Case Title: Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1593

Docket Number: 20001145

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 93 Ohio St.3d 488, 2001-Ohio-1593] 
 
 
DAVIS, EXR., APPELLEE, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., D.B.A. SAM’S CLUB, 
APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Cite as Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 488.] 
Civil procedure — Torts — Claims for spoliation of evidence may be brought 
after primary action has been concluded only when evidence of 
spoliation is not discovered until after the conclusion of the primary 
action. 
(No. 00-1145 — Submitted March 28, 2001 — Decided October 31, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 75224. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Claims for spoliation of evidence may be brought after the primary action has 
been concluded only when evidence of spoliation is not discovered until 
after the conclusion of the primary action. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  On September 10, 1992, Thomas Davis was fatally injured, 
while operating a forklift, when the driver of the produce truck he was unloading 
pulled away from the loading dock prematurely.  As a result of this incident, 
appellee Bernadine Davis, the wife of Thomas Davis, brought an action against 
appellant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”) and a co-worker.  Davis settled the 
claim with the co-worker and dismissed her survivor claim against Wal-Mart.  
Davis’s remaining claim for wrongful death against Wal-Mart, based upon an 
intentional tort, was tried to a jury. 
 
The jury found for Davis and awarded damages.  Thereafter, the trial court 
granted an award of prejudgment interest.  The court of appeals affirmed, and we 
denied review.  Davis v. Sam’s Club (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 1526, 674 N.E.2d 377. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
During the course of post-trial proceedings for prejudgment interest, Davis 
came to believe that Wal-Mart had withheld certain evidence and documents and 
that several employees of Wal-Mart had provided false or misleading testimony 
during their depositions in the intentional tort case.  Davis returned to the trial 
court and filed a new action, alleging that Wal-Mart’s spoliation of evidence had 
led her to dismiss her survivor claim.  Davis claimed that this dismissal prevented 
her from seeking additional compensatory and punitive damages.  Wal-Mart 
moved for summary judgment on Davis’s claim of tortious interference with 
evidence, which was granted, based on res judicata. 
 
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, stating that the present claim 
of tortious interference and the previous claim of intentional tort did not arise out 
of the same set of operative facts and, therefore, res judicata did not bar the claim 
for tortious interference.  The cause is now before this court pursuant to the 
allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
 
In its first proposition of law, Wal-Mart argues that the spoliation claim 
should be precluded because the spoliation was discovered or should have been 
discovered before the resolution of the original litigation.  As primary authority 
for this proposition, Wal-Mart cites Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio 
St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226.  The syllabus of Grava states:  “A valid, final 
judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any 
claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of 
the previous action.”  (Citations omitted.) 
 
While discussing this legal standard, the court of appeals in the case at bar 
stated: 
 
“For res judicata to apply under this theory, however, defendants’ acts of 
allegedly concealing, destroying or intentionally interfering with evidence must 
arise from the same ‘transaction or occurrence’ as that which [led] to decedent’s 
death in the intentional tort wrongful death action. * * * 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
“The ‘occurrence’ which triggered the intentional tort case was the 
decedent’s death.  The term ‘transaction’ may be broader than ‘occurrence’ and 
was defined in Grava to encompass events which arise from a ‘common nucleus 
of operative facts.’  [Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 382, 653 N.E.2d at 229.]  
Concealing, destroying, misrepresenting, or intentionally interfering with 
evidence after a workplace death does not arise from a ‘common nucleus of 
operative facts’ with those which arose before the death.”  Davis v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. (May 8, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 75224, unreported, 2000 WL 
504114, at *4. 
 
We could not agree more. 
 
The court of appeals continued by stating: 
 
“To recover on an intentional tort claim, the claimant must show that the 
employer disregarded a risk of injury or death to the employee that was 
substantially certain to occur.  Nothing in the record shows that any other issue 
was raised or submitted to the jury in the intentional tort case. 
 
“Defendants have likewise not shown that a motion for prejudgment 
interest alleging a failure to make a good faith effort to settle an intentional tort 
case precludes subsequently raising a spoliation of evidence claim.  This is 
particularly true, as in the case at bar, when alleged acts of concealing, destroying, 
misrepresenting, and/or intentionally interfering with evidence were not 
discovered until after the final judgment in the intentional tort litigation.”  Id. 
 
Again we agree with the court of appeals completely. 
 
This case was decided originally when the trial court granted summary 
judgment.  “[S]ummary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the 
evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable 
minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party 
against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.”  
Civ.R. 56(C). 
 
It is possible that reasonable minds could conclude that the basis for the 
second action, the alleged misrepresentations and withholding of evidence, 
occurred after and independent of the first action, based upon the truck’s pulling 
away from the loading dock prematurely and tragically.  Therefore, it is not 
possible for reasonable minds to reach but one conclusion, one that is adverse to 
Davis, namely, that the spoliation claim and the intentional tort claim arose out of 
a common nucleus of operative facts.  However, such a conclusion is essential to 
uphold the trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on res judicata. 
Accordingly, res judicata is inapplicable, and the grant of summary judgment was 
improper.  We reject Wal-Mart’s first proposition of law. 
 
We further note that res judicata is not a shield to protect the 
blameworthy.  “ ‘The doctrine of res judicata is not a mere matter of practice or 
procedure inherited from a more technical time, but rather a rule of fundamental 
and substantial justice, or public policy and of private peace.  The doctrine may be 
said to adhere in legal systems as a rule of justice.  Hence, the position has been 
taken that the doctrine of res judicata is to be applied in particular situations as 
fairness and justice require, and that it is not to be applied so rigidly as to defeat 
the ends of justice or so as to work an injustice.’ ”  Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 386, 
653 N.E.2d at 232 (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting 46 American Jurisprudence 
2d (1994) 786-787, Judgments, Section 522.  There is something wrong with a 
legal doctrine that could be used in a situation like the one before us to reward a 
party for misrepresenting or destroying evidence.  Whether Wal-Mart actually 
committed those acts is for a jury to determine.  Given the facts of this case, Wal-
Mart will not be shielded by res judicata. 
 
In its second proposition of law, Wal-Mart argues that “claims for 
spoliation of evidence should be brought at the same time as, or as an amendment 
January Term, 2001 
5 
to, the primary action.”  We stated in Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc. (1993), 
67 Ohio St.3d 28, 29, 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038, that spoliation claims “may be 
brought at the same time as the primary action.”  “May” is permissive.  Had we 
intended for all spoliation claims to be brought at the same time as the primary 
action we would have chosen “must” or “shall.”  We did not.  To clarify Smith, 
today we hold that claims for spoliation of evidence may be brought after the 
primary action has been concluded only when evidence of spoliation is not 
discovered until after the conclusion of the primary action.  We reject Wal-Mart’s 
second proposition of law.1 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
Moyer, C.J., and DOUGLAS, J., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs except that she dissents from footnote 1. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in part and dissent in 
part. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. I agree with the majority’s decision to remand the cause for a jury trial on 
the spoliation claim under Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 28, 615 N.E.2d 1037.  However, I disagree with the majority’s failure to 
discuss appellee’s separate claim to punitive damages under Moskovitz v. Mt. 
Sinai Med. Ctr. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 635 N.E.2d 331.  Thus, upon remand, 
I would explicitly hold that the plaintiff is entitled to proceed on both the 
spoliation and punitive damages claims. 
                                                          
 
1. 
The plaintiff pled punitive damages pursuant to Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. (1994), 
69 Ohio St.3d 638, 635 N.E.2d 331.  However, due to the nature of the proceedings in the trial 
court, the court of appeals limited its discussion to res judicata.  In the interest of judicial 
economy, we note that nothing in this opinion or the lower court decisions should be taken to 
suggest that Davis is unable to pursue Moskovitz damages on remand. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
In Smith v. Howard Johnson, supra, we held that a cause of action exists 
in tort for interference with or destruction of evidence, and that such a claim “may 
be brought at the same time as the primary action.”  Id., 67 Ohio St.3d at 29, 615 
N.E.2d at 1038.  I agree with the majority’s finding that our use of the word 
“may” certainly does not imply that such a claim must be brought at the same 
time as the primary action.  To the contrary, a claim for damages under Smith 
may—and in the majority of cases most likely will—be brought after entry of the 
judgment in the primary action. 
 
However, to recover compensatory damages in a spoliation claim, 
appellee must prove that her underlying case was disrupted, and that the 
disruption proximately caused damages.  Id. at 29, 615 N.E.2d at 1038.  In this 
case, appellee may ultimately succeed in proving that her case was disrupted and 
that the disruption proximately caused damages. Yet, such success is not a 
prerequisite to her recovery of punitive damages under Moskovitz. 
 
Unlike a claim for compensatory damages under Smith, a claim for 
punitive damages under Moskovitz does not require proof of damages proximately 
caused by the act or acts of spoliation.  Id., 69 Ohio St.3d at 649-652, 635 N.E.2d 
at 341-344.  However, in order to obtain punitive damages for spoliation under 
Moskovitz, there must be some compensatory award in the underlying litigation, 
and the spoliation must be “inextricably intertwined” with the underlying action.  
Id. at 651, 635 N.E.2d at 342.  Such damages may be awarded provided that the 
spoliation was undertaken to avoid liability for the underlying tort.  Id. at 651, 635 
N.E.2d at 342-343.  In Moskovitz, the underlying tort was medical negligence; 
here, it was an employer intentional tort.  Thus, as in Moskovitz, the award to 
appellee on the underlying tort forms the necessary predicate for an award of 
punitive damages based upon the alleged spoliation of evidence tending to 
establish an employer intentional tort. 
January Term, 2001 
7 
 
Appellee faced an uphill battle in proving her intentional tort claim 
because, she alleges, Wal-Mart employees presented false and misleading 
testimony during discovery depositions and at trial.  She claims that important 
documents (“Exhibit A” and weekly accident reports) were not produced, and that 
this conduct continued during the litigation of the spoliation and punitive damages 
claims.  Appellee contends that it was only after Wal-Mart employees were 
confronted with their lies and misleading answers that they were forced to admit 
to them. 
 
The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate a plaintiff but to 
punish the guilty, deter future misconduct, and to demonstrate society’s 
disapproval.  Moskovitz, 69 Ohio St.3d at 651, 635 N.E.2d at 343; Calmes v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 470, 473, 575 N.E.2d 416, 
419; Preston v. Murty (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 334, 512 N.E.2d 1174.  Zoppo v. 
Homestead Ins. Co. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 557, 644 N.E.2d 397, 401, 
establishes that the assessment of punitive damage is for the jury to decide. 
 
In Calmes, supra,  61 Ohio St.3d at 473, 575 N.E.2d at 419, we found that 
punitive damages are available upon a finding of actual malice.  “Actual malice” 
was defined in Preston, supra, 32 Ohio St.3d 334, 512 N.E.2d 1174, syllabus, as 
“(1) that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is characterized by hatred, 
ill will or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety 
of other persons that has a great probability of causing substantial harm.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Based upon this definition, the record in this case supports a 
request for punitive damages. 
 
Accordingly, I would direct the trial court to instruct the jury that if it 
finds that Wal-Mart concealed or destroyed evidence in order to minimize or 
avoid liability for Thomas Davis’s death, the jury may award punitive damages, 
whether or not the concealment or destruction of evidence proximately caused 
damages to appellee. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
In order for our legal system to work, pursuant to our rules of procedure, a 
litigant must have the ability to investigate and uncover evidence after filing suit.  
The intentional concealment or destruction of evidence not only violates the spirit 
of liberal discovery but also reveals a shocking disregard for orderly judicial 
procedures and traditional notions of fair play.  Damage is caused not only to the 
parties to the suit, but also to the judicial system and the public’s confidence in 
that system.  Wal-Mart harms the sanctity of the judicial system and makes a 
mockery of its search for the truth. 
 
For these reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
COOK,  J., dissenting.  In Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc. (1993), 67 
Ohio St.3d 28, 29, 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038, this court adopted the spoliation tort 
(placing this court among the minority of jurisdictions to have done so2) in a 
single conclusory paragraph—ten lines of text summarily responding to three 
certified questions from a federal district court.  Today’s majority opinion, 
equally bereft of substantive legal analysis, overrules appellant’s propositions of 
law with citation only to Smith, Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
379, 653 N.E.2d 226, and the court of appeals’ opinion.  Because I believe that 
the trial court correctly applied the doctrine of res judicata to preclude Davis’s 
second tort action against Wal-Mart, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
                                                          
 
2. 
For discussions of the tort’s precarious status nationwide, see Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. 
Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty. (1998), 18 Cal.4th 1, 11, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 254, 954 P.2d 
511, 517 (California Supreme Court deciding not to recognize the tort, given the “strong policy 
favoring use of nontort remedies rather than derivative tort causes of action to punish and correct 
litigation misconduct”), and Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co., Inc. (2000), 342 Ark. 143, 146, 
151, 27 S.W.3d 387, 388, 391 (Supreme Court of Arkansas finding it “unnecessary and unwise” to 
join those “few jurisdictions” that recognize an independent spoliation tort).  See, also, Smith v. 
Atkinson (Ala.2000), 771 So.2d 429, 439-441 (See, J., dissenting). 
January Term, 2001 
9 
 
Even if I were to agree with the majority’s syllabus that “[c]laims for 
spoliation * * * may be brought after the primary action has been concluded only 
when evidence of spoliation is not discovered until after the conclusion of the 
primary action,” the majority fails to explain exactly which evidence of spoliation 
presented here was not discovered until after Davis’s primary action concluded.  
Nor does the majority explain exactly when a “primary action”  “concludes” for 
purposes of its syllabus and/or res judicata.  These are significant issues, because 
the allegations in Davis’s instant complaint focus on (1) “Exhibit A,” which Davis 
admittedly discovered before her first intentional tort case went to trial, and (2) a 
Sam’s Club claims file, which Davis admittedly obtained in conjunction with her 
motion for prejudgment interest in the intentional tort case.  Because the majority 
opinion never actually applies the syllabus to the specific evidence alleged to have 
been spoliated in this case, the spoliation tort will remain as unexplained to the 
bench and bar as it was after its cursory recognition in Smith. 
II 
 
I also write separately to emphasize a significant procedural issue 
discussed by the court of appeals yet absent from today’s majority opinion.  As 
the appellate court observed, the trial court has yet to determine whether Davis 
has actually presented a prima facie case for spoliation of evidence.  Davis v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (May 8, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 75224, unreported, at 
6, 2000 WL 504114, at *2, fn. 1.  In its motion for summary judgment, in addition 
to arguing that Davis’s instant claim was barred by res judicata, Wal-Mart 
contended that Davis had presented no evidence of (1) a willful destruction of 
evidence, (2) a disruption of her case, or (3) damages proximately caused by 
defendants’ actions.  All of these are essential elements of the tort according to 
this court’s express language in Smith, 67 Ohio St.3d at 29, 615 N.E.2d at 1038.3 
                                                          
 
3. 
The federal district court in Smith queried whether Ohio recognizes a tort of “spoliation 
of evidence and/or tortious interference with prospective civil litigation.”  Smith, 67 Ohio St.3d at 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
One of Smith’s essential elements, “willful destruction,” differs 
significantly from “concealment,” “interference,” or “misrepresentation”—at least 
as these terms are commonly understood.  See Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary (1986) 615 (destruction), 469 (concealment), 1178 (interference), 1445 
(misrepresentation).  Yet, despite this court’s express insistence in Smith that a 
spoliation plaintiff prove “willful destruction,” both the court of appeals and the 
majority apply interchangeably all of these distinct concepts.  For example, the 
court of appeals stated that “[f]or res judicata to apply * * *, defendants’ acts of 
allegedly concealing, destroying or intentionally interfering with evidence must 
arise from the same ‘transaction or occurrence’ as that which [led] to decedent’s 
death.”  (Emphasis added.)  Davis at *4.  And in addition to adopting this 
language from the appellate opinion, the majority states that “[t]here is something 
wrong with a legal doctrine that could be used in a situation like the one before us 
to reward a party for misrepresenting or destroying evidence.”  (Emphasis added.)  
We were not asked in this appeal to broaden the existing elements of the tort 
recognized in Smith, and the majority should not imply that evidence of 
concealment, interference, and/or misrepresentation may satisfy the “willful 
destruction” element of the tort.4 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
29, 615 N.E.2d at 1038.  The Smith court did not apply the district court’s term “spoliation” in its 
order answering this question, although the term has apparently been reborn in today’s syllabus.  
Rather, the Smith court decided that “[a] cause of action exists in tort for interference with or 
destruction of evidence.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id.  The label of the tort recognized in Smith 
suggests that a party may be found civilly liable for “interference with” evidence.  See id.  Yet 
with its enumeration of the essential elements of this tort, Smith expressly requires plaintiffs to 
prove “willful destruction.”  Id.  As the case before us demonstrates, a party’s alleged 
“interference” with evidence does not always equate to “destruction” of evidence.  Indeed, Davis 
attaches to her complaint one of the very documents that she alleges Wal-Mart failed to produce in 
the prior intentional tort action. If the evidence had been “willfully destroyed,” as Smith requires, 
Davis would presumably have been unable to attach it to her complaint.  Other allegations in 
Davis’s complaint are based on a claims file—also not destroyed—that Davis obtained during the 
prejudgment interest proceedings. 
4. 
Wal-Mart has specifically asked us to “reconsider the continued recognition of the 
spoliation tort,” yet the majority has failed to respond to any of these arguments. 
January Term, 2001 
11 
 
Given its disposition in favor of Wal-Mart on the basis of res judicata, the 
trial court never addressed Wal-Mart’s argument that Davis failed to make a 
prima facie case, nor did it address Wal-Mart’s separate contention that no civil 
liability exists for statements made by a witness during trial.  As the court of 
appeals instructed, the trial court should address Wal-Mart’s remaining arguments 
on remand.  Davis at fn. 1.  When it does so, the trial court need not interpret the 
majority’s dicta as a holding by this court that Smith’s necessary element of 
“willful 
destruction” 
may 
be 
satisfied 
by 
proof 
of 
“concealment,” 
“misrepresentation,” or “interference.” 
__________________ 
 
Greene & Eisen Co., L.P.A., William M. Greene, Brian N. Eisen and Eric 
M. Schreibman, for appellee. 
 
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Jeffrey S. Sutton and Brian G. Selden;  
Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., Clifford C. Masch and Roy A. Hulme, for 
appellant. 
__________________