Case Title: MATTHEW JOSEPH RUBY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-10-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
MATTHEW JOSEPH RUBY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 133144 P.3d 425Case Number: 05-165Decided: 10/19/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
MATTHEW 
JOSEPH RUBY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee)

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender, and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Eric A. Johnson, 
Director, Prosecution Assistance Program.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 

HILL, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files a special 
concurrence.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Matthew J. Ruby 
(Ruby) appeals a conviction for taking indecent liberties with a child in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a)1 (LexisNexis 2005).  Ruby alleges that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the conviction and that § 14-3-105(a) was 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct.  Our holding and analysis in Rabuck v. State, 2006 WY 25, 129 P.3d 861 (Wyo. 2006) is dispositive of the arguments raised by Ruby and we will 
affirm his conviction.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Ruby raises two 
issues:

 
 
I.  Whether 
[Ruby's] conduct violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a).

 
 
II.  Whether 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to [Ruby's] 
conduct because there is not notice that his conduct was violative of the 
indecent liberties statute.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Ruby's probation 
officer discovered a videotape that depicted Ruby engaging in sexual activities 
with a seven-year-old child.  Ruby, 
who was sixteen at the time, was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual 
assault2 and one count of taking indecent 
liberties with a minor.  The 
indecent liberties charge was predicated on Ruby's videotaping of the incident, 
not the acts themselves.  After a 
trial, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the two second-degree sexual 
assault charges, guilty on two lesser included charges of third-degree sexual 
assault,3 and guilty on the count of indecent 
liberties.  Ruby was sentenced to 
five to fifteen years on each of the third-degree sexual assault counts with the 
sentences to run consecutively.  He 
received a five- to ten-year sentence on the indecent liberties count that was 
to run concurrently to the other sentences.  On appeal, Ruby challenges only the 
validity of the indecent liberties conviction.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶4]      In reviewing 
claims that a conviction is not supported by sufficient 
evidence:

 
 
[T]his 
Court accepts as true the State's evidence, affording to the State those 
inferences which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from that evidence.  This Court does not consider the evidence 
in conflict with the State's evidence and the inferences therefrom.  Our duty is to determine whether a quorum 
of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the 
same result as the jury actually did.

 
 

Jones v. 
State, 2006 
WY 40, ¶ 9, 132 P.3d 162, 165 (Wyo. 2006) (citing Leyo v. State, 2005 WY 92, ¶ 11, 
116 P.3d 1113, 1116-17 (Wyo. 2005); and Brown v. State, 2005 WY 37, ¶ 18, 
109 P.3d 52, 57 (Wyo. 2005)).

 
 
[¶5]      We apply the 
following standards in analyzing claims that a statute is unconstitutional as 
applied to particular conduct:

 
 
When "a 
statute is challenged on an as applied' basis, the court examines the statute 
solely in light of the complainant's specific conduct."  [Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 15, 
96 P.3d 1027, 1031, fn.2 (Wyo. 2004)].  In determining whether a statute is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to a defendant's conduct, "we must decide 
whether the statute provides sufficient notice to a person of ordinary 
intelligence that appellant's conduct was illegal and whether the facts of the 
case demonstrate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."  [Lovato v. State, 901 P.2d 408, 412 
(Wyo. 1995) and Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 976 
(Wyo. 
1988)]

 
 

Rabuck, 
¶ 16, 129 P.3d  at 865.  Ruby 
does not allege discriminatory enforcement; he contends that the statute failed 
to provide him with sufficient notice that his conduct would violate its 
terms.

 
 
In 
evaluating the sufficiency of the notice, we must consider: (1) the statutory 
language and any prior court decisions which have placed a limiting construction 
on the statute or have applied it to specific conduct; and (2) whether the 
statute has been previously applied to conduct identical to that of 
appellant.

 
 

Id. (citing 
Giles, ¶ 23, 96 P.3d  at 1035; 
and Griego, 761 P.2d at 
976).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      While Ruby raises 
two separate issues, his arguments in each are interrelated. Ruby argues that § 
14-3-105(a) proscribes sexual assault.  He contends that inherent in that 
proscription is a requirement that there be contact between the defendant and 
the victim.  Ruby notes that the 
conduct underlying the indecent liberties charge against him was the 
videotaping, not the physical contact between him and the victim, and that there 
was no evidence that the victim had any knowledge of the videotaping.  Since videotaping by itself is not a 
sexual assault, Ruby concludes that the statute "does not prohibit the discreet 
video recording of minors even if the act being recorded is indecent."  Accordingly, Ruby concludes that his 
conduct was not contemplated by the statute and there is insufficient evidence 
to sustain the conviction.  Similarly, Ruby argues that § 14-3-105(a) 
is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct because it is not clear 
that videotaping a sexual assault is prohibited under the 
statute.

 
 
[¶7]      After Ruby's 
brief was filed in this case, we issued our decision in Rabuck. Rabuck had secretly placed a 
video camera in the bedroom closet of two teenage girls who were staying at his 
house.  Rabuck was charged with two 
counts of taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of § 14-3-105(a). 
 On appeal, he challenged the 
constitutionality of the statute as applied to his conduct making the same 
arguments put forth by Ruby:

 
 
Mr. 
Rabuck claims that the statute, as applied to him, is too vague because it 
requires speculation about which aspect of his conduct was forbidden.  He questions whether his conduct was 
forbidden: (1) because he videotaped the juveniles; (2) because he recorded them 
in a state of undress; or (3) because he did not erase those images.  However, we need not engage in this 
dissection and postulate whether one portion of his conduct, alone, would 
violate the statute.  We review Mr. 
Rabuck's challenge to the statute as applied to him, which means that we 
consider his specific conduct in its entirety.  Because he does not challenge the facial 
validity of the statute, Mr. Rabuck lacks "standing" to assert hypothetical 
applications of the statute to support his "as applied" challenge.  [Alcalde v. State, 2003 WY 99, ¶ 13, 
74 P.3d 1253, 1259-60 (Wyo. 2003)]

 
 
Mr. 
Rabuck concedes that, overall, his conduct could be considered indecent or 
improper, but he argues that prior judicial application and construction of the 
indecent liberties statute does not support its application here.  He relies heavily upon the absence of any 
Wyoming case law involving the indecent liberties statute applied to similar 
conduct to support his claim that there was insufficient notice that his conduct 
would violate Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a).  Mr. Rabuck is correct that we have not 
previously addressed the indecent liberties statute in the context of 
surreptitious videotaping.  However, 
the lack of prior cases discussing similar conduct is not determinative.  As the State aptly observes, the indecent 
liberties statute should not be subject to challenge "by virtue of the fact that 
it is broad enough to capture even innovative forms of sexual imposition upon 
minors."  The indecent liberties 
statute has been a part of Wyoming law for nearly five decades and we 
have uniformly given it broad application. [Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 27, 
29 P.3d 76, 84-85 (Wyo. 2001)].

 
 
In 
several instances when we have considered "novel" conduct in light of the 
application of a criminal statute, we have examined the defendant's 
consciousness of guilt in assessing whether the defendant had notice of the 
criminal prohibition.  [Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1035 
(Wyo. 1979)] 
(defendant's "inquiry to the twelve-year-old girl: you won't tell anybody, will 
you?' reflected recognition" that his act of rubbing her breasts and trying to 
unbutton her shirt violated the indecent liberties statute); Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 658 
(Wyo. 2000) (Campbell's testimony establishes she knew that her conduct was 
prohibited); Saiz v. State, 2001 WY 
76, ¶ 14, 30 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 2001) (appellant recognized his actions were 
unlawful).  Here, Mr. Rabuck 
disposed of the video receiver when he learned that the camera had been 
discovered.  He attempted to deceive 
Detective Hloucal by telling him that he had not recorded or seen any images and 
that the system had not worked, when, in fact, he had made several recordings. 
 Mr. Rabuck's efforts to conceal his 
conduct indicate his understanding that his conduct was 
unlawful.

 
 
Turning 
to our indecent liberties cases involving other conduct, Mr. Rabuck argues that 
these cases have limited the application of the statute.  He makes several assertions that his 
behavior does not fall within the ambit of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a), as 
circumscribed by prior judicial construction.  First, he claims that the indecent 
liberties statute only prohibits conduct which affects the "morals" of the minor 
victim and cites to our decision in [Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 
1998)] where we stated, "[t]he purpose of the indecent liberties statute is to 
protect the morals of a child. "  Pierson, 956 P.2d  at 1124 (citing Derksen v. State, 845 P.2d 1383, 1387 
(Wyo. 1993)). 
 He argues that he did not "endanger 
the morals of the juvenile females he discreetly videotaped in a state of 
undress" because they "were not aware of the recordings until after the video 
camera was found" and he "did not encourage the females to engage in any type of 
act or conduct which could be considered immoral, immodest, or 
indecent."

 
 
The 
State characterizes our language in Pierson as a holdover from the past, 
when sex crimes were thought to morally contaminate the victim.  The State suggests that, as used in Pierson, the word "morals" has served 
merely as convenient shorthand for the complex interests protected by statutes 
prohibiting rape and other sex crimes and that use of that language should not 
imply that victims of indecent liberties are morally compromised.  We agree with the State that a more 
accurate statement of the policy behind the indecent liberties statute is "to 
protect children from exploitation." [Misenheimer v. State, 2001 WY 65, 
¶ 12, 27 P.3d 273, 280-81 (Wyo. 2001)].  Requiring a victim to realize the 
impropriety of the conduct and to feel simultaneously victimized would fail to 
protect several classes of foreseeable victims, such as unconscious or 
incapacitated victims and children too young to understand the inappropriate 
nature of the conduct.

 
 
Mr. 
Rabuck also asserts that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 only applies when there is 
sexual contact between the defendant and the minor.  He points to our decision in Giles, arguing that language in that 
decision equates the crime of indecent liberties with sexual assault.  The conduct at issue in Giles was sexual intercourse with a 
minor, and our decision simply reflected the certitude that such conduct 
constituted indecent liberties. Giles 
did not limit application of the indecent liberties statute to offenses 
amounting to sexual assault.

 
 
Additionally, 
other decisions of this Court demonstrate that physical touching is not a 
required element of the crime of indecent liberties.  Schmidt, ¶¶ 4-7, 29 P.3d 79-80; Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 925 
(Wyo. 1999); see also Derksen v. 
State, 845 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Wyo. 1993) (indicating that jury's decision to 
convict defendant of taking indecent liberties could have been based upon 
evidence that he displayed lewd photographs to minor, although instructing on 
indecent liberties was error because it was not lesser included offense).  In Schmidt, we affirmed a conviction where 
the perpetrator showed Penthouse 
photos to an eleven-year-old and masturbated in front of her.  Schmidt, ¶¶ 4-7, 29 P.3d 79-80. 
 In Griswold, the defendant exposed himself 
to two children and forced one child to perform fellatio while the other child 
watched.  We sustained Griswold's 
conviction of taking indecent liberties with the child who was forced to watch. 
 Id. 
at 925.

 
 
Mr. 
Rabuck attempts to distinguish our decisions in Schmidt and Griswold by claiming that they involved 
a type of assault  a sexual act in the presence of the minor.  He contends that because there was no 
contact with AL or JW and no sexual act in their presence, 
he could not have committed the crime of indecent liberties.  Although not expressly addressed by Mr. 
Rabuck, we discern that his argument that presence or contact is required 
implicates the "with a minor" language in the indecent liberties statute.  Generally, "with" is a "word denoting a 
relation of proximity, contiguity, or association."  Black's Law Dictionary 1602 (6th ed. 1990).  We agree that there is a relational 
component which must be demonstrated between the immodest, immoral or indecent 
conduct and the minor victim in order to constitute the crime of indecent 
liberties.  However, we find that 
this correlation was met in this case because Mr. Rabuck was constructively 
present with AL and JW while they were undressing.

 
 
We find 
persuasive the reasoning of State v. 
McClees, 108 N.C. App. 648, 424 S.E.2d 687 (N.C. App. 1993) which determined 
that constructive presence can place a defendant "with a minor" in establishing 
the crime of indecent liberties.  In 
McClees, the defendant, headmaster of 
a private school, asked a fifteen-year-old female student to try on basketball 
uniforms in order to help him decide which uniform to buy for use at the school. 
 He instructed the student to change 
clothes in his office while he waited outside.  Without the student's knowledge, he had 
secretly placed a video camera on the shelf in his office and recorded her while 
she undressed.  Defendant argued 
that the State failed to show that he took an indecent liberty "with" a child 
because he was not in her actual presence.  The Court rejected that argument 
stating:

 
 
Certainly 
defendant's behavior was such as the common sense of society would regard as 
indecent and improper.  Although the 
defendant was not actually located in the room with his victim, he strategically 
placed a camera such that she was unaware of its presence, thereby secretly 
filming the child as she changed clothes several times at his direction.  As a result, he essentially had the same 
capability of viewing her in a state of undress as he would have had, were he 
physically present in the room.  Through the forces of modern electronic 
technology, namely the video camcorder, one can constructively place himself in 
the "presence" of another.  Thus we 
find that defendant was "constructively present" and thereby took immoral, 
improper or indecent liberties "with" the minor victim.

 
 
                        
McClees, 424 S.E.2d  at 
690.

 
 

Rabuck, 
¶¶ 18-26, 129 P.3d  at 865-67.  
Our discussion in Rabuck is 
dispositive of the arguments raised by Ruby.4  For the reasons noted in that case, we 
reject Ruby's argument that § 14-3-105(a) does not proscribe the discreet video 
recording of minors engaged in indecent acts.  Similarly, we have no trouble concluding 
that the "common sense of society" would regard the videotaping of sexual acts 
with a seven-year-old child as a violation of the statute, and "that a person of 
ordinary intelligence had sufficient notice that such conduct would be against 
the law."  Rabuck, ¶ 31, 129 P.3d  at 868-69. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶8]      Ruby's indecent 
liberties conviction under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1§ 14-3-105. Immoral or 
indecent acts; penalty.

(a)  Except under circumstances constituting sexual assault in 
the first, second or third degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, 
any person knowingly taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any 
child or knowingly causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage 
another child to commit with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a 
felony.  Except as provided by 
subsection (b) of this section, a person convicted under this section shall be 
fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand 
dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten (10) 
years, or both.

(b)  An actor convicted under subsection (a) of this section 
shall be punished by life imprisonment without parole 
if:

(i)  The circumstances of the crime involve a victim who was 
under the age of sixteen (16) at the time of the offense and an actor who was at 
least four (4) years older than the victim; and

(ii)  The actor has two (2) or more previous convictions for 
any of the following designated offenses, which convictions resulted from 
charges separately brought and which arose out of separate occurrences in this 
state or elsewhere:

(A)  A conviction under W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304 or a 
criminal statute containing the same or similar elements as a crime defined by 
W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304.

(B) Repealed 
by Laws 1997, ch. 135, § 2.

(C)  A conviction under W.S. 14-3-105(a), or a criminal statute 
containing the same or similar elements as the crime defined by W.S. 
14-3-105(a), if the circumstances of the crime involved a victim who was under 
the age of sixteen (16) at the time of the offense and an actor who was at least 
four (4) years older than the victim.

(c)  As used in this section, "child" means a person under the 
age of eighteen (18) years.

 
 

2§ 6-2-303. Sexual assault 
in the second degree.

(a)  Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim 
commits sexual assault in the second degree if, under circumstances not 
constituting sexual assault in the first degree:

(i)  The actor causes submission of the victim by threatening 
to retaliate in the future against the victim or the victim's spouse, parents, 
brothers, sisters or children, and the victim reasonably believes the actor will 
execute this threat.  "To retaliate" 
includes threats of kidnapping, death serious bodily injury or extreme physical 
pain;

(ii)  The actor causes submission of the victim by any means 
that would prevent resistance by a victim of ordinary 
resolution;

(iii)  The actor administers, or knows that someone else 
administered to the victim, without the prior knowledge or consent of the 
victim, any substances which substantially impairs the victim's power to 
appraise or control his conduct;

(iv)  The actor knows or should reasonably know that the victim 
submits erroneously believing the actor to be the victim's 
spouse;

(v)  At the time of the commission of the act the victim is 
less than twelve (12) years of age and the actor is at least four (4) years 
older than the victim;

(vi)  The actor is in a position of authority over the victim 
and uses this position of authority to cause the victim to submit; 
or

(vii)  The actor inflicts sexual intrusion in treatment or 
examination of a victim for purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent 
with reasonable medical practices.

(b)  A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree 
if he subjects another person to sexual contact and causes serious bodily injury 
to the victim under any of the circumstances listed in W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) 
through (iv) or paragraphs (a)(i) through (vi) of this 
section.

 
 

3§ 6-2-304. Sexual assault 
in the third degree.

(a)  An actor commits sexual assault in the third degree if, 
under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first or second 
degree:

(i)  The actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim 
and inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen (16) years; 
or

(ii)  The actor is an adult and subjects a victim under the age 
of fourteen (14) years to sexual contact without inflicting sexual intrusion on 
the victim and without causing serious bodily injury to the 
victim;

(iii)  The actor subjects a victim to sexual contact under any 
of the circumstances of W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) or 6-2-303(a)(i) through 
(vi) without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and without causing 
serious bodily injury to the victim.

 
 

4The only 
significant difference between that case and this being that unlike Rabuck, Ruby 
was actually present with the victim during the videotaping.  The relational component between the 
immodest, immoral or indecent conduct and the minor victim was obviously present 
here.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice, specially 
concurring.

 
 
[¶9]      I concur in the 
result of the majority opinion out of deference to the doctrine of stare 
decisis.  See Rabuck v. State, 
2006 Wyo. 
25, ¶ 34, 129 P.3d 861, 869.