Case Title: Lindquist v. Adams

Citation: 174 Vt. 179, 811 A.2d 173

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lindquist v. Adams (2001-178); 174 Vt. 179; 811 A.2d 173

[Filed 23-Aug-2002]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                No. 2001-178


  Evelyn Lindquist	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Rutland Superior Court


  Caryl T. Adams	                         May Term, 2002


  Richard W. Norton, J.

  James W. Swift and Abby C. Moskovitz of Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP,
    Middlebury, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Peter H. Banse of Banse & Banse, P.C., Manchester, for Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

        
       MORSE, J.   Caryl T. Adams appeals from a superior court order
  adopting a commissioners' report partitioning several parcels of land in
  the towns of Fair Haven and West Haven.  Adams argues on appeal that the
  commissioners failed to create a record in support of their report, in part
  due to their actions of undertaking independent investigations of the facts
  and failing to hold a contested hearing with both parties present, and that
  the commissioners' findings are not supported by the record such as it is. 
  Adams also argues that the trial court's order with regard to the
  commissioners' fees should be reversed as unreasonable.  Evelyn Lindquist
  cross-appeals, arguing 

 

  that the trial court erroneously denied her request that the cost of a
  survey relied upon by the commissioners be divided between the parties.  We
  reverse and remand.

       Caryl Adams and Evelyn Lindquist, brother and sister, each own a 50%
  interest in three parcels of land located in the towns of Fair Haven and
  West Haven.  In May 1997,  Lindquist brought an action for partition in
  superior court.  The court appointed three commissioners pursuant to 12
  V.S.A. § 5169, two of whom were selected by Lindquist and Adams, with the
  third selected by the two commissioners selected by the parties.

       On February 16, 1999, the court held a conference with both parties
  present, along with two of the commissioners.  The day of the conference,
  Lindquist filed a motion requesting that the court order a survey of the
  properties, splitting the cost between the parties.  At the conclusion of
  the conference, the court denied Lindquist's motion, holding that, if the
  commissioners subsequently decided a survey was necessary, they should
  notify the court and it would revisit the question.  The court also
  directed the commissioners not to have any ex parte contacts with the
  parties or third parties without notifying Lindquist and Adams and giving
  them an opportunity to be present for the taking of evidence. The court
  suggested the commissioners hold a meeting to determine what evidence would
  be submitted by the parties, whether they could agree to specific
  third-party contacts, whether a survey would be necessary, and whether any
  title work would be necessary to accomplish the partition.  It does not
  appear from the record that such a meeting was held; rather, the
  commissioners sent a letter to the parties soliciting documentary evidence
  and noting that the commissioners would be meeting later that month
  regarding the case.
   
       The next docket entry comes almost a year later, in January 2000,
  noting that a status conference had been scheduled in the case. 
  Apparently, in the intervening time, the commissioners 

 

  had undertaken an independent investigation of the properties, including
  walking the properties on their own, contacting various municipal boards
  regarding the development potential of the parcels, and speaking to an
  individual who had logged portions of the properties in 1995.  The
  commissioners sent a status report to the court indicating their ongoing
  investigations and noting that a survey of at least part of one of the
  properties was necessary to complete the division of the parcels.  The
  status conference was then canceled.  In September 2000, the commissioners
  wrote a letter to the parties' attorneys seeking their legal opinions
  regarding a potential right-of-way to one of the parcels that they had
  uncovered when undertaking a title search of the property.  It is not clear
  how or whether the attorneys responded.  Also some time prior to the
  commissioners' final report, it appears that Lindquist independently
  commissioned a survey of two of the parcels, which she then provided to the
  commissioners. 

       In January 2001, the commissioners submitted their final report to the
  court dividing the properties.  Adams objected to the report and requested
  that the matter be recommitted to the commissioners for further
  proceedings.  Specifically, he contested several specific findings, noting
  that the commissioners had either not taken independent evidence on the
  matters or had not notified him of the taking of such evidence.  He also
  argued that the commissioners had failed to make adequate and detailed
  findings to support their decision so as to allow for review, and, finally,
  that the commissioners had "held no hearings and produced no record of
  their proceedings," thus precluding review. 
   
       The court held a hearing on the matter on February 15, 2001.  After
  hearing argument from both parties, the court concluded that the burden was
  on Adams to demonstrate that the findings by the commissioners were clearly
  erroneous and that it would take evidence from both parties on the 

 

  matter.  The court noted that the parties could call the commissioners in
  order to create a record in support of their findings.  Adams objected to
  the procedure, noting that there was no record to review to determine
  whether the commissioners' findings were supported and that the hearing
  before the trial court was not the place to establish such a record. Adams
  also objected generally to the commissioners giving evidence before the
  court. After the hearing, at which two of the commissioners testified, the
  court determined that Adams had not met his burden, and adopted the
  commissioners' report accordingly.  The court declined, however, to split
  the cost of the survey commissioned by Lindquist between the parties. 

       Lindquist drew up a proposed order, to which Adams objected, again
  arguing that the commissioners as fact-finders could not give evidence in
  support of their own report on appeal, and thus the report was not
  supported by any record evidence.   The court nevertheless decided to
  accept the commissioners' report and entered a final judgment doing so. 
  Both parties appeal from the order to this Court.

       Adams's primary argument on appeal is that the commissioners failed to
  create a record in support of their findings, and the report should not
  have been accepted by the superior court for that reason.  We agree that
  the report of the commissioners should have been rejected by the trial
  court in this case.
   
       As we have previously noted, V.R.C.P. 53 establishes the procedure to
  be followed once the court has appointed commissioners to help effect a
  partition.  Messier v. Messier, 140 Vt. 308, 312,