Case Title: IRA GEORGE TUCKER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0185

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IRA GEORGE TUCKER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 107214 P.3d 236Case Number: S-08-0185Decided: 08/25/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
IRA 
GEORGE TUCKER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]  Ira Tucker entered conditional guilty 
pleas to two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence.  On appeal, he claims his 
conditional plea was invalid; the stop, search of his vehicle and his subsequent 
arrest were not supported by probable cause; he was denied due process because 
of misrepresentations contained in the affidavit supporting the Information, 
limitations on his access to discovery and delay caused by changes of counsel; 
and the arrest warrant was defective.  
We affirm.   

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  In his brief, Mr. Tucker presents the 
following issues:

 
 
I.          
Were the "traffic stop," search of appellant's vehicle and subsequent 
arrest of appellant illegal, as there was no probable 
cause?

 
 
II.         
Was appellant denied due process of law in the following ways:  (1) by the conduct of the prosecutor who 
included misrepresentations in the affidavit supporting the Information; (2) in 
the limited access appellant was provided to the discovery in his case; and (3) 
by the delay which resulted from changes of counsel?

 
 
III.        Was 
the arrest warrant defective?

 
 
The 
State presents substantially the same issues.  Prior to argument, Mr. Tucker advised 
the Court that he intended to rely on Walters v. State, 2008 WY 159, 197 P.3d 1273 (Wyo. 2008), which we issued after he filed his brief, to argue that his 
convictions must be reversed because, contrary to Walters, his conditional plea was based 
in part on an issue that was not dispositive.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  On the afternoon of December 8, 2006, 
the Sheridan County Sheriff's Office received word that an individual wished to 
provide information concerning the use of controlled substances in the 
county.  Deputies Ryan Mulholland 
and Boot Hill interviewed the man.  
In the course of the interview, the man told the deputies that he had 
purchased methamphetamine from a man named "Ira" on two occasions.1  He gave the deputies "Ira's" telephone 
number and told them that "Ira" drove a black Jeep Cherokee and, when he made 
trips into the Sheridan area, frequented the residence of an individual whose 
name the deputies recognized from prior controlled substance 
investigations.  

 
 
[¶4]  The following evening, Deputy Mulholland 
received a call from the informant advising him that "Ira" was in town.  Deputies Mulholland and Hill went to the 
addresses the informant provided but were unable to locate a vehicle matching 
the description of "Ira's" vehicle.  
They returned later with the informant and observed the vehicle at one of 
the locations.  Dispatch confirmed 
the vehicle license plate belonged to Mr. Tucker and was registered to a 1996 
black Jeep Cherokee.  Deputies also 
obtained a copy of Mr. Tucker's driver's license with his photograph.  

 
 
[¶5]  A few days later, the informant went to 
the Sheridan office of the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) and placed a 
recorded phone call to Mr. Tucker.  
Deputy Hill monitored and recorded the call during which Mr. Tucker said 
that he had been to Sheridan and left some "stuff" and would be back again the 
next weekend.  He also said that if 
the informant wanted "green" he could get "QP650."  Based upon his training and experience 
as a drug task force officer, Deputy Hill understood this to mean that Mr. 
Tucker could provide the informant with a quarter pound of marijuana for 
$650.   

 
 
[¶6]  Several months later, Deputy Mulholland 
received another phone call from the informant advising him that Mr. Tucker had 
called again and would soon be on his way to Sheridan.  Deputy Mulholland asked the informant to 
place another recorded telephone call to Mr. Tucker.  The informant agreed and met with 
Special Agent Michael Hamilton to place the call.  Special Agent Hamilton monitored the 
conversation during which Mr. Tucker stated that he normally charged 200 by the 
"O" and used the word "kind."  Based 
upon his training and experience, Special Agent Hamilton understood the first 
reference to mean that Mr. Tucker charged $200 per ounce for marijuana and the 
term "kind" to refer to the grade of the marijuana.  Mr. Tucker also told the informant that 
if he invested in Mr. Tucker's "little corporation," Mr. Tucker would "wake him 
up."  Special Agent Hamilton was not 
familiar with the phrase "wake him up" and the informant advised him it meant 
Mr. Tucker would provide him with methamphetamine.    

 
 
[¶7]  On the basis of what they heard during 
the recorded phone calls, DCI and the sheriff's office made plans to stop and 
search Mr. Tucker's vehicle as he approached Sheridan.  Agents from Casper who had been 
conducting surveillance of Mr. Tucker's Casper residence advised that he left 
his home with a female companion in a white Pontiac with a black bra.  Deputy Mike Gale parked his patrol car 
at an I-25 exit ramp south of Sheridan and waited.  When he saw a white Pontiac with a black 
bra and two occupants approaching from the south, he confirmed the license plate 
as belonging to Mr. Tucker and stopped the vehicle.  He told Mr. Tucker that there had been a 
traffic complaint involving a vehicle like the one he was driving.  Deputy Mike Rogers arrived with his dog 
and had the dog perform an air sniff around the outside of Mr. Tucker's 
vehicle.  The dog alerted to the 
rear of the vehicle.  Deputy Rogers 
searched the rear of the vehicle and found substances that later tested positive 
for marijuana and methamphetamine.  

 
 
[¶8] 
The State charged Mr. Tucker with two counts of possession of controlled 
substances with intent to deliver, one count for marijuana and the second for 
methamphetamine.  Mr. Tucker filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle claiming the State 
lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the stop because there was 
no traffic violation.  Mr. Tucker 
also asserted law enforcement lacked probable cause to search his vehicle 
because the drug dog was not reliable.  
The State filed a response in which it clarified that it was not relying 
on a traffic violation or the drug dog to justify the stop and search.  Rather, the State asserted, the stop was 
justified on the basis of probable cause which arose from the information 
obtained from and as a result of the confidential informant.  After a hearing, the district court 
issued an order denying the motion on the ground that law enforcement had 
probable cause to stop the vehicle. 

 
 
[¶9]  On the morning the jury trial was 
scheduled to begin, defense counsel advised the district court that Mr. Tucker 
wished to enter a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the 
denial of his suppression motion and "other motions that were filed."  Upon questioning from the district 
court, defense counsel identified "the other motions filed" as involving a due 
process violation resulting from the State's "subterfuge" in making it appear 
that law enforcement stopped Mr. Tucker following a traffic complaint and 
searched his vehicle based upon a dog sniff, allegedly without revealing the 
confidential informant's involvement.  
After some discussion aimed at clarifying the issues being reserved for 
appeal, the district court dismissed the jury and accepted Mr. Tucker's 
conditional plea.  The district 
court also indicated it would schedule another hearing to allow full 
presentation and consideration of the due process claim.  

 
 
[¶10] 
Defense counsel subsequently filed a document captioned "Further Specifications 
for Basis of Motion to Suppress" alleging that the State had violated Mr. 
Tucker's due process rights and various court rules by misrepresenting to him 
and the district court throughout the proceedings prior to the suppression 
hearing that his arrest resulted from a traffic stop and dog alert rather than 
information obtained from the confidential informant.  The district court convened another 
hearing and, after the parties' arguments, denied the motion.  The district court subsequently 
sentenced Mr. Tucker to consecutive terms of seven to ten years for the 
marijuana count and fourteen to eighteen years for the methamphetamine count 
with credit for time served prior to sentencing.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]  We review alleged error in the denial of 
a motion to suppress pursuant to the following standards:

 
 
            
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion 
of the trial court.  We will not 
disturb such rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion.  An abuse of discretion occurs when it is 
shown the trial court reasonably could not have concluded as it did.  Factual findings made by a trial court 
considering a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous.  Because the 
trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence, assess witness 
credibility, and draw the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, we 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination.  Whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights 
presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo.  

            

Barekman 
v. State, 
2009 WY 13, ¶ 8, 200 P.3d 802, 804-05 (Wyo. 2009) (citation omitted).  These same standards apply to Mr. 
Tucker's due process claim; that is, we review the question of whether he was 
denied his constitutional right to due process de novo and the question of whether the 
evidence was admissible for abuse of discretion.  Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, ¶ 35, 199 P.3d 1052, 1063 (Wyo. 2009). 

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
            
1.         
Validity of the Conditional Plea

 
 
[¶12]  Mr. Tucker asserts that his conditional 
plea was not valid because one of the issues he reserved for appeal is not 
dispositive of his case.  He cites 
Walters, ¶ 26, 197 P.3d  at 1280, in 
which this Court held that a conditional plea involving two non-dispositive 
issues and one dispositive issue was invalid.  Mr. Tucker contends that his conviction 
must be reversed under Walters 
because resolution of his second issue, i.e., that he was denied due process by 
the State's misrepresentations in the affidavit supporting the Information, will 
not fully resolve his case.

 
 
[¶13]  In Walters, the defendant was charged with 
a second driving under the influence offense.  On the day the trial was scheduled to 
begin, she indicated her desire to change her plea from not guilty to 
guilty.  At the end of the hearing, 
and after the circuit court had accepted her change of plea, defense counsel 
noted for the record that the plea was intended to be conditional.  Contrary to the requirements of 
W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2), there was nothing in writing reserving the right to appeal 
specific pretrial motions or indicating that the State had consented to a 
conditional plea.  Although the 
judgment and sentence stated that the circuit court accepted the plea as 
required by the rule, the record showed that the circuit court was not aware 
that the defendant intended her plea to be conditional until after it had 
accepted the plea. 

 
 
[¶14]  After the judgment and sentence were 
affirmed on appeal to the district court, the defendant sought review in this 
Court claiming that the traffic stop was unconstitutional and the circuit court 
erred in denying her motions to suppress evidence of field sobriety and breath 
test results.  This Court focused 
its review on the requirements Rule 11 imposes for a conditional plea and 
concluded those requirements were not met because there was nothing in writing 
reserving the issues raised on appeal and the record did not demonstrate that 
the defendant intended to preserve the right to appeal the specific issues she 
raised on appeal; there was no clear showing that the State consented and the 
circuit court approved the conditional plea as contemplated by the rule; and it 
was not clear from the record whether reversal on the suppression issues would 
fully resolve the case.  Although 
one of the issues raised would have been dispositive of the case, we held the 
non-dispositive issues tainted the entire conditional plea.  

 
 
[¶15]  Walters was significantly different from 
the present case.  In contrast to Walters, it was clear from the beginning 
of the discussion about a change of plea that Mr. Tucker wanted to enter a 
conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal the district court's 
adverse ruling on his suppression motion and "other motions."  Although there was nothing in writing at 
the time Mr. Tucker made known his desire to enter a conditional plea, the 
district court and the parties discussed at length the issues Mr. Tucker sought 
to preserve and the record is quite clear that he intended to preserve for 
appeal the denial of his suppression motion and, as part of that motion, his 
claim that the State's alleged misrepresentations denied him due process.  In addition to the discussion at the 
change of plea hearing, Mr. Tucker filed two documents identifying the issues he 
intended to reserve.  The record is 
clear that the district court accepted Mr. Tucker's plea knowing that it was 
conditional and only after having defense counsel identify the issues 
reserved.  The record is also clear 
that the State consented to the conditional plea as required by the rule.  

 
 
[¶16]  We said in Walters, ¶ 15, 197 P.3d  at 1277, that 
the requirement that the trial court approve a conditional plea ensures that the 
defendant is not allowed to take an appeal on a matter that can only be fully 
developed by proceeding to trial.  
Similarly, the requirement that the State consent ensures that 
conditional pleas will be allowed only when the decision on appeal will dispose 
of the case either by allowing the plea to stand or by compelling dismissal of 
the charges or suppression of essential evidence.  Id., ¶ 15, 197 P.3d  at 1277-78.  Thus, the requirements of trial court 
approval and State consent are intended to ensure that only dispositive issues 
are reserved for appeal following a conditional plea.  The district court and counsel in Mr. 
Tucker's case made a substantial effort to comply with Rule 11 by making sure 
the issues were clearly identified on the record.  Although no one expressly referred to the 
issues identified as dispositive, it can be inferred from the record that they 
believed the denial of due process claim was simply part of the broader 
suppression motion and that a ruling in Mr. Tucker's favor would lead to 
suppression of the evidence seized from his vehicle and in all likelihood 
dismissal of the charges.

 
 
[¶17]  When entry of a conditional plea was 
first brought to the district court's attention, defense counsel advised the 
court that the due process claim was included in the broader motion to suppress 
and, if it could be understood that way, Mr. Tucker was ready to enter the 
conditional plea.  Defense counsel 
stated that if it was necessary to go to trial in order to preserve the due 
process issue, Mr. Tucker would do so but he preferred to enter a conditional 
plea.  The district court ruled that 
it would accept the conditional plea as outlined but ordered Mr. Tucker to file 
a written reservation of the issues he sought to preserve and a motion 
addressing the due process issue.  
The district court further stated:  

 
 
[B]ecause 
this has been created by the defendant, the defendant would waive any procedural 
issues surrounding or accommodating the defendant in this process.   [Defense counsel], is that 
acceptable to you and your client?  

 
 
Mr. 
Tucker and defense counsel discussed the matter and defense counsel informed the 
district court that Mr. Tucker would waive any procedural issues surrounding the 
conditional plea.

 
 
[¶18]  In his written reservation of right to 
appeal, Mr. Tucker reserved the right to seek review of the 
following:

 
 
(1) 
* * * adverse rulings on the pre-trial motions seeking to suppress the evidence 
obtained during the seizure of his person and automobile at the time of his 
arrest on or about April 24, 2007.

 
 
(2)   Included in Item 1, above, but set 
forth here specifically, is the right to seek review of the Court's rulings, 
before, during and after the suppression hearing held in this matter on April 9, 
2008, relating to misconduct by the law enforcement and the prosecution in 
making false statements to the Defendant at the scene of the arrest, making or 
allowing false or misleading statements in law enforcement reports, making false 
or misleading statements in the Affidavit of Probable Cause . . . . 

 
 
In 
his subsequent filing, "Further Specifications for Basis of Motion to Suppress," 
Mr. Tucker focused on the alleged misstatements in the Probable Cause Affidavit, 
asserted that those misstatements violated his right to due process and asked 
the district court to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the false 
statements.  At the hearing on his 
due process claim, the following exchange occurred:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Well, what is the remedy 
that you are asking?  Are you asking 
for a flat out dismissal or more time to prepare for this additional 
information?

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Suppression of the 
evidence that was described in the probable cause affidavit.   

 
 
[¶19]  From these portions of the record, it is 
clear that the district court and the parties intended the due process claim to 
be part of the suppression motion and understood that the remedy Mr. Tucker 
sought was suppression of the evidence.  
The district court went to great lengths to ensure the requirements of 
Rule 11(a)(2) were met and defense counsel made it clear that Mr. Tucker did not 
want to go to trial, wanted to enter a conditional plea and was willing to waive 
any procedural issues arising from the entry of the conditional plea.  Under these circumstances, we will 
exercise our discretion as we have done before and address the substantive 
issues Mr. Tucker reserved.  See Johnson v. City of Laramie, 2008 WY 73, 
¶ 6, 187 P.3d 355, 357 (Wyo. 2008); Bouch 
v. State, 2006 WY 122, ¶ 29, 143 P.3d 643, 652-53 (Wyo. 2006).      

 
 
            
2.         
Constitutionality of the Stop, Search and Arrest    

 
 
[¶20]  Mr. Tucker contends the stop, search and 
arrest were unconstitutional because law enforcement did not have probable cause 
to support those actions. The State relied on four factors to establish that 
probable cause existed at the time of the stop:  1) Mr. Tucker's criminal history; 2) the 
confidential informant's reliability; 3) the information the confidential 
informant provided; and 4) the information law enforcement obtained directly 
from the recorded phone calls.  Mr. 
Tucker asserts his criminal history did not establish probable cause because his 
last violation was thirteen years earlier and too old to be relevant.  He contends the fact that the 
information the confidential informant provided turned out be correct after the 
stop could not establish that probable cause existed to make the stop and the 
State failed to establish the confidential informant's reliability before the 
stop.  Of the information the 
informant provided, Mr. Tucker asserts the State only corroborated that a black 
Jeep Cherokee registered to Mr. Tucker was observed at a Sheridan residence and 
those facts involved nothing illegal.  
He contends the State did not corroborate the informant's statement that 
he had purchased drugs from Mr. Tucker.  
Finally, he argues the State did not establish that the person on the 
other end of the recorded phone calls was in fact him as opposed to someone 
else. 

 
 
[¶21]  The State responds that the district 
court's determination that probable cause existed at the time of the stop was 
supported by evidence showing that a confidential  informant provided reliable information 
to law enforcement which was independently corroborated by both direct 
observation and the recorded telephone conversations.  As corroboration for the informant's 
statements, the State points to the fact that the agents located a dark Jeep 
Cherokee registered to Ira Tucker at an address on Spaulding Street after the 
informant stated that he had purchased methamphetamine on two occasions from a 
man named "Ira" who drove a dark colored Jeep Cherokee and could be found either 
at an address on Spaulding Street or another address when he was in town. The 
State also points to the agents' corroboration of statements that, while talking 
on the phone during the last recorded conversation, Mr. Tucker was outside his 
Casper residence working on his air conditioner and would be driving to Sheridan 
in a white convertible.  The State 
asserts that even without the information the informant provided, law 
enforcement had probable cause based on what the agents heard during the 
recorded phone conversations concerning the informant's plans to purchase and 
Mr. Tucker's plans to sell controlled substances when Mr. Tucker arrived in 
Sheridan.  The State argues the 
corroborated information combined with Mr. Tucker's prior criminal history gave 
law enforcement probable cause sufficient to justify the stop, search and 
arrest.    

 
 
[¶22]  Both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution protect citizens 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.  
Callaway v. State, 954 P.2d 1365, 1369 (Wyo. 1998).  Under both 
provisions, searches and seizures made without a warrant or outside the judicial 
process are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.  
Id.  One of those exceptions allows the search 
of an automobile without a warrant if the officers have probable cause at the 
time of the search to believe that the automobile contains contraband.  Id. at 1370.  See also McKenney v. State, 2007 WY 129, ¶ 8, 165 P.3d 96, 98 (Wyo. 2007), defining the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement as "a search and/or seizure of an automobile upon probable 
cause."  Probable cause justifying a 
stop and search of a vehicle is established if, under the totality of the 
circumstances, there is a fair probability that the car contains contraband or 
evidence of a crime.  Id., ¶ 8, 165 P.3d  at 99.  The facts and circumstances supporting a 
determination of probable cause need not rise to the level of proof of guilt, or 
even to the level of prima facie 
evidence of guilt.  Id.  Probable cause necessary to justify 
stopping and searching a vehicle without a warrant exists where the known facts 
and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence to 
believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.  Holman v. State, 2008 WY 54, ¶ 21, 183 P.3d 368, 375 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶23]  In the present case, law enforcement 
knew Mr. Tucker had five prior felony convictions involving controlled 
substances.  In addition, Deputy 
Hill was familiar with Mr. Tucker from previous employment as a detention 
officer at a facility where Mr. Tucker had been an inmate. The agents also knew 
the confidential informant had provided accurate information concerning the Jeep 
Cherokee, its owner and where it likely could be found when he was in Sheridan. 
 They independently corroborated 
that the vehicle belonged to Mr. Tucker and that it was located at one of the 
addresses the informant identified on the date the informant said Mr. Tucker was 
in town.  They also independently 
verified the address where Mr. Tucker resided in Casper. 

 
 
[¶24]  In addition to corroborating information 
the confidential informant provided, the agents obtained information first-hand 
by listening to recorded telephone conversations between the informant and a 
male whom they believed to be Mr. Tucker during which controlled substance 
transactions were discussed.  During 
one conversation, the person believed to be Mr. Tucker stated that he was 
working on his air conditioning outside his Casper residence.  In a later conversation, the person 
stated that he and a female friend would be leaving Casper shortly and driving 
to Sheridan in a white convertible.  
An agent conducting surveillance of Mr. Tucker's residence verified that 
Mr. Tucker was working outside the home at the time of the phone conversation 
and left the residence with a woman in a white Pontiac with a black bra and 
headed north on Interstate 25.  
Another agent positioned on an I-25 exit ramp near Buffalo, Wyoming 
observed a white Pontiac Sunfire with a black bra and two occupants traveling 
northbound on I-25 toward Sheridan.  
The agents were able to verify the license plate number and that the 
vehicle was registered to Mr. Tucker. 

 
 
[¶25]  From the totality of these 
circumstances, a man of reasonable prudence would have been warranted in the 
belief that controlled substances would be found in Mr. Tucker's vehicle.  As the district court stated, "I don't 
even think it was a close call. . . .  [T]here was clear probable cause under 
the circumstances . . . based upon the entirety of the evidence. . . .  Not solely based upon information 
obtained from the confidential informant."     

 
 
[¶26]  We find no merit in Mr. Tucker's 
contention that his criminal history was too old to be a relevant factor in 
establishing probable cause.  Although, standing alone, his criminal 
history would not have established probable cause, the fact that he had five 
prior felony convictions involving controlled substances within the past 
nineteen years was certainly a relevant factor in the analysis.  We likewise reject Mr. Tucker's argument 
that the information the confidential informant provided should not have been 
considered because the agents questioned his motive for coming forward, observed 
him under the influence of marijuana and did not corroborate his statements 
until after the stop.  From the 
totality of the circumstances, we conclude the information the informant 
provided, and which law enforcement corroborated, together with the statements 
the agents heard first-hand during the recorded conversations concerning the 
price, quantity and grade of controlled substances Mr. Tucker could provide was 
sufficient to establish probable cause despite any concerns they had about the 
informant's motives and use of marijuana.

 
 
[¶27]  Mr. Tucker contends the facts law 
enforcement corroborated, such as that he drove a Jeep Cherokee and frequented 
an address on Spaulding Street, did not establish probable cause because they 
involved nothing illegal.  We have 
said in prior cases that a degree of particularity in the facts an informant 
provides combined with a prediction of the future actions of third parties makes 
it reasonable for law enforcement to believe that the informant has furnished 
reliable information regarding illegal activities of the subject of the 
tip.  Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549, 553 (Wyo. 
1992).  In Goettl, an informant described a silver 
Volvo with Colorado license plate UKB 606 parked at Mr. Goettl's brother's 
residence in Buffalo, Wyoming and said Mr. Goettl would be leaving there soon to 
transport "a lot of acid" to Sheridan.   A police officer verified that a 
silver Volvo bearing Colorado license plate UKB 606 was parked at the address 
the informant identified.  The 
police officer then drove to the north exit on the route from Buffalo leading to 
Sheridan.  A few minutes later, he 
saw the same silver Volvo traveling north toward the interstate.  We held that the informant's tip, 
particularly the prediction of future events, the details of which were verified 
by the observation of the law enforcement officers, furnished more than adequate 
probable cause to stop the vehicle.  
Id. at 556.  See also Buckles v. State, 998 P.2d 927, 930 
(Wyo. 2000), holding"[T]he degree of particularity in the facts furnished by the 
informant, coupled with the corroboration of the prediction of future events, 
gave the officers a reasonable articulable suspicion that the informant had 
provided accurate information and that the individuals were indeed engaging in 
illegal activity."  The district 
court reasonably concluded probable cause existed to stop and search the vehicle 
and did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Tucker's suppression motion on 
that ground.       
 

 
 
            
3.         
Due Process

 
 
[¶28]  Mr. Tucker asserts that the State 
violated his right to due process and the criminal procedural rules when it did 
not disclose the true basis for the stop, search and arrest until nearly a year 
after he was arrested.  Mr. Tucker 
contends that the State misrepresented that deputies stopped Mr. Tucker 
following a traffic complaint and searched his vehicle after a drug dog alerted, 
a position that it maintained up until the suppression hearing when, he alleges, 
it disclosed for the first time that there was no traffic complaint and the dog 
alert was a subterfuge to protect the State's confidential informant.  Mr. Tucker claims that as a result of 
these misrepresentations, defense counsel prepared his defense without a correct 
understanding as to the circumstances giving rise to the stop, search and 
arrest.     

 
 
[¶29] 
Mr. Tucker's assertion that the State did not disclose the true basis for the 
stop until the April 2008 suppression hearing is not borne out by the 
record.  The probable cause 
affidavit attached to the Information filed April 30, 2007, stated that the 
investigation of Mr. Tucker began when a confidential informant advised law 
enforcement that Mr. Tucker was in possession of controlled substances which he 
planned to transport to Sheridan.  
The introduction to the State's memorandum in response to Mr. Tucker's 
motion to suppress filed October 29, 2007, stated:  

 
 
The 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress has incorrectly identified the basis for 
justifying the stop and search of the Defendant's vehicle which occurred on or 
about April 26, 2007.  The Defendant 
wrongly assumes that the justification for the search and seizure of that 
vehicle was pursuant to the investigatory stop exception to the warrant 
requirement.  To the contrary, the 
search in this matter was a vehicle or Carroll [v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)]2 doctrine search.  

 
 
In 
its October 2007 memorandum, the State fully set forth the facts involving the 
confidential informant and events leading up to the stop.  The State asserted:  

 
 
[I]t 
is the State's position that at the time of the stop, officers possessed 
information sufficient to constitute probable cause to believe that there was 
contained somewhere within the Defendant's vehicle. . . controlled substances 
specifically, marijuana and methamphetamine. . . .  It is the State's position that at the 
time of the stop, and prior to the sniff of the vehicle by the canine, Agents 
had probable cause and not mere reasonable suspicion.  That being the case, law enforcement 
officers were authorized to search the interior of the vehicle.  That search could be a hand search by 
officers, or could be facilitated through the use of a drug dog, or had they 
chosen to do so, they could have employed a divining rod.  In any event, the search was authorized 
under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, 
and the determination of probable cause did not rest upon a sniff by a drug 
canine. 

 
 
Thus, 
the record is clear that the State disclosed the basis for the stop well in 
advance of the April 2008 suppression hearing and Mr. Tucker's assertion that 
the disclosure was not made until the hearing is inaccurate.  Mr. Tucker had notice of the informant's 
involvement from the beginning and was not deprived of due process in this 
regard. 

 
 
[¶30]  Mr. Tucker also contends his due process 
rights were violated because the State denied him access to discovery and his 
criminal proceedings were delayed because three different defense attorneys 
represented him in district court.3  W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) allows a defendant to 
enter a conditional guilty plea while reserving the right to seek appellate 
review of adverse determinations "of any specified pretrial motion."  We have held that the rule does not 
allow a defendant to present any and all arguments on appeal after entering a 
conditional plea.  Kunselman v. State, 2008 WY 85, ¶ 11, 
188 P.3d 567, 569-70 (Wyo. 2008).  
Rather, an appellant may argue only those issues that were clearly 
brought to the district court's attention.  
Id.        

 
 
[¶31]  Having carefully reviewed the record, we 
conclude Mr. Tucker did not present to the district court the claims that he was 
denied due process by any denial of access to discovery or the substitution of 
attorneys.  Rather, Mr. Tucker 
claimed the stop was unconstitutional and his due process rights were violated 
by the alleged misrepresentations concerning the reason for the stop.  The record clearly reflects that the 
district court gave Mr. Tucker several opportunities to present his due process 
claims after the original suppression motion was denied.  Despite these opportunities, he did not 
argue that his rights were violated by denial of access to discovery or the 
substitution of counsel.  Having 
failed to bring those issues to the district court's attention, Mr. Tucker did 
not reserve them for consideration on appeal.  Id.  

 
 
      4.         
Arrest Warrant

 
 
[¶32]  Mr. Tucker's final argument is that the 
arrest warrant was defective because it was supported by false or misleading 
information contained in the probable cause affidavit.  The State contends the issue was not 
raised in district court and, in accordance with Kunselman, this Court should not 
consider it.  In his "Further 
Specifications for Basis of Motion to Suppress," Mr. Tucker argued that a false 
or misleading affidavit will not support the issue of a warrant.  However, having concluded that the 
probable cause affidavit did not contain false or misleading information, we 
reject Mr. Tucker's claim that the arrest was defective.

 
 
[¶33]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The informant also stated he had been involved with drugs most of his 
life, smoked marijuana, had cooked methamphetamine in several different states 
and was in the process of obtaining supplies to cook methamphetamine with 
another individual when he met "Ira."  
He told law enforcement he recently had decided he wanted to end his 
involvement in methamphetamine trafficking and that is why he contacted the 
sheriff's office.

 
 

2In Carroll, an officer posed 
as an individual wishing to buy three cases of whiskey from the defendant and 
his two companions. They agreed on a price and the three men said they would go 
get the liquor and be back in less than an hour. They went away and in a short 
time one of them came back to the apartment and said they could not get it that 
night, but that they would deliver it the next day. They had come to the 
apartment in an Oldsmobile Roadster, the number of which the officer identified. 
The proposed vendors did not return the next day. The officer and his 
subordinates were regularly engaged in patrolling the road leading from Detroit 
to Grand Rapids, looking for violations of the Prohibition Act. Later, Carroll 
was driving eastward from Grand Rapids in the same Oldsmobile Roadster, when he 
passed the officer. The officer advised other officers that Carroll had passed 
him going toward Detroit and although the officer attempted to catch up, he lost 
him. Two months later, the officers were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia, on 
the road to Detroit, when Carroll met and passed them in the same automobile, 
coming from the direction of Detroit to Grand Rapids. The officers followed the 
defendant, stopped him and searched the car.  The Court upheld the warrantless search 
finding that "the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and 
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that 
intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which they stopped 
and searched."  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
162, 45 S. Ct. 280, 288, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925).  

 
 

3The district court granted motions to withdraw filed by two of the 
defense attorneys, the first after Mr. Tucker filed a grievance against him and 
the second after the attorney discovered he had a conflict of 
interest.