Case Title: Shasta View Irrigation Dist. v. Amoco Chemicals

Citation: 

Docket Number: S44723

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  July 29, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

SHASTA VIEW IRRIGATION
DISTRICT, a municipal corporation,

		Plaintiff,

	v.

AMOCO CHEMICALS CORPORATION;
AMOCO CHEMICAL COMPANY, a 
corporation a/k/a Amoco Chemical
Corp; AMOCO REINFORCED 
PLASTICS COMPANY,

	Defendants.

(USDC CV9403064-JPC; USCA 96-35869; SC S44723)

	On certified questions from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Order dated November 12, 1997;
certification accepted December 2, 1997.		

	Honorable Thomas G. Nelson, Circuit Judge.

	Argued and submitted May 7, 1998.

	James M. Duncan, of Perlman & Duncan, Bakersfield,
California, filed the brief and argued the cause for plaintiff. 
With him on the brief was Stanley C. Jones, Jr., of Boivin Jones
Uerlings DiIaconi & Oden PC, Klamath Falls. 

	Roy Pulvers, of Lindsay, Hart, Neil & Weigler, LLP,
Portland, argued the cause for defendants.  With him on the brief
were Jerard S. Weigler, Portland, and Randall S. Henderson,
Pasadena, California.

	Jas. Adams, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed a brief
for amicus curiae State of Oregon.  With him on the brief were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.

	James N. Gardner, of Gardner & Gardner, Portland, and
William N. Stiles, of Sussman Shank Wapnick Caplan & Stiles, LLP,
Portland, filed a brief for amici curiae Associated Oregon
Industries, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America,
and Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors
of America, Inc.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Kulongoski, and Leeson, Justices.  

	LEESON, J.

	Certified questions and additional question answered.

	Durham, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and
filed an opinion in which Kulongoski, J., joined.

	LEESON, J.

	This case is before the court on certified questions of
Oregon law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit under ORS 28.200 et seq. and ORAP 12.20.  We take the
following facts from the Ninth Circuit's certification order:

		"Shasta View Irrigation District ('Shasta') was
organized and formed on December 5, 1917, pursuant to
Chapter 357 of the Oregon Laws of 1917, now Chapter 545
of the Oregon Revised Statutes.  There are
approximately fifty-six individual members of Shasta. 
These members own irrigable land within the geographic
boundaries of Shasta, and farm or lease their land to
others.

		"Under a rehabilitation and betterment project
proposed by Shasta, over twenty-one miles of existing
unlined canals were to be replaced with approximately
seventeen miles of buried pressure pipeline.  In April
1972, Shasta entered into a contract with the United
States Bureau of Reclamation.  The contract provided
that the United States would loan up to $3.222 million
to Shasta for the rehabilitation and betterment of the
irrigation system.  The term of the loan was sixty-five
years.

		"In April 1973, Shasta released the bid
specifications for the project.  The specifications
provided, among other things, that the pressure pipe
used in constructing the irrigation system must last
for the sixty-five year term of the loan.

		"In June 1973, Shasta entered into a contract for
construction of the pressurized irrigation system.  The
pipe installation contractor elected to use two
different types of pressure pipe in constructing the
system:  Techite, a brand of reinforced plastic mortar
pipe manufactured by Amoco Reinforced Plastics Co.
[Amoco] was used in approximately 50,000 feet of the
system and an asbestos-cement pipe manufactured by
Certainteed Products Corp. was used in approximately
38,000 feet of the system.

		"The Techite was ordered from Amoco * * * between
June and September 1973.  Installation of the pipe
began in February 1974 and was completed by June of
that year.  In July 1975, Shasta accepted the
irrigation system as complete and operational.

		"According to Shasta, the Techite pipe has failed
approximately twenty-six times, beginning in 1978, with
two of the failures occurring before July 1, 1982.  On
February 16, 1989, Shasta's board of directors voted in
favor of pursuing legal action against the manufacturer
of the Techite pipe.  In 1994, Shasta filed the present
action in Oregon superior court [sic], alleging strict
product liability, negligence, breach of express
warranty and fraud/misrepresentation.

		"After removing the action to federal district
court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, Amoco
filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that all
of Shasta's claims were statutorily time barred.  The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Amoco, finding that Shasta was not a 'public
corporation' for purposes of statutory time limitations
and that, therefore, all of Shasta's claims were time
barred by Oregon's Product Liability statutes. 
[Shasta] timely appealed."

	The Ninth Circuit certified the following two questions
to this Court:

		"1.  Is an irrigation district a 'public
corporation' for purposes of applying the exemption to
applicable limitations set out in [ORS] 12.250?  If an
irrigation district is a 'public corporation' under
[ORS] 12.250, then:

		"2.  Does [ORS] 12.250's exemption to applicable
limitations apply to [ORS] 30.905(1), a statute of
ultimate repose outside of [ORS] chapter 12?"

We accepted certification of those questions and, at that time,
added an additional question:

		3.  "If ORS 12.250 does not apply to ORS
30.905(1), then is there a common-law variation of ORS
12.250 that would apply to ORS 30.905(1) to make
Shasta's action timely?"

See Western Helicopter Services v. Rogerson Aircraft, 311 Or 361,
370-71, 811 P2d 627 (1991) (court has discretion to reframe
questions presented).  We address the questions in order.

CERTIFIED QUESTION NO. 1:  

		"Is an irrigation district a 'public corporation'
for purposes of applying the exemption to applicable
limitations set out in [ORS] 12.250?"

	ORS 12.250 provides:

		"Unless otherwise made applicable thereto, the
limitations prescribed in this chapter shall not apply
to actions brought in the name of the state, or any
county, or other public corporation therein, or for its
benefit."

(Emphasis added.)  Shasta contends that the legislature has
recognized the public nature of irrigation districts and that
several statutes "confirm the general proposition that Oregon law
treats irrigation districts like other [public] corporations."  
Furthermore, Shasta argues, there is no evidence in ORS 12.250
that the legislature intended not to extend the protection of ORS
12.250 to irrigation districts.  Amoco replies that the text and
context of ORS 12.250 leads to the "inescapable conclusion that
irrigation districts are not one of the 'other public
corporation[s]' entitled to an exemption within the meaning of
that statute."

	To answer the first certified question, we must
construe the phrase, "other public corporation therein."(1)  The
starting point of our analysis is the text and context of the
statute, giving words of common usage their plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning.  See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317
Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (describing statutory
construction methodology).  

	The term "public corporation" is not a term of common
usage, and neither the statute nor ORS chapter 12 defines the
term.  However, this court has held that a public corporation is
a corporation formed for the public's benefit or for a public
purpose.  See State ex rel Eckles v. Woolley, 302 Or 37, 48-49,
726 P2d 918 (1986) (so stating); see also Black's Law Dictionary,
1228 (6th ed 1990) (defining public corporation as a municipality
or government corporation "created for the administration of
public affairs").  This court also has held that "[t]he concept
of a 'public corporation' covers a wide variety of institutions,"
including municipal corporations.  Eckles, 302 Or at 47.

	Two words of common usage in ORS 12.250 modify the term
"public corporation":  "other" and "therein."  Based on the
express words of the statute, we conclude that the exemption
described in ORS 12.250 applies to corporations in addition to -- 
or other than -- the state and counties that are formed for the
public's benefit.

	The next inquiry is whether an irrigation district is
formed for the public's benefit or for a public purpose.  An
irrigation district is a corporation formed to foster the
beneficial use of water by the public.  See ORS 545.249
(irrigation district's use of all water, water rights, and rights
to appropriate water "declared to be a public use more necessary
and more beneficial than any other use").  In Twohy Bros. Co. v.
Ochoco Irr. Dist. et al, 108 Or 1, 11, 216 P 189 (1923), this
court held that an irrigation district is a municipal
corporation, because "its property [is] public property and its
officers [are] public officers, elected by the legal voters of
the irrigation district * * *.  Such a district 'is created for a
public purpose * * *.'"  From the foregoing, we conclude that an
irrigation district formed under ORS chapter 545 is a public
corporation within the meaning of ORS 12.250.

	We answer Certified Question No. 1 "YES."

CERTIFIED QUESTION NO. 2:

		"Does [ORS] 12.250's exemption to applicable
limitations apply to [ORS] 30.905(1), a statute of
ultimate repose outside of [ORS] chapter 12?"

	The second certified question subsumes two issues.  The
first is whether the exemption in ORS 12.250 is restricted to
limitations prescribed in ORS chapter 12, or whether the
exemption applies outside ORS chapter 12 as well.  The second
issue is whether the exemption applies to ORS 30.905(1), which is
a statute of ultimate repose outside ORS chapter 12.

	Shasta argues that the exemption from applicable
statutes of limitations applies outside ORS chapter 12, because
ORS 12.250 contains a policy reflected in the Latin maxim,
"nullum tempus occurrit regi," which means that "[t]ime does not
run against the [sovereign]."  Black's Law Dictionary at 1068. 
Amoco responds that resolution of the issues is a matter of
statutory construction.  We agree.  Consequently, we turn again
to the template for statutory construction, looking first to the
text and context of the statute.  PGE, 317 Or at 610.  

	ORS 12.250, quoted above, consists of a single
sentence.  The exemption contained in that statute unambiguously
refers to "the limitations prescribed in this chapter."  See
Chizek v. Port of Newport, 252 Or 570, 577, 450 P2d 749 (1969) 
(exemption in ORS 12.250 does not apply outside ORS chapter 12).  
Consequently, unless some other statute were to make the
exemption contained in ORS 12.250 applicable to a proceeding
outside ORS chapter 12, that exemption applies only to the
limitations contained in ORS chapter 12.   

	We next inquire whether ORS 30.905(1) itself makes the
exemption in ORS 12.250 applicable.  ORS 30.905(1) provides:

		"Notwithstanding ORS 12.115 or 12.140 and except
as provided in subsection (2) of this section and ORS
30.907 and 30.908(1) to (4), a product liability civil
action shall be commenced not later than eight years
after the date on which the product was first purchased
for use or consumption."

By its express terms, ORS 30.905(1) does not make the exemption
in ORS 12.250 applicable to the ultimate repose period for
commencing a products liability civil action.  The only reference
in ORS 30.905(1) to limitation periods contained in ORS chapter
12 is that the ultimate repose period in ORS 30.905(1) applies
notwithstanding -- that is, in spite of -- the limitations
contained in ORS 12.115(2) and 

ORS 12.140.(3)  Thus, the text indicates that the legislature did
not intend that the exemption in ORS 12.250 apply to the ultimate
repose period in ORS 30.905(1).

	We conclude that the exemption granted to the state,
counties and other public corporations by ORS 12.250 does not
apply to the statute of ultimate repose in ORS 30.905(1).  

	We answer Certified Question No. 2 "NO."

ADDITIONAL QUESTION NO. 3:

		"If ORS 12.250 does not apply to ORS 30.905(1),
then is there a common-law variation of ORS 12.250 that
would apply to ORS 30.905(1) to make Shasta's action
timely?" 

	We note at the outset that the question is not whether
there are any common-law rules that might be relevant to the
analysis in this case.  Rather, the question is whether there is
a common-law variation of ORS 12.250 that might be relevant in
analyzing Shasta's claim.  There is.

	The common-law variation of ORS 12.250 is that general
statutes of limitations do not run against the government unless
the statute "otherwise expressly provide[d]."  State v. Warner
Valley Stock Co., 56 Or 283, 308, 108 P 861 (1910); see also
Corvallis Sand & Gravel v. Land Board, 250 Or 319, 338, 439 P2d
575 (1968) (stating same rule).  In State Land Board v. Lee, 84
Or 431, 434, 165 P 372 (1917), this court explained:

	"Th[e] rule is said to be founded upon the legal fiction
expressed in the maxim nullum tempus occurrit regi. 
However, it is not necessary to predicate this salutary
precept upon any fiction, since sound reason for the rule is
found in the fact that as a matter of public policy it is
necessary to preserve public rights, revenues and property
from injury and loss by the negligence of public officers  
* * *." 

	Oregon originally recognized governmental exemption
from general statutes of limitations afforded by the common law. 
State Land Board, 84 Or at 435.  However, in 1862, the
legislature abolished the rule by enacting Section 13, Deady's
Code, which provided:

		"The limitations prescribed in this title shall
apply to actions brought in the name of the state, any
county or other public corporation therein, or for its
benefit, in the same manner as to actions by private
parties." 

General Laws of Oregon, ch 1, §13, p 142 (Deady 1845-1864)
(emphasis added).  Under Section 13, the state, counties, or
other public corporations lost their common-law exemption from
the running of general statutes of limitations.  In 1903, the
legislature restored that exemption from the running of most
statutes of limitations by amending Section 13 as follows:

		"The limitation prescribed in this title shall not
apply to actions brought in the name of the state, or
any county, or other public corporation therein, or for
its benefit * * *."  

Lord's Oregon Law, v I, title I, ch II, § 13, p 140 (1903)
(emphasis added).  In other words, between 1862 and 1903, the
legislature expressly consented to the application of statutes of
limitations against the state, any county, or other public
corporation.  However, in 1903, the legislature revived and
codified a version of the common-law rule that general statutes
of limitations do not apply to those entities, unless the statute
expressly or by necessary implication provides otherwise.  State
Land Board, 84 Or at 436.

  	With the exception of the introductory clause, which
was added in 1953, the text of Section 13 has remained unchanged
since its amendment in 1903.  That exemption from general
statutes of limitations for the state, counties, or other public
corporations currently is codified at ORS 12.250. 

	As explained in the analysis of the second certified
question, the exemption in ORS 12.250 is limited to statutes of
limitations contained in ORS chapter 12, unless the legislature
expressly makes ORS 12.250 applicable outside ORS chapter 12. 
Nonetheless, the reasoning behind the common-law exemption has
guided this court in determining whether a statute of limitations
outside ORS chapter 12 bars an action brought on behalf of the
state, county, or other public corporation.  For example, in
State Land Board, the question was whether the running of a ten-year statute of limitations in General Laws of Oregon 1913,
chapter 304, barred the State Land Board from foreclosing on a
mortgage lien.  This court held that the statute did not bar the
State Land Board's action, because the court viewed the statute
"in the light of the previously declared policy of the state,"
id. at 436, namely, that "it is necessary to preserve public
rights, revenues and property from injury and loss by the
negligence of public officers."  Id. at 434; accord Chizek, 252
Or at 578 (public would not be served if claim of Port of
Newport, as a public body, were barred by statute of limitations
in ORS 312.230); cf. Withers et al v. Reed, 194 Or 541, 556-57,
243 P2d 283 (1952) (forfeiture statute applies against state,
because common-law exemption from limitation periods is not
applicable where negligence of public officials harms public
good).

	With that background, we turn to whether the common-law
exemption applies to exempt Shasta from the operation of ORS
30.905(1).  To resolve that issue, we must analyze the purposes
underlying statutes of limitations and statutes of ultimate
repose.

	Statutes of limitations "limit[] the time a party has
to initiate an action once a claim has accrued."  Sealey v.
Hicks, 309 Or 387, 394 n 7, 788 P2d 435 (1990); see also Baker v.
Kennedy, 317 Or 372, 376, 856 P2d 314 (1993) ("Statutes of
limitation refer to commencement of legal actions.") (emphasis in
original).  Generally, a statute of limitations does not begin to
run until the injured party knows or should know that it has been
injured.  Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or 247, 259, 864 P2d 1319
(1994).  But see Huff v. Great Western Seed Co., 322 Or 457, 464,
909 P2d 858 (1996) (plaintiff's belated discovery of employer's
unlawful motive does not delay commencement of statutory
limitations period in case brought under ORS 659.121(1)).  The
expiration of a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense
to an action.  ORCP 19 B.  However, statutes of limitations can
be waived, Multnomah County v. Dept. of Rev., 325 Or 230, 234,
935 P2d 426 (1997), and various circumstances can toll their
expiration.  See, e.g., Baker, 317 Or at 374 (statute is tolled
if insurer fails to give injured party timely notice of running
of statute of limitations after making advance payment for
damages).  In sum, although statutes of limitations may affect a
plaintiff's ability to enforce a remedy, the running of such
statutes does not extinguish a right.  See Evans v. Finley, 166
Or 227, 233, 111 P2d 833 (1941) (so stating); Goodwin v. Morris,
9 Or 322, 324 (1881) (same). 

	The legislature enacts statutes of ultimate repose to
supplement applicable statutes of limitations.  DeLay v. Marathon
LeTourneau Sales, 291 Or 310, 315, 630 P2d 836 (1981).  The
legislature enacted Oregon's first statute of ultimate repose in
1967.  Id.  Statutes of ultimate repose set maximum times to file
a claim, regardless of the date of discovery of an injury or
other circumstances that may affect the expiration of a statute
of limitations.  See Josephs v. Burns & Bear, 260 Or 493, 498,
491 P2d 203 (1971) (statute of ultimate repose in ORS 12.155(1)
intended to provide overall maximum time limitation); see also
DeLay, 291 Or at 314-15 (medical malpractice statute of ultimate
repose not tolled by the plaintiff's insanity).  An ultimate
repose period "provides a deadline for the initiation of an
action whether or not the injury has been discovered or has even
occurred."  Sealey, 309 Or at 394 n 7.  Unless otherwise provided
by statute, an ultimate repose period "cannot be extended
regardless of unfairness to the plaintiff."  DeLay, 291 Or at
315.  Once an ultimate repose period has expired, the claim is
extinguished and no legally cognizable injury exists.  See
Sealey, 309 Or at 392 (so declaring with respect to products
liability statute of ultimate repose).

	The legislature enacted ORS 30.905(1) in 1977.  This
court previously has explained that

		"ORS 30.905 was the result of a major 1977
lobbying effort by business and insurance organizations
for reform of the common law of products liability. 
The perceived problem was the high cost of liability
insurance.  One of the legislative solutions was to fix
a limited and predictable time period in which a
manufacturer, distributor, seller or lessor would be
exposed to a product liability civil action." 

Erickson Air-Crane Co. v. United Tech. Corp., 303 Or 281, 286, 

735 P2d 614 (1987).  This court further explained that the
assumption throughout the legislative consideration of the
statute was that "manufacturers, distributors, sellers and
lessors should have the benefit of a limited and predictable time
period during which they would be exposed to liability for
defects that existed when the product left a respective party's
hands."  Id. at 288.  ORS 30.905(1) establishes that time period
as eight years.  

	In Sealey, this court held that ORS 30.905(1) reflects
the legislature's determination "that an injury occurring more
than eight years after a defective product first entered the
stream of commerce is not legally cognizable."  309 Or at 392
(emphasis added).  The court also declared that enactment of ORS
30.905(1) was within the legislature's authority "to determine
what constitutes a legally cognizable injury."  Id. at 394. 

	As discussed above, the court explained in State Land
Board the common-law rule that the government is not included in
general statutes of limitations, unless included expressly or by
necessary implication.  84 Or at 434.  The public policy reason
for the exemption is to protect the public from the negligence of
public officials who fail to assert claims in a timely manner
after they discover, or should have discovered, an injury.  Id. 
Consistent with that policy, the exemption means that
governments' ability to enforce legal remedies is not affected if
public officials are negligent in failing to assert claims.  

	ORS 30.905(1), by contrast, reflects a legislative
judgment that an injury occurring eight years after a defective
product first enters the stream of commerce is not legally
cognizable because, after that time, all claims are extinguished. 
Sealey, 309 Or at 392.  Unlike a statute of limitations, the
eight-year ultimate repose period prescribed by that statute
begins to run on the date on which a product first is purchased
for use or consumption, not on the date on which a purchaser
knows or should have known of an injury caused by the product. 
The eight-year statute of ultimate repose runs whether or not a
public official or any other plaintiff fails to assert a claim in
a timely manner.  The public policy for exempting governments
from statutes of limitations therefore does not apply to statutes
of ultimate repose.  That is so, because the expiration of
ultimate repose periods extinguishes all claims irrespective of
whether the injured plaintiff was negligent in failing to assert
claims in a timely manner. 	

	In sum, because ORS 30.905(1) is not premised on
whether a plaintiff has filed a claim in a timely manner and
because the expiration of the ultimate repose period extinguishes
a claim under ORS 30.900 et seq., the common-law exemption that
underpins ORS 12.250 does not apply to ORS 30.905(1).  We
conclude that the common-law variation of ORS 12.250 does not
apply to ORS 30.905(1). 

	We answer Additional Question No. 3 "NO."

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons explained above, we conclude that an
irrigation district is a public corporation under ORS 12.250. 
The exemption in ORS 12.250 does not apply to ORS 30.905(1).  The
common-law variation of ORS 12.250 does not apply to ORS
30.905(1).

	Certified questions and additional question answered.

	DURHAM, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

	I concur in the majority's answer to the second
certified question, which asks:

		"2.	Does [ORS] 12.250's exemption to applicable
limitations apply to ORS 30.905(1), a statute
of ultimate repose outside of [ORS] Chapter
12?"

	The exemption in ORS 12.250(4) is unambiguous and applies
only to "the limitations prescribed in this chapter."  (Emphasis
added.)  The emphasized phrase refers only to ORS chapter 12. 
The exemption in ORS 12.250 has no effect on the deadline for
commencing a product liability action in ORS 30.905(1)(5) because
that deadline is not a time limitation prescribed in ORS chapter
12.  See Chizek v. Port of Newport, 252 Or 570, 577, 450 P2d 749
(1969) (ORS 12.250 is inapplicable to the statute of limitation
enacted in ORS 312.230, because that limitation is not prescribed
in ORS chapter 12).  Neither ORS 30.905(1) nor any other statute
suggests that the legislature incorporated ORS 12.250 into ORS
30.905(1).  Consequently, ORS 12.250 has no effect on the
applicability of ORS 30.905(1) to this dispute.  The majority
correctly answers Certified Question No. 2 "no."

	The majority's answer to Certified Question No. 2
obviates the need to answer Certified Question No. 1.  Because
the exemption in ORS 12.250 is not applicable to ORS 30.905(1),
no useful purpose is served by deciding, in response to Certified
Question No. 1, whether an irrigation district is a "public
corporation" under ORS 12.250.  I would not answer Certified
Question No. 1 because the majority's analysis and answer to
Certified Question No. 2 renders Certified Question No. 1 moot.  

	As I understand it, the majority claims that Certified
Question No. 1 raises a genuine controversy for two reasons: (1)
that question was certified to this court by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and (2) the answer to
Certified Question No. 1 somehow obviates the need to answer an
unspecified aspect of Certified Question No. 3.  Shasta View Irr.
Dist. v. Amoco Chemicals corp., ____ Or ____, ____ n 1, ____ P2d
____ (1999) (slip op at 4 n 1).  Those assertions evade rather
than answer the problem of mootness.

	Unless the court's decision in the matter before it
will have some practical effect on the rights of the parties to
the controversy, the question -- including a certified question -- is moot.  See Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or 174, 182, 895 P2d 765
(1995) (a justiciable controversy exists when the parties'
interests are adverse and the court's decision will have some
practical effect on the parties' rights); Brummett v. PSRB, 315
Or 402, 405-06, 848 P2d 1194 (1993) (applying same standard).  

	This court has a responsibility, before it decides any
issue before it, to insure that the issue is justiciable and has
not become moot.  The majority violates that responsibility here
because it has not, and cannot, demonstrate that its answer to
Certified Question No. 1 will have any practical effect on the
rights of the parties.  The bare fact that another court
certifies a question to this court does not establish that the
parties have legally cognizable interest in the answer.  The
majority has no license to answer a moot question simply because
another court has certified it to this court.

	The majority's second reason for answering Certified
Question No. 1 is not correct.  Whether Shasta View is a "public
corporation" under ORS 12.250 has not the slightest relationship
to any issue that arises under Additional Question No. 3. 
Nothing in this opinion suggests to the contrary.  Certified
Question No. 1 concerns the legislature's intention in enacting
an exemption in ORS 12.250 for a "public corporation" from the
limitations specified in ORS chapter 12.  Additional Question No.
3 concerns the eligibility of certain public bodies for
protection against the application of ORS 30.905(1) under certain
well-established common-law rules of statutory construction.  In
no way does the answer to the first question assist the court in
resolving any aspect of the third question.  The majority's
related claim that it must answer Certified Question No. 1 in
order to avoid answering some unspecified aspect of Additional
Question No. 3 that the majority asserts should not be answered
is baffling.  That argument fails to confront the mootness
problem that inheres in Certified Question No. 1.

	Certified Question No. 1 is moot and the majority's
answer to that question is dictum.  Accordingly, I dissent from
the majority's decision to decide Certified Question No. 1. 

	The Additional Question No. 3 asks: 

		"If ORS 12.250 does not apply to ORS 30.905(1),
then is there a common law variation of ORS 12.250 that
would apply to ORS 30.905(1) to make Shasta's action
timely?"

		Shasta View argues that, under the common law
recognized and applied in this court's decisions, special rules
apply to the construction of statutes of general applicability,
such as ORS 30.905(1), that could operate to deprive a public
body of its right to commence litigation to protect its
interests.  According to Shasta View, this court follows what it
calls a "default" approach to interpreting such statutes, viz.,
that the court will construe such statutes not to apply to limit
the right of a public body to commence an action unless the
statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, applies to
the public body.  Amicus curiae State of Oregon supports Shasta
View's position.(6)

		The task of determining whether certain public bodies
are exempt from the operation of ORS 30.905(1) is an exercise in
statutory construction.  Under the methodology described in PGE
v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606,  611, 859 P2d 1143
(1993), the court first examines the text and context of the
statute, including, as pertinent here, rules of construction
found "in the case law" that bear directly on how to interpret
the text in context.  Because the text of ORS 30.905(1) says
nothing, one way or the other, regarding the applicability of ORS
30.905(1) to a public body's product liability claim, the
exemption that plaintiff and amicus urge, if it exists, must be
found in case law that directs how to construe a statute such as
ORS 30.905(1) in the context of its application to a public body.

		I note at the outset that this court's inquiry, in
response to Additional Question No. 3, into the substance and
effect of the English common law has a state constitutional
sanction.  Oregon's provisional government adopted the common law
of England by statute before Oregon became a territory or a
state.  State v. Hansen, 304 Or 169, 172, 743 P2d 157 (1987),
citing Act of July 5, 1843, Art 12, reprinted in Lawrence T.
Harris, History of the Oregon Code, 1 Or L Rev 129, 135 (1922);
Act of June 27, 1844, Art III, § 1, reprinted in id. at 138. 
Lytle et al. v. Hulen et al., 128 Or 483, 510, 275 P 45 (1929),
states:

			"'The common law of England and
principles of equity, not modified by the
statutes of Iowa or of this government, and
not incompatible with its principles, shall
constitute a part of the law of this land.' 
Or. L. 1843, 49 P. 100, Act of June 27, 1844.

		"The foregoing statute continued and remained in
effect when the Constitution of Oregon was adopted in
1859.  Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Oregon
Constitution provides:

			"'All laws in force in the territory of
Oregon when this constitution takes effect,
and consistent therewith, shall continue in
force until altered or repealed.'

		"Hence the Act of June 27, 1844, and Section 7 of
Article XVIII of the Constitution constitute a
statutory and constitutional declaration that the
common law of England, unless modified by the statutes
of Iowa when the Act of June 27, 1844, was enacted, or
subsequently modified by the statute of Oregon, and not
incompatible with the principles of our government,
shall constitute a part of the law of Oregon: Peery v.
Fletcher, 93 Or. 43, 52 (182 Pac. 143); In re Water
Rights of Hood River, 114 Or. 112, 166 (227 Pac.
1065)."

		Article XVIII, section 7, continued in force the
substantive principles of the English common law, although it did
not enact any particular common-law rule into law.  See Land Bd.
v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 283 Or 147, 156-57, 582 P2d 1352
(1978) (so noting).  Instead, that constitutional provision
requires this court to decide whether a particular principle of
the common law is enforceable in a particular case by inquiring
whether the common-law rule is compatible with, among other
things, Oregon's political institutions and state and federal
law.

		"We have held that by force of our constitution
and statutes (§7, Art. XVIII, Oregon Const.; Law of
Oregon, 1843-1849, p. 100) the common law of England,
modified and amended by English statutes, as it existed
at the time of the American Revolution, was adopted and
is in force in this state, as far as it was general and
not local in its nature, was applicable to the
conditions of the people, and was not incompatible with
the nature of our political institutions, or in
conflict with the constitution and laws of the United
States or of this state."

In re Estate of Moore, 190 Or 63, 70, 223 P2d 393 (1950)
(citations omitted).  See also Peery v. Fletcher, 93 Or 43, 52-53, 182 P 143 (1919):

	"[The common law of England] has been adopted so far
only as its general principles were suited to the
habits and conditions of the colonies, and in harmony
with the genius, spirit and objects of American
institutions.  Different geographical conditions may
justify modifications, and whether common-law rules
will be followed strictly in the United States will,
necessarily, where no vested rights are actually
concerned, depend upon the extent to which they are
reasonable and in consonance with public policy and
sentiment.  What may be the common law in one state is
not necessarily so considered in another.  In many
jurisdictions in the United States the rules of the
common law of England have been held by the courts to
be in full force so far as the same are applicable and
of a general nature, and are not in conflict with the
Constitution or special enactments of the legislature. 
This is the rule in Oregon[.]"

(Citations omitted.)

		To the extent that the English common law attributed
prerogative rights to the English king, this court attributes
those prerogative rights, wherever applicable, to the people of
this state.  In Fidelity etc. Co. v. State Bank of Portland, 117
Or 1, 4-5, 242 P 823 (1926), after citing United States F. & G.
Co. v. Bramwell, 108 Or 261, 217 P 332 (1923), this court stated:

	"In that case we held that the people of this state
have succeeded to all of the incidental prerogative
rights of the British Crown, which are essential to the
efficient exercise of the powers inherent in the nature
of civil government. * * * It is our understanding that
we are as much bound by the applicable rules of the
common law, where such rules have not been modified, or
abrogated by statute, as we are by the statutes
themselves."

		This court has cited repeatedly two common-law rules,
analyzed below, regarding interpretation of statutes of general
applicability that, when applied to a public body, could 
restrict the right of the government to pursue its claims.  This
court's invocation of those rules in a variety of settings to
protect public bodies demonstrates that they are compatible with
the nature of our political institutions and not in conflict with
the constitution and laws of the United States or of this state,
within the meaning of Moore and Peery.  Accordingly, those rules
"shall continue in force until altered or repealed," as required
by Article XVIII, section 7, of the Oregon Constitution.  In
enacting ORS 30.905(1), the legislature did not alter or repeal
those common-law rules and, therefore, this court must apply
those rules to discern the legislature's intention in enacting
that statute.

		With that body of state constitutional law in mind, I
turn to a consideration of the content of the English common-law
rules that bear on Certified Question No. 3.   

		1.  The rule against inclusion of government.

		The first rule, denominated as the rule against
inclusion of government in this court's cases,(7) was described in
Peninsula Dr. Dist. No. 2 v. Portland et al, 212 Or 398, 418, 320
P2d 277 (1958):

	"[I]t is generally held that 'Neither the government,
whether federal or state, nor its agencies are
considered to be within the purview of a statute unless
an intention to include them is clearly manifested; and
the rule applies, or applies especially, to statutes
which would impair or divest the rights, titles, or
interests of the government.'" 

(Citations omitted.)  For an application of that principle, see
Coos County v. State of Oregon, 303 Or 173, 194-95, 734 P2d 1348
(1987) (conclusive statutory presumption of satisfaction of real
property mortgage lien in ORS 88.110 does not bind the state). 
See also United States F. & G. Co., 108 Or at 269, in which the
court, after noting that certain common-law rules regarding the
king's royal character and authority were not in force in this
country, stated:  

	"But those incidental prerogatives which had no
relation to the king's person and constituted
exceptions in favor of the crown to general rules
applicable to everyone else, and which, from their very
nature, are essential to the welfare of the people of
the state, have been adopted, and the common-law rules
by which these rights were established, have become the
law of the state.  Among those so adopted are the
common-law rules that general words in a statute do not
include the state unless the state is expressly named
therein; that the state cannot be sued without its
consent; that the statute of limitations does not run
against the state in the absence of a statute
permitting it[(8)]; * * * To all of the incidental
prerogative rights of the British Crown, which are
essential to the efficient exercise of the powers
inherent in the nature of civil government, the people
of this state have succeeded."  

(Emphasis added.)

	Common-law judges developed those interpretive principles to
protect the prerogative of the king, as a constituent part of
both the executive and legislative powers of the English
government, to take action in the public interest unless a
statute, enacted with the king's consent, expressly restricted
the king's authority to act.  Sir William Blackstone described
the principle against the inclusion of government as follows:  

	"[I]n domestic affairs, [the king] is considered in a
great variety of characters, and from thence there
arises an abundant number of other prerogatives.

		"First, he is a constituent part of the supreme
legislative power; and, as such, has the prerogative of
rejecting such provisions in parliament, as he judges
improper to be passed.  The expediency of which
constitution has before been evinced at large.  I shall
only further remark, that the king is not bound by any
act of parliament, unless he be named therein by
special and particular words.  The most general words
that can be devised ('any person or persons, bodies
politic, or corporate, etc.') affect not him in the
least, if they may tend to restrain or diminish any of
his rights or interests.  For it would be of most
mischievous consequence to the public, if the strength
of the executive power were liable to be curtailed
without its own express consent, by constructions and
implications of the subject.  Yet, where an act of
parliament is expressly made for the preservation of
public rights and the suppression of public wrongs, and
does not interfere with the established rights of the
crown, it is said to be binding as well upon the king
as upon the subject: and, likewise, the king may take
the benefit of any particular act, though he be not
especially named."  

William Blackstone, Commentaries *262 (emphasis added). 

	Craies on Statute Law, 423 (S. G. G. Edgar ed., 7th ed
1971) presents the following further explanation of that common-law rule: 

		"3.  Crown Not Bound by Statute Unless Specially
Named, or Clearly Intended

		"The history of legislation is to a large extent a
history of the restriction of the royal prerogative,
but 'it is a well-established rule, generally speaking,
in the construction of Acts of Parliament, that the
King is not included unless there are words to that
effect; for it is inferred prima facie that the law
made by the Crown, with the assent of the Lords and
Commons, is made for subjects, and not for the Crown.' 
'This general rule, as expressed in Bacon's Abridgment,
is that, "where a statute is general, and thereby any
prerogative, right, title or interest is divested or
taken from the King, in such case the King shall not be
bound, unless the statute is made by express terms to
extend to him."' The rule is analogous, if not
equivalent, to the rule already stated, that the common
law is not presumed to be altered by statute, for the
rights and titles and prerogatives of the Crown are in
reality part of the common law of England.  The reason
of the rule is thus put by Plowden 240: 'Because it is
not an Act without the King's assent, and it is to be
intended that when the King gives his assent he does
not mean to prejudice himself or to bar himself of his
liberty and his privilege, but he assents that it shall
be a law among his subjects.'" 

(Footnotes omitted; emphasis added.)

	Most of this court's cases have applied the formulation
of the rule stated in the Peninsula Dr. Dist No. 2, United States
F. & G. Co., and Coos County cases cited above.(9)  See Seton v.
Hoyt, 34 Or 266, 273, 55 P 967 (1899), which applies that rule in
favor of a county: 

		"Nor is the state within the purview of a general
law regulating the rate of interest upon money due or
to become due, and this goes upon the ground that a
sovereign is not bound by the words of a statute unless
it is expressly named.  That the county is but the
agent or instrumentality of the state, constituted and
employed essentially for the promotion of its general
government, and, therefore, subject to like rules and
restrictions governing its liabilities as the state,
there can be no controversy."(10)  

(Citations omitted; emphasis added.)  See also State Land Board
v. Campbell, 140 Or 196, 197-98, 13 P2d 346 (1932):

		"It is a universally accepted rule that words of a
statute applying to private rights do not affect those
of the state, and that the sovereign authority is not
bound by the general language of a statute which tends
to restrain or diminish the powers, rights or interests
of the sovereign, and when the rights of a commonwealth
are to be transferred or affected, the intention must
be plainly expressed or necessarily implied * * *."

(Citations omitted.)  See also State v. McVey, 168 Or 337, 348,
121 P2d 461, on reh'g 123 P2d 181 (1942) (quoting Pennsylvania
case law):

		"'Legislative enactments presumptively affect only
private rights and do not embrace the rights of a
sovereign unless the sovereign is explicitly
designated or clearly intended.'"

	One Oregon case indicates that the rule is subject to
an exception, as described by Blackstone in the passage of his
work quoted above, for statutes 

	"expressly made for the preservation of public rights
and the suppression of public wrongs [that do] not
interfere with the established rights of the crown    
* * *."

In Withers, 194 Or at 556-60, this court held that a five-year
water right forfeiture statute did apply to the state.  According
to Withers, that construction returned water to legally required
beneficial use and minimized waste of water, thereby safeguarding
a precious public resource and achieving a benefit for the public
as a whole, in conformance with legislatively declared public
policy and prior case law. 

	Withers recognized the rule against inclusion of
government but concluded that an exception to that rule governed
the outcome of the particular dispute before the court.  The
exception applied in Withers safeguarded the public interest by
promoting the statutorily required beneficial use of water and by
deterring the long-term waste of water by the state.  

	Enforcement of ORS 30.905(1) against Shasta View
protects no public interest equivalent to that involved in
Withers.  Analyzed in Blackstone's terms, ORS 30.905(1) does not
"preserve a public right" or "suppress a public wrong" in barring
a claim by a public body.  Applying the criteria considered in
Withers, I conclude that the rule against inclusion of
government, and not the exception noted in Withers, is the
pertinent rule governing construction of ORS 30.905(1) in the
context of its application to a claim by Shasta View.

	What is the majority's response to the question of the
proper application of the rule against the inclusion of
government to this dispute?  In a word: nothing.  The majority
fails to address the applicability of the rule against inclusion
of government.  That failure is the result of the majority's
inexplicably narrow reading of the third question.

	ORS 12.250 exempts certain public bodies from the
operation of statutes of limitation in ORS chapter 12, unless a
specific statute provides otherwise.  The third question simply
asks whether Oregon common law provides any analogous exemption
from the operation of ORS 30.905(1).  Because the rule against
inclusion of government protects public bodies from the effect of
statutes that diminish their rights, powers and interests, unless
the statute applies to the government expressly or by necessary
implication, that rule is well within the scope of Additional
Question No. 3.  The majority incorrectly refuses to discuss the
rule in this case.

	The majority disregards the practical legal problem
that now confronts the Ninth Circuit.  This court, not the Ninth
Circuit, drafted the third question to provide the vehicle for
advising the Ninth Circuit about Oregon rules of statutory
interpretation that, like ORS 12.250, may exempt Shasta View from
the operation of ORS 30.905(1) and, therefore, prevent the
dismissal of Shasta View's complaint.  The third question
exercise is designed to assist the Ninth Circuit in answering one
legal issue: under Oregon law, is Shasta View's complaint subject
to dismissal because it is filed untimely under ORS 30.905(1)? 
The majority's crabbed reading of the third question leads it to
deprive the Ninth Circuit of one of the specific legal
determinations about Oregon law that it needs to decide correctly
whether to affirm or reverse the dismissal of Shasta View's
complaint.  On learning that the majority of this court will not
discuss or apply the rule against inclusion of government, the
Ninth Circuit justifiably may ask: what was the point of all
this?  The majority's position is as unhelpful and impractical as
it is legally incorrect.

	The majority's failure to analyze and apply the rule
against inclusion of government in this proceeding leaves the
Ninth Circuit free to do so.  But the very point of this
proceeding was to eliminate, for the benefit of the Ninth
Circuit, any uncertainty about whether Shasta View's complaint is
subject to dismissal under Oregon law.  It is in regard to that
point that the majority opinion and this opinion part company. 
The majority is satisfied to perpetuate the Ninth Circuit's
uncertainty about Oregon law.  I am not.

	ORS 30.905(1) is silent regarding its application in
the context of an action brought by a public body, such as Shasta
View.  If enforced here, that statute would deprive Shasta View
of its right to secure a remedy for a defective product and
thereby protect the interest of the public that Shasta View
serves.  That is the precise circumstance to which the common-law
rule against inclusion of government most obviously applies.  The
Ninth Circuit should enforce that rule here.  Certainly nothing
in the majority's opinion prevents it from doing so.
  	Nullum tempus occurrit regi.

 	The second common-law rule is similar in nature and
represents a particular application of the first.  In State Land
Board v. Lee, 84 Or 431, 434, 165 P 372 (1917), this court
stated:

	"[I]t is a rule of universal recognition that the
government is not included in a general statute of
limitation unless it is expressly or by necessary
implication included.  This rule is said to be founded
upon the legal fiction expressed in the maxim nullum
tempus occurrit regi.  However, it is not necessary to
predicate this salutary precept upon any fiction, since
sound reason for the rule is found in the fact that as
a matter of public policy it is necessary to preserve
public rights, revenues and property from injury and
loss by the negligence of public officers * * *."  

(Citations omitted.)

	In Withers, 194 Or 544-46, this court, referring to
both common-law rules discussed above,(11) quoted Judge Story's
"classic exposition of the doctrine" in United States v. Hoar, 26
F Cas 329, 2 Mason 311, 313 (CCD Mass 1821) (No 15,373):

			"'The true reason, indeed, why the law has
determined, that there can be no negligence or
laches imputed to the crown, and, therefore, no
delay should bar its right, (though sometimes
asserted to be, because the king is always busied
for the public good, and, therefore, has not
leisure to assert his right within the times
limited to subjects,) is to be found in the great
public policy of preserving the public rights,
revenues, and property from injury and loss, by
the negligence of public officers.  And though
this is sometimes called a prerogative right, it
is in fact nothing more than a reservation or
exception, introduced for the public benefit, and
equally applicable to all governments. * * *

			"'But, independently of any doctrine founded
on the notion of prerogative, the same
construction of statutes of this sort ought to
prevail, founded upon the legislative intention. 
Where the government is not expressly or by
necessary implication included, it ought to be
clear from the nature of the mischiefs to be
redressed, or the language used, that the
government itself was in contemplation of the
legislature, before a court of law would be
authorized to put such an interpretation upon any
statute.  In general, acts of the legislature are
meant to regulate and direct the acts and rights
of citizens; and in most cases the reasoning
applicable to them applies with very different,
and often contrary force to the government itself. 
It appears to me, therefore, to be a safe rule
founded in the principles of the common law, that
the general words of a statute ought not to
include the government, or affect its rights,
unless that construction be clear and indisputable
upon the text of the act.'

		"In Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 US
126, 132, 82 L Ed 1224, 58 S Ct 785, Mr. Chief Justice
(then Mr. Justice) Stone, after quoting from United
States v. Hoar, said:

			"'* * * Regardless of the form of government and
independently of the royal prerogative once thought
sufficient to justify it, the rule is supportable now
because its benefit and advantage extends to every
citizen, including the defendant, whose plea of laches
or limitation it precludes; and its uniform survival in
the United States has been generally accounted for and
justified on grounds of policy rather than upon any
inherited notions of the personal privilege of the king
[citing cases].  So complete has been its acceptance
that the implied immunity of the domestic 'sovereign,'
state or national, has been universally deemed to be an
exception to local statutes of limitations where the
government, state or national, is not expressly
included; and to the Conformity Act.'

		"The rule that the statute of limitations does not
apply to the state has been several times affirmed by
this court. * * *" 

See also Day v. Salem, 65 Or 114, 122, 131 P 1028 (1913)
(discussing rationale for nullum tempus rule).

		At common law, the nullum tempus rule protected the
king's civil claims not only from the impediment of statutes of
limitation but also from any claim of negligence or prejudicial
untimeliness in pursuing claims:

		"Lapse of time does not bar the right of the crown.

		"In pursuance of the principle, already
considered, of the sovereign's incapability of doing
wrong, the law also determines that in the crown there
can be no negligence or laches; and, therefore, it was
formerly held, that no delay in resorting to his remedy
would bar the king's right; for the time and attention
of the sovereign must be supposed to be occupied by the
cares of government, nor is there any reason that he
should suffer by the negligence of his officers, or by
their fraudulent collusion with the adverse party 

	* * *."

A Selection of Legal Maxims 65 (Herbert Broom ed, 8th American ed
1882) (emphasis in original).  Following the broad formulation of
the rule at common law, this court has applied the nullum tempus
rule in other areas, such as to protect government from the
defense of laches.  Corvallis Sand & Gravel v. Land Board, 250 Or
319, 331-32, 439 P2d 575 (1968), states:

		"By the great weight of authority in this country
the defense of laches is not available against the
government, state or national, in a suit by it to
enforce a public right or protect a public interest

	* * *."

(Citations omitted.)  See also State ex rel Anderson v. Port of
Tillamook, 62 Or 332, 344, 124 P 637 (1912) (nullum tempus rule
protects the right of private parties, acting on the relation of
the state, to initiate quo warranto proceeding at any time; the
lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding).

		Defendants argue that plaintiff is not entitled to rely
on the two common-law rules discussed above for several reasons. 
First, defendants argue that those rules protect only the state
government, not a quasi-municipal corporation such as plaintiff. 
Defendants rely for that view on a dictum statement by this court
in Withers.(12)  Defendants also rely on Cabell v. Fed. Land Bank
of Spokane, 173 Or 11, 144 P2d 297 (1943), but that case sheds no
light on the issue.(13)

		The parties appear to agree, as do I, that each of the
common-law rules discussed above serve to protect identical
levels of government.  Neither common-law rule benefits a broader
range of public entities than the other.

		Several of this court's cases have identified the
entity served by those two common-law rules as the "state."  That
is due, at least in part, to the state's participation in those
cases as a party.  See, e.g., State Land Board v. Campbell, 140
Or at 198 (applying rule against inclusion of government);
Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 250 Or at 332 (applying nullum tempus
rule, the defense of laches is not available against "the
government, state or national * * *").  However, several of this
court's decisions describe the public bodies to which those
common-law rules apply in broader terms.  See Peninsula Dr. Dist.
No. 2, 212 Or at 418 (principle against inclusion of government
applies to the "government, whether federal or state, [and] its
agencies"); State Land Board v. Lee, 84 Or at 434 (nullum tempus
rule protects "the government"); Seton, 34 Or at 273 (rule
against inclusion of government applies to a county, which is an
"agent or instrumentality of the state * * *").  See also Day, 65
Or at 122, in which this court, quoting other authorities,
described the policy supporting the nullum tempus rule:

		"'The real ground is a great principle of
public policy, which belongs alike to all
governments, that the public interest should
not be prejudiced by the negligence of public
officers, to whose care they are confided.'" 

(Emphasis added.)

		If any doubt lingers about the applicability of the two
pertinent common-law rules to public entities other than the
state, Chizek resolves the doubt in Shasta View's favor.  In
Chizek, a county's grantees brought a suit to quiet title to a
lot claimed by the defendant Port of Newport.  252 Or at 571. 
The port was a municipal corporation.  ORS 777.005(5) ("'Port'
means a municipal corporation incorporated, or proposed to be
incorporated, pursuant to ORS 777.010 and 777.050.").  A previous
owner of the lot, Sargeant, had failed to pay property taxes and
transferred the lot to the port.  Id. at 572.  The county
continued to assess property taxes against the property, although
the port was exempt from taxation.  Ultimately, the county
foreclosed and sold the property to the plaintiffs.  In the quiet
title action, the port collaterally attacked the foreclosure
proceeding.  The plaintiffs contended that the collateral attack
was barred by the statute of limitations, ORS 312.230,(14) and by
laches.  Id. at 574.  The port answered that the statute of
limitations did not apply to public bodies.  Id. at 575.

		This court, quoting State Land Board v. Lee, 84 Or at
434, first noted the

		"'rule of universal recognition that the
government is not included in a general
statute of limitation unless it is expressly
or by necessary implication included.'"

Chizek, 252 Or at 576.  The court then stated the following
holding:

		"We hold that the Port, as a public body, is not
barred by the statute of limitations and the tax
foreclosure proceeding is invalid and, therefore, the
plaintiffs secured no title to the disputed property."

Id. at 578 (emphasis added).

		Shasta View, like the Port of Newport in Chizek, is a
public body, specifically, a quasi-municipal corporation created
under the Irrigation District Law.  ORS 545.001 et seq.  Central
Pacific Co. v. Ager, 144 Or 527, 533, 25 P2d 927 (1933) (an
irrigation district, under Oregon's statute, is a quasi-municipal
corporation); Greig v. Owyhee Irr. Dist et al., 102 Or 265, 273,
202 P 222 (1921) (same).  As with other quasi-municipal
corporations, irrigation districts are created by legislative
enactment as "agenc[ies] of the state for a particular purpose  
* * *."  See Wasco County P.U.D. v. Kelly, 171 Or 691, 719-20,
137 P2d 295 (1943) (citations omitted) (describing the attributes
of a quasi-municipal corporation in those terms, and noting that
irrigation, public utility, drainage, and school districts are in
the same classification).  Chizek indicates that Shasta View, as
a public body, is entitled to rely on the rule of nullum tempus. 
Because the nullum tempus rule and the rule against inclusion of
government apply to the same category of public bodies, Shasta
View likewise is entitled to rely on the rule against inclusion
of government.

		The majority asserts that the nullum tempus rule is
inapplicable here, because ORS 30.905(1) is a statute of ultimate
repose, not a statute of limitation.  According to the majority, 
a statute of repose provides a deadline for initiation of an
action whether or not the plaintiff discovers the injury or
whether the injury has even occurred, whereas a statute of
limitation bars a litigant's right to a remedy.(15)  Shasta View,
____ Or at ____ (slip op at 12-15).

		I assume, for purposes of argument, that the expiration
of a statute of ultimate repose can effect harsher consequences
on a plaintiff's claim than the expiration of a statute of
limitations, as the majority theorizes.(16)  But the majority's
effort to point out the differences between those kinds of time
deadlines with respect to the commencement of litigation
logically should lead the majority to the conclusion that the
nullum tempus rule applies here with even greater force.  

		By focusing exclusively on the distinctions between a
statute of ultimate repose and a statute of limitation, the
majority ignores the important feature that they share in this
context: once the time deadline expires, each statute prevents
the public body from asserting its civil claim on behalf of the
public that it represents.  The very purpose of the nullum tempus
rule is to protect government from any prejudice to its claims
due to the lapse of time unless the statute that created the time
deadline applies to the government expressly or by necessary
implication.  That rule rests on a policy of protecting the
public from the loss of its claims, due to the expiration of
time, unless the lawmaking body acts explicitly to apply the time
deadline to the claims of public bodies.  If that public
protection policy shields government from the assertion of any
defense of untimeliness created by a statute of limitations,  by
dint of reasoning, that policy applies all the more obviously to
protect government from a time deadline that purports to nullify
the government's civil claim.  I see no sense in the majority's
approach, which, in the context of statutory barriers to stale
litigation, would protect the public from the lesser jeopardy of
a timeliness defense, but expose the public to the greater
jeopardy of the nullification of its claims.(17)  

		The majority's error stems in part from its erroneous
view that the nullum tempus rule applies solely to statutes of
limitation.  The early cases and treatise authors discussed the
rule's operation in relation to statutes of "limitation" only
because that was the label attributed at that time by the English
parliament to statutes that established time deadlines for
commencing particular civil actions.  Note, Developments in the
Law--Statutes of Limitation, 63 Harv L Rev 1177, 1178 (1950)
("The Limitation Act of 1623 marks the beginning of the modern
law of limitations on personal actions in the common law.").(18)

		The enactment of statutes of "repose" is a relatively
recent legislative phenomenon.  But the case law reviewed above
indicates that statutes of limitation were designed to prevent
litigation of stale claims, and that modern statutes of repose
share the same objective.  In light of that fact, it is
unimaginable that an English common-law court would protect the
sovereign's claims against the running of statutes of limitation,
but permit statutes of repose, had they existed, to nullify the
sovereign's claims without prescribing that consequence
explicitly.  Certainly those courts would have applied the nullum
tempus rule to both kinds of statutes.

		The majority also misperceives how the nullum tempus
rule operates to protect government from the expiration of
statutory deadlines.  Under the common-law nullum tempus rule,
statutory deadlines for the commencement of litigation, or for
the timely assertion of civil claims or defenses, do not commence
to run against public bodies.  In other words, the rule dictates
that, as to the claim of a governmental body, a statutory
deadline does not begin to run and, therefore, never "expires." 
The majority's rationale, which imputes a more onerous
consequence to the expiration of the time deadline in ORS
30.905(1) than to a statute of limitations, fails to recognize
that the nullum tempus rule focuses on whether the statutory
deadline commences to run on the government's claim, not on some
particular effect of the deadline's expiration.  The nullum
tempus rule, correctly applied, compels the conclusion that
Shasta View's claim never expired because, as to the claim of a
public body, the 8-year period in ORS 30.905(1) never commenced
to run.  The majority's discussion of the consequences of
expiration of a statutory deadline that never commenced to run is
irrelevant.

		Without doubt, ORS 30.905(1) does not satisfy the
nullum tempus rule that statutes must include public bodies
expressly or by necessary implication in order for time to run
against public bodies.  ORS 30.905(1) does not make the period of
repose applicable to the claims of public bodies expressly.  ORS
30.905(1) begins with the following phrase: "Notwithstanding ORS
12.115 or 12.140 * * *."(19)  ORS 12.115 is a statute of ultimate
repose for negligence and ORS 12.140 is the general statute of
limitations for any cause for which a period of limitations is
not otherwise specified.  The introductory phrase of ORS
30.905(1) signals only that the 8-year period for product
liability claims operates notwithstanding the enactment of longer
periods of repose or limitation for other types of claims in ORS
12.115 and ORS 12.140.  The introductory phrase was intended only
to eliminate the possible confusion that might result without an
interpretive signal that explained the governing effect of ORS
30.905(1) in respect to product liability claims.  That phrase in
ORS 30.905(1) does not make the statute applicable to the claims
of governmental bodies expressly or by necessary implication. 
Moreover, the legislature's enactment of a complete exemption for
specified public bodies from an entire chapter of limitations,
ORS 12.250, together with a related statute, ORS 12.135(1) and
(5)(a),(20) that subjects public bodies  to the statutory period of
repose for claims arising from construction projects,
demonstrates that the legislature's omission of a reference to
the claims of public bodies in ORS 30.905(1) was intentional.

		I agree with the view of amicus State of Oregon that
nothing in ORS 30.905(1) compels the conclusion that that statute
necessarily must apply to the claims of public bodies.  Product
liability claims arise no more frequently in regard to product
purchases by public bodies than by private purchasers.  If
product vendors might suffer any genuine prejudice because public
plaintiffs are exempt from ORS 30.905(1) -- a fact about which
the present record is noticeably silent -- we must conclude that
the legislature anticipated and intended that consequence.  Like
amicus State of Oregon, I find nothing about the practical
operation of ORS 30.905(1) that suggests that that statute
necessarily must apply to claims by public bodies.

		3.  Conclusion.

		The two common-law rules under consideration govern the
construction of statutory text in context.  Under the rule
against inclusion of government, ORS 30.905(1) does not apply to
product liability claims of a public body such as Shasta View,
because the legislature did not make the statute apply to the
claims of a public body expressly or by necessary implication. 
Under the nullum tempus rule, ORS 30.905(1) does not apply to
Shasta View's product liability claim for the same reason.

		I would answer Additional Question No. 3 "YES." 
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's contrary answer.

		In summary, I concur with the majority's answer to
Certified Question No. 2.  I would not answer Certified Question
No. 1 because, in view of the answer to Certified Question No. 2,
Certified Question No. 1 is moot.  I dissent from the majority's
answer to Additional Question No. 3.

		Kulongoski, J., joins in this opinion.

1. 	As noted earlier, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Amoco on the ground that Shasta is not a
"public corporation" for purposes of the statutory time
limitation.  The dissent claims that it would not answer the
first certified question, which deals with whether Shasta is a
public corporation, because our answer to the second certified
question, with which the dissent agrees, "obviates the need to
answer Certified Question No. 1."  __ Or at __ (Durham, J.,
dissenting, slip op at 2).  Although the dissent would not answer
the question that has been certified by the Ninth Circuit,
curiously it would answer a much broader question, namely,
whether Shasta is a "public body."  __ Or at __ (Durham, J.,
dissenting, slip op at 25).  The parties did not brief or argue
whether Shasta is a public body.  The legislature has defined a
public body in extraordinarily broad terms in ORS 30.260(4).  The
dissent apparently would hold that, because Shasta is a public
body, it, as with other public bodies, is entitled to rely on
what the dissent incorrectly characterizes as the common-law rule
of "nullum tempus occurrit regi."  By answering the first
certified question -- whether Shasta is a public corporation --
we properly avoid answering the broader question that the dissent
would raise and answer sua sponte.

2. 	ORS 12.115 provides:

		"(1)  In no event shall any action for negligent injury
to person or property of another be commenced more than 10
years from the date of the act or omission complained of.

		"(2)  Nothing in this section shall be construed to
extend any period of limitation otherwise established by
law, including but not limited to the limitations
established by ORS 12.110."

3. 	ORS 12.140 provides:

		"An action for any cause not otherwise provided for
shall be commenced within 10 years."  

4. 	ORS 12.250 provides:

		"Unless otherwise made applicable thereto, the
limitations prescribed in this chapter shall not apply
to actions brought in the name of the state, or any
county, or other public corporation therein, or for its
benefit."

5. 	ORS 30.905 provides:

		"(1) Notwithstanding ORS 12.115 or 12.140 and
except as provided in subsection (2) of this section
and ORS 30.907 and 30.908(1) to (4), a product
liability civil action shall be commenced not later
than eight years after the date on which the product
was first purchased for use or consumption.

		"(2) Except as provided in ORS 30.907 and
30.908(1) to (4), a product liability civil action
shall be commenced not later than two years after the
date on which the death, injury or damage complained of
occurs."

6. 	The State of Oregon argues:

	"[T]he state's interest is to support the common law
doctrine, which provides the legislature's 'default
mode' as to whether statutes of general application
apply to governmental entities, absent express
provision therefor.  Longstanding Oregon law, and the
statutory context of the Oregon Revised Statutes,
establish that such statutes do not include the
government, unless governmental entities are included
by express reference or such a result is compelled by
necessary implication."

7. 	See Withers, et al. v. Reed, 194 Or 541, 551-52, 243
P2d 283 (1952) (discussing "the rule against inclusion of
government" and quoting G.A. Endlich, A Commentary on the
Interpretation of Statutes § 167 at 232 (1888)).

8. 	The third cited common-law rule, "nullum tempus
occurrit regi," (literally, "no time runs against the king") is
discussed in detail later in this opinion.

9. 	The legislature is well aware of the rule against
inclusion of government and takes that rule into account in the
lawmaking process.  For example, consider the definition of the
important term "organization" in the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), ORS 71.2010(28):

		"'Organization' includes a corporation, government
or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust,
estate, trust, partnership or association, two or more
persons having a joint or common interest, or any other
legal or commercial entity."

	In drafting that definition, the legislature clearly
expressed its intention to apply the UCC to public bodies.  It
did not leave to the processes of interpretation and inference
the question whether the final phrase of the definition, "any
other legal * * * entity," was adequate to include public bodies.

10. 	The rationale followed in Seton, 34 Or at 273, which
applied the rule against inclusion of government to protect a
county, applies with equal force here to protect plaintiff. 
Irrigation districts exist under state law, ORS 545.001 et seq.
(Irrigation District Law), to facilitate local administration of
a precious resource, water.  See also Chizek, 252 Or 576-78
(applying the closely related rule, nullum tempus occurrit regi,
to protect a public body, i.e., the Port of Newport).

11. 	Withers did not treat separately the two common-law
rules discussed in this opinion, but analyzed them together as
somewhat different applications of one "general rule" that it
described as follows:

		"Reed relies upon the principle crystalized in the
legal maxim, nullum tempus occurrit regi.  The general
rule is thus stated in 3 Sutherland, Statutory
Construction 3d ed, 183, §6301:

			"'General words or language of a statute
that tends to injuriously encroach upon the
affairs of the government receive a strict
interpretation favorable to the public, and,
in the absence of express provision or
necessary implication, the sovereign remains
unaffected.'" 

Withers, 194 Or at 544.

12. 	In Withers, two parties, one of whom was a successor-in-interest to the state, disputed water rights.  The parties'
rights turned on the question whether OCLA § 116-437, providing
that water rights were forfeited if not used for five years,
applied to the state.  194 Or at 542.  The successor-in-interest
to the state argued that OCLA § 116-437 did not so apply,
invoking nullum tempus.  Id. at 544.  This court held that the
state was not entitled to invoke nullum tempus, because OCLA §
116-437 was "passed for the public good."  Id. at 556.  In dicta,
the court spoke to an argument against its holding:

		"The argument that irrigation districts might lose
their water rights for nonuser, if the statute in
question should be held applicable to the state, is
entirely beside the point.  An irrigation district is a
quasi-municipal corporation.  Central Pacific Co. v.
Ager, 144 Or 527, 533, 25 P2d 927.  It is not the
state, nor an agency of the state in the same sense as
the State Land Board is an agency of the state.  Were
we called upon to determine whether irrigation
districts are bound by the provisions of [OCLA § 116-437], we would not be in the least concerned with the
maxim nullum tempus, which applies only to the
sovereign, but with very different considerations,
such, for example, as the purposes which irrigation
districts are intended to serve under the statute which
authorizes their creation."

Id.

13. 	In Cabell, an irrigation district sought foreclosure of
a lien on a parcel of land.  173 Or at 16.  The landowner argued
that the district's claim was not timely filed under a six-year
statute of limitations and the district demurred to the
landowner's statute of limitation plea.  Id. at 17.  The trial
court overruled the demurrer, but ruled ultimately that the
district had no valid lien on the property.  On appeal, this
court stated that the trial court should have sustained the
district's demurrer, because the applicable period of limitation
for a suit upon a sealed instrument seeking no personal judgment
was ten years, not six years.  Id. at 19.  However, this court
decided that the trial court's disposition was correct under an
alternative rationale, viz., the land was not subject to any lien
because it was not suitable for irrigation.  Id. at 23.  The
opinion does not mention, let alone analyze, the relevance of the
nullum tempus principle under those facts.

14. 	ORS 312.230 (1) and (3) state:

		"(1) Every action, suit or proceeding, commenced
for the purpose of determining the validity of a sale
of real property on foreclosure for delinquent taxes,
or to quiet title against such sale, or to remove the
cloud thereof, or to recover possession of the
property, shall be commenced within two years from the
date of the judgment and decree of foreclosure and sale
to the county, or within six months from June 1, 1961,
whichever is the later.

		"* * *

		"(3) For all purposes this section shall be
construed as a statute of prescription as well as a
statute of limitation."

15. 	The label "statute of ultimate repose" can apply to any
of several discrete legislative policy choices.  Francis E.
McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product
Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am Univ L Rev 579, 582 (1981)
(hereinafter McGovern):

		"The term 'statute of repose' itself can create
analytical difficulties unless there is an
understanding of its meaning.  Although courts may
conclude that semantics is irrelevant to a
consideration of statutes of repose, there are
substantial reasons to use precise labels for
underlying statutes.  These reasons become particularly
compelling when at least five definitions of 'statute
of repose' are in use."

(Footnotes omitted.)

16. 	For criticism of the distinction between barring a
"right" and a "remedy," see Note, Developments in the Law­-Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv L Rev 1177, 1186-88 (1950)
("Interpretation of the nature of limitations, proceeding blindly
from an initial determination that they either bar the remedy
only or extinguish the right entirely, has not proved
satisfactory."); Calvin W. Corman, 1 Limitation of Actions, 7,
§1.1 (1991) ("Several recent decisions of the Alaska Supreme
Court reveal the growing judicial belief that categorization of
these statutes as conditioning the right, rather than providing
remedy, actually sacrifices policy for the sake of formalistic
legal abstraction."); Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal Dimension
in Tort Law, 53 U Chi L Rev 1175, 1210 (1986) ("[I]t is wholly a
matter of words to say that the cause of action was barred before
it accrued or to say that it never existed at all.  Whether [a
statute of repose] should stand or fall should depend upon its
substance, not upon an arbitrary judicial verbalization.").

17. 	Widely divergent substantive consequences can flow from
attaching the label "statute of ultimate repose" to a statute
that incorporates a time deadline for the commencement of
litigation.  McGovern at 613.  Therefore, courts must draw
conclusions about a statute's meaning and effect only after
analyzing conventional sources of legislative intent, especially
the statute's text and context, and not simply affix a label and
assume the statute's consequences from the label alone.  For
example, Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Or 387, 392, 788 P2d 435 (1990),
asserted in dictum that ORS 30.905(1) was the "products liability
statute of repose" without examining the statute's text and
context to support that conclusion.  Had the court conducted that
analysis, it would have noticed that that statute is structurally
identical to ORS 30.905(2), which the court correctly identified
as a "statute of limitation," but with a deadline that commences
to run on the date of purchase for use or consumption instead of
the date of injury.  The court rejected a potential construction
that would make ORS 30.905(1) subordinate to ORS 30.905(2), but
failed to consider whether subsections (1) and (2) simply express
two parallel statutes of limitations, each of which could time
bar a claim.  Finally, the court failed to consider the
significance of the absence of the phrase "in no event" from ORS
30.905(1), even though, in Josephs v. Burns & Bear, 260 Or 493,
501, 491 P2d 203 (1971), this court had held that that phrase
helped establish that ORS 12.115(1) was a statute of ultimate
repose for negligence.

18. 	The early statutes of limitation shared more than a
semantic similarity to modern statutes of repose, especially in
their objective of bringing an end to potential litigation
through the expiration of time.  See Ketchum v. State of Oregon,
2 Or 103, 106 (1864):

	"Statutes of limitations are intended to be statutes of
repose, to prevent litigation; and where one has slept
for years with a full knowledge of his rights, and
seeks only to enforce them when essentially important
witnesses have long since departed from the
jurisdiction or reach of process, and the defendant is
powerless from the frailties of human memory, it is
eminently proper that the law should expressly
intervene, and say to the plaintiff that his sleeping
has been too long, and the advantage now sought too
grossly faulty to be encouraged.  This view of the
benefit of such a statute supposes that all this time
the claimant was resting under the shadow of judicial
tribunals whose assistance he might invoke; that by law
he could at any time enforce his claim by action, and
that he abused that right, and by delay disarmed his
opponent of his watchfulness.  Truly, the plaintiff has
a right to choose the time to enforce his rights, but
it is a provident feature in the law to say that he
must exercise that right within a reasonable time or
the law will presume his claim satisfied."  

(Citations omitted; emphasis added.)  See also Ford v. Schall, 
110 Or 21, 27-28, 221 P 1052, on reh'g 222 P 1094 (1924)
(citation omitted) ("'[T]he statutes of limitations * * * are
considered as statutes of repose, and as affording security
against stale claims.'"); Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Or 383, 387, 24 P
195 (1890) ("[T]he statute of limitations [is] one of the means
of giving repose to stale subjects of litigation * * *.").  The
description of statutes of limitation as statutes of "repose" or
"peace" is common in both this country and in England.  See also
United States v. Kubrick, 444 US 111, 117, 100 S Ct 352, 357, 62
L Ed 2d 259, 266 (1979) (statutes of limitation "are statutes of
repose").

19. 	ORS 12.115 states, in part:

		"(1) In no event shall any action for negligent
injury to person or property of another be commenced
more than 10 years from the date of the act or omission
complained of."

ORS 12.140 states:

		"An action for any cause not otherwise provided
for shall be commenced within 10 years."

20. 	ORS 12.135 states, in part:

		"(1) An action against a person, whether in
contract, tort or otherwise, arising from such person
having performed the construction, alteration or repair
of any improvement to real property or the supervision
or inspection thereof, or from such person having
furnished the design, planning, surveying,
architectural or engineering services for such
improvement, shall be commenced within the applicable
period of limitation otherwise established by law; but
in any event such action shall be commenced within 10
years from substantial completion or abandonment of
such construction, alteration or repair of the
improvement to real property.

		"* * * * *

		"(5) This section:

		"(a) Applies, in addition to other actions, to
actions brought in the name of the state or any county
or other public corporation therein, or for its benefit
* * *."