Case Title: In re: Gordon E. Hannett

Citation: 

Docket Number: 050985

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
IN RE:  GORDON E. HANNETT, 
COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY 
FOR THE COUNTY OF FLOYD 
 
Record No. 050985 
 
OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
 
 
 
September 16, 2005 
 
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND/OR PROHIBITION 
 
 
In this proceeding, which invokes this Court's original 
jurisdiction, the primary issue that we consider is whether a 
circuit court has the authority, pursuant to Code § 19.2-156, 
to appoint an attorney-at-law to serve as acting attorney for 
the Commonwealth because of the prolonged absence of the duly 
elected Commonwealth's Attorney. 
I. 
 
Gordon E. Hannett is the duly elected Commonwealth's 
Attorney for the County of Floyd.  His term of office will 
expire on December 31, 2007.  Hannett is also a member of the 
United States Army Reserves.  In February 2005, Hannett 
informed the Honorable Ray W. Grubbs, judge of the Circuit 
Court of Floyd County, that Hannett had been activated for 
military service in Iraq.  Hannett's unit was scheduled to be 
mobilized into active service on May 8, 2005.  Hannett 
informed Judge Grubbs that Hannett would deploy with his unit 
in Iraq unless the United States Army granted him a waiver. 
 
2
 
Subsequently, in support of Hannett's request for a 
waiver, Judge Grubbs forwarded a letter to the United States 
Army.  Judge Grubbs stated in the letter: 
 
"As Judge of the Circuit Court in Floyd County, 
Virginia, I am confronted with a perplexing 
situation with the call-up of Gordon E. Hannett, the 
Commonwealth's Attorney for said County. 
 
"Mr. Hannett is the sole attorney in that 
office, which is the chief law enforcement office 
for the county. 
 
"He prosecutes cases on behalf of the 
Commonwealth and Floyd County in three (3) separate 
courts, Circuit Court, General District and Juvenile 
and Domestic Relations.  In all, Mr. Hannett 
represented the state and county in many of the 
cases as shown [on an attachment to this letter].  
Obviously, his services are vital for the welfare of 
the Floyd County community. 
 
"Please consider our precarious situation in 
evaluating Mr. Hannett's call-up. 
 
. . . . 
 
"Sincerely yours, 
 
"Ray W. Grubbs" 
 
The United States Army denied Hannett's request for a waiver. 
 
In April 2005, Hannett informed Judge Grubbs that Hannett 
planned to seek approval from the State Compensation Board to 
fund a part-time temporary position of assistant 
Commonwealth's Attorney.  Hannett intended to perform the 
duties of the office of Commonwealth's Attorney while deployed 
in Iraq with the assistance of the temporary part-time 
assistant Commonwealth's Attorney.  The Compensation Board 
authorized funding for the part-time temporary position. 
 
3
 
Hannett and Judge Grubbs met on April 29, 2005, and 
Hannett told Judge Grubbs that the Compensation Board had 
approved funding for the part-time temporary assistant 
Commonwealth's Attorney position.  Judge Grubbs suggested that 
Hannett hire an attorney who practiced law in Floyd County to 
serve as the temporary assistant Commonwealth's Attorney. 
 
Judge Grubbs and Hannett met again on May 3, 2005.  
During this meeting, Judge Grubbs provided Hannett with the 
names of three attorneys in Floyd County who would be willing 
to serve in the temporary position.  According to Hannett, 
Judge Grubbs stated during the meeting that if Hannett failed 
to hire one of these attorneys, Judge Grubbs would appoint one 
of them to serve as the Commonwealth's Attorney during the 
period of Hannett's deployment.  Later that day, Hannett 
informed Judge Grubbs that Hannett did not intend to resign 
from the office of Commonwealth's Attorney and, therefore, 
Hannett did not believe that the circuit court had the 
authority to appoint someone who would act during his 
deployment. 
 
Judge Grubbs and Hannett conversed by telephone on May 5, 
2005.  During the conversation, Judge Grubbs asked Hannett 
which of the three lawyers Hannett intended to hire to fill 
the temporary position.  Hannett informed Judge Grubbs that 
Hannett had not made a decision.  Judge Grubbs responded that 
 
4
he was compelled to appoint a lawyer who would serve as the 
temporary Commonwealth's Attorney.  Later that afternoon, 
Hannett hired Dennis E. Nagle, a lawyer who has practiced in 
the City of Roanoke and Montgomery County and who is a member 
in good standing of the Virginia State Bar, as a temporary 
assistant Commonwealth's Attorney for the County of Floyd.  
Nagle executed the required oath of office. 
 
On May 5, 2005, about 5:25 p.m., Judge Grubbs, without 
notice to Hannett, convened the Circuit Court of Floyd County.  
Below is a transcript of that proceeding: 
 
"This is the matter of the interim appointment 
of acting Commonwealth's Attorney, pursuant to 
section 19.2-156 of the 1950 Code of Virginia.  The 
Court, on its own motion, is making an appointment 
for the interim Commonwealth's Attorney, and the 
reasons therefore are as follows:  The Court has 
been advised by Mr. Hannett that he has been called 
to active duty in the Armed Forces of the United 
States for a period of eighteen months.  That 
service is to be performed in Indiana for 
approximately three months, followed by deployment 
to Iraq.  Consequently, Mr. Hannett will be outside 
the boundaries of the Commonwealth during the 
eighteen month period.  In said office there is no 
chief deputy, and there is no other attorney 
employee.  To fully perform the functions of the 
Commonwealth's Attorney's office in this county, as 
has traditionally been accomplished, it is required 
and necessary that a resident attorney be appointed 
for this interim period.  The Court on its own 
motion is appointing Stephanie Murray-Shortt to be 
the acting Commonwealth's Attorney during the 
absence of Mr. Hannett, commencing at midnight May 
8th, 2005, and terminating upon the return of Mr. 
Hannett to this office.  An Order to that effect is 
entered this date, with copies to be served as 
directed in the Order." 
 
5
 
 
Judge Grubbs entered the following order that is the 
subject of this proceeding: 
 
"This day came the Court on its motion, for the 
reasons stated of record, pursuant to the call to 
active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States 
of The Honorable Gordon E. Hannett, Attorney for 
Commonwealth in Floyd County, Virginia, said 
deployment commencing on 8 May, 2005, for an 
extended period of eighteen (18) months. 
 
"It appearing to the Court, pursuant to § 19.2-
156 of the 1950 Code of Virginia, the prolonged 
absence requires the appointment of an attorney-at-
law as acting attorney for the Commonwealth to serve 
for such length of time as may be necessary.  Such 
acting attorney-at-law shall serve in the place of 
and otherwise perform the duties and exercise the 
powers of such regular attorney for the Commonwealth 
and while so acting, shall receive the salary and 
allowance for expenses fixed by the State 
Compensation Board. 
 
"It is, therefore, ORDERED that Stephanie 
Murray-Shortt be, and she hereby is, appointed by 
this Court to serve in the place of The Honorable 
Gordon E. Hannett for such period of time as may be 
necessary, commencing at midnight May 8, 2005, and 
terminating upon the return of The Honorable Gordon 
E. Hannett. 
 
"The Clerk is directed to serve certified 
copies of this order to The Honorable Gordon E. 
Hannett, Commonwealth's Attorney, Stephanie Murray-
Shortt, and mail a certified copy to Bruce W. 
Haynes, Executive Director, State Compensation 
Board, P. O. Box 710, Richmond, Virginia, 23218-
0710.  Further, the Clerk is also directed to mail 
certified copies of this Order to the Judges of the 
Twenty-Seventh Judicial Circuit and to The Honorable 
Edward Turner, Judge of the General District Court 
of Floyd County, and The Honorable James Tompkins, 
Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
District Court of Floyd County. 
 
 
 
 
 
"ENTER:  May 5, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
"Ray W. Grubbs, Chief Judge" 
 
6
 
The remaining judges of the 27th Judicial Circuit concurred 
with Judge Grubbs' decision to appoint a temporary attorney 
for the Commonwealth under Code § 19.2-156. 
 
Subsequently, Hannett filed a "petition for writ of 
mandamus, or prohibition (or both)" in this Court.  Hannett 
requests, among other things, that this Court enter an order 
that allows him to perform the duties of Commonwealth's 
Attorney for Floyd County while he is deployed on active duty 
with the United States Army. 
II. 
A. 
 
Code § 19.2-156 states: 
 
"If it shall be necessary for the attorney for 
the Commonwealth of any county or city to absent 
himself for a prolonged period of time from the 
performance of the duties of his office, then, upon 
notification by such attorney for the Commonwealth, 
or by the court on its own motion, and the facts 
being entered of record, the judge of the circuit 
court shall appoint an attorney-at-law as acting 
attorney for the Commonwealth to serve for such 
length of time as may be necessary. Such acting 
attorney for the Commonwealth shall act in place of 
and otherwise perform the duties and exercise the 
powers of such regular attorney for the 
Commonwealth, and while so acting shall receive the 
salary and allowance for expenses fixed by the State 
Compensation Board for such regular attorney for the 
Commonwealth, who during such length of time shall 
not receive any such salary or allowance." 
 
 
Code § 2.2-2802 provides: 
 
7
"No state, county or municipal officer or 
employee shall forfeit his title to office or 
position or vacate the same by reason of either 
engaging in the war service of the United States 
when called forth by the Governor pursuant to the 
provisions of § 44-75.1, or when called to active 
duty in the armed forces of the United States.  Any 
such officer or employee who, voluntarily or 
otherwise, enters upon such war service or is called 
to service may notify the officer or body authorized 
by law to fill vacancies in his office, of such 
fact, and thereupon be relieved from the duties of 
his office or position during the period of such 
service.  The officer or body authorized to fill 
vacancies shall designate some suitable person to 
perform the duties of such office as acting officer 
during the period the regular officer is engaged in 
such service, and during such period the acting 
officer shall be vested with all the powers, 
authority, rights and duties of the regular officer 
for whom he is acting." 
 
B. 
 
Counsel for Judge Grubbs asserts that Hannett may not 
invoke this Court's original jurisdiction because he may not 
use a writ of mandamus to challenge the circuit court's 
conclusion that the Commonwealth's Attorney will be absent 
from the performance of the duties of his office during the 
period that he will be on active duty in the United States 
Army.  Continuing, counsel for Judge Grubbs asserts that the 
circuit court's exercise of its authority under Code § 19.2-
156 is discretionary and, thus, mandamus is an inappropriate 
remedy.  We disagree. 
 
The basis of Hannett's petition for writ of mandamus is 
that he believes he has been wrongfully deprived of the office 
 
8
of Commonwealth's Attorney of Floyd County.  Clearly, mandamus 
is the appropriate remedy.  Indeed, for over 200 years, courts 
in this Commonwealth have held that the writ of mandamus is a 
proper remedy to restore a public officer who has been 
unlawfully removed or deprived of that office.  In re:  Joseph 
D. Morrissey, 246 Va. 333, 334, 433 S.E.2d 918 (1993); Giles 
County Board of Supervisors v. Carr, 222 Va. 379, 381, 282 
S.E.2d 14, 16 (1981); Bunting v. Willis, 68 Va. 144, 161 
(1876); Dew v. Judges of Sweet Springs, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 
1, 23 (1808); Smith v. Dyer, 5 Va. (1 Call.) 562, 566 (1799).  
Mandamus is a proper remedy because this procedure accords 
prompt resolution of issues relating to the operation of a 
public office, and mandamus provides the most convenient and 
complete relief.  Bunting, 68 Va. at 161. 
C. 
 
Hannett contends that Code § 19.2-156 "does not provide 
the requisite jurisdiction for a circuit court to appoint an 
acting Commonwealth's Attorney merely because the elected 
Commonwealth's Attorney is called to active duty in the Armed 
Forces of the United States during a time of war."  
Continuing, Hannett argues that the circuit court should have 
applied Code § 2.2-2802, which creates certain exceptions for 
public officers or employees engaging in war service or called 
to active duty with the Armed Forces.  Additionally, Hannett 
 
9
asserts that even if Code § 19.2-156 is applicable, the 
circuit court failed to make the requisite findings that 
Hannett will be unable to continue in the performance of the 
duties of his office.  We disagree with Hannett's contentions. 
 
In Virginia, courts are required to apply the plain 
meaning of statutes, and this Court is not free to add 
language, or ignore language, contained in statutes.  Signal 
Corp. v. Keane Federal Systems, 265 Va. 38, 46, 574 S.E.2d 
253, 257 (2003); Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 262 
Va. 91, 99, 546 S.E.2d 696, 702 (2001).  We have repeatedly 
stated that: 
"While in the construction of statutes the 
constant endeavor of the courts is to ascertain and 
give effect to the intention of the legislature, 
that intention must be gathered from the words used, 
unless a literal construction would involve a 
manifest absurdity.  Where the legislature has used 
words of a plain and definite import the courts 
cannot put upon them a construction which amounts to 
holding the legislature did not mean what it has 
actually expressed." 
 
Id. at 262 Va. at 99-100, 546 S.E.2d at 702; see also Watkins 
v. Hall, 161 Va. 924, 930, 172 S.E. 445, 447 (1934); accord 
Haislip v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co., 254 Va. 265, 268, 492 
S.E.2d 135, 137 (1997); Weinberg v. Given, 252 Va. 221, 225, 
476 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1996).  Read in this context, Code 
§ 19.2-156 is the controlling statute in the case at bar, not 
Code § 2.2-2802. 
 
10
Contrary to the assertions of both litigants, Code 
§§ 2.2-2802 and 19.2-156 are not inconsistent.  Rather, the 
two separate and distinct statutes govern different 
circumstances. 
Code § 2.2-2800 provides that individuals cannot 
simultaneously serve as officers or employees of the federal 
government and of the Commonwealth of Virginia.  If a Virginia 
officer or employee accepts a position with "any emolument 
whatever" from the federal government, then that officer or 
employee "ipso facto" vacates his office or position with the 
Commonwealth.  Code § 2.2-2802, among other things, creates an 
exception to this "ipso facto" loss of office or position for 
Virginia officers or employees who are called into active 
service.  Code § 2.2-2802 provides that such officer or 
employee "shall not forfeit his title to office or position or 
vacate the same" by reason of active service in the United 
States Armed Forces.  Thus, pursuant to Code § 2.2-2802, 
Hannett did not forfeit or vacate the office of Commonwealth's 
Attorney "ipso facto" when he began to serve on active duty in 
the United States Armed Forces.  Furthermore, Code § 2.2-2802 
anticipates the appointment of a person to perform the duties 
of the office of attorney for the Commonwealth in an "acting 
capacity."  This statutory authorization to perform such 
 
11
duties of office in an acting capacity does not cause a 
forfeiture or create a vacancy in that office. 
The General Assembly in Code § 19.2-156 specifically 
prescribed a procedure for the temporary appointment of an 
attorney for the Commonwealth when the attorney for the 
Commonwealth was absent for a prolonged period of time from 
the performance of the duties of the office.  Because Code 
§ 2.2-2802 and Code § 19.2-156 are not inconsistent, we need 
not apply rules of statutory construction reconciling the two 
statutes.  In any event, Code § 19.2-156 would be the 
applicable statute because it deals specifically with the 
office of Commonwealth's Attorney. 
Code § 2.2-2802 states in part that "[n]o state, county 
or municipal officer or employee shall forfeit his title to 
office or position or vacate the same by reason of either 
engaging in the war service of the United States . . . or when 
called to the active duty in the armed forces of the United 
States."  (Emphasis added).  Contrary to Hannett's assertions, 
he was not required to forfeit or vacate his office in 
violation of this statutory provision. 
The word "forfeit" means "to lose or lose the right to by 
some error, fault, offense, or crime:  alienate the right to 
possess by some neglect . . . ."  Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 891 (1993).  A public official who 
 
12
has forfeited title to the office lacks the authority to 
perform the duties of that office during the term of office.  
See, e.g., Shell v. Cousins, 77 Va. 328, 332 (1883) (sheriff 
who forfeited office created a vacancy in that office); 
Commonwealth v. Fugate, 29 Va. 724, 726 (1830) (justice of the 
peace who forfeited office legally incapacitated from ever 
acting under his commission).  The order entered by the 
circuit court did not result in a forfeiture of the office of 
the Commonwealth's Attorney of Floyd County because Hannett 
will be able to resume the duties of Commonwealth's Attorney 
upon the conclusion of his active duty with the United States 
Army. 
The circuit court similarly did not decree that Hannett 
had vacated the office of Commonwealth's Attorney of Floyd 
County.  Hannett remains the Commonwealth's Attorney of Floyd 
County.  He is the incumbent who possesses the title to the 
office of Commonwealth's Attorney. 
Murray-Shortt, who has been appointed as the "acting 
attorney" for the Commonwealth for Floyd County, is not the 
incumbent of that office.  Her temporary authority to exercise 
the powers and discharge the duties of the office will abate 
when Hannett ends his prolonged absence on military duty and 
returns to Floyd County to resume his duties as the 
Commonwealth's Attorney.  Simply stated, Murray-Shortt, the 
 
13
acting Commonwealth's Attorney, will be divested of all 
authority to perform the duties of that office upon the 
cessation of Hannett's prolonged "period of time [absent] from 
the performance of the duties of his office."  While Murray-
Shortt is temporarily vested with the duties of the office of 
Commonwealth's Attorney under Code § 19.2-156 and the circuit 
court's order, she is not and could not be vested in the title 
of that office. 
Hannett's status as the Commonwealth's Attorney for Floyd 
County and Murray-Shortt's status as the temporary acting 
attorney for the Commonwealth are illustrated by the 
consequences that would ensue if either Hannett or Murray-
Shortt resigned.  If Murray-Shortt resigned, the office of 
Commonwealth's Attorney would not be vacant, and the circuit 
court, acting pursuant to Code § 19.2-156, would enter an 
order that appointed a lawyer to discharge the duties of the 
office of the Commonwealth's Attorney.  However, if Hannett, 
the incumbent who holds title to the office resigned, a 
vacancy would indeed exist.  Thus, pursuant to Code § 24.2-
228.1(B), the circuit court would make an interim appointment 
"until the qualified voters fill the vacancy by election and 
 
14
the person so elected has qualified and taken the oath of 
office."  Code § 24.2-228.1(B).* 
D. 
 
Hannett argues that the circuit court erred by 
concluding, pursuant to Code § 19.2-156, that it shall be 
necessary for him to be absent for a prolonged period of time 
from the performance of the duties of his office.  We 
disagree.  The verified statement of facts and exhibits before 
this Court contain facts that support the circuit court's 
conclusion that the Commonwealth's Attorney of Floyd County 
will absent himself for a prolonged period of time from the 
performance of the duties of his office. 
Hannett admitted that he advised the circuit court that 
Hannett's Army Reserve unit had been activated for military 
                     
* Code § 24.2-228.1 states in relevant part:  "The highest 
ranking deputy officer, or, in the case of the office of 
attorney for the Commonwealth, the highest ranking full-time 
assistant attorney for the Commonwealth, if there is such a 
deputy or assistant in the office, shall be vested with the 
powers and shall perform all of the duties of the office, and 
shall be entitled to all the privileges and protections 
afforded by law to elected or appointed constitutional 
officers, until the qualified voters fill the vacancy by 
election and the person so elected has qualified and taken the 
oath of office.  In the event that (i) there is no deputy 
officer or full-time assistant attorney for the Commonwealth 
in the office or (ii) the highest-ranking deputy officer or 
assistant attorney for the Commonwealth declines to serve, the 
court shall make an interim appointment to fill the vacancy 
pursuant to Code § 24.2-227 until the qualified voters fill 
the vacancy by election and the person so elected has 
qualified and taken the oath of office." 
 
15
service in Iraq and would be mobilized on May 8, 2005.  Even 
though Hannett had informed the circuit court that he could 
perform the duties of his office while deployed on active 
duty, the court was not required to accept this conclusion. 
Code § 15.2-1627(B), which prescribes certain duties 
imposed upon attorneys for the Commonwealth and their 
assistants, states: 
"B.  The attorney for the Commonwealth and 
assistant attorney for the Commonwealth shall be a 
part of the department of law enforcement of the 
county or city in which he is elected or appointed, 
and shall have the duties and powers imposed upon 
him by general law, including the duty of 
prosecuting all warrants, indictments or 
informations charging a felony, and he may in his 
discretion, prosecute Class 1, 2 and 3 misdemeanors, 
or any other violation, the conviction of which 
carries a penalty of confinement in jail, or a fine 
of $500 or more, or both such confinement and fine.  
He shall enforce all forfeitures, and carry out all 
duties imposed upon him by § 2.2-3126." 
 
 
Based upon the record before the circuit court and this 
Court, it was certainly reasonable for the circuit court to 
conclude that Hannett could not discharge his statutorily 
prescribed duties during deployment on active military duty 
and engagement in a war thousands of miles from Floyd County.  
And, we note that the Commonwealth's Attorney in Floyd County 
prosecutes cases on behalf of the Commonwealth and Floyd 
County in the circuit, general district, and juvenile and 
domestic relations district courts in that County.  Also, the 
 
16
circuit court was of the opinion that Hannett's services were 
"vital for the welfare of the Floyd County community." 
 
We recognize that Hannett hired a temporary assistant 
Commonwealth's Attorney for the County of Floyd, Dennis Nagle, 
to assist Hannett.  We observe that Nagle possesses the lawful 
authority to act as an assistant Commonwealth's Attorney for 
the County of Floyd.  However, the appointment of Nagle as a 
temporary employee did not impair the circuit court's 
statutory authority to appoint an acting attorney for the 
Commonwealth who will serve for such length of time as may be 
necessary.  And, contrary to Hannett's assertion, the judges 
of the 27th Judicial Circuit concurred in the decision to 
appoint an acting attorney for the Commonwealth to serve for 
such length of time as may be necessary pursuant to Code 
§ 19.2-156. 
 
The circuit court failed to give Hannett notice of the 
hearing that occurred on May 5, 2005.  The record does not 
reflect why Hannett, a constitutional officer, was not 
accorded notice of the hearing and an opportunity to appear 
and present evidence.  However, Hannett does not raise these 
issues in his petition and, therefore, they have been waived. 
E. 
 
17
 
Hannett also seeks, in this proceeding, a writ of 
prohibition.  However, it is well-established in the 
jurisprudence of this Commonwealth that: 
 
"The writ of prohibition does not lie to 
correct error, but to restrain an inferior court 
from acting in a matter of which it has no 
jurisdiction, or in which it is transcending the 
bounds of its jurisdiction." 
 
Moss v. Barham, 94 Va. 12, 14, 26 S.E. 388, 388 (1896); see 
also Shell, 77 Va. at 332.  We recently applied this well-
established principle in In re: Commonwealth's Attorney for 
the City of Roanoke, 265 Va. 313, 316-17, 576 S.E.2d 458, 461 
(2003). 
 
In this proceeding, the writ of prohibition clearly does 
not lie.  The circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the 
question whether it was necessary for the attorney for the 
Commonwealth of Floyd County to be absent for a prolonged 
period of time from the performance of the duties of his 
office and if so, what attorney should be appointed as acting 
attorney for the Commonwealth to serve for such length of time 
as may be necessary. 
III. 
 
Finding no merit in Hannett's contentions, we will 
dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus and the petition for 
the writ of prohibition. 
Dismissed. 
 
18
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ and JUSTICE LEMONS 
join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I conclude that the Honorable Ray W. Grubbs, judge of the 
Circuit Court of Floyd County, unlawfully deprived Gordon E. 
Hannett of the office of Commonwealth’s Attorney of Floyd 
County.  The effect of the circuit court’s order of May 5, 
2005 was to require Hannett to vacate his title to office 
because he had been called to active duty in the armed forces 
of the United States.  Thus, that order violated the express 
provisions of Code § 2.2-2802.  For that reason, I 
respectfully dissent with regard to sections II(C) and III of 
the majority opinion and would issue the writ of mandamus.  I 
concur with the other sections of the majority opinion. 
 
Under the provisions of Code § 2.2-2802, “[n]o state, 
county or municipal officer or employee shall forfeit his 
title to office or position or vacate the same by reason of 
either engaging in the war service of the United States . . . 
or when called to active duty in the armed forces of the 
United States.”  (Emphasis added.)  That statute creates an 
exception to the general prohibition set forth in Code § 2.2-
2800 precluding a person from “holding any office of honor, 
profit or trust under the Constitution of Virginia” while at 
the same time holding “any office or post of profit, trust, or 
emolument, civil or military, legislative, executive, or 
 
19
judicial, under the government of the United States.”  Code 
§ 2.2-2800; see City of Lynchburg v. Suttenfield, 177 Va. 212, 
215-20, 13 S.E.2d 323, 324-26 (1941) (applying the exception 
as set forth in a predecessor statute to Code § 2.2-2802).  
Except in the situations covered in Code § 2.2-2802, the 
acceptance of any such office with the government of the 
United States “ipso facto[] vacate[s]” any such office “under 
the government of this Commonwealth or under any county, city, 
or town thereof.”  Id. at 216, 13 S.E.2d at 324. 
 
The majority concludes that Code § 2.2-2802 is not 
applicable to the facts of this case because the action taken 
by the circuit court did not require Hannett either to forfeit 
or to vacate his title or position as Commonwealth’s Attorney.  
No forfeiture occurred, according to the majority, because 
Hannett can return to his position when he concludes his 
active duty in the armed forces of the United States, and the 
office of Commonwealth’s Attorney was not vacated because 
Hannett remains the incumbent.  The General Assembly used the 
operative verbs, forfeit and vacate, in the disjunctive, 
meaning that the provisions of Code § 2.2-2802 apply if the 
May 5, 2005 order required Hannett either to forfeit or vacate 
his position.  While I disagree with the majority’s analysis 
in both respects, I will focus on its conclusion that the 
 
20
circuit court’s order did not require Hannett to vacate the 
office of Commonwealth’s Attorney of Floyd County. 
To understand what it means to vacate the title to a 
public office or position, it is necessary to consider two of 
this Court’s prior decisions, Chadduck v. Burke, 103 Va. 694, 
49 S.E. 976 (1905), and Frantz v. Davis, 144 Va. 320, 131 S.E. 
784 (1926).  Both cases involved the question whether a 
vacancy existed in a particular public office at the end of an 
incumbent’s fixed term. 
In Chadduck, the office of “Superintendent of the Poor” 
was for a term commencing on July 1 and ending on June 30 four 
years later.  103 Va. at 695, 49 S.E. at 976.  However, under 
a new Constitution that had been adopted, the term of the 
office was to begin on January 1.  Id. at 696, 49 S.E. at 976.  
All county officers who were in office when the Constitution 
became effective were authorized to remain in their respective 
offices until the next January 1.  Id.  The new Constitution 
also specified “all officers elected or appointed shall 
continue to discharge the duties of their offices, after the 
terms to same have expired, until their successors have 
qualified.”  Id. 
By statute, a specific procedure for filling the term of 
the office of Superintendent of the Poor commencing on January 
1 was required, but the county judge failed to follow the 
 
21
procedure in filling the office.  Id. at 696-97, 49 S.E. at 
976-77.  Since no valid appointment had been made for the new 
term of office, the question before the Court was whether, as 
of January 1, a vacancy existed in the office of the 
Superintendent of the Poor that the county judge could fill by 
virtue of authority conferred under a different statute.  Id. 
at 697-98, 49 S.E. at 977.  In that context, we explained the 
word “vacancy”: 
It is said that the word “vacancy,” as applied 
to an office, has no technical meaning; that an 
office is vacant or not according to whether it is 
occupied by one who has a legal right to hold it and 
to exercise the powers and perform the duties 
pertaining thereto.  A vacant office is one without 
an incumbent.  Vacancy in office is one thing and 
term is another.  An office may be vacant and filled 
many times during a term of four years; but it 
cannot become vacant at the end of a term where the 
incumbent is authorized to hold over, for the 
instant the successor is duly appointed and has 
qualified he becomes entitled to the office, and 
there has been no hiatus at all.  So long, 
therefore, as an office is supplied with an 
incumbent, in the manner provided by the 
Constitution or law, who is legally qualified to 
exercise the powers and perform the duties which 
appertain to it, the office is not vacant. 
 
Id. at 698, 49 S.E. at 977. 
 
We then concluded that no vacancy existed in the office 
of the Superintendent of the Poor on January 1.  Id. at 700, 
49 S.E. at 978.  Although the regular term of the incumbent 
expired on January 1, “he was just as fully authorized by law 
to hold the office and exercise the powers and perform the 
 
22
duties appertaining to it after that time, until his successor 
had been duly appointed and qualified, as he was before the 
expiration of his regular term.”  Id. at 698, 49 S.E. at 977.  
Continuing, we stated “the period between the expiration of 
his term and the qualification of his successor is as much a 
part of the incumbent’s term of office as the fixed statutory 
period, when the law provides that he shall hold until his 
successor qualifies.”  Id. at 698-99, 49 S.E. at 977. 
Similarly, the question in Frantz was whether a vacancy 
in the office of city treasurer existed when the corporation 
court of the City of Roanoke declared petitioner’s election as 
the new city treasurer null and void.  144 Va. at 322, 131 
S.E. at 784-85.  Believing that a vacancy existed because of 
the action of the corporation court, the city council elected 
the petitioner to the office.  Id. at 322, 131 S.E. at 785.  
The respondent, who held the office of city treasurer before 
the election, claimed that there was no vacancy in the office 
and that the city council therefore was not authorized to 
appoint his successor.  Id. at 323, 131 S.E. at 785.  The 
respondent asserted that he was entitled to discharge the 
duties of the office of city treasurer after his term expired 
until his successor qualified.  Id. at 323-24, 131 S.E. at 
785. 
 
23
We again relied upon the explanation in Chadduck 
regarding the word “vacancy” but decided, based on different 
statutes than those at issue in Chadduck, that a vacancy in 
the office of city treasurer did exist when the election was 
annulled and that the respondent was not entitled to hold over 
in that office.  Id. at 324-27, 131 S.E. at 785-86.  Thus, we 
concluded that the city council was within its rights when it 
appointed the petitioner to succeed the respondent as 
treasurer.  Id. at 327, 131 S.E. at 786. 
In both of these cases, the question whether a vacancy 
existed in the particular office at issue turned on whether 
the incumbent was authorized by law to hold over after the end 
of his fixed term until his successor qualified.  The point to 
be gleaned from our decisions is that there is no vacancy in a 
public office when it is occupied by a person who has the 
legal right to hold the office, to exercise its powers, and to 
perform the required duties.  Chadduck, 103 Va. at 698, 49 
S.E. at 977.  That person is referred to as the “incumbent.”  
See Justice v. Campbell, 410 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Ark. 1967) (“An 
incumbent of an office is one who is in present possession of 
an office; one who is legally authorized to discharge the 
duties of that office.”); Lee v. Peach County Bd. of Comm’rs, 
497 S.E.2d 562, 563 (Ga. 1998) (“An incumbent is one ‘who is 
legally qualified to exercise the powers and perform the 
 
24
duties which pertain to it.’ ”); State ex rel. Sanders v. 
Blakemore, 15 S.W. 960, 961 (Mo. 1891) (“An incumbent of an 
office is one who is legally authorized to discharge the 
duties of that office.”); State ex rel. Peters v. McCollister, 
11 Ohio 46, 50 (1841) (same); Black’s Law Dictionary 782 (8th 
ed. 2004) (defining the term “incumbent” as “[o]ne who holds 
an official post”). 
On the effective date of the circuit court’s appointment 
of Stephanie Murray-Shortt to serve as the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney of Floyd County, Hannett was no longer the 
incumbent.12  At that moment, he was not the person in 
possession of and holding the title to the office; he was not 
the person legally authorized to discharge its duties; he was 
not the person receiving the salary fixed by the State 
Compensation Board for the position of Commonwealth’s Attorney 
of Floyd County.  Instead, Murray-Shortt was that person, 
i.e., the incumbent.  It does not matter that Murray-Shortt 
was authorized to act as the Commonwealth’s Attorney only 
until Hannett returned from active military duty.  During the 
period of her appointment, although it was temporary and 
                     
1 On May 13, 2005, this Court stayed the circuit court’s 
order of May 5, 2005.  That fact does not affect my analysis.  
The stay is in effect only until this case is resolved.  Under 
the majority decision, Murray-Shortt today will become the 
acting attorney for the Commonwealth in Floyd County. 
 
 
25
indefinite, she replaced Hannett as Commonwealth’s Attorney 
and held the title to the office with the attendant duties, 
responsibilities, and salary.  At most, Hannett had “merely 
the inchoate right to be restored” to the office upon his 
return.  Gullickson v. Mitchell, 126 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Mont. 
1942).  Thus, for the majority to say Hannett “is the 
incumbent who possesses the title of the office of 
Commonwealth’s Attorney” and to use that reason to conclude 
that the circuit court’s order did not vacate the office of 
Commonwealth’s Attorney of Floyd County misconstrues the term 
“incumbent.”  If, as the majority concludes, Hannett remains 
the incumbent, two individuals simultaneously were authorized 
to discharge the duties of the office of Commonwealth’s 
Attorney and to receive the salary for the position.  In other 
words, the office had two incumbents at the same time.  Many 
years ago, one court described such a situation as a “legal 
absurdity.”  Commonwealth ex rel. Broom v. Hanley, 9 Pa. 513, 
520 (1848). 
That an “incumbent” is the person presently possessing 
the title to office and authorized to perform the duties of 
the office is consistent with what we said in Chadduck and 
again in Frantz: “So long, therefore, as an office is supplied 
with an incumbent, . . . who is legally qualified to exercise 
                                                                
 
 
26
the powers and perform the duties which appertain to it, the 
office is not vacant.”  Chadduck, 103 Va. at 698, 49 S.E. at 
977; see also Garcia v. Miller, 408 S.E.2d 97, 98 (Ga. 1991) 
(“An office is not vacant so long as it is filled by ‘an 
incumbent who is legally qualified to exercise the powers and 
perform the duties which pertain to it.’ ”); State ex rel. 
Plunkett v. Miller, 137 So. 737, 738-39 (Miss. 1931) 
(“ ‘Vacancy in office’ means the absence of an incumbent of 
the office who has been legally inducted therein.”); Holtan v. 
Beck, 125 N.W. 1048, 1052-53 (N.D. 1910) (“ ‘A ‘vacancy in 
office’ . . . can never exist when an incumbent of the office 
is lawfully there and is in the actual discharge of official 
duty.’ ”); State ex rel. Whitney v. Johns, 3 Ore. 533, 537 
(1869) (“Vacancy in an office means the want of an incumbent 
at the time.”); Richardson v. Young, 125 S.W. 664, 686 (Tenn. 
1910) (“The term ‘vacancy’ means . . . a want of the proper 
officer to officiate in such office.”). 
Obviously, the question in the case before us is not 
whether a vacancy existed in the office of Commonwealth’s 
Attorney because of the absence of an incumbent but whether 
the circuit court’s order required Hannett to vacate his title 
to office.  Since a vacancy in a public office means the 
absence of an incumbent, it follows that the verb “vacate” as 
used in Code § 2.2-2802 means to deprive one of an incumbency.  
 
27
See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2527 (1993) 
(the word “vacate” means to “deprive of an incumbent” or “to 
give up the incumbency”).  There can be no doubt that the May 
5, 2005 order required Hannett to give up his incumbency, 
i.e., his title to the office of Commonwealth’s Attorney and 
the legal authority to discharge the duties of that office.  
Thus, I conclude that Code § 2.2-2802 is indeed applicable to 
this mandamus proceeding. 
To avoid the well-established meaning of the term 
“incumbent,” the majority separates the duties and powers of 
the office of Commonwealth’s Attorney from the title to that 
office and concludes that Murray-Shortt was vested only with 
the duties and powers of the office.  Even if such a 
proposition were possible under Virginia law, the terms of 
Code § 2.2-2802 provide that a public officer such as Hannett 
shall not vacate either his “title to office or position” by 
virtue of being called to active duty in the armed forces of 
the United States.  There can be no doubt that the circuit 
court’s order that appointed Murray-Shortt “to serve in the 
place of” Hannett caused Hannett to vacate his position.  He 
could no longer perform the duties, exercise the powers, or 
receive the salary of the office of Commonwealth’s Attorney. 
Since the circuit court required Hannett to vacate the 
“title to office or position” of Commonwealth’s Attorney 
 
28
despite the clear mandate of Code § 2.2-2802 that “[n]o state, 
county or municipal officer or employee shall . . . vacate” 
his office or position “when called to active duty in the 
armed forces of the United States,” the order of May 5, 2005 
unlawfully deprived Hannett of his title to office unless the 
provisions of Code § 19.2-156, the statute utilized by the 
circuit court to appoint an acting attorney for the 
Commonwealth, prevail over those of Code § 2.2-2802.  Unlike 
the majority, I conclude that the provisions of those two 
statutes, in the context of this case, are conflicting.  I 
resolve that conflict by applying an established rule of 
statutory construction: “[W]hen one statute speaks to a 
subject in a general way and another deals with a part of the 
same subject in a more specific manner, the two should be 
harmonized, if possible, and where they conflict, the latter 
prevails.”  Virginia Nat’l Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 340, 
257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979); accord Frederick County Sch. Bd. 
v. Hannah, 267 Va. 231, 236, 590 S.E.2d 567, 569 (2004); 
County of Fairfax v. Century Concrete Servs., 254 Va. 423, 
427, 492 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1997); Dodson v. Potomac Mack Sales 
& Serv., Inc., 241 Va. 89, 94-95, 400 S.E.2d 178, 181 (1991). 
In deciding which of the two statutes at issue is more 
specific, I recognize that Code § 2.2-2802 applies to a large 
group of public officers and Code § 19.2-156 pertains only to 
 
29
Commonwealth’s Attorneys.  However, if a circuit court can 
appoint an acting attorney for the Commonwealth when the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney is absent from performing the duties 
of the office for a prolonged period due to any reason, 
compare Code § 19.2-156 (authorizing appointment of acting 
attorney for the Commonwealth when Commonwealth’s Attorney has 
a prolonged absence from performing the duties of the office, 
with attendant loss of salary) with Code § 19.2-155 
(authorizing appointment of acting attorney for the 
Commonwealth when the Commonwealth’s Attorney “is unable to 
act, or to attend to his official duties . . . due to 
sickness, disability or other reason of a temporary nature”, 
without loss of salary), that general authority is limited by 
the more specific provisions of Code § 2.2-2802 protecting a 
public officer from forfeiting or vacating the title to office 
because of being called to active duty in the armed forces of 
the United States.  Moreover, as I stated previously, the 
provisions of Code § 2.2-2800 prohibit holding an office under 
the Constitution of the Virginia while at the same time 
holding an office under the United States government.  The 
narrow statutory exception to this prohibition provided in 
Code § 2.2-2802 for public officers who are called to active 
duty in the armed forces of the United States reflects an 
 
30
important policy choice by the General Assembly that should 
not be ignored.2 
Additionally, the General Assembly last amended Code 
§ 19.2-156 in 1975, 1975 Va. Acts ch. 495; whereas, the 
General Assembly amended Code § 2.2-2802 in its entirety in 
2001, 2001 Va. Acts ch. 844.  “ ‘[I]f a later statute does not 
by its terms or by necessary implication repeal entirely a 
former one in pari materia, yet if it clearly appears that the 
later statute was intended to furnish the only rule to govern 
a particular case, it repeals the former to that extent.’ ”  
Standard Drug Co., Inc. v. General Electric Co., 202 Va. 367, 
379, 117 S.E.2d 289, 297 (1960) (quoting American Cyanamid Co. 
v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 831, 841, 48 S.E.2d 279, 285 (1948)).  
Factors to consider in deciding that question include “ ‘the 
occasion and the reason of the enactment, the letter of the 
act, the context, the spirit of the act, the subject matter 
and the provisions of the act.’ ”  Standard Drug Co., 202 Va. 
at 379, 117 S.E.2d at 297.  If the General Assembly did not 
intend for the protection of Code § 2.2-2802 to apply to 
                     
2 Under Code § 2.2-2802, Hannett had the discretion to ask 
to be relieved of his duties as Commonwealth’s Attorney for 
the period of his service in the armed forces of the United 
States.  He chose not to do so, but instead obtained 
permission from the State Compensation Board to hire a part-
time assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney. 
 
31
Commonwealth’s Attorneys, it could have so stated when it 
amended Code § 2.2-2802 in 2001.  But, it did not do so. 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and 
dissent in part.  I would issue the writ of mandamus.