Case Title: State v. Anderson

Citation: 137 N.W.2d 781

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1965-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
137 N.W.2d 781 (1965) STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Andrew Elias ANDERSON, Appellant. No. 39484. Supreme Court of Minnesota. November 5, 1965. Thomas J. Burke, St. Paul, for appellant. Robert W. Mattson, Atty. Gen., Linus J. Hammond, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, John E. MacGibbon, County Atty., Elk River, for respondent. OTIS, Justice. Defendant appeals from a conviction for committing incest with his 17-year-old daughter. The incidents constituting the crime are alleged by the daughter to have occurred over a period of 5 years, during which time with infrequent exceptions the father, daughter, her two brothers, a sister, and stepmother were living together in close proximity in the same farmhouse. The daughter charges that the acts complained of took place in rooms immediately adjacent to a central kitchen at times when the stepmother was physically present in the home. Nevertheless, there was no corroborative evidence, direct or circumstantial, to prove that the father actually had relations with her on any specific occasion, let alone "practically every night" as the daughter testified. She charged that the intercourse occurred in her bedroom, her father's bedroom, and in the living room. Yet there was no testimony by either the stepmother, the brothers, or the sister that any of them entertained the slightest suspicion that defendant was guilty of such misconduct during the period it is alleged to have occurred. At most, the stepmother, who was divorced from the defendant at the time of trial, stated she had seen the father improperly fondle his daughter and in her presence enter the daughter's bedroom when she was bathing. The sons not only contradicted this testimony but categorically denied a charge by the daughter that her father had exposed himself in their presence *782 or had made obscene references to their comparative manliness. This matter represents a classic conflict between a frustrated daughter and an unduly strict father. The record discloses that the father's suspicion that his daughter was having illicit relations with a neighbor boy was subsequently confirmed by a brother. In a fit of anger the father struck her. A few weeks later, she left home, provoking from him an intemperate and vindictive letter accusing her of promiscuity. The fact that she was thus stung by the treatment she had received, considered in the light of a mental or emotional instability which shortly thereafter prompted her confinement for psychiatric treatment, tends to discredit her testimony to a point where, in our opinion, there must be a new trial. Apart from the fact that the father had remarried before his divorce was final and as a result was convicted of bigamy, the evidence discloses no prior record whatever of any sexual aberration or any other history reflecting on his character. During all of this 5-year period when the daughter claims her father had intercourse with her "practically every night," she made no complaint to her friends, her teachers, her stepmother, her brothers, her aunts, or any other relative in whom it would be natural to confide, notwithstanding the fact she knew "it wasn't right" and testified she "fought back." Her testimony indicates that no measures whatever were taken to prevent conception, yet she never became pregnant. Nor did the state produce any medical testimony to prove through a physical examination that the daughter had ever previously had sexual intercourse with anyone.[1] 1. The problems inherent in cases of this kind have not been better stated than by Mr. Justice Mitchell in State v. Connelly, 57 Minn. 482, 485, 59 N.W. 479, 481: In recognition of the role which psychological factors play in provoking charges of sexual misconduct, there is a marked trend on the part of many courts and legislatures to insist on corroboration in prosecutions for such offenses.[2] The considerations which have prompted these safeguards have been thoroughly considered by Dean Wigmore in 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3 ed.) § 924a, to which we have made passing reference in State v. Wulff, 194 Minn. 271, 274, 260 N.W. 515, 516: *784 Dean Wigmore in support of his views quotes the following from Dr. Karl A. Menninger (p. 463): 2. In an atmosphere as highly charged with emotion as the prosecution of a father for violating his daughter, where the corroboration is as deficient as in this case, we consider an incident in which the clerk of court wept openly in the presence of the jury as a matter of serious consequence. While ordinarily it would probably not be sufficient to warrant a new trial, considered with what we regard as inadequate proof of the crime, we find it constitutes substantial prejudice. State v. Schwartz, 266 Minn. 104, 113, 122 N.W.2d 769, 775. We have held in a long line of cases that where this court entertains grave doubt as to defendant's guilt the interests of justice require that there be a new trial.[4] This is such a case. We believe a conviction under the circumstances recited can only be sustained upon clear and convincing evidence which we find lacking in this record.[5] We have considered the other assignments of error and find them to be without merit. Reversed and new trial granted. [1] People v. Porcaro, 6 N.Y.2d 248, 251, 189 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196, 160 N.E.2d 488, 489; People v. Oyola, 6 N.Y.2d 259, 260, 189 N.Y.S.2d 203, 205, 160 N.E.2d 494, 496. [2] People v. Oyola, 6 N.Y.2d 259, 262, 189 N.Y.S.2d 203, 205, 160 N.E.2d 494, 496; 26 Brooklyn L.Rev. 135. State v. Witmer, 174 Neb. 449, 455, 118 N.W.2d 510, 514, a strikingly similar case, held: "* * * Judith [aged 17] alleges that defendant had frequent acts of sexual intercourse with her for 3 or 4 years and admits that she complained to no one, not even to her mother. "The crime charged against the defendant, if true, indicates complete moral depravity. It offends the moral senses of the public from which juries are drawn and tends to create sympathy for a young girl alleging a grievance of this magnitude against her own father. The penalty for such a crime is commensurate with the nature of the crime and, if the crime be established, a severe penalty is required to be assessed. But a defendant cannot be properly convicted on the evidence of the prosecutrix alone. There must be corroborative evidence pointing to the guilt of the defendant of the specific crime charged. In the absence of sufficient corroborating evidence, the protection of the innocent demands that the prosecution must fail for want of competent proof. We find the evidence of corroboration to be insufficient to sustain a finding of guilt by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." See, also, Foster and Freed, Offenses Against the Family, 32 U. of Mo. at Kansas City L.Rev. 33, 60; Savage, Corroboration in Sexual Offences, 6 Criminal L.Q. 282, 310; Williams, Corroboration Sexual Cases, 1962 Criminal L.Rev. 662: "On a charge of a sexual offence, such as rape, indecent assault, or homosexual offence, it is the practice to instruct the jury that it is unsafe to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of the alleged victim. There is sound reason for this, because sexual cases are particularly subject to the danger of deliberately false charges, resulting from sexual neurosis, phantasy, jealousy, spite, or simply a girl's refusal to admit that she consented to an act of which she is now ashamed. Of these various possibilities, the most subtle are those connected with mental complexes." The Arizona court has observed (Power v. State, 43 Ariz. 329, 332, 30 P.2d 1059, 1060): "If proof of opportunity to commit a crime were alone sufficient to sustain a conviction, no man would be safe." 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3 ed.) § 2062; Annotations, 60 A.L.R. 1124 and 74 A.L.R. 2d 705. [3] See, also, Overholser, Psychiatry's Contributions to Criminal Law and Procedure, 12 Okla.L.Rev. 13, 22. [4] State v. Iago, 66 Minn. 231, 68 N.W. 969; State v. Cowing, 99 Minn. 123, 108 N.W. 851; State v. McLarne, 128 Minn. 163, 168, 150 N.W. 787, 789; State v. Steeves, 130 Minn. 53, 152 N.W. 1103; State v. Jacobson, 130 Minn. 347, 352, 153 N.W. 845, 847; State v. Edmons, 132 Minn. 465, 156 N.W. 1086; State v. Nyhus, 176 Minn. 238, 222 N.W. 925; State v. Wulff, 194 Minn. 271, 273, 260 N.W. 515, 516; State v. Star, 248 Minn. 571, 81 N.W.2d 94. See, also, People v. Casillas, 60 Cal. App. 2d 785, 794, 141 P.2d 768, 772. [5] People v. Christie, 16 A.D.2d 598, 600, 229 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781; People v. Griffin, 17 A.D.2d 658, 230 N.Y.S.2d 354; Louis v. State, 92 Okl.Cr. 156, 167, 222 P.2d 160, 165; Foster and Freed, Offenses Against the Family, 32 U. of Mo. at Kansas City L.Rev. 32, 47.