Case Title: Scaling v. Scaling

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Scaling v. Scaling1991 WY 17805 P.2d 866Case Number: 89-227Decided: 02/12/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
Teresa H. 
SCALING, now known as Teresa H. Hartley, 

Appellant, 
(Defendant),

 

v.

 

Samuel T. 
SCALING, 

Appellee, 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from 
the District Court, Natrona 
County, Dan 
Spangler, J.

 

Daniel E. 
White of Vines, Gusea & White, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

 

Donald E. 
Chapin of Crowell & Chapin, P.C., Casper, for 
appellee.

 

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]  Appellant Teresa H. Hartley (Hartley), 
former wife of appellee Samuel T. Scaling (Scaling), appeals two post-divorce 
orders of the district court which in combination denied her 
requests:

 

· for 
reimbursement of one-half of child visitation travel 
expenses;

· for 
increased child support;

· for 
reimbursement of past medical expenses of the parties' minor 
children;

· for 
reimbursement of costs and attorney fees incurred in defending her former 
husband's petition to reduce alimony and child support;

· to 
establish medical support for the parties' minor children;

· to compel 
her former husband to pay moving expenses and to hold him in contempt for his 
failure to pay them;

· to compel 
her former husband to produce documents containing information relevant to her 
former husband's petition to reduce alimony and child 
support.

Appellant 
also claims the district court erred in limiting the hearing on her petition to 
increase child support and to establish medical support for the parties' minor 
children to a consideration of post-divorce changes in her former husband's 
income.

 

[¶2]  We affirm the district court's orders in 
all particulars except for the denial of the former wife's request concerning 
medical support for the parties' minor children. As to this latter issue, we 
reverse and remand for hearing.

 

BACKGROUND

 

[¶3]  On September 
2, 1986, Scaling 
filed for divorce; Hartley timely answered and counterclaimed. The district 
court tried the action on January 16, 
1987, following 
which the court asked both counsel to submit letter memoranda outlining their 
clients' positions on support issues and division of assets and liabilities. 
Each counsel submitted a letter memorandum on January 22, 
1987. On 
February 9, 
1987, the court 
issued its decision letter; the court's final judgment and decree followed on 
April 27, 
1987.

 

[¶4]  Focusing on those provisions of the 
final judgment that are implicated in this appeal, we find that the decree 
provided:

 

1. Moving Expenses. Scaling shall pay the 
reasonable moving expenses for Hartley and the children if they should move from 
Casper. In 
Hartley's letter memorandum dated January 22, 
1987, she 
informed the court she wanted $7,000 for moving expenses to 
Arizona. That the 
designation of Arizona was in error was brought to the court's attention in the 
hearing on August 4, 1989, which covered Hartley's May 31, 1989 motion charging 
Scaling with contempt for failure to abide by the decree. In the court's 
February 9, 
1987 decision 
letter, the court states that Hartley indicated she intended to move to 
New 
Mexico to attend 
college, and "it is hereby ordered that [Scaling] shall pay her moving 
expenses."

2. Child Support. The court ordered Scaling 
to pay the sum of $500 each month for each child under Hartley's direct 
supervision and financial responsibility. The parties' six children ranged in 
age from seventeen years to five years.

3. Child Visitation Travel Expenses. The 
court ordered the parties to share equally the cost of transportation of the 
children from Hartley's out-of-state residence to 
Casper when the 
children were visiting Scaling.

4. Medical Support. The decree, as well as 
the court's decision letter, was silent on this item. Hartley's letter 
memorandum requests that Scaling provide medical and dental insurance for the 
children, pay any excess children's medical expenses, and pay any orthodonture 
expenses incurred by the children. Scaling's letter memorandum states he "will 
continue to provide health and accident insurance upon all the parties with a 
policy having benefits of at least equal to those presently 
available."

 

Neither 
party appealed from the decree.

 

[¶5]  On May 31, 
1989, two years 
after the final judgment, Hartley filed a motion charging that Scaling had 
failed to abide by the decree. She alleged that she and the children had moved 
from Casper in the 
summer of 1987, resided temporarily in Albuquerque, 
New 
Mexico, until 
late December, 1987, then drove to Los 
Angeles, 
California, and flew 
from there to Hawaii where they 
permanently reside and she attends college. She claimed that Scaling must pay 
for all or part of the moving expenses connected with that move.

 

[¶6]  Next, Hartley contended that Scaling 
must pay a storage lien on items of personal property belonging to her and the 
children which she stored while the divorce action was pending. She asserted 
that, had Scaling paid her moving expenses to Hawaii, personal 
property would not have remained in storage.

 

[¶7]  Hartley also charged that Scaling owed 
her $2,000 for child support for two of the children for May and June, 
1987.

 

[¶8]  The court held a hearing on Hartley's 
motion on August 4, 
1989, and on 
August 25, 
1989, issued 
its order denying her relief.

 

[¶9]  In the meantime, on August 4, 
1989, Scaling 
filed a petition to modify the decree with respect to alimony and child support. 
Specifically, Scaling asked the court to assess against Hartley one-half, or at 
least some portion, of a $140,000 tax liability for the taxable years 1982 and 
1983. He asked that her portion be paid by her directly or by deduction from his 
alimony and child support payments. He claimed that the tax liability 
constituted a substantial change in circumstances. In his petition, Scaling also 
asked the court to allow him to deduct from his alimony payments all costs, 
expenses and attorney fees he had incurred in defending an action to increase 
child support and alimony payments filed by Hartley in Hawaii and in defending 
Hartley's Wyoming motions charging Scaling with failing to abide by the decree 
and seeking to disqualify the judge.

 

[¶10]  In response to Scaling's petition, on 
August 21, 
1989, Hartley 
served him with a request for production of documents containing information 
relevant to the matters raised in his petition. On September 
21, 1989, Hartley 
filed a motion to compel Scaling to produce the requested documents.

 

[¶11]  In the court's decision letter dated 
November 
15, 1989, and the 
subsequent order filed January 24, 
1990, the court 
held that Scaling's petition failed to state a cause of action and was, 
therefore, denied. Because the petition was denied, the court reasoned, 
Hartley's motion to compel Scaling's production of documents containing 
information relevant to the matters raised in that petition need not be 
determined.

 

[¶12]  On November 
13, 1989, before 
the court had decided Scaling's petition, Hartley filed her own petition to 
modify the decree. She sought an order increasing child support, compelling 
Scaling to reimburse her an appropriate portion of past children's medical 
expenses she had incurred, and establishing that Scaling provide medical support 
for the children. For proof of substantial changes in circumstances she pointed 
to:

 

· Scaling's 
imminent settlement with the Internal Revenue Service of the 1982 and 1983 tax 
liabilities at a figure of $140,000, a reduction of seventeen percent from the 
original $167,000 referred to in the court's February 9, 1987 decision 
letter;

· Scaling's 
having paid some of the indebtedness that existed when the divorce trial was 
held; and

· an 
increase in Scaling's income from his medical practice.

 

With 
reference to the medical support issue, Hartley alleged that the divorce decree 
was silent on that item; that she had incurred debt for her children's medical 
expenses; and that effective June 8, 1989, W.S. 20-6-401 directs that in any 
action to establish or modify a child support obligation, the court shall 
require in the support order provision for parental responsibility for the 
procurement of medical insurance for the children's medical expenses or for the 
payment of the children's medical expenses.

 

[¶13]  The court responded to Hartley's 
petition to modify in two decision letters and a final order. In the court's 
first decision letter dated November 15, 1989, the court stated that substantial 
changes in circumstances were not proved by Scaling's settling his $167,000 tax 
liability for $140,000, paying some of his debts which existed in January, 1987, 
or the legislature's passage of W.S. 20-6-401 after the decree became final. The 
court noted that a party paying its debts can be anticipated. Having cleared 
away that underbrush, the court set for a one-hour hearing the sole question 
whether Scaling had experienced a substantial increase in his income.

 

[¶14]  Following the court's hearing on that 
sole question on January 5, 
1990, the court 
issued its second decision letter dated January 19, 
1990. In that 
letter the court stated that because Scaling now has approximately the same 
amount of income available to him each month as he had at the time of the 
divorce in 1987, Hartley had failed to prove a substantial change in 
circumstances. On January 24, 
1990, the court 
entered its order denying Hartley's petition. Hartley's appeal 
followed.

 

[¶15]  To recapitulate, Hartley appeals from 
the court's order dated August 25, 
1989, which 
denied the relief she sought in her May 31, 
1989 motion and 
from the court's order dated January 24, 
1990, which 
denied the relief she sought in her November 
13, 1989 
petition.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Order Dated 
August 25, 
1989

 

[¶16]  Hartley claims the district court abused 
its discretion in denying her requests that Scaling be required to pay the 
moving expenses incurred by Hartley and the children in relocating to Hawaii and 
one-half of the travel expenses she claimed for the children's visitations with 
Scaling in Casper from Albuquerque, New Mexico, in November 1987, and from 
Hawaii in June, 1988. The district court's determinations in these matters 
raised in a post-divorce contempt proceeding rest in that court's discretion. 
Chorney v. Chorney, 383 P.2d 859, 860 (Wyo. 1963). 
This court will not disturb a trial court's exercise of discretion unless it has 
been gravely abused or violated a legal principle. This court accepts the 
evidence of the prevailing party as true, leaving out entirely the consideration 
of evidence in conflict with it and giving every favorable inference which may 
fairly and reasonably be drawn from the prevailing party's evidence. Kennedy v. 
Kennedy, 761 P.2d 995, 998 (Wyo. 1988). We 
have carefully reviewed the record in the light of these appellate principles 
and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion as claimed by 
Hartley.

 

[¶17]  The district court received evidence at 
a hearing on August 4, 
1989, and found 
in favor of Scaling. With respect to the moving expenses, the court considered 
the decree provision in light of the parties' pre-decree letter memoranda and 
the court's decision letter. Exhibiting the sound exercise of discretion, the 
district court found that Scaling was responsible for paying only moving 
expenses from Casper to 
Albuquerque, but no 
farther. Concerning the travel expenses, the court found no probative evidence 
establishing the details of Hartley's alleged expenses. In the face of 
insufficient evidence, the trial court properly rejected the claim. 
Ferguson v. 
Ferguson, 481 P.2d 658 (Wyo. 
1971).

Order Dated 
January 24, 
1990

 

[¶18]  Hartley asserts the district court 
abused its discretion in denying her petition to modify the decree. She sought 
to increase Scaling's child support payments, to recover from Scaling 
reimbursement for past children's medical expenses she paid, and to establish 
Scaling's responsibility to provide medical support for the children. With 
reference to post-divorce modification in Warren v. Hart, 
747 P.2d 511, 512 (Wyo. 1987), 
this court stated:

 

A divorce 
decree is generally res judicata on all issues decided therein, Mentock v. 
Mentock, Wyo., 638 P.2d 156 (1981); Heyl v. Heyl, Wyo., 518 P.2d 28 (1974), and 
to clearly show a material and substantial change in circumstance is the proper 
standard for a modification of child support. Manners v. Manners, [706 P.2d 671, 
674 (Wyo. 
1985)].

 

This court 
said, "Whether or not to modify a divorce decree rests in the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and the court's determination will not be disturbed except 
for a grave abuse of that discretion or violation of some legal principle." 
Manners v. Manners, 706 P.2d 671, 674 (Wyo. 
1985).

 

[¶19]  Having carefully read the record with 
respect to the January 5, 
1990 hearing, 
at which Scaling's certified public accountant was the sole live witness,1 and having applied the foregoing 
appellate principles to the court's decision denying an increase in child 
support, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The 
accountant's testimony supported the court's determination that Scaling's net 
take-home salary was approximately the same as it had been when the original 
divorce decree was filed.

 

[¶20]  We part company, however, with the 
district court's decision which cut short Hartley's attempt to recover 
reimbursement for past children's medical expenses and to establish Scaling's 
obligation to provide medical support for his children. In these particulars, 
Hartley sought that on which the divorce decree was silent. In 
Warren, 747 P.2d  
at 512-14, this court held inapplicable the usual standard for a modification of 
a divorce decree because the decree was silent on the item in question. There, 
the decree was silent on a child support award; here, the decree was silent on 
children's medical support. In Warren we 
announced the rule that the petition to establish a provision on which the 
decree was silent is not a motion to modify; rather "[i]t is merely ancillary or 
supplemental to the main cause, and it is not necessary that a determination on 
such motion be based on a change in circumstance." 
Id. at 513. 
Accordingly, "the standard for establishing rather than modifying [children's 
medical support] should apply." Id.

 

[¶21]  Considering the district court's 
decision letters of November 
15, 1989, and 
January 19, 
1990, and the 
court's order dated January 24, 
1990, we hold 
the court erred in applying the "substantial-change-in-circumstances" standard 
to Hartley's motion to recover past children's medical expenses and to establish 
medical support. We remand that part of the case to the district court with 
instructions to allow the parties full opportunity to litigate those 
issues.

 

[¶22]  Next, we turn to Hartley's claim that 
the district court erred in denying the motion to compel Scaling's production of 
information relevant to Scaling's petition for an order requiring Hartley to pay 
some portion of the 1982 and 1983 tax liability. Scaling filed his petition on 
August 4, 
1989; Hartley 
submitted her request for production on August 21, 
1989, and her 
motion to compel on September 
21, 1989. In its 
decision letter dated November 
15, 1989, in which 
it notified the parties that it had denied Scaling's petition, the court noted 
that that dismissal rendered unnecessary any action on Hartley's motion to 
compel. That was confirmed in the January 24, 
1990 order. 
From our review of Scaling's petition and Hartley's request and subsequent 
motion to compel, we are satisfied the district court correctly concluded that, 
upon its dismissal of Scaling's petition, Hartley's motion to compel was moot. 
Her request for production sought information solely for the purpose of 
defending against Scaling's petition. We find no error on this point.

 

[¶23]  Finally, we have reviewed Hartley's last 
assignment of error, that the district court erred in failing to award her 
costs, expenses and attorney fees incurred in defending Scaling's short-lived 
petition to modify. As with most of the other matters Hartley has raised, this 
item resides within the district court's exercise of broad discretion. We find 
no grave abuse presented here.

 

[¶24]  In summary, we affirm the district court 
on all matters raised except with respect to Hartley's claims to recover 
reimbursement for children's past medical expenses and to establish medical 
support, as to which claims we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.

 

Footnotes

 

1 Hartley's 
deposition was received by the district court on January 19, 
1990.