Case Title: Michael Green v. State of Indiana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 15S01-0611-CR-468

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Lorinda Meier Youngcourt 
Steve Carter 
Huron, Indiana 
Attorney General of Indiana  
 
 
J.T. Whitehead 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 15S01-0611-CR-468 
 
MICHAEL GREEN, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Dearborn Superior Court, No. 15D01-0208-FA-004  
The Honorable G. Michael Witte, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 15A01-0508-CR-373 
_________________________________ 
 
November 15, 2006 
 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
 
 
Trial courts sometimes receive a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt on multiple counts, 
one of which represents a lesser-included offense of some other count.  Where the court merges 
the lesser-included offense without imposing judgment, there is no need to remand on appeal to 
“vacate.” 
 
  
Michael Green pled guilty to four counts – attempted robbery, conspiracy to commit 
robbery, burglary, and conspiracy to commit burglary – for his role in the August 5, 2002, 
burglary and attack of Mr. and Mrs. Pohlgeers.  At the sentencing hearing, the judge declared 
that the attempted robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery counts “merge[d] . . . so that only 
one sentence can be imposed between the two counts.”  (Tr. at 166.)  On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals declared this merger inadequate and ordered the trial court to “vacate the robbery 
conspiracy conviction.”  Green v. State, 850 N.E.2d 977, 980 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).  We grant 
transfer to correct this appellate mistake. 
 
 
To be sure, a defendant’s constitutional rights are violated when a court enters judgment 
twice for the same offense, but not when a defendant is simply found guilty of a particular count.  
See, e.g., Carter v. State, 750 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ind. 2001) (“It is highly ordinary that a jury . . . 
may hear evidence about multiple counts during a single trial and determine guilt on each of 
them.  These findings of guilt do not mean that a defendant has faced multiple sentences or 
multiple judgments of conviction.”); Kennedy v. State, 674 N.E.2d 966, 967 (Ind. 1996) (“For 
purposes of double jeopardy, this court has long held that a trial court may not convict and 
sentence a defendant for both murder and felony murder where only one murder occurs.”).  
 
On the other hand, a merged offense for which a defendant is found guilty, but on which 
there is neither a judgment nor a sentence, is “unproblematic” as far as double jeopardy is 
concerned.  Carter, 750 N.E.2d at 781.  See also Laux v. State, 821 N.E.2d 816, 820 (Ind. 2005).  
In Laux, we disapproved those cases which “indicate[] that vacating a jury verdict is the 
appropriate remedy rather than merger and entering a judgment of conviction only on the merged 
count.”  Id. at 820 n.4.  In the present case, the Court of Appeals relied on Kochersperger v. 
State, 725 N.E.2d 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), and Jones v. State, 807 N.E.2d 58 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2004), transfer denied.  On the point at issue here, these opinions likewise are disapproved. 
 
In this instance, the record does not actually indicate a formal judgment of conviction for 
any of the offenses.  The judge’s statement at sentencing, the Abstract of Judgment, and the 
Order on Plea or Finding of Guilt and Sentence all demonstrate that the conspiracy to commit 
robbery charge was merged, rather than reduced to judgment, and that Green was never 
sentenced for that count.  (Tr. at 164-68; Appellant’s App. at 428, 432.)  Thus, “[t]here is no 
particular reason to order a trial court to vacate” a guilty plea “where the trial court entered a 
judgment” on only the attempted robbery.  Carter, 750 N.E.2d at 781.  We thus vacate the Court 
of Appeals’ order remanding this matter to the trial court. 
 
The Court of Appeals appropriately disposed of the remainder of the issues, and we 
summarily affirm their disposition.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).  The trial court is affirmed. 
 
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.