Case Title: State ex rel. State v. Lewis

Citation: 2003-Ohio-2476

Docket Number: 20030447

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 99 Ohio St.3d 97, 2003-Ohio-2476.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. STATE OF OHIO v. LEWIS, JUDGE, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 99 Ohio St.3d 97, 2003-Ohio-2476.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought prohibiting Perry County Common Pleas Court Judge 
Linton D. Lewis Jr. from exercising further jurisdiction in DeRolph v. 
State — Writ granted. 
(No. 2003-0447 — Submitted April 15, 2003 — Decided May 16, 2003.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
The DeRolph Litigation:  DeRolph I, II, III, and IV 
{¶1} 
In December 1991, Dale R. DeRolph and other plaintiffs, including 
five school district boards of education, filed a complaint in respondent Perry 
County Court of Common Pleas.  In an amended complaint, the DeRolph 
plaintiffs requested (1) a declaration that public education is a fundamental 
constitutional right in Ohio, (2) a declaration that the system of funding public 
education in Ohio was unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs and others, and (3) 
a mandatory injunction requiring relator, the state of Ohio, to provide for a system 
of funding public elementary and secondary education in compliance with the 
Ohio Constitution. The DeRolph plaintiffs further requested that the common 
pleas court “retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purpose of assuring 
compliance with its lawful findings and orders.”  Relator, the state of Ohio, the 
State Board of Education, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the 
State Department of Education were named as defendants. 
{¶2} 
Respondent Perry County Common Pleas Court Judge Linton D. 
Lewis Jr. determined that Ohio’s school-funding system violated the Ohio 
Constitution and ordered the preparation of legislative proposals for submission to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
the General Assembly to eliminate wealth-based disparities among Ohio public 
school districts.  See DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 194, 677 
N.E.2d 733 (“DeRolph I”).  After the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s 
judgment, see DeRolph v. State (Aug. 30, 1995), Perry App. No. CA-477, 1995 
WL 557316, we reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.  DeRolph I at 213, 
677 N.E.2d 733. 
{¶3} 
In DeRolph I, we held that “Ohio’s elementary and secondary 
public school financing system violates Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio 
Constitution, which mandates a thorough and efficient system of common schools 
throughout the state.”  Id. at syllabus.  We refused, however, “to encroach upon 
the clearly legislative function of deciding what the new legislation will be.”  
DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 213, 677 N.E.2d 733, fn. 9.  Instead, we ordered the 
General Assembly to create an entirely new school-financing system, but stayed 
the effect of the decision for 12 months.  Id. at 213, 677 N.E.2d 733.  We 
remanded the cause to the common pleas court “with directions to enter judgment 
consistent with this opinion” and ordered that court to “retain jurisdiction until the 
legislation is enacted and in effect, taking such action as may be necessary to 
ensure conformity with this opinion.”  Id.  We conferred plenary jurisdiction on 
the trial court to enforce the decision, including the right to petition this court for 
guidance. Id. at fn. 10. 
{¶4} 
We subsequently clarified DeRolph I by stating that Judge Lewis 
would rule on the constitutionality of the final legislative remedy and that any 
party could then appeal directly to this court.  DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio 
St.3d 419, 421, 678 N.E.2d 886.  We further rejected any supervision of the 
legislative process by the courts. 
{¶5} 
“Given the separate powers entrusted to the three coordinate 
branches of government, both this court and the trial court recognize that it is not 
January Term, 2003 
3 
the function of the judiciary to supervise or participate in the legislative and 
executive process.  * * *  
{¶6} 
“ * * * [I]t is the role of the courts, pursuant to the Ohio 
Constitution, to determine the constitutional validity of the system of funding and 
maintaining the public schools in Ohio.”  Id. at 420-421, 678 N.E.2d 886. 
{¶7} 
On remand, the DeRolph plaintiffs asked Judge Lewis to order the 
DeRolph defendants to follow three steps pursuant to a schedule recommended by 
the plaintiffs.  See DeRolph v. State (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 297, 681 N.E.2d 424.  
After Judge Lewis petitioned this court for guidance on the plaintiffs’ motion, we 
held that the DeRolph plaintiffs’ request for the order should be denied.  Id. 
{¶8} 
In February 1999, Judge Lewis entered his judgment on the 
remanded case.  DeRolph v. State (1999), 98 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 712 N.E.2d 125.  
Judge Lewis held that the state had not proved that its remedy complied with the 
court’s DeRolph I mandate and that the school-funding system remained 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 263, 712 N.E.2d 125.  Judge Lewis retained jurisdiction to 
ensure compliance and ordered the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and 
the State Board of Education to prepare a report with proposals to comply with 
the orders of the common pleas court and this court, to submit the completed 
report to the General Assembly, and thereafter to prepare a report setting forth the 
steps taken to resolve the issues raised by the DeRolph litigation.  Id.  Judge 
Lewis’s remedial order was stayed pending appeal.  DeRolph v. State (1999), 85 
Ohio St.3d 1488, 709 N.E.2d 1215. 
{¶9} 
On appeal, we agreed that the revised school-funding system was 
still unconstitutional but gave the defendants more time to comply with Section 2, 
Article VI of the Ohio Constitution.  DeRolph v. State (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 
36-38, 728 N.E.2d 993 (“DeRolph II”).  In so holding, however, we did not adopt 
Judge Lewis’s 1999 remedial order.  In addition, we “decline[d] to appoint a 
special master to oversee the state’s further efforts to comply with Section 2, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
Article VI” and maintained continuing jurisdiction. We affirmed only those 
portions of the trial court’s judgment that were consistent with DeRolph II.  Id. 
{¶10} In September 2001, after the state further modified the school-
funding system, we ordered the state to implement certain changes that would 
satisfy the tests for constitutionality in DeRolph I and II.  DeRolph v. State (2001), 
93 Ohio St.3d 309, 325, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (“DeRolph III”).  We further stated that 
there was “no reason to retain jurisdiction” and that “[i]f the order receives less 
than full compliance, interested parties have remedies available to them.”  Id. 
{¶11} On reconsideration, we vacated DeRolph III, held that DeRolph I 
and II were the law of the case, and further held that the school-funding system 
was unconstitutional.  DeRolph v. State, 97 Ohio St.3d 434, 2002-Ohio-6750, 780 
N.E.2d 529 (“DeRolph IV”).  We directed the General Assembly “to enact a 
school-financing scheme that is thorough and efficient, as explained in DeRolph I, 
DeRolph II, and the accompanying concurrences.”  Id. at ¶ 5.  In the DeRolph IV 
mandate, we ordered the common pleas court “to carry the following judgment in 
this cause into execution”: 
{¶12} “IT IS ORDERED by the court that, consistent with the opinion 
rendered herein, 2002-Ohio-6750, [97 Ohio St.3d 434, 780 N.E.2d 529], the 
decision entered in this case on September 6, 2001, be, and hereby is, vacated and 
that this court’s decisions in DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 
N.E.2d 733, and DeRolph v. State (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 728 N.E.2d 993, are 
the law of the case and that the current school-funding system is 
unconstitutional.”  DeRolph v. State, 97 Ohio St.3d 1477, 2002-Ohio-6750, 780 
N.E.2d 282. 
Motion for Compliance Conference 
{¶13} On March 4, 2003, the DeRolph plaintiffs moved the trial court to 
schedule and conduct a conference to address the defendants’ compliance with the 
orders of the common pleas court and this court.  The DeRolph plaintiffs also 
January Term, 2003 
5 
requested that, consistent with the trial court’s 1999 remedial order, the 
defendants be ordered to prepare a report setting forth proposals to comply with 
the court’s judgment.  In their motion, the DeRolph plaintiffs asked the common 
pleas court to schedule “a compliance conference at the earliest possible time, in 
order to ensure that the State initiates, without further delay, the process of 
formulating a school funding system that satisfies the mandates of the Supreme 
Court.” 
DeRolph V 
{¶14} Three days later, on March 7, 2003, the state filed this action for a 
writ of prohibition preventing respondents, Judge Lewis and the common pleas 
court, from exercising further jurisdiction in DeRolph. The state also moved for 
an emergency stay of proceedings pending resolution of the state’s request for a 
writ of prohibition.  On March 10, 2003, the DeRolph plaintiffs and the Ohio 
Coalition for Equity & Adequacy of School Funding moved to intervene as 
additional respondents.  On March 12, the state filed a memorandum opposing the 
motion to intervene.  On March 17, Judge Lewis responded to the state’s 
emergency motion for a stay by citing the DeRolph I grant of authority to him to 
petition this court for guidance and stating that since “this case continues in 
uncharted waters, this Court hereby seeks guidance as to the proper course to 
follow in the case at bar.” 
{¶15} On March 26, respondents Judge Lewis and the common pleas 
court filed a response to the complaint in which they reiterated that they seek 
guidance from us “as to the proper course to follow in the case at bar.”  On April 
3, we denied the state’s motion for an emergency stay and granted the motion to 
intervene.  State ex rel. State v. Lewis,  98 Ohio St.3d 1509, 2003-Ohio-1572, 786 
N.E.2d 60. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶16} The cause is now before the court under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) for our 
determination whether to dismiss the complaint or grant a peremptory or 
alternative writ. 
Prohibition 
{¶17} The state seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Lewis and 
the common pleas court from exercising further jurisdiction in DeRolph.  In order 
to be entitled to the requested writ, the state must establish that (1) Judge Lewis 
and the common pleas court are about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, 
(2) the exercise of that power is not authorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ 
will cause injury for which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of 
law exists.  State ex rel.  Illuminating Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas, 97 Ohio St.3d 69, 2002-Ohio-5312, 776 N.E. 2d 92, ¶ 14. 
{¶18} In cases of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, the 
requirement of a lack of an adequate remedy of law need not be proven because 
the availability of alternate remedies like appeal would be immaterial.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Goldberg v. Mahoning Cty. Probate Court (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 
160, 162, 753 N.E.2d 192. 
{¶19} Conversely, “[i]n the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of 
jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its 
own jurisdiction and a party challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy 
by appeal.” State ex rel. Nalls v. Russo, 96 Ohio St.3d 410, 2002-Ohio-4907, 775 
N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18. 
{¶20} Therefore, the dispositive issue is whether Judge Lewis and the 
common pleas court patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the 
DeRolph plaintiffs’ motion for a compliance conference.  For the following 
reasons, we grant a peremptory writ of prohibition.  We hold that the exercise of 
further jurisdiction in this litigation would violate our DeRolph IV mandate. 
The Trial Court’s 1999 Remedial Order 
January Term, 2003 
7 
{¶21} The DeRolph plaintiffs asserted two grounds in their motion for a 
compliance conference to support the continuing exercise of jurisdiction by the 
trial court in DeRolph:  (1) the trial court’s 1999 remedial order and (2) our 
mandate in DeRolph IV. 
{¶22} The trial court’s 1999 remedial order is inconsistent with DeRolph 
II and our various rulings during the DeRolph litigation.  Instead of affirming the 
trial court’s remedy of ordering the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and 
the State Board of Education to prepare reports containing proposals to comply 
with DeRolph I and II, we ordered a different remedy:  granting the state 
additional time to comply with the Ohio Constitution and maintaining continuing 
jurisdiction over the case.  DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 36-38, 728 N.E.2d 993.  
Notably, we expressly denied comparable relief in DeRolph II by declining to 
appoint a special master to oversee the state’s efforts to comply with Section 2, 
Article VI.  Id., 89 Ohio St.3d at 38, 728 N.E.2d 993.  Because the trial court’s 
1999 remedial order was inconsistent with our holding in DeRolph II,1 that order 
was reversed and retains no validity. 
{¶23} Moreover, by repeatedly denying the DeRolph plaintiffs’ requests 
for comparable remedial relief throughout this litigation, we intended to preclude 
this relief.  DeRolph, 79 Ohio St.3d 297, 681 N.E.2d 424 (ordering court to deny 
DeRolph plaintiffs’ motion to follow schedule to comply with DeRolph I); 
DeRolph, 85 Ohio St.3d 1488, 709 N.E.2d 1215 (staying trial court’s 1999 
remedial order pending appeal); DeRolph v. State (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1225, 
741 N.E.2d 533 (declining to grant DeRolph plaintiffs’ motion for an order 
requiring defendants to “file a master plan, and to file subsequent progress 
reports”). 
                                                 
1 We affirmed “those portions of the trial court decision that are consistent with the foregoing 
opinion.”  DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 38, 728 N.E.2d 993. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶24} Therefore, the trial court’s 1999 remedial order did not survive our 
decision in DeRolph II and provides no support for any exercise of jurisdiction by 
the trial court over the DeRolph plaintiffs’ motion for a compliance conference. 
Mandate 
{¶25} The remaining basis claimed by the DeRolph plaintiffs for 
authorizing continued jurisdiction by the trial court to consider their motion for a 
compliance conference is that this exercise of jurisdiction is contemplated, and in 
fact required, by our mandate in DeRolph IV.  Conversely, the state asserts that a 
writ of prohibition is warranted because any further exercise of jurisdiction by the 
trial court would violate the DeRolph IV mandate. 
{¶26} As the parties agree, a writ of prohibition is appropriate to require 
lower courts to comply with the mandate of a superior court.  Berthelot v. Dezso 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 257, 259, 714 N.E.2d 888.  Extraordinary relief in 
prohibition is appropriate under these circumstances because the Ohio 
Constitution does not confer jurisdiction on courts of common pleas to review 
mandates of superior courts.  State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. 
DeCessna (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 180, 182, 652 N.E.2d 742. 
{¶27} Because we issued the DeRolph IV mandate that the plaintiffs seek 
to enforce, this court is in the best position to determine whether Judge Lewis’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over the DeRolph plaintiffs’ motion for a compliance 
conference would be contrary to that mandate.  See State ex rel. Borden v. 
Hendon, 96 Ohio St.3d 64, 2002-Ohio-3525, 771 N.E.2d 247, ¶ 9, quoting State 
ex rel. Bitter v. Missig (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 249, 252, 648 N.E.2d 1355 (“ ‘The 
court that issued the order sought to be enforced is in the best position to 
determine [whether] that order has been disobeyed’ ”). 
{¶28} We crafted our language in the DeRolph IV mandate to order that 
the trial court “carry this judgment into execution.”  97 Ohio St.3d 1477, 2002-
Ohio-6750, 780 N.E.2d 282.  We did not remand the cause for further 
January Term, 2003 
9 
proceedings.  See  R.C. 2505.39 (“A court that reverses or affirms a final order, 
judgment, or decree of a lower court upon appeal on questions of law, shall not 
issue execution, but shall send a special mandate to the lower court for execution 
or further proceedings” [emphasis added]).  In fact, if we had intended a remand 
for further proceedings in this litigation, we would have expressly provided for 
that action.  See DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 213, 677 N.E.2d 733.  By contrast, 
we did not specify any remand in DeRolph IV. 
{¶29} Moreover, despite their disclaimer to the contrary, the DeRolph 
plaintiffs are  requesting continuing judicial oversight of the preparation of the 
final legislative remedy.  For example, in their memorandum in support of their 
motion for a compliance conference, the DeRolph plaintiffs request that Judge 
Lewis “conven[e] a conference and requir[e] the State to advise * * *  when and 
how it intends to comply with DeRolph IV and the 1999 [remedial] orders.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶30} The DeRolph plaintiffs’ request is nothing more than an ill-
disguised attempt to require judicial approval for proposed remedies even before 
those remedies are enacted, i.e., requesting advisory rulings on the 
constitutionality of legislation that has not yet been passed. 
{¶31} This, however, would constitute an unquestioned violation of the 
DeRolph I, II, and IV mandates.  See, e.g., DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 213, 677 
N.E.2d 733, fn. 9 (“we recognize that the proper scope of our review is limited to 
determining whether the current system meets constitutional muster.  We refuse to 
encroach upon the clearly legislative function of deciding what the new 
legislation will be”); DeRolph II, 89 Ohio St.3d at 12, 728 N.E.2d 993 (“it is for 
the General Assembly to legislate a remedy”).  It also constitutes an inappropriate 
request for an advisory opinion.  Cf. Egan v. Natl. Distillers & Chem. Corp. 
(1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 176, 25 OBR 243, 495 N.E.2d 904, syllabus (“it is well-
settled that this court will not indulge in advisory opinions”).  In addition, as 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
previously discussed, because the trial court’s 1999 remedial orders were not 
affirmed by this court in DeRolph II, these orders are no longer valid. 
{¶32} Furthermore, as the state cogently observes, a review of the various 
opinions in DeRolph IV supports our construction that no further jurisdiction over 
that particular case would be exercised, whether by this or any other court.  See, 
e.g., DeRolph IV, 97 Ohio St.3d 434, 2002-Ohio-6750, 780 N.E.2d 529, ¶ 16 
(Resnick, J., concurring) (“it does seem likely that further litigation will be 
forthcoming in the area of school funding, even though it apparently will be under 
a name other than DeRolph”); id. at ¶ 28 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“it is proper for the majority to dismiss the case once it 
has reached a finding of unconstitutionality”); id. at ¶ 37 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) 
(“[the majority] implicitly declares this case concluded, yet does so without fully 
disposing of the issues that have developed during the litigation”); id. at ¶ 73 
(Cook, J., dissenting) (“For the reasons I have expressed throughout this court’s 
consideration of this cause, the court should dismiss this case”).  Nor does the 
plurality opinion in DeRolph IV suggest any continued retention of jurisdiction by 
this court or the trial court. 
{¶33} Therefore, our DeRolph IV mandate forbids Judge Lewis and the 
common pleas court to exercise further jurisdiction in this matter.  We never held 
in DeRolph II or IV that Judge Lewis’s 1999 remedial order or, for that matter, the 
DeRolph plaintiffs’ mandatory-injunction claim would be revived when we 
relinquished our jurisdiction.  The duty now lies with the General Assembly to 
remedy an educational system that has been found by the majority in DeRolph IV 
to still be unconstitutional. 
{¶34} Accordingly, because it is beyond doubt that Judge Lewis and the 
common pleas court patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over any post-
DeRolph IV proceedings, we now grant a peremptory writ and end any further 
litigation in DeRolph v. State. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kim v. Wachenschwanz 
January Term, 2003 
11 
(2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 586, 588, 757 N.E.2d 367.  In so holding, we abide by the 
usual practice that when a court declares a legislative act to be unconstitutional, 
that court generally does not remand the case with an order to retain jurisdiction 
over the constitutionality of new legislation enacted in response to its declaration.  
See, e.g., DeRolph IV, 97 Ohio St.3d 434, 2002-Ohio-6750, 780 N.E.2d 529, ¶ 16 
(Resnick, J., concurring) (“In the normal case, when this court finds a particular 
statute or series of statutes unconstitutional, there is no thought given to retaining 
jurisdiction * * *”);  DeRolph, 78 Ohio St.3d at 422, 678 N.E.2d 886 (Moyer, 
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Typically, when a Supreme Court 
declares a legislative act to be unconstitutional it does not order the legislative 
body to enact new legislation.  Nor does it remand the case to a trial court with an 
order to retain jurisdiction over the consequent act of the legislative authority, 
including jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the new legislation”); 
id. at 423, 678 N.E.2d 886 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“the judiciary’s role in this matter is complete and * * *, as 
with all other legislation declared unconstitutional by this court, we must await 
new challenges to the new legislation”).2 
{¶35} Therefore, we grant the peremptory writ of prohibition and order 
Judge Lewis to dismiss the motion now pending before his court. 
Writ granted. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs. 
                                                 
2  Other state supreme courts have similarly refused to retain jurisdiction after declaring school-
funding legislation unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Lake View School Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cty. v. 
Huckabee (2002), 351 Ark. 31, 91 S.W.2d 474, 511 (“It is not this court’s intention to monitor or 
superintend the public schools of this state.  Nevertheless, should constitutional dictates not be 
followed, as interpreted by this court, we will have no hesitancy in reviewing the constitutionality 
of the state’s school-funding system once again in an appropriate case”); Hull v. Albrecht (1998), 
192 Ariz. 34, 960 P.2d 634; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State (236 Mont. 44, 61, 
1990), 784 P.2d 412 (“We decline to retain jurisdiction in this matter.  The legislative changes in 
1989 and 1991 will require new and different proof on the part of any parties challenging the 
same.  We conclude that should such action be necessary, it can be presented in a new and 
separate court action”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Roger F. Carroll, James G. Tassie and 
Sharon A. Jennings, Assistant Attorneys General, for relator. 
Stephen R. Herendeen, Perry County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for 
respondents. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Nicholas J. Pittner, John F. Birath Jr., Sue W. 
Yount, Quintin F. Lindsmith and Susan B. Greenberger, for intervening 
respondents. 
__________________