Case Title: Armstrong v. Pickett

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-91

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Armstrong v. Pickett1993 WY 148865 P.2d 49Case Number: 93-91Decided: 11/30/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Arthur 
M. ARMSTRONG,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Robert 
J. PICKETT, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal 
from The District Court, Carbon County, Larry L. Lehman, 
J.

Arthur 
M. Armstrong, pro se.

Richard 
H. Honaker of Honaker, Hampton & Newman, Rock Springs, for 
appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, Arthur 
M. Armstrong (Armstrong), sued his former attorney, Robert J. Pickett (Pickett), 
to recover part of the fee he paid Pickett to defend him in a criminal action. 
The trial court awarded judgment to Pickett. Armstrong appeals, asserting he was 
improperly denied a jury trial, that the trial court improperly admitted certain 
documents, and that insufficient evidence was presented to support the 
judgment.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Armstrong 
presents three issues:

Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in not relieving appellant from waiver 
of jury trial under Rule 38 W.R.C.P.

Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing defendant to submit into 
evidence documents not supplied to plaintiff prior to trial in violation of the 
pretrial order.

Did 
appellant prove his case beyond a preponderance of the 
evidence.

[¶4]      As a preliminary 
matter, we note that the record transmitted to this court is devoid of the 
complaint, answer, trial transcript, and the district court's judgment. Thus, we 
rely on the briefs for the essential facts.

[¶5]      After being 
charged with first degree murder, Armstrong hired Pickett as legal counsel for 
his defense. Armstrong paid Pickett $20,000.00 for his services. Armstrong 
asserts that Pickett agreed to represent him all the way through an appeal to 
this court, while Pickett asserts that the agreement was that the fee paid for 
representation through the trial level. 

[¶6]      Armstrong was 
convicted, and his appeal was handled by the Wyoming Public Defender. On May 8, 
1992, Armstrong filed this suit seeking return of $10,000.00 of the retainer fee 
paid to Pickett. After a bench trial on November 12, 1992, the trial court 
entered judgment for Pickett because Armstrong had failed to prove the existence 
of a contract which required Pickett to prosecute the appeal. Armstrong appeals 
from that judgment.

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      Armstrong admits 
that he waived his right to a jury trial by failing to timely demand a jury as 
required by W.R.C.P. 38. He argues, however, that the district court should have 
invoked its discretionary authority provided by W.R.C.P. 39(b), to grant a jury 
trial. Rule 39(b) provides:

(b) 
By the court. - Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 
38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to 
demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have been made of right, 
the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any or 
all issues. [emphasis added]

[¶8]      Armstrong's sole 
argument for relief from his waiver of his right to a jury trial is that he is 
not "well versed or knowledgeable concerning legality's [sic] & niceties of 
judicial procedures." A trial court does not abuse its Rule 39(b) discretion 
when it refuses to relieve a party from its waiver of the right to a jury trial 
when the party's sole reason for urging the trial court to invoke its 39(b) 
discretion is "that he [Armstrong] was unfamiliar with the requirements" of Rule 
38. Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 985 (Wyo. 1984). Pro se litigants are subject to 
the same procedural rules and standards as are attorneys. 
Id.

[¶9]      In his second and 
third arguments, Armstrong asserts that the trial court abused its discretion 
when it admitted certain exhibits which were not listed in Pickett's pretrial 
memorandum and that the trial court should have ruled in Armstrong's favor based 
on the evidence. As is the situation here, "where there is no transcript or an 
insufficient transcript, we accept the findings of the trial court as the only 
basis for deciding issues pertaining to the evidence." Waggoner v. General 
Motors Corp., 771 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Wyo. 1989). "In the absence of anything to 
refute them, we will sustain the findings of the trial court, and we assume that 
the evidence presented was sufficient to support those findings." Osborn v. Pine 
Mountain Ranch, 766 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶10]   In his brief, Armstrong points to 
two exhibits which were admitted but not listed on the pretrial memorandum. 
Neither of these exhibits are a part of the appellate record, which makes the 
search for prejudice difficult. In addition, without the trial transcript, we 
cannot discern whether Armstrong properly objected to the admission of the 
exhibits. As Armstrong recognizes, we review claims of error regarding 
compliance with pretrial orders for an abuse of discretion. Oukrop v. 
Wasserburger, 755 P.2d 233, 237-38 (Wyo. 1988). Based on the record presented to 
us, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

[¶11]   In addition, based on the findings 
of the trial court, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find 
that Armstrong failed to meet his burden of proving the existence of a contract 
requiring Pickett to prosecute Armstrong's appeal.

[¶12]   Finding no error, we affirm the 
trial court's judgment.