Case Title: Racine County v. Int'l Assoc. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2006AP000964

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2008 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP964 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Racine County and Kevin B. Van Kampen, Racine 
County Family Court Commissioner and Director of 
Family Court Counseling, 
          Petitioners-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers District 10, AFL-CIO, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 303 Wis. 2d 744, 735 N.W.2d 193 
(Ct. App. 2007-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 15, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Wilbur W. Warren, III   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
   
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BUTLER, JR., J., join the 
dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For petitioners-respondents-petitioners there were briefs 
by Charles B. Palmer, Kristi S. Nelson Foy, Amy O. Bruchs, and 
Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Charles B. Palmer. 
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief by Matthew 
R. Robbins, Asmaa Abdul-Haqq, and Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, 
Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument 
by Matthew R. Robbins. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew T. Phillips, 
Ronald S. Stadler, Gina M. Ozelie, and Stadler, Centofanti & 
Phillips, S.C., Mequon, on behalf of the Wisconsin Counties 
Association. 
 
 
 
2008 WI 70
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP964 
(L.C. No. 
2005CV1152) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Racine County and Kevin B. Van Kampen, Racine 
County Family Court Commissioner and Director 
of Family Court Counseling, 
 
 
Petitioners-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers, District 10, AFL-CIO, 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 that reversed and 
remanded an order of the Circuit Court for Racine County, Judge 
Wilbur W. Warren III. 
                                                 
1 Racine County v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers, Dist. 10, No. 2006AP964, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. May 9, 2007). 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
2 
 
¶2 
Petitioners, Racine County and Kevin B. Van Kampen 
(Van Kampen), who is the Racine County Family Court Commissioner 
and Director of Family Court Counseling Services, (collectively, 
Racine County), seek review of an unpublished decision of the 
court of appeals.  The court of appeals' decision reversed and 
remanded the order of the Circuit Court for Racine County, Judge 
Wilbur W. Warren III of the Circuit Court for Kenosha County, 
presiding.2  The Respondent is the International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District 10, AFL-CIO (IAM).  
This case centers on whether the circuit court properly vacated 
the arbitration award here that allegedly violated statutory law 
and constitutional separation of powers principles, and also 
whether the arbitrator exceeded her authority under Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.10 (2005-06)3 by not considering Wis. Stat. § 767.405 and 
the relevant case law.  Wisconsin Stat. § 767.405(1m) states 
that the circuit court judges of a county shall appoint, subject 
to the approval of the chief judge, a director of family court 
services.  The director then has the responsibility to employ a 
staff to perform family court mediation services, legal custody 
study services, and physical placement study services.  Wis. 
                                                 
2 Judge Warren was assigned to preside over the case after 
all of the Circuit Court Judges for Racine County recused 
themselves.  It is reasonable to infer from this fact in the 
record that they did so because there could be a conflict of 
interest perceived if they ruled on these matters, because the 
appointment authority of those circuit court judges was clearly 
involved here. 
3 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
3 
 
Stat. § 767.405(2).  The statute specifically states that the 
director may contract "with a person or public or private 
entity" 
to 
provide 
the 
required 
services. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.405(2)(b).4 
¶3 
We reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  We 
hold that the circuit court properly vacated the arbitration 
award here that was contrary to statutory law, specifically Wis. 
Stat. § 767.405, and to constitutional separation of powers 
principles.  We also hold that the arbitration award in this 
case was properly vacated because the arbitrator exceeded her 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(d) by not considering 
§ 767.405 and the relevant case law. 
I 
¶4 
In 
the 
autumn 
of 
2003, 
family 
court 
social 
workers/case managers, Donald LaFave (LaFave), Judith Berndt 
(Berndt), and Janet Vuvunas (Vuvunas) met with Van Kampen and 
were advised of the possibility of early retirement or layoff.  
LaFave and Berndt were told that their positions would be 
eliminated and that there was the possibility of working after 
their retirement as social workers for the county on a contract 
basis.  Vuvunas was told that her position would be reduced to 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.405(2)(b) states that the director 
shall "[c]ontract under sub. (3)(c) with a person or public or 
private entity to perform mediation and to perform any legal 
custody and physical placement study services authorized under 
sub. (14)."  Wisconsin Stat. § 767.405 was previously numbered 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.11, 
but 
the 
statutory 
language 
remains 
unchanged. 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
4 
 
part-time and that, if she did not accept part-time status or 
exercise her bumping rights for another full-time county 
employee position, she would be placed on layoff status.  
Vuvunas decided not to accept a part-time position, and she also 
elected not to exercise her bumping rights.  Indeed, Racine 
County's Human Resources Director, Karen Galbraith (Galbraith), 
testified 
at 
the 
arbitration 
hearing 
that 
Vuvunas 
had 
specifically requested a voluntary layoff rather than exercise 
her bumping rights, and the county granted Vuvunas' request.  
Galbraith further testified that, if Vuvunas had exercised her 
bumping rights, no employee would have been laid off because 
there were vacant positions available.  As a result, Vuvunas was 
placed on layoff status.5  The collective bargaining agreement 
that 
was 
in 
effect 
between 
Racine 
County 
and 
the 
IAM 
specifically stated that it covered social workers/case managers 
who worked in the family court. 
¶5 
Van Kampen met with LaFave and Berndt, in addition to 
John Engel (Engel), who was a retired county social worker 
supervisor.  Van Kampen advised the three individuals that the 
county executive had directed him to provide the statutorily-
mandated services by entering into individual contracts with 
                                                 
5 These moves were the result of the Racine County 
Executive's desire to move the family court social worker/case 
manager positions off of the tax levy to spare layoffs elsewhere 
in the county. 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
5 
 
social workers/case managers.6  LaFave retired on December 30, 
2003, and Berndt was allowed to stay on as a regular employee 
until she reached retirement age on February 6, 2004.  After 
waiting at least the minimum of one month after retirement that 
was required under Wisconsin pension law for former county 
employees to provide services under contract with the county, 
LaFave and Berndt entered into family court counseling services 
agreements and started working for the county as independent 
contractors 
on 
February 
3, 
2004, 
and 
March 
8, 
2004, 
respectively.  Van Kampen continued to supervise these two 
                                                 
6 The dissent repeatedly refers to "actions taken by the 
County" and also refers to our not "focusing on the County's 
actions and instead attribut[ing] those actions to the director 
of family court services, Van Kampen."  Dissent, ¶39.  We are 
satisfied that the plans were carried out with the director's 
approval and with the director's consultation with the circuit 
court judges for whom he worked.  We note again that all of the 
Racine County Circuit Court Judges recused themselves from this 
case.  It is a reasonable inference from the record before us 
that they were all involved in what was occurring in regard to 
the Family Court Counseling Services group. 
The dissent also errs in stating, "The arbitration decision 
and Van Kampen's testimony make it clear that it was the County, 
not Van Kampen, that required the social worker positions to be 
filled by subcontractors."  Id., ¶65.  In contrast to the 
dissent's assertion, the record before us clearly shows that 
Racine County did not dictate to Van Kampen how the positions 
were to be filled.  Racine County's postarbitration brief to the 
arbitrator discusses at great length the various options that 
Van Kampen considered in order to provide the statutorily-
mandated services.  This contradicts the dissent's assertion 
that Van Kampen was not exercising his statutory authority. 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
6 
 
independent contractors, who retained the same duties and pay.7  
Engel also entered into a similar services agreement. 
¶6 
On March 8, 2004, the IAM filed a grievance on the 
matter against Racine County, and the case proceeded to 
arbitration on October 26, 2004.  The issue at arbitration was 
framed by Arbitrator Janice Frankman as whether Racine County 
had violated the collective bargaining agreement's provisions 
when it entered into service agreements with the retired 
employees.  The collective bargaining agreement stated that the 
IAM was "the sole and exclusive bargaining representative for 
all regular full time and regular part time . . . Social 
Workers/Case Managers who work in Family Court . . . ." 
¶7 
On January 19, 2005, the arbitrator ruled in favor of 
the IAM, sustaining the grievance.8  The arbitrator specifically 
stated in her award that she made "no attempt . . . to either 
interpret or apply statutory law."  The arbitrator concluded 
                                                 
7 As retirees, LaFave, Berndt, and Engel were entitled to 
health insurance, but the county did not have to pay employment 
taxes or provide any other benefits. 
8 The dissent criticizes the majority opinion for spending 
"a 
scant 
four 
paragraphs 
explaining 
the 
arbitrator's 
determinations."  Dissent, ¶42.  The dissent then goes on to 
state, "The abbreviated treatment given by the majority to the 
actual decision of the arbitrator leaves a void."  Id., ¶45.  
The dissent also criticizes us for "ignor[ing] the arbitrator's 
factual and legal determinations."  Id., ¶57.  We disagree with 
the dissent's assertions.  Our treatment of the arbitrator's 
award 
is 
proper 
because 
the 
entire 
award 
was 
invalid.  
Furthermore, in contrast to the dissent's assertion, our 
application of the standard of review is appropriate because the 
arbitrator exceeded her powers in the present case.  Id., ¶56. 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
7 
 
that Racine County had improperly displaced three positions from 
the bargaining unit in violation of the collective bargaining 
agreement.  The arbitrator found that Racine County replaced 
three bargaining unit positions with independent contractors who 
provided identical services to take the positions off of the tax 
levy.  The arbitrator ordered Racine County to cease and desist 
from continuing the service contracts, and she also prohibited 
Racine County from entering into new service contracts that 
would displace any court services social worker/case manager 
bargaining unit positions.  Because the arbitrator found that 
LaFave and Berndt had retired, she specifically stated that the 
award would not reinstate them, which left both individuals, 
along with Engel, without an ability to work for Racine County.  
This was so because the arbitrator ordered Racine County to 
"cease and desist from continuing existing Service Agreements or 
[from] entering into new Agreements which displace[d] . . . 
bargaining unit positions . . . ."  The arbitrator also required 
Racine County to make the IAM whole for the damages that it had 
sustained (including lost dues), its expenses in pursuing the 
matter, and lost benefits and wages without a loss of seniority. 
¶8 
Racine County filed a petition in the circuit court to 
vacate the arbitration award.  On February 5, 2006, the circuit 
court granted Racine County's petition and vacated the award.  
The circuit court held that Van Kampen was paid by the county, 
but he was hired by and reported to the Circuit Court Judges in 
Racine County, subject to the approval of the Chief Judge of the 
District.  The circuit court also held that Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
8 
 
§ 767.405(2) gave the director discretion on how to provide the 
services in question, and the director was free to fill the 
positions with county employees, independent contractors, or a 
mix of both options.  The circuit court determined that the 
three positions were not bargained for positions and that the 
positions were vacant by virtue of retirements and a voluntary 
layoff.  As a result, the director had discretion in filling 
these statutorily mandated positions.  Accordingly, the union 
had no vested right in the three positions, and the union could 
not tell the director how to fill the positions.  The circuit 
court determined that the case was a separation of powers case, 
and the arbitrator's award ignored the ramifications of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.405 
by 
eviscerating 
the 
director's 
statutory 
authority and discretion to fill the social worker/case manager 
positions.  The circuit court held that the award, which stated 
that the director could not enter into any new service contracts 
to fill the positions, rendered the statute meaningless.  The 
circuit 
court 
also 
determined 
that: 
(1) 
the 
collective 
bargaining agreement could not supersede statutory and judicial 
authority; and (2) the arbitrator's award, which attempted to do 
so, was invalid because the arbitrator exceeded her powers under 
Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(d).  The circuit court relied on the 
decisions in Barland v. Eau Claire County, 216 Wis. 2d 560, 575 
N.W.2d 691 (1998), Iowa County v. Iowa County Courthouse/Social 
Services Employees, Local 413, 166 Wis. 2d 614, 480 N.W.2d 499 
(1992), and Crawford County v. WERC, 177 Wis. 2d 66, 501 N.W.2d 
836 (Ct. App. 1993). 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
9 
 
¶9 
The IAM appealed the circuit court's decision.  A 
divided court of appeals reversed the circuit court's order and 
remanded the case to the circuit court to reinstate the 
arbitrator's award.  The majority in the court of appeals held 
that the circuit court had erred as a matter of law in vacating 
the arbitrator's award.  Judges Daniel P. Anderson and Richard 
S. Brown were in the majority, and Judge Neal P. Nettesheim 
dissented.  Judge Nettesheim agreed with the circuit court's 
conclusion that the arbitrator had exceeded her powers by 
failing to consider the relevant statutory law.  He saw this 
case as one that was controlled by the Iowa County decision, 
where the register in probate position was covered by a 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement. 
 
In 
his 
dissent, 
Judge 
Nettesheim stated: 
Like the statutory authority conferred by Wis. Stat. 
§ 851.71 on the Iowa County circuit judge to appoint a 
register in probate, here director Van Kampen, acting 
as an agent of the judiciary, has the statutory 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 767.405(2)(a) to employ 
staff to provide the mandated statutory services.  And 
finally, like the Iowa County judge, director Van 
Kampen, although the hiring authority, is not the 
employer.  Thus the question posed here is the same as 
that in Iowa County——when the positions became vacant, 
was Van Kampen bound by the collective bargaining 
agreement, or was he free to exercise his statutory 
authority to employ outside the agreement?  Iowa 
County answers in favor of the latter. 
Racine County v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 
Dist. 10, No. 2006AP964, unpublished slip op., ¶20 (Wis. Ct. 
App. May 9, 2007) (Nettesheim, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted).  Judge Nettesheim was satisfied that this case 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
10 
 
implicated separation of powers concerns, given that Van Kampen 
was an agent of the judicial branch. 
¶10 Racine County and Van Kampen petitioned for review of 
the court of appeals' decision in this case, and we granted that 
petition. 
II 
¶11 The standard of review when reviewing an arbitrator's 
award generally is very limited.  Lukowski v. Dankert, 184 Wis. 
2d 142, 149, 515 N.W.2d 883 (1994); see also City of Madison v. 
Madison Prof'l Police Officers Ass'n, 144 Wis. 2d 576, 586, 425 
N.W.2d 8 (1988).  When a court is reviewing an arbitrator's 
award, its function is essentially supervisory in nature, to 
ensure that the parties to the collective bargaining agreement 
received the arbitration process for which they bargained.  
Lukowski, 184 Wis. 2d at 149.  However, a court must overturn an 
arbitrator's award when the arbitrator exceeded his or her 
powers.  Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(d).  An arbitrator exceeds his 
or her powers when the arbitrator demonstrates either "perverse 
misconstruction" or "positive misconduct," when the arbitrator 
manifestly disregards the law, when the award is illegal, or 
when the award violates a strong public policy.  Lukowski, 184 
Wis. 2d at 149 (citations omitted).  Whether the arbitrator's 
award meets this standard is a question of law, which a court 
reviews de novo.  Iowa County, 166 Wis. 2d at 618. 
 
III 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
11 
 
¶12 The first issue is whether the circuit court properly 
vacated the arbitration award in this case.  The arbitration 
award allegedly violated both statutory law and constitutional 
separation of powers principles. 
¶13 On review, Racine County argues that the arbitrator's 
award improperly conflicted with statutory law and with the 
constitution, thus implicating separation of powers principles.  
Racine County contends that the award here undermines the 
separation of powers set forth in Wis. Stat. § 767.405 by 
voiding contracts that the director, a representative of the 
judicial branch, entered into under that statute, by prohibiting 
the director from contracting with any other social workers to 
provide the statutorily-required services, and by ordering, 
instead, that the union and the county negotiate for the 
employment of social workers/case managers. 
¶14 Racine 
County 
also 
argues 
that 
the 
arbitrator 
erroneously stripped the Racine County Circuit Court Judges of 
their ability, through their designated director, to contract 
with 
social 
workers 
to 
provide 
the 
statutorily-mandated 
services.  Racine County argues that this action was improper 
because a collective bargaining agreement, or an arbitrator's 
award that interprets the collective bargaining agreement, may 
not trump statutory authority, such as Wis. Stat. § 767.405.  
Racine 
County 
also 
argues 
that 
the 
arbitrator's 
award 
substantially impacts families in Racine County because the 
award has the effect of voiding hundreds of court orders that 
appointed the three family court social workers/case managers to 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
12 
 
specific cases.  As a result, the Racine County family court 
system will be disrupted by this wholesale change in its 
operations, and child custody and placement decisions will be 
indefinitely delayed if the court of appeals' decision is not 
reversed.  Racine County argues that the circuit court properly 
vacated the arbitrator's award. 
¶15 On review, the IAM argues that the arbitrator's 
factual findings do not conflict with the director's statutory 
authority or the judiciary's constitutional authority.  The 
union also asserts that the award does not present separation of 
powers concerns because it simply prevents Racine County from 
relabeling employees as independent contractors to evade its 
obligations under the collective bargaining agreement.  As a 
result, the IAM claims that the arbitration award here cannot be 
overturned by the court, and the union also contends that the 
majority in the court of appeals was correct in upholding the 
award. 
¶16 For the reasons discussed in detail below, we are 
satisfied 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly 
vacated 
the 
arbitration award here because it was contrary to statutory law, 
specifically 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.405, 
and 
to 
constitutional 
separation of powers principles. 
¶17 Statutory authority and responsibilities are provided 
in Wis. Stat. § 767.405.  Van Kampen, the director, is an agent 
of the circuit court judges, and the director's statutory 
authority and responsibilities are to be carried out under the 
supervision of the circuit court judges.  As a result, the 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
13 
 
arbitrator's award here improperly invaded the judicial branch's 
statutory authority under § 767.405.  A collective bargaining 
agreement cannot trump such statutory, judicial branch authority 
because doing so would violate separation of powers principles.  
A collective bargaining agreement may not abrogate a statutory 
function of the judicial branch.  Any such provisions in a 
collective bargaining agreement are invalid and unenforceable.9 
                                                 
9 We note that Barland v. Eau Claire County, 216 Wis. 2d 
560, 575 N.W.2d 691 (1998), is distinguishable from the present 
case because Barland was premised on the inherent powers of the 
judicial branch, not on a conflict with governing statutory law.  
In Barland, this court held that circuit court judges had the 
"exclusive, inherent constitutional authority to prevent the 
unilateral removal of their judicial assistants by way of a 
collective bargaining agreement between [a] county government 
and its employees."  Id. at 565.  In contrast, in the present 
case, the arbitration award did not implicate the inherent 
powers of the judicial branch.  Instead, the arbitration award 
in the present case conflicted with Wis. Stat. § 767.405. 
We further note that our recent Kocken decision also is 
distinguishable from the present case.  Kocken v. Wis. Council 
40, AFSCME, 2007 WI 72, 301 Wis. 2d 266, 732 N.W.2d 828.  In 
Kocken, we held that a county sheriff did not have the 
authority, contrary to a collective bargaining agreement, to 
hire and fire the personnel who provided the county jail's food 
service.  Id., ¶4.  We so held because that right was "not a 
time 
immemorial, 
principal, 
and 
important 
duty 
that 
characterizes and distinguishes the office of [the] sheriff," 
and, as a result, that ability was "not within the Sheriff's 
constitutional powers."  Id.  The sheriff was not given hiring 
and firing authority in regard to such personnel by statute 
either, and, therefore, he was subject to the restrictions of 
the relevant collective bargaining agreement.  Id.  This case is 
distinguishable from Kocken because, in the present case, the 
power in question was statutorily given to the judicial branch 
by Wis. Stat. § 767.405 and was not allegedly a constitutional 
power.  As a result, unlike Kocken, in the present case, the 
legislature, 
in 
§ 767.405, 
gave 
the 
judicial 
branch 
the 
authority to fill the relevant positions by using independent 
contractors. 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
14 
 
¶18 As emphasized in the dissent of Judge Nettesheim in 
the court of appeals' decision, and also by Judge Warren in the 
circuit court's decision, we are satisfied that this case is 
very similar to our decision in Iowa County.  In our Iowa County 
decision, we held that a collective bargaining agreement could 
not supersede a circuit court judge's statutory authority to 
appoint a register in probate.  Iowa County, 166 Wis. 2d at 618.  
The position of register in probate was included in the union-
represented bargaining unit.  Id. at 617.  When that position 
became vacant, under the authority conferred by Wis. Stat. 
§ 851.71, the circuit court judge appointed a new register in 
probate, without posting the vacancy as required by the 
collective bargaining agreement.  Id.  In Iowa County, we agreed 
with the circuit court and held that a "collective bargaining 
agreement cannot supersede the statutory authority given to the 
circuit court judge."  Id. at 618.  This court pointed out that 
a circuit court judge, while he or she is the hiring authority, 
is neither a county employee nor an agent of the county.  Id. at 
619-20.  As a result, a circuit court judge does not act in the 
municipal employer's role.  Id.  Consequently, we stated that a 
circuit court judge "is not a party to and cannot be bound by 
the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement entered into 
by Iowa County and [the union] which purport[s] to regulate the 
appointment of a register in probate."  Id. at 620 (footnote 
omitted). 
¶19 In a manner analogous to the statute at issue in Iowa 
County, Wis. Stat. § 767.405 gives the director the authority to 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
15 
 
employ staff to provide the services mandated by the statute, 
even though the social worker/case manager positions in question 
were covered by a collective bargaining agreement.10  Similar to 
the circuit court judge in Iowa County, Van Kampen was acting as 
the judiciary's agent and was exercising statutorily-given 
authority to hire and employ staff to provide the statutorily-
mandated services.  Van Kampen, as the agent of the Racine 
County 
judiciary, 
cannot 
have 
statutorily-granted 
rights 
bargained away through a collective bargaining agreement.  Also 
similar to the circuit court judge in Iowa County, Van Kampen, 
while the hiring authority, is not a municipal employer under 
Wis. Stat § 111.70(1)(j).  As a result, the director, who is a 
representative of the judicial branch, is not bound by the 
collective bargaining agreement when exercising the statutory 
authority to fill the vacated positions.  We are satisfied that 
our decision in the present case is controlled by our earlier 
Iowa County decision. 
¶20 We also are satisfied that the present case is 
analogous to the court of appeals' decision in Crawford County, 
177 Wis. 2d at 66.  In Crawford County, the court of appeals 
                                                 
10 Prior to Wis. Stat. § 767.405 being enacted by 1987 Wis. 
Act 355, the social workers/case managers here were employed by 
Racine 
County 
under 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement, 
providing services similar to those now covered by the statute.  
As was discussed by the attorney representing Racine County at 
oral argument before this court, when § 767.405 was enacted, 
these employees continued to provide such services, but then did 
so under the supervision of the director of family court 
services.  The attorney representing the union did not challenge 
this historical recitation. 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
16 
 
extended the reasoning of our Iowa County decision to encompass 
"the authority of the register of deeds and the clerk of court 
to appoint and discharge their deputies . . . ."  Crawford 
County, 177 Wis. 2d at 69.  As a result, the court of appeals 
overturned a Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) 
decision that had upheld, as a mandatory subject of bargaining, 
the union's proposal "to include the appointed deputies of the 
Crawford 
County 
Register 
of 
Deeds 
and 
Clerk 
of 
Circuit      
Court . . . under all terms and conditions of the union's 
collective bargaining agreement . . . ."11  Id. at 68.  The court 
of appeals reached that decision because the clerks of the 
circuit courts were empowered to appoint their deputies under 
Wis. Stat. § 59.38(1) and because the county registers of deeds 
had similar authority under Wis. Stat. § 59.50.  Id. at 71.  
Both statutes gave those officials the power to appoint deputies 
who would serve at their pleasure.  Id.  In overturning the WERC 
decision, the court of appeals held that the union's proposal 
would effectively abrogate the officials' statutory authority.  
Id. at 73.  As a result, the WERC decision was not valid because 
it did "not merely restrict the officials' statutory appointive 
                                                 
11 The Crawford County court held, however, that whether the 
administrative law clerk position in the district attorney's 
office should be included under all of the terms and conditions 
of the collective bargaining agreement was a mandatory subject 
of bargaining.  Crawford County v. WERC, 177 Wis. 2d 66, 68-69, 
501 N.W.2d 836 (Ct. App. 1993).  The court so held because, 
unlike the other two positions, there was no specific statute 
that gave a district attorney an ability to appoint deputies who 
would serve at his or her pleasure.  Id. at 71-72. 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
17 
 
powers, it transfer[red] them to others."  Id. at 75.  We are 
satisfied that the arbitrator's award in the present case would 
similarly abrogate the director's statutory authority as the 
agent of the circuit court judges and that the arbitrator's 
award must, therefore, be vacated. 
¶21 We are satisfied that Wis. Stat. § 767.405 and the 
collective bargaining agreement cannot be harmonized, as the IAM 
contends. 
 
The 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement, 
and 
the 
arbitration award that resulted from it, attempt to take away 
specific statutorily-granted rights of the director as the agent 
of the Racine County Circuit Judges.  As we have noted, Wis. 
Stat. § 767.405(1m) creates the director of family court 
services position and directs the circuit court judges in each 
county, subject to the approval of the chief judge, to appoint 
the director.  Wisconsin Stat. § 767.405(2)(b) then permits the 
director to contract "with a person or public or private entity 
to perform mediation and to perform any legal custody and 
physical placement study services . . ." that the statute 
authorizes. 
¶22 It was pursuant to this statutory authority that Van 
Kampen contracted with Berndt, LaFave, and Engel after Racine 
County eliminated the three original positions.  It is this 
statutory right to hire, as a judicial branch agent, which the 
collective 
bargaining agreement and the arbitration award 
erroneously attempted to take away from Van Kampen.  Any 
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement that attempt to 
take 
away 
such 
statutory 
authority 
are 
invalid 
and 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
18 
 
unenforceable.  In essence, by ordering the director to cease 
and desist from using the current independent contractors or any 
future independent contractors, the arbitrator exceeded her 
authority and violated separation of powers principles by 
putting into jeopardy the effective functioning of the judicial 
branch, including apparently more than 450 pending Racine County 
family court matters.12 
¶23 Because of the directives of Wis. Stat. § 767.405, 
this case is not merely a contract dispute between Racine County 
and the IAM, and this case raises substantial separation of 
powers concerns.  Van Kampen is an agent of the judicial branch, 
and Wis. Stat. § 767.405 vests discretion in him on how to 
deliver the statutorily-mandated services.  If Van Kampen had 
initially filled the positions in question here, he clearly 
could have used independent contractors.  The positions were not 
bargained-for positions, and they were created by statute.  
Accordingly, the circuit court was correct in holding that Van 
Kampen "had the authority under the statute to either hire 
employees to do the work, contract out to do the work or to 
combine the two methods of providing services in his discretion, 
subject only to the oversight of the Judiciary that appointed 
him."  There is no requirement in § 767.405 that the services be 
                                                 
12 This issue and these figures were presented at oral 
argument before this court. 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
19 
 
provided by county employees, and subcontracting is clearly 
allowable under the statute.13 
¶24 Regardless of whether the empty positions occurred 
because of retirement or layoff, the circuit court judges and 
their agent, the director, had the statutory duty to provide the 
                                                 
13 The dissent argues that Vuvunas' "layoff, therefore, 
[was] a 'direct result of such subcontracting.'"  Dissent, ¶71.  
The record before us on review shows that the dissent's 
contention is erroneous.  As we noted previously, Racine 
County's postarbitration brief, which is in the record before us 
on review, indicates that Racine County's Human Resources 
Director, Karen Galbraith, testified at the arbitration hearing 
that "Ms. Vuvunas requested a voluntary layoff rather than 
exercise her bumping rights.  That request was granted.  If Ms. 
Vuvunas had exercised her bumping rights, no employee would have 
been laid off because there were vacant positions available."  
The record before us on review also shows that Galbraith further 
testified at the arbitration hearing "that there were vacant 
positions available into which [all three] employees could have 
bumped, which would have resulted in no layoffs occurring as a 
result of eliminating these positions." 
Accordingly, as the aforementioned facts from the record 
before us on review indicate, the situation of Vuvunas does not 
appear to be legally distinguishable from the situations of 
LaFave and Berndt.  All three individuals had bumping rights 
under the collective bargaining agreement that they could have 
exercised, and Vuvunas apparently could have used those rights 
to obtain another full-time county position but chose not to do 
so.  As the attorney for Racine County noted at oral argument, 
Vuvunas would not have been fired or discharged.  Indeed, 
Vuvunas apparently did not grieve or make any objections 
whatsoever to her voluntary layoff.  In its July 8, 2005 brief 
to the circuit court, Racine County stated, "As a matter of 
public record, her husband, Emmanuel (Butch) Vuvunas, a Racine 
County judge, retired at around the same time.  She did not 
participate in the grievance or make objections to her voluntary 
layoff, presumably because it fit her personal goals at the 
time."  The circuit court decision determined that the three 
positions were vacant by virtue of retirement and voluntary 
layoff. 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
20 
 
relevant services, and they had the statutory authority to fill 
the positions in any manner allowable under the statute.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.405 does not say that the director is 
authorized to fill the relevant positions only when they are 
vacant, and to interpret the statute in such a manner would be 
contrary to its plain meaning and would read into the statute 
language that is not there.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  This analysis also is consistent with additional 
case law.  See Winnebago County v. Winnebago County Courthouse 
Employees Ass'n, 196 Wis. 2d 733, 540 N.W.2d 204 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
¶25 In Winnebago County, the court of appeals held that 
represented employees might have contractual rights related to 
their employment, but such rights do not include a guarantee of 
a specific position over which the judicial branch maintained 
appointment and removal power.  Id. at 741.  Thus, while a 
circuit court clerk could not terminate the employment of a 
person in the position of a judicial assistant without following 
the conditions and terms of the collective bargaining agreement, 
the judicial assistant could be removed from that position 
because the position itself was subject to the appointment and 
removal power of the judicial branch.  Id. at 736.  The court of 
appeals stated, "A court's right to remove and appoint a staff 
member is an entirely different issue than the subsequent 
termination of that staff member's employment."  Id. at 741.  
The court then held that a "court's right to remove members from 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
21 
 
his or her staff is not subject to collective bargaining."  Id. 
at 741, n.4. 
¶26 We are satisfied that the court of appeals' decision 
in County of Eau Claire v. AFSCME Local 2223, 190 Wis. 2d 298, 
526 N.W.2d 802 (Ct. App. 1994), does not conflict with our 
holding here.  The County of Eau Claire decision involved the 
Eau Claire County Clerk of Court and the Eau Claire County 
Register of Deeds deputizing "virtually every employee in their 
respective offices" in an alleged attempt to exempt those 
employees 
from 
coverage 
under 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement.  Id. at 300.  Unlike the present case, the employees 
in the County of Eau Claire decision were continuing employees 
who, other than being deputized, did not see any change in their 
employment status.  Id.  The County of Eau Claire decision did 
not involve voluntary layoffs, retirements, or any questions on 
how positions were to be filled. 
¶27 We are satisfied that Racine County's reasons for 
terminating the positions in question are not relevant to the 
legal issues here.  Whether Racine County eliminated the 
positions in question for fiscal reasons or otherwise, it does 
not change the fact that Van Kampen, who was acting on behalf of 
the Racine County Circuit Court Judges, had the statutory 
authority to hire any needed replacement staff to perform the 
statutorily-mandated duties and functions of the family court 
services agency. 
¶28 As Judge Nettesheim aptly noted in his dissent in the 
court of appeals: 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
22 
 
 
     Based on Wis. Stat. § 767.405, the trial court saw 
this case not merely as a contract dispute between the 
union and the county, but also as a case that raised 
separation of powers concerns.  The court correctly 
observed that director Van Kampen serves as an agent of the 
judicial branch of government and that the statute vests 
discretion in the director as to how the services mandated 
by the statute should be delivered.  The court also 
correctly noted that when initially filling the positions 
at 
issue, 
Van 
Kampen 
could 
have 
used 
independent 
contractors and that the employees actually hired were not 
"bargained for positions."  From this, the court concluded 
"that the Director had the authority under the statute to 
either hire employees to do the work, contract out to do 
the work or to combine the two methods of providing 
services in his discretion, subject only to the oversight 
of the Judiciary that appointed him." 
Racine 
County, 
No. 
2006AP964, 
unpublished 
slip 
op., 
¶17 
(Nettesheim, J., dissenting).  We agree with Judge Nettesheim's 
analysis, as well as that of Judge Warren, on this issue. 
¶29 In summary, we hold that the circuit court properly 
vacated the arbitration award here, because it was contrary to 
statutory law and to constitutional separation of powers 
principles. 
IV 
¶30 The second issue is whether the arbitration award was 
properly vacated, because the arbitrator exceeded her authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 788.10 by not considering Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.405 and the relevant case law. 
¶31 On review, Racine County argues that the arbitrator 
exceeded her authority by improperly disregarding the law, 
specifically Wis. Stat. § 767.405.  Racine County also contends 
that 
the 
majority 
in 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
erred 
by 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
23 
 
misinterpreting the scope of its review under Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.10.  Racine County argues that the majority improperly 
limited 
its 
review 
to 
whether 
the 
arbitrator 
reasonably 
interpreted the contract, and Racine County contends that the 
implications of § 767.405 should have been addressed by the 
arbitrator.  Racine County argues that the majority's refusal in 
the court of appeals to consider the statutory issues involved 
in this case effectively voided § 788.10 because that statute 
would be meaningless if the courts were restricted from 
considering such statutory provisions when determining whether 
an arbitrator exceeded his or her powers.  Racine County 
contends 
that 
the 
arbitrator 
exceeded 
her 
authority 
and 
manifestly disregarded the law when she failed to consider the 
impact of § 767.405.  As a result, Racine County argues that the 
circuit court properly vacated the arbitrator's award. 
¶32 On review, the IAM argues that an appellate court is 
bound by an arbitrator's factual findings, which, in this case, 
the IAM claims were "that the Racine County executive engaged in 
a scheme to misclassify employees as 'independent contractors' 
to evade the [collective bargaining] agreement."  As a result, 
the union argues that the majority in the court of appeals was 
correct in limiting the scope of its review, and the IAM also 
argues that the arbitrator's failure to consider Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.405 did not result in her exceeding her authority.  The 
IAM contends that the majority in the court of appeals was 
correct in upholding the arbitration award. 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
24 
 
¶33 We are satisfied that the arbitration award in the 
present case must be vacated because the arbitrator exceeded her 
powers under Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(d) when she failed to 
consider Wis. Stat. § 767.405 and the relevant case law, 
primarily the decisions in Iowa County and Crawford County.  
Specifically, the award here must be vacated because the 
arbitrator exhibited a manifest disregard for the law by making 
no attempt to apply or interpret the relevant statutory law, 
§ 767.405. 
 
The 
dissent's 
assertion 
that 
there 
was 
"no 
indication" that the County raised statutory and "separation of 
powers arguments until the case reached the circuit court" is 
not accurate.  Dissent, ¶48.  In Racine County's postarbitration 
brief to the arbitrator, Racine County stated, "Mr. Van Kampen's 
testimony further indicated that by statute the services are 
funded through three types of fees, and that there's a 
substantial difference in the ability to use these funds 
[depending on by whom] the services are being provided . . . ."  
(Emphasis added.)  It must be emphasized that the arbitrator 
candidly admitted in her award that she made "no attempt . . . 
to either interpret or apply statutory law." 
¶34 As we noted above, Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(d) requires 
a court to vacate an arbitrator's award when the arbitrator 
exceeds his or her powers.  An arbitrator exceeds his or her 
powers when the arbitrator demonstrates either "'perverse 
misconstruction'" 
or 
"'positive 
misconduct,'" 
when 
the 
arbitrator manifestly disregards the law, when the award is 
illegal, or when the award violates a strong public policy.  
No. 
2006AP964 
 
25 
 
Lukowski, 184 Wis. 2d at 149-50 (citation omitted).  We are 
satisfied, as a matter of law, that the arbitrator's award 
failed to meet the required standard.  Arbitration awards, such 
as the one here, must be vacated when they conflict with 
governing law, as set forth in the constitution, a statute, or 
the case law interpreting the constitution or a statute.  Id. at 
152-54.  The arbitration award here conflicts with the governing 
law in Wis. Stat. § 767.405. 
¶35 The majority in the court of appeals erred by failing 
to consider fully, as allegedly falling outside of the scope of 
its review, the statutory issue that Racine County properly 
raised.  The majority in the court of appeals erroneously 
limited its review to the collective bargaining agreement's 
terms on the grounds that the arbitrator had limited her review 
to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.  The 
majority in the court of appeals also erred when it approved of 
the fact that the arbitrator had not considered the statutory 
and constitutional issues Racine County presented. 
¶36  In summary, we hold that the arbitration award in the 
present case must be vacated because the arbitrator exceeded her 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(d) by not considering 
Wis. Stat. § 767.405 and the relevant case law. 
V 
¶37 We reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  We 
hold that the circuit court properly vacated the arbitration 
award here that was contrary to statutory law, specifically Wis. 
Stat. § 767.405, and to constitutional separation of powers 
No. 
2006AP964 
 
26 
 
principles.  We also hold that the arbitration award in this 
case was properly vacated because the arbitrator exceeded her 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(d) by not considering 
§ 767.405 and the relevant case law. 
By the Court.—Reversed and remanded to the circuit court 
for all necessary actions that are consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
1 
 
¶38 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).   The error of 
the majority lies in what it avoids.  This case involves two 
actions. The first is the process of eliminating three social 
worker positions. The second is entering into contracts to 
fulfill the statutory responsibility of providing social work. 
Even though the first action, the process of eliminating the 
positions, is the basis of the arbitrator's award, the majority 
nevertheless addresses only the second. 
¶39 This case stems from actions taken by the County. The 
majority, however, avoids focusing on the County's actions and 
instead attributes those actions to the director of family court 
services, Van Kampen. As a result, it subordinates the actions 
of directors to the demands of the County.  
¶40 Finally, 
this 
case 
involves 
an 
arbitrator's 
determination that a County employee, Vuvunas, was laid off in 
direct violation of a collective bargaining agreement. The 
majority, however, fails to explain why that determination is 
error, despite vacating the arbitration award. 
¶41 By failing to address the process by which the County 
eliminated the three positions, attributing the County's actions 
to Van Kampen, and failing to address Vuvunas's layoff, the 
majority ignores the standard of review and the determinations 
of the arbitrator that this court should not disturb. Despite 
its claim of protecting the rights of directors of family court 
services, who are agents of the circuit courts, the majority's 
decision ultimately subordinates those rights to the County. I 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
2 
 
I 
¶42 Despite the fact that the arbitration decision, 
coupled with the collective bargaining agreement, provides the 
factual basis of this case, the majority spends a scant four 
paragraphs 
explaining 
the 
arbitrator's 
determinations. 
See 
majority op., ¶¶4-7. It nevertheless argues that the arbitration 
award should be vacated because "the arbitrator exceeded her 
authority and violated separation of powers principles." Id., 
¶22.1  
                                                 
1 The majority explains its limited treatment of the facts 
and its decision to ignore the arbitrator's factual and legal 
determinations as following from its determination that "the 
entire award is invalid." Majority op., ¶7 n.8. The reason we 
review carefully all of the arbitrator's factual and legal 
determinations is to determine whether the award is valid. The 
majority's explanation simply assumes the answer to the very 
question before the court. 
Rather than taking the facts as determined below by the 
fact finder (the arbitrator), the majority has decided to 
instead find its own "facts." From the circuit judges' recusal, 
the majority makes a factual determination that Van Kampen 
consulted with each of the Racine County circuit judges. 
Majority op., ¶5 n.6. From Van Kampen's consideration of 
"various options" in how to fund subcontractors, the majority 
concludes that the County did not dictate to Van Kampen that the 
positions must be eliminated and filled by a subcontractor 
rather than an employee. Id. From the fact that Van Kampen 
mentioned a statute at the arbitration hearing, the majority 
concludes that the arbitrator was actually presented with the 
complex statutory and constitutional questions at issue here. 
Id., ¶33. 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
3 
 
¶43 The majority maintains that Van Kampen acted under the 
authority of § 767.405(2)(b)2 when he "contracted with Berndt, 
LaFave, and Engel, after Racine County eliminated the three 
original positions." Majority op., ¶22. The director, according 
to the majority, "is not bound by the collective bargaining 
agreement when exercising the statutory authority to fill the 
vacated positions." Id., ¶20. Because Van Kampen acted pursuant 
to this statutory authority, the majority contends that the 
"collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
and 
the 
arbitration 
award . . . attempted 
to 
take 
away 
from 
Van 
Kampen" 
the 
"statutory right to hire" the social workers. Id., ¶21.  
¶44 The consequences of the arbitration award, according 
to the majority, are dire. It asserts that the award "left 
                                                                                                                                                             
At best, the evidence cited by the majority is equivocal. 
More importantly, the facts found by the majority are in 
dispute. This court is not constitutionally permitted to make 
factual determinations where the evidence is in dispute, except 
in appropriate original jurisdiction proceedings. Wurtz v. 
Fleischman, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 107 n. 3, 293 N.W.2d 155 (1980); 
Hatleberg v. Northwest Bank Wisconsin, 2005 WI 109, ¶30, 283 
Wis. 2d 234, 700 N.W.2d 15. The appropriate course would be to 
remand for further factual findings rather than making those 
findings here. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.405(2)(2005-06) provides that the 
director of family court services shall:  
(a) Employ staff to perform mediation and to perform 
any 
legal 
custody 
and 
physical 
placement 
study 
services . . . . 
(b) Contract under sub. (3)(c) with a person or public 
or private entity to perform mediation and to perform 
any 
legal 
custody 
and 
physical 
placement 
study 
services . . . . 
 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
4 
 
[LaFave, Berndt, and Engel] without an ability to work for 
Racine County." Id., ¶7. In so doing the arbitrator "put[] into 
jeopardy the effective functioning of the judicial branch." Id., 
¶22. 
¶45 The abbreviated treatment given by the majority to the 
actual decision of the arbitrator leaves a void. I therefore 
describe the background of this case in more detail.  
¶46 According to the arbitration decision, the County 
decided to eliminate the positions in order to take them off the 
tax levy and informed the director, Van Kampen, of its decision 
in mid-2003. As the majority notes, in the fall of 2003 LaFave 
and Berndt were informed that their positions were being 
eliminated and Vuvunas was told that her position was being 
reduced to part-time status and that she could choose to 
exercise bumping rights or be laid off. Neither LaFave nor 
Berndt had planned to retire when they did until they learned of 
the plan to eliminate their positions.  
¶47 Van Kampen advised them that the county executive had 
directed him to provide the statutorily mandated services by 
entering 
into 
individual contracts. The County negotiated 
service agreements with LaFave and Berndt to provide social work 
after their retirement. At the direction of County corporate 
counsel, Van Kampen discussed setting up limited liability 
corporations with them.  
¶48 After LaFave and Berndt retired and came back to work, 
and after Vuvunas was laid off, the Union filed a grievance 
pursuant to its right under the collective bargaining agreement. 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
5 
 
The parties submitted to arbitration of the case as a contract 
issue. Because the parties submitted a contract issue, the 
arbitrator limited her award to the terms of the parties' 
contract, and did not stray from the positions argued by the 
parties into the area of statutory law. There is no indication 
that the County raised its Wis. Stat. § 767.405 and separation 
of powers arguments until the case reached the circuit court.3  
¶49 The Union argued that the County violated the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement and "engaged in a subterfuge 
                                                 
3 The majority inexplicably asserts that "the arbitrator had 
not considered the statutory and constitutional issues Racine 
County presented." Majority op., ¶35. As noted in the text, the 
statutory and constitutional arguments were not presented to the 
arbitrator. The "evidence" that the majority adduces as support 
is a reference to Van Kampen's testimony in the County's 
postarbitration brief to the arbitrator contesting the award. 
However, that brief concerns only the contract dispute and makes 
no mention of the statutory and separation of powers arguments 
at issue here, indicating that the County did not raise those 
issues to the arbitrator. Additionally, the brief discusses Van 
Kampen's testimony (in which he merely mentions a statute) as 
part of its argument that the County did not violate the terms 
of 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement. 
Rather 
than 
demonstrating that the County presented the statutory and 
separation of powers arguments to the arbitrator, the evidence 
adduced by the majority indicates that the County presented only 
contract issues.  
Moreover, the majority takes the arbitrator to task for her 
statement that she made "no attempt . . . to either interpret or 
apply statutory law." Majority op., ¶¶7, 33. This incorrectly 
describes the arbitrator's statement. She was explicit that the 
parties had presented her with a contract question, and that the 
parties had not argued on the basis of statutory law. It is in 
that context that the arbitrator wrote: "Accordingly, the Award  
made here takes its essence entirely from the parties' Contract. 
There is no attempt here to either interpret or apply statutory 
law." The majority's implication that the arbitrator simply 
ignored statutory law that the parties had presented is 
therefore unfounded. 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
6 
 
resulting in performance of bargaining unit work performance 
pursuant to individual contracts and improper lay-off . . . ." 
It also asserted that the County's discussions with LaFave and 
Berndt 
regarding 
subcontracting 
constituted 
individual 
bargaining. The collective bargaining agreement includes a 
recognition clause providing that the "County recognizes the 
Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representive for all 
. . . Social Workers/Case Managers . . . ." According to the 
Union, the County orchestrated the retirements by negotiating 
with LaFave and Berndt individually.  
¶50 The County maintained that it did not violate the 
collective bargaining agreement and that the retirements of 
LaFave and Berndt and the lay-off of Vuvunas were voluntary. It 
further argued that its discussions with LaFave and Berndt did 
not constitute promises for future contracts. 
¶51 The arbitrator determined that the County improperly 
displaced the three positions and violated several provisions of 
the collective bargaining agreement, including the recognition 
and subcontracting provisions. She further determined that the 
positions had not been eliminated, but instead that the County 
had simply "replaced [the] bargaining unit positions with the 
identical service provided under individual contracts." Despite 
the fact that the County "narrowly focused upon the topic of 
sub-contracting," the arbitrator determined that the service 
agreements entered by Berndt, LaFave, and Engel "are not sub-
contracts" insofar as they "do not provide new or temporary 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
7 
 
service or service supplemental to that being provided in part 
by bargaining unit members."  
¶52 The positions, according to the arbitrator, "have not 
been truly eliminated." Instead, the arbitrator agreed with the 
Union that the County orchestrated LaFave's and Berndt's 
retirements and that they were motivated to retire by the 
County's offer to enter service agreements with them. Their work 
and 
their 
positions did not change. They had the same 
responsibilities, had the same supervisors, were provided office 
space in the same area, continued to receive office supplies, 
maintained the same work relationship with other employees, 
received the same compensation, and did not provide their 
services to anyone other than the County. Colleagues and co-
workers did not know that LaFave's and Berndt's employment 
status had changed. 
¶53 With respect to Vuvunas, the arbitrator determined 
that even if LaFave's and Berndt's retirements were independent 
of the County's actions, "Vuvunas plainly was deprived of an 
opportunity to be fully employed in her Court Services Social 
Worker position" by the service agreements. This action was in 
direct violation of Article 27.07 of the collective bargaining 
agreement, which provides in relevant part: 
27.07 Racine County reserves the right to subcontract 
any work normally done by bargaining unit employees, 
but no bargaining unit employees will be laid off or 
have their normal hours reduced as a direct result of 
such subcontracting. . . .  
¶54 In determining that the County violated the agreement, 
the arbitrator relied on the testimony of Van Kampen, who 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
8 
 
"unequivocally testified that he had been directed by the County 
Executive to enter into Contracts with individuals to provide 
the statutorily required service 'off the levy.'"  Van Kampen 
further testified that in light of the County's decision "he was 
very concerned with regard to how the service would be 
provided." In addition to being worried about how to provide the 
services when the County informed him of its plan, Van Kampen 
testified that he did not know how the services were going to be 
provided after the contracts expired on December 31, 2004, less 
than one year after the positions were changed from bargaining 
unit positions to contract positions. 
¶55 The arbitration award for the violations was that the 
County could no longer continue or enter agreements that 
displace bargaining unit positions: 
The County shall cease and desist from continuing 
existing Service Agreements or entering into new 
Agreements 
which 
displace 
Court 
Services 
Social 
Worker/Case 
Manager 
bargaining 
unit 
positions 
consistent with this Opinion. The Union and its 
members shall be made whole for damages which have 
been sustained including loss of dues, expenses to 
pursue this matter, and loss of wages and benefits 
without loss of seniority. 
No specific remedy was set forth because the arbitrator had 
insufficient evidence of the extent of the Union's damages. The 
arbitrator was cautious so as not to "fashion[] a remedy which 
is 
either 
impossible 
or 
impractical 
to 
implement." 
The 
arbitrator instead noted that the award "will require discussion 
and perhaps some negotiation between the parties." 
II 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
9 
 
¶56 Although the majority cites to the standard of review, 
it ignores the application of that standard. The role of 
reviewing courts in arbitration cases is limited, and courts 
"will not overturn the arbitrator's decision for mere errors of 
law or fact." Madison v. Madison Prof'l Police Officers Ass'n, 
144 Wis. 2d 576, 586, 435 N.W.2d 8 (1988). It will do so only 
when "perverse misconstruction or positive misconduct is plainly 
established, or if there is a manifest disregard of the law, or 
if the award itself is illegal or violates strong public 
policy." Id. (citing Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. Milwaukee 
Teachers' Educ. Ass'n, 93 Wis. 2d 415, 422, 287 N.W.2d 131 
(1980))(internal punctuation omitted).  
¶57 Despite this standard of substantial deference, the 
majority nevertheless ignores the arbitrator's factual and legal 
determinations. It instead bases its arguments on claims that 
are belied by the arbitrator's findings.  
A 
¶58 To begin, the majority fails to address the basis of 
the 
arbitrator's decision——the process of eliminating the 
positions. It asserts that Van Kampen acted "after Racine County 
eliminated the three original positions" and filled "vacated 
positions" with contractors. Majority op., ¶¶22, 19. The basis 
of the arbitration award, however, is that the County did not 
really eliminate the positions and then subcontract for the 
services. Instead, the arbitrator determined that the positions 
remained intact, with LaFave, Berndt, and Engel doing the same 
work under the same conditions as was performed before.  
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
10 
 
¶59 Thus, it is the process of eliminating the positions 
and the fact that LaFave, Berndt, and Engel were not true 
subcontractors that is the basis of the arbitration award and 
the respondents' arguments. The arbitrator's decision does not 
address the prospect that legitimately eliminated or vacated 
positions could be filled with subcontractors. Indeed, the Union 
admitted to the circuit court that "[u]nder the collective 
bargaining 
agreement, 
during 
layoffs 
there 
can 
be 
subcontracting." Further, there is no question that prior to the 
events here, LaFave, Berndt, and Vuvunas were County employees 
subject to the collective bargaining agreement. The County 
conceded that point at oral argument. 
¶60 The majority, however, has simply assumed that the 
determination at the heart of the arbitration award (i.e., that 
the County did not properly eliminate the positions) is 
incorrect without providing an explanation. It then answers a 
question that is not at issue, and which the respondents do not 
contest, namely, whether the director can subcontract to fill 
legitimately eliminated positions.  
¶61 In fact, the arbitrator's conclusion that the County's 
actions are an improper attempt to circumvent the collective 
bargaining agreement is supported by the court of appeals 
decision in County of Eau Claire v. AFSCME, 190 Wis. 2d 298, 526 
N.W.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1994). In that case a county clerk of court 
and register of deeds deputized their employees, and argued that 
the employees were therefore exempt from a collective bargaining 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
11 
 
agreement negotiated under Wis. Stat. § 111.704 on the ground 
that the employees had been deputized pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 59.38 and 59.50.5 The court of appeals determined that such an 
action could exempt employees from the collective bargaining 
agreement only when the action is not an attempt at subterfuge. 
Id. at 306. 
¶62 Similarly, the arbitrator here determined that the 
County's orchestration of the retirements and service agreements 
was merely an attempt to circumvent the collective bargaining 
agreement. Even if the arbitration award would conflict with 
§ 767.405(2), 
under 
County 
of 
Eau 
Claire, 
the 
statutory 
exemption applies only where there is no subterfuge.  
¶63 The majority tries to distinguish this case from 
County of Eau Claire on the ground that the employees in that 
case "were continuing employees who, other than being deputized, 
did not see any change in their employment status." Majority 
op., ¶26. It is difficult to discern the basis for that 
distinction, as the arbitrator specifically determined that, 
other than being contractors, LaFave and Berndt saw no change in 
their employment status, but instead had performed the same 
work, in the same offices, for the same supervisors, and for the 
same compensation.  
B 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.70 sets forth the framework for 
collective bargaining in the municipal employment context. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.38 provides for the clerks of circuit 
courts to appoint deputies, and Wis. Stat. § 59.50 provides for 
the registers of deeds to appoint deputies. 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
12 
 
¶64 By failing to focus on the actions of the County and 
instead attributing those actions to Van Kampen, the majority 
opinion again ignores the arbitrator's factual determinations. 
This 
error 
is 
particularly 
pernicious, 
as 
it 
ultimately 
subordinates the actions of directors like Van Kampen, who are 
agents of the judiciary, to the demands of counties. 
¶65 The arbitration decision and Van Kampen's testimony 
make it clear that it was the County, not Van Kampen, that 
required 
the 
social 
worker 
positions 
to 
be 
filled 
by 
subcontractors. A prior decision had been made to provide the 
statutorily required social services with bargaining unit 
employees.6 There is no indication that Van Kampen wished to have 
different personnel providing the services or to have the 
services 
provided 
by 
subcontractors 
rather 
than 
County 
employees. 
¶66 In fact, it was the County that decided the positions 
would be eliminated, and only after so deciding informed Van 
Kampen. The arbitrator's decision indicates that Van Kampen did 
                                                 
6 As the majority notes, prior to the passage of § 767.405, 
the services were provided by the County with bargaining unit 
positions. After the statute was passed, the director decided to 
continue providing the services with the employees in the 
bargaining unit positions. Majority op., ¶19 n.10.  
The facts set forth by the majority in note 10 appear to 
conflict with the assertion that it makes a few paragraphs 
later. It states that "[i]f Van Kampen had initially filled the 
positions 
in 
question 
here, 
he 
clearly 
could 
have 
used 
independent contractors. The positions were not bargained-for 
positions, and they were created by statute." Majority op., ¶23. 
The fact remains that the director chose to exercise his 
discretion to use bargaining unit positions to provide the 
services. 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
13 
 
not welcome the changes required by the new directive. He was 
concerned about how to provide the services under the new 
regime. Contrary to the majority's suggestion that he was 
"exercising . . . statutory authority," Van Kampen was forced by 
the County (i.e., "directed by the County Executive") to use 
contractors rather than his longtime employees to provide the 
services. 
¶67 Given that the County was directing the actions in 
this case, it is puzzling that the majority purports to protect 
the rights of the director and the judiciary by vacating the 
arbitration award. See majority op., ¶¶21-22. The parties agree, 
and the majority acknowledges, that under § 767.405(2) the 
director is free to fill the positions with County employees, 
independent contractors, or a mix of both. A director chose to 
initially employ persons pursuant to § 767.405(2)(a) by filling 
the positions with County employees, and the County superceded 
that choice by requiring Van Kampen to provide the services only 
by contract pursuant to § 767.405(2)(b). 
¶68 The majority has in effect let counties constrain the 
statutory rights of directors under § 767.405, while apparently 
believing that it has protected them. The majority has been 
misled. It is not the collective bargaining agreement and the 
arbitration award that would "abrogate the director's statutory 
authority as the agent of the circuit court judges." Majority 
op., ¶20. It is the County. 
C 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
14 
 
¶69 The majority also disregards the arbitrator's decision 
concerning the layoff of Vuvunas. The arbitrator determined that 
Vuvunas was laid off in direct violation of a collective 
bargaining agreement. The majority vacates the award with 
respect to Vuvunas, but fails to explain why the arbitrator's 
determination was in error.  
¶70 The arbitrator determined that the County's actions 
plainly deprived Vuvunas of the opportunity to be fully employed 
due to the subcontracting, and that this was "in direct 
violation 
of 
Article 
27.07 
of 
the 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Agreement." 
This 
determination 
by 
the 
arbitrator 
is 
a 
straightforward interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement. Thus, it is a determination that is squarely within 
the arbitrator's authority to make, and courts will generally 
not overturn such a decision. See Madison Prof'l Police Officers 
Ass'n, 
144 
Wis. 2d at 
585-86 
(the 
goal 
of 
reviewing 
an 
arbitration decision is "assuring that the parties are getting 
the  arbitration that they contracted for.")  
¶71 The arbitrator's determination with respect to Vuvunas 
follows the express language of the collective bargaining 
agreement. Although section 27.07 provides that the County may 
subcontract 
work 
normally 
performed 
by 
bargaining 
unit 
employees, 
it 
expressly 
states 
that 
"no 
bargaining 
unit 
employees will be laid off or have their normal hours reduced as 
a direct result of such subcontracting." The parties do not 
dispute that Vuvunas was a bargaining unit employee and they do 
not dispute that she was laid off. Moreover, the County concedes 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
15 
 
the reason Vuvunas was laid off was to subcontract her work in 
order to get it "off the levy." Her layoff, therefore, is a 
"direct result of such subcontracting."7 
¶72 The majority notes that Vuvunas did not exercise her 
bumping rights, that the Union filed the grievance rather than 
Vuvunas, and that Vuvunas's husband retired at roughly the same 
time she was laid off.8 From these facts it concludes that 
Vuvunas's situation is not legally distinguishable from that of 
LaFave and Berndt. 
¶73 However, the majority's decision regarding the legal 
status of LaFave and Berndt appears to be that they are 
legitimate subcontractors based on the director's statutory 
authority to contract for services under § 767.405(2) and that 
the arbitrator's award violated that statute. Majority op., 
                                                 
7 The majority cites a reference in a brief to testimony 
that Vuvunas requested voluntary layoff rather than exercising 
her bumping rights, and that had she exercised her bumping 
rights, no employee would have been laid off. Majority op., ¶4, 
¶23 n. 13. As noted above, the majority is engaged in appellate 
fact-finding. Moreover, it has failed to explain how a voluntary 
layoff comports with the contract language that is at the heart 
of this case. The collective bargaining agreement requires that 
"no bargaining unit employees will be laid off or have their 
normal 
hours 
reduced 
as 
a 
direct 
result 
of 
such 
subcontracting . . . ." Here, the majority is addressing the 
question of whether Vuvunas's layoff violates the terms of a 
contract without reciting, much less examining, the language of 
the contract. 
8 It is unclear what the timing of Vuvunas's husband's 
retirement has to do with whether the County's actions in laying 
Vuvunas off as a result of subcontracting violated the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement. The implication from the 
majority opinion is that she really wanted to be laid off, and 
that this somehow legitimizes the County's actions.  
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
16 
 
¶¶22-23. Vuvunas, though, is not a subcontractor. She was laid 
off and the arbitrator determined that the layoff violated the 
collective bargaining agreement. The majority opinion addresses 
only the status of her replacement.  
¶74 Moreover, the majority appears to conclude that the 
arbitrator erred in determining that the layoff of Vuvunas 
violated the collective bargaining agreement. In essence it has 
reviewed 
the 
decision 
independently 
of 
the 
arbitrator's 
determination. However, it does so without examining the 
language of the agreement or explaining why the arbitrator's 
determination, which follows the express language of the 
agreement, is incorrect.  
¶75 In doing so, the majority leaves many questions 
unanswered. Does the collective bargaining agreement require 
that wrongly laid-off employees grieve on their own behalf? What 
does the collective bargaining agreement say about exercise of 
bumping rights? Does it matter? The effect of the majority's 
analysis on our review of arbitration decisions is unclear. 
III 
¶76 Finally, I address the majority's unsupported claim 
regarding the consequences of the arbitration award. The 
majority asserts that the award "left [LaFave, Berndt, and 
Engel] without an ability to work for Racine County," majority 
op., ¶7, "putting into jeopardy the effective functioning of the 
judicial branch." Id., ¶22. 
¶77 The 
arbitration 
decision 
does 
not 
support 
this 
assertion. The award did not prevent LaFave, Berndt, and Engel 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
17 
 
from working for the County per se. Rather, it prevented them 
from doing so pursuant to contracts that displace bargaining 
unit positions. The award emphasized that the parties would have 
to discuss and negotiate in order to come to an agreement 
regarding remedy, and it explicitly refrained from fashioning a 
remedy that would be impractical to implement. The parties were 
therefore free to negotiate a remedy that included provisions 
for reinstatement or subcontracting, so long as bargaining unit 
positions were not eliminated. 
¶78 The claim that the award jeopardizes the effective 
functioning of the judicial branch is equally unfounded. To the 
contrary, it is the County's actions that undermine its 
effective function. Here, the County wanted the collectively 
bargained for positions to be off the tax levy. The County, not 
the circuit court judges, was orchestrating the maneuver. The 
County, not the arbitrator, was limiting the statutory power of 
the 
director 
of 
family 
court 
services. 
Contrary 
to 
§ 767.405(2)(a), the director was not free to fill the positions 
with County employees. Instead the County required that the 
positions be filled only by subcontracting the positions. Thus, 
the majority's concern about effective functioning of the 
judiciary is more appropriately directed at the County's 
actions.  
IV 
¶79 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that by failing 
to address the process by which the County eliminated the three 
positions, attributing the County's actions to Van Kampen, and 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
18 
 
failing to address Vuvunas's layoff, the majority ignores the 
standard of review and the determinations of the arbitrator. 
Ultimately, it also subordinates to counties the rights of the 
directors of family court services, who are agents of the 
circuit courts, to choose whether to provide services by 
employee pursuant to § 767.405(2)(a) or by contract pursuant to 
§ 767.405(2)(b).  
¶80 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶81 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this dissent.  
 
 
 
No.  2006AP964.awb 
 
1