Case Title: Restrepo-Duque v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 63, 2015

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
JUAN RESTREPO-DUQUE,  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 63, 2015 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
of the State of Delaware, 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
in and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
Cr. ID. No. 1002011017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted:  December 2, 2015 
Decided:  
December 17, 2015 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
ORDER 
 
This 17th day of December, 2015, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
  On February 14, 2010, Kenton Wesley Wolf was shot with a BB gun 
and stabbed to death in his Smyrna residence.  The police arrested Juan Restrepo-
Duque (“Restrepo”), an eighteen-year-old Colombian national who had been living 
in the U.S. for seven years, and charged him with Wolf’s murder.  A Superior 
Court jury found Restrepo guilty of second degree murder, possession of a deadly 
weapon during the commission of a felony, motor vehicle theft, and carrying a 
concealed dangerous instrument.  The Superior Court judge sentenced Restrepo to 
a lengthy jail term, followed by decreasing levels of supervision.    
2 
 
(2) 
Restrepo appeals and argues that the Superior Court erred by (1) 
finding the nighttime search warrant of his residence and his subsequent arrest 
valid; (2) admitting into evidence Restrepo’s statement made to police; and (3) 
admitting into evidence information found on Wolf’s laptop computer and a social 
media profile and posts linking him to Wolf.   
(3) 
After reviewing the record and arguments on appeal, we affirm the 
judgment of the Superior Court.  The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion 
regarding the nighttime search warrant.  Although there were mistakes in the 
warrant, they were not essential to the probable cause determination.  The 
admission of Restrepo’s statement to police, where the police arguably went 
beyond simple clarification of Restrepo’s ambiguous invocation of his Miranda 
rights, presents a closer question under Crawford v. State.1  Looking at the totality 
of the circumstances of the interview, however, we find that the police did not run 
afoul of the clarification rule set forth in Crawford.  Finally, the Superior Court 
correctly found that the victim’s laptop was properly authenticated, as were the 
social media posts.   
(4) 
Restrepo, using the profile “purecolombianblood,” met Wolf on the 
internet.  On January 29, 2010, Wolf picked up Restrepo at a Newark grocery 
store, and together they drove to Wolf’s home in Smyrna, Delaware.  There they 
                                          
 
1 580 A.2d 571 (Del. 1990). 
3 
 
drank beer and watched television.  On February 14, 2010, Wolf sent Restrepo an 
email asking to meet again in person.  Wolf picked up Restrepo from the Newark 
library at around 3:00 p.m., and the two bought beer before driving to Wolf’s 
house.  According to Restrepo, they went upstairs to Wolf’s bedroom to watch 
television and drink beer.  Eventually, as Wolf attempted to touch Restrepo 
sexually, Restrepo claimed that he noticed a nine-inch knife on the nightstand.  
Restrepo testified that Wolf reached for the knife when he rebuffed Wolf’s 
advances, but Restrepo grabbed the knife first.  Restrepo sliced Wolf across the 
throat.  Wolf then chased Restrepo out of the room, yelling at him to get out. 
(5) 
Fearful that Wolf would call the police, Restrepo testified that he 
returned to the upstairs bedroom and found the door locked.  He kicked the door 
open, shot Wolf with a BB gun, and stabbed him repeatedly.  Once he was sure 
Wolf was dead, Restrepo pulled the bedding, the mattress, and the dresser on top of 
Wolf.  He opened the windows and turned off the heat, despite it being a cold 
February day.  Restrepo then retrieved the beer from the kitchen and packed a box 
with some of Wolf’s belongings, including CDs, cellphones, a beeper, Wolf’s 
laptop, and three sets of keys.  Restrepo then left in Wolf’s distinctive green 1994 
Volkswagen Jetta.  He stopped at a Kmart to buy new clothing and to dispose of 
his bloody clothes and shoes. 
4 
 
(6) 
On February 15, 2010, Restrepo drove Wolf’s car to the Newark 
Farmers Market.  He used Wolf’s credit card to purchase two tasers and three 
knives.  He then threw the knife that he used to stab Wolf and the BB gun in a 
creek near his home.  He left Wolf’s laptop buried in the snow in Deacons Walk 
Park.  Finally, he abandoned Wolf’s Jetta in Brook Haven Park. 
(7) 
On February 19, 2010, after Wolf failed to show up to work, two of 
his coworkers went to his home to check on him.  They noticed the windows were 
open and saw his wallet and other personal belongings scattered on the front lawn.  
They called the police, who discovered Wolf’s body upstairs. 
(8) 
The police sent a desktop computer recovered from Wolf’s home to 
the State Police High Tech Crimes Unit for analysis.  Later that same day, a tree 
surgeon in Deacons Walk Park discovered Wolf’s laptop under the snow.  The 
police analyzed both of Wolf’s computers and discovered that Wolf had 
communicated with someone using the screen name “purecolombianblood” on 
January 29 and February 14.  An internet search of “purecolombianblood” led to 
pictures and online profiles that linked the screen name to Restrepo.  The police 
also learned that Wolf’s credit card had been used at the Newark Farmers Market 
on February 15.  A February 15 surveillance video of the Farmers Market parking 
lot showed Wolf’s distinctive green Jetta pulling in and leaving, though the driver 
and the license plate number could not be identified. 
5 
 
(9) 
The police secured a nighttime search warrant and went to Restrepo’s 
house around midnight on February 22, 2010.  The search warrant affidavit alleged 
that there was probable cause to suspect that Restrepo had stolen Wolf’s car and 
used his credit card.  At Restrepo’s house, the police discovered the keys to Wolf’s 
missing Jetta in the pocket of a pair of Restrepo’s pants.  The police brought 
Restrepo in for questioning in the early hours of February 23.  After reading 
Restrepo his Miranda rights, Detective William Porter said, “Having these rights in 
mind, do you wish to talk to me about this case?  Tell me your side of the story.”2  
Restrepo answered, “I don’t know.  What would be better?  If I talk to a lawyer.”3  
The detective replied, “I mean it’s up to you I mean, it’s perfectly up to you I 
mean.  It be nice to get your ahh side of the story out because if you don’t get your 
side of the story out we got to go with . . . you know what I’m saying?”4  Restrepo 
said he understood.  The detective then said, “Okay. So you wish to tell me your 
side of the story?”5  Restrepo replied, “Yeah why not.”6 
(10) Restrepo then described the events of February 14 and 15.  He also 
told the detective where Wolf’s Jetta was and where the police could find the knife 
                                          
 
2 App. to Opening Br. at 151 (Restrepo’s Transcribed Statement).  
3 Id.   
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
6 Id.   
6 
 
he used to stab Wolf.  The police subsequently located Wolf’s car in Brook Haven 
Park, where Restrepo said it would be, and the knife in the creek near his house. 
(11) Restrepo was charged with murder in the first degree, possession of a 
deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, theft of a motor vehicle, second 
degree forgery, and carrying a concealed dangerous instrument.  He was indicted 
on June 7, 2010.  On November 13, 2012, Restrepo filed a motion in limine, a 
motion to suppress, a motion for a Franks hearing, and a motion to prohibit the 
death penalty.  The Superior Court denied the motions on February 19, 2013.  A 
jury trial was held from January 27 to February 4, 2014, and Restrepo was 
convicted of all charges except second degree forgery. 
(12) On April 15, 2014, the Superior Court held an office conference 
regarding the transcripts of Restrepo’s police interview that were submitted to the 
jury during trial.  The court found the submission of the transcripts to be 
conceivably prejudicial to Restrepo and granted a new trial on May 6, 2014.  The 
second jury trial was held from November 17 to 26, 2014.  Wolf’s laptop and the 
social media posts linking “purecolombianblood” to Restrepo were admitted into 
evidence.  Restrepo was again convicted of second degree murder, possession of a 
deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, theft of a motor vehicle, and 
carrying a concealed dangerous instrument.  He appeals his convictions and the 
denial of his motions to suppress and for a Franks hearing. 
7 
 
(13) Restrepo first argues the Superior Court erred in finding the nighttime 
search warrant valid, because the application and affidavit for the search warrant 
did not support a finding of probable cause after an analysis under Franks v. 
Delaware 7 and a reverse-Franks analysis.  This Court reviews a trial court’s 
evidentiary rulings, including a denial of a motion to suppress, for abuse of 
discretion.8  The trial court’s formulation and application of legal concepts are 
reviewed de novo,9 but the trial court’s factual findings will be upheld so long as 
they are not clearly erroneous.10 
(14) Under Franks, a defendant is entitled to a hearing when he has made a 
“substantial preliminary showing” that the police knowingly or “with reckless 
disregard for the truth” relied on a false statement to establish probable cause.11  To 
succeed under a reverse-Franks analysis, “a defendant must show by the 
preponderance of the evidence that the police knowingly and intentionally, or with 
reckless disregard for the truth, omitted information from the search warrant 
affidavit that was material to a finding of probable cause.”12  If the defendant is 
successful, the result of the search warrant must be suppressed. 13   When 
                                          
 
7 438 U.S. 154 (1978).  
8 Adams v. State, __A.3d__, 2015 WL 5692291, at * 6 (Del. Sept. 28, 2015); Rivera v. State, 7 
A.3d 961, 966 (Del. 2010).  
9 Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 318 (Del. 2006).  
10 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 854 (Del. 2009).  
11 Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.   
12 Rivera, 7 A.3d at 968. 
13 Id. 
8 
 
considering a search warrant affidavit, “a magistrate may find probable cause when 
considering the totality of the circumstances, ‘there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’”14 
(15) Restrepo argues that the police knowingly included false statements 
and omitted exculpatory information in the search warrant affidavit.  The search 
warrant affidavit described the knife and BB gun wounds to Wolf’s body, and 
stated that a February 14 online conversation revealed that Wolf agreed to pick 
Restrepo up on that date.  The affidavit stated that EZ-Pass records showed that 
Wolf drove into New Castle County and back to Smyrna on that day.  It stated that 
the police reviewed video surveillance of the Newark Farmers Market parking lot 
and identified Restrepo exiting Wolf’s 1994 Jetta.  Also, it stated that Wolf’s 
wallet was missing.  Finally, the affidavit stated that Restrepo’s family had been 
uncooperative with State Troopers and that there were locks on the bedroom doors 
at Restrepo’s residence. 
(16) The search warrant affidavit contained inaccuracies.  Specifically, the 
EZ-Pass records did not show exactly who drove to New Castle County and back, 
the detective could not identify the license plate or the driver on the surveillance 
video, Wolf’s coworkers said that they saw his wallet at his house, and the 
Troopers’ report did not say Restrepo’s family was uncooperative or that there 
                                          
 
14 Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296 (quoting Stones v. State, 676 A.2d 907 (Del. 1996) (Table)).  
9 
 
were locks on the bedroom doors.  But under Franks, the allegedly false statements 
or omitted information must be necessary to a finding of probable cause before 
suppression is proper.15  Here, the affidavit established probable cause without the 
inaccuracies.  The fact that Restrepo had been communicating with Wolf about 
meeting, that Wolf’s vehicle had traveled to and from where Restrepo was picked 
up, and that Wolf’s car was later spotted being driven by someone who fit the 
general description of Restrepo created a reasonable inference that Restrepo had 
committed a crime and was in possession of evidence.  The Superior Court 
therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Restrepo’s motion for a Franks 
hearing and for suppression of evidence. 
(17) Relatedly, Restrepo argues under a reverse-Franks analysis that the 
police recklessly or intentionally omitted exculpatory information from the 
affidavit.  Restrepo contends that the police should have included the fact that 
Wolf’s computer revealed that he had been chatting with individuals other than 
Restrepo on February 14, and that the clerk at the Farmer’s Market could not 
identify Restrepo as the individual who had used Wolf’s credit card. 16  The 
                                          
 
15 438 U.S. at 155-56. 
16 Restrepo also cites a time discrepancy between the time printed on the Farmer’s Market 
receipt and the timestamp on the parking lot surveillance video as contributing to the alleged 
Franks violation.  This alleged inconsistency appears to have only been brought up as part of one 
of the investigating officers’ testimony at trial, and not in the context of an attempt to invalidate 
the affidavit of probable cause.  See App. to Opening Br. at 268-69 (Trial Tr., Jan. 30, 2014).  
Restrepo did not raise this argument in any of his motions for Franks hearings, and the Superior 
Court did not address it.  See State v. Restrepo-Duque, 2014 WL 1724755, at *1-3 (Del. Super. 
10 
 
Superior Court addressed the effect of the other chats on the probable cause 
determination, and concluded that it was immaterial.17  The Superior Court also 
addressed the clerk’s failure to identify Restrepo, and likewise concluded that it 
was immaterial to the probable cause determination.18  In other words, there would 
have been probable cause even if the facts that Wolf was chatting with other 
individuals on the 14th and if the clerk’s inability to identify Restrepo had been 
included in the affidavit.  We agree.  As discussed above, there was sufficient 
information to support the finding of probable cause, and the omitted information 
would not have affected the overall mix of information to change the outcome.  As 
such, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion. 
(18) Restrepo also argues that because of the alleged errors in the search 
warrant affidavit, there was no probable cause for his arrest, and evidence obtained 
as a result of it should be suppressed.  Because Restrepo failed to raise this 
contention before the Superior Court, we review only for plain error.19  “Whether 
there was probable cause to arrest a defendant is determined under a totality of the 
                                          
 
Apr. 15, 2014).  It therefore was not fairly presented below, and Restrepo may not raise it now.  
See Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
17 Restrepo, 2014 WL 1724755, at *2 (finding there was probable cause even if the affidavit had 
said that Wolf had been communicating on February 14 with “a number of individuals, including 
‘purecolombianblood,’ which a Google search linked to” Restrepo). 
18 Id. at *2-3. 
19 Blake v. State, 65 A.3d 557, 562 (Del. 2013) (“[T]he doctrine of plain error is limited to 
material defects which are apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, serious and 
fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or 
which clearly show manifest injustice”) (quoting Turner v. State, 5 A.3d 612, 615 (Del. 2010)). 
11 
 
circumstances test.”20  Restrepo was initially arrested for motor vehicle theft and 
using Wolf’s credit card.  Because, as discussed above, there was probable cause to 
believe Restrepo had committed these offenses, there was no plain error. 
(19) Restrepo next argues that the Superior Court erred by not suppressing 
his statement to police.  The Superior Court found that Restrepo ambiguously 
invoked his right to counsel.  This Court has held that “[w]here a suspect does not 
unequivocally invoke that right, the police should be entitled to attempt to 
determine the suspect’s intention” and has endorsed the “clarification approach” 
which may include “the repeating of Miranda warnings as a means of emphasizing 
the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel.”21  However: 
If . . . the police make additional inquiries concerning a suspect’s 
intentions, the clarifying questions may not coerce or intimidate the 
suspect or otherwise discourage his effort to secure counsel, if that is 
his intention.  Nor may the police tender any legal advice or attempt to 
dissuade the suspect from pursuing an intended course.22 
                                          
 
20 Jackson v. State, 990 A.2d 1281, 1289 (Del. 2009); see also 11 Del. C. § 1904(b).  
21 Crawford, 580 A.2d at 577 (emphasis added).  The Superior Court noted the distinction 
between state and federal law on this issue:  
The United States Supreme Court has held that “the United States Constitution 
imposes no duty on police to cease questioning” when a suspect makes an 
ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel.  Instead, a suspect must 
unambiguously request counsel in order to trigger cessation of questioning.  
However, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that the State Constitution 
provides additional constitutional protection, requiring police to clarify such 
ambiguous statements before continuing the interrogation.   
Restrepo, 2014 WL 1724755, at *6 (footnotes omitted).  
22 Crawford, 580 A.2d at 577.  
12 
 
(20) In this case, Restrepo responded to a request to make a statement by 
saying, “I don’t know.  What would be better?  If I talk to a lawyer.”23  Detective 
Porter responded, “I mean it’s up to you I mean, it’s perfectly up to you I mean.  It 
be nice to get your ahh side of the story out because if you don’t get your side of 
the story out we got to go with . . . you know what I’m saying?”24  The Superior 
Court found that detective’s statement was “probably not ideal,” but nonetheless 
concluded that the statement did not exceed the bounds of clarification permitted 
by this Court in Crawford.  According to the trial court, the detective’s statement 
did not “coerce or intimidate” Restrepo, and did not “discourage his effort to 
secure counsel” because the extraneous statements did not reach the level of 
coercion found in other cases.25  The Superior Court also relied heavily on the fact 
that, under the “totality of the circumstances,” the interview did not appear 
coercive.  According to the court, the questioning was conversational and Restrepo 
was not outwardly in distress—he expressly agreed to talk to the detective. 
(21) The State does not challenge the ambiguity of Restrepo’s reply to the 
Miranda warning.  Instead, the State argues that this Court’s decision in Crawford 
should be overruled in favor of the federal “bright line rule” where police may 
continue questioning in the face of an ambiguous or equivocal request for 
                                          
 
23 App. to Opening Br. at 151 (Restrepo’s Transcribed Statement). 
24 Id.  
25 Restrepo, 2014 WL 1724755, at *7-8 (reviewing cases). 
13 
 
counsel.26  In the alternative, the State argues that based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the police questioning did not exceed the bounds of clarification.   
(22) We decline the State’s invitation to overrule Crawford.  Applying 
Crawford, we agree with the Superior Court that the police questioning was less 
than ideal.  The detective’s importuning of Restrepo to give his side of the story 
rather than invoke his right to counsel is troublesome.  The detective’s answer to 
Restrepo’s question could also be viewed as advice, rather than clarification.  But 
looking at the “totality of the circumstances,” the detective’s statement does not 
reach the level of coercion found in other cases. 27  The questioning was not 
intimidating or coercive.  Further, Restrepo responded by saying “Why not?”  
Based on our independent review of the interview, we agree with the Superior 
Court that Restrepo’s statement was given voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently, and the police did not exceed the bounds of permitted clarification.  
Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, we affirm the Superior Court’s ruling 
on this issue. 
(23) Additionally, Restrepo argues that the detective’s failure to advise him 
of his consular rights under Article 36 of The Vienna Convention on Consular 
                                          
 
26 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994) (“[A]fter a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and 
unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.”). 
27 See State v. Sumner, 2003 WL 21963008, at *20 (Del. Super. Aug. 18, 2003) (holding that the 
detective’s comment to the suspect that he was “flabbergasted right now as to why you would 
want a lawyer” was not a clarifying statement but “a coercive and systematic attempt to negotiate 
away Sumner’s constitutional rights leading to an admission of guilt”). 
14 
 
Relations precludes the use of Restrepo’s statement to police.  Under Article 
36(1)(b), detaining authorities are required to advise foreign nationals, without 
delay, of their right to confer with their respective country’s consulate.  “Without 
delay” means that a detained foreign national must be advised of this right as soon 
as law enforcement realizes the person is a foreign national or “once there are 
grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign national.”28 
(24) The detective did not know that Restrepo was a citizen of Colombia 
prior to the interview.  He testified at trial that he did not have reason to believe 
that Restrepo was “something other than a U.S. citizen,” and Restrepo did not tell 
him anything about his citizenship prior to the interview.29  Further, as held by the 
United States Supreme Court, Article 36 “secures only a right of foreign nationals 
to have their consulate informed of their arrest or detention—not to have their 
consulate intervene, or to have law enforcement authorities cease their 
investigation.”30  In this case, “[s]uppression [of Restrepo’s statement] would be a 
vastly disproportionate remedy for an Article 36 violation.” 31  Therefore, the 
Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Restrepo’s motion to 
suppress. 
                                          
 
28 Avena and Other Mexican Nat’ls (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 49 (Mar. 2004).  
29 App. to Opening Br. at 113 (Test. of Det. Porter).   
30 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 349 (2006).   
31 Id. 
15 
 
(25) Next, Restrepo argues the Superior Court erred in admitting Wolf’s 
laptop into evidence, because the State failed to fully establish the chain of custody 
of the computer.  Restrepo contends there was a missing link in the chain of 
custody from the Deacons Walk Park tree surgeon, who found the laptop, to the 
detective who retrieved the laptop out of the evidence locker for investigation. 
Other than the fact that the laptop was powered up (but not modified) on February 
16, 2010, there was no evidence that anyone tampered with the laptop or its 
contents. 
(26) The trial judge has substantial discretion in deciding whether to admit 
evidence.32  Under Delaware Rule of Evidence 901(a), the party offering evidence 
at trial must present other evidence “sufficient to support a finding that the matter 
in question is what its proponent claims.” 33   The State has two avenues to 
authenticate physical evidence: “[i]t may have witnesses visually identify the item 
as that which was actually involved with the crime, or it may establish a ‘chain of 
custody,’ which indirectly establishes the identity and integrity of the evidence by 
tracing its continuous whereabouts.”34 
(27) In this case, the State presented witnesses who could identify the 
computer.  The detective who analyzed Wolf’s computers, a member of the State 
                                          
 
32 Trioche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 152 (Del. 1987).  
33 D.R.E. 901(a).   
34 Trioche, 525 A.2d at 152 (quoting Whitfield v. State, 524 A.2d 13, 16 (Del. 1987)) (emphasis 
added).   
16 
 
Police High Tech Crimes Unit, identified the laptop computer as Wolf’s at trial, 
because Wolf was its registered user.  The tree surgeon who found the laptop also 
authenticated it as the same one he had found in the park.  Because the State 
presented these witnesses, there was no need to establish a chain of custody35 in 
order to identify the laptop, and the Superior Court did not err in admitting the 
laptop into evidence. 
(28) Finally, Restrepo argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion 
by admitting into evidence an exhibit consisting of postings from an internet 
profile on a social gaming website linked to Restrepo.  He argues that because the 
detective who was questioned about the postings at trial did not “discover” the 
profile, he lacked the knowledge to authenticate it.  This Court has held that “the 
trial judge as the gatekeeper of evidence may admit [a] social media post when 
there is evidence sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable juror that the 
proffered evidence is what its proponent claims it to be.” 36  Even though the 
detective who testified at Restrepo’s trial may not have “discovered” the profile in 
question, he testified that he was familiar with it. 37  He also testified that he 
                                          
 
35 See 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1142 (“A chain of custody for physical evidence may have to be 
established as part of the foundation for its admission, as in cases where physical evidence is not 
readily identifiable or may be susceptible to tampering. . . . The more fungible the evidence, . . . 
the more elaborate the foundation must be. . . . Whether a proper chain of custody has been 
established goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.”). 
36 Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 688 (Del. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). 
37 App. to Opening Br. at 412 (Test. of Det. Willey) (“Q: Is it a website that you found on the 
Internet?  A: Yes.”). 
17 
 
personally ran an internet search for “purecolombianblood” and found the internet 
profile and postings in question.  There was thus identification evidence sufficient 
to allow a reasonable jury to find the online profile was what the State claimed it to 
be—an online profile that belonged to Restrepo.  The Superior Court therefore did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Justice