Case Title: Rivera v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 50776

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rivera v. State1993 WY 3846 P.2d 1Case Number: 91-223Decided: 01/07/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Calik RIVERA, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee(Plaintiff).

Dissenting 
Opinion of Justice Urbigkit January 
25, 1993.

Appeal from District 
Court, Teton 
County, D. Terry Rogers, 
J.

Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Director (argued), Defender Aid Program, and Donald L. Fuller, Student 
Director, Laramie, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Mary Beth Wolff, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for 
appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and URBIGKIT, J. 
Ret.*

* Chief Justice 
at time of oral argument; retired January 
1, 1993.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Calik Rivera appeals 
his conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, 
in violation of W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (1988). Most of his challenges center on 
the propriety of the reverse sting operation which led to his conviction. He 
also challenges the transactional immunity given to a witness who testified 
against him. Finding no error in the issues he presents, we 
affirm.

[¶2.]     Appellant states the 
issues as follows:

I. Whether the trial 
court erred in instructing the jury on the entrapment issue based upon the 
assumption that Wyoming had adopted the 
subjective theory as the sole rationale for the entrapment 
defense?

II. Whether the trial 
court erred in denying defendant's motions to dismiss on the grounds of the 
objective theory or due process where the evidence of the prosecution 
demonstrated the police creation of crime, an overzealousness in developing 
cases, and the disregard of state statutes and 
regulations?

III. Whether the 
conviction of the appellant must be reversed because it was obtained by the 
police violating applicable statutes and regulations forbidding the importation 
and transfer of contraband except in the course of the investigation of ongoing 
crime?

IV. Whether testimony 
produced pursuant to a grant of transactional immunity in disregard of 
applicable statutes was critical to the prosecution's case and its wrongful 
admission requires reversal?

[¶3.]     The State adds one 
issue for our consideration:

Whether appellant has 
standing to challenge the grant of immunity to Frank 
Compton?

[¶4.]     Appellant was 
apprehended as part of an undercover "reverse sting" operation in which Jackson, 
Wyoming police officers sold marijuana to persons they had targeted as drug 
dealers. To conduct the operation, the officers obtained about 100 pounds of 
marijuana from the Colorado 
Springs, Colorado police department.  They placed the marijuana in a motel 
room at the 49'er Motel in Jackson and set up a video 
camera and a hard wire microphone for surveillance in an adjoining 
room.

[¶5.]     To lure suspects into 
the motel room to make purchases, the police employed an informant named Frank 
Compton. Compton, a drug addict, had been arrested after attempting to 
unlawfully obtain cough syrup with codeine at two drug stores in 
Jackson. After his arrest, 
Compton agreed to help ferret 
out drug traffic in Jackson in exchange for having 
the charges against him dropped. As part of his duties for the police, 
Compton was to introduce 
suspected dealers to undercover officers.

[¶6.]     Acting under police 
supervision, Compton introduced undercover 
officer John Bowers to appellant at appellant's residence.  Appellant agreed to meet Officer Bowers 
and Frank Compton at the 49'er Motel to transact a drug deal. At the motel, 
Bowers, posing as a drug dealer, offered three pounds of marijuana to appellant 
for $800.00 a pound. This was $400.00 per pound less than the going rate. 
Appellant had only $1,350.00, so Bowers agreed to "front" him another $1,150.00 
worth of marijuana, for a total of three pounds.1 The two men exchanged the money and 
marijuana, and appellant left the motel room. Appellant was apprehended shortly 
thereafter with the marijuana.

Failure to Instruct on 
Objective Theory of Entrapment

[¶7.]     In his first issue, 
appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed 
to instruct the jury on an objective, as well as subjective, theory of 
entrapment. He assigns as error the omission of the following requested 
statement from the jury instruction on entrapment:

[E]ntrapment occurs only 
when the criminal conduct was the product of the creative activity of the law 
enforcement officials. It does not arise if one is ready to commit the offense 
given but the opportunity.

[¶8.]     The subjective theory 
of entrapment focuses on a particular defendant's intent or predisposition to 
commit the crime charged, while the objective theory focuses on the effect of 
the State's tactics on the hypothetical "reasonable law-abiding citizen."  See LaFleur v. State, 533 P.2d 309, 314 
(Wyo. 1975); Sorrells v. 
United 
States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S. Ct. 210, 77 L. Ed. 413, 86 A.L.R. 249 (1932) (subjective theory); 
United 
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 439, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 
1646, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1973) (objective approach advocated by Stewart, J., 
dissenting).  See also Laura Gardner 
Webster, Building a Better Mousetrap: Reconstructing Federal Entrapment Theory 
from Sorrells to Matthews, 32 Ariz.L.Rev. 605, 607 (1990).

[¶9.]     The language appellant 
requested can be found in our entrapment cases. See e.g., Noetzelmann v. State, 
721 P.2d 579, 581 (Wyo. 1986). However, it is 
not "objective theory" language, as appellant claims. Although the first of the 
two statements appellant requested mentions the "creative activity of law 
enforcement officials," it does not adopt the objective theory.  Even in subjective theory, there is a 
threshold question whether the police merely offered the defendant an 
opportunity to commit the crime or whether they somehow induced the defendant to 
act illegally. Once it has been determined that inducement is involved, the 
defendant's predisposition comes into question.  This first sentence merely restates the 
threshold question of the subjective inquiry. Its origin is 
Sherman v. 
United 
States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S. Ct. 819, 2 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1958), a case which took the subjective view of entrapment. See 
Dycus v. State, 529 P.2d 979, 981 (Wyo. 
1974).

[¶10.]  The second sentence which appellant 
requested actually concerns predisposition, and so it is difficult to understand 
how it could support the objective theory. In fact, both sentences are standard, 
subjective entrapment language. Even had they been included, they would not have 
presented the objective theory of entrapment to the jury. In any case, appellant 
was not entitled to present that theory, because we do not recognize the 
objective theory of entrapment in Wyoming.2

[¶11.]  A review of our past cases on this 
subject shows that Wyoming follows the subjective 
approach to entrapment. See Noetzelmann, 721 P.2d  at 581; Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1102 (Wyo. 1983) (Rose, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, cert. granted, 
opinion modified and remanded, 707 P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1985); Janski v. State, 538 P.2d 271, 274-76 (Wyo. 1975); Dycus, 529 P.2d at 980-81; Montez v. State, 527 P.2d 1330, 1331-32 (Wyo. 1974); Jackson v. State, 522 P.2d 1286, 1288-89 (Wyo. 
1974); Higby v. State, 485 P.2d 380, 384 (Wyo. 1971). See also W. Michael 
Kleppinger, Note, Criminal Procedure - The Entrapment Defense - The 
Determination of Predisposition. Janski v. State, 538 P.2d 271 
(Wyo. 1975), XI Land and Water 
L.Rev. 265, 270 (1976). But see LaFleur, 533 P.2d  at 314 (taking no position on 
the subjective/objective issue).

[¶12.]  As a part of his argument, appellant 
urges us to either abandon the subjective theory or supplement it with the 
objective. We note that the subjective theory has been adopted by the majority 
of the states. Kleppinger, supra, at 270. That fact alone, of course, is no 
reason to retain it, and certainly does not argue against supplementing it with 
the objective standard. However, there are other, more practical reasons for 
remaining with the subjective test. This court, in the absence of constitutional 
violations, should not attempt to exercise a "chancellor's foot" veto over law 
enforcement practices. See Russell, 411 U.S.  at 435, 93 S. Ct.  at 
1644. Presently existing entrapment law serves the purpose of ensuring that a 
defendant is not punished who, but for government encouragement, would not have 
committed an offense. The subjective test is an adequate vehicle to achieve that 
end.

[¶13.]  We have reviewed the instruction the 
trial court did give, and while it did not use the language found in our cases, 
it did present an acceptable version of the subjective entrapment defense. The 
requested language would not have added anything to the instruction the court 
gave; it would merely have been cumulative. Therefore, it was properly rejected. 
See Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149, 154 (Wyo. 
1989).

[¶14.]  Since this case was argued, we have 
recognized a defense of "outrageous government conduct." See Mondello v. State, 
843 P.2d 1152 (Wyo. 1992). Although it bears 
some similarity to the objective theory of entrapment, this defense should not 
be confused with either of the traditional approaches to the entrapment defense. 
It examines neither the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime nor the 
likely effect of police conduct on a hypothetical reasonable man. Instead, the 
defense focuses purely upon the conduct of the police. The outrageous government 
conduct defense is available only in circumstances where the police conduct is 
"violat[ive of] that `fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of 
justice,' mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment [to the 
United States Constitution]." Mondello, at 1158, quoting 
United 
States v. Russell, 411 U.S.  at 432, 93 S. Ct.  at 
1643.

[¶15.]  A jury instruction on this theory would 
not have been appropriate, because whether the government's conduct was 
outrageous is a question the trial court must decide. It is "the court's" 
conscience which is "shocked." The trial court considered, and rejected, a due 
process defense in this case.  
Whether it did so properly is the subject of appellant's next 
issue.

Outrageous Government 
Conduct

[¶16.]  As mentioned above, this court recognized 
a defense of "outrageous government conduct," separate and distinct from the 
subjective entrapment defense, in Mondello v. State. Our recognition of this 
defense in Mondello came with an acknowledgement of its narrow 
parameters:

[A]lthough state and 
federal courts have at least paid lip service to the doctrine, the defense 
referred to in Russell and Hampton [v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S. Ct. 1646, 48 L. Ed. 2d 113] has not had broad application. In the words of the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the defense is "often raised but is almost never 
successful." United 
States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 
857 (10th Cir. 1984). The murky bottom of the judicial seascape is littered with 
the wrecks of hopeful appeals in which defendants have launched claims of 
outrageous government conduct (in some cases much more egregious than that 
contended here) only to watch them sink after running aground on the difficult 
hurdle of proving the requisite level of outrageous conduct.  

Mondello, at 
1159.  

[¶17.]  Appellant argues that the conduct of the 
police in his case rose (or "sank") to the level envisioned in this defense, and 
his conviction must therefore be reversed. The trial court found that the 
government's conduct did not shock the court's conscience. We 
agree.

[¶18.]  It should be noted that although we 
adopted the outrageous conduct defense in Mondello, we held in that case that 
the government's conduct was not sufficiently outrageous to justify reversal. 
The facts of Mondello were more egregious than those of this case. Mondello 
wanted one ounce of cocaine for his personal use, and the police tricked him 
into buying an extra ounce for resale purposes. He showed marked reluctance to 
deal in the large quantities the police were pushing, but they continually 
pursued him.

[¶19.]  Here, appellant willingly entered into a 
transaction for three pounds of marijuana. It is difficult to believe 
appellant's contention that he intended that quantity of marijuana only for 
himself or a few close friends. He told the officers that he wanted at least two 
or three pounds and that he could possibly sell more later or arrange to have 
more sold later. While the police did "front" a portion of the purchase price, 
"fronting" is quite prevalent in the illegal drug business, and that alone is 
not enough to show outrageous government conduct.

[¶20.]  Nor does the fact that the marijuana was 
offered for lower than the going rate shock our conscience. We might someday be 
presented with a case where the price offered for drugs was so low that the 
inducement would violate due process. Here, however, appellant was willing to 
pay two thirds of the street value.3

Violation of the 
Wyoming Controlled Substances 
Act

[¶21.]  Appellant next argues that the possession 
and sale of the marijuana by the police violated the Wyoming Controlled 
Substances Act, W.S. 35-7-1001 et seq. Appellant contends that the violation of 
the Act by the police should lead to reversal of his conviction. While 
complaining that information about the alleged illegality was kept from the jury 
by a motion in limine, appellant concedes that the information was irrelevant to 
his subjective entrapment defense. We might add that it was also irrelevant to 
any other issue before the jury. We shall therefore ignore that portion of 
appellant's argument which addresses the motion in limine and concentrate on his 
claim that the police infraction of the law to obtain his conviction is relevant 
to the issue of whether the police violated his right to due process by engaging 
in extreme and outrageous conduct.

[¶22.]  Specifically, appellant contends that the 
officers violated W.S. 35-7-1024 (1988) and 35-7-1031 (1988). Section 35-7-1024 
reads in part:

(a) Every person who 
manufactures, distributes or dispenses any controlled substance within this 
state or who proposes to engage in the manufacture, distribution or dispensing 
of any controlled substance within this state, must obtain annually, on or 
before July 1, a registration issued by the board in accordance with its 
rules.

W.S. 35-7-1031 
(1988) states:

(a) Except as authorized 
by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess 
with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled 
substance.

"Person" is defined in 
the statute as:

[any] individual, 
corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, 
estate, trust, partnership or association, or any other legal 
entity.

W.S. 
35-7-1002(a)(xviii) (1988).

[¶23.]  As the State points out, however, 
exception is made in this statute for law enforcement officers while in the 
course of their duties:

All duly authorized peace 
officers including any special agents or other personnel appointed by the 
commissioner, while investigating violations of this act in performance of their 
official duties, shall be immune from prosecution under this 
act.

W.S. 35-7-1043 
(1988).

[¶24.]  Appellant, however, contends that the 
immunity provisions of this statute did not apply here because there was no 
pre-existing "violation" to investigate when the police obtained and sold the 
marijuana. He also argues that while immunized, the possession was still 
illegal, and this illegality should factor into a due process 
analysis.

[¶25.]  We must first construe the statute to 
determine whether investigative immunity extends to the circumstances of this 
case.  When enforcing or construing 
a statute, this court looks only to the intent of the legislature. 
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. State Bd.  of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991). When the words 
used are clear and unambiguous, that language establishes the rule of law. 
Id. A statute is ambiguous 
only where its meaning is vague or ambiguous and subject to varying 
interpretations.  
Id., at 219-20. Only if the 
wording is ambiguous or unclear to the point of demonstrating obscurity with 
respect to the legislative purpose or mandate do we resort to additional 
construction. Id., at 
219.

[¶26.]  The scope of the words "while 
investigating violations of this act in performance of their official duties" is 
sufficiently ambiguous that we must resort to further statutory construction 
beyond their plain meaning. Appellant argues that only a pre-existing violation 
may be investigated within the meaning of the statute. Thus, in appellant's 
view, officers may not possess and distribute controlled substances where that 
possession and distribution is designed merely to result in a violation of the 
Act. Appellant's view assumes a legislative intent to restrict police activities 
connected with narcotics enforcement.

[¶27.]  Often, the only method of catching 
violators of the narcotics laws is to employ the deception or ruse of setting up 
a "sting."  A controlled sale is as 
legitimate a tactic as a controlled buy, and may be more effective in putting 
drug dealers behind bars. A drug retailer will obviously be willing to purchase 
in larger quantities than he intends to sell in any given transaction. A 
controlled sale gives the police an opportunity to catch him with wholesale, 
rather than retail amounts, which more realistically reflects the volume of his 
drug business.

[¶28.]  In order to run such an operation, the 
police need controlled substances to sell to its targets. Absent immunity, no 
reasonable officer would engage in such an operation. Considering the 
comprehensive nature of the Wyoming Controlled Substances Act of 1971, see 1971 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 246, we believe that had the legislature wished to exclude 
controlled sales of narcotics designed to snare drug dealers, it would have 
explicitly prohibited such sales.

[¶29.]  Furthermore, where suspected dealers are 
targeted, as in this case, their suspected pre-existing violations provide the 
investigatory rationale for running the operation. Thus, a suspected "violation" 
of the Controlled Substances Act is being "investigated" at the same time as a 
new violation is "occurring." Accordingly, the statute expressly or implicitly 
allows such operations, and the intent of this statute is to allow the police to 
be exempt from prosecution for technical violations of the controlled substance 
law which are incurred during their legitimate investigations of violations of 
the Controlled Substances Act.

[¶30.]  Turning to appellant's second contention 
that the quantity of marijuana involved should have been registered, § 
3.26(a)(ii) of the Regulations of the Board of Pharmacy provides exemption from 
registration for "any officer or employee of any state, or any political 
subdivision or agency thereof who is engaged in the enforcement of any state or 
local law relating to controlled substances and is duly authorized to possess 
controlled substances in the course of his official duties." For the same 
reasons as those favoring immunity, we believe that had the Board of Pharmacy 
intended to preclude enforcement activities involving reverse sting operations, 
it would have done so expressly. Even if the possession was unregistered or 
otherwise illegal, this does not implicate a violation of due process. The 
California Court of Appeals recently faced a similar situation. That court 
stated:

The possession of the 
rock cocaine by Officer Qualls was not legal, but we conclude there was no 
violation of the statutes governing the disposition of the contraband. In any 
case, we fail to perceive in what manner the source of the cocaine, or Qualls' 
illegal possession of the contraband would have affected defendant's criminal 
conduct or had a bearing on his due process rights.

People v. 
Wesley, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1130, 274 Cal. Rptr. 326, 331 (1990), review denied 
(1991).

[¶31.]  The outrageous government conduct defense 
focuses on police conduct. We might someday be faced with illegal conduct by the 
police, immunized or not, serious enough to infringe on a defendant's right to 
due process. However, in this case, even if the actions of the police were 
illegal in a technical sense, they were not of the caliber to constitute an 
infringement of the defendant's due process rights. Accordingly, we hold that 
the acquisition and use for investigatory purposes without registration of the 
marijuana did not violate appellant's right to due 
process.

Grant of Immunity to 
Frank Compton

[¶32.]  Finally, appellant challenges the grant 
of full transactional immunity to Frank Compton. The general rule is that absent 
some showing of improper coercion of the witness or tainted testimony arising 
from the grant of immunity, a defendant lacks standing to contest the State's 
grant of immunity to a witness against him.  See e.g., 
United 
States v. Lewis, 456 F.2d 404, 
409-10 (3rd Cir. 1972); State v. Rice, 411 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn.App. 1987). Appellant has shown no such coercion or taint 
derived from the grant of immunity. Therefore, he lacks standing to contest 
it.

Conclusion

[¶33.]  Appellant has presented no reversible 
error to this court. His conviction is affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, Retired, 
dissenting.

I. INTRODUCTION 
AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[¶34.]  It was "dry" in 
Jackson, Wyoming - meaning the 
availability of marijuana or other illegal drugs for purchase around town was 
limited. Knowing this, the local police set about curing the problem. By 
arrangement with the Colorado 
Springs, Colorado police force, a 100 
pound "bale" of marijuana was acquired by the Jackson, Wyoming Police Department. The 
marijuana was brought into the community, by the police, to see if sales could 
be made at below-market prices using a lifelong drug addict, Frank Compton 
(Compton), as an 
informant/dealer. The informant was provided money, housing, and drugs as 
compensation for his sales solicitation, i.e. drug peddling.1  Was this entrapment?2

[¶35.]  The assistance provided by this admitted 
career criminal, as an agent of the police, was to help improve the supply of 
drugs in the community by a "reverse sting" program of community advertisement 
and sales consummation.3 Unfortunately, for the appellant, 
he bought into the well-advertised bargain, in part on credit, which turned into 
a conviction and a penitentiary sentence of three to five 
years.

[¶36.]  Appellant, Calik Rivera (Rivera), a 
Puerto Rican by heritage, was particularly unlucky when contrasted with the 
treatment Compton received. 
Compton's career as an informant 
for the Jackson police lasted about 
three months. Despite his admissions to both twenty-eight years of drug use and 
equal time participation as a performer in the illegal drug trade, 
Compton was compensated for his 
activity as a police agent. The police furnished Compton: a house, in 
rental-property-scarce Jackson; an automobile for his use; $750 a month to pay 
for rent on the house, gasoline for the automobile, food, utility bills, doctor 
bills and medical expenses; and $1,420 for methadone from California to assuage 
his drug habit.

[¶37.]  The Jackson police may not have 
received the full benefit of their bargain with 
Compton. The prosecution of 
another target of the "reverse sting" operation, TL (hereinafter TL), which was 
scheduled to follow Rivera's, was dismissed because of the unreliability of the 
state's informant, Compton.4 The prosecutor further stated that 
nine persons had been arrested on the same day, during the same "reverse sting" 
operation, and only the prosecution of the individual whose trial followed that 
of Rivera was dismissed on the basis of Compton's unreliability. It is 
apparent that defense counsel remembered the facts of this conversation with the 
prosecutor somewhat differently. He stated in his motion regarding the quality 
of the information furnished:

3. As a result of the 
motion for new trial in the Rivera case, Frank Compton's testimony at the 
hearing on the motion and Compton's contact with law 
enforcement and the County 
Attorney, the State dismissed the 
[TL] case. The undersigned has been informed by the 
County 
Attorney that the reason for the 
dismissal was the unreliability of Compton, his inability to 
distinguish fact from fiction and his obvious addiction to drugs and the 
influence of drugs on his testimony.

[¶38.]  This exchange came in Rivera's second 
motion for a new trial based on selective prosecution or unreliability of the 
principal witness. The first motion for a new trial, which was previously denied 
and predated the dismissal of the TL case, came on the possibility of recanted 
testimony. The second motion followed the dismissal of the pending prosecution 
against TL, which had been scheduled to immediately follow the Rivera 
trial.

[¶39.]  Was this outrageous police conduct? Was 
this illegal interstate transportation of controlled substances? Was this 
entrapment?  These are the concepts 
which will be encountered in this dissent as I search to draw the line between 
solicitation of crimes by law enforcement and the responsibility of individuals 
who violate the state's criminal code.

II. TRAPS, ENTICEMENT, 
ENTRAPMENT

[¶40.]  This appeal enters the curious and 
subterranean world of a segment of the law - entrapment - which is completely an 
American tradition. The basic concern, never fully answered, is how much should 
law enforcement officials assist, or create occurrences of criminality, when the 
desired result is to capture and punish those persons targeted for prosecution. 
Upon inversion into that world and its connections to American government, 
politics,  judicial conduct and law 
enforcement today, one is given to an immediate reaction similar to what is seen 
upon the slimy upturned surface when a damp flat rock is overturned in the heat 
of the day. In reality, we look at accepted or justified law enforcement 
violations of due process rights. A thoughtful discussion is provided by Gail M. 
Greaney, Note, Crossing the Constitutional Line: Due Process and the Law 
Enforcement Justification, 67 Notre Dame L.Rev. 745, 795-97 (1992) (quoting 
Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 48 S. Ct. 564, 
572-73, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928)) (footnotes omitted), in which she 
concludes:

Whenever a nation is 
faced with an evil that threatens the underpinnings of society, it is tempting 
to compromise personal liberties to combat the threat. Such is the case 
regarding the current fight against narcotics in the 
United 
States. 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, in a recent address to the American Bar Association, 
discussed the role of the Constitution in the nation's battle against 
drugs.  
Recognizing that the war on drugs is 
beginning to exert pressure on the Fifth Amendment right to due process, he 
admonished: "The Constitution is perfectly capable of accommodating the 
legitimate interests of law enforcement - but end runs around the Bill of Rights 
are unacceptable, and it is irresponsible for any administration committed to 
the rule of law to try them." It appears from analyzing many of the reverse 
sting cases that have rejected the due process defense, that courts are coming 
dangerously close to ignoring a defendant's due process rights in the face of 
public policy concerns regarding the war on drugs. "Our constitutional rights do 
not contribute to the drug problem, and compromising them will not solve it. We 
do not need to trample the Bill of Rights to win the war on drugs." The fact 
that our nation is faced with a social problem that is daily approaching tragic 
proportions does not mean that due process rights need no longer be protected. 
The Constitution has endured for two centuries because the courts have not 
sacrificed its protections in the face of current social problems. Judge Zagel 
in Stokes v. City of Chicago 
[744 F. Supp. 183, 188 (N.D.Ill. 1990)] eloquently expressed the enormity of the 
problem facing law enforcement officers in combatting crime:

"Policing is a lofty calling, vital to the public weal, 
often heroic in action. The grace and worth of the work usually remains unseen 
and unappreciated by those it serves. In grime and squalor, facing danger and 
fury, bearing witness to what is worst in men and women - even police officers 
sometimes lose sight of the dignity of their service."

Nevertheless, these problems, and the gravity of the social 
harms resulting from narcotics offenses in the United States, do 
not justify violating the due process rights of individuals. Although the law 
recognizes that at times ends may justify means, the essence of constitutional 
due process is that lawlessness will not be tolerated, no matter how socially 
desirable the goal. As Justice Brandeis cautioned:

"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to 
protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to 
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded 
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of 
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."5

[¶41.]  Justice Brandeis, dissenting sixty-five years 
ago in Olmstead, 277 U.S.  at 
485, 48 S. Ct.  at 575, understood:

Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government 
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to 
the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be 
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the 
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole 
people by its example. Crime is contagious.  If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it 
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it 
invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the 
end justifies the means - to declare that the Government may commit crimes in 
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal - would bring terrible 
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set 
its face.

See 
also Greaney, supra, 67 Notre Dame L.Rev. 745.

[¶42.]  Aimed at political corruption, the F.B.I. 
ABSCAM campaign was undoubtedly the most far flung "sting" operation ever 
attempted.  
Judge Pratt, in one of the multitude of resulting cases, stated:

The 
cynicism and hippocracy displayed by corrupt officials, pretending to serve the 
public good, but in fact furthering their own private gain, probably pose a 
greater danger to this country than all of the drug traffickers combined. 
Corrupt leaders not only betray their constituents, but also contribute to a 
moral decay in American society that many view as the forerunner of economic, 
political and social disaster.

United States v. 
Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1229 (E.D.N Y 1981), aff'd. in part and rev'd and 
remanded in part on other grounds, 692 F.2d 823 (2nd Cir. 1982), cert. Denied 461 U.S. 961, 103 S. Ct. 2437, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1322 (1983).

[¶43.]  Entrapment and the associated conduct of 
"sting" operations have a particular pertinency in Wyoming, at 
this time, following the operation first conducted in the Pinedale, 
Wyoming 
High 
School. 
The operation was apparently conducted by the State Department of Criminal 
Investigation in conjunction with a contracted adult agent who pretended to be a 
student. A similar program followed in Lyman, 
Wyoming. 
Both "stings" immediately ended when a supervising state agent committed 
aggravated assault at a bar in Missoula, 
Montana. 
The Wyoming 
narcotics agent hit a Missoula 
resident over the head with a beer bottle in that offense, resulting in a cut 
requiring ten stitches. The agent's accommodative plea bargain resulted in a 
deferred sentence, small fine, and agreement against reappearance in the 
Montana 
community. Publicity of events in Pinedale, Lyman and Montana 
brought a compelling recognition to the state of the underworld from which 
entrapment cases develop.6

[¶44.]  I dissent in this case. I recognize that the 
morass of increasing criminality permeating American society cannot be ignored. 
I also recognize that entrapment should not constitute a usually accepted 
defense.  
Finally, I recognize that a properly conducted sting operation is not 
necessarily inappropriate. However, I do join great scholars among the 
judiciary; Justice Brandeis, Justice Roberts, Justice Jackson, Justice 
Frankfurter, and Justice Brennan, and equally competent scholars within the 
state judiciary, who have found that what is done within this field of sting 
operations, entrapment, and judicial response is frequently done for the wrong 
reason, in the wrong way, with a resulting adverse permanent result on the 
promotion of idealism in a democratic society. It is my belief that the time is 
here for every jurisdiction to re-examine the generic subject of society's 
limitation on and responsibility for inviting, soliciting and creating crimes in 
order to catch the unwary (innocent or guilty) and have punishment inflicted 
which is seemingly appropriate therefor. We should recheck our basic principles 
to examine whether criminal law is directed to punish for past crimes or to 
create an environment directed to entrap those likely or accidentally available 
to commit future crimes. Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, 
Spies, Stool Pigeons, And Agent Provocateurs, 60 Yale L.J. 1091 (1951); Mark M. 
Stavsky, The "Sting" Reconsidered: Organized Crime, Corruption and Entrapment, 
16 Rutgers 
L.J. 937 (1985).

[¶45.]  It is thoughtfully recognized that three 
persistent themes reflecting basic governmental and societal responsibility are 
found in the entrapment case law and the corollary due process concept of the 
outrageous government conduct doctrine. First, there is the concern for judicial 
integrity. Second, the apprehension of criminals and consequent punishment of 
persons who commit violation of our laws. And, third, the concern which 
addresses law enforcement activities which may passively or actively be involved 
in the targeted crime itself.  Subcategorized, within this category of 
concerns for a democratic nation, is whether the activity of law enforcement 
provides just an opportunity for the predisposed miscreant; or, otherwise, 
whether the activity of law enforcement instigated the actual criminal 
activity.

[¶46.]  A central thesis of one of the early 
entrapment cases, Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 
218, 221-22 (1878), Marston, J., concurring, despite the operation rejection it 
seems to have suffered, deserves repeating:

"I 
cannot . . . silently permit the extraordinary course adopted by the police 
officers in this case to pass unnoticed and uncondemned. . . . The course 
pursued by the officers in this case was utterly indefensible. Where a person 
contemplating the commission of an offense approaches an officer of the law, and 
asks his assistance, it would seem to be the duty of the latter, according to 
the plainest principles of duty and justice, to decline to render such 
assistance, and to take such steps as would be likely to prevent the commission 
of the offense, and tend to the elevation and improvement of the would-be 
criminal, rather than to his farther debasement. Some courts have gone a great 
way in giving encouragement to detectives, in some very questionable methods 
adopted by them to discover the guilt of criminals; but they have not yet gone 
so far, and I trust never will, as to lend aid or encouragement to officers who 
may, under a mistaken sense of duty, encourage and assist parties to commit 
crime, in order that they may arrest and have them punished for so doing. The 
mere fact that the person contemplating the commission of a crime is supposed to 
be an old offender can be no excuse, much less a justification for the course 
adopted and pursued in this case. If such were the fact, then the greater reason 
would seem to exist why he should not be actively assisted and encouraged in the 
commission of a new offense which could in no way tend to throw light upon his 
past iniquities, or aid in punishing him therefor, as the law does not 
contemplate or allow the conviction and punishment of parties on account of 
their general bad or criminal conduct, irrespective of their guilt or innocence 
of the particular offense charged and for which they are being tried. Human 
nature is frail enough at best, and requires no encouragement in 
wrong-doing."

Paul 
Marcus, The Entrapment Defense, § 1.03 at 8-9 (1989).7

III. 
RULES, REALITIES AND RATIONALES - THE ADAPTATIONS

A. 
Entrapment in the Subject and Objective

[¶47.]  There are as few as three or as many as five 
rule rationales applied today within the avalanche of case precedents for 
entrapment principles of law. It should initially be recognized that the use of 
the word "defense" is a misnomer for an intrinsic legal theory. Entrapment is an 
exoneration for perceived (or admitted) criminal conduct. Paul H. Robinson, 
Criminal Law Defenses: A Systemic Analysis, 82 Colum.L.Rev. 199 (1982); see 
also, Laura Gardner Webster, Building a Better Mousetrap:  Reconstructing 
Federal Theory From Sorrells to Mathews, 32 Ariz. 
L.Rev. 605, 607 n. 5 (1990); and Sherman v. 
United States, 
356 U.S. 369, 380, 78 S. Ct. 819, 824-25, 2 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1958), Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in the result.

[¶48.]  The required inquiry tests: "[t]o determine 
whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the trap 
for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal."  Sherman, 356 U.S.  at 
372, 78 S. Ct.  at 820-21. Before we seek to fit the police conduct in this case 
and other contemporary activities in this state into some rule, doctrine, or 
justification, it is necessary to apply at least a cursory delineation of these 
multiple defenses.8

[¶49.]  The three, four, or five congruent or 
alternative defenses are formed from two broadly grouped categorizations: the 
subjective, or sometimes the federal model; and, the direct alternative which is 
designated the objective defense. Generally, it is considered that these 
approaches to entrapment defenses do not have a constitutional basis. Although 
not generally so directly stated, the defense comes from a supervisory or 
integrity maintenance responsibility of the judiciary to rebuff overreaching law 
enforcement techniques. Marcus, supra, at § 1.03.

[¶50.]  Justice Roberts, writing in Sorrells v. 
United States, 
287 U.S. 435, 457, 53 S. Ct. 210, 218, 77 L. Ed. 413 (1932), based the doctrine of 
entrapment

on a 
fundamental rule of public policy. The protection of its own functions and the 
preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs only to the court. It is 
the province of the court and of the court alone to protect itself and the 
government from such prostitution of the criminal law. The violation of the 
principles of justice by the entrapment of the unwary into crime should be dealt 
with by the court no matter by whom or at what stage of the proceedings the 
facts are brought to its attention.

Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Casey v. 
United States, 
276 U.S. 413, 425, 48 S. Ct. 373, 376, 72 L. Ed. 632 (1928), agreed that both control of 
governmental law breaking and judicial integrity were reasons for judicial 
application of entrapment.  See 
State v. 
Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437 (N.D. 1992), Vande Walle, J., specially concurring. The 
significance of the basic theory of entrapment comes from comparison with the 
outrageous conduct defense, which constitutes a third "defense" and is derived 
directly from constitutional due process, as an adaptation of Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952).

[¶51.]  Entrapment dogma is thus divided: either, the 
subjective test, which headlines predisposition of the accused; or, the 
objective test, which examines the conduct of the entrapping law enforcement 
agency officials. "The objective view analyzes entrapment from a position 
protective of the judicial role in achieving convictions." Webster, supra, 32 
Ariz.L.Rev. at 617. Professor Webster says: "If the subjective view of 
entrapment turns upon whether or not the government has made a new criminal of 
an `unwary innocent,' the objective test turns upon government creation of new 
crime." Id. at 
617.

The 
black letter components of the federal entrapment defense include (1) excessive 
governmental inducement to commit a crime aimed at (2) a non-predisposed 
accused. These two elements and the weight each receives account for most of the 
disagreement in the federal system on what constitutes entrapment. * * *

* * 
* * * *

To 
begin with the minority objective test for entrapment, the importance of the 
judiciary is to define clear boundaries for law enforcement and to identify 
instances in which law enforcement breaches that boundary. The selection of a 
target adds little to an endeavor which is deemed overreaching from its 
inception. The objective view analyzes entrapment from a position protective of 
the judicial role in achieving convictions.  

Id. at 
617.

B. 
Outrageous Government Conduct - Where Is Due Process?

[¶52.]  Despite the obdurate support of the 
subjective definition of entrapment, by normally five of the nine members of the 
United States Supreme Court, its philosophic idiosyncracies and operational 
invalidity have been strenuously attacked by most commentators and in many state 
court decisions. In order to fend off the most extreme improvidences of the 
subjective test, the due process - outrageous governmental conduct doctrine  
was developed as an additional principle. This adaptation understood 
predisposition might exist in the mind of the suspect, but the entrapping 
activity conducted by law enforcement was completely outrageous.

[¶53.]  It is important to understand that the due 
process, outrageous conduct, principle is correlative to the subjective rule in 
those jurisdictions. The outrageous conduct principle is semi-meaningless, 
except when considered in application in the federal courts, to escape the 
obvious societal invalidity of the subjective rule theory of "anything goes." 
Like the casual discard of outrageous governmental conduct - due process - 
applied by the majority in this present decision, the adaptation has seldom been 
found in conjunction with the subjective doctrine to be strenuously protective 
of the defendant, State v. Agrabante, 73 Haw. 179, 830 P.2d 492 (1992), apparently from a fear of a sub rosa application of objective 
causality. United States v. 
Payne, 962 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. 
___, 113 S. Ct. 306, 121 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1992); United States v. 
Warren, 747 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 
1984). The due process approach was applied in United States v. 
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978), by consideration of fundamental fairness. See also 
United States v. 
West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1975) and Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).

[¶54.]  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has, 
however, considered the viability of the outrageous conduct defense with comment 
that there was no circuit court known to have denied the viability of the 
defense. With a comprehensive list of citations, the Tenth Circuit noted:

Notwithstanding the lack of a clear holding on outrageous 
conduct by the Supreme Court, most of the circuits, including this one, have 
recognized the viability of the outrageous conduct defense. See, e.g., United 
States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 
112 S. Ct. 1535, 118 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1992); United States v. Nichols, 877 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1464-65 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898, 108 S. Ct. 233, 98 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1987); United States v. Arteaga, 807 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1468 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 264, 78 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1983); United States v. Capo, 693 F.2d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092, 103 S. Ct. 1793, 76 L. Ed. 2d 359, modified on other grounds sub 
nom.  
United States v. 
Lisenby, 716 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 837 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961, 103 S. Ct. 2438, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1322 (1983); United States v. 
Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106, 102 S. Ct. 2906, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1315 (1982); United States v. 
Johnson, 565 F.2d 179, 182 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075, 98 S. Ct. 1264, 55 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1978); United States v. 
Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 878 (7th Cir. 1975). We know of no circuit that has 
denied the viability of this defense.

United States v. 
Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 909 (10th 
Cir. 1992).

[¶55.]  In its review of the case law involving the 
outrageous defense, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in assessing its usage, 
separated out pervasive facts, including: (a) excessive government involvement 
in creating the prosecuted crime; (b) creating a new crime compared to 
involvement in ongoing criminal enterprise; (c) putting people in business and 
setting up crime by providing supplies and expertise for the illegal activity; 
(d) inducement and deceit; and (e) coercion. Mosley, 965 F.2d  at 910-12.

[¶56.]  It is interesting that the agent in Mosley 
was the same individual apparently involved in the Pinedale and Lyman stings and 
who was convicted of a criminal offense (misdemeanor) for the aggravated assault 
which he committed in Montana. 
Although Mosley was unsuccessful, in regard to an outrageous conduct defense, 
the Mosley tests, including bargain price coercion, specifically fit the facts 
of how Rivera came to be intertwined with the offense for which he was 
convicted.

[¶57.]  Comparably, in Payne, 962 F.2d 1228, the court advanced a four point test for outrageous conduct 
analysis. The first factor appraises the current need for law enforcement to 
provide the kind of governmental conduct involved. The second factor considers 
whether the criminal enterprise pre-existed the undercover investigation. The 
third factor considers whether the governmental agent directed or controlled the 
enterprise, and the fourth factor tests the impact of the law enforcement 
activity on the commission of the crime. Under the factual circumstances that 
existed in this case, it is apparent that the enterprise created and operated by 
the Jackson 
police failed on all four tests.  However, like recognition accorded in most 
cases, the majority accords a subjective analysis to a subjective concept with a 
conclusion that "this entrapment program was not outrageous."  Explanations of why 
this is so are conveniently hidden in semantics and undisclosed reasoning.

[¶58.]  The due process, outrageous conduct, concept 
has no real office in conjunction with the objective test because that test 
examines conduct of the government in first analysis.9

C. 
Then, Generally, Where Are We In Entrapment?

[¶59.]  Consequently, we have the subjective test; 
the subjective test as supplemented by the outrageous government conduct 
doctrine; and, the objective test. There is a fourth approach specifically 
detailed in the Florida 
case of Cruz v. State, 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla.), 
cert. denied 473 U.S. 905, 105 S. Ct. 3527, 87 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1985). The test was derived from 
New 
Jersey 
state law development, and is now found in other states, in a less defined 
fashion, for example, New 
Mexico and 
perhaps Utah. It 
is the construction of a principle which considers the entire circumstance, both 
the conduct of the police and of the targeted criminal. This approach has 
aspects of the philosophy of due process incorporated in the totality of the 
circumstances examination. The result is that no need for the super-ameliorative 
concept of outrageous governmental conduct remains. In effect, this is a 
combination of the objective and the subjective test approaches.

[¶60.]  An interesting analysis, for evaluation of 
the most recent United States Supreme Court decision, Jacobson v. United States, 
___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 118 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1992), is provided by United 
States v. Beal, 961 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 
1992). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized: "`Law enforcement 
officials go too far when they "implant in the mind of an innocent person the 
disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order 
that they may prosecute."'" Beal, 961 F.2d  at 1517 (quoting Jacobson, ___ 
U.S. at 
___, 112 S. Ct.  at 1536 and Sorrells, 287 U.S.  at 
442, 53 S.Ct. at 213). The court held a police agent's original inducement for a 
drug transaction provided the motive for the criminal acts charged. Beal, 961 F.2d  at 1517. We are left then with a question of whether Jacobson and its 
progeny, Beal, represent a federal trend toward the amalgam of Cruz.

[¶61.]  The language of Jacobson suggests the 
emerging federal trend.  In Jacobson, ___ U.S. at 
___-___, 112 S. Ct.  at 1537-38, a Nebraska 
farmer who had once ordered two magazines and a brochure from a 
California 
adult bookstore was targeted by federal authorities investigating illegal 
receipt through the mails of sexually explicit depictions of children. At the 
time Jacobson ordered the original materials, no violation of federal or state 
law occurred. His name, however, was on a mailing list seized by federal 
authorities who, for two and one-half years, continued to solicit Jacobson to 
make another, now illegal, purchase. Justice White, writing for the majority, 
said the government failed to prove that Jacobson was predisposed to break the 
law before the government, by its own admission, induced Jacobson to commit the 
crime. Id. at 
___, 112 S. Ct.  at 1541. Justice White relied on Sorrells' "creative activity" 
precedent to argue that the court must first consider the governmental conduct 
in entrapment cases as part of the predisposition determination. 
Id. at 
___-___ n. 2, 112 S. Ct.  at 1540-41 n. 2.

[¶62.]  There is yet a fifth application suggested 
for entrapment defenses. It has aspects of the objective, but is in reality an 
exception to the subjective. The standard was most currently articulated in the 
initial panel reversal of Jacobson, which was then reconsidered en banc, United 
States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 1618, 113 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1991), rev'd on other grounds ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 118 L. Ed. 2d 174 
(1992). It is this second appellate reversal, confirming conviction, which was 
itself then reversed in Jacobson, ___ U.S. 
___, 112 S. Ct. 1535. This standard directed "that governmental suspicion of 
defendant's predisposition is a prerequisite for solicitation." Terri L. 
Chambers, Note, 
United States v. 
Jacobson: A Call For Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity as a Threshold 
Limitation on Government Sting Operations, 44 Ark.L.Rev. 493, 505 (1991). That 
author found a source for the reasonable suspicion criteria in the first federal 
entrapment case reversal. Woo Wai v. United States, 
223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). See also Rothman v. United States, 
270 F. 31 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied 254 U.S. 652, 41 S. Ct. 149, 65 L. Ed. 458 (1920). A similar thesis and identical 
recognition is accorded in Maura F.J. Whelan, Lead Us Not Into (Unwarranted) 
Temptation: A Proposal To Replace The Entrapment Defense With A 
Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1193 (1985).

Clearly entrapment is a facet of a broader problem.  Along with illegal 
search and seizures, wire tapping, false arrest, illegal detention and the third 
degree, it is a type of lawless law enforcement. They all spring from common 
motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. 
Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with known 
criminals or the "criminal classes," justifies the employment of illegal 
means.  The 
Supreme Court has responded more or less effectively in curbing illegal search 
and seizures, illegal detention, and wiretapping by federal officers and "third 
degree" practices by state as well as federal police officers. It has 
occasionally been suggested that entrapment is sustainable as a doctrine on the 
same constitutional grounds as the search and seizure and the confession cases. 
It has been held, however, that the law forbidding conviction by entrapment 
methods has no affinity with legal questions concerning the admissibility of 
testimony for no "constitutional right of the accused has been violated; and the 
question is, not as to the admissibility of evidence, but as to the validity of 
an asserted defense to crime."

Donnelly, supra, 60 Yale L.Rev. at 1111 (quoting Sorrells 
v. United States, 57 F.2d 973, 978 (4th Cir.), cert. Granted 287 U.S. 584, 53 S. Ct. 19, 77 L. Ed. 511, rev'd 287 U.S. 435, 53 S. Ct. 210, 77 L. Ed. 413 (1932)) (footnotes omitted).

[¶63.]  The historical Wyoming 
test of "creative activity" almost exactly fits the implanting and 
indoctrinating terminology of both Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S. Ct. 210 and Jacobson, ___ U.S. 
___, 112 S. Ct. 1535. It is clearly apparent that even if the Wyoming Supreme 
Court is determined to continue from Janski v. State, 538 P.2d 271 
(Wyo. 
1975) to the future with some character of this subjective test, the adaptation 
provided by the present majority complies neither with prior Wyoming 
precedent nor with current federal law. In Com. v. Thompson, 382 
Mass. 
379, 416 N.E.2d 497, 500 (1981), that court, another subjective jurisdiction, 
stated by reference to Sorrells, that the defense arises only if the criminal 
conduct was the product of the "`creative activity' of the law enforcement 
officers or agents * * *." The majority decision in this case clearly does not 
follow historical Wyoming 
precedent.10

IV. 
HISTORICAL PATHWAY TO THE PRESENT IN WYOMING

[¶64.]  The pathway from Casey, 276 U.S.  at 
421, 48 S. Ct.  at 375 and Olmstead, 277 U.S.  at 
471, 48 S. Ct.  at 570, Brandeis, J., dissenting, through the course of federal 
cases leading to Jacobson, ___ U.S. 
___, 112 S. Ct. 1535, is too long to detail in this dissent and too well 
considered in carefully written reviews.11

[¶65.]  Wyoming 
case law fails to provide great illumination in either the present majority or 
previous cases since little consideration was given to philosophical principles, 
ethical governmental morality, or constitutional concepts involved in entrapment 
activities by the government. The exception comes in the brief evaluation 
provided, in a non-definitive decision, by Justice A.G. McClintock in Lafleur v. 
State, 533 P.2d 309, 314 (1975) 
(emphasis added):

Without anticipation of what our view might be should a 
case ever arise wherein the activity of the government has been to manufacture 
the crime, and conceding that the initial suggestion for the crime did not come 
from defendant, there is ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that 
it came from defendant's associate and that defendant himself was at all times 
an active participant in the investigation, planning (such as it was), and 
execution of the offense. By its verdict the jury has rejected any claim that 
this crime was the creation of the State. We therefore hold that whether viewed 
subjectively from the standpoint of the defendant's conduct and intention or 
objectively as to the degree of participation of the State, the defense of 
entrapment was not established as a matter of law.

[¶66.]  In Higby v. State, 485 P.2d 380 
(Wyo. 
1971), an appropriately thoughtful concept was advanced; but, overtly, the 
concept has not been followed to the present majority opinion. "Entrapment does 
not arise where one is ready to commit the offense, given but the opportunity, 
and suspected persons can be tested by being offered an opportunity to 
transgress the law although they may not be put under any extraordinary 
temptation or inducement."  Id. at 
384. That concept requires review of the activity of law enforcement and 
recognizes that an initial suspicion is required before the entrapping process 
becomes justified. The test advanced in Montez v. State, 527 P.2d 1330, 1332 
(Wyo. 
1974) of "government's deception actually implants the criminal design in the 
mind of the defendant," is a more complex statement for the continued concept of 
"creative activity".

[¶67.]  In Higby, the entrapment defense had been 
raised, considered at a pre-trial hearing where denied, and then withdrawn 
before trial. Dycus v. State, 529 P.2d 979 (Wyo. 1974) followed the same concept by finding lack of evidence of any 
"creative activity" of the police authority while citing Sherman, 356 U.S.  at 
372, 78 S. Ct.  at 821. The Wyoming 
court then said that if a dispute existed, the dispute would be referred to the 
jury for a decision as a matter of fact. Dycus, 529 P.2d  at 981.

[¶68.]  The principal case for Wyoming law was 
Janski, 538 P.2d 271, which 
resulted from a fractious final rehearing split decision with two justices 
forming the plurality with one concurrence and two justices dissenting. The 
court adopted the subjective test without differentiation of the prior cases, 
evaluation of the objective approach, or examination of the structural 
invalidity in the subjective approach which was then well known. Justice Robert 
A. Rose, however, in a strongly addressed dissent, recognized that the "creative 
activity" test of Higby and Dycus was being abandoned. Janski was bottomed on an 
esoteric concept of ready complaisance to prove predisposition. In Lafleur, 533 P.2d 309, the court 
quoted in part Saunders, 38 Mich. 
218, which had reapplied the "creative activity" test.

[¶69.]  Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1983) 
involved excessive sentencing questions, see, Wright v. State, 707 P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1985), 
but casually left for the jury's decision questions of initial predisposition 
and, for that matter, apparently ignored "creative activity" conceptualization. 
Neither the initial nor the later Wright case really clarified appropriate 
issues of entrapment, since seemingly not contested among the jurists writing in 
either opinion.12

[¶70.]  This court's last experience with entrapment, 
before today, came in Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579 
(Wyo. 
1986), which was a typical suspicion situation, confirmed by result, where the 
entrapment instruction was denied by the trial court. Those facts hardly 
determined inapplicability of an objective standard or, perchance, adoption of 
the clear subjective approach since predisposition was not an issue.

In 
the present case, the evidence when viewed in a light favorable to appellant 
discloses that the agents went to the Corner Pocket for the express purpose of 
meeting and attempting to purchase drugs from appellant. A surveillance crew was 
already in position outside the bar. Upon being introduced to appellant by their 
informant, the agents asked appellant if he could get them some marijuana.  Appellant left the 
bar and returned 30 minutes later with two baggies of marijuana.

Even 
when viewed in this light, the evidence is not sufficient to support the theory 
of entrapment.  
Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was the product of the 
creative activity of law enforcement officials. * * * It does not arise if one 
is ready to commit the offense, given but the opportunity. * * * The decisions 
in cases involving the illegal sale of drugs are practically unanimous in 
holding that the offense of entrapment is not available where the only 
solicitation is an offer to buy. * * * Suspected persons can be tested by being 
offered an opportunity to transgress the law, although they may not be put under 
an extraordinary temptation or inducement.

Id. at 
581 (emphasis added). See, e.g., People v. Kulwin, 229 Ill. 
App.3d 36, 170 Ill. 
Dec. 828, 593 N.E.2d 717 (1992), where inducement is the test as synonymous with 
creative activity which was previously used in Wyoming.

[¶71.]  It is valuable to recognize, although 
postured more upon an objective analysis, the historical Wyoming tenet of 
"creative activity", Dycus, 529 P.2d 979; Higby, 485 P.2d 380; cf. Lafleur, 
533 P.2d 309, adopted neither objective nor subjective approaches. In essence, I 
recognize the "creative activity" concept to be closely identified with 
"reasonable suspicion."

V. 
THE INFIRMITIES OF THE MAJORITY ANALYSIS

[¶72.]  The instruction actually given by the trial 
court in this case intentionally deleted the concept of "creative activity" 
which had been developed in Dycus, Higby, and Lafleur. References in the 
majority opinion to Janski, 538 P.2d 271, and the law journal article, W. Michael Kleppinger, Note, Criminal 
Procedure - The Entrapment Defense - The Determination of Predisposition.  Janski v. State, 538 P.2d 271 
(Wyo. 
1975), 11 Land & Water L.Rev. 265 (1976), fair no better in adaptation to 
Wyoming 
precedent. In the first place, there is abject confusion in words. In two early 
federal cases, United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2nd Cir. 1933) and United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 881 (2nd Cir. 1952), Judge L. Hand used the word "complaisance" for a 
measured test of predisposition, "willingness * * * as evinced by ready 
complaisance." Justice Raper, in writing the rehearing decision in Janski, 538 P.2d 271, used the 
same word. Justice McClintock, in the special concurrence which made the 
majority decision, used the words "ready compliance," and Justice Rose used 
"complaisance" for the rejected test in dissent. Kleppinger in his article finds 
the adapted test to be emplaced in "compliance."  

[¶73.]  Obviously, the two words communicate an 
entirely different meaning, although both are nouns and both look similar in 
spelling. The real differentiation, which is significant in addressing the 
entrapment conflict about predisposition, is that "complaisance" describes an 
attitude, e.g. affability, as a synonym, while "compliance" describes an act. 
"Compliance" might tend to show "complaisance," but it could also show fraud, 
duress, or threat reaction, or, for that matter, other states of the mind that 
determined that character of action. "Complaisance" is a "why" word and 
"compliance" is a "what" word. This is significant because complaisance may be, 
in reality, an explanation for predisposition, while compliance only would prove 
it happened because it happened and not why.

[¶74.]  It should be noted, however, that Kleppinger 
did recognize that the language of Janski, whether complaisance as was used, or 
compliance as he discusses, represents a fundamental departure from the 
traditional concepts of a sufficient showing of predisposition in the 
entrapment. The author continues to accurately recognize:

With 
a shift away from an inquiry into genesis of intent the creative activity 
doctrine is largely emasculated. The creative activity doctrine has generally 
been invoked to prohibit prosecutions where the criminal design originated with 
the police and the criminal activity was essentially due to the creative efforts 
of the law enforcement officials.  Prohibition of "manufactured crimes" is 
founded on the obvious policy that justice is not served when law enforcement 
officials are allowed to, in effect, create crimes for the sole purpose of 
prosecuting them. However, under the Janski ruling the inquiry is not one into 
where the criminal design itself originated, but is only directed at what 
occurred after the undercover solicitation. The net effect of the ruling is to 
shift the inquiry in the entrapment defense from the question of where the 
creative impetus of the activity was lodged to the question of the defendant's 
reaction to undercover solicitation.

Kleppinger, supra, 11 Land & Water L.Rev. at 273 
(footnotes omitted).

[¶75.]  The author then provides a further conclusion 
which I find appropriately recognizes the logic and realism of this 
subject:  

The 
Janski ruling, then, is a potentially radical departure from traditional 
foundations of the entrapment defense. * * *

* * 
* * * *

The 
doctrine announced by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Janski v. State represents a 
fundamental departure from the traditional concepts of a sufficient showing of 
predisposition in the entrapment defense. Although the requirement that 
predisposition be shown in terms of where the criminal design originated has not 
been completely abandoned in Janski, the ruling opens a new avenue by which the 
state can rebut the defense of entrapment and more easily create a jury issue of 
entrapment. Under Janski, ready compliance is not founded solely in the genesis 
of intent inquiry, the hallmark of the defense since its inception.  Recognition of a 
showing of ready compliance to undercover solicitation as sufficient to 
establish predisposition and send the issue of entrapment to the jury narrowly 
limits the evidentiary inquiry as to the issue of predisposition. The potential 
effect of the Janski doctrine's departure from the genesis of intent inquiry is 
to limit radically the viability of the entrapment defense in Wyoming.

Kleppinger, supra, 11 Land & Water L.Rev. at 274-76 
(footnotes omitted).

[¶76.]  The particular significance of 
Wyoming's 
limitation on the entrapment defense results from the failure of the majority in 
this case to carefully read Jacobson, ___ U.S. 
___, 112 S.Ct.  
1535; to review the historical Wyoming 
law; and, to consider the current movement of many of the court systems of this 
nation.13 With a proper test if it is complaisance at the 
required initial contact by law enforcement will not suffice to provide proof at 
the time of first solicitation to actually commit a crime. Ultimate compliance 
proves only occurrence which is, obviously, a given in an entrapment related 
prosecution. The fact that the crime occurred in this context proves next to 
nothing regarding the question of predisposition or invited solicitation as 
conflicting concerns regarding the creative activity environment. See Jimenez v. 
State, 838 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. App. 1992), discussing origination of the 
criminal design, e.g. governmental officials and their agents or in the mind of 
the defendant. "Creative activity" and origination of the criminal design are 
near synonymous terms and identical concepts.

[¶77.]  One of the best illustrations and analyses 
found is in the New 
York 
case of People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 378 N.E.2d 78 
(1978), in a jurisdiction which followed the subjective test, but applied a 
thoughtful due process outrageous conduct examination. In examining these 
concerns, in our present context, it has to be continually recalled that no 
particular drug activity existed in Jackson 
until law enforcement decided to initiate the sting campaign. With that fact in 
mind, the Isaacson court consideration is fruitful:

Illustrative of factors to be considered are: (1) whether 
the police manufactured a crime which otherwise would not likely have occurred, 
or merely involved themselves in an ongoing criminal activity (compare Greene v. 
United States, 9 Cir., 454 F.2d 783, with United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S. Ct. 1637, supra); (2) whether the police themselves engaged in criminal o[r] 
improper conduct repugnant to a sense of justice (see United States v. Archer, 
486 F.2d 670, supra; cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, supra); (3) whether the defendant's reluctance to commit the crime is 
overcome by appeals to humanitarian instincts such as sympathy or past 
friendship, by temptation of exorbitant gain, or by persistent solicitation in 
the face of unwillingness (See Schecter, Police Procedure and the Accusatorial 
Principal, 3 Crim.L.Bull. 521, 527); and (4) whether the record reveals simply a 
desire to obtain a conviction with no reading that the police motive is to 
prevent further crime or protect the populace. No one of these submitted factors 
is in itself determinative but each should be viewed in combination with all 
pertinent aspects and in the context of proper law enforcement objectives  the 
prevention of crime and the apprehension of violators, rather than the 
encouragement of and participation in sheer lawlessness. As a bare minimum, 
there should be a purposeful eschewal of illegality or egregious foul play. A 
prosecution conceived in or nurtured by such conduct, as exemplified in these 
guidelines, so as to cast aside and mock "that fundamental fairness essential to 
the very concept of justice" should be forbidden under traditional due process 
principles.

Isaacson, 406 N.Y.S.2d  at 719, 378 N.E.2d  at 83.

[¶78.]  It is not inopportune to recognize here that 
a "but for" rule has logical validity. "But for" the introduction of the police 
of drugs available for cheap sale, there would have been no criminal activity. 
Consequently, no conviction opportunity would exist.

[¶79.]  The fact that the allegedly entrapped 
offenses did occur only proves that much and not what prior intent existed in 
the mind of Rivera regarding more than his interest in a product for personal 
use. We have one of the tenth grade fundamental fallacies of logic where we say 
the fact that it happened (what) does not prove why, e.g., predisposition. 
Obviously, when Wright got into the narcotic agent's car while hitchhiking home, 
he had no predisposition to make a gift of his stash, and particularly so to a 
stranger. His affability was tested when the entrapment effort was started by 
his car ride host. Wright, 670 P.2d 1090.

[¶80.]  The real significance of Wyoming 
case law is that the well-defined test of "creative activity" regularly followed 
before and somehow lost in the 2-1-2 
decision of Janski, was intentionally rejected over objection for its use in the 
instructions in this case.

[¶81.]  Consequently, I can state forcefully that 
Wyoming 
historical precedent cannot be used to justify the most confined possible 
instruction given in appellant's disfavor here. In essence, the instruction was 
a "directed verdict" on the issue of guilt in the event that the appellant had 
the temerity to raise an entrapment issue. In this case, no matter how 
outrageous the conduct, the jury was essentially directed to find compliance to 
the offer, for any entrapment defense, was adequate proof to reject entrapment. 
Rivera bought, so, he was not entrapped. The test stated, not bottomed on 
historical Wyoming 
concepts, provided little validity but great damage in usage. That fact is also 
illustrated by the court's decision to "let everything in that the drug addict 
informer might say about past experiences with appellant." Any limitation, if 
there was any, of the W.R.E. 404(b) was thrown out the window and Rivera was 
convicted by what Compton, 
with a twenty-eight year career in drug peddling, might state in testimony.

[¶82.]  The concept of "creative activity" generally 
applied in Wyoming 
cases can be traced to the very first federal entrapment decision. Woo Wai, 223 F. 412. The "creative activity" in that case was there, as here, initiation by 
the government to secure commission of the crime in order to then prosecute. 
"`No state, therefore, can safely adopt a policy by which crime is to be 
artificially propagated.'" Id. at 
415 (quoting Com. v. Bickings, 12 Pa.Dist.R. 206).

[¶83.]  As a demonstration of how legally outrageous 
the denial to Rivera of the terms "creative activity" really was, we need only 
to look to one of the strongest subjective test state jurisdictions, Illinois. 
The subjective test is defined and explained in People v. Spahr, 56 
Ill. 
App.3d 434, 14 Ill.Dec. 208, 211, 371 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (1978):

Under that test, there are two questions which must be 
answered when determining if entrapment is present: (1) whether the defendant 
was induced to commit a criminal offense by a government official or his agent; 
and (2) whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the type of offense with 
which he is charged. In order for entrapment to be present, the criminal conduct 
must be the product of the creative activity of a law enforcement official.

See 
also People v. Walker, 61 
Ill. 
App.3d 4, 18 Ill.Dec. 315, 316, 377 N.E.2d 604, 605 (1978), which states:

The 
Illinois 
rule is that entrapment is established where narcotics are supplied to the 
defendant by the government's paid informant. * * * Furthermore, it has been 
held that the defense of entrapment is established where there is unrebutted 
testimony by defendant that the State's informant supplied the drugs that are 
the subject of the offense.

Thompson, 416 N.E.2d  at 500 (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S.  at 
451, 53 S.Ct. at 216) states: "The defense arises only if the criminal conduct 
was the product of the `creative activity' of law enforcement officers or 
agents[.]"

[¶84.]  This comparison, from the course of the 
Wyoming 
rule development on entrapment, demonstrates that the present decision is not 
led or driven by previously well established precedent.  Rather, the 
majority now adopts an outdated thesis without even recognizing the persistently 
required review of police officer conduct, which is clearly central in Jacobson, 
the most recent United States Supreme Court decision. I perceive that we take a 
direction for Wyoming law 
which is clearly contrary to logic, fairness and the general trend of theory 
development.

VI. 
WHY NOT THE SUBJECTIVE TEST?

[¶85.]  The defects in the subjective entrapment 
approach have been discussed in dissents of the greatest jurists of this century 
and by innumerable commentators and scholars, as well as by the trend in 
understanding of enlightened state judiciaries. The lack of balance and fairness 
in the thesis is observable by the due process governmental outrageous conduct 
palliative which may salve the judicial conscience, but provides no actual 
change in result.

[¶86.]  The first infirmity of the subjective defense 
structure for entrapment is that it controls or supervises neither outrageous 
conduct nor the crime making efforts of law enforcement, and certainly does not 
provide an adequate remonstration for the anything goes "Rambo" conduct. The 
second broadly understood difficulty in operation of the subjective approach is 
the transference of the jury guilt determining function further into bad acts 
and reputation instead of evidence of guilt of the present crime. Great danger 
exists in the use by a defendant of the entrapment defense because it creates an 
open season for the prosecution to prove overtly a predisposition and subjective 
guilt by past history and bad character of the individual's reputation.

[¶87.]  As a result, knowledgeable defense counsel 
and text writers recognize what they give up to assert entrapment in a 
subjective doctrine jurisdiction may be far too dangerous to justify the use of 
the defense. If we think, as I do, Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104 (Wyo. 1992), 
Urbigkit, J., dissenting, that we have converted our law from fact of guilt 
determination to reputation and character through W.R.E. 404(b) utilization, the 
gate becomes completely opened, if entrapment is introduced, to further justify 
extensive expansion of prosecution by admission of testimony regarding 
reputation and character. Professor Roger Park in his analysis, Roger Park, The 
Entrapment Controversy, 60 Minn.L.Rev. 163, 272 (1976), recognized:

The 
greatest fault of federal entrapment doctrine lies in the permissiveness of its 
ancillary rules of evidence. Suspicion, rumor, second-hand reputation evidence, 
and other testimony which would normally be barred by the hearsay rule has been 
welcomed by some courts. This indiscriminate attitude toward predisposition 
evidence is by no means a necessary feature of the subjective test.

In 
even more detail, Michael Senneff, writing regarding entrapment in the federal 
courts, Michael Senneff, Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1 U.S.F.L.Rev. 177, 
180-81 (1966) (quoting Sherman, 356 U.S.  at 
383, 78 S. Ct.  at 826 and Sorrells, 287 U.S.  at 
459, 53 S.Ct. at 219) (footnotes omitted), concluded:

In 
entrapment, we see that evidence inadmissible on the question of guilt is 
submitted to the jury on the question of entrapment. The danger here is 
twofold.  Not 
only may the jury be prejudiced by the evidence admissible in rebuttal, but it 
may well confuse the issues of the defendant's commission of the act with that 
of his entrapment. The fact that the defendant committed the act may infect the 
jury's findings on the question of whether he was entrapped into its commission. 
In following the rationale of Jackson v. 
Denno, the question of "origin of intent" is properly a matter for the court's 
determination. A finding on the question of entrapment, independent from that on 
the guilt of the defendant, is within the province of the court.

Further difficulties, however, are encountered with this 
"origin of intent" test which should lead to its abandonment. This theory makes 
the controlling factor the predisposition of the defendant. The rationale 
justifying the admission of rebuttal evidence is that since the defendant was 
the one who interjected the issue of entrapment, he cannot complain of an 
inquiry into his own conduct. If the defendant elects to avail himself of the 
defense, he must allow the prejudicial evidence to be admitted against him. The 
objection here is that it is unfair to prejudice a defendant for availing 
himself of a valid defense.

Admission of evidence on predisposition tends to divert the 
issue from the guilt of the defendant for the particular offense to that of the 
nature of his prior conduct. A defendant has a right to be tried on the 
particular offense charged. In almost every instance where the defense of 
entrapment is interposed, however, the intent that this particular offense be 
committed at this particular time originated with the Government agent.

The 
danger is that the individual's prior conduct will determine his conviction or 
acquittal in this particular case. One defendant may be convicted because his 
prior record and reputation were found to justify the police conduct, while 
another defendant may be acquitted because his lack of such prior conduct caused 
the same activity to be entrapment. Mr. Justice Frankfurter recognizes this 
possibility, saying that:

"Permissible police activity does not vary according to 
this particular defendant concerned; surely if two suspects have been solicited 
at the same time in the same manner, one should not go to jail simply because he 
has been convicted before and is said to have a criminal disposition."

The 
danger inherent is "to say that such conduct by an official of Government is 
condoned and rendered innocuous by the fact that the defendant had a bad 
reputation or had previously transgressed." The tendency to make the prior 
activities of the defendant controlling on the question of his guilt in this 
particular case, is even more apparent when the matter is submitted to the 
jury.

[¶88.]  Professor Ben A. Hardy, writing in his 
article, The Traps of Entrapment, 3 Am. J.Crim.L. 165, 165 (1974), was even more 
pragmatic:

A 
great deal of confusion and misunderstanding seems to exist with regard to the 
defense of entrapment and its use. The general public and inexperienced members 
of the bar frequently express the view that, whenever a police officer or his 
agent solicits the illegal sale of drugs or contraband, the defense of 
entrapment is automatically applicable to the case and, in all probability, will 
relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility. This article proposes to 
dispel the mistaken belief that the entrapment defense is a panacea in such 
situations.  
Entrapment is a highly dangerous and judicially unpopular defense that 
should only be used in a few cases with ideal fact situations or in desperate 
circumstances where no other defense is possible and plea bargaining has proven 
unsuccessful. The defense is a limited one which must be approached cautiously 
and which, of course, should be fully explained to one's client.

[¶89.]  Philosophically, I have an even more severe 
condemnation of what is occurring and what is justified in the subjective 
entrapment defense. Since the concept is emplaced within the "anything goes" 
ends and means dialogue, criminality of the society is promoted in the guise of 
correction and protection, but even worse than that, the judiciary becomes, in 
result, a cynical co-conspirator in the promotion and justification of 
legitimatizing criminality of those seeking to do good by doing bad. Whether it 
is selling or providing liquor to minors and assisting in property invasion 
felonies, or bringing controlled substances into a society to create buyers, 
both law enforcement and the judiciary depart with dirty hands.

[¶90.]  We all should read with care the law journal 
description of Professor Laura Gardner Webster as she recounts her experiences 
as a litigator during the ABSCAM trials where she initially pursued her vision 
of justice. She concluded:

Society may not care about the collateral victims of a 
deceptive government, but I think it is because society does not see them. For 
myself, it is not the unfairness of the results, the possibility that some 
people got more than they deserved, or that I learned to try a case while others 
learned to hand out money that angers me. It is that, in a matter of grave 
importance to me, I was lied to. As Sissela Bok observes:

"Bias skews all judgment, but never more so than in the 
search for good reasons to deceive. Not only does it combine with ignorance and 
uncertainty so that liars are apt to overestimate their own good will, high 
motives, and chances to escape detection; it leads also to overconfidence in 
their own imperviousness to the personal entanglements, worries, and loss of 
integrity which might so easily beset them."

Despite the loss of my illusions, I knew even then that an 
institution which compromises the very integrity it seeks to enforce and upon 
which it is premised, has lost far more than I did.

Webster, 32 Ariz.L.Rev. at 644 (quoting 5 S. Bok, Lying: 
Moral Choice in Public and Private Life 26 (1978)).

VII. 
WHERE IS THE LAW GOING?

[¶91.]  We should look further at the logic and the 
recognition of the need to preserve a basic integrity for the judiciary which 
was central to Cruz, 465 So. 2d 516, and most recently emplaced in Krajewski v. 
State, 597 So. 2d 814 (Fla.App. 1992), remand State v. Krajewski, 589 So. 2d 254 
(Fla. 1991). Florida, in 
essence, derives its law by an essential recognition of the adjudicatory 
philosophic and logical mastery of Justice Frankfurter, stated in concurrence in 
Sherman, 356 U.S.  at 
382-83, 78 S. Ct.  at 825-26.

"The 
crucial question, not easy to answer, to which the court must direct itself is 
whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below 
standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental 
power. . . .

". . 
. [A] test that looks to the character and predisposition of the defendant 
rather than the conduct of the police loses sight of the underlying reason for 
the defense of entrapment. No matter what the defendant's past record and 
present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the 
estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime 
is not to be tolerated by an advanced society. . . . Permissible police activity 
does not vary according to the particular defendant concerned; surely if two 
suspects have been solicited at the same time in the same manner, one should not 
go to jail simply because he has been convicted before and is said to have a 
criminal disposition. No more does it vary according to the suspicion, 
reasonable or unreasonable, of the police concerning the defendant's activities. 
Appeals to sympathy, friendship, the possibility of exorbitant gain, and so 
forth, can no more be tolerated when directed against a past offender than 
against an ordinary law-abiding citizen. A contrary view runs afoul of 
fundamental principles of equality under law, and would espouse the notion that 
when dealing with the criminal classes anything goes. The possibility that no 
matter what his past crimes and general disposition the defendant might not have 
committed the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements, 
must not be ignored. Past crimes do not forever outlaw the criminal and open him 
to police practices, aimed at securing his repeated conviction, from which the 
ordinary citizen is protected."

Cruz, 465 So. 2d  at 520. The Florida 
court then quoted the New Jersey Supreme Court for that court's substantive 
leadership, which later, to a degree, was superseded by statute:  

We 
do not foresee a problem in providing two independent methods of protection in 
entrapment cases. The New Jersey Supreme Court has found that the two tests of 
entrapment can coexist: 

In 
articulating [the entrapment doctrine], our Court has adopted two standards 
respecting entrapment. The traditional or subjective standard defines entrapment 
as law enforcement conduct which implants in the mind of an innocent person the 
disposition to commit the alleged crime, and hence induces its commission. . . . 
Under this traditional formulation, the defense of entrapment is limited to 
those defendants who were not predisposed to commit the crime induced by 
government actions.

"In 
recent years, however, this Court has fashioned a second, independent standard 
for assessing entrapment. It recognizes that when official conduct inducing 
crime is so egregious as to impugn the integrity of a court that permits a 
conviction, the predisposition of the defendant becomes irrelevant. . . . This 
Court recently explained in Talbot [State v. Talbot, 71 N.J. 160, 167-68, 364 A.2d 9, 13 (1976)]:

`[A]s the part played by the State in the criminal activity 
increases, the importance of the factor of defendant's criminal intent 
decreases, until finally a point may be reached where the methods [employed] by 
the state to obtain a conviction cannot be countenanced, even though a 
defendant's predisposition is shown. Whether the police activity has overstepped 
the bounds of permissible conduct is a question to be decided by the trial court 
rather than the jury.'"

State v. Molnar, 81 N.J. 475, 484, 410 A.2d 37, 41 
(1980).

Cruz, 465 So. 2d  at 521. Sequentially, the Florida 
process having found that the objective and subjective doctrines could coexist, 
first, examined the police conduct as a matter of law.  The test is

to 
require the state to establish initially whether "police conduct revealed in the 
particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for the 
proper use of governmental power." Sherman, 356 U.S.  at 
382, 78 S. Ct.  at 825 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). Once the state 
has established the validity of the police activity, the question remains 
whether "the criminal design originates with the officials of the government, 
and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the 
alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may 
prosecute."  
Sorrells, 287 U.S.  at 
442, 53 S. Ct.  at 212 (1932).  This question is answered by deciding whether 
the defendant was predisposed, and is properly for the jury to decide. In other 
words, the court must first decide whether the police have cast their nets in 
permissible waters, and, if so, the jury must decide whether the particular 
defendant was one of the guilty the police may permissibly ensnare.

Cruz, 465 So. 2d  at 521-22.

[¶92.]  To reach a decision, a two subject threshold 
test is applied:

(a) 
Interruption of a specific ongoing criminal activity; and

(b) 
Utilize means reasonably tailored to apprehend those involved in the ongoing 
criminal activity. Cruz, 465 So. 2d  at 522.

[¶93.]  The Cruz court did not get to the subjective 
jury issue when resolution was made on the inappropriateness of the drunken bum 
routine used for the sting operation. The undercover agent acted like a passed 
out drunken bum with money hanging out of his pockets, which constituted 
entrapment.

[¶94.]  The more recent case of Krajewski, 597 So. 2d 814, following remand by the state in the earlier opinion of Krajewski v. State, 
587 So. 2d 1175 (Fla.App. 1991), addressed the test of Cruz, where the judge 
found against the defendant on the objective test and the jury was sufficiently 
unconvinced about existing predisposition to acquit. Other Florida cases 
providing substance to this approach include: State v. Hunter, 586 So. 2d 319 
(Fla. 1991) (the state agent attempted a fee for service solicitation of the 
targeted individual to become implicated in drug transactions which was found to 
constitute entrapment as a matter of law) and Beattie v. State, 595 So. 2d 249 
(Fla.App. 1992) (involving the question of the interruption of an ongoing 
criminal activity to be factually the issue for the prosecution to escape from 
an entrapment). When the activity started with the sting operation to purchase a 
videotape, the test requirement failed and the conviction was reversed. That 
police activity violated the test of "virtue testing," which is defined in the 
case as police activity seeking to prosecute crime where no crime exists but for 
the police activity engendering the crime. Lack of known involvement in an 
ongoing criminal activity also required reversal on an entrapment objective test 
violation. Morales v. State, 594 So. 2d 343 (Fla.App. 1992). Cf. State v. Valdes, 
599 So. 2d 1046 (Fla.App. 1992), where a factual issue existed precluding a 
motion to dismiss the information and requiring a fact finding trial 
determination which was in the case consideration of the objective test of the 
entrapment to be determined by the trial court under the Cruz rule.

[¶95.]  Florida 
followed case law developments in New 
Jersey, 
which had originated the combination approach, and was then authenticated in 
New 
Jersey 
statutes to "`a single statutory defense' that intertwined the two conventional 
strands of commonlaw entrapment." State v. Johnson, 127 N.J. 458, 606 A.2d 315, 
319 (1992). See also Sean M. Foxe, Survey, Criminal Law - Entrapment - New 
Jersey Criminal Code Modifies Entrapment Defense - State v. Rockholt, 96 N.J. 
570, 476 A.2d 1236 (1984), 15 Seton Hall L.Rev. 464 (1985) and Michael A. Gill, 
The Entrapment Defense In New Jersey: A Call For Reform, 21 Rutgers L.J. 419 
(1990), which were cited in the Johnson decision as hybrid case authorities, and 
the cases of Baird v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1143 (Ind. App. 1982), vacated 446 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 
1983) and Isaacson, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 378 N.E.2d 78.

[¶96.]  Johnson, 606 A.2d  at 321 decisively 
recognized:

Entrapment implicates concerns that have always been 
central to due process. Both share a concern over the "proper use of government 
power." Sherman, 
supra, 356 U.S.  at 
382, 78 S. Ct.  at 825, 2 L. Ed. 2d  at 856. Both doctrines require that government 
adhere to its proper role and not abuse lawful power.  Sorrells v. 
United States, 
287 U.S. 435, 444, 53 S. Ct. 210, 213, 77 L. Ed. 413, 418 (1932). Wrongful government 
conduct also arouses the specter that relatively innocent persons may be coerced 
or seduced into crime. "When the Government's quest for convictions leads to the 
apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own 
devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law, the courts should 
intervene." Jacobson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543, 
118 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1992); see Call for Reform, supra, 21 Rutgers L.J. at 440 
(defendant is less culpable when enticed into committing crime by 
government).  
That concern recognizes that entrapment is not only unfair, it is 
counterproductive. The creation of crime increases crime, it does not detect or 
deter it.

[¶97.]  The Michigan court, which had first 
recognized entrapment for any American jurisdiction in Saunders, 38 Mich. 218, 
took a different approach to reach a similar multifaceted result in People v. 
Juillet, 439 Mich. 34, 475 N.W.2d 786 (1991). That court applied an entrapment 
definition of the conduct that "could induce or instigate the commission of the 
crime * * *." Id. At 
792.

In 
applying the entrapment defense, two tests have emerged across the country. Many 
states and the federal government use a subjective test, while Michigan and 
a minority of other states follow the objective test of entrapment. In Jamieson, 
supra [436 Mich. 61, 461 N.W.2d 884 (1990)], we analyzed both federal and 
Michigan law and determined that we would continue to follow the objective test, 
which focuses primarily on the investigative and evidence-gathering procedures 
used by the governmental agents, rather than the subjective test, which focuses 
on the defendant's predisposition or motivation to commit a new crime. 
Id. 436 
Mich. At 
72, 461 N.W.2d 884.

Under a proper approach, factors of both the subjective and 
objective tests can be considered and utilized to determine if entrapment 
occurred. Id. at 
79, 461 N.W.2d 884. Both tests are concerned with "the eradication of 
convictions that result more from law enforcement invention than from law 
enforcement detection." Id. at 
78, 461 N.W.2d 884. The purpose of the entrapment test is to discourage police 
conduct that manufactures, induces, or instigates the commission of a crime, 
rather than simply detecting criminal behavior. [People v.] Turner, supra 390 
Mich. [7] 
at 20, 210 N.W.2d 336.

Juillet, 475 N.W.2d  at 792-93.

[¶98.]  In essence, the Michigan 
court retained its objective test attenuated by a causality review. The test 
questioned whether the entrapment activities would have netted a "normal" person 
under the same circumstances. Chief Justice Cavanagh stated it differently in 
his concurrence: (1) unusual circumstances; and (2) mere furnishing of 
opportunity without more is not sufficient as addressing concepts of 
reprehensible conduct. Id. 475 N.W.2d  at 803. For an excellent analysis, see Susan E. Zale, Note, People v. 
Juillet, The Entrapment Test: A Michigan Hybrid, 1992 Det.C.L.Rev. 933 
(1992).

[¶99.]  It is apparent that the subjective test fails 
in the initial missions assigned to it of entrapment control of misconduct, 
criminality of police officialdom, and maintenance of the moral and ethical 
stature of the judiciary. Reason and case analysis demonstrate that there is a 
better way - as initiated by New Jersey and followed in Florida, New Mexico, 
Michigan, and, perhaps, New York. The intertwined unitary defense characterized 
by the New 
Jersey 
court in Johnson, 606 A.2d  at 319 can better serve the cause of justice in 
Wyoming. 
The extreme position adopted by the majority of this court is reason enough for 
my dissent. Even better justification is found in trying to direct the future of 
Wyoming law 
into a logical and reasoned stature for future justice and certainty.

[¶100.]  In a case with similarities to our present 
Wyoming 
factual situation, but with far less egregious facts, the conviction was 
reversed on an entrapment defense in Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437, (N.D. 1992). In 
Kummer, one police agent provided the illicit drugs for the accused to sell. 
This participation established entrapment as a matter of law. Id. at 
441. The case involved the establishment of the entrapment defense where law 
enforcement officers furnished the controlled substance that brought about the 
prosecution and conviction. "When the police themselves violate the law in order 
to induce a crime, they employ unlawful means." Id. at 
442. Where the government furnished the drugs, a per se rule of entrapment 
applies.

[¶101.]            
The Kummer court makes another interesting comment which applies here 
regarding agents of the government selling controlled substances:

The 
police tactic of furnishing contraband "lacks the element of necessity that has 
historically been the basis for rationalizing government involvement in the 
commission of undercover crimes." Comment, Criminal Procedure: Entrapment 
Rationale Employed to Condemn Government's Furnishing of Contraband, 59 
Minn.L.Rev. 444, 457 (1974) [Emphasis in original; footnote omitted]. There are 
sound public policy reasons for adopting a per se rule of entrapment in cases 
where the police furnish the controlled substance for the crime:

"It 
seems easy to understand and to explain to police agents, and it seems to give 
clear guidance about the limits of permissible conduct. Moreover, it seems to 
strike at a dangerous and unnecessary law enforcement technique. If an agent 
suspects that a target is dealing in contraband, the agent can attempt to make a 
decoy purchase from him. There will normally be no need to provide the target 
with contraband; a person who has been trafficking will have his own sources. 
Indeed, the fact that an agent found it expedient to provide contraband raises a 
suspicion that the target was not predisposed. . . . [T]he rule against 
furnishing contraband, like the exclusionary rule in search cases, can be seen 
as a prophylactic rule intended to protect innocent persons from police action 
intended for the guilty.  An agent who feels free to give drugs to 
targets creates a danger of corrupting the innocent that an agent who merely 
makes decoy purchases does not."

R. 
Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 Minn.L.Rev. 163, 191 (1976) [Footnote 
omitted].

Kummer, 481 N.W.2d  at 442-43 (emphasis in original).

[¶102.]            
Also apropos to this case, that court further recognized:

No 
criminal liability is imposed by our Uniform Controlled Substances Act "upon any 
authorized state, county, or municipal officer, engaged in the lawful 
performance of their duties." * * * Nevertheless, conduct by a public officer is 
not justified unless it is "required or authorized by law." * * * We are unaware 
of any statutory authority that authorizes a controlled substance confiscated in 
another drug prosecution to be withdrawn from evidentiary retention, offered for 
sale, and sold to others.

Id. at 
443.

[¶103.]            
Comparable authority is provided in West, 511 F.2d  at 1086 and Kemp v. 
State, 518 So. 2d 656 (Miss. 
1988). For a solicited burglary, the Michigan 
court applied the same instigation rule in the old but well established case of 
People v. McCord, 76 Mich. 
200, 42 N.W. 1106 (1889). For a comparison, see State v. James, 484 N.W.2d 799 
(Minn.App. 1992), where the police officers were only available to sell and did 
not "manufacture" a crime. Id. at 
802. See also United States v. 
Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 411 U.S. 949, 93 S. Ct. 1931, 36 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1973); Evans v. State, 550 P.2d 830 (Alaska 
1976); State v. McKinney, 
108 Ariz. 
436, 501 P.2d 378 (1972).

[¶104.]            
In People v. Jamieson, 436 Mich. 61, 461 N.W.2d 884, 900 (1990), which 
prestaged Juillet, 475 N.W.2d 786, Justice Archer, in dissent, provided a list 
of cases with entrapment or governmental misconduct where the government, as in 
this case, supplied both the scene and the means by which the crime was 
committed. Fifteen additional citations from a diverse range of states were 
listed.

[¶105.]            
Illinois, although generally a subjective rule state, responded 
emphatically to Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S. Ct. 1646, 48 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1976), and squarely reversed since "[c]learly a conviction 
for selling a controlled substance or a purported controlled substance cannot be 
sustained if the substance is supplied by the government." Spahr, 14 Ill.Dec. at 
212, 371 N.E.2d  at 1265 (citing People v. Strong, 21 Ill. 2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765 
(1961) and recognizing contra United States v. 
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1973) and Hampton, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646). Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead was quoted with favor 
by the Illinois 
court. For early Illinois 
law, see a similar thesis, although ingrained within a subjective test in Love 
v. People, 160 Ill. 501, 43 N.E. 710 (1896), where a burglary was the product of the creative 
instigation by the undercover police agent. See also Walker, 18 
Ill.Dec. 315, 377 N.E.2d 604.

[¶106.]            
New 
Jersey 
case law is in agreement. See 
State v. 
Branam, 161 N.J. Super. 53, 390 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1978), aff'd. 79 N.J. 301, 399 A.2d 299 (1979), in quoting from the principle New Jersey case of State v. 
Talbot, 71 N.J. 160, 168, 364 A.2d 9, 13 (1976):

"We 
hold that where an informer or other agent generally acting in concert with law 
enforcement authorities, furnishes a defendant with heroin for the purpose of 
then arranging a sale of the heroin by the defendant to an undercover officer, 
which sale is then consummated, defendant has been entrapped as a matter of law 
even though predisposition to commit the crime may appear, and notwithstanding 
that the furnishing of the heroin is unknown to and contrary to the instructions 
of the law enforcement authorities. Those authorities, having set the agent to 
work in enticing the defendant, the prosecution should bear the onus of the 
means selected by the agent."

[¶107.]            
A casual review of even the most recent cases demonstrates a state court 
trend toward the objective or the totality of the circumstances entrapment 
definition.14 Exactly how the most recent United 
States Supreme Court case, Jacobson, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1535, or, for that 
matter, election of a new national president who will appoint additional 
justices to that court, will affect the analysis of the entrapment defense is 
far from clear, except that the five to four adaptation vote did continue for 
the time being. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive 
Criminal Law § 5.2(c) (1986) (footnote omitted), where it is said:

(c) 
The Objective Approach. 
However, there is growing support for the objective approach, variously 
described as the "hypothetical person" approach or the Roberts-Frankfurter 
approach (after the writers of the concurring opinions in Sorrells and Sherman). 
The objective approach is favored by a majority of the commentators, and is 
reflected in the formulation of the entrapment defense appearing in the American 
Law Institute's Model Penal Code.

[¶108.]            
It is apparent that entrapment and sting activities have progressed 
nearly a world away from the 1925 case of State v. Kirkbride, 34 Wyo. 98, 241 P. 709 (1925), where 
the inciting activity of the police authority provided the only solicitation 
[of] an offer to buy.

VIII. TESTING PREDISPOSITION ALONE IS AN INVALID APPROACH 
TO THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE - LET'S LOOK BOTH WAYS

[¶109.]            
I dissent in this case in the belief that the creation of the entire 
environment for a crime to be consequently committed, as in this case a "reverse 
sting," requires at least judicial examination of the objective (character of 
police conduct) test of entrapment. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437. I find the majority 
here, and these subjective test cases in general, hopelessly confused and 
unnecessarily complicated. We should step back and relate to a test that 
examines the entire situation.  Consequently, I favor an approach that offers 
the analysis afforded by Florida and 
New 
Mexico and 
which considers: what the police did; what the defendant did in response; and 
determines whether entrapment existed as a viable defense or, more properly, 
exoneration. Generally, this approach is also the course pursued by the Michigan 
Supreme Court in Juillet, 475 N.W.2d 786. See Zale, supra, 1992 Det.C.L.Rev. 
933.

[¶110.]            
The test of predisposition of the accused to break the law must be 
independent and not the product of activities of law enforcement. Jacobson, ___ 
U.S. at 
___, 112 S. Ct.  at 1541.  Furthermore, as Jacobson determined, in a 
black letter decision on the most highly contested case between majority and 
dissent: "Indeed, the proposition that the accused must be predisposed prior to 
contact with law enforcement officers is so firmly established that the 
Government conceded the point at oral argument[.]" Jacobson, at ___, n. 2, 112 S. Ct.  at 1541, n. 2. Justice White, in the same footnote in the majority 
opinion, reaffirmed what he found stated fifty-one years earlier in Sorrells. 
The minority concept would test predisposition not upon initial contact, but 
only when the government actually suggests commission of the specific crime. The 
minority permits education by the state to create predisposition to defeat any 
entrapment defense. See Justice O'Connor's dissent in Jacobson, at ___, 112 S. Ct.  at 1544. An interesting and persuasive critique of Jacobson is currently 
provided by Maureen Duffy in Note, Jacobson v. United States: Do 
The Ends Justify The Means In Government Stings?, 24 Loy.U.Chi.L.J. 77, 107 
(1992):

The 
Court reached a just decision when it reversed Jacobson's conviction. 
Unfortunately, its silence on the issue of appropriate government conduct may 
suggest to investigators that the ends will continue to justify the means in 
sting operations. As long as the government can demonstrate later that the 
defendant had a guilty state of mind, there is no apparent check on its 
activities. Until the Court establishes some reasonable limits, Big Brother will 
remain alive and well.

[¶111.]            
In support and substantiation, note should be taken of the analysis 
provided eleven years earlier by Ted K. Yasuda, Note, Entrapment as a Due 
Process Defense: Developments After Hampton v. United States, 57 Ind.L.J. 89, 
129-30 (1982) (emphasis in original), where he concluded with a message 
obviously heard by what today may be a majority of state courts:

The 
extensive government aiding and solicitation of crimes disclosed in recent cases 
demonstrate the inadequacy of existing theories of entrapment. Although 
insisting that the defense of entrapment is narrowly based upon a statutory 
exception for the nonpredisposed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged 
in dicta that due process may also set limits to government involvement in 
crime. The lower federal courts in turn have recognized a due process defense 
which would supplement the otherwise statutory defense of entrapment. The 
result, however, has been far from satisfactory. The federal courts have failed 
to formulate the constitutional basis for their insight that the avowedly 
statutory test for entrapment should not be exclusively controlling. The Supreme 
Court's reference to conduct that "shocks the conscience" has been deficient as 
a basis on which to develop standards for safeguarding due process in the 
entrapment context: subjective assessments of "outrageousness" have largely been 
the order of the day. Moreover, the resulting mixture - a statutory defense 
which must be supplemented, due to its own shortcomings, by a vague 
constitutional mandate prohibiting "outrageous" government undercover activity - 
is unwieldy and internally inconsistent.  It is left unexplained why part of the 
entrapment defense is of constitutional dimension, while another part is not, as 
if successfully inducing criminal conduct on the part of those not originally 
ready and willing to commit crime were somehow not outrageous.

A 
more unitary theory of entrapment governed by a more objective inquiry is 
needed. Entrapment should be squarely founded on the principle that the 
manufacturing of crime serves no legitimate purpose, and that where crime is 
manufactured, prosecution must be barred as a matter of due process. The inquiry 
relevant for the defense should simply be whether the government's conduct has 
led the defendant to commit a crime which he otherwise would not have committed. 
Predisposition is relevant: a person not already predisposed to commit a crime 
is not likely to do so independently, and there can be no legitimate reason to 
overcome such an individual's reluctance to engage in crime. The presence of 
predisposition should not be dispositive, however. A bare predisposition to 
commit an act does not establish that the defendant would have acted in the real 
world as he did under the artificial circumstances provided by the government's 
actions.  
Predisposition, if established, should be only one of several factors to 
determine whether a crime has been manufactured, the artificiality of the 
government's aid and encouragement, and the likelihood that a third party would 
have played the role acted by the government being at least equally relevant. 
Such an approach avoids the inadequacies of the predisposition test for 
entrapment, as well as the subjectivity inherent in appraisals of 
"outrageousness." An entrapment defense must ask the right question in order to 
safeguard adequately the right to be free from government conduct which creates, 
rather than detects, crime.

[¶112.]            
It is my conclusion that no rational, practical or fair minded adaptation 
for entrapment can be developed by solely considering the defendant's intent 
without considering the acts of instigation made by officers of the law to 
arrange for a crime to occur so that arrest can be made.

It 
appears doubtful that either the subjective or objective approach could be 
structured in such a way that it alone would provide a rational and fair 
defense. The best approach would be one that incorporates both tests with some 
modifications - that is, one that first would allow the defendant to raise the 
defense by a pretrial motion in which the propriety of the police conduct is 
challenged as creating too great a risk of inducing an innocent man to commit a 
crime. At this stage also, the government should be required to show that it had 
probable cause for singling out the defendant for affirmative action. This 
should be judged on the basis of what was known at the time of such action. Even 
if a challenge under the objective test is not raised, the defendant should be 
entitled to a pretrial hearing in which the government is required to show 
probable cause for its actions with regard to the defendant.  These decisions 
should be for the court alone. If the defendant loses at these preliminary 
stages, he should then be allowed to raise the defense at trial under the 
subjective test. His burden should be as light as possible, and he should be 
required to show no more than government involvement in order to raise the 
issue. Once the defendant has raised the issue, then the burden should be on the 
prosecution to prove no entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, and this should be 
the only issue submitted to the jury concerning entrapment.

Hardy, supra, 3 Am.J.Crim.L. at 203.

[¶113.]            
The real issue considers who created the environment for the criminal act 
within the totality of the circumstances. What I propose, as provided in 
Juillet, 475 N.W.2d 786, and the course of Florida cases starting with Cruz, 465 So. 2d 516, is a re-examination of the totality of the circumstances. The goal is 
to apprehend the criminal, and even prevent criminal conduct, and not to be the 
principal through which its commission is arranged and pursued. This thesis is 
not only consistent with the most recent majority of the United States Supreme 
Court in Jacobson ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1535, but follows reliably from 
Sherman, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S. Ct. 819, and, in this state, Lafleur, 533 P.2d  at 310. I find no office in the 
entrapment defense analysis for a separate consideration of outrageous 
governmental conduct. It is, as the majority essentially concluded in Jacobson, 
that outrageous conduct is an attendant function and factor in any attempted 
application of the subjective entrapment defense.

[¶114.]            
One of the greatest state jurists of this century, Justice Stanley Mosk 
of the California Supreme Court, addressed this subject in the detailed case of 
People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947 (1979). In his broad analysis of the current status of the law he 
recognized:

Such 
support for the [objective test] no doubt derives from a developing awareness 
that "entrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and 
seizures, wiretapping, false arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it 
is a type of lawless law enforcement. They all spring from common motivations. 
Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is condoned 
by the sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals or the 
`criminal classes,' justifies the employment of illegal means." (Donnelly, 
Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs 
(1951) 60 Yale L.J. 1091, 1111.)

Barraza, 153 Cal. Rptr.  at 467, 591 P.2d  at 955.

[¶115.]            
Following a review of the complete literature found in the United States 
Supreme Court cases of Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S. Ct. 210; Sherman, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S. Ct. 819; and Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S. Ct. 1637, and the historical California law, Justice Mosk 
concluded, with the weight of reason provided by Chief Justice Warren in 
Sherman, 356 U.S.  at 372, 78 S. Ct.  at 820-21, "the function of law enforcement 
manifestly `does not include the manufacturing of crime.'" Barraza, 153 Cal. Rptr.  at 466, 591 P.2d  at 954.  Justice Mosk additionally concluded:

Commentators on the subject have overwhelmingly favored 
judicial decision of the issue by application of a test which looks only to the 
nature and extent of police activity in the criminal enterprise. (See,e.g., 
LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law (1972) pp. 371-373; authorities 
cited in State v. Mullen (Iowa 1974) 216 N.W.2d 375, 381; authorities cited in 
Park, The Entrapment Controversy (1976) 60 Minn.L.Rev. 163, 167, fn. 13.) 
Professor Kamisar observed that only two law review articles in the past 25 
years have favored the subjective test.  (Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure 
(4th ed. 1978 Supp.) p. 119.) The Model Penal Code has adopted an objective test 
(Model Pen.Code (Proposed Official Draft 1962) § 2.13(1); see also Nat. Com. on 
Reform of Fed.Crim.Laws, Final Rep. - Proposed New Fed.Crim.Code (1971) § 
702(2))[.]

Barraza, 153 Cal. Rptr.  at 466-67, 591 P.2d  at 954-55.

[¶116.]            
The court held that the proper test for entrapment in California 
asked:

[W]as the conduct of the law enforcement agent likely to 
induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the offense? For the purposes of 
this test, we presume that such a person would normally resist the temptation to 
commit a crime presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. Official 
conduct that does no more than offer that opportunity to the suspect - for 
example, a decoy program - is therefore permissible; but it is impermissible for 
the police or their agents to pressure the suspect by overbearing conduct such 
as badgering, cajoling, importuning, or other affirmative acts likely to induce 
a normally law-abiding person to commit the crime.

Id. at 
467, 591 P.2d  at 955.

IX. 
ENDS AND MEANS - WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW?

[¶117.]            
In examining this impermissible police conduct test, guidance was taken 
from one or both of two principles:

First, if the action of the law enforcement agent would 
generate in a normally law-abiding person a motive for the crime other than 
ordinary criminal intent, entrapment will be established. * * * Second, 
affirmative police conduct that would make commission of the crime unusually 
attractive to a normally law-abiding person will likewise constitute 
entrapment.

Barraza, 153 Cal. Rptr.  at 467, 591 P.2d  at 955.

[¶118.]            
Unless we get tough on crime, it is contended that the societal malady 
which concerns all Americans cannot be erased. I agree. I further believe that 
unless we get tough on conduct that produces criminal conduct by those seeking 
to protect society, the process is prostituted and the disease is cultivated. 
Violence begets violence, inciting crime results in expanded criminality.  Generally, 
releasing, justifying or approving law enforcement officials' conduct in their 
own criminal behavior, if it exists, cannot fail to do less than create hatred, 
distrust and reactivity.

[¶119.]            
Sometimes it is difficult to tell to which team the player belongs 
without the details of an insider's scorecard. There are truly limits to the 
practicing validity in a democractic society that the end always justifies the 
means.15

[¶120.]            
Where our re-examination of the entrapment complicity in our society must 
start is with the millennium-old question, to what extent does the end justify 
the means? How much created criminality should society countenance to ennoble 
its war on crime? Overtly, some balance is required. In this high-tech society, 
with both emotionally uncontrolled and operationally sophisticated criminals in 
increasing numbers, law enforcement needs breathing room in techniques and 
understanding.  
Regretfully, as Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, and hundreds of lesser lights 
proved during this past century, breathing room can turn out democracy and bring 
in autocratic totalitarianism.  Constitutional rights of due process and the 
basic premise of the responsibility of judiciary to provide fairness in conduct 
of criminal proceedings must be maintained.

X. 
CONCLUSION

[¶121.]            
Why does it all matter? What do we say to Rivera, the Puerto Rican 
immigrant, or to the shattered families in Pinedale and Lyman? Who lies, who 
lives and who regrets? Citizens have a proper office in evaluating the conduct 
of their judiciary.  
Unfortunately, the media filter frequently fails to provide a complete, 
impartial and fair recitation of the facts.

[¶122.]            
In a law journal article, now written thirty years ago, in the 
University of 
Chicago Law Review, 
entitled Comment, Administration of the Affirmative Trap and the Doctrine of 
Entrapment: Device and Defense, 31 U.Chi.L.Rev. 137, 137 (1963), David P. 
Bancroft of the United States Department of Justice stated:

[T]he principal police decision that is made in the 
administration of the device of the affirmative trap is not what inducements to 
offer, but whether to lay the affirmative trap at all. Field research into the 
administrative practices of the Cook 
County 
State's 
Attorney's Office reveal marked official insensitivity to the defense. On the 
basis of an analysis of the interaction of appellate doctrine and administrative 
practices the author makes recommendations to increase police safeguards in the 
use of the device and prosecutor sensitivity to the defense. New standards for 
the scope of the defense are proposed for legislative action.

[¶123.]            
It is self evident that with the multiplied use of "sting" and "trap" 
techniques by police, essentially no real progress has been made in many 
jurisdictions, including the regression in Wyoming, to ameliorate this thirty 
year old self-evident societal problem. None of the authors' recommendations 
have even been considered, let alone tested in this jurisdiction. See Donnelly, 
supra, 60 Yale L.J. 1091.

[¶124.]            
Surely now is the time, at least for the Wyoming 
judiciary and law enforcement, to take serious philosophic cognizance of 
entrapment defenses. On one hand, we should recognize constitutional rights of a 
free and non-dictatorial society. On the other side:

Because a demand is made against the criminal process to 
enforce laws whose breach rarely affords the police complaining victims or 
witnesses a tension is created: A claim is made on enforcement agencies which 
cannot be satisfied by standard police techniques. In order to successfully 
apprehend violators the police need to be present at the time and place the 
crime is committed. But omnipresence is not a realistic expectation. Behavior 
offensive to such legislation is likely to be widely dispersed. Time and 
personnel limitations, largely functions of budgetary considerations, call for 
selective enforcement in the form of spot control.

Bancroft, supra, 31 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 139-40 (citing Joseph 
Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process:  Low-Visibility 
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543, 560 (1960)).

[¶125.]            
It may well be that the conviction of Rivera was justified and fair. We 
will never know if a properly instructed jury would, necessarily, have reached 
the same result considering the booby-trapped and mine-field strewn pathway his 
defense was required to pursue. An appropriate recognition of the controversies 
surrounding entrapment presents this court with a challenge that what we do is 
not adequate.

The 
Abscam cases, the John DeLorean trial for cocaine trafficking, and the Chicago 
Greylord investigation of judicial corruption [as certainly more pertinently 
before us in current events in this state] recently brought to public attention 
the question whether and to what extent a free society should permit its law 
enforcement officials to provoke crime in order to detect and punish criminals. 
This question is by no means easy to answer. On the one hand, some involvement 
in the unlawful activities of criminal rings may be the only effective means to 
detect many crimes, particularly those that do not involve a complaining victim. 
To secure the trust and cooperation of the criminals whose activities they seek 
to uncover, government undercover operatives must be prepared to cultivate a 
target over a period of time, to make repeated overtures to that target, and to 
offer some inducement to the target as the price of the agents' admission to the 
criminal activity. Consequently, police solicitation and inducement of criminal 
conduct are believed to be necessary in order to investigate and stop crimes 
that are committed in secret among willing participants.

On 
the other hand, the use of agents provocateurs to obtain evidence against 
individuals by inducing and participating in criminal acts is a feared tool of 
government oppression, used historically by repressive regimes seeking to 
suppress their political opponents. Such a tactic also creates grave risks of 
leading otherwise law-abiding persons into crime. The combination of an ongoing 
relationship between the undercover agent and his target, the necessity for the 
government to offer inducements to secure action by the suspected criminal, the 
police officer's natural desire for professional success, and the use of 
informants of uncertain reliability is a mixture with explosive potential for 
abuse.

Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement And The 
Foundations Of The Entrapment Defense, 73 Va.L.Rev. 1011, 1011-12 (1987) 
(footnotes omitted). The author then concluded:

Police encouragement of crime conflicts with the basic 
values underlying the system of criminal justice, a system founded largely on 
the theory that one must cause an unlawful act in order to bring about 
punishment by the state. Even when it seeks to prevent future harm by 
restraining dangerous individuals, the system is backward-looking and claims 
past conduct as the justification for identifying, prosecuting, convicting, and 
punishing a wrongdoer. The rules defining crimes purportedly ensure both that 
punishment is justified and that the criminal processes are confined within the 
limits necessary to ensure personal freedom. Police encouragement of crime, 
however, undermines the rules. It is a social control tactic rooted in concern 
for the future. Active police encouragement of criminal acts represents, in 
effect, a form of "preventive detection." It does not seek the punishment of 
past wrongdoing, nor is it justifiable as punishment of past conduct. Its 
acceptability as a law enforcement tool is premised on the belief that it is a 
necessary means to detect and punish those who would otherwise pose a continuing 
threat to social order. The various conventional approaches to entrapment each 
seek to make this preventive detection more palatable by ensuring that in some 
way it is directed against significantly dangerous individuals. The conventional 
analyses do not, however, make government encouragement of crime any less of a 
compromise, both of the values normally protected by the act requirement and of 
our commitment to the rule in the criminal justice system.

The 
current approach causes fundamental damage to the central principle that 
punishment must await conduct. Encouragement is - at least in theory  used by 
the government precisely because no past wrongdoing can be proven. Moreover, 
individuals are subject to punishment for choices made in a setting in which 
government intervention has skewed the available options and created strong 
artificial incentives for lawbreaking. Finally, the government's encouragement 
of criminal acts effectively circumvents those restraints on arbitrary and 
discriminatory official actions that are normally imposed by the act 
requirement. Entrapment tests designed merely to restore the act's significance 
as evidence of an actor's dangerousness do not, however, remedy the damage that 
encouragement causes to the law's commitment to imposing punishment on the basis 
of past conduct, rather than on conduct predicted for the future. This Article 
proposes that the law turn back to that commitment by punishing encouraged acts 
only if the acts are truly harmful or if the defendant himself initiates the 
crime, and by prohibiting the punishment of criminal acts that occur purely on 
the government's instigation. The law must recognize the present breakdown in 
its rule-based assumptions, for only then will it develop a response to 
encouragement that will stem the inroads that this law enforcement tactic has 
made on the fundamental values and principles of the criminal law.

Id. at 
1107-08 (emphasis in original).

[¶126.]            
See also Stavsky, supra, 16 Rutgers L.J. at 989, which stated:

The 
one aspect of entrapment which is universally recognized in the 
United States is 
that at some point police encouragement of crime becomes so egregious as to 
mandate the release of the encouraged defendant.  Defining that point is a matter of 
considerable debate among legal scholars. More attention, however, must first 
focus upon the basic question of why exculpation of the encouraged defendant is 
appropriate. Given the general reluctance of the courts to release an otherwise 
guilty defendant simply because of a procedural irregularity, there must be a 
deep reason for its acceptance in the context of entrapment. However, none of 
the rationales commonly tendered for the entrapment defense justify this 
result.

The 
explanation lies in the belief that entrapment breaches a basic obligation of 
the government to allow a defendant to fully and independently choose whether or 
not to violate the law. Any interference with that choice is in and of itself a 
violation of that obligation, regardless of whether it meets the technical legal 
requirements of the traditional entrapment defense.14

[¶127.]            
Entrapment particularly touches the essence of democracy, a statistic 
autocracy, overruling all real rights on one extreme and uncontrolled 
individuality on the other. Undoubtedly, within the political mores of presently 
exasperated crime and unsuccessful "solutions," a considerable segment of our 
society has a greater craving for security than for freedom. Perhaps as much as 
anything done by this writer in the last seven years, this case and Saldana v. 
State, ___ P.2d ___ (Wyo. 1993) (No. 9024), test the fiber of our belief in 
constitutional law and dignity of the individual in our society. Perhaps Rivera 
or Compton, or the police in Jackson who started this program, are not what is 
important to the history of Wyoming, but what about the students and their 
families in Pinedale and Lyman, or wherever else uncontrolled police activity, 
misconduct or perjury are to be permitted as a course of "just doing 
business?"

[¶128.]            
Wyoming, in 
this case, follows none of its historical precedent and not even the clear 
subjective rule for application to Rivera.  What we find here may cause one to believe 
that a statement which appropriately could join, in reference to equal rights, 
the Great Seal of the State with "the end always justifies the means," for in 
recent justice we do not rely on trust.17

[¶129.]            
I dissent. 

FOOTNOTES

1Officer Bowers admitted at trial that math was 
not his strongest subject.

2A very recent United States Supreme Court 
case, Jacobson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 118 L. Ed. 2d 174 
(1992), appears to implicitly combine the subjective and objective approaches. 
This new method is not of constitutional dimension, and therefore is not binding 
on this court. We await more developments of this new theoretical approach 
before considering it for adoption in this state.  

3Appellant's argument brings to mind the story 
of the French noblewoman who remarked one day to the philosopher Voltaire that 
she would prostitute herself, but only for a million francs each time. When 
Voltaire offered her a much lower price, she objected that he had impugned her 
character. Voltaire responded that her character was no longer at issue, only 
her price. Appellant's character is obvious; he saw a good deal, and he took 
it.

Footnotes for the Dissent

1This man-about-town, 
"undercover" police-sponsored agent, Compton, had an interesting history. Age of 
approximately forty-two, Compton admitted to twenty-eight years 
of use and sale of controlled substances which covered the statutory offenses 
from marijuana and cocaine to heroin. What is fascinating is that the 
impeachment effort of defense counsel, regarding a narcotics arrest, was 
sustained upon objection by the prosecution. The record, otherwise, reveals no 
conviction in the twenty-eight years of his involvement in the "business." The 
particular offense, for which the defense counsel attempted impeachment and 
which was negotiated for Compton's "cooperation," involved acquisition of two 
bottles of codeine "cough syrup" which Compton said an associate had supplied. 
Compton's only other conviction, to 
which he admitted, during his lifetime of drug involvement and crime was an 
offense of possession of stolen property. However, his capacity to escape 
personal responsibility was apparently equaled by his entrapment capability. The 
record reflects that the sting operation for sale of below-market price 
marijuana in the "dry" town netted nine arrests in one afternoon.

2Michael Senneff, Entrapment in the Federal 
Courts, 1 U.S.F.L.Rev. 177, 177 (1966) (quoting 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 45(2), 
at 138) provides the well accepted definition: "Entrapment is `the conception 
and planning of an offense by an officer and the procurement of its commission 
by one who would not have perpetuated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or 
fraud of the officer.'"

3In this case, the informer, 
Compton, was overtly acting as an agent of the state in providing the 
solicitation services for the sales of the controlled substance which had been 
brought to the scene and provided by law enforcement. Com. v. Colon, 33 Mass. App. 
Ct. 304, 598 N.E.2d 1143 (1992). Any person cooperating with a 
law enforcement agency is a "law enforcement agent" for the purpose of 
entrapment. State v. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437 (N.D. 1992).

4To be completely accurate, the prosecutor 
stated, in the memorandum brief attacking contentions regarding the dismissal of 
the following criminal prosecution of another target, that he had only 
considered the informant, Compton, to be unreliable for the purpose of that next 
case, but the prosecutor had not considered Compton to be unreliable or that his 
testimony was not believable with regard to the case against Rivera.

5The author also quoted, as a footnote in the 
law journal, an excerpt from an opinion of Justice McKenna in Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 373, 30 S. Ct. 544, 551, 54 L. Ed. 793 (1910), eighty-three 
years ago, which will serve as a challenge for writer and reader throughout this 
discussion:

"Legislation, both 
statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience of 
evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined 
to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into 
existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be 
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.  This is peculiarly 
true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet 
passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, 
`designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach 
it.' The future is their care and provision for events of good and bad 
tendencies of which no prophecy can be made.  In the application of a constitution, 
therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. 
Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it 
would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have 
little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless 
formulas.  
Right declared in words might be lost in reality."

Greaney, supra, 67 Notre Dame L.Rev. at 795-96 n. 297.

Rights stated in the words of 
the Wyoming Constitution are, by this majority's decision, lost in fact from an 
apparent decisional weakness derived from perceived political reality.  See Ralph A. 
Rossum, The Entrapment Defense and The Teaching of Political Responsibility: The 
Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 6 Am. J.Crim.Law 287 (1978). That 
subject was included in an introduction by Edward G. Mascolo, Due Process, 
Fundamental Fairness, And Conduct That Shocks The Conscience: The Right Not To 
Be Enticed Or Induced To Crime By Government And Its Agents, 7 W.New Eng.L.Rev. 
1, 2 (1984) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S. Ct. 205, 209, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952)) (footnotes omitted):

It is not 
surprising, therefore, that methods employed in the administration of the 
criminal law have generated (and inspired) intense debate concerning the scope 
of permissible or acceptable behavior by government in its efforts to combat the 
destabilizing influences of antisocial behavior within a system of justice 
committed to standards of civilized conduct by government and its agents. In 
short, a free society about to do battle with its criminal elements must be 
prepared to say how far it will permit its government to go in "fighting the 
good fight" against crime. Will that society insist upon standards of conduct 
that, while potentially offensive to "some fastidious squeamishness or private 
sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically," do not "shock[] the 
conscience," or will it sanction methods of law enforcement that make the 
government virtually indistinguishable from the criminal?

The author further stated his direction:

It is the thesis of 
this article that a society which tolerates criminal behavior and methods by its 
government in combatting crime is a society that has fatally blurred the 
fundamental distinction between the rule of law and the lawless enforcement of 
the criminal law, and by so doing, cannot long endure.  Specifically, this 
article will step beyond the Supreme Court's suggestion and will propose a due 
process defense, supplemented by principles of judicial integrity and public 
policy, against outrageous practices of government agents in the enforcement of 
the criminal laws that shock the conscience and offend civilized standards of 
conduct.  
Further, this defense will be an absolute bar to the government invoking 
judicial processes to secure a conviction of an individual against whom such 
methods have been employed. It will require the courts to close their doors to 
"such prostitution of the criminal law" so as "not to be made the instrument of 
wrong."

Mascolo, supra, 7 W. New Eng.L.Rev. at 2-3 (quoting 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 456-57, 53 S. Ct. 210, 218, 
77 L. Ed. 413 (1932) (footnotes omitted).

6Entrapment, as an issue in 
criminal case appellate litigation, has probably replaced ineffectiveness of 
defense counsel and challenged conduct of prosecutors as the most prevalent 
issue in current appeals. A Westlaw search for 1992 under the word "entrapment" 
reveals 106 cases from the state courts and 111 from the federal courts, which 
includes the principal decision of the year, Jacobson v. United States, ___ U.S. 
___, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 118 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1992). Jacobson involved a 
Nebraska farmer enticed by a multiple 
sting operation into the purchase of kiddie porn. No less than fifty law 
journals and other scholarly contributions on the subject of entrapment can be 
found, including a very comprehensive book authored by Professor Paul Marcus, 
The Entrapment Defense (1989). A number of interesting examinations are 
available relating to the political corruption investigation of ABSCAM; the 
court corruption "sting" in Philadelphia; and the Cook County, Illinois 
court corruption investigation known as "Greylord." The Cook County investigation resulted in a 
senate select committee to study undercover activities of the components of the 
Department of Justice, Senate Report No. 682, 97th Congress, 2nd Sess. 369 
(1982). See Tamarkin, The Judge Who Wore A Wire, 70 ABA J. 76 (1984); Katherine 
Goldwasser, After ABSCAM: An Examination of Congressional Proposals to Limit 
Targeting Discretion in Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 Emory L.J. 75 
(1987); and Andrew Majeske, Note, The Greylord Investigation Guidelines: 
Protection for Greylord Attorneys, 16 Loy.U.Chi.L.J. 641 (1985).  

7As a historical reference, a 
portion of this quotation was earlier recognized and the thesis of the case 
approved in the Wyoming entrapment case, Lafleur v. 
State, 533 P.2d 309 
(Wyo. 1975), in an opinion authored 
by Justice A.G. McClintock.

8Like nearly all jurists and most text writers 
and commentators who use the word "defense" for convenience, so will I in this 
dissent, even though philosophically and logically it is found to be an 
inaccurate characterization of either or both entrapment or outrageous 
governmental conduct.

9Considering that outrageous conduct defenses 
fail to be accepted with such regularity, there is a surprising volume of cases 
and commentator analysis. The frequency of attempted use was no doubt prompted 
by the recognized dangers from the associated evidentiary effects from evidence 
of prior misconduct used to show predisposition embodied in the subjective 
approach.  This 
was witnessed by this court in Mondello v. State, 843 P.2d 1152 (Wyo. 1992). See also Ben A. Hardy, 
The Traps of Entrapment, 3 Am. J.Crim.L. 165, 202 (1974), where in conclusion 
and recommendation the author stated:

In summary, it 
appears that the entrapment defense is one of last resort, which must be used 
cautiously. Prior to the trial of the issue every attempt should be made to 
learn as much as possible about the government's case and  predisposition 
evidence. The entrapment defense under the subjective approach is much too 
dangerous a defense to be used as a matter of course, and thus is suggested in 
only a few ideal cases.

See generally on outrageous conduct defenses, Kevin H. 
Marino, Outrageous Conduct: The Third Circuit's Treatment of the Due Process 
Defense, 19 Seton Hall L.Rev. 606 (1989); similarly, Stephen A. Meister, Note, 
When Nothing Is Shocking: The Ninth Circuit Degrades The Outrageous Government 
Conduct Defense, 22 Loy. L.A.L.Rev. 843 (1989); and Richard Lawrence Daniels, 
Note, 
United 
States v. Simpson: 
"Outrageousness!" What Does It Really Mean? - An Examination Of The Outrageous 
Conduct Defense, 18 Sw.U.L.Rev. 105 (1988). Paul Marcus, The Due Process Defense 
In Entrapment Cases: The Journey Back, 27 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 457, 457 n. 1 (1990), 
stated: "Certainly, the argument has proved more successful in state courts than 
in federal courts. See generally, P. Marcus, The Entrapment Defense 308-14 
(1989) (state judges often take more expansive view of due process claims, 
particularly in light of individual state constitutional provisions)."

10See the discussion 
of "creative activity" with reference to the use of the terms in both Sherman, 
356 U.S.  at 372, 78 S. Ct.  at 821 and 
Sorrells, 287 U.S.  at 451, 53 S. Ct.  at 216.  See also Comment, 
Criminal Procedure: Entrapment Rationale Employed To Condemn Government's 
Furnishing of Contraband, 59 Minn.L.Rev. 444, 451 (1974).

11 
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 108 S. Ct. 883, 99 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1988); Hampton v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S. Ct. 1646, 48 L. Ed. 2d 113 
(1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1973); Sherman, 
356 U.S. 369, 78 S. Ct. 819; Rochin, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205; Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S. Ct. 210.

The authoritative text, Marcus, supra, 
provides a well documented history. See also Chambers, supra, 44 Ark.L.Rev. 493; 
Senneff, supra, 1 U.S.F.L.Rev. 177; Webster, supra, 32 Ariz.L.Rev. at 614; and 
Greaney, supra, 67 Notre Dame L.Rev. 745.

12 
A rehearing was denied in Wright, 670 P.2d 1090, and then a writ of certiorari was granted to 
ameliorate the critiqued excessive sentence. It would have been easier to 
recognize that the victim in the first case was the entrapped defendant who did 
a favor in return for the ride he had been provided. The "creative activity" was 
totally in the conduct of the undercover narcotics agent who picked up the 
defendant while he was hitchhiking home.

13The majority's 
abrupt dismissal of Jacobson as "not of constitutional dimension," discloses a 
result-oriented quandary.  In one case, the majority seeks the 
protective umbrella of United States Supreme Court precedent despite the 
specific protection accorded by the Wyoming Constitution. In the present case, 
the majority eschews current United States Supreme Court precedent to favor a 
restrictive view of former precedent. There must be a better explanation of this 
form of rationality because in both cases, the majority upheld the 
conviction.

14Within the 
literature, and in part because of the unitary application of the subjective 
test by the federal courts for federal cases, the subjective rule is 
characterized as the majority rule and the objective rule as the minority rule. 
A trend away from the subjective rule is apparent within state courts. The 
characterization for the state courts of majority/minority has continued from a 
validity created by repetition and no clear delineation is found within the 
literature. In colloquial terms, it is fair to say that the legend has validity 
in re-expression and nobody has stopped to count the rabbits. A fairly recent 
law journal lists thirteen states which have adopted the objective standard by 
either or both statute or case law. Chambers, supra, 44 Ark.L.Rev. at 502 n. 56. 
States listed in that summary include: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New 
Mexico, New 
York, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah and Vermont. Other states which could be 
added would include:  
California, People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947 (1979); North 
Dakota, Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437; Mississippi, Sylar v. State, 340 So. 2d 10 
(Miss. 1976); and Indiana, Baird v. State, 446 N.E.2d 342 
(Ind. 1983). Of this group, at least 
three would constitute hybrid states: New 
Jersey, Talbot, 364 A.2d 9; Indiana, Baird, 446 N.E.2d 342; and 
Florida, Krajewski, 587 So. 2d 1175.  No count 
has been provided by any current authority or case revealing a list of states 
which actually continue to use the subjective test. In current review, those 
states number fewer than the states where a clear directive by case or statute 
for the objective test is found. See, e.g., People v. Colano, 231 
Ill. App.3d 345, 172 Ill.Dec. 916, 
596 N.E.2d 195 (1992); Farris v. Com., 836 S.W.2d 451 (Ky.App. 1992); Wilkey v. 
State, 203 Ga. App. 1, 416 S.E.2d 350 (1992); James, 484 N.W.2d 799; State v. 
Grilli, 304 Minn. 80, 230 N.W.2d 445 (1975); Strong v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1048 
(Ind. App. 1992); State v. Tate, 593 So. 2d 864 (La. App. 1992); and State v. 
King, 17 Kan. App. 2d 349, 838 P.2d 349 (1992).  

15 
Justice Brandeis, in his dissent in Casey, 276 U.S.  at 423, 48 S. Ct.  at 376 
(footnote omitted), stated:

I 
am aware that courts - mistaking relative social values and forgetting that a 
desirable end cannot justify foul means - have, in their zeal to punish, 
sanctioned the use of evidence obtained through criminal violation of property 
and personal rights or by other practices of detectives even more 
revolting.  But 
the objection here is of a different nature. It does not rest merely upon the 
character of the evidence or upon the fact that the evidence was illegally 
obtained. The obstacle to the prosecution lies in the fact that the alleged 
crime was instigated by officers of the Government; that the act for which the 
Government seeks to punish the defendant is the fruit of their criminal 
conspiracy to induce its commission. The Government may set decoys to entrap 
criminals. But it may not provoke or create a crime and then punish the 
criminal, its creature. If Casey is guilty of the crime of purchasing 3.4 grains 
of morphine, on December 31st, as charged, it is because he yielded to the 
temptation presented by the officers. Their conduct is not a defence to him. For 
no officer of the Government has power to authorize the violation of an Act of 
Congress and no conduct of an officer can excuse the violation. But it does not 
follow that the court must suffer a detective-made criminal to be punished. To 
permit that would be tantamount to a ratification by the Government of the 
officers' unauthorized and unjustifiable conduct. Compare Gambino v. 
United States, 275 U.S. 310, 48 S. Ct. 137.

16After a review and 
evaluation of the far reaching authorities and cases, a conclusion can be 
reached that there is a missing link in analysis of causation and persuasion. 
Trap programs, war on drugs, stings and attention to societal conduct crime 
prevention activities have become a major American industry, using perhaps more 
money than American citizens spend with the food industry; at least multiples of 
billions of dollars annually. Any major change would involve significant federal 
(and state) budgetary displacements.

17A career, instead 
of a couple of weeks, could fruitfully be spent in understanding the divergences 
of justice, justification and deterrence intrinsic to a proper discussion of 
entrapment law. The fact that no one has really passed this way before in 
Wyoming adjudicatory history is no reason why it should now be ignored in total 
in a quickly directed effort to affirm the conviction of Rivera. Obviously, 
Professor Paul Marcus has spent a good part of his legal career in that 
endeavor.  
Unaccounted in this short analysis is a broader array of material not 
necessarily referenced which should, however, be taken into account: 1 ALI Model 
Penal Code and Commentaries, § 2.13 (1985); I Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. 
Israel, Criminal Procedure, ch. 5 (1984); Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Modern 
Status of the Law Concerning Entrapment to Commit Narcotics Offense - State 
Cases, 62 A.L.R.3d 110, § 2 (1975); Annotation, Contingent Fee Informant 
Testimony in State Prosecutions, 57 A.L.R.4th 643, § 1[b] (1987); Jerry 
Schreibstein, Note, Entrapment In Light of Mathews v. United States: The 
Propriety Of Inconsistency And The Need For Objectivity, 24 U.S.F.L.Rev. 541 
(1990); Leslie W. Abramson and Lisa L. Lindeman, Entrapment And Due Process In 
The Federal Courts, 8 Am.J.Crim.L. 139 (1980); Goldwasser, supra, 36 Emory L.J. 
75; Troy A. Wolf, Note, Criminal Law - Persistence Pays: Enforcement Efforts To 
Solicit Illegal Activity - United 
States v. Hinton, 908 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1990), 17 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 913, 913 (1991) (quoting Justice 
Felix Frankfurter in Sherman, 356 U.S.  at 384, 78 S. Ct.  at 826, "`Human nature 
is weak enough and sufficiently beset by temptations without government adding 
to them and generating crime.'"); Comment, The Serpent Beguiled Me And I Did Eat 
 The Constitutional Status Of The Entrapment Defense, 74 Yale L.J. 942 (1965). 
(This is only a portion of the source material and commentator analysis now 
available.)