Case Title: Downen v. Sinclair Oil Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-98

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Downen v. Sinclair Oil Corp.1994 WY 147887 P.2d 515Case Number: 94-98Decided: 12/16/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Martha A. DOWNEN and 
James D. Downen,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

SINCLAIR OIL CORPORATION, 
d/b/a Little America Travel Center,

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal from District 
Court, Sweetwater County, Jere Ryckman, J.

 

David M. Piaia 
of Bussart, West, Rossetti, Piaia, and Tyler, P.C., Rock Springs, Larry A. 
Morgan of Morgan & Morgan, Inc., Oklahoma City, OK, for 
appellants.

Raymond W. 
Martin of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Chief 
Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellants Martha 
and James Downen (Downens) appeal from a summary judgment granted to appellee 
Sinclair Oil Corporation, d/b/a Little America Travel Center (Sinclair). Downens 
had filed suit against Sinclair after Mrs. Downen slipped and fell in a shower 
at a Little America truckstop. The district court held there were no genuine 
issues of material fact, and Sinclair was entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Downens presented 
this question:

I. Whether the District 
Court erred when it resolved the following fact issue as a matter of law by 
granting Sinclair Oil's Motion for Summary Judgment: Whether the combination of 
the large shower tile coated with a concentrated soapy cleaner and Sinclair 
Oil's failure to furnish a routinely provided nonslip shower mat constituted a 
breach of Sinclair Oil's duty to provide a reasonably safe shower facility which 
caused Martha Downen's fall and resulting disabling back 
injury.

[¶4]      Sinclair states 
the issues as:

I. Can subject matter 
which is set forth for the first time in a WRCP 60(b)(2) motion to the trial 
court, and which is filed simultaneously with an appeal, provide a factual basis 
upon which a summary judgment can be reversed?

II. Does an expert's 
conclusory affidavit, which is provided five days prior to the filing of an 
appeal, constitute newly discovered evidence under WRCP 
60(b)(2)?

III. Did Plaintiffs act 
with due diligence as required by WRCP 60(b)(2)?

IV. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion in granting Defendant's Motion For Summary 
Judgment?

FACTS

[¶5]      Downens, a 
husband and wife long haul truck driving team, purchased fuel at Sinclair's 
Little America Travel Center in Sweetwater County, Wyoming, on February 10, 
1990. Little America provides private locked rooms which include an outer 
dressing room and a separate bathroom/shower facility at no charge to truck 
drivers who purchase fuel at the station. Downens obtained a shower room and 
Mrs. Downen prepared to shower first. Wearing shower thongs, she stepped into 
the shower on one foot and as she stepped down with the other foot, both feet 
slipped and she fell down into the shower striking her back against the lip of 
the shower. Mrs. Downen had grasped the shower curtain but was unable to break 
her fall. Her husband assisted her after she fell and then each took their 
showers.

[¶6]      After showering 
and dressing, the couple notified the fuel manager of the incident and completed 
an incident report. Mrs. Downen was later treated in Evanston for pain from a 
back injury. In 1993, Downens filed suit alleging five claims. The parties 
stipulated to dismissal of all claims except negligence and Mr. Downen's claim 
of loss of consortium.

[¶7]      Discovery 
revealed that Little America's showers have large ceramic tile which are cleaned 
regularly with a commercial cleaner, "Quick Clean," but not waxed, and which are 
wiped dry after each use. The shower in which Mrs. Downen fell did not have a 
handrail, bath mat, or a warning sign. In deposition testimony, both Mr. and 
Mrs. Downen stated the facilities were clean and in good order, the faucets did 
not leak, the floor of the shower was dry, there were no foreign substances on 
the floor, and neither saw anything which would cause them to think it was 
unsafe to step into the shower. Mrs. Downen did not turn on the water before 
entering the shower. Mr. Downen also observed that the floor was clean and dry 
when he assisted Mrs. Downen after the fall.

[¶8]      Mrs. Downen 
believed this shower compared favorably with other truckstop showers the two 
routinely used over a twelve-year period, and the lack of a bath mat or handrail 
was not unusual. She stated that Little America's use of large ceramic tile 
differed from other showers which used either a rough cement floor or smaller 
tile. She had previously showered at Little America showers but did not remember 
if bath mats had been provided. Although Mrs. Downen stated she did not feel the 
tile, it was her belief the floor must be slippery because she fell and it 
looked shiny. In her opinion, the tile was probably slippery from a cleaning 
agent. Mrs. Downen also testified that two employees told her that a bath mat 
should have been inside the shower. It was undisputed that the defendant had not 
experienced any prior slip and fall accidents in the trucker 
showers.

[¶9]      Sinclair filed a 
motion for summary judgment which the district court considered and granted upon 
finding failure by the Downens to show any reason for Mrs. Downen's fall. The 
court found as a matter of law that Sinclair had not breached any duty and 
entered an order of summary judgment. Downens timely filed an appeal of that 
order with this court; however, they later filed a WYO. R.CIV.P. 60(b)(2) motion 
for relief from the order of summary judgment with the district court because of 
newly discovered evidence. That evidence consists of one affidavit of an expert 
who concluded the tile was rendered unsafe by Sinclair's method of using "Quick 
Clean." The motion is pending before the district court.

DISCUSSION

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶10]   We review a summary judgment in the 
same light as did the district court, and we use the same materials, at least to 
the extent they appear in the record on appeal, as did the district court. 
"Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and 
the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Eiselein v. 
K-Mart, Inc., 868 P.2d 893, 894 (Wyo. 1994). "When reviewing the propriety 
of a grant of summary judgment, we review the record in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion, giving that party all favorable inferences 
that can be drawn from the facts." Lynch v. Norton Constr., 861 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Wyo. 1993). "If no issue of material fact is found to exist, summary 
judgment is appropriate, even in a negligence case." Lynch, 861 P.2d  at 
1097 (quoting Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 614 (Wyo. 
1993)).

PREMISES 
LIABILITY

[¶11]   A business visitor-invitee1 is a person invited to enter or 
remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business 
dealings with the possessor of the land. Mostert v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo. 1987). See Yalowizer v. Husky Oil Co., 629 P.2d 465, 467 (1981). A possessor of land owes a duty of reasonable care under all of 
the circumstances, Drew v. LeJay's Sportsmen's Cafe, Inc., 806 P.2d 301, 
306, 2 A.L.R.5th 1172 (Wyo. 1991), and should maintain the premises in a 
reasonably safe condition. Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 
895.

[¶12]   The relevant portion of Downens' 
complaint alleged negligence for failure to exercise ordinary care and 
maintenance of the shower floor surface, failure to warn, failure to provide a 
rubber mat, failure to provide a handrail, and failure of inspection. In moving 
for summary judgment, Sinclair asserted there was no evidence that Mrs. Downen 
fell because of any unsafe condition, there was no evidence of negligence, just 
conjecture, there was no duty to provide handrails or bath mats and there was no 
evidence that any breach of duty had proximately caused her 
injuries.

[¶13]   In opposing the motion, the Downens 
contended Sinclair had breached duties by failing to provide rubber shower mats 
which were usually provided and by failing to warn about the lack of this safety 
device. Downens limited their trial brief to these two issues, claiming each 
presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a duty owed had been 
breached which precluded summary judgment since a factfinder must resolve these 
issues. They cited to Wells v. Howard, 165 Colo. 471, 439 P.2d 997 (1968) 
for the proposition that these issues must be submitted to a jury. Now, on 
appeal and in response to findings in the district court's order, they argue 
additional issues concerning whether a foreign substance caused the floor to be 
slippery. Specifically, they allege Sinclair's improper dilution of the cleaner 
"Quick Clean" and its failure to rinse away the cleaner caused the floor to be 
slippery.

[¶14]   The district court found there was 
no evidence of a specific hazard involved or evidence that Mrs. Downen had 
slipped on anything. Instead, the evidence showed the tile was clean, dry and 
free of any foreign substance, and Sinclair had provided a reasonably safe 
shower free of any hidden dangers. The district court found no duty to provide a 
bath mat or handrails and found no evidence Sinclair had negligently acted or 
failed to act and caused Mrs. Downen's fall. The court held reasonable minds 
could not disagree with this conclusion.

1. Evidence 
of a Foreign Substance

[¶15]   On appeal, the Downens challenge 
two of the district court's findings, numbers five and 
six:

5. Little America has the 
shower units wiped dry after each use. They are cleaned regularly with "Quick 
Clean" a commonly used commercial cleaner, specifically recommended for floors 
and bathroom tile. They do not wax the shower floors.

6. The dressing room and 
shower unit used by plaintiffs was clean and in good order. The faucets did not 
leak. The floor of the shower was dry. There were no foreign substances on the 
floor. 

Downens argue 
that "Quick Clean" is a foreign substance and point to interrogatory and 
deposition answers that the cleaner was applied and wiped dry. Downens 
characterize these answers as admissions the cleaner was not rinsed from the 
showers and, therefore, evidence that the shower floor was coated with a foreign 
substance. They argue that since it is disputed whether there was a foreign 
substance on the floor, summary judgment was inappropriate and should be 
reversed.

[¶16]   The record reveals the court 
concluded there was no evidence of a foreign substance based on deposition 
testimony. Mrs. Downen stated:

Q. Were there any foreign 
substances on the floor?

A. No. Not that I could 
see.

* * * * * 
*

Q. Did you ever touch the 
surface with your hands to determine -

A. To insure that it was 
dry?

Q. No, to determine if it 
was slick for any reason?

A. No, just like I said, 
it looked so shiny and clean, just -

Q. So you are basing your 
opinion that it was slippery on the fact that you fell?

A. That I fell, 
yes.

Q. Anything 
else?

A. I don't know, you 
know, the type of cleaning agents that they might have used or anything else 
about it so I can't, you know, I can't give you any kind of opinion on 
that.

[¶17]   After a movant has adequately 
supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must come forward 
with competent evidence admissible at trial showing there are genuine issues of 
material fact. WYO.R.CIV.P. 56(e); Hyatt v. Big Horn Sch. Dist. No. 4, 
636 P.2d 525, 528 (Wyo. 1981). The opposing party must affirmatively set forth 
material, specific facts in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, 
Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987), 
and cannot rely only upon allegations and pleadings, Hyatt, 636 P.2d  at 
530, and conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy the 
opposing party's burden. Boehm, 748 P.2d  at 710.

[¶18]   Downens' brief in opposition to the 
summary judgment motion did not argue the issue of whether there was any foreign 
object or substances present and did not reference any specific facts that a 
foreign substance was present. Our review of Downens' supporting materials2 and all other materials before the 
district court did not reveal any specific facts that a foreign substance was 
present. There is not any evidence the floor was coated with cleaner or the 
floor was slippery. Our review indicates Downens never asked whether the floor 
was rinsed after the cleaner was applied, and the deposition testimony does not 
support their assertion that the floor was not rinsed.

[¶19]   Mrs. Downen's opinion that the 
floor must have been slippery because she fell and because it looked shiny is 
not specific factual evidence that a foreign substance was present. See 
LaBart v. Hotel Vendome Corp., 213 F. Supp. 958, 959 (D.Mass. 1963). Mrs. 
Downen's belief that a cleaner might have caused the floor to be slippery is 
also not specific, factual evidence. See Pearce v. Motel 6, Inc., 28 Wn. App. 474, 624 P.2d 215, 218 (1981). Mrs. Downen's factually unsupported 
statements or opinions are insufficient to satisfy her burden in opposing 
summary judgment. Bluejacket v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo. 1976) 
(the plaintiff must show a reason for slipping and falling). The district court 
correctly determined the foreign substance evidence did not present a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Sinclair had negligently acted or failed to 
act.

2. 
Foreseeability

[¶20]   Downens next argue it was 
foreseeable the floor would be slippery because the shower floor was tiled with 
large ceramic tile and coated with a concentrated soapy cleaner. They allege 
three factors combined to create foreseeability: other trucker showers were 
tiled with much smaller tile or a rough cement floor, Sinclair employees 
testified the showers were cleaned with a dilution measuring three gallons of 
water to one gallon of "Quick Clean" but did not mention if the showers were 
then rinsed, and Quick Clean instructions directed the floor should be rinsed 
when an amount greater than two ounces of cleaner to one gallon of water was 
used.

[¶21]   In these statements Downens 
continue to assert, without evidence, that Sinclair acted negligently in using 
the cleaner and caused the floor to be slippery which, in turn, caused Mrs. 
Downen's fall and injury. Negligence and proximate cause are never presumed from 
the happening of an accident, and mere conjecture cannot form the basis of 
liability. DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 652 (Wyo. 1986) (citing 
Apperson v. Kay, 546 P.2d 995, 998 (Wyo. 1976)). Without evidence of 
actions rendering the floor unsafe, Downens' foreseeability argument cannot 
prevail because it is based upon conjecture; holding otherwise presumes 
negligence because an accident happened. Furthermore, Downens do not present any 
specific facts that any danger or condition was present or known or discoverable 
which would establish a duty on the basis of foreseeability. As the district 
court found,3 the only evidence presented was to 
the contrary and showed Sinclair had no prior slip and fall accidents in the 
trucker showers.

3. Proximate 
Causation

[¶22]   Finally, Downens argue that whether 
Sinclair breached its duty to provide a reasonably safe shower facility when it 
failed to furnish routinely provided shower mats and failed to inspect the 
shower and discover that the shower mat was missing is a question of fact for 
the jury. It is an uncontroverted fact that a shower mat was not provided. 
However, Downens do not present evidence this omission proximately caused Mrs. 
Downen's fall.

[¶23]   The elements of a cause of action 
for negligence are: 1) a duty owed to the plaintiff, 2) breach of the duty by 
the defendant 3) proximately causing 4) injuries to the plaintiff. Lynch, 
861 P.2d  at 1099. The proximate cause element requires that the injury producing 
event be the natural and probable consequence of the act of negligence. The 
element's presence is normally a question of fact, unless the evidence is such 
that reasonable minds could not disagree. Lynch at 1099. Summary judgment 
will be sustained if causation is clearly refuted by positive evidence contained 
in discovery materials. Bettencourt v. Pride Well Services, 735 P.2d 722, 
729 (Wyo. 1987). The uncontradicted evidence in this case establishes that Mrs. 
Downen slipped on a dry, clean floor, free of any foreign substance. "Where the 
causal connection between defendant's acts and plaintiff's damage is almost 
entirely subject to conjecture and speculation, summary judgment may be proper." 
DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 643. The Downens, apparently believing the omission 
of supplying a bath mat is sufficient to show a causal relation exists, do not 
explain how it can be inferred that the lack of a bath mat in this situation was 
a substantial factor in causing Mrs. Downen's slip and 
fall.

[¶24]   However, in Bettencourt we 
found the following to be an accurate rule of law:

If as a matter of 
ordinary experience a particular act or omission might be expected, under the 
circumstances, to produce a particular result, and that result in fact has 
followed, the conclusion might be permissible that the causal relation 
exists.

Bettencourt, 735 P.2d  at 728 
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL. ON PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, 
at 269-70 (5th ed. 1984). In this case, Downens do not argue and we do not find 
that, in the ordinary experience, the absence of a bath mat can be expected to 
cause a fall in a shower. We conclude a causal relation does not exist. See 
Bluejacket, 550 P.2d  at 497. The trial court did not err in finding Downens' 
argument was conjecture and speculation.

CONCLUSION

[¶25]   Downens failed to identify facts 
demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning negligence. 
Failure to present specific facts does not satisfy the burden for opposing a 
summary judgment motion. The district court's grant of summary judgment to 
Sinclair is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 In 
Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 (Wyo. 1993) this court standardized an 
owner's duty by abolishing the classifications of invitees and licensees. That 
decision ruled that an owner owes a duty of reasonable care under the 
circumstances to an entrant who is not a trespasser. Id. at 296. However, 
Clarke applies prospectively, Id. at 296, and is not applicable to this 
case.

2 Here, 
Downens reference supporting materials to their Rule 60 motion. Because we may 
only consider what was before the district court, those materials are not 
properly before this court.

3 Downens 
attempted to dispute this uncontroverted finding in their motion to reconsider. 
They claim the witness' testimony is correctly perceived as "evasive" on the 
issue of whether there had been previous slip and fall accidents and asked the 
court to consider the witness' "credibility for purposes of this motion." Again, 
their burden was to supply specific facts which would controvert the evidence 
that there had been no slip and fall accidents. Credibility cannot be weighed on 
summary judgment.