Case Title: JACOBY v. JACOBY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-178

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
JACOBY v. JACOBY2004 WY 140100 P.3d 852Case Number: 03-178Decided: 11/15/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                      

 

 

JOHN 
MICHAEL JACOBY and

BARBARA 
JEAN JACOBY,

 

Appellants(Defendants),

 

v.

 

YVONNE 
TERESA JACOBY,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellants:

 

            
Steven F. Freudenthal of Freudenthal, Salzburg & Bonds, P.C., 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Cheryl Wadas, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

VOIGT, 
J., 
delivered the opinion of the Court; 
KITE, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion with which 
HILL, 
C.J., joined.

 

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      John Michael 
Jacoby and Barbara Jean Jacoby (the appellants) appeal from an order of 
equitable lien in the amount of $64,600.00 entered by the district court against 
property owned by them and in favor of their former daughter-in-law, Yvonne 
Teresa Jacoby (the appellee).  We 
reverse because the appellee did not prove all of the necessary elements of an 
unjust enrichment claim.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The parties raise 
the following issues:

 

1.            
Whether the district court correctly allowed recovery based upon the 
theory of constructive trust or equitable lien?

 

2.            
Whether the statute of frauds barred the appellee's 
claim?

 

3.            
Whether the doctrine of unclean hands barred the appellee's 
claim?

 

4.            
Whether lack of consideration barred the appellee's 
claim?

 

5.            
Whether the district court improperly provided relief outside the 
pleadings?

 

6.            
Whether the district court applied the proper measure of 
damages?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The appellants' 
family home was located on property they own in Cheyenne.  During the appellee's marriage to the 
appellants' son, Mike, the appellants agreed to let their son and 
daughter-in-law build a house on the property.  All parties intended the house to be 
occupied by the appellee, her husband, and their children.  All parties contributed funds toward 
construction of the house.  However, 
before construction was complete, Mike Jacoby left his wife and children.  Ultimately, the appellants completed 
construction themselves and moved into the house.

 

[¶4]      The appellee 
subsequently filed a complaint against the appellants in which she claimed that, 
after she had contributed finances, materials and services to the construction, 
the appellants had reneged on their promise that she could occupy the 
house.  She alleged that the 
appellants were unjustly enriched as a result, and that equitable title to the 
house belonged to her subject to any interest of the appellants.  She sought imposition of a constructive 
trust.  In addition to the general 
denials contained in their answer, the appellants filed a counterclaim in which 
they alleged that they had borrowed money and expended funds on the project, 
that they had taken out mortgages on the property, and that the appellee had 
removed property from the house.

 

[¶5]      The matter was 
tried to the district court, after which the district court issued a decision 
letter and order granting to the appellee an equitable lien against the 
appellants' property in the amount of $64,600.00.  Relevant findings in the order 
were:  the appellee and her 
then-husband obtained the appellants' permission to build their marital 
residence on the lot; construction was eighty-five percent complete when the 
appellee was divorced; the appellee requested and was denied permission to move 
into the house; the appellants completed construction of the house; the appellee 
proved the existence of a promise and unjust enrichment; a constructive trust 
remedy would be excessive; and an equitable lien in the amount of $64,600.00 was 
appropriate.1

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      "When a trial 
court in a bench trial makes express findings of fact and conclusions of law, we 
review the factual determinations under a clearly erroneous standard and the 
legal conclusions de novo."  
Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2003 WY 165, ¶ 13, 81 P.3d 215, 218 
(Wyo. 2003).  In reviewing the factual findings, we 
apply the following standard:

 

"The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed."

 

Life 
Care Centers of America, Inc. v. Dexter, 2003 
WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, 389 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Fremont Homes, Inc. v. 
Elmer, 974 P.2d 952, 958 (Wyo. 1999)).  Findings may not be set aside because we 
would have reached a different result.  
Double Eagle Petroleum & Min. Corp. v. Questar Exploration & 
Production Co., 2003 WY 139, ¶ 6, 78 P.3d 679, 681 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting 
Ahearn v. Hollon, 2002 WY 125, ¶ 15, 53 P.3d 87, 90 (Wyo. 2002)).  Also, in reviewing a trial court's 
findings of fact,

 

"we 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it.  We do not substitute ourselves 
for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings 
unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of 
law."

 

. 
. .  We affirm the trial court's 
findings if there is any evidence to support them.

 

Dexter, 
2003 
WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d  at 389 (quoting Kendrick v. Barker, 2001 WY 2, ¶ 12, 
15 P.3d 734, 738 (Wyo. 2001)).

 

[¶7]      When reviewing 
questions of law de novo, we afford no deference to the decision of the 
district court.  Double Eagle 
Petroleum & Min. Corp., 2003 WY 139, ¶ 6, 78 P.3d  at 681 (quoting 
Amoco Production Co. v. EM Nominee Partnership Co., 2 P.3d 534, 540 (Wyo. 
2000)).  Requests for equitable relief are 
matters over which the district court exercises broad discretion.  Wilson v. Lucerne Canal and Power 
Co., 2003 WY 126, ¶ 9, 77 P.3d 412, 416 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Polo Ranch 
Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 15, ¶ 25, 61 P.3d 1255, 1263 (Wyo. 
2003)).  Therefore, we review the district 
court's decision to impose an equitable lien under the abuse of discretion 
standard:

 

In 
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we focus on the 
"reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court."  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo.1998).  If the trial court 
could reasonably conclude as it did and the ruling is one based on sound 
judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances, it will not be 
disturbed absent a showing that some facet of the ruling is arbitrary or 
capricious.  Id. (citing 
Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985); Basolo 
[v. Basolo], 907 P.2d [348] at 353 
[(Wyo.1995)].

 

Jordan 
v. Brackin, 992 P.2d 1096, 1098-99 (Wyo. 1999).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      It is difficult 
to characterize in legal terms the arrangement under which the parties began 
construction of this house.  It is 
doubtful that a contract existed, given the dearth of agreement, or even 
discussion, of many significant terms.  
We do know that title to the property remained with the appellants and 
that the appellee and her husband were supposed to make monthly payments toward 
the loan from the appellants.  At 
the outset, the appellants furnished the real property, most of the funds, and 
some of the work.  The appellee and 
her husband provided most of the work, some of the funds, and some of the 
building materials.  The most that 
can be said is that this was an informal family arrangement that failed because 
the appellee and her husband divorced, resulting in an inability to finish the 
project or make the payments as expected.

 

[¶9]      We have said that 
an appropriate exercise of discretion occurs when "conclusions [are] drawn from 
objective criteria, [and] sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right 
under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.'"  In re Worker's Compensation Claim of 
Shryack, 3 P.3d 850, 855 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998)).

 

"A court does not abuse its discretion unless it 
acts in a manner [that] exceeds the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances.  In determining 
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or 
not the court could reasonably conclude as it did.  An abuse of discretion has been said to 
mean an error of law committed by the court under the 
circumstances."

 

Roberts 
v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980)).  Whether an abuse of discretion has 
occurred must be determined on the peculiar facts of each individual case.  Roberts, 816 P.2d  at 1297 
(quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).

 

[¶10]   Even when acting in equity, the 
district court is not free simply to do what it thinks is fair.  Relief must be fashioned within the 
context of a recognized equitable theory.  
In the instant case, that theory is unjust enrichment.  The elements of an unjust enrichment 
claim are as follows:

 

(1) 
[v]aluable services were rendered, or materials furnished, (2) to the party to 
be charged, (3) which services or materials were accepted, used and enjoyed by 
the party to be charged; and (4) that the services or materials were furnished 
under such circumstances as would reasonably notify the party to be charged that 
the plaintiff, in rendering such services or furnishing such materials, expected 
to be paid by the party to be charged.  
Without such payment, the party would be unjustly 
enriched.

 

Nuhome 
Investments, LLC v. Weller, 2003 
WY 171, ¶ 22, 81 P.3d 940, 948 (Wyo. 2003).  See also Boyce v. Freeman, 
2002 WY 20, ¶ 12, 39 P.3d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶11]   In the present case, the only 
element of unjust enrichment proved by the appellee is the first element.  She and her husband did render valuable 
services and furnish materials.  But 
those services were not rendered and those materials were not furnished to 
the appellants in the classic sense of unjust enrichment.  Rather, this was mutual participation in 
a family venture that failed; and it failed because of the appellee and her 
husband, not because of the appellants.  
And if the services and materials were "accepted, used and enjoyed" by 
the appellants, that occurred only after the appellee and her husband failed to 
finish the house and failed to make their scheduled payments.  Nuhome Investments, LLC, 2003 WY 
171, ¶ 22, 81 P.3d  at 948.  The 
appellants' attempt to mitigate their damages should not be used to create an 
obligation that did not exist.

 

[¶12]   The fourth element of an unjust 
enrichment claim is actually two elements.  
Not only must the proponent of the theory prove that the circumstances 
were such that the other party was reasonably notified that the proponent 
expected to be paid for services rendered or materials furnished, but the 
proponent must prove that "[w]ithout such payment, the party would be unjustly 
enriched."  Id.  Here, there is no evidence that, as part 
of the poorly crafted inter-family arrangement, the appellee expected the 
appellants to pay her for her services or for any materials she may have 
furnished.  She merely expected to 
remain married to her husband and to move into the house with him.  The fact that such did not occur did not 
create an obligation on the part of the appellants to pay her.  As an equitable remedy, unjust 
enrichment is a shield, not a sword.2

 

[¶13]   We have had the following to say 
about the second part of the fourth element of an unjust enrichment 
claim:

 

            
Element four is the heart of an unjust enrichment claim.  The receipt of a benefit must be unjust 
as to the party to be charged.  
Unjust enrichmnt is an equitable remedy that is appropriate only when the 
party to be charged has received a benefit that in good conscience the party 
ought not retain without compensation to the party providing the benefit.  "The words unjust enrichment' concisely 
state the necessary elements of an equitable action to recover money, property, 
etc., which good conscience' demands should be set over to the appellee by 
appellants pursuant to an implied contract between them."  Landeis v. Nelson, 808 P.2d 216, 
218 (Wyo.1991).  As stated at 66 
Am.Jur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 8 
(2001):

 

"The 
phrase unjust enrichment' is used in law to characterize the result or effect 
of a failure to make restitution of, or for, property or benefits received under 
such circumstances as to give rise to a legal or equitable obligation to account 
therefor.  It is a general 
principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies, that one person 
should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another, 
but should be required to make restitution of or for property or benefits 
received, retained, or appropriated, where it is just and equitable that such 
restitution be made, and where such action involves no violation or frustration 
of law or opposition to public policy, either directly or 
indirectly."

 

Boyce, 
2002 WY 20, ¶ 15, 39 P.3d  at 1065-66.

 

[¶14]   The appellants tried to help out 
their son and his wife by providing land upon which they could build a 
house.  Everyone's expectation was 
that the younger couple would live there with the grandchildren and would repay 
the $26,000.00 loan from the appellants used to start construction.  Instead, the appellants had to borrow 
another $25,000.00 to complete the project, and ended up with a much larger 
mortgage against their property.  
While it is true that the appellee and her husband also contributed 
considerable sums and work effort, and while it is true that the value of the 
appellants' real property has been enhanced, those facts alone do not make the 
appellants "unjustly enriched."  An 
extended mortgage late in life is not "enrichment."

 

[¶15]   The divorce caused the appellee and 
her husband to lose their investment in the house.  That loss, although perhaps not "fair," 
was not the appellants' fault and should not be their responsibility.3  The district court's decision is based 
entirely on an increased property value theory.  That decision ignores the realities 
facing this older couple.  Instead 
of having their son's family living next door, and instead of receiving half of 
the increased monthly mortgage payments, the appellants now share their property 
with renters, and they pay more than twice what they used to pay as a monthly 
mortgage payment.  Their additional 
reward, from this lawsuit, is a $64,600.00 lien on their property.  This is simply wrong.  "Let no good deed go unpunished" is not 
an equitable maxim.

 

[¶16]   The appellants were not enriched by 
this failed venture, and they certainly were not unjustly enriched.  These facts did not create a situation 
where the appellants received a benefit "that in good conscience [they] ought 
not retain . . .."  Boyce, 
2002 WY 20, ¶ 15, 39 P.3d  at 1065.  
Discretionary equitable decisions require more than "doing the 
math."  The facts of this case just 
do not cry out for the court to step in and draft a contract where none 
existed.

 

[¶17]   This matter is reversed and 
remanded to the district court for entry of an order consistent with this 
opinion.  Given the above 
resolution, the other issues presented by the appellants need not be 
addressed.
  

KITE, 
Justice, dissenting, in which HILL, C.J., joins.

 

[¶18]   I disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that the district court abused its discretion in holding Ms. Jacoby 
proved the elements of an unjust enrichment claim.  Applying the abuse of discretion 
standard to this equitable ruling as we are required to do, the district court 
"could reasonably conclude as it did" from the evidence and argument presented. 
Jordan v. Brackin, 992 P.2d 1096, 1098-99 (Wyo. 1999).  The ruling was "one based on sound 
judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances," and no showing 
was made that any facet of the ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  Id.  

 

[¶19]   The doctrine of unjust enrichment 
provides for recovery on a contract implied in equity.  Johnson v. Anderson, 768 P.2d 18, 
25 (Wyo. 1989).  It invites 
judgments about what is right between two particular people, considering equity 
and good conscience.  Dan B. Dobbs, 
Law of Remedies, § 4.1(2) at 558 (2nd ed. 1993).  To establish a claim for unjust 
enrichment, the claimant must show:

 

1)     Valuable 
services were rendered, or materials furnished, 2) to the party to be charged, 
3) which services or materials were accepted, used and enjoyed by the party, and 
4) under such circumstances which reasonably notified the party to be charged 
that the [party] in rendering such services or furnishing such materials, 
expected to be paid by the party to be charged.  Without such payment, the party would be 
unjustly enriched. 

 

Metz 
Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, Inc., 
2002 WY 21, ¶36, 39 P.3d 1051, ¶36 (Wyo. 2002) (citations omitted).  Imposition of an equitable lien, the 
remedy awarded here, is one possible remedy for unjust enrichment.4 

 

 [¶20]  Unjust enrichment occurs where a party 
receives something of value without payment, which is accepted and used so as to 
unjustly enrich the recipient of the goods or services.  McNeill Family Trust v. Centura 
Bank, 2003 WY 2, ¶26, 60 P.3d 1277, ¶26 (Wyo. 2003).  Unjust enrichment is an equitable claim 
that is appropriate only when the party to be charged has received a benefit 
that in good conscience the party ought not retain without compensation to the 
party providing the benefit.   
Boyce v. Freeman, 2002 WY 20, ¶15, 39 P.3d 1062, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2002).  The majority cites with 
approval the following language from Boyce:   

 

The 
phrase "unjust enrichment" is used in law to characterize the result or effect 
of a failure to make restitution of, or for, property or benefits received under 
such circumstances as to give rise to a legal or equitable obligation to account 
therefor.  It is a general 
principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies, that one person 
should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of 
another, but should be required to make restitution of or for 
property or benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where it 
is just and equitable that such restitution be made, and where such action 
involves no violation or frustration of law or opposition to public policy, 
either directly or indirectly.  

 

Id. (emphasis added).  Although the majority cites these 
principles, in my view it fails to apply them when it reverses the district 
court's order.

 

[¶21]   Ms. Jacoby presented evidence that 
the home she helped construct on her in-laws' property was intended originally 
for her, her then husband and their children.5 [Vol. II 71] She testified that she 
and her husband had been looking for a home to buy near his parents' home when 
Mr. Jacoby suggested the site on the lot next to their home. [Vol. II 69-71] 
When Ms. Jacoby and her husband attempted to obtain a loan to start construction 
of the home, they discovered they could not because the Jacobys owned the land 
on which the home was to be built. [Vol. II 72] Ms. Jacoby testified it was her 
understanding that the Jacobys looked into partitioning the land so that she and 
her husband could obtain a loan, but upon learning it could not be partitioned, 
refinanced their home, obtained a loan of $31,000 and loaned $26,000 of that 
amount to Ms. Jacoby and their son to start construction of the home. [Vol. II 
73] 

 

[¶22]   Ms. Jacoby testified that she and 
her husband had joint income of approximately $8,000 per month and put much of 
that toward building the home. [Vol. II 77] From their joint income, Ms. Jacoby 
and her husband also paid half ($400 per month) of the Jacobys' payment on the 
$31,000 loan until her husband left in May of 2001.  [Vol. II 78, 127] Before his departure, 
she testified they also put money toward the concrete work and framing of the 
home [Vol. II 80] and performed much of the work on the home, including breaking 
ground, digging out and pouring the footers, pouring the foundation and erecting 
the walls. [Vol. II 81] Ms. Jacoby testified that members of her family and 
friends also contributed time and effort to help build the home. [Vol. II 
83]   Additionally, Ms. Jacoby 
testified that she and her husband bartered services in order to get the home 
built. 

 

[¶23]   Ms. Jacoby testified the Jacobys 
did not help with construction of the home. [Vol. II 84] She also testified that 
her in-laws did not expend money beyond the $26,000 loan or purchase 
construction materials. [Vol. II 125] After her husband disappeared in May 2001, 
Ms. Jacoby continued to work on the home. [Vol. II 131] She testified she had a 
conversation with her father-in-law during this time in which he intimated the 
house was her home and she would be able to continue to live there despite her 
husband's disappearance. [Vol. II 132] Then, in October of 2001, it became clear 
to her during a conversation with the Jacobys that they did not intend for her 
and her children to live in the home. [Vol. II 134]

 

[¶24]   Ms. Jacoby's testimony that the 
home was intended for her family was confirmed by her former husband, the 
Jacobys' son, who also testified that he planned to live in the home with his 
wife and children upon its completion and intended to use his earnings to 
construct the home. [Vol. II 283] He testified that he and Ms. Jacoby paid for 
the supplies, services and labor required for construction of the home. [Vol. 
II, 316] Ms. Jacoby's father-in-law, Mr. Jacoby, also testified that he made an 
agreement with his son that he would loan him money to get started building the 
home. [Vol. II, 327] He testified that the initial plan was for Ms. Jacoby to 
move into the home, but that he and his wife changed their minds when their son 
left and told her in October 2001 that she could not live in the home. [Vol. II 
400, 402]    

 

[¶25]   Thus, the evidence presented, taken 
as true, showed:  (1) Ms. Jacoby and 
her then husband rendered substantial supplies, services and labor; (2) on the 
home constructed on the Jacobys' lot and now inhabited by the Jacobys; (3) by 
moving into the house the Jacobys accepted, used and enjoyed the supplies, 
services and labor rendered by Ms. Jacoby and their son; and (4) the 
circumstances were such that both the Jacobys and Ms. Jacoby knew that she 
expected to live in the home that she helped construct.  Evidence of the fourth element was 
presented in the form of witness testimony to the effect that from the inception 
the parties involved intended the home to be occupied by Ms. Jacoby and her 
family.  The majority acknowledges 
that the fourth element of an unjust enrichment claim does not necessarily 
require proof of an expectation of payment in money.  Ms. Jacoby "expected to be paid" for her 
efforts in building the home by being allowed to live in the home.   

 

[¶26]   In Robinson v. Robinson, 429 N.E.2d 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981), the court affirmed imposition of an equitable 
lien in a case brought by a woman against her former parents-in-law to establish 
her interest in property belonging to them to which she voluntarily and without 
their consent made substantial improvements.  Addressing first the issue of unjust 
enrichment, the court said:

 

The 
improvements were made with the knowledge, cooperation and approval of [the 
parents]. They were the major investment a young couple would ever be expected 
to make. The relationship of the parties and their dealings would lead one to 
believe that the home that was constructed would be a permanent home for [the 
son and daughter-in-law]. The court did not err in granting [the 
daughter-in-law] an interest in the property.

 

Id.  In considering the appropriateness of 
the equitable lien, the court said:

 

"The 
trend of modern decisions is to hold that in the absence of an express contract, 
a lien based upon the fundamental maxims of equity may be applied and declared 
by a court of equity out of general considerations of right and justice as 
applied to the relationship of the parties and the circumstances of their 
dealing. An equitable lien is the right to have property subjected in a court of 
equity to payment of a claim. It is neither a debt nor a right of property, but 
a remedy for a debt."

Id. 
at 446 (citation omitted).   

 

[¶27]   For similar reasons and under 
similar circumstances, the district court concluded that Ms. Jacoby proved the 
elements of unjust enrichment and imposed an equitable lien giving her a 
security interest in the home.  From 
the evidence presented, the district court could reasonably conclude as it 
did.  To allow the Jacobys to change 
their minds and occupy the home after Ms. Jacoby contributed substantial time, 
money, labor and supplies in constructing the home results in the Jacobys being 
unjustly enriched.  From the 
evidence presented, the district court's ruling was one based on sound judgment 
with regard to what was right under the circumstances, and no showing was made 
that any facet of the ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  The Jacobys should not be permitted 
unjustly to enrich themselves at the expense of Ms. Jacoby and her children, but 
should be required to make restitution for the benefit received 
from her substantial contributions to the home.  It is just and equitable that such 
restitution be made and requiring it involves no direct or indirect violation or 
frustration of law or opposition to public policy. Applying the appropriate 
standard of review, the district court's exercise of discretion should be 
affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1After 
her husband left, the appellee filed a divorce action, in which she was awarded 
the right to all proceeds awarded in her action against the appellants, 
including her former husband's share of any proceeds, as payment of child 
support.

 

2We 
are not hereby declaring that the expectation of "payment" necessary to support 
an allegation of unjust enrichment must necessarily be an expectation of payment 
in money.

 

3If 
the project had failed because the appellants had divorced, the 
opposite conclusionthat they had been unjustly enrichedmight readily be 
true.

 

4Equitable 
liens are imposed where unjust enrichment results from the receipt of particular 
property.  Rolfe v. Varley, 
860 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Wyo. 1993). An equitable lien is said to be a special and 
limited form of the constructive trust and closely related to subrogation 
because each is a remedy used to prevent unjust enrichment or fraud, and to 
allow restitution.  Id. 

 

5As 
the majority opinion indicates, the district court in the divorce action awarded 
to Ms. Jacoby as child support her ex-husband's share of all proceeds she 
recovered in this action. Therefore, the $64,600 equitable lien represents the 
value of their combined contribution to the home.