Case Title: State v. Jorge B. Sostre

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP000778-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-0778-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Jorge B. Sostre, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 
JAN 24, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                
   
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County, Michael S. Fisher, Judge.    Affirmed.   
 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.   The issue in this case is whether a 
live-in boyfriend, who is a volunteer caretaker of a child, is a 
"person . . . responsible for the welfare of [a] child," and 
thereby subject to the penalty enhancer found in Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.03(5) (1993-94).1  We hold that a live-in boyfriend can be a 
                     
     1  Wis. Stat. § 948.03(5) provides as follows:   
 
 
(5) Penalty enhancement; abuse by certain persons. If a 
person violates sub. (2) or (3) and the person is 
responsible for the welfare of the child who is the 
victim 
of 
the 
violation, 
the 
maximum 
term 
of 
imprisonment may be increased by not more than 5 years. 
 
No. 94-0778-CR 
 
 
 
2 
"person  . . . responsible for the welfare of [a] child," if he 
was used by the legal guardian of the child as a caretaker for the 
child.  In such situations, it is appropriate for the penalty 
enhancer found in Wis. Stat. § 948.03(5) to be applied. 
 
The facts in this case are not in dispute.  On November 10, 
1991, defendant Jorge B. Sostre was charged with one count of 
child abuse for intentionally injuring three-year-old Joseph F.  
On 
November 
12, 
Irene 
Lundin, 
a 
juvenile 
crisis 
worker, 
interviewed Joseph.  The child told her that the defendant hit him 
and pointed to his head, his stomach and his buttocks.  Asked 
where he was when this took place, the child brought the crisis 
worker into his bedroom and pointed to his bed and said "Poppy hit 
me."   
 
The defendant's trial began on February 22, 1993.  At trial, 
Sandra F., Joseph's mother, testified that she and Sostre had 
known each other about four or five years and lived together for 
about three years.  Sandra F. said that during this time the 
defendant did everything that she did with regard to taking care 
of the children, including feeding and bathing them.  She claimed 
that Joseph considered the defendant his father or stepfather, 
called him "Poppy," and that until the child abuse incident, 
Joseph had had a normal father-son relationship with the 
defendant.  
 
Sandra then testified that on November 8, 1991, she left 
Joseph in the defendant's exclusive care.  She rejoined her son a 
 
No. 94-0778-CR 
 
 
 
3 
few hours later and discovered bruises on Joseph's face, stomach 
and buttocks.  The defendant told her that he did not know how the 
child had gotten hurt.  Sandra took Joseph to the hospital to 
treat his injuries.    
 
 
 
Two physicians also testified for the State:  Dr. Harlow 
LaBarge and Dr. James Concannon.  Dr. LaBarge testified that 
during his October 24, 1991, examination of Joseph, he observed 
numerous older bruises on the child.  He also found numerous acute 
injuries, including injuries to the back and abdomen, the left 
side of the head, the right side of the head and the top of the 
head.  Dr. LaBarge opined that the injuries he observed on the 
body of Joseph were indicative of child abuse. 
 
Dr. Concannon testified that the child told him that "Poppy" 
hit him and indicated that the blows were both with fists and with 
an open hand during the November 8, 1991, incident.  The child 
also indicated that he had been struck about the face, the back, 
the butt, the penis and the belly.  The doctor found the following 
acute injuries:  bruising where the rib cage ends, along the right 
cheek and upper eyelid, petechiae on both cheeks of the face, and 
reddened areas on the buttocks.  Dr. Concannon found a pattern to 
the injuries on the rib cage and cheek that was consistent with a 
slap with an open hand and which indicated more than one blow.  It 
was his opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that 
the injuries were consistent with intentional trauma and rose to 
the level of abuse.   
 
No. 94-0778-CR 
 
 
 
4 
 
At the trial, the defendant denied abusing Joseph.  However, 
he admitted that he cared for Joseph and that he had what could be 
characterized as a parental relationship with Joseph while he was 
living with Sandra.  He also admitted that all of Joseph's 
injuries occurred while he had the child in his exclusive custody. 
  
 
A jury found the defendant guilty of physical abuse of Joseph 
F. pursuant to Wis. Stat. §  948.03(2)(b) (1993-94).2  He was 
sentenced to eight years in prison, which were stayed, and was 
placed on five years probation with certain conditions, including 
the service of one year in jail.  The eight-year stayed sentence 
included a penalty enhancement of three years as required by Wis. 
Stat. § 948.03(5).   
 
After the trial, the defendant moved for either a reduction 
of the sentence imposed or, alternatively, a new trial on the 
issue of the defendant's responsibility for the welfare of the 
child.  The circuit court for Kenosha County, Michael S. Fisher, 
Judge, 
denied 
this 
motion, 
holding 
that 
the 
defendant's 
relationship with Joseph created a situation where the defendant 
became a "person  . . . responsible for the welfare of [a] child" 
under Wis. Stat. § 948.03(5).  The defendant appealed this holding 
to the court of appeals.  The court of appeals, citing due process 
                     
     2  Wis. Stat. § 948.03(2)(b) provides as follows:   
 
 
(b)  Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a child 
is guilty of a Class D felony. 
 
No. 94-0778-CR 
 
 
 
5 
concerns raised by a possible conflict between our decision in 
State v. Evans, 171 Wis. 2d 471, 492 N.W.2d 141 (1992), and its 
decision in State v. Dodd, 185 Wis. 2d 560, 564, 518 N.W.2d 300, 
301 (Ct. App. 1994), certified the case to this court pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (1993-94).  Review was accepted.  
 
The interpretation of a statute and the application of a 
statute to an undisputed set of facts are both questions of law. 
See Ynocencio v. Fesko, 114 Wis. 2d 391, 396, 338 N.W.2d 461 
(1983).  This court reviews such question de novo without 
deference to the trial court or the court of appeals.  See id. 
 
The ultimate goal of this court in interpreting a statute is 
to give effect to the legislature's intent.  See State ex rel. 
Parker v. Sullivan, 184 Wis. 2d 668, 679, 517 N.W.2d 449 (1994).  
The first step in this process is to look to the plain language of 
the statute itself.  See id.   
 
The phrase "person . . . responsible for the welfare of [a] 
child" found in Wis. Stat. § 948.03(5) is defined by Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.01(3).3  One category of persons included in this definition 
is those people who are "employed by one legally responsible for 
                     
     3  Wis. Stat. § 948.01(3) provides as follows:   
 
 
(3) "Person responsible for the child's welfare" 
includes the child's parent; guardian; foster parent; 
treatment foster parent; an employe of a public or 
private residential home, institution or agency; other 
person legally responsible for the child's welfare in a 
residential setting; or a person employed by one legally 
responsible 
for 
the 
child's 
welfare 
to 
exercise 
temporary control or care for the child. 
 
No. 94-0778-CR 
 
 
 
6 
the child's welfare to exercise temporary control or care for the 
child."  Wis. Stat. § 948.01(3).  One of the common meanings of 
the word "employed" is to "engage the service of" or "to make use 
of."  Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2nd ed. 1993).  Under 
these facts, it seems clear that the mother made use of the 
services of the defendant, or engaged the services of the 
defendant, in order to take care of her child when it was 
necessary for her to be away.  In other words, the defendant was 
clearly "employed" by a person "legally responsible" for a child 
to "care for that child."  
 
It is true that the term "employed" is usually equated with 
economic payment for services.  The existence of more than one 
common meaning for the word "employed" creates an ambiguity in the 
statute which should be construed so as to uphold the intent of 
the legislature.  This court recognized in Evans, 171 Wis. 2d at 
480, that the legislature's implicit intent in drafting Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.01(3) was to "broadly define the category of persons 
responsible for a child's welfare."  This finding was based upon 
the statute's remedial purpose of combatting the evils of child 
abuse, especially abuse by people who are entrusted with the 
child's care.  By broadly construing the word "employed," our 
opinion gives effect to this intent.   
 
Although postulated by the court of appeals as a possible 
problem, we find no conflict between our decisions in this case 
and Evans and the court of appeals' decision in Dodd.  It is true 
 
No. 94-0778-CR 
 
 
 
7 
that all three decisions interpret the same language.  It is also 
true that Dodd interprets the phrase "person responsible for [a] 
child's welfare" in a limited manner while this decision and Evans 
interpret the same language much more broadly.  There are, 
however, a number of reasons why this difference in interpretation 
is not only appropriate, but necessary. 
 
First, and most obviously, the language interpreted in Dodd 
is found in a completely different chapter of the Wisconsin 
Statutes than the language interpreted by this decision and Evans. 
 The court of appeals in Dodd explicitly distinguished Evans on 
this basis.  See Dodd, 185 Wis. 2d at 565-66.  This case and Evans 
deal with the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 948.01(3).  This 
subsection is found in ch. 948 which is titled "Crimes Against 
Children."  The entire chapter is specifically aimed at remedying 
the problems of child abuse.  Dodd, however, interprets Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.45(5) (1993-94).4  This section is found in ch. 939 which is 
                     
     4  Wis. Stat. § 939.45(5) (1993-94) provides as follows:   
 
 
(5)(a) In this subsection: 
 
1.  "Child" has the meaning specified in s. 948.01 (1). 
 
3.  "Person responsible for the child's welfare" 
includes the child's parent or guardian; an employe of a 
public or private residential home, institution or 
agency in which the child resides or is confined or that 
provides services to the child; or any other person 
legally responsible for the child's welfare in a 
residential setting. 
 
(b)  When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline 
of a child by a person responsible for the child's 
welfare.  Reasonable discipline may involve only such 
force as a reasonable person believes is necessary.  It 
is never reasonable discipline to use force which is 
intended to cause great bodily harm or death or creates 
 
No. 94-0778-CR 
 
 
 
8 
titled "Crimes - Generally."  Wisconsin Statute § 939.45's purpose 
is to discuss the basic statutory privileges which a defendant may 
invoke when he has been charged with the commission of a crime.  
The parent-child discipline privilege is one of these.  There is 
no reason why these two distinct chapters need to be read 
together.   
 
Second, Wis. Stat. § 939.45(5) sets forth a different 
definition for the phrase "person responsible for [a] child's 
welfare" than does Wis. Stat. § 948.01(3).  Wisconsin Statute 
§ 939.45(5) explicitly limits the application of its definition to 
Wis. Stat. § 939.45(5)(a) and (b).  Furthermore, this court has 
recognized that the definition of this phrase found in Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.01(3) is also "self-contained" and should be interpreted 
independently from other chapters.  Evans, 171 Wis. 2d at 480.  In 
fact, our decision in this case relies upon a portion of the 
definition in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(3) which is not even found in 
Wis. Stat. § 939.45(5).  It is not unreasonable for the 
legislature to wish to define the same language differently in 
separate statutory chapters.  Here, it has done so specifically 
and deliberately.  
 
Finally, the sections must be interpreted differently in 
order to fully realize the legislature's intent of remedying the 
evils of child abuse.  The legislature determined that it was 
(..continued) 
an unreasonable risk of great bodily harm or death. 
 
No. 94-0778-CR 
 
 
 
9 
especially concerned about abuse by people who children, by 
necessity, must rely upon for their physical well-being.  It 
sought to alleviate this concern by limiting the application of 
the child discipline privilege, while at the same time broadening 
the scope of people deemed to be in a special relationship with a 
child and therefore subject to a penalty enhancer.    These 
actions are clearly within the plenary power of the legislature.   
 
When a word used in a statute is ambiguous, it should be 
construed so that it fulfills the intent of the legislature as 
that intent is expressed in the statute as a whole.5  As such, the 
trial court correctly concluded that the penalty enhancer of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.03(5) was applicable to the defendant, Jorge B. 
Sostre. 
 
By the Court.—The judgment of the Kenosha County Circuit 
Court is affirmed.   
                     
     5  We decline to pass judgment today on the dicta in State v. 
Evans, 171 Wis. 2d 471, 480, 492 N.W.2d 141 (1992) which concluded 
that "the category of persons responsible for a child's welfare 
may include classes of persons in addition to those spelled out in 
sec. 948.01(3)."  The facts of this case do not present a 
situation where a new class of persons needs to be created; the 
defendant falls squarely within one of the specifically enumerated 
classes found in the statute itself. 
 
No. 94-0778-CR 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-0778-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Jorge B. Sostre, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
January 24, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 28, 1995 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
MICHAEL FISHER 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and 
oral argument by Ruth S. Downs, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Diane M. 
Nicks, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general.