Case Title: Idaho v. Neimeyer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 48572

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2021-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 48572 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
      Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
SHELAINA DANYELL NEIMEYER, 
 
     Defendant-Appellant. 
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Boise, May 2021 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: June 29, 2021 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Twin Falls County. Thomas J. Ryan, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Ben 
P. McGreevy argued. 
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Andrew V. 
Wake argued. 
_____________________ 
 
 
 
BRODY, Justice. 
This appeal hinges on whether Shelaina Danyell Neimeyer’s argument concerning 
judicial notice of a municipal ordinance was properly preserved for appeal. After Neimeyer was 
charged with possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, she filed a 
motion to suppress evidence. Neimeyer contends the district court erred when it denied her 
motion because: (1) the State did not prove the existence of a City of Twin Falls ordinance; and 
(2) the district court was precluded from taking judicial notice of a municipal ordinance. After 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, Neimeyer filed a petition for review 
with this Court, which was granted. Because Neimeyer raised her argument concerning judicial 
notice for the first time on appeal, we affirm the district court’s decision. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
An employee at a gas station in Twin Falls, Idaho, contacted the police about a vehicle 
that had been parked at the gas station for over an hour. The employee reported that a woman 
 
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who had previously purchased alcohol at the gas station—later identified as Neimeyer—had not 
moved from the vehicle for over 30 minutes. Consequently, Officers Tracy Thompson and 
Candace Comeau were dispatched at approximately 2 a.m. to conduct a welfare check. 
After he arrived at the gas station and located Neimeyer, Officer Thompson inquired 
whether she had been drinking. In response, Neimeyer stated she had not consumed any alcohol 
that day. Officer Thompson observed an alcoholic beverage can on the center console of 
Neimeyer’s vehicle, but Neimeyer explained that she was using the empty can as an ashtray. 
Officer Thompson asked Neimeyer if she needed any assistance, but she declined. At that time, 
Officer Comeau, who was positioned on the other side of the vehicle, observed a bottle of 
alcohol in the passenger compartment of Neimeyer’s vehicle. The seal on the bottle had been 
broken, and the bottle was only partially full. Neimeyer tossed the bottle to the rear of the 
vehicle, commenting that she could now drive the vehicle. 
Officer Comeau then asked Neimeyer about a small, closed container on the passenger 
seat. Neimeyer stated that the container was empty. When Officer Comeau asked Neimeyer if 
she could show the contents of the container to Officer Thompson, she demurred. As the district 
court noted: 
[Neimeyer] protested by stating, “Do I really got to? I mean, I haven’t done 
anything wrong.” Officer Thompson responded by stating, “Well, we have 
alcohol in the vehicle now. . .” [Neimeyer] then offered to “do a test,” which this 
[c]ourt takes to mean a sobriety test based on the context of the conversation. 
Officer Thomson [sic] then stated, “That’s fine. What’s inside of the . . .” at which 
point [Neimeyer] opened the container and showed the contents to Officer 
Thompson. 
After Neimeyer opened the container, Officer Thompson immediately smelled the odor of 
marijuana and, after shining his flashlight into the container, observed a green, leafy substance 
that he recognized as marijuana. Neimeyer quickly closed the container and placed it in her 
purse. 
 
After Officer Thompson asked Neimeyer to exit her vehicle, she complied and took her 
purse with her. Neimeyer was placed in handcuffs and told she was being detained because of 
the alcohol found in her vehicle, the marijuana found in the container, and the possibility that she 
may be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Officer Thompson then searched Neimeyer’s 
purse and discovered incriminating evidence, including methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug 
paraphernalia. As the district court explained: 
 
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[Officer Thompson] found the black container, which contained a glass end to a 
vape with green and brown residue at the end. In addition, the purse contained 
small clear baggies containing a green leafy substance which Officer Thompson 
recognized as marijuana, a small amount of the green leafy substance in the black 
container, and a zip pouch containing a clear glass pipe with white and brown 
residue, 
which 
Officer 
Thompson 
suspected 
to 
be 
used 
to smoke 
methamphetamine. Also in the pouch were two plastic baggies containing white 
residue, which Officer Thompson recognized as methamphetamine, and a small 
gray pick, which Officer Thompson suspected to be used to clean residue out of 
pipes used in the smoking of methamphetamine and marijuana. 
As a result, Officer Thompson informed Neimeyer she was under arrest for possession of 
methamphetamine. Officer Comeau transported Neimeyer to jail while Officer Thompson 
conducted an inventory search of Neimeyer’s vehicle. During the inventory search, Officer 
Thompson found a clear baggie with white and brown particles inside which subsequently tested 
positive for methamphetamine. 
 
The State charged Neimeyer with possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug 
paraphernalia. Neimeyer filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the police did not have probable 
cause to search the small, closed container in her vehicle. During the suppression hearing, 
Officer Thompson testified that, under Twin Falls City Code section 6-2-6, it was a misdemeanor 
for Neimeyer to have an open bottle of alcohol in the passenger compartment of her vehicle. 
Relying on Officer Thompson’s testimony, the prosecutor argued that the open bottle of alcohol 
that the police observed in the passenger compartment of Neimeyer’s vehicle provided probable 
cause to believe a crime had been committed: “As Officer Thompson testified, that is a 
misdemeanor under Twin Falls City Code 6-2-6.” The prosecutor also argued that Neimeyer 
voluntarily consented to opening the small container. Neimeyer did not object to Officer 
Thompson’s testimony concerning Twin Falls City Code section 6-2-6, nor did she object to the 
prosecutor’s statement referencing the municipal ordinance. 
The district court subsequently issued its memorandum decision, holding that the search 
was valid because Neimeyer had voluntarily consented to opening the small container, or, in the 
alternative, that the search was valid under the inevitable discovery rule. As part of its analysis, 
the district court quoted Twin Falls City Code section 6-2-6 verbatim. After doing so, the district 
court found “that Officer Thompson’s comment implying that he and Officer Comeau had 
probable cause to to [sic] arrest [Neimeyer] and conduct a search was accurate and did not render 
the consent of [Neimeyer] in opening the container invalid.” Neimeyer did not object to the 
 
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district court’s reliance on the City of Twin Falls ordinance in its decision, nor did she request an 
opportunity to be heard in accordance with Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(e) (providing that a 
request to be heard may be made after judicial notice has been taken in the absence of prior 
notification). 
 
Neimeyer subsequently accepted a conditional plea agreement, but reserved the right to 
appeal the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. She was sentenced to not less than 
three and not more than six years in the penitentiary for possession of methamphetamine; 18 
days incarceration for possession of marijuana; and 18 days incarceration for possession of drug 
paraphernalia. The three sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The district court 
suspended the execution of Neimeyer’s sentence to the Board of Correction and placed her on 
probation for four years. 
Neimeyer timely appealed the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. The Court 
of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, held that Neimeyer’s argument concerning judicial notice 
was preserved for appeal. State v. Neimeyer, No. 46857, 2020 WL 2534003, at *3 (Idaho Ct. 
App. May 19, 2020). The Court of Appeals also held, however, that: (1) the district court 
properly took judicial notice of Twin Falls City Code section 6-2-6; and (2) there was substantial 
evidence supporting the district court’s ruling that Neimeyer consented to the search of the 
container. Id. at *5. Neimeyer subsequently filed a petition for review with this Court. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When this Court grants a petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision, we give 
serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but we directly review the decision of 
the trial court. State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 97, 439 P.3d 1267, 1269 (2019) (quoting State v. 
Barrett, 163 Idaho 449, 451, 414 P.3d 1188, 1190 (2018)). Therefore, this Court treats the case 
as if it were on direct appeal from the trial court. Id. 
When this Court reviews a trial court’s order denying a motion to suppress evidence, the 
standard of review is bifurcated. State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 671, 450 P.3d 315, 319 
(2019) (quoting State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)). Unless clearly 
erroneous, this Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact. Id. However, we will freely 
review the trial court’s “application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. 
Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 589, 448 P.3d 1005, 1017 (2019) (quoting State v. Moore, 164 Idaho 
379, 381, 430 P.3d 1278, 1280 (2018)). 
 
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III. 
 ANALYSIS 
Neimeyer’s appeal centers on her arguments that: (1) the State did not prove the existence 
of Twin Falls City Code section 6-2-6; and (2) the district court was precluded from taking 
judicial notice of a municipal ordinance. Importantly, however, Neimeyer did not raise these 
arguments below. Neimeyer did not object when the State and its witness referenced Twin Falls 
City Code section 6-2-6 at the suppression hearing. Further, Neimeyer did not object when the 
district court took judicial notice of the ordinance in its decision denying her motion to suppress, 
nor did she request an opportunity to be heard in accordance with Rule 201(e) of the Idaho Rules 
of Evidence. Moreover, Neimeyer has not argued on appeal that the district court’s reliance on 
the City of Twin Falls ordinance constituted fundamental error. See State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 
115, 119, 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019) (quoting State v. Bernal, 164 Idaho 190, 193, 427 P.3d 1, 4 
(2018)) (stating that an alleged error that is not followed by a contemporaneous objection is 
reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine). 
Neimeyer contends that the issue concerning judicial notice was preserved for appeal 
because it is an evolution of her argument before the district court that the police did not have 
probable cause to justify a search of the container found in her vehicle. See State v. Gonzalez, 
165 Idaho 95, 98, 439 P.3d 1267, 1270 (2019) (discussing the evolution of an argument). 
Neimeyer also argues, in the alternative, that the issue was preserved because the trial court 
decided the issue. She cites State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998), for 
the proposition that she may raise an issue for the first time on appeal if the issue was decided by 
the trial court below. Neimeyer contends that, because the district court addressed Twin Falls 
City Code section 6-2-6 in its decision, this Court may consider whether the district court erred 
by taking judicial notice of a municipal ordinance. 
 
This Court recently clarified how it will address legal arguments raised for the first time 
on appeal. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at 96, 439 P.3d at 1268 (stating there is a need to clarify when 
new issues may be addressed on appeal). In doing so, this Court stated that it “will not hold that a 
trial court erred in making a decision on an issue . . . that it did not have the opportunity to 
address.” Id. at 99, 439 P.3d at 1271. Rather, in most instances, a party must raise an issue before 
the trial court in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Id. 
[D]uring the time of an appeal, parties will ruminate on issues and case law will 
be decided that may need to be applied to the specific facts of the case at hand. 
However, these pragmatic evolutions do not leave room for a party to raise new 
 
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substantive issues on appeal or adopt a new position on an issue that the trial court 
has not had the opportunity to rule on. 
Id. at 98, 439 P.3d at 1270. In short, “substantive issues may not be raised for the first time on 
appeal . . . .” Id. 
 
Here, Neimeyer argued below that the police did not have probable cause to search the 
container found in her vehicle. In her memorandum in support of her motion to suppress, 
Neimeyer argued: 
In this case, officers did not have the necessary objective facts that would 
lead a reasonable person to believe that the small canister would contain 
contraband. Nothing suspicious and indicative of drugs was in plain view, or 
“plain smell”. Ms. Neimeyer had a rational explanation for her presence in the 
parking lot. There was no reason to think alcohol would be kept in a small 
canister. Furthermore, possessing an open container of alcohol in a vehicle is not 
even a crime when the vehicle is not on a highway or right of way. The officers’ 
hunch would not have supported issuance of a warrant, and does not support 
probable cause for a warrantless search. 
She advanced a similar argument at the suppression hearing. 
 
During the suppression hearing, Officer Thompson stated, “When I approached the 
vehicle, I suspected I had at least an open container, which is a misdemeanor violation within the 
city code of having an open container in the parking lot.” In response to a question from the 
prosecutor, Officer Thompson stated he was referring to Twin Falls City Code section 6-2-6. 
Citing the same ordinance, the prosecutor later argued that it provided probable cause that 
Neimeyer had committed a crime: “As Officer Thompson testified, [an open container] is a 
misdemeanor under Twin Falls City Code 6-2-6.” Finally, the district court quoted the ordinance 
verbatim. Neimeyer did not object to Officer Thompson’s testimony concerning the City of Twin 
Falls ordinance at the suppression hearing, nor did she object to the prosecutor’s argument. 
Further, she did not object to the district court’s reliance on Twin Falls City Code section 6-2-6 
in its decision denying her motion to suppress. Additionally, Neimeyer’s notice of appeal and 
amended notice of appeal do not reference the district court taking judicial notice of the City of 
Twin Falls ordinance as an issue on appeal. 
That said, Neimeyer argues that this issue was preserved for appeal because it is an 
evolution of her probable cause argument or, in the alternative, because the district court decided 
the issue below. Neimeyer’s arguments are unavailing, however, because this issue and 
Neimeyer’s position on this issue were not raised below. 
 
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We will not hold that a trial court erred in making a decision on an issue or 
a party’s position on an issue that it did not have the opportunity to address. To be 
clear, both the issue and the party’s position on the issue must be raised before the 
trial court for it to be properly preserved for appeal. 
Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at 99, 439 P.3d at 1271. 
Here, the district court did not have an opportunity to address Neimeyer’s contention that 
a district court may not take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance. Stated differently, the issue 
concerning judicial notice and Neimeyer’s position regarding that issue were not raised below. 
Rather, the issue of judicial notice was raised for the first time on appeal. Fairly viewed, 
Neimeyer’s argument concerning judicial notice is not a natural progression or refinement of the 
probable cause argument she asserted below—it is an entirely new argument that is unrelated to 
the issues addressed by the district court. Further, the issue was not “decided by” the district 
court. See DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553, 961 P.2d at 644. As previously explained, Neimeyer did not 
object when the State and its witness referenced Twin Falls City Code section 6-2-6 at the 
suppression hearing, nor did she object when the district court relied on the ordinance in its 
decision. Consequently, the district court never decided the issue of whether a trial court may 
take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance or the procedure to be used. 
In short, because the district court never had an opportunity to address Neimeyer’s 
argument below, the issue was not preserved for appeal. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at 99, 439 P.3d at 
1271. Thus, we are not afforded an opportunity to address whether a district court is precluded 
from taking judicial notice of a municipal ordinance. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Because Neimeyer’s argument regarding judicial notice was not properly preserved for 
appeal, we affirm the district court’s decision concerning the motion to suppress and the 
judgment of conviction. 
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BURDICK, STEGNER, and MOELLER CONCUR.