Case Title: Com. v. Kearns

Citation: 365 Pa. Super. 13, 528 A.2d 992

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1987-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
365 Pa. Superior Ct. 13 (1987) 528 A.2d 992 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Thomas H. KEARNS. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted April 6, 1987. Filed July 21, 1987. *14 Sean K. Code, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Com. Raymond J. Seals, Pittsburgh, for appellee. Before KELLY, POPOVICH and WATKINS, JJ. POPOVICH, Judge: This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence which was imposed upon appellee, Thomas Kearns, after he entered *15 a plea of guilty to two (2) counts of driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(1) and (4)). The prosecution filed a motion to modify appellant's sentence of not less than forty-eight (48) hours to six (6) months in prison with alternate housing approved at Arc House. This motion was denied, and this appeal followed. We must remand the matter for reasons herein stated. The prosecution contends on appeal that appellee should have been sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty (30) days in prison because appellee had been convicted previously of driving under the influence.[1] We agree. The pertinent sections of the statute, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731, reads as follows: Of course, we recognize that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Allsup, 481 Pa. 313, 392 A.2d 1309 (1978). Additionally, we are mindful of the maxim that statutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if possible, as one statute. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932(b); Pennsylvania Social Service v. Pennsylvania, 481 Pa. 81, 392 A.2d 256 (1978). More specifically, statutes or parts of *17 statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or things or to the same class of persons or things. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932(a). At this point, we must examine the statutory scheme of the penalties for driving under the influence. A first offender under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731 receives a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than forty-eight (48) hours. This penalty escalates for a second offender, who is defined as a person who "has previously been convicted of an offense under this section or of an equivalent offense in this or other jurisdictions within the previous seven years." Id. Thus, it is clear that an enhanced penalty becomes relevant if two factors are present: (1) a defendant must have a prior conviction; and, (2) the prior conviction must have occurred within the previous seven years. With respect to the first criteria, we note that Section 303.7 of the sentencing guidelines, 204 Pa.Code § 303.7, defines a prior conviction in the following manner: Implicit in the prior conviction concept is the notion that a defendant must have been found guilty and must have been sentenced. Concomitantly, if a verdict of guilty has been rendered at the first trial but a sentence has not been imposed, a prior conviction has not yet evolved under the sentencing guidelines. Under our statutory sentencing scheme, a prior conviction is born into legal existence on the date of sentence.[2] *18 The second factor which must be examined is whether the prior conviction has occurred "within the previous seven years." 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731. Although subsection (e)(1)(ii) of Section 3731 provides no modifying language regarding whether the seven year period must be measured against the date of the second offense, the date of the arrest, or some other date, another section of this same statute does shed some insight into the subject. Section (d) provides: Thus, under section (d), a defendant is not to be admitted for Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) if a defendant has been found guilty of or accepted ARD "within seven years of the date of the current offense." Id. (Emphasis added).[3] This scheme is consistent with other *19 recidivist statutes which have been enacted for the following general purpose: Commonwealth v. Mourar, 349 Pa.Super. 583, 589, 504 A.2d 197, 203 (1986), appeal granted, 511 Pa. 619, 515 A.2d 898 (1986) ("conviction for the (enhancing) offense [must] predate commission of the principal offense to escape the imputation of a sophistic intent.") (Citation omitted) (Emphasis added) Generally speaking, Pennsylvania follows the majority rule which is that "prior convictions must antedate commission of the principal offense to be eligible for application as sentence enhancers." Id., 349 Pa.Superior Ct. at 588, 504 A.2d at 202. Another statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714, also guides us in our analysis since we may examine other recidivist statutes in pari materia. Section 9714(b) uses as a reference point the following formula for calculating enhanced penalties: We can glean from these recidivist statutes a common thread which runs through the enhancement penalty sections; that is, a seven year period applies to prior convictions which are measured to the date of the current offense. The appellee, Thomas Kearns, contends that we should measure the seven year period from the date of the first offense to the date of the second offense or from the date of the first conviction to the date of the second conviction. The trial court agreed with one of these theories and said that the offense to offense formula was "the only fair way to compute between crimes." Trial Court's Opinion at 3. We, however, must disagree. Rather, a computation which measures the prior conviction to the date of the current offense is also not subject to manipulation by the court calendar because the second variable is the date of the current offense. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the conviction date for the first offense was August 6, 1979, and that the second offense occurred on April 23, 1986. Because the second offense occurred within seven years of the prior *21 conviction, the minimum term of imprisonment required under the statute is not less than thirty (30) days in prison. Hence, the judgment of sentence must be reversed and the matter remanded for resentencing under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731 in a manner consistent with this opinion. [1] Under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(e)(4), the prosecution has a right to an appeal: (4) The Commonwealth has the right to appeal directly to the Superior Court any order of court which imposes a sentence for violation of this section which does not meet the requirements of this section. The Superior Court shall remand the case to the sentencing court for imposition of a sentence in accordance with the provisions of this section. [2] We note that this result is consistent with our rules of criminal procedure which provide that "[p]ost-verdict motions must be decided before sentencing, because the appeal lies from the final order of the trial court, which ordinarily includes sentence." Pa.Crim.P. 1123 (Commentary). [3] Our conclusion that a defendant must be sentenced in order to trigger the recidivist section is also consistent with section (d) which applies to certain provisions of the ARD program. Our Supreme Court has said that "[a]dmission to an ARD program is not a matter of right, but a privilege." Commonwealth v. Lutz, 508 Pa. 297, 307, 495 A.2d 928, 933 (1985).