Case Title: McCarthy v. James E. Simon Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
McCarthy v. James E. Simon Co.1996 WY 119923 P.2d 747Case Number: 95-228Decided: 09/16/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Nancy McCARTHY, d/b/a The Emerald Ranch,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

JAMES E. SIMON 
CO.,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Carbon County, Kenneth E. Stebner, J.

Charles 
Carpenter (argued), Denver, CO, and Paul Kapp, Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & 
Martin, Cheyenne, WY, for Appellant (Defendant).

Gary R. Scott 
(argued), Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, WY, for Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

LEHMAN, Justice.

[¶1]      Nancy McCarthy 
d/b/a The Emerald Ranch (McCarthy) appeals from a judgment of the district court 
which held that an oral agreement terminated a written contract providing for 
the removal of gravel from a pit on her property for use on a highway 
construction project by James E. Simon Company (Simon).

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]            
McCarthy offers six issues for consideration:

1.             
Whether a writing executed only by the purchaser is sufficient to convey 
stockpiled gravel or to otherwise evidence an oral contract to convey stockpiled 
gravel for the purpose of asserting a conversion claim.

2.             
Whether a writing which is relied upon to establish an oral agreement 
must be enforced in accordance with its terms.

3.            
Whether there was clear and convincing evidence establishing that the 
parties orally agreed to terminate the written agreement between them in its 
entirety.

4.             
Whether an agreement to terminate a written contract entered into without 
knowledge of a prior breach thereof operates to extinguish any remedy for the 
prior breach.

5.             
Whether full and fair disclosure of a contractual breach is required when 
a party seeks to "buyout" a contract and, thereby, extinguish any remedies for 
the prior breach.

6.             
Whether a party seeking waiver of a breach of its contractual obligations 
to another party is obligated to disclose that breach to the party from whom the 
waiver is sought.

Simon attempts 
to the simplify the matter:

Was there sufficient 
evidence to support the Trial Court's finding that the stockpiled gravel had 
been purchased by Plaintiff James E. Simon Co. and that Defendant Nancy McCarthy 
was therefore guilty of wrongful conversion of that stockpile?

 

FACTS

[¶4]            
McCarthy is the owner of the McCarthy Pit, a gravel pit. Simon is a 
construction company that was involved in work on a road project called the 
Battle Lake Road Project. The parties entered into a written contract whereby 
Simon agreed to exclusively utilize gravel from the McCarthy Pit for its work on 
the Battle Lake Project. Simon agreed to pay McCarthy $0.40 per ton for the 
gravel and, when the project was finished, to reclaim the area around the pit in 
compliance with the requirements established by the Wyoming Department of 
Environmental Quality.

[¶5]      Simon alleged, 
and the trial court agreed, that almost a year later the parties entered into an 
oral agreement to terminate the written contract for a $15,000 settlement plus 
the last 8,000 tons of rock still stockpiled at the pit. A check and letter were 
sent to McCarthy confirming this agreement. McCarthy cashed the check for 
$15,000. Finding that the parties had intended to terminate the written 
agreement, the trial court concluded that Simon was entitled to the remaining 
stockpiled rock at the pit and that McCarthy's refusal to allow Simon to remove 
it constituted a conversion.

DISCUSSION

[¶6]            
McCarthy raises several claims of error in the trial court's 
disposition.1 She contends that Simon failed to 
prove the elements of its claim for conversion. Specifically, McCarthy argues 
that Simon failed to prove the amount of the rock it claimed or that it was 
entitled to legal possession. McCarthy also asserts that there was insufficient 
evidence demonstrating that the parties intended to terminate the written 
contract through the oral agreement. Finally, McCarthy claims that Simon 
breached the written agreement prior to the execution of the oral one and that 
breach vitiates the oral agreement as there was no waiver of the 
breach.

[¶7]      A trial court's 
findings and judgment on questions of evidence are sustained unless they are 
clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Morris v. 
Staab, 896 P.2d 773, 775 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Wyo. 1995)). We look at the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prevailing party, without considering appellant's evidence in conflict 
therewith. Id.; Samuel v. Zwerin, 868 P.2d 265, 267 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶8]      A review of the 
record demonstrates there is sufficient evidence to support the determination 
that the parties intended to terminate the written agreement by execution of the 
oral one. At trial, the vice president of Simon testified it was agreed that the 
$15,000 payment was to buy out the previous contract and compensate McCarthy for 
rock removed and for the remaining stockpile. Also, McCarthy's son, who 
negotiated both agreements with Simon, testified in accordance with the 
testimony offered by Simon:

Q.        And that 
$15,000, your understanding was to go for the royalties for material already 
taken from the pit, number one, true?

A.             
Yes.

Q.        Number two, 
the $15,000 in part was to pay for the material that had been mined from the pit 
but was still stockpiled there, true?

A.             
In preparation of being hauled, yes.

Q.        And, number 
three, the $15,000 was to go in part for the buyout of the November, 1991 
agreement, true?

A.        Yeah. It 
was in payment for the remainder of - in lieu of their obligation under the 
contract to haul the remainder of the gravel from our pit and pass the per ton 
royalties.

Q.             
That was a buyout of the previous agreement, true?

A.             
That was - Yeah, for what was used for, you know, the road 
project.

 

The trial court 
ruled that McCarthy's son acted as her agent during the negotiations, a finding 
McCarthy has chosen not to contest on appeal. Additionally, after negotiations, 
Simon sent McCarthy a letter:

As per our verbal 
agreement today, please find enclosed a check for $15,000.00 for complete 
payment on the Battle Lake Project, plus the 8,000 ton of rock that is currently 
stockpiled at the pit.

The foregoing 
evidence is more than sufficient to support the trial court's 
determination.

[¶9]            
McCarthy's next argument centers around her contention that Simon had 
breached the written contract prior to the execution of the oral one. The 
written contract contained an exclusivity provision by which Simon was required 
to use only gravel from McCarthy's pit in the road project. Apparently, Simon 
began mining and crushing rock from another pit prior to the time the parties 
agreed to the oral contract. This, McCarthy insists, was a breach, and it was 
not waived since she had no knowledge of this at the time of the breach. 
Consequently, McCarthy contends that the oral agreement was not valid and she 
should be awarded damages for the breach.

[¶10]   The trial court found that McCarthy 
should have known that the buyout of the written contract included the 
exclusivity provision. We agree. It should have been obvious that, by buying out 
the written agreement, Simon was clearly going to be obtaining gravel from 
another source to complete the project. The testimony of McCarthy's son quoted 
supra indicates that McCarthy did, indeed, recognize that 
fact.

[¶11]            
Additionally, testimony from Simon indicated that McCarthy was made aware 
of the fact that Simon was crushing rock from another pit during the 
negotiations on buying out the contract. While McCarthy disputed this, the trial 
court, which heard the testimony and observed the witnesses, believed the 
testimony of Simon. As we noted, the credibility of witnesses is in the province 
of the trial court, and this court will not reweigh its judgment. Creek v. Town 
of Hulett, 657 P.2d 353, 357 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶12]   Finally, McCarthy challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's determination that 
McCarthy's refusal to allow Simon to remove the pile of rock constituted a 
conversion. McCarthy claims that the evidence does not establish Simon's right 
to possess the rock or to the amount of the rock and that this is fatal to 
Simon's conversion claim.

[¶13]   A cause of action in conversion 
consists of five elements which must be proved to effectuate a recovery by the 
plaintiff:

(1) he had a legal title 
to the converted property; (2) he either had possession of the property or the 
right to possess it at the time of the conversion; (3) the defendant exercised 
dominion over the property in a manner which denied the plaintiff his rights to 
use and enjoy the property; (4) in those cases where the defendant lawfully, or 
at least without fault, obtained possession of the property, the plaintiff made 
some demand for the property's return which the defendant refused; and (5) the 
plaintiff has suffered damage by the loss of the property.

Ferguson v. 
Coronado Oil Co., 884 P.2d 971, 975 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Frost v. Eggeman, 638 P.2d 141, 144 (Wyo. 1981)). In this case, Simon's right to possess the pile of 
rock is grounded in the oral agreement. This agreement, as we have already 
noted, was a valid and binding contract. According to the terms of that 
agreement, in exchange for a payment of $15,000, McCarthy agreed to, among other 
things, turn over ownership of the pile of rock to Simon. By barring access to 
the pit for removal, McCarthy converted property that legally belonged to Simon. 
The fact that the exact amount of rock in the pile was not known does not defeat 
that claim inasmuch as the record clearly discloses that the parties intended 
that Simon take ownership of the entire pile irrespective of the amount actually 
contained therein.

CONCLUSION

[¶14]   There is sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's conclusion that the written agreement was bought out 
by the execution of an oral one and that by refusing Simon access to remove the 
remaining crushed rock from her property, McCarthy committed a 
conversion.

[¶15]            
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTE

1 To the extent that 
McCarthy attempts to challenge the credibility of the witnesses at trial in her 
brief, we will not consider her argument. Creek v. Town of Hulett, 657 P.2d 353, 
357 (Wyo. 1983). McCarthy also raises an argument under W.S. 34.1-2-201(a), the 
UCC statute of frauds. She has, however, done so for the first time on appeal. 
Accordingly, following our well established precedent, we decline to address her 
argument. See Stuckey v. State, ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Wyo. 1995).