Case Title: WILKINSON v STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-041

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1983-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. 83-41 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1983 K A T H L E E N R A C H E L WILKINSON, Defendant and Appellant, vs . STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent. Appeal from- D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Missoula Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presidin*. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Nick A. Roterinq argued, Special Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Xontana Robert L. Deschamps 111, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana Karen S. Townsend, Deputy County Attorney, arqued. Missoula, Montana Submitted- June 2 , 198 3 Decided- August 1, 1983 Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e L. C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e S t a t e of Montana a p p e a l s from an o r d e r by t h e District Court of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Missoula County, d e c l a r i n g t h e Department f i n a n c i a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o s t s i n c u r r e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e b i r t h of d e f e n d a n t ' s baby. On September 10, 1982, d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d a g u i l t y p l e a t o t h e c h a r g e of n e g l i g e n t homicide. The D i s t r i c t Court sentenced d e f e n d a n t t o t e n y e a r s w i t h two y e a r s suspended, t o be served a t a women's c o r r e c t i o n a l f a c i l i t y chosen by t h e Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s . Because d e f e n d a n t was soon t o g i v e b i r t h and because testi- mony a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g i n d i c a t e d t h a t she had a s t r o n g medical r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h e r p h y s i c i a n , t h e District Court allowed her t o remain a t t h e Missoula County j a i l u n t i l a f t e r t h e b i r t h of her c h i l d . She was remanded t o t h e c u s t o d y of t h e Missoula County s h e r i f f and s u b s e q u e n t l y gave b i r t h t o h e r c h i l d a t t h e Missoula Community H o s p i t a l . On October 28, 1982, she was t a k e n t o t h e Women's C o r r e c t i o n a l C e n t e r a t Warm S p r i n g s , Montana. The Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s r e f u s e d t o pay t h e medical expenses of t h e b i r t h . Missoula County moved f o r an o r d e r from t h e District Court d e c l a r i n g t h a t t h e Department pay t h e medical expenses. A f t e r a show-cause h e a r i n g , t h e District Court made t h e f o l l o w i n g f i n d i n g s , c o n c l u s i o n s , and d e c r e e : "FINDINGS OF FACT "1. The Defendant, K a t h l e e n Rachel Wilkinson, was found g u i l t y by a p l e a of g u i l t y t o t h e o f f e n s e of N e g l i g e n t Homicide, a f e l o n y , and s e n t e n c e d on t h e 1 0 t h day of September, 1982 t o a term of t e n ( 1 0 ) y e a r s a t Montana S t a t e P r i s o n w i t h two of t h o s e y e a r s suspended. "2. The Defendant, on September 1 0 , 1982, was o r d e r e d t o s e r v e her time a t t h e women's p r i - s o n f a c i l i t y a t Warm S p r i n g s S t a t e H o s p i t a l . " 3 . The Defendant was ordered r e t a i n e d i n t h e Missoula County J a i l u n t i l a f t e r t h e b i r t h of h e r c h i l d s o t h a t her o b s t e t r i c i a n could con- t i n u e t o c a r e f o r h e r . "4. The Defendant was ordered t o remain i n Missoula County and not be t r a n s f e r r e d t o Warm S p r i n g s S t a t e H o s p i t a l u n t i l her d o c t o r d e t e r - mined t h a t it would not be d e t r i m e n t a l t o her i n t e r e s t s o r t h e i n t e r e s t s of her c h i l d t o be t r a n s f e r r e d . "5. The Defendant was t a k e n t o Missoula Community H o s p i t a l f o r t h e b i r t h of h e r c h i l d on October 23, 1982. "6. Expenses f o r medical and s e c u r i t y c o s t s i n t h e amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-two and 47/100th D o l l a r s ($3,482.47) were i n c u r r e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e b i r t h of t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s son. "7. The Defendant was t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e women's p r i s o n f a c i l i t y on t h e 2 8 t h day of O c t o b e r , 1982 a f t e r her p h y s i c i a n s t a t e d s h e c o u l d be t r a n s f e r r e d . "CONCLUSIONS O F L A W "1. The Defendant became a s t a t e p r i s o n e r on t h e 1 0 t h day of September, 1982 upon passing o f s e n t e n c e . "2. The D e f e n d a n t ' s s t a y i n t h e Missoula County J a i l and o r t h e Missoula Community H o s p i t a l from September 1 0 , 1982 u n t i l October 28, 1982, was a temporary s t a y f o r a state p r i s o n inmate. "3. The Montana Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s is f i n a n c i a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e medical and s e c u r i t y c o s t s i n c u r r e d as a r e s u l t of t h e b i r t h of t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s c h i l d . "ORDER "The Montana Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s is h e r e b y ordered t o assume t h e f i n a n c i a l respon- s i b i l i t y f o r a l l medical and s e c u r i t y c o s t s i n c u r r e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e b i r t h of t h e son o f K a t h l e e n Rachel W i l kinson. "The Department is f u r t h e r ordered t o r e m i t t o Missoula Community H o s p i t a l t h e sum of Two Thousand Eighty-f i v e and 87/100ths D o l l a r s ($2,085.87); t o D r . Thomas A. Baumgartner t h e sum of Four Hundred and S i x t y D o l l a r s ($460.00); and t o Missoula County (Guards) t h e sum of Nine Hundred F i f t y - f o u r d o l l a r s ($954.00). The s o l e i s s u e on a p p e a l is whether t h e Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e medical and s e c u r i t y c o s t s i n c u r r e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e b i r t h of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s baby, d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t s h e was n o t d e l i v e r e d t o t h e Women's C o r r e c t i o n a l C e n t e r a t Warm S p r i n g s p r i o r t o t h e b i r t h . The l a w of Montana is c l e a r t h a t " [ o l n c e a v a l i d s e n t e n c e is imposed, t h e c o u r t l a c k s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o v a c a t e o r modify it u n l e s s s p e c i f i c a l l y a u t h o r i z e d by s t a t u t e . S t a t e v. P o r t e r ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 4 3 Mont. 528, 540, 391 P.2d 704." S t a t e v. Downing ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 1 Mont. 242, 593 P.2d 43, 44. Here t h e c o u r t , i n i t s judgment, committed t h e d e f e n d a n t t o t h e Montana Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s . From t h i s it is c l e a r t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e S t a t e as t h e r e is no way f o r t h e judge t o change h i s d e c i s i o n , a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h e judgment. T h i s p o i n t is i l l u s t r a t e d most v i v i d l y by a l i n e of Washington cases where it h a s been s t a t e d t h a t : " T h i s c o u r t s a i d i n J a n u a r y v. P o r t e r , 75 Wash.2d 768, 453 P.2d 876 ( 1 9 6 9 ) , t h a t upon t h e e n t r y o f a f i n a l -- judgment and s e n t e n c e of imprisonment, l e g a l --- a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h e a c c u s e d passes b x o p e r a t i o n o f law t o t h e Department - o f I n s t i t u t i o n s (now the-tmxt o f S o c i a l - - -- and H e a l t h S e r v i c e s ) ---- and t h e Board o T - P r i s o n Terms and P a r o l e s , and t h a t t h o s e a g e n c i e s of t h e e x e c u t i v e branch bear f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r e x e c u t i n g t h e judgment and s e n t e n c e o r g r a n t i n g p a r o l e . " (Emphasis added ) Kanekoa v. Washington S t a t e Department of S o c i a l and H e a l t h S e r v i c e s ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 95 Wash.2d 445, 626 P.2d 6, 7 (see a l s o I n Re Bush ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 26 Wash.App. 486, 616 P.2d 666, I n R e t h e Welfare o f Lowe ( 1 9 7 8 ) , .2d 824, 576 P.2d 6 5 . ) S i m i l a r l y , because of c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n t h i s p a r t i c u - l a r c a s e , t h e Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s must bear t h e medical c o s t s f o r t h e b i r t h of d e f e n d a n t ' s c h i l d . I t must be noted t h a t our h o l d i n g h e r e a p p l i e s s o l e l y t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r expenses i n q u e s t i o n . W e a r e n e i t h e r s e t t i n g nor s u g g e s t i n g a g e n e r a l method f o r d e t e r m i n i n g f i n a n c i a l respon- s i b i l i t y of state p r i s o n e r s . T h a t is a l e g i s l a t i v e a t t e r . d For t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d above, t h e o u r t ' s judgment is a f f i r m e d . W e concur: / %-RJ t . Q w ( & & J Y Chief J u s t i c e Justices Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: I dissent. I would hold that Missoula County is responsible for the expenditures. The unfortunate result here is that the Department of Instituti,ons, without even having been notified of the District Court decision in time to object, has been saddled with paying the costs of hospitalization and cost of providing guards at the hospital. The result not only is unfair it is papered over with citations and quotations of authority that have no application to the questions presented to the District Court and to this Court. At the sentencing hearing it was the defense attorney and the deputy county attorney who requested the District Court to take the action it did. The District Court did so without ever conferring with anyone from the Department of Institutions. Had the Department of Institutions been notified of the contemplated action rather than the completed action, it is possible that it could have made other and satisfactory arrangements for care of the mother and the baby through the time of delivery. The authority cited by the ma:jority has no application to the facts presented here. Here the District Court committed the defendant to the Department of Institutions. This should have meant that the defendant was in the custody and control of the Department and that the Department could have made appropriate arrangements itself for the proper care of the mother and expected child. The question here is not whether custody passed by operation of law to the Department of Institutions upon the passing of sentence of imprisonment. The question is whether the District Court had the authority to grant custody and control of defendant to the Department on the one hand, but on the other to take it away by never notifing the Department that it had made arrangments for the custody of the defendant up to the time that the baby was delivered. By the action it took, the District Court deprived the Department of any meaningful opportunity to object to the Court's decision. In later ruling that the Department must bear the hospitalization and guard expenses the District Court simply sanctified the time-honored rule that if possible make the State pay rather than the local unit of government, a governmental application of the deep pocket theory. This Court has of course, ratified that action by approving the ruling that the State rather than the county must pay. Here the District Court made a mistake and I have no doubt it had the authority to correct its own mistake by a ruling that truly passed the custody and control of defendant to the Department of Institutions. Had the Department been timely notified of the decision it could have objected and the District Court could have amended its decision to truly turn custody and control of defendant over to the Department of Institutions. I doubt that the Department would have been so callous as not to take care of the real needs of the expectant mother, but it was never given the opportunity to act. The county, not the State, should pay.