Case Title: State ex rel. Burt v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1999-Ohio-19

Docket Number: 19980650

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Burt v. Indus. Comm., 87 Ohio St.3d 175, 1999-Ohio-19.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BURT, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Burt v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 175.] 
Workers’ compensation — Accidental expulsion of rod from spinner machine — 
Industrial Commission’s denial of widow-claimant’s application for a 
violation of a specific safety requirement, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-
11(D)(9), not an abuse of discretion, when. 
(No. 98-650 — Submitted September 14, 1999 — Decided November 17, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD01-12. 
 
Decedent Lloyd L. Burt was employed as a kettleman for appellee Gregory 
Galvanizing & Metal Processing, Inc. (“GGMP”).  On July 5, 1994, decedent was 
removing excess molten zinc from one-hundred-fourteen-inch metal rods.  To do 
this, the rods were placed into a spinner.  The spinner was a cylindrical rack-type 
device that was approximately eleven feet long and twenty-seven inches in 
diameter.  It had sequentially spaced perforated disks through which the rods were 
inserted and held in place. 
 
The spinner was powered by a Spin-A-Batch, a mounted rotary air motor 
suspended by an overhead crane.  The Spin-A-Batch was controlled by levers 
attached to the motor housing by means of an arm extending down to the operator. 
 
The spinner was ultimately lowered into a spinner tank or box.  The box 
had two doors on either side, and, at the time of the accident, was protected by a 
ten-to-twelve-inch-high metal flap designed to prevent the molten zinc from 
splashing out. 
 
On the date in question, decedent was operating the Spin-A-Batch from a 
four-foot-high platform located approximately six to seven feet from the spinner 
tank.  He had lowered the loaded rack into the box and had begun to spin it, when 
 
 
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a rod somehow worked its way loose.  To what extent the rod worked loose is 
unclear, as testimony conflicts as to whether the rod still was partially inside the 
rack or was completely ejected in the split second prior to the accident.  In any 
event, the rod struck decedent’s head, killing him instantly. 
 
Decedent’s widow, Valerie Burt, appellant herein, filed a death claim with 
appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio, which was allowed.  She followed that 
with an application for additional compensation, alleging that GGMP had violated 
a specific safety requirement (“VSSR”), Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-11(D)(9).  The 
staff hearing officer found no VSSR, writing: 
 
“The undersigned has examined the Photographs obtained by Special 
Investigator Carol A. Starcher * * *. 
 
“Most particularly, the undersigned has examined the Photographs at 
Employer’s Exhibits # V and # VI and has concluded that they correctly depict the 
machine in question as it existed at the time of the fatality of record. 
 
“The undersigned concludes as a finding of fact and determination of law 
that the same WAS guarded within the meaning and for the purposes of OAC 
4121:1-5-11(D)(9) * * * and as defined in OAC 4121:1-5-01(B)(69, 70 & 117). 
 
“* * * 
 
“The video actually proves the contrary of Widow-Claimant’s contention: 
Nothing in the video demonstrates that Employer knew, should have know[n] or 
could or should have anticipated the distortion of a man-sized rod (Exhibit IV for 
Employer) into the lethal steel boomerang at Exhibit 1, Photograph 1, which the 
parties have stipulated to have been the fatal instrumentality. 
 
“Testimony that Employer in fact guarded the spinner from the ejection of 
bolts and molten galvanizing material is entirely consistent with counsel[’]s video. 
 
“Testimony of record is adopted as if fully reproduced herein.” 
 
Rehearing was denied. 
 
 
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Widow-claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying her 
VSSR application.  The court of appeals disagreed, after determining that the 
commission properly interpreted the safety requirement at issue, and did not abuse 
its discretion in finding no evidence of a violation. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Mitchell A. Stern, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Craigg E. Gould, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
 
Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., Edward D. Murray 
and W. Thomas Newell, for appellee Gregory Galvanizing & Metal Processing. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-11(D)(9) requires: 
 
“Power driven tumblers, rattlers, drums, barrels, containers, or similar 
machines that rotate, spin, or rock shall be guarded on an area or individual basis.  
The guard shall be interlocked with the drive mechanism so that the machine 
cannot operate unless the guard or enclosure is in place.” 
 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-01(B)(69) and (70) define the key terms “guard” 
and “guarded” as: 
 
“(69) ‘Guard’: the covering, fencing, railing, or enclosure which shields an 
object from accidental contact. * * * 
 
“(70) ‘Guarded’: means that the object is covered, fenced, railed, enclosed, 
or otherwise shielded from accidental contact.” 
 
Controversy centers on the employer’s duty entailed by the guarding 
requirements.  GGMP contends that a guard must protect an employee from 
accidental contact with a machine’s moving parts.  Claimant contends that a guard 
 
 
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must also protect the employee from accidental contact with objects ejected from 
a machine. 
 
This accident demonstrates the desirability of accepting claimant’s 
contention.  Desirability, however, is not the criterion by which to construe a 
specific safety requirement.  Because a VSSR is an employer penalty, a specific 
safety requirement must be strictly construed in the employer’s favor.  State ex 
rel. Burton v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 170, 545 N.E.2d 1216.  
Equally important, a specific safety requirement must plainly apprise an employer 
of its legal duties towards its employees.  State ex rel.  Trydle v. Indus. Comm. 
(1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 257, 61 O.O.2d 488, 291 N.E.2d 748. 
 
None of the three cited Administrative Code sections plainly apprises an 
employer of a duty to guard against accidental expulsion of material.  
Semantically, both relevant definitions refer to the shielding of an object from 
accidental contact.  The choice of the term “object” rather than “person” is 
significant, particularly when used with the word “from.”  This connotes that it is 
the worker who is the actor or initiator of potential contact, not the object, i.e., the 
machine or its moving parts.  Where, as here, material is expelled from a machine, 
the machine is the “actor,” contrary to claimant’s interpretation. 
 
Other Administrative Code sections demonstrate the code authors’ ability to 
protect the employee against expelled material when that is the desired goal.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-5-08(D)(5)(a) (swing cutoff saws) and 4121:1-5-08(D)(7)(a) 
(radial saws) require that the hooded guards be “constructed in such a manner and 
of such material that [they] will protect the operator from flying splinters [and] 
broken saw teeth.” There are similar provisions for “portable explosive-actuated 
fastening tools.”  There, for example, a “guard” is specifically defined as a device 
“attached to the muzzle end of the tool which is designed to confine flying 
particles.”   Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-12(B)(2).  This requirement is echoed in 
 
 
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Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-06(C)(1)(a), which requires that “[t]he muzzle end of 
the [high-velocity] tool shall have a * * * guard * * * designed to confine any 
flying fragments or particles that might otherwise create a hazard at the time of 
firing.” 
 
We, therefore, find that the specific safety requirement at issue did not 
entail an employer’s duty to protect against expelled objects.  Consistent with the 
applicable definition of “guard,” we find that the spinning machine was 
appropriately “guarded.” 
 
Claimant alternatively argues that any such guard violated Ohio Adm.Code 
4121:1-5-11(D)(9) nevertheless because the guard was not interlocked with the 
Spin-A-Batch’s drive mechanism.  Claimant states that the video submitted into 
the record “showed that the Spin-A-Batch could be activated outside of the 
guarding of the metal enclosure.”  The flaw in this argument is the lack of a 
proximate cause between this asserted violation and decedent’s accident.  
Decedent was not killed by coming into contact with a Spin-A-Batch accidently 
activated from outside an enclosure.  The Spin-A-Batch was simply a motor, 
meaning that any proper interlock would have permitted only the motor to operate 
and would not have been the reason for the accident. 
 
We find, therefore, that the commission did not abuse its discretion in 
denying a VSSR.  As such, we turn last to claimant’s assertion that State ex rel. 
Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245, was not 
satisfied.  This argument lacks merit, since the order briefly explains its reasons 
and the evidence on which it relied. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
 
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RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent and would reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals.