Case Title: State v. Waushara County Board of Adjustment

Citation: 2004 WI 56

Docket Number: 2002AP002400

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 56 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2400 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Waushara County Board of Adjustment,  
          Defendant, 
 
G. Edwin Howe and Suzanne Howe,  
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 18, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 4, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waushara   
 
JUDGE: 
Lewis Murach   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the intervenors-defendants-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Brian W. McGrath, Erik G. Weidig and Foley & 
Lardner, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Brian W. McGrath. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by P. 
Philip Peterson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas D. Larson and 
Debra P. Conrad, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Realtors 
Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel M. Olson, 
Madison, on behalf of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William P. O’Connor, 
Tracy K. Kuczenski, Mary Beth Peranteau and Wheeler, VanSickle & 
Anderson, S.C., Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Association of 
Lakes, and oral argument by William P. O’Connor. 
 
2004 WI 56 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2400  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 244) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Waushara County Board of Adjustment,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
G. Edwin Howe and Suzanne Howe,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 18, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   G. Edwin and Suzanne Howe 
(Howes) appeal a decision of the Court of Appeals, District IV, 
affirming the circuit court's reversal of the Waushara County 
Board of Adjustment's (Board) decision to grant the Howes' 
request for an area variance.  We must resolve the following 
issue:  In light of the interplay between Snyder v. Waukesha 
County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468, 247 N.W.2d 98 
No. 
02-2400   
 
2 
 
(1976), 
State 
v. 
Kenosha 
County 
Bd. 
of 
Adjustment, 
218 
Wis. 2d 396, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998), and State v. Outagamie 
County Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 
N.W.2d 376, what is the correct legal standard to be applied by 
a board of adjustment when considering whether to grant an area 
variance?  More specifically, is the correct legal standard 
whether the failure to receive the variance will create, for the 
property owner, an unnecessary hardship in light of the purposes 
of the zoning ordinance, or is it whether the owner will have no 
reasonable use of the property without a variance? 
¶2 
We conclude that, in evaluating whether to grant an 
area variance to a zoning ordinance, a board of adjustment 
should focus on the purpose of the zoning law at issue in 
determining whether an unnecessary hardship exists for the 
property owner seeking such variance.  We further conclude that 
the facts of the case should be analyzed in light of that 
purpose, and that boards of adjustment must be afforded 
flexibility so that they may appropriately exercise their 
discretion. 
 
We 
also 
again 
emphasize 
and 
recognize 
the 
presumption that the board's decision is correct.  We reaffirm 
Snyder's definition of the statutory term "unnecessary hardship" 
because it best encompasses the appropriate test for granting an 
area variance. "No reasonable use," as set forth in Kenosha 
County, is no longer applicable when an area variance is being 
considered.  Moreover, while there is a claim that the variance 
implicates shoreland zoning concerns, it should be noted that 
the proposed addition would not bring the Howes' home any closer 
No. 
02-2400   
 
3 
 
to Silver Lake.  Thus, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I 
 
¶3 
The Howes own a single family home located on a .324 
acre parcel of land on Silver Lake in Waushara County.  The 
Howes' property is bordered on the northeast by Silver Lake.  
State Highway 73 borders the southwest portion of the Howes' 
property.  According to Waushara County Ordinance No. 76 
§ 2.14(1),1 a 110-foot setback is required from the house on the 
property to Highway 73.  Waushara County Ordinance No. 76 
§ 2.14(2)2 further requires a 75-foot setback from Silver Lake's 
                                                 
1 2.14  Setback 
 . . .  
(1)  Highway Setback:  All state and federal highways 
in 
the 
county 
are 
hereby 
designated 
Class 
A 
highways. . . .  
  
Class A highway setback shall be 110 feet from the 
centerline of the highway or 50 feet from the right-
of-way line, whichever is greater.   
 . . .  
2 2.14  Setback 
 . . .  
(2)  Water Setback:  All buildings and structures, 
except those enumerated below, shall be set back at 
least 75 feet from the ordinary high water mark of 
navigable waters,  . . . . 
No. 
02-2400   
 
4 
 
ordinary high water mark to the house.  The Howes' lot is 120 
feet deep.  Thus, because there is no building envelope3 on their 
property, it is impossible for the Howes to comply with the 
abovementioned ordinances. 
 
¶4 
 Waushara County Ordinance No. 76 § 2.14(3)4 allows for 
an averaged setback if there are existing homes on either side 
of the property in question that are built with less than the 
required 75-foot setback.  Under § 2.14(3), the applicable 
setback requirement for the Howes' home is 35 feet.  The Howes' 
home is between 30 to 34 feet from Silver Lake and, although its 
distance from Silver Lake is commensurate to that of its 
neighbors, the Howes acknowledge that it is still between one to 
                                                 
3 In using the term "building envelope," we intend to refer 
to the fact that there is no space on the Howes' property in 
which a building can be constructed that would comply with both 
of the applicable setback requirements. 
4 2.14  Setback 
 . . .  
(3)  Reduced Building Setback:  A setback less than 
that required by Section 2.14(1) or (2) may be 
permitted by the Zoning Administrator where there is 
at 
least 
one 
dwelling 
on 
either 
side 
of 
the 
applicant's lot, within 200 feet of the proposed site 
built to less than the required setback.  In such 
case, the setback shall be the average of the nearest 
dwelling on each side of the proposed site or, if 
there is an existing dwelling on only one side, the 
setback 
shall 
be 
the 
average 
of 
the 
existing 
building's and the required setback.  In no case shall 
averaging allow a setback of less than 35 feet from 
the ordinary high water mark. . . .  
  
No. 
02-2400   
 
5 
 
five feet too close to Silver Lake.  Nevertheless, the Howes 
home is not in danger of being destroyed.  Because their home 
existed prior to the enactment of the ordinance, it is a legal 
nonconforming structure.5 
 
¶5 
Although the Howes primarily use their home as a 
seasonal residence, their long-term goal is to use the property 
as their primary residence in retirement.  To this end, they 
acquired the adjoining lot and tore down the existing structure 
on the lot, so as to provide enough space for the construction 
of a small barn.  In 1989, the Howes began a series of 
improvements to transition their home into a place suitable for 
retirement.  The Howes' first improvement connected the existing 
garage on their property to their home.  In 1994, the Howes 
added a second story to their home and constructed a roof over 
an existing deck.  These improvements did not bring the Howes' 
home any closer to Silver Lake.  In each case, the Howes request 
for a variance was granted.  For their most recent improvement 
plans, the Howes applied for a building permit to construct a 
10-foot by 20.5-foot addition to their living room and to build 
                                                 
5 2.10  Nonconforming Structures and Uses 
(1) 
Continued Use:  Any nonconforming building, 
structure or use which existed lawfully at the 
time of the adoption of this ordinance or 
amendment thereto may be continued although 
such building or use does not conform with the 
provisions 
of 
ordinance 
subject 
to 
the 
limitations listed in Section 2.10(2). 
 . . .  
No. 
02-2400   
 
6 
 
a 4-foot by 10-foot porch, which would extend their existing 
outside porch to the edge of their home once the living room 
addition was constructed.  The Howes were denied the permit, 
pursuant to Waushara County Ordinance No. 76 § 2.10(2)(b),6 
because the cumulative value of their previous improvements was 
in excess of 50 percent of their home's equalized assessed 
value.7 
 
¶6 
In 2001, the Howes requested that the Board grant them 
a variance from Waushara County Ordinance No. 76 § 2.10(2)(b).  
Before the hearing regarding the Howes' variance request, the 
Board viewed the Howes' property and noted that the proposed 
construction would not bring the home any closer to Silver Lake.  
                                                 
6 2.10  Nonconforming Structures and Uses 
 . . .  
(2) 
Limitations: 
 . . .  
(b)  No nonconforming structure or use during its 
total lifetime shall be enlarged or expanded in excess 
of 50% of its equalized assessed value over the life 
of the structure or project unless permanently changed 
to 
conform 
with 
the 
regulations 
of 
this 
ordinance. . . .  
7 While the dissent focuses on the fact that the Howes' home 
was near the shore of Silver Lake, we feel that it bears further 
emphasis that the Howes sought a variance from the 50 percent 
rule in § 2.10(b), which relates to nonconforming structures and 
uses, not from the shoreland zoning provisions, which are in 
Section 3 of Waushara County Zoning Ordinance 76, entitled 
"Waushara County Floodplain Ordinance."  Section 3 of that 
ordinance 
is 
entitled 
"General 
Shoreland 
Provisions" 
and 
encompasses what would generally be known as the shoreland 
zoning ordinance for Waushara County. 
No. 
02-2400   
 
7 
 
The Board held a hearing and ultimately approved the Howes' 
variance application in accordance with Waushara County Zoning 
Ordinance  No. 76 § 25.05.8  The Board concluded that enforcing 
the exact terms of the zoning ordinance would result in 
unnecessary hardship for the Howes.  Using its powers under 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c)(2001-02),9 
the 
Board 
granted 
the 
variance. 
                                                 
8 § 25.05 Principles Guiding Board Decisions 
The following are principles that shall guide the 
County Board of Adjustment: 
(1) 
The burden is upon the appellant to prove the 
need for a variance. 
(2) 
Pecuniary hardship, loss of profit, self-imposed 
hardships, such as that caused by ignorance, 
deed restrictions, proceeding without a permit, 
or illegal sales, are not sufficient reasons for 
granting a variance. 
(3) 
The 
Board 
is 
bound 
to 
accept 
the 
zoning 
ordinance and map as being correct. 
(4) 
The plight of the appellant must be unique, such 
as a shallow or steep parcel of land, or 
situation caused by other than his own action. 
(5) 
The hardship justifying a variance must apply to 
individual appellants parcel or structure and 
not generally to other properties in the same 
district. 
(6) 
The variance must not be detrimental to adjacent 
properties. 
(7) 
The Board of Adjustment in fulfilling its duties 
may modify, alter, or change any application. 
9 Unless 
otherwise 
indicated, 
all 
references 
to 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 edition. 
No. 
02-2400   
 
8 
 
 
¶7 
At the request of the Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR), the State filed a complaint for certiorari review in 
Waushara 
County 
Circuit 
Court 
in 
accordance 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10).10  The State asserted that it was 
aggrieved by the Board's decision to grant the Howes' variance 
because, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 59.692 and 281.31, the DNR 
requires adherence to specific standards for protecting the 
shorelands of Wisconsin's navigable waters.  The State contended 
that Waushara County Ordinance No. 76 § 2.10(2)(b) was required, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wisconsin Stat. § 59.694(7)(c) 
 
County 
zoning, 
adjustment board. 
 
(7)  Powers of Board.  The board of adjustment 
shall have all of the following powers: 
 . . .  
 
(c)  To authorize upon appeal in specific cases 
variances from the terms of the ordinance that will 
not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing 
to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the 
provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary 
hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance 
shall be observed and substantial justice done. 
 . . .  
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.694(10) 
 
County 
zoning, 
adjustment board. 
 
(10)  Certiorari.  A person aggrieved by any 
decision of the board of adjustment, or a taxpayer, or 
any officer, department, board or bureau of the 
municipality, may, within 30 days after the filing of 
the decision in the office of the board, commence an 
action 
seeking 
the 
remedy 
available 
by 
certiorari. . . . The court may reverse or affirm, 
wholly or partly, or may modify, the decision brought 
up for review. 
No. 
02-2400   
 
9 
 
in accordance with § 59.692(lm),11 to zone all shorelands in an 
unincorporated area, in order to protect Wisconsin's shorelands.  
The Howes intervened in the State's suit against the Board. 
 
¶8 
The Waushara County Circuit Court reversed the Board's 
decision, which resulted in the denial of the Howes' variance 
application.  Even though the Howes' variance request was based 
on the 50 percent rule, the court reasoned that shoreland zoning 
concerns were implicated nonetheless.  The court agreed with the 
State that the reasonable use analysis set forth in Kenosha 
County was applicable to the Howes' variance request.  Even 
after discussing and applying Justices Crooks' and Wilcox's 
concurrence in Outagamie County,12 the circuit court in this case 
reasoned that the no reasonable use standard was implicated, 
because of concerns over shoreland zoning.  The court concluded 
that there was an insufficient showing by the Howes that there 
would be no reasonable use of their property if the variance was 
not granted.  The court reasoned that simply because the 
property will be less useful or less valuable did not mean that 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.692(1m)  Zoning of shorelands 
on navigable waters. 
 
(1m)  To effect the purposes of s. 281.31 and to 
promote the public health, safety and general welfare, 
each county shall zone by ordinance all shorelands in 
its unincorporated area.  This ordinance may be 
enacted separately from ordinances enacted under s. 
59.69. 
12 Hereinafter, Justices Crooks' and Wilcox's concurrence in 
State v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 244 
Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376 will be referred to, for our 
purposes, as the Outagamie County concurrence. 
No. 
02-2400   
 
10 
 
the Howes had no reasonable use of their property, thus failing 
the no reasonable use test.  The circuit court further concluded 
that there were insufficient facts in the record to establish 
why the Board decided to grant the Howes' variance.  The court 
noted that it could not discern whether the Board looked at the 
unnecessary hardship created in light of the purpose of the 
ordinance, or whether it thought that the no reasonable use test 
was applicable to the case at hand.  The Howes appealed the 
circuit court's decision. 
 
¶9 
The court of appeals' majority, Judges Deininger and 
Lundsten, concluded that, as stated in State ex rel. Ziervogel 
v. Bd. of Adjustment, 2003 WI App 82, ¶21, 263 Wis. 2d 321, 661 
N.W.2d 884, Kenosha County requires that no reasonable use of 
the property must be demonstrated by the property owners before 
a board may grant a variance.  The court of appeals rejected the 
Howes' contention that they need only show unnecessary hardship 
in light of the purpose of the ordinance.  The court noted that 
the Howes did not claim that they had no reasonable use of their 
property, absent the grant of a variance.  Thus, the court 
noted, the Howes could only prevail if a standard other than 
that enunciated in Kenosha County and Ziervogel was applied.  
The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court correctly 
applied the Kenosha County standard and, as a result, affirmed 
the circuit court's decision not to grant the Howes a third 
variance to improve their home. 
No. 
02-2400   
 
11 
 
¶10 In her dissent, Judge Roggensack stated that she 
believed that the majority incorrectly applied Kenosha County to 
the present case.  She concluded that:  
[b]ecause both the plurality and the concurrence in 
Outagamie County agree that when an area variance is 
requested, 
unnecessary 
hardship may be 
shown if 
"compliance with the strict letter of the restrictions 
 . . . would unreasonably prevent the owner from using 
the property for a permitted purpose or would render 
conformity 
with 
such 
restriction 
unnecessarily 
burdensome," that is the test I conclude that the 
Board of Adjustment was bound to apply to the Howes' 
request and it is the test courts should apply as 
well.  
State of Wisconsin v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, No. 02-
2400(D), unpublished slip op. (WI App May 7, 2003) (citation 
omitted). 
¶11 Judge Roggensack concluded that the Board interpreted 
unnecessary hardship, as found in Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c), to 
mean unnecessarily burdensome, as that was the test applied by 
the plurality and the concurrence in Outagamie County regarding 
area variances.  Judge Roggensack reasoned that, because there 
was no way for the Howes to have a structure on their property 
that complied with the ordinances, and since the variance was in 
keeping with the neighborhood, and Silver Lake would not be 
affected by the improvement, the Board appropriately exercised 
its authority in this case in granting the variance. 
II 
¶12 We now consider, in light of the interplay between 
Snyder, Kenosha County, and Outagamie County, what is the 
correct legal standard to be applied by the Board in this case 
No. 
02-2400   
 
12 
 
when considering whether to grant the area variance.  On 
statutory certiorari review, we limit our review to the 
following issues:  (1) whether the Board kept within its 
jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on the correct theory of 
law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive or 
unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; and 
(4) whether the Board might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question, based on the evidence.  Kenosha 
County, 218 Wis. 2d at 410-11; Arndorfer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 
162 Wis. 2d 246, 254, 469 N.W.2d 831 (1991).  The State centers 
its argument on the second and fourth issues. 
¶13 Boards 
of 
adjustment 
exercise 
discretion 
when 
determining whether a request for a variance should be granted.  
State ex rel. Schleck v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 254 Wis. 42, 52, 
35 N.W.2d 312 (1948).  Nevertheless, "board(s) of adjustment 
(are) not authorized to rewrite the law, but rather, to apply 
it."  State v. Ozaukee Bd. of Adjustment, 152 Wis. 2d 552, 564-
65, 449 N.W.2d 47 (1989).   In general, we are hesitant to 
overrule administrative decisions.  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 476.  
A board's decision is presumed to be correct and valid.  Id.  
The board's findings may not be disturbed if any reasonable view 
of the evidence sustains such findings.  Id.  Moreover, we may 
not substitute our discretion for that of the board's, as 
committed to it by the legislature.  Id. 
No. 
02-2400   
 
13 
 
¶14 In this case, Wis. Stat. §§ 59.694(7)(c) and 62.23(7)13 
give the Waushara County Board of Adjustment the power to grant 
zoning 
variances 
from 
Waushara 
County 
Ordinance 
No. 
76 
§ 2.10(2)(b).  Interpretation of ordinances and interpretation 
of statutes invoke the same rules.  Kenosha County, 218 
Wis. 2d at 412.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law 
we review de novo.  VanCleve v. City of Marinette, 2003 WI 2, 
¶17, 258 Wis. 2d 80, 655 N.W.2d 113.  Nevertheless, we benefit 
from the decisions of the court of appeals and the circuit 
court.  Id.   
¶15 When interpreting a statute, we first look to the 
plain meaning of its terms.  Id.  If the statute is unambiguous, 
we will not look beyond the statutory language to discern the 
statute’s meaning.  Id.  Only when a statute is ambiguous will 
we examine aids such as legislative history, scope, context, and 
subject matter.  State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶14, 259 
Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416.  "A statute is ambiguous if 
reasonable persons could disagree as to its meaning."  Id. 
                                                 
13 In 
relevant 
part, 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7) 
states 
the 
following: 
The board of appeals shall have the following powers:  
 . . . to authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance 
from the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the 
public interest, where, owing to special conditions, a literal 
enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in 
practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship, so that the spirit 
of the ordinance shall be observed, public safety and welfare 
secured, and substantial justice done. . . .  
No. 
02-2400   
 
14 
 
¶16 The Howes contend that Wisconsin property law with 
respect to variances is in a state of confusion.  Under Snyder, 
the Howes state that the correct test is "'(w)hether compliance 
with the strict letter of the restrictions governing area, set 
backs, frontage, height, bulk or density would unreasonably 
prevent the owner from using the property for a permitted 
purpose or would render conformity with such restrictions 
unnecessarily burdensome.'"  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 475 (citation 
omitted).  In addition, the Howes assert that the Snyder court 
correctly noted that unnecessary hardship must be determined in 
light of the purpose of the zoning ordinance at issue.   
¶17 The Howes assert that in Kenosha County, this court 
concluded that, in order to prove unnecessary hardship, the 
property owner was required to demonstrate that she would have 
no reasonable use of the property, if her request for a variance 
was denied.  The Howes contend that in Outagamie County, we 
relied on Snyder to define unnecessary hardship and, although we 
did not expressly overrule Kenosha County, we have done so sub 
silentio.  Thus, the Howes assert that courts, and boards of 
adjustment, are unsure whether to apply the reasonable use test 
set forth in Kenosha County or the standard set forth by the 
Outagamie County plurality and concurrence. 
¶18 The Howes contend that if the no reasonable use test 
of Kenosha County is held to be the applicable standard in 
variance cases, then no variances will ever be granted.  The 
legislature intended, the Howes argue, for boards of adjustment 
to exercise their discretion in deciding whether to grant 
No. 
02-2400   
 
15 
 
requests for variances.  If the legal standard for variances 
results in only one conclusion, the Howes contend that the Board 
cannot be said to be engaging in the exercise of its discretion.  
Even if we decline to overrule Kenosha County, the Howes 
maintain that we should make it clear that unnecessary hardship 
must be evaluated in light of the purpose of the zoning 
ordinance, as Snyder, Kenosha County, and Outagamie County all 
contain language to that effect.  The Howes further argue that, 
despite the State's arguments to the contrary, this is not a 
case about a variance to the shoreland zoning rule, but rather 
to the 50 percent rule.  The Howes contend that, at most, 
Waushara County Ordinance No. 76 § 2.14(2), regarding setbacks 
from the ordinary highwater mark of navigable waters, is only 
tangentially involved. 
¶19 The State counters that this case involves a variance 
from a shoreland zoning ordinance; thus, the Howes must 
demonstrate that they have no reasonable use of their property 
unless the variance is granted.  The State asserts that Kenosha 
County supports its position that Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c)'s 
unnecessary hardship requirement mandates that a property owner 
requesting a variance must demonstrate that there is no 
reasonable use of the property, unless a variance is granted.  
The State contends that, because the Howes' situation is 
indistinguishable from the facts presented in Kenosha County, 
the holding in that case controls. 
¶20 Given this allegedly applicable standard, the State 
argues that the Howes cannot demonstrate that they would have no 
No. 
02-2400   
 
16 
 
reasonable use of their property, if the variance was not 
granted.  Under Ordinance No. 76 § 25.05(1), the State maintains 
that the Howes have the burden of proving that they need the 
variance.  The State asserts that the Howes have made use of 
their home for quite some time and, thus, cannot prove that the 
new additions are necessary in order for them to have any 
reasonable use of their home.  Because Wisconsin's navigable 
waters need protection against misuse and overuse, the State 
argues that the no reasonable use test, as applicable to 
shoreland variances, is intentionally hard to satisfy. 
¶21 The State further contends that the Howes' situation 
is not unique, as required by Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c), Kenosha 
County, 
and 
Arndorfer, 
because 
the 
shoreland 
setback 
requirements do not uniquely affect the Howes.  According to the 
State, the Howes also have not demonstrated that their requested 
variance is not contrary to the public interest, as required by 
§ 59.694(7)(intro.) and (7)(c), as the cumulative effect of 
these types of changes along the shoreland would adversely 
affect the public interest.  The State further asserts that the 
Howes have not demonstrated that the proposed variance is in 
keeping with the spirit of the ordinance.  Although the 
additions will make their retirement home more comfortable for 
them, the State contends that this does not mean that the Howes 
are entitled to their requested variance. 
¶22 Moreover, the State maintains that the decisions in 
Snyder, Kenosha County, and Outagamie County are consistent and 
do not need to be clarified.  The State rejects the Howes' 
No. 
02-2400   
 
17 
 
contention that the no reasonable use standard prevents the 
Board from exercising its discretion in deciding whether to 
grant a request for a variance.  Finally, the State points out 
that it would limit the holding of Outagamie County to the 
specific facts of that case; namely, it would make it only 
applicable to "variances for residential basements built below 
the regional flood elevation and to situations where the county 
is estopped from enforcing the applicable floodplain zoning 
ordinance."14  
¶23 In this case, it is our intention to provide needed 
clarification for property law in Wisconsin, with respect to the 
granting of area variances.15  It is evident that there is some 
confusion over how to interpret and apply our decisions in 
Snyder, Kenosha County, and Outagamie County.  See Voss v. 
                                                 
14 The State also contended that the Board made legally 
insufficient findings of fact when it decided to grant the 
Howes' variance.  We conclude that there is no need to address 
this issue, as we remand the cause to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
15 In 
Outagamie 
County, 
we 
set 
forth 
the 
following 
explanation regarding the differences between use and area 
variances: 
"A use variance is one that permits a use other than 
that 
prescribed 
by 
the 
zoning 
ordinance 
in 
a 
particular 
district. 
 
An 
area 
variance 
has 
no 
relationship to a change of use.  It is primarily a 
grant to erect, alter, or use a structure for a 
permitted use in a manner other than that prescribed 
by the restrictions of a zoning ordinance." 
Outagamie County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶34 (citing 3 E.C. Yokley, 
Zoning Law and Practice § 21-6 (4th ed. 1979)). 
No. 
02-2400   
 
18 
 
Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, No. 02-1307, ¶13, n.5, 
unpublished slip op. (WI App Apr. 17, 2003).16  We take this 
opportunity to explain the appropriate legal standard that 
should be used in deciding whether to grant area variances.  In 
doing so, it is our goal to give boards of adjustment and 
Wisconsin courts sufficient guidance as to how to resolve these 
types of cases in the future. 
¶24 We begin our analysis by looking to the concurrence in 
Outagamie County.  The concurrence set forth four major 
principles that should inform courts' decisions when reviewing 
variance cases.  The principles are:  (1) a presumption exists 
that the board's decision is correct; (2) in deciding whether to 
grant a variance, there should be a focus on the purpose of the 
ordinance or statute being analyzed; (3) the facts of the 
particular case should be analyzed in light of the purpose of 
the ordinance or statute; and (4) boards of adjustment must be 
afforded some flexibility so that they may appropriately 
exercise their discretion.  We will address each principle in 
turn and, in the process, hopefully harmonize the other zoning 
decisions of this court, including both Snyder and Kenosha 
County, with Outagamie County. 
                                                 
16 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.23(3), unpublished 
decisions of the court of appeals do not have precedential value 
and may not be cited as precedent.  However, we cite this case 
simply to present an example of a case where the court of 
appeals has asked for our guidance in clarifying the law with 
respect to area variances. 
No. 
02-2400   
 
19 
 
¶25 First, it was stated in Outagamie County that the 
board's decision is given a presumption of correctness and 
validity.  Outagamie County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶76 (Crooks, J., 
concurring).  We have consistently recognized this standard in 
several cases.  See Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 476 ("the findings of 
the board may not be disturbed if any reasonable view of the 
evidence sustains them."); Arndorfer, 162 Wis. 2d at 253 ("a 
court shall accord a presumption of correctness and validity to 
the Board's decision."); Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 415 
("Reviewing courts accord a decision of a board of adjustment a 
presumption of correctness 
and validity."); 
and 
Outagamie 
County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶26 ("a reviewing court is required to 
defer to the decision of the board unless it is 'unreasonable or 
without a rational basis. . . . Thus, the findings of the board 
may not be disturbed if any reasonable view of the evidence 
sustains them.'").  Thus, it is clear that reviewing courts will 
overrule a board's decision only when it is unreasonable or 
irrational.  
¶26 Second, boards must focus on the purpose of the 
ordinance or statute in question when deciding whether to grant 
a variance.  More specifically, boards must consider whether a 
property owner's failure to receive a variance will cause the 
property owner an unnecessary hardship in light of the purpose 
of 
the 
ordinance. 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 59.694(7)(c) 
provides 
boards of adjustment with the power to grant variances to zoning 
ordinances "that will not be contrary to the public interest, 
where, owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the 
No. 
02-2400   
 
20 
 
provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, 
and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and 
substantial justice done."17  We have stated that unnecessary 
hardship is present when "'compliance with the strict letter of 
the restrictions governing area, set backs, frontage, height, 
bulk or density would unreasonably prevent the owner from using 
the property for a permitted purpose or would render conformity 
with such restrictions unnecessarily burdensome.'"  Snyder, 74 
Wis. 2d at 475 (citing 2 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and 
Planning 45——28 (3d ed. 1972)). 
¶27 In Outagamie County it was stated that "(w)hether an 
area or use variance should be granted depends upon the purpose 
underlying the specific provision of the zoning code to which a 
variance is being sought."  Outagamie County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 
¶72 (Crooks, J., concurring).  See also Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 
473.  This observation was explained in other cases before 
Outagamie County.  In fact, both Snyder and Kenosha County 
recognized that examination of the statute or ordinance's 
purpose was an important step in analyzing the bigger question 
of whether to grant a variance.  This requirement relating to 
purpose will be more fully explored later in this opinion. 
¶28 Third, the facts of a particular case must be analyzed 
in light of the purpose of the statute.  In the Outagamie County 
                                                 
17 In answer to the claims of the dissent, ¶¶51-53, we 
emphasize that all of the components, including the public 
interest component, of this standard remain intact.  Boards must 
consider the impact that a proposed variance will have on the 
public interest. 
No. 
02-2400   
 
21 
 
case, it was noted that the board in that case did not analyze 
the purpose underlying the ordinance in question.  Outagamie 
County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶76 (Crooks, J., concurring).  It was 
stated that Kenosha County's no reasonable use standard "should 
have been applied by the Board only after considering the 
purpose of the zoning ordinance, and the nature of the specific 
restriction at issue."  Id.  It was further stated that because 
the board in that case did not evaluate the facts in light of 
the purpose of the ordinance in question, remand may have been 
appropriate.18  Id., ¶77.  In noting that facts must be analyzed 
in light of the purpose of the zoning ordinance, a new standard 
was not being created.  Instead, the standard this court has 
elucidated in previous cases involving variances was merely 
being applied.   
¶29 Our decision in Snyder clearly contemplated that the 
purpose of an ordinance should be taken into account when 
determining whether to grant a variance.  In Snyder we discussed 
the fact that it is often more difficult to obtain a use 
variance than an area variance, and we concluded: 
[T]he fact that area variances are considerably easier 
to obtain than use variances creates the impression 
that a minimal showing of difficulty will establish 
the element of practical difficulty and entitle the 
landowner to a variance.  However, area variances are 
not 
more 
easily 
obtained 
because 
practical 
difficulties are something much less severe than 
                                                 
18 Ultimately, the concurrence decided that remand was not 
necessary, as the board properly decided that a variance should 
be granted, because the property owners' hardship was created by 
the town.  Outagamie County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶77.  
No. 
02-2400   
 
22 
 
unnecessary hardship, but because area variances do 
not 
involve 
great 
changes 
in 
the 
character 
of 
neighborhoods as do use variances.  This relates to 
what 
hardships or 
practical 
difficulties 
may be 
considered unnecessary or unreasonable in light of the 
purpose of the zoning law. 
Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 473 (emphasis added). 
¶30 In Snyder, we then stated that the appropriate test 
for 
unnecessary 
hardship 
relating 
to 
area 
variances 
was 
"'[w]hether 
compliance 
with 
the 
strict 
letter 
of 
the 
restrictions governing area, set backs, frontage, height, bulk 
or density would unreasonably prevent the owner from using the 
property for a permitted purpose or would render conformity with 
such restrictions unnecessarily burdensome.'"  Id. at 475 
(citation omitted). 
¶31 In Kenosha County, we explained that our reason for 
adopting the State's no reasonable use test was because it best 
took into account the purpose of the statute in question.  We 
stated: 
The fundamental difference between the parties' 
definitions of the unnecessary hardship standard is 
the extent to which those definitions incorporate the 
purpose 
of 
the 
shoreland 
zoning 
regulations——to 
enforce a uniform setback that preserves the public's 
interest in shoreland and the navigable waters of the 
state.  Under the State's definition, the issue is 
whether the Board and reviewing courts look first to 
the purpose of the shoreland zoning ordinance and then 
at the applicant's request.  The Board seems to argue 
that the reviewing bodies look at the applicant's 
request primarily in terms of the burden on the 
applicant. 
 
In 
both 
our 
Snyder 
and 
Arndorfer 
decisions, we emphasized that the purpose of the 
zoning regulations, including uniformity, should not 
be lost in the determination of whether to grant a 
variance. 
No. 
02-2400   
 
23 
 
Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 413. 
¶32 When we consider the emphasis on purpose that we find 
in Kenosha County, it appears that the no reasonable use 
standard 
has 
been 
applied, 
since 
that case, 
in a 
very 
restrictive manner.  See Ziervogel, 263 Wis. 2d at 321; Voss v. 
Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, No. 02-1307, unpublished slip 
op. (WI App Apr. 17, 2003); and Waushara County Bd. of 
Adjustment, No. 02-2400, unpublished slip op. (WI App May 7, 
2003).19  Although this court adopted the no reasonable use 
standard proffered by the State, we did so after considering the 
purpose of the zoning ordinance in question.  Insofar as it 
acknowledged that the purpose of the zoning ordinances must be 
taken into account when deciding whether to grant a variance, 
Kenosha County is wholly consistent with the reasoning regarding 
a focus on the purpose of the ordinance set forth in Snyder and 
Outagamie County.  In light of the abovementioned cases, it is 
evident that this court has consistently noted that the purpose 
of a zoning ordinance should not be lost sight of when 
determining whether the variance requested should be granted.  
We find no need to accept the Howes' invitation to overrule 
Kenosha County.  Rather, the term "no reasonable use," as set 
forth 
in 
Kenosha 
County, 
is 
no 
longer 
applicable 
when 
consideration is being given to whether to grant an area 
                                                 
19 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.23(3), unpublished 
decisions of the court of appeals do not have precedential value 
and may not be cited as precedent.  However, we cite these cases 
simply to present examples of cases where the court of appeals 
has interpreted the no reasonable use test too restrictively. 
No. 
02-2400   
 
24 
 
variance.  We reaffirm Snyder's definition of the statutory term 
"unnecessary 
hardship" 
because 
it 
best 
encompasses 
the 
appropriate test for granting an area variance. 
¶33  Finally, a board must be able to exercise its 
discretion when deciding whether to grant a variance.  The 
concurrence stated that "county boards of adjustment have some 
very real flexibility in granting variances."  Outagamie County, 
244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶74 (Crooks, J., concurring).  It was also 
noted that this flexibility is reflected in the fact that 
boards' decisions are given a presumption of validity and 
correctness.  Id., ¶75.  See also Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 
415-16.   The plurality in Outagamie County noted that "(a) 
reviewing court may not substitute its discretion for that of 
the board, the entity to which the legislature has committed 
these decisions."  Outagamie County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶25.  See 
also Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 476, Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 
415.  Even in Schleck, which preceded Outagamie County by over 
50 years, we stated that a board exercises its discretion when 
deciding whether to grant a variance.  Schleck, 254 Wis. at 52.  
We realize that this final principle is closely akin to the 
first principle set forth in this opinion, namely that boards' 
decisions have a presumption of correctness.  Nevertheless, we 
feel that the notion that boards should have flexibility is 
sufficiently important so as to warrant mentioning it as a 
separate principle.   
¶34 We conclude that 
the reasoning discussed 
herein 
provides the appropriate standard for determining whether an 
No. 
02-2400   
 
25 
 
area variance should be granted.20  Unnecessary hardship, as set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c), must be evaluated in light 
of the purpose of the zoning ordinance at issue.  
III 
¶35 We conclude that, in evaluating whether to grant an 
area variance to a zoning ordinance, a board of adjustment 
should focus on the purpose of the zoning law at issue in 
determining whether an unnecessary hardship exists for the 
property owner seeking such variance.  We further conclude that 
the facts of the case should be analyzed in light of that 
purpose, and that boards of adjustment must be afforded 
flexibility so that they may appropriately exercise their 
discretion. 
 
We 
also 
again 
recognize 
and 
emphasize 
the 
presumption that the board's decision is correct.  We reaffirm 
Snyder's definition of the statutory term "unnecessary hardship" 
because it best encompasses the appropriate test for granting an 
area variance.  "No reasonable use," as set forth in Kenosha 
County, is no longer applicable when an area variance is being 
considered.  Moreover, while there is a claim that the variance 
implicates shoreland zoning concerns, it should be noted that 
                                                 
20 We note that this opinion should be read together with 
our decision in State ex rel. Richard W. Ziervogel v. Washington 
County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, __Wis. 2d __, 676 
N.W.2d 401, which was released earlier this term of the court. 
We further point out that this case is being remanded to 
the circuit court, and this court is not granting the Howes' 
variance request.  Instead, we have clarified the appropriate 
standard for the Board to apply when it exercises its discretion 
to determine whether such variance request should be granted. 
No. 
02-2400   
 
26 
 
the proposed addition would not bring the Howes' home any closer 
to Silver Lake.  Thus, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand this case to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶36 PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
 
  
 
                                                                 
 
 
No.  02-2400.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶37 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
opinion reaches an unfortunate result that diminishes the 
constitutionally protected public trust rights of all Wisconsin 
residents in the state's navigable waters.  I hesitate to write 
these words for fear that by shining light on what the majority 
is doing, I may be compounding the damage that flows from its 
decision.  Yet, I conclude that even a superficial reading of 
the majority's opinion renders the damage self-exposed. 
¶38 By declining to admit that it is overruling State v. 
Kenosha County Bd. of Adjustment, 218 Wis. 2d 396, 577 N.W.2d 
813 (1998), the majority attempts to camouflage the consequences 
of its decision.  Instead of forthrightly acknowledging its 
actions, the majority simply concludes that the holding of 
Kenosha County is "no longer applicable."  Majority op., ¶2.  
What is the functional difference between a holding that is 
overruled and one that is "no longer applicable"?  This sub-rosa 
approach undermines rather than promotes the principle of stare 
decisis.   
¶39 More 
troublesome 
than 
the 
majority's 
camouflage, 
however, are the consequences of its decision.  The unfortunate 
result of the majority opinion is that it sacrifices the 
constitutionally protected public trust rights that all citizens 
have in the navigable waters of this state in order to promote 
the local private interests of a few.  By functionally 
overruling Kenosha County, it relaxes the standard necessary to 
obtain a shoreland variance.  In emphasizing flexibility for 
No.  02-2400.awb 
 
2 
 
local boards of adjustment and presuming that their decisions 
are correct, the majority dilutes appellate review, which will 
invariably undermine the legislative directive for uniformity of 
shoreland zoning.  Cumulatively, such an approach will vitiate 
the purposes behind shoreland regulations of preserving the 
public interest in shoreland and the navigable waters of this 
state. 
I. The Public Interest 
¶40 In 
Wisconsin, 
local 
boards 
of 
adjustment 
are 
authorized to grant variances from terms of a zoning ordinance 
only when specific conditions are met.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 59.694(7)(c) authorizes boards to grant variances that: 
[1] will not be contrary to the public interest, 
where, [2] owing to special conditions, [3] a literal 
enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will 
result in unnecessary hardship, and so that [4] the 
spirit 
of 
the 
ordinance 
shall 
be 
observed 
and 
substantial justice done. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶41 The threshold requirement for granting a variance is 
that it not be contrary to the public interest.  The legislature 
has long recognized that strict regulation of buildings near 
shorelands 
is 
necessary 
to 
safeguard 
the 
constitutionally 
protected interests of the public in the state's navigable 
No.  02-2400.awb 
 
3 
 
waters.  Wis. Const. Art. IX, § 1 ("Jurisdiction on Rivers and 
Lakes; Navigable Waters").21 
¶42 In 1965, the legislature passed the Navigable Waters 
Protection Law, which mandated that all counties enact shoreland 
zoning ordinances.  The law provides that the purposes of 
shoreland zoning standards shall "further the maintenance of 
safe and healthful conditions; prevent and control water 
pollution; protect spawning grounds, fish and aquatic life; 
control building sites, placement of structures and land uses 
and reserve shore cover and natural beauty."  See Ch. 614, Laws 
of 1965, § 42, creating Wis. Stat. § 144.216 (now Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.31(1)).   
 
¶43  To aid in the fulfillment of the state's role as 
trustee of its navigable waters, the legislature directed the 
Department of Natural Resources to establish minimum standards 
for shoreland ordinances.  Wis. Stat. § 281.31(6).  The 
shoreland setback is the centerpiece of those minimum standards.  
It protects the value and views of the lakeshore property.  The 
setback further serves as a visual and ecological buffer between 
protected public rights in navigable waters and development in 
adjacent lands.  See Tracy K. Kuczenski, Wisconsin's Shoreland 
Management Program:  An Assessment With Implications for 
                                                 
21 Although the public trust doctrine originally existed to 
protect 
commercial 
navigation, 
it 
has 
been 
expansively 
interpreted to safeguard the public's use of navigable waters 
for other purposes.  R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 2001 WI 73, 
¶19, n. 1, 244 Wis. 2d 497, 628 N.W.2d 781.  For a detailed 
discussion of the evolution of the public trust doctrine, see 
Muench v. PSC, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952). 
No.  02-2400.awb 
 
4 
 
Effective Natural Resources Management and Protection, 1999 Wis. 
L. Rev. 273, 283-84. 
¶44 Under the current zoning system, state law requires 
every county to "zone by ordinance all shorelands in its 
unincorporated area."  Wis. Stat. § 59.692(1m).  Additionally, 
it requires the ordinance to meet certain shoreland zoning 
standards.  Wis. Stat. § 59.692(6).  If the county does not 
adopt a shoreland zoning ordinance or the state determines that 
an adopted ordinance does not meet the shoreland zoning 
standards, the state will adopt an ordinance for the county.  
Id.  Accordingly, it is clear that "[l]ands adjacent to or near 
navigable waters exist in a special relationship to the state."  
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 18, 201 N.W.2d 761 
(1972). 
II. The Standard 
¶45 The controlling authority for shoreland zoning setback 
requirements was Kenosha County, a case decided unanimously by 
this court six years ago.  By functionally overruling Kenosha 
County, the majority lowers the standard that must be met in 
order to obtain a shoreland variance.  Consequently, it 
diminishes the protection afforded to shorelands and navigable 
waters. 
¶46 In Kenosha County, a property owner sought a variance 
enabling her to build a deck into protected shorelands.  218 
Wis. 2d at 398.  The proposed deck would have reduced her 
shoreline setback to 64 feet.  Id. at 401.  This court 
considered whether the Kenosha County Board of Adjustment 
No.  02-2400.awb 
 
5 
 
applied the correct legal standard for determining "unnecessary 
hardship" in order to grant a petition for the variance.  Id. at 
398.  
¶47 The Outagamie County concurrence of Justices Crooks 
and Wilcox22 aptly summarized the Kenosha County holding.  It 
noted that the issue before the court was the definition of 
"unnecessary hardship," (the very same issue in this case).  See 
Outagamie County, 2001 WI 78, ¶73, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 
N.W.2d 376 (Crooks, J., concurring).  The state wanted to define 
it as "no reasonable use," while the property owner wanted to 
define it as "unnecessarily burdensome."  Id.  The concurrence 
explained that the majority's holding in Kenosha County was that 
the state's standard of "no reasonable use" better incorporated 
the purpose underlying the shoreland regulations.  Id.  It 
observed: 
Kenosha County did consider the parties' definition of 
the unnecessary hardship standard in light of the 
purpose of the shoreland zoning regulations at issue.  
The State proffered a "no reasonable use in the 
absence of a variance" standard; the Board proffered 
an "unnecessarily burdensome" standard.  Id. at 411-
12.  This court concluded that the State's test better 
incorporated the purpose underlying the regulations, 
"to enforce a uniform setback that preserves the 
public's interest in shoreland and the navigable 
waters of the state."  Id. at 413. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
                                                 
22 The concurrence of Justices Crooks and Wilcox in State v. 
Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 
628 N.W.2d 376, is hereinafter referred to as the Outagamie 
County concurrence. 
No.  02-2400.awb 
 
6 
 
 
¶48 Now, the majority does an about-face and concludes 
that the "unnecessarily burdensome" standard better promotes the 
underlying purposes of the shoreland regulation at hand.  On its 
facts, Kenosha County cannot be meaningfully distinguished from 
the present case.  Both involve a lakefront property owner 
seeking to expand an existing residence within (or into) the 
shoreland setback area.23  If anything, the facts in this case 
are more troubling than those of Kenosha County, for the 
petitioners' home is a nonconforming structure located a mere 30 
to 34 feet from the water's edge and squarely within the 
shorelands of Silver Lake.24 
¶49 Under the rule of stare decisis, similar facts should 
produce similar results.  Adherence to stare decisis is critical 
because "[r]espect for precedent 'promotes the evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, 
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the 
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.'"  
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, 
¶138, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted).   
                                                 
23 The "shoreland setback area" is defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.692(1)(bn) as "an area in a shoreland that is within a 
certain distance of the ordinary high-water mark in which the 
construction or placement of buildings or structures has been 
limited or prohibited under an ordinance enacted under [section 
59.692]." 
 
24 Shorelands are defined as the area within 1000 feet from 
a lake, pond or flowage.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 281.31(2)(f), and 
59.692(1)(b). 
No.  02-2400.awb 
 
7 
 
¶50 However, the majority here abandons the "no reasonable 
use" standard and appears to adopt the very position advanced by 
the losing party in Kenosha County.  Majority op., ¶2.  This 
begs the question:  what exactly is left of Kenosha County after 
today's decision?   
¶51 Instead of answering this, the majority attempts to 
assuage readers' fears by noting that "the proposed addition 
would not bring the Howes' home any closer to Silver Lake."  Id.  
In the context of state shorelands, such a comment ignores the 
cumulative effect of shoreland building. 
¶52 The Wisconsin Association of Lakes, an organization 
that represents the interests of thousands of lakeshore property 
owners all across Wisconsin, warns in its amicus brief, 
"[g]eneral availability of variances permitting the horizontal 
expansion of structures so close to the water's edge would have 
the cumulative effect of enclosing our inland lakes within a 
wall of impermeable surfaces to the exclusion of vegetation and 
impairing the ecological functions of the shoreland buffer."   
¶53 Indeed, the cumulative effect of such changes was the 
very reason the Department of Natural Resources became involved 
in this case.  See Hixon v. Public Service Comm., 32 Wis. 2d 
608, 631, 146 N.W.2d 577 (1966) ("one fill, though comparatively 
inconsequential, may lead to another, and another, and before 
long 
a 
great 
body of 
water may 
be 
eaten 
away . . ."); 
Sterlingworth Condominium Ass'n v. DNR, 205 Wis. 2d 710, 721-22, 
556 N.W.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1996) (DNR's public interest duty is to 
protect lakes against "cumulative impact"). 
No.  02-2400.awb 
 
8 
 
¶54 Recognizing these concerns, the circuit court in this 
case concluded that the "no reasonable use" standard was 
appropriate.  Ironically, it did so even after discussing and 
applying the Outagamie County concurrence relied upon by the 
majority.  The circuit court stated, "I would find that the no 
reasonable use standard is implicated even under the Crooks-
Wilcox analysis because of the shoreland zoning concerns being 
the background and the public interest accordingly."  Although 
the majority acknowledges this fact in its opinion, majority 
op., ¶8, it makes no attempt explain it. 
¶55 Apparently the circuit court is not alone in its 
interpretation of the principles set forth in the Outagamie 
County concurrence.  The concurring opinion in Ziervogel v. 
Washington County Bd. of Adjustment, 2003 WI App 82, 263 Wis. 2d 
321, 661 N.W.2d 884 (Brown, J., concurring), discussed the 
Outagamie County concurrence at length.  It praised the 
concurrence as "nicely explain[ing]" and "nicely summ[ing] up 
the law."  Id., ¶31, ¶48.  The opinion then cited it to explain 
why the distinction between area and use variances should be 
rejected in lieu of purpose.  It observed, "Justice Crooks' 
concurrence teaches that there is no reason to hold on to the 
artificial distinctions of 'area variances' and 'use variances' 
and of 'unnecessary hardship' versus 'practical difficulties.'"  
Id., ¶40. 
¶56 In describing the holding of Kenosha County, the 
concurring opinion in Ziervogel further relied on Justice Crooks 
and Justice Wilcox's analysis.  It stated: "[T]he [Kenosha 
No.  02-2400.awb 
 
9 
 
County] court looked to the purpose of the shoreland zoning 
regulation at issue.  It then decided that because the purpose 
of the shoreland zoning ordinance was being invaded by the 
requested variance, the 'no reasonable use' definition of 
unnecessary hardship should adhere."  Id. (citations omitted).  
¶57 Contrary to the Kenosha County holding, the majority 
adopts the lower standard of "unnecessarily burdensome."  Its 
decision to do so is a perplexing one.  The majority claims that 
it is not overruling Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 396.  
Majority op., ¶32.  Yet, it reverses the court of appeals for 
relying upon that decision.  Similarly, the majority purports to 
adopt the principles set forth in the concurrence in Outagamie 
County, 244 Wis. 2d 613.  See id., ¶24.  However, it disagrees 
with the circuit court, which applied those principles here.   
III. The Consequences 
¶58 The majority's decision to resurrect and apply the 
area-use distinction in the context of shoreland regulation is a 
dangerous one.  Shoreland regulations, after all, consist 
primarily of area, not use restrictions.25  Under the majority 
opinion, the shoreland setback requirement will always be 
subject to the lesser standard of "unnecessarily burdensome" 
despite its central role in shoreland regulation. 
                                                 
25 Statewide minimum standards for county shoreland zoning 
ordinances include a minimum setback of 75 feet from the 
ordinary high-water mark for most structures, minimum lot sizes, 
and limitations on the clearing of vegetation within 35 feet of 
the ordinary high-water mark.  Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 115.05 
(March 2004). 
No.  02-2400.awb 
 
10 
 
¶59 The majority further undermines shoreland regulations 
by diluting appellate review.  It grants great deference to 
boards of adjustment.  Majority op., ¶25.  The majority 
emphasizes that appellate courts should accord great flexibility 
to local boards and imbues their decisions with a presumption 
that they are correct.  Id., ¶24.  Yet in doing so, it ignores 
the threshold requirement that the variance must be in the 
public 
interest. 
 
Such 
presumptions 
and 
flexibility 
are 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
well-recognized 
legislative 
purposes 
underlying shoreland regulations of (1) uniformity of shoreland 
zoning and (2) preservation of the public's interest in 
shoreland and navigable waters of the state.26 
¶60 The 
problem 
with 
the 
majority's 
approach 
is 
illustrated by the case at hand.  Here, the petitioners had 
already obtained two variances from the local board to increase 
the size of their "cottage," one of which resulted in a direct 
loss of shoreland.  They then sought and received a third 
                                                 
26 The majority attempts to address these concerns by 
emphasizing that "the Howes sought a variance from the 50 
percent rule . . ., not from a shoreland zoning provision."  
Majority op., ¶5, n. 7.  Such a response merely continues the 
majority's effort to mask the consequences of its opinion. 
I challenge the majority to boldly and clearly state:  This 
opinion addresses only variances from the 50 percent rule.  It 
does not implicate the standard for variances in the context of 
shoreland zoning. 
The majority will not meet this challenge because it 
cannot.  Indeed, from the beginning the circuit court judge 
realized that although this case was brought seeking a variance 
from the 50 percent rule, "the concerns of the State with regard 
to the water rights, with regard to the setbacks from bodies of 
water are implicated in this matter . . . ."   
No.  02-2400.awb 
 
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variance to construct a 10-foot by 20.5-foot addition to their 
living room and to build a 4-foot by 10-foot porch.  Although 
the petitioners' desire for a larger home is understandable, the 
sentiment that "more room would be nice" should not be treated 
as an "unnecessary hardship," regardless of the standard. 
¶61 There may very well be legitimate arguments for the 
application of a more relaxed standard to determine unnecessary 
hardship 
when 
the 
variance 
involved 
does 
not 
implicate 
shorelands, a matter subject to specific legislative direction 
and constitutionally protected public interests.  Perhaps in the 
non-shoreland context, there is even a place for distinguishing 
between area and use regulations.  But those arguments have no 
place here, where the proposed variance would enlarge the 
existence of a nonconforming structure within the shoreland 
setback.  In the context of environmental regulations such as 
shoreland zoning, the "no reasonable use" rule simply makes more 
sense.  See David M. Freibus, A New Uncertainty in Local Land 
Use: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of State v. Outagamie 
County Board of Adjustment, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 571, 609. 
¶62 The majority opinion is consistent with the lead 
opinion in Outagamie County, 244 Wis. 2d at 613.  One 
commentator viewed that lead opinion as preoccupied with "the 
rights of individual homeowners compromised for a vision of the 
greater good."  Friebus at 606.   The same malady is evidenced 
here.  In the long run, such a preoccupation with the rights of 
individual property owners forfeits the rights of all citizens 
in the shorelands and navigable waters of this state. 
No.  02-2400.awb 
 
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¶63 Even in the short run, however, the majority opinion 
falls wide of the mark.  By heralding the rights of individual 
property owners in the shorelands of this state, the majority is 
actually undermining the rights of the rest of the shoreland 
owners.  The Wisconsin Association of Lakes advanced in its 
amicus brief that this court should retain the no reasonable use 
standard.  That standard, it asserts, best protects the public 
resource while at the same time enhancing the economic value of 
their private land.  It explained: 
Some may find it ironic that the largest state 
association representing lakefront property owners 
would urge the Court to retain restrictive standards 
for building on lakeshores.  After all, these are the 
property owners most directly regulated by shoreland 
zoning. 
But WAL's members recognize that shoreland zoning is a 
win-win policy for riparian owners.  It protects water 
quality and habitat values of the public resource at 
their borders, while supporting the economic value of 
their private land. . . .  The investments of these 
property owners would be jeopardized by a relaxed 
variance standard . . . . 
¶64 In the end, I fear that the majority opinion threatens 
the public trust rights of all Wisconsin residents in the 
state's navigable waters.  By striking a balance contrary to the 
public 
interest, 
its 
decision 
squarely 
conflicts 
with 
longstanding public policy in Wisconsin.  Given the purpose of 
shoreland 
zoning, 
the 
public 
interest 
involved, 
and 
the 
principle of stare decisis, the standard set forth in Kenosha 
County should prevail in this case.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶65 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J. joins this dissent. 
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