Case Title: Heen v. Kaufman

Citation: 480 P.2d 701

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1971-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
480 P.2d 701 (1971)
Scott HEEN, by His Guardian Ad Litem, Harley Heen, Appellant,
v.
Mark Alvan KAUFMAN, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 1.
Argued and Submitted December 1, 1970.
Decided February 18, 1971.
Henry Kane, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Tilbury & Kane, Portland.
George M. Joseph, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Morrison & Bailey, Portland.
Before O'CONNELL, C.J., and McALLISTER, HOLMAN, and HOWELL, JJ.
*702 HOLMAN, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order refusing an award of attorney's fees.
More than ten days prior to the filing of his complaint, plaintiff made a written demand on defendant for $1,500 in satisfaction of a claim for damages resulting from an automobile accident. Defendant refused to pay the amount demanded and plaintiff filed a complaint requesting $2,377 in damages. Subsequently, plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking only $977. Upon trial, plaintiff was awarded $250 damages. He now appeals from the refusal to additionally award him attorney's fees pursuant to ORS 20.080(1).
The statute in question provides as follows:
Plaintiff contends that "such claim" for which written demand must be made refers back to "any action for damages * * * where the amount pleaded is $1,000 or less," and, therefore, the amount of the pre-complaint demand is immaterial.
The obvious purpose of the statute is to encourage the settlement of damage claims where the amount involved is not large. This purpose was recognized by the court in Johnson v. White, 249 Or. 461, 439 P.2d 8 (1968), where we said that the statute was designed
and also that
Implicit in the statute is the idea that the defendant will be pressured to settle cases in which liability exists by the potential allowance of attorney's fees and also that he will be given the opportunity by a non-inflated pre-complaint demand to settle the claim before the complaint is filed. If plaintiff's construction of the statute is accepted, plaintiff could made an exorbitant demand and still be entitled to attorney's fees. Plaintiff's construction of the statute would, in effect, read the pre-complaint demand out of the statute. It would encourage inflated demands and thus discourage settlements. Although plaintiff's contention may be in conformance with technical English composition, in view of the legislative purpose such a construction is contrary to common sense.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.