Case Title: Lisa C. Green v. William Penn Life Insurance Company of New York

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 55  
Lisa C. Green, 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
William Penn Life Insurance 
Company of New York, 
            Appellant.
Robert D. Meade, for appellant.
Thomas Torto, for respondent.
SMITH, J.:
The Appellate Division held that an attempt to prove a
death was caused by suicide must fail as a matter of law, unless
suicide is the only reasonable finding permitted by the evidence. 
We hold that the Appellate Division misconstrued the presumption
against suicide.  It is a guide for the fact finder, not a rule
that compels a result.
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No. 55
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I
Alan Green died on February 20, 2002.  His life was
insured by defendant under a $500,000 policy issued December 3,
2001.  The policy provided: "If the insured dies by suicide
within two years from the Date of Issue of this contract, the
only death benefit will be the sum of premiums paid."  Plaintiff,
Mr. Green's widow, made a claim for the face amount of the
policy.  Defendant rejected the claim on the ground that Mr.
Green had died by suicide, and plaintiff brought this action.     
Considerable evidence supported defendant's contention
that Mr. Green committed suicide.  He was found lying on his bed,
with an empty glass on the nightstand beside him and two empty
bottles that had contained recently-prescribed pain medication in
the nightstand drawer.  He had been unemployed for months.  He
had seen a doctor on the day before his death; the doctor found
him to be in good physical health, but noted that he had
"suicidal thoughts."  According to a police report, plaintiff
said on the night of her husband's death that he had been
depressed, and had overdosed on pain medication.  She refused to
permit an autopsy or a toxicological examination of his body,
saying that such intrusions were forbidden by Jewish religious
law, but she ordered the body cremated in violation of that
religious prohibition.
There was also evidence supporting plaintiff's
contention that suicide was not the cause of death.  No suicide
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No. 55
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note was found.  Mr. Green had no history of mental illness, and
had not attempted suicide before.  The doctor who noted his
"suicidal thoughts" also quoted him as saying he was "[n]ot
suicidal" and noted that he had "no plans" for suicide.  There
was no proof of how long the pill bottles had been empty;
plaintiff offered testimony suggesting that she and her husband
might have taken all the pills in normal doses over a period of
weeks.  Family members testified that Mr. Green had behaved
normally shortly before his death; they described him as "upbeat"
and "positive."
After a non-jury trial, Supreme Court found that Mr.
Green had committed suicide, and dismissed the complaint.  The
Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting, reversed and
directed the entry of judgment for plaintiff (Green v William
Penn Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 48 AD3d 37 [1st Dept 2007]).  In
reversing, the Appellate Division did not exercise its factual
review power, but held that "the evidence failed as a matter of
law to overcome the presumption against suicide" (id. at 44).  It
reasoned that because "there are other reasonable conclusions
that may be drawn from the evidence, aside from suicide," the
"application of the law regarding the presumption against suicide
necessitated a directed verdict in this case" (id. at 40). 
Defendant appeals as of right, pursuant to CPLR 5601 (a), and we
now reverse.  
II
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No. 55
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We have repeatedly held that a presumption against
suicide is applicable in litigation under life insurance policies
(Schelberger v Eastern Sav. Bank, 60 NY2d 506 [1983]; Wellisch v
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 293 NY 178 [1944]; cf. Matter of
Infante v Dignan, ___ NY3d ___, 2009 NY slip op ___ [decided
today]).  The presumption "springs from strong policy
considerations as well as embodying natural probability"
(Schelberger, 60 NY2d at 510), and we held in both Wellisch and
Schelberger that the presumption justified leaving the issue of
suicide to the jury, even where powerful evidence pointed to
suicide as the cause of death.
We have never held, however, that the presumption
against suicide requires rejection of a claim of suicide as a
matter of law.  As long as such a claim finds support in the
evidence, a fact finder should decide it.  The presumption, as we
said in Wellisch, is "really a rule or guide for the jury in
coming to a conclusion on the evidence" (293 NY at 184).  Where
the evidence leaves open two possible findings, it is "the jury's
business to resolve the doubt" (id. at 185).  
The Appellate Division's error here appears to arise
from a jury charge we approved in Schelberger -- a charge based
on the New York Pattern Jury Instructions which then, as now,
contained this language: "You may make a finding of suicide only
if you are satisfied from the evidence, and taking into
consideration the presumption against suicide, that no conclusion
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No. 55
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other than suicide may reasonably be drawn" (60 NY2d at 509; see
PJI 1:63.2).  This language should not be taken to mean that,
where more than one conclusion is reasonably possible, suicide is
excluded as a matter of law.  If that were true, the issue of
suicide could never be decided by a fact finder; a verdict would
have to be directed against the party asserting suicide whenever
the evidence was inconclusive, and in that party's favor when
suicide was conclusively proved.  The main point of both Wellisch
and Schelberger is to the contrary: Except in rare cases, a claim
of suicide presents a factual issue, not a legal one.  
The instruction that a finding of suicide is
permissible only when "no conclusion other than suicide may
reasonably be drawn" is directed at jurors deciding facts, not at
judges deciding the law; it is a way of impressing on jurors'
minds that the presumption against suicide is a strong one -- of
telling them they should not find suicide unless the evidence
shows suicide to be highly probable.  Of course, the same is true
of a judge sitting as fact-finder in a non-jury trial.  Here, the
evidence was strong enough to permit a finding of suicide, though
not to require it.  
Because there was evidence legally sufficient to
support Supreme Court's decision, the Appellate Division erred in 
rejecting the finding of suicide as a matter of law.  We remit
the case to the Appellate Division, so that it can exercise its
weight of the evidence review power, and consider any other
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No. 55
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issues necessary to resolve the case.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, with costs, and the case remitted to that court for
consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined
on the appeal to that court. 
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order reversed, with costs, and case remitted to the Appellate
Division, First Department, for consideration of the facts and
issues raised but not determined on the appeal to that court.
Opinion by Judge Smith.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Read, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided May 5, 2009