Case Title: Hudson v. Lanier

Citation: 

Docket Number: 971006

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1998-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: All the Justices 
 
DAVID S. HUDSON 
 
v. 
Record No. 971006  OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
February 27, 1998 
CHRISTOPHER M. LANIER, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SURRY COUNTY 
Robert G. O’Hara, Jr., Judge Designate 
 
 
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the trial court 
erred in ruling that a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution 
action failed to prove the element of malice. 
 
We state the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Frances D. Lanier and Christopher M. Lanier, the prevailing 
parties in the trial court.  Horton v. Horton, 254 Va. 111, 115, 
487 S.E.2d 200, 203 (1997); Tuomola v. Regent Univ., 252 Va. 
368, 375, 477 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1996).  On September 3, 1989, 
Allyson Hudson, the daughter of David S. Hudson, was severely 
injured when a tree fell on her while she was playing at the 
Surry County home of her maternal grandparents, Joseph S. 
Lanier, Sr., and Frances D. Lanier.  The day after the incident, 
Frances and her son, Christopher M. Lanier, went to Hudson’s 
home, where Hudson informed them that he was planning to sue the 
elder Laniers to recover damages for Allyson’s injuries.  Hudson 
asked Frances and Christopher to leave his home and called the 
“county sheriff” when they failed to leave.  When the “sheriff’s 
car” entered the driveway, Frances and Christopher left the 
house. 
 
Five days later, Hudson went to the home of Joseph and 
Frances to take photographs of the area where Allyson was 
injured.  Joseph and Frances were not home at the time, but 
Christopher was present.  Although Christopher asked Hudson to 
leave, Hudson remained on the Laniers’ property.  Christopher 
then called his parents to inform them that Hudson was on their 
property.  Christopher spoke with Frances, who asked that he 
again tell Hudson to leave the premises. 
 
As instructed by his mother, Christopher again told Hudson 
to leave the property.  Hudson left the Laniers’ property at 
that time, but he continued to take photographs from an adjacent 
property.  Christopher then asked Hudson to leave the neighbor’s 
property, and Hudson responded, “This is not your property.”  
Hudson cursed Christopher and made an obscene gesture before 
leaving the adjacent property. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Christopher, under instructions from 
Frances, initiated a criminal complaint against Hudson for 
trespass on the Laniers’ property.  A warrant for Hudson’s 
arrest, alleging trespass in violation of Code § 18.2-119, was 
issued.  Five days later, Christopher initiated another criminal 
complaint against Hudson for “curse and abuse,” in violation of 
Code § 18.2-416.  An arrest warrant later was issued against 
 
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Hudson on this charge.  Hudson was tried and acquitted on both 
charges. 
Hudson filed a motion for judgment against Frances and 
Christopher alleging malicious prosecution.  At a bench trial, 
Frances testified that she asked Christopher to obtain an arrest 
warrant for trespass because the “situation had gotten hostile.”  
Frances also stated, “We could see we had to have somebody 
settle it.  We had to have a judge decide it.”  Frances 
explained that she was concerned because she thought that Hudson 
was harassing the family and “bad things happen when people have 
tempers.” 
Christopher testified that he initiated the criminal 
complaint for trespass because he wanted an independent party to 
settle the family’s problem, and he wished to see “justice be 
done.”  Christopher also explained that he initiated the 
complaint for “curse and abuse” because he thought that, at 
trial on the trespass charge, he would be asked why he had not 
taken any action in response to Hudson’s cursing. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court held 
that Hudson failed to prove the element of malice by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Based on this ruling, the court 
did not reach a determination whether there was probable cause 
to support the criminal charges.  The court later entered an 
order dismissing the action with prejudice. 
 
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Hudson contends that the trial court erred in ruling that 
he failed to prove the element of malice.  He asserts that the 
evidence showed that Frances and Christopher initiated the 
criminal complaints against him for reasons other than a desire 
to see justice done.*
In response, Frances and Christopher argue that Hudson 
failed to meet his burden of proving that their controlling 
motive in initiating the criminal complaints was improper.  They 
also argue that there was ample evidence showing that their 
actions were not motivated by malice, but were based on a desire 
to resolve the hostilities among the parties. 
 
In an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff bears 
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the prosecution was (1) malicious; (2) instituted by, or with 
the cooperation of, the defendant; (3) without probable cause; 
and (4) terminated in a manner not unfavorable to the plaintiff.  
Lee v. Southland Corp., 219 Va. 23, 26, 244 S.E.2d 756, 758 
(1978); Bain v. Phillips, 217 Va. 387, 393, 228 S.E.2d 576, 581 
(1976); Gaut v. Pyles, 212 Va. 39, 41, 181 S.E.2d 645, 646-47 
(1971).  In the context of a malicious prosecution action, 
                     
* Hudson also argues that the trial court erred in 
questioning a witness concerning the witness’ religious beliefs 
and practices.  We do not consider this assignment of error, 
however, because Hudson failed to object to the trial court’s 
questioning of the witness or to the content of the questions.  
Rule 5:25. 
 
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malice is defined as any controlling motive other than a good 
faith desire to further the ends of justice, enforce obedience 
to the criminal laws, suppress crime, or see that the guilty are 
punished.  Freezer v. Miller, 163 Va. 180, 206, 176 S.E. 159, 
169 (1934). 
The existence of malice is generally a question to be 
resolved by the fact finder from all the circumstances in the 
case.  Lee, 219 Va. at 27, 244 S.E.2d at 759; Gaut, 212 Va. at 
42, 181 S.E.2d at 647; see Freezer, 163 Va. at 208, 176 S.E. at 
170.  We review the sufficiency of the evidence of malice, and 
the trial court’s judgment that Hudson failed to meet his burden 
of proof on this issue, under the established principle that the 
trial court’s judgment will be upheld unless it is plainly wrong 
or without evidence to support it.  Board of Supervisors v. Omni 
Homes, Inc., 253 Va. 59, 65, 481 S.E.2d 460, 463, cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 58 (1997); Tuomala, 252 Va. at 375, 477 
S.E.2d at 506.  Applying this standard, we conclude that the 
evidence supports the trial court’s judgment that Hudson failed 
to prove that either defendant acted with malice in initiating 
the prosecutions. 
The testimony of both Frances and Christopher supports this 
determination.  As stated above, both testified that they were 
concerned that Hudson’s conduct had escalated existing family 
hostilities, and that the intervention of a neutral party was 
 
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necessary to prevent further confrontations from occurring.  
Christopher also stated that he wanted to see “justice be done.”   
While Frances testified that she did not want Hudson to 
gather evidence on the property to use against her in a lawsuit, 
the balance of the testimony supports the court’s implicit 
finding that this concern was not the controlling motive for 
initiating the criminal complaints.  Thus, the record supports a 
conclusion that Hudson failed to prove that either Frances or 
Christopher had a controlling motive other than to “further the 
ends of justice, enforce obedience to the criminal laws, 
suppress crime, or see that the guilty are punished.”  Freezer, 
163 Va. at 206, 176 S.E. at 169. 
Hudson argues, nevertheless, that the trial court’s 
judgment must be reversed because the court applied an erroneous 
principle of law.  When explaining his decision to the parties, 
the court stated, “I’m unable to find a requisite malice between 
members of a family.”  Hudson contends that this statement 
indicates that the court believed that family members are 
legally incapable of acting with malice toward one another.  
We disagree with Hudson’s contention that the trial court’s 
comment requires reversal of this case.  While the court’s 
comment is not clear on its face, the substance of such a 
comment is not relevant to our examination of the sufficiency of 
the evidence of malice. 
 
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For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s 
judgment. 
Affirmed.
 
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