Case Title: Espinoza v. Dept. of Transp.

Citation: 2012 WY 101, 280 P.3d 1226

Docket Number: 2012-wy-101

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
PATRICK 
R. ESPINOZA,Appellant(Petitioner),v.STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION,Appellee(Respondent).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County
The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
R. 
Michael Vang of Fleener & Vang LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristin M. Nuss, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]      After stopping 
Patrick R. Espinoza for failing to maintain a single lane of travel while 
driving on Interstate 80 (I-80) in Laramie, Wyoming, an Albany County Sheriff’s 
deputy arrested Mr. Espinoza for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol.  The Wyoming Department of 
Transportation (WYDOT) suspended Mr. Espinoza’s driver’s license, and he 
objected.  At the contested case 
hearing, Mr. Espinoza claimed the deputy was not justified in stopping him.  The Office of Administrative Hearings 
(OAH) upheld the suspension, and the district court affirmed.  We conclude the deputy had probable cause 
to stop Mr. Espinoza for a traffic violation and affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      The issue 
presented for our review is whether the evidence supports the conclusion that 
the deputy had probable cause to stop Mr. Espinoza for violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-5-209 (LexisNexis 2011), which requires vehicles be driven “as nearly as 
practicable entirely within a single lane” of traffic.  
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      In the early 
morning hours of February 11, 2011, Albany County Sheriff’s Deputy Jeffrey 
Beeston was patrolling in Laramie when he observed a pickup, which was later 
determined to be driven by Mr. Espinoza, accelerate quickly and turn abruptly 
onto the I-80 on-ramp.  Deputy 
Beeston followed the pickup onto the interstate and activated his DVD recording 
device to record Mr. Espinoza’s driving.  
Deputy Beeston observed Mr. Espinoza swerving and then abruptly leave the 
interstate at the Snowy Range exit.    
 
[¶4]      Deputy Beeston 
followed Mr. Espinoza off the interstate, activated his lights and stopped Mr. 
Espinoza.  The deputy observed signs 
that Mr. Espinoza had been drinking alcohol and proceeded to administer sobriety 
tests, which Mr. Espinoza failed.  
The deputy arrested Mr. Espinoza for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (LexisNexis 2010) and 
administered a breath test that showed he had an alcohol concentration of 0.17%, 
more than two times the legal limit allowed for driving.   

[¶5]      WYDOT suspended 
Mr. Espinoza’s driver’s license, and he requested a contested case hearing.  He argued at the hearing that Deputy 
Beeston did not have legal justification to stop him, but after reviewing the 
DVD recording and the deputy’s report, the OAH found the stop was legal and 
upheld the suspension.  Mr. Espinoza 
petitioned the district court for review of the OAH decision, and that court 
affirmed.  He then filed a notice of 
appeal with this Court.   

 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶6]      Our review of an 
administrative decision is governed by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2009), which provides:
 
(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:
 
 (i) Compel agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
 
 (ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings and conclusions found to be:
 
         
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;
 
         
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;
 
         
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;
 
         
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or
 
         
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute.
 
Reviewing 
an agency’s factual findings,
 
we 
examine the entire record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to 
support an agency’s findings.  If 
the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly 
substitute our judgment for that of the agency and must uphold the findings on 
appeal.  Substantial evidence is 
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
agency’s conclusions.  

 
Hwang 
v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 
2011 WY 20, ¶ 9, 247 P.3d 861, 864 (Wyo. 2011).  The issue in this case invokes 
constitutional protections; the determination of whether a violation of 
constitutional rights occurred is a question of law, which we review de novo.  Tiernan v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 2011 
WY 143, ¶ 10, 262 P.3d 561, 564 (Wyo. 2011).  
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶7]      The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  
Although the purpose of a traffic stop is 
limited and the resulting detention brief, a routine traffic stop still 
constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Parks 
v. State, 
2011 WY 19, ¶ 7, 247 P.3d 857, 858 (Wyo. 2011); 
Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d 700, 704 (Wyo. 2003).  “Detention of a motorist is justified 
when the officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred 
or has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the particular motorist is 
engaged in criminal activity.”  Tiernan, ¶ 11, 262 P.3d  at 565.  See also, Harvey 
v. State, 
2011 WY 72, 250 P.3d 167 (Wyo. 2011); 
Frazier 
v. State, 
2010 WY 107, 236 P.3d 295 (Wyo. 2010).  
 
[¶8]      In this case, 
Deputy Beeston stopped Mr. Espinoza because he observed a violation of § 
31-5-209.  Section 31-5-209 states, 
in relevant part:
 
(a) 
Whenever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes 
for traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith 
shall apply:
 
            
(i) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a 
single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first 
ascertained that the movement can be made with safety[.]
 
Given 
Deputy Beeston’s personal observation of a traffic law violation, our inquiry 
focuses on whether he had probable cause to initiate the stop.1  Tiernan, ¶ 12, 262 P.3d  at 565.  Probable cause is defined as:  
 
The 
substance of all the definitions’ of probable cause 'is a reasonable ground for 
belief of guilt.’ * * * * Probable cause exists where 'the facts and 
circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being 
committed. 
 
DeHerrera 
v. State, 589 P.2d 845, 847 (Wyo. 1979), quoting Rodarte v. City of Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245, 1252 
(Wyo. 1976) (other citations omitted). 
 
[¶9]      As an initial 
matter, we note that Mr. Espinoza expends a great deal of space in his brief 
analyzing the meaning of § 31-5-209 and arguing that, given the statutory 
imperative that a driver maintain his lane to the extent “practicable,” we 
should interpret the statute as only prohibiting failing to maintain a lane if 
another vehicle/driver is placed in danger.2  This Court discussed § 31-5-209 at 
length in Dods v. State, 2010 WY 133, 
240 P.3d 1208 (Wyo. 2010).  We 
considered case law from other jurisdictions interpreting statutes with language 
similar to our “as nearly as practicable” requirement and 
concluded:
 
We 
. . . agree with the [Tenth Circuit’s] assessment that a court must examine all 
of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether there is a justification 
for the stop. . . . Under adverse weather and/or road conditions, any vehicle 
could be subject to an isolated incident of moving into the right shoulder of 
the roadway, without giving rise to a suspicion of criminal activity. 
Gregory, 
79 F.3d  at 978. 
We keep in mind that Gregory, 
however, does not create a “bright-line rule” of what conduct constitutes a 
violation of this type of statute, but rather “highlight[s] the need to analyze 
objectively all the surrounding facts and circumstances” to 
determine whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to make the stop. 
Ozbirn, 
189 F.3d  at 1198 
(emphasis added). Based upon such a fact-sensitive analysis, one or two 
deviations from a lane may or may not constitute a violation, depending on the 
circumstances. While it might not be reasonable to expect a driver to avoid even 
the slightest deviation from a lane over an extended distance, it may be 
reasonable to expect drivers to avoid a sudden, significant deviation from the 
lane or a sudden, over-compensating return back, absent physical obstacles, 
mechanical difficulty, or other uncontrollable circumstances. State 
v. Woodruff, 
403 N.J.Super. 620, 629, 959 A.2d 1233, 1239 (Law Div. 
2008).
 
Id., 
¶ 
16, 240 P.3d  at 1211-12.  Mr. 
Espinoza has not convinced us that we should waver from our decision in Dods, and we will continue to follow 
that approach without superimposing a requirement that any lane deviation put 
another driver into danger before the statute is violated.
 
[¶10]   Mr. Espinoza next claims the DVD 
recording of his driving contradicts the deputy’s report that he failed to 
maintain a single lane of travel and, accordingly, Deputy Beeston was not 
justified in stopping him.  The 
details of Deputy Beeston’s report were included in the OAH 
findings:
 
            
2.         
The certified record included Deputy Beeston’s certified Officer’s Signed 
Statement (Signed Statement) and an attached and referenced Narrative about his 
stop, investigation, arrest and chemical testing of Espinoza on February 11, 
2011.  Deputy Beeston’s Narrative 
described his reasons for stopping Espinoza as follows:
 
On 
02/11/2011 at approximately 0200 hours, I was northbound on 3rd 
Street and saw a vehicle pulling away northbound from the intersection of 
Skyline and 3rd Street.  The vehicle, a dark colored pickup 
truck, accelerated quickly and turned abruptly onto the I-80 westbound on 
ramp.  I began to follow the 
vehicle, but was quite some distance behind.  I was able to see the pickup cross the 
solid white line that separates the right hand travel lane and the on ramp lane, 
and caught up to the vehicle shortly thereafter.
 
I 
noted that in the 312 milepost, the pickup went across the centerline then 
drifted back across the right lane and across the fog line before regaining a 
single lane of travel.  When the 
truck approached the 312 ramp, it passed the actual off ramp lane and suddenly 
veered onto the off ramp.  The left 
tires of the truck were approximately to the left of the left side line, 
although it was covered with snow and I could not tell for certain.  The truck was not driving on the portion 
of the roadway that was cleared of snow where most traffic drives.  
 
The 
OAH decision also describes the DVD recording:
 
            
10.       
This Office thoroughly reviewed the DVD of the traffic stop on February 
11, 2011.  The DVD does not show 
Espinoza’s vehicle pull away from the curb, accelerate and turn onto the I-80 on 
ramp.  The DVD begins at 03:01:54, 
with the deputy on the on ramp to I-80 and Espinoza’s vehicle is some distance 
ahead.  At 03:01:58, Espinoza’s 
vehicle is observed crossing the white line dividing the on ramp lane from the 
right hand lane of travel on I-80.  
While Espinoza’s vehicle is some distance ahead it appeared his vehicle 
crossed into the right lane of travel prior to the end of the on ramp lane.  At 03:02:20, Espinoza’s vehicle is 
observed touching and driving on the centerline dividing the two lanes of travel 
on I-80.  Espinoza’s vehicle is then 
observed drifting to the right and touching or driving on the white fog line at 
03:02:28.  A short time later 
Espinoza’s vehicle appeared to be touching or driving on the center dividing 
line.  At 03:02:32, Espinoza’s 
vehicle appeared to be in the middle of the driving lane and at 03:02:36, 
Espinoza’s vehicle once again appeared to b[e] touching the white fog line.  
 
[¶11]   In response to Mr. Espinoza’s 
argument that the DVD contradicted the deputy’s narrative report, the hearing 
examiner ruled:
 
            
11.       
This Office disagrees with the argument made by Espinoza’s counsel.  Deputy Beeston’s detailed narrative 
established a violation of WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-209 (a)(i) (LEXIS 2010) by 
Espinoza, as he failed to maintain his lane of travel on I-80.  Additionally, the DVD confirmed Deputy 
Beeston’s recitation of driving actions by Espinoza on I-80.  It is questionable that crossing over 
the white line dividing the on ramp lane from the right hand lane of travel is a 
violation of law but Espinoza’s driving actions from approximately 03:02:20 to 
03:02:36[] do establish Espinoza failed to maintain his lane of travel.  The proposed suspension action should be 
upheld.  
 
[¶12]   There are many similarities between 
the case at bar and Tiernan; 
consequently, we look to it for guidance.3  Like Mr. Espinoza, Mr. Tiernan asserted 
the DVD recording of his driving did not demonstrate a justifiable reason to 
stop him.  The highway patrol 
trooper who stopped Mr. Tiernan reported that “he made the stop after observing 
the vehicle cross the center line once, drift back across the lane and cross the 
fog line, and cross the fog line again when a vehicle approached from the 
opposite direction.”  Id., ¶ 13, 262 P.3d  at 565-66.  The DVD recording in Tiernan did not clearly depict the lane 
violations; however, it did show Mr. Tiernan’s vehicle drifting back and forth 
in the lane.  Relying on Dods, we stated that the OAH properly 
examined all of the circumstances, including the trooper’s report, the DVD and 
Mr. Tiernan’s argument that the DVD refuted the report, and concluded the 
trooper was warranted in stopping the vehicle.  Id., ¶ 17, 262 P.3d  at 566.  We, therefore, ruled there was 
substantial evidence in the record to support the agency’s decision that the 
trooper had probable cause to stop Mr. Tiernan for a traffic violation.  Id., ¶ 18, 262 P.3d  at 566-67. 

 
[¶13]   We have carefully reviewed the DVD 
of Mr. Espinoza’s driving and, like in Tiernan, agree with the hearing examiner 
that it confirms rather than contradicts Deputy Beeston’s report.  The DVD shows Mr. Espinoza weaving back 
and forth across his lane of traffic, i.e., driving on or over the center line, 
drifting to the right and driving on or over the fog line, and then drifting 
back across the lane and driving on or over the center line again.  Deputy Beeston’s report stated that Mr. 
Espinoza crossed the center and fog lines as he was driving.  As such, the facts and circumstances 
within Deputy Beeston’s knowledge were sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution to believe Mr. Espinoza failed to drive “as nearly as practicable 
entirely within a single lane.”  
Section 31-5-209; DeHerrera, 
589 P.2d  at 847.  

 
[¶14]   Mr. Espinoza claims the deputy’s 
report improperly stated that the lane violations occurred at milepost 312 when 
milepost 312 is actually further down the highway.  The deputy’s report stated: “I noted 
that in the 312 milepost, the pickup went across the centerline then drifted 
back across the right lane and across the fog line before regaining a single 
lane of travel.”  We do not read the 
deputy’s report as stating that the violations occurred precisely at milepost 
312.  There is obviously a 
typographical error when it states “in the 312 milepost.”  The lane breaches occurred within close 
proximity to milepost 312, and a reasonable interpretation of the report is that 
the deputy was simply referencing the nearby milepost.  Moreover, the lane violations are shown 
on the DVD, so the fact that the deputy may have made a slight mistake in 
locating them is largely irrelevant.  
We conclude the record contains substantial evidence that the deputy had 
probable cause to stop Mr. Espinoza for failing to maintain his lane of travel 
in violation of § 31-5-209.    

 
[¶15]   Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1The hearing examiner analyzed whether the deputy had reasonable 
articulable suspicion to justify the stop.  
As we stated, supra, in 
addition to the probable cause justification for a stop, a law enforcement 
officer may detain a motorist if he “has a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
the particular motorist is engaged in criminal activity.” Tiernan, ¶ 11, 262 P.3d  at 565.  However, when the officer claims he 
personally witnessed a violation of law, the inquiry focuses on whether he had 
probable cause to seize the offender.  
Id., ¶ 12, 262 P.3d  at 
565.  
2Mr. Espinoza also discusses recent changes to the implied consent law and 
the admissibility of the results of chemical testing.  Neither of these matters is relevant to 
the issue presented in this case; consequently, we will not discuss them.  
3Mr. Espinoza completely ignores the existence of the Tiernan decision, not even mentioning it 
in his brief.  This is somewhat 
surprising given Mr. Espinoza and Mr. Tiernan were represented by the same 
attorney.