Case Title: In re D.C.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 19A21

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-104 
No. 19A21  
Filed 24 September 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: D.C. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from order entered on 22 
September 2020 by Judge Christopher B. McLendon in District Court, Martin 
County. This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 
August 2020 but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant 
to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
J. Edward Yeager, Jr., for petitioner-appellee Martin County Department of 
Social Services. 
 
Carrie A. Hanger for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Benjamin J. Kull for respondent-appellant father. 
 
Garron T. Michael for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
BERGER, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondents appeal from the trial court’s order terminating their parental 
rights to D.C. (David).1  We affirm.  
Factual and Procedural Background 
¶ 2 
 
The Martin County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a petition 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used in this opinion to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of 
reading.  
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alleging that David was a neglected and dependent juvenile.  Through Child 
Protective Services (CPS), DSS had a history with respondents’ family dating back to 
December 2008.  DSS received approximately ten CPS reports from 2008 until the 
filing of the petition.  DSS alleged in the petition issues concerning substance abuse, 
injurious environment, and truancy.  
¶ 3 
 
Since April 2017, DSS had been working with respondents’ family trying to 
assist them in obtaining substance abuse treatment and mental health services.   DSS 
further asserted that even though respondent-father had completed his 
recommended substance abuse assessment, he failed to disclose his substance abuse 
issues.  As a result of respondent-father’s failure to disclose, no services were 
recommended to address substance abuse issues.  The day before DSS filed the 
petition, respondent-father was incarcerated.  
¶ 4 
 
In addition, respondent-mother tested positive for cocaine, opioids, and 
marijuana, and was in and out of jail because of probation violations.  She was noted 
as being “very resistant” to receiving help with her drug addiction.   
¶ 5 
 
In October 2017, DSS was informed that a probation officer went to 
respondents’ residence, tested respondent-mother for drugs, and conducted a search 
of the location.  The probation officer found a young female in a bathroom “getting 
ready to shoot up.”   A further search of the home disclosed needles under a bathroom 
sink near David’s bedroom as well as a tourniquet and a spoon.   The probation officer 
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also found a needle cap and a used condom in David’s bedroom.  One of respondents’ 
children told law enforcement that the woman who was found using drugs lived in 
the home and slept in David’s bedroom.   
¶ 6 
 
DSS interviewed respondents while they were both in custody and unable to 
provide for David’s care and supervision.  Both respondents were observed with fresh 
“track marks” on their arms.  Respondent-father admitted to being addicted to heroin 
and needing long term treatment.  Respondent-mother acknowledged that she had a 
problem with drugs.  DSS obtained nonsecure custody for David on October 11, 2017.  
¶ 7 
 
David was adjudicated to be a neglected and dependent juvenile based on 
stipulations made by respondents.  In a separate dispositional order entered in 
February 2018, the trial court ordered that legal custody remain with DSS and 
granted it placement authority.  Respondent-mother was allowed a minimum of two 
hours of supervised visitation every two weeks.  The respondents were further 
ordered to work on a plan of reunification.   
¶ 8 
 
A review hearing was held on March 27, 2018.  At that time, respondent-
mother was incarcerated.  Respondent-father was out of jail but had criminal charges 
pending.  The trial court determined that respondent-father appeared to be impaired 
during one meeting at DSS.  Respondent-father completed a psychiatric evaluation 
and was diagnosed with “Opioid Use Disorder, Severe, in Early Remission.”  The 
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permanent plan for David was set as reunification.  At a subsequent review hearing, 
the trial court set a secondary permanent plan of guardianship.  
¶ 9 
 
The trial court held a permanency planning review hearing in September 2018.   
The trial court found that respondent-mother had missed the majority of her 
Substance Abuse Intensive Outpatient Treatment sessions, missed her appointment 
for her psychological evaluation, had not contacted DSS or visited with David since 
August 2018, and had not started parenting classes.  Additionally, respondent-
mother indicated that she did not wish to work on a plan of reunification and 
approved of David’s current custodians being named his guardians.   
¶ 10 
 
The trial court found that respondent-father cancelled a substance abuse 
assessment because he believed his participation in Narcotics Anonymous was 
sufficient, failed to start parenting classes, had not visited David since July 2018, 
failed two drug tests, and did not appear interested in working on a plan of 
reunification.  The trial court relieved DSS of further reunification efforts and 
changed the primary permanent plan to guardianship.  The trial court subsequently 
changed the primary permanent plan to adoption with a secondary permanent plan 
of guardianship due to ongoing concerns regarding substance abuse.  In a 
permanency planning review order entered on December 9, 2019, the trial court 
ordered DSS to file a motion to terminate respondents’ parental rights.  
¶ 11 
 
On March 11, 2020, DSS filed a petition to terminate respondents’ parental 
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rights on the grounds of neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress, failure 
to pay for the cost of care for the juvenile, and dependency. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–
(3), (6) (2019).  Following a hearing, the trial court determined that grounds existed 
to terminate respondents’ parental rights as alleged in the petition.  The trial court 
further concluded it was in David’s best interests that respondents’ parental rights 
be terminated, and terminated respondents’ parental rights.  Respondents appeal.  
Standard of Review 
¶ 12 
 
A termination of parental rights proceeding consists of an adjudicatory stage 
and a dispositional stage.  N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019); In re Montgomery, 311 
N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984).  At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner 
bears the burden of proving by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” the existence 
of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of our General 
Statutes. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019).  We review a trial court’s adjudication “to 
determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.”  In re Montgomery, 311 
N.C. at 111, 316 S.E.2d at 253 (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 
133 (1982)).  If the petitioner meets its burden during the adjudicatory stage, “the 
court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which the court must consider whether it 
is in the best interests of the juvenile to terminate parental rights.”  In re D.L.W., 368 
N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (citing In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 
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S.E.2d 612, 614–15 (1997); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110). 
¶ 13 
 
“[A]n adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient 
to support a termination of parental rights.”  In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395, 831 
S.E.2d 49, 53 (2019) (citations omitted).  We begin our analysis with consideration of 
whether grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) to terminate 
respondents’ parental rights. 
Analysis 
¶ 14 
 
A trial court may terminate parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(3) where: 
The juvenile has been placed in the custody of a county 
department of social services, a licensed child-placing 
agency, a child-caring institution, or a foster home, and the 
parent has for a continuous period of six months 
immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion 
willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of 
care for the juvenile although physically and financially 
able to do so. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (2019). This Court has stated that: 
The cost of care refers to the amount it costs the 
Department of Social Services to care for the child, namely, 
foster care. A parent is required to pay that portion of the 
cost of foster care for the child that is fair, just and 
equitable based upon the parent’s ability or means to pay.  
In re J.M., 373 N.C. 352, 357, 838 S.E.2d 173, 176–77 (2020) (cleaned up).  
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¶ 15 
 
Here, in support of its conclusion that grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(3) to terminate respondents’ parental rights, the trial court made the 
following findings of fact: 
[16]a. The juvenile has been in the legal custody of [DSS] 
for the past thirty-four (34) months. He is placed in a foster 
home through the foster care system, which entails 
numerous expenses to provide for his case. 
[16]b. Neither respondent-parent has paid any child 
support or given [DSS] or the foster parents any money 
that would pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for 
the juvenile. The respondent-parents have provided the 
juvenile with some food and gifts at visitation, and also 
given the juvenile some small amount of spending money. 
[16]c. Each parent is physically able to work, although 
there was a period during an unsuccessful pregnancy in 
2018-19 in which respondent-mother could not work. Each 
parent has worked at a lawn care business they started at 
the beginning of 2020. 
16[d]. Each parent is financially able to pay a reasonable 
portion of the cost of care for the juvenile. Respondent-
mother reports that the lawn care business has been even 
more successful than they envisioned, and they are able to 
earn enough income to support themselves and their 
children.   
¶ 16 
 
Respondents do not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact regarding this 
statutory ground.2  See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 58 (2019) 
(stating that “[f]indings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed supported 
                                            
2 Respondents make arguments regarding findings of fact 14 and 17, but we do not 
address them because they are not relevant to grounds for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(3). In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891, 900, 845 S.E.2d 16, 23 (2020). 
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by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.”).  Respondents instead claim that 
the trial court failed to make any findings of fact that they had received notice that 
they were under any obligation to make payments to DSS or the foster parents for 
David’s care.  Respondents contend that without notice of such obligation, they could 
not have acted willfully.  Respondents thus assert that the trial court erred by 
concluding grounds exist to terminate their parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1111(a)(3) because their failure to pay was not willful.   
¶ 17 
 
Respondents’ argument is nearly identical to that raised by the respondent-
mother in In re S.E., 373 N.C. 360, 838 S.E.2d 328 (2020).  In In re S.E., the 
respondent-mother conceded that she did not pay anything towards the cost of care 
for her children but similarly claimed that her failure to pay was not willful.  The 
respondent argued that she could have paid, but “she did not know she could pay 
towards the cost of care for her children, did not know how to pay towards the cost, 
and could not reasonably have been expected to do so.”  Id. at 365, 838 S.E.2d at 332.  
This Court disagreed, holding that: 
Respondent-mother’s argument that she did not know she 
had to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for her 
children or how to do so is fundamentally without merit. 
The absence of a court order, notice, or knowledge of a 
requirement to pay support is not a defense to a parent’s 
obligation to pay reasonable costs, because parents have an 
inherent duty to support their children. Given her inherent 
duty to support her children, respondent cannot hide 
behind a cloak of ignorance to assert her failure to pay a 
reasonable portion of the cost of care for her children was 
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not willful. 
Id. at 366, 838 S.E.2d at 333 (cleaned up).  
¶ 18 
 
Respondents contend that we should disavow In re S.E.  Respondents claim 
that the interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) as set forth in In re S.E., when 
compared to termination for lack of support pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4)3, 
“results in an unconstitutional dichotomy, under which similarly situated parents are 
treated differently depending on who the child’s custodian is.”  Respondents argue 
that “the General Assembly could not have possibly intended to hold only some 
parents to a strict liability standard, for doing so would result in an unconstitutional 
outcome in which those parents are deprived of the equal protection of the law.”  
¶ 19 
 
Adhering to the principle of stare decisis, we decline to change our 
interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3). This Court has stated: 
It is . . . an established rule to abide by former precedents, 
stare decisis, where the same points come up again in 
litigation, as well to keep the scale of justice even and 
steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge’s 
opinion, as also because, the law in that case being 
solemnly declared and determined what before was 
uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a 
permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any 
subsequent judge to alter or swerve from according to his 
                                            
3 Section 7B-1111(a)(4) provides that a trial court may terminate parental rights 
where “[o]ne parent has been awarded custody of the juvenile by judicial decree or has 
custody by agreement of the parents, and the other parent whose parental rights are sought 
to be terminated has for a period of one year or more next preceding the filing of the petition 
or motion willfully failed without justification to pay for the care, support, and education of 
the juvenile, as required by the decree or custody agreement.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4) 
(2019). 
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private sentiments; he being sworn to determine, not 
according to his private judgment, but according to the 
known laws and customs of the land—not delegated to 
pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old 
one—jus dicere et non jus dare. 
McGill v. Town of Lumberton, 218 N.C. 586, 591, 11 S.E.2d 873, 876 (1940) (cleaned 
up); see also Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 712, 549 S.E.2d 840, 851–52 (2001) (“A 
primary goal of adjudicatory proceedings is the uniform application of law.  In 
furtherance of this objective, courts generally consider themselves bound by prior 
precedent, i.e., the doctrine of stare decisis.”  (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
827, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, 736–37 (1991)). 
¶ 20 
 
The trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact demonstrate that respondents 
had the ability to pay a reasonable portion of David’s cost of care but failed to pay any 
amount to DSS or the foster parents toward cost of care.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) to terminate respondents’ 
parental rights.  
¶ 21 
 
We next consider respondent-father’s argument that the trial court conducted 
the adjudicatory hearing under a fundamental misapprehension of the law.  
Respondent-father claims that the trial court “conducted the adjudication hearing 
under the fundamentally misguided belief that parent and child were adversaries—
that is, that young David’s interests took priority over his parents’ constitutionally 
protected rights.”  See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 610 
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(1982) (stating that “[a]t the factfinding, the State cannot presume that a child and 
his parents are adversaries.  After the State has established parental unfitness at 
that initial proceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional stage that the 
interests of the child and the natural parents do diverge.”).  We are not persuaded. 
¶ 22 
 
As noted previously herein, a termination of parental rights proceeding 
consists of two stages, an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. 
§§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019); In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110, 316 S.E.2d at 252.  This 
Court has often stated that in proceedings conducted under the North Carolina 
Juvenile Code, the best interests of the juvenile are paramount. See, e.g., In re T.H.T., 
362 N.C. 446, 450, 665 S.E.2d 54, 57 (2008) (affirming that the child’s best interests 
constitute “the ‘polar star’ of the North Carolina Juvenile Code”); see also In re 
Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 109, 316 S.E.2d at 246.  However, a trial court only proceeds 
to “the dispositional stage at which point it must determine whether terminating the 
parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interests” after it “determines at the 
adjudicatory stage that one or more of the grounds in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) exists to 
terminate parental rights.”  In re K.L.M., 375 N.C. 118, 121, 846 S.E.2d 488, 490 
(2020).   Thus, until the trial court has concluded at the adjudicatory stage that a 
ground exists to terminate parental rights, “the constitutionally[ ]protected 
paramount right of parents to custody, care, and control of their children must 
prevail.”  Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 403–04, 445 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1994). 
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¶ 23 
 
Respondent-father’s argument that the trial court focused on David’s interests, 
rather than respondents’ constitutionally protected rights to preserve their family 
intact, and erroneously placed David and respondents in adversarial roles, is based 
upon a statement made by the trial court at the conclusion of the adjudicatory phase 
of the termination hearing.  The trial court stated that “[w]e’re here for -- not for 
[respondents].  We’re here for this child.”   
¶ 24 
 
At the conclusion of the adjudicatory portion of the termination hearing, the 
trial court’s full statement was: 
Well the case is made more difficult than a lot of these 
because just of the length of time it took for [respondents] 
to see the light. We’re here for -- not for [respondents]. 
We’re here for this child. Had [respondents] taken the steps 
early on that I think these lawyers have finally got them at 
least going on, then we wouldn’t be here in the situation 
where [David] had been gone so long. But the court does 
find that there’s evidence to these grounds alleged in the 
petition. 
When read in its entirety and in context, it is apparent that the trial court was not 
acting under a misapprehension of law.  First, the trial court noted in its pre-trial 
order that “[t]his matter shall proceed to adjudication, and, if warranted, to 
disposition[.]” (Emphasis added)  See In re K.L.M., 375 N.C. 118, 121, 846 S.E.2d 488, 
490 (2020).  The trial court recognized that respondents had a constitutionally 
protected interest in preserving familial bonds and that the matter would not proceed 
to disposition unless grounds for termination were proven.  The trial court’s 
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statements further recognize that respondents acted inconsistently with that 
interest, parental unfitness had been established, and the trial court would be 
proceeding to the dispositional phase of the proceeding where determination of 
David’s best interests would be paramount.  We therefore conclude that the trial court 
was not acting under a misapprehension of the law at adjudication.  
¶ 25 
 
The trial court’s conclusion that a ground for termination existed pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) is sufficient in and of itself to support termination of 
respondents’ parental rights.  In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395, 831 S.E.2d at 53.  As 
such, we need not address respondents’ arguments regarding N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), (2) and (6).  Furthermore, respondents do not challenge the trial court’s 
conclusion that termination of their parental rights was in David’s best interests.  See 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019).  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order 
terminating respondents’ parental rights to David. 
AFFIRMED.