Case Title: In re: Larry D. Coleman, Respondent.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC89849

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2009-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
In re:  LARRY D. COLEMAN, 
 
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Respondent.  
 
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No. SC89849 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ORIGINAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING 
 
Opinion, originally issued September 15, 2009, modified by the Court's own motion, 
November 17, 2009. 
 
 
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel (OCDC) seeks discipline of Larry  
D. Coleman for multiple violations of the rules of professional conduct in his 
representation of a client in three cases and one violation for the improper handling of his 
IOLTA account.  This Court finds that Mr. Coleman violated Rule 4-1.2, Scope of 
Representation, by accepting a settlement offer in a wrongful death case without the 
consent of his client and filing a motion in that case requesting that the court enforce the 
agreement despite his client’s refusal to settle; Rule 4-1.7, Conflict of Interest, by 
entering into written agreements with his client purporting to give him the exclusive right 
to settle her three cases and taking direct, adverse action against his client’s directives 
when he filed and proceeded on a motion to enforce the agreement; Rule 4-1.15, 
 
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Safekeeping Property, by failing to keep his personal funds separate from his IOLTA 
account; Rule 4-1.16, Declining or Terminating Representation, by failing to take 
reasonable steps to protect his client’s interest on termination of representation; and Rule 
4-8.4, Misconduct, by violating other rules of professional conduct and by engaging in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.1  Mr. Coleman is suspended 
from the practice of law, with execution of such suspension stayed, subject to Mr. 
Coleman’s completion of a one-year term of probation in accordance with conditions 
imposed by this Court. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
Larry D. Coleman was licensed to practice law in Missouri in 1977.  Mr. Coleman 
has had three prior disciplinary matters.  Mr. Coleman was admonished in 1990 for 
failure to communicate with a client and for unreasonable fees.  He was admonished in 
1999 for failure to act with reasonable diligence, to expedite litigation and to 
communicate with a client.  In April 2008, he received a public reprimand for violations 
regarding diligence, unreasonable fees, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.   
 
                                             
 
1 All citations are to the 2007 Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, unless otherwise 
indicated.  Mr. Coleman’s violations of the rules of professional conduct, except his 
IOLTA account violations, all occurred prior to July 1, 2007, when amendments to the 
rules took effect.  Mr. Coleman’s IOLTA account violations occurred from March to 
June 2008, so they are governed by the version of Rule 4-1.15 in effect from January 1 to 
July 1, 2008.  The subsequent amendments to the rules do not change the essence of the 
rules. 
 
 
3
The present disciplinary action arises from his representation of a client, Vera 
Davis, and his handling of his IOLTA account.  Beginning in July 2001, Ms. Davis hired 
Mr. Coleman to represent her in three separate civil actions that eventually were pending 
simultaneously.  Ms. Davis hired Mr. Coleman to represent her in a wrongful death 
action for medical malpractice in the death of her sister.  She then hired Mr. Coleman to 
represent her in a wrongful termination case against her employer, Two Rivers 
Psychiatric Hospital.  Finally, Ms. Davis hired Mr. Coleman to represent her in a 
discrimination claim against her employer, Western Missouri Mental Health Center.  The 
fee agreement in each case required Ms. Davis to pay Mr. Coleman nonrefundable 
retainers of $5000, $2000 and $1000 respectively, and then an hourly rate of $200 per 
hour.  In addition, the agreement required Ms. Davis to pay the litigation expenses in 
each case.      
From July 2001 to September 2006, Mr. Coleman periodically sent bills to Ms. 
Davis for his legal fees and expenses in the three cases; as the bills arrived, Ms. Davis 
paid them.  Ms. Davis did not keep a ledger or receipts for all monies she paid to Mr. 
Coleman, but she was able to produce receipts for payments of more than $38,000.  She 
believes she may have paid him up to $50,000, which Mr. Coleman does not dispute.  
Mr. Coleman did not maintain copies of any documentation showing his billable hours, 
the litigation costs accrued, or her payments.  Mr. Coleman maintains that his records of 
all bills and statements were delivered to Ms. Davis when she picked up her legal files 
from his office. 
 
4
 
In July 2006, the state of Missouri, on behalf of Western Missouri Mental Health 
Center, made an offer to settle Ms. Davis’ discrimination claim for $20,000.  When Mr. 
Coleman advised Ms. Davis of the settlement offer, she told him that she did not find the 
settlement offer acceptable and instructed him to reject it.  In September 2006, Ms. Davis 
informed Mr. Coleman that she no longer had the financial ability to pay him as 
previously agreed.  Mr. Coleman proposed that their fee agreements in her three cases be 
converted to contingent fee agreements.  For each case, Mr. Coleman prepared a written 
contingent fee agreement, which he executed and mailed to Ms. Davis.  Each agreement 
provided that Mr. Coleman was forgiving any currently owed fees in exchange for the 
right to one-third of any future recovery.2  Mr. Coleman also included the following 
provision in each agreement: 
In consideration of one-third (1/3) of any recovery, I agree to forego my 
hourly rate, and instead, agree to accept one-third of any recovery.  
However, because I am taking a risk with you on this case, and because I 
am more familiar with the legal trends relative to judgments, settlements, 
and summary disposition, you agree I shall have the exclusive right to 
determine when and for how much to settle this case.  That way, I am not 
held hostage to an agreement I disagree with. 
 
Mr. Coleman did not explain or otherwise discuss this clause with Ms. Davis prior to the 
execution of the agreements.  Ms. Davis signed each of the new agreements. 
 
In October 2006, the state, on behalf of Western Missouri Mental Health Center, 
again offered to settle Ms. Davis’ case for $20,000.  When Mr. Coleman advised her of 
                                             
 
2 The contingent fee agreements stated that Mr. Coleman forgave unpaid balances due of 
$4,387.69 in the wrongful death action, $3,249.89 in the Two Rivers case, and $9,647.94 
in the Western Missouri Mental Health Center case.   
 
 
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the offer, Ms. Davis again informed Mr. Coleman that the offer was unacceptable.  
Without Ms. Davis’ consent, Mr. Coleman accepted the state’s $20,000 offer.  Mr. 
Coleman then informed Ms. Davis that he had settled her case against Western Missouri 
Mental Health Center for $20,000.  Because it was necessary for Ms. Davis to execute the 
settlement documents to effectuate the settlement, Mr. Coleman repeatedly requested that 
Ms. Davis sign the documents.  Ms. Davis refused and informed Mr. Coleman that she 
wished to proceed to trial. 
 
In November 2006, Mr. Coleman sent a letter to Ms. Davis stating that, if Ms. 
Davis refused to sign the settlement agreement, Mr. Coleman would be forced to 
withdraw in all three of her cases or move the court to enforce the settlement agreement 
against Western Missouri Mental Health Center despite her explicit refusal to settle.  
Thereafter, Mr. Coleman filed a motion in the case to enforce the settlement agreement.  
In February 2007, the court ruled against Mr. Coleman and declined to enforce the 
settlement agreement.  The court placed the case back on the trial docket for April 2, 
2007.  Mr. Coleman mailed her a copy of the order overruling his motion.  He mailed Ms. 
Davis another letter, dated February 16, 2007, informing her that if she did not contact 
him in writing within one week of his letter, he would withdraw as her attorney.  After 
more than one week had passed, on February 28, 2007, Mr. Coleman filed a motion to 
withdraw as Ms. Davis’ attorney in the Western Missouri Mental Health Center case, 
citing Ms. Davis’ failure to respond to his deadline as his reason for withdrawal.  Mr. 
Coleman did not send Ms. Davis a copy of his motion to withdraw. 
 
6
 
On March 2, 2007, Ms. Davis sent Mr. Coleman a letter requesting her files.  
Three days later, on March 5, 2007, Ms. Davis sent a representative to pick up her files.  
She took her files to one attorney and discussed her cases with another attorney.  At some 
point, Ms. Davis received from the court a copy of Mr. Coleman’s motion to withdraw, 
as well as a directive from the court that she respond on or before April 12, 2007, if she 
wished to object to Mr. Coleman’s motion.  Ms. Davis was uncertain as to how to 
proceed, so on April 5, 2007, she directed a letter to Mr. Coleman asking him a number 
of questions, including whether she needed to obtain another lawyer, what his fees were 
in her cases and whether he intended to assert attorney fee liens in her cases, the status of 
each of her cases, and whether he anticipated that she would have any problems in her 
cases.  Her letter directed Mr. Coleman to respond by the next day, April 6.  Mr. Coleman 
did not reply to Ms. Davis’ letter.  On April 5, 2007, the same day that Ms. Davis wrote 
Mr. Coleman with questions about her case, Mr. Coleman sent a letter to Ms. Davis 
acknowledging that her files had been retrieved from his office.  Mr. Coleman closed his 
letter by stating, “It was a pleasure to serve you.”3   
In May 2007, Ms. Davis filed an objection to Mr. Coleman’s withdrawal in the 
Western Missouri Mental Health Center case because he had not provided the 
information sought in her letter.  Despite her objection, the court granted Mr. Coleman 
leave to withdraw.  Ms. Davis’ case was placed on the fall 2007 accelerated trial docket.  
Unable to obtain new counsel, her case ultimately was dismissed. 
                                             
 
3 It is unknown whether Mr. Coleman or Ms. Davis was aware of the other’s letter at the 
time of drafting his or her April 5th letter.     
 
7
During the time period described above, summary judgment was issued against 
Ms. Davis in her wrongful death action.  In March 2007, Mr. Coleman filed an appeal of 
the summary judgment.  Mr. Coleman then filed a motion to withdraw as Ms. Davis’ 
counsel, which the court of appeals granted.  Similarly, in June 2007, Mr. Coleman 
requested and was granted permission to withdraw as Ms. Davis’ attorney in her 
wrongful termination action against Three Rivers.  In July 2007, Ms. Davis filed a 
complaint against Mr. Coleman with OCDC.  OCDC filed an information, in April 2008, 
charging that Mr. Coleman violated multiple rules of professional conduct in his legal 
representation of Ms. Davis and another client.  In his answer, Mr. Coleman denied all of 
the alleged violations.   
Independent to the issues arising out of his representation of Ms. Davis, other 
conduct by Mr. Coleman came to the attention of OCDC.  In this Court’s April 2008 
order regarding Mr. Coleman’s third disciplinary matter, Mr. Coleman was ordered to 
pay a $750 fee, plus costs, to the clerk of this Court.  On or about June 11, 2008, Mr. 
Coleman wrote a check on his IOLTA account for the amount due.  When it was 
discovered that Mr. Coleman paid his fee and costs from an IOLTA account, OCDC 
opened a complaint and initiated an investigation against Mr. Coleman. 
OCDC discovered that Mr. Coleman regularly deposited checks for settlement 
proceeds into his IOLTA account.  When a settlement check cleared the bank, it was Mr. 
Coleman’s practice to pay out the client’s share of the settlement proceeds to the client.  
Once his clients were paid, Mr. Coleman sometimes would leave his share of the 
settlement proceeds in the account and write checks to pay personal obligations directly 
 
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out of the IOLTA account.  Mr. Coleman did not keep records or ledgers identifying 
deposits into the account.  OCDC amended its previously filed information to add an 
additional count, alleging that Mr. Coleman mishandled his IOLTA account by failing to 
hold client and third-party property separate from his own property.       
A disciplinary hearing panel (“the panel”) heard the matter in October 2008, and 
found there was insufficient proof to establish any violations regarding the other client.  
Regarding Mr. Coleman’s representation of Ms. Davis, the panel found insufficient 
evidence that Mr. Coleman violated Rule 4-1.5, unreasonable or excessive fees; that the 
clause in the contingent fee contract purporting to give Mr. Coleman the exclusive right 
to settle Ms. Davis’ cases created a conflict of interest in violation of Rule 4-1.7; or that 
Mr. Coleman failed to protect Ms. Davis’ interests on termination of his representation in 
violation of Rule 4-1.16(d).  The panel also found there was no evidence Mr. Coleman 
commingled client funds with his own funds in violation of Rule 4-1.15, the rule 
requiring the safekeeping of client property.  However, the panel did determine that Mr. 
Coleman violated Rule 4-1.2(a), by accepting the settlement offer in the Western 
Missouri Mental Health Center case despite Ms. Davis’ expressed wishes.  This conduct 
also violated Rule 4-8.4(d), regarding conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.  
The panel recommended that Mr. Coleman be reprimanded publicly.  OCDC filed its 
rejection of the panel’s recommendation, which brings the matter before this Court.4    
                                             
 
4 OCDC does not challenge the panel’s finding that Mr. Coleman did not violate the rules 
of professional conduct in his representation of his other client.   
 
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OCDC argues that the evidence proves that Mr. Coleman violated the following 
rules of professional conduct:  
(1) 4-1.2, Scope of Representation, in that Mr. Coleman accepted a 
settlement agreement with Western Missouri Mental Health Center without 
consent of his client, Ms. Davis, and then moved the court to enforce the 
agreement despite Ms. Davis’ decision not settle;  
(2) 4-1.5, Fees, in that Mr. Coleman converted an hourly fee agreement into 
a contingent fee agreement and did not give Ms. Davis credit for the more than 
$30,000 in fees she had paid;  
(3) 4-1.7, Conflict of Interest: Current Clients, in that Mr. Coleman entered 
into a contingent fee agreement with Ms. Davis that purported to give him the 
exclusive right to settle all of her cases and subsequently took action in court 
despite Ms. Davis’ explicit refusal to settle;  
(4) 4-1.16, Declining or Terminating Representation, in that Mr. Coleman 
failed to notify Ms. Davis that he had withdrawn as her counsel and failed to 
provide Ms. Davis with information regarding her rights and obligations;  
(5) 4-1.15, Safekeeping Property, in that Mr. Coleman regularly 
commingled personal and client funds; and  
(6) 4-8.4(d), Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice, in that 
Mr. Coleman caused harm to the judicial system and his clients by violating 
multiple rules of professional conduct.   
 
OCDC requests that this Court suspend Mr. Coleman’s license, with no leave to reapply 
for a period of one year. 
Standard of Review 
“Professional misconduct must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence 
before discipline will be imposed.”  In re Crews, 159 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Mo. banc 2005).   
This Court reviews the evidence de novo, independently determines all issues pertaining 
to credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and draws its own conclusions 
of law.  In re Belz, 258 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Mo. banc 2008).  This Court treats the panel’s 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the recommendations as advisory.  In re Crews, 
 
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159 S.W.3d at 358.  Moreover, this Court may reject any or all of the panel’s 
recommendations.  In re Madison, 282 S.W.3d 350, 352 (Mo. banc 2009).     
Discussion 
 
Many of the facts essential to resolve Mr. Coleman’s alleged disciplinary rule 
violations are not contested.  Mr. Coleman admits that he drafted three contingent fee 
agreements for Ms. Davis to sign that purported to give him sole authority to settle her 
three lawsuits.  He admits that he agreed to settle her case against Western Missouri 
Mental Health Center for $20,000, even though she expressly told him that she did not 
agree that the case should be settled for that amount.  He also admits that he filed a 
motion in federal district court seeking enforcement of the agreement and proceeded on 
his motion. 
 
Mr. Coleman does not dispute that, after the court overruled his motion, he filed a 
motion to withdraw as counsel and did not mail a copy of the motion to Ms. Davis.  He 
admits receiving a letter on April 5, 2007, from Ms. Davis requesting detailed 
information about her pending lawsuits and not responding in any way.   
Mr. Coleman further admits that he wrote personal checks out of his IOLTA 
account.  The bank records of that account establish that personal checks were written by 
Mr. Coleman at a time when a client’s funds were in the account.  These facts are 
sufficient to establish that Mr. Coleman violated Rules 4-1.2, 4-1.7, 4-1.15, 4-1.16, and 4-
8.4. 
 
 
 
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Violation of Rule 4-1.2 
 
Rule 4-1.2(a) requires a lawyer to accept and adhere to the client’s decision 
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter:  
 
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and shall consult with 
the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.  A lawyer shall 
abide by a client’s decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a 
matter. 
 
This rule recognizes that fundamental to the attorney-client relationship is the concept 
that an attorney advocates for the client’s objectives.  “The client-lawyer relationship 
itself implies some decisions [are] reserved to the client.  Thus, a client and lawyer could 
not enter into a valid contract that only the lawyer would have the authority to decide 
what would benefit the client[.]”  REST. OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22 cmt. a 
(2000).  Settlement decisions have the potential both to benefit and harm the client.  Rule 
4-1.2(a) requires a client to be in control of the decisions that have the capacity to affect 
the client profoundly, specifically referencing the decision whether to accept a settlement 
of the case, so an attorney may not execute a contract that gives the attorney the sole right 
to settle a case.5   
For the three cases in which he represented Ms. Davis, Mr. Coleman drafted 
contingent fee contracts that included a provision that “[he] shall have the exclusive right 
                                             
 
5 In addition to violating the rules of professional conduct, fee agreements that purport to 
give an attorney control over settlement of the case have not been enforced by the courts 
of other jurisdictions that, like Missouri, have adopted the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  E.g.  Parents Against Drunk Driving v. Graystone Pines 
Homeowners’ Ass’n, 789 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (declaring that fee agreements 
 
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to determine when and for how much to settle this case.”  He executed the three 
agreements with this provision and then had Ms. Davis execute them as well.  This 
expressly is disallowed by Rule 4-1.2(a).  While Rule 4-1.2(c) allows an attorney to limit 
the scope of representation,6  the rules of professional conduct do not allow an attorney to 
expand the scope of representation by a client’s agreement so that the attorney may 
determine whether to accept or reject a settlement offer instead of the decision being 
made by the client. 
 
Mr. Coleman also violated Rule 4-1.2(a) when he acted under the authority of the 
invalid agreement with Ms. Davis and advised counsel for Western Missouri Mental 
Health Center that he agreed to settle Ms. Davis’ case against the center for $20,000.  He 
agreed to settle Ms. Davis’ case after she expressly had told him that she did not accept 
the $20,000 settlement offer.  He further violated Rule 4-1.2(a) when he filed a motion 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
that give attorneys control over the settlement of the case is contrary to the Utah Code of 
Professional Responsibility, contrary to public policy and, ultimately, void). 
6 Under Rule 4-1.2(c): “A lawyer may limit the scope of representation if the client 
consents after consultation.”  The comment to Rule 4-1.2 expressly provides that the 
attorney may not ask the client to surrender the right to settle litigation that the attorney 
may want to continue: 
 
The objectives or scope of services provided by a lawyer may be 
limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the 
lawyer’s services are made available to the client. 
 
*     *     * 
 
An agreement concerning the scope of representation must accord 
with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law.  Thus, the client may 
not be asked to agree to representation so limited in scope as to violate Rule 
4-1.1, or to surrender the right to terminate the lawyer’s services or the 
right to settle litigation that the lawyer might wish to continue. 
 
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requesting that the court order Western Missouri Mental Health to honor the agreement 
he accepted despite Ms. Davis’ refusal to settle the case.  Mr. Coleman’s attempt to 
compel Ms. Davis to settle her case when he knew she did not consent to that settlement 
expressly is disallowed by Rule 4-1.2(a).   
Violation of Rule 4-1.7 
 
Rule 4-1.7(b) provides that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client may be materially limited ... by the lawyer’s own interests, 
unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely 
affected and (2) the client consents after consultation.”  The comment to this rule 
recognizes that “[l]oyalty ... [is] an essential element in the lawyer’s relationship to a 
client” and that “[t]he lawyer’s own interests should not be permitted to have adverse 
effect on representation of a client.”  Rule 4-1.7, Comment.  Although Rule 4-1.7(b) 
provides that representation by an attorney is permissible despite a conflict of interest if 
the client consents after consultation, there is a limitation as to when a client may waive a 
conflict.  The client should not be asked to consent to representation despite the conflict, 
unless it is reasonable to believe that the conflict will not adversely affect the attorney’s 
representation of the client.   
It was not reasonable for Mr. Coleman to believe that his interests would not 
adversely affect his representation of Ms. Davis under the contingent fee agreement that 
gave him the sole right to settle her cases.  Under the contingent fee agreement, Mr. 
Coleman would receive a contingent fee only if Ms. Davis settled her cases or received a 
favorable verdict.  At the same time, he improperly contracted with her for the exclusive 
 
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right to settle her cases with or without her consent.  The conflict of interest the 
agreement created was apparent by Mr. Coleman’s inclusion of a statement in the 
agreement indicating his intent was to protect his financial interests rather than her legal 
interests: “[Y]ou agree I shall have the exclusive right to determine when and for how 
much to settle this case.  That way, I am not held hostage to an agreement I disagree 
with.”   
The contingent fee contract gave Mr. Coleman a motivation to protect his financial 
interests.   By divesting Ms. Davis of settlement authority, Mr. Coleman attempted to 
protect his financial interests by allowing Mr. Coleman to give his interests greater 
priority than Ms. Davis’.  In doing so, this agreement creates a conflict between Ms. 
Davis’ interests and Mr. Coleman’s personal, financial interests.  Additionally, Mr. 
Coleman mailed the agreements to Ms. Davis and never discussed with her the provisions 
that gave him the sole right to settle her cases. 
Mr. Coleman again violated Rule 4-l.7 by acting against Ms. Davis’ interests when 
he advised counsel for Western Missouri Mental Health Center that he would settle Ms. 
Davis’ lawsuit for $20,000, despite her explicit refusal to accept the settlement.  Mr. 
Coleman further acted against her interest, in violation of Rule 4-1.7, by filing a motion 
in the federal lawsuit asking the court to enforce the agreement despite Ms. Davis’ 
explicit refusal to settle, and by proceeding on the motion.  In each of these instances, Mr. 
Coleman promoted his personal interests when he knew they directly conflicted with 
those of Ms. Davis.   
 
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If a conflict of interest arises after representation is undertaken, a lawyer may be 
able to protect his client’s interests by withdrawing from representation.  Rule 4-1.7, 
Comment.  While Mr. Coleman withdrew from his representation of Ms. Davis in her 
three cases, he did not seek to withdraw at the time it became apparent that his interest 
was adverse to hers.  He withdrew only after the federal court overruled his motion to 
enforce the agreement in the Western Missouri Mental Health Center case.  His 
withdrawal was untimely, and it did not mitigate the conflict.  This Court finds that Mr. 
Coleman violated Rule 4-1.7. 
Violation of Rule 4-1.15 
 
Rule 4-1.15(c) states: “A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that 
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s 
own property.  Client or third party funds shall be kept in a separate account[.]”7  Mr. 
Coleman violated this rule.  He admits that, from January to July 2008, he regularly 
deposited settlement proceeds into his IOLTA account for the purpose of allowing the 
settlement checks to clear.  Mr. Coleman acknowledges that, after each check cleared, he 
paid the client the client’s portion of the settlement.  He then regularly paid personal 
obligations out of his portion of settlement proceeds that remained in his IOLTA account.  
Mr. Coleman argues this was not a violation of Rule 4-1.15 because “there are no other 
funds in his IOLTA account, except [Mr. Coleman’s].”  Mr. Coleman misunderstands 
Rule 4-1.15(c).  Rule 4-1.15(c) explicitly states that there must be an account for client 
                                             
 
7 The version of Rule 4-1.15 in the 2008 Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct 
governs.  This version was in effect from January 1, 2008, to July 1, 2008.  
 
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and third-party funds that is kept separate from any account holding an attorney’s own 
funds.  While it may be true that Mr. Coleman did not misuse funds by using client funds 
to pay personal bills or convert any client funds, he did use his IOLTA account for 
personal use.8  That is strictly prohibited.  Rule 4-1.15, Comment 1.   
 
Commingling personal and client funds is only “permissible when necessary to 
pay bank service charges on [the IOLTA] account.”  Rule 4-1.15, Comment 2.  Any 
funds owed to Mr. Coleman should have been transferred into a personal account before 
the money was withdrawn via a check.    Contrary to Mr. Coleman’s argument that there 
were never client funds in the account when he wrote personal checks, records from his 
bank show that, during the time he kept his personal funds in the IOLTA account and 
wrote personal checks to expend the funds, there were client funds in the account.  This is 
a classic example of prohibited commingling of attorney and client funds.   
Additionally, “accurate records must be kept regarding which part of the funds is 
the lawyer’s.”  Rule 4-1.15, Comment 2.  When questioned about the identity of the 
owner of specific deposits, Mr. Coleman was unable to say to whom the money 
belonged.      
Violation of Rule 4-1.16 
OCDC also argues the evidence proves that Mr. Coleman violated Rule 4-1.16 
because he failed to protect Ms. Davis’ interests at the termination of his representation.  
Specifically, OCDC claims Mr. Coleman did not notify Ms. Davis that he filed motions 
                                             
 
8 OCDC never alleged that Mr. Coleman converted any client funds. 
   
 
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to withdraw in her cases and did not provide her with information regarding her rights 
and obligations even though she made a written request for information.   
Rule 4-1.16(d) provides that, “[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall 
take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as 
giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel[.]”  
One step necessary to protect a client’s interest is giving notice to the client that the 
attorney has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel of record.  That notice should be given 
unless it reasonably cannot be done, such as when the client has no known address.   
After Mr. Coleman was unsuccessful in enforcing the provision giving him the 
sole right to settle Ms. Davis’ Western Missouri Mental Health Center case, Mr. Coleman 
filed motions to withdraw as counsel in all three of her cases.  The three motions to 
withdraw filed by Mr. Coleman included certificates of service, indicating that notice of 
each motion to withdraw was given by mailing a copy of the motion.  The certificates of 
service do not show that Ms. Davis was mailed a copy.    
Mr. Coleman did send her a letter advising her that, in light of their conflict over 
whether the Western Missouri Mental Health Center case should be settled for $20,000, 
he needed to know whether he was still representing her in that case and her other two 
cases.  He stated that, unless he heard from her in writing within one week, he would file 
a motion to withdraw in the Western Missouri Mental Health Center case. She did not 
respond to his inquiry as he requested, so Mr. Coleman filed a motion to withdraw as 
counsel in that case on February 28, 2007.  It was reasonable for Mr. Coleman to believe 
that Ms. Davis should know that her failure to respond to his request for communication 
 
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would result in him filing a motion to withdraw as counsel.  Nevertheless, he had an 
obligation to protect her interest by giving her notice that he actually had filed a motion 
to withdraw as counsel of record in all three of her cases.   
Mr. Coleman further violated rule 4-1.16 by failing to take all reasonable steps to 
mitigate the consequence of his withdrawal on Ms. Davis, and to protect her interests by 
providing her with the information she requested.  After Ms. Davis learned that Mr. 
Coleman had filed a motion to withdraw in the Western Missouri Mental Health Center 
case, she sent Mr. Coleman a letter requesting information that would help her decide 
whether to object to his withdrawal.  In the letter, she asked him when her federal lawsuit 
would be set for trial, whether she would need another lawyer, what problems there 
would be, and whether any offer had been made other than the $20,000 offer that she 
declined.  She asked what fees she owed and requested an itemized statement of all 
charges and work done to support the charges.  She also asked him questions about the 
status of her two discrimination cases, for a copy of her fee agreement in the Two Rivers 
case, for itemized statements of the work done, and for Mr. Coleman’s charges in both 
cases.  She asked whether he believed he was entitled to a portion of any recovery in the 
cases and whether he intended to file liens for his fees.  Ms. Davis requested that his 
response be in writing.   
At the time that Ms. Davis sent her letter requesting information from Mr. 
Coleman, she had picked up all of her files from his office.  Although she later disputes 
that her act communicated a decision to terminate Mr. Coleman as her attorney, Mr. 
Coleman was reasonable in interpreting her action as a termination of his representation.  
 
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Even so, under Rule 4-1.16, Mr. Coleman was required to protect Ms. Davis’ interests on 
termination of his representation, if reasonably practicable.   
Most of the information she requested was vital to her ability to hire counsel to 
represent her in the three pending cases.9  While she had possession of her case files at 
the time she requested information from Mr. Coleman, an attorney considering whether 
to represent her would be aided greatly by a statement from the prior attorney of record as 
to the status of her cases.  Additionally, any attorney asked to undertake representation in 
plaintiff’s pending cases would be concerned about receiving payment for services 
rendered.  Whether Mr. Coleman was claiming a percentage of any recovery and whether 
he intended to file attorney liens were major considerations in any attorney’s decision 
whether to represent Ms. Davis, because she no longer had the ability to pay an hourly 
rate. 
 
Mr. Coleman was mistaken that he did not have an obligation to give Ms. Davis 
information about her cases because she had terminated their attorney-client relationship.  
Mr. Coleman’s duty to provide the information arose because of the termination of their 
relationship.  Mr. Coleman violated Rule 4-1.16 by failing to protect Ms. Davis’ interests 
when he did not provide information that was readily within his knowledge and 
possession.   
                                             
 
9 Mr. Coleman does not assert that it was not reasonably practicable to respond to Ms. 
Davis’ inquiries or object to the information requested.  Nor does he claim that he was 
unable to respond to her request because she stated she needed his reply within one day.  
While it was not practicable for him to respond in one day, he never responded at all. 
 
 
 
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Violation of Rule 4-8.4 
 
Rule 4-8.4 defines professional misconduct for which an attorney may be 
disciplined.  Rule 4-8.4(a) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) 
violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.”  Rule 4-8.4(d) also 
provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  By violating rules of professional conduct, 
Mr. Coleman “has necessarily violated Rule 4-8.4(a).”  In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 
910, 916 (Mo. banc 1997). 
OCDC asks this Court to find that Mr. Coleman also violated Rule 4-8.4(d) 
because his conduct in violation of the rules of professional conduct wasted judicial 
resources and negatively impacted the judicial process so it was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.  Regarding Rule 4-8.4(d), Mr. Coleman wasted judicial 
resources when he filed a motion and attempted to enforce a prohibited agreement 
purporting to give him the sole right to settle Ms. Davis’ case.  His conduct also 
negatively impacted the judicial process because his failure to give Ms. Davis 
information at the termination of his representation hindered her ability to obtain new 
counsel that was necessary to adjudicate her claims in the pending cases.  Mr. Coleman, 
therefore, violated Rule 4-8.4(d). 
Insufficient Evidence of Violation of Rule 4-1.5 
 
OCDC asserts that Mr. Coleman violated an additional rule of professional 
conduct, Rule 4-1.5, by making agreements with Ms. Davis for unreasonable fees.  
Despite the fact that Mr. Coleman can produce no written records or accountings to show 
 
21
the work he performed, OCDC does not contend the $30,000 to $50,000 in fees that he 
charged and that Ms. Davis paid were unreasonable.  Instead, OCDC asserts that Mr. 
Coleman’s conversion of his agreements for a $200 hourly fee to contingent fee 
agreements where Mr. Coleman would receive 30 percent of any recovery was per se 
unreasonable because Ms. Davis received no credit for the $38,000 in fees she already 
had paid in her three cases.  Additionally, OCDC notes that, at the time Ms. Davis was 
asked to consent to the contingent fee agreement, she had invested five years in Mr. 
Coleman’s representation with no resolution in any of her actions.  OCDC suggests that 
she had little choice but to agree because her financial resources had been depleted.   
 
This Court is concerned there are no records to document the work Mr. Coleman 
did for Ms. Davis, the amount he billed her for his work, or the expenses he incurred on 
her behalf.  Mr. Coleman claims that he gave all his records to Ms. Davis, except possibly 
tax records, and did not keep copies for himself.  While not keeping copies of records is 
ill-advised, there is nothing in the record to dispute his claim.10   
Importantly, there was evidence that Mr. Coleman spent significant time and effort 
on Ms. Davis’ behalf.  Although Ms. Davis paid Mr. Coleman $38,000, a large sum of 
money, his work was on three lawsuits spanning five years.  All three lawsuits involved 
                                             
 
10 When Mr. Coleman gave Ms. Davis her case files and billing records, he did not make 
and keep copies for his own records.  While duplicate records are not required by the 
rules of professional conduct, the amended version of Rule 4-1.15(c) does require that a 
lawyer preserve “complete records” of a client’s trust account for five years.  Because a 
client generally requests his or her files only when problems have arisen in the attorney-
client relationship, however, this case demonstrates why retaining such records is 
prudent. 
 
 
22
complex legal issues: they were a medical malpractice wrongful death suit and two 
discrimination lawsuits.  He communicated with her on a regular basis, updated her about 
the status of the cases, and provided her copies of documents he filed and received in the 
court proceedings.  Mr. Coleman consulted two doctors and hired one as an expert in the 
wrongful death case.  A portion of the amount Ms. Davis paid Mr. Coleman was for 
litigation expenses, including fees for the two doctors.  Finally, the percentage that Mr. 
Coleman agreed to accept under the contingent fee agreement was 30 percent, which is 
on the lower end of contingent fee percentages, and that percentage was applicable even 
if the case was tried.  The disciplinary hearing panel found that the evidence was 
insufficient to show Mr. Coleman violated Rule 4-1.5, and this Court agrees.    
Appropriate Discipline 
 
Having found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Coleman committed 
multiple acts of professional misconduct, this Court now turns to the appropriate 
discipline to impose.  “The fundamental purpose of an attorney disciplinary proceeding is 
to ‘protect the public and maintain the integrity of the legal profession.’”  Crews, 159 
S.W.3d at 360 (quoting In re Waldron, 790 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Mo. banc 1990)).  This 
Court relies on the ABA Standards when imposing sanctions to achieve the goals of 
attorney discipline.  In re Storement, 873 S.W.2d 227, 231 (Mo. banc 1994).  The goals 
of attorney discipline are to protect the public, ensure the administration of justice, and 
maintain the integrity of the profession.  ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER 
SANCTIONS 6 (1992).  Under the ABA Standards, the factors considered are the ethical 
duty and to whom it is owed, the attorney’s mental state, the amount of injury caused by 
 
23
the attorney’s misconduct, and, finally, any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  
ABA STANDARDS at 7.   
Ethical duties are owed to the client, the public, the legal system, and the 
profession.  Of the duties that are relevant to Mr. Coleman’s violations, the duties owed 
to the client include the duty to preserve the client’s property, Rule 4-1.15, and the duty 
to avoid conflicts of interest, Rule 4-1.7.  The duties owed to the public are protected in 
part by Rule 8.4, attorney misconduct.  This rule helps guarantee that the public can trust 
lawyers to protect their interests and property.  The duties owed to the legal system and 
the legal profession helps to ensure that the administration of justice is swift and accurate.  
Rules 4-8.4, attorney misconduct, and 4-1.16, declining or terminating representation, 
work to protect these interests.   
The ABA’s next factor to examine when calculating sanctions is the attorney’s 
mental state while committing the rule violation.  The ABA Standards use three mental 
states: intent, knowledge, and negligence.  Intent, the most culpable mental state, is 
displayed when “a lawyer acts with the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a 
particular result.”  Id. at 10.  Knowledge is shown when “the lawyer acted with conscious 
awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of his or her conduct both without the 
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.”  Id.  The least culpable 
mental state is negligence, exhibited when “a lawyer fails to be aware of a substantial risk 
that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the 
standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.”  Id.     
 
24
When discussing injury to the client, the ABA Standards look at the actual injury 
to the client as well as the potential injury to the client, public, and legal system or 
profession that is “reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer’s misconduct.”  Id. at 
13.   The level of injury ranges from “serious” to “little or no” injury.   
Finally, the last inquiry in the ABA Standards considers aggravating and 
mitigating factors.  Aggravating factors, which increase the severity of the sanction, 
include prior discipline by the disciplinary committee or vulnerability of the client.  Id. at 
11.  Mitigating factors, which decrease the severity of the sanction, include inexperience 
in the practice of law, remorse, character and reputation, and absence of a selfish motive.  
Id. at 11, 28.  When multiple charges of misconduct are found, “the ultimate sanction 
imposed should at least be consistent with the sanction for the most serious instance of 
misconduct among the violations.”  Id. at 12.   
 
Applying these factors to Mr. Coleman, OCDC asserts that the most serious 
instances of misconduct involve Mr. Coleman failing to follow his client’s directives, 
creating a conflict of interest, and mishandling client funds.  Mr. Coleman’s failure to 
follow Ms. Davis’ directive in violation of Rule 4-1.2 is governed by ABA Standard 4.4, 
which provides that suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform 
services for a client and causes injury or potential injury.  Reprimand is appropriate when 
a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client.  
Despite the plain language of Rule 4-1.2 requiring that the client make any decision 
regarding settlement, Mr. Coleman knowingly had his client execute an agreement where 
he was given the sole authority to settle his client’s cases.  While Mr. Coleman did not 
 
25
intend to violate the rules of professional conduct and is reluctant to accept that his 
actions are improper and prohibited, he knowingly failed to abide by his client’s directive 
to reject the state’s settlement offer by not only advising the state that the settlement offer 
was accepted but also filing a motion to enforce the settlement agreement.  Likewise, Mr. 
Coleman’s conduct in violating Rule 4-1.7, creating a conflict of interest, and Rule 4-
1.15, safekeeping of client property, was knowing conduct.  
 
With regard to the injury to Ms. Davis from these violations, she was required to 
take action to protest Mr. Coleman’s efforts to enforce his settlement with Western 
Missouri Mental Health Center.  Additionally, the improper agreement contributed to the 
deterioration of her relationship with Mr. Coleman, which left her without counsel in all 
three cases and led to the dismissal of her case against Western Missouri Mental Health 
Center.   
As to aggravating circumstances, this Court admonished Mr. Coleman in 1990 and 
1999, and publicly reprimanded him 2008.  The applicable mitigating factor is the 
absence of dishonest motives.   
Applying the ABA standards, the nature of Mr. Coleman’s conduct justifies the 
suspension of Mr. Coleman’s license to practice law without leave to reapply for one 
year.  The ABA Standards provide, however, for lesser discipline where the behavior was 
not intentional.  The ABA Standards suggest that probation is the appropriate punishment 
when the conduct can be corrected and the attorney’s right to practice law needs to be 
monitored or limited rather than revoked.  ABA STANDARDS, Rule 2.7 Probation, 
Commentary.  This concept is recognized by this Court’s Rule 5.225, which provides: 
 
26
A lawyer is eligible for probation if he or she:   
(1)  Is unlikely to harm the public during the period of probation and can be 
adequately supervised; 
(2) Is able to perform legal services and is able to practice law without 
causing the courts or profession to fall into disrepute; and, 
(3) Has not committed acts warranting disbarment. 
 
Mr. Coleman’s actions arose out of ignorance of the rules of professional conduct 
instead of an intention to violate the rules,11 and it is likely that his misconduct can be 
remedied by education and supervision.   Because this Court finds that Mr. Coleman’s 
violations make him a proper subject for probation, it orders that execution of the 
suspension of his license to practice law be stayed and that he be placed on probation for 
one year.  The conditions of his probation shall include attendance at the ethics school 
conducted by OCDC, participation in law practice management education and 
mentoring, preparation of an office management plan that is approved by OCDC, filing 
of quarterly responsibility reports, submission to periodic financial audits, employment 
of a qualified consultant, maintenance of adequate trust account records, and 
commission of no other violations of the rules of professional conduct. 
 
 
 
                                             
 
11 It is unlikely that Mr. Coleman would have filed a motion in court in an attempt to 
enforce the settlement agreement against the Western Missouri Mental Health Center, 
despite Ms. Davis’ explicit refusal to settle, if he knew such an agreement violated the 
rules of professional conduct.  Likewise, it is unlikely that Mr. Coleman would have 
written a check on his IOLTA account to pay his fees and costs in his previous 
disciplinary proceeding if he had known that doing so violated the rules of professional 
conduct. 
 
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Conclusion 
Mr. Coleman is ordered suspended from the practice of law without leave to 
reapply for one year.  The execution of his suspension is stayed, and Mr. Coleman is 
placed on probation for a period of one year, with terms of his probation as imposed 
herein.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  Patricia Breckenridge, Judge 
 
 
 
All concur.