Case Title: State v. Frisbee. Concurring Opinion by C.J. Moon [pdf]. Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakayama [pdf]. ICA s.d.o., filed 09/12/2006 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 01/09/2007 [pdf].

Citation: 114 Haw. 76

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAZ'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

he

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

00 ~-

   

 
   

STATE OF HAWAT'Z,
Plaintiff-Appellee-Respondent,

aqam

FRANK FRISBEE,
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

s

No. 27079

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(Cr. No. 0-1-1685)

APRIL 30, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ., MOOK, C.J.,
CONCURRING SEPARATELY, AND NAKAYAMA, J., DISSENTING

 

OPINION OF THE LEVIN:

on December 11, 2006, the defendant-appellant-

petitioner Frank Frisbee filed en application for a writ of

 

certiorari urging us to review the summary disposition order
(S00) of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in State v
Exisbee, No. 27079 (September 12, 2006) [hereinafter, “the ICA‘s

$00"}, affirming the January 18, 2005 judanent of the circust

 

court of the first circuit, the Honorable Victoria S. Marks
presiding, convicting Frisbee of and sentencing him for the
counts set out infra in section

We accepted certiorari because the ICA's SDO is

 

inconsi

 

nt, gee Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-59(b) (2)
8, §§ 1 and 3

   

upp. 2004), amended by 2006 Haw. Sess. L. Act

 
OR PUBLICATION 18 WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

at 409, with State v. Matias, 102 Hawai'i 300, 75 P.3d 1191
(2003), as discussed infra in section IIT. We therefore hold

 

that Frisbee was entitled to a jury instruction on the
possibility of merger pursuant to HRS § 701-109(1) (e) (1993).¢
Accordingly, we vacate the ICA's SDO and renand with instructions
fox the ICA (1) to vacate the circuit court's January 18, 2005
judgment and (2) to remand to the circuit court for a new trial.

1. BACKGROUND

on August 14, 2000, Frisbee was charged by complaint
with, inter alia, one count of kidnapping in violation of HRS
$ 707-720(1) Ld) (1993) (Count 1) and one count of kidnapping in
violation of HRS § 707-720(1) {el (1993) (Count 11), both
allegedly committed in the City and County of Honolulu on or
about August 3, 2000.7

From November 20 through December 3, 2002, the circuit
court conducted a jury trial. In his application, Frisbee

RE § 701-209(2) provider sn re

 

vent part

linen the sane conduct of 2 defendant may establish an
clenent ef nore than one sffense, the defendant may be prosecuted
for each offense of which sven conduct is an elerent. he
Gefendant may net, honever, be convicted of mere than one offense
ge

iej ine oftence se defined ae continuing course of
conduct and the defendent’s course cf conduct wae
Uninterrupted, unlese the law provices that specific periods
of conduct constitute separate offenses.

 

RS € 707-720(2) provices in relevent part: "A person comite the
oftense of klcnapping if the person intentionally or knowingly restreine
nother person with intent tet... ie) inflict bedily insury open el

Tor] (e) Terzorize that person or  thira person
aph (a) is fulfillea by the intent to either "[1)nfliet bodily
injury upen [2] person or subject that perecn te s sexiel offence,” the
language cf the Complaint tracked cnly the “bodily injury” prong.’ Conmaze HRS
8°03" 92012) te

 

       

      

 
   

POR PUBLICATION IN MEST'S WANAI'E REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER

appears to concede arquende that certain trial testimony would
support at least one of the counts:

[the complaining witness Cher Chang] went with [Frisbee] to
the Kan Shopping Center, where [Frisbee] told her to get out
Gf the car Chang opened the car door snd began to get oot
Sf the car. Ae she was getting out of the car (Frisbe
Grebbed ner by her heir and pulled her back inside the car,
Shang sat in the cer and continved to ride along with
Trrisbee) -

They next went to a house by the Eagle Cafe near .
Kolin Valley. [Frisbee] get out of the eruck and Chang
Stayed ineige then chey went to a Second house and there
Trriabee} hed her get cut and go inside with him(s] Chang
went and dic net pretest. [Frisbee] told Chang to Kies hin
Sno stuff and tell, him that she loved him, ond he made her
tlse'his. “River thet he began to choke Chang.

‘They left the house and went to a Chevron gas’ station

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

to get some chips. Ghang went into the gas station
Wich [esictecl |’. cheng ran out of the stere and junpec
inte ancther cor w"TFriebee) ren after chang, grabbed
her ot ren the Car by her aair and put her back ante his

iptidbee) drove around and ended up at Sand Island.
[als they Grove around [Frisbee] began te tell chang
indt’ne was going to shoot [ber] and ner sons.

‘hc"Sind Jeland Chang trieg to go inte che back of the
sw, 1. {Als she did (Frisbee) began to hit her in the

 

From our review of the entire record, it does not
appear that Frisbee registered any objection to the jury

instructions at trial, nor do Frisbee’s opening brief or his

 

application cite any such objection -- in fact, Frisbee’s
proposed version of the instructions related to Counts I and IT
was materially identical to the version that was ultimately read

to the jury.

 

‘The pertinent snetructions, a2 read and given te the jury, stated:

in Count 1... ys + « Frisbee) 4s charged with the
cffense of Kignapping.

‘Ri persen connite the offense of Kidnapping Sf he
intentionslly ef snowingly reetreins another persen with intent te
inflict bodily injury upon thst person

‘There ave three material elenents of the effense of
Kicnepping, exch of which the prosecution must prove beyond &
Pesrerable deus

 

 

tees )

 
 

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++

on December 3, 2002, the jury found Frisbee guilty as
charged of Counts 1 and 11.

On January 10, 2005, Frisbee moved the circuit court

“to [d]ismiss Count I or IT. . . or to have the Counts . . .
merged into a single offense as it constituted @ single course of
uninterrupted conduct.” The plaintiff-appellee-respondent State
of Hawai'i (hereinafter, “the prosecution”) replied that “there
was a factual basis for the jury to convict [Frisbee] of more
than one count of kidnapping,” to wit:

[Chang and Frisbee) were in a vehicle that was being driven

by [Frisbee]. (He) told (her) to get out by the Kam
Shopping Center. As (she] did so, [he] pulled her back in
by her hair... Later ony -  . [he] used both of Bis
hangs and choked (her].. «for abeut two minutes and told

her te kite bim, He made (her) kiss his.
‘aiter he choked [Chang], [Frisbee] drove to a Chevron

   

station. [He] exited the vehicie to buy sone food. [Chang]
fan away from the vehicle and get inte the car of &
stranger . [Frisbee] followed her and pulled her out
-continves)

 

These, Three elements, are:
‘That, cn or about the 3ré cay of August 2000,

[Fricbee] restraines . - - Cheng; ena

Thet (Frisbee) did so intentionslly of knowingly: and

That [Frisbee] dig so with the intext te inflict Beaily

insury open = = + Chang.

In Count 11 . Feigbee|] is charged with the
of Kidnapping
1 perscn connics the offense of Kidnapping if he
intentionally of knowingly Feetresne encther persen with intent to
cereorize thet person.
There are saree materiel elenente of the offence of
Kidnapping, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond
‘enable’ debt
‘These tnree elenents are
nee, enor about the cf August 2000,
[frisbee] restrained. oa
[frisbee] eid se sttentionsily ex knowingly; and
[Frisree] aig so with the intent to terrorize.
9

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

      

y between the verdict and sentencing was due to: (1) te
ec by frisbee to fineh s course at Cane Ce
[2] three contanvencer because of withora

 

 

   
++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

of the stranger's cer by her hair, (le) dragged her back to
Bie venicle. (He) threstened to shoot [her] and her

At its January 18, 2005 hearing, the circuit court orally ruled

as follows:

‘The first incident, if you will, cccurred at or near Kam
Ehepping Center where (Chong) tried to leave the car. «
Frisbee gresbes herl] by her heir, polled her back into Ale
Car, Ivthink at one point choked her as well.

eters che conpisining witness jumped into
ancther cor, ..”, Frisbee pulled her out of that car and
then ‘threatened her sna ner son

Se what we have axe cifferent tines, different acts at
ditterent locations | = =

Accordingly, the circuit court denied Frisbee's

 

   

January 10, 2005 motion. On January 18, 2005, the circuit court
entered its final judgnent convicting Frisbee of, inter alia,
Counts I and IT. On January 24, 2005, Frisbee filed his timely
notice of appeal.

on direct appeal, Frisbee (1) reiterated the position
taken in his motion to dismiss and (2) further argued that the
circuit court “err[ed) by not instructing the jury on the
question of a merger of the charges.”* (Emphases omitted.) In
ite S00, the ICA affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. (Citing
Matias, 102 Hawai'i at 206, 75 P.3d et 1197; State v. Alston, 75
Haw. 517, 531, 865 P.2d 157, 165 (1994); State v, Libero, 103
Hawai'i 490, 501-02, 83 P.3d 753, 764-65 (App. 2003); State ve
Momoki, 98 Hawai'i 188, 194-95, 96 F.3d 1, 7-€ (App. 2002).) On

 

 

December 11, 2006, Frisbee timely filed the present application.

on January 9, 2007, we accepted certiorari.

  
    
 
 

bee never objected at trie) to the
eto have constroed Frisbee's secend
Court shold neve instructed the Suzy on

snetructions ee 8h

  
 

/+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*
During oral argument, Frisbee and the prosecution

maintained their respective positions as to the significance of a

 

“temporal break” between the initial restraint and the arguable
escape and “recapture” of Chang at the gas station. Frisbee
argued that, “even if [Chang] attempted to get away” at the gas
station, Frisbee’s whole course of conduct amounted to
“essentially just the one act.” Apparently in the alternative,
Frisbee reiterated that the question whether Frisbee's criminal
conduct was interrupted is one of fact for the jury. The
prosecution posited that Chang's fleeing created an interruption
between Counts I and II as a matter of law, i.e., would not
support a jury finding of uninterrupted conduct. We commented
that the prosecution’s closing argunent repeatedly characterized
the entire incident as “the kidnapping,” singular, see infra
section III.A, but the prosecution replied that, during his
opening statement and elsewhere, the prosecutor et trial

portrayed Frisbee’s conduct 2s consisting of two separate acts.

11. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When jury instructicns or the oaission thereof
are at issue on appeal, the standard of review ie

 

 

Instructions given are prejudicially incufficient,
elronecur, inconsistent, ev misleading. Erroneous
ground fer ri

       

 

Exon the ole thet the error wee not
Frejudicsal. helrrer is not to be viewed in
Sletion sie considesea purely in the sberract. It

   

Sost be examined ip the light of the entire
Proceedings and giver the effect wnich the whole
Pecers enews st to be entstles. In trat context, the
Feal question Becenes whether there iss feascrable
feceibility that errer might have contributed to
Ecnvicticn, If there ie such a reasonable possibility
Sng crininel cese, then the erzer ie not hermiess
beyena a reesonebie doubt, ane the juggrent of
conwictsen en ftnay have been Berea must be set

    

     

 

   
 

44+ FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST'S YANAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

Gensaiven, 108 Hawai's 289, 292-93, 119 P.3¢ 597,
EG0-07 (20081 (anternal citations, ‘quctation marks,
fngentations, ena paragraphing cnittedy bracketed material
aases) (7 £)e8 Shanvans, 101 Hewai's 309, 385,
eorrsa sits S23 (2008)

in (State v. }Eberly, [107 Hewett
425 (2008);) we observed that 7

 

 

   

9, 112 B.3d

 

__. Iw]here instructions were net objected to at
ieiei, "TE'Ehe appellant overcenes the presumption that
{he instroct ions were correctly stated, the rule is
that. such erroneous instructions are presuaptively
Edrafol eng ese e ground for reverse] unless it
aifizeatively sppeare fron the Fecord se 5 whole that
the error was not prejudicial

Ide at 250, 112 P.3¢ at 736.
State v. Nichols, 121 Hawei'i 327, 334-35, 141 P.3d 974, 981-82

(2006) (some brackets added and some in original).

 

 

TIT. DISCUSSION

In hie application for writ of certiorari, Frisbee

 

basically reargues his direct appeal: (1) that the circuit court
erred in denying his January 10, 2005 motion to merge Counts I

and 11; and (2) thet the circuit court “errled) by not

 

instructing the jury on the question of a merger of the charges.”
(Emphases omitted.) In particular, Frisbee aroues that “there
was only one act of kidnapping and the initial act of pulling

Chang back inte the car to terrorize merged inte the act of

 

inflicting harm . . . at the Chevron gas station. . . . The two
separate acts . . . were all part of the ongoing criminal
offense. . . .” (Quoting HRS § 701-109, see supre note 1; State

vs Ganal, €1 Hawai'i 388, 384, 917 P.2d 370, 396 (1996); State v.
Hoey, 17 Hawai'i 17, 3€, 881 F.2d $04, 525 (1994); Alston, 75
Hew, at S31, G65 P.2d ot 165; State v. Freeman, 70 Haw. 434, 442,
774 P.2d 686, 892-93 (1989); State v. Capric, 85 Hawai'i $2, 104,
P.2d 933, 945 (App. 1997)) (citing State v. Castro, 69 Hew.

 

 

 

   
RAWAL'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +#¢

 

04 oR PUBLICATION I WES?"
633, 786 P.2d 1033 (1986).) Elaborating on his second point of

error, Frisbee asserts that the circuit court should have

 

ascertained by interrogatory whether the jury found that the
kidnapping(s) constituted “a single act over a period of time[]
or two separate acts.” (Quoting State v. Culkin, 97 Hawai'i 206,
214-15, 35 P.3d 233, 241-42 (2001).)¢

However indirectly he arrives there, the bottom line of
Frisbee’s position is that the circuit court and, hence, the ICA
erroneously ruled cut the possibility that Counts I and II were
grounded in “the same conduct,” see HRS § 701-109(1), thereby
mandating, at 2 minimum, that the circuit court instruct the jury
regarding merger. We agree with Frisbee.

A, In Light Of The whole Record, There Is A Reasonable
Possibility That The Jury Instructions were
Prejudicially Insufficient, Erroneous, Inconsistent, Or
Misleading,

We believe that HRS § 701-109(1)(e), see supra note 1,
entitled Frisbee to have the jury apprised of the possible merger
of Counts I and IT.

HRS § 701-208(11 (e), see supra note [1], interposes a
constraint on multiple convictions arising from the sane

criningl conduct. the statute “reflects 9 policy te Limit

the possibility of multiple cenvictions and. extendes

Sentences when the defendant har basically engaged in only

fone course of criminal conduct directed at one criminal
Qeel{]" See Commentary on HRS § 701-103,

 

<Frisbeets application, with ite seventeen-page body, exceeds the
rmexinun length permitted by Hawai Rule of Appellate Procedure 40.1(a). ("The
2 caIz pages a). On
2006, ‘we crdered Fristee’s counsel to show cause why he should
hot be sanctioned for violating this rule. He vespended presptly and
Contritely, anc, sccorcingly, we tock no further action. In any case, the
of Frisbee's application ade little substance beyone ¢
tion te Ggikin, wnscn repeste tne permissive stengers for plain error in
Jury inetructione, 97 Rawal at 216, 38 Pidd et 243, of which we are freshly

 
 

 

    

 

 
[FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+*

 

Whether # course of conduct gives rise to more
than one crine [within the seaning of HRS § 70)—
Yo8(2) (el). depends in part on the intent and cbjective
Of the defencent.. The test to determine whether the
Gefendant intended te commit nore than one offense is
Whether the evidence discleses one general intent or
Giscloses separate sng distinct intents. where there
{e"Gne intention, one general impulse, and one plan,

there 4s bat one offense. All factual issues involved
Ants cerereination aust be decided by the trier of

 

 

Hoey, 77 Hawal's (at) 27 n.(18, 861 F.2d [at
514 n.{)8 |. + iqueting Buston, 75 hee. (st) 532, 865
Bete iat) des 2 e). Fane's’ 76i=10911) te), however, does
hot opply where & defendant's ections constitute separate
Offenses under the law. See State v. focpii, 68 Haw. 246,
261, 710 Pi2d 1193, 1197 (2385)

Matias, 102 Hawai" at 305, 78 P.3d at 1196 (some citations

 

 

 

omitted) (sone brackets added and sone in original) (emphasis in
original).

In the present matter, the question whether Frisbee's
arguably two acts of “pulling Chang) back inside the
car”/*put [ting] her back inte his car precipitated one course of
criminal conduct or two was never submitted to the jury. We
believe that this contravened the letter and the purpose of HRS
§ 701-109(1) (e). In other words, a reasonable juror could find
that Frisbee executed one continuous “restrain[t],” see HRS
$ 707-720(1), supra note 2, which, as the jury should have been
instructed, would bar Frisbee’s conviction of multiple kidnapping
charges. One “restrainit},” even if accompanied by both colors
of intent enumerated as HRS § 707-720(1) (d) and (e), cannot
support tug convictions of kidnapping. Moreover, because of the
wording of the complaint, see supra notes 2 and 3 and
acconpanying text, even two separate “restrain[ts]” would have to
be accompanied by two distinct requisite stetes of mind -- e.a.,

the prosecution could not apply the intent to terrorize to both
oR PUBLICATION IN WEST! HANAL'X REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++#

 

vrestrain{ts]” unless one of the “restrainits]” were also
undertaken with the intent to inflict bodily injury.

Not only did the circuit court not sua sponte instruct
the jury regarding merger, but the prosecution further mddied
the waters between Counts I and 11 by never electing which

kidnapping count , which of the supposedly distinct

 

wrestrain[ts]" (one at Kam Shopping Center and the other at the
gas station, see supra section I) was committed with the intent
to terrerize and which was accompanied by the intent to inflict
bodily injury. Moreover, the prosecution appears to have
conflated the circunstantial evidence supporting the intent to
terrorize with the circumstantial evidence supporting the intent
to inflict bodily injury.

During his opening statement, the prosecutor stated in

pertinent part:

[Frisbee) decided during thie! tine (ne and chang)
were together that he was not geing to let her do anything
ithe thet he would shew her uho wae in contrcl- They drove
constantly after that all over Honelule

They stopped ats gus station to get some food,
Chang at. that tine tried te escepe. She... ran to (3
: US (Frisbee) saw her going tot
anc trying to escape, [Me] went outside fren the store,
grenbes Shang fron the cer, end pulled her beck inte
the 0.

 

    

Yelena

 

Finally they ended op back at

injne prosecutien will aek you te return @
finding Of guilt eh tne counte of Kidnapping» ss = One
cunt snvelves the intent te do begily fern...
Tenang aiyow thet he caused her to feel pain. The
second court’... invelves the intent te terrorize.
Cheng by culling ber heir, keatane her ug, threatening her

ane her Tansty,

 

      

(Emphases added.)

10
 

‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S WAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +

 

On direct examination, Chang testified that, after the
episode wherein Frisbee “pulled [her] back in” “by Kam Shopping
Center,” he said to Chang, “I'm not going to play any games with
you.” Then, Chang testified, after Frisbee and Chang stopped at
two houses and the Eagle Café, he choked her. Later, after Chang
ren away, “[Frisbee] came and he grabbed [her] by [her] hair,
pulled [her] out! of the stranger’s car], and shoved [her] back
into the [SUV]. According to Chang, he then told her she “ain't
going anywhere,” accompanied by a vile obscenity, Then, before
“ended up at Sand Island,” Frisbee

 

“chang and Frisb
“[t]hreaten(ed Chang] end stuff. . . . He threatened to shoot
[chang] and [her] son.”

Finally, in closing argument, the prosecution did not
foreclose the factual possibility that there was but one

continuous course of conduct:

They Went to the Kam Shopping Center.
‘and ae (Chang) use getting out, (Frisbee)
grebbed her and pulled ner back into the SUV. And this ta
here the sianeceine besine
~ «ANG, You Know {fom the instructions that we
reed tO You there are tee types of Kidnapping i
this cose =~ stent to terscrize and the intent to cause
bodily injury tov... Chang. We'll discuss both of these.
Bot thie is the initiation of the Kidnanping . . . -
They continued to érive sround | |) “she
tried toletcape . «when they went to @ gas station...
Ae that point, [Trisbee) wos... buying sone foodi) |
charg! fen to the cer cf ¢ stronger and tried to get
ini “[Feittee] ssw ner. fie went after hie prey. :
isened with her vet. He went to get her, and he pulled
her back by her naar.
ihe this stace of the Kid ns
Lchancl -cocurses yet only Bt the carticvlar episooe Bue

Tass fer tise Ree He enoh

 

  

 

 

  

 

Th the tate evening hears, [Fristee) finaly
sterpes beating Cheng. He itcppec the SUV at Sand

 

 
‘++ voR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ 8 HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++

[Frisbee] terrified her. And that is one of the
kidnappings that ie charged in this case, the intent to

ineviewe poypicer evicence of Chang's insurtes.1
ve ith regards to the two counts of
Kidnapping ‘~"kidnapping with intent to terrorize bodily
injury (eic] beyond e reasonable doubt, (Frisbee) is guilty
of both of those. Bodily injury «+ it’s pain. And
‘ (Frisbee) caused ber pain numerous tines when he was
ing her up

(Emphases added.) In its rebuttal argument the prosecution

 

 

summarized the charges against Frisbee thusl;

 

 
 

Count 1, Kidnapping. . . . [T]he restraint .
been proven beyond 2 reasonable doubt.
object of that restraint... . And this is
charge involving bedily injury te... Chang in the Beating
he gave her.

‘EoUiie IJ, once again... (Frisbee) restrained . .
Chang. But this tine, with the intention of terrorizing

a chang. And throughout her statenent, she tela you she
wat teared of him after things turned sour’ at the Kew
‘Shoeping Center fit terrorized her.

11! Chang wes consistent in talking about the bodily
spsury at Thriteee] Sntlicted pen her, “the terror thet
(Emphases added.) Admittedly, the choking and the
“threaten[ing]” occurred sequentially, but the prosecution never
established an unmistakable boundary between the allegedly two
acts of “restrain(t].”

We do not imply any impropriety or conscious deceit by
the prosecution. The prosecution may have made an understandable
strategic decision to present its case as 2 seamless narrative
about a relentless predator. Nonetheless, in light of the
reasonable possibility that the Kam Shopping Center events and

 

the gas station events comprised only “one intention, one general
impulse, and one plan,” the factual question of merger should
have “belen) decided by the trier of fact.” See Alston, 75 Haw.

+ 865 P.2d at 165 (emphasis omitted), quoted in Matias, 102

 

at
419+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Hawai'i at 305, 75 P.3d at 1196; State v, Arceo, 84 Hawai'i 1, 18,
928 P.2d 843, 860 (1996); Ganal, @1 Hawai'i at 379, 917 P.2d at

391 (1996); State v. Vinge, &1 Hawai'i 309, 319, 916 P.2d 1210,
1220 (1996); Hoey, 77 Hawai'i at 27 n.9, 38, 881 F.2d at 514 n.9,

525; State v. Kealoha, 95 Hawai'i 365, 377, 22 P.3d 1012, 1024
(app. 2000) .

We are puzzled by the ICA's unelaborated citation of
Matias, inasmuch as thet case is on point and compels an outcome
favorable to Frisbee. In Matias, the defendant was convicted
under the “place to keep firearms” statute and of ownership or
possession of @ firearm by s felon, 102 Hawai'i at 301, 303-05,
75 P.3d at 1192, 1194-96. We noted that, with respect to both
offenses, the charged conduct -- the “possessilon of]” 2
particular object under the same general circunstances -~ was
identical. See dd, at 306, 78 P.3d at 1197. Of course, as an
attendant circumstance required by both statutes, that particular
object happened to be a firearm, but, more importantly, both
offenses arose out of the same elemental “conduct,” ise, what
the defendant gig with the cbject, namely, “possess{ed]” it. See
ids at 303, 306, 75 P.3d at 1194, 1197. Accordingly, we held,
convicting the defendant of both charges without the jury having
been received @ mexger instruction plainly offended HRS
§ 701-109(1) (e). Id. at 306, 75 P.3d at 1197.

on the other hand, while the defendant in Momoki wa
charged with two offenses arising out of the same general act of
Griving, the crimes’ conduct elenents differed. Seg 98 Hawai'i
at 198, 46 P.3d at & (reasoning that the intent to drive under

the influence of drugs, “no matter how egregious the case,” does
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST! § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +1

 

not equate to or “subsune(]” the intent to drive without due
care) (quoting HRS § 701-109(1) (e)). The ICA concluded that “a
general intent to” conmit one of the crimes does not “inevitably
include{} an intent to conmit the latter” and, consequently,
affirmed the convictions. Jd, While the ICA grounded its
discussion in intent, the material difference between the charged
offenses lay in their respective conduct elements; i.e, the mere
act of “driving,” with “the influence of . . . drug(s]” as an
attendant circumstance, is not “the sane conduct” as the
defendant’s “serving” among lanes, see id. at 190, 46 P.3d at 3,

notwithstanding that “driving” and “swerving” could occur

 

simultaneously. By comparison, in the present matter, the
culpable conduct in both Counts 1 and II was Frisbee’s
“restrain[ing]” of Chang.

Finally, we respond to the ICA’s SD0"s citation of
Likero. Insofar as Libero implies that an appellate court may
determine de novo whether a “defendant's course of conduct was
uninterrupted” as 2 matter of law, we hold that it was wrongly
decided. In Liberc, the defendant had been convicted of
attempted murder and assault. 103 Hawai'i at 493-94, 83 P.3d at
756-57. He had confessed to the following chain of events:

[the cefendant) nit (the victim] «(the victim) fell

and ig net get up. (The defendant] tock off the bottom

Rolg-cf [the victin]*s clothes. [3he defendant] thought he

Nentes to nave sex with [tne Victim), but then he “didn't

went [the victim] got up and [the defendant) hit her

asain =
Ad, at 495-86, 83 F.3d at 758-59. On appeal, the defendant

 

 

 

 

argued, inter alia, “that the circuit court should have issued
merger and unanimity instructions to the jury.” Id. at S01, 83

P.3d at 764. The ICA sunmarily reasoned that, while the assault

4
‘i++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S IAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

and attempted murder charges vere based on the same general
behavior of “hit[ting]” this particular victim, they did not
arise out of an uninterrupted course of conduct: “The State
fulfilled its obligation to prove that (the defendant] committed
‘separate offenses under the law’ by showing that [he] at one
point intended only to harm [the victim] and at another point
intended to cause her death.” See id, at 501-02, 83 P.3d at
764-65. The ICA thereby ignored the reasonable possibility of an

HRS § 702-109(1)(e) violation and our oft-repeated admonition

 

that “the factual question of merger” is one for the trier of
fact.
B. The Jury Instructions were Plainly Erroneous.
We realize that Frisbee neither objected to the
instructions as read nor requested his own version of a merger

instruction. Nevertheless, Hawai'i Rule of Penal Procedure $2(b)

 

allows for an appellate court to redress “[p]lain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights” and “*[wle have recognized
that [plain] error occurs when the trial court's instructions to
the jury fail to preclude the return of guilty verdicts which
violate the statutory mandate of HRS § 701-108,’" see supra
note 1, Matias, 102 Hawai'i at 306, 75 F.3d at 1197 (some
brackets added and some in original) (quoting Alston, 75 Hew. at
529, 865 P.2d at 164). In light of our case lew enunciating the
trial court’s responsibility for oversight of jury instructions
regardless of attorneys’ failure to object, see Michols, 112
Hewai'S at 225 6 n.S, 336, 337 6 n.6, 141 P.3d at 982 6 n.5, 963,
984 & n.€ (quoting State v. Haanio, 94 Hawai'i 405, 418, 16 F.36
246, 286 (2001); State v, Astronome, 95 Hawai'i 76, 62, 18 F.3d

as
{9+ FOR PUBLICATION JN WEST’§ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER +44
938, 944 (App. 2003)], we believe that the ICA gravely erred by
failing to remedy an instructional error that is not harmless
beyond @ reasonable doubt. We do not contend that merger is

foreordained, ives, that @ reasonable end properly instructed

 

juror could not find an “[] interrupt (ion]” of Frisbee's course of
conduct. Nevertheless, given the reasonable possibility that the
jury's verdict led to two convictions for “the same conduct,” we
hold that the circuit court’s failure to charge the jury with
respect to merger contravened HAS § 701-109(1)(e) and was not

harmless beyond @ reasonable doubt.

IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing analysis, we (1) vacate the
ICA’s judgment, (2) vacate the circuit court's January 18, 2005
judgment, and (3) remand to the circuit court for a new trial,

see Matias, 102 Hawai'i at 306, 75 P.3d at 1197.

Daniel H. Shimizu,

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
for the plaintiff-appellee-
respondent State of Hawai'i

Richard 0. Gronna, for the Bee ALecrinsen

defendant-appellant-petitioner

Frank Frisbee
Yorn 6 Océ by

1é