Case Title: Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming v. Western Gas Processors, Ltd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming v. Western Gas Processors, Ltd.1990 WY 11786 P.2d 866Case Number: 89-175Decided: 02/01/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
COMMISSION OF WYOMING, 

APPELLANT 
(RESPONDENT),

v.

WESTERN GAS PROCESSORS, 
LTD., 

APPELLEE 
(PETITIONER).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen. and William G. Hibbler, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellant.

Robert G. 
Pickering of Bailey, Pickering & Stock, Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      This is a 
misconduct, drug test, employment termination case. Appellant Employment 
Security Commission of Wyoming (ESC) appeals from a district court reversal of 
its unemployment compensation benefit determination favoring the 
employee.

[¶2]      ESC contends the 
determination was properly based upon findings of fact supported by substantial 
evidence and upon conclusions of law which are in accordance with law. ESC 
granted unemployment insurance benefits to employee Donald B. Wilson (Wilson) 
pursuant to W.S. § 27-3-311(c) (1989 Cum.Supp.)1 after determining his resignation 
from employer Western Gas Processors, Ltd. (Western), appellee, was forced and 
equivalent to discharge. Wilson was allowed unemployment benefits because his 
discharge was not for misconduct connected with his work because he "did not 
commit misconduct * * * by simply refusing to submit to an unreasonable demand 
by his employer." By holding ESC's determinations factually sustainable and 
justified within proper conclusions of law, we reverse the district court 
reversal of the agency award.

FACTS2

[¶3]      Wilson was 
employed at Western late in 1985 to be a "Field Operations Maintenance" worker 
(handyman mechanic). When he was hired, there was no corporate policy indicating 
employees would be subject to any blood or urine tests for illegal drugs or 
legalized abused intoxicants to ensure the safety of the workplace; nor was 
there a policy which indicated employees would be subject to such testing when 
there was a particularized suspicion of improper use.3 Soon after Wilson began work, his 
supervisor, Mike Keil, recognized Wilson had difficulty with mathematics and 
computer usage. In December of 1987, however, Keil noted in a performance report 
that "Don has a high sense of safety awareness and knowledge. His behavior 
towards safety and team mates is an asset to the Newcastle Plant and the 
company. He has a good attitude towards the company and is trying to increase 
his job knowledge."

[¶4]      On June 17, 1988, 
the employee began a four week vacation and was due back on July 15. Two weeks 
before his return, co-employee Donald Schaff went to Keil to allege Wilson 
smoked marijuana on the job. This fellow worker reported he had occasionally 
smelled the scent of marijuana4 on Wilson, that the co-worker 
"would get very uptight when he was faced with a problem or a subject that 
concerned him" and his eyes were sometimes reddish.5 Schaff was the only fellow employee 
to make this allegation. The supervisor was aware the relation between these two 
workers was not friendly. Based on the unilateral and uncorroborated allegation 
of marijuana use, Keil then notified his supervisor of the Schaff 
report.

[¶5]      On the first 
morning back to work following his vacation, Wilson was directed to take a 
company truck from Newcastle to Gillette (seventy-six miles distance) to pick up 
a fire extinguisher, get the truck's radio fixed, and meet with Keil at the 
company's Gillette office at one o'clock. On arriving at the office, the 
employee was handed a surprise (Dear John) letter signed by his supervisor. The 
pertinent parts of the letter read:

I am concerned about the 
state of your health and require you, as a condition of employment, to submit to 
a general physical examination, at Company expense, including an eye exam and 
blood and urine tests, which will involve among other things tests for illegal 
drugs.

Your physical examination 
is scheduled for Friday, July 15, 1988, at 2:00 P.M. with Dr. Naramore in 
Gillette.

Your safety, the safety 
of others and the safe operation of the gas processing equipment are primary 
concerns.

According to Company 
Policy if the blood or urine test results are positive for illegal drugs, you 
will be discharged immediately.[6] Until the tests results are known 
(three to five days) you will be on leave with pay and you are not to enter 
plant property for any reason.

If your blood/urine tests 
are negative and no other physical impairment is found, you must take immediate 
action to improve your performance and maintain an improved performance level. 
We can work together to meet this goal.

[¶6]      With this totally 
unexpected written notice, Wilson was given three options. He could submit to 
the physical and return to work in several days if the tests were negative; he 
could refuse the physical and Western would terminate him on the spot; or he 
could quit. Wilson did quit and asked if he should call his wife to drive to 
Gillette to pick him up to which the response was given that he could drive the 
company truck back the seventy-six miles to Newcastle and finish out the day at 
work.

[¶7]      On July 25, the 
ex-employee filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The initial determination 
by ESC allowed Wilson unemployment benefits and held Western's account 
chargeable with its proportionate share of benefits which might be paid. The 
employer protested but the determination was upheld in the redetermination by 
the Chief of Benefits to ESC who stated "[a]vailable facts indicate that the 
claimant [Wilson] was to be replaced regardless of the test results." The 
employer appealed to an appeals examiner. That hearing examiner reversed the 
redetermination after deciding the employee should be disqualified from benefits 
because he resigned without good cause connected with his work. That decision 
was reversed by ESC by determination that Wilson did not commit misconduct when 
he refused to submit to the drug test because the demand was unreasonable under 
the circumstances. The appeal by Western to the district court claimed ESC's 
findings of fact were arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion because 
they were not supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions of law were 
wrong. The district court accepted the appeal contention and ESC now 
appeals.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8]      The standard of 
review of an agency determination is well-established. Unemployment benefit 
cases involving contended misconduct normally present mixed questions of law and 
fact. Henson v. Employment Sec. Dept. of State, 113 Wn.2d 374, 779 P.2d 715 
(1989). See generally Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. McKnight, 764 P.2d 1039 (Wyo. 1988). A reviewing court is "confined to the matters explicitly 
referenced in W.S. 16-3-114(c) and W.R.A.P. 12.09."7 Cook v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment 
for the City of Laramie, 776 P.2d 181, 184 (Wyo. 1989).

     On appeal from a 
district court's consideration of an agency action, this court is not bound by 
the conclusions of the reviewing court. Rather, using the same evidentiary 
materials and the same review standards as the district court, we conduct an 
independent inquiry into the matter, just as if it had proceeded directly to us 
from the agency.

Southwest 
Wyoming Rehabilitation Center v. Emp. Sec. Com'n. of Wyoming, 781 P.2d 918, 920 
(Wyo. 1989). (Accord Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming v. Bryant, 704 P.2d 1311, 
1314 (Wyo. 1985) and Matter of North Laramie Land Co., 605 P.2d 367, 373 (Wyo. 
1980).) Our deference for findings of fact is reserved for the fact-finder 
which, in this case, is ESC. Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of 
Wyoming v. Casper Legion Baseball Club, Inc., 767 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1989). See 
Zezas Ranch, Inc. v. Board of Control, 714 P.2d 759, 764 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶9]      When reviewing a 
claim that an agency determination is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion because the findings of facts are not supported by substantial 
evidence, we determine if there is "such relevant evidence as reasonable minds 
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Southwest Wyoming 
Rehabilitation Center, 781 P.2d  at 921. (Accord Beddow v. Employment Sec. Com'n. 
of Wyoming, 718 P.2d 12, 14 (Wyo. 1986).) Our review of an agency's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law is simple. First, if we can find from the evidence 
preserved in the record a rational view for the findings of fact made by the 
agency, we then say the findings are supported by substantial evidence. See 
Holdings' Little America v. Board of County Com'rs. of Laramie County, 670 P.2d 699, 704 (Wyo. 1983). Using judicial reliance upon and deference to agency 
expertise in its weighing of the evidence, a reviewing court will not disturb 
the agency determination unless it is "clearly contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence on record." Southwest Wyoming Rehabilitation Center, 781 P.2d  at 921. (Accord Cody Gas Co. v. Public Service Com'n of Wyoming, 748 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Wyo. 1988).) See Ohlmaier v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona, 161 Ariz. 
113, 776 P.2d 791 (1989). See also for a drug test unemployment compensation 
award review, Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n of Utah, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah.App. 1989). Second, we ask if the conclusions of law made by the 
agency are in accordance with law. Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶10]   When we review agency conclusions 
of law, we are alert to three possibilities. The agency may correctly apply 
their findings of fact to the correct rule of law. Belle Fourche Pipeline Co., 
766 P.2d 537. In such case, the agency's conclusions are affirmed. But the 
agency could apply their findings of fact to the wrong rule of law or they could 
incorrectly apply their findings of fact to a correct rule of law. Ballard v. 
Wyoming Pari-Mutuel Com'n of State of Wyoming, 750 P.2d 286 (Wyo. 1988). In 
either case, we correct an agency conclusion to ensure accordance with law. 
Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State Board of Equalization, 749 P.2d 221 
(Wyo. 1987). Our standard of review for any conclusion of law is 
straightforward. If the conclusion of law is in accordance with law, it is 
affirmed, Casper Legion Baseball Club, Inc., 766 P.2d 608; if it is not, it is 
to be corrected, Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n, 749 P.2d 221.8

ANALYSIS

[¶11]   The issue before this court is 
narrow. Our review is limited to determining whether ESC's determinations that 
Wilson was constructively discharged and to allow him unemployment benefits 
under W.S. 27-3-311(c) because he "did not commit misconduct * * * by simply 
refusing to submit to an unreasonable demand by his employer" are based on 
findings of fact supported by substantial evidence and are in accordance with 
law. Our understanding of ESC's determinations and our standard of review 
creates a three-fold inquiry. Could ESC determine that Wilson's resignation was 
equivalent to discharge? Could ESC determine that the demand was unreasonable? 
Could ESC determine, if the demand was unreasonable, that it was not misconduct 
connected with work to refuse such a demand?

[¶12]   ESC concluded that the employer's 
demand to the employee that he yield up a sample of his urine to their corporate 
physician for analysis or resign on the spot was unreasonable and the resulting 
resignation constituted a constructive discharge. We find there was sufficient 
evidence in the record to support the findings of fact necessary to an 
appropriate conclusion of law that Wilson had been constructively discharged. 
"Where an employee resigns due to the reasonable belief that his discharge is 
imminent, his resignation cannot properly be termed `voluntary' * * *." 
Scannevin v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 396 Mass. 1010, 487 N.E.2d 203, 205 (1986). (Accord Malone-Campagna v. Director of the Div. of 
Employment Sec., 391 Mass. 399, 461 N.E.2d 818 (1984).) See Green v. District of 
Columbia Dept. of Employment Services, 499 A.2d 870, 877 (D.C.App. 1985). 
Western was quite matter of fact when it admitted Wilson was told his discharge 
was imminent if he refused to submit immediately to a urine test. We hold that 
ESC could determine that the resignation was equivalent to 
discharge.

[¶13]   We also hold ESC could conclude the 
demand was unreasonable. ESC found the demand unreasonable for three reasons. 
The request was unreasonable as an "invasion of his [Wilson's] privacy and a 
violation of other guaranteed constitutional rights." Second, there was no 
established policy at the time Wilson was hired or later adopted which required, 
as a condition of the employment, any submission to either random testing for 
intoxicants or such testing based upon a reasonable and particularized 
suspicion. Third, the uncorroborated allegations of a hostile co-employee did 
not form the basis of a reasonable suspicion had such a policy been in place.9

[¶14]   While we regard highly the federal 
constitutional guarantees to privacy10 as well as the right to privacy in 
Wyoming,11 it is not necessary to address the 
constitutional rights relied upon by ESC to affirm its determinations. Where 
constitutional difficulties can be avoided legitimately, this court will do so. 
See Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561, 565 (Wyo. 1989) and Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2501, 101 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1988).

[¶15]   We affirm ESC's determination that 
the demand was unreasonable on more narrow grounds. The demand was unreasonable 
because there was no corporate policy either existent at the time Wilson was 
hired or later regularly adopted and adequately circulated which established the 
submission to either random testing for intoxicants or such testing based upon a 
reasonable and particularized suspicion to be a general condition for company 
employment. Nor, had such a policy been in place, are the uncorroborated 
allegations from a hostile co-employee the basis from which to make a reasonable 
demand because of a particularized suspicion. The standard of conduct required 
by the employer must be reasonable before refusal to abide by that standard 
becomes misconduct. See 81 C.J.S. Social Security § 222(b) (1977), entitled What 
Constitutes Willful Misconduct.

[¶16]   This conclusion implicitly rejects 
Western's claim that their handbook inclusion of "[s]erious misconduct of any 
kind, including being under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, fighting 
* * *, etc." "confers implied consent to investigate through drug testing the 
existence of such drugs in the body" as Western argued. ESC may have eyed the 
fact that Wilson had signed the Acknowledgement of Receipt of the WGP Company 
Employee Handbook which stated "[t]he contents of this handbook do not 
constitute an express or implied contract of employment." Such a disclaimer 
works for both parties, not just Western. ESC could rightly disregard Western's 
argument of implied consent. ESC concluded a unilateral change in the condition 
of employment was unreasonable and that the uncorroborated allegations from a 
co-employee with a demonstrated record of hostility toward Wilson cannot form 
the basis of a reasonable demand. We agree. "[T]here was no condition in the 
application for employment or the contract of employment to" provide urine 
samples. Valley Vendors, Inc. v. Jamieson, 129 Ariz. 238, 630 P.2d 61, 64 
(1981). This was apparently the first occurrence and there was not even a 
general company practice. Safety Medical Services, Inc. v. Emp. Sec. Com'n of 
Wyoming, 724 P.2d 468 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶17]   Accepting ESC's determination that 
the demand was unreasonable, we review ESC's legal determination that employee 
misconduct did not occur with refusal of the demand. In Safety Medical Services, 
Inc., 724 P.2d  at 473 and Roberts v. Employment Security Commission of Wyoming, 
745 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wyo. 1987), this court addressed employee misconduct. 
Essential to employee misconduct is a "`disregard of * * * standards of behavior 
which the employer has the right to expect of his employee * * *.'" Safety 
Medical Services, Inc., 724 P.2d  at 473 (quoting Boynton Cab Company v. Neubeck, 
237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636, 639 (1941)). Because Western had no right to expect 
Wilson to submit to the test, related obviously to his return from vacation, 
newly created to be a condition of continued employment, there was, under these 
circumstances, no misconduct at work by test refusal.12

[¶18]   Reversed and remanded for entry of 
an order to sustain the administrative agency.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. 27-3-311(c) 
(emphasis added) provides: "An individual shall be disqualified from benefit 
entitlement and shall forfeit all accrued benefits if he was discharged from his 
most recent work for misconduct connected with his work, fraud in connection 
with a claim for benefits or receipt of disqualifying income." In application of 
the statute, ESC adopted a generally utilized definition:

"`Misconduct under the 
Wyoming Employment Security Law means generally an act of an employee which 
indicates a disregard of (1) the employer's interests or (2) the commonly 
accepted duties, obligations and responsibilities of an employee. This would 
include carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to reveal 
willful intent or an intentional disregard of the employer's interests or of the 
employee's duties and obligations to his employer. Inefficiency or failure in 
good performance as the result of inability or incapacity; ordinary negligence 
in isolated instances or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not 
deemed to be misconduct within the meaning of the Law.'"

Safety Medical Services, 
Inc. v. Emp. Sec. Com'n of Wyoming, 724 P.2d 468, 472 (Wyo. 1986).

2 This is a fact sensitive 
and highly unusual occurrence involving an employer, which has neither a policy 
nor history of requiring random drug testing, requesting an unexpected test 
immediately after the employee had returned from an extended vacation. For 
comparison, see Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n of Utah, 
776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989), where a company policy existed and a written 
consent was used. See also City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla.App. 
1985), where an adopted policy was the litigative subject and Luedtke v. Nabors 
Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989), where both a policy and 
individual specific advance notice was considered as an employment termination 
proceeding. See also Fremont Hotel & Casino v. Esposito, 760 P.2d 122 (Nev. 
1988) and Texas Employment Commission v. Hughes Drilling Fluids, 746 S.W.2d 796 
(Tex. App. 1988). Likewise, see Clevenger v. Nevada Employment Sec. Dept., 770 P.2d 866 (Nev. 1989), where both a policy and history existed. Distinguishable 
also is a complaint history for law enforcement public employment, Fowler v. 
Unemployment Appeals Com'n, 537 So. 2d 162 (Fla.App. 1989). In that case, no 
issue of reasonable suspicion of drug taking was raised.

A 
singular anomaly is provided in present American society. See Harmon v. 
Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 865, 107 L. Ed. 2d 949 (1990), where a federal appeals court "upheld an injunction 
against random drug testing of federal prosecutors in criminal cases and 
employees with access to grand jury proceedings." National District Attorneys 
Association, Case Commentaries and Briefs, at 2 (1990). The injunction was 
modified "to permit the testing of Department of Justice employees holding `top 
secret national security' clearances." Id. at 2. Certiorari was requested by the 
excluded employees but not by the enjoined agency and, on that basis, was denied 
by the United States Supreme Court.

3 Nor was any general 
company substance test policy established during his employment. ESC accurately 
found that until the test request, "[t]he employer did not previously make such 
random testing a condition of the claimant's employment."

4 Schaff admitted during 
his testimony to a hearing examiner that he had been "real familiar" with 
marijuana and so was able to identify the scent.

5 During his testimony 
with the hearing examiner, Wilson indicated he was allergic to over 273 
different items including hay, sagebrush, cat hair, etc. He also denied any use 
of marijuana.

6 If safety concerns 
motivated Western, it remains unexplained why this one employee would be 
terminated for signs of illegal drug use but not signs of alcohol use. Legal and 
illegal drug use seemed of equal safety concern before the regulations contested 
in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n., ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989) were promulgated. "In view of the obvious safety hazards of 
drug and alcohol use by railroad employees, the Agency announced in June 1984 
its intention to promulgate federal regulations on the subject." Id. 109 S. Ct. 
at 1408 (emphasis added). "23% of the operating personnel were `problem 
drinkers.'" Id. at 1407 n. 1 (emphasis added). The timed relationship of 
demanded test to a return from vacation is obvious and was recognized by the 
administrative agency.

7 W.S. 16-3-114(c) 
provides:

To the extent necessary 
to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D) Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

W.R.A.P. 12.09 provides 
in relevant part:

The review shall be 
conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record as 
supplemented pursuant to Rule 12.08, W.R.A.P. and to the issues raised before 
the agency. The court's review shall be limited to a determination of the 
matters specified in § 16-3-114(c).

8 A valuable analysis of 
Wyoming administrative law is provided in Battle, Administrative Law, Wyoming 
Style, XVIII Land & Water L.Rev. 223 (1983). See also Note, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW - The Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, Laramie River 
Conservation Council and Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Industrial 
Siting Council of the State of Wyoming and Basin Electric Power Cooperative, 588 P.2d 1241 (Wyo. 1978), XIV Land & Water L.Rev. 607 (1979) and Bloomenthal, 
Administrative Law in Wyoming - An Introduction and Preliminary Report, 16 Wyo. 
L.J. 191 (1962).

9 The Washington court has 
enunciated a three-part test to establish disqualifying misconduct in 
unemployment compensation cases from on-duty cases and a differentiated standard 
for off-duty conduct disqualification.

"[W]here the conduct or 
activities for which the claimant is discharged occurred off the working 
premises and outside the course and scope of employment, the employer must, in 
order to show that the conduct is work-connected, point to some breach of a rule 
or regulation that has a reasonable relation to the conduct of the employer's 
business."

Nelson v. Department of 
Employment Sec., 98 Wn.2d 370, 655 P.2d 242, 244 (1982) (quoting Giese v. 
Employment Division, 27 Or. App. 929, 935, 557 P.2d 1354 (1976)). The rule for 
on-duty conduct is stated:

In Macey v. Department of 
Empl. Sec., supra [110 Wn.2d 308, 752 P.2d 372 (1988)], we formulated the 
following three-part test to establish disqualifying misconduct: (1) the 
employer's rule must be reasonable under the circumstances; (2) the conduct of 
the employee must be connected with the work; and (3) the conduct of the 
employee must in fact violate the rule. Macey, 110 Wn.2d  at 319, 752 P.2d 372.

The Macey test, however, 
applies only to on-duty misconduct, as opposed to the off-duty test established 
in Nelson v. Department of Empl. Sec., 98 Wn.2d 370, 375, 655 P.2d 242 
(1982).

Henson, 779 P.2d  at 
717.

In this case, we lack 
both an established rule and determinable history for any immediate drug testing 
practice. The absence of an established employer rule makes application of 
either the on-duty or off-duty standard difficult here. Cf. Roberts v. 
Employment Security Commission of Wyoming, 745 P.2d 1355 (Wyo. 
1987).

10            
"The makers of our 
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of 
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his 
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure 
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to 
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their 
sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be left 
alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men."

Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572, 72 L. Ed. 944, 956 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). "All of these aspects of the right 
of privacy are rights `retained by the people' in the meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 756, 757, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973) 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The Reserved Rights Clause (Ninth 
Amendment) was "proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of specifically 
enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all essential rights 
and that the specific mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial 
that others were protected." Griswold v. State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
488-89, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 1684, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring and 
footnote omitted). See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 524, 
532, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).

For 
current literature, see Simpson, Does a "Drug-Free Federal Workplace" Also Mean 
a "Fourth Amendment Free Workplace"?, 40 Labor L.J. 547 (1989); Note, 
Alternative Challenges to Drug Testing of Government Employees: Options After 
Von Raab and Skinner, 58 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 148 (1989); Note, Drug Testing in the 
Workplace: Sacrificing Fundamental Rights in the War on Drugs?, 91 W. Va. L.Rev. 
1969 (1989); and Note, Drug Testing of Public and Private Employees in Alaska, V 
Alaska L.Rev. 133 (1988).

11 Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Wyo. 1987); Arnold v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 
Inc., 707 P.2d 161, 165 (Wyo. 1985) (citing Thomas v. Harrison, 634 P.2d 328, 
334 (Wyo. 1981)). See Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 295 (Wyo. 1982). See 
also Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 36 (Reserved Rights Clause).

12 We do not determine 
whether the employer had a right to discharge without resulting contractual 
liability. This case only examines eligibility for unemployment benefits after 
constructive termination.