Case Title: ALEXANDER, CORDER, PLUNK, BAKER v. Jackson

Citation: 811 So. 2d 506

Docket Number: 1000813

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
811 So. 2d 506 (2001)
ALEXANDER, CORDER, PLUNK, BAKER & SHELLY, P.C.
v.
Durward JACKSON.
1000813.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 13, 2001.
Rehearing Denied August 31, 2001.
*507 Albert L. Jordan and Michael L. Jackson of Wallace, Jordan, Ratliff & Brandt, L.L.C., Birmingham; and James M. Corder, Jr., and Mitchell K. Shelly of Alexander, Corder, Plunk, Baker & Shelly, P.C., Athens, for appellant.
Donald R. Jones, Jr., Montgomery, for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The plaintiff Alexander, Corder, Plunk, Baker, & Shelly, P.C. ("the law firm"), appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant Durward Jackson. We reverse and remand.
In November 1999, the law firm sued Jackson, alleging that Jackson had engaged the services of the law firm; that he had agreed to pay the law firm certain sums of money as a fee for the law firm's services; that the fee was provided for by an agreement of June 23, 1998; that he had failed and refused to pay the sums due the law firm; and that Jackson owed the law firm $80,000. In December 1999, Jackson answered, denying the allegations and contending that in regard to the matter in dispute the law firm had represented Canebrake Properties, L.L.C., and had never represented Jackson individually.
In August 2000, the attorney who had initially represented Jackson in regard to the law firm's action withdrew, and another *508 attorney began representing Jackson. In October 2000, the law firm amended its complaint to allege that Jackson owed it $180,000.
On November 6, 2000, Jackson moved for a summary judgment, asserting that the debt claimed by the law firm was a debt of Canebrake Properties, L.L.C.; that Jackson had been acting as an officer of Canebrake Properties, L.L.C., when he retained the law firm and that he had retained it to represent Canebrake Properties, L.L.C.; and that he never executed a document guaranteeing the debt or agreeing to be personally responsible for the fees incurred for the law firm's representation of Canebrake Properties, L.L.C. Jackson contended that Ala.Code 1975, § 8-9-2, Alabama's version of the Statute of Frauds, disposes of the law firm's claim against him; he says the claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds. Section 8-9-2 provides, in part:
On November 29, 2000, the law firm filed a response in opposition to the summary-judgment motion, contending that Jackson was precluded from raising the Statute of Frauds defense because it was an affirmative defense and had been waived when he failed to raise it in his answer and contending that the law firm had represented both Jackson and Canebrake Properties, L.L.C., and, thus, that both were liable for all fees incurred.
On December 7, 2000, Jackson filed an amended answer, alleging that the law firm's claim was barred by the Statute of Frauds. On January 8, 2001, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Jackson. This appeal followed.
The law firm contends that the summary judgment was improper because, it says, when Jackson failed to affirmatively plead the Statute of Frauds defense in his answer, he waived the defense, and, thus, could not raise it in his summary-judgment motion. We do not agree.
In Bechtel v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 451 So. 2d 793, 795-96 (Ala.1984), this Court stated:
"395 So. 2d  at 1050.
In the present case, Jackson did amend his answer to include the Statute of Frauds defense before the trial court ruled on his summary-judgment motion. Thus, the Statute of Frauds defense was properly before the trial court and the trial court did not err by considering that defense when ruling on Jackson's summary-judgment motion.
The law firm also contends that § 8-9-2(3) does not bar its recovery because, it says, Jackson's promise to pay the legal fees was for his own benefit and was not a "special promise to answer for the debt... of another."
The law firm, relying on Schiffman v. H.L. Raburn & Co., 47 Ala.App. 390, 255 So. 2d 332 (Ala.Civ.App.1971), contends that Jackson and Canebrake Properties, L.L.C., are joint obligors and that each is jointly and severally liable for the fees outlined in the June 23, 1998, fee agreement. The law firm points out that Jackson not only owned and controlled Canebrake Properties, L.L.C., along with other business entities, but also was the owner/developer of the entire Canebrake Project, a residential development and golf course, and it points out that Jackson's personal financial situation would have been adversely affected if a rock quarry had been located on property close to the Canebrake Project.
In Schiffman, 47 Ala.App. at 395, 255 So. 2d  at 337, the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
Jackson, relying on Gregory v. Hardy, 53 Ala.App. 705, 304 So. 2d 209 (Ala.Civ. App.1974), contends that the Statute of Frauds bars the law firm's claim. In *510 Gregory, 53 Ala.App. at 710-11, 304 So. 2d  at 213-14, the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
The law firm, on July 2, 1998, issued an invoice for $30,000, addressed to "Canebrake Properties, L.L.C." On July 7, 1998, Canebrake Properties, L.L.C., issued a $30,000 check to the law firm. The law firm, on November 3, 1998, and January 6, 1999, issued invoices for a $50,000 installment it said was due October 1, 1998; those invoices were addressed to "Mr. Durwood Jackson, Canebrake Properties, L.L.C." These invoices remain unpaid.
When considering Jackson's summary-judgment motion, the trial court had before it numerous exhibits, including the June 23, 1998, fee-arrangement letter; the complaint in Canebrake Properties, L.L.C. v. Rogers Group, Inc. et al; invoices from the law firm dated July 2, 1998, November 3, 1998, and January 6, 1999; a $30,000 check, dated July 7, 1998, from Canebrake Properties, L.L.C., to the law firm; a September 16, 1999, letter from the law firm advising Jackson that the $50,000 and $30,000 payments were overdue and that the law firm intended to withdraw from its representation of Jackson and his companies; the depositions of John Plunk (a member of the law firm) and Durward Jackson; and the affidavit of Walton Ashwander (the project manager for the Canebrake Project).
In his deposition, Plunk testified:
In his affidavit, Ashwander stated the following:
"This distinction [as set out in the first paragraph quoted earlier from Gregory v. Hardy,] between `original [promises],' and collateral [promises],' focuses on the nature of the promise made." Herrington v. Cent. Soya Co., 420 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala.1982).
Herrington, 420 So. 2d  at 3 (quoting Samuel Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 463 (Walter H. Jaeger ed., 2d ed.1960)). "[I]t ordinarily is a question for the jury whether an agreement is an original undertaking by the promisor or a collateral promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another." United Companies Fin. Corp. v. Brown, 584 So. 2d 470, 473 (Ala.1991).
In his deposition, Plunk testified that at the initial meeting between Jackson and the law firm, Jackson explained that he owned and controlled several companies, including the company that owned the property where the Canebrake Project was being developed, and, thus, that there was no need for him to give the law firm financial statements on his companies because those companies belonged to him and he was going to "pay for it." The law firm argues that Jackson's personal financial situation would have been adversely affected if a rock quarry had been located on property close to the Canebrake Project and that the leading object of Jackson's agreement to pay the legal fees was to promote his own interest.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 116 (1981). Section 116 of the Restatement also states what is often called the "main-purpose" or "leading-object" rule: Was the "main purpose" of Jackson's agreement to pay the legal fees to promote his own interest?
On review of a ruling on a summary-judgment motion, we consider the evidence that was before the court when it ruled on the motion, to determine whether it created a genuine issue of material fact, and, if it did not, whether the movant (Jackson in this case) was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. As the moving party, Jackson had the burden of establishing that there was no material fact in dispute. Lott v. Tarver, 741 So. 2d 394, 396 (Ala.1999). In conducting this review, we consider all of the relevant undisputed evidence and we view relevant disputed evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant (in this case, the law firm); and we resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Wally's, Inc. v. Intergraph Corp., 727 So. 2d 34, 37 (Ala.1998).
We conclude that the evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Jackson's promise to pay the legal fees was original, and thus without the Statute, or was collateral, and thus within the Statute. Thus, we reverse the summary judgment in favor of Jackson and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MOORE, C.J., and LYONS, JOHNSTONE, and WOODALL, JJ., concur.