Case Title: Collins v. Michelbach

Citation: 588 P.2d 1041, 92 N.M. 366

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1979-01-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
588 P.2d 1041 (1979) 92 N.M. 366 Sharon C. COLLINS, Petitioner, v. Richard C. MICHELBACH and Southeastern Public Service Co., Respondents. No. 12189. Supreme Court of New Mexico. January 2, 1979. Smith, Ransom & Gilstrap, William G. Gilstrap, Albuquerque, for petitioner. Keleher & McLeod, Henry Narvaez, Albuquerque, for respondents. FEDERICI, Justice. This action was brought by the petitioner Collins (plaintiff) in the District Court of Bernalillo County to recover damages for injuries arising out of a collision. The jury returned a verdict for respondents (defendants). At the trial, the court instructed the jury on plaintiff's burden of proof. It gave N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.1. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict, but it refused to discuss or review plaintiff's second point, which challenged the validity of the above instruction. The question presented by the petition for writ of certiorari is whether it was error for the trial court to give a jury instruction as to plaintiff's burden of proof based upon *1042 N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.1, without excluding the words "any one of" which appear in the last paragraph of the instruction. The entire instruction reads: The Directions on Use of N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.1 reads: It is plaintiff's contention that the underlined portion of the instruction would lead the jury to believe that she would have to prove all of the possible theories of negligence in order to prevail and that since a favorable determination by the jury on one or more of the claims is all that is required, the instruction is contrary to New Mexico law. Defendants contend that considering all of the instructions given, the trial court did not err in the use of N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.1, and that even if the court did err, such error was harmless since plaintiff has not shown any prejudice. The Court of Appeals correctly refused to review plaintiff's objection to the giving of N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.1 since it is bound to follow the Supreme Court's order requiring the use of uniform jury instructions and it has no authority to alter, modify or abolish any such instruction. Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973); Williams v. Cobb, 90 N.M. 638, 567 P.2d 487 (Ct.App. 1977), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977); State v. Scott, 90 N.M. 256, 561 P.2d 1349 (Ct.App. 1977), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 637, 567 P.2d 486 (1977). However, the Supreme Court in appropriate cases is charged with the duty to amend, modify or abolish uniform jury instructions. Also, a trial court may refuse to use a uniform jury instruction as published, if "under the facts or circumstances of the particular case the published Uniform Jury Instruction is erroneous or otherwise improper, and the trial court so finds and states of record its reasons." Section 21-1-1, rule 51(1)(c), N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl. 1970). *1043 We are of the opinion that the use of the words "any one of" in the last paragraph of N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.1 is erroneous in a case such as this where more than one negligent act is alleged by the plaintiff and the several acts of negligence are included by the court in the instruction. Under the instruction given by the trial court, a verdict for defendants could result if the jury found that any one of plaintiff's claims of negligence was not proved, notwithstanding that the plaintiff is only required to prove one of several claims of negligence in order to recover, absent, of course, a proven defense thereto. In cases where multiple claims of negligence are alleged, as in this case, and sufficient evidence is introduced to submit those claims to the jury, as the trial court found here, the words "any one of" should be excluded from N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.1. Under these circumstances the last paragraph of the instruction given by the trial court should be modified to read: With reference to defendants' contention that the error was harmless since plaintiff has not shown prejudice, we stated in Jewell v. Seidenberg, 82 N.M. 120, 124, 477 P.2d 296, 300 (1970): See also Anderson v. Welsh, 86 N.M. 767, 527 P.2d 1079 (Ct.App. 1974). Although Jewell, supra, involved a failure to give a uniform jury instruction, the rationale of that case applies to a challenged instruction given by the court. In view of the importance of N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 3.1 and viewing the record below in the light of the standards of fair trial announced in Jewell, the giving of the instruction without excluding the words "any one of" was prejudicial to appellant and constitutes reversible error. The trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. IT IS SO ORDERED. McMANUS, C.J., and SOSA, EASLEY and PAYNE, JJ., concur.