Case Title: Nelson v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 040028

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
JOHN BYRD NELSON 
 
 
 
   OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.    Record No. 040028             November 5, 2004 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this criminal appeal, we have limited our review to 
two issues:  Whether the Court of Appeals of Virginia erred in 
ruling that the trial court properly reviewed sensitive 
medical records in camera and refused to allow examination of 
the records by the defendant; and, whether the Court of 
Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court correctly 
declined to conduct a hearing regarding allegations of a 
juror's possible bias. 
 
Defendant John Byrd Nelson was found guilty in September 
2002 by a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of Newport 
News of the following felonies:  three counts of forcible 
sodomy, in violation of Code § 18.2-67.1(A)(1); one count of 
taking indecent liberties with a child under the age of 14 
years, in violation of Code § 18.2-370(A)(1); and one count of 
object sexual penetration of a child less than 13 years of 
age, in violation of Code § 18.2-67.2(A)(1). 
 
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When these offenses were committed on August 25, 2000, 
the defendant was 69 years of age and the male victim was 12 
years of age. 
 
Confirming the jury's verdicts, the trial court sentenced 
defendant to a total of 45 years in prison in October 2002 
judgment orders, from which the defendant appealed.  Upon 
review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.  Nelson 
v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 716, 589 S.E.2d 23 (2003).  We 
awarded defendant this appeal, limited to consideration of the 
foregoing issues. 
 
First, the defendant contends that the "Court of Appeals 
erred in affirming the trial court's refusal to make 
subpoenaed records available to the defense."  The issue arose 
in the following manner. 
 
Prior to trial, the defendant, by his attorney, requested 
that a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 3A:12(b) be issued for 
the production of all records in the possession of Dr. Alan 
Rountree, a nonparty, pertaining to the mental and physical 
examination and treatment of the victim.  The request, which 
asked that the records be produced before the clerk of court, 
stated that the documents "are relevant and material to the 
proceedings." 
 
In an affidavit filed with the request, counsel asserted 
that the victim "suffers from a mental condition which causes 
 
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him to have visual and auditory hallucinations," for which Dr. 
Rountree, a Hampton physician, had treated him following the 
offenses.  The affidavit also asserted that access to the 
medical records was "necessary for potential impeachment at 
trial, a determination of [the victim's] competence to testify 
as a witness, and otherwise in the defense of this case." 
 
Following production of the records, the court reviewed 
them in camera at the request of the prosecutor, and ordered 
them sealed.  The defendant then moved for "the opportunity to 
review those records," relying on the provisions of Rule 
3A:12(b). 
 
During a hearing on the defendant's motion, the trial 
judge denied it.  Stating that she had "looked at these 
records very carefully," the judge said "it would be highly 
prejudicial to the victim to release that information."  She 
noted that defense counsel would have "an ethical obligation" 
to reveal the contents to his client, which, she said, would 
not be "appropriate."  Concluding, the court said the records 
were not "material at all" to defendant's case.  The sealed 
documents are part of the record on appeal. 
 
Rule 3A:12(b) deals, in part, with a subpoena duces tecum 
for production of documentary evidence before a circuit court.  
As pertinent to this case, the subparagraph provides: 
 
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"Upon notice to the adverse party and on 
affidavit by the party applying for the subpoena 
that the requested writings . . . are material to 
the proceedings and are in the possession of a 
person not a party to the action, the judge or the 
clerk may issue a subpoena duces tecum for the 
production of writings . . . described in the 
subpoena. . . . 
 
 
"Any subpoenaed writings . . . , regardless by 
whom requested, shall be available for examination 
and review by all parties and counsel.  Subpoenaed 
writings . . . shall be received by the clerk and 
shall not be open for examination and review except 
by the parties and counsel unless otherwise directed 
by the court. . . . 
 
 
"Where subpoenaed writings . . . are of such 
nature or content that disclosure to other parties 
would be unduly prejudicial, the court, upon written 
motion and notice to all parties, may grant such 
relief as it deems appropriate, including limiting 
disclosure, removal and copying." 
 
 
The defendant focuses on the Rule's language in the 
second paragraph quoted above, while ignoring the 
language of the third paragraph.  He emphasizes the 
provision that the subpoenaed writings "shall be 
available for examination and review by all parties and 
counsel," and the provision that the records "shall not 
be open for examination and review except by the parties 
and counsel."  This language, he says, gives the parties 
and counsel "an absolute right to review and examine 
records produced."  According to defendant, the purpose 
of the Rule's next clause in that paragraph, "unless 
otherwise directed by the court," is to specify that the 
 
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records are not to be open to the public unless otherwise 
directed by the trial court. 
 
The defendant argues that the trial court 
"apparently determined" that the Rountree records lacked 
evidentiary value to the defense and "ruled that they 
were, therefore, not material."  He opines that the trial 
judge acceded to the prosecutor's "request for sealing 
subpoenaed records and in camera inspection based upon 
her view that the victim's privacy concerns were more 
important than the preparation of Mr. Nelson's defense."  
Nevertheless, the defendant contends, "not only Mr. 
Nelson's attorney, but John Nelson himself was entitled 
to review and examine the records of Dr. Rountree." 
 
According to the defendant, a victim's privacy 
concerns are logically addressed by the showing of 
materiality at the time of the trial court's threshold 
decision to grant or deny issuance of the subpoena, and 
by the specific provisions of the second paragraph which, 
in defendant's words, "strictly limit any dissemination 
of information produced other than to the parties and 
counsel." 
 
Defendant argues that the Rountree records were 
material to his defense.  He says that another physician, 
who treated the victim prior to these offenses and who 
 
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testified at defendant's first trial, which ended in a 
hung jury, changed his testimony during the instant, 
second trial.  That physician, according to the 
defendant, revised his medical opinion based upon 
information developed during the period of Rountree's 
treatment of the victim, making those records vital to 
the defense. 
 
Therefore, defendant contends, the trial court erred 
in refusing his motion to examine the records, and the 
Court of Appeals erred in failing to reverse the trial 
court.  We disagree. 
 
The Rule's language in question is clear and 
unambiguous.  In the second quoted paragraph of 
subsection (b), subpoenaed writings are "available" for 
examination and review by all parties to the case and 
counsel.  And, consistent with that provision, the 
writings "shall not be open for examination and review 
except by the parties and counsel."  However, if 
"otherwise directed by the court," persons who are not 
parties to the case may be entitled to examine and review 
the documents, in the trial court's discretion.  In other 
words, as the Court of Appeals noted, that provision 
generally prohibits nonparties' "access to subpoenaed 
 
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documents, 'unless otherwise directed by the court.' "  
Nelson, 41 Va. App. at 727, 598 S.E.2d at 28. 
 
The Rule's third quoted paragraph, however, applies 
under the circumstances of this case.  In plain language, 
the paragraph means that when subpoenaed documents "are 
of such nature or content that disclosure to other 
parties would be unduly prejudicial," the trial court, in 
the exercise of its discretion "as it deems appropriate," 
may limit disclosure.  The trial court's power to limit 
applies to the persons directly involved in the case, and 
not just nonparties as the defendant contends. 
 
Manifestly, as the Court of Appeals said, the 
foregoing provision "makes sense only if it refers to the 
court's authority to limit the access of the parties in 
the case, as people who are not parties generally are not 
allowed access to any subpoenaed documents" under the 
second paragraph.  Id. at 726, 598 S.E.2d at 28. 
 
In the exercise of discretion to limit or deny 
access, a trial court must determine whether the 
documents not disclosed are material to the case of the 
party moving for access.  Contrary to the defendant's 
argument, a threshold determination of materiality is not 
made at the time the subpoena duces tecum is issued.  
Indeed, when a party requests issuance of such a 
 
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subpoena, the trial court is not aware of the contents of 
the subpoenaed writings.  As the Attorney General argues, 
"the threshold showing of materiality necessary for the 
issuance of the subpoena does not automatically translate 
into the materiality that compels a court to turn the 
documents over to the requesting party." 
 
In the present case, as requested by the Attorney 
General (but not the defendant), we have examined the 
sealed documents.  We agree with the trial court and the 
Court of Appeals that they are not material to the 
defendant's case and that he has not been prejudiced by 
their non-disclosure.  See id. at 728-29, 589 S.E.2d at 
29. 
 
The second issue we shall address relates to 
possible juror bias.  During the second day of 
defendant's trial, the prosecutor reported to the judge 
that when "court was over yesterday," he had received a 
voice mail message from the foster mother of the victim.  
The prosecutor represented that she said she knew one of 
the jurors who was her "direct supervisor" at the foster 
mother's place of employment "over two years ago" and 
before the victim "came to live with her." 
 
The foster mother told the prosecutor that "at no 
time" did the victim "ever meet" or "come in contact" 
 
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with the juror, and that the juror does not know the 
victim.  She stated to the prosecutor that she saw the 
juror "in the courtroom yesterday," and that the two 
"made eye contact and smiled."  At that time, the foster 
mother said, the victim was not sitting with her, but was 
sitting with his father and stepmother. 
 
The foster mother told the prosecutor that she 
"doesn't even believe [the juror is] aware of any 
relationship between her" and the victim.  The prosecutor 
related to the court:  "She's not a witness in this case 
but she was concerned that it might mean something."  The 
prosecutor reminded the court that during voir dire, when 
the victim "stood up with the other witnesses, all the 
jurors indicated that they did not know any of the 
witnesses." 
 
Following the prosecutor's report, defendant's 
attorney stated:  "I think the Court should inquire of 
the juror about the matter;" later, counsel moved for a 
mistrial.  The trial court denied the request and the 
motion. 
 
On appeal, defendant "asserts that under the facts 
of this case he was entitled to have the Court make 
inquiry of the juror."  He argues that the "Court of 
Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's failure to 
 
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inquire or otherwise act with respect [to] the 
qualifications of a juror known personally by the foster 
mother of the alleged victim, thus depriving the 
defendant of his right to an unbiased and impartial 
jury."  We disagree. 
 
We concur with the Court of Appeals' view that the 
defendant's allegation of possible juror bias is 
supported only by a "series of speculative links:" the 
possible recognition by the juror of the foster mother, 
which possibly could lead to an understanding that she 
was the victim's foster parent, which could have caused 
the juror to recall possibly positive impressions of the 
foster mother from a past working relationship, and those 
impressions could have possibly biased the juror against 
the defendant, such that the juror would "ignore the 
trial court's instructions to evaluate the evidence and 
apply the law impartially."  Nelson, 41 Va. App. at 730-
31, 589 S.E.2d at 30. 
 
In sum, the alleged connection between the foster 
mother and the juror was too tenuous to require the court 
to conduct a hearing mid-trial.  There was no abuse of 
discretion by the trial court, and the Court of Appeals 
correctly so ruled. 
 
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Consequently, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
will be 
Affirmed.