Case Title: COLLENE E WALTZ V CAROL WYSE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 122580

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
 
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 14, 2004 
COLLENE E. WALTZ, Personal Representative
Of the Estate of JERRITH WALTZ, Deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
Docket No. 122580  
CAROL WYSE, D.O., and HILLS & 
DALES COMMUNITY GENERAL HOSPITAL,  
Defendants-Appellees. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
YOUNG, J.   
We granted leave in this wrongful death medical 
malpractice case to consider the interplay between MCL 
600.5856(d)1 and MCL 600.5852.2
 Specifically, we must 
determine whether § 5856(d), the medical malpractice notice 
1 MCL 600.5856(d) tolls the applicable “statute of
limitations or repose” when a claimant, in compliance with
MCL 600.2912b, provides written notice of her intent to
commence a medical malpractice action. 
2 
MCL 
600.5852 
extends 
the 
otherwise-applicable
limitation periods for wrongful death actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
tolling provision, tolls the additional period permitted 
for filing wrongful death actions under the wrongful death 
saving provision, § 5852. 
We conclude that § 5856(d) does 
not apply to the wrongful death saving provision and that, 
therefore, 
plaintiff’s 
action 
was 
not 
timely 
filed. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
I. FACTS3 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff’s son, four-month-old Jerrith Waltz, died in 
the emergency room of defendant Hills & Dales Community 
General Hospital on April 18, 1994. In the months prior to 
his death, Jerrith was treated by defendant Dr. Carol Wyse 
for vomiting, diarrhea, pneumonia, and problems leading to 
dehydration and an inability to eat. 
Bearing in mind that plaintiff’s son died on April 18, 
1994, particularly relevant to this appeal are the dates on 
which plaintiff took steps to file a medical malpractice 
action against the hospital and Dr. Wyse: 
1. In January 1999, plaintiff, who had not
yet been appointed personal representative of 
Jerrith’s estate, notified the hospital and Dr.
Wyse of her intent to file suit as required by
MCL 600.2912b. 
3 This matter was resolved on summary disposition. We 
accept for purposes of this appeal the accuracy of the
recitation of facts contained in plaintiff’s notice of
intent to file suit and complaint.
2 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
2. On May 27, 1999, plaintiff was appointed
personal representative of Jerrith’s estate. 
3. On June 23, 1999, plaintiff, in her 
capacity as personal representative, filed a 
wrongful 
death 
medical 
malpractice 
complaint
against the hospital and Dr. Wyse. 
Defendants sought summary disposition, arguing that 
plaintiff had failed to file her complaint within either 
the applicable two-year limitation period for malpractice 
actions, MCL 600.5805(5),4 or the additional period allowed 
for wrongful death actions under § 5852.5
 Defendants 
contended that the notice tolling provision, § 5856(d),6 did 
4 MCL 600.5805(5) was renumbered as MCL 600.5805(6) by
2002 PA 715, effective March 31, 2003. 
5 MCL 600.5852 provides: 
If a person dies before the period of 
limitations has run or within 30 days after the
period of limitations has run, an action which
survives by law may be commenced by the personal
representative of the deceased person at any time
within 2 years after letters of authority are
issued although the period of limitations has run.
But an action shall not be brought under this
provision 
unless 
the 
personal 
representative
commences it within 3 years after the period of
limitations has run. 
Thus, § 5852 provides an exception to the otherwise­
applicable limitation periods by permitting the personal
representative of a decedent’s estate to file a wrongful
death action up to two years after letters of authority are
issued, subject to a three-year ceiling. 
6 MCL 600.5856 provides, in relevant part: 
The statutes of limitations or repose are
tolled: 
3 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
not toll the additional period provided for wrongful death 
actions under § 5852. 
Defendants argued that § 5852 was 
not itself a “statute of limitations or repose,” but was 
instead a saving provision that merely provided a “grace 
period” that extended the otherwise-applicable limitation 
period. 
Moreover, defendants contended that plaintiff had 
no authority to file her notices of intent in January 1999, 
before she was appointed personal representative; thus, the 
notices did not serve to toll the time limit for filing 
suit in any event.7 
* * * 
(d) 
If, during the applicable notice period
under [MCL 600.2912b], a claim would be barred by
the statute of limitations or repose, for not
longer than a number days equal to the number of
days in the applicable notice period after the date
notice is given in compliance with section 2912b. 
Under this provision, the limitation period is tolled for
182 days if the plaintiff provides a valid notice of intent
before 
the 
limitation 
period 
expires. 
See 
MCL 
600.2912b(1); Omelenchuk v Warren, 461 Mich 567; 609 NW2d
177 (2000). 
7 In addition to her contention that the statute of 
limitations 
barred 
plaintiff’s 
action, 
defendant 
Wyse
argued that (1) plaintiff failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted because she failed to allege
Dr. 
Wyse’s 
standard 
of 
care 
or 
facts 
demonstrating
proximate cause; (2) plaintiff’s affidavit of merit did not
comply with the provisions of MCL 600.2912d; and (3)
plaintiff’s notice of intent to file suit did not comply
with the provisions of § 2912b. 
Defendant hospital joined
in defendant Wyse’s motion only with respect to the statute
of limitations issue. 
Because we conclude that summary
disposition was properly granted on that basis, it is
4 
 
 
     
 
 
                                                 
 
 
   
 
The trial court granted defendants’ motion, holding 
that (1) because the notice tolling provision, § 5856(d), 
did not toll the wrongful death “extension period,” § 5852, 
and (2) because plaintiff was not appointed personal 
representative until after both the statute of limitations, 
§ 5805(5), and the wrongful death “extension period” had 
expired, the action was time-barred.8 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial 
court correctly concluded that the statute of limitations 
barred plaintiff’s claim. 
Unpublished opinion per curiam, 
issued October 1, 2002 (Docket No. 231324). 
We granted 
plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal. 
unnecessary to address the additional issues raised by Dr.
Wyse. 
8 Although in light of our resolution of this matter it
is not necessary to address at any length the significance
of the fact that plaintiff had not yet been appointed
personal representative at the time that she filed her
notices of intent, we note that former MCL 700.332 
(repealed and recodified in part at MCL 700.3701, 1998 PA
386, effective April 1, 2000) provided that “[t]he powers
of an independent personal representative relate back in 
time to give acts by the person appointed which are 
beneficial to the estate occurring before the appointment
the same effect as those occurring thereafter.” 
The trial court additionally held that plaintiff
failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted,
MCR 2.116(C)(8), because she failed to specifically plead
the applicable standard of care. Because we agree that the
statute of limitations barred plaintiff’s action, we need
not address this alternate ground for summary disposition. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We 
review 
de 
novo 
decisions 
regarding 
summary 
disposition motions.9
 Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), summary 
disposition is proper when a claim is barred by the statute 
of limitations. In determining whether summary disposition 
was properly granted under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court 
“consider[s] all documentary evidence submitted by the 
parties, accepting as true the contents of the complaint 
unless 
affidavits 
or 
other 
appropriate 
documents 
specifically contradict them.”10 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. SECTION 5856(d) DOES NOT OPERATE TO TOLL § 5852 
Plaintiff argues that her complaint was timely filed 
under the wrongful death provision, § 5852, as extended by 
the notice tolling provision, § 5856(d). 
Plaintiff 
contends that in Omelenchuk v Warren, this Court applied 
the notice tolling provision to § 5852 and referred to § 
5852 as setting forth a “limitation period.” Thus, despite 
the fact that she did not file her notices of intent until 
well after the expiration of the two-year malpractice 
limitation period, plaintiff claims that she had until 
9 Maskery v Bd of Regents, 468 Mich 609, 613; 664 NW2d 165
(2003). 
10 Fane v Detroit Library Comm, 465 Mich 68, 74; 631 NW2d 678
(2001); MCR 2.116(G)(5). 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 17, 1999 (182 days after the notices of intent were 
served) to file suit. 
The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s argument, 
holding that the notice tolling provision did not toll the 
extended filing period for wrongful death actions: 
In general, the statute of limitations for a
wrongful death action is the statute of limitations
for the underlying theory of liability, Eggleston v
Bio-Medical Applications of Detroit, Inc, 248 Mich
App 640, 646; 645 NW2d 279 (2001), which is two
years 
for 
medical 
malpractice, 
id., 
MCL 
600.5805(5); Solowy v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 454 Mich
214, 219; 561 NW2d 843 (1997). . . . However, a
wrongful death savings provision applies if the
deceased died either before or within thirty days
after the period of limitations ended. 
MCL 
600.5852; McNeil v Quines, 195 Mich App 199, 202;
489 NW2d 180 (1992). Under the savings provision,
the personal representative of an estate may begin
a lawsuit within two years after letters of 
authority are issued, as long as the lawsuit is
brought within three years after the two-year
general period of limitations ended. MCL 600.5852;
McNeil, supra at 202. This creates a maximum time 
of five years for filing suit, unless the six-month
discovery rule in MCL 600.5838(2) applies. 
Here, plaintiff failed to file her complaint
within five years after her son's death. However,
she argues that the five-year period was tolled for
182 days when her attorney sent both defendants
notices of intent before filing suit, as required
when a person alleges medical malpractice, MCL
600.2912b(1). 
See also Rheaume v Vandenberg, 232
Mich App 417, 421; 591 NW2d 331 (1998). Generally,
the potential plaintiff must wait at least 182 days
after giving notice before filing a complaint, MCL 
600.2912b(1); however, this period is reduced to
154 days if, as in this case, there was no written
response to the notice, MCL 600.2912b(8). See also 
Omelenchuk, supra at 572-573. 
When the interval 
when a potential plaintiff is not allowed to 
commence an action would end after the expiration
of the limitations period, then MCL 600.5856(d) 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
applies and the period of limitations is tolled for
182 days, Omelenchuk, supra at 574-575, if the
notice meets the substantive requirements set forth
in MCL 600.2912b, Roberts v Mecosta Co General 
Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 59, 67, 70-71; 642 NW2d 663
(2002). 
Here, the parties do not dispute that the
wrongful death savings statute applied, and thus
plaintiff could file suit within five years of the
infant's 
death, 
which 
plaintiff 
did 
not 
do. 
However, plaintiff claims that the notices of 
intent given to defendants tolled the extended
five-year limit set forth in the savings statute,
MCL 600.5852. 
We disagree. 
We need look no 
further than the language of the tolling statute to
resolve this issue. 
MCL 600.5856(d) expressly
tolls the "statute of limitations." 
The Supreme
Court has said recently that MCL 600.5852 is not a
statute of limitations, but rather a savings
statute. 
Miller [v Mercy Memorial Hosp, 466 Mich 
196; 644 NW2d 730 (2002).] 
Therefore, by its
express language, MCL 600.5856(d) tolls the statute
of limitations, not the extended limit in MCL
600.5852. 
Consequently, the trial court did not
err because the statute of limitations barred 
plaintiff's claim. [Slip op, pp 2-3.][11] 
We agree with and adopt the reasoning of the Court of 
Appeals in affirming the grant of summary disposition for 
defendants. 
Section 5856(d), by its express terms, tolls 
only the applicable “statute of limitations or repose.” As 
we recently stated in Miller, supra at 202, the wrongful 
11 The panel distinguished Omelenchuk: 
To 
the 
extent 
that 
plaintiff 
relies 
on 
Omelenchuk, supra at 577, we find that case 
distinguishable. 
In that case, the Supreme Court
added the 182-day tolling period to the two-year
limitation period that started when the personal
representative was appointed, not the five-year
maximum at issue here. [Slip op p 3 n 2.]
8 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
death provision, § 5852, “is a saving statute, not a 
statute of limitations.” 
(Emphasis supplied.)12
 See also 
Lindsey v Harper Hosp, in which we explained that § 5852, 
as “the statute of limitations saving provision” and an 
“exception to the statute of limitations,” operated “to 
suspend the running of the statute until a personal 
representative is appointed to represent the interests of 
the estate.”13 
The plain language of § 5852 wholly supports our 
conclusion 
that 
it 
is 
not 
itself 
a 
“statute 
of 
limitations.” Again, § 5852 provides: 
If a person dies before the period of 
limitations has run or within 30 days after the
period of limitations has run, an action which
survives by law may be commenced by the personal
representative of the deceased person at any time 
12 Even our dissenting colleague agrees that it has
long been settled that § 5852 is not a statute of 
limitations, but a savings provision. 
See post at 10. 
However, the dissent does not address the plain language of
§ 5856(d), which tolls only the applicable “statute of 
limitations or repose.” 
The dissent further questions “how a claim may be
considered time-barred under the saving provision if the 
saving provision is not a limitation period.” 
Post at 12. 
The dissent misunderstands our analysis. Plaintiff’s claim 
is not time-barred under the saving provision. 
Rather, it
is barred by the two-year statute of limitations for 
medical malpractice actions. 
The saving provision simply
does not save plaintiff’s claim because she did not file
her complaint until after the grace period provided for in
the saving provision had expired. 
13 Lindsey v Harper Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 60-61, 65; 564 
NW2d 861 (1997). 
9 
 
 
 
within 2 years after letters of authority are
issued although the period of limitations has run. 
But an action shall not be brought under this
provision 
unless 
the 
personal 
representative
commences it within 3 years after the period of
limitations has run. [Emphasis supplied.] 
By its own terms, § 5852 is operational only within the 
context of the separate “period of limitations” that would 
otherwise bar an action. 
Section 5852 clearly provides 
that it is an exception to the limitation period, allowing 
the commencement of a wrongful death action as many as 
three years after the applicable statute of limitations has 
expired. 
In this case, the two-year limitation period provided 
in § 5805(5) expired on April 18, 1996, two years after 
Jerrith’s death. 
In order to toll the period under § 
5856(d), plaintiff was required to provide notices of 
intent in compliance with the provisions of MCL 600.2912b 
before the expiration of the two-year limitation period. 
Had she done so, the limitation period would have been 
tolled for 182 days. See Omelenchuk, supra. 
However, plaintiff did not provide her notices of 
intent until January 1999, well after the expiration of the 
two-year limitation period. 
As we have explained, the 
three-year ceiling provided in the wrongful death saving 
provision was not “tolled” following plaintiff’s provision 
10  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
of the notices of intent. Thus, plaintiff’s June 23, 1999, 
complaint was time-barred.14 
B. OMELENCHUK V WARREN 
Plaintiff argues, and the Court of Appeals apparently 
agreed, that this Court in Omelenchuk applied the notice 
tolling provision to § 5852. 
See slip op, p 3 n 2. 
We 
take this opportunity to clarify our holding in Omelenchuk. 
The issue in Omelenchuk was whether the malpractice 
notice tolling provision tolled the statutory limitation 
period for a full 182 days or, instead, for only 154 days, 
when a medical malpractice claimant does not receive the 
written response to the notice of intent contemplated under 
14 We disagree with the dissent’s assertion that our
reading of the applicable statutes “effectively reduce[s]”
by 182 days the two- and three-year periods provided for in
§ 5852. 
See post at 21. 
Plaintiff had a full two years
after letters of authority were issued to commence her
claim, as long as the claim was commenced within three
years after the expiration of the two-year limitation 
period for medical malpractice actions. 
Additionally,
plaintiff was entitled to a 182-day tolling period under §
5856(d), provided that she filed her notice of intent at
some 
point 
before 
the 
expiration 
of 
that 
two-year
limitation period. 
Potentially, then, under §§ 5805(5), 
5852, and 5856(d), plaintiff had five years plus 182 days
to commence her lawsuit following the accrual of her cause
of action. 
However, because plaintiff waited until nearly
five years had passed after her infant’s death to file her
notice of intent, there was simply no unexpired “statute of
limitations” to toll. 
This analysis in no way shortens
either the two-year extension period or the three-year
ceiling provided for in § 5852.
11 
 
 
                                                 
 
MCL 600.2912b(7).15  We held that the limitation period was 
tolled for the entire 182-day period, notwithstanding the 
fact that the plaintiffs, who were appointed personal 
representatives of the decedent’s estate the day after his 
death and who filed their notice of intent before the 
expiration of the two-year limitation period, could have 
commenced their lawsuit after only 154 days. 
It was unnecessary in Omelenchuk to determine whether 
the 182-day notice tolling provision applied to the 
wrongful death saving provision. 
The plaintiffs’ decedent 
died on February 13, 1994. 
Leaving aside application of 
the wrongful death saving provision, the two-year medical 
malpractice limitation period would thus have expired on 
February 13, 1996. 
The plaintiffs filed their notice of 
intent on December 11, 1995, and they did not receive a 
written response from the defendants. 
We held that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to a tolling period of a full 182 
days, rather than only 154 days, even though under MCL 
600.2912b(8) they could have filed suit after 154 days. 
Applying 
the 
182-day 
tolling 
period, 
the 
two-year 
15 MCL 600.2912b(7) provides that the recipient of a
notice of intent shall furnish a written response within
154 days after receipt. 
MCL 600.2912b(8) provides that if
no response is received by the claimant, he may commence a
medical malpractice action upon the expiration of the 154­
day period rather than waiting out the full 182-day period
otherwise contemplated by § 2912b(1).
12 
 
 
 
 
limitation period would have expired on August 13, 1996, 
irrespective of the wrongful death saving statute. 
The 
plaintiffs filed their complaint on July 19, 1996, well 
before expiration of the limitation period as extended by 
the tolling provision. 
The source of the confusion surrounding our holding in 
Omelenchuk stems in part from our passing references to § 
5852 as creating a “limitation period.” 
See, e.g., 
Omelenchuk, supra at 577: 
In the present case, the plaintiffs’ decedent
died on February 13, 1994. The plaintiffs received
their letters of authority the next day, February
14, 1994. Thus, [pursuant to § 5852,] the two-year
limitation period was set to expire on February 14,
1996. [Emphasis added.] 
To the extent that our imprecise choice of words in 
Omelenchuk 
implied 
that 
§ 
5852 
created 
a 
separate 
“limitation period,” we again clarify that § 5852 is not a 
statute of limitations, but a saving statute. 
We 
additionally 
note 
that 
we 
mistakenly, 
and 
unnecessarily, based our time calculations on a starting 
date 
of 
February 
14, 
1994 
(the 
date 
the 
personal 
representatives were appointed), when we should have based 
those calculations on the accrual date of the cause of 
action, February 13, 1994 (the date of the decedent’s 
death). See Omelenchuk, supra at 577: 
13  
 
 
   
 
 
 
In the present case, the plaintiffs' decedent
died on February 13, 1994. The plaintiffs received
their letters of authority the next day, February
14, 1994. Thus, the two-year limitation period was
set to expire on February 14, 1996. 
On December 11, 1995 (sixty-five days before
the expiration of the limitation period) the 
plaintiffs provided the required notice to the
defendants. 
As a result of the notice, the 
limitation period was tolled one hundred eighty-two
days. 
Rather than expiring on February 14, 1996,
the limitation period thus was tolled from December
11, 1995, until June 10, 1996; it then resumed for
another sixty-five days until it expired on August 
14, 1996. 
* * * 
The plaintiffs . . . filed their complaint on
July 19, 1996, nearly a month before the end of the
recalculated limitation period. 
We should have stated that rather than expiring on 
February 13, 1996, the limitation period was tolled from 
December 11, 1995, until June 10, 1996, and then resumed 
for another sixty-five days until it expired on August 13, 
1996. 
In any event, it was unnecessary to apply the 
wrongful death saving provision because the action was 
commenced within the two-year limitation period. 
To the 
limited extent that the above-quoted portion of Omelenchuk 
might be viewed as sanctioning application of the notice 
tolling provision to the wrongful death saving provision, 
it is hereby overruled. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Section 5852 is a saving provision designed “to 
preserve actions that survive death in order that the
14 
 
representative of the estate may have a reasonable time to 
pursue such actions.” 
Lindsey, supra at 66. 
It is not a 
“statute of limitations” or a “statute of repose.” 
Thus, 
the notice tolling provision, § 5856(d)——which explicitly 
applies only to “the statute of limitations or repose”—— 
does not operate to toll the additional period permitted 
under § 5852 for filing wrongful death actions. 
Because 
plaintiff did not file her complaint until well after the 
expiration of both the two-year limitation period for 
malpractice actions and the grace period provided for in § 
5852, the lower courts properly determined that the action 
was time-barred. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
COLLENE E. WALTZ, Personal Representative
of the Estate of JERRITH WALTZ, Deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 122580 
CAROL WYSE, D.O., AND HILLS &
DALES COMMUNITY GENERAL HOSPITAL, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
_______________________________ 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
This case calls on us to determine whether MCL 
600.5856(d) tolls the period provided for filing wrongful 
death claims under MCL 600.5852 where the wrongful death 
claim is predicated on medical malpractice. Because I find 
that § 5856(d) applies to § 5852, I respectfully dissent 
from the majority’s decision. 
The majority’s holding has 
the 
practical 
effect 
of 
shortening 
the 
period 
the 
Legislature expressly permits for bringing wrongful death 
actions. Consistently with the will of the Legislature and 
this Court’s unanimous opinion per curiam in Omelenchuk v 
City of Warren, 461 Mich 567; 609 NW2d 177 (2000), I would 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
I. INTERPLAY OF RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Today’s 
decision 
evidences 
the 
majority’s 
misunderstanding of the nature of plaintiff’s claim, as 
well as the interplay between the statutory limitation 
provisions pertaining to wrongful death actions and medical 
malpractice 
claims. 
Presumably, 
it 
is 
this 
basic 
misunderstanding that drives the majority’s result. 
The 
majority states, “In this case, the two-year limitation 
period provided in § 5805(5) expired on April 18, 1996, two 
years after Jerrith’s death. 
In order to toll the period 
under § 5856(d), plaintiff was required to provide notices 
of intent in compliance with the provisions of MCL 
600.2912b before the expiration of the two-year limitation 
period.” 
Ante at 11. 
Because the majority does not fully 
comprehend the nature of this case, an examination of 
plaintiff’s claim and the applicable statutory provisions 
is necessary. 
“Early in its history, Michigan adopted a rather 
liberal ‘survival act’ to preserve causes of action which, 
under common law, were terminated by the death either of 
the person injured or the tortfeasor.” 
Hawkins v Regional 
Med Labs, PC, 415 Mich 420, 428-429; 329 NW2d 729 (1982). 
MCL 600.2921 pertains to survival actions and provides: 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All 
actions 
and 
claims 
survive 
death. 
Actions on claims for injuries which result in 
death shall not be prosecuted after the death of
the injured person except pursuant to the next 
section. 
If an action is pending at the time of
death the claims may be amended to bring it under
the next section. 
A failure to so amend will 
amount to a waiver of the claim for additional 
damages resulting from death. 
Thus, survival type wrongful death actions are filtered 
through MCL 600.2922, which provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Whenever the death of a person or 
injuries resulting in death shall be caused by 
wrongful act, neglect, or fault of another, and
the act, neglect, or fault is such as would, if
death had not ensued, have entitled the party
injured 
to 
maintain 
an 
action 
and 
recover 
damages, the person who or the corporation that
would have been liable, if death had not ensued,
shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured,
and 
although 
the 
death 
was 
caused 
under 
circumstances that constitute a felony. 
The statute of limitations for a wrongful death action 
is normally governed by the statute of limitations for the 
underlying claim. 
Larson v Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 427 
Mich 301, 314; 399 NW2d 1 (1986). 
In general, the 
limitation period for a medical malpractice action is two 
years. 
MCL 600.5805(5); Miller v Mercy Memorial Hosp, 466 
Mich 196, 199; 644 NW2d 730 (2002). 
The Legislature, 
however, has set forth specific statutory limitation 
provisions relating to medical malpractice and wrongful 
death actions. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, MCL 600.5838a provides in pertinent part: 
(1) For purposes of this act, a claim based
on the medical malpractice of a person or entity
who is or who holds himself or herself out to be 
a licensed health care professional, licensed 
health facility or agency, or an employee or
agent of a licensed health facility or agency who
is engaging in or otherwise assisting in medical
care and treatment, whether or not the licensed
health 
care 
professional, 
licensed 
health 
facility or agency, or their employee or agent is
engaged in the practice of the health profession
in 
a 
sole 
proprietorship, 
partnership,
professional 
corporation, 
or 
other 
business 
entity, accrues at the time of the act or 
omission that is the basis for the claim of 
medical malpractice, regardless of the time the
plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of
the claim. 
* * * 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, an action involving a claim based on
medical malpractice may be commenced at any time 
within 
the 
applicable 
period 
prescribed 
in 
section 5805 or sections 5851 to 5856, or within
6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should
have discovered the existence of the claim,
whichever is later. [Emphasis added.] 
Further, and at issue here, is the wrongful death saving 
provision. MCL 600.5852 provides in pertinent part: 
If a person dies before the period of 
limitations has run or within 30 days after the
period of limitations has run, an action which 
survives by law may be commenced by the personal
representative of the deceased person at any time
within 2 years after letters of authority are
issued although the period of limitations has
run. But an action shall not be brought under
this provision unless the personal representative
commences it within 3 years after the period of
limitations has run. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under § 5852, the Legislature has expressly granted a 
personal representative “an additional two years from the 
date of issuance of letters [of authority] in which to 
bring suit provided that, in any event, the [personal 
representative] brings suit not more than three years after 
the limitations period has run.” 
Hawkins, supra at 438. 
Thus, the Legislature has extended the time in which to 
bring wrongful death claims, including those claims based 
upon medical malpractice. 
It is against this backdrop that the Legislature’s 
tort reform measures must be considered. 
The Legislature 
requires 
a 
plaintiff 
alleging 
medical 
malpractice, 
including a personal representative bringing a wrongful 
death action, to provide notice of intent to commence an 
action to the defendant before filing a complaint. 
MCL 
600.2912b; Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 65; 
642 NW2d 663 (2002). 
After giving notice of intent, a 
plaintiff must wait at least one hundred eighty-two days 
before filing the complaint; however, this period may be 
reduced to one hundred fifty-four days if the plaintiff 
does not receive a written response from the defendant. 
MCL 600.2912b(1) and (8). 
During this “waiting period 
required under MCL 600.2912b,” however, the Legislature has 
provided that MCL 600.5856(d) will toll the period of 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
limitations. 
Roberts, supra at 60 (emphasis added). 
MCL 
600.5856(d) provides: 
If, during the applicable notice period
under section 2912b, a claim would be barred by
the statute of limitations or repose, for not
longer than a number of days equal to the number
of days in the applicable notice period after the
date notice is given in compliance with section
2912b. 
The 
Legislature 
has 
seen 
fit 
to 
provide 
a 
comprehensive time frame for actions alleging medical 
malpractice. 
The statutes pertaining to the timing of 
medical malpractice and wrongful death are intertwined. 
II. OMELENCHUK V CITY OF WARREN
 
In Omelenchuk, nearly all the aforementioned statutory 
provisions were implicated. 
Thus, the majority’s newfound 
wisdom and its avoiding that decision necessitate a 
thorough examination. 
In examining the language of the notice tolling 
provision, § 5856(d), this Court began its analysis with 
the following observation: “Certainly, that provision could 
have been written more clearly.” Omelenchuk, supra at 574. 
In construing § 5856(d), this Court noted: 
If, however, the interval when a potential
plaintiff is not allowed to file suit would end
after the expiration of the limitation period
(i.e., if notice is given one hundred eighty-two
days or less before the end of the limitation 
period), then MCL 600.5856(d); MSA 27A.5856(d) 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
applies. In that instance, the limitation period
is tolled. [Id. (emphasis added).] 
In determining how long the limitation period is tolled 
under § 2912b, “we conclude[d] and [held] that the 
preferred construction is that the limitation period is 
tolled for the full one hundred eighty-two days.” 
Id. at 
575 (emphasis added). 
In applying the notice tolling provision, § 5856(d), 
to the wrongful death saving provision, § 5852, we noted: 
In 
the 
present 
case, 
the 
plaintiffs'
decedent 
died 
on 
February 
13, 
1994. 
The 
plaintiffs received their letters of authority
the next day, February 14, 1994. Thus, the two­
year limitation period was set to expire on 
February 14, 1996. 
On December 11, 1995 (sixty-five days before
the expiration of the limitation period) the 
plaintiffs provided the required notice to the
defendants. As a result of the notice, the 
limitation period was tolled one hundred eighty­
two days. Rather than expiring on February 14, 
1996, the limitation period thus was tolled from 
December 11, 1995, until June 10, 1996; it then
resumed for another sixty-five days until it 
expired on August 14, 1996. 
The plaintiffs were unable to file suit for
one hundred fifty-four days after they provided
notice on December 11, 1995. . . . 
This no-suit 
interval ended on May 13, 1996, after which they
were able to file suit. The plaintiffs then filed
their complaint on July 19, 1996, nearly a month
before the end of the recalculated limitation 
period. [Id. at 577 (emphasis added).] 
Thus, this Court, in a unanimous decision, unquestionably 
applied § 5856(d) to the limitation period provided under 
§ 5852. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
III. THE MAJORITY’S ATTEMPTS TO AVOID OMELENCHUK 
The 
majority, 
in 
vain 
attempts 
to 
avoid 
the 
ramifications of this Court’s decision in Omelenchuk, 
asserts that (1) “we mistakenly, and unnecessarily, based 
our time calculations on a starting date of February 14, 
1994”;1 and (2) confusion has stemmed from “our imprecise 
choice of words in Omelenchuk [that] implied that § 5852 
created a separate ‘limitation period.’”2  Neither assertion 
has 
merit 
and, 
thus, 
the 
majority’s 
decision 
to 
conditionally overrule Omelenchuk is unwarranted. 
A. THE TIME CALCULATIONS IN OMELENCHUK WERE ACCURATE
 
The Omelenchuk plaintiffs, as personal representatives 
of the decedent’s estate, instituted a wrongful death 
action. 
By operation of §§ 2921, 2922, and 5852, the 
decedent’s claim survived. 
Because the decedent died 
within the two-year period of limitation under § 5805, the 
saving provision took effect and the plaintiffs were 
operating under the period set forth under § 5852, the 
saving 
provision. 
Thus, 
we 
did 
not 
mistakenly 
or 
unnecessarily 
base 
our 
calculations 
on 
the 
date 
of 
1 Ante at 13 (emphasis in original).  
2 Ante at 14-15.  
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
appointment. Under § 5852, we were required to measure the 
applicable two-year period from the date the personal 
representatives were appointed. 
We were not permitted to 
consider 
the 
date 
of 
death 
under 
the 
circumstances 
presented in Omelenchuk. 
The majority is simply wrong in its assertion that 
Omelenchuk should have based its calculations on the date 
the cause of action accrued. 
The date of death in that 
case, February 13, 1994, would only have been relevant (1) 
if the decedent somehow survived and brought a medical 
malpractice claim himself or (2) in determining the three­
year ceiling provided under § 5852. 
As such, it was 
absolutely necessary for this Court to examine the wrongful 
death saving provision because that was the nature of the 
plaintiffs’ claim. 
Thus, the majority’s attempt to 
“clarify” Omelenchuk is disingenuous. 
B. SECTION 5852 DOES SET FORTH A LIMITATION PERIOD 
In an attempt to further distance itself from the 
result reached in Omelenchuk, the majority now asserts that 
we misspoke when we referred to § 5852 as a limitation 
period. 
Instead, the majority simply contends that § 5852 
is not a statute of limitation, but a saving provision, in 
order to justify its current holding. 
This point of law, 
however, 
was 
settled 
long 
before 
our 
decision 
in 
9  
 
 
Omelenchuk. Hardy v Maxheimer, 429 Mich 422, 425; 416 NW2d 
299 (1987); Lindsey v Harper Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 60-61; 564 
NW2d 861 (1997). 
Further, while not formally labeled a 
statute of limitation, it is clear from our prior decisions 
that § 5852 is a limitation period because it sets forth 
its own period of limitations. 
In Lindsey, for example, the defendant moved for 
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), asserting that 
the plaintiff’s claim was barred under § 5852 because the 
plaintiff filed suit more than two years after being 
appointed temporary personal representative.  Lindsey, 
supra at 60. 
The plaintiff argued that the claim was 
timely because the claim was filed within two years of the 
issuance of formal letters of authority. 
This Court held 
that the saving provision begins to run when a plaintiff is 
appointed temporary personal representative. 
Because the 
plaintiff did not bring suit within two years after being 
appointed temporary personal representative as required 
under § 5852, the Lindsey Court held that the plaintiff’s 
claim was untimely and, thus, barred. 
As such, we did not 
misspeak when we referred to § 5852 as a limitation period 
in Omelenchuk. 
Miller 
also 
supports 
the 
conclusion 
reached 
in 
Omelenchuk that the saving provision is a limitation 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
period. In concluding that the six-month discovery rule, § 
5838a(2), was a “period of limitation” within the meaning 
of the saving provision, this Court noted: 
Contrary to defendants' assertions, the six­
month discovery rule is a distinct period of
limitation. 
It is a statutory provision that
requires a person who has a cause of action to
bring suit within a specified time. As an 
alternative to the other periods of limitation,
it is itself a period of limitation. 
[Miller, 
supra at 202.] 
This inevitably leads to the conclusion that because § 5852 
requires a plaintiff to bring suit within a specified time, 
§ 5852 must be considered a limitation period. 
Finally, the majority’s decision itself necessarily 
supports the notion that § 5852 is a limitation period. 
The majority concludes that because the wrongful death 
saving provision was not tolled during the notice period, 
plaintiff’s complaint is time-barred. 
I question how a 
claim may be considered time-barred under the saving 
provision if the saving provision is not a limitation 
period.3  While § 5852 is not formally labeled as a statute 
3 Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I do not
misunderstand its analysis. 
Rather, I believe that its
analysis is fundamentally flawed. Plaintiff’s claim is not 
governed by the two-year statute of limitations under 
§ 5805 because her cause of action, by operation of law, 
proceeds under the limitation period set forth under 
§ 5852, the savings provision.  Therefore, if plaintiff’s 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
of limitation, it is clear that if a plaintiff does not 
adhere to the period of limitations set forth under the 
saving provision, he is subject to having his claim 
dismissed as untimely. 
Thus, this unanimous Court did not 
misspeak in Omelenchuk when it referred to § 5852 as 
setting forth a limitation period. 
In sum, I find the majority’s attempts to evade 
Omelenchuk unacceptable. 
I believe Omelenchuk reached the 
correct result and effectively harmonized the applicable 
statutory provisions pertaining to the limitation of 
actions. 
In fairness, however, I suppose the majority’s 
avoidance of Omelenchuk is necessary to support its overly 
narrow construction of § 5856(d). 
IV. THE MAJORITY’S NARROW CONSTRUCTION IS CONTRARY TO THE LEGISLATURE’S 
INTENT 
The majority considers § 5856(d) in isolation and 
strictly construes five words contained in that particular 
provision 
without 
regard 
to 
the 
other 
relevant 
and 
applicable statutory provisions implicated in this action. 
In doing so, the majority undermines the Legislature’s 
intent and violates several well-established principles of 
statutory construction. 
Applying accepted principles of 
claim is to be considered time-barred at all, it must
necessarily be barred under § 5852, not § 5805. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
construction, I would hold that § 5856(d) is applicable to 
§ 5852. 
“The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to 
give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” 
In re MCI, 
460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). 
To reach this 
goal, this Court has recognized the rule that “statutes 
relating to the same subject matter should be read and 
construed together to determine the Legislature’s intent.” 
Id. at 416. 
Further, it is “a maxim of statutory 
construction that every word of a statute should be read in 
such a way as to be given meaning . . . .” 
Id. at 414 
(emphasis added); see also Danse Corp v Madison Hts, 466 
Mich 175, 182; 644 NW2d 721 (2002)(“The court must presume 
that every word has some meaning and, if possible, effect 
should be given to each provision.”). 
As detailed above, the timing provisions relating to 
wrongful death actions, medical malpractice claims, and 
notice tolling are interconnected and are part of a common 
legislative framework. 
Because the various statutory 
provisions implicated in this case relate to the same 
subject matter, the terms of the provisions should be read 
in pari materia. 
Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 136­
137; 521 NW2d 230 (1994). “The object of the rule in pari 
materia is to carry into effect the purpose of the 
13  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
legislature as found in harmonious statutes on a subject.” 
Id. at 137, quoting Wayne Co v Auditor General, 250 Mich 
227, 233; 229 NW 911 (1930). 
In Detroit v Mich Bell Tel 
Co, 374 Mich 543, 558; 132 NW2d 660 (1965), this Court 
stated: 
Statutes in pari materia are those which 
relate to the same person or thing, or the same
class of persons or things, or which have a
common 
purpose. 
It 
is 
the 
rule 
that 
in 
construction of a particular statute, or in the
interpretation of its provisions, all statutes
relating to the same subject, or having the same
general purpose, should be read in connection
with it, as together constituting one law,
although enacted at different times . . . .[4] 
The purpose of the wrongful death statutory framework 
is to preserve causes of action, including those based on 
medical malpractice, which were previously terminated by 
the death of either the injured party or the wrongdoer 
under 
the 
common 
law. 
Hawkins, 
supra 
at 
428-429. 
Similarly, the purpose of § 5852, the saving provision, is 
to “preserve actions that survive death in order that the 
4 See also Dearborn Twp Clerk v Jones, 335 Mich 658,
662; 57 NW2d 40 (1953)(“’It is elementary that statutes in 
pari materia are to be taken together in ascertaining the
intention of the legislature, and that courts will regard
all statutes upon the same general subject matter as part
of 1 system.”); Remus v Grand Rapids, 274 Mich 577, 581;
265 NW 755 (1936)(“In the construction of a particular
statute, or in the interpretation of any of its provisions,
all acts relating to the same subject, or having the same
general purpose, should be read in connection with it, as
together constituting one law.’” [citation omitted].). 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
representative of the estate may have reasonable time to 
pursue such actions.” Lindsey, supra at 66. Under § 5852, 
the Legislature has deemed two years from the issuance of 
letters of authority to be a reasonable time, but, in any 
event, suit must be filed no more than three years from the 
date the statute of limitations on the underlying claim has 
expired. 
The saving provision remained unchanged in the 
face of tort reform; evidencing that the Legislature still 
considered two years to be a reasonable time in which to 
pursue 
wrongful 
death 
claims 
predicated 
on 
medical 
malpractice, 
subject 
to 
the 
three-year 
ceiling. 
Consistently with the rule of in pari materia, the 
aforementioned provisions must be read together with the 
Legislature’s subsequent tort reform measures. 
Under 1993 PA 78, the Legislature amended the Revised 
Judicature Act and drastically changed the procedures 
necessary to bring a medical malpractice claim in Michigan. 
Notably, 
§ 
2912b 
introduced 
the 
notice 
of 
intent 
requirement 
and 
its 
corresponding 
no-suit 
interval. 
However, the Legislature also amended § 5856 to include 
subsection 
d, 
which 
provides 
that 
the 
“statute 
of 
limitations or repose” is tolled during this notice period. 
“The purpose of the notice requirement is to promote 
settlement without the need for formal litigation and 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
reduce the cost of medical malpractice litigation while 
still 
providing 
compensation 
for 
meritorious 
medical 
malpractice claims that might otherwise be precluded from 
recovery because of litigation costs.” Neal v Oakwood Hosp 
Corp, 226 Mich App 701, 705; 575 NW2d 68 (1997), citing 
Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 270, August 11, 1993, and 
House Legislative Analysis, HB 4403-4406, March 22, 1993. 
Thus, the no-suit interval temporarily incapacitates a 
medical 
malpractice 
plaintiff, 
including 
a 
personal 
representative bringing a wrongful death claim, so that the 
defendant 
may 
investigate 
the 
claim 
and 
meaningful 
settlement negotiations may then occur. 
In exchange for 
not being able to file suit, the Legislature has said that 
the limitation period is tolled during the notice period so 
that a plaintiff’s position is not prejudiced. 
When §§ 
2912b, 2921, 2922, 5805, 5852, and 5856(d) are read 
together, it becomes clear that the Legislature intended 
the notice tolling provision to apply to the saving 
provision. 
The approach I advance today is consistent with the 
approach this Court unanimously used in Miller. 
As 
mentioned above, the issue in Miller was whether the six-
month discovery provision for medical malpractice claims, § 
5838a, was incorporated in the wrongful death saving 
16  
 
 
 
 
provision. 
This Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals 
conclusion that the only “period of limitation” applicable 
to a medical malpractice action under § 5852 was the two­
year period under § 5805(5). 
In reaching our ultimate 
conclusion that § 5838a(2) applied to § 5852, this Court 
considered that the purpose of § 5852 was to preserve 
actions and to provide a reasonable time in which to pursue 
wrongful death claims. This Court further stated: 
That purpose is fulfilled by our decision
today. Had plaintiff's decedent not died, he 
would have been able to bring suit for six 
months, or until July 1996. Suit would have been
timely, 
not 
under 
§ 
5805(5), 
but 
under 
§
5838a(2), not as an exception to the two-year
statute, 
but 
as 
an 
additional 
period 
of 
limitation. [Miller, supra at 203.] 
Thus, the saving provision must necessarily be considered 
both a limitation period and, in light of the purposes of 
that provision and the tort reform measures, a period 
subject to the notice tolling provision. 
Further, while currently out of favor with some 
members of this Court, the approach I advance today is also 
consistent 
with 
another 
accepted 
maxim 
of 
statutory 
construction. 
It has long been recognized that “the Court 
may depart from strict construction principles when a 
literal reading of the statute will produce absurd or 
illogical results, and this Court should attempt to give 
17  
 
 
 
 
effect to all relevant statutory provisions.” 
DiBenedetto 
v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 408; 605 NW2d 300 (2000) 
(CAVANAGH, J., dissenting), citing Gross v Gen Motors Corp, 
448 Mich 147; 528 NW2d 707 (1995), and In re Landaal, 273 
Mich 248, 252; 262 NW 897 (1935). 
Personal representatives who bring a wrongful death 
claim on the basis of medical malpractice must comply with 
the notice of intent provision and likewise may not file 
suit during the no-suit interval. However, by operation of 
law, the limitation period for these causes of action is 
governed by § 5852, not § 5805(5). 
Under the majority’s 
holding, wrongful death plaintiffs must still comply with 
the notice requirement of § 2912b, but do not receive the 
benefit of tolling under § 5856(d) because, according to 
the majority, § 5856(d) only applies to § 5805. 
This 
holding, however, ignores the fact that wrongful death 
plaintiffs must proceed under the limitation period set 
forth by § 5852, not § 5805, and must follow the mandates 
of § 2912b. 
Further, the majority’s decision effectively 
shortens the period the Legislature has plainly allowed 
under § 5852 by one hundred eighty-two days. 
The facts of 
this case illustrate the absurdity of the majority’s 
result. 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
Between February and April 1994, defendant Wyse 
evaluated plaintiff’s four-month-old son. 
On April 13, 
1994, plaintiff took her son to defendant Hills & Dales 
Community General Hospital; however, her son was not 
admitted. 
On April 17, 1994, plaintiff brought her son 
back to defendant hospital and the baby died at the 
hospital the next day, April 18, 1994. Thus, under § 5805, 
the medical malpractice statute of limitations was set to 
expire on April 18, 1996. 
Further, the three-year ceiling 
provided under § 5852 was set to expire on April 18, 1999. 
Plaintiff, as personal representative of her son’s 
estate, had to file suit within two years of her 
appointment, but was required to file no later than April 
18, 1999, under the plain language of the saving provision. 
Because plaintiff was alleging medical malpractice, she 
also had to provide defendants with notices of intent 
before filing her action. 
Plaintiff served the required 
notices of intent in January 1999, well before the 
expiration of the three-year ceiling under § 5852. 
Yet, 
under § 2912b, plaintiff could not file suit for one 
hundred eighty-two days, or for one hundred fifty-four days 
if defendants failed to give a written response. 
Thus, 
plaintiff could not have filed suit before the three-year 
ceiling expired even if she so desired under the current 
19  
 
 
 
 
tort reform system because plaintiff was in the “no-suit 
interval,” i.e., plaintiff was required to wait under § 
2912b. 
During this no-suit interval, the Legislature has said 
that, under § 5856(d), time stands still so that a 
plaintiff’s position is not prejudiced and the purposes of 
the tort reform measures can come to fruition. 
If time 
were not tolled for wrongful death plaintiffs in the same 
manner as other plaintiffs, the plain language of § 5852 is 
shortened by one hundred eighty-two days. A wrongful death 
plaintiff would have to give notices of intent at least one 
hundred eighty-two days before the expiration § 5852. 
Thus, the two years expressly provided under the saving 
provision are effectively reduced to one-and-a-half years, 
and the three-year ceiling is reduced because plaintiffs 
are required to provide notice of intent one hundred 
eighty-two days before the expiration of the three-year 
ceiling. 
In this case, for example, plaintiff would then 
have been required to give her notices of intent by October 
16, 1998. 
Such a result is in direct conflict with the 
plain language of § 5852 and is contrary to the purpose of 
the tort reform measures. 
20  
      
        
    
     
            
        
            
            
         
         
            
       
         
        
        
 
 
 
  
                       
    
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
                              
 
 
 
The following highlights the differences between the 
majority’s 
decision 
and 
the 
proper 
reading 
of 
the 
applicable provisions: 
REQUIRED NO-SUIT INTERVAL 
April 18, 1994 
January 16 & 19, 1999 
June 22, 1999
Plaintiff’s baby 
Plaintiff served notices 
No-suit interval 
dies 
of intent as required 
expires under
under § 2912b 
§ 2912b(7) & (8) 
April 18, 1996 
April 18, 1999 
June 23,
Medical malpractice 
Date majority 
1999 
statute of limitation 
says plaintiff 
Plaintiff 
expires under § 5805 
must have filed 
files suit 
§ 5852 TOLLED BY § 5856(d) 
The Legislature clearly did not intend for wrongful 
death plaintiffs to be prejudiced during the no-suit 
interval. 
Yet, this is the result reached by today’s 
majority. 
By strictly construing five words in isolation 
and closing its eyes to the other applicable statutory 
limitation provisions and legislative intent, the majority 
effectively and impermissibly rewrites part of the Revised 
Judicature Act. 
The majority, not the Legislature, has 
elected to treat the notice period for wrongful death 
plaintiffs alleging medical malpractice differently from 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
the notice period medical malpractice plaintiffs who happen 
to survive their injuries. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Rather than rewriting the Revised Judicature Act, I 
would read the various statutory provisions as one law. 
Because the notice tolling provision and the wrongful death 
savings provision are part of the same law, I would hold 
that § 5856(d) applies to claims governed by the limitation 
period under § 5852. 
This approach is consistent with the 
Legislature’s intent, accepted principles of statutory 
construction, and this Court’s unanimous opinion per curiam 
in Omelenchuk. 
I would, therefore, reverse the decision of the Court 
of Appeals and remand for trial.5 
Michael F. Cavanagh
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
5 As the majority accurately notes, former MCL 700.332
dictates 
that 
plaintiff’s 
appointment 
as 
personal
representative relates back to the time she gave her 
notices of intent. Thus, the trial court erred in granting
defendants’ motion for summary disposition on this ground.
Further, defendant Wyse’s arguments that plaintiff failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and
that the notices of intent were deficient under § 2912b are
without merit. 
22