Case Title: P. v. Hurtado

Citation: 

Docket Number: S082112

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 8/22/02 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S082112 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D029586 
RICHARD HURTADO, 
) 
 
 
) 
Imperial County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 13328A 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Resolving a question we left open in People v. Torres (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
680, 686, footnote 2, we hold that before a defendant can be committed or 
recommitted under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 6600 et seq. (SVPA)),1 the trier of fact must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant is likely to commit sexually violent predatory behavior upon 
release.  Thus, the judge or jury trying the case must determine not only whether 
the defendant is likely to “engage in sexually violent criminal behavior” (§ 6600, 
subd. (a)), but also whether that behavior is likely to be directed “toward a 
stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship 
exists, or an individual with whom a relationship has been established or promoted 
for the primary purpose of victimization.”  (§ 6600, subd. (e).) 
                                             
 
1  
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations are to the Welfare and 
Institutions Code. 
 
 
 
 
2
The Court of Appeal here reached the same conclusion, and held that the 
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to determine whether defendant was 
likely to commit future predatory acts.  The Court of Appeal also concluded, 
however, that under the facts of this case the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  We agree with the Court of Appeal opinion in all respects, and 
affirm its judgment. 
I 
As in People v. Torres, supra, 25 Cal.4th 680 (Torres), the issue raised here 
stems from the SVPA’s use of dissimilar language to define a “predatory act” and 
a “sexually violent predator.”  We observed in Torres:  “A predatory act is one 
directed ‘toward a stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no 
substantial relationship exists, or an individual with whom a relationship has been 
established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.’  (§ 6600, subd. 
(e).)  In contrast, the [SVPA] does not define a sexually violent predator by 
reference to victim characteristics.  Rather, a sexually violent predator is ‘a person 
who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims 
and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the 
health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually 
violent criminal behavior.’  (§ 6600, subd. (a).)  In turn, a ‘[s]exually violent 
offense’ under the [SVPA] includes forcible rape, forcible spousal rape, rape in 
concert, lewd act against a person under 14 years of age, forcible penetration, 
forcible sodomy, and forcible oral copulation.  (§ 6600, subd. (b).) 
“Under section 6601, whenever the Director of Corrections determines that 
a defendant serving a prison term may be a sexually violent predator, the 
Department of Corrections and the Board of Prison Terms undertake an initial 
screening ‘based on whether the person has committed a sexually violent 
predatory offense and on a review of the person’s social, criminal, and 
 
 
3
institutional history.’  (§ 6601, subd. (b).)  The screening is conducted in accord 
with a protocol developed by the state Department of Mental Health.  (Ibid.)  If 
that screening leads to a determination that the defendant is likely to be a sexually 
violent predator, the defendant is referred to the Department of Mental Health for 
an evaluation by two psychiatrists or psychologists.  (§ 6601, subds. (b) & (c).)  If 
both find that the defendant ‘has a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is 
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and 
custody’ (§ 6601, subd. (d)), the department forwards a petition for commitment to 
the county of the defendant’s last conviction (ibid.).  If the county’s designated 
counsel concurs with the recommendation, he or she files a petition for 
commitment in the superior court.  (§ 6601, subd. (i).)”  (Torres, supra, 25 Cal.4th 
at pp. 682-683.) 
The statute’s definition of “predatory act” comes into play at the next stage, 
the probable cause hearing.  There, the superior court must “determine whether 
there is probable cause to believe that the [defendant] is likely to engage in 
sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release.”  (§ 6602, 
subd. (a), italics added.)  If the court finds probable cause, the matter is set for 
trial. 
Section 6604 provides that at trial “[t]he court or jury shall determine 
whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator.”  
The phrase “sexually violent predator” is defined in section 6600, subdivision (a), 
as a person likely to “engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.”  Nothing in 
section 6604 expressly requires the trier of fact to determine whether the sexually 
violent criminal behavior is “predatory” behavior—that is, behavior directed at a 
stranger, a casual acquaintance, or someone cultivated for victimization as defined 
in section 6600, subdivision (e).  Thus, as we noted in Torres, the SVPA is 
“unusual in that its language requires the court at a probable cause hearing to 
 
 
4
decide whether the defendant ‘is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory 
criminal behavior upon his or her release’ (§ 6602, subd. (a)), but it does not 
expressly provide for such an issue to be decided by the trier of fact at the trial.”  
(Torres, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 686.) 
II 
We take the facts from the Court of Appeal opinion: 
“In 1987, [defendant] Hurtado sodomized and committed lascivious acts on 
three minor boys (ages 14, 13 and 12).  (Pen. Code, §§ 288, subd. (a), 286, subd. 
(c).)  He approached the minors at a Pizza Hut while they were playing video 
games, took them to his residence where he and the victims engaged in various sex 
acts and threatened to kill them if they told anyone.  He was sentenced to 17 years 
in prison with a scheduled parole release date of August 26, 1996.  [Defendant] 
had earlier prior convictions for sexual misconduct.  In 1979, he was convicted of 
lewd or lascivious conduct upon a child under the age of 14.  He was adjudicated 
as a mentally disordered sex offender and sent to Atascadero State Hospital.  After 
one year, he was deemed unamenable to treatment and returned to the trial court 
for the resumption of criminal proceedings.  He received a sentence of seven years 
and was paroled on June 1, 1984.  [Defendant] violated that parole and returned to 
prison for another year.  In 1985, he again violated parole and was convicted of 
annoying and molesting children.  He was sentenced to prison for another two 
years.  Less than a week after being released, [defendant] violated his parole when 
he was found in the presence of a minor without adult supervision.  He was sent 
back to prison until August 1987.  Less than two months later, he was arrested for 
the offenses with three minor boys summarized above. 
“After [defendant] was evaluated by two clinical psychologists who 
concurred he met the [SVPA]’s criteria for commitment as a sexually violent 
predator, the Department of Mental Health on August 15, 1996, referred 
 
 
5
[defendant]’s case to the district attorney for filing of a civil commitment petition 
pursuant to section 6602.  A commitment petition was filed on October 9.  That 
petition was dismissed without prejudice and a new one was filed on October 29, 
alleging [defendant] was a sexually violent predator who was likely to engage in 
sexually violent criminal behavior upon his release as a result of his diagnosed 
mental disorder.  A probable cause hearing began on December 18, 1996, and a 
finding of probable cause was returned in January 3, 1997. 
“A jury trial began on September 16.  Dr. Harry Goldberg, a clinical 
psychologist who had evaluated [defendant] in July 1996, testified [defendant] 
suffered from two diagnosed mental disorders, to wit, pedophilia and antisocial 
personality.  During the interview, [defendant] had admitted participating in the 
sexual acts with the children and fantasizing about children.  Dr. Goldberg 
testified that his testing placed [defendant] within the severe range of 
psychopathy, explaining that a high score is predictive of violence and poor parole 
adjustment in the future.  He also stated that because those inmates who focus on 
males rather than females have a higher recidivism rate, [defendant]’s preference 
for sexual offenses with males indicated a higher risk of reoffending.  He believed 
[defendant] was predisposed to engage in sexually violent behavior in the future. 
“Dr. Dean Clair, a clinical psychologist who evaluated [defendant] in June 
1996, concluded the 1987 offenses fit the criteria of section 6600, in that they 
were predatory and violent offenses involving children whom [defendant] sought 
out and who were unknown to him.  Dr. Clair concluded [defendant] had a 
diagnosed mental disorder of pedophilia, primarily basing that determination on 
[defendant]’s history of aggressive sexuality toward victims 13 years of age and 
younger and recidivism.  Dr. Clair concluded that based on the length and history 
of [defendant]’s condition, his behavioral recidivism, the nature of pedophilia and 
his inability to perform on parole, he was at considerable risk of reoffending.”   
 
 
6
The trial court instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 4.19, as it read before 
the 2002 revision.2  The instruction directed the jury to determine whether 
defendant was a “sexually violent predator,” and it defined that term as referring to 
someone who is “a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that 
he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.”  The instruction 
included the statutory definition of predatory act as an act “directed towards a 
stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship 
exists, or individual with whom a relationship has been established or promoted 
for the primary purpose of victimization.”  (§ 6600, subd. (e).)  But that definition 
served no function, because the jury was not asked to determine whether 
defendant was likely to commit predatory acts. 
The jury found that defendant was a sexually violent predator as defined in 
section 6600.  He was committed to the state Department of Mental Health for 
placement in a secure facility for a period not to exceed two years. 
Defendant appealed.  While his appeal was pending before the Court of 
Appeal, his two-year commitment expired, and he was recommitted in a new 
proceeding.  The Court of Appeal nevertheless retained the appeal, and held that 
the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could not return a verdict 
that defendant was a sexually violent predator unless it found that he was likely to 
engage in predatory behavior.  The Court of Appeal further concluded, however, 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant and the Attorney General both petitioned for review.  We 
granted both petitions, and we held this case pending our decision in Torres, 
                                             
 
2  
Because there was a conflict in the Court of Appeal cases, the 2002 revision 
of CALJIC No. 4.19 gave the trial judge the option of instructing that the jury 
must find the defendant likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal 
behavior. 
 
 
7
supra, 25 Cal.4th 680.  We decided Torres without resolving the conflict in the 
Court of Appeal decisions as to whether a jury in an SVPA case must determine 
whether the defendant is likely to commit future predatory acts.  We therefore set 
this case for briefing and argument to address that issue. 
Although this case became moot when defendant’s 1996 commitment 
expired in 1998, we have retained it for decision because the issue it raises is 
recurrent—indeed, it is raised in virtually every SVPA trial and appeal—and the 
two-year limit on each commitment makes it likely that any appeal raising the 
issue would become moot before we could decide it.  (See People v. Cheek (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 894, 897-898; Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 
524, fn. 1.) 
III 
We conclude that section 6604 contains an implied requirement that a trier 
of fact must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is likely to commit 
sexually violent predatory criminal acts before the defendant can be committed as 
a sexually violent predator.  We base this conclusion on the structure of the SVPA 
and the purpose of the April 17, 1995, amendments that added “predatory act” 
language to the bill that became the SVPA. 
The SVPA provides for both a preliminary probable cause hearing and a 
later trial.  In In re Parker (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1468, the Court of Appeal 
noted that the Legislature modeled the probable cause hearing of section 6602 
after existing civil involuntary commitment procedures and criminal preliminary 
hearing procedures.  As the Court of Appeal below stated:  “Regardless of the 
legal context of a probable cause determination (an involuntary civil commitment 
or a criminal preliminary hearing), its role is to test the sufficiency of the factual 
basis underlying the People’s pleadings.”  It would be inconsistent with the 
purpose of a probable cause hearing to require the judge to determine whether 
 
 
8
there was probable cause to believe the People can prove a factual assertion that 
they are not required to prove at trial.  Thus the SVPA’s provision for a 
preliminary hearing to test whether there is probable cause to believe a defendant 
is likely to commit future predatory acts implies that the likelihood of such acts 
will also be an issue at trial. 
This conclusion is supported by the purpose of the SVPA as revealed 
through its legislative history.  The bill that ultimately became law as the SVPA 
was introduced in the California Assembly on February 22, 1995, as Assembly 
Bill No. 888 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.).  That bill initially defined a sexually violent 
predator as one who engages in sexually violent criminal behavior, and neither 
defined nor used the term “predatory acts.” 
On April 17, 1995, the Assembly Bill No. 888 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) 
was amended to add a definition of the term “predatory” to section 6600.  The 
amendment inserted the phrase “sexually violent predatory criminal behavior” 
in section 6602, which describes the probable cause hearing.  The amendment 
also revised section 6601(b) to provide that the initial screening to determine if 
SVPA proceedings were warranted should include review of whether the 
defendant has committed a “sexually violent predatory offense,” and section 
6607, subdivision (a), to provide that the Director of Mental Health may 
recommend conditional release of a person not likely to commit acts of 
predatory sexual violence.3 
                                             
 
3  
In 1998 the Legislature added two additional provisions referring to 
predatory acts.  Section 6601.5, which provides for an urgency review when a 
defendant might be released before a section 6602 probable cause hearing can be 
held, requires the judge to determine whether the facts alleged in the petition 
“would constitute probable cause to believe that the [defendant] is likely to engage 
in sexually violent predatory behavior upon his or her release.”  Section 6602.5 
prohibits state hospital placement unless there has been a determination that there 
 
 
9
The apparent purpose—indeed, the only purpose we can discern—of 
these amendments is to limit the class of persons subject to commitment to 
those who are likely to commit predatory acts.  The analysis of Assembly Bill 
No. 888 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.), after its amendment on April 17, 1995, stated 
that the amended bill would define “a sexually violent predator as a person 
who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who has a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person a danger to the 
health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in 
sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.”  (Assem. Com. on Public 
Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 888 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 
17, 1995, italics added.)  The same assessment appears in a subsequent 
analysis.  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill 
No. 888 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 31, 1995, p. 1.) 
The class of persons who commit predatory acts as defined in section 6600, 
subdivision (e), is a much smaller group than the class of persons who commit 
sexually violent criminal acts as defined in the same section.  It includes, however, 
the most dangerous offenders.  Because predatory offenders could strike at any 
time and victimize anyone, they pose a much greater threat to the public at large.  
In contrast, a defendant likely to commit crimes only against family members or 
close acquaintances is less likely to reoffend because potential victims will be 
aware of the defendant’s status as a sex offender.  The public at large, however, is 
inevitably more defenseless against acts committed by strangers. 
 
The Attorney General agrees that the purpose of the amendment was to 
limit commitment to those persons likely to commit predatory acts – those directed 
“toward a stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no substantial 
                                                                                                                                      
 
is probable cause to believe the defendant will engage in sexually violent 
predatory behavior. 
 
 
10
relationship exists, or an individual with whom a relationship has been established 
or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.”  (§ 6600, subd. (e).)  He 
contends, however, that the Legislature intended to assign responsibility for 
excluding offenders unlikely to commit predatory acts to the judge at the 
preliminary hearing.  Taking the issue from the jury, he argues, would spare jurors 
the moral anguish of having to reject commitment for a defendant likely to commit 
violent sexual crimes simply because the defendant’s likely victims were family 
members or close acquaintances.  Moreover, he argues, the judge is better able to 
evaluate psychiatric testimony and records than a jury.   
 
The Attorney General’s conjecture concerning legislature intent is creative, 
but unsupported by anything in the legislative history.  Jurors are often called 
upon to make morally troubling decisions; they are required, for example, to 
acquit a defendant if not convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt even 
though they believe the defendant probably committed a serious crime and will 
probably strike again.  Jurors are also often required to evaluate psychiatric 
evidence.  Indeed, even under the Attorney General’s proposed reading the jurors 
will still have to examine psychiatric evidence to determine if the defendant is 
likely to commit future acts of sexual violence against any class of victim, and 
may face the moral anguish of having to reject commitment for a defendant likely 
to reoffend if the state cannot prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
The principal difficulty with the Attorney General’s argument, however, is 
not that under his construction of the SVPA a judge instead of a jury makes the 
decision whether the defendant is likely to commit future predatory acts, but that 
the judge makes this decision at a probable cause hearing instead of the trial.4  The 
SVPA does not set out a definition of “probable cause,” but “the rule of law is 
well established that where the Legislature uses terms already judicially construed, 
                                             
 
4  
The definition of probable cause and other issues relating to the second 
6002 hearing are before this court in Cooley v. Superior Court (S094676). 
 
 
11
‘the presumption is almost irresistible that it used them in the precise and technical 
sense which had been place upon them by the courts.’ ”  (City of Long Beach v. 
Marshall (1938) 11 Cal.2d 609, 620.)  The term “probable cause” has an 
established meaning in connection with criminal proceedings, and signifies a level 
of proof below that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  It refers to “a state of facts as would lead a man of 
ordinary caution and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong 
suspicion of the guilt of the accused.”  (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 
667; see Cummiskey v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1018, 1027; People v. 
Fischer (1957) 49 Cal.2d 442, 446 [probable cause to arrest]; Williams v. Superior 
Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1144, 1147; 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Crim. Law (3d ed. 
2000) Pretrial, § 147, pp. 349-350.)  This definition of “probable cause” is so well 
settled that we can confidently assume the Legislature intended it to be used in 
proceedings under section 6602, subdivision (a). 
Thus, at the SVPA probable cause hearing the court is required to decide 
whether it has a strong suspicion that the defendant, by reason of a diagnosed 
mental disorder, is (1) “likely to engage in acts of sexual violence upon his or her 
release” (§ 6602, subd. (a)); and (2) is likely to engage in “sexually violent 
predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release” (ibid.) (italics added).  A 
reasonable suspicion standard is appropriate to the first issue, because the effect of 
a finding of probable cause to believe the defendant is likely to engage in future 
acts of sexual violence is to submit that issue for trial under a reasonable doubt 
standard.  Under the Attorney General’s proposed construction, however, the 
second issue —whether the defendant is likely to engage in future predatory acts 
— does not become an issue for trial but is resolved by a finding of probable 
cause.  Thus a defendant could be committed if there were no more than a 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was likely to commit future predatory acts, 
even if that suspicion was against the preponderance of the evidence.   
 
 
12
The Legislative purpose of limiting commitment under the SVPA to only 
those persons who present a “substantial danger” (People v. Superior Court 
(Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 922) of committing future predatory acts would 
be subverted if defendants could be committed when there is no more than a 
reasonable suspicion that they would commit such acts.  One commentator 
explained:  “[I]f the standard to be used for [commitment] . . . is that there is a 
‘likelihood the individual will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior,’ then 
the Act’s narrowing function has essentially been eviscerated.  This standard is 
broader and looser than the one used for a probable cause determination, and 
necessarily would permit a larger number of individuals to be involuntarily 
committed than a standard which required a likelihood of the commission of a 
sexually violent predatory act.  It would also nullify the safeguards sewn into the 
fabric of the Act since the narrowing process . . . would be eliminated by the use 
of this more general standard, in violation of due process protection.”  (Comparet-
Cassani, A Primer on the Civil Trial of a Sexually Violent Predator (2000) 37 San 
Diego L.Rev. 1057, 1107.) 
 
An interpretation of the SVPA that limits the predatory act determination to 
the probable cause hearing also creates problems with judicial review.  In People 
v. Talhelm (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 400, 405, the Court of Appeal applied to an 
SVPA case the rule of People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529, that 
errors at a preliminary hearing are not reviewable on appeal unless they deprived 
the defendant of a fair trial or otherwise caused prejudice.  That rule rests on the 
belief that a fair trial generally renders harmless any preliminary hearing errors.  
(See People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 122.)  Such reasoning is 
inapplicable, however, if an issue at the preliminary hearing is excluded from 
consideration at trial.   
 
In sum, to permit a final determination of the predatory act issue at the 
probable cause hearing under a reasonable suspicion standard would undermine 
 
 
13
the Legislature’s plan to limit commitment to persons likely to commit such acts.  
The more reasonable construction of the SVPA, consistent with its structure and 
purpose, is that if a judge at the section 6602 hearing finds probable cause to 
believe a defendant is likely to engage in future predatory acts, that issue then 
becomes one for decision by the trier of fact under the statutory standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
IV 
 
Having decided that the trial court here erred in not instructing the jury on 
the predatory act requirement, we turn to the question of whether that error was 
prejudicial.  As we have noted, this case became moot once the defendant’s two-
year commitment expired.  But the standard of prejudice for constitutional error in 
SVPA cases, like the instructional issue discussed earlier, is an important and 
recurring issue likely to evade review, one raised in many cases awaiting this 
decision.  We therefore exercise our discretion to decide this issue. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the standard of 
prejudice for instructional error in involuntary commitment cases, leaving the 
parties here free to argue alternative theories.  Defendant contends the failure to 
instruct the jury on the predatory act requirement is “structural error” that is not 
susceptible to harmless error analysis, but requires automatic reversal.  (See 
Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275 [defective reasonable doubt 
instruction].)  The Attorney General argues for the test of prejudice we articulated 
in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, which applies to all non-structural state 
law error (People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 492), and requires a defendant to 
show that without the error a more favorable outcome was reasonably probable.  
The Court of Appeal took an intermediate position, applying the standard of 
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, which applies to federal constitutional 
 
 
14
error and requires the state to show that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court casts a shadow over 
defendant’s contention that failure to instruct on an element essential to 
commitment is structural error requiring automatic reversal.  In Neder v. United 
States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, the trial court erroneously denied the defendant the right 
to have a jury decide whether an alleged fraudulent statement was “material,” and 
instead decided that issue itself.  The high court recognized that the error deprived 
the defendant of a constitutional right, but after reviewing precedent concluded 
“the omission of an element is an error that is subject to harmless-error analysis” 
(id. at p. 10) and found the error harmless under the Chapman standard (Chapman 
v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18).  
 
Defendant argues his case falls within an exception to this rule.  His theory 
is that harmless error analysis requires the court to review the record to evaluate 
the effect of the error on the result, and that accurate review is impossible if the 
parties, unaware that an issue was before the court, did not present evidence on 
that issue.  He relies on Lankford v. Idaho (1991) 500 U.S. 110, in which a judge 
imposed a death penalty even though the prosecution had assured the defense that 
it was not seeking the death penalty.  Under Idaho law in 1991, the jury decided 
guilt in a capital case and the judge, after a sentencing hearing, determined the 
penalty.  (See Idaho Code, § 19-2515; but see Ring v. Arizona (2002) ___ U.S. 
___ [122 S.Ct. 2428].)  The high court reversed the penalty.  It could not rely on 
the record to hold the error harmless because the defense, trusting the prosecution 
assurance, did not present evidence on aggravating or mitigating factors relating to 
the penalty decision.  (See Lankford v. Idaho, supra, 500 U.S. at pp. 122-127.)   
 
The case before us differs from Lankford.  Defendant here knew that the 
likelihood of future predatory acts was at issue in the probable cause hearing.  He 
had an opportunity to present evidence on predatory acts to a judge.  (See In re 
 
 
15
Parker, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1469-1470 [a defendant has a right to present 
evidence at probable cause hearing]; People v. Cheek, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 900 
[endorsing Parker].)  Here, the evidence actually presented at defendant’s trial – 
the nature of his prior acts, his prison record, and the psychiatric reports – is in 
large part the same evidence that a jury would consider in finding whether 
defendant was likely to commit future predatory acts.  Defendant does not suggest 
that he has any additional evidence or argument that he failed to present.  (Cf. 
Lankford v. Idaho, supra, 500 U.S. at pp. 122-124.)  Thus the case here is 
distinguishable from Lankford, and it more closely resembles Neder v. United 
States, supra, 527 U.S. 1, which applied harmless error analysis when the 
defendant was mistakenly required to present his evidence on the issue of 
materiality to the judge instead of the jury.  
Concluding that the court’s failure to instruct on predatory acts is subject to 
harmful error analysis, we turn to the problem of discerning the applicable test of 
prejudice for constitutional error.  The purpose of the SVPA is not punitive.  
(Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 367, 369; Hubbart v. Superior Court 
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1171-1177.)  Instead, its primary purpose is to protect the 
public from “a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators 
that have diagnosable mental disorders that can be identified while they are 
incarcerated.”  (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 1.)  Although treatment is a secondary 
objective (Hubbart v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1166), a defendant 
likely to commit future predatory acts can be committed even if his condition is 
not amenable to treatment.  (See § 6606, subd. (b); Kansas v. Hendricks, supra, 
521 U.S. at p 366.)  
Although the SVPA is a civil proceeding, its procedures have many of the 
trappings of a criminal proceeding.  The probable cause hearing at issue here 
(§ 6602) is one example.  In addition, the defendant is entitled to appointed 
counsel (§ 6603, subd. (a)), the trier of fact must find defendant to be a sexually 
 
 
16
violent predator beyond a reasonable doubt (§ 6604), and a jury verdict must be 
unanimous (§ 6603, subd. (d)). 
In sum, proceedings under the SVPA, in common with proceedings under 
other civil commitment statutes, are civil proceedings with consequences 
comparable to a criminal conviction -- involuntary commitment, often for an 
indefinite or renewable period, with associated damage to the defendant’s name 
and reputation.  The United States Supreme Court and the California courts have 
pointed to these consequences in cases holding that the ordinary burden of proof 
in civil cases, preponderance of the evidence, is constitutionally inadequate in 
cases involving involuntary commitment and, as we shall explain, the California 
courts have in turn relied on the burden of proof decisions to hold that federal 
constitutional error in civil commitment proceedings is reversible unless shown to 
be harmful beyond a reasonable doubt.  
In Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 425, the high court said:  “This 
Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes 
a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.  
[Citations.]  Moreover, it is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental 
hospital after a finding of probable dangerousness to self or others can engender 
adverse social consequences to the individual.  Whether we label this phenomena 
[sic] ‘stigma’ or choose to call it something else is less important than that we 
recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the 
individual.”  The court concluded that the preponderance of the evidence standard 
of proof was constitutionally inadequate in a civil commitment proceeding.  (Id. at 
p. 427.) 
In People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, we considered the burden of 
proof under the former Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Law, former section 
6300 (MDSO Law), which provided for commitment of mentally disordered sex 
offenders.  We said that “so drastic an impairment of the liberty and reputation of 
 
 
17
an individual must be justified by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Burnick, at 
p. 310.)  Four years later we decided Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 
219, which involved an action to extend a conservatorship (and thus to extend the 
confinement of the conservatee in a mental hospital) on the ground that the 
conservatee was gravely disabled.  In requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
we said that “In People v. Burnick [citation], this court explicitly recognized that 
civil commitment to a mental hospital, despite its civil label, threatens a person’s 
liberty and dignity on as massive a scale as that traditionally associated with 
criminal prosecutions.”  (Id. at p. 223.)  The next year, in Conservatorship of 
Hofferber (1980) 28 Cal.3d 161, we held that when a defendant is found 
incompetent to stand trial, his confinement as a person dangerous to others 
required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  “Involuntary confinement for mental 
illness or dangerousness,” Hofferber explained, “whether civil or criminal, 
involves loss of liberty and substantial stigma.  Factfinding error must be 
minimized when such drastic consequences are at stake.”  (Id. at p. 178.) 
The burden of proof is not at issue here, but the reasoning of the cases 
discussing that issue applies equally to the question of the test for harmless error, 
and is so applied in California decisions.  In Conservatorship of Wilson (1982) 
137 Cal.App.3d 132, the Court of Appeal addressed the harmless error issue in a 
case involving erroneous instructions in a proceeding to commit a person as 
gravely disabled under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (§ 5000 et seq. (LPS Act)).  
Relying on Conservatorship of Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d 219, which involved the  
burden of proof under the LPS Act, Wilson reversed the commitment because the 
“error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Wilson, supra, 137 
Cal.App.3d at p. 136.)  Conservatorship of Early (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 244, 255, 
endorsed the holding in Wilson and held that in cases of civil commitment under 
the LPS Act constitutional error was reversible unless shown harmless beyond a 
 
 
18
reasonable doubt.  People v. Lee (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 774, 783, applied the 
same standard in reviewing a commitment under the former MDSO Law.   
An SVPA commitment unquestionably involves a deprivation of liberty, 
and a lasting stigma, equivalent to a commitment under the former MDSO law and 
probably more onerous than a commitment under the LPS Act.  Although the 
commitment period under the SVPA is limited to two years, additional 
commitment proceedings can extend this period indefinitely.  If the defendant has 
a mental disorder that is not susceptible to treatment, the proceedings may result in 
confinement for life.  And whatever the consequences of being labeled as “gravely 
disabled,” or a “danger to himself or others” under the LPS Act, they are surely no 
greater than the consequences of a being labeled a “sexually violent predator.”  
Because the Chapman test (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18) – that 
federal constitutional error is reversible unless shown to be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt – is used for the review of federal constitutional error in civil 
commitment cases in California generally, that test necessarily governs review 
under the SVPA. 
V 
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the trial court’s error in failing to 
instruct the jury on the need to find a likelihood of future predatory acts was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Defendant was first adjudged a mentally 
disordered sex offender in 1979.  He was paroled in 1984, violated parole, and 
was returned to prison.  In 1985 defendant again violated parole and was 
convicted of annoying or molesting children.  (Pen. Code, § 647.6.)  He was 
paroled in August of 1987 and in October of that year was convicted of 
committing sodomy and lewd and lascivious acts on three minors, ages 12, 13, and 
14.  All three victims were strangers to defendant, which means that defendant’s 
acts were “predatory acts” as defined in section 6600, subdivision (e).  Defendant 
 
 
19
admitted to Dr. Goldberg, one of the examining psychiatrists, that he continued to 
have sexual fantasies about children.  Thus there was ample evidence to show that 
defendant was likely to commit future violent sexual acts, and none to indicate 
that his victims would not include strangers, casual acquaintances, or persons 
cultivated for victimization.  We therefore conclude that the trial court’s 
instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
VI 
In his petition for review, defendant also contended that the trial court lost 
jurisdiction because it failed to hold a probable cause hearing within the 10-day 
period provided by section 6601.5.  But he did not raise this contention in his brief 
on the merits.  The issue is therefore not properly before us.  (See 9 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 594, pp. 627-628, and cases there cited.) 
 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J.
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J. 
 
 
I accept the majority’s statutory construction linking commitment as a 
sexually violent predator (SVP) to the risk of future “predatory” acts.  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (e); see id., §§ 6600, subd. (a)(1), 6604.)1  I also agree 
with the majority that failure to so instruct defendant’s jury was harmless, and that 
the challenged commitment order should not be reversed on this ground.  I write 
separately, however, to question the majority’s explicit holding that the 
demanding Chapman2 standard of prejudice must apply — a holding that seems 
both unjustified and unnecessary in this case.  I briefly address each point in turn. 
The standard of prejudice to be applied in civil commitment proceedings to 
the form of error found here is more complicated than the majority suggests.  The 
analytical framework appears in People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478 (Cahill), 
which the majority fails to discuss in detail. 
The general rule in this state is that in order to find “a miscarriage of 
justice” warranting reversal of the judgment (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), the 
reviewing court must believe “it is reasonably probable that a result more 
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the 
error.”  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)  The Watson 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to this code. 
 
2  
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. 
 
 
2 
standard “represents the harmless-error test generally applicable under current 
California law.”  (Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th 478, 492, italics added.)  It applies 
postjudgment to all kinds of cases, civil and criminal, and to all forms of state law 
error, including error arising under the California Constitution.  (Id. at pp. 488-492 
& fn. 7, 501.) 
California courts depart from Watson’s reasonable-probability test only 
under narrow circumstances that depend upon the extraordinary nature of the error 
under review.3  First, federal constitutional error in a criminal trial, if susceptible 
to harmless error analysis at all, nonetheless requires reversal unless the reviewing 
court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 
24, that the conviction was not tainted thereby.  Instructional omission of an 
“element” of the charged offense violates a criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial, and constitutes a form of federal constitutional error 
subject to Chapman review.  (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 8-15; see 
Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th 478, 482, 487, 502, citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 
499 U.S. 279, 307-308 [opn. of Rehnquist, C. J., speaking for a majority of the 
court] (Fulminante).) 
Second, some constitutional rights, both state and federal, are so basic that 
their denial constitutes a “structural defect” which necessarily undermines the 
fairness of the proceedings and the reliability of the verdict.  (Cahill, supra, 5 
Cal.4th 478, 487.)  Such cases defy harmless error review, and trigger neither the 
                                             
 
3  
As in Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th 478, I do not include in my general 
description of harmless error principles the special test applied to all state law 
error at the penalty phase of a capital trial.  Even where no federal constitutional 
violation has occurred, and assuming the judgment is not reversible per se, 
enhanced concerns over the reliability of death judgments require a standard 
“more exacting” than Watson for capital penalty phase error, i.e., whether there is 
a “ ‘reasonable possibility’ ” such error affected the verdict.  (People v. Brown 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447.) 
 
3 
Watson reasonable-probability test otherwise applicable under California law, nor 
the Chapman reasonable-doubt test governing most violations of a criminal 
defendant’s federal constitutional rights.  Errors of this magnitude — denial of 
counsel in a criminal case or trial before a biased judge — require reversal of the 
judgment notwithstanding the strength of the underlying evidence.  (Cahill, supra, 
5 Cal.4th at pp. 492-493, 501-502, citing Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. 279, 309-
310.) 
Here, the majority squarely holds that erroneous failure to instruct on future 
predation is not “structural” or reversible per se.  The majority observes that 
defendant had the motive and means to litigate the likelihood of future “predatory” 
acts at the probable cause stage (§ 6602, subd. (a)), that extensive evidence 
bearing on the issue was subsequently presented at trial, and that defendant 
identifies no related evidence withheld from the jury’s consideration.  For these 
reasons, the majority rejects defendant’s claim that harmless error review is 
“impossible” to perform in this case.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  I agree.  Like the 
majority, I would not automatically reverse the judgment or otherwise ignore the 
wealth of evidence used by the jury to commit defendant as an SVP. 
However, the majority fails to further define the present instructional flaw 
for purposes of rejecting Watson and choosing Chapman as the applicable test of 
prejudice.  We are artfully told that “constitutional error” in the definition of an 
SVP occurred at defendant’s commitment trial.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13, 15.)  
However, the majority never pinpoints the constitutional provision, state or 
federal, that was supposedly breached.  Nor does the majority indicate why 
Chapman should be extended beyond criminal cases.  Absent such an analysis, the 
majority has not adequately explained why Chapman applies here. 
To the extent the majority implies that omission of a statutory condition of 
commitment is analogous to withdrawal of an “element” in a criminal case (see 
 
4 
Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. 1, 8-15), the argument lacks support under 
current law.  The majority suggests, for instance, that California courts already use 
Chapman to review instructional error under other civil commitment schemes, that 
“federal constitutional error” has been found in such cases, and that no different 
standard should apply in SVP proceedings like this one.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 18.)  The majority bases this assertion primarily on Conservatorship of Wilson 
(1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 132, 135-136 (Wilson), which was followed without 
comment in Conservatorship of Early (1983) 35 Cal.3d 244, 255 (Early). 
In Wilson and Early, evidence and instructions were wrongly withheld on 
whether a proposed conservatee was “gravely disabled” and subject to involuntary 
confinement under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act.  (§ 5000 et seq.)  In 
reversing the ensuing conservatorship orders, both the Wilson and Early courts 
assumed that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of prejudice applied.  
However, neither Wilson nor Early offered any analysis or authority for this view.  
These 20-year-old cases also predate Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th 478, which 
authorizes departure from Watson’s reasonable-probability test only under rare 
conditions not present here.  Indeed, the majority’s uncritical reliance on Wilson, 
supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 132, and Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d 244, simply begs the 
question to be decided — whether civil commitment orders receive the same level 
of harmless error review now reserved for federal constitutional error in criminal 
cases.  (Cf. Conservatorship of Warrack (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 641, 648-649 
[finding no reasonable probability that erroneous failure to give a cautionary 
shackling instruction affected the outcome in an LPS commitment trial].) 
In a related vein, the majority invokes Chapman on the theory that SVP 
proceedings are “comparable” to criminal cases in certain respects.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 16.)  The majority emphasizes that under California statutory and 
constitutional law, the standard of proof for commitment as an SVP is proof 
 
5 
beyond a reasonable doubt — the same standard of proof required for criminal 
conviction.  (§ 6604; see People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 310.)  The 
majority also suggests there is little difference between compulsory confinement 
as an SVP and incarceration as a convicted criminal. 
However, this approach arguably resurrects a quasi-criminal view of 
commitment proceedings, which both the United States Supreme Court and this 
court have repeatedly disavowed.  It is settled, for instance, that the federal 
Constitution does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt at trial to confine 
mentally disordered and dangerous persons against their will.  (Addington v. Texas 
(1979) 441 U.S. 418, 425-433.)  The fact that California law departs from 
minimum federal guaranties and imposes such a heavy standard of proof in SVP 
proceedings does not compel a criminal law analogy.  “[T]he use of procedural 
safeguards traditionally found in criminal trials [does] not mean that commitment 
proceedings [are] penal in nature. ‘. . .  That [the state] chose to afford such 
procedural protections does not transform a civil commitment proceeding into a 
criminal prosecution.’ ”  (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 
1174, fn. 33, quoting Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 364-365.) 
Any further suggestion that SVP proceedings are “civil” in name only is 
misleading, and does not support the majority’s harmless error rule.  Unlike the 
criminal justice system, which seeks deterrence and retribution through substantial 
prison terms, the present statutory scheme ensures that dangerously disordered sex 
offenders receive appropriate care and treatment from the Department of Mental 
Health in a secure medical facility.  The maximum two-year commitment period 
can be maintained and renewed only if strict procedural and substantive conditions 
are met.  (Hubbart v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1175-1178.)  As the 
majority concedes, public protection and rehabilitation are the primary legislative 
 
6 
aims.  (See id. at p. 1175 [rejecting claim that “SVP’s are ‘sent to prison’ and 
confined under the same conditions as state prisoners”].) 
It bears emphasis that the United States Supreme Court has never decided 
whether instructional flaws in civil commitment proceedings amount to federal 
constitutional error and, if so, what standard of prejudice should apply.  Absent 
high court authority compelling the result reached by the majority here, other state 
courts do not seem anxious to embrace Chapman under similar circumstances. 
For example, in rejecting a vague and sweeping claim that instructions used 
in an SVP commitment matter were prejudicially inadequate, the Kansas Supreme 
Court cited civil cases and the general rules contained therein.  (Matter of Hay 
(Kan. 1998) 953 P.2d 666, 680 [noting the jury “ ‘could not reasonably be misled 
by’ ” the challenged instructions].)  Courts in other jurisdictions have avoided 
specifying the applicable standard of prejudice where the instructions omit a 
statutory prerequisite to commitment.  These decisions also refrain from 
characterizing such error as a federal constitutional violation.  (In re W.R.G. 
(Wash.Ct.App. 2002) 40 P.3d 1177, 1179-1180 [instructions withdrew question 
whether defendant “ ‘attempted or inflicted serious physical harm’ ”; error was 
harmless because there was an alternative, proper basis for commitment]; Matter 
of Bumper (D.C.Ct.App. 1982) 441 A.2d 975, 977 [instructions omitted full range 
of treatment options needed to decide whether defendant “would benefit from 
treatment”; error was harmless since ample evidence conveyed the missing 
information]; cf. Thomas v. State (Mo. 2002) 74 S.W.3d 789, 791-792 
[instructions failed to require mental disorder causing “ ‘serious difficulty’ ” 
controlling sexually violent behavior; SVP commitment orders reversed].) 
Similar restraint is warranted here.  As noted by the majority, the two-year 
commitment order under review has expired.  The case is therefore technically 
“moot.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)  This court also unanimously agrees that 
 
7 
failure to instruct defendant’s jury on the “predatory” nature of future violent sex 
crimes is harmless under any standard other than per se reversal.  Specifically, all 
seven members of the court find “ample evidence” that defendant — a convicted 
child molester clinically diagnosed as a high-risk pedophile — would continue 
desiring and sexually victimizing underage boys.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  No 
evidence indicates that “his victims would not include strangers, casual 
acquaintances, or persons cultivated for victimization” within the meaning of 
section 6600, subdivision (e).  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.) 
Under these circumstances, I am of the strong view that we need not, and 
should not, use the present case to decide the standard for reversing SVP 
commitment orders where an instructional lapse occurs.  For reasons stated above, 
this significant and difficult question deserves closer scrutiny than the majority 
opinion provides. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
8 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Hurtado 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 73 Cal.App.4th 1243 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S082112 
Date Filed: August 22, 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Imperial 
Judge: Joseph Zimmerman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Chris M. Truax, under appointment by the Supreme Court; and Randall B. Bookout, under appointment by 
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson and Robert R. Anderson, 
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Meagan, J. Beale, Crystal 
L. Bradley, Steven T. Oetting, Robert M. Foster and Bradley A. Weinreb, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Chris M. Truax 
Appellate Defenders, Inc. 
P.O. Box 2127 
La Mesa, CA  91943 
(619) 401-3472 
 
Bradley A. Weinreb 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2290