Case Title: Waite v. Schmidt

Citation: 173 Kan. 353, 245 P.2d 975

Docket Number: 38,704

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1952-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
173 Kan. 353 (1952)
245 P.2d 975
DELMAR C. WAITE and H. LORRAINE WAITE, his wife, Appellees,
v.
ROLAND E. SCHMIDT and SHIRLEY L. SCHMIDT, his wife, Appellants.
No. 38,704

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 3, 1952.
G.D. McSpadden, of Winfield, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellants.
George Templar, of Arkansas City, argued the cause, and Earle N. Wright, also of Arkansas City, was with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WERTZ, J.:
This is an action brought by plaintiffs (appellees) Delmar C. Waite and H. Lorraine Waite, his wife, under the declaratory judgment act, G.S. 1949, 60-3127 et seq., against defendants *354 (appellants) Roland E. Schmidt and Shirley L. Schmidt, his wife, to determine whether a deed of conveyance to certain described real estate tendered defendants conveys a fee simple title.
Plaintiffs' tendered deed of conveyance is based on title received under the following deed of conveyance to them:
The action was tried in the court below on a stipulation of facts. The facts involved herein are fully and best related in the following findings of fact by the court:
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the court concluded as a matter of law:
From the judgment rendered, defendants appeal questioning the correctness of the legal conclusions reached by the lower court.
We think the legal conclusions reached by the trial court were correct. An examination of the deed reveals that the introductory clause designated the parties to the deed "Delmar C. Waite and his bodily heirs of the County of Cowley and State of Kansas" referring to them as parties of the second part; the granting clause conveyed to the "party" of the second part, their heirs and assigns, the described property. The word "party" as used in the granting clause was clearly intended to be "parties." The habendum clause gave all the estate, right and title of the first parties with all appurtances, and then after the usual covenants of ownership, continued that first party was seized of an indefeasible estate in fee simple which first party would warrant and defend in quiet and peaceable possession of parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns forever.
Under the conceded facts, the heirs of the body of Delmar C. Waite were definitely ascertainable at the time of the delivery of the deed on October 10, 1941. They were six in number. In construing the deed from its four corners, we have no difficulty in concluding that what all the parties intended was to convey a life estate to Delmar C. Waite and the remainder in fee to his children living at the time of execution and delivery of the deed.
The form and content of the deed have been set forth previously. If by this deed the grantors were attempting to create a fee tail estate (and whether that would have been accomplished had the deed been prior to the Property Act of 1939, G.S. 1949, ch. 58, art. 5, need not be determined), the attempt was of no effect in view of G.S. 1949, 58-502, abolishing such estates and providing that in such cases a life estate is created in the first taker and the remainder in fee in the next taker. In such cases the legal effect was that the conveyance was to the first named grantee, i.e., Delmar C. Waite, for life, with remainder to his heirs in fee. Under G.S. 1949, 58-503, the heirs who would take are those who can be ascertained by the time the fee is possessed, i.e., those in being at the time the *357 deed was executed and delivered. If it be considered that the deed in question was not sufficient otherwise to create a fee tail estate, then the conveyance comes within the general classification mentioned in G.S. 1949, 58-505, and the same result follows, of a life estate in the first taker and a vested remainder in the children living at the time of execution and delivery of the deed. The last mentioned section further provides that this rule applies when the expression used in the deed is "children" or "issue" or words of similar import. Following this rule, the words "bodily heirs" will be construed as children.
In view of our holding, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.