Case Title: Spear v. Nicholson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-10-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Spear v. Nicholson1994 WY 105882 P.2d 1237Case Number: 93-179Decided: 10/12/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Nancy 
SPEAR; Elisabeth N. Holmes; and G.J. Guthrie Nicholson, III,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Klara 
W. NICHOLSON, individually and as co-trustee of the G.J. Guthrie Nicholson, Jr. 
Trust; David L. Koerwitz, as co-trustee of the G.J. Guthrie Nicholson, Jr. 
Trust; Little Four Bear Ranch, a Wyoming partnership; Adrian Baumgartner; 
Josefine K. Wong; Terry Freeman; Herb Brentlinger; Tracey Market; Charmain 
Goodman; Norma Asay; Colleen Morris; Hot Springs County Senior Citizens Center, 
Inc.; American Power Dispatchers, a Washington corporation; St. Mary's Church, a 
Rhode Island corporation; Shriners Hospitals For Crippled Children, a Colorado 
corporation; Franciscan Sisters of Atonement, a New York corporation; Troy 
Schneider; Mary Schneider; William West; Bob Keough; David Kovash; Bonnie 
Kovash; Don Bonnette; Don Hawkins; Ken Lee; June Lee; Frank Taylor; Rose Taylor; 
Joseph C. Milner; F. Neil Conner; Sharyl D. Conner; Ted Pierce; Town of 
Thermopolis, a Wyoming incorporated town; and Eduardo Troya, 
M.D.,

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal 
from District Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Thomas 
N. Long and H. Frank Gibbard of Thomas N. Long, P.C., and Richard P. Boley of 
Boley & McKellar, P.C., Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellees:

Ronald 
P. Jurovich and Thomas W. Harrington of Messenger & Jurovich, Thermopolis, 
for appellees, Klara W. Nicholson, David L. Koerwitz, Little Four Bear Ranch, 
Tracey Market, Charmain Goodman; Norma Asay, American Power Dispatchers, St. 
Mary's Church, Troy and Mary Schneider, William West, Don Bonnette, Don Hawkins, 
Ken and June Lee, Frank and Rose Taylor, Joseph C. Milner, Town of Thermopolis, 
Colleen Morris, Hot Springs County Senior Citizens, Inc., Franciscan Sisters of 
Atonement, Bob Keough, and David and Bonnie Kovash.

Becky 
N. Klemt of Pence & MacMillan, Laramie, and Harry E. Coff of Reams, Reams 
& Coff, Grand Junction, CO, for appellee, Adrian 
Baumgartner.

Thomas 
A. Fasse of Miller & Fasse, P.C., Riverton, for appellees, F. Neil Conner 
and Sharyl Conner.

William 
R. Jones and Bruce A. Hellbaum of Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, 
for appellee, Eduardo Troya, M.D.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

* 
Retired July 6, 1994.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The issue in this 
case tests whether a 1985 amendment to the probate code vested exclusive 
jurisdiction in the district court sitting in probate over all claims relating 
to the property and affairs of the decedent. After the commencement of probate 
proceedings in Hot Springs County, a declaratory judgment action was filed in 
Natrona County attacking, on the ground of undue influence, inter vivos 
transfers by the decedent. A variety of ancillary equitable remedies were also 
claimed and, in addition, there were claims sounding in tort. The district court 
in Natrona County dismissed the action, ruling it had no jurisdiction because 
jurisdiction was vested in the probate court in Hot Springs County. In its Order 
of Dismissal, the ruling was broadened to encompass lack of venue as well as 
lack of jurisdiction. We hold the amendment to the probate code did not result 
in exclusive jurisdiction in the probate court. We reverse the Order of 
Dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings.

[¶2]      The appellants in 
this case, Nancy Spear, Elisabeth N. Holmes, and G.J. Guthrie Nicholson, III 
(children) set forth the issues in their Brief of Appellants in this 
way:

I. 
Whether the Natrona County District Court, a court of general jurisdiction, has 
subject matter jurisdiction over appellants' claims.

A. 
Whether a district court in Wyoming has jurisdiction over claims relating to the 
validity of inter vivos trust amendments and inter vivos conveyances, and tort 
claims.

B. 
Whether appellants' claims concern "probate matters" within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the district court sitting in probate.

C. 
Whether, even if appellants' claims could have been brought in probate court, 
the district court has concurrent jurisdiction over them.

II. 
Whether venue for appellants' complaint is proper in the Natrona County District 
Court.

Separate 
briefs were filed by several of the appellees. A number of them joined in a 
Brief of Appellees presented principally by Klara W. Nicholson (widow), 
individually and as Co-Trustee of the G.J. Guthrie Nicholson, Jr. Trust, in 
which the issues are stated in this way:

I. 
Did the Seventh Judicial District Court, Natrona County, Wyoming, properly 
dismiss appellants' complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction?

II. 
Did the Seventh Judicial District Court, Natrona County, Wyoming, properly 
dismiss the suit for improper venue?

III. 
Was the order appealed from a final order?

[¶3]      In a separate 
Brief of Appellee, Adrian Baumgartner (widow's son), the issues are stated as 
follows:

1. 
Whether this appeal should be dismissed as an untimely appeal of an 
interlocutory ruling because appellants can proceed in the Hot Springs County 
District Court on all counts in their complaint.

2. 
Whether the lower court's ruling on venue should be 
sustained.

3. 
Whether trial of all claims in the Hot Springs County District Court is proper 
where the court has both general and exclusive 
jurisdiction.

4. 
Whether the term "co-extensive" in W.S. § 2-2-101 should be construed to mean 
"concurrent."

5. 
Whether appellants' objections to venue in Hot Springs County have been 
waived.

6. 
Whether the Hot Springs County District Court has jurisdiction to determine the 
validity of documents involving property that will revert to the probate estate 
if the documents are invalidated.

7. 
Whether the challenged trust amendments and wills must be construed together to 
give effect to the decedent's testamentary intentions and avoid a collateral 
attack on the probate.

8. 
Whether this Court should render an advisory opinion on the torts of intentional 
interference with expectancy and civil conspiracy.

In 
the Brief of Appellees F. Neil Conner and Sharyl Conner, there is no statement 
of the issues, and in the separate Brief of Appellee Eduardo Troya, M.D., the 
issues are stated identically to those set forth in the appellants' 
brief.

[¶4]      The factual focus 
in this case is upon the execution by G.J. Guthrie Nicholson, Jr. (Nicholson) of 
certain documents subsequent to 1985 and prior to his death on April 2, 1991. 
The children contend Nicholson was the subject of undue influence by the widow 
and her son when he signed trust amendments, deeds, checks, and other documents 
transferring property (the challenged documents). The children contend the 
challenged documents effectively disinherited them by vitiating the terms of the 
G.J. Guthrie Nicholson, Jr. Revocable Trust and its First Amendment, which was 
executed in 1985. The children's position is that, at that time, Nicholson was 
free from any influence by the widow and her son, and the property conveyed by 
the challenged documents should be returned to ownership of the trust and 
distributed according to its terms.

[¶5]      After Nicholson 
died, the children first brought this action in the United States District Court 
for the District of Wyoming. We understand they sought essentially the same 
relief they seek in this case. After that action had been filed, the widow 
commenced probate proceedings for Nicholson's estate in the probate court in Hot 
Springs County. Then the United States District Court, acting on its own motion, 
reversed a prior ruling and dismissed the complaint, pointing to a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under the probate exception to diversity 
jurisdiction. One of the children has filed a will contest in the probate 
matter, seeking to inhibit the probate court from ratifying the widow's 
designation as trustee of Nicholson's pour-over testamentary trust. The probate 
action is stayed at this time.

[¶6]            
Following dismissal of the federal court action, the children filed this 
case in Natrona County. The relief the children sought was a declaratory 
judgment establishing the challenged documents were the result of undue 
influence; the imposition of a constructive trust on Nicholson's property that 
had been wrongfully alienated; rescission or reformation of the challenged 
documents; and an accounting. In addition, tort theories for intentional 
interference with the children's expectancy and a civil conspiracy were alleged 
against some of the defendants. All of the appellees filed motions to dismiss in 
which they asserted the district court of Natrona County lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction with respect to the claims of the children and also that venue was 
not proper. The district court of Natrona County, following a hearing, entered 
an Order of Dismissal. It based its order upon the view that subject matter 
jurisdiction was vested in the probate court in Hot Springs County and, in 
addition, venue in Natrona County was improper. This appeal presents that order 
for review.

[¶7]      In 1985, WYO. 
STAT. § 2-2-101 (1980) was amended to enhance the jurisdiction of the district 
court sitting in probate.1 We understand this amendment was 
adopted to address the limiting effect of prior cases decided by this court 
relating to the jurisdiction of the district court sitting in probate. In 
Matter of Estate of Fulmer, 761 P.2d 658 (Wyo. 1988), we acknowledged, in 
dictum, that the 1985 amendments to the statute did extend the jurisdiction of 
the probate court to those cases involving the property of the estate. We do not 
read the statute or Fulmer, however, as establishing exclusive 
jurisdiction in the probate court to address those actions. Amending the 
definition of the jurisdiction of the district court sitting in probate so that 
it is "coextensive" with the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court 
in any civil action is not sufficient to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the 
probate court. The debate in this case is precisely whether the claims of the 
children can be tried only in the probate proceeding, or whether they can be 
tried by the district court in Natrona County.

[¶8]      These claims 
relate to events preceding Nicholson's death. The events antedated any need for 
administration of an estate for Nicholson. In Fulmer, we held the 
jurisdiction of the probate court terminated upon distribution of the estate. 
The allegations in the complaint encompass tort claims and the exercise by the 
widow and her son of undue influence with respect to inter vivos 
transfers and trust amendments. These claims are not necessarily "seeking any 
legal or equitable remedy as to any interest in property, real or personal, in 
which the estate asserts or claims any interest." Neither do they constitute 
causes "cognizable in the district court in any civil action" that may be 
brought "by or against a personal representative * * *." WYO. STAT. § 
2-2-101.

[¶9]      If these claims 
had been filed in Hot Springs County, we are satisfied the statute, together 
with what we said in Fulmer, would justify the resolution by the district 
court in Hot Springs County as a part of the probate administration. We are not 
as satisfied, however, as the district court apparently was, that the district 
court in Natrona County is foreclosed from considering these claims. To the 
contrary, we hold the district court of Natrona County did have subject matter 
jurisdiction with respect to these claims, and it misread the law in dismissing 
them because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction.

[¶10]   There remains the question of the 
appropriate venue. On this issue the debate between the children and the widow 
and her son and other appellees is whether the applicable statute is WYO. STAT. 
§ 1-5-101 (1988) or WYO. STAT. § 1-5-107 (1988). The children rely upon the 
provisions of WYO. STAT. § 1-5-107:

An 
action, other than one (1) of those mentioned in W.S. 1-5-101 through 1-5-104, 
against a nonresident of this state or a foreign corporation, whether or not 
codefendants reside in Wyoming, may be brought in any county where the cause of 
action arose or where the plaintiff resides.

The 
widow, her son, and the other appellees prefer the language of WYO. STAT. § 
1-5-101:

(a) 
Actions for the following causes shall be brought in the county in which the 
subject of the action is situate, except as provided in W.S. 1-5-102 and 
1-5-103:

(i) 
For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest 
therein;

(ii) 
For the partition of real property;

(iii) 
For the sale of real property under a mortgage, lien or other encumbrance or 
charge.

The 
theory for relying upon the latter statute is that some of the documents, which 
the children challenge as being the product of undue influence, relate to the 
transfer of an interest in property in Hot Springs County. The reasoning is that 
the challenge of the validity of the deeds and trust amendments executed by 
Nicholson constitute an action "for the recovery of real 
property."

[¶11]   The children's claims for relief 
are much broader than an action to recover real property. They are premised upon 
undue influence as the predicate for the challenge of the documents. This is not 
essentially an action to recover real property. Other claims for equitable 
relief flow based upon that allegation of undue influence. The children seek a 
declaratory judgment with respect to undue influence, a constructive trust, an 
accounting; and they also charge as torts intentional interference with 
expectancy and civil conspiracy. We are satisfied these claims as they are set 
forth in the children's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages are far 
broader than simply a claim for the recovery of real 
property.

[¶12]   As justification for invoking WYO. 
STAT. § 1-5-107, the children allege: 

1. 
Plaintiff Nancy N. Spear is a resident and citizen of the State of New 
Hampshire.

2. 
Plaintiff Elisabeth N. Holmes is a resident and citizen of the State of 
Virginia.

3. 
Plaintiff G.J. Guthrie Nicholson, III, is a resident and citizen of the State of 
Georgia.

The 
complaint then lists some thirty-four different defendants. Fifteen of the 
defendants are residents of Wyoming and nineteen are 
non-residents.

[¶13]   In plain language, WYO. STAT. § 
1-5-107 sets forth the proposition that an action can be brought against a 
non-resident, whether or not co-defendants reside in Wyoming, in any 
county in which the cause of action arose. The complaint recounts 
Nicholson executed some of the challenged documents in Casper, and the children 
properly can seek venue in Natrona County. See Baker v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Denver, 603 P.2d 397 (Wyo. 1979) (holding that causes of action may arise in 
the county where documents concerning property are executed, rather than where 
the property is situate.)

[¶14]   The widow, her son, and the other 
appellees contend, correctly, that the children's complaint does not allege 
Natrona County is the situs of the torts. The fact they did have notice of this 
assertion by the children is evidenced by the Memorandum Brief in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, which they filed in this case. In that document, 
the contention was made that there was no alleged tort nexus in Natrona County 
based upon Nicholson's execution in Casper of a third amendment to the original 
trust. We are satisfied, when the district court granted the Motion to Dismiss, 
there was before the court requisite information justifying the children's claim 
that venue was proper in Natrona County.

[¶15]   It was clear they relied upon the 
execution of some of the challenged documents in Casper. It is the exercise of 
undue influence upon Nicholson by the widow and her son, causing him to execute 
those documents, that constitutes the tortious acts asserted by the children. 
Venue properly exists where a tort is committed and where the cause of action 
arose. See Baker (holding that a cause of action arose in Colorado, where 
a note signed in Colorado was secured by property located in Wyoming). Other 
jurisdictions invoke this same rationale. E.g., Ebell v. Seapac Fisheries, 
Inc., 692 P.2d 956 (Alaska 1984); Whalen v. Snell, 205 Mont. 299, 667 P.2d 436 (1983); Straske v. McGillicuddy, 388 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1980).

[¶16]   We hold the children alleged 
adequate facts to justify venue in Natrona County as being the place "where the 
cause of action arose" in accordance with WYO. STAT. § 1-5-107. Venue 
appropriately was placed in Natrona County and, since we have held the district 
court had subject matter jurisdiction, the children should have been permitted 
to proceed with the trial of their case in Natrona County.

[¶17]   As a part of their appeal, the 
children suggest we should recognize the torts of intentional interference with 
expectancy and civil conspiracy as causes of action in Wyoming. The trial court 
did not reach that issue, and it would be premature for us to address it. Our 
rule is that we do not furnish advisory opinions. E.g., Wyoming Health 
Services, Inc. v. Deatherage, 773 P.2d 156 (Wyo. 1989); State Bd. of 
Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 745 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1987); Brad 
Ragan Tire Co. v. Gearhart Indus., 744 P.2d 1125 (Wyo. 1987); Graham v. 
Wyoming Peace Officer Standards and Training Comm'n., 737 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 
1987); Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Dev. Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 
1985); Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware), 638 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 
1981); Knudson v. Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1976); Wallace v. Casper 
Adjustment Serv., 500 P.2d 72 (Wyo. 1972). Cf. Engberg v. State, 874 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1994); Tobin v. Pursel, 539 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 1975); 
Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726 (Wyo. 1975); West v. Willey, 453 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1969).

[¶18]   In summary, we hold the district 
court had jurisdiction over the subject matter because WYO. STAT. § 2-2-101, as 
amended, did not provide for exclusive jurisdiction in the probate court. Venue 
was proper in Natrona County. The Order of Dismissal entered by the district 
court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings.

Footnotes

1 After the 1985 amendment, WYO. STAT. § 2-2-101 reads as follows with the 
added language shown in bold text:

The district courts of the state have exclusive original jurisdiction of 
all matters relating to the probate and contest of wills and testaments, the 
granting of letters testamentary and of administration, and the settlement and 
distribution of decedents' estates. The court granting the letters has exclusive 
jurisdiction of all matters touching the settlement and distribution of the 
estates for which letters have been granted. The jurisdiction over subject 
matter of the district court sitting in probate, sometimes referred to in this 
Title 2 as the "probate court", is coextensive with the jurisdiction over 
subject matter of the district court in any civil action. A decree of 
distribution entered by the district court in probate, pursuant to W.S. 2-7-807 
or 2-7-813, shall be a final determination of title as to assets described 
therein, as to all distributees served with notice, or who have waived notice, 
of the hearing provided for in W.S. 2-7-807 or 2-7-811, as the case may be. As 
to all other parties, an action may be brought and maintained at any time prior 
to the entry of final decree of distribution under W.S. 2-7-813, by or against 
the personal representative in the district court, sitting in probate, seeking 
any legal or equitable remedy as to any interest in property, real or personal, 
in which the estate asserts or claims any interest. In addition, all causes 
cognizable in the district court in any civil action may be brought and 
maintained, at any time prior to the entry of final decree of distribution under 
W.S. 2-7-813, by or against a personal representative in the district court 
sitting in probate which granted the letters to the personal 
representative.