Case Title: Gaskins v. Shiplevy

Citation: 1996-Ohio-387

Docket Number: 19960601

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gaskins, Appellant, v. Shiplevy, Warden, Appellee. 
[Cite as Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1996),   Ohio St.3d    .] 
Petition for writ of mandamus seeking release from Lima Correction 
Institution on ground that common pleas court lacked jurisdiction 
over juvenile petitioner due to improper bindover procedure -- Writ 
denied, when. 
 
(No. 96-601 -- Submitted July 10, 1996 -- Decided August 21, 1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Allen County, No. CA95-03-0015. 
 
In March 1995, appellant, Keith A. Gaskins, filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for Allen County, alleging that he was 
unlawfully imprisoned by appellee, Carole Shiplevy, Warden of Lima Correctional 
Institution.  Gaskins claimed that his 1983 Seneca County Court of Common Pleas 
conviction and sentence for burglary was void based on double jeopardy.  On 
April 12, 1995, Gaskins moved to amend his petition to add a claim that the 
common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him due to an improper 
bindover from the Seneca County Juvenile Court.  On April 19, 1995, the court of 
appeals dismissed the petition without ruling on the motion to amend.   
 
On appeal, we determined that the court of appeals should have allowed 
Gaskins’s motion to amend and that the amended petition alleged a potentially 
 
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meritorious cause of action in habeas corpus.  Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1995), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 149, 656 N.E.2d 1282.  We reversed the judgment of the court of appeals 
and remanded the cause for the court of appeals “to allow the writ, require 
appellee to make a return, and determine whether the bindover was improper.”  
Id., 74 Ohio St.3d at 151, 656 N.E.2d at 1284.   
 
Pursuant to our mandate, the court of appeals granted Gaskins’s motion to 
amend his petition, allowed the writ of habeas corpus on his claim of improper 
bindover, and ordered appellee to make a return of the writ.  The court of appeals 
denied Gaskins’s motions to personally appear before the court, for the issuance of 
subpoenas, for appointment of counsel, and to set a hearing date.  
 
Appellee subsequently filed a return which included an attached October 27, 
1983 Seneca County Juvenile Court journal entry.  According to this journal entry, 
Gaskins was present in juvenile court with his attorney on October 26, 1983 on the 
state’s motion for relinquishment of jurisdiction for purposes of criminal 
prosecution.  The juvenile court transferred the case to the common pleas court 
based on the following findings: 
 
“The Court being fully advised of his circumstances finds that Keith A. 
Gaskins is over the age of fifteen (15) years (D.O.B. 12/8/67); that there’s 
 
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probable cause to believe that Keith A. Gaskins committed the act alleged; and 
that such act would be a felony if committed by an adult. 
 
“The Court upon further inquiry of Keith A. Gaskins finds that said child 
Keith A. Gaskins also wishes to waive his right to further proceedings in this 
matter and wishes to have this case bound over to the Court of Common Pleas for 
prosecution. 
 
“The Court, being aware that Keith A. Gaskins is now 15 years of age, and 
being convinced that Keith A. Gaskins is competent and that he is doing this 
freely, voluntarily and knowingly, accepts the waiver of Keith A. Gaskins, of his 
right to notice, investigation, mental and physical examination, and a full hearing. 
 
“Based upon the age of Keith A. Gaskins, as well as the information before 
the Court, the Court further finds that Keith A. Gaskins is not amenable to care or 
rehabilitation in any facility designed for the care, supervision and rehabilitation 
of delinquent children, and the safety of the community requires that Keith A. 
Gaskins be placed under legal restraint for a period extending beyond the child’s 
majority.”   
 
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Appellee’s return further established that upon being bound over, Gaskins 
pled guilty to a charge of burglary, and on November 21, 1983, the common pleas 
court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of two-to-fifteen years in prison.   
 
In February 1996, nine days following the filing of appellee’s return, the 
court of appeals denied the requested relief of immediate release from detention.    
The court of appeals determined that “the juvenile court fully complied with the 
bindover procedure set forth in R.C. 2151.26, as effective in the last half of 1983, 
and the court of common pleas did not lack jurisdiction over petitioner.”   
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
____________________ 
 
Keith A. Gaskins, pro se. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Lillian B. Earl, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Gaskins essentially asserts that the court of appeals erred in 
denying his requested habeas corpus relief based on appellee’s return without first 
conducting an evidentiary hearing and permitting discovery under the Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
 
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Whatever the applicability of a particular Civil Rule, R.C. Chapter 2725 
prescribes a basic, summary procedure for bringing a habeas corpus action.  Pegan 
v. Crawmer (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 607, 608-609, 653 N.E.2d 659, 661.  An 
evidentiary hearing, discovery, and the physical presence of the petitioner are not 
always required in habeas corpus proceedings after allowance of the writ.  
Hammond v. Dallman (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 666, 590 N.E.2d 744; State ex rel. 
Spitler v. Seiber (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 117, 45 O.O.2d 463, 243 N.E.2d 65. 
 
In Hammond, we allowed the writ and after treating a motion to dismiss as a 
return, remanded the petitioner to custody without an evidentiary hearing or an 
order under R.C. 2725.09 and 2725.10 commanding the petitioner’s physical 
presence before the court.  The petitioner’s response to the motion to dismiss in 
Hammond indicated that his claim was not cognizable in habeas corpus. 
 
In Spitler, we allowed the writ in a child custody case and treated a motion 
to dismiss as a return.  We determined that relief would be denied based on a copy 
of the juvenile court’s transcript of docket and journal entries attached to a brief in 
support of dismissal.  No hearing was held. 
 
As in Spitler, the return filed by appellee here included a juvenile court 
journal entry.  The journal entry directly controverted Gaskins’s statements in his 
 
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motion to amend the petition that the bindover was improper.  For example, the 
juvenile court entry states that Gaskins was represented by counsel at the bindover 
proceeding and that Gaskins knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a 
mental and physical examination. The juvenile court entry establishes full 
compliance with the bindover procedure required by the applicable version of R.C. 
2151.26.  See, e.g., 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 585-586; see, also, Juv.R. 3. 
 
A court of record speaks only through its journal entries.  State ex rel. Fogle 
v. Steiner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 163, 656 N.E.2d 1288, 1293.  There is no 
showing by Gaskins to contradict the presumption of regularity accorded all 
judicial proceedings.  State v. Hawkins (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 530, 531, 660 
N.E.2d 454, 455; Coleman v. McGettrick (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 177, 180, 31 
O.O.2d 326, 328, 207 N.E.2d 552, 554. 
 
It has been noted that, generally, a court must hold a hearing in a habeas 
corpus action “whenever, accepting as true all allegations of fact which are non-
frivolous, specific, and not contradicted by the record, there are present, after 
receipt of a return, unresolved issues of fact or issues of mixed fact and law.”  
(Emphasis added and footnote omitted.)  I Antieau, The Practice of Extraordinary 
Remedies (1987) 35, Section 1.25.  Similarly, the presumption of regularity, to the 
 
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extent of not requiring an evidentiary hearing, yields only to those verified 
assertions of fact by the petitioner which are not rebutted by the record.  Id. at 40, 
Section 1.30.  Since Gaskins’s claims of improper bindover below and his 
appellate claims of an altered entry are rebutted by the juvenile court journal entry 
incorporated in appellee’s return, the court of appeals did not err in denying his 
requested habeas corpus relief without first holding a hearing, waiting for the 
completion of discovery, or requiring Gaskins’s presence before the court. 
 
In addition, habeas corpus, like other extraordinary writ actions, is not 
available where there is an adequate remedy at law.  Luchene v. Wagner (1984), 
12 Ohio St.3d 37, 39, 12 OBR 32, 33-34, 465 N.E.2d 395, 396; State ex rel. 
Jackson v. McFaul (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 185, 186, 652 N.E.2d 746, 748.  To the 
extent that Gaskins now contends that the bindover entry is improper and that he is 
entitled to a transcript of the bindover proceeding, he possesses an adequate 
remedy by motion for leave to appeal his criminal conviction in the court of 
appeals under App.R. 5 and correction or modification of the trial court record  
pending appeal pursuant to App.R. 9(E), or a petition in the common pleas court 
for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21 to vacate or set aside his sentence.  
State ex rel. Hester v. Crush (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 563, 564, 664 N.E.2d 930, 931 
 
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(mandamus action to compel trial court to correct entries and produce transcripts 
in criminal case properly dismissed because relator possessed adequate remedy at 
law).  In addition, Gaskins could have filed a motion in the juvenile court to 
correct any alleged errors in the bindover entry so that its record speaks the truth.  
Fogle, 74 Ohio St.3d at 163-164, 656 N.E.2d at 1294 (“[C]ourts and 
administrative tribunals possess inherent authority to correct errors in judgment 
entries [by issuing nunc pro tunc entries] so that the record speaks the truth.). 
 
The court of appeals properly denied the relief requested pursuant to the 
allowed writ.  Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.