Case Title: CHRISTOPHER EDRINGTON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0171

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
CHRISTOPHER EDRINGTON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 70185 P.3d 1264Case Number: S-07-0171Decided: 06/20/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
CHRISTOPHER 
EDRINGTON,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl of Cheyenne, Wyoming;* Michael H. Reese of Michel Henry Reese, P.C., 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.**

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Order 
Granting Motion to Withdraw entered March 13, 2008

**Entry 
of Appearance entered March 13, 2008

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Christopher Edrington, contests the district court's decision to revoke his 
probation.  Appellant admits that he 
violated his probation but asserts that his violation was not willful because he 
was suffering from mental illness at the time and that the district court 
therefore abused its discretion when it reinstated his suspended sentence.  We affirm the district court's decision. 

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the district 
court abuse its discretion when it revoked Appellant's 
probation?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On April 10, 
2006, Appellant agreed to plead nolo 
contendere1 to attempted delivery of a 
controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1031 and 35-7-1042 
(LexisNexis 2007).  In exchange for this plea, Appellant's 
seven-to-ten-year sentence was suspended and, in a Judgment and Sentence dated 
May 12, 2006, the district court placed Appellant on probation for a term of 
eight years.  As part of his 
probation, Appellant agreed to complete a treatment program at Southwest 
Counseling Service.  The State 
agreed to stipulate to reduce Appellant's sentence to three to five years, to be 
suspended in favor of four years of probation, if Appellant successfully 
completed the program.  The plea 
agreement stated that failure to complete the inpatient treatment program would 
result in reinstatement of the original sentence.

 
 
[¶4]      On May 5, 2006, 
the state filed a petition to revoke Appellant's probation as a result of his 
termination from the inpatient treatment program.  The State rescinded that petition on July 
12, 2006, and, pursuant to agreement, the district court entered an Amended 
Judgment and Sentence of the Court on July 21, 2006.  Under the new sentence, Appellant was 
required to complete inpatient treatment at the "Transitional Residential 
Program" (TRP).

 
 
[¶5]      On September 13, 
2006, the State filed another Petition for Revocation of Probation because 
Appellant had been terminated from TRP without successfully completing the 
program.  The district court held an 
evidentiary hearing in the probation revocation on April 11, 2007.  At the close of the hearing, the 
district court indicated that it was revoking Appellant's probation and 
reinstating the original seven-to-ten-year sentence.  An order to that effect was entered on 
April 30, 2007.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      We apply the 
following standard of review to a district court's decision to revoke 
probation:

 
 
A 
district court's decision to revoke probation is discretionary and will not be 
disturbed unless the record demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion.  The district court is required to make a 
conscientious judgment that the violation occurred after considering the reasons 
underlying the conditions of the probation, the violation of those conditions, 
and the reasons leading to the violation.

 
 

Anderson v. 
State, 2002 
WY 46, ¶ 25, 43 P.3d 108, 118 (Wyo. 2002).  
We review the district court's findings of fact according to the 
following standard:

 
 
Because 
the trial court heard and weighed the evidence, assessed witness credibility, 
and made the necessary inferences and deductions from the evidence, the trial 
court's factual findings are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous, and 
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination

 

 

Robinson 
v. State, 2003 
WY 32, ¶ 15, 64 P.3d 743, 747-48 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]                  
            
Revocation of probation is largely governed by court rule.  W.R.Cr.P. 39.  The State is required to establish the 
violation of the conditions of probation alleged in the petition by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(5).

 
 
 . . . .

 
 
[I]n 
order to revoke probation for the violation of a condition of probation not 
involving the payment of money, the violation must be willful, or if not 
willful, must presently threaten the safety of society.

 
 

Messer 
v. State, 2006 
WY 141, ¶ 9, 145 P.3d 457, 459-60 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
            
The proceedings for probation revocation consist of a two-part 
process.  The first part, the 
adjudicatory phase, requires the district court to determine by a preponderance 
of the evidence whether a condition of probation was violated.  W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(5)  The second, dispositional phase, is 
triggered only upon a finding that a condition of probation was violated.  In this phase, the district court must 
deliberate not only upon the violation, but also the reasons the conditions were 
originally imposed and the circumstances surrounding the 
violation.

 
 

Mapp v. 
State, 929 P.2d 1222, 1226 (Wyo. 1996).  "Willfulness is determined at the 
dispositional phase of the proceedings."  
Sinning v. State, 2007 WY 193, 
¶ 10, 172 P.3d 388, 390 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
[¶8]      The parties agree 
that Appellant failed to complete the program at TRP to which the district court 
assigned him.  Both sides agree that 
TRP terminated Appellant from the program because he repeatedly violated the 
program's rules.  Appellant, 
however, claims that he was incapable of following those rules because he 
suffers from a mental illness.  
Therefore, Appellant argues that his violation was not willful and that 
it was an abuse of the district court's discretion to revoke his probation.  

 
 
[¶9]      We have said that 
the term "willful" is to be accorded its ordinary and common meaning unless 
a statute indicates that some specialized meaning is intended.  Butz v. State, 2007 WY 152, ¶ 21, 167 P.3d 650, 656 (Wyo. 2007).  
"Willfully means intentionally, knowingly, purposely, voluntarily, 
consciously, deliberately, and without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from 
carelessly, inadvertently, accidentally, negligently, heedlessly or 
thoughtlessly."  Id. at ¶ 20, 167 P.3d  at 655.  Whether or not a 
violation was willful is a matter of intent, which is a question of fact.  Bryant v. State, 7 Wyo. 311, 56 P. 596, 597 
(1898).  We will not disturb the 
trial court's determination that Appellant willfully violated his probation 
unless that determination was clearly erroneous.  See supra ¶ 6.

 
 
[¶10]   Considering all the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the district court's decision, we cannot say that the 
district court's determination that Appellant willfully violated his probation 
was clearly erroneous.  Appellant's 
probation officer, the director of his program at TRP, and a forensic 
psychologist all testified at the probation revocation hearing.  Appellant also testified on his own 
behalf.  Appellant testified that he 
was aware of the terms of his probation, and knew he had to "follow the 
rules."  He also testified that he 
was informed of the program rules at TRP when he entered the facility and that 
he failed to conform his behavior to those rules.

 
 
[¶11]   The program director testified that 
Appellant was uncooperative and argumentative during his treatment.  He cited several incidents, including 
one in which Appellant refused to allow staff properly to administer a drug test 
for nearly two hours.  The director 
also testified that Appellant broke the program rules repeatedly by having 
unauthorized contact with women at the program facility and on outings.  Appellant also refused to follow the 
peer companion system that required him to be with a fellow program member at 
all times when outside the facility.

 
 
[¶12]   The forensic psychologist testified 
that he had diagnosed Appellant with a severe form of antisocial personality 
disorder called psychopathy.  He 
testified that Appellant's behavior as described by the other witnesses was 
consistent with his diagnosis.  
However, the psychologist also testified that Appellant did not suffer 
from any cognitive defects that would prevent him from understanding right from 
wrong and that Appellant had the cognitive ability to understand the rules of 
his program.  The psychologist also 
found that Appellant was manipulative during the interview process.  Appellant purported to hear voices but 
later admitted that he thought a diagnosis of schizophrenia would be a good 
strategy for getting out of jail.  
The psychologist ruled out a diagnosis of schizophrenia and agreed that 
Appellant does not suffer from any disorder that would prevent him from 
understanding the nature or quality of his actions.  The psychologist's testimony did not 
indicate an innate inability for Appellant to conform his behavior to the rules, 
but merely an unwillingness to do so.  
The diagnosis itself was also called into doubt by Appellant's attempts 
to manipulate the process.  Viewing 
this evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's decision, we 
find that it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude that 
Appellant acted willfully in violating the rules of his court-ordered treatment 
program.  

 
 
[¶13]   We further find that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Appellant's probation and 
reinstated his full sentence.  The 
psychologist testified that any successful program for a person like Appellant 
with a dual diagnosis of substance abuse disorder and personality disorder would 
require intensive cognitive therapy and external structure.  Appellant testified that he had stopped 
taking his medication while in prison and admitted that, since ceasing his 
medication, he had been placed in administrative segregation because of a 
failure to follow rules while incarcerated.  Appellant emphasized that he did not 
want a structured program, saying that he was instead willing to attend 
outpatient treatment or to see a counselor while he was on probation.  He repeatedly demonstrated a continued 
unwillingness to treat his mental illness in any way that did not conform to his 
own preferences.  

            

[¶14]   In his plea bargain, Appellant 
agreed that his full sentence would be reinstated if he did not successfully 
complete his inpatient treatment program.  
It is evident that Appellant's chances of successfully completing a 
treatment program while on probation were low if he suffers from antisocial 
personality disorder.  While it is 
certainly preferable to place an individual with a dual diagnosis in a program 
designed specifically to treat such people, the district court is not required 
to ensure that every difficulty faced by a probationer is addressed by court 
order.  The fact that the court had 
not ordered outpatient treatment for mental health, which Appellant now 
advocates as his best option, did not prevent Appellant from seeking such 
treatment during his probation if he felt it would increase his chances of 
success.  In the absence of a 
program designed to treat all of Appellant's issues,2 both parties agreed to the only 
available option.  After finding 
that Appellant willfully violated the rules of his probation by failing to 
complete his inpatient treatment, it was not abuse of discretion for the 
district court to conclude that he was no longer an appropriate candidate for 
continued probation.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   It was not clearly erroneous to 
find that Appellant violated his probation willingly.  Appellant's mental health diagnosis was 
called into doubt by his attempts to manipulate the diagnosis.  Additionally, the mental illness with 
which Appellant was diagnosed would not have prevented him from understanding 
the rules of his program or the nature and consequences of his actions.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it revoked Appellant's probation and reinstated his full 
sentence.

 
 
[¶16]   We affirm.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Both 
parties concede, and the plea agreement states, that Appellant was to plead nolo contendere.  However, both the Judgment and Sentence 
and the Amended Judgment and Sentence state that Appellant pled 
guilty.

 
 

2There was 
substantial testimony at the hearing about the lack of availability of 
integrated programs to treat individuals who suffer from mental illness coupled 
with substance abuse problems.