Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT RILEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 117837

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED DECEMBER 7, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 117837  
ROBERT RILEY,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PER CURIAM  
On the ground that the defendant’s conviction for first­
degree murder was based on inadmissible testimony, the Court  
of Appeals reversed the conviction, and remanded for entry of  
a judgment of conviction for a lesser offense.  We reverse the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that  
Court for consideration of the defendant’s other appellate  
issues. The defendant waived any issue relating to the now­
disputed testimony.  
I  
A man named Mark Seaton was murdered in June 1997.  
Defendant 
Robert 
Riley acknowledged being present at the scene  
near the time of the death, and he later was observed in the  
act of stealing property from the victim’s apartment.  Also  
involved in these events was a David Ware, whose whereabouts  
are unknown.  
The defendant was charged with first-degree felony  
murder.
 MCL 750.316. 
The underlying felony was “the  
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a larceny.”  
After the prosecution rested, the defense called Mary  
McKinney as its only witness. Ms. McKinney is the mother of  
Mr. Ware.  She had no personal knowledge concerning the death  
of Mr. Seaton, but she had told the police of incriminating  
statements made to her by her son.  Her second-hand account to  
the police apparently included nothing concerning the  
defendant’s involvement in the killing. The evident purpose  
of calling Ms. McKinney as a defense witness was to bolster  
the defense position that Mr. Ware alone was guilty of the  
murder.  
Unfortunately 
for 
the 
defendant, 
Ms. 
McKinney’s 
testimony  
at trial was more detailed than her rendition to the police  
had been.  In telling the jury about her son’s statements, she  
included 
details 
concerning 
the 
defendant’s 
active  
participation in the binding and subduing of the decedent.  
Obviously, this was incriminating evidence against the  
defendant.  
2  
After Ms. McKinney completed her testimony and the jury  
was excused, defense counsel stated:  
Some information from-
--in regards to my 
conversation with Mr. Riley in reference to the 
witness that just testified, Ms. McKinney. 
I  
informed Mr. Riley this morning that Ms. McKinney 
was here, present, ready and willing to testify. I  
also advised him that there was a down side of  
calling her to the witness stand to testify, 
because this was eight months after the incident. 
That even though she gave information to the police 
back in July that incriminated her son, she could 
conceivably incriminate Mr. Riley if he test-
--if  
she testified today. 
He said that he understood  
that possibility. Was willing to take that risk, 
and advised me that he wanted her to testify.  
The jury convicted the defendant as charged, and the  
circuit court imposed the mandatory sentence of life  
imprisonment.  
The 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
reversed 
the 
defendant’s 
conviction,  
and “remanded for entry of judgment of conviction of larceny  
in a building and for resentencing thereon.”1  
The prosecuting attorney has applied to this Court for  
leave to appeal.  
II  
The Court of Appeals found Ms. McKinney’s testimony to  
have been inadmissible. It then reversed on the ground that,  
without her testimony, there was insufficient evidence to  
convict the defendant of first-degree murder.  
The Court of Appeals approached this as a Confrontation  
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 21, 2000, 
reh den September 20, 2000 (Docket No. 211368).  
3  
 
Clause2 case because the defendant was convicted on the basis  
of hearsay statements originally made by the nontestifying  
Mr. Ware.  There having been no objection to the testimony,  
the Court of Appeals treated this as a case of unpreserved  
constitutional error, which is reviewed to determine whether  
“plain error affected substantial rights.” People v Carines,  
460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 
Applying the  
standards set forth in People v Poole, 444 Mich 151, 165; 506  
NW2d 505 (1993), the Court concluded:  
After reviewing all of the circumstances  
surrounding 
the 
portion 
of 
the 
statement  
inculpating defendant, we are convinced that it 
lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to provide 
the jury with a satisfactory basis for evaluating 
the truth of the statement.  The admission of the  
statement 
violated defendant’s Confrontation Clause  
rights.  There was no other evidence to corroborate  
that portion of McKinney’s testimony.  McKinney’s 
own corrected written statement did not include the  
inculpatory hearsay. Absent McKinney’s testimony, 
there 
was 
insufficient 
evidence 
to 
convict  
defendant 
of 
first-degree 
felony 
murder.  
Defendant’s conviction on that charge is therefore 
reversed.
 However, since there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of guilty on the 
underlying felony, we remand for entry of judgment 
of a conviction for larceny from a building.  
The Court added, “In light of our ruling, we decline to  
address defendant’s other issues raised on appeal.”3  
2 US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art I, § 20.  
3 In a concurring opinion, Judge HOLBROOK agreed with the 
plurality of justices who said in Lilly v Virginia, 527 US 
116, 134; 119 S Ct 1887; 144 L Ed 2d 117 (1999) (opinion of 
Stevens, J.), that “accomplices’ confessions that inculpate a 
criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to 
the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.”  
4  
 
 
III  
The Court of Appeals focus on the Confrontation Clause  
issue 
fails 
to 
heed 
this 
Court’s 
admonition 
that  
constitutional issues should not be addressed where the case  
may be decided on nonconstitutional grounds. Or, as we said  
in Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444  
Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 422 (1993), “there exists a general  
presumption 
by 
this 
Court 
that 
we 
will 
not 
reach  
constitutional issues that are not necessary to resolve a  
case.”  Even if we assume that a constitutional Confrontation  
Clause issue is presented, it is not necessary to address that  
issue in order to resolve this case.  
IV  
As indicated, the Court of Appeals treated this as a case  
involving “unpreserved” error, since the defendant “did not  
object to the testimony at trial.”  However, the statement  
that the defendant “did not object” falls short of capturing  
the true state of affairs-
-
-
-Ms. McKinney was called by the  
defense for the specific purpose of giving hearsay testimony  
about what she had been told by an accomplice to the crime.  
In this instance, therefore, the defendant’s right to a  
trial free of such hearsay testimony was not merely  
unasserted.  
It 
was, 
for all practical purposes, affirmatively  
waived.  The defendant himself brought Ms. McKinney to the  
witness stand, though the record is barren of any suggestion  
that she would be able to provide first-hand information.  
The potential that her testimony would harm the  
5  
   
   
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
defendant’s case also was knowingly waived.  As indicated  
above, defense counsel says she warned the defendant that  
Ms. McKinney might incriminate him, but the defendant said  
that he understood, and was willing to take that risk.  He  
asked that Ms. McKinney testify, nonetheless.  
In 
evaluating 
this 
matter, 
we 
examine 
principles 
outlined  
in People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214, 215; 612 NW2d 144  
(2000):  
The rule that issues for appeal must be 
preserved in the record by notation of objection is 
a sound one. 
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 
762-765; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).  Counsel may not 
harbor error as an appellate parachute.  People v  
Pollick, 448 Mich 376, 387; 531 NW2d 159 (1995), 
quoting People v Hardin, 421 Mich 296, 322-323; 365  
NW2d 101 (1984).  "Deviation from a legal rule is 
'error' unless the rule has been waived." United  
States v Olano, 507 US 725, 732-733; 113 S Ct 1770; 
123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993).  
* 
* 
*  
Waiver has been defined as "the 'intentional  
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.' " 
Carines, supra at 762[-763], n 7, quoting Olano,  
supra at 733. 
It differs from forfeiture, which 
has been explained as "the failure to make the 
timely assertion of a right."  Id. "One who waives  
his rights under a rule may not then seek appellate 
review of a claimed deprivation of those rights, 
for his waiver has extinguished any error." United  
States v Griffin, 84 F3d 912, 924 (CA 7, 1996), 
citing Olano, supra at 733-734. Mere forfeiture, 
on the other hand, does not extinguish an "error." 
Olano, supra at 733; Griffin, supra at 924-926.  
The distinction between forfeiture and waiver is  
essential to a sound resolution of the present case.  
Forfeited 
error 
remains subject to appellate review in limited  
circumstances. 
Carines, 460 Mich 774. 
However, apparent  
error that has been waived is “extinguished.”  Carter, 462  
6  
 
 
 
 
 
Mich 215-216.  When a court proceeds in a manner acceptable to  
all parties, it is not resolving a disputed point and thus  
does not ordinarily render a ruling susceptible to reversal.  
As we said more succinctly in Carter:  
Because defendant waived, as opposed to  
forfeited, his rights under the rule, there is no 
“error” to review. [462 Mich 219.]  
For these reasons, the circuit court did not err in  
admitting the testimony of Ms. McKinney.4  Accordingly, we  
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand this  
case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the other  
issues raised by the defendant in that court. 
MCR  
7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
4 On this record, we thus have no occasion to determine 
whether a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause 
can be violated by the admission of testimony from a witness 
called by the defense for the purpose of giving hearsay 
testimony.  
7  
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 117837  
ROBERT RILEY,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I would grant leave to appeal rather than decide this  
case summarily.  The per curiam opinion makes a superficial  
analysis, glossing over the difficult and complex issue  
underlying the prosecutor's appeal.  
The prosecution raises the issue of waiver.  It does not  
challenge the Court of Appeals conclusion that McKinney's  
changed account of Ware's statement was inadmissible hearsay  
and that, without it, there was insufficient evidence of  
first-degree murder.1  
Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder 
(continued...)  
1 
Waiver 
requires 
some 
affirmative 
act 
of 
approval, 
whereas  
forfeiture is the failure to object.  People v Carter, 462  
Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000), quoting People v Carines,  
460 Mich 750, 762-763, n 7; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), quoting  
United States v Olano, 507 US 725, 733; 113 S Ct 1770; 123 L  
Ed 2d 508 (1993).  The majority characterizes the fact that  
defendant called McKinney to the stand as an affirmative act  
that effectively waived appellate review of any of her hearsay  
testimony. In so doing, it denies defendant the right to be  
heard on her allegation of a Confrontation Clause violation.  
I cannot agree with the majority's analysis.  I question  
whether one can waive review of a witness' testimony that had,  
when the witness was called, no more than a potential for  
harming one's case.  
It should be noted that the majority does not advance the  
position that a party waives objection to any inadmissible  
evidence arising from the party's own witness.  The holding is  
narrower than that. It states that a party waives the right  
to object to hearsay when it calls a witness for the purpose  
of eliciting hearsay testimony.  In making that rule, it  
oversimplifies the testimony at issue and ignores the  
1 (...continued) 
as an aider and abettor. It was and is without dispute that 
Ware killed the victim while Ware and defendant were stealing 
the victim's property.  The only question was whether 
defendant assisted him in the murder in some manner.  
2  
following questions:  Can a defendant's own witness ever utter  
hearsay 
testimony 
subject 
to 
a 
Confrontation 
Clause 
challenge?  
Does the fact that it was the defendant who called the witness  
become irrelevant when the witness makes hearsay statements  
prejudicial to the defense that were not part of the witness'  
earlier testimony?  
The concept of waiver is based on the premise that a  
defendant should not be permitted to harbor error as an  
appellate parachute.  See Carter, supra, 462 Mich 214. 
I  
agree that this defendant would be harboring error if he had  
elicited inadmissible hearsay testimony from his own witness  
only to challenge it on hearsay grounds.  But that is not what  
occurred in this case.  
Defendant called McKinney to testify, knowing that she  
had told the police that Ware admitted to her that it was he  
who had murdered the victim.  McKinney had reviewed her own  
written statement to that effect and made corrections to it.  
The statement contained no indication that defendant had  
participated in the killing at all.  
A review of the trial transcript shows that McKinney's  
testimony was admitted at trial over the prosecutor's  
objection.  The trial court admitted it under the statement  
against interest exception to the general rule that hearsay is  
inadmissible. MRE 804(b)(3).  
3  
 
 
McKinney's testimony at trial was not altogether clear,  
particularly when she used pronouns in place of proper names.  
She initially stated that Ware had said that, while he was  
struggling with the victim, he told defendant to retrieve some  
tape from a nearby table. Defendant admitted as much in his  
own statement to the police, but denied giving the tape to  
Ware or using it to subdue the victim.  It was only on cross­
examination that McKinney stated that Ware told her that  
defendant "helped subdue" the victim using the tape.  When  
defense 
counsel 
challenged 
McKinney 
with 
her 
written 
statement  
to the police, she testified that some details were not  
included there. 
She eventually stated, on re-cross­
examination, "he did say that he bound his hands."  
The fact that it was defendant who called McKinney to  
testify does not render the part of her testimony that is at  
issue more reliable.2  A statement against a declarant's penal  
interest must be evaluated case by case to determine whether  
2  The majority puts much emphasis on the fact that 
defendant was aware of the risk that McKinney would say 
something to incriminate him. To the extent that it is true  
in this case, it is true whenever a witness is called to 
testify.  One can never be certain what a witness will say on 
the stand.  The best one can hope for is that it will be 
consistent with the witness' past statements on the same 
matter.
 In this case, defendant had read McKinney's past 
statement to the police.  A defendant should not be deemed to  
have waived objection to otherwise inadmissible testimony 
merely because he knew the witness might testify in a manner 
inconsistent with an earlier statement.  
4  
 
it evidences adequate indicia of reliability to satisfy  
Confrontation Clause concerns.  People v Poole, 444 Mich 151,  
163-164; 506 NW2d 505 (1993); People v Schutte, 240 Mich App  
713, 718; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).  Defendant argued, and the  
Court of Appeals agreed, that the portion of Ware's statement  
that McKinney had given the police was significantly more  
reliable than his statement as recounted by McKinney at trial.  
This Court has outlined a nonexclusive list of factors  
that favor and disfavor the admission of a statement against  
interest.
 
"[C]ourts 
must 
evaluate 
the 
circumstances  
surrounding the making of the statement as well as its  
content." Poole, supra, 444 Mich 165.  
The presence of the following factors would 
favor admission of such a statement: whether the  
statement was (1) voluntarily given, (2) made 
contemporaneously with the events referenced, (3) 
made 
to 
family, 
friends, 
colleagues, 
or  
confederates-
-
-that is, to someone to whom the 
declarant would likely speak the truth, and (4) 
uttered spontaneously at the initiation of the 
declarant and without prompting or inquiry by the 
listener.  
On the other hand, the presence of the  
following 
factors 
would 
favor 
a 
finding 
of  
inadmissibility: whether the statement (1) was made 
to law enforcement officers or at the prompting or 
inquiry of the listener, (2) minimizes the role or 
responsibility of the declarant or shifts blame to 
the accomplice, (3) was made to avenge the  
declarant or to curry favor, and (4) whether the 
declarant had a motive to lie or distort the truth.  
Courts 
should 
also 
consider 
any 
other  
circumstance bearing on the reliability of the  
5  
 
  
 
 
statement at issue. [Id.]  
In light of those factors and after reviewing "all the  
circumstances surrounding the portion of the statement  
inculpating defendant," the Court of Appeals was "convinced  
that [the statement] lacked sufficient indicia of reliability  
to provide the jury with a satisfactory basis for evaluating  
the truth of the statement."  However, the Court failed to set  
forth a detailed analysis.  It is unclear what made the Court  
of Appeals distinguish one part of the statement from the  
other. Moreover, we do not know whether the Court evaluated  
the 
reliability 
of 
Ware's out-of-court statement or whether it  
focused on McKinney's testimony, itself.  
The noninculpatory portion of a declarant's statement is  
admissible when given as part of a generally inculpatory  
narrative. Poole, supra, 444 Mich 161. However, that rule  
must succumb to a finding that one portion of the statement is  
significantly less reliable than another. 
See id. at  
163-164; Schutte, supra, 240 Mich App 718. 
I believe that  
such a reliability distinction is sufficient to withstand the  
prosecution's waiver argument.  By calling McKinney and  
eliciting reliable testimony admissible under the hearsay  
exception, defendant did not waive the right to challenge the  
unreliable portion of her testimony.  
It is difficult to draw a distinction between the  
6  
 
reliability of the parts of the statement that were  
exculpatory and the reliability of those inculpatory to  
defendant.  If the distinction can be made, I would agree with  
the Court of Appeals that the hearsay issue should be reviewed  
as an unpreserved, constitutional error.  However, I am  
troubled by the possibility that the Court of Appeals applied  
the Poole reliability factors to McKinney, rather than to  
Ware's out-of-court statement.  
Defendant argued before the Court of Appeals that it was  
appropriate 
to 
consider 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding  
McKinney's statement. The Court apparently considered those  
circumstances as an indication that Ware's statement was not  
reliable.  
The hearsay rule is grounded on a defendant's right to  
confront witnesses against him.  See People v Meredith, 459  
Mich 62, 71; 586 NW2d 538 (1998); Poole, supra, 444 Mich 162­
163; see also Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56, 65; 100 S Ct 2531; 65  
L Ed 2d 597 (1980).  Whether the Court of Appeals acted  
properly 
in 
finding 
this hearsay challenge an unpreserved, not  
waived, Confrontation Clause issue depends on the validity of  
its 
distinction 
between the two parts of McKinney's testimony.  
We review the Court of Appeals decision in this case for  
clear error.  MCR 7.302 (B)(5); see also People v Stafford,  
434 Mich 125, 134; 450 NW2d 559 (1990).  Without full briefing  
7  
 
and oral argument on leave granted, we cannot adequately  
analyze this complex issue and determine whether the Court of  
Appeals decision was clearly erroneous. Therefore, the case  
is inappropriate for per curiam resolution.  I would grant  
leave to appeal.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
8