Case Title: Jung-Leonczynska v. Steup

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jung-Leonczynska v. Steup1990 WY 156803 P.2d 1358Case Number: 90-144, 90-145Decided: 12/28/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
Malgorzata 
JUNG-LEONCZYNSKA, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Matthias STEUP, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Matthias 
STEUP,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Malgorzata 
JUNG-LEONCZYNSKA, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Albany County, Arthur T. Hanscum, J.

David G. Lewis 
of Brown & Drew, Casper, for appellant in No. 90-144 and appellee in 
No. 90-145.

Steven R. 
Helling, Bruce Willoughby and Rex O. Arney of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, 
for appellant in No. 90-145 and appellee in No. 
90-144.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      We visit this 
case for a second time. As in the first appeal, the primary issue to be 
addressed is the propriety of the grant of a motion for summary 
judgment.

[¶2]      We will, once 
again, reverse the district court's entry of summary judgment.

[¶3]      In the first 
appeal, we determined that the issue of whether a public employee was acting 
within the scope of his duties under W.S. 1-39-104(a) (June 1988 Repl.) 
when he allegedly engaged in tortious conduct, was a question of fact for the 
trier of fact and not one for the court in the context of a motion for summary 
judgment. Jung-Leonczynska v. Steup, 782 P.2d 578 (Wyo. 1989)1. We also noted that Professor 
Matthias Steup (Steup) moved for summary judgment. The district court granted 
this motion, finding as a matter of law that Steup was a public employee acting 
within the scope of his duties as defined in W.S. 1-39-103(a)(v). The trial 
court concluded that the provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (GCA) 
applied; no statutory exception to the grant of immunity existed; Malgorzata 
Jung-Leonczynska's (Leonczynska) complaint failed to allege she had filed a 
claim under the GCA as required by statute, resulting in a lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction in the trial court; and Steup was immune from liability for 
his conduct.

[¶4]      All the 
peripheral issues were decided in favor of Leonczynska and we then addressed the 
principal issue of the propriety of the summary judgment itself. In summary, we 
held in Jung-Leonczynska that Steup's affidavit did not state facts from which 
one could infer that he was acting within the scope of his duties. It alleged he 
was acting within the scope of his employment, but not within the scope of 
his duties. In addition, Steup denied in his answer that he had engaged in 
the conduct alleged at all. Jung-Leonczynska, 782 P.2d  at 582. Thus, because 
Steup was being sued in his individual capacity, he failed in his obligation to 
demonstrate in the materials appended to his motion for summary judgment that 
the conduct upon which his liability allegedly rested, consisted of duties which 
his employing "governmental entity requests, requires or authorizes a public 
employee to perform * * *." W.S. 1-39-103(a)(v). Matthews v. Department of 
Agriculture, 719 P.2d 216, 220 (Wyo. 1986). In conclusion, we held that 
questions for the trier of fact exist about whether Steup acted in the way 
Leonczynska alleged, and, if he did, whether he was, at that time, acting within 
the scope of his duties. Thus, the case was remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings on Leonczynska's claims of assault, battery, and intentional 
infliction of emotional harm. See Jung-Leonczynska, 782 P.2d  at 
581-83.

[¶5]      Both sides have 
taken appeals in this case. In Case No. 90-144, Leonczynska raises these 
issues:

1. Whether there was no 
genuine issue of material fact presented to the court below to show that the 
appellee [Steup] had assaulted, battered, or intentionally inflicted emotional 
harm upon the appellant [Leonczynska].

2. Whether there was an 
issue of material fact presented to the trial court to show that at the time of 
the alleged intentional torts, appellee [Steup] was acting within the scope of 
his duties so as to garb him with protective immunity under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, W.S. § 1-39-104(a).

[¶6]      In response to 
these claims, Steup merely asks whether the district court erred in granting the 
summary judgment.

[¶7]      In Case No. 
90-145, Steup poses these questions:

1. Was the Motion to 
Reconsider filed on behalf of Appellee [Leonczynska] herein a nullity in light 
of the fact that it was not signed by the pro se Appellee (plaintiff below) or 
an attorney?

2. Is it proper for a pro 
se party's husband, who is not a licensed attorney, to appear and argue on 
behalf of a party?

3. Was it proper for the 
District Court to grant Appellee's [Leonczynska's] Motion to Reconsider, in 
light of the fact that it was not signed by the Appellee or an attorney, the 
motion was not argued by Appellee or an attorney, there were no legal grounds 
shown for the granting of such a motion, and Appellee did not supply any 
supporting facts that meritorious defenses existed to the underlying summary 
judgment which the Appellee was asking the District Court to reconsider?2

[¶8]      In addition to 
these claims of error, Steup asserts that Leonczynska's appeal in Case No. 
90-144 and the necessity of Steup's cross-appeal in Case No. 90-145 are both 
lacking in merit and he should receive costs and penalties under W.R.A.P. 10.05 
for both the appeal and the cross-appeal.

[¶9]      In answer to 
these issues, Leonczynska maintains that the actions of her husband on her 
behalf were done as her attorney in fact and were proper and, to the extent any 
of the trial court's rulings on husband's participation in the proceedings on 
behalf of his wife were erroneous, they were, at most, harmless error which did 
not prejudice Steup. In response to the W.R.A.P. 10.05 claim, Leonczynska argues 
that her appeal clearly is not lacking in merit. The Wyoming Supreme Court 
reversed the first summary judgment and Steup had added nothing new to the 
record which would permit the court to affirm this time (thus, the appeal could 
not be meritless). Besides, her argument continues, Steup is the appellant in 
the cross-appeal and there is no provision for an award of damages to an 
appellant in W.R.A.P. 10.05.

[¶10]   After our remand of the first case 
to the district court, Steup filed a second motion for summary judgment. In 
addition to the material filed in the original proceedings, that motion was 
supported by these two affidavits:

Affidavit of Matthias 
Steup

1. I was a former 
visiting assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University 
of Wyoming, and was so for the school years of 1987-1988 and 
1988-1989.

2. As a visiting 
assistant professor, I was employed by and paid by the University of 
Wyoming.

3. As a part of my job 
with the University of Wyoming, I was required to teach Philosophy 
courses.

4. On November 13, 1987, 
I was acting in my capacity as a University instructor, at the time Malgorzata 
Jung-Leonczynska has alleged that I assaulted, battered and inflicted mental 
distress upon her. At the time of the alleged incident, which occurred in a 
classroom at Hoyt Hall, on the University of Wyoming Campus, in Laramie, 
Wyoming, I was meeting with the plaintiff and her husband concerning an 
independent study project that she and her husband were working on. The meeting 
was set up to discuss a topic for a paper they were to write.

5. Several weeks before 
this meeting, I had given the plaintiff, and her husband, various readings which 
I thought would help them in choosing a topic for their paper. During our 
meeting on November 13, 1987, the plaintiff asked me to give her and her husband 
a lecture summarizing all of their readings. I said that that was not my job, 
and that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss with them the readings that 
they had done so that they could choose a topic for their paper. The plaintiff 
got upset because I declined to summarize the readings.

6. Thereafter, a 
discussion was had concerning the meaning of "belief," "true belief," and 
"justified true belief." In the topic of knowledge, "justified true belief" is 
often used as a definition of knowledge. The plaintiff asked a question, but the 
question was unclear, and I did not understand what she was asking. At that 
point, the plaintiff falsely accused me of deliberately not understanding her. 
Prior to November 13, 1987, she had made that same false accusation. I attempted 
to tell her that she had no reason to make that accusation, and that the study 
project would have to be discontinued unless she stopped accusing me. She then 
began to constantly interrupt me and would not let me talk. I told her she would 
have to stop interrupting me. I told her she would have to give me the courtesy 
of letting me finish my sentences. She refused to do so and continued 
interrupting me. She would not let me speak. I walked over to the table that the 
plaintiff was sitting at and, when she continued to interrupt me, I pounded my 
fist in an effort to get her to listen to me. I at no time hit her or any of her 
belongings. I was at no time threatening the plaintiff, nor did I try to put her 
in fear. I merely tried to tell her that her accusation was unjustified, and 
that should allow me to finish my sentences.

7. After pounding my 
fist, there was a brief discussion after which I went back, collected my 
materials, and left the classroom.

Affidavit of Oliver 
Walters

1. I am the acting Dean 
of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Wyoming. The Philosophy 
Department is in the College of Arts and Sciences.

2. As the acting Dean, I 
am familiar with the University of Wyoming rules and regulations.

3. When Matthias Steup 
was hired as a visiting assistant professor, as part of his job with the 
University of Wyoming, he was hired to teach classes in philosophy.

     Although I was not the 
acting Dean at the time Professor Steup was hired (the former Dean is no longer 
at the University), I know that while teaching, he was requested, required and 
authorized by the University to use reasonable means to control the conduct of 
his students in the classroom. This is standard for all professors at the 
University, and has been for many years.

4. Attached hereto, as 
Exhibit "B-1," is a true and correct copy of the University Regulation 29, dated 
August 12, 1970, and the subsequent University Regulation 29 Change 1, dated 
August 11, 1980. These regulations were in effect during the 1987-1988 school 
year at the University of Wyoming. I have compared Exhibit "B-1" with the actual 
regulation, and the attached Exhibit "B-1" is a true and correct copy of the 
same.

[¶11]   The pertinent sections of the 
University regulations attached to Dean Oliver Walter's affidavit are 
these:

II. General 
Conduct

     a. All members of the 
University community share a common and heavy responsibility to maintain a 
climate suitable to a community of scholars and to refrain from conduct which 
obstructs the work of the University, interferes with the lawful exercise of 
rights by other persons, endangers the safety and security of other persons or 
their property, prevents the proper use of the facilities of the University, or 
impairs the maintenance of that kind of an environment which is essential to the 
operation of an institution of higher learning.

     b. The University has 
a duty and the corollary disciplinary powers to protect its educational purposes 
through the regulation of the use of the facilities and through the 
establishment of standards of scholarship and conduct for the students who 
attend the University. Disciplinary proceedings should play a role substantially 
secondary to example, counseling, guidance and admonition. When the preferred 
means fail to resolve problems of student conduct, proper procedural safeguards 
should be observed to protect the student from the unfair imposition of serious 
penalties for violation of the University rules.

     c. The University 
shall strive to assure that all requirements, standards, policies, and 
regulations that are considered essential to the University's educational 
mission and which vitally affect students in general are clarified and published 
or otherwise made known to the affected persons.

* * * * * *

III. The Classroom. The 
instructor in the classroom and in conference should encourage relevant 
discussion, inquiry, and expression. Student performance should be evaluated 
solely on an academic basis, not on opinions or conduct unrelated to academic 
matters.

     a. Students shall be 
free to take reasoned exception to data or views offered in any course of study 
and to reserve judgment about matters of opinion, but they shall be responsible 
for learning the content of any course of study for which they are 
enrolled.

     b. Students shall have 
protection through orderly procedures against prejudiced or capricious academic 
evaluation. At the same time, they shall be responsible for maintaining 
standards of academic performance established for each course in which they are 
enrolled.

     c. The student has a 
right to expect a competent and conscientious effort from his instructor 
including a statement of purpose and scope of the course and expectations of 
student performance. Correspondingly, the instructor has the right and 
responsibility to fail students who do not satisfy the obligations of the 
course.

     d. A student has 
obligations as well as rights in the classroom. He has no right to impinge on 
the instructor's freedom to teach or of the right of other students to learn. 
The instructor shall establish reasonable standards of conduct for each class 
which should be made known at the outset of the class, and the instructor may, 
through orderly procedures, dismiss any student who violates such 
standards.

[¶12]   We cannot find any provision of 
Change 1 to these regulations which is pertinent to this action, although the 
substance of that question must be reserved for the further proceedings which we 
shall direct on remand.

[¶13]   There are additional factual 
materials in the record of this case, including Leonczynska's deposition, her 
affidavit, her husband's affidavit, and other materials which she presented in 
behalf of her case. We will not discuss these in detail, but rather merely 
acknowledge their presence in the record, because they only serve to further 
bolster Leonczynska's position and do not serve in any way to undermine our 
decision to reverse the grant of summary judgment.

[¶14]   In our first opinion in this case, 
we determined that questions of material fact were raised in Leonczynska's 
complaint which precluded the grant of a summary judgment. Without unnecessary 
repetition of the standards that determine the propriety of summary judgment in 
this case, we refer the district court, the parties, and other readers of this 
opinion to Jung-Leonczynska, 782 P.2d  at 581-83. If anything, the materials 
submitted by Steup in his second motion for summary judgment raise additional 
factual questions, e.g., was this a classroom situation as contemplated by the 
University regulations or some other kind of situation? The regulations of the 
University of Wyoming mandate that instructors exercise control over their 
classes, but at the same time they provide wide latitude to students to question 
their professors and the course of study taught. This was an independent study 
class which was attended only by Leonczynska and her husband. This may raise yet 
another question which must be addressed to a fact finder. At this point in the 
proceedings we are convinced even more than before that factual issues, which 
must be determined by a fact finder, are raised by Leonczynska's pleadings. See 
generally, W. Kaplin, The Law of Higher Education, §§ 2.4.1, 4.4 (2d ed. 1985); 
Clayton v. Board of Education, 49 A.D.2d 343, 375 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1975), motion 
den. 38 N.Y.2d 1022, 384 N.Y.S.2d 449, 348 N.E.2d 925 and reversed on other 
grounds (without consideration of self-defense issue), 41 N.Y.2d 966, 394 N.Y.S.2d 882, 363 N.E.2d 588, later appeal (3rd Dept.) 73 A.D.2d 765, 423 N.Y.S.2d 548, appeal dismissed 449 U.S. 807, 101 S. Ct. 54, 66 L. Ed. 2d 11.

[¶15]   We find it unnecessary to address 
any of the issues raised by Steup in his cross-appeal, because the central, and 
perhaps only, issue before the district court was Steup's motion for summary 
judgment. As discussed above, we hold the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Steup to be erroneous based on the existence of material issues of fact which 
must be presented to a fact finder and legal issues that have yet to be 
resolved. Thus, even in the face of Leonczynska's absence from the first hearing 
and her absence from the second hearing on the motion to reconsider the grant of 
summary judgment (with the exception that her husband was there representing her 
interests), the district court erred in granting a motion for summary judgment 
when Steup had failed to carry his burden under Matthews. Of course, under these 
circumstances we need not consider Steup's claim that costs and penalties be 
assessed against Leonczynska for bringing a meritless appeal to this court. 
W.R.A.P. 10.05.

[¶16]   Reversed and remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and our 
previous opinion in Jung-Leonczynska.

CARDINE, 
J., 
filed a dissenting opinion.

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶17]   This is indeed a sad day for those 
in the teaching profession. They will be astonished to learn that this supreme 
court has approved and authorized a cause of action or suit by a student who now 
can recover money damages from a teacher who, in an effort to maintain control 
of the classroom, raises his voice and strikes the student's desk.

[¶18]   The classroom is a place for 
learning. The classroom atmosphere must be such that a fair and orderly exchange 
can occur between teacher and students. Keeping order in the classroom is often 
one of the major problems faced by teachers, and they ought to be accorded 
considerable latitude in the things found necessary to maintain the proper 
classroom decorum.

[¶19]   This case was really not much more 
than a simple verbal exchange between student and teacher. Factually reduced to 
its simplest terms, the student here was interrupting the teacher. The teacher 
attempted to maintain control of the situation by raising his voice. The student 
raised her voice until student and teacher were shouting at each other (this was 
a philosophy class). The teacher approached the student, both were shouting, and 
the teacher hit the desk at which the student was sitting. At this point, 
without more, all would agree that as a matter of law no assault or battery had 
occurred and there would be no cause of action upon which suit could be 
maintained. See Restatement, Second, Torts §§ 13, 21 (1965). But alas, student 
says that the teacher happened to strike a book on her desk which student says 
was touching her hand, and claims this to be a battery. I would hold that a 
battery did not occur in this case, and therefore there did not arise a cause of 
action upon which the student could maintain a suit for damages.

[¶20]   Not every unpleasant occurrence in 
everyday living gives rise to a cause of action or right to sue and recover 
damages. It is long held that words alone, no matter how distasteful, profane, 
unpleasant, or demeaning, will not support a claim for damages upon assault or 
battery. Restatement, Second, Torts § 31. So too, an unintentional touching in a 
crowd, for example, at a year-end sale or passing through the ticket line at a 
basketball game, does not give rise to a claim for damages founded upon assault 
or battery although the touching technically is a battery. See Restatement, 
Second, Torts § 18 and comment (g). Some of life's unpleasantries we simply 
accept as a cost of living together in a developed and sometimes crowded 
society. I would, therefore, hold that what occurred between teacher and student 
here was neither an assault nor a battery, and that student has no cause of 
action and may not maintain suit against teacher for recovery of 
damages.

[¶21]   There is another reason this case 
should be accorded a merciful demise. In addition to it being a wrong public 
policy decision, the court violates every rule of law governing litigation by 
pro se litigants and representation by lay persons. In this case appellant 
represented herself pro se. She complied with few of the rules of procedure with 
respect to pleadings, filing documents and appearances in court in pursuing this 
litigation against the teacher. We have consistently held that an individual who 
elects self-representation is held to the same standard as an attorney, Annis v. 
Beebe & Runyan Furniture Co., 685 P.2d 678, 680 (Wyo. 1984), and failure to 
comply with mandatory rules will result in dismissal of the case. A generous and 
compassionate judge declined dismissal of this case because of appellant's 
failure to comply with rules of procedure and practice. But there is more. 
Appellant did not even appear for the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment. She was represented by her husband, a lay person. A second critical 
violation of our rules which provide that a lay person may not practice law and 
may not represent another in litigation before the courts. Rule 11, Rules 
Providing for the Organization and Government of the Bar Association of the 
Attorneys at Law; W.S. 33-5-117; See Dawson v. City of Casper, 731 P.2d 1186, 
1187-88 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶22]   It ought to be clear to everyone 
that this case is going nowhere. This court would do society and teachers a 
service by acknowledging and applying its own rules of law and putting an end to 
this no-claim suit for damages by student against her teacher.

 FOOTNOTES

1 Rather than repeat the 
salient facts set out in our previous opinion in the text above, they are set 
out here for the convenience of the reader:

     Malgorzata 
Jung-Leonczynska (Leonczynska) filed an action against Professor Matthias Steup 
(Steup) seeking damages because of an incident which occurred at 1:00 p.m. on 
November 13, 1987, in a University of Wyoming classroom during an independent 
study course being taught by Steup as a faculty member and attended by 
Leonczynska as a student. According to Leonczynska's complaint, Steup jumped up 
from his seat and ran four to five yards to where she was sitting. As he came 
toward her he was angry and yelling; he shook his fist in front of her face; and 
pounded her belongings on the table, which belongings were in her immediate 
possession and connected with her body. In her complaint, Leonczynska alleged 
that Steup's intention was to create fear and apprehension of immediate bodily 
contact by him. She sought damages on the alternative theories of assault, 
battery, intentional infliction of emotional harm, and duress and undue 
influence.

2 The motion to reconsider 
was filed because Leonczynska claimed not to have received notice of the first 
hearing. She presented an affidavit to the district court signed by the Laramie, 
Wyoming, postmaster, establishing that the post office had failed to adhere to 
Leonczynska's directions for first holding and then forwarding her mail. Thus, 
through this error on the part of the post office she did not receive notice of 
the first hearing. There was no evidence presented to contradict her claim. 
Because of this, she asked for, and was granted, a hearing on her motion to 
reconsider the district court's grant of the motion for summary judgment. At the 
time of the second hearing Leonczynska was in Poland attending to matters of 
family illness and a death. Therefore her husband, Boguslaw Leonczynska, 
appeared on his wife's behalf as her agent. The district court permitted the 
proceedings to go forward over Steup's objection and, at the conclusion of those 
proceedings, again entered summary judgment in favor of Steup.