Case Title: MX INVESTMENTS INC. v. Crawford

Citation: 700 So. 2d 640

Docket Number: 89623

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1997-09-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
700 So. 2d 640 (1997)
MX INVESTMENTS, INC., d/b/a Days Inn I-75, Petitioner,
v.
William D. CRAWFORD and Joan F. Crawford, Respondents.
No. 89623.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 4, 1997.
Rehearing Denied October 21, 1997.
*641 Francis J. Carroll of Boehm, Brown, Seacrest, Fischer & Lefever, P.A., Daytona Beach, for petitioner.
Michael R.N. McDonnell of McDonnell Trial Lawyers, Naples, for respondents.
WELLS, Justice.
We have for review MX Investments, Inc. v. Crawford, 683 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), based on certified conflict with Tampa Letter Carriers, Inc. v. Mack, 649 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), and Special's Trading Co. v. International Consumer Corp., 679 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
William and Joan Crawford (the Crawfords) filed suit against MX Investments (MX) for injuries William Crawford suffered in a slip-and-fall accident at a Days Inn hotel owned by MX. MX denied liability. Subsequently, MX served two offers of judgment on the Crawfords. After being served with the offers of judgment but before trial, the Crawfords voluntarily dismissed their complaint without prejudice. MX then filed a motion to assess attorney fees and tax costs pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(d) (1991). The trial court denied the motion.
On appeal, the district court affirmed. MX Investments, 683 So. 2d  at 586. The court held that an entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991), requires the entry of a judgment. Id. Judge Booth's opinion provides:
MX Investments, 683 So. 2d  at 585-586 (citations and footnotes omitted). We approve the district court's decision. However, we do so because the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice and not because there was no judgment entered. We conclude that section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991), does not provide a basis for the award of attorney fees and costs unless a dismissal is with prejudice.[1]
We construe the terms "voluntary dismissal" and "involuntary dismissal" in section 768.79(6), Florida Statutes (1991), to mean a dismissal with prejudice so that the dismissal is the basis for a judgment of no liability as contemplated in section 768.79(1), Florida Statutes (1991). Thus, only when a plaintiff's voluntarily dismissal is with prejudice or is a second voluntary dismissal is the defendant entitled to attorney fees in accord with section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991).
We do not agree with MX's contention that entitlement exists based on the definition given to the term "judgment" in section 768.79(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1991).[2] MX argues that the costs imposed under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(d) fall within the definition of judgment. We find that rule 1.420(d) simply specifies a cost judgment and plainly has nothing to do with whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice. The definition in section 768.79(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), merely identifies what is to be used as the total amount for purposes of determining whether attorney fees are to be awarded under the statute and accordingly has nothing to do with whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice.
In sum, we conclude that to be entitled to an award of attorney fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991), there must be a dismissal with prejudice of the cause of action.
Accordingly, we approve the decision below and disapprove Tampa Letter Carriers and Special's Trading Co. to the extent that they conflict with this decision.
It is so ordered.
*643 KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
[1]  Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1), provides in pertinent part:

Unless otherwise stated in the notice or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits when served by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court an action based on or including the same claim.
[2]  Section 768.79(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), provides in pertinent part:

[T]he term "judgment obtained" means the amount of the net judgment entered, plus any post-offer collateral source payments received or due as of the date of the judgment, plus any post-offer settlement amounts by which the verdict was reduced.