Case Title: State v. Torres

Citation: 

Docket Number: 104642

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2012-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 104,642 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
OSCAR F. TORRES, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
An appellate court generally does not decide moot questions or render advisory 
opinions. 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; WARREN M. WILBERT and GREGORY L. WALLER, judges.  
Opinion filed January 27, 2012.  Affirmed. 
 
Charles A. O'Hara, of O'Hara & O'Hara LLC, of Wichita, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
MORITZ, J.:  In 2007, Oscar Torres pleaded guilty to felony murder, criminal 
discharge of a firearm at an occupied building, and aggravated assault. After this court 
remanded the case for resentencing on a separate issue but before resentencing, Torres 
sought to withdraw his plea. Torres argued the State violated the plea agreement at his 
original, since-vacated sentencing by reading a letter from the victim's mother asking the 
court to impose the maximum prison time. Because Torres ultimately received a new 
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sentencing hearing at which the victim's mother personally testified and the court 
imposed the sentence recommended by the plea agreement, we conclude Torres' 
argument on appeal is moot. 
 
In the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend specific sentences on each 
count and that the sentences on the firearm and assault convictions run consecutive to the 
felony-murder conviction but concurrent with each other. At Torres' initial sentencing, 
the prosecutor asked the court to follow the plea agreement. However, without objection 
from Torres, the prosecutor read into the record two letters from the victim's mother, the 
first requesting the court impose the maximum imprisonment. After reading the letters, 
the prosecutor again asked the court to follow the recommendation in the plea agreement. 
Ultimately, the district court imposed a sentence which generally conformed to the plea 
agreement except that the court ordered that all counts run consecutively. 
 
Torres appealed, arguing his sentence was illegal because the district court 
erroneously utilized the off-grid offense as the primary offense. State v. Torres, No. 
99,308, 2009 WL 862166 (Kan. 2009) (unpublished opinion). We agreed, vacated the 
sentence, and remanded with directions to correct the illegal sentence. Torres, 2009 WL 
862166, at *3-4.  
 
On remand, the district court elected to conduct a full sentencing hearing. But 
before the sentencing hearing, Torres moved to withdraw his plea arguing the State 
violated the plea agreement at the initial sentencing hearing when it read the victim's 
mother's letter into the record. The district court denied the motion, finding the State did 
not breach the plea agreement.  
 
At the resentencing hearing, the State again requested that the court follow the 
plea agreement. However, the prosecutor did not read the victim's mother's letter into the 
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record at this hearing. Instead, the victim's mother personally addressed the court and 
asked the court to "give [Torres] what he deserves." The court then imposed a sentence 
consistent with the plea agreement, including concurrent sentences on the firearm and 
assault convictions. 
 
In this appeal, Torres only argues the district court erred in finding he did not 
establish good cause to withdraw his plea. Torres contends that at the original sentencing, 
the State violated the specific sentencing recommendations in the plea agreement when 
the prosecutor read the victim's mother's letter into the record. Torres essentially reasons 
that because the victim's mother asked the court to impose the maximum sentence, the 
State necessarily violated the plea agreement when it read the letter from the victim's 
mother.   
 
"A plea of guilty or nolo contendere, for good cause shown and within the 
discretion of the court, may be withdrawn at any time before sentence is adjudged." 
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 22-3210(d)(1). "To correct manifest injustice the court after sentence 
may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea." 
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 22-3210(d)(2). On appeal, the defendant must establish that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw plea. State v. Plotner, 290 
Kan. 774, 777, 235 P.3d 417 (2010); State v. Woodward, 288 Kan. 297, 299, 202 P.3d 15 
(2009); see State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (stating abuse of 
discretion standard of review). 
 
Torres' argument is flawed in that it relies upon actions taken by the State at the 
original sentencing hearing, and yet the sentence imposed at that hearing was vacated by 
this court. Torres does not argue that the State breached the plea agreement at the second 
sentencing hearing, where both parties essentially had the opportunity for a "do-over." 
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Moreover, at Torres' second sentencing hearing, he ultimately received the sentence he 
bargained for. We affirm his sentence. 
 
Therefore, Torres' claims regarding the State's alleged violation of the plea 
agreement at the initial sentencing hearing are moot, see State v. McKnight, 292 Kan. 
776, 778-79, 257 P.3d 339 (2011) (appellate court does not decide moot questions or 
render advisory opinions), and we need not consider whether the district court abused its 
discretion in denying Torres' motion to withdraw his plea.  
 
Affirmed.