Case Title: State v. McDonald

Citation: 269 Neb. 604, 694 N.W.2d 204

Docket Number: 

State: nebraska

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
694 N.W.2d 204 (2005) 269 Neb. 604 STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Joseph H. McDONALD, appellant. No. S-04-516. Supreme Court of Nebraska. April 1, 2005. *205 Stefanie A. Martinez, Omaha, for appellant. Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Kimberly A. Klein, Lincoln, for appellee. HENDRY, C.J., WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHAN, McCORMACK, and MILLER-LERMAN, JJ. McCORMACK, J. In 1975, Joseph H. McDonald was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The present appeal arises from the district court's denial of McDonald's motion for DNA testing pursuant to the DNA Testing Act (the Act), Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-4116 et seq. (Cum.Supp.2004). Under the Act, a court shall order testing upon a determination that, among other things, such testing was not effectively available at the time of trial. See § 29-4120(5). Because McDonald has failed to satisfy this requirement, we affirm. The following facts are taken from our opinion in State v. McDonald, 195 Neb. 625, 626-29, 240 N.W.2d 8, 9-11 (1976): On November 7, 2003, McDonald filed a motion under the Act seeking DNA testing of exhibits 32 (McDonald's yellow T-shirt) and 33 (his pants) that were received into evidence at his trial. He asserted that DNA testing would reveal that the purported bloodstains on his clothes were actually "red rouge," a metal-polishing substance he used at his place of employment. McDonald also filed a motion for appointment of counsel under the Act. A hearing was held on the matter on April 2, 2004. No one testified, and only one exhibit was received into evidence: an affidavit from a law clerk in the Douglas County Attorney's office. The law clerk averred that he called the Omaha Police Department's property and records divisions about the shirt and pants and was told that they had been destroyed on an unknown date. Based upon the law clerk's affidavit, the district court overruled McDonald's motions for DNA testing and appointment of counsel. McDonald appeals. In his assignments of error, McDonald claims that (1) the district court erred in overruling his motion for DNA testing and appointment of counsel, (2) exhibits 32 and 33 were destroyed without a court order, (3) his due process rights were violated by the destruction of exhibits 32 and 33, and (4) his due process rights were violated by the suppression of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution. A motion for DNA testing is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and unless an abuse of discretion is shown, *208 the trial court's determination will not be disturbed. State v. Lotter, 266 Neb. 758, 669 N.W.2d 438 (2003). The initial step toward obtaining relief under the Act is for a person in custody to file a motion requesting forensic DNA testing of biological material. See § 29-4120. Forensic DNA testing is available for any biological material that is related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in the judgment; is in the actual or constructive possession of the state, or others likely to safeguard the integrity of the biological material; and either was not previously subjected to DNA testing or can be retested with more accurate current techniques. See § 29-4120(1). Once these thresholds are met, the court shall order testing upon a determination that such testing was not effectively available at the time of trial, that the biological material has been retained under circumstances likely to safeguard its integrity, and that the testing may produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence relevant to the claim that the person was wrongfully convicted or sentenced. See, § 29-4120(5); State v. Buckman, 267 Neb. 505, 675 N.W.2d 372 (2004). We affirm the district court's judgment because McDonald apparently agrees that testing was available at the time of trial to determine whether any stains were blood or a polishing substance. See brief for appellant at 6-7 ("[a]lthough DNA testing was not developed at the time of the trial, testing to determine whether or not the red substance was in fact blood was readily available and considered a common, standard practice"). As mentioned, under § 29-4120(5), the court shall order testing upon a determination that such testing was not effectively available at the time of trial. Because such testing was available at the time of his trial, McDonald is not entitled to DNA testing 30 years later. McDonald also argues on appeal that (1) his due process rights were violated under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), when the State failed to inform him of any test results on the shirt and pants and (2) his due process rights were violated under California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984), and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988), when the State destroyed his shirt and pants. Assuming without deciding that such issues are properly raised in this type of proceeding, the record does not indicate that either theory was presented to the district court. An appellate court will not consider an issue on appeal that was not presented to or passed upon by the trial court. State v. Wester, 269 Neb. 295, 691 N.W.2d 536 (2005). AFFIRMED.