Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Peter David Ticktin

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC07-369

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-369 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
PETER DAVID TICKTIN,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 21, 2009] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee's report recommending that Peter David 
Ticktin, a member of The Florida Bar, be found guilty of professional misconduct 
and admonished.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  We approve 
the referee’s findings of fact, his recommendations as to guilt, and his findings in 
aggravation and mitigation, with the exception of the finding in mitigation of 
imposition of other penalties or sanctions.  However, we disapprove the 
recommended discipline of admonishment.  Instead, we impose a ninety-one-day 
suspension. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The Bar filed a two-count complaint against Ticktin seeking lawyer 
discipline.  The Bar alleged that Ticktin violated a number of former Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar, as they existed in 2002, through his representations and 
business dealings that constituted conflicts of interests.  In addition, the Bar alleged 
that Ticktin breached lawyer-client confidentiality.  A referee was appointed.  The 
referee conducted a disciplinary hearing and subsequently submitted a report 
recommending that Ticktin be found guilty of violating the following four rules in 
Count I:  rules 4-1.7(a) (Representing Adverse Interests); 4-1.7(b) (Duty to Avoid 
Limitation on Independent Professional Judgment); 4-1.7(c) (Explanation to 
Clients); and 4-1.8(a) (Business Transactions With or Acquiring Interest Adverse 
to Client).  The referee also recommends that Ticktin be found not guilty of 
violating the following two rules as alleged in Count II:  rules 4-1.6(a) (Consent 
Required to Reveal Information); and 4-1.8(b) (Using Information to Disadvantage 
of Client).  The referee recommends that Ticktin be admonished and that costs be 
awarded to the Bar.   
The Bar petitioned for review challenging the referee’s recommendations of 
not guilty as to Count II and the recommended sanction of admonishment.  Ticktin 
cross-petitioned challenging the referee’s recommendation of guilt regarding 
 
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Count I.  The referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt, which we 
find are supported by the record, are as follows.   
COUNT I 
Beginning in 2001, and at all pertinent times afterward, Ticktin represented 
Paul Johnson in connection with various personal and business matters.  Ticktin’s 
legal representation of Johnson included numerous matters related to three 
corporations for which Johnson was the founder, held executive authority over 
until January 2002, and had a continuing ownership interest:  (1) Link Express 
Delivery Solutions, Inc. (LEDS); (2) Silver State Vending Corporation (Silver 
State) d/b/a Pony Express; and (3) Link Worldwide Logistics (LWL).1  Johnson 
and Richard Bee were the only directors of LWL when it acquired a majority of the 
shares of stock of Silver State.  But, Johnson made all the decisions for both LWL 
and Silver State, and was Bee’s boss.   
In the fall of 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought 
a civil action against Johnson concerning LEDS.  Ticktin represented Johnson in 
connection with the civil action until he withdrew in April 2002.2  Sometime 
                                          
 
 
1.  The referee reports that at the time Ticktin became Johnson’s corporate 
lawyer, LEDS had already been dissolved, but Ticktin represented Johnson in 
litigation matters related to LEDS.  Only after LEDS dissolved did Johnson launch 
Link Worldwide Logistics (LWL).  
 
2.  It was not until April 24, 2002, that the federal trial court granted Ticktin 
leave to withdraw as counsel of record in the civil action. 
 
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before January 5, 2002, Johnson learned that criminal charges in connection with 
LEDS were going to be filed against him.  Ticktin dealt with the Assistant U.S. 
Attorney on Johnson’s behalf concerning the imminent criminal charges and 
advised Johnson concerning his grand jury appearance.  Ticktin recommended a 
criminal attorney to Johnson, but he did not appear in the criminal case.  Johnson 
was ultimately arrested and convicted of defrauding investors out of $20 million.   
In anticipation of his arrest, on or about January 5, 2002, Johnson met with 
Ticktin to discuss who would replace Johnson as chief executive officer (CEO) of 
Silver State.  The referee believed Ticktin’s testimony that he was tricked by 
Johnson into suggesting himself as a suitable replacement.  But both Ticktin and 
the law partner with whom Ticktin discussed the matter viewed it as an 
opportunity.  On January 7, 2002, Johnson, Ticktin, Bee, and Ticktin’s law partner 
met at Ticktin’s law office where the following announcements was made 
concerning Silver State:  (1) Ticktin would immediately replace Johnson as 
Chairman and CEO; (2) Ticktin’s law partner would assume the role of chief 
financial officer (CFO); and (3) Ticktin’s law firm would remain as corporate 
counsel.  Bee understood that, after that meeting, Ticktin would be his new boss at 
Silver State.   
Ticktin failed to prepare a written document for Johnson or Silver State fully 
disclosing and transmitting the terms of the transaction or the terms by which 
 
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Ticktin acquired an interest in Silver State, as required by former rule 4-1.8(a)(1).3 
The referee found that a written press release purportedly prepared and issued by 
Johnson did not satisfy the requirements of the rule.  The press release stated that 
Ticktin accepted the position of Chairman and CEO, Ticktin’s law partner 
accepted appointment as CFO, and Johnson was to remain as a primary consultant.  
The press release was not prepared by Ticktin and did not fully disclose the terms 
of the transaction or contain the oral waiver of conflict and confidentiality Ticktin 
claims he obtained from Johnson, which the referee found was an essential term of 
the transaction.   
Ticktin testified that the oral waiver of conflict and confidentiality obtained 
from Johnson at the January meeting only pertained to Silver State.  Ticktin 
admitted that he did not have a waiver from Johnson pertaining to LWL or a 
waiver from Silver State, pertaining to Johnson, as required by former rule 4-
1.7(a).  There is no evidence to show that Johnson understood the meaning or 
extent of any oral waiver claimed by Ticktin.  In April 2002, when Ticktin 
presented a written waiver, Johnson refused to sign it.   
The referee found Ticktin’s testimony was not credible that he had not taken 
over as CEO of Silver State in January 2002.  On February 26, 2002, Ticktin 
                                          
 
 
3.  Ticktin personally invested millions of dollars into the business, giving 
him another basis for self-interest.   
 
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mailed a letter to shareholders and potential investors that stated he had assumed 
his role as CEO and Chairman of Silver State approximately eight weeks earlier.  
The referee found that when Ticktin made it known that he had no intention of 
being “Johnson’s ‘puppet,’ ” his interests became adverse to Johnson’s interests.  
The adverse positions between Ticktin and Johnson “became stark” by April 2002, 
when Ticktin decided he needed Johnson completely out of the business if it was to 
succeed.   
At that time, Johnson held an assignment for 14.5 million shares of LWL 
stock, which made him the majority shareholder.  Furthermore, LWL was the 
majority shareholder in Silver State.  Bee was the only active trustee for LWL after 
Johnson’s arrest.  Bee testified that prior to Johnson’s arrest, the certificates for 
14.5 million shares in LWL had been issued, but they had not been delivered to 
Johnson.  Ticktin and Bee saw Johnson’s failure to take delivery of the shares in 
LWL as their mutual opportunity to completely oust Johnson from that 
corporation.  Ticktin visited Johnson in jail on multiple occasions during April 
2002 in order to obtain Johnson’s signature on certain agreements.  An initial 
proposed agreement would have provided Johnson with 2.5 million shares of 
Silver State stock in exchange for his 14.5 million shares in LWL.  And that 
agreement also would have secured Johnson’s written waiver as to any existing 
 
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conflicts of interest that Ticktin wanted and needed.  Johnson refused to sign the 
agreement.   
In that same period, Bee approached Ticktin for advice regarding what to do 
about Johnson’s stock shares in LWL.  Ticktin informed Bee that such advice 
would be a conflict of interest because he had no waiver of conflict from Johnson 
concerning LWL.  Ticktin suggested that Bee seek the advice of other counsel 
regarding Johnson’s LWL shares.  After consulting with another lawyer, Bee 
informed Ticktin that he was advised that Johnson’s LWL shares could be 
cancelled.  And Bee testified that even though it was his decision to cancel 
Johnson’s LWL shares, prior to doing so he discussed it with Ticktin.  Ticktin told 
Bee to do whatever Bee thought was necessary.  Bee cancelled Johnson’s LWL 
shares.   
After Bee cancelled Johnson’s LWL shares, Ticktin’s law firm prepared a 
letter, which Bee signed.  That letter provided Johnson with another opportunity to 
sign a written waiver of conflict and another agreement prepared by Ticktin that 
offered Johnson 1.7 million shares Silver State stock.  Again, Johnson refused to 
sign the agreement or the written waiver of conflict.   
The referee found that Ticktin was involved in conflicts of interest when he 
simultaneously represented LWL, Silver State, and Johnson.  Ticktin admitted that 
he did not have the consent of LWL, Silver State, or Johnson for matters related to 
 
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LWL.  The referee found there was evidence clearly showing that Silver State and 
LWL were inextricably linked.  Ticktin was Bee’s boss at Silver State, Bee had 
assumed executive authority at LWL, and Ticktin’s law firm provided legal 
counsel to Bee on issues pertaining to LWL.  Ticktin had access to confidential 
information for all of the parties involved and owed each party a duty of loyalty 
and confidentiality.  The referee found that Ticktin was clearly working with Bee 
against Johnson’s interests when Ticktin was Johnson’s lawyer.  Ticktin was 
representing the interests of Johnson and LWL contemporaneously with his efforts 
and the efforts of his law firm to resolve potential claims that were being made 
against Silver State and LWL by former LEDS shareholders.  In taking steps to 
resolve those claims, Ticktin’s actions were in conflict with Johnson’s ownership 
interest in LWL.   
The referee further found that Ticktin’s self-interest and the interests of 
Silver State substantially limited his independent judgment in representing LWL 
and Johnson, contrary to the requirements of former rule 4-1.7(b).  As Johnson’s 
attorney, Ticktin had a duty to seek all appropriate legal means to protect 
Johnson’s interests.  Ticktin did not provide Johnson with the requisite counsel 
regarding his interest in LWL.  Instead, Ticktin tried to get Johnson to sign the 
agreement to relinquish his shares, and when that failed, he did nothing to prevent 
Bee’s actions to extinguish Johnson’s ownership interest in LWL, which 
 
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necessarily worked to extinguish Johnson’s involvement in Silver State.  Thus, the 
referee concluded that Ticktin could not reasonably believe that his representation 
of Johnson was not adversely affected by the actions in which he and his law firm 
participated.  In addition, Ticktin did not perform the requisite consultation and 
obtain the necessary consents from his clients when he represented multiple parties 
in the action to extinguish Johnson’s ownership interest in LWL and Silver State, 
as required by rule 4-1.7(c).   
Based on these findings, the referee recommends that Ticktin should be 
found guilty of violating the following rules in Count I:  rule 4-1.7(a) (a lawyer 
shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly 
adverse to the interests of another client); rule 4-1.7(b) (a lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the lawyer’s exercise of independent professional judgment in 
the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the lawyer’s own 
interest); rule 4-1.7(c) (when representation of multiple clients in a single matter is 
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the 
common representation and the advantages and risks involved); and rule 4-1.8(a) 
(a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly 
acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a 
 
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client, except a lien granted by law to secure a lawyer’s fee or expenses, without 
written consent). 
COUNT II 
After Johnson was arrested on federal charges, Ticktin testified, in early 
March 2002, before a federal magistrate judge at a bond hearing.  At that hearing 
Ticktin testified that, among other things, he did not believe Johnson was a flight 
risk.  His opinion was based on the fact that Johnson had returned to Florida 
knowing that he was going to be arrested.  However, in April 2002, Johnson told 
Ticktin that he learned that if convicted, he would not be placed in a minimum 
security facility, but a medium or maximum security prison.  Ticktin testified 
before the referee that he could see fear in Johnson’s eyes and, thus, his opinion 
changed about whether Johnson was a flight risk.  Because Ticktin learned that a 
federal district court judge was going to review the materials from the bail hearing 
the next day, Ticktin sent a letter to the Assistant U.S. Attorney, withdrawing his 
testimony before the federal magistrate judge.  Ticktin’s letter indicated that he 
believed his testimony at the time it was given, but later had reason to change his 
mind.   
The referee found that Ticktin neither revealed any of his communications 
with Johnson nor indicated which portion of his previous testimony he no longer 
believed.  The referee concluded that because Ticktin changed his opinion, had he 
 
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not withdrawn his testimony, he would have violated rule 4-3.3(a)(4), providing 
that if a lawyer “has offered material evidence and thereafter comes to know of its 
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.”  The referee reasoned 
that because rule 4-1.6(c)(5) provided that an attorney “may reveal such 
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to comply 
with the Rules of Professional Conduct,” Ticktin took the appropriate steps, under 
the rules governing professional conduct, to withdraw his testimony.  
 
Based on these findings, the referee recommends that Ticktin be found not 
guilty of the two rule violations charged in Count II:  rule 4-1.6(a) (a lawyer shall 
not reveal information relating to representation of a client); and rule 4-1.8(b) (a 
lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the 
disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation).  
SANCTION 
The referee found one aggravating factor, substantial experience in the 
practice of law.  He also found six mitigating factors:  (1) absence of a prior 
disciplinary record; (2) absence of dishonest motive; (3) full and free disclosure to 
the disciplinary board or a cooperative attitude toward its proceedings; (4) good 
character and reputation; (5) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;4 and (6) 
                                          
 
 
4.  The referee recommends this mitigation based on the fact that Ticktin lost 
millions of dollars and was forced into bankruptcy, yet he has continually met his 
 
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remorse.5  Based on his findings and Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions 4.34,6 the referee recommends that the Court discipline Ticktin by 
admonishment.   
DISCUSSION 
 
 Based on the parties’ challenges, we address five issues here:  (1) whether 
the referee’s findings of fact are sufficient to support the recommendations of guilt 
as to Count I; (2) whether the referee’s findings of fact are sufficient to support the 
recommendations that respondent is not guilty as to Count II; (3) whether the 
referee’s decision not to find additional aggravating factors is clearly erroneous or 
without support in the record; (4) whether the referee’s findings in mitigation are 
clearly erroneous or without support in the record; and (5) whether the referee’s 
recommended sanction is reasonably supported by the Florida Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and existing case law.   
ANALYSIS 
                                                                                                                                        
financial obligations.  Also the referee considered the personal and professional 
embarrassment Ticktin endured afterward to be a mitigating factor. 
 
5.  The referee assigned little weight to this mitigating factor, because 
“[Ticktin] regrets only his failure to properly put the terms of his arrangement with 
Mr. Johnson in writing.” 
 
6.  Standard 4.34 describes the circumstances under which admonishment is 
the presumptively appropriate discipline for an attorney’s failure to avoid a conflict 
of interest.   
 
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First, we find no merit to Ticktin’s challenge to the referee’s 
recommendations of guilt as to Count I.  A referee’s factual findings must be 
sufficient under the applicable rules to support the recommendations as to guilt.  
See Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005).  Ticktin does not 
expressly challenge the referee’s extensive findings of fact or argue that those 
findings do not support the recommendations of guilt.  Rather, regarding the rule 4-
1.7 violations, Ticktin argues that he owed a duty to LWL not to help Johnson as 
well as a duty to Johnson not to help LWL.  Ticktin maintains he did the only thing 
he could do under the circumstances and, thus, he contends that he backed away 
from any conflict as soon as it arose.  Ticktin further offers undeveloped arguments 
that the referee made numerous errors regarding his recommendation of guilt as to 
the charges of violating rule 4-1.7.  We find no merit in Ticktin’s argument.  The 
referee’s findings of fact and this record support the conclusion that Ticktin 
immersed himself in a conflict-laden situation and acted in clear violation of rules 
4-1.7(a) – (c).7   
                                          
 
7.  Rule 4-1.7(a) (Representing Adverse Interests) (2002) provided: 
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client 
will be directly adverse to the interests of another client, unless: (1) 
the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely 
affect the lawyer’s responsibilities to and relationship with the other 
client; and (2) each client consents after consultation. 
Rule 4-1.7(b) (Duty to Avoid Limitation on Independent Professional 
Judgment) (2002) provided: 
 
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Regarding rule 4-1.8(a),8 Ticktin argues that the writing requirement of the 
rule should not be strictly interpreted to require that the writing be prepared by the 
attorney and urges us to find that the press release prepared by Johnson was 
sufficient in this case.  We agree with the Bar that rule 4-1.8(a) contemplates that 
the attorney will prepare the written document disclosing the terms of the 
transaction by requiring that the terms must be “fully disclosed and transmitted in 
writing to the client in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client.”   
                                                                                                                                        
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer’s exercise of 
independent professional judgment in the representation of that client 
may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person or by the lawyer’s own interest, unless: (1) 
the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be 
adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation. 
Rule 4-1.7(c) (Explanation to Clients) (2002) provided:  “When 
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the 
consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common 
representation and the advantages and risks involved.” 
8.  Rule 4-1.8(a) (Business Transactions With or Acquiring Interest Adverse 
to Client) (2002) provided: 
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or 
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other 
pecuniary interest adverse to a client, except a lien granted by law to 
secure a lawyer’s fee or expenses, unless:  (1) the transaction and 
terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable 
to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the 
client in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client; (2) 
the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of 
independent counsel in the transaction; and (3) the client consents in 
writing thereto. 
 
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The Bar also is correct that even if the writing could be prepared by the client, the 
referee found that the press release prepared by Johnson did not “fully disclose the 
terms of the transaction,” i.e., it did not state that Johnson was waiving any conflict 
of interest.  These findings are sufficient to support the recommendation that 
Ticktin be found guilty of violating rule 4-1.8(a).  We therefore approve the 
referee’s recommendation that Ticktin be found guilty of the rule violations alleged 
in Count I. 
Next, we examine whether the referee’s findings of fact are sufficient to 
support his recommendation that Ticktin be found not guilty of the rule violations 
alleged in Count II.  See Shoureas, 913 So. 2d at 557-58.  The Bar urges us to 
disapprove this recommendation.   
The Bar argues that when Ticktin withdrew the testimony that he gave 
before the federal magistrate judge, he revealed confidential information related to 
Johnson’s “innocuous statement” pertaining to his eventual prison placement if 
convicted.  The referee found that Ticktin did not reveal any details about his 
conversation with Johnson or why his opinion had changed to the Assistant U.S. 
Attorney.  Accordingly, the findings are sufficient to support a recommendation 
that Ticktin was not guilty of violating former rule 4-1.6(a) (Consent Required to 
 
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Reveal Information).9  The Bar further argues that Ticktin used the “information” 
he learned from his conversation with Johnson to Johnson’s disadvantage 
regarding a potential pretrial bond in 2002.  The referee found that Ticktin did not 
use information acquired during his representation of Johnson in a way that 
disadvantaged Johnson’s chance to obtain a pretrial bond, even though Ticktin 
clearly changed his mind about whether Johnson was a flight risk.  Thus, the 
referee’s findings support his recommendation of not guilty for any violations of 
former 4-1.8(b) (Using Information to Disadvantage of Client).10  We therefore 
approve the referee’s recommendation that Ticktin be found not guilty of the rule 
violations alleged in Count II. 
 
Next, the Bar maintains that the referee should have found the aggravating 
factors of selfish motive, multiple offenses, a pattern of misconduct, and 
vulnerability of the victim.  A referee’s findings in aggravation carry a 
presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or 
                                          
 
9.  Rule 4-1.6(a) (Consent Required to Reveal Information) (2002) provided: 
“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client except 
as stated in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), unless the client consents after disclosure 
to the client.” 
10.  Rule 4-1.8(b) (Using Information to Disadvantage of Client) (2002) 
provided:  “A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client 
to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation, 
except as permitted or required by rule 4-1.6.” 
 
 
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without support in the record.  See Fla. Bar v. Arcia, 848 So. 2d 296, 299 (Fla. 
2003); see also Fla. Bar v. Morse, 784 So. 2d 414, 415-16 (Fla. 2001); Fla. Bar v. 
Bustamante, 662 So. 2d 687, 687 (Fla. 1995); Fla. Bar v. Hecker, 475 So. 2d 1240, 
1242 (Fla. 1985). 
 
We disagree with the Bar’s argument.  Merely because there is some 
evidence pertaining to an aggravating factor does not mean that that evidence rises 
to the level necessary to support a finding of that aggravator.  In weighing the 
evidence, the referee determined that only one aggravating factor, Ticktin’s 
substantial experience in the practice of law, applied.   
As to selfish motive, even though the referee found that there was an 
element of self-interest, he concluded that the finding was not sufficient to find this 
aggravator.  The record supports the referee’s conclusion that Ticktin’s actions 
pertaining to the cancellation of Johnson’s LWL shares primarily benefitted the 
investors that Johnson defrauded.  Therefore, the referee’s decision not to find 
selfish motive as an aggravating factor is not clearly erroneous.   
As to multiple offenses, Ticktin violated four rules within a single count in 
the complaint.  Further, he is not guilty of the Count II violations.11  Thus, it is not 
                                          
 
 
11.  See Fla. Bar v. Orta, 689 So. 2d 270, 273 (Fla. 1997) (multiple offenses 
applied because respondent was found guilty in three separate counts that involved 
dishonesty, which occurred while he was suspended); Fla. Bar v. Adler, 589 So. 2d 
899, 900 (Fla. 1991) (multiple offenses applied because the referee found that 
respondent committed multiple trust fund violations). 
 
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clear error that the referee decided not to find multiple offenses as an aggravating 
factor.   
As to a pattern of misconduct, the referee found Ticktin’s misconduct here to 
be aberrational.  His misconduct relates to a single, continuing series of closely 
related events over a short period of time.12  The referee’s decision that a pattern of 
misconduct should not apply as an aggravating factor is not clearly erroneous.   
Finally, in rejecting vulnerability of the victim as an aggravating factor, the 
referee found that Johnson was a “very sophisticated client who was the CEO of 
publicly traded corporations” who received a twenty-year sentence in a federal 
prison for defrauding investors of $20 million.  Vulnerability of a victim is 
established when findings support that a respondent exercised undue advantage 
over a client who was not reasonably in a position to protect himself or herself.13  
                                          
 
 
12.  See Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 622 (Fla. 2007) (stating 
previous discipline for the same kind of misconduct establishes a pattern of 
misconduct); Fla. Bar v. Walkden, 950 So. 2d 407, 410 (Fla. 2007) (stating there is 
a pattern of misconduct for continuing to engage in acts constituting the practice of 
law while suspended). 
 
13.  See Fla. Bar v. Barrett, 897 So. 2d 1269, 1277 (Fla. 2005) (vulnerability 
of a victim supported where one of the victims retained respondent’s law firm only 
because she was angry that somebody else had tried to take advantage of her 
during a time in which she was clearly preoccupied with her son's critical injuries); 
Fla. Bar v. Karten, 829 So. 2d 883, 890 (Fla. 2002) (finding evidentiary support for 
vulnerability of a victim as an aggravating factor where the respondent, without 
authorization, took possession of and sold four vehicles belonging to his client 
while his client was detained in a federal prison located outside of Florida).   
 
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The Bar argues that Johnson was a vulnerable victim of Ticktin merely because he 
was incarcerated during the pertinent period.  In rejecting this aggravator, the 
referee properly considered the totality of the circumstances.  The fact that Johnson 
was incarcerated does not require a finding of vulnerability of the victim.  
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s finding of a single aggravating factor. 
 
The Bar also challenges the following findings in mitigation:  absence of a 
dishonest motive; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative 
attitude toward the disciplinary process; remorse; and imposition of other penalties 
or sanctions.  “A referee’s findings as to mitigation . . . carry a presumption of 
correctness and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous or without support in 
the record.”  Fla. Bar v. Valentine-Miller, 974 So. 2d 333, 336 (Fla. 2008); see also 
Arcia, 848 So. 2d at 299 (Fla. 2003); Morse, 784 So. 2d at 415-16 (Fla. 2001). 
The referee’s evaluation of the credibility of several witnesses, documentary 
evidence, and the Bar’s concession before the referee that Ticktin had “no 
dishonest intent” supports the finding of absence of a dishonest motive as a 
mitigating factor.  Next, without argument or other support, the Bar asserts that full 
and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the 
disciplinary process should not be found in mitigation.  Because the Bar fails to 
show how this finding in mitigation is clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary 
support, we approve this mitigating factor.   
 
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Next, the fact that the referee assigned little weight to the finding of remorse 
as a mitigating factor does not warrant its exclusion as a presumptively correct 
finding.  The referee found that Ticktin was remorseful about not memorializing 
his business agreement and alleged waiver of conflict of interests in writing.  
Therefore, this finding in mitigation by the referee is also approved.  However, the 
referee’s finding of imposition of other penalties or sanction as a mitigating factor, 
based on the fact that Ticktin (1) continues to fulfill his financial obligations even 
though he was forced to declare bankruptcy after he lost millions of dollars from 
his personal wealth, and (2) has experienced profound personal and professional 
embarrassment from being involved in the present disciplinary process,14 is clearly 
erroneous.  We have consistently determined that application of this mitigating 
factor requires the imposition of a formal sanction or penalty.15   
The referee does not provide any case law in support of his conclusion that 
the personal economic losses that Ticktin suffered should be considered the 
imposition of other penalties or sanctions under standard 9.32(k).  While it is 
                                          
 
 
14.  The referee alternatively offers these findings as other mitigating factors 
not listed in standard 9.32(k).   
 
15.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. De la Torre, 994 So. 2d 1032, 1037 (Fla. 2008) 
(recognizing imposition of other penalties or sanctions as a mitigating factor 
because respondent was subject to specified conditions of probation in a related 
criminal case); Fla. Bar v. Hagendorf, 921 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 2006) 
(recognizing respondent’s suspension for sixty days by the Supreme Court of 
Nevada, prior to disciplinary proceedings in Florida, as a mitigating factor). 
 
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evident that the referee found Ticktin’s eventual financial circumstances and 
embarrassment to be sympathetic factors in this case, there is no authority for a 
finding of imposition of other penalties or sanctions as mitigation.  Under the 
circumstances of this case, we see no reason to recognize Ticktin’s substantial 
personal economic losses and his embarrassment, all of which resulted from 
Ticktin’s serious professional misconduct, as other mitigating factors not 
enumerated in the standards.  Accordingly, we disapprove the referee’s finding of 
imposition of other penalties or sanctions as clearly erroneous. 
Finally, we consider the referee’s recommended sanction.  In reviewing a 
referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope of review is broader than that 
afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, ultimately, it is the Court’s 
responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 
2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  However, generally 
speaking, this Court will not second-guess the referee’s recommended discipline as 
long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 
1999).   
 
Before the referee, the Bar sought a sixty-day suspension.  Finding a 
suspension too harsh, the referee recommends an admonishment, pursuant to 
 
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standard 4.34.16  The Bar challenges this recommendation urging us to impose at 
least a sixty-day suspension.  We agree with the Bar that a suspension is warranted.  
An admonishment is not supported by the case law and the standards.  Rule 
Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(b) states that minor misconduct is the only type of 
misconduct for which an admonishment is appropriate.  The rule states, in 
pertinent part, that a lawyer’s misconduct shall not be regarded as minor 
misconduct if “the misconduct resulted in or is likely to result in actual prejudice 
(loss of money, legal rights, or valuable property rights) to a client or other 
person.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(b)(1)(B).  Ticktin’s misconduct caused 
actual prejudice to Johnson. 
Johnson had a protectable interest in his LWL stock shares when Ticktin 
stood by while Bee cancelled the stock certificates, which Ticktin perceived would 
benefit Silver State.  Ticktin later accepted and supported the cancellation.  Ticktin 
failed to take appropriate legal steps to protect Johnson’s ownership interests in 
LWL.  Ticktin’s misconduct either caused or led to Johnson’s loss of valuable 
property ownership interests in LWL.  Thus, Ticktin’s misconduct was not minor 
pursuant to rule 3-5.1(b).  The Bar relies on standard 4.32, which provides that 
                                          
 
16.  Standard 4.34 provides:  “Admonishment is appropriate when a lawyer 
is negligent in determining whether the representation of a client may be materially 
affected by the lawyer’s own interests, or whether the representation will adversely 
affect another client, and causes little or no injury or potential injury to a client.” 
 
 
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“[s]uspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does 
not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or 
potential injury to a client.”  Ticktin was cognizant that his representations 
constituted conflicts of interest, but did little or nothing to eliminate them.  He did 
not adequately disclose the possible effect of the existing conflicts of interest to his 
clients.  Regarding client injury, Ticktin caused injury or potential injury to 
Johnson when he did nothing to stop the cancellation of Johnson’s LWL stock 
certificates, which Ticktin perceived would benefit Silver State.17  The actual 
injury (or potential injury) Ticktin caused is that he, as Johnson’s lawyer, actively 
worked against Johnson’s ownership interests, even while Johnson was in jail and 
remained his client. 
We find that Ticktin’s misdeeds are egregious and constitute serious 
violations of the rules governing every Florida lawyer’s professional conduct.  
Ticktin’s misconduct warrants a ninety-one-day suspension.  A rehabilitative 
suspension is consistent with the discipline this Court has imposed for similar 
misconduct.  In Florida Bar v. Sofo, 673 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1996), the respondent 
represented two corporations, in which he owned stock, with conflicting interests 
regarding a contract between those corporations without consent.  The respondent 
                                          
 
 
17.  There is nothing in the record to support the referee’s finding that 
Johnson was not injured or potentially injured by Ticktin’s conflict because 
Johnsons’ shares in LWL already had been forfeited to the federal government.   
 
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used information that he obtained during the course of representing one 
corporation to its detriment and to the other corporation’s benefit.  The Court 
imposed a ninety-one-day suspension.   
Ticktin’s blatant disregard for the rules governing conflicts of interest 
reflects his poor professional judgment.  Ticktin’s misconduct is unbecoming of a 
member of The Florida Bar, and such misconduct will not be taken lightly by this 
Court.  Therefore, we impose a ninety-one-day suspension to emphasize to the Bar 
and the public that misconduct like Ticktin’s will result in severe disciplinary 
consequences.   
Accordingly, Peter David Ticktin is hereby suspended from the practice of 
law for ninety-one days.  The suspension will be effective thirty days from the 
filing of this opinion so that Ticktin can close out his practice and protect the 
interests of existing clients.  If Ticktin notifies this Court in writing that he is no 
longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this 
Court will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.  Ticktin 
shall accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed until he is 
reinstated.  Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Peter David Ticktin in 
the amount of $5,346.42, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
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QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and 
LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
PERRY, J., did not participate. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.  
 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Director 
of Lawyer Regulation, The Florida, Tallahassee, Florida, and Michael David 
Soifer, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Kevin P. Tynan of Richardson and Tynan, PLC, Tamarac, Florida,  
 
 
for Respondent