Case Title: People v. Smith

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86775

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 86775-Agenda 2-September 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								DAVID SMITH, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 1, 2000.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, David Smith, appeals from an order of the circuit
court of Cook County dismissing his amended petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Because
defendant was sentenced to death for the underlying convictions,
his appeal lies directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND 
	This court has previously set forth the evidence presented at
defendant's trial in our opinion on defendant's first direct appeal.
See People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229 (1992). Therefore, we discuss
only those facts and evidence necessary to the disposition of this
appeal. Defendant's convictions arise from the murder of Lisa
Ferguson. On the evening of March 17, 1987, defendant entered
the home where the victim was staying, and beat, strangled and
stabbed her multiple times, while her four-year-old cousin hid in
a bedroom. In addition, defendant sexually penetrated the victim's
anus. Defendant was subsequently arrested and provided a
statement in which he admitted killing the victim. A jury found
defendant guilty of first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual
assault, and home invasion. At a separate sentencing hearing, the
same jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty, and
further found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to
preclude the imposition of the death penalty. Defendant was
sentenced to death.
	On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant's convictions,
but vacated defendant's sentence and remanded the cause for a
new sentencing hearing, due to the circuit court's failure to "life-qualify" the jury, pursuant to Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992). Smith, 152 Ill. 2d  at 274.
On remand, defendant waived a jury for sentencing and the same
judge that presided over defendant's trial again imposed the death
penalty for defendant's murder conviction. This court affirmed
defendant's death sentence. People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 261
(1997). On December 21, 1995, defendant filed a pro se petition
for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1998)). Thereafter, on
December 6, 1997, defendant filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief. After hearing arguments, the circuit court denied
defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing.
ANALYSIS 
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a remedy to
criminal defendants who claim that substantial violations of their
federal or state constitutional rights occurred in their original trial
or sentencing hearing. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502
(1998). An action for post-conviction relief is not an appeal from
the underlying judgment, but rather a collateral proceeding.
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502. A post-conviction proceeding allows
inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the conviction and
sentence that have not been, and could not have been, adjudicated
previously on direct appeal. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502.
	A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition as a matter of right. People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 427-28 (1998). Rather, an evidentiary hearing is warranted
only where the allegations of the post-conviction petition,
supported where appropriate by the trial record or accompanying
affidavits, make a substantial showing that the defendant's
constitutional rights have been violated. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 428.
In determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pled facts in the petition and any accompanying affidavits are
taken as true. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503. A trial court's dismissal
of a post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing is
reviewed de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 389 (1998).


I. Timeliness of Post-Conviction Petition


	The State contends in its brief that defendant did not file his
petition within the time limitations prescribed by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1998)).
At oral arguments, however, the State conceded that defendant
did, in fact, file his petition in a timely manner. Therefore, we do
not address this issue.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
	Defendant raises a series of challenges to his trial counsel's
performance. A defendant is guaranteed the effective assistance of
counsel at trial and at a death sentencing hearing. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692-93, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063-64 (1984). To establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove both deficient
performance and prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.
	In order to satisfy the deficient-performance prong of
Strickland, a defendant must show that his counsel's performance
was so inadequate that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Counsel's
performance is measured by an objective standard of competence
under prevailing professional norms. Further, in order to establish
deficient performance, the defendant must overcome the strong
presumption that the challenged action or inaction may have been
the product of sound trial strategy. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83,
93 (1999); People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 73-74 (1997). Matters
of trial strategy are generally immune from claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432 (1999).
	In order to establish prejudice, a defendant must prove that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. A reasonable probability is defined as a probability
that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Thus,
the defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance
rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding
fundamentally unfair. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 93; Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 
at 74. A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test.
People v. Mahaffey, No. 85215, slip op. at 15 (October 13, 2000).
If a defendant cannot establish that he suffered prejudice, a court
need not determine whether counsel's performance was
constitutionally deficient. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 74.
A. Pretrial Errors
	Defendant maintains that his counsel was ineffective in
presenting his motion to suppress a statement that defendant gave
at police headquarters on the night of March 17, 1987, in which he
confessed to the murder of Lisa Ferguson.
	Defendant contends that his counsel failed to introduce
corroborating testimony relating to the claim that his confession
was coerced. Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to suppress
defendant's statement, arguing that it was coerced. In support of
this motion, defense counsel offered testimony from Josephine
Palomino, defendant's girlfriend. She stated:
		"I heard David Smith [at the police station]. He was
yelling, screaming. He was swearing, telling the police
officers-well, I would take it for granted it was the police
officers-to leave him alone, not to touch him, to get away
from him, and he was calling for me. I want to talk to
Josie. I want to talk to Josie. I want to see Josie."
In denying the motion, the trial judge stated:
		"There is absolutely no evidence indicating that there was
any physical abuse in this case, and I think that the
pictures [of defendant] bear this out, that there was no
physical abuse seen in those photographs. *** Assuming
arguendo that there were loud voices raised *** the
Petitioner does not by this type of testimony meet his
burden indicating that *** the statement was not freely
and voluntarily given.
			Where a defendant has made a statement and later has
had an opportunity to reflect on that statement and consult
with his advisors, be they attorneys or other people he
comes into contact with, he shortly realizes that his mere
denial is not going to be enough. He must show
something else.
			Well, I don't think that there is any evidence in this
case that the statement was other than free and voluntary."
Defendant now argues that the trial judge's decision would have
been different had defense counsel offered additional evidence
from Rose Palomino, Josephine Palomino's mother. At trial, Rose
Palomino testified: "I heard [defendant] yelling for Josie, calling
her name, let me see Josie, let me see Josie, and he said, get your
'F'ing hands off of me."
	This argument is waived. Rose Palomino's testimony was part
of the record on direct appeal. Accordingly, this claim could have
been raised at that time. See Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502-03 (issues
that could have been presented on direct appeal but were not, are
waived). However, defendant contends that his appellate counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.
	Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are
measured against the same standard as those dealing with
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 435. "A
defendant who contends that appellate counsel rendered
ineffective assistance, e.g., by failing to argue an issue, must show
that the failure to raise that issue was objectively unreasonable and
that the decision prejudiced the defendant. Appellate counsel is not
obligated to brief every conceivable issue on appeal, and it is not
incompetence of counsel to refrain from raising issues which, in
his or her judgment, are without merit, unless counsel's appraisal
of the merits is patently wrong. Accordingly, unless the underlying
issues are meritorious, defendant has suffered no prejudice from
counsel's failure to raise them on appeal. People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 175 (2000); People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 435 (1999)
(and cases cited therein)." People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 328-29 (2000).
	In examining the claim on the merits, however, we find that
defendant's argument fails. The trial judge was clear in his finding
that, even assuming that there were "loud voices raised," such
evidence did not satisfy defendant's burden of proof to show that
his statement was not freely and voluntarily given. Rose
Palomino's testimony does not significantly differ from Josephine
Palomino's testimony and is merely cumulative. Thus, based on
the trial judge's statements, we do not believe that this additional
testimony by Rose Palomino would have convinced the trial judge
that defendant met his burden in showing that his statement was
not voluntary. There was no reasonable probability that the
outcome of defendant's motion to suppress would have been
different. Defendant has therefore failed to establish that he
suffered prejudice as required by Strickland, and his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim fails.
	With regard to the same suppression hearing, defendant next
argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
testimony that defendant was under the influence of phencyclidine
(PCP) at the time he gave his statement, and that counsel failed to
present expert testimony relating to the effects of PCP. To support
the argument that he was, in fact, under the influence of PCP when
he made his statement at the police station, defendant attaches the
affidavits of two friends who were with defendant on the day of
the murder, Efren Ramirez and Manuel Ramirez. In addition,
defendant attaches an affidavit from Dr. Bruce Perry discussing
how use of PCP could have affected defendant's ability to make
a free and voluntary statement.
		The affidavits on which defendant relies to support the
argument that he was under the influence of PCP are insufficient
to make a substantial showing that his right to effective assistance
of counsel has been violated. In these affidavits, defendant's
friends stated that, on the day of the murder, they drank alcohol
and smoked marijuana with defendant. Manuel Ramirez stated that
"Eddie had mentioned" that PCP was present in the marijuana.
Edward Ramirez stated that "there was PCP in the pot, you could
taste it. I can tell the difference blindfolded." Thus, evidence of
defendant's alleged PCP inhalation boils down to Edward
Ramirez's contention that defendant inhaled PCP because Edward
"can tell the difference [between marijuana and PCP]
blindfolded." We reject defendant's claim that these affidavits
"clearly prove" that defendant had ingested PCP at the time of the
murder. To the contrary, we find that the statement that Edward
Ramirez "can tell the difference blindfolded" is speculative and
insufficient to establish that defendant was under the influence of
PCP. Thus, even if defendant's counsel would have presented the
testimony of these two friends of defendant, we do not believe the
result of suppression hearing would have differed. Defendant has
not established that he suffered prejudice from his counsel's
failure to present the testimony of Efren Ramirez and Manuel
Ramirez. Therefore, defendant did not receive ineffective
assistance of counsel.
	 Defendant next claims that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to present any evidence in support of a motion counsel filed
to suppress additional statements made by defendant at his
apartment. At the suppression hearing on this motion, Officer
Daniel Simon and Detectives John McCann and John Koclanis
testified that, after leaving the crime scene on March 17, 1987,
they proceeded to defendant's apartment as part of their homicide
investigation. When they arrived at defendant's building, Officer
Simon and his partner walked through a gangway and heard an
argument between a woman, later identified as Josephine
Palomino, and a man, later identified as defendant. They went
through a door at the rear of the building which led into a vestibule
area. At that time, the officers heard the following conversation:
			"Female: 'Where have you been tonight?'
			Male: 'I have been out.'
			Female: 'Where have you been tonight?'
			Male: 'I saw someone get killed tonight.'
			Female: 'Your clothes are all full of blood, are all full
of blood. You had something to do with it.'
			Male: 'I did it.' "
On defendant's first direct appeal, he argued that these statements
should have been suppressed because the officers violated the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 6, of the Illinois Constitution when they listened to this
conversation outside of defendant's apartment door. We held that
no fourth amendment "search" occurred because defendant did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversation.
Smith, 152 Ill. 2d  at 245. We found that: (1) the area where the
officers overhead the conversation was a common area; (2) the
area where the officers where standing when they overhead the
conversation was unlocked; (3) defendant's voice was raised; and
(4) the officers used no artificial means to enhance their ability to
hear, nor did they enter an area where they had no legal right to be.
Smith, 152 Ill. 2d  at 245-46.
	Defendant now claims that his counsel should have
introduced testimony from Josephine Palomino at the suppression
hearing. In support of this claim, defendant has attached an
affidavit from Josephine Palomino to his post-conviction petition,
in which she states that defendant never said "I did it." Palomino
also states that the apartment door was "always locked."
Defendant now argues that had this testimony been introduced at
the suppression hearing, the statement made at the apartment
would have been suppressed.
	We find that, even if defendant's statement "I did it" was
suppressed, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of
defendant's trial would have been different. Defendant made
another statement at the police station confessing to the murder of
Lisa Ferguson which included more detail than the mere statement
"I did it." That statement was written by an assistant State's
Attorney, signed by defendant and introduced at trial. As we noted
in our opinion on defendant's direct appeal, the evidence against
defendant was overwhelming. See Smith, 152 Ill. 2d  at 269. In
light of the fact that this was not a closely balanced case, we
conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome
of defendant's trial would have been different had the challenged
statement never been admitted. Therefore, we find that defendant
suffered no prejudice as a result of the claimed error. Mahaffey,
slip op. at 19.
B. Trial Errors
a. Intoxication Defense
		Defendant next contends that his trial counsel failed to
adequately investigate and present evidence that would have
supported an intoxication defense at trial. Defendant claims that
had trial counsel presented testimony as to defendant's drugged
and intoxicated condition on the night of the murder, he would
have had a basis for an affirmative defense of voluntary
intoxication or a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter.
According to defendant, "testimony regarding [defendant's] drug
and alcohol ingestion would have established the defense of
voluntary intoxication and would have reduced [defendant's] legal
culpability for the alleged crime."
	In support of this argument, defendant offers the affidavits of
Efren Ramirez and Manuel Ramirez, as well as an affidavit from
Edward Ramirez. As we have discussed previously in this opinion,
the affidavits of Edward and Manuel Ramirez are insufficient to
establish that defendant was under the influence of PCP at the time
of the murder. Moreover, while Edward Ramirez's affidavit states
that he and defendant smoked marijuana on the day of the murder,
it does not mention anything about PCP. Thus, we do not agree
with defendant's claim that the evidence contained in these three
affidavits "establish" that defendant was under the influence of
marijuana and PCP. Rather, we find that the evidence that
defendant was under the influence of PCP is speculative and
inconclusive.
	Moreover, even if defendant had conclusively established that
he had taken PCP on the day of the murder, the evidence would
have been insufficient to support an affirmative defense of
voluntary intoxication. In People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43 (1991),
rev'd & rem'd, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222
(1992), the defendant claimed that he used cocaine and heroin on
the night that he committed several murders, and that he used
PCP, marijuana and heroin the following day. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 
at 71. A defense expert testified to the effects of the drugs. On
appeal, this court held that it did not believe that any rational jury
would have found the defendant's attempt to raise an intoxication
defense credible. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d  at 86. We found that the
defendant was presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequence of his acts and that such a presumption was
supported by the defendant's written and oral statements in which
he stated his intent to kill the victim. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d  at 87.
We also noted that the detail of defendant's recall in his statements
to the police showed that he was acutely aware of his
surroundings. Finally, we found that those who observed
defendant on the night of the crimes stated that he appeared to
have no difficulty speaking or walking. Thus, we held that the jury
would not have believed that the defendant was not capable of
acting intentionally. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d  at 87.
	Similarly, in this case, even if the jury believed that defendant
had used PCP on the day of the murder, we cannot conclude that
the jury would have found that defendant did not intend to cause
the death of the victim. In his statement to the police, defendant
stated that he initially went to the apartment where the victim was
staying to steal a VCR. When he learned that the victim was home,
he left. Defendant stated that he then "walked around for a while
*** then decided to go back to the apartment," and that "he didn't
know why he went back up to the apartment except that he must
have intended to kill [the victim]." Defendant was able to recall
the events of the murder when giving his statement.
	Further, those who were with defendant on the night of the
murder stated that he did not appear overly intoxicated. Max
Ferguson, the victim's brother, testified that he saw defendant at
Bucko's tavern on the evening of the murder and he did not see
him slurring his speech, swaggering or stumbling, but that he only
noticed that defendant was "being loud." Carlos Moya testified
that on the evening of the murder, although defendant appeared to
be "under the influence" of alcohol because his words were not
completely clear, he did not appear to be intoxicated. Juanita Soto
testified that defendant was at a bar before the murder and that
defendant was "feeling good," "somewhat intoxicated," and that
"you could say" that he was slurring his words, but that he was not
stumbling or swaying. Officer Simon, one of the patrol officers
who assisted in the homicide investigation, testified that around10
p.m. on the night of the murder, defendant did not appear
intoxicated, but rather "seemed normal in every respect. There was
no slurred speech, no bloodshot eyes *** no staggering or
stumbling" and no smell of alcohol. Officer Simon stated that
defendant did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs.
Finally, the assistant State's Attorney who took and drafted
defendant's statement on the night of the murder wrote that
defendant appeared to be free from the effects of alcohol and drugs
and testified that, while he did not specifically ask defendant,
"there was no overt notice" that defendant was under the
influence.
	Defendant relies on People v. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 18 (1986).
Wright, however, is inapposite to the case at bar. In Wright,
evidence existed to show that the defendant was not guilty of
murder, of which she was convicted, but rather of involuntary
manslaughter due to her intoxication at the time that she shot and
killed her daughter. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d  at 29. At the evidentiary
hearing on defendant's petition for post-conviction relief,
defendant's attorney testified that he did not raise the defense of
intoxication because he thought that "the defense of drunkenness
*** is that you have to be drunk to the extent that you have no
recall of the facts." We found that this was a misapprehension of
the law and was not the result of trial tactics or strategy. Wright,
111 Ill. 2d  at 27. Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing on
defendant's post-conviction petition, the trial judge stated that
" 'the outcome would have been different, and I can say with a
certainty because I heard the case, the outcome would have been
different had I heard the evidence that I heard today. I would have
rendered a judgment of guilty of involuntary manslaughter.' "
Wright, 111 Ill. 2d  at 31. We determined that this was a "classic
demonstration" that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the
result of the trial would have been different. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d  at
31.
	Unlike Wright, nothing in the case at bar suggests that
defendant's counsel misunderstood the law regarding voluntary
intoxication. There was simply not enough evidence to support a
defense of voluntary intoxication. Any evidence with regard to
defendant's intoxication is speculative and inconclusive. In fact,
the majority of the evidence tends to show that defendant was not
intoxicated when he committed the murder. Therefore, we do not
find Wright to be pertinent to the case at bar.
	In light of all of the evidence, we believe that, as in Jackson,
evidence of defendant's intent is apparent. Defendant has not
established that he suffered prejudice from his counsel's failure to
present evidence in support of a voluntary intoxication defense, as
required by Strickland. Even if defendant's counsel had offered the
evidence that defendant seeks, we cannot conclude that there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different.
b. Insanity Defense
	In a related argument, defendant claims that counsel was
ineffective for failing to present an insanity defense. In support of
this contention, defendant attaches an affidavit from Dr. Bruce
Perry, a psychiatrist with a degree in neuropharmacology, which
states that, in his opinion, defendant "was intoxicated with drugs
(especially PCP); he was responding to internal processes without
adequate ties to reality. In essence he was operating under a
condition of extreme mental disturbance," and that his judgment
was "severely impaired" at the time of the murder. Defendant
argues that this affidavit, in combination with the evidence that
defense counsel presented at the resentencing hearing, supports the
contention that his counsel should have requested a bifurcated trial
and presented an insanity defense along with the defense theory
presented at trial.
	At defendant's resentencing hearing, Dr. George Savarese, a
licensed clinical social worker who completed a comprehensive
psycho-social developmental history of defendant, testified that,
based on two interviews with defendant and review of interviews
with his family and friends, he concluded that defendant had a
"borderline personality disorder." Savarese further testified that it
was "very feasible that [defendant] could have slipped into [a]
transient psychotic state" during the murder. In describing what a
"transient psychotic state" is, Savarese stated:
		"an individual can decomponsate into a psychotic state
*** they're on a continuum from obviously normal to
actually insane, and most individuals fall somewhere in
the middle probably *** although borderline is not
psychotic, particularly in and of itself, [an individual with
borderline personality disorder] can slip into a psychotic
state where they're completed detached at least for a
limited amount of time from reality."
This evidence does not constitute a substantial insanity defense.
The Criminal Code of 1961 states that "[a] person is not criminally
responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result
of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct." 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a)
(West 1998). Though the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt each element of the offense charged, "the burden of proof is
on the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity." 720 ILCS
5/6-2(e) (West 1998).
	In People v. Wilson, 191 Ill. 2d 363 (2000), the defendant
claimed that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate
and present an insanity defense. Evidence suggested that defendant
suffered from epilepsy, was probably mildly retarded and may
have been suffering form an extreme mental or emotional
disturbance at the time of the murder. We held that the sum of this
evidence would not have placed a reasonable attorney on notice
that an insanity defense was viable because "nothing in
defendant's records provides any indication that his mental
problems would meet the definition of legal insanity." Wilson, 191 Ill. 2d  at 372.
	As in Wilson, we find that defendant's "borderline personality
disorder" does not rise to the level of insanity. In order to enter the
apartment where the victim was staying, defendant pretended to be
the victim's brother. After committing the murder, defendant went
to his apartment and tried to wash the blood out of his clothes.
Clearly, this is a person who appreciated the criminality of his
conduct.	Therefore, we find that defendant's counsel was not
ineffective for failing to present an insanity defense.

c. Prosecution Closing Argument
	Next, defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to a portion of the State's closing argument
during defendant's trial. Though this argument is waived due to
defendant's failure to raise it on direct appeal, defendant avoids
the waiver rule by arguing that his appellate counsel was
ineffective for raising the issue on appeal. See People v.
Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371-72 (1996).
	After the murder, the victim was found lying face down on the
kitchen floor of the apartment where she was staying. Her shirt
was pulled above her waist and her pants and underwear were
pulled away from her body and caught around her right ankle. The
victim's naked buttocks were lying on a curling iron.
	During closing argument, the prosecution stated:
		"Counsel makes a big tado [sic] about why the curling
iron was not uncovered. Well, ladies and gentlemen, I
submit to you in their wildest dreams after all their years
of experience, would [sic] never have thought this curling
iron could have been used in such a horrible fashion as
this Defendant used it. So that perhaps using hindsight,
the curling iron has become more important than it was
then, but you can insure [sic], ladies and gentleman, this
is not an ordinary situation, this is not an ordinary way to
use a curling iron."
Defendant argues that because the State presented no evidence that
"conclusively established" that defendant forcibly penetrated the
victim's anus with a curling iron, the argument was improper.
	A prosecutor is given great latitude in making closing
arguments. People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 127-28 (2000). A
prosecutor may comment on the evidence and all reasonable
inferences stemming from the evidence. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 127.
An argument that serves no purpose other than to inflame the jury,
however, is error. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d  at 128.
	At trial, Dr. Nancy Jones, a forensic pathologist who
examined the victim's body after her death testified: "A laceration
is a tear of the skin caused by separation and pulling. These were
located around the circumference of [the victim's] anus. While
checking the anus, I noticed that it was gaping; that there was
some bloody fluid within the opening and also that there was a tear
or laceration inside the anus in the mucosa or the lining surface of
the rectum." Jones also testified that the victim's injuries would be
consistent with a forced entry of the anus by an object such as a
curling iron, an object of the same shape or size as a curling iron,
or a penis.
	In addition, the State introduced several pictures of the victim.
In those pictures, the victim is lying face down on the floor, with
her shirt pulled above her waste, her jeans and underwear pulled
away from her body and caught around her right ankle, and her
lower torso and buttocks lying on a curling iron. Officer Sharon
Gaynor, one of the first police officers to arrive at the scene,
testified that she found the victim in that manner.
	From the record, the statements made by the prosecutor
during closing argument were a reasonable inference from the
evidence. Jones testified that the victim's injuries were consistent
with forced entry of the victim's anus by a curling iron. Further,
photographs published to the jury showed the victim's lower torso
and buttocks lying on a curling iron.
	Defendant's reliance on People v. Linscott, 142 Ill. 2d 22
(1991), and People v. McCollum, 239 Ill. App. 3d 593 (1992), is
misplaced. In Linscott, the State introduced evidence that the
defendant's hairs were consistent with hairs found at the scene of
the crime. The State's witness stated that one could not determine
from whose head the hair found at the crime scene came, but only
that the hair was consistent with the defendant's hair. In total,
three witnesses testified that they could not conclusively identify
the hairs as coming from the defendant. In closing argument,
however, the prosecutor argued repeatedly that the defendant's
hair was found in the victim's apartment and on her body. This
court held that, because there was no evidence to support these
statements, the prosecution's argument was improper.
	In People v. McCollum, 239 Ill. App. 3d 593 (1992), the
prosecutor clearly misstated the evidence adduced at trial. The
prosecutor stated in closing argument that there was a "definite
match" between tire marks found near the scene of the crime and
the tires belonging to the defendant's car. The testimony at trial
did not establish that the tire prints "matched," but only that they
resembled each other. McCollum, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 599.
Moreover, the prosecutor stated that blood found on a glove in the
defendant's car belonged to the victim. The testimony at trial,
however, did not establish that the blood came from the victim,
but rather that the blood could have come from the victim or 40%
of the general population. The prosecutor also improperly
appealed to the passions of the jurors and argued the defendant's
convictions to show propensity, when those convictions were
introduced at trial for the limited purpose of impeachment.
McCollum, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 600. The court noted that, when
viewed separately, the comments would not constitute reversible
error. McCollum, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 597. However, the court
found that the totality of the improper comments did constitute
reversible error. McCollum, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 597.
	Unlike the situations in Linscott and McCollum, the
prosecutor in the case at bar did not misstate the evidence. The
prosecutor argued reasonable inferences that were supported by
the evidence adduced at trial. Therefore, defendant's appellate
counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this argument on
appeal.


C. Sentencing Errors


	With regard to sentencing, defendant first contends that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present
mitigation testimony at his resentencing hearing. Initially,
defendant contends that his counsel failed to investigate and
present evidence that defendant was under the influence of PCP on
the day of the murder and evidence relating to the effects of PCP.
In support of the argument that he was under the influence of PCP
at the time of the murder, defendant again offers the affidavits of
the three friends who were with defendant on the day of the
murder, Manuel Ramirez, Efren Ramirez and Edward Ramirez.
	We initially note that defendant's claim that trial counsel "did
not even speak to any of the individuals that [defendant] was with
that day" is not entirely correct. Manual Ramirez states in his
affidavit that he spoke with investigators working for defense
counsel. Efren and Edward Ramirez do not state whether or not
they spoke with defense counsel or his team. Therefore, we cannot
assume that defense counsel failed to interview these witnesses.
	Further, as we have concluded, the affidavits from defendant's
friends regarding his alleged use of PCP is speculative and
insufficient to establish that defendant was under the influence of
PCP. George Savarese testified at defendant's resentencing
hearing that defendant's friend Efren Ramirez mentioned that
defendant had smoked marijuana that was laced with PCP on the
day of the murder. Thus, in addition to being speculative, the
evidence that defendant claims was lacking is cumulative.
Accordingly, we find that, even if the judge had heard the
additional evidence from defendant's friends, there is no
reasonable probability that the result of defendant's sentencing
would have been different. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 354-55 (2000); People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 490-91
(1996). Defendant cannot establish that he suffered prejudice as a
result of counsel's failure to present additional evidence of
defendant's PCP use on the day of the murder, and, as a result, his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. Thus, defendant has
failed to establish that his defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to present evidence as to the effects of PCP.
	Defendant also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing "to present a complete picture of David Smith's tumultuous
upbringing" at defendant's resentencing hearing. Specifically,
defendant claims that counsel should have presented evidence that:
(1) defendant's father disciplined him by whipping him; (2)
defendant was physically and verbally abused by his stepmother;
(3) at the age of 10, defendant engaged in a sexual relationship
with his 18-year-old baby-sitter; (4) defendant was forced to take
baths with his siblings as an adolescent; (5) when defendant was
sent to a detention center, he did not want to return home; and (6)
defendant's brother introduced him to drugs, including PCP, when
defendant was 15 years of age. Defendant points to new affidavits
from his sister, his father and the mother of his son that establish
these facts.
	We disagree with defendant's contention that his trial counsel
failed to present a complete picture of defendant's upbringing. At
defendant's resentencing hearing, his counsel and the State
stipulated to the testimony of defendant's brother, James Smith,
which was given at defendant's first sentencing hearing. James
Smith testified that their stepmother did not love them like she
loved her own children, that "the punishments were a little
different," that she struck all the children, including defendant, and
that she hit them with a broom handle. Moreover, he testified that
defendant liked the juvenile detention center where he was sent
more than his home. With regard to defendant's drug use, James
Smith testified that defendant drank, smoked marijuana and took
"acid" beginning in late junior high school or early high school
and that he was personally aware of defendant's use of PCP from
17 years of age on. Defendant's mother also testified to his
marijuana and acid use.
	During defendant's resentencing hearing, Savarese testified to
a comprehensive psycho-social developmental history of the
defendant which he completed. To complete that evaluation,
Savarese reviewed interviews with defendant's mother, father,
half-brother and sister. He testified that, according to defendant's
siblings, defendant's father was "very abusive" and that "there was
physical abuse."
	Savarese also testified that defendant's father admitted that he
beat defendant with a belt on his back and legs, and that
defendant's sister stated that their stepmother would hit defendant
with a board, one time even breaking it on him. He also testified
that defendant's sister stated that "we had to take baths in pairs up
until the time that I was 15 years old." Finally, Savarese testified
about defendant's drug use, stating that defendant "had been
experimenting early on with drugs in the beginning around 11 or
12 years old, and that he had used a variety of substance, anything
from LSD, PCP, marijuana, cocaine, alcohol, heroin, acid,
hallucinogenic mushrooms."
	The evidence offered at defendant's resentencing hearing
establishes that defense counsel presented a complete picture of
defendant's upbringing. The information that defendant claims
was lacking was presented through the testimony of his brother
and Savarese. Any additional testimony regarding defendant's
childhood would have been cumulative. There is no reasonable
probability that introduction of this cumulative evidence would
have altered the result of defendant's resentencing hearing. See,
e.g., Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d at 354-55; Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 490-91.
Thus, defendant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel fails.
	Defendant next claims ineffective assistance of counsel for his
trial counsel's failure to investigate and present witnesses to rebut
aggravating evidence of defendant's conduct while incarcerated.
Defendant argues that two employees of the Illinois Department
of Corrections, Charles Margherio and Robert Ellinger, should
have been called to testify to defendant's positive behavior in
prison. Specifically, defendant presents affidavits from those two
employees which state that: (1) defendant exhibited good
behavior, was polite, did not cause problems, and showed respect
for authority; (2) Margherio never wrote defendant a disciplinary
ticket; and (3) Margherio believed that defendant could adjust well
to incarceration and would not be a danger to other inmates.
	At defendant's resentencing hearing, his counsel and the State
stipulated to the testimony of Timothy Martin, a jail supervisor
who testified at defendant's first sentencing hearing. Martin
testified that defendant was a volunteer worker in the prison, that
his work was satisfactory, that he got along with the other
volunteer workers, that he was polite, courteous, helpful, and
cooperative, and that he was not involved in a gang, but rather
associated with other inmates who stayed out of trouble. Martin
also stated that he never wrote defendant a disciplinary ticket, that
defendant became a Christian while in prison, that he attended
Bible studies and "witnessed" his faith to other inmates, and that
he kept himself and his area neat. Finally, Martin testified that, in
his opinion, defendant would be able to succeed in an
institutionalized setting.
	Again, we find that the evidence defendant claims was lacking
is cumulative. Martin testified to everything that Charles
Margherio and Robert Ellinger stated in their affidavits. In fact,
Martin testified to much more than defendant's cooperation and
good behavior. He presented evidence on defendant's new
commitment to Christianity while incarcerated and his lack of
gang activity. We find that, due to the cumulative nature of this
evidence, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of
defendant's proceeding would have been different had his counsel
introduced it. Therefore, defendant's counsel was not ineffective
for failing to present this additional evidence.
	Defendant relies on People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138 (1995),
and People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148 (1994), to support his
claim that he should have received an evidentiary hearing due to
his counsel's failure to introduce mitigating evidence. In Orange,
defense counsel presented no witnesses in mitigation. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d  at 166. Such is not the case here. Defendant's counsel here
offered a significant amount of evidence in mitigation on
defendant's behalf.
	Moreover, in People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148 (1994),
defense counsel presented only one witness at the defendant's
sentencing hearing-the defendant's wife. Counsel in that case
submitted numerous letters in support of the defendant, but those
letters came from people who did not appear to know the
defendant well. Significantly, in that case, the defendant submitted
a number of affidavits of his family and friends who stated that
they were not contacted by defense counsel prior to the sentencing
hearing. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d  at 166. Here, as noted, defendant's
counsel presented several witnesses on defendant's behalf at the
resentencing hearing. Savarese, who testified on defendant's
behalf, spoke with almost all of the potential witnesses that
defendant claims could have provided mitigating evidence and
offered testimony about those interviews. The evidence that
defendant claims was absent fails to provide any substantial
additional mitigation evidence. Rather, as indicated, much of the
information in the affidavits is cumulative.
	We cannot agree with defendant's contention that but for his
counsel's failure to present evidence of other mitigating factors,
defendant would not have been sentenced to death. In aggravation,
the trial court heard, inter alia, that defendant stated that he was
"glad" that the victim had died because he "didn't want her to live
remembering how bad he had beaten her." Moreover, the court
heard evidence that the victim suffered at least 29 blunt trauma
injuries, three stab wounds, two incised wounds, numerous
bruises, abrasions and hemorrhages, and anal injuries which were
consistent with forcible penetration of her anus. In sentencing
defendant to death, the trial judge stated that he believed this case
to be "exceptionally brutal" and he could not remember a case
where the facts were more aggravated. We find that the evidence
defendant complains was lacking would have had minimal impact
in defendant's sentencing hearing. Thus, even taking all of the
affidavits as true, we believe that the trial court properly denied
defendant an evidentiary hearing. Defendant has failed to make a
substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated.
People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 428 (1998).
III. Constitutionality of the Illinois Death Penalty Statute
	Defendant makes several arguments challenging the
constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute. The circuit
court held that these claims were waived; however, defendant
argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for his failure to
raise these issues on direct appeal. This court has previously
rejected the arguments that the Illinois death penalty statute is
unconstitutional because: it fails to limit the nonstatutory
aggravating factors which may be considered by the sentencing
authority (see, e.g., People v. Williams, No. 85453, slip op. at 53-54 (October 13, 2000); it fails to require written findings with
regard to nonstatutory aggravating factors (see, e.g., People v.
Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173-74 (1997)); it places a judicial
function in the prosecutor (see, e.g., Williams, slip op. at 53); and
it shifts to the defendant the burden of proving that a sentence
other than death is appropriate (see, e.g., Williams, slip op. at 54).
Defendant offers no new or compelling reasons for reconsideration
of these decisions. Therefore, defendant's counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise these issues.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit
court dismissing defendant's amended post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing. We direct the clerk of this court to
enter an order setting Wednesday, March 28, 2001, as the date on
which the sentence of death entered by the circuit court of Cook
County shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the
manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The
clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this
case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms
Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where
defendant is now confined.
Affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree that Smith's convictions should not be disturbed. In
my view, however, his sentence of death cannot be allowed to
stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and
partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois
death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV)
and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §2). Smith's sentence of death should therefore be
vacated and he should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1998).