Case Title: G. Vaughn Stone v. Acuity

Citation: 2008 WI 30

Docket Number: 2005AP001629

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2008 WI 30 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1629 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
G. Vaughn Stone and Christine Stone, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
Humana Wisconsin Health Organization Insurance 
Corporation, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Acuity, a mutual insurance company, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 205 
Reported at:  296 Wis. 2d 240, 723 N.W.2d 766 
(Ct. App. 2006-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 11, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 4, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Mel Flanagan and Christopher Foley   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, Jr., J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ZIEGLER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Arthur P. Simpson, Michelle D. Johnson, and Simpson & Deardorff, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Arthur P. Simpson. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there were briefs by William 
A. Jennaro, Thomas J. Lonzo, and Cook & Franke S.C., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Thomas J. Lonzo. 
 
 
 
2 
Amicus curiae briefs were filed by Michael R. Vescio, Mark 
K. Longua, and SmithAmundsen LLC, Milwaukee, on behalf of 
Wisconsin Insurance Alliance and Continental Insurance Company. 
 
Amicus curiae briefs were filed by Lora A. Kaebler and End, 
Hierseman & Crain LLC, Milwaukee; Charles D. Smith and Cannon & 
Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield; and Charles C. Gleisner, III and the 
Law Offices of William C. Gleisner, Milwaukee; on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
Amicus curiae briefs were filed by Lynn R. Laufenberg and 
Laufenberg & Hoefle, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of Karen Korb. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 30
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP001629  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV1381) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
G. Vaughn Stone and Christine Stone, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
Humana Wisconsin Health Organization Insurance 
Corporation, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Acuity, a mutual insurance company, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 11, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Acuity, seeks 
review of a published court of appeals decision affirming orders 
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County that denied Acuity's 
motions for summary judgment and reconsideration and that 
awarded G. Vaughn Stone and Christine Stone $500,000 pursuant to 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
2 
 
the parties' stipulation.1 Acuity contends that the court of 
appeals erred in its conclusions (1) that Acuity violated 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(2005-06)2 by failing to provide the 
Stones with notice of the availability of underinsured motorist 
(UIM) coverage, and (2) that as a remedy, the Stones are 
entitled to have their umbrella insurance policy reformed to 
provide retroactive UIM coverage. It further asserts that the 
circuit court erred in its determination that the policy was 
contextually ambiguous.  
¶2 
Relying on precedent, we conclude that by failing to 
provide the Stones with notice of the availability of UIM 
coverage as part of their umbrella insurance, Acuity violated 
the notice provision of § 632.32(4m). We further determine that 
where an insurer fails to provide notice of the availability of 
UIM coverage as part of an insurance policy, the appropriate 
remedy is to read in the level of coverage necessary for the 
policy to conform to § 632.32(4m)(d)——$50,000 per person and 
$100,000 per accident.  
¶3 
In the present case, however, the Stones' recovery is 
set by a stipulation between the parties, and we honor their 
                                                 
1 See Stone v. Acuity, 2006 WI App 205, 296 Wis. 2d 240, 723 
N.W.2d 766, affirming orders of the circuit court of Milwaukee 
County. The Honorable Mel Flanagan denied Acuity's motion for 
summary judgment. The Honorable Christopher R. Foley denied 
Acuity's motion for reconsideration and granted the order 
awarding the Stones $500,000.  
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
3 
 
agreement. Because we determine that insurance coverage exists 
from Acuity, under the plain language of the stipulation 
$500,000 is the amount Acuity must pay for the injuries and 
damages sustained by the Stones. Having decided the case on the 
basis of the statute and stipulation, we need not reach the 
question 
of 
whether 
the 
Stones' 
policy 
is 
contextually 
ambiguous. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals, but with 
different rationale. 
I 
¶4 
This 
case 
arises 
out 
of 
an 
automobile-bicycle 
accident. G. Vaughn Stone was riding his bicycle when he was hit 
by a van driven by Alyce Lange. Stone sustained multiple 
fractures and dislocations and a collapsed lung.  He underwent 
multiple 
surgical 
procedures 
and 
was 
hospitalized 
for 
approximately three weeks. Shortly after being released from the 
hospital, he suffered a stroke as a result of complications from 
his injuries. He then entered a rehabilitation hospital, where 
he was an inpatient for over a month. He continued to receive 
therapy and care after his release.  
¶5 
The Stones had automobile liability insurance with 
Acuity, including underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. Both had 
limits of $300,000. They also had umbrella insurance with 
Acuity. The declaration section of the Stones' insurance policy 
lists "Personal Umbrella Liability Insurance" with a limit of $1 
million. The declaration section also contains an entry for 
"Wisconsin Personal Umbrella" in a subsection labeled "Forms."  
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Later 
in 
the 
policy, 
the 
coverage 
provided 
by 
"Wisconsin Personal Umbrella" is described in a section labeled 
"Endorsements." It states that "[w]e will pay sums in excess of 
the primary limit that an insured is legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of personal injury or property damage caused by 
an occurrence to which this insurance applies." As "Primary 
Insurance for Umbrella," the policy lists two items: "Personal 
Liability Exposure" and "Auto Liability Exposure." 
¶7 
Acuity originally issued the Stones' auto insurance 
and personal umbrella endorsement in April 1993. Beginning in 
1996, Acuity sent out notices of availability of UIM coverage on 
auto renewal policies in order to comply with revisions to 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m). However, at that time Acuity did not 
offer UIM coverage for personal umbrella policies similar to the 
Stones'.  
¶8 
In 1999 Acuity began offering UIM coverage for its 
personal umbrella policies. It then provided notice of the 
availability of such coverage to new applicants. However, it did 
not provide notice of the availability of the coverage to 
existing personal umbrella policyholders such as the Stones.  
Thus, the Stones never received notice that UIM coverage was 
available as part of their umbrella insurance.  
¶9 
The Stones brought this action to recover from Lange 
and her insurer and under their Acuity insurance policy. Acuity 
filed a motion for summary judgment with the circuit court. It 
asserted that it did not provide UIM coverage to the Stones 
because, first, Lange was not an underinsured motorist, and 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
5 
 
second, the Stones' umbrella insurance extended only to personal 
liability and auto liability exposure.  The Stones countered by 
arguing 
that 
their 
umbrella 
insurance 
with 
Acuity 
was 
contextually ambiguous with respect to whether it provided UIM 
coverage. 
¶10 The circuit court denied Acuity's summary judgment 
motion. It determined that the Stones' insurance policy was 
contextually ambiguous as to whether it provided UIM coverage. 
The umbrella coverage was listed under the "forms" heading 
rather than under an "endorsement" heading in the policy 
declarations, the policy contained no specific exclusion of UIM 
coverage, and the policy left the impression that the umbrella 
policy is "excess over all other available insurance . . . ."  
¶11 Acuity filed a motion for reconsideration. Prior to 
the circuit court's hearing on Acuity's motion, the court of 
appeals ordered to be published its opinion in Rebernick v. 
Wausau Gen. Ins. Co., 2005 WI App 15, 278 Wis. 2d 461, 692 
N.W.2d 348.3 In that case, the court of appeals determined that 
the requirement under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m) that insurers 
provide notice of the availability of UIM insurance can apply to 
personal umbrella insurance.  
¶12 The Stones submitted a letter alerting the circuit 
court and Acuity of the Rebernick decision and asserting that 
they had not received notice of the availability of UIM umbrella 
                                                 
3 As discussed below, this court affirmed the court of 
appeals decision. Rebernick v. Wausau Gen. Ins. Co., 2006 WI 27, 
289 Wis. 2d 324, 711 N.W.2d 621. 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
6 
 
coverage as required under § 632.32(4m) and Rebernick. Acuity 
responded by letter, arguing that the notice provision of 
§ 632.32(4m) does not provide a "basis for creating a million 
dollars in further coverage." 
¶13 At the reconsideration hearing, the parties argued the 
import of the court of appeals decision in Rebernick. The Stones 
discussed the court of appeals' holding and argued that Acuity 
failed to provide the required notice. The Stones noted that the 
majority of the court of appeals had left open the question of 
the appropriate remedy for failure to provide adequate notice 
under the statute. 
¶14 The court referenced Rebernick in its discussion at 
the motion for reconsideration hearing. However, it denied the 
motion without altering the original decision, which was based 
on contextual ambiguity.   
¶15 The Stones then reached a settlement agreement with 
Lange and her insurer. Pursuant to the agreement, they entered 
into a stipulation dismissing all claims with respect to Lange 
and her insurer.  In exchange, the Stones received $500,000 from 
Lange's insurer and $10,000 from Lange.  
¶16 Before going to trial, the Stones and Acuity also 
reached a stipulation. It provided that a judgment be entered in 
favor of the Stones for $500,000 against Acuity and reserved 
Acuity's right to appeal the denial of its motion for summary 
judgment and motion for reconsideration of that denial. The 
stipulation and final order provide in relevant part: 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
7 
 
WHEREAS, defendant ACUITY as an alleged insurer for 
plaintiffs 
and 
plaintiffs 
having 
negotiated 
an 
agreement as to the amount plaintiffs G. Vaughn Stone 
and Christine Stone, would be entitled to receive from 
ACUITY with the understanding that such agreement does 
not waive any rights of appeal of ACUITY with respect 
to the decisions on ACUITY's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Reconsider; and 
WHEREAS, ACUITY and plaintiffs having agreed that the 
amount in addition to the $510,000 previously paid [by 
Lange and Lange's insurer] would be the sum of 
$500,000; and  
WHEREAS, the parties having agreed that the $500,000 
figure would be the amount that ACUITY would pay for 
the injuries and damages sustained by G. Vaughn Stone 
and Christine Stone in the event insurance coverage is 
found on appeal to exist from ACUITY; 
WHEREAS, the parties understand that this payment by 
ACUITY would include payment with respect to any 
subrogation claims that might exist, with G. Vaughan 
Stone and Christine Stone as well as any subrogated 
entities all reserving their rights to litigate any 
entitlement of the subrogated parties to recover 
damages from the $500,000 if that money is ultimately 
paid. Specifically, but without limitation, plaintiffs 
reserve the right to argue that they have not been 
made whole. 
¶17 Acuity appealed. The court of appeals, however, did 
not address whether the circuit court erred in concluding that 
the Stones' umbrella endorsement was contextually ambiguous. 
Stone v. Acuity, 2006 WI App 205, ¶2, 296 Wis. 2d 240, 723 
N.W.2d 766. Rather, it affirmed the circuit court's orders on 
the 
ground 
that 
Acuity 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m). Id. Relying on this court's recent 
decision in Rebernick v. Wausau Gen. Ins. Co., 2006 WI 27, 289 
Wis. 2d 324, 711 N.W.2d 621, the court of appeals determined 
that Acuity violated § 632.32(4m) by failing to provide the 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
8 
 
Stones with notice that UIM coverage was available as part of 
their umbrella insurance. Stone, 296 Wis. 2d 240, ¶¶5-6. 
¶18 The court of appeals further determined that the 
appropriate remedy for Acuity's violation of the statute was 
reformation of the Stones' umbrella endorsement to provide UIM 
coverage. Id., ¶7. It agreed with the view set forth in 
Rebernick that whether a violation of § 632.32(4m) requires that 
an insurer provide retroactive UIM coverage depends upon whether 
the insured would have purchased such coverage had notice been 
provided. Id., ¶8; see Rebernick, 289 Wis. 2d 324, ¶58 (Butler, 
J., dissenting). However, it determined that on this record 
there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether the Stones 
would have purchased UIM coverage as part of their umbrella 
insurance. Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the Stones 
were entitled to UIM coverage as part of their umbrella 
insurance, retroactive to 1999. Id. 
¶19 Acuity petitioned for review. After the case was 
argued before this court, we requested supplemental briefs on 
the issue of remedy and the effect of the parties' stipulation.4 
                                                 
4 The Stones filed a motion to strike portions of Acuity's 
supplemental briefs pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 802.06(6), 809.63, 
and 809.84. This court had ordered supplemental briefing to 
address specific questions concerning the remedy for failure to 
give notice under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m). The Stones contend 
that sections I and II of Acuity's brief simply reiterate 
arguments made in Acuity's initial brief to this court and are 
therefore redundant. We agree, and the Stones' motion to strike 
sections I and II of Acuity's supplemental brief is granted.  
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
9 
 
 
II 
¶20 This case requires that we determine whether Acuity 
violated Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m) by failing to provide the 
Stones with notice of the availability of UIM coverage as part 
of their umbrella endorsement. If so, we must determine the 
appropriate remedy for such a violation. This requires that we 
interpret Wisconsin's UIM statutes. Statutory interpretation 
presents questions of law that we review independently of the 
determinations of the circuit court and court of appeals. 
Haferman v. St. Clare Healthcare Found., Inc., 2005 WI 171, ¶15, 
286 Wis. 2d 621, 707 N.W.2d 853. 
¶21 Further, we must construe a stipulation between the 
parties. The interpretation of a stipulation is also a question 
of law that we review independently. Duhame v. Duhame, 154 
Wis. 2d 258, 262, 453 N.W.2d 149 (Ct. App. 1989). 
III 
¶22 We begin our analysis by examining the statutes. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(4m)(a)5 requires that insurers writing 
                                                 
5 The full text of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(a) is as follows: 
1. An insurer writing policies that insure with 
respect to a motor vehicle registered or principally 
garaged in this state against loss resulting from 
liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death 
suffered by a person arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall provide to 
one insured under each such insurance policy that goes 
into effect after October 1, 1995, that is written by 
the insurer and that does not include underinsured 
motorist coverage written notice of the availability 
of underinsured motorist coverage, including a brief 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
10 
 
motor vehicle liability policies that do not contain UIM 
coverage provide policyholders notice of the availability of UIM 
coverage. The statute states in relevant part: 
1. An insurer writing policies that insure with 
respect 
to 
a 
motor 
vehicle . . . against 
loss 
resulting from liability imposed by law . . . shall 
provide to one insured under each such insurance 
policy  . . . that is written by the insurer and that 
does 
not 
include 
underinsured 
motorist 
coverage 
written notice of the availability of underinsured 
motorist coverage including a brief description of the 
coverage. . . .  
¶23 This court recently addressed the application of 
§ 632.32(4m) to umbrella insurance policies. In Rebernick, we 
determined 
that 
in 
enacting 
§ 632.32(4m) 
the 
legislature 
intended that "where UIM coverage is available, insureds should 
know about it." 289 Wis. 2d 324, ¶25. It also sought to "aid 
consumers in making responsible and informed decisions about the 
                                                                                                                                                             
description of the coverage. An insurer is required to 
provide the notice required under this subdivision 
only one time and in conjunction with the delivery of 
the policy. 
2. An insurer under subd. 1. shall provide to one 
insured under each insurance policy described in subd. 
1. that is in effect on October 1, 1995, that is 
written by the insurer and that does not include 
underinsured motorist coverage written notice of the 
availability 
of 
underinsured 
motorist 
coverage, 
including a brief description of the coverage. An 
insurer is required to provide the notice required 
under 
this 
subdivision 
only 
one 
time 
and 
in 
conjunction with the notice of the first renewal of 
each policy occurring after 120 days after October 1, 
1995. 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
11 
 
nature and amount of insurance coverage they may need." Id., 
¶30.  
¶24 Because the Rebernicks' umbrella policy included auto 
liability coverage, it fell within the scope of § 632.32. Id., 
¶15; see Wis. Stat. § 632.32(1)(addressing scope of § 632.32). 
Further, because the umbrella policy at issue provided insurance 
"against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily 
injury or death arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use 
of a motor vehicle," it fell within the scope of § 632.32(4m). 
We therefore determined that the insurer was required to provide 
the Rebernicks with notice of the availability of UIM coverage 
under their umbrella policy. Id., ¶21.6 
¶25 Ultimately, however, we concluded that the insurer had 
provided the Rebernicks with notice under § 632.32(4m). One week 
before issuing the umbrella policy, the insurer provided a 
general notice regarding the availability of UIM in its 
policies. This, coupled with the specific exclusion of UIM 
coverage 
in 
the 
umbrella 
policy, 
sufficed 
to 
alert 
the 
Rebernicks of the availability of UIM coverage under an umbrella 
policy. Id., ¶¶34-36. 
¶26 Thus, under Rebernick, it is clear that insurers must 
provide notice of the availability of UIM coverage under 
umbrella policies that insure against liability "for loss or 
                                                 
6 We note that Wis. Admin. Code § Ins 6.77(4)(a)(June 2007) 
provides that "Any umbrella liability or excess liability 
insurance policy is exempt from the requirements of ss. 
631.36(2)(a) and 632.32 (4), Stats." We do not address here the 
authority to enact such a rule.  
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
12 
 
damage resulting from accident caused by any motor vehicle," 
§ 632.32(1), and "against loss resulting from liability imposed 
by law for bodily injury or death suffered by a person arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle," 
§ 632.32(4m). There is no dispute that in this case, the Stones' 
umbrella coverage applies to motor vehicle liability coverage.  
¶27 Nonetheless, Acuity maintains that it was not required 
to provide the Stones with notice when it began offering 
umbrella UIM coverage. It argues that the Stones' umbrella 
coverage is not a policy within the meaning of the statute. 
Rather, it is merely an endorsement to their policy.  
¶28 Acuity's argument is unpersuasive. To begin, the 
Stones' policy is equivocal as to whether their umbrella 
coverage is a "form" or an "endorsement." In the declarations 
section of the Stones' insurance policy, Acuity lists the 
umbrella coverage in a section called "Forms." Later in the 
policy, Acuity describes the umbrella coverage in a section 
labeled "endorsements." Wisconsin Stat. § 600.03(21) is clear 
that a "form" may constitute a policy: 
"Form" 
means 
a 
policy, 
group 
certificate, 
or 
application prepared for general use and does not 
include 
one 
specially 
prepared 
for 
use 
in 
an 
individual case. See also "policy". 
(Emphasis added). 
¶29 Even 
if 
the 
Stones' 
umbrella 
coverage 
is 
an 
"endorsement" rather than a "form," Wis. Stat. § 600.03(35) 
allows that an endorsement may constitute a policy. It provides: 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
13 
 
"Policy" means any document other than a group 
certificate used to prescribe in writing the terms of 
an insurance contract, including endorsements and 
riders and service contracts issued by motor clubs. 
¶30 Acuity's 
own 
analysis 
of 
the 
umbrella 
coverage 
provides further reason to treat it as a "policy" under 
§ 632.32(4m). In a memorandum incorporated into an affidavit, an 
Acuity 
analyst 
describes 
the 
company's 
Personal 
Umbrella 
coverage (the type held by the Stones) as constituting a 
"policy." The analyst states that "back in 1996 we did not offer 
the Excess Uninsured Motorists Bodily Injury and Underinsured 
Motorists coverage endorsement to the Personal Umbrella policy." 
(Emphasis added). He also notes that when Acuity began offering 
UIM coverage as part of the Personal Umbrella policies, "[t]here 
was no special notice of the availability of this endorsement 
sent to our existing Personal Umbrella policyholders." Thus, the 
Acuity analyst viewed the umbrella coverage carried by the 
Stones as a policy and viewed people with such umbrella coverage 
as policyholders. 
¶31 Moreover, in the memorandum the analyst makes it clear 
that the umbrella coverage carried by the Stones was available 
to be purchased separately from an Acuity auto policy. "Let me 
know if you think there is anything that should be modified to 
clarify coverage, particularly in the situation where we might 
have a separate ACUITY Auto policy and Personal Umbrella 
policy." Thus, while the Stones purchased their auto coverage 
and umbrella coverage at the same time and as a single unit, the 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
14 
 
record indicates that they could have purchased them at 
different times and as discrete policies.  
¶32 Under Wis. Stat. § 600.12(1), "chs. 600 to 655 shall 
be liberally construed to achieve the purposes stated therein." 
The purpose of § 632.32 is to "assure insurance coverage to 
accident victims" and it "must be broadly construed so as to 
increase rather than limit coverage." Kettner v. Wausau Ins. 
Cos., 
191 
Wis. 2d 723, 
742, 
530 
N.W.2d 399 
(Ct. 
App. 
1995)(internal citation omitted); Home Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 175 
Wis. 2d 104, 
112, 
499 
N.W.2d 193 
(Ct. 
App. 
1993). 
More 
specifically, "a central purpose of § 632.32(4m) is to ensure 
that all insureds know of the availability of UIM coverage." 
Rebernick, 289 Wis. 2d 324, ¶25. 
¶33 In 
examining 
the 
statutes 
and 
applying 
these 
interpretive principles to the facts of this case, we determine 
that the Stones' umbrella coverage constitutes a policy under 
the meaning of § 632.32(4m). Interpreting the umbrella coverage 
as a policy both increases coverage and furthers the purpose of 
ensuring that insureds know of the availability of UIM coverage. 
¶34 In the alternative, Acuity claims that even if the 
umbrella coverage constitutes a policy within the meaning of 
§ 632.32(4m), it actually did provide the Stones with the 
required notice of availability of UIM insurance. Beginning in 
January 1996, Acuity sent notice of the availability of UIM 
coverage to all of its automobile policy renewals. Such notice 
was sent even to those policyholders who, like the Stones, 
already had UIM coverage in their personal automobile liability 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
15 
 
policy. That notice did not differentiate between UIM coverage 
for an underlying policy or an umbrella policy. Because 
§ 632.32(4m)(a)2. requires that the insurer provide notice "only 
one time," Acuity contends that its notice was sufficient.  
¶35 This argument is also unpersuasive. We have already 
determined that the umbrella coverage is a policy within the 
meaning of § 632.32(4m), and that notice of availability of UIM 
coverage for that policy is required. However, Acuity did not 
begin offering UIM coverage under its Personal Umbrella policies 
until 1999. It would be meaningless to provide notice of the 
availability of UIM umbrella coverage when that type of coverage 
was in fact not available.  
¶36 Moreover, allowing the earlier notice to suffice as 
notice of the availability of UIM umbrella coverage three years 
hence runs counter to our instruction in Rebernick that "where 
UIM coverage is available, insureds should know about it." 289 
Wis. 2d 324, ¶25. UIM umbrella coverage became available in 
1999, and a notice sent three years prior does not let insureds 
know about it becoming available. The notice sent out for the 
Stones' personal automobile policy renewal therefore does not 
satisfy the requirements of § 632.32(4m). 
¶37 Thus, the Stones' umbrella insurance applies to motor 
vehicle liability and constitutes a policy within the meaning of 
§ 632.32(4m). Acuity was therefore required to provide notice of 
the availability of UIM coverage under that policy. Because it 
failed to provide such notice, Acuity violated the mandate of 
the statute.  
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
16 
 
IV 
¶38 Having concluded that Acuity violated § 632.32(4m) by 
failing to provide the Stones with notice of the availability of 
UIM coverage on their umbrella policy, there remains a question 
of 
the 
appropriate 
remedy 
for 
such 
a 
violation. 
Under 
Wis. Stat. § 631.15(3m), a "policy that violates a statute or 
rule is enforceable against the insurer as if it conformed to 
the statute or rule."  
¶39 Citing the dissent in Rebernick, the court of appeals 
determined that whether a violation of the notice provision in 
§ 632.32(4m) requires retroactive UIM coverage depends on 
whether the insureds would have purchased such coverage had 
notice been provided. 296 Wis. 2d 240, ¶8 (citing Rebernick, 289 
Wis. 2d 324, ¶58 (Butler, J. dissenting)).7 The court of appeals 
concluded that there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether 
the Stones would have actually purchased UIM umbrella coverage 
had Acuity provided the required notice. Id., ¶8. It based its 
conclusion on Acuity's failure to contend that the Stones would 
not have purchased UIM coverage under their umbrella insurance 
and the fact that the Stones had indeed purchased $300,000 of 
UIM coverage in their underlying policy. 
                                                 
7 The majority in Rebernick determined that the insurer had 
given the Rebernicks notice of the availability of UIM coverage. 
Rebernick v. Wausau Gen. Ins. Co., 2006 WI 27, ¶¶34-36, 289 
Wis. 2d 324, 711 N.W.2d 621. It therefore did not reach the 
issue of remedy. Because the dissent concluded that the insurer 
did not provide notice, it addressed remedy. Id., ¶41 (Butler, 
J., dissenting). 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
17 
 
¶40 We disagree with the court of appeals' determination 
that there is no genuine issue of fact as whether the Stones 
would have purchased UIM umbrella coverage. The mere fact that 
the 
Stones 
purchased 
$300,000 
of 
UIM 
coverage 
in 
their 
underlying policy is insufficient to show that they would have 
paid more in premiums to purchase UIM umbrella coverage. 
¶41 More 
importantly we disagree that enforcing the 
insurance contract as if it conformed to § 632.32(4m) even 
requires a factual determination of whether the Stones would 
have purchased UIM umbrella coverage. Instead we determine that 
enforcing 
the 
Stones' 
policy 
"as 
if 
it 
conformed 
to" 
§ 632.32(4m) requires that we examine what is the appropriate 
remedy under the statute.   
¶42 One possibility for remedy is that enforcing the 
policy as if it conformed to § 632.32(4m) demands that Acuity 
provide retroactive coverage in the amount of the umbrella 
policy limits. A second possibility for remedy is that enforcing 
the policy as if it conformed to § 632.32(4m) requires that 
Acuity provide retroactive coverage only at the minimum level of 
coverage set forth in the statute. 
¶43 Section 632.32(4m)(d) provides as follows:  
If an insured who is notified under par. (a) 1. 
accepts underinsured motorist coverage, the insurer 
shall include the coverage under the policy just 
delivered to the insured in limits of at least $50,000 
per person and $100,000 per accident. For any insured 
who accepts the coverage after notification under par. 
(a) 2., the insurer shall include the coverage under 
the renewed policy in limits of at least $50,000 per 
person and $100,000 per accident. 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
18 
 
Thus, 
had 
the 
Stones 
accepted 
UIM 
coverage 
pursuant 
to 
§ 632.32(4m)(a), Acuity would have been obligated to provide UIM 
coverage of at least $50,000 per person and $100,000 per 
accident. 
¶44 This court applied § 631.15(3m) to an insurance policy 
that failed to comply with § 632.32(4m)(d) in Brunson v. Ward, 
2001 WI 89, 245 Wis. 2d 163, 629 N.W.2d 140. In that case an 
insured had UIM coverage in the amount of $25,000 per person and 
$50,000 per accident. Id., ¶4. However, that coverage level did 
not comport with the minimum requirements under § 632.32(4m)(d) 
of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. We determined 
that the policy must be read to provide the level of coverage 
required under the statute. "By operation of law, the higher 
level of coverage is 'read in,' even though it was not reflected 
in the premium paid." Id., ¶24.  
¶45 Brunson provides only limited guidance. The statutory 
violation in Brunson was a failure to provide sufficient UIM 
coverage to a policy that already provided some UIM coverage. 
Here, the statutory violation is a failure to provide notice of 
availability, and the question is how much coverage to provide 
if coverage is warranted at all.  
¶46 The legislative history provides no further guidance. 
As we noted in Rebernick, the bill that led to § 632.32(4m) 
being adopted concerned "stacking" of motor vehicle coverage and 
"drive-other-car" provisions in motor vehicle policies. 289 
Wis. 2d 324, ¶24. The drafting records regarding notification of 
the availability of UIM coverage are sparse, and provide no 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
19 
 
information regarding coverage to be implied for failure to 
provide adequate notice. See id.; 1995 S.B. 6, Legislative 
Reference Bureau drafting file; see also 1995 Wis. Act 21. 
¶47 Lacking clear authority from this state's case law and 
legislative history on the question of coverage, we turn to 
other sources for instruction. Two areas of jurisprudence 
provide some guidance: cases in which coverage is implied 
because of a failure to offer coverage as part of an auto 
liability policy and cases in which coverage is implied because 
of a failure to provide coverage as part of an umbrella policy. 
¶48 First, there are a number of jurisdictions that have 
addressed insurers' failure to fulfill statutory requirements to 
make offers of uninsured motorist (UM) and UIM coverage as part 
of an automobile liability policy. A leading treatise on UM and 
UIM insurance summarizes the cases as follows.   
When 
underinsured 
motorist 
insurance 
coverage 
is 
imposed by operation of law because an insurance 
company failed to comply with a legislative mandate, 
questions sometimes arise about the coverage limits 
for the insurance. Typically, legislation mandates 
that when an insurer fails to prove an effective 
offer, the insurer must provide the minimum coverage 
required to be offered to the purchaser under the 
statute. 
3 Alan I. Widiss & Jeffrey E. Thomas, Uninsured and Underinsured 
Motorist Insurance, § 32.7 (3d ed. 2005).  
¶49 In Tucker v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., for example, the 
Appellate Court of Illinois interpreted a statute providing that 
no 
automobile 
liability 
insurance 
may 
be 
issued 
"unless 
underinsured motorist coverage is offered in an amount equal to 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
20 
 
the insured's uninsured motorist coverage limits." 465 N.E.2d 
956, 958 (Ill. App. 1984)(citing 1979 Ill. Laws 4771). It 
determined that where an insurer failed to make a sufficient 
offer under the statute, a proper remedy was to imply UIM 
coverage into a policy "by operation of law in limits equal to 
[the insured's] uninsured motorist coverage . . . ." Id. at 962.  
¶50 In Rutter v. The Horace Mann Ins. Co., 545 N.E.2d 1381 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989), the appellate court reiterated that view. 
Where 
there is a 
deficient offer of UIM coverage, the 
appropriate remedy is to imply UIM coverage with "limits equal 
to those of the uninsured-motorist coverage." Id. at 1387-88 
(citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 73, par. 755a -- 2(4)); see 
also Fuoss v. Auto Owners (Mut.) Ins. Co., 516 N.E.2d 268, 270 
(Ill. 1987)("Should we reform Fuoss' policy in accordance with 
the Code, we could imply coverage at no more than either 
$15,000/$30,000 (as the circuit court did)——the amount of his 
uninsured limits——or $25,000/$50,000 (as the appellate court 
did)——the amount of his bodily injury liability insurance.") 
¶51 The Illinois cases, however, interpret a statute 
different from Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(d). The Illinois statute 
requires that insurers offer UIM in an amount equal to the 
insured's UM coverage. Section 632.32(4m)(d), however, requires 
that insurers providing UIM coverage offer it at least at a set 
minimum level——$50,000 per person, $100,000 per accident——for 
all insureds, regardless of the limits of the insured's 
liability and uninsured motorist coverage. This difference does 
not appear to change the analysis: 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
21 
 
Where the statute calls for underinsured motorist 
limits at least equal to statutory minimum liability 
limits, 
the 
insurer's 
obligation 
to 
provide 
underinsured motorist limits is limited to those 
required for minimum liability coverage, and there is 
no obligation to provide underinsured motorist limits 
equal to the higher liability limits carried by the 
insured. 
3 William J. Schermer & Irvin E. Schermer, Automobile Liability 
Insurance, § 38.28 (4th ed. 2004).  
¶52 Ross v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 899 S.W.2d 53 (Ark. 
1995), is illustrative. In Ross, UIM coverage was implied by 
operation of law because the insured failed to obtain an 
adequate rejection of coverage. Id. at 54. Determining the 
amount of coverage implied required the court to interpret Ark. 
Code Ann. § 23-89-209 (1992), which provides that UIM coverage 
"shall be at least equal to the limits prescribed for bodily 
injury or death under [Ark. Code Ann.] § 27-19-605." Id. at 54-
55. Section 27-19-605, in turn, requires $25,000 minimum 
liability coverage for bodily injury or death. Id. at 55. The 
court determined that the statutes mandate only that insurers 
offer $25,000 UIM coverage, and that when UIM is implied by law, 
"the insured will be limited to the minimum amount referred to 
in the statute of $25,000." Id. To require more would be to 
"force upon the insurance company something that is not present 
in the statute." Id. (quoting Jablonski v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. 
Co., 408 N.W.2d 854, 857-58 (Minn. 1987)).  
¶53 These authorities all indicate that where an insurer 
fails to make an adequate offer of UIM coverage, and UIM 
coverage is therefore implied by operation of law, it is implied 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
22 
 
at a level equal to the minimum level required to be offered 
under the statute. This suggests that under Wisconsin law, 
implied UIM coverage should be at the level prescribed in 
§ 632.32(4m)(d)——$50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident.  
¶54 However, the above cases concern the failure to 
fulfill a statutory obligation to provide UIM insurance as part 
of a primary automobile liability policy rather than as part of 
an umbrella policy. Because this case concerns umbrella coverage 
rather than a primary automobile liability policy, it is also 
useful to examine cases in which courts have determined that UIM 
coverage is implied because an insurer fails to offer UIM 
coverage 
as 
part 
of 
an 
umbrella 
policy. 
A 
number 
of 
jurisdictions have determined that where UIM coverage is implied 
in an umbrella policy, it will be implied at the full level of 
liability coverage provided by the umbrella policy.  
¶55 In Ormsbee v. Allstate Ins. Co., 859 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 
1993), for example, the Arizona Supreme Court determined that an 
umbrella policy providing automobile liability coverage was an 
automobile 
liability 
policy 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
state 
statutes. Arizona's UM/UIM statute required insurers to offer 
UIM coverage "in limits not less than the liability limits 
within the policy," Id. at 733 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 20-
259.01(C)(1992)). The court determined that an insurer's failure 
to offer UIM coverage as part of an insured's umbrella policy 
resulted in "imputation" of the UIM coverage to the policy as a 
matter of law. Id. at 736.  
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
23 
 
¶56 The Northern District of Ohio has similarly concluded 
that umbrella policies that cover automobiles must provide UIM 
coverage at the full level of liability coverage under the 
policy. The court in Krstich v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 776 
F. Supp. 1225 (N.D. Ohio 1991) applied both Ohio and North 
Carolina UIM statutes to a $1 million umbrella policy. The Ohio 
statute stated that no automobile liability insurance could be 
issued unless it provided "[u]nderinsured motorist coverage, 
which shall be in an amount of coverage equivalent to the 
automobile liability" coverage. Id. at 1232-33 (quoting Ohio 
Rev. Code § 3937.18(A)(1990)).  
¶57 The 
North 
Carolina 
statute 
required 
that 
any 
automobile 
liability 
policy 
"provide 
underinsured 
motorist 
coverage . . . in an amount equal to the policy limits for 
automobile 
bodily 
injury 
liability 
as 
specified 
in 
the . . . policy." Id. at 1234 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stats. § 20-
279.21(b)(4)(1990)). 
The court determined that under both 
statutes, the insurer was required to provide UIM coverage with 
a limit of $1 million under the umbrella policy. Id. at 1235. 
See also Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Canamore, 834 P.2d 542, 544 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1992)(under statute requiring every motor vehicle 
policy to provide UIM, insurer's failure to offer UIM coverage 
required reforming policy to provide UIM coverage in the amount 
of umbrella policy's bodily injury limits); United Nat'l Ins. 
Co. v. DePrizio, 705 N.E.2d 455, 460-61 (Ind. 1999); Rhonda 
Sukin Kaye, Requirement that Multicoverage Umbrella Insurance 
Policy Offer Uninsured- or Underinsured-motorist Coverage Equal 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
24 
 
to Liability Limits under Umbrella Provisions, 52 A.L.R.5th 451, 
§ 3 (1997)(collecting cases). 
¶58 Thus, there are a number of instances in which courts 
have determined that where an insurer fails to provide UIM 
coverage in an umbrella policy, UIM coverage will be implied 
into the policy at the level of liability coverage offered by 
that policy. We note, however, that these cases are based upon 
statutes requiring automobile liability policies to provide UIM 
coverage in amounts equal to the liability limits of the policy. 
They therefore contrast with the present case because Wisconsin 
requires only that insurers who make UIM coverage available 
provide 
it 
at 
a 
statutory 
minimum 
level. 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(4m)(d). 
¶59 There do not appear to be any cases in which courts 
have determined that a statutory minimum level of UIM coverage, 
independent of the insured's liability limit, is implied in an 
umbrella policy. Indeed, Wisconsin seems to be anomalous in 
interpreting a state statute that requires insurers to provide 
UIM coverage at a statutory minimum level as applying to 
umbrella policies. That is, the cases requiring insurers to 
provide UIM coverage in umbrella policies do so on the basis of 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
25 
 
statutes requiring insurers to provide UIM coverage at the 
liability limit of automobile policies.8 
¶60 Nonetheless, the cases in which courts have determined 
that UIM coverage is implied where an insurer fails to provide 
UIM coverage as part of an umbrella policy are instructive. UIM 
coverage is generally implied at the full level of liability 
coverage in an umbrella policy where statutes require that any 
automobile liability policy provide UIM coverage at the full 
level of the insured's liability coverage. Wisconsin does not 
have such a requirement. Moreover, because the cases are based 
on statutes requiring UIM coverage at the full level of 
liability coverage, they actually imply UIM coverage at the only 
level 
recognized 
by 
statute 
for 
motor 
vehicle 
liability 
policies. Wisconsin, though, recognizes UIM coverage at a lower 
level than the liability limits of a motor vehicle liability 
policy. 
                                                 
8 Several authorities assert that whether an umbrella policy 
may be considered an automobile policy such that it provides UM 
or UIM coverage reflects whether a state's UM/UIM statutes are 
"minimum liability" statutes (requiring insurers to provide 
coverage at a statutory minimum level independent of an 
insured's 
liability 
coverage) or "full recovery" statutes 
(requiring insurers to provide coverage at liability limits). 
Generally, courts have interpreted "minimum liability" statutes 
as not requiring umbrella policies to provide UM/UIM coverage, 
while courts have often (though not always) interpreted "full 
recovery" statutes as requiring umbrella policies to provide 
UM/UIM coverage. Lisa K. Gregory, "Excess" or "Umbrella" 
Insurance Policy As Providing Coverage for Accidents with 
Uninsured or Underinsured Motorists, 2 A.L.R.5th 922, §§ 2[a], 
5[a] (1992); United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. DePrizio, 705 N.E.2d 455, 
461-62 (Ind. 1999); Ormsbee v. Allstate Ins. Co., 859 P.2d 732, 
735 (Ariz. 1993). 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
26 
 
¶61 Having reviewed the foregoing authorities, we are 
persuaded that where an insurer fails to provide adequate notice 
of the availability of UIM coverage, the appropriate remedy is 
to read in only the minimum level of UIM coverage required under 
§ 632.32(4m)(d)——$50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. 
The sole Wisconsin case applying § 631.15(3m) to an insurance 
policy that did not comply with § 632.32(4m)(d) "reads in" the 
statutory minimum coverage. Brunson, 245 Wis. 2d 163, ¶24.  
¶62 Further, in cases where insurers fail to offer UIM 
coverage as part of an automobile liability policy, the amount 
of UIM coverage implied depends upon whether state statutes 
require insurers to provide UIM coverage at a statutory minimum 
level or at the level of the insured's UM or liability coverage. 
Where, as in Wisconsin, insurers that provide UIM coverage must 
provide it at a statutory minimum level independent of the 
insured's liability limit, courts imply that minimum level. 
Higher levels are implied only where required by statute.  
¶63 Finally, where courts imply UIM coverage in umbrella 
polices, they imply the coverage at the statutorily required 
level. This has generally resulted in implied UIM coverage at 
the level of coverage for the umbrella policy. However, this is 
because the relevant state statutes require motor vehicle 
liability policies to provide UIM coverage at the same level as 
the insured's liability coverage. In Wisconsin, insurers that 
provide UIM coverage are required to do so only at a statutory 
minimum level, regardless of the insured's liability coverage.  
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
27 
 
¶64 We therefore conclude that pursuant to § 631.15(3m),  
enforcing the umbrella policy "as if it conformed to the 
statute" entitles the insureds to only the level of coverage 
necessary for their policy to conform to § 632.32(4m)(d)——
$50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. Accordingly, we 
read in that level of coverage to the Stones' umbrella 
insurance. 
V 
¶65 Acuity has persuaded us that interpreting the Stones' 
policy as if it conformed to § 632.32(4m) requires reading in 
coverage at the statutory minimum level——$50,000 per person and 
$100,000 per accident.  However, that determination does not end 
our inquiry. Rather, we must address the question of remedy in 
light of the stipulation between the parties.  
¶66 After the circuit court denied Acuity's motion for 
reconsideration, and before trial, the parties entered into a 
stipulation. They agreed "that the $500,000 figure would be the 
amount that ACUITY would pay for the injuries and damages 
sustained by G. Vaughn Stone and Christine Stone in the event 
insurance 
coverage 
is 
found 
on 
appeal 
to 
exist 
from 
ACUITY . . . ."  
¶67 We have recently held that "interpretation of a 
stipulation must, above all, give effect to the intention of the 
parties." Pierce v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2005 WI 
14, ¶31, 278 Wis. 2d 82, 692 N.W.2d 558 (citing D'Angelo v. 
Cornell 
Paperboard 
Prods. 
Co., 
33 
Wis. 2d 218, 
227, 
147 
N.W.2d 321 (1967)). While relief from stipulations is governed 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
28 
 
by Wis. Stat. § 806.07, principles of contract law apply in 
interpreting stipulations. Kocinski v. Home Ins. Co., 154 
Wis. 2d 56, 67-68, 452 N.W.2d 360 (1990). In determining the 
parties' intentions, the terms of a contract or stipulation 
"should be given their plain or ordinary meaning." Huml v. 
Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, ¶52, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 716 N.W.2d 807. If the 
agreement is not ambiguous, ascertaining the parties' intent 
"ends 
with 
the 
four 
corners 
of 
the 
contract, 
without 
consideration of extrinsic evidence." Id. 
¶68 Because we have determined that interpreting the 
Stones' umbrella insurance as if it conformed to the statute 
requires 
reading 
in 
the 
statutory 
minimum 
UIM 
coverage, 
"insurance coverage is found on appeal to exist from Acuity." 
Thus, under the plain language of the stipulation, the amount 
Acuity must pay the Stones for their injuries is $500,000. 
¶69 After the first round of oral arguments before this 
court, we issued an order requesting that the parties submit 
supplemental briefs addressing the issue of remedy, including 
the effect of the stipulation. Acuity argues the stipulation was 
based on the contextual ambiguity issue, and that the Rebernick 
issue "did not exist" at the time of the stipulation "other than 
as a Court of Appeals dissent." It maintains that Acuity should 
have the opportunity to litigate the "new theory." 
¶70 We disagree. First, it is incorrect that at the time 
the parties entered into the stipulation the Rebernick issue 
existed only in a court of appeals dissent. The majority of the 
court of appeals in Rebernick agreed that insurers are required 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
29 
 
to provide notice of the availability of umbrella UIM coverage. 
278 Wis. 2d 461, ¶8. The court did not read in UIM coverage 
because it determined that the insurer had provided notice. Id., 
¶13. That was the same determination made by this court on 
review. 289 Wis. 2d 324, ¶39.  
¶71 Moreover, before entering into the stipulation, the 
parties submitted letters to the circuit court regarding the 
applicability of the court of appeals' decision in Rebernick. At 
the hearing on Acuity's motion for reconsideration, both parties 
addressed the import of Rebernick. The circuit court considered 
Rebernick 
in 
its 
deliberations 
on 
the 
motion 
for 
reconsideration.  
¶72 In addition, the stipulation has no language stating 
that Acuity will pay $500,000 if coverage is found to exist 
because the policy is contextually ambiguous. Rather, its terms 
are general, applying "in the event insurance coverage is found 
on appeal to exist from Acuity." It is therefore unpersuasive 
that the parties intended the stipulation to operate only if the 
case were decided on the grounds of contextual ambiguity.9  
                                                 
9 Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent maintains that 
the language of the stipulation is ambiguous because of its 
general language. ("Because of the general language in which the 
stipulation is phrased, reasonable people could disagree about 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
document." 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶91.)  In essence, it argues that because 
the language of the stipulation is worded so broadly as to 
require payment in any case that coverage is found to exist on 
appeal, it can be interpreted as requiring payment only in a 
narrow range of cases in which coverage is found to exist. That 
view turns the plain language of the stipulation on its head.  
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
30 
 
¶73 Rather, in entering into the stipulation Acuity 
avoided the potential for even greater exposure due to the $1 
million limit and the lack of a reducing clause in the Stones' 
umbrella policy. One of the key disputes in Acuity's motion for 
reconsideration and in the hearing on that motion was whether 
umbrella UIM coverage should be read to include a reducing 
clause, even though neither the Stones' umbrella policy nor the 
UIM endorsement to personal umbrella coverage that the Stones 
could have purchased contained a reducing clause. Thus, the 
stipulation avoided a dispute over whether, if coverage was 
found to exist on appeal, such coverage was subject to a 
reducing clause. Acuity therefore avoided the potential that it 
would have to pay the full $1 million limit of the policy should 
an appellate court determine that the coverage was not subject 
to a reducing clause.  
¶74 We are also not persuaded by Acuity's argument that it 
should be allowed to litigate the Rebernick theory. The 
interpretation 
of 
the 
terms 
of 
a 
stipulation, 
like 
the 
interpretation of the terms of a contract, is a question of law. 
Duhame, 154 Wis. 2d at 262. Thus, we need not remand the case to 
the circuit court for the parties to litigate the interpretation 
of the stipulation, which is clear on its face. Acuity has 
already had the opportunity to argue the issue in its 
supplemental briefs.  
¶75 The circuit court determined that the Stones were 
entitled to UIM coverage under their umbrella insurance because 
their policy was contextually ambiguous, and the Stones have 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
31 
 
continued 
to 
maintain 
that 
their 
policy 
is 
contextually 
ambiguous. However, because we determine that insurance coverage 
exists due to Acuity's failure to provide adequate notice under 
§ 632.32(4m) and that the amount set forth in the stipulation 
controls, we need not reach the question of whether insurance 
coverage also exists on the ground that the policy was 
contextually ambiguous.  
¶76 Having determined that where an insurer fails to 
provide adequate notice of the availability of UIM coverage, the 
appropriate remedy is to read in the minimum level of UIM 
coverage required under § 632.32(4m)(d)——$50,000 per person and 
$100,000 per accident, coverage has been found to exist on 
appeal from Acuity. Thus, under the plain language of the 
stipulation $500,000 is the amount that Acuity must pay for the 
injuries sustained by the Stones. 
VI 
¶77 In sum, relying on precedent, we conclude that by 
failing to provide the Stones with notice of the availability of 
UIM coverage as part of their umbrella insurance, Acuity 
violated the notice provision of § 632.32(4m). We further 
determine that where an insurer fails to provide notice of the 
availability of UIM coverage as part of an insurance policy, the 
appropriate remedy is to read in the level of coverage necessary 
for the policy to conform to § 632.32(4m)(d)——$50,000 per person 
and $100,000 per accident.  
¶78 In the present case, however, the Stones' recovery is 
set by a stipulation between the parties, and we honor their 
No. 
2005AP001629   
 
32 
 
agreement. Because we determine that insurance coverage exists 
from Acuity, under the plain language of the stipulation 
$500,000 is the amount Acuity must pay for the injuries and 
damages sustained by the Stones. Having decided the case on the 
basis of the statute and stipulation, we do not reach the 
question 
of 
whether 
the 
Stones' 
policy 
is 
contextually 
ambiguous. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals, but with 
different rationale. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶79 Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER did not participate. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP1629.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶80 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).   I join the majority opinion except for 
those portions of that opinion that interpret the stipulation 
between G. Vaughn Stone and Christine Stone (the Stones) and 
Acuity, a Mutual Insurance Company (Acuity), as requiring Acuity 
to provide $500,000 in underinsured motorist (UIM) payments to 
the Stones under the umbrella policy Acuity issued.  I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion's discussion and 
conclusions relative to the stipulation for three reasons:  (1) 
the stipulation is ambiguous as to the parties' intent; (2) the 
majority 
opinion 
unreasonably 
interprets 
the 
parties' 
stipulation to effect an unwarranted penalty against Acuity; and 
(3) in the alternative, even were I to agree with the majority 
opinion's interpretation of the stipulation, fairness requires 
that the penalty to which Acuity should be subjected for failing 
to comply with Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(a)1 be referred to the 
circuit court so that Acuity can bring a motion pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 806.07(1), to request relief from the stipulation, in 
order that Acuity be treated the same as would any other insurer 
who did not give the notice required by § 632.32(4m)(a)1.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶81 The background facts relating to the stipulation 
between the Stones and Acuity are quite brief.  The parties 
agreed after the circuit court had denied Acuity's motion for 
summary 
judgment 
and 
had 
denied 
Acuity's 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, that if the decision of the circuit court was 
No.  2005AP1629.pdr 
 
2 
 
reversed, the level of damages sustained by the Stones would 
require Acuity to pay an additional $500,000.   
¶82 In its denial of Acuity's motion for summary judgment, 
the circuit court decided that UIM coverage was afforded because 
the umbrella policy was contextually ambiguous.  As the circuit 
court explained: 
 
We——The umbrella policy here——The question is——is 
it the——insured left with the impression that the 
umbrella policy is excess over all other available 
insurance? 
. . . 
 
And I——I think it's a very close call, but I 
think 
that 
the 
Court, 
reviewing 
everything, 
is 
persuaded by the presentation and argument of the 
plaintiff, that there is an ambiguity in this policy 
that would work to the detriment of the insured, and I 
am going to deny the motion for summary judgment and 
the motion filed by Acuity. 
 
I think that the other issues, being whether 
there is——there is——there are damages that have been——
that——I——it seems to me, that based on what you have 
alleged the medicals to be, the loss of employment to 
be, the potential, here, that there is a potential 
for——for the coverage, and there is an ambiguity in 
the policy such that the Court would not dismiss the 
action against Acuity. 
Because of that contextual ambiguity in the policy, subject to 
the reducing clause which was upheld as part of the circuit 
court's denial of Acuity's motion for reconsideration, the 
circuit court concluded that $1,000,000 of potential UIM 
coverage existed under the umbrella policy.  
¶83 The Stones and Acuity stipulated to damages, rather 
than taking the case to trial where that issue would have been 
decided by a jury.  The Stones had received $500,000 from the 
No.  2005AP1629.pdr 
 
3 
 
tortfeasor's insurer.  The amount the parties agreed was yet to 
be paid if the $1,000,000 umbrella provided UIM coverage was 
$500,000.  The stipulation relieved the Stones from their burden 
of proving the extent of their damages in a case where damages 
were not seriously contested by Acuity, and it moved the legal 
issue on which the circuit court's decision rested, i.e., that 
the policy was contextually ambiguous, forward to an appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶84 The question that is presented is whether the Stones 
and Acuity intended to agree that if an appellate court applied 
the court of appeals decision in Rebernick v. Wausau General 
Insurance Company, 2005 WI App 15, 278 Wis. 2d 461, 692 N.W.2d 
348, to the umbrella policy and concluded that Acuity had not 
provided the notice required by Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(a)1, 
Acuity would pay the Stones $500,000.    
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶85 "The construction of a stipulation is a question of 
law" subject to our independent review.  Duhame v. Duhame, 154 
Wis. 2d 258, 262, 453 N.W.2d 149 (Ct. App. 1989).  We also 
determine whether a stipulation is ambiguous as a question of 
law.  See Flejter v. Estate of Flejter, 2001 WI App 26, ¶¶28-30, 
240 Wis. 2d 401, 623 N.W.2d 552.   
B. 
Stipulations 
1. 
General principles 
¶86 A stipulation is ambiguous if it is "reasonably or 
fairly susceptible to more than one construction."  Id., ¶28.  
Stipulations are to be construed consistent with the intention 
No.  2005AP1629.pdr 
 
4 
 
of the parties at the time they entered into the stipulation and 
in "the spirit of justice, . . . and should not be construed 
technically so as to defeat the purposes for which they were 
made."  Pierce v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2005 WI 14, 
¶31, 278 Wis. 2d 82, 692 N.W.2d 558 (citation omitted). 
¶87 When 
the 
parties' 
intent 
about 
all 
potential 
applications of a stipulation is not apparent from the face of 
the stipulation, one must look to the context in which the 
stipulation was made.  The context includes the procedural 
posture of the case, as well as the parties' purpose in entering 
into 
the 
stipulation. 
 
Id., 
¶32. 
 
An 
examination 
and 
understanding of the context in which the stipulation was made 
is extremely important because a stipulation must, above all, 
"give effect to the intention of the parties."  D'Angelo v. 
Cornell Paperboard Prods. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 218, 227, 147 N.W.2d 
321 (1967).  When a stipulation is entered into merely as a 
procedural facilitation, the stipulation should be narrowly 
construed.  Id. 
¶88 And 
finally, 
although 
we 
have 
indicated 
that 
stipulations may have the attributes of a contract, "they are 
not governed by contract law and may be set aside, in the 
court's discretion, for any of the reasons specified in Rule 
806.07(1), Stats."  Kocinski v. Home Ins. Co., 154 Wis. 2d 56, 
73, 452 N.W.2d 360 (1990) (citation omitted).   
No.  2005AP1629.pdr 
 
5 
 
2. 
Stones and Acuity's stipulation 
¶89 Acuity appealed from the circuit court's decision that 
UIM coverage was afforded under the umbrella policy because it 
was contextually ambiguous.  The stipulation of the parties did 
not waive any rights of appeal that Acuity had "with respect to 
the decisions on Acuity's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion 
to Reconsider."  Stipulation and Final Order 2 (Milwaukee County 
Cir. Ct. Jun. 8, 2005).  There is nothing in the stipulation 
that mentions Rebernick or addresses whether Acuity did or did 
not 
comply 
with 
the 
notice 
requirements 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4m)(a)1, in regard to the umbrella policy.  There is 
nothing in the stipulation that addresses what penalty, if any, 
should be imposed if it is determined that Acuity should have, 
but did not, give a sufficient § 632.32(4m)(a)1 notice.   
¶90 The Stones assert that the court of appeals decided 
Rebernick before the circuit court's decision on Acuity's motion 
for reconsideration and Rebernick was brought to the attention 
of the circuit court.  Therefore, the Stones continue, the 
language in the stipulation requiring Acuity to pay $500,000 in 
the event "insurance coverage is found on appeal to exist from 
Acuity" applies to a determination by an appellate court that 
Acuity did not comply with Rebernick's interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(4m)(a)1.  The majority opinion agrees.1   
¶91 Acuity contends that the stipulation has no such 
meaning, and if it is concluded that it failed to fulfill its 
obligations under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(a)1, a remand to the 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶37. 
No.  2005AP1629.pdr 
 
6 
 
circuit court is necessary to determine whether the Stones would 
have purchased more UIM coverage if proper notice had been 
given.  Because of the general language in which the stipulation 
is phrased, reasonable people could disagree about the meaning 
of the document.  Therefore, I conclude that it is ambiguous.  
Accordingly, consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret 
the intent of the parties is appropriate.  See Farm Credit 
Servs. of N. Cent. Wis. v. Wysocki, 2001 WI 51, ¶12, 243 Wis. 2d 
305, 627 N.W.2d 444; Duhame, 154 Wis. 2d at 264-67.  
¶92 When 
interpreting 
an 
ambiguous 
stipulation, 
the 
context in which the stipulation arises is important in 
determining the intent of the parties.  D'Angelo, 33 Wis. 2d at 
227.  The procedural posture of the case at the time that the 
stipulation was made is part of that context.  Pierce, 278 
Wis. 2d 82, ¶32.  Here, the parties stipulated solely to 
eliminate the need to conduct a jury trial to determine the 
Stones' damages and to facilitate the appeal of the circuit 
court's decision.  Therefore, the stipulation was a procedural 
device formulated to facilitate the parties' appeal, and it 
should be narrowly construed.  D'Angelo, 33 Wis. 2d at 227.   
¶93 I also note that the Stones did not plead a lack of 
notice pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(a)1 as a basis for 
requiring UIM payments under the umbrella policy.  While it is 
true, as the majority opinion points out, that the court of 
appeals' decision in Rebernick was brought to the circuit 
court's attention,2 the circuit court never addressed whether 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶71. 
No.  2005AP1629.pdr 
 
7 
 
Acuity did or did not comply with § 632.32(4m)(a)1.  See 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court Order of July 6, 2004. 
¶94 In addition, when the parties entered into the 
stipulation, there was nothing in the court of appeals Rebernick 
decision that would have alerted Acuity to what penalty it might 
face for noncompliance with Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(a)1.  This 
is so because although Rebernick decided that notice of UIM 
coverage is required for umbrella policies, it concluded that 
Wausau General Insurance Company had complied with the notice 
provisions of the statute.  Rebernick, 278 Wis. 2d 461, ¶¶9–11.  
Accordingly, no penalty was addressed by the majority opinion in 
Rebernick.  Even the separate opinion of Judge Kessler in 
Rebernick did not foretell the penalty the majority opinion 
assesses against Acuity.  Rather, Judge Kessler would have 
required the insurance company to give notice and then would 
have permitted the Rebernicks to decide whether to purchase UIM 
coverage under the umbrella policy as an addition to their 
automobile liability policy.  Id., ¶14 (Kessler, J., concurring 
in part; dissenting in part).  Because no court had decided on 
an appropriate remedy for an insurer's failure to comply with 
§ 632.32(4m)(a)1 in regard to an umbrella policy when the 
stipulation was made, it is unreasonable to conclude that the 
parties intended to agree that Acuity would pay a $500,000 
penalty, if it was determined at a later date that Acuity had 
not complied with § 632.32(4m)(a)1. 
¶95 Furthermore, the majority opinion imposes an excessive 
penalty as a remedy for a failure to give sufficient notice 
No.  2005AP1629.pdr 
 
8 
 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(a)1.  Acuity must pay 
$500,000.  However, to all other insurers, the amount of the 
penalty 
is 
the 
minimum 
amount 
of 
UIM 
insurance 
that 
§ 632.32(4m)(d) requires when UIM is sold, i.e., $50,000 per 
person and $100,000 per accident.3  The majority opinion relies 
on Wis. Stat. § 631.15(3m) for deciding upon the amount of UIM 
coverage to assess as a penalty because § 631.15(3m) directs 
that a "policy that violates a statute or rule is enforceable 
against the insurer as if it conformed to the statute or rule."4     
¶96 Moreover, the circuit court concluded that coverage 
was 
afforded 
for 
an 
occurrence 
because 
the 
policy 
was 
contextually ambiguous.  Concluding that coverage exists due to 
the language of the policy is a different conclusion than is 
assigning a penalty for failing to comply with a statutory 
directive.  The coverage question to which the stipulation is 
directed is based on the circuit court's construction of the 
words used in Acuity's policy.  Therefore, it was the policy 
itself, not a statutory penalty, that created the potential of 
an additional payment under the stipulation.   
¶97 Accordingly, I conclude that the parties did not 
intend to agree that the stipulation would encompass a remedy 
for noncompliance with Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(a)1.  My reasons 
for this conclusion are five-fold:  (1) The stipulation was a 
procedural device intended to move the case forward toward 
appellate review of the circuit court's decision by foregoing a 
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶76. 
4 Majority op., ¶38. 
No.  2005AP1629.pdr 
 
9 
 
trial on damages, when damages were not seriously contested; (2) 
the Stones did not plead noncompliance with § 632.32(4m)(a)1 as 
a basis for payment by Acuity; (3) the circuit court did not 
address whether Acuity was in compliance with the court of 
appeals decision in Rebernick; (4) Rebernick did not address the 
question of remedy for noncompliance; and (5) the remedy for 
noncompliance the majority opinion assigns could not have been 
anticipated 
by 
the 
parties 
when 
they 
entered 
into 
the 
stipulation because that remedy was first determined in the case 
now before us.  To construe the stipulation otherwise, as the 
majority opinion does, ignores the purpose for which the 
stipulation was made, a construction that is contrary to the 
recent precedent of this court.  See Pierce, 278 Wis. 2d 82, 
¶¶31-32.   
3. 
Fairness 
¶98 Because my construction of the stipulation is a 
minority opinion, it cannot provide the relief Acuity seeks.  
However, the majority opinion treats Acuity more harshly than it 
treats any other insurer who has failed to comply with Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(4m)(a)1 because of the way in which the majority 
opinion interprets the stipulation.  In my view, fairness 
requires that Acuity be treated no better and no worse than any 
other insurer who has failed to comply with § 632.32(4m)(a)1.   
¶99 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07 provides an avenue for a 
circuit court to grant relief from a stipulation, as the 
majority opinion interprets it, and thereby treat Acuity as any 
No.  2005AP1629.pdr 
 
10 
 
other insurer that has failed to comply with Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(4m)(a)1.  Section 806.07(1) provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court, 
subject to subs. (2) and (3), may relieve a party or 
legal 
representative 
from 
a 
judgment, 
order 
or 
stipulation for the following reasons: 
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; 
(b) Newly-discovered evidence which entitles a 
party to a new trial under s 805.15(3); 
(c) Fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct 
of an adverse party; 
(d) The judgment is void; 
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released or 
discharged; 
(f) A prior judgment upon which the judgment is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated; 
(g) It is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or 
(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
In my view, fairness requires consideration of Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07(1). 
No.  2005AP1629.pdr 
 
11 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶100 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion's 
discussion and conclusions relative to the stipulation for three 
reasons:  (1) the stipulation is ambiguous as to the parties' 
intent; (2) the majority opinion unreasonably interprets the 
parties' stipulation to effect an unwarranted penalty against 
Acuity; and (3) in the alternative, even were I to agree with 
the 
majority 
opinion's interpretation of the stipulation, 
fairness requires that the penalty to which Acuity should be 
subjected for failing to comply with Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(a)1 
be referred to the circuit court so that Acuity can bring a 
motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1), to request relief 
from the stipulation, in order that Acuity be treated the same 
as would any other insurer who did not give the notice required 
by § 632.32(4m)(a)1.   
 
 
No.  2005AP1629.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶101 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I concur with the majority's conclusions 
that Acuity violated the notice provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(4m) 
when 
it 
failed 
to 
provide 
notice 
of 
the 
availability of UIM coverage, and that the Stones' recovery for 
that violation is potentially set by the stipulation they 
entered into with Acuity.  See majority op., ¶¶2-3, 77-78.  
Consequently, I join that part of the opinion. 
¶102 However, I dissent from that part of the majority 
opinion establishing the remedy for other cases in which Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(4m) is violated but where, unlike this case, a 
stipulation does not set the remedy for the parties.  In its 
analysis, the majority goes beyond the facts and issues of the 
present case.  Not only does the majority address questions 
which need not be resolved in this case, but I also disagree 
with the answer the majority chose:  the creation of a new rule 
that when an insurer fails to provide notice of the availability 
of UIM coverage in an umbrella insurance coverage policy, the 
remedy is to reform the policy to automatically read into the 
policy primary coverage amounts of $50,000 per person and 
$100,000 per accident.  See id., ¶64. 
¶103 The majority fails to recognize that an insurance 
policy "that violates a statute or rule is enforceable against 
the insurer as if it conformed to the statute or rule."  
Rebernick v. Wausau Gen. Ins. Co., 2006 WI 27, ¶57, 289 
Wis. 2d 324, 711 N.W.2d 621 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 631.15(3m)).  
No.  2005AP1629.lbb 
 
2 
 
Thus, in my view, a determination of the appropriate reformation 
remedy for Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m) violations generally requires 
a prerequisite factual determination of whether an insured would 
have purchased a UIM policy in the first place, and at what 
amount.  Moreover, capping available umbrella coverage at the 
levels established in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(d) conflicts with 
the meaning and purpose of "umbrella" insurance policies, which 
set the minimum coverage at $1,000,000.  Wis. Admin. Code § INS 
6.77(3)(c)(June 2007).  
I 
 
¶104 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(4m) clearly provides that:  
An insurer writing policies that insure with respect 
to a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged 
in this state against loss resulting from liability 
imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by 
a person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or 
use of a motor vehicle shall provide to one insured 
 . . . written 
notice 
of 
the 
availability 
of 
underinsured motorist coverage, including a brief 
description of the coverage. . . .  
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(a)1. (emphasis added).  In Rebernick, 
289 Wis. 2d 324, ¶¶22-23, we explained that notice of the 
availability of UIM coverage must be provided under umbrella 
policies in addition to the notice provided with underlying 
primary policies.  In Rebernick, this court did not determine 
the appropriate remedy for violations of § 632.32(4m) because 
the 
majority 
concluded 
that 
the 
insurer 
had 
given 
the 
statutorily required notice.  Id., ¶¶34-37. 
¶105 In the present case, because the required notice was 
clearly not given, the issue of determining the appropriate 
remedy is back on the table.  However, the remedy in this case 
No.  2005AP1629.lbb 
 
3 
 
may 
have 
been 
already 
pre-determined 
by 
the 
parties' 
stipulation.  The majority acknowledges that the stipulation 
between the parties in this case reflects a clear and explicit 
agreement by Acuity to pay the Stones $500,000 in the event that 
insurance coverage from Acuity was found on appeal to exist.  
Majority op., ¶¶3, 66.  
¶106 Our conclusion that Acuity failed to give statutorily 
required notice is only the first step in determining whether 
insurance coverage exists in this case.  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 631.15(3m), an insurance policy "that violates a statute or 
rule is enforceable against the insurer as if it conformed to 
the statute or rule."  Thus, § 631.15(3m) provides, in effect, 
for reformation of an insurance policy that violates a statute.  
Yet, we do not know if the Stones would have purchased an 
umbrella policy had they known of its availability, and at what 
amount.  Lack of such notice will not always translate into 
payment of insurance proceeds.  In short, the remedy question in 
this case involves factual issues that cannot be resolved based 
on the current record.  
¶107 If, on remand, the circuit court concludes that the 
Stones would have purchased an umbrella policy if they had been 
provided with the requisite notice, the terms of the unambiguous 
stipulation would then be met in this case, triggering Acuity's 
responsibility to compensate the Stones in the amount of 
$500,000 and resolving the issue of the appropriate remedy.  
No.  2005AP1629.lbb 
 
4 
 
 
II 
¶108 Even if this case did not involve such a stipulation 
and it were necessary to determine a different remedy for an 
insurer's failure to provide notice of the availability of UIM 
coverage under an umbrella policy, I strongly disagree with the 
majority's proposed solution of reading into an umbrella policy 
a level of coverage in the amount of $50,000 per person and 
$100,000 per accident, which is well below the minimum coverage 
provided for an umbrella policy.   
¶109 In addition to deciding an issue not squarely before 
it, this judicially constructed remedy is flawed for two other 
reasons: it fails to take into account the necessity of 
remanding such cases for required factual determinations, and 
the amount established for violating notice provisions for UIM 
in umbrella insurance policies contravenes the purpose and 
nature of umbrella insurance policies. 
A 
¶110 Acuity's failure to comply with the requirements of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4m) 
involves 
the 
interpretation 
and 
application of a statute to undisputed facts, which is a 
question of law subject to independent review.  Phelps v. 
Physicians Ins. Co., 2005 WI 85, ¶25, 282 Wis. 2d 69, 698 N.W.2d 
643.  Wisconsin Stat. § 631.15(3m), which provides that an 
insurance policy "that violates a statute or rule is enforceable 
against the insurer as if it conformed to the statute or rule," 
authorizes reformation of insurance policies which are not in 
No.  2005AP1629.lbb 
 
5 
 
compliance with statutory requirements.  See also Brunson v. 
Ward, 2001 WI 89, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 163, 629 N.W.2d 140.   
¶111 However, determination of the appropriate reformation 
is not a straightforward determination which may be made absent 
further 
factual 
inquiries. 
 
A 
recitation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.15(3m) does not answer the question of whether, had Acuity 
provided the required notice, the Stones would have purchased 
UIM coverage in their umbrella policy and at what amount. 
¶112 In this case, the majority concedes that whether the 
Stones would have purchased UIM coverage remains a genuine issue 
of fact.  Majority op., ¶40.  Findings of whether a particular 
policy would have been purchased, and at what amount, are 
questions of fact reserved for the circuit court.  Should the 
circuit court find, on remand, that coverage exists, then the 
terms of the stipulation clearly govern. 
¶113 Even if there were no such stipulation in this case, 
we would exceed the scope of our authority were we to determine 
the amount of coverage the Stones' UIM policy should provide 
before first remanding the case for the factual determination of 
whether the Stones would have purchased such a policy in the 
first place, as well as how much insurance they would have 
purchased.  Any remedy beyond that clearly provided by the 
unambiguous stipulation between the parties is a determination 
involving factual issues that is within the province of the 
circuit court, not this court.  I therefore consider the 
majority's consideration of this issue to be unnecessary and 
beyond the scope of this court's authority. 
No.  2005AP1629.lbb 
 
6 
 
B 
¶114 Finally, even if it were appropriate for us to 
determine the appropriate default amount of coverage for future 
cases involving Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m) violations, I would 
nevertheless reject the default remedy proposed by the majority 
opinion for failure to offer UIM coverage with an umbrella 
policy.  Setting the remedy for failure to offer UIM coverage 
for an umbrella policy at a primary insurance policy default 
coverage level of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident 
does not make sense in light of the underlying nature, purpose, 
and policy minimums of umbrella policies.  
¶115 Unlike primary insurance policies, umbrella policies 
are meant to cover large expenses which may vastly exceed those 
covered by primary insurance.  The coverage provided by umbrella 
policies "'gives a financial security, as well as peace of mind, 
to the individual purchasing such coverage who is hopeful that 
he will never be involved in any substantial claim or lawsuit, 
but, if he is, is desirous of not losing the security it may 
have taken a lifetime to acquire.'"  Oelhafen v. Tower Ins. Co., 
171 Wis. 2d 532, 538-39, 492 N.W.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1992)(quoting 
8A J.A. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, 
§ 4909.85 at 452-53 (rev. ed. 1981)). 
¶116 Setting 
the 
levels 
established 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4m)(d) as the appropriate level of coverage for 
violations which fail to give notice of the availability of 
umbrella policies is in direct contravention of the clear intent 
of the Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner to set the minimum 
No.  2005AP1629.lbb 
 
7 
 
coverage for umbrella policies at $1,000,000.  Wisconsin Admin. 
Code § INS 6.77(3)(c) defines an umbrella liability policy as 
"an 
insurance 
contract 
providing 
at 
least 
$1,000,000 
of 
liability coverage per person or per occurrence in excess of 
certain required underlying liability insurance coverage or a 
specified amount of self-insured retention." 
¶117 It is well established that although this court may 
not  
ex post facto compel the performance of conditions in 
a contract which the parties did not contemplate or 
bargain for, coverages omitted from an insurance 
contract may nevertheless be compelled and enforced as 
though a part thereof where the inclusion of such 
coverage is required by a properly enacted statute. In 
such case a policy of insurance omitting a required 
coverage will be enforced as though it had been 
written 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
legislative 
prescription. 
Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 53, 170 
N.W.2d 813 (1969)(citing 44 C.J.S. Insurance, § 302 at 1215-16; 
Zippel v. Country Gardens, Inc., 262 Wis. 2d 567, 55 N.W.2d 903 
(1952); Sandstrom v. Estate of Clausen, 258 Wis. 534, 46 N.W.2d 
831 
(1951)). 
 
In 
this 
case, 
the 
applicable 
legislative 
prescription 
includes 
both 
the 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4m) 
requirement that coverage be offered and the clear language of 
Wis. Admin. Code § INS 6.77(3)(c) setting the minimum amount of 
umbrella coverage at $1,000,000.  Consequently, the omission of 
required umbrella coverage should be enforced as though the 
coverage in the amount of at least $1,000,000 had been offered.  
In the absence of any legal authority requiring or explicitly 
authorizing this court to lower the umbrella policy coverage 
No.  2005AP1629.lbb 
 
8 
 
levels in favor of a new judicially created statutory violation 
remedy, the majority goes too far and fails to accommodate the 
difference between umbrella insurance policies and primary 
insurance policies.  
¶118 In Rebernick, this court stated that the central 
purpose of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m) is to ensure that insureds 
are informed both of the availability of UIM coverage, as well 
as the nature and amount of coverage.  See Rebernick, 289 Wis. 
2d 324, ¶30.  The contradictory result of the majority opinion 
would be to require that insureds be told that they could 
receive $1,000,000 UIM umbrella coverage, but then be given only 
a fraction of that upon a statutory or rule violation.  
¶119 As such, if a policy were reformed to provide the kind 
of coverage that would have been available had the Stones opted 
for UIM umbrella coverage, that amount would more appropriately 
be set at $1,000,000 (or more, if upon remand the Stones could 
establish they would have purchased more coverage), not the 
lower statutory minimum set by § 632.32(4m)(d) for primary 
policies. 
III 
¶120 In conclusion, the stipulation between the parties in 
this case makes the majority's analysis of other potential 
remedies for Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(d) violations unnecessary.  
What is necessary is a remand to determine whether the 
stipulation should take effect.  Even if this case were not 
resolved through the application of the stipulation, however, I 
still disagree with the majority's new rule adopting the 
No.  2005AP1629.lbb 
 
9 
 
statutory minimum coverage for primary insurance policies as the 
required statutory minimum for umbrella insurance policies as 
well, 
where 
there 
is 
a 
violation 
of 
§ 632.32(4m)(d), 
particularly where the finder of fact has not determined whether 
and at what amount umbrella UIM coverage would have even been 
purchased, and in light of the minimum umbrella insurance amount 
of $1,000,000.  I therefore respectfully concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP1629.lbb 
 
 
 
1