Case Title: Behm v. DIVISION. OF ADMIN., STATE DEPT. OF TRANSP.

Citation: 336 So. 2d 579

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1976-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
336 So. 2d 579 (1976)
Ray G. BEHM and Frances K. Behm, Petitioners,
v.
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, STATE of Florida DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent.
No. 45431.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 8, 1976.
Rehearing Denied September 21, 1976.
*580 James J. Richardson, of Henderson, Richardson, Henry, Buchanan, Munroe & Rodman, Tallahassee, for petitioners.
Geoffrey B. Dobson, Tallahassee, Barbara Dell McPherson, Jacksonville, and Winifred Sheridan Smallwood, Tallahassee, for respondent.
OVERTON, Chief Justice.
This cause is before the Court upon petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal reported at 292 So. 2d 437 (Fla.4th DCA 1974). The decision sought to be reviewed acknowledges direct conflict with City of Jacksonville v. Yerkes, 282 So. 2d 645 (Fla.1st DCA 1973), cert. den. 291 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974). We have jurisdiction.[1] The First District Court of Appeal by another panel in Tuttle v. Division of Administration, State of Florida Department of Transportation, Fla.App., 327 So. 2d 841, (1976), reaffirmed but qualified the decision in City of Jacksonville v. Yerkes, supra. The Tuttle decision is now before this Court upon the asserted contention that it conflicts with the Yerkes decision and a certification of the First District that it passed upon a question of great public interest.
The issue before this Court concerns the latitude an eminent domain jury has in awarding compensation when the only evidence on an element of compensation is the testimony of one expert witness.
The petitioners were the property owners in an eminent domain proceeding below, and challenge the jury's verdict of $9,500 for business damages. Evidence offered by the property owners' expert at trial valued the business damages at $19,500. The property owners assert that the jury was without authority to award them less than the sum of $19,500. The specific facts were well summarized by Judge Walden in his decision for the Fourth District:
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held the verdict was within the proper range for the compensation of business loss. We agree and affirm.
The petitioner property owners contend that the jury was without authority to award them less than the figure testified to by their expert witness since the state failed to present any expert testimony on the element of business loss compensation. This contention is predicated upon their interpretation of this Court's decisions in Meyers v. City of Daytona Beach, 158 Fla. 859, 30 So. 2d 354 (1947), and Dade County v. Renedo, 147 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1962). These decisions established a rule of law in condemnation proceedings requiring that "the jury verdict must be not less than the lowest estimates nor more than the highest." Dade County v. Renedo, supra at 316. This rule was necessitated by the uniqueness of condemnation proceedings, and is expressed in instructions to the jury as "your verdict shall not be less than the lowest value testified to by any witness nor shall it be higher than the highest value testified to by any witness." See Florida Eminent Domain Practice and Procedure, Section 8.13, Instruction No. 11 (2d ed. 1970).
The issue before this Court evolves from an interpretation of this rule. The law *582 of this state requires a condemning authority to establish what it believes to be just compensation for the land taken. The condemning authority thus admits damages in this amount, and requires the jury to find that amount as the minimum award. The property owner on the other hand may rebut that evidence and, moreover, may come forward with evidence of additional elements of damages as provided by statute. The maximum total amount of compensation presented in evidence for each element of damage by the property owner establishes the maximum amount of compensation. By the proper application of the rule adversaries admit the value of the property interest taken is neither less nor more than their respective claims. We agree with Judge Walden that the property owners' expert testimony was the maximum amount requested, not a minimum amount admitted. The case of Meyers v. City of Daytona Beach, supra, is an instance where the jury awarded less than the minimum amount admitted by the evidence presented by the condemning authority.
In considering an expert's testimony the jury must be guided by the greater weight of the evidence, and it remains the jury's province to determine the weight and credibility to be given an expert's testimony. Guidelines for this evaluation were established by Mr. Justice Drew in Dade County v. Renedo, supra, where he stated:
The jury in a condemnation proceeding may not make an independent determination of the value of the property. But in evaluating, interpreting, and weighing the credibility of the testimony of an expert witness they may apply to the expert testimony their knowledge and experience, view of the property, as well as other evidence in the case to determine its reasonableness. The opinion of an expert is worth no more than the reasons on which it is based, and if properly susceptible to differing interpretations the jury is at liberty to make such intrepretations. Dade County v. Renedo, supra. See generally Elston v. York, 77 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1955); Wynne v. Adside, 163 So. 2d 760 (Fla.1st DCA 1964); Fekany v. State Road Department, 115 So. 2d 418 (Fla.2d DCA 1959); Robertson v. Robertson, 106 So. 2d 590 (Fla.2d DCA 1958); and Millar v. Tropical Gables Corp., 99 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958). Compensation in an eminent domain case is by our constitution committed for final determination to the jury, not to an expert.
We reject the reasoning of City of Jacksonville v. Yerkes, supra. Judge Walden stated in his opinion the Yerkes view would,
We fully agree.
The expert testimony in the instant case has been erroneously characterized by the petitioner as uncontroverted. The record reflects that the testimony was assailed on both cross and recross examination, and the jury's award suggests that this impeachment was to an extent effective. But even if there had been no such cross-examination, we would not reverse the judgment. In the instant case the testimony concerning business loss was in itself susceptible to differing interpretations and the jury was well within its authority to establish the value of losses attributable to business damage to be $9,500. We find no error in that verdict.
We approve the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal and discharge the petition for certiorari.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, BOYD and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents.
[1]  Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.