Case Title: In Re Marriage of Prybil

Citation: 230 N.W.2d 487

Docket Number: 2-56840

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1975-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
230 N.W.2d 487 (1975) In re the MARRIAGE OF Delores A. PRYBIL and Howard J. Prybil. Upon the Petition of Delores A. PRYBIL, Appellee, and Concerning Howard J. PRYBIL, Appellant. No. 2-56840. Supreme Court of Iowa. June 25, 1975. *488 Gary L. Robinson, Cedar Rapids, for appellant. R. Bruce Haupert, Iowa City, for appellee. Submitted to MOORE, C. J., and RAWLINGS, LeGRAND, UHLENHOPP and REYNOLDSON, JJ. LeGRAND, Justice. This appeal presents two issues challenging the provisions of a dissolution of marriage decree. We resolve both against respondent and affirm the trial court. I. The decree provided for a division of property and directed that neither party be awarded alimony from the other. However, it ordered respondent to pay accumulated temporary alimony which had been allowed upon petitioner's application at the inception of the case. Although served with notice of hearing on that application, respondent failed to appear. A default order was entered granting petitioner $90 per week during pendency of the action. Thereafter respondent filed a motion to set that order aside, which, after full hearing, was overruled. No appeal was taken from the order fixing temporary alimony nor from the later refusal to vacate it. Respondent ignored his obligation to support petitioner, and, when the matter came on for trial, the sum of $3,215 was due and unpaid. The decree listed this as one of the debts respondent was to pay. Respondent now seeks to attack the allowance of temporary alimony as both unwarranted and excessive. We hold the matter is not reviewable on this appeal. The order directing payment of alimony pendente lite was final under Rule 331, Rules of Civil Procedure for purposes of appeal. Having failed to appeal within the time permitted by Rule 335, R.C.P., respondent has waived his right to review. We said as much in Walsmith v. Jackson, 195 Iowa 630, 632, 192 N.W. 513, 514 (1923) where this appears: As illustrative of the many cases in which appeals have been taken as a matter of right from orders allowing temporary alimony, see Hanford v. Hanford, 214 Iowa 839, 240 N.W. 732 (1932); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 189 Iowa 326, 178 N.W. 384 (1920); Eastman v. Eastman, 159 Iowa 167, 169, 140 N.W. 400 (1913). *489 We refuse to consider respondent's claim temporary alimony should not have been allowed. II. The second issue raised is alleged error committed by the trial court in appointing a receiver to take charge of and distribute the assets of the parties in accordance with the provisions of the dissolution decree. Respondent claims no request for such an appointment was made; that none is authorized by statute; and that the appointment was wrongfully made without notice or hearing. See § 680.1, The Code, 1973. Recently we appointed a fiscal agent to perform duties similar to those usually undertaken by a receiver which we described as an exercise of "sound legal discretion." Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517, 527 (Iowa 1974). There we said this: In Wolf v. Murrane, 199 N.W.2d 90, 99 (Iowa 1972), where the same objection now voiced was raised, we said: That statement is peculiarly applicable here. While the appointment was perhaps irregular and should not have been made without notice and hearing, there is no claim the appointment resulted in prejudice to respondent. The case of Bennett v. Eldon Miller, Inc., 252 Iowa 76, 87, 106 N.W.2d 257, 262 (1960), relied on by respondent is distinguishable on its facts and we find no conflict between the two. We hold there was no reversible error in the appointment of a receiver. III. Finding no merit in the issues raised, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Affirmed.