Case Title: Sacks v. Com., Dept. of Public Welfare

Citation: 465 A.2d 981, 502 Pa. 201

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1983-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
502 Pa. 201 (1983) 465 A.2d 981 Stephen M. SACKS, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Appellee. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 26, 1983. Decided September 23, 1983. *202 *203 *204 Stanley M. Shingles, Philadelphia, for appellant. Stanley Slipakoff, Mary Alexine Reilly, Asst. Counsels, Philadelphia, for appellee. Before ROBERTS, C.J., and NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON and ZAPPALA, JJ. FLAHERTY, Justice. This case presents the question of under what circumstances a government employee may be disciplined because of his public statements which are critical of the government agency for which he works. The Supreme Court of the United States, addressing this problem, has stated: Connick v. Myers, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983). Because in the present case appellant Sacks was speaking on a matter of public importance and did not impair the functioning of his agency beyond incurring the displeasure of his superiors, we reverse the Commonwealth Court and direct the Department of Public Welfare to reinstate Sacks with full pay and benefits for the period of suspension. This case began when Sacks, an employee of the Department of Public Welfare, gave a public address during the evening of October 4, 1978 to the Health Systems Agency of Southeastern Pennsylvania (HSA). HSA plans health care facilities in Southeastern Pennsylvania and establishes guidelines for health care costs. Membership of HSA consists of representatives of many, if not all, major health care delivery agencies in the region. On the evening of October 4, 1978 Sacks appeared at a public hearing conducted by HSA on a proposed plan for improving the quality of health care and reducing its cost. His comments, in pertinent part, are as follows: The commission went on to state that its decision was based not only on the fact that detrimental remarks were made, but also on "the fact that the remarks were made under the false guise of authoritative expertise and contained, as noted previously, patently false insinuations." Our review of the record indicates that these findings of fact are without substantial support. To begin with, a fair reading of Sacks' opening remarks does not suggest "the false guise of expertise." Secondly, it is not at all clear that Sacks' remarks contained "patently false insinuations." The "patently false insinuations" referred to are Sacks' remarks that the $768,000 surplus was "a rip-off" and his implication that there was an impropriety involved in the joint involvement of department employees on the board of the PHMC and in the Department of Welfare. That the surplus existed and that the joint involvement occurred the agency does not dispute; it disputes that either was improper. The essence of the agency's explanation of the contract which permitted a non-profit agency to accumulate a $768,000 profit from the work it performed for the agency was that negotiating such a contract was ultimately beneficial to the Commonwealth and to citizens served because although a surplus was accumulated, paying for medical examinations at a fixed rate per examination encouraged a larger volume of service and allowed the agency to renegotiate the contract periodically as costs went down because of volume. As to the joint membership on the board of the Philadelphia Health Management Corporation and employment by the *210 Department of Welfare, the agency explained that as part of the contract with the federal government under which PHMC was formed as a non-profit corporation, it was agreed that the Department of Welfare, because of its role as the agency which administrates Title XIX, the Medicaid Program, and other health care payors as well, might participate in the PHMC. The Civil Service Commission apparently felt that the agency's explanation of the situation precluded criticism, for in its opinion, cited supra, the commission stated that Sacks would not have made his remarks had he not unreasonably failed to "examine the facts prior to testifying. . . ." However, the commission's speculation about Sacks' testimony may or may not be accurate. Since the testimony in question has two componentsa fact component and a value or opinion component and since the fact component of Sacks' speech was accurate, it is not possible to say that the value component necessarily would have changed had Sacks been in possession of supplementary information which was offered by the agency at the Civil Service hearing. Additionally, there is nothing of record to indicate that Sacks did not already know the agency's reasons, as they were asserted at the hearing, for the surplus and the joint involvement. Therefore, the commission's assertions that Sacks would not have testified as he did if he had been more careful is in error for two reasons: (1) Sacks' opinion may have remained the same if he had been in possession of supplementary information on the agency's position, and (2) there is nothing of record to indicate that he did not have this supplementary information. In sum, Sacks' view that the surplus was improper and the joint involvement questionable was a value judgment on which reasonable minds could disagree. Furthermore, the subject matter of this value judgment, while it concerned matters of agency management, also, more importantly, concerned matters of substantial public interest. Subject to limitations which will be stated infra, it is permissible for a government employee to disagree with his agency *211 on matters of fiscal policy and to articulate that disagreement publicly. In Pickering, the United States Supreme Court commented on the right of a teacher to speak publicly on the school board's allocation of funds between educational and athletic programs: 391 U.S. 563, 571-72, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1736. See also Chalk Appeal, 441 Pa. 376, 384, 272 A.2d 457, 461 (1971). Is not Sacks in a similar position? He too is most likely to have "informed and definite opinions" as to the expenditure of Department of Welfare funds. Where the Commission erred was in not recognizing the value or opinion component of Sacks' speech. Sacks' facts are not really at issue in this case; rather it is his characterization of the facts that is "unacceptable." However, the First Amendment does not serve to protect only views that are universally accepted, or accepted by those in positions of power, or views which are innocuous. Such ideas have little need for protection. More importantly, the First Amendment serves to protect "[u]nconstrained discussion concerning the manner in which government performs its duties," Connick v. Myers, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1697, and as this Court stated in Chalk Appeal, the best test of the truth of speech relating to public policy is acceptance in the competition of the marketplace of ideas. 441 Pa. at 384, 272 A.2d at 461. The opinion of the Commonwealth Court affirmed the Commission on the grounds that Sacks occupied a "sensitive position" and was duty bound to make a greater effort than he made to verify his erroneous information that the Philadelphia Health Management Corporation had financially exploited the Department of Welfare and that there was impropriety in some Welfare personnel's simultaneous joint work in both agencies. There was, therefore, the court concluded, substantial evidence that Sacks recklessly disregarded the truth in making public statements to the HSA. To begin with, there is nothing of record to indicate that Sacks occupied a "sensitive position," except insofar as any employee who has knowledge of his agency's activities is in a sensitive position. Moreover, there is nothing of record to indicate that Sacks was reckless in his remarks. In fact, his testimony, which was uncontradicted, was that he had spent a great deal of time in researching and preparing the remarks made to HSA. Furthermore, as stated earlier, the agency does not contend that the surplus did not exist or the simultaneous joint work did not occur; it alleges only that in its view there were good reasons for these occurrences. It may be that Sacks was unaware of or that he misunderstood the reasons for certain agency actions, but this is not the stuff of which reckless disregard is made. Fundamentally, the Commonwealth Court's opinion is based on the view that when a government employee comments on a matter "about which his position qualified him to speak with greater authority than any other taxpayer" he is obligated to make substantial efforts to ensure that his statements are accurate before publishing them.[2] *213 However, because this case does not involve remarks that are especially related to Sacks' publicly acknowledged job function, we need not address the merit of the Commonwealth Court's view that remarks closely related to the speaker's position require particular care before they may be made with First Amendment protection. Sacks' identification of himself as a behavioral scientist and an employee of the Department of Welfare who had been involved in Pennsylvania's attempts to modernize its health care system over the last ten years does not lead a listener to believe that what he is about to hear will be based on knowledge necessarily related to Sacks' position. In fact, Sacks' introductory remarks specify that he intended to utilize information from sources outside the Department of Welfare. Thus, we conclude that there is no substantial evidence to support the findings that Sacks was "reckless" in his preparation and delivery of public remarks; or that he spoke under the false guise of authoritative expertise; or that he made false insinuations. In Pickering v. Board of Education, in which a public school teacher wrote a letter to the editor critical of the school board's allocation of funds between education and athletics, and its failure to inform the public as to how the money was being spent, the Court rejected the idea that a teacher's public comments on school board policy which were substantially correct could be grounds for dismissal if they were sufficiently critical in tone. 391 U.S. at 570, 88 S. Ct. at 1735. The Court noted, however, that different considerations may become operative if the speaker occupied a position in which the need for confidentiality was great or in which criticism of a superior undermined the necessary close *214 working relationship between superior and subordinate. 391 U.S. at 570, n. 3, 88 S. Ct. at 1735, n. 3. As to false statements, some of which were contained in Pickering's letter to the editor, the Court stated: 391 U.S. at 570-71, 88 S. Ct. at 1736 (Emphasis supplied). The Court then went on to observe that the only way in which Pickering's letter may have had a per se detrimental effect would be if the interest of the school board were to be equated with the board member's own interests. On the facts of the Pickering case, the Court concluded that no such equation could be made. Moreover, the Court observed that Pickering's false statements would normally have had no necessary impact on the actual operation of the schools, apart from angering the board. In Connick v. Myers, a case in which an assistant district attorney was discharged after she circulated a questionnaire among fellow workers concerning, inter alia, their attitudes toward supervisors and whether co-workers felt pressured to work on political campaigns, the Court addressed a question not posed by the Pickering case: what injury to the government employer is required when the speech activity at issue has only a limited First Amendment aspect: ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S. Ct. at 1694. As the foregoing discussion indicates, there is a calculus of injury required in First Amendment government employee cases in which as the First Amendment interest in the speech rises, so does the government's obligation to react with caution, disciplining an employee, if at all, only when injury to the agency is more than speculative. Assuming that the speech in question concerns matters of general public interest, the principles which we distill from the foregoing discussion are (1) as the public interest value of the speech increases, government's disciplinary action related to the speech activity will proportionately increase in difficulty of justification; (2) in most cases, factually accurate but critical statements made by a public employee may not be punished at all; (3) false but harmless statements also may not be punished if the government is unable to demonstrate that the statements were in some way injurious; (4) the claim that false statements were per se harmful requires an equation of the interests of the agency criticized with individuals who are in positions of authority in the agency, and whether such an equation will be made will depend on the nature of the speech in question. In clarification of these general principles, the Court has articulated a number of additional factors which it may be appropriate to consider in a given case when a government *216 employee is disciplined for speaking on a matter of public importance.[3] These additional factors, articulated in Connick, may include the following: ___ U.S. at ___ _ ___, 103 S. Ct. at 1691-1694. In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968), the Court implied that there were still other factors which, although they were not present in the Pickering case and were therefore not considered, might have affected the disposition of the case: *217 Finally, the Connick Court pointed out that the context in which the employee decided to speak in the first place is a matter of importance: ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S. Ct. at 1693. Thus, the motive of the employee plays an important role in the balancing process where it can be demonstrated that a public employee makes statements for a purely vindictive and malicious purpose. Applying these general considerations to the analysis of a public employee First Amendment case, a court should consider: As the public importance of the speech increases, the government's difficulty of justifying disciplinary action taken against the employee because of the speech will increase proportionately, and as the public importance of the speech decreases, the government's burden of showing injury before it may discipline an employee, for First Amendment purposes, will proportionately decrease. If the speech has no element of public importance, then the analysis will not apply, and the speech should be treated merely as an ordinary complaint about the work place. Because there is no substantial evidence in support of the lower court's pivotal legal conclusions and because a review of the record indicates that Sacks' speech concerned matters of public importance which were expressed in substantially accurate terms and were of no demonstrated harm *218 to the agency, the judgment of the Commonwealth Court is reversed and the Department of Public Welfare is directed to reinstate Mr. Sacks for the period of his suspension with full pay and benefits. LARSEN, J., concurs in the result. [1] The reasons given for the suspension, in pertinent part, are as follows: 1. Insubordination, in that your statements at the Health Systems Agency public hearing on October 4, 1978, and to the press, and your conduct on the job demonstrate such antagonism to the established policies of the Department of Public Welfare that they amount to insubordination, thereby jeopardizing the proper delivery to the public of the services performed by the Department through its employees. . . . 2. Your statements at the above-mentioned meeting were made with reckless disregard for the truth. Your use of the term "Rip-Off" is accusatory, inflammatory, and irresponsible and connotes illicit motivation and intention. 3. You violated the Department of Welfare's general principles of conduct when you failed to conduct yourself in a manner that will bring credit to the Commonwealth and promote good public relations for the Department of Welfare with the citizens of the State. 4. You violated the Department of Welfare's general principles of conduct when you engaged in an activity which caused unfavorable publicity to and adversely effected [sic] the public's confidence in the integrity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Department of Public Welfare. You chose to incite public suspicion and distrust by alleging profiteering and a "Rip-Off", while publicly acknowledging your awareness of the sensitive budgetary condition of the Department of Public Welfare which is unable to pay medical assistance bills after April 30, 1979. Although the first item in this letter refers to "conduct on the job," there is no substantial evidence that the suspension was based on anything beyond Sacks' public speaking. [2] In the Pickering case, the United States Supreme Court stated: We are not . . . presented with a situation in which a teacher has carelessly made false statements about matters so closely related to the day-to-day operations of the schools that any harmful impact on the public would be difficult to counter because of the teacher's presumed greater access to the real facts. Accordingly, we have no occasion to consider at this time whether under such circumstances a school board could reasonably require that a teacher make substantial efforts to verify the accuracy of his charges before publishing them. 391 U.S. at 572, 88 S. Ct. at 1736. [3] The Court in Connick explained that whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern is determined by the content, form, and context of the speech as determined by the whole record. ___ U.S. at ____, 103 S. Ct. at 1689-1691. [4] In the Connick case, Myers' questionnaire was distributed at the office.