Case Title: DAVID LARRY ABEYTA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
DAVID LARRY ABEYTA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 142167 P.3d 1Case Number: 06-123Decided: 09/05/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
DAVID 
LARRY ABEYTA,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

D. 
Terry Rogers, InterimState Public Defender; and Donna D. 
Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The Appellant, 
David Larry Abeyta, was arrested and charged with three separate criminal drug 
charges after a search of his residence revealed drugs and drug 
paraphernalia.  Abeyta filed a 
motion to suppress this evidence asserting that the affidavit submitted in 
support of the application for the search warrant failed to demonstrate probable 
cause.  The motion to suppress was 
denied and Abeyta entered a conditional guilty plea pending the outcome of this 
appeal.  We affirm. 

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      The sole issue 
before this Court is whether the affidavit executed in support of the search 
warrant provided the warrant-issuing judicial officer with a substantial basis 
for concluding that probable cause existed to search Abeyta's 
residence.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On May 4, 2005, Officer William Hill of the 
Rawlins Police Department requested a warrant to search Abeyta's home.  The affidavit attached in support of the 
warrant application read, in its entirety, as follows: 

 
 
AFFIDAVIT

 
 
1.     I, William Hill, of 
lawful age, being first duly sworn upon oath according to law, depose and say as 
follows:

 
 
2.     On or about April 20, 
2005, Rawlins Police Department received information that Larry Abeyta was 
selling methamphetamine from his house located at 517 McKinley St., 
which is situated within three hundred feet of PershingElementary 
School in Rawlins, Carbon County, Wyoming.

 
 
3.     After receiving this 
information, the Rawlins Police Department began to watch the above-described 
house to determine whether drug activity was afoot.

 
 
4.     Over the past two 
weeks, or so, I, together with other law enforcement officers in the area, have 
observed numerous known drug users and other individuals frequenting the house 
located at 517 McKinley Street.  
These individuals have been observed entering the house, remaining there 
for short visits of approximately 5-10 minutes and then 
leaving.

 
 
5.     On a number of these 
occasions, officers have observed the above-described persons walking from the 
house to a shed situated in the back yard of the same property, turning on a 
light, spending a few minutes inside the shed, and then returning to the house 
for a few more minutes, and then leaving the premises.

 
 
6.     On or about May 1, 
2005, Rawlins Police Officer Hooper received information that Larry Abeyta had 
offered to provide a confidential informant with methamphetamine, and that Mr. 
Abeyta always carries in his waistband a silver, 9mm semi-automatic handgun. 
 Mr. Abeyta told the confidential 
informant that he was aware the police department is watching him and his 
residence.

 
 
7.     During the late evening 
hours of May 3, 2005, your Affiant was parked outside the house located at 517 
McKinley.  During this time, I 
noticed a dark-colored car which appeared to be a Ford, pull into a vacant lot 
situated to the West of the house.  
I watched as the vehicle lights were shut off, and approximately 20 
seconds later, the person I believed to be the driver of this vehicle entered 
the front door of 517 McKinley 
Street.  
Approximately 10 minutes later, I observed this same person leave the 
residence, and run from the front door toward the vacant lot where the 
dark-colored car had been parked.  I 
then observed the dark-colored car start up and drive off, heading South on 
McKinley 
Street, then turning to travel East on Center Street.  The vehicle then turned to travel North 
on Washington 
Street.  
At that point, I informed officers that the vehicle had left the area and 
described the vehicle.  At this same 
time, the vehicle was turning in front of Rawlins Police Department Officer 
Reynolds, and was observed to be traveling 28 miles per hour in a fifteen mile 
per hour zone.

 
 
8.     Officer Reynolds placed 
a stop on the vehicle for exceeding the posted speed limit.  The driver told the officer his name was 
Charles Herbst with a date of birth of 9/20/58.  Officer Reynolds was advised by dispatch 
that there was an active warrant for Charles Herbst.

 
 
9.     Lieutenant Eric Ford of 
the Rawlins Police Department and Sheriff's Deputy Jeff Walton were assisting 
Officer Reynolds and knew from prior contact with the individual that his 
identity was not Charles Herbst, but was actually David M. Thomas.  He was then arrested for interference 
with a police officer.

 
 
10.   While inventorying the contents of 
Mr. Thomas's wallet, a white paper bindle containing what appeared to be a small 
amount of crystallized methamphetamine was found.  The substance in the bindle was tested 
with a methamphetamine NIK test kit, showing a presumptive positive result for 
methamphetamine.

 
 
11.   Mr. Thomas claimed that he had come 
from Stagecoach apartments, and that he found the bindle on the ground in his 
shop earlier in the day.  It is 
known that Mr. Thomas has no shop, and in fact, received permission on Monday, 
May 2, 2005, from District Court Judge Wade Waldrip to move to Cheyenne, where 
he had obtained employment with Sky Harbor Air Service, being unemployed here in 
Rawlins.  Additionally, your Affiant 
personally observed him to have come from 517 McKinley Street, and that he had not 
come from the Stagecoach Apartments.

 
 
12.   Your Affiant is aware that David M. 
Thomas is presently out on bond for a felony charge of concealing or disposing 
of stolen property in Criminal Docket No. CR-2005-044, in the District Court for 
the Second Judicial District, State of Wyoming.

 
 
FURTHER 
YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.

 
 
Based 
on the above affidavit, a search warrant was issued on May 4, 2005, and executed 
that same day.  Upon searching 
Abeyta's residence, officers discovered a measurable amount of crystal 
methamphetamine on a digital scale and a marijuana pipe with marijuana residue 
in it next to the bed where a five-year-old child was sleeping.  Officers also discovered, among other 
items, additional drugs, scales and other drug paraphernalia, weapons  
including a handgun and ammunition, large quantities of cash, a video 
surveillance system, and a police scanner.

 
 
[¶4]      Abeyta was 
charged with possession of methamphetamine, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(c)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004), possession of cocaine, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004), and endangering a 
child with methamphetamine, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405(c) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2004).  On October 
4, 2005, Abeyta filed a motion to suppress evidence wherein he asserted that the 
affidavit attached to the search warrant was not sufficient to establish 
probable cause.  The matter was 
assigned to the circuit court judge for the limited purpose of deciding Abeyta's 
motion to suppress.  A hearing was 
held on October 26, 2005, and an order denying Abeyta's motion to suppress was 
entered on November 14, 2005.

 
 
[¶5]      On November 22, 2005, Abeyta changed his 
not-guilty plea to a conditional guilty plea.  Abeyta was sentenced to three to seven 
years in prison for the possession of methamphetamine charge, three to five for 
the possession of cocaine charge, and three to five for the endangering a child 
with methamphetamine charge, with all periods of incarceration running 
concurrently.

 
 
[¶6]      Abeyta timely appealed the judgment and 
sentence.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      When reviewing 
the adequacy of a probable cause affidavit, we have said 
that:

 
 
The 
duty of reviewing courts is simply to ensure that the warrant-issuing judicial 
officer had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. As 
both our Court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized, the 
resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely 
determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.

 
 

Rohda 
v. State, 2006 
WY 120, ¶ 4, 142 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      The legal 
standards applied when reviewing the sufficiency of a probable cause affidavit 
are well established.  Both the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Wyoming Constitution 
Article 1, § 4, protect citizens against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  Our state provision, 
however, is stronger because it requires "the probable cause finding for 
issuance of a search warrant to be supported by affidavit."  Hixson v. State, 2001 WY 99, ¶ 5, 33 P.3d 154, 156 (Wyo. 2001) (footnote omitted).1  We 
have held that the affidavit requirement strengthens the Wyoming citizen's rights 
by creating a permanent record.  
Id.  
Wyoming Constitution Article 1, § 4 provides:

 
 
The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

 
 
[¶9]      When reviewing whether a particular affidavit 
provided probable cause for issuance of a search warrant, this Court begins with 
the presumption that an affidavit presented in support of a search 
warrant is valid.  Page v. 
State, 2003 WY 23, ¶ 9, 63 P.3d 904, 909 (Wyo. 2003).  Search 
warrant affidavits are tested by much less vigorous standards than those 
governing the admissibility of evidence at trial, and because of the preference 
for warrants, and the desire to encourage law enforcement personnel to seek 
warrants, any doubt should be resolved by sustaining the search.  Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 
94 (Wyo. 
1993).  

            

[¶10]   The warrant-issuing judicial 
officer must examine the affidavit to determine whether the factual statements 
contained therein provide probable cause to support the issuance of a search 
warrant.

 
 
The 
probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification 
into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality 
of the circumstances. Probable cause

 
 
is 
a "practical, nontechnical conception."  Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 
69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949).  "In dealing with probable cause, . . . as 
the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.  These are not technical; they are the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act."  Id., at 175, 69 S. Ct.  at 
1310.

* 
* * *

 
 
[P]robable 
cause is a fluid concept -- turning on the assessment of probabilities in 
particular factual contexts -- not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat 
set of legal rules.

 
 

Schirber 
v. State, 
2006 WY 121, ¶ 6, 142 P.3d 1169, 1172-73 (Wyo. 
2006) (some citations omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
231-32, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328-29, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)).  Ultimately the "test for determining the 
existence of probable cause is whether the factual situation described in the 
affidavit is sufficient to cause a reasonably cautious or prudent person to 
believe that a crime was being committed or that one had been committed."  TJS v. State, 2005 WY 68, ¶ 12, 113 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
[¶11]   When presented with an application 
for a search warrant, the warrant-issuing judicial officer applies a "totality of circumstances" 
analysis in making an independent judgment whether probable cause exists to 
support the issuance of the warrant. Crackenberger v. State, 2006 WY 162, ¶ 
7, 149 P.3d 465, 470 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
In 
making that independent judgment, the judicial officer is limited to the four 
corners of the supporting affidavit.  Page [v. State], [2003 WY 23], ¶ 9, 
63 P.3d [904,] 909 [(Wyo. 2003)].  The "totality of circumstances" analysis 
requires the judicial officer simply "to make a practical, common sense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 
including the veracity' and basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay 
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place."  Gates, 462 U.S.  at 238, 103 S. Ct.  at 2332; see Bonsness 
[v. State], 672 P.2d 
[1291,] 1293 [(Wyo. 1983)].

 
 

Rohda, 
¶ 5, 142 P.3d  at 1159.  

 
 

[¶12]   With those principles in mind, we 
turn to the specific issues presented in this appeal.  Abeyta points to a number of isolated 
portions of the affidavit that he claims are defective and contends that as a 
result of these alleged deficiencies, the affidavit fails to support a finding 
of probable cause to search his home.  
Before examining Abeyta's individual arguments in detail, we note that 
Abeyta's paragraph-by-paragraph analysis is inconsistent with the "totality of 
the circumstances" approach requiring us to "consider all of the material 
evidence together, and not in piecemeal fashion." Rhoda, 
¶ 11, 142 P.3d  at 1164.

 
 
[¶13]   Abeyta's first argument relates to 
the following statement in paragraph 2 of the affidavit: "[o]n or about April 
20, 2005, Rawlins Police Department received information that Larry Abeyta was 
selling methamphetamine from his house located at 517 McKinley 
St."  
Abeyta contends that the source of the "information" regarding Abeyta 
selling methamphetamine is unverified and therefore the judicial officer had no 
means of assessing the veracity of this information.  Abeyta points to Hixson v. State, 2001 WY 99, 33 P.3d 154 
(Wyo. 2001) in support of his contention.  
In Hixson, the affidavit 
mentioned an investigation but failed to state who conducted the investigation 
or attribute any details surrounding the investigation to any person.  Id. 
at ¶ 8, at 157-58.  We concluded 
that, because the affidavit did not identify the source of the information 
contained therein, it would have been impossible for the judicial officer to 
assess the reliability of those individuals.  Id. 
at ¶ 11, at 158-59.  

 
 
[¶14]   The facts presented in the present 
affidavit are distinguishable from those in Hixson.2  To begin, the factual information 
missing from the affidavit in Hixson 
was central to the probable cause determination  without knowing who 
conducted the investigation, it was impossible to determine whether the 
statements regarding the investigation were reliable.  Here, however, the statement that the 
police department received information that Abeyta was selling drugs is not an 
important or even necessary element of the probable cause equation.  That statement appears to have been 
included primarily to provide context for the officers' subsequent actions in 
observing Abeyta's property.  Also, 
unlike the affidavit in Hixson, the 
affidavit here contains independent reliable and verifiable information 
supporting a finding of probable cause.  

 
 

[¶15]   In his next argument, Abeyta takes 
exception to the veracity and reliability of the statement in paragraph 4 that 
Officer Hill and other law enforcement officers observed "numerous known drug 
users" frequenting Abeyta's house.  
Abeyta insists this statement is a barebones conclusion that does not 
support a probable cause finding.  
We agree.  We have often said 
that an affidavit "must include more than bare conclusions of the affiant."  Bouch v. State, 2006 WY 122, ¶ 13, 143 P.3d 643, 648 (Wyo. 2006); TJS, 
¶ 
12, 113 P.3d  at 1057; Cordova v. State, 2001 WY 96, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d 142, 148 (Wyo. 2001). 

 
 
[¶16]   We recognize the lack of 
corroboration supporting the "known drug users" statement.  The affidavit does not contain the names 
or other identifying characteristics of those individuals, nor does it state how 
the affiant was aware that these individuals were drug users.  If the warrant-issuing officer were 
relying upon this information alone, there would be no substantial basis for a 
probable cause finding.  However, 
the law does not require that an affidavit be absolutely devoid of conclusory 
statements; rather, the law requires that the affidavit "must include more than bare conclusions of the 
affiant."  Cordova, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d  at 148 (emphasis 
added).  Under the totality of the 
circumstances approach, we cannot evaluate the entire affidavit based on one 
isolated unverified statement.  Instead, we must examine the entire 
affidavit and determine whether, based on all the information contained therein, 
the warrant-issuing officer had a substantial basis for concluding that probable 
cause existed.  Therefore, while we 
agree that the "known drug users" statement lacked a proper factual foundation, 
we must examine the remaining portions of the affidavit to determine whether, 
without that statement, a substantial basis for the probable cause finding 
remains.  

 
 
[¶17]   In Abeyta's next argument, he 
points to statements contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the affidavit.  Those paragraphs detail officers' 
observations of individuals entering the house or shed situated in back of 
Abeyta's house and remaining there for a short period of time (5-10 minutes) and 
then leaving.  Abeyta asserts that 
these observations do not support a probable cause finding as there is no 
description of the specific nature of the activity occurring during those 
visits.    

 
 
[¶18]   These firsthand observations of 
Officer Hill are presumed reliable. 

 
 
The 
affiant law enforcement officer may include in his affidavit the raw data of his 
own sense perception, that is, what he saw, heard, or smelled firsthand. This 
firsthand information constitutes the affiant's basis of knowledge  how he 
acquired his information. From affiant's firsthand information, the judicial 
officer may draw conclusions about the existence or not of probable cause. With 
respect to the affiant's veracity or reliability, the judicial officer relies on 
the affiant's oath, with its sanctions of perjury, which is an integral part of 
the affiant's affidavit.

 
 

Rohda, 
¶ 
7, 142 P.3d  at 1159.  Likewise, when 
the affiant is reporting the firsthand observation of a fellow law enforcement 
officer, "courts hold that such an 
officer is presumed truthful or reliable and, therefore, no special showing of 
veracity or reliability is necessary." Id. 
at ¶ 8, at 1159.   

 
 

[¶19]   With regard to the nature of the 
activity observed, other courts have found that short-term visits by multiple 
individuals in a drug related investigation is a proper fact to be considered in 
evaluating the totality of the circumstances surrounding a probable cause 
determination.  United 
States 
v. Leon, 
379 F.3d 1024, 1028 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Rankin, 261 F.3d 735, 
739 (8th Cir. 2001); People v. 
Hill, 690 P.2d 856, 859 (Colo. 1984).  As noted previously, reasonable 
conclusion may be drawn from the firsthand observations of law enforcement 
officers.  In drawing conclusions, 
the affidavit must be interpreted in a "commonsense and realistic fashion" 
resolving all doubts in favor of sustaining the search.  TJS, ¶ 10, 113 P.3d  at 1057.  We have held that, when considering the 
firsthand observations of law enforcement officers, "a magistrate is entitled to rely upon 
practical considerations of everyday life."  Guerra v. State, 897 P.2d 447, 
456 (Wyo. 
1995).  

 
 
[¶20]   Abeyta contends that multiple short 
visits observed by the law enforcement officers were never verified to be in 
furtherance of illicit activity and could have easily been for purposes of 
innocent conduct, such as the legal sale of personal property.  While this may be true, in light of the 
other facts set forth in the affidavit and the above-articulated standards by 
which we must review affidavits, we hold that the officers' statements regarding 
their observations, and any reasonable conclusions that could be drawn 
therefrom, were proper factors to be considered in evaluating the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the probable cause question.  See supra ¶¶ 7-11.

 
 
[¶21]   Next, Abeyta asserts information 
provided by a confidential informant, detailed in paragraph 6 of the affidavit, 
was never attested to as being given by reliable informants or corroborated by 
the officer's personal knowledge.  
With regard to the confidential informant, the affidavit 
provided:

 
 
6.         
On or about May 1, 2005, Rawlins Police Officer Hooper received 
information that Larry Abeyta had offered to provide a confidential informant 
with methamphetamine, and that Mr. Abeyta always carries in his waistband a 
silver, 9mm semi-automatic handgun.  
Mr. Abeyta told the confidential informant that he was aware the police 
department is watching him and his residence.  

 
 
[¶22]   Abeyta claims that the affidavit 
fails to provide information from which the warrant-issuing judicial officer 
could assess the veracity and basis of knowledge of the informant.  With regard to the reliability and 
veracity of confidential informants, we have said:

 
 
When 
the secondary source person is a confidential informant, the veracity or 
reliability requirement is usually met by the recitation in the affiant's 
affidavit by either the primary source affiant or the secondary source law 
enforcement officer of previous instances in which the law enforcement officer 
obtained information from the confidential informant that led to arrests or 
convictions.  In the absence of such 
a recitation, an acceptable substitute recognized by courts is the confidential 
informant's admission of activities against his penal interests contained in the 
information provided. With respect to the secondary source person's basis of 
knowledge, the affiant's affidavit must contain the raw data of that person's 
sense perception  what that person saw, heard, or smelled firsthand.  It is from that secondary source's 
firsthand knowledge that the judicial officer will be able to draw conclusions 
about the existence or not of probable cause. If the affidavit fails to show how 
the secondary source person acquired his information, courts have applied the 
notion of "self-verifying detail" to cure such a failure. Simply stated, the 
secondary source person's information is considered "self-verifying" if it 
describes the warrant-target's criminal activity in such sufficient detail that 
the judicial officer reasonably may know that he is relying on information more 
substantial than a casual rumor or an accusation based merely on general 
reputation.

 
 

Rohda, 
¶ 8, 142 P.3d  at 1160.  We have not 
adopted any rigid test for the level of factual specificity necessary to 
corroborate the information provided by a confidential informant.  We have simply said that the information 
from an informant must be based on more than mere "information and belief." 
 Cordova, ¶ 15, 33 P.3d  at 
149.

 
 
[¶23]   The affidavit here does not contain 
information regarding previous instances in which law enforcement officers 
obtained information from the informant that led to arrests or convictions, nor 
are there statements by the informant against his/her penal interests.  Nevertheless, we conclude that the 
information provided by the confidential informant contains enough 
"self-verifying detail" to cure this failure.  The confidential informant did not tell 
the officers that he/she believed Abeyta was a drug dealer, or that he/she had 
heard Abeyta sold drugs; instead, the informant specifically stated that Abeyta 
had offered to provide him/her methamphetamine.  Additionally, the informant provided 
specific detail regarding the color, caliber, type and location of a handgun 
Abeyta carried with him.  Finally, 
the informant stated that Abeyta was aware he was being watched by the police 
department.  

 
 
[¶24]   This detail, specifically 
describing Abeyta's criminal activity, strongly implies that the confidential 
informant had firsthand knowledge of what he/she was reporting.  Based on the information provided, the 
judicial officer could reasonably know that he was relying on something more 
substantial than a casual rumor or an accusation based merely on general 
reputation.  Thus, the confidential 
informant's report could have been properly considered as part of the totality 
of the circumstances showing probable cause. 

 
 
[¶25]   In Abeyta's final argument, he 
points to paragraphs 7-12 which describe an incident where a person recently 
leaving Abeyta's residence was arrested and in possession of 
methamphetamine.   Abeyta 
contends the factual information detailed in paragraphs 7-12 fails to provide a 
nexus between the place to be searched (Abeyta's house) and the evidence sought 
(drugs and drug paraphernalia).  
With regard to this "nexus" requirement we have 
said:

 
 
Probable cause justifying issuance of a search 
warrant involves a twofold finding.  First, the factual situation must be 
sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent person to believe that a 
crime was being committed or that one had been committed.  Second, there must be an adequate showing 
that the fruits of the crime or the evidence thereof are in the area or 
structure sought to be searched. Cordova, ¶ 12, 33 P.3d  at 148.  This second prong is often described as 
requiring a "nexus" between the contraband to be seized or the suspected 
criminal activity and the place to be searched. United 
States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 
1998). It is "necessary that there be established a sufficient nexus between (1) 
criminal activity, and (2) the things to be seized, and (3) the place to be 
searched."  Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 3.7(d), at 412 (4th ed.2004).

 
 

Bouch, 
¶ 15, 143 P.3d  at 
648.

 
 
[¶26]   Abeyta argues that the factual link 
between Abeyta's house and the methamphetamine eventually found on David M. 
Thomas was broken because there were no facts connecting the vehicle seen by the 
affiant at Abeyta's house to the vehicle eventually stopped.  We disagree.  Paragraph 7 of the affidavit details law 
enforcement officers' firsthand observations and interactions with Mr. Thomas, 
and in part reads as follows:

 
 

I 
then observed the dark-colored car start up and drive off, heading South on 
McKinley 
Street, turning to travel East on Center Street.  The vehicle then turned to travel North 
on Washington 
Street.  
At that point, I informed officers that the vehicle had left the area and 
described the vehicle.  At this same 
time, the vehicle was turning in front of Rawlins Police Department Officer 
Reynolds, and was observed to be traveling 28 miles per hour in a fifteen mile 
per hour zone.  

 
 
[¶27]   The affidavit indicates that 
Officer Hill maintained visual contact with Mr. Thomas' vehicle from the time it 
left Abeyta's residence until it was eventually stopped.  Abeyta apparently assumes that because 
Officer Hill informed officers that the vehicle had left the area, Officer Hill 
must have lost contact with the vehicle at that point.  This is not what the affidavit states; 
rather, the affidavit indicates that at the same time Officer Hill informed that 
the vehicle had left the area, he observed the vehicle turn in front of another 
police officer.  

 
 
[¶28]   Contrary to Abeyta's contention, 
the affidavit demonstrates that the vehicle that left Abeyta's house was the 
same vehicle eventually stopped.  
Therefore, there exists a sufficient factual nexus between the suspected 
criminal activity, the contraband to be seized, and the place to be searched. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶29]   Although one of the statements 
contained in the affidavit  the description of individuals as "known drug 
users"  lacked a sufficient factual basis to be considered reliable, this 
defect was not fatal to the affidavit as a whole.  Based on our review of the totality of 
the circumstances  as reflected within the four corners of the affidavit  we 
conclude that the factual information set forth therein provided a substantial 
basis for the warrant-issuing judicial officer's finding of probable cause.  Said another way, we conclude that, 
based on the information contained in the affidavit, a reasonably 
cautious and prudent person would believe there was a fair probability that a 
crime was being committed or had been committed at Abeyta's residence.  Therefore, we affirm the conviction and 
sentence. 

 
 
[¶30]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which contains no affidavit 
requirement, reads as follows:

The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.

 
 

2"The 
determination of probable cause must rest upon the factual showing in each case. 
Decided cases are helpful only in declaring the general rule, and are 
persuasive only insofar as they present similar facts[.]'"  Smith v. State, 557 P.2d 130, 
133 (Wyo. 
1976) (quoting Garhart v. United 
States, 157 F.2d 777, 779 (10th Cir. 1946)).