Case Title: Tweedy v. State

Citation: 380 Md. 475

Docket Number: 35/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 100263024
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 35
September Term, 2003
______________________________________________
MILLARD TWEEDY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
______________________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
Harrell, J., concurs
_______________________________________________
Filed:    April 6, 2004
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and
conference of this case while an active member of this Court;
after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV,
Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of
this opinion.
1Petitioner appeared in court with his co-defendant.  Petitioner and the co-defendant
entered guilty pleas, and the judge accepted both pleas.
Millard Tweedy, petitioner, appeals his sentence for possession with intent to
distribute controlled dangerous substances on the grounds that the sentence was illegal
because it did not conform to the plea agreement and because the trial court sentenced him
in absentia.  Because we find that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City imposed a sentence
which exceeded the terms of the plea agreement, we shall vacate the sentence and remand
for resentencing.
I.  Background
Petitioner was indicted by the Grand Jury for Baltimore City on the charges of
possession of controlled dangerous substances, possession with intent to distribute,
conspiracy to distribute, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to
possess marijuana.  On April 16, 2001, petitioner appeared in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City with his defense counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.1  In accordance with Maryland Rule 4-242,
defense counsel examined Tweedy, on the record in open court, in order for the court to
determine that the plea of guilty was voluntary, with understanding of the nature of the
charge and consequences of the plea.  Defense counsel advised Tweedy of the consequences
of his plea and the terms of the plea agreement.  The colloquy proceeded as follows:  
“[Defense Counsel]:  The maximum penalty for possession with
intent to distribute marijuana is five years incarceration, I
2The sentencing date was originally scheduled for July 26th but was changed to
August 2nd.  It is undisputed that petitioner was served with notice of the new date.
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believe, and a five thousand dollar fine.  You have entered into
a plea agreement, Mr. Tweedy, whereby you would receive a
sentence of five years, suspend all but six months with two
years probation.  However —
 [State’s Attorney]:  As a cap.
[Defense Counsel]:  That is a cap.  However, if you do certain
things, that would turn into a complete parole or probation, do
you understand that?
[Defendant]:  Yes.”
The State proffered the factual basis upon which to accept the plea and the court stated, on
the record, “accept the pleas.”  The court concluded the proceedings with the following
remarks:
“Based on the plea agreement and the statements by [the
Assistant State’s Attorney], the court finds with respect to Mr.
Tweedy on Count 1.  
* * *
What the court is going to say is that — I don’t know whether
I  will say it again on July 26th — I hope this works out.  If you
come back and things have worked out as we hope, the sentence
will be five years suspended and two years probation.  If it is
not as we hope it to be, the sentence on July the 26th will be
five years suspend all but six months.  If you don’t show up at
all and you have fulfilled your end of the agreement and you’re
not able to be here or not here on July the 26th at 9:30 and we
have to send out a warrant, the sentence will be five years.”  
Sentencing was scheduled for July 26, 2001.
At 9:30 a.m., the morning of the sentencing, petitioner was nowhere to be found.2
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The court recessed the proceedings to enable defense counsel to locate his client.  Defense
counsel later advised the court that he learned that his client was on his way to the
courthouse.  At 2:00 o’clock that afternoon, petitioner still had not appeared and the judge
commenced to sentence Tweedy in absentia.  The court stated as follows:
“But I compliment counsel making every effort this morning.
It is unfortunate, but with Mr. Tweedy’s previous history, the
Court had been concerned as to whether he was going to appear
at the time of sentencing.  And the agreement was very clear
that, if he appeared, it would be five years, suspend all but six
months, two years probation, and that, if he did not appear, the
Court would sentence him anyway.
* * *
The Court will always consider a motion to modify, but, in
these circumstances where we permit persons to get their life
together before coming to court, this Court has never deviated.
And the deal is if he shows, one thing if he doesn’t.
So in accordance with the Court’s previous
understanding, the sentence is five years.”
Defense counsel subsequently filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, requesting
that, in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the court sentence petitioner to a
term of five years with all but six months suspended.  Although counsel requested a hearing,
the judge denied the motion without a hearing.  
Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  In an unreported
opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed.  This Court granted Tweedy’s petition
for writ of certiorari.  See Tweedy v. State, 376 Md. 49, 827 A.2d 112 (2003).
II.  Plea Agreement
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The first question we address is whether the trial court imposed a sentence beyond
the terms of the plea agreement.  Whether a plea agreement has been violated is a question
of law which we review de novo.  In considering whether a plea agreement has been
violated, several courts have noted that the terms of the plea agreement are to be construed
according to what a defendant reasonably understood when the plea was entered.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Johnson, 973 F.2d 857, 860 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v.
Jimenez, 928 F.2d 356, 363 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 854, 112 S. Ct. 164, 116 L.
Ed. 2d 129 (1991)).  When a guilty plea is predicated upon an agreement, the agreement
must be fulfilled.  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499, 30 L. Ed.
2d 427, 433 (1971).   Plea bargains have been likened to contracts, which cannot normally
be unilaterally broken with impunity or without consequence.  See State v. Parker, 334 Md.
576, 604, 640 A.2d 1104, 1118 (1994) (stating that “contract principles should generally
guide the determination of the proper remedy of a broken plea agreement” yet “contract
principles alone will not suffice”); United States v. Sandles, 80 F.3d 1145, 1147 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating that “plea bargains are contracts, albeit ‘unique contracts in which special due
process concerns for fairness and the adequacy of procedural safeguards obtain’”).  In the
instant case, in denying the defense request for a hearing on the Motion to Correct an Illegal
Sentence, the trial court did not make any factual findings as to the terms of the plea
agreement.  Based on the record presented, we conclude that the trial court did not impose
a sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. 
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The State argues that the plea agreement had not yet been accepted when the judge
announced that petitioner’s presence at sentencing was required in order for him to receive
a sentence of five years, either all suspended, or all but six months suspended.  According
to the State, the trial court added that condition as the court was accepting the plea.  The
judge stated that the sentence would be based upon whether petitioner cooperated with the
authorities and, regardless of his cooperation, if he failed to appear, the sentence would be
five years.  The State argues that the judge added the condition of petitioner’s presence at
sentencing while the judge was in the process of accepting the agreement (with that
condition included).  In the alternative, the State argues that petitioner consented to this
condition because he failed to object to it.
Petitioner argues that his appearance at sentencing was not part of the negotiated plea
agreement with the State.  The judge accepted the guilty plea and the terms of the agreement
— then, he sua sponte added that if petitioner did not appear at sentencing, the sentence
would be five years in prison.  Petitioner points out that his lawyer, while conducting the
guilty plea litany in open court, stated the terms of the agreement — without that condition
— on the record.  The judge accepted the plea, stating “[b]ased on the plea agreement and
the statements by [the prosecutor].”  Thus, petitioner argues, the judge approved the plea
agreement at that point, subsequently adding the requirement of petitioner’s appearance at
the sentencing hearing, thereby unilaterally and improperly changing the terms of the
negotiated, and approved, plea agreement.  Petitioner argues that his failure to object to this
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added condition does not matter because the plea agreement that was stated on the record
during the guilty plea litany became fully enforceable when the judge accepted it.
Plea agreements are an accepted procedure throughout the United States and are
recognized as an important component of the criminal justice system.  See Santobello, 404
U.S. at 260, 92 S. Ct. at 498, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 432 (approving plea bargaining, stating that the
process “is an essential component of the administration of justice”); Chertkov v. State, 335
Md. 161, 170, 642 A.2d 232, 237 (1994); Dotson v. State, 321 Md. 515, 516-18, 583 A.2d
710, 710-11 (1991).  The Supreme Court held that “when a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”  Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262,
92 S. Ct. at 499, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 433.
Maryland Rule 4-243(c) sets forth the procedures to be followed when the prosecutor
and defendant have entered into a plea agreement.  The Rule, in pertinent part, provides as
follows:
“(c) Agreements of sentence, disposition, or other judicial
action.
(1) Presentation to the court. If a plea agreement has been
reached pursuant to subsection (a) (1) (F) of this Rule for a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere which contemplates a particular
sentence, disposition, or other judicial action, the defense
counsel and the State’s Attorney shall advise the judge of the
terms of the agreement when the defendant pleads. The judge
may then accept or reject the plea and, if accepted, may approve
the agreement or defer decision as to its approval or rejection
until after such pre-sentence proceedings and investigation as
the judge directs.
-7-
(2) Not binding on the court. The agreement of the State’s
Attorney relating to a particular sentence, disposition, or other
judicial action is not binding on the court unless the judge to
whom the agreement is presented approves it.
(3) Approval of plea agreement. If the plea agreement is
approved, the judge shall embody in the judgment the agreed
sentence, disposition, or other judicial action encompassed in
the agreement or, with the consent of the parties, a disposition
more favorable to the defendant than that provided for in the
agreement.
(4) Rejection of plea agreement. If the plea agreement is
rejected, the judge shall inform the parties of this fact and
advise the defendant (A) that the court is not bound by the plea
agreement; (B) that the defendant may withdraw the plea; and
(C) that if the defendant persists in the plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the sentence or other disposition of the action may
be less favorable than the plea agreement. If the defendant
persists in the plea, the court may accept the plea of guilty only
pursuant to Rule 4-242(c) and the plea of nolo contendere only
pursuant to Rule 4-242(d).”
Petitioner negotiated a plea agreement that contemplated a particular sentence.  Once
the plea was accepted, the court was required to impose the agreed upon sentence, assuming
that all the conditions imposed upon the defendant were fulfilled.  See State v. Poole, 321
Md. 482, 497, 583 A.2d 265, 272 (1991) (holding that when a court has accepted a guilty
plea and has committed itself to be bound by the provisions contained within the plea
agreement, the judge cannot refuse to carry out the bargain that induced the plea).  Under
the plain text of the Maryland Rules, plea negotiations are recognized and sanctioned.  Rule
4-243(c)(3) requires that “the judge shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence,
disposition, or other judicial action encompassed in the agreement or, with the consent of
the parties, a disposition more favorable to the defendant than that provided for in the
3The State does not argue that the defendant’s presence at sentencing is a condition
implicit in every plea agreement.
-8-
agreement.”
The parties do not dispute that the judge explicitly accepted petitioner’s guilty plea.
The parties also do not dispute that the judge approved the plea agreement, rather than
rejecting it or deferring its approval or rejection to a later date.  The disagreement concerns
the timing of and manner in which the judge approved the plea agreement.  These factors
— the “when” and “how” of the approval — dictate whether petitioner’s presence at
sentencing was a condition of the plea agreement or a requirement which the judge
unilaterally imposed after the agreement had been approved.3
We find that defense counsel clearly and unambiguously stated the terms of the plea
and the anticipated length of the sentence on the record.  Defense counsel stated that
Tweedy’s sentence was “capped” at five years, all but six months suspended with two years
probation, with the understanding that if he cooperated and performed “certain things,” the
sentence would be “complete parole or probation.”  The trial court accepted the plea
agreement, and the guilty plea, and only then warned Tweedy of the consequences of his
failure to appear at sentencing.  These consequences were discussed with Tweedy after the
court accepted his plea.  While terms and consequences may be imposed as a condition of
accepting a guilty plea, it may be done only before the plea is accepted, not after.  When the
parties agree as part of a plea bargain to an increase in the sentence if the defendant does not
-9-
appear for sentencing, that provision is valid and enforceable.  See, e.g., United States v.
Rivera, 954 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that reasonable meaning of plea
agreement was that defendant’s failure to appear for sentencing would release the
government from its obligation to recommend a sentence reduction); State v. Holman, 486
So. 2d 500, 503 (Ala. 1986) (holding that defendant tendered guilty plea with full
knowledge of trial judge’s condition that defendant appear for sentencing and therefore plea
agreement with that condition was enforceable); People v. Masloski, 25 P.3d 681, 687 (Cal.
2001) (holding that provision for an increased sentence in the event defendant failed to
appear for sentencing was part of the plea agreement); State v. Garvin, 699 A.2d 921, 930
(Conn. 1997) (holding that plea bargain did not violate due process when defendant agreed
to condition that trial court could impose greater sentence if defendant failed to appear at
sentencing); Jones v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Ky. 1999) (holding that
condition of plea agreement providing for a recommended sentence reduction only in the
circumstance that defendant appeared for sentencing was a lawful condition).  But, the
condition providing for an increase in the sentence must be an express term of the plea
bargain, clearly agreed upon before the guilty plea is accepted.
A defendant who does not appear for sentencing does not automatically forgo the
protection of Rule 4-243(c)(3).  Whether a defendant is entitled to the benefit of the bargain
is determined by whether the defendant has fulfilled his or her obligation under the
agreement.  Absent a specific term of the agreement that appearance at sentencing is part of
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the agreement, failure to appear at sentencing may constitute a separate violation of the law,
see, e.g., Md. Code (2001, 2003 Cum. Supp.) § 5-211(b) of the Criminal Procedure Article,
or contempt of court, see Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2003 Cum. Supp.) § 1-202 of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, but a sanction for the defendant’s non-
appearance may not be repudiation of the plea bargain. 
Courts that have considered this issue have distilled principles to guide their analysis
and treatment of plea agreements in the context of a defendant’s nonappearance at
sentencing.  See, e.g., People v. Casillas, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 290, 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
First, when a defendant does not appear at sentencing after entering a negotiated plea, and
no specific sanction or consequence is mentioned for nonappearance, if the court refuses to
honor the plea agreement, Rule 4-243 has been violated and the defendant is entitled to a
remedy.  Second, the same is true when, during the plea proceedings but after the parties
have negotiated the basic plea agreement, the court unilaterally imposes an additional
condition providing a sanction for nonappearance.  Finally, when the parties themselves
agree as part of the plea agreement to a specific sanction for nonappearance, and the court
accepts the plea in accordance with the agreement, the defendant is subject to the bargained-
for sanction and is not entitled to any remedy.  The important point is that the condition must
be an integral part of the plea agreement and agreement must be reached before the plea was
accepted, not after.
Several courts around the country have considered this issue and have reached a
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similar conclusion.  See, e.g., People v. Masloski, 25 P.3d 681 (Cal. 2001); People v.
Casillas, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Valentine v. State, 736 So. 2d 706 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Rossman, 722 N.E.2d 1216 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Boyd v.
State, 10 S.W.3d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).  But see United States v. David, 58 F.3d 113,
115 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that although the plea agreement between defendant and the
government did not address the effect of defendant absconding before sentencing, implicit
in every plea agreement is the requirement that the defendant appear for sentencing and
failure to do so relieves the government of the obligation to recommend a reduction in
sentence).  
Petitioner requests specific performance of the plea agreement.  In this State, it is well
settled that where the defendant has not received the benefit of a plea bargain to which he
is entitled, the defendant ordinarily may elect to have the bargain specifically enforced or
withdraw the guilty plea.  See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 259, 278, 747 A.2d 1199,
1209 (2000) (remanding to the lower courts with instructions to specifically enforce an
agreement breached by the State); State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 699-700, 357 A.2d 376,
384 (1976); Miller v. State, 272 Md. 249, 255, 322 A.2d 527, 530 (1974).  We said in
Jackson, as follows:
“The basic ground rules governing the negotiation and
enforcement of plea agreements were set out in Brockman, as
to which the Court summarized: ‘the standard to be applied to
plea negotiations is one of fair play and equity under the facts
and circumstances of the case, which, although entailing certain
contract concepts, is to be distinguished from . . . the strict
-12-
application of the common law principles of contracts.’ Thus,
it is now well settled in this State that ‘when a plea bargain has
been agreed to by both a proper representative of the State and
a defendant, and is not in violation of any law or public policy
of this State, it would be a grave error to permit the prosecution
to repudiate its promises in a situation in which it would not be
fair and equitable to allow the State to do so.’”
Jackson, 358 Md. at 275, 747 A.2d at 1207 (citation omitted).
Although in this case it was the court which failed to abide by the bargain, not the
prosecutor, the choice of remedy is the same.  See Poole, 321 Md. at 496, 583 A.2d at 272;
United States v. Ritsema, 89 F.3d 392, 402 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court
improperly rescinded its prior approval of a plea agreement and, on remand for resentencing,
ordering specific enforcement of plea agreement); State ex rel. Brewer v. Starcher, 465
S.E.2d 185, 198 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that where trial court unilaterally modified a
previously accepted plea agreement, defendant was entitled to specific performance of the
agreement if, on remand, evidence failed to show that defendant  misrepresented facts to the
court); People v. Danny G., 461 N.E.2d 268, 271 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that specific
performance of plea agreement was proper remedy where court breached plea agreement by
refusing to impose the agreed upon sentence).
Petitioner has requested specific performance of the plea agreement with respect to
the agreed upon sentence.  He is entitled to the benefit of his bargain.  We shall vacate the
sentence imposed by the trial court and remand for resentencing consistent with the plea
agreement and this opinion.
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III.  Sentencing in Absentia
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him in absentia.  He maintains
that, first, the record does not support a finding that his right to be present at sentencing was
voluntarily waived; and second, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to consider
deferring the sentencing proceeding until he was brought before the court.
When petitioner did not appear for sentencing, the trial court imposed a sentence of
five years incarceration, forfeited petitioner’s bail, and issued a bench warrant.
Subsequently, defense counsel filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.  Defense counsel
argued that the sentence imposed by the court violated the plea agreement and requested an
opportunity to present evidence to support his proffer that petitioner’s failure to appear at
sentencing was attributable to an alcohol problem and “bouts of forgetfulness caused by a
prior assault.”  The trial court denied the motion, without a hearing.
We hold that the trial court erred in denying petitioner a hearing on his Motion to
Correct Illegal Sentence, thereby denying him an opportunity to explain his absence from
the sentencing proceeding.  Assuming that the trial court had the discretion to sentence
petitioner when he did not appear, when petitioner was apprehended and brought before the
court, petitioner should not have been precluded from explaining his absence.  A defendant’s
explanation of his absence, and the trial court’s finding of fact in this regard, is an important
component of the evidence available to a reviewing court in determining whether it was
-14-
error to sentence a defendant in absentia.  See Fennell v. State, 492 N.E.2d 297, 299 (Ind.
1986).
Maryland has long recognized the right of a criminal defendant to be present at every
stage of the trial.  See Collins v. State, 376 Md. 359, 375, 829 A.2d 992, 1001 (2003) (citing
Pinkney v. State, 350 Md. 201, 208-09, 711 A.2d 205, 209 (1998)); Williams v. State, 292
Md. 201, 211, 438 A.2d 1301, 1306 (1981) (pointing out that a criminal defendant’s right
to be present at every stage of the trial is a common law right).  The Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”  This right of confrontation, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965),
encompasses the right of a defendant in a criminal case to be present at every stage of the
trial.  See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 356
(1970).  Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights requires that “in all criminal
prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
Thus, the right to be present at trial is provided for and protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the
common law.  It is implemented by Maryland Rule 4-231. 
Rule 4-231 addresses the presence of the defendant.  The Rule provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
4The predecessor of Rule 4-231, prior Maryland Rule 724, explicitly stated that “[t]he
defendant shall be present at every stage of the trial, including the impaneling of the jury and
the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as provided by these
Rules.”  The committee note to Rule 4-231 and Rule 724 states that except when specifically
covered by the Rule, the matter of presence of the defendant is left to case law, and the Rule
is not intended to exhaust all situations.  The change in language of Rule 4-231 was not
intended to be a substantive change to exclude the right of a defendant to be present at
sentencing.
The Maryland Rules are replete with references to the defendant’s rights at
sentencing, as well as the court’s obligations at sentencing.  For example, before sentence
is imposed, the defendant has the right to allocute.  Rule 4-342(f) provides that “[b]efore
imposing sentence, the court shall afford the defendant the opportunity, personally and
through counsel, to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of
punishment.”  (Emphasis added.)  Rule 4-342(i) requires that at the time of sentencing, the
court shall advise the defendant of any appeal rights, sentence modification and reduction
rights, and time limits for ordering a transcript after filing an appeal.  In drug cases, Rule 4-
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“(a) When presence required. A defendant shall be present at all
times when required by the court.  A corporation may be present
by counsel. 
(b) Right to be present — Exceptions. A defendant is entitled to
be present at a preliminary hearing and every stage of the trial,
except (1) at a conference or argument on a question of law; (2)
when a nolle prosequi or stet is entered pursuant to Rules 4-247
and 4-248; or (3) at a reduction of sentence pursuant to Rules
4-344 and 4-345. 
(c) Waiver of right to be present.  The right to be present under
section (b) of this Rule is waived by a defendant: 
(1) who is voluntarily absent after the proceeding
has commenced, whether or not informed by the
court of the right to remain; or 
(2) who engages in conduct that justifies
exclusion from the courtroom; or 
(3) who, personally or through counsel, agrees to
or acquiesces in being absent.” 
Although the Rule does not state explicitly that the defendant has the right to be present at
sentencing,4 “every stage of the trial” includes sentencing.  See, e.g., Bartholomey v. State,
340 requires the court, immediately after sentencing the defendant, to take certain reporting
steps with respect to any license a defendant holds if the defendant has a prior conviction,
or if the court determines that there is a relationship between the current conviction and a
license.  The defendant would have a right to participate in this hearing.
5The issue of sentencing in absentia has been addressed in the federal courts and in
many of our sister states.  The legal effect of the absence of the defendant at sentencing has
had a checkered history.  See Annot., Voluntary Absence of Accused When Sentence is
Pronounced, 59 A.L.R. 5th 135 (1998, updated 2003).  The majority view is that a defendant
may waive or forfeit the right to be present at sentencing.  See, e.g., People v. Williams, 151
P.2d 244, 247 (Cal. 1944); Capuzzo v. State, 596 So. 2d 438, 440 (Fla. 1992); Byrd v.
Ricketts, 213 S.E.2d 610, 611 (Ga. 1975); State v. Fry, 602 P.2d 13, 17 (Haw. 1979); People
v. Nielson, 718 N.E.2d 131, 145 (Ill. 1999); Harrison v. State, 707 N.E.2d 767 (Ind. 1999);
Carter v. Commonwealth, 782 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Ky. 1989); People v. Palmerton, 503
N.W.2d 663, 664 (Mich. App. 1993); People v. Corley, 491 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (N.Y. 1986);
State v. Wanosik, 31 P.3d 615, 620 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), aff’d by State v. Wanosik, 79 P.3d
937, 941 (Utah 2003).
The minority view is that sentencing may never occur in a defendant’s absence,
irrespective of whether the defendant is absent voluntarily.  See, e.g., State v. Utecht, 36
N.W.2d 126, 131 (Minn. 1949); State v. Ernest, 264 N.W.2d 677, 679 (Neb. 1978); State
v. Koopmans, 563 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Wis. 1997).  Other courts have held that sentencing in
absentia should only take place in the most extraordinary circumstances and only where it
would otherwise work an injustice.  See, e.g., State v. Fettis, 664 P.2d 208, 209 (Ariz. 1983);
State v. Braun, 853 P.2d 686, 690 (Kan. 1993).
Some states have statutes, rules, regulations, or constitutional provisions governing
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267 Md. 175, 187 n.6, 297 A.2d 696, 702 n.6 (1972) (stating that sentencing hearing is a
critical stage of the proceeding and the defendant is entitled to be present); State v. Ditmars,
567 P.2d 17, 19 (Idaho 1977) (stating that defendant has constitutional right to be present
at imposition of sentence); Jones v. Commonwealth, 317 S.E.2d 482, 483 (Va. 1984) (stating
that presence at every stage of trial includes sentencing).
The right to be present at trial is not absolute and may be waived. Similarly, in
Maryland, the right to be present at sentencing may be waived by a defendant.5
the sentencing of an absent defendant.  For example, the Commonwealth of Virginia
precludes by statute sentencing in absentia.  See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-237 (2000 Repl.
Vol., 2003 Cum. Supp.) (stating that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor shall not be
sentenced to jail in absentia).  The Court of Appeals of Virginia, finding that the policy
considerations against sentencing in absentia apply equally to felony cases, has extended this
per se rule to felony cases.  Head v. Commonwealth, 348 S.E.2d 423, 429-30 (Va. Ct. App.
1986).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 initially provided that a defendant may not be
sentenced in absentia, absent extraordinary circumstances.  See, e.g., United States v. Lastra,
973 F.2d 952, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that Rule 43 mandates that the defendant be
present “for all but the most ministerial of sentencing actions”); United States v. Ammar, 919
F.2d 13, 17 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that “[a]lthough sentencing in absentia should be
reserved for extraordinary circumstances, under certain circumstances a defendant may
waive his right to be present”); United States v. Songer, 842 F.2d 240, 244 (10th Cir. 1988)
(noting that “[t]he rule that the defendant must attend his sentencing is not subject to any
exception”); United States v. Brown, 456 F.2d 1112, 1114 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating that a
defendant may only waive his right to be present at sentencing “in the most extraordinary
circumstances, and where it would otherwise work an injustice . . . and then only under
appropriate safeguards, as where the defendant has expressly waived his right to be present
either by sworn affidavit or in open court for the record”).  The Rule was amended in 1995,
and now permits the district court to sentence a defendant who has pled guilty in absentia
when the defendant is voluntarily absent.  See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 216 F.3d 1248,
1249 (11th Cir. 2000). The revision created a sea change in the approach in federal courts
to sentencing in absentia, precipitating a change from an almost absolute ban on sentencing
in absentia to one within the discretion of the trial court.
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In Pinkney v. State, 350 Md. 201, 711 A.2d 205 (1998), we reviewed a defendant’s
right to be present in the context of the guilt-innocence stage of the proceedings.  A
defendant is entitled, under Rule 4-231, under Maryland common law, and as a
constitutional right, to be present at trial.  Id. at 208, 711 A.2d at 209.  That right, however,
may be waived.  At least with respect to trial proceedings, we established in Pinkney that
when faced with the nonappearance of a defendant, “before a court may find an agreement
or an acquiescence to trial in absentia, the court must generally be satisfied of two primary
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facts: that the defendant was aware of the time and place of trial, and that the nonappearance
was both knowing and sufficiently deliberate to constitute an agreement or acquiescence to
the trial court proceeding in his or her absence.”  Id. at 215-16, 711 A.2d at 212.  Once the
court finds that the defendant’s nonappearance was voluntary, the inquiry is not at an end.
The court must then “balance two competing interests: the right of the defendant to be
present at trial, and the need for the orderly administration of the criminal justice system.”
Collins, 376 Md. at 376, 829 A.2d at 1002 (quoting Pinkney, 350 Md. at 213, 711 A.2d at
211).
The clear message is that trial in absentia is not favored and that it “should be the
extraordinary case, ‘undertaken only after the exercise of a careful discretion by the trial
court.’”  Pinkney, 350 Md. at 221, 711 A.2d at 215 (quoting In re Dunkerley, 376 A.2d 43,
48 (Vt. 1977)).  See also State v. Fettis, 664 P.2d 208 (Ariz. 1983).  A court must consider
all relevant circumstances and then exercise its discretion in deciding whether to proceed.
Although not mandating consideration of any particular factors in determining whether to
proceed without the defendant, we noted with approval the factors set out in United States
v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1210 (2d Cir. 1972), including “the likelihood that the trial could
soon take place with the defendant present; the difficulty of rescheduling, particularly
multiple-defendant trials; [and] the burden on the Government in having to undertake two
trials.”  Pinkney, 350 Md. at 219-20, 711 A.2d at 214.  We also emphasized that “the public
interest and confidence in judicial proceedings is best served by the presence of the
-19-
defendant at trial.”  Id. at 218, 711 A.2d at 214.
Like the right to be present at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the right to be
present at sentencing may be waived by the defendant’s voluntary absence from the
sentencing proceedings.  Although Pinkney dealt with waiver of the right to be present at
trial, our reasoning applies to sentencing in absentia.  See Commonwealth v. Hilburn, 746
A.2d 1146, 1149 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (noting that in assessing the propriety vel non of
sentencing in absentia, the court uses the same analysis as it does for absence at trial).  A
judge may not automatically conclude voluntariness based solely on the unexplained absence
of a defendant who has been notified of the date and time of sentencing.  See Collins, 376
Md. at 376, 829 A.2d at 1002.
Under Rule 4-231, petitioner could properly be sentenced in absentia.  A trial judge
has the discretion to sentence a defendant in absentia.  A trial court’s finding of waiver,
however, does not require but merely permits the court to proceed in the defendant’s
absence.  See Barnett v. State, 307 Md. 194, 213, 512 A.2d 1071, 1080-81 (1986) (noting
that a trial court which has concluded that a defendant’s absence was voluntary is not
compelled to conduct a trial in absentia but may exercise discretion and postpone the trial
until the defendant is apprehended).
Where the court finds that the defendant has voluntarily absented himself from the
sentencing proceedings, the court may proceed in the defendant’s absence after
consideration and balancing of factors, including the additional burdens, waste, and expense
-20-
inflicted upon the court, the State, and witnesses, and the likelihood of apprehending the
defendant within a reasonable time.  The factors that bear on the exercise of discretion and
underlie the decision to proceed with the trial in the defendant’s absence are rarely present
in determining whether to proceed to sentence in absentia.  See Head v. Commonwealth, 348
S.E.2d 423, 430 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that unlike the decision to proceed with the
non-appearing defendant at trial, none of the relevant factors are present at sentencing; loss
of witnesses, multiple-defendant issues, juror inconvenience, and difficulty of rescheduling
are all not present).
At most sentencing proceedings, the loss of witnesses, the difficulty of rescheduling
the case,  the issue of multiple defendants, or other prejudices to the State are rarely a factor
and generally are not a compelling reason to proceed with the sentencing in the defendant’s
absence.  On the other hand, an indefinite delay in sentencing, precipitated by the
defendant’s misconduct, might be severely prejudicial to the State.  An open-ended
postponement of the sentencing could interfere significantly with the orderly judicial process
in that the appeal date is extended indefinitely and if the case were to be reversed years later,
the State might be at severe disadvantage for retrial.  See United States v. Jordan, 216 F.3d
1248, 1251 (11th Cir. 2000).  In addition, a verdict of guilty is not a final judgment until
sentence is pronounced, and if a defendant were to flee to a jurisdiction where no extradition
treaty or convention provides for surrender of the defendant, the defendant could potentially
avoid a conviction.
-21-
There are many benefits to requiring that a defendant be present at sentencing,
particularly when incarceration is to be imposed.  There are benefits to the State as well as
the defendant.  The State benefits by the defendant’s presence for several reasons.  First, if
incarceration is imposed, the defendant is present and may immediately be taken into
custody.  Second, the presence of the defendant makes him or her publicly accountable for
the criminal conduct.  In the oft-cited Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing
for Felony, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 821 (1968), the author commented on the value to society of
the defendant’s presence at sentencing, as well as the benefit to the defendant, as follows:
“Presence is of instrumental value to the defendant for the
exercise of other rights, such as to present mitigating evidence
and challenge aggravating evidence, and it may also be
advantageous to him that the decision maker be required to face
him.  The state may have an interest in the presence of the
defendant in order that the example of personal admonition
might deter others from similar crimes.
***
However, there is an additional and perhaps more fundamental
justification for the right to be personally present.  Respect for
the dignity of the individual is at the base of the right of a man
to be present when society authoritatively proceeds to decide
and announce whether it will deprive him of life or how and to
what extent it will deprive him of liberty.  It shows a lack of
fundamental respect for the dignity of a man to sentence him in
absentia.  The presence of the defendant indicates that society
has sufficient confidence in the justness of its judgment to
announce it in public to the convicted man himself.  Presence
thus enhances the legitimacy and acceptability of both sentence
and conviction.”
Id. at 831 (footnotes omitted).  It has been said that the defendant’s presence at sentencing
“encourages public confidence in the fairness of the proceedings.”  United States v. Lastra,
6The right of allocution existed at common law.  See Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344,
355, 509 A.2d 120, 125 (1986) (noting that allocution permits a defendant to inform the
court of any mitigating factors relevant to sentencing, or simply to plead for leniency);
United States v. Waters, 158 F.3d 933, 943 (6th Cir. 1998) (defining “allocution” as the
opportunity for the defendant personally to speak to the court before sentence is imposed).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “allocution,” 
inter alia, as an unsworn statement, not subject
to cross-examination, from a convicted defendant to the sentencing judge or jury in which
the defendant “can ask for mercy, explain his or her conduct, apologize for the crime, or say
anything else in an effort to lessen the impending sentence.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 75
(7th ed. 1999).
-22-
973 F.2d 952, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  While victims of crime in Maryland have a right to be
heard at sentencing, see Md. Code (2001, 2003 Cum. Supp.) § 11-403 of the Criminal
Procedure Article, and a defendant’s failure to appear is disturbing, disruptive, and
frustrating for victims, as well as the court, the victims are often better served by having the
defendant hear their words and the impact of the crime.  See State v. Wanosik, 79 P.3d 937,
945 (Utah 2003) (Nehring, J., concurring).
Sentencing in absentia has many disadvantages.  Rule 4-342, governing sentencing
procedure in non-capital cases, contemplates the defendant’s presence, affording the
defendant the right to allocute and to present mitigating evidence.6  In addition, the Rule
requires the trial judge to advise the defendant of important procedural rights which are
triggered by the imposition of sentence, such as the right of appeal, to any sentence review
under the Review of Criminal Sentences Act, any right to move for modification or
reduction of sentence, and the time allowed for the exercise of these rights.  The court must
7We take no position and make no comment on what is known as the “automatic
dismissal” rule, see United States v. Ortega-Rodriguez, 13 F.3d 1474 (11th Cir. 1994), or
the “escape rule,” see Thompson v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, 39 F.3d 186
(8th Cir. 1994).  See also Annot., Application of Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine in Federal
Criminal Cases, 179 A.L.R. Fed. 291 (2002, updated 2003).  The Supreme Court reiterated
in Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 242, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 1204, 122 L. Ed.
2d 581, 593 (1993), that where a defendant becomes a fugitive from justice during the
pendency of an appeal, the appellate court has the authority to dismiss the appeal.  The Court
noted that dismissal after a defendant has fled the jurisdiction serves an important deterrent
purpose and “advances an interest in efficient, dignified appellate practice.”  Id. at 242, 113
S. Ct. at 1204-05, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 593.
-23-
also inform the defendant of the requirement of ordering a transcript if an appeal is filed.7
We need not address in the instant matter whether the trial court made an adequate
inquiry into whether petitioner’s absence was voluntary because the sentence, in any case,
must be vacated and petitioner is entitled to have the sentence imposed in accordance with
the plea agreement.  It is clear from the record, however, that the trial court did not consider
postponing the sentencing until petitioner was apprehended on the bench warrant and
returned to court.  Assuming arguendo that petitioner voluntarily waived his presence, the
trial judge did not consider anything other than petitioner’s nonappearance in deciding to
sentence him in absentia.  The instant case is one in which the court, had it considered all
of the relevant factors, might well have concluded that adjournment for a reasonable period
of time to apprehend petitioner and to bring him before the court was more appropriate than
sentencing petitioner in absentia. The court could have ascertained, from petitioner himself,
whether he had in fact complied with the terms of the plea agreement.
There was nothing extraordinary about this particular case.  Petitioner pled guilty and
8Justice Nehring, in his concurring opinion in State v. Wanosik, 79 P.3d 937, 945
(Utah 2003), noting that sentencing in absentia is a seldom used practice, sounded the
caution bell that sentencing in absentia “should, except in highly unusual circumstances,
continue to be avoided by trial judges.” 
-24-
was convicted of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute.  There were no
individual victims who had an interest in testifying at the sentencing.  See Md. Code (2001,
2003 Cum. Supp.) §11-403 of the Criminal Procedure Article (affording the victim or
victim’s representative the right to address the court during sentencing).  In addition, the
likelihood was great that sentencing could have taken place without inordinate delay, with
petitioner present.  There was no evidence that petitioner had absconded from the
jurisdiction and no reason to believe that a bench warrant would not have brought him
promptly before the court.  A bench warrant twice in the past effectively prompted
petitioner’s appearance when he had failed to appear before the trial court on two previous
court dates.  The State had no need to summons witnesses and needed little time on the trial
court’s docket.
While we do not suggest that a defendant can never be sentenced in absentia,
sentencing in absentia should rarely occur.8  A defendant’s right to be present at every stage
of trial, his right of allocution, and the importance of notice of the date from which the time
limit on his appeal right begins to run, weigh heavily against sentencing in absentia.  It
should only be the “extraordinary case,” Pinkney, 350 Md. at 221, 711 A.2d at 215, where
proper exercise of judicial discretion results in sentencing in a defendant’s absence.
-25-
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
VACATE THE SENTENCE OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AND REMAND
TO THAT COURT FOR RESENTENCING IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS
IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.
-26-
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 35
September Term, 2003
______________________________________________
MILLARD TWEEDY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
______________________________________________
Concurring Opinion by Harrell, J.
______________________________________________
Filed:    April 6, 2004
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and
conference of this case while an active member of this Court;
after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV,
Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of
this opinion.
-27-
I concur in the judgment because I would conclude that the sentencing judge erred in
not conducting a hearing on Tweedy’s Motion To Correct Illegal Sentence (insofar as
Tweedy sought to offer reasons for his involuntary non-appearance at sentencing) and
thereby failed to engage in necessary fact-finding and the drawing of conclusions as required
by Pinkney (but see Majority slip op. at 23 where it avoids deciding directly this question
(“We need not address . . . whether the trial court made an adequate inquiry into whether
Petitioner’s absence was voluntary . . .”).  I hold this view notwithstanding the sentencing
judge’s apparent prior knowledge of similar reasons tendered for Tweedy’s earlier “no-
shows,” as well as the State’s express incredulity as to the contemporarily proffered reasons
(See Respondent’s Brief  at 23).  I have some problems with a number of things in the
Majority opinion.
First, the Majority opinion observes that “[a] trial judge has the discretion to sentence
a defendant in absentia.”  Majority slip op. at 19.  Yet, in almost the next breath, the M ajority
so circumscribes that discretion as to suggest that its exercise to do so hardly ever will be
affirmed (“While we do not suggest that a defendant can never be sentenced in absentia,
sentencing in absentia should rarely occur . . .”.  It should only be the ‘extraordinary case’
. . . where proper exercise of judicial discretion results in sentencing in a defendant’s
absence.”  Majority slip op. at 24 (emphasis in original)).  This treatment creates mere
illusions.  If sentencing judges are to be said to possess this discretion, and we outline
-2-
neutrally the proper considerations to guide them in its exercise, that should be enough to be
said.  An appellate court should standdown at that point and decide each appeal according
to whether abuse is found (or not) in each case.
Second, I disagree with the analytical viewpoint, and hence the result, of Part II of the
Majority opinion.  The Majority chooses to focus critically on only a particular part of the
plea hearing, a slice in time if you will, instead of considering the proceeding as a whole or
as a continuum.  Not illogically perhaps, the Majority seizes upon the trial judge’s utterance
of the phrase “[a]ccept the pleas,” made immediately following counsels’ interrogation of
Tweedy and his co-defendant as to their understanding of the proposed plea agreements.
According to the Majority, it was at that moment in time that an enforceable plea agreement
arose, notwithstanding that the State had yet to satisfy the need for a factual basis to accept
the plea.  There is no doubt, however, that the judge made clear before the proceeding
concluded what would happen if Tweedy failed to appear for sentencing or failed to
cooperate with the State.  Tweedy knew it.  His counsel knew it.  They said nothing to
evidence their disagreement or non-acceptance of the judge’s added requirement.  Thus, if
viewed as a whole, the 16 April 2001 hearing resulted in the court’s acceptance of Tweedy’s
negotiated plea agreement with the State, conditioned on the court’s requirement of
Tweedy’s presence at sentencing, together with the known consequences of Tweedy’s failure
to meet that and the pre-existing requirements.  In effect, further negotiations occurred on
the record of the hearing and Tweedy acquiesced in the added condition in order to receive
-3-
the court’s acquiescence.  The additional condition imposed a minimal additional “burden”
on Tweedy.  Thus, until the proceeding on 16 April 2001 was concluded, the terms of the
plea agreement acceptable to the court were not cast in concrete.
Alternatively, I would adopt the view of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit and hold that implicit in every plea agreement is the requirement that the defendant
appear for sentencing.  See U.S. v. David, 58 F.3d 113 (4 th Cir. 1995).  Tweedy walked from
the courtroom on 16 April 2001 knowing exactly what would happen if he failed to appear
at sentencing (unless he could persuade the sentencing judge, pursuant to Pinkney, that his
absence was other than voluntary).  It was in resolving the latter question that the trial judge
erred, for the reasons explained previously.