Case Title: State v. Ribbel

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LIBHANY

 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

=--000---

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee,

DENISE RIBBEL, Respondent /Defendant-Appellant .

 

No. 26525

CERTIORARI T0 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS,
(CASE NO, 086348240)

   

SEPTEMBER 8, 2006

MOON, C.J., NAKAYAMR, ACOBA, AND DUFFY,
AND LEVINSON, 3., DISSENTING

 

EYAL YHNON
aam

 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J,
on July 6, 2006, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee State of
Hawas's (hereinafter, State!) filed a timely Application for Writ
of Certiorari (Application), requesting that this court review
the published opinion of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA)
in State v. Ribbel, No. 26525, 2006 WL 1530186 (Haw. App. June 6,
2006), which reversed the District Court of the Second Circuit's

March 31, 2004 Judgment, finding Respondent /Defendant-Appellant

 

1 The state of Howal"t ie referred to he the “state” rather then
the “prosecution” because a traffic infraction is a civil matter rather than @
Grinine: offence. Hawaii Revices fs (IRS) § 291-1 (3993) Inctang che
Gecriminalization of traffic int I Was € 2910-2 (1993) (stating that
Tall ¥: or tles relating to trsific movenent
Cquiprent, and pedestrian offenses,

       
   
     
   
   

   

    

For which the p
ciel *erattic 22, 23 Dele
ae'the "eate"
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Denise Ribbel “guilty” of violating HRS § 291-11.6 (Supp. 2003),
“Mandatory use of seat belts, when, penalty” [hereinafter, seat
belt statute].! The State asserts that the ICA gravely erred:
(1) because its literal construction of the seat belt statute
failed to effectuate the statute's plain and obvious meaning as
intended by the Hawai'i State Legislature; and (2) in concluding
that the seat belt statute is ambiguous, but then ignoring the
statute's legislative history. On August 22, 2006, we accepted
the State’s Application. We now reverse the ICA's decision and
affirm the district court's determination that Ribbel violated
HRS § 291-11.6. However, because the district court erroneously
found Ribbel “guilty” of the offense, which is a civil traffic
infraction rather than a crime, see supra note 1, we vacate the
judgment and remand to the district court for entry of a
replacement judgment in favor of the State that complies with the
applicable statutes governing traffic infractions. See State w
Stoa, No. 26272, 2006 WL 2255646, at *1 (Haw. App. August 7,
2006) (affirming the district court's determination that the
defendant committed a traffic violation, but vacating the
judgment and renanding for entry of a replacement judgment in
favor of the State that complies with the applicable statutes
governing traffic infractions) (citing State v. Rees, 107 Hawai'i

687, reconsideration denied, 108 Hawai'i 76, 116

 

508, 118 P.3:

‘The Honorable Reinette W. Cooper presided over this matter.

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

P.3d 718 (App. 2005), cert. denied, 108 Hawai'i $9, 116 P.34 702

(2005).

follows:

1. BACKGROUND

The undisputed facts, as stated by the ICA, are as

(on November 18, 2003, Officer Keith Tagune (Officer
‘Taguna) was working on [Maui Police Department's (MPO) 1s
Belt enforcement team, “specificelly locking for any motor
vehicle travelling on’ public roadway with any front seat
passengers unrestrained oF any children in the rear seats
bnrestrained."" Shortly before 2:50 p.m., he observed
“two(=Jdoor [1984] Tord ...-” headed "easttouns on Wake:
avenue toward the Lane Avenue intersection.” Officer Taguma
Roticed that the seat belt assembly of the driver of the
Vehicle vee “pullea down tucked under [the Griver'e] left

tina. thereupon activates the lsghts on his
police car, pulled the vehicle over, and cited Aibbel, the
Griver, for violating the seat belt statute.

 

   

 

 

   

At Ribbel's trial, officer Taguna explained how he
could tell that the shoulder harness of the sent belt uss
Under Ribbel'® arn:

Firat of all, the portion, one piece assenbly,
the belt pulls ovt’ fron the side panel of the vehicle
hen you pull it cut end yeu put the rale portion ints
The female portion on the right side of the seat, the
Shoulder harness should be over your shoulder blade,
Gown infront you to secure your upper body from front
Rovewent. The lep belt would come ost from the Dotto
‘nd be strapped over your lower pelvis area and that
Scoures your sody into the chase

 

  

On (Ritbe2"e] belt, the belt was pulled down.
‘you could clearly see. the buckle was hanging straight
Gown and under the left am. There was no shoulder
harness over Aer body.

ofsicer Taguna testifies that Ribbel was not in an exergency
venicie, mase transit vehicle, of taxi cab. Additionally,
Rinsel did not have any visisle physicel condition that
would prevent her use of a seat belt, end she did not
mention any sven condition.

Officer Taguna stated that upen approaching Ribbel’s
vehicle, he informed Riboel that she was in viclation of the
Seat belt stature Because “the seat Delt acsembiy (wae) not
properly wern[.]" On crses-exanination, Officer Tagana
Eontirred that hen he stopped the vehicle, Aibbel nad her
Tap belt on, but her shoulder harness was tucked under her

 

 

 

 
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The following colloquy then ensued between the
district court and Ribbel!

‘THE court:
Whet"s your defense? That's not the proper way.

(RIBBELI: T hed the seat belt on.

‘THE COURT: When you wear it like thet you
violating the seat belt, It's meant to protect =

IRIBBELI: Your Honor, Af T may. T went ang
Looked in the HEC's (sic) and it says you have to wear
the seat belt assembly, and 1 do. 1 wear, you know,
the lap belt, ana then’ I tuck St under my azn, acrous
this way and unger my arm, because my car is a
Echvertivie, Where the retractor thing =~ where st
Sones out of the docr panel ~~ the cide panel of the
Ser, At"2 dow Below ny shoulder:

 

1f you need to know why T do it this way de
because {pulls down on ay shoulder and my arm will
go to sleep and it hurts firet, and then it goes to
Seep. And it taker awhile to get {t back and so.
Ehat's not safe to operate the ear.0! So when T have
fo drive I pot it cross and under here.

 

THE COURT: You going lose. With that argument

 

[RIBBEL): But T have At on,

THE COURT: Mo, no. The seat belt assembly is
ade to be worn

 

[RIBBEL}: So 1 should just go ahead and go
without st.

 

> We note that HRS § 291-11-6(c) (3) (1993) provi

 

(c)__ No person shall be guilty of violating thie
section df:

ia) the person not restrained by a seat belt
aecenbly has a consition which prevents
appropriate restraint by the seat belt assembly:
peovides euch condition is Guly cersitsed by a
Bhusician who snail state the natore of the
Eondition, as well as the reason such restraint
Se inoppropeiate( +)

 

 

(Enphasie added.) However, Ribbel di¢ not provide sny evidence thet her
alleges condition was "duly certified by 0 physician.”

 

 

ie else enphasize that, although HRS § 281-11.6(c) improperly uses the
word “guilty,” a violation of HRS § 29i-11.6 Se 2 civil traffic infraction and
fot a crininal offense. ise aupca note 1

 
 

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THE COURT: Then you get seat belt. It’s meant
to be worn the way it's sssenbled properly, over the
‘shoulder ana across the lap. You can net’ [(sie)) Just
Secige on your oun that now the shoulder harness, yoo
Seing te put under your armpit. That"s an illegal use
Of the sesenbly.

 

 

So you really have no defense. If you're
saying, well, your orm =~

[RIBBEL]: T wee wearing the seat belt thoush.

THE COURT: io, wearing the seat belt is wesring
Ae w+ wearing the assembly the way it's made to be
worn ic not under the arspit. All of the literature
‘how that that will cause nore injury rather than less
injury." that's shy they make Lt'to go Over yOUr vpper
forec, ‘not onder your sr

 

 

(RIBBEL]: I was -- 1 wae wearing —- T had
St buckled. I feel that 1s safer to at least
have that and acrose here

 

 

 

‘THE COURT: Well, if you feel

 

(RIBBEL];~- then to not where [{sic}) st at
all is what I'm saying.

‘THE COURT: -- you feel it's safer, but the
experts will £612 you you endangering yourself mere.

(RIBBELI: Well, it’s
plugged in.

 

at least 7 had it

‘THE COURT: ALL right, I'm going te find in
favor of the State, You pay the ¢5, the 10 neure
feauna, 15 admin, $7.00 driver's ed

Seat belt is not meant to be worn the way you
think t should be worn” It's made to be worn the Way
the manufacturer invented it to be worn

ibbel at 1-3 (some alterations in original). Officer Taguna
also testified that wearing the seat belt in the manner in which
Ribbel wore the shoulder harness could cause more severe injuries
to one’s upper body, as well as injuries to one's internal organs

where the seat belt rides.
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On March 31, 2004, the district court entered judgment
for the State, finding Ribbel “guilty” of violating the seat belt
statute and ordering Ribbel to pay fines, fees, and costs
amounting to $77.00, On April 16, 2004, Ribbel filed her Notice
of Appeal.

In its June 6, 2006 published opinion, the ICA reversed
and remanded for “dismissal of the charge against Ribbel and the
refund to Ribbel of any fines, fees, and costs that may have been
paid by her[,]” Ribbel at *1, concluding that Ribbel was
“restrained by a seat belt assembly” in conformance with the seat
belt statute. Specifically, the ICA stated:

The language of the seat belt statute Literally

requires only that a person operating « motor vehicle upon

public highway be “restrained bye sest belt essenbly[.1”

The statute dees not state that the operator must be

erly ssetrsined of that the Seat belt essemsly aust be

Norn in @ particular nanner. Indeed, except for requiring

that the motorist be “restrained” by’ the assembly, the

statute 1s completely silent 2s to the way the seat bel
assembly is to be used.

 

 

 

The term “restrained” is not defined in the seat belt
stature. However, the ebster

(10th G4. 2000) defines “restrained” az “marked
By restraint” and defines “restraint” ase device that
restricts novenent [.]”
Ld. ot 996. Under thie definition, Aitbel was clearly
Stestrained” by her seat belt assembly since it is
undispotes thet her seat belt was buckled, the Lap portion
of the seat belt covered her lap, and the shoulder harness
portion of the seat belt was tucked under her arm and across

Fer torso, thereby restricting Ribbel"s novenen
Ribbel at *4-5 (final emphasis added) (alterations in original).

 

  

 

 

 

Comparing HRS § 291-12.5 (Supp, 2005), which governs the usage of
child passenger restraints, to HRS § 291-11.6, the ICA further

reasoned:
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The State does not argue that the meaning of
vrestrained" is ambiguous. It argues instead that, based on
the legislative history of the seat belt statute and the
Feguirenents of various federal laws upon which the seat
belt statute was predicates, the Hawai Legislature clearly
intended the term “restrained by 2 seat belt assembly

neon “properly restrained” by 8 seat belt oscenbly.
Bnswering Brief at 12. (Emphasis added.)

 

 

Me note, however, that unlike the seat belt statute at
issue in this case, SRS 291-11.5 (Supp. 2005), whien governs
the usage of child’ passenger restraints, provides, in
relevant part, a6 follows:

 

Child paseenger restraints. (2) Except as
otherwise provided in this section, no person
Sperating 8 notor vehicle ons public highway in the
State shall traneport a child under four years of age
hless the person operating the motor vehicle ensures
that the chile ts properly restrainea in a child
passenger restraint system approved by the United
States Department of Transportation at the tine of its
manufacture

(eapheste added.) Recerding different statutes that address
the sane subject matter, the general rule is thet

claws in pari nateris, or upon the same subject
matter, shall be construed with reference to each
Sther. What is clear in one statute nay be calles in
Sid'to explain what is doubtful in ancther where &
Statute with reference to one subsect contains 2 siven
provision, the omission of such provision from @
Einilar statute concerning @ related subject is
Significant to chow shat a different legislative
intent existed.”

State vil Villeza, 85 Hawas's (256,) 273, 942 F.2d (822,)
557 [(1997] (rackets, citations, and some quotation marks
onittes).

  

The legislature specifically required children under
the age of four to be “properly restrained” in child
Festraint seat. However, it did not include a similar
Fequiresent for use of s veniole’s seat belt assembly by
operators or passengers four years of age end cider. See
ks § 291-13.6.. Since our cage law requires us to construe
tthe Legislsture’e chiseion of the adver "properly" a2
intentional, we decline the prosecution's invitaticn to
insert "properly" into the seat belt statute

 

Ribbel at *S (emphases in original). Finally, the ICA cited with
approval several cases from New York, which “struck down

convictions for driving a motor vehicle without wearing a seat
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belt or driving a vehicle with @ passenger not restrained by a
seat belt, where the motorist or passenger was restrained by a
lap seat belt, but wearing @ shoulder harness seat belt in a

manner other than over the shoulder." 1

 

 

on July 6, 2006, the State filed an application for
certiorari, which this court dismissed without prejudice because
the ICA had not entered 2 judgment on appeal. On July 19, 2006,
the ICA filed the Judgment on Appeal. The State filed this
timely Application on August 2, 2006.

TT. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

(a) Aster iesvence
court's judgment or diem:
Of the intermediate appellate court's decision end judgment
Sr dismissal order only by application to the supreme court
for s writ of certiorari, the acceptance or rejection of
which shall be discretionary upon the supreme court.

 

   

 

Ib) The application for writ of certiorari shall
tersely state ite grounds, which shall include:
{2} Grave errors of law or of fact? or
{2} Gbvicus inconsistencies in the decision of the
intermediate appellate court with chat of the supreme
court, federal decisions, oF its own decision,
and the magnitude of those errors of inconsistencies dictating the
need for further eppeat

 

2006 Haw. Sess. L. Act 149, § 1 (amending HRS § 602-59 (Supp.
2005)).
B. Statutory Interpretation

Statutory interpretation is “a question of law

reviewable de nove.” State v, Levi, 102 Hawai'i 262, 285, 75
P.3d 117)

 

7€ (2003) (quoting State v. Arcec, 64 Hawai" 1, 10,

 
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928 P.2d 843, 852 (1996)). This court's statutory construction

is guided by established rules:

First, the fundamental starting point for statutory
interpretation is the language of the statute itself,
Second, uhere the 3

Third, implicie Tn the
tesk of statutory construction is'cur

AT Eo be cbtained

TESif “recrtn, wien there te doubt, deublenees of
Reaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty cf an
Cxpression uses ina statute, an ambiguity exiete
Ana fifth, in construing an ambiguous statute, the
esning of the anbigvour words nay be sought by
examining the context, with which the ambiguols words,
Phrases, and sentences nay be compared, in order to
tain their true meaning

 

eon v. Haw: Jaht Co, Inc, @5 Hawas's 322, 327-28,
944 P.2d 1265, 1270-71 (1997), superseded on other arounds by HRS
§ 269-15.5 (Supp. 1999) (block quotation format, brackets,
citations, and quotation marks omitted) (emphases added).
IIT. pISCUSSION

The State contends that the ICA gravely erred because
its construction of the seat belt statute failed to effectuate
the statute’s plain and cbvicus meaning as intended by the
Hawai'i State Legislature. We agree.
AL ause the Languase of the Seat Belt Statute is Plain a

vious Neaning As Intended By th

HRS § 291-11.6, entitled “Man:

  

ory use of seat belts,
when, penalty” provides in relevent part:

(a) Except az ctherwiee provided by Jay

 

ne perscn
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(2) Shall operate # motor vehicle upon any public
highsay unless the person ss restrained By a
seat Bet aszenbly(-]

 

Ae used in this section “seat belt assembly” means the
seat belt asseably required to be in the motor vehicle under
any federal motor vehicle safety standard iscued pursuant te
Pobiie Low 65-563, the federal Mational Treffic and Motor
Veniele Sefety Act of 1966, a5 anended, unless original
Feplacenent seat belt asseablies are not readily
availeblel-]

The ICA concluded that because this statute does not
expressly require that a motorist be properly restrained by a
seat belt assembly or prescribe a specific manner in which the
seat belt assembly must be worn, Ribbel did not violate the
statute inasmuch as she was “restrained,” albeit improperly, “by
2 seat belt assembly” insofar as the seat belt “restrict [ed]
Ribbel’s movement.” Bibbs) at *5. This interpretation does not
give effect to either the plain and obvious meaning of the
statutory language or the intention of the legislature as

expressed in that language.

 

irst, the plain end obvious meaning of this statute is
to require motorists to utilize the seat belt assembly in the

manner in which it was designed to be worn so as to prevent

 

injury and death. HRS § 1-14 (1993) provides that “(t]he words
of a law are generally to be understood in their most known and
usual signification, without attending so much to the literal and
strictly grammatical construction of the words as to their

general or popular use or meaning.” As the district court noted,

20
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it is generally understood that requiring @ person to be
restrained by @ seat belt assembly is requiring the lap belt
portion to be worn over the lep and the upper torso belt portion
to be worn over the chest and shoulder.‘ Ribbel was not wearing
her seat belt in the manner in which it is designed and generally
understood to be worn.

Second, we need not delve into the statute's
legislative history to know that the legislature did not enact
the statute merely to restrict motorists’ movenent; rather, it is
clear that the legislature's intent in enacting this statute was
to prevent injury and death resulting from motor vehicle
accidents.’ The ICA’s construction of the statute, which allows
motorists to use the seat belt assenbly in a manner in which it

is not intended to be used

 

and in fact, causes more injury ~~
is contrary to the legislature's intent. Indeed, Officer Taguma

presented uncontroverted testimony that wearing the seat belt in

 

This general understanding ie eupported by federal safety standards.
Ribbel's car mos equipped with a "Type 2” seat belt accembiy, which is 3
Combination of pelvic snd Upper torso restraints. Safety Standard No. 208, 49
CcPsR. § 5710208, $3: “Upper torso restraint” noone "2 portion of 2 seat belt
Sceenbiy intended to restfain movenent of the chest and shoulder reaions.”"
[ar Yeaphasis addes), "A Type 2 seat belt assembly shell provice upper torso
Fertraine without, shifting the pelvic restraint into the absoninel region.”
hot s4.ticis The way in which Ribbel wos wearing her seat belt did not
Prcvide complete teres torso" restraint becouse it Gia fot restrain povenent, of

shoulder region, and thus, wae not the way ip which the seat belt assembly
Mie designed £'be worn

 

 

 

 

 

 

+ hile we need not examine the statute's legislative history to know
the legislature's intent in enacting the seat pelt statute, the legislative
history dees support anc fake clear that the purpose of the statute is to
Gcctease the nutber of snnecessary injuries and fatlities in traffic
Secidente, See Antes Section 111-8.

 

 

 

 
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the manner in which Ribbel wore the shoulder harness could cause
severe injuries to her upper body and internal organs.
Accordingly, the ICA gravely erred in interpreting the seat belt
statute and concluding that Ribbel’s use of the seat belt

assembly complied therewith.*

B. The ICA's Interpretation is Inconsistent With the
Lesislative Intent of the Statute and Would Lead to Absurd
its

 

Inasmuch as the plain language of the seat belt statute
is clear on its face, there vas no need for the ICA to resort to
the use of the doctrine of in pari materia’ or to examine the
legislative history of the statute. State v. Smith, 103 Hawai'i
228, 234, 81 P.3d 408, 414 (2003) (stating that “it is a cardinal
rule of statutory interpretation that, where the terns of a
statute are plain, unambiguous and explicit, we are not at
liberty to look beyond that language for a different meaning”)
(internal quotation signals and citations omitted).

Nevertheless, assuming, arquendo, that the statute is ambiguous,
we agree with the State that the ICA’s construction of the seat

belt statute should be rejected because it yields an absurd

* Because ue held that Ribbel clearly viclated the Hawai'i seat belt

statute, we find the New York cases relied upon by the ICA unpereussiver and
Go not Address then further herein.

    

 

 

 

1993) provides: “Laws in pari materia, or upon the sene

Shall be construed with reference to each other. What ie

clear invone statute nay be celled in aid to eaplain whet is gecbt‘al in
other.” {Esphasis ocdec-)

 

   

 

 
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result inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the
statute.
MRS § 1-15 (1993) provides:

Where the words of » lew are ambiguous:

(1) The meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by
examining the context, with which the ambiguous words,
Phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to
Secertain their true meaning

(2) The reasen and spirit of the lav, and the cause which
induced the legislature to enact it, may be considered
to discover sts true meaning

(3] Every construction which leads to an absurdity shall
be rejected.

An examination of the legislative history of the seat
belt statute elucidates the “reason and spirit of the law, and
the cause which induced the legislature to enact it." See
Peterson, 85 Hawai'i at 328, 944 P.2¢ at 1271 (“T]he courts may
resort to extrinsic aids in determining the legislative intent.
One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive
tool.” (Block quotation format and citation omitted.)). The
seat belt statute was enacted in 1985 in order to, inter alia,
“require operators of motor vehicles to be restrained by 2 seat
belt assenbly(.]" Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 330, in 1985 House
Journal, at 1133; Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 881, in 1985 Senate
Journal, at 1277. In passing the mandatory seat belt law, the

Transportation and Judiciary Committees stated, in relevant part:

 

d that in the last ten years in
Hawait ‘there have been en average of between 16,000 and
17,000 traztic sccisents, involving an average of 2¢,000
Grivers and 5,000 passengers per year. Your Committees also
fing thet seat belt use 1s the single most costweffective
highway cafety neaeure available.

 

 

 
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‘The Departrent of Transportation provided your
Committees with eeatistice insicating “if everyone used &
beat Delt oh every trip, motor vehicle occupant. fotalitie
could be expected to crop about 7% and insuries abot 60 to
Sours

Your Committees also find that the opposition to seat
belt legislation is rooted in the belief that seat belt laws
infringe upon an individual's right of choice. However, the
Qnotnous social cost of unnecessary death and Snjury
Sustifice any possible mininal intfingenent on the Fight of
Zhotce of the ineividsal caused by Fequiring him or her to
rear s Seat Belt ina vehicle being operation on = pUublic|
Foad.

 

 

 

Hse. Stand. Conm. Rep. No. 330, in 1985 House Journal, at 1133-
34, The Ways and Means Committee additionally noted, in relevant
part:

‘Your Committ

 

Finds thet seat belts are a cost=
effective and efficient way te reduce the nunber and
Severity of injuries and the fateiities reeultsng from moter
Veniele sccidente. Your Conmittee believes. that # Loy
Fequiring sest Beit usage By front sect

Increase the furber of people who wear
‘Ill promote the safety and welfare of the entire state

  

 

     

Sen. Stand. Conm. Rep. No. 881, in 1985 Senate Journal, at 1277
Inasmuch as the clear purpose of the seat belt statute
As to protect motorists’ safety, it would be absurd to read it as
permitting improper use cf seat belt assembly that could cause
serious injury to motorists. The ICA's construction of the
statute, however, would allow motorists to utilize the seat belt
assenbly in any number of ways that are potentially dangerous as
long as the assembly was in any way restricting the motorists’
movement. For example, according to the ICA’s interpretation, a
motorist would be in compliance with the statute if the person

simply wrapped thi

 

arm in the seat belt, thereby restricting
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the person’ s movement, but clearly not protecting the person's
safety. Additionally, the ICA's conclusion that the seat belt
statute does not require proper restraint because the child
passenger restraint statute uses the word “proper” while the seat
belt statute does not, is absurd. Certainly, the legislature did
not intend to only protect children under the age of four and not
any other passengers. Because the ICA's construction leads to an
absurdity, it should be rejected. Accordingly, Ribbel’s use of
the seat belt assembly constituted violation of the seat belt

statute

 

id the ICA gravely erred in concluding otherwise.
IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ICA gravely

erred in interpreting the seat belt statute. We therefore

reverse the ICA's decision, but vacate the district court’s

judgment and remand for entry of a replacement judgment in favor

of the State that complies with the applicable statutes governing

traffic infractions.

on the application:

Peter A. Hanano, Gor—e—
Deputy Prosecuting
Rttorney, for petstioner/

plaintiff-appellee State
of Hawai'i