Case Title: State of Oregon v. Watts

Citation: 208 Or. 407, 301 P.2d 1035

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1956-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reversed October 10, 1956.
*408 Dale W. Pierson, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was J. William Stortz, Salem.
Kenneth E. Brown, District Attorney, Salem, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Before WARNER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LUSK and PERRY, Justices.
REVERSED.
PERRY, J.
The defendant Daniel D. Watts was convicted of the rape of his 14 year old daughter, and appeals.
The facts relied upon for a conviction are: (1) that the father was alone with his daughter in the family home for a period of thirty or forty minutes while the mother and other children were absent; (2) that the daughter made an extrajudicial statement that the crime did occur during this interval; (3) that following the defendant's arrest he made oral confession of the crime; and (4) that a medical examination *409 disclosed that the child's vaginal opening was enlarged.
The daughter upon the witness stand categorically denied ever having had sexual intercourse with the defendant, and the defendant repudiated his oral confession.
The defendant sets forth several assignments of error, but the primary question to be considered is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. ORS 136.540 provides:
1. Under this statute it is necessary that the corpus delicti be proven aliunde the confession; that is, the evidence must show the commission of the crime independent of the declarations of the accused. State v. Henderson, 182 Or 147, 190, 184P2d 392, 186 P2d 519. The reason for this general rule of law, now statutory, is set forth in State v. Howard, 102 Or 431, 203 P 311. It is, therefore, clear that, while the confession may be used to show who perpetrated a crime, it must first be legally shown that a crime was committed.
2. In this case (omitting the matter of the daughter's age) it was incumbent upon the state to prove, independent of the confession, that the child had been penetrated by a male person.
3. It is well-established that direct evidence is not required to prove the corpus delicti, but that circumstantial *410 evidence is sufficient. In State v. Williams, 46 Or 287, 297, 80 P 655, we said:
In State v. Weston, 102 Or 102, 119, 201 P 1083, speaking of the quality of the circumstantial evidence necessary to establish proof of the corpus delicti, we said:
And again in State v. Dennis, 177 Or 73, 77, 159 P2d 838, 161 P2d 670:
4. We are not faced with the same question as confronted the jury. We do not weigh the evidence; our duty is to determine whether or not there was sufficient circumstantial evidence, clear, cogent, and convincing, from which the jury in the performance of its legal duties could deduce the commission of a crime.
5. When the daughter, upon the witness stand, categorically denied ever having had intercourse with the defendant, her prior statements to the contrary were of no probative force whatsoever, and were relevant only for purposes of impeachment. State v. Jarvis, 18 Or 360, 23 P 251.
6. We are left then only with proof of defendant's opportunity to commit the crime, and proof that at some time and in some manner the vaginal opening of the child was enlarged. Generally "* * * Evidence of mere opportunity for sexual indulgence, in the absence of proof of a lascivious inclination * * *, is *412 not sufficient circumstance to warrant an inference of the commission of such offense." State v. Welch, 41 Or 35, 38, 68 P 808.
In Jenkins v. Jenkins, 103 Or 208, 213, 204 P 165, we cited with approval this rule from 3 Abbott's Trial Evidence (3 ed) 2034:
We again approved this rule in Parsons v. Parsons, 197 Or 420, 253 P2d 914.
7. While the latter cases stating the rule are civil, they deal with an act criminal in nature, and are analogous to the question before us. The rule there stated applies with even greater force in a criminal case where the proof must reach the quality of being clear, cogent and convincing to prove the corpus delicti. To hold that a criminal inference could be deduced from the fact that a parent was alone with his child would be contrary to sound reasoning, and contrary to the spirit of ORS 41.330, which provides:
And to hold that a criminal inference could be drawn simply from the fact that a parent is alone with his child in the home would be unthinkable. The home is established for the care, nurture and protection of *413 the young; it is the normal abode of parent and child; the base of true filial relationships where love and affection, each for the other, normally abide; and the only reasonable deduction, without evidence to the contrary, would be that the child was in a place of loving protection.
8. The medical testimony relied upon by the state to establish male penetration of the vaginal orifice of the child is as follows:
Such testimony, at best, can be taken to establish the fact that there was a dilation or enlargement of the vaginal opening of the child. There was a possibility that the child may or may not have had sexual intercourse at some time. There was no indication of hysteria; there were no bruises, lacerations, or other proof of injuries normally brought about by sexual activity found to be corroborative in other cases. State v. Mitchell, 68 Iowa 116, 26 NW 44; State v. Leavitt, 44 Idaho 739, 260 P 164.
*416 In the case of Messel v. State, 176 Ind 214, 217, 95 NE 565, upon which the plaintiff relies, the Court said:
In that case, the record shows that the testimony of two doctors who were witnesses for the state established beyond a reasonable doubt that the child had had sexual intercourse.
In State v. McCord, 237 Mo 242, 246, 140 SW 885, a prosecution for rape committed upon a small child, the court held that the expert testimony, plus the direct testimony of the defendant that, in his opinion, the child had been ravished, "coupled with the inherent improbability that her injuries could have been otherwise produced," was sufficient proof of the corpus delicti.
9. The facts in the instant case do not allow such a conclusion. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the expert opinion-evidence presented here, equivocal in essence and conjectural in part, was sufficient proof of the corpus delicti. Such circumstantial evidence must be clear, unequivocal, cogent and convincing. Because of the obvious tendency of a layman sitting as a juror to give primary consideration to the confession of the defendant, notwithstanding the admonitions of the trial judge, it is the duty of the courts to guard against this probability, especially in a case such as this where a man is tried for a crime so heinous and base that it inflames the minds of even the most prudent, and emotion rather than reason rules.
Reversed.