Case Title: State v. Langley

Citation: 

Docket Number: S41885

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: DECEMBER 29, 2000 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent,
	v.
ROBERT PAUL LANGLEY, JR.,
	Appellant.
(CC 88-C-21624; SC S41885)

	On automatic and direct review of the sentence of death
imposed by the Circuit Court of Marion County.
	C. Gregory West, Judge.
	Argued and submitted October 13, 1999.
	Jesse Wm. Barton, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the supplemental brief and additional authorities
for appellant.  With him on the supplemental brief was David E.
Groom, Public Defender.  On the brief were Sally L. Avera, Public
Defender, and Diane L. Alessi, Chief Deputy Public Defender.  
	Robert P. Langley, Jr., filed a supplemental brief pro se. 
	Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs and additional authorities for
respondent.  With him on the brief, supplemental brief, and
additional authorities, were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.  Also on the brief was
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.*
	CARSON, C.J.
	The sentence of death is vacated, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
		CARSON, C.J.
		This is an automatic and direct review of a judgment
that imposed a sentence of death for aggravated murder.  Former
ORS 163.150(1)(g) (1993), renumbered as ORS 138.012(1) (1999). 
See Or Laws 1999, ch 1055, § 1 (repealing former ORS
163.150(1)(g) (1993)). (1)  This is the second time that the case
has been before this court.  On the first direct review, this
court affirmed all but one of defendant's convictions, vacated
the sentence of death, and remanded for resentencing due to an
error committed at trial.  State v. Langley, 314 Or 247, 839 P2d
692 (1992), on recons 318 Or 28, 861 P2d 1012 (1993) (Langley I). 
For the reasons that follow, we vacate defendant's second
sentence of death and remand this case to the trial court for
further penalty-phase proceedings.  
BACKGROUND

		This case stems from defendant's conviction on 16
counts of aggravated murder for the death of Gray.  The facts
regarding the crime are set out in Langley I, 314 Or at 249-52. 
At the time when the proceeding in Langley I was underway,
defendant already had been convicted and sentenced to death for
the murder of Rockenbrant.  This court subsequently vacated
defendant's death sentence in the Rockenbrant proceeding.  See
State v. Langley, 314 Or 511, 840 P2d 691 (1992) (reversing upon
ground that evidence of Gray murder erroneously admitted in
Rockenbrant proceeding). (2)  Defendant murdered both Gray and
Rockenbrant while he was living on the grounds of the Oregon
State Hospital and participating in a residential Criminal
Treatment Program (CTP) for mentally and emotionally disturbed
inmates.  
		As noted, after defendant had been convicted and
sentenced to death for the Gray murder, this court reversed the
sentence of death and remanded for a new penalty-phase proceeding
(remand proceeding).  This review stems from that remand
proceeding, at which a jury again sentenced defendant to death. 
On direct review, defendant raises 22 assignments of error, only
three of which we address in this opinion.
TRUE-LIFE SENTENCING OPTION

		Defendant's primary assignment of error relates to the
trial court's refusal to permit the jury to consider the option
of sentencing him to life in prison without the possibility of
parole (true life).  Defendant argues that the trial court was
required to instruct the jury on the true-life sentencing option
under former ORS 163.150(5) (1993), set out post, renumbered as   
ORS 138.012(2) (1999), (3) which, according to defendant, applied
retroactively to his remand proceeding.  In defendant's view,
because he expressly waived any constitutional ex post facto
objection to retroactive application of the true-life option, (4)
former ORS 163.150(5)(e) (1993) required the trial court to
instruct the jury on that option. 
		We begin by setting out the relevant procedural
history.  Gray was reported missing in December 1987, and her
body was discovered in April 1988.  In November 1989, a jury
convicted defendant of 16 counts of aggravated murder for Gray's
death.  At the time of defendant's trial, aggravated murder
proceedings were governed by ORS 163.150 (1989), (5) which recently had been amended by the 1989 Legislature and which, as relevant
here, purported to apply retroactively to "trials commencing on
or after July 19, 1989."  ORS 163.150(4) (1989).  Among other
things, the 1989 amendments added true life as a sentencing
option in aggravated-murder cases.  Or Laws 1989, ch 720, § 2. 
Before the 1989 amendments, only death and life imprisonment with
the possibility of parole (ordinary life) were possible sentences
for aggravated murder.  ORS 163.150(2) (1987).
		The trial court in Langley I applied ORS 163.150 (1989)
retroactively to defendant's case, instructing the jury on the
new, true-life sentencing option.  The jury unanimously answered
"yes" to the four statutory questions set out in               
ORS 163.150(1)(b) (1989), and the trial court entered a judgment
that convicted defendant of aggravated murder and sentenced him
to death.  Langley I, 314 Or at 252, 254 n 5.
		In 1992, this court considered the case on direct
review and affirmed all but one of defendant's convictions. 
However, the court concluded that the fourth question, asked of
the jury pursuant to ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989),
constitutionally was inadequate under State v. Wagner, 309 Or 5,
18, 786 P2d 93 (1990), because it failed to allow for proper
consideration of mitigating evidence.  Accordingly, the court
vacated defendant's sentence of death and remanded the case to
the trial court for further penalty-phase proceedings.  Langley
I, 314 Or at 272.  The court declined to consider defendant's
additional pro se argument that application of the true-life
sentencing option violated his constitutional protection against
ex post facto laws, concluding that, on remand, defendant would
be sentenced under the statutory scheme in effect at the time of
his crime.  In support, the court quoted State v. Isom, 313 Or
391, 395, 837 P2d 491 (1992), for the proposition that "the
legislature intends that Oregon courts sentence criminal
defendants under the statutory scheme in force when a particular
criminal act was committed."  Langley I, 314 Or at 254 n 5.
		Both defendant and the state petitioned for
reconsideration, which this court allowed to consider the ex post
facto issue.  Langley I, 314 Or 247, on recons 318 Or at 30
(Langley I (on reconsideration)).  On reconsideration, the court
discussed the then-recent case of State v. Wille, 317 Or 487,
505, 858 P2d 128 (1993), in which this court had held that
"[r]etroactive imposition of [the true-life sentencing option]
violated Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, and
Article I, section 10, of the Constitution of the United States." 
The court concluded that the constitutional prohibition against
ex post facto laws discussed in Wille, rather than the general
rule set out in Isom, precluded retroactive application of the
true-life sentencing option in defendant's case.  See State v.
McDonnell, 329 Or 375, 384 n 5, 987 P2d 486 (1999) (summarizing
Langley I (on reconsideration) in that manner).  The court
adhered to its earlier decision in Langley I and vacated
defendant's sentence of death, based upon the inadequacy of the
fourth question.  As with Langley I, the court remanded the case
to the trial court for further proceedings.  Langley I (on
reconsideration), 318 Or at 32.
		At his remand proceeding, which commenced in 1994,
defendant changed his strategy regarding the true-life sentencing
option and sought to waive his ex post facto objection to
retroactive application of ORS 163.150 (1989).  Defendant
specifically argued that the true-life option was available in
his remand proceeding under former ORS 163.150(5) (1993), which
provided for application of the true-life option in penalty-phase
proceedings conducted on remand and purportedly applied "to any
defendant sentenced to death after December 6, 1984."  Former ORS
163.150(5)(e) (1993). (6)  The trial court rejected defendant's
attempted waiver, reasoning that, because the true-life option
did not exist at the time of defendant's crime, that option was
not available in defendant's case in any circumstance under this
court's collective decisions in Langley I.  The trial court then
applied the statute in effect at the time of defendant's crime,
ORS 163.150 (1987), and instructed the jury that defendant must
be sentenced either to death or to ordinary life.  The jury
answered the four statutory questions in the affirmative, and the
trial court again sentenced defendant to death.  
		On direct review of the remand proceeding, defendant
now argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to
waive his ex post facto objections to the true-life sentencing
option set out in former ORS 163.150(5) (1993).  He primarily
relies upon McDonnell, 329 Or 375, in which this court held that
a trial court erred by refusing to allow a defendant to waive his
ex post facto objections to retroactive application of that
statute.  The state responds that, for various reasons, the rule
set out in McDonnell either should not or cannot apply to this
case.  
		We begin with the state's various preliminary
contentions.  The state first argues that the trial court lacked
authority to instruct on the true-life sentencing option because
that option was beyond the scope of this court's remand
instructions in Langley I (on reconsideration).  The state bases
that argument upon its understanding that, in Langley I (on
reconsideration), this court "unambiguously held that this
defendant may not be sentenced to true life on remand."  That
characterization is inaccurate.  Langley I (on reconsideration)
merely recognized that defendant's constitutional protection
against ex post facto laws, if asserted, would preclude the trial
court from applying the true-life option retroactively.  Nothing
in the remand instructions precluded the trial court from
accepting defendant's waiver of those constitutional rights on
remand; indeed, waiver was not at issue in the Langley I
proceedings.
		Second, the state argues that the doctrine of "the law
of the case" precludes application of the rule set out in
McDonnell.  The law of the case applies here, the state argues,
because, "[w]hen this case previously was before this court, the
court fully considered the issue and held (1) that the issue of
potential sentences on remand properly was before it, and (2)
that the true-life sentencing option was not among them."  
		Under the doctrine of the law of the case,
"when a ruling or decision has been once made in a
particular case by an appellate court, while it may be
overruled in other cases, it is binding and conclusive
both upon the inferior court in any further steps or
proceedings in the same litigation and upon the
appellate court itself in any subsequent appeal or
other proceeding for review."  
State v. Pratt, 316 Or 561, 569, 853 P2d 827 (1993) (internal
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the law of the case "precludes
relitigation or reconsideration of a point of law decided at an
earlier stage of the same case."  Koch v. So. Pac. Transp. Co.,
274 Or 499, 512, 547 P2d 589 (1976) (emphasis omitted).  
		In Langley I, the "point of law" at issue was whether
retroactive application of the true-life sentencing option to
defendant during his initial penalty-phase proceeding, to which
defendant timely had objected, would violate constitutional ex
post facto prohibitions.  On reconsideration, this court
concluded that it would.  That point of law is not in dispute
here.  Rather, the question is whether defendant, on remand, was
entitled to waive his constitutional protections against ex post
facto laws.  Because that question was not presented or decided
in the earlier proceeding, the doctrine of the law of the case
does not prevent us from considering it now.		
		Finally, the state asserts that, during the Langley I
proceeding, defendant did more than merely assert his ex post
facto rights; rather, he made a separate, more general argument
that the true-life sentencing option should not be provided to
any jury in his case.  Specifically, the state argues: 
	"It is important to note the breadth of defendant's
position:  He did not state merely that application of
the true-life sentencing option to him would violate ex
post facto principles; rather, he insisted that he must
be sentenced under the law as it existed at the time he
committed his offense.  The difference may be
important, because the latter position does not leave
room for an argument that, although the law is ex post
facto, the ex post facto violation may be waived.  In
short, defendant's position was that under no
circumstances could he be sentenced to true life."  
In the state's view, defendant is bound by that argument here.
		We disagree.  Even if defendant had made such an
argument in Langley I -- a point with which we do not necessarily
agree -- such an argument would have no bearing upon our present
review of the remand proceeding, particularly in light of the
rule announced in McDonnell, discussed below.
		We now apply the rule from McDonnell to determine
whether remand is appropriate in this case.  The defendant in
McDonnell, who committed his crime in 1984, filed a waiver of all
ex post facto objections to retroactive application of the true-life sentencing option at a remand proceeding that took place in
1993.  The trial court refused to provide the true-life
instruction in accordance with former ORS 163.150(5) (1993) and,
instead, instructed the jury as to only the two sentencing
options that were in effect in 1984 -- death and ordinary life. 
The defendant was sentenced to death.  On review, this court
concluded that the trial court had erred in refusing to provide
the true-life instruction, reasoning that the defendant was
entitled to, and did, waive his constitutional protections
against ex post facto laws.  McDonnell, 329 Or at 390, 392.
		Here, defendant argues that, as in McDonnell, he was
entitled to the true-life instruction at his remand proceeding,
even though that instruction was added by an amendment enacted
after his crime.  In McDonnell, this court concluded that, in
enacting former ORS 163.150(5) (1993), the legislature intended
the true-life sentencing option to be available in remand
proceedings in which a defendant had been sentenced to death
after December 6, 1984.  Because defendant originally was
sentenced to death in 1989, he falls within that class of
defendants.  We therefore conclude that the legislature intended
the true-life option to be available in defendant's remand
proceeding.
		The final question is whether, given our conclusion
that the legislature intended that former ORS 163.150(5) (1993)
apply retroactively to defendant's case, defendant in fact waived
any ex post facto objection.  In McDonnell, this court concluded
that the defendant's written waiver indicated that his decision
not to invoke his constitutional protection against ex post facto
laws constituted an intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
329 Or at 389, 392; see also State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 291, 4
P3d 1261 (2000) (reaching same conclusion in similar
circumstances).  Similarly, defendant here intentionally decided
not to invoke the protection of the state and federal ex post
facto clauses and submitted a written waiver to the court.  We
conclude that defendant waived the protection afforded by those
clauses. 
		The state argues, nonetheless, that this case is
distinguishable from McDonnell in two ways.  First, the state
emphasizes that, in McDonnell, the state acquiesced in the
defendant's request to apply the true-life sentencing option,
whereas, in this case, the state consistently has objected to
application of that option.  This court rejected that same
argument in Rogers, 330 Or at 291: 	"That the state objected to defendant's waiver in
this case, whereas, in McDonnell, it did not, makes no
difference to the result.  As this court observed in
McDonnell, the 'claim [that application of          
ORS 163.150(5) (1993) violated the prohibition against
ex post facto laws] was defendant's to assert, and he
did not do so.'  329 Or at 390.  Any objection by the
state to defendant's waiver of the protection of the ex
post facto clauses has no effect.  Because defendant
did not invoke those constitutional protections in this
case, he waived those protections."
(Brackets in original.)  We reject the state's argument here for
that same reason.
		Second, the state argues that this case differs from
McDonnell because the trial court in the Langley I proceeding
instructed the jury on the true-life sentencing option and the
jury nonetheless sentenced defendant to death.  The state argues:
		"Defendant's first jury, knowing that it had the
option of sentencing defendant to ordinary life, true
life, or death, chose the latter.  In short, what
defendant seeks here -- an opportunity for a jury to
consider the true-life sentencing option -- he already
has received.  This court should not reverse
defendant's death sentence simply to allow a second
jury to consider the options that one jury already has
considered." 
		Defendant counters that, although the jury in the
Langley I proceeding was instructed on the true-life sentencing
option, that jury received inadequate instructions on mitigating
evidence.  Defendant further points out that, although the jury
in his remand proceeding received adequate instructions on
mitigating evidence, it was not instructed properly on the true-life option.  Defendant argues that he is entitled to a penalty-phase proceeding in which the jury properly is instructed in all
respects.
		We agree with defendant.  A properly instructed jury,
that is, a jury properly instructed both on the true-life
sentencing option and on mitigating evidence, could have returned
a verdict supporting a sentence other than death.  We reject the
state's contrary argument.
		In sum, we conclude that we must vacate defendant's
sentence of death and remand the case for further proceedings. 
See Rogers, 330 Or at 291-92 (reaching same conclusion and
disposition); McDonnell, 329 Or at 392 (same).  Defendant raises
two additional assignments of error that are likely to arise on
remand, which we address below.  See, e.g., Rogers, 330 Or at 292
(following that methodology).  
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

		Defendant contends that certain evidence was admitted
at his remand proceeding in violation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege set out in OEC 504(2).  Specifically, defendant
objects to the admission of five exhibits and the testimony of
eight witnesses (discussed in further detail below), the
substance of which, to some extent, either pertained or referred
to defendant's participation in the CTP at the Oregon State
Hospital.  In defendant's view, the substance of all the evidence
at issue constituted privileged communications under OEC 504,
which provides, in part:
	"(1) * * * As used in this section, unless the
context requires otherwise:
	"(a) 'Confidential communication' means a
communication not intended to be disclosed to third
persons except:
	"* * * * *
	"(C) Persons who are participating in the
diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the
psychotherapist, including members of the patient's
family.
	"(b) 'Patient' means a person who consults or is
examined or interviewed by a psychotherapist.
	"* * * * *
	"(2) * * * A patient has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing confidential communications made for the
purposes of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's
mental or emotional condition among the patient, the
patient's psychotherapist or persons who are
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the
direction of the psychotherapist, including members of
the patient's family." (7)
Defendant further contends that the admission of the evidence at
issue violated his right to privacy under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (8)  
		In response, the state contends, among other things,
that:  (1) this court previously held in Langley I, 314 Or at
265-67, that defendant had waived his psychotherapist-patient
privilege as to some of the communications at issue and,
therefore, that particular evidence and other related evidence
now is admissible as the law of the case; (2) much of the
challenged evidence was not privileged in any event under OEC
504; and (3) defendant's constitutional privacy argument is
without merit. 
		We begin with the challenged exhibits and the state's
argument that this court's decision in Langley I controls our
determination of the evidentiary issue before us now.  In Langley
I, this court addressed the admissibility of three of the five
exhibits at issue here, all of which arose from defendant's
participation in the CTP:  (1) a "treatment contract" (exhibit
1140); (2) a "self-assessment" (exhibit 1141); and (3) a 13-page
"life history" (exhibit 1297).  314 Or at 262.  The court first
determined that the psychotherapist-patient privilege set out in
OEC 504(2) applied to each of those three exhibits.  Id. at 263-64.  The court then concluded, however, that, because exhibits
1140 and 1141 previously had been admitted during the Rockenbrant
trial, defendant had waived his privilege as to those exhibits
under OEC 511, which provides, in part:
	"A person upon whom * * * Rules 503 to 514 * * *
confer a privilege against disclosure of the
confidential matter or communication waives the
privilege if the person * * * voluntarily discloses or
consents to disclosure of any significant part of the
matter or communication. * * *"
(Brackets omitted); Langley I, 314 Or at 264-65.  Finally, the
court reviewed the contents of exhibit 1297 and concluded that
that exhibit disclosed a "significant part" of the communications
contained in exhibits 1140 and 1141 under OEC 511, because "[t]he
subject matter of all [the] documents was the mental or emotional
problems underlying defendant's tendency to commit crimes." 
Langley I, 314 Or at 266.  Accordingly, the court concluded that,
as with exhibits 1140 and 1141, defendant had waived his
privilege in respect of exhibit 1297.  Id.
		Defendant argues that, as to those three exhibits,
Langley I should not be deemed controlling because he personally
and affirmatively had not waived his privilege during the
Rockenbrant trial.  This court rejected defendant's similar
argument in Langley I, noting that defense counsel in the
Rockenbrant trial took time to review exhibits 1140 and 1141, and
thereafter did not object to their admission.  Id. at 265 n 14. 
We again reject defendant's argument for that reason.  See Pratt,
316 Or at 569 (under doctrine of law of the case, earlier
appellate court decision is binding and conclusive in subsequent
proceedings involving same issue in same case); see also
Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, Ltd., 314 Or 336, 342, 838
P2d 1069 (1992) (in absence of evidence to contrary, court can
infer that lawyer who voluntarily turns over privileged material
during discovery acts within scope of authority from client and
with client's consent); Groff v. S.I.A.C., 246 Or 557, 566-67,
426 P2d 738 (1967) (noting that statutory privilege can be waived
when evidence at issue offered by holder of privilege during her
case-in-chief or otherwise without objection).  Accordingly, we
hold that the trial court did not err in admitting exhibits 1140,
1141, and 1297 into evidence during the remand proceeding. (9)
		Defendant also challenges the admission of exhibit
1104, which sets out a record of defendant's requests for off-premises passes, as well as his check-in and check-out records.
Although it is unclear from the record before us whether exhibit
1104, like exhibits 1140 and 1141, was admitted during the
Rockenbrant trial, we have reviewed the record from the Langley I 
proceedings and have determined that that exhibit was admitted,
without objection, (10) during the guilt phase.  Consequently, even
assuming (without deciding) that exhibit 1104 disclosed
privileged communications under OEC 504, we conclude, for the
same reasoning set out in Langley I, 314 Or at 264-65, that
defendant waived his privilege in respect of that exhibit.
		We turn to exhibit 1379, which consists of the
following materials relating to defendant's stay at the CTP:  a
face sheet summarizing defendant's medical record; a list of the
reasons for defendant's admission to the CTP and his progress
while in attendance; a psychological evaluation; a comprehensive
list of chart notes dating from August 1987 to April 1988 that
summarize defendant's off-premises passes, check-in and check-out
records, interaction with staff, and weekly progress updates; a
psychological diagnosis update; information concerning
defendant's identified mental and emotional problems, and his
treatment plan; progress records; and a security-action sheet. 
As with exhibits 1140, 1141, 1297, and 1104, defendant contends
that exhibit 1379 consists of privileged communications under OEC
504(2) that should not have been admitted at trial.  The state
responds that, as with the other exhibits, defendant waived his
privilege.
		As noted, in Langley I, this court concluded that
defendant had waived his privilege in respect of exhibits 1140
and 1141, the subject matter of which was defendant's "mental or
emotional problems underlying [his] tendency to commit crimes." 
314 Or at 266.  Under OEC 511, a waiver occurs when the holder of
the privilege "voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of
any significant part of the matter or communication."  (Emphasis
added.)  Like exhibits 1140, 1141, and 1297, a "significant part"
of the material contained in exhibit 1379 relates to the mental
and emotional problems underlying defendant's tendency to commit
crimes -- in addition to other information concerning his
treatment goals, progress, and a record of his leaving and
returning to the CTP.  Similarly, parts of exhibit 1379 duplicate
much of the information contained in exhibit 1104, regarding
defendant's off-premises pass requests and check-in and check-out
records.  Because a "significant part" of the substance of
exhibit 1379 previously was admitted without objection during
both the Rockenbrant trial and the Langley I proceedings, we
hold, under the same reasoning set out in Langley I, 314 Or at
264-65, in respect of exhibit 1297, that defendant has waived his
privilege as to the content of exhibit 1379.
		In addition to the five exhibits discussed above,
defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the
testimony of eight witnesses, upon the ground that each witness
testified as to confidential communication protected by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.  The state responds that the
objectionable subject matter of each witness's testimony fell
within the scope of defendant's waiver discussed in Langley I
and, accordingly, that testimony must be deemed admissible under
the law of the case.  Alternatively, the state argues that much
of the testimony at issue did not involve privileged
communications.
		For seven of the eight witnesses at issue, (11) we need
not determine whether their testimony disclosed privileged
communications under OEC 504 or whether that testimony fell
within the scope of defendant's waiver under OEC 511 concerning
the exhibits at issue in Langley I.  That is so, because those
seven witnesses all testified without objection (12) during either
the guilt or penalty phase of defendant's trial in Langley I.  We
have reviewed the records from both that proceeding and
defendant's remand proceeding, and have concluded that each
witness's testimony, to the extent that it arguably disclosed any
privileged communications, conveyed essentially the same
information in both proceedings. (13)  Accordingly, we conclude
that, consistent with the analysis in Langley I, 314 Or at 264-65, 265 n 14, concerning defendant's waiver of the privilege
during the Rockenbrant trial, defendant similarly waived his
privilege in respect of the communications disclosed in the
testimony of those seven witnesses.
		As to the eighth witness, Ulven, we conclude that her
testimony did not disclose any privileged communication.  Ulven,
who is defendant's second cousin, testified about a number of
conversations that she had had with defendant while he was on
family visits approved by CTP staff.  In those conversations,
which took place off the state hospital grounds, defendant told
Ulven about his criminal record and his plans for the future. 
Nothing in the record demonstrates that Ulven was "participating
in the diagnosis and treatment" of defendant "under the direction
of [a] psychotherapist," OEC 504(1)(a)(C), or that the
communications were made "for the purposes of diagnosis or
treatment of [defendant]'s mental or emotional condition," OEC
504(2).  In short, defendant's conversations with Ulven simply do
not fit within the definition of "confidential communication" set
out in OEC 504.
		Defendant next contends that, in respect of all the
challenged exhibits and testimony, an initial violation of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege occurred when police
investigators seized various CTP documents and interviewed CTP
staff and inmate participants, following the discovery of the
bodies of Rockenbrant and Gray, thereby obtaining information
concerning defendant's privileged communications and actions
while a patient at the CTP.  Defendant continues that a similar
violation of the privilege occurred when CTP staff and inmate
participants testified before the grand jury that ultimately
indicted defendant on multiple counts of aggravated murder.  In
defendant's view, those initial disclosures -- of which he was
unaware and to which he did not consent -- dictate that
subsequent references to the same privileged communications
should have been deemed inadmissible at his remand proceeding.
		Assuming, without deciding, that CTP staff violated
defendant's psychotherapist-patient privilege when they spoke to
investigators and testified before the grand jury, we disagree
that such facts preclude the conclusion that defendant
nonetheless voluntarily waived the privilege at a later time,
specifically, during the Rockenbrant trial and the Langley I
proceedings.  At the outset, we note the well-settled principle
that a privilege pertaining to confidential communications
terminates upon the holder's voluntary waiver:
"'Briefly, a privilege is lost when the reason for it
ceases to apply.  As the commentary to Federal Rule 511
explains:
	"'"The central purpose of most
privileges is the promotion of some interest
or relationship by endowing it with a
supporting secrecy or confidentiality.  It is
evident that the privilege should terminate
when the holder by [the holder's] own act
destroys this confidentiality.  McCormick,
Evidence §§ 93, 103 (2d ed 1972); 8 Wigmore,
Evidence §§ 2242, 2327-2329, 2374, 2389-2390
(McNaughton rev 1961).
	"'"* * * * * 
	"'"By traditional doctrine, waiver is
the intentional relinquishment of a known
right.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464,
58 S Ct 1019, 82 L Ed 1461 (1938).  However,
in the confidential privilege situations,
once confidentiality is destroyed through
voluntary disclosure, no subsequent claim of
privilege can restore it, and knowledge or
lack of knowledge of the existence of the
privilege appears to be irrelevant. 
California Evidence Code § 912; Wigmore §
2327."'"
Goldsborough, 314 Or at 341 (quoting Commentary to OEC 511,
reprinted in Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence, 282-83 (2d ed
1989)) (emphasis added).  
		It follows from the foregoing that a voluntary waiver
can operate to terminate a privilege to confidential
communications, notwithstanding that another participant in the
communications might have violated the privilege at an earlier
time without the holder's knowledge or consent.  Accordingly, we
conclude that defendant's waiver of his psychotherapist-patient
privilege during the Rockenbrant trial and the Langley I
proceedings as to the exhibits and testimony at issue operated to
terminate that privilege, notwithstanding possible earlier
violations of the privilege by CTP staff and inmate participants. 
Compare State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 709 P2d 225 (1985) (state-employed psychotherapist's unauthorized disclosure of privileged
communications to police deemed inadmissible in subsequent
prosecution of criminal defendant; waiver not at issue).
		Defendant next contends that, in disclosing privileged
information to police investigators and the grand jury, CTP staff
violated his right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.  We agree with defendant that, at
the least, his constitutional right to privacy might have been
implicated by those disclosures. (14)  As explained below, however,
we need not make that determination here, because we conclude
that defendant waived any protection afforded to him under the
Fourteenth Amendment.  
		As explained earlier, defendant's failure to object to
the admission of certain exhibits and testimony during the
Rockenbrant trial and the Langley I proceedings constituted a
voluntary waiver of his psychotherapist-patient privilege under
OEC 511.  See __ Or at ___ (slip op at 17, 25) (under OEC 511,
holder can waive privilege by voluntarily disclosing or
consenting to disclosure of any significant part of
communications; holder need not be aware of existence of
privilege to waive it).  In criminal cases involving
constitutional rights, a waiver ordinarily is treated as "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."  Johnson, 304 US at 464.  However, the Supreme Court
recently has noted that, in certain circumstances, the test for
determining whether such a waiver has occurred can be a flexible
one:
	"What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of
the right at issue.  '[W]hether the defendant must
participate personally in the waiver; whether certain
procedures are required for waiver; and whether the
defendant's choice must be particularly informed or
voluntary, all depend on the right at stake.'  United
States v. Olano, 507 US 725, 733 (1993).  For certain
fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make
an informed waiver.  See, e.g., Johnson * * *, 304 US
[at] 464-65 * * * (right to counsel); Brookhart v.
Janis, 384 US 1, 7-8 (1966) (right to plead not
guilty).  For other rights, however, waiver may be
effected by action of counsel.  'Although there are
basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the
fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the
client, the lawyer has -- and must have -- full
authority to manage the conduct of the trial.'  Taylor
v. Illinois, 484 US 400 (1988). * * * Thus, decisions
by counsel are generally given effect as to what
arguments to pursue, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 US 745
(1983) [and] what evidentiary objections to raise, see
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 US 443, 451 (1965) * * *. 
Absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsel's
word on such matters is the last."
New York v. Hill, 528 US 110, 120 S Ct 659, 664, 145 L Ed 2d 560
(2000).  See also Taylor, 484 US at 418 ("Putting to one side the
exceptional cases in which counsel is ineffective, the client
must accept the consequences of the lawyer's decision to forgo
cross-examination [or] to decide not to put certain witnesses on
the stand * * *.").
		The foregoing statements from the Supreme Court
demonstrate that a criminal defendant personally need not waive
certain federal constitutional protections.  Rather, absent a
demonstration that counsel was ineffective, or some other
affirmative showing that no waiver in fact occurred, a defendant
can be deemed to have consented voluntarily to certain actions of
defense counsel, such as the failure to object to certain
evidence.  Compare Taylor, 484 US at 418 (notwithstanding
Compulsory Process Clause of Sixth Amendment, client bound by
defense counsel's decision to withhold identity of witness,
resulting in trial court's refusal to hear witness's testimony),
with Henry, 379 US at 451 n 7 (no waiver where defense counsel
briefly broached subject of certain evidence only after moving
for directed verdict upon ground that evidence obtained
illegally).  
		In this case, defense counsel did not object to any of
the evidence at issue upon privacy grounds during the Langley I
proceedings.  Accordingly, we conclude that defendant waived any
privacy protection afforded to him under the Fourteenth
Amendment. (15)
ACCOMPLICE INSTRUCTIONS

		Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
refusing to give five requested jury instructions concerning
accomplice testimony, in connection with the testimony of Thayer,
who was defendant's girlfriend at the time of Gray's murder.  The
requested instructions (1) defined the term "accomplice witness";
(2) stated that defendant had the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that a witness was an accomplice
witness; (3) explained the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard; (4) stated that, if the jury found Thayer to be an
accomplice witness, then it should view her testimony with
distrust; and (5) defined the terms "aid[]" and "abet[]."  The
trial court refused to give those instructions, reasoning that
they were not relevant to the penalty phase of defendant's trial.
		Defendant argues that the trial court should have
instructed the jury that it could consider whether Thayer was an
accomplice in Gray's murder and, if it so found, that the jury
should view her testimony with distrust.  In defendant's view,
such instructions would have served a mitigating purpose,
because, so instructed, the jury might have determined that
defendant should not be sentenced to death if it thought that
Thayer also was involved in Gray's murder.  The state responds
alternatively that:  (1) as the trial court concluded, the
instructions at issue are not applicable in a penalty-phase
proceeding; and (2) in any event, defendant failed to present any
evidence that tended to prove that Thayer had acted as an
accomplice.  
		This court reviews a trial court's refusal to give a
requested jury instruction for error as a matter of law.  State
v. Moore, 324 Or 396, 427, 927 P2d 1073 (1996).  For the reasons
explained below, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
refusing to give defendant's requested accomplice instructions in
the remand proceeding.
		The issue of accomplice testimony generally arises
under the corroboration requirement of ORS 136.440, which
provides, in part:
	"(1) A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony
of an accomplice unless it is corroborated by other
evidence that tends to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense. * * *
	"(2) As used in this section, an 'accomplice'
means a witness in a criminal action who, according to
the evidence adduced in the action, is criminally
liable for the conduct of the defendant under ORS
161.155 and 161.165[. (16)]"
(Emphasis added.)  In light of that corroboration requirement,
juries are to be instructed, "on all proper occasions," that "the
testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust." 
ORS 10.095(4); see also State v. Simson, 308 Or 102, 110, 775 P2d
837 (1989) (purpose of corroboration requirement and accompanying
accomplice instructions is to highlight fact that "criminals may
falsely accuse others of their misdeeds in order to minimize
their own culpability").
		The corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony
in ORS 136.440(1) is a predicate for entry of a conviction.  That
is, if the evidence includes the testimony of an accomplice, then
the court cannot enter a conviction unless the record also
contains other evidence that corroborates the accomplice's
testimony in the manner stated in ORS 136.440(1).  
		In a trial for aggravated murder, the jury addresses
the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence during the guilt
phase.  If the jury determines that the defendant is guilty of
aggravated murder, then the trial proceeds to the penalty phase. 
However, the jury does not address, during the penalty phase, the
question whether the defendant committed the charged crime. 
Instead, the jury determines the appropriate penalty for the
crime for which the jury found the defendant guilty during the
guilt phase.  
		In short, within the structure of a trial for
aggravated murder, only during the guilt phase does the jury
decide whether to "convict" the defendant.  See ORS 163.150(1)(a)
(contrasting guilt phase with penalty phase).  That supports the
conclusion that the corroboration requirement set out in ORS
136.440(1) applies only during the guilt phase.  The requirement
in that statute that corroborative evidence must "tend[] to
connect the defendant with the commission of the offense" also
reinforces our view that the corroboration requirement pertains
only to the guilt phase of a trial for aggravated murder.  That
is the only plausible interpretation that we can draw from the
statutory text and context of ORS 136.440(1).  See PGE v. Bureau
of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (if
statutory meaning is clear from examination of text and context,
further inquiry is unnecessary).
		From the foregoing, we conclude that ORS 136.440 did
not entitle defendant to jury instructions regarding the
corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony during his
remand proceeding, which pertained only to the ascertainment of
the proper penalty for aggravated murder.  The trial court
therefore did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested
instructions. (17)
REMAINING ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

We have considered defendant's remaining assignments of
error and have concluded that they involve either issues that
this court previously has decided in the state's favor or are not
likely to arise on remand, or arguments that are not developed or
are without merit.
CONCLUSION

In summary, we conclude that the trial court erred when
it refused to permit defendant to waive any ex post facto
objection to retroactive application of the true-life sentencing
option set out in former ORS 163.150(5) (1993) and when it
refused to instruct the jury on that option.  That error requires
us to vacate the sentence of death and remand the case for
further proceedings.  We further conclude that the trial court
did not err in admitting evidence that defendant contends was
subject to a psychotherapist-patient privilege under OEC 504, as
well as a constitutional right to privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Finally, we conclude that the trial court did not err
in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instructions on
accomplice testimony.
		The sentence of death is vacated, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.



1. 	In enacting ORS 138.012, the 1999 Legislature
renumbered the statute that described this court's review
authority in death-penalty cases, but made no substantive change
to that authority.

2. 	On remand, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment
with a 30-year minimum for the Rockenbrant murder.

3. 	As with former ORS 163.150(1)(g) (1993), the 1999
Legislature made no substantive changes when it renumbered former
ORS 163.150(5) (1993) as ORS 138.012(2).  We refer to the 1993
statute throughout this opinion.

4. 	Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:  "No ex-post facto law * * * shall ever be
passed * * *."  Article I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution, provides, in part: "No State shall * * * pass any * * * ex post facto Law * * *." 

5. 	ORS 163.150 (1989) provided, in part:
		"(1)(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is
guilty of aggravated murder, the court, except as
otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section,
shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to
life imprisonment, as described in ORS 163.105(1)(c),
life imprisonment without the possibility of release or
parole, as described in ORS 163.105(1)(b), or death. * * *.
		"(b)  Upon the conclusion of the presentation of
the evidence, the court shall submit the following
issues to the jury:  
		"(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;
		"(B) Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society;
		"(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased; and
		"(D) If constitutionally required, considering the
extent to which the defendant's character and
background, and the circumstances of the offense may
reduce the defendant's moral culpability or
blameworthiness for the crime, whether a sentence of
death be imposed.
		"* * * * *
		"(2)(a) Upon the conclusion of the presentation of
the evidence, the court shall also instruct the jury
that if it reaches a negative finding on any issue
under paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section,
the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment without the possibility of release or
parole, as described in ORS 163.105(1)(b), unless 10 or
more members of the jury further find that there are
sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life
imprisonment, in which case the trial court shall
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as
described in ORS 163.105(1)(c).
		"* * * * *
		"(4) * * * Subsection (2) of this section shall
apply only to trials commencing on or after July 19,
1989."

6. 	Former ORS 163.150(5) (1993) provided, in part:
		" * * * Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a) of this
section, the following shall apply:
		"(a) If a reviewing court finds prejudicial error
in the sentencing proceeding only, the court may set
aside the sentence of death and remand the case to the
trial court. * * * Upon remand and at the election of
the state, the trial court shall either:
		"(A) Sentence the defendant to imprisonment for
life in the custody of the Department of Corrections as
provided in ORS 163.105(1)(c); or
		"(B) Impanel a new sentencing jury for the purpose
of conducting a new sentencing proceeding to determine
if the defendant should be sentenced to:
		"(i) Death;
		"(ii) Imprisonment for life without the
possibility of release or parole as provided in ORS
163.105(1)(b); or
		"(iii) Imprisonment for life in the custody of the
Department of Corrections as provided in ORS
163.105(1)(c).
		"* * * * *
	"(e) The provisions of this section are procedural
and shall apply to any defendant sentenced to death
after December 6, 1984."

7. 	In respect of defendant's challenge to all the
communications at issue, we note that neither party has
questioned whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies
when the relationship itself is imposed by the state.  As have
the parties, we proceed on the assumption that it does.

8. 	The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in part:  "No State shall * * * deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."

9. 	Defendant contends that the doctrine of "the law of the
case" should not apply here because he produced new evidence
below demonstrating that he personally had not waived his
privilege in respect of exhibits 1140 and 1141 during the
Rockenbrant trial.  Defendant is correct that, as a general
matter, the doctrine of the law of the case is inapplicable in
light of new facts or evidence bearing on the legal issue in
question.  See Huszar v. Certified Realty Co., 272 Or 517, 523,
538 P2d 57 (1975) (doctrine inapplicable where parties produce
further evidence); Peltier v. Dahlke, 256 Or 84, 88-89, 471 P2d
434 (1970) (application of doctrine turns upon whether evidence
offered at subsequent proceeding "substantially the same" as
earlier evidence).  However, defendant points to no part of the
record -- and we have found none -- that supports his contention
that he introduced further evidence establishing that he did not
personally waive his privilege during the Rockenbrant trial.

10. 	We note that, during the Langley I proceedings, defense
counsel initially objected to parts of exhibit 1104 upon
relevance and prejudice grounds, but never upon privilege
grounds.  The state redacted the objectionable parts of the
exhibit after conferring with defense counsel.  That redacted
exhibit appears to be the same as the exhibit at issue here.

11. 	Those seven witnesses were:  Sampson (CTP program
coordinator and provider of after-care treatment); Romany (CTP
therapy supervisor); Northcott (CTP security director); Briggs
(CTP night-shift security aide); McEvoy (CTP night-shift security
aide); Layton (former inmate and CTP participant); and Gowin
(former inmate and CTP participant).

12. 	We note that, in a few isolated instances, defense
counsel in the Langley I proceedings did object during the course
of certain witnesses' testimony; however, such objections were
not based upon the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  We further
note that one of the witnesses at issue, Samson, was called by
the defense, as well as the state, during the Langley I
proceedings, and testified in that regard as to some of the
communications at issue.

13. 	We note that the testimony of Layton, a former inmate
and CTP participant, during the remand proceeding, conveyed some
additional information that his testimony during the Langley I
proceedings did not convey.  Specifically, Layton testified about
defendant's somewhat suspicious acquisition of a vehicle about
the time when Rockenbrant was murdered, as well as two isolated
incidents in which defendant had displayed aggression toward
Layton while participating in the CTP.  However, to the extent
that that new testimony arguably disclosed any privileged
communications under OEC 504, certain testimony of other
witnesses during the Langley I proceedings -- specifically,
Romany (CTP therapy supervisor) and Briggs (CTP night-shift
security aide) -- disclosed a "significant part," OEC 511, of
Layton's new testimony during the remand proceeding.

14. 	We note that, in Miller, 300 Or at 220 n 10, this court
rejected a similar contention that an unauthorized disclosure of
privileged information by a state-employed psychotherapist
violated the defendant's right to privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment.  The Miller court relied upon Whalen v. Roe, 429 US
589, 97 S Ct 869, 51 L Ed 2d 64 (1977), for the proposition that
the United States Supreme Court had rejected the notion that the
doctor-patient relationship falls within a constitutional zone of
privacy.  Miller, 300 Or at 220 n 10.
		In Whalen, 429 US 589, the Supreme Court upheld a state
statute that required physicians to report their patients'
prescriptions for certain controlled substances to the state, in
light of strict statutory safeguards protecting against
unwarranted disclosure.  Upon further review of Whalen, we agree
with defendant that that case does not preclude the conclusion
that information conveyed to a psychotherapist during the course
of the psychotherapist-patient relationship could fall within the
privacy interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Indeed,
in Whalen, the Supreme Court stated that one type of privacy so
protected is "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters."  Whalen, 429 US at 599.  Following Whalen, a
number of courts have held that medical information falls within
that protection, see Doe v. City of New York, 15 F3d 264, 267 (2d
Cir 1994) ("the right to confidentiality includes the right to
protection regarding information about the state of one's
health"); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F2d 570,
577 (3d Cir 1980) (to same effect), and some specifically have
held that the psychotherapist-patient relationship also falls
within that protection, see Hawaii Psychiatric Soc., Dist. Branch
v. Ariyoshi, 481 F Supp 1028, 1038 (D HI 1979) (right to choose
confidentiality "particularly crucial" in context of
psychotherapist-patient communications); Hirschfeld v. Stone, 193
FRD 175, 185-86 (SD NY 2000) (disclosure of incarcerated criminal
defendants' psychiatric and medical information deemed to be
invasion of constitutional right to privacy).  See also generally
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 US 1, 11, 116 S Ct 1923, 135 L Ed 2d 337
(1996) (in concluding that psychotherapist-patient communications
fall within federal evidentiary privilege, Supreme Court noted
that protection of such communications from involuntarily
disclosure "serves important private interests").

15. 	Defendant also contends that, because the state
violated his right to privacy, any additional information
obtained from CTP staff and inmate participants was inadmissible
as fruit of the poisonous tree.  We need not address that
argument, in light of our conclusion that defendant waived any
right to privacy that might have been implicated.
		Finally, defendant contends that the state should be
estopped from prosecuting him using evidence obtained in
violation of his psychotherapist-patient privilege and right to
privacy.  However, defendant did not make that argument in the
trial court; therefore, we do not address it.

16. 	ORS 161.155 provides:
"A person is criminally liable for the conduct of
another person constituting a crime if:
	"(1) The person is made criminally liable by the
statute defining the crime; or
	"(2) With the intent to promote or facilitate the
commission of the crime the person:
	"(a) Solicits or commands such other person to
commit the crime; or
	"(b) Aids or abets or agrees or attempts to aid or
abet such other person in planning or committing the
crime; or
	"(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission
of the crime, fails to make an effort the person is
legally required to make."
ORS 161.165 provides:
	"Except as otherwise provided by the statute
defining the crime, a person is not criminally liable
for conduct of another constituting a crime if:
	"(1) The person is a victim of that crime; or
	"(2) The crime is so defined that the conduct of
the person is necessarily incidental thereto."

17. 	In this assignment of error, defendant also contends
that the trial court's refusal to give his requested instructions
prevented the jury from considering mitigating evidence; at
trial, defendant cited Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US 302, 109 S Ct
2934, 106 L Ed 2d 256 (1989), to support that proposition. 
However, the trial court's proper refusal to give the requested
instructions did not preclude defendant from arguing to the jury
his theory that Thayer's testimony was not credible because she
might have been involved in Gray's murder.  Further, the trial
court properly instructed the jury on mitigating evidence under
the fourth question currently set out in ORS 163.150(b)(D).  See
Moore, 324 Or at 432 (fourth question enacted to comply with
Penry, concerning effect of Eighth Amendment upon state's ability
to narrow jury discretion in considering mitigating evidence);
Wagner, 309 Or at 18 (clarifying fourth question).  For those
reasons, we reject defendant's argument.