Case Title: State v. Jerry J. Meeks

Citation: 2003 WI 104

Docket Number: 2001AP000263-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 104 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0263-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Jerry J. Meeks,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 65 
Reported at:  251 Wis. 2d 361, 643 N.W.2d 526 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 5, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel L. Konkol   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., joins the dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there was a brief by 
Christopher T. Van Wagner and Van Wagner & Woods, S.C., Madison, 
and oral argument by Christopher T. Van Wagner. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Eileen 
W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 104 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0263-CR  
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 6567) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jerry J. Meeks,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Jerry J. Meeks (Meeks), seeks 
review of a court of appeals' decision affirming a circuit court 
judgment convicting him of felony murder—armed robbery as a 
habitual criminal.  At issue is whether an attorney's opinions, 
perceptions, and impressions relating to a former client's 
mental competency are confidential communications within the 
meaning of the attorney-client privilege, Wis. Stat. § 905.03(2) 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
2 
 
(1997-98),1 and SCR 20:1.6, and therefore cannot be revealed 
without the consent of the client.  
¶2 
We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
hold that an attorney's opinions, perceptions, and impressions 
relating to a former client's mental competency fall within the 
definition 
of 
a 
confidential 
communication 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 905.03(2) and SCR 20:1.6.  As a result, such 
communications may not be revealed without the consent of the 
client.  We therefore remand this matter to the circuit court 
for a nunc pro tunc competency hearing. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶3 
The facts are undisputed.  On December 6, 1998, Meeks 
was involved in a robbery and murder in Milwaukee.  The police 
arrested Meeks on December 12, 1998, and a criminal complaint 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 905.03(2) provides: 
General rule of privilege.  A client has a privilege 
to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person 
from disclosing confidential communications made for 
the 
purpose 
of 
facilitating 
the 
rendition 
of 
professional legal services to the client: between the 
client or the client's representative and the client's 
lawyer or the lawyer's representative or between the 
client's lawyer and the lawyer's representative or by 
the client or the client's lawyer to a lawyer 
representing another in a matter of common interest or 
between representatives of the client or between the 
client and a representative of the client or between 
lawyers representing the client. 
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
1998 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
3 
 
was filed that same day charging Meeks with felony murder as a 
habitual criminal.   Meeks later pled guilty. 
¶4 
Meeks' counsel first raised the issue of Meeks' 
competency ten days after his initial appearance.  The circuit 
court 
ordered 
a 
competency 
examination 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2). 
On 
February 
10, 
1999, 
the 
court 
determined Meeks was not competent and committed him to the 
Department of Health and Family Services for treatment.  At a 
subsequent 
competency 
hearing 
after 
Meeks 
had 
received 
treatment, based upon testimony from physicians, a parole agent 
who had previously supervised Meeks, and a public defender who 
had previously represented Meeks, the circuit court determined 
Meeks was then competent to proceed. 
¶5 
The focus of this case involves the circuit court 
decision that Meeks was competent to proceed.  After defense 
counsel raised the question of Meeks' competency to proceed, an 
initial competency evaluation was ordered which was performed by 
a psychiatrist, Dr. Gary J. Maier, who concluded that Meeks was 
not competent. 
¶6 
After Meeks was committed for treatment, the circuit 
court again received information in the form of reports and 
testimony from psychiatrists and psychologists who had examined 
Meeks in order to determine his mental competency.  The circuit 
court also heard lay testimony from Meeks' former probation and 
parole agents and Meeks' former attorney from the state public 
defender's office.  
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
At issue is the testimony of Mary Scholle (Scholle), 
Meeks' former attorney, offered by the State at an October 26, 
1999, competency hearing.  Scholle had previously represented 
Meeks in 1994 and in 1996-1997, but was not Meeks' attorney in 
this case. The State subpoenaed Scholle and her attorney asked 
for a hearing on the subpoena, claiming that there was an 
"arguable" attorney-client privilege attached to her testimony 
(R. 20); (R. 70:73).  Meeks' attorney objected to Scholle's 
testimony on "relevance grounds." (R. 71:4).  He also asked that 
the court "take judicial notice that every lawyer is supposed to 
raise competence when it becomes apparent." Id.  The circuit 
court noted the relevancy objection for the record, but allowed 
the State to call Scholle to testify.  Meeks' attorney also 
objected, on the basis of the attorney-client privilege, to a 
question asked of Scholle, but the objection was overruled.  
¶8 
At 
the 
hearing 
Scholle 
testified 
regarding 
her 
standard practice in representing clients.  She testified that 
she had extensive background in representing criminal defendants 
and that she had represented approximately 3,000 defendants.  
She testified that she represented a variety of individuals, 
including individuals with mental health issues.  Moreover, 
Scholle testified that she had been educated about competency 
issues, and about what to look for to recognize incompetency in 
her clients, and that she understood the special concerns in 
determining competency in such situations.  Scholle testified 
that: "[I]n general, if I have any question as to a person's 
competency, their ability to understand, to make decisions, to 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
5 
 
know the various roles of the players in court, I would bring 
that to the attention of the court."  (R. 71:12).  In addition, 
Scholle testified that she had represented Meeks "on two 
separate occasions" involving three cases, between 1994 and 
1997.  State v. Meeks, 2002 WI App. 65, ¶29, 251 Wis. 2d 362, 
643 N.W.2d 526.  (R. 71:12).  According to the records in regard 
to those cases, Meeks pled guilty in the 1994 case and entered 
an Alford2 plea in another case.3  Scholle testified that the 
concept 
of 
an 
Alford 
plea 
is 
a 
"sophisticated 
legal 
concept[s] . . . ."  (R. 71:19).  The court asked Scholle to 
describe 
her 
practice 
in 
going 
over 
the 
guilty 
plea 
questionnaire with her clients and how she determined whether 
the client understood the plea.  Scholle responded that she 
would ask her clients if they understood and if they had any 
questions.  The record was clear that during Scholle's previous 
representation of Meeks, she had not raised the issue of Meeks' 
competency in any of those proceedings.4   
¶9 
Meeks concedes that: "Ms. Scholle did not relate in 
her testimony any specific words said to her by Mr. Meeks."  
(Pet'r Br. at 9).  However, he claims that clearly implicit in 
                                                 
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
3 It is unclear from the record or the briefs what occurred 
in the third case. 
4 Despite the claims of the dissent (¶68), it seems quite 
clear that Scholle, through her testimony, did offer her 
opinions, 
perceptions, 
and 
impressions 
concerning 
Meeks' 
competency. 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
6 
 
her testimony was her belief that Meeks was not incompetent when 
she represented him. 
A. Circuit Court Decision 
¶10 On January 4, 2000, upon reviewing the evidence,5 the 
Honorable Elsa C. Lamelas determined that Meeks was competent to 
proceed.  In reaching that decision, Judge Lamelas relied upon 
Meeks' competency in past legal proceedings, the testimony of 
parole agents who supervised Meeks, the testimony of Meeks' 
attorney 
in the previous 
prosecutions, 
Meeks' 
rudimentary 
understanding of the legal system, Meeks' demeanor, and the 
court's observations of Meeks.  In regard to the testimony of 
Attorney Scholle, the court said: 
[S]he testified that if there was any scintilla 
of doubt in her mind about a person's competency she 
would have brought that to my attention [in the prior 
cases]. . . .   I have really no doubt in my mind that 
if 
the 
defendant's 
cognitive 
limitations 
were 
such . . . [given her] experience and commitment, that 
if it had come to her notice, it would have been 
brought to my attention; and she did not.6  
(Def. Br. App., p. 6-7).  The court then concluded that Meeks 
was competent to proceed.  
                                                 
5 The 
evidence 
included 
approximately 
13 
months 
of 
psychiatric examinations, reports, and competency hearings. 
6 Scholle's 
testimony, 
and 
similar 
testimony 
from 
probation/parole agents who had dealt with Meeks in the years 
immediately prior to this crime, apparently was presented to 
counter testimony from defense psychiatrists and psychologists 
who had concluded from their examinations of Meeks that he was 
incompetent.  The State's witnesses bolstered the argument that 
in the recent past, Meeks appeared to be able to function 
adequately. 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
7 
 
¶11 The Honorable Daniel L. Konkol was assigned the case 
after the preliminary hearing, and he denied subsequent requests 
for another competency exam.  Meeks entered pleas of not guilty 
and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  On April 
6, 2000, at a scheduled plea hearing, defense counsel stated his 
belief that Meeks could not make a knowingly, voluntary, and 
intelligent plea.  On July 6, 2000, Meeks entered a guilty plea.  
Meeks was subsequently sentenced to 40 years in prison. 
B. Court of Appeals' Decision 
¶12 Meeks appealed raising several issues, the main issue 
being whether Scholle's testimony regarding Meeks' competency 
was a confidential communication which was obtained during the 
course of representation, and was therefore inadmissible under 
Wis. Stat. § 905.03. 
¶13 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
upheld 
Meeks' 
conviction, 
concluding that Meeks was competent to proceed.  The court of 
appeals also held that the testimony of Scholle, who had 
represented Meeks in a prior criminal case, was admissible and 
relevant at the competency hearing, and that the testimony did 
not violate the attorney-client privilege.  The court of appeals 
held that, because Scholle did not divulge the contents of any 
specific conversations with Meeks, she did not disclose any 
confidential communications under Wis. Stat. § 905.03(1)(d), and 
hence, did not violate the attorney-client privilege.  As a 
result, the court of appeals found that Scholle's testimony was 
properly admitted. 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
8 
 
¶14 In support of its decision, the majority relied on 
"substantial case law" distinguishing impermissible testimony 
relating to a client's statements from permissible testimony 
providing an opinion about the client's competency.7  Meeks, 251 
Wis. 2d 361, ¶¶35-42.  In reaching its decision, the majority 
stated:  
[Attorneys] remain officers of the court, obligated to 
assist the judicial effort to determine whether a 
defendant is competent to proceed. . . .   Therefore, 
in a very important sense, counsel cooperate in a 
court's effort to make one of the justice system's 
most 
fundamental 
findings——whether 
a 
defendant 
understands the proceedings and can assist in the 
defense.  And in a closely related way, counsel 
cooperate 
in 
the 
court's 
continuing 
effort 
to 
determine whether a defendant needs mental health 
assistance, and possibly medication, in order to 
function in a legal setting.   
Thus, 
despite 
the 
intensity 
and 
competing 
interests of the adversarial setting, counsel must set 
aside strategic considerations and candidly assist the 
court's effort to determine whether a defendant is 
competent to proceed. 
. . . . 
And just as defense counsel must be candid in 
expressing an opinion about a client's competency, 
                                                 
7 The court of appeals cited eight cases, including six 
federal court of appeals' cases.  The majority also relied upon 
3 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 503.14 
(4)(c) (2 Ed. 2001): 
Courts generally permit an attorney to testify to the 
client's competency to stand trial when the testimony 
does not relate to confidential communications with 
the client, but instead relates to the attorney's 
observations of the client during the time of the 
communication. 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
9 
 
courts, in turn, should understand that counsel's 
opinion 
derives, 
in 
substantial 
part, 
from 
confidential 
conversations 
with 
the 
client.  
Therefore, careful courts, under most circumstances, 
will give due weight to counsel's opinion without 
testing it with questions likely to expose the details 
of 
client 
conversations 
and 
other 
privileged 
communications. 
These principles logically apply not only to a 
defendant's trial counsel, but to prior counsel as 
well . . . . 
Here, the court did not improperly consider 
privileged communications.  Explicitly, [the attorney] 
did not relate any of her conversations with Meeks or 
testify about the substance of any other privileged 
communications. 
Id., 251 Wis. 2d 361, ¶¶36-41 (citations omitted). 
¶15 Moreover, the court of appeals' majority concluded 
that the duty of an attorney, as an officer of the court, in 
determining competency supersedes the duty to the client in 
protecting the attorney-client privilege.  
¶16 The Honorable Ralph Adam Fine concurred, stating that 
he disagreed with the majority opinion's extended discussion of 
the attorney-client privilege in paragraphs 28-42.  Rather, 
Judge Fine contended that there was no showing that Scholle's 
testimony 
revealed, 
or 
tended 
to 
reveal, 
confidential 
communications between her and Meeks; therefore, the attorney-
client privilege was not involved.  Id., Concurrence, ¶66. 
¶17 Meeks petitioned this court for review on the issue of 
whether an attorney's opinions, perceptions, and impressions of 
a 
former 
client's 
mental 
competency 
were 
confidential 
communications within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 905.03(2), 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
10 
 
and, therefore, cannot be revealed without the consent of the 
client.  Meeks' petition for review was granted on April 22, 
2002. 
II. ISSUE 
¶18 This case presents an issue of first impression: 
whether an attorney's opinions, perceptions, and impressions of 
a 
former 
client's 
mental 
competency 
are 
confidential 
communications within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 905.03(2) and 
SCR 20:1.6. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 To determine whether Wisconsin law allows for an 
attorney's opinions, perceptions, and impressions of a former 
client's mental competency to be admitted during a competency 
hearing, 
we 
need 
to 
construe 
the 
statutory 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 905.03, 
which 
sets 
forth 
the 
attorney-client 
privilege.  This presents a question of statutory construction, 
which we review de novo.  If the circuit court made an error of 
law in allowing and considering the testimony of Scholle, then 
it erroneously exercised its discretion.  State v. Hydrite Chem. 
Co., 220 Wis. 2d 51, 59, 582 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1998) review 
denied, 220 Wis. 2d 364, 585 N.W.2d 156 (1998). 
¶20 The party asserting the attorney-client privilege 
bears the burden to establish that the privilege applies.  See 
Franzen v. Children's Hosp. of Wis., 169 Wis. 2d 366, 386, 485 
N.W.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1992).  The privilege must be strictly and 
narrowly interpreted, and a "mere showing that the communication 
was from a client to his attorney is insufficient to warrant a 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
11 
 
finding that the communication is privileged."  Jax v. Jax, 73 
Wis. 2d 572, 581, 243 N.W.2d 831 (1976) (holding that "[b]ecause 
the 
attorney-client 
privilege 
is 
'an 
obstacle 
to 
the 
investigation of the truth' it should be 'strictly confined 
within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic 
of the 
principle.'"). 
 
Id. 
at 579. 
 Moreover, "[w]hen 
determining whether a privilege exists, the trial court must 
inquire into the existence of the relationship upon which the 
privilege is based and the nature of the information sought."  
Franzen, 169 Wis. 2d at 386 (emphasis in original). 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
¶21 Meeks asks this court to find that Scholle's testimony 
was covered by the attorney-client privilege; and, as a result, 
asks this court to reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶22 First, Meeks argues that this court has set forth 
exceptions involving guidance as to when an attorney can 
ethically reveal confidential information without the consent of 
the client.  He argues that under Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 
20:1.6, this situation does not fall within any of the 
exceptions.  He states that SCR 20:1.6 does not contain an 
exception that permits an attorney to offer his or her opinions 
or perceptions regarding a former client's mental competency.  
Meeks claims, therefore, that the court of appeals erred in 
creating a new exception to the attorney-client privilege. 
¶23 Second, Meeks argues that other jurisdictions are 
split over the issue of what confidential communications are 
under the attorney-client privilege.  Meeks maintains that there 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
12 
 
is no definitive guidance for Wisconsin courts on the issue of 
whether a former counsel's opinions, perceptions, or impressions 
relating to the mental competency of a prior client are 
protected by the attorney-client privilege.  In support of his 
position that Scholle's testimony violated the attorney-client 
privilege, Meeks asks this court to follow the cases from other 
jurisdictions which have held that an attorney may not testify 
as to his or her opinion of a former client's competency to 
proceed, because it would violate the attorney-client privilege.  
¶24 Next, Meeks argues that even if the court of appeals 
is 
correct 
that 
Scholle's 
testimony 
was 
admissible, 
the 
rationale is wrong.  Meeks maintains that the appellate court 
erred in emphasizing the role of an attorney as an "officer of 
the court" in revealing information about a former or current 
client's competency.  Meeks contends that the majority's 
analysis, which emphasized that Scholle's responsibilities as an 
"officer of the court" superseded her duty to a former client, 
seriously eroded the basic privilege and ethical duties of 
attorneys to protect their confidential communications with 
clients.  Meeks argues that the majority's rationale was overly 
broad and potentially could provide a limitless exception to the 
attorney-client privilege. 
¶25 The State disagrees and asks this court to uphold the 
court of appeals' decision.  The State argues that the attorney-
client privilege does not cover Scholle's testimony because her 
testimony did not involve a confidential communication within 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 905.03(2).  In support of its 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
13 
 
argument the State relies on case law from other jurisdictions.  
Those cases hold that an attorney may testify at a competency 
hearing without violating the attorney-client privilege, as long 
as the substance of the client's communication is not revealed. 
See, e.g., United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 
1964).  Because Scholle's testimony did not involve the 
substance of her communications with Meeks, the State maintains 
that there was no violation of the attorney-client privilege. 
¶26 The State also argues that Scholle was a competent 
attorney with many years of experience in representing criminal 
defendants.  Scholle had testified that if she had any doubt of 
a client's competency, she would have raised it.  Her testimony 
did not reveal any confidential communications she had with 
Meeks.  Therefore, the State claims that the attorney-client 
privilege does not apply to her testimony.8 
V. ANALYSIS 
¶27 Meeks argues that it "is impossible for an attorney to 
testify regarding her opinion of the client's fitness to stand 
trial without violating the attorney-client privilege."  (Pet'r 
Br. at 10-11). 
¶28 As noted previously, we review the interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 905.03 
which 
sets 
forth 
the 
attorney-client 
privilege, de novo.  It is well settled that the attorney-client 
privilege belongs to the client.  Wis. Stat. § 905.03(2).  The 
                                                 
8 The State also argues that Meeks waived the attorney-
client privilege by failing to assert the privilege at the time 
prior counsel testified. 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
14 
 
client is therefore the privilege's "holder," as that term is 
used 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 905.11. 
Only 
the 
client 
or 
someone 
authorized by the client to do so may waive the privilege.  
State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 34 
Wis. 2d 559, 605, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967) (an attorney "may not 
waive any objections to discovery which are based upon the 
attorney-client privilege. Only the client can waive these 
objections."); See also Swan Sales Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing 
Co., 126 Wis. 2d 16, 31-32, 374 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1985).  As 
the court in Schlitz said: 
In addition, the mere fact that an attorney 
offers 
him- 
or 
herself 
as 
a 
witness 
does 
not 
automatically waive the attorney-client privilege or 
work product doctrine as to documents reviewed by the 
attorney in preparing to testify.  We note that these 
privileges are owned by the attorney's client and can 
only be waived voluntarily at the client's direction. 
Schlitz, 126 Wis. 2d at 31-32.  There is nothing in the record 
to 
indicate 
that 
Meeks, 
himself, 
consented 
to 
Scholle's 
testimony, or in any way waived the attorney-client privilege. 
¶29 The 
attorney-client 
privilege 
applies 
only 
to 
confidential communications between an attorney and the client.  
The 
attorney-client 
privilege 
is 
recognized 
in 
both 
Wis. Stat. § 905.03(2) and SCR 20:1.6(a).  Section 905.03(2) 
states that "[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose 
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential 
communications 
made 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
facilitating 
the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client. . . ." 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
15 
 
¶30 With regard to defining a confidential communication 
that 
is 
protected 
by 
the 
attorney-client 
privilege, 
Wis. Stat. § 905.03(1)(d) 
states: 
"A 
communication 
is 
'confidential' if not intended to be disclosed to 3rd persons 
other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those 
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication." 
¶31 Next, Wis. Stat. § 905.03(3) sets forth who may claim 
the attorney-client privilege: 
(3) Who may claim the privilege: The privilege may be 
claimed by the client, the client's guardian or 
conservator, the personal representative of a deceased 
client, 
or 
the 
successor, 
trustee, 
or 
similar 
representative of a corporation, association, or other 
organization, whether or not in existence.  The person 
who was the lawyer at the time of the communication 
may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the 
client.  The lawyer's authority to do so is presumed 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.  
¶32 In addition to the statutory language defining the 
attorney-client relationship and privilege, this court has 
adopted specific rules that outline the situations in which an 
attorney can ethically reveal confidential information without 
the consent of the client.  Supreme Court Rule 20:1.6(b) and (c) 
state: 
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to 
prevent the client from committing a criminal or 
fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is 
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm 
or in substantial injury to the financial interest or 
property of another. 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
16 
 
(c) A lawyer may reveal such information to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to rectify the consequences of a client's 
criminal or fraudulent act in the furtherance of which 
the lawyer's services had been used; 
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of 
the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the 
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or 
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in 
which the client was involved, or to respond to 
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's 
representation of the client. 
There are no added exceptions to this rule permitting former 
counsel 
to 
offer 
his 
or 
her 
opinions, 
perceptions, 
and 
impressions of a former client's competency to proceed.9 
¶33 The 
comment 
to 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
Rule 
on 
confidentiality of information fleshes out the rationale behind 
the attorney-client privilege.  In relevant part, the comment 
states: 
The observance of the ethical obligation of a 
lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of 
the client not only facilitates the full development 
of facts essential to proper representation of the 
client but also encourages people to seek early legal 
assistance. 
 . . . . 
The 
common 
law 
recognizes 
that 
the 
client's 
confidences must be protected from disclosure. . . .   
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer 
relationship 
is 
that 
the 
lawyer 
maintain 
confidentiality 
of 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
representation.  The client is thereby encouraged to 
                                                 
9 See also In Re Disciplinary Proceedings Against James Paul 
O'Neil, 2003 WI 48, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 661 N.W.2d 813. 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
17 
 
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as 
to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. 
¶34 Thus, under the comment to SCR 20:1.6, the attorney-
client privilege applies in situations other than those "where 
evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law."  
The 
confidentiality 
rule 
applies 
not 
merely 
to 
matters 
communicated in confidence by the client, but also to all 
information relating to the representation, whatever its source.  
A lawyer may not disclose such information unless the client 
consents after consultation, except as stated in the Rule.10  
A. Observations 
and 
Perceptions 
and 
the 
Attorney-Client 
Privilege 
¶35 As noted above, courts in other jurisdictions are 
split on the question of whether an attorney's opinions, 
perceptions, and impressions of his or her client are covered by 
the attorney-client privilege.  The majority of these courts 
have held that the attorney-client privilege only protects 
confidential communications between an attorney and his or her 
client.  An attorney's opinions, perceptions, and impressions of 
a 
former 
client's 
mental 
competency 
are, 
therefore, 
not 
protected by the privilege if they do not reveal the substance 
of their communications.  See Darrow v. Gunn, 594 F.2d 767 (9th 
Cir. 1979); United States v. David, 511 F.2d 355, 360 (D.C. Cir. 
                                                 
10 SCR 20:1.6(a). "Confidentiality of Information: (a) A 
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation 
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, 
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to 
carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraphs 
(b), (c) and (d)." 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
18 
 
1975); Clanton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Tom, 340 F.2d 127 (2nd Cir. 1965); Kendrick, 
331 F.2d 110; Howell v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. 
Ill. 1968); People v. Kinder, 512 N.Y.S.2d 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1987); Jones v. District Court, 617 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1980). 
¶36 However, a number of other courts have held that 
disclosure of even non-verbal communications, such as the ones 
at issue here, violates the attorney-client privilege.  Gunther 
v. United States, 230 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (any expression 
as to the client's mental competency necessarily embraces more 
than facts observable by anyone); Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110 
(Sobeloff, C.J., (concurring) (it necessarily follows that the 
attorney's opinions are based upon discussions with the client); 
Bishop v. Superior Court, 724 P.2d 23 (Ariz. 1986); State v. 
Adams, 
283 
S.E.2d 
582 
(S.C. 
1981) 
(any 
"professional 
impressions" drawn by the attorney should be privileged). 
¶37 These cases hold that it is difficult, or nearly 
impossible, for an attorney to testify regarding an opinion of 
the client's competency to proceed without violating the 
attorney-client privilege.  For example, in Gunther the court 
held prior counsel cannot be called by the government to testify 
and give an opinion regarding his former client's mental 
competency, because this would necessarily be premised upon, and 
could potentially reveal, factual data protected under the 
attorney-client privilege. In particular, the court said: 
If trial counsel in a criminal case could be called by 
the Government and asked to give an opinion as to the 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
19 
 
accused's competency and ability to assist in the 
defense, he could necessarily also be asked for the 
factual data upon which he premised his opinion. These 
questions would open to inquiry by the Government the 
entire relationship 
between the 
accused 
and his 
counsel.  Such revelations would be a violation of the 
attorney-client privilege and would also invade an 
accused's right to counsel in the trial of the 
criminal charge. 
Gunther, 230 F.2d at 223-24. 
¶38 In addition to opening the door to questions involving 
the relationship between the accused and counsel, other courts 
have 
held 
that 
a 
lawyer's 
observations 
are 
inextricably 
intertwined with communications between the attorney and the 
client, and the lawyer's opinion as to the client's competency 
is based upon conclusions drawn in the course of a unique 
attorney-client relationship.  Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110.  The 
Kendrick Court said: "Any expression as to the client's mental 
competency necessarily embrace[s] more than facts observable by 
anyone it comprehend[s] conclusions drawn in the course of an 
association that is uniquely regarded in the law."  Id. at 115.  
See also Bishop, 725 P.2d at 29 (stating that "it defies reality 
to pretend that the lawyer has formed opinions on competency 
without relying upon discussions with the defendant"). 
¶39 Moreover, in State v. Adams, the court held that "the 
entire setting of the confidential conference must be protected 
as well.  To lend privilege to the words spoken but to allow 
disclosure of professional impressions drawn from the manner of 
their delivery all but destroys the substance of the privilege."  
Adams, 283 S.E.2d at 586. 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
20 
 
¶40 We agree with the jurisdictions that hold that an 
attorneys opinions, perceptions, and impressions of a client's 
competency to proceed are protected by the attorney-client 
privilege. 
 
An 
attorney's 
opinion 
of 
a 
client's 
mental 
competency is based largely upon private communications with the 
client.  In a law review article, The Role of the Criminal 
Defense Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: 
Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?, the author Rodney 
Uphoff states: 
 . . . it 
is 
clear 
that 
a 
criminal 
defense 
lawyer . . . often forms his opinion of a client's 
competency 
largely 
as 
a 
result 
of 
private 
communications with the client.  The protection of the 
attorney-client privilege is not limited only to the 
client's words but may include the client's nonverbal 
communications.  A number of courts have held that a 
lawyer can be compelled to testify regarding counsel's 
opinion of a client's competency even though the 
lawyer's observations would involve privileged client 
communications, but the better reasoned position is 
that a lawyer's opinion about a client's competence or 
state of mind is inextricably mixed with the client's 
private communications. 
1988 Wis. L. Rev. 65, 91. (citations omitted). 
¶41 The testimony of Meeks' former attorney, Scholle, 
regarding Meeks' mental competency did not involve facts 
observable by just anyone——otherwise her testimony would not 
have been required by a subpoena from the State.  Furthermore, 
Scholle's testimony necessarily involved the entire confidential 
conference setting, as well as the revelation of information 
conveyed to her through her private, confidential conversations 
with Meeks. 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
21 
 
B. State v. Johnson——No Reasonable Inference 
¶42 The State argues that the minority view of the 
attorney-client privilege is in direct conflict with this courts 
decision in State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 395 N.W.2d 176 
(1986).  (Resp't Br. at 23).  We disagree. 
¶43 Much like the argument of the State, the court of 
appeals, in its decision, highlights an attorney's duty as an 
officer of the court as trumping the attorney-client privilege 
in this case.  We hold that the former attorney's duty as an 
officer of the court does not, under the circumstances set forth 
herein, trump the attorney-client privilege. 
¶44 Pursuant to statute and our decision in Johnson, we 
have held that it is an attorney's duty to the court to raise 
the issue of competency, if he or she believes there is a reason 
to doubt that the client is not competent. 
¶45 The Johnson decision marked the first time this court 
recognized that defense counsel has an affirmative duty to raise 
the competency issue.  The State is correct to the extent that 
it identifies a tension between our holding today and the 
decision in Johnson.  An attorney who informs the court that he 
or she has reason to doubt the competency of a client, as 
required by Johnson, will be stating an opinion that is based 
largely on the same private communications that we hold, today, 
to be protected by the attorney-client privilege.   
¶46 This tension, however, does not amount to a direct 
conflict requiring that we overrule Johnson.  An attorney's duty 
under Johnson demands a very narrow and limited breach of the 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
22 
 
attorney-client privilege.  The attorney is merely obligated to 
"raise the issue [of competency] with the trial court."  
Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 220.   There is no requirement that the 
attorney testify about his or her reasons for raising the issue 
or the opinions, perceptions, or impressions that form the basis 
for his or her reason to doubt the clients competence. 
¶47 More importantly, this narrow and limited breach of 
the attorney-client privilege is compelled by very strong public 
policy and constitutional considerations.  An incompetent person 
cannot be tried for an alleged crime consistently with his 
constitutional right to a fair trial.  State ex rel. Matalik v. 
Schubert, 57 Wis. 2d 315, 321, 204 N.W.2d 13 (1973) (citing Pate 
v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966)).  A defendant who is 
incompetent can neither understand the proceedings nor help in 
his or her own defense "only where a defendant is mentally 
competent will he [or she] be able to exercise effectively the 
rights which this society extends to persons charged with 
committing a crime."  Id. (citation omitted). 
¶48 In order to protect these important interests, courts 
are required to determine the competency of a defendant whenever 
there is reason to doubt the defendant's competence.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14. 
 
In 
Johnson, 
we 
concluded 
that 
an 
attorney's obligation, as an officer of the court, required that 
he or she raise the issue of competency whenever there was 
reason to doubt as well.  Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 220. 
¶49 The compelling interests that drove our decision in 
Johnson are simply not present in a case, like this one, in 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
23 
 
which a defendant's former counsel is called to testify about 
her former client's competence.  A defendant's former counsel is 
not caught between the duty to maintain the attorney-client 
privilege, and the Johnson duty, because only the duty to guard 
confidential 
communications 
survives 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship.  Present counsel, not former counsel, alone is 
saddled with both obligations, and it is thus present counsel's 
duty, as an officer of the court, to assist the court in 
ensuring that his or her client is competent to be tried.  In 
addition, although Scholle did not relate any of Meeks' specific 
words or conduct, the clear implication of her extensive 
testimony was that she thought Meeks was competent when she 
represented him.  Her testimony, therefore, extended well beyond 
the narrow, limited breach of the attorney-client privilege 
permitted in Johnson.  
¶50 Finally, we note that it is not reasonable, in light 
of the rule in Johnson, for a court to infer a defendant's 
competence from the fact that his or her attorney did not raise 
the issue of competence, in a prior proceeding.  Given the 
nature of mental illness, a defendant may have been competent 
during a prior proceeding but incompetent now, and vice versa.  
Similarly, although there is an affirmative duty under Johnson 
to raise the issue of competence, it is impossible for a court 
to know why an attorney did not raise the issue of competency.  
Maybe the attorney's contacts with the defendant were so minimal 
as not to give reason to doubt maybe the attorney had access to 
psychological records or other information that contradicted his 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
24 
 
or her doubts about competency or maybe the attorney failed to 
meet his or her duty as an officer of the court. 
C. Policy Considerations 
¶51 As noted previously, the attorney-client privilege was 
recognized in the common law.  The ethical obligation of the 
lawyer to "hold inviolate confidential information" facilitates 
the 
full 
development 
of 
the 
facts 
essential 
to 
proper 
representation of the client, and encourages people to seek 
early legal assistance.  See SCR 20:1.6 comment. 
¶52 Because of the importance of facilitating open and 
frank communications between attorney and client, the government 
should first exhaust all investigatory powers which do not 
potentially 
violate 
the 
attorney-client 
privilege, 
before 
attempting to compel a person such as a criminal defense 
attorney to testify.  Corry v. Meggs, 498 So. 2d 508, 513 (Fla. 
Ct. App. 1986) (quoting In re Witness-Attorney Before Grand Jury 
No. 83-1, 613 F. Supp. 394, 398 (S.D. Fla. 1984)).  Exhausting 
all such investigatory powers would not only prevent placing 
attorneys in an "ethical dilemma," such as was done here, but 
would also prevent the attorney from incurring claims of a Sixth 
Amendment violation, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, 
or claims of denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.  
See Uphoff, supra at 85 n.91 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984)). 
¶53 Here, Scholle should have continued to protect the 
attorney-client privilege in her testimony by declining to give 
her 
opinions, 
perceptions, 
or 
impressions 
as 
to 
Meeks' 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
25 
 
competency to proceed.11  There is no applicable exception to 
attorney-client 
privilege 
for 
such 
lawyer 
testimony 
under 
                                                 
11 As noted previously, when subpoenaed by the State, 
Scholle moved for a hearing on the subpoena, claiming that there 
was an arguable attorney-client privilege attached to her 
testimony (R: 20); (R. 70:73).  Given the objections raised by 
Scholle's attorney and the attorney for Meeks (see ¶7 herein), 
we take issue with the assertion of the dissent (¶¶62, 93-94) 
that there was no timely objection, and, therefore, that waiver 
occurred in regard to Scholle's testimony. 
The dissent's claim that Wis. Stat. §§ 805.18(1), 901.03(1) 
and 
901.03(4) 
are 
somehow 
applicable 
here 
is 
likewise 
perplexing.  Apparently, the dissent is claiming that Meeks' 
substantial rights were not affected by the testimony required 
in error, over objection, from Scholle's attorney and Meeks' 
counsel.  Dissent, ¶¶96-97.  In State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 
207, 223-24, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986), this court made it quite 
clear that what was at issue was a defendant's "constitutional 
right to a fair trial." 
In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72, Chief Justice 
Warren Burger, writing for a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court, 
stated:  
It has long been accepted that a person whose mental 
condition is such that he lacks the capacity to 
understand the nature and object of the proceedings 
against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in 
preparing his defense may not be subjected to a 
trial . . . .  For our purposes, it suffices to note 
that the prohibition is fundamental to an adversary 
system of justice. 
See also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966), wherein the 
United States Supreme Court made it clear that what was at issue 
was the defendant's "constitutional right to a fair trial." 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
26 
 
Wis. Stat. § 905.03, or under SCR 20:1.6, or in the comment 
thereto. 
¶54 Although the testimony of Scholle did not explicitly 
divulge the actual contents of conversations with Meeks, her 
opinions, perceptions, and impressions of her former clients 
mental state were necessarily premised upon her privileged and 
confidential relationship with Meeks.  A thorough examination of 
those opinions, perceptions, and impressions arising from such a 
privileged 
and 
confidential 
relationship 
would 
necessarily 
reveal factual data upon which the opinions, perceptions, and 
impressions were based, thus clearly violating the attorney-
client privilege. 
¶55 The matters testified to by Scholle concerning the 
competency of Meeks to proceed are covered by the attorney-
client privilege.  The circuit court judge in Meeks' competency 
hearing decision dated January 4, 2000, stated: "If the 
defendant's cognitive limitations were such that someone with 
Ms. Scholle's experience and commitment, that if it had come to 
her notice, it would have been brought to my attention; and she 
did not."  (Def. App. B, p.7). 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Here we are clearly dealing with error that involved a 
substantial right of Meeks, the constitutional right to a fair 
trial.  As such, the error is not excused by an attempt to 
invoke §§  805.18(1), 901.03(1) and 901.03(4).  The error here 
was plain, it was objected to, and it was not harmless.  It 
seems quite clear based on Scholle's testimony at the Meeks 
competency hearing (¶8 herein), that Circuit Judge Elsa C. 
Lamelas relied heavily on that testimony in making her decision 
that Meeks was competent (see ¶¶10, 55-56 herein). 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
27 
 
¶56 Moreover, the judge stated that Scholle remembered 
Meeks and "that when she had spoken to him on the previous 
night, the night before the hearing, in jail, he had indicated 
to her that he was on medication, and so that she was aware of 
the fact that there were some mental health issues at that 
point."  Id. 
¶57 Certainly, the State did not exhaust all other 
investigatory powers in preparing its case for the competency 
hearing before compelling Scholle to testify.  By including the 
testimony of four expert witnesses and two other lay witnesses, 
the State already had an arsenal of testimony, which did not 
violate 
the 
attorney-client 
privilege, 
to 
prove 
Meeks' 
competency.  Indeed, the State could have provided testimony of 
other potential lay witnesses, including police officers, social 
workers, and former employers, to prove Meeks' competency, 
before relying upon Scholle's testimony and, thus, impinging 
upon the attorney-client privilege. 
¶58 In summary, we hold that the testimony of Scholle 
violated the attorney-client privilege.  While the contents of 
confidential conversations with Meeks were not revealed in her 
testimony, 
Scholle's 
expressed 
opinions, 
perceptions, 
and 
impressions 
of 
Meeks' 
competency 
were 
premised 
upon 
and 
inextricably 
linked 
to 
confidential 
communications.  
Confidential communications must be interpreted to include both 
verbal and non-verbal communications in order to preserve 
inviolate the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. 
No. 
01-0263-CR   
 
28 
 
¶59 Policy considerations play a fundamental role in 
protecting the very important relationship between attorney and 
client.  The attorney-client privilege provides sanctuary to 
protect a relationship based upon trust and confidence.  As 
such, the State should have exhausted all other means of 
information prior to attempting to present an attorney's 
testimony about her client without the clients consent. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶60 We hold that the court of appeals erred in finding the 
testimony 
of 
prior 
counsels 
opinions, 
perceptions, 
and 
impressions of her former clients competency did not violate the 
attorney-client privilege.  We hold that Scholle's opinions, 
perceptions, and impressions of Meeks' competency to proceed are 
within 
the 
attorney-client 
privilege 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 905.03 and SCR 20:1.6. 
¶61 As a result, such information should not have been 
revealed without the consent of the former client.  We reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand the case to the 
circuit court to conduct a competency hearing nunc pro tunc.  
The court is to determine the competency of Meeks to proceed as 
of 
January 
4, 
2000, 
without 
consideration 
of 
Scholle's 
testimony. 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and cause remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
1 
 
¶62 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  I must strenuously 
dissent.  The majority opinion applies a non-existent legal rule 
to facts that are not present in the case.  Furthermore, the 
alleged evidentiary error upon which the majority reverses was 
not preserved by a timely objection from the defense, and was 
therefore waived. 
¶63  The majority repeatedly states that the issue in this 
case is whether an attorney's "opinions, perceptions, and 
impressions relating to a former client's mental competency" are 
privileged under the attorney-client privilege.  Majority op., 
¶¶1-2, 17-18, 19, 22-23, 32, 40, 46, 53-54, 58, 61.  This 
statement of the issue bears no relationship to the facts in the 
case.  The attorney whose testimony is challenged on this review 
did 
not 
in 
fact 
render 
any 
"opinions, 
perceptions, 
or 
impressions" about a former client's mental competence. 
¶64  What happened in the circuit court was this: Assistant 
State Public Defender Mary Scholle was subpoenaed by the state 
to testify at a competency hearing involving a former client, 
Jerry Meeks, who is charged in this case with felony murder.  
Scholle arrived at the hearing with counsel; Scholle, her 
counsel, and the prosecutor then discussed with the court the 
"arguable" 
attorney-client 
privilege 
implications 
of 
her 
testimony. 
¶65  The issue was resolved when the prosecutor indicated 
that he did not intend to question Scholle regarding any 
attorney-client privileged communications, but, rather, would be 
pursuing a more general line of questioning.  Meeks' counsel 
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
2 
 
then objected to Scholle's testimony on relevance grounds, and 
suggested that the court instead take judicial notice of the 
transcripts and files in the cases on which Scholle had 
previously represented Meeks, as well as the obligation of every 
lawyer to raise the issue of his or her client's competence when 
there is a reason to do so.  See generally State v. Johnson, 133 
Wis. 2d 207, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986).  The circuit court overruled 
the relevance objection.  Meeks never asserted the attorney-
client privilege to prevent Scholle from testifying.12 
¶66  On direct and cross-examination, Scholle testified 
very generally about her background, training, and 15-years' 
experience 
as 
a 
criminal 
defense 
lawyer, 
which 
included 
representation of approximately 3,000 defendants, among them 
persons with mental health problems.  She also testified about 
her general practices in representing clients, including those 
with mental health problems, and indicated that "in general, if 
I have any question as to a person's competency, their ability 
                                                 
 
12  During Scholle's testimony, Meeks' counsel objected to 
only one question on attorney-client privilege grounds.  The 
objection was overruled, and Scholle's answer was an innocuous, 
"I don't recall."  More specifically: 
 
MR. GRIFFEN: Do you recall whether or not, when you 
represented Mr. Meeks whether or not you were aware of 
his criminal history? 
MR. NANZ: Objection, Your Honor, I think that goes 
into perhaps privileged communications. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
ATTORNEY SCHOLLE: I don't recall specifically.     
  
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
3 
 
to understand, to make decisions, to know the various roles of 
the players in court, I would bring that to the attention of the 
court."  She further testified that if she ever had a "scintilla 
of doubt" as to a client's competence, she would raise it with 
the court. 
¶67  As to Meeks in particular, Scholle testified that she 
represented him on several cases in the mid-1990s, and briefly 
related 
certain 
basic 
public-record 
facts 
about 
that 
representation, including the fact that Meeks entered a guilty 
plea on one case and an Alford plea on another.  Scholle was 
never asked for, and never offered, any testimony about her 
"opinions, perceptions, and impressions" about Meeks' mental 
competence.  She was never asked, and never revealed, any 
confidential communications of her former client. 
¶68  How, then, can the majority credibly assert that this 
case is about the admissibility of an attorney's "opinions, 
perceptions, and impressions" of a former client's mental 
competence when the attorney in question was not asked about and 
did not testify to any "opinions, perceptions, and impressions" 
of a former client's competence?  The majority does not cite to 
any record testimony by Scholle that constitutes an "opinion, 
perception, or impression" of Meeks' competence, because there 
is none. 
¶69 The majority responds to this inescapable reality by 
tepidly asserting in a footnote that "it seems quite clear that 
Scholle, 
through 
her 
testimony, 
did 
offer 
her 
opinions, 
perceptions, and impressions concerning Meeks' competency."  
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
4 
 
Majority op., ¶8, n.4.  If it is "quite clear" that Scholle 
testified as to her "opinions, perceptions, and impressions" of 
Meeks, one would expect the majority to identify at least one or 
two of those "opinions, perceptions, and impressions" to support 
its assertion.  The fact that the majority does not do so means, 
of course, that it cannot do so——again, because there are none.   
¶70  The majority also ignores the fact that any argument 
against the admissibility of Scholle's testimony on attorney-
client privilege grounds was waived by Meeks' failure to object.  
The attorney-client privilege, Wis. Stat. § 905.03, is an 
evidentiary rule.  The evidence code plainly provides that 
"[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected" and "a timely objection or motion to strike appears of 
record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific 
ground 
was 
not 
apparent 
from 
the 
context."  
Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1)(a).  Here, Meeks' attorney objected only 
to the relevance of Scholle's testimony.  Meeks never objected 
or sought to prevent Scholle from testifying on attorney-client 
privilege grounds. 
¶71 The privilege statute itself specifies that the 
attorney-client privilege "may be claimed by the client" or a 
representative of the client, including the client's lawyer.  
Wis. Stat. § 905.03(3)(subsection entitled "Who May Claim The 
Privilege").  With the one inconsequential exception noted 
above, supra, ¶4 n.1, the record is devoid of any indication 
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
5 
 
that Meeks' attorney ever claimed or asserted the attorney-
client privilege in order to prevent Scholle from testifying.13   
¶72  Despite this waiver, and disregarding the undeniable 
fact that the specific issue the majority purports to decide is 
not actually present in this case, the majority plows ahead and 
decides the evidentiary privilege question anyway.  In so doing, 
the majority acknowledges but ignores the overwhelming weight of 
authority finding no attorney-client privilege violation where 
an attorney's testimony is limited to observations about a 
client's competence and does not reveal the substance of 
confidential communications.14  Majority op., ¶35.  Instead, the 
majority opts to follow "a number of other courts" which (the 
majority claims) "have held that disclosure of even non-verbal 
communications, such as the ones at issue here, violates the 
attorney-client privilege."  Majority op., ¶36. 
                                                 
 
13    As noted, before testifying, Scholle herself, by 
counsel, raised with the court any "arguable" attorney-client 
privilege implications of her testimony, and the matter was 
resolved when the prosecutor agreed to keep his questions "at a 
high level of generality," to use the words of Scholle's 
counsel, Attorney William Tyroler.  Also as noted, Meeks' 
attorney never asserted the attorney-client privilege to prevent 
Scholle's testimony, did not ask for a continuing objection on 
attorney-client privilege grounds once Scholle's testimony was 
underway, and only objected to one specific question on 
attorney-client privilege grounds. 
  
 
14  See, Darrow v. Gunn, 594 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Clanton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1974); United 
States v. David, 511 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Howell v. United 
States, 442 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Tom, 340 
F.2d 127 (2nd Cir. 1965); United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 
110 (4th Cir. 1964); Manning v. State, 766 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1989); People v. Kinder, 126 A.D.2d 60 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1987); Jones v. District Court, 617 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1980).   
  
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
6 
 
¶73  First of all, as I have noted, there is no evidence in 
the record that Scholle disclosed any communications from Meeks, 
either verbal or non-verbal.  The majority does not identify the 
"non-verbal communications" it believes are cause for concern——
again, because there are none.  The majority's reference to a 
disclosure of "non-verbal communications, such as the ones at 
issue here" is totally mystifying. 
¶74  In addition, the four cases that the majority has 
opted to follow in lieu of the overwhelming weight of authority 
do not in fact support the conclusion that the majority reaches 
here.  Two of the four cases relied upon actually reached the 
opposite result, concluding that an attorney's observations 
about a former client's competence do not constitute privileged 
communications.  The third case did not involve the issue of a 
client's 
competence 
at 
all, 
but 
rather, 
involved 
the 
admissibility of an attorney's opinion about the voluntariness 
of his client's confession, as well as an actual disclosure of a 
confidential attorney-client conversation.  The sole remaining 
case is likely no longer good law. 
¶75  More specifically, the majority relies upon Gunther v. 
United States, 230 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1956), United States v. 
Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1964)(concurring opinion), 
Bishop v. Superior Court, 724 P.2d 23 (Ariz. 1986) and State v. 
Adams, 283 S.E.2d 582 (S.C. 1981).  Majority op., ¶36. 
¶76  Kendrick is fully consistent with the established line 
of authority that an attorney's observations about a client's 
competence are not privileged communications.  Kendrick, 331 
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
7 
 
F.2d at 113-14.  The majority acknowledges this, and includes 
Kendrick in the long list of cases that the majority has decided 
not to follow.  Majority op., ¶35.  The majority cites the 
concurrence in Kendrick as one of the "other courts" and "cases" 
which "hold" that an attorney's observations about a client's 
competence are protected by privilege.  Majority op., ¶¶36-38.  
The Kendrick concurrence represented the minority view of two 
judges in an en banc federal appellate decision; it cannot be 
cited as "holding" anything at all.  The majority paraphrases 
and quotes from the Kendrick concurrence, with attribution to 
"[t]he Kendrick Court," as if to suggest that Kendrick actually 
supports the majority's position, when in fact it does not.  
Majority op., ¶38. 
¶77  The majority also relies upon Bishop, which, like 
Kendrick, held that an attorney's observations of a client's 
mental competence do not constitute privileged communications: 
While few cases have dealt with this issue, the 
weight of authority supports the view that an attorney 
may testify at a competency hearing without violating 
the attorney-client privilege so long as the testimony 
does 
not 
include 
the 
substance 
of 
confidential 
communications. United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 
110, 114 (4th Cir. 1964) (objectively observable 
particularizations 
of 
the 
client's 
demeanor 
and 
attitude not within the privilege if made at a time 
when neither lawyer nor client manifested any reason 
to suppose they were confidential); see also Darrow v. 
Gunn, 594 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1979), United States v. 
David, 511 F.2d 355, 360 (D.C.Cir. 1975); Clanton v. 
United States, 488 F.2d 1069, 1070 (5th Cir. 1974); 
Howell v. United States, 282 F.Supp. 246 (N.D.Ill. 
1968), aff'd 442 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1971); United 
States v. Tom, 340 F.2d 127 (2nd Cir. 1965); Jones v. 
District Court, 617 P.2d 803, 808 (Colo. 1980). 
. . . . 
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
8 
 
[W]e 
will 
allow 
the 
testimony 
for 
several 
reasons. 
Observation 
of 
behavior 
is 
not 
a 
communication and therefore is not protected by the 
privilege. See Granger v. Wisner, 134 Ariz. 377, 379-
80, 656 P.2d 1238, 1240-41 (1982); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 
§ 89 at 213 (3d ed. 1984) . . . .  
We therefore conclude that, in a competency 
hearing, the judge may call upon both counsel as 
officers of the court to provide whatever conclusions 
and opinions they may have, together with so much of 
the supporting facts as may be obtained without 
violating either the attorney-client privilege or the 
confidentiality provided to attorney's work product. 
Bishop, 724 P.2d at 28-30. 
¶78 Adams, another case relied upon by the majority, 
involved the admissibility of an attorney's opinion regarding 
the voluntariness of his client's confession, not his client's 
competence to stand trial.  Adams, 283 S.E.2d at 585-86.  In 
addition, the attorney in Adams actually "describe[d] one 
private conversation" he had with the client, a fact not present 
here.  Id. 
¶79  Finally, Gunther, also cited by the majority, is no 
longer good law in light of a decision of the same circuit 
nearly 20 years later reaching a different conclusion.  Gunther 
was a three-paragraph per curiam opinion of the D.C. Circuit in 
which the court summarily concluded that trial counsel could not 
be called to testify at a post-trial hearing regarding a 
client's competence because of the danger that additional 
questions "could" be asked that would implicate the attorney-
client privilege.  Gunther, 230 F.2d at 223.  Two of the three 
paragraphs in the Gunther per curiam recited procedural matters, 
and 
the 
court's 
summary 
conclusion 
about 
the 
attorney's 
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
9 
 
testimony was more prophylactic than substantive: the court did 
not actually hold that an attorney's opinion about his client's 
competence was privileged, only that an attorney's testimony in 
this regard could open the door to questions about matters that 
were.  Id. 
¶80 In any event, in United States v. David, 511 F.2d 355 
(D.C. Cir. 1975), the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by Judge 
Bazelon, who had been on the panel in Gunther, held that "in 
making a competency determination it may be very useful for the 
trial judge to question both the defendant and his counsel."  
Id. at 360.  The court further held that "counsel's first-hand 
evaluation of a defendant's ability to consult on his case and 
to understand the charges and proceedings against him may be as 
valuable as an expert psychiatric opinion on his competency."  
Id.; 
see 
also Medina v. 
California, 
505 
U.S. 
437, 450 
(1992)(citing David, 511 F.2d at 360)("defense counsel will 
often have the best-informed view of the defendant's ability to 
participate in his defense").  While the D.C. Circuit continues 
to apply David, see, e.g., United States v. Klat, 213 F.2d 697, 
703 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the last, and only, time that it applied 
Gunther was in Seidner v. United States, 260 F.2d 732, 733 (D.C. 
Cir. 1958).  Given its conclusory nature, the Gunther per curiam 
has limited persuasive value in the first place; after David, it 
may no longer be held up as good law.  See Manning, 766 S.W.2d 
at 556-57 (concluding that Gunther was essentially overruled by 
David).   
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
10 
 
¶81 In short, the majority has adopted an interpretation 
of the attorney-client privilege that has either extremely 
flimsy or no support in the extra-jurisdictional case law.  As 
demonstrated above, there is in fact no "split" of authority in 
other jurisdictions, as the majority contends.  Majority op., 
¶35.  The legal rule the majority adopts——that an attorney's 
opinions, perceptions, and impressions about a former client's 
mental competence are privileged——does not exist anywhere, 
inside or outside of Wisconsin. 
¶82 More importantly, however, and setting aside the 
majority's misplaced reliance on the foregoing cases, the 
majority has grossly distorted the language and scope of the 
attorney-client privilege statute in its attempt to bring 
Scholle's testimony within the privilege. 
¶83 
The 
attorney-client 
privilege 
appears 
at 
Wis. Stat. § 905.03, which provides that the privilege protects 
"confidential 
communications 
made 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the 
client." 
 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 
905.03(2). 
 
A communication is 
"confidential" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
attorney-client 
privilege "if not intended to be disclosed to 3rd persons other 
than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition 
of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably 
necessary 
for 
the 
transmission 
of 
the 
communication."  
Wis. Stat. § 905.03(1)(d). 
¶84 It is well-established that "the [attorney-client] 
privilege protects 'communications,' not necessarily facts or 
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
11 
 
evidence."  State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 
559, 
578, 
150 
N.W.2d 
387 
(1967). 
 
Thus, 
"it 
is 
the 
communications, not facts relevant to the controversy, which are 
shielded by the privilege."  Id. at 580.  "Wisconsin, like most 
jurisdictions, has recognized only a narrow ambit to the 
communications included within the attorney-client privilege."  
Id. at 579.  We have also recognized that the attorney-client 
privilege, like all evidentiary privileges, is an obstacle to 
the truth and "should be 'strictly confined to within the 
narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of the 
principle.'"  Jax v. Jax, 73 Wis. 2d 572, 579, 243 N.W.2d 831 
(1976)(citations omitted). 
¶85 The 
majority 
seems 
to 
implicitly 
concede 
that 
Scholle's testimony did not directly implicate any confidential 
communication within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 905.03, because 
the 
majority 
explicitly 
rests 
its 
conclusion 
upon 
an 
interpretation of "the attorney-client privilege set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 905.03 and SCR 20:1.6."  Majority op., ¶61 
(emphasis added); see also, majority op., ¶¶1-2.  But SCR 
Chapter 20 does not "set forth" any evidentiary privileges at 
all, nor could it, as it is a code of ethics, not evidence.  
Indeed, the preamble to SCR Chapter 20 explicitly provides that 
the rules of professional responsibility "are not intended to 
govern or affect judicial application of either the attorney-
client privilege or work product privilege."  Wisconsin SCR Ch. 
20, Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Preamble: A 
Lawyer's Responsibilities. 
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
12 
 
¶86  Thus, by incorporating SCR 20:1.6 into the statutory 
attorney-client privilege, the majority has done what the 
preamble to SCR Chapter 20 says must not be done.  The majority 
has determined the scope and application of the statutory 
attorney-client privilege by reference to the SCR rules, 
contrary to the expressed intent of those rules. 
¶87 I am also extremely troubled by the significant 
overbreadth of the majority opinion.  The majority concludes 
that Scholle's testimony violates the attorney-client privilege 
without evaluating any of the specific questions asked of 
Scholle or the answers she gave.  This conflicts with the law, 
recited earlier in the majority opinion, that "[t]he party 
asserting the privilege bears the burden to establish that the 
privilege applies," that the privilege is to be "strictly and 
narrowly interpreted," and that the court must inquire into "the 
nature of the information sought" before concluding that the 
privilege applies.  Majority op., ¶20 (quoting Franzen v. 
Children's Hosp. Of Wis., 169 Wis. 2d 366, 386 485 N.W.2d 603 
(Ct. App. 1992) and Jax, 73 Wis. 2d at 581).  The applicability 
of the attorney-client privilege is typically evaluated on a 
question-by-question basis precisely to avoid overly broad 
invocations of the privilege that are inconsistent with its 
purpose and would thwart the discovery of the truth.  How can 
the majority properly apply these legal principles if it reaches 
its conclusion without reference to the testimony that was 
actually sought and given?  
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
13 
 
¶88 The 
majority 
also 
broadly 
invokes 
"policy 
considerations" in support of its conclusion, majority op., 
¶¶51-59, on the theory that "policy considerations play a 
fundamental role in protecting the very important relationship 
between attorney and client."  Majority op., ¶59.  I do not 
understand how the majority's ideas about policy can override 
the specific terms of a statutory privilege.  The majority's 
evaluation of non-statutory "policy considerations" lead to the 
sweeping conclusion that "[c]onfidential communications must be 
interpreted to include both verbal and non-verbal communications 
in order to preserve inviolate the integrity of the attorney-
client relationship."  Majority op., 
¶58. 
 
This 
is an 
extraordinary expansion of the scope of the attorney-client 
privilege, and there is no authority for it.  The ramifications 
of this unwarranted extension of the privilege are unknown, but 
potentially far-reaching.  
¶89  Finally, the majority's attempt to distinguish Johnson 
may have unforeseen implications for the duty of defense counsel 
to raise the issue of a client's competence when there is reason 
to do so.  Johnson involved a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failure to raise the defendant's competence as an 
issue.  Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 210-11.  We held that "where 
defense counsel has a reason to doubt the competency of his 
client to stand trial, he must raise the issue with the trial 
court."  Id. at 220. 
¶90  The majority dismisses the inference that, consistent 
with her duty under Johnson, Scholle would have raised the issue 
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
14 
 
of Meeks' competence had there been reason to do so.  Majority 
op., ¶50.  The majority rejects this very reasonable inference 
by 
speculating 
about 
other 
possible 
explanations 
for 
an 
attorney's silence in the face of the Johnson duty.  Id.  The 
inference that an experienced attorney would comply with her 
Johnson duty to raise the issue of competence does not become 
unreasonable or impermissible merely because there may be other 
possible explanations for the attorney's inaction.  Choosing 
between competing inferences is the job of the factfinder——here, 
the circuit court.  It is improper for an appellate court to 
weigh competing inferences, or, as the majority has done here, 
to completely rule out an otherwise reasonable inference that 
the factfinder was entitled to consider. 
¶91 I 
must 
also 
strongly 
object 
to 
the 
majority's 
conclusion that "Scholle should have continued to protect the 
attorney-client privilege in her testimony by declining to give 
her 
opinions, 
perceptions, 
or 
impressions 
as 
to 
Meeks' 
competency to proceed."  Majority op., ¶53.  Once again, there 
is no evidence whatsoever that Scholle actually "gave" any 
"opinions, perceptions, or impressions" about Meeks' competence, 
and even if she had done so, there is no legal support for the 
proposition that an attorney's "opinions, 
perceptions, or 
impressions" 
about 
a 
former 
client's 
competence 
are 
"confidential communications" protected by the attorney-client 
privilege. 
¶92  Implicit in the majority's assertion about what 
Scholle "should have" done is a conclusion that Scholle 
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
15 
 
committed an ethical and legal wrong against her former client.  
The majority thus maligns the integrity of an experienced member 
of the bar by way of an opinion that is wholly unsupported in 
fact or law. 
¶93  Finally, reversal is improper here unless the supposed 
erroneous admission of Scholle's testimony affected Meeks' 
substantial 
rights. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
901.03(1); 
see 
also 
Wis. Stat. §§ 805.18(2) and 972.11(1).  Where the alleged error 
was not preserved by a timely objection, the error is waived and 
reversal is statutorily prohibited; the only exception is plain 
error.  Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1)(a) and (4).  The plain error rule 
of Wis. Stat. § 901.03(4) provides that even in the absence of a 
timely objection, a reviewing court may remedy a plain error, 
but 
only 
where 
the 
error 
implicates 
a 
violation 
of 
constitutional rights so serious that it affects the fundamental 
fairness and integrity of the trial court proceedings.  Virgil 
v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 166, 192-93, 267 N.W.2d 852 (1978); State 
v. Vinson, 183 Wis. 2d 297, 515 N.W.2d 314 (Ct. App. 1994). 
¶94 The majority makes no effort to engage in either a 
harmless error analysis under Wis. Stat. §§ 901.03(1) or 
805.18(2) 
or 
a 
plain 
error 
analysis 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 901.03(4), but simply reverses for a nunc pro tunc 
competency 
hearing 
"without 
consideration 
of 
Scholle's 
testimony."  Majority op., ¶61.  As such, the majority opinion 
compounds all its multiple mistakes by also ignoring the 
No.  01-0263-CR.dss 
 
16 
 
requirements of Wis. Stat. §§ 901.03, 805.18(2) and 972.11(1).15  
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶95 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. 
PROSSER, JR. joins this dissenting opinion. 
 
 
                                                 
15 The majority responds by saying that the constitutional 
right to a fair trial is implicated if an incompetent person is 
subjected to a trial.  Majority op., ¶53 n.11.  Of course it is, 
and no one is saying otherwise.  The material point, however, is 
that the majority has utterly failed to engage in any analysis 
whatsoever 
of 
the 
effect 
of 
Scholle's 
testimony 
on 
the 
determination of Meeks' competence.  In order to justify a new 
competency hearing under either harmless error or plain error 
analysis, the majority must be able to conclude that Scholle's 
testimony so influenced the competency determination that but 
for her testimony, Meeks would have been found incompetent.  See 
State v. Weed, 2003 WI ___, ¶¶29-30 ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d 
___ (reviewing court evaluates an error's harmlessness by 
evaluating the nature of the error and the harm it is alleged to 
have caused).