Case Title: DEREK DUNSMORE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-205

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
DEREK DUNSMORE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 40153 P.3d 275Case Number: No. 05-205Decided: 03/12/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 

                                                                                                

DEREK 
DUNSMORE,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan 
R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Roden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Dee Morgan, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Morgan.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury found 
Derek Dunsmore ("the appellant") guilty of child abuse, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2003), but not guilty of aggravated 
assault and battery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) (LexisNexis 
2003).  The appellant now appeals 
his child abuse conviction, claiming that the district court erred in denying 
his motions for a mistrial and a new trial, that the district court failed 
properly to instruct the jury on the applicable law, and that his conviction was 
not supported by sufficient evidence.  
We agree that sufficient evidence did not exist to support the jury's 
guilty verdict and, therefore, reverse.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The dispositive 
issue is whether sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find the appellant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of recklessly inflicting physical injury on his 
stepdaughter.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On January 27, 
2003, the appellant was working from home in Cheyenne, Wyoming, and watching his two-year-old 
stepdaughter, MR, while his wife worked.  
At about 11:30 a.m., the appellant telephoned emergency services to 
request aid for MR because she "just fell down the stairs."  MR was taken to the hospital by 
emergency services personnel because she had symptoms "indicative of a possible 
head injury."  Doctors performed a 
CAT scan upon MR, the result of which indicated that MR had suffered a subdural 
hematoma, meaning "a bleed inside of the brain in between the brain and the 
covering of the brain, the dura."  
The bleeding inside her skull "pushe[d] [MR's] brain off to one side," 
causing her brain to swell and ultimately endangering her life.  A neurosurgeon performed surgery to 
evacuate the blood from the subdural area and MR was taken to Children's 
Hospital in Denver, 
Colorado.  MR's doctors, while preparing her for 
surgery, also noted the existence of older bruising on her scalp that occurred 
prior to her subdural hematoma.

 
 
[¶4]      The Cheyenne police department 
officers who investigated the incident concluded that the appellant's 
explanation of the incident was inconsistent with MR's injury.  The appellant was subsequently arrested 
and charged with aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-502(a)(i),1 and, as an alternative charge, 
child abuse in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503(b)(i).2

 
 
[¶5]      After a four-day 
trial, the jury found the appellant not guilty of aggravated assault and 
battery, but found him guilty of child abuse.  The jury returned a special verdict for 
the alternative elements of the child abuse charge wherein it unanimously found 
that the appellant recklessly inflicted physical injury 
on MR, but did not unanimously find that he intentionally inflicted physical 
injury.  On May 6, 2005, the 
district court sentenced the appellant to a term of not less than twelve nor 
more than twenty-four months incarceration.  He was released on bond pending the 
outcome of this appeal.  Specific 
facts and testimony from the appellant's trial will be discussed as relevant 
herein.

 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      In order to 
determine whether evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, we apply the 
following standard:

 
 
This 
Court assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough 
to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State.  We will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our 
only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury 
actually did.

 
 

Orona-Rangal 
v. State, 2002 
WY 134, ¶ 19, 53 P.3d 1080, 1086 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 
(Wyo. 1995)); see also DeWitt v. State, 917 P.2d 1144, 
1148 (Wyo. 
1996) (applying the standard in a child abuse appeal).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court instructed the jury that the elements of child abuse under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-503(b)(i) were:

 
 
1.   On or about the 27th day of January 
2003;

2.   In the County of Laramie and State of Wyoming;

3.   The Defendant, Derek 
Dunsmore;

4.   Being 18 years of age or older and 
a person responsible for M.R.'s welfare;

5.   Intentionally or 
recklessly;

6.   Inflicted physical 
injury;

7.   Upon M.R., a child under the age of 
18 years.

 
 
The jury 
returned a special verdict finding that the appellant recklessly inflicted 
physical injury on MR, but acquitted him of intentionally inflicting physical 
injury on the child.3  Therefore, we must view the evidence 
that indicates that the appellant inflicted a reckless injury on MR in the light 
most favorable to the State, but we must reject, as the jury did, the State's 
evidence that tends only to show that the appellant intentionally harmed 
MR.

 
 
[¶8]      The State sought 
to convince the jury at trial that the appellant intentionally struck MR and 
that his claim that she fell down a staircase was untrue.  To that end, the State presented various 
doctors who either personally examined MR or later examined her case file.  The State also presented testimony from 
the Cheyenne 
police officers and detectives who were involved in investigating this case, 
MR's biological mother and father, and her paternal grandmother.  In our review of the record, it appears 
that the State made no cogent attempt at trial to argue that MR's injury might 
have been inflicted recklessly rather than intentionally.

 
 
[¶9]      Nearly every 
medical expert examined by the State testified that MR's subdural hematoma would 
not likely be caused by a fall down a staircase.  As one doctor explained, "[a] child who 
falls down carpeted stairs would have a series of small falls and not one large 
fall."  Another surgeon opined that 
"this could have been a case of nonaccidental trauma."  The State's witnesses also testified, as 
a rebuttal to questions from defense counsel, that they did not believe that 
MR's injury on January 27 was a "rebleed" of a chronic hematoma, meaning that 
they doubted that MR had suffered a hematoma days before and that a fall down 
the stairs on the 27th caused new bleeding from the older hematoma.  The State also elicited testimony that 
the medical history given to MR's treating physicians was incomplete or 
inaccurate, apparently in an attempt to allow the jury to infer that the 
appellant and MR's mother had something to hide.  Finally, one doctor testified that MR 
had recently suffered a torn frenulum in her mouth, an injury that would have 
bled "like crazy"; however the appellant and MR didn't report any bleeding when 
questioned about the injury.

 
 
[¶10]   Four members of the Cheyenne Police 
Department also testified for the State.  
These witnesses testified about the general layout of the appellant's 
house and the stairwell down which the appellant said MR fell.  One witness also presented the jury with 
pictures of possible blood or vomit stains upstairs but noted that there was no 
such forensic evidence at the bottom of the stairwell.4  They further testified regarding the 
appellant's and MR's mother's demeanor at the hospital and during subsequent 
police interviews, claiming that the appellant was unconcerned and playing card 
games while MR's mother looked variously sad but subdued or joking and somewhat 
upbeat.  Finally, these officers 
testified about a variety of allegedly inconsistent or incomplete statements 
given by the appellant and MR's mother, which statements included: (1) claiming 
to not know about MR's older scalp bruises, then later explaining that they were 
present when her biological father returned the child ten days earlier; (2) 
whether the appellant was watching television with MR or if they were in 
separate rooms; (3) whether the appellant heard MR walking down the stairs 
before he heard her fall; and (4) how the appellant initially reacted when he 
saw MR fall.

 
 
[¶11]   MR's father and paternal 
grandmother testified that they had custody of the child in early January 2003, 
returned her to her mother and the appellant's home in Cheyenne on January 17, and she was in good health and had 
no scalp bruises before she arrived in Cheyenne.  
MR's father indicated, however, that MR "started vomiting, making herself 
sick, [and] said I don't want to go Dad, I don't want to go" when they arrived 
in Cheyenne.  
The State called MR's mother to testify that the appellant had told her 
that if his relationship with MR did not improve they would both "have to move 
on with [their] lives."  The State 
also questioned her regarding many of her previous statements to the police and 
MR's doctors.

 
 
[¶12]   During closing, when asking the 
jury to return a guilty verdict on either the aggravated assault or child abuse 
charge, the State contended that the foregoing evidence 
proved:

 
 
            
What we have is the benefit of all of the circumstances, all of the 
direct objections, all of the expert opinions, and all of your collective life 
experience that tells you, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [MR] 
did not fall down the stairs, and that the blow to her head that almost killed 
her was inflicted by Derek Dunsmore.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The State went on to argue 
that the injury to MR was the result of "nonaccidental trauma" and the reason 
that the appellant struck MR was that "[h]e was tired and frustrated with the 
new parent thing and the challenge of dealing with someone else's 
daughter."

 
 
[¶13]   After two days of testimony, the 
State rested and the appellant presented his case.  The appellant argued that MR's father 
returned her on January 17 with extensive bruising to her scalp, which caused 
her to be lethargic and irritable between the 17th and 27th.  He claims that these symptoms arose 
because MR had been struck while in her father's care and she suffered a 
subdural hematoma at that time.  
Then, on the morning of January 27, 2003, while walking down the stairs 
to look at the puppies, a feat she had accomplished unassisted before, she 
suffered a seizure which forced her to stiffen and fall down the stairs, hitting 
her head on the thinly carpeted cement of the basement and resulting in a 
"rebleed" of the original hematoma.  
On cross-examination by the appellant, the State's experts also admitted 
that it was possible to suffer MR's injuries from a fall down the stairs, though 
it was very unlikely.

 
 
[¶14]   Based on the foregoing evidence, 
the appellant now argues that his conviction must be reversed because there was 
insufficient evidence to find that he recklessly inflicted MR's injuries.  The State, in its brief, responds that 
the evidence was sufficient and the district court's reasoning from the hearing 
on the appellant's motion for acquittal is sufficiently persuasive that "the 
State finds no way to improve on the district court's findings or analysis and 
will rely on that decision."  The 
district court, at the hearing on the motion for acquittal, 
said:

 
 
The 
[appellant] contends that there was no evidence that he acted recklessly or that 
he inflicted injury.  Reviewing the 
[appellant's] argument and the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State, this Court disagrees.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
            
The following facts viewed in the light most favorable to the State 
support the jury's verdict in the finding that the [appellant] acted recklessly 
on January 27, 2003:  An emergency 
call was placed by the [appellant] to the police dispatcher.  The [appellant] excitedly told the 
dispatcher that a child, M.R., was unconscious and having seizures.  He's heard frantically telling the child 
"You're going to be okay."  The 
police and emergency personnel quickly responded to the call.  They found the child unconscious and 
lying on the floor in the living room.  
The [appellant] explained that she had injured herself as a result of a 
fall down the stairway leading to the basement.  It was later determined that she had a 
massive, subdural hematoma on the left side of her brain.  M.R. was taken to the hospital where 
emergency cranial surgery was performed to remove the hematoma.  

 
 
            
Expert witnesses called by the State testified that it is extremely rare 
for a subdural hematoma to occur as a result of a fall down the stairway.  This is because the fall does not 
produce the velocity needed to produce such an injury.  Experts testified this injury occurred 
as a result of blunt force trauma.  
An expert on child abuse testified that parents who inflict physical 
injury on children routinely claim that the injuries came about as a result of 
an accident or fall.  

 
 
            
The evidence also established that the [appellant] was home alone with 
the child on January 27, 2003; that he and the child were still bonding, but the 
child was not responding well to him.  
A few days shortly before this incident, the [appellant] had told the 
mother that if the relationship didn't improve by the first of March, he was 
going to move out of the home.  A 
few days before January 27, 2003, the child complained of her head hurting and 
old bruises were found when the child was at the hospital.

 
 
            
The testimony also established that the child had been ill the proceeding 
day and was vomiting and was irritable.  
The [appellant] had recently had surgery on his left arm and was 
recuperating at home from the surgery.  
He had stated he did not want to be with the child while she watched 
videos and got a television for her to watch the videos alone in her room.  Finally, the [appellant] told Officer 
Brown that her injury was his fault.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
            
The jury obviously rejected the 
[appellant's] testimony regarding the accidental 
fall.  The exact manner in which the 
child received the blunt force trauma to her head was not established by the 
State and it is not required to do so.  
The jury could reasonably infer that the [appellant] became irritated at a crying, vomiting child 
who did not relate well to him.  It 
could have reasonably inferred that the [appellant] was irritable as the result 
of the pain in his arm that was recently operated upon.  That as a result of a triggering 
incident, the [appellant] struck the child on the left side of her head with his 
healthy right arm, resulting in a subdural hematoma.  The frantic nature of his call, coupled 
with his pleading assurances to the child that she was going to be all right, 
could indicate  or indicated that he didn't mean the blow to be as hard as it 
was.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶15]   When read in light of the jury's 
special verdict, the district court's reasoning is facially flawed.  The jury specifically found that the 
appellant had not intentionally injured MR, therefore, they clearly did not 
unanimously believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally 
struck the child.  Further, based on 
our review of the trial transcript, there is no evidence from which to draw the 
inference that the appellant was irritated because of his recent surgery, 
therefore, it is not reasonable to further infer that the appellant lashed out 
at MR due to his irritability.

 
 
[¶16]   Perhaps realizing that the district 
court's reasoning was unsupported by the verdict, the State at oral argument 
conceded that the jury had rejected its theory at trial, but argued that the 
appellant was still guilty of recklessly inflicting injury on MR under the child 
abuse statute because he left MR to check on the dogs and, when he heard MR at 
the top of the stairs, he "stayed with the puppies instead of checking on her," 
even though he knew he had left the door open.  This argument is a marked change from 
the position taken by the State in its brief and was raised for the first time 
in appellate oral argument.  Though 
not supported by supplementary briefing or citation to pertinent authority, we 
agree with the State's position insofar as it concedes that the recordin light 
of the jury's verdictdoes not support any theory of the case at trial except 
that espoused by the appellant.  The 
issue, therefore, is whether the appellant recklessly inflicted physical injury 
upon MR when he left the basement door open and allowed MR to come down the 
stairs unsupervised.  

 
 
[¶17]   "Recklessly," as used in the 
Wyoming Criminal Code,

 
 
is 
defined as the following conduct:  A 
person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the harm he is accused of causing will occur, and the 
harm results.  The risk shall be of 
such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the 
situation[.]

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(ix) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2004).  When discussing other crimes in which 
acting recklessly is a criminal element, we have stressed that a person acts 
recklessly only if he "consciously disregards" a substantial risk and such disregard grossly deviates from 
the conduct that a reasonable person would observe.  See Olson v. State, 960 P.2d 1019, 1021 
(Wyo. 1998); Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 664 
(Wyo. 1993); and Murray v. 
State, 855 P.2d 350, 357 (Wyo. 1993).  

 
 
[¶18]   The State's evidence tending to 
show that the appellant acted recklessly by leaving the door open and failing to 
check on MR when she was at the top of the stairs is sorely lacking.  The only evidence presented at trial 
that is remotely probative on the issue of whether descending the stairs 
unassisted posed a danger to MR indicated that she had successfully accomplished 
this feat before and, therefore, it would not be considered a dangerous 
situation by the appellant.  A 
police detective testified that the appellant told him that he thought MR "was 
probably preparing to . . . sit down on her butt and slide down, which was her 
way of doing things" just before she fell.  
While juries are free to weigh the credibility of testimony, absent this 
evidence the record is silent on the issue of whether the appellant consciously 
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk to MR.  Further, it is clear that the 
appellant's version of his conduct, which description was conceded as true by 
the State during oral argument, does not constitute the sort of gross deviation 
from what a reasonable person would observe under the circumstances that we have 
previously recognized in our cases.  
See Orona-Rangal, ¶¶ 17-19, 53 P.3d  at 1086-87 (finding that the evidence was sufficient to support a 
conviction for reckless endangerment where a defendant engaged in a high-speed 
chase, ran a red light, and crashed into and killed one motorist and injured two 
others); Hodges, 904 P.2d  at 344, 
(finding evidence sufficient to support a reckless endangering conviction where 
the defendant, driving a truck, created a dangerous situation by intentionally 
maneuvering in front of a cyclist, obstructing his view and only avoiding a 
collision because the victim was an expert cyclist); and  Murray, 855 P.2d  at 356-57 (finding 
that evidence was sufficient to establish reckless conduct in an involuntary 
manslaughter trial where a defendant fired a gun in the direction of the victim 
and one of the bullets ricocheted off a rock and severed the victim's femoral 
artery and vein).  While our 
previous cases do not illuminate the minimum standard of care that must be 
breached in order to find a defendant guilty of a crime involving reckless 
behavior, they do demonstrate the level of conduct that we have previously found 
to deviate grossly from the standard of care of a reasonable person and provide 
a stark contrast to the appellant's description of his conduct in the instant 
case.  

 
 
[¶19]   Further, the child abuse statute, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503, references a definition of "physical injury" 
contained in title 14 of our statutes.  
That definitional statute states, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
            
(ii) "Abuse" means inflicting or causing physical or mental injury, harm 
or imminent danger to the physical or mental health or welfare of a child other than by accidental means, 
including abandonment, . . . excessive or unreasonable corporal punishment, 
malnutrition or substantial risk thereof by reason of intentional or 
unintentional neglect, and the commission or allowing the commission of a sexual 
offense against a child as defined by law:

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
(B) "Physical injury" means any harm to a child including but not limited 
to disfigurement, impairment of any bodily organ, skin bruising if greater in 
magnitude than minor bruising associated with reasonable corporal punishment, 
bleeding, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma or substantial 
malnutrition[.]

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).  Though the definition of "abuse" is not 
specifically referenced by the criminal child abuse statute, we have previously 
recognized its utility in determining whether a child has been criminally 
abused.  In Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 725 
(Wyo. 1983), we said that the title 14 definition "ascribe[s] importance in 
ascertaining whether a child has been a victim of abuse to discovering whether 
the injuries sustained by the child were accidental or deliberate."  According to this definition, then, an 
individual responsible for a child's welfare does not abuse that child if the 
child suffers a physical injury by accidental means.

 
 
[¶20]   While there is a strong preference 
in the law for the validity of jury verdicts, the verdict in the instant case 
cannot stand.  Under the specific 
circumstances of this case, we hold that it was neither reasonable nor rational 
for the jury to return a guilty verdict on the charge of child abuse with the 
finding that the appellant acted recklessly in causing injury to MR.  The State admits that the jury 
determined that the appellant merely left the basement door open and heard MR at 
the top of the stairs, preparing to descend them.  The appellant's failure to check on the 
child at that point simply does not rise to the level of criminal recklessness 
envisioned by the child abuse statute.  
The facts conceded by the State in the instant case amount only to a 
tragic accident and our statutes are clear that a criminal conviction for child 
abuse cannot be predicated upon an accidental injury.

 
 
[¶21]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court is reversed and we remand with instructions to enter a judgment 
of acquittal.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1That 
statute states:

 
 
(a)   A person is guilty of aggravated 
assault and battery if he:

(i) 
Causes serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life[.]

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i).

2Under 
Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-503(b)(i), 

 
 
(b)   Except under circumstances 
constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-502, a person is guilty of child abuse, a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, if a person 
responsible for a child's welfare as defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(i) 
intentionally or recklessly inflicts upon a child under the age of eighteen (18) 
years:

            
(i) Physical injury as defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii)(B), excluding 
reasonable corporal punishment[.] 

3It is not 
disputed that sufficient evidence exists to satisfy the other elements of the 
charge.

4It 
appears the appellant has always maintained that after MR fell down the stairs 
he carried her upstairs before dialing 911 and it was not until MR was upstairs 
that she began to vomit.