Case Title: State v. Kreischer

Citation: 2006-Ohio-2706

Docket Number: 20050216 and 20050412

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Kreischer, 109 Ohio St.3d 391, 2006-Ohio-2706.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. KREISCHER, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Kreischer, 109 Ohio St.3d 391, 2006-Ohio-2706.] 
Former R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) — Under former R.C. 2929.18(A)(1), a court may 
order an offender to pay restitution to an insurance company that incurred 
medical costs on behalf of the victim. 
(Nos. 2005-0216 and 2005-0412 — Submitted December 13, 2005 — Decided 
June 14, 2006.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Perry County,  
No. 03 CA 20, 2004-Ohio-6854. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Statutory interpretation involves an examination of the words used by the 
legislature in a statute, and when the General Assembly has plainly and 
unambiguously conveyed its legislative intent, there is nothing for a court 
to interpret or construe, and therefore, the court applies the law as written. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} This case calls for our review of a former version of R.C. 
2929.18(A)(1).  Hence, our resolution of this case will likely affect only those 
cases arising prior to the June 1, 2004 effective date of the statutory change, 
because on that date, the legislature amended R.C. 2929.18 to delete all references 
to restitution for third parties.  See 2003 Sub.H.B. No. 52. 
{¶ 2} Specifically, this case is presented to us as a certified conflict 
between holdings of the courts of appeals on the question of whether a trial court 
may order a convicted defendant in a criminal case to pay restitution to a third-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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party insurer for medical costs it paid to the victim of a crime.  We also review the 
case upon our acceptance of a discretionary appeal. 
{¶ 3} This case began on May 28, 2000, when Terry Wooten attempted 
to drive to his cabin located off Pole Cat Road in a remote part of Perry County, 
Ohio, which is adjacent to the property of Robert Kreischer.  At that time, a 
vehicle belonging to an acquaintance of Kreischer blocked the road, causing 
Wooten to demand that Kreischer move the vehicle.  Following a verbal 
confrontation, Kreischer and Wooten fought.  As a result, Wooten suffered a 
fractured facial bone, decreased vision in his left eye, and partial hearing loss.  A 
grand jury subsequently indicted Kreischer on one count of felonious assault, and 
a jury convicted him of that charge. The trial court sentenced Kreischer to a term 
of incarceration of two years and ordered restitution of $9,136.16 paid to Wooten.  
On appeal from that judgment, the court of appeals vacated the order of restitution 
as unsubstantiated and remanded the matter to the trial court. State v. Kreischer 
(Jan. 23, 2002), 5th Dist. No. 01-CA-04, 2002 WL 106683.  Upon remand, the 
trial court ordered Kreischer to pay restitution in the sum of $17,046.07 to 
Wooten and also ordered Kreischer to pay $20,323.92 to Anthem Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield (“Anthem”), Wooten’s medical-insurance carrier, as reimbursement for its 
costs expended on Wooten’s behalf.  On a second appeal of the sentence, the Fifth 
District Court of Appeals reversed the award to Wooten but affirmed the award to 
Anthem.  State v. Kreischer, 5th Dist. No. 03 CA 20, 2004-Ohio-6854, at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 4} Upon determining that its order for reimbursement to Anthem 
conflicted with a decision of the Sixth District Court of Appeals in State v. Miller 
(Mar. 1, 2002), 6th Dist. No. L-01-1265, 2002 WL 313380, the court certified the 
following question to our court: 
{¶ 5} “Whether a court may order restitution by an offender pursuant to 
R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) to include medical costs paid on behalf of the victim by a 
third-party insurer.” 
January Term, 2006 
3 
Third-Party Restitution 
{¶ 6} Kreischer urges that the language of former R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) 
authorized restitution only for Wooten’s actual economic loss.  He further 
maintains that because Anthem, rather than Wooten, incurred the $20,323.92 
expense, the trial court was unable to order that amount paid as restitution.  
Finally, he urges us to follow the reasoning used by the Sixth District Court of 
Appeals in State v. Miller, 6th Dist. No. L-01-1265, which reversed an order to 
pay restitution to a hospital’s Care Assurance plan, holding that R.C. 
2929.18(A)(1) permitted restitution only for the victim’s economic loss, not the 
carrier’s loss. 
{¶ 7} The state contrariwise argues that nothing in the former statute 
limits the definition of economic loss to medical costs incurred by the victim.  
Accordingly, it urges that we follow the decision of the Fifth District Court of 
Appeals in this case and hold that former R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) allows for court-
ordered restitution to insurance carriers that have paid medical expenses to 
victims of crime. 
{¶ 8} We begin by examining the law in effect at the time of the 
incident, May 28, 2000.  Former R.C. 2929.18(A), 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8674, 
8767, provided:  
{¶ 9} “[T]he court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony 
may sentence the offender to any financial sanction or combination of financial 
sanctions authorized under this section * * *.  Financial sanctions that may be 
imposed pursuant to this section include, but are not limited to, the following:  
{¶ 10} “(1) Restitution by the offender to the victim of the offender’s 
crime  * * * in an amount based on the victim’s economic loss. * * * [T]he 
restitution * * * may include a requirement that reimbursement be made to third 
parties for amounts paid to or on behalf of the victim * * * for economic loss 
resulting from the offense.”  (Emphasis added.)   
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{¶ 11} Further, R.C. 2929.01(M) defined economic loss as “any economic 
detriment suffered by a victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission 
of an offense and includes any loss of income due to lost time at work because of 
any injury caused to the victim, and any property loss, medical cost, or funeral 
expense incurred as a result of the commission of the offense.”1  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 12} When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and 
conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need for this court to apply rules 
of statutory interpretation.  State v. Muncie (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 447, 746 
N.E.2d 1092; Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 
553, 721 N.E.2d 1057.  Statutory interpretation involves an examination of the 
words used by the legislature in a statute, and when the General Assembly has 
plainly and unambiguously conveyed its legislative intent, there is nothing for a 
court to interpret or construe, and therefore, the court applies the law as written. 
{¶ 13} In this case, former R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) expressly stated that 
restitution may include “a requirement that reimbursement be made to third 
parties for amounts paid to or on behalf of the victim.”  148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
8674, 8767.  Further, we note that R.C. 2929.01(M) defines economic loss to 
include medical costs incurred as result of the commission of the offense.  
Accordingly, the General Assembly authorized trial courts to exercise discretion 
when imposing financial sanctions on a defendant and permitted those sanctions 
to include reimbursement to third parties for amounts paid on behalf of a victim.  
In this case, the trial court exercised its discretion and ordered payment to the 
medical-insurance provider in accordance with former R.C. 2929.18(A)(1).  
Therefore, although our decision is limited in scope because this portion of the 
                                                          
 
1.  The versions of R.C. 2929.01(M) in effect at the time of the crime and the restitution hearing 
do not differ from the current version in any respect relevant to the issues addressed today.  See 
148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8674, 8745.   
January Term, 2006 
5 
Revised Code has since been amended, we answer the certified question in the 
affirmative because at the time of its ruling, the trial court had discretion to 
include reimbursement to third parties for amounts paid on behalf of the victim, 
and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in that regard. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., FORD, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
DONALD R. FORD, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District, sitting for 
RESNICK, J. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 14} I concur in the syllabus; it simply and generally reasserts a 
standard that this court has adhered to for over 100 years.  See Bernardini v. 
Conneaut Area City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 1, 4, 12 
O.O.3d 1, 387 N.E.2d 1222 (“a statute that is free from ambiguity and doubt is not 
subject to judicial modification under the guise of interpretation”);  Slingluff v. 
Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraph two of the syllabus 
(when the words of a statute are “free from ambiguity and doubt, and express 
plainly, clearly, and distinctly the sense of the lawmaking body, there is no 
occasion to resort to other means of interpretation”).  See, also, Gardner v. 
Collins (1829), 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 58, 93, 7 L.Ed. 347 (“What the legislative 
intention was, can be derived only from the words they have used; and we cannot 
speculate beyond the reasonable import of these words”). 
{¶ 15} Former R.C. 2929.18(A), 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8674, 8767, 
provided for restitution, including restitution to third parties, “based on the 
victim’s economic loss.”  R.C. 2929.01(M) defines economic loss as “any 
economic detriment suffered by a victim as a direct and proximate result of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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commission of an offense,” including medical costs.  The majority opinion 
conflates money that an insurance company paid pursuant to a contract of 
insurance on behalf of an insured with “economic detriment suffered by a victim.”  
Whatever amount the insurance company paid is unambiguously and by definition 
not a “detriment suffered by a victim.”  It is more in the nature of detriment 
suffered by the insurance company.  Apparently, a majority of this court believes 
that the insurance company was the victim of felonious assault.  Fortunately, the 
General Assembly, perhaps foreseeing such a decision by this court, has already 
amended R.C. 2929.18(A) to make it clear that restitution is not intended to be a 
windfall for insurance companies.  See 2003 Sub.H.B. No. 52. 
{¶ 16} The insurance company in this case has a right to pursue the 
offender in civil court.  Until today, it did not have a right to use the state of 
Ohio’s criminal justice system as an unpaid collection agency.  Astonishingly, 
that is the import of the majority opinion.  I dissent from the judgment. 
__________________ 
Kura & Wilford Co., L.P.A., and Barry W. Wilford, for appellant. 
Joseph A. Flautt, Perry County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
______________________