Case Title: Reardon v. King

Citation: 

Docket Number: 114937

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2019-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 114,937 
 
KEVIN E. REARDON, Special Administrator,  
for the Estate of 
MARILYN K. PARSONS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JON M. KING, 
Defendant, 
and 
THE TRUST COMPANY OF KANSAS,  
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
In Kansas, an employer owes a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances to 
prevent harm to third parties caused by its employees when those employees are acting 
within the scope of their employment. More particularized articulations of this duty are 
disapproved. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed March 17, 2017. 
Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; DAVID J. KING, judge. Opinion filed November 15, 2019. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is 
reversed and the case is remanded with directions. 
 
Rachel N. Wetta, of Foulston Siefkin LLP, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Darrell L. Warta, of 
the same firm, was with her on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Michael P. Crow, of Crow & Associates, of Leavenworth, argued the cause, and Peter C. 
Robertson and Dan Heinz, of the same firm, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
STEGALL, J.:  The Trust Company of Kansas (TCK) employed Jon M. King, a 
Kansas-licensed attorney, as a trust officer. TCK had a policy prohibiting employees 
from practicing law during employment. Unbeknownst to TCK, King represented his 
TCK client—Marilyn K. Parsons—in legal matters before, during, and after his 
employment with TCK. In his capacity as a trust officer, King would transfer funds from 
Parsons' TCK account to her personal account to pay a flat rate legal fee of $5,000 per 
month. Once TCK learned about King's attorney-client relationship with Parsons, TCK 
filed a complaint of suspected elder abuse with the Kansas Department of Social and 
Rehabilitation Services and an ethics complaint with the Kansas Disciplinary 
Administrator's Office.  
 
Further investigation by the Kansas Disciplinary Administrator's Office revealed 
that Parsons paid King approximately $250,271.50 in attorney fees during his 
employment at TCK. As a result, King voluntarily surrendered his license to practice law. 
See In re King, 297 Kan. 208, 300 P.3d 643 (2013). Soon after, Parsons filed a lawsuit 
against TCK and King, asserting various theories of liability. The case went to trial, and a 
jury found TCK liable for "negligent training" and King liable for breach of fiduciary 
duty. The Court of Appeals reversed the jury's verdict against TCK, finding the evidence 
insufficient. Accordingly, the panel remanded the case with instructions to enter 
judgment as a matter of law in favor of TCK.  
 
On review, we conclude the district court's instructions failed to present the jury 
with an accurate statement of our negligence law and incorrectly separated Parsons' 
negligence claim against TCK into two causes of action. As a result of these errors, 
questions of fact remain. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this matter for a 
new trial decided on proper instructions.  
 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
At this stage of the litigation, the key facts are procedural and they are not in 
dispute. Parsons sued TCK and King seeking $250,271.50 in damages plus an additional 
$12,111.99 for loss of income and loss of investment appreciation. After Parsons 
amended her complaint several times and each party filed multiple pretrial 
questionnaires, the district court issued a pretrial order describing three separate claims 
against TCK:  "(1) breach of contract, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) failure to 
properly supervise its employee, Jon King."  
 
The case proceeded to a four-day jury trial. At the close of Parsons' case-in-chief, 
TCK moved for judgment as a matter of law on all claims against TCK. After hearing 
oral argument, the court granted TCK's motion for judgment as a matter of law on part of 
Parsons' breach of contract claim. The court then summarized Parsons' remaining claims 
as follows:   
 
"What I have is—is the—the claims that plaintiff has asserted against TCK that survived 
is their breach of contract claim, partially, one of their specifications of breach of 
contract, I've ruled that there's not evidence to support there was a breach.  
 
"[S]o, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent representation, and 
negligent supervision."  
 
 
The district court proceeded to finalize its jury instructions and verdict form. The 
instructions included a claim of "negligent supervision and training" against TCK:   
 
 
 
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"INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
 
"Negligent supervision and training claim against Trust Company of Kansas 
 
"The plaintiff, Marilyn Kay Parsons, claims the defendant, Trust Company of 
Kansas, failed to adequately supervise and train Jon M. King by the following: 
 
"(1) Failing to train and orient Jon M. King that he was prohibited from practicing 
law for TCK clients while employed by TCK 
 
"(2) Failing to provide training regarding TCK company policies 
 
"(3) Failing to provide training regarding fiduciary duties to TCK clients 
 
"(4) Failing to verify that Jon M. King did not engage in the private practice of law 
while employed by TCK 
 
"The plaintiff must prove her claim for negligent supervision and training by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
 
"In response to this claim, the defendant, Trust Company of Kansas, denies that it 
failed to adequately supervise and train Jon M. King. It maintains that plaintiff's losses 
are not attributable to any failure of training and supervision on its part, but rather to the 
intentional wrongful acts of Jon M. King, of which it was not aware." 
 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
 
"Negligent supervision and training 
 
"In considering the plaintiff's claim against Trust Company of Kansas for 
negligent supervision and training, you should consider the following: 
 
"1. An employer has a duty to supervise an employee it knows, or has reason to 
know, is unfit to undertake the responsibilities of his or her employment. 
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"2. Negligent supervision entails either inadequate oversight and review of an 
employee in the performance of his or her job duties or failing to control an employee 
with propensities that might pose a danger. 
 
"3. A claim based on negligent training depends upon establishing facts showing 
that more or better training would have prevented the harm. 
 
"The plaintiff must prove her claim for negligent supervision and training by a 
preponderance of the evidence." 
 
 
But the verdict form separated the "claims" of negligent supervision and negligent 
training into two distinct causes of action:   
 
"PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT TRUST COMPANY OF KANSAS 
 
. . . . 
 
"10. 
Do you find that plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant Trust Company of Kansas negligently failed to supervise Jon M. 
King? . . . 
 
"11. 
Do you find that plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant Trust Company of Kansas negligently failed to train Jon M. King?"  
 
 
TCK then questioned the instructions and informed the court that "[t]he claim 
against us was stated negligent supervision and training claim. There was 'and' it was one 
claim with both supervision and training." But the court explained the separation was 
intentional because negligent supervision and negligent training had "different 
standard[s]." After this explanation, TCK had no further objection.  
 
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These instructions, along with the verdict form, were given to the jury. In the end, 
the case submitted to the jury included five claims against TCK:  (1) breach of contract; 
(2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) negligent failure to 
supervise King; and (5) negligent failure to train King.  
 
Ultimately, the jury found TCK liable for negligent training and King liable for 
breach of fiduciary duties. The jury returned a defendant's verdict on the remainder of 
Parsons' claims against TCK and King. The jury awarded damages of $125,135.75 plus 
interest of $6,055.99—half the amount claimed—jointly and severally against TCK and 
King.  
 
 
TCK timely filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the 
alternative, a new trial. The district court denied the motion and TCK timely appealed. 
King did not appeal the jury's finding against him for breach of fiduciary duty, and 
Parsons did not cross-appeal.  
 
 
At the Court of Appeals, TCK argued:  (1) there was insufficient evidence to 
support the verdict; (2) the district court should have granted its motion for judgment as a 
matter of law; and (3) the jury instructions on Parsons' negligence claims were erroneous. 
Parsons v. King, No. 114,937, 2017 WL 1035190, at *1 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished 
opinion). The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions for the district 
court to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of TCK. 2017 WL 1035190, at *5. 
The panel found the evidence could not support the jury verdict for negligent failure to 
train even when considering all the facts and inferences that could reasonably be drawn in 
Parsons' favor. 2017 WL 1035190, at *4. According to the panel, the evidence failed to 
show more or better training would have prevented Parsons' loss and that it "rather . . . 
focused on whether TCK adequately supervised King." 2017 WL 1035190, at *4.  
 
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Parsons filed a petition for review arguing the Court of Appeals erred by finding 
TCK was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Parsons' negligence claim. TCK 
responded to Parsons' petition, asking us to consider the district court's jury instructions 
on Parsons' negligence claim or claims. We granted Parsons' petition and review TCK's 
issue raised in its response to provide guidance on remand. See Supreme Court Rule 
8.03(c)(3) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 55) ("In a civil case, the response also may present for 
review adverse rulings or decisions of the district court that should be considered by the 
Supreme Court in the event of a new trial, provided that the respondent raised the issues 
in the Court of Appeals."); see also Puckett v. Mt. Carmel Regional Medical Center, 290 
Kan. 406, 443, 228 P.3d 1048 (2010) (reviewing an issue raised in a response to petition 
for review under Supreme Court Rule 8.03[c][3]).  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
We take the unusual step of beginning with our conclusion. In short, we agree with 
both parties. The trial court's jury instructions on Parsons' negligence claim were 
erroneous. And as a direct result of this error, the Court of Appeals erred in granting 
judgment as a matter of law in favor of TCK. The instructions and verdict form in this 
case were so erroneous that an after-the-fact evaluation of the evidence is not possible. 
The jury instructions did not adequately or accurately explain the elements of Parsons' 
negligence claim. This prevented the jury from ever being able to consider whether 
Parsons had sufficiently proven each of the elements of the claim. Given this failure, any 
review of the evidence for sufficiency became futile and the case must now be returned to 
the district court for a new trial on proper instructions.  
 
 
The proper place to begin our analysis is with the jury instructions. When 
reviewing jury instruction issues, we follow a three step process to determine:  
(1) whether the issue is reviewable; (2) whether any error occurred; and (3) whether the 
error requires reversal. Siruta v. Siruta, 301 Kan. 757, 771, 348 P.3d 549 (2015). 
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The first and third steps are related because the standard for determining whether 
an error requires reversal depends on whether the party preserved the issue. 301 Kan. at 
771. TCK failed to object to the district court's jury instruction and verdict form with 
respect to Parsons' claim of negligent supervision and negligent training. When an 
alleged instruction error was not objected to below we still review whether the instruction 
was legally and factually appropriate, but will reverse only for "clear error." 301 Kan. at 
772 ("'"An instruction is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court reaches a firm 
conviction that if the trial error had not occurred there was a real possibility that the jury 
would have returned a different verdict."'"). 
  
When conducting an error analysis, we must determine whether the instructions 
were legally and factually appropriate. 301 Kan. at 775. We consider the instructions as a 
whole and review whether the instructions "'properly and fairly stated the law as applied 
to the facts of the case and could not have reasonably misled the jury.'" 301 Kan. at 775 
(quoting State v. Horton, 300 Kan. 477, 491, 331 P.3d 752 [2014]). For an instruction to 
be legally appropriate, it must fairly and accurately communicate the applicable law to 
the jury. Castleberry v. DeBrot, 308 Kan. 791, 802, 424 P.3d 495 (2018). Thus, 
determining whether the instructions in this case were legally appropriate require us to 
review the law applicable to a negligence cause of action.  
 
In its simplest form, a negligence claim requires a plaintiff to prove four essential 
elements:  (1) defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) defendant breached that duty; 
(3) plaintiff's injuries were caused by the defendant's breach; and (4) plaintiff suffered 
damages. Patterson v. Cowley County, Kansas, 307 Kan. 616, 622, 413 P.3d 432 (2018).  
 
The first of these elements—the existence of a duty—is actually a question of law 
rather than one of fact. Siruta, 301 Kan. at 766-67. Because the existence of a duty is a 
question of law, the court must decide whether a duty exists and how to articulate that 
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duty. Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick, The Law of Torts § 164 (2d ed. 2019). Thus, one of the 
crucial jury instructions in any negligence cause of action must be the trial court's 
articulation of the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. If this instruction is wrong 
or misleading, the jury will be incapable of performing its fact-finding role in 
determining the existence (or lack thereof) of the latter three elements.  
 
Here, Parsons asserted a negligence claim against TCK as an employer. Although 
this claim involves the conduct of TCK's employee and alleged harm to a third person, 
the cause of action seeks to impose direct liability on TCK for its allegedly negligent acts 
causing the harm, not for any negligence or fault on the part of the employee. As a 
general rule, in the absence of a "special relationship" a defendant does not owe a duty to 
third parties. C.J.W. v. State, 253 Kan. 1, 7-8, 853 P.2d 4 (1993). Kansas common law, 
however, recognizes a "special relationship" between employers and third parties who 
come into contact with their employees. See, e.g., Kansas State Bank & Tr. Co. v. 
Specialized Transportation Services, Inc., 249 Kan. 348, 362, 819 P.2d 587 (1991). This 
relationship creates a legal duty owed to the third party by the employer. But how is this 
duty defined by Kansas law and how should it be explained to a jury? 
 
A review of our caselaw makes it clear that an employer owes a duty of reasonable 
care under the circumstances to prevent harm to third parties caused by its employees 
when those employees are acting within the scope of their employment. See, e.g., Kansas 
State Bank & Tr. Co., 249 Kan. at 362 (explaining that liability results from the employer 
having "reason to believe that an undue risk of harm to others would exist as a result of 
the employment of the alleged tortfeasor"); Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 235 Kan. 
580, 590, 682 P.2d 653 (1984) ("an employer has a duty to use reasonable care in the 
selection and retention of employees"); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts § 41, 
comment c (2012) ("The duty . . . is to exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances."). 
 
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By defining an employer's duty as one of "reasonable care," we reserve the 
question of what specific acts constitute "reasonable care" in any of the infinite factual 
circumstances that could exist to the second element of a negligence claim—breach of 
the duty. And determining whether a legal duty was breached is a question of fact for the 
jury.  
 
We acknowledge that there has been a trend in recent years toward defining the 
legal duty owed in negligence cases in ever narrower and more particularized ways. This 
can have the deleterious effect of taking the fact question of breach away from the jury 
"under the guise of deciding the question of 'duty' in its primary sense." Goldberg & 
Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 Vand. L. 
Rev. 657, 713 (2001). Particularized duties tend to sneak conclusions about the facts of 
particular cases into what are intended to be general standards. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 
§ 226 (2000). But duty rules are not meant to be fact specific. Rather, they are to set 
broadly applicable guidelines for public behavior. Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58 
Vand. L. Rev. 739, 754 (2005). Otherwise, the line between the first and second elements 
of a negligence claim—duty and breach—are blurred. 
 
Today's case is a good example of that trend. The instructions told the jury below 
that TCK had specific, discrete duties "to train" and "to supervise." But this misstates 
Kansas law. Employers in Kansas do not have a duty to third parties to train or to 
supervise their employees. They have a duty to exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances. A failure to either train or to supervise may (or may not) constitute a 
breach of that duty—just as other specific facts may (or may not) constitute a breach. But 
these are fact questions properly belonging to the second element of the negligence claim, 
not the first. 
 
 
The Supreme Court of Illinois helpfully confronted this unfortunate trend in 
Marshall v. Burger King Corporation, 222 Ill. 2d 422, 856 N.E.2d 1048 (2006). There, 
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the plaintiff had filed a negligence action against Burger King due to the death of his son. 
The decedent was killed when a car crashed through the window of the Burger King 
restaurant where the decedent was eating. Plaintiff alleged that Burger King and Davekiz, 
Inc.—Burger King's franchisee—were negligent for failing to place safety barriers such 
as vertical concrete pillars or poles in front of the restaurant. This, they argued, would 
have prevented Fritz' car from coming through the window and killing the decedent. 
Defendants moved to dismiss arguing they owed no duty to protect the decedent from the 
injury caused by Fritz' car. The trial court granted the motion holding there was no duty 
owed by the defendants to place barriers in front of their restaurant. The court reasoned 
that, given the likelihood of such an accident happening was minor, recognizing a duty 
for all restaurant owners to construct such barriers was impractical. Marshall, 222 Ill.2d 
at 427.  
 
Ultimately, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial court. 222 Ill.2d at 425. In 
doing so, the court observed that by advocating for a particularized statement of duty, 
Burger King and the other defendants were  
 
"actually requesting that we determine, as a matter of law, that they did not breach their 
duty of care. It is inadvisable for courts to conflate the concepts of duty and breach in this 
manner. Courts could, after all, 'state an infinite number of duties if they spoke in highly 
particular terms,' and while particularized statements of duty may be comprehensible, 
'they use the term duty to state conclusions about the facts of particular cases, not as a 
general standard.' 1 D. Dobbs, Torts § 226, at 577 (2001); see also 54 Vand. L. Rev. at 
712-17 (discussing problems associated with using the duty element of negligence to 
render decisions that no breach occurred as a matter of law). Thus, the issue in this case is 
not whether defendants had a duty to install protective poles, or a duty to prevent a car 
from entering the restaurant, or some such other fact-specific formulation. Because of the 
special relationship between defendants and the decedent, they owed the decedent a duty 
of reasonable care. The issue is whether, in light of the particular circumstances of this 
case, defendants breached that duty. That question cannot be answered at this stage of the  
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proceedings. See Espinoza, 165 Ill.2d at 114 (issue of breach is for jury to decide 
provided there is genuine issue of material fact regarding that issue)." 222 Ill.2d at 443-
44. 
 
We find this discussion instructive and adopt the same posture toward today's 
case. Like the trial court in Marshall, the trial court here constructed a definition of 
TCK's duty so fact specific that on review by the Court of Appeals, the line between duty 
and breach disappeared. In other words, the duty was defined with such particularity that 
on review, the Court of Appeals determined that there was no evidence of breach.  
 
Instructing the jury on a "duty to supervise" or a "duty to train" is analogous to 
instructing a jury that Burger King has a duty to install concrete barriers outside its 
restaurants. Rather than providing the jury with a standard against which it could judge 
TCK's actions, the instructions described allegations which, if proven, might constitute a 
breach of TCK's reasonable care duty. The breach element of Parsons' negligence claim 
concerns the factual question of whether TCK took reasonable steps, in light of the 
foreseeable probability and magnitude of any harm, to prevent harm. See Restatement 
(Third) of Torts:  Physical & Emotional Harm § 41, comment e (2012). To fulfill its duty 
of reasonable care to protect Parsons against risks posed by King, TCK did not 
necessarily have to supervise or train King. A jury might find that, through other actions, 
TCK did fulfill its duty of reasonable care. Or alternatively, the jury might decide that 
some act or omission by TCK falling outside the categories of "train" or "supervise" 
amounted to a breach of its duty of reasonable care. This determination, however, should 
be left to the jury.  
 
The instructions, combined with the verdict form, likewise erroneously created 
two negligence causes of action where only one existed. By separating negligent 
supervision and negligent training into two separate claims the jury was left to assume 
that an employer owes two separate legal duties to a third party:  (1) a duty to supervise 
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its employees and (2) a duty to train its employees. Negligence causes of action, 
however, are wholly derivative of the duty owed by the defendant. See Boulanger v. Pol, 
258 Kan. 289, 296-97, 900 P.2d 823 (1995) ("'In Kansas it is a fundamental rule 
actionable negligence must be based on a breach of duty.'"). And in Kansas, an employer 
owes third parties a single duty of reasonable care, as we have described.  
 
While an employer's practices when hiring, training, and supervising its employees 
may be evidence of a breach of an employer's duty of reasonable care to third parties, 
they are not separate causes of action. Here, TCK only owed Parsons one duty—the duty 
to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent Parsons or any other 
customer from being harmed by its employees. And with only one duty recognized, only 
one cause of action for breach existed. To the extent our prior caselaw contributed to this 
confusion by using terms like "negligent supervision" or "negligent training," we make 
the conscientious decision today to move away from such characterizations of the 
anatomy of a negligence claim in Kansas.  
 
We have concluded the jury instructions erred:  (1) by failing to properly state the 
legal duty owed by TCK to Parsons; and (2) by separating Parsons' negligent claim into 
two separate causes of action. Now we must determine whether these errors were 
harmless or whether they require reversal. Because TCK failed to object to the 
instructions at trial, we will reverse only for clear error. Siruta, 301 Kan. at 772. "'"An 
instruction is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court reaches a firm conviction that if 
the trial error had not occurred there was a real possibility that the jury would have 
returned a different verdict."'" Siruta, 301 Kan. at 772 (quoting Hawkinson v. Bennett, 
265 Kan. 564, 581, 962 P.2d 445 [1998]). In other words, if we are firmly convinced that 
the legally inappropriate definition of negligence affected the verdict, we must reverse. 
See Siruta, 301 Kan. at 780; State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 516, 286 P.3d 195 (2012). 
 
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This case is unique in that the effect of the error on the verdict did not become 
clear until the Court of Appeals reviewed the verdict. After all, Parsons won at trial. But 
due to the defects in the instructions, the verdict was infirm on appeal. In fact, the verdict 
was flawed at the outset because the jury found TCK liable for breaching a duty that does 
not exist. 
 
Had the jury been properly instructed, any jury verdict in favor of Parsons on her 
negligence claim would likely have survived a sufficiency challenge. It was only because 
the jury was factually cramped by the erroneous instructions that the Court of Appeals 
was able to reach its conclusion of insufficient evidence. We do not know whether a 
properly instructed jury would return a verdict in favor of Parsons. But we are firmly 
convinced that the legal errors we have identified with the instructions did affect the 
verdict. Therefore, we must reverse and remand for a new trial on legally appropriate 
instructions.  
 
Reversed and remanded with directions.  
 
 
BEIER and JOHNSON, JJ., not participating.1 
 
DAVID WILLIAM ROGERS, District Judge, assigned.2  
                                                          
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Justice Johnson heard oral arguments but did not participate in 
the final decision in case No. 114,937. Justice Johnson retired effective September 6, 
2019.  
2REPORTER'S NOTE:  District Judge Rogers was appointed to hear case No. 114,937 
vice Justice Beier under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) of the 
Kansas Constitution.