Case Title: In Re: Maria P.

Citation: 393 Md. 661

Docket Number: 89/05

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Maria P.
No. 89, September Term, 2005
HEADNOTE: Juvenile Court Proceedings: A judge may not exclude a parent from a CINA
adjudicatory hearing during the child’s testimony without a hearing or evidence to support the
exclusion of the party.  In this case, where the only evidence to support the exclusion of the parent
from the adjudicatory hearing was the Department’s allegation that Petitioner would unduly
influence her daughter’s testimony, the hearing judge abused his discretion in excluding the
Petitioner from the courtroom without first making a finding on the record to support a factual basis
for his decision.
 In the Circuit Court for M ontgomery County
Civil No.: 06-I-04-226 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 89
September Term, 2005
______________________________________
In Re:  MARIA P.
____________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Greene, J.
______________________________________
Filed:     August 1, 2006
1 The record indicates that Maria Gabriella P. is known by the nickname “Gabby.”
2Section 3-801 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article defines a “child in need
of assistance” as follows:
(f) “Child in need of assistance” means a child who requires
court intervention because:
(1) The child has been abused, has been neglected, has a
developmental disability, or has a mental disorder; and
(2) The child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable
or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and
the child's needs.
(g) “CINA” means a child in need of assistance.
Allegations that a child is a CINA must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Md.
Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-817(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
3 An adjudicatory hearing is a hearing under Subtitle 8 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article “to determine whether the allegations in the [CINA] petition, other than
the allegation that the child requires the court’s intervention, are true.”  Md. Code (1973,
2002 Repl. Vol & 2005 Supp.) § 3-801(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 
4At the time of the alleged abuse at issue, Gabby was living in Silver Spring,
Maryland, with her mother, Matrida R., her stepfather, Victoriano, her stepbrother, two half
brothers, and her stepfather’s mother.  There was also a boarder in the home, H. Goldames,
(continued...)
This matter originated in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as a
juvenile court, where Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services (“the
Department”) filed a petition alleging that Maria P. (“Gabby”),1 age 12, was a child in need
of assistance (“CINA”) pursuant to Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801(f) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.2  At the CINA adjudicatory hearing,3 Gabby’s
mother, Matrida R. (“Petitioner”), was excluded from the hearing because of the court’s
concern that Gabby might not testify truthfully in the presence of her mother.  Ultimately, the
court declared Gabby a CINA and placed her in the care and custody of the Department.4
4(...continued)
who rented a bedroom on the first floor. 
5 Petitioner’s original questions presented were:
1. 
May a juvenile court exclude a parent, who is a party to
a CINA proceeding, but who is not alleged to have
committed any abuse or neglect, from that proceeding
during her child’s testimony, absent compelling
circumstances?
2. 
Did the juvenile court commit prejudicial error in
excluding petitioner from the courtroom during her
child’s testimony, without hearing any evidence in
support of exclusion, and without making any findings in
support of exclusion, other than that exclusion of her
mother might prevent the child from being “bashful?”
3. 
Was the evidence sufficient to find Gabby a child in need
of assistance where the trial court found that petitioner,
who complied with the safety plans and was willing and
able to give Gabby proper care and attention, was “not to
be blamed,” should be “commended,” and “has done
almost everything she can do?” 
-2-
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals and that court affirmed, in an unreported
opinion, the judgment of the Circuit Court.  Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari,
which we granted.  In re Maria P., 390 Md. 90, 887 A.2d 655 (2005).
Petitioner presents three questions for our review,5 which we have combined and
recast into two questions:
1. 
During a CINA adjudicatory hearing, may a juvenile
court exclude a parent from the courtroom during her
child’s testimony without hearing any evidence, or
making any findings, in support of exclusion?
6The Court of Special Appeals incorrectly stated the year of Gabby’s birth as 1982.
-3-
2. 
Was the evidence sufficient to find Gabby a CINA?
We answer the first question in the negative, and remand this matter to the juvenile
court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.  In light of our resolution of
Petitioner’s first question, we decline to reach her second issue. 
FACTS
Gabby was born in 1992.6  On or about October 20, 2004, Gabby told her mother that,
a week before, she was on her way to school when four men abducted, drugged and raped
her.  Gabby’s mother took her to school to seek assistance from the authorities.  Detective
Gary Irwin, of the Montgomery County Police Department, Pedophile Section, responded
to the call from Gabby’s school regarding the allegations.  Det. Irwin characterized Gabby
as “lackadaisical” during his initial interview with her, and questioned the veracity of her
allegations.  Subsequently, Gabby was brought to Shady Grove Hospital for an examination
where it was determined that she was approximately six weeks pregnant. 
The next day, Gabby was interviewed a second time and again stated that her
allegations were true.  When confronted with inconsistencies in her story, Gabby revealed
that, actually, she had been raped by her stepfather in September 2004. A child victim
coordinator, Darryl Leach, was called to interview Gabby when it was determined that her
abuse allegations were against a family member.  Larissa Holstead, of Montgomery County
Child Welfare Services, was subsequently called in to observe Leach’s interview with Gabby.
7 It was at this point that Holstead first felt that Gabby’s mother doubted the veracity
of Gabby’s story.  Petitioner asked Holstead why Gabby would not have told her sooner, and
then indicated that, if the incident had actually occurred, “Gabby would have screamed and
woken up her brothers.” 
-4-
When Holstead told Gabby that her mother needed to be told about the allegations, Gabby
indicated that she did not want to be present when Holstead informed Gabby’s mother.  
Holstead told Petitioner that she needed to speak to Gabby’s stepfather, Victoriano,
and asked if there was a phone number at which he could be contacted.  Petitioner stated that
she did not have his phone number, but while left alone briefly, Petitioner called Victoriano
and was heard speaking to him about the allegations when Holstead returned to the room.
Petitioner continued to insist that she did not know Victoriano’s work number.7  
Petitioner was then taken in to see Gabby.  Holstead advised Petitioner that it was
essential that she be supportive of Gabby and demonstrate a belief in her allegations, and
Holstead asked Petitioner to refrain from asking Gabby why she did not tell Petitioner
sooner.  Notwithstanding this warning and upon seeing Gabby, Petitioner immediately asked
Gabby why she did not tell her about the incident earlier.  Holstead stated that Gabby then
began to get upset and cry, so the Petitioner and Gabby were separated.  Due to her concern
that Petitioner did not believe Gabby, Holstead told Petitioner that she did not feel
comfortable sending Gabby home.  Petitioner expressed concern about Gabby returning
home with her; therefore, Holstead suggested that Petitioner place Gabby in foster care
overnight, until a protective order could be obtained.  Petitioner agreed to this arrangement.
8 See Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.) § 4-505 of the Family Law Article.  
-5-
Subsequently, Gabby’s pregnancy was terminated, and Petitioner obtained a temporary
protective order8 at that time.  With her stepfather no longer staying in the home, Gabby
returned to her mother’s care with a safety plan in place.  On October 29, Petitioner returned
to court to obtain a permanent protective order, but refused to do so once she discovered that
Victoriano could be arrested if he failed to appear for the protective order hearing.  Instead,
Petitioner signed another safety plan stating that she would continue to prohibit Victoriano
from contacting Gabby.  Sometime over the next week, Gabby overheard Petitioner telling
relatives that she had forgiven Victoriano.  Gabby then went outside and laid under a parked
truck, refusing to come out from under the truck for 30 minutes.  As a result of this incident,
Petitioner told Holstead that she was concerned that she could not handle Gabby.  At a
subsequent November 2 meeting at her home, Petitioner indicated that she wanted to explore
out-of-home placements for Gabby, either with a relative or in foster care.
Holstead and a community service aide met with Petitioner again on November 9 to
talk about potential placements with relatives.  Concerned that she was still unable to control
Gabby and that Gabby might try to hurt herself, Petitioner suggested placement with
Petitioner’s brother in Georgia.  On this same day, Petitioner discussed the “intended action
letter” that she had received in the mail from Holstead that identified Victoriano as Gabby’s
abuser.  Petitioner asked whether she could appeal such a finding, and was upset when she
was informed that she could not.  Upon returning to her office from the meeting, the
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community service aide discovered that she had a message from Petitioner indicating that
Gabby had disclosed that she had been raped by Goldames, the boarder in the home.  The
next day, Holstead met with Gabby who indicated that, at some point before she was raped
by her stepfather, she had been raped by Goldames.  
As a result of Gabby’s new allegations, Holstead met with Petitioner, informing her
that Gabby would not be allowed to return home unless Goldames left the house.  Petitioner
told Holstead that she did not think that she could ask Goldames to leave because he had
already paid rent through the end of the month, and she did not have the money to refund the
rent.  Petitioner also indicated that it might be helpful to keep Goldames in the home to
“know his whereabouts.”  When Holstead again told Petitioner that Gabby could not return
if Goldames remained in the house, Petitioner indicated that she would be willing to place
Gabby in voluntary foster care.  Gabby was placed in foster care that day, and was still in
foster care when the CINA hearing occurred.  Petitioner testified that the next time she saw
Goldames, the day after her meeting with Holstead, she told him that he had to leave the
house.  It is unclear from the record whether Goldames actually left at that time. 
Soon after Gabby was placed in foster care, her foster mother contacted Holstead to
indicate that Gabby had recanted the allegations against her stepfather.  Holstead, concerned
that Gabby was being pressured to recant by her mother, filed a CINA petition in juvenile
court on November 16, 2004, and an adjudicatory hearing was held on the CINA petition on
9 Gabby’s mother was excluded from the courtroom during Gabby’s testimony.
Additional facts in connection with Petitioner’s exclusion will be added infra in our
discussion of Issue I.
-7-
December 28, 2004.9  Gabby testified that, notwithstanding her mother’s assurances, she did
not think that her mother believed her allegations.  Gabby stated that she was uncertain about
wanting to return home, and expressed concerns that her grandmother was angry with her.
Gabby testified that she was “doing okay” in foster care, and enjoyed her new middle school.
Holstead then testified that she thought Petitioner’s support of Gabby was “[t]enuous, at
best,” noting Petitioner’s focus on the DNA testing that could indicate that Victoriano was
not the father of Gabby’s child.  Petitioner then testified that, since she learned of Gabby’s
allegations, Victoriano had never been in the home at the same time as Gabby, and Petitioner
had not spoken to him since October 21.  Petitioner also testified that Gabby and her
grandmother have a good relationship that has not changed since Gabby’s allegations.  It was
later determined through DNA testing, after the CINA hearing, but prior to the decision of
the intermediate appellate court, that Victoriano was not the father of Gabby’s baby.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court found that Gabby’s pregnancy at age 12
clearly constituted abuse.  The court commended Petitioner for doing “almost everything she
[could] do” in Gabby’s situation, but found that Petitioner was unable or unwilling to give
Gabby the proper care and attention that she needs.  The court found Gabby to be a CINA
and indicated that she should be kept in her current foster home. The court also ordered
supervised visitation for Petitioner at a minimum of once a week.  
-8-
DISCUSSION
I. 
During a CINA adjudicatory hearing, may a juvenile court
exclude a parent from the courtroom during her child’s
testimony without hearing any evidence, or making any findings,
in support of exclusion?
During the CINA adjudicatory hearing in the instant case, the Department made a
motion to close the courtroom to everyone except court personnel, Gabby’s counsel, certain
social workers, and Petitioner’s counsel.  The Department specifically requested to exclude
Petitioner from the courtroom during Gabby’s testimony.  Petitioner’s counsel objected, and
the hearing judge granted the Department’s request to exclude Petitioner, stating:
Thank you, I will grant the County’s request to exclude the
mother from the courtroom during and only during the period of
direct and cross-examination of the daughter.  The heart of the
allegations here is this young lady has been raped and that the
allegation of the County is that her mother has not responded
appropriately, and therefore, there may be some influence on
this girl of tender years, age 12, with her mother in the
courtroom and I think it would be in the best interest of the child
if she not be subjected to any type of influence that may cause
her to shade her testimony, being bashful.
Petitioner contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in excluding her from the
CINA proceedings during Gabby’s testimony.  
In affirming the juvenile court, the intermediate appellate court cited Maryland Rule
11-110(b) in support of its holding that the juvenile court had the discretion to exclude
Petitioner from the courtroom during Gabby’s testimony.  The Court of Special Appeals
10 Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801(u) of the Courts and Judicial
(continued...)
-9-
noted that the juvenile court’s decision to exclude Petitioner was evidently based on its
knowledge of Holstead’s concern that Petitioner did not believe Gabby and might have
pressured her to change her story.  The intermediate appellate court also took into
consideration that the juvenile court was concerned about ensuring an environment in which
Gabby was most likely to testify truthfully.  
Maryland Rule 11-110(b) states in pertinent part:
Place of Hearing. A hearing may be conducted in open court, in
chambers, or elsewhere where appropriate facilities are
available. The hearing may be adjourned from time to time and,
except as otherwise required by Code, Courts Article, § 3-812,
may be conducted out of the presence of all persons except those
whose presence is necessary or desirable. If the court finds that
it is in the best interest of a child who is the subject of the
proceeding, the presence of the child may be temporarily
excluded except when the child is alleged to have committed a
delinquent act.
(Emphasis added.)  Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-810(b)(1) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article also addresses the juvenile court’s ability to exclude certain
individuals from a hearing: 
(b)(1) In any proceeding in which a child is alleged to be in need
of assistance or in any voluntary placement hearing, the court
may exclude the general public from a hearing and admit only
those persons having a direct interest in the proceeding and their
representatives.
It is clear that a parent is a party to a CINA proceeding10 and, as such, would be considered
10(...continued)
Proceedings Article defines “party” under the subtitles and provides:
(u)(1) “Party” means:
(i) A child who is the subject of a petition;
(ii) The child's parent, guardian, or custodian;
(iii) The petitioner; or
(iv) An adult who is charged under § 3-828 of this
subtitle.
(2) “Party” does not include a foster parent.
(Emphasis added.)
11 The Rule also requires that it be considered whether Petitioner’s presence was
“desirable” under the facts of the instance case.   As we shall discuss infra, the findings, if
any, made by the juvenile court prior to excluding Petitioner from the courtroom during
Gabby’s testimony, were insufficient to adequately determine the effect of Petitioner’s
presence during Gabby’s testimony.
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a person whose presence is generally necessary under Rule 11-110(b).11  A CINA proceeding
is essentially civil in nature. Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 3-8A-23(a) of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article; In re John P., 311 Md. 700, 707, 537 A.2d 263, 267 (1988).
  
In concert with courts throughout the country, we have made
clear that a party to civil litigation has a right to be present for
and to participate in the trial of his/her case. Although we have
not, in our previous cases, specifically identified the source of
that right, it is clear that the right emanates, at least, from the
common law of Maryland, from the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, from the
Maryland equivalent of that clause, Article 24 of the Declaration
of Rights, and from Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights. We
have also made clear, as have most other courts in the nation,
that the right is not absolute-that there are circumstances in
which a civil case may proceed without the attendance of a party
and, indeed, with the party excluded.
12 Green involved a medical malpractice action where the plaintiff was severely
injured while receiving care in an emergency room and sued defendants, North Arundel
Hospital Association and two doctors employed there.  Green, 366 Md. at 601, 785 A.2d at
364. We considered whether the trial court erred in precluding Green, who was essentially
in a motionless vegetative state as a result of his injury, and unable either to communicate
or to understand the proceeding, from being brought into the courtroom for a period during
the two-week trial as to liability, to be exhibited to the jury “to demonstrate his current
condition.” Id. at 602, 785 A.2d at 364.  Ultimately, we held that there is a right of presence
even in the liability phase of a bifurcated trial, and it cannot be denied solely because the
party's physical appearance may garner jury sympathy.   Id. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378.  The
right of presence is not absolute, “and must be balanced against the defendant's equivalent
right to a fair trial.”  Id. 
While the Green case provides some guidance on the various perspectives of the states
on the issue of excluding a party from a civil proceeding, we limited our holding to the facts
of Green’s case.  The facts of the instant case are inapposite.   As we shall discuss, despite
being civil in nature, the particular concerns of a CINA proceeding, with regard to parental
rights and the best interests of the child, are what set it apart from a typical civil case.  Those
concerns must be taken into consideration when reviewing a parent’s exclusion from a CINA
proceeding.  
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Green v. North Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, 366 Md. 597, 618-19, 785 A.2d 361, 373-74 (2001).12
In Green, we summarized our review of the exclusion of parties in numerous states, noting
that “what emanates from these cases is that there is a right of presence, that the right is not
absolute, and that a determination of whether exclusion of a party constitutes sufficient
prejudice, either presumed or actual, to warrant a new trial depends, to some extent, on the
circumstances.” Id. at 620, 785 A.2d at 375.  
Petitioner argues that the right to due process encompasses a parent’s right to be
present during his or her child’s testimony during a CINA adjudicatory proceeding. Judge
Cathell, then writing for the Court of Special Appeals, provided a detailed framework for the
consideration of due process in connection with parental rights in Wagner v. Wagner, 109
13 While the analysis of Wagner is instructive, it is factually inapposite to the instant
case.  In that child custody case, the mother was absent from a pendente lite hearing because
she had absconded to California, but her counsel was present and she was presumed to know
of the proceedings.  There were also additional facts relevant to the volatile relationship of
the parties in Wagner that necessitated prompt action for the benefit of the children.  In the
instant case, the mother was present at the hearing prior to being excluded.   In contrast, the
mother in Wagner was not present because she was voluntarily absent, and not, as in the
instant case, absent because of the alleged effect of her presence on a testifying child.  
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Md. App. 1, 674 A.2d 1 (1996), cert. denied, Wagner v. Wagner, 343 Md. 334, 681 A.2d 69
(1996):13
Article 24 of Maryland's Declaration of Rights states: “That no
man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his
freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any
manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property,
but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the Land.”
Just what process is due is determined by an analysis of the
particular circumstances of the case, including the functions
served and interests affected. Techem Chemical Co. v. M/T
Choyo Maru, 416 F.Supp. 960, 968 (D.Md.1976) . . . .  Indeed,
it is sufficient if there is at some stage an opportunity to be heard
suitable to the occasion and an opportunity for judicial review
at least to ascertain whether the fundamental elements of due
process have been met. Burke v. Fidelity Trust Co., 202 Md.
178, 188, 96 A.2d 254 (1953). Moreover, with respect to legal
issues, due process does not even necessarily require that parties
be given an opportunity to present argument. Blue Cross of
Maryland, Inc. v. Franklin Square Hosp., 277 Md. 93, 103-04,
352 A.2d 798 (1976).
Due process, thus, is a flexible concept that calls for such
procedural protection as a particular situation may demand.
International Caucus of Labor Comm. v. Maryland Dep't of
Transport., 745 F.Supp. 323, 329 (D.Md.1990); Department of
Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 416, 474 A.2d 191 (1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 311 Md. 64, 532 A.2d 1056 (1987);
Attorney Grievance Comm. v. Reamer, 281 Md. 323, 333, 379
A.2d 171 (1977); Lomax v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 88
14 The circuit court's CINA adjudication will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
(continued...)
-13-
Md.App. 50, 57, 591 A.2d 1311 (1991); Vavasori v.
Commission on Human Relations, 65 Md.App. 237, 245, 500
A.2d 307 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 419, 504 A.2d 1152
(1986). It does not require procedures so comprehensive as to
preclude any possibility of error. International Caucus, 745
F.Supp. at 329-30. Stated another way, due process merely
assures reasonable procedural protections, appropriate to the fair
determination of the particular issues presented in a given case.
See generally Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F.Supp. 1295, 1310
(D.Md.1975)[.]  Therefore, the asserted denial of due process is
to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of the facts in a given
case. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 1256, 86
L.Ed. 1595 (1942). Notably, there is no requirement that actual
prejudice be shown before denial of due process can be
established. Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 66, 225 A.2d 294 (1966).
Once it is determined that an interest is entitled to due
process protection, the pertinent inquiry then becomes what
process is due, a determination that requires consideration and
accommodation of both government and private interests; a
balancing of the various interests at stake. See Pitsenberger v.
Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 30, 410 A.2d 1052, appeal dismissed,
449 U.S. 807, 101 S.Ct. 52, 66 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980). Plainly
stated, due process is not to be evaluated in a vacuum. Its
purpose is to assure basic fairness of procedure and, if departure
from procedure results in unfairness, it may be said to deny due
process; if no unfairness results, there is no denial of due
process. Moss v. Director, Patuxent Instit., 32 Md.App. 66, 74,
359 A.2d 236 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 279 Md. 561, 369
A.2d 1011 (1977).
Wagner, 109 Md. App. at 11-12, 674 A.2d at 23-25 (footnote omitted) (some citations
omitted).   
We turn now to the instant case.14  It is well-established that a parent's interest in
14(...continued)
Md. Rule 8-131(c).
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raising a child is a fundamental right. In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 566-58, 819 A.2d 1030,
1039-40 (2003)(quoting In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 705, 782 A.2d 332, 342-43 (2001)).
Equally  understood is the principle that a parent's fundamental right is not absolute, and is
subject to the best interests of the child standard.  Id. at 568-69, 819 A.2d at 1040-41 (citation
omitted).  Petitioner in the instant case clearly has a liberty interest in the care and custody
of her child, and when, as in a CINA proceeding, a state seeks to change the parent-child
relationship, “the due process clause is implicated.”  Wagner, 109 Md. App. at 25, 674 A.2d
at 12-13 (citing Williams v. Rappeport, 699 F.Supp. 501, 505 (Md.1988), aff'd sub nom.
Williams v. Dvoskin, 879 F.2d 863 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894, 110 S.Ct. 243, 107
L.Ed.2d 193 (1989)) (citation omitted).  
Having determined that Petitioner’s interest is entitled to due process protection, we
next focus our analysis on what process is due, and in doing so, balance the consideration and
accommodation of both the Department’s and Petitioner’s interests at stake.  In addition, we
note that we review Petitioner's asserted denial of due process by an appraisal of the totality
of the facts of the case.  One of the Department’s many goals in a CINA proceeding is to
determine the best interests of the child and act according to those interests.  Petitioner is a
parent and party to the action, with a fundamental interest in the care and welfare of her
child.  
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The motion to exclude Petitioner occurred immediately after the parties’ opening
statements but prior to any testimony on the part of Holstead or another social worker
familiar with the case.  In support of its decision, the juvenile court noted that the proceeding
focused on Gabby’s allegations, and “that the allegation of the County is that her mother has
not responded appropriately, and therefore, there may be some influence on” Gabby due to
her age.  The juvenile court also found that it was in the best interests of Gabby “not [to] be
subjected to any type of influence that may cause her to shade her testimony.”  We hold that
the juvenile court abused its discretion in excluding Petitioner from the hearing without
conducting any inquiry as to the reasons for Petitioner’s exclusion.  There is no indication
on the record that the hearing judge considered Petitioner’s due process rights.  No testimony
was placed on the record, and no inquiries were made of the Department as to the specific
reasons for Petitioner’s exclusion during Gabby’s testimony.  In this situation, we are unable
to discern the judge’s exercise of discretion if he or she does not state, or there does not exist,
on the record, the factual basis for his or her decision.
Our decision does not imply that a juvenile court may never exclude a parent during
the testimony of a child in a CINA proceeding, as Rule 11-110(b) clearly provides the
juvenile court with the discretion to conduct a hearing outside the presence of all persons
except those whose presence is necessary or desirable.  Notwithstanding, we note that the
juvenile court's discretion to exclude certain individuals from a juvenile proceeding is not
unlimited and must be exercised in accord with purposes for which it was given and within
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applicable constitutional limitations.  Baltimore Sun Co. v. State, 340 Md. 437, 456-57, 667
A.2d 166, 175-76 (1995).  Despite the informal nature of proceedings in juvenile court, “the
rules of practice, of procedure, of evidence, and standards of fairness must be observed.”  In
re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 524, 255 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1969)(citing In re Fletcher, 251 Md.
520, 248 A.2d 364 (1968)).   The rules of evidence contained in Title 5 of the Maryland
Rules apply to CINA adjudicatory hearings.  Md. Code (1972, 2002 Repl. Vol) § 3-817(b)
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  See In re Ashley E., 158 Md. App. 144, 854
A.2d 893 (2004), cert. granted, 383 Md. 569, 861 A.2d 60, aff'd, 387 Md. 260, 874 A.2d 998
(2005) (stating that, under the Maryland Rules, “a juvenile court in a disposition hearing in
a CINA case has discretion not to strictly apply the Rules of Evidence [but that] is not the
case in an adjudicatory proceeding in a CINA case . . . [where] the Rules of Evidence ‘shall
apply.’”).  
Maryland Rule 5-615 (a) provides that, upon the request of a party made before
testimony begins, “the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the
testimony of other witnesses.”  Excepted from the rule permitting the exclusion of witnesses
is “a party who is a natural person.”  Md. Rule 6-615(b)(1).  “[I]t is clear that the right [to be
present for and to participate in the trial of one's case] emanates . . . from the common law
of Maryland, from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, from the Maryland equivalent of that clause, Article 24 of the Declaration of
Rights, and from Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights.”  Green v. North Arundel Hosp.
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Ass'n, Inc., 366 Md. 597, 618, 785 A.2d 361, 373 (2001).  This right, however, is not
absolute, and “there are circumstances in which a civil case may proceed without the
attendance of a party and, indeed, with the party excluded.”  Id. at 618-19, 785 A.2d at
373-74.   The determination of whether the exclusion of a party constitutes sufficient
prejudice, either presumed or actual, to warrant a new trial depends, to some extent, on the
circumstances. Id. at 620, 785 A.2d at 375.  We stated in Green that the focus of our analysis
should not just hinge upon the exclusion of a party from the proceedings, but “why the
exclusion was prejudicial.”  Id. at 620-21, 785 A.2d at 375.
 The procedure in the instant case resulted in the exclusion of Petitioner based merely
on the Department’s allegation that Petitioner would unduly influence Gabby’s testimony.
To exclude Petitioner on the basis of a brief mention of the Department’s allegations alone
resulted in  unfairness and prejudice to Petitioner, and thus denied her due process.
Petitioner was unable to confer with her attorney during Gabby’s testimony, and was only
permitted by the court to confer with her attorney before cross-examination of Gabby.
Though Gabby’s testimony was recorded, there is no indication from the record that Gabby’s
recorded testimony was provided to Petitioner when she conferred with her attorney.  This
is inconsistent with the practice in Maryland custody cases of providing to the excluded party
a recorded copy of a child’s interview that occurs out of the presence of a party.  See Shapiro
v. Shapiro, 54 Md. App. 477, 480, 458 A.2d 1257, 1259 (1983) (citing Marshall v.
Stefanides, 17 Md. App. 364, 369, 302 A.2d 682, 685 (1973)) (“In all cases [where a judge
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interviews a child out of the presence of the parties], unless waived by the parties, the
interview must be recorded by a court reporter and immediately following the interview its
content shall be made known to counsel and the parties by means of the court reporter's
reading of the record to them.”). Under the facts of the instant case, it was an abuse of
discretion for the juvenile court to exclude Petitioner from the courtroom during Gabby’s
testimony without making any finding on the record as to the factual basis for such an action.
Balancing the considerations of both the Department and Petitioner, consideration must be
given to Petitioner’s right to due process.
 
We hold that the juvenile court abused its discretion  in excluding Petitioner
from the proceedings without making any specific factual finding as to the propriety of her
exclusion.  As this error was not harmless, we remand the matter to the juvenile court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.  See In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 586, 819
A.2d at 1051 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 122-26, 372 A.2d 231, 232-34
(1977)(some internal citations omitted)(emphasis added)) (“[I]f it appears that the chancellor
[in a child custody hearing] erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court
will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless.”). 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED AND
CASE 
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
C I R C U I T  
C O U R T  
F O R
MONTGOMERY COUNTY AND TO
REMAND THE CASE TO THAT
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C O U R T  
F O R  
F U R T H E R
P R O C E E D I N G S  
N O T
INCONSI S T E N T 
W I T H  
T H IS
OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
R
E
S
P
O
N
D
E
N
T
.