Case Title: Conner v. National Pest Control Association

Citation: 

Docket Number: 981088

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
DEBORAH A. CONNER 
 
v.  Record No. 981088     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
February 26, 1999 
NATIONAL PEST CONTROL  
ASSOCIATION, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Leslie M. Alden, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether Code § 2.1-725 of the 
Virginia Human Rights Act (VHRA), Code §§ 2.1-714 et seq., 
prohibits a common law cause of action for wrongful 
termination based on a violation of public policies enunciated 
in both the VHRA and other provisions of state, federal, or 
local statutes or ordinances. 
 
Deborah A. Conner was terminated by her employer, the 
National Pest Control Association, Inc. (NPCA), in September 
of 1995.  She filed a common law cause of action for wrongful 
termination against NPCA, alleging that her termination 
"constituted discrimination . . . based on her gender" and 
that it violated the public policy against retaliation for 
complaints of discrimination in employment as articulated in 
the VHRA and other provisions of Virginia and federal law.1  
                     
1 Specifically Conner relied on art. 1, § 1 of the 
Virginia Constitution, Chapter 11, § 11-1-1 et seq. of the 
Fairfax County Code, Virginia Code §§ 2.1-374, 8.01-42.1, 11-
44, 11-51, 15.1-37.3:8 (repealed and reenacted in substance as 
§ 15.2-965 (1997)), 15.1-48.1 (repealed and reenacted in 
substance as § 15.2-1604 (1997)), 36-96.1, 38.2-2212(C1), 
Conner sought $1,000,000 in compensatory damages, $350,000 in 
punitive damages and attorneys' fees.  
 
NPCA filed a demurrer claiming that Conner's motion for 
judgment failed to state a cause of action because the common 
law cause of action asserted was eliminated by the 1995 
amendments to the VHRA.  NPCA, relying on Doss v. Jamco, Inc., 
254 Va. 362, 492 S.E.2d 441 (1997), contended that the 1995 
amendments to the VHRA restricted the remedy for wrongful 
termination of employment based on a violation of a public 
policy found in the VHRA to a statutory remedy.  The trial 
court agreed and entered an order dismissing Conner's motion 
for judgment for failure to state a cause of action. 
 
On appeal Conner asserts, as she did in the trial court, 
that even if the 1995 amendments to the VHRA as interpreted in 
Doss "effectively prohibited a victim of discrimination from 
relying on the public policy articulated in the VHRA" as the 
basis for a common law action, they do not prohibit reliance 
"upon other state or federal laws, or upon the public policies 
enunciated elsewhere."  We disagree. 
 
The plaintiff in Doss, relying on Bowman v. State Bank of 
Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985), and Lockhart v. 
Commonwealth Education Systems, 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328 
                                                                
38.2-2213, 38.2-4312(3)(E)(1994), as amended 38.2-
4312(D)(1998), 59.1-21.21:1 and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
 
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(1994), filed a common law action against her employer 
claiming that her termination violated Virginia's public 
policy against discrimination on the basis of gender as 
enunciated in the VHRA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq..  She maintained that the 
1995 amendments to the VHRA did not alter her common law cause 
of action.  In response to a question certified to us by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, we held 
that the plain meaning of the 1995 amendments required the 
conclusion that the General Assembly abrogated the common law 
action for wrongful termination based upon a violation of the 
public policies contained in the VHRA.  Doss, 254 Va. at 372, 
492 S.E.2d at 447.  Although the decision in Doss was limited 
to a cause of action for wrongful termination relying on the 
VHRA as the source of the public policy allegedly violated, 
id. at 366, 492 S.E.2d at 443, the rationale of that decision 
controls the disposition of this case. 
 
Our decision in Doss centered on the application of 
subsection D of Code § 2.1-725, which was added to the VHRA in 
1995.  That subsection provides:  
Causes of action based upon the public policies 
reflected in this chapter shall be exclusively 
limited to those actions, procedures and 
remedies, if any, afforded by applicable federal 
                                                                
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.. 
 
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or state civil rights statutes or local 
ordinances. 
 
We concluded that this subsection plainly manifested the 
General Assembly's intent to alter the common law and to limit 
actions based on violations of the policies reflected in the 
VHRA to applicable statutory causes of action and remedies.  
Id. at 371, 492 S.E.2d at 446.  Thus, we held that the 
plaintiff in Doss could not maintain her common law action 
based on alleged violations of policy stated in the VHRA, 
because allowing her to do so would circumvent and render 
meaningless the mandate of subsection D that the actions for 
violations of such policies be "exclusively limited" to 
statutory causes of action.  Id.
 
In this case, just as in Doss, subsection D's exclusivity 
requirement would be circumvented and rendered meaningless if 
Conner could maintain her common law action based upon an 
alleged violation of a policy enunciated in the VHRA by simply 
citing a different Code section or other source of public 
policy which enunciated the same policy.  Furthermore, the 
General Assembly did not limit the exclusivity provision to 
those causes of action relying on the VHRA itself as the 
source of the public policy statements.  Rather, it made 
statutory causes of action the exclusive avenues for pursuing 
a remedy for an alleged violation of any public policy 
 
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"reflected in" the VHRA.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
General Assembly, in enacting the 1995 amendments to the VHRA, 
eliminated a common law cause of action for wrongful 
termination based on any public policy which is reflected in 
the VHRA, regardless of whether the policy is articulated 
elsewhere. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's order 
sustaining the demurrer of NPCA and dismissing Conner's motion 
for judgment for failure to state a cause of action.2
Affirmed.
JUSTICE HASSELL, with whom JUSTICE KEENAN joins, concurring. 
 
Gender discrimination should not be countenanced in any 
manner and victims of such discrimination should be accorded a 
tort remedy that fully and fairly compensates them for 
injuries caused by an employer's repugnant conduct.  As this 
Court recognized in Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys., 247 
Va. 98, 105, 439 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1994): 
 
"Without question, it is the public policy of 
this Commonwealth that all individuals within this 
Commonwealth are entitled to pursue employment free 
of discrimination based on race or gender.  Indeed, 
racial or gender discrimination practiced in the 
                     
2 We do not consider Conner's assignment of error that the 
trial court erred in holding that the 1995 amendments to the 
VHRA do not violate the equal protection clause of the United 
States Constitution, because the trial court's order does not 
reflect such a holding, and the issue of the constitutionality 
of a statute is not properly before us on review of an order 
sustaining a demurrer. 
 
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work place is not only an invidious violation of the 
rights of the individual, but such discrimination 
also affects the property rights, personal freedoms, 
and welfare of the people in general." 
 
 
However, the General Assembly of this Commonwealth has 
chosen to impose limitations on the right of a woman to 
recover damages against an employer who discriminates against 
her because of her gender.  See Code §§ 2.1-714, et seq.  And, 
this Court, which does not, and constitutionally cannot, act 
as a super-legislative body, is required to apply these 
restrictions as expressed by the General Assembly.  For this 
reason solely, I am compelled to concur with the majority's 
opinion. 
 
 
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