Case Title: DeRolph v. State

Citation: 1997-Ohio-87

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
DeRolph et al., Appellants, v. The State of Ohio et al., Appellees. 
[Cite as DeRolph v. State (1997), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Motion for reconsideration and clarification of the School Funding 
Decision -- Clarification granted. 
 
(No. 95-2066 — Submitted April 15,1997 — April 25, 1997.) 
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION.1 
—————— 
 
Bricker & Eckler, Nicholas A. Pittner, John F. Birath, Jr., Sue W. Yount, 
Michael D. Smith and Susan B. Greenberger, for appellants. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, 
Christopher M. Culley and Sharon A. Jennings, Assistant Attorneys General, for 
appellees. 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, Mark A. VanderLaan, Joel S. Taylor and William M. 
Mattes, Special Counsel for appellees State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
and State Department of Education. 
—————— 
 
Per Curiam.     Upon consideration of appellees’ “Motion for 
Reconsideration and Clarification,” we find that appellees’ motion raises three 
questions: 
 
1.   May local property taxes be used as any part of a funding solution? 
 
 
 
2 
 
2.   Do debt obligations for school funding incurred before March 24, 1998, 
pursuant to state law, remain valid even though repayment provisions extend 
beyond March 24, 1998? 
 
3.   Should this court retain exclusive jurisdiction of the case to review all 
remedial legislation enacted in response to the court’s decision? 
I 
 
May local property taxes be used as any part of a funding solution?  The 
answer is “Yes,” but property taxes can no longer be the primary means of 
providing the finances for a thorough and efficient system of schools. 
II 
 
Do debt obligations for school funding incurred before March 24, 1998, 
pursuant to state law, remain valid even though repayment provisions extend 
beyond March 24, 1998?  The answer is “Yes.” 
 
Much has been said and published about our decision.  With all that has 
been said, it seems to us that the appellees’ motion for reconsideration now before 
us and its memorandum in support of the motion further support our decision.  
Specifically, appellees state that “[a] significant amount of borrowing is planned 
during this period, including $100-200 million that various school districts 
 
 
 
3 
anticipate borrowing prior to June 30, 1997, in order to meet their operating 
expenses (including salaries).  Among these school districts is the Cleveland 
public schools, which had anticipated completing a significant debt restructuring 
by early May 1997.”  (Emphasis added.)  In other words, some school districts 
need to borrow money to continue to operate and at least one (Cleveland) needs to 
borrow additional money to help pay off past borrowing. 
 
Addressing the question itself, there are two answers.  First, the status quo 
exists for a year.  Second, an agreement by one party to borrow and repay money 
and another party to lend the money results in a contract.  As we stated in Peerless 
Elec. Co. v. Bowers (1955), 164 Ohio St. 209, 210, 57 O.O. 411, 129 N.E.2d 467, 
468, “[t]he general rule is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction 
overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not 
that the former was bad law, but that it never was the law.  The one general 
exception to this rule is where contractual rights have arisen or vested rights have 
been acquired under the prior decision.”  (Emphasis added.)  Subsequently, in 
Wendell v. AmeriTrust Co., N.A. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 74, 77, 630 N.E.2d 368, 
371, this court said that “[i]n Peerless Elec. Co. v. Bowers * * *, we held that, 
generally, a decision of this court overruling a previous decision is to be applied 
 
 
 
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retrospectively with an exception for contractual or vested rights that have arisen 
under the previous decision.  This reasoning applies with similar force when the 
court’s decision strikes down a statute as unconstitutional.”  (Emphasis added.) 
III 
 
Should this court retain exclusive jurisdiction of the case to review all 
remedial legislation enacted in response to the court’s decision?  Our answer is 
“No.” 
 
Given the separate powers entrusted to the three coordinate branches of 
government, both this court and the trial court recognize that it is not the function 
of the judiciary to supervise or participate in the legislative and executive process.  
We accord respect to the coordinate branches of government, and we have full 
faith and trust that they will act to remedy the disparate effects of the current 
statutory method for raising and distributing funding for education.  The creating 
of a constitutional system for financing elementary and secondary public 
education in Ohio is not only a proper function of the General Assembly, it is also 
expressly mandated by the Ohio Constitution. 
 
Conversely, it is the role of the courts, pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, to 
determine the constitutional validity of the system of funding and maintaining the 
 
 
 
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public schools in Ohio.  It is now up to the General Assembly to devise a system 
of funding which will be in compliance with our Constitution. 
 
Our decision to remand this matter is a recognition of the unique role of trial 
courts as triers of fact and gatherers of evidence.  Our remand to the trial court is 
to provide a proper venue for the parties, if necessary and requested by any party, 
to present all evidence concerning the final enacted remedy, including measures 
taken since the record in this case closed and further enactments made in response 
to our decision. 
 
It would then be the trial judge’s responsibility to rule on the 
constitutionality of the enacted legislation and to render an opinion.  Any party 
could then appeal that decision directly to this court for final determination.  
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in 
part. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1 
The decision on the merits in this case may be found at 78 Ohio St.3d ___, 
___ N.E.2d ___. 
 
 
 
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Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur in the judicious disposition of the two points of clarification 
requested by the defendants. 
 
With respect to the third issue raised in the motion, for clarification and 
reconsideration, I dissent from the decision of the majority overruling the 
defendant’s motion for reconsideration. 
 
I concur in the dissent of Justice Cook to the extent that it suggests 
that the procedure crafted by the majority is highly unusual.   
 
A review of sixteen other state Supreme Court decisions that have 
declared their systems for funding public education unconstitutional reveals 
that a majority of those decisions remanded the case to a trial court.  
However, it is those states that have had the most difficulty producing a final 
plan that met the Supreme Court’s opinion of constitutionality.  For example, 
in New Jersey the issue has been through the courts for a period of twenty 
years and is now again pending in the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Similar 
experiences, though not as dramatic, have occurred in Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, New Hampshire and Texas.  In each of these states, either the 
final public school funding plan is not yet approved by the Supreme Court of 
 
 
 
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the state after several years of litigation after remand or the plan has been 
approved only after several years of litigation. 
 
Typically, when a Supreme Court declares a legislative act to be 
unconstitutional it does not order the legislative body to enact new 
legislation.  Nor does it remand the case to a trial court with an order to 
retain jurisdiction over the consequent act of the legislative authority, 
including jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the new legislation.  
That would be my preference for a disposition of this case.  But this case is 
different.   
 
A majority of this court, as the Supreme Courts of other states, has 
ordered the legislative branch of our state government to adopt legislation 
that will remedy the law that has been declared unconstitutional.  Were I in 
the majority, I would not vote to remand this case to the trial court, not 
because of any lack of confidence in the ability of the trial court to provide a 
venue for the gathering of evidence, but because the purpose of such a 
remand would be better served by this court’s retention of jurisdiction. 
 
In view of the majority decision declaring the laws relating to the 
funding of Ohio’s public schools to be unconstitutional and ordering the 
 
 
 
8 
General Assembly to enact a new constitutional plan within a year, I submit 
that the most expeditious means of removing the uncertainty regarding the 
constitutionality of the new plan is for this court to issue an order retaining 
jurisdiction in this court.  If it proves necessary to provide a forum for the 
submission of evidence or to take further action at the expiration of the 
twelve-month stay, we have the authority to appoint a special master or 
issue other orders as might be appropriate.  Such a disposition has 
precedent in the case in Helena Elementary School Dist. v. State (1989), 
236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684, in which the Supreme Court of Montana 
retained jurisdiction in an educational funding case.   
 
Moreover, the writers of a highly respected treatise have observed as 
follows: 
 
"*** Power to deal with the issues presented on appeal inherently 
includes authority to enforce the court's decision or to regulate the course of 
further proceedings required to reach an effective decision. *** The 
questions arising from retained jurisdiction go more to the wise exercise of 
this power than its existence.*** 
 
 
 
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“*** If the need for enforcement does arise, the [appellate court] is in 
an awkward position.  Appellate procedure is not geared to factfinding ***.  It 
is tempting to think that provisions should be made for enforcing [appellate] 
judgments in the [trial] courts, but this temptation has been rightly resisted. 
*** [C]ompelling reasons counsel against [trial] court enforcement.  In 
principle, reliance on a different court for enforcement could undercut the 
control of the [appellate court] over its own judgment.*** 
 
"The ordinary response to the difficulties presented by proceedings in 
[an appellate court] to enforce its own judgment is to appoint a special 
master.  The most common practice has been to adopt the Civil Rules by 
analogy to govern proceedings before the master, and to review findings of 
fact only for clear error."  16 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & 
Procedure (1996) 677-699, Section 3937.1 
 
Any retention of jurisdiction should be only in this court in recognition 
of the fact that uncertainty will envelop all aspects of public school funding in 
our state until the day this court deems a new funding system to be 
constitutional.  The motion for clarification and reconsideration filed by the 
defendants and other well-publicized activities of those who will ultimately be 
 
 
 
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responsible for adopting a new funding plan leave me with no doubt that 
those persons are acting responsibly.  Even those who disagree with the 
judgment of the court recognize that it is their constitutional duty to respond 
constructively to it.  If the parties affected by the decision of this court act 
responsibly and expeditiously to comply with the order of the court, we have 
a corresponding duty, in this extraordinary case, to provide a procedure by 
which this court can, as expeditiously as possible, determine whether the 
parties have complied with the order of the March 24, 1997.  That we can do 
if we retain jurisdiction with no remand to the trial court. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.,  concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
The majority has spoken, and DeRolph is now the decision of this court.  
Therefore, I believe all justices can participate fully in deciding all subsequent 
motions filed in DeRolph. 
 
I concur in the conclusions reached by the majority on the motion for 
clarification as to the continued viability of property tax as a source of funding, as 
well as the contractual validity of any loans made until March 24, 1998, when the 
stay expires. 
 
 
 
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However, I join in Justice Cook’s and Chief Justice Moyer’s dissents as to 
the motion to reconsider, believing strongly, as Justice Cook points out,  that the 
judiciary’s role in this matter is complete and that, as with all other legislation 
declared unconstitutional by this court, we must await new challenges to the new 
legislation.  But if there is to be continuing jurisdiction, we should, as suggested 
by Chief Justice Moyer, retain jurisdiction in this court to review the remedial 
legislation upon the expiration of the stay, although I still question what authority 
we have to play such an unprecedented role.  However, since this court is taking 
an activist role, and has ordered the legislature to remedy the situation, an 
unprecedented action to my knowledge and research,  we should avert years of 
litigation by continuing our direct supervision of this case and answering 
questions such as those just presented as they arise, when it is appropriate to do so, 
by a majority vote or through a master commissioner.   
 
But I stress that my preferred course, as we do in all other cases where a 
statute is declared unconstitutional, is to end our involvement and let the other 
branches of government, the legislative and executive, remedy the problem.  If all 
parties work together for the good of our children’s future, we may set a new 
 
 
 
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precedent as a state that has no subsequent litigation and no further need for our 
services.  We can only hope. 
 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the remand as redefined by the 
majority opinion. 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.   On the motion for reconsideration, I would modify 
the order granting the trial judge plenary and continuing jurisdiction over the 
matter by disposing altogether with any continuing jurisdiction. 
 
This case originated as a declaratory judgment asking that the statutes 
supporting the funding of education be declared unconstitutional as applied to 
plaintiffs for failing to be “thorough and efficient.”  The majority has entered a 
judgment to that effect.  There remains nothing more for this, or any other, court to 
do. 
 
There is no case or controversy pending before the trial judge to decide.   
No issue remains to be retried.  The remand (DeRolph II) does not direct the court 
to answer unresolved issues from DeRolph I.   No evidence gathering or fact 
finding is necessary on the issues as presented to us by the appeal; this court has 
already stricken the statutes.  Thus, the usual reasons for remanding a case do not 
exist here. 
 
 
 
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It is a bizarre procedure for any appellate court to remand a case for a 
review of facts arising not only after the complaint was filed but after the appeals 
are over.  Moreover, the complaint raised an “as applied” constitutional challenge, 
but the remand seems to require a review by the trial court of legislation, enacted 
under an unprecedented mandate, as a “facial” challenge.  Add to all of this 
variance from the tenets of appellate review, the dispensation from the Ohio 
Constitution in skipping the court of appeals on the path back to this court. See 
Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution; R.C. 2501.02. 
 
If the majority’s concern is enforcing its judgment, then, upon the enactment 
of new laws for school funding, new challenges may be brought.  In fact, given the 
majority holding that the courts will be the branch of government that determines 
the ever-changing concept of what amounts to a thorough and efficient system of 
schools, we can be sure that the constitutionality of the funding of schools will be 
judicially reviewed over and over again. 
  
 
The remand, broad or limited, seems to be a vain act.  Indeed, the trial judge 
to whom the court is remanding the case revealed a wide-ranging view of what he 
would like to see the new system provide.  This view included twelve standards 
for “adequate educational opportunities,” among them “sufficient support and 
 
 
 
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guidance so that every child feels a sense of self-worth and ability to achieve, and 
so that every student is encouraged to live up to his or her full potential.”  If the 
majority is remanding for the trial judge to pass upon the sufficiency of new 
legislation, and that judge has already opined in great detail as to what he would 
adjudge sufficient, this court might as well review the trial judge’s model at this 
juncture.1 
 
Otherwise, the questions remain, what precisely is the trial judge to do on 
remand?  What precisely is the point of the remand?  Why the need to retain 
jurisdiction other than to dictate a legislative response?   
 
Does the majority envision the two other autonomous branches of 
government attending hearings before a trial judge?  That is unprecedented in my 
experience.   Is there not something very offensive to our basic knowledge of 
American government in having representatives of the legislative and executive 
branches reporting to a common pleas court judge on the enactment of new laws  -
- new tax laws, no less?  
 
The courts are not in the business of making new laws.  In a climate of finite 
resources,  the General Assembly, with its function of reaching decisions through 
compromise and consideration of popular opinion, has the greatest legitimacy in 
 
 
 
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making budget decisions that require a choice among priorities.  The General 
Assembly acts at the behest and the will of the people, not of the courts.  Unless 
the other branches of government are to be totally subordinate to the judiciary, we 
cannot direct the General Assembly in the performance of its legislative duties. 
 
Since “thorough and efficient” is not a judicially determinable standard, the 
effort by the General Assembly to meet it creates an untenable situation.  To 
further complicate the ambiguity by interposing an individual, in an undefined 
role, is ill-advised. If the majority is unwilling to acknowledge that this case is 
over, this court should at most retain jurisdiction itself, since only this court 
should answer the inevitable disputes about what DeRolph I means.   
 
As for the motion for clarification, my fundamental disagreement with the 
majority decision precludes my participation in clarifying it. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1 
We note that the twelve enumerated platitudes that apparently form part of 
the trial court’s equitable decree ordering the state to provide a “constitutionally 
acceptable system of school funding” are unenforceable.   
Civ.R. 
65(D) 
requires that “every order granting an injunction * * * shall be specific in terms; 
shall describe in reasonable detail * * * the act or acts sought to be restrained * * 
 
 
 
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*.”  The United States Supreme Court noted in regard to the identical requirements 
in the federal Civil Rule, "[T]he specificity provisions of Rule 65(d) are no mere 
technical requirements.  The Rule was designed to prevent uncertainty and 
confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders, and to avoid the 
possible founding of a contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood.” 
Schmidt v. Lessard (1974), 414 U.S. 473, 476, 94 S.Ct. 713, 715, 38 L.Ed.2d 661, 
664.    “The judicial contempt power,” that court has noted, “is a potent weapon.  
When it is founded upon a decree too vague to be understood, it can be a deadly 
one.” Internatl. Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Assn. (1967), 
389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S.Ct. 201, 208, 19 L.Ed.2d 236, 245.  
 
Thus, the trial court’s injunction, containing only abstract conclusions that 
sound more like educational philosophy than judicial specificity, falls far short of 
the requirements of Civ.R.65 (D).