Case Title: PATRICK F. MADIGAN V. TAMMY J. MAAS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
PATRICK F. MADIGAN V. TAMMY J. MAAS2005 WY 91117 P.3d 1194Case Number: 04-173Decided: 08/11/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
PATRICK 
F. MADIGAN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
TAMMY J. 
MAAS,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Carol A. Serelson, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Sasha Johnston of Woodard & White, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
 
 
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The 
appellant, Patrick F. Madigan (Madigan) and the appellee, Tammy J. Maas 
(Maas) married in 1994.  They divorced in 2004.  In this appeal, Madigan challenges the 
district court's property division in that divorce.  We will affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Madigan presents 
the following issues for our review:

 
 
            
1.         
Whether the decree of divorce should be corrected to conform to the 
decision letter of the district court?

 
 
            
2.         
Whether the monetary award of $22,000.00 to Maas must be adjusted because it is contrary to the 
evidence and clearly erroneous?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Madigan and 
Maas married in 1994.  They adopted one child in 1999, custody 
of whom is not at issue in this appeal.  
Both parties owned homes at the time of their marriage.  They sold both and purchased a new 
house.  Maas sold her home first and used the $22,833.00 in 
proceeds as a down payment on the new house (the John Drive 
house).  Madigan's home then sold, 
yielding $25,344.00.  Madigan used 
part of this money to settle personal debts and he also paid Maas $7,000.00, intended as a contribution toward the down 
payment on the John 
Drive house.

 
 
[¶4]      Madigan and Maas 
lived in the John 
Drive house until 2002, when Madigan took a new job 
and moved to Monticello, Utah.  Maas and the parties' daughter remained 
in Cheyenne, and 
Madigan traveled home on a regular basis to be with the family.  As a result of Madigan's relocation, the 
parties decided to sell the John 
Drive house, which sale resulted in a $100,000.00 net 
profit.  $54,000.00 of the proceeds 
were used as a down payment on a new house in Cheyenne (the Belmont 
house), $16,000.00 went toward the down payment on a house in Monticello (the Monticello house), and the remaining $30,000.00 was set 
aside to be used in remodeling the Belmont house.

 
 
[¶5]      In August of 
2003, Maas filed for divorce.  Shortly thereafter, Madigan requested, 
and was granted, a transfer back to Cheyenne.  
Madigan purchased a home in Cheyenne (the 
Crestline house) and listed the Monticello house for sale.  The parties agreed out of court on an 
appropriate custody arrangement for their child, and in March of 2004, a trial 
was held on the property division issues.  
At the close of evidence, the district court requested that the parties 
submit written closing arguments, including a statement of their respective 
proposals for the property division.  
After receiving the parties' closing arguments, the district court issued 
its decision letter on April 12, 2004.  
The one-page decision letter read as follows:

 
 
Dear 
Counsel:

 
 
            
I've reviewed your written summations.  The Court will adopt the distribution 
and allocation urged in Tammy Maas' submittal including the items incorporated 
by reference with the exception that Ms. Maas will pay to Mr. Madigan the sum of 
$22,000.00 to reconcile the interests in the Belmont residence.  The ring and bracelet will be sold by 
Ms. Maas and the proceeds equally divided.  
So, each will retain the accounts in their respective 
names.

 
 
            
The parties will each retain their own retirement interests and 
accounts.  It is not the sort of 
case that would call for any division of these items.

 
 
            
Each party will pay the fees and costs incurred by the party.  [Maas' 
attorney] will please prepare the decree.

 
 
On 
May 3, 2004, Maas submitted a decree of divorce 
to the district court pursuant to W.R.C.P. 58.1  Madigan did not object to the form of 
the decree, and the decree of divorce was entered on May 19, 
2004.

 
 
[¶6]      With respect to 
the parties' real property, the decree of divorce awarded Maas the Belmont house and awarded Madigan the Monticello house and the 
Crestline house.  Also, each party 
was awarded his or her separate accounts and personal property, except that 
Maas was awarded fifty shares of XM Satellite 
Radio (XMSR) stock that was in Madigan's name.  Finally, Maas was ordered to pay Madigan $22,000.00 to settle his 
share of the equity in the parties' real property.

 
 
[¶7]      On May 25, 2004, 
Madigan filed a Motion to Correct Decree of Divorce to Conform to Decision 
Letter and/or to Correct Clerical Error.  
In this motion, Madigan asserted that the decree of divorce's award of 
the XMSR stock to Maas was inconsistent with the decision letter's statement 
that the parties should retain their separate accounts, and that the decree of 
divorce should be corrected to provide that Madigan receive the stock with no 
credit to Maas for its value.  Madigan filed another motion on June 1, 
2004, titled Motion for Court to Reconsider Decision and Clarify Terms as to 
Sale of Jewelry.  In that motion, 
Madigan claimed, among other things, that the $22,000.00 equity settlement 
payment should actually be $41,494.34.  
He asserted that the $22,000.00 figure was based on incorrect 
numbers.  Maas responded to both motions, and on June 29, 2004, the 
district court entered orders denying both motions.  Madigan filed a timely 
appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]                              
We have often acknowledged:

 
 
"There 
are few rules more firmly established in our jurisprudence than the proposition 
that the disposition of marital property is committed to the sound discretion of 
the district court.  Judicial 
discretion is made up of many things, including conclusions reached from 
objective criteria, as well as exercising sound judgment with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. 
 We are required to ask ourselves 
whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any 
facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious."

 
 

Holland v. 
Holland, 2001 
WY 113, ¶ 8, 35 P.3d 409, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2001).  
. . .  [W]e consider the 
prevailing party's evidence to be true and give every reasonably drawn inference 
to it while we disregard all conflicting evidence.  Hensley v. Hensley, 896 P.2d 115, 115 
(Wyo.1995) (per curiam).  Further, 
property divisions are complex and therefore require the trial court, in its 
discretion, to assess what is right under the circumstances while considering 
the respective merits and needs of the parties.  McCulloh v. Drake, 2001 WY 56, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 1162, ¶ 15 (Wyo.2001).  "An 
abuse of discretion occurs when the property disposition shocks the conscience 
of this court and appears to be so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people 
cannot abide it."  Hall v. Hall, 2002 WY 30, ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 1228, ¶ 12 (Wyo.2002).

 
 

Root v. 
Root, 2003 
WY 36, ¶ 8, 65 P.3d 41, 44 (Wyo. 2003).  The district 
court's decision in a property division case is afforded considerable 
deference.  Metz 
v. Metz, 
2003 WY 3, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 383, 385 (Wyo. 2003).  Therefore, the 
division of property should not be disturbed except on clear grounds since the 
district court is usually in a better position than the appellate court to judge 
the parties' respective merits and needs.  Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
The XMSR 
Stock

 
 
[¶9]      In Madigan's 
first appellate issue, he asserts that the divorce decree should be corrected to 
conform to the district court's decision letter.  The decision letter provided that "each 
[party] will retain the accounts in their respective names."  However, the divorce decree awarded 
Madigan the accounts in his name, "except for 50 shares of XMSR stock which 
shall be awarded to [Maas]."  Madigan contends that this inconsistency 
between the decision letter and the divorce decree is the result of a mistake by 
the district court and should be corrected.  He urges that we remand the case with 
instructions to conform the divorce decree to the decision 
letter.

 
 

[¶10]   In support of this contention, 
Madigan cites Root, 2003 WY 36, ¶ 25, 
65 P.3d  at 49.  There, the district court's decision 
letter stated that the husband was to receive $25,000.00 from the wife.  Id.  
The divorce decree, however, omitted this award.  Id.  
Neither party raised the omission on appeal.  Id. 
at ¶ 26, 65 P.3d  at 49.  However, 
because the district court undeniably intended the husband to receive this 
amount, we remanded the case with instructions to conform the divorce decree to 
the decision letter.  Id.

 
 
[¶11]   Unlike the omission of $25,000.00 
in Root, the record in this case does 
not indicate that the award of the XMSR stock to Maas resulted from an oversight or mistake.  Although the district court's decision 
letter provided that each party would retain his or her own accounts, it also 
stated that it would adopt Maas' proposed 
distribution, which proposal included a request for an accounting of the XMSR 
stock.  The divorce decree 
specifically addressed the stock and clearly provided for its disposition.  The decree of divorce 
read:

 
 
[Madigan] 
is awarded . . . all personal property, including retirement accounts, 
investment accounts, bank accounts, vehicles, and notes, and reimbursement 
payments solely in his name, except for 50 shares of XMSR stock which 
shall be awarded to [Maas].  If 
[Madigan] chooses to retain this stock instead of transferring it to [Maas], 
[Maas] shall receive a credit of $1300 toward 
satisfaction of the equity payment in paragraph 9 of this 
decree.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The adoption of Maas' proposed distribution and subsequent award of the 
XMSR stock does not appear to be a mistake, but rather an exercise of the 
district court's discretion.  We 
have held the district court may, in its discretion, make changes in the final 
order from what was indicated in the decision letter.

 
 
The 
trial judge's decision letters, discussing legal principles and expressing his 
conclusions of law, [do] not constitute a judicial determination which may be 
considered a final order. We analogize that, if a trial court in exercise of its 
discretion may modify tentative decisions until entry of the final order, it 
does not err in rendering a decree with changed 
provisions.

 
 

Broadhead 
v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo. 
1987).2

 
 
[¶12]   The absence of mistake in awarding 
the XMSR stock to Maas is further evidenced by the district court's denial of 
Madigan's post-trial motion to correct the decree of divorce, wherein Madigan 
asserted that the "Decree of Divorce should be corrected to provide that [he] 
receive the XMSR stock with no credit to [Maas] for its value."  Had the district court erroneously 
awarded Maas the XMSR stock, surely it would 
have granted Madigan's motion and corrected the decree of 
divorce.

 
 

[¶13]   We conclude that the award of the 
XMSR stock to Maas was not the result of a 
mistake or omission, but rather an exercise of the district court's discretion 
in dividing the parties' property.  
Madigan does not argue that the district court abused its discretion in 
making that award, and we find nothing in the record indicating such an 
abuse.  Therefore, we affirm the 
award of the XMSR stock to Maas.

 
 
The 
$22,000.00 Equalization Payment

 
 
[¶14]   In Madigan's second appellate 
issue, he asserts that the $22,000.00 equalization payment, which the district 
court ordered Maas to pay to Madigan, is 
inconsistent with the evidence and improperly calculated.  The $22,000.00 figure was based on 
calculations set out in Maas' written closing 
statement.  After the close of 
evidence, the district court requested that the parties submit their closing 
arguments in writing.  Maas' proposed distribution included the following 
figures:

 
 
Figure 
1: Refund of Investment

 
 

$42,000          
[Madigan]'s 
½ of down payment [on the Belmont house] + remodeling 

+          
$4,000            
[Madigan]'s 
½ of mortgage payments [on  the 
Belmont house] 
since August, 2003

-           
$23,000          
[Maas' down payment on the John Drive 
house]

+           
$7,000           
[Madigan]'s 
claimed reimbursement to 
[Maas]

-            
$8,000           
[Maas'] 
½ of down payment on [Monticello] house            
            

             
$22,000         
[Madigan]'s 
net share

 
 
The 
district court adopted Maas' proposed property 
distribution.  On appeal, Madigan 
takes exception to the district court's use of two of the above figures: the 
$23,000.00representing the amount Maas paid as a down payment on the 
John 
Drive house, and the $4,000.00representing the 
amount Madigan contributed to the Belmont house 
mortgage after Maas had filed for 
divorce.

 
 
[¶15]   With regard to the $23,000.00, 
Madigan asserts that the district court should have used $11,500.00 instead of 
$23,000.00.  In his appellate brief, 
Madigan articulates his argument as follows:

 
 
At the 
time [Maas] contributed the $23,000.00 to the down payment, she contributed her 
half of the down payment, which was $11,500.00, plus [Madigan]'s half of the 
down payment, his $11,500.00.  Had 
[Madigan] repaid her nothing, [Maas] would have 
overpaid $11,500.00, not $23,000.00 as indicated [above].

 
 

Madigan 
claims that the $23,000.00 figure used by the district court is "against all the 
weight of the evidence and is based on a mathematical miscalculation."  However, he cites no evidence which 
would mandate a different result, nor does he demonstrate the mathematical 
error.  Rather, Madigan's argument 
appears to reflect nothing more than his apparent belief that the down payment 
on the John 
Drive house should have been allocated equally 
between him and Maas.  We recognize that the use of the 
$23,000.00 figure may not reflect an exact 50/50 distribution; nevertheless, we 
have stated that "[a] 
just and equitable distribution is as likely as not to be unequal."  Hoffman v. Hoffman, 2004 WY 68, ¶ 12, 91 P.3d 922, 926 (Wyo. 2004); Sweat v. Sweat, 2003 WY 82, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo. 2003).  The 
record clearly shows that Maas paid the $23,000.00 down payment on the 
John 
Drive house and that Madigan later paid Maas $7,000.00 as reimbursement for a portion of that 
amount.  We find nothing in the 
record indicating 
that the district court abused its discretion by allocating Maas and Madigan the amounts they contributed, rather than 
dividing the down payment equally.  
Without more, Madigan's conclusory statement that the down payment should 
have been divided equally falls well short of providing the "clear grounds" 
necessary for us to disturb the district court's property distribution.  Metz, 2004 WY 3, 
¶ 6, 61 P.3d  at 385.

 
 
[¶16]   Madigan's objection to the 
$4,000.00 figure stems from his contention that he should receive credit for all mortgage payments he contributed 
from the time he relocated to Monticello, and 
not just those made after Maas filed for 
divorce.  Madigan asserts that 
instead of the $4,000.00, he should be entitled to a $9,900.00 credit.  As support of this argument, he points 
to an in-court statement made by Maas during 
cross examination:

 
 
            
Q.        
You're willing to give [Madigan] credit for approximately 500 - - is it 
500 or 550 he was paying toward the [Belmont] house payment?

 
 
            
A.        We 
can say 550.

 
 
            
. . . 

 
 
            
Q.        So 
550 would be an appropriate figure times 18 months, is that what it's 
been?

 
 

A.                 
That 
would be approximately right.

 
 
            
Q.        
Whatever we figured to be a number of months, you agree that number . . . 
times 550, he should be given credit on Belmont?

 
 
            
A.        
Correct.

 
 
            
Q.        
So that's approximately 9,900, if we have the numbers correct.  You would be willing to give him that 
credit?

 
 
            
A.        
Yes.

 
 

Maas' 
statement is the only evidence Madigan cites in support of his argument on this 
issue.  In response, Maas points out that her statement was later clarified and 
corrected upon redirect, and that she clearly articulated her position in her 
closing statement, wherein she used the $4,000.00 figure instead of 
$9,900.00.

 
 

[¶17]   Even if Maas had not clarified her original statement, the 
district court is not bound to adopt the testimony of either party.  In Hoffman, 2004 WY 68, ¶ 11, 91 P.3d  at 
925, the 
wife testified that she did not think the husband should be responsible for all 
the parties' business debts.  The 
district court, nevertheless, allocated those debts to husband.  Id. at ¶ 13, 91 P.3d  at 926.  On appeal, the husband challenged the 
allocation of corporate debt to him claiming that 
"because Wife must be considered a reasonable person, and she didn't think it 
was fair, it must meet our standard for abuse of discretion that no reasonable 
person could abide by the result."  
Id. at ¶ 16, 91 P.3d  at 926.  In affirming the 
district court's decision we stated:

 
 
[I]t is 
the trial court that decides the equitable distribution of property. The trial 
court hears all the evidence, judges the credibility of the witnesses on 
all issues, and makes its determination regarding property distribution of all 
marital property after considering the statutory factors. Wife's isolated 
comment is but one piece of the puzzle and is not definitive for any 
purpose.

 
 

Id.  Clearly, 
Madigan's 
reliance on Maas' isolated and disputed 
statement is insufficient to establish that the evidence does not support the 
use of the $4,000.00 figure, or that the district court abused its 
discretion.

 
 

[¶18]   As a final point, we note that even 
if we were to find the district court's use of one or both of Maas' figures to 
be erroneous, we are required to examine the reasonableness of the district 
court's property division from the perspective of the overall distribution of 
marital assets and liabilities, rather than from a narrow focus on the effects 
of any particular disposition.  Sweat, 2003 WY 82, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d  at 
278; 
Carlton 
v. Carlton, 
997 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 2000).  Madigan does not even attempt to show 
how the overall distribution is inequitable.  The parties were each awarded real 
property, vehicles, household items, accounts, and retirement interests.  To settle the equities in the parties' 
real property, Madigan was also awarded $22,000.00.  This distribution, when viewed as a 
whole, does not shock the conscience of this Court nor do we find it to be so 
unfair and inequitable that reasonable people could not abide 
it.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   The district court's award of 
the XMSR stock to Maas was not the result of an 
oversight or mistake by the district court, but was a result of the exercise of 
discretion.  Further, the district 
court's adoption of Maas' proposed 
distribution, including use of the $23,000.00 and $4,000.00 figures, was not 
arbitrary, the result of a miscalculation, or an abuse of 
discretion.

 
 
[¶20]   Affirmed.

 
 
 
 

FOOTNOTES

1

Rule 
58.  Entry of judgment or order 

 
 
(a)  Presentation.  Subject to the 
provisions of Rule 55(b) and unless otherwise ordered by the court, written 
judgments or orders shall be presented to the court within 20 days after its 
decision is made known. Before submitting the judgment or order, the party 
drafting it shall seek to secure the written approval as to form of the other 
parties. If, within 10 days, approval as to form is not obtained, the party 
drafting the form of judgment or order may forward the original to the court and 
serve a copy on the other parties with a notice advising objections must be made 
within 10 days. If no written objection is timely filed, the court may sign the 
judgment or order. If objection is filed, the court will resolve the matter with 
or without a hearing. A party objecting shall submit an alternative form of 
judgment or order with the objection.

 
 
(b)  Form of Entry.  Subject to the 
provisions of Rule 54(b), in all cases, the judge shall promptly settle or 
approve the form of the judgment or order and direct that it be entered by the 
clerk. Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document, shall be 
identified as such, and may include findings of fact and conclusions of law. The 
names of all parties shall be set out in the caption of all final orders, 
judgments and decrees. All judgments and orders must be entered on the journal 
of the court and specify clearly the relief granted or order made in the 
action.

 
 
(c)  Time of Entry.  A judgment or final 
order shall be deemed to be entered whenever a form of such judgment or final 
order, signed by the trial judge, is filed in the office of the clerk of the 
court in which the case is pending. Entry of the judgment shall not be delayed, 
nor the time for appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees, except 
that, when a timely motion for attorneys fees is made under Rule 54(d)(2), the 
court, before the appellate court acquires jurisdiction, may order that the 
motion have the same effect on the time for appeal for all parties as a timely 
motion under Rule 59.

 
 

  2If the decree of divorce contains 
terms different from those contained in the decision letter and a party believes 
that the difference is the result of a mistake or omission, the proper remedy is 
to object to the order pursuant to W.R.C.P. 58, so that the discrepancy can be 
resolved.  Root, 2003 WY 36, ¶ 26, 65 P.3d  at 
49.  Although Madigan was provided a copy of 
the decree of divorce containing the errors he now alleges, he failed to object 
as allowed in W.R.C.P. 58.  While 
this failure does not preclude him from challenging the order on appeal, the 
issue might have been more expeditiously resolved by using this 
procedure.