Case Title: WHITEHAWK v CLARK

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-582

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1989-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 88-582 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 9 PHIL WHITEHAWK and CONNIE BELLET, Plaintiffs and Appellants, -VS- STAN CLARK, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, In and for the County of Park, The Honorable Byron Robb, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Karl Knuchel, Livingston, Montana For Respondent: J. Robert Planalp, Landoe, Brown, Planalp and Kommers, Bozeman, Montana Filed: Submitted on Briefs: April 27, 1 9 8 9 Decided: June 29, 1989 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f s , P h i l Whitehawk and Connie B e l l e t (Whitehawks), appeal from a jury v e r d i c t rendered i n t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Park County, t h e Honorable Byron L. Robb p r e s i d i n g , i n f a v o r o f t h e defendant, Stan Clark. P l a i n t i f f s i n i t i a t e d t h e a c t i o n seeking t o recover damages f o r t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f personal property. W e r e v e r s e and remand f o r a new t r i a l . The Whitehawks r e n t e d a l o g c a b i n and f o u r o u t b u i l d i n g s l o c a t e d near W i l s a l l , Montana, from t h e defendant Stan Clark. The Whitehawks r e s i d e d i n t h e c a b i n and used t h e o u t b u i l d i n g s t o s t o r e v a r i o u s p e r s o n a l i t e m s , i n c l u d i n g a r t work, musical instruments, musical recordings and h i s t o r i c a l documents. Much o f t h e m a t e r i a l s t o r e d i n t h e o u t b u i l d i n g s w e r e used i n connection w i t h t h e Whitehawks' musical performances e n t i t l e d " I n s p i r a d a Americana." On A p r i l 28, 1985, Duane Clark, son o f t h e defendant, began burning d i t c h e s on t h e family ranch s o u t h e a s t o f t h e p r o p e r t y r e n t e d by t h e Whitehawks. I n t h e e a r l y evening hours, a s l i g h t b r e e z e caused t h e f i r e t o move o u t o f t h e d i t c h e s , burning brush and swamp a r e a t o t h e n o r t h e a s t . Duane tended t h e f i r e throughout t h e day and r e t u r n e d home a t 6:00 p.m. f o r d i n n e r . L a t e r , Duane received a phone c a l l from t h e Whitehawks e x p r e s s i n g concern over t h e f i r e . Duane r e t u r n e d t o t h e f i e l d and continued t o watch t h e f i r e u n t i l approximately 10:OO p.m. The testimony a t t r i a l c o n f l i c t e d regarding t h e f i r e a c t i v i t y d u r i n g t h e n i g h t and t h e following morning. Duane t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he r e t u r n e d t o t h e f i e l d i n t h e l a t e evening, t h e f i r e had diminished t o only embers and smoke. I n a d d i t i o n , Duane s t a t e d t h a t he viewed t h e f i e l d t h e next morning and found t h e embers and smoke completely extinguished. T h e r e a f t e r , Duane l e f t t h e a r e a t o continue work with his father in another portion of the ranch several miles away. On the other hand, the Whitehawks testified that throughout the night, they could see both embers and flames. However, they testified that the following morning, no embers were visible, but a substantial amount of smoke was present. The Whitehawks stated that they remained concerned about the fire, but that a heavy dew, a backburn, a still wind and lack of any embers reassured them that they could leave their residence for a doctor's appointment. Additionally, Mr. Whitehawk testified that he spoke to Duane in the morning and was assured that Duane would continue to watch the area. Duane denied the conversation entirely. During the afternoon, the fire flared up, sweeping across the marshes and open fields. When the Whitehawks returned home in the afternoon, they found three of the four outbuildings completely destroyed and fire threatening the log cabin. Mrs. Janet Clark, Duane's wife, was on the premises when the Whitehawks returned. Immediately, the Whitehawks began fighting the fire. After 45 minutes, the local volunteer fire department arrived and extinguished the blaze. The Whitehawks filed suit against Stan Clark, alleging negligence and strict liability. On September 18, 1987, the Whitehawks moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability, arguing that S 50-63-103, MCA, imposed strict liability upon one who intentionally starts a fire which destroys property, and therefore, they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The District Court denied the motion without opinion. On August 29, 1988, the case was tried before a twelve member jury. Upon the completion of testimony, the District Judge met with the attorneys to settle jury instructions and prepare a special verdict form. At this time, the District Court rejected plaintiffs' Proposed Instruction No. 22 concerning 8 50-63-103, MCA, concluding t h e s t a t u t e pertained only t o t h e i n t e n t i o n a l burning of excess f o r e s t m a t e r i a l . Thereafter, t h e jury returned a v e r d i c t i n favor of t h e defendant. The Whitehawks appeal t h e following issues: 1. Does S 50-63-103, MCA, apply t o t h e i n s t a n t case? 2 . Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r when it denied p l a i n t i f f s ' motion f o r summary judgment? 3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r when it refused t o i n s t r u c t t h e jury on p l a i n t i f f s ' Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 22 regarding 8 50-63-103, M C A ? Section 50-63-103, MCA, s t a t e s i n p a r t : L i a b i l i t y of offender f o r damages and c o s t s . Any person who s h a l l upon any - land within t h e s t a t e , whether on h i s own o r on a n o t h e r ' s land, s e t o r leave any f i r e t h a t s h a l l spread and damage o r destroy property of any kind n o t h i s own s h a l l be l i a b l e f o r a l l damages caused thereby, and any owner of property damaged o r destroyed by such f i r e may maintain a c i v i l s u i t f o r t h e purpose of recovering such damages. Any person who s h a l l upon any land within t h i s s t a t e , whether on h i s own o r on a n o t h e r ' s land, s e t o r leave any f i r e which t h r e a t e n s t o spread and damage o r destroy property s h a l l be l i a b l e f o r a l l c o s t s and expenses incurred by t h e s t a t e of Montana, by any f o r e s t r y a s s o c i a t i o n , o r by any person extinguishing o r preventing t h e spread of such f i r e . (Emphasis added. ) This Court has been c a l l e d upon t o i n t e r p r e t t h e s t a t u t e on two occasions. Montana Dept. of Natural Res. and Cons. v. Clark Fork Logging (1982), 198 Mont. 494, 646 P.2d 1207; and Belue v. S t a t e (1982), 199 Mont. 451, 649 P.2d 752. Defendant contends t h a t our previous decisions c o n t r o l t h e outcome o f t h e f i r s t i s s u e which questions t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of S 50-63-103, MCA. Defendant argues t h a t t h e s t a t u t e applies only to the burning of excess forest materials. We find defendant's interpretation unduly restrictive. In Clark Fork Logging, defendants entered into a timber sale contract with the United States Forest Service to log an area in Sanders County. During operation, an employee started a chain saw which backfired and ignited a forest fire. The Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC), acting under contract with the United States Forest Service, extinguished the fire at a cost of $126,721.80. Thereafter, the DNRC brought suit to recover the cost under theories of strict liability and negligence. On appeal, we affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment against DNRC's strict liability count, holding: As they are used in section 50-63-103, MCA, the words "set or leave a fire" refer to the deliberate act of burning excess forest material. The statute does not apply to the instant situation. The fire was not deliberately --- ignited. Rather, it accidentally started when a spark from the chain saw ignited a slash pile. Under these facts summary judgment on Count I was proper. (Emphasis added. ) Clark Fork Logging, 646 P.2d at 1209. Subsequently, this Court issued its decision in Belue. During a severe windstorm, a fire ignited near a slag pile. The fire spread four and one half miles across defendant's land to plaintiffs ' property. Relying upon Clark Fork Logging, we concluded the facts did not support the applicability of 5 50-63-103, MCA. Belue, 649 P.2d at 754. Our decisions emphasized that the statute applied to the intentional setting of a fire. None of the factual circumstances which limited the statute's applicability in Clark Fork Logging, or Belue, are present here. Our review of the statute failed to disclose limiting factors which would render the provision inapplicable to private landowners, or language which i n d i c a t e s an a p p l i c a t i o n exclusively t o t h e burning of f o r e s t m a t e r i a l s . Therefore, we conclude (5 50-63-103, MCA, may be applicable t o t h e i n s t a n t case. Next, t h e Whitehawks contend t h e D i s t r i c t Court should have granted t h e i r motion f o r summary judgment on t h e l i a b i l i t y i s s u e , leaving damages a s t h e s o l e i s s u e t o be decided a t t r i a l . W e disagree. The standard t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t a p p l i e s when reviewing a g r a n t o r d e n i a l of a motion f o r summary judgment i s t h e same a s t h a t u t i l i z e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n i t i a l l y ; summary judgment i s proper when it appears t h e r e i s no genuine i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a matter of law. Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.; Reagan v. Union O i l Co. of C a l i f o r n i a (1984), 208 Mont. 1, 675 P.2d 953. I f t h e r e i s any doubt a s t o t h e p r o p r i e t y of t h e motion, it should be denied. Dare v. Montana Petroleum Marketing Co. (1984), 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015. The v i o l a t i o n of a s t a t u t e intended t o p r o t e c t t h e p l a i n t i f f from t h e i n j u r y incurred i s generally held t o be negligence per s e . Taylor, Thon, Thompson & Peterson v. Cannaday (Mont. 1988), 749 P.2d 63, 45 St.Rep. 1 0 2 ; ~ e h r i n g v. LaCounte (1986), 219 Mont. 462, 712 P.2d 1329. The defendant's conduct must s t i l l be t h e proximate cause of t h e harm t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s , and t h e r e remains t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of defenses, such a s contributory negligence. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B (1974) ; Martel v. Montana Power Co. (Mont. 1988), 752 P.2d 1 4 0 , 4 5 St.Rep. 460. Because t h e s e a r e i s s u e s of f a c t , summary judgment was inappropriate. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of t h e Whitehawks' motion f o r summary judgment was t h e r e f o r e proper. F i n a l l y , we address t h e t h i r d i s s u e on appeal. The Whitehawks contend t h e D i s t r i c t Court improperly refused t o g r a n t t h e i r Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 22 which s e t f o r t h verbatim t h e f i r s t sentence of § 50-63-103, MCA. A t t r i a l , defendant objected t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n and argued t h e Whitehawks abandoned t h e v i o l a t i o n of s t a t u t e claim because they by f a i l e d t o include it within t h e p r e t r i a l order. The D i s t r i c t Court denied t h e i n s t r u c t i o n and s t a t e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e pertained only t o t h e burning of excess f o r e s t m a t e r i a l . The purpose of t h e p r e t r i a l order i s t o prevent s u r p r i s e , simplify i s s u e s and permit counsel t o prepare f o r t r i a l on t h e b a s i s of t h e p r e t r i a l order. Workman v. McIntryre (1980), 190 Mont. 5, 617 P.2d 1281. This Court has held t h a t t h e p a r t y may n o t r a i s e an i s s u e on appeal which deviated from those s t a t e d i n t h e p r e t r i a l order. Morse v. Cremer (1982), 200 Mont. 71, 647 P.2d 358. Under t h e s e two premises, it appears reasonable f o r defendant t o have assumed t h a t t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y under t h e s t a t u t e would not a r i s e a t t r i a l . However, o t h e r f a c t o r s weigh a g a i n s t defendant's waiver contention. F i r s t , t h e Whitehawks properly preserved t h e i s s u e f o r appeal a s applied t o jury i n s t r u c t i o n s . Rule 51, M.R.Civ.P., provides i n p a r t t h a t " [ n l o p a r t y may assign a s e r r o r t h e f a i l u r e t o i n s t r u c t on any p o i n t of law unless he o f f e r s an i n s t r u c t i o n thereon." When t h e Whitehawks presented an i n s t r u c t i o n which s t a t e d verbatim t h e language of S 50-63-103, MCA, t h e D i s t r i c t Court denied t h e i n s t r u c t i o n a s inapplicable t o t h e case. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e s t a t u t e was t h e s u b j e c t of a motion f o r summary judgment. Notwithstanding c e r t i f i c a t i o n , an order denying summary judgment i s i n t e r l o c u t o r y . Rule 1, M.R.Civ.P. Thus, t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of 5 50-63-103, MCA, has not been waived i n s o f a r a s it was presented t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t h e Whitehawks' motion. W e t h e r e f o r e a r e persuaded t h a t t h e Whitehawks' i s s u e of t h e f a i l u r e t o i n s t r u c t i s proper f o r appeal. W e have held t h a t t h e r e f u s a l t o i n s t r u c t a jury on an important p a r t of a p a r t y ' s theory of t h e case i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Smith v. Rovick (Mont. 1988), 751 P.2d 1053, 45 St.Rep. 451; Northwestern Union Trust Co. v. Worm (1983), 204 Mont. 184, 663 P.2d 325. While other instructions addressed the elements necessary to establish negligence, none of the given instructions informed the jury of the effect of a violation of statute. This was an essential part of the Whitehawks' case and therefore they were entitled to have Proposed Instruction No. 22 submitted to the jury. Reversed and remanded for new trial. We concur: , + '