Case Title: State ex rel Upham v. McElligott

Citation: 

Docket Number: S43433

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  March 26, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE ex rel SCOTT D. UPHAM,

	Plaintiff-Relator,

	v.

MICHAEL J. McELLIGOTT, Circuit
Court Judge, Washington County,

	Defendant,

	and

B.C.W.,

	Intervenor.

STATE ex rel B.C.W., a juvenile,

	Plaintiff-Relator,

	v.

MICHAEL J. McELLIGOTT, Circuit
Court Judge, Washington County,

	Defendant,

	and

STATE OF OREGON, by and through
SCOTT D. UPHAM, Washington County
District Attorney,

	Intervenor.

(SC S43433 (control), S43551)*

(consolidated)

	Original proceedings in mandamus.

	Argued and submitted September 9, 1997.

	Michael C. Livingston, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for relator Scott D. Upham and intervenor State
of Oregon.  With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Virginia L. Linder, former Solicitor General.

	Kathleen M. Correll, of Curtis & Correll, Portland, argued
the cause for relator and intervenor B.C.W.  With her on the
brief was Michael Curtis.

	No appearance contra.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Graber, and Durham, Justices.**

	GRABER, J.

	In SC S43551, alternative writ dismissed.  In SC S43433,
peremptory writ to issue.	

    *Relating to Washington County Circuit Court Case 

No. J95-0415.

   **Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Kulongoski, J., did not participate
in the consideration or decision of this case.

		GRABER, J.

		These two consolidated mandamus proceedings arise out
of the same underlying case.  Petitions filed in the juvenile
court allege that B.C.W., a youth,(1) is within the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court pursuant to ORS 419C.005(1),(2) because he
committed several acts that, if done by an adult, would
constitute the crimes of sodomy in the first degree, rape in the
first degree, and sexual abuse in the first degree.  B.C.W. filed
a motion for a jury trial, claiming a constitutional entitlement
under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.(3)  B.C.W. then filed an alternative
motion for an "advisory jury," relying on ORCP 1 A and ORCP 

51 D.(4)

		The juvenile court denied the first motion, ruling that
B.C.W. had no constitutional right to a jury trial and citing
State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Reynolds, 317 Or 560, 857 P2d 842
(1993).  Relator B.C.W. filed a petition for an alternative writ
of mandamus to challenge that ruling.  Second, the juvenile court
held that it "has discretion to grant an advisory jury to a youth
in a juvenile delinquency proceeding" and granted B.C.W.'s motion
for an advisory jury.  Relator Scott D. Upham, district attorney,
filed a petition for an alternative writ of mandamus to challenge
that second ruling.

		This court allowed both petitions, issued alternative
writs, and ordered that the mandamus matters be consolidated. 
For the reasons that follow:  (1) we hold that B.C.W. has no
constitutional right to a jury trial and, accordingly, dismiss
the alternative writ in SC S43551; and (2) we hold that the
juvenile court has no discretion to empanel an advisory jury in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding and, accordingly, direct that a
peremptory writ issue in SC S43433, requiring the juvenile court
to vacate the order granting B.C.W.'s motion for an advisory
jury.

B.C.W.'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS:

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS OF A RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

I.  ARTICLE I, SECTION 11

		In 1993, this court held that the jurisdictional phase
of a juvenile court delinquency proceeding under former ORS
419.476(1)(a)(5) "is not a 'criminal prosecution' within the
meaning of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,"(6)
and that "the juvenile court properly denied the child's motion
for a jury trial."  Reynolds, 317 Or at 575.

		Like the present proceedings, Reynolds involved
allegations of sex-related crimes.  The youth in that case had
engaged in conduct that, if done by an adult, would constitute
sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and
furnishing obscene materials to minors.  Id. at 563.  As here,
the youth argued that he was entitled to a jury trial, because
the juvenile court delinquency proceeding was a "criminal
prosecution" that called into play the right of jury trial
embodied in Article I, section 11.  Id. at 564.  This court
extensively examined the history of that constitutional provision
and of Oregon's juvenile justice system.  Id. at 565-70.  This
court noted, among other things, the vastly different result for
an adult convicted of first-degree sexual abuse (up to 10 years'
imprisonment, with a presumptive sentence of 16 to 18 months'
imprisonment) than for the youth:  "the juvenile court in this
case merely upgraded the child's previous informal probation to
formal probation and sent him home."  Id. at 572.  The court also
explained in detail other differences between adult and youth
adjudications such as, in the juvenile system, flexible, often
noncustodial dispositional alternatives; parental involvement;
and emphasis on the best interests of the child.  Id. at 572-74. 
The court concluded:

		"In summary, in the jurisdictional phase of a
delinquency proceeding * * *, the issue is not whether
the child should be punished for his or her conduct
but, rather, whether the statutory grounds for
jurisdiction have been established and, if so, what
disposition is in the child's best interests.  Juvenile
courts are concerned with rehabilitation, not
punishment.  If the state wishes to prosecute a child
criminally, it must do so by transferring the child to
an adult criminal court.

		"* * * * *

		"We conclude that, in the juvenile code, the
legislature so changed the way that a juvenile is
treated as to create a proceeding that is sui generis. 
We hold that the jurisdictional phase of a juvenile
proceeding * * * is not a 'criminal prosecution' within
the meaning of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution.  Accordingly, the juvenile court properly
denied the * * * motion for a jury trial."  Id. at 574-75.

		B.C.W. argues that Reynolds is not controlling, because
various legislative changes in 1995 rendered a delinquency
proceeding for a sexual offense "the functional equivalent of a
criminal prosecution."  His wholesale attack on the 1995
legislation is not well taken, because the alleged delinquent
acts occurred in 1994.  B.C.W. has not demonstrated that whatever
parts of the 1995 legislation may apply to this proceeding have
rendered Reynolds distinguishable.  Reynolds controls here, and
B.C.W.'s argument under Article I, section 11, must fail.(7)

II.  FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE

		B.C.W. next contends that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment(8) guarantees a right to a jury trial in this
delinquency proceeding.  However, binding federal precedent is to
the contrary.

		In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 US 528, 91 S Ct 1976,
29 L Ed 2d 647 (1971), five justices agreed that a juvenile
delinquency proceeding is not a "criminal prosecution" within the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment.  Additionally, the court in
McKeiver held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require a jury trial as a basic component of a
juvenile delinquency proceeding.  403 US at 538-51.

		B.C.W. points to no federal authority to the contrary. 
Neither does he point to anything peculiar in his situation that
would cause due process to require a jury trial here.  His
federal constitutional claim is not well taken.

III.  DISPOSITION.

		B.C.W. has no constitutional right to a jury trial. 
Accordingly, we dismiss the alternative writ of mandamus in SC
S43551.

DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS:

AUTHORITY TO EMPANEL AN ADVISORY JURY

		After holding that B.C.W. has no constitutional right
to a jury trial, the juvenile court ordered that an advisory jury
be empaneled in the present case.  B.C.W.'s alternative motion
cited ORCP 1 A and ORCP 51 D as sources of authority for an
advisory jury in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.  The question
before us is whether the juvenile court acted within its
statutory authority when it ordered an advisory jury.

		ORCP 1 A provides in part:

		"These rules govern procedure and practice in all
circuit courts of this state, except in the small
claims department of circuit courts, for all civil
actions and special proceedings whether cognizable as
cases at law, in equity, or of statutory origin except
where a different procedure is specified by statute or
rule."  (Emphasis added.)

For the purpose of discussion, we assume (without deciding) that
proceedings in juvenile court come within the coverage of the
Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure as special proceedings of
statutory origin.(9)  ORCP 51 D provides:

		"In all actions not triable by right to a jury,
the court, upon motion of a party or on its own
initiative, may try an issue with an advisory jury or
it may, with the consent of all parties, order a trial
to a jury whose verdict shall have the same effect as
if trial to a jury had been a matter of right."

As the first portion of this opinion demonstrates, this matter is
"not triable by right to a jury."  Consequently, ORCP 51 D would
appear to allow the use of an advisory jury unless the emphasized
proviso of ORCP 1 A operates.

		We turn, then, to the dispositive question under the
Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure: whether there is "a different
procedure * * * specified by statute," ORCP 1 A, for a juvenile
delinquency proceeding.  This proceeding arose from a petition
alleging that B.C.W., a youth, is within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court pursuant to ORS 419C.005.  ORS 419C.400 prescribes
the manner of conducting a hearing in such cases:

		"(1)  The hearing shall be held by the court
without a jury and may be continued from time to time.

		"(2)  The facts alleged in the petition showing
the youth to be within the jurisdiction of the court as
provided in ORS 419C.005, unless admitted, must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt.

		"(3)  For the purpose of determining proper
disposition of the youth, testimony, reports or other
material relating to the youth's mental, physical and
social history and prognosis may be received by the
court without regard to their competency or relevancy
under the rules of evidence.

		"(4)  An adjudication by a juvenile court that a
youth is within its jurisdiction is not a conviction of
a crime or offense."  (Emphasis added.)

		In construing ORS 419C.400, we apply the template
established in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606,
610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  The statute directs that "[t]he
hearing shall be held by the court without a jury."  The word
"shall" is mandatory.  See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary
2085 (unabridged ed 1993) ("shall" is "used in laws, regulations,
or directives to express what is mandatory").  The verb "hold"
means, as pertinent, "to take place."  Id. at 1078.  The text
thus requires the "hearing" -- the proceeding itself -- "to take
place" before the judge without a jury.

		The context of ORS 419C.400(1) includes the other
subsections of ORS 419C.400.  ORS 419C.400(3) provides that
evidence bearing on disposition need not comply with rules of
evidence, and ORS 419C.400(4) provides that an adjudication is
not a conviction of a crime or offense.  Those provisions are
consistent with a paradigm in which the court, sitting without a
jury, hears the matter.

		The context of ORS 419C.400 also includes the remainder
of the juvenile code's provisions on delinquency proceedings. 
Other such provisions similarly are consistent with a hearing
before the court without a jury.  For example, new parties, the
parents, are added to the proceedings at the dispositional stage. 
ORS 419C.285(1)(a).

		In summary, context does nothing to detract from the
textual command to hold the hearing without a jury.  At the first
level of analysis, the legislature's intention is clear.  Because
ORS 419C.400 specifies a procedure for a juvenile delinquency
proceeding, ORCP 51 D does not apply, even if the rules of civil
procedure generally govern such a proceeding.  The juvenile court
lacks authority to empanel any jury to hear a delinquency case.

		Therefore, the juvenile court in this case committed
legal error when it entered an order granting B.C.W.'s motion for
an advisory jury.  We direct that a peremptory writ issue in SC
S43433, requiring the juvenile court to vacate that order.(10)

		In SC S43551, alternative writ dismissed.  In SC
S43433, peremptory writ to issue.

1. 	A "youth" means a person who is under the age of 18 and
who is alleged to have committed an act that would be a crime if
committed by an adult.  ORS 419A.004(27).

2. 	ORS 419C.005(1) provides:

		"Except as otherwise provided in ORS 137.707, the
juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in
any case involving a person who is under 18 years of
age and who has committed an act which is a violation,
or which if done by an adult would constitute a
violation, of a law or ordinance of the United States
or a state, county or city."

3. 	The texts of those constitutional provisions appear
below, ___ Or at ___ n 6 and ___ n 8 (slip op at 3 n 6 and 6 n 8,
respectively.

4. 	The texts of the pertinent rules of civil procedure
appear below, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 7-8).

5. 	In 1993, the legislature reorganized the juvenile code. 
See Or Laws 1993, ch 33 (creating new provisions and amending and
repealing other provisions).  Former ORS 419.476(1)(a), repealed
by Or Laws 1993, ch 33, § 373, is identical in all material
respects to ORS 419C.005(1).

6. 	Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides in part:

		"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to public trial by an impartial jury 

	* * *."

7. 	Because of our disposition of the Article I, section
11, claim on the merits, we need not consider the state's
argument that Measure 40 applies.

8. 	Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in part
that no "State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."

9. 	But see, e.g., ORS 419C.270 (incorporating by reference
many "rules of criminal procedure," such as those pertaining to
motions to suppress, demurrers, and discovery); ORS 419C.343
(providing special procedure for taking depositions when "waiver"
to adult court is under consideration); ORS 419C.309 to 419C.317
(specifying method of serving summons and other process issuing
from the juvenile court); Reynolds, 317 Or at 575 (juvenile
delinquency proceedings are sui generis).

10. 	Because of our disposition of this issue, we need not
consider relator Upham's argument that Measure 40 applies.