Case Title: Gray v. Warden (order)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 080524

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Friday, March 4, 2011. 
 
 
Present:  Kinser, C.J., Goodwyn and Millette, JJ., and Carrico, 
Lacy and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
Ricky Jovan Gray, 
Petitioner, 
 
     against 
Record No. 080524 
 
Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 
Respondent. 
 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed March 14, 2008, and the respondent’s motion to dismiss, the 
Court is of opinion that the writ should be granted in part and 
dismissed in part. 
Petitioner, Ricky Jovan Gray, was convicted in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Richmond of capital murder in the commission 
of a robbery or attempted robbery under Code § 18.2-31(4), capital 
murder of more than one person as part of the same transaction 
under Code § 18.2-31(7), capital murder of more than one person 
within a three-year period under Code § 18.2-31(8), and two counts 
of capital murder of a person under the age of fourteen by a person 
age twenty-one or older under Code § 18.2-31(12).  The crimes 
concerned the killing of four members of a family during a home 
invasion robbery.  After finding the aggravating factor of 
vileness, the jury fixed petitioner’s sentence at death for each of 
the two convictions under Code § 18.2-31(12) and life imprisonment 
 
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for each of the three remaining capital convictions.  The trial 
court sentenced petitioner in accordance with the jury’s verdicts.  
This Court affirmed petitioner’s convictions and upheld his 
sentence of death in Gray v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 290, 295, 645 
S.E.2d 448, 451 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1151 (2008). 
I. 
In claim (IV), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to protect 
petitioner’s rights to be free from double jeopardy.  Petitioner 
contends he was tried and punished for separate counts of capital 
murder under Code §§ 18.2-31(7) and (8) even though the crimes 
arose from the same criminal act and “one punishment is for a crime 
which is a lesser included offense of the other.”  Furthermore, 
petitioner contends that counsel failed to advise petitioner that a 
non-frivolous ground for appeal existed, namely that petitioner’s 
rights against double jeopardy had been violated as alleged in 
claim (IV). 
The Court holds that claim (IV) satisfies the “performance” 
and the “prejudice” prongs of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  As this Court 
held in Andrews v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231, 287-88, 699 S.E.2d 
237, 269-70 (2010), the double jeopardy prohibition against 
multiple punishments is violated when a defendant receives separate 
sentences under Code §§ 18.2-31(7) and (8) when each of the 
constituent murders for both convictions occurred as part of the 
 
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same act or transaction.  There is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s failure to raise this issue at trial, the 
Commonwealth  would have been permitted to proceed to sentencing on 
only one of the two indictments.  Therefore, petitioner is granted 
a writ of habeas corpus as to his life sentences imposed under Code 
§§ 18.2-31(7) and (8), and these convictions are remanded and the 
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond is directed to exercise its 
discretion to vacate one of the underlying convictions.  See Ball 
v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864 (1985). 
II. 
The remainder of the petition is dismissed for the reasons as 
follows: 
In a portion of claim (I), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth improperly concealed material and exculpatory evidence 
and knowingly made false representations in violation of the 
holdings in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Napue v. 
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).  During argument at petitioner’s 
October 23, 2006 sentencing hearing, the prosecutor commented that 
Ray Dandridge, who had participated in the murders of the family 
members, had pleaded guilty to capital murder and been sentenced to 
life imprisonment in connection with another set of murders, “was 
one or two points above the level of retardation, depending on when 
in his life he was tested and depending on who tested him.”  
Petitioner contends that the comment was made to undercut 
petitioner’s argument that Dandridge was relatively more culpable 
 
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in the crimes and that petitioner’s sentence should be proportional 
to the life sentence Dandridge received.  Relying on a September 
2006 report prepared by a mental health expert in anticipation of 
Dandridge’s capital murder trial for the other set of murders, 
petitioner contends that the Commonwealth was aware that its 
representations about Dandridge were false.  Petitioner contends 
further that the report was not made available to him.  
The Court holds that this portion of claim (I) is without 
merit.  The September 2006 capital sentencing evaluation report of 
Dandridge, proffered by petitioner in support of his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus, demonstrates that Dandridge had taken a 
number of I.Q. tests during the course of his life and that his 
performance I.Q. score in 2006 was two points above the legal 
threshold under which one could be classified as being mentally 
retarded in Virginia.  See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 53, 75, 
591 S.E.2d 47, 59 (2004), vacated on other grounds, 544 U.S. 901 
(2005).  As a result, the prosecutor’s comment that Dandridge 
scored a few points above the cut-off for determining mental 
retardation, “depending on when in his life he was tested and 
depending on who tested him,” did not violate Napue because it was 
not false. 
Furthermore, petitioner has failed to show that Dandridge’s 
evaluation report was material to petitioner’s case.  Evidence is 
only material if its suppression would undermine the confidence in 
the outcome of the trial.  Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 
 
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488, 643 S.E.2d 708, 727 (2007).  The record, including the 
September 2006 evaluation report, the trial and sentencing hearing 
transcripts, and petitioner’s pre-sentence report, demonstrates 
that Dandridge’s evaluation occurred after the jury returned with 
its findings of guilt and recommendations as to the sentences 
petitioner should receive.  Petitioner has failed to prove that the 
court would not have imposed the death sentence as the jury had 
recommended had the report been made available to petitioner prior 
to being sentenced by the court.   
In another portion of claim (I), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth presented misleading testimony from Detective Howard 
Peterman, who testified that a written narrative of petitioner’s 
interview constituted the entirety of petitioner’s statement.  
Detective Peterman denied that he had informed petitioner about 
anything that Dandridge had told the police.  Petitioner claims 
that Detective Peterman’s testimony conflicts with petitioner’s 
recollection that Detective Peterman had provided petitioner with 
information obtained from Dandridge.  Petitioner contends also that 
Detective Peterman provided inconsistent testimony a year and a 
half after petitioner’s trial during a pretrial hearing in Culpeper 
County.  At that time, Detective Peterman stated that he had spoken 
with petitioner about the murders before he memorialized the 
statement into writing. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (I) is barred.  
Petitioner was present during the interview and, therefore, knew 
 
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what Detective Peterman said to him, whether the written statement 
covered the entirety of petitioner’s interview, and whether 
Detective Peterman’s testimony was truthful.  Thus, this non-
jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial and on direct 
appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 29-30, 205 S.E.2d 
680, 682 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 
In another portion of claim (I), petitioner alleges that 
during closing arguments, the prosecutor falsely told the jury that 
petitioner was not “under the influence of anything” when he 
committed the murders even though petitioner had told the police 
when he was arrested that he was on “PCP” on the day of the 
murders. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (I) is barred 
because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at 
trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Id. 
In claim (I), footnote (2), petitioner alleges: “Should the 
Court determine that claims alleged herein are defaulted because 
counsel could have presented the claim[s] at trial and on appeal, 
[petitioner] alleges that he was deprived of his right to effective 
representation under Strickland . . . by counsel’s failure to 
investigate and present the claims set out herein under Brady and 
Napue.” 
 
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The Court holds that this portion of claim (I) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavit 
of counsel, demonstrates that petitioner did not inform counsel 
that he had been provided details of the crimes, and that, despite 
his statement that he was on PCP the day of the murders, petitioner 
assured counsel that “PCP could not be to blame” as petitioner 
“knew what he was doing.”  Counsel made a tactical decision not to 
try to blame petitioner’s actions on his use of drugs because 
counsel decided that a defense of intoxication would detract from 
the best defense at sentencing, which would be to focus on the 
abuse petitioner suffered as a child.  Additionally, assuming 
counsel had Dandridge’s September 2006 mental evaluation, 
petitioner cannot demonstrate that counsel should have used the 
report to rebut the Commonwealth’s argument.  The report did not 
indicate that Dandridge controlled petitioner but rather contained 
information that Dandridge believed petitioner had tricked him and 
that Dandridge suffered mental health issues.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In claim (I), footnote (4), petitioner alleges, “For each 
claim stated herein, . . . trial counsel failed to provide 
 
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effective assistance of counsel by properly preserving and 
presenting each claim on appeal.”  
The Court holds that this claim satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner fails to articulate what 
steps, or additional steps, he contends counsel should have taken 
to preserve these issues, and fails to articulate the appellate 
arguments he contends counsel should have raised in support of 
these issues.  Furthermore, the selection of issues to address on 
appeal is left to the discretion of appellate counsel, and counsel 
need not address every possible issue on appeal.  Jones v. Barnes, 
463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983).  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In a portion of claim (II), petitioner alleges he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
investigate, develop, and present evidence of the relative 
culpability between petitioner and Dandridge.  Petitioner claims 
that counsel failed to discover that Dandridge was a “troublemaker 
and a leader,” who could assert his will over others, and who had 
led petitioner into criminal activity. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the 
 
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transcript from the sentencing hearing, demonstrates that counsel 
argued that the notion that Dandridge was “some borderline idiot 
doing whatever [petitioner] says is nonsense” and that Dandridge 
was equally culpable in the murders.  Counsel was attempting to 
argue that because Dandridge received life sentences for his role 
in a different set of murders committed by both men, petitioner, 
likewise, should receive life sentences for killing the children.  
Additionally, the record, including the affidavit of counsel and 
petitioner’s statement to the police, demonstrates that petitioner 
claimed that Dandridge played a minimal role in the murders of the 
family members.  Petitioner fails to provide any evidence to show 
what effect, if any, Dandridge’s background as an alleged 
troublemaker or leader played in light of the fact that petitioner 
confessed to the murders.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (II), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to investigate whether the police made petitioner aware of 
statements from Dandridge before the police interviewed petitioner.  
Petitioner contends that such information was important, as it 
would have caused the jury to question petitioner’s relative 
culpability for the crimes in relation to Dandridge. 
 
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The Court holds that this portion of claim (II) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, the transcript from the hearing in the Circuit Court of 
Culpeper County, and the affidavit of counsel, demonstrates that 
Detective Peterman consistently testified that petitioner was never 
provided with any information police had obtained from Dandridge 
before or during petitioner’s interview.  Although petitioner 
alleges that the police gave him information from Dandridge’s 
statement, he fails to provide any evidence to corroborate the 
allegation.  Additionally, the record, including the affidavit of 
counsel and the statement petitioner gave to the police, 
demonstrates that petitioner minimized the role Dandridge played in 
the murders.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (II), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to investigate the physiological effects “PCP” use had on 
petitioner’s memory.  Petitioner contends that such information 
would have shown that the drug affects brain cells and would have 
called into question the statements petitioner gave to the police.   
The Court holds that this portion of claim (II) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
 
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test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavit 
of counsel and the trial transcript, demonstrates that petitioner 
stated that “PCP could not be to blame” for his actions as 
petitioner “insisted that he knew what he was doing” and that 
petitioner’s statement to the police contained details about the 
murders consistent with the evidence discovered by the police.  
Petitioner fails to proffer the names of any witnesses counsel 
should have spoken to or what information those witnesses would 
have provided to counsel about the effects of PCP.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In a portion of claim (III), petitioner alleges he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to make 
a reasonable investigation of petitioner’s statements to the 
police.  Petitioner contends that an investigation would have shown 
that at the time he talked to the police, petitioner could not 
remember the details of the incident because he was under the 
influence of drugs when the murders were committed and that the 
police provided petitioner with details from Dandridge’s statement.  
Petitioner claims that, had this evidence been adequately 
investigated, counsel could have either moved to suppress 
petitioner’s statement or used the information to impeach the 
credibility of Detective Peterman’s testimony. 
 
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The Court holds that this portion of claim (III) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavit 
of counsel, demonstrates that petitioner insisted to counsel that 
he knew what he was doing when he committed the murders and that 
“PCP could not be to blame.”  Furthermore, counsel spoke to every 
officer involved in petitioner’s arrest, including Detective 
Peterman, and determined that petitioner was not provided any 
details from Dandridge’s statement before or during his statement 
to the police.  The affidavit of counsel also demonstrates that 
petitioner never informed counsel that Detective Peterman had “fed” 
him the details of the crimes or of Dandridge’s statements to 
police and that counsel looked for but could not find any evidence 
that would have supported a motion to suppress petitioner’s 
statements to police.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (III), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to protect petitioner’s right to be free from self-incrimination by 
not moving to suppress petitioner’s statements to the police that 
were later admitted at trial. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
 
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test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, petitioner’s statement to the police, and the affidavit 
of counsel, demonstrates that petitioner understood his 
constitutional rights and voluntarily agreed to speak to the police 
about the murders and that counsel looked for but could not find 
any evidence that would have supported a motion to suppress 
petitioner’s statements to police.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (V), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to protect 
petitioner’s rights to plead guilty and to have sentencing factors 
determined in a constitutional manner.  Petitioner contends that 
counsel should have objected to the fact that, in order to plead 
guilty in Virginia, a defendant must waive his right to have a jury 
determine his sentence.  Petitioner avers that the arrangement in 
Virginia, which allows only a court to determine the appropriate 
sentence when a defendant pleads guilty, is a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment under the decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296 (2004), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).   
The Court holds that claim (V) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavit of 
 
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counsel, demonstrates that counsel advised petitioner not to plead 
guilty in order to preserve his right to appeal and that petitioner 
understood and agreed with that advice.  Petitioner fails to allege 
that he would have pleaded guilty or that his sentences, which were 
determined by a jury, would have been different if the procedures 
in Virginia were different.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (VI), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object during 
closing argument at the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial to the 
Commonwealth’s statements that petitioner “offered no apology, he 
offered no remorse” and that petitioner “never said he was under 
the influence of anything.”  Petitioner contends that by making 
these statements the prosecutor impermissibly commented on 
petitioner’s failure to testify. 
The Court holds that claim (VI) fails to satisfy the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record, including the trial transcript and the affidavit of 
counsel, demonstrates that the statements were not a comment on 
petitioner’s failure to testify at trial but rather called the 
jury’s attention to petitioner’s demeanor and responses during his 
confession to police.  Furthermore, although petitioner alleges 
that counsel’s failure to object undermined confidence in the 
 
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jury’s decisions, he fails to allege that he would have been found 
not guilty or would have received a different sentence had counsel 
objected to the prosecution’s argument.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
In a portion of claim (VII), petitioner alleges he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
ensure that the jurors were properly instructed regarding the 
meaning of the “vileness” factor.  Petitioner contends that after 
counsel unsuccessfully moved the court to declare Virginia’s 
capital sentencing statutes unconstitutional because, under Godfrey 
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), the definition for “vileness” was 
constitutionally inadequate, counsel should have offered an 
additional instruction regarding the meaning of the vileness 
factor.  Petitioner argues that counsel’s failure to proffer the 
instruction waived the issue on appeal and that, had counsel 
proffered the proper instruction, there was a reasonable likelihood 
that a juror would have decided to sentence petitioner to life 
imprisonment.   
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VII) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the jury 
instructions and the trial transcripts, demonstrates that the 
instruction provided to the jury tracked the language provided in 
 
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the statute and properly defined vileness.  As such, the 
instruction was proper and did not run afoul of the holding in 
Godfrey.  See Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 446-47, 304 
S.E.2d 271, 284-85 (1983) (addressing Godfrey and holding that no 
additional instructions are needed if the instruction given by the 
court tracks the statutory language).  In addition, petitioner 
fails to provide the additional vileness instructions he contends 
counsel should have offered at trial.  Thus, petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (VII), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to ensure that the jurors were properly instructed that the legal 
impact of a non-unanimous decision would be a life sentence for 
petitioner.  When the jury asked about the outcome if a non-
unanimous decision was reached, the court declined to answer the 
question.  Petitioner contends that counsel’s failure to have the 
question answered “interfered with [the] jurors’ ability to give 
effect to mitigating evidence” by causing the jury to believe that 
“any decision, even decisions as to mitigating evidence, must be 
unanimous.” 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VII) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner fails to proffer any 
 
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evidence to demonstrate that the jury was referring to mitigating 
evidence when it submitted its question to the court.  Petitioner 
also fails to articulate how refusing to answer the jury’s question 
about the outcome if it were not able to arrive at a unanimous 
decision, “impermissibly interfered with [the] jurors’ ability to 
give effect to mitigating evidence.”  This Court has previously 
rejected the argument that a jury should be instructed that its 
finding as to individual mitigating factors “need not be 
unanimous.”  Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 431, 626 S.E.2d 
383, 426 (quoting Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 212, 257 
S.E.2d 784, 791 (1979)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 960 (2006).  
Counsel was not unreasonable for not requesting an unnecessary 
instruction, as the instruction provided by the court that the 
jury’s decision regarding punishment had to be unanimous did not 
prevent the jury from considering mitigating evidence.  Jackson v. 
Warden, 271 Va. 434, 448, 627 S.E.2d 776, 788-89 (2006), cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 1122 (2007).  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (VIII)(a), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to make 
further inquiry of juror Carol Chaffin and failed to request a 
mistrial after two jurors reported to the trial court that Chaffin 
had spoken to a friend about the case, had looked at a newspaper, 
 
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and had made inappropriate comments.  The trial court questioned 
jurors Elizabeth Ransom and Sharon Dabney, who explained that 
Chaffin had remarked that a friend had told her that the newspaper 
had identified the make-up of the jury by race and gender, that 
Chaffin had noticed sketched drawings of the jurors on the front 
page of the paper, and had queried why petitioner would want to go 
to prison to be sexually molested every day by other inmates.  
Chaffin denied having discussed the case with any person, or 
reading the newspaper, although Chaffin did state that she picked 
up the newspaper and noticed a drawing on the outside of the paper.  
Chaffin admitted making the statement about petitioner going to 
prison, but denied having made up her mind as to the sentence 
petitioner should receive.  Petitioner contends that the evidence 
adduced during the inquiry was insufficient to rebut the 
presumption of prejudice that arises after “[a]ny private 
communication with a juror,” and that a mistrial should have been 
requested and granted.  Petitioner contends further that counsel 
should have made further inquiry of Chaffin. 
The Court holds that claim (VIII)(a) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner fails to state what 
additional inquiry counsel should have conducted or what Chaffin’s 
responses would have been.  Furthermore, the record, including the 
trial transcript, demonstrates that no juror’s name or picture had 
appeared in the paper.  The court and counsel accepted Chaffin’s 
 
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denials and Chaffin’s, Ransom’s and Dabney’s assurances that they 
could keep an open mind and had yet to determine what penalty 
petitioner should receive.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In a portion of claim (VIII)(b), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to object to petitioner’s absence during the questioning of Chaffin 
or failed to obtain a waiver from petitioner regarding his presence 
in violation of petitioner’s rights under Code § 19.2-259 and the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Petitioner contends he would 
never have waived his appearance at the hearing, and, if he had 
been present, would have “insisted counsel question the jurors 
further and request a mistrial.” 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VIII)(b) fails to 
satisfy the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland.  The record, including the trial transcript and the 
affidavit of counsel, demonstrates that counsel waived petitioner’s 
presence at the hearing and that counsel did not believe petitioner 
was needed, as counsel wanted the court to address the matter 
immediately, and did not believe petitioner’s presence would have 
aided the inquiry.  See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 
(1987) (holding a defendant has the right to be present at critical 
stages of the criminal proceeding if his presence would contribute 
 
20
to the fairness of the procedure).  The record, including the trial 
transcript and the affidavit of counsel, demonstrates that counsel 
agreed to speak with petitioner and that counsel would revisit the 
issue with the court if petitioner had any concerns; petitioner did 
not.  Petitioner has failed to show that his presence at the 
hearing would have aided counsel because petitioner has not 
proffered what additional questions he contends counsel should have 
asked or what the responses would have been.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (VIII)(b), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to object to the court’s finding that its instructions to 
the jury had not been breached. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VIII)(b) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that the court instructed the jury not to 
talk to anyone or to read, watch, or listen to any news about the 
trial.  During the inquiry, Chaffin informed the court that she had 
followed the instructions.  At no other point in the trial was the 
court ever presented with evidence that any other member of the 
jury had not complied with the court’s instructions.  Petitioner 
has failed to present any such evidence.  Thus, petitioner has 
 
21
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In another portion of claim (VIII)(b), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to memorialize in a transcript the discussions with and 
about Chaffin for petitioner to review.  Petitioner contends that 
the transcript does not contain the entirety of the inquiry. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VIII)(b) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript and the affidavit of counsel, demonstrates that the 
court offered to have a transcript prepared if one was needed to 
aid counsel in discussions with petitioner about the hearing.  
However, no transcript was needed as counsel informed petitioner 
about the hearing before court reconvened and petitioner stated 
that he had no concerns about any particular juror or the jury in 
general.  Petitioner fails to state how a transcript of the hearing 
would have aided his discussions with counsel or would have altered 
the court’s handling of the matter.  Furthermore, petitioner fails 
to state the basis for his assertion that the transcript contained 
in the record is incomplete, fails to provide evidence to verify 
this assertion, and fails to proffer what he contends took place 
but was not recorded.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
 
22
that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In a portion of claim (IX), petitioner alleges he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of 
trial because counsel presented only limited testimony, which 
failed to demonstrate how petitioner’s life experiences affected 
his personal and moral development and culpability, and which 
failed to “provide a comprehensive and accurate picture of 
[petitioner’s] life.”  Petitioner contends that counsel failed to 
present evidence of the “poverty, chaos, neglect and toxic 
environment” in which petitioner was raised.  In support of this 
claim, petitioner presents affidavits from petitioner’s father, 
mother, sister, half-sisters, half-brother, cousin, uncle, aunt, 
grandmother, Dandridge, petitioner’s case manager, petitioner’s 
probation officer, and a director of a community center.  These 
potential witnesses state that they were available had counsel 
attempted to contact them and that they would have testified 
concerning petitioner’s addiction to drugs, the physical and sexual 
abuse petitioner was subjected to as a child by his father and 
half-brother, the absence of petitioner’s parents for portions of 
his childhood, and the environment of drugs and crime petitioner 
was exposed to where he lived. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
 
23
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that counsel presented the same 
information through the testimony of petitioner’s mother and 
sister.  “[C]ounsel’s ‘decision not to seek more’ mitigating 
evidence from [petitioner’s] background ‘than was already in hand’ 
[falls] ‘well within the range of professionally reasonable 
judgments.’ ”  Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 13, 19 
(2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699).  Additionally, 
petitioner is unable to show that he suffered any prejudice as a 
result of counsel not interviewing the additional witnesses as any 
testimony they would have provided would have added no new relevant 
information at sentencing.  Id.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (IX), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase 
of trial because counsel failed to present documentary evidence of 
the abuse petitioner suffered as a child, which would have 
corroborated the testimony and other evidence that was presented.  
In support of this claim, petitioner references a 1996 pre-sentence 
report, a 2000 pre-sentence report, a 2004 intake report in which 
both petitioner and his grandmother discussed the abuse, and a 
photograph that showed the difference in size between himself and 
the half-brother who sexually abused him.   
 
24
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavit 
of counsel, demonstrates that petitioner did not want to testify 
about the abuse and counsel had no other basis upon which he could 
introduce the otherwise hearsay statements contained in the 
reports.  Furthermore, this information was cumulative of the 
testimony provided by the mother and sister about the physical 
abuse done by petitioner’s father and the sexual abuse at the hands 
of petitioner’s half-brother.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (IX), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase 
of trial because counsel failed to present any evidence that 
petitioner suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a 
result of his upbringing.  In support of this claim, petitioner 
provides an affidavit from petitioner’s case manager from 2004-05, 
which stated that dealing with PTSD issues was one of petitioner’s 
goals.  Petitioner also provided records that note that petitioner 
suffers from sleeping disorders and affidavits from Drs. David 
Lisak and Mark Cunningham that petitioner has symptoms of PTSD. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
 
25
test enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner fails to provide any 
evidence to show that he has ever been diagnosed with having PTSD 
by anyone qualified to make such a diagnosis.  The record, 
including the affidavit of counsel, demonstrates that there was no 
admissible evidence that petitioner suffered from PTSD.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In another portion of claim (IX), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to present any expert testimony to explain petitioner’s drug use 
and the impact it had on petitioner’s “moral culpability and 
behavior.”  Petitioner claims that Drs. Lisak and Cunningham could 
have explained that petitioner’s early use of drugs stemmed from 
either the abuse he suffered or from modeling the behavior of the 
adults in his life who were using drugs, that drugs become a 
primary motivator in the life of a traumatized child, and that PCP 
is a drug used by abuse survivors.   
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavit 
of counsel and the trial transcript, demonstrates that Dr. Lisak’s 
videotaped deposition was played for the jury.  Dr. Lisak opined 
generally regarding the effects of physical and sexual abuse and 
 
26
substance abuse on children.  Dr. Lisak also testified that he 
would not be surprised to learn after hearing about the experiences 
petitioner had as a child, that petitioner had murdered several 
people in a relatively short period of time.  Dr. Lisak, however, 
had not personally evaluated petitioner.  Furthermore, petitioner 
repeatedly told counsel that drugs were not to blame for his 
actions because petitioner knew what he was doing.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In another portion of claim (IX), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to present evidence of petitioner’s redeeming qualities and the 
attempts petitioner made to improve himself.  In support of this 
claim, petitioner provides information that while petitioner was in 
a pre-release center in Maryland in 2004 and 2005 petitioner had no 
infractions, never failed a drug test, was a role model for other 
prisoners, and did well on work release.  Petitioner also provides 
information that, days before the murders, he attempted to find 
work and volunteered to fix a furnace in a church.  Petitioner 
contends that this information would have provided a more complete 
picture of his life and would have made a compelling case for a 
life sentence. 
 
27
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavit 
of counsel and the trial transcript, demonstrates that counsel was 
never made aware of any witnesses from the church.  On the other 
hand, counsel was aware of petitioner’s employment and school 
records but found nothing that would help petitioner’s mitigation 
case.  Counsel only presented evidence of petitioner’s positive 
character when it could be placed in context, such as the testimony 
from the community relations sergeant for the City of Richmond’s 
Sheriff Office that petitioner would speak to school children about 
staying out of trouble.  Petitioner has failed to show that even if 
the information he raised had been presented it would have resulted 
in petitioner only receiving a life sentence for the brutal murders 
he admitted to committing.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (IX), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
to present expert testimony to aid the jury in assessing the 
mitigating evidence and petitioner’s background and relating it to 
the impact it had on petitioner’s “moral culpability.”  Petitioner 
contends that Dr. Cunningham could have provided testimony 
regarding petitioner’s life experiences and his behavior by showing 
 
28
the jury studies and scientific literature on the effects 
petitioner’s adverse background and substance abuse had on his 
behavior and development. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IX) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavit 
of counsel and the trial transcript, demonstrates that Dr. Lisak’s 
videotaped deposition played for the jury included his expert 
testimony regarding the relationship between childhood abuse and 
its later impact on the development of people and violence in men, 
the factors that would predict if a person would be violent, and 
the studies that have been done.  Petitioner has failed to show 
that even if the information he contends Dr. Cunningham would have 
testified about were presented it would have resulted in petitioner 
receiving a different sentence than the one he received.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (X), petitioner alleges that the cumulative character 
of counsel’s performance and the resulting prejudice deprived 
petitioner of the effective assistance of counsel. 
The Court holds that petitioner’s claim (X) is without merit.  
As addressed previously, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
prejudice as a result of counsel’s alleged errors.  “Having 
 
29
rejected each of petitioner’s individual claims, there is no 
support for the proposition that such actions when considered 
collectively have deprived petitioner of his constitutional right 
to effective assistance of counsel.”  Lenz v. Warden, 267 Va. 318, 
340, 593 S.E.2d 292, 305, cert. denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004). 
III. 
Upon further consideration, petitioner’s Motion for Leave to 
Supplement His Appendix and the respondent’s Motion for Leave to 
File Supplemental Affidavits are granted.  Petitioner’s Motion for 
an Evidentiary Hearing, Motion for Discovery, Motion to Strike the 
Warden’s Affidavit, and notice regarding the warden’s Motion to 
Dismiss are denied.  Respondent’s Motion to Strike Affidavits is 
denied.  Respondent’s Motion to Strike Appendix Entries is denied 
in part with regard to Dr. Lisak’s affidavit, but granted in part 
with regard to Judith A. McClendon’s affidavit and the May 26, 2006 
letter from John B. Boatwright, III.  Respondent’s Motion for Leave 
to File a Supplemental Motion in response is granted in part with 
regard to the supplemental response to the portion of claim (IX) 
involving Dr. Lisak’s affidavit and is denied in part as to the 
respondent’s remaining supplemental responses. 
IV. 
For these reasons, a limited grant of the writ of habeas corpus 
shall issue to remand petitioner’s convictions under Code §§ 18.2-
31(7) and (8) to the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond.  The 
remainder of the petition is dismissed. 
 
30
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports.  The 
Clerk of this Court shall certify copies of this order to counsel 
for the petitioner, to the respondent, to the Clerk of the Circuit 
Court of the City of Richmond, and to the Attorney General of 
Virginia, which certification shall have the same force and effect 
as if a writ of habeas corpus were formally issued and served.  
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk