Case Title: People v. Lewis

Citation: 

Docket Number: S272627

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
RODNEY TAUREAN LEWIS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S272627 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G060049 
 
Santa Clara County Superior Court 
B1366626 
 
 
June 22, 2023 
 
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Evans concurred. 
 
Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice 
Groban concurred. 
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
S272627 
 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant Rodney Taurean Lewis of 
raping S.D. while she was intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 261, 
subd. (a)(3))1 and kidnapping S.D. to commit rape (§ 209, 
subd. (b)).  The trial court sentenced Lewis to a determinate 
term of eight years in prison for the rape conviction and a 
consecutive indeterminate term of life imprisonment, with the 
possibility of parole after seven years, for the kidnapping 
conviction.   
Lewis appealed.  As relevant here, he contended the trial 
court erred by instructing the jury that he could be convicted of 
kidnapping to commit rape based on the theory that he 
accomplished the kidnapping by deception rather than by force 
or fear.  Lewis further contended the evidence at trial did not 
support the required element of force or fear, thus barring 
retrial on the kidnapping offense. 
A divided Court of Appeal agreed with Lewis.  (People v. 
Lewis (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1, 5 (Lewis).)  The majority 
concluded that kidnapping by deception was an invalid legal 
theory, the trial court erred by including that theory in its 
instructions, the ordinary force or fear element of kidnapping 
applied even to intoxicated victims like S.D., and the evidence 
at trial was insufficient to support that element.  (Id. at pp. 13–
 
1  
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
2 
19.)  One justice disagreed and would have affirmed the 
judgment on the ground that the ordinary force or fear element 
did not apply where the victim is intoxicated and unable to 
legally consent to movement.  (Id. at pp. 31–32 (conc. & dis. opn. 
of Bedsworth, J.).) 
We granted review to examine the force or fear element of 
kidnapping in the context of an intoxicated adult victim.  We 
have previously interpreted the kidnapping statute to 
incorporate a relaxed standard of force where the victim is an 
infant or small child.  (In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 
610 (Michele D.).)  We reasoned that infants and children are too 
young to give their consent to being moved and are therefore “in 
a different position vis-à-vis the force requirement for 
kidnapping than those who can apprehend the force being used 
against them and resist it.”  (Ibid.)  Thus, “the amount of force 
required to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is simply the 
amount of physical force required to take and carry the child 
away a substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an 
illegal intent.”  (Ibid.)  We conclude that an unresisting 
intoxicated person who is unable to legally consent is similarly 
vulnerable to victimization, and the Legislature must have 
intended the relaxed standard of force to apply to such 
individuals as well. 
In his petition for review, the Attorney General did not 
raise the underlying instructional error found by the Court of 
Appeal, and the parties have not briefed the issue.  Thus, 
although the Attorney General agrees with the Court of Appeal 
that deception is an invalid theory of kidnapping even for an 
intoxicated adult victim, we do not need to consider that 
question here.  Even assuming this instructional error, we 
conclude it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  By its 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
3 
verdict, the jury found that Lewis moved or made S.D. move a 
substantial distance, beyond that merely incidental to the 
commission of rape, and it was undisputed at trial that Lewis 
used some quantum of physical force — he admitted driving 
S.D. in his car — to accomplish that movement.  The jury also 
found the remaining elements of the offense, including that 
Lewis had the requisite illegal intent.  Any rational juror who 
made these findings would, based on the evidence at trial, have 
likewise found Lewis guilty of kidnapping under the relaxed 
force standard beyond a reasonable doubt.  (In re Lopez (2023) 
14 Cal.5th 562, 589 (Lopez).)  In other words, “it would be 
impossible, based on the evidence, for a jury to make the 
findings reflected in its verdict without also making the findings 
that would support a valid theory of liability.”  (Id. at p. 568.) 
Because 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeal 
found 
prejudicial 
instructional error, it was unnecessary for it to consider Lewis’s 
other appellate contentions.  We therefore reverse the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal but remand with directions to conduct 
further proceedings, including addressing any contentions that 
remain unresolved by this opinion. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
During one early morning, a family attending a youth 
sports game in Palo Alto discovered a young woman lying in 
some landscaping adjacent to a parking lot.  The woman, later 
identified as S.D., was unconscious and wrapped in a blanket.  
The family called 911 and waited for emergency personnel to 
arrive.   
Fire department paramedics responded to the scene.  S.D. 
“appeared to be passed out, and right next to a loud freeway.”  A 
paramedic pulled back the sheet and found that S.D.’s 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
4 
underwear was partly pulled down.  The paramedic spoke to 
S.D., and she slowly became more responsive.  S.D. told the 
paramedic she had been at a bar the night before and recalled 
she had lost her cell phone there.  She said a man had 
approached her, told her he knew where the phone was, and said 
she should come with him.  S.D. did not remember how the night 
ended or how she came to be in the parking lot.  The paramedic 
suspected S.D. had been sexually assaulted, and he arranged to 
have her transported to a hospital where she could be examined 
and treated.   
Police officers responded as well.  One officer tried to speak 
to S.D., but she had a difficult time answering questions.  S.D. 
did not understand where she was or what was going on.  Her 
eyes were “very glassy,” and she had a dazed look.   
The officer eventually accompanied S.D. to the hospital.  
S.D. became more coherent as time passed.  She explained to the 
officer that she had been at a bar called “Rudy’s” the night before 
and had lost her cell phone.  A stranger came up to her and said 
he knew who had her phone.  The stranger appeared to call 
someone on his own cell phone, and then he suggested they get 
a drink.  They went up to the bar, and S.D. drank some sort of 
brown liquid in a whiskey glass.   
At the hospital, nurses collected blood and urine samples 
and performed a sexual assault examination on S.D.  S.D. told 
one of the nurses she had pain in her vagina, and she thought it 
was likely she had had sexual intercourse.  But, S.D. said, “I 
don’t remember a single thing.”  The nurse noted various 
bruises, abrasions, and other physical indicators which were 
consistent with S.D.’s belief that she had vaginal intercourse, 
but not necessarily indicative of sexual assault.  S.D.’s blood test 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
5 
showed a blood-alcohol level of 0.18 percent.  Her urine test, 
converted to blood-alcohol equivalent, reflected a value of 
0.23 percent.  Testing also revealed the presence of the 
prescription drug Xanax in S.D.’s urine.  S.D. was not prescribed 
Xanax and had no memory of ever taking it.2   
Meanwhile, a police detective made an emergency request 
to S.D.’s cell phone company and obtained the location of her cell 
phone, which was within a few yards of Rudy’s.  The detective 
went to Rudy’s, met with the owner, and recovered the phone.  
The owner and the detective also reviewed surveillance video 
from inside the bar.  (There were no security cameras outside 
the bar.)  Using the video footage, police detectives were able to 
single out the man who interacted with S.D.  They matched the 
footage to the man’s drink purchases and credit card receipts.  
The receipts identified the man as Rodney Lewis, the defendant 
here.   
At trial, S.D. testified about her memory of the night.  She 
was working at the time as an au pair in a city south of Palo 
Alto.  She was 22 years old.  S.D.’s employers had gone on 
vacation, so she invited a young man over for dinner.  They 
shared a bottle of wine, and after dinner S.D.’s date suggested 
they go out somewhere.  They took a taxi to Rudy’s, and S.D.’s 
date ordered drinks.  S.D. thought her drink was too strong, like 
“pure alcohol,” so she only drank around a third of it.  S.D. and 
her date went to the dance floor.  At some point, S.D. realized 
she had lost her phone and walked around the bar looking for it.  
She felt “somewhat tipsy” but in control.  Lewis approached S.D. 
and asked what she was doing.  S.D. said she had lost her phone.  
 
2  
Xanax, combined with alcohol, can cause blackouts and 
memory loss.   
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
6 
Lewis told S.D. his friend had found a phone.  Lewis said he 
would call the friend, and he put his own phone to his ear.  
(Lewis’s cell phone records do not reflect any calls at that time.)  
Lewis suggested they have a drink while they waited for Lewis’s 
friend to return.  S.D. remembered walking up to the bar, but 
nothing else from that evening.  Her next memory was from the 
following day at the hospital.   
S.D.’s date generally corroborated S.D.’s testimony.  They 
had dinner, shared a bottle of wine, and went to Rudy’s.  He 
bought a drink for each of them.  Each drink was essentially four 
shots of liquor with a small amount of soda.  He recalled that 
S.D. lost her cell phone, they were separated, and they met up 
again after S.D. met Lewis.  S.D.’s date was becoming 
intoxicated, and he lost sight of S.D.  He remembered looking for 
S.D. and eventually leaving Rudy’s.  He took a taxi back to S.D.’s 
house, but she was not there, so he slept in his car.   
The surveillance video depicts most of the time S.D., her 
date, and Lewis spent at Rudy’s.  Lewis arrives alone around 
10:45 or 11:00 p.m.  He never appears to meet up with anyone, 
though he tries to talk to and dance with a couple of women.  
S.D. and her date arrive at around 11:15 p.m.  They sit down 
together in the front bar area.  S.D. and her date eventually 
move to the dance floor and dance together for a while.  At 
approximately 12:30 a.m., S.D. apparently realizes she lost her 
cell phone, and S.D. and her date return to the front bar area.  
They separate, and S.D.’s date appears to be speaking with 
various people.  A couple of minutes later, the video captures 
S.D. and Lewis talking in a different bar area.  They walk up to 
the bar, and Lewis orders two drinks, as well as a shot for S.D.  
While they wait, Lewis puts his phone up to his ear.  S.D. and 
Lewis lean close to one another; S.D.’s date stands behind them 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
7 
talking with someone else.  S.D. drinks the shot and sips her 
other drink.  Lewis tries to order two more shots, but the 
bartender initially refuses.  After Lewis talks to the bartender, 
she eventually serves them.  Lewis and S.D. each drink a shot.  
Lewis and S.D. speak with S.D.’s date and then walk to the front 
of the bar.  S.D.’s date follows them but, once in the front bar, 
he stops and begins to dance.  At approximately 12:45 a.m., S.D. 
and Lewis appear to leave Rudy’s.   
The bartender who served Lewis had tended bar for 
14 years and undergone regular training sponsored by the police 
department to spot dangerous levels of intoxication in patrons.  
She remembered interacting with Lewis and S.D.  When Lewis 
attempted to order two more shots, the bartender believed S.D. 
was too drunk and should not be drinking any more.  S.D. was 
leaning heavily on the bar, “swerving,” and “just didn’t seem 
coherent.”  The bartender recalled telling Lewis, “[L]ook at her.  
She can barely stand up.”  Lewis started arguing with the 
bartender and claimed the shots were not for S.D.  Lewis said 
he knew the owners of the bar and threatened to have the 
bartender fired.  The bartender decided to trust Lewis and serve 
the shots.  She did not see who eventually drank them.3   
 
3  
A criminalist testified about S.D.’s level of intoxication 
that night based on the number of drinks S.D. had consumed.  
Assuming the wine from dinner had been completely 
metabolized and S.D. drank the equivalent of four or four and a 
half drinks at Rudy’s, her blood-alcohol level would be 
approximately 0.13 percent.  However, working backward from 
her blood-alcohol level of 0.18 percent the next morning, S.D. 
would have had a blood-alcohol level of 0.35 percent when she 
left Rudy’s.  The criminalist testified it was common for people 
who have been drinking to underestimate their level of 
 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
8 
A detective interviewed Lewis a few days after S.D. was 
found.  Lewis told the detective he was at Rudy’s waiting for a 
friend and ended up meeting S.D.  S.D. asked Lewis if he had 
found her phone.  Lewis “thought maybe he knew someone that 
may have found a phone,” and they went outside.  Lewis said 
S.D. was “pretty drunk” and asked for a ride home.  In Lewis’s 
car, S.D. was “passing out” but she eventually awoke, started 
“freaking out,” and demanded to leave the car.  Lewis said he 
exited the freeway, tried to convince S.D. to stay, but eventually 
let her out in a driveway.  Lewis initially denied having sex with 
S.D.  But when the detective told Lewis she had a warrant to 
collect a DNA sample, Lewis changed his story.  He admitted 
they had sex, and he claimed it happened in his car on a side 
street in Palo Alto.  Lewis still maintained that S.D. demanded 
to be let out of his car afterward.  He said he gave her a blanket 
that he happened to have and left her outside.   
A wireless communications expert reviewed data from 
Lewis’s cell phone provider to determine Lewis’s location after 
he left Rudy’s with S.D.  Lewis made two short outgoing phone 
calls to his girlfriend at the time and received a third incoming 
call from her.  The third call, which lasted approximately 
15 minutes, was initiated at 1:10 a.m.  The cell tower data 
associated with these calls was consistent with a route directly 
from Rudy’s to Lewis’s home north of Palo Alto.  It was not 
consistent with a route from Rudy’s to the parking lot where 
S.D. was found.   
Lewis testified in his own defense.  He said he went to 
Rudy’s that evening to meet a friend, but the friend never 
 
intoxication and to misjudge the number of alcoholic drinks they 
have consumed.   
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
9 
arrived.  Lewis danced with a couple of women, but he denied he 
was at Rudy’s to pick someone up.  Lewis eventually met S.D. 
on the dance floor, and she told him she had lost her phone.  
Lewis said he “thought [he] saw somebody pick something up,” 
but he denied telling S.D. that his friend had found a phone or 
that he would help her find it.  They chatted and went over to 
the bar.  The surveillance video shows them leaning close 
together, and Lewis believes they were kissing briefly.  Lewis 
bought S.D. a shot as well as another drink that consisted 
almost entirely of liquor.  Lewis remembered ordering two 
additional shots, but he claimed they were both for himself.  He 
did not recall the bartender telling him that S.D. should not 
drink any more.  Lewis left Rudy’s with S.D. and offered her and 
her date a ride home.  Lewis claimed that S.D. wanted a ride 
home alone.  They drove a short while, stopped, and had 
consensual sex.  Lewis said S.D. was “drunk” (as was he) but she 
was able to consent.  Afterward, Lewis continued to drive S.D. 
home.  When Lewis was asked on direct examination which 
direction, he first answered, “North,” and then, after further 
prompting, he said, “South.”  While they were driving, S.D. said 
she wanted to get out, so Lewis let her out.  S.D. seemed “happy” 
or “relieved” that Lewis let her out, and Lewis gave her a 
blanket from his car.  Lewis got back on the freeway and went 
home.  He denied taking S.D. to his house or having sex with 
her there.   
The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the 
charged offenses.  For the offense of rape of an intoxicated 
woman, the instructions required the prosecution to prove 
(1) “the defendant had sexual intercourse with a woman,” (2) “he 
and the woman were not married to each other at the time of the 
intercourse,” (3) “the effect of an intoxicating or controlled 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
10 
substance or a combination of both prevented the woman from 
resisting,” and (4) “the defendant knew or reasonably should 
have known that the effect of an intoxicating or controlled 
substance prevented the woman from resisting.”  The 
instructions further explained, “A person is prevented from 
resisting if he or she is so intoxicated that he or she cannot give 
legal consent.  In order to give legal consent, a person must be 
able to exercise reasonable judgment.  In other words, the 
person must be able to understand and weigh the physical 
nature of the act, its moral character, and probable 
consequences.  Legal consent is consent given freely and 
voluntarily by someone who knows the nature of the act 
involved.”   
For the offense of kidnapping to commit rape, the 
instructions required the prosecution to prove (1) “the defendant 
intended to commit rape of a woman while intoxicated”; 
(2) “acting with that intent, the defendant used physical force or 
deception to take and carry away an unresisting person with a 
mental impairment”; (3) “acting with that intent, the defendant 
moved the person with a mental impairment a substantial 
distance”; (4) “the person with a mental impairment was moved 
or made to move a distance beyond that merely incidental to the 
commission of a rape of a woman while intoxicated”; (5) “when 
that movement began, the defendant already intended to 
commit rape of a woman while intoxicated”; (6) S.D. “suffered 
from a mental impairment that made her incapable of giving 
legal consent to the movement”; and (7) “the defendant knew or 
reasonably should have known that [S.D.] was a person with a 
mental impairment.”  The instructions went on to state, “A 
person with a mental impairment may include [an] unconscious 
or intoxicated adult[] incapable of giving legal consent.  A person 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
11 
is incapable of giving legal consent if he or she is unable to 
understand the act, its nature, and possible consequences.  [¶]  
Deception includes tricking the mentally impaired person into 
accompanying him or her a substantial distance for an illegal 
purpose.”4   
In closing arguments, the prosecutor contended that 
Lewis deliberately plied S.D. with alcohol and Xanax, drove her 
to his house, and raped her.  Afterward, Lewis drove S.D. back 
to Palo Alto and left her passed out in the parking lot, where she 
was found the next day.  The prosecutor argued that Lewis 
kidnapped S.D. using both deception and force.  Lewis deceived 
S.D. by claiming his friend had recovered her phone, and he used 
force against S.D. by taking her forearm and guiding her out of 
the bar.  By contrast, defense counsel argued that S.D. was not 
intoxicated and she freely consented to sex with Lewis.  S.D. 
voluntarily left the bar with Lewis, and he had no intention of 
raping her.   
Following a half-day of deliberations, the jury convicted 
Lewis of raping S.D. while she was intoxicated (§ 261, 
subd. (a)(3)) and kidnapping S.D. to commit rape (§ 209, 
subd. (b)).  After the verdicts, the court and the parties 
memorialized certain off-the-record discussions regarding jury 
instructions that had occurred previously.  For the offense of 
kidnapping to commit rape, the court explained that its eventual 
 
4  
The court defined “substantial distance” to mean “more 
than slight or trivial distance.  The movement must have 
increased the risk of physical or psychological harm to the 
person beyond that necessarily present in the rape of a woman 
while intoxicated.  In deciding whether the movement was 
sufficient, consider all the circumstances relating to the 
movement.”   
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
12 
jury instruction was a combination of CALCRIM No. 1201 
(kidnapping a child or other person incapable of consent) and 
CALCRIM No. 1203 (kidnapping for the purpose of rape or other 
offenses).  The parties largely agreed to this combination and 
the language as given, including the reference to movement of a 
person with a mental impairment.  Defense counsel did, 
however, object to the inclusion of deception as an alternative 
theory of kidnapping.  The trial court overruled the objection.  
The court likewise denied Lewis’s motion for a new trial 
premised on the same instructional error.   
On appeal, as relevant here, Lewis renewed his challenge 
to deception as a theory of kidnapping.  (Lewis, supra, 
72 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.)  The Court of Appeal majority agreed 
that deception was not a valid theory of kidnapping.  It observed, 
“Since 1972, our Supreme Court has repeatedly held asportation 
by fraud alone does not constitute general kidnapping in 
California.”  (Id. at p. 13.)  However, the majority identified “two 
lines of cases where courts have recognized a reduced quantum 
of force was permissible in a kidnapping case.”  (Ibid.)  The 
majority held that neither line, one involving minor victims and 
another involving incapacitated persons, applied here.  (Id. at 
pp. 13–14.)  And, in any event, the majority believed the 
challenged jury instruction allowed the jury to convict Lewis 
without any showing of force.  (Id. at p. 16.)  The majority 
further held that the error was prejudicial under People v. 
Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1 (Aledamat) because, in its view, the 
evidence at trial did not compel the conclusion that Lewis must 
have used force against S.D.  (Lewis, at pp. 17–18.)  Indeed, the 
majority believed there was no evidence of force at all.  (Id. at 
p. 19.)  It therefore reversed Lewis’s conviction for kidnapping 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
13 
to commit rape and barred retrial based on insufficiency of the 
evidence.  (Id. at p. 23.) 
One justice disagreed.  His separate opinion reviewed the 
applicable precedent and concluded that “kidnapping can — 
under narrowly drawn exceptional cases — be accomplished 
without force or fear.”  (Lewis, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 31 
(conc. & dis. opn. of Bedsworth, J.).)  Where, as here, the victim 
“lacked the capacity to legally consent to being moved, due to 
her inebriated condition,” a jury could convict Lewis of 
kidnapping based “upon proof that defendant took advantage of 
[S.D.’s] mental impairment by luring her out the bar under false 
pretenses for the purpose of raping her.”  (Id. at p. 32.)  
Moreover, even if force or fear were required, the separate 
opinion posited that the instructional error was harmless 
because “all [the prosecution] would have had to show is that 
[Lewis], acting with unlawful intent, used enough force to take 
and carry [S.D.] away a substantial distance while she was 
mentally incapacitated.”  (Id. at p. 33.)  “By driving [S.D.] away 
from the bar, [Lewis] clearly and indisputably used enough force 
to move her a substantial distance while the kidnapping was in 
progress.”  (Ibid.)  The separate opinion would therefore have 
affirmed Lewis’s kidnapping conviction.  (Id. at p. 36.)  We 
granted the Attorney General’s petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Kidnapping To Commit Rape 
Kidnapping to commit rape is a type of aggravated 
kidnapping, which is kidnapping “for the purpose of robbery or 
certain sex offenses.”  (People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 
232 (Martinez).)  It is defined by statute:  “A person who kidnaps 
or carries away an individual to commit . . . rape . . . shall be 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
14 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the 
possibility of parole.”  (§ 209, subd. (b)(1).)  Aggravated 
kidnapping builds on the definition of kidnapping in section 207.  
(People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1131.)  The statute 
provides, as relevant here, “Every person who forcibly, or by any 
other means of instilling fear, steals or takes, or holds, detains, 
or arrests any person in this state, and carries the person into 
another country, state, or county, or into another part of the 
same county, is guilty of kidnapping.”  (§ 207, subd. (a).)  This 
general offense of kidnapping includes an element of force or 
fear.  We have held it cannot be accomplished by fraud or 
deception alone.  (People v. Majors (2004) 33 Cal.4th 321, 327 
(Majors).)5 
The parties agree force or fear is required to accomplish 
the offense of aggravated kidnapping as alleged, and the trial 
court erred by including deception as an alternative.  We note 
the concurring and dissenting opinion below took a different 
position.  It believed that “kidnapping can — under narrowly 
drawn exceptional cases — be accomplished without force or 
fear.”  (Lewis, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 31 (conc. & dis. opn. 
of Bedsworth, J.).)  But the Attorney General did not raise this 
issue, and the parties have not briefed it, so we have no occasion 
to consider whether deception is a valid theory under the 
circumstances here.  We assume without deciding that it is not. 
We granted review to consider the nature of the force or 
fear requirement for an intoxicated adult victim.  The Attorney 
General contends the force required to kidnap an intoxicated 
 
5  
Other, specialized varieties of kidnapping do not 
necessarily require force or fear.  (See § 207, subds. (c), (d).)  
These varieties of kidnapping are not at issue here. 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
15 
adult victim like S.D. is not the same as the force required to 
kidnap an unimpaired victim.  Instead, the force required to 
kidnap an intoxicated victim is akin to the relaxed force 
requirement applicable to infants and children.  Lewis responds 
that the relaxed force requirement is inapplicable and contrary 
to the statute where, as here, the victim is an adult.  We 
conclude the Attorney General is correct. 
The relaxed force requirement applicable to infants and 
children appears to have its origins in People v. Oliver (1961) 
55 Cal.2d 761 (Oliver), a case involving the kidnapping and 
molestation of a two-year-old boy.  The defendant led the boy 
away by the hand, took him behind a fence, and undressed the 
boy and himself.  (Id. at p. 763.)  Police officers arrived, 
witnessed lewd conduct, and arrested the defendant.  (Ibid.)  On 
the kidnapping charge, the trial court provided the following 
instruction:  “ ‘To constitute the crime of kidnaping . . . there 
must be a carrying, or otherwise forcible moving, for some 
distance of the person who, against his will, is stolen or taken 
into the custody or control of another person.’ ”  (Id. at p. 764.)  
The instructions did not require any specific intent beyond a 
general criminal intent.  (Ibid.) 
We noted the child “went willingly with [the] defendant,” 
but he was “too young to give his legal consent to being taken by 
the defendant.”  (Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 764.)  We 
observed that the traditional rule, under circumstances where 
the victim is capable of giving consent, did not require any 
specific intent by the kidnapper:  “It is equally true that the 
forcible moving of a person against his will . . . is kidnaping 
under . . . section 207, without more, and ‘[the] purpose or 
motive of the taking and carrying away [is] immaterial in 
prosecutions for kidnapping.’ ”  (Id. at p. 765.)  But such a rule, 
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as applied to small children, might cover situations where “a 
minor, unable to give his consent because of his immature years, 
might be forcibly taken and transported by an adult for a good 
or innocuous purpose, and in which it would be unthinkable that 
the adult should be held guilty of kidnaping.”  (Ibid.)  By 
contrast, an adult who transports a child “with an evil and 
unlawful intent” would “fall within the legislative purpose” and 
properly be convicted of kidnapping.  (Ibid.) 
We determined that the same logic would apply to “an 
adult person, who by reason of extreme intoxication, delirium or 
unconsciousness from injury or illness is unable to give his 
consent [and] is forcibly carried by another.”  (Oliver, supra, 
55 Cal.2d at p. 765.)  Justice Dooling wrote, “If I forcibly carry a 
helplessly intoxicated man lying in the middle of the highway to 
a place of greater safety, if I forcibly take a delirious man or one 
who is unconscious to a hospital or to a doctor, nobody again 
could reasonably believe that it was the intention of the 
Legislature that for any of these acts I could be convicted of 
kidnaping.  But if I forcibly take one of such persons and carry 
him in the same manner for an evil and unlawful purpose, 
everybody would again agree that my conviction of kidnaping 
would fall within the legislative design.”  (Id. at pp. 765–766.) 
To resolve this contradiction, we announced an exception 
to the literal scope of the kidnapping statute.  We held that the 
general rule, “which makes a person who forcibly carries such a 
person and transports him against his will guilty of kidnaping, 
however good or innocent his motive or intent may otherwise be, 
can only lead to obvious injustice and a perversion of the 
legislative purpose if blindly and literally applied where the 
person who is forcibly transported, because of infancy or mental 
condition, is incapable of giving his consent.”  (Oliver, supra, 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
17 
55 Cal.2d at p. 766.)  In this situation, “The courts are not 
powerless to read exceptions into the law when confronted by a 
criminal statute which literally interpreted would lead to the 
conviction of crime in cases to which it is obvious that the 
Legislature cannot have intended the statute to apply.”  (Ibid.)  
Thus, “as applied to a person forcibly taking and carrying away 
another, who by reason of immaturity or mental condition is 
unable to give his legal consent thereto,” we construed the 
statute “as making the one so acting guilty of kidnaping only if 
the taking and carrying away is done for an illegal purpose or 
with an illegal intent.”  (Id. at p. 768.) 
Oliver is notable for two reasons.  First, it accepted that 
the defendant had “forcibly” carried away the two-year-old 
victim, even though the boy went willingly with the defendant.  
(Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at pp. 764–765.)  The premise of 
Oliver’s holding was that the statute would have covered the 
defendant’s conduct, but for the exception announced by the 
court.  (Id. at p. 766.)  Thus, “At the least, our decision in Oliver 
‘indicated that in kidnapping cases the requirement of force may 
be relaxed where the victim is a minor who is “too young to give 
his legal consent to being taken” ’ ” and the kidnapping “ ‘is done 
for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.’ ”  (People v. Hill 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 853, 857 (Hill).)  Second, Oliver analogized the 
situation of a small child to “an adult person, who by reason of 
extreme intoxication, delirium or unconsciousness from injury 
or illness is unable to give his consent.”  (Oliver, at p. 765.)  
Oliver therefore broadly described its exception as applying to a 
victim “who by reason of immaturity or mental condition is 
unable to give his legal consent.”  (Id. at p. 768, italics added.) 
Four decades later, we considered the force requirement 
more directly in Michele D., supra, 29 Cal.4th 600.  There, a 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
18 
minor was found to have violated section 207 by kidnapping a 
12-month-old infant.  (Michele D., at p. 604.)  While on a 
shopping trip with a friend, the minor took the infant from her 
stroller and walked away.  (Id. at p. 603.)  A witness saw the 
minor with the infant and took them inside.  (Id. at p. 604.)  
Police, who were searching for the infant, arrived and arrested 
the minor.  (Ibid.)  In appellate proceedings, the minor argued 
that the evidence was insufficient to show a violation of 
section 207 because she had not “forcibly seized” the infant.  
(Michele D., at p. 605.) 
We began our discussion by noting that “ordinarily the 
force element in section 207 requires something more than the 
quantum of physical force necessary to effect movement of the 
victim from one location to another.”  (Michele D., supra, 
29 Cal.4th at p. 606.)  But we held the “minor’s conduct falls 
within the ambit of the statute.  Even if force, as conventionally 
understood, was not used to effect [the infant’s] kidnapping, the 
minor’s intent in carrying off the infant still renders her conduct 
kidnapping.”  (Ibid.) 
Like Oliver, we were required in Michele D. to construe 
section 207.  But, “whereas in Oliver we were concerned that a 
literal construction of the statute might lead to wrongful 
convictions, in this case a literal construction of the statute 
might result in the absurd consequence of finding that a 
kidnapping did not occur where it is clear a kidnapping was 
intended.  Minor removed [the infant] from her stroller with the 
intention of taking her away and raising her as her own child.  
Like the Court of Appeal in the present case, ‘we find it 
inconceivable that the Legislature intended the physical taking 
of an infant in the manner described in these facts not to be the 
crime of kidnapping.  In fact, we believe the taking of an infant 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
19 
or child in this manner is the prime example of kidnapping and 
is clearly intended to be within its scope.’ ”  (Michele D., supra, 
29 Cal.4th at pp. 607–608.) 
To “avoid[] the absurd consequence of allowing a 
defendant who carries off an infant or small child under 
circumstances similar to those in the present case to escape 
liability” (Michele D., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 613), we construed 
the statute to include a reduced force requirement where the 
victim is an infant or child.  We held, “[T]he amount of force 
required to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is simply the 
amount of physical force required to take and carry the child 
away a substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an 
illegal intent.”  (Id. at p. 610.)   
The Legislature later codified this standard.  (§ 207, 
subd. (e), added by Stats. 2003, ch. 23, § 1.)  The Legislature 
explained, “The amendment to Section 207 of the Penal Code 
made by this act codifies the holding in [Michele D.], and does 
not constitute a change in existing law.”  (Stats. 2003, ch. 23, 
§ 2, p. 99.) 
The Court of Appeal applied these precedents to an 
intoxicated victim in People v. Daniels (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 
304 (Daniels).  The victim in Daniels had consumed around 
13 shots of alcohol over three to four hours.  (Id. at p. 308.)  After 
leaving a bar, she ran over to a parking lot, vomited, and passed 
out.  (Ibid.)  She woke up in an alley with the defendant, but 
apparently she passed out again.  (Ibid.)  She ended up in the 
defendant’s car, but she did not remember how and did not 
consent to the movement.  (Ibid.)  The victim continued to 
alternately vomit and pass out.  (Id. at pp. 308–309.)  At some 
point, she realized a person was touching her breasts, but she 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
20 
passed out again.  (Id. at p. 309.)  The defendant drove to a motel 
and carried the victim up to a room.  (Ibid.)  When the victim 
realized the defendant had left for a moment, she escaped and 
sought help from other hotel guests.  (Ibid.) 
For the charged offense of kidnapping to commit rape, the 
trial court instructed the jury using the relaxed force 
requirement described in Michele D., i.e., “ ‘the defendant used 
enough physical force to take and carry away an unresisting 
person with a mental impairment’ ” and, moreover, “ ‘acting 
with that intent, the defendant moved the person with a mental 
impairment a substantial distance.’ ”  (Daniels, supra, 
176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 324–325.)  The instructions went on to 
explain, “ ‘A person with a mental impairment may include 
unconscious or intoxicated adults incapable of giving legal 
consent.  The person is incapable of giving legal consent if he or 
she is unable to understand the act, its nature, and possible 
consequences.’ ”  (Id. at p. 325.) 
On appeal, the defendant challenged the relaxed force 
requirement as inapplicable and inadequate.  (Daniels, supra, 
176 Cal.App.4th at p. 326.)  The Court of Appeal rejected this 
challenge based on a direct analogy to Michele D.  (Id. at p. 332.)  
It held, “An interpretation of . . . section 209, subdivision (b)(1) 
to avoid the absurd consequence of allowing a defendant to 
escape liability for carrying off an incapacitated person for the 
purpose of rape serves the legislative purpose underlying the 
statute, just as the California Supreme Court’s construction 
of . . . section 207 did in Michele [D.]  [¶]  Indeed, under the 
rationale 
of 
Michele [D.], 
it 
is 
our 
‘duty’ 
to 
construe . . . section 209, subdivision (b)(1) to proscribe the 
kidnapping for rape of an incapacitated person, as to find 
otherwise would be absurd.”  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
21 
concluded that the statute was violated “when a defendant takes 
and carries away an incapacitated person to commit rape even 
if the defendant uses only the force necessary to accomplish such 
a taking and carrying away.”  (Id. at p. 333.) 
The Court of Appeal in Daniels correctly synthesized our 
holdings in Michele D. and Oliver.  Michele D. approved the 
relaxed force requirement for infants and children.  (Michele D., 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 610.)  Oliver drew a direct connection 
between infants and children, on one hand, and adults “who by 
reason of extreme intoxication, delirium or unconsciousness 
from injury or illness [are] unable to give [their] consent,” on the 
other.  (Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 765.)  While children and 
mentally impaired adults may not be similar in all respects, they 
are similarly vulnerable to kidnapping and equally unable to 
consent to being moved, so the relaxed force requirement applies 
to each. 
Lewis accepts the holding in Daniels, but he contends it is 
factually distinguishable.  The majority below likewise found 
Daniels inapposite because, “Unlike the victim in Daniels, [S.D.] 
was not lying face down on the bar unable to move or talk.  At 
various points [S.D.] leaned on the bar and swerved.  But she 
talked to Lewis and [her date], and she was able to stand 
without assistance.  She walked out of Rudy’s on her own.  The 
video does not show a person who was unable to stand on her 
own and needed to be helped out of the bar.  Indeed, [the 
bartender] said that although she had concerns about [S.D.’s] 
sobriety, she did not look ‘completely out of control.’ ”  (Lewis, 
supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 15.) 
While we agree the victim in Daniels likely was more 
intoxicated than S.D., at least at the moment S.D. left Rudy’s, 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
22 
Daniels itself did not require such a high degree of intoxication.  
Instead, the relaxed force standard in Daniels depended on the 
ability of the victim to legally consent.  (Daniels, supra, 
176 Cal.App.4th at p. 325 [“ ‘A person with a mental 
impairment may include unconscious or intoxicated adults 
incapable of giving legal consent’ ”].)  The inability to legally 
consent 
does 
not 
require 
total 
incapacitation 
or 
unconsciousness.  The instructions in Daniels went on to 
explain, “ ‘The person is incapable of giving legal consent if he 
or she is unable to understand the act, its nature, and possible 
consequences.’ ”  (Ibid.; accord, People v. Griffin (1897) 117 Cal. 
583, 585 [“legal consent presupposes an intelligence capable of 
understanding the act, its nature, and possible consequences”].) 
This focus on consent is consistent with the rule in Oliver, 
which applied to any person who, “because of infancy or mental 
condition, is incapable of giving his consent.”  (Oliver, supra, 
55 Cal.2d at p. 766, italics added; accord, People v. Westerfield 
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 714 (Westerfield).)  Michele D. reasoned 
that Oliver’s discussion of consent led directly to a relaxed 
element of force “because the consent and force elements of 
kidnapping are clearly intertwined.”  (Michele D., supra, 
29 Cal.4th at p. 609.)  “If a person’s free will was not overborne 
by the use of force or the threat of force, there was no 
kidnapping.”  (People v. Moya (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 912, 916; 
see Michele D., at p. 609.)  But a person who cannot legally 
consent has no true free will that can be overborne.  In that 
situation, even though “there is no evidence the victim’s will was 
overcome by force” (Michele D., at p. 609), kidnapping is 
established by proof that the victim was taken “for an illegal 
purpose or with an illegal intent” (id. at p. 610). 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
23 
We applied a similar principle more than a century ago in 
People v. Verdegreen (1895) 106 Cal. 211 (Verdegreen).  The 
defendant in Verdegreen was convicted of an assault with intent 
to rape.  (Id. at p. 212.)  The record showed that the victim, a 
seven-year-old girl, went willingly with the defendant.  (Ibid.)  
The defendant recognized that the victim could not legally 
consent to sexual intercourse, but he argued that assault was 
different because it “implies resistance on the part of the one 
assaulted.”  (Id. at p. 213.)  The court in Verdegreen was not 
persuaded:  “It is true that an assault implies force by the 
assailant and resistance by the one assaulted; and that one is 
not, in legal contemplation, injured by a consensual act.  But 
these principles have no application to a case where under the 
law there can be no consent.”  (Id. at p. 215; accord, People v. 
Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 248.) 
Verdegreen illuminates the connection between force and 
consent.  “[T]he concepts of consent and force or fear ‘are clearly 
intertwined.’ ”  (Majors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 327.)  Normally, 
“ ‘If a person’s free will was not overborne by the use of force or 
the threat of force, there was no kidnapping.’ ”  (Hill, supra, 
23 Cal.4th at p. 856.)  But where a victim is unable to legally 
consent, and has no true free will, the traditional force 
requirement loses its salience.  “[W]here the victim by reason of 
youth or mental incapacity can neither give nor withhold 
consent,” kidnapping is established by proof that the victim was 
taken for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent, even if 
“there is no evidence the victim’s will was overcome by force.”  
(Michele D., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 609.)  The law protects the 
victim, who may go willingly with the defendant because he or 
she is unable to appreciate the defendant’s illegal intent.  
(Verdegreen, supra, 106 Cal. at p. 215.) 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
24 
We are confident the Legislature intended this result.  “ ‘It 
would ill serve the law to exclude as kidnappers those who prey 
on persons who cannot resist.’ ”  (Michele D., supra, 29 Cal.4th 
at p. 610, fn. 3, quoting Stancil v. Maryland (1989) 78 Md.App. 
376, 386 [553 A.2d 268, 273].)  As the Court of Appeal in Daniels 
explained, 
“An 
interpretation 
of . . . section 209, 
subdivision (b)(1) to avoid the absurd consequence of allowing a 
defendant to escape liability for carrying off an incapacitated 
person for the purpose of rape serves the legislative purpose 
underlying the statute, just as the California Supreme Court’s 
construction of . . . section 207 did in Michele [D].”  (Daniels, 
supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 332.)6 
Lewis 
contends 
the 
Legislature’s 
codification 
of 
Michele D.’s relaxed force requirement for children precludes its 
application to adults.  We disagree.  Lewis’s contention rests on 
the incorrect premise that the Legislature chose to change the 
law of kidnapping as it applied to children, but not as to adults.  
The Legislature expressly stated that its amendment “codifies 
the holding in [Michele D.], and does not constitute a change in 
existing law.”  (Stats. 2003, ch. 23, § 2, p. 99, italics added.)  The 
Legislature’s decision to codify the specific holding of Michele D. 
does not imply its disapproval of other developments in the law 
of kidnapping, and it does not dictate how the force requirement 
 
6  
Although it should be obvious, we emphasize the 
requirement that a defendant act with illegal intent or for an 
illegal purpose to be liable for kidnapping an unresisting 
intoxicated victim does not necessarily mean that a defendant 
who kidnaps a resisting intoxicated victim must act with such a 
specific intent.  (See People v. Hartland (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 
71, 78–79 [a defendant who kidnaps a resisting intoxicated 
victim need only act with general intent].)  The latter situation 
is materially different, and we need not consider it here. 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
25 
should be interpreted in situations not covered by the 
amendment.  Indeed, the Legislature’s action was prompted by 
Michele D., and not the later opinion in Daniels or any other 
similarly direct authority considering the specific circumstance 
of a mentally impaired adult.  It is therefore unremarkable the 
Legislature did not address that circumstance.  “The fact that 
the Legislature may not have considered every factual 
permutation of kidnapping . . . does not mean the Legislature 
did not intend for the statute to reach that conduct.”  
(Michele D., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 606.) 
Lewis also contends application of the relaxed force 
requirement here would constitute an improper judicial 
expansion of criminal liability in contravention of the 
Legislature’s exclusive power to define crimes in California.  
(Cf. Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 631–632.)  
Lewis is incorrect.  Our decision today falls well within the 
proper role of the judiciary.  Section 207 requires “force,” but the 
Legislature has not defined the term.  Michele D. explored its 
meaning with respect to infants and children who, by virtue of 
their youth, are legally unable to consent; we do the same here 
for intoxicated adults who, by virtue of their impaired mental 
state, are similarly unable to consent.  Our purpose is to 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature, not thwart it.  Our 
opinions in Oliver and Michele D., and that of the Court of 
Appeal in Daniels, lead directly to the conclusion that the 
Legislature intended to criminalize the kidnapping of an 
intoxicated adult victim, who is unable to legally consent, where 
the kidnapper has an illegal purpose or intent.  This conclusion 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
26 
does not expand the scope of the statute.  It interprets the 
statute as it already exists.7 
For similar reasons, we disagree that the application of 
the relaxed force requirement here is unforeseeable and would 
violate due process.  “[A]n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of 
a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like 
an ex post facto law . . . .”  (Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964) 
378 U.S. 347, 353.)  “The fundamental principle that ‘the 
required criminal law must have existed when the conduct in 
 
7  
We note the jury instructions here did not merely 
articulate the relaxed force standard.  The instructions 
specifically required the prosecution to show that Lewis “knew 
or reasonably should have known that [S.D.] was a person with 
a mental impairment.”  The parties agreed to this instruction in 
the trial court, and the Attorney General concurs it was properly 
given under the circumstances.  It reflects the general principle 
that an alleged kidnapper must harbor at least “criminal 
negligence as to consent.”  (People v. Fontenot (2019) 8 Cal.5th 
57, 68.)  Where, as here, a victim lacks the ability to consent, 
this principle requires that the defendant knew or should have 
known of the victim’s impaired state.  A defendant is not liable 
for kidnapping a mentally impaired adult if the defendant 
actually and reasonably believed the victim was not a mentally 
impaired person.  This requirement applies to the aggravated 
kidnapping of a mentally impaired adult alleged here (§ 209, 
subd. (b)), as well as the simple kidnapping of a mentally 
impaired adult (§ 207, subd. (a)).  Jury instructions like 
CALCRIM No. 1201 that do not explicitly recite this 
requirement, but rely on the relaxed force concept for 
kidnapping a mentally impaired adult, risk materially 
misstating the law.  On a separate matter, we have no occasion 
here to consider the precise nature of the additional required 
mental state — illegal intent or illegal purpose — that is 
required in the relaxed force context.  (See People v. Singh (2019) 
42 Cal.App.5th 175, 181–183.)  The intent to rape certainly 
suffices. 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
27 
issue occurred,’ [citation], must apply to bar retroactive criminal 
prohibitions emanating from courts as well as from legislatures.  
If a judicial construction of a criminal statute is ‘unexpected and 
indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed 
prior to the conduct in issue,’ it must not be given retroactive 
effect.”  (Id. at p. 354.) 
Our interpretation of the kidnapping statute is neither 
unexpected nor indefensible.  It is based on the principles of 
Verdegreen, Oliver, and Michele D.  Verdegreen established the 
connection between force and consent.  (Verdegreen, supra, 
106 Cal. at p. 215.)  Oliver identified a kidnapping as “forcibl[e]” 
even though the child went willingly with the defendant.  
(Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 765.)  It drew an explicit 
connection between that situation and a mentally impaired 
victim unable to consent; its holding applied to any victim “who 
by reason of immaturity or mental condition is unable to give 
his legal consent.”  (Id. at p. 768, italics added.)  Even before 
Michele D., 
we 
recognized 
that 
Oliver 
indicated 
“ ‘the 
requirement of force may be relaxed’ ” where the victim is a child 
and unable to consent.  (Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 857.)  
Michele D. confirmed this relaxed standard of force for infants 
and small children.  (Michele D., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 610.) 
Given the principles of Verdegreen and Oliver, it was 
foreseeable that Michele D.’s holding would be applied to 
mentally impaired adults.  Indeed, the Court of Appeal in 
Daniels had no trouble doing so:  “[U]nder the rationale of 
Michele [D.], it is our ‘duty’ to construe . . . section 209, 
subdivision (b)(1) to proscribe the kidnapping for rape of an 
incapacitated person, as to find otherwise would be absurd. . . .  
‘[O]rdinarily the force element in section 207 requires something 
more than the quantum of physical force necessary to effect 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
28 
movement of the victim from one location to another.’  [Citation.]  
Since an incapacitated person, like an infant, has no ability to 
resist being taken and carried away, the ‘something more’ that 
is ‘ordinarily’ required is not necessary, and ‘the amount of force 
required to kidnap an [incapacitated person] is simply the 
amount of physical force required to take and carry the 
[incapacitated person] away . . . with an illegal intent.’ ”  
(Daniels, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 332.) 
While we have never explicitly applied the relaxed 
standard of force to intoxicated adult victims before today, we 
also have never indicated to the contrary.  (Cf. Martinez, supra, 
20 Cal.4th at p. 241.)  Instead, the clear import of Verdegreen, 
Oliver, and Michele D. is that the relaxed standard of force 
would apply.  We have consistently treated children and 
mentally impaired adults differently from unimpaired adults for 
purposes of the kidnapping statute, and specifically its force 
requirement, and our case law provides more than sufficient 
warning that Lewis’s conduct here was criminal. 
In sum, a defendant acting with an illegal intent or 
purpose may be liable for kidnapping under section 207 if he or 
she uses physical force to take and carry away a person who, 
because of intoxication or other mental condition, is unable to 
consent to the movement.  The quantum of force required is no 
greater than the amount of physical force required to take and 
carry the victim away a substantial distance, and there is no 
constitutional prohibition on applying that standard here. 
B.  Instructional Error and Prejudice 
The jury was instructed that Lewis was guilty of 
kidnapping if he “used physical force or deception” to take and 
carry away S.D.  (Italics added.)  As noted, we assume without 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
29 
deciding that the trial court erred by including deception as an 
alternate theory of kidnapping.  Under this assumption, a valid 
theory of kidnapping in this context requires force, albeit the 
relaxed standard we have discussed:  physical force sufficient to 
take and carry away the victim a substantial distance for an 
illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.  (See Michele D., supra, 
29 Cal.4th at p. 610; Daniels, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 324–325.)   
The Attorney General contends that the instructions as a 
whole were not erroneous because they adequately conveyed the 
relaxed force requirement, notwithstanding the inclusion of 
deception as an alternative.  “A claim of instructional error is 
reviewed de novo.  [Citation.]  An appellate court reviews the 
wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether the 
instruction accurately states the law.  [Citation.]  In reviewing 
a claim of instructional error, the court must consider whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions 
caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the 
Constitution.  [Citations.]  The challenged instruction is viewed 
‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record 
to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury 
applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ”  (People 
v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) 
To support his claim that the jury instructions as a whole 
were not misleading, the Attorney General points to a different 
requirement in the instructions that Lewis must have “moved” 
S.D. “a substantial distance.”  The Attorney General asserts, 
“The instruction on the third element expressly conditioned 
guilt on a finding that [Lewis] ‘moved’ [S.D.] — which could only 
happen through the application of force.”  Lewis responds that 
the term “move” could include a situation where a person caused 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
30 
another to move by instilling fear or deceiving the victim.  In 
Lewis’s view, the jury could have understood the term to include 
indirect movement without any application of physical force. 
We need not definitively resolve whether a jury would 
have viewed the instructions as the Attorney General suggests.  
Even assuming the instructions did not adequately convey the 
force requirement to the jury, any error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The assumed error here is a form of 
alternative-theory error because it is premised on the idea that 
the jury may have found Lewis guilty based on an invalid theory 
of deception rather than a valid theory of force.  An alternative-
theory error is a federal constitutional error, subject to review 
for harmlessness under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 
18, 24.  Under this standard, “The reviewing court must reverse 
the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, 
including 
the 
evidence, 
and 
considering 
all 
relevant 
circumstances, it determines the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 13.) 
We have confirmed that “no higher standard of review 
applies to alternative-theory error than applies to other 
misdescriptions of the elements.  The same beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard applies to all such misdescriptions, including 
alternative-theory error.”  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 9.)  
The fundamental question is whether “it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the 
same verdict absent the error.”  (People v. Merritt (2017) 
2 Cal.5th 819, 831; accord, Neder v. United States (1999) 
527 U.S. 1, 18 (Neder).)  “In determining . . . whether the error 
was harmless, the reviewing court is not limited to a review of 
the verdict itself.”  (Aledamat, at p. 13.)  A court may examine 
“the entire cause, including the evidence.”  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
31 
We recently explained, “To determine harmlessness under 
Aledamat, a reviewing court essentially asks whether any 
rational juror who made the findings reflected in the verdict and 
heard the evidence at trial could have had reasonable doubt 
regarding the findings necessary to convict the defendant on a 
valid theory.  ‘The reviewing court examines what the jury 
necessarily did find and asks whether it would be impossible, on 
the evidence, for the jury to find that without also finding the 
missing fact as well.’ ”  (Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 591.)8 
Here, under the trial court’s instructions, the jury was 
required to find that Lewis intended to commit the offense of 
rape of an intoxicated woman, he moved S.D. a substantial 
distance, and S.D. was moved (or was “made to move”) a 
distance beyond that merely incidental to the commission of the 
intended offense.  By its guilty verdict, we know the jury did so.  
The jury also found this movement involved “more than slight 
or trivial distance.”  It “increased the risk of physical or 
 
8  
Lewis takes issue with this articulation of the standard of 
prejudice.  He asserts that a reviewing court can only examine 
what the jury actually did, rather than what a reasonable jury 
would do if properly instructed.  We addressed and rejected this 
assertion in Aledamat.  We disagreed that an alternative-theory 
error “requires reversal unless there is a basis in the record to 
find that ‘the jury has “actually” relied upon the valid theory.’ ”  
(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 9.)  Instead, we held an 
alternative-theory error harmless where “ ‘[n]o reasonable 
jury’ ” could have made the findings reflected in its verdict 
without finding the omitted element as well.  (Id. at p. 15.)  We 
recently confirmed and expanded on this principle.  (Lopez, 
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 580–581.)  Lewis’s reliance on the 
United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Sullivan v. Louisiana 
(1993) 508 U.S. 275 for a different standard is unavailing for the 
reasons we explained in Lopez, at pages 583 to 584.   
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
32 
psychological harm to [S.D.] beyond that necessarily present in 
the rape of a woman while intoxicated.”   
Additionally, it was undisputed at trial that Lewis used 
some quantum of physical force to move S.D.  The record does 
not support a contrary finding.  (See Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at 
p. 19.)  Lewis admitted driving S.D. away from Rudy’s, and the 
act of driving necessarily involved the application of physical 
force to S.D. under the relaxed force standard in Michele D.  
(See Lewis, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 33 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Bedsworth, J.) [“By driving [S.D.] away from the bar, [Lewis] 
clearly and indisputably used enough force to move her a 
substantial distance while the kidnapping was in progress”].)  
S.D. did not move herself; she was moved by the car driven by 
Lewis.  Lewis used the car to apply physical force to S.D. and 
carry her away.  Just as a person might kidnap an infant by 
pushing the child away in her stroller, so too did Lewis kidnap 
S.D. by driving her away in his car.  (See Westerfield, supra, 
6 Cal.5th at pp. 714–715; see also Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 
pp. 857–858 [“The baby certainly did not move herself”].)  The 
relaxed force requirement does not demand that the kidnapper 
touch his or her victim directly.  Thus, even if Lewis used 
deception to persuade S.D. to accompany him, he still 
indisputably used physical force as well — i.e., his act of driving 
S.D. — to accomplish the kidnapping under the relaxed force 
standard.9 
 
9  
We are aware that an argument could be made that 
Michele D.’s relaxed force requirement includes “physically 
escorting” the victim to a remote location for an illegal purpose 
or with an illegal intent.  (People v. Dalerio (2006) 
 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
33 
Based on this evidence, any rational juror who made the 
findings reflected in the verdict would necessarily have found 
that Lewis used some quantum of physical force to move S.D. as 
well.  (See Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 580.)  Because “any 
rational juror would have made the additional findings, based 
on the jury’s actual verdict and the evidence at trial, the error is 
harmless because the presentation of the invalid theory to the 
jury made no difference.  The error did not contribute to the 
verdict.”  (Id. at p. 589.)10 
Lewis claims this showing is insufficient because “there is 
no evidence that [S.D.] was incapacitated when she and [Lewis] 
drove away from the bar.”  (Fn. omitted.)  As an initial matter, 
the standard is not “incapacitat[ion],” but the inability to give 
legal consent due to mental condition or impairment, as we have 
discussed.  Moreover, although we may assume the jury 
instructions allowed the jury to rely on deception rather than 
force, the instructions did not eliminate the requirement of 
mental impairment.  The instructions required the jury to find 
 
144 Cal.App.4th 775, 782; see also Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at 
pp. 764–765.)  Because we conclude Lewis used physical force to 
move S.D., we need not consider whether “physically escorting” 
S.D. would be sufficient as well.  (Dalerio, at p. 782.)  We express 
no opinion on this theory or its potential applications.  We also 
express no opinion about whether the phrase “relaxed force” 
fully captures the relevant showing, or whether a broader term 
would be more appropriate. 
10  
Lewis contends the error was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt because “the prosecution relied heavily” on the 
theory of deception during its opening and closing arguments.  
But, as we recently explained, “[t]he prosecutor’s mere reliance 
on an invalid theory will not overcome a showing of 
harmlessness under Neder and Aledamat.”  (Lopez, supra, 
14 Cal.5th at p. 590.)   
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
34 
that Lewis “used physical force or deception to take and carry 
away an unresisting person with a mental impairment.”  (Italics 
added.)  This requirement was repeated in the two subsequent 
instructions relating to movement:  “acting with [intent to rape 
an intoxicated person], the defendant moved the person with a 
mental impairment a substantial distance,” and  “the person 
with a mental impairment was moved or made to move a 
distance beyond that merely incidental to the commission of a 
rape of a woman while intoxicated.”  (Italics added.)  The jury 
further found that S.D. was a mentally impaired person:  she 
“suffered from a mental impairment that made her incapable of 
giving legal consent to the movement.”  Thus, the jury found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that S.D. was mentally impaired at 
the relevant time, regardless of whether it thought Lewis used 
force or deception to move her.  As the separate opinion below 
explained, “In finding [Lewis] guilty of kidnapping for rape, the 
jury 
necessarily 
determined 
that 
[S.D.] 
was mentally 
incapacitated due to intoxication and that [Lewis] intended to 
rape her in that condition when they left the bar together.”  
(Lewis, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 33 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Bedsworth, J.).) 
Given the jury’s findings, Lewis’s claim amounts to a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s 
verdict.  Lewis raised at least two sufficiency of the evidence 
challenges in the Court of Appeal, including this one, but the 
majority found it unnecessary to address them because it found 
prejudicial 
instructional 
error. 
 
(See Lewis, 
supra, 
72 Cal.App.5th at p. 18.)  We need not address them in the first 
instance here.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal and remand for further proceedings, including any 
appellate contentions that remain unresolved. 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
35 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
S272627 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Kruger 
 
At the trial of defendant Rodney Taurean Lewis, the court 
instructed the jury it could convict Lewis of aggravated 
kidnapping if it determined that Lewis used “physical force or 
deception” to take and carry away S.D., an adult woman 
impaired by intoxication, with the intent to rape her.  The 
parties agree, at least for the purposes of this case, that the trial 
court erred by instructing the jury it could convict Lewis if it was 
convinced that he had tricked S.D. into accompanying him.  The 
majority concludes that the purported error in instructing on a 
kidnapping-by-deception theory was harmless:  Any reasonable 
juror that found Lewis guilty of kidnapping S.D. under the 
instructions that were given necessarily would have found that 
he technically used “some quantum of physical force” inasmuch 
as he took and carried her away by driving her in his car.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 3; see id. at pp. 2–3.) 
I agree with the majority that any instructional error was 
harmless, and I join its opinion in full.  I write separately to 
make two points about what the majority opinion says — and, 
importantly, what it does not say — about the substantive law 
governing the kidnapping of young children and intoxicated or 
otherwise impaired adults. 
I. 
The first point concerns the criminal act, or actus reus, 
constituting the kidnapping of a young child or an impaired 
PEOPLE  v. LEWIS 
Kruger, J., concurring 
2 
adult.  Because the Attorney General has conceded it was error 
to instruct the jury on a kidnapping-by-deception theory, the 
majority opinion does not address the issue.  But to be clear, this 
silence is not an endorsement:  Whether the kidnapping of 
young or impaired victims can be accomplished by deception — 
or, for that matter, by any other means not involving technical 
uses of physical force — remains an open and significant 
question. 
Our precedent does make clear that the crime of 
kidnapping typically cannot be accomplished by deception alone.  
Penal Code section 207, subdivision (a) provides that a 
kidnapping must be accomplished “forcibly, or by any other 
means of instilling fear,” and Penal Code section 209, the 
aggravated 
kidnapping 
statute, 
incorporates 
the 
same 
requirement (People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1131 
(Daniels)).  We have interpreted the force element of this force-
or-fear requirement to mean that kidnapping typically requires 
the use of actual physical force, and we have not considered that 
element satisfied by mere technical uses of force.  In People v. 
Stephenson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 652, for example, the defendant 
tricked the victims into accepting a ride home from the airport 
in his car, drove to a secluded location, and then robbed them of 
their belongings.  (Id. at p. 657.)  We held that the victims “were 
enticed to get voluntarily into defendant’s car by deceit or fraud” 
and that because he “did not forcibly require any of them to 
enter his car initially,” the charged offenses did not meet the 
statutory definition of kidnapping.  (Id. at pp. 659–660; see 
People v. Majors (2004) 33 Cal.4th 321, 327.)  
That is the rule that governs the typical kidnapping case.  
But our precedent also makes clear that cases involving young 
children and impaired adults are not typical cases.  When 
PEOPLE  v. LEWIS 
Kruger, J., concurring 
3 
victims lack the ability to understand what is happening to 
them, whether because of their young age or mental condition, 
the law does not insist on the same force-or-fear showing as 
would be required in kidnapping cases involving victims who are 
legally capable of consenting to movement.  In the seminal case 
of People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761 (Oliver), the defendant 
led a two-year-old boy away by the hand, taking him from an 
alley at the back of his home behind a fence somewhere nearby.  
(Id. at p. 763.)  We noted that the child “went willingly with [the] 
defendant,” but because the child was “too young to give his legal 
consent to being taken,” we took the view that the defendant’s 
conduct would be sufficient to establish the actus reus element 
of kidnapping.  (Id. at p. 764; see id. at pp. 764–765.)  We thus 
concluded, at least implicitly, that leading the willing child away 
by the hand satisfied the statute’s requirement of a forcible 
taking.  We reversed the defendant’s kidnapping conviction, 
however, because the jury had not been instructed that the 
defendant must take the child for an unlawful purpose.  (Id. at 
p. 768.)  We interpreted the statute to require this unlawful 
intent in order to ensure that a defendant who moved a child 
without consent but for “a good or innocuous purpose” could not 
be convicted of kidnapping.  (Id. at p. 765.)  And we noted that 
the same considerations should govern the substantive law of 
kidnapping in cases involving adult victims “who by reason of 
extreme intoxication, delirium or unconsciousness from injury 
or illness” are similarly unable to consent to being moved.  
(Ibid.) 
We again considered the law governing the kidnapping of 
small children in In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600 (Michele 
D.), where we more directly addressed the force-or-fear 
requirement.  In that case, the defendant conceded that she had 
PEOPLE  v. LEWIS 
Kruger, J., concurring 
4 
taken a 12-month-old child from a stroller and carried the child 
away, but she argued that there was insufficient evidence to 
support her kidnapping conviction because she had not taken 
the child “forcibly,” as that term is used in Penal Code section 
207, subdivision (a).  We rejected the argument.  In interpreting 
the statute’s force-or-fear requirement, we sought to avoid the 
“absurd consequence of allowing a defendant who carries off an 
infant or small child . . . to escape liability.”  (Michele D., at 
p. 613.)  We thus concluded that “the amount of force required 
to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is simply the amount of 
physical force required to take and carry the child away a 
substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an illegal 
intent.”  (Id. at p. 610.)   
This holding is what the majority opinion refers to as 
Michele D.’s “relaxed” or “reduced” force standard.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 27, 19.)  In conceding the jury was wrongly 
instructed here, the Attorney General appears to assume this 
“relaxed” force standard requires the use of actual physical 
force, if only in a technical sense.  This is understandable:  
Michele D. does seem to suggest that some “amount of physical 
force” is required (Michele D., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 610) — if 
only the amount of force necessary to lift an unresisting small 
child from a stroller.  But there are also reasons to doubt 
whether the law draws a firm line between technical uses of 
force and other ways of moving a victim.  After all, Michele D. 
sought to avoid an absurd construction of the statute that would 
have permitted a defendant who picks up an unresisting small 
child and carries the child away to avoid liability.  But it would 
also seem odd to interpret the statute in a way that fails to reach 
the defendant who lures a young child away with false promises 
of ice cream or puppies, without ever exerting the physical force 
PEOPLE  v. LEWIS 
Kruger, J., concurring 
5 
necessary to hold a hand or push a stroller.  (Cf. People v. Dalerio 
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 775, 777–778 [holding that the evidence 
of kidnapping sufficed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule where 
the defendant “deceived a nine-year-old child into voluntarily 
accompanying him” by telling her that her friends were nearby 
“looking at a deer” and then “physically escorted” her to a remote 
location]; but see People v. Nieto (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 188, 197 
[holding that deception is not an alternative to force under the 
general kidnapping statute in a case involving a six-year-old 
victim].)  As the majority explains, in cases where the victim is 
a small child or suffers from a mental impairment, it is the 
victim’s inability to consent that justifies a departure from the 
ordinary standard of force.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.)  A 
defendant who moves such a victim for an unlawful purpose 
would seem equally blameworthy, regardless of whether the 
movement was accomplished through the use of force in a 
technical sense, deception, or some other means. 
Perhaps for that reason, although Michele D. contains 
language suggesting that some amount of physical force is 
required, it also suggests that “kidnapping is established by 
proof that the victim was taken for an improper purpose or 
improper intent” even where “there is no evidence the victim’s 
will was overcome by force.”  (Michele D., supra, 29 Cal.4th at 
p. 609; see id. at p. 612, fn. 5 [noting that this holding “affects 
only a narrow class of cases in which an unresisting infant or 
small child is taken away without any force or fear”].)  We 
similarly suggested in People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632 
that physical force is not necessarily required, holding that a 
kidnapping conviction for the taking of a seven-year-old child 
could stand “even assuming [the victim] had been moved by a 
ruse and not through force or fear.”  (Id. at p. 713.)   
PEOPLE  v. LEWIS 
Kruger, J., concurring 
6 
The majority opinion takes no sides on this issue, instead 
concluding any instructional error was harmless because “it was 
undisputed at trial that Lewis used some quantum of physical 
force to move S.D.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 32.)  The majority 
explains:  “Lewis admitted driving S.D. away from [the bar], and 
the act of driving necessarily involved the application of physical 
force to S.D. under the relaxed force standard in Michele D.  
[Citation.]  S.D. did not move herself; she was moved by the car 
driven by Lewis.  Lewis used the car to apply physical force to 
S.D. and carry her away.  Just as a person might kidnap an 
infant by pushing the child away in her stroller, so too did Lewis 
kidnap S.D. by driving her away in his car.”  (Ibid.)   
It is true that, as a matter of Newtonian physics, Lewis 
applied force to S.D.’s person by moving her in his car.  But the 
question remains whether kidnapping liability in fact turns on 
this sort of technicality.  One can easily conceive of ways that a 
person could accomplish the movement of an intoxicated or 
impaired person without any use of force at all.  Imagine, for 
example, that instead of tricking an intoxicated victim into 
entering his car, the defendant persuaded her to walk with him 
to a nearby apartment.  Or imagine that instead of taking the 
defendant’s own car, the defendant hailed a cab or escorted her 
onto a city bus.  In those scenarios, the defendant might not have 
deployed physical force to move his victim, but he would have 
caused her to move all the same.  In all of these scenarios, the 
defendant has taken advantage of his victim’s impairment to 
move her — by whatever means — to a location that 
“ ‘substantially increase[d] the risk of harm [to her] over and 
above that necessarily present in the crime’ ” of rape itself.  
(People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1150, quoting 
Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139; cf. People v. Martinez 
PEOPLE  v. LEWIS 
Kruger, J., concurring 
7 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 236 [“a primary reason forcible 
asportation is proscribed by the kidnapping statutes is the 
increase in the risk of harm to the victim because of the 
diminished likelihood of discovery, the opportunity for the 
commission of additional crimes, and the possibility of injury 
from foreseeable attempts to escape”].) 
Given the rationale underlying Michele D., it could be 
argued that the operative standard under our precedent is best 
described not as a “relaxed” or “reduced” force standard, but as 
a constructive force standard — a standard that is satisfied so 
long as the defendant can be said to have caused the movement 
of a victim who, because of the victim’s young age, state of 
intoxication, or other mental impairment, can neither effectively 
resist nor consent to the movement.  (Cf. maj. opn., ante, at p. 23, 
quoting People v. Verdegreen (1895) 106 Cal. 211, 215 [“ ‘It is 
true that an assault implies force by the assailant and resistance 
by the one assaulted; and that one is not, in legal contemplation, 
injured by a consensual act.  But these principles have no 
application to a case where under the law there can be no 
consent.’ ”].)  As Justice Bedsworth explained in his opinion in 
the Court of Appeal, such an approach would mean there was no 
error in the jury instruction at issue here:  In his view, the 
instruction properly “allowed the jury to find [the asportation] 
requirement satisfied upon proof that defendant took advantage 
of [S.D.]’s mental impairment by luring her out [of] the bar 
under false pretenses for the purpose of raping her.”  (People v. 
Lewis (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1, 32 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Bedsworth, J.).)  And if that is so, then it does not matter 
whether Lewis happened to accomplish the movement through 
the technical use of force. 
PEOPLE  v. LEWIS 
Kruger, J., concurring 
8 
Again, it is unnecessary to decide the issue in this case, so 
the majority does not decide it.  But the majority’s willingness 
to assume, for the sake of argument, that the kidnapping-by-
deception instruction was invalid should not be mistaken for a 
judicial determination of invalidity.  The question whether 
kidnapping liability exists only if the defendant can be shown to 
have used physical force to move the victim — even if only in a 
technical sense — is one that warrants further attention in an 
appropriate case. 
II. 
The second point about the majority’s treatment of the 
substantive law of kidnapping concerns the required mental 
state, or mens rea, in cases involving very young or impaired 
victims.  As we have repeatedly recognized, with any reduced 
force requirement comes a danger of inadvertently criminalizing 
innocent — or even beneficial — behavior.  To avoid that 
danger, our cases have made clear that, to establish kidnapping 
liability in the case of a young child or other person incapable of 
consenting to movement, the prosecution must prove the 
defendant’s wrongful intent.  (Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 768.)   
In this case, the jury was told that, to convict, it must 
make another finding about Lewis’s mental state:  that he was 
actually or constructively aware of the impairment that 
rendered his victim incapable of consent.  So instructed, the jury 
found that Lewis “knew or reasonably should have known” that 
S.D. “suffered from a mental impairment that made her 
incapable of giving legal consent to the movement.” 
As the majority notes, all agree that the instruction was 
appropriate, including the Attorney General.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 26, fn. 7.)  The instruction is consistent with our 
PEOPLE  v. LEWIS 
Kruger, J., concurring 
9 
explanation in People v. Fontenot (2019) 8 Cal.5th 57 of the 
mental state required for kidnapping:  “Conviction under [Penal 
Code] section 207, subdivision (a) requires the defendant to 
intentionally perform the physical acts constituting the crime.  
And because any criminal conviction in California (with a few 
exceptions not applicable here) requires, as a threshold matter, 
‘ “a union of act and wrongful intent” ’ (People v. Mayberry (1975) 
15 Cal.3d 143, 154 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337] 
(Mayberry)) under [Penal Code] section 20, we have further 
concluded that someone with an honest and reasonable belief 
that the victim ‘voluntarily consented to accompany him’ 
(Mayberry, at p. 155) is not guilty of completed kidnapping.  (See 
also [Pen. Code,] § 26, class Three [providing that someone is not 
guilty of a crime if they ‘committed the act or made the omission 
charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves 
any criminal intent’].)  So to satisfy a basic requirement for 
criminality — that a defendant’s mental state be culpable in 
some minimal way — completed kidnaping under [Penal Code] 
section 207, subdivision (a) requires not just the intentional 
commission of physical acts, but also — at least — criminal 
negligence as to consent.  (Mayberry, at p. 154, citing People v. 
Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798, 801, fn. 2 [299 P.2d 850].)”  (Id. at 
p. 68.) 
This principle holds in cases involving the kidnapping of 
young children or mentally impaired adults.  To be sure, as 
noted above, Oliver and Michele D. require the prosecution to 
prove that the defendant moved the young or impaired victim 
with an unlawful intent.  (Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 768; 
Michele D., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 612.)  And in an aggravated 
kidnapping case, the prosecution must prove that the defendant 
harbored a specific intent to commit one of a list of enumerated 
PEOPLE  v. LEWIS 
Kruger, J., concurring 
10 
crimes.  (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b).)  There is thus no danger of 
penalizing a defendant with entirely innocent intentions.  But 
the actual or constructive knowledge requirement serves an 
important purpose, in that it ensures that the defendant 
harbored a culpable mental state specifically with respect to the 
act of taking and carrying away a victim who was unable either 
to consent or resist.   
This mens rea requirement has particular salience in a 
case like this one, involving application of Michele D.’s modified 
force standard due to an adult victim’s state of intoxication.  
Whereas children who are young enough to be taken without 
force, as conventionally understood, are always legally 
incapable of consent, the same is not true of adults.  And it may 
sometimes be difficult to determine whether another adult has 
reached a level of impairment that would preclude giving legal 
consent to being moved.  Without the requirement that the 
defendant act with at least criminal negligence as to the victim’s 
capacity to consent, there is a danger the defendant could be 
liable for simple kidnapping merely for transporting an adult 
the 
defendant 
reasonably 
believed 
was 
coming 
along 
voluntarily, with any illegal intent or unlawful purpose (see 
Michele D., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 612).  And if the defendant 
harbored a specific intent to commit one of the additional crimes 
enumerated in Penal Code section 209, subdivision (b), there is 
likewise a danger the defendant could be liable for aggravated 
kidnapping for the same conduct, despite having no intention of 
moving the victim somewhere the victim had not agreed to go.  
As all parties here agree, the jury was properly instructed that 
they had to find more — that Lewis knew or should have known 
S.D. was intoxicated to a degree that rendered her unable to 
legally give consent — in order to return a conviction. 
PEOPLE  v. LEWIS 
Kruger, J., concurring 
11 
With these observations, I join the majority’s opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    KRUGER, J. 
 
I Concur: 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Lewis 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 72 Cal.App.5th 1 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S272627 
Date Filed:  June 22, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Santa Clara 
Judge:  Vincent J. Chiarello 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Swanson & McNamara, Edward W. Swanson and August Gugelmann 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant 
Attorney General, Alice B. Lustre, Seth K. Schalit and Arthur P. 
Beever, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
August Gugelmann 
Swanson & McNamara LLP 
300 Montgomery Street, Suite 1100 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
(415) 477-3800 
 
Arthur P. Beever 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3761