Case Title: State ex rel. Stevenson v. King

Citation: 2022-Ohio-3093

Docket Number: 2021-1138

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Stevenson v. King, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3093.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3093 
THE STATE EX REL. STEVENSON, APPELLEE, v. KING, MAYOR, ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Stevenson v. King, Slip Opinion No.  
2022-Ohio-3093.] 
Mandamus—Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43—Attorney fees—Petition seeking to 
compel the East Cleveland mayor and finance director to produce records 
to the city-council president related to funds received and spent by the city 
under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, 15 U.S.C. 
9001 et seq. (“the CARES Act”) was correctly granted because the mayor 
and finance director failed to present sufficient evidence to support their 
claim that no written records existed pertaining to the application for and 
award of CARES Act grant money and because they failed to authenticate 
the evidence submitted in support of their claim that records pertaining to 
the appropriation and expenditure of CARES Act money had already been 
shared with the city council through regular financial reports—Attorney 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
fees were improperly awarded for pro se litigant who failed to demonstrate 
the existence of an attorney-client relationship between the attorney who 
was awarded fees and herself individually or the city council. 
(No. 2021-1138—Submitted June 14, 2022—Decided September 7, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 110221, 
2021-Ohio-1093. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee, Korean Stevenson, brought a mandamus action in the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals seeking to compel appellants, East Cleveland 
Mayor Brandon King and East Cleveland Finance Director Charles Iyahen, to 
produce records related to certain public expenditures.  The court of appeals denied 
two of Stevenson’s claims for relief but granted a third, issuing a writ of mandamus 
directing King and Iyahen to produce documents in response to a public-records 
request.  In a subsequent order, the court of appeals ordered King and Iyahen to pay 
attorney fees. 
{¶ 2} The matter is now before this court on King and Iyahen’s appeal of 
right.  We affirm the Eighth District’s judgment granting a writ of mandamus, but 
we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment granting an award of attorney fees. 
I. Background 
{¶ 3} Stevenson is president of the East Cleveland City Council (“the city 
council”).  She was elected to the position in September 2020. 
{¶ 4} In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the United 
States Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, 
15 U.S.C. 9001 et seq. (“the CARES Act”).  East Cleveland received funds from 
the CARES Act.  According to Stevenson, she learned in November 2020 that King 
was spending money without authorization from the city council and that King’s 
expenditures included CARES Act funds that had not been appropriated by the city 
January Term, 2022 
 
3 
council.  Stevenson requested documentation from King showing how certain funds 
had been spent. 
{¶ 5} On November 6, 2020, the city council approved Resolution 39-20, 
authorizing it to retain the law firm McDonald Humphrey, L.L.C., as special 
counsel and approving a budget of $50,000 to pay the firm.  Three days later, King 
vetoed the resolution. 
{¶ 6} On November 18, 2020, Jonathan M. McDonald, an attorney with 
McDonald Humphrey, sent a letter to Iyahen stating: 
 
As you are aware, the East Cleveland City Council has 
engaged the attorneys at McDonald Humphrey, LLC and the 
undersigned lawyer as special legal counsel.  In that regard, we have 
been tasked with facilitating the production of documents 
concerning financial records related to federal funds (i.e., money) 
sent to the City of East Cleveland by and through the enactment of 
the federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security 
(CARES) Act. 
It is our understanding that the Finance Department is in 
possession of those documents.  As such, we are requesting all 
documents including, but not limited to, award letters, grant 
applications, executed contracts, disbursement receipts, and 
financial reports which outline where, when, and how the money has 
been disbursed to date. 
 
(Footnotes omitted.)  On the same day, East Cleveland’s law director advised 
Iyahen that McDonald Humphrey was not retained by the city council because the 
mayor had vetoed the resolution that would have allowed the firm to be retained.  
“Nevertheless,” the law director wrote, “Mr. McDonald is certainly welcome to 
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submit a public records request as a private citizen as long as he understands he has 
not been retained by the East Cleveland City Council; and will not be reimbursed 
for his efforts.” 
{¶ 7} On January 11, 2021, Stevenson filed a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus in the Eighth District against King and Iyahen.  Stevenson asked for 
three forms of relief: (1) a writ compelling King and Iyahen to allocate and provide 
the city council with $50,000 to pay for the services of special counsel, (2) a writ 
compelling King and Iyahen to submit all contracts and expenditures for amounts 
in excess of $2,500 to the city council for approval,1 and (3) a writ compelling King 
and Iyahen to produce any and all financial documents relating to CARES Act 
money, including financial reports showing where, when, and how the money has 
been disbursed. 
{¶ 8} King and Iyahen filed a motion to dismiss.  The motion included 9 
exhibits, totaling more than 100 pages.  The motion did not include an affidavit 
authenticating the exhibits.  The court of appeals sua sponte converted the motion 
to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and then held the motion in abeyance 
pending discovery.  King and Iyahen filed a counterclaim, alleging that Stevenson 
was preventing the city council from appropriating funds by refusing to schedule 
regular council meetings.  They demanded a writ of mandamus compelling 
Stevenson to put a permanent appropriations ordinance on the city council’s 
agenda. 
{¶ 9} Stevenson filed a brief in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment, with affidavits, as well as a cross-motion for summary judgment on her 
 
1. Section 72 of the East Cleveland City Charter requires the mayor to seek the city council’s 
approval before making any contract or purchase in excess of $2,500.  American Legal Publishing, 
Charter 
of 
the 
City 
of 
East 
Cleveland, 
Section 
72, 
available 
at 
https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/eastcleveland/latest/eastcleveland_oh/0-0-0-382 (accessed 
Aug. 18, 2022) [https://perma.cc/9MFT-AVNM]; see also The City of East Cleveland, Ohio, City 
Charter & Codified Ordinances, at https://eastcleveland.org/government/city_charter___codified 
_ordinances/index.php (accessed Aug. 18, 2022) [https://perma.cc/7P4L-UYNY]. 
January Term, 2022 
 
5 
own claims and a motion to dismiss the counterclaim.  King and Iyahen filed an 
omnibus response to the motions, which included hundreds of pages of exhibits, 
but again, they did not provide an affidavit authenticating their exhibits. 
{¶ 10} On March 29, 2021, the court of appeals issued a decision and 
judgment entry disposing of the motions.  2021-Ohio-1093.  The court granted 
Stevenson’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim for a writ of mandamus compelling 
her to schedule items on the city council’s agenda.  Id. at ¶ 74.  With respect to the 
cross-motions for summary judgment, the court ruled in favor of King and Iyahen 
as to counts one and two of Stevenson’s complaint (i.e., the counts seeking to 
compel the mayor to allocate $50,000 to pay for special counsel and to submit all 
contracts and expenditures in excess of $2,500 to the city council for approval), 
denying the request for a writ of mandamus.  Id. at ¶ 26, 37.  But the court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Stevenson on count three, “granting a writ of 
mandamus directing Iyahen to produce records responsive to the records request 
submitted to him on November 18, 2020.”  Id. at ¶ 58.2  In addition, the court 
awarded Stevenson court costs and attorney fees and ordered briefing to establish 
the amount of the attorney fees.  Id. at ¶ 62. 
{¶ 11} On July 30, 2021, the court of appeals awarded attorney fees to 
Stevenson in the amount of $7,996.86.  King and Iyahen appealed, challenging the 
Eighth District’s judgment granting a writ of mandamus on the public-records claim 
and awarding attorney fees to Stevenson. 
II. Legal analysis 
A. Standard of review 
{¶ 12} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a party must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear 
 
2. Although the court issued the writ of mandamus against both King and Iyahen, the court directed 
Iyahen specifically to respond to the public-records request because the request was submitted to 
him and he is the custodian of the records being sought. 
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legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell, 150 Ohio 
St.3d 378, 2017-Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3.  We review de novo a court of 
appeals’ grant of summary judgment in a mandamus action.  State ex rel. Ames v. 
Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 165 Ohio St.3d 292, 2021-Ohio-2374, 178 N.E.3d 
492, ¶ 11.  Likewise, we review de novo a court of appeals’ determination regarding 
attorney fees.  State ex rel. Armatas v. Plain Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 163 Ohio St.3d 
304, 2021-Ohio-1176, 170 N.E.3d 19, ¶ 12. 
B. The decision to grant a writ of mandamus 
{¶ 13} In their motion to dismiss, King and Iyahen argued that, as of the 
date of the public-records request, there were no contracts or receipts relating to 
CARES Act funds, “as can be seen from Respondent Iyahen’s Financial responses 
to same as well as his regular reports.”  The motion referred to the month-to-date 
and year-to-date fund reports and the combined expenditures ledger for the period 
ending December 31, 2020, which were attached as exhibits, as proof of this 
assertion.  As for the requested financial records showing CARES Act 
disbursements, King and Iyahen argued that “the disbursement[s] of CARES ACT 
monies are fully set forth in the financial reports that are regularly submitted to 
Council.” 
{¶ 14} In their omnibus motion, King and Iyahen renewed their claim that 
records concerning grant applications and award letters did not exist.  But this time, 
they argued that applications and contracts did not exist because 
 
[t]he City did not have to contract with itself to put the CARES ACT 
money in the General Fund for its First Responders payroll, Hazard 
Pay and purchase of PPE equipment.  For the latter, masks, hand 
sanitizer, glass partitions, etc., were procured by City personnel and 
January Term, 2022 
 
7 
the invoices for same were paid as they arrived with no pre-existing 
“contract.” 
 
King and Iyahen also suggested that complying with the public-records request for 
financial records was unnecessary because the stated reason for seeking the records 
was to ferret out any misappropriation of CARES Act funds and there were no 
inappropriate expenditures to find.  They stated: 
 
The CARES Act FAQS disseminated by the state’s Office of Budget 
and Management, which was shared with Council, set forth specific 
guidelines as to how the money could be spent.  It was unequivocally 
spent in that manner. 
 
King and Iyahen again claimed that the information sought through the public-
records request had already been shared with the city council, and they referred the 
court to the exhibits submitted with their converted motion for summary judgment. 
{¶ 15} The Eighth District granted summary judgment in favor of 
Stevenson, finding that a proper public-records request had been sent to Iyahen and 
that Iyahen had not responded to that request.  2021-Ohio-1093 at ¶ 42.  It 
explained: “This is all the court is left with to determine the action because King 
and Iyahen have not provided this court with any evidence that can properly be 
considered on summary judgment.”  Id. at ¶ 43.  The court admonished King and 
Iyahen for failing to authenticate the exhibits even after the court had issued two 
separate journal entries reminding the parties that exhibits must be authenticated 
and after Stevenson had argued that their exhibits were unauthenticated.  Id. at  
¶ 44.  The Eighth District specifically rejected the suggestion that responsive 
records do not exist, because King and Iyahen had conceded that grants were 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
awarded but they presented no evidence that the grants were awarded based on 
anything other than written applications.  Id. at ¶ 50-51. 
{¶ 16} On appeal to this court, King and Iyahen claim that McDonald seeks 
“nonexistent” records through the public-records request.  In response to the Eighth 
District’s finding that their exhibits were unauthenticated, King and Iyahen argue 
that their exhibits were self-authenticating. 
{¶ 17} King and Iyahen claim that the “CARES Act fund records provided 
to Stevenson were indeed authenticated” pursuant to Evid.R. 901(A).  That rule 
provides that authentication requires “evidence sufficient to support a finding that 
the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”  Id.  But King and Iyahen do 
not identify what evidence allegedly authenticated the exhibits that were attached 
to their converted motion for summary judgment. 
{¶ 18} Alternatively, in their merit brief, King and Iyahen quote Evid.R. 
902(2) for the proposition that “ ‘[e]xtrinsic evidence of authenticity * * * is not 
required with respect to * * * [d]omestic public records not under seal.’ ”  However, 
King and Iyahen truncate the quote by omitting crucial phrases.  Evid.R. 902(2) 
provides that public records lacking a seal but purporting to bear the signature of a 
government officer or employee in his or her official capacity are self-
authenticating “if a public officer having a seal and having official duties in the 
district or political subdivision of the officer or employer certifies under seal that 
the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is genuine.”  King and 
Iyahen do not assert that their exhibits fall into this category, and we will not review 
the exhibits to determine whether they contain signatures, because “[i]t is not the 
role of this court to ‘search the record or formulate arguments on behalf of the 
parties.’ ”  State ex rel. McKenney v. Jones, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-583, __ 
N.E.3d __, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-
4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19.  And even if the exhibits attached to the motions do 
January Term, 2022 
 
9 
contain official signatures, King and Iyahen have not identified the Evid.R. 902 
certification of those signatures. 
{¶ 19} King and Iyahen also argue that a select number of documents 
attached as exhibits to their counterclaim were properly authenticated.  The 
counterclaim contains affidavits from both King and Iyahen “verify[ing] that the 
exhibits attached to [their] Complaint and Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, are true 
and accurate copies of the original[s] to the best of [their] personal knowledge.”  
According to King and Iyahen’s merit brief, these affidavits serve to make the East 
Cleveland Permanent Appropriations record and the proposed East Cleveland 
Fiscal Recovery Plan self-authenticating under Evid.R. 902.  But Evid.R. 902 is 
inapplicable to these documents because they are unsigned. 
{¶ 20} Finally, King and Iyahen argue that the public-records request “kept 
shifting” throughout the case “because this action was instituted for nefarious 
purposes.”3  As the Eighth District observed, neither King nor Iyahen objected to 
the original request as being vague or overbroad, although they made that argument 
later in a motion for a more definite statement.  2021-Ohio-1093 at ¶ 57. 
{¶ 21} In their merit brief, King and Iyahen argue that the Eighth District 
should have granted the motion for a more definite statement because the CARES 
Act information “had already been disseminated to [the city council] in the ordinary 
course of financial reporting” and because “much of the information [Stevenson] 
claimed she wanted still did not exist.”  Those two affirmative defenses—that King 
and Iyahen had fully complied with the request and that the request sought 
nonexistent documents—have nothing to do with a purported need for clarification 
of the request. 
 
3. Stevenson’s motive for seeking the records is irrelevant.  See Rhodes v. New Philadelphia, 129 
Ohio St.3d 304, 2011-Ohio-3279, 951 N.E.2d 782, ¶ 20; R.C. 149.43(B)(4).  It follows logically 
that her motive for filing suit to compel release of the requested records is equally irrelevant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
{¶ 22} For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Eighth District 
granting a writ of mandamus for the production of public records. 
C. The award of attorney fees 
{¶ 23} If a court renders a judgment ordering a public official to comply 
with the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, the court may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the requester.  R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b); State ex rel. Summers v. Fox, 164 Ohio 
St.3d 583, 2021-Ohio-2061, 174 N.E.3d 747, ¶ 13.  In this appeal, King and Iyahen 
do not challenge the reasonableness of the hours expended or the rates charged by 
the McDonald Humphrey law firm.  The sole issue on appeal is whether there is an 
attorney-client relationship between Stevenson and McDonald Humphrey. 
{¶ 24} Attorney fees are not recoverable under the Public Records Act when 
there is no evidence that the requester “either paid or was obligated to pay” its 
attorney.  State ex rel. O’Shea & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. 
Auth., 131 Ohio St.3d 149, 2012-Ohio-115, 962 N.E.2d 297, ¶ 45.  For example, a 
corporation cannot recover attorney fees when it is represented by its salaried, in-
house counsel, absent evidence of a fee agreement or the actual payment of fees to 
counsel in addition to payment of his or her regular salary and work benefits.  State 
ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-
6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 62, superseded by statute on other grounds as explained 
in State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 138 Ohio St.3d 378, 2014-Ohio-539, 7 N.E.3d 
1146, ¶ 13.  Likewise, a prevailing party cannot recover attorney fees under the 
Public Records Act without evidence of a fee agreement when he or she is 
represented by his or her spouse.  See State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ., 87 
Ohio St.3d 535, 542, 721 N.E.2d 1044 (2000). 
{¶ 25} In her motion for attorney fees, Stevenson submitted timesheets 
showing the hours that attorneys with McDonald Humphrey spent on the case.  The 
motion also included affidavits from McDonald and another attorney attesting to 
the accuracy and reasonableness of the billing records.  But in his affidavit, 
January Term, 2022 
 
11 
McDonald does not aver the existence of an attorney-client relationship or a fee 
agreement between himself and Stevenson or between himself and the city council. 
{¶ 26} In its journal entry and opinion dated July 30, 2021, the Eighth 
District held that the record supported the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship because King and Iyahen attached to their memorandum opposing fees 
“an engagement letter executed by Stevenson facially establishing an attorney-
client relationship.”  That letter, dated November 5, 2020, purports to establish an 
attorney-client relationship between McDonald Humphrey and the city council.  
Stevenson signed the agreement in her capacity as the city council’s president on 
November 8, two days after the city council passed Resolution 39-20 approving the 
retention of the McDonald Humphrey law firm on its behalf.  But on November 9, 
Mayor King vetoed that resolution. 
{¶ 27} The East Cleveland City Charter, Section 113(E), authorizes the 
mayor to veto any resolution and ordinance.  American Legal Publishing, Charter 
of 
the 
City 
of 
East 
Cleveland, 
Section 
113(E), 
available 
at 
https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/eastcleveland/latest/eastcleveland_oh/0-0-
0-520 (accessed Aug. 18, 2022) [https://perma.cc/P7VD-2Z5X]; see also The City 
of East Cleveland, Ohio, City Charter & Codified Ordinances, at 
https://eastcleveland.org/government/city_charter___codified_ordinances/index.p
hp (accessed Aug. 18, 2022) [https://perma.cc/7P4L-UYNY].  If the mayor vetoes 
a measure, the city council may override the veto with a vote of four-fifths of its 
members approving the measure on reconsideration.  Id.  Stevenson has not alleged 
that the city council overrode the veto, nor has she explained how the city council 
might have had authority to retain McDonald Humphrey despite the veto. 
{¶ 28} McDonald Humphrey was not retained by the city, as a matter of 
law.  There is no evidence that the firm was retained by Stevenson individually.  At 
times in this litigation, King and Iyahen have taken the position that because 
Stevenson did not enter into an agreement retaining the services of McDonald 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
Humphrey in her individual capacity, the public-records request from attorney 
McDonald is void.  There is no authority for the proposition that the lack of a 
retainer agreement would excuse King and Iyahen from their obligations under the 
Public Records Act.  Absent an attorney-client relationship between McDonald 
Humphrey and either Stevenson in her individual capacity or the city council, the 
public-records request would have been made by attorney McDonald on his own 
behalf, and Stevenson as a pro se litigant is not entitled to attorney fees.  See State 
ex rel. Ullmann v. Klein, 160 Ohio St.3d 457, 2020-Ohio-2974, 158 N.E.3d 580,  
¶ 15. 
{¶ 29} For these reasons, we reverse the award of attorney fees. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 30} We affirm the Eighth District Court of Appeals’ judgment granting a 
writ of mandamus, and we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment granting an award 
of attorney fees. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, 
and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Willa M. Hemmons, East Cleveland Director of Law, and Heather 
McCollough, Assistant Director of Law, for appellants. 
_________________