Case Title: Carousel Snack Bar v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N

Citation: 156 Ariz. 43, 749 P.2d 1364

Docket Number: 87-0160

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1988-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
156 Ariz. 43 (1988) 749 P.2d 1364 CAROUSEL SNACK BAR, Petitioner Employer, Aetna Fire Underwriters Insurance Company, c/o INA/Aetna, Petitioner Carrier, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, Lynn E. Hoskin, Respondent Employee. No. CV 87-0160-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. January 14, 1988. Long & Lester by James B. Long and Joseph L. Moore, Phoenix, for petitioner employer/carrier. Dennis P. Kavanaugh, Chief Counsel, Phoenix, for respondent. Charles M. Wilmer, Phoenix, for respondent employee. CAMERON, Justice. I. JURISDICTION Lynn Hoskin, claimant, seeks review of a court of appeals' decision to set aside an award of the Industrial Commission of Arizona (Commission). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3) and A.R.S. § 23-948. II. ISSUE PRESENTED We address the following issue: III. FACTS Claimant sustained an injury to her back during the course of her employment with Carousel Snack Bar (Employer) on 21 October 1982. Aetna Fire Underwriters Insurance Company (Carrier) accepted a claim for benefits filed by claimant following the injury. In January 1984, Carrier issued a notice of claim status closing the claim with no permanent disability, effective 9 January 1984. Claimant timely protested the decision and a hearing was conducted. At the hearing, the following testimony was given by John Gelsey, M.D.: The administrative law judge (ALJ) issued an award for an unscheduled permanent partial disability stating: The ALJ "accepted the opinion of Dr. Gelsey [a medical expert] that [claimant] has sustained a permanent impairment as a result of the subject industrial episode as being more probably correct." The ALJ did not find the percentage (rate) of impairment. The Carrier sought judicial review, arguing that claimant had failed to prove the existence and extent of the permanent medical impairment caused by the industrial accident based on a precise rating figure. The court of appeals agreed and, in a memorandum decision, set aside the award holding that to prove a permanent partial unscheduled disability a claimant's impairment must be "rated." We granted the claimant's petition for review because we do not believe that there must be a rating for an unscheduled permanent disability before an award can issue. IV. MUST THERE BE A RATING? Our statute provides: A.R.S. § 23-1044(D) (emphasis added). The court of appeals has previously stated that an actual percentage impairment is not necessary to uphold an award for compensation benefits. Cassey v. Industrial Comm'n, 152 Ariz. 280, 282, 731 P.2d 645, 647 (App. 1987). We have stated: Smith v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Ariz. 304, 307 n. 4, 552 P.2d 1198, 1201 n. 4 (1976). The injury in the instant case is of the unscheduled variety. The reason an unscheduled injury need not be "rated" so long as it results in some disability is that there is often little relationship between the injury and the resulting disability. A small injury can result in total disability and a large injury can result in a minimum of disability or loss of earning capacity. The medical testimony as a whole may aid the Commission in determining the "nature and extent of the physical disability" in its loss of earning capacity determination as set forth in A.R.S. § 23-1044(D). However, the inability to give a precise figure for rating is not determinative of the fact that there is some industrial impairment of the claimant's physical condition. If an impairment causally related to an industrial accident is found, but it cannot be rated under the AMA Guidelines, the lack of a magic number does not preclude a finding of a permanent disability. Gomez v. Industrial Comm'n, 148 Ariz. 565, 569, 716 P.2d 22, 26 (1986). Moreover, where the magic number of a rating is only a factor and not necessarily the determinative factor in a disability analysis, the result *46 should be no different simply because the expert testifies to a causal relationship between the compensable injury and the impairment without stating per se the numerical rating. Pew v. Industrial Comm'n, 20 Ariz. App. 113, 115, 510 P.2d 424, 426 (1973). Although we admit that the better practice would be to assign a rating number to the impairment, we find no error in the failure of the ALJ to assign a rating number. V. DOES THE EVIDENCE SUPPORT A DISABILITY? In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the ALJ's findings, we first note that conflicts in medical evidence must be resolved by the trier of fact. Ortega v. Industrial Comm'n, 121 Ariz. 554, 557, 592 P.2d 388, 391 (App. 1979). Many factors enter into a resolution of conflicting evidence, including whether or not the testimony is speculative, consideration of the diagnostic method used, qualifications in backgrounds of the expert witnesses and their experience in diagnosing the type of injury incurred. See generally Ison v. Western Vegetable Distributors, 48 Ariz. 104, 112, 59 P.2d 649, 653 (1936); Cash v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Ariz. App. 526, 532, 556 P.2d 827, 833 (1976); Radlein v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Ariz. App. 215, 218, 553 P.2d 248, 251 (1976). Neither the court of appeals nor this court is a trier of fact. An award of the Commission will be affirmed if it can be supported by any reasonable theory of evidence. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 119 Ariz. 566, 568, 582 P.2d 656, 658 (1978). We believe that the evidence was sufficient to support the findings by the ALJ. VI. HOLDING We have reviewed the medical evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the award by the Commission. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 114 Ariz. 472, 476, 561 P.2d 1244, 1248 (App. 1977). We find that the evidence supports the award. The Commission's award is approved. The decision of the court of appeals is vacated. GORDON, C.J., FELDMAN, V.C.J., and HOLOHAN and MOELLER, JJ., concur.