Case Title: WENTLAND v. B.B.C. CORPORATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
WENTLAND v. B.B.C. CORPORATION2004 WY 11398 P.3d 196Case Number: 03-247Decided: 09/24/2004
April 
Term, A.D. 2004

 
 

NEDRA 
RONEY, a/k/a NEDRA RONEY

WENTLAND,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

B.B.C. 
CORPORATION, a Wyoming corporation,

d/b/a 
COLDWELL BANKER/THE REAL ESTATE

CO. 
IN JACKSON, WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Frank 
Hess and Paul E. D'Amours of Hess Carlman & D'Amours, LLC, Jackson, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
D'Amours.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Weston 
W. Reeves and Timothy W. Miller of Reeves & Miller, Casper, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Reeves.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

  LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      This 
is an appeal from the district court judgment ruling that appellant Nedra Dee 
Roney (Roney) is liable under a listing agreement for the payment of a 
commission, plus prejudgment interest and attorneys fees to appellee B.B.C. 
Corporation, doing business as Coldwell Banker/The Real Estate Company in 
Jackson, Wyoming (BBC).  We 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Roney sets forth 
the following issues on appeal:

 

I.  Did 
the trial court err in concluding that Appellant and Appellee made an express 
contract, the terms of which were contained in the exclusive listing 
agreement?

 

II.  Did 
the trial court err in finding that the brokerage disclosure received by 
Appellant was in substantial compliance with Wyoming Statute § 
33-28-306?

 

III.  Did 
the trial court err in finding that the release of Appellant from the listing 
agreement by John Gould was not effective to release Appellee's interest in the 
listing contract?

 

IV.  Did 
the trial court err in failing to find that Appellee was the first to breach the 
contract?

 

V.  Did 
the trial court err in awarding Appellee the full 7% 
commission?

 

VI.  Did 
the trial court err in awarding attorneys fees?

 

 

1.  Whether 
the trial court clearly erred in finding appellant liable for a commission based 
on undisputed evidence admitted at trial without 
objection.

 

2.  Whether 
appellant can use technical defects in disclosures approved by her real estate 
portfolio manager to avoid paying the commission she owes 
appellee.

 

[¶3]      Roney is a 
sophisticated owner of real estate worth millions of dollars located in 
California, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, and the Cayman Islands.  John Gould (Gould), a California 
licensed real estate agent working for Coldwell Banker/Beverly Hills North 
(CB/BHN), worked with Roney in the real estate arena for over ten years.  On March 22, 2001, Roney and Gould 
entered into an agreement making Gould her real estate portfolio manager, 
wherein Gould was authorized to identify and consult with local area brokers to 
co-list Roney's properties.  Roney 
retained signatory authority for any transactions. 

 

[¶4]      On January 26, 
2001, Roney and Gould executed California listing agreements for three separate 
properties located in Teton and Fremont Counties in Wyoming, commonly known as 
the Pine Meadows, Smoky Hollow-Mosquito Creek, and Lucky Dog properties.  The listing prices were $5.9 million, 
$12.5 million, and $650,000, respectively.  
On this same date, Roney and Gould signed a California real estate agency 
disclosure form.  Later, on February 
9, 2001, Roney and Gould executed another California listing agreement 
concerning a property located in Bonneville County, Idaho, commonly known as the 
Pine Creek Ranch for the listing price of $2.5 million.  Subsequently still, on March 22, 2001, 
Roney and Gould executed a California listing agreement concerning a separate 
property located within the downtown area of Jackson, Wyoming ("Downtown 
property") for the listing price of $2.2 million.  The latter transaction is the subject of 
this action. 

 

[¶5]      Each of the 
listing agreements provided that Roney pay a seven percent commission on the 
listing price in the event she withdrew the properties from the market without 
prior consent.  The agreements also 
stated that Gould would locate a local broker to co-list the properties and that 
the local laws, rules, and regulations wherein each respective property was 
located would prevail. 

 

[¶6]      In early 2001, 
Gould and Roney's attorney, Tom Branch, met with members of BBC, including Cyril 
Richard (Richard), a broker licensed in both Idaho and Wyoming, to find an 
acceptable local real estate broker to list the properties.  Ultimately, BBC was formally retained, 
and Richard executed each of the listing agreements on behalf of BBC.  Specifically with respect to the listing 
agreement concerning the Downtown property, Gould faxed the listing agreement 
that had already been signed by Roney and Gould and a co-listing agreement as 
between Gould and BBC to Richard on March 27, 2001.  Richard signed the listing agreement and 
co-listing agreement and returned the co-listing agreement to Gould.1  

 

[¶7]      BBC extensively 
marketed each of the properties for sale.  
Through BBC's efforts, the Pinecreek Ranch property located in Idaho sold 
in June 2001.  Upon the closing of 
that sale, Roney identified BBC as the listing broker, and BBC received payment 
of its commission.  On June 20, 
2001, Roney asked Gould if she could withdraw the Wyoming properties from the 
market and be released from the listing agreements.  Gould agreed and advised Roney of such 
releases on his part, but warned that his release may not be binding on 
BBC.  Gould then requested that BBC 
release Roney from the listing agreements.  
In particular, Gould explained that Roney often varied her position with 
respect to sales of her real estate portfolio and that because she was a very 
important client, he let her do what she wanted in an effort to retain her 
business.  BBC refused to release 
Roney outright from the listing agreements, but stated that it would consider 
releasing the listing agreements concerning any transaction wherein Roney traded 
property with her brother, as long as Roney paid for BBC's expenses.  Ultimately, BBC formally agreed to 
accept payment of its expenses from Roney and released the listing agreement 
concerning the Smoky Hollow-Mosquito Creek property that Roney traded with her 
brother for other property. 

 

[¶8]      On September 6, 
2001, the Lucky Dog property sold through BBC's efforts, and BBC received a 
commission from the sale.  
Nevertheless, Roney withdrew the Downtown property from the market and, 
four months later, listed the property for sale with a different Jackson broker 
at the same listing price.  On April 
9, 2002, BBC filed a complaint against Roney alleging that Roney had breached 
the listing agreement on the Downtown property.  After trial, the district court ordered 
Roney to pay BBC the seven percent commission on the listing price, interest, 
and attorney fees called for under the listing agreement.  This appeal followed.  

 

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶9]      A trial was held 
before the district court, with the district court issuing specific findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.  We 
recently revisited the standard of review applicable in such case in Double 
Eagle Petroleum & Mining Corp. v. Questar Exploration & Prod. Co., 
2003 WY 139, ¶6, 78 P.3d 679, ¶6 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Ahearn v. Hollon, 
2002 WY 125, ¶15, 53 P.3d 87, ¶15 (Wyo. 2002)):

 

The 
purpose of specific findings of fact is to inform the appellate court of the 
underlying facts supporting the trial court's conclusions of law and disposition 
of the issues. Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 
(Wyo. 1993).  While the findings of 
fact made by a trial court are presumptively correct, we examine all of the 
properly admissible evidence in the record.  Because this court does not weigh the 
evidence de novo, findings may not be set aside because we would have reached a 
different result.  Rather, the 
appellant has the burden of persuading the appellate court that the finding is 
erroneous.  Id. See also 
Maycock v. Maycock, 2001 WY 103, ¶11, 33 P.3d 1114, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001).  Findings of fact are not set aside 
unless inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or contrary to the 
great weight of the evidence.  The 
definitive test of when a finding of fact is clearly erroneous is when, although 
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is 
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. A 
determination that a finding is against the great weight of the evidence means 
that a finding will be set aside even if supported by substantial evidence. 
Id. See also Mathis v. Wendling, 962 P.2d 160, 163 (Wyo. 
1998).  Conclusions of law made by 
the trial court are not binding on this court and are reviewed de novo. 
Maycock, ¶12.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Breach 
of Contract Issues

 

[¶10]   Initially, Roney asserts that the 
trial court erred in concluding that the listing agreement constituted an 
express contract between Roney and BBC.  Roney claims that she and Gould were the 
only parties particularly identified within the listing agreement, and even 
though BBC signed the agreement, it was not a party to the agreement. Roney 
contends that the agreement unambiguously sets forth Gould and herself as 
parties to the agreement, and it was therefore improper for the district court 
to rely upon extrinsic evidence in ultimately concluding that BBC was a party to 
the agreement.  

 

In 
contract litigation, when the terms of the agreement are unambiguous, the 
interpretation is a question of law.... Examination Management Services, Inc. 
v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 689 (Wyo. 1996); Union Pacific Resources Co. 
v. Texaco, Inc., 882 P.2d 212, 218-19 (Wyo. 1994). Whether a contract is 
ambiguous is a question of law for the reviewing court.   Prudential Preferred Properties 
v. J and J Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Wyo. 1993).  We review questions of law de novo 
without affording deference to the decision of the district court.  Hermreck v. United Parcel Service, 
Inc., 938 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 1997); Griess v. Office of the Atty. Gen., 
Div. of Criminal Investigation, 932 P.2d 734, 736 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

            
According to our established standards for interpretation of contracts, 
the words used in the contract are afforded the plain meaning that a reasonable 
person would give to them.  
Doctors' Co. v. Insurance Corp. of America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1023 
(Wyo. 1993).  When the provisions in 
the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court looks only to the "four 
corners" of the document in arriving at the intent of the parties. Union 
Pacific Resources Co., 882 P.2d  at 220; Prudential Preferred 
Properties, 859 P.2d  at 1271.  
In the absence of any ambiguity, the contract will be enforced according 
to its terms because no construction is appropriate. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. 
Republic Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 539 (Wyo. 1996); Prudential Preferred 
Properties, 859 P.2d  at 1271.

 

Amoco 
Prod.  Co. v. EM Nominee Partnership 
Co., 
2 P.3d 534, 540 (Wyo. 2000).

 

Double 
Eagle Petroleum & Min. Corp., 
at ¶7.

 

[¶11]   Each of the listing agreements, 
including the listing agreement involving the Downtown property, specifies only 
the names of Roney and Gould within the body of the contract.  However, Richard signed each of the 
listing agreements on behalf of BBC at the bottom of those agreements.  The listing agreements also provided, in 
applicable part:

 

1.  EXCLUSIVE 
AUTHORIZATION:  Nedra Roney 
("Owner") hereby employs and grants Coldwell Banker  John Gould ("Broker") the 
exclusive and irrevocable right, commencing on 3-22-01 and 
expiring at 11:59 p.m. on 3-21-03 ("Listing Period") to sell: [the Downtown 
property]. 

 

2.  TERMS 
OF SALE:  

 

A.  LIST 
PRICE:  The listing price shall be 
[Two Million Two Hundred Thousand Dollars].

 

. . .

 

C.  ADDITIONAL 
TERMS:  [Gould] to identify local 
area Broker to co-list and market property. Wyoming laws, rules & 
regulations prevail.

 

. . .

 

5.  COMPENSATION 
TO BROKER:

 

. . .

 

A.  Owner 
agrees to pay to Broker as compensation for services irrespective of agency 
relationship(s) seven percent of the listing price . . . as 
follows:

 

. . .

 

(3)  If, 
without Broker's prior written consent, the Property is (i) withdrawn from 
market . . . during the Listing Period, or any extension.

 

[¶12]   Upon our review, we agree with 
Roney that the language used within the Downtown property listing agreement is 
clear and unambiguous.  However, we 
hold that BBC was a party to the agreement.  Specifically, the agreement states that 
Gould was to identify a local broker to co-list the Downtown property.  Thus, the agreement explicitly provides 
for a third party to be involved.  
There is little doubt that Roney and Gould contemplated that a co-listing 
broker would need to be retained to market and sell the Downtown property.  Moreover, the agreement patently states 
that seven percent of the listing price would be due as a commission should 
Roney withdraw the Downtown property from the market during the listing period 
without consent.  

 

[¶13]   In this case, it is undisputed that 
Gould and Roney's attorney met with BBC in an effort to find a local real estate 
broker to list the Downtown property.  
Ultimately, BBC was formally retained for such services when Richard 
signed the listing agreement on behalf of BBC.  By providing the listing agreement to 
BBC, Roney and Gould indicated their intent to include BBC as co-listing broker 
and that BBC be a party to that agreement.  
Thereafter, Roney withdrew the Downtown property from the market during 
the listing period without full consent and, four months later, listed the 
property with a different Jackson broker for sale at the same listing 
price.  Roney's actions triggered 
the requirement that she pay BBC the specified commission and all other related 
expenses enumerated within the listing agreement.  Even if we assume that the listing 
agreement's designation of Roney and Gould as the parties within the body of the 
agreement coupled with BBC's signature at the bottom of the listing agreement 
renders the listing agreement ambiguous, we would reach the same result.  The surrounding circumstances mandate 
such a conclusion.

 

[¶14]   The parties entered into listing 
agreements involving the sale of five separate properties.  Each of these listing agreements 
contained the same terms.  Most 
importantly, these agreements called for the involvement of a co-listing broker 
where the properties were located.  
Again, as indicated under these provisos, BBC was retained in such 
capacity.  Furthermore, when Gould 
was questioned at trial, the following colloquy 
transpired:

 

Q.  You 
understood from the beginning, didn't you, that you couldn't practice your 
profession as a real estate sales person in Wyoming?

 

A.  That's 
correct.

 

Q.  And 
so you did not solicit any offers?

 

A.  No, 
I did not.

 

Q.  On 
the Wyoming property you made no contacts with any other realtors looking for 
offers or advertising the property, did you?

 

A.  In 
my California market and on my website the properties were there, but not in 
Wyoming, no.

 

Q.  Okay.  You were careful not to do that in 
Wyoming because you recognized that there was a criminal penalty if you acted as 

 

A.  My 
license is in California, not in Wyoming.  
That's why Mr. Richard was brought in.

 

Q.  But 
surely didn't you as theas the longtime advisor of Ms. Roney you wanted her to 
be represented in Wyoming by a competent and reliable real estate 
professional?

 

A.  I 
did.

 

Q.  Somebody 
who could do all of the things that a broker and sales person does on the ground 
here that you could not do?

 

A.  Correct.

 

Q.  And 
after checking them out your choice for that service was the 
[BBC]?

 

A.  That's 
correct.

 

Each of the 
listing agreements stated explicitly that the local laws, rules and regulations 
wherein each respective property was located would prevail.  Moreover, Roney and Gould entered into 
an exclusive agreement wherein Gould was authorized to identify and consult with 
local area brokers to co-list properties owned by Roney. 

 

[¶15]   The Pinecreek Ranch property 
located in Idaho sold in June 2001, as a result of the work performed by 
BBC.  Upon the closing of that sale, 
Roney identified BBC as the listing broker and paid BBC its commission.  Similarly, on September 6, 2001, the 
Lucky Dog property sold through BBC's efforts.  BBC also received a commission from this 
sale.  These transactions evidence 
that Roney understood and intended that BBC formally act as the co-listing 
broker under each of the listing agreements, including the Downtown property 
listing agreement.

 

[¶16]   On June 20, 2001, Roney asked Gould 
if she could withdraw the properties located in Wyoming from the market and be 
released from the listing agreements.  
Gould agreed to release his portion of the listing agreements, but warned 
that his release may not be binding on BBC.  Gould then requested that BBC release 
Roney from the listing agreements.  
Gould advised BBC that Roney often changed her mind concerning the sale 
of her real estate and that because she was a very important client, he let her 
do what she wanted to retain her business.  
Gould's actions show that he believed that BBC was also required to 
formally release the listing agreements.  
Roney also apparently believed this to be the case because she ultimately 
sought and formally obtained BBC's formal agreement to accept payment of its 
expenses in exchange for releasing Roney from the listing agreement concerning 
the Smoky Hollow-Mosquito Creek property.  
In fact, under this agreement, Roney explicitly stated that if BBC agreed 
to the release, the parties would move forward with a relationship that would 
benefit both parties and resolve any hard feelings.  Such a statement infers that Roney 
understood that she was contractually obligated to BBC under the Downtown 
property listing agreement.   

 

[¶17]   Finally, Roney is the owner of many 
pieces of real estate worth millions of dollars and often engages in real estate 
transactions.  Throughout the 
applicable period, Roney utilized the services of Gould, a California licensed 
real estate agent.  Roney had 
previously worked with Gould in the real estate area for over ten years, and 
Roney formally made Gould her real estate portfolio manager on March 22, 
2001.  Roney's attorney was also 
used to locate a local real estate broker to list the Downtown property as 
required under the listing agreement.  
Under the evidence put forth, it was well established that Roney and 
Gould intended to include BBC as a party to the Downtown property listing 
agreement.  It was essential to 
enlist the services of a local broker under the contract in order to lawfully 
market the property for sale in Wyoming.  
BBC was the chosen local broker and became a party to the listing 
agreement when Richard signed the agreement on behalf of 
BBC.

 

[¶18]   In a related contention, Roney 
asserts that Gould's release of the Downtown property listing agreement excused 
her from any obligations under the contract.  However, for the same reasons stated 
above, we are not persuaded by Roney's argument.  BBC was a party to the listing 
agreement, and its release was also required to discharge Roney's 
responsibilities under the agreement.  

 

[¶19]   In a different argument, Roney 
asserts that the district court impliedly ruled that an enforceable oral 
contract existed between the parties when it recited the Van Ewing v. Hladky 
Const., Inc., 2002 WY 95, ¶11, 48 P.3d 1086, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002), case in its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
Upon our review, we conclude that this argument is unpersuasive, as we 
conclude that the district court's order is clear that this was not the court's 
finding.  In any event, we hold that 
an explicit written contract existed between the parties, and we therefore need 
not address Roney's arguments regarding the formation of an oral 
contract.

 

[¶20]   Roney next argues that even if 
there was a valid listing agreement between herself and BBC, BBC first breached 
the agreement by failing to offer a 3.5 percent commission when BBC listed the 
property for sale.  According to 
Roney, the co-listing agreement entered into between Gould and BBC constitutes 
an integral addendum to the listing agreement concerning the Downtown 
property.  She therefore asserts 
that the terms of the co-listing agreement must be incorporated into the listing 
agreement.  Thus, because the 
co-listing agreement specified that at least a 3.5 percent cooperating 
commission would be offered and BBC only offered a 3 percent commission when it 
listed the property for sale, BBC materially breached the listing agreement 
precluding BBC from enforcing the contract against Roney. 

 

[¶21]   We do not agree that the co-listing 
agreement must be considered an addendum to the listing agreement.  To the contrary, while both deal with 
the sale of the Downtown property, they address separate and distinct subject 
matters and were entered into by different parties, namely, Roney, Gould, and 
BBC with respect to the listing agreement and Gould and BBC with respect to the 
co-listing agreement.  The breach of 
another contract not between the same parties is not a defense.  Peters Grazing Ass'n v. Legerski, 
544 P.2d 449, 458 (Wyo. 1975).  
Further, even if BBC breached the contract as alleged by Roney, such 
action does not amount to a material breach of the listing agreement.  As cited by Roney, "[t]o be material, 
the breach [of contract] must be a failure to do something so substantial and 
fundamental as to go to the root, essence, or substance of the contract, and 
defeat the object or purpose of the parties in entering into the contract." 17B 
C.J.S., Contracts § 507 (1999) (footnotes omitted).  BBC's actions do not rise to the level 
of a material breach of the contract.  
Roney's contention that BBC's failure to offer a higher incentive may 
have prevented the property from being sold is purely speculative.  

 

[¶22]   Lastly, Roney argues that the 
district court wrongfully awarded BBC the full seven percent commission stated 
within the listing agreement.  The 
listing agreement clearly set forth that Roney owed seven percent of the listing 
price as a commission should Roney withdraw the Downtown property from the 
market without consent during the listing period.  Any potential dispute between Gould and 
BBC concerning the division of such amount under the co-listing agreement is not 
before this court. 

 

Disclosure

 

[¶23]   Roney also argues that the trial 
court erred when it found that BBC's brokerage disclosures substantially 
complied with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-28-306 (LexisNexis 2003).  In essence, Roney asserts that because 
the statute requires disclosure as a condition precedent to the formation of a 
valid listing agreement and BBC provided Roney with no such disclosure, no valid 
listing agreement between Roney and BBC existed as a matter of 
law.

 

[¶24]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-28-306 
(LexisNexis 2003), provides: 

 

(a)  Prior 
to engaging in any discussion or arrangement incidental to a sale, purchase, 
exchange or lease, and prior to entering into any written agreement, with a 
buyer or seller, a broker shall make a written disclosure of applicable 
brokerage relationships which must contain at a minimum the 
following:

 

(i)  A 
description of all the different brokerage relationships allowed by this article 
and a statement that the commission for different relationships is 
negotiable;

 

(ii)  An 
explanation of the duties and obligations owed under each such 
relationship;

 

(iii)  A 
conspicuous statement of duties and obligations owed by an agent but which are 
not owed by an intermediary;

 

(iv)  A 
statement that any established relationship cannot be modified without the 
written consent of the buyer or seller and that the buyer or seller may, but is 
not required to, negotiate different commission fees as a condition of 
consenting to a change in relationship; and

 

(v)  A 
statement that an intermediary is not an agent or advocate for any party and has 
only the obligations set forth in W.S. 33-28-305.

 

(b)  The 
written disclosure shall contain a signature line for the buyer or seller to 
acknowledge receipt of the disclosure.  
The disclosure and acknowledgment, by itself, shall not constitute a 
contract or agreement with the broker.  
Until the buyer or seller executes such acknowledgment, no representation 
agreement shall be executed or valid.

 

. . .

 

(d)  Disclosures 
made in accordance with this article shall be sufficient to disclose brokerage 
relationships to the parties to the transaction and to the 
public.

 

[¶25]   In this case, it is true that no 
brokerage disclosure statement was provided by BBC to Roney.  However, Gould presented Roney with a 
written disclosure regarding the listing agreements involving the Pine Meadows, 
Smoky Hollow-Mosquito Creek, and Lucky Dog properties.  This disclosure contained a description 
of the different brokerage relationships in substantial compliance with § 
33-28-306.  Moreover, Gould advised 
Richard that the single California disclosure form Gould presented to Roney 
concerning the Pine Meadows, Smoky Hollow-Mosquito Creek, and Lucky Dog 
properties would suffice for all the listings.  In addition, as required under the 
statute, each of the listing agreements, including that for the Downtown 
property, advised that the compensation for different relationships was 
negotiable.  These listing 
agreements also contain disclosures of a broker's responsibilities and of agency 
relationships.  Further, additional 
advisories were given in Exhibit 1 appended to the listing agreement concerning 
the Pine Meadows property.  We also 
note that Roney often entered into transactions concerning her many pieces of 
real estate and used Gould's services during these transactions.  Indeed, Roney formally appointed Gould 
to act as her exclusive agent to identify and consult with local area brokers to 
co-list properties owned by her. 

 

[¶26]   Looking at each of the disclosures 
given and the underlying circumstances, we conclude, as did the district court, 
that the disclosures substantially complied with § 33-28-306.  Furthermore, while Roney tries to argue 
that distinctions exist between the California disclosure given and what is 
required under Wyoming law, we note that the listing agreement explicitly 
provides that commission would be required to be paid when an unauthorized 
withdrawal of the property was made "irrespective of agency 
relationship(s)." 

 

[¶27]   We have expressed on many occasions 
that public policy does not favor the forfeiture of contract rights.  In Wyoming Realty Co. v. Cook, 
872 P.2d 551, 554 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Battlefield, Inc. v. Neely, 656 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Wyo. 1983)), we reiterated:

 

Courts do 
not like to aid litigants in avoiding their contractual obligations by joining 
in their games of hide-and-seek behind statutory technicalitiesespecially is 
this so where the other party has performed and the party looking to avoid the 
contract has reaped all the benefits of the performance.  We will not aid and abet such efforts if 
we can possibly avoid it.

 

See 
also Gray v. 
Stratton Real Estate, 2001 WY 125, ¶¶9-10, 36 P.3d 1127, ¶¶9-10 (Wyo. 
2001).  As in the above-cited cases, 
we decline to allow Roney to avoid her contractual obligations.   

 

Damages

 

[¶28]   Lastly, in a very summary argument, 
Roney asserts that if this court finds that BBC was not a party to the Downtown 
property listing agreement, the district court improperly awarded BBC its 
attorney fees and costs in this case.  
Given that this court holds that BBC was a party to that contract, 
Roney's arguments regarding damages do not apply.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶29]   We hold the district court did not 
err in finding that the listing agreement constituted an enforceable contract, 
that Roney breached its terms by withdrawing the Downtown property from BBC 
during the applicable listing period without consent and, consequently, that BBC 
was entitled to the commission, interest, and attorney fees 
assessed.

 

[¶30]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Co-listing 
agreements were also executed between CB/BHN and BBC for each of the other 
properties.