Case Title: Rutter v. Oakwood Living Centers

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Russell and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
BARBARA A. RUTTER, ADMINISTRATRIX  
OF THE ESTATE OF  
VIRGIL W. RUTTER, DECEASED  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 100499 
  CHIEF JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
JUNE 9, 2011 
OAKWOOD LIVING CENTERS  
OF VIRGINIA, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
Edward W. Hanson, Jr., Judge 
In this appeal, we conclude that Code § 8.01-335(B), 
governing the discontinuance or dismissal of inactive cases, 
does not permit a trial court to discontinue or dismiss such a 
case with a self-executing, prospective order.  As that 
conclusion renders the order appealed from not final for 
purposes of appeal, we will dismiss this appeal without 
prejudice. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Barbara A. Rutter (Rutter), in her capacity as 
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Virgil W. 
Rutter, filed a wrongful death action in July 2000 in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach.  Rutter named as 
defendants Oakwood Living Centers of Virginia, Inc. (Oakwood), 
an assisted living facility where Virgil Rutter had lived prior 
to his death; Prism Rehab Systems, Inc. (Prism Rehab), a company 
that had contracted with Oakwood to provide physical therapy 
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services to residents of Oakwood; Thomas P. Dixon (Dixon), the 
president of Prism Rehab; and Frank Knowlton (Knowlton), an 
employee of Prism Rehab whose alleged negligence caused the 
decedent to fall and sustain a hip fracture, allegedly resulting 
in his death.  Rutter claimed that Oakwood, Prism Rehab, and 
Dixon were vicariously liable for Knowlton's negligence and 
sought damages against the defendants, jointly and severally. 
In September 2000, Dixon and Prism Rehab  filed a notice of 
bankruptcy stay, notifying the circuit court that both Prism 
Rehab and its parent company had filed bankruptcy proceedings 
and that Rutter's action against Prism Rehab and Dixon was 
stayed pursuant to federal bankruptcy law.  In response, the 
circuit court entered an order on October 4, 2000 (the 2000 
Order), stating: 
[T]his action is removed from the docket of this 
[c]ourt with leave to counsel to place this 
action back on the docket of this [c]ourt upon 
resolution of the bankruptcy proceeding should 
such procedure be deemed advisable. 
 
This action shall be ordered to be discontinued 
if after three years there has been no further 
order or proceeding under [Code] § 8.01-335(B)[.] 
 
Following entry of this order, Rutter, however, continued 
discovery against Oakwood and in February 2001 filed a motion to 
compel Oakwood to answer interrogatories.  Oakwood responded by 
filing a notice of the bankruptcy stay order.  Asserting that 
3 
 
the 2000 Order was "unclear . . . as to whether the action 
against Oakwood was also removed" from the docket, Oakwood filed 
a motion requesting the circuit court to remove Rutter's action 
against it pending resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings.  In 
March 2001, Knowlton also filed a motion to stay, claiming that 
the action against him was stayed pending resolution of the 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
The circuit court did not rule on either motion, and the 
docket reflects no activity in the case until Rutter filed a 
motion in June 2005 to set a trial date.  Rutter stated the 
bankruptcy stay was lifted in April 2002 and the action against 
the defendants thus could proceed pursuant to the circuit 
court's 2000 Order.  Again, no orders or proceedings took place 
until April 2009, when Oakwood filed a plea of the statute of 
limitations and/or motion to dismiss.  According to Oakwood, the 
2000 Order served to discontinue Rutter's action on October 4, 
2003 pursuant to Code § 8.01-335(B) because, as of that date, 
the action had been inactive for three years.  Oakwood asserted 
that because the matter "abate[d]" as of October 4, 2003, Rutter 
then had two months, the balance of the statute of limitations 
remaining when she originally filed her complaint, in which to 
refile her action.  Alternatively, Oakwood asserted that Rutter 
could have reinstated the discontinued action, pursuant to Code 
4 
 
§ 8.01-335(B), within one year of the discontinuance in October 
2003.  Oakwood argued that because Rutter had failed to employ 
either remedy, she could no longer pursue the action. 
Rutter responded that the 2000 Order only removed the 
action from the circuit court's docket and did not actually 
discontinue it.  Rutter maintained that the language of the 2000 
Order contemplated a subsequent order being entered after three 
years of inactivity and noted that no such order had been 
entered.  Rutter also contended that Code § 8.01-335(B) does not 
permit a prospective dismissal of a case, meaning the 2000 Order 
was void to the extent that it attempted to do so. 
The circuit court sustained Oakwood's motion.  In an order 
entered on December 18, 2009 (the 2009 Order), the court stated 
that the  
case was removed from the [c]ourt's docket and 
discontinued as of October 4, 2003.  Under the 
provisions of [Code] § 8.01-244 . . ., a two year 
statute of limitations applies to wrongful death 
claims, leaving two months following the 
discontinuance of the case for [Rutter] to re-
file her claim. 
 
Because Rutter had not re-filed her action within that time, the 
circuit court dismissed "the Complaint against Oakwood" with 
prejudice. 
Rutter appeals from the circuit court's judgment.  She 
contends, inter alia, that Code § 8.01-335(B) does not permit a 
5 
 
trial court to dismiss an action prospectively, but instead 
requires entry of an order subsequent to the period of 
inactivity.  Thus, according to Rutter, the circuit court erred 
in sustaining Oakwood's plea of the statute of limitations and 
dismissing the action. 
ANALYSIS 
The primary question on appeal, whether the circuit court 
erred by treating the 2000 Order as a self-executing order 
prospectively discontinuing Rutter's action under Code § 8.01-
335(B), requires the Court to interpret the provisions of that 
statute.  Statutory interpretation is a pure question of law 
reviewed de novo on appeal.  Conyers v. Martial Arts World of 
Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007).  In 
interpreting a statute, we must "'ascertain and give effect to 
the intention of the legislature,' which is usually self-evident 
from the statutory language."  Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & 
State Univ. v. Interactive Return Serv., Inc., 271 Va. 304, 309, 
626 S.E.2d 436, 438 (2006) (quoting Chase v. DaimlerChrysler 
Corp., 266 Va. 544, 547, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2003)).  When a 
statute's terms are clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute 
in accordance with its plain language.  HCA Health Servs. of 
Va., Inc. v. Levin, 260 Va. 215, 220, 530 S.E.2d 417, 419-20 
(2000). 
6 
 
The provisions of Code § 8.01-335(B) state: 
Any court in which is pending a case wherein for 
more than three years there has been no order or 
proceeding, except to continue it, may, in its 
discretion, order it to be struck from its docket 
and the action shall thereby be discontinued.  
The court may dismiss cases under this subsection 
without any notice to the parties.  The clerk 
shall provide the parties with a copy of the 
final order discontinuing or dismissing the case.  
Any case discontinued or dismissed under the 
provisions of this subsection may be reinstated, 
on motion, after notice to the parties in 
interest, if known, or their counsel of record 
within one year from the date of such order but 
not after. 
 
The statute's purpose is  
to enable trial courts to eliminate from their 
dockets cases for which there is no reasonable 
prospect of trial.  In summarily dismissing such 
cases, trial courts may thus promote efficiency 
in the administration of justice by saving the 
time of court personnel which would otherwise be 
required to preserve on the courts' dockets 
actions long forgotten or abandoned by litigants 
and lawyers. 
 
Nash v. Jewell, 227 Va. 230, 234, 315 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1984).  
As recently stated, that the "plain meaning of this statute is 
that any action in which there is no activity by the parties for 
three or more years may be removed from the court's docket, 
either by dismissal or discontinuance."  Conger v. Barrett, 280 
Va. 627, 632, 702 S.E.2d 117, 119 (2010).  That is, "[a] case 
must be inactive for three years before a circuit court may 
7 
 
dismiss a case sua sponte under Code § 8.01-335(B)."  Collins v. 
Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 401, 649 S.E.2d 672, 677 (2007). 
In light of the plain terms of Code § 8.01-335(B) and its 
purpose, we conclude that the circuit court erred when it held  
that the 2000 Order served to discontinue Rutter's action as of 
October 2003.  The provisions of Code § 8.01-335(B) allow a 
discontinuance when, for three years or more, "there has been no 
order or proceeding."  (Emphasis added.)  A trial court's 
determination that there has been no order or proceeding for at 
least three years must be made contemporaneously with the entry 
of the order discontinuing or dismissing the action.  This 
temporal requirement complies with the purpose of the statute: 
"to enable trial courts to eliminate from their dockets cases 
for which there is no reasonable prospect of trial."  Nash, 227 
Va. at 234, 315 S.E.2d at 827 (emphasis added).  A trial court 
prospectively entering a self-executing order is unable to 
determine whether there has in fact been "no order or 
proceeding" for three or more years, or whether there is a 
reasonable prospect of trial.  In short, such an order would 
preclude a trial court from considering factors relevant to the 
exercise of its discretion to discontinue an action under Code 
§ 8.01-335(B). 
8 
 
That subsection also requires the clerk of the trial court 
to provide the parties with a copy of the final order 
discontinuing or dismissing the action and allows reinstatement 
of such within one year of the entry of the order.  Code § 8.01-
335(B).  However, in the case of a self-executing, prospective 
order of discontinuance, the clerk could not provide the parties 
with "the final order discontinuing or dismissing the case." 
Instead, the clerk could only provide an order that may be final 
at some point at least three years into the future.  In other 
words, a party would have to determine on what date the action 
had been inactive for a period of three years for lack of an 
order or proceeding.  Likewise, a party would not know when the 
one-year period for reinstatement commenced to run.  Such 
uncertainty and guesswork is incompatible with the language of 
Code § 8.01-335(B) and would undermine "efficiency in the 
administration of justice."  See Nash, 227 Va. at 234, 315 
S.E.2d at 827. 
Oakwood contends, however, that we have recognized the 
validity of a prospective, self-executing order and cites our 
decisions in Norris v. Mitchell, 255 Va. 235, 495 S.E.2d 809 
(1998), and Berean Law Grp., P.C. v. Cox, 259 Va. 622, 528 
S.E.2d 108 (2000).  In both Norris and Berean Law Group, the 
respective trial courts entered orders sustaining a demurrer and 
9 
 
dismissing the action, but granted leave for the plaintiff to 
file an amended complaint by a specific date.  255 Va. at 238, 
495 S.E.2d at 811; 259 Va. at 624, 528 S.E.2d at 110.  We held 
that an order sustaining a demurrer but granting leave to amend 
"does not become final 'until after the time limited therein for 
the plaintiff to amend his [pleading] has expired.'"  Norris, 
255 Va. at 239, 495 S.E.2d at 811 (quoting London-Virginia 
Mining Co. v. Moore, 98 Va. 256, 257, 35 S.E. 722, 723 (1900)); 
see Berean Law Grp., 259 Va. at 626, 528 S.E.2d at 111.  
Applying that rationale to the present case, Oakwood argues the 
prospective discontinuance of Rutter's action similarly was 
valid and effective after three years of inactivity. 
Unlike the present action, neither Norris nor Berean Law 
Group involved the application of a statute.  Here, the circuit 
court's discretion to discontinue or dismiss an action for lack 
of any order or proceeding for more than three years is governed 
by Code § 8.01-335(B).  And, that statute does not contemplate 
entry of a self-executing, prospective order of discontinuance 
prior to the period of inactivity.  In addition, the orders at 
issue in Norris and Berean Law Group, containing a date certain 
and specifying the plaintiff’s required act, did not necessitate 
the guesswork that would result from a prospective order of 
discontinuance under Code § 8.01-335(B). 
10 
 
In sum, we conclude that Code § 8.01-335(B) does not allow 
a trial court to enter a self-executing order prospectively 
discontinuing or dismissing an action.  Instead, if a trial 
court first determines that there has been no order or 
proceeding in an action for more than three years, it then may 
discontinue or dismiss the action pursuant to Code § 8.01-
335(B).  The circuit court thus erred by concluding that the 
2000 Order served to discontinue Rutter's action as of October 
2003 and by sustaining Oakwood's plea of the statute of 
limitations.  The 2000 Order merely removed the action from the 
docket and, pursuant to Code § 8.01-335(B), a subsequent order 
was required to discontinue or dismiss the action.  Rutter's 
action thus remained pending in the circuit court, and she was 
entitled to move to set a trial date because the bankruptcy stay 
had been lifted in 2002. 
This conclusion, however, does not end our analysis.  The 
peculiar circumstances of this appeal require us to address an 
additional issue sua sponte.  In the 2009 Order, the circuit 
court, in sustaining Oakwood's plea of the statute of the 
limitations, treated the 2000 Order as prospectively 
discontinuing the entire action, i.e., as an order that became 
final on October 4, 2003.  Because the 2000 Order did not in 
fact discontinue the action and Rutter's action remained pending 
11 
 
in the circuit court, the 2000 Order never became final.  That 
fact calls into question whether the 2009 Order, which is 
challenged in this appeal, was a final, appealable order.  If it 
was not, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
In answering that question, we apply the familiar principle 
that "[a] court always has jurisdiction to determine its own 
jurisdiction."  Lewis v. C.J. Langenfelder & Son, Jr., Inc., 266 
Va. 513, 516, 587 S.E.2d 697, 699 (2003); United States v. 
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 292 n.57 (1947); see, e.g., 
Jenkins v. Mehra, 281 Va. 37, 51, 704 S.E.2d 577, 585 (2011).  
This principle applies even when, as here, determining 
jurisdiction first requires analysis of the merits of an issue.  
See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) ("In order 
to make that determination [regarding its own jurisdiction], it 
was necessary for the [appellate court] to address the 
merits."); Childers v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 881 
F.2d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir. 1989) (federal courts may "address a 
state claim on its merits in the process of determining its own 
jurisdiction").  See generally Myers v. Hancock, 185 Va. 454, 
460, 39 S.E.2d 246, 249 (1946) (disposition on realty fixture 
issue resulted in the absence of jurisdiction); Western Union 
Telegraph Co. v. White, 113 Va. 421, 424-26, 74 S.E. 174, 176  
(1912) (analysis of the meaning of a statute on the merits 
12 
 
required dismissal for lack of jurisdiction).  With these 
principles in mind, we now turn to the question whether we have 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
In relevant part, Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) provides that "any 
person may present a petition for an appeal" to this Court if 
that person is aggrieved "[b]y a final judgment in any other 
civil case."  See Comcast of Chesterfield Cnty., Inc. v. Board 
of Supervisors of Chesterfield Cnty., 277 Va. 293, 306, 672 
S.E.2d 870, 876 (2009) (holding that "Code § 8.01-670(A)(1) does 
not authorize appeals of interlocutory orders in those types of 
controversies enumerated in that subsection").  A final order 
"is one which disposes of the whole subject, gives all the 
relief contemplated, provides with reasonable completeness for 
giving effect to the sentence, and leaves nothing to be done in 
the cause save to superintend ministerially the execution of the 
order."  James v. James, 263 Va. 474, 481, 562 S.E.2d 133, 137 
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "'[I]n the absence 
of a statutory provision to the contrary, a judgment is not 
final for purposes of appeal if it is rendered with regard to 
some but not all of the parties involved in the case.'"  Leggett 
v. Caudill, 247 Va. 130, 133, 439 S.E.2d 350, 351 (1994) 
(quoting Wells v. Whitaker, 207 Va. 616, 628, 151 S.E.2d 422, 
432 (1966)). 
13 
 
Rutter named four defendants in her complaint: Oakwood, 
Prism Rehab, Dixon, and Knowlton.  Because the 2000 Order merely 
removed the action from the docket, and no other order was 
entered discontinuing the action or dismissing any defendant, 
all parties remained before the circuit court when it entered 
the 2009 Order.  That order, sustaining Oakwood's plea of the 
statute of limitations, stated that "the Complaint against 
Oakwood is dismissed."  The order adjudicated nothing with 
regard to defendants Prism Rehab, Dixon, and Knowlton.  The 2009 
Order, therefore, was only "rendered with regard to some but not 
all of the parties involved in the case" and was not a final 
order for purposes of appeal.  Leggett, 247 Va. at 133, 439 
S.E.2d at 351.1 
Under the "severable interests" exception, however, "a 
final adjudication of a collateral matter that addresses 
separate and severable interests can be appealed [if] the appeal 
cannot affect the determination of the remaining issues in the 
case, even if the adjudication is reversed."  Thompson v. Skate 
Am., Inc., 261 Va. 121, 127, 540 S.E.2d 123, 126 (2001).  Thus, 
"prior to the determination of the case against all defendants," 
a party may appeal an adjudication that is final "as to a 
                         
1 The parties did not utilize the procedure for the appeal 
of an interlocutory order pursuant to the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-670.1.  Thus, we express no opinion whether that 
procedure would have been applicable in this instance.  
14 
 
collateral matter, separate and distinct from the general 
subject of the litigation and affecting only particular parties 
to the controversy."  Wells, 207 Va. at 628, 151 S.E.2d at 432.  
See generally Rule 5:8A(a).2  In Wells, the Court held that an 
order was not a final, appealable order because if the plaintiff 
obtained "a reversal on his theory that [the dismissed 
defendant] was a joint venturer, then [that defendant] might be 
charged with liability for the same acts or omissions which are 
the basis of [the remaining defendant's] liability."  Id. at 
629, 151 S.E.2d at 433.   
The 2009 Order, which was not final as to all the 
defendants, is thus only appealable if the "severable interests" 
exception applies.  The 2009 Order adjudicated Rutter's ability 
to proceed with the cause of action only as to Oakwood.  But, 
the interests of all four defendants are joint and not 
severable.  Like the situation in Leggett, Rutter's allegations 
against Oakwood, Prism Rehab, and Dixon derive from the alleged 
negligent conduct of Knowlton.  See Leggett, 247 Va. at 134-35, 
439 S.E.2d at 352.  Thus, the circuit court's adjudication as to 
Oakwood in the 2009 Order did not concern "a collateral matter, 
separate and distinct from the general subject of the 
litigation."  Wells, 207 Va. at 628, 151 S.E.2d at 432. 
                         
2 This rule, addressing appeals from partial final judgments 
in multi-party cases, took effect after entry of the 2009 Order. 
15 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In exercising jurisdiction to determine our own 
jurisdiction and thereby analyzing the merits of the issue 
presented on appeal, we conclude that Code § 8.01-335(B) does 
not allow the prospective discontinuance or dismissal of an 
action.  The 2000 Order therefore merely removed Rutter's action 
from the circuit court's docket but did not discontinue or 
dismiss the action.  It was not final in any respect.  Further, 
because the 2009 Order only adjudicated Rutter's claim against 
Oakwood, whose interests are not severable from those of the 
other defendants, that order was not final for purposes of 
appeal.  As a result, this Court has no jurisdiction over this 
appeal and the appeal, therefore, will be dismissed without 
prejudice. 
Dismissed without prejudice.