Case Title: State v. Harris D. Byers

Citation: 2003 WI 86

Docket Number: 1999AP002441

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 86 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-2441 & 00-0454 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Harris D. Byers: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Harris D. Byers,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  242 Wis. 2d 470, 625 N.W.2d 359 
(Ct. App. 2001-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 21, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
William C. Griesbach   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. concurs (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH, J., joins concurrence. 
BABLITCH, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
SYKES, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Jack E. Schairer and Jefren E. Olsen, assistant state public 
defenders, and oral argument by Jefren E. Olsen. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Kevin C. Greene, Brown County Assistant District 
Attorney. 
 
 
2003 WI 86 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454  
(L.C. No. 
98 CI 1) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Harris D. Byers: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Harris D. Byers,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Harris Byers, 
seeks review of a decision of the court of appeals1 affirming a 
judgment and order committing him pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
Chapter 980 (1997-98) to a secure mental health facility as a 
                                                 
1 State v. Byers, Nos. 99-2441 & 00-0454, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. January 23, 2001) (affirming a judgment and 
orders of the circuit court for Brown County, William C. 
Griesbach, Judge).  The court of appeals' decision also affirmed 
the circuit court's order denying Byers' post-commitment motion. 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
2 
 
sexually violent person.2  Byers asserts that a district attorney 
lacks authority to file a Chapter 980 petition unless the agency 
with jurisdiction has first requested the filing of a petition 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) has declined.  We agree and 
conclude that a request from the agency with jurisdiction and a 
subsequent decision by the DOJ not to file are prerequisites to 
a district attorney's authority to file a Chapter 980 petition.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand the 
matter to the circuit court for dismissal of the petition. 
I 
¶2 
Prior to Byers' release on parole in January of 1995, 
the Department of Corrections (DOC) evaluated Byers to determine 
his 
status 
under 
the 
sexually 
violent 
person 
commitment 
provisions of Chapter 980, Wisconsin Statutes.  The doctor who 
performed the evaluation concluded that Byers did not meet the 
criteria for referral under Chapter 980.  Another evaluation, 
conducted by a second doctor, took place in August of 1998 after 
Byers was revoked from parole and shortly before his scheduled 
release date.  This evaluation also concluded that Byers was not 
eligible for commitment.  Consequently, the DOC did not request 
that a Chapter 980 petition be filed against Byers. 
¶3 
The DOC notified the Brown County district attorney 
that Byers intended to reside in Brown County after his release.  
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
1998 version unless otherwise indicated. 
 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
3 
 
The Brown County district attorney arranged for an independent 
evaluation of Byers by Dr. Raymond M. Wood.  Dr. Wood opined 
that Byers met the criteria for a Chapter 980 proceeding.  Based 
on this determination and the fact that Byers had been convicted 
for a "sexually violent offense," the Brown County district 
attorney 
concluded 
that 
Byers 
came 
within 
Chapter 980's 
definition of "sexually violent person."3  The district attorney 
filed a Chapter 980 petition against Byers prior to his release 
date and requested a jury trial. 
¶4 
Byers moved to dismiss the petition claiming that the 
Brown County district attorney did not have the authority to 
file the Chapter 980 petition without the DOC requesting that 
such a petition be filed.  He argued that the statutory scheme 
contemplated that the district attorney would not have authority 
unless the agency with jurisdiction requested the DOJ to file a 
petition and the DOJ declined to do so. 
¶5 
The circuit court concluded that the Brown County 
district attorney could file the petition even though there was 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.01(7) defines "sexually violent 
person" as follows: 
(7) "Sexually violent person" means a person who has 
been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been 
adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, 
or has been found not guilty of or not responsible for 
a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or 
mental 
disease, 
defect 
or 
illness, 
and 
who 
is 
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental 
disorder that makes it substantially probable that the 
person will engage in acts of sexual violence. 
 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
4 
 
no DOC request and subsequent decision by the DOJ declining to 
file.  It noted that while the authority of the DOJ to file a 
Chapter 980 petition is conditioned upon a request from the 
agency with jurisdiction, there is no such condition on the 
authority of a district attorney. 
¶6 
Byers filed an interlocutory appeal contesting the 
circuit court's interpretation.  The court of appeals denied 
review. 
¶7 
A jury trial commenced on the issue of whether Byers 
was a sexually violent person.  On the second day of the trial, 
Byers agreed that he would admit that he was a sexually violent 
person in exchange for the district attorney's agreement not to 
oppose his request for conditional release. 
¶8 
At the dispositional hearing, the State did not oppose 
Byers' request for conditional release, but it also did not join 
the request.  The court determined that institutional care was 
appropriate and ordered Byers committed to the Wisconsin 
Resource Center. 
¶9 
Byers appealed the circuit court's judgment and order 
for commitment.  The court of appeals granted Byers' motion 
requesting remand to the circuit court for a hearing on the 
effectiveness of his trial counsel.  He then filed a post-
commitment motion with the circuit court asserting that his 
trial counsel was ineffective in connection with preserving for 
appeal the issue of the district attorney's authority.  Based on 
testimony presented, the circuit court found that Byers' trial 
counsel advised him that this issue would be preserved despite 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
5 
 
Byers' admission and waiver of rights.  The circuit court also 
found that Byers relied on this advice and that he would not 
have made the admission if he had not been so advised. 
¶10 The circuit court further found that the advice of the 
trial counsel was erroneous because, at the very least, the law 
is unclear regarding whether Byers could pursue the issue on 
appeal.  Nevertheless, the circuit court concluded that Byers 
did not suffer any prejudice by the erroneous advice because it 
was satisfied that, even if the issue had been preserved, Byers 
would not have prevailed.  The circuit court noted that 
§ 980.02(1) was "poorly worded" but concluded that Byers would 
not have prevailed because the statute did not limit the 
authority of the district attorney to cases where the agency 
with jurisdiction has first made a request of the DOJ.  The 
circuit court therefore denied Byers' post-commitment motion and 
Byers appealed this decision. 
¶11 The court of appeals consolidated the appeals and 
addressed the issue of the Brown County district attorney's 
authority.  It concluded that § 980.02(1) did not prevent the 
district attorney from filing the Chapter 980 petition against 
Byers.  The court then rejected Byers' claims of ineffectiveness 
of counsel and the absence of a knowing and voluntary plea.  It 
reasoned that these claims were based on Byers' ability to 
obtain appellate review of the issue of the district attorney's 
authority and the court of appeals had now addressed the issue.  
Accordingly, his ineffectiveness of counsel claim failed because 
there was no prejudice and his knowing and voluntary plea claim 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
6 
 
failed because any error was harmless since the court of appeals 
addressed the issue he sought to preserve.  Therefore, the court 
of appeals affirmed the judgment and orders of the circuit 
court. 
II 
¶12 This case provides us with an opportunity to examine 
the limits of a district attorney's authority to file a petition 
alleging that a person is subject to involuntary commitment 
under Chapter 980 as a sexually violent person.  Specifically, 
we must resolve whether, under Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1), a 
district attorney may file a Chapter 980 petition only if the 
agency with jurisdiction has first requested the filing of a 
petition and the DOJ has declined to file.4  The resolution of 
this issue is a matter of statutory interpretation which 
presents a question of law subject to independent appellate 
review.  State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 405-06, 565 N.W.2d 
506 (1997). 
¶13 The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern the 
intent of the legislature.  Id. at 406.  We first analyze the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1) to determine whether the 
                                                 
4 The court of appeals determined that the circuit court's 
post-commitment 
order 
concluding 
that 
Byers 
suffered 
no 
prejudice because the district attorney had authority to file a 
Chapter 980 petition preserved the authority issue on appeal.  
This determination is not contested on review in this court. 
 
Additionally, Byers raised two due process issues in his 
brief.  Because we have reversed the court of appeals decision 
on the issue of the district attorney's authority, we need not 
address the due process issues. 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
7 
 
legislature intended that a district attorney have authority to 
file only if the DOJ has declined to do so following a request 
by the agency with jurisdiction.  We next examine the statute's 
legislative history, its purpose, and the policy reasons 
supporting the conclusion that the legislature intended to 
create a significant gatekeeper role for the agency with 
jurisdiction.  Finally, based on our analysis, we determine that 
the intent of the legislature in enacting § 980.02(1) was to 
require that there be a request of the agency with jurisdiction 
followed by a DOJ decision not to file before a district 
attorney has authority to file a Chapter 980 petition. 
III 
¶14 Chapter 980 creates an involuntary civil commitment 
procedure that is intended primarily to provide treatment for 
sexually violent persons and to protect the public.  State v. 
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 258-259, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995).  
Under Chapter 980, when a person who may meet the criteria for 
commitment as a sexually violent person is nearing release from 
confinement, the agency that will release the person (the 
"agency with jurisdiction")5 is required to notify the DOJ and 
the appropriate district attorneys.6  The appropriate district 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.015(1) states that ". . . 'agency 
with jurisdiction' means the agency with the authority or duty 
to release or discharge the person." 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.015(2) provides as follows: 
(2) If an agency with jurisdiction has control or 
custody over a person who may meet the criteria for 
commitment as a sexually violent person, the agency 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
8 
 
attorneys are the district attorney for the county in which the 
proceeding occurred that resulted in the person's confinement 
and the district attorney of the county in which the person will 
reside upon release.  In re Commitment of Goodson, 199 Wis. 2d 
426, 437, 544 N.W.2d 611 (Ct. App. 1996). 
¶15 The notice from the agency with jurisdiction must 
contain specified information including the person's offense 
history and documentation regarding any treatment.7  The notice 
                                                                                                                                                             
with 
jurisdiction 
shall 
inform 
each 
appropriate 
district 
attorney 
and 
the department 
of 
justice 
regarding the person as soon as possible beginning 3 
months prior to the applicable date of the following: 
(a)  The anticipated discharge from a sentence, 
anticipated release on parole or extended supervision 
or anticipated release from imprisonment of a person 
who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense. 
(b) 
 
The 
anticipated 
release 
from 
a 
secured 
correctional facility, as defined in s. 938.02 (15m), 
or a secured child caring institution, as defined in 
s. 938.02 (15g), of a person adjudicated delinquent 
under s. 938.183 or 938.34 on the basis of a sexually 
violent offense. 
(c)  The termination or discharge of a person who has 
been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by 
reason of mental disease or defect under s. 971.17. 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.015(3) provides as follows: 
(3) The agency with jurisdiction shall provide the 
district attorney and department of justice with all 
of the following: 
(a) 
 
The 
person's 
name, 
identifying 
factors, 
anticipated future residence and offense history. 
(b) If applicable, documentation of any treatment and 
the 
person's 
adjustment 
to 
any 
institutional 
placement. 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
9 
 
must be sent as soon as possible beginning three months prior to 
the person's release. 
¶16 Under § 980.02(1), the authority to file a Chapter 980 
petition is limited to the DOJ and the appropriate district 
attorneys.  The language of § 980.02(1) provides as follows: 
980.02  Sexually violent person petition; contents; 
filing. (1) A petition alleging that a person is a 
sexually violent person may be filed by one of the 
following: 
(a)  The department of justice at the request of 
the agency with jurisdiction, as defined in s. 
980.015(1), over the person.  If the department of 
justice 
decides 
to 
file 
a 
petition 
under 
this 
paragraph, it shall file the petition before the date 
of the release or discharge of the person. 
(b)  If the department of justice does not file a 
petition under par. (a), the district attorney for one 
of the following: 
1.  The county in which the person was convicted 
of a sexually violent offense, adjudicated delinquent 
for a sexually violent offense or found not guilty of 
or not responsible for a sexuality violent offense by 
reason of insanity or mental disease, defect or 
illness. 
2.  The county in which the person will reside or 
be placed upon his or her discharge from a sentence, 
release on parole or extended supervision, or release 
from 
imprisonment, 
from 
a 
secured 
correctional 
facility, as defined in s. 938.02(15m), or a secured 
child 
caring 
institution, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 938.02(15g), or from a commitment order. 
(Emphasis added.)  The parties agree that the agency with 
jurisdiction in this case is the DOC. 
¶17 Byers argues that a request by the agency with 
jurisdiction and the subsequent declination of the DOJ are 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
10 
 
prerequisites to the district attorney's authority to file a 
Chapter 980 petition.  This narrow interpretation of the 
district attorney's authority focuses on the introductory clause 
in par. (b) that states "If the department of justice does not 
file a petition under par. (a) . . . ."  Byers advances that 
this clause reflects a statutory framework in which the district 
attorney's authority to file arises only if the DOJ has had the 
opportunity to file but has elected not to do so. 
¶18 Under this interpretation, if there has been no 
request by the agency with jurisdiction, the DOJ does not have 
the opportunity to file a petition.  Therefore, in such 
circumstances, 
the 
district 
attorney's 
authority 
is 
never 
triggered.  Essentially, Byers argues that paragraph (b)'s 
reference to paragraph (a) incorporates into paragraph (b) the 
conditions set forth in paragraph (a).  Since an agency request 
is a part of the procedure prescribed in paragraph (a), the 
request must occur before filing authority can be vested in the 
district attorney under paragraph (b).  Byers maintains that to 
read the statute otherwise would essentially delete the words 
"under par. (a)" from the statute. 
¶19 The State counters that an agency request is not a 
prerequisite to the district attorney's authority to file a 
Chapter 980 petition.  Its broad interpretation of the district 
attorney's 
authority 
focuses 
on 
the 
prefatory 
clause 
to 
paragraphs (a) and (b) that states that a petition may be filed 
by "one of the following."  Paragraph (a) allows the DOJ to file 
the petition pursuant to an agency request.  Paragraph (b) 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
11 
 
allows a district attorney to file the petition if the DOJ has 
not filed a petition.  The State advances that the only 
predicate to the authority of the district attorney to file is 
that a petition has not already been filed by the DOJ.  To 
interpret the statute otherwise would require that the language 
"at the request of the agency with jurisdiction" be written into 
paragraph (b). 
¶20 The reference to paragraph (a), according to the 
State, is simply a direction as to where the authority of the 
DOJ originates.  It was not intended to incorporate the "at the 
request of the agency with jurisdiction" language as a limit on 
the district attorney's authority to file.  The State argues 
that to read in such an intention ignores that the agency 
request 
language 
appears 
in 
paragraph (a) 
but 
not 
in 
paragraph (b) or even in the introductory language to paragraphs 
(a) and (b). 
¶21 The language of § 980.02(1) could have more clearly 
delineated the limits of the district attorney's authority.  We 
agree with the circuit court that the statute is "poorly 
worded." 
 
If 
the 
legislature 
intended 
Byers' 
narrow 
interpretation, it could have repeated the "at the request of 
the 
agency 
with 
jurisdiction" 
language 
directly 
within 
paragraph (b).  On the other hand, if the legislature intended 
the State's broad interpretation, it could have omitted the 
reference to the DOJ's ability to file "under par. (a)" from 
paragraph (b).  Thus, we look to the legislative history to 
assist us in discerning the intent of the legislature. 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
12 
 
IV 
¶22 Chapter 980 was created by 1993 Wis. Act 479.  The 
bill that eventually became Act 479 was Assembly Bill 3 of the 
1994 May Special Legislative Session (A.B. 3).  As originally 
introduced, A.B. 3 contained language that granted filing 
authority to the district attorney without any requirement that 
there be a request from the agency with jurisdiction.  A.B. 3 
also granted filing authority to the DOJ, but the DOJ could file 
only at the request of the district attorney or the agency with 
jurisdiction. 
¶23 Initially, the district attorney's filing authority 
was broader than the DOJ's filing authority.  The original 
language of A.B. 3 read as follows: 
980.02  Sexually violent person petition; contents; 
filing.  (1)  A petition alleging that a person is a 
sexually violent person may be filed by one of the 
following: 
(a)  The district attorney for the county in 
which the person was convicted of a sexually violent 
offense, adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent 
offense or found not guilty of or not responsible for 
a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or 
mental disease, defect or illness. 
(b)  The department of justice in any case at the 
request of a district attorney or the agency with 
jurisdiction, as defined under s. 980.015(1), over the 
person. . . . 
¶24 A.B. 3 was amended by Assembly Amendment 2 (AA-2), 
which changed the above language to substantially what currently 
exists in § 980.02(1).  Thus, the bill as originally introduced 
would have allowed the district attorney to file absent a 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
13 
 
request from the agency with jurisdiction.  The State would have 
us interpret the effect of AA-2 as having very little impact on 
the district attorney's authority, other than granting the 
authority to two district attorneys instead of one. 
¶25 However, the placement of the provisions and the 
legislative history more strongly support the position that the 
legislature decided to place the district attorney's authority 
as secondary to the DOJ's authority and to place the agency with 
jurisdiction as a "gatekeeper" that limits the authority of both 
the DOJ and the district attorneys. 
¶26 A review of the placement of the provisions, together 
with the legislative history, reflects an intent to create a 
step-by-step process that must be followed before a district 
attorney has authority to file a petition.  Under this step-by-
step process, the initial step is that the agency with 
jurisdiction evaluates the person to be released to determine 
whether the person may meet the criteria for commitment as a 
sexually violent person.  If the agency determines that the 
person may meet the criteria, the agency requests that the DOJ 
file a petition.  The DOJ can then file a petition or coordinate 
with one of the appropriate district attorneys regarding filing 
a petition.  Alternatively, the DOJ can determine that a filing 
is not warranted despite the agency request, in which case one 
of the appropriate district attorneys can then file the petition 
on his or her own. 
¶27 Interpreting AA-2 as changing the district attorney's 
broad authority to narrow authority is supported by AA-2's 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
14 
 
change in the placement of the provisions granting authority to 
the district attorney and the DOJ.  As originally drafted, A.B. 
3 
placed 
the 
district 
attorney's 
authority 
first, 
in 
paragraph (a).  However, AA-2 changed that priority.  It instead 
placed the DOJ in paragraph (a) and the district attorney in 
paragraph (b), supporting an interpretation that the legislature 
intented to place the role of the district attorney as secondary 
to that of the DOJ. 
¶28 An examination of other legislative history reveals a 
contemporaneous Legislative Fiscal Bureau memorandum describing 
the pending bill to members of the legislature.  See May 19, 
1994 Memorandum to Legislators from Robert Lang.  The purpose, 
in part, of the memorandum was to explain the effect of the very 
amendment which is the focus of our analysis, and which sets 
forth a step-by-step process: (1) notice is given of impending 
release 
or 
discharge, 
(2) the 
DOJ 
must 
first 
make 
a 
determination if it is going to file, and (3) if the DOJ 
determines that it will not prosecute the petition, then (4) the 
appropriate district attorney can proceed.  The memorandum 
states: 
 
Amendment 2 . . . provide[s] that DOC . . . inform 
(a) the Department of Justice and (b) the District 
Attorneys of both the county of conviction and the 
county of release (if different) of the anticipated 
discharge or release of the sexual offender.  Require 
DOJ to make a determination of whether it will 
prosecute the petition for civil commitment and to 
notify the appropriate DAs of its decision no less 
than 30 days prior to discharge or release. . . . 
Provide that, if DOJ determines it will not prosecute 
the petition, either the DA of the county of convicion 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
15 
 
or the DA of the county of release may prosecute the 
petition (at their own cost). 
¶29 The 
drafting 
instructions 
also 
support 
an 
interpretation that the legislature intended to place the role 
of the district attorney as secondary to that of the DOJ.  
Assembly Amendment 2 (AA-2) was identical to Senate Amendment 2 
(SA-2), 
which 
was 
drafted 
using 
instructions 
that 
were 
identified in the drafting file as being a part of LRBa4722.8  
The instructions provided that "if DOJ refuses, DA can do 
it . . . (and) DOJ must make decision no later than 30 days b4 
release". 
¶30 Both parties acknowledge that in order for the DOJ to 
have made a determination of whether it wants to proceed, a 
referral must be made as a precondition to that determination.   
Thus, any discussion of a DOJ determination necessarily is 
premised upon an initial agency referral. 
¶31 However, the State advances an argument that all that 
is needed as a precondition for the district attorney to file is 
that the DOJ has not yet filed.  Presumably, under the State's 
interpretation, even if the DOJ intended to file, but had not 
yet done so, the district attorney could proceed to file.  Under 
its interpretation, the district attorney need not wait for the 
DOJ to determine whether it is going to file. 
¶32 AA-2 created Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1)(a) and (b) as they 
currently exist, along with the requirement that if DOJ decides 
                                                 
 
8 See Drafting Record for Senate Amendment 2, May 1994 Spec. 
Sess.  A.B. 3, in drafting record 1993 Wis. Act 479. 
 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
16 
 
to file a petition, it must do so no later than 30 days before 
the date of discharge or release.  This 30-day notice 
requirement, 
though 
subsequently 
vetoed 
by 
the 
governor, 
illustrates that the State's interpretation is misguided and 
that the district attorney was to wait for a decision from the 
DOJ. 
¶33 The 30-day notice requirement was vetoed by the 
governor, not because the governor wanted to restore the primary 
power of the district attorney that AA-2 had taken away, but 
rather to assist the DOJ.  The governor's veto message states 
that the purpose of the partial veto was to provide the DOJ with 
more flexibility in filing Chapter 980 petitions.  The drafting 
record for 1993 Wis. Act 479 contains a letter dated May 26, 
1994 from the governor to the assembly.  The letter states, in 
part: 
Section 40 contains a requirement that the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) file a petition against a sexually 
violent person no later than 30 days before the date 
of 
release. 
 
This 
does 
not 
provide 
sufficient 
flexibility 
for 
DOJ 
to 
petition 
for 
releases.  
Accordingly, I am partially vetoing the provision 
requiring the filing of a petition no later than 
30 days prior to release or discharge. 
 
¶34 The State argues that it is incorrect to interpret the 
district 
attorney's 
authority 
as 
secondary 
to 
the 
DOJ's 
authority because other provisions in Chapter 980 grant the 
district attorney the same or broader authority than the DOJ.  
We are not persuaded that the provisions cited by the State 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
17 
 
support an interpretation that would give a district attorney 
broader filing authority than the DOJ. 
¶35 The 
State 
cites 
first 
several 
provisions 
of 
Chapter 980 that grant equal authority to the district attorney 
and the DOJ.9  However, these grants of equal authority simply 
reflect that, even under the narrow interpretation of the 
district attorney's authority, there can be circumstances when 
the district attorney rather the DOJ has properly filed a 
Chapter 980 petition.  In fact, many of these provisions refer 
to the "district attorney or the department of justice" but then 
qualify 
the 
reference 
with 
"whichever 
is 
applicable" 
or 
"whichever filed the original petition."  Therefore, the State's 
citations regarding the equal authority of the district attorney 
and the DOJ do not support the conclusion that the district 
attorney's filing authority must be at least equivalent to the 
DOJ's authority. 
¶36 The State also argues that certain provisions of 
Chapter 980 grant the district attorney broader authority than 
the DOJ.  The State cites two examples.  First, the State argues 
                                                 
9 The State cites the following sections that grant equal 
authority to the district attorney and the DOJ: § 980.015 
(notice 
from 
the 
agency 
with 
jurisdiction 
regarding 
the 
release); § 980.05(2) (request for jury trial); § 980.08(2) 
(right to receive petitions by committed individuals for 
supervised release); § 980.09(1)(a) (right to receive petition 
for discharge); § 980.09(1)(b) 
(representing 
the state in 
connection with a petition for discharge with DHFS approval); 
§ 980.09(2)(b) (representing the state in connection with a 
petition for discharge without DHFS approval); and § 980.11(4) 
(right to receive notice cards from DHFS without charge). 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
18 
 
that the listing of two district attorneys (i.e., the county of 
conviction and the county of intended residence) reflects a 
broader grant of authority to the district attorneys than to the 
DOJ.  This, however, does not reflect that the authority itself 
is broad, only that more than one district attorney has the 
power to exercise the authority that exists. 
¶37 As its second example, the State argues that it 
appears the district attorney can file a Chapter 980 petition at 
any time up to 90 days after a person has been released.  This 
position is untenable in that it is contrary to precedent which 
interprets § 980.02(2)(ag) as requiring that a Chapter 980 
petition be filed on or before the date of a person's release or 
discharge.10  See State v. Thiel, 2000 WI 67, ¶¶30-32, 235 Wis. 
2d 823, 612 N.W.2d 94; State v. Thomas, 2000 WI App 162, ¶17, 
238 Wis. 2d 216, 225, 617 N.W.2d 230; State v. Pharm, 2000 WI 
App 167, ¶15, 238 Wis. 2d 97, 111, 617 N.W.2d 163. 
¶38 We recognize that the step-by-step process elevates 
the role of the agency with jurisdiction in determining when a 
Chapter 980 petition can be filed.  There are several policy 
reasons that support having the agency with jurisdiction serve 
as such a gatekeeper. 
¶39 First, the agency with jurisdiction has the person 
under its supervision, care, and custody.  Accordingly, it has 
                                                 
10 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 980.02(2)(ag) 
requires 
that 
a 
Chapter 980 petition allege that the "person is within 90 days 
of discharge or release, on parole, extended supervision or 
otherwise, from a sentence . . . . " 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
19 
 
the most comprehensive information regarding the person's status 
under Chapter 980.  Second, not only does the agency with 
jurisdiction have a significant amount of information regarding 
the person, but it also has a significant amount of knowledge 
and expertise with supervising and dealing with the type of 
offenders that are potentially subject to Chapter 980 petitions. 
¶40 Third, the agency with jurisdiction has the most 
recent contact with the person, whereas the district attorney of 
the county of conviction will likely have lost personal contact 
during the years of confinement.  The district attorney of the 
county of intended residence may have had no prior contact with 
the person.  Fourth, a gatekeeper role for the agency with 
jurisdiction facilitates creating a consistent and coordinated 
process for filing Chapter 980 petitions. 
¶41 Fifth, there is a benefit to having a central 
screening 
process 
to 
conserve 
scarce 
resources 
because 
Chapter 980 cases can be complex and can result in significant 
treatment costs.  Sixth, the use of the independent expertise of 
the agency with jurisdiction can be a tool for ensuring that the 
decision to file a Chapter 980 petition is insulated from local 
pressures. 
¶42 Granted, there is nothing in the legislative history 
that directly articulates reasons for or against placing the 
agency with jurisdiction in a gatekeeper role that limits the 
district attorney's authority.  However, the existence of these 
policy reasons supports the conclusion that such a broad 
gatekeeper role would be consistent with a legislative intent to 
No. 
99-2441 & 00-0454   
 
20 
 
create a step-by-step process that enhances the coordinated and 
efficient operation of Chapter 980. 
V 
¶43 In sum, we conclude that, under § 980.02(1), a request 
from the agency with jurisdiction and a subsequent decision by 
the DOJ not to file are prerequisites to a district attorney's 
authority to file a Chapter 980 petition.  Because those 
prerequisites were not met in this case, we determine that the 
petition was not properly filed.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals and remand the matter to the circuit court for 
dismissal of the petition. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded.  
 
¶44 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate. 
  
 
 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶45 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I write separately to respond to Justice Crooks's conclusion, in 
dissent, 
that 
the 
rules 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, 
specifically the plain meaning rule, "prohibit" a court from 
looking to legislative history, context, purpose, and subject 
matter when construing a statute in the absence of an express 
finding that the statute is ambiguous.11 
¶46 An examination 
of 
our cases involving 
statutory 
interpretation demonstrates that this court often mechanically 
repeats the plain meaning rule that it will not resort to 
extrinsic sources when the meaning of the text is unambiguous.  
Yet in a large number of these cases the court has examined 
sources beyond the specific text of the statute at issue to 
determine the meaning of the language, regardless of any finding 
that the text is ambiguous.12  Even a casual observer of the 
                                                 
11 Dissent, ¶65. 
12 For an example of a recent Wisconsin case discerning 
legislative intent by looking to the language of a statute as 
well as its scope, history, context, subject matter, and 
purpose, see Fox v. Catholic Knights Insurance Co., 2003 WI 87, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (examining legislative history 
to support interpretation of unambiguous language). 
The dissent cites to VanCleve v. City of Marinette, 2003 WI 
2, ¶17, 258 Wis. 2d 80, 655 N.W.2d 113, and State v. Delaney, 
2003 WI 9, ¶¶13-14, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416, for the 
proposition that the court must not look beyond the statutory 
language to ascertain a statute's meaning if the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous.  Yet neither of these cases 
adopts such a simplistic method of statutory interpretation.  In 
VanCleve, for example, this court looked to case law and 
legislative history to properly construe Wis. Stat. § 81.17.  
See VanCleve, 258 Wis. 2d 80, ¶23 ("In addition to the plain 
language of the statute, Wisconsin case law interpreting the 
statutory language  provides guidance on this issue."),  ¶¶28-29 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.ssa 
 
2 
 
Wisconsin cases would, without fear of being contradicted, 
summarize the case law as adopting inconsistent approaches to 
statutory interpretation.13 
¶47 We should, I believe, stop paying lip service to the 
supremacy of the plain meaning rule14 and clearly adopt a more 
encompassing analytic model for statutory interpretation.15   
                                                                                                                                                             
(setting forth the historical construction and development of 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17).  Similarly, in Delaney, this court admitted 
that even a clear and unambiguous statute could be construed 
contrary to its plain meaning "if a literal application would 
lead to an absurd or unreasonable result."  Delaney, 259 
Wis. 2d 77, ¶15 (citing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. LaFollette, 
106 Wis. 2d 162, 170, 316 N.W.2d 129 (Ct. App. 1982)). 
13 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The 
Philosophies of Justices Scalia and Breyer and the Use of 
Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 Marq. L. 
Rev. 161, 201-19 (1996); Brad A. Liddle, Statutory Construction—
Legislative Intent—Use of Extrinsic Aids in Wisconsin, 1964 Wis. 
L. Rev. 660.   
14 Rules 
of 
interpretation 
cannot 
by 
themselves 
be 
dispositive in interpreting a statute because almost every rule 
can be countered by an opposing rule.  Karl N. Llewellyn, 
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 
395 (1950). 
Moreover, the dissent's insinuation that employing the full 
array of rules of statutory construction should be equated with 
a "results-oriented" analysis is simplistic.  Dissent, ¶63.  The 
plain meaning rule can be manipulated as well as any other rule 
of statutory construction to reach a particular result.  See 
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation——In the Classroom 
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 816-17 (1983) ("By 
making statutory interpretation seem mechanical rather than 
creative, the canons conceal, often from the reader of the 
judicial opinion and sometimes from the writer, the extent to 
which the judge is making new law in the guise of interpreting a 
statute or a constitutional provision."). 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶48 This court has consistently and resolutely held that 
the purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine and give 
effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting a particular 
statute.  It is, of course, a legal fiction to assert that there 
                                                                                                                                                             
Although 
courts 
may 
be 
influenced 
by 
rules 
of 
interpretation, the legislature apparently is not.  Former Chief 
Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and former 
Congressman Abner Mikva writes of "canons of interpretation" as 
follows:  "When I was in Congress, the only 'canons' we talked 
about were the ones the Pentagon bought that could not shoot 
straight."  Abner Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. 
Pitt. L. Rev. 627, 629 (1987). 
15 I have used this approach in majority and minority 
opinions.  See, e.g., Fox v. Catholic Knights Ins. Co., 2003 
Wis. 2d 87, ¶44, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); 
State v. Peters, 2003 WI 88, ¶34, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); State v. Davison, 
2003 WI 89, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting); State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___; 
Juneau 
County 
v. 
Courthouse 
Employees, 
221 
Wis. 2d 630, 641-51, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998); State v. Sample, 215 
Wis. 2d 487, 510, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring); State v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 75-82, 396 
N.W.2d 177 (1986); City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 
Wis. 2d 224, 
244, 
332 
N.W.2d 782 
(1983) 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
dissenting); Milwaukee County v. DILHR, 80 Wis. 2d 445, 451, 
456, 259 N.W.2d 118 (1977). 
I have tried to use this approach consistently, though I, 
like all judges, probably have not been consistent.  Justice 
Scalia explains his inconsistency in using legislative history 
in interpreting statutes contrary to his textualist approach as 
follows: "I play the game like everybody else . . . I'm in a 
system which has accepted rules and legislative history is 
used . . . You read my opinions, I sin with the rest of them."  
Judges and Legislators:  Toward Institutional Comity, 175-75 (R. 
Katzmann ed. 1988) (Justice Scalia's comments during a panel 
discussion) 
(quoted 
in 
Frank 
H. 
Easterbrook, 
What 
Does 
Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 441, 442 n.4 
(1991)). 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.ssa 
 
4 
 
is an actual legislative "intent."16  "It is impossible to argue 
that a legislative body actually has a collective, corporate 
intent that is somehow the sum of the individual, and often 
conflicting, intents of its members."17   
¶49 Rather, discerning and giving effect to the "intent" 
of the legislature is an exercise in logic in which a court 
determines what a reasonable person in the position of a 
legislator enacting the statute would have said about the legal 
issue presented in a given case.18  As Judge Richard Posner has 
written, "The judge should try to think his way as best he can 
into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they 
would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar."19  
Rules 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
are 
merely 
codified 
expressions of legal reasoning that assist courts in this task.  
¶50 To insist dogmatically on the primacy and supremacy of 
the plain meaning rule, to the exclusion of all other rules of 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, 
Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev. 423, 423 
(1988). 
17 Burt Neuborne, Background Norms for Federal Statutory 
Interpretation, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 721, 724 (1990). 
18 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory 
State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 429 (1989) (arguing that searching 
for legislative intent does not involve looking for "a general 
legislative aim or purpose, but instead to see more particularly 
how the enacting legislature would have resolved the question, 
or how it intended that question to be resolved, if it had been 
presented."). 
19 Richard 
A. 
Posner, 
Statutory 
Interpretation——In the 
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 817 
(1983). 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.ssa 
 
5 
 
statutory interpretation, is neither helpful to this endeavor20 
nor supported in law.21  Proper statutory interpretation requires 
that a court take a comprehensive view toward determining 
legislative intent.  A court begins with the language of the 
statute and then considers all relevant evidence of legislative 
intent including its "scope, history, context, subject matter 
and purpose."22  All of these factors bear on the interpretation 
of the language, and no single one is exclusive or controlling.23   
¶51 The language of a given statute is without a doubt the 
most important indication of legislative "intent."  After all, 
the words are the objective manifestation of the legislative 
                                                 
20 See State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 581-83 (Conn. 
2003) (concluding that the plain meaning rule is not a "useful 
rubric for the process of statutory interpretation" because it 
is inconsistent with the purposive and contextual nature of the 
legislative language, it is inherently self-contradictory, and 
it requires the court to engage in a threshold determination of 
whether 
language 
is 
ambiguous, 
which 
tends 
to 
lead 
to 
"intellectually and linguistically dubious" declarations that 
leave a court open to criticisms that it is results-oriented). 
21 See Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 
426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976) ("[W]hen aid to construction of the 
meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there 
certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however 
clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.'") 
(quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 
543-44 (1940)).   
22 Scott by Ricciardi v. First State Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 
608, 612, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990) ("The cardinal rule in all 
statutory interpretation, as this court has often said, is to 
discern the intent of the legislature.  The court will ascertain 
that intent by examining the language of the statute as well as 
its scope, history, context, subject matter and purpose."). 
23 State v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 82, 396 N.W.2d 177 
(1986). 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.ssa 
 
6 
 
intent we seek to discern.  More importantly, citizens obligated 
to follow the law, public officials elected to carry out the 
law, and attorneys employed to advise clients on the meaning of 
the law should be able to rely upon the words written in the 
Wisconsin Statutes when fulfilling these duties. 
¶52 Nevertheless, language, especially statutory language, 
is often ambiguous.  "Anything that is written may present a 
problem of meaning . . . .  The problem derives from the very 
nature of words.  They are symbols of meaning.  But unlike 
mathematical symbols, the phrasing of a document, especially a 
complicated enactment, seldom attains more than approximate 
precision."24  Language is further a product of its time and 
context.  "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, 
it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color 
and content according to the circumstances and the time in which 
it is used."25 
¶53 Moreover, statutory language is also specifically 
adopted with a purpose beyond the mere conveyance of words as 
symbols of meaning.  The legislature enacts statutes in order to 
address social problems.  As Karl Llewellyn has remarked, "If a 
statute is to make sense it must be read in the light of some 
                                                 
24 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of 
Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 528 (1947).  
25 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918); see also 
William N. Eskridge, Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1509, 1559 (1998) (reviewing Antonin Scalia, A Matter of 
Interpretation:  Federal Courts and the Law (1997)) ("Reading 
the legislative history puts the judge better in touch with the 
values, vocabulary, and policy choices of the authors of the 
statute . . . ."). 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.ssa 
 
7 
 
assumed purpose.  A statute merely declaring a rule, with no 
purpose or objective, is nonsense."26 
¶54 Proper statutory interpretation therefore requires 
that a court begin——but not necessarily end——with the language 
of the statute.  A court must also consider all other relevant 
and available evidence concerning the history of the statute's 
enactment, the purpose of the statute, the statute's context, 
and the subject matter of the statute to ensure that it adopts 
the construction most consistent with the "intent" of the 
legislature.  A judge must consider "the usual things that the 
intelligent literature on statutory construction tells him to 
look at——such as the language and apparent purpose of the 
statute, 
its 
background 
and 
structure, 
its 
legislative 
history . . . and the bearing of related statutes."27 
¶55 Scholars 
have 
long 
understood 
that 
statutory 
interpretation is a process involving the consideration of all 
                                                 
26 Llewellyn, supra note 14, at 400 (1950). 
27 Posner, supra note 19, at 818; see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 352 (1990): 
[A]n interpreter will look at a broad range of 
evidence——text, historical evidence, and the text's 
evolution——and thus form a preliminary view of the 
statute. 
 
The 
interpreter 
then 
develops 
that 
preliminary 
view 
by 
testing 
various 
possible 
interpretations 
against 
the 
multiple 
criteria 
of 
fidelity 
to 
the 
text, 
historical 
accuracy, 
and 
conformity to contemporary circumstances and values.  
Each criterion is relevant, yet none necessarily 
trumps the others. 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.ssa 
 
8 
 
evidence bearing on the meaning of a statute.28  State courts are 
following suit.  The Alaska Supreme Court, for example, has 
adopted a sliding-scale approach to statutory interpretation in 
which a court looks to the statutory language as well as all 
other extrinsic sources of information bearing on legislative 
intent, recognizing that the clearer the language is in a given 
statute, the more convincing other sources must be to prove a 
contrary legislative intent.29  Similarly, the Connecticut 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory 
Interpretation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 20 (1988); Stephen Breyer, On 
the Uses of Legislative History, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845 (1992); 
Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 527 
(1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory 
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321 
(1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent 
and Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev. 423 (1988); Felix Frankfurter, 
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 
527 (1947); L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law——A Reply 
to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1958); J. Willard 
Hurst, Dealing with Statutes (1982); Llewellyn, supra note 14; 
William D. Popkin, Statutes in Court: The History and Theory of 
Statutory Interpretation (1999); Richard A. Posner, The Problems 
of Jurisprudence (1990); Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 
56 Harv. L. Rev. 388 (1942); Antonin Scalia, A Matter of 
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (1997); Jane S. 
Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the 
Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1 
(1998); Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 
§ 45.02 (6th ed. 2000); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory 
Interpretation, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 149 (2001). 
The literature on statutory interpretation is voluminous. 
29 Homer Elec. Ass'n v. Towsley, 841 P.2d 1042, 1043-44 
(Alaska 1992); State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 208 n.4 (Alaska 
1982) (under 
Alaska's 
sliding-scale 
approach 
to 
statutory 
interpretation, the more plain the language of the statute, the 
more convincing the evidence of contrary legislative intent must 
be). 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.ssa 
 
9 
 
Supreme Court has rejected its on-again-off-again adherence to 
the plain meaning rule and made explicit that it will consider 
"all of those sources beyond the language itself without first 
having to cross any threshold of ambiguity of the language."30 
¶56 Wisconsin should be no different.  As early as 1871, 
our court recognized that the plain meaning rule was merely part 
of 
a 
broader, 
more 
comprehensive 
view 
toward 
statutory 
interpretation.  We explained:   
[T]he true rule for the construction of statutes is, 
to look at the whole and every part of the statute, 
and the apparent intention derived from the whole, to 
the subject matter, to the effects and consequences, 
and to the reason and spirit of the law, and thus, to 
ascertain the true meaning of the legislature, though 
the meaning so ascertained may sometimes conflict with 
the literal sense of the words.31 
This 
comprehensive 
analytical 
framework 
reflects 
a 
more 
pragmatic view of the legislative and judicial processes, 
promotes greater judicial candor, and maintains the supremacy of 
the legislature as the policy and rule making governmental 
institution.  By using this comprehensive approach to statutory 
interpretation 
we 
acknowledge 
and 
deal 
with 
"interpretive 
problems that arise from the inherent ambiguity of language as 
                                                                                                                                                             
See J. Willard Hurst, The Legislative Branch and the 
Supreme Court, 5 U. Ark. J. L. 487, 499 (1985) (suggesting this 
kind of sliding scale). 
30 Courchesne, 816 A.2d at 578.  
31 Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43, 59 (1871) (emphasis in 
original). 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.ssa 
 
10 
 
well as the limits of our linguistic capabilities"32 and 
sufficiently uphold our duty to interpret and apply the 
statutory law of the state of Wisconsin. 
¶57 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶58 I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH joins this concurrence. 
 
                                                 
32 Sample, 215 Wis. 2d at 510 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) 
(citing Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Judges 38, 117 
(1993)).   
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.WAB 
 
1 
 
¶59 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   (concurring).  "That depends 
on what the meaning of the word 'is' is."  William Jefferson 
Clinton.   
¶60 I write only to emphasize that canons of statutory 
construction, such as the "plain meaning" rule, are tools, not 
rules.  They are all designed to reach one fundamental goal: 
discerning legislative intent.  Ignoring relevant evidence on 
legislative 
intent 
in 
the 
name 
of 
"plain 
meaning" 
will 
necessarily 
at 
times 
lead 
to 
an 
interpretation 
that 
is 
completely contrary to what the legislature intended.   
¶61 Language 
is 
inherently 
ambiguous——perhaps 
not 
as 
ambiguous as the quotation above would have us believe, but the 
quote makes a point: plain meaning is frequently in the eye of 
the beholder.  What is plain to one may be ambiguous to another.  
If good evidence as to legislative intent is present, why not 
use it?  Accordingly, I join Chief Justice Abrahamson's 
concurrence.    
 
 
 
 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.npc 
 
1 
 
¶62 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  For the reasons 
set forth below, I respectfully dissent. 
¶63 The majority opinion fails to follow well-established 
rules of statutory interpretation.  As we have consistently 
noted, the purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain 
and give effect to the legislature's intent.  State v. Delaney, 
2003 WI 9, ¶13-14, 259 Wis.2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416.  In a results- 
oriented analysis, the majority fails to cite several well-
established statutory interpretation rules.  See majority op., 
¶13.  Specifically, the majority ignores the rule, which we have 
reiterated on several occasions this term, that when determining 
legislative intent, we first look to the language of the statute 
itself.  State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶13-14; VanCleve v. City 
of Marinette, 2003 WI 2, ¶17, 258 Wis.2d 80, 655 N.W.2d 113.  As 
we clearly noted in VanCleve:  
 . . . [I]t is a well established rule that if the 
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the 
court must not look beyond the statutory language to 
ascertain the statute's meaning. Only when statutory 
language 
is 
ambiguous 
may 
we 
examine 
other 
construction 
aids 
such 
as 
legislative 
history, 
context, and subject matter.  
VanCleve, ¶17 (citing State v. Waalen, 130 Wis.2d 18, 24, 386 
N.W.2d 47 (1986).  Accordingly, if the meaning of the statute is 
clear on its face, this court will not look outside the statute 
in applying it. 
¶64 The majority disregards this first step.  Indeed, the 
majority 
never 
explicitly 
finds 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1) ambiguous. Instead, the majority uses 
phrases such as: "[t]he language of § 980.02(1) could have more 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.npc 
 
2 
 
clearly delineated the limits of the district attorney's 
authority," and "if the legislature intended the state's broad 
interpretation, it could have omitted the reference to the DOJ's 
ability to file. . . . "  See majority op. at ¶21 (emphasis 
added).  The majority does not state that the statutory language 
is ambiguous.  Instead, without doing so, the majority engages 
in an analysis of the legislative history. 
¶65 As noted above, the rules of statutory interpretation 
are clear.  Unless the language is ambiguous, we are to apply 
the clear language of the statute.  Moreover, if the language is 
clear, the rules of statutory interpretation prohibit us from 
doing exactly what the majority does.  Unless the statutory 
language is established as ambiguous, 33  we are prohibited from 
                                                 
33 The Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence claims that 
language is often ambiguous. See Chief Justice Abrahamson's 
Concurrence at ¶52: "language, especially statutory language, is 
often ambiguous." If this was correct, we could never simply 
"appl[y]] the law as written," as we have previously done.  See 
State ex rel. Brookside Poultry Farms v. Jefferson County Bd. of 
Adjustment, 131 Wis. 2d 101, 113, 388 N.W.2d 593 (1986).  ("The 
statute and ordinance clearly state that persons aggrieved, not 
parties aggrieved, have a right to appeal.  This court applies 
the law as written.”) (emphasis in original).  Instead, we would 
as a rule in every case, start with the assumption of ambiguity, 
and then begin a search for extrinsic sources of meaning.  To 
the contrary, we have repeatedly held that the statutory 
language at issue was quite clear (and therefore not "often 
ambiguous").  See, e.g., State v. Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d 91, 102, 
556 N.W.2d 737 (1996) (Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(c) is "clear and 
unambiguous"); Nicholson v. Home Ins. Cos., 137 Wis. 2d 581, 
593, 405 N.W.2d 327 (1987) ("The operative language of sec. 
807.01(4) clearly indicates that an offer of settlement under 
sec. 807.01(4) must be made under sec. 807.01 . . . . Sec. 
807.01(3) makes it clear . . . ").  The statute also makes clear 
that . . . "). 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.npc 
 
3 
 
engaging in an analysis of whether the legislature could have 
worded the statute differently, or whether it could have omitted 
certain references. 
¶66 Following these well-established rules of statutory 
interpretation, 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
that  
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1) is clear on its face.  As the court of 
appeals noted: 
If the DOJ does not file a petition, subsec. (b) 
allows the district attorney for the county where the 
person was convicted of the sexually violent offense 
or where that person will reside or be placed upon 
release from imprisonment to file a petition for 
commitment.  Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1)(b).  We note that 
§ 980.02(1) neither requires the DOC to make a 
referral to the DOJ nor the latter to expressly 
decline filing as a condition precedent to the 
district attorney instituting proceedings.  The sole 
requirement 
is 
that 
the 
DOJ, 
under 
whatever 
circumstances, did not file a petition. 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, 
251 Wis. 2d 171; 641 N.W.2d 158 ("The immunity statute does not 
apply in the present case because imposing liability on Kreuser 
for breaking his promise is unrelated to and outside of the 
clear and unambiguous scope of this immunization statute.") 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
If language were "often ambiguous," it is not at all clear 
how the language a court might examine regarding the scope, 
history, context, and purpose of a statute would be at all 
helpful.  In fact, "one Supreme Court Justice [has] remarked 
that because the legislative history is often ambiguous, 'it is 
clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to 
find the legislative intent,' rather than the other way around."  
See Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History:  The Philosophies 
of Justices Scalia and Breyer and the Use of Legislative History 
by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 Marq. L. Rev. 161, 162 (1996); 
Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence, ¶46 n.3. 
 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.npc 
 
4 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1)(b) 
unambiguously permits the district attorney in either 
the county of conviction or of anticipated residence 
or 
placement 
upon 
discharge 
to 
file 
a 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980 petition in the event the DOJ does 
not.  Here it is undisputed that the department did 
not file a petition, but the district attorney for the 
county 
in 
which 
Byers 
would 
have 
resided 
upon 
discharge did.  
State v. Byers, Nos. 99-2441 & 00-0454, unpublished slip op. at 
¶18-19 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2001). 
¶67 For the reasons discussed, I respectfully dissent. 
¶68 I am authorized to state that Justice DIANE S. SYKES 
joins this dissent. 
 
No.  99-2441 & 00-0454.npc 
 
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