Case Title: State v. Williams

Citation: 131 Ariz. 211, 639 P.2d 1036

Docket Number: 5326-PR

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1982-01-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
131 Ariz. 211 (1982) 639 P.2d 1036 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Eddie Vance WILLIAMS, Appellant. No. 5326-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. January 4, 1982. Rehearing Denied February 2, 1982. *212 Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer III, Greg A. McCarthy, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender by Paul J. Prato, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. STRUCKMEYER, Chief Justice. This consolidated appeal is from a conviction for a crime of sexual assault and from an order revoking probation in a conviction for the crime of robbery. The Court of Appeals reversed, one judge dissenting. See State v. Williams, 131 Ariz. 218, 639 P.2d 1043 (App. 1981). We accepted review. Opinion of the Court of Appeals vacated. Judgment and sentence of the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. CR-105855 affirmed. Order revoking probation and the sentence in Maricopa County Cause No. CR-101302 affirmed. Appellant, Eddie Vance Williams, was convicted of robbery and on April 17, 1978, placed on probation. On March 12, 1979, a petition to revoke appellant's probation was filed by the Maricopa County Attorney, asserting that appellant had "committed the crime of sexual assault on or about February 22, 1979." The Superior Court conducted a hearing and at its conclusion said: Appellant was subsequently convicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court in Cause CR-105855 of sexual assault, a violation of A.R.S. § 13-1406, a felony. Section 13-1406 provides: The sexual assault for which appellant was convicted was the same offense which was the basis for the petition to revoke his probation on the conviction for the crime of robbery. As a consequence of the sexual assault conviction, appellant's probation for robbery was ordered revoked and he was committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections. From the order revoking his probation and from the sentence imposed, appellant filed this appeal. Appellant also has appealed from his conviction on the charge of sexual assault. Because the appeal from the order revoking probation raised one of the same questions appellant raised as grounds for reversal for the conviction for sexual assault, the two appeals were consolidated for decision in the Court of Appeals. It is appellant's position that collateral estoppel precludes his prosecution for sexual assault after the petition to revoke his probation had been denied, but we do not think so. Collateral estoppel attaches only to a judgment. The force of the estoppel is the judgment itself. It is not the finding of a court but, rather, the judgment entered thereon which concludes the parties. We find no dissent to this proposition. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1970), the Court said: By Rule 26.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., a judgment is defined: Palpably, the conclusion of the judge at the revocation hearing does not rise to the respectability of a judgment. We therefore hold that the finding that the State had failed to establish a violation of probation did not preclude appellant's prosecution for sexual assault. Appellant requested the court to instruct the jury in his sexual assault trial as follows: The court instructed as requested, except that the phrase "if possible" appearing in the second sentence was deleted. Appellant urges that the court by the deletion rendered the instruction a "dynamite" instruction such as is disapproved in State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959). The instruction disapproved in State v. Thomas read: The instruction given by the court is in no sense the equivalent of that given in State v. Thomas. While the second sentence, if it stood alone, might possibly tend in some degree to pressure the jury to reach a verdict, a reading of the instruction as a whole compels the conclusion that it fairly informs the jurors of their responsibility. We do not think the deletion of the phrase "if possible" was apt to compel the jury to act cohesively to find appellant guilty. On the evening of the sexual assault, officer Steven Gregory interviewed the victim concerning what had occurred. Appellant argues the trial court erroneously allowed the officer to relate to the jury the victim's statements which were consistent with her testimony at the trial. We do not agree. By Ariz.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B),[1] the victim's statements were admissible because they were consistent with her testimony at the trial. They were offered to rebut an express and implied charge against her of improper motive that she had consented to the sexual intercourse, later felt shame, and concocted the accusation of rape. Appellant argues that certain remarks of the prosecution created a false impression with the jury. On direct examination, appellant testified that he had been convicted of strong-armed robbery in 1978 in Maricopa County. He also testified that in 1971 or 1972 he had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon in Maricopa County. The following exchange took place during cross-examination: Appellant's position is that the prosecutor's remarks created the impression that in addition to the two felony convictions the appellant had already admitted, there was at least one other felony conviction. The State replies that because appellant was mistaken as to the date and nature of the offense, the prosecutor was only trying to establish the true facts regarding the aggravated assault which occurred in 1973. In State v. Killian, 118 Ariz. 408, 413, 577 P.2d 259 (App. 1978), the court stated: In the instant case, the State sought to elicit from defendant the correct nature and date of the prior conviction. The trial court was, of course, correct in its ruling. The exchange which took place did not confuse the jury nor was it prejudicial. The court said: "Well, it has already been testified to. He has already testified to it on direct and on cross." And later, again: "This has already been testified to on direct and on cross." Judgment and sentence of the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. CR-105855 affirmed. Order revoking probation and sentence in Maricopa County Cause CR-101302 affirmed. HOLOHAN, V.C.J., and HAYS, CAMERON and GORDON, JJ., concur. [1] Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides: "A statement is not hearsay if (1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is * * * (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive * * *."