Case Title: State v. Pepka

Citation: 2010-Ohio-1045

Docket Number: 20090678

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Pepka, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1045.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1045 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PEPKA, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Pepka, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1045.] 
An indictment that charges a defendant with child endangering in violation of 
R.C. 2919.22(A) as a third-degree felony but does not contain language 
that the victim suffered serious physical harm adequately informs the 
defendant of the charge against which he must defend and is sufficient. 
(No. 2009-0678 — Submitted January 12, 2010 — Decided March 25, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, No. 2008-L-016,  
2009-Ohio-1440. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
An indictment that charges a defendant with child endangering in violation of 
R.C. 2919.22(A) as a third-degree felony but does not contain language 
that the victim suffered serious physical harm adequately informs the 
defendant of the charge against which he must defend and is sufficient. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} Pursuant to Crim.R. 7(D), a court may amend an indictment at any 
time provided that the amendment does not change the name or identity of the 
crime charged.  We are called upon to determine whether amending an indictment 
that charges a defendant with endangering children in violation of R.C. 
2919.22(A) as a third-degree felony to add language that the victim suffered 
serious physical harm impermissibly changes the name or identity of the offense.  
We hold that it does not. 
{¶ 2} Pursuant to the Ohio Revised Code, the only circumstance in 
which child endangering in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A) is a third-degree felony 
is when the victim suffers serious physical harm.  R.C. 2919.22(E)(2)(c).  An 
indictment that charges a defendant with child endangering in violation of R.C. 
2919.22(A) as a third-degree felony but does not contain language that the victim 
suffered serious physical harm adequately informs the defendant of the charge 
against which he must defend and is sufficient.  Because appellee Joseph Pepka’s 
original indictment specified that he was being charged with third-degree-felony 
child endangering for violating R.C. 2919.22(A), the addition of the serious-
physical-harm language in the amended indictment changed neither the name nor 
identity of the crime.  We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and reinstate Pepka’s third-degree-felony convictions and sentence. 
Relevant Background 
{¶ 3} In March 2007, Pepka lived in an apartment in Eastlake, Ohio, 
with his girlfriend, Kaysie Perry, and her eight-month-old daughter, M.P.  On the 
morning of March 3, 2007, Pepka gave M.P. a bath, but when he placed her in the 
bathtub, the water was too hot, and M.P. cried.  Pepka and Perry cooled the water, 
and Pepka finished giving the bath.  After the bath, Perry noticed that M.P.’s feet 
were pink.  Perry and Pepka argued, and Perry left the apartment to do laundry, 
leaving M.P. with Pepka. 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 4} Pepka later called Perry and told her that he thought M.P. was 
having seizures.  Pepka claims that he took off M.P.’s clothes, put her in a little 
bit of cold water in the bathtub to revive her, wrapped her in towels and called 
911.  Responding paramedics testified that they found M.P. lying on a wet towel 
in the living room.  She was partially dressed, and her clothes were wet.  Her lips 
and extremities were blue, and she was unresponsive.  The paramedics 
determined that her body temperature was 85.7 degrees Fahrenheit, and they 
transported her almost immediately to Hillcrest Hospital.  On the way to the 
hospital, the paramedics managed to restore M.P. to consciousness.  M.P. was 
later transferred from Hillcrest to Rainbow Babies and Children’s Hospital.  M.P. 
suffered permanent and serious physical injury as a result of Pepka’s actions. 
{¶ 5} At trial, the state introduced testimony from a consulting physician 
that M.P.’s body temperature had dropped dangerously low, that her left foot was 
burned from submersion into something hot, and that she suffered a subdural 
hematoma and retinal hemorrhages in both eyes.  The physician testified that the 
latter two injuries were consistent with her having been shaken.  The physician 
also testified that M.P.’s injuries were inconsistent with the history given by 
Pepka. 
{¶ 6} On June 25, 2007, a three-count indictment was filed against 
Pepka.  Each count read as follows: 
{¶ 7} “On or about the 3rd day of March, 2007, in the City of Eastlake, 
Lake County, State of Ohio, one JOSEPH PEPKA did recklessly, being the 
parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody or control, or person in loco 
parentis of a minor victim, a child under eighteen years of age or a mentally or 
physically handicapped child under twenty-one years of age, to wit:  eight months 
of age, create a substantial risk to the health or safety of the said female minor 
victim, by violating a duty of care, protection, or support. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 8} “This act, to-wit: Endangering Children, constitutes a Felony of the 
Third degree, contrary to and in violation of the Ohio Revised Code, Title 29 
§2919.22(A) and against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio.” 
{¶ 9} Pepka entered a not-guilty plea.  And on December 11, 2007, the 
state moved the trial court to amend the indictment to add additional language to 
the first paragraph in each count specifying that Pepka caused “serious physical 
harm to the said female minor victim.”  The trial court granted the state’s motion 
to amend on December 12, 2007, and a jury trial commenced on December 17, 
2007.. 
{¶ 10} Prior to opening statements, Pepka objected to the judge’s having 
allowed the state to amend the indictment and requested that the new language be 
removed, or, alternatively, that the judge grant him a two-week continuance.  
Pepka argued that he was not prepared to defend against the allegation that he had 
caused serious physical harm.  However, upon questioning by the trial court, 
Pepka’s counsel admitted knowing upon the initial indictment that the charges 
brought were for third-degree felonies, not misdemeanors, and that the state 
would argue that M.P. suffered serious physical harm.  Counsel also stated that he 
received the medical records and the consulting physician’s report, which 
described the seriousness of M.P’s injuries, two or three months before trial.  
After a lengthy dialogue, the trial court concluded that the amendment did not 
change the nature of the harm alleged, that appellee had sufficient notice 
regarding the serious-physical-harm allegation, and that appellee did not need 
additional time to prepare to defend against that allegation.  The trial court 
overruled Pepka’s objection to the amended indictment and denied his motion for 
a continuance. 
{¶ 11} A jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts.  Before the 
sentencing hearing, defense counsel moved the court to sentence Pepka for first-
degree misdemeanors rather than for the third-degree felonies of which he was 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
convicted.  Counsel argued that the state should not have been permitted to amend 
the indictment and that without the amendment, Pepka had been charged with 
only misdemeanor child endangering.  The trial court reaffirmed its decision 
allowing the state to amend the indictment and sentenced Pepka to four years in 
prison on the felony convictions. 
{¶ 12} Appellee appealed his convictions and sentence.  A divided court 
of appeals reversed the trial court and held that the original indictment was fatally 
defective for failing to specify the serious-physical-harm specification or element.  
State v. Pepka, Lake App. No. 2008-L-016, 2009-Ohio-1440, ¶ 36.  The court of 
appeals agreed with Pepka that by allowing the state to amend the indictment, the 
trial court had permitted Pepka to be convicted of a charge that was “ ‘ 
“essentially different from that found by the grand jury.” ’ ”  Id., ¶ 37, quoting 
State v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-4537, 903 N.E.2d 609, ¶ 12, 
quoting State v. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 478-479, 453 N.E.2d 716.  The court 
of appeals vacated Pepka’s felony convictions, remanded the case to the trial 
court, and ordered the trial court to enter judgments of conviction on three counts 
of first-degree-misdemeanor child endangering.  Id., ¶ 78. 
{¶ 13} We granted the state’s discretionary appeal to address the 
important constitutional issues implicated in this appeal.  State v. Pepka, 122 Ohio 
St.3d 1477, 2009-Ohio-3625, 910 N.E.2d 477.  The state asserts two propositions:  
(1) “an indictment that charges a defendant with endangering children in violation 
of R.C. 2919.22(A) as a felony of the third degree is sufficient regardless of 
whether it indicates that the victim suffered serious physical harm” and (2) “the 
elements of endangering children do not include serious physical harm suffered 
by the victim.”  The state argues that “serious physical harm is a special finding to 
determine the degree of the offense, but is not part of the definition of the crime.”  
Because we reverse the Eleventh District’s decision based on the first proposition 
and application of State v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-4537, 903 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
N.E.2d 609, and State v. O’Brien (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 122, 508 N.E.2d 144, we 
do not reach the  second proposition. 
Analysis 
{¶ 14} Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides that “no 
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, unless 
on presentment or indictment of a grand jury.”  Thus, the Ohio Constitution 
guarantees an accused that the essential facts constituting the offense for which he 
is tried will be found in the indictment by the grand jury.  Harris v. State (1932), 
125 Ohio St. 257, 264, 181 N.E. 104. 
{¶ 15} As this court recently reaffirmed, “[u]nder Crim.R. 7(D), a court 
may amend an indictment ‘at any time’ if the amendment does not change ‘the 
name or identity of the crime charged.’ ”  State v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 239, 
2008-Ohio-4537, 903 N.E.2d 609, ¶ 1.  An amendment that changes the penalty 
or degree of the charged offense changes the identity of the offense, and is not 
permitted by Crim.R. 7(D).  Id.  As long as the state complies with Crim.R. 7(D), 
it may cure a defective indictment by amendment, even if the original indictment 
omits an essential element of the offense with which the defendant is charged.  
State v. O’Brien, 30 Ohio St.3d at 127-128, 508 N.E.2d 144. 
{¶ 16} As the Eleventh District noted, it is undisputed that the name of the 
crime alleged against Pepka was never amended—he was always charged with 
endangering children in violation of 2919.22(A).  State v. Pepka, 2009-Ohio-
1440, ¶ 31.  However, the Eleventh District held that by adding the language 
specifying that the alleged crimes resulted in serious physical harm to the victim, 
the state modified the charges from first-degree misdemeanors to third-degree 
felonies.  Id.  As a result, the court of appeals concluded, the amendment did not 
satisfy Crim.R. 7(D), because it impermissibly changed the identity of the crimes.  
Id. 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
{¶ 17} The state asks the court to reverse the Eleventh District and hold 
that the amendment did not change the degree or identity of the crimes alleged 
against Pepka.  Specifically, the state explains that the body of the indictment for 
each count specified that Pepka was charged with a third-degree felony and that 
pursuant to R.C. 2919.22(E)(2)(c), the only circumstance in which endangering 
children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A) is a third-degree felony is when the 
victim suffers serious physical harm.  Thus, the state contends that by charging 
him with third-degree felonies, Pepka’s indictment was sufficient to notify him 
that he was charged with causing M.P. serious physical harm. 
{¶ 18} Pepka, however, contends that the charges in the indictment did 
not allege an essential element of third-degree-felony child endangering—that he 
caused the victim serious physical harm.  Therefore, Pepka argues, the indictment 
was sufficient to charge him with only misdemeanor offenses.  Pepka insists that 
by amending the indictment to allege that he caused M.P. serious physical harm, 
the state unconstitutionally changed the degree and identity of the offense with 
which he was charged. 
{¶ 19} The state concedes that if the original indictment was insufficient 
to charge Pepka with third-degree felonies, then the amendment impermissibly 
changed the charges from first-degree misdemeanors to third-degree felonies.  
Therefore, whether the trial court erred in granting the state’s motion to amend the 
indictment turns on whether the original indictment was sufficient to charge 
Pepka with third-degree-felony child endangering.  We hold that the indictment 
was sufficient. 
{¶ 20} “The purposes of an indictment are to give an accused adequate 
notice of the charge, and enable an accused to protect himself or herself from any 
future prosecutions for the same incident.”  State v. Buehner, 110 Ohio St.3d 403, 
2006-Ohio-4707, 853 N.E.2d 1162, ¶ 7.  “ ‘An indictment meets constitutional 
requirements if it “first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and second, 
enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for 
the same offense.” ’ ”  Id. at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Childs (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 
558, 564-565, 728 N.E.2d 379, quoting Hamling v. United States (1974), 418 U.S. 
87, 117-118, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590. 
{¶ 21} The original indictment set forth the elements of child endangering 
under R.C. 2919.22(A) and specified that Pepka was charged with third-degree 
felonies.  The only circumstance in which child endangering in violation of R.C. 
2919.22(A) is a third-degree felony is when the victim suffers serious physical 
harm.  R.C. 2919.22(E)(2)(c).  Thus, the original indictment was sufficient to 
provide Pepka adequate notice of both the offenses and the degree of the offenses 
with which he was charged.  In fact, Pepka’s counsel conceded at trial and at oral 
argument in this court that Pepka knew “[f]rom the beginning” that he was facing 
third-degree-felony charges and that the state would argue that M.P. suffered 
serious physical harm.  Pepka was also aware that the state planned to submit 
evidence at trial of the seriousness of M.P.’s injuries, based on discovery received 
from the state months before trial—including M.P.’s medical records and the 
consulting physician’s report.  Finally, each charge in the indictment specified 
one crime and was specific enough to prevent future prosecutions based on the 
same offense. 
{¶ 22} Pepka argues that the indictment was insufficient because the 
statement in the indictment—“This act, to wit:  Endangering Children, constitutes 
a Felony of the Third degree * * *”—is a conclusion of law, whereas a grand 
jury’s role is to find the material and essential facts constituting an offense.  The 
assertion is not persuasive. 
{¶ 23} In support of his argument, Pepka cites State v. Wozniak (1961), 
172 Ohio St. 517, 521, 18 O.O.2d 58, 178 N.E.2d 800, a case that was decided 
prior to the enactment of Crim.R. 7(D) and that is therefore not controlling.  
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
O’Brien, 30 Ohio St.3d at 125, 508 N.E.2d 144, fn. 5.  Furthermore, endangering 
children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A) can be a third-degree felony only upon a 
finding of serious physical harm to the victim.  R.C. 2919.22(E)(2)(c).  The fact 
that the grand jury returned an indictment for third-degree-felony child 
endangering under R.C. 2919.22(A) against Pepka means that it made the 
necessary factual finding of serious physical harm.  That return was sufficient to 
give Pepka the notice required by the Ohio Constitution.  “ ‘[T]here is no 
requirement that the indictment demonstrate the basis for the grand jury’s 
findings.  The bill of particulars serves this function.’ ”  State v. Buehner, 110 
Ohio St.3d 403, 2006-Ohio-4707, 853 N.E.2d 1162, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Skatzes, 
104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 30.  Indeed, Pepka’s 
counsel conceded this point at oral argument, stating, “We all know that the actual 
facts necessary to indict for the third-degree felony were present and probably 
were at the grand jury” and that the fact that the indictment alleged third-degree 
felonies without specifying that Pepka caused serious physical harm was due to a 
“ministerial mistake.” 
{¶ 24} Because the original indictment was sufficient to charge appellee 
with third-degree-felony child endangering, the trial court did not err in granting 
the state’s motion to amend the indictment.  The amendment changed neither the 
name nor the identity of the offense. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 25} Pepka was on notice from the initial indictment that he was 
charged with a third-degree felony for violating R.C. 2919.22(A), and the Revised 
Code makes it clear that the only circumstance in which endangering children 
under R.C. 2919.22(A) is a third-degree felony is when the victim suffers serious 
physical harm.  Pepka’s original indictment was sufficient to charge him with a 
third-degree-felony offense, and the amended indictment did not change the name 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
or identity of the crime charged.  Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals and reinstate Pepka’s third-degree-felony convictions and sentence. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J, and O’DONNELL, J., dissent and would dismiss the appeal as 
having been improvidently accepted. 
__________________ 
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joshua S. 
Horacek, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Albert L. Purola, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public 
Defender. 
______________________