Case Title: Gauthier v. Gauthier

Citation: 2013-Ohio-5479

Docket Number: 2012-1398

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Gauthier v. Gauthier, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5479.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-5479 
GAUTHIER, APPELLEE, v. GAUTHIER, APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Gauthier v. Gauthier, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5479.] 
Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
(No. 2012-1398—Submitted October 8, 2013—Decided December 18, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Warren County, 
No. CA2011-05-048, 2012-Ohio-3046. 
____________________ 
{¶ 1} The cause is dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 2} I respectfully dissent from the decision to dismiss this appeal as 
having been improvidently accepted.  Appellant’s, Forrest Gauthier’s, proposition 
of law regarding whether a trial court’s finding of contempt, with the opportunity 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
to purge, is a final, appealable order presents a matter of public or great general 
interest, and I would address the merits of the appeal. 
Background 
{¶ 3} Appellant and appellee, Su Kang Gauthier, were granted a decree 
of divorce on March 3, 2009.  The decree stated that appellant and appellee had 
entered into a written full-text separation agreement that “settled all of their 
differences, disagreements and property rights arising out of their marital 
relationship and agreed upon an equitable division of marital property, made 
provisions for payment of marital debts and obligations and agreed upon the 
amount, terms, conditions and duration of spousal support.”  The parties “also 
entered into a Memorandum Separation Agreement in which they summarized, 
ratified, confirmed and adopted the terms and provisions of the Full Text 
Separation Agreement.”  The memorandum separation agreement was filed with 
the trial court; however, the full-text separation agreement was not filed with the 
trial court.  According to the memorandum agreement, this arrangement was 
intended “to protect the privacy of the parties’ financial dealings with one another 
and [was] necessitated by the fact that all documents journalized through the 
Clerk of Courts of Warren County, Ohio are by law available to the general 
public.”  The memorandum separation agreement was attached to the decree, and 
the full-text separation agreement was said to be incorporated into the decree by 
reference, as the only order of the court on matters pertaining to division of 
property, allocation of debts, and spousal support. 
{¶ 4} With respect to the division of household goods and other personal 
property, the documents established that appellant was to provide appellee with 
the final list of items that he was to receive from the marital residence.  Appellant 
was then to retrieve the items on or before April 30, 2009, weather permitting. 
{¶ 5} On May 26, 2009, appellant filed a motion seeking to have 
appellee found in contempt of court for failing to allow appellant to retrieve his 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
personal and business property by April 30, 2009.  A hearing on appellant’s 
motion was held before a magistrate. 
{¶ 6} On October 4, 2010, the magistrate issued a decision finding 
appellee in contempt for failing to return appellant’s property by April 30, 2009.  
The magistrate recommended that the parties be ordered to arrange for delivery of 
appellant’s property that appellee acknowledged was in her possession and to 
conclude the process by November 30, 2010.  As a sanction for appellee’s 
contempt, the magistrate also recommended that appellee be ordered to pay 
$2,500 toward appellant’s attorney fees and pay court costs in the matter. 
{¶ 7} Appellant filed objections to the magistrate’s decision.  On 
December 1, 2010, the trial judge adopted the magistrate’s finding that appellee 
was in contempt but modified the magistrate’s recommended sanction.  In 
addition to the attorney fees and court costs, the trial judge found that an 
appropriate sanction for appellee’s contempt was a 30-day jail sentence.  The trial 
judge provided appellee the opportunity to purge by complying with the terms set 
forth in the magistrate’s decision on or before December 31, 2010.  Neither party 
attempted to appeal that ruling. 
{¶ 8} On January 12, 2011, appellant filed a motion to impose the 
sentence and a notice of failure to comply with the court order.  He alleged that 
appellee had failed to return all the property to him by December 31, 2010, as 
ordered by the trial judge.  Appellant sought to have the jail sentence imposed. 
{¶ 9} The magistrate conducted a hearing on appellant’s motion.  The 
magistrate issued a decision finding that the evidence was insufficient to conclude 
that appellee still possessed appellant’s property.  Accordingly, the magistrate 
declined to recommend the imposition of the jail sentence. 
{¶ 10} Appellant filed objections to the magistrate’s decision.  In a 
decision in April 2011, the trial judge agreed with the magistrate that based on the 
factual findings, the jail sentence could not be imposed.  The trial judge amended 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
the magistrate’s decision by imposing a continuing order on appellee to look for 
the property appellant claimed he had not yet received and to return to appellant 
any found items. 
{¶ 11} Appellant appealed to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, 
arguing that the December 2010 contempt order had been final and appealable 
and thus should not have been modified later.  The Twelfth District held: 
 
[T]he trial court’s 2010 entry finding [appellee] in contempt and 
conditionally sentencing her to 30-days in jail was not a final, 
appealable order but rather an interlocutory order, which the trial 
court was free to reconsider and revise.  See Pitts [v. Ohio Dept. of 
Transp], 67 Ohio St.2d [378] at 379 [423 N.E.2d 1105] (1981), fn. 
1; Civ.R. 54(B). 
 
2012-Ohio-3046 at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 12} We accepted appellant’s first proposition of law: 
 
When a judge makes a finding of contempt that is made 
based upon the evidence presented and imposes a penalty, that 
order is a final appealable order, even if the party found in 
contempt has the opportunity to purge. 
 
134 Ohio St.3d 1417, 2013-Ohio-158, 981 N.E.2d 883. 
Issue of Public or Great General Interest 
{¶ 13} Ohio’s courts handle more than two million cases a year.  Ohio 
Supreme Court, 2012 Ohio Courts Statistical Report 175 (2013).  The potential 
exists for a contempt ruling to be made in any of these cases.  Domestic and 
juvenile actions particularly are rife with contempt rulings.  While specific figures 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
are not available, in light of the significant number of cases that are litigated 
yearly, there is a strong probability that Ohio’s courts handle hundreds, if not 
thousands, of contempt motions yearly.  Therefore, it is imperative that contempt 
orders that impose a penalty and provide purge conditions are reviewed by the 
appellate courts in a consistent manner.  This is currently not the situation. 
{¶ 14} Conflict exists not only among but within appellate districts 
regarding whether a contempt order that imposes a penalty or sanction and 
provides purge conditions is a final, appealable order.  The Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Eighth Districts have concluded that such an order is a final, appealable 
order.  In re R.T.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98498, 2012-Ohio-5080, ¶ 6; In re 
J.Z., 6th Dist. Huron No. H-11-003, 2012-Ohio-1105, ¶ 7; Frey v. Frey, 197 Ohio 
App.3d 273, 2011-Ohio-6012, 967 N.E.2d 246, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.); Davis-Wright v. 
Wright, 4th Dist. Highland No. 09CA1, 2010-Ohio-3984, ¶ 8; Peterson v. 
Peterson, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2003-0049, 2004-Ohio-4714, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 15} There is discord within the Seventh District.  While the Seventh 
District consistently holds that “ ‘[t]o constitute a final appealable order in a 
contempt proceeding, the order must contain both a finding of contempt and the 
imposition of a sanction,’ ” McCree v. McCree, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 
01CA228, 2003-Ohio-1600, ¶ 21, quoting Chain Bike Corp. v. Spoke ‘N Wheel, 
64 Ohio App.2d 62, 64, 410 N.E.2d 802 (8th Dist.1979), the application of the 
holding is not uniform.  In McCree, the Seventh District held that the trial court’s 
order finding the defendant in contempt and imposing a 30-day jail term as a 
sanction unless he purged himself of the contempt by appearing at a scheduled 
compliance hearing was a final, appealable order.  Id. at ¶ 21.  It reasoned that 
notwithstanding the defendant’s ability to purge the contempt by appearing at the 
hearing, the jail sentence was imposed, because “[t]he trial court did not defer the 
sentencing aspect of the contempt hearing or defer imposing a specific sentence.”  
Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
{¶ 16} In contrast is B.J. Alan Co. v. Andrews, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 
10MA87, 2011-Ohio-5165, in which the trial court found the defendant in 
contempt, sentenced him to 30 days in jail, but provided the defendant the 
opportunity to purge the contempt and avoid the jail sentence.  On appeal, the 
court concluded that the trial court’s order was not a final, appealable order.  
“Where the contempt order imposes a conditional sanction with the opportunity to 
purge, it is not final until the opportunity to purge has been removed.”  Id. at ¶ 22, 
citing Carroll Cty. Bur. of Support v. Brill, 7th Dist. Carroll No. 05CA818, 2005-
Ohio-6788, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 17} In the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, there has been a recent 
about-face on this issue.  On July 2, 2012, the Twelfth District held in this action 
that the trial court’s contempt order that imposed a sanction and provided purge 
conditions was not a final, appealable order.  2012-Ohio-3046, ¶ 23.  However, on 
January 7, 2013, the court reached a contrary position in Hetterick v. Hetterick, 
12th Dist. Brown No. CA2012-002, 2013-Ohio-15.  In Hetterick, Ralph Hetterick 
was held in contempt for failing to pay his child’s college expenses as ordered in 
the divorce decree.  The trial court ordered Ralph to serve 30 days in jail and 
provided him the opportunity to purge the contempt if he paid the ordered college 
expenses within six months.  Id. at ¶ 10-11.  On appeal, the Twelfth District 
stated,  “Before a finding of contempt of court constitutes a final appealable order, 
two elements must exist:  (1) a finding of contempt, and (2) the imposition of a 
penalty or sanction.”  Id. at ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. Doe v. Tracy, 51 Ohio 
App.3d 198, 555 N.E.2d 674 (12th Dist.1988).  In applying this reasoning to 
Ralph’s contempt order, the court concluded that it was a final, appealable order: 
 
The fact that the court gave [Ralph] six months to comply with its 
order in order to purge the contempt, however, did not in any way 
negate or eliminate the 30-day sentence.  There is no indication in 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
the record that any action other than [Ralph’s] failure to purge 
would be necessary before the 30-day sentence is executed.  
Therefore, the finding or contempt and the imposition of the 
sentence has [sic] rendered the cause final and appealable. 
 
Id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 18} Finally, there is the consistent position of the Eleventh District 
Court of Appeals that a contempt order with purge conditions is not a final, 
appealable order.  The Eleventh District holds that the second element of a final, 
appealable order, the imposition of a penalty or sanction, see Chain Bike, 64 Ohio 
App.2d at 64, 410 N.E.2d 802, is not met if the trial court provides the contemnor 
with the opportunity to purge the contempt.  Armstrong v. Armstrong, 11th Dist. 
Lake No. 2004-L-010, 2004-Ohio-1521, ¶ 4-5.  See also, e.g., Janece k v. 
Marshall, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-059, 2011-Ohio-2994. 
{¶ 19} The inconsistency on this issue around the state creates uncertainty 
for trial courts and litigants.  Trial courts, counsel, and litigants in the Seventh 
District do not know which precedent will control.  Further, litigants in the 
Eleventh District are treated differently than litigants in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Eighth Districts, and now the Twelfth with the recent decision in 
Hetterick. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 20} This issue has plagued lower courts throughout our state.  And this 
case is optimally positioned to resolve this question of law and provide guidance 
to appellate courts and litigants.  The magistrate found appellee in contempt and 
imposed attorney fees and courts costs as a sanction.  The trial judge adopted the 
contempt finding and the sanction of attorney fees and court costs, but modified 
the order and imposed the jail sentence.  Additionally, the trial judge provided 
appellee with the opportunity to purge.  This is not a case in which the trial judge 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
held either the contempt finding or the sanction in abeyance in order to provide 
the party with an opportunity to comply with a court order. 
{¶ 21} The division in the appellate courts and the large number of 
litigants who may face this type of contempt order compel us to exercise our 
constitutional duty.  See Article IV, Section 2(B)(2)(e) of the Ohio Constitution.  
As eloquently stated in State v. Bartrum, 121 Ohio St.3d 148, 2009-Ohio-355, 
902 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 31 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting), “our role as a court of last resort 
is not to serve as an additional court of appeals on review, but rather to clarify 
rules of law arising in courts of appeals that are matters of public or great general 
interest.”  Additional appellate review is not the exclusive result of our 
examination of this issue; instead it will result in a clear rule of law on an issue 
that is seen on many of Ohio’s trial court dockets.  Contempt proceedings may be 
for the enforcement of a court’s injunction, of an order requiring counsel to hold 
attorney fees in trust for a future quantum meruit hearing, or, as in the current 
dispute, of an order for the return of personal property.  Our review will have 
widespread effect and, thus, this issue embodies the concept of “public or great 
general interest.”  By dismissing this appeal, the majority is permitting the 
conflict in the appellate courts to continue and is denying the equality of appellate 
review to the citizens of Ohio.  Therefore, I must dissent from the decision to 
dismiss the appeal as having been improvidently accepted. 
FRENCH and O’NEILL, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Robert A. Klinger Co., L.P.A., and Robert A. Klinger, for appellee. 
 
Thomas E. Grossmann; Charles Fischer; and Burke Law Office, L.L.C., 
and Travis E. Burke, for appellant, Forrest Gauthier. 
________________________