Case Title: Miller v. Miller

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12298

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12298 
 
BENJAMIN H. MILLER  vs.  JOANNA ISABELLA MILLER. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 6, 2017. - January 12, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Divorce and Separation, Child custody.  Minor, Custody.  Parent 
and Child, Custody. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint for divorce filed in the Middlesex Division of 
the Probate and Family Court Department on May 20, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Patricia A. Gorman, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Elaine M. Epstein (Richard M. Novitch also present) for the 
husband. 
 
Matthew P. Barach (Melinda J. Markvan also present) for the 
wife. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The husband, Benjamin H. Miller, appeals from a 
Probate and Family Court judgment permitting the wife, Joanna 
Isabella Miller, to remove and relocate the parties' daughter to 
Germany, the wife's home country.  We have previously held that 
2 
 
when deciding whether removal should be permitted, the 
particular criteria depends on whether physical custody of the 
child is sole or shared.  Where the parent seeking removal has 
sole physical custody, his or her removal petition is analyzed 
using what has been called the "real advantage" standard 
of Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704 (1985).  Where, 
however, the parents share physical custody, a parent's removal 
request is evaluated using the standard articulated in Mason 
v. Coleman, 447 Mass. 177 (2006), known as the "best interests" 
standard.  In this case, no prior custody order existed to guide 
the trial judge as to whether the Yannas or Mason analysis 
should apply.  In such circumstances, we hold that the judge 
must first perform a functional analysis, which may require a 
factual inquiry, regarding the parties' respective parenting 
responsibilities to determine whether it more closely 
approximates sole or shared custody, and then apply the 
corresponding standard.1  We also take this opportunity to 
                     
 
1 In the concurrence's view, our adherence to the Yannas-
Mason framework when deciding this case constitutes an 
endorsement of an overly formalistic analysis that constrains 
judges' discretion.  See Mason v. Coleman, 447 Mass. 177 (2006); 
Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704 (1985).  By 
incorporating this functional (rather than formalistic) inquiry 
regarding custody into our existing framework, however, we seek 
to provide trial judges with more discretion when deciding these 
cases (beyond that inherent in a judge's application of either 
Yannas or Mason).  And although we do not necessarily disagree 
with certain of the concurrence's concerns, to the extent we 
must reexamine the wisdom of the Yannas-Mason framework, we wait 
3 
 
emphasize that the best interests of the child is always the 
paramount consideration in any question involving removal. 
 
We are satisfied that the judge conducted the requisite 
functional analysis here, and in determining whether removal was 
in the child's best interests she afforded considerable weight 
to the benefits the proposed move to Germany would offer the 
wife, the child's primary caregiver.  Because we discern no 
abuse of discretion or error of law from the judge's 
consideration of those benefits, or from her ultimate conclusion 
that removal is in the child's best interests, we affirm the 
judgment below. 
 
Background.2  The wife, a German citizen, and the husband, a 
United States citizen, were married in Tanzania in September, 
2007.  Their only child, a daughter, was born in Uganda in 
March, 2008.  In July, 2011, the family moved to Massachusetts, 
where the husband's family resides, so that the husband could 
attend graduate school.  The parties did not intend to remain in 
Massachusetts and planned to leave once the husband received his 
graduate degree.  The wife had grown up in Germany and had never 
                                                                  
to do so in a case where the issue has been raised and briefed 
by the parties. 
 
2 We present the relevant facts as found by the judge, 
supplementing them by the record where necessary, and reserving 
certain details for our discussion of the issues.  A.Z. v. B.Z., 
431 Mass. 150, 151 (2000). 
4 
 
lived in the United States before, and the husband had not 
resided here in eighteen years. 
 
The husband ultimately did not attend graduate school, 
however, and the parties first separated in April, 2012.  During 
this separation, which lasted from April to August, the wife 
moved with the child to Germany, where they resided with the 
wife's mother and the child attended a German public school.  
The wife returned to Massachusetts with the child that August in 
an attempted reconciliation, but the parties separated for the 
final time in September, 2012.  The husband filed for divorce in 
May, 2013, citing an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and 
requesting shared custody of the child.  The wife counterclaimed 
shortly thereafter, seeking sole custody of the child and 
requesting permission to permanently remove her to Germany. 
 
Among the relevant facts found by the judge was the 
determination that the "[w]ife has been [the child]'s primary 
caregiver since birth," and has continued in that role following 
the parties' separation.  The wife cared for the child when she 
was an infant, and is now the parent who "arranges and attends 
her medical appointments," "cares for [the child] when she is 
ill," "purchases the majority of her clothing, and attends all 
parent-teacher conferences."  The judge also found that although 
the "[h]usband is not seeking sole physical custody of [the 
child,] and does not propose that he should be her primary 
5 
 
caregiver," the husband does participate in certain parenting 
tasks, and he and the child have a loving relationship. 
 
Following their divorce filings, the parties filed a 
stipulation in the trial court stating that they "shall share 
custody" of the child.  By its terms, the husband, who lives in 
an apartment in Watertown, has the child overnight on Mondays 
and Wednesdays; he also has her every Saturday, and alternates 
each week between dropping the child off with the wife that 
Saturday evening, or the following evening on Sunday.  The wife 
has the child at all other times at the couple's former marital 
residence in Somerville, where the wife still resides.3  In 
practice, however, the husband often travels for work, and when 
he does he communicates with the child infrequently, and he 
misses parenting time that he has not sought to make up.  The 
judge also found that "the parties struggle to communicate 
effectively regarding parenting issues," and that the husband 
does not usually allow the wife to speak with the child when the 
child is in his care. 
 
Despite their impressive professional credentials,4 the 
husband and wife have both struggled financially since they 
                     
 
3 It is uncontested that the stipulation establishes an 
approximate split of sixty per cent-forty per cent in parenting 
time, with the wife receiving the greater amount. 
 
 
4 The husband earned degrees from Harvard University and the 
University of Chicago, and has extensive experience working for 
6 
 
arrived in Massachusetts, and the judge concluded that their 
current parenting arrangement is "financially untenable."  The 
husband's salary from his current position at a Cambridge-based 
nonprofit is insufficient to provide for the wife and the child; 
he cannot meet his current expenses, which include weekly child 
support payments to the wife and paying for the wife and the 
child's health insurance.  The judge found that the wife is 
likewise "unable to provide for [the child] in Massachusetts."  
Despite her good-faith efforts to find a job -- she has applied 
for over 400 positions -- the wife has been unable to find one 
commensurate with her experience.  At the time of trial she was 
working part-time as a kitchen assistant making fourteen dollars 
per hour; beyond that, her income consisted of the husband's 
child support payments, supplemental nutrition assistance 
program benefits for the child, and periodic financial support 
from both the husband's and her own mother.5 
 
Prior to trial, the wife was offered a well-paying job in 
Germany, which the judge found would enable the wife "to support 
herself and [the child] without child support from [the 
h]usband."  Beyond a livable salary, its benefits include health 
                                                                  
nongovernmental organizations.  The wife likewise holds two 
degrees, speaks three languages, and specializes in public 
relations in the Middle East region. 
 
5 The judge found that the wife has borrowed over 100,000 
euros from her mother, who "has liquidated most of her private 
retirement fund" to support her daughter. 
7 
 
insurance and "the ability to work from home most of the time." 
The wife expressed her intention of accepting the position if 
her requests for custody and removal were granted.  In contrast 
with Massachusetts, where the wife lacks any family or friends, 
a return to Germany would place the wife among her extended 
family.  This includes the wife's mother, with whom the child is 
especially close.  The child has already spent considerable time 
in Germany as well -- she has visited at least ten times since 
birth, and has attended German schools for two extended periods.  
The child is fluent in German, has a German passport, and has 
kept in regular contact with her family and friends there. 
 
Following a three-day trial, the judge concluded that 
permanently relocating to Germany with the wife was in the 
child's best interests and granted the wife's requests for 
physical custody and removal.  The judgment granted the husband 
"parenting time with [the child] during three of the four annual 
vacations from school in Germany, including six consecutive 
weeks during each summer vacation," as well as "additional 
parenting time with [the child] in Germany upon reasonable 
notice to [the w]ife by agreement."  The husband appealed from 
the judgment, and we transferred his case from the Appeals Court 
on our own motion. 
8 
 
 
Discussion.  The husband challenges the judge's removal 
order on two grounds.6  First, he argues that the judge erred in 
applying the "real advantage" analysis of Yannas, applicable 
where a parent seeking removal has sole physical custody of his 
or her child.  The husband contends that because the parties 
shared physical custody of the child, the judge should have 
applied the "best interest" standard articulated in Mason.  
Second, the husband argues that even if the judge properly 
employed the Yannas standard, she nevertheless abused her 
discretion in concluding that removal is in the child's best 
interests.  Before engaging the husband's arguments, we briefly 
review the legal framework for evaluating removal petitions in 
the Commonwealth. 
 
1.  Applicable law.  a.  G. L. c. 208, § 30.  General Laws 
c. 208, § 30, governs removal from the Commonwealth of children 
of divorced parents where one parent seeks to relocate without 
the consent of the other parent.  It provides that "[a] minor 
child of divorced parents who is a native of or has resided five 
years within this commonwealth . . . shall not . . . be removed 
                     
 
6 While the husband's notice of appeal states that he 
appeals the lower court judge's determinations as to both 
custody and removal, his brief focuses solely on the removal 
issue.  Given the husband's focus on that issue, and the fact 
that "[t]he custody issues in this case are bound up with [the 
wife's] request to remove the children from the Commonwealth," 
Prenaveau v. Prenaveau, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 131, 138-139 (2009), 
we likewise fix our attention on the removal issue to resolve 
the husband's appeal. 
9 
 
out of this commonwealth . . . without the consent of both 
parents, unless the court upon cause shown otherwise orders."  
G. L. c. 208, § 30.7  "Upon cause shown" means that removal is in 
the best interests of the child.  Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711.  The 
statute is intended to "preserve the rights of the noncustodial 
parent and the child to maintain and develop their familial 
relationships, while balancing those rights with the right of 
the custodial parent to seek a better life for himself or 
herself."  Wakefield v. Hegarty, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 772, 775 
(2006), citing Yannas, supra at 712. 
 
We note at the outset that the removal statute does not, by 
its terms, apply to the parties' daughter:  she was born in 
Uganda, so she is not "a native" of the Commonwealth; likewise, 
she had "resided" here for less than five years when the wife 
                     
 
7 Despite the removal statute's longevity -- it was first 
enacted in 1842 -- the substantive case law and principles did 
not begin to develop until the 1970s and 1980s.  Earlier cases 
simply acknowledged the statute's import in light of its plain 
meaning.  See, e.g., Hersey v. Hersey, 271 Mass. 545, 555 (1930) 
("It is plain also that the respondent, by taking the child out 
of the Commonwealth, has not abided by the terms of [§ 30]").  
This court first interpreted the statutory language in Rubin v. 
Rubin, 370 Mass. 857, 857 (1976), where we held that the phrase 
"upon cause shown" means the best interests of the child.  Even 
as of 1981, however, the Appeals Court observed that 
"Massachusetts authorities have not discussed in detail the 
factors to be weighed in deciding questions of removal."  Hale 
v. Hale, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 815 (1981).  Hale was the first 
Massachusetts case to explore those factors in detail, as well 
as the first to adopt a "real advantage" analysis.  Id. at 815-
820.  In doing so, Hale set the stage for this court's first in-
depth discussion of the factors to be considered in evaluating a 
removal petition in Yannas. 
10 
 
filed her removal request.  This does not mean, however, that 
the removal principles developed in cases under § 30 are not 
relevant or applicable here.  This court previously has applied 
(or endorsed the application of) those principles in other 
circumstances where not every component of the removal statute 
was satisfied.  See, e.g., Smith v. McDonald, 458 Mass. 540, 546 
(2010), citing Wakefield, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 775 (applying 
§ 30 principles to child of unmarried parents, despite 
recognition that "a statute governing divorced children is not 
applicable directly to nonmarital children," in light of "the 
legal equality of nonmarital children"); Smith, supra at 546 
n.13, quoting Altomare v. Altomare, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 602-
603 (2010) (although § 30 "applies only to relocation outside 
the Commonwealth, '[w]e apply out-of-State removal principles to 
in-State moves,' pursuant to common law, in cases where the move 
would disrupt significantly existing parenting arrangements, 
such as when the move is long-distance").8  In light of the 
considerable time the child has spent in Massachusetts, the 
meaningful ties she has developed while here, and the fact that 
the wife's proposed move would likewise "disrupt significantly 
existing parenting arrangements," Smith, supra at 546 n.13, we 
                     
 
8 This approach is consistent with "the Commonwealth's broad 
policies of protecting the family unit and promoting the best 
interests of children."  Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 
756, 759 (1997). 
11 
 
analyze the wife's removal request using the same principles 
developed in cases under the removal statute.9 
 
b.  Removal analysis.  The "touchstone inquiry" is always 
whether removal is in a child's best interests.  Smith, 458 
Mass. at 544.  This question "can be resolved only on a case by 
case basis," Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711, as the best interest 
standard "is one grounded in the particular needs and 
circumstances of the individual child in question" (citation 
omitted).  Mason, 447 Mass. at 183-184.  Still, this court has 
established certain guideposts to aid the judge's determination 
of this often difficult question.  Removal petitions in the 
Commonwealth are evaluated under one of two analyses, depending 
on the physical custody of the child.10  Where one parent has 
sole physical custody, a judge must evaluate that parent's 
request to remove the child under the "real advantage" analysis 
set forth in Yannas, supra at 711-712.  Where, on the other 
hand, the parents share joint physical custody, a judge must 
apply the "best interests" analysis articulated in Mason, supra 
                     
 
9 It is also worth noting the children in Mason were, like 
the child in this case, "not born in the Commonwealth" and "had 
not resided in the Commonwealth for five years when the mother 
requested permission for removal."  Mason, 447 Mass. at 183 n.9. 
 
 
10 "Physical custody" refers to a child's residence with and 
supervision by one or both parents; it may be either sole or 
shared physical custody.  G. L. c. 208, § 31.  This is distinct 
from "legal custody," which refers to the "right[s] and 
responsibilit[ies] [of parents] to make major decisions 
regarding the child's welfare."  Id. 
12 
 
at 178.11  "The main distinction" between these analyses "comes 
down to the weight that should be assigned to the benefits that 
relocation would provide the parent seeking to move." Prenaveau 
v. Prenaveau, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 131, 139 (2009).12 
 
c.  Evaluating custody.  In deciding the applicable removal 
standard where there is no custody order the judge must first 
evaluate the parties' custodial arrangement and determine 
whether it more closely resembles sole or shared custody.  Sole 
physical custody "generally reflects that the children reside 
with only one parent 'subject to reasonable visitation by the 
other parent.'"  Mason, 447 Mass. at 182, quoting G. L. c. 208, 
§ 31.  Shared physical custody, on the other hand, "contemplates 
that 'a child shall have periods of residing with and being 
under the supervision of each parent . . . assur[ing] . . . 
frequent and continued contact with both parents.'"  Mason, 
supra, citing G. L. c. 208, § 31.  Compare Abbott v. Virusso, 68 
Mass. App. Ct. 326, 327 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 1031 (2008) 
                     
 
11 We reiterated the distinction between these two analyses 
most recently in Smith v. McDonald, 458 Mass. 540 (2010).  There 
we noted that "[w]hen a parent has sole custody of a child . . . 
the analysis articulated in Yannas . . . applies" to that 
parent's removal request (citation omitted).  Id. at 547.  We 
observed that "[a] different analysis, more protective of the 
interests of the parent who is not relocating, is appropriate 
when the parents share joint physical custody."  Id. at 547 
n.14, citing Mason, 447 Mass. at 184-185. 
 
 
12 Yannas recognizes that the best interests of a child can 
be greatly affected by the happiness of the primary caregiver 
where care or custody is not equal.  Yannas, 395 Mass. at 710. 
13 
 
(mother had sole physical custody of son where son resided 
primarily with her, and mother was his "primary care parent"), 
with Mason, supra at 178-179 (parents shared physical custody 
where "each parent took the part of a 'primary caretaker'" 
during marriage, and they "divided physical custody of the 
children approximately equally" after divorce). 
 
In determining which manner of custody is present in a 
given case, the judge typically will look to an existing custody 
order between the parties.  Even where there is such an order, 
though, the judge is still required to look beyond its 
characterization of custody (e.g., "the parties shall share 
physical custody"), in order to examine "the functional 
responsibilities and involvement of each parent" with their 
child in practice.  Altomare, 77 Mass. App. Ct. at 605.13  
                     
 
13 This functional assessment is necessary for two reasons.  
First, "custody judgments issued by the Commonwealth's courts do 
not consistently utilize" the categorical phrases "sole physical 
custody" or "shared physical custody" "as defined in G. L. c. 
208, § 31."  Abbott v. Virusso, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 326, 329 n.8 
(2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 1031 (2008), and cases cited.  As a 
result, "such categorizations . . . are utilized inconsistently, 
[and] can obscure more than they illuminate."  Altomare v. 
Altomare, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 605 (2010).  Second, even where 
a custody order renders such a "categorical custodial 
determination," Woodside v. Woodside, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 713, 717 
(2011), the actual practice of the parties may differ from what 
the order specifies.  See, e.g., Altomare, supra at 606 
(although divorce judgment provided for "shared legal and 
physical custody" of couple's children, "as a functional matter" 
caring for children was "the primary responsibility of the 
wife"); Abbott, supra at 327 (despite fact that divorce judgment 
provided that parties would "share physical custody of their 
14 
 
See id. at 605-606, and cases cited ("Our cases make clear that, 
in the context of spousal relocation, the label we attach to 
custodial status results from a factual inquiry"). 
 
In other cases, such as the instant one, there is no prior 
custody order to refer to, as a parent's removal request is 
concurrent with their divorce complaint.  Still, the same 
principles apply; in deciding the appropriate removal standard, 
the judge must focus on "functional," as opposed to technical, 
"divisions in caregiving and parenting 
responsibilities."  Woodside v. Woodside, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 713, 
717 (2011).  At this stage, "the judge must make a 'factual 
inquiry' to determine the approximate custodial arrangement and 
then apply the corresponding test" (citation omitted).  Id. 
 
i.  Sole custody and Yannas.  As we explained in Yannas, 
where one parent has sole physical custody, the interests of 
that child are "so interwoven with the well-being of the 
custodial parent" that "the determination of the child's best 
interest requires that the interests of the custodial parent be 
taken into account" (citation omitted).  Yannas, 395 Mass. at 
710.  Yannas involves a two-part inquiry.  First, a judge must 
examine "whether there is a good reason for the move, a 'real 
advantage'" to the parent.  Id. at 711.  This requires the 
                                                                  
children," in practice son "continued to reside primarily with 
the mother," who was "the son's 'primary care parent'"). 
15 
 
custodial parent to establish "a good, sincere reason for 
wanting to remove to another jurisdiction."  Id.  At this stage 
the judge must consider "the soundness of the reason for moving, 
and the presence or absence of a motive to deprive the 
noncustodial parent of reasonable visitation."  Id. 
 
Second, if the custodial parent satisfies that threshold 
inquiry, the judge must then "consider[] collectively" the 
interests of the custodial parent, the noncustodial parent, and 
their child, and balance those interests to determine whether 
removal is in the best interests of the child.  Id. at 712.  
Pertinent considerations at this step include "whether the 
quality of the child's life may be improved by the change 
(including any improvement flowing from an improvement in the 
quality of the custodial parent's life), the possible adverse 
effect of the elimination or curtailment of the child's 
association with the noncustodial parent, and the extent to 
which moving or not moving will affect the emotional, physical, 
or developmental needs of the child."  Id. at 711.  "It is 
important to emphasize that consideration of the advantages to 
the custodial parent does not disappear" at this second step, 
"but instead remains a significant factor in the 
equation."  Pizzino v. Miller, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 865, 870 
(2006).  Here the judge should also consider "[t]he 
reasonableness of alternative visitation arrangements."  Yannas, 
16 
 
395 Mass. at 711.  See Dickenson v. Cogswell, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 
442, 447-453 (2006) (explaining appropriate consideration and 
weighing of interests under Yannas); Rosenthal v. Maney, 51 
Mass. App. Ct. 257, 268-272 (2001) (same). 
 
ii.  Joint custody and Mason.  In Mason, we explained that 
"[w]here physical custody is shared, the 'best interest' 
calculus pertaining to removal is appreciably different from 
those situations that involve sole physical custody."  Mason, 
447 Mass. at 184.  Under Mason, "[t]he advantage to the moving 
parent becomes merely a relevant factor in the over-all inquiry 
of what is in the child's best interests."  Wakefield, 67 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 776.  This is so because with shared custody, "[n]o 
longer is the fortune of simply one custodial parent so tightly 
interwoven with that of the child; [here] both parents have 
equal rights and responsibilities with respect to the child[].  
The importance to the child[] of one parent's advantage in 
relocating outside the Commonwealth is greatly 
reduced."  Mason, supra at 184-185.  See Smith, 458 Mass. at 
547, n.14 (Mason is "more protective of the interests of the 
parent who is not relocating"); Prenaveau, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 
140 (Mason makes it "more difficult for the parent to justify 
the uprooting of the child"). 
 
2.  The standard applied by the judge.  Turning to the 
facts of this case, we must first determine which of the two 
17 
 
removal standards the trial judge applied below.  In certain 
respects, it appears the judge thought she could apply neither.  
More than once during the trial proceedings the judge declared 
that she would apply a general "best interest" standard to the 
removal issue, on the ground that "there is no custody order."14  
And in her opinion authorizing removal, she explained that the 
two-step analysis of Yannas applies "if there is a current court 
order granting one party sole physical custody."  As we have 
stated, although an existing custody order is of course a common 
feature of removal cases, the fact that one does not exist does 
not preclude the application of the appropriate removal 
standard.15,16 
                     
 
14 The judge first said this in her order on the parties' 
joint motion seeking clarification as to the standard the 
guardian ad litem should apply to the removal issue.  She wrote 
that "[a]lthough the [guardian ad litem] shall gather facts and 
report as to [the wife's] advantage by the move, the standard to 
be used as there is no custody order should be 'best interest.'"  
The judge then reiterated this point at trial.  There is no 
indication that the judge, when mentioning the "best interest" 
standard, was referring to the Mason analysis. 
 
 
15 The husband maintains that the stipulation itself is an 
existing custody order.  The stipulation specifically states 
that its status as a "[t]emporary [o]rder or [j]udgment" is 
"subject to the approval of the [c]ourt."  There is no 
indication, however, that the probate judge approved the 
stipulation because it lacks the judge's signature or some other 
indicia of court approval.  Unlike the judge's various orders, 
which are reflected on the docket as such, the parties' 
agreement was docketed only as a "Stipulation of the Parties."  
And not once during the trial proceedings did the judge refer to 
the stipulation as an order; indeed, as we just noted, the judge 
18 
 
 
It is clear from the judge's written decision that she 
thoroughly examined the parties' allocation of custody and 
parenting responsibilities.  See Woodside, 79 Mass. App. Ct. at 
717.  The judge made sixty-one factual findings concerning only 
custody, with many addressing how the parties have divided the 
child's care.  The judge concluded that "[a]lthough [the 
h]usband was involved in caring for [the child] during the 
marriage, [the w]ife has always been primarily responsible for 
her physical and emotional care, as well as day-to-day tasks 
such as feeding, clothing, and bathing."  More significantly, in 
the opinion's section discussing removal, the judge analyzed the 
issue solely in terms of the two steps of the Yannas analysis, 
concluding that "although G. L. c. 208, § 30, does not apply, 
because there is a real advantage to the [w]ife in the proposed 
removal, and because the removal is consistent with [the 
child]'s best interests, it would bring about the same result if 
it did."  See Prenaveau, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 140 (court's 
conclusion that Mason was "the proper lens through which to 
                                                                  
repeated -- despite the stipulation's existence -- that "there 
is no court order" regarding custody. 
 
 
16 Yannas itself involved an instance where there was no 
prior custody order; there, as here, the wife's removal petition 
was part of her divorce action.  Yannas, 395 Mass. at 705-706.  
Likewise, there was no earlier custody order in Wakefield v. 
Hegarty, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 772, 772-773 (2006), in which the 
mother sought removal while her custody case was still pending.  
In both cases the courts still proceeded to apply the "real 
advantage" standard. 
19 
 
evaluate the judge's ruling . . . reinforced by the fact that 
the judge made no attempt to justify the removal decision using 
a Yannas analysis" [citation omitted]).  We have already stated 
that although the removal statute does not apply directly here, 
the same removal principles do, including the "real advantage" 
analysis of Yannas.  On this score, we agree with the wife 
that Yannas, not Mason, is "the proper lens through which to 
evaluate the judge's ruling" in this case.  
See Prenaveau, supra. 
 
3.  The merits.  The husband does not challenge the judge's 
pertinent factual findings, so we review both her determination 
of the applicable removal standard, and her ultimate conclusion 
as to whether removal is in the child's best interests, for an 
abuse of discretion.  Mason, 447 Mass. at 184.  "[A] judge's 
discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where 
[the appellate court] conclude[s] the judge made 'a clear error 
of judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision 
. . . such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives" (citation omitted).  L.L. 
v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
The husband first argues that the judge abused her 
discretion in applying the "real advantage" analysis 
under Yannas.  He maintains that because the parties shared 
physical custody of the child, the judge should have evaluated 
20 
 
the wife's removal petition using the "best interest" standard 
of Mason, which affords less weight to the advantages a move 
offers the parent seeking removal.  In support of his contention 
of shared physical custody, the husband relies primarily on the 
stipulated parenting plan the parties filed in the trial court 
following their respective divorce filings, which states that 
the husband and the wife "shall share custody" of the child.  
According to the husband, the stipulation, which was "in effect 
for over three years as of the trial judge's Judgment," 
allocates parenting responsibilities "almost equally."17 
 
The judge clearly considered the stipulation, having 
detailed its contents both in her recitation of the case's 
procedural history and in an individual factual finding.  Yet 
the judge also found that the husband travels frequently for 
work, and when he does he "communicates with [the child] 
infrequently" and misses allotted parenting time that he has not 
sought to make up.  With respect to the parties' parenting 
responsibilities, the judge found that the wife has always been 
the child's primary caregiver.  The husband, in contrast, is 
"not seeking sole physical custody of [the child] and does not 
propose that he should be her primary caregiver."   See, 
                     
 
17 The husband also points to the fact that the guardian ad 
litem, in her report on the removal issue, characterized the 
parties' arrangement as "coparenting."  The judge was not 
required to adopt the guardian ad litem's characterization.  
Mason, 447 Mass. at 186. 
21 
 
e.g., Woodside, 79 Mass. App. Ct. at 718 (no abuse of discretion 
in applying Yannas where "mother was the primary 
caregiver"); Wakefield, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 776-777 (same).  
Likewise, although a hallmark of shared custody is the parents' 
"ability and desire to cooperate amicably and communicate with 
one another to raise the[ir] child[]," Mason, 447 Mass. at 182, 
the judge found that "the parties struggle to communicate 
effectively regarding parenting issues, and that [the h]usband 
often fails to communicate with [the w]ife."  See Katzman 
v. Healy, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 589, 596 & n.7 (2010) (questioning 
propriety of judge's "Mason-like approach to removal" where 
cooperation necessary for shared physical custody was "obviously 
not present"); Prenaveau, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 143 (same).  As 
we noted, the husband does not contest these findings. 
 
The Mason analysis generally applies where "neither parent 
has a clear majority of custodial responsibility" (citation 
omitted).  Mason, 447 Mass. at 185.  Although the terms of the 
parties' stipulation may have approximated shared custody, the 
judge concluded (in light of the above facts) that in practice, 
their custodial arrangement more closely resembled the sole 
custody of Yannas.  Past cases support the judge's conclusion on 
this point.  See, e.g., Altomare, 77 Mass. App. Ct. at 602, 606 
(wife had sole custody where, despite prior custody order 
stating that "[t]he parties shall have shared . . . physical 
22 
 
custody," children were "as a functional matter" "under the 
primary responsibility of the wife"); Abbott, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 327, 330 (applying Yannas to mother's request to remove son 
where, despite prior custody order stating that parties were to 
"share physical custody of the children," son "continued to 
reside primarily with the mother who . . . [was] the son's 
'primary care parent'").  Because the judge's decision plainly 
does not "fall[] outside the range of reasonable alternatives" 
here, L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27, we conclude she did not abuse 
her discretion in analyzing the wife's removal petition using 
the "real advantage" standard of Yannas. 
 
Turning to the judge's application of the Yannas analysis, 
the husband does not argue that the first step of Yannas is not 
satisfied -- namely, that there is a real advantage to the wife 
in moving to Germany.  As the judge found, the wife has secured 
a well-paying job, something she has been unable to accomplish 
in Massachusetts, despite having "applied for over 400 jobs," 
and her entire support system is there.  There is also nothing 
to suggest that the wife's move is motivated by a desire to 
deprive the husband of parenting time with the child.  Yannas, 
395 Mass. at 711. 
 
Instead, the husband only challenges the judge's subsequent 
conclusion, formally the second step of the Yannas analysis, 
that removal is in the child's best interests.  The husband 
23 
 
contends that the judge abused her discretion in reaching that 
conclusion because she failed to consider adequately how removal 
would impact or benefit the child, and failed to consider 
reasonable alternative visitation arrangements.  To recount, at 
this stage the judge must collectively consider the interests of 
all those involved -- child, custodial parent, and noncustodial 
parent -- and balance those interests in order to determine 
whether removal is in the best interests of the 
child.  Yannas, supra at 712.  The "judicial safeguard" of each 
person's interest "lies in careful and clear fact-finding."  Id. 
 
a.  Interests of the child.  In assessing the interests of 
the child, a judge is bound to consider "whether the quality of 
a child's life may be improved by the change (including any 
improvement flowing from an improvement in the quality of the 
custodial parent's life)," the effect of the move on "the 
child's association with the noncustodial parent," as well as 
its effect on "the emotional, physical, or developmental needs 
of the child."  Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711.  See Dickenson, 66 
Mass. App. Ct. at 449-450. 
 
With respect to the effect of the move on the child's 
quality of life and her "emotional, physical, or developmental 
needs," the judge found that in Germany the child would be 
attending better schools, and would again be treated by her 
long-time pediatrician.  She found further that in Germany the 
24 
 
child would "have support from the loving extended family with 
whom she has had frequent and extensive contact since birth," 
including her maternal grandmother, with whom the child "is very 
close."18  Although the judge observed that the child struggles 
during transitions between the parties' households, nothing in 
the record suggests that she would likewise struggle with a move 
to Germany.  To the contrary, the child has been visiting the 
country throughout her life, including for extended periods.  
She is fluent in German, has already attended German schools, 
and keeps in touch with her friends there (who would also be her 
classmates if she were to return to Germany). 
 
More significantly, the judge observed that the child's 
quality of life will be "particularly" improved "through the 
impact of the improvement in [the w]ife's quality of life."  In 
Massachusetts, the wife could not meet her expenses, and lived 
in poverty.  By contrast, the judge found that the wife's well-
paying job in Germany would permit her to support herself and 
                     
 
18 The husband protests that the judge failed to find that 
the child's connections in Germany are in any way more 
substantial than her connections in Massachusetts.  Indeed, the 
judge found that the child and the husband spend meaningful time 
with each other and the husband's family.  But "[t]here is 
nothing in the record to indicate that, here, those 
relationships are so important to [the child's] emotional well-
being that they deserve primacy over [her] relationship with 
[her] mother, who ha[s] been the primary custodial parent 
throughout [the child's] life."  See Rosenthal v. Maney, 51 
Mass. App. Ct. 257, 272 (2001) (reversing judgment denying 
removal). 
25 
 
the child, while continuing to fulfil her role as the child's 
primary caregiver, as the position would enable the wife "to 
work from home most of the time."  Compare Wakefield, 67 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 777 (mother's "income will increase, and she will be 
able to work from home and spend more time with her daughter"), 
and Rosenthal, 51 Mass. App. Ct. at 268 (family's financial 
situation "greatly improved" by move), with Dickenson, 66 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 449 ("The child's financial security would . . . be 
diminished by the move," as it placed mother in "a less-stable 
employment relationship").  In addition, the wife has virtually 
no support network in Massachusetts because she "has few 
acquaintances" here and "feels lonely and isolated," but in 
Germany she would reunite with her supportive extended family.  
The trial judge concluded that this improvement in the wife's 
emotional situation would also "benefit [the child] 
significantly."  See Pizzino, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 870 ("Common 
sense demonstrates that there is a benefit to a child in being 
cared for by a custodial parent who is fulfilled and happy 
rather than by one who is frustrated and angry"). 
 
Notwithstanding the direct and indirect benefits a move to 
Germany would offer the child, the judge also found that the 
child has a "loving relationship" with her father, and 
recognized that moving to Germany would have a "detrimental 
effect" on that relationship. 
26 
 
 
b.  Interests of the custodial parent.  "Because the best 
interests of a child are so interwoven with the well-being of 
the custodial parent, the determination of the child's best 
interest requires that the interests of the custodial parent be 
taken into account."  Yannas, 395 Mass. at 710.  The judge 
thoroughly considered the wife's interests in moving to Germany.  
The judge found that despite the wife's professional background 
and diligent efforts, she has been unable to find a job in 
Massachusetts commensurate with her education and experience, 
rendering her continued presence here unsustainable.19  The wife 
has been offered a position in Germany with a salary that would 
allow her to "support herself and [the child] without child 
support from [the h]usband," and benefits that include use of a 
company vehicle, ample vacation time, health insurance and 
retirement benefits, and the ability to work from home most of 
the time.  As mentioned, the judge concluded that a move to 
Germany offers the wife significant improvements to her 
financial and emotional health.  See, e.g., Williams v. Pitney, 
                     
 
19 It is noteworthy that although the wife works in the 
highly-specialized field of public relations in the Middle East 
(the trial judge observed this made it "unsurprising that her 
job search has been difficult"), the wife also applied for 
positions for which "she was overqualified, such as office 
assistant positions," and even looked for work "in Germany or 
the Middle East that would allow her to work from 
Massachusetts."  The trial judge thus concluded that the wife 
made "a good faith effort" to find gainful employment in 
Massachusetts. 
27 
 
409 Mass. 449, 456 (1991) (mother would benefit from move, 
"would be close to friends and relatives who would provide 
emotional support after the move, and . . . would be better able 
to secure employment"). 
 
c.  Interests of the noncustodial parent.  Last, the judge 
must consider the interests of the noncustodial parent.  Yannas, 
395 Mass. at 711.  This includes assessing "whether reasonable 
'alternative visitation arrangements' might achieve ongoing and 
meaningful contact appropriate to the 
circumstances."  Rosenthal, 51 Mass. App. Ct. at 271, 
quoting Yannas, supra. 
 
The judge found that the husband cares for the child 
deeply, and recognized the "detrimental effect" separation would 
have on their relationship.  She also acknowledged the husband's 
concerns "regarding his ability to communicate with [the child] 
on a regular basis given the six-hour time difference between 
Massachusetts and Germany," as well as the various travel costs 
the husband would incur during his visitation periods.  The 
judge concluded that, in addition to frequent telephone and 
Internet contact, aligning the husband's visitation with the 
child's extended vacation periods will lessen the detrimental 
effects of their separation, by providing them with lengthier, 
and hence more meaningful, visits together.  Contrast Dickenson, 
66 Mass. App. Ct. at 449, 451 (under mother's proposed 
28 
 
visitation schedule, which would entail "frequent 'red-eye' 
flights" between Massachusetts and California, "someone would 
inevitably be tired and stressed . . . thereby diminishing the 
quality of the visits").  In light of the travel costs the 
husband would incur in facilitating visitation with the child, 
the judge did not order child support. 
 
d.  Balancing the interests.  After consideration of the 
parties' and child's respective interests, the judge must 
balance those factors to determine whether removal is in the 
best interests of the child.  Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711-712.  A 
judge's determination of the best interests of the child 
represents a "classic example of a discretionary decision" in 
which "much must be left to the trial judge's experience and 
judgment" (citation omitted).  Adoption of a Minor (No. 2), 367 
Mass. 684, 688 (1975). 
 
We discern no abuse of discretion with respect to the 
judge's consideration and balancing of the interests at stake 
here.  The judge recognized that she was faced "with two 
difficult alternatives."  Granting the wife's removal request 
would have the negative impact of permanently altering the 
child's relationship with her father, who cares for her deeply.  
Yet the judge also determined, on the basis of uncontested 
factual findings, that "allowing the current shared parenting 
schedule is financially untenable for the parties."  Financial 
29 
 
struggle -- "poverty," as the wife described her current 
lifestyle -- is in the interest of no child.  As in Yannas, a 
move to Germany "would be to the advantage of the wife, 
financially, emotionally, and socially," and would inure to the 
child's benefit as well.  Yannas, 395 Mass. at 712.  Removal has 
been deemed appropriate in similar circumstances in past cases.  
See, e.g., Williams, 409 Mass. at 456 (affirming grant of 
removal where mother "would be close to friends and relatives 
who would provide emotional support after the move, and . . . 
the mother would be better able to secure 
employment"); Wakefield, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 774, 777-778 
(removal allowed where mother, child's primary caretaker, sought 
to return to home country where she "would enjoy greater family 
support," and "would be working at an increased salary" in 
position that would enable her "to work from home and spend more 
time with her daughter").20  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment 
of the trial judge in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
20 In contrast, these are not the circumstances in which 
removal has been deemed not to be in a child's best interest.  
See, e.g., Dickenson v. Cogswell, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 442, 449, 
451, 453 (2006) (affirming denial of removal by mother, who was 
custodial parent, where move would diminish child and mother's 
financial security, "would take [mother] away from her support 
network of friends and family," and would require child to take 
"frequent 'red-eye' flights across the country, including trips 
by himself with layovers"). 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring, with whom Gaziano, J., joins).  I 
agree with the court that the judge here did not abuse her 
discretion in concluding that removal from the Commonwealth is 
in the child's best interests.  I write separately only because 
I disagree with the artificially binary decision-making 
framework that has emerged from Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 
Mass. 704 (1985), and Mason v. Coleman, 447 Mass. 177 (2006), 
and that the court applies today.  Under that framework, the 
removal analysis depends on whether the parent seeking to remove 
the child has "sole physical custody" of the child, in which 
case the judge must follow the "real advantage" analysis 
in Yannas, or whether the parents share "joint physical custody" 
of the child, in which case the judge must follow the "best 
interests" analysis in Mason.  I believe that the ultimate 
"touchstone" in all removal cases, whether one parent has sole 
physical custody or both parents share physical custody, is 
always the best interests of the child.  Smith v. McDonald, 458 
Mass. 540, 544 (2010), quoting Custody of Kali, 439 Mass. 834, 
840 (2003).  I would therefore discard the Yannas-Mason 
framework in favor of a single, uniform standard -- the best 
interests of the child -- to be applied to all removal cases, 
recognizing that the "real advantage" to the parent seeking 
removal is a factor that must be considered under that standard. 
 
 
2 
 
 The current binary decision-making framework has two 
substantial flaws.  First, it places too much weight on the 
threshold determination as to whether one parent has "sole 
physical custody," meaning that "[the] child . . . reside[s] 
with and [is] under the supervision of one parent, subject to 
reasonable visitation by the other parent," G. L. c. 208, § 31; 
or both parents have "shared physical custody," meaning that 
"[the] child . . . ha[s] periods of residing with and being 
under the supervision of each parent."  Id.  This is a false 
dichotomy, which fails to reflect the many variations on the 
theme of sole and joint physical custody that often play out in 
our increasingly complicated lives.  In many cases, as here, 
custody is shared, but not equally, and the percentage of time a 
child spends with a parent may vary over time, depending on a 
parent's work and travel obligations, or perhaps on a parent's 
(or grandparent's) health. 
 
We have seen judges struggle to fit cases into one of these 
two categories.  See, e.g., Prenaveau v. Prenaveau, 75 Mass. 
App. Ct. 131, 140 (2009) ("While the co-parenting arrangement 
. . . does not fit neatly into the traditional taxonomy, it can 
perhaps best be understood as an attempt at approximating joint 
custody . . . ").  Recognizing the inherent inflexibility of 
these two categories, our appellate courts have held that 
whether a physical custody arrangement is "sole" or "joint" 
 
 
3 
should be determined with respect to "the functional 
responsibilities and involvement of each parent."  Altomare 
v. Altomare, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 605 (2010).  This is a wise 
approach.  But any such nuanced, functional assessment is 
severely limited by the strict binary framework the court 
applies today.  Ultimately, a judge will have to categorize a 
physical custody arrangement as either "sole" or "joint," which 
will in turn mandate the analysis the judge must follow. 
 
The inflexibility of the Yannas-Mason framework is on full 
display in this case where, as in many cases, the parenting 
arrangement resists easy classification.  Unlike Yannas, this is 
not a case where one parent has sole physical custody.  Yannas, 
395 Mass. at 705, 706 (mother awarded sole physical custody).  
Nor is it a case like Mason, where the parents share physical 
custody equally.  Mason, 447 Mass. at 179 (parents divided 
physical custody "approximately equally" pursuant to 
stipulation).  Here, pursuant to the parties' stipulated 
parenting plan, the child spends approximately sixty per cent of 
her time with her mother and forty per cent with her father.  In 
practice, the percentage of time spent with the mother was 
higher because, although the father has a loving relationship 
with the child, he travels frequently.  Based on these and other 
facts, the judge decided that the mother is the child's primary 
caregiver and analyzed it -- as she is required to do under the 
 
 
4 
court's binary framework -- as if it were a straightforward, 
uncomplicated case where one parent does in fact have sole 
physical custody. 
The second flaw with the Yannas-Mason framework is that it 
invites the misperception that the best interests of the child 
is "the touchstone inquiry" only where there is joint physical 
custody, Smith, 458 Mass. at 544, quoting Custody of Kali, 439 
Mass. at 840, and that the "real advantage" to the parent 
seeking removal is the more important consideration where one 
parent has sole physical custody.  In endorsing this framework, 
the court has lost sight of the guiding principles behind our 
two decisions in Yannas and Mason. 
In Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711, we emphasized that "the 
central question" in removal cases is "how [the] 'best 
interests' [of the child] are to be determined."  We applied the 
"real advantage" standard only because we believed that it was 
the most accurate reflection of the child's best interests under 
those circumstances; we recognized that, where one parent has 
sole physical custody, "the best interests of [the] child are so 
interwoven with the well-being of the custodial parent, [that] 
the determination of the child's best interest requires that the 
interests of the custodial parent be taken into account."  Id. 
at 710, quoting Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 54 (1984). 
 
 
5 
In Mason, 447 Mass. at 184, we took a different approach to 
our determination of the child's best interests, emphasizing 
that "[w]here physical custody is shared, the 'best interest' 
calculus pertaining to removal is appreciably different," 
because the child's best interests are "[n]o longer . . . so 
tightly interwoven" with the interests of one parent over 
another. 
Together, these two decisions reiterate what judges have 
always known:  that when determining the best interests of the 
child, facts matter.  "The 'best interest' calculus" is a 
dynamic one that must be adapted to each case, assigning 
different weight to different factors depending on the facts.  
In removal cases, whether the parent seeking removal can show a 
"real advantage" from the move is only one among many factors 
contributing to the child's best interest; it is often 
important, but may not be in every case.  Yannas and Mason do 
not announce separate standards but are merely applications of 
the same standard, which should in every case guide our 
analysis:  whether removal is in the best interests of the 
child.  See Prenaveau, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 139 ("[Yannas 
and Mason] do not articulate distinctly different tests.  In 
each case, one question was preeminent:  is removal in the best 
interests of the children?"). 
 
 
6 
 
In Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711, we recognized that removal 
cases "present difficult choices."  Faced with these choices, we 
declined to "apply a fixed but arbitrary rule," preferring 
instead to resolve the issues "on a case by case basis."  Id.  
It is ironic that, today, the court invokes our decision 
in Yannas to preserve a fixed and inflexible framework for 
resolving these difficult cases. 
 
I emphasize that my disagreement with the court's approach 
does not mean I disagree with the outcome of this case.  Because 
the second step of the Yannas analysis requires a determination 
of the child's best interests, a judge is usually able -- 
whether under Yannas or Mason -- to reach the decision that best 
serves the interests of the child.  See, e.g., Dickenson 
v. Cogswell, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 442, 449, 453 (2006) (analysis 
under second step of Yannas "independently establishe[d] that 
removal was not justified," because not in best interests of 
child).  See also Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711 ("That the move is in 
the best interests of the custodial parent does not mean that it 
is automatically in the best interests of the child").  Indeed, 
that is exactly what happened here.  Having applied the "real 
advantage" standard, the judge ultimately resolved the case 
under what I believe is the proper analysis, finding that 
removal was in the child's best interests.  But judges should 
 
 
7 
not be required to engage in analytical gymnastics in order to 
arrive at the best outcome. 
 
Nor can we ignore the risk that this formalistic approach 
will, in some cases, derail the proper analysis.  How a case is 
categorized under the Yannas-Mason framework can have serious 
consequences for the parties involved, in that it alters the 
balance that must be struck between the interests of each 
parent.  Under Yannas, it is the parent who seeks removal whose 
interests are accorded greater weight.  Prenaveau, 75 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 139.  But under Mason, it is the opposite:  the parent 
who opposes removal enjoys the "more protective" 
standard.  Smith, 458 Mass. at 547 n.14.  Thus, whether the 
child can be removed may very well hinge on which side of an 
unrealistic binary -- "sole physical custody" or "joint physical 
custody" -- the case happens to fall. 
 
To abandon the Yannas-Mason framework would not mean that 
we are abdicating our responsibility to provide appellate 
guidance to judges who must make difficult removal decisions.  
In Yannas, apart from the "real advantage" to the parent seeking 
removal, we identified several other relevant factors that must 
be considered, including "whether the quality of the child's 
life may be improved by the change . . . , the possible adverse 
effect of the elimination or curtailment of the child's 
association with the noncustodial parent, and the extent to 
 
 
8 
which moving or not moving will affect the emotional, physical, 
or developmental needs of the child."  Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711.  
How these factors are to be balanced will depend on the facts of 
each case. 
 
Where the form of the common law no longer serves its 
function, it is this court's responsibility to change it.  This 
case well illustrates the limits of the Yannas-Mason framework; 
we should not allow it to linger any longer.  It is time that we 
abandon it and resolve all removal cases under the same 
standard:  whether removal is in the best interests of the 
child.  As part of that "best interests" determination, a judge 
should be permitted to consider the "real advantage" of the move 
to the parent seeking removal of the child, regardless of 
whether that parent has sole or joint physical custody, and 
accord that factor as much weight as is warranted by the 
specific facts of the case.  As the court acknowledges, the 
determination whether removal is in the child's best interests 
is a "classic example of a discretionary decision," in which 
"much must be left to the trial judge's experience and judgment" 
(citation omitted).  Adoption of a Minor (No. 2), 367 Mass. 684, 
688 (1975).  But in its strict adherence to the Yannas-Mason 
framework, the court chooses to constrain that equitable 
discretion, and in a way that interferes with, rather than 
assists, sound decision-making.