Case Title: State v. Lenny P. Keding

Citation: 2002 WI 86

Docket Number: 2000AP001700

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 86 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1700 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Lenny P. Keding: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Lenny P. Keding,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 29, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Wood   
 
JUDGE: 
James M. Mason   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument 
by 
Margaret 
A. 
Maroney, 
assistant 
state 
public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Warren 
D. Weinstein, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, 
attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 86 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-1700  
(L.C. No. 
96 CF 30) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Lenny P. Keding: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Lenny P. Keding,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Wood County, 
James M. Mason, Circuit Court Judge.   Affirmed.     
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.    This case is before the court on 
certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.61 (1999-2000) on the question of whether a circuit court 
is required to consider alternatives to revocation before 
revoking a sexually violent person's supervised release under 
Chapter 980. 
¶2  The court is evenly split on the answer to this 
question. Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justices Bablitch and 
Bradley would say yes; Justices Wilcox, Crooks, and the author 
No. 
00-1700   
 
2 
 
of this 
opinion would say 
no. Justice Prosser did not 
participate. 
¶3 Despite the tie vote on the legal issue, we nevertheless 
affirm the circuit court's order revoking Lenny Keding's 
supervised release under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) (1999-2000),1 
because four members of the court——Justices Bablitch, Wilcox, 
Crooks, and the author of this opinion——agree that the circuit 
court in this case did in fact inquire about whether there were 
any 
alternatives 
to 
revocation 
before 
revoking 
Keding's 
supervised release, and was advised that there were none. 
I 
¶4 
Lenny Keding was convicted in 1993 of second-degree 
sexual assault of a child.  A sentence of four years in prison 
was imposed and stayed in favor of probation.  In 1994, Keding's 
probation was revoked and he was sent to prison.  As he neared 
the end of his prison term, the State initiated Chapter 980 
proceedings against him.  Keding's case was tried to a jury, and 
he was ultimately determined to be a sexually violent person as 
defined by Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).2  The Wood County Circuit 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version.   
2 Wisconsin Statute § 980.01(7) provides:  
"Sexually violent person" means a person who has 
been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been 
adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, 
or has been found not guilty of or not responsible for 
a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or 
mental 
disease, 
defect 
or 
illness 
and, 
who 
is 
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental 
No. 
00-1700   
 
3 
 
Court, the Honorable James M. Mason, considered Keding an 
appropriate candidate for supervised release, but because no 
facility was available in Wood County, Keding was committed to 
the Wisconsin Resource Center (WRC).   
¶5 
Keding appealed the circuit court's order to the 
extent that it placed him in institutional treatment rather than 
on supervised release.  The court of appeals reversed and 
remanded, holding that the circuit court had erroneously 
exercised its discretion by limiting its consideration of 
potential supervised release facilities to those in Wood County.  
See State v. Keding, 214 Wis. 2d 363, 571 N.W.2d 450 (Ct. App. 
1997).  On remand, however, the circuit court, based on reports 
regarding Keding's behavior at WRC, concluded that Keding was no 
longer an appropriate candidate for supervised release.  Keding 
remained in institutional treatment at WRC.  
¶6 
Keding again appealed, and the court of appeals 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The parties subsequently entered into a 
stipulation to the effect that Keding would agree to forego his 
post-conviction claims and the State would agree that Keding was 
an appropriate candidate for supervised release.  Based on the 
stipulation, and after some initial difficulty locating a 
suitable community placement for Keding, the circuit court 
                                                                                                                                                             
disorder that makes it substantially probable that the 
person will engage in acts of sexual violence.   
No. 
00-1700   
 
4 
 
ordered supervised release, and on January, 20, 2000, Keding was 
released from WRC to a duplex in Wisconsin Rapids. 
¶7  On the day of his release, Keding reported to his 
supervising agent.  The agent searched his belongings and found 
a photo album stuffed with pictures of young boys from magazines 
and newspapers.  During the first few weeks of his supervised 
release, Keding met with his psychotherapist a number of times, 
and reported that he was fantasizing about young boys and 
masturbating to the fantasies.  His medication was increased and 
Keding later reported to his psychotherapist and agent that he 
was no longer having such fantasies. 
¶8  On March 13, 2000, the Department of Health and Family 
Services (DHFS) petitioned the court for revocation of Keding's 
supervised release pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m).  The 
petition alleged that Keding had violated the terms of release 
by contacting residents at WRC, including one with whom he had 
had a sexual relationship; possession of sexually explicit 
letters; purchasing items on a credit card while prohibited from 
doing so; and lying to his agent. 
¶9 
Keding admitted to three of the violations: writing 
letters to WRC residents, possessing sexually explicit letters, 
and lying to his agent.  He argued, however, that the violations 
were not significant enough to warrant revocation of supervised 
release.  At the revocation hearing, Keding's psychotherapist 
testified that in his opinion, Keding was "slipping" and was "a 
high risk to re-offend."  After hearing argument from counsel, 
the circuit court inquired: "Is there an alternative to 
No. 
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returning him to the Resource Center which the State considers 
appropriate or is [revocation] the only option which is 
available?"  Keding's supervising agent replied that she had 
discussed the matter with a representative of DHFS and concluded 
that there were no community alternatives to revocation. 
¶10 The circuit court ordered Keding's supervised release 
revoked, concluding that Keding had violated the terms of his 
supervised release by contacting residents at WRC, making 
unauthorized credit purchases, and lying to his agent, and that 
these violations were serious enough to warrant revocation.  The 
circuit court held that "Lenny Keding has established himself as 
too great a risk to re-offend to be continued in supervised 
release.  On the basis of his performance and attitude since 
supervised release was ordered, it's doubtful that Lenny Keding 
will comply with the rules of supervised release in the near 
future.  He presents a danger to others." 
¶11 Keding appealed, arguing that the circuit court was 
required to consider alternatives to revocation before making a 
decision 
to 
revoke 
supervised 
release 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m).  The court of appeals certified the 
case to us for determination of the following question: 
"[W]hether 
the 
circuit 
court 
is 
required 
to 
consider 
alternatives to revocation when a proceeding is brought to 
revoke the supervised release of a person committed under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980, the sexual predator statute."  We accepted 
the certification.   
II 
No. 
00-1700   
 
6 
 
¶12 Keding argues that Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m), either 
alone or read together with Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(e), requires a 
circuit court to consider alternatives to revocation before 
revoking 
a 
sexually 
violent 
person's 
supervised 
release.  
Alternatively, he argues that consideration of alternatives to 
revocation is required by due process.  Finally, he argues that 
the record does not support the circuit court's decision to 
revoke his supervised release. 
¶13 Whether a circuit court is required to consider 
alternatives to revocation before revoking supervised release 
under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) is a question of law subject to 
independent review (in any event, neither lower court decided 
the question); the revocation decision itself is a discretionary 
one, subject to a deferential standard of review.  We will 
uphold a circuit court's exercise of discretion if the court 
employs a process of reasoning based on the facts of record and 
reaches "a conclusion based on a logical rationale founded upon 
proper legal standards."  State ex rel. J.H. Findorff v. Milw. 
Cty., 2000 WI 30, 233 Wis. 2d 428, ¶21, 608 N.W.2d 679 (quoting 
McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)).   
¶14 Wisconsin Statute § 980.08(6m) provides, in pertinent 
part: 
An order for supervised release places the person 
in the custody and control of the department. The 
department 
shall 
arrange 
for 
control, 
care 
and 
treatment of the person in the least restrictive 
manner consistent with the requirements of the person 
and in accordance with the plan for supervised release 
approved by the court under sub. (5).  A person on 
No. 
00-1700   
 
7 
 
supervised release is subject to the conditions set by 
the court and to the rules of the department. . . .  
If the department alleges that a released person has 
violated any condition or rule, or that the safety of 
others requires that supervised release be revoked, he 
or she may be taken into custody under the rules of 
the department.  The department shall submit a 
statement showing probable cause of the detention and 
a petition to revoke the order for supervised release 
to the committing court . . . . The state has the 
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence 
that any rule or condition of release has been 
violated, or that the safety of others requires that 
supervised release be revoked. If the court determines 
after hearing that any rule or condition of release 
has been violated, or that the safety of others 
requires that supervised release be revoked, it may 
revoke the order for supervised release and order that 
the released person be placed in an appropriate 
institution until the person is discharged from the 
commitment under s. 980.09 or until again placed on 
supervised release under this section. 
Wis. Stat. § 908.08(6m)(emphasis added). 
¶15  The "patient's rights" statute, Wis. Stat. § 51.61, is 
applicable to sexually violent persons committed under Ch. 980, 
see Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1), and provides that persons committed 
for 
treatment 
"have 
the 
right 
to 
the 
least 
restrictive 
conditions necessary to achieve the purposes" of commitment.  
Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(e).  Keding argues that Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(6m), on its own or read in conjunction with the 
patient's rights statute, requires consideration of alternatives 
to revocation before supervised release can be revoked. 
¶16  Keding relies primarily on State ex rel. Plotkin v. 
DHSS, 63 Wis. 2d 535, 217 N.W.2d 641 (1974), and Van Ermen v. 
DHSS, 84 Wis. 2d 57, 267 N.W.2d 17 (1978).  Plotkin held that 
alternatives to revocation must be considered before revocation 
No. 
00-1700   
 
8 
 
of probation could occur; Van Ermen imposed the same requirement 
on parole revocations.  Plotkin, 63 Wis. 2d at 544-45; Van 
Ermen, 84 Wis. 2d at 68.  Keding also argues that to avoid a 
violation of due process, Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) must be 
construed to require consideration of alternatives prior to 
revocation of supervised release. 
¶17  In opposition, the State relies on State v. Jefferson, 
163 Wis. 2d 332, 340, 471 N.W.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1991), which held 
that the circuit court was not required to consider alternatives 
to revocation before revoking the conditional release of a 
person committed for treatment following a finding of not guilty 
by reason of mental disease or defect.  The State also cites 
Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 (1985), in which the United 
States Supreme Court declined to impose an affirmative due 
process 
requirement 
that 
alternatives 
to 
revocation 
be 
considered before probation or parole could be revoked. 
¶18  As noted above, the court is evenly split on the issue 
of 
whether 
a 
circuit 
court 
is 
required——statutorily, 
constitutionally, or as a matter of policy as in Plotkin and Van 
Ermen——to consider alternatives to revocation prior to revoking 
a sexually violent person's supervised release under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(6m).  Accordingly, we do not resolve the certified 
question.  We nevertheless affirm the circuit court's order 
revoking 
Keding's 
supervised 
release, 
because 
the 
record 
reflects 
that 
the 
court 
inquired 
about 
alternatives 
to 
revocation, and was advised that there were none. 
No. 
00-1700   
 
9 
 
¶19  We also reject Keding's contention that the record 
does not support the decision to revoke.  Keding argues that the 
rules violations were too minor to justify revocation.  We do 
not reverse a discretionary judgment of the circuit court where, 
as here, the record reflects a process of reasoning based upon 
facts of record and a proper standard of law.  Findorff, 2000 WI  
428, ¶21. 
¶20  The circuit court based its decision to revoke on the 
three rules violations that were substantiated and the testimony 
of Keding's psychotherapist that Keding was a "high risk to re-
offend."  Although the court is divided on the question of 
whether the circuit court was required to consider alternatives 
to revocation, such consideration is certainly permissible in 
the circuit court's exercise of its discretion.  Here, the 
circuit court inquired about available alternatives, and was 
advised that there were none. 
¶21  While reasonable minds might differ on the issue of 
whether these particular rules violations were sufficiently 
serious to warrant revocation, we perceive no erroneous exercise 
of discretion.  The circuit court was entitled to rely upon the 
psychotherapist's opinion that Keding was "slipping" and "at 
risk 
to 
re-offend," 
considered 
together 
with 
the 
rules 
violations, in concluding that Keding was too great a danger to 
maintain on supervised release.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
circuit court's order revoking Keding's supervised release 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m). 
No. 
00-1700   
 
10 
 
  By the Court.—The order of the Wood County Circuit Court 
is affirmed.       
 
 
 
 
No.  00-1700.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶22 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  In affirming 
the circuit court's order revoking Lenny Keding's supervised 
release, the majority concludes that the court considered 
whether there were any alternatives to revocation.  I conclude 
that the circuit court's inquiry here was meaningless because no 
alternatives exist. 
¶23 The majority states:  "the record reflects that the 
court inquired about alternatives to revocation, and was advised 
that there were none."  Majority op. at ¶18.  Here is what the 
record reflects.  First, the circuit court inquired as follows: 
THE COURT: 
Is there an alternative to returning 
him to the Resource Center which the State considers 
appropriate or is that the only option which is 
available? 
The State began to respond, but then deferred to Keding's 
probation agent.  She explained as follows: 
I 
had 
talked 
to 
Matt 
Kaesermann 
from 
the 
Department of Health & Family Services because he and 
I actually batted around the idea of——because we 
figured that it would come up at the hearing. 
 
We both agree——he has no knowledge of any place 
that would be——that would be an alternative, because 
if it was a regular revocation, we could look at 
minimum security camps and things like that.  Since 
this is not a revocation of the probation, he said 
that there really isn't any place.  And since there 
were so many difficulties trying to get him placed in 
an appropriate residence, he said that, you know, he 
has no knowledge of anything——any living situation 
that would be an appropriate alternative. 
¶24 The reason that "there were none" is because the State 
has failed to provide for necessary alternatives.  No one in the 
community is willing to take a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 respondent.  
No.  00-1700.awb 
 
2 
 
See State v. Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316, 322, 595 N.W.2d 692 
(1999); State v. Krueger, 2001 WI App 76, ¶2, 242 Wis. 2d 793, 
626 
N.W.2d 
83; 
State 
v. 
Castillo, 
205 
Wis. 2d 599, 
556 
N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1996); see also State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 
81, ¶76, _____ Wis. 2d ____, ____ N.W.2d ____ (Bradley, J. 
dissenting). 
¶25 Keding was on both ch. 980 supervised release status 
and probation status.  It is clear from the record that had his 
probation status been revoked, an alternative would have been 
available:  "minimum security camps and things like that."  
However, the court was unable to consider alternatives to 
revocation of ch. 980 supervised release because none existed. 
¶26 Just as there were no alternatives available at the 
time 
of 
Keding's 
revocation, 
there 
were 
no 
alternatives 
available when he first became eligible for supervised release.  
At that time, a community placement was attempted in Wood 
County, but no suitable housing could be found.  Next, another 
placement was attempted in a group home in Richland County, but 
the group home decided against it because of concern about the 
community's reaction.  Yet another placement was attempted, this 
time in a group home in Jefferson County, but the group home 
ultimately rejected Keding because of friction with the county 
sheriff.  Still other placements also failed.3 
                                                 
3 Upon questioning at oral argument, the State acknowledged 
the unavailability of the placements in Wood, Richland, and 
Jefferson Counties, then added:  "You forgot La Crosse and Dane 
Counties."  
No.  00-1700.awb 
 
3 
 
¶27 Ultimately, and despite the fact that the record shows 
that Keding has an IQ of 72, the placement provided for his 
supervised release was an empty duplex in which he lived alone, 
subject to electronic monitoring.  Even that placement was 
proving to be unacceptable at the time that he became subject to 
revocation.4  
¶28 It is hardly surprising, given the nature of Keding's 
placement, that he committed some minor violations of the rules 
attached to his supervised release.  As a result, he was 
confined indefinitely to the Wisconsin Resource Center. 
¶29 To my mind, the question this case raises is why did 
this ch. 980 respondent, who the circuit court deemed a proper 
candidate for supervised release, ultimately end up back in a 
secure facility?  The answer is not because he broke some rules.  
The answer is because the State failed to devote the necessary 
resources to provide a viable alternative in order to properly 
effectuate supervised release. 
¶30 The constitutionality of ch. 980 hinges in part upon 
its provisions for supervised release.  I conclude that these 
provisions require a circuit court to consider alternatives to 
revocation before revoking supervised release under ch. 980.  
Just as the State failed to provide a viable community placement 
                                                 
4 When the landlord at the duplex informed the State that 
someone was about to move into the other unit in the duplex, the 
staff of the agency with which the State contracted to provide 
monitoring did not think the duplex placement would continue to 
be a good idea. 
No.  00-1700.awb 
 
4 
 
at the time of Keding's supervised release, it failed to provide 
any viable alternative to revocation. 
¶31 If, as here, the State fails to ensure that viable 
alternatives exist, then the necessary inquiry into alternatives 
to revocation is fanciful, and so is the constitutionality of 
ch. 980 as applied to Keding.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶32 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON, joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  00-1700.awb 
 
 
 
1