Case Title: State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid

Citation: 2014-Ohio-538

Docket Number: 2012-1704

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-538.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-538 
THE STATE EX REL. DIFRANCO, APPELLANT, v. THE CITY OF  
SOUTH EUCLID ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-538.] 
Public-records requests—Statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(1)—Attorney 
fees under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b). 
(No. 2012-1704—Submitted June 4, 2013—Decided February 19, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 97713,  
2012-Ohio-4399. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is a public-records mandamus case originally brought in the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals.  All parties agree that the writ claim became 
moot when all the requested records were produced after the filing and during the 
pendency of the mandamus action.  The remaining issue is whether Emilie 
DiFranco is, as she claims, entitled to statutory damages and attorney fees, given 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
that (i) the city delayed two months in providing any response to the request at all 
and (ii) the original production of documents was incomplete—only after 
DiFranco presented an expert affidavit indicating that there were additional 
records to be produced did the city complete its production of the requested 
records. 
{¶ 2} The Eighth District denied both statutory damages and attorney 
fees.  After granting summary judgment to the city on mootness grounds, the 
appellate court concluded, “DiFranco has failed to establish any viable public 
benefit that would permit this court to award statutory damages and/or attorney 
fees.”  2012-Ohio-4399, ¶ 10.  DiFranco has appealed. 
{¶ 3} With respect to DiFranco’s claim for statutory damages, we hold, 
contrary to the decision below, that the question whether DiFranco demonstrated 
sufficient public benefit is irrelevant.  In authorizing an award of such damages, 
R.C. 149.43(C)(1) does not condition that award on applying the public-benefit 
test.  We therefore reverse the Eighth District’s denial of statutory damages, and 
we remand with instructions that the court of appeals consider the amount of 
damages in light of the statutory criteria, with particular consideration to be given 
to the applicability of the mitigating factors in R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(a) and (b). 
{¶ 4} As for DiFranco’s claim for attorney fees, we hold that it is barred 
here for a reason not stated by the Eighth District.  R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b) 
conditions any award of attorney fees on the court’s having “render[ed] a 
judgment that orders the public office or the person responsible for the public 
record to comply with” the public-records law.  Because the judgment entered by 
the court of appeals disposed of the case on grounds of mootness, the plain 
language of the statute prohibits an award of attorney fees. 
{¶ 5} Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part, and we remand 
with instructions that the appellate court determine the proper amount of statutory 
damages to be awarded. 
January Term, 2014 
3 
 
Facts 
{¶ 6} DiFranco sent a public-records request by certified mail to Keith 
Benjamin on October 13, 2011.  Benjamin is an official of the city of South 
Euclid who serves as its records custodian.  DiFranco’s request sought nine 
categories of public records.  (Benjamin and South Euclid are both appellees in 
this matter, and will be referred to collectively as “the city.”)  The certified-mail 
receipt evidences the request’s arrival at the city’s offices on October 14, 2011. 
{¶ 7} The city provided no response of any kind to DiFranco between its 
receipt of the request on October 14 and the filing of DiFranco’s mandamus 
action on December 16, 2011—a lapse of two months.  After DiFranco filed the 
mandamus action in the Eighth District, Benjamin saw the request for the first 
time on December 19, when the city was served with the mandamus complaint.  
On December 20, 2011, Benjamin electronically produced a set of responsive 
documents, which did not contain all the requested items. 
{¶ 8} On December 27, 2011, the city filed its answer and motion to 
dismiss.  The motion asked for dismissal on grounds of mootness because the city 
had produced the records the week before.1  The city attributed its delay in 
responding to an internal office difficulty in processing the mail.  DiFranco’s 
memorandum in opposition, filed on January 13, 2012, argued that she was 
entitled to statutory damages and attorney fees under the standards set forth in the 
statute, on account of the city’s two-month delay in providing any response.  The 
city’s reply, filed on March 16, argued that DiFranco had failed to prove a public 
benefit as a prerequisite to obtaining attorney fees and also argued that damages 
                                          
 
1 Benjamin’s affidavit, an attachment to the motion to dismiss, additionally stated that DiFranco 
has “made dozens of public record requests over the last six to seven years” and that in the past 
she had called or otherwise contacted Benjamin when she felt that her request had not been 
fulfilled—a course of action that she did not take in this case.  Respondents’ motion to dismiss 
explicitly faulted DiFranco for not doing so:  “Had she taken the time as she has always done in 
the past, her request would have been fulfilled immediately [and] she would have avoiding having 
to hire an attorney and avoided the corresponding attorney’s fees.”  
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or fees were not mandatory because, although the city received the request in 
October, the records custodian did not actually lay eyes on it until December 19. 
{¶ 9} The court converted the motion to dismiss to one for summary 
judgment on account of the evidentiary submissions in support of the motion. 
{¶ 10} On February 8, 2012, DiFranco submitted the affidavit of Brian 
Johnson, a certified public accountant, who offered his conclusion that certain 
documents that would be responsive to DiFranco’s request must exist but had not 
been produced.  By order dated July 3, 2012, the court of appeals required the city 
to address the points raised by Johnson’s affidavit, and to produce any responsive 
documents.  Thereafter, on July 20, the city issued a certification, stating that 
additional documents had been produced on June 18, and describing those 
documents in detail.  The filing also certified that no further documents were 
outstanding. 
{¶ 11} In her August 8 response to the city’s certification, DiFranco 
reiterated her entitlement to statutory damages and attorney fees in light of the 
chronology of the case, and she specifically cited the mandatory criteria for both 
damages and fees. 
{¶ 12} Finally, on September 26, 2012, the Eighth District issued its 
decision and judgment, which dismissed the mandamus complaint as moot and 
denied both statutory damages and attorney fees on the grounds that DiFranco had 
not established a “public benefit.”  DiFranco appealed. 
Analysis 
{¶ 13} DiFranco claims entitlement to both damages and fees under the 
mandatory-fee criteria enacted in the September 2007 amendments to R.C. 
149.43, the public-records law.  Sub.S.B. No. 9, 151 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8219, 
8236.  The argument calls for a construction and application of those statutory 
amendments and therefore presents a question of law that we review de novo on 
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
appeal.  See Akron Centre Plaza, L.L.C. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 145, 2010-Ohio-5035, 942 N.E.2d 1054, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 14} To be sure, when the appeals court renders a decision on a 
discretionary issue, we defer to that court’s discretion as the originating court.  
See State ex rel. Cranford v. Cleveland, 103 Ohio St.3d 196, 2004-Ohio-4884, 
814 N.E.2d 1218, ¶ 24, quoting State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman, 92 Ohio St.3d 312, 
314, 750 N.E.2d 156 (2001) (“ ‘In an appeal of a judgment granting or denying 
fees in a public record case, we review whether the court abused its discretion’ ”); 
State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-Ohio-4149, 914 N.E.2d 159, 
¶ 15-17 (abuse-of-discretion standard applied in reviewing fee issue that did not 
invoke mandatory-fee criteria and was therefore a discretionary-fee case).  The 
city relies on Cranford and urges that we defer to the court of appeals’ judgment, 
but deference would be due only when the grant or denial of attorney fees 
occurred under discretionary criteria.  This case presents the an issue of damages 
and attorney fees authorized by specific statutory criteria; therefore, a 
determination of entitlement to damages and fees is not a discretionary decision of 
the court below, but rather a determination of how to apply legal standards.  That 
determination lies within this court’s authority to review legal issues de novo on 
appeal. 
A. The public-benefit test was developed to guide the discretionary 
award of attorney fees before the 2007 amendments 
{¶ 15} “Effective September 29, 2007, R.C. 149.43 was amended, and 
subsection (C) now provides new standards for awarding attorney fees in public-
records mandamus cases.”  State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Seneca Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs., 120 Ohio St.3d 372, 2008-Ohio-6253, 899 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 48.  This 
amendment “[s]pecifies certain circumstances in which a court must award * * * 
reasonable attorney fees to the aggrieved person in a mandamus action, and 
certain circumstances in which a court must reduce or deny an award of * * * 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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attorney fees to the aggrieved person.”  Legislative Service Commission Final 
Analysis of Sub.H.B. 9, 126th General Assembly, http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/ 
bills/previousga.htm 2 
{¶ 16} Prior to the 2007 amendments, R.C. 149.43(C) generally referred 
to attorney fees as available relief, but did not specify criteria under which such 
fees ought to be awarded.  E.g., 2001 Sub.H.B. No. 196, 149 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
6395, 6402. Under that earlier version of the statute, this court had held that “[a]n 
award of attorney fees under R.C. 149.43 is not mandatory” and that “[i]n 
exercising its discretion” to determine the propriety of a fee award, “a court 
considers the reasonableness of the government’s failure to comply with the 
public-records request and the degree to which the public will benefit from the 
release of the records in question.”  State ex rel. Beacon-Journal Publishing Co. 
v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 59.  See also 
Cranford, 103 Ohio St.3d 196, 2004-Ohio-4884, 814 N.E.2d 1218, ¶ 26 (attorney 
fees not allowed because the records requested “were mostly beneficial to [the 
relator], and he ultimately received the records in time for his civil service 
commission hearing”). 
{¶ 17} The 2007 amendments provide generally that a court “may” award 
attorney fees under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b) if the court has issued a judgment 
ordering compliance with the public-records law.  But immediately thereafter, the 
amendments carve out two situations in which attorney-fee awards are mandatory 
rather than discretionary.  R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b)(i) and (ii).  The amendments also 
specify mitigating criteria that relate to the reasonableness of the government’s 
action in resisting the production of records.  R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c). 
{¶ 18} But the plain language of R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b) conditions all 
attorney-fee awards on the court’s having issued a judgment ordering compliance 
                                          
 
2 The 2007 amendments also enacted the statutory damage provisions at issue in this case.  
Sub.H.B. No. 9, 151 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8219, 8236-8237. 
January Term, 2014 
7 
 
with the public-records law.  That condition is fatal to DiFranco’s attorney-fee 
claim here, because South Euclid produced all the pertinent documents before any 
court order was issued. 
B. DiFranco is entitled to prescribed damages of $100 per day, 
subject to mitigation in accordance with the statute 
1. DiFranco is entitled to statutory damages because of the 
unreasonable delay of the city’s response to her records request 
{¶ 19} The second paragraph of R.C. 149.43(C)(1), added in 2007, states 
that if the public-records requester transmits the request by hand delivery or 
certified mail, then 
 
the requestor shall be entitled to recover the amount of statutory 
damages set forth in this division if a court determines that the 
public office or the person responsible for public records failed to 
comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) of this 
section. 
 
{¶ 20} R.C. 149.43(B) sets forth the requirements that public records be 
made accessible and available upon request.  Division (B)(1) states that “all 
public records responsive to the request shall be promptly prepared and made 
available for inspection to any person at all reasonable times during regular 
business hours.”  The statute affords the option of asking for copies to be made 
and permits the public office to charge the cost of copying in advance.  R.C. 
149.43(B)(6).  In such an instance, the statute requires that the public office 
“transmit a copy of a public record to any person by United States mail or by any 
other means of delivery or transmission within a reasonable period of time after 
receiving the request for the copy.”  R.C. 149.43(B)(7).  If the public office denies 
the request, the statute requires that an explanation be given to the requester.  R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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149.43(B)(3).  In addition, division (B) specifically requires that the public office 
“organize and maintain records in [such] a manner that they can be made 
available for inspection or copying in accordance with division (B) of this 
section.”  R.C. 149.43(B)(2). 
{¶ 21} It follows that the absence of any response over a two-month 
period constitutes a violation of the “obligation in accordance with division (B)” 
to respond “within a reasonable period of time” per R.C. 149.43(B)(7).  The delay 
also violates the mandate of R.C. 149.43(B)(1) that the records be “promptly 
prepared and made available.”  These violations then trigger the mandatory 
statutory damages under the language of R.C. 149.43(C)(1) quoted above. 
{¶ 22} DiFranco’s October 2011 request was sent by certified mail and 
specifically asked for copies of the requested documents to be made available in 
electronic format, if possible, and committed to paying up to $50 for the cost of 
copying.  As indicated, the city did not respond to this request in any way during 
the two months leading up to the filing of the mandamus action.  That violation of 
division (B) of R.C. 149.43 triggered the statutory-damages provision, which 
makes no mention of a public-benefit requirement. 
{¶ 23} As contrary authority, the city cites State ex rel. Dawson v. Bloom-
Carroll Local School District, 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 
524, but its reliance on that case is unavailing.  That post-2007-amendments case 
presented claims for both damages and attorney fees, and the city argues that 
under the pronouncement of the case, entitlement to both depended on the public-
benefit test.  That argument relies on the following sentence:  “Finally, because 
Dawson’s public-records claims lack merit and were primarily beneficial to her 
rather than the public in general, she is not entitled to an award of attorney fees or 
statutory damages.”  Id. at ¶ 34.  The court of appeals’ decision also cites Dawson 
in support of its dismissal of the damages and attorney-fee claims for lack of 
public benefit. 
January Term, 2014 
9 
 
{¶ 24} We conclude that Dawson is inapposite.  In Dawson, we held that 
the requester was not entitled to obtain the documentation sought because the 
attorney-client privilege applied.  Neither failure to produce documents that ought 
to be produced nor delay of initial response to the request was at issue.  As a 
result, there was no basis in Dawson for awarding statutory damages under the 
plain language of the damages provision.  Given that state of affairs, there was no 
call for us to give further consideration to the damages claim, including whether 
or not a public-benefit test ought to be applied.  As a result, Dawson’s 
pronouncement concerning damages and the lack of public benefit was obiter 
dictum and has no precedential force here.  See WCI Steel, Inc. v. Testa, 129 Ohio 
St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-3280, 951 N.E.2d 421, ¶ 27 (statement in earlier case was 
obiter dictum, given that the actual ground for the earlier decision was not 
dependent on that statement); Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Mgt. Co., 
Inc., 70 Ohio St.3d 281, 284, 638 N.E.2d 991 (1994) (statement in earlier case 
that was admittedly dicta had “no binding effect on this court’s decision in this 
case”). 
2. The city’s contention that DiFranco is not aggrieved lacks merit 
{¶ 25} The city also argues that DiFranco is not an “aggrieved” person for 
purposes of R.C. 149.43(C) and relies on this court’s decision in Rhodes v. New 
Philadelphia, 129 Ohio St.3d 304, 2011-Ohio-3279, 951 N.E.2d 782.  In Rhodes, 
the plaintiff brought a suit for civil forfeiture pursuant to R.C. 149.351 for 
destruction of records in violation of the public-records act.  This court held that, 
based upon the factual record, Rhodes was not “aggrieved” within the meaning of 
R.C. 149.351, because he had not really had the goal of accessing records that had 
been unlawfully destroyed; instead, the plaintiff’s only goal was to reap the 
windfall of an award of civil forfeitures.  Id. at ¶ 24. 
{¶ 26} The city attempts to import the Rhodes distinction—one who 
actually seeks access to records as distinguished from one who seeks only a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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monetary windfall—into the present case.  In support, the city relies on the fact 
that DiFranco’s previous practice had been to telephone to spur compliance with a 
records request but that she did not follow that practice in this case.  By 
proceeding directly to the filing of a mandamus action, DiFranco showed 
(according to the city) that she was actually pursuing statutory damages and 
attorney fees rather than the requested records. 
{¶ 27} We reject this argument.  Rhodes addresses a claim for forfeitures 
under R.C. 149.351 and is not apposite to a claim for statutory damages under 
R.C. 149.43(C)(1).  R.C. 149.43(C) refers to “person[s] allegedly aggrieved” by 
violations of division (B), which contains the substantive requirement that records 
be made available upon request.  Every records requester is aggrieved by a 
violation of division (B), and division (C)(1) authorizes the bringing of a 
mandamus action by any requester.  That same provision authorizes statutory 
damages for certified-mail requests when there are violations of division (B).  The 
statutory language leaves no room for a determination that damages may be 
denied based on an inquiry into the requester’s state of mind. 
3. DiFranco is entitled to statutory damages of $100 per day, 
subject to reduction pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(a) or (b) 
{¶ 28} For the foregoing reasons, the court of appeals erred by applying 
the public-benefit test.  DiFranco is entitled to statutory damages because she was 
subjected to a violation of R.C. 149.43(B) when the city failed to respond to her 
request in any way for two months.  She also suffered a continuing violation 
during the pendency of the mandamus case until the final production of 
documents in June 2012. 
{¶ 29} R.C. 149.43(C)(1) imposes damages at $100 for each “business 
day during which the public office * * * failed to comply with an obligation in 
accordance with division (B) of this section, beginning with the day on which the 
requester files a mandamus action to recover statutory damages, up to a maximum 
January Term, 2014 
11 
 
of one thousand dollars.”  DiFranco filed the mandamus action on December 16, 
2011.  The city’s first production of responsive documents occurred on December 
20.  Thus, damages accrued on December 16 (a Friday) and on December 19 (a 
Monday)—two days.  But as the mandamus case unfolded, DiFranco 
demonstrated that the city had not come into compliance on December 20, 
because certain responsive documents were not produced until June 2012.  It 
therefore appears at first blush that DiFranco is entitled to the statutory maximum 
of $1,000. 
{¶ 30} But on remand, the appeals court must itself count the days of 
noncompliance.  The appeals court must also consider whether R.C. 
149.43(C)(1)(a) and (b) call for a partial or entire reduction of the damages award. 
C. DiFranco is not entitled to an award of attorney fees 
{¶ 31} After the 2007 amendments, R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b) begins by 
stating:  “If the court renders a judgment that orders the public office or the 
person responsible for the public record to comply with division (B) of this 
section, the court may award reasonable attorney fees * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  
The very next sentence sets forth the criteria under which the court “shall award 
reasonable attorney fees.”  (Emphasis added.)  DiFranco claims entitlement to 
attorney fees under the second sentence, but she can qualify to receive an award 
of fees only if her case satisfies the condition set forth at the beginning of R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(b):  that the court have issued a judgment that compels compliance 
with the public-records law. 
{¶ 32} The parties do not argue this point, but it is nonetheless dispositive 
of the attorney-fees claim.3  Although it might be contended that the “if” clause 
                                          
 
3 The court of appeals rejected DiFranco’s attorney-fees claim based on its application of the 
public-benefit test.  For the reasons set forth in our decision in No. 2012-1893, the public-benefit 
test did not apply to DiFranco’s attorney-fees claim.  State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, __ Ohio 
St.3d __, 2014-Ohio-__, __ N.E.3d __.  Accordingly, DiFranco’s contention that due process 
requires that she be afforded an opportunity to demonstrate public benefit is moot. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
applies only to the first sentence, we think the correct reading requires us to apply 
the initial condition to both sentences, given that the General Assembly chose to 
put both sentences in the same statutory compartment.  Accordingly, we hold that 
neither discretionary nor mandatory attorney fees may be awarded under R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(b) unless the court has issued a judgment that orders compliance 
with the public-records law. 
{¶ 33} In the present case, there is no such judgment.  Indeed, the final 
judgment of the court of appeals disposed of the writ complaint on grounds of 
mootness, given that the documents had already been tendered to the relator. 
{¶ 34} To be sure, it could be argued that the court’s July 3, 2012 order 
might satisfy the condition, inasmuch as it ordered production of any responsive 
documents that had not yet been produced.  But the July 3 order probably cannot 
qualify as a “judgment,” since that order is interlocutory and does not dispose of 
the case.  See Civ.R. 54(A) (expansively defining “judgment” to encompass “a 
decree and any order from which an appeal lies as provided in section 2505.02 of 
the Revised Code”); State ex rel. Sylvania Home Tel. Co. v. Richards,  94 Ohio 
St. 287, 294, 114 N.E. 263 (1916) (defining “judgment” as “ ‘[t]he decision or 
sentence of the law pronounced by a court or other competent tribunal upon the 
matter contained in the record,’ ” quoting  1 Freeman on Judgments, Section 2 
(4th Ed.).  Moreover, the response to the July 3 interlocutory order demonstrated 
that all the responsive documents had been produced before the order was issued.  
Thus, even if the term “judgment” were extended to include an interlocutory 
order, South Euclid’s compliance did not occur as a result of that order. 
{¶ 35} In any event, as the claimant seeking attorney fees, it was 
DiFranco’s burden to show that all statutory conditions for an award of fees were 
satisfied, and DiFranco has not done so.  We must therefore affirm the court of 
appeals’ decision to deny attorney fees, albeit on a different ground from that 
relied upon below. 
January Term, 2014 
13 
 
Conclusion 
{¶ 36} For the foregoing reasons, the court of appeals erred by applying 
the public-benefit test to DiFranco’s claim for statutory damages.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the judgment below as to damages, and we remand for a determination 
of the proper amount of damages under all the pertinent statutory criteria.  With 
regard to the claim for attorney fees, we conclude that DiFranco did not satisfy 
the statutory condition for an award of fees, and on that basis we affirm the denial 
of attorney fees. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
____________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 37} Although I agree with the majority that Emilie DiFranco was 
entitled to an award of statutory damages, I disagree with the majority’s analysis 
of the attorney-fee issue. 
{¶ 38} R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b) specifies two types of attorney fees in public-
records mandamus cases.  Under the statute, fees may be either discretionary or 
mandatory: 
 
(b) If the court renders a judgment that orders the public 
office or the person responsible for the public record to comply 
with division (B) of this section, the court may award reasonable 
attorney’s fees subject to reduction as described in division 
(C)(2)(c) of this section. The court shall award reasonable 
attorney’s fees, subject to reduction as described in division 
(C)(2)(c) of this section when either of the following applies: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
 
(i) The public office or the person responsible for the public 
records failed to respond affirmatively or negatively to the public 
records request in accordance with the time allowed under division 
(B) of this section. 
(ii) The public office or the person responsible for the 
public records promised to permit the relator to inspect or receive 
copies of the public records requested within a specified period of 
time but failed to fulfill that promise within that specified period of 
time. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b). 
{¶ 39} The first sentence covers discretionary fees, which are to be 
awarded “[i]f the court renders a judgment that orders” production of records.  
Mandatory fees are covered in the second sentence and are awarded if one of two 
conditions exists.  See State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-Ohio-
4149, 914 N.E.2d 159, ¶ 23-32. 
{¶ 40} The majority concludes that the “if” clause in the first sentence of 
R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b) imposes a condition on the award of both discretionary and 
mandatory attorney fees.  I respectfully disagree. 
{¶ 41} First, the two types of fees, discretionary and mandatory, are 
described in two separate sentences.  This indicates that they are to be interpreted 
separately; discretionary fees are to be considered when the court has had to order 
a party to produce records, but mandatory fees are to be imposed on the 
satisfaction of one of the two conditions in (C)(2)(b)(i) or (ii), regardless of 
whether the court has had to order production.4  If the General Assembly had 
                                          
 
4 But see State ex rel. Laborers Internatl. Union of N. Am., Local Union No. 500 v. Summerville, 
122 Ohio St.3d 1234, 2009-Ohio-4090, 913 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 8 (stating in dicta that the 2007 
January Term, 2014 
15 
 
meant the “if” clause to apply to mandatory fees, it would have used one sentence 
to describe both types of fees, or it would have found other means to express a 
conjunctive approach to the two types of fees.  Instead, the legislature chose 
language implying a disjunction between the condition justifying a discretionary 
fee award on one hand—i.e., the rendition of a judgment ordering compliance 
with the public-records law—and on the other hand the two conditions that trigger 
a mandatory award of fees. 
{¶ 42} Second, the majority’s construction defeats the evident purpose of 
adding the mandatory-fee provision to the statute:  ensuring an award of fees 
when the records custodian has unreasonably delayed the production of records.  
If no fees could be awarded unless the court had ordered a party to produce 
records, it would allow a public office to sit on a public-records request until a 
mandamus case was filed and then turn over the records before the court had a 
chance to issue an order.  It would thereby prevent a requester from obtaining 
records within a reasonable time, while the public office would escape liability for 
attorney fees altogether, even though it would probably have violated division 
(C)(2)(b)(i) by failing to respond affirmatively or negatively to the request within 
a reasonable time. 
{¶ 43} For these reasons, I would hold that mandatory fees are to be 
imposed if the public office’s conduct falls within R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b)(i) or (ii), 
whether or not the court has ordered the production of the records.  Under that 
holding, DiFranco would be entitled to a mandatory award of fees in this case, 
subject to reduction pursuant to the consideration of factors set forth at R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(c). 
                                                                                                                   
amendments do not preclude an award of discretionary fees when the mandamus claim has been 
rendered moot by production of the requested records).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 44} In sum, I agree with the majority’s disposition of the statutory-
damages issue but disagree with the majority’s decision that DiFranco was not 
entitled to attorney fees.  I therefore concur in part and dissent in part. 
____________________ 
 
The Law Firm of Curt C. Hartman and Curt C. Hartman; and Finner, 
Stagnaro, Saba & Patterson Co., L.L.P., and Christopher P. Finney, for appellant. 
Michael P. Lograsso, Law Director, for appellees. 
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