Case Title: Berry & Gould v. Berry

Citation: 360 Md. 142

Docket Number: 125/99

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Berry & Gould, P.A. and Jed D. Gould v. F. Norman Berry, No. 125, September Term, 1999.
[Restitution - Claim by obstetrician, withdrawing from professional association due to
disability, for value of goodwill.  Shareholders agreement silent.  No attempted sale by
claimant to any third party.  Held:  Unjust enrichment action does not lie.  Residual goodwill
a byproduct of service to association for which claimant was compensated.]
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 148750V
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 125
September Term, 1999
_________________________________________
BERRY & GOULD, P.A.
and JED D. GOULD
v.
F. NORMAN BERRY
_________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell, 
JJ. 
_________________________________________
Opinion by Rodowsky, J.
________________________________________
Filed:   July 28, 2000
We granted certiorari in this case to determine if the plaintiff enjoyed a substantive
right for which a restitutionary remedy would lie.  Due to disability, the plaintiff was required
to withdraw from the practice of obstetrics and, accordingly, as a shareholder in his
professional services corporation.  At issue is whether the corporation and its remaining
shareholder were obliged to pay to the plaintiff the value of his share of the goodwill enjoyed
by the practice, when there was no express promise to do so.  The material facts relevant to this
issue are undisputed and present a question of law.  We shall hold that the corporation and the
remaining shareholder have not been unjustly enriched and have no obligation to pay the
plaintiff, as restitution, the value of his goodwill. 
The instant action was brought in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County by the
respondent, F. Norman Berry, M.D. (Berry), against the petitioners, Jed D. Gould, M.D.
(Gould) and Berry & Gould, P.A., a professional services corporation (the P.A.).  The P.A. was
incorporated in 1970 with Berry as one of the original shareholders.  Over the years
shareholders came and went, but, for purposes of the issues in the instant matter, we may
consider that Berry and Gould were fifty percent shareholders at all relevant times.  
By 1987 Gould had become a shareholder and, that year, the shareholders in the P.A.
entered into a corporate stock agreement (the Agreement).  Under ¶ A.1 of the Agreement the
P.A. was obligated to redeem a shareholder's stock upon certain events, including:  
"f.  If any Stockholder voluntarily terminates his or her employment with
the Corporation.
"g.  If any Stockholder becomes 'disabled' for more than eighteen (18)
months as hereinafter set forth in Paragraph A.5 below."
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The purchase price for redeemed stock was its book value, determined on an accrual basis of
accounting and as of the last day of the month in which the redemption took place.  Book value
was to be determined by the then CPA for the P.A., whose determination would be binding on
all parties.  
Under the disability provisions of the Agreement, the P.A. paid full compensation each
month to a disabled shareholder for a period of three consecutive months from the first day
of the month following the month in which the disability commenced.  Thereafter, for the next
twelve months, the P.A. paid to that disabled shareholder the difference, if any,  between two-
thirds of the disabled shareholder's annual compensation and the amount paid under a disability
policy carried by the P.A.  If the disability continued for eighteen months the disabled
shareholder agreed to sell and the P.A. agreed to redeem the stock of the disabled shareholder
within ninety days of the end of the eighteen month period.  
Each shareholder of the P.A. also agreed to "devote his or her full time, knowledge, skill
and attention to the professional practice of the [P.A.], to the exclusion of any other
competitive business and/or professional activities."  
Beginning in the fall of 1994 Berry developed arthritic pain in his right elbow which
became progressively worse.  On one occasion, in the course of a difficult forceps delivery,
he dropped the forceps.  He was unable to button his shirt or to put on a scrub hat.  Gould, an
employee obstetrician of the P.A., Dr. Gregory C. Tyler (Tyler), or an obstetrician from
outside the P.A. had to be available to back up Berry for difficult deliveries.  Berry continued
to see patients but had to examine them left-handedly.  By March 1995 Berry was unable to eat
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with his right arm.  In a memorandum to Gould dated March 8, 1995, Berry advised, "As of
March 15, 1995, I will be leaving on disability."  The memorandum contained some twenty
proposals as to how the transition should be effected and contemplated that Tyler would buy
Berry's shares in the P.A.  Berry also sought payment for goodwill, saying:
"I will be the very first partner ever leaving the practice and not taking his
or her patients with them.  Dr. Piver was bought out and took his practice with
him, Dr. Ladd was bought out for $180,000 and took her patients with her, Dr.
Mazer was bought out and he still maintains his practice, and Dr. Tran was
bought out and took her patients with her.  I will be leaving over 25 years of
good will and practice patients that have real value.  I think this is essential to the
viability of the continuation of the practice.  It has definite worth of
approximately $75,000.  I will personally correspond or talk to all the patients
and urge them to continue care in our offices with the two remaining associates.
If this cannot be agreed upon, then I will find a practice to make arrangements
for my patients to be bought by them and then I will make full faith efforts to see
[that my] patients go to them."
"The $75,000 for good will and patients to be left in the practice would
be $75,000 to be divided equally, $37,500 by Dr. Gould and Dr. Tyler." 
A few days later, on March 12, Berry and Gould met at Berry's request to discuss
Berry's departure.  They reviewed the March 8 memorandum point by point.  Thereafter, Berry
drafted a memorandum dated March 19, 1995, in which Berry memorialized the March 12
discussion.  In part the memorandum reads:
"That Dr. Berry will be the first and only partner who has ever left the
practice and not taken his or her patients/goodwill (26 years) with him or her.
That these patients/goodwill are a valued asset and that Dr. Berry will negotiate
with Drs. Gould and Tyler to purchase of same.  That it makes excellent business
sense and is extremely important that these patients and goodwill remain with
the practice to ensure continuity and long-term success of the practice.  If this
option to purchase Dr. Berry's patients/goodwill is not agreed upon, then Dr.
Berry will take his patients/goodwill and negotiate for their purchase with other
physicians." 
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Berry scheduled another meeting with Gould at which Berry asked Gould to sign this
"Memorandum of Understanding."  Gould refused to sign and indicated instead that he wished
to have his attorney review the memoranda and the Agreement.  
In a letter to Gould, dated April 25, 1995, Gould's attorney, after describing the
payments that the Agreement required the P.A. to make "if a stockholder becomes disabled,"
opined that 
"[i]t is absolutely clear that all patients belong to the corporation, subject only
to the desires of the patient.  This was obviously made a part of the agreement
so that the corporation would be able to make continued salary payments to the
disabled person."
(Emphasis added).
The letter from counsel further stated as follows:
"Furthermore, the corporation will thereafter acquire the stock of the
disabled stockholder ....  At this point, the corporation becomes the owner of
all of the assets ....  This, of course, includes 'goodwill' and it is difficult to see
how, under this agreement, or any similar agreement that does not make a
specific provision for the same, that [Berry] can claim that he is entitled to any
additional payment for turning over patients to the corporation.  Again, these
patients are an asset of the corporation and belong to the corporation ....
"Any disabled stockholder who, in any way, interferes with the
corporation's rights to the patients is guilty of a breach of contract which will
cause severe financial loss to the corporation.  Any attempt ... to contact patients
in a manner that would encourage them to leave the practice would be in
violation of the agreement.  This damage involves not only the loss of the fee for
a particular professional service but also loss of future anticipated fees.  In my
opinion, this would involve the loss of thousands of dollars per patient and the
corporation could bring an immediate suit for the total anticipated loss.
"From the foregoing you can see that it is my opinion that this is a typical
buy-sell agreement whereby the corporation acquires all of the assets of a
disabled stockholder in the corporation.  The three months of salary, disability
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In December 1995 Berry wrote a letter to his former patients, but that letter is not in
1
evidence and its content is not described in the evidence.  
payments and book value of the corporation include any goodwill factor and the
terminating stockholder has no rights thereafter in any corporation asset."
(Emphasis added).
Gould gave Berry a copy of this letter.  Berry then obtained counsel.  On June 15, 1995,
Berry advised Gould and the P.A. that Berry was not electing a disability retirement; rather, he
took the position that he was voluntarily retiring from the P.A., thereby triggering the P.A.'s
obligation to redeem Berry's stock as of June 30, 1995.   In response, Gould took the position
1
that Berry, once having elected a disability retirement, could not thereafter elect a voluntary
retirement.  
Tyler never purchased Berry's stock, and Tyler left the practice in December 1995.
Through counsel, the parties continued to negotiate for some time.  Berry never attempted to
market his patient list to some other obstetrical practice.  Berry testified that he thought it was
best for all concerned that he continue to negotiate with Gould and Tyler to have his patients,
with his help, stay with their practice.  Secondly, Berry said, "I was under a threat of litigation
and if I would go out and try and make an arrangement with anyone else, I'd have to morally and
honestly tell them that there is a potential litigation out there, and I felt that very few people
would want to be involved in any litigation."  Thirdly, Berry said that he and his attorney
believed that there would be some area of agreement with Gould.  No agreement, however, was
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ever reached.  Gould and the P.A. paid nothing to Berry, who in March 1996 instituted the
action that is before us.  It was tried non-jury.
From Berry's multi-count complaint those counts seeking a declaratory judgment and
a recovery for unjust enrichment are pertinent to our review.  Preliminarily, the circuit court
ruled under the declaratory judgment count that the Agreement did not make Berry's election
of disability retirement irrevocable and that Berry could voluntarily terminate his employment
with the P.A., even though Berry was disabled.  This ruling is not challenged in this Court.  The
circuit court also ruled that the Agreement did not impose an obligation on the P.A. to pay for
goodwill, a ruling that, likewise, is not challenged in this Court.  The circuit court, however,
deferred for trial whether Berry could recover for goodwill, absent any express provision for
payment in the Agreement.  
After trial the circuit court netted out a number of debits against and credits to the
defendants resulting in judgment in favor of Berry against Gould and the P.A. for $101,700.
Included within the judgment were awards of $50,000 for the book value of the P.A. stock,
$19,600 for unpaid management fees to Berry, and $12,500, representing the principal amount
of a loan made by Berry to the P.A. that remained unpaid.  These items, totaling $82,100, were
made subject to prejudgment interest running from June 30, 1995.  Credits to the defendants
included $17,000 in fees paid by the P.A. to an obstetrician from another practice who helped
cover for Berry during the latter's pre-termination disability.  
The $101,700 judgment in favor of Berry also included $37,500 for goodwill.  That
portion of the judgment is the only issue in the matter before us.  The circuit court found that
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goodwill was, in fact, an asset of the practice.  The court further found that in the negotiations
"Gould's question was not so much whether he had to pay for [goodwill]"; rather, "Gould
thought that there was goodwill, and it was just a question that he did not think it should be that
much," referring to Berry's valuation of $75,000 for his half of the goodwill for which Berry
had proposed that Gould and Tyler each pay $37,500.  The circuit court said that Gould had
asked for the letter from counsel because Gould was "having trouble over this whole thing" and
that Gould "did not disavow that he was going to sue if [Berry] did something different."  The
value of the total goodwill was found to be one-half of what Berry's initial demand had been,
and the court's award of $37,500 to Berry represented fifty percent of goodwill of the practice
which the court valued at $75,000.  In this Court the sole basis advanced by Berry to sustain
the $37,500 award for goodwill is that the petitioners were unjustly enriched.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which, in an unreported
opinion, affirmed.  On the issue before us the Court of Special Appeals stated that the trial
judge, "as the trier of fact, was in the best position to evaluate the totality of the evidence on
the subject of goodwill and to determine whether the parties intended for goodwill to be a
marketable asset." 
We granted the petition for certiorari filed by Gould and the P.A.  Reflecting Berry's
exclusive reliance on unjust enrichment to support the judgment, the petitioners present the
following questions:
1.  Did the Agreement, which provided that a withdrawing shareholder
was to receive only the "book value" for stock, preclude Berry from recovering
for goodwill? and
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2.  Even if not precluded by the express language of the Agreement, was
Berry properly awarded compensation for goodwill under the theory of
quantum meruit/unjust enrichment?
Because we shall answer the second question"no," and find that Berry cannot recover for
goodwill under a theory of unjust enrichment, we need not address the first question of whether
the Agreement itself would otherwise preclude recovery for goodwill.  
In this Court Berry contends that the threat of suit contained in the letter of April 25,
1995, written to Gould by his attorney, was wrongful conduct on the part of the petitioners
which prevented Berry's sale of his goodwill and that, by this wrongful conduct, the P.A. and
Gould are unjustly enriched to the extent of the value of Berry's goodwill.  In opposition, the
petitioners argue that the residual benefit to the P.A. and to Gould of the goodwill from Berry's
practice was incidental to Berry's having participated in practice through the P.A. for many
years, for which Berry was paid, so that there is no unjust enrichment. 
I
Restatement (Second) of Restitution § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983) (Tent.
Restatement) states the general principle of unjust enrichment to be:
"A person who receives a benefit by reason of an infringement of another
person's interest, or of loss suffered by the other, owes restitution to him in the
manner and amount necessary to prevent unjust enrichment."
Id. at 8-9.
This Court has defined unjust enrichment as constituting three elements:
"'1.
A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
"'2.
An appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and
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"'3.
The acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under
such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the
benefit without the payment of its value.'"
County Comm'rs v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 358 Md. 83, 95 n.7, 747 A.2d 600, 607
n.7 (2000) (quoting Everhart v. Miles, 47 Md. App. 131, 136, 422 A.2d 28, 31 (1980)).  
As one commentator has said:  
"The concept of unjust enrichment is notoriously difficult to define.  It
has on occasion been regarded as too indefinite and vague to be recognized as
a general legal principle, with concern expressed that its adoption might
undermine legal stability, confuse legal thinking, and jeopardize clear,
systematic organization of the law."
D. Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property or
the Commission of a Wrong, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 504, 504-05 (1980).  
The Tent. Restatement, recognizing that "[t]he situations that generate rights to
restitution cannot be enumerated exhaustively," identifies three characteristic circumstances.
Id. § 1 cmt. c, at 10.  These are "(i) a voluntary transaction between the parties, not fully
effective; (ii) wrongdoing directed against an interest of the claimant; and (iii) mistake."  Id.
The work cautions, however, that "[i]n other situations restitution is required although none of
these elements is present."  Id. at 10-11.  
Here, the tort that bears some resemblance to Berry's theory of wrongdoing is
"maliciously or wrongfully interfering with economic relationships in the absence of a breach
of contract."  Natural Design, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 302 Md. 47, 69, 485 A.2d 663, 674 (1984).
The elements of the tort are
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"(1) intentional and wilful acts; (2) calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs
in their lawful business; (3) done with the unlawful purpose to cause such
damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendants
(which constitutes malice); and (4) actual damage and loss resulting."
Id. at 71, 485 A.2d at 675 (internal quotations and attribution omitted).  "[W]rongful or
malicious interference with economic relations is interference by conduct that is
independently wrongful or unlawful, quite apart from its effect on the plaintiff's business
relationships."  Alexander & Alexander Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., Inc., 336 Md.
635, 657, 650 A.2d 260, 271 (1994).  See also Macklin v. Robert Logan Assocs., 334 Md.
287, 307-08, 639 A.2d 112, 122 (1994).
To illustrate the types of wrongful or unlawful acts that could form the basis for
malicious interference with economic relations, this Court has quoted W. Prosser, Law of
Torts § 130, at 952-53 (4th ed. 1971), which refers to "violence or intimidation, defamation,
injurious falsehood or other fraud, violation of criminal law, and the institution or threat of
groundless civil suits or criminal prosecutions in bad faith."  Alexander, 336 Md. at 657, 650
A.2d at 271; K & K Management, Inc. v. Lee, 316 Md. 137, 166, 557 A.2d 965, 979 (1989).
Here, the economic relationship with which Berry contends that the petitioners
interfered is that between Berry and some undetermined purchaser of Berry's patient list.  We
shall assume, arguendo, the existence of a class of obstetricians who likely would be
interested in purchasing a list of Berry's patients and that the existence of such a class is
sufficient proof of a probable buyer to satisfy the actual loss element of the tort.  Cf. Volvo
North Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof'l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1988)
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Berry was represented by counsel who presumably could advise Berry that he was free
2
to sell his practice to a third party, if counsel viewed the threat as groundless.  
(allegations, inter alia, that defendants used monopoly power over men's professional tennis
to threaten punitive action against tournament producers if they permitted banners bearing
plaintiff's tennis logo held sufficient, without allegation that any particular contract was lost
due to defendants' activities.). 
Here, there is no evidence that the petitioners had any contact with any prospective
purchaser.  The act which Berry alleges constitutes the interference is the threat of suit
contained in the attorney's April 25, 1995 letter.  That threat was not groundless.   The letter
2
was directed solely to the state of facts then existing.  It was written after Berry had elected
disability retirement and before Berry undertook to change his election to a voluntary
withdrawal.  The letter clearly addresses only disability retirement.  In the opinion of counsel
the P.A. acquired as its asset any individual goodwill that Berry owned in consideration of the
P.A.'s obligation to pay Berry full salary for three months, disability retirement for twelve
months, and to pay book value for his stock not earlier than eighteen months nor more than
twenty-one months after the inception of disability status.  This is not an unreasonable
interpretation of the Agreement.  
Viewing the Agreement as a whole, counsel's interpretation contrasts disability
retirement with voluntary withdrawal.  In the latter event, precedent within the P.A. recognized
a construction of the Agreement whereby voluntarily withdrawing shareholders could take their
practices with them, and they would be paid only for their shares at book value.  The
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The petitioners assert in their brief that Berry was paid full salary under the disability
3
(continued...)
shareholder retiring on disability, however, received a stream of payments from the P.A., and
it is reasonable to imply a promise on the part of the disabled shareholder to leave his practice
with the P.A. in consideration of receiving that stream of payments while inactive.  Indeed,
inasmuch as the disabled shareholder remained a shareholder until the corporation redeemed
the shares after the disability payments had ceased, the express provision of the Agreement
proscribing competitive activity by any shareholder seemingly would prevent a disabled
shareholder from selling his or her practice to another practice.  
At some point after June 15, 1995, when Berry had elected voluntarily to withdraw from
the P.A., the petitioners took the position that his earlier election of disability retirement fixed
the liability of the P.A. under the Agreement.  Although the circuit court concluded that the
Agreement did not prevent a change of that earlier election, and although that ruling is not
challenged on this certiorari review, it does not follow that the petitioners' assertion that Berry
could not change his election constituted unlawful means for purposes of the interference tort.
Petitioners' position was not groundless.  Under the election of disability retirement Berry
could not require the P.A. to redeem Berry's stock until at least eighteen months had passed
from the commencement of the disability.  A construction of the Agreement under which
Berry was permitted to change the election unilaterally increased the P.A.'s liability by
accelerating the time for payment of the redemption price.  It is unusual for contracts to be
construed as permitting one party unilaterally to increase the other party's liability.3
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(...continued)
3
provisions of the Agreement for the ninety days from March 15 to June 15, 1995, but they give
no reference to the record to support that assertion.
Based upon the circuit court's construction of the Agreement, the P.A.'s refusal to
recognize Berry's change of election breached the Agreement in that the P.A. did not redeem
based on the June 30, 1995 valuation of Berry's stock.  Berry has been compensated for this
breach by the award of damages on a breach of contract count in the complaint.  Pertinent to
this case is the rule that breach of a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant is not a
basis for the interference tort, if the interference is simply incidental to the breach.  See K &
K Management, Inc., 316 Md. at 159-65, 557 A.2d at 976-79 (lessor's breach of lease of
restaurant not tortious interference with lessee's relations with restaurant customers and
suppliers).  Here, the petitioners, by maintaining their position that the P.A. had acquired
Berry's patient list under the disability retirement provisions of the Agreement, only
incidentally affected the relationship between Berry and a potential purchaser.  Berry was faced
with an adverse claim of title that was not groundless.  Acting with the advice of counsel, Berry
chose to negotiate, ultimately unsuccessfully, with the petitioners rather than to attempt to sell
his patient practice to some other obstetrical practice, as he had threatened to do, and to take
his chances on litigating with petitioners his right to sell. 
Berry has cited this Court to Maryland Code (1975, 1993 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum.
Supp.), § 5-119 of the Corporations and Associations Article which reads:
"(a)
Individual employee.--The relationship between an individual
rendering professional services as an employee of a domestic or foreign
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professional corporation and the client or patient of the individual is the same
as if the individual were rendering the services as a sole practitioner.
"(b)
Corporation.--The relationship between a domestic or foreign
professional corporation and the client or patient for whom an employee of the
corporation is rendering professional services is the same as that between the
client or patient and the employee."
Berry contends that the policy of this statute requires that Berry's goodwill from his practice
be owned by him and that it could not have been owned by the P.A.  Although Berry utilizes this
statute primarily to answer an argument advanced by the petitioners under question one, which
we are not considering, the statute does have some relevance to question two.  
There is complete accord between the parties that the patients are free to see the
obstetrician of their choice, and, in that sense, no one owns the practice.  It is also agreed
between the parties that Berry was free to take his practice with him if he voluntarily withdrew
from the P.A. to practice elsewhere, but it is apparent that his physical limitations made that
alternative impossible.  It is unnecessary for us to decide the respective interests, if any, that
Berry and the P.A. had in goodwill associated with Berry's patients during his years of active
practice with the P.A.  The point made in the letter from Gould's counsel is that, by electing
disability retirement, Berry sold his goodwill to the P.A. for the added consideration promised
to a disabled shareholder and that, at that time, the goodwill became an asset of the P.A.
Inasmuch as the plaintiffs did not tortiously interfere with a prospective sale by Berry
of his goodwill, the petitioners did not continue, after Berry's retirement, to benefit from
Berry's residual goodwill by wrongful means.  Accordingly, the petitioners are not liable to
Berry for unjust enrichment on that ground.
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II
Although restitution is not limited to situations in which the defendant has acquired a
benefit by wrongful means, conferral of a benefit and a right to restitution are far from
equivalent concepts.  Perhaps the most common illustration of receipt of a benefit without
restitution liability is found in building construction contracting.  The subcontractor who
furnished labor and materials which have been incorporated into the building and which benefit
the owner has no claim for restitution from the owner in the event that the subcontractor is not
paid by the general contractor.  See Bennett Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. NationsBank
of Maryland, 342 Md. 169, 674 A.2d 534 (1996).  Included among the reasons for this result
are that "'the parties almost certainly contemplated that their contractual arrangements
constituted the full set of liabilities.'"  Id. at 184, 674 A.2d at 541 (quoting 1 D. Dobbs, Law
of Remedies § 4.9(4), at 698 (2d ed. 1993)). Specifically, the subcontractor has relied upon
the credit of the general contractor (mechanics' liens aside) and not on the credit of the owner,
and the owner has bargained for a fixed liability, the price agreed to be paid to the general
contractor.  See also Goldberg v. Ford, 188 Md. 658, 53 A.2d 665 (1947) (plaintiff, who by
contract with lessee of strip mine expended $18,000 in uncovering 8,000 tons of coal, not
entitled to restitution from lessor who benefitted from the work upon reentry after default by
lessee). 
In the instant matter Berry acquired his patients while practicing within the P.A. which
paid Berry an agreed consideration for practicing through it, but there was no agreement that
the P.A. would purchase Berry's goodwill if Berry voluntarily withdrew from the P.A.  The fact
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that, at Berry's retirement, there was a pool of patients who would have confidence in his
recommendation concerning a successor obstetrician and who, absent any recommendation
by Berry to the contrary, would likely continue to seek the professional services of the P.A.,
is an incidental consequence of Berry's having practiced for his own benefit with the P.A.
Ordinarily restitution is not available for a benefit conferred as an  incident of a plaintiff's
having acted primarily for his or her own benefit.
Relevant to the facts here is Ulmer v. Farnsworth, 15 A. 65 (Me. 1888).  There the
plaintiff and the defendant owned interconnected quarries.  When the plaintiff drained his
quarry, the defendant's quarry was necessarily drained as well.  The plaintiff's claim for
restitution was denied.  Dobbs explains the result on the following basis:
"Although [the plaintiff's] purpose was not to benefit the defendant, the benefit
was nonetheless intentionally conferred in the sense that the plaintiff knew with
certainty that it would result.  Nothing in the nature of the circumstances
prevented bargaining:  the parties knew each other and knew the interests
involved; parties were not so numerous that bargaining was infeasible.  Where
the benefit is intentionally conferred, is not in cash or specific chattels, and the
parties are in a position to bargain about compensation, the cases, in line with
Ulmer v. Farnsworth, deny restitution."
1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.9(4), at 693 (2d ed. 1993) (Dobbs) (footnote omitted).  
The fact that the benefit to the petitioners, initially acquired incidentally to Berry's
pursuing his own self-interest, remains with the petitioners after Berry's retirement, does not
give rise to a restitutionary obligation on the petitioners.  In the case of real estate the concept
is presented in the following illustration from Tent. Restatement:
"Upon the death of his wife, B moves into the home of S, his sister.  With
her consent B pays for finishing unused attic space, adding to the comfort of the
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entire household and enhancing the value of S's house.  After a year B finds
quarters elsewhere.  S does not owe restitution to B."
Id. § 2, cmt. d, illustration 10, at 42.  
More analogous to the case before us is Gidatex, S.r.L. v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd.,
49 F. Supp. 2d 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  In that case the defendant had been the exclusive United
States distributor for the plaintiff manufacturer's line of furniture, but the plaintiff had
terminated that relationship.  The defendant was left with a stock of furniture of the plaintiff's
manufacturer which the defendant continued to promote for sale through various forms of
advertising.  When the plaintiff sued the defendant for trademark infringement, the defendant
counterclaimed for unjust enrichment, contending that its promotion of plaintiff's product, as
well as handling complaints about defective merchandise and unfilled orders, enhanced the
plaintiff's goodwill.  Id. at 304.  The court granted the plaintiff summary judgment on the
counterclaim.  Although an issue of fact for trial was presented on whether the manufacturer
was enriched, the court held as a matter of law that the enrichment was not unjust.  The
defendant "continued to support the mark because it continued to sell the furniture and because
it wished to ensure that its customers would continue to purchase furniture at its stores.  Any
benefit to [the plaintiff] was a by-product."  Id. at 305.  
Similar to Gidatex is Piccoli A/S v. Calvin Klein Jeanswear Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 157
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).  The plaintiff in that case was the former distributor for Scandinavia of Calvin
Klein jeans.  It terminated that relationship with the defendants when the plaintiff believed that
the latter were selling Calvin Klein jeans to discount stores, thereby undercutting the
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prestigious market that the plaintiff allegedly had created.  Id. at 161.  In the litigation that
followed one of the plaintiff's claims was for unjust enrichment, seeking the profits that the
defendants had realized allegedly based on six years of effort expended by the plaintiff in
promoting the product in Scandinavia.  In granting summary judgment for the defendants on this
claim the court said:
"[The plaintiff] performed for its own benefit and perhaps for the benefit of its
customers and [the defendants].  Defendant's actions in tapping into the demand
created by [the plaintiff] therefore cannot give rise to a claim for quasi-
contractual relief."
Id. at 167 (footnote omitted).
The commentators on restitution have identified certain themes that help to explain
cases in which a benefit has been received but in which no restitution is ordered.  Dobbs speaks
of the defendant's "autonomy interests" so that "rights fixed by a contract between the parties
must not be altered by an award of restitution."  1 Dobbs § 4.1(2), at 563.  Palmer states that
"the promotion of self-interest will rarely justify restitution which has the effect of imposing
a new money obligation on the recipient of the benefit."  2 G. Palmer, The Law of Restitution
§ 10.7, at 417 (1978).  That author further states that "[c]learly restitution will never be allowed
if the only self-interest the plaintiff seeks to advance is to obtain the advantages of a contract
without making one."  Id.  Dawson discerns in the cases "a general disposition against
intervening to redistribute gains and losses in a market economy in which a preference is
expressed for private initiative and private decision."  J.P. Dawson, The Self-Serving
Intermeddler, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1412 (1974).   
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Here, Berry developed his patient following while practicing under the Agreement
which is silent as to payment by the P.A. or by remaining shareholders for the goodwill of a
voluntarily withdrawing shareholder.  As illustrated by specific precedents, the Agreement
permitted voluntarily withdrawing obstetricians to take their practice with them, but Berry was
unable to continue to practice at all.  Berry ultimately elected to be treated as a voluntarily
withdrawing shareholder and attempted, in that status, to negotiate for payment for goodwill,
without success.  Berry claimed the right to sell his patient list to a third party, but did not do
so, although there was no wrongful interference by petitioners.  Under all of the circumstances
of this case, restitution should not be granted to create a liability which the plaintiff could not
achieve by bargaining.  Consequently, the judgment of the circuit court should not have
included $37,500 for goodwill.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED IN PART.  CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY
COUNTY IN PART AND TO REMAND THIS
CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY 
WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO REDUCE THE JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT, F. NORMAN
BERRY, BY $37,500.
COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY THE
RESPONDENT, F. NORMAN BERRY.  COSTS IN
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID TWO-THIRDS BY THE PETITIONERS,
BERRY & GOULD, P.A. AND JED D. GOULD,
AND ONE-THIRD BY THE RESPONDENT, F.
NORMAN BERRY.
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