Case Title: Sivit v. Village Green of Beachwood, L.P.

Citation: 2015-Ohio-1193

Docket Number: 2013-0586

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Sivit v. Village Green of Beachwood, L.P., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1193, 2015-
Ohio-1193.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-1193 
SIVIT ET AL., APPELLEES, v. VILLAGE GREEN OF BEACHWOOD, L.P., ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Sivit v. Village Green of Beachwood, L.P.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1193.] 
Damages—Tort—R.C. 2315.21—Punitive damages are limited by statute in a tort 
action. 
(No. 2013-0586—Submitted March 11, 2014—Decided April 2, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 98401, 2013-Ohio-103. 
_______________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 1} In 2004, a fire destroyed Building 3 of the Village Green 
Apartments, located in Beachwood, Ohio.  At the request of the Beachwood Fire 
Department, the fire was investigated by Ralph Dolence, an experienced fire 
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investigator and consultant, who determined that the fire originated between the 
ceiling of the second story and the floor just above it as a direct result of 
construction defects. 
{¶ 2} On October 23, 2007, a fire broke out in another building, Building 
8, of the apartment complex.  Dolence conducted an investigation and concluded 
that the fire originated in the space between the floor and ceiling of apartments 
210 and 310.  Dolence detailed various National Electric Code violations, 
including unsecured feeder cables, wires double stapled, and wires placed against 
metal gusset places with insulation damage.  Dolence also saw extensive 
infiltration of water within the building.  At trial, Dolence testified that he was 
100 percent certain that the fire was caused by “faulty electrical wiring 
contaminated by water leaks” within the building. 
{¶ 3} Following the 2007 fire, appellees, Carlos Sivit and several other 
tenants, filed suit against appellants, Village Green of Beachwood, L.P., and 
Forest City Residential Management, Inc. (collectively, “Village Green”), 
claiming that the building had been negligently constructed.  Several subrogated 
insurers filed separate actions; the actions were consolidated in the trial court.1  
Sivit also claimed that Village Green had negligently maintained electrical wiring 
in violation of the Ohio Landlord-Tenant Act, R.C. Chapter 5321.  After a jury 
trial, Village Green was found liable.  The jury awarded compensatory damages 
of $582,146, punitive damages of $2,000,000, and attorney fees of $1,040,000.  
The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed.  We granted Village Green’s 
discretionary appeal.  136 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2013-Ohio-2645, 989 N.E.2d 1019. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 4} Village Green has raised three propositions of law, which are quoted 
and addressed in turn. 
                                                 
1 The plaintiffs in the consolidated actions will be referred to in this opinion as “Sivit.” 
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Proposition of Law I 
An action to recover damages for injury to person or 
property caused by negligence or other tortious conduct is a “tort 
action” within the meaning of R.C. 2315.21(A) even though the 
plaintiff’s claim may have arisen from a breach of duty created by 
a contractual relationship and even though the defendant’s conduct 
may have constituted both tortious conduct and a breach of 
contract. 
 
{¶ 5} Village Green argues that the action brought by Sivit is a tort and 
thus that R.C. 2315.21 applies.  The court of appeals concluded that Village 
Green and Sivit had a contractual agreement, which is true, and that “injurious 
conduct arising out of the contract is not a tort action,” which is not necessarily 
true.  2013-Ohio-103, ¶ 59.  Certainly, injurious conduct arising between parties 
to a contract does not always sound in tort, but it can, as in this case.  Here, 
Village Green and Sivit have a contractual agreement, but the harm caused in this 
case is not the result of a contractual breach; it is the result of a violation of R.C. 
5321.04, which imposes negligence per se.  Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 
2006-Ohio-6362, 857 N.E.2d 1195, ¶ 23, citing Sikora v. Wenzel, 88 Ohio St.3d 
493, 727 N.E.2d 1277 (2000).  Furthermore, counsel for Sivit conceded in oral 
argument that the case sounds in tort.  We conclude that this is a tort action and, 
therefore, that it is subject to R.C. 2315.21. 
{¶ 6} R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) states that “in a tort action,” a “court shall not 
enter judgment for punitive or exemplary damages in excess of two times the 
amount of the compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff.”  The 
compensatory-damages award by the jury totaled $582,146.  The judgment entry 
of the trial court also included stipulated compensatory damages of $186,631.95, 
which were contingent on a finding of liability.  The punitive damages awarded 
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totaled $2,000,000.  The $2,000,000 award for punitive damages is more than 
twice the total compensatory damages.  Accordingly, it is clear that the award of 
punitive damages is contrary to the mandate of R.C. 2315.21(D)(2). 
{¶ 7} “The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate a plaintiff, 
but to punish and deter certain conduct.”  Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 69 
Ohio St.3d 638, 651, 635 N.E.2d 331 (1994).  In Moskovitz, we reiterated that an 
award of punitive damages requires that actual malice be proven, and we defined 
“actual malice” as either “ ‘that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is 
characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge’ ” or “ ‘a conscious 
disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of 
causing substantial harm.’ ”  Id. at 652, quoting Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St.3d 
334, 512 N.E.2d 1174 (1987), at syllabus.  We also discussed the difficulty of 
determining an appropriate amount of punitive damages, quoting with approval 
Shoemaker v. Crawford, 78 Ohio App.3d 53, 66, 603 N.E.2d 1114 (1991), in 
which the Tenth District Court of Appeals stated:  
 
No simple mathematical formula can be applied as to either 
a minimum or a maximum, and there is a wide range between 
those figures.  The decision rests as much on policy considerations 
as it does anything else and some degree of arbitrariness cannot be 
totally divorced from the decision, whether made by us or by the 
jury. 
 
{¶ 8} Remittitur of punitive damages is required.  Accordingly, we must 
consider the four criteria that arise from this court’s decision in Chester Park Co. 
v. Schulte, 120 Ohio St. 273, 166 N.E. 186 (1929), paragraph three of the 
syllabus.  See Dandinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St.3d 77, 
2002-Ohio-7113, 781 N.E.2d 121, ¶ 184.  First, the punitive damages must have 
January Term, 2015 
 
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been assessed by a jury; they were.  Second, the verdict must not have been 
influenced by passion or prejudice; Village Green does not argue that the jury was 
unduly influenced by passion or prejudice.  Third, the punitive damages must be 
excessive; they are in excess of the statutory limit.  Fourth, the plaintiff must 
agree to the reduction; we consider the chance that Sivit will refuse remittitur 
remote given the clear mandate of the statute.  We order reduction of the amount 
of punitive damages to twice the amount of compensatory damages that were 
awarded in the trial court’s judgment entry, which we deem an appropriate 
amount to deter the conduct at issue in this case. 
Proposition of Law II 
In order to recover punitive damages against a landlord on 
the ground that the landlord consciously disregarded the rights and 
safety of a tenant, the tenant must prove that the specific danger 
that caused tenant’s injury was a danger of which the landlord had 
subjective knowledge.  The fact that the landlord had knowledge of 
another danger on the premises is irrelevant if that other danger 
had no causal connection to the tenant’s injury. 
 
{¶ 9} The essence of this proposition of law is to challenge the trial court’s 
decision to allow the claim for punitive damages to go to the jury.  Reviewing 
courts “will not disturb a decision of the trial court as to a determination of 
damages absent an abuse of discretion.”  Roberts v. United States Fid. & Guar. 
Co., 75 Ohio St.3d 630, 634, 665 N.E.2d 664 (1996), citing Blakemore v. 
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).  “The term ‘abuse of 
discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies that the 
court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”  State v. Adams, 62 
Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 420 N.E.2d 144 (1980), citing Steiner v. Custer, 137 Ohio 
St. 448, 31 N.E. 855 (1940). 
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{¶ 10} In reviewing the record, we see nothing that indicates that the trial 
court abused its discretion when it allowed the claim for punitive damages to go 
to the jury.  The fire in 2007 had substantially the same cause as the fire in 2004.  
The circumstances attendant to both fires—the conscious disregard of code 
violations that affected health and safety—were more than enough for the jury to 
conclude that Village Green had acted with “ ‘a conscious disregard for the rights 
and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing substantial 
harm.’ ” Moskovitz, 69 Ohio St.3d at 652, 635 N.E.2d 331, quoting Preston, 32 
Ohio St.3d 334, 512 N.E.2d 1174, syllabus.  Given that, we cannot conclude that 
the trial court acted in a way that was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.  
In short, the trial court’s decision to allow the issue of punitive damages to go to 
the jury was not an abuse of discretion. 
Proposition of Law III 
A landlord cannot be held liable under R.C. 5321.04 for 
failure to correct defects occurring in electrical wiring of which it 
was unaware and which were concealed above ceilings or behind 
walls. 
 
{¶ 11} Village Green may be correct in stating that it cannot be held liable 
for defects of which it was unaware.  But that is not the issue in this case.  There 
had been a previous fire in a different building started by the same cause as the 
fire in this case.  Furthermore, there was evidence that faulty wiring caused the 
fire, and the walls of the building, where the wiring was installed, were described 
as “waterlogged” by a former maintenance supervisor at the apartment complex.  
There were sufficient facts upon which the jury could determine that Village 
Green was aware of the potential, indeed likelihood, of a fire.  After reviewing the 
record, we see nothing that indicates that the trial court abused its discretion in 
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allowing the jury to determine that Village Green had failed to comply with R.C. 
5321.04. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 12} In summary, we affirm the court of appeals with respect to all 
issues related to the verdict except the award of punitive damages.  We agree with 
Village Green that the amount of punitive damages allowed exceeds the limit 
prescribed by R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a).  Therefore, we hold that punitive damages 
in the amount of two times the award of compensatory damages is the appropriate 
amount and remand to the trial court to set the amount of damages. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
_________________________ 
 
Diemert & Associates Co., L.P.A., Joseph W. Diemert Jr., and Daniel A. 
Powell, for appellees. 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Marvin L. Karp, and Lawrence D. Pollack, for 
appellants. 
_________________________