can rationally form an
     opinion about the point of impact, he should be allowed to
     testify as to that opinion; it is for the trial court to
     determine whether proper foundation has been laid for the
     testimony. 

4.   Evidence -- opinions given by officer permissible -- refusal
     to declare oneself expert does not disqualify officer. --
     Where the deputy's testimony dealt with the point of impact,
     and he detailed his academy training and work experience and
     described his investigation at the scene that led him to reach
     his conclusions, his testimony dealt with matters that have
     been found permissible as opinion testimony; a law officer's
     modest refusal to declare himself an expert does not
     disqualify the officer.

5.   Trial -- two trials held -- judge not prohibited from changing
     ruling under circumsatnces. -- Although the judge in the first
     trial sustained objections to the deputy's testimony,
     appellee's counsel spent more effort in qualifying the deputy
     in the second trial than in the first and there was more of a
     basis for determination; a judge in such a circumstance is not
     prohibited from changing his ruling.


6.   Appeal & error -- argument raised for first time on appeal --
     no reversal possible. -- The supreme court did not reach
     appellant's argument that the deputy's opinions lacked
     foundation because they were raised for the first time on
     appeal; the supreme court does not reverse on the basis of
     arguments not raised in the trial court. 

7.   Appeal & error -- attorney misconduct alleged -- no prejudice
     toward appellant found. -- Although appellant cited numerous
     examples of alleged attorney misconduct that it argued led to
     the verdict of $3 million, most of the references by witnesses
     to the fact that the case had been tried once before appeared
     to be inadvertent; from the record, the supreme court could
     not say that the references created any prejudice toward
     appellant.

8.   Attorney & client -- trial court refused to allow certain
     questions of appellee's own attorney -- attorney not witness -
     - no showing that ruling was erroneous. -- Where appellant
     attempted to inquire of the witness whether appellee's
     attorney had asked that he serve as an expert for the
     appellee, thus to prove that appellee's counsel was
     questioning the trustworthiness of a witness he had previously
     attempted to procure for his client, the trial court refused
     to allow it on the ground that the appellee's attorney would
     have to become a witness to refute any such evidence and that
     would not be permitted; appellant did not demonstrate that the
     ruling was in error.
9.   New trial -- instances of attorney misconduct alleged --
     denial of motion within trial court's discretion. -- Of the
     two alleged instances of attorney misconduct addressed by the
     supreme court, neither was found sufficient to constitute a
     "flagrant transgression" such that a new trial should have
     been awarded; the responses of the trial court to the
     objections and the new-trial motion were within the trial
     court's discretion, and the supreme court was not given
     sufficient reason to reverse on the basis of counsel's
     misconduct.

10.  New trial -- alleged juror misconduct -- applicable standard.
     -- On denial of a motion for a new trial based on alleged
     juror misconduct the standard to be applied is whether the
     jurors' misconduct created a reasonable possibility of
     prejudice; on review the supreme court will reverse the denial
     of a motion for a new trial only if there has been a manifest
     abuse of discretion.  

11.  New Trial -- juror misconduct alleged -- no abuse of
     discretion in denial of new-trial motion. -- The appellate
     court could not say that the trial court's overruling of the
     new-trial motion, which was based upon an allegation
     concerning misconduct of the jury in its use of toy cars that
     were brought into the jury room for a demonstration, was a
     manifest abuse of discretion; a jury may use "props" to
     reenact an event; in view of the clear evidence as to the
     nature of the vehicles involved in the case and the obvious
     differences between them and the toy cars, the appellate court
     could not say that there was any reasonable possibility of
     prejudice resulting from their presence in the jury room or
     that there was an abuse of discretion in the denial of the
     new-trial motion. 

12.  Damages -- evidence sufficient to show conscious pain and
     suffering -- damage award in that respect did not shock
     conscience of court. -- Where the a witness  on the scene of
     the accident testified that she had the definite impression
     that the victim understood her and responded to her
     instructions, the supreme court could not say the evidence was
     insufficient to show that there was conscious pain and
     suffering on the part of the decedent or that the damage award
     in that respect shocked the conscience of the court.

13.  Damages -- damages awarded to two family members who neither
     testified at trial nor had evidence of mental anguish
     presented on their behalf -- awards removed and judgment so
     modified. -- Damages were awarded to two family members who
     did not testify at the trial and no other witness presented
     evidence of mental anguish on their part; although Act 589 of
     1993 permits recovery by a family member of a decedent for
     grief normally associated with the loss of a loved one, grief
     must be demonstrated to some degree; the judgment was modified
     by removing those awards.   


     Appeal from Pope Circuit Court; John S. Patterson, Judge;
affirmed as modified.
     Tatum, Rife & Tatum, by:  Tom Tatum; Clevenger, Angel &
Miller, by:  Richard L. Angel; and Barrett & Deacon, by:  D.P.
Marshall, Jr., for appellant.
     Peel Law Firm, P.A., by: Richard L. Peel, for appellees.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     This is a negligence case resulting from an automobile-truck
accident in which Jolene Marie Jones died.  Ms. Jones was driving
a Mercury Topaz that collided with a Ford Ranger pickup truck
driven by Carl Lewallen and owned by Mr. Lewallen's employer,
appellant New Prospect Drilling Co. ("New Prospect").  As the
result of a jury's verdict, appellee First Commercial Trust, N.A.
("First Commercial"), administrator of Ms. Jones's estate,
recovered $3 million in damages against New Prospect.  New Prospect
argues for reversal on account of jury misconduct and misconduct by
First Commercial's attorney during the trial.  It also contends
that the Trial Court erred by allowing a deputy sheriff to give
expert testimony and that the damages awarded were not supported by
substantial evidence.  We affirm the judgment as modified to reduce
the damages by $100,000.

                       1. Expert testimony
     The action was originally brought against Mr. Lewallen and New
Prospect.  A nonsuit was taken with respect to Mr. Lewallen.  A
trial began in June 1996.  A mistrial occurred, and the retrial
resulting in the verdict favoring First Commercial was held in
January 1997.  
     The accident occurred on two-lane Pope County Road 81 north of
London.  Ms. Jones was westbound, and Mr. Lewallen was eastbound. 
The issue of fault depended upon whether one or both of the
vehicles crossed the center line.  Mr. Lewallen testified he had
dropped his watch inside his truck and had pulled off on the
shoulder to retrieve it.  Having done so, he pulled back onto the
road, and the wreck occurred shortly thereafter.  He remembered
nothing about how it happened, and there were no other eyewitnesses
to the crash.
     In the first trial, First Commercial presented the testimony
of Pope County Deputy Sheriff Danny Sorey who investigated the
accident.  In response to questions about how the accident
happened, Deputy Sorey said that the Ford pickup was found
straddling the center line and that a skid mark, shown in
photographs to have been in the westbound lane, came from the right
front wheel of the pickup.  Objections to that testimony were
sustained on the basis that Deputy Sorey had not been qualified as
an expert.
     At the second trial, New Prospect sought a ruling that Deputy
Sorey not be allowed to offer expert opinion testimony.  In
response, counsel for First Commercial stated he would "qualify"
the witness by presenting evidence of his education and experience
in accident investigation.  New Prospect asked the Trial Court to
review the record of the previous trial and to assure that the
rulings on the questions would be the same.  The Trial Court
responded that he would hope to follow the same "line" but that he
would have to hear the questions asked this time before ruling.
     On direct examination, First Commercial's counsel, Richard
Peel, asked Deputy Sorey a number of questions about his accident-
investigation training at the law-enforcement academy.  Deputy
Sorey recalled having studied various aspects of accident
investigation and added that he had been investigating accidents
for six years at the time this one occurred.  He said he had
benefitted from the experience of others, including state police
officers, with whom he had worked accidents.
     Mr. Peel asked Deputy Sorey if, "based on [his] education and
experience in [his] investigation of this accident," he had an
opinion as to which tire on the Ford pickup was skidding.  As the
skid mark in question went into the westbound lane of traffic, an
answer that it was the right front tire of the truck would place
the truck squarely in the oncoming lane of traffic in which Ms.
Jones had the right of way.  Counsel for New Prospect objected on
the ground that "[t]he proper foundation has not been laid . . .
nor is he qualified to render that opinion. . . ."  The Trial Court
overruled the objection.  Deputy Sorey testified that it was the
truck's right front tire and further opined, over further
objection, that the wreck occurred in the westbound lane.
     On cross-examination, New Prospect questioned the deputy's
credibility.  Deputy Sorey acknowledged and reiterated his
deposition testimony in which he had said he was not an expert.  He
admitted that his drawings of the scene in front of the jury were
different from his field-note drawings, which apparently suggested
the wreck occurred in Lewallen's eastbound lane.  He initially had
the Topaz in the eastbound lane, but that was error, he said, and
he made a second drawing to correct that mistake.  He conceded that
most of the truck was in the eastbound lane after the accident and
that he had not noted in his field notes whether there were any
gouge marks at the scene on the day of the accident.  The marks had
been covered, he explained, and did not become visible until later. 
The deputy conceded that he "never got underneath the Ford Ranger"
and attempted to follow the skid marks to either tire.     
     Although the cross-examination was effective and perhaps
raised some questions about the deputy's thoroughness in
investigating the scene, the abstract does not show any motion from
New Prospect to strike his testimony on the ground that his expert
qualifications had been somehow disproved in view of what had come
out on cross-examination.   
     Each side presented an expert accident reconstructionist to
testify about who was responsible for the accident.  Deputy Sorey
was a second expert witness for First Commercial on the issue of
who had caused the collision. 
     New Prospect frames the issue as whether Sorey was properly
declared an expert.  Arkansas R. Evid. 702 provides: "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise."  We have held that, "[w]hether a
witness may give expert testimony rests largely within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and that determination will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion.  On appeal, the appellant
must demonstrate that the trial court has abused its discretion." 
Wade v. Grace, 321 Ark. 482, 486,