Case Title: Sparks v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 23

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
ane

 

4127 Nev, Advance Opinion 23
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

ROY SPARKS AND ANDREA SPARKS, | No, 50668
HUSBAND AND WIFE; AND ROY
SPARKS, III, BY AND THROUGH HIS |
GUARDIAN AD LITEM, ROY SPARKS,
Appellants, |

vs.
‘THE ALPHA TAU OMEGA
FRATERNITY, INC., A MARYLAND
CORPORATION; ALPHA TAU OMEGA
ETA EPSILON CHAPTER, UNLV, AN | FILED
UNIDENTIFIED ENTITY; DOUG
FOLEY, IT'S PRESIDENT; ALPHA TAU | MAY 2.6 2011
OMEGA DELTA IOTA CHAPTER, UNR,
AN UNIDENTIFIED ENTITY; ROBERT
ROJAS, ITS PRESIDENT; ALPHA TAU
OMEGA NEVADA SOUTHERN |
ALUMNI ASSOCIATION; UNIVERSITY
OF NEVADA ALUMNI ASSOCIATION,
INC; JULIE ARDITO, ITS PRESIDENT;
AND SOUTHERN NEVADA YOUNG
ALUMNI CHAPTER,
Respondents,

 

 

 

Appeal from district court orders, certified as final pursuant to
NRCP 64(), granting summary judgments in a tort action. Highth
Judicial District Court, Clark County; David B. Barker, Judge.

med,
Sterling Law, LLC, and Beau Sterling and Richard Vilkin, Las Vegas;

Simon Law Office, and Daniel S. Simon, Las Vegas,
for Appellants.

st5522.

 
Maupin, Cox & LeGoy and Michael E. Malloy and Carolyn K. Renner,
Reno,

for Respondents University of Nevada Alumni Association, Inc.; Julie
Ardito; and Southern Nevada Young Alumni Chapter.

Stephenson & Dickinson and Bruce Scott Dickinson and Michael E.
Hottman, Las Vegas,
for Respondents Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Inc; Alpha Tau Omega Eta
Epsilon Chapter, UNLV; Doug Foley; Alpha Tau Omega Delta Iota
Chapter, UNR; Robert Rojas; and Alpha Tau Omega Nevada Southern
Alumni Association.

 

BEFORE DOUGLAS, C.J., PICKERING and HARDESTY, JJ.

OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

Appellant Roy Sparks and Jeffrey Clack engaged in a fight
during a college football tailgate event that resulted in an injury to Roy.
Roy and his wife, appellant Andrea Sparks, filed suit against Clack and a
number of other entities allegedly involved with the tailgate event,
asserting several causes of action, including negligence and intentional
torts, The Sparkses also named fictitious Doe and Roe defendants because
they did not know the true identity of all of the potentially liable parties.
Eventually, the Sparkses attempted to substitute the UNR Alumni
Association, Inc., Julie Ardito, and the Southern Nevada Young Alumni
Chapter (collectively, the Alumni respondents) in place of the fictitious
Doe and Roe defendants. The district court dismissed claims against the
Alumni respondents based on the statute of limitations and granted

summary judgment in favor of the other entities. The Sparkses appealed.

 

 
In this appeal, we address three main issues: (1) whether the
Sparkses exercised reasonable diligence under Nurenberger Hercules-
Werke v. Virostek, 107 Nev. 873, 822 P.2d 1100 (1991), in ascertaining the

identities of the Doe and Roe defendants, such that their amended

 

complaint could relate back to the date that they filed the first complaint,
pursuant to NRCP 10(a); (2) whether respondents Alpha Tau Omega
Fraternity, Inc. (ATO National); Alpha Tau Omega Eta Epsilon Chapter
(ATO-UNLV); Doug Foley, president of ATO-UNLV; Alpha Tau Omega
Delta Tota Chapter, UNR (ATO-UNR); Robert Rojas, president of ATO-
UNR; and Alpha Tau Omega Nevada Southern Alumni Association (ATO-
NSAA) (collectively, the ATO respondents) owed a duty of care to the
nd (8)
whether a factual dispute exists as to the ATO respondents’ exercise of

 

Sparkses, which is needed to proceed with their negligence claims;

control over Clack or subsequent ratification of his actions sufficient to
hold them liable for his intentional torts, if any. After explaining what
constitutes reasonable diligence under the third element of the
Nurenberger test, we conclude that the Sparkses did not exercise
reasonable diligence in ascertaining the identities of the Doe and Roe
defendants and, thus, the statute of limitations ran on their causes of
action against the Alumni respondents. We further conclude that the ATO
respondents owed no duty of care to the Sparkses and did not possess the
ability to control Clack or ratify his actions sufficient to be held liable for

 

In October 2002, prior to a football game between the
University of Nevada, Reno (UNR) and the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas (UNLV) in Las Vegas, the Sparkses and some of their friends had a
birthday party for the Sparkses’ son in a designated family tailgate area at

3

 
Sam Boyd Stadium. Clack and a group of his friends attended a separate
tailgate gathering across from the Sparkses, in a section reserved by
respondents University of Nevada Alumni Association, Inc. (UNR Alumni
Association), and the Southern Nevada Young Alumni Chapter (SNYAC).
Also present at the tailgate gathering were members of ATO-UNR and
ATO-UNLY,

After their son's birthday party, the Sparkses returned to
their vehicle to put away gifts and the birthday cake, Clack and two other
young men gathered near the Sparkses’ car, and Andrea asked them to get
off the car. Roy then repeated Andrea's request, after which an altercation
ensued. At some point during the brief fracas, Clack bit off a piece of Roy's
nose. Roy has since had two surgeries to repair the damage caused by the
dite.

In February 2004, the Sparkses filed a complaint against
Clack, UNLV Foundation, UNLV, Sam Boyd Silver Bowl, Sam Boyd
Stadium, Greek Life at UNLV, Alpha Tau Omega Chapter, ATO-NSAA,
and unnamed Doe and Ree corporation defendants. The Sparkses then
amended their complaint to add ATO-UNLY and its president Doug Foley,
ATO-UNR and its president Robert Rojas, and ATO National as
defendants.

During the course of discovery, which lasted for over a year,
the Sparkses learned that the UNR Alumni Association was the party
responsible for the tailgate function, and that SNYAC was the party
responsible for arranging pre-game transportation to the stadium for
Clack and other attendees. In July 2006, over two years after filing their

initial complaint, the Sparkses moved for and were granted leave to file a

second amended complaint to substitute the UNR Alumni Association, its

 

 
ane a

 

president, Julie Ardito, and SNYAC for unnamed Doe and Roe defendants,
pursuant to NRCP 10(a). Almost eight months after the motion was
granted, the Sparkses filed their second amended complaint, which added
claims against the three UNR Alumni respondents.

‘The Alumni respondents did not answer the complaint but
instead filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment, Among other arguments, the Alumni respondents asserted that
the two-year statute of limitations had expired for the Sparkses’ claims.
Moreover, according to the Alumni respondents, the Sparkses had not
satisfied the elements that must be met for an amended complaint to
relate back to the filing date of the initial complaint set forth by this court
in Nurenberger Hercules-Werke v. Virostek, 107 Nev. 873, 822 P.2d 1100
(1991.2 Following a hearing, the district court granted the Alumni

INRCP 10(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] party whose name
is not known may be designated by any name, and when the true name is
discovered, the pleading may be amended accordingly.”

“The three-part test established in Nurenberger allows an amended
complaint to relate back to the filing date of the initial complaint if the
plaintiff:

(2) plead[s} fictitious or doe defendants in the

caption of the complaint; (2) plead{s} the basis for

naming defendants by other than their true

identity,...;and (8) _exercis[es]_ reasonable

diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the

intended defendants and promptly movfe] to

amend the complaint in order to substitute the

actual for the fictional.

107 Nev. 873, 881, 822 P.24 1100, 1106 (1991).

 

 
respondents’ motion, granting summary judgment in favor of the UNR
Alumni Association, Ardito, and SNYAC. The district court concluded
that the Sparkses failed to satisfy the third Nurenberger requirement,
which is “exercising reasonable diligence in ascertaining the true identity
of the intended defendants and promptly moving to amend the complaint
in order to substitute the actual for the fictional,” and that the statute of
limitations had expired. 1d, at $81, 822 P.2d at 1106,

‘The ATO respondents? answered the complaint and later
moved for summary judgment. The motion rested on four grounds: (1)
“{nleither Mr. Sparks nor Mr. Clack were members of ATO or otherwise
under the control of ATO at the time of the fight”; (2) the tailgate area was
not subject to ATO's control; (3) “ATO did not direct, authorize or ratify
the actions of Mr. Clack”; and (4) “{nleither Robert Rojas nor Doug Foley
were the president of ATO-UNR or ATO-UNLY, respectively, at the time
the fight occurred.”

The Sparkses opposed the motion on numerous grounds,
including, among others, that because ATO-UNLV, ATO-UNR, ATO
National, and ATO-NSAA failed to supervise their ATO members, they
‘were responsible for their members’ various actions; and “ATO-UNR and
ATO-UNLY directed, authorized and ratified the actions of Mr. Clack.”

"The Sparkses also named Alpha Tau Omega Chapter in their
complaint; however, the ATO respondents indicate that the Sparkses
never effected service upon Alpha Tau Omega, and that party has not
appeared in the lower court. Additionally, the Sparkees named various
other entities with whom they later settled.

 

 
‘The district court granted the ATO respondents’ motion for summary
judgment, finding that the Sparkses failed to show any genuine issues of
material fact and, therefore, the ATO respondents were entitled to
judgment

 

matter of law. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION

In this appeal, we must initially determine whether, prior to

amending their complaint pursuant to NRCP 10(a), the Sparkses

exercised reasonable diligence in ascertaining the identities of the Doe and

 

Roe defendants. In doing so, we explain what constitutes reasonable
diligence under the third element of the Nurenberger test and, based on
that explanation, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed
the Alumni respondents because the Sparkses did not exercise reasonable
diligence in ascertaining the identity of the Doe and Roe defendants.

We then examine the duty of care, if any, the ATO
respondents owed to protect the Sparkses from Clack and whether the
ATO respondents exercised sufficient control over Clack or subsequently
ratified his actions, making them liable for any intentional torts. We
conclude that the ATO respondents did not owe a duty to protect the
Sparkses and that they are not liable for Clack’s intentional torts.

‘The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
the Alumni respondents

Standard of review:

‘The alumni respondents filed a “motion to dismiss or in the
alternative for summary judgment.” The district court granted this
motion “in its entirety,” but did not specify which motion it granted.

Where the court considers matters outside the pleadings, such as

affidavits, we treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment.

Stevens v, McGimsey, 99 Nev. 840, 841, 673 P.2d 499, 500 (1983); see also

 

 
MacDonald v. Kassel, 97 Nev. 305, 307, 629 P.2d 1200, 1200 (1981). Here,
the district court presumably considered the affidavit of Ardito, which the
Alumni respondents attached to its motion. Therefore, the district court
effectively treated the motion as a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to NRCP 56,

We review a district court order granting summary judgment
de novo. Ozawa v. Vision Airlines, 125 Nev. _, _. 216 P.8d 788, 791
(2009), “Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
ssue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

 

matter of law.” Id, When reviewing an order granting summary
judgment, this court views the record “in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Delgado v. American Family Ins, Group, 125 Nev. _,
—— 217 P.3d 563, 568 (2009). What constitutes “reasonable diligence”
under the third element of the Nurenberger test is a question of law,
subject to de novo review. Nurenberger, 107 Nev. at 881, 822 P.2d at

1105; Buzz Stew, LLC v, City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d
670, 672 (2008).
Reasonable diligence

NRCP 10a) allows a plaintiff to amend his or her complaint to
substitute a Doe or Roe defendant with a named party when the true
name is discovered. To do so, the plaintiff must meet all elements of the
‘three-part test established in Nurenberger. See 107 Nev. at 881, 822 P.2d
at 1106. If those elements are satisfied, then the amended complaint shall
relate back to the date of the filing of the original complaint. Id, at 881-82,
822 P.2d at 1106.

Here, the district court granted the Alumni respondents’
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of

limitations had expired on the Sparkses! claims against the Alumni

8
ee eeerceeraner oer cineca facie se a veeannncumne nseonnnrenenabinn os

 

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ane

respondents,‘ and that the second amended complaint did not relate back
to the filing date of the initial complaint because the Sparkses failed to
satisfy the third Nurenberger requirement.

In Nurenberger, we recognized that plaintiffs must proactively
seek to identify unknown defendants in order for an amendment made
pursuant to NRCP 10(a) to relate back to the filing date of the original
complaint, and we therefore included a reasonable diligence requirement
as the third factor. 107 Nev. at 881, 822 P.2d at 1105, The reasonable
diligence requirement is intended to guard ay

inst the abuse of Doe and

 

Roe defendants as placeholders during the commencement of litigation
and “was not intended to reward indolence or lack of diligence by giving
plaintiffs an automatic method of circumventing statutes of limitations.”
Id, However, this court has not addressed what constitutes reasonable
diligence in the context of satisfying the Nurenberger requirements when
amending a complaint pursuant to NRCP 10(a). Thus, we take this
opportunity to examine Nurenberger's “reasonable diligence” requirement.

‘Roy suffered his injuries on October 5, 2002; thus, the two-year
statute of limitations “for injuries...caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another,” NRS 11.190(4)(e). expired on October 5, 2004. The
Sparkses do not challenge the district court’s determination that the
statute of limitations had expired by April 6, 2007, when the second
amended complaint naming the Alumni respondents was filed.

‘The district court's specification that the Sparkses failed to satisly
the third requirement implies that the first two requirements were
satisfied. Moreover, the Alumni respondents failed to respond to the
Sparkees’ arguments regarding the first two Nurenberger requirements,
so we do not address them. Consequently, we examine the third
requirement only.

 

 
08

 

Other jurisdictions have addressed similar diligence
requirements for allowing amended pleadings to relate back based on the
substitution of actual parties for fictitious defendants. ‘The decisions from
these other jurisdictions are instructive and provide factors that we
determine district courts in Nevada should consider when evaluating
whether a party has exercised reasonable diligence in ascertaining the
identity of a defendant. Such factors include whether the party
unreasonably delayed amending the pleadings to reflect the true identity
of a defendant once it became known, Ensey v, Culhane, 727 A.2d 687, 690
(I. 1999); whether the plaintiff utilized “judicial mechanisms such as
discovery” to inquire into a defendant's true identity, Price v, Clark, 21
So. 3d 509, 526 (Miss. 2009) (quoting Rawson v. Jones, 816 So. 2d 367, 369
(Miss, 2001); and whether a defendant concealed its identity or otherwise
obstructed the plaintiff's investigation as to its identity, Fazzalare v, Desa
Industries, Inc,, 351 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (Be:
dissenting). These factors are not exhaustive.

 

 

Here, the district court found that the Sparkses did not
exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the identity of the Alumni
respondents. The Sparkses filed their initial complaint in February 2004,
and discovery commenced with the filing of the joint case conference
report in December 2004. Over one year and seven months later, in July
2006, the Sparkses learned that the Alumni respondents had organized
the tailgate gathering and filed a motion to amend their complaint to
substitute the Doe and Roe defendants with the Alumni respondents. The
Sparkses then waited almost eight more months after the district court

granted their motion to finally file the amended complaint.

10

 
 

On appeal, the Sparkses explain that the reason for the delay
in ascertaining the true defendants was that their trial attorney “was
frustrated in discovery by a complex set of facts brought on by the nature
of the various fraternity, university and alumni organizations involved
with the event .

 

ind witnesses who claimed memory loss and frustrated
the investigation.” However, they do not identify which witnesses were
not forthcoming or how their discovery of the Alumni respondents was
impeded, and they offer no explanation for their eight-month delay in
filing the amended complaint after the district court granted leave to
amend. Additionally, the Sparkses took only two depositions from the
time discovery commenced in December 2004 until the time they filed the
motion to amend their complaint in July 2006. Further, nothing in the
record suggests that the Alumni respondents did anything to hide their
true identity or obstruct the Sparkses’ investigation of their identity.

‘Thus, we determine that the Sparkses’ inexplicable delay in
ascertaining the identity of the Alumni respondents and their failure to
promptly amend their complaint once they ascertained the proper identity
of the Alumni respondents demonstrates a lack of reasonable diligence.
Therefore, the district court correctly found that the Sparkses failed to
satisfy the third element of the Nurenberger test, the amended complaint
could not relate back to the filing date of the initial complaint, and the
statute of limitations had run as to the causes of action alleged against the

Alumni respondents, making summary judgment appropriate.

The did not err in the ATO r ion for
summary judgment

‘The Sparkses argue that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of the ATO respondents because a special
relationship created a duty of care owed to them. After carefully

i

 
reviewing the briefs on appeal, it is unclear what special relationship the

Sparkses claim oxists. We conclude that neither ATO National nor the

 

local ATO chapters had a special relationship with the Sparkses to give
rise to a duty of care.
Standard of review

Whether a defendant was negligent is generally “a question of
fact for the jury,” and thus, this court is hesitant “to affirm summary
judgment in negligence cases.” Rodriguez v, Primadonna Company, 125
Nev. __, __, 216 P.3d 793, 798 (2009). However, a defendant is entitled
to summary judgment if the plaintiff cannot recover as a question of law.
Id, “[TJhe question of whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of
care is a question of law,” and thus, “if this court determines that no duty
exists, it will affirm summary judgment.” Id,

‘The ATO respondents do not_have a special relationship with the
Sparkses such that the ATO respondents owe the Sparkses a duty of

care

A plaintiff alleging negligence must demonstrate “(1) the
existence of a duty of care, (2) breach of that duty, (3) legal causation, and
(4) damages.” Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, 125 Nev. __, __, 221 P.3d
1276, 1280 (2009). Generally, “no duty is owed to control the dangerous
conduct of another.” Jd, However, Nevada recognizes an exception to the

general rule, and a duty of care arises “when (1) a special relationship

exists between the parties...,and (2) the harm created by the
defendant's conduct is foreseeable.” Id, at __, 221 P.3d at 1280-81.

A crucial factor in establishing liability in the context of
special relationships between national and local fraternity chapters and a
third party is “the element of control.” Scialabba v. Brandise Constr. Co,,
112 Nev. 965, 969, 921 P.2d 928, 930 (1996). In Scialabba, we noted that,

 

 
 

the rationale for imposing liability when one party controls another is
that:

[Slince the ability of one of the parties to provide
for his own protection has been limited in some
way by his submission to the control of the other, a
duty should be imposed upon the one possessing
control (and thus the power to act) to take
reasonable precautions to protect the other one
from assaults by third parties which, at least,
could reasonably have been anticipated.

Id, (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted), Such ability to
exercise control “must be real and not fictional and, if exercised, would
meaningfully reduce the risk of the harm that actually occurred.” Grand
Aerie Fraternal Order v, Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840, 851 (Ky. 2005). In
the absence of this degree of control, “there is no special relationship

 

giving rise to a duty of reasonable care.” Id. at 853. In order to determine
whether a special relationship existed such that any of the ATO
respondents owed a duty of care to the Sparkses, we must separately
examine the relationship between the national organization and the
Sparkses, and the relationship between the local chapters and the
Sparkses. ATO National can be liable only if it hed some duty to monitor
or control its local chapters.

Relationship between ATO National and the Sparkses

Although this court has not previously addressed whether
there is a special relationship between a national fraternity and a third
party, such that the national fraternity owes a duty to control the conduct
of the local chapter and could be held liable for harm caused to a
nonmember by a third party guest, other courts have addressed similar
questions. In Alumni Ass'n v, Sullivan, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
considered a national organization's relationship to a local chapter. 572

13

 
A.2d 1209, 1209-10 (Pa. 1990). In that case, a freshman college student
drank alcohol that was provided at parties hosted by both his dormitory
and a local chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity (of which he was not a
member). Id. At some point, a fire was set at a neighboring fraternity,
Lambda Chi Alpha, allegedly by the student, Id, at 1210. Thereafter, the
neighboring fraternity sued the student and Sigma Chi for negligently
providing him with alcohol. Id, In declining to extend Pennsylvania's
social-host doctrine,’ the court concluded that the national fraternity did

not owe a duty to monitor the everyday activities of its local chapters. Id.

 

at 1211, 1213, The court reasoned that “[tJhe national organization in
fraternal groups has only the power to discipline an errant chapter after
the fact. It does not possess the resources to monitor the activities of its
chapters contemporaneously with the event.” Id, at 1213; see also
Camneyhan, 169 8.W.3d at 854 (concluding that because the local chapter's
ability to conduct its social functions was not controlled at all by the
national organization, “no special relationship existed giving rise to a duty
on the part of the [national organization] to exercise reasonable care to
control [the local chapter]"); Colangelo v, Tau Kappa Epsilon Fraternity,
517 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that “imposfing] a
duty upon the national fraternity to supervise the daily activities of its
local chapters” would be impractical and would result in a significant

increase in operating costs).

"Pennsylvania's social-host doctrine holds social hosts liable when
they “knowingly furnish{ ' alcoholic beverages to a minor.” Alumni Ass'n
xv, Sullivan, 572 A.2d 1209, 1211-12 (Pa. 1990).

 

 
‘The imposition of a duty on ATO National is likewise not
warranted here. In their second amended complaint before the district
court and in their briefs on appeal, the Sparkses fail to differentiate
between ATO National and ATO-UNR and ATO-UNLV. Rather, they
argue broadly that the ATO respondents “had a duty to control and
supervise their guests." However, the Sparkses fail to provide any
rationale for placing responsibility on ATO National to control and
supervise a tailgate party, even if it had been hosted by or in an area
reserved by a local ATO chapter. Thus, like the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, and based on the facts presented in this case, we are not persuaded
that a national fraternal organization has a duty to supervise the
everyday activities of its local chapters. Accordingly, we conclude that a
special relationship did not exist, and that ATO National did not owe a
duty to the Sparkses to protect them from injury caused by a third party,

Relationship_between_ATO-UNR_and_ATO-UNLV and the

As noted above, ATO-UNR or ATO-UNLV owed a duty to the
Sparkses only if a special relationship existed between the fraternities and
the Sparkses. Whether such a relationship existed depends upon the level
of actual control the local chapters exerted over the Sparkses or over
Clack.

 

We have previously concluded that special relationships giving
rise to a duty of care include, but are not limited to, those between “an
innkeeper-guest, teacher-student [and] employer-employee,” as well as “a
” Lee v. GNLV Corp., 117 Nev. 291, 295-96,
22 P.3d 209, 212 (2001), Other courts have also recognized “landowner-

restaurateur and his patron:

 

invitee, businessman-patron . .. school district-pupil, hospital-patient, and

 

 
08

 

carrier-passenger” relationships. Scialabba, 112 Nev. at 969, 921 P.2d at
930.

‘The sole relationship cited by the Sparkses on appeal as
existing between them and the ATO respondents is that of
. witeo.” | We

 

landowner/possessor

   

isagree. First, there is no such

 

relationship present between the ATO respondents and the Sparkse:
the Sparkses were not invitees of the ATO respondents, This fact is
critical because, as explained in Scialabba, the reason behind imposing a
duty in a landowner-invitee relationship is that the invitee’s ability to
protect himself “has been limited in some way by his submission to the
control of the other, [such that] a duty should be imposed upon the one
possessing control.” Jd, (internal quotation omitted). As the Sparkses
were not invitees and thus did not submit themselves to the control of the
ATO respondents, the Sparkses’ argument fails.

Furthermore, even assuming, without deciding, that a duty to
the Sparkses under a “landowner/possessor-invitee” relationship could
exist based on the fact that Clack was an invitee of the ATO respondents,
such a duty would not apply here. While “fa] land owner or occupier owes
a duty to the people on the land to act reasonably under the
circumstances,” Rockwell v, Sun Harbor Budget Suites, 112 Nev. 1217,
1228, 925 P.2d 1175, 1182 (1996), the altercation at issue in this matter
occurred in an area not controlled by the ATO respondents. Thus, even
under this potential theory, the ATO respondents had no duty to control
Clack outside of their tailgate area.

‘The ATO respondents are not liable for Clack’s intentional torts

Finally, the Sparkses contend that the ATO respondents, as
associations, even if they were not themselves negligent, should be liable

16

 
for Clack’s intentional torts because they ratified Clack’s actions. But an
association cannot be liable for the “tortious acts of a person... where
such person is not under the control of the association, or subject at the
very time to its right to control his or her acts.” 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations
and Clubs § 45 (2008). Moreover, even if the wrongdoer is a member of
the association, the association will not be liable for his or her intentional
torts “[a]bsent authorization or ratification by the [other] members of [the]
association.” Jd, Clack was not under the control of the ATO respondents,
and he was not a member of that organization. Therefore, the ATO
respondents are not liable for his intentional torts.

Although this court has not previously addressed whether a
fraternity is liable for the intentional torts of its members or guests, the
Alabama Supreme Court addressed a similar issue. In Rothman _v.
Gamma Alpha. a fight occurred between several members of the Gamma
Fraternity and the Delta Fraternity on the Delta Fraternity’s premises,
599 So. 2d 9, 10 (Ala, 1992). One of the injured Delta members filed suit
against Gamma and two of its members. Id, The court concluded that
summary judgment in favor of Gamma was proper because the appellants
failed to present evidence demonstrating that “Gamma encouraged,
authorized, or subsequently ratified the actions of its members during the
fight.” Id. at 11 It was inconsequential to the court that the Gamma
members involved in the fight were not subsequently punished by Gamma
because that lack of punishment was not evidence of ratification. [d, The
court further stated that Gamma did not “owe[] a duty to [appellants] to
control the conduct of its members.” Id.

7

 
Here, the Sparkses presented no evidence that the ATO
respondents controlled Clack or ratified his violent behavior, In their

opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the Sparks:

 

argued only
that the ATO respondents “encouraged Clack when they surrounded the
Plaintiffs.” On appeal, they merely contend that, unlike the scenario in
Rothman, here the ATO respondents ratified Clack’s actions when the
ATO-UNR officers suffered memory loss when giving their statements to
the police, According to the Sparkses, concealing information is evidence
of ratification after the fact. However, the vice president of ATO-UNR
called the police back 30 minutes after his first interview to provide them
with Clack’s name, indicating an inconsequential delay that does not
create a genuine issue of material fact regarding ratification.
Furthermore, the fight broke out unexpectedly and ended after only a few
seconds, so in this instance, the ATO respondents had no time to ratify the
behavior as it was occurring. Cf, Nittinger v. Holman, 119 Nev. 192, 194,
197, 69 P.3d 688, 690, 692 (2003) (concluding that a jury could find that a
security guard who witnessed other security guards beat a patron, chase
him down, and continue beating him ratified their actions by failing to
intervene). Therefore, we conclude that the ATO respondents are not

liable for Clack’s intentional torts because they did not have an ability to
control Clack and, even if they could be held liable based on their
ratification of a nonmember's actions, there exists no genuine dispute of
material fact that they did not subsequently ratify Clack’s actions.

 

 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Alumni and ATO respondents,

[Sun 2a, 2

Hardesty

We concur:

oa
Doughas