Case Title: Elisha Gooden, as personal representative of the estate of Tyrone Gooden, deceased v. City of Talladega and Daniel Dill

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1041780

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:03/02/2007 Gooden v. City of Talladega
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1041780
____________________
Elisha Gooden, as personal representative of the estate of
Tyrone Gooden, deceased
v.
City of Talladega and Daniel Dill
Appeal from Talladega Circuit Court 
(CV-05-94)
SMITH, Justice.
Elisha Gooden, as personal representative of the estate
of Tyrone Gooden, deceased, appeals from a summary judgment in
favor of the City of Talladega and Daniel Dill in a wrongful-
1041780
2
death action Elisha filed in the Talladega Circuit Court.  We
affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History
At approximately 3:30 a.m. on November 3, 2002, City of
Talladega police officers Tony Haynes and Charles Courtney
were on patrol when they encountered a black Ford Explorer
sport-utility vehicle 
("SUV") 
with an out-of-state 
tag.  
After
noticing a broken taillight on the SUV, the officers requested
the dispatch officer to "run" the tag in the National Crime
Information Center ("NCIC") database, and the officers then
turned on the blue lights on their patrol car to pull over the
SUV.
However, the driver of the SUV, Tyrone Gooden, did not
pull over.  After traveling a short distance, Tyrone turned
onto Alabama Highway 77 and proceeded north.  The officers
then turned on the siren, and Tyrone pulled the SUV over and
came to a stop approximately 50 yards from the intersection of
Highway 77 and Peters Road.  The officers notified the
dispatcher of the location of the stop, and the dispatcher
informed them that the NCIC database was not then available.
1041780
3
When Officers Haynes and Courtney got out of the patrol
car and began walking towards the SUV, three male passengers
got out of the SUV.  Courtney testified that he and Haynes
told the passengers to get back in the SUV but that the
passengers said they could not because the driver "was
leaving."  Tyrone, whose driver's license had been suspended,
then took off in the SUV, again heading north on Highway 77.
Officer Courtney testified that the SUV almost struck one of
the former passengers as it was leaving.  
As the SUV crossed Peters Road, it passed in front of
the patrol car of Talladega police officer Daniel Dill.  Dill
did not know why Officers Haynes and Courtney had stopped the
SUV, but he had watched the SUV pull over, and he saw two of
the passengers get out as Officers Haynes and Courtney
approached the SUV.  Dill saw the SUV leave the scene, and
when it passed in front of his patrol car, Dill turned on his
blue lights and siren and began pursuing the SUV.  Haynes and
Courtney got back in their patrol car, turned on their lights
and siren, and joined the pursuit.
The vehicles in the chase were traveling at a much higher
rate of speed than the posted speed limit.  Dill testified
1041780
4
that he was traveling at approximately 70 to 80 miles per hour
and was approximately 100 yards from Tyrone's SUV.  Haynes
testified that he was approximately 2 or 3 car lengths behind
Dill and was traveling between 80 and 90 miles per hour.
The chase continued until Tyrone reached the intersection
of Cove Access Road and Howell Cove Road, which was
approximately a mile from Highway 34.  The intersection was
after a slight upgrade and curve in the road, and there was a
four-way stop at that intersection.  Tyrone attempted to
proceed through the intersection at a high rate of speed.
Tyrone's speed caused him to lose control of the SUV and run
off the road, and he was ejected from the vehicle.  
As Dill traveled around the curve, he saw the SUV turned
sideways in the road about 200-300 yards away.  Dill then
locked his brakes and swerved.  He missed the SUV, but he lost
control of his patrol car and left the road.  The airbag in
Dill's patrol car deployed, and he was knocked unconscious but
was not seriously injured.  
Haynes and Courtney stopped near the SUV.  After getting
no response from Dill on the radio, Courtney went to check on
Dill, and Haynes went to check on Tyrone.  Haynes found Tyrone
1041780
5
lying in a ditch near the road.  Tyrone was still alive, but
he was bleeding and severely injured and could not talk.
Tyrone was taken to a hospital, where he died of injuries he
suffered in the wreck.
The distance from where Tyrone was first pulled over to
where the chase ended was approximately 3.2 miles, although at
his deposition Dill estimated the chase had been only about
1.5 miles.  Elisha asserts that the parties stipulated that
the chase lasted two to three minutes.
On October 24, 2003, Tyrone's mother Elisha filed an
action in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama, naming as defendants the City of
Talladega; Alan Watson, the Chief of Police of the City of
Talladega; and Dill.  Elisha asserted four claims, including
a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and various state-law claims.
The defendants moved for a summary judgment, and on August 10,
2004, Elisha conceded that the federal-law claim was due to be
dismissed.  On January 28, 2005, the district court entered a
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the federal-law
1041780
When all federal claims in an action are dismissed with
1
prejudice, § 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state-
law claims.  Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for
the dismissed state-law claims for at least 30 days, thereby
providing an opportunity for the claims to be refiled in a
state court.
6
claim, and, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3),  the court
1
dismissed, without prejudice, Elisha's state-law claims.
On February 16, 2005, Elisha filed a wrongful-death
action in the Talladega Circuit Court, naming as defendants
Dill and the City of Talladega.  Elisha asserted, among other
claims, that Dill and the City "through ... neglect,
carelessness, 
unskillfulness, recklessness, 
willfulness,
and/or wantonness caused Tyrone Gooden's death."
On April 19, 2005, the defendants moved for a summary
judgment.  Among other things, the defendants argued that Dill
was entitled to immunity, that there was not substantial
evidence to show breach of duty or causation, and that
Tyrone's 
contributory 
negligence 
or 
assumption 
of 
the 
risk 
was
the sole cause of his death.
On August 8, 2005, the trial court entered a summary
judgment for the defendants.  Elisha appealed.
1041780
7
Standard of Review
"'This Court's review of a summary judgment is
de novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003).  We apply the same
standard of review as the trial court applied.
Specifically, we must determine whether the movant
has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.
2004).  In making such a determination, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986).  Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce "substantial evidence" as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact.  Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12.
"[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight
and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise
of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."  West v.
Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So. 2d 870,
871 (Ala. 1989).'"
Prince v. Poole, 935 So. 2d 431, 442 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Dow
v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala.
2004)).
Discussion
I.
The parties devote a significant portion of their briefs
to 
discussing whether the 
defendants 
are immune from liability
1041780
8
under § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975, and/or Ex parte Cranman,
792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000).  However, Elisha alleges that
during the high-speed chase the defendants violated a number
of statutes, including § 32-5A-7, Ala. Code 1975, as well as
policies and procedures set forth in the Talladega Police
Department Manual("the TPD manual").  She contends that those
statutes, policies, and procedures limit the discretion
conferred upon 
the defendants; she argues 
that 
the defendants'
alleged 
violations 
of 
those 
statutes, 
policies, 
and 
procedures
prevent the defendants from successfully asserting immunity.
Thus, we must decide whether there is substantial evidence of
causation or of a breach of a duty. 
II.
Elisha argues first that the summary judgment in favor of
the defendants on the negligence claim was not appropriate.
Elisha's allegations of negligence fall into two general
categories:  First, Elisha contends Dill was negligent in
deciding to pursue Tyrone in a high-speed chase; second,
Elisha contends Dill was negligent in carrying out the high-
speed chase.
 Elisha summarizes her position as follows:
"In conclusion, the hi[gh]-speed chase should
have never started, and it should have been
1041780
9
discontinued from the moment it started all the way
until the wreck due to 1) the excessive rates of
speed, 2) the legal speed limit in the area, 3) the
conditions of the road, 4) the fact that Tyrone
drove off the road 5 times, 5) the fact that Tyrone
almost flipped over as he made a left turn in a[n]
SUV, 6) the fact that parties were headed for a
four-way stop sign at high rates of speed on a curvy
road, with a rise on it, 7) the type of area in
which the parties were driving, 8) it was late at
night, 9) the weather conditions, 10) reckless
driving, 11) violation of state statutes, 12)
violation of Talladega's policies and procedures,
13) the cars went past another car and past a
trailer park full of people and their property, and
14) [Talladega Police] Chief Watson committed state
and federal felonies by illegally running a[n] NCIC
check on Tyrone to defend the civil litigation."
(Elisha's brief, pp. 41-42 (emphasis in original).)
The defendants respond to Elisha's arguments with a
number of arguments of their own; however, to affirm the trial
court's summary judgment on the negligence claim we need
consider only the defendants' argument that, even if Dill was
negligent (which the defendants deny), Elisha has not offered
substantial evidence indicating that any negligence by Dill
proximately caused Tyrone to wreck the SUV and caused his
resulting death.
1041780
10
A.
1.
Much of Elisha's brief argues that Dill violated a number
of guidelines set forth in the TPD manual regarding high-speed
pursuits, as well as a number of statutory provisions.  For
example, the TPD manual defines "hot pursuit" as 
"an active attempt by one or more police officers to
apprehend a suspect operating a motor vehicle, while
the suspect is trying to avoid capture by using high
speed driving or other evasive tactics such as
driving off a highway, making sudden or unexpected
movements, or maintaining legal speed but willfully
failing to yield to the officer's signal to stop."
According to the TPD manual:
"The purpose of hot pursuit is the apprehension of
a suspect who refuses to voluntarily comply with the
law requiring drivers to stop upon command.  The
primary goal of the department is the protection of
life and property.  To the extent that a hot pursuit
exposes any officer, suspect, or member of the
general public to an unnecessary risk of harm or
injury then hot pursuit is inconsistent with that
goal.
"Hot pursuit is justified only when the officer
knows or has reasonable grounds to believe the
suspect presents a clear and immediate threat to the
safety of other motorists; has committed or is
attempting to commit a serious felony; or when the
necessity of immediate apprehension outweighs the
level of danger created by the hot pursuit, as in
the case of serious traffic violation such as
[driving while intoxicated]."
1041780
11
Elisha interprets this language as meaning that
"a hi[gh]-speed chase cannot occur unless the
officer knows why he is chasing the suspect and then
makes an informed decision that the chase falls
within one of the three exceptions [i.e., (1) the
suspect presents a clear and immediate threat to
other motorists' safety; (2) the suspect has
committed or is attempting to commit a serious
felony; or (3) the level of danger created by the
high-speed chase is outweighed by the necessity of
immediately apprehending the suspect]."
(Elisha's brief, pp. 24-25.)  Elisha claims that, in deciding
to initiate hot pursuit of Tyrone, Dill violated the TPD
manual.  In particular, Elisha asserts:
"Tyrone Gooden was pulled over for a broken
taillight and then took off, attempting to elude the
police.  Dill took off, chasing Tyrone without
knowing why he was chasing Tyrone and whether the
chase fell within one of the three very limited
exceptions for hi[gh]-speed chases.  Therefore, Dill
violated 
Talladega's 
policies 
and procedures 
because
he did not knowingly make an informed choice.  Dill
also violated the policies and procedures because a
broken taillight is a mere traffic violation, a
misdemeanor[,] and does not fall within one of the
limited three exceptions.  According to the policies
and 
procedures, 
this 
chase 
should 
have 
not
occurred[,] and Tyrone would have never died from
the hi[gh]-speed chase."
(Elisha's brief, p. 25.)  Thus, Elisha argues that under the
guidelines provided in the TPD manual, a broken taillight did
not justify Dill's decision to pursue Tyrone.  
1041780
12
However, as the defendants point out, Elisha is confusing
the reason for the initial stop with the reason for the
pursuit.  Just as Elisha does not suggest that Tyrone was
attempting to elude the police merely because he did not want
to receive a citation for having a broken taillight, the
defendants do not suggest that Dill pursued Tyrone only
because the SUV he was driving had a broken taillight.
Rather, the defendants argue (and the undisputed evidence in
the record shows) that Dill pursued Tyrone because Tyrone was
attempting to elude the police.  The TPD manual allows hot
pursuit for that reason; indeed, the  TPD manual defines "hot
pursuit" as "an active attempt by one or more police officers
to apprehend a suspect operating a motor vehicle, while the
suspect is trying to avoid capture by using high speed driving
or other evasive tactics ...."  (Emphasis added.)   
Furthermore, it is undisputed that in addition to almost
wrecking at one point in the pursuit when he turned abruptly,
Tyrone drove at excessive speeds throughout the pursuit and
ran off the road at least five times.  Therefore, we agree
with the defendants' contention that the undisputed evidence
shows that the pursuit was justified under the first
1041780
In arguing that Dill was "ignorant" of why Tyrone had
2
been pulled over or why Dill was chasing him, Elisha implies
that Dill should have contacted Officers Haynes and Courtney
by radio to determine why they had stopped Tyrone's vehicle.
See, e.g., Elisha's brief, p. 25 ("The defendants also claim
Dill cannot be blamed for failing to find out from dispatch or
Haynes and Courtney why Tyrone had been pulled over before
Dill engaged in the hi[gh]-speed chase with Tyrone.").
However, as noted, Dill knew why he was chasing Tyrone, and
13
"exception" in the TPD manual--that is, "when the officer
knows or has reasonable grounds to believe the suspect
presents a clear and immediate threat to the safety of other
motorists."  In fact, Elisha's brief concedes that Tyrone's
conduct 
constituted 
reckless 
driving 
and 
presented 
a 
threat 
to
others, because Elisha asserts that "both Tyrone and Dill were
engaged in reckless driving, at excessive rates of speed," and
Elisha cites § 32-5A-190, Ala. Code 1975, the statutory
definition of the offense of reckless driving, which includes
as an element driving "at a speed or in a manner so as to
endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property."
(Elisha's brief, p. 34 (quoting § 32-5A-190, Ala. Code 1975).)
Thus, Elisha's assertion that Dill did not "know[] why he was
chasing Tyrone" is incorrect, as is her contention that the
chase did not fit within one of the "limited three exceptions"
for which the TPD manual permits a high-speed chase.2
1041780
the pursuit was justified, in accordance with the TPD manual.
Moreover, the undisputed evidence shows that, to minimize
distractions, the officers had been trained to keep their
communications to a minimum during a chase.  See Dill's
deposition.  Cf. TPD manual ("The assisting unit, upon joining
the 
pursuit 
shall 
immediately 
notify 
the 
communications 
center
of its identity.  If the primary unit is a one-man unit, the
assisting 
unit 
may 
assume 
radio 
communications 
responsibility,
allowing the primary unit to devote full attention to
driving.").
14
Consequently, Elisha has not offered substantial evidence
indicating that 
under 
the policies and procedures reflected in
the TPD manual Dill negligently decided to initiate pursuit of
Tyrone.
Elisha also has not offered substantial evidence
indicating that 
Dill's 
continuing the 
pursuit violated the 
TPD
manual.  The defendants cite the following from the TPD
manual:
"A hot pursuit shall be terminated under any of the
following circumstances:
"a.  If, in the opinion of the pursuing
officer[,] the commanding officer, or[] the
field 
supervisor, 
there 
is 
a 
clear 
and
unreasonable danger to the officer and other
users of the highway created by the pursuit
that outweighs the necessity for immediate
apprehension.
"b.  The [identity of the suspect] has been
established 
to 
the 
point 
that 
later
1041780
15
apprehension can be accomplished, and there is
no longer any need for immediate apprehension.
"c.  The prevailing traffic, roadway and
environmental conditions indicate the futility
of continued hot pursuit.
"d.  The pursued's vehicle's location is no
longer known.
"e.  The pursuing officer knows, or is
reasonably certain, that the fleeing vehicle is
operated 
by 
a 
juvenile 
and 
the 
offense
constitutes a misdemeanor or a non-serious
felony and the safety factors involved are
obviously greater than a juvenile can cope
with."
We agree with the defendants' contention that Elisha has
not offered substantial evidence indicating that any of those
categories applied to Dill's pursuit of 
Tyrone. 
 Specifically,
the defendants argue:
"First, the identity of the driver of the black SUV
could not have been established by Officer Dill.
Second, no traffic, roadway, or weather conditions
indicated that pursuit should be stopped.  Third,
even if [Tyrone] could have been identified as the
driver, he was not a juvenile.  Therefore, the
pursuit should only have been terminated if any of
the discretionary tests set forth in [the TPD
manual] were met: (1) that the suspect did not
'present[] a clear and immediate threat to the
safety of other motorists' or (2) that the suspect
had not 'committed or attempt[ed] to commit a
serious felony,' or (3) that 'there [wa]s a clear
and unreasonable danger to the officer and other
users of the highway created by the pursuit that
outweigh[ed] 
the 
necessity 
for 
immediate
1041780
Elisha disputes that Dill was aware of reasons (1) and
3
(3)--that Tyrone was crossing over the centerline and that he
almost ran over one of his own passengers.  However, that
factual dispute is immaterial.  First, reasons (2), (4), and
(5), along with the fact that Tyrone was driving at excessive
speeds, lead to the conclusion asserted by the defendants--
that is, "all jurors would agree that Officer Dill would have
reasonably believed that [Tyrone] 'present[ed] a clear and
immediate threat to the safety of other motorists,' and that
'the necessity of immediate apprehension outweigh[ed] the
level of danger created by the hot pursuit.'" Second, even if
those reasons did not lead to that conclusion, the factual
dispute is immaterial because, as we discuss, Elisha has not
offered substantial evidence that Dill's continuing the
pursuit proximately caused Tyrone to wreck. 
16
apprehension.'  However, Officer Dill had reason to
believe that none of these ... reasons for ending
the pursuit existed.  Because [Tyrone] (1) was
crossing over the center line, (2) kicked his
passengers out of the car, (3) almost ran over one
of his own passengers, (4) kept driving off the
road, and (5) nearly flipped the SUV at the corner
of Highway 34 and Cove Access [Road], all jurors
would 
agree 
that 
Officer 
Dill
 
would 
have
[3]
reasonably believed that [Tyrone] 'present[ed] a
clear and immediate threat to the safety of other
motorists,' and that 'the necessity of immediate
apprehension outweigh[ed] the level of danger
created by the hot pursuit.' ... Furthermore, there
was no 'clear and unreasonable danger to the officer
and other users of the highway created by the
pursuit.'  It was nearly four o'clock in the
morning, the roads were dry, there was no fog, and
there was only one motorist on the road."
(Defendants' brief, pp. 
34-35 
(citations 
omitted).)  
We 
agree,
therefore, with the defendants' assertion that Elisha has not
1041780
17
offered 
substantial 
evidence 
indicating 
that 
Dill 
violated 
any
of the high-speed-chase provisions of the TPD manual.
Even if Elisha had offered substantial evidence showing
that Dill had violated provisions of the TPD manual (or that
Dill had been negligent in some other manner), she has not
offered substantial evidence showing that any alleged
negligence by Dill proximately caused Tyrone's wreck and
resulting injuries.  The defendants cite the following
definition of proximate cause:
"Proximate 
cause 
is 
an 
essential 
element 
of 
both
negligence claims and wantonness claims.  See Albert
[v. Hsu, 602 So. 2d 895 (Ala. 1992)]; Smith [v.
Davis, 599 So. 2d 586 (Ala. 1992)].  Proximate cause
is an act or omission that in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any new independent
causes, produces the injury and without which the
injury would not have occurred.  Thetford v. City of
Clanton, 605 So. 2d 835, 840 (Ala. 1992).  An injury
may proximately result from concurring causes;
however, it is still necessary that the plaintiff
prove that the defendant's negligence caused the
injury.  Buchanan v. Merger Enterprises, Inc., 463
So. 2d 121 (Ala. 1984); Lawson v. General Telephone
Co. of Alabama, 289 Ala. 283, 290, 267 So. 2d 132,
138 (1972)."
Martin v. Arnold, 643 So. 2d 564, 567 (Ala. 1994).  The
defendants concede that generally proximate cause is a
question to be determined by the trier of the fact.  Even so,
the question of proximate cause may be decided by a  summary
1041780
18
judgment if "'there is a total lack of evidence from which the
fact-finder may reasonably infer a direct causal relation
between the culpable conduct and the resulting injury.'"
Green v. Alabama Power Co., 597 So. 2d 1325, 1328 (Ala. 1992)
(quoting Davison v. Mobile Infirmary, 456 So. 2d 14, 24 (Ala.
1984)); see also Cooley v. Gulf Bank, Inc., 773 So. 2d 1039,
1044 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (Crawley, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
The defendants contend that the decisions in Blair v.
City of Rainbow City, 542 So. 2d 275 (Ala. 1989), and in Doran
v. City of Madison, 519 So. 2d 1308 (Ala. 1988), are
controlling.  We agree.
In Doran, Toney Lindsey collided with a vehicle occupied
by James Doran, Alesia Lake, and Suzanne Nelson.  "At the time
of the collision, Lindsey was attempting to elude police
officers ...."  519 So. 2d at 1309.  Doran, Lake, and Nelson
sued the officers and their respective employers, alleging
negligence in the officers' pursuit of Lindsey.  519 So. 2d at
1309.  The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of
the defendants, and this Court affirmed.  519 So. 2d at 1314.
1041780
19
The evidence showed that several police officers had
pursued Lindsey at speeds approaching 100 miles per hour and
that the 
officers 
had 
unsuccessfully 
attempted to stop 
Lindsey
through the use of two "rolling roadblocks."  519 So. 2d at
1313-14.  The pursuit continued through the City of Decatur,
where the vehicles traveled at a high rate of speed through
several intersections.  An eyewitness to the collision
testified that "[a]t the time of the impact the police cars
were right behind [Lindsey's vehicle] and appeared to be going
about the same speed as it was going, which [the witness]
estimate[d] to be 100 miles an hour."  519 So. 2d at 1313.  
However, this Court concluded there was not substantial
evidence showing that the police officers had caused the
plaintiffs' injuries.  519 So. 2d at 1314.  This Court noted:
"After 
reviewing 
the 
affidavits 
..., 
we 
conclude
that no triable issue is presented.  Although
neither affidavit [submitted by the plaintiffs]
disputes the defendants' assertions that the police
vehicles involved in the pursuit of Lindsey were
flashing blue lights and sounding sirens, [one]
affidavit does indicate that the police vehicles
approached the intersection [where the collision
occurred] at an extremely high rate of speed.  Even
so, neither affidavit tends to show that any of the
police vehicles entered the intersection and caused
the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs.  It
appears undisputed that none of the police vehicles
collided with the plaintiffs' vehicle.  These
1041780
20
affidavits do tend to prove that the police vehicles
exceeded the maximum speed limit during the pursuit;
however, that matter is not disputed by the
defendants.  The mere fact that a police officer
exceeds the maximum speed limit during a pursuit,
such as the one in the present case, does not
present a genuine issue of material fact as to the
liability of that officer for negligence.  See §
32-5A-7, [Ala. Code 1975], and Madison v. Weldon,
446 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 1984).  There can be little
doubt that the high speed pursuit by the police
officers contributed to Lindsey's reckless driving
in this case.  However, the rule regarding the
conduct of a police officer in pursuit of an
escaping offender is succinctly stated in Madison:
"'"The rule governing the conduct of
[a] police [officer] in pursuit of an
escaping offender is that he must operate
his car with due care and, in doing so, he
is not responsible for the acts of the
offender.  Although pursuit may contribute
to the reckless driving of the pursued, the
officer is not obliged to allow him to
escape."' (Emphasis added.)
"446 So. 2d at 28, quoting City of Miami v. Horne,
198 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1967).
"Lindsey's actions were the proximate cause of
the plaintiffs' injuries, not the actions of [the
police 
officers]; 
therefore, 
the 
trial 
court
properly granted the summary judgment in favor of
the defendants."
519 So. 2d at 1314.
In Blair, Donald Ricky Blair led Rainbow City police in
a high-speed chase.  Blair's motorcycle left the road and
crashed, and Blair died as a result of the injuries he
1041780
The complaint in Blair was filed before the scintilla
4
rule was abolished in favor of the substantial evidence rule.
The scintilla rule of evidence was abolished effective June
11, 1987. See § 12-21-12, Ala. Code 1975. 
21
sustained.  A wrongful-death action was filed on behalf of
Blair's estate against the police officers and the two
municipalities that employed them.  The trial court entered a
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and this Court
affirmed.  542 So. 2d at 275-76.
This Court refused to decide whether the municipalities'
failure to have a written policy regarding high-speed chases
was negligence, because, the Court concluded, "there [was] no
evidence to show that the failure of the municipalities to
have a written policy was a contributing factor in Ricky
Blair's death."  542 So. 2d at 276.  The Court also held that
the plaintiff had not offered even a scintilla of evidence4
showing that the officers had acted negligently in pursuing
Blair.  542 So. 2d at 277.  In doing so, the Court relied on
Doran and stated:
"In both Doran and Madison[v. Weldon, 446 So. 2d
21 (Ala. 1984)], the issue was whether the officers
were liable for injuries inflicted on a third party
by the fleeing offender.  This case involves
injuries suffered by the offender himself.  If
pursuing officers are not responsible for the
1041780
22
actions of the offender if the fleeing offender
injures a third party, it is only logical to
conclude that officers are also not responsible for
the actions of the fleeing offender when he injures
himself, as is the case here.  The evidence is
without contradiction that Ricky could have slowed
down and stopped at any time during the chase; the
choice to speed and drive recklessly to evade
capture was Ricky's alone.  The plaintiff would have
us require police officers to allow a fleeing
offender to escape if the offender exceeds the speed
limit; Doran and Madison have clearly rejected this
contention.
"....
"The plaintiff also argues that there was at
least a scintilla of evidence of the officers'
alleged negligence because there was evidence that
a skid mark was found three days after the accident
and, he argues, this evidence was some proof that
the officers forced Ricky off the road.
"Officer Gilbreath states in his affidavit,
deposition, and sworn interrogatory answers that he
never got within 100 yards of the motorcycle.  He
said he was approximately 100 yards behind Blair
when the motorcycle veered off the pavement. The
testimony of [O]fficer Gilbreath is not controverted
by any other evidence.
"The plaintiff offered Martin Crawford as an
accident reconstruction expert. Crawford, however,
stated affirmatively:
"'There is no evidence at the scene to
conclusively state that the police car did
force the motorcycle off the road.'
"There is no evidence at all to show that the skid
mark was made by Officer Gilbreath's police unit,
1041780
23
nor is there any evidence to prove that the skid
mark was created at the time of the accident.
"'Speculation and conclusory allegations are
insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.'
Bogle v. Scheer, 512 So. 2d 1336, 1340 (Ala. 1987).
All the evidence before the trial judge indicates
that none of the officers was within 100 yards of
Ricky at the time of the crash and that the officers
did nothing to cause the crash other than to pursue
Ricky.  The mere fact that a skid mark was found,
without more, cannot give the plaintiff a right to
a trial, even under the scintilla rule."
542 So. 2d at 276-77.
In this case, it is undisputed that Tyrone wrecked
because he lost control of the SUV as a result of his
excessive speed.  The defendants included in their summary-
judgment materials a report prepared by the Traffic Homicide
Unit of the Highway Patrol Division of the Alabama Department
of Public Safety, which states:
"[As 
Dill 
and 
Tyrone] 
approached 
the
intersection of Cove Access R[oad] and Howell Cove
R[oad] the driver of the [SUV] lost control of his
vehicle.  The [SUV] came through the 4-way
intersection at a high rate of speed.  The travel
path of the [SUV] was over [a] small rise in the
road and into a slight curve.  This slight curve was
magnified by the velocity that the vehicle was
traveling.  The driver of the [SUV] lost control of
his vehicle in the curve and ran off the road to the
right.  The [SUV] came back onto the road sideways,
the vehicle[']s wheels began to dig into the
pavement causing the vehicle to overturn.  The
driver was ejected from the vehicle and came to rest
1041780
24
in the ditch on the north side of Cove Access
R[oad].  The vehicle continued to overturn and came
to a stop in the road facing northeast.
"....
"There was no contact at any time made between
[Dill's patrol car and the SUV].  This is supported
by the damage to both vehicles and the markings on
the roadway.  It is clearly shown by the skid marks
left on the roadway that Officer Dill locked the
brakes on his vehicle prior to the point that Tyrone
Gooden lost control of his vehicle and left the
roadway.  This supports Officer Dill's statement
that he applied his brakes when he saw Tyrone
Gooden's vehicle sliding sideways because he did not
want to hit the other vehicle.  The damage to both
vehicles is relative to the events that took place
in their collision path.  There is no damage to
either vehicle that was caused by another vehicle.
 
"This investigator determined that the [SUV]
driven by Tyrone Gooden wrecked due to his excessive
speed.  The speed led to his inability to negotiate
through the curve in the road.  This caused him to
straighten out the curve and leave the road. [Dill's
patrol car] left the roadway due to the driver
locking up the brakes to avoid the [SUV].  After
[Dill] locked the brakes he slid straight off the
road in the direction he was traveling prior to lock
up; [Dill] didn't have any control after he locked
the brakes."
Elisha does not dispute the accuracy of the statements
included in that report.  Nor does Elisha dispute  Dill's
testimony that when he first noticed that Tyrone's SUV was
sideways in the road (that is, after Tyrone had wrecked), Dill
was 200-300 yards away from the SUV.
1041780
25
At pages 59-63 of her brief, Elisha purports to address
the issue of proximate causation.  However, she fails to
articulate with any specificity how Dill allegedly caused
Tyrone to wreck; instead, she cites a general statistic
regarding the number of deaths that are thought to result each
year from 
high-speed 
pursuits, and she 
essentially 
repeats her
contention that Dill violated guidelines set forth in the TPD
manual, as well as various statutes.  In short, her theory of
causation is analogous to the theory in Blair.  The evidence
indicates that Dill was more than 200-300 yards from the SUV
when the SUV wrecked.  Moreover, the evidence is undisputed
that Tyrone could have slowed down and stopped at any time
during the chase--indeed, Tyrone initially had stopped for
Officers Courtney and Haynes.  Therefore, "the choice to speed
and drive recklessly to evade capture was [Tyrone's] alone."
Blair, 542 So. 2d at 276.  To conclude that Dill proximately
caused Tyrone to wreck requires speculation or conjecture; it
is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Elisha contends, however, that Doran and Blair are
distinguishable and that the decision in Seals v. City of
Columbia, 641 So. 2d 1247 (Ala. 1994), controls.  In Seals,
1041780
26
Jimmy H. Watford led a police officer of the City of Columbia
on a high-speed chase that ended when Watford's vehicle struck
another vehicle head-on.  The driver of the other vehicle was
killed, and her estate sued the police officer and the City.
The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the
officer and the City, but this Court reversed that judgment.
641 So. 2d at 1248-50.
In Seals there was evidence indicating that a roadblock
was in place to stop Watford and that the police officer was
notified of the roadblock.  The officer testified that when an
officer was notified that a roadblock was in place, the proper
procedure was to turn off the vehicle's lights and siren and
stop the high-speed pursuit "'in hopes that [the fleeing
offender] will slow down rather than run straight into the
roadblock and cause a collision.'" 641 So. 2d at 1248 (quoting
the officer's deposition testimony).  
Although the officer testified that he had followed the
proper procedure and ended the pursuit when he was notified of
the roadblock, that testimony was contradicted by the
affidavit of an eyewitness who stated that he saw the officer
in hot pursuit of Watford at the precise point the officer
1041780
27
stated he had ended the chase.  The eyewitness stated further
that the police vehicle's lights and siren were still engaged
as well.  641 So. 2d at 1249.
In addition, the plaintiff in Seals offered expert
testimony asserting that the officer had operated his police
car negligently during the pursuit.  The expert testified that
the police officer "'should have discontinued the chase some
two miles prior to the place where the wreck occurred, when
[the officer] first saw that the Watford vehicle had turned
its lights off.'" 641 So. 2d at 1249 (emphasis added).  The
expert testified further "'that a collision with a third
oncoming car was foreseeable and almost inevitable if the
chase continued [and] that no pursuit was necessary because a
road block was in place.'" 641 So. 2d at 1249 (emphasis added
in Seals).
This Court in Seals distinguished Blair and Doran in the
following manner: 
"The City would have us affirm the summary
judgment on the authority of Blair v. City of
Rainbow City, 542 So. 2d 275 (Ala. 1989), and Doran
v. City of Madison, 519 So. 2d 1308 (Ala. 1988).
While we reverse the summary judgment in this case,
we note that this reversal is not inconsistent with
our holdings in Blair and Doran.
1041780
28
"In Blair, the administrator of the estate of
Donald Ricky Blair, who was killed while being
pursued at a high speed by the police, sued Rainbow
City and others, alleging that they were responsible
for Donald Blair's death. ... In Blair, it was the
fleeing offender who was killed in the chase.  He
had ignored the siren and blue light signals of the
officers to pull over.  In doing so, he elected to
evade the police, and he died as a result of
injuries when his own motorcycle left the road.  542
So. 2d at 276.  Clearly, in Blair, the fleeing
offender was responsible for his own injuries,
because, as this Court stated in the opinion, he
could have pulled over at any time during the chase.
542 So. 2d at 276.
"In Doran, police officers were pursuing a
vehicle driven by a person suspected of driving
under the influence of alcohol. 519 So. 2d at 1310.
In support of their motion for summary judgment,
three officers offered affidavits tending to show
that at all times during their pursuit of the
vehicle they had used their sirens and their blue
lights.  The accident occurred when the fleeing
vehicle proceeded through an intersection and struck
another vehicle. The police cars were not involved
in the collision.
"In Doran, in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff offered affidavits
tending to show that the police officers exceeded
the speed limit while in pursuit; however, there was
no evidence offered to show that they did not
exercise due care in their pursuit.  519 So. 2d at
1314. ...
"....
"Again, this Court stated in Seals v. City of
Columbia, 575 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. 1991):
1041780
29
"'Neither Madison v. Weldon, nor Blair
v. City of Rainbow City, nor Doran v. City
of Madison stands for the proposition that
in order to state a claim upon which relief
could 
be 
granted, Seals had 
to 
specifically
allege that Officer Cook's vehicle came
into contact with the vehicle in which his
daughter was riding or that Officer Cook
otherwise "directly" caused his daughter's
death.'
"575 So.2d at 1064.
"In opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, Seals offered evidence tending to show
that Cook did not discontinue his pursuit of Watford
once the roadblock was in place.  While Cook
disputed this fact, he did state in his deposition
that in regard to pursuit of a fleeing offender,
proper procedure was to back off once a roadblock
was in place.  Seals's expert testified that Cook
acted negligently and that no pursuit was necessary
because a road block was in place.  Thus, the
plaintiff's evidence created a genuine issue of
material 
fact. 
The 
summary 
judgment 
was
inappropriate and must be reversed."
641 So. 2d at 1249-50.
Elisha's case, however, is distinguishable from Seals.
In Seals, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the pursuing officer had violated the rule requiring
a pursuit to end once the officer was notified of the
existence of a roadblock.  Moreover, there was expert
testimony in Seals to the effect that the officer was
negligent by continuing to pursue the suspect after the
1041780
Elisha also cites the requirement in the TPD manual that
5
"[a]ll units in pursuit, whether the vehicle in
front of the unit is the suspect vehicle or another
police vehicle, shall space themselves at a distance
that will ensure proper braking and reaction time in
the event the lead vehicle stops, slows, or turns."
Elisha asserts Dill negligently violated that requirement
because Dill lost control of his vehicle when he locked his
brakes to avoid hitting Tyrone's wrecked SUV.  Even if that
assertion is true, however, Elisha does not explain how Dill's
alleged violation of that requirement proximately caused
30
suspect had turned off the headlights on his vehicle.  Thus,
in Seals the plaintiff's theory of proximate causation was
supported by more than speculation or conjecture; that is,
there 
was substantial evidence suggesting 
that 
the 
officer was
negligent and that his negligence had proximately caused the
death of the driver of the vehicle struck by the fleeing
suspect's vehicle.
However, as we have discussed, in this case Elisha has
not offered substantial evidence suggesting that Dill
negligently pursued Tyrone or that he negligently continued
the pursuit.  In addition, Elisha has not articulated a theory
of proximate causation supported by anything other than
speculation or conjecture.  Therefore, Doran and Blair are
controlling.5
1041780
Tyrone to wreck.
31
2.
In addition to guidelines of the TPD manual, Elisha
claims that Dill violated a number of statutes and that those
alleged violations are substantial evidence of negligence.
For example, Elisha cites § 32-5A-7, Ala. Code 1975, which
governs drivers of "authorized emergency vehicles" such as
Dill. Section 32-5A-7(b)(3) permits a driver such as Dill to
"[e]xceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does not
endanger 
life 
or 
property." 
 
Section 
32-5A-7(d) 
also 
provides:
"(d) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve
the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of
all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the
driver from the consequences of his reckless
disregard for the safety of others."
(Emphasis added.)  Section 32-5A-7(b)(2) requires the driver
of an authorized emergency vehicle to "slow[] down as may be
necessary for safe operation" before "[p]roceed[ing]  past a
red or stop signal or stop sign." 
Elisha also cites § 32-5A-170, Ala. Code 1975, which
provides:
"No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent under the
1041780
32
conditions and having regard to the actual and
potential hazards then existing.  Consistent with
the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe
and appropriate speed when approaching and crossing
an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when
approaching 
and 
going 
around 
a 
curve, 
when
approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any
narrow or winding roadway, and when special hazards
exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic
or by reason of weather or highway conditions."
We disagree with Elisha's contention that any alleged
violation 
of 
those 
statutory provisions 
means 
that the 
summary
judgment for Dill and the City was inappropriate.  As with
Elisha's allegations regarding the requirements of the TPD
manual, there is no evidence indicating that Dill's alleged
violations of the statutory provisions proximately caused
Tyrone to wreck.
3.
At pages 36-38 of her brief, Elisha argues that the
Talladega police chief illegally accessed the NCIC database
for the sole purpose of defending against the wrongful-death
action she filed.  Elisha cites Alabama Power v. Murray, 751
So. 2d 494, 496-97 (Ala. 1999), for the proposition that the
alleged illegal accessing of the NCIC database may be used to
infer negligence on the part of Dill and the City.  We
disagree.
1041780
33
In Murray, this Court held that there was sufficient
evidence to support an instruction to the jury that it could
consider Alabama Power's alleged spoliation of evidence
essential to the plaintiffs' case as an inference of Alabama
Power's culpability.  Even if the Talladega police chief
accessed the NCIC database and did so illegally, there is
nothing to indicate that Murray applies to this case.
Consequently, Elisha's argument is without merit.
B.
Elisha also alleges that there is substantial evidence
showing that Dill 
acted 
wantonly. 
 Specifically, 
Elisha argues
that Dill drove at reckless speeds.  She contends that those
speeds, when viewed with the other circumstances of the chase,
are substantial evidence of wantonness.  
We disagree that Elisha has offered substantial evidence
of wantonness.  Even if there were substantial evidence of
wantonness, however, Elisha has not offered substantial
evidence to show that any alleged wantonness by Dill
1041780
Because Elisha has not offered substantial evidence of
6
negligence, wantonness, or proximate cause, we pretermit
consideration of the defendants' contention that Tyrone was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law.  
34
proximately caused Tyrone's death.  Thus, Elisha's arguments
regarding wantonness likewise are without merit.6
Conclusion
The summary judgment in favor of the City of Talladega
and Daniel Dill is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, and Parker, JJ., concur.