Case Title: In re Allen

Citation: 

Docket Number: S41729

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  December 3, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of the Application 

for Reinstatement of

DAVID K. ALLEN,

Applicant.

(OSB 94-191; SC S41729)

	En Banc

	Application for reinstatement to the practice of law in
Oregon.

	Submitted on the record August 11, 1998.  Resubmitted
November 25, 1998.

	Marc D. Blackman, of Ransom Blackman, Portland, for
applicant.

	Jeffrey D. Sapiro, Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
for the Oregon State Bar.

	PER CURIAM

	Application for reinstatement approved.

	PER CURIAM

	In In re Allen, 326 Or 107, 949 P2d 710 (1997), this
court suspended applicant from the practice of law for a period
of one year.  That suspension will expire on February 18, 1999. 
Applicant seeks early reinstatement.  For the reasons that
follow, we conclude that applicant is entitled to receive credit
toward the remaining period of his disciplinary suspension for
time that he spent in a voluntary and complete withdrawal from
the practice of law pending completion of the disciplinary
proceeding (withdrawal credit).  We therefore reinstate him. 
However, we also conclude that, until the Board of Governors
(Board) of the Oregon State Bar (Bar) evaluates the merits of
withdrawal credit and, if it so chooses, recommends -- and this
court approves -- an amendment to the State Bar Rules of
Procedure (Rules of Procedure) that incorporates withdrawal
credit, this court no longer will extend withdrawal credit.

	In Allen, after determining that a one-year suspension
was the appropriate sanction for applicant's misconduct, the
court addressed briefly "the question whether the accused is
entitled to credit for any time spent in a voluntary withdrawal
from the practice of law before the imposition of the
disciplinary suspension * * *."  Id. at 131.  The court reasoned
that the concept of withdrawal credit is consistent with the
goals of lawyer discipline, which include "[protection of] the
public and the administration of justice."  Ibid.: see also
American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions 1.1 (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards) (stating
same).  However, the court found that the record in Allen was
insufficient to determine, at that time, whether applicant was
entitled to receive credit for any time that he had spent in a
voluntary and complete withdrawal from the practice of law
pending completion of the disciplinary proceeding in his case. 
The court held:

	"In order to qualify for such credit, the accused must
demonstrate, in a formal application for reinstatement
filed under [Rule of Procedure] BR 8.1(a), that he has
complied with all requirements for reinstatement and,
as a matter of fact, has refrained completely from the
practice of law for not less than the required period
of the disciplinary suspension."  Allen, 326 Or at 132.

	Shortly thereafter, applicant filed a formal
application for reinstatement.  After conducting its
investigation, the Board recommended applicant's reinstatement on
character and fitness grounds, but submitted to this court the
question whether applicant is entitled to any credit against the
term of his suspension for time that he spent in a voluntary and
complete withdrawal from the practice of law.  The court referred
the matter to the Bar for a hearing before its Disciplinary
Board.

	No hearing occurred.  Instead, on July 20, 1998, 
applicant and the Bar agreed to a factual stipulation regarding
applicant's employment between March 1994 (when applicant
committed the criminal misconduct that resulted in his one-year
suspension) and June 24, 1998 (when applicant accepted a position
as a staff attorney for the Office of Public Advocacy in
Fairbanks, Alaska).  Based on that stipulation, applicant filed a
motion requesting that this court reconsider its order of
referral.  In addition to timing considerations, applicant
asserted that "[t]his court is uniquely qualified to determine
whether [applicant] is entitled to credit for the time he
voluntarily withdrew from the practice of law prior to his formal
suspension."  We allowed the motion. 

	The stipulation reveals that applicant did not engage
in the practice of law for a period of 25 months between March
1995 and February 1998.  During that time, he served only as a
law clerk for lawyers.  He did not accept fees from any client,
and he claimed the "law clerk" exemption from coverage by the
Professional Liability Fund.  

	As noted above, the court in Allen adopted the concept
of withdrawal credit and held that applicant "is a candidate for
such credit" upon a showing that he "refrained completely from
the practice of law for not less than the required period of the
disciplinary suspension."  Id.  The stipulation reveals that
applicant did so.  Consequently, we conclude that applicant is
entitled to withdrawal credit for the time remaining on the
period of his disciplinary suspension. 

	Granting applicant withdrawal credit in this
reinstatement proceeding does not end the matter.  In considering
applicant's entitlement to withdrawal credit, we also have
considered whether it was premature for this court to insert the
concept of withdrawal credit into the lawyer discipline process. 
We conclude that it was.  Consequently, we now decline to
implement further that portion of Allen that introduced the
concept of withdrawal credit. 

	The lawyer discipline process, including reinstatement
proceedings, is governed by the Rules of Procedure that the Board
adopts and this court approves.  ORS 9.005(8); ORS 9.542; BR 1.2;
see also In re Barber, 322 Or 194, 206, 904 P2d 620 (1995)
(describing process).  Although in Allen the court did not
describe the concept of withdrawal credit as an amendment to the
lawyer discipline process, such credit could be viewed as having
that effect.  As described in Allen, withdrawal credit also may
have other unforeseen effects on the lawyer discipline process
that deserve evaluation.  We conclude that the better course is
for the Board in the first instance to consider whether the Rules
of Procedure should be amended to incorporate the concept of
withdrawal credit and, if so, how withdrawal credit should be
administered to serve the goals of the lawyer discipline process.

As stated at the outset of this opinion, until the Board
evaluates the merits of withdrawal credit and, if it so chooses,
recommends -- and this court approves -- an amendment to the
Rules of Procedure that incorporates withdrawal credit, this
court no longer will extend withdrawal credit. 

	Application for reinstatement approved.