Case Title: State, Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n v. Thornock

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-05-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
State, Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n v. Thornock1993 WY 71851 P.2d 1300Case Number: 92-205Decided: 05/13/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE of Wyoming, WYOMING 
GAME AND FISH COMMISSION, 

Appellant 
(Respondent),

v.

J.R. THORNOCK, 

Appellee 
(Petitioner).

Appeal from District 
Court, Lincoln County, John D. Troughton, J.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Ron Arnold, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen., for appellant.

Margo Harlan 
Sabec, Casper, for appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The dispositive 
issue for this case is whether arbitrators, appointed pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
23-1-901(d) (1991), are vested with authority to award to a landowner the cost 
of materials and expense of constructing a stack yard fence which had been built 
by the landowner claimant partially with materials that were furnished by the 
Game and Fish Commission. Collateral issues are raised concerning the 
appointment of an arbitrator whose brother was married to the claimant's 
sister1 and hostility of the spectators at 
the arbitration hearing, which is claimed to have caused counsel for the Game 
and Fish Commission to limit his participation in the hearing. We are satisfied 
the statute does not authorize the award of the construction expenses claimed in 
this instance, and the decision of the district court, which affirmed the 
arbitration award, must be reversed and the award set aside. We find no error 
with respect to the other issues that assist in the disposition of this 
appeal.

[¶2]      The State of 
Wyoming, Wyoming Game and Fish Commission (Commission), as appellant in this 
case, summarizes the issues in its brief in this way:

I. Whether the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers by awarding monies for improvements not 
damaged by wildlife.

II. Whether there was 
partiality by an arbitrator related to the claimant, necessitating setting aside 
the award.

III. Whether the 
arbitrator's action in denying the appellant counsel necessitates setting aside 
the award.

Thornock, as 
appellee, describes the issues as follows:

I. The arbitration award 
was for actual damages, and was wholly within the authority of the statutory 
arbitration board. The district court judgment that the arbitrators did not 
exceed their powers in making the award should be affirmed.

A. Wyoming Statutes and 
regulations require payment of actual damages.

B. "Actual damages" are 
compensatory damages.

C. "Actual damages" 
include awards in restitution for unjust enrichment under 
quasi-contract.

D. The state may be 
liable under quasi-contract. 

E. Appellee constructed 
the "game fence" yard at appellant's request and is entitled to restitution 
therefor.

F. Appellee constructed 
the "game fence" yard under duress from appellant and is entitled to restitution 
therefor.

G. The measure of actual 
damages in a restitution award is the value of labor and materials furnished, 
plus interest.

H. Arbitration award of 
actual damages was within the authority of the arbitration board and the 
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.

I. The award does not 
include any award on punitive damages.

II. Appellant has failed 
to prove evident partiality or bias of an arbitrator which prejudiced its 
rights.

III. Appellant waived, by 
implied waiver, its rights to object to arbitrator Birch on the ground of 
partiality or bias, and cannot withdraw such waiver or reclaim its right to 
object.

IV. The arbitration board 
did not prohibit appellant's counsel from participating in the proceeding, and 
the action of the arbitrators did not prejudice the rights of 
appellant.

[¶3]      Thornock owns a 
ranch in Lincoln County. During the summer months, he farms his irrigated land 
and cuts and stores his hay crop in stacks near his fields. Thornock had 
constructed a "cow fence" style of stack yard enclosure which he maintained 
around his haystacks to keep his livestock out of the stored hay.

[¶4]      In 1991, Thornock 
presented several claims to the Wyoming Game and Fish Department (Department) 
for damage to stored hay and fences surrounding the stack yards caused by elk. 
The Department paid $2,795.80 on these claims, and those amounts were accepted 
by Thornock and are not at issue in this case. In addition to his other claims 
for damage to hay and fences, Thornock filed a claim with the Department for the 
cost of certain building materials and the expense of labor in constructing a 
new elk-proof stack yard fence. On April 10, 1991, without any charge to 
Thornock, some materials to be used in constructing this new fence were 
furnished to him by the Department. At the time the materials were delivered to 
Thornock, he was advised it was not the policy of the Department to pay 
construction costs nor to provide material for gates.

[¶5]      Thornock 
proceeded to construct the new stack yard fence designed to keep elk out of the 
hay. He kept track of his costs and, about August 20, 1991, submitted a claim in 
the amount of $1,850.50 to the Department. In that claim, Thornock requested 
that the Department pay the expense of the labor and the cost of the additional 
materials used to build the stack yard fence designed to keep wildlife away from 
his hay. The claim was presented pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 23-1-901 (1991), which 
provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Any landowner, lessee 
or agent whose property is being damaged by any of the big or trophy game 
animals or game birds of this state shall, not later than fifteen (15) days 
after the damage is discovered by the owner of the property or the 
representative of the owner, report the damage to the nearest game warden, 
damage control warden, supervisor or commission member.

(b) Any landowner, lessee 
or agent claiming damages from the state for injury or destruction of property 
by big or trophy game animals or game birds of this state shall present a 
verified claim for the damages to the Wyoming game and fish department not later 
than sixty (60) days after the damage or last item of damage is discovered. The 
claim shall specify the damage and amount claimed. As used in this subsection, 
"verified claim" means a claim which the claimant has signed and sworn to be 
accurate before a person authorized to administer oaths.

[¶6]      In a letter dated 
September 27, 1991, the Department rejected this claim on the ground it was not 
a claim for damages caused by wildlife. Thornock appealed the decision of the 
Department to the Commission, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 23-1-901(c), which 
provides: 

(c) The department shall 
consider the claims based upon a description of the livestock damaged or killed 
by a trophy game animal, the damaged land, growing cultivated crops, stored 
crops, seed crops, improvements and extraordinary damage to grass. Claims shall 
be investigated by the department and rejected or allowed within ninety (90) 
days after submission, and paid in the amount determined to be due. In the event 
the department fails to act within ninety (90) days, the claim, including 
interest based on local bank preferred rates, shall be deemed to have been 
allowed. No award shall be allowed to any landowner who has not permitted 
hunting on his property during authorized hunting seasons. Any person failing to 
comply with any provision of this section is barred from making any claim 
against the department for damages. Any claimant aggrieved by the decision of 
the department may appeal to the commission within thirty (30) days after 
receipt of the decision of the department as provided by rules of practice and 
procedure promulgated by the commission. The commission shall review the 
department decision at its next meeting following receipt of notice of request 
for review. The commission shall review the investigative report of the 
department, and it may approve, modify or reverse the decision of the 
department.

The Commission, 
upon review, rejected the claim for the same reason as the one given by the 
Department, and Thornock was notified of that decision on March 5, 
1992.

[¶7]      On April 17, 
1992, Thornock pursued the statutory claim process by calling for arbitration 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 23-1-901(d). This section of the statute 
provides:

(d) Within ninety (90) 
days after receiving notice of the decision of the commission, the claimant may 
in writing to the department call for arbitration. Within fifteen (15) days 
after the department receives the call for arbitration, the claimant and the 
department shall each appoint a disinterested arbitrator who is an elector 
residing in the county where the damage occurred and notify each other of the 
appointment. Within twenty (20) days after their appointment, the two (2) 
arbitrators shall appoint a third arbitrator possessing the same qualifications. 
If the third arbitrator is not appointed within the time prescribed, the judge 
of the district court of the county or the court commissioner in the absence of 
the judge shall appoint the third arbitrator upon the application of either 
arbitrator.

A panel of three 
arbitrators was selected, which, in accordance with the required notice, heard 
the case on June 29, 1992, in Cokeville. On July 9, 1992, the Commission 
received a decision from the arbitrators, which awarded $850 to Thornock on his 
claim. The arbitration award then was appealed to the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District in Lincoln County by the Commission in accordance with 
Wyo. Stat. § 23-1-901(e). On September 2, 1992, the district court entered its 
order denying the petition to vacate the arbitration award and confirming the 
award. The Commission has taken a timely appeal from that order.2

[¶8]      In his brief in 
this appeal, Thornock has asserted a plethora of facts, without including 
any page references to the record as required by Wyo.R.App.P. 5.01(3), 
now found in Wyo.R.App.P. 7.01(e)(2). The Commission has complied with this 
rule, because references to the record are encompassed in its Statement of the 
Facts. In order to provide a factual background to address the legal issues, we 
have relied upon the version of the proceedings in this case that the Commission 
has articulated in its Statement of the Case. Thornock failed to include such a 
section in his Brief of Appellee. Still, the only fact we can verify 
conclusively from the record is that Thornock is a rancher in Lincoln County. 
The record does not permit us to verify the remainder of the facts for accuracy 
or validity, and it totally fails to support the facts set forth by Thornock in 
his brief. 

[¶9]      We have 
admonished members of the Bar and cautioned them with respect to the necessity 
of complying with Wyo.R.App.P. 5.01(3), now Wyo.R.App.P. 7.01(e)(2), on numerous 
occasions, iterating the last such comment quite recently. See Coones v. Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp., 848 P.2d 783 (Wyo. 1993); Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc. v. 
Baker Hughes Tubular Services, Inc., 812 P.2d 555 (Wyo. 1991); Jung-Leonczynska 
v. Steup, 782 P.2d 578 (Wyo. 1989), appeal after remand, 803 P.2d 1358 (Wyo. 
1990); V-1 Oil Co. v. Ranck, 767 P.2d 612 (Wyo. 1989). The Commission has not 
requested any sanction in this case because of Thornock's non-compliance with 
the rule, and we choose not to impose any. This record is brief, and it does 
contain the information requisite to address the dispositive legal question in 
this case. We renew our admonition to members of the Bar, however, and suggest 
that, had the State requested that we refuse to consider Thornock's contentions, 
we would have been justified in so doing.

[¶10]   In Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. 
Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1993), we had occasion to 
consider the thrust of Wyo. Stat. § 23-1-901. We there summarized our approach 
to interpretation of this statute in this way:

We read the text of the 
statute and pay attention to its internal structure and the functional relation 
between the parts and the whole. We make the determinations as to meaning, that 
is, whether the statute's meaning is subject to varying interpretations. If we 
determine that the meaning is not subject to varying interpretations, that may 
end the exercise, although we may resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation, 
such as legislative history if available and rules of construction, to confirm 
the determination. On the other hand, if we determine that the meaning is 
subject to varying interpretations, we must resort to available extrinsic aids. 
If an ambiguous statute has been construed by an agency charged with 
administering it, we will accord deference to, but are not bound by, that 
construction. After all, the final construction of an ambiguous statute is a 
question for the court.

Parker, 845 P.2d  
at 1045. See also Sheridan Commercial Park, Inc. v. Briggs, 848 P.2d 811 (Wyo. 
1993).

We held that the 
statute is not ambiguous. When the language in a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, the words are to be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning 
unless there is found some manifestation of a legislative intent that they not 
be accorded that plain and ordinary meaning. Jackson State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093 (Wyo. 1993); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 
1988).

[¶11]   The contention of the Commission is 
that the award made by the arbitrators to Thornock should be set aside because 
the arbitrators exceeded their authority by compensating him for construction of 
the stack yard fence. Wyo. Stat. § 23-1-901(e) cross-references provisions of 
the Uniform Arbitration Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-36-101 to -119 (1988). Through case 
law analysis, the Commission relies indirectly upon Wyo. Stat. § 
1-36-114(a)(iii), which provides:

(a) Upon application of a 
party the court shall vacate an award where:

* * * * * *

(iii) The arbitrators 
exceeded their powers * * *.

The Commission 
also contends the arbitrators have no greater power than the authority conferred 
by Wyo. Stat. § 23-1-901(d), which limits their power to the arbitration of 
damage claims presented under the statute. The Commission's position is 
correct.

[¶12]   The Commission cites rules and 
regulations it has promulgated, which define damage in this way:

"Damage" as used in W.S. 
23-1-901 means actual damage as proved to have occurred by the claimant, to 
livestock, land, crops, improvements, and extraordinary grass damage, and shall 
not include any amount for punitive damages under any circumstances.

Regulations of 
Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, Ch. XXVIII, Regulation Governing Big or Trophy 
Game Animals or Game Bird Damage Claims, § 3(c) (1985). Thornock argues that the 
damages the arbitrators awarded constitute compensatory damages for his fencing, 
and he is entitled to have the award pursuant to a quasi-contract theory, a 
restitution theory, or a theory of duress. These arguments quite obviously go 
far beyond the language of the statute.

[¶13]   The statutory language authorizing 
such claims states specifically that damage to property by wildlife will be 
compensated. It does not allude to the expenses of constructing a fence as a 
measure to avoid further damage. Thornock even concedes in his brief that 
"[a]lthough that statute [Wyo. Stat. § 23-1-302] does not specifically empower 
the Commission to contract for fence construction, it does give the Commission 
broad and pervasive powers and authority to enter into contracts in which fence 
construction would ordinarily be a minor part * * *." We previously have alluded 
to the rule that when the language in a statute is plain and unambiguous, as it 
is here, those words are to be given the plain and ordinary meaning. It is clear 
the arbitrators exceeded their authority when they compensated Thornock for the 
construction of the stack yard fence. That expense is not a claim for damage 
within the statute.

[¶14]   Collateral issues appear relating 
to the selection of an arbitrator whose brother was married either to Thornock's 
sister or to Thornock's wife's sister and the hostility of spectators at the 
arbitration hearing that resulted in the limitation of his participation in the 
arbitration hearing by counsel for the Commission. The Commission relies upon 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-36-114(a)(ii) as authority to support its argument to vacate the 
award. That provision states:

(a) Upon application of a 
party the court shall vacate an award where:

* * * * * 
*

(ii) There was evident 
partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption of any of the 
arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party * * *.

This provision 
assumes there is a demonstration of partiality or corruption or misconduct which 
resulted in prejudice to the rights of a party. The contention of the Commission 
is that the appointment of an arbitrator who in some manner was related to 
Thornock's wife or sister was prejudicial. Beyond that, there is nothing to 
demonstrate, nor does the Commission point out, any evidence of partiality by a 
neutral arbitrator, corruption, or misconduct.

[¶15]   We are not persuaded that the 
argument by the Commission demonstrates any prejudice to either party because of 
the relationship suggested. Furthermore, we find nothing in the record 
suggesting any actual prejudice. The reasoning of the district court is 
persuasive:

Considering the grounds 
for vacation of an arbitration award contained in the statute to which reference 
has been made, it is clear that there is nothing in the record indicating that 
because one of the arbitrator's was related to the Claimant by marriage that 
either this arbitrator or the other arbitrators were corrupt. It does not appear 
that the award was obtained by fraud or other undue means.

The record does not 
reflect evidence partiality by any of the arbitrators. The record does not 
reflect misconduct by any of the arbitrators. The record only reflects that one 
of the arbitrators had a brother who was married to J.R. Thornock's sister. 
Without further evidence, this kind of marriage relationship is neutral. It is 
just as reasonable for the Court to assume that someone would disfavor his 
shirttail relatives as it is to assume that he or she would favor their 
shirttail relatives.

There is no 
error here, although it would seem appropriate for the neutral arbitrator, 
selected under the statute, always to disclose any relationship that might raise 
concern. Obviously, in view of our disposition of the case, the composition of 
the Board of Arbitration is not material to the case.

[¶16]   With respect to the claim that the 
hostility of the spectators caused counsel for the Commission to limit his 
participation in the arbitration hearing, we find this contention difficult, if 
not impossible, to evaluate. The quality of the transcription of the arbitration 
proceedings does not permit us to either verify or refute the contentions of the 
Commission. The transcript was prepared from a tape recording, and often the 
speaker is not identified. Consequently, we cannot determine the extent of the 
participation of counsel for the Commission. We can only conclude counsel was 
present and did participate in the arbitration proceedings. We do not know the 
extent of that participation, but we assume counsel fulfilled his obligation to 
his client. Since we are unable to discern a violation of the rights of the 
parties, particularly with respect to the right to counsel, we conclude that no 
error exists with respect to this collateral issue.

[¶17]   In any event, the issues lose their 
import in view of the decision that the statute does not authorize the award of 
construction expenses claimed by Thornock. The decision of the district court 
affirming the arbitration award is reversed and the arbitration award is set 
aside.

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶18]   I would affirm the decision of the 
arbitrators and the district court and, therefore, dissent.

[¶19]   In this case, each year appellee 
sustained damage by elk to stored hay. Appellee's stored hay was protected by a 
cow fence that was insufficient to keep elk out of the hay. This fence was 
damaged by elk in gaining entry to the hay stacks. The Game and Fish Department 
suggested that appellee replace the damaged cow fence with a more substantial 
game fence and supplied, without charge, material to construct this game fence. 
Appellee furnished some additional material which, together with the material 
furnished by Game and Fish and his labor, was used to repair, replace and 
reconstruct his fence. He then submitted a bill to Game and Fish for his labor 
and cost of the additional material he supplied in the amount of 
$1,850.50.

[¶20]   Game and Fish denied his claim of 
$1,850.50. Arbitrators were appointed pursuant to the rules for appointment of 
arbitrators, and a hearing was held at which testimony and evidence were 
received. Appellee was awarded damages of $850 by the arbitrators. The existing 
fence was replaced by a more substantial game fence at the request of Game and 
Fish. It is only fair and just that, having complied with that request, he be 
awarded at least the value of material he supplied and for the damage to his cow 
fence which was repaired and made into a more substantial game 
fence.

[¶21]   I would hold that the award was for 
damages to his cow fence and was proper as a matter of law. I would affirm the 
decision of the district court.

FOOTNOTES

1 A factual discrepancy 
exists with respect to the relationship. The State asserts that the arbitrator's 
brother was married to Mr. Thornock's sister. Mr. Thornock, on the other hand, 
contends that the arbitrator's brother is married to the sister of Mr. 
Thornock's wife. The disposition of the case does not depend upon a 
determination as to which version is correct.

2 There is no transcript 
of the proceedings in the district court in the record on appeal. However, there 
is a transcript from the arbitration proceedings.