Case Title: Gutierrez v. Ortiz

Citation: 268 P.2d 979, 58 N.M. 187

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1954-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
268 P.2d 979 (1954) 58 N.M. 187 GUTIERREZ v. ORTIZ et al. No. 5694. Supreme Court of New Mexico. April 2, 1954. Noble, Spiess & Noble, H.E. Blattman, Las Vegas, for appellant. Roberto L. Armijo, Las Vegas, for appellees. LUJAN, Justice. The appellant, who was plaintiff below, commenced this suit to quiet title to a tract of land located in the City of Las Vegas, New Mexico. The appellees, defendants below, filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint and a cross-complaint alleging ownership in fee simple of a tract of land which conflicts with the land described in plaintiff's complaint at the extreme southeast corner. The area in dispute is a strip of land 125' long by 13.51' wide on one side and 9.5' on the other. The issue was as to the title to the above strip of land. The plaintiff and cross-defendant will be referred to as the plaintiff and the defendants and cross-complainants will be referred to as the defendants. Plaintiff's claim to the land in question is based on a quit claim deed from Henrietta Roth and children, dated October 19, 1950. Defendants' claim is based on a tax deed and ten years adverse possession as required by statute, said deed being dated March 9, 1940. Plaintiff contends that the tax deed is void and conveys no title, for two reasons: (1) Insufficiency of description; and (2) double taxation. The tax deed described the land as follows: At the conclusion of the trial the court made the following findings of fact: The court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the tract of land described in his complaint minus the disputed overlap, and quieted title in the defendants to substantially the property described in the cross-complaint including the disputed overlap. The points urged for reversal can be stated as follows: (1) That the tax deed resulted from a double assessment, and was therefore void, and could not constitute color of title; (2) that the description in the tax deed was so vague as to prevent the use of same for color of title; and (3) that the defendants failed to establish the facts necessary to constitute adverse possession under Section 27-121 of 1941 Compilation. As to points two and three the findings above quoted are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, and we think they are so supported. With reference to adequacy of description see Stevens v. Fincher, 52 N.M. 52, 191 P.2d 350; Padilla v. Northcutt, 57 N.M. 521, 260 P.2d 709; Maynard v. Miller, 132 Fla. 269, 182 So. 220; 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 30, page 210 et seq. As to point one appellant relies on the case of Pratt v. Parker, 57 N.M. 103, 255 P.2d 311, particularly paragraph seven on rehearing. Appellant contends that what was there said means that a void tax deed cannot serve as color of title; in this contention he is in error. In that decision we were concerned with the problem of tacking to a period of adverse possession the period of time during which the State asserted ownership and we held that such tacking was not permissible, and cited text writers and cases. It is our conclusion that a tax deed even though void for failure of title in the grantor may constitute color of title; therefore it is unnecessary to determine the question of double taxation. See, Turner v. Sanchez, 50 N.M. 15, 168 P.2d 96, 164 A.L.R. 1280; Chambers v. Bessent, 17 N.M. 487, 134 P. 237. Finding no reversible error the judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered. McGHEE, C.J., and SADLER, COMPTON, and SEYMOUR, JJ., concur.