Case Title: Powell v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 032402

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
MARK ANTHONY POWELL 
v.  Record No. 032402       OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
September 17, 2004 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
Mark Anthony Powell seeks reversal of the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals affirming his convictions for violation of Code 
§ 18.2-53.1, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that he possessed a firearm in the commission of a 
felony.1 
I. 
 
On July 19, 2001, Powell and a friend hired a taxicab to 
take them from Norfolk to Portsmouth.  After a brief stop, 
Powell directed the taxicab to a clothing store.  Powell entered 
the store and told the clerk that he was looking for a present 
for his wife.  According to the clerk, while Powell was looking 
at the clothes, he kept "his left hand in his pocket the entire 
                     
1 Code § 18.2-53.1 provides, in pertinent part, 
It shall be unlawful for any person to use or 
attempt to use any pistol . . . or other firearm 
or display such weapon in a threatening manner 
while committing or attempting to commit . . . 
robbery . . . or abduction.  Violation of this 
section shall constitute a separate and distinct 
felony . . . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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time."  After selecting a pair of pants, he and the clerk 
proceeded to the cash register where the clerk's supervisor 
began conducting the transaction. 
 
After confirming that no other people were currently in the 
store, Powell informed the employees that he had a pistol in his 
pocket.  Moving back and forth in a nervous, fidgety manner with 
his hand in his pocket, Powell told them not to move "and won't 
nobody get hurt."  Powell ordered the supervisor to open the 
cash register and give him all the money inside it, and she 
immediately complied.  With his hand still in his pocket, Powell 
directed the employees into a stockroom in the back of the store 
and made them lie down on the floor.  When he left the room, the 
employees watched him exit the building through a one-way 
mirror.  The supervisor then opened the stockroom door, ran to 
the front of the store, and observed Powell enter a taxicab. 
 
Several minutes after Powell left the store, a police 
officer, alerted to the robbery, initiated a traffic stop on 
Powell's taxicab.  The officer waited for additional officers to 
arrive before approaching the vehicle.  Then the police officers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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searched the taxicab and the surrounding area.  They found $196 
in the taxicab, but no gun was ever located. 
 
Powell admitted during questioning that he had told the 
store employees he had a gun, but insisted to the questioning 
detective that he, in fact, had not had one.  Powell was charged 
with one count of robbery, two counts of abduction, and three 
counts of the use of a firearm in the commission of these 
crimes. 
 
At trial, the store employees and the taxicab driver 
testified that they never saw Powell with a gun or observed the 
outline of a gun in his clothing.  Neither the taxicab driver 
nor the police officer pursuing the taxicab saw Powell roll down 
his window or throw anything out of the taxicab. 
The trial court denied Powell's motion to strike the 
abduction and firearms charges and convicted Powell of all 
offenses.  Powell appealed his firearm convictions to the Court 
of Appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to establish 
that he had actually possessed a firearm.  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed his firearm convictions in an unpublished order, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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stating that Powell's declarations that he had a gun, "his 
assertive conduct," and the surrounding circumstances, including 
being fidgety and keeping his hand in his pocket, were an 
"implied assertion" that Powell possessed a firearm and 
therefore the evidence supported the convictions.  Powell v. 
Commonwealth, No. 1490-02-1, (August 5, 2003).  We awarded 
Powell an appeal. 
II. 
To convict a person of using, attempting to use, or 
threatening to use a firearm in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1, 
the Commonwealth must prove that 
the accused actually had a firearm in his possession 
and that he used or attempted to use the firearm or 
displayed the firearm in a threatening manner while 
committing or attempting to commit robbery or one of 
the other specified felonies. 
 
Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 215, 218, 441 S.E.2d 342, 
344 (1994). 
On appellate review, we view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below, and we will set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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aside the judgment only if it is clearly wrong or unsupported by 
the evidence.  Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 281-82, 427 
S.E.2d 411, 421 (1993).  Furthermore, proof of the crime must be 
established beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 
238 Va. 480, 487, 384 S.E.2d 95, 99 (1989); Young v. 
Commonwealth, 185 Va. 1032, 1042, 40 S.E.2d 805, 810 (1947). 
Powell asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support 
the firearms convictions because the Commonwealth's only proof 
that he had a firearm in his possession was the statements he 
made during the commission of the robbery and abductions.  
Powell argues that it may be reasonable to infer "that one who 
says he has a gun, has a gun," if there is no other evidence, 
but in this case Powell maintains that the Commonwealth's 
evidence "proves" that Powell did not have a gun.2  We disagree. 
                     
2 Citing Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538 
(1998), Powell argues that "a defendant's out of court 
statements alone are insufficient without some corroboration."  
However, Jackson and the cases it relies upon stand for the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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The evidence in this case is virtually undisputed.  Powell 
told the victims that he had a gun and threatened to "hurt" them 
if they didn't follow his instructions.  While in the store 
Powell was "fidgety" and kept his hand in his pocket.  Neither 
the victims nor any other witness testified to seeing Powell 
with a gun or disposing of a gun, and no gun was recovered.  The 
police apprehended Powell in a very short period of time after 
he left the scene of the crimes, and for most but not all of 
that time he was observed by both the police officer following 
the taxicab in which Powell was riding and the driver of the 
taxicab.  Finally, there was evidence that a second passenger 
was in the taxicab with Powell, and although the record reflects 
                                                                  
proposition that an extra-judicial confession is insufficient to 
establish the corpus delicti of a crime unless corroborated by 
other evidence.  In this case, as Powell recognizes, there was 
no confession.  Id. at 645-46, 499 S.E.2d at 551.  Powell's 
extra-judicial statement that he had a gun was a statement he 
made in the course of committing the crime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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that police officers searched the taxicab, nothing in the record 
indicates that the police ever searched Powell or his companion 
when apprehended or when transported to the police station. 
It was the province of the trier of fact to consider all 
the evidence and resolve any conflicts.  In this case, evidence 
that no gun was found conflicts with Powell's statements and 
actions during the commission of the offenses.  The trier of 
fact resolved this conflict against Powell, and in doing so, 
necessarily concluded that Powell had a gun.  In other words, 
resolution of the factual conflict in this manner established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Powell had a gun.  Based on this 
record we cannot say that the judgment of the trial court was 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent.  No principle in the criminal law 
is more fundamental and essential to the just resolution of a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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criminal charge against an accused than the principle that the 
Commonwealth is required to prove the guilt of the accused 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Indeed, that burden of proof has 
constitutional status, for a conviction on legally insufficient 
evidence constitutes a denial of due process.  Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 
Va. 505, 512, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
124 S.Ct. 444 (2003).  In characterizing that exacting burden of 
proof, we have repeatedly stated that the evidence must exclude 
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and observed that 
evidence that creates a suspicion or probability of guilt is 
insufficient to support a conviction.  Yarborough v. 
Commonwealth, 247 Va. 215, 218, 441 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1994); 
Burrows v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 317, 320, 295 S.E.2d 893, 895 
(1982); Hyde v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 950, 954-55, 234 S.E.2d 
74, 77-78 (1977); see also Hudson, 265 Va. at 513, 578 S.E.2d at 
785.  In my view, the evidence in the present case fails, as a 
matter of law, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mark 
Anthony Powell used a “pistol . . . or other firearm” in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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violation of Code § 18.2-53.1 while committing the robbery and 
abductions of the employees of the clothing store. 
The evidence was presented to the trial judge solely by the 
Commonwealth and, as correctly noted by the majority, is 
“virtually undisputed.”  On appeal, under familiar principles of 
appellate review, that evidence and all reasonable inferences 
therefrom are to be considered in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth.  Hickson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 383, 387, 
520 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1999).  Beyond question, the evidence 
established that Powell asserted during the robbery and 
abductions that he had a gun in his pocket and his actions were 
consistent with that assertion.  The store employees believed 
that Powell had a gun and were placed in fear for their personal 
safety as a result.  In combination, those circumstances 
permitted Powell to accomplish his intent in committing those 
crimes.  The Commonwealth was not required to prove that Powell 
actually had a gun to establish his culpability for the robbery 
and abductions of the store employees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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However, with regard to the Commonwealth’s burden of proof 
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Powell was also 
guilty of violating Code § 18.2-53.1, the Commonwealth was 
required to prove that Powell “actually had a firearm in his 
possession” when he committed the robbery and abductions of the 
store employees.  Yarborough, 247 Va. at 218, 441 S.E.2d at 344.  
To determine whether, as a matter of law, the Commonwealth met 
that burden of proof, Powell’s assertion to the store employees 
that he had a gun cannot be considered in isolation or without 
consideration of the other undisputed evidence in the case.  Lee 
v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 222, 227, 482 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1997) 
(Koontz, J., dissenting); see also Hankerson v. Moody, 229 Va. 
270, 274-75, 329 S.E.2d 791, 794 (1985); Forbes v. Commonwealth, 
27 Va. App. 304, 312, 498 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1998); Wynne v. 
Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 277, 283, 437 S.E.2d 195, 199 (1993) 
(Koontz, J., dissenting), majority opinion withdrawn and 
different result reached on rehearing, 18 Va. App. 459, 460, 445 
S.E.2d 160, 161 (1994) (en banc). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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The other undisputed evidence established that the store 
employees never saw a gun in Powell’s possession or any object 
in Powell’s pocket that indicated the presence of a concealed 
gun.  Following the robbery, one of the employees observed 
Powell entering and then fleeing in a waiting taxi which was 
occupied by another passenger in addition to the driver.*  
Shortly thereafter, police stopped the taxi and arrested Powell.  
The police recovered the money taken in the robbery from the 
back seat of the taxi.  When questioned later by a police 
detective, Powell admitted telling the store employees that he 
had a gun, but insisted that, in fact, he had not had one.  At 
trial, the taxi driver testified that he never saw a gun and 
that Powell had not thrown any object from the taxi.  A police 
officer testified that no “firearms or other weapons [were] 
recovered from the cab.” 
The totality of this evidence, considered in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, undoubtedly creates a suspicion 
                     
* There is no suggestion in the record that the passenger in 
the taxi was involved in the crimes, and the passenger was not 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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or even a probability that Powell actually possessed a gun when 
he committed the separate crimes of robbery and abduction of the 
store employees.  The same evidence, however, falls far short of 
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that Powell actually 
possessed a gun during the commission of those crimes as 
required to establish that he was also guilty of violating Code 
§ 18.2-53.1.  No gun was ever displayed, seen, or recovered and, 
under the particular circumstances of this case, the 
Commonwealth’s evidence established that Powell had little if 
any opportunity to discard a gun before his arrest without being 
observed by the store employees, the taxi driver, or the police 
following behind the taxi.  When the totality of the undisputed 
evidence is considered, it requires, at best, speculation and 
conjecture to support the Commonwealth’s supposition that 
Powell’s assertion to the store employees that he had a gun was 
more than a pretext to accomplish the robbery and abductions.  A 
“verdict . . . based only upon speculation and conjecture . . . 
cannot be permitted to stand.”  Dunn v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 
                                                                  
called as a witness at Powell’s trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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704, 705-06, 284 S.E.2d 792, 793 (1981); see also Wright v. 
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 669, 670, 232 S.E.2d 733, 734 (1977); 
Powers v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 386, 389, 177 S.E.2d 628, 630 
(1970). 
An additional issue prompts my dissent in this case.  The 
majority correctly notes that it was within the province of the 
trial judge to resolve factual conflicts in the evidence.  
Relying upon that principle, however, the majority then permits 
the reasonable doubt standard to be satisfied in this case on 
the basis that the trial judge factually concluded that when 
Powell asserted that he had a gun, he actually did have a gun, 
regardless of the other undisputed evidence suggesting the 
contrary.  Under the particular circumstances of this case, this 
effectively eliminates the requirement for the Commonwealth to 
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Whether a conviction 
is supported by sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the 
accused beyond a reasonable doubt is not a question of fact, but 
one of law.  To the extent that this distinction between issues 
of fact and law in the present case are not addressed in detail, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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I write separately to emphasize that distinction to avoid the 
mischief that may occur in future cases in which the reasonable 
doubt standard is at issue. 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and enter final judgment reversing Powell’s 
convictions for violating Code § 18.2-53.1.