Case Title: United Food & Commercial Workers International Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 42/16

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, et al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
et al., No. 42, September Term, 2016.  Opinion by Getty, J. 
 
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT — NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT — 
PREEMPTION 
Employer’s state law claims for trespass and nuisance against labor union that held 
disruptive, nonviolent demonstrations on employer’s private property were not preempted 
by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).  Although labor union’s conduct was 
arguably prohibited by the NLRA, local interest exception to NLRA preemption applied.  
First, protecting the private property rights of citizens is a significant state interest that is 
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.  Second, the state law claims presented to 
the circuit court are not identical to the claims presented to the National Labor Relations 
Board (“NLRB”), so exercising state court jurisdiction over the state law claims entails 
little risk of interference with the regulatory jurisdiction of the NLRB.  Therefore, the 
circuit court properly denied labor union’s motion to dismiss the state law claims for lack 
of jurisdiction. 
 
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT — ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT — LABOR DISPUTE 
CASE 
Employer’s lawsuit for trespass and nuisance against labor union did not “involve or grow 
out of a labor dispute,” because labor union did not represent, or seek to represent, 
employer’s employees.  Therefore, employer was not required to satisfy heightened criteria 
of Maryland’s Anti-Injunction Act in order to receive an injunction against the labor union. 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Case No. 02-C-13-181974 
Argued: January 6, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 42 
 
September Term, 2016 
 
 
  
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL 
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
ET AL. 
 
 
 
v. 
 
WAL-MART STORES, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Getty, J. 
 
 
Filed: June 22, 2017 
 
 
 
In this appeal, a labor union seeks dismissal of an employer’s state law claims for 
trespass and nuisance on grounds of federal preemption.  The employer, on the other hand, 
seeks to uphold an injunction to prohibit the labor union from holding demonstrations about 
the employer’s employment conditions on the employer’s private property.  United Food 
and Commercial Workers International Union (“UFCW”), petitioner, is a labor union that 
represents grocery, retail, meatpacking, and food-processing workers.  The other 
petitioners are a subsidiary of UFCW known as the Organization United for Respect at 
Walmart (“OURWalmart”), employees of UFCW, a coalition of labor organizations known 
as Jobs with Justice, and demonstrators identified only as “Does 1-10.”  Respondents—
Wal-mart Stores, Inc.; WalMart Stores East, LP; and Sam’s East, Inc. (collectively, 
“Walmart”)—own and operate approximately sixty retail stores in Maryland.  Between 
2011 and 2013, UFCW held demonstrations at Walmart stores throughout Maryland, 
protesting Walmart’s employment conditions.  In response, Walmart sued UFCW in the 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for trespass and nuisance, and sought an injunction 
against UFCW. 
 
UFCW filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Walmart’s claims were preempted by 
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).  The circuit court held that Walmart’s claims 
were not preempted, and denied UFCW’s motion to dismiss.  Walmart filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction, in which it argued that this case does not involve a labor dispute 
within the meaning of Maryland’s Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”).  The circuit court agreed 
with Walmart that the AIA does not apply, and granted the preliminary injunction.  After 
the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court granted summary 
 
2 
 
judgment in favor of Walmart, and issued a permanent injunction against UFCW.  On 
appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 
 
Before this Court, UFCW argues that the circuit court erred in denying its motion 
to dismiss, because Walmart’s state law claims for trespass and nuisance are preempted by 
the NLRA.  Additionally, UFCW argues that this case involves a labor dispute within the 
meaning of the AIA, and that Walmart did not satisfy the AIA’s requirements to receive 
an injunction.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that Walmart’s claims for trespass and 
nuisance are not preempted by the NLRA, and therefore the circuit court properly denied 
UFCW’s motion to dismiss.  Furthermore, we hold that the circuit court was correct in 
ruling that this case does not involve a labor dispute within the meaning of the AIA.  
Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
 
UFCW represents grocery, retail, meatpacking, and food-processing workers.  
Between 2011 and 2013, UFCW held demonstrations at Walmart stores in thirteen states, 
including Maryland.1  Walmart employees are not unionized, and UFCW does not seek to 
represent them.  UFCW claims that the purpose of its demonstrations was to persuade 
Walmart to improve employment conditions and to stop retaliating against employees who 
speak out for better conditions. 
                                                 
1 UFCW’s demonstrations also took place in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
 
3 
 
 
UFCW’s demonstrations in Maryland took place between July 16, 2011 and 
September 5, 2013, at seven Walmart stores located in Arbutus, Bowie, Germantown, 
Hanover, Landover Hills, Laurel, and Severn.  Most demonstrations took place inside the 
stores; some took place in adjacent parking areas owned or leased by Walmart; and one 
took place on a public road near one of the stores.  The demonstrations were organized as 
“flash mobs,” meaning the demonstrators were notified by social media or cell phone text 
messages to quickly gather at a particular store.2  The demonstrators then arrived at the 
store en masse in a coordinated effort.  During the demonstrations, they marched through 
the stores—chanting, singing, blowing whistles, shouting into bullhorns and megaphones, 
and littering the stores with flyers.  On some occasions, demonstrators inside the stores 
interrupted management meetings by forcing themselves into the meeting rooms and 
videotaping the managers’ efforts to get them to leave.  Some of the demonstrations lasted 
only fifteen to twenty minutes, while others lasted over an hour and included over one 
hundred demonstrators. 
 
During many of the demonstrations, the demonstrators interfered with customers by 
blocking access to the cash registers and restrooms.  In some cases, customers with items 
in their shopping carts left the store without purchasing any items.  For example, during a 
demonstration at the Laurel Walmart on July 16, 2011, forty demonstrators wearing 
                                                 
2 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 382 P.3d 
1249, 1252 n.2 (Colo. App. 2016) (defining “flash mob” as “[a] group of people summoned 
(such as by e-mail or text messages) to a designated location at a specified time to perform 
an indicated action before dispersing”). 
 
4 
 
OURWalmart t-shirts formed a human chain stretching from the first to the last checkout 
counter.  In some instances, the demonstrators also blocked ingress and egress to parking 
lots, parking spaces, and store entrances.  During a demonstration in May 2012 at the Bowie 
Walmart, demonstrators parked a large van decorated with OURWalmart logos in the 
parking lot.  They played OURWalmart videos on a television screen mounted on the van, 
piped music through speakers, and solicited customers and employees as they passed by. 
At all of the demonstrations, Walmart managers repeatedly told the demonstrators 
to leave Walmart’s property, but they refused.  In each instance, the demonstrators were 
ultimately removed by the police, but sometimes returned to the same store as soon as the 
next day.  Walmart’s lawyers sent cease and desist letters to counsel for UFCW in October 
2011, October 2012, November 2012, and April 2013.  UFCW refused to cease the 
demonstrations absent a court order to do so. 
In March 2013, Walmart filed an unfair labor practice (“ULP”) charge against 
UFCW and OURWalmart with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).  Walmart 
alleged that UFCW had violated section 8 of the NLRA “by planning, orchestrating, and 
conducting a series of unauthorized and blatantly trespassory in-store mass demonstrations 
. . . by which the UFCW restrained and coerced [Walmart] employees in the exercise of 
their Section 7 rights” under the NLRA.  The ULP charge included a summary of seventy 
“events” UFCW had held at Walmart stores in thirteen states, including twelve “events” in 
Maryland.  The allegations in the ULP charge all pertained to instances in which 
demonstrators confronted Walmart managers or employees directly, using “in your face” 
tactics in an effort to intimidate them into supporting UFCW.  Demonstrations that did not 
 
5 
 
include such coercive tactics were not included in the ULP charge.  In May 2013, Walmart 
amended its ULP charge to narrow its scope to several events at a few stores around the 
country.  The amended ULP charge did not include any events at Walmart stores in 
Maryland. 
On September 20, 2013, Walmart filed a complaint against UFCW in the Circuit 
Court for Anne Arundel County.3  In its first amended complaint, filed on October 2, 2013, 
Walmart alleged that UFCW had violated Maryland law “through coordinated, statewide 
acts of trespass,” such as conducting “in-store ‘flash mobs’” and blocking “ingress and 
egress to parking lots, parking spaces, vehicular traffic, and store entrances.”  The amended 
complaint detailed fifteen demonstrations at seven Walmart stores in Maryland.  The 
complaint set forth claims for trespass and public and private nuisance, and sought nominal 
damages, a permanent injunction, and declaratory relief. 
On October 10, 2013, Walmart filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.  As part 
of its motion, Walmart argued that this case does not involve a labor dispute within the 
meaning of the AIA, and therefore Walmart was not required to satisfy the AIA’s 
heightened requirements to receive an injunction.  On October 25, 2013, UFCW filed a 
response in opposition to the motion.  UFCW responded to Walmart’s argument 
concerning the AIA that this case does involve a labor dispute, and therefore Walmart must 
satisfy the heightened requirements in order to receive an injunction. 
                                                 
3 Walmart also filed state court actions in Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Ohio, and 
Washington. 
 
6 
 
On November 25 and 26, 2013, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the 
motion.  First, after hearing argument from both parties, the circuit court ruled that the case 
does not involve a labor dispute within the meaning of the AIA, so Walmart was not 
required to satisfy its heightened criteria for receiving an injunction.  Next, Walmart 
presented three witnesses, each of whom was cross-examined by UFCW.  At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court granted the preliminary injunction.  In its order, 
entered on November 26, 2013, the circuit court enjoined UFCW from 
(i) 
entering on or inside Walmart private property in the State of 
Maryland to engage in activities such as unlawful picketing, patrolling, 
parading, demonstrations, “flash mobs,” handbilling, solicitation, customer 
interference, and manager confrontations; 
(ii) 
entering on or inside Walmart’s private property in the State of 
Maryland without permission or authorization from Walmart for any purpose 
other than shopping for and/or purchasing merchandise at Walmart’s stores; 
[and] 
(iii) 
engaging in any nuisance conduct off Walmart’s private 
property in the State of Maryland which blocks, causes to be blocked, 
disrupts and/or interferes with Walmart customers’ or associates’ access to, 
or ability to move around on, or enter or exit Walmart private property in the 
State of Maryland[.] 
Meanwhile, on October 11, 2013, UFCW filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Walmart’s claims were preempted by 
the NLRA.  On October 28, 2013, Walmart filed a response in opposition to the motion.  
On November 12, 2013, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion, and ruled that 
Walmart’s claims were not preempted.  The circuit court issued an order denying UFCW’s 
motion to dismiss on November 26, 2013. 
 
7 
 
On August 19, 2014, after extensive discovery, Walmart and UFCW filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.  At a hearing on March 3, 2015, the circuit court denied 
UFCW’s motion and granted Walmart’s motion.  On March 16, 2015, the circuit court 
issued a memorandum opinion and order to that effect.  That same day, the circuit court 
entered a permanent injunction against UFCW, prohibiting it from 
1. 
Entering on Walmart’s private property in the State of 
Maryland to engage in activities such as picketing, patrolling, parading, 
demonstrations, chanting, “flash mobs,” handbilling, solicitation, customer 
disruptions, manager delegations or confrontations, or associate engagement 
for a non-shopping purpose; 
2. 
Entering on Walmart’s private property in the State of 
Maryland without permission for any purpose other than shopping for and/or 
purchasing merchandise at Walmart’s stores; 
3. 
Interfering with, obstructing or blocking Walmart’s and its 
customers’ access to, and use of, easements and/or right-of-ways granted by 
Walmart across or upon apron sidewalks and parking lots adjacent to stores 
for which Walmart has a “building-only” lease; and 
4. 
Engaging in any nuisance conduct off Walmart’s private 
property which disrupts and/or interferes with Walmart’s customers’ or 
associates’ access to, or ability to move around on or exit, Walmart private 
property in the State of Maryland[.] 
The injunction defined “Walmart’s private property” as the interior of its stores and other 
facilities in Maryland, and “[t]he apron sidewalks, parking lots, and other areas on any 
parcel of property in Maryland that Walmart controls as owner or lessee.” 
 
UFCW appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court 
in a reported opinion on June 1, 2016.  United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“UFCW”), 228 Md. App. 203 (2016).  UFCW then petitioned this 
Court for a writ of certiorari on July 11, 2016, which we granted on September 2, 2016.  
 
8 
 
United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. Wal-Mart, 450 Md. 103 (2016).  
UFCW presents two questions for our review, which we have rephrased as follows4: 
1) 
Did the circuit court err in denying UFCW’s motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction on grounds of federal preemption? 
2) 
Did the circuit court err in ruling that this case does not involve a labor dispute 
within the meaning of the AIA? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Whether a federal statute preempts Maryland law is a question of law that this Court 
reviews de novo.  Sweeney v. Savings First Mortg., LLC, 388 Md. 319, 326 (2005).  
Similarly, the construction of a Maryland statute, like the AIA, and the determination of 
whether the statute applies to a particular case, are also questions of law that this Court 
reviews de novo.  See Vu v. Allied Foot & Ankle, P.C., 180 Md. App. 663, 677–84 (2008) 
(reviewing without deference the circuit court’s determination that the AIA did not apply). 
DISCUSSION 
A. 
NLRA Preemption 
 
Congress has the power, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause5 of the United States 
Constitution, to preempt state law.  Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 708 (1992) (citing 
                                                 
4 In its petition for a writ of certiorari, UFCW combined the two issues into a single 
question presented: “Did the Court [of Special Appeals] err when it held that this case does 
not involve a labor dispute and the NLRA does not preempt Walmart’s claims?”  However, 
in their briefs, both parties addressed the question as two separate issues. 
5  
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the 
 
9 
 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)).  Federal law preempts state law when “Congress has 
expressly stated preemptive intent or evidenced an intent to occupy a field,” or when state 
law conflicts with federal law.  Law v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 37, 373 
Md. 459, 466–67 (2003).  “Because Congress has never exercised authority to occupy the 
entire field in the area of labor legislation, the question of whether a certain state action is 
preempted by federal law is one of congressional intent.”  Batson, 325 Md. at 708 (citing 
Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)). 
The enactment of the NLRA in 1935 marked a fundamental change in 
this Nation’s labor policies.  Congress expressly recognized that collective 
organization of segments of the labor force into bargaining units capable of 
exercising economic power comparable to that possessed by employers could 
produce benefits for the entire economy.  Congress determined that those 
benefits would eventually outweigh the occasional costs of industrial strife 
associated with the organization of unions and the negotiation and 
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. 
Vane v. Nocella, 303 Md. 362, 366 (1985). 
In addition, “[t]he NLRA established the NLRB to adjudicate labor disputes 
between and among employees, unions and employers.”  Law, 373 Md. at 468.  As 
explained by the Supreme Court, 
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be 
enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties.  It 
went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a 
specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular 
procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, 
including judicial relief pending a final administrative order.  Congress 
evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed 
                                                 
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or 
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 
10 
 
procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive 
rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety 
of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. 
Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 
(1953).  “Thus, to achieve uniform as well as effective enforcement of the national labor 
policy, Congress vested the NLRB, not federal or state courts, with primary jurisdiction 
over activities subject to regulation by the Board.”  Vane, 303 Md. at 367 (citing Local 
926, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 681 (1983)). 
 
The NLRB has primary jurisdiction over activities regulated by sections 7 and 8 of 
the NLRA.  Law, 373 Md. at 471.  Section 7 protects certain conduct of employees, while 
section 8 prohibits certain conduct of employers and labor organizations by defining what 
constitutes an “unfair labor practice.”  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158.  Pursuant to section 7, 
employees “have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, 
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection[.]”  Id. at § 157.  In addition, and particularly relevant here, employees “also 
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right 
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a 
condition of employment . . . .”  Id.  Pursuant to section 8, it is “an unfair labor practice for 
a labor organization or its agents . . . to restrain or coerce . . . employees in the exercise of 
the rights guaranteed in section [7 of the NLRA.]”  Id. at 158(b)(1) (paragraph break 
omitted).  The NLRB has the authority, pursuant to the NLRA, “to prevent any person from 
engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce.”  Id. at § 160. 
 
11 
 
 
“In enacting the NLRA, Congress never determined the precise extent to which state 
law must be displaced to achieve the unifying ends sought by the national legislature.”  
Vane, 303 Md. at 368.  “Consequently, a major difficulty with labor law preemption 
analysis is that ‘the aims and social policy’ Congress was implementing ‘were drawn with 
broad strokes while the details had to be filled in, to no small extent, by the judicial 
process.’”  Id. (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. 
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 240 (1959)). 
 
Accordingly, through a series of decisions, the Supreme Court established the 
following framework for determining whether state law causes of action are preempted by 
the NLRA: 
First, we determine whether the conduct that the state seeks to regulate or to 
make the basis of liability is actually or arguably protected or prohibited by 
the NLRA.  . . . [I]f the conduct at issue is arguably prohibited or protected[,] 
otherwise applicable state law and procedures are ordinarily preempted.  
When, however, the conduct at issue is only a peripheral concern of the Act 
or touches on interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility 
that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not be 
inferred that Congress intended to deprive the state of the power to act, we 
refuse to invalidate state regulation or sanction of the conduct.  The question 
of whether regulation should be allowed because of the deeply-rooted nature 
of the local interest involves a sensitive balancing of any harm to the 
regulatory scheme established by Congress, either in terms of negating the 
[NLRB]’s exclusive jurisdiction or in terms of conflicting substantive rules, 
and the importance of the asserted cause of action to the state as a protection 
to its citizens. 
Jones, 460 U.S. at 676 (citations omitted). 
Thus, in cases of arguably protected or prohibited conduct, we begin with the 
presumption that the conduct is regulated by the NLRA and therefore that state law claims 
are preempted.  However, the presumption is rebutted if either of two exceptions to 
 
12 
 
preemption apply.  First, the NLRA does not preempt state law claims if “the conduct at 
issue is only a peripheral concern of the [NLRA].”  Id. (citing Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243).  
Second, the NLRA does not preempt state law claims when the conduct at issue “touches 
on interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of 
compelling congressional direction, it could not be inferred that Congress intended to 
deprive the state of the power to act[.]”  Id. (citing Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244).  This is 
known as the “local interest exception” to the NLRA preemption analysis. 
To determine whether the local interest exception applies in cases of arguably 
prohibited conduct,6 the courts engage in a two-part inquiry.  First, the courts must 
determine whether “there exist[s] a significant state interest in protecting the citizen from 
the challenged conduct.”  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. Council of 
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 196 (1978).  Second, the courts must consider whether “the 
exercise of state jurisdiction over the tort claim entail[s] little risk of interference with the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the [NLRB].”  Id.  Regarding this second inquiry, the courts must 
focus on “whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical with that which 
could be presented to the [NLRB].”  Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 510 (1983). 
                                                 
6 The Supreme Court has made clear that the preemption analysis for arguably protected 
conduct under section 7 of the NLRA is distinct from the analysis for arguably prohibited 
conduct under section 8 of the NLRA.  See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. 
Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 190 (1978) (“While the considerations underlying 
the two categories overlap, they differ in significant respects and therefore it is useful to 
review them separately.”).  UFCW has not claimed that their conduct was arguably 
protected by the NLRA, so that branch of the preemption analysis is not at issue here. 
 
13 
 
UFCW argues that the circuit court erred in denying its motion to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction.  UFCW asserts that Walmart’s state law claims for trespass and nuisance 
are preempted by the NLRA because they pertain to conduct that is arguably prohibited by 
the NLRA.  Walmart responds that its state law claims are not preempted because the local 
interest exception to the NLRA preemption analysis applies to trespass and nuisance.  Thus, 
the issue before this Court is whether the local interest exception applies to Walmart’s state 
law claims for trespass and nuisance.7 
In order to determine whether the local interest exception applies to Walmart’s 
claims, we first must decide whether there is a significant state interest involved in those 
claims.  In other words, does “there exist[] a significant state interest in protecting the 
citizen from the challenged conduct”?  Sears, 436 U.S. at 196.  Second, we must consider 
whether “the exercise of state jurisdiction over the tort claim entail[s] little risk of 
interference with the regulatory jurisdiction of the [NLRB].”  Id. 
Regarding the first inquiry, UFCW asserts that the local interest exception only 
applies to conduct involving violence, threats of violence, property damage, or malice, 
none of which occurred here, and therefore there is no “significant state interest” involved 
in Walmart’s claims.  Walmart responds that Sears held that protecting citizens from 
“peaceful trespass” qualifies as a significant state interest, even in the absence of violence 
or threats of violence.  Moreover, Walmart argues that protecting private property rights is 
                                                 
7 Walmart does not argue that the “merely peripheral concern” exception to NLRA 
preemption applies to their claims, so we will not address that exception in this opinion. 
 
14 
 
a more significant state interest than certain other state interests that have been recognized 
to support the local interest exception, and therefore protecting private property rights 
should qualify as well. 
Regarding the second inquiry, UFCW asserts that courts must look to whether the 
conduct at issue in the state law claims is similar to the conduct at issue in the (actual or 
hypothetical) NLRB claim.  If the conduct is similar, then the state law claims are 
preempted.  In this case, UFCW contends, the conduct at issue in Walmart’s state law 
trespass and nuisance claims is the same conduct that would have been at issue in the NLRB 
claim as originally filed, and therefore the state law claims are preempted.  Walmart 
responds that courts must compare the legal elements of the state law claims and the (actual 
or hypothetical) NLRB claim, not the factual underpinnings of those claims, in order to 
determine whether there is a risk of interference with the regulatory jurisdiction of the 
NLRB.  In this case, Walmart contends, the legal elements of its state law trespass and 
nuisance claims are distinct from the NLRB claim filed by Walmart: the former is 
concerned with whether UFCW trespassed on Walmart’s property by exceeding its limited 
invitation to the public to enter its property for shopping purposes; the latter is concerned 
with whether UFCW engaged in coercive activities in violation of section 8 of the NLRA.  
Therefore, Walmart concludes, its state law claims for trespass and coercion are not 
preempted by the NLRA. 
Both parties recognize that Sears is the leading Supreme Court decision regarding 
the local interest exception to NLRA preemption, and both parties assert that Sears is 
controlling here.  However, the parties differ on their respective interpretations of the Sears 
 
15 
 
decision.  In Sears, a carpenters union picketed on Sears’ exterior private property.  436 
U.S. at 182.  “The picketing was peaceful and orderly.”  Id.  When Sears attempted to 
remove the pickets from its property through the use of its private security, the union 
refused to leave.  Id. at 182–83.  Thereafter, Sears filed a complaint in state court “seeking 
an injunction against the continuing trespass.”  Id. at 183. 
Sears asserted no claim that the picketing itself violated any state or federal 
law.  It sought simply to remove the pickets from its property to the public 
walkways, and the injunction issued by the state court was strictly confined 
to the relief sought.  Thus, as a matter of state law, the location of the 
picketing was illegal but the picketing itself was unobjectionable. 
Id. at 185.  The union argued that Sears’ state law claim was preempted because the 
peaceful picketing was both arguably protected and arguably prohibited by the NLRA.  Id. 
 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by quoting the general rule of NLRA 
preemption: “When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States 
as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if the 
danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.”  Id. at 187–88 (quoting 
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245).  The Sears Court then qualified that general rule with the 
following observation: 
While the Garmon formulation accurately reflects the basic federal concern 
with potential state interference with national labor policy, the history of the 
labor pre-emption doctrine in this Court does not support an approach which 
sweeps away state-court jurisdiction over conduct traditionally subject to 
state regulation without careful consideration of the relative impact of such 
a jurisdictional bar on the various interests affected. 
Id. at 188. 
 
16 
 
 
The Court then turned to the “arguably prohibited” prong of the preemption 
analysis, and began by discussing prior cases in which the contested state law claims were 
held to be preempted by the NLRA.  See id. at 191–94 (citing, inter alia, Garner, 346 U.S. 
485).  Next, the Sears Court contrasted those cases with others in which it had held that the 
local interest exception applied, and therefore the state law claims at issue were not 
preempted.  See id. at 194–97.  The Court summarized these “local interest” cases as 
follows: 
Thus, for example, the Court has upheld state-court jurisdiction over conduct 
that touches “interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility 
that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer 
that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.”  [] Garmon, 359 
U.S. at 244.  See Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 
347 U.S. 656 [(1954)] (threats of violence); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 
U.S. 131 [(1957)] (violence); Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 
[(1958)] (violence); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 [(1966)] 
(libel); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 [(1977)] (intentional infliction 
of mental distress). 
Id. at 195. 
 
Next, citing Farmer, the Sears Court identified two factors that “warranted a 
departure from the general pre-emption guidelines in the ‘local interest’ cases.”  Id. at 196. 
First, there existed a significant state interest in protecting the citizen from 
the challenged conduct.  Second, although the challenged conduct occurred 
in the course of a labor dispute and an unfair labor practice charge could have 
been filed, the exercise of state jurisdiction over the tort claim entailed little 
risk of interference with the regulatory jurisdiction of the [NLRB].  Although 
the arguable federal violation and the state tort arose in the same factual 
setting, the respective controversies presented to the state and federal forums 
would not have been the same. 
The critical inquiry, therefore, is not whether the State is enforcing a law 
relating specifically to labor relations or one of general application but 
whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to (as in 
 
17 
 
Garner) or different from (as in Farmer) that which could have been, but 
was not, presented to the [NLRB].  For it is only in the former situation that 
a state court’s exercise of jurisdiction necessarily involves a risk of 
interference with the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the [NLRB] which 
the arguably prohibited branch of the Garmon doctrine was designed to 
avoid. 
Id. at 196–97 (footnote omitted). 
 
Finally, the Sears Court applied these two factors to Sears’ state law claim and 
determined that “the controversy which Sears might have presented to the [NLRB] is not 
the same as the controversy presented to the state court.”  Id. at 198. 
If Sears had filed a charge, the federal issue would have been whether the 
picketing had a recognitional or work-reassignment objective; decision of 
that issue would have entailed relatively complex factual and legal 
determinations completely unrelated to the simple question whether a 
trespass had occurred.  Conversely, in the state action, Sears only challenged 
the location of the picketing; whether the picketing had an objective 
proscribed by federal law was irrelevant to the state claim.  Accordingly, 
permitting the state court to adjudicate Sears’ trespass claim would create no 
realistic risk of interference with the [NLRB]’s primary jurisdiction to 
enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that preemption was 
inappropriate in this situation, because normal preemption considerations were 
“insufficient to preclude a State from exercising jurisdiction limited to the trespassory 
aspects of [the union’s] activity.”  Id.8 
 
UFCW insists that Sears did not apply the local interest exception to the union’s 
picketing, but simply held that Sears’ state law claim for trespass was not preempted 
                                                 
8 The Supreme Court then went on to consider whether Sears’ state law claim was 
preempted under the “arguably protected” prong of the NLRA preemption analysis, and 
ultimately concluded that it was not.  Sears, 436 U.S. at 199–207. 
 
18 
 
because it involved conduct that was distinct from the “arguably prohibited” conduct under 
the NLRA.  In addition, UFCW notes that in its summary of local interest cases, the Sears 
Court specifically enumerated four state interests that qualified for the exception—
violence, threats of violence, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress—but did 
not mention trespass.  Based on this observation, UFCW concludes that trespass is not a 
significant state interest to which the local interest exception applies. 
 
Walmart responds that the Sears decision did apply the local interest exception to 
the union’s picketing, and establishes that preventing peaceful trespass is a significant state 
interest worthy of the exception.  Walmart notes that the Sears Court did not mention 
trespass in its list of examples of prior local interest cases, because that case was the first 
time the Supreme Court had held that peaceful trespass qualifies for the exception.  
Walmart also contends that in holding that Sears’ trespass claim entailed little risk of 
interference with the NLRB, the Supreme Court compared the respective legal elements of 
the state law claim versus the NLRB claim, rather than the underlying conduct. 
 
We agree with Walmart’s interpretation of the Sears decision.  UFCW is simply 
incorrect when it states that Sears did not apply the local interest exception in its “arguably 
prohibited” preemption analysis.  The Sears Court made clear that it was applying this 
exception by summarizing its prior case law regarding the exception, 436 U.S. at 194–95, 
identifying the two-part test for analyzing the exception, id. at 196–97, and then evaluating 
the facts of the case before it in the context of that two-part inquiry.  Id. at 198.  Although 
the Court did not explicitly state that peaceful trespass supports the local interest exception 
to NLRA preemption, this was clearly the holding of the case.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
 
19 
 
confirmed this holding when it cited Sears in a later case discussing the local interest 
exception: 
This presumption of federal pre-emption, based on the primary jurisdiction 
rationale, properly admits to exception when unusually “deeply rooted” local 
interests are at stake.  In such cases, appropriate consideration for the vitality 
of our federal system and for a rational allocation of functions belies any easy 
inference that Congress intended to deprive the States of their ability to retain 
jurisdiction over such matters.  We have, therefore, refrained from finding 
that the NLRA pre-empts state court jurisdiction over state breach of contract 
actions by strike replacements, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983), 
state trespass actions, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. [San Diego Cnty. Dist. 
Council of] Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978), or state tort remedies for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 
290 (1977). 
Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Emps. & Bartenders Int’l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 502–03 
(1984) (emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, we reject UFCW’s contention that the local interest exception is strictly 
limited to cases involving violence, threats of violence, or malicious conduct.  The 
Supreme Court held in Sears (and later confirmed in Brown) that preventing peaceful 
trespass also qualifies as a significant state interest that is deserving of the local interest 
exception.  Furthermore, we agree with Walmart that the state interest in protecting private 
property rights is at least as significant as other previously recognized interests falling 
under the exception (such as protection against libel and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress), and therefore it would be irrational to conclude that this state interest is not 
“significant” enough to qualify for the exception unless it is accompanied by violence, 
threats of violence, or property damage.  See Taggart v. Weinacker’s Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 
227–28, (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“The protection of private property, whether a 
 
20 
 
home, factory, or store, through trespass laws is historically a concern of state law.  . . .  
Few concepts are more ‘deeply rooted’ than the power of a State to protect the rights of its 
citizens.”).  Accordingly, we hold that there is a significant state interest involved in 
Walmart’s state law claims for trespass and nuisance—namely, the interest in protecting 
private property rights. 
 
Turning to the second inquiry under the local interest exception, we agree with 
Walmart’s contention that courts must look to the legal controversies that would be 
presented to each tribunal (i.e., the state court and the NLRB), not the conduct underlying 
those controversies, to determine whether exercising state court jurisdiction would entail 
little risk of interference with the regulatory jurisdiction of the NLRB.  As the Supreme 
Court stated in Sears, 
The critical inquiry, therefore, is . . . whether the controversy presented to 
the state court is identical to (as in Garner) or different from (as in Farmer) 
that which could have been, but was not, presented to the [NLRB].  For it is 
only in the former situation that a state court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
necessarily involves a risk of interference with the unfair labor practice 
jurisdiction of the [NLRB] which the arguably prohibited branch of the 
Garmon doctrine was designed to avoid. 
436 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added).  Thus, the Sears Court explicitly referenced 
controversies, not conduct, when discussing the second inquiry under the local interest 
exception. 
Moreover, when the Sears Court applied this formulation to the case before it, its 
analysis concerned controversies, or legal issues, not conduct: 
In the present case, the controversy which Sears might have presented to the 
[NLRB] is not the same as the controversy presented to the state court.  If 
Sears had filed a charge, the federal issue would have been whether the 
 
21 
 
picketing had a recognitional or work-reassignment objective; decision of 
that issue would have entailed relatively complex factual and legal 
determinations completely unrelated to the simple question whether a 
trespass had occurred.  Conversely, in the state action, Sears only challenged 
the location of the picketing; whether the picketing had an objective 
proscribed by federal law was irrelevant to the state claim.  Accordingly, 
permitting the state court to adjudicate Sears’ trespass claim would create no 
realistic risk of interference with the [NLRB]’s primary jurisdiction to 
enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices. 
Id. at 198 (emphases added) (footnote omitted). 
 
Later, in Belknap, the Supreme Court once again utilized the comparison-of-
controversies analysis to determine that the contested state law claims were not preempted 
by the NLRA.  In Belknap, employees went on strike when contract negotiations between 
their collective bargaining representative and the employer broke down.  463 U.S. at 494.  
After the strike began, the employer granted a wage increase to union employees who 
stayed on the job.  Id.  The employer then hired replacement workers to take the place of 
the employees who went on strike, and made repeated representations to the replacement 
workers that their employment would continue even if the striking employees returned to 
work.  Id. at 494–95.  Meanwhile, the striking employees filed a complaint against the 
employer with the NLRB, contesting the unilateral wage increase.  Id. at 495.  Following 
additional negotiations between the employer and the union, the striking employees 
returned to work pursuant to a settlement agreement resolving the NLRB complaint.  Id. at 
496.  In order to make room for the return of the striking employees, the employer laid off 
the replacement workers to whom it had made representations of continued employment.  
Id.  The replacement workers sued the employer in state court for misrepresentation and 
 
22 
 
breach of contract.  Id.  The employer argued that the state law claims were preempted by 
the NLRA.  Id. at 497. 
 
To determine whether the local interest exception applied, the Supreme Court 
utilized the Sears analysis to compare the state law and NLRB claims.  The Court noted 
that “[t]he focus of [the NLRB’s] determinations . . . would be on whether the rights of 
strikers were being infringed.”  Id. at 510.  However, “[n]either controversy [presented to 
the NLRB] would have anything in common with the question whether [the employer] 
made misrepresentations to replacements that were actionable under state law.  The 
[NLRB] would be concerned with the impact on strikers[,] not with whether the employer 
deceived replacements.”  Id. 
In addition, the Court noted the difference in remedies available pursuant to state 
law and the NLRA: “the injury remedied by the state law has no relevance to the [NLRB]’s 
function and . . . the [NLRB] can award no damages, impose no penalty, or give any other 
relief to the plaintiffs in this case.”  Id. at 511 (brackets and internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Linn, 385 U.S. at 63); see also id. at 510 (“The strikers cannot secure 
reinstatement, or indeed any relief, by suing for misrepresentation in state court.  The state 
courts in no way offer them an alternative forum for obtaining relief that the [NLRB] can 
provide.”).  Therefore, the Court concluded that “[t]he state interests involved in this case 
clearly outweigh any possible interference with the [NLRB]’s function that may result from 
permitting the action for misrepresentation to proceed.”  Id. at 511. 
And, if Sears and Belknap left any doubt as to whether courts should compare legal 
controversies instead of the underlying facts of the respective claims, this Court squarely 
 
23 
 
addressed that issue when it applied the Supreme Court’s analysis to a union’s preemption 
argument regarding claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress: 
Thus, where the conduct at issue in the state litigation is said to be arguably 
prohibited by the NLRA and hence within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
NLRB, as contended here, the critical inquiry in applying the Garmon rules 
is “whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical with that 
which could be presented to the [NLRB],” not whether there is a similarity 
of facts to be presented before the NLRB and the state court, or whether 
the same events and conduct gave rise to both an unfair labor practice 
claim and a state tort claim. 
Batson, 325 Md. at 714 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 
Therefore, we conclude that, in assessing whether the exercise of state court 
jurisdiction would entail little risk of interference with the regulatory jurisdiction of the 
NLRB, this Court must compare the respective controversies, not the underlying conduct 
giving rise to those controversies.  As exemplified by Sears, Belknap, and Batson, an 
examination of the respective controversies focuses on the legal elements of the claims, the 
issues that would be presented to each tribunal, and the remedies that each tribunal is 
authorized to award to the parties. 
 
In this case, the controversies presented to the circuit court—trespass and 
nuisance—are not identical to the controversy presented to the NLRB.  Although the 
controversies are based on the same conduct (namely, UFCW’s demonstrations at various 
Walmart stores), the legal elements, issues, and potential remedies of the state law claims 
are notably distinct from those of the NLRB claim.  For example, the primary issue in the 
state law trespass claim is whether UFCW exceeded the scope of Walmart’s limited 
invitation to the public to enter its private property for shopping purposes.  Similarly, the 
 
24 
 
primary issue in the nuisance claim is whether UFCW invaded Walmart’s interest in the 
use and enjoyment of its land.  In contrast, the primary issue in the NLRB claim is whether 
UFCW’s demonstrations restrained or coerced Walmart employees into supporting the 
union, in violation of section 8 of the NLRA. 
Resolution of the state law claims is not dependent upon whether UFCW violated 
the NLRA.  Even if UFCW’s demonstrations did not restrain or coerce Walmart employees 
into supporting the union, UFCW would still be liable for trespass and nuisance as long as 
it exceeded the scope of Walmart’s limited invitation to the public to enter its property for 
shopping purposes (trespass), and interfered with Walmart’s use and enjoyment of its land 
(nuisance).  For example, UFCW could be liable for trespass and nuisance if it had entered 
Walmart’s property for the purpose of soliciting customers and employees to buy a product 
or service without Walmart’s permission, even if the solicitation was completely unrelated 
to union activity.  Thus, the fact that UFCW may have also violated section 8 of the NLRA 
when it entered Walmart’s property is immaterial to whether it committed trespass and 
nuisance. 
 
Furthermore, the potential remedy available to Walmart regarding UFCW’s conduct 
in state court is distinct from the potential remedy available from the NLRB.  The state 
court could (and did) prohibit UFCW from entering Walmart’s property for any non-
shopping purpose without Walmart’s permission.  The NLRB, by contrast, could prohibit 
UFCW from coercing Walmart employees to support the union anywhere.  For example, 
if UFCW knew that Walmart employees at a particular store regularly ate lunch at a 
neighboring restaurant, not on Walmart’s property, and UFCW decided to conduct their 
 
25 
 
demonstrations targeting Walmart employees at the restaurant rather than at the store, 
Walmart would still be able to file a ULP charge with NLRB against UFCW, but Walmart 
would have no state law cause of action for trespass or nuisance, because the 
demonstrations did not take place on or interfere with Walmart’s private property.  In other 
words, the relief awarded by the state court is premised upon the location of the 
objectionable conduct, not its purpose; the relief awarded by the NLRB is premised upon 
the purpose of the objectionable conduct, not its location.  Simply put, while there is some 
overlap in the type of conduct that would be covered by the two remedies, including some 
of UFCW’s conduct in this case, the remedies are not the same. 
 
Finally, in considering whether the exercise of state court jurisdiction would entail 
little risk of interference with the jurisdiction of the NLRB, we agree with the policy 
concern raised by the Court of Special Appeals below: 
[I]n cases such as this, where a labor organization that does not represent the 
employees enters on the employer’s private property to demonstrate about its 
labor practices, without any arguably protected right to do so under the 
NLRA, it would make little sense if, by also engaging in conduct arguably 
prohibited by the NLRA, it could deprive the employer of the state law claims 
it otherwise could bring to remedy the conduct.  In other words, a labor 
union cannot fairly say that because it violated the NLRA, it is no longer 
subject to state trespass and nuisance laws. 
UFCW, 228 Md. App. at 229 (emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, we conclude that, regarding the second inquiry of the local interest 
exception analysis, the exercise of state court jurisdiction over Walmart’s claims for 
trespass and nuisance against UFCW would entail little risk of interference with the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the NLRB.  Having already concluded, regarding the first inquiry 
 
26 
 
of the analysis, that protecting private property rights is a significant state interest that 
qualifies for the exception, we hold that Walmart’s state law claims satisfy both prongs of 
the analysis, and therefore the local interest exception applies.  Thus, we hold that 
Walmart’s state law claims for trespass and nuisance are not preempted by the NLRA, and 
the circuit court properly denied UFCW’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
B. 
The Anti-Injunction Act 
 
Maryland’s Anti-Injunction Act, enacted in 1935, “place[s] restrictions on the 
power of equity courts to grant injunctions in labor disputes.”  Dist. 1199E, Nat’l Union of 
Hosp. & Health Care Emps. v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 293 Md. 343, 345 (1982).  The AIA 
“requires detailed notice, hearing and specified fact-finding procedures before any 
injunction may issue.”  Id. at 346.  Specifically, the AIA provides that 
a court may not issue a temporary or permanent injunction in a case that 
involves or grows out of a labor dispute unless . . . the court finds that: 
(i) an unlawful act: 
1. has been threatened and, unless restrained, will be 
committed; or 
2. has been committed and, unless restrained, will be 
continued; 
(ii) unless it grants the relief requested, the property of the plaintiff 
will be injured substantially and irreparably; 
(iii) greater injury will be inflicted on the plaintiff for each item of 
relief that the court denies than will be inflicted on the defendant if 
the court grants the item; 
(iv) it is not granting any item of relief for which a court lacks 
jurisdiction under § 4-307 of this subtitle; 
(v) the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law; and 
 
27 
 
(vi) each public officer who has a duty to protect the property of the 
plaintiff has failed or is unable to give adequate protection. 
Md. Code (1991, 2008 Repl. Vol.), Labor & Employment Article (“LE”) § 4-314(3). 
The AIA defines a “labor dispute” to 
include[] any controversy, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the 
proximate relation of employee or employer, concerning: 
(1) terms or conditions of employment; 
(2) employment relations; 
(3) the association or representation of persons in negotiating, setting, 
maintaining, or changing terms or conditions of employment; or 
(4) any other controversy arising out of the respective interests of 
employee or employer. 
LE § 4-301(c).  Furthermore, the AIA provides that 
[a] case shall be held to involve or grow out of a labor dispute when the case 
involves: 
(1) persons who are engaged in a single industry, trade, craft, or 
occupation, employees of the same employer, or members of the same 
or an affiliated organization of employees or employers, regardless of 
whether the dispute is between: 
(i) 1 or more employees or associations of employees and 1 or 
more employers or associations of employers; 
(ii) 1 or more employees or associations of employees and 1 or 
more employees or associations of employees; or 
(iii) 1 or more employers or associations of employers and 1 or 
more employers or associations of employers; or 
(2) a conflicting or competing interest in a labor dispute of a person 
participating or interested in the labor dispute. 
LE § 4-310. 
 
28 
 
 
UFCW argues that the circuit court erred in ruling that this case does not involve a 
labor dispute within the meaning of the AIA, and Walmart should have been required to 
establish the heightened requirements for receiving an injunction under the AIA.  Walmart 
responds that the circuit court correctly ruled that this case does not “involve or grow out 
of a labor dispute,” and therefore Walmart was not required to satisfy the heightened 
requirements of the AIA in order to receive an injunction against UFCW.  Furthermore, 
Walmart asserts that, even if the AIA did apply, Walmart submitted sufficient evidence to 
the circuit court to satisfy the heightened criteria for receiving an injunction under the AIA.  
The latter argument, however, is not properly before this Court, and therefore we shall 
address only the former.9 
                                                 
9 Walmart also argues that UFCW waived any claim of error with respect to whether the 
AIA applies because, in its petition for a writ of certiorari, UFCW did not contest the Court 
of Special Appeals’ alternative holding that, if the AIA did apply, Walmart nonetheless 
satisfied its heightened requirements for receiving an injunction.  After holding that the 
AIA did not apply to this case, the Court of Special Appeals went on to hold that, “[e]ven 
if this case did involve a labor dispute, we nevertheless would affirm the circuit court’s 
ruling that the Anti-Injunction Act criteria were met.”  UFCW, 228 Md. App. at 237.  Based 
on our review of the record, we do not believe the circuit court ever made such a ruling. 
At the beginning of the hearing on November 25, 2013, the circuit court ruled that this case 
did not involve a labor dispute within the meaning of the AIA.  At the conclusion of that 
hearing, on a motion for reconsideration, the circuit court again ruled that this case did not 
involve a labor dispute.  The circuit court never considered whether Walmart had satisfied 
the six criteria for receiving an injunction in a labor dispute case under the AIA, and never 
made any factual findings with respect to those criteria.  Instead, after ruling that the case 
did not involve a labor dispute, the circuit court applied the four factors that a court must 
consider before granting a preliminary injunction in any case, citing Fogle v. H & G 
Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441, 455–56 (1995).  Based on its consideration of those four 
factors, the circuit court granted the preliminary injunction. 
Because the circuit court did not make factual findings as to whether Walmart satisfied the 
AIA’s requirements, that question is not properly before us.  See Md. Rule 8-131(a) 
 
29 
 
The AIA expressly states that it “shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with 
the policy stated in § 4-302[.]”  LE § 4-303.  That policy provides as follows: 
(1) negotiation of terms and conditions of employment should result from 
voluntary agreement between employees and employer; and 
(2) therefore, each individual worker must be: 
(i) fully free to associate, organize, and designate a representative, as 
the worker chooses, for negotiation of terms and conditions of 
employment; and 
(ii) free from coercion, interference, or restraint by an employer or an 
agent of an employer in: 
1. designation of a representative; 
2. self-organization; and 
3. other concerted activity for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 
LE § 4-302.  Furthermore, “because the [AIA] is in derogation of the law and deprives a 
court of jurisdiction, it must be strictly construed.”  Vu, 180 Md. App. at 683 (citing Dist. 
1199E, 293 Md. at 359–60). 
 
With these considerations in mind, we hold that this case does not “involve or grow 
out of a labor dispute” within the meaning of the AIA.  This case does not satisfy either of 
the two definitions of a “labor dispute case” provided in LE § 4-310.  Although UFCW 
could qualify as “persons who are engaged in a single industry, trade, craft, or occupation” 
                                                 
(“Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by 
the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]”).  However, the circuit 
court’s ruling that this case does not involve a labor dispute within the meaning of the AIA, 
which was raised in UFCW’s petition for a writ of certiorari, is properly before this Court, 
and we conclude that the issue has not been waived. 
 
30 
 
under LE § 4-310(1), UFCW was not acting in this capacity during its demonstrations at 
various Walmart stores.  UFCW does not represent Walmart employees, and does not seek 
to represent them.  Instead, the stated purpose of UFCW’s demonstrations was to bring 
awareness to Walmart’s unsatisfactory employment conditions.  In this way, UFCW could 
more properly be characterized as activists, not representatives.  And, because this case 
does not involve the negotiation of employment conditions, or demonstrations by Walmart 
employees themselves, none of the policy goals stated in LE § 4-302 are applicable here. 
 
We recognize, as did the Court of Special Appeals, that the ultimate goal of UFCW’s 
demonstrations was to improve the terms or conditions of employment for Walmart 
employees, and thus one could argue that this case involves a labor dispute as defined by 
LE § 4-301(c)(1).  But, because the demonstrations were not conducted by Walmart 
employees, or a union representing Walmart employees, or a union seeking to represent 
employees, in order to improve the terms and conditions of their employment, we do not 
believe that this case can properly be considered a labor dispute under the AIA. 
In reaching this conclusion, we consider not only the stated policy of the AIA, but 
also the historical context in which it was enacted: 
Historically, employers had sought and obtained the remedy of 
injunction to thwart workers in organized labor activities, most notably 
strikes and picketing, that gave them leverage and bargaining power.  The 
anti-injunction statutes of the 1930’s and 1940’s, including the Maryland 
Act, were designed to limit and, in some circumstances, circumscribe entirely 
the remedy of injunction as it was being used by employers to suppress labor 
organization. 
Vu, 180 Md. App. at 682.  Here, Walmart did not seek an injunction against UFCW “to 
thwart workers in organized labor activities . . . that gave them leverage and bargaining 
 
31 
 
power.”  Id.  Instead, Walmart sought an injunction against UFCW in order to restore peace 
and order to its stores, and to prevent further disruptions to its business.  Thus, the 
injunction against UFCW not only benefits Walmart, but Walmart’s employees as well, by 
protecting them from the disruptive behavior of UFCW’s demonstrators. 
 
Therefore, we hold that the circuit court was correct in ruling that this case does not 
involve a labor dispute within the meaning of the AIA, and thus Walmart was not required 
to satisfy the AIA’s heightened requirements in order to receive an injunction against 
UFCW. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that the local interest exception to NLRA preemption applies to Walmart’s 
state law claims for trespass and nuisance against UFCW, and therefore those claims are 
not preempted by the NLRA.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in denying UFCW’s 
motion to dismiss Walmart’s claims for lack of jurisdiction.  Additionally, we hold that 
this case does not involve a labor dispute within the meaning of the AIA, and therefore 
Walmart was not required to satisfy the heightened requirements of the AIA in order to 
receive an injunction against UFCW.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Special Appeals. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.  
COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS.