Case Title: State v. Fletcher

Citation: 181 S.E.2d 405, 279 N.C. 85

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1971-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
181 S.E.2d 405 (1971)
279 N.C. 85
STATE of North Carolina
v.
William Dallas FLETCHER.
STATE of North Carolina
v.
Wesley ST. ARNOLD.
No. 70.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
June 10, 1971.
*408 Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan and Staff Atty. Edward L. Eatman, Jr., Raleigh, for the State.
Jerry B. Grimes, Lexington, for defendant Fletcher.
William H. Steed, Thomasville, for defendant St. Arnold.
BRANCH, Justice:
Defendant St. Arnold contends that the trial court erred in admitting, over his objection, the custodial statement made by him to Myers while in a police officer's presence.
Major Kirkman of the Thomasville Police force, accompanied Myers to St. Arnold's cell about 7:00 p. m. on 28 February 1970. At that time the record shows that the following conversation occurred between Myers and St. Arnold:
The statement made by defendant St. Arnold amounted to a confession since it, in effect, admitted that he took part in the armed robbery. State v. Williford, 275 N.C. 575, 169 S.E.2d 851; State v. Hamer, 240 N.C. 85, 81 S.E.2d 193. Thus, the constitutional and evidentiary rules of law relative to confessions are applicable.
Voluntariness remains the test of admissibility of a confession. State v. McRae, 276 N.C. 308, 172 S.E.2d 37; State v. McCloud, 276 N.C. 518, 173 S.E.2d 753. The fact that a defendant is in jail and under arrest when he makes a confession does not, standing alone, render it involuntary. State v. Crawford, 260 N.C. 548, 133 S.E.2d 232.
In State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E.2d 581, it is stated:
The so-called "Miranda warnings" are only required where defendant is being subjected to custodial interrogation. State v. Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 158 S.E.2d 638; State v. Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 165 S.E.2d 245. Unquestionably, St. Arnold was in custody in a police dominated atmosphere. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694. However, whether the question addressed to St. Arnold by Myers constituted interrogation within the meaning of Miranda poses a more serious question.
In 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 555, p. 610, it is stated:
In People v. Morse, 70 Cal. App. 2d 711, 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607, the defendant, a prisoner, was accused of murdering one of the prison inmates. The prison guard found the victim outside defendant's cell, and the guard was permitted to testify that while he was trying to revive the victim he asked defendant, "Joe, did you do this?" The defendant nodded his head in the affirmative, and said "Yeah." The Court, holding that the guard's questions were "devoid of inquisitorial techniques" and that no process of interrogation had been undertaken, stated:
In Howell v. State, 5 Md.App. 337, 247 A.2d 291, the defendant had been questioned initially and had terminated the questioning *410 by stating he did not wish to be questioned further. An hour later, while the appellant was being "processed" at the police station, he was told that his accomplice had made incriminating statements about him. He thereupon made a statement which he later attacked in court. It was held that the statement did not result from "interrogation" but was more in the nature of volunteered information.
In State v. Perry, 276 N.C. 339, 172 S.E.2d 541, the defendant was confined to jail awaiting trial for murder. Upon his trial the court allowed his cellmate to testify that the defendant told him that he (the defendant) shot the deceased. Holding that the court need not conduct a voir dire hearing to determine the voluntariness of the admission, this Court, speaking through Higgins, J., stated:
Accord: State v. Spence, 271 N.C. 23, 155 S.E.2d 802.
We do not think that the statement made to Myers by St. Arnold was a result of custodial interrogation as condemned by the line of authority represented by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977; Miranda v. Arizona, supra; and Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 16 L. Ed. 2d 895, 86 S. Ct. 1761. Even had there been error in the admission of this statement, it would not have been prejudicial since there is no reasonable possibility that it would have contributed to St. Arnold's conviction. We believe that the admission of the statement, if erroneous, would have been harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705.
Defendant Fletcher assigns as error the admission of the above-quoted extra-judicial statement made by his codefendant St. Arnold to Myers.
The rules of law pertinent to decision of this question were enunciated and applied as they relate to the defendant in State v. Swaney, supra. In that case, this Court, relying particularly on State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E.2d 492, and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, held the admission of St. Arnold's statement to be erroneous; however, the error was declared "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." See also State v. Brinson, 277 N.C. 286, 177 S.E.2d 398, and Chapman v. California, supra. The principles upon which Swaney was decided are even more clearly applicable to Fletcher. Swaney was found sitting in an automobile near the scene of the crime, with the motor running. Fletcher was identified by the victim as one of the *411 men who robbed him. Several police officers saw him emerge from the building where the alleged robbery occurred. He immediately fired at the officers and attempted to flee, but was wounded and arrested at the very scene of the robbery. This overwhelming evidence of his participation in the robbery demands an application of the rule declaring the admission of St. Arnold's statement to be "harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt."
This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant Fletcher contends that the trial judge erred by denying his motion to disclose the identity of an alleged informer.
Fletcher's motion was made in apt time. We must therefore consider whether the circumstances of this case require disclosure of the informer's identity. State v. Swaney, supra, differs factually from instant case, in that Swaney contended that he knew nothing about the robbery. However, both Swaney and Fletcher rely on the defense of entrapment to support this assignment of error.
We find in 76 A.L.R.2d, at p. 282, the following:
The North Carolina cases on entrapment are accurately summarized in 2 Strong's N.C.Index 2d, Criminal Law, § 7, as follows:
We think that the language used by the U. S. Supreme Court in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S. Ct. 1381, 10 L. Ed. 2d 462, is appropriate to decision of the question here presented. There the Court stated:
Here there is not only strong independent evidence of Fletcher's guilt, but there is complete failure to show any conduct *412 by police officers which may have induced defendant Fletcher to commit the crime of armed robbery. The evidence shows only that officers received information that a crime might be committed and thereupon took appropriate action. Neither do we find prejudicial error in the fact that the trial court did not rule on this motion until the State had completed a portion of its evidence. We fail to see that the ruling denying this motion prejudiced Fletcher since he was not forced to develop inconsistent defenses and had full opportunity to offer any available defense.
Under the circumstances of this case we hold that the trial judge properly denied the motion to disclose the identity of the informer.
Fletcher next assigns as error the action of the trial judge in allowing the solicitor to cross-examine Swaney concerning his prior criminal record.
The general rule is that when a defendant in a criminal action testifies in his own behalf, the State's solicitor may, for the purpose of impeachment and attacking his credibility as a witness, cross-examine him as to previous criminal convictions. State v. Goodson, 273 N.C. 128, 159 S.E.2d 310; Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence, 2d, § 112. Fletcher, however, points to the further cross-examination when the solicitor asked Swaney where he met Fletcher, and Swaney, over defendant Fletcher's objection, replied, "Virginia State Pen."
The rule controlling the question here presented is well stated in Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence, 2d Ed., § 91, p. 210, as follows:
Here Swaney testified that as a result of automobile trouble he was hitchhiking and was picked up by Fletcher and St. Arnold. His testimony implied that there was an accidental meeting, and that no plan or design to commit armed robbery could have existed between the parties. This cross-examination was properly allowed in order to show that Fletcher and Swaney had known each other for many years and that a plan or design could have existed between them to commit the armed robbery. See Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence, § 92, p. 216.
Defendant Fletcher further contends that the trial judge erred in sustaining the State's objection to lay testimony relative to defendant's being under the influence of Wyamine, an amphetamine drug.
In this connection defendant's attorney asked Patrolman Scruggs if he had an opinion as to "whether or not he (defendant) was under the influence of some drug to a sufficient amount to have deprived him of his reason or control." The court sustained the State's objection, but permitted his answer to be placed in the record. The answer to the question as shown in the record is "I don't know." Later, Patrolman Scruggs was recalled for further cross-examination by defendant's attorney, and the following transpired:
It is evident that defendant was not prejudiced by the court's first ruling in light of the patrolman's negative answer. Upon recall, the court allowed defendant's counsel fully to explore Patrolman Scruggs' opinion as to defendant's condition relative to drugs. Even if the evidence then elicited were prejudicial, defendant may not complain of evidence elicited by him on cross-examination. State v. Burton, 256 N.C. 464, 124 S.E.2d 108.
On cross-examination defendant's counsel elicited from Swaney that he had seen defendant Fletcher inject himself with Wyamine six to ten times during the week immediately preceding 28 February, 1970, and that after such injections he would appear to get a "feeling of well-being and be relaxed * * * and mostly just talked and get very excited." During the cross-examination of Swaney by defendant's counsel the record shows the following:
Thereafter, Swaney was allowed to testify that he himself had used Wyamine from 1961 to 1966, and had been using the same drug for some time immediately preceding the armed robbery.
This Court has long recognized that a lay witness may give his opinion as to whether a person is under the influence *414 of intoxicants when the witness has personally observed him. State v. Warren, 236 N.C. 358, 72 S.E.2d 763; State v. Flinchem, 247 N.C. 118, 100 S.E.2d 206. Likewise, a lay witness may state his opinion as to whether a person is under the influence of drugs when he has observed the person and such testimony is relevant to the issue being tried. State v. Cook, 273 N.C. 377, 160 S.E.2d 49.
Swaney appeared to be well qualified by special experience to give opinion testimony as to whether Fletcher was under the influence of the drug Wyamine, and he had ample opportunity to observe Fletcher on the occasion of the alleged robbery. See 47 NCL Rev. 193. However, it must be noted that the question to which objection was made was patently a leading question.
In Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence, § 31, p. 58, it is stated:
Further, the answer as to whether defendant could form an intent to commit the crime was unresponsive and was properly stricken on the solicitor's motion. State v. Norris, 242 N.C. 47, 86 S.E.2d 916.
The record does not contain an answer to many of the questions asked Swaney concerning Fletcher's condition with respect to drugs. An exception to the exclusion of evidence cannot be sustained when the record fails to show what the witness would have testified had he been permitted to answer. State v. Poolos, 241 N.C. 382, 85 S.E.2d 342; State v. Kirby, 276 N.C. 123, 171 S.E.2d 416.
Aside from the technical rules of evidence, the opinion evidence which counsel sought to elicit from Swaney concerning Fletcher's ability to form an intent to commit the crime of armed robbery runs counter to the actions of Fletcher as described by Swaney and all of the other eyewitnesses. We cannot perceive how a person who could not form an intent to commit a crime could know right from wrong. Fletcher's actions in firing at the police officers and in attempting to flee demonstrates his ability to distinguish right and wrong. The possession of his senses was further demonstrated by his actions during the robbery. He told St. Arnold where the money box could be found, and he asked Myers if he had other money. He assisted in tying up the victim and, after placing him in a small room, helped secure the door with wire. These actions would overwhelmingly rebut any testimony which counsel sought to elicit from Swaney concerning Fletcher's ability to form an intent to commit the act of armed robbery. Thus, if the judge did technically err in his ruling, which we do not concede, the facts of this case would relegate such error to the class of harmless error.
Defendant assigns as error the signing of the judgment and denial of his motion in arrest of judgment. An exception to the judgment presents the face of the record for review, and a motion in arrest of judgment is one generally made after verdict to prevent entry of judgment based upon insufficiency of the indictment or some other fatal defect appearing on the face of the record. We have carefully searched the record in instant case, and *415 no fatal defect appears on its face. State v. Kirby, supra.
Fletcher and St. Arnold were simply caught "red-handed" in the very act of committing the crime of armed robbery. This record recites the uncontradicted testimony of seven eyewitnesses which unerringly points the finger of guilt to both Fletcher and St. Arnold. In light of the overwhelming evidence presented by the State, any errors which might have occurred in this trial are clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We find no prejudicial error as to either William Dallas Fletcher or Wesley St. Arnold.
No Error.