Case Title: FRANK J. GARCIA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-53

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
FRANK J. GARCIA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 48153 P.3d 941Case Number: 06-53Decided: 03/16/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
FRANK J. 
GARCIA,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Richard 
B. Lipka of Gillette, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Frank 
J. Garcia, pled guilty to murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery and 
was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life and twenty to twenty-five years 
in prison, respectively, for those crimes.  
He appeals his sentence on the basis that the trial court, in sentencing 
him, considered facts not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the district 
court err when it found that Appellant's sentence was not illegal and therefore 
not subject to correction under W.R.Cr.P. 35(a),1 where the sentencing court 
considered Appellant's drug and alcohol abuse, work history, and the nature of 
the crimes committed, in pronouncing sentence?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The facts 
underlying Appellant's plea and sentence in this case are not determinative and 
are set forth at length in our decision regarding Appellant's first appeal, Garcia v. State, 774 P.2d 623 (Wyo. 
1989).  We will not restate those 
facts in detail here.

 
 
[¶4]      Appellant was 
charged with two counts of first-degree murder and one count of conspiracy to 
commit aggravated robbery.  
Appellant testified to participating in the robbery and murder of 
Kathleen and Robert Bernard at his change of plea hearing.  In exchange for the State's agreement to 
dismiss one of the murder charges and not to seek the death penalty, Appellant 
pled guilty to the murder of Kathleen Bernard and to conspiracy to commit 
aggravated robbery.  The district 
court held a sentencing hearing at which Appellant acknowledged receipt of the 
sentencing report, a psychological evaluation, and a social summary that the 
district court had ordered for use in sentencing.  Appellant did not object or make any 
additions or corrections to those documents at the hearing.  Appellant was sentenced to life in 
prison for the murder of Kathleen Bernard and twenty to twenty-five years for 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, with the sentences to run 
consecutively.  In the course of 
sentencing Appellant, the trial court set forth the 
following:

 
 
Mr. 
Garcia, I have considered your presentence report.

 
 
I've 
considered the letters from the psychologist and social 
worker.

 
 
I have 
considered your substantial criminal record.  Besides the incarceration at the Boys' 
School that was mentioned before, I note several assault and batteries, DWI's, 
disorderly conducts, a host of prior convictions.

 
 
I have 
considered your history of violence.  
I've considered your drug and alcohol abuse, your sporadic work 
history.

 
 
And I 
have considered the especially heinous nature of this offense.  It was a senseless and brutal 
killing.  And it was, as all 
killings must be, committed for no good reason.

 
 
For 
those reasons, it is the order of this court that with regard to Count I, the 
first degree murder, that you be sentenced to a term of the rest of your natural 
life in the Wyoming State Penitentiary, and for the conviction in Count III of 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery you are to receive a punishment of not 
less than twenty nor more than twenty-five years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.

 
 
[¶5]      Appellant filed 
an immediate appeal asserting that his sentence violated the double jeopardy 
clauses of the Wyoming and United States 
constitutions because the district court should have merged his crimes for 
sentencing.  This Court affirmed the 
judgment and sentence in Garcia v. 
State, 774 P.2d 623 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 
[¶6]      On January 9, 
2006, Appellant filed Petitioner's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence Pursuant 
to Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 35.  
The district court denied the motion in an order dated January 26, 
2006.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      The parties agree 
that this review of a motion to correct illegal sentence involves questions of 
constitutional law, which we review de 
novo.  Strickland v. State, 2004 WY 91, ¶ 40, 
94 P.3d 1034, 1051 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
An 
illegal sentence is one that exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of 
imprisonment for the same offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the 
law.  The determination of whether a 
sentence is illegal is made by reference to the authorizing statute or 
applicable constitutional provisions and is, therefore, a matter of statutory 
interpretation.  Interpretation of 
statutes is a question of law, which we review de novo.  

 
 

Brown v. 
State, 2004 
WY 119, ¶ 7, 99 P.3d 489, 491 (Wyo. 2004) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      Appellant claims 
that his sentence offends constitutional precepts because the sentencing court 
considered factors that were not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Specifically, Appellant 
attacks the district court's reference to his history of drug and alcohol abuse, 
his work history, and the heinous nature of the crime, at sentencing.  Appellant relies on the United States 
Supreme Court's rulings in Apprendi v. 
New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000) 
and Blakely v. Washington, 
542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), and subsequent cases for support.

 
 
[¶9]      We have discussed 
this line of cases as it relates to Wyoming's sentencing structure in several of 
our previous decisions.  In Gould v. State, 2006 WY 157, ¶ 23, 151 P.3d 261, 267 (Wyo. 2006) we stated:

 
 
Appellants 
were sentenced in accordance with Wyoming's indeterminate sentencing statute, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 (LexisNexis 2005) . . . and their individual 
sentences fell within the statutory maximums set out for their crimes.  Consequently, in accordance with our 
rulings in Janssen and Smith, there was no obvious violation of 
the constitutional principles discussed in Apprendi and Blakely.

 
 
[¶10]   We summarized the holding of the 
United States Supreme Court in Apprendi and its progeny in Janssen v. State, 2005 WY 123, ¶ 21, 120 P.3d 1006, 1011-12 (Wyo. 2005):

 
 
In Apprendi, the United States Supreme 
Court held that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 12 S. Ct.  at 2362 (emphasis added).  Mr. 
Janssen's sentence was within the 
statutory maximum of 60 months.  Apprendi does not support his 
claim.  The Blakely decision involved a determinate 
sentencing structure.  Blakely, 542 U.S.  at 300, 124 S. Ct.  at 2535.  Mr. Janssen was not 
sentenced pursuant to a determinate sentencing scheme, making Blakely inapplicable to his case.  Indeed, Blakely recognized that indeterminate 
sentencing does not infringe on the province of the jury. Id. at 308, 124 S. Ct.  at 2540.  Under Apprendi and its progeny, the district 
court was free, in the exercise of its sentencing discretion, to consider 
factors relating to Mr. Janssen and his crimes in imposing an appropriate 
sentence within the statutory range.  Smith v. State, 2005 WY 113, ¶ 37, 
119 P.3d 411 (Wyo.2005).  

                        

[¶11]   In Smith, we discussed some of the very 
issues Appellant attempts to raise in this appeal. 

 
 
But, 
because it is clear that Smith misunderstands Apprendi and Blakely, as the state explains, we shall 
briefly comment.  In Apprendi, the Supreme Court noted that 
any fact which permits a trial court to exceed the maximum penalty set out in 
the standard sentencing category for a given offenseand to therefore place a 
defendant in a more severe categorywas much like an element of the offense, 
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Accordingly, the Court held that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  The 
Apprendi 
Court drew a distinction, however, between a trial 
court impermissibly finding facts which place a defendant in a more severe 
sentencing category, and its exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence 
within the range permitted by a sentencing category whose use is supported by a 
jury verdict.  With respect to the 
latter, the Court emphasized that sentencing judges were still free to exercise 
their traditional discretion in considering various facts relating to the crime 
and the offender in imposing sentence within the prescribed statutory 
limits.  In Blakely, the Court did no more than 
apply Apprendi to a sentence which 
departed from the standard sentencing range for the charged offense based on the 
trial court's finding of a fact that justified the departure, but which was not 
admitted by the defendant when he entered his guilty plea.  In the present case, the jury verdict on 
each count established all the facts necessary for the trial court to sentence 
Smith, as it did, according to the standard statutory sentencing range for each 
of the charged crimes.  Under Apprendi and its progeny, the trial 
court was further free, in the exercise of its sentencing discretion, to 
consider victim impact statements, the PSI and other factors relating to Smith 
and his crimes in imposing an appropriate sentence within that statutory 
range.  

 
 

Smith, 2005 
WY 113, ¶ 37, 119 P.3d  at 422 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶12]   Appellant pled guilty to 
first-degree murder.  Under 
Wyoming law, 
murder carries a minimum sentence of life in prison and a maximum penalty of 
death.2  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 (LexisNexis 
2005).  Appellant was sentenced to 
life in prison.  He was, therefore, 
sentenced within the statutory range for the crime of murder.   

 
 
[¶13]   Appellant also pled guilty to 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.  
The crime of conspiracy carries the same penalty as the most serious 
offense to which the conspiracy relates.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-304 (LexisNexis 2005).  
The punishment for aggravated robbery carries a statutory range of 
between five and twenty-five years.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(c) (LexisNexis 2005).  
Appellant was sentenced to a minimum of twenty and a maximum of 
twenty-five years.  His sentence on 
that count was also within the statutorily required range.  

 
 
[¶14]   Apprendi and its progeny do not affect 
the legality of Appellant's sentences because both sentences fell within the 
prescribed statutory maximum terms for each of the crimes to which he pled 
guilty.  Appellant was sentenced 
under Wyoming's indeterminate sentencing statute and 
his sentences did not involve judicial fact finding that increased either 
sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the crimes he committed.  When a defendant pleads guilty, he 
immediately exposes himself to criminal liability up to, and including, the 
maximum sentence for each of his crimes.3  The conviction itself triggers the 
availability of all penalties enumerated in the applicable criminal statue.  Because no additional fact-finding is 
necessary in order for a judge to impose the maximum sentence, Apprendi and its progeny have no 
application to cases such as this, where a sentence does not exceed the maximum 
penalty permitted under the statute.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   The district court did not err in 
denying Appellant's motion to correct an illegal sentence under W.R.Cr.P. 
35(a).  Appellant's sentences were 
within the applicable statutory limits and did not violate the United States 
Constitution, Wyoming Constitution, or any other law.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Rule 
35(a) states:  "(a) Correction.  The court may correct an 
illegal sentence at any time.  
Additionally the court may correct, reduce, or modify a sentence within 
the time and in the manner provided herein for the reduction of 
sentence."

 
 

2The 
substantive criminal statutes at issue have not changed materially since 
Appellant's sentencing in 1987.

 
 

3In this 
case, Appellant's plea bargain included an agreement that the State would not 
seek the death penalty for the murder conviction.