Case Title: Commonwealth v. Armstrong

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13134

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13134 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  GLENN R. ARMSTRONG. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     April 10, 2023. - June 30, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Waiver of constitutional 
rights.  Evidence, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Fingerprints, Expert opinion.  
Search and Seizure, Threshold police inquiry.  Threshold 
Police Inquiry.  Mental Impairment.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Motion to suppress, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver, 
Instructions to jury.  Witness, Expert. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 13, 2017. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Shannon 
Frison, J., and the cases were tried before Daniel M. Wrenn, J. 
 
 
Sean M. Smith for the defendant. 
Danielle E. Borges, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The defendant, Glenn Armstrong, was 
convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of 
2 
 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty in 
connection with the January 2017 killing of his eighty-three 
year old father, Walter Armstrong.1  The victim was found dead in 
his Blackstone home.  He had suffered multiple blows to his head 
and torso, and six of his ribs were fractured.  A plastic 
garbage bag had been placed over his head, apparently while he 
was still alive, and then tied tightly around his neck with a 
belt.  A medical examiner would later opine that the cause of 
death was blunt force injuries of the head and torso and 
asphyxia by ligature strangulation.  There were no signs of 
forced entry, and the defendant's belongings were in the home, 
as was the sideview mirror of the victim's truck, although the 
truck was missing.  Earlier that day, before the discovery of 
the victim's body, the defendant, who had been estranged from 
his father for decades before reestablishing a connection that 
year, had arrived at his brother-in-law's home searching for 
adhesive to reattach the truck's sideview mirror; he left a 
handwritten note, stating, "DAds iN A Betta Mood Now."  The 
defendant would later be found in New Jersey along with the 
victim's truck, which was missing its sideview mirror. 
 
In this direct appeal, the defendant maintains that the 
motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence 
 
 
1 The defendant was also convicted of larceny of a motor 
vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 28 (a). 
3 
 
from the New Jersey police officers who arrested him, that the 
trial judge erred in denying his request for a jury instruction 
on mental impairment, and that testimony by the Commonwealth's 
fingerprint analysis expert opining that fingerprints found on 
the bag covering the victim's body matched the defendant's was 
improper.  He also asks the court to exercise its authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt or 
order a new trial.  We affirm the convictions and discern no 
reason to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  The following facts are 
supported by the evidence presented at trial. 
 
i.  Discovery of the victim.  The defendant and the victim, 
his eighty-three year old father, had been estranged for 
approximately two decades.  They had reconnected after the death 
of the defendant's mother -- the victim's wife -- in 2016. 
 
Approximately nine months later, on January 11, 2017, a 
Blackstone police officer arrived at the victim's Blackstone 
home at about 5 P.M. to conduct a welfare check;2 no one answered 
 
 
2 Earlier that morning, at about 10:45 A.M., a "Meals on 
Wheels" delivery driver had arrived at the victim's home, but 
the victim had not answered the door and his truck was not in 
the carport.  The driver observed that the television in the 
living room was on and saw a man's shoe in the middle of the 
floor; the driver informed her supervisor, and ultimately the 
Blackstone police department was asked to conduct a welfare 
check. 
4 
 
the door, and the victim's truck was not in the carport.3  There 
were no signs of forced entry; the doors to the house were 
locked, and the windows were secured.4 
 
The police officer radioed dispatch to ask for assistance 
in gaining entry to the home.  The defendant's sister and 
brother-in-law arrived; the sister had a key to a sliding door 
in the carport, but not to the screen in front of it, which the 
officer cut through.  They entered the house and ultimately 
found the victim dead on the floor of one of the bedrooms. 
 
A black garbage bag covered the victim's head and was 
secured tightly with a belt around his neck.  In the opinion of 
the Commonwealth's expert on fingerprint analysis, latent 
fingerprints found on the bag and on a roll of bags in the 
basement matched the defendant's fingerprints.5  Next to the 
victim were his wallet, which did not appear to be missing any 
 
 
3 The television, which had been on earlier that morning, 
see note 2, supra, was still on. 
 
 
4 There were three doors to the house.  Two were locked from 
the inside -- only the front door could have been locked and 
deadbolted from the outside.  Given that there was no sign of 
forced entry, the Commonwealth's theory was that the killer 
could have left through the front door and then locked it from 
the outside with the key.  As discussed infra, when the 
defendant was later found in New Jersey, he had two keys for the 
front door -- one had belonged to the victim, and the other had 
belonged to the defendant's mother. 
 
 
5 The expert based this opinion on the "analysis, 
comparison, evaluation, and verification" (ACE-V) framework, as 
discussed infra. 
5 
 
items, and a receipt from the prior day for an order, including 
a medium sized drink, from a quick serve food establishment in 
Woonsocket, Rhode Island.  In the hallway in front of the 
doorway was a red-brown stain of the victim's blood. 
 
On the kitchen table lay the victim's glasses6 and a 
sideview mirror from the victim's truck.7  Near the kitchen sink 
was a cup bearing a logo from the same quick serve food 
establishment as shown on the receipt.  In the basement were the 
defendant's leather jacket, identification card, and cell phone.  
These items were found next to a couch that appeared slept-in; 
the defendant had been evicted recently from his own home.  Near 
the belongings was the roll of black garbage bags. 
 
A medical examiner performed an autopsy on the victim.  
Inside the garbage bag, she found almost three cups of blood.  
There was a ligature furrow, three centimeters wide, around the 
victim's neck.  The victim had multiple bruises on his arms and 
torso, bruises and lacerations on his face and hands, swelling 
and bruising of the left ear, hemorrhages of the conjunctivae of 
his eyes, and six fractured ribs.  The medical examiner opined 
that the victim was alive when the bag was placed over his head.  
She explained that strangulation occludes part of the blood 
 
 
6 After the death of his wife, the victim had been sleeping 
on a couch in the adjacent living room. 
 
 
7 Two bent venetian blinds were the only sign of a struggle. 
6 
 
flow, increasing the blood pressure in the capillaries in the 
face, resulting in ruptured capillaries and pinpoint 
hemorrhages, which the victim had.  These hemorrhages would not 
have occurred if the victim had not been alive while he was 
being strangled.  She opined that the cause of death was blunt 
force injuries of the head and torso and asphyxia by ligature 
strangulation.  The defendant's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) was 
not found on the victim, nor was the victim's DNA found on the 
defendant. 
 
ii.  Events prior to discovery of the victim's body.  Two 
days before the victim's body was found, the defendant was 
without a vehicle -- his own truck was being repaired by his 
brother-in-law and his rental car was in an impound lot.  He 
wore the leather jacket and a lanyard with the identification 
card –- items that would be found later in the victim's home -- 
when the defendant and his brother-in-law tried and failed to 
retrieve the rental vehicle.  The victim had refused to drive 
the defendant to the impound lot, but gave him a ride to a 
storage facility in his truck.8  The victim generally did not 
allow others to drive his truck, and at least once, the 
 
 
8 The defendant showed an employee of the storage facility 
his identification card and told her that he was "homeless." 
 
7 
 
defendant had asked to borrow the victim's truck, but the victim 
had refused.9 
 
On the morning of the day before the victim's body was 
found, his truck was in its usual place in the carport of the 
Blackstone home.10  The truck had no visible damage.  The victim 
happily greeted a delivery driver from "Meals on Wheels," 
engaging in "light-hearted banter."11  That afternoon was the 
last time the victim was seen alive; he had arrived at a 
business in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, looking for the 
defendant.12  During that same afternoon, the defendant initially 
had called his brother-in-law to ask to be picked up from a 
quick serve food establishment in Woonsocket, but later informed 
his brother-in-law that he no longer needed assistance because 
the victim had given him a ride in his truck.  As discussed 
supra, a receipt and cup from this establishment would later be 
found in the victim's home when his body was discovered. 
 
 
9 A witness for the defense, a friend of the defendant, 
testified that once, in 2016, the defendant borrowed the 
victim's truck. 
 
 
10 The victim generally parked his truck in the carport of 
his home and did not drive at night due to his limited vision. 
 
11 Following the death of his wife, the defendant's mother, 
the victim had been receiving food deliveries from "Meals on 
Wheels." 
 
 
12 The defendant had lived in Woonsocket, which is just 
south of Blackstone, prior to being evicted from his home. 
8 
 
 
At approximately 3 A.M. and 5 A.M. on January 11, 2017, the 
day the victim's body was found, the defendant left voice 
messages for the car rental company.  In the second message, he 
told the company that he no longer needed a vehicle. 
At around 9:30 A.M., the defendant drove the victim's truck 
to his brother-in-law's garage, looking for adhesive to reattach 
the sideview mirror.  The brother-in-law was not there.13  The 
defendant entered the garage, carrying a brown paper bag, and 
then left. 
 
Later that day, the brother-in-law found a note written on 
a paper bag in the defendant's handwriting, left on his work 
bench, reading "THNX 4 The Donut Bro."  The brother-in-law would 
later find a second note, also written in the defendant's 
handwriting on a piece of a brown paper bag, reading "DAds iN A 
Betta Mood Now."  Neither note had been in the garage before 
that morning. 
 
iii.  New Jersey events.  The day after the victim's body 
was found, two police officers from Mount Laurel, New Jersey, 
Mark Ricigliano and Alan Levy, were dispatched to a motel to 
respond to "a trespassing-suspicious persons complaint."  
Ricigliano encountered the defendant in the lobby bathroom and 
walked with him to the motel's parking lot, where the defendant 
 
 
13 The brother-in-law's coworker was present and testified 
as to his observations of the defendant that morning. 
9 
 
had left the victim's truck.  The truck was missing its sideview 
mirror.  The defendant was disheveled, wearing shorts and 
unlaced boots, and had abrasions and scratches on his face and 
legs.  He refused to share his name with the officers.  He told 
the officers that he had been robbed of his cell phone14 and 
wallet; he reported that he was stranded, having run out of 
gasoline while on his way to the Department of the Interior, 
where he claimed he worked an unpaid job.15  Ricigliano testified 
that the defendant was "just kind of strange" and was 
confrontational and "aggressive at times."  Levy added that the 
defendant "was just speaking things that didn't make much sense 
. . . and just kind of irrational, and just like something was 
going on." 
 
Ricigliano conducted a registration query of the truck and 
learned that it was registered to the victim; he also learned 
that "Glenn Armstrong" was wanted for questioning in a murder 
investigation.  Ricigliano called the defendant by his first 
name; when the defendant acknowledged him, the defendant was 
placed under arrest. 
 
 
14 As set forth supra, the defendant's cell phone was found 
in the victim's basement the day prior, when the victim's body 
had been found. 
 
 
15 Ricigliano offered to make a telephone call for the 
defendant. 
10 
 
 
From the glove box of the truck, officers recovered a set 
of keys on a keychain with the name "Walter" and a label "front" 
-- the victim's keys to the front door of his house.  Another 
set of keys to the front door of the victim's house were 
recovered; these were labeled with the name of the defendant's 
mother.  Later, while officers attempted to read the defendant 
the Miranda rights, he repeatedly interrupted them, including to 
ask them whether the victim had reported the truck stolen and to 
tell them that he had been evicted; that he had ripped the 
sideview mirror off the victim's truck; that he subsequently had 
awakened his father, who appeared "grouchy"; and that he had 
stolen the truck to get it fixed at his brother-in-law's garage. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted in 
June 2017 on one count of murder in the first degree, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1, and one count of larceny of a 
motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 28 (a).  The 
defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence from the New 
Jersey encounter, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. 
 
A jury trial was held in May 2019.  The jury found the 
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the theories 
of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
11 
 
The defendant was sentenced to life without parole.16  He filed a 
timely notice of appeal. 
 
2.  Discussion.  In this direct appeal, the defendant 
raises several issues, which we address in turn. 
 
a.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant contends that the 
motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence 
obtained by the New Jersey police officers, arguing for the 
first time on appeal that he was subject to custodial 
interrogation without being provided with Miranda warnings.17  
The Commonwealth asserts that, because the interaction was 
within the scope of the community caretaking function, there was 
no custodial interrogation and Miranda warnings were not 
required.  "In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings absent clear error but 
conduct an independent review of [the] ultimate findings and 
 
 
16 The jury also found the defendant guilty of larceny of a 
motor vehicle, and the defendant was sentenced to a term of from 
two years to three years in State prison, concurrent with his 
life sentence. 
 
 
17 In his motion to suppress, the defendant argued that he 
was illegally seized prior to the point at which the New Jersey 
police officers learned of the outstanding arrest warrant in 
connection with the victim's killing; he did not raise an 
argument related to an alleged failure to provide him with 
Miranda warnings.  Similarly, at trial, the defendant renewed 
his "motion to suppress the Terry stop," but again did not 
contend that there was a Miranda rights violation.  The renewed 
motion was denied on the same grounds as was his motion to 
suppress. 
12 
 
conclusions of law" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015). 
 
i.  Background.  We recite the facts found by the motion 
judge.18 
 
Ricigliano and Levy "received a call for a person who would 
not leave . . . [a m]otel"; upon arriving at the motel, 
Ricigliano spoke with employees at the front desk, who told him 
"that a man who was not a guest had been in and out of the 
building most of the night, and that they were concerned about 
his appearance and demeanor."  The employees "wanted [the 
officers] to check on [the defendant] and make sure he was 
okay."  A desk clerk stated that the defendant "made her feel 
uncomfortable."19 
 
Ricigliano knocked on the door of the motel lobby bathroom, 
and the defendant emerged, left the lobby area, and departed 
 
 
18 We also supplement the motion judge's subsidiary findings 
with "evidence from the record that 'is uncontroverted and 
undisputed and where the judge explicitly or implicitly credited 
the witness's testimony.'"  Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. at 431, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), 
S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008).  We "do so only so long as the 
supplemented facts 'do not detract from the judge's ultimate 
findings.'"  Jones-Pannell, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Jessup, 471 Mass. 121, 127-128 (2015). 
 
 
19 Levy testified as to the "normal protocol" in these 
situations; he stated that this "standard operating procedure" 
was intended to "make the complainant feel good that . . . we 
identified this person . . . [and] they're not wanted, they're 
not missing [or] endangered, [and] . . . they're not a [National 
Crime Information Center] hit." 
13 
 
from the motel into the adjacent parking lot.  Ricigliano 
followed him.  Ricigliano explained that the defendant "was 
reluctant to give his name to the officer, but [he] stated that 
he had lost his wallet (and money) and had run out of 
gas[oline]."  It was winter; the defendant was wearing shorts, 
and his work boots were unlaced.  He "was argumentative at 
times, [and] said that he worked for the Department of the 
Interior and [was] on his way back to Washington[,] D.C. (though 
he said he did not get paid from that job)." 
 
Ricigliano noted that "the defendant's emotions seemed to 
fluctuate during their conversation."  He thought the defendant 
"might be lost, disoriented, or a missing person."20  Ricigliano 
 
 
20 Ricigliano testified that they "were trying to figure out 
who [the defendant] was and how [they] could help him"; their 
"main concern was that he may have been -- just by the way he 
was acting -- he may have been an emotionally disturbed person 
that may have been entered missing or endangered and [they] 
were, at that point in time[,] concerned for his well-being to 
see if, you know, what [they] could do to assist him."  He 
further testified: 
 
"[W]e asked him, obviously, what was going on, why you were 
there.  And just his answers -- his evasiveness about who 
he was kind of makes you, you know, maybe [think] there's 
something going on.  Maybe he doesn't know who he is.  So 
out of concern for his well-being, and just trying to see 
if he needs some type of help, he said he was stranded 
there.  We dug a little more to, you know . . . -- like I 
said, sometimes people leave their house and they're 
reported missing because they have mental problems, or 
issues, or whatever.  And they're, you know, we were just 
concerned that he may have been, you know, ha[ving] an 
 
14 
 
"directed the defendant to sit down near [the victim's] truck at 
one point because he was becoming agitated and irrational."21  
Ricigliano then entered the truck's license plate number into 
his mobile data terminal and learned of an arrest warrant for an 
individual named "Glenn Armstrong"; when the defendant responded 
to the name "Glenn," Ricigliano placed the defendant under 
arrest.22  The interaction lasted approximately twenty minutes, 
from when Ricigliano arrived on the scene to when he arrested 
the defendant.23 
 
ii.  Analysis.  Law enforcement officers sometimes are 
called upon to engage in duties "in which there is no claim of 
 
issue and he left the house and he -- so, you never know.  
There's a thousand things that it could be." 
 
Levy testified that he and Ricigliano were trying to "maybe help 
get [the defendant] some gas[oline]" and "maybe even possibly 
get[] him medical treatment if he needed." 
 
 
21 When asked whether the order was made in "a command 
voice," Ricigliano answered, "We pressed him to sit down, yes."  
Additionally, Levy explained that he was concerned that the 
defendant may have been missing, wanted, or a danger to himself 
or others. 
 
 
22 Levy testified that, until they learned of the warrant, 
they were "trying to find ways to help" the defendant. 
 
 
23 An audio recording of the interaction was introduced at 
trial; this recording was not presented during the motion 
hearing, nor was it before the trial judge when he denied the 
renewed motion.  Nonetheless, we have reviewed the audio-visual 
footage independently, see Commonwealth v. Yusuf, 488 Mass. 379, 
380-381 (2021), in connection with our review pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E. 
15 
 
criminal liability," such as the officers' "community caretaking 
functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, 
or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a 
criminal statute."  Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 
(1973).  Under the community caretaking function, "an officer 
may, when the need arises, stop individuals and inquire about 
their well-being, even if there are no grounds to suspect that 
criminal activity is afoot."  Commonwealth v. Knowles, 451 Mass. 
91, 94-95 (2008).  See id. at 95 ("An officer may take steps 
that are reasonable and consistent with the purpose of his 
[community caretaking] inquiry, . . . even if those steps 
include actions that might otherwise be constitutionally 
intrusive"). 
But "[a] noncoercive inquiry initiated for a community 
caretaking purpose may ripen into a seizure requiring 
constitutional justification."  Commonwealth v. Mateo-German, 
453 Mass. 838, 842 (2009).  See id. ("A check by a police 
officer . . . falls within the scope of the community caretaking 
function when its purpose is to protect the well-being of the 
[individual] and the public -- and not when the purpose is the 
detection or investigation of possible criminal activity").  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Eckert, 431 Mass. 591, 595-596 (2000) 
(well-being check ripened into seizure when officer asked 
defendant to get out of vehicle and perform field sobriety tests 
16 
 
such that "it was reasonable for the defendant to conclude that 
he was no longer free to leave and that his cooperation with the 
trooper's investigation was no longer voluntary"). 
 
Here, the record shows that the New Jersey officers had "an 
objectively reasonable basis for believing that the safety of an 
individual or the public [was] jeopardized," and their actions 
stayed within their community caretaking function.  Commonwealth 
v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 9-10 (2005), abrogated on other 
grounds as recognized by Commonwealth v. Rand, 487 Mass. 811, 
825 n.14 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Brinson, 440 Mass. 609, 
615 (2003).  The officers' noncoercive inquiries centered on the 
well-being of the defendant, who appeared to be stranded, away 
from his home, without a cell phone, a wallet, or gasoline for 
the truck, and ill-dressed for the winter day.  Moreover, the 
defendant refused to identify himself and also exhibited 
behaviors indicating that he was disoriented or potentially 
experiencing a mental health crisis. 
 
The officers' actions and questions did not stray into a 
custodial investigation of criminal conduct; indeed, at the time 
they were questioning the defendant, they were unaware that he 
was wanted in connection with the victim's killing.  Cf. 
Knowles, 451 Mass. at 95-96 (community caretaking function not 
implicated where "objective view of the actions of the officer 
leads to the conclusion that he was in fact conducting a 
17 
 
criminal investigation," motivated by search for evidence, 
rather than caretaking).  In these circumstances, the officers' 
attempts, including temporarily detaining the defendant, to 
ascertain the defendant's identity and to ensure he was not 
missing or wanted were reasonable.  See id. at 95 ("under 
community caretaking doctrine, officers may, without reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, approach and detain citizens for 
community caretaking purposes").  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Evans, 436 Mass. 369, 376 (2002) ("This request for the 
defendant's license and registration was a minimal intrusion on 
the defendant's rights, outweighed by the trooper's 
responsibility to protect the public, through the community 
caretaking function, from a driver who may be unfit to continue 
driving"). 
 
Because the officers' conduct did not ripen into a 
custodial investigation of criminal activity, the officers were 
not required to give Miranda warnings to the defendant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 448 Mass. 304, 309 (2007), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Jung, 420 Mass. 675, 688 (1995) ("Miranda 
warnings are only necessary for 'custodial interrogations'").  
See also Cady, 413 U.S. at 447-448 (where officer's conduct 
falls within community caretaking function, no search or seizure 
in constitutional sense occurs); Evans, 436 Mass. at 372 
(interactions within community caretaking function "do not 
18 
 
require judicial justification").  Cf. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 9 
("Questioning by law enforcement agents to secure a volatile 
scene or establish the need for or provide medical care is not 
colloquially understood as interrogation -- it is not commonly 
understood as related to the investigation or prosecution of a 
crime" [footnote omitted]). 
 
b.  Mental impairment instruction.  The defendant also 
maintains that the judge erred in denying his request for a 
mental impairment instruction.  However, as early as the hearing 
on the motion to suppress, defense counsel explained that the 
defendant did not want to pursue a defense based on mental 
impairment: 
"[W]e're in a situation with this case what defense [sic] 
we're going to go with; whether it's going to be a mental 
health or a reasonable doubt defense, if you will -- 
identification.  My client has indicated that he would 
rather go with the reasonable doubt identification 
defense."24 
 
The defendant then filed the motion in limine to "exclude 
evidence of the defendant's mental health diagnosis . . . [and] 
institutional commitments," which was "allowed generally." 
 
In turn, the prosecutor repeatedly affirmed that he "[did] 
not intend to get involved with" the defendant's mental health 
 
 
24 Appellate counsel represented that his own investigation 
into the case revealed that the defendant was competent to make 
this decision.  See discussion, infra, on a defendant's 
constitutional right to choose whether to raise a mental 
impairment defense. 
19 
 
issues in his direct examination of witnesses and would not "ask 
those questions," in view of the ruling on the motion in limine.  
Before the New Jersey police officers testified, defense counsel 
noted:  "I know you have exclud[ed] references to [the 
defendant's] mental health diagnosis, so in advance of their 
testimony I would want to alert the court that I would be 
objecting to any answers regarding his mental health, or their 
opinion that he was having some mental health breakdown on that 
particular occasion." 
 
The defendant first requested the instruction after the 
Commonwealth had rested, arguing that the instruction was 
warranted principally in view of the New Jersey officers' 
testimony concerning the defendant's behavior on the day 
following the discovery of the victim's body.25  But even at the 
charge conference, defense counsel reiterated the defense 
strategy of challenging the Commonwealth's ability to meet its 
burden of showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
was the person who killed the victim.  Defense counsel 
explained: 
 
 
25 Specifically, defense counsel focused on "the booking 
photos, the appearance, his irrational statements during that 
. . . interaction with Mount Laurel [police department], his 
rants about being an employee of the Department of Interior but 
he doesn't get paid -- things of that nature," along with 
testimony that "he seemed to be acting irrationally or strangely 
to them." 
20 
 
"[E]ven though we're not arguing it, I think there's a lot 
of evidence of some sort of mental illness, if you will, 
that's kind of seeped into the case.  Obviously, I've tried 
to keep . . . as much as possible out, but most of the 
evidence that's been admitted which would point to that 
would be through the [C]ommonwealth, really -- the voice-
mails, the dash-cam cruiser video, and his statements, the 
booking photos, the behavior, the irrational statements.  
He drives until he runs out of gas[oline] -- I think there 
is some evidence of mental illness in this case.  We didn't 
want it in and I'm not going to argue it, but I think the 
court is required to instruct the jury on it if there's 
facts in evidence that would justify an instruction." 
 
The prosecutor objected to the defendant's request for the 
instruction, contending that, based on the allowance of the 
motion in limine, he had "[done his] best to limit any 
[statements about any mental impairment] from the witnesses."  
Defense counsel responded that, while he had tried to keep out 
as much mental health evidence as possible, some evidence of the 
defendant's bizarre behavior, nonsensical statements, and 
disheveled appearance had been admitted.  The trial judge 
declined to give the instruction, explaining that there was 
insufficient evidence of mental impairment and that he "[did 
not] view mental impairment to be a live issue in this case." 
 
"[W]here evidence of the defendant's mental impairment is 
significant and where it is a critical aspect of [the 
defendant's] defense, the failure to instruct the jury that they 
could consider evidence of that impairment" is error.  
21 
 
Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 794, 799 (2011).26  To be 
entitled to a mental impairment instruction, "a defendant must, 
at a minimum, introduce evidence that such an impairment existed 
at the time of the conduct in question."  Commonwealth v. 
Santiago (No. 2), 485 Mass. 416, 426-427 (2020).  Here, at the 
defendant's own request, no evidence of mental impairment at the 
time of the killing was introduced. 
 
Moreover, although expert testimony is not required,27 see 
Santiago, 485 Mass. at 425, the evidence of the defendant's 
disheveled appearance on the day after the victim's body was 
found, his choice of summer clothing in winter, his 
confrontational manner with the New Jersey officers, his claimed 
unpaid employment with the Department of the Interior, and his 
otherwise "bizarre" or "odd" behaviors were not "significant" 
evidence of mental impairment.  Compare Commonwealth v. Doughty, 
491 Mass. 788, 800 (2023) (no mental impairment instruction 
 
 
26 Evidence of a defendant's mental impairment "bears on the 
specific intent required for murder in the first degree based on 
deliberate premeditation," Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 
682 (1980), and also on the defendant's "ability to make a 
decision in a normal manner," relevant to "whether the murder 
was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty," id. at 685-686. 
 
 
27 In connection with his consideration of the requested 
instruction, the trial judge mentioned the failure of the 
defendant to offer any "formal opinion evidence."  Of course, a 
mental impairment instruction can be warranted even in the 
absence of expert testimony.  See Santiago, 485 Mass. at 425.  
Here, however, the judge was correct that the evidence presented 
was insufficient, as explained infra. 
22 
 
required based on testimony defendant was "odd," including 
strange behavior and statements after killing), with Rutkowski, 
459 Mass. at 796-799 (mental impairment instruction required 
based on evidence of defendant's "long history of mental 
illness," including hospitalizations and diagnoses). 
 
Further, far from being a critical aspect of the defense, 
the defendant repeatedly made clear that he was not pursuing a 
mental impairment defense.  Rather, as discussed supra, he 
intended to focus the defense on challenging the prosecution's 
ability to meet its burden of proof in identifying him as the 
killer.  Even in closing argument, defense counsel did not 
mention mental impairment, instead raising questions regarding 
the prosecution's proof that the defendant was the killer.  
Compare Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 799 ("The sole defense in this 
case was lack of criminal responsibility and its closer 
relative, mental impairment"). 
 
On this record, the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion in declining to give a mental impairment instruction. 
 
c.  Certainty of fingerprint testimony.  The defendant 
contends that the Commonwealth's fingerprint analysis expert 
impermissibly suggested a level of scientific certainty 
regarding his testimony that the fingerprints found on the bag 
that covered the victim's head when the victim's body was found 
matched those of the defendant.  The defendant did not object to 
23 
 
the expert's testimony.  Accordingly, we examine the testimony 
to determine whether it was improper and, if so, whether it 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 43, cert. denied, 138 
S. Ct. 330 (2017). 
 
The defendant principally relies on a report published by 
the National Research Council from the National Academy of 
Sciences in 2009, which we previously have considered and have 
recognized evinces certain limitations of ACE-V28 fingerprint 
analysis -- the same framework employed by the expert in the 
present case.  See Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 724-
726 (2010), citing National Research Council, Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States, A Path Forward 102-104, 
136-145 (2009) (NAS report).29  "Ultimately, the [NAS] report 
 
 
28 ACE-V stands for analysis, comparison, evaluation, and 
verification. 
 
 
29 We explained that, although fingerprint evidence is not 
so unreliable that courts should no longer admit it, and "[t]he 
report does not appear to question the underlying theory . . . 
[that] there is scientific evidence supporting the theory that 
fingerprints are unique to each person and do not change over a 
person's life," Gambora, 457 Mass. at 724-725, citing NAS 
report, supra at 143-144 & n.34, the uniqueness of fingerprints 
does not "guarantee that prints from two different people are 
always sufficiently different that they cannot be confused, or 
that two impressions made by the same finger will also be 
sufficiently similar to be discerned as coming from the same 
source."  Gambora, supra at 724-725, quoting NAS report, supra 
at 144.  The report "stress[ed] the subjective nature of the 
 
24 
 
focuse[d] on the need to prevent overstatement of the accuracy 
of fingerprint comparisons . . . ."  Gambora, supra at 726.  In 
light of the NAS report, we gave the following guidance in 
Gambora:  "[t]estimony to the effect that a latent print 
matches, or is 'individualized' to, a known print, if it is to 
be offered, should be presented as an opinion, not a fact, and 
opinions expressing absolute certainty about, or the 
infallibility of, an 'individualization' of a print should be 
avoided."  Id. at 729 n.22.30  See Commonwealth v. Joyner, 467 
Mass. 176, 183 n.9, 184-185 (2014) ("Gambora permits a 
fingerprint expert to opine on whether two fingerprint match," 
 
judgments that must be made by the fingerprint examiner at every 
step of the ACE-V process," Gambora, supra at 725, explaining: 
 
"ACE-V provides a broadly stated framework for conducting 
friction ridge analyses. However, this framework is not 
specific enough to qualify as a validated method for this 
type of analysis.  ACE–V does not guard against bias; it is 
too broad to ensure repeatability and transparency; and 
does not guarantee that two analysts following it will 
obtain the same results.  For these reasons, merely 
following the steps of ACE–V does not imply that one is 
proceeding in a scientific manner or producing reliable 
results." 
 
Gambora, supra at 725-726, quoting NAS report, supra at 142. 
 
 
30 We noted "tension in the report between its assessments 
that, on the one hand, 'it seems plausible that a careful 
comparison of two impressions can accurately discern whether or 
not they had a common source,' . . . but that, on the other, 
'merely following the steps of ACE-V does not imply that one is 
proceeding in a scientific manner or producing reliable 
results.'"  Gambora, 457 Mass. at 729 n.22, quoting NAS report, 
supra at 142. 
25 
 
and "[t]he weight and credibility to be accorded the 
identification evidence . . . was for the jury to determine"). 
 
Here, the Commonwealth's fingerprint expert framed his 
conclusions that the defendant' fingerprints matched those on 
the bag as "opinions" to a "reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty."31  See Gambora, 457 Mass. at 729 n.22.  The opinions 
were not presented as facts or as infallible.  Compare Fulgiam, 
477 Mass. at 44-45 (expert improperly testified "that 
individualization signifies that the print examiner has 'come[] 
to the conclusion that there is a sufficient amount of quality 
and quantity of those details between the latent print and the 
known fingerprint . . . to establish that the latent 
[fingerprint] originated from the known print" and that "on 
 
31 After the date of the trial in the present matter, we 
clarified that, prospectively from the date of our decision, "an 
expert testifying to a fingerprint match must state expressly 
that the match constitutes the expert's opinion based on the 
expert's education, training, and experience"; "[i]t is not 
enough . . . for the expert to avoid testifying that the match 
is one hundred percent certain."  Commonwealth v. Robertson, 489 
Mass. 226, 238, cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 498 (2022).  We 
suggested that the prosecutor ask "whether the witness has an 
opinion 'to a reasonable degree of fingerprint analysis 
certainty,'" analogizing to our holdings in ballistics cases 
(emphasis added).  Id. at 238, citing Commonwealth v. Pytou 
Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 848 (2011).  See Pytou Heang, supra at 
848-849 ("expert may offer . . . opinion to a 'reasonable degree 
of ballistic certainty," but "[p]hrases that could give the jury 
an impression of greater certainty . . . should be avoided," and 
"[t]he phrase 'reasonable degree of scientific certainty' should 
also be avoided because it suggests that forensic ballistics is 
a science, where it is clearly as much an art as a science"). 
26 
 
several occasions . . . she individualized fingerprints of the 
defendants to latent prints found at the scene of the crime" 
without "clearly fram[ing] the[] findings in the form of an 
opinion"). 
The expert's description of the ACE-V process as a 
"scientific methodology" arguably verged on suggesting that the 
ACE-V process is more scientific than warranted.  Gambora, 457 
Mass. at 726, quoting NAS report, supra at 142 ("merely 
following the steps of ACE-V does not imply that one is 
proceeding in a scientific manner").  While he clarified that 
the process involved a "subjective analysis," he coupled that 
statement with the assertion that ACE-V involved "an objective 
evaluation."32  See Joyner, 467 Mass. at 181 n.6 (noting 
"subjective nature of the judgments that a fingerprint examiner 
makes in conducting each step of the ACE-V methodology").  
Still, viewed as a whole, his testimony on direct examination 
did not claim that the ACE-V process was infallible or 
absolutely certain, and his opinions based on the process were 
expressed as "opinions." 
 
 
32 In response to the prosecutor's question whether an 
identification was "an opinion of the expert looking at the 
sample for the individualization," the expert said:  "Yes.  
Well, it's a subjective analysis with an objective evaluation.  
Again, it's a scientific method." 
27 
 
 
The expert's testimony on cross-examination was more 
troublesome.  When asked by defense counsel whether fingerprint 
analysis was "a science like DNA," the expert answered that 
"[i]t is a science" and that he applied "a scientific 
methodology."  In response to defense counsel's inquiry 
regarding the subjective nature of the evaluation, the expert 
answered that "it's a subjective analysis which leads to an 
objective conclusion based on the -- over the 120 years of the 
fingerprint science."  And when defense counsel noted the NAS 
report's criticism of examiners "for placing a hundred percent 
infallibility, a zero error rate, . . . with respect to 
fingerprint examination," the expert responded: 
"The zero error rate attributed to examiners is kind of a 
fallacy.  The zero error rate is more attributed to the 
ACE-V methodology, and whether or not the examiner applies 
it correctly.  I would say that there is an error rate in 
the general field for the examiner, but it's on the 
examiner's end, it's not on the scientific methodology." 
 
This testimony suggested that ACE-V is a time-tested scientific 
methodology leading to an objective conclusion, as opposed to a 
framework that includes subjective aspects and as to which the 
NAS report has raised concerns.  See Gambora, 457 Mass. at 724-
725.  Although acknowledging that fingerprint examiners 
generally might make errors, the testimony suggested that the 
ACE-V methodology itself was error-free and arguably suggested 
that an examiner, who was faithful to the methodology, could 
28 
 
come to an infallible conclusion.  If elicited on direct 
examination, such testimony would have been error.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wadlington, 467 Mass. 192, 205 (2014) (would be 
error for prosecutor to elicit statement that "[i]f a 
fingerprint examiner trained in competency follows the 
scientific methodology of ACE-V, then the error rate should be 
zero"). 
 
"Because this testimony occurred on cross-examination, 
however, and because there was no motion to strike, we identify 
no error in this testimony, much less an error sufficient to 
create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  
Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 23, 30 (2015), S.C., 479 
Mass. 479 (2018).  See Wadlington, 467 Mass. at 206 ("there was 
no motion to strike, and . . . admission under the 
circumstances, particularly given the totality of the 
inculpatory evidence, did not create a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice"). 
 
"[A]s in Gambora, we note that the vigorous cross-
examination of the analyst countered any possible misconception 
that individualization is infallible."  Fulgiam, 477 Mass. at 
45.  Defense counsel, for example, elicited testimony from the 
expert regarding the NAS report's critique of fingerprint 
analysis as not being based in a statistical model; counsel also 
inquired about an incident in which the Federal Bureau of 
29 
 
Investigation erroneously identified a suspect in a 2004 train 
bombing in Madrid, Spain, based on a faulty fingerprint analysis 
using the ACE-V framework.  Moreover, the defendant presented 
his own expert, who disputed the Commonwealth's expert's 
opinions as to the fingerprints on the bag. 
 
Most importantly, "the Commonwealth's evidence linking the 
defendant[] to the crime, separate and apart from the 
fingerprint evidence, was strong."  Fulgiam, 477 Mass. at 45.  
The victim was last seen looking for the defendant, and 
subsequently picked up the defendant from a quick serve food 
establishment in his truck; a cup and receipt from the 
establishment were in the victim's home when the victim's body 
was found, along with the defendant's belongings, including his 
identification card, leather jacket, and cell phone.  There were 
no signs of forced entry in the victim's home, and the defendant 
was found with two sets of keys to the front door, which the 
killer seemingly locked from the outside.  On the morning of the 
day that the victim's body was found, the defendant was driving 
the victim's truck, which the victim had previously denied him 
permission to drive, and was looking for adhesive to reattach 
the sideview mirror, which was found later in the victim's home.  
The defendant left a note for his brother-in-law about the 
victim and fled the Commonwealth; when he was found in New 
Jersey, he admitted that the victim was upset with him over the 
30 
 
sideview mirror.  Given the strength of this evidence, the 
erroneous testimony did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.33 
 
d.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant argues 
that his mental health history, the evidence of which he has 
provided to us on appeal but was not introduced at trial, and 
the circumstances surrounding the killing warrant relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  He contends that this was a minor 
controversy that exploded into a spontaneous killing of the 
victim, which cuts against premeditation, citing Commonwealth v. 
Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 110, 119 (1963) (allowing § 33E relief 
where "a minor controversy . . . explode[d] into the killing of 
a human being" and "the [defendant and the victim] were 
acquainted only slightly, if at all"), and Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 364 Mass. 145, 152 (1973) (allowing § 33E relief where 
defendant, who carried no weapon, reacted with violence when 
discovered in robbery intended to be nonviolent such that "[t]he 
entire sequence reflect[ed] spontaneity rather than 
premeditation").  He also maintains that a reduction in the 
 
 
33 The evidence was strong as to both theories of murder in 
the first degree on which the defendant was convicted.  The 
beating was astounding in nature, including fractured ribs, 
multiple blows, and the affixing of a bag over the victim's head 
with a belt, causing asphyxiation by strangulation, evidencing 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  And the placing of the bag on the 
head after the beating, while the victim was still living, 
evidenced deliberate premeditation. 
31 
 
degree of guilt is warranted based on his relationship with the 
victim and his mental illness, citing Commonwealth v. Seit, 373 
Mass. 83, 94-95 (1977) (allowing § 33E relief where "no 
indication of animosity between [the defendant and the victim] 
until the episode in suit" and defendant may have acted in 
excessive self-defense or in passion upon provocation or sudden 
combat), and Commonwealth v. Concepcion, 487 Mass. 77, 95, cert. 
denied, 142 S. Ct. 408 (2021) (allowing § 33E relief where 
defendant was fifteen years old, functioned at level of ten year 
old, suffered from depression and posttraumatic stress disorder, 
and shot victim under pressure by members of gang).  The 
defendant directs the court to his mental health records, 
indicating a history of hospitalizations for mental health 
issues. 
 
The Commonwealth responds that the defendant's personal 
characteristics do not, by themselves, warrant a reduction, see 
Concepcion, 487 Mass. at 95 ("Mental illness alone is generally 
insufficient to support a verdict reduction under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E . . ."), and the verdict as to premeditation is otherwise 
supported by the weight of the evidence, see Commonwealth v. 
Ruci, 409 Mass. 94, 98 (1991) ("a primary consideration is 
whether the killing reflects spontaneity rather than 
premeditation" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
32 
 
 
"Our duty is not to sit as a second jury but, rather, to 
consider whether the verdict returned is consonant with justice" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Dowds, 483 
Mass. 498, 512 (2019).  Baker and Williams are inapt; this is 
not a case in which "[t]he weight of the evidence . . . 
indicates murder in the second degree" because "[t]he entire 
sequence reflects spontaneity rather than premeditation."  
Williams, 364 Mass. at 151-152.  See Baker, 346 Mass. at 119 
("justice will be more nearly achieved by concluding that the 
intention to shoot was formed in the heat of sudden affray or 
combat").  The circumstances of the patricide, shortly after 
reconciliation, do not affect the justness of the verdict.  The 
defendant struck the victim multiple times in the head and 
torso.  While the victim was still living, the defendant placed 
a garbage bag over his head and tied a belt around his neck, 
strangling him.  "The facts of this case do not even hint of 
spontaneity."  Ruci, 409 Mass. at 98. 
 
The defendant chose not to present to the jury an argument 
that his mental illness prevented him from forming the requisite 
intent, instead exercising his constitutional right to argue 
that the Commonwealth had insufficient evidence to prove him 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  The defendant made this 
choice, and there is no suggestion that he was incompetent to 
make it.  See Commonwealth v. Velez, 487 Mass. 533, 544 (2021) 
33 
 
("a competent defendant maintains autonomy over the decision 
whether to assert a mental health defense").  See also McCoy v. 
Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1505 (2018) ("it is the defendant's 
prerogative, not counsel's, to decide on the objective of this 
defense:  to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the 
sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving it to 
the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"); 
Commonwealth v. Miranda, 484 Mass. 799, 818-819, cert. denied, 
141 S. Ct. 683 (2020), quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 
751 (1983) (under Sixth Amendment to United States Constitution 
and art. 12 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, "the 
defendant always retain[s] exclusive authority to make 'certain 
fundamental decisions' regarding his own defense, including 
whether to insist on his innocence or accept responsibility for 
a lesser offense").  We will not now undo this decision. 
 
After a review of the entire record, we discern no error 
warranting relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.