Case Title: In the Matter of the City of New York v. The Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 205  
In the Matter of The City of New 
York, et al.,
            Appellants,
        v.
The Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association of the City of New 
York, Inc. et al.,
            Defendants,
The Sergeants' Benevolent 
Association of the City of New 
York, et al.,
            Respondents.
Julian L. Kalkstein, for appellants.
John F. Wirenius, for respondents New York City Office
of Collective Bargaining and Gold.
Candace Reid Gladston, for respondents Sergeants'
Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., et al.
READ, J.:
In January 2005, the New York City Police Department
(NYPD) informed representatives of various police unions,
including the Detectives Endowment Association (DEA), Patrolmen's
Benevolent Association (PBA), Sergeants' Benevolent Association
(SBA), and Captains Endowment Association (CEA) (collectively,
the unions), that it intended to use a methodology for hair
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No. 205
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testing known as radioimmunoassay (hereafter, RIAH or hair
analysis) for all drug screening of uniformed members, beginning
the following summer.  The unions protested that this decision
was subject to collective bargaining.  We disagree: the Police
Commissioner's disciplinary authority over the NYPD vests him
with discretion to choose the scientific methodology to be used
for drug testing, and the circumstances prompting testing; i.e.,
so-called testing triggers. 
I.
At the time this dispute began to take shape, drug
testing of uniformed members was governed by several Patrol Guide
Procedures (PGPs), effective January 1, 2000, two of which called
for checking either urine or hair samples.  Specifically, PGP No.
205-30 specified testing either the urine or hair of members
reasonably suspected of illegal drug use; and PGP No. 205-35,
which allowed members subject to unsubstantiated allegations of
illegal drug use to request voluntary testing, provided for
testing of either hair or urine samples.  In addition, all
probationary NYPD members received an end-of-probation medical
examination, which included drug testing of hair samples.  RIAH
was the methodology used for hair testing.
  
PGP No. 205-29 addressed random drug testing, whereby
an automated database was used to select uniformed members who
were directed to appear at a specified time and date for testing. 
While this PGP did not identify urine analysis as the testing
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No. 205
1The City characterized its discussions with the unions as
"information sharing," not collective bargaining.
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methodology, it incorporated a number of steps specific to urine
testing.  Three other PGPs similarly did not actually identify
the method of drug testing, but referred only to the collection
of urine samples: PGP No. 205-32 (covering members applying for
and assigned to the Organized Crime Control Bureau); PGP Nos.
205-31 and 205-33 (covering members applying for assignment to
designated specialized units); and PGP No. 205-34 (covering
members applying for discretionary promotions).
Representatives of the City of New York and the unions
met several times to discuss the NYPD's plan to phase out urine
analysis in favor of RIAH.  At the first meeting, held on January
7, 2005 at the New York City Office of Labor Relations, the City
explained that there would be no change to existing NYPD policies
regarding drug testing triggers, due process protection, and
disciplinary consequences; the only modification of existing
policies was the switch from urine analysis for most drug testing
to RIAH for all drug testing.  At a second meeting with the City
on February 15, 2005, the unions asked questions and voiced
concerns, and the City provided additional information about hair
analysis.
By letter to the New York City Commissioner of Labor
Relations, dated April 21, 2005, the unions requested an
additional meeting "to continue our collective bargaining1 to
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discuss our concerns regarding hair follicle testing which the
[NYPD] intends to implement over the summer."  On April 27, 2005,
the Commissioner sent the unions a copy of a planned Finest
Message from the NYPD's Chief of Personnel, addressed to all
commands.  The cover letter identified the Finest Message as "the
Police Department's drug testing policy regarding the use of hair
analysis," and stated that "[a]s previously discussed, the City
is providing you with a copy of this policy in advance of its
August 1, 2005 implementation."
The subject of the enclosed Finest Message was
"Expanding the Use of Hair Analysis as a Means of Drug Screening
Uniformed Members of the Service."  It began by explaining that
effective August 1, 2005, the NYPD would 
"expand the use of hair analysis as a means of drug
screening uniformed members of the service.  Beginning
on that date, the [NYPD] will use hair analysis in lieu
of the current practice of using urine analysis to
conduct random drug screening as well as for
promotional drug screening.  Hair analysis drug
screening will also be used for uniformed members
applying for assignment to designated specialized
units."  
The Finest Message set out the protocol for collecting
hair samples, and gave an assurance that appropriate chain-of-
custody procedures would be followed; asserted that the NYPD had
used hair analysis when testing for cause and at the end of
probation since May 1995 and February 1996 respectively; and
provided the following rationale for the changeover from urine
analysis in most cases to RIAH in all cases:
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"Hair analysis provides a window of detection of
approximately ninety (90) days, compared with a
relatively shorter window with urine analysis, and
thereby provides a more effective method of detection. 
In addition, hair analysis cannot be evaded in the same
fashion as urine analysis, where drug users can attempt
to substitute clean specimens, or merely abstain from
drug use for a few days, and pass the screening test. 
Furthermore, drug residues remain permanently embedded
in the hair -- they cannot be washed or bleached out."
Finally, the Finest Message suspended any conflicting provisions
of the NYPD's manual or other directives.
Letters in the record from the Deputy Commissioner of
the NYPD to the unions, dated June 6, 2005, indicate that City
and union representatives met on June 1, 2005 to discuss further
"the NYPD's planned implementation of Hair Testing for [its]
random drug screening program" and, according to the City, to
address each of the unions' outstanding concerns.  These letters
included as an enclosure a list of laboratories approved by the
New York State Department of Health to conduct hair analysis "for
reference only and pursuant to discussions at [the June 1st]
meeting."  On August 1, 2005, the NYPD issued the same Finest
Message supplied to the unions on April 27th.
On August 26, 2005, the DEA filed an improper practice
petition on behalf of itself, the PBA and the SBA to commence
proceedings before the Board of Collective Bargaining (the
Board), a constituent body of the New York City Office of
Collective Bargaining (OCB) (see New York City Collective
Bargaining Law [NYCCBL] [Administrative Code of City of NY] 
§ 12-306; Rules of the NY City Office of Collective Bargaining
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No. 205
2 NYCCBL § 12-306 (a) (4) states that it is an improper
practice for a public employer "to refuse to bargain collectively
in good faith on matters within the scope of collective
bargaining with certified or designated representatives of its
public employees."
3The record includes a copy of only the CEA petition.
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[61 RCNY] §§ 1-07, 1-12).  This petition generally alleged that
the NYPD violated NYCCBL § 12-306 (a) (4) by unilaterally
changing its policy regarding drug testing.2  The CEA filed an
improper practice petition on November 7, 2005, which is
described in the record as essentially identical to the earlier
DEA petition.  
The CEA alleged in its petition3 that the "procedures
used by [the NYPD] in implementing a decision to conduct drug
testing on employees [were] mandatory subjects of bargaining." 
The CEA petition does not define what the word "procedures" is
meant to encompass, but refers to "'testing methodology, choice
of laboratory, collection procedures, chain of custody, sample
screening, conditions for retesting, and reporting and recording
of test results'" (quoting District Council 37 and The N.Y. City
Emergency Med. Serv. of N. Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 57 OCB
16 [BCB 1996] [Decision No. B-16-96] [following Matter of Nassau
County Police Benevolent Assn. [County of Nassau], 27 PERB ¶ 3054
[1994]).  The singular thrust of the CEA petition is that the
NYPD engaged in an improper practice by "using RIAH exclusively
in lieu of urine analysis to conduct random drug screening,"
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No. 205
4The only other unilateral change that the NYPD was ever
alleged to have made was its designation in early 2006 of a
different laboratory to perform RIAH testing of hair samples. 
The CEA brought up this issue in its reply to the City's answer
to its petition.
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and/or "implementing . . . an expansion of RIAH testing" -- i.e.,
by unilaterally changing the methodology for drug testing
employees who were not under any suspicion of wrongdoing.4
In its answer to the CEA petition, the City responded
generally that there had been no change in its longstanding
"procedures" for hair testing, and that the "decision to expand
hair testing primarily involve[d] a basic goal or mission of the
employer."  As was the case with the CEA petition itself, what
the City meant by "procedures" is not entirely clear, although
the City also seems to have considered this word to embrace
testing methodology.  In sum, the City contended that it had not
unilaterally modified a term or condition of employment because
the NYPD already used RIAH for drug testing, and other procedures
employed for hair testing remained the same after August 1, 2005
as they had been before that date.  That is, the City did not
dispute that a change in drug testing procedures (however
"procedures" might be defined) would give rise to an obligation
to bargain with the unions; the City simply argued that there had
been no change. 
After the record closed in the proceedings before the
Board, we issued our decision in Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent
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Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations
Bd. (PBA v PERB) (6 NY3d 563 [2006]).  In that case, we held that
police discipline in New York City "may not be a subject of
collective bargaining under the Taylor Law" because New York City
Charter § 434 (a) and New York City Administrative Code 
§ 14-115 (a) "expressly commit[] disciplinary authority over
[the] police department to local officials" (id. at 570).  The
Board asked the parties to submit written statements to explain
their respective positions on the applicability and impact, if
any, of our decision.
In response, the unions took the position that PBA v
PERB did not affect the duty to bargain over drug testing
procedures because they "[were] not disciplinary procedures," and
"[did] not form the basis for discipline.  Rather, the results of
the tests, not the procedures, may form the basis for
discipline."  The City countered that PBA v PERB foreclosed
collective bargaining because "[t]esting procedures, testing
triggers and disciplinary consequences [were] inextricably
intertwined, at least in this situation, with the Police
Commissioner's disciplinary authority" under New York City
Charter § 434 (a) and New York City Administrative Code 
§ 14-115 (a).  In short, the City now contended that drug testing
procedures generally were disciplinary matters outside the
purview of collective bargaining.
On December 4, 2006, the Board granted both petitions
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No. 205
5 This opinion generally refers to the Board's majority
opinion in the DEA case only.  The Board's reasoning in the CEA
decision was the same as in the DEA case.  The Board did,
however, address an additional question in the CEA case -- i.e.,
"whether a change in testing laboratory [was] encompassed within
mandatory bargainable testing procedures" (Matter of Captains
Endowment Assn. [City of N.Y.], 77 OCB 38 [BCB 2006] [Decision
No. B-38-2006], at 10; see also n 4, supra).  The Board decided
that it was.  As noted later, the CEA has withdrawn from this
litigation (see n 9, infra).
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because it found that "even if [the] NYPD's procedures for hair
testing [were] the same [before and after August 1, 2005], the
expansion of the categories of employees to whom the procedures
now [were] applied constitute[d] a unilateral change in drug
screening procedures" (Matter of Detectives Endowment Assn. [City
of N.Y.], 77 OCB 37 [BCB 2006] [Decision No. B-37-2006], at 16
[emphasis added]).5  Similarly, the Board characterized the issue
before it as "whether [the] NYPD's adoption of RIAH (hair)
testing as the prescribed mechanism of drug screening under
circumstances in which, prior to August 1, 2005, [the] NYPD
tested only urine, constitute[d] a unilateral change in a
mandatory subject of bargaining," and concluded that it did (id.
at 12).  That is, the Board decided that an expansion of
categories subject to testing (i.e., the adoption of additional
testing triggers) and a change in testing methodology were
subject to collective bargaining.
In reaching these conclusions, the Board relied on
County of Nassau, supra, the "leading decision" of the New York
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No. 205
6While pointing out the "clear distinction" between the
decision to test and procedures to implement such a decision,
PERB did not express an opinion in County of Nassau about the
negotiability of the former because it was not an issue in the
case.  Thus, PERB assumed for purposes of its analysis that a
public employer's decision to test employees for drugs was not
mandatorily negotiable.  In discussing its own prior decisions in
this case, though, OCB seems to accept the proposition that the
public employer's decision to test employees for drugs is not
subject to collective bargaining.  But, as was the situation in
County of Nassau, the Police Commissioner's decision at this
level of generality was never an issue in this case.
7In County of Nassau, PERB identified the following as
"several separate implementation decisions" or "procedures used
to implement" a public employer's decision to drug test
employees: "testing methodology, testing triggers (e.g.,
definition of reasonable suspicion), choice of laboratory,
collection procedures, chain of custody, sample screening,
conditions for retesting, reporting and recording of test
results, due process protections, and disciplinary consequences"
(emphasis added).
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State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) on the topic of
drug testing.  In County of Nassau, PERB opined that there was a
"clear distinction between an employer's decision to drug test
employees and the procedures used to implement that decision,
including the consequences of the testing."  As a result of this
"clear distinction," PERB held that an employer's choice to
conduct drug testing might not be a mandatory subject of
bargaining,6 but that the procedures to implement that choice
most certainly were.  Further, PERB classified both the
particular scientific methodology to be utilized for drug testing
and testing triggers as "procedures."7  
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No. 205
8The Board is made up of two City representatives, two union
representatives, and three impartial members.  Both City
representatives dissented in the CEA case.  One of the City
representatives recused himself in the DEA matter; the other City
member dissented there, too, for the reasons set out in his
dissent in the CEA case.
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Finally, the Board was not persuaded that our decision
in PBA v PERB called for a different outcome.  As the Board put
it,
"[t]he procedural matters raised by the Unions,
specifically, testing methodology, choice of
laboratory, collection procedures, chain of custody,
sample screening, conditions for re-testing, and
reporting and recording of test results, are not
implicit parts of the disciplinary process.  As the
Unions point out, the procedures for drug testing are
utilized before any basis for discipline is determined
by the Commissioner to exist . . . [T]he decision to
conduct drug testing, like the decision to impose
discipline, is a management right . . . not subject to
bargaining; but . . ., unlike the matter of discipline,
there is no statutory or policy basis to remove the
procedures by which drug testing is to be conducted
from within the scope of mandatory collective
bargaining" (id. at 20).
There was a dissent to the Board's decision on dual
grounds:8 that the NYPD had not materially changed its drug
testing procedures; and that the Board's decision was
"fundamentally irreconcilable" with PBA v PERB (Matter of
Captains Endowment Assn., dissenting opn at 3).  As for the
former ground, the dissent noted that all NYPD uniformed members
were already subject to hair testing, because that method had
been used for end-of-probation, reasonable suspicion and
voluntary drug screening.  As a result, "[a]ll that ha[d] changed
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[was] the relative frequency with which the NYPD use[d] hair
testing as opposed to urine testing, where the employees were
already subject to testing with both procedures and where the
procedures themselves were already well-established" (id. at 2).
Next, the dissent observed that County of Nassau and
its progeny, which were cited by the Board to support its
decision, all predated PBA v PERB and, in the case of the Board's
prior decisions, did not address the Police Commissioner's
responsibility for discipline.  As a result, it was "questionable
. . . whether the distinction they purport[ed] to find between a
decision to test for drugs (not mandatory) and the procedure to
be utilized to test for drugs (mandatory) could now be sustained
in those jurisdictions such as the City of New York which have a
special or local law relating to police discipline" (id. at 4).
The dissent further pointed out that, with respect to
PBA v PERB,
"[a]mong the proposals held to be prohibited subjects
of bargaining . . . were proposals that concerned the
conduct of departmental investigations of possible
misconduct.  These investigatory procedures [were]
necessarily utilized before the Commissioner
determine[d] that there [was] any basis for discipline
. . . Similarly, the Commissioner's random drug tests
are [to be] conducted for the purpose of investigating
the possible misconduct of officer use of an illicit
drug . . . The investigatory procedures utilized --
whether interrogation procedures or biochemical assays
-- are an element of the Commissioner's disciplinary
decisions, and as such, under [PBA v PERB], are not
proper subjects of bargaining" (id. at 5).
The dissent concluded by observing that the City had, for years,
maintained two drug testing procedures (RIAH and urine analysis),
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9 Prior to Supreme Court's decision, the CEA withdrew its
opposition to the City's position in this litigation.
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applicable to all of the employees represented by the unions;
thus, "[t]he decision to shift from predominant use of one test
to predominant use of the other plainly [did] not constitute a
material change in terms or conditions of employment, and [was]
clearly an exercise of the Commissioner's authority over
discipline."    
In January 2007, the City brought this CPLR article 78
proceeding to annul the Board's decisions.  In its petition, the
City emphasized that hair testing is the most effective method
for ferreting out illegal drug use, and that its hair testing
procedures were "as related to the disciplinary process as were
the investigatory interviews the Court of Appeals in [PBA v PERB]
found to be prohibited collective bargaining subjects."  The City
also again contended that it had not changed terms and conditions
of employment because the complained of procedures were identical
to those already in effect in numerous contexts.
In a decision dated December 5, 2007, Supreme Court
granted the City's petition, annulled the Board's decisions, and
denied OCB's cross motion to dismiss the City's petition.9 
According to the court, the unions, in line with County of
Nassau, argued that "while the Police Commissioner's disciplinary
authority over the police force included the right to screen
officers for drug use, the expanded use of a particular testing
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No. 205
10 The PBA withdrew its appeal prior to the Appellate
Division's decision in this case.
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method such as RIAH, along with the implementation of different
procedures to administer the test, altered the terms and
conditions of the represented officers' employment."  The court
disagreed, reasoning that "requiring that drug screening
methodologies and practices be submitted to collective bargaining
seriously limits the Commissioner's ability to effectively
enforce discipline within the New York City Police Department."
On October 16, 2008, the Appellate Division reversed
Supreme Court's judgment on the law; reinstated the Board's
decision; denied the City's petition; and dismissed the
proceeding.10  The court reasoned that the expanded use of hair
testing "does not implicate the Police Commissioner's discretion
to conduct an investigation into an alleged infraction by a
member of the force, a prerogative that arises only after written
charges have been preferred" (Matter of City of New York v
Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc., 56 AD3d 70,
76 [1st Dept 2008] [emphasis added]).  The Appellate Division
concluded that "no persuasive policy reason ha[d] been advanced
to require [OCB] to depart from its prior decisions, which . . .
consistently found that routine drug screening procedures are a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining" (id. at 71).  We
subsequently granted leave to appeal (12 NY3d 707 [2009]), and
now reverse.
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No. 205
11The Taylor Law allows localities to establish substantially
equivalent provisions and procedures, to be administered by a
local version of PERB, or a mini-PERB, such as OCB (Civil Service
Law § 212).  Consistent with the Taylor Law, the New York City
Collective Bargaining Law contains a requirement similar to Civil
Service Law § 204 (2) (see NYCCBL § 12-307 [a]).
12Section 434 (a) provides that "[t]he [police] commissioner
shall have cognizance and control of the . . . discipline of the
department, and of the police force of the department"; section
14-115 (a) specifies that, in cases of police misconduct, "[t]he
[police] commissioner shall have power, in his or her discretion, 
. . . . to punish the offending party."
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II.         
The Taylor Law requires public employers to
collectively bargain over "terms and conditions of employment of
the public employees" (Civil Service Law § 204 [2]).11  We have
long recognized the "strong and sweeping policy of the State to
support collective bargaining under the Taylor Law" (Matter of
Cohoes City School Dist. v Cohoes Teachers Assn., 40 NY2d 774,
778 [1976]).  There exists a "presumption . . . that all terms
and conditions of employment are subject to mandatory bargaining"
(Matter of City of Watertown v State of N.Y. Pub. Empl. Relations
Bd., 95 NY2d 73, 79 [2000]).  Nonetheless, "some subjects are
excluded from collective bargaining as a matter of policy, even
where no statute explicitly says so" (PBA v PERB, 6 NY3d at 572). 
In PBA v PERB, we concluded that New York City Charter § 434 (a)
and Administrative Code of the City of New York § 14-115 (a),12
originally enacted as state statutes, "state the policy favoring
management authority over police disciplinary matters in clear
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No. 205
13 We noted that "where Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 apply,
police discipline may be the subject of collective bargaining"
(PBA v PERB, 6 NY3d at 573); however, New York City Charter 
§ 434 (a) and Administrative Code § 14-115 (a) were grandfathered
pursuant to Civil Service Law § 76 (4).
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terms" and "express a policy so important that the policy
favoring collective bargaining should give way" (id. at 576).13
The DEA and the SBA, the two unions remaining in this
litigation, essentially ask us to endorse County of Nassau and to
opine generally that the Police Commissioner's decision to drug
test uniformed officers is a managerial prerogative, but the
"procedures" to implement his decision are mandatorily
negotiable.  There are two problems with this approach.  First,
the Police Commissioner's authority under New York City Charter 
§ 434 (a) and Administrative Code § 14-115 (a) was not 
implicated in County of Nassau; second, the only "procedures"
that the DEA and SBA challenged or the Board addressed in this
case were testing methodology and testing triggers.  The record
admits no possibility of misunderstanding on this score, as the
detailed discussion of it in Part I illustrates.  Specifically,
the narrow issue decided by the Board, and therefore the only
issue properly before us for review, is "whether [the] NYPD's
adoption of RIAH (hair) testing as the prescribed mechanism of
drug screening under circumstances in which, prior to August 1,
2005, [the] NYPD tested only urine, constitute[d] a unilateral
change in a mandatory subject of bargaining" (Matter of
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Detectives Endowment Assn., supra, at 12).  In light of our
decision in PBA v PERB, we conclude that it does not.
The Police Commissioner's disciplinary authority under
sections 434 (a) and 14-115 (a) is not limited to the formal
disciplinary process; i.e., situations where allegations of
misconduct have been made or are being adjudicated against
identified officers.  Our decision in PBA v PERB did not say
this.  Indeed, two of the five subjects covered by the expired
collective bargaining agreement at issue in PBA v PERB -- the
length of time a police officer could confer with counsel before
being questioned in a departmental investigation and guidelines
for interrogation of police officers -- preceded the lodging of
any charges.
Moreover, the detection and deterrence of wrongdoing
within the NYPD -- particularly crimes, such as illegal drug use
-- is a crucial component of the Police Commissioner's
responsibility to maintain discipline within the force.  And both
the Board and the unions concede that the Commissioner may
unilaterally institute drug testing of uniformed officers.  They
would, however, check his discretion to select the investigatory
measures that he deems most effective to discover and deter
illegal drug use by requiring collective bargaining over testing
methodology and testing triggers.  In our view, however, these
subjects are inextricably intertwined with the Commissioner's
authority to conduct drug testing in the first place; they are
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not ancillary or tangential to his disciplinary authority.  As
Supreme Court put it
"if the Commissioner is not at liberty to use a
particular drug test even after determining that [it]
would be more effective at exposing drug use among
police offices, then his ability to carry out his
disciplinary 'authority' has been significantly
limited.  Similarly, decisions about when and where to
use such a test -- especially in the area of random
testing -- has an obvious bearing [on] how effective
efforts to detect drug use will ultimately be."
Finally, we emphasize that we are answering only the
discrete question posed in this case: whether drug testing
methodology and testing triggers are encompassed within the
Police Commissioner's disciplinary authority and therefore are
excluded from collective bargaining as a matter of policy.  We
are not saying that every step that the Commissioner takes or
every decision that he makes to implement drug testing is
excluded from bargaining.  The full extent or the limits of his
unilateral disciplinary authority in the context of drug testing
are simply not presented on this record. 
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, with costs, and the judgment of Supreme Court
reinstated.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed, with costs, and judgment of Supreme Court, New
York County, reinstated.  Opinion by Judge Read.  Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.  Chief Judge
Lippman took no part.
Decided December 17, 2009