Case Title: Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes

Citation: 

Docket Number: S267453

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
BETTY TANSAVATDI, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES, 
Defendant and Respondent.  
 
S267453 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Four 
B293670 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC633651 and BC652435 
 
 
April 27, 2023 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
 
1 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
S267453 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
Under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et 
seq.), a public entity can be held liable for either creating a 
dangerous condition on its property (id., § 835, subd. (a)) or 
failing to protect against such a condition when the entity had 
notice of the danger and sufficient time to remedy the situation 
(id., subd. (b)).  The statutory defense of design immunity, 
however, precludes liability for injuries that were allegedly 
caused by a defect in the design of a public improvement when 
certain conditions are met.  (Id., § 830.6.)  To obtain design 
immunity, a public entity must establish that the challenged 
design was discretionarily approved by authorized personnel 
and that substantial evidence supported the reasonableness of 
the plan.  (Cornette v. Dept. of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
63, 66 (Cornette).)    
The question presented in this case is whether design 
immunity bars all forms of claims that seek to impose liability 
for injuries resulting from a dangerous feature of a roadway.  
More specifically, we must determine whether design immunity 
is limited to claims alleging that a public entity created a 
dangerous roadway condition through a defective design, or 
whether the statutory immunity also extends to claims alleging 
that a public entity failed to warn of a design element that 
resulted in a dangerous roadway condition.   
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
Relying on our holding in Cameron v. State of California 
(1972) 7 Cal.3d 318 (Cameron), we conclude that design 
immunity does not categorically preclude failure to warn claims 
that involve a discretionarily approved element of a roadway.  
As we expressly held in Cameron, “[W]here the state is immune 
from liability for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of its 
property because the dangerous condition was created as a 
result of a plan or design which conferred immunity under 
[Government Code] section 830.6, the state may nevertheless be 
liable for failure to warn of this dangerous condition.”  
(Cameron, at p. 329.)  The effect of Cameron is that while section 
830.6 shields public entities from liability for injuries resulting 
from the design of the physical features of a roadway, they 
nonetheless retain a duty to warn of known dangers that the 
roadway presents to the public.  
The City of Rancho Palo Verdes (the City), however, 
argues that Cameron is poorly reasoned and should be 
overruled.  The City contends that Cameron’s “illogical” holding 
gravely undermines the design immunity defense:  “If the 
improvements at issue would be covered by design immunity, 
and the [public] entity is therefore not liable for injuries caused 
by them, how could it make sense to hold the entity liable for the 
defendant’s failure to warn of the same improvements?”  
Contrary to the City’s assertions, however, we find nothing 
illogical in Cameron’s conclusion that section 830.6 was not 
intended to allow government entities to remain silent when 
they have notice that a reasonably approved design presents a 
danger to the public.  
Moreover, the City has failed to identify any subsequent 
development in the law or other special justification that 
warrants departure from the doctrine of stare decisis.  (See 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 336 [“ ‘stare decisis’ is ‘a 
fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable 
precedent usually must be followed’ ”]; Moradi-Shalal v. 
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 297 
[“reexamination of precedent may become necessary when 
subsequent developments indicate an earlier decision was 
unsound”]; Kisor v. Wilkie (2019) __ U.S. __ [139 S.Ct. 2400, 
2422] (Kisor) [“any departure from [stare decisis] demands 
‘special justification’ — something more than ‘an argument that 
the precedent was wrongly decided’ ”].)  Cameron has been 
controlling law for over 50 years and the Legislature has never 
chosen to abrogate the holding.  (See People v. Latimer (1993) 
5 Cal.4th 1203, 1213 (Latimer) [“ ‘Considerations of stare decisis 
have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for 
here . . . [the Legislature] remains free to alter what we have 
done’ ”], italics omitted.)  For all those reasons, we decline to 
overrule our prior precedent.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Accident and Complaint 
On the afternoon of March 18, 2016, decedent Jonathan 
Tansavatdi was riding his bicycle on Hawthorne Boulevard in 
the City of Rancho Palos Verdes.  Although most of Hawthorne 
Boulevard includes a bike lane, the bike lane stops at Dupre 
Drive (to the north) and then restarts after Vallon Drive (to the 
south).  The block between Dupre and Vallon  pitches sharply 
downhill in the southbound direction.  The City  chose not to 
provide a bike lane along this section of Hawthorne because it 
wanted to make space for street parking that provides access to 
an adjacent park.  The parking spots end shortly before a right 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
turn lane at the intersection of Hawthorne and Vallon.  The bike 
lane then resumes on Hawthorne, south of Vallon. 
At the time of the accident, the decedent was traveling 
southward (downhill) along the right side of Hawthorne 
Boulevard.  As he approached the intersection with Vallon 
Drive, the decedent rode his bicycle into the right turn lane but 
rather than turn right onto Vallon, he continued riding straight 
through the intersection.  As the decedent was entering the 
intersection, an 80-foot tractor trailer began making a right turn 
from Hawthorne onto Vallon.  Due to the length of the trailer, 
the truck started its turn from a southbound lane of Hawthorne, 
causing it to cut across the right turn lane at a perpendicular 
angle.  The decedent collided with the truck and died from his 
injuries. 
The decedent’s mother, plaintiff Betsy Tansavatdi, filed a 
complaint against the City for “[d]angerous [c]ondition of 
[p]ublic [p]roperty pursuant to Government Code section 835.”  
The complaint alleged that the intersection of Hawthorn 
Boulevard and Vallon Drive constituted a dangerous condition 
that the City had “created, or allowed to be created . . . under 
[section] 835.”  The complaint further alleged the City had 
provided “inadequate warning of dangerous conditions not 
reasonably apparent to motorists . . . for those driving through 
the road at the intersection of Hawthorne Boulevard and Vallon 
Drive.” 
B.  Trial Court Proceedings 
1. The City’s motion for summary judgment 
The City filed a motion for summary judgment arguing 
that it had a “complete defense to [the] action for design 
immunity under Government Code section 830.6.”  In support of 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
the motion, the City submitted evidence showing that local 
officials had approved a repaving project along Hawthorne 
Boulevard in 2009.  The plans showed a bike lane running along 
Hawthorne Boulevard that stopped at Dupre Drive and then 
restarted again at Vallon Drive.  On the block between Dupre 
and Vallon, the plans showed parking spots in lieu of a bike lane, 
and a right turn lane at the intersection of Hawthorne and 
Vallon.  A former city engineer provided a declaration 
explaining that the City had decided against including a bike 
lane on that block because it wanted to provide on-street 
parking for the benefit of an adjacent park. 
The City also provided the declaration of a traffic 
engineering expert who had reviewed the 2009 repaving plans 
and concluded that they were reasonable and compliant with all 
applicable state and federal guidelines.  The engineer also 
reviewed collision data that showed the decedent’s accident was 
the only serious collision that had occurred at the intersection of 
Hawthorne Boulevard and Vallon Drive between 2006 to 2017.  
The expert opined that this data demonstrated the intersection 
had an “extremely good” collision record and was safe when used 
with due care. 
The City argued that, considered together, its evidence 
established as a matter of law that it was entitled to judgment 
based on the defense of design immunity.  In particular, the City 
argued the evidence showed the element of the roadway that 
had allegedly caused the decedent’s accident — the absence of a 
bike lane between Dupre and Vallon — had been approved by 
authorized personnel and that substantial evidence supported 
the reasonableness of the design.  Thus, the City contended, it 
could not be held liable under Government Code section 835 for 
any injury resulting from that alleged dangerous condition.  In 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
a footnote, the City acknowledged Tansavatdi’s complaint had 
also alleged an alternative theory of liability for “failing to warn 
of a dangerous condition.”  In the City’s view, however, because 
it had “met the requisites of design immunity, no such warning 
was required.” 
In opposition, Tansavatdi argued there were disputed 
questions of fact as to whether the design of the street qualified 
as a dangerous condition, contending that the City “should have 
ensured 
the 
roadway 
would 
be 
striped 
with 
a 
continuous . . . bicycle lane directing bicyclists approaching the 
intersection of Hawthorne and Vallon to the left of the right turn 
lane.”  Tansavatdi also argued there were disputed issues 
whether the City was entitled to design immunity under 
Government Code section 830.6, arguing there was no evidence 
showing that the public employees who approved the repaving 
project on Hawthorne had authority to do so, or that the design 
was reasonable. 
Citing Cameron, Tansavatdi separately argued that even 
if the City had demonstrated it was entitled to design immunity, 
that immunity did not apply to her claim that the City should 
have “warned of the dangerous condition . . . since it [was] not 
reasonably apparent to a bicyclist” and thus “create[ed] a 
concealed trap.”  Tansavatdi noted that the City’s motion 
acknowledged 
the 
complaint 
had 
“pled 
this 
separate, 
independent theory [of dangerous conditions liability], negating 
any claimed design immunity.” 
In support of her opposition, Tansavatdi submitted an 
expert declaration opining that the discontinuation of the bike 
lane along the steeply pitched section of Hawthorne caused 
“bicyclists to ride their bicycles at relatively high speeds and 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
straight through the right turn lane at Vallon,” thus increasing 
the risk of collision between cars and bicycles.  The declaration 
further stated that to avoid the possibility of injury, “a bicyclist 
on Hawthorne between Dupre and Vallon needs more advanced 
warning and positive guidance for the safe and intended 
operation of the roadway.” 
In its reply, the City did not challenge Tansavatdi’s 
assertion that Cameron had held that design immunity does not 
preclude a claim for failure to warn of a dangerous traffic 
condition.  Instead, the City argued the evidence submitted in 
support of its motion showed that the section of roadway where 
the accident occurred had signs warning vehicles to reduce their 
speed.  According to the City, this signage was sufficient to 
defeat any failure to warn claim.  The City also contended that 
it would be “readily apparent” to bicycle riders that they should 
not travel straight through the right turn lane. 
2. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment 
The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, 
concluding that the City had established as a matter of law that 
it was entitled to design immunity under Government Code 
section 830.6.  Specifically, the court found the evidence showed 
a “discretionary decision was made that street parking near the 
community park on Hawthorne Boulevard east of Dupre Drive 
had a higher priority than a bicycle lane near that particular 
stretch of Hawthorne Boulevard,” and that the “plan and design 
were reasonable.”  The court’s order made no mention of 
Tansavatdi’s argument that design immunity did not preclude 
her alternative theory of liability for failure to warn of a 
dangerous traffic condition. 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
C.  The Court of Appeal Proceedings 
As in the trial court, Tansavatdi argued on appeal that the 
City had failed to prove each of the elements necessary to 
establish design immunity.  Tansavatdi also argued reversal 
was necessary because the trial court failed to address her 
alternative assertion that “design immunity ‘[does] not 
immunize [a government entity] for its concurrent negligence in 
failing to warn of the dangerous condition.’  [Citation.]  The 
evidence detailing the City’s failure to warn of the concealed 
trap here precludes a finding that design immunity applies to 
shield the City of all liability.” 
Although the City’s briefing focused on design immunity, 
it also responded to Tansavatdi’s failure to warn claim.  The City 
contended that even after Cameron, “a failure to warn claim 
cannot be based on a condition that is subject to design 
immunity; such a claim is only permissible when it involves 
something other than the approved design.”  According to the 
City, because “the absence of a bicycle lane from the stretch of 
Hawthorne at issue — and the presence of a lane at other parts 
of Hawthorne — was part of the approved plan,” there could be 
no claim for failing to warn of that immunized design.  
The Court of Appeal affirmed that the evidence supported 
a finding of design immunity, thus precluding any claim that the 
City was liable for having created a dangerous roadway 
condition by failing to provide a bike lane on the block between 
Dupre and Vallon.  However, citing Cameron,  the appellate 
court agreed with Tansavatdi that “design immunity does not, 
as a matter of law, preclude liability under a theory of failure to 
warn of a dangerous condition.”  (Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho 
Palos Verdes (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 423, 441 (Tansavatdi).)  
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
Because the trial court did not address the failure to warn claim 
in its order granting summary judgment, the court remanded 
for further proceedings on that issue. 
The City filed a petition for review challenging the court’s 
conclusion that design immunity does not bar Tansavatdi’s 
claim for failure to warn.  We granted review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review  
The sole question presented in this case is whether the 
statutory defense of design immunity set forth in Government 
Code section 830.61 categorically precludes any claim that the 
public entity is liable for having failed to warn of a dangerous 
traffic condition resulting from that approved design.  Because 
this issue involves a pure question of law, we apply a de novo 
standard of review.2  (People v. Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860, 870 
[“pure question of law . . . is examined de novo”]; Regents of 
University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 
531 [“ruling on . . . summary judgment motion, and its 
resolution of the underlying statutory-construction issues, were 
subject to independent review”].) 
 
1 
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory citations are 
to the Government Code. 
2  
We have no occasion to consider, and express no opinion 
on, several additional arguments the City raised in its motion 
for summary judgment that are unrelated to design immunity.  
Those additional arguments include, among other things, that 
the discontinuation of the bike lane does not qualify as either a 
“ ‘[d]angerous condition’ ” (§ 830, subd. (a)) or a concealed trap 
(see § 830.8), and that Hawthorne Boulevard contains adequate 
signage to protect against any possible danger. 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
B. Legal Background 
1. Relevant provisions of the Government Claims Act 
a.  Government liability for dangerous conditions 
(§ 835)   
Under the Government Claims Act, a tort action cannot be 
maintained against a government entity unless the claim is 
premised on a statute providing for that liability.  (See § 815.)  
In this case, plaintiff Tansavatdi brought her claims pursuant 
to section 835, which “ ‘is the principal provision addressing the 
circumstances under which the government may be held liable 
for maintaining a dangerous condition of public property.’ ”  
(Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1131.)  To 
establish liability under section 835, a plaintiff must show:  “(1) 
‘that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of 
the injury’; (2) ‘that the injury was proximately caused by the 
dangerous condition’; (3) ‘that the dangerous condition created 
a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was 
incurred’; and (4) either (a) that a public employee negligently 
or wrongfully ‘created the dangerous condition’ or (b) that ‘[the] 
public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous 
condition a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken 
measures to protect against the dangerous condition.’ ”  (Ducey 
v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 716, quoting § 835, italics 
& fn. omitted.)  
Thus, section 835 expressly authorizes two different forms 
of dangerous conditions liability:  an act or omission by a 
government actor that created the dangerous condition (§ 835, 
subd. (a)); or, alternatively, failure “to protect against” 
dangerous conditions of which the entity had notice (id., subd. 
(b)).  The term “protect against” is statutorily defined to include, 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
among other things, “warning of a dangerous condition.”  (§ 830, 
subd. (b).)   
b.  Statutory immunities to dangerous conditions 
liability 
 
The Government Code also provides numerous statutory 
exceptions that limit liability for claims involving a dangerous 
condition.  (See §§ 830.1–831.8.)  Two of those exceptions are 
relevant here. 
Section 830.6, commonly referred to as “design immunity,” 
precludes liability for any injury caused by “the plan or design 
of . . . , or an improvement to, public property.”  (§ 830.6.)  As we 
explained in Cornette, design immunity requires that a public 
entity establish three elements:  “(1) a causal relationship 
between the plan or design and the accident; (2) discretionary 
approval of the plan or design prior to construction; and (3) 
substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the plan 
or design.”  (Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 69.)  Resolution of 
the third element — the existence of substantial evidence 
supporting the reasonableness of the adoption of the plan or 
design — is a matter for the courts, not the jury, to decide.  (See 
§ 830.6 [“[T]he trial or appellate court” is to determine whether 
“there is any substantial evidence upon the basis of which . . . a 
reasonable public employee could have adopted the plan or 
design”].) 
“The rationale for design immunity is to prevent a jury 
from second-guessing the decision of a public entity by reviewing 
the identical questions of risk that had previously been 
considered by the government officers who adopted or approved 
the plan or design.  [Citation.]  ‘ “ ‘[T]o permit reexamination in 
tort litigation of particular discretionary decisions where 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
reasonable [people] may differ as to how the discretion should 
be exercised would create too great a danger of impolitic 
interference with the freedom of decision-making by those 
public officials in whom the function of making such decisions 
has been vested.’ ” [Citation.]’ ”  (Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 
p. 69.) 
Section 830.8 provides a second form of immunity, 
precluding public entity liability “for an injury caused by the 
failure to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings or 
devices described in the Vehicle Code.”  (§ 830.8.)  Section 830.8, 
however, sets forth a limitation to such immunity:  “Nothing in 
this section exonerates a public entity . . . from liability for 
injury . . . caused by such failure if a signal, sign, marking or 
device . . . was necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which 
endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not 
be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated 
by, a person exercising due care.”  This limitation to section 
830.8 immunity is commonly referred to as the “concealed trap” 
exception.  (See Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 
38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1196–1197; Callahan v. City and County 
of San Francisco (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 696, 704; see also Van 
Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 
1980) § 3.40, p. 253 (Van Alstyne) [immunity under § 830.8 
“inapplicable when a warning sign . . . is necessary to warn of a 
concealed trap”].)3  
 
3  
As the Court of Appeal noted, at this stage of the 
proceedings “[i]t is unclear precisely what kind of warning 
[Tansavatdi] 
claims 
the 
city 
should 
have 
provided.”  
(Tansavatdi, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 441, fn. 17).  
 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
2.  Relevant case law   
a.  Flournoy v. State of California 
As discussed below, our holding in Cameron is based 
largely on the analysis set forth in Flournoy v. State of 
California (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 806 (Flournoy).  Thus, to aid 
our understanding of Cameron, it is helpful to first consider 
Flournoy. 
The plaintiffs in Flournoy brought a wrongful death action 
under section 835 alleging that the state had maintained a 
bridge in a dangerous condition.  According to the complaint, the 
bridge had been designed in a manner that caused moisture to 
condense on the roadway, which then froze in cold weather 
resulting in icy conditions.  The complaint further alleged that 
although the state had notice of numerous accidents caused by 
ice on the bridge, it had not posted any warning signs or 
redesigned the roadway surface.  The trial court granted 
summary judgment based on design immunity (§ 830.6), 
concluding that “ ‘the condition [on] which plaintiff seeks to 
predicate liability was inherent in the design of the bridge.’ ”  
(Flournoy, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 810.) 
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that design 
immunity only addressed one of the two theories of dangerous 
 
Tansavatdi has consistently taken the position, however, that 
the warning she claims was necessary would fall within section 
830.8 as a type of “traffic or warning signal[] . . . described in the 
Vehicle Code.”  (§ 830.8.)  Because both parties have proceeded 
under the assumption that any possible warning regarding the 
bike lane would fall within section 830.8, we do the same.  We 
express no opinion regarding the breadth of section 830.8 or how 
design immunity might affect failure to warn claims that do not 
involve a traffic condition. 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
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conditions liability set forth in section 835:  “The trial court 
erred in granting the summary judgment, for the state’s [design 
immunity defense] could affect only one of two [alternative] 
theories of recovery . . . made by the pleadings . . . :  (1) The state 
was liable under subdivision (a) of section 835, for it had created 
a dangerous condition by constructing an ice-prone bridge; and 
(2) the state was liable under subdivision (b) of section 835, for 
it had knowledge of a dangerously icy condition (not reasonably 
apparent to a careful driver) and failed to protect against the 
danger by posting a warning.  Each of these theories postulated 
a separate, although concurring, cause of the accident.  
[Citation.]  The first theory asserted causation in the state’s 
active negligence in creating a danger, the second in the state’s 
passive negligence in failing to warn of it.”  (Flournoy, supra, 
275 Cal.App.2d at pp. 810–811.) 
Flournoy explained that the distinct theories of liability 
set forth in section 835 subdivision (a) and subdivision (b) 
reflected the common law principle that a single defendant may 
produce “two concurring, proximate causes of an accident[:] . . . 
an affirmatively negligent act and . . . a passively negligent 
omission. . . . [¶]  Here, . . . the complaint alleged active and 
passive negligence of a single defendant (the creation of a 
dangerous condition and the failure to post a warning of it) as 
separate, concurring causes.  Regardless of the availability of 
the active negligence theory, plaintiffs were entitled to go before 
a jury on the passive negligence theory, i.e., an accident caused 
by the state’s failure to warn the public against icy danger 
known to it but not apparent to a reasonably careful highway 
user.”  (Flournoy, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 811.) 
The court also rejected the state’s argument that section 
830.6’s design immunity provisions “ ‘prevail[]’ over any liability 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
for a dangerous condition of public property under section 835,” 
concluding that “[b]y force of its very terms the design immunity 
of section 830.6 is limited to a design-caused accident.  
[Citation.]  It does not immunize from liability caused by 
negligence independent of design, even though the independent 
negligence is only a concurring, proximate cause of the 
accident.”  (Flournoy, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 811, fn. 
omitted.)   
b.  Cameron v. State of California 
In Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d 318, plaintiffs filed a 
complaint alleging the state was liable under section 835 for 
having negligently constructed an improperly banked “S” curve 
that left drivers unable to “negotiate the curve even though 
going at a lawful speed.”  (Id. at p. 322.)  Plaintiffs separately 
alleged the state had failed to adequately warn of this defective 
design, contending that a sign warning drivers to slow their 
speed to 35 miles per hour would have been sufficient to 
neutralize the dangerous design.  At the close of evidence, the 
trial court granted a motion for nonsuit based on design 
immunity. 
On appeal, plaintiffs raised two arguments in support of 
reversal.  First, they argued design immunity was inapplicable 
because the approved plans did not address the banking of the 
“S”-curve, which plaintiffs alleged was the dangerous condition 
that had caused the accident.  Second, plaintiffs argued that 
“even if ‘design immunity’ . . . immunize[d] the state for 
negligence in the creation of the dangerous condition, the 
concurrent negligence by the state in failing to warn of the 
dangerous condition provides an independent basis for 
recovery.”  (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 322.)  Plaintiffs 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
contended that because the state had provided no evidence that 
this “negligent failure to warn” was “the result of any design or 
plan which would confer immunity under section 830.6”, such 
conduct provided a separate “basis for recovery, even if the 
dangerous condition itself was created as a result of a plan 
covered by section 830.6.”  (Id. at p. 327.) 
We agreed with both arguments.  Regarding the first 
issue, we found the state had presented no evidence that the 
curve’s banking was part of the design approved by the public 
entity, and thus there was “no basis for concluding that any 
liability for injuries caused by this [alleged defect] was 
immunized by section 830.6.”  (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at 
p. 326, fn. omitted.)  Although that conclusion was sufficient to 
reverse the trial court’s judgment of nonsuit, we went on to 
consider plaintiffs’ second argument that, even if proven, design 
immunity would not preclude their claim for failing to warn 
motorists about the dangerous curve.  We explained that 
addressing this alternative claim was necessary “[f]or the 
guidance of the trial court” (id. at p. 326) because it was possible 
“upon remand that the state could produce evidence to show 
that the [banking] was [part of the approved design].  In that 
event, plaintiffs’ second contention would become determinative 
on the issue of design immunity.”  (Id. at p. 327, fn. 11.) 
We began our analysis of the failure to warn claim by 
noting that while section 830.8 generally immunizes liability for 
injuries caused by the failure to provide traffic or warning 
signals, the statute allows public entity liability “if a sign was 
necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which would not be 
reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, 
a person using the highway with due care.”  (Cameron, supra, 
7 Cal.3d at p. 327.)  We further held that plaintiffs had 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
introduced sufficient evidence to support a finding “that 
warning signs, indicating the proper speed to negotiate the 
curve, . . . would eliminate the dangerousness from the condition 
of uneven [banking].”  (Ibid.) 
Turning to whether section 830.6’s design immunity 
provision precluded plaintiffs’ claim for failure to warn, we 
summarized Flournoy at length, and in particular its discussion 
of active versus passive negligence.  (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d 
at pp. 327–328.)  We ultimately “[a]gree[d] with the reasoning 
and conclusions of Flournoy” (id. at p. 328), and held that, as in 
that case, plaintiffs had alleged “active negligence . . . (the 
creation of the dangerous condition, namely [improper banking]) 
and passive negligence (failure to warn of the dangerous 
condition) of . . . the state.”  (Ibid.)  We further held that, “as in 
Flournoy, the passive negligence alleged is independent of the 
negligent design” and that plaintiffs were therefore “entitled to 
go to the jury on the passive negligence theory.”  (Id. at pp. 328–
329.) 
We then “recapitulate[d]” our holding, explaining that 
“where the state is immune from liability for injuries caused by 
a dangerous condition of its property because the dangerous 
condition was created as a result of a plan or design which 
conferred immunity under section 830.6, the state may 
nevertheless be liable for failure to warn of this dangerous 
condition where the failure to warn is negligent and is an 
independent, separate, concurring cause of the accident.”  
(Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 329.) 
C. Analysis 
 
To resolve the legal question presented in this case, we 
must answer three questions involving Cameron.  First, we 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
must determine whether the Court of Appeal correctly 
interpreted Cameron as holding that “design immunity for a 
dangerous condition [does] not necessarily shield the state from 
liability for a failure to warn of the same dangerous condition.”  
(Tansavatdi, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 442.)  Second, 
assuming the interpretation was correct, we must address the 
City’s assertion that Cameron’s analysis regarding failure to 
warn claims does not constitute binding precedent or has 
otherwise been impliedly displaced by subsequent events.  And 
third, to the extent the Court of Appeal properly interpreted 
Cameron and the decision is binding precedent, we must decide 
whether there is an adequate justification to depart from the 
doctrine of stare decisis and overrule our prior holding.   
1. The breadth of Cameron’s holding 
a.  The Court of Appeal correctly interpreted 
Cameron  
The first question we must resolve is whether the Court of 
Appeal correctly interpreted Cameron as permitting failure to 
warn claims that involve an immunized element of a design 
decision.  Several other courts have adopted a similar reading of 
Cameron.  (See 
Grenier v. City of Irwindale (1997) 
57 Cal.App.4th 931, 945 [“[t]he failure to warn of a trap can 
constitute independent negligence, regardless of design 
immunity”]; 
Hefner 
v. 
County 
of 
Sacramento 
(1988) 
197 Cal.App.3d 1007, 1017, abrogated on another ground in 
Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th 63; Levine v. City of Los Angeles 
(1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 481, 488; Anderson v. City of Thousand 
Oaks (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 82, 91 (Anderson) [“In spite of 
respondent’s immunity for a defectively designed roadway, a 
second independent ground of liability under subdivision (b) of 
Government Code section 835 exists for its failure to warn of the 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
dangerous condition if it had actual or constructive notice of 
such a condition”]; see also Van Alstyne, supra, § 3.40 at p. 253 
[Cameron and other authorities support the proposition that 
“even if the source of the danger is inherent in the approved plan 
or design of the improvement, and therefore appears to be 
nonactionable under the ‘design immunity,’ the entity’s failure 
to pose adequate warning signs may result in liability”].) 
The City, however, argues we should follow the analysis of 
Weinstein 
v. 
Department 
of 
Transportation 
(2006) 
139 Cal.App.4th 52 (Weinstein), which adopted a substantially 
narrower interpretation of Cameron.  The plaintiffs in Weinstein 
alleged that a freeway “ ‘lane drop’ ” (the discontinuation of a 
lane) created a dangerous traffic condition and that defendant 
had failed to properly warn of that condition.  (Id. at p. 54.)  The 
trial court granted summary judgment based on design 
immunity.  On appeal, the court rejected plaintiffs’ contention 
that “defendant’s design immunity defense did not bar them 
from recovering for defendant’s failure to post” sufficient 
warnings about the lane drop.  (Id. at p. 61.)  The appellate court 
explained that “ ‘[i]t would be illogical to hold that a public 
entity immune from liability because the design was deemed 
reasonably adoptable, could then be held liable for failing to 
warn that the design was dangerous.’  [Citation.]  Since 
defendant could not be held liable for these aspects of the 
roadway’s design as dangerous conditions, it could not be held 
liable for failing to warn of these same aspects.”  (Ibid.)  
Weinstein further explained that its holding was not in conflict 
with Cameron.  According to the court, “Cameron involved the 
failure to warn of a hidden dangerous condition that was not 
part of the approved design of the highway.  [Citation.]  Here, 
plaintiffs claim that defendant was obligated to warn of 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
conditions that were part of the approved design.”  (Weinstein, 
at p. 61, italics omitted.) 
The Court of Appeal here found that Weinstein’s reading 
of 
Cameron 
was 
“mistaken.” 
 
(Tansavatdi, 
supra, 
60 Cal.App.5th at p. 442.)  We agree.  As noted above, our 
decision in Cameron expressly held that if the state were able to 
establish on remand that the challenged condition at issue in 
that case (the banking of the “S” turn) was part of the approved 
highway plans, and thus subject to design immunity, that 
immunity would not defeat plaintiffs’ alternative claim that the 
state’s failure to warn drivers of the known danger was an 
independent, intervening cause of the accident.  Contrary to 
Weinstein, there is no language in Cameron suggesting that our 
holding was only intended to apply when a failure to warn claim 
challenges a road condition “that was not part of the approved 
design.”  (Weinstein, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 61.)  Indeed, 
such a limitation is in direct conflict with Cameron’s conclusion 
that if the defendant were able to produce evidence on remand 
demonstrating that the banking of the curve was part of the 
approved plan (thus precluding any claim for having created 
that dangerous condition), plaintiffs would nonetheless remain 
entitled to move forward with their failure to warn claim.  (See 
Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 326–327 & fn. 11.)  Accordingly, 
we disapprove that portion of Weinstein v. Department of 
Transportation, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 52.4 
 
4   
We likewise disapprove language in Compton v. City of 
Santee (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 591, suggesting that design 
immunity categorically precludes claims alleging failure to warn 
of a dangerous traffic condition created by the immunized 
 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
b.  Cameron’s limitations on failure to warn claims 
While we agree with the Court of Appeal’s determination 
that Weinstein misread Cameron, for the guidance of our courts 
we think it helpful to clarify additional aspects of Cameron’s 
analysis that affect the requirements necessary to prevail on a 
claim alleging failure to warn of a dangerous traffic condition. 
First, as noted above, Cameron expressly adopted both the 
reasoning and the conclusions set forth in Flournoy.  (See 
Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 328.)  Flournoy, in turn, made 
clear that its conclusion that design immunity does not 
categorically preclude failure to warn claims was based on the 
two distinct grounds for dangerous conditions liability set forth 
in section 835:  liability for injuries caused by a dangerous 
condition that a public entity created (§ 835, subd. (a)); and 
liability for failing to protect against a dangerous condition of 
which the public entity had notice (id., subd. (b).)  Flournoy 
further reasoned that these two distinct theories of liability 
incorporated the “active” and “passive” theories of negligence 
recognized in the common law.  (See Flournoy, supra, 
275 Cal.App.2d at pp. 810–811.)  Thus, under Flournoy and 
Cameron, section 830.6 immunizes liability for having created a 
dangerous traffic condition under section 835, subdivision (a) (a 
form of active negligence) but does not necessarily immunize 
liability for failing to warn of a known dangerous traffic 
condition under section 835, subdivision (b) (a form of passive 
 
design.  (See id. at p. 600.)  Although decided many years after 
Cameron, the Compton court failed to address our holding in any 
way. 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
negligence).5  This distinction is important because unlike 
claims brought under section 835, subdivision (a), to prevail on 
a claim under subdivision (b), the plaintiff must prove the public 
entity had notice of the dangerous condition.  (See § 835, subds. 
(a), (b); compare Van Alstyne, supra, § 3.17, at p. 208 [“[w]hen 
the alleged basis of entity liability for a dangerous property 
condition is . . . creation of the condition [under § 835, subd. (a)], 
plaintiff is not required to establish . . . notice to the entity”]; 
with id. at § 3.20, p. 212 [when alleged basis of entity liability is 
failure to protect under § 835, subd. (b), plaintiff’s “failure to 
establish . . . notice is fatal to recovery”].)  Accordingly, a 
plaintiff seeking to impose liability for failure to warn of an 
immunized design element must prove the public entity had 
notice that its design resulted in a dangerous condition.  (See, 
e.g., Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 
829 [public entity “could not be liable under section 835, 
subdivision (b)” where “there was no evidence that [it] had notice 
 
5  
The City argues the reasoning of Cameron and Flournoy 
are flawed because they incorporate “common law negligence 
concepts” — namely active versus passive negligence — when 
interpreting public entity liability for dangerous conditions.  The 
City contends this analysis conflicts with subsequent case law 
clarifying that “public entity liability for dangerous property 
conditions must be based on Government Code section 835, 
rather than common law negligence.”  The City’s argument, 
however, overlooks that Cameron and Flournoy’s discussion of 
active and passive negligence was rooted in the statutory 
language of section 835, with subdivision (a) incorporating the 
concept of active negligence and subdivision (b) incorporating 
the concept of  passive negligence.  In other words, Cameron did 
not find that public entities can be held liable for failure to warn 
based on common law principles of active versus passive 
negligence, but rather found that section 835 incorporates those 
common law principles. 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
of the allegedly dangerous condition”]; Anderson, supra, 
65 Cal.App.3d at p. 92 [discussing notice requirement of claims 
arising under section 835, subdivision (b)].) 
Second, while Cameron held that design immunity does 
not categorically preclude claims alleging failure to warn of a 
dangerous traffic condition pursuant to section 835, subdivision 
(b), the decision’s reasoning also makes clear that such claims 
may be subject to a separate, more limited form of statutory 
immunity:  Signage immunity set forth in section 830.8.  That 
provision precludes government liability for failing to provide 
“traffic or warning signals” (§ 830.8), except when “necessary to 
warn of a dangerous condition which would not be reasonably 
apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person 
using the highway with due care” (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at 
p. 327).  As noted above, this exception to signage immunity is 
known as the “concealed trap” exception.  (See ante, at p. 12.)  
Thus, under Cameron, despite the inapplicability of design 
immunity, a plaintiff alleging failure to warn of a dangerous 
traffic condition must nonetheless overcome signage immunity 
by establishing the accident-causing condition was a concealed 
trap. 
Third, Cameron makes clear that to establish liability for 
failing to warn of a dangerous traffic condition that is otherwise 
subject to design immunity, the plaintiff must prove the absence 
of a warning was an “independent, separate, concurring cause 
of the accident.”  (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 329.)  We have 
previously observed that “[i]n cases where concurrent 
independent causes contribute to an injury, we apply the 
‘substantial factor’ test” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. 
Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 352, fn. 12), which 
requires the plaintiff to “show some substantial link or nexus 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
between omission and injury.”  (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 778.)  Thus, if a plaintiff is not able to 
establish that the absence of a warning sign was a substantial 
factor in causing the injury, the claim will fail. 
Finally, we note that while Cameron concluded a public 
entity can be held liable for failing to warn of a dangerous 
roadway feature that was the result of a properly approved 
design, our decision did not address whether design immunity 
might apply if the public entity is able to show that the presence 
or absence of warning signs was part of the approved design.  
The plaintiffs in Cameron specifically alleged that the state’s 
failure to warn was not part of any approved plan (id. at p. 326), 
and they acknowledged in their petition for review that section 
830.6 might apply “where the presence or absence of signs was 
a considered element of the plan or design.”6  In this case, the 
City’s summary judgment motion argued only that section 830.6 
shields public entities from failure to warn claims involving an 
approved feature of the roadway; the City did not argue that the 
evidence offered in support of its design immunity defense 
showed city officials had considered whether to provide a 
warning about the discontinuance of the bike lane.  Thus, as in 
Cameron, we have no occasion to consider, and express no view 
on, how design immunity might affect a failure to warn claim 
when a public entity does produce evidence that it considered 
whether to provide a warning.  
 
6  
We granted Tansavatdi’s request that we take judicial 
notice of the petition for review that the plaintiffs filed in 
Cameron as well as a 1978 Staff Report prepared by the Joint 
Committee on Tort Liability.  That staff report is discussed in 
more detail below.  (See post, at pp. 30–31.) 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
The above discussion illustrates that while Cameron 
generally permits claims for failure to warn of a dangerous 
traffic condition that is subject to design immunity, a plaintiff 
pursuing such a claim must nonetheless prove various elements 
that are not present when pursuing a claim alleging a public 
entity created that dangerous condition:  (1) the public entity 
had actual or constructive notice that the approved design 
resulted in a dangerous condition (see §§ 835, subd. (b) & 835.2 
[defining “notice” within the meaning of § 835, subd. (b)]);  (2) 
the dangerous condition qualified as a concealed trap, i.e., 
“would not [have been] reasonably apparent to, and would not 
have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care”  (§ 
830.8); and (3) the absence of a warning was a substantial factor 
in bringing about the injury. 
2.  Cameron constitutes binding precedent     
Having clarified the breadth of our holding in Cameron, 
we next consider the City’s arguments that Cameron’s 
discussion of failure to warn claims is nonbinding dicta or, 
alternatively, no longer remains good law due to an intervening 
amendment to section 830.6.   
a.  Cameron’s discussion of the plaintiffs’ failure 
to warn claim is not dicta 
The City argues that Cameron’s discussion of the 
plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim is properly construed as 
nonbinding “dictum” insofar as the discussion was only provided 
“ ‘[f]or the guidance of the trial court on remand’ ” in the event 
the state was able to prove on remand that the banking of the 
curve was an approved aspect of the plan.  This argument is 
without merit. 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
We have previously held that “[s]tatements by appellate 
courts ‘responsive to the issues raised on appeal and . . . 
intended to guide the parties and the trial court in resolving the 
matter following . . . remand’ are not dicta.”  (Sonic-Calabasas 
A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1158.)  Cameron 
expressly clarified why we elected to address the failure to warn 
claim at issue in that case, explaining that if the state was able 
to produce evidence showing the banking of the “S” turn was 
part of the approved design, “plaintiffs’ second contention” — 
i.e., their failure to warn claim — “would become determinative 
on the issue of design immunity.”  (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at 
p. 327, fn. 11.)  Under established law, our analysis of the 
plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim is not dicta. 
b.   The 1979 amendments to section 830.6 did not 
abrogate Cameron 
The City next argues that even if Cameron held that 
design immunity does not preclude failure to warn claims, the 
holding is no longer good law in light of amendments the 
Legislature made to section 830.6 in 1979 (seven years after 
Cameron was decided).  Those amendments describe the 
circumstances under which government entities can retain 
design immunity when changed circumstances have rendered 
the original design no longer safe.    
To understand this argument, further background 
discussion regarding the 1979 amendments is necessary.  When 
originally enacted in 1963, section 830.6 did not contain any 
provision explaining whether, once obtained, design immunity 
could ever be lost.  Although we initially interpreted the absence 
of any such provision to mean design immunity continued 
regardless of any subsequent change in conditions (see Cornette, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 69–70 [discussing history of § 830.6]), 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
we overruled those decisions in Baldwin v. State of California 
(1972) 6 Cal.3d 424 (Baldwin), which held that section 830.6’s 
statutory immunity is lost when “the actual operation of the 
plan or design over a period of time and under changed 
circumstances discloses that the design has created a dangerous 
condition of which the entity has notice.”  (Baldwin, at p. 431.)  
In 1979, the Legislature responded to Baldwin by 
adopting Assembly Bill No. 893 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) 
(Assembly Bill 893), which amended section 830.6 to “specify the 
circumstances under which a public entity retains its design 
immunity despite having received notice that the plan or design 
has become dangerous because of a change of physical 
conditions.”  (Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 71.)  Those 
amendments added the following language to section 830.6:  
Notwithstanding 
notice 
that 
constructed 
or 
improved public property may no longer be in 
conformity with [an approved] plan or design . . . , 
the immunity provided by this section shall continue 
for a reasonable period of time sufficient to permit 
the public entity to obtain funds for and carry out 
remedial work necessary to allow such public 
property to be in conformity with [the approved 
plan] . . . .  In the event that the public entity is 
unable to remedy such public property because of 
practical impossibility or lack of sufficient funds, the 
immunity provided by this section shall remain so 
long as such public entity shall reasonably attempt 
to provide adequate warnings of the existence of the 
condition not conforming to the approved plan or 
design or to the approved standard.  (Italics added.) 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
As we discussed in Cornette, the legislative history of Assembly 
Bill 893 makes clear the amendments were intended to both 
codify Baldwin’s conclusion that design immunity can be lost 
due to changed circumstances while also softening the financial 
ramifications of such a rule by allowing public entities “a 
reasonable time to finance and take remedial action or to 
provide adequate warning of the dangerous condition.”  
(Cornette, at p. 72.) 
The City argues the 1979 amendments undermine 
Cameron because the statute now expressly describes the 
limited circumstances under which design immunity does not 
preclude a failure to warn claim:  When the public entity has 
notice that the originally approved plan or design has become 
dangerous because of a change in physical conditions but takes 
no remedial action.  The City contends that because section 
830.6 now specifically states when an entity must warn of the 
dangers associated with a design, Cameron no longer controls.  
The City further contends that the amendments create a conflict 
between Cameron, which holds that design immunity does not 
extend to claims alleging the failure to warn of an approved 
design element, and the statutory language of section 830.6, 
which indicates that a warning is necessary only when changed 
circumstances have rendered the original design dangerous.  In 
the City’s view, because plaintiff has never argued that a change 
in physical conditions rendered the original design of the 
roadway dangerous, any claim for failure to warn necessarily 
fails. 
We are not persuaded.  As noted above, the legislative 
history demonstrates that the 1979 amendments were intended 
to mitigate the financial effects of Baldwin’s holding that design 
immunity can be lost when “the plan or design has become 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
dangerous because of a change of physical conditions.”  
(Cornette, supra,  26 Cal.4th at p. 71, italics added.)  Cameron, 
in contrast, addresses whether design immunity applies to 
failure to warn claims irrespective of changed circumstances.  
Indeed, in the claims at issue in Cameron, there was no 
allegation that the challenged design feature (the banking of the 
turn) had become dangerous as the result of changed physical 
conditions, but rather that the design of the roadway was 
dangerous from its inception, and that a warning would have 
mitigated the problem.  Thus, Cameron allows plaintiffs to seek 
redress for injuries where the public entity has notice that an 
approved design has resulted in a concealed traffic danger and 
a warning would have protected against that danger.  The 1979 
amendments do not speak to that specific situation.   
The legislative history lends clear support to the 
conclusion that the 1979 amendments were unrelated to 
Cameron.  In January 1979, the Joint Committee on Tort 
Liability, chaired by assemblyman John Knox, issued a staff 
report recommending that the Legislature amend section 830.6 
in two distinct ways:  (1) add language to the statute that would 
limit the financial impacts of Baldwin, supra, 6 Cal.3d 424; and 
(2) “obviate[] [Cameron’s] holding” that a public entity can be 
held liable for failing to warn of a dangerous design element 
“even though design immunity may have been applicable.”  
(Joint Com. on Tort Liability, 1978 Staff Report on Tort Liability 
(Jan. 1979) p. 78-257.)   
In the 1979 amendments that followed, however, the 
Legislature made the recommended changes in response to 
Baldwin but took no action to abrogate Cameron.  Indeed, in a 
letter that Assemblyman Knox (who both authored Assembly 
Bill 893 and chaired the Joint Committee on Tort Liability) sent 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
to then Governor Edmund J. Brown, Jr., Knox explained that 
“ ‘[a]lthough the staff of the Joint Committee agreed with 
Baldwin, it felt there should be some recognition of the practical 
limitations which have been imposed upon governments by 
Article XIII A of the California Constitution (Proposition 13) and 
ever increasing liability insurance costs.  This recognition is 
achieved by AB 893.’ ”  (Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 72, 
quoting Assemblyman John T. Knox, letter to Governor 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., re Assem. Bill No. 893, Aug. 30, 1979, 
pp. 1–2; see also Cornette, at p.  72 [“Although referenced 
elsewhere in several legislative analyses, the purpose of the 
[1979 amendment] was best explained by its author 
[Assemblyman Knox] in a letter to the Governor urging him to 
approve it”]; Martin v. Szeto (2004) 32 Cal.4th 445, 450–451 
[statements from a bill’s sponsor “are entitled to consideration 
to the extent they constitute ‘a reiteration of legislative 
discussion and events leading to adoption of proposed 
amendments rather than merely an expression of personal 
opinion’ ”].)  The letter contains no reference to Cameron.  This 
history supports the view that the amendments to section 830.6 
were intended to address how changed circumstances affect 
design immunity, not Cameron’s holding regarding how design 
immunity affects failure to warn claims.7 
 
7  
In an answer brief filed in response to amicus Consumer 
Attorneys of California, the City has also argued that regardless 
of what Cameron may have concluded about design immunity’s 
application to failure to warn claims brought pursuant to section 
835, subdivision (b), our subsequent decision in Cornette, supra, 
26 Cal.4th 63, “squarely held that design immunity” does apply 
to claims arising under subdivision (b).  In support, the City cites 
 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
3. Adherence to stare decisis 
Finally, we address the City’s contention that even if 
Cameron remains binding precedent, we should overrule the 
decision and hold that design immunity precludes any claim 
alleging that a public entity failed to warn of a dangerous 
roadway condition that was reflected in the approved plans.  “It 
is, of course, a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior 
applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the 
case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the 
current justices.”  (Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency 
Formation Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 489, 503–504.)  “Accordingly, 
a party urging us to overrule a precedent faces a rightly onerous 
 
language from Cornette that states:  “Section 835, subdivision 
(b) provides that a public entity is liable for injury . . . caused by 
a dangerous condition of its property if the . . . public entity had 
actual or constructive notice of the condition a sufficient time 
before the injury to have taken preventive measures. . . . [¶]  
However, under section 830.6, the public entity may escape such 
liability by raising the affirmative defense of ‘design 
immunity.’ ”  (Cornette, at pp. 68–69, fn. omitted.)   
Although this isolated passage is arguably in tension with 
some of our discussion in Cameron, we find it notable that 
Cornette did not involve a claim for failure to warn nor did it 
discuss Cameron’s treatment of failure to warn claims.  Instead, 
the plaintiff in Cornette claimed loss of design immunity based 
on changed physical circumstances.  Moreover, Cornette’s brief 
reference to section 835, subdivision (b) was of only marginal 
relevance to the legal issue presented in that case, which was 
whether section 830.6 requires that every element of design 
immunity should be decided by the court rather than the jury.  
(See Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 66–67.)  We find nothing 
in Cornette suggesting that our brief reference to section 835, 
subdivision (b) was intended to modify or otherwise overrule our 
holding in Cameron, which had been binding precedent at that 
time for over thirty years. 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
32 
task.”  (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 288 (Trope); see also 
Kisor, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 2422] [“any departure from [stare 
decisis] demands ‘special justification’ ”].)  That burden is even 
greater where, as here, “ ‘the Court is asked to overrule a point 
of statutory construction.  Considerations of stare decisis have 
special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, 
unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the 
legislative power is implicated, and [the Legislature] remains 
free to alter what we have done.’ ”  (Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 
p. 1213, italics omitted.)   
a. Cameron’s reasoning is not “illogical” 
The City argues we should depart from stare decisis 
because Cameron’s holding is “illogical”  insofar as it takes away 
the very immunity that section 830.6 is intended to provide:  “If 
the improvements at issue would be covered by design 
immunity, and the entity is therefore not liable for injuries 
caused by them, how could it make sense to hold the entity liable 
for the defendant’s failure to warn of the same improvements?  
The injuries would still be caused by the same dangerous 
condition:  the improvements.” 
Contrary to the City’s suggestion, we find nothing  illogical 
in Cameron’s conclusion that while section 830.6 shields public 
entities from liability for the design of the physical features of a 
roadway, those entities retain a duty to warn of known dangers 
that the roadway presents to the public.  At its core, Cameron 
held that if a warning would have “effectually neutralized” 
(Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 329) the risks associated with a 
dangerously designed roadway, the absence of such a warning 
qualifies as an independent cause of the injury.  Stated 
differently, if a warning would have “eliminate[d] the 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
33 
dangerousness” (id. at p. 327) of the approved design, the failure 
to extend such a warning is a distinct cause of the accident that 
is separate from the design itself, and thus not subject to section 
830.6.  That reasoning is evident in Cameron, where the court 
found that the plaintiffs had introduced sufficient evidence to 
support a finding that any danger arising from the design of the 
curve would have been mitigated by a sign that warned drivers 
to slow down their speed.  (See ibid. [“plaintiffs have introduced 
sufficient evidence to show that . . . warning signs . . . , if obeyed 
by the driver, would eliminate the dangerousness from the 
condition of uneven [banking]”]; id. at p. 329 [“if there had been 
proper warning of a dangerous curve and posting of the safe 
speed, the dangerous condition of the highway would have been 
effectually neutralized”].) 
Indeed, Cameron’s conclusion that a government entity 
cannot simply remain silent when it has notice that a reasonably 
approved design presents a danger to the public (see § 830.8),  
closely mirrors how we (and our Legislature) have treated 
design immunity in the context of changed circumstances.  In 
Baldwin, supra, 6 Cal.3d 424, we held that when a public entity 
has notice that changed physical conditions have caused an 
approved design to become dangerous in operation, the entity 
“must act reasonably to correct or alleviate the hazard.”  (Id. at 
p. 434.)  Concluding that design immunity was never intended 
to be “absolute” (id. at p. 433), we explained that while section 
830.6 protects a public entity’s initial design decision, the entity 
nonetheless remains “ ‘under a continuing duty to review its 
plan in the light of its actual operation.’ ”  (Baldwin, at p. 433, 
quoting Weiss v. Fote (N.Y. Ct.App. 1960) 167 N.E.2d 63, 67; see 
Baldwin, at p. 434 [“Having approved the plan or design, the 
governmental entity may not, ostrich-like, hide its head in the 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
34 
blueprints, blithely ignoring the actual operation of the plan”].)  
In response to concerns that permitting the loss of design 
immunity would “forc[e] [public entities] to spend vast sums of 
money 
to 
update 
hazardous 
or 
obsolescent 
public 
improvements” (id. at p. 436), we noted that “[i]n many cases, 
inexpensive remedies, such as warning signs . . . will be 
sufficient” (id. at p. 437).  The Legislature’s subsequent 1979 
amendments to section 830.6 were intended to codify Baldwin’s 
approach to design immunity, while making clear that 
governments can retain immunity by providing a warning in 
lieu of remedying the design defect.  (See ante, at pp. 26–31.)  
While Baldwin and the 1979 amendments addressed how 
design immunity can be retained or lost when changed 
circumstances have rendered an approved design dangerous, 
Cameron’s conclusion that section 830.6 does not bar claims for 
failing to warn of a dangerous design element employs similar 
logic.  Under Cameron’s approach, section 830.6 operates to 
protect a public entity’s discretionary design decisions but does 
not permit it to remain silent when it has notice that an element 
of the road design presents a concealed danger to the public.  
And much like section 830.6’s treatment of loss of design 
immunity, Cameron does not compel public entities to engage in 
costly remediation projects or redesign roadways to avoid the 
danger in question; it merely compels the government to provide 
warnings about dangers of which it has notice.  Stated 
differently, Cameron recognizes that a design might be the best 
engineers can do under the circumstances but still leave 
foreseeable dangers that can and should be addressed through 
appropriate warnings. 
In sum, we find nothing illogical about interpreting 
sections 830.6 and 835 in a manner that compels government 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
35 
entities to provide a warning when they know (or should know) 
that an approved roadway design presents concealed dangers to 
the public.  Indeed, as argued by amicus curiae, “[A] contrary 
rule would effectively allow public entities to withhold . . . 
warnings for known hazards despite [repeated injuries or even 
deaths]. . . .  [I]t [disserves] . . . public policy to allow 
governmental entities to consciously disregard known, ongoing 
hazards to the public.”8 
b. Factors supporting stare decisis 
In addition to Cameron being well reasoned, several other 
factors support application of stare decisis.  Our unanimous 
decision in Cameron is over 50 years old.  (See Trope, supra, 
 
8   
The City also argues that Cameron was poorly reasoned 
insofar as it concluded that the “concealed trap exception” set 
forth in section 830.8’s  signage immunity provision also creates 
an exception to the general rule of design immunity set forth in 
section 830.6.  As stated in the City’s briefing, “To hold that 
section 830.8’s exception to one immunity trumps a different 
and broader immunity is illogical.”  
This 
argument, 
however, 
misconstrues 
Cameron’s 
reasoning as to why design immunity does not categorically 
preclude claims for failure to warn.  As discussed above, we do 
not read Cameron as having concluded that the concealed trap 
exception in section 830.8 also creates an exception to section 
830.6’s design immunity provision.  Instead, Cameron’s holding 
was based on the distinct theories of dangerous conditions 
liability set forth in section 835 subdivision (a) (creating a 
dangerous condition) and subdivision (b) (failing to protect 
against a known dangerous condition).  (See ante, at pp. 15–17, 
21–22.)  Cameron reasoned that while design immunity shields 
public entities from liability for having created a dangerous 
condition (see § 835, subd. (a)), design immunity does not 
necessarily shield such entities from having failed to warn 
against dangerous condition of which it had notice.  (See § 835, 
subd. (b).) 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
36 
11 Cal.4th at p. 288 [citing “age of the precedent” as factor in 
evaluating stare decisis]; People v. Shea (1899) 125 Cal. 151, 
153; see also Woollacott v. Meekin (1907) 151 Cal. 701, 705 
[noting prior opinion was unanimous in applying stare decisis].)  
While some decisions have suggested that design immunity 
continues to preclude most forms of failure to warn claims, the 
weight of authority has long understood Cameron to preserve 
such claims.  (See ante, at pp. 18–21; 9 Witkin, Cal. Proc. (6th 
ed. 2023) Appeal, § 536 [“The long acceptance of a rule by the 
courts, as where it is followed in other cases, . . . is a potent 
argument in favor of allowing it to stand”].)  Moreover, on the 
record before us, there has been no showing that Cameron has 
broadly impacted government liability for dangerous conditions 
or gravely undermined design immunity.  (Cf. Johnson v. 
Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 875 [overruling 
prior precedent that was shown to be “having a broad impact”].)  
That is not particularly surprising given that, as discussed 
above, Cameron leaves in place substantial barriers for parties 
who seek to impose liability for failing to warn of an immunized 
roadway design element.  (See ante, at pp. 21–25.)    
Finally, it bears emphasizing that Cameron involves a 
question of statutory interpretation, 
which leaves the 
Legislature free to abrogate the holding through amendment of 
the Government Claims Act.  (See Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 
p. 1213 [“ ‘Considerations of stare decisis have special force in 
the area of statutory interpretation, for here . . . Congress 
remains free to alter what we have done’ ”]; Halliburton Co. v. 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (2014) 573 U.S. 258, 274.)  The fact 
that the Legislature has never elected to address Cameron is 
particularly persuasive in light of legislative history showing 
that it was directly asked to do so.  As discussed above, that 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
37 
history shows the Legislature previously chose to follow a 
legislative committee’s recommendation to amend section 830.6 
in response to Baldwin, supra, 6 Cal.3d 424, but it declined the 
commission’s further recommendation to amend the statute to 
abrogate Cameron.  (See ante, at pp. 29–31.)  While the City 
correctly notes that “legislative inaction alone does not 
necessarily imply legislative approval” (Latimer, at p. 1213), the 
fact that Cameron was brought to the attention of the 
Legislature, and the Legislature thereafter modified section 
830.6 without addressing Cameron, further bolsters our decision 
to follow the principles of stare decisis.  (See 9 Witkin, Cal. Proc. 
(6th ed. 2023) Appeal, § 537 [“Another justification frequently 
advanced for following a precedent is that . . . the Legislature 
has not seen fit to change it by statute.  [¶] . . . [¶]  Much 
strength is added to this factor where it further appears that the 
Legislature modified or reenacted a statute without changing 
the provision as previously construed”].)  If the Legislature 
ultimately comes to agree with the City that design immunity 
should likewise preclude all claims asserting that the public 
entity failed to warn of dangers resulting from approved 
elements of a roadway design, it can act accordingly.9 
 
9  
The Department of Transportation, acting as amicus 
curiae for the City, notes that courts have interpreted other 
statutory immunities that contain language similar to section 
830.6 to preclude failure to warn claims.  (See, e.g., Arroyo v. 
State of California (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 755, 760 [language in 
§ 831.2 that precludes liability for “an injury caused by a natural 
condition of any unimproved public property” extends to claims 
alleging failure to warn of a dangerous natural condition].)  
Although we decline to overrule Cameron based on the principle 
of stare decisis, we express no opinion whether its reasoning can 
 
TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
38 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is affirmed and the matter 
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
or should be extended to other statutory immunities set forth in 
the Government Code that pertain to dangerous conditions 
liability. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 60 Cal.App.5th 423 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S267453 
Date Filed:  April 27, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Robert Broadbelt III 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Mardirossian & Associates; Mardirossian Akaragian, Garo 
Mardirossian, Armen Akaragian, Adam Feit; The Linde Law Firm, 
Douglas A. Linde, Erica A. Gonzales; Esner, Chang & Boyer, Holly N. 
Boyer, Shea S. Murphy; Ehrlich Law Firm and Jeffrey I. Ehrlich for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Singleton Schreiber McKenzie & Scott and Benjamin I. Siminou for 
Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Wesierski & Zurek, Frank J. D'Oro, David M. Ferrante-Alan; Pollak, 
Vida & Barer, Daniel P. Barer and Anna L. Birenbaum for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
 
Hanson Bridgett, Alexandra V. Atencio, Adam W. Hofmann and David 
C. Casarrubias for League of California Cities, California State 
Association of Counties, California Special Districts Association, 
California Association of Joint Powers Authorities and Independent 
 
 
Cities Risk Management Authority as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Erin E. Hollbrook, Alan M. Steinberg, Joann Georgallis, Judith A. 
Carlson and Brandon S. Walker for California Department of 
Transportation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Jeffrey I. Ehrlich 
Ehrlich Law Firm 
237 West Fourth Street, Second Floor 
Claremont, CA 91711 
(909) 625-5565 
 
Daniel P. Barer 
Pollak, Vida & Barer 
11500 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 400 
Los Angeles, CA 90064 
(310) 551-3400