Case Title: Horejs v. Milford

Citation: 

Docket Number: 19S-CT-97

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2019-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-CT-97 
James T. Horejs, James Harris, and Robert Horejs, as Co-
Administrators of the Estate of Laura A. Shaner, Deceased 
Appellants (Plaintiffs below), 
–v–
Albert Milford, D.O., St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare 
Centers, Inc., and TRC-Indiana LLC d/b/a 
Comprehensive Renal Care-Munster d/b/a DaVita, Inc. 
Appellees (Defendants below). 
Argued: October 25, 2018 | Decided: February 21, 2019 
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court  
No. 45D11-0711-CT-195 
The Honorable Diane Kavadias Schneider, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 45A03-1709-CT-2173 
Opinion by Justice David 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Feb 21 2019, 2:44 pm
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CT-97 | February 21, 2019 
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David, Justice. 
On occasion, a case arises that demonstrates the enduring importance 
of drafting a will.  This is one such case.  The present dispute arises out of 
a wrongful death suit initiated by David Shaner after his wife Laura’s 
death due to complications with the administration of dialysis treatments.  
David sought two categories of damages contemplated by Indiana’s 
wrongful death statute: damages related to medical, hospital, funeral, and 
burial expenses and additional damages including loss of consortium, lost 
earnings and wages, and loss of additional employment benefits.  During 
litigation, David died intestate, leaving no immediately ascertainable 
heirs.  Defendants, Dr. Albert Milford, St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare 
Centers, Inc., and TRC-Indiana, LLC, moved for partial summary 
judgment on David’s claim for damages related to loss of consortium, 
arguing any damages in excess of medical, hospital, funeral, and burial 
expenses would be punitive in nature because David left no heirs.  The 
trial court granted the Defendant’s motion and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed.   
We grant transfer today to reverse the trial court’s grant of partial 
summary judgment and hold that the wrongful death and survival 
statutes enable David’s claim to survive regardless of the existence of an 
heir.  Because we are not convinced the proper party is maintaining 
David’s claim, however, we also instruct the trial court to determine 
whether there is a proper party to continue the action as contemplated by 
the relevant statutes. 
Facts and Procedural History 
In late 2005, Laura Shaner underwent surgery performed by Defendant 
Albert Milford, D.O. (“Milford”) at St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Center 
(“St. Margaret”) in Dyer, Indiana, for the repair of an abdominal hernia.   
Unfortunately, complications arose after the surgery, which necessitated 
Laura’s dialysis treatments at TRC–Indiana, LLC d/b/a Comprehensive 
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Renal Care–Munster d/b/a DaVita, Inc. (“TRC”).  Laura died on January 4, 
2006, after problems from administration of the dialysis and was survived 
by her husband David Shaner. 
David, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Laura A. 
Shaner, brought suit against Milford, St. Margaret, and TRC, asserting 
Defendants were liable in negligence for Laura’s death.  David sought two 
categories of damages resulting from the wrongful death of Laura: “final–
expense damages” including medical, hospital, funeral, and burial 
expenses, and “survivor damages” for the loss of consortium, including 
the loss of Laura’s earnings and wages, and her services, love, affection, 
companionship, society, support, and protection. 1  While these claims 
were pending, David died intestate on October 30, 2015, leaving no 
known surviving heirs.  David’s estate escheated to the State of Indiana. 
In 2016, Laura’s father, James T. Horejs, was appointed successor 
administrator of Laura’s Estate, and Laura’s brothers, Robert Horejs and 
James Harris, were appointed as co-administrators (collectively “Horejs”).  
These co-administrators continued to claim both final–expense and 
survivor damages flowing from the wrongful death claim.  TRC, joined by 
St. Margaret and Milford, moved for partial summary judgment on the 
survivor damages claim, arguing that, because of David’s death, there was 
no evidence to support a claim for loss of consortium damages.  Because 
David left no will, had no dependents or next of kin, and there was no 
evidence available to calculate damages for a loss of consortium claim, the 
trial court granted Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.  
The trial court also concluded that the co-administrators lacked standing 
to continue this claim on behalf of the Estate of David Shaner. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that because David had no 
heirs, any survivor damages would pass to the state—a result contrary to 
                                                 
1 The Court of Appeals intuitively referred to these two distinct categories of damages as 
“final-expense damages” and “survivor damages.”  See Horejs v. Milford, 104 N.E.3d 622, 623 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2018).  For the purposes of this opinion, we will continue to use these terms to 
describe the damages at issue in this case.   
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CT-97 | February 21, 2019 
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the compensatory purpose of the wrongful-death statute.  Horejs v. 
Milford, 104 N.E.3d 622, 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).  The court’s opinion 
closely examined this Court’s decision in Bemenderfer v. Williams, 745 
N.E.2d 212 (Ind. 2001), and found the holding in Bemenderfer “turned on 
the fact that an heir of the deceased statutory beneficiary would receive a 
smaller inheritance absent an award of survivor damages.”  Horejs, 104 
N.E.3d at 624-25.  The Court of Appeals found that allowing a claim for 
survivor damages in the instant case would only serve to punish the 
Defendants because the damages would simply pass to the State.  Id. at 25. 
Horejs sought transfer, which we now grant, thereby vacating the 
Court of Appeals’ opinion.  Ind. App. Rule 58(A).  
Standard of Review 
We review a grant of partial summary judgment the same as in the trial 
court.  Ballard v. Lewis, 8 N.E.3d 190, 193 (Ind. 2014).  “[S]ummary 
judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Where a challenge 
to the trial court’s summary judgment ruling presents only legal issues or 
a question of statutory interpretation, it is reviewed de novo.  Id.  
Discussion and Decision 
The parties in this case ask us to affirm our Court’s prior decision in 
Bemenderfer v. Williams, 745 N.E.2d 212 (Ind. 2001), albeit for different 
reasons.  Horejs argues Bemenderfer should be read to authorize a claim for 
survivor damages that extends beyond the death of a party regardless of 
the existence of an heir.  Meanwhile, Defendants argue Bemenderfer turned 
specifically on the existence of an heir and that policy considerations 
discussed in Bemenderfer cut in their collective favor to foreclose a claim 
for survivor damages.  Although we find that neither the relevant statutes 
nor Bemenderfer require an heir for this type of claim to survive the death 
of a party, we are not convinced the proper party is before the Court to 
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continue David’s claim for survivor damages.  Each of these issues will be 
discussed in turn. 
I. The relevant statutes do not preclude an action for 
survivor damages and Bemenderfer does not change 
that result. 
Two statutes inform the basis of our holding today:  the “death from a 
wrongful act or omission” statute codified at Indiana Code section 34-23-
1-1, and the “continuing action after death of party” statute found in 
Indiana Code section 34-9-3-1.  The current versions of each statute were 
re–codified in the same piece of legislation, see 1998 Ind. Acts 39-40, 141-
42, and neither statute has been amended since the recodification or our 
decision in Bemenderfer.  As we have previously observed, “[t]he survival 
statute and the wrongful death statute must be construed together.”  
Bemenderfer, 745 N.E.2d at 218.  
Indiana’s wrongful–death statute, convoluted as it may be, lays out the 
general cause of action for when a wrongful act or omission causes the 
death of another.  This provision allows the personal representative of the 
decedent to maintain an action against the alleged wrongdoer that caused 
the death “if the [decedent] might have maintained an action had he or 
she…lived.”  Ind. Code § 34-23-1-1.  This cause of action contemplates the 
possibility of damages, which is described as follows:  
[D]amages shall be in such an amount as may be determined 
by the court or jury, including, but not limited to, reasonable 
medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses, and lost 
earnings of such deceased person resulting from said wrongful 
act or omission.  That part of the damages which is recovered 
for reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expense 
shall inure to the exclusive benefit of the decedent's estate for 
the payment thereof.  The remainder of the damages, if any, 
shall, subject to the provisions of this article, inure to the 
exclusive benefit of the widow or widower, as the case may be, 
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and to the dependent children, if any, or dependent next of kin, 
to be distributed in the same manner as the personal property 
of the deceased. 
Id.  Simply put, any final–expense damages inure to the decedent’s estate 
for payment of reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses, 
and any excess damages, including survivor damages, inure to the 
exclusive benefit of the widow or widower and any dependents.  
As applied to the present case, David Shaner brought an action under 
the wrongful–death statute against Milford, St. Margaret, and TRC for 
both final–expense and survivor damages.  Had this action been frozen in 
time, both parties seem to agree that under the wrongful–death statute, 
David was entitled to pursue both final–expense and survivor damages as 
the administrator for Laura’s estate and in his individual capacity as 
Laura’s widower.  David’s death before judgment, however, does not 
necessarily mean these claims abate.  Rather, courts must look to Indiana’s 
survival statute to determine whether a particular type of action may 
continue. 
Indiana’s survival statute provides, “If an individual who is entitled or 
liable in a cause of action dies, the cause of action survives and may be 
brought by or against the representative of the deceased party…”  Ind. 
Code § 34-9-3-1(a).  The statute also instructs:  
An action under this chapter may be brought, or the court, on 
motion, may allow the action to be continued by or against the 
legal representatives or successors in interest of the deceased.  
The action is considered a continued action and accrues to the 
representatives or successors at the time the action would have 
accrued to the deceased if the deceased had survived.  
Ind. Code § 34-9-3-1(b).  As this Court has previously held, “the plain 
language of the survival statute tells us that a cause of action, once 
accrued, does not abate.”  Bemenderfer, 745 N.E.2d at 218.   
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Defendants in this case argue that the wrongful–death statute must be 
harmonized with the survival statute to require that an heir take up the 
claim on behalf of the decedent’s estate.  Reading these statutes together, 
however, we see no indication in the text of either statute that David’s 
claim for survivor damages terminated upon his death simply because he 
had no heirs.  A plain reading of the text confirms that the claim for 
survivor damages, once properly asserted, does not abate due to the death 
of the once-surviving spouse.  
This Court’s prior decision in Bemenderfer does nothing to change this 
result.  Rather, the holding in that case reinforces this interpretation.  The 
facts presented in that case are nearly identical to the facts of the present 
action.  The wife in Bemenderfer died as a result of complications from a 
laparoscopic examination and her husband and daughter sought both 
final–expense and survivor damages under the wrongful death statute.  Id. 
at 214-15.  During the pendency of that lawsuit, the husband died, leaving 
the couple’s daughter as the personal representative of both estates.  Id. at 
215.  The doctor–defendant moved for partial summary judgment, 
arguing that any damages beyond final–expense damages were foreclosed 
by the husband’s death.  Id.  The trial court ultimately denied the 
defendant’s motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Id. 
In examining the same statutes at issue in today’s decision, our Court 
specifically found that, “[t]here is no suggestion in this version of the 
[wrongful death] statute that the cause of action expires if the surviving 
spouse or beneficiary dies before the wrongful death action is prosecuted 
to its conclusion.”  Id. at 217.  Furthermore, we observed that the statute 
“expressly suggests that survival of the statutory beneficiary to the 
wrongful death victim’s death, and not until judgment, is a prerequisite to 
recovering damages under the statute.”  Id.  Simply put, our Court held 
that there was nothing in the survival statute that required this type of 
cause of action to abate upon the death of one of the parties.  Id. at 218. 
The Bemenderfer opinion also examined several policy arguments 
advanced by each party.  Namely, the defendant argued that the purpose 
of the wrongful death statute was compensatory rather than punitive.  Id.  
As such, there should have been no award of survivor damages because 
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the damages would inure to someone not contemplated by the statute.  Id.  
Conversely, the plaintiffs argued that cutting off an otherwise valid award 
of damages only served to benefit the tortfeasor and incentivized 
defending parties to draw out litigation in the hopes that a contemplated 
beneficiary would die before judgment.  Id.  Ultimately, our Court found 
the policy concerns favored the plaintiffs because the husband lost his 
lifelong companion, was forced into a nursing home, suffered from the 
profound financial impact of the circumstances, and that the loss was 
ultimately borne by his heirs.  Id. 
The parties before us today make similar policy arguments and we see 
no reason to upend the basic reasoning set forth in Bemenderfer.  While it is 
true there was an immediately identifiable heir in Bemenderfer, there is no 
language in that opinion that would suggest our Court read a requirement 
of a surviving heir into the otherwise facially clear wrongful death and 
survival statutes.  Defendants, believing otherwise, point us to the 
following statement in the Bemenderfer opinion: “Because we conclude that 
[husband’s] damages did not abate upon his death, and because, as an heir, 
[daughter] stands to recover those damages…” Id. at 219 (emphasis added).  
Defendants interpret this language to mean that the entire opinion turned 
on the existence of an heir.  But Defendants fail to quote the second part of 
that sentence, which reads, “…we do not address the Court of Appeals’ 
conclusion that Dillier establishes that [daughter] may bring a separate 
action to recover her pecuniary losses.”  Id.  Read as a whole, this sentence 
is inconsequential to the overall holding and purpose of Bemenderfer, 
which was to affirm the finding that, despite the husband’s death prior to 
final judgment, his claim for survivor damages did not abate.  The 
sentence simply explained why the Court’s opinion did not address a 
particular portion of the Court of Appeals analysis. 
We decline to carve out an exception to the central holding of 
Bemenderfer in today’s opinion.  After all, a wrongful death action is 
“entirely a creature of statute.”  Durham ex rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul, 745 
N.E.2d 755, 758 (Ind. 2001).  Because the plain language of the wrongful 
death and survival statutes require that a properly–accrued claim does not 
abate, we hold that David’s claim for survivor damages could have 
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survived regardless of the existence of an heir.  Therefore, summary 
judgment on this basis was inappropriate. 
II. The proper party to this claim remains unclear. 
Although we hold today that an heir was not required under the 
wrongful death and survival statutes for David’s claim to continue, we are 
not convinced that the Estate of Laura Shaner is the proper party to assert 
this claim.  Defendants have hinted as much, arguing that the co–
administrators of Laura’s estate should not be the party pursuing this 
claim.  Rather, as Defendants suggest, David’s estate should have taken 
up this claim when it had the opportunity.2 
As noted above, the wrongful death statute allows a claim for damages 
beyond final–expense damages to “inure to the exclusive benefit of the 
widow or widower…to be distributed in the same manner as the personal 
property of the deceased.”  Ind. Code § 34-23-1-1.  As it relates to this 
provision, the survival statute allows an action to be continued “by or 
against the legal representatives or successors in interest of the deceased.”  
Ind. Code § 34-9-3-1(a).  Applied to David’s claim, survivor damages were 
to inure to his exclusive benefit.  The survival statute allows David’s legal 
representative or successor in interest to continue this action beyond 
David’s death. This claim “is considered a continued action and accrues to 
the representatives or successors at the time the action would have 
accrued to the deceased if the deceased had survived.”  Ind. Code § 34-9-
3-1(b).  As such, the party seeking any survivor damages to which David 
was entitled must be either a legal representative or successor in interest 
to David. 
We note that the key difference between Bemenderfer and today’s 
decision is that the daughter in Bemenderfer was appointed as a personal 
representative of the husband’s estate and the wife’s estate.  745 N.E.2d at 
                                                 
2 The trial court’s findings of fact indicate that David Shaner’s estate escheated to the state 
after his death in late 2015. 
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215.  This position allowed her to continue the husband’s claim for 
survivor damages on behalf of the husband’s estate after his death.  Here, 
only Laura’s estate is before our Court.  We recognize that the trial court 
concluded the “[s]uccessor Co-administrators of the Estate of Laura A. 
Shaner do not have the standing to continue a claim on behalf of the Estate 
of David Shaner,” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 22, and take this conclusion 
at face value.  But given that David’s claim for survivor damages could 
have survived David’s death regardless of the existence of an heir, we 
instruct the trial court on remand to consider whether a proper party 
exists to continue this claim such that David’s estate would be eligible to 
be reopened. See Ind. Code § 29-1-17-14.   
Conclusion 
We hold that David’s claim for survivor damages did not abate upon 
his death and was not dependent on the existence of an heir.  Therefore, 
summary judgment on this claim was inappropriate.  We reverse the trial 
court’s grant of partial summary judgment and remand this matter for 
additional proceedings. 
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CT-97 | February 21, 2019 
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A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L A N TS 
Timothy S. Schafer 
Timothy S. Schafer, II 
Todd S. Schafer 
Schafer & Schafer 
Merrillville, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E A LB E RT  MI L F O R D,  D. O . 
Jason A. Scheele 
Edward L. Murphy 
Rothberg Logan & Warsco LLP 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E S T.  MA R GA R ET  M E RC Y  
H E AL TH CA R E CE NT E RS , IN C.  
Libby Yin Goodknight 
Krieg DeVault LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Shannon L. Noder 
Julie Ann Rosenwinkel 
Krieg DeVault LLP 
Merrillville, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E T RC -I N D IA NA  L LC  
Leslie B. Pollie 
Travis W. Montgomery 
Kopka Pinkus Dolin PC 
Carmel, Indiana