Case Title: Katzberg v. Regents

Citation: 

Docket Number: S097445

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 11/27/02  (This opinion should precede the companion opinion in Degrassi v. Cook.) 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
RICHARD W. KATZBERG, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
S097445 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
Ct. App. 3 Civil C035456 
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY 
) 
 
OF CALIFORNIA et al., 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 97AS00934 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
__________________________________ ) 
 
 
We granted review in this matter and in the companion case, Degrassi v. Cook 
(Nov. 27, 2002, S094248) __ Cal.4th ___ (Degrassi), to consider whether an individual 
may bring an action for money damages on the basis of an alleged violation of a 
provision of the California Constitution, in the absence of a statutory provision or an 
established common law tort authorizing such a damage remedy for the constitutional 
violation.  In the present case, plaintiff seeks, among other relief, monetary damages 
based upon defendant’s alleged violation of his due process “liberty” interest under 
article I, section 7, subdivision (a), of the California Constitution (hereafter article I, 
section 7(a)), by failing to provide him with a timely “name-clearing” hearing after his 
removal as department chairman at a university medical center.  We conclude that an 
action for damages is not available.1  
                                             
 
1  
We do not here consider the propriety of actions such as those based upon grounds 
established under common law tort principles — for example, actions for false arrest, 
false imprisonment, wrongful termination based upon violation of public policy, or the 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
2
I. 
In 1991, plaintiff Richard Katzberg was appointed professor of medicine at the 
University of California at Davis Medical School and Chairperson of the Department of 
Radiology at the University of California Davis Medical Center.  In July 1995, the 
university commenced an investigation concerning alleged mishandling of funds by the 
department of radiology.  In February 1996, the university issued a press release 
regarding the investigation, and the Sacramento District Attorney’s Office thereafter 
announced that it would initiate a criminal investigation.   
The investigation concerned approximately $250,000 that allegedly had been 
placed inappropriately in radiology accounts to be used for payment of department 
expenses.  Most of this money came from rebates provided by medical equipment 
vendors.  There never has been any allegation that plaintiff made any personal use of the 
challenged funds.  Instead, the alleged improprieties related to placement of funds in the 
department’s account rather than in the medical center’s general funds.   
In March 1996, the university announced that “appropriate personnel actions” had 
been initiated, but did not name any specific employee.  Later that month, plaintiff was 
removed as chairperson of the department.  He remained a tenured professor at the 
medical school and a staff physician at the medical center. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
like.  In such actions, a breach of duty or violation of public policy may be established by 
demonstrating a violation of a constitutional provision, and damages properly may be 
awarded to remedy the tort.  We consider here only whether an action for damages is 
available to remedy a constitutional violation that is not tied to an established common 
law or statutory action.   
 
3
In February 1997, plaintiff sued various defendants on numerous grounds, and the 
resulting litigation has moved back and forth between state and federal courts.2  For 
present purposes, it is sufficient to note that plaintiff’s third amended complaint — the 
one here at issue — named as defendants the Regents of the University of California (the 
Regents) and the Chancellor of the University of California at Davis, Larry N. 
Vanderhoef (hereafter collectively, defendants).  The complaint alleged that by making 
stigmatizing statements about plaintiff in the course of removing him from his position as 
department chairperson, defendants violated the liberty interest of plaintiff protected 
under article I, section 7(a).   
Although the department chairmanship was an at-will position, terminable without 
cause at the discretion of the chancellor of the Davis campus (and hence plaintiff 
concedes that he had no due process property right to that position), it is well-established 
that “an at-will [public] employee’s liberty interests are deprived when his discharge is 
accompanied by charges ‘that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his 
community’ or ‘impose[] on him a stigma or other disability that foreclose[s] his freedom 
to take advantage of other employment opportunities.’ ”  (Holmes v. Hallinan (1998) 68 
Cal.App.4th 1523, 1530, quoting Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 573 
(Roth).)  When such a liberty deprivation occurs, a party has a right to a so-called “name-
clearing hearing.”  (Codd v. Velger (1977) 429 U.S. 624, 627.)   
The third amended complaint alleged that plaintiff had not been provided with 
such a hearing at which he could defend himself, either prior to, or since, his removal.  
The complaint also sought a variety of relief, including an injunction, damages, attorney 
fees, and costs.   
                                             
 
2  
Defendants filed an unopposed motion for judicial notice, submitting for our 
consideration various filings in the earlier related litigation in this case.  We granted the 
motion in an order filed prior to oral argument.   
 
4
The trial court granted defendants’ motion to strike the prayer for relief.  Later, in 
October 1999 — three and a half years after plaintiff’s removal — defendants offered 
plaintiff a name-clearing hearing.  For the next few months, the parties negotiated 
unsuccessfully concerning the parameters of such a hearing.  In February 2000, 
defendants revised and renewed the proposal for a name-clearing hearing, but plaintiff 
rejected that offer, and no such hearing has been held.   
Defendants thereafter moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s due-process-
liberty-interest claim on the grounds that (i) a liberty interest violation could not be 
proved, because the “alleged false statements are not stigmatizing as a matter of law,” 
and (ii) even if a liberty interest violation could be proved, the remedy would be limited 
to a name-clearing hearing, which plaintiff previously had rejected.  Plaintiff opposed the 
motion on the ground, among others, that defendants had not offered him an adequate 
name-clearing hearing.   
In April 2000, following a court hearing, the trial judge granted summary 
judgment to defendants, finding they had offered plaintiff an adequate name-clearing 
hearing, and that such a postremoval hearing was the sole remedy for the asserted liberty 
interest violation under the due process clause of article I, section 7(a).  The court found 
that money damages were not available under California law to remedy “infringement of 
liberty interests,” or to remedy any alleged undue delay in the offer of a name-clearing 
hearing.  The trial court confined its ruling on the summary judgment motion to the 
damages issue, and did not rule on defendants’ claim that plaintiff’s allegations were 
insufficient to demonstrate a liberty-interest violation.   
Upon review, the Court of Appeal began by noting that the state constitutional due 
process liberty interest alleged to have been violated in this case has been recognized 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution in 
Roth, supra, 408 U.S. 564, 573.  In that decision the high court observed that “ ‘[w]here a 
person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the 
 
5
government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.’  
[Citations.]  In such a case, due process would accord an opportunity to refute the charge 
before University officials.”  (Ibid.)3  The Court of Appeal stated that it would assume for 
purposes of analysis that a similar liberty interest exists under article I, section 7(a) of the 
state Constitution, and it further assumed that the facts alleged in this case state a 
violation of plaintiff’s due process liberty interest under this provision of the state 
Constitution.  Focusing solely upon the damages question, the Court of Appeal affirmed 
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants, holding that money damages 
are not available to remedy such a violation of the liberty interest under article I, section 
7(a).   
In this court, plaintiff contends that article I, section 7(a) affords him a right to 
damages for the asserted violation of his due process liberty interest.  By contrast, 
defendants assert that a name-clearing hearing is the sole remedy that a court should 
impose for the alleged constitutional violation.  For purposes of analyzing the damages 
issue upon which we granted review, we shall assume, as did the Court of Appeal, that 
the facts alleged in the third amended complaint are sufficient to establish a violation of 
the due process liberty interest under the state Constitution’s due process clause.   
II. 
Article I, section 26 of the California Constitution states:  “The provisions of this 
Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to 
be otherwise.”  Under this provision, “all branches of government are required to comply 
                                             
 
3  
See also Codd, supra, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (when there has been a due process 
liberty violation, the “remedy mandated . . . [for an employee] is ‘an opportunity to refute 
the charge’ . . . [and] ‘to clear his name’ ”); Binkley v. City of Long Beach (1993) 16 
Cal.App.4th 1795, 1807-1808 (a liberty interest is implicated by removal from a public 
position for mismanagement, and due process requires that the person removed have an 
opportunity to refute the charges and clear his or her name); Holmes v. Hallinan, supra, 
68 Cal.App.4th 1523, 1530-1531.  
 
6
with constitutional directives (Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474, 493, fn. 17; 
Bauer-Schweitzer Malting Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1973) 8 Cal.3d 942, 
946) or prohibitions (Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 8).”  (Leger v. Stockton 
Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1454 (Leger).)  As we observed more 
than a century ago, “[e]very constitutional provision is self-executing to this extent, that 
everything done in violation of it is void.”  (Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton (1886) 69 Cal. 
479, 484.)   
Accordingly, the question posed in this case is not whether article I, section 7(a) is 
“self-executing.”  It is clear that the due process clause of article I, section 7(a) is self-
executing, and that even without any effectuating legislation, all branches of government 
are required to comply with its terms.  Furthermore, it also is clear that, like many other 
constitutional provisions, this section supports an action, brought by a private plaintiff 
against a proper defendant, for declaratory relief or for injunction.  (See generally 
Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194; Friesen, State Constitutional Law 
(2d ed. 1996) § 7-5(a), pp. 416-418 (Friesen).)  The question presented here is whether, 
assuming the complaint states a violation of plaintiff’s due process liberty interest, 
plaintiff may maintain an action for monetary damages to remedy the asserted violation 
of his due process liberty interests under article I, section 7(a), on the facts alleged.4   
                                             
 
4  
As observed in Friesen, supra, section 7-5, at page 416:  “Occasionally the 
argument over damages is cast in terms of whether the clause is ‘self-executing.’  
However, [the “self-executing” issue] truly concerns the question whether a clause is 
judicially enforceable at all, and does not automatically answer the question whether 
damages are available for enforceable clauses.”  Some cases, recognizing this, have 
characterized the inquiry concerning whether a damages remedy is allowed as presenting 
a question whether the provision under review is “ ‘self-executing’ in a different 
sense” — and as calling for examination as to whether the provision “provides [for] rules 
or procedures by which its declaration of rights is to be enforced, and, in particular, 
whether it provides citizens with a specific remedy by way of damages for its violation in 
the absence of legislation granting such a remedy.”  (Leger, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 1454, 1st italics added.)  As explained post, part IV.A.2, we agree that these 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
7
III. 
More than 30 years ago in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents (1971) 
403 U.S. 388 (Bivens), the United States Supreme Court recognized the right of a party to 
recover damages for the violation of a constitutional right in an action against federal 
agents.  In Bivens, a citizen’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and 
seizure was violated by federal law enforcement officers.  The court in Bivens did not 
approach the issue as posing a question whether the Fourth Amendment was intended to 
provide an action for damages, or whether such an intent could be inferred from that 
provision; instead, the court viewed the matter as posing a question whether the court 
should create a cause of action for damages — in effect, a constitutional tort — to 
remedy a Fourth Amendment violation, even though Congress had not specifically 
provided such a remedy and even though the Fourth Amendment does not provide for 
enforcement by an award of damages.  (Id., at pp. 395-397; see also id., at pp. 398-411 
(conc. opn. by Harlan, J.).)5  The high court reasoned that as a general proposition 
“ ‘federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.’ ”  (Id., at 
p. 396.)  In support of its conclusion that a damages remedy was warranted, the court 
emphasized that (i) there existed “no special factors counseling hesitation” to recognize 
such a right (ibid.); (ii) there was no equally effective alternative remedy (id., at p. 397; 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
considerations are relevant in determining the availability of a damages remedy, but we 
believe it potentially confusing to employ the “self-executing” terminology in this 
context; accordingly, we shall not do so.   
5  
The court asserted:  “The question is merely whether petitioner, if he can 
demonstrate injury consequent upon the violation by federal agents of his Fourth 
Amendment rights, is entitled to redress his injury through a particular remedial 
mechanism normally available in federal courts.  [Citations.]  ‘The very essence of civil 
liberty certainly consists of the right of every individual to claim the protection of the 
laws, whenever he receives an injury.’  Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803).”  
(Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. 388, 397.)   
 
8
see also id., at p. 410 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.)); and (iii) there was no “explicit 
congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer’s violation of the 
Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents” (id., at p. 397).6   
Subsequent to Bivens, the United States Supreme Court has considered numerous 
cases in which plaintiffs have sought money damages under a constitutional cause of 
action premised upon the asserted violation of various federal constitutional provisions.  
After twice following the lead of Bivens, and recognizing the availability of a 
constitutional tort action for damages on the strength of the considerations set out above 
(Davis v. Passman (1979) 442 U.S. 228, 245 (Davis) [damages allowed to remedy 
violation by former congressman of equal protection component of Fifth Amendment due 
process clause]; Carlson v. Green (1980) 446 U.S. 14, 18-23 (Carlson) [damages allowed 
to remedy Eighth Amendment violations by prison officials]), the high court for the past 
two decades repeatedly has refused to recognize a federal constitutional tort action for 
money damages in cases presenting that issue.  (Chappell v. Wallace (1983) 462 U.S. 
296, 305 (Chappell) [alleged equal protection violations by superior officer in United 
States military]; Bush v. Lucas (1983) 462 U.S. 367 (Bush) [alleged First Amendment 
violation against federal agency employee by superiors]; United States v. Stanley (1987) 
483 U.S. 669 (Stanley) [alleged due process violations by military personnel during the 
course of active military service]; Schweiker v. Chilicky (1988) 487 U.S. 412 (Schweiker) 
[alleged due process violation by government officials, resulting in deprivation of social 
security benefits]; FDIC v. Meyer (1994) 510 U.S. 471 (Meyer) [alleged due process 
violation concerning employment termination by federal agency]; Correctional Services 
                                             
 
6  
In so holding, Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. 388, allowed suits against federal agents 
comparable to the suits that Congress expressly permitted against state agents through the 
enactment of 42 United States Code section 1983. 
 
9
Corp. v. Malesko (2001) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [122 S.Ct. 515, 520] (Malesko) [alleged 
Eighth Amendment violation by private operator of federal prison halfway house].) 
In each of these more recent cases, the high court found that the first Bivens 
consideration mentioned above — “special factors” that “counsel hesitation” by a court in 
recognizing a constitutional tort damages remedy — militated against recognition of that 
remedy.  And in these recent cases, the court also substantially retreated from, and 
reformulated, the other Bivens considerations mentioned above.  The court has found that 
the absence of a “complete” alternative remedy will not support an action for damages, so 
long as a “meaningful” alternative remedy in state or federal law is available (Bush, 
supra, 462 U.S. at p. 386; Schweiker, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 422-425), and it has 
implicitly discarded the proposition, mentioned in Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. 388, 396-397, 
and emphasized in Davis, supra, 442 U.S. 228, 246-247, and Carlson, supra, 446 U.S. 
14, 19-20, that money damages are presumptively available unless Congress prohibits 
that remedy (e.g., Chappell, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 304;  Bush, supra, 462 U.S. at pp. 380-
390; Schweiker, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 429; Meyer, supra, 510 U.S. at p. 486).7   
The experience in other jurisdictions has been similar.  Some out-of-state 
decisions, often relying upon a combination of (i) the jurisdiction’s indigenous common 
law antecedents, (ii) special legislative history, and (iii) the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts (1979) section 874A,8 have recognized a constitutional tort cause of action and 
corresponding right to be awarded money damages for various state constitutional 
                                             
 
7  
Although the high court has declined to extend Bivens, it has not abandoned the 
core holding of that case, and has recognized the continuing validity of that decision and 
its progeny.  (See McCarthy v. Madigan (1992) 503 U.S. 140, 144-156 [plaintiff, federal 
prisoner, not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to pursuing an Eighth 
Amendment action under Bivens]; Malesko, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [122 S.Ct. 515, 522] 
[holding that a Bivens claim may not be asserted against an agency, but noting that such a 
claim may be asserted against an individual officer].)   
8  
See post, part IV.B (quoting and discussing the Restatement provision).   
 
10
violations.9  A greater number of cases, however, often tracking the reasoning of the most 
recent United States Supreme Court decisions or pointing to the absence of any historical 
basis for implying a damages action, have declined to recognize such a constitutional tort 
or implied damages remedy in a variety of circumstances.10   
                                             
 
9  
See Brown v. State of New York (N.Y. 1996) 89 N.Y.2d 172, 188-192 (Brown) 
(damages allowed for violation of state’s search and seizure and equal protection 
provisions, based upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 874A, early New York 
case authority recognizing a right to damages for such violations, and the absence of 
adequate alternative remedies); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Center (Md. 1984) 479 
A.2d 921, 923-925 (Widgeon) (damages allowed for violation of state’s search and 
seizure provision, based in part upon well-established English and early Maryland 
common law antecedents); Moresi v. Dept. of Wildlife & Fisheries (La. 1990) 567 So.2d 
1081, 1091-1093 (Moresi) (damages permissible to remedy illegal search and seizure, 
based in part upon English common law); see also Binette v. Sabo (Conn. 1998) 710 A.2d 
688, 699 (damages allowed for state constitution search and seizure violation; court 
found this remedy supported by “compelling policy considerations” and the absence of 
any special factors counseling against recognition of such an action); Corum v. University 
of North Carolina (N.C. 1992) 413 S.E.2d 276, 289-291 (suggesting that damages may 
be allowed to remedy state free speech violation, based upon state common law authority, 
but noting that courts must defer to alternative remedies); Old Tuckaway v. City of 
Greenfield (Wis.Ct.App. 1993) 509 N.W.2d 323, 328, fn. 4 (suggesting in dictum that 
damages may be allowed to remedy violations of state due process clause); see also 
Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison (Ill.App.Ct. 1978) 377 N.E.2d 242, 243-245 (Walinski) 
(damages allowed to remedy violation of constitutional antidiscrimination clause; court 
found the drafters of the provision intended to create a right enforceable through 
damages).   
 
Other decisions upon which plaintiff relies do not hold money damages to be 
available.  Phillips v. Youth Development Program (Mass. 1983) 459 N.E.2d 453, merely 
recognizes that jurisdictions differ on this issue, and does not otherwise address the 
question.  (See id., at p. 457, fn. 4.)  Likewise, the earlier case of Cooper v. Nutley Sun 
Printing Co. (N.J. 1961) 175 A.2d 639 stressed that courts possess broad equitable 
powers to remedy such violations, but did not specifically endorse the award of money 
damages.  (Id., at pp. 644-645.)   
10  
See Dick Fischer Dev. v. Dept. of Admin. (Alaska 1992) 838 P.2d 263, 268 (Dick 
Fischer) (no damages allowed for asserted violation of state due process provision, based 
in part upon availability of alternative remedies); Board of County Com’rs v. Sundheim 
(Colo. 1996) 926 P.2d 545, 549-553 (Sundheim) (no damages allowed for asserted 
violation of state due process provision, based in part upon availability of alternative 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
11
California decisions have followed a similar trend.  Putting aside cases 
recognizing an inverse condemnation action for damages to remedy a violation of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
remedies); Kelley Property Dev. v. Town of Lebanon (Conn. 1993) 627 A.2d 909, 923-
924 (Kelley) (no damages allowed for asserted violation of state due process provision, 
based in part upon availability of alternative remedies and special factors counseling 
hesitation to recognize such a right); Garcia v. Reyes (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1997) 697 So.2d 
549, 551 (summarily holding there is no right to money damages for violation of state 
due process guarantee); 77th Dist. Judge v. State (Mich.Ct.App. 1989) 438 N.W.2d 333, 
339-340 (77th Dist. Judge) (no damages for violation of state equal protection rights; 
court noted, among other things, the availability of alternative relief and deference to 
legislative policy-making expertise); Moody v. Hicks (Mo.Ct.App. 1997) 956 S.W.2d 
398, 402 (no damages for asserted violation of state search and seizure rights; court 
noted, among other things, the availability of alternative relief and deference to 
legislative policy-making expertise); Rockhouse Mountain Prop. v. Town of Conway 
(N.H. 1986) 503 A.2d 1385, 1388-1389 (Rockhouse) (no damages for alleged state due 
process and equal protection violations, based in part upon availability of alternative 
remedies); Augat v. State (A.D. 1997) 666 N.Y.2d 249, 251-252 (declining to extend 
Brown, supra, 89 N.Y.2d 172, to allow damages for asserted violation of due process and 
freedom of association rights, based upon availability of alternative remedies); Hanton v. 
Gilbert (N.C.Ct.App. 1997) 486 S.E.2d 432, 438-439 (no damages for alleged violation 
of state due process clause, based in part upon availability of alternative remedies and 
deference to Legislature); Provens v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Mental Ret. (Ohio 1992) 594 
N.E.2d 959, 963-965 (Provens) (no damages for alleged state free speech violation, based 
in part upon availability of alternative remedies and deference to Legislature); Hunter v. 
City of Eugene (Or. 1990) 787 P.2d 881, 883-884 (no damages for alleged state “free 
expression” violations based in part upon absence of textual or historic basis for implying 
such a right; court concluded that creation of such a right is a task properly left to 
Legislature); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion (Tex. 1995) 896 S.W.2d 143, 148-150 (no 
damages for alleged state free speech and assembly violations; court noted there was no 
evidence that violations of the provisions were intended to be remedied by damages, and 
observed that there was no historical or common law basis for recognizing a damages 
action); Spackman ex rel. Spackman v. Board of Educ. (Utah 2000) 16 P.3d 533, 537-539 
(Spackman) (no damages for asserted state due process and “open education” violations, 
based in part upon availability of alternative remedies and deference to Legislature); 
Shields v. Gerhart (Vt. 1995) 658 A.2d 924, 929-934 (Shields) (no damages for asserted 
state free speech and due process violations, based in part upon availability of alternative 
remedies).   
 
12
state just compensation clause (a constitutional provision that clearly contemplates an 
award of damages determined in a judicial proceeding, see Cal. Const., art. I, § 19),11 
only two decisions, each filed two decades ago, have recognized an action for damages to 
remedy a violation of the state Constitution.  All subsequent decisions addressing the 
issue have declined to find such an action for damages.  We proceed to review, in 
chronological order, the relevant California cases.   
 
In Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458 (Gay 
Law Students), this court addressed an action by employees who claimed they were 
discriminated against by their employer, a state-regulated telephone company, on the 
basis of their sexual orientation.  Our opinion observed that plaintiffs sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief, and “also prayed for monetary damages.”  (Id., at p. 464.)  Without 
expressly addressing the question of availability of damages in addition to the requested 
equitable relief, we held that plaintiffs could maintain a “direct court action” under the 
California equal protection clause, article I, section 7(a).12  (Gay Law Students, supra., at 
p. 475 & fn. 10.)  In the process of announcing this holding we added a “cf.” signal and 
citation to Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. 388, at pages 390-397.  (Gay Law Students, supra, 24 
Cal.3d 458 at p. 475.)   
                                             
 
11  
See Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327, 362-367; Holtz v. Superior 
Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 296, 302 (applying Cal. Const., former art. I, § 14); Rose v. State 
of California (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713, 720 (same, noting the provision is “self-executing” 
and supports an action for damages, even in the absence of statutory authorization); 
Weber v. County of Santa Clara (1881) 59 Cal. 265, 266 (same); see generally Gates v. 
Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 519-524 (setting out relevant history of the 
just compensation clause and contrasting it with relevant history of the equal protection 
clause).   
12  
In addition to setting out the due process liberty right at issue in this case, article I, 
section 7(a) also provides, “A person may not be . . . denied equal protection of the laws 
. . . .”   
 
13
Plaintiff suggests that our citation in Gay Law Students, supra, 24 Cal.3d 458, to 
those pages of Bivens implies approval of a damages remedy for the equal protection 
violation asserted in Gay Law Students.  Only the last few of the pages cited from Bivens 
spoke to the question of damages, however, and given the circumstance that in Gay Law 
Students, we did not explicitly address the question of damages, it would be an 
overstatement to interpret that decision, or its citation to Bivens, as directly endorsing 
such a remedy.   
Plaintiff does, however, find support for his position in the Court of Appeal 
opinion in Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 
816 (Laguna Publishing).  In that case the Court of Appeal, in a two-to-one decision, held 
that the owners of a private gated retirement community violated a newspaper publisher’s 
state free speech and press rights (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a)) by enforcing a rule 
barring the distribution of unsolicited free newspapers within the community, and the 
court remanded the case for a new trial at which the plaintiff would have an opportunity 
to prove damages.  (Laguna Publishing, at pp. 848-857.)  In reaching this conclusion and 
expressly finding that money damages were available, the majority stressed the “special 
dignity” of “the rights of free speech and free press” (id., at p. 853, italics in original), 
thereby suggesting that violation of such rights may be remedied by equitable relief 
and/or damages but that violation of other constitutional rights of “lesser” dignity may 
not warrant relief in damages.  The majority did not consider whether article I, section 2, 
subdivision (a) was intended to afford a damages remedy, and, instead, appears to have 
found a right to damages based upon a constitutional tort theory similar to that employed 
in Bivens and its progeny.   
Shortly after Laguna Publishing was filed, the Court of Appeal in Fenton v. 
Groveland Community Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797 (Fenton) considered a 
suit in which it was claimed that various county officials denied the plaintiffs their right 
to vote in a general election.  The plaintiffs filed an action for damages to remedy the 
 
14
asserted violation of voting rights under California Constitution, article II, section 2.  In 
the process of addressing various claims of immunity, and without focusing upon the 
propriety of damages as a remedy for the asserted violation, the court impliedly endorsed, 
in passing, the notion that there exists a right to seek damages to remedy a violation of 
the state constitutional right to vote.  As in Laguna Publishing, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d 
816, the court in Fenton did not consider whether our Constitution’s right-to-vote 
provision was intended to afford such a remedy; instead, it simply relied upon Laguna 
Publishing and the asserted “special dignity” of the right to vote (Fenton, at p. 805), and 
upon inverse condemnation case law.  (Ibid.)13   
                                             
 
13  
Five other decisions relied upon by plaintiff are distinguishable.  We held in 
White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775, that California Constitution article I, section 1, 
was “intended to be self-executing, i.e., that the constitutional provision, in itself, ‘creates 
a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian,’ ” and hence supported an 
action for an injunction.  But we did not consider or address any claim for damages.  In 
Payton v. City of Santa Clara (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 152, the Court of Appeal reversed a 
judgment of dismissal that was entered following the granting of a summary judgment 
motion in an action for violation of privacy rights under California Constitution, article I, 
section 1.  The claimed violation arose from an employer’s act of posting a notice of the 
plaintiff’s termination and the reasons therefor in a public workroom.  Although noting 
that the plaintiff had prayed for damages (Payton, at p. 154), the court did not address the 
availability of such damages, but held only that the complaint stated a prima facie 
violation of the right of privacy.  Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 
Cal.App. 3d 825 (Porten) is similarly distinguishable.  There the plaintiff sued for 
damages under the state constitutional right of privacy, claiming that the university 
improperly disclosed the grades he had earned at an out-of-state school.  The Court of 
Appeal concluded that the action could be brought, despite the absence of enabling  
legislation.  In the process of reaching this conclusion, the court appears to have assumed 
that damages would be available for such a violation, but it did not analyze or discuss that 
question.  In any event, each of the foregoing decisions was rendered under the privacy 
provision of article I, section 1 — a provision with a relatively rich legislative history — 
and is not directly on point here.  We have no occasion to consider in the present case the 
circumstances under which the privacy clause of the state Constitution may support a 
cause of action for damages.   
 
Two decisions cited by plaintiff — Wilkerson v. City of Placentia (1981) 118 
Cal.App.3d 435 and Lubey v. City and County of San Francisco (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
15
Most subsequent California cases that have addressed the availability of 
damages — all decided by the Court of Appeal — have taken an approach different from 
the “constitutional tort” analysis of Bivens and its progeny.  Whereas Bivens and many of 
the federal and state decisions that have applied its principles have focused upon the 
circumstances in which a court should create or recognize a tort action premised upon 
violation of a constitutional provision, most California decisions issued during the past 
two decades, by contrast, have viewed the determinative question as whether an action 
for damages exists in (or can be inferred from) the constitutional provision at issue.  
Accordingly, most of the recent California decisions expressly focus their analysis upon 
whether the provision at issue was intended, either expressly or impliedly, to afford relief 
in damages.   
In Leger v. Stockton Unified School District, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 1448 (Leger), 
a high school student who was assaulted in a restroom sued the school district for 
damages under the “safe schools” clause of California Constitution, article I, section 28, 
subdivision (c) (article I, section 28(c)).14  The Court of Appeal reviewed the history of 
that provision, which was added to the Constitution as part of a broad criminal justice 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
340 — are closer on point, because they involve due process claims arising in the 
employment context, but they too are distinguishable from the case before us.  Those 
decisions approved an action for reinstatement with back pay, following a due process 
violation in the termination of probationary employees for misconduct.  As defendants 
observe, however, the facts in both cases suggest that the plaintiffs possessed a due 
process property interest as well as a due process liberty interest.  In the present case, 
plaintiff concedes he had no due process property interest in his position.  Moreover, 
neither Wilkerson nor Lubey explicitly analyzed the question whether damages are 
available in an action based directly and solely upon the due process provisions of article 
I, section 7(a), or any other constitutional provision.   
14  
Article I, section 28(c) states in full:  “Right to safe schools.  All students and staff 
of public primary, elementary, junior high and senior high schools have the inalienable 
right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful.”   
 
16
initiative in 1982, and found “no indication . . . to suggest it was intended to support an 
action for damages in the absence of enabling and defining legislation.”  (Leger, at 
p. 1456.)  The court also observed that the plaintiff had not advanced a constitutional tort 
theory of recovery, and declined to address such a theory.  (Id., at p. 1457, fn. 4.)  The 
court held that the plaintiff could not maintain an action for damages.   
In Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School District (1991) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224 
(Clausing), the Court of Appeal considered an action for damages to remedy asserted 
violations of both the “safe schools” clause (art. I, § 28(c)) and the privacy clause (art. I, 
§ 1) of the California Constitution, based upon a school district’s alleged physical and 
emotional mistreatment of a handicapped student.  On the first point, the court agreed 
with Leger, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, finding “nothing in the legislative history of 
section 28, subdivision (c), to suggest that it was intended to create a civil action for 
damages.”  (Clausing, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1237.)15  On the second point, the 
court summarily concluded that the privacy provision affords only a right to injunctive 
                                             
 
15  
The court stated:  “The right proclaimed by [the constitutional provision], although 
inalienable and mandatory, simply establishes the parameters of the principle enunciated; 
the specific means by which it is to be achieved for the people of California are left to the 
Legislature.”  (Clausing, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1237.)  The court further observed in 
a footnote:  “In this respect section 28, subdivision (c), is closely analogous to article I, 
section 1, of the California Constitution, which states:  ‘All people are by nature free and 
independent and have inalienable rights.  Among these are enjoying and defending life 
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining 
safety, happiness, and privacy.’  Clearly, although safety and happiness are inalienable 
rights, this provision of the Constitution does not establish the means whereby they may 
be enjoyed.  No case ever has held that this provision enunciating the inalienable right to 
obtain safety and happiness is self-executing in the sense that it gives rise, in and of itself, 
to a private right of action for damages or an affirmative duty on the part of the state to 
take particular steps to guarantee the enjoyment of safety or happiness by all citizens.  
(Langdon v. Sayre (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 41, 44, . . . .)” (Id. at p. 1237, fn. 6.)  
 
17
relief and does not afford a right to damages.  (Id., at p. 1238.)16  Accordingly, the court 
declined to allow either action for damages.   
The plaintiffs in Gates v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 481 (Gates) 
sought damages to remedy an asserted violation of their rights under the state equal 
protection clause (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7), based upon the allegedly discriminatory 
deployment of police protection during a riot.  The court found that neither the language 
of the provision, nor the court’s extensive review of the historical documents underlying 
the provision, revealed any intent to afford a damages remedy (32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
519-524), and declined to allow such an action.17   
In Bonner v. City of Santa Ana (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1465 (Bonner), a homeless 
man stored his bag of possessions under a bush near the Santa Ana City Hall.  City 
employees found the bag and discarded it.  The plaintiff sued for damages, asserting 
violations of his due process right to property and of his equal protection rights.  (Art. I, 
§ 7(a).)  Relying upon Gates, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 481, the court found no intent by the 
electorate to provide a damages remedy for violations of the state equal protection clause, 
and declined to allow such an action.  (Bonner, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1473.) 
The court in Bonner also undertook an analysis of the voters’ intent with regard to 
affording a damages action to remedy the asserted due process clause violation.  (Bonner, 
supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1473-1476.)  The court concluded from its review of Bivens, 
                                             
 
16  
In so concluding, the court relied upon White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 757, in 
which we held that the privacy clause of article I, section 1, supported an action for 
injunction, but the court in Clausing overlooked Porten, supra, 64 Cal.App. 3d 825, in 
which, as observed ante, footnote 13, the court suggested that money damages are 
available in an action based upon a violation of that same clause.   
17  
The court in Gates criticized the decisions in Laguna Publishing, supra, 131 
Cal.App.3d 816, and Fenton, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d 797, for failing to discuss whether 
the provisions at issue were intended to support an action for damages.  (Gates, supra, 32 
Cal.App.4th at p. 525, fn. 16.)   
 
18
supra, 403 U.S. 388, and its progeny — notably, Davis, supra, 442 U.S. 228 — that the 
due process clause of the federal Constitution supports an action for damages, in the 
absence of an alternative or equally effective remedy.  The court in Bonner hypothesized 
that the voters’ intent in enacting the due process right set out in article I, section 7(a), 
was to mirror the due process right recognized in its federal counterpart, and accordingly 
the court in Bonner reasoned that in the absence of an alternative or equally effective 
remedy, the state due process clause similarly provided a right to damages.  The court in 
Bonner ultimately concluded that damages were not available, however, on the ground 
that the plaintiff had an effective alternative remedy — a common law action for 
conversion.  (Bonner, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1473-1476.)   
Thereafter the plaintiff in Bradley v. Medical Board (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 445 
(Bradley) asserted a due process violation under article I, section 7(a), relating to his 
surrender of a medical license while disciplinary charges were pending against him.  He 
sought damages for the alleged violation.  Relying upon Bonner, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 
1465, and Gates, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 481, the court in Bradley summarily and 
categorically concluded:  “There is . . . no right to sue for monetary damages under this 
constitutional provision.”  (Bradley, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 462-463.)   
 
Apart from the present case and the companion matter, Degrassi, the most recent 
Court of Appeal decision addressing the general issue of money damages to remedy a 
state constitutional violation is Carlsbad Aquafarm, Inc. v. Department of Health 
Services (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 809 (Carlsbad Aquafarm).  In that case, a shellfish 
producer sued a state agency for damages allegedly resulting from the agency’s refusal to 
process a form that was required to permit the producer to sell its products outside 
California, a refusal that the producer claimed violated its procedural due process rights 
under article I, section  7(a).  The court in Carlsbad Aquafarm held that no such action 
for damages could be maintained.   
 
19
The court began by taking note of Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. 388, and most of the 
subsequent United States Supreme Court and California decisions discussed above.  
(Carlsbad Aquafarm, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 809, 816.)  Having discerned “no single 
rationale underlying [those] decisions” (ibid.), the court proposed an analysis that 
essentially combines (i) some of the policy-based factors that have been considered in the 
“constitutional tort” cases, and (ii) the intent-based analysis adopted by recent California 
Court of Appeal decisions:  “On reviewing these decisions, we believe the issue of 
whether to recognize a state constitutional tort is essentially one of policy and is 
dependent on numerous factors, including (1) the voters’ intent in permitting monetary 
damages for a violation of the particular constitutional provision[;] (2) the availability of 
another remedy; (3) the extent to which the provision is ‘self-executing’ and the judicial 
manageability of the tort; and (4) the importance of the constitutional right.”  (Id., at 
p. 817.)  After “[a]pplying appropriate weight to each of these factors” (ibid.), the court 
concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages for the state’s alleged 
violation of its procedural due process rights.   
IV. 
 
As we shall explain, we conclude it is appropriate to employ the following 
framework for determining the existence of a damages action to remedy an asserted 
constitutional violation.  First, we shall inquire whether there is evidence from which we 
may find or infer, within the constitutional provision at issue, an affirmative intent either 
to authorize or to withhold a damages action to remedy a violation.  In undertaking this 
inquiry we shall consider the language and history of the constitutional provision at issue, 
including whether it contains guidelines, mechanisms, or procedures implying a monetary 
remedy, as well as any pertinent common law history.  If we find any such intent, we 
shall give it effect.   
 
Second, if no affirmative intent either to authorize or to withhold a damages 
remedy is found, we shall undertake the “constitutional tort” analysis adopted by Bivens 
 
20
and its progeny.  Among the relevant factors in this analysis are whether an adequate 
remedy exists, the extent to which a constitutional tort action would change established 
tort law, and the nature and significance of the constitutional provision.  If we find that 
these factors militate against recognizing the constitutional tort, our inquiry ends.  If, 
however, we find that these factors favor recognizing a constitutional tort, we also shall 
consider the existence of any special factors counseling hesitation in recognizing a 
damages action, including deference to legislative judgment, avoidance of adverse policy 
consequences, considerations of government fiscal policy, practical issues of proof, and 
the competence of courts to assess particular types of damages.   
A. 
We begin our inquiry by asking whether, when the constitutional provision at 
issue was adopted, the enactors intended that it include a damages remedy for its 
violation.  (Carlsbad Aquafarm, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 809, 817; Gates, supra, 32 
Cal.App.4th 481, 517-518, and cases cited; see generally White v. Davis, supra, 13 
Cal.3d 757, 775.)   
Such an intent may be quite clear on the face of a particular provision — for 
example, it is plain that California Constitution article I, section 19, which provides that 
“[p]rivate property may be taken for public use only when just compensation, ascertained 
by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner,” supports an 
action for money damages, and our cases consistently have so held.  (See cases cited 
ante, fn. 11.)  But with regard to most constitutional provisions, the words of the 
provision do not on their own manifest any such intent.   
The due process clause of article I, section 7(a), falls within this latter category.  It 
states in relevant part:  “A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law . . . .”  These words do not explicitly disclose an intent either to 
authorize or to withhold damages as a remedy for a violation of the provision.  
 
21
Accordingly, we must look further in our attempt to discern whether article I, section 7(a) 
was intended to include a damages remedy.   
1. 
In considering evidence of an implied right to seek damages, we shall review the 
available drafting history of the provision at issue and materials that were before the 
voters when they adopted the measure.   
Article I, section 7(a) was added to the state Constitution by the adoption of 
Proposition 7 on the November 1974 ballot.  (See Gates, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 522-524.)  The ballot pamphlet provided to all voters prior to the general election in 
1974 explained that the measure was designed to revise article I, the California 
Constitution’s declaration of rights, in a number of respects, one of which was to set out 
some basic rights that were then “presently . . . contained in the federal Constitution” but 
not listed in the state charter.  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1974) analysis of 
Prop. 7, p. 26.)  Among such rights, the Legislative Analyst explained, was the following 
right:  “(b)  A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of the law.”  (Ibid., italics added.)   
Although the state Constitution long had contained a similarly worded due process 
provision prior to 1974 (see Cal. Const., former art. I, § 13 [“No person shall be . . . 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law”]; Cal. Const. of 1849, 
art. I, § 8 [same]), the previous incarnations of the state constitutional due process right 
were contained within broad provisions setting forth the rights of criminal defendants.  
The 1974 amendment, placing the clause in article I, section 7(a), was designed to make 
it clear that the due process guarantee applied not only in criminal prosecutions, but 
afforded a general civil right as well.18   
                                             
 
18  
Commenting upon the then existing article I, section 21, which provided that no 
citizen shall be granted privileges or immunities not also granted to all other citizens (see 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
22
We have reviewed the relevant passages of the debates that preceded adoption of 
the 1849 and 1879 Constitutions.  (See Browne, Report of the Debates in Convention of 
Cal. on Formation of State Const. (1850) pp. 30-31, 41 [adopting the due process 
language without debate], 474-475 [Address “To the People of California,” introducing 
the proposed Constitution]; 2 Willis & Stockton, Debates and Proceedings, Cal. Const. 
Convention 1878-1879, pp. 1188-1189, 1425-1426, 1491, 1509 [adopting the due process 
language without debate], 1521-1524 [Address “To the People of the State of California,” 
introducing the proposed Constitution].)  The parties have not cited, nor have we 
discovered, any indication in these materials suggesting that the drafters considered the 
question whether the predecessors to article I, section 7(a) would provide a remedy in 
damages for violation of the liberty interest of the due process clause.  (Cf. Walinski, 
supra, 377 N.E.2d 242, 243-245 [drafters of the Illinois Constitution’s antidiscrimination 
clause intended to create a right to enforce that provision through action for damages]; 
Brown, supra, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 189 [drafters of the New York Constitution assumed that 
damages would be allowed to remedy state search and seizure violations, and implicitly 
approved allowing that remedy].)  Nor have we discovered any evidence that the drafters 
of the 1974 revision, which as noted broadened the due process guarantee so as to afford 
both criminal and civil rights, considered the issue or had any such intent.  (See Cal. 
Const. Revision Com., Article I (Declaration of Rights) Background Study 2 (Aug. 1969) 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
current article I, section 7, subdivision (b)), the California Constitution Revision 
Commission proposed to maintain that prohibition, but also to add “a clause granting 
equal protection and due process of law to all persons.  Although the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution assures due process and equal protection, the 
Commission believes that our fundamental legal document should also provide these 
guarantees.”  (Cal. Const. Revision Com., Proposed Revision (pt. 5, 1971) p. 29 
[comment on proposed article I, section 23, the substance of which subsequently became 
article I, section 7, subdivisions (a) and (b)].)   
 
23
pp. 6-16 [concerning proposed revision of former article I, section 21]; id., Background 
Study 4 (Dec. 1969) pp. 19-28 [concerning proposed revision of former article I, section 
13]; Cal. Const. Revision Com., Article I (Declaration of Rights) Rep. II (Jan. 1970) 
pp. 3-5 [concerning proposed revision of former article I, section 21]; id., Rep. IV (Feb. 
1970) pp. 6-10 [concerning proposed revision of former article I, section 13]; Cal. Const. 
Revision Com., Proposed Revision, supra, p. 24 [concerning the right to due process in 
criminal proceedings]; id., at p. 29 [concerning extension of civil rights of due process 
and equal protection]; see generally Cal. Const. Revision Com., Rep., Materials Relating 
to Provisions in Cal. Const. Recommended or Endorsed by Com. (Dec. 10, 1974), 
pp. 74-82.)   
We also have examined the materials that were placed before the voters when the 
provision last was amended in 1974.  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1974) Prop. 7.)  
Like the Court of Appeal in Gates, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 481, which examined these 
same materials in order to consider the voters’ implied intent to create a damages remedy 
with respect to the equal protection clause of article I, section 7(a) (Gates, at pp. 522-
524), we find nothing in the ballot materials to suggest that the voters affirmatively 
intended to create, within article I, section 7(a), a damages remedy with respect to the due 
process clause set forth in this constitutional provision.19  Indeed, there is nothing to 
suggest that the issue was considered at all.   
As noted above, one recent decision, Bonner, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1465, 
concluded otherwise, finding that the voters in 1974 intended to permit an action for 
                                             
 
19  
Defendants purport to find in the ballot pamphlet an intent to bar damages claims, 
based upon the statement therein, by the Legislative Analyst, that “[t]his proposition does 
not increase government costs.”  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1974) analysis of 
Prop. 7, p. 26.)  We do not read this line from the ballot pamphlet as reflecting any intent 
to preclude actions for damages for the violation of any right set out by the ballot 
measure.   
 
24
damages to remedy a state due process violation if there is no alternative remedy.  The 
court in Bonner reasoned that because the voters’ pamphlet in 1974 advised that 
Proposition 7 would add rights “presently . . . contained in” the federal charter, and 
because in Davis, supra, 442 U.S. 228, the United States Supreme Court construed the 
equal protection component of the federal due process clause to permit a damages 
remedy for a violation in circumstances in which no other remedy was available, the 
voters who adopted Proposition 7 must have intended to provide a damages remedy for a 
state constitutional due process violation whenever a plaintiff has no alternative (or 
effective) remedy.   
We find Bonner’s voter intent analysis to be unpersuasive, and adopt the critique 
of that conclusion set out in Carlsbad Aquafarm, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 809.  As the 
Court of Appeal in Carlsbad Aquafarm pointed out:  “First, Davis v. Passman, supra, 442 
U.S. 228, and the subsequent United States Supreme Court authority relied upon by 
Bonner were decided after Proposition 7’s adoption by the voters.  It is not reasonable to 
infer from the single statement in the voter’s pamphlet that the voters would have 
predicted the United States Supreme Court’s extension of Bivens to a procedural due 
process claim.  Second, the language in the voter pamphlet relied upon by the Bonner 
court states only that Proposition 7 puts ‘rights’ into the state Constitution that 
‘ “presently are contained in the federal Constitution.” ’  (Bonner, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1474, italics omitted.)  This statement does not necessarily mean the voters would 
have understood they were adopting the analysis of the United States Supreme Court with 
respect to the existence of a damages remedy pertaining to those rights.”  (Carlsbad 
Aquafarm, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 819.)   
Plaintiff concedes that Bonner’s analysis of voter intent is unpersuasive, but insists 
nevertheless that the voters must have intended to provide a damages remedy because 
without such a remedy the provision’s adoption would be a “vain and meaningless act” 
and “any other construction [of the provision] would . . . make its language a mere 
 
25
mockery . . . .”  We are unpersuaded.  Even if the due process right embodied in article I, 
section 7(a) is enforceable only through an action for injunctive or declaratory relief, and 
not by an action for damages, this constitutional provision is hardly rendered innocuous 
or empty. 
We conclude that the materials that were before the voters when they adopted the 
current version of article I, section 7(a) in November 1974, provide no basis upon which 
to infer an intent that the provision itself permit an action for damages to remedy a 
violation of that clause.   
2. 
We next consider the extent to which the provision, even if not setting forth an 
explicit indication of a right to damages, nevertheless contains “guidelines, mechanisms, 
or procedures from which a damages remedy could be inferred.”  (Leger, supra, 202 
Cal.App.3d at p. 1455; Carlsbad Aquafarm, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 809, 822.)  The 
presence of such express or implied guidelines, mechanisms, or procedures may support 
an inference that the provision was intended to afford such a remedy.   
Again, we agree with the court in Carlsbad Aquafarm, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 809, 
which, addressing this consideration in the context of alleged violations of the right to 
procedural due process, observed that article I, section 7(a) neither includes nor suggests 
any such guidelines, mechanisms, or procedures, but instead “reflects general principles 
‘ “ ‘ without laying down rules by means of which those principles may be given the 
force of law.’ ” ’  (See Leger, supra,  202 Cal.App.3d at p. 1455.)”  (83 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 822.)  Although plaintiff asserts that California courts are capable of fashioning 
procedures to govern damage claims in this context, and this may be so, it is not relevant  
 
26
to the point here at issue.  The question at this stage of the analysis is whether there are 
guidelines, mechanisms, or procedures set out in (or reasonably inferable from) the 
provision itself from which we may infer that the voters, in adopting article I, section 
7(a), affirmatively intended that the provision permit an action for damages to remedy a 
violation of that clause.  Article I, section 7(a) contains no such guidelines, mechanisms 
or procedures. 
3. 
In considering evidence of an implied right to seek damages, we also believe it 
appropriate to examine, as have sister-state jurisdictions that have permitted damage suits 
to remedy search and seizure violations, common law history from which we might infer, 
within the provision at issue, an intent to provide an action for damages to remedy a 
violation of that provision.  (See Brown, supra, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 188-189; Widgeon, 
supra, 479 A.2d 921, 923-925; Moresi, supra, 567 So.2d 1081, 1091-1093.)   
For example, in recognizing a right to damages to remedy a violation of the state 
search and seizure and equal protection provisions, the New York Court of Appeals 
observed that “the courts have looked to the common-law antecedents of the 
constitutional provision to discover whether a damage remedy may be implied.  New 
York’s first Constitution in 1777 recognized and adopted the existing common law of 
England and each succeeding Constitution has continued that practice.  Thus, in some 
cases, there exist grounds for implying a damage remedy based upon preexisting 
common-law duties and rights.”  (Brown, supra, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 188.)   
The court in Brown found such grounds for implying a right of action.  First, the 
court observed, “[t]he prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures originated  
 
27
in the Magna Carta and has been part of our history since 1828.  The civil cause of action 
was fully developed in England and provided a damage remedy for the victims of 
unlawful searches at common law (see, Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 
[1763]; Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 [1763]; Entick v. Carrington, 19 State 
Tr. 1029, [1558-1774] All ER Rep. 41 [1765]).”  (Brown, supra, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 188, 
brackets in Brown.)  Second, the court in Brown observed that this English common law 
rule had been endorsed and accepted by the New York court and by the drafters of the 
most recent state constitution (ibid.),20 and hence found historical support for an implied 
remedy in damages.  Similar reasoning supporting an action for damages  
                                             
 
20  
The court in Brown observed that in People v. Defore (1926) 242 N.Y. 13, 19, 24, 
Judge Cardozo, speaking for the court, cited the same English authority in concluding 
that evidence obtained in violation of the search and seizure clause could be used against 
the defendant in a criminal trial and that the defendant’s remedy for the wrong consisted 
of a civil suit for damages.  (Brown, supra, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 189.)  The court in Brown 
also stated:  “The availability of a civil suit for damages sustained as the result of a 
constitutional violation was contemplated by the delegates to [New York’s] 
Constitutional Convention of 1938.  They did not consider whether [such a suit] was 
desirable — they assumed a civil remedy already existed.  At least that is so with respect 
to section 12 [the search and seizure provision].  The debates over the proposed exclusion 
of evidence unlawfully obtained in criminal proceedings make that abundantly clear.  [¶]  
. . . .  Based upon [Judge] Cardozo’s [opinion in People v. Defore], the Convention 
delegates assumed that damages were available to the victim of unconstitutional action 
and they used that argument to help persuade the Convention that exclusion was 
unnecessary to deter official misconduct (see, 1 Rev. Record of N.Y. Constitutional 
Convention, 1938, at 416, 425, 459).  These debates reveal that the concept of damages 
for constitutional violations was neither foreign to the delegates nor rejected by them.  
That the Convention adopted the equal protection provision without similarly discussing 
the damage remedy does not establish that the delegates disfavored it nor does it 
foreclose our consideration of that relief.”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.)   
 
28
to remedy a search and seizure violation has been embraced by the high courts of 
Maryland21 and Louisiana.22   
The parties have not cited, nor have we found, any similar history with respect to 
the liberty interest set out in article I, section 7(a), or its predecessors, former article I, 
section 13, and article I, section 8, of the Constitution of 1849.23   
                                             
 
21  
In Widgeon, supra, 479 A.2d 921, the Maryland Supreme Court described in detail 
the three English cases cited above (id., at pp. 924-925) and then observed that Maryland 
courts long had expressly endorsed the rule of those cases.  (Id., at p. 925, citing Blum v. 
State (Md. 1902) 94 Md. 375, 384-385.)  The court continued:  “Moreover, in Meisinger 
v. State, 155 Md. 195 (1928), in which this Court rejected the argument that evidence 
obtained by unlawful searches and seizures under Article 26 of the Declaration of Rights 
should generally be excluded from criminal trials, both the majority opinion and the 
dissenting opinion recognized the alternate availability of a civil action for damages.  155 
Md. at 199 . . . .  [¶]  Legal scholars also have long taken the position that an unlawful 
search and seizure gives rise to a damage action against both the officer executing an 
illegal warrant and the official causing it to issue. . . .  Fraenkel, Concerning Searches 
and Seizures, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 363-364 (1921).  See Cornelius, Search & Seizure 
§§ 480, 484 (2d ed. 1930); H.D. Evans, Maryland Practice — A Treatise on the Course of 
Proceeding in the Common Law Courts of the State of Maryland 61-62 (1867); 2 
Sutherland on Damages § 412 (4th ed. 1916); 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2183 
(McNaughten rev. 1961).”  (Widgeon, supra, 479 A.2d at p. 925.)   
22  
In Moresi, supra, 567 So.2d 1081, the Louisiana Supreme Court observed:  
“Under the common law of England, where individual rights, such as those protected by 
[the search and seizure clause of the Louisiana Constitution], were preserved by . . . the 
Magna Carta . . . , a violation of those rights generally could be remedied by a traditional 
action for damages.  The violation of the constitutional right was viewed as a trespass, 
giving rise to a trespass action.  [Citing, among other cases, the English decisions.]”  
(Moresi, supra, 567 So.2d 1081, 1092.)  The court continued:  “Considering the 
expression of the framers in the textual formula of [the constitutional provision], the 
history of the provision as recorded in the convention proceedings, and . . . [the 
provision’s] English constitutional law antecedents, we conclude that damages may be 
obtained by an individual for injuries or loss caused by a violation” of the search and 
seizure clause of the state Constitution.  (Ibid.)   
23  
Plaintiff argues that the court in Melvin v. Reid (1931) 112 Cal.App. 285 (Melvin) 
permitted a cause of action for damages to remedy a constitutional violation, and that 
hence, by analogy, such an action should be recognized in the present case as well.  
Plaintiff, however, misreads Melvin.  In that case, the Court of Appeal, citing article I, 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
29
We conclude that there is no indication in the language of article I, section 7(a), 
nor any evidence in the history of that section, from which we may find, within that 
provision, an implied right to seek damages for a violation of the due process liberty 
interest.   
B. 
This determination, however, does not end our inquiry.  Just as we have not 
discovered any basis for concluding that a damages remedy was contemplated or 
reasonably might be inferred within article I, section 7(a) for violation of that provision, 
we also have not discovered any basis for concluding that a damages remedy was 
intended to be foreclosed.  In such circumstances, we, like the United States Supreme 
Court and the courts of numerous other jurisdictions that have faced similar 
circumstances, shall proceed to consider whether a constitutional tort action for damages 
to remedy the asserted constitutional violation should be recognized.   
As observed by Friesen, “[Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. 388, and its progeny] actually 
illustrate[] a body of precedent established by state courts, . . . [and] expressed in section 
874A of the Second Restatement of Torts.”  (Friesen, supra, § 7-5(c), at p. 420.)   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
section 1 (which provides that all people have “inalienable rights” among which are 
“pursuing and obtaining safety [and] happiness”), recognized a common law tort action 
based upon allegations that the defendants had made a motion picture depicting the 
plaintiff’s earlier “shameful” life, using her real name.  In allowing the action, the court 
in Melvin found in article I, section 1’s guarantee of “pursuing and obtaining safety and 
happiness,” a policy supporting a common law tort action for invasion of privacy.  
(Melvin, supra, 112 Cal.App. 285, 291-292; see also id., at p. 287, citing Warren & 
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193 [advocating recognition of 
common law right].)  As subsequent cases make clear, however, Melvin cannot properly 
be read as authorizing an action directly under article I, section 1, for damages to remedy 
a violation of that provision.  Instead, Melvin represents the foundation, in California, of 
the common law invasion of privacy tort.  (See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest 
Association (1971) 4 Cal.3d 529, 534.)   
 
30
The cited Restatement section provides:  “When a legislative [or constitutional] 
provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does 
not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the 
remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to 
assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right 
of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an 
existing tort action.”  (Rest.2d Torts, § 874A, bracketed material and italics added; see 
also id., com. (a), p. 301 [“legislative provision” includes constitutional provisions].)24   
In determining whether to recognize such a constitutional tort, courts have 
“look[ed] for the policy behind the legislative [or constitutional] provision, attempting to 
perceive the purpose for which it was enacted, and then, having ascertained that policy or 
purpose, [have] determine[ed] the most appropriate way to carry it out and identif[ied] 
the remedy needed to accomplish that result.”  (Rest.2d Torts, § 874A, com. (d), 
p. 303.)25   
                                             
 
24  
As observed in Friesen, supra, section 7-5(c), at page 420, “[t]he reporter for the 
Second Restatement used the words ‘legislative provision’ in section 874A to describe 
the duty-creating element of this tort, but, as comment a to the section explains, 
‘legislative provision’ includes constitutional provisions . . . .”  (See also id., at pp. 422-
423 [comparing and contrasting a section 874A cause of action with the “negligence per 
se” doctrine]; Rest.2d Torts, § 874A, com. (e), pp. 303-304 [same].)   
25  
As the drafters of the Restatement explained:  “This process requires policy 
decisions by the court, and it should be aware of them and face them candidly.  In these 
cases, it is the court itself that is according a civil remedy to the injured party.  The action 
is in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation [or constitutional provision] and is 
stimulated by it, but what is involved is judicial rather than legislative modification of the 
existing law.  The court is not required to provide a civil remedy, and yet judicial 
tradition gives it the authority to do so under appropriate circumstances.  The court has 
discretion and it must be careful to exercise that discretion cautiously and soundly.”  
(Rest.2d Torts, § 874A, com. (d), p. 303; accord, Spackman, supra, 16 P.3d 533, 538; see 
also Rest.2d Torts, § 874A, com. (h) (1)-(6), pp. 308-310 [setting out factors “to which a 
court may be expected to give consideration in determining whether a tort remedy is 
appropriate and needed”].)   
 
31
We join the jurisdictions that have endorsed, implicitly or explicitly, the view set 
out in the Restatement, that courts, exercising their authority over the common law, may, 
in appropriate circumstances, recognize a tort action for damages to remedy a 
constitutional violation.  (See Rest.2d Torts, § 874A, com. (g), pp. 306-308; Friesen, 
supra, at § 7-5(c), pp. 420-421.)  We proceed to determine whether a tort action for 
damages is appropriate here.   
1. 
We first consider the adequacy of existing remedies.  (See, e.g., Rest.2d Torts, 
§ 874A, com. (h)(2), p. 309; Carlson, supra, 446 U.S. 14, 20-23; Davis, supra, 442 U.S. 
228, 245; Bush, supra, 462 U.S. 367, 381-388; Schweiker, supra, 487 U.S. 412, 424-429; 
Malesko, supra, 122 S.Ct. 515, 522-523; Carlsbad Aquafarm, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 809, 
821; Dick Fischer, supra, 838 P.2d 263, 268; Kelley, supra, 627 A.2d 909, 923; 
Sundheim, supra, 926 P.2d 545, 549-553; Rockhouse, supra, 503 A.2d 1385, 1388-1389; 
Provens, supra, 594 N.E.2d 959, 963-965; Shields, supra, 658 A.2d 924, 929-934; 
Spackman, supra, 16 P.3d 533, 537-539.)   
We conclude that this consideration does not support recognition of a 
constitutional tort cause of action for damages to remedy an asserted violation of the due 
process “liberty” interest under article I, section 7(a).  In addressing a similar issue in 
Carlsbad Aquafarm, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 809, the Court of Appeal reasoned:  “Under 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, Aquafarm could have immediately petitioned the 
superior court for a writ of mandate ordering [the] Department to provide it with due 
process before it refused to reissue a [required form].  [Citations.]  The essence of 
Aquafarm’s due process claim was that it wanted a hearing to permit a neutral decision 
maker to determine whether [the] Department was correct in its determination that it had 
not complied with [national shellfish safety] standards.  If Aquafarm had promptly filed 
for a writ of mandate, rather than waiting 14 months to file a civil complaint seeking 
 
32
compensatory damages, it could have achieved this desired objective.”  (Id., at p. 821, fn. 
omitted.)   
The same can be said here.  As the Court of Appeal below observed, instead of 
attempting to proceed against defendants by asserting an action for damages, plaintiff 
could have sought to remedy the alleged violation of his due process liberty interest and 
his concomitant right to a “name-clearing hearing” by seeking a writ of mandate under 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, compelling defendants to provide a name-clearing 
hearing.26  Indeed, it seems ironic that, whereas in his pleadings below and in his briefs 
before this court plaintiff frames the issue narrowly — as whether he is entitled to 
damages to remedy defendants’ failure to provide him with a timely name-clearing 
hearing — in fact, plaintiff himself did not timely seek to compel such a hearing through 
an action under section 1085.27  Moreover, plaintiff also could have sought to establish a 
violation of his due process liberty interest by seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.  
(See ante, pt. II.)   
In addition, plaintiff had an adequate remedy for the alleged delay in offering an 
adequate “name-clearing hearing,” by way of a defamation action.  As the Regents 
observe, “because a plaintiff who timely sues for defamation may obtain damages for 
reputational injury, such damages are an adequate remedy for any actionable ‘delay’ in 
                                             
 
26  
The Court of Appeal below observed,  “[a]t oral argument the Regents stressed 
that ‘at all times’ [plaintiff] had the right to a hearing under University policies.  The 
Regents argued [plaintiff] had waived that right by failing to request a hearing.” 
27  
Although the parties have not discussed the point, had plaintiff timely sought a 
writ of mandate under section 1085 and prevailed in that action, plaintiff might have been 
entitled to obtain damages in such an action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 
1095, which provides in relevant part that “if judgment be given for the applicant [in a 
mandate proceeding under section 1085], the applicant may recover the damages which 
the applicant has sustained . . . .”  (See, e.g., Apte v. Regents of University of California 
(1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1084, 1099-1100.) 
 
33
providing a name-clearing hearing  whose sole purpose is to protect the plaintiff’s 
reputation.”28 
The availability of these adequate alternative remedies militates against judicial 
creation of a tort cause of action for damages in the circumstances presented.29   
2. 
We next consider the extent to which a constitutional tort action would change 
established tort law.  (See Rest.2d Torts, § 874A, com. (h)(5), p. 310.)   
Plaintiff suggests that a damages action to remedy an asserted violation of his due 
process liberty interest is contemplated by tort law as codified by Civil Code sections 
1708 and 3333.  The former section provides that “[e]very person is bound, without 
contract, to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon 
any of his rights.”  (Civ. Code, § 1708, italics added.)  The latter statute provides, “for the 
breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where 
otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate for all 
the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could be anticipated or not.”  (Civ. 
Code, § 3333.)  Echoing the majority in Laguna Publishing, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d 816, 
which placed some reliance upon these statutes, plaintiff suggests that the asserted due 
process violation in this case falls within the ambit of section 1708, and that the violation 
“imports by reason of section 3333 a correlative right to recover any damages 
proximately resulting from the violation of such right . . . .”  (Id., at p. 854.) 
                                             
 
28  
Indeed, as is revealed by documents that we have judicially noticed, plaintiff 
initially sued the Regents and various Doe defendants for defamation, but dropped that 
claim prior to the trial court’s ruling on the demurrer to that claim. 
29  
In this case, we need not and do not determine what role the availability of a 
federal law remedy (for example, under 42 U.S.C., § 1983) should play in the 
determination whether a state action for damages should be recognized for violation of a 
state constitutional provision. 
 
34
As Justice Kaufman observed in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Laguna 
Publishing, however, Civil Code “section 3333 is not a substantive statute; it merely 
prescribes the general measure of damages in tort cases.  Civil Code section 1708[,] 
which provides that every person is bound to abstain from injuring the person or property 
of another or infringing any of his rights, states a general principle of law, but it hardly 
provides support for the adoption of the novel legal proposition that a violation of 
subdivision (a) of section 2 of article I of the California Constitution gives rise to a direct 
cause of action for damages outside the parameters of recognized tort law . . . .”  (Laguna 
Publishing, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d 816, 859 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kaufman, J.).)  We 
reject plaintiff’s contention that a damages action to remedy an asserted violation of his 
due process liberty interest is contemplated by tort law as codified by Civil Code sections 
1708 and 3333.   
3. 
We also consider the nature of the provision and the significance of the purpose 
that it seeks to effectuate.  (Rest.2d Torts, § 874A, com. (h)(1) & (4), pp. 308-310.)  As a 
general matter, the due process “liberty” interest of article I, section 7(a) is both 
important and fundamental.   
Plaintiff relies upon Laguna Publishing, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d 816, in which the 
Court of Appeal majority stressed the “special dignity” of the rights of free speech and 
free press, while finding a right to seek damages to remedy a violation of the state free 
speech and free press clause, article I, section 2(a).  (Laguna Publishing, supra, 131 
Cal.App.3d at p. 853, italics in original.)  Subsequently, the court in Fenton, supra, 135 
Cal.App.3d 797, reached a similar conclusion concerning a violation of the right to vote 
(art. II, § 2), relying upon Laguna Publishing, supra, and the asserted “special dignity” of 
the right to vote.  Plaintiff asserts that a similar conclusion applies here.   
 
35
Although we may agree that this factor, in the abstract, is a consideration that 
favors recognition of a constitutional tort action for damages, we also find persuasive the 
cautionary view set out in Carlsbad Aquafarm, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 809:  “While this 
factor may be a proper consideration in the overall analysis, it is not one upon which we 
place great significance.  How does one rank the importance of different constitutional 
provisions?  . . . [C]an we say a procedural due process right should be accorded more or 
less dignity [than free speech or voting rights]?  We agree that the due process right is 
fundamental.  But absent the applicability of the other relevant factors discussed here, 
the relative importance of the constitutional right is of little help in determining the 
availability of a damages remedy for a violation of that right.”  (Id., at p. 823, italics 
added.)30   
The same can be said here.  The availability of meaningful alternative remedies 
leads us to decline to recognize a constitutional tort to remedy the asserted violation of 
article I, section 7(a) in the case before us.   
4. 
Because we conclude that the foregoing factors militate against recognition of a 
constitutional tort to remedy the asserted violation of due process liberty interests in this 
case, we need not consider, in addition, whether any special factors would counsel 
hesitation in recognizing such a damages action.  If we had found, however, that the 
considerations discussed above favored recognition of a constitutional tort, we would,  
                                             
 
30  
In light of our analysis, we disapprove the methodology employed by the courts in 
Laguna Publishing, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d 816, and Fenton, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 
to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.  We express no view on the correctness 
of the results reached in those cases. 
 
36
before actually recognizing the tort, also consider the existence of any special factors 
counseling hesitation in recognizing a damages action, including deference to legislative 
judgment,31 avoidance of adverse policy consequences,32 considerations of governmental 
fiscal policy,33 practical issues of proof,34 and competence of courts to assess particular 
types of damages.35   
V. 
In sum, we discern no evidence from which to infer within article I, section 7(a), 
an intent to afford a right to seek damages to remedy the asserted violation of the due 
process liberty interest alleged in this case.  We also find no basis upon which to 
recognize a constitutional tort action for such damages.   
                                             
 
31  
See Bush, supra, 462 U.S. 367, 370; Schweiker, supra, 487 U.S. 412, 427, 429; 
Meyer, supra, 510 U.S. 471, 486; Chappell, supra, 462 U.S. 296, 304; see also Kelley, 
supra, 627 A.2d 909, 922; Smith v. Department of Public Health (Mich. 1987) 410 
N.W.2d 749, 789 (opn. by Brickley, J.) (Smith); 77th Dist. Judge, supra, 438 N.W.2d 
333, 337; Spackman, supra, 16 P.3d 533, 539.   
32  
See Kelley, supra, 627 A.2d 909, 923-924; Malesko, supra, 122 S.Ct. 515, 521; 
Meyer, supra, 510 U.S. 510, 485; Smith, supra, 410 N.W.2d 749, 789 (opn. by Brickley, 
J.); see generally Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 874A, com. (h)(3), pp. 309-310.)  
33  
See Meyer, supra, 510 U.S. 471, 486; Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. 388, 396; King v. 
Alaska State Housing Authority (Alaska 1981) 633 P.2d 256, 259-261; Kelley, supra, 627 
A.2d 909, 924.  In a related vein, it has been suggested that courts also should consider 
“[t]he burden that the new cause of action will place on judicial machinery.”  (Rest.2d 
Torts, § 874A, com. (h)(6), p. 310.) 
34  
See Carlsbad Aquafarm, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 809, 822. 
35  
See Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. 388, 408-409 & footnote 9 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.); 
see also Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 874A, comment (h)(3), pages 309-310.   
 
37
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
1 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY BROWN, J. 
 
 
I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the Court of Appeal’s judgment barring 
plaintiff from seeking damages for any violation of his state constitutional right to due 
process.  In my view, however, it is not only unnecessary but entirely inappropriate to go 
beyond the short, clear answer to the question presented or to consider anything other 
than the constitutional history and drafters’ intent in determining whether a constitutional 
provision is enforceable by an action in tort.  The majority cites no authority and offers 
no rationale for applying the “constitutional tort” analysis adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents (1971) 403 U.S. 388 to a 
provision of the California Constitution. 
 
“[I]t is well established that the California Constitution ‘is, and always has been, a 
document of independent force’ [citation], and that the rights embodied in and protected 
by the state Constitution are not invariably identical to the rights contained in the federal 
Constitution.  [Citation.]  California cases long have recognized the independence of the 
California Constitution [citation], and article I, section 24, of the California Constitution 
expressly confirms that the rights ‘guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on 
those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.’  Past cases make clear that even 
when the terms of the California Constitution are textually identical to those of the 
federal Constitution, the proper interpretation of the state constitutional provision is not 
invariably identical to the federal courts’ interpretation of the corresponding provision 
contained in the federal Constitution.  [Citations.]”  (American Academy of Pediatrics v. 
2 
Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 325-326; see People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737, 
782-783 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.); Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 660 (dis. 
opn. of Brown, J.).) 
 
When a part of our state Constitution has been adopted by initiative, one of our 
core interpretive principles is that the courts must measure its scope according to the 
intentions of the voters.  (Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 518, and 
cases cited therein; see, e.g., White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775 [ballot statements 
indicated state constitutional right of privacy was intended to be self-executing and 
supported injunctive relief]; cf. Holtz v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 296, 302 
[language of article I, section 14, allows monetary damages for inverse condemnation].)  
“This is because the Constitution ‘ “owes its whole force and authority to its ratification 
by the people . . . .” ’  [Citations.]”  (Gates, at p. 518.) 
 
The majority correctly concludes there is no evidence the voters intended to create 
a right to monetary damages in adopting the due process clause set forth in article I, 
section 7, subdivision (a) of our Constitution.  Nevertheless, it declines to end its inquiry 
with that determination because it finds no basis “for concluding that a damages remedy 
was intended to be foreclosed.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29.)  The majority fails to explain 
this non sequitur, however, and to identify any principle of constitutional interpretation 
that translates the absence of an express or implied bar to monetary damages into an 
authorization for a court to determine whether to provide for such a remedy on its own 
initiative.  By its very nature, a constitution orders the relationships of the government 
and its citizens and serves as a bulwark against encroachment on their rights.  The fact 
that the judicial branch interprets the constitution does not give license to augment its 
provisions as any shifting majority of judges sees fit.  Until now, this court has jealously 
guarded its role in effectuating legislative intent, particularly with respect to the initiative 
process.  (See, e.g., Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 501; Raven v. Deukmejian 
(1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 341; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. Of 
3 
Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 248; see also In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 
889-890.)  In this case, however, the majority abandons that vigilance. 
 
Moreover, the majority applies an analytical framework based not on our own 
jurisprudence but a derivation of United States Supreme Court decisions.  “The 
California Constitution is the supreme law of our state—a seminal document of 
independent force that establishes governmental powers and safeguards individual rights 
and liberties.  [Citations.]  As the Supreme Court of California, we are the final arbiters 
of the meaning of state constitutional provisions.  [Citation.]  Our authority and 
responsibility in this regard is part of the basic structure of California government; it 
cannot be delegated to the United States Supreme Court or any other person or body.  
[Citation.]  When we construe provisions of the California Constitution, we necessarily 
do so in light of their unique language, purposes, and histories, in accordance with 
general principles of constitutional interpretation established in our case law.  Nor do we 
act differently when the state constitutional provision in issue contains the same language 
as a federal constitutional provision.  In such a case, we are not bound by a decision of 
the United States Supreme Court or any other court.  We must consider and decide the 
matter independently.”  (Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 863, 
902-903 (conc. opn. of Lucas, C.J.).) 
 
The majority’s lapse of analytical independence—and apparent “assumption that 
any Supreme Court doctrine is generic constitutional law” (Linde, Are State Constitutions 
Common Law? (1992) 34 Ariz. L.Rev. 215, 227)—betrays our obligation as final arbiter 
of state constitutional law in two interrelated ways.  First, the majority’s approach 
compounds and perpetuates the misperception that state constitutions are part of common 
law and that meaningful analysis can be “borrowed wholesale from federal constitutional 
discourse, as though the language of federal constitutional law were some sort of lingua 
franca of constitutional argument generally.”  (Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State 
Constitutionalism (1992) 90 Mich. L.Rev. 761, 766.)  Unlike the common law, however, 
4 
constitutional interpretation is bound by text as well as by principles of construction and 
is decidedly not subject—whenever a majority of the court agrees—to judicial extension 
and innovation in the interest of public policy or national consensus or similar 
justification.  (See Linde, at pp. 225-229.)  Although in this context “[t]he pull toward a 
common law of judicial review, toward a vortex of clichés [lifted from United States 
Supreme Court decisions], is strong” (id. at p. 229), this court must resist if it is to remain 
faithful to its role as the final arbiter of the meaning of our state Constitution and to 
respect the demarcations between the respective branches of government—a concern 
equally of constitutional dimension.  (See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky (1988) 487 U.S. 
412, 414.) 
 
Second, the majority’s approach creates a lacuna in our constitutional 
jurisprudence, adopting without meaningful consideration the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpolation of an unrelated federal constitutional provision in lieu of rigorous 
substantive analysis of the unique language, purpose and history of our own due process 
guarantee.  Defaulting to the high court fundamentally disserves the independent force 
and effect of our Constitution.  Rather than enrich the texture of our law, this reliance on 
federal precedent shortchanges future generations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
I CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Katzberg v. Regents of University of California 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 88 Cal.App.4th 147 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S097445 
Date Filed: November 27, 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Joe S. Gray and Jeffrey L. Gunther 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Siegel & Yee and Dan Siegel for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, Paul D. Fogel, Raymond A. Cardozo; Pahl & Gosselin, Kenneth L. Kann, Nanette 
Joslyn; James E. Holst, John F. Lundberg and Jeffrey A. Blair for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Dan Siegel 
Siegel & Yee 
499 14th  Street, Suite 220 
Oakland, CA  94612 
(510) 839-1200 
 
Paul D. Fogel 
Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May 
Two Embarcadero Center, 20th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94111-4106 
(415) 543-8700