Case Title: JASON CARL RIDEOUT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING; MICHAEL SCOTT RIDEOUT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
JASON CARL RIDEOUT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING; MICHAEL SCOTT RIDEOUT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 141122 P.3d 201Case Number: Nos. 04-260, 04-261Decided: 10/28/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
JASON CARL 
RIDEOUT,

Appellant 
(Defendant) ,   

 
 
v.         

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,           

Appellee 
(Plaintiff) .  

 
 
MICHAEL 
SCOTT RIDEOUT,

Appellant 
(Defendant) ,

 
 
v.         

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,           

Appellee 
(Plaintiff) .  

 
 
Appeals 
from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

 
 
Stuart S. 
Healy of Healy Law Firm, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Patrick J. 
Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jennifer A. Golden, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Golden.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE JJ., and BROOKS, 
D.J.

 
 
HILL, Chief 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In these 
consolidated cases, Jason Carl Rideout (J.C. Rideout) and his brother, Michael 
Scott Rideout (Scott Rideout) (collectively referred to as the Defendants) 
appeal a district court order denying their motions to suppress marijuana and 
associated paraphernalia seized from J.C. Rideout's residence after police 
officers effectuated a warrantless entry to secure the residence after detecting 
the odor of marijuana emanating from the residence and from Scott Rideout's 
person.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

[¶2]      The Defendants 
filed virtually identical appellate briefs.  The issue they present 
is:

 
 
Did the 
District Court err in denying [Defendants'] Motion to Suppress by finding the 
State had sustained its burden of proving that the forcible entry into 
[Defendants'] home was justified under the "exigent circumstances" exception to 
the search warrant requirements of the Constitutions of the United States of 
America and the State of Wyoming?

 
 
The State 
offers a slightly different statement of the same issue:

 
 
Whether the 
district court properly denied [Defendants'] Motions to Suppress Evidence 
obtained from Appellant Jason Carl Rideout's residence following two officers' 
warrantless entry to secure the residence and subsequent search pursuant to 
consent and a search warrant.

 
 
FACTS

[¶3]      J.C. Rideout was 
arrested and incarcerated in the SheridanCountyDetentionCenter on February 14, 2004, on charges 
unrelated to the current proceedings.  
Around 10:00 p.m. on February 16, 2004, it was noticed that a piece of 
metal framing was missing from a window in the DetentionCenter.  A search of two adjoining cell blocks 
was commenced.  Sergeant Kody Lamb 
and his canine unit were called to assist in the search.  After the search of the cell block was 
completed, Sergeant Lamb suggested that he take his dog through the DetentionCenter property room where prisoners' 
personal effects were stored during their term of incarceration.  The dog alerted on the bag containing 
J.C. Rideout's property.  Inside of 
a jacket, a portion of a marijuana joint was found in a cigarette 
packet.

 
 
[¶4]      Sergeant Lamb 
interviewed J.C. Rideout, who denied knowledge of the marijuana, claiming that 
he had grabbed a jacket belonging to his friend, Jeremy Chacon, when he was 
arrested.  Since J.C. Rideout had 
been arrested at his own residence, Sergeant Lamb inquired whether Jeremy Chacon 
could be found there.  J.C. Rideout 
replied "no"  and provided some 
vague directions to where Jeremy Chacon resided.  Sergeant Lamb subsequently received 
information that a Justin Chacon was living at J.C. Rideout's residence.  Sergeant Lamb suspected that J.C. 
Rideout may have confused names.  
Wanting to contact Jeremy Chacon before J.C. Rideout had an opportunity 
to do so, he asked Sheridan County Deputy Sheriffs Ryan Mulholland and Casey 
Cunningham to go by J.C. Rideout's residence, and if there was any activity, to 
contact the residents.

 
 
[¶5]      The deputies 
arrived at the residence at about 1:28 a.m. on February 17.  The lights were on inside the residence 
and as the deputies exited their vehicle, they immediately recognized the smell 
of burnt marijuana.  The odor became 
"more obvious " as they approached the residence.  As they were climbing the stairs to the 
front door, the deputies observed through a picture window someone moving 
quickly from the dining room area in the front of the house toward the 
back.  At the front door, the odor 
of burnt marijuana was "fairly strong."  
They knocked on the door but there was no answer.  After the deputies knocked a second 
time, Scott Rideout opened the door, slipped out, and closed it behind 
him.

 
 
[¶6]      Deputy Mulholland 
smelled marijuana on Scott Rideout, who denied smoking anything other than 
cigarettes.  Scott Rideout informed 
the deputies that Jeremy Chacon was not at the residence and that Justin Chacon, 
not Jeremy, lived there.  Scott 
Rideout offered to get Justin.  
Deputy Mulholland agreed but asked Scott Rideout to call for him from the 
front door and not to go inside the residence.  When Scott Rideout opened the door, the 
deputies received a "very strong" odor of burnt marijuana.

 
 
[¶7]      At that point, 
the deputies concluded that the smell of burnt marijuana established probable 
cause that a misdemeanor crime  possession of a controlled substance  was 
being committed.  The deputies 
decided to enter the residence and secure it before seeking a search warrant in 
order to prevent the destruction of any evidence.

 
 
[¶8]      Once inside the 
residence, the deputies observed in plain view marijuana seeds and approximately 
a quarter ounce of marijuana in plastic containers on the dining room table 
along with six small marijuana plants growing in a planter by the table.  Justin Chacon was located in the kitchen 
area and brought to the dining room, where he and Scott Rideout were advised 
that they were under investigative detention and were read their Miranda1 rights.

 
 
[¶9]      Both Justin 
Chacon and Scott Rideout agreed to answer questions.  Justin Chacon admitted to smoking 
marijuana with a friend, who had left and whom he would not identify, about 45 
minutes before the deputies arrived.  
He also denied that the marijuana found in J.C. Rideout's property 
belonged to his brother, Jeremy Chacon.  
Justin Chacon denied a request for consent to search the residence 
claiming that he did not have the authority to do so as he only lived there, and 
that any consent to search was up to J.C. Rideout.  Similarly, Scott Rideout refused the 
request for consent to search because he did not live there.  Justin Chacon and Scott Rideout were 
then placed under arrest for possession of a controlled 
substance.

 
 
[¶10]   After the evidence found in plain 
view was secured, Deputy Mulholland left to secure a search warrant.  Meanwhile, Sergeant Lamb contacted J.C. 
Rideout and obtained his consent to search the residence.  The officers returned to the residence 
and began to search it, with the exception of Justin Chacon's room, which they 
concluded required a search warrant since he had refused consent.  The search of the residence revealed 
numerous items related to drug trafficking, including a bag of marijuana 
weighing just under a pound in the kitchen, along with small amounts of 
marijuana in various other rooms, a large quantity of plastic baggies, forty $20 
dollar bills, and a suspected drug ledger.

 
 
[¶11]   The case was turned over to 
officers from the Wyoming Department of Criminal Investigation (DCI), who 
obtained a search warrant for Justin Chacon's room, and J.C. and Scott Rideout's 
vehicles, as well as their financial records.  The search of Justin Chacon's room 
disclosed a digital scale, gallon size plastic baggies, and a small quantity of 
marijuana.  A small amount of 
marijuana and what appeared to be ledgers detailing drug transactions were found 
in Scott Rideout's vehicle.  Similar 
documents were located in J.C. Rideout's vehicle.

 
 
[¶12]   Later in the day on February 17, 
DCI interviewed all three subjects individually.  J.C. Rideout disclosed that the 
residence was owned by his mother.  
He admitted that he wired money to Scott Rideout, who would bring 
marijuana from his home in Arizona to Sheridan in one- to 
two-pound quantities.  Justin Chacon 
acknowledged that the marijuana and digital scale found in his room were 
his.  He also claimed that Scott 
Rideout was bringing marijuana to Wyoming from 
Arizona.  Scott Rideout only admitted that he had 
brought the marijuana found on the dining table from Arizona.  The search of the Rideouts' financial 
records confirmed that significant sums of money had been wired from J.C. 
Rideout to his brother in Arizona.

 
 
[¶13]   J.C. Rideout was charged with one 
count of possession of a Schedule I controlled substance (marijuana) with intent 
to deliver in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2005).  Scott Rideout was charged 
with one count of possession of a Schedule I controlled substance (marijuana) in 
an amount greater than three ounces in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(c)(iii) (LexisNexis 2005).  
The Defendants pleaded not guilty and filed separate motions to suppress 
the evidence seized from the residence.  
After a hearing, the district court denied the motions finding that the 
smell of burnt marijuana gave the officers probable cause to believe that a 
crime was being committed within the residence and that exigent circumstances 
existed justifying a warrantless entry of the residence to secure it and 
preserve evidence of the crime.  
Thereafter, the Defendants entered into a plea agreement wherein they 
pleaded guilty to the respective charges against them while reserving the right 
to challenge on appeal the district court's order denying the motions to 
suppress.  The Defendants' 
consolidated appeals are now before us.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶14]   The standard we apply when 
reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well 
established:

 
 
We 
generally do not disturb evidentiary rulings made by a trial court unless the 
trial court abused its discretion. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 
(Wyo. 1994). 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not 
interfere with the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous. Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 361 (Wyo. 1998). We view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination because 
the trial court has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess "the 
credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary 
inferences, deductions, and conclusions." Id. The constitutionality of a 
particular search or seizure is, however, a question of law that we review 
 de novo. Id.; Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 690 
(Wyo. 
1995).

 
 

Hughes v. 
State, 2003 WY 
35, ¶10, 65 P.3d 378, 381 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Martindale v. State, 2001 
WY 52, ¶9, 24 P.3d 1138, [1140-41] (Wyo. 2001), and Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 2000)).  See 
also Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶25, 98 P.3d 857, 869 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶15]   In their motions to suppress and in 
their briefs on appeal, the Defendants contended that the police entry into the 
residence violated Article 1, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution as well as 
the Fourth Amendment of the United S tates Constitution.  The Defendants do not provide an 
independent state constitutional analysis.  
"A failure to present a sufficient argument supporting adequate and 
independent state grounds,' prevents this court, as a matter of policy, from 
considering other than the federal constitutional principles at issue."  Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, 
¶14, 99 P.3d 987, 993 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 
219 (Wyo. 1994), and Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983)).  Accordingly, 
our analysis of the issues presented in this case will be pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.   Vassar, 99 P.3d 993.

 
 

DISCUSSION2

 
 
[¶16]   The Defendants raise several 
arguments contesting the legality of the officers' warrantless entry into J.C. 
Rideout's residence.  The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  Gompf v. 
State, 2005 WY 112, ¶17, ___ P.3d ___  
, ___(Wyo. 2005).

 
 
It is 
axiomatic that the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which 
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."  State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 
597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1972)).  [A] home is entitled to special dignity 
and special sanctity and  the proper way to search a home is to obtain a search 
warrant.'  Brown v. State, 
738 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Wyo. 1987).  Thus, searches and seizures inside a 
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, but there are a few  
carefully delineated" exceptions to the warrant requirement.'  Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, 
¶19, 99 P.3d 987, ¶19 (Wyo. 2004).  
Consent and the existence of exigent circumstances are two of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.  
Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶29, 98 P.3d 857, ¶29 (Wyo. 2004); 
Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶29, 65 P.2d 30, ¶29 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 

Id.

 
 
[¶17]   Initially, the Defendants claim 
that the odor of burnt marijuana, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish 
probable cause.  We have little 
trouble in finding that it may give an officer probable cause to search or 
arrest.  See Gompf, 
¶20, ___ P.3d. ___.  In a case where 
police officers effectuated a warrantless entry of a motel room based on the 
smell of marijuana emanating from it, the Colorado Supreme Court discussed the 
same claim:

 
 
We have 
previously held that the smell of burning marijuana may give an officer probable 
cause to search or arrest.  See 
People v. Baker, 813 P.2d 331, 333 (Colo. 1991). In Baker, police officers 
effected a valid warrantless entry of the defendant's home based upon probable 
cause and exigent circumstances. After knocking on the defendant's door for the 
purpose of investigating an outstanding arrest warrant, police were greeted by 
the defendant. The officers smelled the pungent odor of burning marijuana 
emanating from inside the house. The defendant attempted to warn someone else in 
the house that the police were at the door, then attempted to shut the door. The 
police then entered the home and discovered evidence of drug possession and 
use.  See Baker, 813 P.2d  at 332. We held that under those circumstances, "the officers had probable 
cause to believe a crime was being committed when they smelled burned 
marijuana." Id. at 333; see also People v. Stephenson, 187 Colo. 
94, 96, 529 P.2d 1333, 1334 (1975) (holding that officer had probable cause to 
arrest defendant after smelling burning marijuana emanating from the defendant's 
hand-rolled cigarette). We now take this opportunity to reaffirm our holding in 
Baker.

 
 
The origins 
of the use of smell to support a finding of probable cause to search can be 
traced to Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948). In Johnson, police conducted a warrantless search of the 
defendant's hotel room after detecting the smell of burning opium in the hallway 
outside the room. While the Court ultimately concluded that no exigent 
circumstances existed in that case to justify excusing the warrant requirement, 
the Court was careful to point out:

 
 
If the 
presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds the affiant 
qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a 
forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis insufficient to 
justify issuance of a search warrant.  
Indeed it might very well be found to be evidence of most persuasive 
character.

 
 

Johnson, 333 U.S.  at 13, 68 S. Ct. 367 (emphasis 
added).  Since the Johnson 
decision, numerous courts have held that probable cause to search exists when a 
trained officer detects the distinctive odor of marijuana emanating from a 
particular place.  See 
United States v. Nicholson, 17 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1366 (5th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Kerr, 
876 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1989);  see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure 3.6(b) (3d ed. 1996). Likewise, we find that common sense 
dictates that the smell of burning marijuana gives rise to a very high 
probability that the search of a particular place will reveal contraband or 
evidence of a crime. [Footnote omitted]

 
 
In holding 
that probable cause existed in this case, we emphasize that the smell of burning 
marijuana is sufficiently distinctive as to be readily identifiable to a trained 
police officer.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. DeLeon, 979 F.2d 761, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1992); People v. 
Titus, 880 P.2d 148, 156 (Colo. 1994) (Mullarkey, J., 
dissenting).

 
 

Mendez v. 
People, 986 P.2d 275, 280-81 (Colo. 1999).3   See also United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 657-60 (4th Cir. 2004); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 302-03 (Va. App. 2004); and 
State v. South, 885 P.2d 795, 798-99 (Utah App. 1994), reversed and 
remanded on other grounds 924 P.2d 359 (Utah 1996).  We hold that the deputies had probable 
cause to believe that a crime had been or was being committed within the 
residence.  We now turn to the 
question of whether exigent circumstances existed.

 
 
[¶18]   The recognized exigent 
circumstances include:

 
 
1) search 
of an arrested suspect and the area within his control; 2) a search conducted 
while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect; 3) a search and/or seizure to prevent 
the imminent destruction of evidence; 4) a search and/or seizure of an 
automobile upon probable cause; 5) a search which results when an object is 
inadvertently in the plain view of police officers while they are where they 
have a right to be; 6) a search and/or seizure conducted pursuant to consent; 
and 7) a search which results from an entry into a dwelling in order to prevent 
loss of life or property.

 
 

Hughes, 65 P.3d 378, 382 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Andrews v. State, 2002 WY 28, ¶18, 40 P.3d 708, ¶18 (Wyo. 2002), and  Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 610 
(Wyo. 1992)).  "The existence of 
exigent circumstances is dependent upon all of the facts or circumstances viewed 
in their entirety.  If such facts 
reflect the danger or destruction of valuable evidence, exigent circumstances 
are present."  Hughes, 65 P.3d  at 382 (quoting Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 691 (Wyo. 1995), and Patterson v. State, 691 P.2d 253, 
258 (Wyo. 
1984)).

 
 
[¶19]   The district court found that 
exigent circumstances existed justifying the warrantless entry into the 
residence.  Specifically, the court 
concluded that it was reasonable for the deputies to suspect that once the 
occupants were aware of the officers' presence, that there was a possibility 
that any evidence of contraband would be destroyed.  The Defendants contest this 
finding.  They claim that there were 
no exigent circumstances.  In 
particular, they argue that the odor of marijuana by itself is insufficient to 
provide exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry.  They insist that there were no other 
facts to support the deputies' decision to enter the residence.  In addition, the Defendants assert that 
to the extent exigent circumstances existed, they were created by the deputies 
themselves when they approached the residence despite detecting the odor of 
marijuana when they had exited their vehicles  the deputies should have left 
the premises at that point to obtain a search warrant.

 
 
[¶20]   The impetus for the deputies' 
presence at the residence was the discovery of marijuana in J.C. Rideout's 
property at the SheridanCountyDetentionCenter.  Suspicious of the explanation regarding 
the provenance of the jacket in which the marijuana was found and wanting to act 
before J.C. Rideout had an opportunity to contact anyone, the officer in charge 
of the Detention Center asked two deputy sheriffs to go to J.C. Rideout's home 
and attempt to verify the story with the other residents.  The deputies had a legitimate 
investigative reason for going to J.C. Rideout's 
residence.

 
 
[¶21]   The deputies arrived at the 
residence at about 1:28 a.m.  The 
lights were on inside the residence indicating that the occupants were still 
awake. "The prevailing rule is that, absent a clear expression by the owner to 
the contrary, police officers are permitted to approach a dwelling and seek 
permission to question an occupant in the course of their official 
business."  Gompf, ¶23, 
___P.3d.___ (citing Scott v. State, 67 S.W.3d 567, 575 (Ark. 2002)).  While the presence of the deputies may 
have been "unexpected and surprising," there is no evidence that the occupants 
"clearly indicated to the public or law enforcement that they were not welcome 
to approach the front door of the residence."  Gompf, ¶25, ___ P.3d.___. 

 
 
[¶22]   After exiting their vehicle, the 
deputies immediately noticed the odor of burnt marijuana.  The odor became stronger as the 
officers' approached the front door.  
As they approached the door, they noticed through a picture window 
someone in the residence observing them and then moving quickly out of view to 
the back of the home.  At the front 
door, the marijuana odor was "fairly strong."  Scott Rideout answered the door after 
the second time the officers had knocked.  
He exited the residence by partially opening the door, slipping out, and 
then closing it.  The deputies could 
smell marijuana on Scott Rideout's person.  
When he opened the front door to call out to Justin Chacon, the odor of 
marijuana emanating from the residence was "very strong."  It is at that point that the officers 
concluded they had probable cause that a crime was being committed and entered 
the residence to secure it to prevent the destruction of any evidence pending a 
search warrant.

 
 
[¶23]   We conclude that these facts 
support the district court's finding that sufficient exigent circumstances 
existed to justify the warrantless entry, and that the exigencies were not of 
the deputies' making.  The deputies 
had a legitimate law enforcement purpose for their presence at the residence for 
which they were permitted to approach and seek to speak with the occupants.  The deputies testified that they did not 
have probable cause that a crime was being committed until after they had spoken 
with Scott Rideout and smelled marijuana on his person and emanating from inside 
the residence.  When the deputies 
exited their vehicle and smelled the marijuana, there is nothing in the record 
to indicate that they could tie the odor to the residence itself, let alone the 
occupants.  The possibility existed 
that the source of the odor was somewhere other than within the residence.  Without probable cause that a crime was 
being or had been committed within the residence, the deputies could not have 
obtained a search warrant at that time.  
Before the deputies could establish probable cause that a crime was being 
committed within the residence, their presence was noted by the occupants when 
someone observed them through a picture window walking up to the front 
door.  That person then moved 
quickly toward the back of the residence where he could not be observed.  When Scott Rideout responded to the 
deputies' knock on the door, he exited the residence in a manner suggesting that 
there was something inside of which he did not want the deputies to become 
aware.

 
 
[¶24]   Once the deputies had established 
probable cause that a crime was being committed within the residence because of 
the odor emanating from inside and from Scott Rideout's person, the deputies 
were confronted with a situation in which their presence was known to the 
occupants.   Any evidence could 
have been easily destroyed before the deputies would have had an opportunity to 
obtain a search warrant.  
Hughes, 65 P.3d. at 382 (citing Patterson v. State, 691 P.2d 253, 258 (Wyo. 1984)); see also Mendez v. 
People, 986 P.2d 275, 282 (Colo. 1999) (odor of marijuana emanating from 
motel room indicated that evidence of a crime, possession of marijuana, was in 
the process of being destroyed justifying a warrantless entry); Cherry v. 
Commonwealth, 605 S.E.2d 297, 304-05 (Va. App. 2004) (warrantless entry into 
residence justified upon officer's detection of marijuana odor where the 
occupants' awareness of his presence made it likely that both the drugs and the 
occupants would be gone before a warrant could be secured).  Given the furtive movements of the 
individual when the deputies approached the residence and their knowledge that 
at least one other person  Justin Chacon  was inside, it was reasonable for 
the deputies to fear destruction of evidence if they exited the premises and 
waited for a search warrant.

 
 
[¶25]   The ultimate question is the 
reasonableness of the deputies' conduct.  
Hughes, 65 P.3d  at 383.  
The deputies possessed probable cause that a crime was being committed 
within the residence.  Exigent 
circumstances existed justifying a warrantless entry to secure the residence and 
prevent destruction of any evidence.  
Once inside, the deputies located all persons present in the house.  They seized some evidence that was in 
plain view but otherwise did not search  
the residence until J.C. Rideout had given his consent and a warrant had 
been obtained for Justin Chacon's room.  
See Hughes, 65 P.3d  at 383.  The deputies acted reasonably under the 
circumstances.

 
 
[¶26]   The Defendants also contend that 
the destruction of the evidence does not constitute an exigent circumstance 
sufficient to justify a warrantless entry because the crime for which the 
deputies had probable cause that was being committed, possession o f marijuana, 
is a minor, misdemeanor offense.   
The Defendants cite in support of their argument the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984).  There, 
a witness observed Welsh drive erratically, go off the road, and come to a rest 
in an open field.  Id. at 742.  Welsh walked away from the accident 
scene. Id.  When the police arrived, they checked the 
vehicle registration, learned that it was registered to Welsh and that his 
residence was a short distance away, easily within walking distance. Id.  Without securing a warrant, the police 
proceeded to Welsh 's home, arriving about 9:00 p.m.   Id. at 743.  
When Welsh's stepdaughter answered the door, the police entered the 
residence and proceeded to the upstairs bedroom where they arrested Welsh for 
driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. 
Id.  At the 
time, Wisconsin law provided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated 
was a non-criminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture and a maximum fine of 
$200.00 with no potential jail time.  
Id. at 746.

 
 
[¶27]   The Court began its analysis by 
noting that physical intrusion into a person's home " is the chief evil against 
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed" and that a basic 
principle of Fourth Amendment law is that "searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."  Welsh, 466 U.S.  at 748-49 
(quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)).  In accord with 
those principles, the Court noted that it had allowed warrantless intrusions 
into the home for a felony arrest only if probable cause and exigent 
circumstances were present.  
 Id.at 749 (citing  Payton, 445 U.S. at 
583-90).  The Court expressed 
hesitation in finding exigent circumstances when warrantless arrests in the home 
were at issue, particularly when the underlying offense for which there was 
probable cause to arrest was relatively minor.  Id. at 750.  The Court declared that the presumption 
of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries is difficult 
to rebut when the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor 
offense.  Id.  After noting that most lower courts that 
had addressed the issue had refused to permit warrantless home arrests for 
non-felonious crimes, the Court reached its holding:

 
 
We 
therefore conclude that the common-sense approach utilized by most lower courts 
is required by the Fourth Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and 
seizures," and hold that an important factor to be considered when determining 
whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which 
the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no exigency is created simply 
because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been 
committed, see Payton, application of the exigent-circumstances exception 
in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is 
probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue 
in this case, has been committed.

 
 
.

 
 
 The State 
of Wisconsin 
has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a 
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. 
[Statutory citations omitted] This is the best indication of the State's 
interest in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily identified 
both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest. [Citation 
omitted] Given this expression of the State's interest, a warrantless home 
arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the petitioner's 
blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. 
[Footnote omitted] To allow a warrantless home entry on these facts would be to 
approve unreasonable police behavior that the principles of the Fourth Amendment 
will not sanction.

 
 

Welsh, 
466 U.S.  at 753-54.

 
 
[¶28]   Seventeen years later, the United 
States Supreme Court revisited the Welsh decision in Illinois v. 
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2001).  There, the police accompanied McArthur's 
wife to the coupl e's trailer so that she could remove her belongings without 
harassment.  Id. at 328.  After collecting her belongings, she 
told the officers that McArthur had drugs in the trailer.  Id. at 329.  McArthur, who was standing outside the 
trailer on the porch, denied the officers permission to search the trailer.  Id.  While one officer left to obtain a 
warrant, another stayed at the trailer and informed McArthur that he could not 
re-enter the trailer unless an officer accompanied him. Id.  Once the warrant was issued, the officer 
searched the trailer and recovered a marijuana pipe, a box for marijuana, and a 
small amount of the drug.  
Id.

 
 
[¶29]   The Court went on to hold that the 
restrictions imposed upon McArthur's liberty were reasonable, and hence lawful, 
under the circumstances.  
McArthur, 531 U.S.  at 331-33.   For our purposes, the decision in 
McArthur is relevant because the Court addressed an argument by McArthur 
that the misdemeanor crimes for which he was convicted were minor in nature and 
did not justify the restraint imposed  keeping him out of his home  which he 
contended was "nearly as serious" as the warrantless entry in Welsh.  Id. at 335-36.  The Court 
responded:

 
 
We 
nonetheless find significant distinctions. The evidence at issue here was of 
crimes that were "jailable," not "nonjailable." See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, § 
550/4(a) (1998); ch. 730, § 5/5-8-3(3) (possession of less than 2.5 grams of 
marijuana punishable by up to 30 days in jail); ch. 720, § 600/3.5; ch. 730, § 
5/5-8-3(1) (possession of drug paraphernalia punishable by up to one year in 
jail). In Welsh, we noted that, "given that the classification of state 
crimes differs widely among the States, the penalty that may attach to any 
particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication 
of the State's interest in arresting individuals suspected of committing that 
offense." 466 U.S.  at 754, n. 14. The same 
reasoning applies here, where class C misdemeanors include such widely diverse 
offenses as drag racing, drinking alcohol in a railroad car or on a railroad 
platform, bribery by a candidate for public office, and assault. See, e.g., Ill. 
Comp. Stat., ch. 65, § 5/4-8-2 (1998); ch. 610, § 90/1; ch. 625, § 5/11-504; ch. 
720, § 5/12-1.

 
 

McArthur, 531 U.S.  at 336.  The Court concluded that " the need to 
preserve evidence of a jailable' offense was sufficiently urgent or pressing to 
justify the restriction upon entry that the police imposed." Id.

 
 

[¶30]   The unmistakable implication of the 
discussion in McArthur is that the distinction drawn by the Court in 
Welsh between minor offenses that do not justify a warrantless entry into 
a residence and those offenses that do is predicated upon whether the subject 
offense carries a potential jail term.  
Several other courts 4  have concluded that the distinction 
should be whether an offense is "jailable" or "non-jailable."   See State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 
81, 90 P.3d 306, 312-14 (Idaho 2004); City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002);  State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 773 
(Iowa 2001); State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Minn. 1996); Stark v. 
N.Y. State Department of Motor Vehicles, 104 A.D.2d 194, 483 N.Y.S.2d 824, 
826 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1984); Ulysse v. State, 899 So. 2d 1233, 1234 
(Fla. App. 3 Dist. 2005); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Cherry, 605 
S.E.2d at 306-07; and In re Lavoyne M., 221 Cal. App. 3d 154, 159, 270 Cal. Rptr. 394 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990).

 
 
[¶31]   In this case, the deputies had 
probable cause to believe that the occupants of the residence were in possession 
of a controlled substance (marijuana), a misdemeanor.  In Wyoming, a first offense for possession of 
less than three ounces of marijuana is punishable by up to  12 months imprisonment and/or a fine of 
$1,000.00. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  Under Wyoming law, possession 
of marijuana is not a minor crime, and the need to preserve evidence of the 
offense was sufficient to justify the warrantless entry to arrest the occupants 
of the residence and to secure it until a search warrant or consent could be 
obtained.  Accordingly, we must 
reject the Defendants' contention that Welsh prohibited the use of 
exigent circumstances to excuse the warrant requirement 
here.

 
 
CONCLUSION

[¶32]   The district court did not err in 
denying the Defendants' motion to suppress.  The judgment and sentence in each case 
is affirmed.

 
 
 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Miranda 
v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

 
 

2The 
State argues for the first time on appeal that Scott Rideout lacks standing to 
challenge the legality of the warrantless entry because he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the residence.  
The State's argument raises the question of whether it should be allowed 
to raise the question on appeal when it did not do so before the trial 
court.  Since we affirm the district 
court's ruling denying Scott Rideout's motion to suppress, we need not address 
that question today.

 
 

3We note that the Defendants do not challenge the deputies' qualifications 
to identify the odor emanating from the residence as marijuana in this 
case.

 
 

4Some 
of the cited decisions reached their conclusion after analyzing McArthur 
and Welsh; others anticipated McArthur and reached their 
conclusion based on the Court's discussion in 
Welsh.