Case Title: Morris v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0167

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: CATHERINE LYNETTE MORRIS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2012 WY 71Case Number: S-11-0167Decided: 05/22/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2012
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER’S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:CATHERINE LYNNETTE MORRIS,Appellant(Employee-Claimant),v.STATE 
OF WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS’ SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,Appellee(Respondent).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County
The 
Honorable Catherine E. Wilking, Judge 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
James 
C. Worthen of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, Wyoming 
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; John D. Rossetti, Deputy Attorney 
General; Michael J. Finn, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kelly Roseberry, 
Assistant Attorney General
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]     Catherine Lynnette Morris (Morris) submitted a worker’s compensation claim for 
permanent total disability (PTD) benefits, and the Wyoming Workers’ Safety and 
Compensation Division (Division) denied her claim.  Morris sought review by the Wyoming Medical Commission 
(Commission), which upheld the Division’s denial of benefits.  The district court 
affirmed.
 
[¶2]     On appeal, 
Morris does not contend that the 
Commission’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or that the 
Commission misapplied the law.  
Morris instead challenges two 
evidentiary rulings by the Commission: 1) the admission of a psychological 
report produced after the discovery cutoff; and 2) a limitation on the scope of 
Morris’ testimony to matters not 
testified to in the Division’s discovery deposition of Morris.
 
[¶3]     We find no abuse of 
discretion in the Commission’s admission of the psychological report.  The Commission did abuse its discretion 
in the limitation it placed on the testimony of Morris, but Morris did not 
object below to that limitation and thus waived her right to appeal that 
issue.  We therefore affirm. 

 
ISSUES
 
[¶4]     Morris presents the following issues on 
appeal:
 
Issue 1 – Did 
the Hearing Officer err when he admitted the expert report of Dr. Kenneth Bell into evidence?
 
Issue 2 – Did 
the Hearing Officer err when he denied Ms. Morris the 
opportunity to present live testimony before the Medical Commission on matters 
previously discussed in her discovery deposition?
 
FACTS
 
[¶5]     On August 20, 1995, 
Morris slipped and fell while working 
as a master control operator for KFNB-TV.  
She injured her back and was diagnosed with a left L5 herniated disc with 
compression of the S1 nerve root.  
On August 24, 1995, Morris underwent a hemilaminectomy and 
microdiscectomy.  Following her 
surgery and recovery, Morris returned to work for a different television station 
and continued working until the fall of 1996, when she stopped working due to 
increased back pain.  In October 
1996, Morris underwent a redo of the laminectomy and discectomy at the L5 disc 
level.  Thereafter, Morris was able to work until sometime in 2001.  
 
[¶6]     On July 1, 2001, 
Morris was seen in the emergency room 
following a fall down a set of stairs, a fall that did not occur while 
Morris was working.  She reported low back and left hip pain, 
and an MRI of her back was obtained.  
The MRI showed degenerative changes, disc disease at the L2-3 level, and 
the prior surgery at the L5-S1 level.  
The radiologist reported the following impression:
 
1.         
Postoperative changes of L5-S1 with enhancing scar tissue and no 
recurrent disc protrusion identified.
 
2.         
Desiccated slightly flattened disc L2-3 level with diffuse annular bulge 
but without discrete herniation or canal stenosis 
identified.
 
The Emergency 
Room Report concluded with the assessment: “low back pain status post fall,” and 
“left hip contusion.” 
 
[¶7]     On September 26, 2001, 
Morris saw Dr. Douglas Hemler for an independent medical evaluation 
and impairment rating.  
Dr. Hemler reviewed Morris’ medical history and performed physical and 
neurological assessments.  Dr. 
Hemler found Morris had a work-related lumbar spine injury with residual S1 
radiculopathy following two surgeries.  
He concluded Morris had reached maximum medical improvement and rated her 
impairment as a twelve percent whole person impairment.  Dr. Hemler felt Morris could lift twenty 
pounds, sit, walk, and stand as tolerated and that she could work in a sedentary 
position and perform light duty work.  

 
[¶8]     In November 2001, the 
Division notified Morris of the twelve percent whole person impairment rating 
and provided Morris a form that gave her the option of accepting the impairment 
rating or requesting a second opinion.  
On January 4, 2002, Morris returned the form to the Division with her 
signed agreement to the physical impairment rating and her application for a 
permanent partial impairment award based on that rating.  The Division issued its final 
determination granting the award on January 8, 2002.  
 
[¶9]     On February 9, 2002, 
Morris was seen at the emergency room 
after falling down metal stairs at a trailer home.  She was treated for a laceration to her 
left ankle and reported no other injuries or pain.  
 
[¶10]   On April 12, 2002, Morris saw Dr. Robert 
Narotzky, with whom she had 
consulted earlier concerning her back pain.  Dr. Narotzky reported that she had an 
extreme limp, reduced range of motion in her low back, and tenderness at L2-3 
and L5-S1.  Testing revealed 
evidence of a chronic left S1 radiculopathy and concordant pain response at L2-3 
and L5-S1.  Dr. Narotzky recommended 
against fusion at the L2-3 and L5-S1 levels, but he noted “Ms. Morris is being quite persistent.”  On May 15, 2002, Dr. Narotzky performed the L2-3 and L5-S1 
fusion.  
 
[¶11]   On July 9, 2002, Morris had a follow-up appointment with 
Dr. Narotzky.  Notes from that visit 
indicate:
 
She comes in 
today status post anterior posterior fusion.  She is doing fairly well with regard to 
her symptoms.  Her preoperative 
symptoms have resolved.
 
She is going 
through a tough time now, as her boyfriend recently left her and she is 
concerned about her financial situation.
 
Otherwise, she 
stated her preoperative pain is gone and she is improving on a daily 
basis.
 
She complains 
today of paraesthesia in her left upper extremity, mainly her pinky and ring 
finger.
 
[¶12]   From the fall of 2002 into January 
2003, Morris’ symptoms remained 
improved over her preoperative symptoms.  
In January 2003, Morris complained of pain in her left leg with numbness 
and tingling.  Because those 
complaints continued, Dr. Narotzky 
recommended a psychological evaluation to assist in determining whether 
Morris would be a candidate for 
implantation of a spinal cord stimulator.  

 
[¶13]   In April 2003, the Division 
referred Morris to an orthopedic 
surgeon for an independent evaluation.  
The Commission’s findings of fact accurately summarized that evaluation 
as follows:
 
            
On April 16, 2003, Morris was 
evaluated by Dr. 
Robert Knetsche, an Orthopedic Surgeon at the 
request of the Division.  Complaints 
included severe mid to lower lumbar pain, left leg pain, numbness below the 
knee, and weakness in the left ankle and possibly the quadriceps region.  Dr. Knetsche reviewed the medical 
treatment history, conducted an examination of Morris, and reviewed radiographic 
studies.  His assessment was severe 
low back pain due to multiple surgeries and degenerative disc disease with a 
possible fusion failure at L2-3 and S1 radiculopathy shown on EMG as well as 
examination.  The S1 radiculopathy 
was impairing her left lower extremity in the ankle and the foot.  The Panel notes that it appears the 
fusion was solid and no records or studies show a fusion 
failure.
 
            
In responding to specific questions by the Division, Dr. Knetsche believed that her current condition 
was related to the initial surgery following the work injury and set in motion a 
chain of events resulting in subsequent surgeries.  There did not appear to [be] any 
preexisting medical conditions.  
According to Dr. Knetsche, there was no evidence of symptom magnification 
on examination or through testing and she has multiple symptoms of back 
pain.  The Dr. opined that she was 
essentially totally disabled from work due to her severe back pain that prevents 
her from sitting or standing for any length of time and limits the distance she 
can walk and her need to take pain medications.
 
[¶14]   Also in April of 2003, 
Dr. Narotzky received the results of 
Morris’ psychological evaluation and 
recommended a trial placement of a spinal cord stimulator.  The stimulator was implanted, and on 
June 6, 2003, Morris returned to Dr. Narotzky for a follow-up examination.  Morris reported being “ecstatic with her 
results,” and the examination showed that her strength was normal, her gait was 
normal, and she was not using a cane. 
 
[¶15]   On August 15, 2003, on the 
Division’s referral, Morris saw 
Dr. Anne MacGuire for an independent evaluation and 
permanent impairment rating.  The 
Commission’s findings accurately summarized Dr. MacGuire’s 
evaluation as follows:
 
            
Dr. 
Anne MacGuire authored an opinion medical 
evaluation report on August 25, 2003.  
Dr. MacGuire’s report reflects a detailed medical record review 
and Dr. MacGuire also conducted a physical 
examination.  Morris was poorly 
conditioned.  She had generally 
equal leg circumferences and she was able to squat completely.  She showed positive pain behaviors 
throughout the evaluation and had inconsistent straight leg maneuvering 
results.  She was able to walk 
without the use of a cane and getting on and off the examination table.  She had giveaway weakness in her lower 
extremities that was inconsistent with her ability to stand.  Dr. MacGuire then performed a rating 
based on the injury to the L5-S1 lumbar level.  Dr. MacGuire was concerned about the 
impact of the L2-3 level and whether it should be rated as there was no 
indication the L2-3 level was related to the work injury and there were notes of 
prior injuries including injuring her back lifting laundry and a motor vehicle 
accident.  The L2-3 level was likely 
related to degenerative conditions and poor health habits, including smoking and 
drug use (Dr. MacGuire apparently was not aware of the post accident falls and 
the complaints that began at that time).  
Dr. MacGuire did not include the L2-3 level in the rating.  Morris was rated with a 23% whole person 
impairment.  Dr. MacGuire felt she 
could return to light sedentary work and she has been able to drive herself to 
Denver from Casper, and was taking care of a disabled son.  Dr. MacGuire 
opined that when factoring her known history of drug and substance abuse, 
emotionally she may consider herself disabled.
 
[¶16]   On September 18, 2003, the Division 
notified Morris of the twenty-three percent whole person impairment rating and 
again provided Morris a form that gave her the option of accepting the 
impairment rating or requesting a second opinion.  On October 1, 2003, Morris returned the 
form to the Division with her signed agreement to the physical impairment rating 
and application for a permanent partial impairment award based on that 
rating.  The Division issued its 
final determination granting the award on October 7, 2003.  
 
[¶17]   During the remaining months of 
2003, Morris continued to complain of 
low back pain and numbness in her legs, and Dr. 
Narotzsky referred her to Dr. Tuenis Zondag, a pain management physician.  Dr. Zondag 
obtained a history, conducted an examination, and provided the following 
assessment:
 
1.         
Postlaminectomy syndrome at the L5-S1 with fusion with footdrop on the 
left.  On examination, Patient has 
atrophy and weakness and difficulty with gait.
2.         
Status post fusion of symptomatic disc L2-L3.
3.         
Major depression disorder.
 
Dr. Zondag prescribed an 
antidepressant and pain and sleep medications.  He opined that Morris is not able to return to competitive 
employment.  
 
[¶18]   Acting on an application that dated 
back to November 29, 2002, the Social Security Administration (SSA), on December 
15, 2004, found that Morris was 
entitled to Social Security Disability Benefits dating back to January 1, 2001. 
The SSA determination noted that Morris 
asserted a disability “due to severe low back and left leg pain due to 
post-laminectomy syndrome at L5-S1 with foot drop on the left, chronic hepatitis 
C, a major depressive disorder, history of PTSD, and a history of polysubstance 
abuse.”  The SSA’s findings in 
support of its disability determination included the 
following:
 
2.         
The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 
January 1, 2001.
 
3.         
The medical evidence establishes the claimant is status-post disectomy 
[sic] and has post-laminectomy syndrome with foot drop on the left, chronic 
hepatitis C, a major depressive disorder, and a history of PTSD, impairments 
which are considered to be “severe” under Social Security 
Regulations.
 
[¶19]   Between December 2004 and 
Morris’ July 2008 application for 
permanent total disability benefits, Morris’ medical records show the 
following:
 
December 
2004: Morris experienced difficulty with her spinal 
stimulator following a vehicle accident.  
She also slipped on ice and fell on her left leg;
 
January 
2005:  Morris was seen in the emergency room for apparent 
seizures while being transported in a police vehicle following 
arrest;
 
September 
2005:  Morris fell climbing down from a ladder and landed on 
concrete with pain in her right shoulder and arm;
 
April 
2006:  Morris reported to the emergency room with chest pain, 
facial twitching and confusion;
 
August 
2007:  Morris saw Dr. Daniel 
Cummings who 
reported:
 
            
This 48-year-old woman comes in today as a new patient.  She had a hysterectomy with ovarian 
removal about 6½ months ago for cervical cancer and an ovarian tumor.  She felt good for approximately 3 months 
after surgery but has had severe fatigue, weakness, nausea, and diarrhea for the 
past 3 months.  She also had 
vomiting for about 5 days recently that is now gone.  She has had recurrent hot flashes while 
taking Premarin 0.625 mg once daily; she had fewer hot flashes when she took the 
same dose of Premarin twice daily.  
She has had chronic spinal pain after spinal surgery for many years and 
previously for about 3 years took OxyContin 20 mg 3 times daily plus an extra 
immediate release dose of oxycodone when needed for breakthrough pain; she took 
herself off all pain medications against medical advice about 2 years ago 
because of rather severe dysphoria.  
Since then she has refused to take any chronic pain medications, 
including fentanyl and Suboxone.  A 
spinal stimulator was inserted into her right buttock about three years ago with 
significant benefit.  She has 
chronic upper abdominal pain for which she takes nonprescription Prilosec 40 mg 
every morning prior to a breakfast low in protein.  
 
December 
2007:  Morris saw Dr. Narotzky 
and reported that her spinal cord stimulator was shut off during gall bladder 
surgery in September and since then she had experienced increased pain in her 
back and right leg.  Dr. Narotzky’s impression was “failed back 
syndrome,” and he ordered additional radiographic and nerve conduction 
studies;  
 
January 
2008:  Radiographic studies of the cervical 
spine showed multilevel minimal disc bulging with no stenosis or narrowing.  Lumbar spine studies showed the fusions 
at L2-3 and L5-S1, multilevel disc bulging, possible neural foraminal narrowing, 
with no cord compression or central stenosis at any level;  
 
February 
2008:  Dr. Narotzky 
performed surgery to implant a new spinal cord stimulator and to treat left 
carpal tunnel syndrome.  The 
Division denied benefits for any costs related to the carpal tunnel treatment, 
and the record contains no appeal of that denial;  
 
April 
2008:  Morris apparently had follow-up treatment related to 
neck pain as the record contains the Division’s final determinations denying 
payment of charges for a cervical CT and cervical spine treatment.1  
 
[¶20]   On July 20, 2008, Morris submitted an application to the Division for 
PTD benefits, and on July 24, 2008, the Division issued a final determination 
denying the application.  The 
Division denied the PTD benefits on the ground that Morris had not shown that her 1995 back injury caused 
her permanent disability.  
Morris appealed the Division’s 
denial, and on August 6, 2008, the matter was referred to the Commission for 
hearing.  
 
[¶21]   On October 9, 2008, the Commission 
issued a scheduling order setting the case for an evidentiary hearing on March 
13, 2009.  On January 28, 2009, 
Morris requested a continuance of the 
evidentiary hearing, and on January 30, 2009, the Commission issued an order 
rescheduling the evidentiary hearing for July 10, 2009.  On May 19, 2009, the Division and 
Morris filed a stipulated motion to 
again continue the evidentiary hearing, and on May 26, 2009, the Commission 
issued an order vacating the evidentiary hearing and setting a status conference 
for September 14, 2009.  On 
September 15, 2009, the Commission issued an order setting the case for an 
evidentiary hearing on January 20, 2010.  
The order also scheduled a pretrial conference for December 21, 2009, and 
directed that all discovery be completed prior to the pretrial conference.  
 
[¶22]   On December 21, 2009, following the 
pretrial conference, the Commission issued a Final Scheduling Order confirming 
the January 20, 2010, evidentiary hearing and requiring Morris to file her 
disclosure statement by January 4, 2010, and the Division to file its disclosure 
statement by January 11, 2010.  
After the pretrial conference, on December 30, 2009, the Division 
received the psychological evaluation and report of Dr. Kenneth Bell.  
Counsel for the Division provided a copy of the report to Morris’ attorney and advised him that the Division 
would be designating the report as an exhibit but not calling Dr. Bell as a witness.  Counsel also advised Morris’ attorney that Dr. Bell would be out of his office and 
unavailable for a deposition until January 11, 2010.   
 
[¶23]   After the parties filed their 
disclosure statements, Morris filed a 
motion in limine seeking to exclude the Division’s Exhibit 2, the psychological 
evaluation prepared by Dr. Bell.  Morris objected to the report as untimely because it 
was submitted after the discovery cutoff and “raises a whole host of new issues 
not previously addressed by any medical provider or psychological evaluation of 
the Employee-Claimant.”  On January 
15, 2010, the Commission issued an Order Ruling on Motion in Limine and Case 
Management Order.  In that order, 
the Commission, through its hearing officer, denied the request to exclude Dr. 
Bell’s report but ordered that Dr. Bell would not be permitted to testify at the 
hearing unless Morris consented to that testimony.  After addressing the motion in limine, 
the hearing officer added the following provision to the 
order:
 
            
In addition, the deposition of Morris was taken and submitted as an exhibit to the 
Division’s disclosure statement.  
Counsel for Morris has not objected to the inclusion of this 
deposition.  The disclosure 
statements have been submitted to the Panel and read by the Panel.  As such, those matters inquired into in 
Morris’ deposition shall not be subject 
to testimony at the hearing.
 
[¶24]   On January 19, 2010, the Division 
and Morris filed a stipulated motion to 
vacate the evidentiary hearing and submit the case on briefs only.  The joint motion noted Morris’ motion in limine to exclude Dr. Bell’s report, and it noted entry of the 
Commission’s Order Ruling on Motion in Limine and Case Management Order.  The motion stated that “the parties 
agree that this matter should be submitted to the Commission on the Disclosure 
Statements,” and it further stated that the “parties agree this Motion does not 
constitute a waiver, on behalf of Employee-Claimant, of any objection on appeal 
to the Medical Commission’s January 15, 2010 Order Ruling on Motion in Limine 
and Case Management Order.”   
 
 
[¶25]   On January 20, 2010, the Commission 
convened to consider the case on the parties’ written submissions, and on 
February 8, 2010, the Commission issued its decision upholding the Division’s 
denial of PTD benefits.  In so 
ruling, the Commission concluded:
 
            
11.       
Morris has several physical 
conditions that appear to impact her ability to work including poorly explained 
seizures that began prior to the work accident, cervical pain and symptoms into 
her upper extremities, carpal tunnel syndrome, upper back pain, jaw pain and 
hand pain.  She also has 
hepatitis.  The evidence is also 
clear that her psychological condition has a great impact on her condition and 
ability to work.  The record shows 
symptom exaggeration, pain behaviors, inconsistent and inaccurate exam results, 
non-anatomic symptoms, give way weakness, pain with light touching, and equal 
leg measurements showing no atrophy or muscle wasting.  Morris has a long history of poly 
substance abuse and the file documents methamphetamine use to at least 
2008.  Methamphetamine use was 
reported to increase her low back pain.  
Psychological diagnosis have noted depression, psychological problems 
impacting her physical symptoms, post traumatic stress disorder, substance 
abuse, and malingering or somatoform disorder.
 
* * * * 

 
            
13.       
Morris’ overall impairment or 
disability from the L5-S1 injury, the surgeries to that level, and the residual 
S1 radiculopathy, is only moderate.  
Morris’ greatest obstacles to 
her overall well being and ability to secure employment are related to her 
profound psychological conditions and their sequella and substance abuse.  Her many other unrelated physical issues 
also impact her ability to find gainful employment.
 
[¶26]   Morris sought review of the Commission’s decision in 
district court, and the district court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion 
in the admission of Dr. Bell’s 
report or in the limitation on Morris’ 
testimony.  Morris filed a notice of appeal to this Court, again 
challenging only the Commission’s evidentiary rulings and not its findings of 
fact or conclusions of law.
 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶27]   We review administrative decisions 
based on the factors set forth in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, 
which provides:
 
(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:
 
(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and
 
(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:
 
(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;
 
(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;
 
(C) 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;
 
(D) 
Without observance of procedure required by law; or
 
(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2011).
 
[¶28]   “Admissibility of evidence is 
committed to the discretion of the hearing examiner. A hearing examiner abuses 
his discretion when his decision shocks the conscience of the court and appears 
to be so unfair and inequitable that a reasonable person could not abide 
it.” Watkins v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. 
Comm’n, 2011 WY 49, ¶ 21, 250 P.3d 1082, 1089 
(Wyo. 2011) 
(quoting Goddard v. Colonel Bozeman’s 
Rest., 914 P.2d 1233, 1238 
(Wyo. 1996)); see also McIntosh v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. 
Comm’n, 2007 WY 108, ¶ 42, 
162 P.3d 483, 494 (Wyo. 
2007).  We have also defined the 
exercise of discretion as “a composite of many 
things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a 
sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.”  Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 
2003 WY 126, ¶ 11, 77 P.3d 412, 416 (Wyo. 2003) 
(quoting Pasenelli 
v. Pasenelli, 
2002 WY 159, ¶ 11, 57 P.3d 324, 329 (Wyo. 
2002)).
 
[¶29]   In an appeal from a district 
court’s appellate review of an administrative decision, we review the case as if 
it came directly from the hearing examiner, affording no deference to the 
district court’s decision.  Deloge v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2011 WY 
154, ¶ 5, 264 P.3d 28, 30 (Wyo. 2011); In re Kaczmarek, 2009 WY 110, ¶ 7, 215 P.3d 277, 280 
(Wyo. 2009).
 
DISCUSSION
 
Report of 
Dr. Bell
 
[¶30]   This Court has held that when a 
party claims an error in the admission of evidence on the basis of unfair 
surprise and prejudice, we will not consider that alleged error unless the party 
requested a continuance upon learning of the alleged surprise.  Parrish v. Groathouse Constr., Inc., 2006 WY 33, ¶ 15 n.4, 130 P.3d 502, 507 n.4 (Wyo. 2006); 
Meyer v. Rodabaugh, 982 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Wyo. 1999) 
(failure to request continuance on ground of unfair 
surprise precludes party from contending on appeal that he was prejudiced).  Morris did not request a continuance after receiving 
Dr. Bell’s report.  Nonetheless, Morris did clearly identify 
her objection to the report and moved for its exclusion, and the parties 
stipulated to preservation of that objection.  Under these circumstances, we will 
consider the claim of error in allowing the report to be admitted into 
evidence.
 
[¶31]   We have considered the following 
factors in determining whether under the circumstances an expert report could be 
fairly admitted after the disclosure deadline:

(1)  whether 
allowing the evidence would incurably surprise or prejudice the opposing 
party;
 
(2)  whether 
excluding the evidence would incurably prejudice the party seeking to introduce 
it;
 
(3)  whether 
the party seeking to introduce the testimony failed to comply with the 
evidentiary rules inadvertently or willfully;
 
(4)  the 
impact of allowing the proposed testimony on the orderliness and efficiency of 
the trial; and
 
(5)  the 
impact of excluding the proposed testimony on the completeness of the 
information before the court or jury.
 
Winterholler v. 
Zolessi, 989 P.2d 621, 628 (Wyo. 1999).  
 
[¶32]   The hearing officer, in denying the 
motion to exclude Dr. 
Bell’s report, reasoned as 
follows:
 
            
1.         
This case originates from a work injury in 1995 and involves a claim for 
permanent total disability.  This 
matter was referred to the Medical Commission in August of 2008.  Several hearing dates were set that were 
continued at the request of counsel due to ongoing discovery.  The last continuance motion was a 
stipulated motion filed in May 2009, and one of the represented grounds for the 
continuance was the Division’s need for an independent medical exam.  Both sides have been less than 
expeditious in conducting discovery.
 
            
2.         
It appears that examinations were obtained from Dr. Ruttle, an orthopedist, and 
Dr. Kenneth Bell, a psychologist.  Originally the Division was going to use 
a psychologist in Colorado, but at the request of counsel for Morris, the 
Division had to find a psychologist in Casper.  Presumably, had another provider in 
Colorado been located earlier, a report would have been generated sooner.  However, some delay was encountered 
accommodating the request of counsel for Morris.
 
            
3.         
The Report of Dr. Bell notes that he saw Morris between August and December 2009.  It appears that multiple visits were 
necessary for Dr. Bell to review massive records, obtain a complete history, 
perform psychological testing, and conduct a psychological evaluation.  The last time Morris saw Dr. Bell was 
December 15, 2009.  Counsel for 
Morris appears to have known of this ongoing evaluation and even wrote to the 
counsel for the Division in late December regarding this matter.  Counsel for Morris did not file a motion 
to compel, a motion to expedite the report, a motion to enlarge the time, or a 
motion to continue, based on this pending report.  Counsel for the Division raised this 
issue with Dr. Bell and that his report was forthcoming at the pretrial 
conference held on December 21, 2009.  
Counsel for Morris did not object or raise any issue as to this report at 
the pretrial conference.  Further, 
since it was known by Morris and her 
counsel that an evaluation was occurring, counsel for Morris could have arranged an independent 
psychological evaluation.
 
            
4.         
Once the report was received, counsel for Morris acknowledges he was given the opportunity to 
depose Dr. Bell the week before the hearing.  While this is short notice, counsel does 
not state why he was not available for the entire week of January 11, 2010 or 
why other counsel in his office could not have participated in the 
deposition.  In fact, at the 
pretrial conference, counsel for Morris advised his schedule was fairly open for 
purposes of completing depositions in this case.  There is no reason shown why counsel 
could not have obtained an expedited transcript of the deposition to submit to 
the hearing panel.
 
            
5.         
The parties have submitted what amounts to massive disclosure 
statements.  The factual history and 
materials referenced in Dr. Bell’s report are contained elsewhere in the 
disclosure statements of counsel and the opinions of Dr. Bell are not new, but 
likewise noted through other documents in the disclosure statements, (i.e., 
inaccurate history, substance abuse, psychological problems, exaggeration of 
symptoms, a psychological basis for her physical symptoms, prior and subsequent 
traumatic events, and a history of symptoms that were not medically 
verified).  As such, there is no 
true surprise, and these matters are documented elsewhere in 
record.
 
            
6.         
Based on a complete consideration of the history of this case, the large 
volume of materials submitted, a review of the factual materials submitted, the 
matters at issue in Dr. Bell’s report, the arguments of counsel, and the interests of 
justice and equity, the motion in limine should be denied as to Dr. Bell’s report.  However, under the facts presented, 
Dr. Bell shall not be allowed to testify at the 
hearing either through deposition or in person, unless consented to by counsel 
for Morris.
 
[¶33]   Although the hearing officer did 
not expressly identify the Winterholler factors in his analysis, 
the above analysis does illustrate that the hearing officer considered the 
appropriate factors.  In particular, 
the hearing officer considered surprise, prejudice, the impact of excluding the 
report, whether the timeliness of the report was due to a willful act of the 
Division or its counsel, and the orderliness and efficiency of the 
proceedings.  
 
[¶34]   Of particular importance, of 
course, is the question of unfair surprise and prejudice to Morris.  
On this question, we find that it is difficult, given the expansive 
record and medical history that the Commission had before it, to find either 
unfair surprise or prejudice.  
Dr. Bell was not the first medical provider to 
note the trauma in Morris’ history or 
to opine that her psychological issues and addictive behaviors may impact her 
treatment, recovery, and her ability to return to gainful employment.  Likewise, the record is replete with 
evidence of Morris’ physical ailments 
unrelated to her back injury, and opinions that those conditions disable her 
from continued employment.  Included 
in this evidence is Claimant’s Exhibit 20, the 483-page Social Security 
Administration file relating to Morris’ 
application for Social Security Disability benefits, which contains the 
disability determination itself and extensive medical and psychological reports 
on Morris. 
 
[¶35]   Under these circumstances, the 
Commission’s admission of Dr. Bell’s 
report does not “shock the conscience of the Court” 
or “appear to be so unfair and inequitable that a reasonable person could not 
abide it.”  See Watkins, ¶ 21, 250 P.3d  at 1089.  We thus find no abuse of discretion in 
the admission of Dr. 
Bell’s report.
 
Limitation on 
the Testimony of Morris
 
[¶36]   In her second contention on appeal, 
Morris argues that the Commission erred 
by limiting her testimony to matters not discussed in the discovery deposition 
taken by the Division.  We 
agree.
 
[¶37]   This Court has described a party’s 
right to due process of law in a contested case proceeding as 
follows:
 
Parties 
to administrative proceedings are entitled to due process of law. Pfeil 
v. Amax Coal West, Inc., 
908 P.2d 956, 961 (Wyo. 
1995); Amoco 
Production Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 
882 P.2d 866, 872 (Wyo. 
1994). 
“Procedural due process principles require reasonable notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard before government action may substantially affect a 
significant property interest.” Pfeil, 
908 P.2d  at 961; 
see also Whiteman 
v. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, 
Department of 
Employment, 
984 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Wyo. 
1999).
 
            
The procedures outlined in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act are 
designed to provide parties in administrative proceedings with due process. 
Roush 
v. Pari-Mutuel Commission of State of Wyoming, 
917 P.2d 1133, 1143 (Wyo. 
1996). 
For example, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107(a) 
(LEXIS 1999) states in relevant part: “In any contested case, all parties shall 
be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice.” Additionally, 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107(j) 
(LEXIS 1999) provides in pertinent part: “Opportunity shall be afforded all 
parties to respond and present evidence and argument on all issues 
involved.”
 
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Wyo. 
State Bd. of Equalization, 7 P.3d 900, 905 (Wyo. 
2000).
 
[¶38]   We have further held that “[w]hile 
administrative agencies are afforded considerable latitude in the procedures to 
be followed in such hearings, that flexibility does not go so far as to permit 
procedures which are contrary to statutory mandate or procedures which allow the 
agency to act without collecting the necessary facts.”  Jackson v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. 
Div., 786 P.2d 874, 878 
(Wyo. 1990).  Of course, important 
information in any worker’s compensation case will be the claimant’s version of 
events and chronology of symptoms coupled with that claimant’s demeanor and 
affect during testimony.  See Kenyon v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2011 WY 
14, ¶ 38, 247 P.3d 845, 856 
(Wyo. 2011) (fact finder is in best position to judge a witness’ demeanor, 
truthfulness and veracity); Herrera v. 
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 103, ¶ 15, 236 P.3d 277, 282 (Wyo. 2010) (fact 
finder has opportunity to observe witness and hear testimony and court therefore 
defers to its credibility determinations); Huntington v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ 
Comp. Div., 2007 WY 124, ¶ 
11, 163 P.3d 839, 842 (Wyo. 
2007) (assessing witness credibility is 
responsibility of the trier of fact).
 
[¶39]   Balanced against these 
considerations is the agency’s responsibility to exclude “irrelevant, immaterial 
or unduly repetitious evidence.”  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-108(a) (LexisNexis 
2011).  This Court has said, 
however, that “evidence which in the context of the litigation is merely 
repetitious or time consuming may be excluded, but only if time consideration 
substantially outweighs the incremental probative value of the proffered 
evidence.”  Winterholler, 989 P.2d  at 629.  And, like other courts, we have observed 
that live testimony is preferred over deposition testimony.  See King v. State, 780 P.2d 943, 954 (Wyo. 1989) 
(W.R.E. 804(a) unavailability requirement “reflects a preference for live 
testimony”); Waggoner v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 771 P.2d 1195, 1201 
(Wyo. 1989) (W.R.C.P. 32 is “premised on the principle that oral testimony is 
preferable to a deposition”) (citing Napier v. Bossard, 102 F.2d 467 (2nd 
Cir. 1939) (“per Learned Hand, deposition is treated as a substitute 
– second best, not to be used when original is 
available”).
 
[¶40]   Given a claimant’s right to present 
evidence on all of the issues involved in the case, and given the preference for 
live testimony over a cold transcript, we are at a loss to understand why the 
hearing officer in this case would sua sponte move to save time and avoid 
repetition by choosing a discovery deposition over the claimant’s live 
testimony.  It is true that there 
had been no objection to the Division’s proffer of Morris’ deposition transcript, but, likewise, there 
had been no objection to Morris’ 
designation as a witness to testify “concerning all matters in this case.”  If the hearing officer desired to limit 
the taking of evidence to save time and avoid redundancy, the evidence 
restricted should have been the deposition testimony, in favor of the live 
testimony.  The live testimony was 
the more probative of the evidence because, by its very nature, it offered the 
Commission more and better information concerning the claimant and her benefits 
claim than the transcript could provide.
 
[¶41]   A worker’s compensation claimant 
has the right to testify in the contested case hearing that will determine that 
claimant’s entitlement to benefits, and while a hearing officer may limit that 
testimony in a manner consistent with the applicable rules of evidence, we find 
that it is arbitrary to limit it to matters not discussed in a discovery 
deposition.  We thus find that the 
Commission abused its discretion in limiting Morris’ testimony in this case.2
 
[¶42]   Our finding of an abuse of 
discretion does not, however, end the inquiry in this case.  This Court has long held that it will 
not consider issues on appeal that were not first 
raised below in the administrative action.  
Beall v. Sky Blue Enter., 
Inc., 2012 WY 38, ¶ 15, 271 P.3d 1022, 1029 (Wyo. 2012); Watkins, ¶ 22, 250 P.3d at 1089-90; Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 33, 188 P.3d 554, 562-63 (Wyo. 2008); 
Shaffer v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ 
Safety & Comp. Div., 960 P.2d 504, 507-08 (Wyo. 1998); McCulloch Gas Transmission Co. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of Wyoming, 627 P.2d 173, 180 (Wyo. 1981); 
see 
also 
W.R.A.P. 
12.09(a) 
(“Review shall be conducted by the reviewing court and shall be confined to the 
record as supplemented pursuant to Rule 12.08 and to the issues set forth in the 
petition and raised before the agency.”).  We have explained:
 
We 
have recognized in more than a few decisions . . . that orderly procedure and 
good administration require that objections to the proceedings of an 
administrative agency be made while it has opportunity for correction in order 
to raise issues reviewable by the courts.
 
Beall, ¶ 15, 271 P.3d  
at 1029 (quoting Watkins, ¶ 22, 250 
P.3d at 1989). 
 
[¶43]   The rule applies equally to claims 
of procedural errors or due process violations. 
 
A 
party is obligated to object at the agency level to the administrative 
tribunal’s procedure so that the tribunal will have an opportunity to correct 
its errors. If a party has an opportunity to object to the administrative 
tribunal’s procedural rulings and fails to do so, it waives its right to 
challenge the administrative tribunal’s procedure on 
appeal.
 
Amoco Prod. 
Co., 7 P.3d  at 906 
(citations omitted); see also Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div. v. 
Wright, 983 P.2d 1227, 1232 
(Wyo. 1999) (“'Due process’ is not a talismanic term 
which guarantees review in this court of procedural errors correctable by 
the administrative tribunal.”) (emphasis in original), overruled on other grounds, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety 
& Comp. Div. 2004 WY 92, 
95 P.3d 794 (Wyo. 
2004).
 
[¶44]   Contrary to her approach to the 
ruling on the admission of Dr. Bell’s 
report, Morris did not specifically 
object to the limitation the Commission placed on Morris’ testimony.  Morris did not object to the admission 
of the Division’s discovery deposition, she did not file an objection to the 
Commission’s order limiting her testimony, and, unlike the issue of Dr. Bell’s 
report, she did not identify the limitation as a ruling to which she objected 
when she stipulated to the submission of the case on the documents.  Under these circumstances, we cannot 
find a preservation of her objection in the stipulated motion to have the case 
heard on the documents.  See Dunning v. Sheridan Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 982 P.2d 704, 708 (Wyo. 1999) (to 
avoid a waiver, “objections must have particularity so as to properly identify 
the question and to give notice of the contention”).
 
[¶45]   Thus, although the Commission 
abused its discretion with the limitation it placed on Morris’ testimony, we find that the issue was not 
properly raised before the Commission, and we will not consider it as grounds 
for reversal.3
 
 
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶46]   This Court finds no abuse of 
discretion in the Commission’s admission of Dr. Bell’s 
psychological report, but we find that the Commission did abuse its discretion 
in the limitation it placed on the testimony of Morris.  
Morris did not object below to that limitation, however, and we thus 
conclude she waived her right to appeal that issue. The decision of the 
Commission is affirmed.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES
1The Commission’s decision, at Finding No. 45, includes a discussion of 
the cervical spine imaging.  On 
review of those records, however, they appear to be the records of a patient 
other than Morris.  Those findings 
are therefore not discussed in this opinion.  
2With this holding, we do not intend to suggest that the Commission may 
not use the expedited procedure provided for in Chapter XI, Section 1 of its 
Rules.  The rule allows the claim to 
be reviewed on the documents, without the presentation of live testimony, upon 
agreement of the parties or if there is no disputed issue of material fact.  Additionally, it provides for a 
formalized designation of the proceeding, presumably at the outset of the 
case.  The expedited proceeding thus 
differs from the type of limitation placed on the claimant’s testimony in this 
case, just before the hearing.
3A claimant 
must be given the opportunity to present his or her own live testimony, without 
the type of restriction the Commission imposed in this case.  We are convinced, however, under these 
particular circumstances, with the weight of contrary evidence the Commission 
had before it, that the live testimony of Morris, even without the impermissible 
limitations, would not have changed the result in this case.