Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Moore

Citation: 2004-Ohio-734

Docket Number: 20031120

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Moore, 101 Ohio St.3d 261, 2004-Ohio-734.] 
 
 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. MOORE. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Moore, 101 Ohio St.3d 261, 2004-Ohio-734.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — One-year suspension with sanction stayed on 
conditions and two years’ probation — Engaging in conduct prejudicial 
to the administration of justice — Engaging in conduct adversely 
reflecting on fitness to practice law — Improperly accepting professional 
employment where personal interests may affect the exercise of 
professional judgment on a client’s behalf. 
(No. 2003-1120 — Submitted September 24, 2003 — Decided March 3, 2004.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 02-85. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Respondent, C. Michael Moore of Jackson, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0071174, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1999.  On December 
9, 2002, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a two-count complaint charging 
respondent with violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  A panel of 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause and 
made findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation. 
{¶2} 
As to the first count, the panel found that respondent had been 
appointed in September 2001 to defend a 28-year-old woman, one year his junior, 
who had been charged with various traffic offenses, including operating a motor 
vehicle under the influence.  On the day of his client’s arraignment, respondent 
conferred with her for the first time in the courthouse library about the case.  
During their conversation, respondent intermittently commented on the size of his 
penis and on sexual positions in what he considered to be a flirtatious manner. 
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{¶3} 
Before the panel, respondent admitted that he had made very 
graphic remarks to his client about sexual positions women generally preferred.  
He also admitted having described the size of his penis as large enough to cause 
discomfort during sex.  He denied, however, the client’s claims that he also 
touched her inappropriately and made a variety of other offensive remarks. 
{¶4} 
The client felt shocked and violated by respondent’s unsolicited 
sexual remarks.  She consulted her mother and employer about the incident, and 
on the advice of her employer’s attorney, she reported respondent’s conduct to the 
Vinton County Prosecuting Attorney and to relator.  The prosecutor arranged for 
the client to secretly record the next conversation between her and respondent. 
{¶5} 
That conversation took place in November 2001 in a courthouse 
hallway prior to a suppression hearing.  After a brief exchange concerning when 
her case would be called, respondent again persisted in asking about his client’s 
sexual experiences and preferences, and his remarks were recorded.  Upon 
learning of the client’s having reported him, respondent withdrew from the 
client’s case.  Since then, respondent has not been assigned to represent a female 
defendant. 
{¶6} 
With respect to the first count, the panel found, as stipulated by the 
parties, that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that 
adversely reflects on an attorney’s fitness to practice law), and 5-101(A)(1) 
(improperly accepting professional employment where the attorney’s personal 
interests may affect the exercise of professional judgment on a client’s behalf). 
{¶7} 
As to the second count of misconduct, the panel found, again as 
stipulated, that respondent had also violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and 5-101(A)(1) by 
having an extramarital affair with a client he was representing in matters relating 
to the custody and care of her two small children.  Respondent agreed to represent 
this client, who was only 22 at the time, in September 2000.  He successfully 
January Term, 2004 
3 
defended the client against a criminal charge of domestic violence. They later 
consummated a consensual sexual relationship and continued to see each other for 
months afterward.  For at least some of that time, respondent also continued to 
represent the client’s custody interests, and he conceded that he did not 
sufficiently advise his client of the potentially compromising effect that their 
relationship could have had on those interests. 
{¶8} 
In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the panel 
reviewed the mitigating and aggravating considerations listed in Section 10 of the 
Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.  As mitigating, the 
panel found that respondent had never before been the subject of disciplinary 
action and had cooperated fully in the disciplinary proceedings.  The panel also 
considered the testimony of a county court judge, a municipal court judge before 
whom respondent regularly appeared, and the county prosecutor to whom the 
Count-I client had reported respondent’s misconduct.  All were convinced that 
respondent would not repeat his misconduct, that he was otherwise a capable and 
professional practitioner, and that his services would be seriously missed if he 
were suspended from practicing law.  The panel found respondent’s own 
expressions of sorrow and regret of particularly mitigating effect.  Respondent 
apologized repeatedly at the hearing for his misconduct and the embarrassment he 
had caused his wife and other family members, his clients, and his profession.  He 
assured the panel that he could not be any sorrier for his actions and promised that 
they would never be repeated. 
{¶9} 
The panel recommended the sanction suggested jointly by the 
parties:  a one-year suspension, all stayed.  But the panel added one year of 
probation following the suspension and added the following conditions to the 
stay:  that respondent be required (1) to seek treatment and counseling at his own 
expense from a medical professional approved by the Ohio Lawyers Assistance 
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Program (“OLAP”), (2) to authorize the medical professional to report 
periodically to OLAP about the results of his treatment program, and (3) to refuse 
appointments to defend female clients until such appointments are approved by 
the medical professional treating respondent. 
{¶10} The board adopted the panel’s findings of misconduct but modified 
its recommendation.  Because respondent’s misconduct was “directed toward 
vulnerable female clients” while he was representing them on family matters, the 
board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six 
months, with no portion of the suspension stayed. 
{¶11} We agree that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 
and 5-101(A)(1) as found by the board.  However, upon review, we find the 
panel’s recommendation to be the more appropriate sanction. 
{¶12} In objections to the board’s recommendation, respondent cites 
Ohio precedent establishing that a public reprimand is the usual sanction for an 
attorney who engages in consensual romantic relations with a client during 
representation, provided that the client’s interests were not harmed by the affair.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. DiPietro (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 391, 643 N.E.2d 1145; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Paxton (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 163, 610 N.E.2d 979; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Ressing (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 265, 559 N.E.2d 1359.  
But here, as relator argues, only the conduct alleged in Count II was consensual.  
Respondent’s explicit advances toward the client in Count I were neither invited 
nor welcome.  Moreover, both clients had expressed to respondent their concerns 
about retaining custody of their children, interests that the clients could have felt 
pressure to protect by acceding to respondent’s advances or that a romantic 
relationship with respondent could have compromised. 
{¶13} The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held that an attorney’s 
unsolicited advances toward a client warranted a 90-day suspension from the 
practice of law, explaining: 
January Term, 2004 
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{¶14} “[T]he public must not be subjected to unsolicited sexual conduct 
by attorneys in the context of an attorney-client relationship.  Frequently, the 
client is in some difficulty and, as a result, is particularly vulnerable to improper 
advances made by the attorney. The client rightfully looks upon the attorney as 
legal advisor, one who will act in the client’s best interests. Often, a client will be 
reluctant to terminate representation in response to an attorney’s improper 
conduct for fear of losing time and money already invested in the attorney’s 
representation. 
{¶15} “The attorney stands in a fiduciary relationship with the client and 
should exercise professional judgment ‘solely for the benefit of the client and free 
of compromising influences and loyalties.’ * * * By making unsolicited sexual 
advances to a client, an attorney perverts the very essence of the lawyer-client 
relationship.  Such egregious conduct most certainly warrants discipline.”  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gibson (1985), 124 Wis.2d 466, 474-475, 369 
N.W.2d 695, appeal dismissed sub nom. Gibson v. Bd. of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility of Wisconsin (1985), 474 U.S. 976, 106 S.Ct. 375, 88 L.Ed.2d 330. 
{¶16} We completely concur in the views expressed in Gibson.  In fact, 
when a court-appointed counsel in Ohio had sexual relations with his criminally 
charged client, we suspended his license to practice law for one year, holding: 
{¶17} “The lawyer-client relation in a criminal matter is inherently 
unequal.  The client’s reliance on the ability of her counsel in a crisis situation has 
the effect of putting the lawyer in a position of dominance and the client in a 
position of dependence and vulnerability.  The more vulnerable the client, the 
heavier is the obligation upon the attorney not to exploit the situation for his own 
advantage.  Whether a client consents to or initiates sexual activity with the 
lawyer, the burden is on the lawyer to ensure that all attorney-client dealings 
remain on a professional level.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Booher (1996), 75 Ohio 
St.3d 509, 510, 664 N.E.2d 522. 
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{¶18} Respondent did not meet this burden, and we denounce the 
misconduct in which he engaged.  Moreover, we commend the client who 
reported his misconduct based, in part, on her hope that it would protect 
respondent’s other clients from similar transgressions. 
{¶19} However, we must also take into account evidence that 
significantly militates against an actual suspension in this case, the most 
compelling being the unwavering faith expressed by respondent’s local judges 
and prosecuting attorney in respondent’s zealousness and competence in 
representing his clients; respondent’s own expression of remorse for his 
misconduct, including his sincere apologies to the clients and others; and 
respondent’s assurances that he would never repeat the misconduct.  The panel 
heard this evidence firsthand and was obviously moved enough to recommend 
against actual suspension, notwithstanding the gravity of respondent’s actions.  In 
a supplement to the record, respondent has also provided a preliminary report 
about his condition from his treating psychologist, whom he consulted on the 
panel’s referral.  The psychologist reported respondent’s forthright participation 
in and commitment to his treatment program, as well as the psychologist’s 
optimistic prognosis. 
{¶20} For these reasons and because we are convinced that the panel’s 
conditions, which we have slightly modified, will prevent a recurrence of any 
similar unethical behavior, we adopt the sanction recommended by the panel.  
Respondent is therefore suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, 
with the suspension stayed, and respondent is placed on two years’ probation 
under the following conditions: (1) respondent shall continue treatment and 
counseling at his own expense from a medical professional approved by OLAP, 
(2) respondent shall authorize the medical professional to make periodic reports to 
OLAP about the results of his treatment program, and (3) respondent shall refuse 
appointments to defend female clients until the medical professional treating 
January Term, 2004 
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respondent approves such representation.  If respondent fails to comply with any 
of these conditions, the stay shall be lifted and respondent will serve the entire 
one-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶21} I respectfully dissent from the majority decision with respect to the 
sanction it imposes on respondent.  Respondent had been appointed to provide 
legal representation to a 28-year-old married mother of three who had been 
charged with criminal offenses.  She informed respondent at their initial meeting 
on the day of her arraignment that she was having marital difficulty and was 
concerned about the possibility of losing custody of her children.  Respondent 
responded by making repeated sexual comments that the client found offensive 
and that respondent thereafter conceded were raw, gross, unprofessional, and 
inappropriate. 
{¶22} I agree with the board that respondent’s comments to and conduct 
toward his client constituted sexual harassment.  Moreover, respondent’s 
improper conduct toward this client was not an isolated incident.  Respondent 
conceded that he had engaged in a sexually intimate conversation with another 
client while representing her in child-custody matters.  This conversation led to a 
consensual sexual relationship between respondent and this client during his 
representation of her.  The board concluded that misconduct “directed toward 
vulnerable female clients while representing them on marriage and family 
matters” should receive a stronger sanction than a stayed suspension.  I agree. 
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{¶23} The board recommended a six-month actual suspension.  I agree 
with the recommendation of the board that respondent should be actually 
suspended for six months.  I would suspend respondent for one year with only six 
months of that suspension stayed on the conditions ordered by the majority. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Lori J. Brown, First 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, L.P.A., and Geoffrey Stern, for respondent. 
__________________