Case Title: WEST AMERICA HOUSING CORPORATION, a Wyoming corporation, and JEANNE JOELSON V. VANDON, INC., a Wyoming corporation, and DONALD PEARSON, also known as DONALD E. PEARSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0071

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
WEST AMERICA HOUSING CORPORATION, a Wyoming corporation, and JEANNE JOELSON V. VANDON, INC., a Wyoming corporation, and DONALD PEARSON, also known as DONALD E. PEARSON2008 WY 62185 P.3d 19Case Number: S-07-0071Decided: 06/05/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
WEST 
AMERICA HOUSING CORPORATION, a Wyoming corporation, and JEANNE 
JOELSON,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.VANDON, INC., a 
Wyoming 
corporation, and DONALD PEARSON, also known as DONALD E. 
PEARSON,Appellees(Defendants).

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Lynn 
Boak, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

William 
W. Harden, Casper, 
Wyoming.   

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      West America 
Housing Corporation and its president Jeanne Joelson (hereinafter referred to as 
"West America" unless identification of a specific party is necessary) filed 
suit after Vandon, Inc. declared two contracts for deed it had executed with 
West America to be forfeited.  After 
a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Vandon and its 
president Donald Pearson (hereinafter referred to as "Vandon" unless 
identification of a specific party is necessary).  West 
America appealed, claiming that the trial was procedurally 
unfair.    

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm.  

            

ISSUES

            

[¶3]      West America presents the following issues on 
appeal:

 
 

I.                    
Whether 
the attempt at impeachment pursuant to Wyoming Rules of Evidence, Rule 609, 
fatally prejudiced the Plaintiff Jeanne Joelson[.]

 
 

II.                  
Whether 
the testimony of Donald Pearson was probative of any material facts or issues in 
the case and whether the trial court erred in receiving any documentary evidence 
based on his testimony.  

 
 
Vandon 
restates the issues as:

 
 

I.                    
Whether 
the district court's findings of fact[] and conclusions of law were clearly 
erroneous when it found against appellants and for 
appellees.

 
 

II.                  
Whether 
the record reflects any prejudice whatsoever against appellant[s] warranting a 
re-hearing of the matter[.]

 
 

III.                
Whether 
or not appellant[s'] appeal is frivolous and sanctions should issue[.]  

 
 
FACTS

            

[¶4]      On January 18, 
2001, Vandon, as seller, and West America, as buyer, entered into a contract for 
deed on property in Converse 
County, Wyoming.  West 
America provided a small down payment and agreed to pay Vandon 
$298.01 per month in principal and interest, plus a "property tax installment" 
of $55.00 per month.  West America also agreed to "maintain sufficient Hazard 
Insurance to cover the Seller's interest in the property with a loss payable 
clause in the Seller's name."  The 
contract stated that, in the event of a default, Vandon would give notice and 
West America would have 30 days to cure.  If West 
America failed to cure the default, the contract could be declared 
to be forfeited and Vandon could take immediate possession of the property.  In the event of forfeiture, West America's principal and interest payments would "be 
considered as rent paid for the use of the said property."      

 

[¶5]      On March 9, 2002, 
Vandon and West America entered into a similar contract for deed on property 
located in Natrona County, 
Wyoming.  That contract called for monthly 
principal and interest payments of $758.20 "plus an amount of One Hundred, Five 
dollars per month to cover the existing cost of ha[z]ard insurance and the 
property taxes as they are levied by th[e] Natrona County Assessors 
Office."  The contract also 
recognized that the costs of insurance and taxes could fluctuate on a periodic 
basis.    

 
 
[¶6]      Paragraph 3a of 
the NatronaCounty contract pertained to hazard insurance and 
taxes and was more detailed than the ConverseCounty contract:

 
 
(3a)     The Buyer agrees to 
maintain sufficient hazard insurance to cover the Seller[']s interest with a 
loss payable clause in the Seller[']s name.  After the current hazard insurance 
becomes due and payable, the Seller will pay the additional costs of insurance 
out of the funds which will begin to accumulate with the first payment on the 
outstanding indebtedness, and the Seller will also pay the property taxes as 
they become due from the above mentioned amount of ONE HUNDRED and FIVE DOLLARS 
($105.00) per month to be added to the amount of the Principal and Interest 
Payment. 

 
 
The 
default provisions were similar to those contained in the ConverseCounty contract.  Both contracts also stated that Vandon's 
acceptance of payments from West America 
different from the contract terms would "in no way alter the terms of the 
contract as to the forfeiture herein mentioned."   

 
 
[¶7]      On June 15, 2005, 
Vandon's attorney sent notices to West America stating that the ConverseCounty and NatronaCounty contracts were in default.  The notice pertaining to the ConverseCounty contract identified the specific 
instances of default as:

 
 

1.                  
[T]he 
additional amount of $55.00 per month to cover the existing cost of property tax 
has not been timely made, and there is currently due and owing $1,323.07. (See 
Contract Re-Cap).

 
 

2.                  
Failure 
to maintain hazard insurance on said property pursuant to paragraph (3a).  

 
 
The 
"Contract Re-cap" stated:

 
 

I.                    
Taxes:  Required payments for taxes is $55.00 
per month, times 12 months, or a total of $660.00 per year.  Buyer is credited for payment of $271.93 
in 2003, leaving an unpaid balance for taxes in the amount of $388.07.  No payments were made for taxes pursuant 
to the contract in 2004 or 2005 for a total of $935.00. 

 

II.                  
Pursuant 
to paragraph (3a) of the contract, Buyer is to maintain hazard insurance with 
Seller named on the loss payable clause, and this was not done for any 
years.    

 
 
Vandon 
demanded payment and an insurance binder showing it as a named insured in the 
loss payable clause on or before July 15, 2005.      

 
 
[¶8]      The default 
notice on the NatronaCounty property stated that West 
America had failed to pay the $105 per month amount to cover 
insurance and property taxes and "there is currently due and owing 
$3,146.74."  The "Contract Re-Cap" 
stated that Vandon had calculated the amount due by multiplying the $105.00 
monthly tax payment by the term of the contract through the end of May 2005, and 
giving West America credit for taxes paid 
directly to the county treasurer.   
Vandon again demanded payment on or before July 15, 2005.    

 
 
[¶9]      On July 12, 2005, 
counsel for West America replied to the notices of default and tendered a check 
in the amount of $724.81 for payment of the taxes on the NatronaCounty property and a check in the amount of $559.79 
for payment of the taxes on the ConverseCounty property.  The letter accompanying the checks also 
indicated that "a copy of the proof of insurance and proof of taxes on both 
properties" was enclosed.  Vandon 
rejected the tendered payments as cure for the defaults on the two contracts and 
demanded that West America vacate the 
properties.  

 
 
[¶10]   On September 8, 2005, the Natrona 
County Circuit Court signed a writ of restitution restoring possession of the 
NatronaCounty property to 
Vandon.  On September 12, 2005, 
West America filed a "Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment, Injunction, Breach of Contract, Unjust Enrichment, Trespass and 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress."  Vandon apparently counterclaimed to have 
title to the properties quieted to it.    

 
 
[¶11]   The district court conducted a 
bench trial on February 5 and 6, 2007.  
At the conclusion of the trial, the court entered oral findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in favor of Vandon.  
After a written order was filed, West 
America appealed.    

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
            
1.         
Impeachment 
Evidence

 
 
[¶12]   
West America does not challenge the 
district court's findings of fact.  
Instead, in its first issue, it claims it was prejudiced when the 
district court heard evidence about felony charges against Ms. Joelson in 
Arizona.  The district court's decisions on the 
admissibility of evidence, including rulings regarding the admissibility of 
convictions to impeach a witness's credibility, are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.    See generally, Miller v. State, 2003 WY 55, ¶¶ 10, 
12-16, 67 P.3d 1191, 1194-96 (Wyo. 2003). 

 
 
            
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria.'  In determining whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably 
have concluded as it did.'  In the 
context of alleged abuse of discretion, the assessment of the circumstances in 
the case is tantamount to an evaluation of whether the evidence is sufficient to 
support the decision of the district court.  In review of the evidence, we accept the 
successful party's submissions, granting them every favorable inference fairly 
to be drawn and leaving out of consideration conflicting evidence presented by 
the unsuccessful party.  

 
 

Morris 
v. Morris, 2007 WY 
174, ¶ 5, 170 P.3d 86, 88-89 (Wyo. 2007), quoting CJ v. SA, 2006 WY 49, ¶ 5, 132 P.3d 196, 
199 (Wyo. 2006) (other citations omitted).

 
 
[¶13]   The statement challenged by 
West America was made by Vandon's attorney 
during a colloquy with the district court.  
We quote the statement (identified in bold type) in context, as 
follows:

 
 
(Proceedings 
previously transcribed in transcript entitled "Transcript of Excerpt of Trial 
Proceedings," page 2, line 14 through[] page 4, line 3.)  

 
 
            
THE COURT:            
Mr. Harden, your response.

 
 
            
MR. HARDEN:         Your Honor, there are four felony charges 
against Ms. Joelson in Arizona that were filed about July 15th, 2005.  
Ms. Joelson has entered a guilty plea to those charges.  There has not been a sentencing.   The sentencing is scheduled  it's 
been scheduled and rescheduled.  The 
reason for that is because she was extradited to Wyoming on three felony 
charges.

 
 
            
MR. EDMONDS:      
Same objection even as to that, Your Honor.

 
 
. . . . 

 
 
            
THE COURT:            
Let me interrupt.  It seems 
like there are two things.  One is 
the topic on which this was raised was sort of a discussion of place of 
residence as I recall, and then you were referencing some proceedings in the 
Arizona 
criminal cases.  My thought would be 
that you could pursue that line of questioning without getting into what the 
charges were or whether they're being offered for impeachment purposes if you 
just make reference to that.

            
Second, under Rule 609, if I agree with you, you're limited to ask the 
three or four questions, that is, have you been convicted of a felony, what is 
the felony or felony offenses, where was it at, and what was the disposition of 
the case.  And so I think for 
impeachment purposes, the inquiry is limited to those topics. 

            
So I guess what I'd say is we'll go on to the next question, and if 
you're really looking back at further things that happened in the criminal case 
proceedings, let's stay away from referencing what the charges were and maybe 
make any inquiry that way.  And then 
if you're going to impeachment, go ahead with the direct questions if you 
would.

 
 
            
(Proceedings previously transcribed in transcript entitled "Transcript of 
Excerpt of Trial Proceedings," page 4, line 6 through page 6, line 1).   

 
 
(emphasis 
added). 

 

[¶14]   The excerpts referred to in the 
quote are not included in the record on appeal; consequently, we do not have the 
full context of the discussion.  It 
appears, however, that the district court essentially upheld West America's objection, although it apparently would 
have allowed Vandon to ask direct questions about the convictions, subject to 
further review by the court.  
West America does not direct us to any 
further testimony at the trial specifically referencing Ms. Joelson's criminal 
convictions.  

 
 
[¶15]   Nevertheless, West America claims that the statement by Vandon's 
attorney "fatally prejudiced" its 
case.  We do not agree.  After a bench trial, we presume 
the judge disregarded any inadmissible evidence in making a decision.  Donnelly v. Donnelly, 2004 WY 72, ¶ 13, 
92 P.3d 298, 302 (Wyo. 2004).  Even 
if the evidence of Ms. Joelson's criminal history was inadmissible, a question 
we do not need to decide, there is nothing in the judge's decision indicating 
that he took Ms. Joelson's criminal history into account in rendering his 
decision.  Consequently, we reject 
West America's claim that its case was fatally 
prejudiced when Vandon's attorney briefly referenced Ms. Joelson's criminal 
history.

 
 
2.         
Mr. Pearson's Testimony

 
 
[¶16]   In its second issue, West America claims that Mr. Pearson's testimony was not probative of any material 
facts or issues in the case and the trial court erred in receiving documentary 
evidence based on his testimony.  In 
support of its claim, West America points to 
parts of the transcript indicating that Mr. Pearson was confused during some of 
his direct examination.  Although 
West America's argument is not completely 
clear, it apparently claims that Mr. Pearson was not competent to testify.  

 
 
[¶17]   The general rule is that a person 
is competent to testify "if he has a sufficient understanding to receive, 
remember, and narrate impressions and is sensible to the obligations of the 
oath."   Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 
(Wyo. 
1984).  Failure to object to the 
competence of a witness at the time of the trial limits our review to plain 
error.  See, e.g., id. at 584.   In order to establish plain error, 
the appellant must satisfy a three-part test:

 
 
"* 
* * * First, the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as 
error.  Second, the party claiming 
that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated.  
Finally, that party must prove that a substantial right has been denied 
him and as a result he has been materially prejudiced. * * * *"'  

 
 

Id. 
(citations 
omitted).          

 
 
[¶18]   We recently considered another case 
involving Mr. Pearson, Ms. Joelson and West 
America.  West America Housing Corp. v. Pearson, 
2007 WY 184, 171 P.3d 539 (Wyo. 2007).  
We noted that Mr. Pearson's testimony in that case was somewhat 
unclear:  

 
 
At 
trial Pearson testified in his own behalf.  
Pearson was 84 years of age at that time (November 6, 2006), and his 
testimony was not always as coherent as might be desired.     

 
 

Id., 
¶ 
4, 171 P.3d  at 540.   
Nevertheless, we recognized that Mr. Pearson related some relevant 
evidence during his testimony.  
Id.  
 

 
 
[¶19]   The same conditions existed in this 
case.  Mr. Pearson did seem to be 
confused during some of his testimony.  
However, he was able to relate relevant information regarding this case 
and West America did not raise an objection 
regarding Mr. Pearson's competence during the trial.  On appeal, it does not offer any cogent 
argument or pertinent authority to establish it was plain error for the trial 
court to allow Mr. Pearson to testify.   

 
 
[¶20]   Moreover, we have examined the 
record and discovered that Mr. Pearson did not provide the foundation for any of 
Vandon's exhibits.  The parties 
stipulated to the admission of many of the exhibits at the beginning of the 
trial.  The district court admitted 
Vandon's other exhibits into evidence during other witness testimony.  Interestingly, West 
America did offer exhibits for admission during its cross 
examination of Mr. Pearson.  It, 
therefore, is surprising that it claims on appeal  he was not competent to provide the 
foundation for any exhibits.  Based 
upon these circumstances, we summarily reject West 
America's arguments.   

 
 
3.         
W.R.A.P. 10.05 Sanctions

 
 
[¶21]   Vandon requests that we grant 
sanctions in its favor pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05.  That rule states in relevant 
part:

If 
the court certifies there was no reasonable cause for the appeal, a reasonable 
amount for attorneys' fees and damages to the appellee shall be fixed by the 
appellate court and taxed as part of the costs in the case.  The amount for attorneys' fees shall not 
be less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than five thousand dollars 
($5,000.00).  The amount for damages 
to the appellee shall not exceed two thousand dollars 
($2,000.00).

 
 
[¶22]   In general, "we are reluctant to 
grant sanctions and will do so only in those rare circumstances where an appeal 
lacks cogent argument, where there is an absence of pertinent authority to 
support the claims of error, and/or when there is a failure to adequately cite 
to the record." Amen, Inc. v. Barnard, 
938 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1997).   While this appeal certainly is not 
a paradigm of good appellate practice and the arguments presented by the 
appellants are not persuasive, we cannot say that it satisfies our stringent 
standards for granting sanctions under W.R.A.P.  10.05.  Consequently, we decline to do so.  

 
 
[¶23]   Affirmed.