Case Title: State v. Mason

Citation: 2018-Ohio-1462

Docket Number: 2017-0200

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Mason, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-1462.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-1462 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MASON, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Mason, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-1462.] 
Criminal law—Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution—Death 
penalty—Right to trial by jury—Ohio death-penalty scheme does not violate 
the Sixth Amendment, because the jury must find that offender guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt and that an aggravating circumstance exists. 
(No. 2017-0200—Submitted January 23, 2018—Decided April 18, 2018.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Marion County, No. 9-16-34, 
2016-Ohio-8400. 
_______________________ 
FISCHER, J. 
{¶ 1} At issue in this case is whether Ohio’s death-penalty scheme violates 
the right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  The Marion County Court of Common Pleas found that it does, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2
but the Third District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment.  Because 
the Ohio scheme satisfies the Sixth Amendment, we affirm. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} A jury found that appellant, Maurice Mason, raped and murdered 
Robin Dennis in 1993.  See State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 148, 694 N.E.2d 
932 (1998).  The jury found Mason guilty of aggravated murder with a felony-
murder capital specification, rape, and having a gun while under disability.  The 
jury recommended a death sentence, and the trial court sentenced him to death.  The 
Third District Court of Appeals and this court affirmed the convictions and 
sentence.  State v. Mason, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-94-45, 1996 WL 715480 (Dec. 9, 
1996); Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932. 
{¶ 3} In 2008, after finding that Mason’s trial counsel had provided 
ineffective assistance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus and remanded the case to the trial court 
for a new penalty-phase trial.  Mason v. Mitchell, 543 F.3d 766, 768 (6th Cir.2008).  
On remand, Mason moved the trial court to dismiss the capital specification from 
his indictment, arguing that Ohio’s death-penalty scheme violates the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury.  He relied on the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hurst v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 616, 624, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 
(2016), which invalidated Florida’s former capital-sentencing scheme because it 
“required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance.”  
The trial court granted Mason’s motion, and the state appealed to the Third District 
Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment and remanded the case. 
{¶ 4} On appeal here, Mason argues that Ohio’s death-penalty scheme is 
unconstitutional under Hurst. 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
3
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
{¶ 5} We must presume that the death-penalty scheme enacted by the 
General Assembly is constitutional.  R.C. 1.47.  To prevail on his facial challenge, 
Mason must establish “beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and 
constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.”  State ex rel. Dickman v. 
Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955), paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  Thus, “doubts regarding the validity of a legislative enactment are to be 
resolved in favor of the statute.”  State v. Gill, 63 Ohio St.3d 53, 55, 584 N.E.2d 
1200 (1992). 
B.  Ohio’s Death-Penalty Scheme 
{¶ 6} R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04 establish what is required for a death 
sentence to be imposed in Ohio when the defendant elects to be tried by a jury.  The 
essential steps outlined below are required under current law and under the versions 
of R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04 in effect when Dennis was killed in 1993.  See 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 9-17.  Although the Ohio General 
Assembly has since amended R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04, because the changes to 
the wording at issue in this appeal were not substantive, the amendments do not 
affect the analysis in this case. 
{¶ 7} First, to face the possibility of a death sentence, a defendant must be 
charged in an indictment with aggravated murder and at least one specification of 
an aggravating circumstance.  R.C. 2929.03(A) and (B).  The state charged Mason 
with aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(B) and an aggravating circumstance 
(committing aggravated murder while committing rape) under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). 
{¶ 8} Second, the jury verdict must state that the defendant is found guilty 
of aggravated murder and must state separately that he is guilty of at least one 
charged specification.  R.C. 2929.03(B).  The state must prove guilt of the principal 
charge and of any specification beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.; R.C. 2929.04(A).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
4
The jury found Mason guilty of aggravated murder and the charged aggravating 
circumstance. 
{¶ 9} Third, once the jury finds the defendant guilty of aggravated murder 
and at least one specification, he will be sentenced either to death or to life 
imprisonment.  R.C. 2929.03(C)(2).  When the defendant is tried by a jury, the 
penalty “shall be determined * * * [b]y the trial jury and the trial judge.”  R.C. 
2929.03(C)(2)(b). 
{¶ 10} Fourth, in the sentencing phase, the court and trial jury shall consider 
(1) any presentence-investigation or mental-examination report (if the defendant 
requested an investigation or examination), (2) the trial evidence relevant to the 
aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing and relevant 
to mitigating factors, (3) additional testimony and evidence relevant to the nature and 
circumstances of the aggravating circumstances and any mitigating factors, (4) any 
statement of the offender, and (5) the arguments of counsel.  R.C. 2929.03(D)(1).  In 
this proceeding, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “the aggravating 
circumstances the defendant was found guilty of committing are sufficient to 
outweigh the factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death.”  Id. 
{¶ 11} Fifth, the jury finds and then recommends the sentence: “If the trial 
jury unanimously finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating 
circumstances * * * outweigh the mitigating factors, the trial jury shall recommend 
to the court that the sentence of death be imposed on the offender.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  R.C. 2929.03(D)(2).  But “[a]bsent such a finding” by the jury, the jury 
shall recommend one of the life sentences set forth in R.C. 2929.03(D)(2), and the 
trial court “shall impose the [life] sentence recommended.”  R.C. 2929.03(D)(2).  
Also, if the jury fails to reach a verdict unanimously recommending a sentence, the 
trial court must impose a life sentence.  State v. Springer, 63 Ohio St.3d 167, 586 
N.E.2d 96 (1992), syllabus. 
January Term, 2018 
 
5
{¶ 12} Sixth, if the trial jury recommends a death sentence, and if “the court 
finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, * * * that the aggravating circumstances 
* * * outweigh the mitigating factors, [the court] shall impose sentence of death on 
the offender.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2929.03(D)(3).  Then, the court must state 
in a separate opinion “the reasons why the aggravating circumstances * * * were 
sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors.”  R.C. 2929.03(F). 
C.  Sixth Amendment Caselaw 
1.  Apprendi, Ring, and Hurst 
{¶ 13} Mason’s Sixth Amendment claim principally relies on Hurst, which, 
in turn, relied on Apprendi v. United States, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 
L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 
L.Ed.2d 556 (2002).  Apprendi involved New Jersey’s “hate crime” law, which 
allowed a trial court to enhance an offender’s penalty if the trial judge found that 
the offender had been motivated by racial or other bias in committing an offense.  
Apprendi at 468.  The question in Apprendi was whether such an aggravating fact 
must be found by a jury based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 469.  
Apprendi held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 490. 
{¶ 14} Two years later, in Ring, the Supreme Court applied Apprendi to 
invalidate Arizona’s former death-penalty scheme, which permitted imposition of 
a death sentence based solely on a trial judge’s finding of the existence of a statutory 
aggravating circumstance.  See Ring at 609.  The Ring court concluded that an 
aggravating circumstance in a capital case was “ ‘the functional equivalent of an 
element of a greater offense’ ” that must be submitted to a jury.  Id., quoting 
Apprendi at 494, fn. 19.  Arizona’s death-penalty law violated the Sixth 
Amendment because that law required the trial judge alone to find the aggravating 
facts necessary to sentence a defendant to death.  See id. at 609. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
6
{¶ 15} The Supreme Court applied Apprendi and Ring in Hurst.  A jury 
found Timothy Hurst guilty of first-degree murder.  Although that offense was a 
capital felony under Florida law, the jury’s verdict alone did not qualify Hurst for 
the death penalty: at the time of his conviction, Florida law provided that “ ‘[a] 
person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death’ only 
if an additional sentencing proceeding ‘results in findings by the court that such 
person shall be punished by death.’ ”  Hurst, ___ U.S. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 620, 193 
L.Ed.2d 504, quoting former Fla.Stat. 775.082(1), C.S.H.B. No. 3033, Ch. 98-3, 
Laws of Fla.  In Hurst’s sentencing proceeding, the jury, as required by former 
Fla.Stat. 921.141(2), C.S.H.B. 207, Ch. 96-302, Laws of Fla., rendered an 
“advisory sentence” recommending death, but Florida law did not require the jury 
to specify the aggravating circumstances that influenced its decision.  Id., citing 
former Fla. Stat. 921.141.  The sentencing judge then imposed a death sentence 
after independently determining and weighing aggravating circumstances and 
mitigating factors.  Id., citing former Fla.Stat. 921.141(3).  Hurst’s sentencing 
judge, who explained her findings in writing, found that two aggravating 
circumstances existed.  Id. 
{¶ 16} The United States Supreme Court began its review of Hurst’s Sixth 
Amendment claim by reciting Apprendi’s basic tenet: “any fact that ‘expose[s] the 
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict’ 
is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to a jury.”  Hurst at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 621, 
quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435.  It then 
explained that the Apprendi rule had required invalidation of Arizona’s death-
penalty scheme in Ring because Arizona had allowed the imposition of the death 
penalty based solely on judicial fact-finding of the aggravating facts.  Hurst at ___, 
136 S.Ct. at 621, citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 591-593, 597, 604, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 
L.Ed.2d 556.  The Hurst court concluded that under the same analysis, Florida’s 
scheme had to be invalidated, because Florida did “not require the jury to make the 
January Term, 2018 
 
7
critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty.”  Id. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 
622.  The court observed that the Florida jury’s advisory sentence was immaterial 
for Sixth Amendment purposes, because it did not include “ ‘specific factual 
findings with regard to the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances 
and its recommendation [was] not binding on the trial judge.’ ” Id., quoting Walton 
v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990).  The court 
held that Florida’s scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because Florida law 
“required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance.”  Id. 
at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 624. 
2.  Past Sixth Amendment Challenges to Ohio’s Death-Penalty Scheme 
{¶ 17} After the Ring decision was issued in 2002, we held that Ohio’s 
death-penalty scheme does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  
See State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 48,  
¶ 68-70.  We explained that in contrast to Arizona’s scheme, Ohio’s capital-
sentencing scheme places the responsibility for making all factual determinations 
regarding whether a defendant should be sentenced to death with the jury.  Id. at  
¶ 69.  We noted that “R.C. 2929.03 charges the jury with determining, by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of any statutory aggravating 
circumstances and whether those aggravating circumstances are sufficient to 
outweigh the defendant’s mitigating evidence.”  Id., citing R.C. 2929.03(B) and 
(D).  See also State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 
215, ¶ 221. 
{¶ 18} After the Hurst decision, we revisited the issue in State v. Belton, 
149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, ¶ 59, stating that “Ohio’s 
capital-sentencing scheme is unlike the laws at issue in Ring and Hurst.”  In 
reaching that conclusion, we reasoned that Ohio law requires a jury in a capital case 
to make the findings required by the Sixth Amendment, because “the determination 
of guilt of an aggravating circumstance renders [an Ohio] defendant eligible for a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
8
capital sentence,” id., and the weighing of aggravating circumstances against 
mitigating factors “is not a fact-finding process subject to the Sixth Amendment,” 
(emphasis sic) id. at ¶ 60.  Mason argues that Belton is not controlling here, because 
the Hurst question was not squarely presented in that case. 
D.  Ohio’s Death-Penalty Scheme and the Sixth Amendment 
{¶ 19} The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”  
This entitles criminal defendants “to a jury determination of any fact on which the 
legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.”  Ring, 536 U.S. 
at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556.  See also Hurst, ___ U.S. at ___, 136 S.Ct. 
at 619, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (“The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to 
find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death”).  Ohio’s death-sentence 
scheme satisfies this right. 
{¶ 20} When an Ohio capital defendant elects to be tried by jury, the jury 
decides whether the offender is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated 
murder and—unlike the juries in Ring and Hurst—the aggravating-circumstance 
specifications for which the offender was indicted.  R.C. 2929.03(B).  Then the 
jury—again unlike in Ring and Hurst—must “unanimously find[], by proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found 
guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors.”  R.C. 2929.03(D)(2).  An 
Ohio jury recommends a death sentence only after it makes this finding.  Id.  And 
without that recommendation by the jury, the trial court may not impose the death 
sentence. 
{¶ 21} Ohio law requires the critical jury findings that were not required by 
the laws at issue in Ring and Hurst.  See R.C. 2929.03(C)(2).  Ohio’s death-penalty 
scheme, therefore, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.  Mason’s various 
arguments to the contrary misapprehend both what the Sixth Amendment requires 
and what it prohibits. 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
1.  Death Eligibility 
{¶ 22} Mason’s arguments focus on the sentencing phase within Ohio’s 
death-penalty scheme—namely, the “weighing” process that follows after a 
defendant has been found guilty of aggravated murder and at least one capital 
specification.  He contends that the jury does too little during this phase (merely 
recommending a death sentence), while the trial court does too much (imposing the 
sentence based on its own specific, written findings).  Before addressing these points, 
it is necessary to consider a threshold question: does the weighing that occurs in the 
sentencing phase—after the jury already has found the existence of an aggravating 
circumstance—constitute fact-finding under the Sixth Amendment?  
{¶ 23} Hurst does not answer, or even address, this question.  The question 
in Hurst was more basic: did the Florida scheme require that a Florida jury make a 
finding of fact as to an aggravating circumstance before a sentence of death was 
imposed?  See Hurst, ___ U.S. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 622, 193 L.Ed.2d 504.  Florida’s 
former capital-sentencing scheme was unconstitutional because, instead of requiring 
the jury to make the critical finding before making its recommendation, it “required 
the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance.”  Id. at ___, 136 
S.Ct. at 624.  The Hurst court did refer to Florida’s weighing process by mentioning 
the role mitigating facts play in capital sentencing.  Id. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 622, 
quoting Walton, 497 U.S. at 648, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (a Florida jury 
“ ‘does not make specific factual findings with regard to the existence of mitigating 
or aggravating circumstances’ ”); id., quoting former Fla.Stat. 921.141(3) (“The trial 
court alone must find ‘the facts * * * [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances 
exist’ and ‘[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances’ ” [emphasis, ellipsis, and brackets sic]).  But those 
references merely described Florida’s scheme; the court’s holding did not address the 
weighing process.  In the end, the court held only that Florida’s sentencing scheme 
violated the Sixth Amendment because it “required the judge alone to find the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
10 
existence of an aggravating circumstance.”  Id. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 624.  With that in 
mind, it is necessary to consider additional caselaw on the subject. 
a.  The nature of the weighing process 
{¶ 24} The United States Supreme Court has recognized “two different 
aspects of the capital decision-making process: the eligibility decision and the 
selection decision.”  Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 
L.Ed.2d 750 (1994).  For purposes of the Eighth Amendment, a defendant is eligible 
for the death penalty if the trier of fact finds him guilty of murder and at least one 
aggravating circumstance.  Id. at 972.  This determination is necessarily factual.  Id. 
at 973.  See also Kansas v. Carr, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 633, 642, 193 L.Ed.2d 
535 (2016) (stating that “the aggravating-factor determination (the so-called 
‘eligibility phase’) * * * is a purely factual determination”).  “The selection 
decision, on the other hand, requires individualized sentencing and must be 
expansive enough to accommodate relevant mitigating evidence so as to assure [sic] 
an assessment of the defendant’s culpability.”  Tuilaepa at 973.  This, the Supreme 
Court has said, “is mostly a question of mercy,” involving an exercise of judgment.  
Carr at 642.  See also Tuilaepa at 978 (“at the selection stage, the States are not 
confined to submitting to the jury specific propositional questions”).  Thus, the 
selection decision does not obviously involve a determination of fact. 
{¶ 25} The eligibility/selection distinction is relevant under the Sixth 
Amendment in capital cases because the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt all facts that make a defendant death-eligible.  See Hurst 
at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 619 (referring to “each fact necessary to impose a sentence of 
death”); Ring, 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (“Capital 
defendants, no less than noncapital defendants * * * are entitled to a jury 
determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their 
maximum punishment”).  See also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309, 124 
S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (referring to “the jury’s traditional function of 
January Term, 2018 
 
11 
finding the facts essential to lawful imposition of the penalty”); Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
at 483, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (referring to “the basic principles 
undergirding the requirements of trying to a jury all facts necessary to constitute a 
statutory offense”). 
{¶ 26} Nearly every court that has considered the issue has held that the 
Sixth Amendment is applicable to only the fact-bound eligibility decision 
concerning an offender’s guilt of the principal offense and any aggravating 
circumstances.  See United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 532-533 (6th Cir.2013) 
(rehearing en banc); United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 516 (4th Cir.2013); 
United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 993-994 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. 
Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 31-32 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 
345-346 (5th Cir.2007); United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 749 (8th Cir.2005); 
Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind.2004); Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 251, 
835 A.2d 1105 (2003); Commonwealth v. Roney, 581 Pa. 587, 601, 866 A.2d 351 
(2005); State v. Gales, 265 Neb. 598, 628, 658 N.W.2d 604 (2003); Nunnery v. 
State, 127 Nev. 749, 770-775, 263 P.3d 235 (2011); State v. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 
¶ 37-38, 138 N.M. 700, 126 P.3d 516. 
{¶ 27} But some post-Hurst decisions have held otherwise.  See Smith v. 
Pineda, S.D.Ohio No. 1:12-cv-196, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22082, *6 (Feb. 16, 
2017) (finding that Ohio’s scheme satisfies the Sixth Amendment but also finding 
that “the relative weight of aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors is a 
question of fact akin to an element under the Apprendi line of cases”); Chinn v. 
Jenkins, S.D.Ohio No. 3:02-cv-512, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22088, *5 (Feb. 13, 
2017) (same); Davis v. Bobby, S.D.Ohio No. 2:10-cv-107, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
157948, *6-7 (Sept. 25, 2017); Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 434 (Del.2016). 
{¶ 28} In Gabrion, the Sixth Circuit (analyzing the federal death-penalty 
statute) explained that the weighing process requires “not a finding of fact in support 
of a particular sentence * * * [but] a determination of the sentence itself, within a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
12 
range for which the defendant is already eligible.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 533.  This 
analysis is persuasive and applies to the Ohio scheme, which expressly makes the 
weighing process a determination of the sentence itself.  See R.C. 2929.03(C)(2)(b) 
(“if the offender is found guilty of both the charge and one or more of the 
specifications, the penalty to be imposed on the offender * * * shall be determined 
* * * [b]y the trial jury and the trial judge, if the offender was tried by jury”).  In other 
words, after completing its role as the fact-finder concerning a defendant’s guilt, an 
Ohio jury assumes a different role as a “sentencer” (albeit in conjunction with the 
trial court).  See Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 216, 126 S.Ct. 884, 163 L.Ed.2d 
723 (2006) (“Once the narrowing requirement has been satisfied, the sentencer is 
called upon to determine whether a defendant thus found eligible for the death 
penalty should in fact receive it”).  But see State v. Rogers, 28 Ohio St.3d 427, 429, 
504 N.E.2d 52 (1986), reversed on reconsideration on other grounds, 32 Ohio St.3d 
70, 512 N.E.2d 581 (1987) (recognizing the trial court as the ultimate “sentencing 
authority”). 
b.  Ohio’s statutory scheme does not violate the Sixth Amendment 
{¶ 29} Based on the above analysis, we were correct to state in Belton, 149 
Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, at ¶ 60, that “[w]eighing is not a 
fact-finding process subject to the Sixth Amendment.”  (Emphasis sic.)  The Sixth 
Amendment was satisfied once the jury found Mason guilty of aggravated murder 
and a felony-murder capital specification.  See State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 
2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 269 (“Adams became death-eligible when the 
jury unanimously found him guilty of aggravated murder in the course of some 
predicate felony”); State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, 
¶ 189 (“the jury’s verdict, and not the judge’s findings, made Davis eligible for the 
death penalty”); State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 417, 653 N.E.2d 253 (1995) (“At 
the point in time at which the factfinder * * * finds the defendant guilty of both 
aggravated murder and an R.C. 2929.04(A) specification, the defendant has become 
January Term, 2018 
 
13 
‘death-eligible,’ and a second phase of the proceedings (the ‘mitigation’ or ‘penalty’ 
or ‘sentencing’ or ‘selection’ phase begins”).  See also Jenkins v. Hutton, ___ U.S. 
___, 137 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 198 L.Ed.2d 415 (2017) (stating that Hutton was death-
eligible under Ohio law when the jury found him guilty of aggravated murder and 
two aggravating circumstances).  Accordingly, we approve our analysis in Belton and 
reject Mason’s claim that Ohio’s death-penalty scheme is unconstitutional under 
Hurst. 
2.  The Jury’s Role in Sentencing 
{¶ 30} While we uphold our conclusion in Belton that weighing is not a fact-
finding process subject to the Sixth Amendment, we further conclude that even if the 
weighing process were to involve fact-finding under the Sixth Amendment, Ohio 
adequately affords the right to trial by jury during the penalty phase.  Mason 
contends that it does not, because the process permits a jury only to recommend a 
death sentence.  See R.C. 2929.03(D)(2).  Here, he emphasizes the statement in 
Hurst that “[a] jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.”  Hurst, ___ U.S. at 
___, 136 S.Ct. at 619, 193 L.Ed.2d 504.  But he fails to appreciate the material 
difference between the process by which an Ohio jury reaches its death 
recommendation and the Florida process at issue in Hurst. 
{¶ 31} The Florida statute required the jury to render an “advisory sentence” 
after hearing the evidence presented in a sentencing-phase proceeding: 
 
Advisory sentence by the jury.—After hearing all the 
evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence 
to the court, based upon the following matters: 
(a)  Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as 
enumerated in subsection (5); 
(b)  Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which 
outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
14 
(c)  Based on these considerations, whether the defendant 
should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. 
 
Former Fla.Stat. 921.141(2).  In Hurst, the court held that the Florida scheme 
violated the Sixth Amendment because it did not require the jury to find that Hurst 
was guilty of committing a specific aggravating circumstance.  Hurst at ___, 136 
S.Ct. at 622, 624. 
{¶ 32} Ohio law, in contrast, requires a jury to find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt of at least one aggravating circumstance, R.C. 
2929.03(B), before the matter proceeds to the penalty phase, when the jury can 
recommend a death sentence.  Ohio’s scheme differs from Florida’s because Ohio 
requires the jury to make this specific and critical finding. 
{¶ 33} Mason disputes this conclusion, relying on this court’s statement in 
Rogers, 28 Ohio St.3d at 430, 504 N.E.2d 52, that Florida’s system “is remarkably 
similar to Ohio’s.”  But Rogers involved a different question.  See id. at 429-430.  
Rogers noted that the systems are similar in that they both allow for jury 
recommendations; it did not consider the findings that the jury was required to make 
before recommending a sentence. 
{¶ 34} Mason also argues that Ohio’s scheme is inadequate under the Sixth 
Amendment because it requires the jury to render “only a general verdict.”  Here, 
Mason relies on Hurst’s reference to the “ ‘specific factual findings’ ” by a jury that 
were lacking under Florida’s scheme.  See Hurst, ___ U.S. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 622, 
193 L.Ed.2d 504, quoting Walton, 497 U.S. at 648, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 
511.  He contends that this requires a jury to explain why it concluded that the 
aggravating circumstances are sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors.  He 
contrasts the jury’s general verdict to the trial court’s sentencing opinion, which 
indeed must explain “the reasons why the aggravating circumstances the offender 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
was found guilty of committing were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors,” 
R.C. 2929.03(F). 
{¶ 35} While it is true that a trial court must fully explain its reasoning for 
imposing a sentence of death, Mason does not provide any support for the 
proposition that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to explain why it found that 
the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors.  In citing Hurst for 
this proposition, Mason fails to appreciate that Florida’s statutory scheme violated 
the Sixth Amendment because the jury did not specify its finding of which 
aggravating circumstance supported its recommendation, not because the jury did 
not explain why it found that the aggravating circumstances were not outweighed 
by sufficient mitigating circumstances. 
{¶ 36} On a related point, Mason contends that the jury’s sentencing-phase 
finding and recommendation are insufficient because they provide no guidance to 
the trial court for its own findings and sentence determination.  His argument relies 
on the statement in Hurst that “ ‘[a] Florida trial court no more has the assistance 
of a jury’s findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues than does a trial judge 
in Arizona.’ ”  Hurst at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 622, quoting Walton at 648. 
{¶ 37} Mason misses a key distinction between Ohio’s statutory scheme 
and the Florida and Arizona statutory schemes at issue in Hurst and Walton: in 
Ohio, a jury is required to find the defendant guilty of a specific aggravating 
circumstance, thus establishing the aggravating circumstance that a trial court will 
weigh against the mitigating factors in its independent determination of 
punishment.  See R.C. 2929.03(D)(3); State v. Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 662 
N.E.2d 311 (1996), paragraph one of the syllabus.  Mason does not explain why 
further guidance for the trial court is constitutionally required. 
{¶ 38} Mason also complains that Ohio’s statutory scheme does not require 
the jury to make findings regarding mitigating factors or to specify the factors that it 
considered in mitigation.  There is only limited support for the argument that a jury 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
16 
must do so:  Hurst, again quoting Walton, notes that Florida’s former scheme did not 
require the jury to “ ‘make specific factual findings with regard to the existence of 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances.’ ”  Hurst, ___ U.S. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 622, 
193 L.Ed.2d 504, quoting Walton, 497 U.S. at 648, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511.  
Notably, however, neither Ring nor Hurst held that the Sixth Amendment requires a 
jury to find mitigating facts.  See State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 
890 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 186.  Rather, they recognized that the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees that a jury will determine the facts that serve to increase the maximum 
punishment.  Ring, 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556; Hurst at ___, 
136 S.Ct. at 619.  See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490-491, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 
L.Ed.2d 435, fn. 16 (stating that “[c]ore concerns animating the jury and burden-of-
proof requirements are thus absent” when a trial judge alone finds a mitigating fact 
that reduces an offender’s sentence).  Because a finding that mitigating facts exist is 
not “necessary to impose a sentence of death,” Hurst at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 619, this 
aspect of Mason’s claim has no merit. 
3.  The Trial Judge’s Role and the Sixth Amendment 
{¶ 39} One of Mason’s main concerns is the last step in Ohio’s capital-
sentencing process: the trial judge’s independent findings that culminate in a 
written sentencing opinion.  See R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) and (F).  He contends that the 
trial judge must “make additional ‘specific findings’ beyond those made by the trial 
jury” and that an offender is not eligible for the death penalty until this judicial task 
is complete.  Relying on Hurst, he says that a death sentence can be imposed in 
Ohio only after the trial judge makes these “independent factual determinations.”  
But Mason misapprehends the issue, framing it as a question whether a death 
sentence “can be imposed,” instead of whether it “will be imposed.”  Ohio does not 
permit the trial judge to find additional aggravating facts but requires the judge to 
determine, independent of the jury, whether a sentence of death should be imposed.  
See State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 160. 
January Term, 2018 
 
17 
{¶ 40} Two significant flaws are apparent in Mason’s claim.  First, unlike 
the Arizona scheme found unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 
Ring, under the Ohio scheme, the trial court cannot increase an offender’s sentence 
based on its own findings.  Rather, the trial court safeguards offenders from 
wayward juries, similar to how a court might grant a motion for acquittal following 
a jury verdict under Crim.R. 29(C). 
{¶ 41} Second, Mason wrongly supposes that the Sixth Amendment 
prohibits judicial fact-finding.  To be sure, Hurst and Ring both decry judicial fact-
finding to some extent.  But they do so in the context of reviewing statutory 
schemes that fail to provide for any jury fact-finding on critical questions.  See 
Hurst, ___ U.S. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 622, 193 L.Ed.2d 504, (noting “the central and 
singular role the judge play[ed] under Florida law” [emphasis added]); Ring, 536 
U.S. at 592, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (noting that the court alone made the 
factual determination of an aggravating factor under Arizona law).  The Supreme 
Court made clear in Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308, 124 S.Ct.2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403, that 
“the Sixth Amendment by its terms is not a limitation on judicial power, but a 
reservation of jury power.  It limits judicial power only to the extent that the claimed 
judicial power infringes on the province of the jury.”  See also Alleyne v. United 
States, 570 U.S. 99, 116, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (“Our ruling 
today does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found 
by a jury.  We have long recognized that broad sentencing discretion, informed by 
judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment”); United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (“We have never 
doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence 
within a statutory range”). 
{¶ 42} Mason suggests that under Hurst, the Sixth Amendment requires the 
jury alone to decide whether a sentence of death will be imposed.  But Hurst did not 
create this requirement.  Ohio trial judges may weigh aggravating circumstances 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
against mitigating factors and impose a death sentence only after the jury itself has 
made the critical findings and recommended that sentence.  Thus, “the judge’s 
authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury’s verdict.”  Blakely at 306.  
Under Ohio’s death-penalty scheme, therefore, trial judges function squarely within 
the framework of the Sixth Amendment. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 43} We conclude that Ohio’s death-penalty scheme does not violate a 
defendant’s right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  For this 
reason, the trial court erred in granting Mason’s motion to dismiss the death-penalty 
specification from his indictment.  We accordingly affirm the decision of the Third 
District Court of Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and JENSEN, FRENCH, HALL, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs, with an opinion. 
JAMES D. JENSEN, J., of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
O’DONNELL, J. 
MICHAEL T. HALL, J., of the Second District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
O’NEILL, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring. 
{¶ 44} Because the majority’s judgment is in line with our holding in State 
v. Belton, 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, I concur in that 
judgment.  Although the majority never explicitly addresses Mason’s argument that 
the analysis of Hurst v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 
(2016), in Belton is dicta, its failure to cite Belton as binding precedent that resolves 
this case implies that the majority agrees that our holding in Belton is dictum. 
{¶ 45} With regard to dicta, Chief Justice Marshall wrote the following 
almost 200 years ago in Cohens v. Virginia: “It is a maxim not to be disregarded, 
January Term, 2018 
 
19 
that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the 
case in which those expressions are used.  If they go beyond the case, they may be 
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very 
point is presented for decision.”  19 U.S. 264, 399, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).  For this 
reason, a court is not bound to follow its own dicta from a prior case in which the 
point at issue “was not fully debated.”  Cent. Virginia Community College v. Katz, 
546 U.S. 356, 363, 126 S.Ct. 990, 163 L.Ed.2d 945 (2006); see also Cosgrove v. 
Williamsburg of Cincinnati Mgt. Co., Inc., 70 Ohio St.3d 281, 284, 638 N.E.2d 991 
(1994) (explaining that dicta in a prior case had no binding effect on a court's 
decision in a later case). 
{¶ 46} This is so because “ ‘[t]he problem with dicta, and a good reason that 
it should not have the force of precedent for later cases, is that when a holding is 
unnecessary to the outcome of a case, it may be made with less care and 
thoroughness than if it were crucial to the outcome.’ ”  State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio 
St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 89 (O’Donnell, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part), quoting Bauer v. Garden City, 163 Mich.App. 562, 
571, 414 N.W.2d 891 (1987). 
{¶ 47} Our determination in Belton that Ohio’s death-penalty statutes do not 
contravene the holding in Hurst, however, is not dictum.  The issue presented in 
the third proposition of law in Belton was whether Ohio’s death-penalty statute 
violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  The court quoted Belton as 
asserting that   
 
“even if a capital defendant enters a guilty plea to Aggravated 
Murder and the accompanying death specifications, he has a right to 
a jury trial to determine the existence of any mitigating factors and 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
aggravating 
circumstance 
or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
circumstances to which he would plead guilty outweigh those 
factors by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
 
Belton, 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, at ¶ 55.  In effect, 
Belton argued that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a capital defendant the right 
to have a jury make additional factual determinations before sentencing—that 
notwithstanding his having waived the right to have a jury determine guilt, only a 
jury can make the finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating factors.  The court answered the question squarely presented by the 
parties by applying Hurst—then the United States Supreme Court’s most recent 
pronouncement on the issue—and explaining that the Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial is not implicated by a sentencing scheme that requires the trial judge to 
weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors before selecting death 
as the appropriate sentence. 
{¶ 48} The fact that the court could have analyzed the question presented in 
a different way—for instance, by considering whether Belton’s waiver of a jury 
trial relinquished any right to a jury’s participation in sentencing—does not mean 
that the way we did answer it is dicta.  In Richards v. Mkt. Exchange Bank Co., 81 
Ohio St. 348, 367, 90 N.E. 1000 (1910), we rejected the view that “the 
determination of a question fairly presented by the record becomes mere dicta if 
there happens to be another proposition on which the decision might have been 
based.” 
{¶ 49} That a case could be distinguished on some factual basis from 
another case does not affect the authority of the rule of law it announced or reduce 
its holding to mere dictum.  See United States v. Schuster, 684 F.2d 744, 748 (11th 
Cir.1982), adopted on reh’g, 717 F.2d 537 (11th Cir.1983) (en banc) (“Virtually all 
cases are factually distinguishable, but that does not vitiate the underlying rule of 
law to be derived from [a prior decision]”); State v. Rice, 169 N.H. 783, 795, 159 
January Term, 2018 
 
21 
A.3d 1250 (2017) (acknowledging that the case was distinguishable from a prior 
case on the facts, but concluding that the “factual distinction” did not “justif[y] a 
difference in outcome”).  Our decision in Belton is binding precedent controlling 
the outcome of this appeal, because its holding did not go beyond the facts and 
issues then before the court and its analysis was necessary for our ruling.  Therefore, 
it is not dictum. 
{¶ 50} Applying Belton, 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 
319, I agree that Ohio’s death-penalty statutes do not violate the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial as construed by Hurst, __ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 
504.  As we explained in Belton, the weighing of aggravating circumstances and 
mitigating factors required to ensure that only a defendant deserving of the ultimate 
penalty is sentenced to death “is not a fact-finding process subject to the Sixth 
Amendment” (emphasis sic), id. at ¶ 60, but rather “amounts to ‘a complex moral 
judgment’ about what penalty to impose upon a defendant who is already death-
penalty eligible,” id., quoting United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 515-516 (4th 
Cir.2013). 
{¶ 51} Once the jury found Mason guilty of aggravated murder and at least 
one aggravating circumstance, under former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 
1, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 10, the court could impose only one of the following 
penalties: “death, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty full 
years of imprisonment, or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving 
thirty full years of imprisonment.”  Therefore, the maximum penalty authorized by 
the statute following the jury’s verdict at the trial phase was death, and no judicial 
fact-finding could expose Mason to any greater punishment. 
{¶ 52} Because Mason was eligible for capital punishment based on the 
jury’s verdict at the end of the trial phase, his argument that Ohio’s death-penalty 
scheme violates the Sixth Amendment because it does not require the jury to make 
specific findings of fact regarding the mitigating circumstances or why the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
22 
mitigating circumstances were outweighed by the aggravating circumstances is not 
well taken.  Accordingly, the majority correctly affirms the judgment of the court 
of appeals, and I concur. 
_________________ 
Ray A. Grogan, Marion County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kevin P. Collins, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Carpenter, Lipps & Leland, L.L.P., and Kort Gatterdam; and Todd 
Anderson, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, and 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Ohio Attorney General. 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Christopher D. Schroeder, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office. 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
Jeffrey M. Gamso and Erika B. Cunliffe, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
_________________