Case Title: Stonewall Insurance Co. v. E.I. duPont deNemours Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 523, 2009

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
STONEWALL INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
No. 523, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant/Appellant/ 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
Cross-Appellee, 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  C.A. No. 99C-12-253 
E.I. du PONT de NEMOURS & CO.,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff/Appellee/  
 
) 
 
 
Cross-Appellant.  
 
) 
 
Submitted:  March 10, 2010 
Decided:  June 3, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in 
part and REMANDED. 
 
 
Dawn C. Doherty and Brian L. Kasprzak, Marks, O’Neill, O’Brien & 
Courtney, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware; Virginia A. Seitz (argued) and William M. 
Sneed, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC; pro hac vice for appellant. 
 
 
John E. James an Richard L. Horwitz, Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, 
Wilmington, Delaware; John M. Sylvester (argued), Christopher C. French and 
Kimberley J. Geary, K&L Gates LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, pro hac vice for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
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Stonewall Insurance Company and E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company 
appeal from a series of summary judgment rulings arising out of disputed 
insurance policy language affecting the amount DuPont may recover under two 
excess insurance policies.  Stonewall contends that the motion judge erroneously 
determined the number of occurrences triggering coverage as a matter of law, and 
applied a non-cumulation clause that inaccurately reduced Stonewall’s liability for 
a subset of claims but not for all.  Stonewall further complains that the motion 
judge awarded prejudgment interest from the wrong date.   
In response to Stonewall’s contentions, DuPont asserts that the motion judge 
correctly granted summary judgment but erroneously found the non-cumulation 
clause to be unambiguous.  With the exception of the prejudgment interest award, 
which we now REVERSE, we find the motion judge correctly determined the 
number of occurrences and properly applied an unambiguous non-cumulation 
clause.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company developed an acetal resin product to 
“bridge the gap between metals and plastics.”  Between 1983 and 1989, DuPont 
sold that innovative product for use in polybutylene plumbing systems.  After 
allegations surfaced that inherent defects in the product caused leaks in those 
 
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systems, with resulting property damage and loss of property, DuPont stopped 
selling the product to polybutylene manufacturers.   
During the relevant time period, DuPont maintained a comprehensive 
general liability insurance plan that utilized a $50 million self-insurance retention 
and multiple excess insurance policies to cover losses exceeding the SIR.  There 
were four separate “towers” of insurance, one for each year, as follows:  
1983: $50 million SIR, $145 million excess insurance ($165m);  
1984: $50 million SIR, $145 million excess insurance ($195m);  
1985: $50 million SIR, $115 million excess insurance ($165m); 
1986: $50 million SIR, $195 million excess insurance ($245m).   
 
DuPont defended and settled thousands of claims involving the leaking plumbing 
systems, incurring liabilities exceeding $239 million.  In 1999, DuPont filed a 
complaint against multiple insurance carriers, seeking a declaration of rights and 
obligations, including a designation of which of the fifty excess insurance policies 
issued by sixteen different carriers should respond and indemnify DuPont.  
Ultimately, DuPont settled and recovered approximately $111.7 million from 
fifteen carriers.  As a result, DuPont’s sole remaining recourse was to seek 
indemnification from Stonewall Insurance Company.   
In an August 4, 2006 letter, DuPont demanded recovery under Stonewall’s 
1985 policies that provided a total of $5 million in excess coverage.1  Stonewall 
                                                 
1 Stonewall participated in the 1985 tower and provided $1 million of coverage in the first layer 
of excess policies and $4 million of coverage in the second layer of excess policies.   
 
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denied coverage, contending that:  (1) a “Prior Insurance and Non-cumulation” 
clause in its policies negated its coverage obligations; and, (2) DuPont’s liabilities 
from the degradation of the acetal resin product constituted multiple occurrences, 
thereby triggering multiple per-occurrence self-insured retentions.   
In a series of summary judgment rulings, the motion judge decided that:  (1) 
the product liabilities arose out of one single occurrence; (2) the non-cumulation 
clause clearly and unambiguously directed a multi-policy year loss to the earliest 
applicable coverage, and reduced Stonewall’s coverage obligations to zero for 
claims that triggered a pre-1985 excess insurance policy; and (3) the non-
cumulation clause did not reduce Stonewall’s liability for claims arising in 1985.  
A Final Judgment Order dated August 5, 2009 directed the Prothonotary to enter 
judgment in favor of DuPont and against Stonewall for $9,790,982, consisting of 
Stonewall’s policy limits of $5 million and prejudgment interest for $4,790,982.  
This appeal and cross-appeal followed.   
Claims on Appeal 
The parties’ coverage dispute turns on three issues.  The first is whether the 
product liabilities arose out of a single occurrence so that DuPont only had to 
contribute one $50 million SIR before seeking coverage from the excess insurers 
or whether the product liabilities arose out of multiple occurrences, triggering 
multiple SIRs.  The second issue is whether a non-cumulation clause extinguished 
 
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Stonewall’s coverage obligations for all claims or only for those claims that 
triggered a pre-1985 excess policy.  The third issue focused on whether 
prejudgment interest began accruing from the date of DuPont’s complaint or from 
the date of DuPont’s specific letter demand. 
Standard of Review 
 
 
We review de novo the Superior Court’s grant or denial of summary 
judgment.2 
Discussion 
I. 
The Number of Occurrences 
Stonewall’s policies provide that “[t]he term ‘Occurrence,’ wherever used 
herein, shall mean an accident or a happening or event or a continuous or repeated 
exposure to conditions which unexpectedly and unintentionally results in personal 
injury, property damage or advertising liability during the policy period.  All such 
exposure to substantially the same general conditions existing at or emanating from 
one premises location shall be deemed one occurrence.” 
Stonewall contends that the motion judge erroneously invaded the jury’s 
province by resolving the number-of-occurrences question as a matter of law, 
where several issues of material fact were in dispute.  Stonewall identifies two 
                                                 
2 Motorola, Inc. v. Amkor Tech., 849 A.2d 931, 935 (Del. 2004); Rizzitiello v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 868 A.2d 825, 829 (Del. 2005); Lank v. Moyed, 909 A.2d 106, 108 (Del. 2006). 
 
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purportedly disputed facts.  The first concerns how many separate causes of system 
failure gave rise to the polybutylene system liability claims.  DuPont claims that 
the liabilities arose from the product’s susceptibility to chemical degradation alone 
(inside-out cracks).  Stonewall claims that fault lies with two separate and 
independent causes – chemical degradation and the product’s inability to resist 
mechanical stresses (outside-in cracks). 
Stonewall’s “two independent causes” contention misguidedly attempts to 
turn the number-of-occurrences analysis into a number-of-conditions question.  
Whether the failure resulted from the product’s susceptibility to chemical 
degradation from the inside of the pipe or from its inability to withstand 
mechanical stress from the outside, or both, the product itself was the source of the 
leaking polybutylene systems and the resultant property damage.  Indeed, both 
sides’ experts agreed that the product was unsuitable for use in that type of system.  
Whether it was one condition or two that made the product unsuitable for use in 
polybutylene systems, is of no legal significance. 
The second alleged factual dispute arises from the second sentence of the 
“occurrence” definition in Stonewall’s policies; namely that “[a]ll such exposure to 
substantially the same general conditions existing at or emanating from one 
premises location shall be deemed one occurrence.”  Stonewall queries whether 
there was only one occurrence, because the relevant “premises location” was a 
 
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plant in West Virginia where DuPont manufactured the product; or whether each 
of the 469,000 plus liability claims constituted a separate occurrence because each 
claim involved an individual building where polybutylene systems failed and 
damage occurred.  Not surprisingly, Stonewall argues that the latter interpretation 
is the correct one. 
In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,3 a Superior Court 
judge analyzed how other jurisdictions treated the number-of-occurrences issue 
and concluded that “generally, an occurrence is determined by the cause or causes 
of the resulting injury.”4  Following that conclusion, the court adopted the 
“commonly accepted [cause] test” and reaffirmed the principle that “where a single 
event, process or condition results in injuries, it will be deemed a single occurrence 
even though the injuries may be widespread in both time and place and may affect 
a multitude of individuals.”5   
Consistent with Admiral, the motion judge here correctly identified and 
applied the cause test to the facts set forth by Stonewall and DuPont.  Specifically, 
the judge held that when determining the number of occurrences in a products 
liability case, the “[p]roper focus is . . . on production and dispersal – not on the 
                                                 
3 1996 WL 190764 (Del. Super. April 9, 1996). 
4 Id. (citing Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
5 Admiral, 1997 WL 190764, at *3 (citing Transp. Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 487 
F. Supp. 1325, 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1980)). 
 
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location of injury or the specific means by which injury occurred.”  Therefore, 
DuPont’s production of an unsuitable product triggered only one single occurrence 
under the policies.   
Despite the judge’s application of the reasoning in Admiral to the set of facts 
before him, Stonewall (relying on non-Delaware cases) contends that product 
manufacturers are subject to multiple occurrences findings in the property damage 
context.6  We note that the courts in Stonewall’s cases reached that result based on 
their interpretation of the specific policies at issue.  Those cases did not apply the 
cause test, did not involve substantially similar policy language, and did not 
concern the same type of products liability issue facing DuPont.7   
Further, if Stonewall’s interpretation of the occurrence provision is correct, 
then each separate claim would constitute its own separate occurrence.  As a 
consequence, DuPont must first expend $50 million per occurrence for a total of 
approximately $23,450,000,000,000 before being entitled to look to its excess 
insurers.  It is inconceivable to imagine 469,000 occurrences generating almost $24 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Michigan Chem. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d 374, 383 (6th Cir. 
1984); Dow Chem. Co. v. Assoc. Indem. Corp., 727 F. Supp. 1524, 1531 (E.D. Mich. 1989); 
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hanson, 902 A.2d 152, 170 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); Norfolk & W. R. 
Co. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 796 F. Supp. 929, 937 (W.D. Va. 1992); CSX Transp., Inc. v. 
Cont’l Ins. Co., 680 A.2d 1082, 1098 (Md. 1996). 
7 The authority cited by Stonewall involves cases applying the “effects” test, environmental 
liabilities disputes (asbestos and lead paint), products liability cases involving marketing defects 
(i.e. improper labeling of products), and nuisance-noise cases involving loss of hearing. 
 
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trillion in damages.8  Such an interpretation would produce an absurd, 
unacceptable result that would render meaningless the excess insurance purchased 
by DuPont and deprive DuPont of the protection for which it paid.   
Stonewall’s policies are, by definition and by choice, occurrence-based 
policies, not claims-made policies.  The use of the former instead of the latter 
signifies that neither DuPont nor Stonewall intended to base coverage on 
individual accidents that gave rise to claims.  Rather, they intended to base 
coverage on the underlying circumstances (or occurrences) that resulted in the 
claims for damages.9  
Even if Stonewall’s interpretation of the deemer10 clause was somehow 
tenable, the motion judge correctly declined to require a jury trial, because 
Stonewall’s argument does not involve any issues of fact.  Whether the relevant 
premises location for purposes of determining the number of occurrences was the 
plant in West Virginia or each individual building where damage occurred, is not a 
factual issue.  Rather, it involves the interpretation of policy language that is 
                                                 
8 See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1515, 1527 (D.D.C. 1984). 
9 See Champion Int’l Corp. v. Cont’l Casualty Co., 546 F.2d 502, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977). 
10 3 Alan S. Rutkin et al., NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE  39.15(4) (2009) 
(“[a] ‘deemer’ clause [ ] is a mechanism to determine which single policy responds where an 
occurrence potentially triggers more than one policy . . . .  [t]he intent of these clauses is to limit 
the insurer’s liability where loss spreads over more than one policy period. . . .”). 
 
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generally a question of law for the court and not a factual dispute for a jury to 
decide.11   
Accordingly, we hold that the motion judge correctly concluded that only a 
single “occurrence” triggered the Stonewall policies. 
II. 
Non-Cumulation Clause & the Reduction of Liability 
 
The non-cumulation clause contained in Stonewall’s policies reads as 
follows: 
It is agreed that if any loss covered hereunder is also covered in whole or in 
part under any other excess policy issued to the Assured prior to the 
inception date hereof the limit of liability hereon as stated in Items 5 and 6 
of the Declarations shall be reduced by any amounts due to the Assured on 
account of such loss under such prior insurance. 
 
Stonewall contends that although the motion judge correctly determined that 
the non-cumulation clause unambiguously operated to reduce Stonewall’s liability, 
he erroneously allocated the loss such that Stonewall’s limits were reduced to zero 
for only part of the loss.  Stonewall claims that because prior insurance (the 1983 
and 1984 policies) covered most of that loss, DuPont cannot recover any amount 
under Stonewall’s policies. 
Responding to Stonewall’s contentions, DuPont asserted that non-
cumulation provisions operate only to prevent an insured from obtaining a double 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Hercules Inc. AMEC Va., 1999 WL 167829, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 17, 1999); 
Deakyne v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 728 A.2d 569, 572 (Del. Super. 1997); A-E Newark Assoc. 
v. CNA Ins. Cos., 2001 WL 1198930, at *2 (Del. Super. Oct. 2, 2001). 
 
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recovery, which will not take place here.  DuPont emphasizes that it seeks only to 
obtain the highest per-occurrence limits of coverage in any one year, not a double 
recovery.  DuPont further contends that even if the non-cumulation clause applies, 
it is ambiguous, as several words and phrases (“covered,” “due,” “should be 
reduced,” and “reduction of limits”) allow for multiple reasonable interpretations.  
Therefore, DuPont contends, the ambiguous non-cumulation clause must be 
construed against Stonewall – the drafter. 
We conclude that the motion judge correctly applied the unambiguous non-
cumulation clause and reduced Stonewall’s liability properly.  In a previous 
opinion, the judge adopted the all-sums approach,12 also known as joint and several 
liability.  Under that approach, each insurer whose policy has expired, is wholly 
liable for damages that exceed the SIR and that occurred over multiple years (up to 
the limits of each individual policy).13  For example, where a system is installed in 
1983 and removed in 1985, then all insurers from 1983 – 1985 are jointly and 
severally liable for the covered damage that occurred over the three year time 
period.14   
                                                 
12 On appeal, the parties do not contest the allocation method chosen; rather, Stonewall contests 
the application of the method.   
13 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WL 2338045, at *7 (Del. Super. July. 
31, 2006). 
14 See 3 Alan S. Rutkin et al., NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE  39.12 (2009). 
 
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Under the all sums approach, DuPont may choose a single tower of 
coverage, applicable to a single year, from which to seek indemnity and defense 
costs.15  After selecting a tower, coverage then proceeds up the tower from the first 
layer of coverage until full indemnity or complete exhaustion of the policy limits 
occurs.16  In turn, the selected insurers may then seek contribution against other 
carriers from other towers whose policies were also triggered by the product 
liability claims.   
The non-cumulation clause does not create an ambiguity which alters this 
process.  Despite DuPont’s effort to assign multiple interpretations to several terms 
in the clause, we have noted that non-cumulation clauses “reduce[ ] recovery under 
an excess policy to the extent that the insured already recovered under ‘a policy 
issued prior to the inception date’ of that excess policy.” 17  Moreover, other courts 
applying clauses nearly identical to Stonewall’s have determined that the clause 
clearly reduces policy limits “by the total amounts paid, or due, to the insured from 
the prior excess insurers.”18   
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 481, 493-94 (Del. 2001). 
18 See Greene, Tweed & Co., Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 2006 WL 1050110 (E.D. Pa. 
April 21, 2006); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 2004 WL 1878764, at 
*19 (N.J. Super. July 8, 2004); Viking Pump, Inc. Century Indem. Co., 2009 WL 3297559, at *30 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2009). 
 
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Indeed, interpreting the non-cumulation clause to limit how much DuPont 
may seek from the selected tower of insurance by subtracting any amounts 
received by or payable to DuPont from prior excess insurers, is the only proper 
interpretation.  Here, the controlling rule of construction is that “[a] single clause 
or paragraph of a contract cannot be read in isolation, but must be read in 
context.”19  Under this framework, reading “covered, due, should be reduced, and 
reduction of limits” as ambiguous and in isolation would dishonor the spirit of the 
clause and improperly allow DuPont to obtain a double recovery by negating 
settlements already received from the 1983 and 1984 insurers.   
Relying primarily on California Insurance Co. v. Stimson Lumber Co.20 and 
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,21 Stonewall asserts that 
the term “loss” means the entire loss at issue and not subsets of it.  Stonewall 
further contends that the loss was large enough to trigger the $50 million SIR and 
reach into the excess policies in 1983 and 1984; therefore, those policies covered 
the loss in part and reduces Stonewall’s liability to zero for the entire loss.   
                                                 
19 Cheseroni v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 402 A.2d 1215, 1217 (Del. Super. 1979), aff’d, 410 
A.2d 1015 (Del. 1980); Hudson v. D & V Mason Contractors, Inc., 252 A.2d 166 (Del. Super. 
1969). 
20 2004 WL 1173185 (D. Or. May 26, 2004). 
21 670 N.E.2d 740 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
 
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First, the motion judge correctly distinguished the two cases on which 
Stonewall relies.  Those cases involve the application of a pro rata method,22 not 
an all sums method.  Moreover, he aptly observed that the loss produced both 
multi-year damage and single-year damage.  Although “loss” may be read broadly 
to include the entire loss and not subsets thereof, any such reading counterfactually 
assumes that the loss consists entirely of indivisible damage over multiple policy 
periods—which is not the case here.  That reading contradicts both parties’ stated 
ability to segregate a part of the target loss and confine it to a single year.  It 
logically follows that where the parties can confine damage to a single-year, then 
only the insurers participating in a CGL tower covering that year are responsible 
for responding to that damage.   
Secondly, Stonewall’s interpretation fails to consider the “in whole or in 
part” language in the non-cumulation clause.  Amounts payable to DuPont that 
cover the entire loss extinguishes Stonewall’s liability.  But, where the amounts 
payable by prior excess insurers only cover part of the loss, then Stonewall’s 
coverage applies to the remaining portion.  Here, DuPont selected the insurers in 
the 1985 CGL tower from which to seek indemnity for its defense costs.  Both 
DuPont and Stonewall agree that all insurers are jointly and severally liable for at 
                                                 
22 3 Alan S. Rutkin et al., NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE 39.13 (2009) 
(Unlike the all sums method where one insurer is wholly liable for the entire loss, a pro rata 
approach spreads the loss and assigns liability on a proportionate basis.). 
 
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least $74.8 million in defense costs.  Stonewall goes further and lists an additional 
$18.5 million in liability claims that are confined to 1985 (i.e. damage from 
systems that were installed and removed in 1985).23  Thus, Stonewall’s figures 
establish that there are at least $93.3 million in damages for which Stonewall is 
wholly liable.  
There also appears to be no genuine factual dispute that DuPont recovered 
over $20 million in settlements from its 1983 and 1984 insurers.24  Because the $20 
million represents “any amounts due to the Assured on account of such loss under 
such prior insurance,” the $93.3 million figure is reduced to $73.3 million.  
Applying DuPont’s SIR to the reduced figure, $23.3 million remains.25  Stonewall 
policies provide $1 million of the $5 million first layer of excess coverage and $4 
million of the $15 million second layer of excess coverage.  As a participant in the 
                                                 
23 DuPont and Stonewall dispute whether the remaining liabilities total $137.5 million or $127.3 
million.  The $74.8 million is included in both parties’ figures; therefore, we used this figure to 
determine the extent of Stonewall’s liability.  We make no findings regarding the accuracy of 
these figures. 
24 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., et al., 2008 WL 7020668, at *5 (Del. 
Super. Aug. 14, 2008) (noting that in a June 2, 2008 Order the court accepted as fact, without 
objection from DuPont, that the amounts recovered by DuPont in settlements with its 1983 and 
1984 insurers exceeded $20 million). 
25 Although the judge used different numbers, the results are the same.  The amount of claims 
reaches Stonewall’s excess policies.  Furthermore, we agree with the motion judge that the plain 
language of the non-cumulation clause prevents its application to SIRs.  The non-cumulation 
clause refers to excess insurance.  Title 18, section 102(d) of the Delaware Code defines 
insurance as a “contract whereby one undertakes to pay or indemnify another.”  If insurance 
mandates an undertaking by one to pay or indemnify another, a mechanism where an entity 
indemnifies itself (i.e. SIR) does not appear to satisfy that requirement. 
 
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first two layers of excess insurance, Stonewall must first respond to losses that 
exceed DuPont’s $50 million SIR by $20 million.  Because the $23.3 million 
figure falls almost squarely within the first two layers of coverage, the judge 
correctly determined that the $23.3 million loss reaches Stonewall’s excess 
policies.   
We, therefore, uphold the motion judge’s interpretation and application of 
the non-cumulation clause. 
III. 
Amount of Prejudgment Interest 
Standard of Review 
The final issue concerns the calculation of prejudgment interest.  We 
determine the due date of a prejudgment interest award by plenary review.26   
Discussion 
 
The parties do not dispute DuPont’s entitlement to prejudgment interest; 
rather, Stonewall questions on what date interest should have begun to accrue.  As 
a general rule, interest accumulates from the date payment was due to a party.27  
For insurance claims, interest accumulates from the date a party actually demands 
payment.28  Where it is difficult to determine to a reasonable degree of certainty 
                                                 
26Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 826 (Del. 1992).    
27 Hercules, 784 A.2d at 507-08. 
28 Id. 
 
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when an insured demanded payment, we often rely on the date that the insured 
filed the complaint.  Here, the motion judge awarded prejudgment interest from the 
date DuPont filed its complaint, December 30, 1999.   
We disagree with the chosen accrual date.  Prejudgment interest is an 
extraordinary award that applies when a party unjustifiably refuses to live up to its 
obligation after payment is due.29  Although DuPont’s initial 1999 complaint may 
in the abstract be construed as a demand for payment, DuPont amended that 
complaint to make demand against the 1983 insurers.  After settling with the 1983 
insurers, DuPont then changed its strategy and made claims against the 1985 
insurers, including Stonewall, in an August 4, 2006 demand letter.  Therefore, 
Stonewall could not have unjustifiably refused to pay until DuPont demanded 
payment on August 4, 2006.  Accordingly, the motion judge erred by awarding 
prejudgment interest from December 30, 1999. 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Superior Court’s judgment in 
part, REVERSE the prejudgment interest award and REMAND for a modification 
of the award of prejudgment interest.   
 
                                                 
29 Citrin v. Int’l Airport Centers LLC, 922 A.2d 1164, 1167 (Del. Ch. 2006).