Case Title: State ex rel. McGee v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1994-Ohio-88

Docket Number: 19930641

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1994-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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The State ex rel. McGee, Appellant, v. Industrial Commission of                  
Ohio, Appellee.                                                                  
[Cite as State ex rel. McGee v. Indus. Comm. (1994),       Ohio                  
St.3d     .]                                                                     
Workers' compensation -- Courts not precluded from ordering                      
     Industrial Commission, in mandamus action, to award                         
     permanent total disability benefits notwithstanding the                     
     so-called "some evidence" rule, when.                                       
     (No. 93-641 -- Submitted March 29, 1994 -- Decided June 1,                  
1994.)                                                                           
     Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No.                   
92AP-14.                                                                         
     Appellant-claimant, Robert McGee, sustained two industrial                  
injuries while in the course of and arising from his employment                  
with Celotex Corporation.  The most recent, a 1986 back and hip                  
injury, eventually resulted in a total left hip replacement.                     
Claimant worked after the surgery for approximately fifteen                      
months before continuing hip problems prompted another                           
operation.  The failure of this second surgery forced claimant                   
from the workplace permanently on July 5, 1989.                                  
     Later that year, claimant applied to appellee, Industrial                   
Commission of Ohio, for permanent total disability                               
compensation.  He accompanied his application with two reports                   
from attending physician Edward H. Miller, the latter of which                   
concluded:                                                                       
     "Mr. Robert McGee has been under my care for many years                     
and he has undergone a revision total hip replacement                            
arthroplasty for aseptic loosening of the left total hip.  He                    
also has the residuals of an old compression fracture with                       
localized areas of spondylosis.  Both are symptomatic.  Due to                   
Mr. McGee's condition, he is unable to stand, sit or walk for                    
any extended amount of time.  It is my opinion that he is                        
totally and permanently disabled."                                               
     Claimant was examined on the commission's behalf by Dr.                     
Arnold R. Penix, who felt that claimant could not return to his                  
former position of employment, but could engage in sedentary                     
sustained remunerative employment.                                               
     On August 6, 1990, claimant's application was heard by an                   
Industrial Commission district staff hearing officer who issued                  
an interlocutory order awarding permanent total disability                       
compensation from August 7, 1990 through November 16, 1990.  On                  
October 30, 1990, another hearing was held.  At that time, the                   
claimant submitted a vocational analysis from Henry J. Cohen,                    
which stated in part:                                                            
     "In terms of his education, Mr. McGee left school after                     
completing the eighth grade. * * *  His limited formal                           
education has left him well below the norms of the average                       
working population in the area of basic 3R skills.  This is                      
unfortunate considering his average intellectual capacity, oral                  
communications skills and self-confidence.  Mr. McGee did not                    
undertake special trade skills training and was not promoted on                  
his job to any supervisory or management capacity.  He does                      
possess specialized skill in semi-truck driving and some                         
mechanical aptitude.  However, his entire working career is                      
limited to hands-on labor experiences in which strength,                         
endurance and visual motor coordination were his primary assets.                 
     "* * *                                                                      
     "From an overall vocational standpoint, the present study                   
reveals that Mr. McGee's basic cognitive functions are intact,                   
but his limited education, deficiencies in basic 3R skills, and                  
lack of transferable job skills significantly reduce his                         
marketability in the conventional workplace.  While it is                        
possible for him to be considered for service support                            
activities, inspecting, stock checking work, etc., it is                         
unlikely that employers would look upon him favorably given his                  
limitations in mobility and endurance, lack of fundamental                       
administrative skills, as well as his advanced age.                              
Consequently, based upon his current vocational status, we                       
conclude that the odds against Mr. McGee's obtaining                             
remunerative employment at this time are prohibitive."                           
     The commission held its decision in abeyance in order to                    
obtain its own vocational evaluation.  Vocational consultant                     
James S. Albrink concluded:                                                      
     "1.  It is my opinion, based upon the allowed condition                     
that Mr. McGee is permanently totally impaired from the work                     
force.                                                                           
     "2. It is my opinion that based upon the allowed condition                  
and other conditions, including age, education, experience,                      
that Mr. McGee is permanently and totally impaired."                             
     Claimant was subsequently examined by Dr. Wayne C. Amendt,                  
a commission specialist, who found claimant unable to return to                  
his former job.  Dr. Amendt limited claimant to "sedentary                       
type[s] of work activities which would not require any                           
prolonged standing or sitting for over one hour at a time.  He                   
would also be restricted from lifting objects in excess of ten                   
pounds."                                                                         
     On October 30, 1991, the commission issued a final order                    
that denied permanent total disability compensation:                             
     "The reports of Drs. Miller, Penix, Albrink and Amendt                      
were reviewed and evaluated.  This order is based particularly                   
upon the reports of Drs. Penix and Amendt, a consideration of                    
the claimant's age, education, work history * * *.                               
     "Claimant is sixty four years old, has a sixth grade                        
education and previously worked in the unskilled physical labor                  
field and as a slate control operator.  It is concluded that                     
claimant is capable of performing sedentary work, and is                         
therefore not permanently and totally disabled.  The reports of                  
Drs. Penix and Amendt were persuasive on this point.  While                      
claimant's age, education and work history are not conducive to                  
sedentary work, those factors do not totally preclude claimant                   
from obtaining said sedentary work."                                             
     Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of                      
Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that the commission                        
abused its discretion in denying permanent total disability                      
compensation.  The appellate court, concluding that the                          
commission's order did not adequately explain its reasoning,                     
vacated the order and returned the cause to the commission for                   
further consideration and amended order pursuant to State ex                     
rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d                  
245.                                                                             
     This cause is now before this court on appeal as of right.                  
                                                                                 
     Harris, Bella & Burgin and Jerald D. Harris, for appellant.                 
     Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General, and Jetta Mencer,                          
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.                                        
                                                                                 
     Per Curiam.  The medical evidence relied on by the                          
commission found claimant medically capable of sedentary                         
labor.  The success of claimant's permanent total disability                     
application turns, therefore, on the commission's                                
interpretation of his nonmedical factors.  Given the medical                     
evidence relied on, the denial of permanent total disability                     
compensation was necessarily predicated on the conclusion that                   
the totality of claimant's nonmedical factors was vocationally                   
favorable.  Based on our recent decision in State ex rel. Gay                    
v. Mihm (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 315, 626 N.E.2d 666, we find that                  
the commission abused its discretion.                                            
     The commission cites no evidence in favor of the                            
conclusion that claimant's nonmedical factors made him amenable                  
to sedentary employment.  To the contrary, the order                             
specifically stated that claimant's age, education and work                      
experience were not conducive to sedentary work, yet permanent                   
total disability compensation was denied nonetheless.                            
     We recognize that the absence of "some evidence"                            
supporting denial of permanent total disability compensation,                    
is not automatically "some evidence" supporting its award.                       
State ex rel. Wilcox v. Ashtabula Cty. Hwy. Dept. (1992), 64                     
Ohio St.3d 190, 593 N.E.2d 1390.  Traditionally, we have                         
returned such orders to the commission for further                               
consideration and amended order.  Gay provides a new                             
alternative, allowing us to issue a writ compelling a permanent                  
total disability award in those circumstances where a return                     
would be pointless.                                                              
     This case falls squarely under Gay.  It serves no purpose                   
to return the matter to the commission to attempt to explain                     
its decision when it has already conceded that claimant's                        
nonmedical factors are not conducive to sedentary work.  The                     
commission's decision is essentially indefensible given the                      
reasoning already cited by the commission itself, rendering                      
further consideration inappropriate.                                             
     The appellate judgment is hereby reversed and the writ of                   
mandamus is allowed.                                                             
                                    Judgment reversed                            
                                    and writ allowed.                            
     Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney                   
and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.                                                        
     Wright, J., concurring in judgment only.  I concur in the                   
judgment of the majority only because, in my view, there was an                  
abuse of discretion by the Industrial Commission.  My belief                     
that State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 315, 626                    
N.E.2d 66, was poorly reasoned remains unchanged, and thus Gay                   
should not be used as a basis for formulating a decision in                      
this or any other case except where there is an abuse of                         
discretion by the commission.