Case Title: State ex rel. Musial v. N. Olmsted

Citation: 2005-Ohio-5521

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Musial v. N. Olmsted, 106 Ohio St.3d 459, 2005-Ohio-5521.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. MUSIAL, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF 
 NORTH OLMSTED ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Musial v. N. Olmsted, 106 Ohio St.3d 459, 2005-Ohio-
5521.] 
Petition for writ of mandamus — Public Records Act — Confidential law-
enforcement records are exempt from disclosure under Public Records 
Act. 
(No. 2005-0252 ─ Submitted July 26, 2005 ─ Decided November 2, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 84201, 2005-Ohio-95. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying in part a request for a 
writ of mandamus to compel access to certain police and ethics commission 
investigative records. 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Norman T. Musial, was the mayor of respondent city of 
North Olmsted, a principal in the Musial & Musial law firm, and the president of 
North Olmsted Foundation, Inc., during the pertinent period.  North Olmsted 
owns the Springvale Ballroom Facility (“Springvale”), which it rents for private 
functions. 
{¶ 3} In 2002, the North Olmsted Police Department conducted a 
criminal investigation of the city’s rentals of Springvale by the Musial law firm 
for a Christmas party in 1999 and by the foundation for the Mayor’s Ball from 
1998 through 2001.  Musial and his administrative assistant had allegedly 
received lower rental and catering-service prices at Springvale than were available 
to others holding comparable events at the facility.  In July 2002, the police 
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forwarded the results of their investigation to the Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 
Attorney, the Ohio Ethics Commission, and the North Olmsted Ethics 
Commission.  In October 2002, the police requested that the North Olmsted 
Ethics Commission review its investigative reports to determine whether any 
ethics violations had occurred. 
{¶ 4} On September 10, 2003, after reviewing the police investigation 
concerning Springvale, a Cuyahoga County grand jury declined to indict Musial.  
The Ohio Ethics Commission did not conduct an independent investigation of 
Musial.  On November 24, 2003, the North Olmsted Ethics Commission found 
that no probable cause existed to believe that Musial had violated any provision of 
the North Olmsted Ethics Code. 
{¶ 5} In September 2003, Musial requested that appellee North Olmsted 
Police Chief George Ruple provide him with all police records relating to the 
criminal investigation, including the grand jury proceedings.  See R.C. 149.43, 
Ohio’s Public Records Act.  After receiving advice from the North Olmsted 
Director of Law, the police released all pertinent records except those considered 
exempt confidential law-enforcement investigatory records pursuant to R.C. 
149.43(A)(1)(h).  The law director later notified both Musial and the police chief 
that under the city’s charter, Musial might be entitled to access the withheld 
records if he needed them to perform his mayoral duties. 
{¶ 6} In December 2003, Musial requested that the law director provide 
him with access to all investigative reports involving him and his administrative 
assistant, “including but not limited to any and all reports obtained by the [North 
Olmsted Ethics] Commission from the Police Department in conducting its 
review/investigation of this matter.”  Musial did not specify that he was 
requesting these records in his capacity as mayor or that he needed the records to 
perform his duties as mayor.  The law director denied Musial’s request because 
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3 
the only records reviewed by the North Olmsted Ethics Commission were the 
police records, which were confidential law-enforcement investigatory records. 
{¶ 7} In February 2004, Musial filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in 
the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.  In his amended petition, Musial 
sought to compel appellees, North Olmsted and its Clerk of City Council, Chief of 
Police, and Director of Public Safety, to provide access to all records pertaining to 
him compiled by or held by the city’s ethics commission and police department.  
Musial claimed entitlement to the records under R.C. 149.43, alleging that the 
city’s claimed exemption did not apply because he “was the focus of the * * * 
investigations and [was] requesting those records pertaining to him.”  Appellees 
filed a joint answer. 
{¶ 8} On April 6, 2004, appellees moved for summary judgment, 
claiming that the requested records were exempt from disclosure as confidential 
law-enforcement investigatory records.  Appellees expressly refuted the claim by 
Musial in his amended petition that the records should be disclosed because he 
was the focus of the investigations. 
{¶ 9} On April 20, 2004, Musial filed a response and cross-motion for 
summary judgment.  On April 23, 2004, Musial filed an amended and restated 
response in opposition to appellees’ motion for summary judgment and a cross-
motion for summary judgment.  In that amended filing, Musial argued for the first 
time that the records should be disclosed because charter and statutory provisions 
require that the city ethics commission’s proceedings be open to the public.  
Appellees moved to strike Musial’s amended response.  Appellees also filed a 
reply brief to Musial’s initial response. 
{¶ 10} As ordered by the court of appeals, appellees submitted an index of 
pertinent records that it had released in full to Musial, records that had been 
redacted and released, and records that had been completely withheld from 
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disclosure.  Appellees filed unredacted copies of the records and portions of 
records that they had refused to disclose to Musial. 
{¶ 11} On January 7, 2005, the court of appeals denied the writ of 
mandamus for the majority of the undisclosed records because they were 
confidential law-enforcement investigatory records.  The court of appeals further 
held, however, that for four of the sealed documents, appellees had redacted too 
much and that after redacting all identifying information concerning the 
uncharged suspects, these four records should be released to Musial.  The court of 
appeals denied Musial’s request for attorney fees. 
{¶ 12} This cause is now before the court upon Musial’s appeal as of 
right. 
Scope of Appeal 
{¶ 13} Musial asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying him access 
to the majority of the requested records and claims that the writ of mandamus 
should have been granted in full.  Although the sealed records are part of the 
record on appeal, Musial specifies that a detailed analysis of these records is not 
necessary because “all of the records can and should be disclosed under Ohio’s 
Public Records law, Ohio’s Open Meeting laws, and the North Olmsted City 
Charter.” 
{¶ 14} Musial’s argument on appeal is thus limited to whether the court of 
appeals erred in not granting the writ of mandamus to compel disclosure of all the 
requested records.  Consequently, Musial asserts: 
{¶ 15} “There is no need for a detailed review of each of the records to 
determine whether each record is subject to redaction and/or withholding in whole 
or in part, because the fundamental bases establish that all of the records must be 
released.  If on the other hand the fundamental bases are not upheld, there is no 
need to modify the terms of the Court of Appeals decision with respect to its 
determination as to the disputed records.”  (Emphasis added.)   
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{¶ 16} Therefore, our review of Musial’s appeal is likewise restricted to 
his express arguments. 
Confidential Law-Enforcement Investigatory Records: 
Confidential Law-Enforcement Records 
{¶ 17} The court of appeals denied the writ of mandamus for records and 
parts of records that it determined to be confidential law-enforcement 
investigatory records.  R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h) excepts “[c]onfidential law 
enforcement investigatory records” from the definition of “[p]ublic record” for 
purposes of the Public Records Act.  R.C. 149.43(A)(2) defines “[c]onfidential 
law enforcement investigatory record” as “any record that pertains to a law 
enforcement matter of a criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative nature, 
but only to the extent that the release of the record would create a high probability 
of disclosure of” any of the types of information set forth in subsection a, b, c, and 
d. 
{¶ 18} We have recognized that “we employ a two-step test to determine 
whether a record is exempt as a confidential law-enforcement record under R.C. 
149.43: 
{¶ 19} “ ‘First, is the record a confidential law enforcement record?  
Second, would release of the record ‘create a high probability of disclosure’ of 
any one of the four kinds of information specified in R.C. 149.43(A)(2)?’ ”  State 
ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Maurer (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 56, 
741 N.E.2d 511, quoting State ex rel. Polovischak v. Mayfield (1990), 50 Ohio 
St.3d 51, 52, 552 N.E.2d 635. 
{¶ 20} Regarding the first requirement, Musial contends that the requested 
records are not confidential law-enforcement records.  But appellees established 
that the requested records satisfied this initial requirement because “ ‘[t]he 
investigation herein was of specific alleged misconduct, not a routine monitoring 
investigation.’ ”  State ex rel. Yant v. Conrad (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 681, 660 
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N.E.2d 1211, quoting Polovischak, 50 Ohio St.3d at 53, 552 N.E.2d 635.  These 
records were generated by the police investigation of alleged misconduct of 
Musial in his capacity as mayor and of his administrative assistant in securing 
favorable service and rental rates for a city-owned facility.  Therefore, the records 
are confidential law-enforcement records. 
Confidential Law-Enforcement Investigatory Records: 
Uncharged-Suspect Exemption 
{¶ 21} The court of appeals also determined that appellees satisfied the 
second requirement for the exemption by establishing that release of the records 
would create a high probability of disclosure of “[t]he identity of a suspect who 
has not been charged with the offense to which the record pertains.”  R.C. 
149.43(A)(2)(a). 
{¶ 22} Musial contends that the court of appeals erred in so holding 
because this uncharged-suspect exemption does not apply to persons ─ like him 
and his administrative assistant ─ who are the subject of grand jury proceedings, 
especially when the grand jury did not return an indictment charging the persons 
with criminal offenses. 
{¶ 23} In construing a statute, our paramount concern is legislative intent.  
State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 395, 2003-Ohio-
1630, 786 N.E.2d 39, ¶ 12.  In order to determine the statute’s intent, we must “ 
‘read words and phrases in context according to the rules of grammar and 
common usage.’ ”  State ex rel. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 105 
Ohio St.3d 177, 2005-Ohio-1150, 824 N.E.2d 68, ¶ 27, quoting State ex rel. Lee v. 
Karnes, 103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2004-Ohio-5718, 817 N.E.2d 76, ¶ 23; R.C. 1.42.  A 
“suspect” is a “person believed to have committed a crime or offense.”  Garner, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 1486.  A “charge” is a “formal accusation 
of an offense as a preliminary step to prosecution.”  Id. at 248. 
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{¶ 24} A formal accusation of an offense requires a charging instrument, 
i.e., an indictment, information, or criminal complaint.  See Crim.R. 7; see, also, 
Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 249, defining “charging 
instrument” as a “formal document ─ usu. either an indictment or an information 
─ that sets forth an accusation of a crime.” 
{¶ 25} Musial was a suspect investigated by the police department, but he 
was never charged with a criminal offense for the Springvale matter.  That is, he 
was never the subject of an indictment, information, or criminal complaint.  In 
fact, by issuing a no bill, the grand jury specifically decided not to indict Musial 
or his administrative assistant with a criminal offense.  R.C. 2953.51(A) (“ ‘No 
bill’ means a report by the foreperson or deputy foreperson of a grand jury that an 
indictment is not found by the grand jury against a person who has been held to 
answer before the grand jury for the commission of an offense”). 
{¶ 26} Moreover, this interpretation of the uncharged-suspect exemption 
is consistent with precedent because “R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a) excepts records that 
identify persons who have neither been charged with nor arrested for an offense.”  
(Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. WLWT-TV5 v. Leis (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 357, 
360, 673 N.E.2d 1365; see, also, State ex rel. Moreland v. Dayton (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 129, 130, 616 N.E.2d 234.  Musial has never been charged with or arrested 
for an offense relating to the Springvale matter. 
{¶ 27} Musial next contends that the uncharged-suspect exemption 
applies only when criminal charges are either pending or highly probable.  This 
contention lacks merit.  “[T]he absence of pending or highly probable criminal 
charges is not fatal to the applicability of the uncharged-suspect exemption.”  
State ex rel. Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Mentor (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 
440, 447, 732 N.E.2d 969; see, also, State ex rel. Master v. Cleveland (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 23, 29-30, 661 N.E.2d 180.  Musial erroneously relies on cases 
interpreting the work-product exemption instead of the uncharged-suspect 
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exemption.  See State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 
N.E.2d 83, paragraph five of the syllabus. 
{¶ 28} In addition, the fact that the police investigation and the city ethics 
commission’s administrative review of that investigation have concluded does not 
affect the uncharged-suspect exemption.  “The uncharged suspect exception 
applies despite the passage of time, the lack of enforcement action, or a 
prosecutor’s decision not to file formal charges.”  Master, 75 Ohio St.3d at 30, 
661 N.E.2d 180. 
{¶ 29} Therefore, based on the plain language of R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a) as 
well as precedent, the court of appeals correctly held that the uncharged-suspect 
exemption applied to the majority of the withheld records. 
Open Meetings Act and North Olmsted Charter 
{¶ 30} Musial next asserts that the confidential law-enforcement 
investigatory records became public records when they were provided to the city 
ethics commission because the Open Meetings Act, R.C. 121.22, and the North 
Olmsted Charter required that the proceedings be open. 
{¶ 31} Musial’s claims are not properly before the court.  He did not raise 
his claims under R.C. 121.22 or the municipal charter in his petition or amended 
petition, and appellees did not expressly or impliedly consent to litigation of them 
in the court of appeals.  See State ex rel. Van Dyke v. Pub. Emp. Retirement Bd., 
99 Ohio St.3d 430, 2003-Ohio-4123, 793 N.E.2d 438, ¶ 42; State ex rel. 
Taxpayers Coalition v. Lakewood (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 385, 391, 715 N.E.2d 
179. 
{¶ 32} Musial did not mention either R.C. 121.22 or the North Olmsted 
Charter in his original and amended mandamus petitions and did not seek to 
amend his amended petition to include these claims.  Appellees relied on Musial’s 
amended petition to structure their dispositive motion and to submit evidence to 
support that motion.  Appellees moved to strike Musial’s amended response and 
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cross-motion for summary judgment, which raised these claims for the first time.  
Although the court of appeals denied appellees’ motion by entry issued on the 
same date that it rendered its judgment, the court of appeals specified that 
appellant never claimed that these authorities supersede the statute.  The court of 
appeals did not err in so holding.  See Van Dyke, 99 Ohio St.3d 430, 2003-Ohio-
4123, 793 N.E.2d 438, and Taxpayers Coalition, 86 Ohio St.3d 385, 715 N.E.2d 
179. 
{¶ 33} In addition, even if these claims were properly before the court, 
Musial’s argument ignores Section 1(a), Article XV of the North Olmsted 
Charter, which permits a public body to hold an executive session, closed to the 
public, solely for the purpose of considering “the investigation of charges or 
complaint against a public * * * official.”  The ethics commission reviewed the 
police investigation records relating to Musial and his administrative assistant to 
determine whether there was probable cause to believe that ethics violations had 
occurred. 
Ethics Commission Proceedings: 
Effect on the Applicability of Uncharged-Suspect Exemption 
{¶ 34} Musial next contends that the ethics commission proceeding ended 
the applicability of the uncharged-suspect exemption because he was then charged 
with violating ethics provisions. 
{¶ 35} Musial’s contention is erroneous.  Disciplinary and administrative 
reviews of police investigations do not negate the exempt status of confidential 
law-enforcement investigatory records.  State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co., Inc. 
v. Cleveland (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 566 N.E.2d 146; State ex rel. McGee v. 
Ohio State Bd. of Psychology (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 59, 60, 550 N.E.2d 945, 
overruled in part on other grounds by Steckman, 70 Ohio St.3d at 426, 639 N.E.2d 
83. 
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{¶ 36} In addition, Musial was never charged with ethics violations.  
Instead, the police department merely forwarded its records to the ethics 
commission for the commission’s review.  The ethics commission then 
investigated the matter and determined that no probable cause existed to proceed 
further against Musial. 
{¶ 37} Furthermore, the decision by the police department to forward its 
investigative records to the city ethics commission for its administrative review 
did not waive or otherwise affect the uncharged-suspect exemption.  See, e.g., 
WLWT-TV5, 77 Ohio St.3d at 361, 673 N.E.2d 1365 (“Absent evidence that 
respondents have already disclosed the investigatory records to the public and 
thereby waived application of certain exemptions, the exemptions are fully 
applicable”).  Forwarding the police investigatory records to the ethics 
commission did not disclose these records to the general public. 
Attorney Fees 
{¶ 38} Notwithstanding Musial’s assertions to the contrary, the court of 
appeals acted properly by denying his request for attorney fees.  He was not 
entitled to a fee award, because his mandamus claim was largely without merit.  
State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 385, 700 N.E.2d 12.  
Therefore, the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s 
request for these fees.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Cranford v. Cleveland, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 196, 2004-Ohio-4884, 814 N.E.2d 1218, ¶ 24. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 39} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not err in denying 
Musial’s claim for a writ of mandamus concerning most of the requested records 
based on the uncharged-suspect exemption.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals.  We also deny Musial’s June 14, 2005 motion to allow a 
proposed supplemental record.  The proposed supplement does not further the 
resolution of this appeal. 
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Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Law Office of Jon S. Musial and Jon S. Musial; Seeley, Savidge & Ebert 
Co., L.P.A., and Gary A. Ebert, for appellant. 
 
Walter & Haverfield, L.L.P., R. Todd Hunt, and Frederick W. Whatley, 
for appellees. 
______________________