Case Title: State v. Conway

Citation: 2006-Ohio-2815

Docket Number: 20031964

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CONWAY, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld. 
(No. 2003-1964 — Submitted January 10, 2006 — Decided June 21, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, No. 02CR-3117. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶1} 
In September 2001, James T. Conway III, defendant-appellant, 
killed Andrew Dotson with a pickax.  A jury convicted Conway of aggravated 
murder and recommended the death penalty, and Conway was sentenced to death. 
I. Facts and Case History 
{¶2} 
On Friday, September 14, 2001, Jesse James was shot and 
wounded near the intersections of Evergreen, Fern Hill, and Palmetto Streets on 
the west side of Columbus.  James, who was a witness for the defense, said that 
Dotson was at the scene of the shooting with a “big, fat white guy,” a description 
that matches Conway.  James said that the “big, fat white guy” had a gun.  Later 
that evening, Dotson’s mother and his brother picked up Dotson’s car on 
Evergreen, where it was parked. 
{¶3} 
On Saturday, September 15, 2001, two Franklin County detectives 
went to the home of Dotson’s mother, Lora Eberhard.  Eberhard told the 
detectives that Dotson was not there but that she was expecting him.  She gave the 
detectives Dotson’s home address and cell phone number, and they left a business 
card.  Dotson arrived at Eberhard’s home a few hours later with Jamie Horton and 
another person in a white Jeep Cherokee.  Eberhard gave Dotson the detectives’ 
business card, and she left to go to church.  This was the last time Eberhard saw 
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or spoke to Dotson.  One of the last calls from Dotson’s cell phone was made later 
that evening to the Franklin County Sheriff’s Detective Bureau. 
{¶4} 
Under a plea agreement, Mike Arthurs, a co-conspirator of 
Conway’s, testified that sometime in mid-September 2001, he had attended a 
party at the Hampton Inn in Chillicothe with Conway, Dotson, Horton, and 
Shawn Nightingale.  During the party, Conway met secretly with Arthurs and 
Nightingale in the bathroom of their hotel room and asked them to kill Dotson.  
Conway gave no reason for wanting Dotson killed, but Arthurs and Nightingale 
nevertheless agreed to carry out the murder. 
{¶5} 
The group spent the night at the hotel, and the next morning, 
Conway, Dotson, Arthurs, Nightingale, and Horton met in the hotel parking lot.  
Conway and Horton left in Conway’s car.  Arthurs and Nightingale drove to West 
Virginia in Nightingale’s Jeep Cherokee with Dotson to kill him. 
{¶6} 
After they arrived in West Virginia, Arthurs and Nightingale 
realized that they could not kill Dotson.  Arthurs testified that Dotson wanted 
drugs, so the group picked up some pills.  Dotson started taking the pills and 
subsequently passed out in the back seat of Nightingale’s Jeep. 
{¶7} 
Arthurs and Nightingale decided to drive to Columbus.  During the 
trip, they called Conway to tell him that they could not kill Dotson.  According to 
Arthurs, Conway told him and Nightingale to “quit being bitches” and instructed 
them to bring Dotson to a shopping center on the west side of Columbus. 
{¶8} 
Dotson was still passed out when Arthurs and Nightingale met 
Conway and Horton in the shopping center parking lot after dark.  Conway 
directed Arthurs and Nightingale to follow him to a nearby cornfield on Galloway 
Road.  Once at the cornfield, Conway ordered Arthurs to pull Dotson out of 
Nightingale’s Jeep and choke him, which Arthurs said he pretended to do.  
Conway then had Arthurs and Horton drag Dotson further into the cornfield.  
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Arthurs said that Dotson was unconscious but still breathing after he was dragged 
into the cornfield. 
{¶9} 
Horton and Nightingale then removed Dotson’s clothes, except for 
his underwear, and placed them in a plastic bag.  At this point, Conway took a 
pickax from his truck and walked into the cornfield where Dotson was.  Arthurs 
could not see Conway but testified that he heard “two thuds.”  After Arthurs heard 
the thuds, Conway reappeared and removed blood from the pickax by wiping it in 
the dirt.  Conway broke apart the pickax, placed the metal part of the pickax into 
the plastic bag containing Dotson’s clothes, and put the handle in his truck.  
Horton then removed a bag of lime from Nightingale’s Jeep and poured the lime 
over Dotson’s body.  The group then left Dotson’s body in the cornfield. 
{¶10} After leaving the cornfield, Arthurs disposed of Dotson’s clothes 
and part of the pickax in the trash behind his cousin’s house.  The next morning, 
Conway, Horton, and Nightingale picked up Arthurs, and they drove to a 
hardware store.  While there, Conway picked up a spaded shovel and told Arthurs 
that “it was for the next time.”  Conway later admitted to Arthurs that he had 
stabbed Dotson twice in the chest with the pickax. 
{¶11} Thereafter, the group went to the mall, where Conway bought 
Arthurs new clothes and new shoes.  Conway then took the clothes that Arthurs 
had worn when Dotson was killed and said that he was going to burn them. 
{¶12} Ronny Trent, Conway’s cellmate at the Franklin County 
Corrections Center, also testified against Conway under a plea agreement.  Trent 
testified that he and Conway had never met prior to their joint incarceration.  
Soon after discovering that Trent was a distant cousin, however, Conway began 
confiding in him. 
{¶13} In April 2002, before Conway was charged with Dotson’s murder, 
Dotson’s mother visited Conway in jail, seeking information about her son’s 
death.  After telling Trent that Dotson’s mom had just visited him, Conway said, 
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“That stupid bitch actually thinks I’m going to tell her I killed her son.”  Conway 
later told Trent that he had killed Dotson because he was afraid that Dotson would 
tell the police that Conway had shot someone “in the butt” at a White Castle 
restaurant. 
{¶14} Trent testified that Conway had instructed Arthurs and Nightingale 
to take Dotson to West Virginia, cause him to overdose on drugs, and dump his 
body in the hills.  When Arthurs and Nightingale could not kill Dotson, they 
brought him back to Columbus and met Conway and Horton.  Conway originally 
told Trent that he had stepped on Dotson’s neck until Dotson died.  Conway later 
admitted to Trent, however, that he had struck Dotson twice in the chest with a 
pickax “to be sure that Andrew was dead.” 
{¶15} Trent also said that Conway hired him to kill Arthurs because 
Conway feared that Arthurs would tell the police about Dotson’s murder.  
Conway paid Trent $5,000 by having the money placed in Trent’s jail account.  
However, instead of killing Arthurs, Trent went to the prosecutor and began 
working as a confidential informant gathering incriminating information on 
Conway. 
{¶16} Gary Wilgus, a special agent with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation, was called to an area off Galloway Road in Franklin County on 
October 10, 2001.  There, Wilgus saw the badly decomposed body of a white 
male lying in a cornfield.  The body was undressed except for a pair of boxer 
shorts.  The victim’s left foot was missing, and Wilgus speculated that it was 
removed by an animal.  Wilgus noticed a white powder on and around the body, 
which was later identified as a cement-type material. 
{¶17} Wilgus took pictures of the body and crime scene.  Because of 
decomposition, the victim’s face was unrecognizable.  Wilgus attempted to 
identify the body through fingerprints but was unsuccessful.  The body was later 
identified as Dotson’s through his dental records. 
January Term, 2006 
5 
{¶18} Dr. Patrick Fardal, chief forensic pathologist and deputy coroner 
for Franklin County, determined that Dotson had died as a result of two stab 
wounds to his chest that pierced his heart and liver.  Both wounds were 
substantially similar and appeared to have been caused by the same instrument.  
Dotson’s wounds were consistent with those that would be inflicted by an 
instrument such as a pickax.  Fardal also compared Dotson’s wounds with a 
pickax purchased by Arthurs that was offered into evidence as similar to the 
pickax used in the murder.  Fardal found that the pickax purchased by Arthurs 
could have been the type of instrument that caused Dotson’s chest wounds. 
{¶19} During the autopsy, Fardal found blood in Dotson’s chest cavity, 
indicating that he was still alive when he sustained his stab wounds.  No evidence 
suggested that Dotson was killed by strangulation.  Fardal also noted that when 
Dotson’s body was discovered, it was partially covered with a “powdered whitish, 
gray material” that looked like lime or concrete powder.  The toxicology report 
showed that alcohol and Valium were present in Dotson’s body. 
{¶20} In June 2002, Conway was indicted on six counts, including one 
count of aggravated murder.  Count One charged that Conway had purposely and 
with prior calculation and design caused the death of Dotson, R.C. 2903.01(A), 
and/or that Conway had purposely caused the death of Dotson during a 
kidnapping, R.C. 2903.01(B).  Count Two charged Conway with kidnapping.  
R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) and (3).  Conway was charged in Count Three with 
possession of criminal tools, R.C. 2923.24(A); Count Four, abuse of a corpse, 
R.C. 2927.01(B); Count Five, obstruction of justice, R.C. 2921.32(A)(4) and 
(C)(4); and Count Six, tampering with evidence, R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). 
{¶21} The aggravated murder count contained three death-penalty 
specifications.  Specification one charged that the aggravated murder was 
committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or 
punishment for another offense.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(3).  Specification two charged 
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aggravated murder during a kidnapping.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  Specification three 
charged that the aggravated murder was committed to prevent the victim from 
testifying in a criminal proceeding.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(8). 
{¶22} The defense theory of the case was that Arthurs had already killed 
Dotson before Conway struck him with the pickax.  Defense counsel extensively 
cross-examined Arthurs and challenged Dr. Fardal’s conclusion that Dotson had 
died from being stabbed twice in the chest.  The defense also called seven 
witnesses. 
{¶23} James testified for the defense and said that he was shot at the 
corner of Evergreen and Palmetto Streets on September 14, 2001.  James drove 
his maroon Ford Explorer to this location after Dotson called him.  James said 
that the shooting occurred in a residential neighborhood, and no White Castle 
restaurant was nearby. 
{¶24} James has never been able to identify his shooter.  Moreover, 
James never identified Conway as being at the scene of the shooting.  Although 
James testified that “a big, fat white guy” was with Dotson at the scene, he has 
never said that that person was Conway.  To James’s knowledge, the police have 
never filed any charges regarding his shooting. 
{¶25} Robert Hale testified that he lives on Evergreen Terrace, about 100 
to 200 feet from the corner of Evergreen and Palmetto.  On September 14, 2001, 
Hale was about 150 feet from this intersection when he heard five loud gunshots.  
Hale then saw a young man run and jump into a maroon Ford Explorer.  As the 
Explorer sped away, Hale heard nine more shots from a different gun.  Hale did 
not see who was doing the shooting. 
{¶26} Linda Goodman, the general manager at the Hampton Inn Suites in 
Chillicothe, testified about a hotel billing record.  The bill indicated that Arthurs 
checked into room number 306 at 10:31 p.m. on September 11, 2001, and 
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checked out on September 15, 2001, at 1:44 p.m.  Goodman also stated that it was 
hotel policy to require photo identification if the hotel guest paid with cash. 
{¶27} Brian Woodworth, a maintenance worker at the Chillicothe 
Hampton Inn, measured the dimensions of the bathroom in room 306.  
Woodworth said that the bathroom measured slightly over ten feet by five and 
one-half feet and that the “surface area for the standing room” in the bathroom 
was about three and one-half by five and one-half feet.  According to Woodworth, 
three large adult males would be able to stand in the bathroom at the same time, 
but “it would be tight.” 
{¶28} Arthur Wood testified that Dotson was his “adopted cousin.”  
Wood was a fellow inmate of Arthurs, and he claimed that Arthurs admitted 
killing Dotson.  Wood, however, conceded that he did not know whether Arthurs 
was telling the truth. 
{¶29} The jury convicted Conway of all charges and specifications.  
After a penalty hearing, the trial court sentenced Conway to death, consistently 
with the jury’s recommendation, for the aggravated murder of Dotson.  The trial 
court merged Conway’s kidnapping conviction (Count Two) into his aggravated 
murder conviction and did not impose a separate sentence on Count Two.  The 
trial court imposed sentences of one year for each of Conway’s convictions for 
possessing criminal tools (Count Three) and abuse of a corpse (Count Four), and 
five years for each of Conway’s convictions for obstructing justice (Count Five) 
and tampering with evidence (Count Six).  The trial court ordered that Counts 
Three through Six run consecutively to each other and concurrently with Count 
One. 
{¶30} The cause is now before this court on direct review from the trial 
court.  R.C. 2929.05(A). 
{¶31} Conway has raised eight propositions of law.  We have reviewed 
each one and have determined that none justifies reversal of Conway’s 
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convictions.  Pursuant to R.C. 2929.05(A), we have also independently weighed 
the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating evidence.  We find that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Therefore, we affirm Conway’s convictions and sentence of death. 
II. Pretrial Publicity 
{¶32} In his fourth proposition of law, Conway contends that the trial 
court’s denial of his motion to change venue deprived him of a fair and impartial 
jury.  Conway claims that adverse publicity surrounding both his trial in this 
matter and a prior murder conviction and death sentence required that venue be 
moved from Franklin County. 
{¶33} A motion for change of venue is governed by Crim.R. 18(B), 
which provides that a trial court may transfer venue “when it appears that a fair 
and impartial trial cannot be held” in that court.  See, also, R.C. 2901.12(K).  “A 
change of venue rests largely in the discretion of the trial court * * *.”  State v. 
Fairbanks (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 34, 37, 61 O.O.2d 241, 289 N.E.2d 352.  
Moreover, “a careful and searching voir dire provides the best test of whether 
prejudicial pretrial publicity has prevented obtaining a fair and impartial jury from 
the locality.”  State v. Davis (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 111, 666 N.E.2d 1099, 
quoting State v. Bayless (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 98, 2 O.O.3d 249, 357 N.E.2d 
1035.  Accord State v. Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 479, 653 N.E.2d 304; 
State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 117, 559 N.E.2d 710. 
{¶34} Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion to change venue under 
Crim.R. 18(B).  During a pretrial hearing in July 2003, the trial judge indicated 
that he saw no reason to change venue.  When juror selection began on September 
15, 2003, defense counsel moved for a continuance and a change of venue based 
on various media reports about the trial and Conway’s prior aggravated-murder 
conviction and death sentence.  During trial, defense counsel also submitted to the 
court newspaper articles about the crimes. 
January Term, 2006 
9 
{¶35} The trial court deferred ruling on defense counsel’s motions for a 
continuance and a change of venue until voir dire was completed.  After 
prospective jurors were individually questioned about pretrial publicity, the trial 
court denied these motions. 
{¶36} Some newspaper articles were adverse to Conway.  These articles 
described Conway’s criminal background, including his prior murder conviction 
and death sentence, his alleged plans to kill witnesses and prosecutors, allegations 
that he was the leader of a criminal gang, and details of the charges against 
Conway in this case.  Other articles described Conway as a father of two young 
children and a college student, or mentioned him only peripherally. 
{¶37} Notwithstanding the publicity before and during the trial, Conway 
has not shown that the trial court erred in failing to change venue.  The trial court 
conducted individual voir dire of prospective jurors to determine the extent of 
their exposure to media coverage involving Conway.  Only 14 of 60 venire 
members indicated that they had read or heard anything about this case or 
Conway’s prior murder conviction and death sentence.  Defense counsel 
challenged four of these jurors, and the trial court readily dismissed those jurors.  
Defense counsel did not challenge any other prospective juror based on exposure 
to adverse media coverage about Conway.  Cf. Murphy v. Florida (1975), 421 
U.S. 794, 803, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589; State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 
227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 92-93. 
{¶38} Defense counsel also did not exhaust their peremptory challenges.  
The limited number of defense challenges for pretrial publicity and the failure to 
exhaust peremptory challenges indicate that the defense did not believe that the 
jury venire was overly exposed to negative publicity.  See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 98 
Ohio St.3d 514, 2003-Ohio-2284, 787 N.E.2d 1185, at ¶ 37. 
{¶39} Moreover, none of the seated jurors indicated they had any 
knowledge about this case or Conway’s other criminal activities.  A defendant 
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claiming that pretrial publicity has denied him a fair trial must show that one or 
more jurors were actually biased.  See State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 
464, 739 N.E.2d 749; State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d 27, 2004-Ohio-4190, 813 
N.E.2d 637, at ¶ 40-41.  Conway is unable to demonstrate that any biased juror sat 
on his jury. 
{¶40} The trial court took other precautions.  The court granted one 
continuance to allow publicity from Conway’s first capital trial to dissipate.  The 
court also continually cautioned jurors not to discuss the case and to avoid media 
reports.  Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by declining to change venue.  The trial court took effective steps to 
protect Conway’s rights.  State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 
817 N.E.2d 29, at ¶ 47-58; State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 
776 N.E.2d 1061, at ¶ 30.  Therefore, we reject Conway’s fourth proposition. 
III. Guilt-Phase Issues 
A. Sufficiency of Evidence 
{¶41} In his second proposition of law, Conway challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence regarding the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) (murder to escape 
detection) and 2929.04(A)(8) (murder to prevent testimony) capital specifications 
contained in the indictment. 
{¶42} In reviewing a record for sufficiency, “[t]he relevant inquiry is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 
574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia 
(1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.  The weight to be given the 
evidence and the credibility of witnesses are primarily jury issues.  State v. Waddy 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 430, 588 N.E.2d 819; State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio 
St.2d 230, 231, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212. 
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11 
{¶43} R.C. 2929.04(A)(3). The first capital specification charged 
Conway with committing aggravated murder “for the purpose of escaping 
detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the 
offender,” R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), which was the felonious assault upon James.  
Conway contends that the state failed to present sufficient evidence that he had 
committed that felonious assault. 
{¶44} In State v. Jones (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 347, 744 N.E.2d 1163, 
this court held that proof of the defendant’s commission of the prior offense 
constituted an essential element of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) specification.  Thus, 
the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Conway 
committed the offense of felonious assault for which he had sought to avoid 
detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment. 
{¶45} The state presented testimony from Ronny Trent (Conway’s cousin 
and a government informant) that Conway was afraid that Dotson would tell the 
police that Conway had shot someone.  Conway also told Trent that he had killed 
Dotson because Dotson had seen Conway shoot someone. 
{¶46} James testified that he was shot on September 14, 2001.  James 
said that Dotson was at the scene of the shooting with a “big, fat white guy,” a 
description that matches Conway, and that the “big, fat white guy” had a gun.  
James also testified that the shooting occurred at Evergreen and Palmetto in 
Columbus.  On September 14, police recovered multiple shell casings from that 
area. 
{¶47} R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) defines felonious assault as knowingly causing 
or attempting to cause serious physical harm to another by means of a deadly 
weapon.  Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a 
rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Conway had 
feloniously assaulted Jesse James.  Therefore, we find that sufficient evidence 
was presented to prove this element of R.C. 2929.04(A)(3). 
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{¶48} R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) Jury Instruction. Under this proposition of 
law, Conway also contends that the jury was not instructed that a finding on the 
felonious assault charge was necessary to convict on the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) 
specification.  After defining the offense of felonious assault in conjunction with 
the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) specification, the trial court instructed: 
{¶49} “Now, felonious assault can also be committed, the State of Ohio, 
and that’s the felonious assault that – you aren’t deciding that offense before you, 
but the State must prove that it was intended to, with respect to that specification, 
that a felonious assault – the State has to show that the offense was committed for 
the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, [or] punishment for another 
offense and the other offense is the felonious assault.” 
{¶50} Conway complains about the trial court’s instruction to the jury, 
“[Y]ou aren’t deciding that offense [felonious assault] before you * * * .” 
{¶51} The challenged instruction is less than a model of clarity.  
Nevertheless, Conway failed to object to this instruction and has waived all but 
plain error.  Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 
N.E.2d 1240.  A trial court’s failure to properly instruct on every essential 
element of a crime does not, per se, constitute plain error under Crim.R. 52(B).  
State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 16 O.O.3d 169, 404 N.E.2d 144, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  It is only when the failure to properly instruct 
results in a “manifest miscarriage of justice” that plain error may be recognized.  
Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶52} We conclude that there was no prejudice to Conway resulting in a 
manifest miscarriage of justice.  The state did present sufficient evidence to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Conway had committed a felonious assault.  Thus, 
plain error is absent because the outcome of the trial would not clearly have been 
different with a more precise instruction.  See State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 
91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2006 
13 
{¶53} R.C. 2929.04(A)(8). Conway also maintains that the state failed to 
present sufficient evidence to prove the third capital specification, that he killed 
Dotson to prevent his “testimony in any criminal proceeding.”  R.C. 
2929.04(A)(8).  Conway contends that the (A)(8) specification is inapplicable 
because there was no evidence that Conway was a suspect in the shooting of Jesse 
James, and no criminal proceeding regarding the James shooting was underway. 
{¶54} R.C. 2929.04(A)(8) allows the death penalty if “[t]he victim of the 
aggravated murder was a witness to an offense who was purposely killed to 
prevent the victim’s testimony in any criminal proceeding and the aggravated 
murder was not committed during the commission, attempted commission, or 
flight immediately after the commission or attempted commission of the offense 
to which the victim was a witness.” 
{¶55} Under the R.C. 2929.04(A)(8) specification, the state was not 
required to show that Conway was a suspect or that he had committed any 
underlying offense in order to prove the witness-murder specification.  In 
addition, R.C. 2929.04(A)(8) does not require that a criminal action be pending 
when the defendant kills the victim-witness.  Indeed, we have previously upheld 
application of the witness-murder specification in situations where no criminal 
proceeding had been initiated at the time the victim was murdered.  See, e.g., 
State v. Keene (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 655, 693 N.E.2d 246; State v. Brooks 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 159, 661 N.E.2d 1030; State v. Hooks (1988), 39 Ohio 
St.3d 67, 69, 529 N.E.2d 429.  The plain language of the statute requires only (1) 
that the victim was a witness to an offense and (2) that the purpose of killing the 
victim was to prevent the victim from testifying in a criminal proceeding.  See 
State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, at ¶ 
126. 
{¶56} James testified that he was shot on September 14, 2001, and that 
Dotson was at the scene.  Trent testified that Conway was afraid that Dotson 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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would tell the police that Conway had shot someone.  Conway told Trent that he 
had killed Dotson because Dotson had seen Conway shoot someone.  In addition, 
Arthurs testified that Conway was concerned that Dotson would disclose 
Conway’s criminal activities.  Finally, the state presented evidence that one of the 
last calls made on Dotson’s cell phone was to a Franklin County sheriff’s 
detective.  This call was made on September 15, 2001, one day after the James 
shooting.  Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, we hold 
that sufficient evidence was presented to prove the R.C. 2929.04(A)(8) 
specification.  Therefore, we overrule Conway’s second proposition. 
B. Hearsay 
{¶57} Conway argues in his sixth proposition of law that the trial court 
erred in admitting hearsay testimony when it permitted two witnesses to testify 
that Dotson had been involved in a shooting and that detectives had wanted to 
speak with him. 
{¶58} Lora Eberhard, Dotson’s mother, testified that on September 15, 
2001, two Franklin County Sheriff’s detectives came to her house looking for 
Dotson.  According to Eberhard, the detectives told her that “they believed [that 
Dotson] was witness to a shooting and they wanted to talk about it.”  Defense 
counsel objected, and the judge gave the jury during Eberhard’s testimony a 
lengthy explanation of the law concerning hearsay.  Similarly, Cecil Dotson, 
Dotson’s brother, was permitted to testify that Roberta Hannah, Dotson’s 
girlfriend, told him “that there was a shooting and that [Dotson] was there.”  
Again, defense counsel objected, and the witness was warned not to relate the 
statements of others. 
{¶59} Any errors in admitting these statements were harmless.  The 
testimony of Eberhard and Cecil Dotson was cumulative.  James testified that 
Dotson was present when James was shot, and Conway admitted to Trent that 
January Term, 2006 
15 
Dotson had seen Conway shoot someone and that Conway was afraid that Dotson 
would tell the police.  Therefore, we reject Conway’s sixth proposition. 
C. Other-Acts Evidence 
{¶60} In his eighth proposition of law, Conway maintains that the trial 
court improperly admitted “other acts” evidence in violation of Evid.R. 404(B).  
He also argues that the probative value of this evidence was substantially 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.  Evid.R. 403(A). 
1. Evid.R. 404(B):  Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts 
{¶61} “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.”  Evid.R. 404(B).  Such evidence may be admissible, however, for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.  Id.  The exceptions 
allowing the evidence “must be construed against admissibility, and the standard 
for determining admissibility of such evidence is strict.”  State v. Broom (1988), 
40 Ohio St.3d 277, 533 N.E.2d 682, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶62} Nevertheless, the admission of evidence lies within the broad 
discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary 
decisions in the absence of an abuse of discretion that has created material 
prejudice.  State v. Issa (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 752 N.E.2d 904.  Thus, our 
inquiry is confined to determining whether the trial court acted unreasonably, 
arbitrarily, or unconscionably in deciding the evidentiary issues about which 
Conway complains.  State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 23, 759 N.E.2d 1240. 
{¶63} Hannah’s testimony. Conway first complains about Hannah’s 
testimony regarding an incident during which Conway yelled at Dotson.  Hannah 
testified that on one occasion, she accompanied Dotson to meet Conway.  As they 
were leaving a neighborhood in separate vehicles, Conway stopped at the side of 
the road and yelled at Dotson for following him.  Conway did not object to this 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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testimony and waived all but plain error.  Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio 
St.3d at 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240. 
{¶64} This evidence was relevant to a noncharacter issue and was 
allowed under Evid.R. 404(B).  Hannah’s testimony indicated that Conway 
distrusted Dotson.  The testimony was probative of Conway’s motive to kill.  See, 
e.g., State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d 27, 2004-Ohio-4190, 813 N.E.2d 637, at ¶ 
81; State v. Tibbetts (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 161, 749 N.E.2d 226.  Therefore, 
we conclude that there was no plain error. 
{¶65} Arthurs’s testimony. Conway argues that the trial court erred in 
allowing Arthurs to testify about a statement that Conway made the day after 
Dotson’s murder.  Arthurs testified that he and Conway were at a hardware store 
where Conway picked up a spaded shovel and said that “it was for the next time.”  
Conway objected, but we find that there was no error. 
{¶66} Conway’s reference to the spaded shovel and “the next time” was a 
thinly veiled reference to his murder of Dotson with a pickax the previous night.  
Accordingly, Conway’s statement to Arthurs was an implied admission of guilt 
and was not barred by Evid.R. 404(B).  Cf. State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 
2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, at ¶ 47. 
{¶67} Conway also challenges Arthurs’s testimony about faking his 
murder with the help of Franklin County sheriff’s detectives.  Over objection, 
Arthurs testified, “[The detectives] asked me to dig my own grave and let them 
take pictures of me in it because * * * [Conway] had hired someone to kill me.” 
{¶68} The trial court did not err in admitting this testimony.  Trent 
testified that Conway had hired him to kill Arthurs because Conway was afraid 
that Arthurs would implicate Conway in Dotson’s murder.  Evidence of conduct 
designed to impede or prevent a witness from testifying is admissible to show 
consciousness of guilt.  State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 11, 679 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2006 
17 
646, citing United States v. Cirillo (C.A.2, 1972), 468 F.2d 1233, 1240.  See, also, 
State v. Richey (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 357, 595 N.E.2d 915. 
{¶69} Trent’s testimony. First, Conway complains about Trent’s 
testimony regarding his initial conversations with Conway concerning Dotson’s 
murder.  Trent testified that Conway discussed a Chillicothe case and his concerns 
about people cooperating with police.  According to Trent, Conway then said that 
“he had some people he wanted to take care of.”  Trent added that “it was like a 
list, you know, a hit list” and that Conway had then asked Trent to kill Arthurs.  
The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection. 
{¶70} Trent’s testimony explained how his conversation with Conway 
turned to the subject of killing Arthurs, who was present when Conway killed 
Dotson.  The evidence that Conway wanted Trent to kill Arthurs to prevent his 
testimony was admissible to show Conway’s consciousness of guilt for Dotson’s 
murder.  State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d at 11, 679 N.E.2d 646.  Thus, the trial 
court did not commit error. 
{¶71} Second, Conway complains about Trent’s testimony that Conway 
was afraid that Dotson was going to talk to police about a racketeering case and 
about seeing Conway shoot someone at a White Castle restaurant.  But testimony 
that Dotson knew of Conway’s other criminal acts and that Conway was afraid 
that Dotson would go to the police was probative of Conway’s motive and intent 
to kill and his identity as Dotson’s killer, and it was relevant to the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(8) witness-murder specification.  See, e.g., State v. Gross, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, at ¶ 47; State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio 
St.3d at 161, 749 N.E.2d 226; State v. McNeill (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 442, 
700 N.E.2d 596.  In addition, the White Castle shooting and the Jesse James 
shooting were the same offense, and evidence relating to Conway’s commission 
of a felonious assault was necessary to prove the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) escaping-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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detection specification.  See State v. Brinkley, 105 Ohio St.3d 231, 2005-Ohio-
1507, 824 N.E.2d 959, at ¶ 32-34. 
{¶72} Third, Conway challenges testimony, admitted over objection, that 
he asked Trent to kill Arthurs because Conway was afraid that Arthurs would tell 
police about a robbery in Chillicothe and “the thing with [Dotson].” 
{¶73} As we previously determined, evidence that Conway solicited 
Trent to kill Arthurs was admissible to show Conway’s consciousness of guilt.  
State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d at 11, 679 N.E.2d 646.  However, reference to 
the Chillicothe robbery in relation to Conway’s plan to kill Arthurs was irrelevant 
to the charges in this case and was not admissible under one of the exceptions to 
Evid.R. 404(B).  See, also, Evid.R. 401 and 402. 
{¶74} Nevertheless, Conway’s alleged involvement in this robbery is of 
minor significance compared to the gravity of the aggravated murder charged in 
this case.  Accordingly, we hold that the admission of this evidence did not result 
in prejudicial error.  See State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272, 2004-Ohio-971, 804 
N.E.2d 433, at ¶ 126-127; State v. Woodard (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 623 
N.E.2d 75. 
{¶75} Fourth, Conway complains of Trent’s testimony on redirect 
examination about a letter that Trent wrote to prosecutors while he and Conway 
were incarcerated together.  Trent testified over objection that he wrote the letter 
at Conway’s request in order to get placed in protective custody so that he could 
kill a witness against Conway in an unrelated case. 
{¶76} On cross-examination, defense counsel had inquired into Trent’s 
letter in an effort to impeach Trent regarding his motivation for contacting the 
prosecutor about the Dotson murder.  In cross-examining Trent, defense counsel 
questioned why Trent’s letter to the prosecutor had not implicated Conway in 
Dotson’s murder. 
January Term, 2006 
19 
{¶77} In State v. Kamel (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 306, 311-312, 12 OBR 
378, 466 N.E.2d 860, we held that the prosecutor’s cross-examination into the 
defendant’s use of Demerol was permissible because it was the defense that had 
first raised the subject of defendant’s drug problem and made it an issue at trial.  
We reasoned that after putting the drug problem in issue, defense counsel could 
not limit the subject to only those points of evidence that were in its favor.  
“Rather, the topic became open to all relevant inquiry in the discretion of the trial 
court.”  Id. at 312, 12 OBR 378, 466 N.E.2d 860, citing, generally, Evid.R. 402. 
{¶78} In this case, defense counsel first inquired into Trent’s letter in an 
effort to attack his credibility.  Thus, Conway cannot now contend that the 
prosecution was foreclosed from delving into the same subject in an effort to 
rehabilitate its witness.  Admittedly, evidence of Conway’s desire to kill a witness 
in an unrelated murder case reflected very badly on Conway’s character.  
Nevertheless, the evidence was not offered to show propensity or bad character 
but was necessary to bolster Trent’s claim that it was Conway’s idea to write the 
letter.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing this 
testimony. 
{¶79} Fifth, Conway challenges the following testimony by Trent:  
“Conway told me he might have a couple other people he might need me to kill.”  
He also challenges Trent’s related comment that “now the body count’s * * * 
getting astronomical.”  Finally, Conway complains about testimony that Trent 
showed Conway photographs of two people that Trent had purportedly killed for 
Conway: Arthurs and another “guy that made a video confession for [Conway].” 
{¶80} Conway failed to object to Trent’s “body count” comment and has 
waived all but plain error.  Crim.R. 52(B).  Conway did object to Trent’s 
testimony that Conway might want him to kill other people, but not on Evid.R. 
404(B) grounds.  Thus, he has forfeited all but plain-error analysis by failing to 
state the specific ground raised on appeal.  Evid.R. 103(A)(1); State v. Tibbetts, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
92 Ohio St.3d at 161, 749 N.E.2d 226, citing State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio 
St.3d 144, 159, 694 N.E.2d 932.  Conway preserved error as to the remaining 
testimony about the photographs because the basis for his objection is apparent 
from the transcript.  Evid.R. 103(A)(1). 
{¶81} Except for the reference to the photograph of Arthurs, none of the 
complained-of testimony should have been admitted because it did not “ ‘tend to 
show’ by substantial proof” any of the exceptions under Evid.R. 404(B).  See 
State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 533 N.E.2d 682, paragraph one of the 
syllabus, quoting State v. Flonnory (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 124, 126, 60 O.O.2d 95, 
285 N.E.2d 726.  Nor do we accept the state’s argument that these comments 
were necessary or relevant to rebut defense counsel’s cross-examination of Trent. 
{¶82} Nevertheless, the admission of Trent’s testimony in these 
instances, although improper, does not rise to the level of prejudicial error.  The 
comments were gratuitous on Trent’s part and were not invited by the prosecutor.  
Moreover, other evidence showing similar acts and intentions of Conway was 
properly admitted.  Thus, we conclude that Conway did not suffer material 
prejudice from the erroneous admission of this testimony.  Cf. State v. Tibbetts, 
92 Ohio St.3d at 161, 749 N.E.2d 226; State v. Woodard, 68 Ohio St.3d at 73, 623 
N.E.2d 75. 
2. Evid.R. 403(A):  Unfair Prejudice 
{¶83} Conway also contends under this proposition of law that the other-
acts evidence in his case was highly prejudicial and should have been excluded 
under Evid.R. 403(A).  Yet Conway failed to object on Evid.R. 403(A) grounds to 
the trial court’s admission of other-acts evidence.  Thus, he has waived all but 
plain-error analysis.  Evid.R. 103(A)(1); Crim.R. 52(B). 
{¶84} We determine that the challenged testimony was substantive 
evidence showing Conway’s motive, intent, and identity as Dotson’s killer and his 
consciousness of guilt.  See, e.g., State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d at 11-12, 679 
January Term, 2006 
21 
N.E.2d 646.  In light of the substantial relevance of this evidence, the trial court 
did not commit plain error in allowing relevant testimony of Conway’s other acts.  
Therefore, we overrule Conway’s eighth proposition. 
IV. Penalty-Phase Issues 
A. Defense Mitigation Exhibits 
{¶85} In his third proposition of law, Conway contends that the trial court 
erred when it prevented the jury from considering defense mitigation exhibits.  
Conway argues that the trial court should have admitted photographs of him with 
various family members. 
{¶86} In the penalty phase, the state objected twice to the defense 
introduction of these photographs, arguing that they were irrelevant to mitigation 
and were intended solely to invoke sympathy.  No ruling was made on the record, 
but the trial court did allow Conway’s mitigation witnesses to testify about the 
photos. 
{¶87} At the close of its mitigation case, the defense moved to admit the 
photos into evidence.  The state again objected on relevancy grounds.  In 
response, defense counsel argued that the photos were relevant evidence of 
Conway’s history and background.  The trial court, however, found that the 
photos were not relevant “to any of the factors that the jury can consider” and 
granted the state’s objection.  Defense counsel then proffered the photos for 
appellate review. 
{¶88} We hold that the trial court should not have excluded the defense 
photographs.  R.C. 2929.04(B) requires the sentencer to consider “the history, 
character, and background of the offender.”  Moreover, R.C. 2929.04(C) grants 
the defendant great latitude in the introduction of mitigating evidence during 
death-penalty hearings.  See State v. Dixon, 101 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-1585, 
805 N.E.2d 1042, at ¶ 67. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
{¶89} The excluded evidence depicted Conway at various stages of his 
life and included photos of several family members, including Conway’s two 
young children.  The photos illustrated testimony that Conway is part of a loving 
and supportive family and that he maintains a close relationship with his two 
children.  Thus, the photos were relevant mitigating evidence of Conway’s 
history, character, and background under R.C. 2929.04(B), and to “[a]ny other 
factors” in mitigation under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  See State v. White (1999), 85 
Ohio St.3d 433, 448, 709 N.E.2d 140, citing Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988), 487 
U.S. 164, 174, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (in Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, mitigating factors are facts about the defendant’s character, 
background, and record that may call for a penalty less than death).  See, e.g., 
State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, at ¶ 198-
199 (evidence of loving, dedicated family, and support of young son entitled to 
mitigating weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7)). 
{¶90} However, we hold that the trial court’s decision not to allow 
Conway to introduce the photographs into evidence does not require a new 
sentencing hearing.  First, Conway has not shown how he was prejudiced by the 
trial court’s exclusion of this evidence.  The photographs themselves, while 
illustrative of testimony by defense mitigation witnesses, are essentially 
cumulative of Conway’s mitigation evidence.  For instance, several witnesses 
testified that Conway loves and cares for his two young children and enjoys a 
close relationship with his family.  Conway’s mitigation witnesses also testified 
about the photographs in great detail by identifying the individuals depicted, their 
ages, when and where the photographs were taken, and the activities being 
pursued. 
{¶91} Moreover, we can eliminate the effect of the trial court’s decision 
as a result of our independent review.  When independently reviewing a sentence 
of death pursuant to R.C. 2929.05(A), we may consider proffered evidence that 
January Term, 2006 
23 
the jury was prevented from considering.  State v. Sanders (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
245, 267, 750 N.E.2d 90; State v. Williams (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 578, 660 
N.E.2d 724.  Accordingly, we reject Conway’s third proposition. 
B. Penalty-Phase Jury Instructions 
{¶92} Conway argues in his fifth proposition of law that the trial court 
gave a faulty reasonable-doubt instruction in the penalty phase by repeating the 
instruction from the guilt phase.  Conway challenges the following instruction:  
“Reasonable doubt is present when after you’ve carefully considered and 
compared all of the evidence you cannot say you are firmly convinced of the truth 
of the charge.”  (Emphasis added.)  Conway waived this issue by not objecting to 
the court’s instruction.  State v. Franklin (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 128, 580 
N.E.2d 1; State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 
1332, syllabus; Crim.R. 30(A). 
{¶93} We have consistently rejected claims of prejudice stemming from 
the erroneous use of this particular reasonable-doubt instruction in the penalty 
phase.  See State v. Jones (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 403, 418, 739 N.E.2d 300; State 
v. Goff (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 131-132, 694 N.E.2d 916; State v. Taylor 
(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 29-30, 676 N.E.2d 82.  We stated in those cases that an 
appropriate penalty-phase instruction on reasonable doubt conveys to the jurors 
that they must be firmly convinced that the aggravating circumstances outweigh 
the mitigating factors and that the prosecution has the burden of proof on the 
issue. 
{¶94} In addition to the challenged instruction, the trial court told the 
jury, “The burden is solely on the State to prove that the aggravated circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.”  There were three 
similar instructions informing the jury that, before imposing the death penalty, 
they must be unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
aggravating circumstances in this case outweigh the mitigating factors.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
Therefore, we hold that the instructions when viewed as a whole were not 
prejudicial.  See, also, State v. Woodard, 68 Ohio St.3d at 76-77, 623 N.E.2d 75.  
Accordingly, we overrule Conway’s fifth proposition. 
V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
{¶95} In his seventh proposition of law, Conway makes various claims 
relating to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Reversal of a conviction or 
sentence based upon ineffective assistance of counsel requires satisfying the two-
prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Strickland requires that the defendant show, first, that 
counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that counsel’s deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  
Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  In order to show deficient 
performance, the defendant must prove that counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective level of reasonable representation.  To show prejudice, the defendant 
must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  Id.; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 
136, 143, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
A. Trial Phase 
{¶96} Failure to request hearing. Immediately prior to Arthurs’s 
testimony, defense counsel complained that the prosecutor had violated the trial 
court’s order for separation of witnesses when Arthurs spent approximately 50 
minutes in a holding cell talking with Detective Zachary Scott, one of the 
investigating detectives in the case.  Conway now contends that trial counsel were 
ineffective in failing to request a hearing on this issue.  We disagree. 
{¶97} There is no evidence that the trial court’s separation order was 
violated.  First, Detective Scott was on the list of potential witnesses, but the 
prosecution never called Scott as a witness.  When defense counsel brought the 
issue to the trial court’s attention, the prosecutor explained that Detective Scott 
January Term, 2006 
25 
was assigned to keep the state’s witnesses separated while they were housed in 
holding cells prior to testifying.  The prosecutor had also instructed Scott not to 
talk about the case, and there is no evidence that he disobeyed this instruction. 
{¶98} Second, there is no evidence that Detective Scott heard any of the 
testimony of the prosecution witnesses who testified before Arthurs.  In fact, 
Conway does not complain that Scott was in the courtroom while these witnesses 
testified or that he was privy to their testimony. 
{¶99} Finally, defense counsel cross-examined Arthurs on this issue.  
Arthurs admitted that he and Scott talked in the holding cell prior to his testimony 
but denied that they discussed this case.  Thus, trial counsel did not perform 
deficiently by failing to request a hearing. 
{¶100} Prejudicial cross-examination. Conway claims that trial counsel 
were ineffective when their cross-examination of Trent opened the door to 
damaging testimony on redirect.  On cross-examination, defense counsel 
attempted to impeach Trent regarding his reasons for contacting the prosecutor 
about the Dotson murder.  Defense counsel inquired into a letter that Trent had 
written to prosecutors while he and Conway were incarcerated together, and 
counsel questioned why Trent’s letter had failed to mention Conway’s role in 
Dotson’s murder.  On redirect, the prosecutor was able to elicit that Trent had 
written the letter at Conway’s request in order to be placed into protective custody 
so that he could kill a witness against Conway in an unrelated case. 
{¶101} The scope of cross-examination falls within the ambit of trial 
strategy, and debatable trial tactics do not establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 
45; State v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 339, 738 N.E.2d 1178.  In 
addition, to fairly assess counsel’s performance, “a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
professional assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674. 
{¶102} Admittedly, counsel may not have exercised the best judgment in 
cross-examining Trent on his letter to the prosecutor.  (See our discussion 
regarding Conway’s eighth proposition of law.)  The details of the letter were 
previously unknown to the jury because the state did not attempt to question Trent 
during his direct testimony about the contents of the letter.  Nevertheless, even if 
counsel’s cross-examination reflected deficient performance, Conway has failed 
to establish prejudice under Strickland.  The jury had before it similar testimony 
that Conway had hired Trent to kill Arthurs in order to prevent Arthurs from 
testifying against Conway.  Thus, Conway has not shown that there was a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of his trial would 
have been different. 
{¶103} Failure to object. Conway contends that counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance when they failed to object to inadmissible hearsay and 
other-acts testimony.  However, the failure to make objections is not alone enough 
to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  State v. Holloway (1988), 
38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244, 527 N.E.2d 831; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
413, 428, 653 N.E.2d 253. 
{¶104} First, Conway claims that trial counsel should have objected to 
hearsay testimony from Roberta Hannah that Dotson had made a phone call to her 
from Chillicothe, “where * * * events leading up to the homicide began.”  
Conway’s claim is without merit. 
{¶105} Hearsay is an out-of-court statement made by the declarant offered 
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  Evid.R. 801(C).  Hannah’s 
testimony was not objectionable on hearsay grounds because she never testified 
that Dotson had made the statement in question — i.e., that he was calling from 
Chillicothe.  See Evid.R. 801(B) (defining “declarant” as “a person who makes a 
January Term, 2006 
27 
statement”).  While the statement was objectionable under Evid.R. 602 based on 
Hannah’s lack of personal knowledge, Conway has not shown that counsel’s 
failure to object affected the outcome of the trial.  Indeed, Conway concedes in 
his brief that other evidence indicated that Dotson was in Chillicothe just prior to 
his death. 
{¶106} Second, Conway claims that defense counsel were ineffective by 
eliciting hearsay testimony from Arthurs on cross-examination that Nightingale 
had told Arthurs that Conway had shot Jesse James.  Conway claims that counsel 
should have asked the court to strike Arthurs’s response. 
{¶107} The state argues that Nightingale’s statement was not hearsay 
because it was admissible as a statement by a co-conspirator under Evid.R. 
801(D)(2)(e).  To be admissible as a nonhearsay statement, Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e) 
requires that the co-conspirator’s statement must be made during the course of the 
conspiracy.  While the record is not entirely clear, it appears that Nightingale’s 
statement to Arthurs was made prior to the commencement of the conspiracy to 
kill Dotson.  Thus, we reject the state’s co-conspirator argument. 
{¶108} Nevertheless, even if we determine that defense counsel should 
have moved to strike this testimony, Conway has failed to show that a reasonable 
probability exists that the outcome of his trial would have been different had 
counsel done so.  Other evidence proved that Conway shot Jesse James. 
{¶109} Third, Conway claims that his trial counsel were ineffective for not 
objecting to Hannah’s testimony describing the incident during which Conway 
had yelled at Dotson.  However, we decided under Conway’s eighth proposition 
of law that Hannah’s testimony was properly admitted.  Thus, there was no basis 
for counsel to object. 
{¶110} Failure to request curative instructions. Conway contends that, in 
addition to not objecting to inadmissible hearsay and other-acts evidence, trial 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request curative instructions 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
regarding this evidence.  Conway maintains that whenever clearly inadmissible 
evidence is presented to the jury, counsel has a “clear obligation” to request a 
curative instruction. 
{¶111} However, counsel’s decision not to request a jury instruction falls 
within the ambit of trial strategy.  See, e.g., State v. Lawson (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 
336, 341, 595 N.E.2d 902; State v. Schaim (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 51, 61, 600 
N.E.2d 661, fn. 9.  Furthermore, debatable trial tactics do not constitute 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  State v. Clayton (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 
49, 16 O.O.3d 35, 402 N.E.2d 1189; State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-
Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 146.  Conway does not mention what language the 
curative instructions should have contained or how such instructions would have 
cured any errors.  As Conway has failed to show that counsel’s decision not to 
request curative instructions was either unreasonable trial strategy or prejudicial, 
we reject his claim.  Cf. State v. Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 331, 686 
N.E.2d 245 (counsel’s decision not to request curative instructions to inadmissible 
evidence reflected an objective standard of reasonable representation). 
{¶112} Testimony of Jesse James. Conway contends that trial counsel 
were ineffective because they called Jesse James as a defense witness.  Conway 
claims that James’s testimony established that Conway murdered Dotson to 
escape detection for committing a felonious assault on James.  See R.C. 
2929.04(A)(3). 
{¶113} Counsel’s decision to call a witness is a matter of trial strategy.  
Such decisions will generally not be second-guessed by a reviewing court.  State 
v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, at ¶ 143; State 
v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d at 490, 739 N.E.2d 749.  We conclude that counsel’s 
decision to call James as a defense witness did not amount to ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
January Term, 2006 
29 
{¶114} As a defense witness, James testified that he was shot on 
September 14, 2001.  He claimed that Dotson was at the scene but that he was 
unable to identify his shooter.  On cross-examination, James did testify that a 
“big, fat white guy” with a gun was at the scene.  While Conway resembled this 
description, James never testified that Conway was present at the shooting.  In 
addition, James said that the shooting occurred in a residential neighborhood and 
that no White Castle restaurant was located nearby, testimony that contradicted 
the testimony of Trent, who had said that Conway shot someone at White Castle.  
Finally, James testified that, to his knowledge, no charges had been filed 
regarding his shooting. 
{¶115} Defense counsel noted for the record that they made a strategic 
decision to call James as a witness in light of the trial court’s ruling denying the 
defense’s Crim.R. 29 motion.  Moreover, counsel’s decision to call James 
reflected reasonable trial strategy.  James’s testimony could have created 
reasonable doubt in the minds of jurors regarding whether Conway had shot 
James.  That this strategy was unsuccessful and the jury ultimately found Conway 
guilty of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) specification is not a basis for finding ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Trial counsel’s strategic choices must be accorded 
deference and cannot be examined through the distorting effect of hindsight.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; State 
v. Cook (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 524-525, 605 N.E.2d 70. 
B. Penalty Phase 
{¶116} Failure to object to reasonable-doubt instruction. Conway 
maintains that his trial counsel were ineffective for not objecting to the trial 
court’s penalty-phase reasonable-doubt instruction.  But this instruction was 
harmless.  (See the discussion regarding Conway’s fifth proposition of law.)  
Thus, we cannot deem counsel ineffective for failing to object. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
{¶117} Failure to call psychologist. Conway argues that trial counsel were 
ineffective for failing to call a psychologist during the penalty phase.  Trial 
counsel did employ the services of Dr. Robert Stinson, a forensic psychologist, 
but did not call Dr. Stinson as a defense mitigation witness. 
{¶118} A decision by trial counsel not to call an expert witness generally 
will not sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  State v. Coleman 
(1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 307-308, 544 N.E.2d 622; State v. Thompson (1987), 
33 Ohio St.3d 1, 10-11, 514 N.E.2d 407.  The record does not reveal why Dr. 
Stinson was not called to testify or what testimony he would have provided.  
Thus, nothing in the record establishes that counsel were deficient by not calling 
Dr. Stinson or that, if called, he would have provided relevant mitigating 
evidence.  Therefore, we hold that this claim has no merit.  See, e.g., State v. 
Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 335, 703 N.E.2d 1251. 
{¶119} Testimony of high school physics teacher. Finally, Conway claims 
that his trial counsel were ineffective in calling William Kruczynski, his high 
school physics teacher, as a mitigation witness.  Kruczynski testified that Conway 
was a very good physics student but, notwithstanding, he believed that Conway 
was an “at-risk” student.  Kruczynski defined an at-risk student as one who may 
have “problems in * * * life, at home or work or somewhere else” that may 
prevent the student from performing up to his or her capabilities in class.  Conway 
contends that Kruczynski’s testimony left the jury with the impression that 
Conway “most certainly had the potential to do something positive with his life, 
and that he most certainly understood the consequences of the decisions he was 
making.” 
{¶120} Kruczynski’s testimony corroborated other mitigation testimony 
and fit within the overall mitigation strategy adopted by the defense: to show that 
Conway was physically and verbally abused by his father and that Conway has 
some redeeming qualities.  Thus, Conway has not shown that counsel were 
January Term, 2006 
31 
deficient in calling Kruczynski or that there was a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of his penalty hearing would have been different had Kruczynski not 
testified. 
{¶121} Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Conway has not shown 
that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel.  Accordingly, we 
reject Conway’s seventh proposition of law. 
VI. Constitutional Issues 
{¶122} In his first proposition of law, Conway raises various constitutional 
challenges to Ohio death-penalty statutes.  However, we have already rejected 
similar arguments.  See, e.g., State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 
311, 473 N.E.2d 264; State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 22 OBR 203, 489 
N.E.2d 795; State v. Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 734 N.E.2d 345.  Ohio’s 
capital sentencing scheme is constitutional.  See, e.g., State v. Clemons (1998), 82 
Ohio St.3d 438, 454, 696 N.E.2d 1009; State v. Smith (1997) 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 
684 N.E.2d 668; State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 253-254, 586 N.E.2d 
1042.  Accordingly, we summarily reject Conway’s first proposition of law.  State 
v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568. 
VII. Independent Sentence Evaluation 
A. Penalty Hearing 
{¶123} At the penalty hearing, Conway called 12 mitigation witnesses and 
gave an unsworn statement. 
{¶124} Tina Bourne, Conway’s cousin, is the same age as Conway, and 
they grew up together.  Bourne said that Conway is like a brother, and she wants 
him to remain in her life. 
{¶125} Conway has two children:  four-year-old James IV, whose 
nickname is “Bubba,” and two-year-old Halle.  According to Bourne, Conway is 
very close to his children. 
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32 
{¶126} Bourne described Conway’s father, James Conway Jr., as an 
“extremist.”  Bourne said that Conway’s father loved his children, but he would 
get upset over “the littlest things” and would physically and verbally abuse 
Conway and his siblings. 
{¶127} Conway’s uncle, Richard Wilkinson (the brother of Conway’s 
mother, Janice Conway), said that Conway’s father was “volatile” and violent at 
times.  According to Richard, Conway’s father gave Janice Conway a “black eye 
or two.”  Conway’s father was not a good role model, and he failed to provide 
Conway with basic values or a strong work ethic. 
{¶128} Richard also noted that Conway was intelligent and performed 
well in school.  Conway was an elementary school chess champion and was good 
at sports.  Richard said that Conway would be a good influence on his children 
even while incarcerated. 
{¶129} Thelma Jean Wilkinson, Conway’s maternal grandmother, testified 
that Conway lived with her while his father was in prison and that she loved 
Conway. 
{¶130} Randall Wilkinson, Conway’s uncle, testified that his daughter, 
Tina Bourne, and Conway attended Bible school together.  Conway also played 
football for the west side Boys’ Club and was in high school ROTC.  He wanted 
to become a Navy SEAL but was rejected because of poor eyesight.  Randall said 
that Conway adds “value” to his life and that he will maintain contact with 
Conway if Conway is given a life sentence. 
{¶131} John Hambel, Conway’s uncle, has lived in close proximity to 
Conway his entire life.  Conway’s father used to “whip” his children, but John 
never discussed this matter with Conway’s father or considered calling children’s 
services or the police.  John and Conway are close in age; they played youth 
football together for the west side Boys’ Club, and later, both coached football at 
January Term, 2006 
33 
the boys’ club.  John has maintained his close relationship with Conway during 
his incarceration. 
{¶132} Maranda Oliver, the mother of Conway’s daughter, Halle, had a 
one-year relationship with Conway.  While they were dating, Conway attended 
Columbus State and made the dean’s list.  Oliver still maintains contact with 
Conway, and she believes it is important that Conway remain in Halle’s life. 
{¶133} Jo Ellen Conway, Conway’s aunt, baby-sat Conway when he was a 
child.  Her relationship with Conway is important, and she wants to continue to be 
a part of his life. 
{¶134} Jo Ellen testified that her brother, Conway’s father, physically 
abused her as well as his wife, Janice.  She described her brother as a “maniac” 
and said that he verbally abused his children. 
{¶135} Gretchen Roese met Conway through his sister and had a several-
month romantic relationship with him.  Roese remains friends with Conway, 
visits him in jail, writes letters, and talks with him on the phone.  Roese said that 
Conway has a great relationship with his children. 
{¶136} Roese, however, observed that Conway’s relationship with his 
father is abnormal.  Roese claims that Conway’s father constantly yelled, called 
Conway names, and never offered any positive comments. 
{¶137} William Kruczynski, Conway’s high school physics teacher, 
testified that Conway was a very good physics student.  However, he opined that 
Conway was an “at-risk” student, which he described as a student who has 
problems outside of school that prevents the student from performing to his or her 
full potential in class. 
{¶138} Clara Hambel, Conway’s paternal grandmother, described her 
family as very close.  Clara has spent a considerable amount of time with 
Conway, and continues to write and visit him in jail.  Clara said Conway’s 
children also visit him in jail and that he is a loving and supportive father.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
Everyone in the family loves Conway and wants him to remain a part of their 
lives. 
{¶139} Jennifer Conway, Conway’s sister, enjoys a close relationship with 
Conway and said that the entire family is tight-knit.  Jennifer helps care for 
Conway’s children while he is incarcerated.  She still loves her brother, visits him 
in jail every chance she gets, and will always support him. 
{¶140} Jennifer said that Conway did well in school and was always on 
the honor roll when he was younger.  In high school, Conway was in the band and 
ROTC. 
{¶141} Jennifer described her father as very stern.  He would become 
angry over little things and yell a lot and was always critical.  Her father would 
often “whoop” her and her brothers, and he was verbally abusive. 
{¶142} Janice Conway, Conway’s mother, said that her husband was 
incarcerated after Conway was born and that she took Conway to visit him in 
prison.  Her husband drank a lot and physically abused her and the children, once 
breaking their other son’s jaw.  However, Janice never thought of calling the 
police or children’s services because she did not think it would help.  In hindsight, 
Janice recognized that she should have left and taken the children with her. 
{¶143} Janice testified that Conway did well in school and played chess, 
football, and the saxophone.  Conway was in high school ROTC and wanted to be 
a Navy aviator and a Navy SEAL.  However, his eyesight was poor, and he did 
not pass the tests.  Janice visits Conway in jail and wants to maintain their 
relationship. 
{¶144} In Conway’s unsworn statement, he said he could never imagine 
what Dotson’s family was going through.  Conway asked the jury for the 
opportunity to see his children grow older and to teach them right from wrong.  
He said that no one can do that better than people who “had opportunities and 
made the wrong choices in their life.” 
January Term, 2006 
35 
{¶145} Conway said that he would like to be there for his family, and he 
never realized until then how many people cared for him.  Ultimately, he said that 
his family was being punished for the “things that [he has] been convicted of.”  
Conway hoped that the jurors could see that his family did nothing wrong and that 
they would spare his life. 
B. Sentence Evaluation 
{¶146} The jury convicted Conway of three death-penalty specifications:  
R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), aggravated murder to escape detection, apprehension, trial or 
punishment for another offense; R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), aggravated murder during a 
kidnapping; and R.C. 2929.04(A)(8), aggravated murder to prevent the victim 
from testifying in a criminal proceeding.  For purposes of sentencing, the trial 
court merged the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) and (A)(8) specifications and submitted two 
aggravating circumstances for the jury’s consideration.  See State v. Frazier 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 344, 652 N.E.2d 1000. 
{¶147} After independent assessment, we hold that the evidence 
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Conway killed Andrew Dotson during 
a kidnapping and that he did so for the purpose of escaping detection for 
committing a felonious assault.  Conway solicited Arthurs and Nightingale to kill 
Dotson because Dotson had seen Conway shoot Jesse James.  Arthurs and 
Nightingale drove Dotson to West Virginia under false pretenses for the purpose 
of killing him.  When they could not carry out the murder, Conway ordered them 
to bring Dotson to him, and Conway killed Dotson himself. 
{¶148} Nothing in the nature and circumstances of the offense is 
mitigating.  Dotson was passed out from ingesting drugs when Conway instructed 
Arthurs and Nightingale to follow him to a nearby cornfield.  After arriving at the 
cornfield, Conway brutally killed Dotson by striking him twice in the chest with a 
pickax as he lay unconscious and helpless on the ground. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
{¶149} Conway’s history, character, and background provide some 
mitigating features.  There was testimony that Conway’s father verbally and 
physically abused Conway and other family members.  Despite this abuse, 
Conway was able to succeed in several areas.  Witnesses attested to Conway’s 
academic achievements in grade school, high school, and college.  As a juvenile 
and young adult, Conway was successful in several endeavors, including chess, 
football, band, and high school ROTC. 
{¶150} Several family members and friends testified that Conway is a 
loving and supportive father to his two young children.  While attending college, 
Conway was employed at his uncle’s concrete company, and he contributed to his 
local community by coaching youth football.  We accord some mitigating weight 
to these factors.  See, e.g., State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 
818 N.E.2d 229, at ¶ 198; State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 194, 631 
N.E.2d 124. 
{¶151} Conway’s age of 23 at the time of the offense qualifies as a 
mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04(B)(4) (youth of offender).  However, we 
assign only modest weight to this factor.  See, e.g., State v. Fears (1999), 86 Ohio 
St.3d 329, 349, 715 N.E.2d 136; State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 319, 
652 N.E.2d 988. 
{¶152} As to the R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) “other factors,” Conway grew up in a 
loving, supportive, and close-knit family.  Several family members and friends 
testified of their love for Conway and the importance of having him in their lives.  
We have also considered Conway’s family photographs that the trial court 
improperly excluded.  The love and devotion of Conway’s family and friends 
qualify as “other factors” worth some mitigating weight.  See, e.g., State v. 
Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, at ¶ 199; State v. 
Jalowiec (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 220, 239, 744 N.E.2d 163.  That Conway has 
children who love and need him is also mitigating.  See, e.g., State v. Adams, 103 
January Term, 2006 
37 
Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, at ¶ 144.  There was some brief 
testimony that Conway would do well in a structured and disciplined 
environment, but this factor is entitled to only slight weight. 
{¶153} We hold that Conway’s unsworn statement is entitled to little 
weight.  Conway expressed little remorse and never specifically apologized for 
murdering Dotson.  See, e.g., State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-
6548, 819 N.E.2d 1047, at ¶ 180; State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d at 671, 693 
N.E.2d 246. 
{¶154} As to the remaining statutory mitigating factors, no evidence was 
presented in regard to R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement), (B)(2) (duress, 
coercion, or strong provocation), (B)(3) (mental disease or defect), (B)(5) (lack of 
a significant criminal record), and (B)(6) (accomplice only). 
{¶155} Upon weighing the evidence, we hold that the aggravating 
circumstances of murder to escape detection, R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), and murder in 
the course of a kidnapping, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), outweigh Conway’s collective 
mitigation evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, we hold that 
Conway’s death sentence is appropriate. 
{¶156} Finally, the death penalty imposed is proportionate to death 
sentences approved in other cases in which the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) specification 
was present in combination with an R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification.  See State 
v. Brinkley, 105 Ohio St.3d 231, 2005-Ohio-1507, 824 N.E.2d 959, ¶ 180; State v. 
Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 152; State v. 
Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d at 344-345, 652 N.E.2d 1000. 
{¶157} Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences, including 
the sentence of death. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
__________________ 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Sheryl L. Pritchard, and Jennifer L. Coriell, Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
W. Joseph Edwards and Dianne Worthington, for appellant. 
______________________