Case Title: Long v. State

Citation: 371 Md. 72

Docket Number: 79/00

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Derrick D. Long, Sr. v. State of Maryland
No. 79, September Term, 2000
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT; ORDER; DECREE; CONSENT JUDGMENT; CONSENT
ORDER; CONSENT DECREE; CHILD SUPPORT; SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT ACTION; CIVIL CONTEMPT; PURGE PROVISIONS;
INCARCERATION; SETTLEMENTS; CONTRACT; CONTRACT
CONSTRUCTION; PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS; FAIR, ADEQUATE
AND REASONABLE; ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Where the parties to a support enforcement action have agreed to settle the
dispute by consent order, the appellate court lacks authority to enter a modified
order that does not reflect the parties agreement without giving the parties notice
and an opportunity to be heard. 
Circuit Court for Washington County
Case No. 21-P-96-003926 PA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 79
   
 September Term, 2000
                                                                            
DERRICK D. LONG, SR.
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                            
                             Bell, C.J.
                             Eldridge
                             Raker
                             Wilner
                             Cathell
                             Harrell
                             Battaglia
                             JJ.
                                                                            
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
                                                                            
Filed:    September 17, 2002
The issue this case presents for resolution is the propriety of entry, by the Court of
Special Appeals, as a consent judgment in settlement of a contempt case pending appeal,  of
an order that is inconsistent with the consent order filed by the parties.    In September, 1999,
the State filed in the Circuit Court for Washington County a petition for contempt alleging
that Derrick D. Long, Sr., the petitioner, was in contempt of court for failing to comply with
that court’s child support orders.   Following a hearing in April 2000, the Circuit Court found
the petitioner in constructive civil contempt and, notwithstanding its acknowledgment  that
he did not have the present ability to pay a purge amount, sentenced him to imprisonment for
a specified period, subject to purger upon the payment of $700.  
The petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and, joined by the
State, filed a joint motion to vacate the contempt order, together with a proposed consent
order to facilitate the petitioner’s immediate release from incarceration.  As jointly requested,
the intermediate appellate court vacated the petitioner’s sentence; however, instead of
entering the order submitted by the parties, it  entered a modified order.  That order remanded
the case to the Circuit Court to determine conditions of release that would ensure the
petitioner’s appearance at further proceedings.  
We granted the petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari, Long v. State, 360 Md. 485, 759
A.2d 230 (2000),  stayed enforcement of the Court of Special Appeal’s order, and ordered
the petitioner immediately released from incarceration.   We shall reverse the judgment of
the Court of Special Appeals.
1  Maryland Rule 15-207 governs constructive contempt proceedings in general. 
Subsection (e), pertaining  to constructive civil contempt proceedings based on
nonpayment of child support, provides: 
“Constructive civil contempt - Support enforcement action.-   
 “(1) Applicability.- This section applies to proceedings for constructive
civil contempt based on an alleged failure to pay spousal or child support,
including an award of emergency family maintenance under Code, Family
Law Article, Title 4, Subtitle 5.  
“(2) Petitioner’s burden of proof.- Subject to subsection (3) of this section,
the court may make a finding of contempt if the petitioner proves by clear
and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor has not paid the
amount owed, accounting from the  effective date of the support order
through the date of the contempt hearing.
“(3) When a finding of contempt may not be made.- The court may not
make a finding of contempt if the alleged contemnor  proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that (A) from the date of the support order
through the date of the contempt hearing  the alleged contemnor (i) never
had the ability to pay more than the amount actually paid and (ii) made
reasonable efforts to become or remain employed or otherwise lawfully
obtain the funds necessary to make payment, or (B) enforcement by
contempt is barred by limitations as to each unpaid spousal or child support
payment for which the  alleged contemnor does not make the proof set forth
2
I.
The petitioner is the father of Kianna L. Long, born September 3, 1995.  On March
14, 1997, the Circuit Court for Washington County ordered him to pay $25.00 per week for
Kianna’s support.   The petitioner did not comply with this order, or subsequent support
orders issued by the court.  
When the petitioner, still not in compliance with the support orders, failed to appear
at an enforcement hearing pertaining to one of the support orders, the State filed a petition,
pursuant to Md. Rule 15-207(e),1 requesting that he be held in contempt.  At the hearing on
in subsection (3) (A) of this section.  
“(4) Order.- Upon a finding of constructive civil contempt for failure to pay
spousal or child support, the court shall issue a written order that specifies
“(A) the amount of the arrearage for which enforcement by contempt is not
barred by limitations, (B) any sanction imposed for the contempt, and (C)
how the contempt may be purged. If the contemnor does not have the
present ability to purge the contempt, the order may include directions that
the contemnor make specified payments on the arrearage at future times and
perform specified acts to enable the contemnor to comply with the direction
to make payments.”  
2  The petitioner was incarcerated, as he confirmed in his testimony, from
September 6, 1999 through November 1, 1999.   When he appeared for the hearing, he
also was incarcerated, having been arrested on January 17, 2000 for driving while his
license was suspended for nonpayment of child support, and being held due to his failure
to appear at the earlier scheduled contempt hearing.
3
that petition, evidence was presented that the latest support order required the petitioner to
pay support and an amount toward the arrears he had amassed, but that no payments had been
made.   The evidence also was that, although payments had been suspended during two
periods when the petitioner was incarcerated,2 the current amount of arrearage was
$2,975.00.  Admitting that he had no physical or mental impairment that prevented his
working, that in May, 1999, “off and on,” until his incarceration in September, he worked
at Labor Ready,  and that if he were not incarcerated he would be able to return to that
employment, the petitioner offered his intermittent incarceration and his inability to find
employment following his release in November as the only explanation for failing to pay
child support.  He testified that  he had no personal assets of any kind, including a car, and
that the mortgage on his home, which he had owned with his mother and sister, had been
3  During the proceedings, the court commented, in response to defense counsel’s
argument that the court could not continue the petitioner’s incarceration due to his
inability to pay a purge amount, that the petitioner “can pay ‘cause he says he can go back
to work at Labor Ready.”’
4
foreclosed.  
The court found the petitioner in contempt for his failure to pay child support from
May 1999 to September 1999.    Despite defense counsel’s argument that imprisonment
could not be the sanction for contempt, given the petitioner’s inability to pay any purge
amount, and specifically finding  that the petitioner did not have the present ability to pay,3
the court nevertheless sentenced him to incarceration in the Division of Correction, subject
to his paying $700 to purge the contempt.    It ruled:
“All right, based on prior adjudications and the fact that okay, sure, he can’t
pay now ‘cause he’s in jail for failure to appear, which I’ve dismissed since
I’ve found him in contempt, but there was just a blatant disregard back in May,
June, July and August.    I can’t hide that.    He’s in contempt. ... You seem to
have a lot of problems not only not paying child support but apparently
operating vehicles and everything else.    If we can go out and buy a house and
start paying on a house, we certainly can contribute money towards child
support which apparently you didn’t think you wanted to do.  [It is the
s]entence of this Court [that] you be committed to DOC for a period of thirteen
months. ...”
 The petitioner noted an immediate appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  While that
appeal was pending, the petitioner and the State filed a Joint Motion to Vacate Sentence, in
which they agreed, relying on Thrower v. State ex rel. Bureau of Support Enforcement, 358
Md. 146, 747 A.2d 634 (2000),  that “the trial court did not find a present ability to purge,
but, to the contrary, found that [the petitioner] lacked such an ability” and that “where [the
4  Md. Rule 2-612, pertaining to consent judgments, provides that “[t]he court may
enter a judgment at any time by consent of the parties.”
5  The overlapping terms, “judgment,” “order,” and “decree,” though often used
interchangeably, have different meanings.   Maryland Rule 1-202(n) defines a “judgment”
as "any order of court final in its nature entered pursuant to these rules."   Generally, the
term “order” refers to the written direction or command issued by the court, see Black’s
Law Dictionary 1123 (7th ed. 1999), and filed with the court clerk, as required by Md.
5
petitioner] has been incarcerated [over four months] and lacks the ability to pay a purge, ...
it is appropriate that he should be released immediately from incarceration.”   Attached to the
motion was a proposed order, which, if signed, would have vacated the petitioner’s sentence
and ordered his immediate release, both without remand for further proceedings.4  
Rather than the proposed order submitted by the parties, however, the Court of Special
Appeals issued its own order, in which, after acknowledging the parties’ agreement that the
petitioner be immediately released from incarceration, the court vacated the Circuit Court
contempt judgment, remanded the case to that court “for further proceedings that conform
to the requirements of Md. Rule 15-207" and “ORDERED that [the petitioner] be taken
without unnecessary delay to the Circuit Court for Washington County so a judge of that
court can determine what - if any- conditions of release will reasonably assure [the
petitioner’s] appearance at those further proceedings required by this Order.”    
II.
The petitioner, joined by the State, argues that, where the parties to  civil contempt
proceedings agree to settle the case while it is on appeal and submit their agreement to the
court in the form of a proposed consent order,5 the appellate court may not enter a modified
Rule 2-601.  The term “decree,” which traditionally referred to a judicial decision in a
court of equity, as contrasted with a judgment of a court of law, may be used to refer to
any judgment or court order.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 419 (7th ed. 1997).   
6
consent order that does not reflect the parties’ agreement.  Further, the petitioner maintains
that, because the joint motion and proposed consent order filed by the parties were legally
correct under Thrower v. State, supra, there was no basis for the Court of Special Appeals
to reject any of its substantive provisions.
Moreover, the petitioner asserts, while the court to whom a consent order is submitted,
the Court of Special Appeals in this case, properly may  reject the proposed order, it does not
have the authority to enter  its own order disposing of the appeal.  The entry of a modified
order that does not give effect to the parties’ agreement, he concludes,  deprives the parties
of the benefit of their bargain and, simultaneously,  of the alternative right to litigate the case
through briefing and oral argument on the merits.  The State agrees generally with the latter
point, but believes that, in this case, where the intermediate appellate court erred was in
failing to afford the parties an opportunity to be heard on why their proposed order should
be altered or to address, and remedy, any perceived deficiencies. 
Finally, the petitioner argues that a court may not incarcerate a person pending a
hearing pursuant to Md. Rule 15-207(e).  He submits that, by ordering the case remanded for
the trial court to “determine what - if any - conditions of release w[ould] reasonably assure
[the petitioner’s] appearance at those further proceedings required by [its] Order,” the  Court
6  “[A] consent judgment is a judgment and an order of court.  Its only distinction
is that it is a judgment that a court enters at the request of the parties.”  Jones v. Hubbard,
356 Md. 513, 528, 740 A.2d 1004, 1013 (1999).
7
of Special Appeals authorized the petitioner’s continued incarceration for constructive civil
contempt, despite the uncontroverted evidence that he lacked the present ability to purge the
contempt.  The petitioner further challenges the broad remand ordered by the intermediate
appellate court on the basis that it allows, contrary to Md. Rule 15-207 and this Court’s cases,
the trial court  to order his continued incarceration upon a finding that that is the only way
to ensure his appearance at further contempt proceedings.  
III.
A consent judgment or consent order is an agreement of the parties with respect to the
resolution of the issues in the case or in settlement of the case, that has been embodied in a
court order and entered by the court, thus evidencing its acceptance by the court.6  Jones v.
Hubbard, 356 Md. 513, 529, 740 A.2d 1004, 1013 (1999);  Chernick v. Chernick, 327 Md.
470, 478, 610 A.2d 770, 774 (1992) (“Consent judgments or decrees are essentially
agreements entered into by the parties which must be endorsed by the court.”)    See  Black’s
Law Dictionary 846 (7th ed. 1999); Montgomery County v. Revere Nat’l Corp., 341 Md. 366,
378, 671 A.2d 1, 7 (1996).     Consent judgments are hybrids, having attributes of both
contracts and judicial decrees.  Chernick, 327 Md. at 478, 610 A. 2d at 774.   While this
“dual character ... has resulted in different treatment for different purposes,”  Local Number
93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters  v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3073,
8
92 L.Ed.2d 405, 421 (1986), consistent with other courts that have addressed the issue, see
Jones, 356 Md. at 530-32,  740 A.2d at 1013-14, this Court has repeatedly held that “consent
judgments should normally be given the same force and effect as any other judgment,
including judgments rendered after litigation.”  Jones, 356 Md. at 532, 740 A. 2d at 1014.
See  Kirsner v. Fleischmann, 261 Md. 164, 170-71, 274 A.2d 339, 343 (1971).   Thus, “[a]
consent decree no doubt embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is
contractual in nature.  But it is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be
reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally
applicable to other judgments and decrees.” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S.
367, 378, 112 S.Ct. 748, 757, 116 L.Ed.2d 867, 882 (1992).  
This is not to say that the contractual aspect of the consent judgment is unimportant.
On the contrary, the consent judgment memorializes the agreement of the parties, pursuant
to which they have relinquished the right to litigate the controversy in exchange for a certain
outcome and/or, perhaps, expedience.    In United States v. Armour & Co., the United States
Supreme Court explained:
“Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation
has produced agreement on their precise terms.  The parties waive their right
to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time,
expense, and inevitable risk of litigation.  Naturally, the agreement reached
normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and
elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won
had they proceeded with the litigation.  Thus the decree itself cannot be said
to have a purpose; rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each
other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes
as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve.  For
9
these reasons, the scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four
corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the
parties to it.  Because the defendant has, by the decree, waived his right to
litigate the issues raised, a right guaranteed to him by the Due Process Clause,
the conditions upon which he has given that waiver must be respected, and the
instrument must be construed as it is written, and not as it might have been
written had the plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theories in
litigation.”
402 U.S. 673, 681-82, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 1757, 29 L. Ed. 2d 256, 263 (1971) (footnote omitted).
It is the parties’ agreement that defines the scope of the decree.    When there is an
issue as to the scope of the judgment, therefore, it is to the parties’ agreement that we look
and interpret.   Where the agreement is embodied in the judgment, the court having approved
it, without modification,  construction of the judgment is construction of the agreement of
the parties.   Where, however, as here,  the court has modified the agreement, we look to the
agreement as submitted by the parties.    In either case, we determine what the parties meant
by what they plainly and unambiguously expressed, not what they intended the agreement
to mean.   Roged, Inc. v. Paglee, 280 Md. 248, 254, 372 A.2d 1059, 1062 (1977).  This is the
objective test of contract interpretation, the rule in Maryland: “[t]he written language
embodying the terms of an agreement will govern the rights and liabilities of the parties,
irrespective of the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the contract, unless the
written language is not susceptible of a clear and definite understanding, or unless there is
fraud, duress or mutual mistake.”   Slice v. Carozza Properties, Inc., 215 Md. 357, 368, 137
A.2d 687, 693 (1958). See Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490, 506-07, 784 A.2d 1086, 1095
(2001); Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 178, 776 A.2d 645, 653 (2001); Wells
10
v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 363 Md. 232, 251, 768 A.2d 620, 630 (2001); Auction &
Estate Reps., Inc. v. Ashton, 354 Md. 333,  340-41, 731 A.2d 441, 445 (1999); Calomiris v.
Woods, 353 Md. 425, 436, 727 A.2d 358, 363 (1999).  
 
We have stated that “[a]s long as the basic requirements to form a contract are present,
there is no reason to treat such a settlement agreement differently than other contracts which
are binding.”  Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 219, 406 A.2d 922, 928 (1979).    In Chernick v.
Chernick, 327 Md. 470, 610 A.2d 770 (1992), we held that where parties “stipulate to terms
embodied in a proposed consent order, the fact that a court must approve and sign the order
does not affect the parties’ ability to reach a valid agreement.” Id. at 479, 610 A.2d at 774.
Treating settlement agreements in civil cases contemplating a consent judgment,
including their interpretation, as any other binding contract “is consistent with the public
policy dictating that courts should ‘look with favor upon the compromise or settlement of law
suits in the interest of efficiency and economical administration of justice and the lessening
of friction and acrimony.” Elza, 286 Md. at 219, 406 A. 2d at 928 (quoting Chertkof v. Harry
C. Weiskittel Co., 251 Md. 544, 550, 248 A.2d 373, 377 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 974,
89 S.Ct. 1467, 22 L.Ed.2d 754 (1969));  see also Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md.
452, 466-67, 713 A.2d 962, 969 (1998) (“the policy of this State is to encourage parties to
negotiate compromises or settlements of law suits”); General Motors v. Lahocki, 286 Md.
714, 727, 410 A.2d 1039, 1046 (1980) (“The public policy is to encourage settlements.”);
Sisson v.Baltimore, 51 Md. 83, 95-96 (1879) (“The law always favors compromises and
amicable adjustments of  disputes, rather than compel parties to resort to litigation and it
7  There,  this Court, quoting 1 Story's, Commentaries on Equity §§ 131-32, said:
 
“ ‘If compromises are otherwise unobjectionable they will be binding, and
the right will not prevail against the agreement of the parties, for the right
must always be on one side or the other, and there would be an end of
compromises if they might be overthrown upon any subsequent
ascertainment of right contrary thereto.'   The doctrine of compromises rests
on this foundation.”
Id. at 248.
8  The right to appeal in a contempt case is governed by Maryland Code (1974,
1998 Replacement Volume) § 12-304 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.   It
provides:
11
would be strange if, in the absence of clear evidence of fraud or mistake, the parties were not
bound and concluded after what has taken place in respect to this award.”).  The public
policy of encouraging settlements is so strong that settlement agreements will not be
disturbed even though the parties may discover later that settlement may have been based on
a mistake or if one party simply chooses to withdraw its consent to the settlement.  Chernick,
327 Md. 470, 481-83, 610 A.2d 770, 775-76 (1992).    In Fiege v. Boehm, 210 Md. 352, 360,
123 A.2d 316, 321 (1955), citing Hartle v. Stahl, 27 Md. 157, 172 (1867), our predecessors
noted: “(1) that forbearance to assert a claim before institution of suit, if not in fact a legal
claim, is not of itself sufficient consideration to support a promise; but (2) that a compromise
of a doubtful claim or a relinquishment of a pending suit is good consideration for a promise;
and (3) that in order to support a compromise, it is sufficient that the parties entering into it
thought at the time that there was a bona fide question between them, although it may
eventually be found that there was in fact no such question.”   See also McClellan v.
Kennedy, 8 Md. 230 (1855).7
Ordinarily, no appeal will lie from a consent judgment.8   Osztreicher v. Juanteguy,
“(a) Any person may appeal from any order or judgment passed to preserve
the power or vindicate the dignity of the court and adjudging him in
contempt of court, including an interlocutory order, remedial in nature,
adjudging any person in contempt, whether or not a party to the action.
“(b) This section does not apply to an adjudication of contempt for violation
of an interlocutory order for the payment of alimony.”  
12
338 Md. 528, 534, 659 A.2d 1278, 1281 (1995); Globe American v. Chung, 322 Md. 713,
716-17, 589 A.2d 956, 957 (1991); see also Franzen v. Dubinok, 290 Md. 65, 68, 427 A.2d
1002, 1004 (1981); Long v. Runyeon, 285 Md. 425, 429-430, 403 A.2d 785, 788 (1979);
Suburban Dev. Corp. v. Perryman, 281 Md. 168, 171, 377 A.2d 1164, 1165 (1977); First
Federated Commodity Trust Corp. v. Comm'r, 272 Md. 329, 332, 322 A.2d 539, 542 (1974);
Lohss and Sprenkle v. State, 272 Md. 113, 118-119, 321 A.2d 534, 538 (1974); Rocks v.
Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 630, 217 A.2d 531, 541 (1966); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schloss, 165
Md. 18, 24, 166 A. 599, 601 (1933).  This is so because “entry of a judgment by consent
implies that the terms and conditions have been agreed upon” and that the parties have
consented to its entry.  Chernick, 327 Md. at 484, 610 A.2d at 776.  By agreeing  to settle
their dispute, the parties give up any meritorious claims or defenses they may have had in
order to avoid further litigation.  E.g., Fiege v. Boehm, 210 Md. 352, 360, 123 A.2d 316, 321
(1956).  
On the other hand, a court’s refusal to enter a consent judgment submitted by the 
parties is reviewable for an abuse of discretion.   E.g.,  State v. Smith, 295 N.J. Super. 399,
407, 685 A. 2d 73, 77 (1996); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F. 2d 1358, 1361-62
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. City of Miami, Florida, 614 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1980);
rehearing en banc, United States v. City of Miami, Florida, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam); Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F. 2d 1170, 1177 (7th Cir. 1985); Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Randolph, 736 F. 2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984).     Generally, the test
13
to be applied by the trial court is whether the settlement reached by the parties is “fair,
adequate, and reasonable.”  United States v. City of Miami, Florida, 614 F. 2d at 1330.   See
Randolph, 736 F. 2d at 529 (“Unless a consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable,
it ought to be approved”), Donovan, 752 F. 2d at 1177 (decree is “reasonable”).
Moreover, 
“[w]hile the court may either approve or deny the issuance of a consent decree,
generally it is not entitled to change the terms of the agreement stipulated to
by the parties. ...If the court discerns a problem with a stipulated agreement,
it should advise the parties of its concern and allow them an opportunity to
revise the agreement.”
United States v. Colorado, 937 F. 2d 505, 509 (10th Cir. 1991)(citations omitted).  See  
Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 655 n.1 (2d Cir. 1982) (“the district court judge
should not take it upon himself to modify the terms of the proposed settlement decree, nor
should he participate in any bargaining for better terms”) (citation omitted); United States v.
City of Miami, Fla., 664 F.2d at 441 (in approving a settlement, trial court “need only
determine that the settlement is fair, adequate, reasonable and appropriate under the
particular facts and that there has been valid consent by the concerned parties.  Objectors
must be given reasonable notice and their objections heard and considered); Hanlon v.
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The settlement must stand or fall in its
entirety.”); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 630
(9th Cir. 1982) (The court does not have the authority “to delete, modify or substitute certain
provisions,” rather, the settlement must stand or fall in its entirety.); see also Thibbitts v.
Crowley, 539 N.E.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Mass. 1989); In re Liquidation of Nat'l Colonial Ins. Co.,
892 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Kan. App 1995); Tridyn Industries, Inc. v. American Mutual Liability
Insurance Company, 264 S.E.2d 357, 359 (N.C. App. 1980);  McEntire v. McEntire,  706
S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. Ct. of App. 4th Dist. 1986); Haller v. Wallis, 573 P.2d 1302, 1305
9  Appeal also lies from an order striking a judgment or decree that has become
enrolled from an order refusing to set aside such an enrolled judgment or decree.   First
Federated Commodity Trust Corp. v. Commissioner of Securities for Maryland, 272 Md.
329, 333, 322 A.2d 539, 543 (1974)
10  It is interesting to note that the State did not negotiate, and, therefore, apparently
did not contemplate or desire, a remand for further proceedings.   Clearly, it is the State
that ordinarily determines whether and when to initiate civil contempt proceedings.
14
(Wash. 1978).    Thus, an appeal lies when, as here, the court, rather than the consent
judgment proposed, enters another, modified one. Thibbitts, 539 N.E.2d at  1037, n. 5.9
The Motion to Vacate Sentence embodied the parties’ agreement in resolution of this
civil contempt case.    It, together with the proposed order, constituted the consent judgment
which they requested the Court of Special Appeals to enter.   As we have seen, the consent
judgment would have vacated the petitioner’s sentence and ordered his immediate release
from incarceration.    It did not provide for remand to the Circuit Court for further
proceedings.    It was for this outcome for which the petitioner bargained, giving up his right
to litigate the civil contempt finding entered against him. 
Instead of entering the consent judgment as submitted, the intermediate appellate court
modified it and, as modified, entered it.   While vacating the petitioner’s sentence as the
consent judgment requested, rather than ordering his immediate release as the consent
judgment also requested, the court remanded the case for further civil contempt proceedings10
and a pretrial determination of the petitioner’s eligibility for release pending those
proceedings.    The court apparently noticed a void in the agreement reached by the parties
and, by its modified order, sought to fill it.
11  In addition to their settlement concerns, both the petitioner and the State,
especially the State, are interested in assuring that the law is followed, as the Joint Motion
to Vacate Sentence makes clear.
15
We agree with the petitioner and the State that the Court of Special Appeals erred
when it entered the modified order rather than the proposed consent order jointly submitted
by the parties.  The modified order materially altered the agreement reached by the parties:
by ordering a remand for further proceedings and a pretrial release determination, it is totally
inconsistent with their agreement that the petitioner be released immediately from
incarceration.  Thus,  as the parties correctly point out, by entering the modified consent
order the intermediate appellate court improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the
parties, and, in the process, undermined the settlement agreement at issue, and consent
judgments in general, contrary to the State’s longstanding policy of encouraging settlements.
As to this, we are mindful of our admonition in Roged, Inc. v. Paglee, 280 Md. 248, 372
A.2d 1059 (1977), where we  held that a trial court properly declined to hear evidence
regarding the construction of a consent decree because if, in fact, the decree “failed to
provide for certain contingencies, this was a void to be filled by the draftsmen, not by the
courts.”  Id. at 254, 372 A.2d at 1062.   That action also deprived both of them of the benefit
of their bargain and the petitioner of the alternative right to litigate the dispute.11   
Furthermore, because the purpose of imprisoning the contemnor is remedial,  Lynch
v. Lynch, 342 Md. 509, 519, 677 A.2d 584, 589 (1996), i.e., “to preserve and enforce the
rights of private parties to a suit and to compel obedience to orders and decrees primarily to
16
benefit such parties,” Jones v. State, 351 Md. 264, 279-80, 718 A. 2d 222, 230-31 (1998),
this Court consistently, and emphatically, has held that a civil contemnor may be incarcerated
only when he or she has been found to have “the present ability to purge the contempt.”
Thrower, 358 Md. at 160-61, 747 A. 2d at 643; Jones, 351 Md. at 281, 718 A.2d at 231;
Lynch, 342 Md. at 520, 677 A. 2d at 590; Ott v. Frederick County Dept. of Social Services,
345 Md. 682, 688-89, 694 A.2d 101, 105 (1997); Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347,
357, 464 A.2d 228, 233 (1983); Elzey v. Elzey, 291 Md. 369, 374, 435 A.2d 445, 447 (1981);
State v. Roll & Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 728, 298 A.2d 867, 876 (1973); Soldano v. Soldano,
258 Md. 145, 146, 265 A.2d 263, 264 (1970); Johnson v. Johnson, 241 Md. 416, 420, 216
A.2d 914, 917 (1966).   We pointed out in Thrower, 358 Md. at 160,  747 A.2d at 643, that
incarceration for non-support “obviously impinges upon the liberty interest that parents have
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, under the Maryland Constitution,
and under Maryland common law, and thus must comport with both procedural due process
and with the non-Constitutional procedures ordained by this Court.”  
In Jones, we stated: “Before incarceration is imposed, the contemnor must be provided
with the opportunity to show that he or she is unable, rather than unwilling, at that time, to
make the court-ordered payments.” 351 Md. at 281, 718 A. 2d at 231.     An order
incarcerating a defendant without regard to his or her ability to comply with the obligation
underlying it smacks of a criminal sanction, imposed without the constitutionally required
protections.  Hicks v. Feiocks, 485 U.S. 624, 632, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 1430, 99 L. Ed. 2d 721,
17
732 (1988).
Having vacated the petitioner’s sentence, that portion of the court order that remands
the case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings and requires the petitioner to be
processed for pretrial release necessarily has the effect of incarcerating the petitioner without
a hearing and, therefore, without an opportunity to “show that he or she is unable , rather than
unwilling, at th[is] time, to make the court-ordered payments.”     Moreover, because the
pretrial release decision is entrusted to the discretion of the court, to determine “what - if any
- conditions of release will reasonably assure the [petitioner’s] appearance at those further
proceedings,” it is conceivable that the petitioner may remain incarcerated throughout the
further proceedings.   Neither of these situations is contemplated nor authorized by Maryland
Rule 15-207(e) or our cases.    Both violate due process.    Accordingly, the Court of Special
Appeals, lacking the authority to order the petitioner’s detention pending further civil
contempt proceedings, erred.
The cases from other jurisdictions are in accord.  Vermont National Bank v. Taylor,
445 A. 2d 1122, 1125 (N. H. 1982); Hipschman v. Cochran, 683 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F. 3d 564, 576 (7 th Cir. 1998).    In
Hipschman, explaining the invalidity of the contempt order, on the basis of which the
petitioner was arrested and detained, the court pointed out: “In the area of civil contempt, due
process requires that notice to the contemnor and an opportunity to be heard precede the
imposition of sanctions, such as the issuance of an arrest warrant.”  683 So. 2d at 211.  
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Vermont National Bank, observed:
“If procedural due process requires notice and a prior opportunity to be heard
when dealing with the attachment of property, it certainly requires those same
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safeguards when personal liberty is restrained, an undoubtedly more severe
infringement of an individual’s rights than the attachment of property. ...
Because the ex parte capias procedure used by the Keene District Court to
initiate civil contempt proceedings against the defendants resulted in Lorraine
Taylor’s arrest before she had notice or any opportunity to be heard on her
present ability to pay the judgment, use of the writ in this case was
unconstitutional.”
445 A. 2d at 1125 (citations omitted).    
To be sure, the Court of Special Appeals was concerned that the petitioner would not
appear for further child support proceedings, a valid concern in light of the petitioner’s
repeated failure to comply with existing child support orders or to appear at previous
proceedings.  We share the intermediate appellate court’s concern with respect to the
petitioner, in particular, as well as to countless other parents that regularly breach the duty
to pay child support.  As Judge Wilner  explained in Thrower v. State, supra, 358 Md. at 160,
747 A.2d at 642:
“Enforcement of that obligation, when enforcement is required, has never been
easy.  It is a significant problem that has plagued the nation and this State for
many years.  Studies have been conducted, volumes have been written, and
laws have been enacted by both Congress and the State legislatures.  Efforts
to induce compliance are multi-faceted, ranging from employment counseling
and other programs designed to assist in voluntary compliance, to a variety of
intermediate coercive techniques, including wage liens, the interception of tax
refunds and other governmental payments, and the suspension of various
licenses and privileges, to the ultimate and most traditional device of
threatening or actually imposing incarceration, either through ordinary criminal
proceedings or, when the duty of support has been formalized in a court order,
through criminal or civil contempt proceedings.  The ultimate objective of all
these efforts and techniques, including those that are truly punitive in nature,
is not to punish the parent but to provide support for the children.”
Judge Wilner further cautioned:
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“[I]t may be frustrating to judges and masters to have to deal with people who
appear to be deliberately ignoring their child-support obligations, by spending
available funds for other purposes, by voluntary impoverishment, by refusing
to obtain steady employment, or by other techniques–people who return time
and again with excuses that the judge or master finds incredible or inadequate
and who thus seem to flaunt their defiance of properly entered court orders.
Nonetheless, because a person’s liberty is at stake and because it is a judicial
proceeding, both the form and substance of due process and proper judicial
procedure must be observed.  Shortcuts that trample on these requisites and
conclusions that are based on hunch rather than on evidence are not allowed.”
Id. at 160-61, 747 A.2d at 642.   
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR WASHINGTON
COUNTY.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY THE STATE OF MARYLAND.