Case Title: Foster v. Jefferson County Board of Election Comm'rs

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jack FOSTER v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD of
ELECTION COMMISSIONERS, A Body Corporate; Don
A. Eilbott, Chairman of the Jefferson County
Board of Election Commissioners, In His
Individual and Official Capacity; Ruth
Parette, In Her Individual and Official
Capacity; City of Pine Bluff, A Municipal
Corporation; and Steve Dalrymple, In His
Official Capacity as Judge of the Municipal
Court of Pine Bluff

96-332                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 28, 1997


1.   Statutes -- special and local legislation defined. -- A legislative act
     is special if, by some inherent limitation or classification,
     it arbitrarily separates some person, place, or thing from
     those upon which, but for separation, it would operate; an act
     is local if it applies to any division or subdivision of the
     state less than the whole; nevertheless, the fact that a
     statute affects less than all of the state's population does
     not necessarily render it local or special; although a law may
     be limited in effect to only a few classifications, it is not
     necessarily special or local legislation if the classification
     is not arbitrary and bears a reasonable relation to the
     purpose of the law.

2.   Statutes -- presumption of constitutionality and rational relationship to
     legitimate governmental objective -- burden on challenger. -- The supreme
     court must presume legislation is constitutional and
     rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective;
     this presumption places the burden of proof on the party
     challenging the legislation to prove its unconstitutionality;
     all doubts will be resolved in favor of an act's
     constitutionality if it is possible to do so.

3.   Statutes -- local or special acts -- test for determining in context of
     administration of justice. -- Statutes designed to meet the
     judicial needs of an area on a nondiscriminatory basis are a
     part of a judicial system for the entire state and are not
     local or special within the meaning of Ark. Const. amend. 14,
     even though such statutes may apply only to individual
     counties, judicial districts or divisions within districts;
     the limited application of the statute must be
     nondiscriminatory and bear a reasonable relation to the
     subject matter of the legislation; in providing for a
     statewide judicial system, the legislature should strive to
     create a system that is as uniform as practical.

4.   Statutes -- Act 181 of 1955 bore reasonable relation to its purpose. --
     As challenger, appellant had the burden of proving that the
     limited application of Act 181 of 1955 bore no reasonable
     relation to the purpose of the legislation; there was evidence
     at trial that, prior to the passage of Act 181, residents of
     Jefferson County living outside Pine Bluff were paying part of
     the expenses of the Pine Bluff Municipal Court yet were not
     permitted to vote for the municipal judge; a rational basis
     for Act 181 was to remedy this inequity; where appellant
     offered no proof at trial showing a contrary purpose behind
     Act 181 and offered no proof that in 1955 other counties in
     the state faced a similar situation, in which residents lived
     outside the municipality, paid part of the expenses for the
     municipal court, and were precluded from voting for the
     municipal judge, the supreme court concluded that the
     application of Act 181 to Jefferson County bore a reasonable
     relation to its purpose, which was to allow those Jefferson
     County residents whose taxes helped fund the Pine Bluff
     Municipal Court the opportunity to vote and thus be
     represented in the election for municipal judge.

5.   Statutes -- appellant offered no proof that limited application of Act 181
     was discriminatory -- constitutionality of act upheld. -- Appellant
     failed to show that the limited application of Act 181 to
     Jefferson County was discriminatory, having offered no proof
     at trial that any other county had residents whose tax dollars
     were funding the municipal courts but were unable to vote and
     having failed to demonstrate that Act 181 provided an
     alternate procedure for selecting municipal judges; because
     appellant failed to satisfy both prongs of the test for
     determining whether an act is local or special legislation,
     the supreme court declined to hold that Act 181 is
     unconstitutional.     

6.   Appeal & error -- absence of ruling constituted waiver of civil-rights
     issue on appeal. -- Where appellant contended that Act 181 of
     1955 violated the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, codified
     at Ark. Code Ann.  16-123-101 to -108 (Supp. 1995), it was
     appellant's burden to obtain a ruling from the chancellor, and
     the absence of such a ruling constituted a waiver of this
     issue on appeal.

7.   Constitutional law -- mere speculation does not equate to proof of racial
     motive or disparate impact. -- Mere speculation does not equate to
     proof of racial motive behind or disparate impact of a
     legislative act.  


     Appeal from Jefferson Chancery Court; Leon N. Jamison,
Chancellor; affirmed.
     Bowden Law Firm, by: David O. Bowden, for appellant.
     Joe Childers, Pine Bluff Ass't City Att'y, for appellees.

     W.H. "Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
     The subject of this appeal is Act 181 of 1955.  Section 1 of
the Act provides as follows:
          From and after the passage of this Act, the office
     of Municipal Judge in any Municipal Court in counties
     having a population of not more than 76,100 nor less than
     76,000 according to the 1950 Federal census, shall be
     voted upon by the qualified electors of the entire county
     in which such Municipal Court is located.
On May 12, 1994, appellant Jack Foster, a resident of the city of
Pine Bluff, brought an action for injunctive and declaratory relief
against appellee Jefferson County Board of Election Commissioners
and others, claiming that Act 181 of 1955 was unconstitutional and
that only qualified voters living within the corporate limits of
Pine Bluff should be permitted to vote for municipal judge.  He
further alleged that the expenditures of tax monies on the upcoming
1994 election constituted an illegal exaction.  Specifically,
Foster complained that, because the only county within Arkansas
having a population between 76,000 and 76,100 according to the 1950
census was Jefferson County, the Act constituted local and special
legislation in violation of Amendment 14 to the Arkansas
Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from passing any
local or special act.  Following a trial, the chancellor concluded
that Act 181 was neither local nor special legislation.  We affirm.

                     1. Special legislation  
     It is an undisputed fact that Act 181 can only apply to
Jefferson County.  However, this fact alone is not dispositive of
whether the Act is violative of Amendment 14.  A legislative act is
special if, by some inherent limitation or classification, it
arbitrarily separates some person, place, or thing from those upon
which, but for separation, it would operate. Owen v. Dalton, 296
Ark. 351,