Case Title: Pierce v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 554, 2004

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
KENNETH PIERCE, 
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No. 554, 2004
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below: Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
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for New Castle County
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STATE OF DELAWARE, 
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No. 0310017917
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: June 15, 2005
Decided: August 10, 2005
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices.
ORDER
This 10  day of August 2005, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and
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the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Kenneth Pierce (“Pierce”), appeals from his
convictions following a jury trial in the Superior Court on the charges of robbery in
the first degree and conspiracy in the second degree.  The Superior Court sentenced
Pierce as a habitual offender to 25 years at Level V followed by 6 months at Level IV
in the CREST Program for his robbery conviction and 1 year at Level V suspended
immediately for 1 year at Level III supervision for his conspiracy conviction.  Pierce
raises two arguments in support of his direct appeal.  He first argues that he was
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denied his right to a fair trial because the prosecution  characterized his defense as a
“fantasy” and described certain testimony as  “the only credible evidence” during
rebuttal argument.  He also contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion in
permitting the prosecution to introduce into evidence certain photographs of the
alleged victim.  We find no reversible error and affirm.
(2)
On September 29, 2003 two hooded men kicked open the office door of
the Motel 6 near the Delaware Memorial Bridge.  The first, later identified as Rico,
hit the general manager in the face several times and threw him to the floor.  The
second intruder then reached into the general manager’s pocket and removed the
Sunday deposit bag.  During the process, the second intruder removed his hood and
the general manager saw the second intruder’s face. 
(3)
The Delaware State Police investigated the incident.  The Detective
presented the general manager with a photo lineup.  The general manager then
identified Pierce as the second intruder.  Subsequently, Pierce gave  the Detective
three increasingly self-incriminatory versions of his involvement.  He initially denied
any knowledge of the event, then later acknowledged his presence at the motel but still
denied any part in the event.  Finally, after being advised of surveillance footage, he
admitted to being approached by Rico about a potential robbery for lots of money and
that he responded to Rico with “Count me in.”
 See Daniels v. State, 859 A.2d 1008, 1011 (Del. 2004)  (applying a de novo standard of
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review to a prosecutor’s remarks during closing arguments). 
 See Swan v. State, 820 A.2d 342, 354 (Del. 2003) (applying a plain error standard of review
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to a prosecutor’s remarks during closing arguments which were not objected to at trial).
 Transcript of Trial Proceedings on September 10, 2004 at 160.
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(4)
At trial, Pierce elected not to testify and he presented no witnesses.  His
defense strategy was that the prosecution’s evidence only supported the lesser charge
of theft and not the robbery in the first degree charge.  The jury ultimately found
Pierce guilty of robbery in the first degree and conspiracy in the second degree.
Pierce then brought this instant appeal.
(5)
Pierce argues that the Superior Court deprived him of a fair trial by
permitting the prosecution to improperly denigrate the role of his defense counsel as
well as improperly vouch for the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses during the
prosecution’s rebuttal argument.  Specifically, Pierce points to two separate comments
made by the prosecutor during the  rebuttal argument.  Because Pierce’s counsel
objected only to the first comment at trial, two separate standards of review apply.
We will review  de novo the ruling on the first comment,  and apply a plain error
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analysis to the second.  
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(6)
Defense counsel argued to the jury during his closing statement that
Pierce’s actions were nothing more than a “snatch and grab theft.”   The general
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manager had already testified, however, that he was severely beaten during the
 Id. at 172-73.
4
 Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1219-20 (Del. 2002).
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robbery, and the Detective  had provided corroborating evidence of the condition of
the general manager after the incident.  The prosecutor replied to defense counsel’s
argument directly by stating in his rebuttal that it “belies reason and common sense
and the facts in this case.  This is a court of law.  Your decision must be based on
facts, not fantasy.”   
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(7)
Pierce claims that this comment sarcastically mocked his case and
presented Pierce’s guilt to the jury as a foregone conclusion.  We have recognized that
as long as the prosecutor refrains from “impugning the integrity ... of defense
counsel,” the prosecutor is given wide latitude in his presentation to the jury.   The
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prosecutor’s challenged statement simply reminded the jury that its decision must be
based upon the facts of the case.  We are satisfied that his argument did not impugn
the integrity of the defense counsel in this case and that his argument was appropriate
under the circumstances.  
(8)
Pierce also challenges the prosecutor’s rebuttal statement that “[t]he only
credible evidence presented in this case which is corroborated by the video is that on
September 29, 2003, two men that we now know to be Rico and the defendant,
Kenneth Pierce, walked in the Motel 6 office, Rico knocked down the door, and that,
 Transcript of Trial Proceedings on September 10, 2004 at 197.
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 Caldwell v. State, 770 A.2d 522, 529-30 (Del. 2001).
7
 Stevenson v. State, 709 A.2d 619, 633 (Del. 1998).
8
 Floudiotis v. State, 726 A.2d 1196, 1202, 1208 (Del. 1999). 
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two or three seconds later, the defendant, Kenneth Pierce, came walking in.”   Pierce
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claims that, in making this comment, the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of the
victim’s testimony.  We review this comment for plain error.  
(9)
The law is clear that a prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of any
witness.   Pierce has the burden of showing that the comment was so clearly improper
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as to undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict.   Given the record  in this case,
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including Pierce’s admission to the Detective  that he told Rico to “count me in” we
are not persuaded that the comment was so clearly improper as to undermine any
confidence in the jury’s verdict.
(10)
Finally, Pierce argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting photographs of the general manager’s injuries without proper
authentication.  During the testimony of the Detective, the prosecution presented three
photographs taken by the Detective of the injuries approximately three weeks after the
robbery.  Pierce’s counsel objected to these photograph’s, claiming that the Detective
was in no position to authenticate them as the injuries sustained by the general
manager as a result of the robbery.  Both sides agree that the standard by which this
claim is reviewed is abuse of discretion.9
 Id. at 1208.
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(11)
We find no merit in Pierce’s argument that the Superior Court erred in
admitting the photographs.  Pierce’s argument goes to the weight of the evidence
rather than its admissibility.  The Detective authenticated the photographs as showing
the general manager’s injuries at the time the photos were taken.  The case law in
Delaware is clear that a photographer who has personally observed a person’s physical
injuries may verify that the photographs accurately depict what he saw.   The
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Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the photographs into
evidence.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS SO ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
          /s/ Henry duPont Ridgely                
                       Justice