Case Title: State v Berry

Citation: 

Docket Number: 315A14

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. COA14-79 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 15 July 2014 
 
 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
 
 
 
 
J.C. 
 
J.C. 
Johnston County 
Nos. 13 JA 101-02 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by respondent mother from orders entered 15 and 22 
October 2013 by Judge Resson Faircloth in Johnston County 
District Court.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 June 2014.  
 
Holland 
& 
O’Connor, 
by 
Jennifer 
S. 
O’Connor, 
for 
petitioner-appellee Johnston County Department of Social 
Services. 
 
Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
Marie H. Mobley for guardian ad litem. 
 
 
ELMORE, Judge. 
 
 
Respondent mother appeals from the trial court’s orders 
adjudicating the juveniles neglected and dependent.  Respondent 
contends that the trial court made insufficient findings to 
demonstrate it had obtained jurisdiction over the matter, made 
insufficient findings to support its order adjudicating the 
juveniles neglected and dependent, and improperly required 
respondent to pay the costs of her visitation.  We affirm the 
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adjudication of neglect and the disposition order, but remand 
for correction of a clerical error as to the adjudication of 
dependency. 
The juveniles were born in 2007.  Kentucky authorities  
became involved with the family in 2008 based on reports of 
domestic violence between respondent and the juveniles’ father.  
A Kentucky court granted the father custody of the juveniles.  
The family moved to North Carolina in December of 2011, and 
respondent and the father have been involved in domestic 
violence and custody disputes in North Carolina since March of 
2012.  
On 31 May 2013, the Johnston County Department of Social 
Services (“DSS”) substantiated a report of neglect due to an 
injurious environment, based on the parents’ unresolved conflict 
and its negative impact on the juveniles.  That conflict 
included concerns that the juveniles had made false accusations 
of sexual abuse against their father at respondent’s behest.  On 
27 June 2013, DSS filed petitions alleging that the juveniles 
were neglected and dependent, and it filed amended petitions on 
11 July 2013. 
The matter came on for an adjudication hearing on 29 August 
2013.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made an 
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oral finding that the juveniles were neglected.  The trial court 
entered its initial adjudication order on 4 October 2013, and 
entered an amended order on 22 October 2013.  In the written 
orders, the trial court adjudicated the juveniles neglected and 
dependent.  The disposition hearing took place on 12 September 
2013.  The trial court placed the juveniles in the custody of 
their 
paternal 
grandmother 
and 
provided 
respondent 
with 
supervised visitation to be held at a visitation center at her 
expense.  Respondent appeals. 
In her first argument on appeal, respondent contends that 
the trial court failed to make adequate findings to establish 
its jurisdiction, in light of the prior case in Kentucky.  We 
disagree. 
“This Court’s determination of whether a trial court has 
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that is 
reviewed on appeal de novo.”  Powers v. Wagner, 213 N.C. App. 
353, 357, 716 S.E.2d 354, 357 (2011) (citation and quotation 
omitted). 
 
The 
district 
court 
has 
“exclusive, 
original 
jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged 
to be abused, neglected, or dependent.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
200(a) (2013).  The jurisdictional requirements of the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) must 
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also be satisfied for a court to have authority to adjudicate 
petitions filed pursuant to the Juvenile Code.  In re Brode, 151 
N.C. App. 690, 692-94, 566 S.E.2d 858, 860-61 (2002). 
Under the UCCJEA, a North Carolina court has jurisdiction 
to make an initial child-custody determination if North Carolina 
“is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement 
of the proceeding[.]”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201(a)(1) (2013).  
A child’s “home state” is “the state in which a child lived with 
a parent . . . for at least six consecutive months immediately 
before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding.”  N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 50A-102(7) (2013).  Although this Court has 
recognized that making specific findings of fact related to a 
trial court’s jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201(a)(1) 
“would be the better practice,” the statute “states only that 
certain 
circumstances 
must 
exist, 
not 
that 
the 
court 
specifically make findings to that effect.”  In re T.J.D.W., 182 
N.C. App. 394, 397, 642 S.E.2d 471, 473, aff’d per curiam, 362 
N.C. 84, 653 S.E.2d 143 (2007).  Therefore, so long as the trial 
court asserts its jurisdiction and there is evidence to satisfy 
the statutory requirements, the trial court has properly 
exercised subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 397, 642 S.E.2d 
at 473-74. 
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In this case, the trial court made a finding that it had 
jurisdiction to enter an adjudication order, and the evidence 
shows that the juveniles have continuously resided with a parent 
in North Carolina since December of 2011.  Although, as we have 
previously held, it would be the better practice for the trial 
court to make more specific findings of fact to support its 
jurisdiction, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial 
court’s assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
50A-201(a)(1).  Accordingly, respondent’s first argument lacks 
merit. 
Next, respondent contends that the trial court erred by 
adjudicating the juveniles neglected and dependent.  We first 
address respondent’s argument that the trial court erred by 
adjudicating the juveniles neglected.  Respondent disputes the 
trial court’s conclusion that the effect of the parents’ 
domestic violence and discord on the juveniles was sufficient to 
support an adjudication of neglect.  Respondent also disputes 
the trial court’s finding that respondent failed to submit to 
DSS’s in-home services.  We do not agree with respondent’s 
contentions. 
“The allegations in a petition alleging abuse, neglect, or 
dependent shall be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”  
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-805 (2013).  In reviewing an adjudication 
order, this Court must determine “(1) whether the findings of 
fact are supported by ‘clear and convincing evidence,’ and (2) 
whether the legal conclusions are supported by the findings of 
fact.”  In re Gleisner, 141 N.C. App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 
365 
(2000) 
(citations 
omitted). 
“In 
a 
non-jury 
neglect 
adjudication, the trial court’s findings of fact supported by 
clear and convincing competent evidence are deemed conclusive, 
even where some evidence supports contrary findings.”  In re 
Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997). 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101, in part, defines a neglected 
juvenile as “[a] juvenile who does not receive proper care, 
supervision, or discipline from the juvenile’s parent” or “who 
lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare[.]”  
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2013).  A parent’s refusal to 
cooperate with DSS’s attempts to offer services and a “long 
standing” and “enduring” history of domestic violence between 
the parents are factors that support an adjudication of neglect.  
In re B.M., 183 N.C. App. 84, 89, 643 S.E.2d 644, 647 (2007). 
Here, the trial court’s findings of fact support its 
conclusion that the juveniles were neglected.  The trial court 
found that the parents’ history of domestic violence dated back 
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to the initial investigation in Kentucky, that the juveniles 
were aware of the violence and domestic discord, and that a 
Child and Family Evaluation indicated that the parents were not 
able to parent the juveniles due to “their continued conflicts 
with each other and the impact the conflicts have on the 
children.”  Specifically, the trial court found: 
16. [T]he children were negatively impacted 
by witnessing the parents’ domestic discord 
and that it caused the children emotional 
stress.  The Court further finds that the 
children were put in the middle of the 
parents’ dispute, which also caused stress 
upon the children.  The Court is further 
concerned about the children being coached 
to 
make 
allegations 
in 
an 
effort 
to 
circumvent the domestic action. 
 
In addition, the trial court found that respondent refused to 
develop an in-home services agreement with DSS to address the 
identified issues. 
Contrary to respondent’s contentions, these findings are 
supported by the evidence introduced at the adjudication 
hearing, specifically the testimony of a social worker, and in 
turn support the trial court’s conclusion that the juveniles 
were neglected.  Respondent points to her own testimony that she 
only “hesitated” in response to DSS’s efforts to implement in-
home services, but the trial court was free to weigh that 
testimony against the social worker’s contradictory testimony 
-8- 
 
 
and make a finding adopting one point of view.  Accordingly, we 
hold that the evidence and the trial court’s findings of fact 
support the adjudication of neglect. 
Next, as respondent correctly points out, at the hearing 
the trial court orally concluded that the juveniles were 
neglected, but both the original and amended adjudication orders 
contain conclusions, made by checking boxes on each of the pre-
printed portions of the orders, that the juveniles were 
neglected and dependent.  We believe that the trial court’s 
checking of the box for dependency represents a clerical error. 
“A clerical error is an error resulting from a minor 
mistake or inadvertence, especially in writing or copying 
something on the record, and not from judicial reasoning or 
determination.”  State v. Jones, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 736 
S.E.2d 634, 637 (2013) (citations and quotations omitted).  
“When, on appeal, a clerical error is discovered in the trial 
court’s judgment or order, it is appropriate to remand the case 
to the trial court for correction because of the importance that 
the record ‘speak the truth.’”  State v. Smith, 188 N.C. App. 
842, 845, 656 S.E.2d 695, 696 (2008) (citations omitted). 
In this case, although DSS filed petitions alleging that 
the juveniles were both neglected and dependent, it only argued 
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that they were neglected at the adjudication hearing.  The trial 
court orally concluded that the juveniles were neglected and 
made findings of fact supporting that conclusion, but made none 
to support a conclusion that they were dependent.  Accordingly, 
it appears that the “dependent” box on the adjudication form was 
inadvertently checked, and the matter should be remanded for 
entry of a new adjudication order that reflects the trial 
court’s conclusion that the juveniles were neglected, but not 
dependent. 
Finally, respondent contends that the trial court erred by 
ordering her to pay the costs of her supervised visitation.  We 
disagree. 
In 2013, the General Assembly enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
905.1 (2013), which sets out the requirements for findings 
regarding visitation in abuse, neglect, and dependency cases.1  
Under the new statute, a disposition order that removes a 
juvenile from a parent’s custody “shall provide for appropriate 
visitation as may be in the best interests of the juvenile 
                     
1 Formerly, visitation was addressed in the disposition statute, 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905(c) (2011).  Section 7B-905.1 was 
effective 1 October 2013, and applies to actions “filed or 
pending on or after that date.”  2013 N.C. ALS 129.  The 
disposition order in this matter was entered 15 October 2013.  
Therefore, the matter was pending as of the effective date of 
the new statute, and we must review the disposition order under 
the terms of the new statute. 
-10- 
 
 
consistent with the juvenile’s health and safety.”  N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 7B-905.1(a) (2013).  The new statute describes the 
findings the trial court must make defining the conditions of 
visitation when a child is placed with a relative, as is the 
case here: 
(c) If the juvenile is placed or continued 
in the custody or guardianship of a relative 
or 
other 
suitable 
person, 
any 
order 
providing for visitation shall specify the 
minimum frequency and length of the visits 
and whether the visits shall be supervised.  
The 
court 
may 
authorize 
additional 
visitation as agreed upon by the respondent 
and custodian or guardian. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(c) (2013).  The terms of the statute 
are consistent with our case law interpreting the visitation 
findings required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905(c), the prior 
statute.  See In re J.P., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 750 S.E.2d 
543, 547 (2013) (holding that a disposition order must, at a 
minimum, set out the time, place, and conditions of visitation). 
 
In this case, the trial court made a finding that squarely 
addresses all three requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
905.1(c):  “[Respondent] is to have a supervised visit every 
other week for one hour via a supervised visitation center, at 
her expense.”  Respondent does not challenge the sufficiency of 
this finding as to the statutory requirements and concedes that 
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the trial court made findings that support its decision that 
supervised visitation was in the juveniles’ best interests under 
the circumstances. 
Instead of challenging the need for supervised visitation 
or the trial court’s findings, respondent first contends that 
the Juvenile Code does not permit the trial court to order her 
to pay the cost of supervised visitation.  When an argument 
presents an issue of statutory interpretation, full review is 
appropriate, and the trial court’s conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  Romulus v. Romulus, 216 N.C. App. 28, 32, 715 
S.E.2d 889, 892 (2011) (citations omitted).  “‘If the language 
of the statute is clear, this Court must implement the statute 
according to the plain meaning of its terms.’”  Whitman v. 
Kiger, 139 N.C. App. 44, 46, 533 S.E.2d 807, 808 (2000), aff’d 
per curiam, 353 N.C. 360, 543 S.E.2d 476 (2001) (citation 
omitted). 
Here, respondent’s argument is contradicted by the plain 
language of the statute, which provides:  “The court may specify 
in 
the 
order 
conditions 
under 
which 
visitation 
may 
be 
suspended.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(a).  Thus, in the best 
interests of the juvenile, the trial court has the authority to 
set conditions for visitation, as the trial court did in this 
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case by requiring respondent to pay the costs of visitation.  We 
also note that other sections of the Juvenile Code, including 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-903 and -904, permit the trial court to 
impose costs on the parents of a juvenile adjudicated abused, 
neglected, 
or 
dependent. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
disagree 
with 
respondent’s 
contention 
that 
the 
Juvenile 
Code 
does 
not 
authorize the trial court to order her to pay the costs of 
supervised visitation.  
 
Next, respondent contends the trial court erred by ordering 
her to pay the costs of supervised visitation without making any 
findings that she was able to do so.  Respondent cites no 
authority to support her assertion that such findings are 
required pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1, or its 
predecessor, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905(c).  Instead, respondent 
relies on case law interpreting other statutes, including N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 7B-904 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4, to support 
her argument.  See, e.g., In re W.V., 204 N.C. App. 290, 296-97, 
693 S.E.2d 383, 388 (2010) (holding that the trial court must 
make findings that a parent is able to pay a reasonable portion 
of the cost of foster care before ordering her to do so).   
We 
find 
respondent’s 
argument 
on 
this 
point 
to 
be 
unpersuasive.  The section of the Juvenile Code cited in In re 
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W.V. specifically instructs courts to consider the parents’ 
ability to pay.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-904(d) (providing that 
the trial court may order a parent to pay support “if the court 
finds that the parent is able to do so”).  This specific 
directive is significant in interpreting the intent of the 
legislature in enacting the statute, and there is no such 
statutory instruction as to the costs of supervised visitation 
in the recently enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(c).  Further, 
the terms of the disposition order in this case account for a 
90-day review hearing, and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(d) (2013) 
specifically authorizes all parties to “file a motion for review 
of any visitation plan entered pursuant to this section.”  N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(d).   
Thus, respondent has ample opportunity to present evidence of 
her inability to pay the cost of supervised visitation and have 
the 
visitation 
plan 
modified, 
should 
the 
need 
arise.  
Accordingly, we affirm the visitation portion of the disposition 
order. 
In sum, we affirm the trial court’s adjudication of neglect 
and the disposition order, but remand the matter for correction 
of clerical error in the adjudication order. 
Affirmed, in part; remanded, in part. 
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Chief Judge MARTIN concurs. 
Judge HUNTER, Robert N., concurs in part and dissents in 
part 
by 
separate 
opinion.
NO. COA14-79 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 15 July 2014 
 
 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
 
 
 
 
J.C. 
 
J.C. 
Johnston County 
Nos. 13 JA 101–02 
 
 
 
 
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
 
 
Though I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the 
trial court’s adjudication of neglect and to remand for 
correction of a clerical error as to the adjudication of 
dependency, I cannot agree with the majority’s decision to 
affirm 
the 
visitation 
portion 
of 
the 
disposition 
order.  
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(a) (2013), the trial 
court should consider a parent’s ability to pay before requiring 
the parent to pay supervised visitation costs.  Accordingly, 
because the court below ordered respondent to pay the costs of 
supervised visitation without making any findings that she was 
able to do so, I respectfully dissent from the majority on this 
issue. 
The potential consequences of failing to pay the costs of 
supervised visitation includes having visitation suspended, a 
condition which, if uncured, could ultimately lead to the  
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termination of parental rights.  This Court has consistently 
held that a parent’s poverty, alone, should not be grounds for 
termination of parental rights.  See In re T.D.P., 164 N.C. App. 
287, 290–91, 595 S.E.2d 735, 738 (2004), aff’d per curiam, 359 
N.C. 405, 610 S.E.2d 199 (2005).  Denying visitation to a poor 
parent who was required, but unable, to pay the costs of 
visitation conditions an important constitutional right on 
wealth.  As judges, we have a duty to construe statutes so that 
their application would not violate either the Constitution of 
North Carolina or the United States Constitution.  See, e.g., 
Appeal of Arcadia Dairy Farms, Inc., 289 N.C. 456, 465, 223 
S.E.2d 323, 328 (1976) (“If a statute is reasonably susceptible 
of two constructions, one of which will raise a serious question 
as to its constitutionality and the other will avoid such 
question, it is well settled that the courts should construe the 
statute 
so 
as 
to 
avoid 
the 
constitutional 
question.”).  
Requiring the trial court to make findings of fact addressing a 
parent’s ability to pay before ordering the parent to pay the 
costs 
of 
supervised 
visitation 
would 
obviate 
any 
unconstitutional result. 
Accordingly, because N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(a) is 
silent as to whether the trial court must make the findings at 
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issue, and because the majority’s holding could lead to 
undesirable 
outcomes 
for 
poverty-stricken 
parents, 
I 
respectfully dissent.  I would remand the disposition order for 
further findings of fact addressing respondent’s ability to pay 
the costs of supervised visitation before entering such an 
order.