Case Title: Oliver v. Woodward

Citation: 824 So. 2d 693

Docket Number: 1990641

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
824 So. 2d 693 (2001)
Karen OLIVER
v.
Dr. Bryan WOODWARD III.
1990641.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 14, 2001.
*694 G. Whit Drake and Elizabeth H. Shaw of Drake & Shaw, Birmingham, for appellant.
Crawford S. McGivaren, Jr., and Melanie M. Bass of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, Birmingham, for appellee.
JOHNSTONE, Justice.
The opinion of September 28, 2001, is withdrawn and the following is substituted therefor.
Karen Oliver appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of Dr. Bryan Woodward III. We reverse and remand.
On March 23, 1995, suffering from bilateral pneumonia, Karen Oliver was admitted to the intensive care unit of Medical Center East, Inc. (MCE). On March 25, 1995, at the direction of Oliver's treating physician, Dr. Greg Sullivan, an anaesthesiologist Dr. Barry Martin inserted a central venous catheter into a vein on the left side of Oliver's neck for the purpose of infusing medications and fluids. Dr. Martin ordered a chest X-ray to verify the placement of the central venous catheter. Because no radiologist was available, an emergency-room doctor, following hospital policy, read Oliver's X-ray to verify placement of the catheter. The emergency-room doctor verified placement of the catheter. In Oliver's medical chart, Oliver's nurse noted that an emergency-room doctor had cleared the central venous catheter for use. The nurse did not note the name of the emergency-room doctor or note the time that the emergency-room doctor cleared the catheter for use. Later that night, Dr. Suzanne Vaughan, a radiologist, read Oliver's X-ray and noted that the catheter "is a little more to the left than is usually seen in when it is in the superior vena cava." The next day, Oliver developed thrombosis in her right arm, and the thrombosis eventually required the amputation of Oliver's right arm below the elbow.
The material procedural facts follow.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., and Dobbs v. Shelby County Econ. & Indus. Dev. Auth., 749 So. 2d 425 (Ala.1999). The court must accept the tendencies of the evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. System Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Boykin, 683 So. 2d 419 (Ala.1996). In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court, de novo, applies the same standard as the trial court. Dobbs, supra.
Oliver contends that, because at the time she filed her original complaint she was ignorant of Dr. Woodward's identity and his involvement in her treatment, her substitution of Dr. Woodward for various fictitious defendants relates back to the filing of her complaint. Dr. Woodward contends that (1) Oliver's claims against him are barred by the statute of limitations, because Oliver did not sue Dr. Woodward within four years of the act or omission, and (2) Oliver's substitution of Dr. Woodward for the fictitious defendants does not relate back to the original filing, because she knew of Dr. Woodward's identity before the two-year statute of limitations and the four-year statute of repose had run.
In Marsh v. Wenzel, 732 So. 2d 985 (Ala.1998), we addressed the applicability of the doctrine of relation back in a medical-malpractice case:
732 So. 2d  at 987-88. This Court has further held:
Crawford v. Sundback, 678 So. 2d 1057, 1060 (Ala.1996).
It is undisputed that Oliver was ignorant of Dr. Woodward's identity at the time she filed her original complaint. It is also undisputed that Oliver's complaint stated causes of actions against various fictitious defendants named in her complaint. The issue before this Court is when Oliver knew or should have known Dr. Woodward's identity as a tortfeasor "described fictitiously" in the complaint. Marsh, supra. Dr. Woodward claims that Oliver knew his identity on November 25, 1998, when MCE identified Drs. Pepper and Woodward as emergency-room doctors on duty between 8:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. on March 25, 1995. Oliver asserts that she did not know Dr. Woodward's identity as the emergency-room doctor who read Oliver's X-ray until April 28, 1999, when Elisa Byrd identified Dr. Woodward as the emergency-room doctor who read Oliver's X-ray and verified placement of Oliver's central venous catheter. We agree with Oliver.
Although on November 25, 1998, MCE identified Dr. Woodward as an emergency-room *699 doctor on duty on March 25, 1995, MCE did not identify Dr. Woodward as the emergency-room doctor who read Oliver's X-ray and who verified the placement of Oliver's central venous catheter. Oliver diligently and reasonably began serially deposing the four doctors identified as working in the emergency room on March 25, 1995. Three of the four doctors, including Dr. Woodward, denied being the emergency-room doctor who read Oliver's X-ray. Not until Oliver deposed Elisa Byrd did Oliver have any notice that Dr. Woodward was the emergency-room doctor responsible for verifying placement of her central venous catheter.
Although Dr. Woodward argues that Oliver should have sued him and the other emergency-room doctor as soon as they were identified by MCE in November 1998, substitution of Dr. Woodward and the other emergency-room doctor for fictitious defendants without a reasonable factual basis or a substantial justification for the substitution would have subjected Oliver to sanctions under Rule 11, Ala. R. Civ. P., and the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act, § 12-19-270 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. § 12-19-272, and Pacific Enters. Oil Co. v. Howell Petroleum Corp., 614 So. 2d 409, 418 (Ala.1993). See also DeSisto College, Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755 (11th Cir.1989), and Plus Int'l, Inc. v. Pace, 689 So. 2d 160 (Ala.Civ.App.1996).
We conclude that Oliver sued Dr. Woodward within a reasonable time, one day, after learning his true identity as the fictitiously-named doctor who read her March 25, 1995 X-ray and verified placement of central venous catheter. Thus, the doctrine of relation back applies to Oliver's complaint and to her substitution of Dr. Woodward. Consequently, Oliver sued Dr. Woodward within the two-year statute of limitations and the four-year statute of repose.
Therefore, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Dr. Woodward. We reverse the summary judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings.
APPLICATION OVERRULED; OPINION OF SEPTEMBER 28, 2001, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SEE, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
HOUSTON and LYONS, JJ., concur specially.
MOORE, C.J., concurs in the result.
HOUSTON, Justice (concurring specially).
I do not believe Karen Oliver failed to use due diligence in attempting to discover Dr. Bryan Woodward III's identity, as a matter of law. I believe that the question whether she proceeded with due diligence must be determined by the trier of the facts.
LYONS, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion's rejection, on the authority of Marsh v. Wenzel, 732 So. 2d 985 (Ala.1998), of Dr. Woodward's defense grounded upon the rule of repose set forth in § 6-5-482, Ala.Code 1975. I also concur in the main opinion's rejection of Dr. Woodward's contention that Oliver failed to use due diligence in ascertaining his identity and that, therefore, the amendment to the complaint adding him as a defendant should not relate back to the original date of filing. I concur specially to address further Dr. Woodward's contentions regarding the rule of repose and Oliver's alleged lack of due diligence.
Dr. Woodward contends that the amendment to the complaint adding him as a defendant should not relate back to the *700 original date of filing because Oliver was allegedly unable to demonstrate the requisite ignorance of identity before the expiration of the limitations period, as required by Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P. This Court in Marsh v. Wenzel, 732 So. 2d  at 989, defined ignorance of identity in terms of "ignorance of the existence of a relationship that could give rise to a duty." In Wenzel, only one pathologist was involved in the treatment of the plaintiff, and his name appeared on the records generated as of the time of treatment. Here, the identity of the emergency-room physician who read Oliver's X-ray and verified placement of the central venous catheter was unclear when the action was filed. Applying the rule in Wenzel, I conclude that Oliver did not have sufficient knowledge of the existence of a legal relationship that could give rise to a duty to her, and her amendment should not be denied the benefit of relation back to the filing of the complaint on the basis that she lacked the requisite ignorance of identity.
With respect to Woodward's claim that Oliver did not exercise due diligence in amending her complaint, this Court observed in Wenzel, in the context of whether to use a defendant's real name or to use fictitious parties in filing a lawsuit:
732 So. 2d  at 990. The same policy considerations ought to govern amendments pursuant to Rule 9(h), substituting a named party for one sued only by a fictitious name. I therefore cannot fault Oliver for failing to sue both Dr. Pepper and Dr. Woodward immediately upon learning that they were the emergency-room doctors, when only one of them could have been involved in the legal relationship giving rise to the breach of duty alleged in the initial complaint. Such an amendment at that stage of the proceedings would have been wholly groundless as to one of them.