Case Title: Commonwealth v. Gonzalez

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11411

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11411 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  STEVEN GONZALEZ. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     September 11, 2015. - December 30, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Alibi.  Evidence, Alibi.  Constitutional 
Law, Assistance of counsel.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Assistance of counsel, Instructions to jury, Cross-
examination by prosecutor, Argument by prosecutor, 
Presumptions and burden of proof. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 17, 2008. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Mary-Lou Rup, J., and a motion 
for a new trial, filed on July 22, 2013, was considered by her. 
 
 
 
Joseph A. Hanofee for the defendant. 
 
Deborah D. Ahlstrom, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  At approximately 5 P.M. on October 17, 2008, a 
man approached the victim, Alexander Gautier, and shot him in 
the face at close range with a sawed-off shotgun, killing him.  
A Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of murder in 
2 
 
the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation.1  The 
defendant claims on appeal that he is entitled to a new trial 
because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  He 
contends, first, that his trial attorney called an alibi witness 
to testify in his defense without first interviewing her, which 
resulted in the witness providing testimony contradicting the 
defendant's own alibi testimony.  Second, he contends that his 
attorney should have called certain individuals to testify in 
his defense who witnessed the immediate aftermath of the 
shooting, and whose testimony would have created a reasonable 
doubt regarding the identification of him as the shooter.  We 
conclude that these alleged errors were not "likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion."  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 
411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  We 
therefore affirm the defendant's convictions. 
 
Background.  The evidence supported the following facts.  
The victim had controlled the sale of narcotics in the low-rise 
apartment buildings in the area of 244-266 Locust Street in 
Springfield, but left for Puerto Rico when a warrant issued for 
his arrest.  In the victim's absence, Sammy Ramos (Sammy), a 
                                                          
 
 
1 The jury also found the defendant guilty on indictments 
charging illegal possession of a sawed-off shotgun and of 
ammunition.  The jury found the defendant not guilty of illegal 
possession of a shotgun, after the judge instructed the jury 
that a shotgun is defined as a weapon with a barrel length equal 
to or greater than eighteen inches. 
3 
 
friend who operated an automobile dealership on Locust Street, 
took over the drug business on the block, and permitted others 
to sell drugs there, including two brothers, both named Jose 
Rodriguez.  Also during the victim's absence, Jasson Gonzalez 
(Jasson) began selling drugs on the block without Sammy's 
permission and had other individuals, including Miguel Angel 
Nieves (known as Mikey), selling drugs for him.  On October 17, 
2008, the victim returned to Springfield and made clear his 
intent to regain control of his drug territory.  At 
approximately noon, the victim met with Sammy at the dealership 
and stated his interest in meeting with the people who had been 
selling drugs in his territory without permission. 
 
The defendant was a heroin addict who supported his drug 
habit by theft, begging, and occasionally washing and detailing 
vehicles for Sammy at the dealership.  He lived with his girl 
friend, Daneris Rivera (Daneris), in an apartment at 258 Locust 
Street.  While the victim was still at Sammy's dealership in the 
early afternoon, the victim spoke to the defendant in Sammy's 
presence.  The victim told the defendant that he had to "stop 
stealing from the neighbors" or leave. 
 
Julia Rojas (Julia) is the former girl friend of Sammy's 
brother, and Sammy describes her as "like a daughter" to him.  
At approximately 4:30 P.M., Julia saw the defendant, whom she 
knew, speaking with Jasson and Mikey on the rear porch of the 
4 
 
apartment building at 258 Locust Street.  Shortly before 5 P.M., 
the victim and Sammy walked from the dealership to the area 
behind 258 Locust Street, accompanied by the two Rodriguez 
brothers.  Once they arrived, Sammy told Mikey to get Jasson so 
they could talk.  The six men -- the victim, Sammy, the two 
Rodriguez brothers, Jasson, and Mikey -- began talking while 
standing in a semicircle on the pavement behind 258 Locust 
Street. 
 
Julia was on the third-floor porch overlooking the back of 
258 Locust Street, saw Sammy on the pavement with the others, 
and walked down the back stairs towards him.  As she approached, 
she saw the defendant walk behind her wearing a black hooded 
sweatshirt and a mask.  Sammy, who was standing next to the 
victim, also saw the defendant walk behind Julia and approach 
the group.  As the defendant approached, Sammy saw him pull up a 
handkerchief from around his neck to cover his face.  Once he 
reached the group, he pulled out a sawed-off shotgun and fired a 
single shot at the victim's face at close range, killing him.  
After the shotgun blast, Jasson, Mikey, and the Rodriguez 
brothers immediately scattered.  Sammy testified that the 
defendant then pointed the shotgun at Sammy, who had fallen next 
to the victim, and told him, "This is not with you."2  The 
                                                          
 
 
2 Julia Rojas had a slightly different recollection.  She 
testified that, after the defendant had shot the victim in the 
5 
 
defendant then attempted to enter the first-floor apartment at 
258 Locust Street, without success, and ran towards 244 Locust 
Street. 
 
After the shooting, both Sammy and Julia gave statements to 
the police.  Julia described what had occurred, identified the 
defendant as the shooter, and provided a description of the 
shotgun used in the attack.  She also told the police that she 
saw the defendant run in the direction of 244 Locust Street and 
thought he might hide there because the apartment building was 
abandoned.  That night, after receiving the information provided 
by Julia, the police recovered a twelve-gauge sawed-off shotgun 
inside an incinerator just outside the basement of 244 Locust 
Street.  After the police brought the shotgun back to the 
station, Julia identified it as the one used by the shooter. 
 
The shotgun was recovered with a spent shell partially 
ejected from the chamber and four unfired shells in the 
magazine.3  The shotgun, the spent shell, and the unfired shells 
were swabbed to collect any deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence 
that may have been left on those items.  The criminalist who 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
face, he pointed the gun at Sammy Ramos (Sammy), and she heard a 
sound like a firework that lights up but does not explode.  The 
defendant then told Sammy, "Don't worry, this is not your day." 
 
 
3 State police Sergeant Thomas Murphy, a firearms examiner, 
testified that the sawed-off shotgun could not load another 
shell using its pump action in the ordinary manner because the 
shotgun had been modified incorrectly. 
6 
 
swabbed the shotgun used two swabs, each of which was used to 
swab the stock, the grip, and the trigger of the shotgun.4  As 
part of their investigation, law enforcement obtained DNA 
samples of the defendant, the victim, and Jasson.  The swabs 
from the shotgun were found to contain a mixture of two or more 
persons' DNA with the defendant matching the major profile of 
that mixture; the victim and Jasson were excluded as potential 
sources of the minor profile.5  The swabs from the unfired shells 
also contained a mixture of two or more contributors with Jasson 
matching the major profile.6  There was insufficient DNA to make 
a determination as to the minor profile on the unfired shells. 
 
During the autopsy of the victim, the medical examiner 
recovered plastic wadding from a shotgun shell and lead 
fragments from the victim's brain.  The diameter of the wadding 
was consistent with the wadding that would be used in a twelve-
                                                          
 
 
4 As a result, the presence of a person's deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA) on any one of those surfaces would indicate that the 
person touched the shotgun, but would not reveal which of those 
surfaces he or she touched. 
 
 
5 The statistical probability of a randomly selected person 
matching the major profile of the DNA found on the shotgun is 
one in 4.312 billion for Caucasians, one in 3.784 billion for 
African-Americans, one in 2.486 billion for Hispanics, and one 
in 2.958 billion for Asians. 
 
 
6 The statistical probability of a randomly selected person 
matching the major profile of the DNA found on the unfired 
shells is one in 5.252 billion for Caucasians, one in 2.827 
billion for African-Americans, one in 680.7 million for 
Hispanics, and one in 2.22288 billion for Asians. 
7 
 
gauge shotgun shell.  The lead fragments were consistent with a 
shell containing a one-ounce slug, which can only be fired by a 
twelve-gauge shotgun. 
 
At trial, the defendant offered an alibi defense.  In 
support of that alibi, the defendant called Carol Adorno, who 
lived with the defendant's oldest sister at the time of the 
shooting.  Adorno testified that the defendant arrived at her 
house at approximately 3:30 P.M. on the day of the shooting and 
remained there "until the nighttime," except that the defendant 
and Adorno's husband briefly left to retrieve the defendant's 
girl friend's vehicle, which had broken down.  Adorno also 
testified that she took a photograph of the defendant with his 
niece while in her house sometime after dark.7  The photograph 
was admitted in evidence, but it had no date or time indicating 
when it was taken. 
 
After Adorno testified, the defendant testified in his 
defense.  The defendant told the jury that, on the day of the 
shooting, he helped his girl friend, Daneris, pack her 
belongings because she was being evicted from her apartment at 
258 Locust Street.  He then drove with her to a storage facility 
in Connecticut to store her belongings; he could not recall 
which city or town he traveled to in Connecticut.  When he was 
                                                          
 
 
7 There was testimony that it was getting dark at 6:30 P.M. 
on the day of the shooting. 
8 
 
driving back from Connecticut, the defendant received a 
telephone call from Mikey saying that he "better not come to the 
block" because "they were saying" that he had killed the victim, 
and "what [he] did was wrong."  After receiving this news, the 
defendant and his girl friend had an argument "about money [and] 
drugs," and he stopped the vehicle in West Springfield and 
walked to Adorno's house, arriving there a few minutes before it 
got dark.8  At Adorno's house, he ate, had a "good time with the 
family," and thought about what he was going to do because he 
feared they would "jump" him if he returned to Locust Street.  
He then "went back to some spot to get some drugs," and the next 
day left for Syracuse, New York, where he stayed at his cousin's 
house. 
 
On cross-examination, the defendant testified that he saw 
the shotgun recovered by police the day before the shooting, 
when he was washing a vehicle at the dealership and Sammy asked 
the defendant to move the shotgun from the trunk of one vehicle 
to another vehicle.  He explained that his handling of the 
shotgun on the day prior to the shooting must have been how DNA 
matching his profile was recovered from the weapon. 
 
After being challenged about the timing of his travel to 
Connecticut and the location of the storage facility on cross-
                                                          
 
 
8 The defendant testified that he "broke" the vehicle when 
he stopped it because he "threw the gear from drive to park 
without pressing the brake." 
9 
 
examination, the defendant's recollection was refreshed by a 
receipt from the storage facility.  The receipt, in Daneris's 
name, reflected a transaction at a storage facility in Suffield, 
Connecticut, at 5:18 P.M. on the day of the shooting. 
 
After his convictions, the defendant moved for a new trial, 
making the same claims he makes on direct appeal.9  The trial 
judge denied the motion in a carefully considered memorandum of 
decision without an evidentiary hearing. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The 
defendant, represented by new counsel on appeal, claims that he 
was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance 
of counsel for two reasons.  First, he argues that his trial 
attorney failed to interview Adorno before putting her on the 
witness stand and therefore failed to recognize that her alibi 
testimony would contradict that of the defendant.  Second, he 
contends that his trial attorney failed to call two witnesses to 
testify who would have offered new evidence regarding the 
immediate aftermath of the shooting that would have raised a 
reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was the shooter.  
Because we review a conviction of murder in the first degree 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and because "the statutory standard 
of § 33E is more favorable to a defendant than is the 
                                                          
 
 
9 The defendant also faulted his trial counsel for not 
requesting a jury instruction on intoxication, but he does not 
pursue that claim on appeal. 
10 
 
constitutional standard for determining the ineffectiveness of 
counsel," we "need not focus on the adequacy of trial counsel's 
performance" in reviewing such claims but rather "consider 
whether there was an error in the course of the trial (by 
defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there 
was, whether that error was likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion."  Wright, 411 Mass. at 682.  See Commonwealth v. 
Riley, 467 Mass. 799, 807-808 (2014). 
 
a.  Alibi testimony.  In an affidavit submitted with the 
defendant's motion for a new trial, Adorno attested that she was 
not interviewed by trial counsel before she testified, that she 
made no written statement, and that "[n]o one" (including, 
implicitly, a defense investigator) had asked her the questions 
she was asked at trial.  The defendant also submitted an 
affidavit from trial counsel in which counsel did not address 
whether he or a defense investigator had questioned Adorno 
before she testified, but attested only that he "did not have a 
tactical or a strategic reason for putting on an alibi defense 
in which the alibi witnesses . . . gave contradictory 
testimony."  Because Adorno's affidavit was uncontradicted and 
because there was no evidentiary hearing, we assume the truth of 
Adorno's assertions for purposes of this appeal and conclude 
that defense counsel erred in calling Adorno to testify as an 
alibi witness without knowing what she would say. 
11 
 
 
In determining whether that error "was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion," Wright, 411 Mass. at 682, we 
note that the only evidence offered in support of the 
defendant's alibi was the testimony of the defendant and Adorno.  
Thus, we consider whether the credibility of the defendant's 
testimony would have been materially stronger had defense 
counsel interviewed Adorno before trial and decided to forgo 
offering her testimony.  There is no question that Adorno's 
testimony provided the defendant with an alibi that was 
materially different from and inconsistent with the defendant's 
alibi testimony.  Adorno testified that the defendant was at her 
home from approximately 3:30 P.M. until after sunset.  The 
defendant testified that he was with his girl friend in 
Connecticut at or around the time of the shooting, that he 
learned about the shooting when he was driving back from 
Connecticut, and that he did not arrive at Adorno's house until 
shortly before nightfall.  The prosecutor noted the 
contradiction in his closing argument:  "So he's in Connecticut 
with his girlfriend at 5:01, and he's at Carol Adorno's house at 
3:00.  Which is it?" 
 
But we agree with the motion judge's conclusion that 
defense counsel's decision to call Adorno to testify was not 
likely to have influenced the jury's verdict because the 
defendant's alibi, had it stood alone, was "unsupported, lacking 
12 
 
in credibility, and at odds with the significant evidence 
pointing to him as [the] person who shot [the victim]."  The 
only corroboration of the defendant's alibi was the receipt -- 
referenced in the defendant's testimony but not admitted in 
evidence -- reflecting a transaction at a storage facility in 
Suffield, Connecticut, at 5:18 P.M. on the day of the shooting.  
That receipt, however, bore the name of Daneris, not the 
defendant, and the defendant offered no testimony from anyone at 
the storage facility to corroborate that Daneris was not there 
alone.  Nor did the defendant call Daneris, the person he 
claimed he was with at the time of the shooting, to testify in 
support of his alibi.10 
 
Also, the defendant's testimony that he learned of the 
shooting from Mikey while driving back from Connecticut was a 
double-edged sword, because he recalled that Mikey accused him 
of committing the killing ("what you did was wrong").  Yet, 
Sammy and Julia both placed Mikey in the semicircle of persons 
speaking with the victim at the time of the shooting, so 
presumably he would have had firsthand knowledge of the identity 
of the shooter. 
                                                          
 
 
10 The defendant does not contend that his trial attorney 
was ineffective for failing to call Daneris Rivera to testify.  
Nor, based on our review of the record pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, do we see any factual support for such a claim. 
13 
 
 
Further, his explanation as to how his DNA got on the 
shotgun strained credulity.  When questioned by police after his 
arrest in Syracuse, he was asked about his possession of a 
shotgun and said nothing about Sammy asking him to move a 
shotgun from one vehicle to another at the dealership.  When 
asked at trial why he had failed to mention this to the police, 
he answered that he did not do so because the police asked 
whether he had possessed a shotgun on the day of the shooting, 
not whether he possessed one on other days.11 
 
Nor did the defendant's testimony persuasively support the 
argument of defense counsel that Sammy had solicited someone 
else to kill the victim so that Sammy could continue to control 
the drug operation in the neighborhood.  To counter the 
eyewitness identifications by Sammy and Julia, both of whom knew 
the defendant well and were within a few feet of the shooter, 
defense counsel contended that Sammy had planned in advance to 
falsely accuse the defendant of the crime by causing him to 
touch the murder weapon and by causing Julia to join Sammy in 
falsely identifying the defendant as the shooter.  Yet, the 
defendant offered no testimony regarding any acrimony between 
Sammy and him that would have caused Sammy to plan to frame him. 
                                                          
 
 
11 The Commonwealth chose not to offer testimony in its 
case-in-chief regarding the defendant's interrogation after his 
arrest in Syracuse, New York.  The jury learned of it only 
because the defendant spoke of it during his testimony. 
14 
 
 
In short, although Adorno's contradictory alibi testimony 
likely diminished the credibility of the defendant's alibi, we 
are convinced that Adorno's testimony did not likely influence 
the jury's verdict.  Given the strength of the Commonwealth's 
evidence -- Sammy and Julia identified the defendant as the 
shooter, the defendant's DNA was consistent with the DNA found 
on the apparent murder weapon, and the defendant fled the day 
after the shooting to Syracuse -- the defendant's testimony, had 
it stood alone, was not likely to have been regarded as 
sufficiently credible to create a reasonable doubt regarding the 
defendant's guilt. 
 
b.  Failure to call witnesses.  The defendant claims that 
his counsel was ineffective for failing to call two witnesses:  
Julio Marcano and Springfield police Officer Daniel Brunton. 
 
In a statement to police, Marcano said that he lived in 
Springfield in a residence that abutted the rear of 258 Locust 
Street.  He recalled that he was working in his backyard and 
speaking on the telephone to a friend on October 17, 2008, when 
he heard a gunshot from the other side of his fence.  He ended 
the telephone call with his friend and telephoned 911, noting 
the time as 5 P.M. exactly.  He spoke with one person who 
answered the 911 call and then was transferred to another 
person.  While describing what he had heard to the dispatcher, 
he pulled a chair up to his fence and looked over into the rear 
15 
 
of 258 Locust Street.  He stated that, about twenty-five feet 
away, he saw one "Spanish guy" lying on the ground bleeding from 
his head and three "Spanish" people, including one female, 
walking east away from the body.  At that moment, he noticed 
another "Spanish guy" walking "real fast" away from the body.  
Marcano thought that this person was involved in the shooting 
because he looked "real nervous" and "wanted to get out of 
there."  That person walked up the back stairs to one of the 
buildings, pushed aside a group of people on the second-floor 
porch, and went into an apartment.  The man looked to be in his 
early thirties, was dark skinned, and had short hair pulled into 
a small ponytail.12  Marcano declared in a subsequent affidavit 
that he looked over his fence approximately sixty seconds after 
he heard the gunshot. 
 
Officer Brunton arrived at the crime scene in the moments 
after the shooting, and he authored a "Forced Door Report" 
regarding what happened.  According to that report, when he and 
two other officers arrived at the rear of 258 Locust Street, the 
officers were told by an unidentified person that the shooter 
had fled into a particular apartment at 252 Locust Street.  
Officer Brunton and four fellow officers went up the rear stairs 
to that apartment, and while they remained outside the rear 
                                                          
 
 
12 The defendant was described as having "light colored 
skin" and a "fade" haircut, apparently without a ponytail. 
16 
 
door, one of his fellow officers saw two Hispanic males inside 
the kitchen.  When Officer Brunton knocked on the door, the two 
men fled the apartment.  Officer Brunton then forced open the 
rear door of the apartment, but the officers were unable to 
locate the two individuals.  Mikey and Awilda Nieves lived in 
that apartment, but they were already outside the building when 
this occurred, and they reported that no one else had a key to 
their apartment. 
 
Trial counsel submitted an affidavit in support of the 
motion for a new trial in which he stated that he did not have a 
tactical or strategic reason for not calling Marcano or Brunton.  
We need not decide whether counsel was ineffective for not 
having called these witnesses to testify, because we agree with 
the trial judge that their testimony would not likely have 
influenced the jury's verdict. 
 
Although Marcano's testimony would have differed to some 
degree from the testimony of the Commonwealth's witnesses 
regarding the events immediately following the shooting, it 
would not have directly contradicted the identification of the 
defendant as the shooter.  Marcano did not see the shooting and 
did not see anyone holding a firearm.  Marcano saw a man walking 
"real fast" away from the site of the shooting approximately 
sixty seconds after the shot was fired, but the testimony of the 
other witnesses established that, apart from the victim, at 
17 
 
least five men and one woman were at the scene of the shooting.  
Because the victim had just been shot in the face at close range 
with a sawed-off shotgun in a drug-related shooting, there could 
be many reasons why a man other than the shooter would walk 
quickly and appear nervous in fleeing the scene.  Where Marcano 
estimated that approximately sixty seconds had passed since the 
shot was fired and where Marcano did not observe the fleeing man 
to be carrying a firearm, there is little reason why a 
reasonable jury would have inferred that the fleeing man was the 
shooter.  Therefore, the fact that the description of the 
fleeing man did not match the defendant's appearance would not 
likely have influenced the jury's verdict.  See Commonwealth v. 
Britto, 433 Mass. 596, 602-603 (2001) (failure to call witnesses 
did not prejudice defendant where impact of those witnesses 
would be "marginal at best"). 
 
Turning to Officer Brunton, even if he were allowed to 
testify to all that he wrote in his report, the evidence he 
would have offered would not have been inconsistent with the 
defendant being the shooter.  There was evidence that Jasson, 
Mikey, and the defendant each had reason to be unhappy about the 
victim's return and his intent to regain control of drug 
distribution in the Locust Street neighborhood.  Because the 
defendant was seen with Jasson and Mikey shortly before the 
shooting, evidence that two Hispanic males had fled to Mikey's 
18 
 
apartment, and later escaped when the police arrived, would be 
consistent with the inference that the defendant and Jasson ran 
to Mikey's apartment after the defendant shot the victim.  We 
acknowledge that Julia testified that, if the defendant had run 
towards 252 Locust Street, she "would have seen him because you 
can see all of it from the porch."  But where Sammy testified 
that the defendant unsuccessfully tried to enter an apartment at 
258 Locust Street immediately after the shooting, where Julia 
testified that she saw the defendant run in the direction of 244 
Locust Street, and where 252 Locust Street is located between 
244 and 258 Locust Street, we are convinced that, if the 
defendant were to have placed in evidence all the information 
contained in Officer Brunton's report, its admission would not 
likely have affected the jury's verdict.  See Britto, supra. 
 
2.  Remaining claims.  The defendant claims that various 
errors were made by the prosecutor and judge.  None were 
preserved by a contemporaneous objection, so we review to 
determine whether any created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Penn, 472 
Mass. 610, 625-626 (2015). 
 
a.  Alibi instruction.  The defendant did not request an 
alibi instruction and did not object to its omission after the 
judge instructed the jury.  Nonetheless, the defendant argues on 
appeal that the failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury 
19 
 
regarding an alibi defense sua sponte resulted in a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  We disagree. 
 
"When evaluating jury instructions, 'we consider the charge 
in its entirety, to determine the "probable impact, appraised 
realistically . . . upon the jury's factfinding function."'"  
Commonwealth v. Walker, 466 Mass. 268, 284 (2013), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Batchelder, 407 Mass. 752, 759 (1990).  "[I]t is 
well settled that an 'alibi instruction is not required where 
the charge as a whole makes clear that the Commonwealth must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he was indicted.'"  Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 
Mass. 590, 614 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Thomas, 439 Mass. 
362, 371 (2003).  Here, the trial judge repeatedly emphasized in 
her instructions that the Commonwealth bore the burden of 
proving every element of each charged crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In particular, the judge specifically instructed the 
jury on evaluating eyewitness identifications and informed the 
jury that "the prosecutor must have proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt the identity of [the defendant] as the perpetrator of the 
offenses with which he has been charged."  There was no danger 
that the jury believed that they could convict the defendant 
even if they found him not to be present at the scene of the 
shooting, and thus there was no substantial likelihood of a 
20 
 
miscarriage of justice due to the failure specifically to 
furnish the jury with an alibi instruction. 
 
b.  Burden of proof.  The defendant claims that the judge 
in her final instructions shifted to the defendant the burden of 
creating reasonable doubt that he was the shooter by giving the 
following instruction: 
"It is important that you understand that unlike inferences 
that may be used in proving guilt, inferences which create 
some doubt about whether a person committed a crime do not 
have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  If an 
inference you draw from the evidence in this case creates a 
reasonable doubt in your mind as to any element of a crime 
charged or whether the defendant . . . committed that 
offense, then you must return a verdict of not guilty on 
that particular offense." 
 
This instruction made clear to the jury that an inference that 
creates a reasonable doubt is sufficient to find the defendant 
not guilty; the inference negating guilt need not be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  No reasonable jury would understand 
this instruction to shift the burden of proof to the defendant.  
Moreover, as noted earlier, the trial judge made repeated 
references in her charge to the prosecution's burden to prove 
each and every element of the charged crimes, including when she 
commenced her instruction regarding inferences.  The defendant's 
claim is without merit. 
 
c.  References to the defendant's pretrial confinement.  
The defendant contends that the prosecutor's questions during 
his cross-examination of the defendant that referred to the 
21 
 
defendant's pretrial confinement created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  The prosecutor asked 
the defendant whether he telephoned Daneris after he had been 
arrested, and whether she visited him or received calls from him 
while he was in jail.13  When called to sidebar, defense counsel 
stated that he did not object because he did not want to call 
attention to the defendant's confinement.  The judge immediately 
                                                          
 
 
13 In relevant part, the questioning went as follows before 
the judge sua sponte stopped the exchange and called counsel to 
sidebar: 
 
Q.: "Did you call her after you got arrested on this 
case?" 
 
A.: "No." 
 
Q.: "You didn't call her from the jail from Syracuse?" 
 
A.: "From Syracuse?" 
 
Q.: "Yeah." 
 
A.: "I don't recall that.  I can't tell you." 
 
. . . 
 
Q.: "She doesn't come visit you at the jail?" 
 
A.: "No.  That's my girlfriend right there.  I'm not with 
that lady no more." 
 
Q.: "How long has it been since you've no longer been with 
Daneris?" 
 
A.: "I don't know.  Months.  A year.  Over a year." 
 
Q.: "When was the last time she visited you at the jail?" 
 
A.: "She wanted to see me --" 
22 
 
instructed the jury that they were to "disregard any questions 
that were asked about any type of visits to the jail. . . .  
This has nothing to do with this case, and you're not to 
conclude anything from that or take that into account in any 
way." 
 
There is no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  The references to the defendant's confinement were 
brief, and suggested that he was in custody awaiting trial on 
the pending murder charge, not that he had been convicted of 
other unrelated crimes.  See United States v. Deandrade, 600 
F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1102 (2010) 
(holding that "a brief and fleeting comment on the defendant's 
incarceration during trial, without more, does not impair the 
presumption of innocence").  Moreover, immediately after the 
final reference to the defendant's pretrial confinement, the 
judge instructed the jury that they were to disregard the 
references and not to take them into account in any way.  Jurors 
are presumed to follow such instructions.  See Commonwealth v. 
Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 195 (2010). 
 
d.  Burden shifting.  The defendant argues that the 
prosecutor in his cross-examination of the defendant and again 
in closing argument suggested that the burden was on the 
defendant to produce a witness who would corroborate his alibi.  
As to the cross-examination of the defendant regarding his 
23 
 
contact with Daneris and his knowledge of her whereabouts, the 
questioning was proper because it was apparent from the 
defendant's testimony that Daneris could be the key witness to 
corroborate his alibi testimony, and the prosecutor was entitled 
to attempt to elicit the factual predicates required for a 
missing witness instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Rollins, 441 
Mass. 114, 117-118 (2004).  After the prosecutor asked whether 
the defendant knew of Daneris's whereabouts and inquired when 
the defendant had last seen her, he ended that line of 
questioning.  Any inference that the defendant had an obligation 
to call Daneris as a witness was cured by the judge's 
instructions regarding the burden of proof, which made clear 
that the prosecutor bore the burden of proving the identity of 
the defendant as the perpetrator of the shooting beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
The defendant also argues that the prosecutor in closing 
argument shifted the burden to the defendant to establish that 
he was not the shooter.14  Viewed in the context of the 
                                                          
 
 
14 The defendant rests this argument on the following 
statements in the prosecutor's closing argument: 
 
"So what does he do?  Does he come forward and say, Hey, I 
was in Connecticut.  I couldn't have possibly been there.  
And . . . , by the way, he told the police he was in 
Hartford.  And he told you from the stand that he was 
somewhere else and he had to look at the receipt in order 
to remember what that city was.  Why?  Because he wasn't 
there.  Because if he were there, wouldn't it be a surefire 
24 
 
prosecutor's entire closing argument, a reasonable jury would 
understand the prosecutor to be challenging the credibility of 
the defendant's alibi by focusing on the defendant's motivation 
to create a false alibi.  Although the prosecutor carelessly 
told the jury that the defendant "needs to bring a witness to 
you," this isolated statement did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice by suggesting that the 
defendant bore the burden of presenting an alibi, particularly 
in light of the judge's instructions on that point. 
 
Conclusion.  We have reviewed the entire record of the case 
pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and find no just 
reason to exercise our authority to order a new trial or to 
reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree.  The order 
denying the motion for a new trial is affirmed, and the 
judgments of conviction are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
alibi that at 5:01 P.M. on October 17th of 2008 he was in 
the city in Connecticut helping his girlfriend unload some 
boxes?  What more do you need? . . .  And what does he do?  
He needs to bring a witness to you, Carol Adorno who is a 
friend of his sister's who brings in a photograph that he 
puts into evidence.  And what does she say?  He was at my 
house.  I got home at 3:00 that day, could have been 3:30, 
but I certainly remember it was 3:00, and he was there 
until way past 7:50 when that picture was taken.  His 
words, I can't be at two places at the same time.  So he's 
in Connecticut with his girlfriend at 5:01, and he's at 
Carol Adorno's house at 3:00.  Which is it?"