Case Title: Altersberger v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC15-628, SC15-1612

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-628 
____________ 
 
JOSHUA LEE ALTERSBERGER,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-1612 
____________ 
 
JOSHUA LEE ALTERSBERGER,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 27, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Joshua Lee Altersberger appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ 
 
 
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of habeas corpus.  For the reasons that follow, we vacate the death sentence and 
remand for a new penalty phase.1   
I.  BACKGROUND 
On direct appeal, this Court described the facts as follows:  
Late in the morning of January 12, 2007, the [d]efendant drove 
to a friend’s home in Highlands County.  Also at the home was 
Quentin Kinder, who was in Florida to avoid arrest for violating his 
Georgia probation.  After drinking and playing videogames, 
Altersberger left the home with Kinder.  Kinder testified that, at this 
point, Altersberger was not so affected by the alcohol that his speech 
was impaired but was “buzzing a little bit.” 
Later that afternoon, around 3:00 p.m., Altersberger drove with 
Kinder to a restaurant in Lake Placid in an effort to meet a girl whom 
he believed to be working there.  Upon learning that the girl was not 
at work, Altersberger drove with Kinder to a nearby convenience store 
so that he could buy a cigar.  As Altersberger and Kinder were 
walking out of the store, the two noticed a deputy sheriff in a marked 
patrol car stopped at a red light.  Kinder then heard Altersberger state, 
as though he was speaking to the deputy, “You better not stop me or 
I’m going to shoot you.” 
Altersberger left the store with Kinder and drove north on 
Highway 27 out of Lake Placid.  Altersberger’s driving was 
aggressively erratic, and he swerved several times in and out of heavy 
afternoon traffic.  At one point, Altersberger had to swerve in the 
midst of a lane change in order to avoid striking another car.  This 
attracted the attention of Florida Highway Patrol Sergeant Nick Sottile 
who had been travelling in the opposite direction and who turned to 
pursue. 
Kinder saw Sergeant Sottile turn around and notified 
Altersberger.  Altersberger responded by saying that he was going “to 
push it,” or speed up to flee.  Kinder told Altersberger not to try to 
flee and also said that, because of his Georgia probation violation, he 
was going to run from the car once Altersberger pulled over.  As he 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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was pulling over, Altersberger cut sharply from the left lane across the 
right lane, cutting off and nearly striking a semi truck.  And, as 
Altersberger pulled off the roadway, he stated to Kinder that he was 
going to shoot Sergeant Sottile.  Kinder told Altersberger not to shoot 
the officer, and then got out of the car and ran into a nearby orange 
grove. 
Intending to complain to Sergeant Sottile about Altersberger’s 
driving, the semi truck driver pulled over behind the trooper’s patrol 
car.  The truck driver then got out of his truck and walked toward 
Sergeant Sottile, who ordered him back to his truck.  From the 
elevated cab of his semi truck, the driver was able to observe the 
events that followed. 
Sergeant Sottile approached Altersberger’s driver’s side 
window with his hand resting on his gun.  Altersberger raised his 
hands as Sottile approached and kept them raised while he spoke with 
Sottile for a short time.  Sottile, appearing to be more comfortable 
with the situation, took his hand from his gun.  After Sottile took his 
hand off his gun, Altersberger lowered his hands and pulled a gun.  
Sergeant Sottile raised his hands and started to back away from 
Altersberger’s window when Altersberger shot him.  Sergeant Sottile 
was hit near his left collar bone and fell backward to the ground.  
Altersberger then reached out the window of his car to aim his gun at 
Sergeant Sottile and tried several times to shoot him in the head, but 
his gun would not fire.  Altersberger then rapidly drove away.  
Sergeant Sottile died shortly thereafter as a result of internal bleeding 
from the gunshot wound. 
Altersberger pled guilty to first-degree murder on March 13, 
2009.  At the penalty phase, the State presented testimony regarding 
the murder of Sottile.  The defense presented laywitness testimony of 
Altersberger’s mother and aunt, one of his mother’s friends, and the 
testimony of former teachers and health department employees who 
remembered Altersberger as a child.  These witnesses testified that 
Altersberger had an impoverished and unstable upbringing and a 
history of anger problems.  They also testified that his mother had 
very poor parenting skills, did not make good decisions regarding the 
men that she brought around her children, did not treat or discipline 
Altersberger appropriately, and did not display affection toward him.  
Altersberger also presented the testimony of two mental health 
experts.  The first, Dr. Krop, a forensic psychologist, testified that 
Altersberger has anger issues that stem from his dysfunctional 
 
 
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relationship with his mother and the insecurity caused by her poor 
parenting and decision-making throughout his childhood.  Dr. Krop 
also explained that, despite his 103 IQ, Altersberger has problems 
with planning and impulse control and was extremely immature for 
his age, both socially and developmentally.  Dr. Gur, a 
neuropsychologist who specializes in neuroimaging, testified that the 
orbital frontal and amygdala regions of Altersberger’s brain are 
significantly undersized and that such a condition would result in 
impaired ability to control and regulate emotions and impulses, an 
impairment that would be exacerbated by drug and alcohol use or 
abuse.  However, Dr. Gur stated that, because he had never met 
Altersberger and was not familiar with the facts of the case, he could 
not connect his findings to the crime itself. 
The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of nine to 
three.  After a Spencer[N.1] hearing, the trial court followed the jury’s 
recommendation and sentenced Altersberger to death.  In so doing, the 
trial court found the following aggravators:  (1) the victim was a law 
enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his official 
duties (great weight); and (2) the murder was committed in a cold, 
calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP) without any pretense of 
moral or legal justification (great weight).  The trial court also found 
the following mitigators:  (1) Altersberger was 19 years old at the time 
of the murder (slight weight); (2) Altersberger’s capacity to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was substantially impaired (moderate weight);[N.2] 
(3) the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner (very, 
very slight weight); (4) Altersberger was under the influence of 
alcohol at the time of the offense (little weight); (5) Altersberger had a 
long-term history of substance abuse from age 15 (very slight weight); 
(6) Altersberger was brought up in a dysfunctional family and home 
environment (moderate weight); (7) Altersberger loves and is valued 
by his family (very slight weight); (8) Altersberger loved his 
grandfather and was devastated by his death (very slight weight); (9) 
Altersberger was the victim of racial discrimination within his own 
family (little weight); (10) Altersberger maintained good behavior 
throughout the proceedings (very slight weight); and (11) Altersberger 
[pled] guilty and took responsibility for the offense (little weight).  In 
weighing the aggravators and mitigators and determining death to be 
the appropriate sentence, the trial court specifically stated “that the 
aggravating circumstances in this case far outweigh the mitigating 
 
 
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circumstances” and that “either aggravating circumstance alone would 
outweigh all of the mitigating circumstances.” 
 
[N.1]  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
[N.2]  The trial court merged the following nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances into this one statutory 
mitigator:  (1) Altersberger did not fully develop 
emotionally; (2) Altersberger did not fully develop 
cognitively; (3) Altersberger has brain deficiencies that 
reduce his ability to control impulse behavior; (4) 
Altersberger has brain deficiencies that reduce his 
capacity to make reasoned decisions; (5) Altersberger 
suffered significant emotional deprivation while he was 
growing up that adversely affected his psychological 
development; and (6) Altersberger’s dysfunctional family 
life prevented healthy psychological development.  The 
court then explained that it gave each mitigator slight 
weight, individually, but moderate weight when merged 
and considered collectively. 
 
Altersberger v. State, 103 So. 3d 122, 124-26 (Fla. 2012). 
This Court affirmed Altersberger’s conviction and death sentence on direct 
appeal.  Id. at 131.  On direct appeal, Altersberger argued that the trial court erred 
in finding the CCP aggravator.  Id. at 126.  And this Court also reviewed whether 
Altersberger’s plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and 
whether his death sentence was proportionate.  Id. at 128-31.  For preservation 
purposes, Altersberger also argued on direct appeal that “(1) the use of hearsay 
evidence during the penalty phase violates the Confrontation Clause; (2) Florida’s 
death penalty statute violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); (3) Florida’s 
death penalty statute and jury instructions unconstitutionally shift the burden of 
 
 
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proof to the defendant to show why death is not the appropriate sentence; (4) the 
CCP aggravator is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (5) victim impact 
evidence violates defendant’s due process rights; and (6) execution by lethal 
injection is unconstitutional.”  Id. at 126 n.4.  This Court “reject[ed] each of these 
arguments as contrary to this Court’s well established precedent.”  Id.  
Altersberger filed a motion for postconviction relief on November 13, 2013, 
and filed an amended motion on March 7, 2014, which the trial court denied after 
holding an evidentiary hearing.  Altersberger appeals the trial court’s denial and 
also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  
II.  POSTCONVICTION MOTION 
A.  Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
Altersberger argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
adequately advise Altersberger, during the time frame between the entry of his 
guilty plea and the trial court’s sentence of death, about the different legal standard 
that applies to a motion to withdraw a guilty plea depending on whether the motion 
is made prior to or after sentencing.2  However, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
this claim. 
                                          
 
 
2.  Altersberger also argues that trial counsel was ineffective during the 
penalty phase and that there was reversible cumulative error.  Because we remand 
for a new penalty phase, we do not address these claims or the summarily denied 
claims related to the penalty phase. 
 
 
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Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court explained that two requirements must 
be met for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful: 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 
490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)). 
Regarding the deficiency prong of Strickland, there is a strong presumption 
that trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  
Moreover, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Id.  The defendant carries the burden to 
“overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 
U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 
Regarding the prejudice prong of Strickland, “the defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, ‘absent the [deficient performance], the 
factfinder would have [had] a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.’ ”  Henry v. State, 
 
 
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948 So. 2d 609, 617 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).  “A 
reasonable probability is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.’ ”  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  
“Because both prongs of Strickland present mixed questions of law and fact, 
this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the trial court’s factual 
findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the 
trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.”  Dennis v. State, 109 So. 3d 680, 690 (Fla. 
2012). 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(f) provides the legal standard that 
applies to motions to withdraw plea agreements made prior to sentencing:    
The court may in its discretion, and shall on good cause, at any time 
before a sentence, permit a plea of guilty or no contest to be 
withdrawn and, if judgment of conviction has been entered thereon, 
set aside the judgment and allow a plea of not guilty, or, with the 
consent of the prosecuting attorney, allow a plea of guilty or no 
contest of a lesser included offense, or of a lesser degree of the 
offense charged, to be substituted for the plea of guilty or no contest.  
The fact that a defendant may have entered a plea of guilty or no 
contest and later withdrawn the plea may not be used against the 
defendant in a trial of that cause. 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(f).  Under this provision, a trial court has broad discretion in 
determining motions to withdraw a plea, although it must permit withdrawal upon 
“good cause.”  State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Fla. 2003).   
Rule 3.170(l) provides the standard that applies to motions to withdraw plea 
agreements made after sentencing:   
 
 
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A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere without expressly 
reserving the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue may file a 
motion to withdraw the plea within thirty days after rendition of the 
sentence, but only upon the grounds specified in Florida Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(a)-(e) except as provided by 
law. 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(l).  According to this Court’s case law, pursuant to rule 
3.170(l), once a sentence has been imposed, a defendant must demonstrate 
manifest injustice or prejudice in order to withdraw a guilty plea.  Campbell v. 
State, 125 So. 3d 733, 736 (Fla. 2013); Partlow, 840 So. 2d at 1042.  “[A] court 
does not enjoy broad discretion as to motions filed after sentencing.”  Griffin v. 
State, 114 So. 3d 890, 898 (Fla. 2013).  
In this case, Altersberger has not demonstrated deficiency.  Regarding 
Altersberger’s plea and including the time period between the entry of his guilty 
plea and the trial court’s sentence of death, trial counsel discussed with 
Altersberger “the importance of prevailing at the penalty phase and had explained 
to him that entering a plea would be a good strategic decision.”  Altersberger, 103 
So. 3d at 128.  The decision to enter a guilty plea was a difficult decision for 
Altersberger to make, and it took him a while to make the decision to enter a plea.  
However, as this Court noted on direct appeal, the decision to enter the plea was 
ultimately made by Altersberger, it was “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
made,” Altersberger was not forced or coerced into entering his plea, and he was 
not promised anything in return for his plea.  Id. at 130.   
 
 
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This Court also noted that the trial court, after holding a Nelson3 hearing on 
March 11, 2009, denied Altersberger’s motion to discharge his attorneys on the 
grounds that they were improperly attempting to force him to plead guilty “because 
there was nothing presented to indicate that counsel was ineffective or had 
performed incompetently.”  Id. at 129.  After entering the plea on March 13, 2009, 
and “a lengthy plea colloquy,” the judge inquired even further, and “Altersberger 
told the judge that he had been fully advised by his attorneys that pleading guilty 
would be in his best interest.”  Id. at 129-30. 
One of Altersberger’s trial counsels, Deb Goins, testified at the evidentiary 
hearing that, to her knowledge, they did not talk to Altersberger about the specific 
subtleties between filing a motion to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing versus 
filing a motion to withdraw a plea after sentencing.  And trial counsel Peter Mills 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that he “probably covered the issues with him 
generally,” but did not get into specifics.  Nevertheless, trial counsel’s advice to 
Altersberger that it was better to wait until after sentencing to move to withdraw 
his plea was reasonable trial strategy.  See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 
1048 (Fla. 2000) (“[S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of 
                                          
 
 
3.  Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). 
 
 
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counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s 
decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.”).   
Specifically, trial counsel was weighing the decision to wait until after 
sentencing to withdraw the plea so that their deal with the State to keep out 
damaging testimony from the penalty phase would not be impacted against filing 
the motion to withdraw the plea before sentencing where a different standard 
would apply.  As this Court discussed on direct appeal: 
Altersberger’s attorneys testified that they knew the prosecution 
had as many as twenty witnesses who could provide highly damaging 
testimony as to Altersberger’s acts and admissions following the 
shooting and that this testimony would make obtaining a life sentence 
extremely difficult.  They believed, therefore, that the best trial 
strategy was to agree with the prosecution that Altersberger would 
plead guilty in return for the prosecution not calling those witnesses at 
the penalty phase.  They also explained that when Altersberger asked 
them what his odds of getting a life sentence would be, they told him 
that they could not guarantee anything, but his chances would greatly 
improve if he were to enter a plea so as to limit the prosecution’s 
introduction of evidence at the penalty phase.  As to his desire to 
withdraw his plea prior to sentencing, Altersberger’s attorneys 
testified that they explained Altersberger’s rights regarding plea 
withdrawal and advised him against withdrawing the plea but would 
have filed the motion to withdraw the plea if they had been directed to 
do so. 
Altersberger, 103 So. 3d at 129.  And in denying Altersberger’s motion to 
withdraw his plea that was filed after sentencing, the trial court explained that, 
based on the testimony given by Altersberger and his attorneys, “[i]t is clear that 
the [d]efendant in agreement with his attorneys made a tactical decision that it was 
 
 
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in his best interest in the hopes of obtaining a life sentence to enter a plea of guilty 
and proceed directly to the penalty phase.”  Id. at 130.   
Additionally, Altersberger has not demonstrated prejudice from trial 
counsel’s decision to advise Altersberger to move to withdraw the plea after 
sentencing rather than before sentencing and from failing to specifically explain 
the different standards.  After holding a hearing, Altersberger’s motion to withdraw 
his plea, which was filed after sentencing, was denied.  The trial court in this case 
actually did review Altersberger’s plea and the circumstances surrounding his plea 
before sentencing when Altersberger filed a motion to discharge his attorneys on 
the grounds that they were improperly attempting to force him to plead guilty.  
And, at the hearing on this motion, Altersberger also complained about his 
attorney’s advice regarding the plea.  Altersberger cannot show that the trial court 
would have granted a presentence motion to withdraw his plea.  Moreover, as this 
Court’s review of Altersberger’s plea on direct appeal demonstrates, Altersberger 
would not have been able to offer proof that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary.  See id. at 128-30.  Accordingly, Altersberger has failed to 
demonstrate how he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s advice or lack of advice 
regarding when to file the motion to withdraw his plea.  
Therefore, because Altersberger has failed to establish deficiency and 
prejudice, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief. 
 
 
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B.  Hurst 
Next, we consider whether Altersberger is entitled to relief after the United 
States Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).  
Because the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of nine to three, we 
conclude that Altersberger’s death sentence violates Hurst.  See Kopsho v. State, 
209 So. 3d 568, 570 (Fla. 2017).  We must then consider whether the Hurst error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: 
The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman[v. California, 386 
U.S. 18 (1967),] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the 
beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively 
stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed 
to the conviction. 
Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 68 (Fla. 2016) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 
1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986)), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-998 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2017). 
 
Because the jury in this case recommended death by a vote of nine to three, 
“we cannot determine that the jury unanimously found that the aggravators 
outweighed the mitigation.”  Kopsho, 209 So. 3d at 570.  “We can only determine 
that the jury did not unanimously recommend a sentence of death.”  Id.  Therefore, 
because we cannot say that there is no possibility that the error did not contribute 
to the sentence, the error in Altersberger’s sentencing was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
 
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Accordingly, we vacate the death sentence and remand for a new penalty 
phase.  See Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 69.   
III.  HABEAS PETITION 
Altersberger argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
a claim on direct appeal regarding the voluntariness of Altersberger’s guilty plea.4  
In this case, because the conviction for which the death penalty was imposed was 
the result of Altersberger’s guilty plea, “this Court’s [mandatory] review shifts to 
the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of that plea.”  Barnes v. State, 29 So. 
3d 1010, 1020 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Tanzi v. State, 964 So. 2d 106, 121 (Fla. 
2007)).  This Court held on direct appeal that “Altersberger’s plea was knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered.”  Altersberger, 103 So. 3d at 130.  Because 
this Court actually reviewed this claim on direct appeal, we deny relief.  See 
Wheeler v. State, 124 So. 3d 865, 889 (Fla. 2013) (denying habeas relief for claim 
that appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to make more specific claims 
regarding victim impact photographs because this Court already reviewed the 
photographs on direct appeal); Messer v. State, 439 So. 2d 875, 879 (Fla. 1983) 
(“Habeas corpus is not a vehicle for obtaining a second determination of matters 
previously decided on appeal.”). 
                                          
 
 
4.  Because we remand for a new penalty phase, we do not specifically 
address the penalty phase claim Altersberger raised in his habeas petition. 
 
 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Altersberger’s 
postconviction guilt phase claims, deny his guilt phase habeas claim, vacate his 
death sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase.    
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision except its vacating of the death 
sentence pursuant to Hurst. 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Highlands County,  
Angela Jane Cowden, Judge - Case No. 282007CF000041XXAXMX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Julie A. 
Morley and Mark S. Gruber, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, 
Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and C. Suzanne Bechard, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent