Case Title: Sarvold v. Dodson

Citation: 237 N.W.2d 447

Docket Number: 2-57067

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1976-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
237 N.W.2d 447 (1976) Lyle SARVOLD, Appellant, v. Terry Lee DODSON, Appellee. No. 2-57067. Supreme Court of Iowa. January 21, 1976. Shaw, Shaw & Beneke by Donald G. Beneke, Laurens, for appellant. Fitzgibbons Brothers, Estherville, for appellee. Heard by MOORE, C. J., and LeGRAND, REES, REYNOLDSON and McCORMICK, JJ. MOORE, Chief Justice. Plaintiff appeals dismissal of Count (Division) I of his petition for failure to state a cause of action for abuse of process. We find the trial court applied the wrong rule of law in sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Count I and accordingly reverse and remand. I. Count I of plaintiff's three Count petition alleges a cause of action for abuse of process, Count II alleges a cause of action for malicious prosecution and Count III alleges a cause of action for a civil rights violation. Defendant's motion to dismiss each Count for failure to plead a cause of action was sustained. Plaintiff has appealed only from dismissal of Count I. On *448 issues raised at the pleading stage we consider all well plead allegations as true. Aalfs v. Aalfs, 246 Iowa 158, 160, 66 N.W.2d 121, 122. Count I of plaintiff's petition alleges that prior to September 1, 1971, plaintiff was in possession of information which he felt would be grounds for discharge of defendant from his job as a police officer in Spencer, Iowa. He alleges further that plaintiff acted upon this information by conveying same to certain public officials for the purpose of obtaining defendant's discharge. It is then alleged defendant filed an information and caused plaintiff to be confined at the State Mental Health Institute at Cherokee, Iowa and later committed to the Veteran's Hospital in Knoxville, Iowa for evaluation and treatment of mental illness. Plaintiff then pleads: The court dismissed both Count I and Count II on the grounds plaintiff's petition failed to allege absence of probable cause and termination of the commitment proceedings favorably to plaintiff. II. Our first problem is to determine the elements of and distinctions between actions for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Specifically we must determine if plaintiff must allege absence of probable cause or favorable termination to support an abuse of process action. Although both actions include common elements of malice and improper application of process, actions for abuse of process and actions for malicious prosecution are fundamentally different in focus. The elements of a malicious prosecution action are: (1) a previous prosecution, (2) instigation or procurement thereof by defendant, (3) termination of the prosecution by an acquittal or discharge of plaintiff, (4) want of probable cause, (5) malice in bringing the prosecution on the part of the defendant and (6) damage to plaintiff. Vander Linden v. Crews, Iowa, 231 N.W.2d 904, 905; Liberty Loan Corp. of Des Moines v. Williams, Iowa, 201 N.W.2d 462, 466. The basis of an action for malicious prosecution consists of the wrongful initiation of an unsuccessful civil or criminal proceeding with malice and without probable cause. Hyde Construction Co., Inc. v. Koehring Company, 387 F. Supp. 702, 713 (S.D.Miss.1974); Liberty Loan Corp. of Des Moines v. Williams, supra, 201 N.W.2d 462, 466; 72 C.J.S. Process § 119, p. 1189. The requisites of an action for abuse of process have not been consistently defined by our case law. As we point out infra two of our older cases indicate absence of probable cause must be alleged to support an abuse of process action. However, in Ashland v. Lapiner Motor Co., 247 Iowa 596, 75 N.W.2d 357, we indicated we would follow the Restatement view on the subject; and recently in Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, Iowa, 207 N.W.2d 1, 4, we cite and quote Restatement, Torts, (1938). Section 682 thereof at page 464 on the subject of abuse of process states the general principle as: "One who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed is liable to the other for the pecuniary loss caused thereby." The tentative redraft of section 682 would add only "primarily" after the word "another." It is not pertinent to the pleading problem here presented. *449 The formulation of the rule is supported by the weight of recent authority and is fundamentally sound. Of importance is comment "a" to the Restatement of Torts section 682 (1938) which reads: A number of courts have followed this formulation. See Simkins Ind., Inc. v. Fuld & Co., Div. of Met. Gr., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 126 (E.D.Pa.1975); Hyde Construction Co., Inc. v. Koehring Co., supra; Hughes v. Swinehart, 376 F. Supp. 650 (E.D.Pa.1974); ADM Corp. v. Speedmaster Packaging Corp., 384 F. Supp. 1325 (D.N.J.1974); Bohm v. Holzberg, 47 A.D.2d 764, 365 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1975); See also 72 C.J.S. Process § 119, p. 1188; Prosser, Torts, 4th Ed., section 121. Iowa has not always followed this approach. Language in at least two old cases indicates that absence of probable cause must be alleged to support an abuse of process action. See Nix v. Goodhill, 95 Iowa 282, 63 N.W. 701 (1895); Shadden v. Butler, 164 Iowa 1, 144 N.W. 329 (1913), but see Bradshaw v. Frazier, 113 Iowa 579, 85 N.W. 752 (1901). The first two cases no longer represent sound precedent and, to the extent inconsistent with this opinion, are hereby overruled. A good statement of the rule is found in Hyde Construction Co., Inc. v. Koehring Company, pages 712, 713 of 387 F.Supp.: III. For clarification of the distinctions between the two torts, the following should be considered: From the foregoing analysis, we are convinced the trial court was incorrect in determining that absence of probable cause and favorable termination were essential elements of an action for abuse of process. The dismissal of Count I of plaintiff's petition must therefore be set aside, and plaintiff's cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. In fairness to the trial court we must note inadequate briefing by plaintiff's counsel contributed to the erroneous ruling. IV. Appellee has questioned whether an action for abuse of process can be grounded upon the initiation of commitment *450 proceedings under Code chapter 229. Our reading of this chapter convinces us that for the purpose of an action for abuse of process, the initiation and maintenance of such proceedings is sufficient to constitute "process." See Maniaci v. Marquette University, 50 Wis.2d 287, 184 N.W.2d 168; the annotation at 30 A.L.R.3d 455; 72 C.J.S. Process § 121, p. 1197. Reversed and remanded.