Case Title: Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-82-16

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of
the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.)

    Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Board (A-82-16) (079146)

Argued February 26, 2018 -- Decided August 2, 2018

SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court.

        This appeal tests the limits of the definition of “interested party” within the Municipal
Land Use Law (MLUL), 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4, as applied to the holder of a tax sale certificate -
- a tax lienholder -- under New Jersey’s Tax Sale Law. Specifically, the Court considers
whether a tax lienholder has standing to challenge a planning board’s approval of a land use
application for a neighboring property.

        Defendant Goodman North American Partnership Holdings, LLC (Goodman)
purchased a parcel of land in Linden, New Jersey (the Property). In 2013, after several
transfers, bankruptcy proceedings, and abandonment, ownership of the adjacent parcel (the
Neighboring Property), a superfund site, was purportedly transferred by quitclaim deed to
Cherokee LCP Land, LLC (Cherokee), a plaintiff in this matter. That same year, non-party
Cherokee Equities, LLC (Equities), purchased three tax sale certificates on the Neighboring
Property from the City of Linden and initiated tax foreclosure proceedings. After filing the
foreclosure complaint, Equities assigned the tax sale certificates to Linden 587, LLC (Linden
587), and Linden 587 was substituted as plaintiff in the foreclosure proceedings.

        Goodman submitted a site plan application for development of the Property to the
City of Linden Planning Board (the Board). Seventeen days before Equities assigned the tax
sale certificates to Linden 587, the Board held a public hearing on Goodman’s application.
Cherokee attended as an objector. Neither Equities nor Linden 587 attended the hearing. In
part, Cherokee challenged the proposed project’s elimination of certain points of access to
the Neighboring Property, its interference with an existing easement on the Property, and
substantial modifications to storm water management on the Property. The Board
unanimously approved the application with qualifications. Thereafter, Cherokee’s principal
offered to sell the Neighboring Property to Goodman for 2% of the project to avoid litigation.

      Plaintiffs Cherokee and Linden 587 filed a complaint challenging the Board’s
approval of Goodman’s application. Defendants filed motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment, arguing, in part, that Cherokee and Linden 587 lacked standing.

        The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, concluding that
“Linden 587 does not have a present interest in the Neighboring Property as its ownership
rights . . . are conditioned upon its right of redemption which it has failed to exercise.” The
                                                  1
trial court found “that until redemption and entry of foreclosure, the holder of a tax sale
certificate does not have any vested ownership or present possessory interest in a property
that is subject to the tax sale certificate.” As a result, the trial court determined that Linden
587 “cannot be deemed an interested party” based on its status as a tax lienholder and that, as
a consequence, dismissal was warranted. Additionally, the court noted that the plaintiffs’
motive was not to redevelop the Neighboring Property, but to “extract value from the Project
through the sale of the Neighboring Property . . . to Goodman.” The Appellate Division
affirmed, and the Court granted plaintiffs’ petition for certification. 
230 N.J. 500 (2017).

HELD: Pursuant to 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4, a tax lienholder who can show that its “right to use,
acquire or enjoy property is or may be affected” if the application is granted is an interested
party and therefore may have standing to challenge a planning board’s approval of a land use
application.

1. The sale of tax certificates allows a municipality to transform a non-performing asset into
cash without raising taxes. However, the holder of a tax sale certificate does not have title to
the land. The holder’s purchase of the certificate at a tax sale does not divest the delinquent
owner of his title to the land. Instead, the purchaser of a tax sale certificate acquires a lien
formerly held by the municipality’s taxing authority, derived from the property owner’s
obligation to pay real estate taxes. The lien purchaser obtains an inchoate interest that consists
of three rights: the right to receive the sum paid for the certificate with interest at the
redemption rate for which the property was sold; the right to redeem from the holder a
subsequently issued tax sale certificate; and the right to acquire title by foreclosing the equity of
redemption of all outstanding interests, including that of the property owner. By virtue of
foreclosure, the purchaser of the tax sale certificate may become the owner of the property in
fee simple. (pp. 13-15)

2. The “right to acquire title” is therefore significant in resolving standing under the MLUL.
Indeed, the MLUL explains standing as follows: “[a]ny interested party may appeal to the
governing body any final decision of a board of adjustment approving an application for
development.” 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-17(a). An “interested party” is defined as: “any person,
whether residing within or without the municipality, whose right to use, acquire, or enjoy
property is or may be affected by any action taken under [this act], or whose rights to use,
acquire, or enjoy property under [this act], or under any other law of this State or of the United
States have been denied, violated or infringed by an action or a failure to act under [this act].”

N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 (emphases added). New Jersey’s courts have long taken a liberal approach
to standing in zoning cases and thus have broadly construed the MLUL’s definition of
“interested party.” (pp. 15-16)

3. Although a tax lienholder does not have title to the subject property and has, at best, a
limited possessory interest in it, the absence of title or possession is not determinative of
standing. Indeed, the MLUL clearly and unambiguously provides that standing may be
afforded to those with a “right to use, acquire, or enjoy property.” 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4. The
purchaser of the tax sale certificate has the right to acquire title to the property and the right to
use the property in a limited manner “in order to make repairs, or abate, remove or correct any
                                                 2
condition harmful to the public health, safety and welfare, or any condition that is materially
reducing the value of the property.” 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c). Therefore, the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint based on its legal conclusion that holders of tax sale certificates who
have not foreclosed upon the subject property cannot have standing. (pp. 16-18)

4. That conclusion, however, is not in and of itself determinative of standing: to have standing
pursuant to the MLUL, a tax lienholder must show that its “right to use, acquire, or enjoy
property is or may be affected” by the action. 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4. Therefore, standing must be
considered on a case-by-case basis. In this case, plaintiffs have alleged principally that the
proposed project would eliminate certain points of access to the Neighboring Property, interfere
with an existing easement on the Property, and substantially modify storm water management
on the Property. Those representations -- which defendants have not contested -- suggest that
plaintiffs’ limited present possessory interest in the Neighboring Property pursuant to 
N.J.S.A.
54:5-86(c) may be affected, and that Linden 587 therefore may have standing. Consequently,
the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing. (pp. 18-19)

5. The Court adds the following guidance. If the Legislature had intended for only parties
required to be notified to have standing, it would have restricted the standing requirements
accordingly. Standing does not depend upon ownership or proximity, but rather on the
definition of an “interested party.” Linden 587’s motive in obtaining the certificates and
challenging the Board’s decision is not pertinent to the determination here of standing under the
MLUL. Nor is it conclusive that Linden 587 was assigned the tax sale certificates after the
Board hearing; the date of acquisition is not determinative of a party’s standing. (pp. 19-20)

6. The Court stresses that it makes no findings regarding Linden 587’s acquisition of the
certificates; whether Cherokee did hold title to the Neighboring Property; the relationship
among Cherokee, Equities, and Linden 587; whether the Neighboring Property was
“abandoned,” thus providing a limited possessory interest under 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c); the extent
to which plaintiffs’ right to acquire or limited possessory interest “may be affected”; or the
merits of plaintiffs’ objections in general. The record is lacking on these matters and, to the
extent relevant, they should be considered and a record developed on remand. (pp. 20-21)

       REVERSED.

        TIMPONE, J., dissenting, disagrees that the holder of a tax sale certificate has the
“right to acquire” property within the meaning of the MLUL. Even if a speculative,
contingent interest like a tax lien could be deemed a “right to acquire” property, according to
Justice Timpone, that right is not affected unless the acquisition itself is or may be affected
by the Board’s decision. Justice Timpone stresses that Linden 587 failed to properly plead or
defend standing and expresses concern about the impact of the majority’s decision.

JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZ-VINA join in
JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE TIMPONE filed a dissent, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER joins.

                                               3
                                     SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       A-
82 September Term 2016
                                                079146

CHEROKEE LCP LAND, LLC and
LINDEN 587, LLC,

    Plaintiffs-Appellants,

         v.

CITY OF LINDEN PLANNING
BOARD, GOODMAN NORTH AMERICAN
PARTNERSHIP HOLDINGS, LLC,
and LINDEN PROPERTY HOLDINGS,
LLC,

    Defendants-Respondents.

         Argued February 26, 2018 – Decided August 2, 2018

         On certification to the Superior Court,
         Appellate Division.

         Keith A. Bonchi argued the cause for
         appellants Cherokee LCP Land, LLC and Linden
         587, LLC (Goldenberg, Mackler, Sayegh,
         Mintz, Pfeffer, Bonchi & Gill, attorneys;
         Keith A. Bonchi, of counsel and on the
         briefs, and Elliot J. Almanza, on the
         briefs).

         Paul H. Schafhauser argued the cause for
         respondent Linden Property Holdings, LLC
         (Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi, attorneys;
         Paul H. Schafhauser, of counsel and on the
         briefs).

         Anthony D. Rinaldo, Jr., argued the cause
         for respondent City of Linden Planning Board
         (Law Offices of Anthony D. Rinaldo, Jr.,
         attorneys; Anthony D. Rinaldo, Jr., on the
         brief).

                                1
           Adam D. Greenberg argued the cause for
           amicus curiae National Tax Lien Association,
           Inc. (Honig & Greenberg and Taylor and
           Keyser, attorneys; Adam D. Greenberg and
           Robert W. Keyser, on the brief).

    JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.

    The Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-17(a),

recognizes that development on one parcel of land can have

consequences for others.   The MLUL thus provides that “[a]ny

interested party may appeal to the governing body any final

decision of a board of adjustment approving an application for

development,” 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-17(a), and defines “interested

party” broadly to include “any person . . . whose right to use,

acquire, or enjoy property is or may be affected by any action

taken under [the MLUL],” 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4.

    This appeal tests the limits of that definition as applied

to the holder of a tax sale certificate -- a tax lienholder --

under New Jersey’s Tax Sale Law (Tax Sale Law), 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-1

to -137.   Specifically, we consider whether a tax lienholder has

standing to challenge a planning board’s approval of a land use

application for a neighboring property.

    We conclude that, pursuant to 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4, a tax

lienholder who can show that its “right to use, acquire or enjoy

property is or may be affected” if the application is granted is

                                 2
an interested party and therefore may have standing to challenge

a planning board’s approval of a land use application.

    Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate

Division affirming the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of

plaintiffs’ complaint in lieu of prerogative writs pursuant to

Rule 4:6-2(e), and remand for further proceedings.   The record

is deficient with respect to a number of factual issues, as

noted throughout the opinion; to the extent that those matters

are pertinent to standing or the substantive merits of this

case, they should be considered and a record developed on

remand.

                                I.

                                A.

    We glean the following relevant facts from the motion

proceedings before the trial court.

    A predecessor of GAF Corporation (GAF) acquired and

subsequently subdivided a property in Linden, New Jersey, into

two parcels of land.   GAF retained ownership of one parcel, now

known as Block 587, Lots 1 and 2.01, on Linden’s official tax

map (the Property), and sold the other, now known as Block 587,

Lots 3.01, 3.02, and 3.03, on the Linden tax map (the

Neighboring Property) to Linden Chlorine Products, Inc.

    GAF transferred the Property to Linden Property Holdings,

LLC (LPH), which entered into a purchase and sale agreement with

                                3
Goodman North American Partnership Holdings, LLC (Goodman).     The

purchase and sale agreement was contingent upon Goodman

procuring approval to undertake redevelopment projects on the

Property.

     In 2013, after several transfers, bankruptcy proceedings,

and abandonment, ownership of the Neighboring Property, a

superfund site, was purportedly transferred by quitclaim deed to

Cherokee LCP Land, LLC (Cherokee), a plaintiff in this matter.

That same year, non-party Cherokee Equities, LLC (Equities),

purchased three tax sale certificates on the Neighboring

Property from the City of Linden and initiated tax foreclosure

proceedings.   After filing the foreclosure complaint, Equities

assigned the tax sale certificates to Linden 587, LLC (Linden

587), and Linden 587 was substituted as plaintiff in the

foreclosure proceedings.1   According to the record, those

proceedings are still pending.2

1  Plaintiffs claim before this Court that Cherokee, rather than
Equities, transferred the tax liens to Linden 587. They further
contend that Cherokee was the party that foreclosed upon the
Neighboring Property. However, the record indicates that
Equities was the entity that purchased the tax liens from the
City of Linden and transferred them to Linden 587.
Additionally, Equities is named as the original plaintiff in the
foreclosure proceedings. We make no findings regarding Linden
587’s acquisition of the tax sale certificates.

2  During oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs represented that
one tax lien had been foreclosed upon but not the remaining two.

                                  4
     In May 2014, Goodman submitted a site plan application for

development of industrial, warehouse and distribution space on

the Property to the City of Linden Planning Board (the Board).

Following the submission of those plans, Goodman served notice

of its application to interested parties and property owners

within 200 feet of the Property, as identified by the City of

Linden, including Cherokee.

     Seventeen days before Equities assigned the tax sale

certificates to Linden 587, the Board held a public hearing on

Goodman’s application.   Cherokee attended the hearing as an

objector,3 based on its status as owner of the Neighboring

Property.   Neither Equities nor Linden 587 attended the hearing.

     In part, Cherokee challenged the proposed project’s

elimination of certain points of access to the Neighboring

Property, its interference with an existing easement on the

Property, and substantial modifications to storm water

3  In their complaint, plaintiffs asserted that they “appeared
through counsel to oppose the application of Goodman” at the
public hearing held in June 2014. In oral argument before this
Court, plaintiffs appeared to suggest -- and defendants to
dispute -- that the attorney for Cherokee also represented the
entity that held the tax certificates. The record is
undeveloped on this point, and the Court makes no findings as to
whether counsel for Cherokee appeared at the Board hearing on
behalf of Equities and/or Linden 587.

                                 5
management on the Property.   Counsel for Cherokee cross-examined

Goodman’s witnesses and presented its engineer as a witness.

     Following the hearing, the Board unanimously approved the

application with qualifications.4    Thereafter, Cherokee’s

principal, Jay Wolfkind, emailed Goodman offering to sell the

Neighboring Property to Goodman as a means of avoiding

litigation in exchange for “just TWO (2%) PERCENT of the

project.”5   The bottom of Wolfkind’s email states, “[Cherokee]

and Linden 587 . . . are separate legal entities from each

other, and from every other Cherokee entity.”6

     In October 2014, plaintiffs Cherokee and Linden 587 filed a

complaint in lieu of prerogative writs with the Chancery

Division of the Superior Court, challenging the Board’s approval

of Goodman’s application.   The complaint named Goodman, LPH, and

the Board as defendants.    In response, defendants Goodman and

LPH filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint or,

4  In its resolution, the Board noted that Goodman agreed to
construct a thirty-five-foot roadway to allow access to the
Neighboring Property.

5  At oral argument, plaintiffs represented that the email should
never have been included in the record under the rules of
evidence that preclude consideration of settlement offers. The
record is undeveloped on this point, and the Court makes no
findings as to the admission of the email.

6  The record is not conclusive as to the relationship among
Cherokee, Equities, and Linden 587, and the Court makes no
findings on that subject.
                                 6
alternatively, for summary judgment, and submitted a statement

of material facts in support of their motion.      They argued, in

part, that Cherokee and Linden 587 lacked standing.         The Board

joined in those motions.

    Following oral argument, the trial court noted that

plaintiffs “either admitted or failed to substantively respond”

to defendants’ statement of material facts.      The trial court

thus considered the facts to be uncontested for the purposes of

ruling on the motion to dismiss.       The trial court granted the

motion pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) and dismissed plaintiffs’

complaint with prejudice.

    In its Statement of Reasons, the court stated that both

Cherokee and Linden 587 lacked standing to challenge the Board’s

approval.   Based on that finding, the court did “not [need to]

reach the merits of the summary judgment motion.”      In

determining that Linden 587 lacked standing, the court noted

that neither “Linden 587’s affiliated status with Cherokee” nor

its “status as a holder of three liens on the Neighboring

Property” conferred standing.

    In discussing Linden 587’s affiliated status with Cherokee,

the court noted that “plaintiffs have not provided any

information to this court showing the nature of the relationship

between the entities,” adding that, as noted at the bottom of

Wolfkind’s email offering to sell the Neighboring Property to

                                   7
Goodman, the “record . . . suggests that the plaintiffs are

separate legal entities.”    The court stated that “the injury of

one separate legal corporate entity cannot be imputed to

another” and reasoned that, even if imputation was permissible,

it would not be appropriate because “Cherokee does not have an

interest in the Neighboring Property.”7

     The court concluded that “Linden 587 does not have a

present interest in the Neighboring Property as its ownership

rights, which include the use and enjoyment of the property, are

conditioned upon its right of redemption which it has failed to

exercise.”   Citing Township of Jefferson v. Block 447A, Lot 10,

228 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1988), the trial court found

“that until redemption and entry of foreclosure, the holder of a

tax sale certificate does not have any vested ownership or

present possessory interest in a property that is subject to the

tax sale certificate.”     As a result, the trial court determined

that Linden 587 “cannot be deemed an interested party” based on

its status as a tax lienholder and that, as a consequence,

dismissal was warranted.

7  Plaintiffs do not challenge the Appellate Division’s
conclusion that Cherokee was not the titled owner of the
Neighboring Property. Because the issue of Cherokee’s standing
is not before this Court, our discussion of the Appellate
Division’s judgment is limited to Linden 587’s standing. We
make no findings as to whether Cherokee did, in fact, hold title
to the Neighboring Property.
                                  8
     Additionally, the court noted that the plaintiffs’ motive

was not to redevelop the Neighboring Property, but to “extract

value from the Project through the sale of the Neighboring

Property . . . to Goodman.”

     Plaintiffs appealed.   The Appellate Division “affirm[ed]

the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint” and did “not reach the

merits of the challenge to the Board’s approval.”   In affirming

the Chancery Division’s determination, the panel found that

Linden 587 lacked standing because “Linden 587 [did not]

appear[] before the Board nor file[] any objection with the

Board.”8   The appellate panel also determined that Linden 587 had

not foreclosed upon the Neighboring Property or redeemed the tax

sale certificates before filing its complaint in lieu of

prerogative writs.   Hence, the panel concluded that “Linden 587

did not have an existing property interest in the Neighboring

Property.”   The panel noted that “the holder of a tax sale

certificate is not always an 'interested party’ with standing to

be heard concerning all matters affecting the property.”

     The Appellate Division also determined that the trial court

correctly considered plaintiffs’ motive because “courts need

not, and should not, ignore such facts,” but found motive to be

8  The Appellate Division opinion indicates that Linden 587 did
not acquire the tax liens until after the Board hearing.
                                 9
“ancillary” to its analysis of plaintiffs’ standing in the

matter.

    This Court granted plaintiffs’ petition for certification.

230 N.J. 500 (2017).   We granted leave to appear as amicus

curiae to the National Tax Lien Association, Inc. (NTLA).

                                II.

                                A.

    Plaintiffs assert “the strong merit of their substantive

case” and ask this Court to reverse and remand the matter.

    They maintain that Linden 587, as the holder of tax sale

certificates and as plaintiff in the foreclosure proceedings

upon the Neighboring Property, has standing as an “interested

party” pursuant to 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 “because its right to

acquire or use the [Neighboring Property] has been destroyed by

the Board’s approval of the Goodman plan.”

    Plaintiffs also claim that the Appellate Division analyzed

legally irrelevant factors in determining standing.     First, it

was inappropriate to consider the fact that Linden 587 was not

assigned the tax sale certificates until after the Board hearing

because, as “a Cherokee-related affiliate,” “Linden 587 stood in

the shoes of its assignor for all intents and purposes.”

Second, plaintiffs contend that it was irrelevant that Linden

587 “had not obtained or sought final judgment of tax

foreclosure.”   Lastly, plaintiffs assert that motive “is

                                10
irrelevant to the real and justiciable issues that are presented

to this Court” -- whether Linden 587 had standing to contest the

Board’s approval.

                                  B.

    Defendants LPH, Goodman, and the Board urge this Court to

affirm the Appellate Division’s determination that Linden 587

lacks standing.     They claim support for their argument in the

MLUL’s requirement that notice of a public hearing need only be

given to “the owners of all real property as shown on the

current tax duplicates, located in the State and within 200 feet

in all directions of the property.”    
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12(b).

Defendants assert that the statutory notice requirement bears

upon who qualifies as an “interested party” to challenge a

planning board’s action.

    Defendants contend that standing must be considered on a

case-by-case basis and agree with the Appellate Division that

Linden 587 is not an “interested party” under the MLUL because

it does not hold title to or a possessory interest in the

Neighboring Property.     Defendants note that the Board’s approval

of the Goodman project may change Linden 587’s desire to acquire

the Neighboring Property, but stress that its “right to acquire”

is unaffected.

                                  C.

                                  11
    Aligning with plaintiffs, amicus curiae NTLA “submits that

New Jersey’s traditionally liberal view of standing should apply

to permit a tax lienholder’s concerns to be heard.”   The NTLA

contends that, in rendering their decisions, “the lower courts

were unaware of all of the rights held by a tax lienholder and[]

improperly entertained factors such as 'motive’ to assess

standing.”

    The NTLA avers that the trial court and Appellate Division

overlooked that Linden 587 has the “right to pay or redeem

subsequent municipal liens, and 'most importantly, the right to

acquire title by foreclosing the equity of redemption of all

outstanding interests, including the owner’s.’”   (quoting Caput

Mortuum, L.L.C. v. S & S Crown Servs., Ltd., 
366 N.J. Super.
 323, 336 (App. Div. 2004)).   In addition to those rights, the

NTLA contends that the Legislature granted tax lienholders the

right “to enter onto a property to address conditions that

endanger the health, safety and welfare of the public, as well

as to add the costs of repair to the amount to redeem, and even

to foreclose immediately or in rem.”   (citing 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-

86(b), (c), and (d)).   Accordingly, the NTLA concludes that “a

tax lienholder [has] a possessory right, albeit limited, in a

property.”

                               III.

                                12
    As indicated above, the procedural posture and inconclusive

record of this case confine our inquiry to a narrow legal

question -- whether a tax lienholder has standing to challenge a

land use application for a neighboring property.     The answer to

that question will determine whether plaintiffs’ complaint was

properly dismissed for lack of standing.

    Whether a party has standing to pursue a claim is a

question of law subject to de novo review.      People For Open

Gov’t v. Roberts, 
397 N.J. Super. 502, 508 (App. Div. 2008)

(citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (“The issue of standing is a matter of law

as to which we exercise de novo review.”)).     We therefore accord

no “special deference” to the “trial court’s interpretation of

the law and the legal consequences that flow from established

facts.”    Manalapan Realty, 
140 N.J. at 378.

                                 IV.

                                 A.

    Under the Tax Sale Law, “a municipality that is owed real

estate taxes [receives] 'a continuous lien on the land’ for the

delinquent amount as well as for 'all subsequent taxes,

interest, penalties and costs of collection.’”     In re Princeton

Office Park, L.P. v. Plymouth Park Tax Servs., LLC, 
218 N.J. 52,

61-62 (2014) (quoting Simon v. Cronecker, 
189 N.J. 304, 318

(2007)).    “[T]he municipality may enforce the lien by selling

                                 13
the property as prescribed by [N.J.S.A. 54:5-19].”      Varsolona v.

Breen Capital Servs. Corp., 
180 N.J. 605, 617 (2004) (quoting

Savage v. Weissman, 
355 N.J. Super. 429, 436 (App. Div. 2002)).

          The Tax Sale Law sets forth the procedure by
          which tax sale certificates are generated,
          purchased, and sold.    The certificate . . .
          verifies “the taxes, assessments or other
          municipal liens or charges, levied or assessed
          against   the  property    described  in   the
          application” as of the certificate’s effective
          date.   After providing notice to the public
          and the property owner as required by N.J.S.A.
          54:5-26 and -27, the municipality may sell the
          certificate at a public auction.

          [Princeton Office Park, 
218 N.J. at 62
          (footnote omitted) (quoting 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-
          12).]

In this way, the sale of tax certificates allows a municipality

to “transform a non-performing asset into cash without raising

taxes.”   Ibid. (quoting Varsolona, 
180 N.J. at 610).

    However, “[t]he holder of a tax sale certificate does not

have title to the land.   The holder’s purchase of the

certificate at a tax sale does not divest the delinquent owner

of his title to the land.”   Township of Jefferson, 
228 N.J.

Super. at 4.   “Instead, the sale operates as 'a conditional

conveyance of the property to the purchaser, subject to a person

with an interest in the property having the right to redeem the

certificate, as prescribed by statute.’”   Princeton Office Park,

218 N.J. at 63 (quoting Simon, 
189 N.J. at 318).     “The purchaser

of a tax sale certificate thus acquires a lien formerly held by

                                14
the municipality’s taxing authority, derived from the property

owner’s obligation to pay real estate taxes.”     Id. at 67.   The

lien purchaser obtains an

         inchoate interest [that] consists of three
         rights: the right to receive the sum paid for
         the   certificate   with  interest   at   the
         redemption rate for which the property was
         sold; the right to redeem from the holder a
         subsequently issued tax sale certificate; and
         the right to acquire title by foreclosing the
         equity of redemption of all outstanding
         interests, including that of the property
         owner.

         [Id. at 63 (alteration in original) (emphasis
         added) (quoting Varsolona, 
180 N.J. at 618).]

    The tax sale certificate holder’s “right to acquire title

by foreclosure is asserted in the Superior Court, which may

enter [a] final judgment.”    Ibid.   “[B]y virtue of foreclosure,

the purchaser of the tax sale certificate may become 'the owner

of the property in fee simple.’”      Id. at 63-64 (quoting Simon,

189 N.J. at 318).    The “right to acquire title” is therefore

significant in resolving standing under the MLUL.

    Indeed, the MLUL explains standing as follows:      “[a]ny

interested party may appeal to the governing body any final

decision of a board of adjustment approving an application for

development.”   
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-17(a).     Under 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4,

an “[i]nterested party” includes anyone with a “right to use,

acquire, or enjoy property” “affected” by a land use

application.    In whole, an “interested party” is defined as:

                                 15
            any person, whether residing within or without
            the municipality, whose right to use, acquire,
            or enjoy property is or may be affected by any
            action taken under [this act], or whose rights
            to use, acquire, or enjoy property under [this
            act], or under any other law of this State or
            of the United States have been denied,
            violated or infringed by an action or a
            failure to act under [this act].

            [
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 (emphases added).]

    “New Jersey’s courts have long taken a liberal approach to

standing in zoning cases and . . . [thus] have broadly construed

the MLUL’s definition of 'interested party.’”    DePetro v. Twp.

of Wayne Planning Bd., 
367 N.J. Super. 161, 172 (App. Div.

2004).   Nevertheless, standing requires that, in addition to

establishing its “right to use, acquire, or enjoy property,” a

party must establish that that right “is or may be affected.”

N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4.

                                 B.

    In this appeal, the trial court found that only a party

with an “ownership or possessory interest” could have standing

to maintain an action challenging a municipal planning board’s

approval.    The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint,

finding that “the holder of a tax sale certificate cannot be

deemed an 'interested party’” without an “ownership or

possessory interest,” which did not exist here.     We disagree and

conclude that a tax lienholder may have standing to challenge a

planning board’s actions.

                                 16
     Although a tax lienholder does not have title to the

subject property, Township of Jefferson, 
228 N.J. Super. at 4,

and has, at best, a limited possessory interest in it pursuant

to 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-86 (c),9 the absence of title or possession is

not determinative of standing.    Indeed, the MLUL clearly and

unambiguously provides that standing may be afforded to those

with a “right to use, acquire, or enjoy property.”    
N.J.S.A.

40:55D-4.    The purchaser of the tax sale certificate has the

“right to acquire title” to the property, Princeton Office Park,

218 N.J. at 63, and “the right to use” the property in a limited

manner “in order to make repairs, or abate, remove or correct

9 N.J.S.A. 54:5-86 allows tax certificate holders to access an
“abandoned property.” Specifically, subsection (c) states:

            Any person holding a tax sale certificate on
            a property that meets the definition of
            abandoned property as set forth in L. 2003, c.
            210 ([
N.J.S.A.] 55:19-78 et al.), either at
            the time of the tax sale or thereafter, may
            enter upon that property at any time after
            written notice to the owner by certified mail
            return receipt requested in order to make
            repairs, or abate, remove or correct any
            condition harmful to the public health, safety
            and welfare, or any condition that is
            materially reducing the value of the property.

            [N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c).]

The record reveals that the Neighboring Property was previously
abandoned. However, the record does not reveal whether the
Neighboring Property satisfies the requirements for
“abandonment” under 
N.J.S.A. 55:19-81.

                                 17
any condition harmful to the public health, safety and welfare,

or any condition that is materially reducing the value of the

property,” 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c).    We therefore find that the

trial court erred in dismissing the complaint based on its legal

conclusion that holders of tax sale certificates who have not

foreclosed upon the subject property cannot have standing.

                                  C.

    That conclusion, however, is not in and of itself

determinative of standing:   to have standing pursuant to the

MLUL, a tax lienholder must show that its “right to use,

acquire, or enjoy property is or may be affected” by the action.

N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4.   Therefore, not every tax lienholder has

standing to challenge a land use application.    We thus agree

with defendants that standing must be considered on a case-by-

case basis.

    In this case, plaintiffs have alleged principally that the

proposed project would eliminate certain points of access to the

Neighboring Property, interfere with an existing easement on the

Property, and substantially modify storm water management on the

Property.   Those representations -- which defendants have not

contested -- suggest that plaintiffs’ limited present possessory

interest in the Neighboring Property pursuant to 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-

86(c) -- the right to enter onto the property to address certain

conditions -- may be affected by the elimination of certain

                                  18
points of access to the Neighboring Property, the interference

with an existing easement on the Property, and the modification

of storm water management on the Property.

    Linden 587 therefore may have standing as the holder of tax

sale certificates for the Neighboring Property whose “right to

use . . . [the] property . . . may be affected” if the

application is granted.     See Black’s Law Dictionary 1541 (6th

ed. 1990) (defining “use,” in pertinent part, as “[t]o make use

of; to convert one’s service; to employ; to avail oneself of”).

Consequently, we determine that the trial court erred in

dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing.

                                  D.

    We add the following guidance.     It is true that the MLUL

requires notice of a public hearing only to “the owners of all

real property as shown on the current tax duplicates, located in

the State and within 200 feet in all directions of the

property.”   
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12(b).    However, we reject

defendants’ assertion that the MLUL’s statutory notice

requirement bears upon who qualifies as an “interested party” to

challenge a planning board’s action.     If the Legislature had

intended for only parties required to be notified to have

standing, it would have said so and restricted the standing

requirements accordingly.    Instead, the Legislature allows any

“interested party” to appeal a board action, which is discrete

                                  19
from a noticed party under the MLUL.   Standing does not depend

upon ownership or proximity, but rather on meeting the

definition of an “interested party.”

     In addition, Linden 587’s motive in obtaining the tax sale

certificates and challenging the Board’s decision is not

pertinent to our determination here of standing under the MLUL.10

Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that their “right to use,

acquire, or enjoy [the neighboring] property . . . may be

affected” to establish standing.

     Nor is it conclusive that Linden 587 was assigned the tax

sale certificates after the Board hearing; the date of

acquisition is not determinative of a party’s standing.     See

Domanske v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 
330 N.J. Super. 241, 248 (App. Div.

2000) (observing that successor in interest “retains the same

rights as the original owner, with no change in substance”

(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1445 (7th ed. 1999)).

     Finally, we stress once more that we make no findings

regarding Linden 587’s acquisition of the tax sale certificates;

whether Cherokee did, in fact, hold title to the Neighboring

10 In their briefing, plaintiffs contend that in Bron v.
Weintraub, 
42 N.J. 87, 91 (1964), this Court issued a
“commandment . . . that courts not express hostility towards
certificate-holders.” However, Bron does not conclude that
motive is irrelevant. Because motive is not relevant under the
facts before us, we decline to determine whether and under what
circumstances it might be relevant.

                               20
Property; the relationship among Cherokee, Equities, and Linden

587; whether the Neighboring Property was “abandoned” under

N.J.S.A 55:19-81, thus providing plaintiffs with a limited

possessory interest under 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c); the extent to

which plaintiffs’ “right . . . to acquire” or limited possessory

interest in the Neighboring Property “may be affected”; or the

merits of plaintiffs’ objections in general.   The record is

lacking on these matters and, to the extent they are relevant,

they should be considered and a record developed on remand.

                               V.

    For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the Appellate

Division’s judgment and remand to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

     JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZ-VINA
join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE TIMPONE filed a
dissent, in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER joins.

                               21
                                        SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                          A-
82 September Term 2016
                                                   079146

CHEROKEE LCP LAND,    LLC   and
LINDEN 587, LLC,

     Plaintiffs-Appellants,

          v.

CITY OF LINDEN PLANNING BOARD,
GOODMAN     NORTH     AMERICAN
PARTNERSHIP HOLDINGS, LLC, and
LINDEN PROPERTY HOLDINGS, LLC,

     Defendants-Respondents.

     JUSTICE TIMPONE, dissenting.

     Liberality in standing should not be confused with

automatic standing.   In the context of land use disputes, the

standing requirement protects the ability to develop property in

accordance with the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), 
N.J.S.A.

40:55D-1 to -112, without interference by third parties who lack

any cognizable interest.    The majority’s decision -- that tax

lienholders who have not yet foreclosed on, and may never obtain

a possessory interest in, a property have standing to challenge

development on adjacent land -- crosses the generous line drawn

by the MLUL’s liberal standing requirement and opens the

courthouse door to claimants with other similarly attenuated

interests.   Mindful that the difference in standards commands a

difference in result in this matter, and of the profound impact

                                  1
today’s decision will have on future land use cases, I

respectfully dissent.

                                I.

    I adopt the majority’s statement of facts and highlight

pertinent portions from the record.   Plaintiffs Cherokee LPC

Land, LLC (Cherokee) and Linden 587, LLC (Linden 587)

(collectively, the LLCs) dispute and challenge the City of

Linden Planning Board’s (the Board) grant of approval to Goodman

North American Partnership Holdings, LLC, and Linden Property

Holdings, LLC (collectively, Goodman) to redevelop heavy-

industrial-zone property into an industrial campus with

warehouses, office space, and distribution facilities.    The LLCs

claim unique interests in a nearby property -- a long-

unremediated Superfund site (the Neighboring Property):

Cherokee, as a one-dollar quitclaim deed holder, and Linden 587,

as the assignee of tax sale certificates on the Neighboring

Property.

    Pursuant to the MLUL, the Board held a public hearing on

Goodman’s application.   Cherokee attended the hearing and

objected to Goodman’s proposed development project, asserting

ownership in the Neighboring Property.   Cherokee sought an

agreement from Goodman that its development would “provide

appropriate access to their property” by means of preserving an

existing easement.   Cherokee also raised concerns regarding the

                                 2
development’s impact on the Neighboring Property’s Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) remediation and susceptibility to

stormwater run-off.

    The Board permitted Cherokee to present witnesses and

considered Cherokee’s objections.     Ultimately, the Board

unanimously approved Goodman’s application, noting that Goodman

agreed to build a thirty-five-foot roadway that would protect

the Neighboring Property’s easement to a nearby road.     The Board

also conditioned Goodman’s application, in part, on receiving a

hardship waiver from the New Jersey Department of Environmental

Protection (DEP) for stormwater quality and other DEP and EPA

approvals.

    Neither Linden 587 nor the assignor of its tax sale

certificates, Cherokee Equities, LLC (Equities), attended the

hearing.    Instead, Linden 587 and Cherokee filed a complaint in

lieu of prerogative writs in the Chancery Division, challenging

the Board’s resolution.   Goodman filed a motion to dismiss the

LLCs’ complaint and, in the alternative, a motion for summary

judgment.    Highlighting the Neighboring Property’s tortuous

ownership history leading to Cherokee’s purported quitclaim deed

and Linden 587’s assignment of tax liens for nominal value,

Goodman argued that the LLCs lacked standing to file suit.

    The trial court agreed.     In its thorough and well-reasoned

Statement of Reasons, the court concluded that Cherokee did not

                                  3
have an ownership interest in the Neighboring Property because

the company that conveyed its quitclaim deed did not itself have

a valid ownership interest.   So, it dismissed Cherokee for lack

of standing.

    Linden 587 suffered a similar fate.    Its only connection to

the Neighboring Property is an inchoate ownership interest in

unredeemed tax sale certificates for which it paid ten dollars

and “other valuable consideration.”   Relying on this Court’s

precedent, the trial court carefully explained the rights of a

tax sale certificate owner, including “the right to acquire

title,” and stressed that those rights are “subordinate to the

property owner’s right of redemption.”    (quoting Simon v.

Cronecker, 
189 N.J. 304, 319-20 (2007)).    The court noted that

Linden 587 had no present possessory interest in the Neighboring

Property through which it could obtain “interested party” status

because it had not foreclosed on the property owner’s right to

redeem.   For those reasons, the court concluded that Linden 587

also lacked standing and dismissed the LLCs’ complaint with

prejudice.   For substantially the same reasons as the trial

court, the Appellate Division affirmed.

                                II.

    Standing is a “threshold issue” that “neither depends on

nor determines the merits of a plaintiff’s claim.”   Watkins v.

Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, 
124 N.J. 398, 417 (1991).       Our

                                 4
courts “will not render advisory opinions or function in the

abstract or entertain proceedings by plaintiffs who do not have

sufficient legal standing to maintain their actions.”    Al

Walker, Inc. v. Borough of Stanhope, 
23 N.J. 657, 660 (1957)

(citation omitted).    We also will not “entertain proceedings by

plaintiffs who are 'mere intermeddlers,’ or are merely

interlopers or strangers to the dispute.”   Crescent Park Tenants

Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., 
58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971)

(citations omitted).   A litigant has standing only if the

litigant demonstrates “a sufficient stake and real adverseness

with respect to the subject matter of the litigation [and a]

substantial likelihood of some harm . . . in the event of an

unfavorable decision.”   Jen Elec., Inc. v. County of Essex, 
197 N.J. 627, 645 (2009) (first alteration in original) (quoting In

re Adoption of Baby T., 
160 N.J. 332, 340 (1999)).

    The court must determine standing before resolving the

merits of a plaintiff’s claim.   Watkins, 
124 N.J. at 418.    See

also Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 
422 N.J. Super.
 214, 224-25 (App. Div. 2011) (finding that a plaintiff must have

standing at the time of filing a complaint); see also Davis v.

FEC, 
554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (“While the proof required to

establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, the standing

inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking

                                 5
jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the

suit was filed.”).

    For land use disputes, the MLUL permits “[a]ny interested

party [to] appeal to the governing body any final decision of a

board of adjustment approving an application for development.”

N.J.S.A. 40:55D-17(a).   The MLUL defines “interested party,” in

relevant part, as “any person . . . whose right to use, acquire,

or enjoy property is or may be affected by any action taken

under [the MLUL].”   
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4.

    I agree with the majority that the “right to acquire” is

significant in resolving standing under the MLUL.      But I depart

from my colleagues in their approach to that significant issue

in two critical respects.   First, I disagree that the holder of

a tax sale certificate has the “right to acquire” property

within the meaning of the MLUL.       Second, even if a speculative,

contingent interest like a tax lien could be deemed a “right to

acquire” property, that right is not affected unless the

acquisition itself -- not the post-acquisition use or enjoyment

of the property -- is or may be affected by the Board’s action.

                                  A.

    The purpose behind the municipal sale of tax certificates

is twofold.   First, the sale of outstanding tax debt generates

revenue for a municipality by providing “a mechanism to

transform a non-performing asset into cash without raising

                                  6
taxes.”   In re Princeton Office Park, L.P. v. Plymouth Park Tax

Servs., LLC, 
218 N.J. 52, 62 (2014) (quoting Varsolona v. Breen

Capital Servs. Corp., 
180 N.J. 605, 610 (2004)).      Second, it

gives “the property owner the opportunity to redeem the

certificate and reclaim his land.”      Simon, 
189 N.J. at 319.

    The New Jersey Tax Sale Law, 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-1 to -137, “sets

forth the procedure by which tax sale certificates are

generated, purchased, and sold.”       Princeton Office Park, 
218 N.J. at 62.   For purchasers, tax sale certificates constitute an

investment -- an “inchoate interest” -- in the burdened property

comprised of three rights:

          [1] the right to receive the sum paid for the
          certificate with interest at the redemption
          rate for which the property was sold; [2] the
          right to redeem from the holder a subsequently
          issued tax sale certificate; and [3] the right
          to acquire title by foreclosing the equity of
          redemption of all outstanding interests,
          including that of the property owner.

          [Id. at 63 (quoting Varsolona, 
180 N.J. at
          618).]

Significantly, “[a]lthough the property is 'sold’ as evidenced

by a tax sale certificate, 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-46, a tax sale

certificate is not an outright conveyance, and the certificate

holder does not have title to the land.”       Caput Mortuum, L.L.C.

v. S & S Crown Servs., Ltd., 
366 N.J. Super. 323, 336 (App. Div.

2004) (emphasis added).   Rather, a tax sale certificate holder

                                   7
has a conditional right to acquire title.    Princeton Office

Park, 
218 N.J. at 63.

    Forces beyond the control of the lienholder determine

whether a tax lienholder can eventually acquire title.    First

and foremost, the conditional right to acquire is subject to the

property owner’s failure to redeem the certificate, ibid., and

the entry of final judgment of the Superior Court foreclosing

redemption, 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a), -87.    Property owners may

exercise their right of redemption at any time until entry of

that final judgment.    R. 4:64-6(b); Simon, 
189 N.J. at 319.

And, during the court-determined redemption period, “others with

an interest in the land (an heir, a prior tax certificate

holder, a mortgagee, or an occupant)” may also redeem.     Simon,

189 N.J. at 319; accord 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-54.    Until the tax sale

certificate holder receives and records a final judgment, the

holder’s right to acquire title remains subordinated to any

interested party’s right to redeem.     See 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a),

-104.65; Simon, 
189 N.J. at 318.

    A tax sale certificate holder’s right to acquire title is

also subject to the priority of liens.    Municipal liens are

“paramount” to all other liens on encumbered land except

subsequent municipal liens.   
N.J.S.A. 54:5-9.   For tax liens,

“[a] subsequent tax sale certificate . . . has priority over an

earlier certificate, and the foreclosure of the later

                                 8
certificate can extinguish the earlier certificate.”    Lato v.

Rockaway Township, 
16 N.J. Tax 355, 363 (Tax 1997) (citation

omitted); see also Town of Phillipsburg v. Block 1508, Lot 12,

380 N.J. Super. 159, 165-66 (App. Div. 2005) (suggesting that to

protect its inchoate interest in property, a prior tax

lienholder must redeem a later tax sale certificate before the

subsequent holder obtains a judgment in foreclosure).     So, even

the earliest tax lienholder must remain vigilant and perhaps

purchase later tax certificates and any other municipal liens to

retain its potential to acquire title.

    Like any other investment, the purchase of a tax sale

certificate carries risks.   The Tax Sale Law, while affording

the tax lienholder certain rights, does not protect the holder

from those risks.   The Tax Sale Law neither promises the holder

that she will acquire title to the subject property nor assures

the holder that, after receiving authorization to exercise her

right to foreclose, she will receive a favorable return on her

investment.   The statute is intended “to promote the sale of tax

sale certificates as a source of municipal revenue,” Princeton

Office Park, 
218 N.J. at 56 (emphasis added), not to shield

lienholders from uncertainties natural to a tax sale certificate

investment.   Risks like the need to purchase subsequent liens to

preserve a priority interest, a decline in property value or

worthless property, repair costs after foreclosure, and

                                 9
municipal fines and condemnation are inherent in a tax sale

certificate investment.   Development on adjacent property is no

different.   A tax sale certificate confers a right to acquire

title that is packaged with -- not separate from -- those risks.

    I am not persuaded, based on the foregoing, that Linden 587

has the right to acquire title to the Neighboring Property.     The

MLUL speaks only to the right to acquire and not a contingent

right to acquire title to property.     Here, the record reflects

that Linden 587 had not obtained and recorded a final judgment

foreclosing the title holder’s right to redeem the Neighboring

Property before filing suit.   Cf. 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a), -87.

Counsel’s representation at oral argument that Linden 587 has

foreclosed on one of its three tax sale certificates is

inconsequential.   Standing is an issue that “must be resolved

before a court proceeds to determine the merits of a suit.”

Watkins, 
124 N.J. at 418; see also Mitchell, 
422 N.J. Super. at
 224-25 (suggesting that any post-complaint foreclosure cannot

retroactively confer standing).

       Obtaining a final judgment before filing a complaint is

imperative because it cuts off the title holder’s right to

redeem, 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a), and it prevents subsequent

lienholders from acquiring a priority interest, which would

complicate Linden 587’s future right to foreclose, Town of

Phillipsburg, 
380 N.J. Super. at 165.     Without that final order,

                                  
10 Linden 587’s ability to acquire is entirely dependent on the

absence of intervening forces that may compromise its interest

in the Neighboring Property.    When it filed its complaint,

Linden 587 had no right to acquire title to the Neighboring

Property, or even to exercise its right to acquire the

Neighboring Property.    Whether that right will be realized

remains speculative.    And it is certainly apparent that it has

no present rights to use and enjoy that property.

                                  B.

       Even if I agreed with the majority that the MLUL could be

read to confer interested-party status on persons with a

contingent right to acquire title, I would not agree with its

determination that Linden 587 has standing.     Linden 587’s right

to acquire the Neighboring Property has not been -- nor could it

be -- affected by the challenged Board action.

       An interested party is one whose right to acquire property

“is or may be affected by any action taken under [the MLUL].”

N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4.     Here, Linden 587 challenges the Board’s

decision to grant Goodman’s application for development.     It

logically flows that Goodman’s development project on the

Property must, at the very least, have the potential to affect

Linden 587’s right to acquire the Neighboring Property.      It does

not.    Linden 587’s right to foreclose on the Neighboring

Property owner’s right to redeem and later acquire title through

                                  11
that foreclosure is in no way affected by development projects

on adjacent land.

    To be sure, Linden 587 may decide not to exercise its right

to acquire the Neighboring Property as a result of the Goodman

project, but it still has the ability to assert that right.

Simply put, Linden 587 can exercise its right to acquire the

Neighboring Property whether or not the Board approves the

Goodman project.     Whether the Neighboring Property is affected

by Goodman’s development is a risk Linden 587, as an investor

without present title to the property, assumed.     Because Linden

587’s conditional right to acquire is not and could not be

affected by the Board’s approval, Linden 587 cannot be an

interested party under the MLUL.

    The essence of the LLCs’ complaint is not that the Goodman

project will compromise their putative right to acquire, but

rather that -- assuming they can exercise that right –- the

project will infringe on their ability to use and enjoy the

Neighboring Property.    In accepting that argument, the majority

applies a two-level analysis to the MLUL’s one-level definition

of “interested party” as a person “whose right to use, acquire,

or enjoy property is or may be affected by any action taken

under [the MLUL].”    Ibid.   In other words, the majority’s

decision requires the following analysis: (1) Is there a right

to acquire property?; and (2) If so and if that right is

                                  12
exercised, will development on adjacent land affect the future

rights to use and enjoy the property?

    I reject the majority’s two-step analysis.         A plain reading

of 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 suggests that future or speculative rights

do not satisfy the interested-party requirement.        The statute

requires that a person’s “right to use, acquire, or enjoy

property” “is or may be affected by any action taken” under the

MLUL.   A person need not have a present injury; it suffices that

the asserted right “may be affected.”       But that contingency

arises only if the person has a present property right to assert

at the outset.      To interpret the statute to include speculative

or future rights renders the statute superfluous, conferring

interested-party status and standing to anyone that might have a

protected property right that might be affected sometime in the

future.     But, the statute plainly requires a party to have a

present -- not future -- right to use, acquire, or enjoy

property, and without it, the party does not have standing.

    The three protectable property interests set forth in

N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4 are distinct, as evidenced by the statute’s

use of the word “or.”        The two other bases for standing listed

in the statute are the right to use and the right to enjoy.         Did

the plaintiffs’ tax sale certificate give them the right to use

the property?       No.   Did it give them the right to enjoy the

property?     No.   It is the claimant’s present rights -- not

                                     13
speculative future rights -- that are necessary to satisfy the

interested-party requirement.

    The majority’s theory of standing appears to rest on Linden

587’s right to use the Neighboring Property -- its “limited”

“right to enter onto the property to address certain

conditions.”    That theory, in turn, rests on a slender reed:

N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c).     
N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c) permits a tax sale

certificate holder of abandoned property to enter that property

“to make repairs, or abate, remove or correct any condition

harmful to the public health, safety and welfare, or any

condition that is materially reducing the value of the

property.”     Put otherwise, tax sale certificate holders do not

have a right to enter property that is not abandoned.     And, even

if the property “meets the definition of abandoned,” the holder

may not enter until it provides “written notice to the owner by

certified mail return receipt requested.”    
N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c).

    Here, the record is devoid of any evidence that the

Neighboring Property was abandoned, as the majority concedes.

Nothing in the record shows that the Neighboring Property meets

the definition of abandoned under 
N.J.S.A. 55:19-81.     Section 86

therefore does not provide a basis for standing in this case.

And, even if the Neighboring Property were statutorily

abandoned, I question whether a limited right to abate a public

safety concern or material reduction in property value can be

                                  14
equated with the “right to use” property under 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-

4.   Regardless, we need not determine whether the neighboring

property is abandoned under the statutory definition.     The

parties did not raise abandonment under 
N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(c) to

our Court or the courts below in their briefs or during oral

arguments.

     Linden 587 had neither the right to use nor the right to

enjoy the Neighboring Property when it filed suit.    See Michael

G. Pellegrino & Ralph P. Allocca, Tax Certificates:     A Review of

the Tax Sale Law, 
26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1607, 1620 (1996) (“A

tax certificate represents only a lien; no immediate possessory

rights are transferred until foreclosure is completed.     Thus, a

private certificate holder is not entitled to enter upon the

underlying property to analyze, manage or protect it.”

(footnotes omitted)).   So, whether Linden 587 has standing

hinges on whether its claimed right to acquire is or may be

affected by the Board’s action.    It follows that, because Linden

587’s inchoate, contingent right to acquire the Neighboring

Property was not and could not be affected by the Board’s

action, Linden 587 did not have standing.

      New Jersey courts often liberally construe the standing

requirements to grant standing.    Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n, 
58 N.J. at 107-12; Spinnaker Condo. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Sea Isle

City, 
357 N.J. Super. 105, 110-11 (App. Div. 2003).     But the

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majority’s decision takes liberality a step too far.     Instead of

relying on the MLUL’s plain language to arrive at the most

logical conclusion, the majority has transformed a list of

present rights into a fusion of present and future rights to

confer standing on a class of third parties never envisioned by

the Legislature.    Standing should only be accorded to true

stakeholders and, in my mind, according to the facts of this

case, Linden 587 is not one of them.

       We should not graft upon the statute additional rights not

intended by the Legislature or met by Linden 587.     Nor should we

afford plaintiff a fresh opportunity to establish standing by

remanding to the trial court for further proceedings.     The

nature of the hearing on remand will be novel in light of our

traditional recognition of standing as a “threshold” issue that

a court must determine at the outset of a lawsuit.     Watkins, 
124 N.J. at 417-18.    Addressing the standing inquiry at the first

stage of a plaintiff’s claim is crucial because the answer

determines whether the court has “power to hear the case.”      Id.

418.   Linden 587 had the opportunity to demonstrate its standing

in its bare-bones, four-page complaint, its brief in response to

the motion to dismiss its complaint, and during oral argument at

the motion hearing.    It failed to do so.   Failure of Linden 587

to properly plead under the requisite statutes or properly

defend in motion practice or in oral argument are not a cause

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for remand.   Linden 587’s failures are of its own design and may

be causes for its lack of standing.    For those reasons, I depart

from my colleagues in the majority that a remand is warranted

here.

                               III.

    To me, the fact that this land use standing issue -- in

2018 -- is an issue of first impression suggests tax sale

certificate holders have not previously sought to use our courts

to thwart development projects related to neighboring properties

of land they may or may not acquire.   No longer.   Going forward,

I predict an onslaught of new land use disputes in our Superior

Court that will stall development projects and encourage other

attenuated interested parties to follow suit.   For all of those

reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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