Case Title: Ex parte Esaw Jackson. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Esaw Jackson v. State of Alabama)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1090679

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 09/24/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
_________________________
1090679
_________________________
Ex parte Esaw Jackson
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Esaw Jackson
v.
State of Alabama)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CC-06-2138; CC-06-2139; 
CC-06-2140; and CC-06-2141;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-06-1398)
WOODALL, Justice.
1090679
This victim's name is spelled "Denarius" in the Court of
1
Criminal Appeals' opinion.
2
Esaw Jackson was convicted of three counts of capital
murder for (1) killing Pamela Montgomery by shooting her with
a rifle fired from a vehicle, see § 13A-5-40(a)(18), Ala. Code
1975; (2) killing Milton Poole III by shooting him with a
rifle fired from a vehicle, see § 13A-5-40(a)(18), Ala. Code
1975; and (3) killing Montgomery and Poole during one act or
pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, see § 13A-5-
40(a)(10), Ala. Code 1975.  He was also convicted of two
counts of attempted murder for shooting Denaris  Montgomery
1
and Shaniece Montgomery.  
The jury recommended, by a vote of 10-2, that Jackson be
sentenced to death for the capital-murder convictions.  After
a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Jackson to
death.  The trial court also sentenced him to consecutive
terms of life imprisonment for the two attempted-murder
convictions.  After Jackson's motion for a new trial was
denied by operation of law, he appealed.
The 
Court 
of 
Criminal 
Appeals 
affirmed 
Jackson's
convictions and sentences.  Jackson v. State, [Ms. CR-06-1398,
December 18, 2009] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).
1090679
3
Jackson raised only two issues on appeal to the Court of
Criminal Appeals, both of which related solely to his capital-
murder convictions.  The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected
his argument "that the penalty of death by lethal injection is
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution."  Jackson, ___
So. 3d at ___.  That court also rejected his argument "that
charging him with three counts of capital murder was
multiplicitous and that his resulting convictions and sentence
of death for all three counts violated principles of double
jeopardy."  Jackson, ___ So. 3d at ___.  Further, as required
by Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P., the Court of Criminal Appeals
reviewed the record for any plain error or defect in the
proceeding and found none during either the guilt phase or the
sentencing phase of Jackson's trial.  After the Court of
Criminal Appeals overruled his application for a rehearing,
Jackson, through new counsel, petitioned this Court for
certiorari review of the capital-murder convictions and
sentences of death that the Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed.  
1090679
4
Rule 39(a)(2)(A), Ala. R. App. P., provides that, in a
death-penalty case, "a petition for writ of certiorari will
... be considered from a decision failing to recognize as
prejudicial any plain error or defect in the proceeding under
review whether or not the error or defect was brought to the
attention of the trial court or the Court of Criminal
Appeals." In his petition for certiorari review, Jackson
presents several issues that, according to him, warrant plain-
error review.  See Rule 39(a)(2)(B), Ala. R. App. P.  We
granted his petition to consider four of those issues.  
"Plain error is defined as error that has 'adversely
affected the substantial right of the appellant.'" Hall v.
State, 820 So. 2d 113, 121 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting
Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P.), aff'd, 820 So. 2d 152 (Ala. 2001).
"Plain error is 'error so obvious that the failure to notice
it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the
judicial proceedings.'" Ex parte Walker, 972 So. 2d 737, 742
(Ala. 2007) (quoting Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 167
(Ala. 1997)).  "To rise to the level of plain error, the
claimed error must not only seriously affect a defendant's
'substantial rights,' but it must also have an unfair
1090679
5
prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations."  Hyde v.
State, 778 So. 2d 199, 209 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), aff'd, 778
So. 2d 237 (Ala. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 907 (2001).
Plain-error review "is to be 'used sparingly, solely in those
circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would
otherwise result.'" United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15
(1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.
14 (1982)). "Although the failure to object will not preclude
[plain-error] review, it will weigh against any claim of
prejudice."  Sale v. State, 8 So. 3d 330, 345 (Ala. Crim. App.
2008).  
In its opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals summarized
much of the trial testimony, and there is no need to repeat
most of that discussion. On February 1, 2006, Pamela
Montgomery was operating her automobile; in the vehicle with
her were her children, 17-year-old Denaris and 21-year-old
Shaniece, as well as 16-year-old Milton Poole III, a family
friend.  While Pamela was stopped at an intersection, someone
fired many rounds from an assault rifle into her vehicle,
killing Pamela and Milton and injuring Denaris and Shaniece.
Denaris testified that he had seen Jackson drive up beside his
1090679
6
mother's car and open fire.  Shaniece was not able to identify
a shooter.  Brandon Carter, a defense witness, testified that
he was in Jackson's vehicle at the time of the shooting and
that the shots were fired from another vehicle, not by
Jackson. 
Milton's mother was Loretta Poole.  She was acquainted
with Jackson, who lived in the same area she lived in.
Loretta testified, as stated  in Jackson, ___ So. 3d at ___,
that, approximately two weeks before the shooting, Jackson had
told her that he did not like her and that he was going to
make her move from the area by "hurt[ing] [her] so bad" that
she "ain't going to have no choice but to move."  However, the
Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion does not address all
Loretta's testimony concerning what the State describes as
Jackson's "vague and cryptic threat."  State's brief, at 21.
Some of Jackson's claims of plain error relate to the
testimony not addressed by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
During the guilt phase of Jackson's trial, Loretta, on
direct examination, gave the following testimony:
"Q.
[PROSECUTOR:]  Okay.
"A.
[LORETTA:]  But I thought he was talking about
doing something to 'me.'  I asked still, 'What
1090679
7
you going to do?'  He said, 'Never f------ mind
what I'm going to do.'  He said, 'Because what
I'm going to do,' he said, 'you know, you ain't
going to be able to take it.'
"Q.
Okay.
"A.
And he don't lie.  He didn't lie.  I ain't able
to take it.  (witness crying)
"Q.
Okay.
"A.
He killed my child.
"Q.
Okay.  Hang on.  Hang on.  Hang on.  Just take
a minute.  Take a minute.  Take a minute.
"A.
Oh, God help me.
"Q.
Take an easy breath.
"A.
Help me, Jesus.  Help me, God.
"Q.
Breathe.
"A.
Help me, Lord Jesus, Jehovah; please help me.
"Q.
Ma'am -- okay?
"A.
Thank you, Jesus.
"Q.
Let me ask you a question.  You okay?  You
okay?
"A.
I never be okay anymore.
"Q.
All right.  Well, let me ask you one more
question, and I will be done.  Okay?
"A.
Okay.
"Q.
Okay?
1090679
8
"A.
Go ahead.
"Q.
All right.  About how long before [Milton] was
killed did that conversation take place?
"A.
Within a week or two, no longer; wasn't quite
two weeks.
"Q.
Okay.
"A.
It was early one morning.  I won't forget it.
"Q.
Okay.
"A.
He was riding along the side, and he started
coming by the house and stuff, flashing a whole
lot of 1's in the windows, and you know, we be
out in the yard, and he just come back peeking
(sic), doing the peeking things (sic), you
know.
"Q.
Okay.
"A.
Peeking things.  And I paid no attention.  I
thought he was talking about doing something to
me.  But then when he said I wasn't going to be
able to take it, I didn't have no idea he was
talking about killing my child, until the night
he did it, when my child told me --
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  We are going to object to this,
non-responsive; not been a question asked in fifteen
minutes.
"[PROSECUTOR]:  Hold on.
"THE WITNESS: Because it wasn't your child killed.
It wasn't your child killed. (witness crying)
"THE COURT: Hang on, ma'am.  Listen to the question.
1090679
9
"THE WITNESS: Oh, it hurts so bad.
"THE COURT: I know it does.  Just hang on just for
a second.  Just close your eyes and think about
Jesus for a second.  Just hang on just a second."
(Emphasis added; parenthetical language original.) This
emotional, mostly nonresponsive testimony forms the basis for
some of Jackson's claims of plain error.
Jackson correctly observes that "Loretta Poole ... was
permitted to provide extremely emotional testimony regarding
her opinion of [Jackson's] guilt, despite the fact that she
had no personal knowledge of the identity of the shooters."
Jackson's brief, at 8.  Loretta was not at the scene of the
shooting; nevertheless, she twice expressed her opinion that
Jackson had killed her son.  Such testimony from a lay witness
was clearly inadmissible. Rule 701, Ala. R. Evid., provides,
in pertinent part, that a lay "witness's testimony in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions and
inferences which are ... rationally based on the perception of
the witness."  "The Advisory Committee's Notes on [this]
portion of Rule 701 ... indicate that '[t]his is no more than
a restatement of the "firsthand knowledge rule," found in Ala.
R. Evid. 602, tailored to opinions.  No lay witness may give
1090679
Although Jackson specifically addressed Rule 701 in his
2
petition and in his brief, the State has made no attempt to
explain how Loretta's opinions regarding Jackson's guilt can
be reconciled with the firsthand-knowledge requirement of that
rule.    
10
an opinion based upon facts that the witness did not actually
observe.'" Musgrove Constr., Inc. v. Malley, 912 So. 2d 227,
239-40 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).  See also Lewis v. State, 889
So. 2d 623, 646 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).  
2
Jackson 
argues 
that 
Loretta's 
"extraordinarily
prejudicial testimony was improper because it went to the
ultimate issue in this case –- whether [he] had shot ...
Milton and the others in the car with him."  Jackson's brief,
at 8 (emphasis added).  Although the only disputed issue at
trial was whether Jackson had fired a weapon into the vehicle
occupied 
by 
the 
victims, 
Loretta's 
statements 
were
inadmissible, 
regardless of 
whether they are properly
characterized as going to the ultimate issue to be decided by
the jury. Rule 704, Ala. R. Evid., states: "Testimony in the
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is to be
excluded if it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the
trier of fact." (Emphasis added.)  As previously discussed,
Loretta's opinions were not "otherwise admissible," because
1090679
11
they did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 701. "If the
witness has no personal or firsthand knowledge, then lay
opinion should be excluded whether or not it concerns an
ultimate issue."  Charles W. Gamble & Robert J. Goodwin,
McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 127.01(6) at 720 (6th ed. 2009)
(footnote omitted).  Loretta, who was not present at the crime
scene, should not have been allowed to testify that it was
Jackson who had killed her son. Under the facts of this case,
the significance of the issue embraced within Loretta's
opinions is relevant to whether a substantial right of
Jackson's has been affected, but not to the admissibility of
the opinion.
According to the State, "[t]here cannot be a serious
argument that the jury would have perceived [Loretta's]
emotional outburst as preempting [its] role as fact finder."
State's brief, at 22.  However, during his guilt-phase closing
argument, the prosecutor sought to benefit from Loretta's
inadmissible conclusions.  He stated: "Loretta Poole knows
that Esaw Jackson did it.  I guarantee you she's convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that man killed her son.  I
guarantee she is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Esaw
1090679
12
Jackson killed Pam Montgomery."  It was, of course, the jury's
responsibility to determine whether the State had carried its
burden to prove that Jackson had intentionally killed the
victims, 
and 
Loretta's 
inadmissible 
opinion 
testimony
concerning that issue should not have been before the jury as
it fulfilled that responsibility.  Indeed, "[t]he admission of
these emotionally charged opinions as to what conclusions the
jury should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent
with the reasoned decisionmaking we require in capital cases."
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508-09 (1987), overruled in
nonrelevant part, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
The State argues that any error in admitting Loretta's
testimony giving her opinion that Jackson killed her son "was
harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt
presented at Jackson's trial."  State's brief, at 27.
However, "the proper inquiry here is not whether evidence of
the defendant's guilt is overwhelming but, instead, whether a
substantial right of the defendant has or probably has been
adversely affected."  Ex parte Lowe, 514 So. 2d 1049, 1050
(Ala. 1987).  At any rate, the evidence of Jackson's guilt was
far short of overwhelming.  Indeed, during his closing
1090679
Bullet fragments removed from the bodies of Pamela
3
Montgomery and Milton Poole were determined to have been fired
from an AK-47 or a SKS (the semiautomatic version of an AK-47)
assault rifle.  The State argues that "[t]here was evidence
that Jackson was in possession of an assault rifle on the day
of the shooting."  State's brief, at 29. However, our review
of the record finds no support for this statement.  Brandon
Carter denied seeing a weapon in Jackson's vehicle, and, as
Jackson points out, "the only evidence that anyone ever
possessed an assault rifle was testimony that Mr. Jackson's
cousin, not Mr. Jackson, had said he bought a 'SK' a couple
weeks before the incident, not the same day."  Jackson's reply
brief, at 5 (citations to reporter's transcript omitted).   
13
argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that the "whole case,
quite honestly, boils down to Denaris," the only eyewitness to
identify Jackson as the shooter. There was no physical
evidence to connect Jackson to the shooting, and the State
never found the murder weapon.   
3
The State argues that "[e]vidence was presented that
Jackson planned and carried out this shooting attack after he
had instigated several altercations with Loretta Poole,
Milton's mother, and her acquaintances."  State's brief, at
28.  As previously discussed, there was evidence indicating
that Jackson made what the State describes as "cryptic
threats" toward Loretta approximately two weeks before the
shooting.  However, according to Loretta, Jackson merely
harassed her in the days that followed the threats, doing her
1090679
The State does not argue that Loretta's statements were
4
not improper victim-impact evidence or that the statements
were relevant to any disputed issue at the guilt stage of
Jackson's trial. 
14
no physical harm.  Before Jackson's threats toward Loretta, he
had argued with someone who happened to be at Loretta's house
at the time, but there was no physical violence involved.
According to Shaniece Montgomery, Jackson had, at some
unspecified time, accused Milton of stealing Jackson's dog,
but there is no evidence concerning the outcome of any dispute
regarding that accusation.  Finally, although there was
testimony that Jackson had been seen both driving and parked
near Loretta's residence on the night of the shooting, such
activities were, by Loretta's own admission, not unusual. 
In her testimony, Loretta did more that simply express
her opinion as to Jackson's guilt. She also, while crying,
described how badly her son's death had affected her: "I ain't
able to take it"; "I never be okay anymore"; "it hurts so
bad."  As Jackson argues, these victim-impact statements were
not relevant to any material issue during the guilt phase of
Jackson's trial and, therefore, were not admissible.  Ex parte
Crymes, 630 So. 2d 125, 126 (Ala. 1993).   "[T]he introduction
4
of victim impact evidence during the guilt phase of a capital
1090679
15
murder trial can result in reversible error if the record
indicates that it probably distracted the jury and kept it
from performing its duty of determining the guilt or innocence
of the defendant based on the admissible evidence and the
applicable law."  Ex parte Rieber, 663 So. 2d 999, 1006 (Ala.
1995).  However, "a judgment of conviction can be upheld if
the record conclusively shows that the admission of the victim
impact evidence during the guilt phase of the trial did not
affect the outcome of the trial or otherwise prejudice a
substantial right of the defendant."  663 So. 2d at 1005.
Jackson argues that "the highly emotional testimony of
[Loretta], who also expressed her personal belief that Mr.
Jackson was the shooter," created a situation where "the jury
could not have been able to objectively evaluate the evidence
against [him] after hearing how deeply the incident had
impacted the victim's family."  Jackson's brief, at 18.
"Indeed, [according to Jackson,] it is unlikely that any
person sitting in the courtroom would not have been moved by
[Loretta's] deep anguish over the loss of her son.  The
prejudice was even further heightened because [Loretta] also
1090679
16
expressed her opinion that Mr. Jackson was guilty."  Jackson's
reply brief, at 10.
The State, on the other hand, argues that the error in
admitting the victim-impact evidence "does not rise to the
level of plain error," because, according to the State, "it is
implausible that the limited testimony cited by Jackson had
any effect on the jury's determination of [his] guilt,
especially 
in 
light 
of 
the 
trial 
court's 
thorough
instructions" 
concerning 
the 
jury's 
responsibility 
"to
determine, based on all of the evidence, whether ... the
prosecutor had established Jackson's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."  State's brief, at 32.  However, given the highly
emotional nature of Loretta's testimony, as well as the
prosecutor's "guarantee [to the jury] that [Loretta was]
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt" that Jackson committed
the murders, we cannot say that "the record conclusively shows
that the admission of the victim impact evidence ... did not
affect the outcome of the trial or otherwise prejudice a
substantial right of the defendant."  Rieber, 663 So. 2d at
1005.
1090679
17
We have not ignored the cases relied upon by the State.
However, the facts of this case distinguish it from those
cases.  In Rieber, the obviously unemotional victim-impact
testimony by the victim's husband during the guilt phase of
the trial concerning "[the victim's] children, their ages, and
the status of their custody after the murder" was not infected
with any other inadmissible testimony. 663 So. 2d at 1005. In
Crymes, which was not a death-penalty case, the only issue
preserved for review was whether the admission of testimony
concerning the ages of the victim's children was reversible
error.  The Court concluded that, "[e]ven though the testimony
was inadmissible, the trial court's error in admitting it was
harmless in light of the prior testimony, to which Crymes did
not object, regarding how long the witness had been married to
the victim and how many children they had, and in light of the
overwhelming evidence of Crymes's guilt."  630 So. 2d at 127.
Finally, in Hodges v. State, 856 So. 2d 875, 920 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2001), the evidence in question "was not [even] offered
as victim-impact evidence."  
For these reasons, we conclude that Loretta's expression
of anguish and the inseparable inadmissible opinion and
1090679
It is not necessary for us to consider Jackson's other
5
claims of plain error in the guilt and sentencing phases of
his trial.  Also, as previously indicated, there is no issue
before this Court concerning Jackson's attempted-murder
convictions.  
18
victim-impact testimony thereby communicated to the jury rise
to the level of plain error, because the errors reflected by
the admission of that testimony affected Jackson's substantial
rights and likely had an unfair prejudicial impact on the
jury's deliberations. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
5
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Parker, Murdock,
and Shaw, JJ., concur.
Bolin, J., concurs in the result.