Case Title: Buhler v. People

Citation: 377 P.2d 748

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1963-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
377 P.2d 748 (1963) Patricia Ann BUHLER, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 20146. Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc. January 14, 1963. Caddes & Capra, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., J. F. Brauer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error. HALL, Justice. On February 7, 1961, the plaintiff in error, to whom we shall refer as Patricia, was named as defendant in an information filed in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, under C.R.S. '53, 60-1-13 (Cum.Supp.), wherein she is charged (in Criminal Action No. 47983) with the crime of forgery committed in the State of Illinois. The crime is alleged to have been committed on September 7, 1960. Patricia was arrested on February 7, 1961, pursuant to criminal capias issued in said action, and released on bond for appearance. *749 On March 3, 1961, there was filed in said case: On May 12, 1961, Patricia filed her petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the above mentioned "Criminal Action No. 47983," in which she appears as petitioner and the Sheriff of the City and County of Denver is named as respondent, wherein she asserts that the warrant for her arrest and surrender to authorities of Illinois, issued and directed by the Governor of Colorado, are in direct violation of C.R.S. '53, 60-1-3 (Cum.Supp.), illegal and void, and she is being unlawfully restrained of her liberty by the respondent. The respondent made no answer to this petition; however, it appears that the district attorney filed his answer thereto, putting in issue many matters that were fully established by documents filed by him in the case. Hearing was had on the issues made up by the petition and answer, the writ of habeas corpus was denied, and Patricia remanded to the custody of the sheriff to be released to the Illinois authorities for return to that state. Petitioner is here by writ of error seeking reversal. Petitioner specifies numerous reasons, many clearly without merit, why the extradition proceedings are void and the judgment erroneous. We need not pass on all of these alleged errors. One reason advanced is that the "complaint and affidavit" filed in the justice court in Illinois does not charge an offense under the revised statutes of the State of Illinois. With this contention we are in accord. C.R.S. '53, 60-1-3 (1960 Cum.Supp.) provides: *750 As pointed out above, there is attached to the demand of the Governor of Illinois a duly authenticated copy of the "complaint and affidavit" made before a magistrate in Illinois, together with a duly authenticated copy of the criminal statutes of Illinois governing the crime of forgery, including the aforementioned Section 277, Chapter 38, thereof. This statute provides that one who forges the name of another: Clearly, the mere signing of another's name to a document is no offense under that statute, and this is all that Patricia is charged with doingshe is not charged with delivering the document or acting with intent to damage or defraud anyone. More important than the act of signing is the intent and purpose in signing and what use is made of the false document. In 37 C.J.S. Forgery, § 4, p. 34, it is said: And at § 49: The Illinois statute does not dispense with, nor is it silent as to intent, but expressly makes "intent to damage or defraud" a necessary element to constitute an offense. The complaint against Patricia fails to state any offense. Such being the case, it was the duty of the Governor of Colorado to deny the demand of Illinois, as provided by C.R.S. '53, 60-1-3 (Cum.Supp.), supra. To recognize the demand of Illinois the Governor of Colorado had to determine from the documents before him: (1) that Patricia was substantially charged with having committed a crime in Illinoisa question of law; and (2) that she was in Illinois at the time of the commission of the alleged crimea question of fact. In 22 Am.Jur. 259, Extradition, § 21, it is said: From the papers presented by Illinois to Colorado it was not made to appear to the Governor of Colorado that the accused was "substantially charged with having committed a crime in Illinois." In People v. Fore, 384 Ill. 455, 51 N.E.2d 548, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois had before it for review a judgment and sentence entered after a plea of guilty to the crime of forgery, as defined by Section 277, Chapter 38 of the Illinois statute the same statute that we have before us in this case. In holding the indictment did not charge an offense and that the judgment and sentence are without legal basis, that court stated: "* * * To constitute the offense of forgery at common law and under section 105 of division I of the Criminal Code, Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, c. 38, § 277, there must be a false writing or alteration of an instrument, the instrument as written must be apparently capable of defrauding, and there must be an intent to defraud. * * * Falsely signing another's name to an instrument without intent to defraud or deceive someone does not constitute the crime of forgery. * * * Since intent to defraud is an essential element of the offense of forgery, an indictment which fails to charge fraudulent intent is fatally defective. * * * Here, the indictment neither charges a general intent *751 to defraud and prejudice nor a specific intent to defraud and prejudice a particular person. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in Cassis v. Fair, 126 W.Va. 557, 29 S.E.2d 245, 151 A.L.R. 233, had before it for review an order discharging from custody an accused held under a warrant issued by the Governor of West Virginia in extradition proceedings initiated by the State of Ohio. In affirming the order of discharge the court, among other things, said: Holding, as we do, that the record before us does not show Patricia to be charged with any offense in Illinois, the recognition of extradition by the Governor of Colorado and the warrant for arrest issued pursuant thereto are within the inhibitions imposed by C.R.S. '53, 60-1-3 (Cum.Supp.) and without authority of law. We again call to the attention of members of the bench and bar that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding, and that a defendant in a criminal case seeking the writ should file a civil suit wherein he appears as petitioner and the person restraining him is named as respondent. Oates v. People, 136 Colo. 208, 315 P.2d 196. Here, a new party, the sheriff, was injected into the criminal case and the People omitted. Such procedure finds no sanction in the substantive or procedural laws of Colorado. The judgment discharging the writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to make the writ permanent and order the immediate release of Patricia from the custody of respondent.