Case Title: Commonwealth v. Witkowski

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12717

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12717 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAMES WITKOWSKI. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 8, 2021. - June 18, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Rape.  Practice, Criminal, 
Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, Question by 
jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 1, 2015. 
 
The case was tried before Mitchell H. Kaplan, J. 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan for the defendant. 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In 2017, the defendant was convicted of murder 
in the first degree, on a theory of felony-murder, with 
aggravated rape as the predicate felony.  The victim, Lena 
Bruce, was found dead in her Boston apartment in 1992; the case 
went unsolved until the defendant became a suspect in 2015 on 
the basis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence.  In his 
2 
 
direct appeal, the defendant raises issues concerning the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction of felony-
murder; the propriety of certain statements in the prosecutor's 
closing argument; the wording of a Tuey-Rodriquez charge;1 and 
the judge's answer to a jury question.  We affirm the conviction 
and discern no reason to exercise our authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have 
found, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Copeland, 481 Mass. 255, 256 
(2019), and reserving some details for later discussion of 
specific issues. 
 
a.  Circumstances of the victim's death.  At the beginning 
of June 1992, the victim, who had just graduated from college, 
moved into a new apartment in Boston with her friend Barbra 
Eden.  Eden left the city for a weekend trip on the evening of 
Friday, July 10, 1992, returning on Sunday, July 12, 1992, at 
around 8 P.M.  When Eden entered the apartment on her return, 
she found that it had been ransacked.  Soda cans, a beer bottle, 
empty glasses, and half-eaten fruit had been left lying around.  
A television set and an answering machine were missing, and an 
 
 
1 See Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 101-102 
(1973) (Appendix A); Commonwealth v. Tuey, 8 Cush. 1, 2-3 
(1851). 
3 
 
intercom that allowed communication with someone at the front 
door had been ripped from the wall.  Although the door to the 
apartment was locked, a window leading onto a fire escape 
overlooking a back alleyway was open.  The victim was lying face 
down on her bed, dead.  She was naked below the waist, and her 
hands were tied behind her back with a telephone cord.  The 
cause of death later was determined to be suffocation. 
 
Of the witnesses who testified at trial, Eden was the last 
to have seen the victim alive, on Friday evening before Eden's 
departure from Boston.  Joe Sullivan, a friend of the victim, 
testified that he had spoken with her by telephone on Friday 
evening and on Saturday at around 1:30 P.M.  The victim agreed 
to call him back that evening but did not.  Laurence Grant, the 
man whom the victim was dating at the time of her death, 
testified that he had called the victim's apartment several 
times on Sunday, beginning in the morning, and got no answer; he 
noted that it was unusual that the answering machine had not 
"picked up" if no one was home. 
 
b.  Investigation.  Decomposition of the victim's body 
suggested that at least one day had elapsed between the time of 
her death and the autopsy, which was conducted in the early 
morning hours of Monday, July 13, 1992.  A high number of intact 
sperm cells were detected on a vaginal swab taken at that time; 
semen was not detected on oral or anal swabs.  The director of 
4 
 
the Boston police crime laboratory, who had worked at the 
laboratory for some three decades and had been assigned to the 
original case, testified that the sperm on the vaginal swab 
likely had been deposited within twenty-four hours of when the 
autopsy was conducted, sometime in the early morning hours of 
Sunday, July 12, 1992, or thereafter.2  Blood group typing was 
performed on the vaginal swab in 1992, but no further testing to 
identify the source of the sperm was possible at the time. 
 
The case went unsolved for over twenty years.  In 1998, the 
Boston police crime laboratory began using an early form of DNA 
testing that examined seven locations on the chromosome in a 
sample tested.  This type of DNA testing was performed on the 
vaginal swab and on samples of skin found under the victim's 
fingernails.3  The DNA extracted from the vaginal swab produced a 
mixed profile composed of a male sperm fraction and a female 
epithelial fraction, the latter identified as being from the 
 
2 The expert's opinion that intact sperm ordinarily could be 
detected for up to twenty-four hours after deposit was based on 
his own personal experience; he also discussed several studies, 
one of which found that the average time that intact sperm could 
survive was under twenty-four hours, with some surviving between 
twenty-four and forty-eight hours. 
 
3 The only other DNA tests performed on crime scene evidence 
in this case were on swabs from the telephone cord, a stain on 
the front of the victim's shirt, and a hair recovered from the 
same shirt.  The telephone cord and the stain yielded no 
conclusive results, and the hair proved to be from the victim 
herself. 
5 
 
victim.  The same mixed profile was found on one of the 
fingernail samples.  Given the limitations of the technology, 
however, no suspect could be identified. 
Around 2000, more advanced DNA testing was performed on the 
vaginal swab and the fingernail cuttings, and the resulting male 
DNA profile was submitted to a national database.  In 2015, the 
database produced a match identifying the defendant, who had not 
previously been connected to the crime, as a possible suspect.  
In June of 2015, Boston police interviewed the defendant and 
obtained a DNA sample from him by buccal swab.  Subsequent 
testing, then using fourteen or sixteen chromosome locations, 
confirmed the defendant as the source of the sperm DNA, with a 
frequency calculation suggesting that one in twenty-nine 
quadrillion Caucasians, one in 4.8 quadrillion African-
Americans, or one in sixty-two quadrillion Southeastern 
Hispanics would share the same profile.  The male DNA found 
under the victim's fingernail also matched the defendant's, 
albeit with a somewhat higher possibility of a random match due 
to the mixed DNA profiles in the sample.4 
 
In 1992, the defendant had frequented the victim's 
neighborhood.  He slept at a homeless shelter and spent his days 
 
4 Approximately one in 6.5 million Caucasians, one in 1.2 
million African-Americans, or one in ten million Southeastern 
Hispanics could be included as possible contributors to the 
mixture. 
6 
 
panhandling and drinking, including on the steps of the victim's 
apartment building.  When he was interviewed by police in 2015, 
the defendant denied having known the victim by name or by 
sight, but said that he had been drinking heavily at that point 
in his life and could not remember all of the many women with 
whom he had had casual sex.  He said that if he had known the 
victim, "it was probably through sex and that was it," and later 
added, "if I had sex with her it was consensual."  After 
initially denying that he had ever tied up women before having 
sex with them, the defendant subsequently said that he had bound 
and gagged "plenty of girls" as part of his sexual activities, 
including some whom he would leave tied up at the end of the 
encounter.  He also told police that he would do so in the 
company of his friends "all the time."  At trial, the 
Commonwealth argued that the defendant's varying replies during 
the interview indicated consciousness of guilt. 
 
The theory of the defense was that a consensual sexual 
encounter could have taken place between the defendant and the 
victim, but that the police investigation had been inadequate to 
rule out other possible killers.  The defendant stressed that 
police had not collected DNA or fingerprint evidence from a 
variety of objects inside the victim's apartment, and he pointed 
7 
 
out that there was no direct evidence that the defendant ever 
had been inside the apartment.5 
 
c.  Trial proceedings.  The jury were instructed on all 
three theories of murder in the first degree, as well as on 
involuntary manslaughter.  After deliberating for two days, the 
jury sent the judge a note stating, "Currently the jury is split 
between [six] 'guilty' and [six] 'non-guilty.'  We are 
undecided."  The judge consulted with counsel and decided that 
the jury were deadlocked; he then gave them a Tuey-Rodriquez 
charge.  Slightly more than one hour later, the jury sent 
another note asking, "Can we make inferences based o[n] the LACK 
of evidence?"  The judge again conferred with counsel, and then 
sent the jury a written response, "Yes, provided that any 
inferences you draw are reasonable.  Please remember that you 
cannot guess or speculate, and you may draw no inference from 
the fact that [the defendant] did not testify." 
 
The jury deliberated for more than two additional hours 
that day and more than four hours on the next day that the court 
was in session.  They then returned a verdict of guilty of 
murder in the first degree, on the theory of felony-murder only. 
 
 
5 A fingerprint from the defendant's left thumb eventually 
was found on a piece of paper inside an empty wallet that police 
had discovered on the evening of July 12, 1992.  The wallet was 
in a small garden in front of the apartment building where the 
victim lived, along with two empty condom wrappers, an unwrapped 
condom, and a bottle of baby oil. 
8 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant challenges the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the conviction of felony-murder; the 
propriety of certain statements in the prosecutor's closing 
argument; the wording of the Tuey-Rodriquez charge; and the 
judge's response to a jury question.  We address each issue in 
turn. 
 
a.  Sufficiency of the evidence of felony-murder.  The 
defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove 
that the homicide and the aggravated rape were parts of one 
continuous event.  He also argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction of aggravated rape because 
there was insufficient evidence of a kidnapping, distinct from 
the rape itself, that could have served as the aggravating 
factor. 
 
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are evaluated 
under the Latimore standard, that is, whether, "after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).  "[T]he 
inferences a jury may draw from the relevant evidence need only 
be reasonable and possible, not necessary or inescapable" 
(quotation omitted).  Copeland, 481 Mass. at 259–260, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 312 (2014).  In 
9 
 
determining whether the evidence was sufficient to have allowed 
a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, we "do not weigh supporting evidence against 
conflicting evidence when considering whether the jury could 
have found each element of the crime charged."  Copeland, supra 
at 260, quoting Martin, supra. 
 
i.  Continuous event.  The defendant argues that the 
homicide and the rape could have occurred at separate points 
over the roughly thirty hours between Sullivan's last telephone 
call with the victim on Saturday afternoon, July 11, 1992, and 
Eden's return to the apartment on Sunday evening, and that 
therefore the evidence of a connection between the two crimes 
was insufficient to support a conviction of felony-murder.  See 
G. L. c. 265, § 1 (felony-murder in first degree is murder 
"committed . . . in the commission or attempted commission of a 
crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life" [emphasis 
added]). 
 
To support a conviction of felony-murder in the first 
degree, the killing need not have occurred during the course of 
the predicate felony itself, but only "as part of one continuous 
transaction," a standard which is met if the two "took place at 
substantially the same time and place."  Commonwealth v. Morin, 
478 Mass. 415, 422 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 408 
Mass. 463, 466 (1990) (robbery and killing took place within 
10 
 
thirty minutes of each other).  See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 459 
Mass. 249, 256, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1080 (2011) (connection 
to predicate felony was sufficient where homicide was committed 
during escape or flight); Commonwealth v. Osman, 284 Mass. 421, 
425 (1933) (evidence was sufficient for felony-murder where 
testimony suggested that rape, killing, and concealment of body 
occurred within forty-five minutes).  Where rape is the 
predicate felony, it is "not necessary that the homicide occur 
while the rape is in progress nor that it be caused by the 
rape."  Commonwealth v. Tarver, 369 Mass. 302, 316 (1975), 
quoting People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App. 3d 438, 451 (1974).  In 
addition, "[i]n the circumstances of one continuous event, it 
does not matter whether the victim's death preceded or followed 
the sexual attack."  Commonwealth v. Waters, 420 Mass. 276, 280 
(1995). 
 
Here, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
forensic evidence suggested that the killing occurred at least 
twenty-four hours before the autopsy, and the rape not much more 
than twenty-four hours before the autopsy.  There was expert 
testimony to the effect that the fact that semen was detected on 
the vaginal swab taken from the victim at the autopsy, but not 
on the anal swab, suggested that the victim had not gotten up or 
walked around after the semen was deposited.  This would have 
allowed the jury reasonably to infer that the victim had not 
11 
 
moved from the position in which she was raped, and thus that 
the sexual intercourse did not occur long before her death.  See 
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 837–838 (2008) (that 
victim was found on her back, and no sperm was found on her 
underwear, supported finding that death occurred after 
intercourse and before victim could pull up her clothing).  That 
the victim was discovered face-down on the bed and naked, having 
died from suffocation, further supported the reasonable 
inference that she had been smothered in the course of, or 
shortly after, sexual intercourse.  Indeed, "the jury could have 
found that the killing was causally related" to the rape.  
Morin, 478 Mass. at 422.  See Commonwealth v. Alcequiecz, 465 
Mass. 557, 566 (2013) (causal relationship between burglary and 
killing made them parts of single transaction).  In sum, the 
evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to have found that 
the rape and the suffocation were part of a single, continuous 
transaction.6 
 
6 The defendant argues that the evidence was consistent with 
the alternative possibility that the victim was killed and her 
body then was raped only after a considerably longer interval 
had elapsed.  In general, when "conflicting inferences are 
possible from the evidence, 'it is for the jury to determine 
where the truth lies.'"  Commonwealth v. Garuti, 454 Mass. 48, 
55 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Wilborne, 382 Mass. 241, 245 
(1981), S.C., 448 Mass. 1010 (2007).  See Commonwealth v. 
Gordon, 422 Mass. 816, 851 (1996) ("although there may have been 
other inferences possible, under the sufficiency of the evidence 
standard, we need only consider whether the inference was 
"reasonable and possible" [citation omitted]). 
12 
 
 
ii.  Aggravated rape.  The defendant contends that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of aggravated 
rape, and thus to find him guilty of murder in the first degree 
on a theory of felony-murder, because there was no evidence that 
the victim's freedom of movement was restricted any more than 
was inherent in the rape itself. 
 
Under G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b), the felony of rape is defined 
as sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a 
person who is compelled to submit by force and against his or 
her will, or by threat of bodily injury.  It is punishable by a 
term of imprisonment for not more than twenty years for a first 
offense.  Aggravated rape, as defined in G. L. c. 265, § 22 (a), 
is a felony punishable by life in prison or any term of years, 
and thus can support a conviction of felony-murder.  Three 
possible aggravating factors cause a rape to become an 
aggravated rape:  if the rape is committed (1) with acts 
resulting in serious bodily injury; (2) by a joint enterprise; 
or (3) during the commission or attempted commission of a number 
of enumerated offenses, including kidnapping.7  Id. 
 
 
7 The other aggravating offenses are assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon, assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon; armed or unarmed robbery; armed or unarmed burglary; 
breaking and entering in the nighttime with intent to commit a 
felony; breaking and entering in the daytime or entering without 
breaking in the nighttime; entering a dwelling house in the 
nighttime; and certain firearms offenses.  See Commonwealth v. 
McCourt, 438 Mass. 486, 492 n.8 (2003). 
13 
 
 
The offense of kidnapping, in turn, is defined as "without 
lawful authority, forcibly or secretly confin[ing] or 
imprison[ing] another person within this [C]ommonwealth against 
his will."  G. L. c. 265, § 26.  The term "confinement" means 
"[a]ny restraint of a person's liberty."  Commonwealth v. 
Dykens, 438 Mass. 827, 841 (2003), citing Commonwealth v. 
Nickerson, 5 Allen 518, 525–526 (1862).  See Commonwealth v. 
Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 548 (2017) (confinement is "broadly 
interpreted to mean any restraint of a person's movement" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
The defendant is correct that "[i]f the confinement of the 
victim during the rape itself did not exceed the restraint which 
was incident to the rape, it did not constitute the crime of 
kidnapping, separate and apart from the rape."  Commonwealth v. 
Kastner, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 131, 141 (2010).  But any 
"confinement, detention, or restraint exceeding the conduct 
necessary for commission of the other charged offenses 
constitutes independent, not incidental, conduct."  Oberle, 476 
Mass. at 548, quoting Commonwealth v. Boyd, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 
190, 195 (2008).  The fact that a confinement in some way 
facilitated a rape does not necessarily make it incidental to 
the rape.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 397 Mass. 244, 246, 254 
(1986), abrogated on another ground by Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 
407 Mass. 553 (1990) ("Although the restraint that is an 
14 
 
integral part of rape . . . may be one with the rape," defendant 
committed separate crime of kidnapping when he dragged victim 
into dark, secluded area in order to commit rape). 
 
The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence 
for the jury to have concluded that he forcibly or secretly 
confined the victim, beyond any restraint necessary to commit 
the rape.  Considering the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, we disagree.  The fact that the victim's 
hands were bound shows a confinement, long established under 
Massachusetts law as meaning any restraint of a person's liberty 
or movement.  See Oberle, 476 Mass. at 548; Dykens, 438 Mass. at 
841.  That a telephone cord had been used to bind the victim's 
hands, thus disabling the telephone, and that the intercom that 
communicated with the front door had been ripped out of the 
wall, also tended to show that the defendant secretly confined 
the victim in the apartment and isolated her from using the 
devices to call for help.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 460 Mass. 
139, 142 (2011) (confinement is "secret" for purposes of 
kidnapping when it "serves to isolate or insulate the victim 
from meaningful contact or communication with the public" 
[citation omitted]).  This evidence clearly went beyond the 
confinement or restraint that was incident to the rape, and was 
sufficient to establish aggravated rape.  See Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 242-244 (2006) (sufficient 
15 
 
evidence of kidnapping for conviction of aggravated rape where 
victim voluntarily accompanied defendant to secluded location 
where he poked her with sharp stick, threatened to kill her, and 
told her she could not leave). 
 
b.  Closing argument.  The defendant challenges two aspects 
of the prosecutor's closing argument.  First, he maintains that 
the prosecutor impermissibly encouraged the jury to put 
themselves in the victim's place -- a so-called "golden rule" 
argument.  Second, he argues that the prosecutor improperly 
shifted the burden of proof by telling the jury that, in order 
to acquit the defendant, they had to believe that he and the 
victim had had consensual sex. 
 
i.  "Golden rule" argument.  During his closing, the 
prosecutor repeatedly urged the jury to "think about" the time 
immediately before the victim's death, including that "she knew 
exactly what was going to happen next."  With respect to the 
length of time it took for the victim to die by suffocation, he 
pointed to the minute the medical examiner testified that it 
would have taken the victim to die, with her nose and mouth 
covered, and urged the jury to "think about a minute of 
grasping, gasping for air, wondering if you're going to live or 
die, and at some point knowing you are going to die."  After 
apparently pausing for forty-five seconds to illustrate the 
length of time, the prosecutor explained that it was "important 
16 
 
to know that [the victim] felt fear and terror at the hands of 
her rapist and killer" because the Commonwealth was pursuing a 
conviction on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  As the 
defense did not object, we review for a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. 
404, 423 (2000). 
"Prosecutors may 'argue forcefully for the defendant's 
conviction,'" and the use of "'[e]nthusiastic rhetoric, strong 
advocacy, and excusable hyperbole' will not require reversal."  
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass. 186, 199 (2017), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350-351 (1998).  Here, as 
the prosecutor explicitly noted, the Commonwealth was arguing 
for a conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  "Dramatic description from the 
prosecutor is more likely in such cases given the nature of the 
charge . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 205 
(2012).  At the time of the defendant's trial, moreover, a 
conviction on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty could be 
based on evidence of the "consciousness and degree of suffering 
of the victim."  See Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 
(1983).8  Accordingly, the prosecutor permissibly could argue 
 
8 In Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 864-865, 867 
(2020), we modified the Cunneen factors prospectively, such that 
a jury no longer may "find extreme atrocity or cruelty based 
only on the degree of a victim's suffering, without considering 
17 
 
based "both on the defendant's actions, in terms of the manner 
and means of inflicting death, and on the resulting effect on 
the victim."  See Commonwealth v. Barros, 425 Mass. 572, 580-581 
(1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 684 (1980) 
(approving closing argument in explicit support of conviction of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty).  The prosecutor also permissibly 
could argue in support of a conviction of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty by describing the victim's final moments and "emotional 
response."  Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 44 (2017). 
 
We also long have emphasized, however, that prosecutors 
must not use language "calculated . . . to sweep jurors beyond a 
fair and calm consideration of the evidence."  Commonwealth v. 
Perry, 254 Mass. 520, 531 (1926).  In particular, the "jury 
should not be asked to put themselves 'in the shoes' of the 
victim, or otherwise be asked to identify with the victim."  
Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 646 (2017), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 420 (2011).  It thus 
usually is "impermissible for the prosecutor to ask the jury to 
imagine the victim's final thoughts."  See Rutherford, supra at 
645-646 (improper for prosecutor to ask jury to imagine victim's 
last thoughts from victim's own perspective).  But see 
Commonwealth v. Raymond, 424 Mass. 382, 389–390 (1997), S.C., 
 
whether the defendant's conduct was extreme in either its 
brutality or its cruelty" (emphasis in original). 
18 
 
450 Mass. 729 (2008) (acceptable for prosecutor to ask jury to 
"[t]hink about [murder victim's] state of mind" and to 
"[i]magine . . . what was going through [her] mind" as she was 
being raped).  In general, a "focus on the victim distracts 
attention from the actual issues, and invites the jury to decide 
guilt or innocence on the basis of sympathy."  Bizanowicz, 
supra.  An argument dwelling on the victim's state of mind is 
disfavored even where the Commonwealth is seeking "to prove that 
the killing was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, a 
showing that turns largely on what the defendant has done" 
(emphasis in original).  Id. at 420–421.  See Commonwealth v. 
Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 862 (2020) (focus in cases of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty always has been on defendant's conduct). 
 
On balance, we conclude that the prosecutor's argument here 
was not improper.  Crucially, it did not involve speculation 
about the circumstances of the victim's death beyond what 
reasonably could be inferred from the evidence.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 486 Mass. 617, 634 (2021) 
("prosecutor's statements not only played to the emotions of the 
jury in inviting them to imagine the victim's last moments, but 
also were unsupported by the evidence").  Although his 
references to the victim's "fear," "terror," and what "she knew" 
clearly invited the jury to focus on her state of mind, this is 
not necessarily impermissible.  We emphasize, however, that this 
19 
 
type of rhetoric must be used with caution.  The repeated 
exhortation that the jury "think about" the victim's last 
moments (an imperative repeated some fifteen times) and the 
direction that the jury contemplate "wondering if you're going 
to live or die, and at some point knowing you are going to die" 
came close to "invit[ing] the jury into the victim's position."  
See Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 Mass. 587, 608 (2015) (improper 
for prosecutor to ask jury, with reference to victim, to "think 
about landing face down on that dirty, beer-stained barroom 
floor.  You are completely helpless . . . you're laying there 
bleeding, in pain, in terror").  Compare Rakes, 478 Mass. at 44 
(no impropriety in "brief reference" to victim's mental 
suffering that "was presented in a relatively straightforward 
manner" to show extreme atrocity or cruelty). 
Even if the challenged statements had been error, they 
clearly did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  "While the statements 'went to the heart' of the 
matter with respect to the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty," the jury deliberated at length and ultimately did not 
convict on that theory, "making these comments collateral," and 
suggesting that the jury's emotions in fact were not enflamed.  
Teixeira, 486 Mass. at 635, quoting Commonwealth v. Niemic, 472 
Mass. 665, 673 (2015), S.C., 483 Mass. 571 (2019).  Moreover, 
the judge specifically instructed the jury not to decide the 
20 
 
case based on "the sympathy that we may all feel for [the 
victim] and her family and friends."  At the same time, the DNA 
match provided compelling evidence of the defendant's guilt.  
See Commonwealth v. Kent K., 427 Mass. 754, 761 (1998) ("Where 
guilt is clear, improper appeals to sympathy, although 
troubling, are less crucial . . ."). 
 
ii.  Consensual sex.  At one point in his closing, the 
prosecutor said, "Let's be very clear about what the defense is 
asking you to believe.  To find the defendant not guilty, you 
have to actually, don't you have to actually believe that [the 
victim] had consensual sex with [the defendant]?"  The defendant 
objected, once the argument ended, on the ground that the 
comment impermissibly shifted the burden of proof; the defendant 
requested a specific curative instruction addressing this 
comment, but none was given.  Because the defendant timely 
objected, we review for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lester, 486 Mass. 239, 247 (2020). 
 
As the defendant argues, the evidence would have allowed 
the jury to conclude that he raped the victim but was not the 
killer.  There also was no need that the jury "actually 
believe[d]" any particular account of what had occurred in order 
to have acquitted the defendant.  That said, the theory of the 
defense was that a consensual encounter had occurred, consistent 
with the defendant's statement to police.  Defense counsel 
21 
 
elicited on cross-examination of the defendant's former 
girlfriend that, at the time of trial, the defendant had been 
"good-looking" and "charming."  In his closing argument, counsel 
invited the jury to consider the possibility that the defendant 
and the victim "could have talked on the street and something 
could have happened."  A prosecutor is "entitled to respond to 
the defense argument and also to comment on the . . . weakness 
of the defense, 'as long as argument is directed at the 
defendant's defense and not at the defendant's failure to 
testify.'"  Commonwealth v. Silva, 471 Mass. 610, 623 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Garvin, 456 Mass. 778, 799 (2010). 
 
The challenged comments were not akin to those we 
previously have labeled impermissible burden shifting; the 
prosecutor did not suggest that the defendant had "an 
affirmative duty to bring forth evidence of his innocence," for 
instance, by "calling the jury's attention to the defendant's 
failure to call a witness or witnesses."  See Commonwealth v. Tu 
Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 787 (2011).  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Amirault, 404 Mass. 221, 240 (1989) (it was improper burden 
shifting for prosecutor to state in closing argument that 
defendant "was unable to point to one single thing in the whole 
world that would account for why all these [witnesses] have 
turned against him").  To the extent that the prosecutor's 
single statement suggested an inaccurate view of the law or of 
22 
 
the evidence, the misstatement was minor.  His "brief, isolated 
statement . . . was not egregious enough to infect the whole of 
the trial."  Commonwealth v. Salazar, 481 Mass. 105, 118 (2018).  
Accordingly, if there were any error, the defendant was not 
prejudiced by it. 
 
c.  Charge to the deadlocked jury.  On the third day of 
deliberations, after consultation with counsel, the judge 
delivered a Tuey-Rodriquez charge to the jury.  See Commonwealth 
v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 101–102 (1973) (Appendix A); 
Commonwealth v. Tuey, 8 Cush. 1, 2–3 (1851).  The charge is 
"intended for a deadlocked jury to encourage them to continue 
deliberating."  Commonwealth v. Chalue, 486 Mass. 847, 860 
(2021).  The judge stated near the beginning of the charge that 
"[i]n most cases, and perhaps strictly speaking in all cases, 
absolute certainty cannot be attained, and probably we shouldn't 
expect that."  These words were in substantive accord with the 
model given in Rodriquez, supra.  See P.M. Lauriat & D.H. 
Wilkins, Massachusetts Jury Trial Benchbook, at 357 (3d ed. 
2016) (Appendix 5H) ("In most cases, and perhaps, strictly 
speaking, in all cases, absolute certainty cannot be attained, 
nor is it expected").  Before the charge was given, however, the 
defendant had requested that this language be replaced with a 
statement to the effect that "[i]n all cases we expect the jury 
to insist on the highest degree of certainty possible in matters 
23 
 
relating to human affairs before it makes a decision."  The 
defendant objected to the charge being given without his 
requested modification.  On appeal, he argues that such a 
modification in fact is required by our decision in Commonwealth 
v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 476–477 (2015).  We do not agree. 
 
Russell concerned the explanation on reasonable doubt in a 
judge's final charge.  In that case, the court decided to modify 
the venerable Webster language on reasonable doubt, see 
Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 320 (1850), in part by 
adding a definition of "moral certainty" as "the highest degree 
of certainty possible in matters relating to human affairs," 
Russell, 470 Mass. at 477.  The addition was motivated by 
concern that the phrase "moral certainty," without 
clarification, could mislead jurors when presented as a synonym 
for "beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 476.  See Victor v. 
Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 12 (1994) (explaining that "moral 
certainty" originally meant certainty "based on general 
observation of people, . . . rather than on what is 
demonstrable" [citation omitted]). 
 
The words "moral certainty" do not appear in the Tuey-
Rodriquez charge.  Moreover, the sentence concerning "absolute 
certainty," which the defendant sought to replace, does not 
serve to articulate the degree of certainty that a jury must 
reach, but, rather, a degree of certainty that they need not 
24 
 
achieve.  A statement that "absolute certainty" is not 
required -- as it indeed is not, see Commonwealth v. Costley, 
118 Mass. 1, 24 (1875) -- is hardly out of place in a charge 
that is, after all, intended to help a deadlocked jury reach a 
decision. 
 
In revising the Webster charge, this court also eliminated 
the concluding words "if the law, which mostly depends upon 
considerations of a moral nature, should go further than this, 
and require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial 
evidence altogether."  See Russell, 470 Mass. at 469, 477-478, 
quoting Webster, 5 Cush. at 320.  The reason for the elimination 
of this sentence, however, was its use of the adjective "moral" 
in an obsolete sense, not the phrase "absolute certainty."  The 
latter words are colloquial and were not "introduced into our 
jurisprudence from the publicists and metaphysicians," as was 
the phrase "moral certainty."  See Costley, 118 Mass. at 23.  We 
have not expressed concern that "absolute certainty" is a phrase 
liable to be misleading for modern juries, and we see no need to 
banish it from the standard Tuey-Rodriquez charge. 
 
The Tuey-Rodriquez charge "has a 'sting' and can, if 
improperly phrased or improvidently given, risk 'coercion' of 
the jury to reach a verdict with which they are not fully 
comfortable."  Ray v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 1, 6 (2012), 
quoting Rodriquez, 364 Mass. at 100.  The judge in this case 
25 
 
consulted the attorneys before resorting to it, in response to 
an unsolicited communication from the jury after roughly two 
days of deliberations.  In these circumstances, the use of the 
charge was not an abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Haley, 413 Mass. 770, 779 (1992) (giving charge was not abuse of 
discretion after four hours of deliberation in noncomplex case); 
Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 412 Mass. 664, 679 (1992), overruled on 
another ground by Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217 (2005) 
(risk of premature charge is greatest when judge "recalls the 
jury on his or her own initiative in order to prompt the jury to 
reach a decision").  The judge also prudently relied on the 
standard Tuey-Rodriquez language.  See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 
65 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 295 (2005) (judge should be "particularly 
vigilant that there not creep into the phraseology any 
suggestion that the jurors are obligated to decide the case one 
way or another").  There was no error. 
 
d.  Response to jury question.  The defendant argues that 
the judge's response to the jury's question about the 
permissibility of inferences from a lack of evidence violated 
his right to due process, because the judge only instructed the 
jury not to draw inferences from the fact that the defendant 
himself did not testify, and did not provide any instruction 
that they also should not draw any inferences from the fact that 
the defendant did not introduce any other evidence.  Because the 
26 
 
defendant did not object to the judge's formulation, we review 
for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 416 (2020). 
 
The judge expressed hesitation about how to respond to the 
question, "Can we make inferences based o[n] the LACK of 
evidence?"  The question indeed was a difficult one to answer in 
the abstract, given that whether any particular inference is 
licit "necessarily depends . . . upon the posture of the 
particular case and the state of the evidence."  Commonwealth v. 
Franklin, 366 Mass. 284, 292–293 (1974), quoting Commonwealth v. 
O'Rourke, 311 Mass. 213, 222 (1942).  The substance of the 
renewed instruction -- that the jury could make any reasonable 
inference, as long as they did not guess or speculate or make 
inferences from the fact that the defendant did not testify -- 
was accurate.  Additionally, in his final charge, the judge 
instructed that "the defendant never has any burden to prove his 
or her innocence or to produce evidence."  Although it might 
have been better for the judge to have included a statement to 
this effect in his response to the jury's question, the fact 
that they deliberated for more than six hours after having been 
given the challenged answer suggests that the response itself 
did not sway their verdict.  There was no substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice. 
27 
 
 
e.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   We have reviewed 
the entire record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, and discern no reason reduce the verdict or to order a 
new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.