Case Title: Michaelis etc. v. Super. Ct.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S133464

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 6/22/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
MICHAELIS, MONTANARI & JOHNSON,  ) 
 
 
  ) 
 
Petitioner, 
  ) 
 
 
  ) 
S133464 
 
v. 
  ) 
 
 
  ) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B178884 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS 
  ) 
ANGELES COUNTY, 
  ) 
 
 
  ) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Respondent. 
  ) 
Super. Ct. No. BC090033 
 
 
  ) 
CITY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT   ) 
OF AIRPORTS et al. 
  ) 
 
 
  ) 
 
Real Parties in Interest. 
  ) 
 
 
  ) 
____________________________________  ) 
 
 
In this case, we consider California’s Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 
6250, et seq. (the Act)), generally calling for disclosure of a public agency’s 
records, and the statutory exception (id., § 6255) applicable where the public 
interest in nondisclosure “clearly outweighs” the public interest in disclosure.  
More specifically, we face questions concerning the availability and timing of 
public disclosure of competitive proposals submitted to a public agency as part of 
a process of qualifying and negotiating for a public contract, lease, or other 
project.  As will appear, consistent with analogous federal law and the majority of 
statutes and decisions in other states, we conclude that public disclosure of such 
 
2 
proposals properly may await conclusion of the agency’s negotiation process, 
occurring before the agency’s recommendation is finally approved by the 
awarding authority.  We will reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of 
Appeal.   
FACTS 
The following uncontradicted facts are taken largely from the Court of 
Appeal’s decision.  On November 3, 2003, the City of Los Angeles Department of 
Airports, also known as Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA), issued a “Request 
for Proposals” (RFP) for the lease of a 7.2854-acre parcel of land at Van Nuys 
Airport.  Situated on the parcel is a complex consisting of three hangars, two 
office buildings, and a fuel farm.  “Proposers” were told to submit proposals by 
December 15, 2003, although the date was later extended to February 15, 2004.  
The RFP provided that all proposals “will become the property of LAWA and a 
matter of public record.”   
Under the RFP, LAWA would select the successful proposal based on a 
number of criteria or qualifications, including the proposed rent and concession 
fees, the proposed use of the property, financial capability and responsibility, 
management qualifications and experience, general reputation to conduct 
aeronautical services, scope of aviation services to be provided and “other such 
factors as LAWA deems appropriate.”  The RFP also provided that LAWA could 
reject any or all proposals, could advertise for new proposals, or could “proceed 
otherwise.”  Additionally, LAWA could elect to negotiate with the “Proposer(s) 
found . . . to have submitted the best Proposals . . . .”  Following negotiations, 
LAWA would submit a proposed lease to the reviewing authority, the Board of 
Airport Commissioners (the Board) and, following the Board’s approval of a 
proposed lease exceeding five years, to the Los Angeles City Council.  Prior to the 
 
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Board’s approval, the public would have five days to review these proposals and 
the proposed lease.  LAWA received eight proposals in response to its RFP.   
On April 19, 2004, after the deadline for submitting proposals had passed, 
but before LAWA had negotiated with or selected the successful proposer, 
petitioner, a law firm engaged in aviation related business, submitted to the 
Airport Division of the Los Angeles City Attorney (City Attorney) a request under 
the Act for copies of all proposals submitted in response to the RFP.  On May 7, 
2004, LAWA’s Airport Property Manager, Jess Romo, informed petitioner that 
LAWA would provide it with copies of the proposals after LAWA had concluded 
negotiations with the (yet to be named) successful proposer.   
Mr. Romo’s letter noted the “long-established practice of most 
governmental agencies to make RFP proposals available for public review at the 
time the contract is presented to the awarding authority [i.e., the Board] for award.  
More precisely, proposals are first available for review when the awarding 
authority's agenda containing the contract to be awarded is published.  [¶]  This 
practice allows for the public to obtain the information prior to the awarding 
authority's consideration and award of the contract.  Importantly, it also allows the 
governmental entity, on behalf of its residents and taxpayers, to complete the 
negotiations without the proposers knowing each other's price and terms.  To make 
proposals available for public review prior to this time would seriously impact the 
government's ability to negotiate a fair and cost effective proposed contract.”   
On May 12, 2004, petitioner filed a mandate petition in superior court.  
(See Gov. Code, §6258.)  A hearing was set for September 13, 2004.  In the 
meantime, on June 8, 2004, after the deadline for submitting proposals had passed, 
the City Attorney provided petitioner with the names of the companies that had 
submitted proposals, but did not provide copies of the proposals themselves.  The 
City Attorney opined that disclosing the information at that time “would 
 
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irretrievably corrupt the process and harm not only the respondents, but also city 
taxpayers who may not receive the best value in return for the expenditure of their 
tax dollar,” because the successful proposer could gain a negotiating advantage if 
it knew the details of the unsuccessful proposals.   
The City Attorney referred petitioner to section 10.15(f)(6) of the Los 
Angeles Administrative Code, which relates to competitive bidding.  That section 
provides:  “Proposals shall be opened and their contents secured to prevent 
disclosure during the process of negotiating with competing proposers.  The 
proposals shall be opened publicly, but only the names of the proposers shall be 
revealed.  Adequate precautions shall be taken to treat each proposer fairly and to 
insure that information gleaned from competing proposals is not disclosed to other 
proposers.  Prices and other information concerning the proposals shall not be 
disclosed until a recommendation for award is made to the awarding authority.” 
On June 30, 2004, LAWA mailed letters to all the bidders announcing that 
its evaluation panel was recommending Castle & Cooke Aviation Services as the 
best-qualified firm for the project.  LAWA told the unsuccessful proposers that if 
they wanted to “provide additional information” they could do so by “completing 
a public comment card.”  Under the provisions of the RFP, if any person wanted to 
submit a protest concerning the award it was required to do so “by 5:00 p.m. of the 
fifth business day after the issuance of a notice of intent to award the Lease.”  Any 
such protest had to contain “a full and complete statement specifying in detail the 
grounds of the protest and the facts in support thereof.”  
Although LAWA’s request to negotiate with Castle & Cooke Aviation 
Services was placed on the agenda for the July 19, 2004, meeting of the Board, it 
declined to approve the award at that time.  Rather, the Board deferred its decision 
and returned the matter to LAWA to “evaluate all scenarios of all proposals for the 
 
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highest and best return to LAWA prior to presenting an agenda item to the Board.”  
LAWA’s staff scheduled meetings with three proposers in mid-September 2004.   
On September 13, 2004, the trial court issued its tentative decision to deny 
petitioner’s mandate petition.  The court cited Government Code section 6255, and 
stated its tentative view that disclosing contents of the proposals prior to the 
ultimate selection of the successful proposer would adversely impact the city's 
negotiating position.  The mandamus petition was heard September 27, 2004.  On 
October 8, 2004, the court issued its decision denying the petition pursuant to 
Government Code section 6255 “because the public interest in nondisclosure 
clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure.”  
The Court of Appeal, by a two-to-one vote, disagreed with the trial court, 
finding that “the City has failed to demonstrate there is a ‘clear overbalance’ in 
favor of delaying disclosure.”  The majority felt that the city’s reasons for 
nondisclosure were “vague and speculative,” and that the public had a “significant 
interest” in knowing, prior to completion of the negotiating process, whether 
LAWA had acted properly and in accordance with its own guidelines.   
The Court of Appeal majority also reasoned that (1) the city’s concern 
about the possibility of proposers changing their proposals was unfounded because 
proposers were not permitted to change their proposals after the submission 
deadline had passed, (2) the city enjoyed an “enormous negotiating advantage” in 
being able to reject any proposals deemed unsuitable, and (3) the city’s negotiating 
position could not be hurt by permitting proposers to know that other competitive 
proposals were “waiting in the wings.”  The majority concluded that the public 
had a legitimate interest in knowing during the negotiating process, whether the 
city had acted in accordance with its guidelines, or instead had improperly favored 
certain proposers.   
 
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In his dissent, Justice Mosk stated that substantial evidence supported the 
trial court’s findings, that little if any public benefit would derive from premature 
disclosure of the competing proposals, and that such disclosure could impair the 
city’s selection and negotiating process.  As will appear, we think the dissent’s 
views have merit and will reverse.   
DISCUSSION 
The Act, while “mindful of the right of individuals to privacy,” provides 
that “access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a 
fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.”  (Gov. Code, § 
6250; see also Cal. Const. art. I, §3, subd. (b) [creating constitutional right of 
access to public agency records and calling for strict construction of statutes 
limiting such access]; Gov. Code, § 54950.)  Accordingly, as a general rule, public 
records are open to inspection at all times during office hours, “and every person 
has a right to inspect any public record, except as hereafter provided.”  (Gov. 
Code, § 6253, subd. (a).)  In addition to specific exemptions of particular records 
set forth in Government Code section 6254, the Act contains a broad catchall 
exemption for agencies able to “justify withholding any record by demonstrating 
that . . . on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not 
disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of 
the record.  (Id., § 6255, subd. (a).)  As petitioner observes, this provision 
contemplates a case-by-case balancing process, with the burden of proof on the 
proponent of nondisclosure to demonstrate a clear overbalance on the side of 
confidentiality.  (E.g., California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. Superior 
Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 810, 831.)   
As noted, the trial court expressly found that in this case the public interest 
in nondisclosure clearly outweighed the public interest in disclosure.  The court’s 
tentative decision, which the court later ordered filed as setting forth the court’s 
 
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“rationale,” contained the following additional findings:  “[LAWA’s] ability to get 
the most value for the hangar facility would be impacted if the proposer that is 
ultimately approved by [the Board] enters into lease negotiations with full 
knowledge of what each proposer is willing to pay.  [LAWA’s] ability to negotiate 
with the proposer would be hampered because the proposer’s doubt as to what the 
competition is offering would be eliminated.  To the extent the public interest in 
disclosure is to hold government agencies accountable by verifying their actions, 
that interest would still be served by disclosing the proposals after [the Board] 
actually takes action and negotiates a lease with one of the proposers.  [¶]  
Currently all proposals are subject to further review, recalculation and [LAWA] 
interviews of the proposers.  Disclosure of specific details of the proposals would 
impact [LAWA’s] flexibility in negotiation and could be used against the City to 
gain competitive advantage.”  
The dissent below explained that although a reviewing court should weigh 
the competing public interest factors de novo, it should accept as true the trial 
court’s findings of the “facts of the particular case” (Gov. Code, § 6255, subd. 
(a)), assuming those findings are supported by substantial evidence.  (CBS, Inc. v. 
Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 650-651; Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 
53 Cal.3d 1325, 1336; CBS Broadcasting Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 
Cal.App.4th 892, 906; California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. Superior 
Court, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 824; see Gov. Code, § 6259.)  As will appear, 
the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and confirm our 
independent reweighing of the various public interest factors in the city’s favor.   
Petitioner also argues that, even if the records at issue were exempt from 
advance disclosure, the city was obliged to disclose them because it failed to 
comply with the timing requirements of the Act (e.g., Gov. Code, § 6253, subds. 
(c) [requiring agency decision within 10 days as to whether it will comply with 
 
8 
disclosure request], (d) [proscribing delay in disclosure].)  But we believe that 
requiring disclosure of otherwise exempt records as a penalty for delay in 
complying with the Act’s timing requirements is unduly harsh.  Certainly, the Act 
does not expressly provide such a remedy.  (Cf. Rogers v. Superior Court (1993) 
19 Cal.App.4th 469, 483.)  Accordingly, we will address the merits of the 
nondisclosure issue.   
1.  Public interest in disclosure – The Court of Appeal majority found a 
“significant” public interest in advance disclosure of the various proposals after 
the deadline for submitting them had passed, but before LAWA’s negotiations 
with the preferred proposer had ceased.  In the majority’s view, the public was 
entitled to “assur[e] itself that LAWA is following its own guidelines [in] selecting 
the successful proposer, and is not selecting these individuals or entities based on 
political favoritism or some other criteria that do not serve the public.”   
To support the Court of Appeal majority’s position, petitioner points to a 
2003 city audit report, made public before the LAWA proposals in this case were 
due, raising concerns about LAWA’s general contracting practices, its difficulties 
in evaluating and selecting contract proposals because the definition and weight 
given to the various evaluation factors were insufficiently specific, and the 
“potential of abuse and conflict of interest” inherent in the RFP process.  
Petitioner also stresses the “intense public interest” in the airport lease proposals, 
given the potential benefits to, and burdens on, the “aviation community” as well 
as the surrounding commercial and residential neighborhood.   
We agree that the competitive bidding process is intended to assure a 
healthy degree of competition, to guard against discrimination, favoritism, or 
extravagance, and to assure the best social, environmental, and economic result for 
the public.  (See, e.g., Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 314; Domar Electric, Inc. v. City 
 
9 
of Los Angeles (1994) 9 Cal.4th 161, 173; Pub. Contract Code, § 100, subds. (b)-
(d).)  Accordingly, the public may have a legitimate and substantial interest in 
scrutinizing the process leading to the selection of the winning proposal.  (E.g., 
California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 90 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 833-834.)  But, as the trial court specifically found here, 
petitioner has offered no compelling reason why public scrutiny of this process 
cannot as effectively take place after LAWA’s negotiations are completed, but 
before the Board and the city finally approve the lease.  As the city observes, 
petitioner’s concern about the inadequacy of the five-day period for public 
comment is based on mere speculation and further assumes the Board would 
arbitrarily reject a reasonable request for additional time to analyze the winning 
proposal and prepare critical input.  Moreover, further opportunity for such 
analysis and input presumably would be available if and when the matter is 
submitted to the city council for final approval.   
As Justice Mosk’s dissenting opinion in this case noted, “[p]ublic scrutiny 
of the lease process and accountability of the decision makers will be served better 
after the negotiating process, LAWA’s decision, and, perhaps, after the actual 
decision to award the lease contract by the Board.  Those interested in the integrity 
of the city’s decisionmaking practices will be able to make such an evaluation 
after decisions are actually made.”  In that regard, we note that the city does not 
contend that disclosure necessarily should follow the actual Board award, but “at a 
time that allows an opportunity to review the process.”  We need not decide in this 
case the precise point in time appropriate for such disclosure, as long as a 
reasonable time remains for public input before the Board’s final award is made.   
Therefore, we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeal dissent that 
public disclosure of the various competing proposals after negotiations are 
complete, and before the Board finally approves the award of the contract, would 
 
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give the public and all interested parties ample opportunity to scrutinize and 
protest the proposed award.  No reason appears why disclosure of the various 
proposals prior to negotiations would provide any significantly greater benefit to 
the public.   
2.  Public interest in nondisclosure – The trial court found substantial 
public benefits from delaying disclosure of the various proposals until LAWA had 
selected a proposal to be submitted to the Board and the city for approval.  
Essentially, the court ruled that premature disclosure would reveal specific, 
confidential details of the competing proposals to the other proposers, thereby 
potentially impairing the city’s negotiation and selection processes.   
As the Court of Appeal dissent observed, “[t]he request for proposals 
suggests that LAWA might elect to negotiate with more than one bidder.  If the 
disclosure of bids takes place prior to negotiations with one or more bidders, the 
City’s ability to obtain the most favorable arrangement may be jeopardized once a 
negotiating bidder becomes aware of the content of competitive bids because that 
bidder would no longer be in doubt as to its relative bargaining position.  For 
example, a bidder that is negotiating will be in a position to know that it does not 
have to accede to City requests because of the content of other bids.  The request 
for proposals also contemplates that changes and amendments to bid proposals 
will take place during negotiations.  During negotiations, bidders may adjust their 
bids—presumably to the detriment of the City—if they have knowledge of other 
bids.” 
Additionally, the city observes that advance disclosure of any significant 
“gap” between the terms offered by the “finalist” proposer and its competitors 
could induce that proposer to resist the city’s requests for even more favorable 
terms, or lead to an amended proposal that offers less attractive terms.  As an 
amicus curiae herein observes, the willingness of a negotiating party to agree 
 
11 
depends in part on its assessment of the other party’s alternatives.  Consider a 
hypothetical example raised during oral argument in this case.  If the selected 
finalist for the lease project knew during negotiations that all of the proposals 
specified a minimum seven-year period for constructing airport improvements, 
LAWA could enjoy considerably less leverage in attempting to negotiate a shorter 
construction period.   
This possibility could be even more pronounced in “second-round” 
situations involving negotiations with more than one potential “finalist.”  
Nondisclosure during the negotiation process also tends to reduce the possibility 
of collusion, price-fixing, or bid-rigging tactics.  In other words, as the trial court 
found, advance disclosure of the various proposals could adversely affect the 
city’s ability to maximize its financial return on the lease.   
The city observes that the RFP called for more than a simple high bid for a 
leasehold, and instead contemplated a complete lease proposal that included a 
detailed development plan.  As the city states in its opening brief, “Proposers are 
not likely to present their best work in their proposals if they know that their 
competitors can filch their ideas during negotiations.”  A proposer might well 
hesitate to disclose creative, innovative insights or solutions after weighing the 
threat of misappropriation by competitors.  The result could be submission of 
inferior proposals, to the ultimate detriment of the public interest.   
The Court of Appeal majority questioned the city’s concern that 
competitors might unfairly use the disclosed information to restructure their 
proposals in such a manner as to appear more attractive.  The majority stated that 
“the proposals cannot be changed once the deadline for submitting them has 
passed.  Thus, the proposers could not amend their proposals to tailor them to 
those of competitors.”  But as the dissent observed, “[t]he notion that proposals 
cannot be changed once the deadline for submitting them has passed does not, in 
 
12 
practical effect, appear to be accurate.  There are negotiations with bidders over 
the terms of the bids.  If changes could not be made, there would be nothing to 
negotiate.  Moreover, the City can reopen the bidding process.  The disclosure of 
bids during the predecision period may affect the information submitted by 
bidders and the decision maker’s deliberations and processes.”   
We agree with the Court of Appeal dissent.  Although the RFP indicates 
that amendments to proposals “will not be accepted” after the RFP deadline has 
passed, certainly LAWA could waive or ignore that provision during negotiations.  
The RFP contemplates possible postsubmission “interview” sessions when invited 
proposers may “clarify” their proposals.  Moreover, the RFP gives LAWA the 
right to reject all proposals, advertise for new ones, “or to proceed otherwise.”  
Certainly the RFP would allow LAWA to consider amended proposals.   
The Court of Appeal dissent discerned an additional policy reason for 
withholding disclosure during the negotiation process:  “The idea that members of 
the public should have input into the selection of, and negotiation with, potential 
lessees would add undesirable pressures, political and otherwise, to the process.”  
Again, we agree. Although similar pressures could be exerted when the negotiated 
proposal is presented to the Board and city for final approval, the public interest 
seemingly would better be served by allowing LAWA to negotiate the terms of its 
lease without facing those pressures.   
3.  Federal and state authorities – Federal statutes and cases 
implementing or interpreting the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) are 
instructive because the California Act is modeled on the FOIA.  (See, e.g., Times 
Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1338.)  With regard to federal 
procurement contracts, federal law prohibits disclosure of bid or proposal 
information prior to the actual award of the contract.  (See 41 U.S.C. §§ 253b(f)(4) 
[debriefing unsuccessful bidders shall not include content, ranking, or evaluation 
 
13 
of other proposals], 253b(m) [prohibition on release of contractor proposals unless 
incorporated in contract with proposer]; 423(a) [prohibition on release of 
contractor bid or proposal information before award]; 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3) 
[exempting from FOIA disclosure any material exempted from disclosure by 
statute]; 48 C.F.R. 424.203 (2005) [regulation exempting competitive proposals 
from FOIA; Shermco Industries v. Secretary of Air Force (5th Cir. 1980) 613 F.2d 
1314, 1317-1318 [disclosure of bid competitor’s cost proposals exempt under 
FOIA until final award of contract]; Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Dept. of the Army 
of U.S. (D.D.C. 1984) 595 F.Supp. 352, 355-356, affd. (D.C. Cir. 1985) 762 F.2d 
138 [agency could delay release to prospective bidder of documents on which 
Army would rely in preparing its own sealed bid to perform work in-house].)   
Petitioner observes, however, that these federal cases and statutes primarily 
pertain to public agency procurement of goods and services on a “lowest 
competitive bid” basis, and not to competitive proposals for lease contracts 
seeking the highest competitive bid.  Nonetheless, we think the governing 
principle of preserving the confidentiality of competitive proposals for 
government contracts seems equally applicable to both categories of contracts.   
In addition, as the city’s opening brief sets forth at length, the great 
majority of states, by statute or case law, exempt from public disclosure any 
proposals submitted to public agencies during lease or contract negotiations.  
Similarly, the American Bar Association’s 2000 Model Procurement Code for 
State and Local Governments provides that “Proposals shall be opened so as to 
avoid disclosure of contents to competing offerors during the process of 
negotiation . . . .”  (§ 3-203 (4).)  It also provides that the “Register of Proposals 
shall be . . . open for public inspection after contract award.”  (Ibid.)  Although 
California has not adopted the American Bar Association’s Model Procurement 
 
14 
Code, and as petitioner observes, technically procurement is not involved here, the 
provisions of the Model Code are worthy of consideration.   
 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude the trial court correctly ruled that public disclosure of the 
competing proposals for the city’s lease project properly could await conclusion of 
LAWA’s negotiation process.  In light of our conclusion that the proposals 
submitted to the city were, during the negotiation process, exempt under 
Government Code section 6255 from the disclosure requirements of the Act, we 
need not consider the city’s alternative argument that these proposals were 
“official information” protected from disclosure under Evidence Code section 
1040 and Government Code section 6254, subdivision (k).   
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the cause remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
  
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Michaelis, Montanari & Johnson v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 127 Cal.App.4th 1298 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S133464 
Date Filed: June 22, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Dzintra I. Janavs 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Michaelis, Montanari & Johnson, Garry L. Montanari and Nathan B. Rand for Petitioner. 
 
DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US, James M. Chadwick, Jarod M. Bona; Thomas W. Newton, James W. 
Ewert; Harold W. Fuson, Jr.; Karlene Goller; Andrew Huntington; Thomas R. Burke; and Jonathan 
Donnellan for the California Newspaper Publishers Association, The Copley Press, Inc., Los Angeles 
Times, San Jose Mercury News, Inc. The Bakersfield Californian and The Hearst Corporation as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Davis, Cowell & Bowe and Andrew J. Khan for Retail Food Industry Joint Labor Management Committee 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Eduardo A. Angeles, Assistant City Attorney, M. Lynn Mayo, 
Deputy City Attorney; Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Mara E. Rosales, Joseph M. Quinn and 
Julia L. Bond for Real Parries in Interest. 
 
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney (San Francisco), Buck Delventhal and Paul Zarefsky, Deputy City 
Attorneys; David L. Alexander, Port Attorney, and Christopher H. Alonzi, Deputy Port Attorney, for City 
and County of San Francisco, League of California Cities, California State Association of Counties and 
City of Oakland, acting by and through its Board of Port Commissioners as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real 
Parties in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Garry L. Montanari 
Michaelis, Montanari & Johnson 
4333 Park Terrace Drive, Suite 110 
Westlake Village, CA  91361 
(818) 865-0444 
 
James M. Chadwick 
DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US 
401 B Street, Suite 1700 
San Diego, CA  92101-4240 
9619) 699-2826 
 
M. Lynn Mayo 
Deputy City Attorney 
1 World Way 
P.O. Box 92216 
Los Angeles, CA  90009-2216 
(310) 646-3260