Case Title: Benjamin v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49191

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
LEAH D. BENJAMIN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 147Case Number: S-10-0204Decided: 10/25/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011

LEAH D. 
BENJAMIN,
Appellant 
(Defendant),
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,
Appellee 
(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Johnson County
The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane M. Lozano, 
State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Olson.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Stewart M. Young, Special Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Young.
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Leah D. Benjamin was 
convicted of second degree murder for the shooting death of her estranged 
husband.  She appeals that 
conviction.  We will 
affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      
Ms. Benjamin presents 
four issues:
 
1.                                            
Did the trial court 
err in not dismissing juror Blaney?
 
2.                                            
Did the trial court 
err in refusing Appellant’s proposed jury instructions G and 
H?
 
3.                                            
Did the trial court 
err in denying Appellant’s post-trial motion for judgment of 
acquittal?
 
4.                                            
Did reversible 
prosecutorial misconduct occur?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
On Sunday, May 3, 
2009, Ms. Benjamin shot and killed the victim, Donald Benjamin, at her home in 
Buffalo, Wyoming.  The relevant 
events of that day began at 9:41 a.m., when Ms. Benjamin sent a text message to 
her husband, from whom she was separated and was soon to be divorced, asking 
whether he was coming to pick up their daughter, K.B., to take her fishing.  Ms. Benjamin knew that K.B. was at a 
friend’s house, but proceeded to leave numerous voicemails and text messages for 
Mr. Benjamin stating that K.B. was “sitting here waiting for you,” but telling 
him not to call K.B. because she did not have her phone.  When Mr. Benjamin called to say he was 
on his way, Ms. Benjamin told him that K.B. no longer wanted to go fishing.  Mr. Benjamin arrived a few minutes after 
this conversation, and died approximately an hour later.
 
[¶4]        
In their briefs, Ms. 
Benjamin and the State present starkly contrasting versions of the Benjamin 
relationship.  Ms. Benjamin portrays 
herself as the victim of domestic abuse, while the State portrays her as more 
the aggressor than the victim.  The 
long record of this eight-day trial includes evidence to support both 
versions.  Most of the details are 
not relevant to this appeal, however, and will be presented here in summary 
fashion.
 
[¶5]        
Ms. Benjamin 
married Mr. Benjamin in 1999.  
She had four children from previous relationships, and he had three.  They also had a daughter together.  The family lived in Hulett, Wyoming, 
until 2005, when the couple separated and Mr. Benjamin moved to Buffalo, 
Wyoming.  Ms. Benjamin moved to 
Buffalo in 2006, apparently hoping to reconcile with Mr. Benjamin, although 
the two continued to live separately.  
In February of 2009, Mr. Benjamin filed for divorce.  Although Ms. Benjamin had signed the 
divorce settlement agreement, the divorce had not been finalized by the time of 
Mr. Benjamin’s death.  Several 
witnesses agreed that Ms. Benjamin was extremely upset about the pending 
divorce.  
 
[¶6]        
On Saturday, May 2, 
2009, the Benjamin’s daughter arranged to spend the weekend with a friend in 
Buffalo.  Although Ms. Benjamin 
knew their daughter would not be home, she began contacting Mr. Benjamin, 
telling him their daughter would be waiting at home on Sunday for him to take 
her fishing.  During Saturday 
afternoon and Sunday morning, Ms. Benjamin made twenty-one telephone calls to 
Mr. Benjamin, sent ten text messages, and left five voicemail 
messages.  At 10:17 a.m. on Sunday, 
Ms. Benjamin left the following message:
 
Don, [K.B. is] 
sitting here waiting for you.  If 
you don’t want to take her fishing at least let us know and I’ll go take her to 
do something OK[?]  I told her you 
were going to take her cause you guys needed time together too OK?  I tried to tell you that last night to 
have you call me but you didn’t . . . I don’t know 
whatever.
 
[¶7]        
At about 10:30 on 
Sunday morning, Mr. Benjamin telephoned Ms. Benjamin to confirm that he was 
on his way to her house to pick up their daughter.  Ms. Benjamin responded that their 
daughter no longer wanted to go fishing, expecting that Mr. Benjamin would 
“turn around and leave.”  However, 
Mr. Benjamin arrived at Ms. Benjamin’s house a few minutes later.  According to Ms. Benjamin, the two 
sat in the living room and talked.  
The conversation started calmly, but Mr. Benjamin became increasingly 
angry, and after about an hour, Ms. Benjamin went into the bathroom to get away 
from him.
 
[¶8]        
Ms. Benjamin’s 
testimony was that as she left the bathroom, Mr. Benjamin was standing in 
the bedroom, near the bathroom door.  
He appeared angry, and approached her.  After that, she explained, “[e]verything 
happened so fast” that she could not recall the exact sequence of events.  She recalled that Mr. Benjamin shoved 
her into the shower door.  She hit 
the shower door with her elbow and, she said, broke the glass door.  
 
[¶9]        
Ms. Benjamin 
testified that she ran from the bathroom into her bedroom and grabbed her pistol 
from under her bed.  Holding the 
pistol, she told Mr. Benjamin to leave, and he cursed at her.  Then he “lunged” at her and grabbed at 
the pistol.  She shot.  Although she could remember shooting 
only once, she acknowledged that Mr. Benjamin was shot three times.  The next thing she recalled was lying on 
the floor near the bed with Mr. Benjamin on top of her.  She threw the pistol behind the 
nightstand, pushed Mr. Benjamin off of her, and got up from the 
floor.
 
[¶10]     
Unknown to Ms. 
Benjamin, her eighteen-year-old son was also in the house, and he came into the 
bedroom as Ms. Benjamin was getting up from the floor.  Her son helped her up and into the 
kitchen, then checked on Mr. Benjamin and determined that he was dead.  Ms. Benjamin gave her son several 
thousand dollars she had been saving, and told him to pick up his sister in 
Buffalo and take her to a relative’s home in Gillette “to be safe.”  After he left, Ms. Benjamin talked 
on the telephone with some of her children and other people.  She sent text messages to her 
children.1  She cleaned up glass from the broken 
shower door.  A text message from 
Ms. Benjamin to her son indicates that, at 5:00 p.m. that evening, she went to a 
movie in town.  Eventually, at the 
urging of her sons, she drove herself into town and went to the police 
station.
 
[¶11]     
She turned herself in 
at about 4:30 in the morning on Monday, May 4, approximately sixteen hours after 
shooting Mr. Benjamin.  The police 
officer recorded the interview.  In 
the recording, Ms. Benjamin sounded very emotional and, occasionally, 
nearly incoherent.  She eventually 
told the police officer that Mr. Benjamin was dead at her home, and that 
she had shot him around noon the previous day.  Because Ms. Benjamin lived outside 
the town limits, the policeman dispatched officers from the Johnson County 
Sheriff’s department to her home.  
They found Mr. Benjamin on the floor of Ms. Benjamin’s bedroom between 
the bed and the wall, and confirmed that he was dead.
 
[¶12]     
The officers found a 
relatively small amount of blood at the scene given the gravity of Mr. 
Benjamin’s wounds.  There was a 
small amount of blood on a floor heating vent, on some boxes against the wall, 
and on a mirror.  Upon further 
inspection, the officers found that the boxes had been deliberately moved and 
stacked to cover up a small amount of blood on the wall.  The officers also found a bloody towel 
on the bed and later found fifteen damp, freshly washed towels in the washing 
machine.  They also found fourteen 
dry towels in the dryer.  

 
[¶13]     
Ms. Benjamin was 
charged with first degree murder.  
Based on the evidence summarized above, the State argued at trial that 
Ms. Benjamin had purposely lured Mr. Benjamin to her home under the false 
pretense that their daughter was waiting for him.  It argued that this was a premeditated, 
purposeful, and malicious effort to harm Mr. Benjamin. 

 
[¶14]     
The State also 
presented evidence that contradicted Ms. Benjamin’s version of the 
shooting.  There was, for example, 
forensic evidence that there was no gun powder residue on Mr. Benjamin’s 
hands or clothing, indicating that he had been shot at a distance of several 
feet, not while grabbing the pistol and trying to turn it on her as she had 
testified.  There was also forensic 
evidence that the shower door was shattered by a bullet, contrary to Ms. 
Benjamin’s testimony that it was broken by her elbow.
 
[¶15]     
Anticipating Ms. 
Benjamin’s claim that she was a victim of domestic abuse, the State offered 
testimony indicating that Ms. Benjamin was actually the aggressor in the 
relationship.  Witnesses had 
observed her initiating confrontations with Mr. Benjamin, and slapping or 
punching him.  One witness testified 
that Ms. Benjamin “was never afraid to confront him on anything.  She was never afraid to be around 
him.”  Other witnesses testified 
that Ms. Benjamin had, on at least two occasions, initiated physical 
confrontations with a woman Mr. Benjamin had been dating. 
 
[¶16]     
Several witnesses 
also testified that Ms. Benjamin telephoned Mr. Benjamin with unusual 
frequency.  One acquaintance 
testified that Ms. Benjamin “called him and called him and called him all of the 
time,” and a former roommate of Mr. Benjamin estimated that she sometimes called 
up to thirty times per day.  
Evidence also showed that Ms. Benjamin had been recording many of 
her telephone conversations with Mr. Benjamin, although her recording 
device recorded only his side of the conversation, not hers.  Based on these arguments and this 
evidence, the State asked the jury to convict Ms. Benjamin of first degree 
murder.
 
[¶17]     
Ms. Benjamin never 
denied that she had shot Mr. Benjamin, but asserted that she had done so in 
self-defense.  She admitted that she 
misled Mr. Benjamin about their daughter waiting at home to go fishing with 
him.  She explained that she never 
expected him to show up, however, and was calling only to “make him feel 
guilty.”  According to her 
testimony, she got the pistol to convince Mr. Benjamin to leave, and shot only 
after he grabbed the pistol and tried to turn it on her.
 
[¶18]     
In further support of 
her self-defense claim, a psychologist testified that Ms.  Benjamin 
was diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, particularly 
from a subset of that disorder known as Battered Woman’s Syndrome.2  Ms. Benjamin testified that Mr. 
Benjamin had hit her on several occasions and frequently verbally abused 
her.  Witnesses for both the defense 
and the prosecution bolstered her testimony with observations of many arguments, 
fights, and confrontations between the Benjamins.  Several witnesses had seen 
Ms. Benjamin at various times with black eyes and bruises.  There was also testimony that 
Mr. Benjamin drank heavily and frequently, and that he could become loud, 
mean, and violent when he was drinking.
 
[¶19]     
The jury acquitted 
Ms. Benjamin on the charge of first degree murder, but also rejected her claim 
of self-defense, finding her guilty of the lesser included offense of second 
degree murder.  The district court 
sentenced her to twenty to thirty years in prison.  Ms. Benjamin challenges her conviction 
in this appeal.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Did the trial court 
err in not dismissing juror Blaney?
 
[¶20]     
During voir dire, a 
potential juror introduced herself as Karen Blaney.  A Dr. Blaney was listed by the 
State as a possible witness to rebut the defense’s expert witnesses.  The district court pointed this out, and 
asked Ms. Blaney if they were related.  Ms. Blaney said she was married to Dr. 
Blaney.  She explained that he was a 
psychologist who had consulted with the prosecution, but said that he had never 
discussed the case with her.  Asked 
by the prosecutor if she could still “be fair to both sides” despite her 
husband’s involvement in the case, Ms. Blaney answered, “I don’t often 
agree with Dr. Blaney, but no.  
I am a very independent person.”  
Her answer may seem ambiguous when read from the transcript, but it is 
apparent in the context of the record that everyone understood Ms. Blaney to 
mean that she could be fair to both sides.  
No one asked her any more questions.  Neither the defense nor the State moved 
to excuse Ms. Blaney from the jury for cause.  Neither side exercised a peremptory 
challenge against Ms. Blaney, and she was seated on the 
jury.
 
[¶21]     
At the end of the 
day, and outside of the presence of the jury, the district court again raised 
the issue of Ms. Blaney’s relationship to a listed witness.3  Apparently the judge expressed some 
surprise that Ms. Benjamin had not moved to excuse Ms. Blaney from the 
jury.  Defense counsel confirmed the 
decision not to challenge Ms. Blaney for cause, explaining to the district 
court that “we [the defense] kind of like her” as a juror.
 
[¶22]     
Dr. Blaney did not 
testify during the trial, but he was present when the prosecution cross-examined 
Dr. Finney, a psychologist who diagnosed Ms. Benjamin as suffering post 
traumatic stress disorder.  Later, 
when the jury was not present, defense counsel told the district court of his 
concerns about Dr. Blaney’s actions:
 
[D]uring the cross 
examination of Dr. Finney, [Dr.] Blaney was seated behind the prosecutor and 
appeared to be just participating with the prosecutor as sort of like a team 
member, and he rushed up to the prosecutor’s table sort of like, here, I show 
you this, and it would have given the jury the impression that he had a 
passionate view opposite of what was being said, and certainly would have given 
his wife that impression.  We have 
alternates and I want to use an alternate and not [Ms. Blaney], because of 
that.  God knows what effect that 
would have on her.  It showed that 
he was not a sworn witness testifying about something.  It showed that he was participating with 
the prosecutor to try to discredit Dr. Finney.  And I think – And we are very concerned 
that might cause an effect on Ms. Blaney.
 
Defense counsel asked 
to have Ms. Blaney removed from the jury, but the district court denied the 
request.
 
[¶23]     
On appeal, Ms. 
Benjamin challenges this decision.  
She 
claims that Ms. Blaney’s presence on the jury impinged upon her constitutional right 
to a fair and impartial trial.
 
The Sixth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States and Art. 1 § 10 of the Wyoming 
Constitution guarantee the accused in a criminal proceeding a trial by an 
impartial jury.  Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751, 755 (1961); Collins v. State, 589 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Wyo. 
1979).  The constitutional right to 
due process also guarantees a criminal defendant’s right to an impartial 
jury.  See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595, 
n.6, 96 S. Ct. 1017, 1020, n.6, 47 L. Ed. 2d 258, 263 (1976). An impartial jury 
consists of those jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the 
facts.  Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423, 
105 S. Ct. 844, 852, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 851 (1985).  Impartiality is not measured easily by 
tests as it is not a technical conception but rather a state of mind.  United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 
145, 57 S. Ct. 177, 185, 81 L. Ed. 78, 88 (1936).
 
Miller 
v. State, 
904 P.2d 344, 352 (Wyo. 
1995).
 
[¶24]     
Ms. 
Benjamin does not contend that Ms. Blaney was actually biased.  Rather, she asserts that “[t]his is a 
claim of implied bias on the part of [Ms.] Blaney.”  We have previously explained the 
difference between actual bias and implied bias:
 
[A] party can obtain 
a new trial by showing that the juror had an actual or implied bias.  A finding of actual bias is based upon 
express proof, e.g., . . . admission by the prospective juror of a state of mind 
prejudicial to a party’s interest.  
Actual bias is a factual finding reviewed for clear error.  A determination on a claim of implied 
bias, on the other hand, is a question of law reviewed de novo.  Implied bias can be proved by showing 
that the juror had a personal connection to the parties or circumstances of the 
trial or when there are similarities between the personal experiences of the 
juror and the issues being litigated.
 
Smith v. 
State, 2008 WY 98, ¶ 29, 190 P.3d 522, 531-32 (Wyo. 2008) (internal citations and some punctuation omitted).  
 
[¶25]     
Ms. Benjamin claims 
that Ms. Blaney should have been removed from the jury on the basis of implied 
bias because of her relationship to Dr. Blaney, a listed witness for the 
prosecution.  Relying on Smith, as quoted above, she asserts that 
this is an issue of law to be reviewed de 
novo.  The State counters that 
Ms. Benjamin did not move to excuse Ms. Blaney for cause during voir dire, 
and because “there was no contemporaneous objection below,” Ms. Benjamin’s claim 
must be reviewed for plain error.  

 
[¶26]     
We agree with the 
State that, in cases in which the parties raised no objection at trial, we 
generally review for plain error.  
See Jones v. State, 2011 WY 114, ¶ 10, 256 P.3d 527, 532 (Wyo. 2011); Tucker v. State, 2010 WY 162, ¶ 28, 245 P.3d 301, 309 (Wyo. 2010).  If we were asked to decide whether the 
district court should have removed Ms. Blaney from the jury during voir 
dire despite defense counsel’s lack of objection, then we might apply the plain 
error standard of review.  However, 
it is clear from Ms. Benjamin’s brief that she is not challenging the district 
court’s decision during voir dire to leave Ms. Blaney on the jury.  Instead, she is challenging the district 
court’s denial, near the end of the trial, of her request to remove Ms. Blaney 
from the jury.  Given this explicit 
objection by defense counsel, review for plain error is not appropriate. 

 
[¶27]     
On the other hand, 
Ms. Benjamin’s assertion that we must review the issue de novo is based on an 
oversimplification of our decision in Smith.  When we are faced with a straightforward 
question of whether, as a matter of law, the district court should have removed 
a juror or jurors because of implied bias, then de novo review may be appropriate.  For example, in State 
v. Dobbs, 
70 Wyo. 26, 244 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 
1952), we “assumed prejudice when noncompliance with the selection procedures 
caused a significant number of nonqualified jurors to be empaneled.”  Miller, 904 P.2d  at 353.  Although the standard of review was not 
explicitly set forth in Dobbs, it is 
apparent that the Court undertook a de 
novo review:  “The question . . 
. before us is as to the effect 
of the 36% error and mistake in the jury list and in the panel.”  Dobbs, 244 P.2d  at 282.
 
[¶28]     
In other cases and 
other contexts, questions involving implied bias have been reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion.  In Miller, 904 P.2d  at 351, for example, “a 
potential juror expressed his belief in front of the rest of the panel that [the 
defendant] had previously stolen the juror’s horse.”  The district court denied 
Mr. Miller’s motion for a mistrial.  
We reviewed that decision “under an abuse of discretion standard” and we 
concluded that “a mistrial should have been granted and the failure to grant one 
was an abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 351, 354.  To similar effect is Lee v. State, 743 P.2d 296, 299 (Wyo. 1987).  A juror in that case had previously 
served on the jury in a related case.  
We concluded that the district court “abused its discretion in refusing 
to grant the challenge for cause.”  
In Majors v. State, 2011 WY 63, ¶ 15, 252 P.3d 435, 440 (Wyo. 2011), we concluded that it was error to appoint one of the 
investigating officers as bailiff for the jury, but continued that, “in 
resolving whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion 
for a mistrial, . . . we must consider the potential for prejudice.”  We found no prejudice.  “Consequently, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Majors’ motion for a mistrial.”  Id., ¶ 21, 252 P.3d  at 
441.
 
[¶29]     
The lesson we take 
from these cases is that not every question involving implied bias is subject to 
de novo review on appeal.  The proper standard of review must be 
adapted to fit the context in which the question is presented.  Accordingly, we must consider the 
context in which Ms. Benjamin’s issue comes before us.
 
[¶30]     
During voir dire, Ms. 
Benjamin did not move to strike Ms. Blaney from the jury for cause.  As the district court later 
explained,
 
Well, I have always 
been concerned about [Ms. Blaney].  
I was surprised that nobody made a motion for cause.  I probably would have granted it, but 
nobody did.  I am not the lawyer in 
the case.
 
We have previously 
established that “failure to challenge a juror, and then later acceptance of the 
panel at trial, waives any objection to the service of a particular juror.”  Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 1996).  Ms. Benjamin clearly waived any 
objection to Ms. Blaney’s service on the jury.  Moreover, given counsel’s indication to 
the district court that the defense “kind of like” Ms. Blaney as a juror, 
it appears that this waiver was a deliberate decision based on trial strategy 
considerations.
 
[¶31]     
Near the end of the 
trial, defense counsel objected to Ms. Blaney’s remaining on the jury.  At that point, the district court 
reminded defense counsel that Ms. Blaney’s relationship to Dr. Blaney had been 
revealed during voir dire, and suggested “that is the time to raise this 
issue.”  The district court inquired 
whether defense counsel had “thought about it and changed your position.”  Defense counsel responded:  “Well, we thought about it and observed 
what happened and we think that changes our position about 
her.”
 
[¶32]     
To the extent that 
Ms. Benjamin’s objection was based on “what happened,” it does not raise a 
question of law that should be reviewed de novo.  The 
district court observed “what happened,” and was in a better position than we 
are to evaluate Dr. Blaney’s actions.  
In such circumstances, we should “not presume to place ourselves in the 
shoes of the trial court in these cases by reading a cold record.”  Gruwell v. State, 2011 WY 67, ¶ 25, 254 P.3d 223, 231 (Wyo. 2011), 
quoting Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶ 32, 76 P.3d 805, 819 
(Wyo. 2003).  Because we 
traditionally afford district courts considerable discretion in the proper 
conduct of trials, it follows that the district court’s denial of 
Ms. Benjamin’s request to remove Ms. Blaney from the jury should be 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  
In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the 
ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.  Breazeale v. State, 2011 WY 10, ¶ 30, 245 P.3d 834, 843 (Wyo. 
2011).
 
[¶33]     
When Ms. Benjamin 
sought to remove Ms. Blaney from the jury based on “what happened” with Dr. 
Blaney, the question before the district court was whether the circumstances had 
changed sufficiently to require reconsideration of Ms. Benjamin’s previous 
waiver of any objection to Ms. Blaney’s serving on the jury.  As the district court observed, many 
circumstances had not changed at all.  
Prior to trial, the State had designated Dr. Blaney as a witness who 
might testify to rebut the defense’s expert witness.  Ms. Blaney had revealed during voir dire 
that she was married to Dr. Blaney and that she was aware that he was a 
consultant on the case.  

 
[¶34]     
The only circumstance 
that had changed was that Dr. Blaney did not testify, but instead reacted 
visibly during the cross examination of Dr. Finney.  Defense counsel posited that 
Dr. Blaney’s participation “would have given the jury the impression that 
he had a passionate view opposite of what was being said.”  But as the district court explained, it 
“would have been more concerned had [Dr.] Blaney actually testified.”  If Dr. Blaney had testified instead, his 
disagreement with Dr. Finney would have been made explicit rather than 
implied by his actions.  The 
district court determined that Dr. Blaney’s actions during trial had less 
negative impact than if he had testified to his disagreement with the defense 
expert, and so concluded that the circumstances had not changed sufficiently to 
compel the removal of Ms. Blaney from the jury.
 
[¶35]     
We are satisfied that 
the district court’s conclusion was reasonable.  Ms. Benjamin had waived her implied bias 
objection to Ms. Blaney during voir dire.  
We 
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. 
Benjamin’s request, late in the course of the trial, to remove Ms. Blaney from 
the jury. 
 
Did the trial court 
err in refusing Appellant’s proposed jury 
instructions?
 
[¶36]     
During the jury 
instruction conference, Ms. Benjamin proposed these two jury 
instructions:
 
Instruction No. 
G
 
Where an accused is 
the sole witness of a transaction charged as a crime, as in the case at bar, her 
testimony cannot be arbitrarily rejected, and if her credibility has not been 
impeached, and her testimony is not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the 
facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent therewith, then her 
testimony should be accepted.
 
Instruction No. 
H
 
[Ms. Benjamin] being 
the sole witness to the transaction charged as a crime, her testimony must be 
accepted as true, if it is not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the 
facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent 
therewith.
 
The district court 
refused to give the instructions.  
Ms. Benjamin claims that the district court’s decision was in 
error.
 
[¶37]     
When reviewing 
questions involving jury instructions, we afford significant deference to the 
trial court’s decisions.  Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 20, 124 P.3d 699, 706 (Wyo. 2005).  “A trial court is given wide latitude in 
instructing the jury and, as long as the instructions correctly state the 
law and the instructions in their entirety sufficiently cover[] the relevant 
issue, reversible error will not be found.”  Roden v. State, 2007 WY 200, ¶ 21, 173 P.3d 369, 375 (Wyo. 2007), 
quoting Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 90, 99 P.3d 928, 954 (Wyo. 
2004).
 
[¶38]     
Ms. Benjamin argues 
on appeal, as she did before the district court, that her proposed instructions 
were supported by our holding in Eagan v. 
State, 58 Wyo. 167, 198, 128 P.2d 215, 226 (1942):
 
Where an accused is 
the sole witness of a transaction charged as a crime, as in the case at bar, his 
testimony cannot be arbitrarily rejected, and if his credibility has not been 
impeached, and his testimony is not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the 
facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent therewith, then his 
testimony should be accepted.
 
This holding has been 
referred to as the 
“Eagan Rule.”  See, e.g., Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 25, 123 P.3d 543, 
551 (Wyo. 2005).
 
[¶39]     
The State concedes 
that Ms. Benjamin was the only witness to the shooting of 
Mr. Benjamin.  It claims, 
however, that the “Eagan Rule” is 
inapplicable in this case because Ms. Benjamin’s credibility had been impeached, 
and her testimony was not consistent with other facts and circumstances 
shown.  Having reviewed the trial 
transcript, we agree with the State.  
Several examples can be found in the record, but one will be sufficient 
to illustrate that Ms. Benjamin was impeached, and that her testimony was 
inconsistent with other evidence.  

 
[¶40]     
When Ms. Benjamin 
turned herself in at the police station, she told the officer that she and Mr. 
Benjamin had “fought over the gun.”  
She said that she was “just trying to scare him,” but he grabbed the 
pistol, and she “just shot.”  These 
statements were consistent with a note Ms. Benjamin had written and left at her 
home, in which she said that “I grabbed the gun to scare him out of here.  He grabbed it.  I shot and he tried to turn the gun on 
me and I just kept shooting.”  At 
trial, Ms. Benjamin first testified that she shot Mr. Benjamin when he 
“lunged” at her, but later asserted that Mr. Benjamin “tried to turn [the gun] 
around on me and I just shot.” 
 
[¶41]     
A pathologist, called 
as an expert witness by the State, testified that no gun powder residue was 
found anywhere on Mr. Benjamin’s body or clothing.  According to this witness, the lack of 
residue indicated that the shots had been fired from “several feet away.”  Two other witnesses, a forensic analyst 
from the state crime lab and an expert who specialized in firearms, also 
testified that the absence of gun powder on Mr. Benjamin meant that the 
shots had been fired from a distance of three or four feet or more.  The pathologist concluded that the lack 
of gun powder residue on Mr. Benjamin’s hands indicated that he was not 
grabbing the pistol when it went off.  
The other expert confirmed this point:
 
I don’t believe they 
were close enough to struggle over the gun.  If he had his hands close to the gun, 
not only the muzzle puts out gun powder but the cylinder gap between the 
cylinder as it rotates in the back of the barrel, that puts out some powder 
residue.  And typically when you 
have somebody that is struggling over a gun when it goes off, you have some 
residue on the skin or the clothing next to that.  And that was not 
there.
 
[¶42]     
Ms. Benjamin’s 
statements and testimony that Mr. Benjamin had grabbed the pistol when it went 
off are not consistent with the physical evidence and expert testimony 
indicating the shots were fired from several feet away.  The “Eagan Rule” applies only if the 
witness’s “credibility has not been impeached” and “is not inconsistent with the 
facts and circumstances shown.”  
Eagan, 
128 P.2d  at 226.  It therefore did 
not apply in Ms. Benjamin’s case, and the district court did not err in 
refusing the “Eagan Rule” 
instructions she proposed.
 
Did the trial court 
err in denying the post-trial motion for judgment of 
acquittal?
 
[¶43]     
After trial, Ms. 
Benjamin filed a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 29(c), 
asserting that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she 
did not act in self-defense.  The 
district court denied the motion, and Ms. Benjamin challenges that 
decision.  She claims that the State 
failed to prove that she did not act in self-defense because it presented “no 
evidence of Ms. Benjamin’s state of mind at the time of the 
shooting.”
 
[¶44]     
Motions for judgment 
of acquittal should be granted “when it may be said as a matter of law that 
there is no evidence of guilt whatsoever in the record or where there is no 
substantial evidence from which reasonable [jurors] may say that the defendant 
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Chavez v. State, 601 P.2d 166, 170 (Wyo. 
1979).
 
In reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence in the context of a denial of a motion for judgment 
of acquittal, we examine and accept as true the State’s evidence and all 
reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it.  We do not consider conflicting evidence 
presented by the defendant.  We do 
not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a 
jury could have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
This standard applies whether the supporting evidence is direct or 
circumstantial. 
 
Najera v. 
State, 2009 WY 105, ¶ 5, 214 P.3d 990, 992 (Wyo. 2009), 
quoting Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 32, 149 P.3d 707, 715 (Wyo. 2007) 
(citations omitted).
 
[¶45]     
Ms. Benjamin 
correctly points out that the State had the burden of disproving her claim of 
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Olson v. State, 960 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Wyo. 
1998).  Consistent with this 
precedent, the district court properly instructed the jury that “Before [Ms. 
Benjamin] may be convicted of any crime, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [Ms. Benjamin] did not act in self-defense.”  The jury was also 
instructed:
 
If [Ms. Benjamin] 
believed that she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, and 
that deadly force was necessary to repel such danger, and if a reasonable person 
in a similar situation seeing and knowing the same facts would be justified in 
believing that she was in similar danger, [then Ms. Benjamin] would be 
justified in using deadly force in self-defense.
 
[¶46]     
Our review of the 
record confirms Ms. Benjamin’s claim that the State presented no direct evidence of her state of mind 
at the time of the shooting.  The 
only direct evidence of that was her own testimony that she feared Mr. Benjamin 
was going to hurt her, and that she acted to prevent that.  We have previously observed, however, 
that “in 
all cases, civil or criminal, turning upon the state of an individual’s mind, 
direct evidence may be rare; usually the trier of facts is required to draw 
inferences of the state of mind at issue from surrounding acts, utterances, 
writings, or other indicia.”  MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 
612 P.2d 830, 843 (Wyo. 1980) 
(emphasis omitted), quoting Widener v. 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 75 Cal. App. 3d 415, 435, 142 Cal. Rptr. 304, 314 (1977), overruled on other 
grounds by McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835, 846 n.9, 231 Cal. Rptr. 518, 525 n.9, 727 P.2d 711, 719 n.9 (1986).  The State claims that there was 
sufficient evidence of the surrounding facts and circumstances to allow a 
reasonable jury to draw the inference that Ms. Benjamin did not act in 
self-defense.  We keep in mind, as we evaluate this 
claim, that we “accept as true the State’s evidence and all reasonable 
inferences which can be drawn from it.  
We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant.”  Najera, ¶ 5, 214 P.3d  at 
992.
 
[¶47]     
The evidence viewed 
in this way was sufficient to disprove that Ms. Benjamin acted in 
self-defense.  The prosecution 
presented evidence that Ms. Benjamin had been extremely angry and upset 
about the pending divorce from Mr. Benjamin and about his relationship with 
another woman.  It presented 
evidence suggesting that Ms. Benjamin pressured Mr. Benjamin – “lured” him, as 
the State put it – to come to her home to pick up their daughter, even though 
Ms. Benjamin knew that the daughter was not there.  A little more than an hour after Mr. 
Benjamin arrived, Ms. Benjamin shot him three times.  Some of her testimony about the incident 
was inconsistent with the physical evidence.  
 
[¶48]     
In particular, as 
discussed above, she testified that she shot Mr. Benjamin when he grabbed the 
gun and tried to turn it on her.  
However, there was no gunpowder residue on Mr. Benjamin or his clothing, 
indicating that he had been shot from a distance of at least several feet.  There was evidence that Ms. Benjamin had 
been the aggressor in past confrontations with Mr. Benjamin, and testimony that 
she was not afraid of him.  Finally, 
we note that Ms. Benjamin delayed reporting the shooting for approximately 
sixteen hours.
 
[¶49]     
This provided 
sufficient evidence for a jury to make reasonable inferences about 
Ms. Benjamin’s state of mind.  
It provided an adequate basis for the jury to reject Ms. Benjamin’s 
testimony that she believed she was in imminent danger of death or serious 
bodily harm at the time of the shooting.  
The district court did not err in denying Ms. Benjamin’s motion for a 
judgment of acquittal.
 
Did reversible 
prosecutorial misconduct occur?
 
[¶50]     
In her fourth issue, 
Ms. Benjamin complains of several instances of alleged misconduct on the part of 
the prosecution at trial.  
“Allegations 
of prosecutorial misconduct are settled by reference to the entire record and 
'hinge on whether a defendant’s case has been so prejudiced as to constitute 
denial of a fair trial.’”  Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, ¶ 39, 228 P.3d 874, 887 (Wyo. 2010), 
quoting Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo. 2000).  Two of the asserted instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct were objected to at trial, and we will review them by 
applying a harmless error standard.  
Harris v. State, 2008 WY 23, ¶ 12, 177 P.3d 1166, 1170 (Wyo. 
2008).  The instances not objected 
to will be reviewed for plain error.  
Schreibvogel, ¶ 39, 228 P.3d  at 887.
 
[¶51]     
The first instance of 
asserted misconduct occurred during voir dire.  Ms. Benjamin contends that the 
prosecutor made improper comments about the personal background of the assistant 
prosecutor.  The prosecutor called 
his co-counsel “a carpet bagger from Chicago,” said that he was a graduate of 
the University of Wyoming and had spent four years as a prosecutor in Rock 
Springs.  Defense counsel objected 
to these comments.  The district 
court sustained the objection, reminding the prosecutor that it was not 
appropriate “to pass out the resume.”
 
[¶52]     
Ms. Benjamin points 
out that W.R.Cr.P. 24(c)(2) prohibits comment on the personal lives of the 
attorneys involved in a case.  We 
have previously stated, however, that “[T]he limitations placed on voir dire by 
the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure are flexible, and purposely so, so as to 
allow the trial court discretion in that important process.”  Person v. 
State, 2004 WY 149, ¶ 33, 100 P.3d 1270, 1286 (Wyo. 
2004).  Although 
the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection, the preference for 
flexibility in the voir dire process nonetheless guides our review on appeal. 
The prosecutor’s comment that the assistant was a “carpet bagger” was plainly an 
attempt at humor rather than a reference to his personal life.  In context, the comments were a preface 
to questions about whether anyone on the jury panel would hold against the State 
anything that the two prosecutors may have done in their various jobs.  Considering this context, the 
information imparted by the prosecutor could be deemed useful in discovering any 
bias that the jurors may have had.  
Accordingly, given that the trial court’s discretion is justified with 
this objective in mind, we cannot say that the comments amounted to 
misconduct.  Even if the comment 
could be considered improper, Ms. Benjamin has not articulated how it was 
harmful to her.  Indeed, as the 
comment was meant to reflect negatively on the assistant prosecutor, we cannot 
perceive that it was prejudicial to Ms. Benjamin.
 
[¶53]     
The second instance 
also occurred during voir dire.  Ms. 
Benjamin asserts that the prosecutor made an improper statement about her 
defense counsel:
 
[Prosecutor]:  Okay.  Picking a jury is never easy.  There is always somebody that you look 
out there and you say darn, I should know that person and there is a story 
behind it.  You look familiar.  Do I know you?  And the lady answers, yes, I know 
you.  I have known you since you 
were a young boy.  And you say, 
well, what do you know of me?  Well, 
I know you drink too much, you cheat on your wife, you are generally no good, 
and I would not believe anything you said.  
Dang, I shouldn’t have asked that question.  Well, do you know the defense 
attorney?  Yes, I have known him 
since he was a young boy.  What do 
you think of him?  Well, he cheated 
his way through school, he drinks too much, he has a gambling problem, and I 
would not believe a word he has to say.
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:  Your Honor, these kind of 
jokes have no purpose in voir dire at all and they are 
improper.
 
THE COURT:  Sustained.  Please proceed.
 
[¶54]     
Ms. Benjamin cites 
authority from several other jurisdictions that disparaging remarks directed 
toward defense counsel have no place in a courtroom, and clearly constitute 
misconduct.  We may be willing to 
apply this rule in Wyoming as well, but contrary to Ms. Benjamin’s claim, 
these comments cannot reasonably be interpreted as an insult to defense 
counsel.  Even in his objection, 
defense counsel referred to the comments as “jokes.”  The prosecutor did not seriously contend 
that defense counsel had cheated in school or drank too much, any more than he 
meant to indicate that he himself had cheated on his wife or lacked 
credibility.  Read in context, the 
comments appear to be part of an effort to put prospective jurors at ease about 
revealing information they might know about the parties, the witnesses, or the 
attorneys.  Such jokes may or may 
not be an effective voir dire technique, but we cannot say that they constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct.
 
[¶55]     
Third, Ms. Benjamin 
objects to remarks made during the prosecutor’s opening statement.  After telling the jury it would hear 
evidence that Mr. Benjamin was “mean” and a “drunkard,” the prosecutor 
continued, “You will also hear that he was somebody’s son, somebody’s brother, 
four kids’ father, a good worker, a good friend.  Somebody that would help people.”  Ms. Benjamin did not object below, 
but now contends that these comments were improper references to victim 
impact.  Reviewing for plain error, 
we note that the record is clear as to what the prosecutor said.  We turn then to the second and third 
prongs of the analysis, determining whether a clear rule of law was violated and 
whether a substantial right has been denied causing material prejudice to the 
defendant.  We note that the 
defendant bears the burden of proving prejudice.  Teniente 
v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 10, 169 P.3d 512, 520 (Wyo. 
2007).
 
[¶56]     
The prosecutor stated 
that Mr. Benjamin was a son, brother, and father.  These were facts supported by the 
evidence and, moreover, did not indicate anything about the impact of Mr. 
Benjamin’s death on his relatives.  
The prosecutor also asserted that Mr. Benjamin was a good worker and 
good friend.  This similarly 
indicated nothing about the impact of his death on his co-workers or 
friends.  Ms. Benjamin does not cite 
to any authority supporting her conclusion that the statements amounted to 
“victim impact testimony.”  In 
consideration of Ms. Benjamin’s failure to provide any authority by which we can 
compare the prosecutor’s statements to victim impact testimony, we turn to our 
general definition of victim impact evidence:  “Broadly speaking, victim impact 
evidence is that evidence relating to the victim’s personal characteristics and 
to the physical, emotional, or social impact of a crime on its victim and the 
victim’s family.”  Sweet v. State, 2010 WY 87, ¶ 41, 234 P.3d 1193, 
1207 (Wyo. 2010).  The statements 
made by the prosecutor simply did not address the “physical, emotional, or 
social impact” of the crime, and the statements did not create any inferences 
that could not otherwise have been drawn from the mere fact of the victim’s 
death.  Further, because there was 
no suggestion of victim impact in these statements, we do not perceive how they 
could have prejudiced Ms. Benjamin.  
Indeed, Ms. Benjamin concedes that “Standing alone, these comments might 
be held to be harmless,” but she states that when these comments are added to 
statements made during closing arguments, she was denied her right to a fair 
trial.4  In recognition of the rule that 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are examined with “reference to the 
entire record,” Mazurek, 10 P.3d  at 
542, we acknowledge that our review should encompass the cumulative effect of 
the alleged instances of misconduct.  
But our review of the total effect of such instances does not warrant 
acceptance of conclusory allegations regarding individual incidents where there 
has been no attempt to demonstrate prejudice.  We conclude that the comments did not 
amount to prosecutorial misconduct, and that Ms. Benjamin has not met her burden 
of proving that prejudice resulted from the statements.  We find no reversible error in the 
prosecutor’s opening statement.
 
[¶57]     
Fourth, Ms. Benjamin 
cites several instances in the prosecutor’s closing argument in which he 
reminded the jury that it would never hear Mr. Benjamin’s side of the 
story.  Again, in the absence of an 
objection below, we review for plain error.  To support her claim that such remarks 
were improper, Ms. Benjamin cites a Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Beavers, 424 A.2d 1313, 
1315 (Pa. 1981).  This case 
indicates that a prosecutor may not tell the jury what he believes a victim 
would have testified if he were still alive.  However, the prosecutor here told the 
jury only that Mr. Benjamin was not there to testify.  He did not suggest how Mr. Benjamin 
might have testified if he were still alive.  Once again, Ms. Benjamin provides no 
authority, and presents no clear and unequivocal rule of law, to support an 
assertion that it is improper to tell the jury that it will not hear the 
victim’s side of the story.  
Additionally, Ms. Benjamin does not argue that she was prejudiced by this 
statement, other than to assert that the prosecutor improperly interjected “this 
issue” into the minds and deliberations of the jury.  We fail to see how raising the fact of 
the victim’s death resulted in undue prejudice to Ms. Benjamin, and, as a 
result, do not find plain error.
 
[¶58]     
Fifth, Ms. Benjamin 
complains that the prosecutor “speculated and created scenarios” that were 
“unsupported by any evidence.”  In 
particular, she complains that the prosecutor presented a version of the 
shooting in which “Mr. Benjamin, not Ms. Benjamin, had gone back to 
use the bathroom, and Ms. Benjamin followed him and got the gun, and Mr. 
Benjamin turned around and she was there with the gun.”  She also objects to the prosecutor’s 
argument that Ms. Benjamin removed her bloody clothes, then put them back on 
before turning herself in at the police station.  In both instances, Ms. Benjamin 
asserts that these arguments lack any factual support.  In both instances, no objection was made 
below, and we will review for plain error.
 
[¶59]     
We agree with Ms. 
Benjamin’s contention that closing arguments must be based on the evidence 
admitted at trial.  “Wide latitude 
is allowed in discussing inferences to be drawn from the evidence.  However, prosecutors must limit their 
closing arguments to commenting on the evidence.”  Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 22, 100 P.3d 386, 
392 (Wyo. 2004).  “To the extent 
that [a prosecutor’s] observation is not reflected by the evidence, it was an 
improper comment.”  Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wyo. 
1978).  We disagree, however, with 
Ms. Benjamin that the prosecutor’s arguments in this case lacked factual 
support.
 
[¶60]     
To analyze the 
prosecutor’s remarks, we find it helpful to consider the full text of the 
argument rather than a characterization of it.  During closing argument, the prosecutor 
stated as follows:
 
[Ms. Benjamin] will 
also tell you that she left the argument and went back to the bathroom.  Let[’]s talk about that bathroom a 
little bit.  Thirty inches between 
the shower door and the front of the stool.  This door you have seen in the pictures. 
You will have the pictures.
 
Originally the 
thought was maybe they are both in there.  
How did—Where was [Ms. Benjamin] positioned and where was the victim’s 
position?  Because if [Ms. Benjamin] 
was in here, then the victim would have to crowd in here, maybe here, get his 
feet positioned and then push her into the shower door.  Or if [she] is out here, then somehow 
she would have to get pushed, make several steps back into the shower door and 
bang into it but not so hard that she would be flying through or fall inside of 
the shower, but hard enough to break it and somehow injure her right arm in the 
process.
 
Or, if [Mr. Benjamin] 
went back to that bathroom and was using the restroom and then turned around and 
[Ms. Benjamin] had a gun, I submit to you 
that makes more sense.  There is no 
way there is a pushing and shoving match in here and the shower door got broke, 
and [Ms. Benjamin] tells you that she pushed past, somehow, [Mr. Benjamin] and 
traveled over here, this twenty some feet, recovered a gun from under the bed 
there and came back, stood about here, that she had a conversation or exchanged 
words with the victim and then she shot him after he charged 
[her].
 
Ask yourself when you 
are judging the possibility of that story, why would the victim be standing in 
that bathroom[?]  The only 
explanation [Ms. Benjamin] was able to give you was that he was looking at the 
glass, at the broken door, but if the door was not broken until he was shot, why 
is he standing around looking at it, maybe while she travels these forty feet 
round trip and shows up with a gun?  
And then if he is pushing her, how does she get out of there?  If there is really a fight going on, or 
a push, she says, I am out of here, and he stands around in the bathroom and 
waits and she gets the gun and comes back and says, get out of here.  The physical evidence at the scene does 
not support the testimony of [Ms. Benjamin].  The prior story of [Ms. Benjamin] 
doesn’t support the physical evidence. 
 
Sometime during the 
next twenty-four hours, or the next fifteen hours, rather, [Ms. Benjamin] leaves 
the scene at least once to go to the police station.  We know that.  She does not remember if she sent 
another – She sent a text saying I am in town, but she does not recall if she 
did that.  She texts.  She calls folks.  She leaves this note, death leaves a 
heartache no one can heal text message. She does some tidying up around the 
scene, and never does she call the authorities until she goes in at 4:20 in the 
morning.
 
If she did leave the 
scene before that – I submit to you that you will see a photograph of her 
clothing setting on the vanity there in the bathroom.  On top of that clothing is the cosmetic 
bag.  Stuffed inside of the cosmetic 
bag is the note that is Exhibit 27 that is saying that I killed [Mr. 
Benjamin].  This was found crumpled 
up inside of the bag. I submit to you that she put clothes on and left the 
scene and came to town. She decided she could not turn herself in, and we will 
never know that, and went back home, and before 4:30 a.m., replaced the bloody 
clothes on her person.
 
Why would she say 
that she did not have blood on my underwear?  Did you have blood on you?  I don’t know, all I had was the socks 
and underwear.  Question, well, it 
soaked through, right?  Answer, 
well, they did not take those.  They 
did not take my socks.  Then she 
also says to Officer Simeral, I have blood on my clothes.  I did not even change or anything. 

 
Look at that 
photograph. Think about the testimony. Draw the reasonable inferences that you 
can from the facts of the case.  She 
was prepared with the note.  She was 
prepared to provide her story.  
Remember when she told Officer Simeral – I asked, was that a response to 
a question, and he said, no, she just stated that.  He shoved me into the shower.  She had that statement prepared for 
him.  
 
(Emphasis 
added.)
 
[¶61]     
As discussed earlier, 
Ms. Benjamin provided the only eye-witness testimony about the shooting 
incident.  The prosecutor’s argument 
did postulate a scenario somewhat different from Ms. Benjamin’s testimony, but 
as also discussed earlier, Ms. Benjamin’s testimony was not entirely 
consistent with some of the physical evidence.  Of particular significance here, she 
testified that the shower door broke when Mr. Benjamin pushed her into it, while 
forensic evidence indicated that the door was shattered by a bullet.  This provided a factual basis for the 
prosecutor to question Ms. Benjamin’s testimony that Mr. Benjamin was 
standing in the bathroom looking at the broken shower door before any shot was 
fired.  This was a sufficient basis 
for the prosecutor to posit that Mr. Benjamin had been in the bathroom when 
Ms. Benjamin followed him with the pistol.  Given that the physical evidence 
contradicted Ms. Benjamin’s testimony on multiple points, and that a prosecutor 
is allowed “wide latitude” in discussing inferences drawn from the record, we 
conclude that the prosecutor’s argument violated no clear and unequivocal rule 
of law.
 
[¶62]     
With regard to the 
bloody clothing, when Ms. Benjamin turned herself in at the police station, 
there was a significant amount of blood on Ms. Benjamin’s clothing, but none on 
her underwear.  This provided a 
factual basis from which the prosecutor could properly draw an inference that 
Ms. Benjamin had removed her bloody clothing, including the underwear, then 
put the clothing back on over clean underwear.  The prosecutor’s argument was 
sufficiently based on the trial evidence, and did not constitute plain 
error.
 
[¶63]     
Finally, Ms. Benjamin 
objects to the prosecutor’s characterization of Battered Woman’s 
Syndrome:
 
I think that folks 
have a general common sense idea of what a domestic violence cycle or domestic 
violence pattern relationship is.  
The idea is that the abuser is in constant control of the victim of that 
violence.  The abuser lives with 
them, of course.  Sometimes 
imprisons them and does not let them out of the house.  The abuser controls their every 
movement. . . .
 
The 
abuser may control and beat them and then reconcile.  You heard that testimony from the 
expert, there is reconciliation and the honeymoon to draw the victim back in 
there, and then the abuse begins anew and it is worse than before.  The victim of that kind of abuse has 
this learned helplessness.  You 
heard about that.  They are so 
downtrodden and beat down and broke that they cannot help themselves, that they 
cower in the face of these situations and cannot do anything.
 
The 
prosecutor further asserted that Ms. Benjamin was not under Mr. Benjamin’s 
control, as they had separated and were living apart.  He asserted that she was not downtrodden 
and broken, but to the contrary, she was often the aggressor in confrontations 
with Mr. Benjamin.  In sum, the 
prosecutor argued that Ms. Benjamin’s characteristics did not match those of 
someone suffering from Battered Woman’s Syndrome. 
 
[¶64]     
Ms. Benjamin claims 
that this characterization of Battered Woman’s Syndrome was not supported by any 
evidence.  Our review of the record, 
however, reveals testimony about the extent 
of control an abuser exerts over a battered woman.  There was evidence about cycles of 
reconciliation followed by renewed violence.  Ms. Benjamin’s social worker and a 
psychologist gave testimony relating to the “cycle of violence” associated with 
Battered Woman’s Syndrome, including the extent to which an abuser may control 
the victim.  Specifically, there was 
testimony that the relationship is often marked by a honeymoon period, after 
which the cycle will start over again, many times involving escalating acts of 
violence.  There was also evidence 
that individuals suffering from Battered Woman’s Syndrome often respond to 
events with strong feelings of fear and helplessness.  The psychologist testified that “there 
is almost always in Battered Woman’s Syndrome really low self-esteem of a victim 
and the traumatic bonding between the victim and the perpetrator.  The traumatic bonding is that – [i]t is 
really difficult to understand for most of us but the more violence there is, 
the stronger the attachment is between the two people.”  Further, Ms. Benjamin’s social worker 
testified that a common feature of Battered Woman’s Syndrome is “an imbalance of 
power” between “the captive and caregiver,” a statement invoking an implication 
of forced confinement or subjugation.  
In light of this testimony, we find adequate evidence to support the 
prosecutor’s arguments.
 
[¶65]     
We 
do not conclude that the prosecutor misstated the evidence.  Rather, he sought to convey the evidence 
using descriptive language that was not specifically used by the witnesses, but 
that may fairly be inferred from their testimony.  We also find no showing by Ms. Benjamin 
that she suffered prejudice from the prosecutor’s arguments.  Accordingly, she has not demonstrated 
any prejudicial misconduct.
 
[¶66]     
Individually and 
collectively, the instances pointed out by Ms. Benjamin do not constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶67]     
Affirmed.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1At 12:56 p.m. on 
Sunday, Ms. Benjamin sent the following text message to her four sons from 
previous relationships:
 
~ Death Leaves a 
Heartache no one can heal, Love Leaves a Memory no one can STEAL 
~\n(~*~1~4~3~*~}
2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-203 (LexisNexis 2011) provides as 
follows:
(a)                
The 
“battered woman syndrome” is defined as a subset under the diagnosis of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder established in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders III – Revised of the American Psychiatric 
Association.
 
(b)                
If 
a person is charged with a crime involving the use of force against another, and 
the person raises the affirmative defense of self-defense, the person may 
introduce expert testimony that the person suffered from the syndrome, to 
establish the necessary requisite belief of an imminent danger of death or great 
bodily harm as an element of the affirmative defense, to justify the person’s 
use of force. 
 
3Although this 
discussion was not transcribed and is not preserved in the record, we can 
discern what occurred because the district court later described the discussion 
on the record.  

4Ms. Benjamin also 
challenges similar statements made by the prosecutor during his closing 
argument.  For the reasons just 
discussed, we also conclude that this argument was not improper.