Case Title: Mays v. Neal

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Richard L. MAYS v. James NEAL, Executive
Director of the Supreme Court Committee on
Professional Conduct

96-690                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 17, 1997


1.   Jurisdiction -- jurisdiction over lawyers -- Professional
     Conduct Committee has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider
     issues that fall within parameters of the Model Rules of
     Professional Conduct. -- The supreme court derives its power
     through Amendment 28 to the Arkansas Constitution to establish
     and maintain, through its Committee on Professional Conduct,
     jurisdiction over a lawyer's person by virtue of the issuance
     of his license to practice law; where the appellee's
     complaints were not directed against employees of appellant's
     law firm, but were filed against the attorney-appellant, who
     was subject to the court's jurisdiction by virtue of his
     status as a licensed attorney, the Professional Conduct
     Committee, through the court's supervisory authority, had
     subject-matter jurisdiction to consider those issues that fell
     within the parameters of the Model Rules.

2.   Appeal & error -- appellant received relief requested at
     hearing -- no prejudice shown -- both hearing and action taken
     were valid. -- Where the record reflected that appellant was
     prepared to present his case on the merits on the hearing day,
     and the Committee conceded that point to him, and that
     appellant did not argue that he had been prevented from
     introducing any relevant evidence, appellant received the
     relief he asked of the Committee and showed no prejudice in
     having proceeded; the Committee's hearing and action were
     valid. 

3.   Evidence -- procedural claim never raised below -- suggested
     evidentiary findings harmless -- Committee fully met its
     burden of proof. -- Where appellant objected to two references
     made by the Committee in its written decision because they had
     impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to appellant, yet he
     never raised this objection before the Committee, but instead,
     willingly participated in the hearing, the supreme court,
     after considering all the evidence submitted to the Committee,
     found that the two suggested evidentiary findings in the
     Committee's opinion letter were harmless; the Committee fully
     met its burden of proof. 

4.   Appeal & error -- appeals from action by Committee on
     Professional Conduct reviewed de novo -- Committee's action
     affirmed unless clearly against preponderance of evidence. -- 
     Appeals from any action by the Committee on Professional
     Conduct are heard de novo on the record, and the supreme court
     pronounces such judgment as in its opinion should have been
     pronounced below; the court affirms the Committee's action
     unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the
     evidence, and will not reverse its findings unless they are
     clearly erroneous.

5.   Attorney & client -- proof clear that appellant failed to
     properly communicate with his client -- no error found. -- The
     Committee's decision, that appellant violated Rule 1.4(b) of
     the model Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to
     communicate properly with his client, was not in error where
     there was proof that appellant's law firm failed to explain
     its contract with the client or to make clear early in the
     employment relationship the objectives of that legal
     representation and the client was afforded no opportunity to
     communicate directly with appellant-counsel or to ask him
     questions about her case; the record supported the view that
     appellant had relied entirely upon his nonlawyer staff member
     to communicate with his client even though the client had
     posed questions concerning her legal representation, and she
     was denied the opportunity to resolve those questions by
     meeting with him.
6.   Attorney & client -- practice of law -- why limited to
     performance by licensed lawyers. -- The practice of law is
     limited to performance by licensed lawyers not only to ensure
     professional competence, but because it is in the public
     interest, to ensure that the public be not led to rely upon
     the counseling, in matters of law, by those who are not
     answerable to the courts in this state for the manner in which
     they meet their professional obligations by compliance with
     standards of professional conduct imposed upon those engaging
     in the practice of law; while a lawyer may delegate certain
     tasks to his assistants, he or she, as supervising attorney,
     has the ultimate responsibility for compliance by the non-
     lawyer with the applicable provisions of the Model Rules.  

7.   Attorney & client -- evidence sufficient to support finding --
     appellant assisted nonlawyer in unauthorized practice of law.
     -- The evidence was sufficient to support the Committee's
     finding that appellant violated Rule 5.5(b) of the Model Rules
     of Professional Conduct by assisting a person who was not a
     member of the bar to perform the unauthorized practice of the
     law where, upon review of the record, it was clear that
     appellant failed in this respect both in his firm's initial
     contracting with the client and when negotiating her claim; it
     was a nonlawyer working for appellant who first contacted the
     client to confirm that the law firm had commenced work on the
     client's behalf; there was substantial evidence that appellant
     had provided inadequate supervision over the manner in which
     his assistants negotiated the client's claim; the settlement
     offered was never authorized by the client, yet appellant's
     nonlawyer staff agreed to the amount and a check was sent to
     the firm; appellant failed to supervise his nonlawyer staff
     personnel in meeting his fundamental obligations owed any new
     client, namely, to explain the parties' responsibilities under
     the contract, and to permit the client to ask questions and to
     make informed decisions regarding the representation;
     appellant failed to properly delegate his legal work and
     responsibilities and failed to properly supervise work
     delegated to his assistants; the Committee's decision was
     affirmed.


     Appeal from the Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on
Professional Conduct; Bart Virden, Chairman; affirmed.
     Darrell F. Brown & Associates, P.A., by:  Darrell F. Brown and
Bowden Law Firm, by:  David O. Bowden, for appellant.
     Claibourne W. Patty, Jr., for appellee.
     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     Appellant Richard L. Mays brings this appeal from the appellee
Supreme Court Professional Conduct Committee's reprimand sanction,
having found Mays violated Rules 1.4(b) and 5.5(b) of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.  Rule 1.4(b) directs that a lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
Rule 5.5(b) prohibits a lawyer from assisting a person who is not
a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes
the unauthorized practice of law.
     This dispute arose after Mays's law firm, Mays & Crutcher,
P.A., undertook to represent Vanessa Conley, who on July 18, 1994,
was involved in a motor-vehicle accident in Little Rock.  The other
vehicle involved in the accident was a rental car, which was
insured by Empire Insurance Company.  At the scene of the accident,
a man, later known to be Tim Mason, approached Conley, asking her
who caused the accident.  Conley said that Mason identified himself
as an investigator, and suggested Conley needed legal
representation.  This interchange resulted in Conley signing a
contract employing Mays as her attorney.  Mason gave Conley a
business card bearing the name of Catherine Stevens and instructed
Conley that Stevens was the person Conley should call.  Stevens
later sent a copy of Conley's contract to Empire, along with her
business card. 
     Conley said that, on July 19, 1994, Stevens called Conley's
home and spoke with her husband, and Conley says she returned the
call on July 20, 1994.  Conley claims that, during her conversation
with Stevens, Stevens referred her to the Price Chiropractic
Clinic.   Conley was subsequently treated by the Price Clinic from
about July 25, 1994, to October 21, 1994.  In November 1994,
negotiations to settle Conley's claim took place between Stevens
and Chuck Traylor, who was the claims adjuster with Empire
Insurance Co.  Some confusion and differences occurred between
Stevens and Conley over the method and amount of payment Conley
would approve before reaching any settlement.  Conley also
expressed that, although she had been released by the Price Clinic,
she was still having pain and needed to see another doctor.  Conley
became dissatisfied with the manner in which her case was being
handled, and on November 30, 1994, she went to Mays's office to
retrieve her file.  While Stevens retained possession of Conley's
file because Mays was not present, it is clear the Mays-Conley
relationship had been severed by December 6, 1994 -- the date
Stevens had notified Empire Insurance by letter (with a copy to
Conley) that Mays no longer represented Conley.  The letter also
reflected that Conley had rejected Empire's $9,000.00 offer to
settle, but Mays had retained an attorney's lien on any proceeds to
be paid Conley in the future.  Conley later claimed she had been
unaware of any $9,000.00 offer until she received a copy of the
December 6 letter.   
     Conley subsequently pursued her claim without the assistance
of an attorney, and sought information from Empire Insurance by
writing that Company on March 26, 1995.  Empire's adjuster,
Traylor, responded, indicating that he had not received the
December 6 letter written by Mays, that he had already settled
Conley's claim by having spoken with "Jim," who was with Mays's
firm, and that Conley would have to obtain a letter reflecting Mays
no longer represented her.  In May of 1995, Conley forwarded to
Traylor a copy of Mays's earlier December 6 letter, and informed
Traylor that she had since contacted the Supreme Court Professional
Conduct Committee and complained about Mays's representation.  She
further asked Traylor for a copy of the $9,000.00 check dated
November 30, 1994, which purportedly had been sent to Mays in
settlement of her claim.  Upon receipt of Conley's May 1995 letter,
Traylor sent Conley another letter, wherein he forwarded her a copy
of the $9,000.00 check.  The check had never been cashed.  In
August of 1995, Conley filed her formal complaint against Mays with
the Professional Conduct Committee, alleging eight violations of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, two of which the Committee
eventually found meritorious.  Besides complaining to the Committee
about her initial confusion concerning the manner in which Mays
established his contractual relationship with Conley, she also
complained he failed to communicate and keep her informed
concerning the law firm's negotiations with Empire Insurance
Company in her behalf.
     Mays first controverts Conley's complaints by raising several
procedural points.  None has merit.  Mays initially argues this
court's Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (CUPL) has
prerequisite jurisdiction of this matter because its Rule III
provides in part that "all inquiries and complaints relating to the
unauthorized practice of law shall be directed to the Committee on
the Unauthorized Practice of Law."  He further argues that, because
Rule 5.5(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a
lawyer from assisting a person who is not a member of the bar in
performing the unauthorized practice of law, Conley was required
first to get CUPL to determine what is or is not "the unauthorized
practice of law."  We disagree.  Nothing in either committee's
rules reflect that CUPL's rules in any way preempted the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.  As is obvious from reading them,
the Model Rules deal only with the activities of licensed lawyers,
whereas CUPL's rules are intended to prevent non-lawyers from
practicing law.  
     As this court has recognized earlier, it derives its power
through Amendment 28 to the Arkansas Constitution to establish and
maintain, through its Committee on Professional Conduct,
jurisdiction over a lawyer's person by virtue of the issuance of
his license to practice law.  McCullough v. Neal, 314 Ark. 372,