Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V CARMAN A HARDIMAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 118670

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 25, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 118670  
CARMAN A. HARDIMAN,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
At the conclusion of a jury trial in the circuit court,  
the defendant was convicted of possessing less than fifty  
grams of heroin with intent to deliver, and possession of  
marijuana. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that  
the 
prosecution 
introduced insufficient evidence of guilt.  We  
reverse 
because, 
in 
our judgment, the evidence was sufficient.  
I  
The Court of Appeals has stated the facts:  
On October 22, 1996, police officers executed 
a search warrant at an apartment in Pontiac.  
 
Although several people were in the hallway outside 
the apartment, no one was in the apartment when the 
police entered.  Police stopped defendant in the 
apartment’s parking lot sometime during the raid. 
During the search, officers found in the dining 
room wastebasket eight plastic sandwich bags, each 
with one corner cut away.[1] Police also searched the  
apartment’s northwest bedroom and found in a  
nightstand a letter addressed to defendant at that 
address, six $10 bags of heroin, a $10 bag of 
marijuana, $130 in cash, an ID card, and a loan 
payment book belonging to Rodney Crump. Both male  
and female clothing were found in the bedroom  
closet, including a blue denim dress that contained 
forty $10 packs of heroin in the pocket.  Four  
hundred dollars was found in a sock in a dresser  
drawer.
 Written correspondence and a telephone 
calling card belonging to Crump were found in a 
television 
stand. 
Police 
also 
found 
an  
unpostmarked letter addressed to defendant in the 
mailbox of the apartment. [Unpublished opinion per 
curiam, issued February 6, 2001 (Docket No.  
213402).]  
On the basis of these proofs, a circuit court jury found  
the defendant guilty of possession of less than fifty grams of  
heroin with intent to deliver, and possession of marijuana.  
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), 333.7403(2)(d).2  
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the proofs to be  
insufficient.  From that judgment, the prosecuting attorney  
timely applied to this Court for leave to appeal.  
1 A police officer testified that, in his experience as 
a narcotics officer, he had come across instances in which 
baggies were used to package drugs such as marijuana, crack, 
powder cocaine, and heroin.  The officer explained that the 
drugs are placed in the corner of the baggie, that portion of 
the baggie is twisted or tied off, the corner is cut or torn 
away, and the remaining portion of the baggie is thrown away.  
2 
 The prosecutor’s theory was that defendant and Crump 
lived in the apartment together and jointly possessed the 
drugs found in the bedroom.  Crump was convicted in a separate  
trial.  
2  
 
II  
The 
standard 
for 
reviewing 
an 
issue 
concerning  
sufficiency of the evidence has been explained on several  
prior occasions.  People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 722-723; 597  
NW2d 73 (1999); People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513-514; 489  
NW2d 478 (1992)3; People v Hampton 407 Mich 354, 366; 285 NW2d  
284 (1979). Taking the evidence in the light most favorable  
to the prosecution, the question on appeal is whether a  
rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond  
a reasonable doubt.  
III  
As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, Wolfe  
provides the governing principles for our inquiry:  
A person need not have actual physical 
possession of a controlled substance to be guilty 
of possessing it. Possession may be either actual 
or constructive.  Likewise, possession may be found  
even when the defendant is not the owner of  
recovered narcotics.  Moreover, possession may be 
joint, with more than one person actually or 
constructively possessing a controlled substance.[4]  
The courts have frequently addressed the  
concept of constructive possession and the link 
between a defendant and narcotics that must be  
shown to establish constructive possession. It is  
well established that a person’s presence, by 
itself, at a location where drugs are found is 
insufficient to prove constructive possession. 
Instead, some additional connection between the  
3 Amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).  
4 
 We further observed in Wolfe, supra at 520, that 
constructive possession exists where the defendant has the 
right to exercise control over the narcotics and has knowledge 
of their present.  
3  
 
defendant and the contraband must be shown.  [440 
Mich 519-520 (citations omitted).]  
In the present case, the Court of Appeals said that the  
evidence did not link the defendant to the drugs.  It found no  
“direct evidence” that the defendant resided at the apartment  
or knew about the contraband.  It noted that no fingerprint  
evidence placed the defendant near the drugs; also, no  
evidence established that the defendant owned the dress in  
which the drugs were found.  
The Court of Appeals failed to view the evidence in the  
light most favorable to the prosecution.  Circumstantial  
evidence suggested the defendant resided in the apartment;  
both the mailbox and nightstand contained mail addressed to  
her, and she was found in the rear parking lot.  The contents  
of the nightstand and closet supported the prosecuting  
attorney’s theory that the defendant and Mr. Crump shared the  
bedroom.  
The dress containing packaged heroin in the closet  
permitted a reasonable inference that the defendant possessed  
the drugs.  No evidence that another woman resided at the  
apartment is in the record.  The packaging of the heroin in  
the dress suggested an intent to deliver.5  
5 A police officer testified that the heroin was packaged 
in four “bundles” or packs of ten. He explained that heroin 
is commonly sold on the street as a “bundle.” 
No  
paraphernalia associated with the use of drugs was found in 
this bedroom.  Finally, he testified that, in his opinion, on 
the basis of all the circumstances, including packaging, the 
heroin was possessed for delivery, not for personal use.  
4  
 
 
As detailed above, the evidence that supported the  
inference of defendant’s residence at the apartment was  
strong:  two letters addressed to defendant were found at the  
residence—one in the mailbox and one (correspondence from a  
local government agency) in a nightstand in the bedroom.  
Women’s 
clothing 
was 
found 
in 
the 
bedroom 
closet.  
Additionally, defendant was found by the police in the parking  
lot behind the apartment.  Viewed in a light most favorable to  
the prosecution, this evidence permitted as a reasonable  
inference that defendant resided in the apartment.  
Regarding the claim that the letter addressed to defendant  
might have been found in one nightstand, while the cocaine,  
marijuana, and items of identification pertaining to Rodney  
Crump might have been found in another nightstand, there is no  
evidence that there was more than one nightstand in the  
bedroom.  The opinion of the Court of Appeals states that the  
police “found in a nightstand a letter addressed to defendant  
at that address, six $10 bags of heroin, a $10 bag of  
Although defendant has challenged the sufficiency of the 
proofs generally, she has not specifically challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence regarding intent to deliver. 
Intent to deliver can be inferred from “the quantity of 
narcotics in a defendant’s possession, from the way in which 
those narcotics are packaged, and from other circumstances 
surrounding the arrest.” Wolfe, supra at 524. The evidence  
in this case, including the quantity and packaging of the 
narcotics, along with the discarded baggies with one corner 
cut off and the lack of use paraphernalia, is sufficient to 
justify a finding that the possessor intended to deliver the 
drugs.  See People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 271, n 4; 536 NW2d  
517 (1995).  
5  
marijuana, $130 in cash, an ID card, and a loan payment book  
belonging to Rodney Crump.”  Slip op at 1. 
(Emphasis  
supplied.)  Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to  
the prosecution, Wolfe, supra at 515, and recognizing that  
“possession may be joint,” id. at 520, we must conclude that  
a rational trier of fact could have decided that the presence  
of the letter in the nightstand supported the reasonable  
inference that defendant possessed—even if jointly—the drugs  
that were also located in that nightstand.  
Next, the prosecution’s decision not to directly  
demonstrate that the dress in the closet fit defendant did not  
invalidate the reasonable inference that it was her dress.  
“Even in a case relying on circumstantial evidence, the  
prosecution 
need 
not 
negate 
every 
reasonable 
theory 
consistent  
with the defendant’s innocence, but need merely introduce  
evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable jury in the face  
of 
whatever 
contradictory 
evidence 
the 
defendant 
may 
provide.”  
People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 273, n 6; 536 NW2d 517 (1995).  
The prosecution was not required to prove a negative:  that  
the dress could not have belonged to some other unknown  
female.  In light of the clear evidence that defendant resided  
in the apartment, and specifically in the northwest bedroom of  
the apartment, the presence of women’s clothing in the closet  
of that bedroom supported the reasonable inference that such  
clothing—including the dress—belonged to defendant.  
6  
All these attacks on the verdict essentially coalesce  
around the proposition that the jury violated the rule  
articulated in People v Atley, 392 Mich 298; 220 NW2d 465  
(1974), that established that an inference can not be built  
upon an inference to establish an element of the offense.  
This is indeed the black letter holding of Atley standing  
alone. However, virtually from the time of its publication,  
Atley was apparently felt to be unworkable and has been the  
subject of judicial redefinition by a series of decisions.  
Before discussing those cases, however, it is useful to  
understand the conceptual problems with forbidding the  
building of an inference upon an inference. It appears that  
the doctrine forbidding the piling of an inference upon an  
inference arose from the intuitive view that circumstantial  
evidence was less probative or reliable than direct evidence.  
Despite its initial appeal, this view is hard to justify as a  
logical 
proposition 
and has accordingly been assailed by legal  
scholars. One is the distinguished commentator in the field  
of evidence, Professor John Henry Wigmore, who dismissed the  
doctrine as follows:  
It was once suggested that an inference upon 
an inference will not be permitted, i.e., that a 
fact desired to be used circumstantially must 
itself be established by testimonial evidence, and 
this suggestion has been repeated by several courts 
and sometimes actually has been enforced.  
* * *  
There is no such orthodox rule; nor can there 
be. If there were, hardly a single trial could be  
7  
 
adequately prosecuted. . . . 
In these and  
innumerable daily instances we build up inference 
upon inference, and yet no court (until in very 
modern times) ever thought of forbidding it.  All  
departments of reasoning, all scientific work, 
every day’s life and every day’s trials proceed 
upon such data.  The judicial utterances that 
sanction 
the 
fallacious 
and 
impracticable 
limitation, 
originally 
put 
forward 
without  
authority, must be taken as valid only for the 
particular evidentiary facts therein ruled upon. 
[1A Wigmore, Evidence (Tiller rev), § 41, pp 1106, 
1111.]  
Courts 
attempting 
to 
cabin 
the 
“fallacious 
and  
impractical 
limitation” of this theory are many, including the  
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in  
Dirring v United States, 328 F2d 512, 515 (CA 1, 1964), which  
gave the rule a gloss that left little of the original  
doctrine. The court stated:  
The defendant cautions us against “piling 
inference upon inference.”  As interpreted by the 
defendant this means that a conviction could rarely 
be justified by circumstantial evidence. . . .  The  
rule is not that an inference, no matter how 
reasonable, is to be rejected if it, in turn, 
depends upon another reasonable inference; rather 
the question is merely whether the total evidence, 
including reasonable inferences, when put together 
is sufficient to warrant a jury to conclude that 
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . .  
.  If enough pieces of a jigsaw puzzle fit together 
the subject may be identified even though some 
pieces are lacking.  
Echoing this analysis, the Arizona Supreme Court, in  
recently abandoning what it referred to as the “obsolescent  
inference upon inference rule,” cited Wigmore’s observation  
that the rule “was based on the assumption that circumstantial  
evidence is intrinsically weaker than testimonial evidence”  
8  
and then rejected that view, stating that “[i]t is now well­
settled, however, in Arizona and elsewhere, in civil and  
criminal cases, that direct and circumstantial evidence have  
equal probative worth.”  Lohse v Faulkner, 176 Ariz 253, 259;  
860 P2d 1306 (1992).6  
Following an approach similar to the First Circuit’s in  
Dirring, our courts have parsed and refined terms so as to  
leave little remaining of Atley. In fact, it was criticized,  
but not explicitly rejected, by this Court in People v Nowack,  
462 Mich 392, 403, n 2; 614 NW2d 78 (2000), after we had  
earlier made clear in People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 61;  
508 NW2d 114 (1993), our disillusionment with the rule by  
quoting Professor Edward J. Imwinkelreid:  
At one time, several American jurisdictions 
adhered to the view that an inference cannot be  
based upon another inference.  That view made it  
difficult to introduce evidence which relied on  
lengthy chains of inference for its logical 
relevance.  In particular, that view made it  
difficult 
to 
introduce 
uncharged 
misconduct  
evidence which relied on intermediate inferences  
for its relevance. 
Modernly, the courts have 
discredited the “no inference on an inference”  
rule.  The acid test is logical relevance, and a 
logically relevant act is admissible even when the 
finding of logical relevance requires a long chain 
of 
intervening 
inferences. [Imwinkelreid, Uncharged 
Misconduct Evidence, § 2:18, p 98.]  
6 See also Commonwealth v Dostie, 425 Mass 372, 375-376; 
681 
NE2d 
282 
(1997)(“In cases where circumstantial evidence is 
introduced, we have never required that every inference be  
premised on an independently proven fact; rather, we have 
permitted, in carefully defined circumstances, a jury to make 
an inference based on an inference to come to a conclusion of  
guilt or innocence”).  
9  
 
The way for VanderVliet and Nowack was made easier by the  
handling of the doctrine by our Court of Appeals in People v  
Orsie, 83 Mich App 42, 46; 268 NW2d 278 (1978). 
There the  
Court first observed that the Atley Court had admitted that  
the doctrine “is a very difficult concept at best,” and then  
noted that the doctrine is now “generally discredited” and  
held in “ill repute.” Quoting from an Indiana Supreme Court  
case, Shutt v State, 233 Ind 169, 174; 117 NE2d 892 (1954),  
the 
Court 
narrowed 
the doctrine by confining its applicability  
as follows:  “an inference cannot be based upon evidence which  
is uncertain or speculative or which raises merely a  
conjecture or possibility.”  Orsie, supra at 47. 
This, of  
course, implicitly allows inferences that are logical and  
reasonable, much as the Dirring court discussed.  The Orsie  
Court concluded that there was “nothing inherently wrong or  
erroneous in basing a valid inference upon a valid inference”  
and concluded that this was not contrary to Supreme Court  
precedent, but rather, was “consistent with the substance of  
those decisions.” Id. at 48.  
In further clarifying the Orsie reading of Atley, the  
Court of Appeals in People v McWilson, 104 Mich App 550, 555;  
305 NW2d 536 (1981), held:  
[T]he fact-finder is not prevented from making 
more than one inference in reaching its decision. 
That is, if each inference is independently 
supported by established fact, any number of  
inferences may be combined to decide the ultimate 
question.  
10  
  
McWilson, which was, of course, the effort of a Court of  
Appeals panel that was unhappy, but nevertheless bound by  
Atley, is an improvement because it narrowed Atley. Yet, that  
having been said, the Court of Appeals was constrained to stay  
within the template of Atley. 
This Court is not so  
constrained; the fact is Atley is flawed and must be  
overruled. 
Atley does not comport with the later-enacted  
rules of evidence and, in particular, with MRE 401, which  
defines relevant evidence as that having “any tendency to make  
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the  
determination of the action more probable or less probable  
than it would be without the evidence.”  Thus, if evidence is  
relevant and admissible, it does not matter that the evidence  
gives rise to multiple inferences or that an inference gives  
rise to further inferences.  The MRE 401 test is, as Professor  
Imwinkelreid has articulated, “logical relevance.”  
Accordingly, when reviewing sufficiency of the evidence  
claims, courts should view all the evidence—whether direct or  
circumstantial—in 
a 
light most favorable to the prosecution to  
determine whether the prosecution sustained its burden.  It is  
for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine  
what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to  
determine the weight to be accorded those inferences.  In  
compliance with MRE 401, we overrule “the inference upon an  
inference” rule of Atley and its progeny.  
11  
 
To focus now on inferences, without the evidentiary  
distortions occasioned by Atley, we can deduce that the  
presence of forty $10 packets of heroin in the dress supported  
the reasonable inference that whoever owned the dress had  
knowledge of the presence of that substantial quantity of  
heroin in the pocket. The inference that the dress belonged  
to whoever resided in the bedroom was supported by the  
recognition that, ordinarily, clothes in a bedroom closet  
belong to the occupants of the bedroom. Defendant’s identity  
as the female occupant of the bedroom could be inferred by the  
letter addressed to her that was found in the nightstand, an  
inference that was also supported by the letter in the mailbox  
and defendant’s apprehension in the adjoining parking lot.  
Therefore, given the reasonable inferences outlined above,  
each of which are supported by established facts, it was an  
entirely reasonable conclusion that the dress belonged to  
defendant and that she knew there were forty $10 packets of  
heroin in the pocket.  
In 
this 
case, 
all 
the 
evidence, 
direct 
and  
circumstantial,7 as well as all reasonable inferences that may  
be drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to  
the prosecution, Wolfe, supra, is sufficient to support  
defendant’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.  
7 
 
As 
we 
emphasized 
in 
Wolfe, 
supra 
at 
526, 
“circumstantial evidence is oftentimes stronger and more 
satisfactory than direct evidence.” (Citation omitted.)  
12  
 
 
  
Despite acknowledging the requirement that we view the  
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,  
Justices Kelly and Cavanagh, in our view, prefer considering  
the evidentiary inferences from defendant’s perspective.  
Justice Kelly acknowledges that “the jury reasonably  
could have stretched and inferred that defendant resided in  
the apartment.”  Post at 4. This is an admission that should  
end the inquiry.  Yet she continues by offering various  
alternative hypotheses, favorable to defendant, that could be  
drawn from the evidence. She suggests that sometimes people  
send mail to addresses other than where they live and then  
opines that defendant could have come to the parking lot only  
to pick up her mail. Id. While such alternate explanations  
are possible, they are not the proper test of the proofs. The  
reason is that the prosecution is only required to produce  
sufficient evidence to establish guilt; it is not required to  
negate every reasonable theory consistent with a defendant’s  
innocence. Konrad, supra at 273, n 6 (opinion by Brickley,  
C.J.).  
Justice Cavanagh, while willing to overrule Atley and  
affirm a conviction built on inferences derived from  
circumstantial 
evidence, 
argues 
that 
more  
evidence—fingerprints and the admission of the actual dress  
into evidence—would have made the case easier for the jury.  
No one would contest this point, nor would they likely contest  
that in every case hindsight can always conjure up additional  
13  
 
investigative actions that could have been beneficially  
undertaken.  Yet these actions would still only constitute  
additional circumstantial proof of defendant’s residency in  
the apartment and her ownership of the dress. 
If the  
prosecution 
produced 
sufficient 
evidence—and 
we 
have 
concluded  
that it did—that is all that is required. Konrad, supra.  
Once having found that the jury could reasonably draw the  
inferences that it did, and that the evidence, considered with  
those inferences, was sufficient to establish defendant’s  
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the review of the appellate  
court is complete.8  Such alternative musings as are offered  
by the dissents are not the stuff of appellate criminal  
review.  Jurors determine the weight of the evidence; we do  
not. As we said in Wolfe, supra at 514-515:  
[A]ppellate courts are not juries, and even 
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 
they must not interfere with the jury’s role:  
[An appellate court] must remember that the 
jury is the sole judge of the facts.  It is the  
function of the jury alone to listen to testimony, 
weigh the evidence and decide the questions of 
fact. . . . Juries, not appellate courts, see and  
8 The assertion by the dissent that the majority does not 
agree that the evidence must meet the sufficiency requirement 
of Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307; 99 S Ct 2781; 61 L Ed 2d  
560 
(1979)—and 
Hampton, 
Wolfe, 
and 
Johnson, 
supra—is  
incorrect.  We have plainly stated that the Jackson/Hampton  
standard controls the determination whether the evidence was  
sufficient, and we have applied the Jackson/Hampton standard  
in our analysis. Our difference with the dissent is that we  
have concluded, applying that standard to the facts of this 
case, the inferences that could be drawn from the evidence by 
the jury are reasonable and the circumstantial evidence of 
defendant’s guilt is therefore sufficient.  
14  
 
 
 
 
hear witnesses and are in a much better position to 
decide the weight and credibility to be given to 
their testimony. [Citation omitted.]  
In summary, then, it is simply not the task of an appellate  
court to adopt inferences that the jury has spurned.  
Thus, the evidence, when viewed as a whole and in a light  
favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to support a  
finding that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable  
doubt.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court.  MCR  
7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, 
C.J., 
and WEAVER, 
YOUNG, 
and MARKMAN, 
JJ., concurred  
with TAYLOR, J.  
15  
 
 
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 118670  
CARMAN A. HARDIMAN,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I agree that the “inference on an inference” rule,  
articulated in People v Atley, 392 Mich 298; 220 NW2d 465  
(1974), is internally inconsistent and should, therefore, be  
rejected, in spite of its deceptive utility as a bright-line  
safeguard 
against 
the 
admission 
of 
evidence 
lacking 
sufficient  
relevance.  The concerns over tenuous evidentiary links, that  
resulted in the adoption of the rule in Atley, have eased with  
the enactment of the rules of evidence.  Evidence–direct or  
circumstantial–may 
only be admitted when relevant and not more  
prejudicial than probative.  MRE 401, 403. In addition, where  
the evidence fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable  
doubt, a court must order a directed verdict.  People v  
Patrella, 424 Mich 221, 275; 380 NW2d 11 (1985) (“While the  
 
 
 
trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from facts of  
record, it may not indulge in inferences wholly unsupported by  
any 
evidence, 
based 
only upon assumption”).  These evidentiary  
tests more adequately protect the harms Atley attempted to  
prevent.  Therefore, I concur with the majority’s rejection of  
Atley.  
However, I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that the  
evidence was “sufficient to justify a rational trier of fact  
in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  People v Wolfe,  
440 Mich 508, 513-514; 489 NW2d 478 (1992).  Viewing the  
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a  
rational juror could infer the existence of the facts  
necessary to establish the elements of the crimes with which  
defendant was charged. However, I disagree that those facts  
were proven so that a rational juror could find their  
existence beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The officers tested  
nothing in the apartment for fingerprints.  Nor did they seize  
the dress in which the heroin was found; only its photo was  
admitted in evidence. 
No evidence linked the dress to  
defendant, 
other 
than 
the 
circumstantial 
evidence 
of 
residence  
on the basis of the mail found at the apartment.  Clearly, the  
evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that  
defendant knew of the presence of the controlled substances.  
In an attempt to rebuff its dissenting colleagues, the  
majority implies that the discovery of reasonable inferences  
2  
 
 
  
supporting the elements of a crime charged will end the  
inquiry demanded by due process guarantees.  However, this  
ignores the Supreme Court mandate in Jackson v Virginia, 443  
US 307; 99 S Ct 2781; 61 L Ed 2d 560 (1979), that appellate  
courts review the evidence to determine if a rational trier of  
fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  See also  
Wolfe; People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284  
(1979) (adopting Jackson and holding that a trial judge must  
review a directed verdict motion to ensure that a rational  
trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).  
In adopting this standard, the Supreme Court expressly  
considered and rejected the notion that the existence of any  
evidence to support a conviction would satisfy due process  
requirements. Id. at 320. An appellate court has “a duty to  
assess the historic facts when it is called upon to apply a  
constitutional standard to a conviction . . . .”  Id. at 318.  
A “mere modicum” of evidence is insufficient. 
Id. at 320.  
Rather, reviewing judges must do more than simply identify an  
inference; the evidence admitted must be sufficient so that a  
rational trier of fact could find the elements of the crime  
established beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, where  
an element of a crime is supported only by an inference  
establishing a mere modicum of proof–even if the inference  
itself is “reasonable”–a conviction cannot stand.  
Thoughtful judges in the courts below will continue to  
3  
respect the mandate to which they are bound, affirming  
convictions only when a rational trier of fact could find that  
the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Because the evidence does not establish guilt beyond a  
reasonable doubt, I would affirm the result of the Court of  
Appeals.  To hold otherwise would ignore the second step in  
the inquiry articulated in Wolfe and Jackson, and the  
judiciary’s duty to ensure that all elements of a crime be  
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
4  
___________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 118670  
CARMAN A. HARDIMAN,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
The Court of Appeals found insufficient evidence to  
support defendant's convictions of possessing marijuana and  
possessing heroin with intent to deliver.  The majority on  
this Court has reversed that ruling, concluding that the panel  
failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the  
prosecution.  
The majority's decision is plausible only through an  
exaggeration of the strength of the prosecutor's evidence and  
the allowance of stacked inferences. Because I believe that  
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
correctly 
found 
the 
evidence  
insufficient, I respectfully dissent.  
  
I also disagree with overruling the "no inference on an  
inference" rule from People v Atley, 392 Mich 298; 220 NW2d  
465 (1974).  In erasing that twenty-eight-year-old precedent,  
the 
majority 
has 
increased the likelihood that future criminal  
convictions will be based more on speculation than on facts.  
I would leave Atley intact.  
I  
The 
crimes 
of 
possession of marijuana and possession with  
intent to deliver less than fifty grams of heroin both require  
proof of possession.  See MCL 333.7403; People v Wolfe, 440  
Mich 508, 516-517; 489 NW2d 478 (1992). The key question in  
this case is whether, when the evidence is viewed most  
favorably to it, the prosecution carried its burden of showing  
knowing possession beyond a reasonable doubt.  
In establishing the element of possession,  
"[t]he ultimate question is whether, viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the  
government, the evidence establishes a sufficient 
connection between the defendant and the contraband  
to support the inference that the defendant  
exercised 
a 
dominion 
and 
control 
over 
the  
substance."  [Id. at 521, quoting United States v  
Disla, 805 F2d 1340, 1350 (CA 9, 1986).]  
Reasonable inferences can be made from the facts presented,  
but the trier of fact cannot "indulge in inferences wholly  
unsupported by any evidence, based only upon assumption."  
People v Petrella, 424 Mich 221, 275; 380 NW2d 11 (1985).  
The prosecution's theory in this case was that defendant  
2  
constructively possessed the marijuana and heroin that police  
located in an apartment.  Constructive possession requires  
evidence showing that the accused knew about the drugs and  
could exercise control over them.  The fact is that defendant  
was never found to be present in the apartment in question.  
She was in a nearby parking lot. Showing that she was in the  
vicinity was not sufficient to prove that she constructively  
possessed the drugs. Wolfe, supra at 520.  
II  
It is without dispute in this case that no evidence  
directly linked defendant to the drugs.  There was no claim  
that her fingerprints were on the container of marijuana  
located in a nightstand in a bedroom.  Heroin was found in the  
pocket of someone's dress in a closet.  Cross-examination  
showed that the police did not attempt to size the dress or in  
any other way identify it as belonging to defendant.  The  
record did not even show how many people lived in the  
apartment.  
The evidence that was alleged to connect defendant to the  
drugs, all circumstantial, consisted of (1) one piece of mail  
addressed to her and found in the mailbox and one piece found  
in a drawer, which drawer may or may not have contained  
marijuana, (2) defendant's presence in a nearby parking lot,  
and (3) an unidentified dress in a bedroom closet with heroin  
3  
 
in the pocket.  The majority concludes that the sum of this  
evidence permits the inferences that defendant lived in the  
apartment and possessed the marijuana and heroin found there.  
I disagree.  
From 
the 
evidence of the letters and defendant's presence  
in the parking lot, the jury reasonably could have stretched  
and inferred that defendant resided in the apartment.  This is  
inference number one. Even viewed in a light most favorable  
to the prosecution, it is weak.  People sometimes have mail  
sent to an address where they do not live.  Among other  
possibilities, defendant could have come to the parking lot to  
pick up her mail. The fact that it is such a weak inference  
takes on great significance when one realizes how much depends  
on it.  
The jury could have inferred that defendant had control  
over the drawer containing marijuana only on the basis of the  
inference that she lived in the apartment.  From that it could  
have inferred that she knew of the marijuana and exercised  
control over it.  On the basis of the inference that she lived  
in the apartment, it could have inferred that the dress in the  
closet belonged to her.  From that it could have inferred that  
she knew of and possessed the heroin in the dress pocket.  
These are inferences two, three, four, and five.  
But the jury could not have reached the second and fourth  
4  
 
 
inferences without having the first on which to base them. It  
could not have reached the third and fifth inferences without  
having the second and fourth on which to base them.  Thus, the  
finding of guilt must be made on the basis of stacked  
inferences.  The evidence fails to sustain the inferences  
needed to find defendant guilty.  
III  
In this case, the great value of the Atley "no inference  
on an inference" rule is that its application leaves no  
lingering doubt that the evidence will not support the  
verdict.  The rule has received some criticism in case law and  
from legal scholars, but the majority's overruling of it today  
is unwarranted and dangerous.  
The rule provides a needed scale on which to weigh  
inferences.  It forces an assessment of whether they are both  
reasonable and supported by facts introduced in evidence. It  
deters speculation based on unfounded inferences, making it  
less likely that a weak case will succeed.  In so doing, it  
reinforces 
a 
fundamental principle of criminal law, that guilt  
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Criticism of the rule should be weighed against the fact  
that it serves a useful purpose and has done so for decades.1  
1  The "no inference on an inference" rule was initially 
adopted by this Court eighty-four years ago in the context of 
(continued...)  
5  
 
The 
reasoning 
of 
the 
majority 
in 
discarding 
it 
is  
unpersuasive.  
IV  
I agree with Justice Cavanagh's position that the  
evidence was not sufficient to prove defendant's guilt beyond  
a reasonable doubt.  Evidentiary rule MRE 401 defines relevant  
evidence.  The rule does not state that all inferences are  
permissible.
 Nor does Michigan case law permit such a  
conclusion.
 Rather, inferences must be reasonable. 
See  
Petrella, supra. 
The inferences that must be drawn here  
respecting 
defendant's knowledge of and control over the drugs  
found in the apartment are not reasonable.  
V  
No matter how favorably to the prosecution one views the  
evidence 
here, 
a 
rational factfinder could not conclude beyond  
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
defendant 
constructively 
possessed 
the  
drugs.  Application of Atley's "no inference on an inference"  
1 (...continued) 
civil matters.  See, e.g., Ginsberg v Burroughs Adding Machine  
Co, 204 Mich 130; 170 NW 15 (1918).  Forty-seven years ago, it 
was applied to criminal law in People v Petro, 342 Mich 299; 
70 NW2d 69 (1955).  
Since then, numerous cases have relied on the rule in 
criminal appeals.  See, e.g., People v Blume, 443 Mich 476, 
485-486, n 14; 505 NW2d 843 (1993); People v McGregor, 45 Mich 
App 397; 206 NW2d 218 (1973); People v Smith, 21 Mich App 717; 
176 NW2d 430 (1970); People v Eaves, 4 Mich App 457; 145 NW2d 
260 (1966).  
6  
 
rule confirms it.  The evidence is too weak to support the  
convictions.  Moreover, the majority's decision to overrule  
Atley impedes the proper administration of justice.  It  
removes a safeguard designed and used for decades to prevent  
a finding of guilt based on speculation, alone.  
I would affirm the Court of Appeals conclusion that the  
evidence is insufficient to support the convictions of  
possession and possession with intent to deliver. 
In  
addition, I would reaffirm the significance and viability of  
the "no inference on an inference" rule established in Atley.  
7