Case Title: People v. Frederickson

Citation: 

Docket Number: S067392

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DANIEL CARL FREDERICKSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S067392 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
96CF1713 
 
 
February 3, 2020 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON 
S067392 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant, Daniel Carl Frederickson, of 
the first degree murder of Scott Wilson.  (Pen. Code,1 
§ 187,  subd. (a).)  It found true the special circumstance 
allegation that defendant committed the murder while engaged 
in the commission of the attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(l7)(i)), and it also found true that defendant personally used 
a firearm while committing the crime (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 
12022.5, subd. (a)).  Following a sanity trial, the jury found 
defendant was sane at the time of the crimes.  After a penalty 
trial, the jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court 
imposed a judgment of death.  This appeal is automatic. 
We strike an improperly imposed restitution fine and 
affirm the judgment in all other respects. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On June 13, 1996, defendant walked into a home 
improvement store and shot the store manager once in the head, 
killing him.  Defendant represented himself at trial with the 
assistance of advisory counsel. 
                                        
1 
All further undesignated statutory references are to this 
code. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
2 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case 
On June 13, 1996, 30-year-old Scott Wilson was working 
as a customer service manager at the HomeBase home 
improvement store in Santa Ana.  The store was crowded due to 
a relocation sale.  Around 11:30 a.m., cashier Maricela Saucedo 
asked Wilson to make change for her to give to a customer.  
Wilson walked to the store’s safe, which was located behind the 
customer service area.  Saucedo turned back to her customer.  
Within seconds, she heard a gunshot.  She turned and saw 
defendant waving his gun while running out of the store.  
Saucedo saw Wilson lying bleeding on the ground, holding 10 
five-dollar bills in his hand. 
Cashier Susan Bernal saw Wilson walking toward the 
customer service area and a man following him.  Wilson did not 
argue with anyone and did not call out for help.  Bernal saw the 
man shoot Wilson in the head at close range and then run out of 
the store. 
Loss prevention employee Christopher Rodriguez saw 
defendant run out of the store carrying what appeared to be a 
silver revolver.  Rodriguez followed defendant outside to an 
alleyway.  The man entered the passenger side of a white van, 
which then drove away.  Rodriguez memorized the license plate 
number and provided it to the police. 
Santa Ana police officers arrived at HomeBase within a 
few minutes of the shooting.  Officer Ronald Dryva was on the 
scene for two to three hours interviewing witnesses.  During 
that time, defendant called and spoke to an employee.  
Defendant did not identify himself by name.  The employee 
handed the phone to Dryva.  Defendant, who believed he was 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
3 
still speaking with the employee, told Dryva, “I’ve never killed 
or shot anyone before.  This is stupid.  That is what I do for a 
living.  Do you understand?”  Defendant continued, “You need to 
tell your employees that money is not worth getting killed over.” 
Dryva asked defendant why he “pull[ed] the trigger.”  
Defendant replied, “Because I was flustrated [sic].  He didn’t do 
what I told him.  Do you understand?”  Defendant explained that 
he followed Wilson to the safe.  “While I pointed the gun at him 
and told him to put the money in the bag, he just started 
counting the money.  I told him not to count the fucking money.  
I told him to put the money in the box.  He just closed the safe 
and started walking away.  The man continued — continued to 
say [that] he didn’t believe I was serious.  I got mad, flustrated 
[sic], so I shot him.”  Defendant told Dryva he would “probably” 
turn himself in that night. 
The next day, June 14, 1996, police officers conducted 
surveillance outside defendant’s residence.  In the driveway, 
officers observed a white van matching the description 
Rodriguez had given.  Approximately three hours after 
beginning their surveillance, officers observed the van, driven 
by defendant, pull out of the driveway.  An officer ordered 
defendant to stop and exit the vehicle.  Officers arrested him and 
searched his residence, a camper located on his grandparents’ 
property.  They found a .32-caliber revolver containing five live 
rounds and one empty round. 
Santa Ana police investigators Phillip Lozano and Mark 
Steen interviewed defendant shortly after his arrest on June 14, 
1996.  Steen advised him of his Miranda rights.  (Miranda v. 
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).)  Defendant 
acknowledged he understood his rights and agreed to speak with 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
4 
the officers.  The prosecution played an audiotape recording of 
the interview for the jury.  Defendant admitted he had been 
committing robberies for nearly 15 years and that he walked 
into the HomeBase on June 13 with “a game plan.”  Defendant 
first looked around to “get a feel for the place” and to identify 
the manager.  After he identified Wilson as the manager, he 
waited until Wilson needed to retrieve change for a customer.  
He followed Wilson to the safe and said, “Excuse me?”  When 
Wilson looked up, defendant said, “Can you put that money in 
this box?”  Wilson ignored defendant and began counting five-
dollar bills.  Defendant showed Wilson part of his gun, and 
Wilson closed the safe door and stood up.  Defendant said that 
“the next thing I knew, you know, [the gun] was at his temple.”  
He expected Wilson to hand over the money and was surprised 
and “pissed off” that Wilson refused.  After firing the shot, he 
ran out of the store and into his van. 
Defendant explained that he called the HomeBase store 
approximately one hour later and asked to speak with a 
manager.  Crying, he told the officers, “I just laid into him.  I 
told him, ‘You son of a bitch.  That fucker didn’t need to die.’ . . .  
I just told him man.  He ought to make his fucking life mission 
to instruct all of his employees of the proper procedures.  Just 
giving the money up, and that fucker died protecting [the 
money].”  He said he was “just tired of . . . being broke all the 
time” and “just got frustrated with life and shit, and said, well, 
fuck it man, if I get caught, you know, I’ll go back in for about 
two or three years and, you know, . . . get out and try it again 
later.” 
The following day, newspaper reporter Marla Jo Fisher 
interviewed defendant in jail.  Defendant admitted that he was 
attempting to rob the store and shot Wilson during the attempt.  
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
5 
He explained that Wilson did not hand over the money, and after 
Wilson shut the safe door, defendant shot him.  According to 
Fisher, defendant thought “Wilson was brave but stupid.  He 
admired Wilson’s courage but thought [Wilson] was foolish for 
defying him and that he should have complied with his request 
for money.”  He blamed HomeBase management for failing to 
train their managers to hand over the money if they were 
robbed. 
On July 25, 1996, defendant sent Officer Lozano a letter 
asking to speak with the investigators again.  Lozano and Steen 
interviewed defendant at the jail on August 12.  Defendant 
explained that he had “held back some info” regarding 
accomplices.  He stated that he got the gun from his “associate” 
John McCanns.  McCanns met defendant in January or 
February of 1996 and, at some point, moved into defendant’s 
camper.  McCanns and defendant discussed the robbery 
beforehand, and after the murder, McCanns took the spent shell 
casing. 
Dr. Richard Fukomoto, the pathologist who performed the 
autopsy on Wilson’s body, testified that Wilson died from a 
single gunshot wound to the head.  He opined that the barrel of 
the gun was six to twelve inches from the wound when the gun 
discharged. 
2.  Defense Case 
Defendant represented himself during the guilt phase.  He 
called as a witness clinical psychologist Dr. Martha Rogers, who 
had evaluated defendant regarding his sanity at the time of the 
offense.  Dr. Rogers met with defendant for almost 15 hours and 
reviewed defendant’s juvenile records and prior psychological 
testing records.  Dr. Rogers found no neurological injury or 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
6 
impairment, and no loss of cognitive function.  She found him to 
be “a pretty high functioning individual.”  She noted in her 
report that defendant “most likely has not had a memory lapse 
or loss of functioning such that he did not know or understand 
his behavior was wrong or illegal as he claims.” 
The defense also called psychologist Dr. Roberto Flores de 
Apodaca.  Dr. Flores interviewed defendant for approximately 
four hours and reviewed several relevant records.  Dr. Flores did 
not conduct any clinical testing, although he reviewed reports 
from testing previously conducted.  He opined that defendant 
suffered from a personality disorder that expressed itself with 
narcissistic and antisocial features.  He concluded that no 
psychiatric condition prevented defendant from knowing the 
difference between right and wrong, and that defendant was not 
insane. 
Attorney Wayne Dapser testified that he was defendant’s 
mentor through an organization called Volunteers in Parole.  
Dapser explained that he was struck by defendant’s high degree 
of optimism, but there were also times when defendant got very 
depressed.  Defendant often told Dapser that he turned down 
criminal activity, such as using stolen credit cards or getting 
involved in drugs.  Dapser never felt that defendant was a 
danger to society.  Dapser agreed that defendant had “fairly 
good cognitive abilities,” including the ability to plot and 
strategize. 
Defendant’s 22-year-old cousin, Nick Peres, testified that 
defendant had previously asked Peres to kill him.  When Peres 
refused, defendant asked him to find an assassin to kill him.  He 
also asked Peres to help him get a gun.  Peres testified that 
defendant used drugs “all the time.” 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
7 
Jan Moorehead testified that she became defendant’s 
probation officer when he was 14 years old.  Moorehead said that 
defendant was a “high control” parolee because of his high 
violence potential and mental instability.  She tested him for 
drugs approximately twice a month.  When defendant told 
Moorehead he felt depressed, she encouraged him to write down 
positive thoughts.  Moorehead had referred defendant to the 
Volunteers in Parole program because she thought he was 
“worth taking a chance on.” 
B.  Sanity Phase 
1.  Defense Case 
Defendant’s advisory counsel conducted the sanity phase.  
Roger Wunderlich, a staff psychiatrist at Atascadero State 
Hospital, testified that he examined defendant on June 17, 
1994, to determine, in connection with a different case, whether 
defendant was a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO).2  After 
interviewing defendant for 30 minutes, Dr. Wunderlich 
concluded defendant was an MDO.  As a result, defendant was 
paroled to the hospital for treatment.  Dr. Wunderlich testified 
that defendant wanted treatment under the MDO law because 
he “was afraid of what he might do if paroled” to the streets.  On 
                                        
2  
The Mentally Disordered Offenders Act (§ 2960 et seq.) 
“addresses the treatment and civil commitment of offenders who 
suffer from a ‘severe mental disorder.’ ”  (People v. Blackburn 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1127.)  “The term ‘severe mental 
disorder’ means an illness or disease or condition that 
substantially impairs the person’s thought, perception of reality, 
emotional process, or judgment; or which grossly impairs 
behavior; or that demonstrates evidence of an acute brain 
syndrome for which prompt remission, in the absence of 
treatment, is unlikely.”  (§ 2962, subd. (a)(2).) 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
8 
cross-examination, Dr. Wunderlich said that the basis of his 
MDO determination was that defendant had “violent fantasies” 
that had, in fact, resulted in an assault.  He further testified 
that defendant was a “coherent, fairly intelligent individual.”  
Dr. Wunderlich opined that defendant was able to distinguish 
between right and wrong. 
Psychiatrist Joseph Chong-Sang Wu testified that he 
performed positron emission tomography (PET) scans on 
defendant.  Defendant’s scans showed an impairment in his 
frontal lobe function, which has been reported in patients with 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.  The scans also showed 
increased activity in defendant’s temporal lobes, which is found 
in people with “aggressive, explosive, [and] violent” behavior. 
Steven Clagett, a therapist and case manager for Health 
Care Agency of Orange County, testified that he evaluated 
defendant at the state hospital on May 5, 1995, about a year 
before the Wilson murder, and concluded that defendant was 
not suitable for release into the community.  Clagett explained 
that defendant had not met the agency’s release criteria, which 
included 12 months of nonaggressive behavior, cooperation with 
the treatment plan, and participation in the groups, programs, 
and activities that the agency recommended.  During the 
evaluation, Clagett saw no evidence of a thought disorder, 
hallucinations, or suicidal or homicidal ideation.  Defendant told 
Clagett that he had “played up” psychiatric symptoms in the 
past, trying to “get out of the prison system” and “into the 
hospital.” 
Defendant testified at the sanity trial.  He said he was first 
hospitalized when he was 13 years old.  He had been running 
away from home, sleeping on the streets, and getting into fights 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
9 
at school.  Defendant described “thought patterns” and 
“fantasies” that led him to “act out and to destroy or to hurt 
things.”  Sometime after his first hospital stay, defendant 
started taking medication that helped him control these 
thoughts.  Defendant was hospitalized again two years later.  At 
that time, he was diagnosed as having latent schizophrenia with 
explosive personality disorder. 
Defendant spent his juvenile and adult life in and out of 
institutions.  He underwent several mental health evaluations 
while incarcerated and testified that he functioned better while 
medicated, both in and out of prison.  Defendant was in prison 
in 1994, and before his scheduled release, defendant indicated 
to prison mental health professionals that he wanted to be sent 
to the state hospital as an MDO because he did not receive 
mental health treatment on the streets.  Following two 
evaluations and a parole hearing, he was committed to 
Atascadero on July 1, 1994.  Defendant was released from the 
state hospital on August 22, 1995.  He did not meet with the 
parolee outpatient doctor between the date of his release and the 
date of the instant offense, nearly 11 months later.  He 
developed suicidal thoughts and, on June 13, 1996 (the date of 
the Wilson murder), acquired a gun with which to commit 
suicide.  He drove to HomeBase later that day to buy material 
for a project he was working on with a friend.  He carried the 
gun with him in case he found the opportunity to commit suicide 
while running errands.  Defendant testified that he did not 
intend to rob the store. 
On 
cross-examination, 
the 
prosecutor 
questioned 
defendant about several theft incidents:  stealing cigarettes in 
1977; possession of a stolen moped in 1978; stealing clothing 
from a department store in 1979; possession of a stolen moped 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
10 
in 1980; stealing a car in 1981; and armed robbery of a market 
in 1982.  Defendant also acknowledged that he pleaded guilty 
for stabbing a fellow inmate in September 1984, although he 
claimed he did not actually stab the individual.  Regarding a 
conviction for assault with a deadly weapon in 1991, defendant 
testified that someone was attacking another person, and 
defendant tried to intervene.  The family of the attacker paid 
defendant to plead guilty, and he agreed to do so because he 
“needed an excuse” to go back to prison.  He denied that he 
committed the instant offense in order to go back to prison. 
The prosecutor asked defendant about his testimony on 
October 7, 1997, when he testified as a gang expert for the 
defense in an unrelated trial.  The prosecutor in that case had 
asked defendant if he considered himself to be insane, and 
defendant replied, “No.”  The prosecutor asked if he considered 
himself insane at the time he murdered Wilson, and defendant 
replied, “No, sir.  I presented that as a defense, and it’s up to a 
jury to decide whether I was insane at the time the crime 
occurred.”  Defendant also admitted testifying in the other trial 
that he had claimed to have violent fantasies so that he could 
get into Atascadero. 
2.  Prosecution Case 
The prosecution recalled Drs. Flores and Rogers.  Dr. 
Flores testified that he reviewed defendant’s medical records 
and spoke with defendant, and that he did not believe defendant 
met the criteria for insanity under section 1026, which governs 
insanity pleas.  Dr. Flores opined that at the time of Wilson’s 
murder, defendant knew the difference between right and 
wrong, and he chose to ignore it.  Dr. Flores believed defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
11 
diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder was 
“debatable” and irrelevant to the issue of insanity. 
Dr. Rogers reviewed defendant’s medical records and 
examined his behavior before, during, and after the Wilson 
murder.  In her opinion, defendant was sane when he murdered 
Wilson. 
Phillip Kelly, a staff psychiatrist at Atascadero, testified 
that he had daily contact with defendant between July 1994 and 
September 1995.  Defendant told Dr. Kelly that he had 
“manipulated the examiners” into declaring him to be an MDO.  
When Dr. Kelly told defendant that because he manipulated 
himself into the hospital, he would “have to deal with the 
problem,” defendant replied, “Well you are the experts, you 
shouldn’t have let me get away with it.”  Dr. Kelly ultimately 
diagnosed defendant with antisocial personality disorder and 
substance abuse.  He did not believe defendant belonged in the 
MDO program, concluding he did not have a mental illness. 
The jury found that defendant was sane at the time he 
committed the crime. 
C.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
Four witnesses testified regarding defendant’s prior 
criminal activity.  Jeff Tawasha testified that he was working as 
a cashier at a market on October 25, 1981.  Around 3:00 p.m., 
defendant, wearing a stocking over his face, entered the market 
with a sawed-off shotgun and said, “This is a robbery.  Give me 
the money or I’ll blow your head off.”  A female customer walked 
into the store, and defendant pointed the shotgun at her and 
ordered her behind the counter.  He then ordered Tawasha to 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
12 
take cash out of the cash register and put the money in his bag.  
Defendant ran out on foot and entered a waiting vehicle. 
Correctional Officer Grant Henry testified that on 
January 12, 1983, he conducted a search of defendant’s jail cell 
and found a “manufactured stabbing implement.”  The weapon 
had been made by sharpening a metal rod. 
Correctional Lieutenant Richard Martinez testified that 
on March 7, 1984, he was working as a floor officer in the prison 
where defendant was housed.  At approximately 8:00 p.m., 
Martinez was talking to an inmate when defendant began 
stabbing the inmate.  Defendant stabbed the inmate three to 
seven times before Martinez separated them. 
Deputy Sheriff Bradford Blakely testified that on 
November 15, 1990, he was working in a men’s jail where 
defendant was housed.  While searching defendant’s cell, he 
found a five-inch stabbing instrument fabricated from a mop 
bucket. 
The prosecutor also introduced defendant’s testimony 
from an unrelated trial, in which he admitted that in 1991 he 
had stabbed a man six times. 
Four witnesses testified regarding defendant’s mental 
health.  Dr. Flores testified that defendant’s personality 
disorder had minimal to no impact on his free will.  He explained 
that defendant’s “history is not indicative of someone who acts 
in an irrational manner, out of touch with reality in ways that 
don’t make sense.  His history is consistent with someone who 
violates the rights of others, consistently.”  Dr. Hannah 
McGregor, a psychiatrist with the California Department of 
Corrections, testified that she certified defendant as an MDO in 
1994 after she reviewed reports from Dr. Wunderlich and 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
13 
another psychiatrist, Dr. Steven Moberg.  Neurologist Dr. Helen 
Mayberg testified that she reviewed defendant’s PET scans.  She 
disagreed with many of Dr. Wu’s findings and methods.  She 
further opined that defendant’s frontal lobes were “relatively 
normal” and that his temporal lobes were normal.  Psychologist 
Dr. Leisla Howell testified that she had evaluated defendant in 
1982 at a state prison following his armed robbery conviction.  
She testified that defendant did not take responsibility for his 
actions and blamed “everything on everybody for his 
difficulties.” 
The prosecution also recalled reporter Marla Jo Fisher, 
who testified that defendant had told her that he had committed 
the robbery because he wanted to go back to prison.  He told 
Fisher that he did not like “life on the outside.”  He appeared 
apologetic for shooting Wilson, but blamed HomeBase officials 
for failing to teach employees to hand over money without 
arguing. 
Officer Mark Steen testified regarding his interview of 
defendant, conducted with Officer Lozano, on June 14, 1996.  
When Steen asked defendant why he tried to commit a robbery, 
defendant replied that he was “tired of being broke all the time” 
and “want[ed] to be rich.”  Defendant told the investigators that 
he was “in [his] right mind” during the attempted robbery. 
Three witnesses provided victim impact testimony.  
Maricela Saucedo, the cashier who asked Wilson for change, 
testified that Wilson had been her manager for two months, 
during which time she saw him nearly every day.  She described 
Wilson as outgoing, understanding, friendly, and a hard worker.  
She felt responsible for his death, because if she had not asked 
him for change, he would not have walked to the safe and would 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
14 
not have been killed.  Wilson’s aunt, Joyce Fyock, testified that 
Wilson’s father had died when he was a toddler and that she had 
helped his mother care for him.  She described Wilson as 
outgoing and said he cared about people.  She discussed visiting 
Wilson in the hospital before he died and having to take Wilson’s 
mother to the mortuary.  Wilson’s brother Kirk testified that 
because he was 10 years older than Wilson and because their 
father had died, the brothers had a father-son relationship.  He 
described walking into Wilson’s hospital room and staying in the 
room until Wilson was pronounced dead about five hours later.  
He testified that Wilson enjoyed working at HomeBase because 
he liked being around people, but he said that Wilson was also 
trying to pursue a career in sports broadcasting.  Wilson had 
just become an intern at a local network and produced one sports 
promotional segment before he died. 
2.  Defense Evidence 
The defense recalled Dr. Wu, who disagreed with Dr. 
Mayberg’s conclusions and interpretations of defendant’s PET 
scans. 
Defendant testified on his own behalf, with advisory 
counsel conducting the examination.  He explained that his 
family moved frequently and that his father left when he was 
five years old.  He struggled to fit in with his peers and even 
with members of his own family, because he was a “mixture of 
Scandinavian and Hispanic.”  He attended school through 
seventh grade and applied for his General Educational 
Development (GED) certificate in 1982, at the age of 19, while 
incarcerated.  Defendant served in the United States Navy for 
five months in 1982, receiving an honorable discharge.  From 
the time he was 12 years old until trial, when he was 34 years 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
15 
old, defendant estimated that he spent 15 years in group homes, 
juvenile halls, or state institutions. 
Defendant 
studied 
religion 
and 
language 
while 
incarcerated, and he spent time with several different religious 
communities.  In 1992, he earned vocational certificates in 
drywall installation and small engine repair.  In 1995, he earned 
four computer and programming certificates.  Defendant 
explained that he felt motivated and was able to focus on his 
studies because of the “external controls” that existed in prison 
and because of the guidance provided by deputies, counselors, 
and correctional officers. 
Defendant further testified that he was “groomed” to join 
the Mexican Mafia gang beginning in 1981 and that he officially 
joined the gang in 1984.  He withdrew from the gang in 1985 
after he disagreed with the gang’s decision to go to war with 
other prisoners.  Shortly after, a fellow Mexican Mafia member 
stabbed defendant with a welding rod, because leaving a gang 
was punishable with death.  Defendant’s subsequent prison 
sentences had to be served in protective custody. 
He said that he asked his mother several times to attend 
the penalty phase of his trial, but she did not want to testify, 
because her husband’s parents did not know about the offense, 
and she worried they would find out about it if she testified on 
behalf of her son. 
Defendant asked the jury to return a verdict of death.  He 
explained that he had wanted to be put to death since the day of 
his arrest.  The death penalty would be a “fitting end to a ruined 
life.”  He also said that he would “like to apologize” and that he 
had never denied his guilt.  He said that he had tried to plead 
guilty and “acknowledge full responsibility to all of the charges, 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
16 
including the special circumstances, even though I don’t believe 
in my mind that they’re true.” 
The defense recalled Volunteers in Parole mentor Wayne 
Dapser.  Dapser testified that he knew defendant “probably 
better than anyone in this courtroom.”  He believed defendant 
was one of the most intelligent men he knew.  He stated that 
defendant “had a childhood from hell” and “a history that very 
few of us can even comprehend.”  Dapser did not believe 
defendant deserved the death penalty. 
II.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Self-Representation and Desire to Plead Guilty 
Defendant raises several arguments in relation to his 
decision to represent himself and his desire to plead guilty in 
the municipal court prior to his preliminary hearing.  Before 
addressing the specific arguments, a detailed description of the 
relevant procedural history is necessary. 
1.  Procedural Background 
On June 18, 1996, defendant appeared for arraignment 
before a municipal court magistrate.  (Former §§ 859, 859b, 
860.)  At defendant’s request, the court appointed the public 
defender to represent him, and the arraignment was continued 
to a later date.  On July 16, 1996, defendant filed a handwritten 
motion seeking to proceed in propria persona (in pro. per.).  At a 
hearing in the municipal court on August 22, 1996, the court 
asked defendant, “You are willing to roll the dice all by yourself 
without any skills of an experienced attorney to assist you?”  
Defendant replied that he did not trust the public defender’s 
office.  The court warned defendant that, as a self-represented 
defendant, he would not have special privileges, that his 
“opposition will be a skilled and talented attorney,” that if 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
17 
convicted he could not later complain he did not have effective 
assistance of counsel, and that he would be unable to change his 
mind during the trial.  Defendant’s counsel then asked the court 
to defer ruling on the motion, and the court continued the matter 
to the date of the scheduled arraignment. 
At the arraignment on October 30, 1996, defendant 
informed the municipal court that he did not then want to 
represent himself, but he reserved the right to represent himself 
at some later point.  Additionally, defendant requested a 
hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 
(Marsden), asking the judge to replace one or both of his 
attorneys.  The court conducted a Marsden hearing in chambers.  
Defendant explained that he had “zero confidence” in his two 
attorneys and that he did not want “that vigorous of a defense.”  
He continued, “I want them to let me — allow me to steer them 
away from certain witnesses that I don’t want called onto the 
stand because of — you know, I just — I just don’t want certain 
information coming out.”  Defendant clarified that he was 
concerned about information coming out in the penalty phase of 
the case, not the guilt phase.  The court explained, “Well, you’re 
here now facing just a preliminary hearing, where the People 
put on some of their evidence and the defense puts on nothing.  
So you’re talking about way down the line at trial and then 
sentencing rights.”  Defendant replied that he wanted to waive 
the preliminary hearing and plead guilty.  He acknowledged 
that his attorneys were not ineffective and that he was not yet 
ready to represent himself, but he wanted counsel who would 
not work as hard.  The court explained that it could not remove 
counsel for working too hard and denied the Marsden motion. 
After holding the Marsden hearing, the municipal court 
arraigned defendant.  Defense counsel acknowledged receipt of 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
18 
a copy of the complaint, waived reading and advisement, and 
entered a plea of not guilty.  Defendant then said, “Over my 
objection.”  Defense counsel clarified, “What he means is he 
would like to have the complaint read.”  Defendant did not offer 
any further clarification, and the court noted his objection on the 
record. 
One week later, on November 7, 1996, defendant made an 
oral motion in the municipal court to proceed in propria persona.  
Defendant said that he had a GED certificate, was aware he 
faced the death penalty, and had previously represented himself 
in superior court proceedings.  Defendant’s only concern was 
whether, as a self-represented defendant, he would still have the 
ability to request funding for an investigator, and the court 
assured him he would.  The court stated that it found defendant 
to be “a very bright person, mentally alert,” and it granted the 
motion to proceed in propria persona.  Defendant then accepted 
the court’s offer to appoint advisory counsel, and the court 
appointed Edgar Freeman.  The court went through defendant’s 
list of requested jail privileges related to his status as a self-
represented defendant, and it granted much of what defendant 
sought. 
At an in camera hearing on December 5, 1996, defendant 
asked the municipal court to award funds for a guilt phase 
investigator and a penalty phase investigator.  The court 
explained that the district attorney had not yet declared an 
intent to pursue the death penalty and therefore the case was 
not yet a capital case.  Defendant responded that the prosecutor 
had stated in open court that it was a capital case.  Defendant 
also informed the court that he had submitted a letter to the 
prosecution offering “to stipulate to the murder in the first 
degree and admit all special circumstances and waive all 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
19 
appellate rights in order for a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole.”  Defendant said, “The district attorney has 
refused that.  It’s a death penalty case, your honor.  I wish it 
wasn’t.”  The court then explained that it only needed to provide 
sufficient investigation funding to allow defendant to have a fair 
preliminary hearing; after that, assuming defendant was held 
to answer in the superior court, the superior court would be 
responsible for disbursing investigation funds.  The court then 
appointed an investigator and explained that the investigator 
could submit bills to the court for the court’s discretionary 
consideration. 
On December 17, 1996, the municipal court called 
defendant back for another in camera hearing, revoking all prior 
orders concerning jail privileges and substituting a new order 
that, among other things, granted no more than $3,000 in 
investigative funds.  When the court denied defendant’s request 
for an additional $3,000 for office supplies, defendant 
complained that the county provided the public defender’s office 
with money for office supplies, and he accused the court of not 
taking his case seriously.  The court replied that “this is a very 
serious case.  I want you to appreciate your life is on the line and 
that you’re not, despite what you think, you are not, I don’t 
believe, capable of adequately representing yourself, that is, 
doing a legally competent job. . . .  I want you to know that my 
offer to appoint counsel for you remains outstanding.”  
Defendant replied, “I’ll accept if you are going to appoint 
secondary counsel on the case under [section] 987, subsection 
(d), which grants a second attorney to a capital defendant.”  The 
court asked whether defendant intended to continue to act as 
his own lead counsel, and defendant responded in the 
affirmative, indicating that his request was for appointment of 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
20 
cocounsel in place of advisory counsel.  The court denied the 
request without prejudice. 
On December 20, 1996, the municipal court called 
defendant back once again, this time to make clarifications 
regarding its prior orders.  Defendant expressed frustration 
with some of his self-representation jail privileges, mentioning 
in particular his inability to reach his investigator via collect 
calls.  The court then acknowledged its previous denial of 
defendant’s request for secondary counsel, and it offered 
defendant the opportunity to show a need for such counsel.  
Defendant argued that, given the limitations of his jail 
privileges, it would help him to have second counsel to prepare 
briefs and motions, and to make appearances on minor matters.  
He told the court that writing motions was “a little bit above” 
him but added, “I am stubborn enough that if the court does not 
grant me a second chair, I will continue to fight the case as best 
I can.”  The court granted defendant’s request and appointed 
Edgar Freeman as “second counsel,” vacating Freeman’s 
appointment as advisory counsel.  The significance of that 
change was apparently that Freeman could make appearances 
on behalf of defendant. 
As of December 24, 1996, the case was being formally 
treated as a capital case, and a superior court judge, sitting in 
camera, was handling disbursements of investigative funds 
under section 987.9.  (See Anderson v. Justice Court (1979) 99 
Cal.App.3d 398, 402 [“[T]he superior court is the only court with 
jurisdiction to entertain an application for funds under section 
987.9. . . .  A magistrate has only such powers as are statutorily 
granted and it cannot be said that section 987.9 clearly grants 
this power to the magistrate.”].)  For purposes of the preliminary 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
21 
hearing, however, the case was still before a municipal court 
magistrate.  (See former § 860.) 
On January 23, 1997, a superior court judge held an in 
camera hearing to discuss defendant’s request to replace his 
investigator.  The court stated at the outset of the hearing that 
it had received notice that an officer had discovered a file folder 
containing nude photographs in defendant’s jail cell.  This 
discovery indicated a violation of defendant’s self-representation 
jail privileges, because the photographs were being stored in 
plastic sheet protectors that defendant had requested from the 
court for purposes of preparing his defense.  When the superior 
court judge raised the issue, defendant stated, “Well, if the court 
would please hear my first motion, this matter could become 
moot very fast.” 
Defendant then informed the superior court that he 
wanted to “go public” — as opposed to in camera — and plead 
guilty.  He requested the court schedule the penalty phase for 
February 5, 1997, and reappoint the public defender’s office to 
represent him.  He stated that he had already spoken with his 
previous attorneys and that they had agreed to take the case for 
the penalty phase after he pleaded guilty.  The superior court 
judge asked defendant if he had spoken to cocounsel Freeman 
and received advice about pleading guilty.  Defendant replied 
that he had spoken to Freeman but “this is not on the advice of 
anyone, sir.  This is a decision that I have made based on the 
fact that there is absolutely zero potential for me receiving any 
type of justice whatsoever.”  He expressed frustration over his 
inability to get a working computer in jail and his difficulty 
placing unmonitored telephone calls.  He continued, “I do not 
care to allow the State of California, the government, to run over 
me.  I just want to go ahead, plead guilty, go and put my life in 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
22 
front of a jury, and let the jury decide whether or not I should 
get this death penalty, or whether I should get life 
imprisonment.  But as to the matter of death, I don’t even want 
to play these games anymore.  I want to just go ahead, I want to 
enter a plea of guilty.  I have a right to do so, and I wish to do so 
at this time.  [¶]  I’ve spoken with counsel.  And like I said, I 
would drop my pro. per. status and accept the public defender’s 
office to represent me as far as the penalty phase is concerned.  
And if the court would take my waiver, I’m making a knowing 
and . . . intelligent waiver.” 
As noted, this request to plead guilty arose while the 
superior court was holding an in camera hearing solely to 
address the disbursement of investigative funds under section 
987.9.  The case was not otherwise in the superior court, since 
the preliminary hearing had not occurred and defendant had not 
been held to answer.  The superior court therefore explained to 
defendant that “the issue as to whether or not you’re going to 
plead guilty or waive a preliminary hearing is really not before 
me today.”  Defendant replied, “I would like it to be before you 
because it would handle a lot of these other matters.” 
Defendant explained that he had received money from the 
court for investigation services but had not received an 
investigative report, and he had to “keep coming to this court 
and begging for phone calls, begging for materials, begging for 
this, while a criminal investigation needs to proceed.”  The court 
then stated that it would hold a hearing the following week on 
the allegations surrounding defendant’s jail violation, and it 
temporarily suspended his self-representation jail privileges.  
The court continued, “But I would be frank with you and say this 
is one of the things I tried to talk to you [about] out front when 
I kind of bottom-lined it [on] one of the first days you were in 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
23 
court.  I sincerely hope you’re sincere in wanting these privileges 
to defend yourself.”  Defendant replied that he did not believe 
the court had ever been sincere in its efforts to assist him.  He 
added that he would “still like to make the matter moot” by 
waiving the preliminary hearing, pleading guilty, and accepting 
the appointment of the public defender’s office for the penalty 
phase. 
The court then agreed to help defendant.  It said, “With 
your permission and request, I’ll contact — or have my clerk 
contact — the judicial officer in Division [311 (where the 
preliminary hearing was scheduled to be held)] and request your 
matter be calendared as soon as possible because you 
want [¶] . . . [¶] . . . to consider a change of plea or waiver of 
preliminary hearing . . . .”  Later, defendant said, “I’m pleading 
guilty and that’s that.”  The court responded, “Well, you haven’t 
done that yet,” and defendant said, “Well, I’m attempting to 
very, very, very hard.”  When asked whether he had discussed 
the matter with cocounsel Freeman, defendant answered that 
he had done so.  Defendant discussed the difficulties he was 
having with his investigator, and he repeated that the problem 
would be moot if the court would allow him to plead guilty.  The 
court then told defendant, “That part of the matter’s not before 
me. [¶] . . . [¶]  Okay.  Those matters are pending in [Division] 
311 [of the municipal court] [¶] . . . [¶]  We’re going to make 
arrangements to have you brought over to [Division] 311, and 
you can discuss your desires there.” 
After more discussion concerning defendant’s request to 
replace his investigator, the court denied that request.  The 
court then made clear that it intended to assist defendant in his 
effort to waive the preliminary examination and plead guilty.  
The court said, “[We]’ll do our best to get you calendared in 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
24 
[Division] 311 [of the municipal court] as soon as possible.  I 
can’t guarantee when that will be.  As soon as we’re in recess, 
I’m sure my clerk will call over there.  If I have to call over there 
personally, I would do it.”  The hearing then came to an end.  
The minute order for the hearing reflected the court’s effort to 
help defendant achieve his aim of pleading guilty.  It states:  
“Defendant’s oral request that preliminary hearing in Div. 311 
be advanced and waived, that defendant be allowed to change 
his plea to a guilty plea and that the Public Defender be 
appointed to represent defendant.  Court orders that Div. 311 be 
contacted by the Court clerk and that defendant’s requests be 
expedited in Div. 311.” 
A few days later, on January 27, 1997, the superior court 
held another in camera hearing, this time to address defendant’s 
violation of his self-representation jail privileges.  The court 
stated, “It appears to me in this short time that I have been 
involved in this case that Mr. Frederickson at least has a dual 
focus in what he is doing.  Part of it he is trying to defend 
himself, and part of it he is trying to use his pro. per. privileges 
to do other things that common sense would indicate just aren’t 
appropriate and are a violation of the implicit terms of the pro. 
per. privilege.  [¶] . . .  He was in court the other day on the 23rd.  
He indicated that, well, judge, you don’t have to worry about it.  
I am going to waive the preliminary hearing.  I am going to plead 
guilty. . . .  [¶]  He wanted me to contact the judge at [Division] 
311 to see if he could be brought over there to waive [the] 
preliminary hearing or whatever he was talking about doing.” 
Cocounsel Freeman then represented to the court that 
defendant was dedicated and committed but had, in his opinion, 
a low tolerance for frustration.  Freeman stated that after a 
“series of frustrations,” including a poorly functioning computer, 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
25 
defendant told him that he wanted to “ ‘go in and plead guilty in 
muni[cipal] court and get this over with and get it on the road 
and let the public defender handle [the] penalty phase.’ ”  
Freeman continued, “I told him, ‘Well, Daniel, that is your 
decision.  That is up to you.  I will not participate in entering 
into a plea with you in your case.’  I have told him that.” 
Lieutenant Danny Jarvis, a facility master at the intake 
center that housed defendant, then testified about defendant’s 
violation of his self-representation jail privileges.  Jarvis 
explained that defendant was “very, very inconvenient to care 
for,” because he was in protective custody due to his self-
representation.  He continued, “What I see that he is doing 
within the jail environment, he is using his pro. per. status to 
manipulate his status within the areas that he is housed to try 
to bring more credence on him so he can have some sort of status 
and role within the jail population, which makes it doubly 
difficult.”  After more discussion among the court, defendant, 
and cocounsel Freeman, the court revoked defendant’s self-
representation jail privileges.  It closed the hearing by again 
offering to help defendant to waive his preliminary hearing and 
plead guilty, if that was what defendant still wanted:  “We will 
call [the municipal court judge assigned to your case] and see if 
she can work it in sometime late this morning, or sometime this 
afternoon.” 
That afternoon, defendant appeared in the department of 
the municipal court assigned to his case.  He explained to the 
court, “[T]he guilt of my crime has been weighing heavily on me 
with a remorseful heart.  I would like to offer a change of plea 
and enter a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree and admit 
the special circumstances and waive all appellate rights at this 
time.”  The prosecutor then requested to speak with both 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
26 
defendant and Freeman off the record.  Following that 
conversation, the prosecutor informed the municipal court that 
he had explained to defendant that “by law he cannot plead 
guilty to a special circumstances allegation case.”  The 
prosecutor continued, “I told him no judge can accept your 
plea.  [¶]  Furthermore, I told him that it was my opinion Mr. 
Freeman would offer him the best possible representation and 
suggested that he follow Mr. Freeman’s advice on the 
matter.  [¶]  It’s my understanding Mr. Frederickson — despite 
Mr. Freeman’s conversations with him and my own 
conversations with him in Mr. Freeman’s presence — Mr. 
Frederickson still wants to plead guilty, although I think he 
realizes that he cannot.”  The prosecutor added, “I think it’s his 
desire to actually waive the preliminary hearing which is still 
scheduled for February 5th.  My last suggestion to him was not 
to do anything today.  That we just come on February 5th and 
have more of a chance to think about it.  To talk to Mr. Freeman, 
or talk to his investigator, and then he can decide what he wants 
to do on the 5th.” 
The court reminded the parties that the People also have 
a right to a preliminary hearing, and even if defendant waived 
his right, the People could choose not to do so.  The prosecutor 
stated that the People were not prepared to waive the 
preliminary hearing at that time, although the People might be 
willing to do so on the scheduled date of the hearing.  The court 
then explained to defendant, “If the People are unwilling at this 
time, or at any time, to waive the preliminary hearing, it doesn’t 
really matter [that you want to do so], because they have the 
right to have a preliminary hearing in your case. . . .  [¶]  So [the 
prosecutor] is telling me that he is not prepared today to make 
that decision even if you are.  So to have further discussions and 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
27 
undertake further proceedings today would be — for lack of a 
better word — a waste of time, and I am going to suggest that 
we terminate these proceedings today and that you come back 
on February 5th.  [¶] . . .  You will have had another nine days 
to think about this and decide whether or not you truly want to 
waive [the] preliminary hearing or not.”3  Defendant agreed 
with that solution. 
On the scheduled date of the preliminary hearing, 
February 5, 1997, defendant never requested to waive the 
hearing, and the hearing proceeded.  At the end of the hearing, 
defendant was held to answer the allegations of the complaint 
in the superior court. 
By information filed in the superior court on February 18, 
1997, the People formally charged defendant with one count of 
first degree murder, an enhancement allegation of personal use 
of a firearm, and a robbery-murder special circumstance 
allegation.  On February 24, 1997, defendant appeared in 
superior court with cocounsel Freeman and entered pleas of not 
                                        
3  
The magistrate’s statement implied that defendant could 
waive the preliminary hearing despite his self-represented 
status.  The text of former section 860 and relevant case law 
suggest otherwise.  (See former § 860, Stats. 1963, ch. 1174, § 2, 
p. 2670 [“. . . a defendant represented by counsel may . . . waive 
his right to an examination . . . ,” italics added]; People v. White 
(1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 171, 174 [“Unless represented by counsel 
a felony defendant who appears before a committing magistrate 
may not . . . waive a preliminary examination (Pen. Code, § 
860).”].)  Defendant did, however, have the assistance of Edgar 
Freeman who, per the magistrate’s order, was serving as 
“second counsel.”  We need not decide whether, with Freeman 
serving in that role, defendant could waive the preliminary 
hearing, because, as noted in the main text, the People were not 
prepared to join such a waiver. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
28 
guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.  Defendant said 
nothing about a desire to plead guilty.  At an appearance the 
following day, defendant confirmed that despite the revocation 
of his self-representation jail privileges, he still intended to 
represent himself.  Then, during an in camera hearing on 
February 28, 1997, the court granted defendant’s request to 
appoint a second investigator, tasked solely with interviewing 
his family.  The court also reinstated defendant’s jail privileges. 
On March 14, 1997, the assigned trial judge began 
presiding over defendant’s case.  On the same date, the 
prosecutor requested the court take a second waiver of 
defendant’s right to counsel (see Faretta v. California (1975) 422 
U.S. 806 (Faretta)), because the first waiver occurred before the 
People had formally declared an intent to seek the death 
penalty.  Defendant stated he understood his rights and the 
maximum sentence he faced, and he signed a written Faretta 
waiver. 
At a pretrial hearing on July 25, 1997, defendant told the 
court, “I’m contemplating withdrawing my right to . . . plead in 
propria persona and ask for counsel to start representing me.”  
Later in the hearing, defendant explained, “[O]ne of the reasons 
why I would even be considering giving up my pro. per. status 
would be [that] I feel, if counsel represents me, the court will 
give counsel the funds to do it, whereas they won’t give it to me.”  
The judge presiding over the trial of a capital case does not 
oversee disbursement of investigative funds (§ 987.9, subd. (a)), 
and therefore the court responded, “It’s an issue I’m not involved 
in, so I really can’t comment.” 
On August 1, 1997, the trial court held a Marsden hearing 
at defendant’s request, despite the circumstance that defendant 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
29 
was representing himself.  Defendant explained, “I wanted to let 
the court know, if the court was not aware, that I’m in pro. per.  
I’m lead counsel; he is second chair. . . .  This hearing was not 
about [cocounsel] Freeman or whether or not he was effectively 
representing me.  It’s about whether I’m effectively representing 
myself as a pro. per. defendant.  It sounds funny, a pro. per. 
defendant stating that he’s complaining of ineffective 
representation, but through all the information that I’ve been 
filing, the court has doggedly refused to give me funds for my 
investigation. . . .  And if that continues, your honor, then 
obviously I’m going to lose.  And I feel if I continue to represent 
myself, it would be a danger to my life, and therefore, if the court 
steadfastly refuse[s] to acknowledge that the defendant needs 
[section] 987.9 funds for an investigation, then the defendant 
would request that the court appoint counsel, [so] that the court 
will give money to defend me, which is wrong.  I shouldn’t have 
to waive my right for defending myself just so I can have money 
to effectively represent myself, that’s what I’m complaining of.” 
The court reminded defendant that by representing 
himself, he could not claim incompetence of counsel.  Defendant 
replied, “I’m complaining actually of incompetence of judiciary 
in this case.”  The court then informed defendant that an 
appointed attorney would not be given unlimited investigative 
funds, and it asked, “So I just need to know if you want to 
represent yourself, or do you want [the] court to appoint counsel 
for you?”  Defendant said that he was withdrawing his Marsden 
motion and would continue to represent himself. 
The same issue came up again on September 25, 1997.  
During an in camera hearing, the court read aloud a note it had 
received from defendant:  “ ‘Sir, I am requesting an ex parte, in 
camera hearing with you to discuss the very possible mechanics 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
30 
of turning my case over to appointed counsel.  My reasons are 
legion, but the biggest is the fact that the court will not give me 
investigative funds to fully investigate my cause.  I know that it 
is only due to my persistence of wanting pro. per. that this is the 
case.  [¶]  So the issues to be discussed by us in camera and ex 
parte are:  1. Appointment of new lead counsel; 2. Appointment 
of new second chair; 3. Hear any argument by defendant and 
counsel for the purpose of retaining some of the pro. per. 
privileges now enjoyed to assist in the speedy transition of case 
information.’ ”  The note continued:  “ ‘Sir, I know that a lot of 
men go pro. per. just to confound the court’s process.  I assure 
you my intention was honorable.  It is still my desire to defend 
myself, but I cannot present a case to [the] jury without a full 
and proper investigation.  The court will be open to new 
counsel’s requests, where they were closed to mine.  I know that 
this will also probably make me waive more time, a thing the 
court knows I do not want to do, but if we could just sit down 
and work out a good plan of action immediately, I am sure the 
end of justice will be served.  Thank you, sir.’ ” 
After a lengthy discussion, the court explained:  “I’ve 
always been prepared to work with you, sir, the problem, sir, I 
can’t hold you to a lower standard than I hold everybody else.  
Someone who represents himself or herself basically steps into 
the shoes of someone that is represented by counsel, and so there 
aren’t any special privileges.  Your pro. per. privileges I don’t 
think are special privileges; we basically afford you . . . the 
privileges so you can basically be able to do the same things that 
a lawyer can do if the lawyer were representing you.”  Defendant 
then asked to speak with cocounsel Freeman off the record.  On 
return, the court asked defendant to state his “desire with 
respect to representation.”  Defendant asked to discuss funding 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
31 
first, “because that’s the primary motivation of whether or not I 
will continue in pro. per. or give the case over to counsel, but I 
mean it seems dangerous . . . for me to set precedent for the rest 
of the pro. per. [litigant]s if all the court has to do is set a few 
harsh standards, and then the pro. per. [litigant] can lay down, 
and counsel can step in and automatically start getting funds 
available to do the case.  It would be dangerous to future pro. 
per. [litigant]s of the United States of America.”  The court then 
reminded defendant that there was no guarantee that an 
attorney would receive investigative funds that defendant had 
not received, and the court asked defendant if he wished to 
continue to represent himself.  Defendant said, “I intend to 
proceed in pro. per.” 
On October 20, 1997, during a pretrial conference, the 
court initiated a discussion on cocounsel Freeman’s role during 
trial.  The court opined that “advisory counsel is just that, an 
advisory counsel.  There is no such thing as a pro. per. 
cocounsel.”  Defendant explained that Freeman had been 
relieved as advisory counsel and appointed as cocounsel under 
section 987, subdivision (d).  Defendant further related that he 
planned to present the opening statement and closing 
argument, and to conduct the examination of witnesses during 
the guilt phase, while Freeman would conduct the sanity phase.  
Defendant and Freeman planned to share responsibilities 
during the penalty phase, with defendant conducting the 
opening statement and the examination of witnesses, Freeman 
conducting the direct and redirect examination of defendant, 
and both of them conducting the closing argument. 
The court responded, “I’m somewhat puzzled at [the 
municipal court’s] order, because the research that I’ve done 
indicates that there is no such thing as cocounsel when the 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
32 
defendant is pro. per.”  The court continued, “The reason I need 
to sort that out is because in my opinion, if you are going to be 
representing yourself, you need to represent yourself in all 
processes — all stages of the trial.”  After defendant requested 
that Freeman be permitted to object on his behalf throughout 
trial, the court said, “No.  You either represent yourself or you 
don’t.  He can certainly advise you. . . .  But in terms of him 
acting as your attorney, either he is your attorney or he’s 
advisory counsel, which means it’s up to you.”  After more 
discussion, the court concluded that the previous appointment 
of Freeman as second chair was inappropriate.  It said:  “So I’m 
going to be conducting this trial as if you are representing 
yourself in pro. per., and Mr. Freeman is your advisory counsel.” 
Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor asked the court to order 
defendant not to mention any discussion of a proposed plea deal 
in front of the jury.  Defendant replied by bringing up his earlier 
attempt to plead guilty:  “In Division 311 and on several 
occasions the defendant has attempted to plead guilty, and the 
prosecution has refused to accept that.  Counsel at that time 
refused to join, and the court refused to accept that or 
acknowledge my plea of guilty, but it was placed on the record.”  
The prosecutor acknowledged that “[i]t was placed on the 
record” but pointed out that “the Penal Code specifically 
disallows a guilty plea while he’s in pro. per., and no counsel has 
ever agreed to join in his plea, so technically it’s an illegal, 
unacceptable plea and still should not be mentioned to this 
jury.”  The court agreed that defendant’s attempts to plead 
guilty were not relevant for the guilt phase, but the question was 
“open to argument” for the sanity and penalty phases. 
On October 27, 1997, defendant again asked the court to 
allow him to introduce evidence of his attempts to plead guilty.  
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
33 
He said, “Your honor, a clear and distinct part of my testimony 
and evidence is the fact of my remorse and confession.  It would 
appear to a trier of fact that I am playing a game by pleading 
not guilty yet introducing evidence of my confessions of guilt.  
Just because my attorneys have refused to join my plea 
pursuant to [section] 1018 does not alter the truth.  The truth is 
that I have attempted to plead guilty and accept responsibility 
for the [violation of section] 187.  [¶] . . . [¶] . . .  The jury is going 
to feel like, well, if he’s confessing and now coming in front of us 
and saying he’s not guilty, he’s pulling the wool over our eyes.  
My veracity is at stake here, your honor.”  Defendant then asked 
the court to introduce evidence that defendant had “accepted 
responsibility and guilt for [his] crime and [had] attempted to 
plead guilty.”  The court reminded defendant that such 
information was relevant at the penalty phase but not at the 
guilt phase.  Defendant nonetheless asked the court to “instruct 
the jury on [section] 1018.”  He asked that the court explain to 
the jury “that the defendant has attempted to plead guilty” but 
that, by law, he could not do so.  The court again ruled that the 
information was relevant only at the penalty phase, not at the 
guilt phase. 
2.  Right to Plead Guilty 
Defendant contends that he was denied his personal and 
fundamental right to control his defense when the trial court, 
acting under compulsion of section 1018, refused to permit him 
to plead guilty without the consent of counsel.  We conclude his 
claim is forfeited because he never moved to plead guilty in the 
superior court, thereby causing that court to invoke section 
1018. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
34 
a. Legal Background 
Section 1018 provides in relevant part:  “No plea of guilty 
of a felony for which the maximum punishment is death, or life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, shall be received 
from a defendant who does not appear with counsel, nor 
shall that plea be received without the consent of the 
defendant’s counsel.”  This portion of section 1018 was added in 
1973 as part of an extensive revision to the death penalty laws.  
(Stats.1973, ch. 719, § 11, p. 1301.)  “The fact that the 
requirement of counsel’s consent to guilty pleas in capital cases 
was enacted as part of [an extensive revision of the state’s death 
penalty laws in response to Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 
238] demonstrates that the Legislature intended it to serve as a 
further independent safeguard against erroneous imposition of 
a death sentence.”  (People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 750 
(Chadd).) 
Two years after the 1973 amendment to section 1018, the 
high court recognized a defendant’s constitutional right to self-
representation in Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806.  In Chadd, 
supra, 28 Cal.3d 739, we reconciled the right of self-
representation with section 1018’s requirement that counsel 
consent to a guilty plea in a capital offense.  Defense counsel in 
Chadd informed the trial court that the defendant wanted to 
plead guilty against counsel’s advice, and counsel explained that 
he would not consent to his client entering such a plea, because 
the defendant’s desire was to commit suicide.  (Id. at p. 
744.)  The defendant admitted to the court that he had 
attempted suicide, and if he did not receive the death penalty, 
he would “just have to do it myself.”  (Id. at p. 745.)  Defense 
counsel reminded the court that a guilty plea by his client was 
without his consent, and the prosecutor agreed that section 1018 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
35 
prohibited the court from accepting such a plea.  (Chadd, at p. 
745.) 
The trial court ruled that if it found the defendant 
competent to act as his own attorney under Faretta, it could 
accept his guilty plea despite section 1018.  (Chadd, supra, 28 
Cal.3d at p. 745.)  The court questioned the defendant, found 
him competent under Faretta, and then, without actually 
dismissing defense counsel, allowed the defendant to plead 
guilty to the information.  (Chadd, at p. 745.)  On appeal, the 
Attorney General argued that section 1018 could be construed 
to permit a capital defendant to discharge his attorney, 
represent himself, and plead guilty.  (Chadd, at p. 746.)  We 
rejected this contention, however, stating that the language of 
section 1018 plainly required the consent of counsel to plead 
guilty.  (Chadd, at p. 746.)  Construing the statute “to permit a 
capital defendant to discharge his attorney and plead guilty if 
he knowingly, voluntarily, and openly waives his right to 
counsel” “would make a major portion of the statute redundant,” 
we reasoned, because “that is precisely what the third sentence 
of section 1018 expressly authorizes noncapital defendants to 
do.”  (Chadd, at p. 747.) 
We noted the larger public interest at stake in guilty pleas 
in capital offenses, as well as the Legislature’s “increasing 
concern to insure that no defendant enter a guilty plea in our 
courts 
without 
fully 
understanding 
the 
nature 
and 
consequences of his act.”  (Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 748–
749.) 
We read Faretta as not affecting the Legislature’s 
authority to condition guilty pleas on counsel’s consent.  (Chadd, 
supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 750.)  “Nothing in Faretta, either 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
36 
expressly or impliedly, deprives the state of the right to conclude 
that the danger of erroneously imposing a death sentence 
outweighs the minor infringement of the right of self-
representation resulting when defendant’s right to plead guilty 
in capital cases is subjected to the requirement of his counsel’s 
consent.”  (Chadd, at p. 751.)  We further concluded that Faretta 
did not grant a capital defendant the right to discharge counsel 
and waive his automatic appeal, explaining that the state, too, 
had an indisputable interest in correct judgments in capital 
cases.  (Chadd, at p. 752.) 
We again held section 1018 to be constitutional more than 
25 years later in People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277 (Alfaro).  
In Alfaro, the defendant accepted complete responsibility for the 
offenses in a videotaped confession on the day of her arrest.  (Id. 
at p. 1295.)  Eleven days before jury selection began, defense 
counsel informed the trial court that the defendant wanted to 
plead guilty to the special circumstances against counsel’s 
advice and asked the court whether it believed he should 
withdraw from the case.  (Ibid.)  The defendant explained to the 
court that she wanted to plead guilty because she feared for her 
safety and that of her family should she implicate her 
accomplice in the crime.  (Id. at p. 1296.)  The court responded 
that under section 1018 she could not plead guilty against her 
attorney’s advice.  The court also declined to remove defense 
counsel from the case, concluding that the disagreement 
between counsel and the defendant involved trial tactics and 
therefore did not require counsel’s removal.  (Alfaro, at p. 1296.)  
The prosecutor then argued during the penalty phase that the 
defendant had not accepted responsibility and lacked remorse, 
and the jury did not hear evidence that the defendant had 
attempted to enter a guilty plea.  (Id. at pp. 1296–1297.) 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
37 
We acknowledged the defendant’s argument that “a 
defendant has the ultimate, fundamental right to control his or 
her own defense,” but concluded that section 1018 was “one of 
several exceptions to the general rule.”  (Alfaro, supra, 41 
Cal.4th at p. 1298.)  We noted that “[t]he statute constitutes a 
legislative recognition of the severe consequences of a guilty plea 
in a capital case, and provides protection against an ill-advised 
guilty plea and the erroneous imposition of a death sentence.”  
(Id. at p. 1300.)  We rejected the defendant’s assertion that the 
trial court improperly failed to inquire into her reasons for 
desiring to plead guilty and that had it done so, it would have 
discovered her intent to demonstrate remorse.  We noted that 
nothing in the record supported the defendant’s assertion on 
appeal that her desire to plead guilty was motivated by a desire 
to establish a defense of remorse or to establish that she 
accepted responsibility for the murder.  (Id. at p. 1302.)  
“Accordingly, the trial court reasonably concluded that the 
dispute between defendant and her counsel did not implicate a 
constitutionally protected fundamental interest that might 
override the plain terms of section 1018.”  (Alfaro, at p. 1302.)  
We left undecided whether a defendant might be able to make a 
successful as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of 
section 1018 in a case in which the evidence of guilt was very 
strong and the defendant’s express reason for wanting to plead 
guilty was to lay the foundation for a remorse argument at the 
penalty phase. 
Most recently, in McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) __ U.S. __ 
[138 S.Ct. 1500] (McCoy), the United States Supreme Court held 
that “it is the defendant’s prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide on 
the objective of his defense:  to admit guilt in the hope of gaining 
mercy at the sentencing stage [of a capital case], or to maintain 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
38 
his innocence, leaving it to the State to prove his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1505], italics 
added.)  In McCoy, the defendant’s retained counsel determined 
that the best strategy for avoiding a death sentence was to 
concede guilt as to the three murders during the guilt phase and 
plead for mercy during the penalty phase.  (Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. 
at p. 1506].)  The defendant was “ ‘furious’ ” with counsel’s 
strategy and wanted to pursue acquittal instead.  (Ibid.)  The 
trial court denied the defendant’s request to remove his counsel, 
as well as defense counsel’s request to be relieved if the 
defendant secured other counsel.  (Ibid.)  The court told counsel 
that it was his decision whether to concede guilt or put on a 
defense case.  (Ibid.)  Defense counsel then acknowledged during 
his opening statement to the jury that the evidence 
unambiguously showed that the defendant had committed the 
murders.  Nonetheless, the defendant testified he was innocent.  
(Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1507].)  The jury found the defendant 
guilty and then returned three death verdicts.  (Ibid.) 
The 
defendant, 
represented 
by 
new 
counsel, 
unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the ground that the 
court had violated his constitutional rights by allowing counsel 
to concede his guilt over his objection.  (McCoy, supra, __ U.S. at 
p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1507].)  The Louisiana Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court’s ruling, concluding that the concession 
was permissible because defense counsel reasonably believed 
that admitting guilt offered the defendant the best chance to 
avoid a death sentence.  (Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1507].) 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment.  
(McCoy, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1512].)  It 
explained that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant 
the right to make a defense; it “ ‘speaks of the “assistance” of 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
39 
counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant.’ ”  
(Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508].)  While some decisions, such 
as trial management, are best left to counsel, “[s]ome 
decisions . . . are reserved for the client — notably, whether to 
plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify in one’s own 
behalf, and forgo an appeal.”  (Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508], 
italics added.)  The high court held that a defendant who 
“insist[s] on maintaining her innocence at the guilt phase of a 
capital trial” cannot be forced by counsel to concede guilt.  
Defense counsel can make strategic choices regarding how best 
to achieve a defendant’s objectives, but the defendant chooses 
those objectives.  (Ibid.) 
b. Analysis 
If defendant wanted to challenge the constitutionality of 
section 1018, whether on the ground that it precluded him from 
using a guilty plea to lay the foundation for a penalty phase 
remorse argument or on some other ground, he needed to 
request to plead guilty in the superior court and ask that court 
to make a ruling based on section 1018, thus preserving the 
issue on appeal.  He never did so.  The claim is therefore 
forfeited. 
Before 1992, there were clear jurisdictional lines 
separating misdemeanor cases from felony cases:  The 
municipal court had no jurisdiction in felony cases, and the 
superior court had no jurisdiction in misdemeanor cases.  
Therefore, in a felony case, the municipal court could not convict 
a defendant on a plea of guilty, because it was not authorized to 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
40 
render a felony judgment.  (See, e.g., former § 1462,4 Stats. 1976, 
ch. 1288, § 21, p. 5765; People v. Callahan (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 
1419, 1424–1425 [magistrate had no authority under the pre-
1992 amendment to section 1462 to impose judgment in 
noncapital felony cases]; People v. Miskiewicz (1984) 158 
Cal.App.3d 820, 824–825; People v. Denton (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 
Supp. 1, Supp. 4–Supp. 6.)  A municipal court judge, sitting as a 
magistrate (not as a judge), could arraign a defendant in a 
noncapital felony case, and if the defendant pleaded guilty (or 
nolo contendere), the magistrate could accept the plea and 
certify the case to the superior court for entry of judgment.  
(Former § 859a,5 Stats. 1980, ch. 540, § 1, pp. 1495–1496; People 
                                        
4  
Before 1992, former section 1462 provided:  “Each 
municipal and justice court shall have jurisdiction in all 
criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor, where the offense 
charged was committed within the county in which such 
municipal or justice court is established except those of which 
the juvenile court is given jurisdiction and those of which other 
courts are given exclusive jurisdiction.  Each municipal and 
justice court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases 
involving the violation of ordinances of cities or towns situated 
within the district in which such court is established.” 
5  
Before 1992, former section 859a provided in relevant 
part:  “(a) If the public offense charged is a felony not punishable 
with death, the magistrate shall immediately upon the 
appearance of counsel for the defendant read the complaint to 
the defendant and ask him whether he pleads guilty or not 
guilty to the offense charged therein . . . ; thereupon, or at any 
time thereafter, while the charge remains pending before the 
magistrate and when his counsel is present, the defendant may 
plead guilty to the offense charged . . . .  [¶]  (b) . . . [T]he 
magistrate shall, upon the receipt of a plea of guilty . . . , 
immediately appoint a time for pronouncing judgment in the 
superior court . . . .”  (Italics added.) 
 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
41 
v. Miskiewicz, at pp. 824–825 [upon entry of felony plea, 
magistrate must immediately certify case to superior court].)  
And, conversely, if the defendant pleaded not guilty, a municipal 
court judge, again sitting as a magistrate, could preside at the 
preliminary hearing and hold the defendant to answer.  (Former 
§ 859b, Stats. 1989, ch. 897, § 26.5, p. 3066–3067; former § 860, 
Stats. 1963, ch. 1174, § 2, p. 2670.)  But, as stated, the municipal 
court lacked jurisdiction to render a felony judgment.  Moreover, 
under former section 859a, its judges, sitting as magistrates, 
also lacked authority to accept a guilty plea to a felony 
punishable by death. 
These jurisdictional lines began to blur in 1992.  Former 
section 1462 was amended, effective that year, to allow the 
municipal courts to accept guilty pleas in “noncapital” felony 
cases and to pronounce judgment in such cases, thus reducing 
the burden on the superior courts.  (Former § 1462,6 Stats. 1991, 
                                        
6  
As a result of this change, former section 1462 provided:  
“(a) Each municipal and justice court shall have jurisdiction in 
all criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor, where the offense 
charged was committed within the county in which the 
municipal or justice court is established except those of which 
the juvenile court is given jurisdiction and those of which other 
courts are given exclusive jurisdiction.  Each municipal and 
justice court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases 
involving the violation of ordinances of cities or towns situated 
within the district in which the court is established.  [¶]  (b) 
Each municipal and justice court shall have jurisdiction in all 
noncapital criminal cases to receive a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere, appoint a time for pronouncing judgment 
under Section 859a, pronounce judgment, and refer the case to 
the probation officer if eligible for probation.   [¶]  (c) The 
superior courts shall have jurisdiction in all misdemeanor 
criminal cases to receive a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, 
 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
42 
ch. 613, § 8, p. 2886; see former § 859a,7 Stats. 1991, ch. 613, § 
6, pp. 2884–2885.)  The same amendment allowed superior 
courts to take guilty pleas in misdemeanor cases, thus giving 
superior courts flexibility to accept misdemeanor plea bargains 
as a way of resolving felony charges.  (Stats. 1991, ch. 613, § 8, 
p. 2886.)  But the law remained unchanged for capital cases — 
that is, the law continued to be that the municipal court lacked 
jurisdiction to pronounce judgment in such cases, and its judges, 
sitting as magistrates, lacked statutory authority to accept 
guilty pleas in such cases.  Former section 1462 was again 
amended in 1998 in ways that are not relevant here.  (Stats. 
1998, ch. 931, § 417, p. 6633.)  Finally, in 2002, due to unification 
of the municipal and superior courts, former section 1462 was 
repealed.  (Stats. 2002, ch. 784, § 554.1.) 
Therefore, when defendant was in the municipal court in 
1996, the judicial officers before whom he appeared were not 
acting as judges; rather, they were sitting as magistrates.  (See 
former §§ 859, 859b, 860.)  Moreover, because the offense 
                                        
appoint a time for pronouncing judgment, and pronounce 
judgment.”  (Italics added.) 
 
7  
As a result of this change, former section 859a provided in 
relevant part:  “(a) If the public offense charged is a felony not 
punishable with death, the magistrate shall immediately upon 
the appearance of counsel for the defendant read the complaint 
to the defendant and ask him or her whether he or she pleads 
guilty or not guilty to the offense charged therein . . . .  While 
the charge remains pending before the magistrate and when the 
defendant’s counsel is present, the defendant may plead guilty 
to the offense charged . . . .  [¶]  (b) . . . [T]he magistrate shall, 
upon the receipt of a plea of guilty . . . , immediately appoint a 
time for pronouncing judgment in the superior court, municipal 
court, or justice court . . . .”  (Italics added.) 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
43 
charged was a felony “punishable with death” (former § 859a, 
subd. (a), Stats. 1992, ch. 78, § 1, pp. 274–275), the municipal 
court judge (sitting as a magistrate) was, at most, empowered to 
deliver to defendant a copy of the complaint (former § 859, 
amended by initiative, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990), commonly 
known as Prop. 115), inform defendant that, if needed, counsel 
would be provided for him at the public’s expense (ibid.), set a 
time for the preliminary hearing (former § 859b, Stats. 1989, ch. 
897, § 26.5, pp. 3066–3067), and, at that appointed time, 
“proceed to examine the case,” unless such examination was 
waived (former § 860, Stats. 1963, ch. 1174, § 2, p. 2670).  The 
magistrate was simply not authorized to accept a plea of guilty 
and pronounce judgment, because former section 859a — which 
authorized that procedure — only applied “[i]f the public offense 
charged is a felony not punishable with death.”  (Former 
§ 859a.)8 
Hence, if defendant wanted to plead guilty before his 
preliminary hearing, when his case was before a magistrate, his 
only option was (1) to waive the preliminary hearing, and then 
(2) enter his guilty plea in superior court to the information filed 
in that court.  (Former § 860, Stats. 1963, ch. 1174, § 2, p. 2670.)  
Defendant was required to follow that two-step process.  (See, 
e.g., In re Van Brunt (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 96, 101–102.)  
Moreover, the People could insist on a preliminary hearing 
                                        
8  
In a letter brief filed after oral argument, defendant 
concedes this point, saying, “As it appears that the municipal 
court could not accept his guilty plea under former section 1462, 
the municipal court should have certified or transferred the case 
to the superior court for acceptance of the plea.” 
 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
44 
notwithstanding defendant’s willingness to waive it.  (Former 
§ 860, Stats. 1963, ch. 1174, § 2, p. 2670 [“nothing contained 
herein shall prevent the district attorney . . . from requiring that 
[a preliminary] examination be held as provided in this 
chapter”].)9 
Here, defendant’s attempts to plead guilty, all of which 
occurred before the preliminary hearing, were all rejected for 
procedural reasons unrelated to section 1018.  Defendant first 
mentioned wanting to plead guilty on October 30, 1996, during 
a Marsden hearing.  He complained that his attorneys were 
working too hard and that he did not want “certain information 
getting out” during the penalty phase.  When the court 
explained that the penalty phase was a long time away, 
defendant stated that he wanted to waive the preliminary 
hearing and plead guilty.  He acknowledged that his counsel 
were not ineffective, but he did not want attorneys who would 
work so hard.  The court denied the Marsden motion and 
arraigned defendant that same day.  Defense counsel waived 
reading of the complaint and entered a plea of not guilty.  
Defendant objected, but counsel explained that defendant’s 
objection meant that he wanted the complaint read.  Defendant 
did not further clarify his reason for objecting.  The case was one 
in which the punishment might be death, and the municipal 
court had no power to accept a guilty plea.  At no point did the 
municipal court rule that, based on section 1018, it would not 
accept defendant’s guilty plea. 
                                        
9  
As noted in footnote 3 on page 27, ante, defendant may also 
have been precluded from waiving the preliminary hearing 
because of his self-represented status. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
45 
On January 23, 1997, defendant was before a superior 
court judge for an in camera hearing regarding investigative 
funds under section 987.9, but the preliminary hearing had not 
occurred and the case was still before the municipal court.  
Defendant told the superior court judge that he wanted to “go 
public” and plead guilty.  He expressed frustration, saying, “I 
don’t even want to play these games anymore.  I want to just go 
ahead, I want to enter a plea of guilty.  I have a right to do so, 
and I wish to do so at this time.”  Because defendant was only 
before a superior court judge on a section 987.9 hearing, the 
superior court explained that “the issue as to whether or not 
you’re going to plead guilty or waive a preliminary hearing is 
really not before me today.”  Defendant was insistent, and the 
court agreed to help defendant to achieve his aim.  As noted, 
pleading guilty required a two-step process:  (1) waiver of the 
preliminary hearing; and (2) entry of a guilty plea in superior 
court.10  Therefore, the superior court judge said, “With your 
permission and request, I’ll contact — or have my clerk contact 
— the judicial officer in Division [311 of the municipal court] and 
request your matter be calendared as soon as possible because 
you want [¶] . . . [¶] . . . to consider a change of plea or waiver of 
preliminary hearing . . . .”  Defendant continued to insist.  At 
one point he said, “I’m pleading guilty and that’s that.”  The 
superior court judge responded, “Well, you haven’t done that 
yet.”  And defendant said, “Well, I’m attempting to very, very, 
                                        
10  
Significantly, several times when defendant expressed his 
desire to plead guilty, he also said he wanted to waive the 
preliminary hearing.  It seems, therefore, that defendant had 
been informed of the two-step process requiring him first to 
proceed through (or waive) the preliminary hearing before he 
could enter a guilty plea in superior court. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
46 
very hard.”  The court told defendant, “That part of the matter’s 
not before me. [¶] . . . [¶]  Okay.  Those matters are pending in 
[Division] 311 [of the municipal court] [¶] . . . [¶]  We’re going to 
make arrangements to have you brought over to [Division] 311, 
and you can discuss your desires there.”  The court added, 
“[We]’ll do our best to get you calendared in [Division] 311 [of 
the municipal court] as soon as possible.  I can’t guarantee when 
that will be.  As soon as we’re in recess, I’m sure my clerk will 
call over there.  If I have to call over there personally, I would 
do it.”  Thus, the superior court judge made a considerable effort 
to help defendant achieve his aim of pleading guilty. 
Defendant argues that these efforts were misleading.  He 
contends that the superior court could have accepted his guilty 
plea and instead it misleadingly sent defendant to municipal 
court, a court that lacked authority to accept the guilty plea.  
Because defendant was proceeding in propria persona, 
defendant argues, the superior court’s instructions were unfair 
to him.  Defendant points out that although a self-represented 
defendant is held to the same standard as counsel, the court is 
not permitted to mislead a self-represented defendant. 
But the superior court did not mislead defendant.  The 
superior court was only involved because the case was a capital 
case that required disbursement of investigative funds under 
section 987.9, and a municipal court judge was not empowered 
to disburse such funds.  (See Anderson v. Justice Court, supra, 
99 Cal.App.3d at p. 402.)  The case was not otherwise pending 
in the superior court, and the superior court therefore could not 
have accepted defendant’s guilty plea.  Rather, the law required 
a magistrate to hold a preliminary hearing (or accept a waiver 
of such a hearing), and only then could defendant be held to 
answer in superior court and plead guilty.  Defendant cites no 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
47 
authority for the proposition that in 1996, when municipal court 
judges sitting as magistrates conducted preliminary hearings in 
felony cases, a defendant in a case in which the punishment 
might be death could enter a guilty plea in superior court 
without first having completed proceedings in the municipal 
court.  Here, the superior court judge who was holding the 
section 987.9 hearing while defendant’s case was otherwise in 
the municipal court could not accept defendant’s guilty plea.  
Hence, the superior court judge did not mislead defendant; 
rather, he sent defendant on the only path that would have 
allowed defendant to achieve his stated aim. 
A few days later, on January 27, 1997, the superior court 
held another in camera hearing and defendant’s request to plead 
guilty was discussed.  The superior court again offered to help 
defendant waive his preliminary hearing and plead guilty, if 
that was what defendant still wanted:  “We will call [the 
municipal court magistrate assigned to your case] and see if she 
can work it in sometime late this morning, or sometime this 
afternoon.” 
That afternoon, defendant appeared in the department of 
the municipal court assigned to his case.  He explained to the 
court, “[T]he guilt of my crime has been weighing heavily on me 
with a remorseful heart.  I would like to offer a change of plea 
and enter a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree and admit 
the special circumstances and waive all appellate rights at this 
time.”  The prosecutor then told defendant, off the record 
(although later described on the record), that “by law he cannot 
plead guilty to a special circumstances allegation case” and “no 
judge can accept your plea.”  The court then reminded the 
parties that the People also have a right to a preliminary 
hearing, and even if defendant waived his right, the People 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
48 
could choose not to do so.  The prosecutor stated that the People 
were not prepared to waive the preliminary hearing, and so the 
municipal court explained to defendant that there was no choice 
but to proceed with that hearing.  The court said:  “So to have 
further discussions and undertake further proceedings today 
would be — for lack of a better word — a waste of time, and I 
am going to suggest that we terminate these proceedings today 
and that you come back on February 5th.  [¶] . . .  You will have 
had another nine days to think about this and decide whether 
or not you truly want to waive [the] preliminary hearing or not.”  
Defendant agreed with that solution. 
Then, on the scheduled date of the preliminary hearing in 
municipal court, February 5, 1997, defendant never requested 
to waive the hearing, and the hearing proceeded.  At the end of 
the hearing, defendant was held to answer in superior court. 
Defendant was then charged in the superior court by 
information filed on February 18, 1997.  On February 24, 1997, 
defendant appeared in superior court and entered pleas of not 
guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.  Defendant said 
nothing about a desire to plead guilty. 
As noted, if defendant wanted to challenge the 
constitutionality of section 1018, he needed to ask to plead guilty 
in superior court and ask the court to make a ruling based on 
section 1018, thus preserving the issue on appeal.  He never did 
so.  He did ask to plead guilty while his case was in the 
municipal court, and both the superior court judge hearing his 
section 987.9 motion and the municipal court magistrate 
assigned to his preliminary hearing attempted to assist him.  
But after the preliminary hearing, when defendant was held to 
answer in superior court, he never renewed his request to plead 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
49 
guilty.  On the contrary, he entered pleas of not guilty and not 
guilty by reason of insanity. 
It is true that defendant was apparently persuaded that 
he could not plead guilty.  The prosecutor had told him that “no 
judge can accept your plea.”  Moreover, at the hearings on 
October 20 and 27, 1997, he told the court that he had wanted 
to plead guilty but could not do so, due to section 1018, and he 
asked the court to allow him to inform the jury of that fact.11  
                                        
11  
Defendant may have been under the impression that his 
previous requests to plead guilty, made when his case was in the 
municipal court, were denied pursuant to section 1018, but that 
possibility does not change the fact that, under former section 
859a, the municipal court lacked statutory authority to accept 
defendant’s guilty plea. 
 
The concurring opinion argues that the municipal court 
relied on section 1018 in rejecting defendant’s request to plead 
guilty.  It focuses on the prosecutor’s statement to the municipal 
court that “by law [defendant] cannot plead guilty to a special 
circumstances allegation case.”  The concurrence describes that 
statement as “an evident reference to section 1018.”  (Conc. opn. 
of Liu, J., p. 4, post.)  But the prosecutor could equally well have 
been referring to the municipal court’s lack of authority under 
former section 859a.  That would explain why the prosecutor 
added, “I think it’s [defendant’s] desire to actually waive the 
preliminary hearing,” meaning that defendant wanted to get his 
case out of the municipal court.  To be sure, the prosecutor also 
said that “no judge” could accept defendant’s plea, but the 
prosecutor may only have meant that no judge could do so at 
that time, before defendant was charged in the superior court.  
Significantly, in arguing to the municipal court that defendant 
was barred from pleading guilty, the prosecutor never made any 
reference to defendant’s unrepresented status, and the 
prosecutor’s comments nine months later in the superior court 
could not have influenced the municipal court, which clearly 
relied on the People’s right to a preliminary hearing, not section 
1018, in rebuffing defendant’s request to plead guilty. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
50 
But, be that as it may, defendant never requested to plead guilty 
before the superior court, and he never asked that court to make 
a ruling based on section 1018, which would have preserved on 
appeal the issue of that statute’s constitutionality.  He may have 
been acting based on the advice that no judge could accept his 
plea, but he still needed to obtain a ruling and thus preserve the 
issue.  Self-represented defendants are “held to the same 
standard of knowledge of law and procedure as is an attorney,” 
and that point remains valid even in capital cases.  (People v. 
Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 625; see People v. Espinoza (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 61, 75; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 734; People 
v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 157; Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 
806, 834–835, fn. 46.)  “We have . . . rejected claims that the fact 
or likelihood that an unskilled, self-represented defendant will 
perform poorly in conducting his or her own defense must defeat 
the Faretta right.  [¶] . . .  Instead, we have accepted that the 
cost of recognizing a criminal defendant’s right to self-
representation may result ‘ “in detriment to the defendant, if not 
outright unfairness.” ’  [Citations.]  But that is a cost that we 
allow defendants the choice of paying, if they can do so 
knowingly and voluntarily.”  (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 
181, 206; see People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 866.) 
In summary, pleading guilty before the preliminary 
hearing was simply not an option for defendant, because the 
municipal court magistrate had no power to accept a guilty plea 
in a capital case.  The municipal court never made a section 1018 
ruling prohibiting defendant from pleading guilty, because the 
issue of a guilty plea was not before it and, for jurisdictional 
reasons, could not be before it.  The most the municipal court 
could do for defendant was accept a stipulated waiver of the 
preliminary hearing and then send the case to the superior 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
51 
court.  But the People did not agree to waive the preliminary 
hearing, and when the day of the preliminary hearing arrived, 
defendant did not renew his request to plead guilty.  Nor did he 
renew it in the superior court after he was held to answer.  Only 
the superior court could have made a ruling based on section 
1018, and once the case got to the superior court, defendant 
never asked to plead guilty, so such a ruling never became 
necessary.  We therefore reject defendant’s constitutional 
challenge to section 1018 on the ground that the trial court 
never made a ruling under section 1018, and his claim is 
therefore forfeited. 
3.  Validity of Waiver of Right to Counsel 
Defendant challenges the validity of his waiver of his right 
to counsel, making several arguments.  None of his arguments 
has merit. 
a.  Municipal Court’s Asserted Error in Denying 
Defendant’s Marsden Motion without Sufficient 
Inquiry 
Defendant first contends his waiver of the right to counsel 
was induced by the municipal court’s errors during his first 
Marsden hearing on October 30, 1996, when he said that he did 
not want that vigorous of a defense and added that he wanted 
to plead guilty.  He asserts that the court made no inquiry into 
his intent to plead guilty or his conflict with counsel, and it then 
permitted counsel to enter a not guilty plea despite defendant’s 
stated desire to plead guilty.  He argues that the court’s actions 
placed him in an unconstitutional dilemma of either (1) 
defending himself with counsel who would not “accede to his 
fundamental and personal right to control his defense by 
pleading guilty and pursuing a case for life at penalty,” or (2) 
defending himself without counsel.  In these circumstances, he 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
52 
argues, there was no valid waiver of the right to counsel.  He 
asserts that the unaddressed and unresolved conflict he had 
with his counsel negated the required showing that his waiver 
was voluntary and intelligent. 
Defendant is wrong.  After defendant made an oral 
Marsden motion, the municipal court held a Marsden hearing in 
chambers.  The court started the hearing by asking defendant 
to describe why he believed one or both of his attorneys were not 
rendering competent or reasonable representation.  Defendant 
explained that he did not agree with “their idea of what they 
want to do tactical-wise” and that he did not want them to call 
witnesses over his objection.  Defendant’s complaints regarding 
trial preparation and strategy were tactical disagreements, as 
defendant conceded in the hearing, which do not by themselves 
constitute an irreconcilable conflict.  (People v. Cole (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 1158, 1192 (Cole); see People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 
297, 334 [whether to call certain witnesses is a matter of trial 
tactics].)  Although the McCoy court acknowledged a defendant’s 
fundamental right to choose the objective of his or her defense, 
the court also acknowledged that it is defense counsel’s job to 
determine how best to achieve a client’s objectives.  (McCoy, 
supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508].) 
Defendant did not indicate to the municipal court that the 
conflict he had with counsel was so serious that he would 
consider representing himself just to terminate his relationship 
with his current public defenders, nor did defendant say that his 
conflict with counsel concerned whether or not to enter a guilty 
plea.  On the contrary, defendant’s main concern was about 
whether certain witnesses would be called at the penalty phase.  
When the municipal court said that the penalty phase was still 
a long way off, defendant responded that it was not a long way 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
53 
off, because he planned to waive the preliminary hearing and 
plead guilty, which meant the penalty phase would occur 
relatively soon.  He added that his dispute with counsel 
concerned how to conduct the penalty phase.  His counsel 
wanted “to check all avenues,” and defendant didn’t want that.  
He also said that he didn’t want to represent himself and allow 
the prosecutor “to just walk all over me.”  He continued, “I’m 
going to keep these counsel.  I’m not saying they are ineffective.”  
Defendant’s comments contradict his assertion that his waiver 
of the right to counsel was due to a conflict over whether he 
should plead guilty.  On the contrary, what he told the court was 
that the conflict was over how the penalty phase should be 
conducted, and the court acted within its discretion in finding 
no irreconcilable conflict requiring counsel’s replacement. 
b.  Failure to Advise that Defendant Could Not 
Plead Guilty 
Defendant next contends his waiver was invalid because 
the municipal court failed to advise him that even if he waived 
his right to counsel, he still could not plead guilty.  He notes that 
his request to waive counsel “came one week after counsel was 
allowed to thwart [his] stated intent to plead guilty,” suggesting 
that the court should therefore have known that his reason for 
waiving counsel was his desire to plead guilty.  He points out 
that section 1018 prohibits a capital defendant from pleading 
guilty without consent of counsel, and he argues that court 
failed to ensure he was aware of the rule. 
“The requirements for a valid waiver of the right to 
counsel are (1) a determination that the accused is competent to 
waive the right, i.e., he or she has the mental capacity to 
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him 
or her; and (2) a finding that the waiver is knowing and 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
54 
voluntary, i.e., the accused understands the significance and 
consequences of the decision and makes it without coercion.”  
(People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1069-1070.)  “On 
appeal, we examine de novo the whole record—not merely the 
transcript of the hearing on the Faretta motion itself—to 
determine the validity of the defendant’s waiver of the right to 
counsel.”  (Id. at p. 1070.) 
Defendant here asserts, in effect, that the court did not 
ensure he was aware of all of the disadvantages of self-
representation; namely, that he would not be able to plead guilty 
because such a plea requires the consent of counsel under 
section 1018.  Defendant argues that the timing of his Faretta 
request, made only one week after he attempted to plead guilty, 
demonstrated that his request stemmed from a mistaken belief 
that a guilty plea would be accepted after counsel was 
discharged. 
Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that when 
a defendant waives the right to counsel, the trial court must 
inform the defendant of every possible specific disadvantage 
that might later flow from the waiver.  Countless disadvantages 
might result from a waiver of the right to counsel, and a trial 
court could not possibly predict each of those disadvantages in 
advance.  Therefore, the trial court need only inform the 
defendant in general terms of the most common disadvantages.  
(See People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 277–278 (Riggs); 
People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568, 572–573.) 
Nor on this record was the municipal court made aware of 
the need to inform defendant that he could not plead guilty if he 
represented himself.  On November 7, 1996, when defendant 
made his oral motion to proceed in propria persona, he did not 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
55 
say anything about an intent to plead guilty.  Quite the opposite:  
Defendant’s only concern about representing himself was 
whether he would have the ability to obtain funding for an 
investigator to assist him.  It is true that defendant had told the 
court one week earlier, during the Marsden hearing, that it was 
his plan to waive the preliminary hearing and plead guilty.  
However, when the court arraigned defendant after the hearing, 
counsel entered a plea of not guilty.  Defendant then said, “Over 
my objection,” but counsel clarified that defendant’s objection 
related to the reading of the complaint, and defendant did not 
dispute that point.  Those facts do not support defendant’s 
assertion that on the day of the Marsden hearing “counsel was 
allowed to thwart [his] stated intent to plead guilty.” 
A week later when defendant waived his right to counsel, 
defendant’s actions were too ambiguous for the court to have 
reasonably known that the reason he sought to represent 
himself was that he wanted to plead guilty.  Furthermore, when 
defendant later learned that he would be unable to plead guilty 
as a self-represented defendant, he reaffirmed his desire to 
continue without counsel. 
We conclude that the record “ ‘as a whole demonstrates 
that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-
representation, including the risks and complexities of the 
particular case’ ” (Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 276), and that 
because defendant did not make his intent clear, the municipal 
court was not obligated to specifically inform defendant that he 
would not be able to plead guilty if he waived his right to 
counsel. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
56 
c.  Sufficiency of the Court’s Inquiry 
Defendant further contends that the municipal court’s 
Faretta inquiry was insufficient to support a valid waiver of the 
right to counsel in a capital case.  He asserts the court did not 
specifically inquire into his understanding of capital case 
proceedings and did not make him aware of the specific dangers 
and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel in capital 
proceedings or of the fundamental legal rights that would be 
affected by proceeding without counsel.  He also notes that his 
Faretta form did not advise him of such disadvantages.  We 
conclude the court’s inquiry was sufficient. 
As noted, the trial court could not possibly predict every 
disadvantage that might flow from a waiver of the right to 
counsel, and therefore it need only inform the defendant in 
general terms of the most common disadvantages.  We have 
upheld warnings similar to those that defendant here received.  
(Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 277–278 [advisements were 
adequate where record showed the defendant was aware that 
defending himself against capital charges was a complex process 
involving extremely high stakes and that his ability to defend 
himself might be hampered by his incarceration and lack of 
training]; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 709–710 
[advisements were adequate where record reflects that the 
defendant understood the nature of the charged offense, the 
nature of a capital proceeding and penalty phase, and was 
advised by the court to receive help from a lawyer].) 
On August 22, 1996, the municipal court discussed at 
length with defendant his desire to plead guilty.  Defendant 
explained that he had been involved in several cases in the 
criminal justice system and had previously represented himself 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
57 
against three felony charges, none of which went to jury trial.  
He understood that he would be treated the same as an attorney 
and would receive no special privileges.  He affirmed that he 
could read and understand English “very well” and that he had 
a “healthy, clear mind.”  On November 7, 1996, defendant 
executed a written waiver of his right to counsel.  The waiver 
form emphasized that it was “almost always unwise to represent 
yourself” and reminded defendant that he would be facing a 
skilled and experienced prosecutor.  During the oral colloquy, 
defendant affirmed his awareness that he faced “murder with 
special circumstances and [that] the maximum term is the death 
penalty.” 
The record here reflects that defendant was aware of the 
charges against him, that he knew he faced both a guilt phase 
and, if found guilty, a penalty phase, that he could expect to 
have access to only limited resources due to his incarceration, 
and that the assistance of an attorney was highly recommended.  
The court’s inquiry was sufficient. 
d.  Requests to Reappoint Counsel 
Defendant next asserts the trial court erred by failing to 
address and grant his requests on January 23 and 27, 1997, for 
reappointment of counsel. 
The hearing on January 23 was an in camera hearing 
before a superior court judge who was overseeing disbursement 
of investigative funds under section 987.9.  At the start of the 
hearing, the court explained that it had received notice that 
defendant had violated the terms of the order granting him jail 
privileges.  Defendant replied that he wished to plead guilty.  He 
expressed frustration with his lack of a working computer and 
difficulty placing unmonitored phone calls.  He explained that 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
58 
he did not want the government to “run over” him and did not 
“want to play these games anymore.”  He told the court that he 
preferred to plead guilty and have the public defender’s office 
reappointed to represent him during the penalty phase.  
Defendant complained that he had to “keep coming to this court 
and begging” for phone calls, materials, and investigation 
reports and did not believe the court was sincere in its efforts to 
assist him.  Defendant asked insistently to “go public” and allow 
him to change his plea.  The court, which was addressing only 
the disbursement of investigative funds under section 987.9, 
said, “That part of the matter’s not before me.”  As noted, the 
court told defendant he would need to discuss his desire to 
change his plea in the proper department, and the court offered 
to help him do so.  (See ante, p. __.) 
Defendant returned to the superior court on January 27, 
1997, for an in camera hearing on his alleged jail violation and 
to further discuss his displeasure with his assigned investigator.  
The court revoked defendant’s self-representation jail privileges 
and closed the hearing by again offering to help defendant waive 
his preliminary hearing and plead guilty, if that was what 
defendant still wanted:  “We will call [the municipal court judge 
assigned to your case] and see if she can work it in sometime 
late this morning, or sometime this afternoon.” 
That afternoon, defendant appeared in the department of 
the municipal court assigned to his case and asked to plead 
guilty.  As already discussed, the municipal court had no 
authority to accept a guilty plea in a capital case.  Instead, if 
defendant insisted on pleading guilty, the court would need to 
proceed with the preliminary examination, hold defendant to 
answer, and then defendant would have to plead guilty in the 
superior court.  The prosecutor told defendant that the law 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
59 
prevented him from pleading guilty.  The municipal court then 
explained that the People were not prepared to waive the 
preliminary hearing, and therefore there was no choice but to 
proceed with that hearing.  The court said, “I am going to 
suggest that we terminate these proceedings today,” adding that 
defendant should return on the day scheduled for the 
preliminary hearing, having considered the matter further.  
Defendant agreed with that solution. 
A motion to abandon self-representation and have counsel 
reappointed must be unequivocal.  (People v. Lawrence (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 186, 193 (Lawrence); see People v. Lewis and Oliver 
(2006) 
39 
Cal.4th 
970, 
1002 
(Lewis 
and 
Oliver).)  
“Equivocation . . . may occur where the defendant tries to 
manipulate the proceedings by switching between requests for 
counsel and for self-representation, or where such actions are 
the product of whim or frustration.”  (Lewis and Oliver, supra, 
39 Cal.4th at p. 1002.)  A trial court’s denial of a Faretta 
revocation request is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
(Lawrence, at p. 192.) 
At the hearing on January 23, 1997, defendant did not 
simply request to have counsel reappointed.  Instead, he 
expressed an intent first to plead guilty, and only then to have 
counsel reappointed to handle the penalty phase.  As already 
discussed, however, in order to plead guilty, defendant needed 
to proceed through the preliminary hearing (or waive it), be held 
to answer in superior court, and then enter his guilty plea in 
that court.  The superior court, which was handling only 
disbursement of investigative funds under section 987.9, did not 
fail to address defendant’s request.  The court appropriately 
informed defendant that the matter of his pleading guilty was 
not before it and that he needed to raise that issue in the proper 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
60 
department.  It then arranged a hearing in the division of the 
municipal court that was assigned to defendant’s preliminary 
hearing.  Because defendant’s request to have counsel 
reappointed was expressly conditioned on his pleading guilty, 
and because he could not plead guilty without proceeding 
through the preliminary hearing (or waiving it), the court 
properly directed defendant to the division of the municipal 
court where he could begin that process. 
On January 27, 1997, when defendant was before the 
municipal court division that was handling his preliminary 
hearing, defendant again requested to plead guilty, but he did 
not repeat his request to have counsel reappointed.  Because the 
People were not willing to waive the preliminary hearing, the 
court had no choice but to proceed with that hearing as 
scheduled. 
Contrary to defendant’s claim, the trial court did not fail 
to address his request to plead guilty and have counsel 
reappointed.  Instead, it did what was within its power to assist 
defendant.  We conclude there was no error. 
e.  Waiver of Right to Counsel after Defendant Was 
Held to Answer in Superior Court 
Lastly, defendant asserts he did not validly waive counsel 
on March 14, 1997, when the superior court took a second 
Faretta waiver.  The prosecutor requested this second waiver of 
defendant’s right to counsel, because defendant’s previous 
waiver was before the prosecution had formally declared its 
intent to pursue the death penalty. 
At the hearing on March 14, 1997, the superior court 
advised defendant that he had the right to a speedy and public 
trial, and the right to a trial by jury.  The court also advised 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
61 
defendant that he had the right to use the court to subpoena 
witnesses or records he might need and the right to confront in 
open court all witnesses called to testify against him.  The court 
then noted that, according to a minute order dated February 28, 
another judge had gone “through all this” with defendant.  
Defendant clarified that “those were in camera hearings.”  The 
court asked, “Were all these rights explained to you at that 
time?”  In response, defendant said, “Yeah, I’m fully aware of my 
rights.  I’m making a knowing and intelligent waiver of my 
rights.  I understand that this is a death penalty case and that 
the minimum term, mandatory minimum is life without the 
possibility of parole.  I am also aware that by pleading not guilty 
and not guilty by reason of insanity, I could spend the rest of my 
life in a mental institution if a jury so finds, but I’m willing to 
fill out your petition here.”  The court stated, “As long as this 
has all been gone over with you by [the other judge], I’m 
satisfied.”  Defendant then signed the Faretta waiver for the 
court. 
Defendant contends the trial court’s failure to readvise 
him of his rights violated section 987, subdivision (b), which 
provides that if a capital defendant appears for arraignment 
without counsel, the court shall inform him that he shall be 
represented by counsel at all stages of the preliminary and trial 
proceedings. 
In People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, a noncapital 
defendant waived his right to counsel in municipal court.  After 
the defendant was held to answer, the superior court did not 
readvise him of his right at his subsequent arraignment, as is 
required by section 987, subdivision (a).  We held that when “a 
defendant has been fully informed of his or her right to counsel 
at all stages of the proceedings (including trial), and voluntarily 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
62 
and knowingly has invoked the right to represent himself or 
herself throughout all the proceedings, the trial court’s failure 
to provide a new advisement and obtain a renewed waiver at the 
arraignment (as required by section 987) does not operate to 
terminate 
or 
revoke 
the 
defendant’s 
validly 
invoked 
constitutional right to represent himself or herself at trial.”  
(People v. Crayton, at p. 365.)  We further held that a trial court’s 
error in failing to comply with section 987 was susceptible to a 
harmless error analysis.  (People v. Crayton, at p. 365.)  We 
noted that a review of the record will reveal whether, despite the 
absence of an explicit advisement by the superior court at 
arraignment, the defendant was aware that he or she had the 
right to appointed counsel at subsequent proceedings and 
whether an explicit advisement at the arraignment would have 
been likely to lead the defendant to reconsider the decision to 
represent himself or herself.  (Ibid.) 
The same rule applies to capital defendants under section 
987, subdivision (b).  Where, as here, the record reveals that the 
defendant was aware that he had the right to appointed counsel 
at subsequent proceedings and an explicit advisement at 
arraignment would not have been likely to lead to the 
defendant’s reconsidering his decision to represent himself, the 
court’s failure to readvise the defendant is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Defendant was well aware that he had the 
right to appointed counsel at all stages.  When the municipal 
court took his Faretta waiver on November 7, 1996, the court 
expressly stated that defendant’s motion “is to represent 
yourself throughout the proceedings, prelim, pretrial, trial, 
everything?”  Defendant replied, “Yes, sir.”  Defendant also 
repeatedly reminded the court during in camera hearings that 
he wanted to represent himself, that he was lead counsel on his 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
63 
case, and that he did not want the court to handle matters 
through his advisory counsel.  He also signed a second written 
waiver of his Faretta rights.  And when the court attempted to 
readvise defendant of his rights, he told the court that he was 
“fully aware” of his rights and was making a “knowing and 
intelligent” waiver of those rights.  We conclude that any 
possible error was harmless under any standard.   
B.  Failure to Suppress Statements 
Investigators first interviewed defendant shortly after his 
arrest on June 14, 1996.  Officer Mark Steen advised defendant 
of his right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used 
against him in court, of his right to have an attorney present 
before or during any questioning, and that if he could not afford 
an 
attorney, 
one 
would 
be 
appointed 
before 
questioning.  
Following 
each 
advisement, 
Steen 
asked 
defendant if he understood.  To each question, defendant 
replied, “Yes, sir.”  Steen then proceeded to question defendant 
about his involvement in the crime. 
Early in the questioning, defendant said, “Hey, when am I 
going to get a chance to call my lawyer.  It’s getting late, and 
he’s probably going to go to bed pretty soon.”  Steen replied, 
“Your lawyer?  Well you can call your lawyer after we’re done in 
our facility.”  Defendant said, “Oh, okay.  So what do we got to 
do in our facility here?”  Steen explained, “Well, we’re 
conducting this interview.”  When defendant asked if they could 
finish the interview the following day, Steen replied, “Um, we 
can continue talking tomorrow; however, we’re not going to 
continue the interview.”  Steen then continued asking defendant 
about the murder. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
64 
Eleven days later, on July 25, 1996, defendant sent 
Officers Steen and Lozano a letter requesting to meet.  The 
investigators spoke with defendant at the jail on August 12, 
1996.  Lozano advised defendant that he was represented by the 
public defender, who had invoked defendant’s right to remain 
silent.  Lozano asked if defendant would like to waive his right 
to have an attorney present.  Defendant replied, “I waive that, 
and I have since fired him.”12  Lozano advised defendant of his 
Miranda rights, and defendant signed a waiver.  Lozano then 
interviewed defendant. 
On June 23, 1997, defendant filed a pretrial motion to 
suppress his statements from the June 14 interview.  He also 
moved to dismiss the information on the grounds that his 
confession was obtained in violation of Miranda, and without 
the confession, there was insufficient evidence to hold him to 
answer on the murder charge.  On September 8, 1997, defendant 
filed a motion to suppress both the June 14 confession and his 
statements from the August 12 interview.  He argued the 
August statements “still carried the taint” of the June 14 
interview at which the investigators engaged in misconduct by 
failing to notify his counsel when he requested to speak with 
them.  Defendant further argued that his “known history of 
mental illness and current treatment with psycho[tropic] 
medications are factors to consider.” 
At a hearing on September 26, 1997, the trial court denied 
the motions.  The court found that defendant’s statements 
                                        
12  
Actually, defendant had submitted, on July 16, 1996, a 
handwritten motion requesting to proceed in propria persona.  
Defendant later withdrew that request, but he then made a new 
request, which the court granted on November 7, 1996. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
65 
during the June 14 interview did not constitute a clear request 
for an attorney.  Rather, his inquiry into when he could call his 
attorney indicated that he was “desirous of speeding up the 
interview so he [could] call his lawyer when the interview was 
over.  There is certainly nothing close to a clear request for an 
attorney.”  The court found that because defendant initiated 
contact before the August interview and signed written waivers 
of the presence of counsel and of his Miranda rights, “defendant 
can hardly complain that his statements were coerced, 
involuntary, or in violation of his right to counsel.”  The court 
further found that defendant presented no evidence of any 
mental defect that would preclude him from understanding and 
waiving his rights. 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to 
suppress his statements from the June 14 interview because he 
did not validly waive his right to counsel.  He further asserts the 
trial court erred in failing to suppress statements from the 
August 12 interview because there was no break in the causal 
chain from the erroneous first interrogation.  Lastly, defendant 
asserts that the state violated his Sixth Amendment rights “by 
approaching appellant [on August 12] without first contacting 
his attorney,” and he further asserts that his mental illness 
affected his ability to waive his rights.  We disagree. 
In Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, the United States 
Supreme Court set forth prophylactic measures to protect an 
individual’s right against self-incrimination from curtailment 
under the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial 
interrogation.  (Id. at p. 467.)  A suspect “must be warned prior 
to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that 
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that 
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
66 
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to 
any questioning if he so desires.”  (Id. at p. 479.)  After a suspect 
has heard and understood these rights, he or she may waive 
them.  (People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 683.)  The 
prosecution, however, bears the burden of showing that the 
waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under the 
totality of circumstances.  (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 
1146, 1171; see Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98, 104.) 
On appeal, we view the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the order denying the motion to suppress.  (People v. Tully 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979.)  “Moreover, the reviewing court 
‘must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and its 
assessment of credibility.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
In People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, a police officer 
interviewed the defendant on three separate occasions.  At the 
beginning of each interview, the officer advised the defendant of 
his rights under Miranda and asked whether he understood 
them.  Each time, the defendant responded that he did.  The 
officer then proceeded to question the defendant.  (Id. at 
pp. 237–239.)  We concluded the defendant’s statements were 
voluntary, noting that the record was devoid of any suggestion 
that the police resorted to physical or psychological pressure to 
elicit them.  (Id. at pp. 248–249.)  We concluded the defendant 
was aware of the rights he was waiving and the consequences of 
his decision to do so, observing that there was no evidence that 
during any interview his judgment was clouded or otherwise 
impaired.  (Id. at p. 249.)  We further concluded that the 
defendant’s waiver was intelligent, noting that there was no 
evidence that he lacked sufficient intelligence to understand his 
rights or the consequences of waiving them.  (Id. at p. 250.)  We 
held: 
 
“Although 
the 
police 
officers 
did 
not 
obtain 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
67 
an express waiver of defendant’s Miranda rights, decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court and of this court have held 
that such an express waiver is not required where a defendant’s 
actions make clear that a waiver is intended.”  (Ibid.; see North 
Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 374–375.) 
As in Whitson, ample evidence supports a finding here 
that defendant’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent.  Officers Steen and Lozano explained each Miranda 
right to defendant, after which he indicated that he understood.  
Following a complete admonition, defendant began to discuss 
his role in the murder.  His actions made clear that a waiver was 
intended. 
Defendant also did not unequivocally invoke his right to 
counsel when he subsequently asked, “Hey, when am I going to 
get a chance to call my lawyer?  It’s getting late, and he’s 
probably going to go to bed pretty soon.”  When a defendant has 
waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with police, any 
subsequent invocation of the right to counsel must be 
unequivocal and unambiguous.  (Davis v. United States (1994) 
512 U.S. 452, 461–462.)  “[A]fter a knowing and voluntary 
waiver, interrogation may proceed ‘until and unless the suspect 
clearly requests an attorney.’ ”  (People v. Williams (2010) 49 
Cal.4th 405, 427 (Williams).)  Defendant’s statement that it was 
getting late and his question about when he would get to call his 
lawyer did not amount to an unequivocal and unambiguous 
request for counsel.  A reasonable officer in Steen and Lozano’s 
position would have concluded that defendant’s remark 
expressed concern over the length of the interview and a desire 
to contact counsel when the interview was over.  Defendant 
never said that he wanted to stop the interview immediately and 
consult counsel. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
68 
We conclude that defendant’s statements from the June 14 
interview were properly obtained.  It follows that his subsequent 
statements at the August 12 interview did not carry any taint 
from the previous interview.  Furthermore, the investigators 
readvised defendant of his Miranda rights before beginning the 
August 12 interview, and defendant signed a waiver. 
Defendant’s contention that the August 12 interview 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel also fails.  Officer 
Lozano reminded defendant that the investigators were present 
for the interview because defendant had initiated contact 
through a letter indicating a desire to speak with them.  While 
advising defendant of his Miranda rights, Lozano said, “You are 
being represented, at this point, that we know of, by a public 
defender, okay, . . . who has invoked your right to remain silent 
with the court.  He’s filed papers to that effect, . . . that you are 
just . . . [to] remain silent, okay?  You have the right to have your 
attorney . . . present while we talk to you, okay?  Uh, . . . do you 
wish to have him here at this time, or do you waive that right to 
have that attorney . . . here at this time?”  Defendant replied, “I 
waive that, and I have since fired him.”13 
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least 
after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel 
as a ‘medium’ between him and the State.”  (Maine v. Moulton 
(1985) 474 U.S. 159, 176.)  A suspect has the right, however, to 
knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel, 
especially if the accused himself initiates such communication.  
(Patterson v. Illinois (1988) 487 U.S. 285, 291.)  Defendant 
                                        
13  
As noted, defendant had filed a motion to proceed in 
propria persona, but the court had not ruled on it.  Defendant 
later withdrew the motion. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
69 
initiated contact with the investigators when he sent them a 
letter requesting to meet.  He was then thoroughly advised of 
his right to have counsel present during the interview, and he 
unequivocally waived that right.  Moreover, his waiver was not 
invalidated by his asserted mental illness.  Defendant relies on 
a declaration he submitted to the trial court with his motion to 
suppress, in which a psychologist declared that defendant was 
“mentally ill” and that his letter requesting a meeting with the 
investigators “was a product of this deteriorated mental state.”  
On review of this declaration, the trial court expressed concern 
over the lack of cross-examination by the People and found that 
the psychologist’s statement was “a legal conclusion that would 
not be admissible, as it is without foundation.”  In its written 
order, the trial court stated that defendant failed to present 
evidence of any mental defect that would prohibit him from 
waiving his rights. 
The record does not demonstrate that defendant failed to 
understand or validly waive his rights.  We conclude that 
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings. 
C.  Failure to Suppress Evidence 
Santa Ana Police Corporal Richard Reese testified at trial 
that he arrested defendant on the evening of June 14, 1996.  
After the arrest, Reese and other law enforcement personnel 
conducted a parole search of defendant’s camper.  They located 
a .32-caliber revolver in its holster, hidden under a blanket.  
Reese testified that they found five live rounds in the revolver. 
Defendant objected and asked the trial court to strike 
Reese’s testimony.  Outside the jury’s presence, defendant 
explained the basis of his objection:  “No probable cause for the 
search.  The evidence that he’s attempting to introduce is the 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
70 
object of an illegal search and seizure.  I believe that Officer — 
Corporal Reese testified that the defendant was already in 
custody [and hence no longer on parole], and . . . I believe that 
there was no exigent circumstances for them to conduct a search 
without a search warrant.  They could have obtained a search 
warrant, so on and so forth.”  The prosecutor replied that if 
defendant wanted to suppress the evidence of the search, “he 
had ample time before the proceedings” to do so.  He argued the 
search was actually conducted by parole agent Jan Moorehead 
pursuant to a parole condition.  The prosecutor explained that 
he “did not want to raise the specter of a parole search” before 
the jury, and he had only vaguely questioned Reese as to 
whether other investigators were present, so as not to reveal to 
the jury that defendant was on parole.  Defendant replied that 
he was in custody at the time of the search and no longer on 
parole. 
The court stated that the objection was “extremely tardy” 
and asked defendant why he waited until mid-trial to raise the 
issue.  Defendant explained that he was under the assumption 
that the officers had conducted the search pursuant to a 
warrant, but he realized after Reese’s testimony that they did 
not have a warrant.  The prosecutor responded that an evidence 
list from the parole search had listed a revolver, holster, and 
bullets, thus informing defendant that the gun was found during 
the parole search, not during a later search of the same camper, 
done pursuant to a warrant. 
The court denied defendant’s motion, stating:  “If there’s 
nothing in any of the discovery to indicate that the weapon was 
taken during a search pursuant to a warrant, I’m somewhat 
confused as to how you would not be aware that it was taken by 
Corporal Reese during his search of the camper.”  Defendant 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
71 
explained that the documents confused him and that he did not 
purposefully wait to make the argument.  The court replied, 
“The problem presented here is that if I were to allow this 
motion to be heard at this time, it would be granting favoritism 
to an individual who decided to represent himself.  I don’t 
believe that it’s fair to the process of justice to do that.  The 
defendant, having chosen to represent himself, is bound to know 
the rules and procedures.  I frankly can’t see any justification 
for waiting mid-trial to make a motion to suppress.” 
Section 1538.5, subdivision (a), provides that a defendant 
may move to suppress as evidence any tangible thing obtained 
as a result of an illegal search or seizure.  A defendant is not 
permitted to raise a search and seizure issue for the first time 
during trial, however, unless the opportunity for the motion did 
not previously exist or the defendant was not aware, prior to 
trial, of the grounds for the motion.  (§ 1538.5, subd. (h); People 
v. Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471, 476.) 
We conclude that sufficient evidence supported the trial 
court’s finding that defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence 
was untimely.  The discovery provided to defendant clearly 
indicated that the gun was located during Reese’s post-arrest 
search of the camper, not during the subsequent execution of the 
search warrant.  Defendant said the paperwork confused him; 
he did not claim, however, that he had been provided erroneous 
or incomplete pretrial discovery and therefore was incapable of 
discovering the grounds for his motion.  Defendant’s failure to 
bring his motion to suppress prior to trial therefore does not fall 
within the exceptions recognized in section 1538, subdivision 
(h). 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
72 
D.  Disclosure of Reporter’s Unpublished Notes 
Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to 
obtain evidence when it refused to require a reporter to disclose 
her notes from her jailhouse interview with him.  He asserts 
application of the newsperson’s shield law (Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 2, subd. (b); Evid. Code, § 1070) limited his ability to challenge 
testimony from Marla Jo Fisher, a reporter with the Orange 
County Register (the Register). 
On June 15, 1996, the day after defendant’s arrest, Fisher 
visited the jail to conduct an interview.  After Fisher identified 
herself to defendant and explained the purpose of her visit, he 
agreed to speak with her.  He admitted that he was attempting 
to rob the HomeBase store and that he shot Wilson.  The 
following day, the Register published an article containing 
several statements and admissions from defendant. 
The prosecution subpoenaed Fisher to testify at trial.  
Defendant in turn subpoenaed the Register for any notes and 
materials it had regarding Fisher’s interview.  The Register 
provided a copy of the published article.  After defendant argued 
that the Register wanted to “quash the unpublished” notes, the 
trial court issued an order to show cause why the Register 
should not produce the requested documents.  In response, the 
Register, on its own behalf and on behalf of Fisher, moved for a 
protective order limiting the scope of subpoenas to information 
not protected under the California reporter’s shield law and also 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that statements he 
made during the interview would establish mitigating 
circumstances relative to the penalty determination, might 
establish that the murder was not in furtherance of a robbery, 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
73 
and might be relevant for the sanity phase.  He further argued 
that Fisher published his statements out of context, and he 
needed the ability to impeach her credibility and to show that 
she was acting as a government agent. 
At a hearing on the matter, the court concluded that 
defendant 
could 
cross-examine 
Fisher 
regarding 
the 
circumstances surrounding the interview, including statements 
he may have made that were not published.  The court also 
concluded, however, that it would not order Fisher to turn over 
her notes at that time, stating that making such an order would 
depend on her testimony and whether she relied on those notes 
in refreshing her recollection while testifying. 
The trial court then conducted another hearing before 
Fisher testified to determine whether she would be using any 
unpublished notes to refresh her recollection.  Attorney Alec 
Barinholtz appeared on behalf of Fisher and the Register’s 
parent company.  Fisher did not testify regarding whether she 
had taken notes during her interview with defendant.  Rather, 
she said that prior to coming to court, she had refreshed her 
recollection by reviewing the published newspaper article and 
watching a videotape of a televised interview.  The court ruled 
that because Fisher did not rely on any notes to refresh her 
recollection, any notes she may have taken were shielded by law.  
The court concluded that defendant could “inquire about 
matters that were discussed during his interview with her. . . .  
Well, anything that he recalls that he wants to talk to her about 
that occurred during the course of the interview is subject to be 
examined upon.” 
Article I, section 2, subdivision (b) of the California 
Constitution provides, as relevant to this case, that a 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
74 
“reporter . . . shall not be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, 
legislative, or administrative body . . . for refusing to disclose 
any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, 
receiving or processing of information for communication to the 
public.”  The constitutional provision is codified in section 1070 
of the Evidence Code.  This law, known as the “shield law,” 
“protects a newsperson from being adjudged in contempt for 
refusing to disclose either:  (1) unpublished information, or (2) 
the source of information, whether published or unpublished.”  
(Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 797 (Delaney).)  
A newsperson’s immunity, however, must yield to a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.  (Id. at p. 805; 
People v. Charles (2015) 61 Cal.4th 308, 325 (Charles).)  “ ‘In 
order to compel disclosure of information covered by 
the shield law, the defendant must make a threshold showing of 
a reasonable possibility that the information will materially 
assist his defense.  The showing need not be detailed or specific, 
but it must rest on more than mere speculation.’ ”  (People v. 
Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 526 (Ramos).) 
We have previously “set forth a number of factors to guide 
the trial court in balancing the interests of a criminal defendant 
seeking 
to 
overcome 
the 
immunity 
granted 
by 
the shield law with the newsperson’s interests.  Those factors 
are:  (a) ‘whether the unpublished information is confidential or 
sensitive’; (b) whether ‘the interests sought to be protected’ by 
the law would be thwarted by disclosure; (c) ‘the importance of 
the information to the criminal defendant’; and (d) ‘[w]hether 
there is an alternative source for the unpublished information.’ ”  
(Charles, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 325; see Delaney, supra, 50 
Cal.3d at pp. 810–811.) 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
75 
Defendant asserts that the shield law should not apply 
because he was both the source of the unpublished information 
and the person seeking its disclosure.  In Delaney, supra, 50 
Cal.3d 785, we acknowledged that when “the criminal defendant 
seeking disclosure is himself the source of the information, it 
cannot be seriously argued that the source (the defendant) will 
feel that his confidence has been breached.  The reporter’s news-
gathering ability will not be prejudiced.”  (Id. at pp. 810–811.) 
Before the court may weigh the interests sought to be 
protected by the shield law, however, the defendant must first 
make the threshold showing that there is a reasonable 
possibility that the information will materially assist his 
defense.  In Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th 494, a newspaper reporter 
interviewed the defendant about the charges pending against 
him.  The newspaper published the interview.  When the 
prosecution subpoenaed the reporter, he filed a motion to quash 
on the ground that the information the prosecution sought was 
protected by the shield law.  (Id. at p. 523.)  Following an in 
camera hearing, the trial court decided the defense could cross-
examine the reporter on his observations of the defendant’s 
mental status and demeanor, but it did not require the reporter 
to produce his notes of the interview.  (Id. at p. 524.) 
We concluded that the defendant’s assertion that the 
reporter’s notes were material to his defense was mere 
speculation.  (Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 527.)  The 
defendant had not established that the notes contained 
anything different from the reporter’s testimony, and the record 
did not suggest the notes contained anything of substance that 
the jury had not already heard.  (Ibid.)  Because the defendant 
failed to meet the threshold showing, we did not balance the 
Delaney factors to determine whether disclosure was required, 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
76 
and we found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in using 
the shield law to protect the reporter’s notes.  (Ibid.) 
Here, defendant has likewise failed to make a threshold 
showing that there was a reasonable possibility, beyond mere 
speculation, that the information contained in Fisher’s notes 
would have materially assisted his defense.  Indeed, he has not 
established that such notes even existed.  Although he asserted 
in his motion that he had been misquoted in various passages of 
the article, the statements attributed to him in the article were 
consistent with his statements to the investigators.  Defendant’s 
vague assertion that he needed the notes to “test her credibility” 
does not show a reasonable possibility that the notes would have 
materially assisted his defense.  He has not made an adequate 
showing that any notes made by Fisher contained anything 
different from her testimony or from what the jury had already 
heard. 
Further, the trial court permitted defendant to cross-
examine Fisher on “all of the circumstances” surrounding the 
interview, including statements defendant may have made that 
were not published.  As the court told defendant during the 
hearing, “Considering the interview was of you, I think there is 
significant areas of testing the credibility available to you.” 
The trial court likewise did not err when it denied 
defendant’s motion to strike Fisher’s testimony.  For the reasons 
discussed above, defendant was not, as he asserts, unable to 
effectively cross-examine Fisher without her notes. 
E.  Instructional Error 
1.  Instruction on First Degree Murder 
Defendant contends that the instructions permitting him 
to be convicted of first degree murder on a theory of either 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
77 
premeditated murder or felony murder violated his rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution because he was not charged with first degree 
murder.  He asserts that because he was charged only with 
second degree murder under section 187, he cannot be found 
guilty of first degree murder.  He further asserts that the trial 
court committed reversible error by failing to require the jury to 
unanimously agree on the theory of first degree murder.  We 
have repeatedly rejected substantially similar claims and do so 
again here.   (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 592; Cole, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1221; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
287, 369; People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1132; People v. 
Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 367; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 312, 394–395.)  Defendant offers no persuasive reason 
to revisit these holdings. 
2.  Attempted Robbery–Murder Instruction 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it 
instructed the jury on attempted robbery–murder.  He asserts 
the instruction was “tantamount to a directed verdict on the 
issue of whether the killing occurred during the commission of 
attempted robbery, because the undisputed evidence showed 
that [he] fatally shot the victim long before he had reached a 
place of ‘temporary safety.’ ” 
The court instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC 
Nos. 8.21:  “The unlawful killing by a defendant of a human 
being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which 
occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the 
crime of robbery is murder of the first degree when the 
perpetrator had the specific intent to commit that crime.”  It also 
instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 8.21.1:  “For 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
78 
the purposes of determining whether an unlawful killing has 
occurred during the commission or attempted commission of a 
robbery, the commission of the crime of robbery is not confined 
to a fixed place or a limited period of time.  An attempted 
robbery is still in progress after the attempted taking of the 
property while the perpetrator is fleeing in an attempt to escape.  
Likewise it is still in progress so long as immediate pursuers are 
attempting to capture the perpetrator.  An attempted robbery is 
complete when the perpetrator has eluded any pursuers and has 
reached a place of temporary safety.” 
Defendant asserts that the evidence showed the 
attempted robbery and murder were two distinct crimes, not one 
continuous transaction, and that the instruction erroneously 
removed a factual issue from the jury’s consideration by 
directing the jury to conclude that the attempted robbery was 
still in progress when he shot the victim.  He relies on People v. 
Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596 (Sakarias).  In that case, the jury 
asked the court for clarification regarding when a burglary 
begins and ends.  The court responded, “ ‘Although it is alleged 
that the killing in the present case occurred sometime after it is 
alleged the defendant entered the house, if the jury finds that 
the defendant committed burglary by entering the house with 
the intent to steal, the homicide and the burglary are parts of 
one continuous transaction.’ ”  (Id. at p. 623.)  In Sakarias, we 
concluded that the trial court’s response relieved the jury of its 
obligation to determine whether all the elements of first degree 
murder and the burglary-murder special circumstance had been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but we further concluded 
that the error was harmless.  (Id. at pp. 624–625.) 
Subsequent to our decision in Sakarias, we have held 
CALJIC No. 8.21.1 to be a correct statement of the law.  (People 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
79 
v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177, 204–205.)  Defendant concedes 
that CALJIC No. 8.21.1 “may be a proper instruction under 
appropriate circumstances,” but he asserts that the instruction 
was erroneous in this situation.  He is mistaken.  In Sakarias, 
the trial court’s written response to the jury’s question was 
erroneous because it did not instruct the jury that it must decide 
for itself whether the homicide and burglary were part of a 
single continuous transaction.  (Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 
p. 626.)  The CALJIC No. 8.21.1 instruction given here did not 
suffer from the same flaw.  The jury was left to decide whether 
the attempted robbery was complete before the murder took 
place. 
3.  Special Circumstance Instruction 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously instructed 
the jury on the special circumstance allegation of attempted 
robbery–murder.  He contends that the instruction, combined 
with CALJIC No. 8.21.1, permitted the jury to find the special 
circumstance true without finding that he killed the victim 
while engaged in an attempted robbery.  We reject the claim. 
Over defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the 
jury using a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.8.17 as follows, 
with the modified portion in italics:  “To find that the special 
circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder in the 
commission of attempted robbery, is true, it must be proved:  
1. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged 
in the attempted commission of a robbery, or the murder was 
committed during the immediate flight after the attempted 
commission of a robbery by the defendant and 2. The murder 
was committed in the course of the commission of the crime of 
attempted robbery or to facilitate the escape therefore or to 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
80 
avoid detection.  In other words, the special circumstance 
referred to in these instructions is not established if the 
attempted robbery was merely incidental to the commission of 
the murder.” 
The standard jury instruction at the time of trial read, 
“The murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the 
commission of the crime . . . .”  (Italics added.)  Defendant 
asserts that the evidence supported instructing the jury with the 
standard “carry out or advance” language, because the jury 
could have reasonably concluded that any intent to steal no 
longer existed when he shot the victim.  We have previously 
held, however, that there “is nothing magical about the phrase 
‘to carry out or advance’ the felony.  Indeed, we ourselves have 
stated the requirement without using that phrase.”  (People v. 
Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 908.)  We reiterated in Horning 
that if the felony was merely incidental to the murder, no 
separate felony-based special circumstance exists, and the 
instruction’s explanation that the robbery must not be “ ‘merely 
incidental to the commission of the murder’ ” adequately 
conveys this requirement.  (Ibid.)  Because the court properly 
instructed the jury that it could not find the special 
circumstance true if it found the robbery to be merely incidental 
to the commission of the murder, there was no error. 
4.  Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
Defendant contends the instructions on circumstantial 
evidence (CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 8.83, 8.83.1) diluted the proof-
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard because they “informed 
the jurors that if [he] reasonably appeared to be guilty, they 
could find him guilty even if they entertained a reasonable doubt 
as to guilt.”  We have previously rejected similar challenges to 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
81 
these instructions.  (People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 
1058.)  Defendant offers no persuasive reason for us to revisit 
our precedent. 
5.  Flight Instruction 
Defendant raises three challenges to the trial court’s 
instruction on flight, 
CALJIC No. 2.52. 
He first asserts the instruction was unnecessary because 
it was duplicative of the general jury instructions regarding 
circumstantial evidence, citing CALJIC Nos. 2.00, 2.01, and 
2.02.  We have previously rejected this claim, concluding:  
“ ‘CALJIC Nos. 2.00, 2.01, and 2.02 instruct[] the jury on the 
definition of circumstantial evidence and its sufficiency in 
establishing facts to establish guilt.  On the other hand, CALJIC 
No. 2.52 [is] a cautionary instruction that benefit[s] the defense 
by “admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding evidence 
that might otherwise be considered decisively inculpatory.”  
[Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 608.) 
Defendant 
next 
contends 
the 
instruction 
was 
impermissibly argumentative in light of People v. Mincey (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 408, which he contends rejected, as argumentative, an 
instruction structurally similar to CALJIC No. 2.52.  We have 
described the instruction in Mincey, like that in CALJIC No. 
2.52, as having an if/then structure:  “ ‘If [certain facts] are 
shown, then you may [draw particular conclusions].’ ”  (People v. 
Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 330.)  We explained in Bonilla, 
however, that the structure of the instruction given in Mincey 
was not problematic.  Rather, the Mincey instruction was flawed 
because it contained argumentative language that focused on 
the defendant’s version of the facts, not his legal theory of the 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
82 
case.  (Bonilla, at p. 330.)  In Bonilla, we also rejected the 
defendant’s 
argument 
that 
CALJIC 
No. 2.03, 
another 
consciousness of guilt instruction, was argumentative simply 
because it, too, contained the if/then structure.  (Bonilla, at p. 
330.)  For the same reason, we reject defendant’s argument here. 
Lastly, defendant asserts that the instruction permitted 
the jury to draw an impermissible inference concerning his guilt.  
We have previously rejected this contention (People v. Bryant, 
Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 438; People v. Rundle 
(2006) 43 Cal.4th 76, 153–154), and defendant presents no 
compelling reason to reconsider these decisions. 
6.  Motive Instruction 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury with CALJIC No. 2.51, regarding motive, because it 
improperly allowed the jury to determine guilt based upon the 
presence of an alleged motive and thus shifted the burden of 
proof to the defense.  We have repeatedly rejected substantially 
similar contentions, and we do so again here.  (People v. Nelson 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 552–553; People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 
Cal.4th 830, 876–877.) 
III.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Refusal of Defendant’s Requested Jury 
Instructions 
1.  Instructions on Aggravating Factors 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it refused 
his proposed instruction that would have informed the jurors 
that they could not double-count the facts underlying the special 
circumstance.  The proposed instruction read:  “You must not 
consider as an aggravating factor the existence of any special 
circumstances if you have already considered the facts of the 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
83 
special circumstance as a circumstance of the crime for which 
the defendant has been convicted.  [¶] In other words, do not 
consider the same facts more than once in determining the 
presence of aggravating factors.”  The trial court rejected the 
proposed instruction, concluding that defendant’s concern was 
addressed in CALJIC No. 8.88. 
Defendant cites People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 
743, in which we held the trial court committed harmless error 
when it denied the defendant’s request to instruct the jury 
against double-counting the special circumstances.  (Id. at 
p. 789.)  The court had instructed the jury with CALJIC 
No. 8.85, “which instructed the jury to consider, take into 
account, and be guided by, inter alia, ‘the circumstances of the 
crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present 
proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found 
to be true.’ ”  (People v. Monterroso, at p. 789.)  We noted that, 
even without the clarifying instruction the defendant had 
requested, the possibility that a jury would believe it could 
weigh each special circumstance twice was remote, and thus, in 
the absence of any misleading argument by the prosecutor or 
some other event substantiating the claimed double-counting, 
reversal was not required.  (Id. at pp. 789–790.) 
In the present case, the trial court also instructed the jury 
in the language of CALJIC No. 8.85.  Defendant does not allege 
that the prosecutor argued the issue in a misleading manner, 
nor does he point to anything in the record giving rise to a 
substantial likelihood of double-counting.  Even assuming error, 
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it 
refused his proposed instruction that read:  “In deciding whether 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
84 
you should sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole, or to death, you cannot consider as an 
aggravating factor any fact that was used by you in finding him 
guilty of murder in the first degree unless that fact establishes 
something in addition to an element of the crime of murder in 
the first degree.”  Section 190.3, factor (a), however, expressly 
permits the penalty phase jury to consider the circumstances of 
the crime in determining penalty, and on that ground, we have 
previously upheld the rejection of substantially similar proposed 
instructions.  (See People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 40.)   
2.  Refusal of Additional Penalty Phase Instructions 
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously 
refused to give several requested penalty phase instructions 
that would have clarified the standard penalty phase 
instructions and provided guidance to the jurors.  We disagree. 
The first proposed instruction would have told the jury 
that certain sentencing factors could only be considered as 
mitigating.  The trial court concluded the instruction was 
duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.85.  It did not err.  As we have 
previously held, the trial court need not define which statutory 
factors could be considered aggravating and mitigating.  (People 
v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 509.) 
The second proposed instruction would have told the jury 
that its consideration of mitigating factors was not limited to the 
factors provided and that jurors could consider any other 
circumstances relating to the case or to defendant as reasons for 
not imposing the death penalty.  We have previously held that 
such instructions are not necessary because “the catchall section 
190.3, factor (k) instruction ‘allows the jury to consider a 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
85 
virtually unlimited range of mitigating circumstances.’ ”  
(People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1007.) 
The third proposed instruction would have told the jury it 
could not consider evidence of defendant’s lifestyle or 
background as an aggravating factor, but it could consider such 
evidence as a mitigating factor.  In People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 398, 457, we concluded that the court’s refusal to give a 
substantially similar instruction was not erroneous because, as 
in this case, the court properly instructed the jury on 
aggravating and mitigating factors. 
Defendant also proposed instructing the jury that it could 
consider as a mitigating circumstance whether defendant was 
under the influence of any mental or emotional disturbance at 
the time of the offense and whether his capacity to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct was a result of mental disease, 
mental defect, or intoxication.  The court rejected these 
instructions, concluding they were cumulative.  Defendant now 
asserts the proposed instructions were not cumulative because, 
unlike CALJIC No. 8.85, they did not contain the term 
“extreme.”  (See, e.g., CALJIC No. 8.85 [permitting the jury to 
consider “[w]hether or not the offense was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance” (italics added)].)  He asserts this 
distinction is important because jurors “must be allowed to 
consider 
a 
defendant’s 
entire 
personal 
history 
and 
characteristics, not just those that may be seen as ‘extreme.’ ”  
We have previously held, however, that the “use of restrictive 
adjectives — i.e., ‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ — in the list of 
mitigating 
factors 
in section 
190.3 does 
not 
act 
unconstitutionally as a barrier to the consideration of 
mitigation.”  (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 365.)  We 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
86 
have also held that the instruction allows a jury to consider a 
defendant’s mental condition as mitigation even if not 
“ ‘extreme.’ ”  (People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 720–721.) 
In addition, defendant requested that the court instruct 
the jury that defendant bore no burden to prove the existence of 
mitigating factors, that a mitigating factor need not be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury need not 
unanimously agree on any fact or circumstance offered in 
mitigation.  We again conclude that the trial court did not err in 
refusing these instructions.  (Kansas v. Carr (2016) 577 U.S. __, 
__ [136 S.Ct. 633, 642] [“our case law does not require capital 
sentencing courts ‘to affirmatively inform the jury that 
mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt’ ”]; Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 328 [the court 
was not required to instruct the jury on burden of proof]; People 
v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 314–315 (Breaux) [the court is 
not required to instruct the jury that unanimity on mitigating 
factors was not required].) 
Defendant also proposed three instructions regarding the 
jurors’ consideration of aggravating factors.  The first proposed 
instruction would have told the jury it could consider rebuttal 
evidence offered by the prosecution only as it relates to the 
existence or weight of a mitigating factor; it could not consider 
it as an aggravating factor.  Because the prosecutor did not 
present rebuttal evidence during the penalty phase, the court 
did not err in refusing to give this proposed instruction.  
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor nonetheless presented 
rebuttal evidence during its case in chief (namely, evidence of 
his background and character) and that such evidence should 
have instead been presented as rebuttal evidence.  Therefore, 
defendant argues, the court should have provided the proposed 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
87 
instruction.  Because defendant does not actually challenge the 
admissibility of this evidence during the prosecutor’s case in 
chief, we decline to decide whether or not it was improper.  As 
the Attorney General notes, even if the evidence was improperly 
introduced during the case in chief and should have been 
introduced 
as 
rebuttal 
evidence, 
defendant’s 
proposed 
instruction would have confused the jury, as the jury would not 
have understood what evidence the instruction referred to. 
The second proposed instruction would have told the jury 
that it must find an aggravating factor has been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  We have repeatedly held that, except for 
evidence of other crimes and prior convictions under section 
190.3, factors (b) and (c), the jury need not find the aggravating 
factors have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. 
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235; Williams, supra, 49 
Cal.4th at pp. 458-459.)  We have no cause to reconsider those 
holdings here. 
The third proposed instruction would have instructed the 
jurors that they could not allow sympathy for the victim or the 
victim’s family to divert their attention from their sentencing 
role, and they could not impose a penalty of death as a purely 
emotional response to the evidence.  The court did not err when 
it found this proposed instruction cumulative.  The court 
instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.84.1, which in relevant 
part provides, “You must neither be influenced by bias nor 
prejudice against the defendant, nor swayed by public opinion 
or public feelings.”  We presume the jurors understood and 
followed the court’s instruction.  (People v. Homick (2012) 
55 Cal.4th 816, 873.) 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
88 
Lastly, defendant requested instructions regarding the 
jurors’ weighing of factors and their consideration of mercy and 
sympathy.  The first proposed instruction would have told the 
jury that it could decide to impose life without the possibility of 
parole even if it found no mitigating factors present.  We have 
previously held that the trial court is not required to so instruct 
the jury.  (People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 320; People v. 
Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52.)   
The second proposed instruction would have told the jury 
that the presence of a single mitigating factor is sufficient to 
support a vote against imposing the death penalty.  We have 
previously held a trial court does not err in refusing such an 
instruction.  (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1160–
1161.)   
The third proposed instruction provided:  “The law of 
California does not require that you ever vote to impose the 
penalty of death.  After considering all of the evidence in the 
case and instructions given to you by the court, it is entirely up 
to you to determine whether you are convinced that the death 
penalty is the appropriate punishment under all of the 
circumstances of the case.”  We have previously held that such 
instruction is misleading and argumentative if it does not also 
inform the jury that the law has no preference for the 
punishment of life without the possibility of parole.  (People v. 
Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 903.)  Rather, a correct statement 
of California law is that “our law ‘expresses no preference as to 
the appropriate punishment.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The trial court properly 
rejected defendant’s proposed instruction. 
Defendant also requested that the jury be instructed that, 
on the basis of mercy, it could decide not to impose the death 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
89 
penalty, regardless of whether or not defendant deserved their 
sympathy, and that if any of the evidence aroused sympathy to 
such an extent that they believed death was not an appropriate 
punishment, the jury could act on that sympathy by imposing 
life in prison without the possibility of parole.  In rejecting these 
proposed instructions, the trial court concluded they were 
duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k), which informed the 
jury that it could consider “any sympathetic or other aspect of 
the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as 
a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to 
the offense for which he is on trial.”  (Ibid., internal brackets 
omitted.)  “As we have previously explained, CALJIC No. 8.85 
adequately instructs the jury concerning the circumstances that 
may be considered in mitigation, including sympathy and 
mercy.  [Citation.]  We therefore ‘must assume the jury already 
understood it could consider mercy and compassion.’ ”  (People 
v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 801.) 
B.  Instruction on Applicable Sentencing Factors 
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in 
delivering its oral instructions to the jury. 
While reading the penalty phase instructions to the jury, 
the court read CALJIC No. 8.85 as follows:  “In determining 
which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant, you shall 
consider all of the evidence which has been received during any 
part of the trial of this case except as you may hereafter be 
instructed.  You may consider, take into account and be guided 
by the following factors, if applicable . . . .”  (Italics added.)  The 
court erroneously said “may consider” instead of “shall 
consider,” but the written version of CALJIC No. 8.85 correctly 
instructed the jury that it shall consider the enumerated factors. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
90 
The court also instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.88, 
which read in part:  “After having heard all of the evidence, and 
after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, you 
shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable 
factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which 
you have been instructed.”  (Italics added.)  The court also 
instructed the jurors, “You are to be governed only by the 
instruction in its final wording.” 
We presume the jury understands and follows the trial 
court’s instructions, including the written instructions.  (People 
v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803.)  Moreover, “[t]o the extent 
a discrepancy exists between the written and oral versions of 
jury instructions, the written instructions provided to the jury 
will control.”  (Ibid.)  Defendant cites to nothing in the record to 
rebut the presumption that the jurors followed the written 
instructions that were provided. 
IV.  OTHER ISSUES 
A.  Challenges to the Death Penalty 
Defendant presents a number of challenges to California’s 
death penalty law that our prior decisions have considered and 
rejected.  He provides no persuasive reason for us to reexamine 
the following conclusions: 
“California’s death penalty law ‘adequately narrows the 
class of murderers subject to the death penalty’ and does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.  [Citation.]  Section 190.2, 
which sets forth the circumstances in which the penalty of death 
may be imposed, is not impermissibly broad in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.”  (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 
294.) 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
91 
“Allowing the jury to consider the circumstances of the 
crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) does not lead to the imposition of the 
death penalty in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”  (People v. 
Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 641.) 
“Nor is the death penalty statute unconstitutional for not 
requiring ‘findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
aggravating circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor 
(b) or (c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence.’ ”  (People v. Erskine (2019) 7 Cal.5th 279, 
304.) 
CALJIC No. 8.88 is not impermissibly broad.  (Breaux, 
supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 316, fn. 14.) 
The death verdict need not be based on unanimous jury 
findings.  “While all the jurors must agree death is the 
appropriate penalty, the guided discretion through which jurors 
reach their penalty decision must permit each juror individually 
to assess such potentially aggravating factors as the 
circumstances of the capital crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)), prior 
felony convictions (id., factor (c)), and other violent criminal 
activity (id., factor (b)), and decide for him- or herself ‘what 
weight that activity should be given in deciding the penalty.’ ”  
(People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 41 (Demetrulias).) 
The trial court need not instruct the jury that it must 
return a sentence of life without the possibility of parole if it 
finds that mitigation outweighs aggravation.  (People v. Duncan 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978.) 
Instructions on the meaning of a sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole and on the 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
92 
“ ‘presumption of life’ ” are not constitutionally required.  
(Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 43.) 
“The trial court has no obligation to delete from CALJIC 
No. 8.85 inapplicable mitigating factors, nor must it identify 
which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating.”  
(People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 618.) 
“Comparative intercase proportionality review by the trial 
or appellate courts is not constitutionally required.”  (People v. 
Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126.) 
“The capital sentencing scheme does not violate equal 
protection by denying to capital defendants procedural 
safeguards that are available to noncapital defendants.”  (People 
v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 836 (Thomas).) 
California’s death penalty does not violate international 
law or international norms of decency.  (Thomas, supra, 53 
Cal.4th at p. 837.) 
B.  Restitution Fine 
The abstract of judgment indicates that the trial court 
imposed a $10,000 restitution fine.  However, the court did not 
actually impose the fine at the sentencing hearing; it was merely 
added to the abstract of judgment later.  Defendant contends 
that because the court never imposed the fine in open court in 
his presence, it should be stricken from the abstract of 
judgment.  (See § 1202.4; People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
300, 303.)  The Attorney General properly concedes the error.  
We order the restitution fine stricken from the record and the 
minutes, and the abstract of judgment modified accordingly. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
93 
C.  Cumulative Error 
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the 
asserted errors requires reversal of the judgment.  We have 
identified one error, the imposition of the restitution fine, and 
assumed other errors but found no prejudice.  Nor is this error 
and any assumed error cumulatively prejudicial. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The restitution fine is ordered stricken from the abstract 
of judgment.  The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.  
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON 
S067392 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
I agree with the judgment and with today’s opinion, except 
that I would reach the merits of whether Penal Code section 
1018 is constitutional after McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 584 U.S. 
__ [138 S.Ct. 1500] (McCoy) and hold that it is. 
Penal Code section 1018 says that no guilty plea to an 
offense punishable by death or life without the possibility of 
parole “shall be received from a defendant who does not appear 
with counsel, nor shall that plea be received without the consent 
of the defendant’s counsel.”  (All statutory references are to the 
Penal Code.)  Frederickson’s primary argument in his automatic 
appeal is that the trial court denied his repeated requests to 
plead guilty based on section 1018 and that section 1018 violates 
his right to control his defense under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  The court dismisses this 
argument exclusively on the basis that he failed to secure a 
ruling from the superior court rejecting his plea on section 1018 
grounds.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 50–51.)  But the record is too 
muddled to support that conclusion, and in any event, this court 
has often excused forfeitures raising pure questions of law.  On 
the merits, I would reject Frederickson’s claim that section 1018 
is unconstitutional after McCoy.  McCoy does not upend our long 
and unbroken precedent holding that section 1018 constitutes a 
valid balance between society’s interest in ensuring the 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
2 
reliability of judgments in capital cases and a criminal 
defendant’s right to conduct his own defense. 
I. 
I am skeptical of dismissing Frederickson’s section 1018 
challenge on the ground that he failed to secure a ruling from 
the superior court that section 1018 barred him from pleading 
guilty as a self-represented capital defendant.  The record is at 
least ambiguous as to whether the municipal court on January 
27, 1997 implied such a ruling and therefore indicated to 
Frederickson that any attempt to plead guilty at his preliminary 
hearing would be futile because of section 1018. 
As today’s opinion recounts (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 17–27), 
Frederickson diligently pursued his desire to plead guilty before 
trial until the prosecution informed him that he could not 
lawfully do so, and the municipal court appeared to endorse that 
view.  Frederickson expressed a desire to waive his preliminary 
hearing and plead guilty on December 24, 1996 at an in camera 
hearing in the superior court to address the disbursement of 
investigative funds.  At this point, he was representing himself 
with the aid of advisory counsel.  Because only the disbursement 
issue was before it, the superior court explained that “the issue 
as to whether or not you’re going to plead guilty or waive a 
preliminary 
hearing 
is 
really 
not 
before 
me 
today.”  
Frederickson repeated his wishes by saying, “I’m pleading guilty 
and that’s that.”  The court responded, “Well, you haven’t done 
that yet.”  Frederickson said, “Well, I’m attempting to very, very, 
very hard.”  The superior court said it would contact the 
municipal court, where the rest of Frederickson’s case was 
pending, and ask it to calendar his preliminary hearing as soon 
as possible. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
3 
On January 27, 1997, the superior court held another in 
camera hearing, this time to address Frederickson’s violation of 
his self-representation jail privileges.  Frederickson’s advisory 
counsel 
reiterated 
Frederickson’s 
desire 
to 
waive 
the 
preliminary hearing and plead guilty, and the superior court 
again offered to contact the municipal court. 
That afternoon, Frederickson and his advisory counsel 
appeared in municipal court.  Frederickson stated to the court, 
“[T]he guilt of my crime has been weighing heavily on me with 
a remorseful heart.  I would like to offer a change of plea and 
enter a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree and admit the 
special circumstances and waive all appellate rights at this 
time.”  Before the municipal court could rule on his request, the 
prosecutor asked to speak with Frederickson and his advisory 
counsel off the record.  Following that conversation, the 
prosecutor summarized the conversation for the court:  “What I 
did your honor, for the record I had a brief conversation with Mr. 
Frederickson in the presence of Mr. Freeman [advisory counsel] 
and I had suggested to Mr. Frederickson that he seriously 
reconsider his thoughts about what he was planning on 
doing.  He wants to plead guilty to the charges.  I told him by 
law he cannot plead guilty to a special circumstances allegation 
case.  He understands that, but I told him no judge can accept 
your plea.  Furthermore, I told him that it was my opinion Mr. 
Freeman would offer him the best possible representation and 
suggested that he follow Mr. Freeman’s advice on the 
matter.  It’s my understanding Mr. Frederickson despite Mr. 
Freeman’s conversations with him and my own conversations 
with him in Mr. Freeman’s presence Mr. Frederickson still 
wants to plead guilty, although I think he realizes that he 
cannot.  I think it’s his desire to actually waive the preliminary 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
4 
hearing which is still scheduled for February 5th.  My last 
suggestion to him was not to do anything today.  That we just 
come on February 5th and have more of a chance to think about 
it, to talk to Mr. Freeman, or talk to his investigator and then 
he can decide what he wants to do on the 5th.”  (Italics added.) 
The court responded: “Well, that is all true, but Mr. 
Tanizaki [the prosecutor], the People also have a right to a 
preliminary examination.  So even if Mr. Frederickson does 
want to waive preliminary hearing, the People may choose not 
to.”  The court went on to explain to Frederickson that the 
prosecution was not prepared to waive the preliminary hearing 
at that time and suggested that Frederickson reassert his 
request if he wished to do so on February 5 at his preliminary 
hearing.  At the preliminary hearing, Frederickson did not 
request to waive the hearing or to plead guilty. 
The prosecutor’s summary of his January 27, 1997 
conversation with Frederickson and advisory counsel suggests 
that he told Frederickson that section 1018 prevented him from 
pleading guilty to a capital crime.  The prosecutor specifically 
stated that Frederickson “by law . . . cannot plead guilty to a 
special circumstances allegation case,” an evident reference to 
section 1018.  The prosecutor reinforced this by saying that “no 
judge can accept your plea.”  He did not say that Frederickson 
could not plead guilty at this hearing or that he could not plead 
guilty before a municipal court; instead, he suggested that the 
legal bar to pleading guilty was unconditional for Frederickson, 
who proceeded pro per.  This categorical statement did not 
suggest that “the prosecutor may only have meant that no judge 
could [accept his plea] at that time.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 49, 
fn. 11).  Indeed, at a hearing on October 21, 1997, the prosecutor 
asked the court to bar Frederickson from mentioning that he 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
5 
had previously attempted to plead guilty because “the Penal 
Code specifically disallows a guilty plea while he’s in pro per.” 
The municipal court then endorsed the entirety of the 
prosecutor’s remarks to Frederickson, stating, “Well, that is all 
true.”  The court did not expressly deny Frederickson’s attempt 
to plead guilty based on section 1018, and according to today’s 
opinion, it appears that the municipal court had no jurisdiction 
to accept such a plea.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 42–44.)  But the 
municipal court’s endorsement of the prosecutor’s admonition 
that “no judge can accept [Frederickson’s] plea” informed 
Frederickson that section 1018 barred him from pleading guilty 
regardless of which court he was in. 
Today’s opinion relies heavily on the fact that the 
municipal court on January 27, 1997 did not have jurisdiction to 
accept Frederickson’s guilty plea and that Frederickson should 
have pressed for a ruling on his request to plead guilty at his 
February 5, 1997 preliminary hearing.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 47–50.)  But Frederickson had no reason to press for a ruling 
on his guilty plea request at the preliminary hearing; in light of 
the municipal court’s endorsement of the prosecutor’s statement 
that “no judge can accept [his] plea,” Frederickson had good 
reason to believe any further effort to plead guilty would have 
been futile.  Indeed, based on the prosecutor’s remarks at the 
hearing on October 27, 1997, it appears that both parties 
operated on the assumption that a court had in fact rejected 
Frederickson’s plea on the ground that it was precluded by 
section 1018.  Given Frederickson’s diligent efforts to plead 
guilty until the municipal court endorsed the prosecutor’s 
statement that “by law he cannot plead guilty to a special 
circumstances allegation case,” I would not reject Frederickson’s 
section 1018 challenge on forfeiture grounds. 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
6 
In any event, we regularly excuse forfeiture where the 
defendant has asserted the deprivation of a fundamental 
constitutional right (People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 276 
[“A defendant is not precluded from raising for the first time on 
appeal a claim asserting the deprivation of certain fundamental, 
constitutional rights.”]), and we have recognized, approvingly, 
that the Courts of Appeal have excused forfeiture “when a 
forfeited claim involves an important issue of constitutional law 
or a substantial right” or “when applicability of the forfeiture 
rule is uncertain or the defendant did not have a meaningful 
opportunity to object at trial” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
875, 887–888, fn. 7 [collecting cases]).  Frederickson’s claim 
implicates his Sixth Amendment rights, and ample precedent 
supports excusal of any forfeiture here. 
II. 
On the merits, I would hold that section 1018 is 
constitutional notwithstanding the high court’s decision in 
McCoy.  I addressed this issue in People v. Miracle (2018) 6 
Cal.5th 318, 360–361 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.), and reprise the main 
points here.  I note that the Attorney General in this case, 
contrary to his position in Miracle, contends that section 1018 is 
constitutional and assured this court at oral argument that 
going forward he will no longer take the position that section 
1018 is unconstitutional. 
At the core of the question is whether the Eighth 
Amendment requirement of “reliability in the determination 
that death is the appropriate punishment” (Woodson v. North 
Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 305 (Woodson)), when balanced 
against a capital defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to control 
his own defense, allows the Legislature to limit that defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
7 
ability to plead guilty without consent of counsel.  A long and 
unbroken line of precedent has upheld section 1018 as striking 
an appropriate balance between these interests, and McCoy 
does not disturb that precedent. 
A. 
The Sixth Amendment “grants to the accused personally 
the right to make his defense.”  (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 
U.S. 806, 819 (Faretta).)  This right, grounded in the 
“fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed 
to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own 
liberty” (Weaver v. Massachusetts (2017) 582 U.S. __, __ [137 
S.Ct. 1899, 1908]), guarantees to the accused the “ultimate 
authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the 
case” (Jones v. Barnes (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 751 (Barnes)). 
However, “the right to self-representation is not absolute,” 
particularly in capital cases where there are competing 
constitutional concerns.  (Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 
Fourth Appellate Dist. (2000) 528 U.S. 152, 161 (Martinez).)  The 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment imposes a “high requirement of reliability [in] the 
determination that death is the appropriate penalty in a 
particular case.”  (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1228 
(Bloom).)  The high court has long recognized that the Eighth 
Amendment requires “a greater degree of reliability when the 
death sentence is imposed” because of the “qualitative difference 
between death and other penalties.”  (Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 
U.S. 586, 604 (plur. opn.); see also Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 
U.S. 625, 637 (Beck); cf. People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal. 4th 1068, 
1134.)  This heightened requirement reflects “the fundamental 
respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment” 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
8 
(Woodson, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 304) and the “ ‘vital importance 
to the defendant and to the community that any decision to 
impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason 
rather than caprice or emotion’ ” (Beck, at pp. 637–638).  As a 
result, certain procedural safeguards may be warranted in a 
capital case because they mitigate “risk [that] cannot be 
tolerated in a case in which the defendant’s life is at stake.”  (Id. 
at p. 637; see id. at pp. 637–638 & fn. 14 [requiring lesser 
included offense instruction in a capital case but “not decid[ing] 
whether the Due Process Clause would require the giving of 
such instructions in a noncapital case”].)   
This court has recognized that the “rights and decisions 
that are normally personal to a criminal defendant may be 
limited or overruled in the service of death penalty reliability.”  
(People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1055 (Mai); see Martinez, 
supra, 528 U.S. at p. 162 [“[T]he government’s interest in 
ensuring the integrity . . . of the trial at times outweighs the 
defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.”].)  In 
particular, we have long recognized that section 1018, which 
reflects the legislative judgment that heightened requirements 
for guilty pleas to capital crimes are necessary to mitigate the 
risk of unreliability in California’s death penalty scheme, strikes 
a constitutionally valid balance between competing Sixth 
Amendment and Eighth Amendment considerations. 
In People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739 (Chadd), we 
upheld section 1018 against a constitutional challenge that the 
statute “denies [the defendant] his ‘fundamental right’ to control 
the ultimate course of the prosecution.”  (Chadd, at p. 747.)  We 
explained that the Legislature amended section 1018 to require 
capital defendants to appear with counsel and obtain counsel’s 
consent before pleading guilty “to serve as a further independent 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
9 
safeguard against erroneous imposition of a death sentence.”  
(Chadd, at p. 750.)  We noted that the amendments to section 
1018 were part of a comprehensive revision of California’s death 
penalty statutes in response to the Eighth Amendment concerns 
raised in Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238, which held 
that the operation of the death penalty was arbitrary at the 
time.  (Chadd, at p. 750 [chronicling legislative history of section 
1018].)   
Moreover, we rejected the Attorney General’s argument 
that section 1018 as we construed it “is unconstitutional because 
it allows counsel to ‘veto’ a capital defendant’s decision to plead 
guilty.”  (Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 747.)  We specifically 
recognized that section 1018 was a constitutionally permissible 
balance between the constitutional concerns of reliability and 
defendant autonomy:  “[The Attorney General] fails to recognize 
the larger public interest at stake in pleas of guilty to capital 
offenses.  It is true that in our system of justice the decision as 
to how to plead to a criminal charge is personal to the defendant: 
because the life, liberty or property at stake is his, so also is the 
choice of plea.  [Citation.]  But it is no less true that the 
Legislature has the power to regulate, in the public interest, the 
manner in which that choice is exercised.”  (Chadd, at pp. 747–
748.)  We continued, “The Attorney General in effect stands 
Faretta on its head:  from the defendant’s conceded right to 
‘make a defense’ in ‘an adversary criminal trial,’ the Attorney 
General attempts to infer a defendant’s right to make no such 
defense and to have no such trial, even when his life is at stake.  
But in capital cases, as noted above, the state has a strong 
interest in reducing the risk of mistaken judgments.  Nothing in 
Faretta, either expressly or impliedly, deprives the state of the 
right to conclude that the danger of erroneously imposing a 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
10 
death sentence outweighs the minor infringement of the right of 
self-representation resulting when defendant’s right to plead 
guilty in capital cases is subjected to the requirement of his 
counsel’s consent.”  (Id. at p. 751.) 
This holding — that section 1018 strikes a permissible 
balance between Eighth Amendment reliability concerns and 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment interest in control over an 
aspect of the defense — has been a consistent through-line in 
our capital jurisprudence.  In 2007, we reaffirmed this 
understanding of section 1018 in People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 1277 (Alfaro).  Relying extensively on Chadd, we 
concluded that defense counsel’s refusal to consent to a guilty 
plea was reasonable where a capital defendant sought to plead 
guilty in order “to prevent the presentation of evidence 
regarding an accomplice.”  (Alfaro, at p. 1301.)  We rejected the 
defendant’s argument that her desire to plead guilty “concerned 
a fundamental aspect of her defense that . . . must remain within 
defendant’s control.”  (Id. at p. 1302.)  Our unanimous opinion 
reaffirmed that “[t]he consent requirement of section 1018 has 
its roots in the state’s strong interest in reducing the risk of 
mistaken judgments in capital cases and thereby maintaining 
the accuracy and fairness of its criminal proceedings.  [Citation.]  
The statute constitutes legislative recognition of the severe 
consequences of a guilty plea in a capital case, and provides 
protection against an ill-advised guilty plea and the erroneous 
imposition of a death sentence.”  (Id. at p. 1300.) 
We have never suggested that autonomy interests 
implicated by a capital defendant’s desire to plead guilty take 
precedence over heightened reliability interests.  Rather, the 
baseline requirement that the prosecution “discharge[] its 
burden of proof at the guilt and penalty phases” has been the 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
11 
fundamental point of departure for our evaluation of capital 
defendants’ autonomy rights.  (Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at 
p. 1228.)  In such cases, we have reiterated that “a defendant 
may not discharge his lawyer [in a capital case] in order to enter 
. . . a [guilty] plea over counsel’s objection.”  (Mai, supra, 57 
Cal.4th at p. 1055; see People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 
983, fn. 1 (Daniels).) 
Reliability concerns are particularly significant at the plea 
phase, since the plea substitutes for the prosecution’s discharge 
of the burden of proof, a bedrock component of the adversarial 
process ensuring that outcomes are reliable.  (See Boykin v. 
Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 242 [describing the plea as “itself 
a conviction”].)  Thus “a trial, even one where a defense is 
voluntarily forgone, is fundamentally different from a guilty 
plea” because in a trial, “the state [i]s put to its burden of proof.”  
(Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 983.)  At the same time, the 
defendant does not have the “absolute right under the 
Constitution to have [a] guilty plea accepted by [a] court.”  
(North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 38, fn. 11; see 
Lafler v. Cooper (2012) 566 U.S. 156, 168 [“It is, of course, true 
that defendants have ‘no right to be offered a plea . . . nor a 
federal right that the judge accept it.’ ”].) 
Finally, we have found similar legislative judgments 
limiting a defendant’s prerogative to direct his representation to 
be permissible because they further society’s interests in the 
reliability of criminal judgments.  For example, a capital 
defendant cannot waive automatic appeal of a judgment of death 
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); § 1239, subd. (b)) because 
“the state . . . has an indisputable interest in it which [a capital 
defendant] cannot extinguish.”  (People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 
Cal.2d 820, 834.)  We have likewise recognized the requirement 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
12 
that defendants be represented by counsel in competency 
proceedings as a constitutionally valid legislative choice insofar 
as it limits defendants’ right of self-representation in service of 
reliability.  (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 696–697 
[noting 
special 
concern 
with 
the 
possibility 
for 
“breakdown . . . in the process of meaningful adversarial testing 
central to our system of justice”].)  Section 1018 represents a 
similarly valid legislative judgment in light of competing 
constitutional considerations. 
B. 
The high court’s recent decision in McCoy does not upend 
our longstanding precedent.  In McCoy, the high court reversed 
the conviction of a capital defendant whose counsel had 
conceded his client’s guilt at trial over defendant’s objections.  
(McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1512].)  Before 
trial, McCoy’s attorney had determined that the best strategy 
for avoiding a death sentence was to admit to the three murder 
charges during the guilt phase and plead for mercy during the 
penalty phase.  (Id. at p. 1506.)  McCoy disagreed and was 
“ ‘furious’ ” with his attorney’s strategy.  (Ibid.)  He insisted that 
his attorney pursue acquittal instead.  The trial court denied 
McCoy’s request to remove his counsel and defense counsel’s 
request to be relieved if McCoy secured other counsel.  It 
instructed counsel to decide how to proceed.  At trial, McCoy’s 
counsel acknowledged during his opening statement that the 
evidence unambiguously showed McCoy committed the 
murders, while McCoy testified he was innocent.  (Id. at 
p. 1507.)  The jury ultimately found the defendant guilty and 
returned three death verdicts.  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
13 
The high court reasoned that by availing himself of the 
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, McCoy did not 
“surrender control entirely to counsel.”  (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. 
at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508].)  While “[t]rial management is the 
lawyer’s province,” the court explained, “[s]ome decisions . . . are 
reserved for the client — notably, whether to plead guilty, waive 
the right to a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and forgo an 
appeal.”  (Ibid; see also id. at p. 1505 [“[I]t is the defendant’s 
prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide on the objective of his 
defense:  to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the 
sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving it to the 
State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”].)  The high 
court concluded that because McCoy’s decision to assert 
innocence was a choice about the objectives of his case, his 
counsel could not override that decision over his objections.  (Id. 
at pp. 1508–1509.) 
Although McCoy explained that the choice of “whether to 
plead guilty” (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at 
p. 1508]) or “to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the 
sentencing stage” is “the defendant’s prerogative” (id. at 
p. 1505), the high court was not announcing any new legal 
principle in doing so.  Rather, it was restating established Sixth 
Amendment principles, as evidenced by its citation to Jones v. 
Barnes, supra, 463 U.S. 745, which in turn relied on earlier 
authority to explain that “the accused has the ultimate 
authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the 
case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or 
her own behalf, or take an appeal, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U.S. 72, 93 n. 1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-5.2, 21-2.2 (2d ed. 1980).”  
(Barnes, at p. 751; see McCoy, at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508].)  
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
14 
This dicta adds nothing to the legal landscape that already 
existed when we decided Chadd and Alfaro. 
More importantly, the Eighth Amendment concerns 
reflected in section 1018 were not at issue in McCoy.  Rather 
than insist upon pleading guilty, the defendant in McCoy sought 
to maintain his innocence and subject his case to the rigors of 
the adversarial process.  He did not seek to avoid that process 
and its accompanying safeguards.  As a result, the high court 
had no occasion to address, and did not address, the heightened 
Eighth Amendment reliability interests where a capital 
defendant seeks to forgo trial on the issue of his guilt.  McCoy 
did not weigh a defendant’s autonomy interests against 
countervailing reliability interests because there was no conflict 
between the defendant’s objectives and the reliability interests 
of the Eighth Amendment; it did not address whether a capital 
defendant may enter a guilty plea against the advice of counsel 
in the face of a state statute requiring counsel’s consent as a 
measure to lessen the risk of a mistaken judgment.  (See People 
v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 285 [“ ‘[A] decision is not 
authority for propositions not considered.’ ”].)  By contrast, we 
expressly addressed the interplay between the heightened need 
for reliability in capital cases and a defendant’s right to control 
his own defense in Chadd, and our reasoning and holding 
remain controlling. 
It is no light matter to find a statute unconstitutional, 
particularly one that we have upheld on numerous occasions.  
That is especially true here, given the ramifications of a guilty 
plea in a capital case.  (Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 748.)  
Against the backdrop of all that we have said about the 
constitutionality and importance of section 1018’s requirement 
of counsel’s consent, McCoy’s broad dicta is not a sufficient basis 
PEOPLE v. FREDERICKSON, 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
15 
for jettisoning decades of precedent.  This is not to suggest that 
any restriction on a capital defendant’s right to his own defense 
in the name of reliability is constitutionally valid.  That right is 
foundational and rooted in “ ‘respect for the individual which is 
the lifeblood of the law.’ ”  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834.)  
The balance to be struck is a delicate one, and with respect to 
section 1018, it is a balance we struck decades ago. 
I would hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to 
allow Frederickson to plead guilty without counsel’s consent.  In 
all other respects, I join the opinion of the court. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Frederickson 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S067392 
Date Filed:  February 3, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Orange 
Judge:  William R. Froeberg 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender,  and Douglas Ward, Deputy State Public Defender,  
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Lance 
E. Winters and Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. Garland, Ronald Matthias and 
Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorneys General, Holly D. Wilkens, Theodore M. Cropley, Annie Featherman 
Fraser, Ronald A. Jakob and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Douglas Ward 
Attorney at Law 
350 Bay Street, P.M.B. #199  
San Francisco, California 94133 
(415) 494-9252 
 
Tami Falkenstein Hennick 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 738-9223