Case Title: J&T Properties, L.L.C. v. Gallagher

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0213

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PRIVATE ROADWAY TO REAL PROPERTY OWNED BY DANIEL GALLAGHER; J & T PROPERTIES, LLC v. DANIEL GALLAGHER2011 WY 112Case Number: S-10-0213Decided: 07/21/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PRIVATE ROADWAY TO REAL PROPERTY OWNED BY 
DANIEL GALLAGHER:J & T PROPERTIES, LLC,Appellant 
(Respondent),v.DANIEL GALLAGHER,Appellee 
(Petitioner).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

R. 
Todd Ingram of Clapp, Ingram & Olheiser, P.C., Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Keith 
R. Nachbar of Keith R. Nachbar, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The district 
court granted Daniel Gallagher a private road across land owned by J & T 
Properties, LLC (J & T).  J 
& T appealed, arguing the private road did not meet the statutory 
requirements because it did not connect directly to a public road and the 
district court erred by not ordering Mr. Gallagher to reimburse J & T for 
the costs of an appraisal establishing the damages to its property from the 
private road.

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm.  

ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      J & T 
presents the following issues on appeal:

 
 

A.   Did 
the district court err in failing to create a private road leading from 
Gallagher's land "to some convenient public road?"

 
 

B.   Did 
the district court err in failing to award J & T costs incurred [in] 
obtaining and presenting its own "before and after" 
appraisal?

 
 
Mr. 
Gallagher restates the issues as:

 
 
1.   Does the private roadway statute, 
Wyo. Stat. § 24-9-101, require joining neighboring landowners in the proceeding 
where the applicant already holds legal and record access to a public road 
across those neighboring lands?

 
 
2.  Did the District Court below commit 
reversible error by declining to order the applicant to pay for the private 
commercial appraiser hired by the landowner?

 
 
J 
& T articulates several issues in its reply brief.  However, just one complies with the 
requirements of W.R.A.P. 7.03, which allows a reply brief only when necessary to 
address new issues raised in the appellee's brief.  The one issue meeting that requirement 
is whether J & T argued in the district court that the rules of civil 
procedure authorized reimbursement of the appraisal fees.  

   

FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Gallagher 
purchased property in an industrial area of Natrona County, just west of J & 
T's property.  When he purchased the 
property, he believed that a series of easements across properties to the east 
provided access to a nearby public road.  
However, Mr. Gallagher soon learned that he did not have an easement 
across J & T's property.  
Consequently, on July 17, 2008, he petitioned the Natrona County Board of 
County Commissioners for a private road across J & T's property.   

 
 
[¶5]      The county 
commissioners concluded that Mr. Gallagher has no legally enforceable access and 
certified the case to the district court.1  The district court appointed viewers and 
appraisers to locate a private road and place a value on the damage to the 
condemned property.  The viewers and 
appraisers recommended condemning a private road along an existing roadway on J 
& T's property.  The private 
road began at Mr. Gallagher's property line and continued east to the eastern 
boundary of J & T's property, where it connected with a series of private 
easements crossing the adjoining properties to a nearby public service 
road.     

 
 
[¶6]      The viewers and 
appraisers set the value of the damage to J & T's property from the private 
road at $1,000, without any evidentiary basis for that amount.  J & T engaged a professional 
appraiser who performed a before-and-after analysis of the impact of the private 
road and concluded that the value of J & T's property was reduced by $8,200 
as a result of the private road.   

 
 
[¶7]      After a hearing, 
the district court accepted the viewers and appraisers' recommendation as to the 
location of the road, but rejected their damages valuation and accepted J & 
T's.  Although the district court 
awarded J & T the higher damage amount, it refused to award other expenses 
requested by J & T, including the cost of the appraisal.  J & T appealed.    

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶8]      Resolution of 
this case requires us to interpret the relevant statutes and court rules.  Because these determinations involve 
issues of law, our standard 
of review is de novo. Dorr v. Smith, Keller & Assoc., 2010 WY 120, ¶ 
11, 238 P.3d 549, 552 (Wyo. 2010).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

A.   
Private 
Road Statute

 
 
[¶9]      J & T argues 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) required that a private road 
directly connect the applicant's landlocked parcel to a public road and the 
district court violated the statute by condemning a private road which connected 
with a series of private easements to reach a public road.  The gist of J & T's argument is that 
Mr. Gallagher should have joined, in the private road action, all of the owners 
of the land he traversed to reach a public road even though he already had 
private easements across their properties.

 
 
[¶10]   The relevant portion of § 
24-9-1012 stated:  

 
 

(a)          
Any 
person whose land has no outlet to, nor 
connection with a public road, may 
file an application in writing with the board of county commissioners in the 
county where his land is located for a 
private road leading from his land to some convenient public road. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added).  This Court applies the 
following principles when interpreting statutory language:

 
 

Statutory 
interpretation is a question of 
law. Our paramount consideration is the legislature's intent as reflected in the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute. Initially, we 
determine whether the statute is clear or ambiguous.

 
 
A 
statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons 
are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability. 
Conversely, a statute is 
ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. If we determine that 
a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.

 
 
In 
interpreting a statute, we will not ignore other statutory provisions pertaining 
to the same subject but will, instead, consider all such provisions in pari 
materia.

 
 

Sorenson 
v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 2010 
WY 101, ¶ 13, 234 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Wyo. 2010), quoting Horse 
Creek Cons. Dist. v. State ex rel. Wyo. Attorney General, 
2009 WY 143, ¶ 14, 221 P.3d 306, 312 (Wyo. 2009) (citations omitted). 

 
 
[¶11]   Section 24-9-101(a) allows a person 
to apply for a private road if he has no outlet to, nor connection with, a public road.  We have interpreted this language as 
allowing a private road application when the petitioner does not have permanent, 
unrestricted, legally enforceable access to his property.  See, e.g., Voss v. Albany County Comm'rs, 2003 WY 
94, 74 P.3d 714 (Wyo. 2003) (holding that personal and/or restricted easements 
do not satisfy the statute's "legally enforceable" access requirement).  On the other hand, if the applicant has 
legally enforceable access, even via a private easement, he is not landlocked 
and is not entitled to a private road.  
See id.  

 
 

[¶12]   Section 
24-9-101(a) sets out the requirements for a private road application and those 
requirements demonstrate that the legislature wanted to encourage landlocked 
property owners to obtain private easements, if possible, rather than apply for 
private roads.  Subsection 
(ii) 
requires the applicant to include a "specific statement as to why the land has 
no legally enforceable access;" subsection (iii) requires a "description of the 
applicant's efforts to purchase a legally enforceable access to a public road;" 
and subsection (vi) requires a "statement as to whether any actions of the 
applicant or any person with the consent and knowledge of the applicant, caused 
the applicant's land to lose or to not have any legally enforceable 
access."  Bearing in mind the 
legislature's obvious preference for private negotiations, it does not follow 
that it would require a landowner to condemn a right of way across property over 
which he already has legally enforceable access or to join parties who had 
previously provided such access. 

 
 

[¶13]   Section 
24-9-101(a) states that the applicant can apply for a private road leading from his land to some convenient 
public road.  The plain meaning of 
"lead" in the context used here is "to serve to bring a person to a place."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 
1281 (2002).  Applying this 
definition, the statute clearly states that the private road must "serve to 
bring a person to" a public road.  
It does not state that the private road has to cover the entire distance 
from the applicant's land to the public way or terminate at a public road.  "When 
the legislature omits language from a statute, we consider the omission intentional."  Office of State Lands and Inv. v. Mule Shoe 
Ranch, Inc., 2011 WY 68, ¶ 22, 252 P.3d 951, 957 (Wyo. 2011), 
citing Stutzman v. Office of Wyo. State Engineer, 2006 WY 30, ¶ 16, 
130 P.3d 470, 475 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶14]   Closs v. Schell, 2006 WY 95, 139 P.3d 435 (Wyo. 2006) involved a private road that connected to a private easement 
rather than a public road.  The 
Schells applied for a private road along an existing two track road across two 
different properties, the Closses' and Mr. Gronski's, to a public road.  Prior to the initial hearing on the 
Schells' application, Mr. Gronski granted the Schells an easement across his 
property and was dismissed from the private road action.  Although the issue of whether it was 
proper for a private road to terminate somewhere other than at a public road was 
not specifically raised, we did not indicate that there was anything wrong with 
the Schells using a private road and the Gronski easement to gain access to a 
public road.  The decision indicates 
that once Mr. Gronski agreed to a private easement, it was appropriate to 
dismiss him from the action.  Id., ¶¶ 3-6, 139 P.3d  at 
438-39.

 
 
[¶15]   We have long said that "convenience 
and reason should prevail in the establishment of roads," and these policies are 
included within the private road statutes.  
See, e.g., Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 462 (Wyo. 
1995).  The statutes are also 
intended to provide "a readily available, economically affordable, and time 
efficient method to obtain a means of access to property."  Martens v. Johnson County Board of Comm'rs, 
954 P.2d 375, 380 (Wyo. 1998).  
By interpreting the private road statutes to allow an applicant to use 
other means of legal access together with a private road to cure his access 
problem, we fulfill the policies of reason, convenience and economic 
affordability.  Moreover, we avoid 
the unsatisfactory result that would arise if an applicant who had gone to the 
time and expense of securing private easements along part of his way then had to 
bring those same people into the private road condemnation action.  The district court correctly interpreted 
§ 24-9-101 as allowing the condemnation of a private road even though it did not 
connect directly with a public road and properly refused to require Mr. 
Gallagher to join the owners of land over which he already had easements.3  

   
 

B.   
Costs

 
 
[¶16]   J & T maintains that the 
district court erred by denying it reimbursement for the costs of securing and 
presenting the appraisal used in determining its damages.  Specifically, it requested $2,500 for 
the appraisal and $130 for the costs of having the appraiser testify at the 
hearing.   

 
 

[¶17]   Section 24-9-101(f) stated:  "The 
board may assess to the applicant costs for acting on the application under this 
section and W.S. 24-9-103 . . . ."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-103(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) stated:  "In addition to paying any damages to be 
suffered by the affected parties having an interest in the land through which 
the access shall be provided, the applicant shall be responsible for obtaining 
and for paying for any engineering and construction costs incurred concerning 
the location and construction of the road."  The district court reviewed the private 
road statutes and concluded they did not authorize assessment of the appraisal 
costs to Mr. Gallagher.  We 
agree.  

 
 
[¶18]   The plain language of § 24-9-101(f) 
addresses the costs the county commissioners, or in this case the district 
court, may assess for "acting on the application," which would include things 
such as paying the statutorily mandated viewers and appraisers and the costs of 
the court-ordered survey.  The costs 
of acting on the application do not logically include the expenses incurred by 
either party for the preparation of their respective case, including the 
retention of experts.  On its face, 
§ 24-9-103(d) also does not authorize an award of appraisal costs.  The statute is very specific and only 
imposes upon the applicant the responsibility to pay for engineering and 
construction costs.   

 
 
[¶19]   We certainly understand that it may 
seem inequitable to require J & T, the respondent in this private road 
action, to pay the costs of the appraisal, especially when the district court 
expressly rejected the viewers and appraisers' damages calculation and assessed 
a much higher damages amount in accordance with J & T's independent 
appraisal.  However, we are limited 
by the statutory language and there is simply nothing in the relevant statutes 
to support awarding J & T the costs of the appraisal.  The legislature is, therefore, the 
appropriate forum to address the propriety of awarding such costs in private 
road actions.

 
 
[¶20]   J & T also argues that, because 
§ 24-9-101(m) specifically provides that private road actions certified to the 
district court shall be treated as civil actions, the rules of civil procedure 
apply.4  It claims that it was the prevailing 
party on the damages issue and, consequently, W.R.C.P. 54(d) and U.R.D.C. 501 
authorized the district court to require Mr. Gallagher to pay the appraisal 
expenses.  In particular, J & T 
argues that Rule 501(a)(3)(B)(ii) authorizes the district court to award it $130 
for expert witness fees and Rule 501(a)(3)(F) allowed an award of $2,500 for the 
costs for preparing the appraisal.

 
 
[¶21]   W.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) provides 
generally that the prevailing party is entitled to its 
costs:

 
 
(1) 
Costs Other Than Attorney's Fees. Except when express provision therefor 
is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs other than attorney's fees 
shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; but costs against the State of Wyoming, its officers or agencies, shall 
be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.

 
 
U.R.D.C. 
501(a) delineates the allowable costs in civil cases and provides in relevant 
part:  

 
 
(1) 
Filing of Certificate of Costs. 
- Within 20 days after entry of the final judgment allowing costs to 
the prevailing party, a certificate of costs shall be filed and copy served upon 
opposing counsel. 

. 
. . . 

(3) 
Allowable 
Costs.

. 
. . .

(B) 
Witness fees.

. 
. . .

(ii) 
Expert witness fees shall be allowed at the rate of $25.00 per day or such other 
amount as the court may allow according to the circumstances of the case. If the 
amount allowed constitutes a higher hourly rate than $25.00 per day, this higher 
amount is allowable only for the time that the expert witness actually 
testified. Time charged in preparation for providing testimony and/or standing 
by awaiting the call to give testimony is not allowable as costs, except at the 
rate of $25.00 per day.

. 
. . .

 (F) Exhibits Received in Evidence. The 
expense of preparing exhibits received in evidence, including 8 by 10 
photographs (but not enlargements), videotapes, models, and other demonstrative 
evidence are allowable as taxable costs at the discretion of the 
court.

 
 
[¶22]   Mr. Gallagher claims that J & T 
did not argue to the district court that it was entitled to costs under the 
rules of civil procedure.  "[W]e 
typically do not address arguments that were not raised in, or argued to, the 
district court unless they are fundamental or jurisdictional in nature."  Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Caballo Coal 
Co., 2011 WY 24, ¶ 22, 246 P.3d 867, 873 (Wyo. 2011).  With regard to the expert witness fees, 
J & T concedes it did not present any evidence to the district court about 
the appraiser's charge for testifying at the hearing because it did not receive 
his $130 bill until later.  Given 
its failure to present the matter to the district court, we will not consider it 
on appeal.  

 
 

[¶23]   Although J & T did request the 
district court award it the $2,500 appraisal fee, it did not specifically argue 
to the district court that it was entitled to recover the costs of the appraisal 
pursuant to Rule 54(d) and U.R.D.C. 501.  
Even 
now, J & T provides no authority or cogent argument to establish that it was 
the prevailing party or that an appraisal fee qualifies as an "expense of 
preparing exhibits received in evidence" under Rules 54(d) and 
501(a)(3)(F).  Egan v. Egan, 2010 WY 164, ¶ 15, 244 P.3d 1045, 1050 (Wyo. 2010); Pittard v. Great Lakes Aviation, 2007 WY 64, 
¶ 44, 156 P.3d 964, 977 (Wyo. 2007).  
The argument was not properly presented to the district court or this 
Court, and we refuse to consider it further.  

 
 
[¶24]   Affirmed. 

 
FOOTNOTES

 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(m) (LexisNexis 2008) allowed the board of 
county commissioners to certify the case to the district court: 

 
 
If at the completion of the hearing the board finds that the applicant 
has satisfied the requirements of this section and access is necessary because 
the applicant has no legally enforceable access, the board shall, within twenty 
(20) days of so finding, certify the application directly to the district court 
unless the board elects to retain jurisdiction. 

 
 
The 
authority for certification is currently found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(h) 
and (m) (LexisNexis 2011).  

2This same language is included in the current version of the 
statute.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 
(LexisNexis 2011).  

3J & T argues in its reply brief that Mr. Gallagher did not present 
sufficient evidence that he had legally enforceable access across the other 
properties.  "The purpose of a reply brief is to allow the appellant to 
reply to new issues raised in 
the appellee's brief; not to raise new issues himself."  Mattern v. State, 2007 WY 24, ¶ 1 n.1, 
151 P.3d 1116, 1120 (Wyo. 2007).  We 
will not, therefore, consider J & T's new issue.  

4Subsection (m) was amended in 2009 to specifically state that the rules 
of civil procedure apply to private road actions before the district court.  Because we conclude J & T did not 
properly present the issue of whether the rules of civil procedure required 
assessment of the appraisal costs, we do not need to consider whether the 
statutory change had any effect in this case.