Case Title: Hairston v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 46665

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2020-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 46665 
 
JAMES HARVEY HAIRSTON,   
 
)        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)          Boise, May 2020 Term 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
)            
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)          Opinion Filed:  September 3, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)                
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
 
 
) 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)           
Respondent.   
 
 
 
) 
SUBSTITUTE OPINION. THE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
COURT’S PRIOR OPINION 
DATED JULY 6, 2020 IS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HEREBY WITHDRAWN. 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of 
 
the State of Idaho, Bannock County. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge. 
 
The district court’s dismissal of Hairston’s petition for post-conviction  
relief is affirmed. 
 
Federal Public Defender Services of Idaho, Boise, attorneys for  
Appellant. Jonah Horwitz argued. 
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for  
Respondent. Lamont Anderson argued. 
_______________________________ 
BEVAN, Justice 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a successive claim for post-conviction relief in a capital case. James Hairston was 
sentenced to death after a jury convicted him of two counts of first-degree murder in connection 
with the deaths of William and Dalma Fuhriman. Hairston was about nineteen and a half when 
he killed the Fuhrimans. In this, his fourth post-conviction petition, Hairston argues his sentence 
is unconstitutional because: (1) he was under the age of twenty-one at the time of the offense; 
and (2) the trial court failed to give adequate consideration to the mitigating factors that must be 
considered with youthful defendants. The district court dismissed Hairston’s first claim after 
holding that he failed to show that evolving standards of decency prohibited imposing the death 
penalty for offenders between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. The court dismissed 
Hairston’s second claim after finding that there was no basis to extend the special sentencing 
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considerations that have been specifically limited to juvenile defendants under eighteen to those 
under twenty-one. We affirm. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This Court summarized the facts leading to Hairston’s conviction in State v. Hairston, 
133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999) (Hairston I): 
On January 6, 1996, Hairston and a companion, Richard Klipfel, were 
driving from Grand Junction, Colorado, to Spokane, Washington. They stopped at 
the Fuhrimans’ ranch because they had run out of money and could not continue 
their journey. The Fuhrimans invited Hairston and Klipfel into their home and 
offered to help them find jobs. While Mr. Fuhriman was sitting at a kitchen table 
looking at a phone book, Hairston shot him in the head and then shot Mrs. 
Fuhriman. Hairston and Klipfel took $30 in cash, credit cards, and some personal 
property from the Fuhrimans’ home and continued their journey. Hairston and 
Klipfel pawned some of the Fuhrimans’ property. They purchased several items 
with the credit cards including toy remote control cars, tires, food, gas, and 
lodging. They also attempted to purchase a Harley Davidson motorcycle and 
$2500 worth of snowboarding equipment, but the credit card was rejected. 
Hairston and Klipfel were apprehended together near Clarkston, Washington, 
three days after the murders. 
133 Idaho at 500–01, 988 P.2d at 1174–75. On September 6, 1996, a jury found Hairston guilty 
of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery. Id. at 501, 988 P.2d at 1175. The 
district court imposed a death sentence for each of the two murders and life in prison for the 
robbery. Id. Hairston was just over nineteen and a half years old at the time of the murders. 
1. Prior claims for post-conviction relief  
In 1996, Hairston brought his first petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied. 
Hairston appealed his conviction and the district court’s denial of his post-conviction petition to 
the Idaho Supreme Court. In 1999, this Court affirmed the district court’s denial of post-
conviction relief and upheld Hairston’s convictions and death sentences on direct appeal. 
Hairston I, 133 Idaho at 518–19, 988 P.2d at 1192–93. 
In 2000, Hairston filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which the U.S. district court 
dismissed. Hairston v. Blades, No. 1:00-CV-00303-BLW, 2011 WL 1219267, at *32 (D. Idaho 
Mar. 30, 2011). In 2018, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for the 
court to apply Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), to Hairston’s claim that his trial counsel was 
ineffective in investigating and presenting mitigation evidence at sentencing. Hairston v. 
Ramirez, 746 F. App’x 633, 634 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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In 2001, Hairston filed a second petition for post-conviction relief in state court, alleging 
that he had been deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel on 
direct appeal and that he had been denied adequate resources during the sentencing hearing and 
the first post-conviction proceeding. In 2002, Hairston filed a third petition for post-conviction 
relief, alleging that his death sentence was unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536, U.S. 584 
(2002), which concluded statutory aggravating factors must be found by a jury, rather than the 
court. Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51, 54, 156 P.3d 552, 555 (2007) (Hairston II). The district 
court dismissed both petitions as untimely under Idaho Code section 19-2719. Id. In a 
consolidated appeal, this Court held that Hairston failed to raise his claims in a timely manner, 
thus, the consolidated appeals were dismissed. Id. at 59, 156 P.3d at 560. The United States 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded Hairston II because of Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 
264 (2008), but only as to the Ring claim. Hairston v. Idaho, 552 U.S. 1227 (2008). The district 
court dismissed Hairston’s claim seeking to vacate his death sentence. Hairston’s case was 
consolidated with several others for appeal, and this Court affirmed the district court after 
concluding Ring is not retroactive. Rhoades et al. v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 140, 233 P.3d 61, 71 
(2010). 
2. Current claim for post-conviction relief  
On March 16, 2018, Hairston filed a fourth post-conviction petition, contending: (1) it is 
unconstitutional to execute someone who was under the age of twenty-one at the time of the 
offense; and (2) the trial court failed to give adequate consideration to the mitigating factors that 
must be considered with youthful defendants. The State filed an answer alleging, among other 
affirmative defenses, that Hairston’s petition was barred by the statute of limitations in Idaho 
Code section 19-4902(a). Later, the State moved for summary dismissal under Idaho Code 
section 19-4906(c).  
Hairston later filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, which raised the same 
claims, but included additional evidentiary support for his assertion that the Idaho trial courts had 
evolved beyond the practice of sentencing late-adolescent defendants to death. In part, Hairston 
submitted an affidavit from Laurence Steinberg, Ph.D., an expert in adolescent development, 
who concluded that the new, emerging medical and scientific consensus across the country is 
that defendants between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one are just as deserving of 
constitutional protection from the death penalty as those defendants eighteen and younger. 
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Hairston alleged that the basis for his petition arose from American Bar Association (ABA) 
Resolution 111, adopted by its House of Delegates on February 5, 2018, which “urges each 
jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment to prohibit the imposition of a death sentence on or 
execution of any individual who was [twenty-one] years old or younger at the time of the 
offense.” The district court took judicial notice of Hairston’s exhibits. 
After answering Hairston’s amended petition, the State again moved for summary 
dismissal under Idaho Code section 19-4906(c). The State argued Hairston’s claims were time-
barred and that the authority he relied on was inapplicable to his claims because it only applied 
to juvenile defendants and Hairston was nineteen at the time of his crimes.  
On December 17, 2018, the district court entered an order denying post-conviction relief. 
The court declined to dismiss Hairston’s petition on the grounds that it was untimely, but 
ultimately dismissed his claims on the merits. The district court dismissed Hairston’s first claim 
after concluding he failed to show that his death sentence diverged from national and Idaho 
evolving standards of decency. The court dismissed Hairston’s second claim after finding that 
there was no basis to extend the special sentencing considerations that have been specifically 
limited to juvenile defendants under eighteen to those under twenty-one. Hairston filed a timely 
notice of appeal to this Court.  
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. 
Is Hairston’s successive petition for post-conviction relief time-barred? 
2. 
Is Hairston’s death sentence unconstitutional because he was under twenty-one at the 
time of the offense? 
3. 
Is Hairston’s sentence unconstitutional because the district court failed to give proper 
consideration to the mitigating factors associated with his youth?  
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The constitutionality of Idaho’s capital sentencing scheme is a question of law over 
which this Court exercises free review. Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 132, 233 P.3d 61, 63 
(2010). Idaho Code section 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court’s own initiative. 
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant’s evidence has raised no genuine 
issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant’s favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110, 15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000) (internal citation 
omitted). Thus, “[s]ummary dismissal sought under the UPCPA [Uniform Post-Conviction 
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Procedure Act] is the procedural equivalent of a motion for summary judgment.” Charboneau v. 
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). In determining whether a motion for 
summary dismissal is properly granted, a court must review the facts in a light most favorable to 
the petitioner, and determine whether they would entitle petitioner to relief if accepted as true. 
Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001) (internal citation omitted). “A 
court is required to accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the 
petitioner’s conclusions.” Id. 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. 
The State failed to adequately argue Hairston’s successive post-conviction 
petition was time-barred below; thus, its argument that Hairston’s petition is 
untimely will not be considered on appeal. 
Idaho Code section 19-2719 sets forth discrete post-conviction procedures that govern all 
capital cases. Capital post-conviction proceedings, like non-capital post-conviction proceedings, 
which are governed by the UPCPA, Idaho Code sections 19-4901–4911, are civil in nature and 
except for discovery matters are governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. I.C.R. 39(b); 
I.C. § 19-4907(a). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1)(Q) provides that the statute of 
limitations is an affirmative defense which must be “affirmatively state[d]” in a party’s answer. 
“[T]he time bar of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that may be waived if it is 
not pleaded by the defendant.” Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110, 15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000) 
(internal citation omitted). 
The narrow and demanding statute of limitations set forth in Idaho Code section 19-
2719(3) and (5) require that “[a] petitioner bringing a successive petition for post-conviction 
relief has a heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that 
petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute.” Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 
471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995) (Pizzuto II). We have held that the narrow exception requires 
successive post-conviction petitions be filed within a “reasonable time,” which 
is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of 
the claim, unless the petitioner shows that there were extraordinary circumstances 
that prevented him or her from filing the claim within that time period. In that 
event, it still must be filed within a reasonable time after the claim was known or 
knowable. 
Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642, 649 (2008) (Pizzuto V). The State argues on 
appeal that Hairston’s amended successive petition is untimely under Idaho Code section 19-
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2719(5) and this authority. The State asserts generally that Hairston’s claims were known or 
reasonably could have been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition.  
The difficulty for the State in raising this argument now is that the statute of limitations 
argument it makes on appeal was asserted only in passing before the district court during oral 
argument. No pleading filed by the State included section 19-2719 as a bar to Hairston’s petition. 
In fact, the State raised the inapt general statute of limitations set forth in Idaho Code section 19-
4902(a), rather than the specific statute of limitations that is applicable to post-conviction actions 
in capital cases.  
Beyond that, when moving for summary dismissal below, the extent of the State’s 
timeliness argument was that Hairston’s “claims and allegations are moot and should be 
procedurally foreclosed as [Hairston’s] application for post-conviction relief is time barred, is a 
successive petition, and contains claims that were or could have been raised in previous 
proceedings.” In making these generic statements, the State failed to cite to the specific statute 
governing post-conviction procedures in capital cases, nor did it offer any support for its 
conclusory claims. In its response memorandum, the State was required to state its defense “with 
particularity[, including] the grounds for the relief sought [and] the number of the applicable 
civil rule.” I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1)(B). In the same vein, the State made no specific argument below that 
the newly discovered issues raised by Hairston were known or reasonably should have been 
known outside the limited forty-two-day time limit for raising those successive post-conviction 
claims. We thus affirm the district court’s determination that the State’s cursory statements and 
lack of specific argument did not provide sufficient notice for summary disposition under Idaho 
Code section 19-4906(c). We therefore reach the merits of Hairston’s argument on appeal. 
B. 
Hairston’s death sentence is constitutional. 
Hairston’s primary argument is that the constitutional prohibition against executing 
juvenile defendants under the age of eighteen announced in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005), should be extended to defendants who were under the age of twenty-one when they 
committed their crimes. In Roper, the U.S. Supreme Court extended the previous prohibition 
against executing juveniles under the age of sixteen set forth in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 815 (1988), to include juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen. The foundation for the 
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Court’s analysis, and for ours today, is grounded in the Eighth Amendment1 – and by principles 
the U.S. Supreme Court articulated for the first time in 1958 in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 
(1958). The Court there recognized that “the [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from 
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id. at 101 
(emphasis added). This standard has continued to inform the Supreme Court as it limited the 
death penalty for juveniles in Thompson and Roper, as well as in more recent cases of Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of life 
without parole sentence on juvenile offender who did not commit homicide) and Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for 
those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishment). 
Hairston argues that evolving standards of decency support his claim that the death 
penalty is unconstitutional when imposed against an individual who is under twenty-one years of 
age at the time of his crime. His arguments rely upon information from several fronts. First, he 
relies heavily upon a report of Dr. Steinberg, which argues that there is a new emerging 
consensus that many aspects of psychological and neurobiological immaturity characteristic of 
early adolescents and middle adolescents are also characteristics of late adolescents aged 
nineteen and twenty. Hairston also claims that his sentence is inconsistent with evolving 
standards of decency, both nationally and in Idaho, which show that imposition of the death 
penalty for adolescent offenders is disfavored. In addition, Hairston cites to the American Bar 
Association House of Delegate’s recently passed Resolution 111, which advocates “each 
jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment to prohibit the imposition of a death sentence on or 
execution of any individual who was 21 years old or younger at the time of the offense.” The 
Resolution, like Dr. Steinberg, advocates that the brains of those under twenty-one are so 
immature that all individuals under twenty-one are undeserving of death sentences.  
Hairston adds that there are also emerging national, international, and state trends against 
the imposition of the death penalty on defendants who were under the age of twenty-one at the 
time of their offense. Hairston cites jurisdictions that have abolished the death penalty altogether, 
                                                 
1 “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 
U.S.Const., Amend. VIII 
 
 
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suspended executions through moratoria, and those that no longer impose or carry out capital 
sentences for offenders under twenty-one. Hairston also highlights several non-criminal statutes 
that he claims support the idea that those under twenty-one do not have enough maturity to be 
treated as adults. Beyond national statistics, Hairston also cites some international developments 
to contend there is a strong trend against the death penalty worldwide, which is by definition a 
trend against the execution of defendants in late adolescence as well.  
In addition, Hairston asserts there is Idaho-specific evidence that defendants who were 
under twenty-one at the time of their crime should not be sentenced to death. Specifically, since 
the time Hairston received his sentence, apparently no other defendant under twenty-one has 
received the death penalty, while eleven defendants over the age of twenty were sentenced to 
death. Hairston argues this results from decisions by several different actors, including 
prosecutors, judges, and juries, that all reflect the sentiments of Idaho citizens opposing the death 
penalty for late-adolescents.  
While we are not blind to the national and international trends, and even those Idaho-
centric cases which arguably show that offenders who were under the age of twenty-one at the 
time of the offense are rarely given the death penalty, Hairston has provided no evidence that a 
consensus exists among those states that continue to exercise the death penalty about this issue. 
We have recognized “absent some legislative or executive action, a determination by this Court 
that Idaho’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional based on evolving standards of decency and 
public opinion is unsupported.” State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 456, 348 P.3d 1, 71 (2015). 
We continue to follow this view.  
Hairston has not cited to any legislative enactments or executive action since Roper that 
have made executing nineteen and twenty-year-olds as a class by themselves unconstitutional.2 
We have in the past, and we continue to subscribe to the views of legislative bodies as the basis 
for determining a national consensus; and no such consensus exists among those states that still 
regard the death penalty itself as a valid form of punishment. Nor has Hairston cited to any case 
of meaningful precedential value that has extended Roper as he advocates we should do here.3 
                                                 
2 We recognize some states have adopted statutes or executive branch moratoria against the death penalty in all its 
forms since 2005 when Roper was decided. 
3 Hairston referenced a trial court decision out of Kentucky, Commonwealth v. Bredhold, 2017 WL 8792559 (Ky. 
Cir. Ct. Aug. 01, 2017), which declared Kentucky’s death penalty statute unconstitutional as applied to those under 
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Indeed, there are none. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 120 N.E.3d 900, 914 (Ill. 2018) (noting that 
courts have repeatedly rejected claims to extend Roper and its progeny to offenders over the age 
of 18). Like the Illinois Supreme Court, “[w]e agree with those decisions . . . that, for sentencing 
purposes, the age of 18 marks the present line between juveniles and adults.” Id. 
Most importantly, we believe that the Supreme Court of the United States has definitively 
spoken on this issue. Idaho courts have traditionally tracked the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 599, 261 P.3d 853, 876 (2011). In 
Roper, the Court held that eighteen years is “the age at which the line for death eligibility ought 
to rest.” 543 U.S. at 574. In the fifteen years since that time, the Supreme Court has not seen fit 
to recognize that a national consensus exists sufficient to move the line to twenty-one years. 
Neither do we. 
We understand that this view is not without its detractors in academia, the American Bar 
Association, and other circles opposed to capital punishment. We also acknowledge, as has the 
Supreme Court, the problem with drawing the line at the age of 18 years as a “categorical rule”:  
Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always 
raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from 
adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some 
under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. 
For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn. The plurality 
opinion in Thompson drew the line at 16. In the intervening years the Thompson 
plurality’s conclusion that offenders under 16 may not be executed has not been 
challenged. The logic of Thompson extends to those who are under 18. The age of 
18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood 
and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility 
ought to rest. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
Since Roper was decided, the Supreme Court has continued to identify 18 years as the 
critical age for purposes of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 
460, 465 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory sentences of life without parole for homicide offenders 
who committed their crimes before the age of eighteen); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 74–75 (2010) (prohibiting sentences of life without parole for nonhomicide offenders who 
                                                                                                                                                             
twenty-one. Id. at * 1. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court subsequently vacated that decision. Commonwealth v. 
Bredhold, 599 S.W.3d 409, 423 (Ky. 2020). 
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committed their crimes before the age of eighteen). We have done likewise. See State v. 
Shanahan, 165 Idaho 343, 445 P.3d 152, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 545 (2019) (sentence of 
indeterminate life with 35-years fixed does not violate the Eighth Amendment under Miller’s 
rationale). Because the Supreme Court of the United States has not determined that the age of 
eligibility for capital punishment should be moved, we will continue to adhere to Roper. Thus, 
we hold that Hairston’s death sentence is constitutional.  
Although we have rejected a categorical exception for those under twenty-one who have 
been sentenced to death, Hairston asks this Court to vacate his death sentence based on his 
personal lack of maturity at the time of the murders. In support, Hairston cites to Dr. Steinberg’s 
report, which analyzed his conduct before, during and after the offense and concludes it 
demonstrated the hallmarks of adolescence and significant immaturity. However, in drawing the 
line at eighteen the Supreme Court recognized “qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do 
not disappear when an individual turns 18.” 543 U.S. at 574. Hairston has failed to present any 
legal authority to show the immaturity he exhibited as an adult provides him special immunity 
from the bright-line rule excluding juveniles from the death penalty who were under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the capital offense. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s rejection of 
Hairston’s request for a special exemption from the categorical rule.  
Finally, Hairston asks this Court to remand the case because the district court applied an 
incorrect legal standard in evaluating his claim. Hairston claims the district court erred by 
employing “a presumption in favor of the State,” under which the court was “obligated to seek 
an interpretation” that foreclosed the aggrieved party’s claims and only granted relief “in clear 
cases.” Hairston also asserts that based on the vast body of uncontested evidence proving the 
merits of his first claim, he is entitled to relief as a matter of law. Hairston’s arguments are 
unconvincing.  
While “a court is required to accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true,” it 
“need not accept the petitioner’s conclusions.” Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 
112 (2001). The district court appropriately analyzed the facts presented and came to its own 
conclusion as to the lack of a consensus in support of abolishing the death penalty for those 
under the age 21 years based on evolving standards of decency. Further, even if the district court 
applied the incorrect standard to reach this conclusion, remand is unnecessary because we have 
reviewed the constitutional issues decided today under an independent, de novo standard of 
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review. State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, 82, 383 P.3d 1249, 1252 (2016) (quoting Draper, 151 
Idaho at 598, 261 P.3d at 875).  
We likewise reject Hairston’s request to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. 
Hairston argues that if we accept all of his allegations as true and draw all inferences liberally in 
his favor, he has presented extensive information to suggest there is a consensus against 
executing adolescents, which warrants an evidentiary hearing. Hairston’s argument ignores the 
fact that the Court must “express its own independent determination” about what categories of 
defendants are shielded from the death penalty by the evolving standards of decency. Hall v. 
Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 710 (2014). This is a question of law, which is suitable for disposition on 
the pleadings and the facts in the record. Matthews v. State, 113 Idaho 83, 85, 741, P.2d 370, 372 
(1987) (citing Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469, 491 P.2d 733 (1971)). As we held above, we 
continue to follow the Supreme Court’s holding in Roper, that 18 years is the minimum age for a 
person against whom the death penalty may be imposed. 
C. 
Hairston had no right to consideration of the special sentencing factors 
applicable to juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen because he was 
nineteen at the time of his offense. 
As a second basis for relief, Hairston argues that because of his age he was 
constitutionally entitled to probing consideration of the features associated with youthfulness 
before he received his punishment. In support of his argument, Hairston relies on case law that 
has been specifically limited to adolescent offenders under the age of eighteen. Mainly, Hairston 
relies on Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), in which the U.S. Supreme Court set 
forth specific factors the judge must consider when sentencing juvenile offenders under 18 years 
of age to life without parole. Hairston acknowledges that Montgomery concerned offenders 
under the age of 18 at the time of their offense, but reiterates his argument that the 18-year-old 
cutoff for capital cases is no longer consistent with evolving standards of decency. We have 
already rejected this claim on the merits. Hairston was 19 at the time of his offense, thus, the 
sentencing factors specifically applicable to defendants under the age of 18 at the time of their 
offense do not apply to Hairston’s case.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hairston’s petition for post-conviction relief.   
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices BRODY, STEGNER and MOELLER, CONCUR.