Case Title: Holyoke Mutual Insurance Co. in Salem v. Vibram USA, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12401

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12401 
 
HOLYOKE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY IN SALEM & another1  vs. 
VIBRAM USA, INC. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 6, 2018. - September 12, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Insurance, General liability insurance, Coverage, Insurer's 
obligation to defend.  Advertising.  Words, "Advertising 
idea." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 31, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Mitchell H. Kaplan, J., on motions 
for summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Steven P. Wright for the defendant. 
 
Robert L. Ciociola for Maryland Casualty Company. 
 
Michael D. Riseberg (David B. Stanhill also present) for 
Holyoke Mutual Insurance Company in Salem. 
 
Laura A. Foggan, of the District of Columbia, & Jon C. 
Cowen, for Complex Insurance Claims Litigation Association, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
                                                 
 
1 Maryland Casualty Company. 
2 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  This appeal stems from an insurance coverage 
dispute between the insured, Vibram USA, Inc. (Vibram),2 and two 
insurers, Holyoke Mutual Insurance Company in Salem and Maryland 
Casualty Company, which had issued several general commercial 
liability policies (the policies) to Vibram.3  The heirs of the 
late, famed marathon runner Abebe Bikila sued Vibram in Federal 
court for improperly using the name "Bikila" to advertise 
Vibram's running shoes.  Vibram tendered the defense to the 
insurers, who denied coverage on the ground that a provision in 
the policies covering improper use of another's advertising idea 
did not cover the claims raised in this action.  The insurers, 
however, agreed to fund Vibram's defense under a reservation of 
rights.   The insurers then commenced an action in the Superior 
Court seeking a declaration that they were not obligated to 
defend Vibram in the underlying action.  A Superior Court judge 
granted the insurers' motion for summary judgment on that 
ground.  Vibram appealed. 
                                                 
 
2 An affiliate of Vibram USA, Vibram FiveFingers, LLC, was 
involved in this case.  Because distinguishing between the two 
entities is not relevant to our decision, we refer to a single 
defendant, "Vibram." 
 
 
3 To the extent there are some linguistic differences 
between the insurance policies at issue, those differences are 
not at issue in this appeal.  Accordingly, for simplicity, we 
refer to "the policies" as encompassing all of the policies at 
issue. 
3 
 
 
 
We conclude that the allegations in the underlying 
complaint were sufficient to trigger the insurers' duty to 
defend under the provision of the policies covering the use of 
another's advertising idea, and therefore, the insurers have an 
obligation to defend Vibram in the underlying action.  
Accordingly, we reverse the allowance of the insurers' motion 
for summary judgment.4 
 
1.  Factual background and procedure.  a.  The policies.  
Between 2009 and 2011, Vibram, a producer of minimalistic shoes 
that simulate walking and running barefoot, purchased from the 
insurers the policies, which, among other things, provide 
coverage for "personal and advertising injury liability."  With 
certain enumerated exceptions, the policies state that the 
insurers have a duty to defend Vibram from any suit seeking 
damages for covered losses, particularly for claims seeking 
damages against Vibram for "advertising injury." 
 
The particular form of advertising injury at issue in this 
case is the one described in clause (f) of the policies as 
"[t]he use of another's advertising idea in your 
'advertisement.'"  The policies define "advertisement" as a 
"notice that is broadcast or published to the general public or 
specific market segments about your foods, products or services 
                                                 
 
4 Given this disposition, we need not reach the issues 
raised by the parties related to recoupment of monies paid for 
defending Vibram under a reservation of rights. 
4 
 
 
for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters."  The 
policies do not define the term "advertising idea." 
 
b.  The underlying action.  In 2015, while the policies 
were in effect, the living heirs of Abebe Bikila (Bikila 
family), the famed runner who won the 1960 Olympic marathon 
while running barefoot,5 commenced the underlying action against 
Vibram in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Washington.  The Bikila family's complaint alleges 
that Vibram had misused their late relative's name in 
advertising and promoting Vibram's "'FiveFingers' line of 
minimalist running shoes . . . [that are designed] to mimic 
biomechanical properties of barefoot running while providing the 
protection of a conventional shoe."  The complaint contends that 
Vibram's "Bikila model shoes are named after Abebe Bikila and 
are intended to associate [Vibram's] commercial footwear with 
Abebe Bikila's legendary barefoot Olympic feats."  The complaint 
alleges, in relevant part, that the Bikila family has "by their 
                                                 
 
5 Because Abebe Bikila was originally designated as an 
alternate runner for the Ethiopian national team, when the 
decision was made that he would run in the Olympic marathon, the 
team's shoe sponsor could not provide him with a pair of running 
shoes that fit properly.  Abebe Bikila ran the race barefoot and 
is the only person to win an Olympic marathon gold medal while 
competing barefoot. 
 
 
He also won the 1964 Olympic marathon forty days after 
undergoing an appendectomy.  In 1969, he was involved in an 
automobile accident that left him paralyzed.  He died several 
years later from complications related to that accident. 
5 
 
 
commercial uses, sponsorships and promotion of historical and 
education events, and multimedia events emphasizing the cultural 
and athletic legacy of Abebe Bikila, . . . intentionally 
associated their family name with Abebe Bikila's barefoot 
dedication to succeed under any circumstances." 
 
The Bikila family's commercial uses of the name Bikila 
include: (1) operating a sporting goods store bearing the name 
"Abebe Bikila"; (2) publishing a book entitled "Triumph and 
Tragedy:  A History of Abebe Bikila and his marathon career"; 
(3) authorizing the use of "Abebe Bikila" in a Japanese 
commercial; and (4) authorizing a feature film portraying the 
last years of Abebe Bikila's life.  Further, the Bikila family 
has operated an Internet Web site "offer[ing] a comprehensive 
experience of the life and legacy of Abebe Bikila . . . 
contain[ing] pictures, videos, news events, and information on 
current races such as the Abebe Bikila International Marathon . 
. . held annually in Addis Ababa, which is sponsored by the 
Bikila Family." 
 
The complaint enumerates four counts: (1) a violation of 
the Washington Personality Rights Act; (2) Washington Consumer 
Protection Act claims; (3) a claim of false designation and 
Federal unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(a); and (4) a claim that Vibram had been unjustly 
enriched by its unauthorized use of Abebe Bikila's name. 
6 
 
 
 
c.  Coverage dispute.  As indicated previously, after 
denying that they had a duty to defend Vibram and agreeing to 
fund the defense under a reservation of rights, the insurers 
commenced an action in Superior Court, seeking a declaration 
that they did not have a duty to defend Vibram in the underlying 
action because the complaint did not raise claims covered by the 
policies.  Vibram counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that the 
claims in the underlying action were covered by the policies, 
and therefore, that the insurers were obligated to defend 
Vibram.  Following cross motions for summary judgment, the 
motion judge agreed with the insurers.  Specifically, the judge 
concluded that the complaint did not raise a claim that Vibram 
had used another's advertising idea in Vibram's advertisement.  
According to the judge, the complaint only raised claims 
implicating a "personality right" -- an intellectual property 
right,6 and a claim that is excluded from coverage under the 
policies.7  We disagree. 
                                                 
 
6 The complaint alleges that Vibram's parent company secured 
a trademark for "Bikila" as a word mark in 2010. 
 
 
7 The policies contain an exclusion for claims arising out 
of "infringement of copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret 
or other intellectual property rights.  Under this exclusion, 
such other intellectual property rights do not include the use 
of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement.'  However, 
this exclusion does not apply to infringement, in your 
'advertisement,' of copyright, trade dress or slogan." 
7 
 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  "Our review of a motion judge's decision 
on summary judgment is de novo, because we examine the same 
record and decide the same questions of law."  Kiribati Seafood 
Co., LLC v. Dechert LLP, 478 Mass. 111, 116 (2017).  See Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). 
 
The issue before us is whether the allegations in the 
complaint raise a claim that is potentially covered under the 
policies, thus triggering the insurers' duty to defend Vibram.  
"It is settled that an insurer's duty to defend is independent 
from, and broader than, its duty to indemnify."  Metropolitan 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 460 Mass. 352, 357 (2011), 
quoting A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency 
Fund, 445 Mass. 502, 527 (2005).8  An insurer's duty to defend 
the insured is triggered where the allegations in the complaint 
"are reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that states or 
roughly sketches a claim covered by the policy terms,"  Billings 
v. Commerce Ins. Co., 458 Mass. 194, 200 (2010), notwithstanding 
the possibility that the underlying claim may ultimately fail, 
or that the merits of the claim are weak or frivolous.  See 
Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., supra at 358. 
                                                 
 
8 The duty to indemnify "arises only after the insured's 
liability has been established and is between the insurer and 
the insured," as opposed to the broader duty to defend, which 
"arises in situations involving threatened or actual litigation 
by a third party," against the insured.  See Wilkinson v. 
Citation Ins. Co., 447 Mass. 663, 671 (2006). 
8 
 
 
 
"A liability insurer's duty to defend is determined by 
comparing the allegations in the third-party complaint against 
the provisions of the insurance policy."  Deutsche Bank Nat'l 
Ass'n v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 465 Mass. 741, 744-745 
(2013).  The underlying complaint "need only show, through 
general allegations, a possibility that the liability claim 
falls within the insurance coverage.  There is no requirement 
that the facts alleged in the complaint specifically and 
unequivocally make out a claim within the coverage."  Billings, 
458 Mass. at 200-201, quoting Sterilite Corp. v. Continental 
Cas. Co., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 316, 319 (1983).  Accordingly, a 
duty to defend does not turn on the specific cause of action 
enunciated by the pleader or require that the complaint mirror 
the policy's coverage language.  See Boston Symphony Orch., Inc. 
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 406 Mass. 7, 12-13 (1989).  
Rather, the analysis focuses on "envisaging what kinds of losses 
may be proved as lying within the range of the allegations of 
the complaint, and then seeing whether any such loss fits the 
expectation of protective insurance reasonably generated by the 
terms of the policy."  Billings, supra at 201, quoting Boston 
Symphony Orch., Inc., supra at 12-13.  "Any uncertainty as to 
whether the pleadings include or are reasonably susceptible to 
an interpretation that they include a claim covered by the 
9 
 
 
policy terms is resolved in favor of the insured . . . ."  
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 465 Mass. at 745. 
 
Vibram's principal contention is that the Superior Court 
judge erred in concluding that the complaint did not assert a 
claim that it had used the Bikila family's advertising idea when 
it advertised its running shoes.  According to Vibram, the 
advertising idea alleged in the complaint was the Bikila 
family's intentional association of their family name with Abebe 
Bikila's legacy and desirable qualities, and their use of the 
name "Bikila" to advertise the family's running-related 
commercial ventures.  Therefore, because use of an "advertising 
idea" is within the scope of covered "advertising injur[ies]" 
covered by the policies, Vibram claims that the insurers had a 
duty to defend it in the underlying action.   We agree. 
 
"As with any contract, in interpreting an insurance policy, 
we begin with the plain language of the policy."  Mount Vernon 
Fire Ins. Co. v. VisionAid, Inc., 477 Mass. 343, 348 (2017).  
The policies here provide coverage for advertising injuries that 
arise from the insured's use of another's "advertising idea," 
but do not define the term "advertising idea."  Therefore, we 
interpret the words "in light of their plain meaning, . . . 
giving full effect to the document as a whole[,] . . . 
consider[ing] 'what an objectively reasonable insured, reading 
the relevant policy language, would expect to be covered' . . . 
10 
 
 
[and] interpret[ing] the provision of the standard policy in a 
manner consistent with the statutory and regulatory scheme that 
governs such policies" (citation omitted).  Golchin v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 466 Mass. 156, 159-160 (2013).  Where the terms 
of a policy are susceptible to different interpretations, we 
"construe the policy [terms] in favor of the insured and against 
the drafter, who is invariably the insurer, unless specific 
policy language is controlled by statute or prescribed by 
another authority."  Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 460 
Mass. at 362-363.  In addition, where, as here, an insurer 
claims that a policy exclusion negates the duty to defend, "any 
ambiguity in the exclusion 'must be construed against the 
insurer.'"  Hakim v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, 424 
Mass. 275, 282 (1997), quoting Vappi & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 348 Mass. 427, 431 (1965). 
This court has not yet had occasion to interpret the phrase 
"advertising idea" in an insurance coverage dispute where 
advertising injury liability is at issue.  The phrase has been 
described as "not hav[ing] a single, plain and clear meaning[,]" 
Lebas Fashion Imports of USA, v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 50 
Cal. App. 4th 548, 560 (1996); however, myriad other 
jurisdictions have interpreted "advertising idea" in these 
circumstances.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit has broadly defined "advertising idea" as "an idea about 
11 
 
 
the solicitation of business and customers," Green Mach. Corp. 
v. Zurich-American Ins. Group, 313 F.3d 837, 839 (3d Cir. 2002); 
or "ideas in connection with marketing and sales and for the 
purpose of gaining customers," CAT Internet Servs., Inc. v. 
Providence Washington Ins. Co., 333 F.3d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit stated that the "plain and ordinary meaning of 
'advertising idea' generally encompasses an idea for calling 
public attention to a product or business, especially by 
proclaiming desirable qualities so as to increase sales or 
patronage" (citation omitted).  American Simmental Ass'n v. 
Coregis Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 2002).9 
                                                 
 
9 Equally broad definitions of an "advertising idea" are 
reflected in other cases.  See, e.g., Del Monte Fresh Produce 
N.A., Inc. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 640, 646 (7th 
Cir. 2007) ("idea about the solicitation of business"); State 
Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 343 
F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 2003) (manner in which products are 
promoted to public);  Hyman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
304 F.3d 1179, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) ("any idea or concept 
related to the promotion of a product to the public"); Ekco 
Group, Inc. v. The Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., 273 F.3d 409, 
413 (1st Cir. 2001) ("an advertising concept or plan for an 
advertising campaign"); Evanston Ins. Co. v. Clartre, Inc., 158 
F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1190-1120 (W.D. Wash. 2016), quoting 
Amazon.com Int'l, Inc. v. American Dynasty Surplus Lines Ins. 
Co., 120 Wash. App. 610 (2004) ("another's manner of 
advertising, . . . an idea concerning the solicitation of 
business and customers, or . . . the manner by which another 
advertises its goods or services" [quotation omitted]); 
Gustafson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 901 F. Supp. 2d 
1289, 1301 (D. Colo. 2012) ("Most courts presented with this 
issue have held that the use of another's idea means the 
wrongful taking of the manner by which another advertises its 
12 
 
 
It is not surprising that given this broad definition, 
courts have concluded that a wide variety of concepts, methods, 
and activities related to calling the public's attention to a 
business, product, or service constitute advertising ideas.  
See, e.g., Street Surfing, LLC v. Great Am. E&S Ins. Co., 776 
F.3d 603, 611-612 (9th Cir. 2014) (logo and brand name); Dish 
Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 659 F.3d 1010, 1022 
(10th Cir. 2011) (patented telephone service enabling sale and 
promotion of products); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. 
Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 2006) (advertising 
strategy of "trad[ing] upon a reputation, history, and sales 
advantage" associated with Native American made products); Taco 
Bell Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 388 F.3d 1069, 1072 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (using concept of "Psycho Chihuahua" obsessed with 
Taco Bell food to advertise business); State Auto Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co. v. The Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 343 F.3d 249, 258 
(4th Cir. 2003) (using word "NISSAN" to promote vehicles to 
public constituted "quintessential example of trademark 
functioning to advertise a company's products"); CAT Internet 
Servs., Inc., 333 F.3d at 142 (use of Internet domain name); 
Hyman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 1179, 1189 
(11th Cir. 2002) (using artwork and product model numbers 
                                                                                                                                                             
goods or services" [citation and quotation omitted]); Winklevoss 
Consultants, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 1024, 1038 
(N.D. Ill. 1998) ("an idea about the solicitation of business"). 
13 
 
 
designed to promote products [claim for trade dress 
infringement]); American Simmental Ass'n, 282 F.3d at 587 (using 
word "fullblood," connoting desirable quality, to advertise 
Simmental cattle breed); Gustafson v. American Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 901 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1301 (D. Colo. 2012) (agent 
misrepresenting himself as working for another company for 
purposes of inducing customers to make purchases); Amazon.com 
Int’l, Inc. v. American Dynasty Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 120 
Wash. App. 610, 616-617, 619 (2004) (patented technology used to 
market music for sale on Internet Web site). 
Although "advertising idea" is clearly a broad concept, it 
is not all-encompassing.  Generally, an "advertising idea" does 
not include a nonadvertising idea that is later advertised for 
sale.  See Green Mach. Corp., 313 F.3d at 839, quoting Frog, 
Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 748 (3d 
Cir. 1999); Winklevoss Consultants, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 991 
F. Supp. 1024, 1034 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (covered use "must at the 
very least relate to marketing, not to manufacture or 
production").  See 14 Couch, Insurance § 201:53, at 201-82 (3d 
ed. 2005) (advertising injury "does not extend to injury caused 
by other activities that are coincidentally advertised").  
Otherwise stated, "[i]f the insured took an idea for soliciting 
business or an idea about advertising, then the claim is covered 
. . . [b]ut if the allegation is that the insured wrongfully 
14 
 
 
took a . . . product and tried to sell that product, then 
coverage is not triggered" (citation omitted).  Auto Sox USA 
Inc. v. Zurich N. Am., 121 Wash. App. 422, 427 (2004).  See, 
e.g., Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 662 F.3d 765, 
768-769 (7th Cir. 2011) (conspiring to fix price of eggs); Del 
Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 500 
F.3d 640, 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2007) (disparagement of 
competitor's pineapples to undermine their advertising); Green 
Mach. Corp., supra at 839-840 (advertising another's patented 
method for cutting concrete); Ekco Group, Inc. v. Travelers 
Indemnity Co. of Ill., 273 F.3d 409, 413 (1st Cir. 2001) (design 
of product); Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 
193 F.3d at 749-750 (misappropriation of product design); Hameid 
v. National Fire Ins. of Hartford, 31 Cal. 4th 16, 19-20 (2003) 
(taking customer list and soliciting customers from it); Auto 
Sox USA Inc., supra (manufacturing and selling patented 
product). 
Here, the Superior Court judge's decision relied, at least 
in part, on the conclusion that the Bikila family had not 
actually used the name "Bikila" as an advertising idea, and thus 
there was no claim that Vibram used another's advertising idea.  
Instead, the judge interpreted the complaint as alleging that 
Vibram had infringed Abebe Bikila's personality rights, a claim 
not covered under the policies. 
15 
 
 
As an initial matter, it is uncontested that Vibram's use 
of "Bikila" to advertise its minimalist FiveFingers running 
shoes constituted an advertising idea.  Vibram used the name of 
a legendary barefoot marathon runner for purposes of calling 
attention to its running shoes that simulated barefoot running. 
In their complaint, the Bikila family asserted that through 
"their commercial uses, sponsorship and promotion of historical 
and educational events," they "intentionally associated their 
family name with Abebe Bikila's barefoot dedication to succeed 
under any circumstances."  The name Bikila appears to have been 
prominently used in each of these running-related ventures, 
including operating a sporting goods store named after Bikila; 
sponsoring the annual "Abebe Bikila International Marathon"; 
operating an Internet Web site to promote that annual marathon 
as well as Bikila's life and legacy; publishing and selling a 
book bearing Bikila's name; permitting Abebe Bikila to be 
featured in a commercial; and authorizing a feature length film 
about him. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the complaint reasonably may 
be interpreted as claiming that the Bikila family intentionally 
created a connection between their family name and Abebe 
Bikila's legacy and desirable qualities for purposes of using 
"Bikila," and everything it conveyed, to attract customers to 
their running-related commercial ventures.  Cf. American 
16 
 
 
Simmental Ass'n, 282 F.3d at 587 (use of word "fullblood" to 
advertise cattle breed "falls within the ordinary meaning of an 
'advertising idea,'" because term called attention to what was 
being sold by conveying desirable quality).  In other words, the 
Bikila family's advertising idea was using the name Bikila, and 
the legacy that name conveyed, to attract business to each of 
their ventures.  Because the allegations in the complaint 
generally allege that the Bikila family used the Bikila name to 
advertise and promote their various running-related ventures, 
the judge erred in concluding that the Bikila family had not 
actually used the name Bikila as an advertising idea. 
The policies here state that the insurers will defend 
Vibram for, among other things, claims that Vibram was liable 
for an advertising injury -- specifically, through Vibram's use 
of another's advertising idea.  Vibram used "Bikila" to 
advertise its running-related products, and the complaint 
alleged that the Bikila family had also used "Bikila" to 
advertise their running-related commercial ventures.  At its 
core, the complaint alleges that Vibram improperly used "Bikila" 
for the same purposes as the Bikila family had used it -- to 
advertise its running-related ventures and business.  Given that 
determining whether a claim is covered by an insurance policy 
focuses on the nature of the claim, not its relative strengths 
or weaknesses, we conclude that it was reasonable for Vibram to 
17 
 
 
expect that the policies it purchased, which provided coverage 
in the event Vibram was sued for alleged advertising injuries, 
would cover it for the claims at issue in the underlying 
action.10 
The insurers argue that the complaint raises claims related 
only to Abebe Bikila's right of publicity, and not an 
advertising idea.  They argue that because the Bikila family did 
not use the name Bikila to market a particular product or 
service, the name Bikila did not develop a "secondary meaning" 
or an association among consumers between a product or service 
and its source.  The insurers point out, correctly, that many of 
the cases discussing an advertising idea involve claims of 
trademark infringement.  See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
343 F.3d at 258 (NISSAN "quintessential example of trademark 
functioning to advertise a company's products").  However, the 
                                                 
10 Considering the other kinds of losses that may be proved 
in the complaint bolsters the conclusion that Vibram reasonably 
expected coverage in the underlying action.  The Bikila family's 
claim under the Washington Consumer Protection Act alleges that 
Vibram's action "constitute[d] unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in the conduct of trade or commerce" that would be 
"confusing and deceptive to the public."  Notably, in this 
portion of the complaint, the Bikila family stated that Vibram's 
conduct had caused damage to "Abebe Bikila's business 
reputation, personality right, and other rights and properties 
of the Bikila family."  Given the underlying complaint's 
frequent references to the Bikila family's "commercial uses" of 
Abebe Bikila's name, it is more than reasonable to conclude that 
the Washington Consumer Protection Act claim -- by referencing 
the "other rights and properties" of the Bikila family -- 
contemplated damages from Vibram's use of an advertising idea 
and the resulting consumer confusion. 
18 
 
 
insurers have not directed this court to any authority, and we 
have not uncovered any, standing for the proposition that an 
advertising idea needs to have secondary meaning or otherwise 
embody principles of trademark law.  Indeed, such an 
interpretation is unnecessarily narrow given that an advertising 
idea focuses on how the public's attention is being drawn to a 
business or product and not necessarily on the business or 
product itself.  American Simmental Ass'n, 282 F.3d at 585, is 
instructive, given that the court there concluded that the term 
"fullblood" was an advertising idea, without referencing 
secondary meaning or trademark law.  Although the term 
"fullblood" described a desirable quality in cattle, the focus 
of the court's analysis did not necessarily depend on the 
specific secondary meaning of the term "fullblood," but rather 
on the fact that the term was used as a way of soliciting 
business.  Id. at 587.11 
We see no reason to narrow the scope of "advertising idea" 
by incorporating the secondary meaning requirement proposed by 
                                                 
 
11 To the extent that the complaint also can be interpreted 
as alleging a misappropriation of Abebe Bikila's right of 
publicity, which might be excluded from coverage under the 
policy, it does not foreclose the possibility that the complaint 
asserts claims that are potentially covered under the policy 
provision providing coverage from use of another's advertising 
idea.  Furthermore, where there is ambiguity in this regard, we 
must resolve the issue in favor of the insured.  See Deutsche 
Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 465 Mass. 741, 745 
(2013). 
19 
 
 
the insurers.  However, even if there were a secondary meaning 
requirement in these circumstances, given the standard under 
which we analyze insurance coverage disputes, the complaint 
generally asserts that the Bikila family intentionally and 
specifically connected the name to running-related ventures, and 
the name itself conveys a "barefoot dedication to succeed under 
any circumstances," a desirable quality for any of these 
ventures. 
Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the insurers.  The case is remanded to the Superior 
Court for entry of a judgment declaring that the insurers are 
obligated to pay Vibram's reasonable costs for defending the 
underlying action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.