Case Title: Slavens v. Board of County Com'rs for Uinta County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-230

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Slavens v. Board of County Com'rs for Uinta County1993 WY 82854 P.2d 683Case Number: 92-230Decided: 06/09/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Bert R. SLAVENS and Kim 
West,

 Appellants 
(Petitioners),

v.

The BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS for UINTA COUNTY, Wyoming; Casey Davis, John R. Stevens, Patrick 
Mulhall, and Paul Barnard, in their individual and official capacities, 
Appellees (Respondents).

June 9, 1993. Rehearing 
Denied July 20, 1993.

Bruce S. Asay, 
Cheyenne, for appellants.

Elizabeth Zerga 
of Herschler, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Rideout, Cheyenne, for 
appellees.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Bert R. Slavens 
and Kim West filed suit against the Board of County Commissioners 
(Commissioners) for Uinta County claiming that they were wrongfully removed from 
their county jobs and sought recovery of damages for slander and defamation, 
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and other claims. 
The district court granted summary judgment for the 
Commissioners.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellants raise 
these issues:

1. Did the District Court 
err as a matter of law in granting the Appellees/Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment?

      2. Did the 
District Court err in refusing the Appellants' Motion to Amend 
Complaint?

FACTS

[¶4]      Appellant Kim 
West was hired by the Uinta County Fair Board as the county fairgrounds 
superintendent in 1984. Under his job description with the Fair Board, he was to 
make available to travelers passing through the county, temporary board for 
their livestock. West was to keep monies he received for boarding or 
"off-loading" the livestock for travelers rather than the Fair Board paying him 
overtime. Because of disagreements between him and the Fair Board, in 1985 West 
was transferred from working for the Fair Board to working for the Public Works 
Department. While at the Public Works Department, West worked under appellant 
Bert Slavens who was Director of Public Works. During 1984 through 1990, West 
continued the livestock off-loading practice.

[¶5]      In 1990, the 
Uinta County Prosecuting Attorney received a report concerning West's livestock 
off-loading practice. The County Commissioners were made aware of the report, 
and a "sting" operation was organized. In the sting, fifty-two head of cattle 
were off-loaded onto the Uinta County Fairgrounds. Mr. West charged $52.00, 
which he kept. After the "sting," on December 31, 1990, the county attorney 
filed a criminal complaint against West charging him with misconduct of a public 
servant. The prosecutor also filed a criminal complaint against Bert Slavens, 
alleging that he committed official misconduct, conspiracy and wrongful 
appropriation of public property. The same day, West and Slavens received notice 
that they were being dismissed from their county jobs. The criminal charges were 
dismissed on January 3, 1991, on the prosecutor's motion.

[¶6]      The notices of 
dismissal indicated that the County Commissioners would hold a "Hearing Pending 
Dismissal." West and Slavens did not respond to the offer to hold a hearing. 
Instead, appellants filed suit in United States District Court alleging civil 
rights violations. The federal district court judge granted summary judgment for 
the Commissioners.

[¶7]      An administrative 
hearing was held on July 24, 1991, to consider disciplinary action against both 
West and Slavens. The hearing was held before a hearing examiner, and both 
parties appeared and examined witnesses. As a result of the hearing examiner's 
decision, Slavens was not reappointed as Director of the Public Works 
Department, and West was suspended for ten days. West and Slavens appealed the 
administrative decision to the Third Judicial District Court. The district court 
affirmed the decision of the administrative hearing officer. West and Slavens 
chose not to appeal the administrative decision further.

[¶8]      However, West and 
Slavens then filed this suit in state district court. Their complaint included 
claims for slander and defamation, intentional interference with prospective 
economic advantage, violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, 
constitutional violations relating to reputation, outrageous misconduct or 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution. Slavens 
also asserted a claim for failure to pay wages. West and Slavens requested 
compensatory and punitive damages. The Commissioners answered and moved for 
summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the 
Commissioners. The district judge found that since West and Slavens had a full 
opportunity to present their case before the impartial hearing examiner and that 
decision became final with affirmance after appeal to the district court and no 
further appeal, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel applied 
and required summary judgment in favor of the 
Commissioners.

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶9]      When reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment, we utilize our oft-repeated standard of review. We 
examine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the 
prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Davidson v. 
Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Wyo. 1993); W.R.C.P. 56(c).

[¶10]   The district court found that the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel both applied and that there 
were no genuine issues of material fact which barred summary judgment. 
Appellants argue that the issues involved in this case have not been totally 
litigated and that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not 
apply.

[¶11]   This court has held that both res 
judicata and collateral estoppel apply to final adjudicative determinations by 
administrative tribunals. Salt Creek Freightways v. Wyoming Fair Employment 
Practices Comm'n, 598 P.2d 435, 437 (Wyo. 1979). In fact, this court has noted 
that it is almost universally recognized that the two doctrines apply to 
adjudicative administrative decisions. Salt Creek Freightways, 598 P.2d  at 437; 
Joelson v. City of Casper, 676 P.2d 570, 572 (Wyo. 1984); and see Batson v. 
Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 602 A.2d 1191, 1200 (1992). The United States Supreme 
Court has also held that administrative decisions may have res judicata effect. 
United States v. Utah Const. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22, 86 S. Ct. 1545, 1559-60, 16 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1966). And recently the United States Supreme 
Court stated:

We have long favored 
application of the common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel (as to issues) 
and res judicata (as to claims) to those determinations of administrative bodies 
that have attained finality. "When an administrative agency is acting in a 
judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which 
the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not 
hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose." United States v. Utah Const. 
& Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S. Ct. 1545, 1560, 16 L. Ed. 2d 642 
(1966).

Astoria Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2169, 
115 L. Ed. 2d 96, (1991). In Salt Creek Freightways, we noted that although many 
cases speak of res judicata in the administrative context, they actually apply 
collateral estoppel. Salt Creek Freightways, 598 P.2d  at 437. Collateral 
estoppel is the appropriate doctrine since collateral estoppel bars relitigation 
of previously litigated issues. Salt Creek Freightways, 598 P.2d  at 438 (quoting 
Roush v. Roush, 589 P.2d 841, 843 (Wyo. 1979) (per curiam)). See also Bresnahan 
v. May Dept. Stores Co., 726 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Mo. 1987) (when a fact is properly 
determined in one legal proceeding, it is given effect in another lawsuit). Res 
judicata on the other hand bars relitigation of previously litigated claims or 
causes of action. Salt Creek Freightways, 598 P.2d  at 437. See also Batson v. 
Shiflett, 602 A.2d  at 1201 (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979)). Since administrative decisions 
deal primarily with issues rather than causes of action or claims, collateral 
estoppel is the appropriate doctrine. Salt Creek Freightways, 598 P.2d  at 
437.

[¶12]   To analyze whether the doctrine of 
res judicata applies, we have examined actions for these four 
factors:

(1) identity in parties; 
(2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the 
subject matter; [and] (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in 
reference to both the subject matter and the issues between 
them.

Moore v. Moore, 
835 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting CLS v. CLJ, 693 P.2d 774, 775-76 (Wyo. 
1985)). See also CSP v. DDC, 842 P.2d 528, 532-33 (Wyo. 1992). The factors that 
have been used to determine whether collateral estoppel applies are similar. 
State v. $11,346.00 in U.S. Currency, 777 P.2d 65, 68 (Wyo. 1989). When 
determining whether collateral estoppel applies, courts should consider four 
factors: (1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical 
with the issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior 
adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against 
whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to 
the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral 
estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in 
the prior proceeding. Bresnahan v. May Dept. Stores Co., 726 S.W.2d  at 330 
(quoting Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. 1979)). 
See also Utah Const., 384 U.S.  at 421-22, 86 S.Ct. at 1559-60; State v. 
$11,346.00 in U.S. Currency, 777 P.2d  at 68.

[¶13]   Applying the above collateral 
estoppel factors, we determine that West and Slavens were collaterally estopped 
from bringing this action. Here, all the elements of collateral estoppel are 
satisfied. First, the issue decided in the administrative adjudication was 
identical with the issue appellants seek to raise in this law-suit - whether the 
Board of County Commissioners wrongfully took disciplinary action against West 
and Slavens. Second, the decision made by the hearing examiner did result in a 
judgment on the merits - the hearing examiner determined, after hearing all the 
evidence and testimony, that the cattle off-loading activities were improper 
since county property was used for personal pecuniary gain. Third, the Board of 
County Commissioners and the individual commissioners were parties to the 
administrative hearing and are the identical parties named in this action. 
Fourth, appellants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the 
prior administrative hearing. The hearing was conducted before an independent 
hearing examiner. All sides were allowed to present evidence, provide opening 
and closing statements, and to cross-examine witnesses. The hearing examiner's 
decision was then reviewed by a district court that concluded the findings were 
proper and affirmed the decision.

[¶14]   Appellants' failure to appeal the 
district court's decision reviewing the hearing examiner's decision also plays a 
part in our determination. Not only did appellants receive a full and fair 
hearing, they were also provided an opportunity to appeal the decision of the 
district court if they believed it to be in error. They did not do so and 
instead filed this collateral suit. Other courts have barred the subsequent 
action when no appeal was taken from the initial administrative decision. 
Neunzig v. Seaman Unified Sch. Dist., 239 Kan. 654, 722 P.2d 569, 576 (1986); 
Umberfield v. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 185 Colo. 165, 522 P.2d 730, 734 (Colo. 
1974).

[¶15]   Appellants argue that Wyoming Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 12.12 specifically allows them to bring this suit. Rule 
12.12 provides:

The relief, review, or 
redress available in suits for injunction against agency action or enforcement, 
in actions for recovery of money, in actions for a declaratory judgment based on 
agency action or inaction, in actions seeking any common law writ to compel, 
review or restrain agency action shall be available by independent action 
notwithstanding any petition for review.

[¶16]   Appellants assert that W.R.A.P 
12.12 provides authority for the complaint they filed and therefore the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment against them. It is true that Rule 
12.12 allows several forms of relief for those who wish to challenge an agency 
action. However, W.R.A.P. 12.12 does not provide for a collateral attack against 
an agency action when the agency action has already been reviewed in district 
court by a petition for review. In addition, W.R.A.P. 12.12 is not an exception 
to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

[¶17]   Since we determine that collateral 
estoppel applies, we need not reach the other issues raised (statute of 
limitations and governmental immunity act) that support the grant of summary 
judgment. We conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment 
because appellants were collaterally estopped from bringing the 
action.

MOTION TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT

[¶18]   Appellants argue that the district 
court erred by denying their motion to amend their complaint. They argue that 
W.R.C.P. 15 allows for liberal amendment of complaints and that a party can 
serve supplemental pleadings under Rule 15(d). Rule 15 
provides:

(a) Amendments. - 
A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served, or if the pleading is one to which no 
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the 
trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is 
served. Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court 
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. * * *

* * * * * 
*

(d) Supplemental 
pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice 
and upon such terms as are just, permit the party to serve a supplemental 
pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened 
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be 
granted even though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a 
claim for relief or defense.

[¶19]   Whether to permit an amendment or 
supplementation of the pleadings is within the sound discretion of the district 
court. W.R.C.P. 15; Herrig v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487, 490 (Wyo. 1992); Narans v. 
Paulsen, 803 P.2d 358, 363 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶20]   We find no abuse of discretion. 
Appellants' motion to amend was filed four days after the district court had 
issued its decision letter on August 24, 1992. In Narans, we upheld a district 
judge's decision not to allow an amendment of pleadings on the eve of trial, 
Narans, 803 P.2d  at 363, and there is less reason to allow amendment after a 
decision in the case had been made. Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion 
when the district judge denied the motion to amend. Finally, we note that 
although the substantive counts were listed differently in the amended 
complaint, the factual basis of the complaint remained the same and therefore it 
too would have been barred by collateral estoppel. 

CONCLUSION

[¶21]   The district court did not err in 
granting summary judgment as appellants' claims were barred by collateral 
estoppel. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' 
motion to amend their complaint when the motion was made after the decision 
letter had been issued.

[¶22]   Affirmed.