Case Title: IN THE INTEREST OF DCP

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-00-10

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE INTEREST OF DCP2001 WY 7730 P.3d 29Case Number: C-00-10Decided: 08/23/2001

                                                                                                                                 

 

IN THE 
INTEREST OF DCP,

a child 
under the age of eighteen years:

 

STATE OF 
WYOMING, DEPARTMENT

OF FAMILY 
SERVICES,

Appellant.

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney 
General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kristen L. 
Blume, Assistant Attorney General.

 

Representing 
Appellee (KP): 

            
Mark W. Harris of Harris Law Firm, P.C., Evanston, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Before 
GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ., and GUTHRIE, D.J.

 

GUTHRIE, 
District Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, 
Justice, filed a dissenting opinion.

  

GUTHRIE, 
District Judge.

 [¶1]      Appellant, State 
of Wyoming, Department of Family Services (DFS), appeals an order entered in 
juvenile court requiring DFS to pay for an out-of-state placement for a juvenile 
adjudged delinquent under the Juvenile Justice Act.  We affirm.

 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      DFS states the 
issue as:

 

Did the 
juvenile court exceed its statutory authority when it ordered the State of 
Wyoming, Department of Family Services to pay for a private out-of-state 
placement?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      DCP is a minor 
child born April 26, 1988.  
Appellee, KP, adopted DCP when he was approximately five years old.  In September of 1999, DCP performed acts 
of delinquency.  In November of 
1999, KP placed DCP in a residential treatment program in Evanston, Wyoming, the 
Youth Alternative Home Association (YAHA).

 

[¶4]      A petition 
alleging that DCP was delinquent was filed on December 1, 1999.  The initial hearing was held on December 
10, 1999.  Present at this hearing 
was DCP, KP, KP's attorney, a DFS representative, a YAHA representative and the 
Deputy County and Prosecuting Attorney.  
DCP admitted all the allegations in the petition.  Two orders were generated as a result of 
the initial hearing.  The first 
order was signed by the district court commissioner on December 22, 1999.  The second order was signed by the 
juvenile court judge on January 21, 2000 and was based upon a Court 
Commissioner's Resume signed by the Court Commissioner on January 20, 2000.  In both orders, constructive custody of 
DCP was placed with the Uinta County Sheriff's Department.  In the first order, physical custody of 
DCP was placed with KP for placement at YAHA and legal custody with KP.  The second order placed physical custody 
of DCP with YAHA and legal custody with DFS.  A dispositional hearing was scheduled 
for January 26, 2000.

 

[¶5]      On January 19, 
2000, DCP was released by YAHA to KP.  
The next day, KP moved DCP to a residential treatment program at Primary 
Children's Hospital in Utah.

 

[¶6]      After two 
continuances, a dispositional hearing was held on April 12, 2000.  No one appeared on behalf of DFS at this 
hearing.  The juvenile court entered 
an order that contained no terms of disposition for DCP.  The juvenile court only ordered KP to 
pay for the cost of DCP's placement at Primary Children's Hospital from the date 
of his admission until January 26, 2000.  
After that date, DFS was required to pay all costs not covered by KP's 
insurance.  DFS timely 
appealed.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      All proceedings 
under the Juvenile Justice Act are regarded as being in equity and this Court 
shall exercise equitable jurisdiction.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-238 (LexisNexis 2001).  This appeal involves a question of law 
requiring statutory interpretation.  
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  In re NG, 14 P.3d 203, 205 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      DFS contends that 
the juvenile court exceeded its statutory authority when it ordered DFS to pay 
for a private out-of-state placement.  
The statutes at issue provide, in pertinent part:

 

            
(a)       
In determining the disposition to be made under this act in regard to any 
child:

 

            
* * *

 

            
(v)        The 
court shall not order an out-of-state placement unless:

 

            
(A)       
Evidence has been presented to the court regarding the costs of the 
out-of-state placement being ordered together with evidence of the comparative 
costs of any suitable alternative in-state treatment program or facility, as 
determined by the department pursuant to W.S. 21-13-315(d)(vii), whether or not 
placement in the in-state program or facility is currently 
available;

 

            
(B)       
The court makes an affirmative finding on the record that no placement 
can be made in a Wyoming institution or in a private residential treatment 
facility or group home located in Wyoming that can provide adequate treatment or 
services for the child; and

 

            
(C)       
The court states on the record why no in-state placement is 
available.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2001).  This section references Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 21-13-315(d)(vii) (LexisNexis 2001), which provides:

 

            
(d)       
If a placement of a child is to be made and funded under this section, 
the predisposition study required by W.S. 14-6-227 shall 
include:

 

            
* * *

 

            
(vii)      
If an out-of-state placement is under consideration, the name, address, 
program description and costs of each Wyoming institution and each private 
residential treatment facility and group home located in Wyoming that the 
department of family services has determined can provide adequate treatment or 
services for the child, and whether placement in the in-state institution, 
treatment facility or group home is available.

 

[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-6-229 authorizes the juvenile court to order the out-of-state placement of a 
juvenile adjudged delinquent as part of the juvenile's disposition only if 
certain procedures are followed.  
The juvenile court's order following the dispositional hearing did not 
specifically order out-of-state placement nor did it specifically include the 
findings required by statute.  DCP 
was placed at the out-of-state facility by his mother before the dispositional 
hearing.

 

[¶10]   DFS argues that the statutory 
requirements for out-of-state placement were not followed; therefore, the 
juvenile court did not have the authority to require DFS to pay for the 
treatment.  KP, on the other hand, 
argues that the May 11, 2000 order following the dispositional hearing meets the 
requirements of a court-ordered placement of DCP.  KP seems to be arguing that since the 
May 11, 2000 order requires DFS to pay the costs of the treatment, the juvenile 
court was in effect ratifying the actions of KP in placing DCP in the 
out-of-state facility and ordering that DCP remain there.  KP argues that nothing in the statute 
requires an out-of-state placement order be made prior to 
placement.

 

[¶11]   KP also asserts that the other 
statutory requirements for out-of-state placement have been met.  KP points to portions of the record 
where costs of out-of-state placement were presented to the juvenile court along 
with comparative costs of Wyoming placement provided by 
DFS.

 

[¶12]   In In re NG, 14 P.3d 203, DFS 
appealed an order by a juvenile court requiring it to pay for electronic 
monitoring services provided by a private company for a minor child in a 
child-in-need-of-supervision (CHINS) case.  
There, when the CHINS petition was filed, the minor was on probation 
through the municipal court and was wearing an electronic monitor provided by a 
private company and paid for by the municipal court.  Id. at 204.  Prior to arraignment on the CHINS case, 
the minor, her mother and DFS agreed to a "CHINS CASE PLAN."  The plan acknowledged that NG was on 
probation and wearing an electronic monitor.  Subsequently, the DFS worker wrote a 
letter to the assistant district attorney and attached the case plan.  The letter indicated the court date had 
been cancelled because they were in agreement to follow the case plan.  Id. at 205.

 

[¶13]   In September of 1998, the DFS 
worker recommended that electronic monitoring be discontinued.  At NG's arraignment in October of 1998, 
NG admitted the allegations in the petition and the juvenile court discontinued 
the electronic monitoring.  In 
November of 1998, the juvenile court found that the electronic monitoring 
services were reasonable and in the best interest of the minor.  The court ordered DFS to pay for the 
monitoring services.  
Id.

 

[¶14]   Similar to the arguments here, DFS 
argued in In re NG that the court lacked the statutory authority to order 
DFS to pay for services such as electronic monitoring.  Id.  DFS argued that its duties in CHINS 
cases are explicitly defined by statute.  
Id.  This Court took 
an equitable approach.  "The purpose 
of the law is to promote the best interests of the children.  DFS and the juvenile court must work 
together to that end.  To accomplish 
this task, it is necessary for both the agency and the court to have somewhat 
more flexibility than DFS would concede."  
Id.  This Court also 
held that "[i]t is not reasonable to expect the legislature to foresee every 
method that might be employed to assist a juvenile."  Id.

 

[¶15]   The important similarity is that 
the electronic monitoring services were never explicitly ordered by the juvenile 
court in the CHINS case.  Justice 
Golden dissented in In re NG, arguing that "DFS should only be 
responsible for payment of electronic monitoring services when ordered by a 
juvenile court or required by the CHINS statutory framework."  Id. at 206 (Golden, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Golden noted 
that the monitoring took place prior to the juvenile court having jurisdiction 
and the court took no action "indicating the monitoring services were required, 
and did not order electronic monitoring services nor approve the services as 
part of a consent decree."  
Id.  "We should not 
require DFS pay for juvenile services that have not resulted from a juvenile 
court order * * *."  
Id.

 

[¶16]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229(a)(v) 
states that "[t]he court shall not order an out-of-state placement" unless 
certain evidence is presented and the district court makes affirmative findings 
on the record.  "Where a statute 
uses the mandatory language shall,' a court must obey the statute as a court 
has no right to make the law contrary to what is prescribed by the 
legislature."  In re LePage, 
2001 WY 26, ¶ 11, 18 P.3d 1177, 1180 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶17]   We must also keep in mind our 
longstanding principle that the exercise of equitable jurisdiction may not 
prevail over statutory language.  In 
In re Hartt's Estate, 75 Wyo. 305, 295 P.2d 985, 991 (1956), this court 
stated that, when invoking equitable jurisdiction, "mandatory statutes must be 
obeyed and * * * courts have no right to make a law contrary to that prescribed 
by the legislature."  Similarly, 
"courts of equity are powerless to vary the direct mandate of legislative 
enactments as are courts of law * * *."  
In re Hartt's Estate, 295 P.2d  at 996.  In sum, "[e]quity follows the law."  Brewer v. Folsom Brothers Co., 43 
Wyo. 433, 5 P.2d 283, 290 (1931).

 

[¶18]   Upon careful examination of the 
facts that appear in the record, we conclude the statutory framework of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229(a)(v) has been substantially adhered to in the instant 
case.  Although the juvenile court 
did not provide an order prior to DCP's out-of-state placement, there is no 
statutory language which necessitates that the applicable requirements be met 
prior to placement.  A review of the 
record makes it clear that comparative costs of placement in Wyoming as well as 
the costs of the out-of-state placement were presented to the juvenile 
court.  In addition, there was a 
discussion at the hearing based upon the recommendations of Primary Children's 
Hospital that it was important for KP to play an active role in DCP's 
treatment.  KP would not have been 
sufficiently involved at the in-state proposed treatment facilities due to their 
location, thus affecting the availability of those 
facilities.

 

[¶19]   We assume the juvenile court made a 
careful review of the entire record, and we conclude the juvenile court had 
sufficient information to properly require DFS to pay for the out-of-state 
placement of DCP.  In this case, we 
conclude there was a clear indication that the out-of-state placement 
effectuated the protection of public safety and provided for the care, 
protection, and mental and physical development of DCP.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-201(c)(ii), (iii) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  The interests of 
judicial economy will not be served by a remand in this case so that the 
juvenile court's findings can be placed on the record.  However, in the future, we require 
affirmative findings to be placed on the record in accordance with the mandatory 
language in the applicable statutes.  
This will allow this Court to properly review a juvenile court's decision 
to assure a comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors was 
completed.

 

[¶20]   The order of the juvenile court is 
affirmed.

  
GOLDEN, 
Justice, dissenting.

 

[¶21]       
Once 
again I find myself at odds with a majority opinion of this Court over the 
interpretation of how the legislature intends a juvenile court action to 
proceed.  In this case, the majority 
opinion holds that a mother may unilaterally determine an out-of-state private 
placement for her son and, simply because a delinquency petition has been filed 
against her son, the juvenile court may order the State of Wyoming to pick up 
the bill for such private placement.  
Because I do not agree that the legislature intended such haphazard 
expenditure of public funds, I respectfully dissent.

 

[¶22]       
This 
case involves statutory interpretation of the Juvenile Justice Act, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-6-201 through § 252 (LexisNexis 2001).  Many of the general statements regarding 
interpretation of the Juvenile Justice Act contained in my dissent in the recent 
case of WJH v. State, 2001 WY 54, ¶¶27, 30, 24 P.3d 1147, ¶¶27, 30 (Wyo. 
2001) are equally applicable here.  
The Juvenile Justice Act must be interpreted as a whole.  Any interpretation must start with the 
premise that the juvenile court is a court of limited jurisdiction.  The juvenile court must have statutory 
authority for its actions.

 

[¶23]       
In this 
case, the juvenile court has ordered the State of Wyoming Department of Family 
Services to pay for a private placement unilaterally selected by a juvenile's 
mother.  The majority opinion 
legitimizes this action by holding that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229(a)(v) was 
"substantially adhered to," thus authorizing the order for payment.  As a matter of statutory construction, I 
disagree with this holding on two grounds.

 

[¶24]       
First, § 
14-6-229 does not apply to the facts of this case.  Section 14-6-229 is the statutory 
section defining options available to the juvenile court in determining the 
disposition for a juvenile adjudicated delinquent.  The operative language in that statute 
under review is: "In determining the disposition to be made under this act in 
regard to any child . . . the court shall not order an out-of-state placement 
unless . . . ."  By its terms, its 
application is limited to situations in which the juvenile court is considering 
ordering an out-of-state placement as part of the terms of disposition of a 
juvenile adjudicated delinquent.  
This section has no application to the facts of this case.  At no time did the juvenile court order 
placement of DCP at Primary Children's Hospital in Utah, whether as part of 
disposition or otherwise.1  This should be the end of the 
discussion.  Because the majority 
opinion goes further, however, so shall I.

[¶25]       
Second, 
accepting arguendo that § 229 somehow can be applied to these facts, there was 
no substantial compliance with § 229.  
Substantial compliance requires compliance with all material provisions 
of a statute.  The principle of 
substantial compliance exists to allow for irregularities that do not affect any 
substantive principles.  See 
generally State v. Dobbs, 70 Wyo. 26, 35, 244 P.2d 280, 282-83 (Wyo. 
1952).  

 

[¶26]       
By even 
applying § 229 to the facts of this case, the majority opinion obviously 
concludes that the language applying this section only to court orders of 
disposition is not material and can be ignored, essentially removing the section 
from its context within the Juvenile Justice Act.  The application of this section is thus 
broadened to apply to any placement at any time for any reason, judicially 
creating a substantive change in the law.  
This Court should not extend the application of this section beyond what 
is obviously and clearly intended by the legislature.  There can be no substantial compliance 
with this section when no attempt is being made to apply the section to an order 
of disposition.  

 

[¶27]       
Further, 
looking specifically at subsection 229(a)(v),2 the substantive purpose of this 
subsection is clear.  In a perfect 
world, every juvenile would receive the best treatment available.  This, however, is not a perfect 
world.  This is a world in which 
budgetary constraints are a reality. The legislature is well aware of these 
budgetary constraints and has adopted a statutory scheme to help ensure that the 
best possible treatment is available to the greatest number of Wyoming 
juveniles.  The statutory scheme 
includes limitations on the juvenile court's ability to order out-of-state 
placements.  The limitation, put 
simply, is that certain specific evidence must be submitted that all in-state 
options have been examined and that the out-of-state placement is the most 
economical, suitable alternative.  
This limitation is intended to protect the dollars of Wyoming taxpayers 
as well as to protect all juveniles who may come into the system needing 
help.  

 

[¶28]       
The 
record simply does not support the conclusion that the statutorily required 
factual information was presented to the juvenile court.  Subsection 229(a)(v)(A) requires certain 
evidence to be presented to the juvenile court on costs of placement options "as 
determined by the department" of family services.  There was no representative of the 
Department of Family Services present at the hearing from which the order for 
payment originated.  Thus, the 
Department did not present any direct evidence or argument regarding costs of 
placements.  Further, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 21-13-315(d)(vii)3 requires very specific information 
to be present in the predisposition report of the Department of Family 
Services.  None of this information 
was included in the predisposition report.  

 

[¶29]       
Again, 
the majority opinion obviously concludes that the legislature was only adding 
superfluous language when it required the presentation of very specific cost 
information "as determined by the department."  I cannot agree that requiring the State 
to provide very specific cost information is not a material provision in a 
statute intended to protect public money.  
Because no cost information "as determined by the department" regarding 
suitable alternative in-state facilities was presented to the juvenile court, 
there was no compliance with the statute, substantial or otherwise.  

 

[¶30]       
Subsections 
229(a)(v)(B) and (C), for the purposes of this appeal, are somewhat 
related.  They require respectively 
the juvenile court to make "an affirmative finding on the record that no 
placement can be made in" Wyoming and to state "on the record why no in-state 
placement is available."  While some 
information was presented on the efficacy of the placement at Primary Children's 
Hospital in Utah, there was no information regarding suitable in-state 
options.  The juvenile court 
specifically asked if the Wyoming State Hospital in Evanston had been 
considered, and the mother answered that it had not been considered.   No cost information was presented 
regarding the Wyoming State Hospital nor was any information presented regarding 
its suitability as a placement alternative for DCP.  Thus, at least one potentially viable 
alternative was not even considered at the hearing, nor was it considered before 
the placement.

 

[¶31]       
In fact, the 
mother stated to the juvenile court that she did not seriously consider placing 
DCP any place other than Primary Children's Hospital.  The mother was informed, before her 
placing her son at Primary Children's Hospital, that other in-state alternatives 
might be options, but she placed DCP at Primary Children's Hospital because she 
was told that it could provide the best evaluation and treatment.  As she stated to the juvenile court, she 
believed Primary Children's Hospital "was the best place to do the eval on [DCP] 
and the eval was to take two to three weeks and then start treatment."  While the intentions of the mother are 
commendable, and she may even be correct in her determination that Primary 
Children's Hospital was the best possible placement for her son, the placement 
still was made with no regard for the juvenile court process and no regard for 
the budget of the State of Wyoming Department of Family Services.  If anything is clear from § 229(a)(v), 
it is that the State cannot be financially liable for such a 
decision.

 

[¶32]       
The 
filing of a petition alleging a juvenile is delinquent begins a judicial 
process.  The judicial process is 
delineated by the legislature in the Juvenile Justice Act.  Again, my general comments regarding the 
dispositional process in my dissent in WJH, at ¶¶56, 57, apply to this 
case.  The dispositional process is 
supposed to be marked by a group of professionals investigating the specific 
circumstances of a juvenile and making recommendations as a team to the juvenile 
court.  The juvenile court then acts 
upon those recommendations.  In this 
case, despite the fact that there was a judicially appointed and operating 
multidisciplinary team, the mother unilaterally placed her son in Utah.4  The juvenile court was not approached 
for a court order for such a placement.  

 

[¶33]       
It would 
have been an easy matter to bring a placement of DCP within the ambit of the 
Juvenile Justice Act.  The mother is 
a party to the juvenile court proceedings5 and as such at any time could have 
requested a hearing before the juvenile court.  Because the mother obviously wanted a 
medical evaluation of her son before disposition, she could easily have 
requested the juvenile court to order such under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-219(a) 
(LexisNexis 2001) which states:

 

Any time after the filing of a 
petition, on motion of the district attorney or the child's parents, guardian, 
custodian or attorney or on motion of the court, the court may order the child 
to be examined by a licensed and qualified physician, surgeon, psychiatrist or 
psychologist designated by the court to aid in determining the physical and 
mental condition of the child.  The 
examination shall be conducted on an outpatient basis, but the court may commit 
the child to a suitable medical facility or institution for examination if 
deemed necessary.  Commitment for 
examination shall not exceed fifteen (15) days.

 

Thus, the mother could have 
requested the juvenile court to order a medical evaluation and could have 
requested the evaluation be done at Primary Children's Hospital in Utah.  If the court had so ordered, then DCP 
could have been evaluated in Utah and the county would have paid for the 
evaluation.6  The mother also could have requested the 
placement in Utah for evaluation and treatment as part of disposition, but no 
proper dispositional hearing ever occurred.7  

 

[¶34]       
Certainly 
the juvenile, the parents, and other interested parties continue to live their 
lives and make their own personal decisions while the judicial process is 
underway, but such personal decisions should not be confused with judicially 
authorized decisions.  Personal 
decisions are made entirely at the risk of the individual.  Indeed, in this case, upon unilaterally 
making the decision to place her son at Primary Children's Hospital in Utah, the 
mother acknowledged that she would be responsible for the costs, at least until 
the scheduled dispositional hearing was held.  The dispositional hearing was postponed 
twice, the first time because "the juvenile is undergoing an evaluation at 
Primary Children's Hospital and will not be completed by said date" while the 
second continuance was granted at the joint request of the mother and the 
prosecuting attorney.

 

[¶35]       
The 
critical factor in this case is that the mother was in complete control of the 
placement.  She was the one who 
placed DCP at Primary Children's Hospital in Utah, acknowledging that it was at 
her own expense.  She is the one who 
decided to keep DCP at Primary Children's Hospital not only for a complete 
evaluation but also for treatment.  
She could have asked for a hearing before the juvenile court to bring the 
placement within the parameters of the Juvenile Justice Act.  She did not make any effort to do 
so.  Indeed, she acquiesced in two 
continuances of the dispositional hearing, thus avoiding the juvenile 
court.  It was only after DCP had 
completed his evaluation and almost completed treatment that DCP's mother came 
before the juvenile court.  The 
hearing was ostensibly a dispositional hearing but the mother, through her 
attorney, stated up front that there was no need for the juvenile court to 
address the disposition of DCP.  
Instead, the only issue addressed was the oral request from DCP's mother 
that the juvenile court order the State of Wyoming Department of Family Services 
to pay for the costs of a placement she unilaterally chose completely outside of 
the framework of the Juvenile Justice Act.8  

 

[¶36]       
My 
dissent in In re NG, 14 P.3d 203 (Wyo. 2000), which the majority opinion 
has quoted in part, is equally applicable here.  The people of Wyoming should not be 
required to pay for a private placement that was undertaken with absolutely no 
regard for the procedural and substantive requirements of the Juvenile Justice 
Act.  The legislature has clearly 
enacted statutes that protect against such an outcome and such statutes should 
not be ignored or interpreted by this Court so broadly, under the guise of 
substantial compliance, as to lose all their intended protective 
effect.

 

[¶37]       
Because 
the majority opinion does not properly analyze the pertinent statutory language 
and extends the principle of substantial compliance beyond all recognition, I 
respectfully dissent.

 

FOOTNOTES

1I note a serious concern as to whether 
the juvenile court process was even properly in the dispositional phase.  The initial hearing was held before the 
court commissioner, not the court.  
The juvenile purportedly admitted to the allegations in the petition, and 
the court commissioner issued the "Initial Hearing Order" adjudicating DCP 
delinquent and ordering custody arrangements and various other matters.  Although the court commissioner's 
"order" was ratified by the juvenile court almost a month later, holding an 
initial hearing before the court commissioner seems to exceed the authority of 
the court commissioner, thus rendering the adjudication void.  I also note a concern over the policy of 
the juvenile court to tape record the initial hearing but only retain the tape 
recording for four months.  Thus, no 
transcript of the initial hearing is available for this appeal, and this Court 
cannot review the proceedings at that initial hearing.  These are serious issues affecting the 
fundamental rights of DCP, and this Court could therefore take cognizance of 
them.  However, because neither 
issue has been addressed by the parties in this appeal, the issues are better 
left to another day when they may be directly on point before this 
Court.

2The complete text of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-6-229(a)(v) is found in the majority opinion at 
¶8.

3Cited in full in the majority opinion at 
¶8.

4The record contains no report from the 
multidisciplinary team.

5Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-201(a)(xviii) 
(LexisNexis 2001) defines "party" as including "the child, his parents . . . 
."

6Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-235(b)(iv) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  "Costs of any 
physical or mental examinations or treatment ordered by the court" are to be 
paid by the county.

7The case was terminated before any 
judicially determined disposition.  

8By affirming the court order of 
payment in this case, it is interesting to note that the majority opinion, while 
properly emphasizing the need for the Department of Family Services and the 
juvenile court to work together to promote the best interests of children, has 
in effect cut the Department of Family Services out of the process all together, 
calling only on the Department's checkbook at the end of the day.  The statutory scheme is clear that 
procedurally and substantively such a result is 
unacceptable.