Case Title: Mitchell v. State Recreation Com'n Snowmobile Trails

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-85

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mitchell v. State Recreation Com'n Snowmobile Trails1998 WY 142968 P.2d 37Case Number: 97-85Decided: 12/04/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Richard 
T. MITCHELL, Appellant (Employee-Claimant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming RECREATION COMMISSION SNOWMOBILE 
TRAILS, Appellee (Employer-Respondent), and State of

Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division, Appellee (Objector-Defendant).

 

                         
Appeal from the District Court, Fremont County, Nancy Guthrie, 
J.

 

Keith M. Gingery of Western 
Law Associates, Lander, WY, Appellant.

Gerald W. Laska, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General, and Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General, 
for Appellee Worker's Compensation Division.

Michael D. Basom, Assistant 
Attorney General, for Appellee State Recreation 
Commission.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of expedited case conference; 
retired November 2, 1998.

 

LEHMAN, Chief Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant Richard T. Mitchell (Mitchell) appeals 
the district court's order affirming a hearing officer's determination that his 
claim for worker's compensation benefits was barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations and that neither the employer nor the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division (Division) was estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a 
defense.

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] Mitchell poses these 
issues:

 

I. 
Does the statute of limitations under W.S. § 27-14-503(a), of one year, begin to 
run at the time of the accident or when the employee discovers the full extent 
and nature and seriousness of the injury and the injury is correctly 
diagnosed?

 

II. The employer should be estopped from raising the 
statute of limitations defense under W.S. § 27-14-503 as a matter of law, due to 
the employer's failure to timely file the statutorily required "report of 
injury" which, procedurally, would have resulted in the clerk of the district 
court putting the employee on written notice of his rights and responsibilities; 
and to the extent the employer is estopped from raising the statute of 
limitations defense in this particular case, the worker's compensation division 
as an agent of this employer, when objecting to the employee's claim, should 
also be estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense under W.S. § 
27-14-503.

 

[¶4] In response, the 
Division provides this abstract of the issues:

 

A. 
Was the hearing examiner's denial of benefits based on the statute of 
limitations supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with 
law?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶5] Mitchell worked as a 
part-time, seasonal employee of the State of Wyoming, Department of Commerce, 
Snowmobile Trails Project in Lander during the winters of 1993 and 1994. In 
December 1993, Mitchell slipped and fell on a patch of ice as he attempted to 
move a single-axle snowmobile trailer with two snowmobiles on it. Mitchell's 
supervisor witnessed the incident; however, an injury report was not completed 
at that time, either by Mitchell or his employer. Mitchell continued to work for 
another half hour and then went home because his "back muscles had started to 
kind of seize up." He did not work for the next couple of days. About a week 
later, Mitchell visited Dr. Vince Irene, 
a chiropractor, for an examination and spinal manipulation treatments. Mitchell 
continued to see Dr. Irene periodically over the next eighteen months "as 
needed." He did not submit worker's compensation claims for the visits to Dr. 
Irene. In the summer of 1995, Mitchell began to experience more intense pain and 
numbness in his left leg; and, in September 1995, Dr. Irene referred Mitchell to 
a specialist in Salt Lake City. On September 27, 1995, Mitchell underwent 
surgery for a herniated disc and removal of a fragment of disk material which 
had lodged next to his spine.

 

[¶6] Mitchell first filed an 
injury report on November 3, 1995, and an employer's report was also completed. 
The report indicated that the accident had occurred in December 1993. The 
Division denied Mitchell's claim for benefits because it was not filed within 
the limitations period set out in W.S. 27-14-503(a). After a contested case 
hearing, the hearing examiner agreed that Mitchell's claim was barred by the 
statute of limitations. The hearing examiner also ruled that neither the 
Division nor the employer was estopped from raising the statute of limitations 
as a defense by the employer's late filing of the accident report. The district 
court affirmed the hearing officer's 
determination, finding it was supported by substantial evidence. Mitchell timely 
appeals.

 

                                       
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶7] W.R.A.P. 12.09 provides 
for judicial review of agency action according to W.S. 16-3-114(c) (1997), which 
states that the reviewing court shall:

 

          
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

 

          
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

 

          
* * *

 

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

When reviewing an 
administrative agency action, we review the action as if it came directly from 
the agency, according no special deference to the district court's decision. 
Fritz v. State, ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 937 P.2d 1345, 
1348 (Wyo. 1997). An agency's factual findings are viewed with 
deference:

 

We 
examine the entire record to determine if there is substantial evidence to 
support an agency's findings. If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency, and must uphold the findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of 
the agency. It is more than a scintilla of evidence.

 

Aanenson v. State ex rel. 
Worker's Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Hohnholt v. 
Basin Elec. Power Coop, 784 P.2d 233, 234 (Wyo. 1989)). An agency's conclusions 
of law will be affirmed only if they are in accordance with law. Id.  Where the determination to be reviewed is 
a mixed question of law and fact, the reviewing court will defer to the agency's 
findings of basic fact, but will correct misapplication of the law to those 
facts. Id. at 1079-80.

 

[¶8] The historical actions 
and inactions of Mitchell, as determined by the hearing examiner, are basic 
facts and are given due deference. Id. at 1080. We will affirm the hearing 
examiner's decision that W.S. 27-14-503, when applied to the basic facts, bars 
Mitchell's claim only if it is in accordance with law. Id.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶9] The worker's 
compensation statute of limitations in effect at the time of the injury 
provided:

 

(a) A payment for benefits involving an injury which 
is the result of a single brief occurrence rather than occurring over a 
substantial period of time shall not be made unless in addition to the proper 
and timely filing of the reports of the accident, an application or claim for 
benefits is filed within one (1) year after the date the accident occurred or 
for injuries not readily apparent, within one (1) year after discovery of the 
injury by the employee. The report of accident is not a claim for benefits. * * 
*.

 

W.S. 27-14-503(a) (1991). 
The term "injury" as used in the worker's compensation statutes means 
"compensable injury." Big Horn Coal Co. v. Wartensleben, 502 P.2d 187, 188 (Wyo. 
1972); Aanenson, 842 P.2d  at 1080. We have consistently held that when a correct 
diagnosis or prognosis of present or likely future disability is communicated to 
the claimant, the injury is discovered, it is compensable, and the statute of 
limitations begins to run. City of Casper v. Haines, 886 P.2d 585, 589 (Wyo. 
1994), citing Aanenson, 842 P.2d  at 1081-83 (discussing this court's decisions 
regarding compensable injury). "[W]hen determining the time a particular injury became compensable, it should be 
asked: When would a reasonable person, under the circumstances, have understood 
the full extent and nature of the injury and that the injury was related to his 
or her employment?" Aanenson, 842 P.2d  at 1082.

 

[¶10] Mitchell filed the 
injury report and a claim for benefits in November 1995. He asserts that his 
injury was not readily apparent, and thus not compensable, until a MRI was done 
in September 1995. We find substantial evidence in the record to support the 
hearing examiner's determination that Mitchell knew he had suffered a 
compensable injury in December of 1993. In Big Horn Coal Co. v. Wartensleben, 
502 P.2d  at 188, this court distinguished between a trivial injury and a 
compensable injury:

 

[W]here an employee in the course of his employment 
sustains an apparent trivial injury which does not result in present disability 
and which would not reasonably be expected to cause future disability, but which 
injury in fact over a period of latency does cause future disability, the time 
for giving notice of the occurrence of the injury to the employer runs from the 
time when it becomes apparent that such injury has resulted in, or is likely to 
cause, compensable disability.

 

In Big Horn, the claimant 
was driving a scraper when he began to suffer muscle spasms in his back. A 
doctor told claimant the only thing wrong was nerves and treated the injury with 
muscle relaxants. At that time, the claimant did not realize what had caused his 
back trouble and did not relate the trouble to his job. Later, after having his 
back x-rayed, claimant was informed he had a more serious injury. We held the 
claimant had not suffered a compensable injury until he was informed of the more 
serious injury. Big Horn, 502 P.2d  at 188.

 

[¶11] In contrast, 
Mitchell's injury was immediately apparent to him when he fell at work. Within 
thirty minutes of the fall, his back muscles started to seize up, he left work 
early as a result, and he did not come to work for the next couple of days. 
Although Mitchell first believed he had pinched or strained a muscle, the pain 
never really subsided and, after about a week, he sought chiropractic medical 
attention from Dr. Irene. According to Mitchell, Dr. Irene told him the problem 
was more than "just muscle" and that he suffered a disk misalignment problem. A 
reasonable person would realize the serious nature of his injury when informed 
of a misaligned disk. Further, Mitchell experienced continuing back pain, and he 
continued to see Dr. Irene over the next eighteen months, whenever he "felt too uncomfortable to 
continue doing whatever [he] was doing." Mitchell testified that he worked in 
the Snowmobile Trails Program again in the winter of 1994, and he agreed to 
obtain help with heavy lifting because of his ongoing back problems. These facts 
would have caused a reasonable person to discover he had suffered a compensable 
injury in December 1993, when the fall occurred.

 

[¶12] Mitchell argues, in 
the alternative, that the employer and the Division should be estopped from 
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense because the employer did not 
comply with the reporting requirements in W.S. 27-14-506(a) and failed to 
respond to his requests for information about worker's compensation coverage. As 
we pointed out in Bauer v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 695 P.2d 1048 (Wyo. 1985), the statute of limitations contains no provision for tolling 
because of excusable neglect or to relieve hardship in particular circumstances. 695 P.2d  at 
1050. Thus, the statute of limitations is a bar to Mitchell's claim unless the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents the employer or the Division from 
raising the statute of limitations as a defense. See id.

 

[¶13] In Bauer, we 
enumerated several circumstances in which the doctrine may apply, including 
actual or legal fraud, or a reasonable reliance on incorrect information 
provided by the employer. Id. at 1051-52. We decline to extend the holding of 
Bauer to the facts of this case. There is no evidence of fraud here, nor did the 
employer provide incorrect information to Mitchell concerning coverage under the 
worker's compensation statutes. Wyoming Statute 27-14-506 penalizes employers 
who fail to timely file an injury report; but failure to comply with the 
statute, in and of itself, does not rise to the level of fraud or 
misrepresentation necessary to invoke equitable estoppel. Mitchell testified that his 
supervisor did not respond to his requests for information about worker's 
compensation coverage and that he ultimately had to contact the Division for the 
proper forms. However, Mitchell admitted that he did not ask his supervisor for 
information until June or July of 1995, well after the statute of limitations 
had expired. The hearing examiner correctly determined that the employer is not 
estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a defense to Mitchell's 
claim.

 

[¶14] The district court's 
order affirming the hearing examiner's decision is 
affirmed.