Case Title: Bloomingdales, Inc. v. The New York City Transit Authority

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 99  
Bloomingdales, Inc., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
The New York City Transit 
Authority,     
            Appellant. 
(And Third-Party Actions.)
Lisa A. Sokoloff, for appellant New York City Transit
Authority.
Peter Cooper, for third-party appellant Judlau
Contracting, Inc.
Brendon T. Fitzpatrick, for third-party appellant Janus
Industries, Inc.
Kevin P. Westerman, for third-party appellant M-Track
Enterprises, Inc.
Harry Steinberg, for respondent.
PIGOTT, J.:
In September 1999, third-party defendant Janus
Industries, Inc., as part of a project undertaken by defendant
New York City Transit Authority, began excavation work between
59th Street and 60th street on the west side of Third Avenue in
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No. 99
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Manhattan.  In the course of the work, Janus cut a working
drainpipe that ran down from plaintiff Bloomingdales, Inc.'s
roof, believing it to be a "dead" water main.  It then installed
a conduit encased in concrete in its place.  Sometime thereafter,
Bloomingdales experienced flooding on the lower level of its
store when it rained.  In February 2002, Bloomingdales hired a
contractor, who excavated the area of the drainpipe, determined
that it had been cut and discovered the conduit.  Bloomingdales
alleges it was required to install a new drainpipe above the
conduit costing in excess of $165,000. 
After filing a Notice of Claim, Bloomingdales then
commenced an action against the New York City Transit Authority,
in January 2003, alleging causes of action for negligence,
trespass and nuisance.  Third and fourth-party actions ensued
involving various contractors and subcontractors on the project. 
The Transit Authority and third-party defendants moved
for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, invoking Public
Authorities Law § 1212, General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i
and CPLR 214, arguing that Bloomingdales' claim was barred by the
statute of limitations because the action was commenced more than
one year and ninety days after the complained-of negligent act -
the severing of the drainpipe. 
Supreme Court concluded that the moving parties
established their entitlement to summary judgment, finding that,
pursuant to the controlling statutes, the statute of limitations
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was triggered when the drainage pipe was severed in September
1999.  Bloomingdales appealed.
The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the
trespass and nuisance causes of action (52 AD3d 120).  The
majority held that the concrete conduit "physically interrupted
[Bloomingdales'] storm drainpipe and interfered with
[Bloomingdales'] easement and right of access to the sewer." 
Thus, it held that this was a "continuing" tort resulting in
successive causes of action and because the claims were not tied
to the single negligent act of severing the drainpipe, the
actions were timely commenced.  
The Appellate Division certified the following question
to this Court:  "Was the order of this Court, which reversed the
order of the Supreme Court, properly made?"  We now answer the
question in the affirmative.
Public Authorities Law § 1212 (2) and General Municipal
Law § 50-i both require that an action for damages to real
property be commenced within one year and ninety days after the
occurrence of the event upon which the claim is based,
irrespective of when the action accrued (see Klein v City of
Yonkers, 53 NY2d 1011, 1013 [1981]).  The Transit Authority and
third-party defendants argue that this is the correct time period
upon which to measure all of Bloomingdales' claims.  
There is no dispute that if the happening of the event
complained of by Bloomingdales was solely the severing of the
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drain pipe, all of the causes of action would be time barred. 
However, another act occurred here- - the placement of the
conduit.
The essence of trespass to real property is injury to
the right of possession, and such trespass may occur under the
surface of the ground.  A person need not have title to the
property, but must simply have sufficient property rights to
maintain an action for trespass (see CJS Trespass §30).  Although
Bloomingdales did not have exclusive possession of the area of
the drainpipe, it still had legal rights against trespass for an
unlawful encroachment to its right of way.  We have held that a
trespass that constitutes an unlawful encroachment on a
plaintiff's property will be considered a continuous trespass
giving rise to successive causes of action (509 Sixth Ave. Corp.
v New York City Transit Authority, 15 NY2d 48 [1964]).  Thus, for
purposes of the statute of limitations, suits will only be time
barred by the expiration of such time as would create an easement
by prescription or change of title by operation of law (id.).
Here, the presence of the concrete conduit interfered
with Bloomingdales' access to its drainpipe and ultimately the
City sewer, and as a result, Bloomingdales was required to
install a new pipe following a new path over the conduit. 
Notably, the actual damages sought by Bloomingdales did not arise
from the mere severance of its drainpipe, but from the need to
install the new drainpipe in a different location.  Thus, because
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the conduit encroached on Bloomingdales' right of way, we find
that the Appellate Division correctly concluded that
Bloomingdales has a viable cause of action sounding in trespass,
for which the statute of limitations has not yet run. 
For the same reasons, we find that there is a viable
claim for private nuisance, which is, in this case, simply
another way of characterizing the trespass claim.  There was a
continuous interference with Bloomingdales' right to use and
enjoy its property right, and as such the same statute of
limitations as the trespass applies.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question should be
answered in the affirmative.
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Order affirmed, with costs, and certified question answered in
the affirmative.  Opinion by Judge Pigott.  Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Read, Smith and Jones concur.  Chief Judge Lippman took
no part.
Decided June 11, 2009