Case Title: Johnson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99, 2004

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LEON F. JOHNSON, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 99, 2004 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID 0202010750 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: September 23, 2004 
  Decided: November 4, 2004 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 4th of November 2004, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On February 13, 2004, the defendant-appellant, Leon Johnson, 
was found guilty of violating the no-contact provision of an earlier-imposed 
probationary sentence.  The Superior Court resentenced Johnson to three and 
a half years at Level V imprisonment to be suspended after serving one year 
for two years of decreasing levels of supervision.  This is Johnson’s appeal. 
(2) 
Johnson's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Johnson's counsel asserts that, based upon 
 
 
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a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Johnson's attorney informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Johnson with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Johnson also was informed of his 
right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Johnson has raised several 
issues for this Court's consideration.  The State has responded to Johnson’s 
arguments, as well as the position taken by Johnson's counsel, and has 
moved to affirm the Superior Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
(4) 
The record reflects that Johnson pled guilty on December 2, 
2002 to one count of second degree assault and one count of terroristic 
threatening.  The incident involved Johnson holding a knife to the throat of 
                                                 
1Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
 
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the victim, who was his girlfriend.  The Superior Court sentenced Johnson to 
a total period of four years at Level V imprisonment, suspended for time 
served and three years at Level II probation.  A condition of the sentence 
required that Johnson have no contact with the victim.  In February 2003 and 
again in September 2003, Johnson was found in violation of his probation by 
having contact with the victim.  Following the second VOP hearing, the 
Superior Court added a zero tolerance provision to the conditions of the 
sentence.   
(5) 
At the February 2004 VOP hearing, Johnson’s former probation 
officer testified that he saw Johnson riding in a car with the victim.  Johnson 
did not deny the allegation.  His sole contention was that he and the victim 
love each other and that she wanted to have contact with him.  The Superior 
Court found Johnson in violation of his probation.  The Superior Court 
revoked Johnson’s probation and sentenced him to serve a year in prison 
followed by decreasing levels of supervision.   
 
(6) 
Although not easily understood, Johnson appears to raise three 
arguable claims in this appeal.  First, he contends the Superior Court denied 
him due process because he was not allowed to ask leading questions of an 
unidentified hostile witness.  Johnson next claims that the Superior Court 
 
 
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never imposed a zero tolerance provision with respect to the condition of his 
probation prohibiting contact with the victim.  Finally, Johnson alleges a 
double jeopardy violation.  Although it is not entirely clear, Johnson appears 
to argue that he could not be found guilty on three separate occasions of 
violating probation by having contact with the victim. 
 
(7) 
None of these contentions has merit.  To the extent Johnson 
argues that the Superior Court refused to permit him to ask leading questions 
of a hostile witness in accordance with Delaware Rule of Evidence 611(c), it 
is difficult to assess Johnson’s argument because he has not identified the 
alleged hostile witness.  In any event, there is nothing in the transcript of the 
VOP hearing to support Johnson’s contention that the Superior Court denied 
him the right to ask leading questions of a hostile witness.  Moreover, the 
Delaware Rules of Evidence do not apply to VOP hearings.2  Accordingly, 
this first claim is without merit. 
 
(8) 
Furthermore, Johnson’s contention that the Superior Court 
never imposed a zero tolerance provision with respect to the no-contact 
restriction is contradicted by the record.  The Superior Court’s sentencing 
order clearly prohibited Johnson from having contact with the victim.   
                                                 
2 Brewington v. State, Del. Supr., No. 525, 2001, Veasey, C.J. (May 20, 2002) 
(citing Del. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3)). 
 
 
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Following his second VOP adjudication, the Superior Court’s sentencing 
order incorporated by reference all previous conditions of the sentence, 
including the no-contact provision.  It also clearly imposed a zero tolerance 
for Johnson’s violation of any conditions of his sentence.  Johnson’s 
contention to the contrary is simply unsupported by the record.  
 
(9) 
Finally, Johnson asserts an unspecified double jeopardy 
violation.  He appears to argue that principles of double jeopardy should 
have prohibited the State from prosecuting him more than once for violating 
probation by having contact with the victim.  While it is true as a general 
rule that double jeopardy prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same 
offense,3 that principle does not apply in Johnson’s case.  While the nature 
of his probation violations was similar, i.e. having contact with the victim, 
the contact occurred on multiple occasions that were “separated in time and 
space.”4  His multiple probation violations, therefore, did not constitute the 
“same” offense for double jeopardy purposes. 
(10) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Johnson’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Johnson's counsel has made a 
                                                 
3 See Poteat v. State, 840 A.2d 599, 602 (Del. 2003). 
4 Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485, 491 (Del. 2003). 
 
 
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conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Johnson could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
Justice