Case Title: SIERRA CLUB v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, and MEDICINE BOW FUEL & POWER, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0105

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
SIERRA CLUB v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, and MEDICINE BOW FUEL & POWER, LLC2011 WY 42Case Number: No. S-10-0105Decided: 03/09/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

SIERRA 
CLUB,

Appellant 
(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, and MEDICINE BOW FUEL & POWER, 
LLC,

Appellees 
(Respondents).

 
 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) 
Certification from the District Court of Laramie 
County

The Honorable Peter 
G. Arnold, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellant:

Gay George, George 
Law, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Andrea Issod, Sierra Club, San Francisco, 
California.  Argument by Ms. 
Issod.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Jay Jerde, Deputy Attorney General; Nancy Vehr, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; John Coppede, Hickey & Evans, LLP, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming; Mary Throne, Throne Law Office, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. Vehr and Ms. 
Throne.

 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
The Wyoming 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) issued an air quality permit to 
Medicine Bow Fuel and Power LLC (Medicine Bow), authorizing the construction of 
a facility that will gasify and liquefy coal, and of an associated underground 
coal mine.  The Sierra Club appealed 
the issuance of that permit to the Wyoming Environmental Quality Council 
(Council), which upheld the DEQ's decision.  The Sierra Club appealed the Council's 
decision to the district court, which certified the appeal directly to this 
Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).  
We will affirm the Council's decision.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
The Sierra Club 
states the issues for review as follows:

 
 

1.    
Whether the air 
permit for the Medicine Bow coal to liquids plant fails to consider significant 
sulfur dioxide emissions from flares in determining the Potential to Emit and 
fails to apply the Best Available Control Technology (BACT) to limit the flare 
emissions.

 
 

2.    
Whether the Medicine 
Bow permit fails to consider fine particulate matter (PM2.5) 
emissions.

 
 

3.    
Whether the 
Department of Environmental Quality failed to include fugitive particulate 
emissions in its model to demonstrate compliance with 24-hour air quality 
standards.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On December 31, 2007, 
Medicine Bow applied for a permit to construct an industrial coal gasification 
and liquefaction plant to produce transportation fuels and other products, along 
with an underground mine that will supply the coal, all to be located 
approximately eleven miles southwest of Medicine Bow, Wyoming.  DEQ completed its analysis of the permit 
application on June 19, 2008, and concluded that the Medicine Bow facility would 
comply with all requirements of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act and of its 
implementing regulations, the Wyoming Air Quality Standards and Regulations 
(WAQSR).  DEQ published a 
public notice of its proposed decision to issue the permit.  During the public comment period that 
followed, DEQ received comments from many interested parties, including the 
Sierra Club.  DEQ reviewed and 
analyzed the comments, along with additional information submitted by Medicine 
Bow, and issued the permit on March 4, 2009. 

 
 

[¶4]        
The Sierra Club filed 
a petition for review with the Council, challenging DEQ's decision to issue the 
air quality permit to Medicine Bow.  
After discovery was completed, cross-motions for summary judgment were 
filed by the Sierra Club, DEQ, and Medicine Bow.  The Council conducted a hearing on the 
motions on December 7, 2009.  It 
denied the Sierra Club's motion, and granted summary judgment in favor of DEQ 
and Medicine Bow.  The Sierra Club 
filed a timely Petition for Review with the district court, followed by an 
unopposed motion to certify the appeal directly to this Court.  The district court granted the motion, 
and we accepted the certification.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶5]        
We review the 
decisions of administrative agencies pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114 
(LexisNexis 2009).  The specific 
decision under review in this case is the Council's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of DEQ and Medicine Bow and against the Sierra Club.  "[W]e review an agency's order granting 
a summary judgment in the same manner as in the civil context by employing our 
de novo standard of review and utilizing 
the same standards and reviewing the same materials as the agency."  Powder River Basin Resource Council v. 
Wyoming Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 2010 WY 25, ¶ 33, 226 P.3d 809, 819 (Wyo. 2010), 
quoting Rollins v. Wyoming 
Tribune-Eagle, 2007 WY 28, 
¶ 7, 152 P.3d 367, 370 
(Wyo. 2007).

 

DISCUSSION

 
 
1.         
Sulfur Dioxide Emissions

 
 

[¶6]        
An application for an 
air quality permit must provide information on the proposed source's Potential 
to Emit, or PTE, which is defined by regulation as:

 
 
the maximum capacity 
of a stationary source to emit a pollutant under its physical and operational 
design.  Any physical or operational 
limitation on the capacity of the source to emit a pollutant, including air 
pollution control equipment and restrictions on hours of operations or the type 
or amount of material combusted, stored, or processed, shall be treated as part 
of its design if the limitation or the [e]ffect it would have on emissions is 
enforceable.

 
 
WAQSR ch. 6, 
§ 4(a).

 
 

[¶7]        
Based on information 
provided by Medicine Bow during the permitting process, DEQ determined that the 
proposed facility's PTE for sulfur dioxide is approximately 37 tons per year. 
 The Sierra Club claims that the 
facility's PTE should be much larger, arguing that the DEQ improperly excluded 
from Medicine Bow's PTE emissions that will occur during malfunctions of the 
facility, and emissions resulting from "cold starts."1  Cold starts are necessary after the 
facility has been shut down long enough that the equipment has cooled to ambient 
air temperature.

 
 

[¶8]        
The facts underlying 
this issue are not in dispute.  
Medicine Bow will perform a cold start when the facility first begins 
operations.  Additional cold starts 
will be necessary to restart operations if the facility is shut down for major 
maintenance or repairs.  Cold starts 
are estimated to occur once every three or four years.  Medicine Bow also acknowledges that 
malfunctions will occur on occasion.  
The parties do not dispute the estimated emissions rates associated with 
cold starts and malfunctions.  They 
disagree over whether, as a matter of law, these emissions must be included in 
Medicine Bow's PTE.

 
 

[¶9]        
When it issued the 
permit, DEQ explained that it has been the agency's "consistent practice" to 
make PTE determinations "based on consideration of a facility's routine 
operations."  DEQ determined that 
emissions from malfunctions and cold starts did not result from the facility's 
routine operations, and so excluded them from Medicine Bow's PTE.  This appears consistent with the 
regulatory definition of PTE.  As 
explained in United States v. 
Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1141, 1158 (D. Colo. 1988), PTE is 
meant to represent "the maximum emissions that can be generated while operating 
the source as it is intended to be operated and as it is normally 
operated."  Malfunctions and cold 
starts do not represent the way the Medicine Bow facility is intended to be 
operated, or the way it will normally be operated.

  

[¶10]     
Significantly, DEQ 
drew a distinction between "cold starts" and "warm starts."  Warm starts occur after planned regular 
maintenance activities, and will take place approximately once every 60 
days.  Because warm starts are 
planned and relatively frequent, DEQ considered them to be part of the 
facility's normal operations, and included those emissions in the facility's 
PTE.  Cold starts, in contrast, are 
unplanned and irregular, and are estimated to occur only once every three to 
four years.  DEQ did not consider 
cold starts to be part of the facility's normal operations, and excluded those 
emissions from Medicine Bow's PTE.  
Medicine Bow agrees with DEQ's position, emphasizing that the exclusion 
of emissions from cold starts and malfunctions is consistent with DEQ's 
long-standing interpretation of the PTE regulation.

 
 

[¶11]     
The Sierra Club's 
argument that DEQ failed to consider the emissions from cold starts and 
malfunctions suggests that DEQ ignored these emissions.  The record demonstrates otherwise.  The permit limits Medicine Bow's sulfur 
dioxide emissions to the 37 tons per year, the same as its PTE.  If emissions from malfunctions and cold 
starts exceed the limit of 37 tons per year, DEQ and Medicine Bow have 
recognized that these emissions will be considered excess emissions, and could 
subject Medicine Bow to enforcement action.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-11-201, 
-701, -801.  As will be discussed in 
detail below, the permit issued by DEQ included several conditions intended to 
control and limit emissions from cold starts and malfunctions.  As a practical matter, the Sierra Club 
has not pointed out any way in which emissions from cold starts and malfunctions 
would be regulated differently if they had been included in Medicine Bow's 
PTE.

 
 

[¶12]     
In addition, we note 
that the emissions from cold starts and malfunctions were included in computer 
models used to predict the air quality impacts of Medicine Bow's facility.  DEQ reported that "[r]esults of the 
modeling were below the 3-hour and 24-hour WAAQS and NAAQS."2  DEQ's inclusion of sulfur dioxide 
emissions in modeling is not determinative of whether such emissions must also 
be included in the facility's PTE.  
However, DEQ's inclusion of these emissions in the modeling demonstrates 
that DEQ did not overlook these emissions.  

 
 

[¶13]     
The Sierra Club 
maintains that there is "a mountain of authorities" demonstrating that DEQ's 
interpretation is inconsistent with that of the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).  We have previously 
recognized that Wyoming's air quality regulatory program "is intended to be 
compatible with, and at least as stringent as, the federal Clean Air Act," and 
accordingly, "federal precedent and regulatory guidance is persuasive authority 
in Wyoming air quality cases."  Powder River Basin Resource Council, 
¶ 7, 226 P.3d  at 813.  Having 
reviewed the federal authorities cited by the Sierra Club, however, we find 
little support for its position.

 
 

[¶14]     
The Sierra Club 
quotes from Louisiana-Pacific, 682 F. Supp.  at 1157, for "the concept [that] potential to emit refers to the maximum 
emissions a source can generate when being operated within the constraints of 
its design."  But as we have already 
discussed, Louisiana-Pacific 
establishes that PTE includes only emissions that occur during normal 
operations:

 
 
Any 
analysis of the definition of "potential to emit" must include a reference to 
the case of Alabama Power Co. v. 
Costle, 204 U.S. App. D.C. 51, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C.Cir. 1979) because the 
current definition above was promulgated in response to the D.C. Circuit's 
holding in that case. . . .  

 
 
The 
broad holding of Alabama Power is 
that potential to emit does not refer to the maximum emissions that can be 
generated by a source hypothesizing the worst conceivable operation.  Rather, the concept contemplates the 
maximum emissions that can be generated while operating the source as it is intended 
to be operated and as it is normally operated. . . . 
 Alabama Power stands for the proposition 
that hypothesizing the worst possible emissions from the worst possible 
operation is the wrong way to calculate potential to emit.

 
 

Louisiana-Pacific, 
682 F. Supp.  at 1157-58 (emphasis added).  
This discussion is more supportive of DEQ's interpretation than the 
Sierra Club's.  

 
 

[¶15]     
The Sierra Club also 
relies on various EPA documents, but close reading of these documents reveals 
that they are distinguishable or, when put in context, do not further the Sierra 
Club's argument.  For example, the 
Sierra Club quotes from an EPA guidance letter explaining that, "to determine 
PTE, a source must estimate its emissions based on the worst-case scenario 
taking into account startups, shutdowns and malfunctions."  Letter from Steven C. Riva, EPA, to 
William O'Sullivan, New Jersey Dep't of Environmental Protection, 
February 14, 2006.  
On 
first reading, the quoted sentence would appear to support the Sierra 
Club's assertion that emissions from malfunctions and cold starts should be 
included in Medicine Bow's PTE.  We 
note, however, that the letter's indication that PTE is based on a "worst-case 
scenario" seems inconsistent with the court's holding in Louisiana-Pacific, 
682 F. Supp.  at 1158, that PTE "does not refer to the maximum emissions that can 
be generated by a source hypothesizing the worst conceivable operation."  Moreover, when the quoted sentence is 
read in context, it does not support the Sierra Club's position.

 
 

[¶16]     
 In the quoted guidance letter, the EPA 
was answering a question from the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection about how to deal with emissions from emergency generators when 
determining PTE.  The answer given 
was that "EPA has no policy that specifically requires exclusion of emergency' (or 
malfunction) emissions."  Letter 
from Steven C. Riva, supra.  (Emphasis added.)  By the same token, the letter did not 
set forth any policy that specifically requires inclusion of emergency or 
malfunction emissions in PTE.  
"Rather," the EPA said, "to determine PTE, a source must estimate its 
emissions based on the worst-case scenario taking into account startups, 
shutdowns and malfunctions."  Id. (Emphasis added.)  Following this discussion, the EPA 
advised that 

 
 
New Jersey should 
continue as they have and permit emergency units at some amount of operation 
sufficiently large to cover emergencies (i.e. 500 hours a year).  Malfunctions that may require the 
operation of the emergency units and that may exceed the 500 hours/year limit 
could be handled through enforcement discretion on a case-by-case basis, as 
appropriate.

 
 

Id.  We read this guidance letter to say that 
emissions from startups, shutdowns, and malfunctions are not automatically 
excluded from PTE, nor are they automatically included.  They must be taken into account by 
including them in PTE if they fit within the regulatory definition, or excluding 
them if they do not.

 
 

[¶17]     
The Sierra Club's 
position that emissions from cold starts and malfunctions must be included in 
PTE is, therefore, inconsistent with the EPA's guidance that such emissions are 
not automatically included or excluded from PTE.  In contrast, DEQ's decision in this case 
appears in accord with the guidance letter.  As noted above, DEQ took into account 
emissions from cold starts, warm starts, and malfunctions.  It determined that emissions from warm 
starts should be included in PTE, while emissions from cold starts and 
malfunctions should be excluded.  
With regard to the emissions excluded from Medicine Bow's PTE, DEQ also 
noted that excess emissions from cold starts and malfunctions may be handled 
through enforcement discretion, which is also consistent with the EPA's guidance 
letter.

 
 

[¶18]     
We conclude that 
DEQ's decision to exclude emissions from malfunctions and cold starts from 
Medicine Bow's PTE was not contrary to applicable Wyoming statutes and 
regulations.  The Sierra Club has 
not demonstrated that it was inconsistent with federal authority or EPA 
guidance.  The Council did not err 
in upholding DEQ's decision on Medicine Bow's PTE.

 
 

[¶19]     
As the second part of 
its sulfur dioxide issue, the Sierra Club asserts that DEQ did not require 
Medicine Bow to adopt the Best Available Control Technology (BACT) to control 
sulfur dioxide emissions from flares during cold starts and malfunctions.  As discussed above, DEQ did not include 
these emissions within Medicine Bow's PTE.  
Nevertheless, Wyoming regulations provide that these emissions are still 
subject to BACT requirements.  WAQSR 
ch. 6, § 2(c)(v). 
 BACT is a term of art, and because 
different portions of the definition become significant in the discussion to 
follow, we set forth here the entire regulatory definition:

 
 

"Best 
available control technology" 
means an emission limitation (including a visible emission standard) based on 
the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under 
these Standards and Regulations or regulation under the Federal Clean Air Act, 
which would be emitted from or which results [from] any proposed major 
stationary source or major modification which the Administrator, on a 
case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic 
impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such source or 
modification through application [of] production processes and available 
methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning or treatment or 
innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of such pollutant.  If the Administrator determines that 
technological or economic limitations on the application of measurement 
methodology to a particular emissions unit would make the imposition of an 
emission standard infeasible, he may instead prescribe a design, equipment, work 
practice or operational standard or combination thereof to satisfy the 
requirement of Best Available Control Technology.  Such standard shall, to the degree 
possible, set forth the emission reduction achievable by implementation of such 
design, equipment, work practice, or operation and shall provide for compliance 
by means which achieve equivalent results.  
Application of BACT shall not result in emissions in excess of those 
allowed under Chapter 5, Section 2 or Section 3 of these regulations and any 
other new source performance standard of national emission standards for 
hazardous air pollutants promulgated by the EPA but not yet adopted by the State 
of Wyoming.

 
 
WAQSR 
ch. 6, § 4(a).  The federal Clean 
Air Act includes an essentially identical definition of BACT.  42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).  "In simplified terms, this regulation 
requires the DEQ to consider a broad range of available pollution control and 
reduction options, determine which can be achieved reasonably, and impose those 
as permit requirements."  Powder River Basin Resource Council, 
¶ 40, 226 P.3d  at 821.  

 
 

[¶20]     
The permit issued to 
Medicine Bow contains several conditions relating to emissions from the 
flares:

 
 
22.       [Medicine 
Bow] shall monitor SO2 emissions from the HP [heavy liquid] and LP 
[light liquid] flares.  Monitoring 
of SO2 emissions shall consist of installing flow monitoring 
equipment to the flares, and by either direct sampling of the flow to the flares 
or sampling of the coal.  Records 
shall be kept for a period of at least 5 years and shall be made available to 
[DEQ] upon request.

 
 
23.       That the HP 
and LP flares shall be designed, constructed, operated and maintained to be 
smokeless, per Chapter 5, Section 2(m) of the WAQSR, with no visible 
emissions except for periods not to exceed a total of five (5) minutes during 
any two (2) consecutive hours as determined by Method 22 of 40 CFR part 60, 
Appendix A.

 
 
24.       [Medicine 
Bow] shall maintain and operate the HP and LP flares during all period[s] of 
active operation such that the controls remain effective as viable emission 
control devices.

 
 
25.       That the 
presence of a pilot flame shall be monitored using a thermocouple and continuous 
recording device or any other equivalent device to detect the presence of a 
flame on the HP and LP flares.  
[Medicine Bow] shall maintain records noting the date and duration of 
time during active operation when the pilot flame is not present in the HP and 
LP flares.  Records shall be kept 
for a period of at least 5 years and shall be made available to [DEQ] upon 
request. . . .

 
 
31.       During 
periods of startup, [Medicine Bow] shall adhere to their procedures in their 
Startup/Shutdown Emission Minimization Plan, attached as Appendix A.  This plan may be modified as deemed 
necessary by [Medicine Bow] without amending the permit, but revisions to the 
plan shall be approved by [DEQ] prior to implementation.3

 
 

As DEQ explains, in 
issuing the permit to Medicine Bow, it considered the available information 
regarding pollution 
control and reduction options for flares and, applying its 
engineering judgment and experience, determined which measures were reasonably 
available.  Such measures were 
included as permit requirements meant to ensure that flare emissions would be 
minimized.

 
 

[¶21]     
The Sierra Club's 
initial contention is that "BACT is an emissions limitation  a numerical limit 
that a source cannot exceed."  This 
is simply incorrect.  BACT need not 
be expressed as a numerical emissions limit.  The 
regulation, quoted above, explicitly provides that BACT requirements may be 
satisfied by "a design, equipment, 
work practice or operational standard or combination thereof."  WAQSR 
ch. 6, § 4(a).  Corresponding EPA regulations also 
provide, in nearly identical language, that numerical emissions limitations are 
not the exclusive means of achieving BACT.  
40 C.F.R. §§ 51.166(b)(12); 52.21(b)(12).

 
 

[¶22]     
The Sierra Club 
nevertheless contends that a "work practice plan like the SSEM plan can be used 
for BACT only in limited circumstances' if a well-reasoned determination is 
made in the record that [a numerical] emission limit is technically infeasible 
and the plan is equivalent to BACT," citing a decision of the federal 
Environmental Appeals Board, In re 
Indeck-Elwood, LLC, PSD Appeal 03-04, 2006 WL 3073109 at *33 (E.A.B. 2006). 
 The Sierra Club's contention that 
the agency's decision to impose a substitute for numerical emissions limitations 
must be documented by "a well reasoned determination . . . in the record" is an 
accurate paraphrase of Indeck-Elwood, 
in which the Environmental Appeals Board stated that BACT determinations must be 
"well documented in the administrative record."  2006 WL 3073109 at *54, n.97.  However, the procedures by which the 
Environmental Appeals Board reviews permit decisions differ from those by which 
Wyoming's Environmental Quality Council reviews DEQ decisions.  Because of these procedural differences, 
the Sierra Club's view of how BACT decisions must be documented "in the record" 
is not applicable in Wyoming.

 
 

[¶23]     
When the EPA reviews 
an application for an air quality permit, the agency must compile a record, as 
set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 124.9.  
The decision to issue or deny a permit is made by the Regional 
Administrator, and is based on the record compiled by the agency.  40 C.F.R. § 124.18.  The Regional Administrator's decision 
may be appealed to the Environmental Appeals Board, which also bases its 
decision on the compiled record, and does not take new evidence from the 
parties.  40 C.F.R, 
§ 124.19.  See generally, Environmental Appeals 
Board website, available at www.epa.gov/eab.

 
 

[¶24]     
Wyoming has an 
EPA-approved air quality regulatory program.  40 C.F.R. part 52, subpart ZZ.  DEQ, rather than the EPA, issues air 
quality permits in Wyoming.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-11-801, 
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a).  DEQ's permit 
decisions are reviewed by the Wyoming Environmental Quality Council.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-11-112, -208, 
-802.  Unlike the federal 
Environmental Appeals Board, the Council is not limited to reviewing the record 
compiled by DEQ prior to issuing a permit.  Instead, the Council conducts a contested 
case hearing at which all parties are afforded the opportunity to present new 
evidence.  See generally, DEQ Rules of Practice and 
Procedure Applicable to Hearings in Contested Cases, Chapter II; Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-107(j) (In a contested case hearing, "[o]pportunity shall be 
afforded all parties to respond and present evidence and argument on all issues 
involved.").  Accordingly, the 
Council is allowed, even obligated, to consider new evidence presented to it on 
review.

 
 

[¶25]     
When the Council 
considered the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, it was not limited 
to considering only the record previously compiled by the DEQ.  As the Council correctly recited in its 
order granting summary judgment to DEQ and Medicine Bow, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
56(c), it was required to consider the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and 
other supporting material presented by the parties in conjunction with their 
cross-motions for summary judgment, and to grant summary judgment if there were 
no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.  The Council's 
conclusions of law also included this accurate explanation:

 
 
8.         
On a summary judgment motion, the movant has the burden of establishing a 
prima facie case based on admissible 
evidence.  The burden then shifts to 
the opposing party to establish through "specific facts" that a material 
question of fact remains.  Cornelius v. Powder River Energy, 2007 
WY 30, ¶ 10, 152 P.3d 387, 
390 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
9.         
The evidence opposing a prima 
facie case on a motion for summary judgment "must be competent and 
admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely eviscerated 
by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or wishful 
speculation."  Speculation, 
conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even probability, are 
insufficient to establish an issue of material fact.  Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, ¶ 11, 113 P.3d 34, 38 ([Wyo.] 
2005).

 
 

[¶26]     
Our review of the 
record reveals that DEQ and Medicine Bow provided sufficient evidence to the 
Council to establish a prima facie 
case on the question of whether DEQ's substitution of Medicine Bow's SSEM Plan 
was justified because of the infeasibility of measuring emissions from the 
flares.  In its decision document, 
DEQ's response to comments from the public explained that DEQ "did not establish 
emissions limits for the flares as emission limits would not be practically 
enforceable as these units cannot be tested using traditional EPA reference 
methods to determine compliance with emission limits."  This information was presented to the 
Council as an exhibit to DEQ's motion for summary judgment.  Medicine Bow provided additional support 
for the technical infeasibility of measuring emissions from the flares in the 
form of an affidavit from its expert witness confirming that numerical emissions 
limits for the flares could not be verified because there was no measurement 
methodology.  This evidence was 
adequate to make the prima facie 
showing that, in the words of the regulation, "technological or 
economic limitations on the application of measurement methodology" rendered the 
imposition of a numeric emission standard "infeasible."  WAQSR 
ch. 6, § 4(a).

 
 

[¶27]     
At this point, the 
burden shifted to the Sierra Club to establish through "specific facts" that a 
material question of fact remained to be answered.  Cornelius, ¶ 10, 152 P.3d  at 
390.  Because the Sierra Club was 
the party opposing summary judgment, the Council was required to view the 
evidence from the vantage point most favorable to the Sierra Club, and give the 
Sierra Club the benefit of all favorable inferences that could fairly be drawn 
from the evidence.  On judicial 
review, we afford the Sierra Club the same favorable view of its evidence and 
the same benefit of fairly drawn favorable inferences.  Loya v. Wyoming Partners of Jackson Hole, 
Inc., 2001 WY 124, ¶ 8, 
35 P.3d 1246, 1251 (Wyo. 
2001).

 
 

[¶28]     
The Sierra Club 
offered no such evidence, either in support of its own motion for summary 
judgment, or in response to the motions of DEQ and Medicine Bow.  Rather than offering any evidence to 
refute that offered by DEQ and Medicine Bow, the Sierra Club insisted before the 
Council, as it continues to argue before this Court, that the evidence presented 
by DEQ and Medicine Bow was not "in the record" compiled by DEQ before issuing 
the permit.  It characterized the 
report attached to the affidavit of Medicine Bow's expert as "little more than 
classic post-hoc rationalization offered in an attempt to clean up after the 
lack of analysis done by DEQ."  
  

 
 

[¶29]     
As discussed above, 
however, the Council was not limited to considering only the record compiled by 
DEQ prior to issuing the permit.  
The Council did not err in considering the evidence offered by DEQ and 
Medicine Bow.  Through that 
evidence, DEQ and Medicine Bow established their prima facie cases that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact regarding the infeasibility of measuring 
emissions from the flares.  The 
Sierra Club presented no evidence to dispute the evidence offered by DEQ and 
Medicine Bow, and accordingly, it failed to establish that any genuine issue of 
material fact remained to be decided.  

 
 

[¶30]     
The Sierra Club's 
final contention with regard to the flares is that a work practices plan is 
acceptable as BACT only if it is demonstrated to be the equivalent of BACT, and 
that there was no determination in the record compiled by DEQ prior to issuing 
the permit that the SSEM Plan was equivalent to BACT.  As previously discussed, the Council was 
not limited to the record compiled by DEQ prior to issuing the permit.  Our review of the record on appeal 
indicates that DEQ supported its motion for summary judgment with factual 
evidence that it had reviewed the SSEM Plan using its engineering judgment and 
experience to ensure that flare emissions were minimized, and the result was a 
determination, supported by evidence, that the SSEM Plan was equivalent to BACT. 
 Medicine Bow supported its motion 
for summary judgment with expert opinion that no feasible add-on emissions 
controls exist for flares, and that a work practices plan such as the SSEM Plan 
"can result in dramatic emission reductions and pollution prevention."  Upon this showing by DEQ and Medicine 
Bow, the burden shifted to the Sierra Club to present evidence raising a genuine 
issue of material fact.  It provided 
one paragraph in the affidavit of its expert, who quoted selectively from the 
SSEM Plan but ignored other permitting conditions for the flares.  His opinion that the SSEM Plan was not 
equivalent to BACT was unsupported by any specific facts.  Even viewing this evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Sierra Club, it is speculative, unsupported, and 
insufficient to counter the showings by DEQ and Medicine Bow.  

 
 

[¶31]     
Considering all of 
the Sierra Club's sulfur dioxide claims, we conclude that the Council did not 
err in ruling against the Sierra Club and upholding DEQ's decision to grant 
Medicine Bow's air quality permit.

 
 

2.            
Fine Particulate 
Matter Emissions

 
 

[¶32]     
As its second issue, 
the Sierra Club claims that DEQ, in its decision to issue an air quality permit 
to Medicine Bow, failed to consider fine particulate matter emissions from the 
facility.  DEQ asserts that it did 
consider fine particulates, but because emissions of fine particulates are 
difficult to measure, model, and control, the agency used measurements, models, 
and controls of coarse particles as a surrogate to determine that Medicine Bow 
also complied with requirements relating to fine particulates.  Medicine Bow supports DEQ's 
position.  The Sierra Club 
acknowledges that DEQ used coarse particles as a surrogate for the smaller 
particles, but argues that it was improper for DEQ to do so without making a 
case-specific determination that it was reasonable to use coarse particles as a 
surrogate for finer particles.

 
 

[¶33]     
A brief history of 
the regulation of particulate matter is needed as background for this 
issue.  When the EPA first issued 
NAAQS for particulate matter, the standards applied to "a broad class of 
chemically and physically diverse substances that exist as discrete particles 
(liquid droplets or solids) over a wide range of sizes."  62 Fed. Reg. 38652, 38653 (July 18, 
1997).  Particulate matter was 
measured as total suspended particulates, which included particulates of all 
sizes.  Id.  Over time, the EPA considered evidence 
that smaller particles in the air present greater health risks than larger 
particles.  In response, the EPA 
promulgated particulate matter standards measured in terms of PM10, 
which refers to "particles with an aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to a 
nominal 10 micrometers."  Id. at 38654 n.1.  Later, the EPA sharpened its focus on 
even smaller particles, and added particulate matter standards measured in terms 
of PM2.5, or "particles with an aerodynamic diameter less than or 
equal to a nominal 2.5 micrometers."  
Id., 
n.5.

 
 

[¶34]     
When it promulgated 
the PM2.5 standards in 1997, the EPA recognized that the methods 
needed to measure or calculate emissions of such small particles had not been 
established, that modeling techniques for projecting the ambient impacts of 
these fine particles were undeveloped, and that means of controlling 
PM2.5 emissions were unproven.  
To help fill these gaps, the EPA issued guidance authorizing the use of 
PM10 as a "surrogate" in order to determine compliance with the 
PM2.5 standards.  
Memorandum from John Seitz, EPA, to All Regions, on Interim 
Implementation of New Source Requirements for PM2.5 (Oct. 13, 1997) 
(the Seitz Memorandum).  See 73 Fed. Reg. 28321, 28324 (May 16, 
2008).  

 
 

[¶35]     
In 2005, the EPA 
issued a guidance document reaffirming the continued use of PM10 as a 
surrogate to address the requirements of the PM2.5 standards.  Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, EPA, to 
Regional Administrators on Implementation of New Source Review Requirements in 
PM2.5 Nonattainment Areas (April 5, 2005) (the Page Memorandum).  See 73 Fed. Reg. at 28324.  Then, in 2007, the EPA proposed 
additional rules relating to PM2.5, and reconfirmed that states could 
continue using PM10 as a surrogate for PM2.5 until their 
State Implementation Plans were approved by the EPA.  72 Fed. Reg. 54112, 54114 (Sept. 21, 
2007).

 
 

[¶36]     
In 
May of 2008, the EPA approved a revision to Wyoming's SIP.  In its approval, the EPA expressly 
stated that "Wyoming will implement the current rules in accordance with EPA's 
interim guidance using PM10 as a surrogate for PM2.5 in 
the PSD program."  73 Fed. Reg. 
26019, 26024 (May 8, 2008).  

 
 

[¶37]     
Also in May of 2008, 
the EPA promulgated finalized regulations implementing the PM2.5 
standards.  73 Fed. Reg. 28321 (May 
16, 2008). In the preamble to these regulations, the EPA acknowledged that it 
had previously approved of using PM10 
as a surrogate for meeting PM2.5 requirements "until certain 
difficulties were resolved, primarily the lack of necessary tools to calculate 
the emissions of PM2.5 and related precursors, the lack of adequate 
modeling techniques to project ambient impacts, and the lack of PM2.5 
monitoring sites."  73 Fed. Reg. at 
28340.  The EPA declared, however, 
that "these difficulties have largely been resolved."  Id.  Accordingly, the EPA planned a 
"transition" away from the use of PM10 as a surrogate for 
PM2.5 and toward more direct enforcement of the PM2.5 
standards.  During this transition 
period, however, the EPA "elected to 
maintain our existing PM10 surrogate policy."  73 Fed. Reg. at 28341.  The 
transition period lasts for three years after promulgation of the finalized 
PM2.5 regulations, i.e., "(until May 2011) or until the 
individual revised State . . . programs for PM2.5 are approved by 
EPA, whichever comes first."  75 
Fed. Reg. 6827, 6831 (Feb. 11, 2010).

 
 

[¶38]     
DEQ has not yet 
received EPA approval for its PM2.5 programs, and so Wyoming remains 
in the transition period.  Citing 
the history reviewed above, DEQ and Medicine Bow assert that the EPA's 
PM10 policy expressly allows DEQ to continue using PM10 as 
a surrogate for PM2.5 during this transition period.  For that reason, DEQ and Medicine Bow 
assert that it was proper for DEQ to use PM10 as a surrogate for 
PM2.5 when it analyzed Medicine Bow's permit application and issued 
the air quality permit.

 
 

[¶39]     
The Sierra Club does 
not seriously dispute DEQ's authority to use PM10 as a surrogate for 
PM2.5, but claims that the surrogate policy must be justified in each 
case by a permit-specific determination that it is reasonable to use it.  As support for its position, the Sierra 
Club relies on the EPA decision set forth in In re Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 
Trimble County, Kentucky, Title V/PSD 
Air Quality Permit # V-02-043, Revisions 2 and 3, Petition No. 
IV-2008-3 (August 12, 2009) ("Trimble").  In that case, the Kentucky Division for 
Air Quality had issued a permit for the construction of a new coal-fired boiler 
for an existing electric generating station.  Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b), 
the petitioners, including the Sierra Club, asked the EPA to object to this air 
quality permit.  The EPA granted the 
petition and determined that it would object to the permit, on grounds including 
Kentucky's use of PM10 as a surrogate for PM2.5.  As the Sierra Club characterizes the 
EPA's decision in Trimble, a 
"permitting authority seeking to use the PM10 surrogate policy must 
undertake a rigorous, individualized assessment of the appropriateness of 
surrogacy as applied to the proposed unit."

 
 

[¶40]     
As a first step in 
analyzing the Sierra Club's argument, we note that Medicine Bow submitted its 
permit application on December 31, 2007, and received the permit on March 
4, 2009.  Trimble was not issued until August 12, 
2009.  The Sierra Club asserts that 
the Trimble decision applies to 
Medicine Bow because it is an expression of the EPA's previously existing 
policy.  DEQ and Medicine Bow argue 
that Trimble is a declaration of new 
policy, and does not apply retroactively.  
For a number of reasons, we believe that the Trimble decision reflects a change in 
the EPA's policy toward the use of PM10 as a surrogate for 
PM2.5, and conclude that it does not apply in Medicine Bow's case.4

 
 

[¶41]     
The Trimble decision observed that, "[w]hen 
the EPA issued the PM10 Surrogate Policy in 1997, the Agency did not 
identify criteria to be applied before the policy could be used for satisfying 
the PM2.5 requirements."  
In a footnote, the EPA noted that, in 2007, it had "denied a petition 
requesting that EPA object to [an air quality permit] for failure to include a 
BACT limit for PM2.5 emissions."  The fact that the EPA made one decision 
in 2007, then reached a contrary result in Trimble in 2009, establishes that Trimble was meant to promulgate a change 
in EPA policy, not to confirm a previously existing policy.  In fact, the EPA signaled that a change 
was being made when it explained that the decision in Trimble reflected "an evolving 
understanding of the technical and legal issues associated with the use of the 
PM10 Surrogate Policy."  

 
 

[¶42]     
The change is also 
indicated by the EPA's legal analysis.  
In Trimble, the EPA reviewed 
four decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, all dealing with the use of surrogates in the air quality 
context.  The EPA concluded that 
"the overarching legal principle from these decisions is that a surrogate may be 
used only after it has been shown to be reasonable."  In finding this overarching legal 
principle, however, the EPA recognized that "these court decisions do not speak 
directly to the use of PM10 as a surrogate for 
PM2.5."  In fact, none of 
the cases discussed the use of PM10 as a surrogate for 
PM2.5.  One dealt with 
the use of hydrocarbons as a surrogate for fine particulate matter.  Bluewater Network v. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 370 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  The other three dealt with the use of 
surrogates for hazardous air pollutants.  
National Lime Ass'n v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 233 F.3d 625, 637 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("The 
EPA may use a surrogate to regulate hazardous pollutants if it is 
reasonable' to do so.") (emphasis added); Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 353 F.3d 976, 982-84 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Mossville Environmental Action Now v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 370 F.3d 1232, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 
2004).  PM10 and 
PM2.5 are criteria pollutants, not hazardous pollutants.5  In addition, none of the four considered 
whether a case-specific reasonableness determination was required for every 
individual permit decision.  
Instead, all four considered the determination of reasonableness the EPA 
must make to support the promulgation of a generally applicable regulation 
implementing a surrogate policy.

 
 

[¶43]     
One court that 
considered the impact of the ruling in National Lime noted the limitations of 
that decision.  Contrary to the 
EPA's decision in Trimble, the court 
specifically concluded that National 
Lime did not mandate a permit-specific determination that the use of 
PM10 as a surrogate for PM2.5 was 
reasonable:

 
 
[T]he National Lime test does not apply to the 
use of PM10 as a surrogate for PM2.5 in PSD permits as is 
the issue in this case.  Rather, National Lime involved the use of PM as 
a surrogate for hazardous air pollutants . . . .  Accordingly, the case is inapposite to 
this issue.

 
 

Appalachian Voices v. 
State Air Pollution Control Board, 56 Va. App. 282, 
297-98, 693 S.E.2d 295, 303 (2010).  
The point here is not that a court has disagreed with the EPA's Trimble decision.  Our point is that the requirement of a 
permit-specific reasonableness determination is not immediately apparent from 
the holdings in the four court cases on which the EPA relied.  The EPA first recognized this 
overarching principle in Trimble, 
signaling a change in the EPA's PM10 surrogate policy, not a 
continuation of previously established policy.

 
 

[¶44]     
The Sierra Club has 
not cited any document in which the EPA imposed a permit-specific reasonableness 
requirement prior to the Trimble 
decision.  The history of the EPA's 
PM10 surrogate policy, as set forth by the DEQ, includes no 
expression of such a requirement by the EPA prior to the Trimble decision on August 12, 
2009.  By then, Medicine Bow had 
already received its air quality permit, and it was too late for retroactive 
application of the EPA's Trimble 
decision.  

 
 

[¶45]     
When DEQ and Medicine 
Bow moved for summary judgment against the Sierra Club on this issue, they 
argued as a matter of law that no permit-specific reasonableness determination 
was required, but even if it were, as a matter of fact the use of the surrogate 
was reasonable.  The Council ruled 
as a matter of law that the Trimble 
decision did require a permit-specific reasonableness determination, but that 
there were no genuine issues of fact that DEQ had made such a 
determination.  We, on the other 
hand, conclude that the Trimble 
decision does not apply retroactively, so that no permit-specific reasonableness 
determination was required in Medicine Bow's case.  The practical result of our decision is, 
however, the same as the Council's decision:  a ruling against the Sierra Club's claim 
and in favor of DEQ and Medicine Bow.  
"[W]e can affirm an administrative agency's summary judgment decision on 
any basis apparent in the record."  
Powder River Basin Resource 
Council, ¶ 33, 226 P.3d  at 819.  
Although we reach this conclusion on a basis different from the 
Council's, we conclude that the Council did not err when it rejected the Sierra 
Club's fine particulate matter claim and upheld DEQ's issuance of Medicine Bow's 
air quality permit.

 
 
3.         
Fugitive Particulate Emissions

 
 

[¶46]     
As its final issue, 
the Sierra Club contends that DEQ improperly failed to model, or require 
Medicine Bow to model, the impacts of fugitive emissions of particulate 
matter.  Fugitive emissions are 
"emissions which could not reasonably pass through a stack, chimney, vent, or 
other functionally equivalent opening."  
WAQSR ch. 6, § 4(a).  See also 40 C.F.R. 
§ 52.21(b)(20).  Examples might 
include dust blown by the wind from coal stockpiles or raised by vehicles 
travelling on unpaved roads.  DEQ 
admits that it did not require modeling of the short term impacts of fugitive 
emissions, but asserts that it is not required to do so.  Medicine Bow supports DEQ's 
assertion.

 
 

[¶47]     
Under Wyoming 
regulations, no air quality permit may be issued "unless the applicant shows, to 
the satisfaction of the Administrator of the Division of Air Quality" that 
"[t]he proposed facility will not cause significant deterioration of existing 
ambient air quality in the Region."  
WAQSR ch. 6, § 2(c)(iii).  
In addition, a proposed facility may not receive a permit unless it shows 
that the predicted impact of its emissions is less than the maximum allowed 
increment.  Id., § 4(b)(i)(A)(I).  As explained by the Sierra Club, the 
permit applicant "must analyze the predicted impact' of the new source's 
emissions and prove that [the] impact is less than both the maximum allowable 
increment and the ambient standard."  
The regulation continues, 

 
 
An analysis of the 
predicted impact of emissions from the stationary source is required for all 
pollutants for which standards have been established . . . and which are emitted 
in significant amounts.  An analysis 
of the impact of other pollutants may be required by the Administrator.  Such analysis shall identify and 
quantify the impact on the air quality in the area of all emissions . . . .  The purpose of this analysis is to 
determine the total deterioration of air quality 
from the baseline concentrations; however, projections of deterioration due to 
general non-stationary source growth in the area predicted to occur after the 
date of application is not required.

 
 
WAQSR ch. 6, 
§ 4(b)(i)(A)(I) (emphasis in original).  As we recently observed, "To predict 
whether the impacts of a proposed source's emissions will exceed [these 
standards], one tool available to the DEQ is a computer model that estimates 
what the impacts will be."  Powder River Basin Resource Council, 
¶ 9, 226 P.3d  at 814.  The 
question presented to us now is whether DEQ is required to employ the computer 
modeling tool to predict the short term air quality impacts of fugitive 
particulate emissions.

 
 

[¶48]     
As noted above, DEQ 
admits that it did not model the short term impacts of fugitive particulate 
matter emissions.  However, the 
analysis undertaken by DEQ in this case included modeling of the long term 
impacts of fugitive particulate matter, and of the short term impacts of 
particulate emissions from point sources.  
These models predicted no violations of the applicable standards.  Instead of requiring modeling of the 
short term impacts of fugitive particulates, DEQ applied its expertise and 
experience to analyze various pertinent factors, including the fact that 
Medicine Bow's fugitive particulate emissions will be relatively smaller than 
other comparable operations in Wyoming.  
Based on this analysis, DEQ concluded that the predicted impact of 
emissions from the  Medicine Bow 
facility will not exceed the applicable standards.  This prediction will be verified by 
actual monitoring of the facility's air quality impacts once it has begun 
operations.

 
 

[¶49]     
DEQ explains that it 
does not require modeling of the short-term impacts of fugitive particulate 
emissions because such models "do not produce realistic results" and can 
significantly overestimate short-term impacts.  DEQ cites a long history of technical 
difficulties in quantifying and modeling fugitive emissions, particularly when 
used to predict short-term impacts, and of the regulatory uncertainty about how 
to deal with these difficulties.  See, e.g., 48 Fed. Reg. 38742, 38743-47 (August 
25, 1983).  In 1990, at least in 
part because of these difficulties and uncertainties, the United States Congress 
promulgated Section 234 of the federal Clean Air Act, known as the "Simpson 
Amendment," to address modeling issues relating to fugitive 
emissions:

 
 
Prior to any use of 
the Industrial Source Complex (ISC) Model using AP-42 Compilation of Air 
Pollutant Emission Factors to determine the effect on air quality of fugitive 
particulate emissions from surface coal mines, for purposes of new source review 
or for purposes of demonstrating compliance with national ambient air quality 
standards for particulate matter applicable to periods of 24 hours or less, 
under section 110 or parts C or D of title I of the Clean Air Act, the 
Administrator [of the EPA] shall analyze the accuracy of such model and emission 
factors and make revisions as may be necessary to eliminate any significant 
over-prediction of air quality effect of fugitive particulate emissions from 
such sources.  Such revisions shall 
be completed not later than 3 years after the date of enactment of the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1990.  Until such 
time as the Administrator develops a revised model for surface mine fugitive 
emissions, the State may use alternative empirical based modeling approaches 
pursuant to guidelines issued by the Administrator.

 
 
Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 234 (1990).  DEQ and Medicine Bow argue that this 
statutory provision expressly authorizes the use of alternative means to analyze 
the short-term impacts of fugitive particulate matter 
emissions.

 
 

[¶50]     
The Sierra Club 
suggests two reasons that this statute does not apply.  First, it points out that the statute 
applies only to emissions from "surface coal mines," not to the underground coal 
mine proposed by Medicine Bow.  
Federal law, however, defines the term "surface coal mine" to include the 
"surface operations and surface impacts incident to an underground coal 
mine."  30 U.S.C. 
§ 1291(28)(A).  See also 30 U.S.C. § 1266(a) 
(authorizing the regulation of the "surface effects of underground coal mining 
operations").  This supports DEQ's 
interpretation of the statute as encompassing the surface impacts associated 
with Medicine Bow's underground mine.  
Second, the Sierra Club points out that the statute refers to the ISC 
Model, an older model that has been replaced by one called AERMOD.  The Simpson Amendment expressly provides 
that "[u]ntil such time as the Administrator develops a revised model for 
surface mine fugitive emissions, the State may use alternative empirical based 
modeling approaches pursuant to guidelines issued by the Administrator."  DEQ contends that AERMOD still produces 
a "high degree of uncertainty in modeling short-term fugitive impacts."  Accordingly, DEQ and Medicine Bow assert 
that the Simpson Amendment continues to authorize the use of analytical 
techniques other than modeling to predict the short-term air quality impacts of 
fugitive particulate emissions.  The 
Sierra Club has not cited any authority indicating that the EPA has revised 
either model so as, in the words of the Simpson Amendment, to "eliminate any 
significant over-prediction of air quality effect of fugitive particulate 
emissions from such sources."

 
 

[¶51]     
The DEQ also relies 
on a Memorandum of Agreement it made with the EPA in 1994, in which the two 
agencies agreed that monitoring could be substituted for short-term modeling of 
fugitive particulate emissions for mines in Wyoming's Powder River Basin.  DEQ admits that the Medicine Bow 
facility will not be located in the Powder River Basin.  However, DEQ also points out that the 
Memorandum of Agreement was made pursuant to the authority of the Simpson 
Amendment, which does not limit its scope to the Powder River Basin.  Accordingly, DEQ argues that it is 
legally authorized to, and has, extended the policy of the Memorandum of 
Agreement to apply throughout Wyoming.

 
 

[¶52]     
In response to the 
arguments of DEQ and Medicine Bow, the Sierra Club posits that "[m]odels are 
required under Wyoming law to demonstrate compliance with air quality 
standards."  After a close reading 
of the Sierra Club's brief, however, we conclude that it has failed to support 
this argument with reference to any statute, regulation, or policy, either in 
Wyoming law or from the EPA.  The 
Sierra Club seems to rely on WAQSR ch. 6, § 4(b)(i)(A)(I), quoted above, 
which requires the permit applicant to analyze the predicted impact of the new 
source's emissions.  However, the 
Sierra Club has not cited any statutory or regulatory definition equating the 
term "analyze" with "computer model," or any provision indicating that modeling 
is a required step in the analysis of predicted air quality impacts.  As we recently observed, "To predict 
whether the impacts of a proposed source's emissions will exceed [applicable 
standards], one tool available to the DEQ is a computer model that estimates 
what the impacts will be."  Powder River Basin Resource Council, 
¶ 9, 226 P.3d  at 814.  Modeling 
is one tool, but the Sierra Club has not demonstrated that it is the only 
permissible tool. 

 

[¶53]     
The Sierra Club also 
points to WAQSR ch. 6, § 4(b)(iv), which provides that "[a]ll applications 
of air quality modeling required under paragraph (b)(i) above shall be based on 
the applicable models, databases, and other requirements specified in Appendix W 
of 40 CFR part 51 (Guideline on Air Quality Models)."  This regulation does not require 
modeling in every instance.  It 
provides only that when modeling is done, it must meet certain 
standards.

 
 

[¶54]     
From Appendix W of 40 
C.F.R. part 51, the Sierra Club points to language stating that "the impacts of 
new sources that do not yet exist can only be determined through modeling."  40 C.F.R. part 51, Appendix W, 
subsection 1.0.b.  This language 
should not be read in isolation, however.  
The purpose of the subsection as a whole is to explain varying uses and 
limitations of modeling, monitoring, and measuring:

 
 
Due to limitations in 
the spatial and temporal coverage of air quality measurements, monitoring data 
normally are not sufficient as the sole basis for demonstrating the adequacy of 
emission limits for existing sources.  
Also, the impacts of new sources that do not yet exist can only be 
determined through modeling.  Thus, 
models, while uniquely filling one program need, have become a primary 
analytical tool in most air quality assessments.  Air quality measurements can be used in a 
complementary manner to dispersion models, with due regard for the strengths and 
weaknesses of both analysis techniques.  
Measurements are particularly useful in assessing the accuracy of model 
estimates.  The use of air quality 
measurements alone however could be preferable, as detailed in a later section 
of this document, when models are found to be unacceptable and monitoring data 
with sufficient spatial and temporal coverage are 
available.

 
 

Id.  The phrase cited by the Sierra Club, 
taken in context, presents the unremarkable observation that sources that do not 
exist cannot be measured or monitored.  
See Powder River Basin Resource 
Council, ¶ 13 n.1, 226 P.3d  at 815 n.1 ("Because Dry Fork was not yet 
in operation, its actual emissions could not be documented.").  The text recognizes modeling as "a 
primary analytical tool in most air quality assessments," but not as the 
exclusive analytical tool.  Taken as 
a whole, this explanation of modeling does not create a mandate to employ 
modeling in every instance.

 
 

[¶55]     
In granting summary 
judgment to DEQ and Medicine Bow, the Council determined that DEQ's 
long-standing practice of not requiring modeling of fugitive particulate 
emissions to demonstrate compliance with the 24-hour standards is consistent 
with controlling law, and that the Sierra Club failed to show that DEQ's actions 
were contrary to the law or applicable DEQ rules and regulations.  We agree, and conclude that the Council 
did not err in rejecting the Sierra Club's fugitive particulate emissions 
claim.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶56]     
We affirm the 
Council's grant of summary judgment in favor of DEQ and Medicine Bow and against 
the Sierra Club.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Specifically, the 
Sierra Club contends that Medicine Bow's PTE should include an additional 165 
tons per year for malfunctions, and an additional 257 tons per year from cold 
starts.  However, as discussed 
below, cold starts are not expected annually, but estimated to occur only once 
every three or four years.

 
 

2NAAQS 
(National Ambient Air Quality Standards) are "ambient air quality standards the 
attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based 
on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to 
protect the public health."  42 
U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).  WAAQS (Wyoming 
Ambient Air Quality Standards) are Wyoming's version of such standards.  In broad terms, an air quality permit 
can be issued "only if the proposed source demonstrates that its emissions will 
not cause significant deterioration of ambient air quality. 6 WAQSR §§ 2 and 
4."  Powder River Basin Resource Council, 
¶ 8, 226 P.3d  at 813.

 
 

3The plan referred to 
in this permit condition has been referred to by the parties as the 
"Startup/Shutdown Emission Minimization Plan" or "SSEM Plan."  We will adopt their 
terminology.

 
 

4There 
is "well-established Wyoming law to the effect that statutes are not applied 
retroactively unless retroactivity is expressly provided for in the 
statute."  Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power & 
Light, 922 P.2d 850, 859 
(Wyo. 1996).  We have also decided a 
number of cases that "generally stand for the proposition that the retroactive 
application of either statutes or administrative rules and regulations [is] 
disfavored."  State ex rel. State Department of Revenue v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2003 WY 
54, ¶ 33, 67 P.3d 1176, 
1188 (Wyo. 2003) (collecting several such cases).  The parties in this case seem to assume 
that these principles apply to the retroactive application of agency policy, as 
well as to the retroactive application of statutes and regulations.  This assumption does not appear 
unreasonable, but the parties have failed to cite any legal authority to support 
it.  We may adopt the parties' 
assumption for purposes of this case, but we will reserve any decision on the 
question until it is more directly presented to us.

 
 

5See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7408 (criteria pollutants defined); 40 C.F.R. § 50.6 
(PM10); 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.7, 50.13 (PM2.5); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7412(b) (list of hazardous air pollutants, not including PM10 
or PM2.5).

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