Case Title: People ex rel. Devine

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90470

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90470-Agenda 18-September 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. RICHARD
A. DEVINE, Appellant, v. $30,700.00 UNITED STATES
								 CURRENCY et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed March 21, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Pursuant to the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (the Act)
(725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)), the State initiated civil
forfeiture proceedings against currency totaling $30,700 and
$20,811. The State served notice of the forfeiture proceedings
upon claimants Rashawn and Ida Carter (Rashawn and Ida) by
certified mail, with return receipts requested (725 ILCS
150/4(A)(1) (West 2000)), to their last known addresses and made
additional service by publication (725 ILCS 150/4(A)(3) (West
2000)). The circuit court of Cook County entered a default order
forfeiting the claimants' interest in the currency. The appellate
court reversed the order of the circuit court. 316 Ill. App. 3d 464,
469. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d
R. 315) and now reverse the judgment of the appellate court. In
this appeal, we examine whether claimants received proper notice
of civil forfeiture proceedings under the Act and whether such
notice satisfied procedural due process.
BACKGROUND
	On May 23, 1998, the Chicago police received a tip that a
man wearing a white jersey had entered the Drexel National Bank,
in Chicago, holding a gun. Responding to the tip, police entered
the bank and observed a man wearing a white jacket holding a
white cylindrical object under his arm. The police officers
approached the man, whom they later identified as Rashawn, and
performed a protective pat-down. This pat-down revealed a sock
filled with United States currency and additional bundles of
currency. The combined amount of currency recovered from
Rashawn totaled $30,700.
	Following the pat-down, the officers questioned Rashawn and
learned that he did not have an existing account at the bank, but
that he planned to rent a safety deposit box. Rashawn provided
conflicting answers when asked where he obtained the money and
was unable to provide an accurate figure of the amount of money
he was carrying. The officers subsequently took Rashawn to the
police station for further questioning. At the police station,
Rashawn admitted that he was a member of the Gangster Disciples
street gang, that he was unemployed and did not own the money,
and that he "messed up" trying to deposit the money. Rashawn
also informed officers that he had been previously arrested for
cannabis possession and that he was out on bond pending a
hearing in that case. A background check confirmed a prior arrest
and revealed an extensive criminal history, including six adult
arrests by the Chicago police, a 1992 narcotics possession
conviction, the use of multiple aliases, an arrest in Sangamon
County, Illinois, for possession of a controlled substance, and the
use of separate invalid driver's licenses with addresses in both
Chicago and Springfield, Illinois.
	The officers performed a "money lineup" with the currency.
The money was "hidden" and subsequently "discovered" by a
narcotic-sniffing police dog. The police dog positively identified
the money as having a residue odor of narcotics.
	Officers also discovered in Rashawn's possession three
separate safety deposit box keys. Although Rashawn initially
denied any knowledge about the keys, he ultimately informed the
officers that the keys belonged to "two separate banks in Peoria,
Illinois." The officers, however, ascertained that one of the keys
belonged to a safety deposit box held at the Drexel National Bank
in Chicago. The State asserts that the box was registered to Ida,
Rashawn's grandmother, and that the key to the box granted
Rashawn access to its contents. On May 26, 1998, the officers
obtained and executed a search warrant and recovered $20,811
from the safety deposit box. The officers then performed a
separate "money lineup" with a second narcotic-sniffing police
dog on the currency totaling $20,811. This second dog also gave
a positive indication for the odor of narcotics on the currency.
	Five days after the Chicago police executed the warrant, Ida
telephoned the police to inquire about the contents of the safety
deposit box. When the officer questioned Ida about the safety
deposit box, Ida was unable to identify its contents. Ida did not
indicate to the police that she possessed any interest in the contents
of the safety deposit box. Notwithstanding, officers scheduled two
separate appointments with Ida so that she could establish a claim
to its contents. Ida failed to keep either appointment with the
police.
	On August 4, 1998, the State filed a consolidated in rem
complaint for forfeiture of the $30,700 and $20,811 pursuant to
section 505 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS
570/505 (West 2000)). The complaint named Rashawn as a party
with interest in the currency. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that
the Gangster Disciples street gang is an active criminal
organization that participates in the illegal distribution of
prohibited substances through its members, who will often use
safety deposit boxes to conceal and store proceeds from ongoing
drug operations. The complaint further alleged that in obtaining
safety deposit boxes these drug dealers often use false names or
the identities of relatives and third parties to conceal the true
identity of the owner and to hide the location of the proceeds.
Finally, the complaint alleged that the gang often uses individuals
as couriers to transport currency to safe storage locations.
	On the same day, the State mailed notice of the forfeiture
proceedings and a copy of the in rem complaint via certified mail,
with a return receipt requested, to Rashawn at his last known
address on Chicago's south side. The notice was accompanied by
an affidavit of an assistant State's Attorney who verified the
method of service, identified the party having an interest in the
money, and asserted that no claim to the money had been filed.
The State concedes that it did not receive a return receipt from the
August 4 mailing. The State also made additional service by
publication of the forfeiture proceedings on August 7, August 14,
and August 21 in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin. Rashawn did
not respond to the notice of forfeiture or appear before the court at
the forfeiture proceeding.
	Following the mailing to Rashawn and notice by publication,
the State made additional efforts to serve notice of the proceedings
to additional potential parties of interest. The record shows that on
September 2, 1998, the State sent notice of forfeiture by certified
mail to Ida at her address, on Chicago's south side, also
Rashawn's last known address. As with the previous mailing, the
State concedes, it did not receive a return receipt from the
September 2 mailing. Ida did not appear before the court at the
forfeiture proceeding.
	On October 13, 1998, the circuit court entered a default order
forfeiting Rashawn's interest and that of all other parties claiming
right, title, or interest in the currency. On January 13, 1999,
Rashawn and Ida filed a joint motion to vacate the forfeiture,
alleging that they never received notice of the forfeiture
proceeding. Rashawn provided an affidavit stating that he was
incarcerated for unrelated charges in the Vandalia Correction
Center beginning July 7, 1998, until his release November 10,
1998. In her affidavit, Ida claimed that she was the owner of the
safety deposit box at the Drexel National Bank and never received
notice of forfeiture at her residence. The circuit court denied the
motion to vacate the forfeiture order.
	The appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court,
holding that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over
Rashawn and Ida because they were not properly served in accord
with the Act. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 474-75. According to the
appellate court, complete service under the Act is accomplished
when the State receives a return receipt signed by the addressee.
316 Ill. App. 3d at 469. Moreover, the appellate court held that the
State failed to give Rashawn notice required by due process. 316
Ill. App. 3d at 471. This appeal by the State followed.
ANALYSIS
I. Effective Notice Under the Act
	As an initial matter, we review whether service is perfected
under the Act upon mailing of the notice or, conversely, upon
receipt of the certified mail return receipt signed by the addressee.
The parties agree that absent proper notice of the forfeiture
proceedings, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction and the power to
order forfeiture of the currency. The parties also agree that the
State never received certified mail return receipts of the notice
mailings sent to both claimants. However, the State argues that
failure to receive these return receipts does not render the notice
defective. Rather, the State argues that service is effective under
the Act upon the mere mailing of notice by certified mail, as long
as the notifying party had no reason to suspect that the notice
would not reach the intended recipient. This matter involves an
issue of statutory interpretation, and our review is de novo.
Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503 (2000).
	The Act is a remedial civil sanction enacted for the express
purpose of deterring the rising incidence of the abuse and
trafficking of substances prohibited by the Illinois Controlled
Substance Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2000)) and the
Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 2000)). See
725 ILCS 150/2 (West 2000). Forfeiture under the Act
"encourages owners 'to take care in managing their property and
ensures that they will not permit that property to be used for illegal
purposes.' " In re P.S., 175 Ill. 2d 79, 87 (1997), citing United
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549, 116 S. Ct. 2135
(1996). Thus, the Act is designed to serve a remedial purpose and,
therefore, is liberally construed to achieve that purpose. 725 ILCS
150/13 (West 2000). Moreover, it is the intent of the legislature
that the Act be interpreted in light of "the federal forfeiture
provisions contained in 21 U.S.C. 881 as interpreted by the federal
courts, except to the extent" the provisions expressly conflict. 725
ILCS 150/2 (West 2000).
	The Act contains uniform procedures to accomplish the
forfeiture of drug-related assets. 725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West
2000)). Non-real property is seized by two different methods
depending on the value of the property. Non-real property valuing
less than $20,000 is forfeited in a nonjudicial forfeiture action. 725
ILCS 150/6 (West 2000). Where the value of non-real property
exceeds $20,000, the State shall "institute judicial in rem forfeiture
proceedings" in accordance with section 9 of the Act. 725 ILCS
150/6 (West 2000).
	The Act outlines the method of notice required to apprise
individuals of pending forfeiture proceedings. 725 ILCS 150/4
(West 2000). The method of service depends upon the State's
knowledge of the identity and location of the claimant at the time
of service. Section 4 of the Act, entitled "Notice to Owner or
Interest Holder," provides that, "[i]f the owner's or interest
holder's name and current address are known, then [notice or
service shall be given] by either personal service or mailing a copy
of the notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to that
address." 725 ILCS 150/4(A)(1) (West 2000). The Act requires
notice by publication in the event the address or name of the
owner or interest holder is unknown. 725 ILCS 150/4(A)(3) (West
2000). Owners or interest holders are obligated to advise the
seizing agency of address changes that occur prior to the mailing
of notice. 725 ILCS 150/4(A)(1) (West 2000) ("if an owner or
interest holder's address changes prior to the effective date of the
notice of pending forfeiture, the owner or interest holder shall
promptly notify *** of the change in address"). Individuals
claiming an interest in the property subject to forfeiture may file
a claim to the property within "45 days after the effective date of
notice." 725 ILCS 150/6(C)(1) (West 2000). Further, the Act
provides when notice is effective: "Notice served under this Act
is effective upon personal service, the last date of publication, or
the mailing of written notice, whichever is earlier." 725 ILCS
150/4(B) (West 2000). If parties fail to appear at the forfeiture
proceedings, "property may be subject to forfeiture even if no one
appears to claim it." In re P.S., 175 Ill. 2d  at 88.
	In order to determine when mailed notice is perfected under
the Act, we are bound by longstanding principles of statutory
construction. We must give effect to legislative intent, which
begins with the plain language of the statute. People v. Woodard,
175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997); Garza v. Navistar International
Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1996); People ex rel.
Baker v. Cowlin, 154 Ill. 2d 193, 197 (1992). Where clear and
unambiguous, statutory language must be enforced as enacted, and
a court may not depart from its plain language by reading into it
exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the
legislature. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d  at 443. Moreover, where
language is express and plain, a court must not search for subtle
intentions of the legislature. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d  at 443.
	In light of the express language contained in section 4 of the
Act, we hold that service of notice by mailing is perfected when
the notice is deposited in the mail, provided the State complies
with the mailing procedures set forth in the Act. Section 4(B)
expressly states, "[n]otice served under this Act is effective upon
*** the mailing of written notice ***." 725 ILCS 150/4(B) (West
2000). The meaning of this provision is clear and unambiguous.
The Act does not condition the effectiveness of notice upon receipt
of the return receipt signed by the addressee, and this court will
not rewrite the Act to create this requirement.
	Claimants argue that the inclusion of the "return receipt"
language implies that the legislature intended that notice would
not be perfected unless and until the State receives the return
receipt. This argument fails to consider the structure of section 4,
which, when plainly read, supports another conclusion. Section
4(A) directs the State to issue notice of forfeiture proceedings by
specific methods-personal service, publication, or postal delivery.
Essentially, section 4(A) directs how notice shall be given, or by
what means notice must be served. Where postal delivery is
required, section 4(A) requires service by certified mail with a
return receipt requested. In contrast, section 4(B) fixes when
service is complete. Service is effective "upon personal service,
the last date of publication, or the mailing of written notice,
whichever is earlier." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 150/4(B)
(West 2000). The return receipt requirement is omitted from the
"when" provision of section 4(B).
	Clearly, our legislature is able to expressly condition service
upon receipt of the signed return receipt. Other enactments
expressly demand a return receipt to complete service. See, e.g.,
225 ILCS 115/18 (West 2000) (Veterinary Medicine and Surgery
Practice Act of 1994) (notice is given to the owner "by certified
mail, return receipt requested, and shall allow a period of 7 days
to elapse after the receipt is returned before disposing of such
animal"); 705 ILCS 405/2-30(1)(a) through (1)(c) (West 2000)
(Juvenile Court Act of 1987) ("[t]he return receipt, when returned
to the clerk, shall be attached to the original notice, and shall
constitute proof of service"); 750 ILCS 25/10(a)(1) (West 1998)
(Expedited Child Support Act of 1990) ("[i]f service is made by
certified mail, the return receipt shall constitute proof of service");
765 ILCS 1033/15(b) (West 1998) (Museum Disposition of
Property Act) ("[n]otice is deemed given if the museum receives,
within 60 days of mailing the notice, a return receipt"). Therefore,
based upon our principles of statutory construction and the clear
difference in wording between sections 4(A) and 4(B), we must
construe the omission of the return receipt requirement from
section 4(B) as intentional. See People v. Parvin, 125 Ill. 2d 519,
525 (1988) (the inclusion of specific language in one provision
and the omission in another provision evinces legislative intent to
refrain from imposing the requirement); see also People v. Keene,
296 Ill. App. 3d 183, 189-90 (1998).
	Citing Avdich v. Kleinert, 69 Ill. 2d 1 (1977), the appellate
court reasoned that the mere inclusion of a return receipt
requirement in any portion of section 4 implies that the return of
the receipt is required for notice to be effective. 316 Ill. App. 3d
at 469. Specifically, the appellate court stated, "[t]hat the party
giving notice must receive a return receipt signed by the addressee
in order to accomplish service is a well-established requirement in
Illinois law." 316 Ill. App. 3d at 469. Avdich is not authority for
the proposition that all enactments which contain the "return
receipt" requirement demand return of the receipt to perfect
service. In fact, Avdich, like the enactments previously referred to,
illustrates our legislature's ability to expressly condition service
upon receipt of the signed receipt. In Avdich, we considered the
notice requirement under the forcible entry and detainer statute.
See 735 ILCS 5/9-211 (West 2000). As in the instant matter, the
parties in Avdich disputed whether the mere mailing of notice by
certified mail constituted service or whether the statute required
receipt of the return receipt in order to complete service. The
forcible entry and detainer statute states that "[a]ny demand may
be made or notice served *** by sending a copy of said notice to
the tenant by certified or registered mail, with a returned receipt
from the addressee." 735 ILCS 5/9-211 (West 2000). Based upon
this language, we held that the "statute clearly indicates a
legislative intent that service of a notice by certified mail is not to
be considered complete until it is received by the addressee."
Avdich, 69 Ill. 2d  at 9. However, the forcible entry and detainer
statute conditions effectiveness of notice upon "a returned receipt
from the addressee." By contrast, the Act only requires "with a
return receipt requested." If we afford the language in each
provision its plain and ordinary meaning, one demands the return
of the receipt while the other merely demands a request.
	 Claimants argue that the only advantage of certified mail with
a return receipt requested is to provide proof of delivery. Proof of
delivery is not the only discernable advantage. Rather, the
inclusion of a return receipt request requirement in the statute
serves more than one purpose. According to the certified mailing
receipt contained in the record, each piece of certified mail is
assigned a tracking number, and a record of all deliveries is kept
by the postal service for a period of two years. This information
grants the sender actual proof of mailing. This proof of mailing is
objective evidence for the State during forfeiture proceedings. This
proof of mailing, therefore, facilitates overall enforcement of the
Act. This mailing method also serves a claimant's interest. Parties
who receive certified mail with a return receipt requested are
alerted to the importance of its contents and are less likely to
discard the mail upon receipt without reading its contents.
	Finally, we must also consider that the Act is remedial in
nature; therefore, the Act warrants liberal construction to achieve
the overall purpose of the statute. 725 ILCS 150/2, 13 (West
2000). The appellate court's holding, that the State must receive
a return receipt signed by the addressee, fails to recognize the
circumstances which often accompany forfeiture. It is frequently
the case that currency is seized from individuals who provide false
address information to the officers upon seizure. In this case, we
observe that at the time of seizure, Rashawn held licenses with two
alias addresses in the State of Illinois. Moreover, as noted by the
State during oral arguments and in its complaint, it is also
common that individuals in possession of the currency at the time
of seizure are merely couriers used to transport the currency. These
individuals have no interest in receiving the certified mail and,
therefore, refuse to sign for the mail upon its arrival. Conditioning
the completion of notice upon receipt of the return receipt is a
condition not expressed by the legislature, and given the realities
of what often occurs in these cases, an obstacle to the enforcement
of the Act. The statute provides for mailing of notice to the last
known address of the owner or interest holder. It does not
condition this mailing upon the State's investigation into the
accuracy of this information. In fact, it expresses the contrary: the
owner or interest holder is obligated to notify the seizing agency
of his or her change in address occurring prior to the mailing of
notice. 735 ILCS 150/4(A)(1) (West 2000). The appellate court's
holding renders this obligation superfluous. See Yang v. City of
Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 106 (2001) "[w]e construe a statute so that
no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless, when the statute
is examined as a whole").
	The record shows that on August 4, 1998, pursuant to section
4(A)(1) of the Act the State mailed notice to Rashawn via certified
mail with a return receipt requested. The State mailed this notice
pursuant to information supplied by Rashawn on the date of
seizure, May 23, 1998. The record does not show that Rashawn
notified the State of a change in his address. Pursuant to our
holding, we find that service of this notice was complete upon its
mailing, August 4, 1998. The record also shows that pursuant to
section 4(A)(1), on September 4, 1998, the State mailed notice to
Ida at the address believed to be her residence. Consistent with our
holding, service was complete upon its mailing, September 4,
1998.
II. Due Process
	We now turn to whether notice in this instance satisfied
procedural due process. According to the appellate court, notice
mailed to Rashawn's home address was "not reasonably calculated
to apprise Rashawn of the pending forfeiture proceeding." 316 Ill.
App. 3d at 471. The appellate court concluded that because
Rashawn's address at the Vandalia Correctional Center was
"readily ascertainable," failure to send notice of forfeiture to this
address denied Rashawn due process of law. 316 Ill. App. 3d at
471. We disagree. The State provided constitutionally adequate
notice.
	Whether claimants were afforded due process in the instant
matter is an issue of law, and any review is de novo. People v.
Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d 156, 162 (2001); see also People v. Anaya,
279 Ill. App. 3d 940, 944-45 (1996).
	"Due process entails an orderly proceeding wherein a person
is served with notice, actual or constructive, and has an
opportunity to be heard and to enforce and protect his rights."
Stratton v. Wenona Community Unit District No. 1, 133 Ill. 2d 413, 432 (1990). The "fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections." Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d  at
432; see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. ___, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694 (2002); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444,
449-50, 72 L. Ed. 2d 249, 254-55, 102 S. Ct. 1874, 1877-78
(1982); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 94 L. Ed. 865, 873, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657 (1950). Due
process is satisfied if the "manner of effecting service of summons
gives reasonable assurance that notice will actually be given."
People ex rel. Loeser v. Loeser, 51 Ill. 2d 567, 572 (1972); see
also Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 432-33; Mullane, 339 U.S.  at 315, 94 L. Ed.  at 874, 70 S. Ct.  at 657 (the method of service must be one
the party receiving service "might reasonably adopt to
accomplish" service). Put another way, notice cannot be a "mere
gesture," but rather must be a reasonable attempt to inform those
affected by the proceeding. Mullane, 339 U.S.  at 315, 94 L. Ed.  at
874, 70 S. Ct.  at 657; see Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d  at 432-33. It is
important to note, however, that in examining the sufficiency of
notice with regard to due process a court may consider the
character of the proceedings and the practicalities and peculiarities
of the case. See Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d  at 433; see also Mullane, 339 U.S.  at 317, 94 L. Ed.  at 875, 70 S. Ct.  at 659.
	Further, as recently stated by the United States Supreme
Court, due process does not require that "the State must provide
actual notice, but that it must attempt to provide actual notice."
(Emphases in original.) Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at ___, 151 L. Ed. 2d 
at 606, 122 S. Ct.  at 701. In Dusenbery, the United States Supreme
Court considered the constitutional sufficiency of forfeiture when
notice was sent by certified mail to a petitioner where he was
incarcerated but, according to the petitioner, he never actually
received the notice from the prison mailroom. The petitioner
argued that the government had the burden of securing actual
delivery of the notice because the government had the ability to
ensure the petitioner's receipt. For example, the defendant argued
that due process required that a prison official watch the inmate
open the notice and cosign a receipt. The Court disagreed.
			"Petitioner argues that because he was housed in a
federal prison at the time of the forfeiture, the FBI could
have made arrangements with the BOP [Bureau of
Prisons] to assure the delivery of the notice in question to
him. [Citation.] But it is hard to see why such a principle
would not also apply, for example, to members of the
Armed Forces both in this country and overseas.
Undoubtedly the Government could make a special effort
in any case (just as it did in the movie 'Saving Private
Ryan') to assure that a particular piece of mail reaches a
particular individual who is in one way or another in the
custody of the Government. *** But the Due Process
Clause does not require such heroic efforts by the
Government; it requires only that the Government's effort
be 'reasonably calculated' to apprise a party of the
pendency of the action ***." Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at ___,
151 L. Ed. 2d  at 606-07, 122 S. Ct.  at 701.
	Despite the dissent's contention, the Court did not hold that
"[i]n the event the property owner is incarcerated, the government
must send the notice to the owner at his place of incarceration."
Slip op. at 21 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and
Kilbride, JJ.). This issue was not considered by the Court. Instead,
the Court considered the constitutional sufficiency of the mail
delivery and distribution system once mail arrived to the prison.
Dusenbery, 534 U.S. ___, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694.
	Turning to the instant matter, the appellate court determined
that the sending of notice to a claimant at his home address while
the claimant is incarcerated fails to reasonably apprise the claimant
of the pending forfeiture proceedings. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 469. The
appellate court based its decision upon both Illinois appellate and
federal decisions. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 34 L. Ed. 2d 47, 93 S. Ct. 30 (1972); Ramirez v. United States, 767 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Winters v. Working, 510 F. Supp. 14
(W.D. Tex. 1980); Jaekel v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 993
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d 791 (8th Cir.
1993); People v. Smith, 275 Ill. App. 3d 844 (1995). These cases
do not convince this court that claimants were denied due process.
	For example, in Smith the defendant was arrested for the
possession of cocaine and cannabis. Smith, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 846.
At the time of his arrest, officers seized the sum of $106 from the
defendant. Notice of pending forfeiture was sent to the defendant's
home address. Defendant failed to reply or appear, and the court
ordered forfeiture of the currency. The appellate court held that the
State failed to give notice required by due process because notice
of the forfeiture proceedings was mailed to defendant's residential
address despite the State's knowledge that the defendant was
confined to jail for charges brought at the time of seizure. Smith,
275 Ill. App. 3d at 850-51. Similarly, in Robinson the defendant
was arrested and charged with armed robbery. Robinson, 409 U.S. 
at 38, 34 L. Ed. 2d  at 48, 93 S. Ct.  at 30. The defendant was held
in custody awaiting trial when the State initiated forfeiture
proceedings against the automobile used by the defendant at the
time of his arrest. The State issued notice of forfeiture proceedings
to the address listed with the Secretary of State. In an ex parte
hearing, the trial court ordered forfeiture of the automobile. On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court reversed
forfeiture because the State knew that the defendant "could not get
to [the address to which notice was mailed] since he was at that
very time confined" in the jail. Robinson, 409 U.S.  at 40, 34 L. Ed. 2d  at 49, 93 S. Ct.  at 31.
	In the above-mentioned cases, and other cases relied upon by
the appellate court and claimants, we find one critical factor
present which is absent in the instant matter: the notifying party
knew the claimant's name and address and failed to serve notice
to that address. See, e.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 210, 9 L. Ed. 2d 255, 258, 83 S. Ct. 279, 281 (1962) (the
appellant's name and address were known from both deed records
and tax rolls); Woodall, 12 F.3d  at 794-95 (notice mailed to the
defendant at home and jail was insufficient because the
government knew the defendant was released on bond to a
different temporary residence); Williams v. United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, 51 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 1995)
(notice mailed to the claimant's residential address was
insufficient because although he was incarcerated on unrelated
charges, the seizing agency was "well aware of his incarceration"
and had weekly conversations with him at the jail at the time it
mailed notice to his residence); Jaekel, 304 F. Supp.  at 999 (the
seizing agency had plaintiff's name and address; therefore, notice
by publication was insufficient); Montgomery v. Scott, 802 F. Supp. 930, 936 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (at the time of his arrest for the
possession and sale of a controlled substance, officers seized
$32,000 in currency, holding that " 'where the state knows that an
interested party does not reside at the mailing address *** due
process may require more than sending a letter to the address on
file' " (emphasis in original)), quoting Weigner v. City of New
York, 852 F.2d 646, 650 n.4 (2d Cir. 1988). Often in forfeiture
cases, the party claiming interest in the subject property was
incarcerated or confined to jail for conduct related to the seizure
of property. As a result, the arrest and seizure were interrelated,
such that the seizing agency knew the claimant's actual location.
Therefore, in instances where the seizing agency has knowledge
the individual is incarcerated, notice mailed to the individual's
listed last known address is a mere gesture and not reasonably
calculated to apprise the individual of the pending proceedings.
	A federal court case is helpful in the instant matter. In Sarit v.
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 987 F.2d 10 (1st Cir.
1993), the court of appeals addressed whether notice mailed to the
claimant's last known address, which was returned "unclaimed,"
and was supplemented by publication satisfied due process. In
Sarit, the claimants argued that the DEA knew that they were
represented by counsel and planned to contest forfeiture.
Therefore, they argued that when the notice was returned
"unclaimed," the DEA's failure to contact counsel and acquire
their current address denied them due process. The court of
appeals disagreed:
			"We note at the onset that while Mullane clearly
contemplates inquiry into the 'peculiarities' and the
'practicalities' of a given case, it has not generally been
interpreted to require a party to make additional attempts
beyond notice that is legally satisfactory at the time it is
sent. [Citation.] The Court has read an implicit bad faith
standard into the notice inquiry, overturning notice even
where formal procedures were followed if the notifying
party knew or had reason to know that notice would be
ineffective. [Citations.] ***
			Virtually all of the cases relied upon by plaintiffs share
the feature-missing from this case-that the government
knew at the time the notice was sent that the notice was
likely to be ineffective. [Citations.]
			*** Only exceptional circumstances would compel us
to so extend the DEA's duty, absent indication that it
knew or should have known that the notice would be
ineffective." (Emphasis added.) Sarit, 987 F.2d  at 14-15.
	Likewise, we have considered the "peculiarities" and
circumstances of the instant matter. Here, there is no evidence in
the record that the seizing agency knew or should have known
Rashawn was incarcerated in the Vandalia Correctional Center.
Rather, Rashawn's subsequent arrest and incarceration were
unrelated to the seizure of the currency at issue here. In fact,
Rashawn was incarcerated in a separate county for a separate
crime approximately six weeks after officers seized the currency.
The record shows that on May 23, 1998, at the time of seizure,
Rashawn gave his address to the officers and freely left the station.
This was Rashawn's final contact with the seizing agency; he did
not notify the seizing agency of his change of address. 725 ILCS
150/4(A)(1) (West 2000). We note that Rashawn does not allege
that the State had actual notice of his whereabouts at the time
notice was mailed. Importantly, the parties do not dispute that the
information Rashawn provided on May 23, 1998, was, according
to the seizing agency, his last known address. Moreover, based
upon the record in this case-which is sparse on the issue of Ida's
involvement-there is nothing to suggest the State had
contradictory information regarding Ida's address. Rather, the
record shows that after her June 5, 1998, telephone conversation
with an officer following the seizure of the currency, she never
contacted the police again or appeared personally to establish a
claim. (In oral argument counsel for claimants referenced two
phone conversations between Ida and the police; however, the
record belies this assertion.) Notwithstanding this discrepancy,
importantly, Ida does not argue that the State mailed the notice to
an incorrect address. Rather, Ida simply claims that she never
received the mailing. The claimants argue that the State must
investigate and verify each address prior to service of notice.
However, such "heroic efforts" are not required. Dusenbery, 534
U.S. ___, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694. Moreover, the
circumstances of this case do not demand that we extend the
State's duty in this manner.
	Regardless, we observe that the State did make additional
attempts to afford notice in the instant case. This is evident by the
State's attempt to supplement the notice mailing with notice by
publication. Pursuant to the Act, the State published notice of the
forfeiture proceedings on three separate occasions. According to
the Act, publication is only acceptable where the claimant's
address is unknown. 725 ILCS 150/4(A)(3) (West 2000).
However, the peculiar circumstances and facts known by the State,
namely, Rashawn's history of alias addresses throughout the state,
led it to take further action. Although we do not find that this
additional effort was required, either by the statute or by due
process, this effort to supplement the notice mailing made the risk
of nonreceipt more acceptable. See Weigner v. City of New York,
852 F.2d 646, 651 (2d Cir. 1988) ("The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that notice by first-class mail is sufficient,
notwithstanding the Court's obvious awareness that not every
first-class letter is received by the addressee *** [p]articularly
where mailing is supplemented by other forms of notice such as
posting or publication, the risk of non-receipt is constitutionally
acceptable").
CONCLUSION
	Accordingly, we hold that under the Drug Asset Forfeiture
Procedure Act, where notice of forfeiture is mailed by certified
mail with a return receipt requested, service is complete upon the
mere mailing of the written notice. Additionally, we conclude that
notice in this case was reasonably calculated to apprise all
interested parties of the pending proceedings and, therefore,
satisfied due process of law.
	The judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	The majority holds that claimant, Rashawn Carter, received
appropriate notice of the forfeiture proceedings at issue. I disagree.
Due process requires the government to provide notice that is
reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the forfeiture
proceedings and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard. In
the present case, the notice the State gave Rashawn fell far short
of the requirements of due process.
BACKGROUND
	On May 23, 1998, police officers responded to a tip that a
man with a gun had entered the Drexel National Bank. Upon their
arrival at the bank, the officers observed Rashawn holding a white
cylinder-shaped object under his arm. The officers performed a
protective pat-down of Rashawn and found several bundles of
currency. The white cylinder-shaped object was actually a sock
filled with additional currency. In all, the officers recovered
$30,700 from Rashawn.
	The officers questioned Rashawn and learned that he did not
have an existing account at the bank, but that he planned to rent a
safety deposit box. Rashawn gave conflicting answers when asked
where he had obtained the money and was unable to tell the
officers how much money he was carrying. The officers took
Rashawn to the police station for further questioning. At the
station, Rashawn admitted that he was a member of a gang, that he
was unemployed and that he did not own the money. Rashawn also
told the officers that he had been arrested for possession of
cannabis and was out on bond pending a hearing. A background
check confirmed this arrest and also revealed that Rashawn had
been arrested several times in Sangamon County, the last arrest on
September 30, 1997.
	The officers performed a "money lineup," at which a police
dog positively identified the currency as having a residue odor of
narcotics. A further search of Rashawn revealed three separate
safety deposit box keys. One of the keys was for a safety deposit
box at the Drexel National Bank registered to Ida Carter,
Rashawn's grandmother. The officers obtained a search warrant
for the safety deposit box. During a subsequent search of the box,
the police recovered $20,811. A police dog positively identified
the currency as having a residue odor of narcotics. The State did
not prosecute Rashawn for any narcotics violation in connection
with the currency.
	On August 4, 1998, the State filed a complaint for forfeiture
of the $30,700 and $20,811. The complaint named Rashawn as a
party with interest in the currency. On the same day, the State
mailed notice of the forfeiture proceedings and a copy of the
complaint via certified mail, with a return receipt requested, to
Rashawn at 4844 S. State Street, Chicago, Illinois. The State did
not receive a return receipt from the mailing. The State then
published notice of the forfeiture proceedings on August 7, August
14 and August 21 in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin. And on
September 2, 1998, the State sent a notice of forfeiture by certified
mail to Ida at 4844 S. State Street. The State did not receive a
return receipt from the September 2 mailing. Neither Rashawn nor
Ida appeared at the forfeiture proceedings.
	On October 13, 1998, the circuit court entered a default order
forfeiting Rashawn's interest and that of all other parties claiming
right, title, or interest in the currency. On January 13, 1999,
Rashawn and Ida filed a joint motion to vacate the forfeiture,
alleging that they did not receive notice of the forfeiture
proceedings. In support of the motion, Rashawn averred that he
was incarcerated for unrelated charges in the Vandalia Correction
Center beginning July 7, 1998, until his release November 10,
1998. Ida also filed an affidavit in which she averred that she was
the owner of the safety deposit box and she did not receive the
notice of the forfeiture proceedings mailed to her home. The
circuit court denied the motion to vacate the forfeiture order.
	The appellate court reversed, finding that the circuit court
lacked personal jurisdiction over Rashawn and Ida because they
were not properly served. 316 Ill. App. 3d 464, 471. The court
noted further that numerous federal courts have questioned the
probative value of positive dog alerts due to reports that reveal the
high level of contamination of the nation's money supply with
narcotics residue. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 472. The court adopted the
view of these federal courts that the mere fact of prior
contamination fails to establish that the currency was actually
exchanged for or intended to be exchanged for drugs by the person
currently in possession of the currency. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 473.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the "sniff test" was not
enough to establish probable cause that the currency seized from
Rashawn was connected to narcotics. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 473.
ANALYSIS
	The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution of the United States require, at a
minimum, that "deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 94 L. Ed. 865, 873, 70 S. Ct. 652, 656-57 (1950). See also Dusenbery v. United States,  534
U.S. ___, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694 (2002). In Mullane,
the Supreme Court explained the principles involved,
			"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality
is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections. [Citations.] The notice must be of
such nature as reasonably to convey the required
information, [citation], and it must afford a reasonable
time for those interested to make their appearance,
[citation]. But if with due regard for the practicalities and
peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably
met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied. 'The
criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury but
the just and reasonable character of the requirements,
having reference to the subject with which the statute
deals.' [Citations.]
			But when notice is a person's due, process which is a
mere gesture is not due process. The means employed
must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The
reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of
any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it
is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected,
[citation], or, where conditions do not reasonably permit
such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less
likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and
customary substitutes." Mullane, 339 U.S.  at 314-15, 94 L. Ed.  at 873-74, 70 S. Ct.  at 657-58.
	Notice by publication is not a favored mode of process. As the
Supreme Court explained in Mullane,
			"[i]t would be idle to pretend that publication alone as
prescribed here, is a reliable means of acquainting
interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the
courts. *** Chance alone brings to the attention of even
a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in
the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home
outside the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the
odds that the information will never reach him are large
indeed." Mullane, 339 U.S.  at 315, 94 L. Ed.  at 874, 70 S. Ct.  at 658.
Where the names and addresses of interested parties are not
known, notice by publication must be accepted out of necessity.
However,
		"[e]xceptions in the name of necessity do not sweep away
the rule that within the limits of practicability notice must
be such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested
parties. Where the names and post-office addresses of
those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons
disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to
apprise them of its pendency." Mullane, 339 U.S.  at 318,
94 L. Ed.  at 875, 70 S. Ct.  at 659.
	The incarceration of a party with an interest in property being
forfeited shapes the notice by due process. In Robinson v.
Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 34 L. Ed. 2d 47, 93 S. Ct. 30 (1972), the
appellant was arrested on a charge of armed robbery on June 16,
1970. The State instituted forfeiture proceedings against the
appellant's car, alleging that the appellant had used the car in the
armed robbery. The appellant was held in custody in the Cook
County jail from June 16, 1970, to October 7, 1970, awaiting trial.
Nevertheless, the State mailed notice of the forfeiture proceedings
to appellant's home address as listed in the records of the
Secretary of State, and not to the jail facility. In finding the notice
ineffective, the Supreme Court explained,
			"In the instant case, the State knew that appellant was
not at the address to which the notice was mailed and,
moreover, knew also that appellant could not get to that
address since he was at that very time confined in the
Cook County jail. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
said that the State made any effort to provide notice which
was 'reasonably calculated' to apprise appellant of the
pendency of the forfeiture proceedings." Hanrahan, 409 U.S.  at 40, 34 L. Ed. 2d  at 49, 93 S. Ct.  at 31-32.
	In Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at ___, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 605, 122 S. Ct.  at 700, quoting Mullane, 339 U.S.  at 314, 94 L. Ed.  at 873, 70 S. Ct.  at 657, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the government
must give a property owner notice that is " 'reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances' " to apprise the owner of the
pendency of the forfeiture. In the event the property owner is
incarcerated, the government must send the notice to the owner at
his place of incarceration. Although the government need not
show that the property owner received the notice, the method
chosen by the government in attempting notice, that is, the
procedures used by the government in mailing the notice and in
processing the mail at the correctional facility, must be defendable
" 'on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform
those affected.' " Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at ___, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at
606, 122 S. Ct.  at 701, quoting Mullane, 339 U.S.  at 315, 94 L. Ed.  at 874, 70 S. Ct.  at 657.
	Applying these principles to the facts at issue, the Supreme
Court found that the notice the government gave the property
owner satisfied the requirements of due process. The Supreme
Court explained,
		"The Government here carried its burden of showing the
following procedures had been used to give notice. The
FBI sent certified mail addressed to petitioner at the
correctional facility where he was incarcerated. At that
facility, prison mailroom staff traveled to the city post
office every day to obtain all the mail for the institution,
including inmate mail. *** The staff signed for all
certified mail before leaving the post office. Once the
mail was transported back to the facility, certified mail
was entered in a logbook maintained in the mailroom. ***
A member of the inmate's Unit Team then signed for the
certified mail to acknowledge its receipt before removing
it from the mailroom, and either a Unit Team member or
another staff member distributed the mail to the inmate
during the institution's 'mail call.' " Dusenbery, 534 U.S.
at ___, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 605-06, 122 S. Ct.  at 700.
The method chosen by the government in attempting notice was
reasonable in light of the procedures followed by the FBI and the
correctional institution.
	Dusenbery, 534 U.S.   , 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694
(2002), is based squarely upon Mullane, 339 U.S.  at 306, 94 L. Ed. 
at 865, 70 S. Ct.  at 652, and Hanharan, 409 U.S. 38, 93 S. Ct. 30,
34 L. Ed. 2d 47.  It holds that the government must mail notice to
the property owner at the place of incarceration.  However, the
government need not show that the property owner received the
notice, in order to comply with due process.
	The majority rejoins,
			"Despite the dissent's contention, the Court did not
hold that '[i]n the event the property owner is
incarcerated, the government must send the notice to the
owner at his place of incarceration.'  Slip op. at 21
(Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and
Kilbride, JJ.).  This issue was not considered by the Court. 
Instead, the Court considered the constitutional
sufficiency of the mail delivery and distribution system
once mail arrived to the prison.  Dusenbery, 534 U.S.   ,
151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694."  Slip op. at 12.
	The majority's construction of Dusenbery is simplistic, if not
surprising.  If due process did not require that mail be sent to the
property owner at the place of incarceration, the Court would not
have considered the "constitutional sufficiency of the mail delivery
and distribution system once mail arrived to the prison."  Rather,
the Court would have considered either the notice sent to the
property owner at the house trailer where he was arrested or the
notice sent to the property owner  in Randolph, Ohio, the town
where his mother lived, sufficient to comply with due process.  Of
course, such a holding would be contrary to Hanharan, where, as
noted above, the Court held that notice mailed to the property
owner's home address as listed in the records of the Secretary of
State, but not to the jail facility, was ineffective.
	Perhaps the majority is intimating that Hanharan is not good
law, or that Dusenbery has limited Hanharan in some fashion. 
Given the fact that Dusenbery did not criticize or, in any way,
diminute the holding in Hanharan,  I, for one, believe that
Hanharan remains good law.
	Turning to the facts of this case, Rashawn was incarcerated at
Vandalia Correctional Center at the time the State mailed the
notice of forfeiture to his home. The State did not receive a return
receipt from the mailing and was thus alerted to the fact that the
notice was ineffective. The State, however, made no attempt to
send notice of the forfeiture to Rashawn at Vandalia. Instead, the
State was satisfied with publication of notice in the Daily Law
Bulletin. Such notice fell woefully short of due process. The State
knew, or should have known, that Rashawn was incarcerated at
Vandalia. Consequently, the State was required to send notice to
Rashawn at Vandalia.
	In a forfeiture proceeding, the interest of the property owner
is potentially great. See 725 ILCS 150/6 (West 1998) (providing
for administrative forfeiture of nonreal property valued at less than
$20,000, and judicial in rem forfeiture proceedings for nonreal
property that exceeds $20,000). As noted in Weng v. United States,
137 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1998),
		"A person who violates the narcotics laws might well
possess valuable property that is unrelated to narcotics.
The forfeiture of such property may be a matter of great
importance to him. And without the owner even being
made aware of, or having a practical opportunity to
challenge the forfeiture, its lawfulness is difficult to
justify. In these circumstances, furthermore, no one but
the owner can be relied on to protect the owner's
interest."
	Although the potential loss to the property owner may be
great, forfeiture statutes generally allow notice by mail or
publication. See 725 ILCS 150/4 (West 1998). When the property
owner is incarcerated, however, he has little influence as to
whether the notice given is actually received. "[A]s a prisoner, the
owner is unable to insure that he will receive the notice once the
post office has delivered it to the institution. The owner is entirely
dependant on the institution to deliver his mail to him." Weng, 137 F.3d  at 715. By contrast, the hardship to the government in
implementing procedures "reasonably certain to inform" the
property owner of the forfeiture is small. As noted by the dissent
in Dusenbery, "[t]he agency responsible for giving notice of the
forfeiture, here, the FBI, is part of the same Government as the
prisoner's custodian, the Bureau of Prisons." Dusenbery,  534 U.S.
at ___, 151 L. Ed. 2d  at 612, 122 S. Ct.  at 705 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter and Breyer, JJ.). "Where a
claimant is 'residing at a place of the government's choosing,' the
seizing agency must take steps to locate the claimant in order to
satisfy due process." United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 511
(1st Cir. 1995). See also In re Forfeiture of $2,354.00 United
States Currency, 326 Ill. App. 3d 9 (2001) (where the State
maintained that a prisoner's address is easy to ascertain).
	The majority disagrees. The majority maintains there is no
evidence in the record that the seizing agency knew or should have
known Rashawn was incarcerated in Vandalia. Rashawn was
incarcerated in a separate county for a separate crime
approximately six weeks after officers seized the currency. Slip
op. at 13-14. Citing Sarit v. U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration, 987 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1993), a case it finds
"helpful in the instant matter," the majority concludes that the
notice to Rashawn's home was effective.
	The majority fails to consider that when the officers
interviewed Rashawn, he informed them he was out on bond for
a prior arrest. A background check confirmed this arrest and also
revealed that Rashawn had been arrested several times in
Sangamon County, the last arrest on September 30, 1997. As the
Third Circuit observed in Foehl v. United States, 238 F.3d 474,
480 (3d Cir. 2001), "although Foehl was not in jail at the time the
notice was returned, he had been released on bail. We can safely
assume that the Beaumont police had a very good idea of his
whereabouts during that time."
	More importantly, however, the majority fails to consider that
the State is one entity and not several agencies or departments. The
State, in the person of the State's Attorney of Cook County,
prosecuted the forfeiture action at issue. At the same time, the
State prosecuted Rashawn for possession of cannabis based upon
an incident on March 28, 1995, and aggravated battery based upon
an incident on May 9, 1996.(1) The State incarcerated Rashawn at
Vandalia. A simple telephone call from the State's Attorney of
Cook County to the Illinois Department of Correction would have
provided the State's Attorney with the information needed to
effectuate notice upon Rashawn.(2)
	Lastly, the majority's reliance on Sarit is misplaced. In Sarit,
DEA agents seized $41,448 from the plaintiffs' then residence,
located at 114 Alvin Street, on July 28, 1989. The attendant search
was conducted without a warrant. On August 21, 1989, the
plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(e) seeking return of the currency. On September 1,
the United States Attorney objected to this motion and filed a
memorandum of law in which he informed the plaintiffs that the
currency was being held for administrative forfeiture.
Subsequently, on September 19, 1989, the DEA sent notice of the
administrative forfeiture proceeding by certified mail to 114 Alvin
Street. The notice was returned unclaimed. The DEA also
published notice of the proceeding, with the first notice published
on September 27, 1989. On October 13, 1989, the district court
denied the plaintiffs' Rule 41(e) motion on equitable grounds,
deferring to the administrative forfeiture proceedings. The
plaintiffs' right to file a claim with the DEA expired on October
17, 1989. On November 2, 1989, the administrative forfeiture was
decreed and entered.
	In upholding the validity of the notice given by the DEA, the
circuit court observed,
		"Given plaintiffs' vigorous (although tardy) pursuit of
their claim, the fact that the government had been
involved in ongoing court action on the very issue of the
seizure of plaintiffs' currency, the government's
awareness of plaintiffs' representation by counsel, and the
frowned upon treatment of forfeitures, the call is a close
one. [Citation.] Nevertheless, Mullane counsels us to
consider all of the circumstances, and we find in this case
other pertinent factors, including the government's
memorandum and the conduct of plaintiffs' counsel,
which compel us to uphold the finding of the district
court." (Emphasis in original.) Sarit, 987 F.2d  at 14.
The court of appeals found decisive that the plaintiffs' counsel had
sufficient general notice of the risk that the property would be
forfeited within the coming months if action were not taken; the
statute covering forfeitures and the regulations interpreting it were
available to counsel; and, once the plaintiffs and their counsel
were aware that notice of the forfeiture would be sent in the
ensuing two months, they could have notified the DEA of their
own change of address. The court concluded that "the damage
done by the ineffective notice could and ought to have been
stemmed by plaintiffs' counsel." Sarit, 987 F.2d  at 15.
	Sarit is distinguishable from the present case. First, the
plaintiffs in Sarit were not incarcerated at the time of the forfeiture
proceedings. Second, the plaintiffs in Sarit had instituted an action
in the district court for the return of the property and were
represented by counsel. Knowledge of the statutes regulating the
forfeiture proceedings and the risk that the property would be
forfeited within a short time period was attributed to counsel, and
thus to the plaintiffs. Third, the plaintiffs in Sarit had received a
memorandum informing them that the currency was being held for
administrative forfeiture and providing them with a seizure
number that had been assigned to the currency. The memorandum
further informed the plaintiffs that if they filed a claim and cost
bond with the DEA, the DEA would be required to refer the matter
to the United States Attorney for the initiation of judicial forfeiture
proceedings. In contrast, Rashawn was incarcerated at the time the
State mailed the notice of forfeiture. The State did not attempt to
notify Rashawn's criminal counsel of the forfeiture. Indeed, there
is no indication in the record that Rashawn's criminal counsel
continued to represent him once the criminal proceedings resulted
in the convictions. Thus, the Sarit court's conclusion that "the
damage done by the ineffective notice could and ought to have
been stemmed by plaintiffs' counsel" (Sarit, 987 F.2d at 15), has
no bearing in this case. Further, the State nowhere claims that it
gave Rashawn information of the kind given the Sarit plaintiffs in
the memorandum. The majority's assertion that Sarit is "helpful
in the instant matter" is simply incorrect.(3)
	The majority's holding that the notice given Rashawn was
effective is based upon the premise that the State may be
compartmentalized, such that information available to the State's
Attorney of one county or to the Illinois Department of
Corrections is not attributable to the State's Attorney of another
county. The majority's sole support for this holding is Sarit.
However, this holding is not supported by Sarit and is contrary to
case law. See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. ___, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694 (in determining whether the government's actions were
reasonable, the Supreme Court looked to the procedures followed
by the FBI, the forfeiting agency, in mailing the notice, and the
procedures followed by the federal correctional institution where
the property owner was incarcerated, in processing certified mail
addressed to inmates);  United States v. Minor, 228 F.3d 352 (4th
Cir. 2000) (since property owner was in federal custody, the DEA
notices mailed to his home address and to the Forsyth County jail,
where he had been held for a brief period following his arrest,
were ineffective); United States v. One Toshiba Color Television,
213 F.3d 147, 150 (3d Cir. 2000) (where the DEA administratively
forfeited certain property, the court held that "the circumstances
surrounding the federal government's incarceration of a prisoner
require greater efforts at ensuring notice than would be expected
for individuals at liberty in society"); United States v. McGlory,
202 F.3d 664, 674 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (on review of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding conducted by the DEA, the
court held: "at a minimum, due process requires that when a
person is in the government's custody and detained at a place of its
choosing, notice of a pending administrative forfeiture proceeding
must be mailed to the detainee at his or her place of
confinement"); Lopez v. United States, 201 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (where notices sent by the DEA to the property owner's
home and to the county jail were returned to the DEA, and where
the DEA knew that the property owner was in the custody either
of the State of Florida or of the Attorney General of the United
States, the DEA should have attempted to locate the property
owner within the prison system); United States v. Real Property,
135 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1998) (the requirements of due process
were satisfied where the record showed that the government sent
notice, by certified mail, to the property owner at the jail facility,
and the watch commander at the jail testified that jail personnel
sign for certified mail, open it in the presence of the inmate, and
then distribute it directly to the inmate); Boero v. Drug
Enforcement Administration, 111 F.3d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1997)
("Boero was a prisoner in custody, having been transferred to his
place of incarceration directly from a federal facility, and notice
could easily have been given to him; the notice was indisputably
inadequate and the district court has found *** that the DEA was
responsible for the failure of notice"); United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378 (10th Cir. 1996); Williams v. United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, 51 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 1995); State v.
U.S. Currency in the Amount of $3,743.00, 25 Kan. App. 2d 54,
956 P.2d 1351 (1998) (where the property owner was booked into
the Shawnee County jail and later transferred to the Kansas State
Correctional Facility, the court found the notice mailed to the
property owner's home ineffective, rejecting the State's claim that
it had no reason to know the property owner remained incarcerated
during the criminal proceedings); State v. $17,636.00 in United
States Currency, 650 So. 2d 900 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994); State v.
Jacobiak, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 4747 (1989) ("by virtue of
appellant's conviction and sentencing, appellee knew or should
have known appellant was incarcerated at the time the petition was
filed. Under the circumstances *** sending a copy of the petition
by regular mail to appellant's trial attorney, was not 'an effort' that
would ordinarily provide notice to appellant of the pendency of the
forfeiture proceedings"); People v. Smith, 275 Ill. App. 3d 844
(1995). See also Garcia v. Meza, 235 F.3d 287 (7th Cir. 2000)
(where the notice sent by the Secret Service to the property owners
was returned to the government five days later marked
undeliverable, and where the property owners were actively
seeking the return of their money through an administrative FTCA
claim filed with the INS, "another attempt at written notice [by the
Secret Service] would have been reasonable, even necessary,
under the circumstances and would not have been too burdensome
on the government"); Montgomery v. Scott, 802 F. Supp. 930, 936
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) ("It was unreasonable for the DEA to ignore its
discovery that plaintiff had not received the original mailed notice. 
The Government must use the information it possesses to
determine whether to rely on a particular method of notice; it may
not ignore information that reveals that a method of notice is
inadequate to provide an interested party with notice"); Redd v.
Tennessee Department of Safety, 895 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tenn.
1995) (where a drug task force of the Tennessee Department of
Safety seized money in a raid at a mobile home and the home's
owner told the task force officers that the petitioner had brought
the money to her and told her to use it if she needed to, and where
police later arrested the petitioner for an unrelated murder he
committed two days before the raid, the court held "it is clear that
the Department of Safety possessed the requisite knowledge of the
petitioner's possible proprietary interest in the seized property.
Such knowledge required the Department to give notice to the
petitioner of the seizure and possible forfeiture of the property").
CONCLUSION
	The opportunity to be heard has "little reality or worth unless
one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for
himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."
Mullane, 339 U.S.  at 314, 94 L. Ed.  at 873, 70 S. Ct.  at 657. In the
present case, the State mailed the notice of the forfeiture to
Rashawn's home. Although the State did not receive a return
receipt from the mailing, the State inquired no further. The State
failed to notify Rashawn of the forfeiture at the correctional center
where he was incarcerated. Rashawn was thus deprived of the
opportunity to contest the forfeiture and divested of his property
without due process of law. It matters not that Rashawn was
incarcerated on charges unrelated to the forfeiture. The State
prosecuted and incarcerated Rashawn on those charges. The State
was aware of the incarceration and knew, or should have known,
that notice mailed to Rashawn at his home address would be
ineffective. As held by the Supreme Court, notice sent to a
prisoner's home is inadequate. Hanrahan, 409 U.S.  at 40, 34 L. Ed. 2d  at 49, 93 S. Ct.  at 31. Such notice is not reasonably
calculated to apprise the prisoner of the pendency of the forfeiture
proceedings. Hanrahan, 409 U.S.  at 40, 34 L. Ed. 2d  at 49, 93 S. Ct.  at 31-32. "[W]hen notice is a person's due, process which is a
mere gesture is not due process." Mullane, 339 U.S.  at 315, 94 L. Ed.  at 874, 70 S. Ct.  at 657.
	I respectfully dissent.
	JUSTICES McMORROW and KILBRIDE join in this dissent.
1.      1The State represented to the circuit court and to this court that "the
offense for which Rashawn was incarcerated occurred almost one month
after the incident that led to the forfeiture," that is, in June 1998 rather
than the dates shown above.

2.      2Information about inmates is available to the general public at the
Illinois Department of Correction's internet site. 

3.      3At least one commentator has roundly criticized Sarit,
 			"While these unique facts make the decision easily
distinguishable, it is still disturbing that the court allowed a
claimant's right to contest the forfeiture to be snuffed out so
cavalierly by the DEA.  The decision is wholly out of sync
with the Supreme Court's efforts to provide additional
procedural safeguards in civil forfeiture actions."  1 D. Smith,
Prosecution and Defense of Forfeiture Cases par. 9.03, at 9-53
(2001).
The commentator lists a number of cases which have distinguished
Sarit.