Case Title: Conahan v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC18-303

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2018-10-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-303 
____________ 
 
DANIEL O. CONAHAN, JR., 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
October 19, 2018 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Daniel O. Conahan, Jr. appeals an order denying a motion to vacate 
judgments of conviction, including one of first-degree murder, and sentence of 
death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.1 
 
The underlying facts of this case were described in this Court’s opinion on 
direct appeal.  Conahan v. State, 844 So. 2d 629, 632-34 (Fla. 2003).  After 
Conahan waived his right to a jury trial, “the trial court found and adjudicated 
Conahan guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and kidnapping” of Richard 
Montgomery.  Id. at 634.  Then, following a unanimous jury recommendation for 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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death, the trial court sentenced Conahan to death for Mr. Montgomery’s murder.  
Id.  On direct appeal, we affirmed Conahan’s convictions and sentence of death.  
Id. at 643.  We also affirmed the denial of Conahan’s initial postconviction motion 
and denied relief on his habeas petition.  Conahan v. State, 118 So. 3d 718, 737 
(Fla. 2013). 
In Conahan’s first successive postconviction motion, Conahan raised two 
claims for relief:  (1) newly discovered evidence; and (2) the constitutionality of 
his death sentence pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. 
State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).  Conahan v. State, No. SC16-1153, 2017 WL 
656306, at *1, SC17-1153 (Fla. Feb. 17, 2017).  We affirmed the denial of the first 
claim, but upon agreement of the parties, did not address Conahan’s Hurst claim, 
without prejudice, allowing Conahan to raise the issue in a future proceeding.  Id. 
at *2. 
 
Now, Conahan argues that he is entitled to relief pursuant to Hurst.  We 
agree with Conahan that Hurst is applicable to his case.  See Mosley v. State, 209 
So. 3d 1248, 1276 (Fla. 2016).  However, because we find that the Hurst error in 
this case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm the denial of Hurst 
relief.  See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 175 (Fla. 2016) (“The unanimous 
recommendations here are precisely what we determined in Hurst to be 
constitutionally necessary to impose a sentence of death.”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
 
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2218 (2017).  We also reject Conahan’s Hurst-induced Caldwell2 claim.  See 
Reynolds v. State, 251 So. 3d 811, 824-25 (Fla. 2018) petition for cert. filed, No. 
18-5181 (U.S. July 3, 2018).  Finally, we reject Conahan’s contention that he is 
entitled to application of chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida.  See Taylor v. State, 246 
So. 3d 231, 240 (Fla. 2018) (“[W]e rejected as without merit the claim that chapter 
2017–1, Laws of Florida, created a substantive right that must be retroactively 
applied.”).   
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, J., concur in result. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 
 
 
I agree that Conahan is not entitled to Hurst3 relief.  I write separately to 
explain that it is the combination of the jury’s unanimous recommendation for 
death and the absence of any stricken aggravating factor or other issue that would 
                                          
 
 
2.  Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
 
3.  Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2161 (2017); see Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 
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undermine the reliability of the jury’s unanimous recommendation that allows this 
Court to conclude that the Hurst error in Conahan’s case was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.4    
QUINCE, J., dissenting. 
 
I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that there is no reasonable 
possibility that the Hurst error in this case did not affect Conahan’s sentence.  We 
declined to speculate about why the jurors voted for death in Hurst v. State, 202 
So. 2d 40, 69 (Fla. 2016).  The majority’s determination that the Hurst error in this 
case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt amounts to pure speculation.  This 
Court cannot know whether the jury would have found unanimously each 
aggravating factor, and that the aggravation outweighed mitigation as Hurst 
requires.  The HAC and CCP aggravators in particular require findings of fact that 
the jury did not make.  To find the error in this case harmless is to substitute our 
own evaluation of the evidence for the jury’s.  Therefore, I dissent. 
 
 
                                          
 
 
4.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. State, 43 Fla. L. Weekly S163, S169, 2018 WL 
1633075, *14 (Fla. Apr. 5, 2018) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (explaining how Hurst 
could have affected defendant’s decision to waive mitigation); Grim v. State, 244 
So. 3d 147, 148-52 (Fla. 2018) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (explaining how a 
mitigation waiver affects the Hurst harmless error analysis); Middleton v. State, 42 
Fla. L. Weekly S637, 2017 WL 2374697, *1-2 (Fla. June 1, 2017) (Pariente, J., 
dissenting) (explaining how a stricken aggravating factor affects the Hurst 
harmless error analysis), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 829 (2018); see also Davis v. 
State, 207 So. 3d 142, 173-75 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2218 (2017). 
 
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Charlotte County,  
Donald Mason, Judge – Case No. 081997CF0001660001XX 
 
Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, William M. Hennis III, 
Litigation Director, and Jason Kruszka, Staff Attorney, Southern Region, Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Timothy A. 
Freeland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee