Case Title: Pullins v. FENTRESS CTY. GEN. HOSPITAL, ETC.

Citation: 594 S.W.2d 663

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1979-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
594 S.W.2d 663 (1979) Mary E. PULLINS and Norman E. Pullins, Plaintiffs-Petitioners, v. FENTRESS COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL AND ALL-AMERICAN EXTERMINATING COMPANY, INC., Defendants-Respondents. Supreme Court of Tennessee. December 17, 1979. Petition to Rehear Denied February 25, 1980. *664 Kenneth E. Hall, Donald F. Paine, Knoxville, for plaintiffs-petitioners; Egerton, McAfee, Armistead & Davis, P.C., Knoxville, and John E. Appman, Jamestown, of counsel. Proctor Upchurch, Crossville, for defendant-respondent, Fentress County General Hospital; Upchurch & Turner, Crossville, of counsel. C.A. Cameron, William A. Cameron, Cookeville, for defendant-respondent, All-American Exterminating Co., Inc.; Cameron & Madewell, Cookeville, of counsel. BROCK, Chief Justice. We granted certiorari in this case to review the action of the Court of Appeals, Judge Drowota dissenting, which reversed the judgment of the trial court entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and against both defendants in the sum of $500,000.00 and dismissed the complaint upon the ground that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff, Mary E. Pullins, is the wife of plaintiff, Norman E. Pullins. She and her husband filed the complaint in this case seeking damages for personal injuries which she alleges she received by reason of sustaining a bite from a brown recluse spider while she was a patient in the defendant Fentress County General Hospital on or *665 about July 20, 1973. Her claim against the defendant, All-American Exterminating Company, Inc., is based upon allegations that it was under contract to provide pest control to the hospital and that the plaintiff, as a patient of the hospital, was a third party beneficiary of that contract. The legal theory of liability advanced against each defendant is that the alleged spider bite was the result of "negligence" and breach of contract on the part of the defendants. Plaintiffs allege that the defendant hospital knew or should have known in the exercise of reasonable care that the hospital was infested with insects, including poisonous brown recluse spiders, at the time Mrs. Pullins was bitten and, thus, that the hospital failed to discharge its duty to make its premises safe for her while she was a patient therein. It is alleged that the defendant exterminating company failed to make proper inspections for spiders and also failed to take suitable measures to exterminate them. Plaintiff alleges that the complications arising from the spider bite resulted in the loss of both her feet and that she is permanently and totally disabled at the age of 22 years. The defendants answered and denied liability. The jury found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages to the plaintiffs against both defendants in the sum of $500,000.00. This verdict was challenged by a motion for a new trial but was in all things approved by the trial judge and judgment was entered accordingly. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, directed a verdict and ordered the complaint dismissed, its conclusion being that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that the verdict was the result of speculation. The Court of Appeals said: Judge Drowota, in a dissenting opinion, stated: We agree with the dissent and hold that the Court of Appeals erred in directing the verdict and dismissing the complaint. In Crabtree Masonry Co. v. C & R Const., Inc., Tenn., 575 S.W.2d 4 (1978), we recently stated the well settled principles governing review of jury verdicts by appellate courts in this State as follows: The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals discloses that these principles were not followed in this case and that the majority has undertaken to weigh the evidence and decide where the preponderance lies. Our own review of the evidence in this case within the limits imposed by the foregoing principles convinces us that the verdict of the jury is supported by the evidence and should have been affirmed. About six weeks after she had given birth to a baby, the plaintiff, Mary Pullins, was admitted to the defendant hospital on July 15, 1973, at about 9:00 p.m. with the diagnosis of pleurisy. She was assigned to bed "B", next to a window, in Room 20 of the hospital. On July 18, she was given a dose of Coumadin, an anticoagulant, as a medication for phlebitis, an ailment which her physician believed was part of her problem. At about 10:00 p.m. on July 20, 1973, she awoke with a sharp pain in her left thigh and upon examination found a red pimple or blip at the point where her pain was localized. Right away the thigh began to swell, her pain became very intense and she became acutely ill and suffered shock, so that, Dr. Allred, her physician, decided to move her from the defendant hospital in Jamestown to the Fort Sanders General Hospital in Knoxville during the early morning hours of July 21, 1973, where she could be treated by Dr. James Ely, a prominent vascular surgeon. Dr. Ely diagnosed her acute illness as systemic poisoning caused by the bite of a brown recluse spider at the site of the blister on Mrs. Pullins' left thigh. Dr. Ely has practiced as a vascular surgeon in Knoxville since 1946 and serves on the staffs of five different hospitals. He was in charge of Mrs. Pullins' treatment for a period of about five months beginning July 21, 1973. He testified positively that it was his opinion as a medical expert that Mrs. Pullins' condition was caused by the bite of a brown recluse spider and that the bite had to have occurred within 24 to 36 hours prior to the time he saw the patient in Knoxville on July 21, 1973. Dr. Ely testified, in part, as follows: Dr. Ely was also asked about the possibility that Mary Pullins' condition was caused by pseudomonas and he testified that her illness was not due to that organism. Dr. Ely explained that a brown recluse spider bite causes a systemic effect as well as a local reaction at the site of the bite. He explained that the toxin of the brown recluse spider contains eight to nine "foreign proteins" which cause fibrinogen fragmentation of the blood of the patient, resulting in "dry gangrene," a condition which developed in both of Mary Pullins' feet. Dr. Ely described the fibrinogen fragmentation as follows: Dr. Robert Collier, who practiced general and vascular surgery in Knoxville, testified that he was called in by Dr. Ely early on Sunday, July 22, 1973, as a consultant and examined the plaintiff and that he agreed completely with Dr. Ely's diagnosis that Mrs. Pullins' condition was caused by the bite of a brown recluse spider. The foregoing is a summary of the expert medical testimony favorable to the verdict of the jury. There was, of course, medical testimony to the contrary. Thus, two other medical experts, Dr. Bruce Bellomy and Dr. Wayne Smith, were called as witnesses for the defense and each stated his opinion that Mrs. Pullins' condition was not caused by the bite of a brown recluse spider. Dr. Bellomy was of the opinion that the plaintiff's condition was probably "a cutaneous gangrenous reaction to Coumadin." He admitted, however, that a case could also be made for the theory that a brown recluse spider bite could cause a systemic effect in the patient and even death and that it typically caused a deep necrosis such as Mrs. Pullins suffered on her thigh. Dr. Bellomy also testified that Dr. Ely was an excellent physician and was in a better position to diagnose the plaintiff's case than was he who did not treat the plaintiff. The presence of spiders in the defendant hospital and the likelihood that Mrs. Pullins was bitten by one is also supported by the testimony of several lay witnesses: Ester Waters, a nurse at the defendant hospital, testified that approximately one year earlier, in July, 1972, while employed by the defendant hospital she was bitten by a spider while in a bathroom located about ten feet from Room 20, the room to which Mrs. Pullins was assigned. She reported this incident to the Superintendent of Nurses of defendant hospital at the time. Betty Ford testified that after Mrs. Pullins was removed from the defendant hospital and was a patient in the Knoxville hospital, she, Mrs. Ford, was in the defendant hospital and killed a large spider in a bathroom there and also saw a lot of little spiders. Johnny Pyle, the maintenance supervisor of the defendant hospital since 1972, appeared as a witness for the defense but testified that he had seen roaches in the hospital, that he had also seen spiders inside and outside the hospital, and that there were open cracks around the air conditioner units located in the windows of the hospital through which one could see to the outside. He further testified that he heard about nurse Waters being bitten by a spider in July, 1972, while in a bathroom about 20 feet from Room 20 which Mrs. Pullins occupied in 1973. Charlene Cravens appeared as a witness for the plaintiff and testified that while visiting her sister when she was a patient in the defendant hospital on July 26, 1973, she *669 killed a brown spider and a roach on her sister's hospital bed and also that on another occasion when she was a patient herself in the hospital in 1974 she killed three brown spiders in the hospital. Mr. Louis Finley, an employee of the Orkin Exterminating Company, testified that he made an inspection of the defendant hospital in the summer of 1973, after Mrs. Pullins had been a patient there, which revealed that the defendant hospital, both inside and outside, was infested with spiders; that there were cracks around the air conditioning units of the hospital and that his company was employed by the defendant hospital to rid the hospital of "rats, mice, spiders, roaches, crickets and beetles." He further testified that Rooms 19, 20 and the emergency room were listed as "problem areas" in the contract between his company and the defendant hospital. He further testified that a spider is known in the exterminating trade as a "pest." John Howard, a witness for the defense, testified that he was employed by the defendant, All-American Exterminating Company, to perform the extermination services for which the defendant hospital had contracted and that, according to his authority, "Handbook of Pest Control," spiders bite when they are squeezed and trapped or crushed in clothing or in bed. Mr. Howard Bruer, Tennessee State Entomologist, testified that people are often bitten by spiders while in bed; that the brown recluse spider's bite causes a local reaction and a systemic reaction as well; and that it would be highly unusual for a brown recluse spider to be brought into the hospital room on somebody's person. He further testified that the average person would find it most difficult to distinguish between a brown recluse spider and other brown spiders. As already indicated, it is our opinion that the evidence outlined above is sufficient to support a finding that Mrs. Pullins was bitten by a brown recluse spider while in her hospital bed in the defendant hospital and that her injuries and disability resulted from the reaction of her body to the toxin injected by the spider bite. We are also of opinion that the evidence supports a finding that the plaintiff suffered the spider bite by reason of the negligence and breach of contract on the part of each of the defendants. We outline such evidence as follows: Mr. Bill W. Ragland, the Administrator of the defendant hospital, testified that "of course, a broad policy dictates that you must eliminate pests." He acknowledged the duty of the hospital to "provide a sanitary environment to avoid sources and transmission of infections." Dr. Ely testified that it was the duty of every hospital to its patients to eradicate pests such as spiders. John Howard, an employee of the defendant, All-American Exterminating Company, who undertook to exterminate the pests in the defendant hospital testified that he received no instructions from his company with respect to servicing the hospital contract; that he doesn't know whether he ever went all the way around the hospital building in performing his inspection and exterminating duties; that he had never received instructions from either of his employers' two licensed exterminating men, one of whom lived in Murfreesboro and the other of whom lived in Nashville; that he did not go into each room of the hospital when servicing the hospital; that spiders bite when squeezed and trapped or crushed in clothing or in bed according to the "Handbook of Pest Control," an authority with which he was familiar; and that he held himself out as one who can control pests. Howard Bruer, the State Entomologist, testified that before July, 1973, Mr. John Howard was not certified "to go out on a job and obtain the contract and service that job without supervision." Mr. Michael Hurd, who served as administrator of the Cookeville Hospital from 1971 to 1975, testified that it was a part of the duty of a hospital administrator "to know whether or not there are pest problems and to be observant and see that they *670 are taken care of." He further testified that it was the primary duty of the hospital housekeeper to do so. Mr. Lloyd McKelvy, trained as an entomologist and employed in the extermination business, testified that if asked by a hospital to service it he would first inspect it both inside and outside; and, that "general pest control" covers every kind of pest from rats to chiggers. He also testified that the brown recluse spider is difficult to identify by the average person because it looks very much like harmless ones. Mr. Alfred Foster, president of the defendant, All-American Exterminating Company, testified that John Howard had a termite license but not a general pest license and that he "just assumed that Howard knew what he was doing." He stated that his company employed two men who were licensed pest men, but neither of them ever went to the defendant hospital; that only John Howard serviced the hospital. In our opinion, the jurors, as reasonable people, could conclude from the above recited evidence that the defendant hospital failed to discharge its duty to make its premises safe for the plaintiff and other patients and that it knew or should have known that it was subjecting its patients to the danger of brown recluse spiders and other pests and failed to take reasonable measures to protect its patients from such pests; and, further, that the defendant exterminating company violated its contract with the hospital and with Mrs. Pullins as a third party beneficiary of such contract in that it failed to properly inspect for and exterminate spiders and other pests and employed for the purpose of servicing the hospital contract a person who was uncertified, unlicensed and incompetent to properly perform the duties thus undertaken, and, that these violations of duty on the part of each of the defendants proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. As indicated earlier in this opinion, the majority of the Court of Appeals in this case sought to apply what it referred to as the "equal probabilities rule," in reaching its conclusion that a verdict should have been directed for the defendants. Actually, that "rule" is nothing more than a particular method of stating the fundamental requirement that a plaintiff must support his theory by a preponderance of the evidence. This burden of the plaintiff is well stated by Professor Prosser in his Prosser on Torts, Hornbook Series (1941) at 326 as follows: See also Harmon v. Richardson, 88 N.H. 312, 188 A. 468 (1936) in which the court described the degree of burden on the plaintiff as "... a little more probable than otherwise." Our own Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Ely, 30 Tenn. App. 294, 205 S.W.2d 759 (1947) correctly stated the law as follows: This statement from the Johnson case was quoted with approval and followed in Crowe v. Provost, 52 Tenn. App. 397, 374 S.W.2d 645 (1963). In our opinion the error of the Court of Appeals lay not in its statement of the so *671 called "rule of equal probabilities," but in its confusion of the relative roles to be played by the jury and a reviewing court. Thus, it is proper for the jury as triers of the facts to apply the "rule" in any case and, likewise, proper for the trial court to give instructions to the jury with respect to that rule, but the occasions when it would be proper for a reviewing court to apply the rule are few, indeed. The proper roles for the court and the jury, respectively, to play in determining causation are stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, American Law Institute (1934), § 434, as follows: Applying these principles to the instant case, it is obvious that "what actually occurred" in this case was not agreed upon, admitted by the pleadings nor found by special verdict; and, further, the testimony is not undisputed and uncontradictory so that there is only one inference which reasonable men could draw from it. Clearly, therefore, the issues of actual causation and of proximate causation in this case were factual ones properly for determination by the jury and not by the Court of Appeals. In short, it was not the proper province of the Court of Appeals to determine, as it did, that "the probabilities are at least equal if not distinctly in favor of the conclusion that she [Mrs. Pullins] was suffering from phlebitis and the after effects of the chemical Coumadin as against the possibility of the bite of a brown recluse spider." This was an invasion of the province of the jury as fact-finders. The defendants have filed some cross assignments of error which we have also considered but found to be without merit or to have been answered by what we have already said in this Opinion. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed; the judgment of the trial court is affirmed and this cause is remanded to that court for execution upon the judgment and for any other proceedings which may be proper. Costs will be borne by the defendants. FONES, COOPER, HENRY and HARBISON, JJ., concur. BROCK, Chief Justice. The defendants have filed a petition to rehear which the Court has considered but found to be without merit. A petition for rehearing will not be granted which merely reargues petitioner's original position. Supreme Court Rule 32; New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Cole, Tenn., 532 S.W.2d 246 (1975). A rehearing will be refused where no new argument is made, no new authority is adduced and no material fact is pointed out as having been overlooked. Insurance Co. of North America v. Cliff Pettit Motors, Inc., Tenn., 513 S.W.2d 785 (1974). *672 The proper office of a petition to rehear is to call attention of the Court to matters which were overlooked in the original opinion, not those matters which counsel supposes to have been improperly decided after full consideration. Clover Bottom Hospital and School v. Townsend, Tenn., 513 S.W.2d 505 (1974). The instant petition does nothing more than reargue matters previously argued and considered by the Court. Accordingly, the petition to rehear is overruled. FONES, COOPER, HENRY and HARBISON, JJ., concur.