Case Title: P. v. Cowan

Citation: 50 Cal. 4th 401

Docket Number: S055415

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
Filed 8/5/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S055415 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
ROBERT WESLEY COWAN, 
) 
 
) 
Kern County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 059675A 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
A Kern County jury found defendant Robert Wesley Cowan guilty of the 
first degree murders of Clifford and Alma Merck (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 
189)1 and found true the special circumstance allegations of multiple murder 
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and murder during the commission of robbery and burglary 
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G)).2  As to both murders, the jury found that a 
principal had been armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and the court 
found that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. 
(a)).  The jury was unable to reach a verdict on a murder count involving a third 
victim, Jewell Russell, resulting in a mistrial on that count. 
                                              
1 
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 
Section 190.2, former subdivision (a)(17)(i) and (vii), which were in effect 
at the time of the crimes in 1984, were renumbered without relevant substantive 
change in 1995.  (Stats. 1995, ch. 478, §§ 2, 3, 4, pp. 3564-3567; Prop. 196, as 
approved by voters, Primary Elec. (Mar. 26, 1996).) 
2 
 
 
At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned verdicts of death for 
Alma‟s murder and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 
Clifford‟s murder.  The trial court denied defendant‟s automatic application to 
modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and imposed the death sentence with a one-
year arming enhancement for Alma‟s murder, a consecutive sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus a one-year arming 
enhancement for Clifford‟s murder, and a five-year enhancement for the prior 
serious felony conviction.   
 
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Introduction 
 
Clifford and Alma Merck, an elderly Bakersfield couple, were found dead 
in their home on September 4, 1984, the Tuesday after Labor Day.  Clifford had 
been shot, Alma had been strangled, and their house had been ransacked, with 
numerous items stolen.  Jewell Francis Russell was found dead in his home in 
Shafter on September 7, 1984.  He had been beaten and his throat had been 
slashed.  Defendant was not arrested and charged with these murders until 1994, 
after a Kern County Sheriff‟s Department fingerprint examiner reexamined the 
latent fingerprints lifted from the Merck murder scene and concluded that two 
latent prints matched defendant‟s prints.  In addition, new ballistics tests suggested 
that a gun stolen from the Mercks and linked to defendant was the weapon used to 
kill Clifford Merck.  Evidence that defendant had possessed items of the Mercks‟ 
property and had made inculpatory statements also tied him to the Merck and 
Russell murders.3 
                                              
3 
Defendant‟s brother Gerald Cowan was charged with the Merck and 
Russell murders along with defendant.  Gerald was convicted of the voluntary 
(footnote continued on next page) 
3 
 
B. Guilt Phase 
1. The prosecution’s case 
a. The killing of Clifford and Alma Merck 
In September of 1984, Clifford and Alma Merck lived on McClean Street 
in East Bakersfield.  Clifford was 75 years old and Alma was 81; they had been 
married for almost 33 years.  Defendant lived approximately four blocks away on 
Easter Street.   
Clifford owned a Colt .25-caliber automatic pistol with white grips and a 
two-inch barrel.  He also owned a metal cigarette lighter cover with a “kachina” or 
“rain god” design on it, and a tooled leather wallet in which he kept his driver‟s 
license.  Alma owned a turquoise ring and costume jewelry, including a pearl 
bracelet, a necklace watch, a diamond watch, and earrings.  She had at least two 
jewelry boxes — one green, and the other a musical box with a dancing figurine 
on top.  Clifford liked to mark his property with his initials, and he marked some 
of his wife‟s property with her initials as well.  Clifford had etched his initials on 
the inside of the grips of his Colt .25-caliber pistol.   
On August 31, 1984, the Friday before the Labor Day weekend, Alma‟s son 
Robert Johnson called the Mercks and told them that he and his wife would be 
visiting the following Tuesday.  Margarita Macias, who lived across the street 
from the Mercks and sometimes drove them places because Clifford could not see 
well, last saw the Mercks the following day, Saturday, September 1.   
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
manslaughter of Russell pursuant to a no-contest plea, and the other charges 
against him were dismissed.  (See Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 
367.)  Gerald was not tried with defendant and did not testify against him.  
4 
 
Robert Johnson and his wife arrived at the Mercks‟ house as promised on 
the morning of Tuesday, September 4, 1984.  Johnson first went to the back door 
and knocked, but nobody answered.  He then went to the front door and knocked, 
but also got no answer.  Looking through the front window, he did not see 
anybody, but he heard the Mercks‟ dog barking.  Johnson returned to the back 
door, which was not locked, opened it, and peered into the service porch area, 
which served as a laundry room.  Inside, he saw items of the Mercks‟ property 
lined up from the back door to the kitchen.  Sensing something was wrong, he 
went to a window on the side of the house and tried to look inside, but so many 
flies were buzzing around the window that he backed away.  Johnson had his wife 
contact the sheriff‟s department. 
Gregory Laskowski, a criminalist with the Kern County Regional 
Criminalistics Laboratory, responded to the Merck home to investigate.  The home 
had been “ransacked.”  Chairs were overturned, and drawers had been pulled out 
and their contents strewn about.  Items were out of place; the television was in the 
service porch area.  The receiver was missing from the wall phone, and the phone 
cords and wires were pulled loose.  Lamp cords had been severed.  On the shelf 
near the kitchen window, Laskowski found an open pocket knife.   
Laskowski made his way to one of the bedrooms, where he found Clifford 
Merck‟s body lying across the bed, his head under a pillow which had a bullet hole 
in it.  Clifford had been shot in the head twice.  An orange throw pillow, which 
also had a bullet hole in it, was on the bed.  In Laskowski‟s opinion, the purpose of 
shooting into a pillow was to muffle the sound.  Clifford‟s ankles and wrists were 
bound with electrical cords, and his blood had drained onto the bedroom floor.   
The same day, Quentin Nerida, a fingerprint technician with the Kern 
County Sheriff‟s Department Technical Investigations unit, went to the Merck 
crime scene to lift latent fingerprints.  Working his way through the house, Nerida 
5 
 
arrived at a bedroom used as a sewing room.  When he opened the closet doors, 
Alma‟s body fell out.  Alma had been strangled.  Her hands were bound with a 
lamp cord, and a telephone cord with the receiver still attached was wrapped 
around her neck and mouth. 
Dr. Armand Dollinger, a forensic pathologist in the Kern County coroner‟s 
office, examined the Mercks‟ bodies on September 5, 1984.  Both bodies were in 
an advanced state of decomposition, suggesting the Mercks had been dead for 
several days.  Clifford had died from two penetrating gunshot wounds.  One bullet 
had entered slightly above and in front of his left ear, traveled through his head 
and terminated in the scalp above his right ear, perforating and lacerating his 
brain.  Another bullet had entered the base of his neck on the left side, traveled up 
and toward the front, and terminated in his spinal canal, lacerating his spinal cord.  
His death was probably nearly instantaneous.   
Alma‟s wrists were bound behind her back with electrical cord, and her 
ankles were also bound.  A telephone cord was wound over her chin and then 
tightly around her neck.  She had died from asphyxiation due to strangulation by 
ligature.  Her death probably occurred about four to five minutes after the cord 
was tightened around her neck.     
More than 40 latent fingerprints were lifted from the Merck home.  When 
family members cleaned out the house, they discovered that several Social 
Security checks were missing.   
About a month after the murders, Bakersfield police received information 
about alleged drug activity taking place at the Caravan Inn.  On October 14, 
several officers raided two adjoining rooms at the Caravan Inn and arrested five 
people, including Danny Phinney and Robert Lutts.  In a trash can in one of the 
rooms, police found a loaded Colt .25-caliber automatic pistol.  The initials “C” 
and “M” or “W” were etched inside the gun‟s grips.  From Phinney‟s van, the 
6 
 
police seized a coin purse, jewelry, watches, a loaded .38-caliber revolver, and a 
large quantity of methamphetamine packaged for sale.  Phinney initially denied 
knowing anything about the origins of the Colt .25-caliber pistol.   
Laskowski compared bullets test-fired from the Colt pistol seized in the 
raid with the bullets recovered from the body of Clifford Merck.  He concluded 
the gun had not fired the bullets.   
In November 1984, Kern County Sheriff‟s Department technical 
investigator Jerry Roper compared the latent fingerprints recovered from the 
Merck crime scene with the rolled prints of several known suspects, including 
defendant, but found no match.4  At trial, Roper could not recall if anyone had 
double-checked his work.  In January 1985, the latent prints lifted from the scene 
were compared with the rolled prints of Phinney and Lutts.  Again, no match was 
found.5   
Meanwhile, Phinney, a drug addict who suffered from bipolar disorder and 
had several misdemeanor drug-related convictions, was in protective custody 
following his arrest.  Before his arrest Phinney had been using primarily “street 
                                              
4 
There was considerable testimony concerning Roper‟s competency, or lack 
thereof, in the field of fingerprint comparisons.  Thomas Jones, another examiner 
in the unit who later became the unit supervisor, began to question Roper‟s 
competence sometime before 1984, when Roper found no match in a case where 
Nerida had found a match.  Jones reported his concerns to Jerry Grimes, who at 
that time supervised the unit.  At some point, Grimes asked Jones to reexamine all 
of Roper‟s cases going back a period of time, and also to double-check all of 
Roper‟s future work.  Jones found no additional problems.  Roper left the 
technical investigations unit in 1987 due to failing eyesight and “personnel” 
problems.   
5 
In 1987, latent No. 44, which had been lifted from the bottom of a plastic 
sewing tray found on the dining room table, was run through a computerized 
fingerprint database, but again no match was found.  The Kern County Sheriff‟s 
Department had defendant‟s rolled prints as of 1967. 
7 
 
speed” (methamphetamine), but he also had used LSD, mescaline, peyote, 
amphetamines, and barbiturates.  While in jail, Phinney read a newspaper article 
about a “secret witness” program seeking information about the Merck murders.  
Someone pointed out the initials of the victims, which triggered in Phinney‟s mind 
the memory of the initials on the Colt .25-caliber pistol seized in the raid.  Phinney 
also recognized the street name — McClean Street — because he had seen it 
before.  Concerned that his connection to the gun might tie him to the murders, 
Phinney decided to talk to the police.   
Phinney gave a statement to Detective John Diederich of the Kern County 
Sheriff‟s Department on December 21, 1984.  The statement was tape-recorded 
and transcribed.  Phinney told Diederich that sometime after Labor Day in 
September 1984 he had met defendant at an auto parts store in Bakersfield and 
then gone with him to defendant‟s brother‟s house on Pearl Street.  At the house, 
defendant showed Phinney a bag of coins, including a 1922 silver dollar; some 
costume jewelry; two government checks in the name of Merck or Myrick on 
McClean Street with a total value of about $600; and a carved leather billfold with 
a driver‟s license, medical cards, and a Social Security card inside.  The year of 
birth on the driver‟s license was 1911 or 1914.  Phinney also saw a Shafter High 
School class ring, plastic pearls, a necklace,6 and two jewelry boxes — one green, 
the other with a dancing figurine on top.7   
                                              
6 
Phinney said the name “Dolly” or “Dotty” was inscribed on the necklace.  
Alma‟s daughter, Betty Turner, and granddaughter, Terri Jones, testified that a 
woman named Daisy had lived with the Mercks from 1980 until she died, about a 
year before the Mercks were killed.  Alma told Betty that Daisy had given Alma 
some of her jewelry.   
7 
Phinney said the figurine on top of the jewelry box was shaped like a swan.   
Betty Turner, on the other hand, testified that the figurine on her mother‟s jewelry 
box was shaped like a ballerina.     
8 
 
During the interview, Detective Diederich showed Phinney the Colt .25-
caliber pistol seized in the raid.  Phinney said he had heard that defendant had sold 
the gun to Lutts, who had tried to file the initials off.  Phinney recalled that 
defendant had said, regarding the gun, “Whatever happens, don‟t get caught with 
it,” and “eat it; throw it away or whatever, but don‟t get caught with it.”    
Craig Fraley was the Kern County Sheriff‟s Department detective in charge 
of the Merck case from December 1984 through September 1987.  In January 
1985, Fraley contacted defendant‟s sister, Catherine Glass.  Glass produced a 
turquoise ring, which she said she had purchased from defendant.  That month, 
Fraley showed the ring to Alma Merck‟s granddaughter, Terri Jones.  At trial, 
Jones testified that exhibit No. 39, the ring Fraley obtained from Glass, “looked 
like” her grandmother‟s ring.  During the investigation the ring also was shown to 
Alma‟s daughter, Mary Watts, who recognized the ring as her mother‟s.  At trial, 
Watts testified that exhibit No. 39, the ring obtained from Glass, “look[ed] like” 
her mother‟s ring.  There appeared to be an “M” scratched into the underside of 
the ring.   
Also in January 1985, Fraley interviewed Ronnie Woodin, a friend of 
defendant‟s since childhood.  Woodin gave Fraley a metal cigarette lighter with a 
kachina or rain god design on it, which he said he had purchased from defendant 
for $5 sometime between the 10th and 13th of the previous September.  Woodin 
also said defendant had a bag of things he was trying to sell, including costume 
jewelry.  Woodin told Fraley that when he asked defendant where he had gotten 
the lighter, defendant said “never mind” or something similar.  At trial Woodin 
confirmed that he had purchased the lighter from defendant.  Fraley showed the 
lighter to Terri Jones‟s husband Jerry Jones on January 30, 1985.  Jones said he 
had seen Clifford Merck use the lighter many times.   
9 
 
The investigation of the Merck murders languished until mid-1994, when 
James Christopherson was promoted from patrolman to detective in the 
robbery/homicide unit of the Kern County Sheriff‟s Department.  Christopherson 
had secured the Merck crime scene and searched for witnesses in 1984, but 
otherwise had not been involved in the investigation.  After obtaining permission 
to reopen the investigation, in May 1994 Christopherson asked the technical 
investigations unit to re-compare all of the latent fingerprints lifted from the 
Merck murder scene with the rolled prints of seven known suspects, including 
defendant and his brother Gerald.  Supervisor Thomas Jones assigned the initial 
comparison to Sharon Pierce.  Pierce concluded a latent print lifted from the inside 
of the back service porch door above the doorknob (latent print No. 10) matched 
defendant‟s left thumbprint, and a latent print lifted from the bottom of a plastic 
sewing tray that had been lying on a table in the dining room area (latent print No. 
44) matched defendant‟s left middle fingerprint.  Per department policy, Pierce 
brought all of the latent prints, and the rolled prints of all of the suspects she had 
compared with them, to Jones and had him recheck her work.  Jones 
independently determined that latent print Nos. 10 and 44 matched the rolled 
prints from defendant‟s left thumb and left middle finger, respectively.  In July of 
1994, Jones brought defendant‟s rolled prints and the cards with latent print Nos. 
10 and 44 to the Department of Justice in Sacramento for verification of the 
match.  Martin Collins, the latent print supervisor there, confirmed that the latent 
prints matched defendant‟s rolled prints.  Another examiner in the office agreed.8   
                                              
8 
Collins testified that one of the prints matched defendant‟s left middle 
finger and the other matched his right thumb.  Pierce and Jones, however, testified 
that the latents matched defendant‟s left middle finger and left thumb.  This 
discrepancy was not cleared up at trial.   
10 
 
Detective Christopherson interviewed defendant on August 8, 1994. 
Defendant consistently denied any involvement in the Merck murders, even after 
learning that his fingerprints had been found at the crime scene.   
Detective Christopherson reinterviewed Phinney on August 23, 1994.  
During this interview, Phinney revealed for the first time that he had acted as a go-
between for the transfer of the Colt .25-caliber automatic pistol from defendant to 
Lutts.  He also revealed for the first time that, after taking the gun apart and seeing 
the initials on the inside, Lutts had attempted to alter the rifling by putting things 
down the barrel.  Told about the possible alteration of the rifling, in April 1996 
criminalist Laskowski made a mold of the inside of the gun‟s barrel and compared 
it to the bullets removed from Clifford Merck‟s body.  This time, Laskowski 
concluded the gun had fired the bullets that killed Clifford Merck.   
Robert Lutts, who in 1984 sold drugs — mostly methamphetamine — to 
support his own drug habit and had been convicted of felonies including robbery 
and possession of drugs for sale, testified that he believed he had obtained the Colt 
.25-caliber pistol seized in the October 1984 raid on the Caravan Inn from 
defendant through Phinney, as payment for drugs.  He acknowledged having taken 
the gun apart and having seen the initials on the grips, but denied having tried to 
alter the barrel‟s rifling.   
Mitzi Cowan, who in 1984 was defendant‟s brother Gerald‟s girlfriend and 
later married Gerald, testified that sometime between the first and fifth of 
September 1984, defendant and his girlfriend, Gerry Tags, came to the apartment 
that Mitzi shared with Gerald.  Defendant had a box full of clothes and some other 
items, such as jewelry.  Mitzi remembered in particular an older silver watch and a 
necklace with a heart-shaped watch on it.  Gerald put the necklace in his pocket.  
Later that day he threw it into a vacant field.   
11 
 
Former Shafter Police Lieutenant John Porter testified that he had 
interviewed Emma Foreman, the mother of defendant‟s girlfriend Gerry Tags, in 
January 1990.  Foreman told Porter that defendant had admitted beating to death 
an old couple he had found in a bedroom in Bakersfield.   
b.  The killing of Jewell Francis Russell 
Jewell Francis Russell, also known as “Shafter Bobby,” lived in Shafter, 
about 25 miles from the Mercks‟ home in Bakersfield.  In September 1984, 
Russell was about 55 years old.  He carried his money in his front pocket, folded 
neatly in half, with the smallest bills on the outside.  His daughter Mitzi was 
Gerald Cowan‟s girlfriend. 
About 9:30 p.m. on September 7, 1984, Russell‟s son Danny was driving 
by his father‟s house and noticed that all the lights and the television were on.  
This seemed “not right” to him, so he decided to investigate.  He entered the side 
door, which was unlocked.  In the kitchen, he saw blood on the floor and blood 
leading into the next room.  In the living room there was more blood leading to the 
hall area.  The house was hot and smelled bad, and the television was on “full 
blast.”  Danny left and returned with family members, and the police were 
summoned.    
Paul Petersen, a sergeant and watch commander in the Shafter Police 
Department, responded to the scene.  Entering the house through the kitchen door, 
Petersen noticed bloodstains on the floor, what appeared to be dried blood spatters, 
and drag marks leading from the kitchen to the rug area.  In the living room, 
Petersen noticed shoes, cowboy boots, socks, a guitar, a stained towel, and dried 
blood on the rug.  Following the strong odor of what he believed to be a deceased 
person to the northeast bedroom, he found a body under the bed.  He called the 
coroner‟s office and summoned a technical investigation team.  
12 
 
Jerry Grimes, the supervisor of the Kern County Sheriff‟s Department 
Technical Investigations unit, arrived to investigate.  In the bedroom, he found 
drawers opened and their contents lying about.  Investigators moved the bed, 
revealing Russell‟s body lying prone with the head resting on the right cheek.  The 
pockets of Russell‟s pants were turned inside out.  Russell‟s throat had been slit on 
the right side and he had been severely beaten; bruising in the facial area appeared 
to match the stock of a shotgun.  Petersen later seized from the house a knife and 
sheath, a cigarette butt, a golf club and a shotgun.   
A postmortem examination of Russell‟s body revealed numerous bruises 
around the face and a bruise on the chest wall, apparently inflicted using a blunt 
object such as a fist or a shoe.  A large slashing incised wound on the right side of 
the neck from the midline to the back had severed the sternocleidomastoid muscle, 
jugular vein, carotid sheath and artery, and everything down to the spine, trachea, 
and larynx.  There was also a superficial incised wound on the left side of the 
neck.  Russell died from exsanguination — he bled to death.  The wound to his 
neck probably rendered him unconsciousness almost immediately, and he died in 
less than 10 minutes.   
Defendant‟s girlfriend in 1984, Gerry Tags, died before trial, so her 1994 
preliminary examination testimony was read to the jury.  Tags testified that she 
had lived with defendant for three to four years, ending in 1986.  Defendant was 
using “crank” (methamphetamine) every day and did not have a steady job.  Tags 
also used methamphetamine on a daily basis if she could get it.  Sometimes the 
drug made her stay awake for several days at a time.  She worked as a prostitute, 
giving the money she earned to defendant.  She had stopped using drugs about six 
or seven months before her testimony because she was being treated for cancer.   
13 
 
Tags was acquainted with Russell because his son Danny was the father of 
her child.  She had seen Russell many times at the pool hall carrying a large 
amount of money in his pocket.   
The night before Tags learned that Russell had been killed, Tags and 
defendant were playing cards with defendant‟s brother Gerald and his girlfriend 
Mitzi, who was Russell‟s daughter (and who later married Gerald), at Mitzi‟s 
apartment.  Tags and defendant got into an argument because defendant wanted 
Tags to go out and “make some money” so defendant could buy drugs, but Tags 
did not want to go.  Tags allowed defendant to use her car; defendant did not say 
where he was going.  She then went upstairs and went to sleep.  A while later, 
she was awakened by Gerald‟s voice yelling.  Gerald (who apparently had left the 
apartment at some point) had returned by himself.  Defendant returned separately 
around daybreak wearing different clothes than he had worn when he left the night 
before.  Defendant and Gerald were arguing.  Defendant and Tags then left Mitzi‟s 
apartment.  Tags did not question defendant because she feared he would beat her.   
A week or two later, Tags saw, in the trunk of her car, the clothes defendant 
had been wearing the night he left Mitzi‟s apartment after arguing with Tags.  
There appeared to be blood on defendant‟s beige pants.  A knife Tags had seen 
at Russell‟s house was wrapped in defendant‟s pants and shirt.  When defendant 
saw Tags looking at the clothes, he said “Bitch, don‟t you touch anything of 
mine.” 
After Russell‟s funeral, Tags, defendant, and Gerald drove to Oklahoma 
and Florida on a two- or three-week trip.  One night in Oklahoma, Tags asked 
defendant if he had killed Russell.  Defendant responded, “Yeah bitch, and if you 
say anything, I‟ll cut your throat, just like I did his.” 
14 
 
At trial Mitzi Cowan gave an account of the early-September card-playing 
evening and subsequent events that was similar to Tags‟s account, but with 
additional details.  Her testimony is discussed in greater detail below in part II.C.8.   
Tags‟s mother, Emma Foreman, testified that sometime after Russell was 
killed, defendant and Tags were at Foreman‟s house.  They were arguing because 
Tags was resisting defendant‟s demand that she go out to prostitute herself.  
According to Foreman, defendant said to Tags, “if you don‟t go out, I‟ll cut your 
damn throat,” and “I‟ll do you like I did motherfucking Bobby.”  One time 
Foreman saw some bloody clothes in the trunk of Tags‟s car.   
Tags‟s step-uncle Roy Davidson — a heroin abuser with a felony 
conviction for forgery — worked for Russell for 12 years.  Davidson claimed to 
have seen a knife and some bloody boots in defendant‟s car sometime in 
September of 1984.  Defendant also had a roll of bills, some jewelry, and a 
man‟s watch that Davidson recognized as Russell‟s.  A few days later, defendant 
said something like he had “done away with Bob” or “Bob won‟t be around no 
more.”  
2. The defense case 
 
Ruth Scott worked for two companies that manufactured Native American 
jewelry and components.  From 1976 to 1981 her company manufactured about 
50,000 reusable cigarette lighter cases decorated with a kachina or rain god figure, 
some of which were sold in California.  One or two competitors made similar 
cases.  The lighter case Detective Fraley had obtained from Ronnie Woodin was 
similar to the lighter cases her company manufactured.  Scott‟s company also 
manufactured component parts for rings similar to the ring Detective Fraley had 
obtained from Catherine Glass.  The ring was a low-priced “tourist item,” and 
Scott had seen thousands of them.  Scott testified that the marking scratched on the 
15 
 
back of the ring appeared to be a “3” placed there by the wholesaler, indicating the 
price paid for the ring.   
 
Damon Gene Taylor had managed a discount cigarette store in Bakersfield 
since early 1984.  His store sold lighter cases similar to the case Detective Fraley 
obtained from Ronnie Woodin.  Such cases were very common; Taylor ordered 50 
to 100 such cases every week and sold them for $1.50 each.  Other cigarette and 
jewelry stores also sold the cases.   
 
Bakersfield Police Officer Kevin Clerico, who had participated in the raid 
at the Caravan Inn on October 14, 1984, testified that, upon his arrest, Phinney 
said that the guns seized in the raid belonged to Lutts, that most of Lutts‟s property 
was stolen from others, and that he had no further information concerning the 
guns.   
 
Christopher Hillis, a Kern County District Attorney‟s Office investigator, 
interviewed Gerry Tags on June 18, 1986.  In that interview, Tags made several 
statements that were inconsistent with her testimony at the preliminary 
examination.  Lieutenant John Porter was recalled and testified that when he 
interviewed Emma Foreman in January 1990, she said that defendant told her 
about the old couple “about a month before or after [Russell] was killed.”  
Detective Fraley was recalled and testified that when he interviewed Foreman in 
February 1985, she said she hated defendant “with a purple passion.”  Although 
Fraley had worked on the Merck and Russell cases since December 1984, he first 
came into contact with Roy Davidson in October 1986 at the jail.  Davidson, a 
drug abuser, offered to “get people to talk” if Fraley would help him get out of jail.   
 
Dr. David Bird, a clinical psychologist with experience researching and 
treating drug abuse, testified that long-term use of methamphetamine damages the 
user‟s memory, perception, language comprehension, and visual motor control. 
Continued use over a period of years can result in lost memories of days or weeks.  
16 
 
The user may confuse actual experiences with things he or she read or heard 
about, and may stay awake for days at a time.  The user also may hallucinate and 
record the hallucinations as memories, and may become paranoid regarding a 
person the user hates.  Dr. Bird also said that about six months after a person stops 
using methamphetamine, that person will experience an acute brain damage 
syndrome that lasts another six months to one year.  Even after recovery, the 
person‟s memory of the period of drug abuse remains jumbled.  According to Dr. 
Bird, the transcript of Gerry Tags‟s preliminary examination testimony showed 
signs of prolonged methamphetamine abuse, including lack of comprehension, 
faulty recall, suggestibility, contaminated memory, and mixing reality with her 
imagination.    
 
 
Dr. Bird further testified that heroin, an opiate, is primarily a pain analgesic 
but also brings on euphoria.  Heroin affects the ability to perceive and recollect 
because the user is focused on what is happening inwardly.  After the euphoria 
subsides, the user is uneasy and begins looking for the next dose.  Dr. Bird said the 
cessation of heavy heroin use causes very strong biological withdrawal symptoms 
beginning one to 12 hours after the last dose.  An addict will “do anything” to get 
more of the drug, including lying, cheating, and stealing. 
3. The verdicts 
 
The jury found defendant guilty of the Merck murders but could not agree 
on the charge involving Russell.  The trial court declared a mistrial as to the 
Russell count.   
C. Penalty phase 
1. The prosecution’s case 
 
 Alma‟s daughter, Betty Turner, and two of Alma‟s granddaughters, Terri 
Jones and Shelley Denise Cox, testified about the impact of the Mercks‟ deaths 
17 
 
upon them and their families.  James Foster testified about an incident in October 
1985 when defendant broke into his home, threatened him with a gun, bound his 
hands and feet and those of his coworker Jessie Cruz, and stole numerous items 
before leaving.  A neighbor of defendant, Betty Jean Abney, testified about an 
incident in 1993 in which defendant had allegedly picked up his girlfriend‟s young 
son Robert by the hair and thrown him to the ground.  The testimony of these 
witnesses is discussed in more detail below in parts II.D.1, II.D.4 and II.D.7. 
 
Certified court records of defendant‟s 1970 robbery conviction were 
admitted into evidence.  The parties stipulated that defendant perpetrated the 
offenses involving James Foster and Jessie Cruz. 
2. The defense case 
 
Defendant‟s aunt, Selma Yates, and her son, Leroy Cowan, testified about 
the abuse defendant suffered as a child at the hands of his father, Wes. According 
to Yates and Leroy, Wes, like his father before him, was an alcoholic who was 
violent when drunk.  Defendant‟s mother, Betty, had eight children.  Because Wes 
spent much of his money on alcohol, there often was not enough food in the 
house.  Wes beat defendant for no reason, and beat Betty when she was pregnant.  
Once when both defendant and Leroy were present, Yates had to hit Wes over the 
head with a rolling pin to get him to stop beating Betty.  While the police were 
dragging Wes away, he threatened to kill everyone when he got out of jail.  When 
Leroy stayed at defendant‟s house, the boys all slept in the same bed.  After a 
night of drinking, Wes would wake up the boys, jerk them out of bed and beat 
them.  Several times Wes mistook Leroy for defendant and when he realized his 
mistake, he tossed Leroy aside and grabbed defendant.  Once Wes locked 
defendant and Leroy in a car for an entire afternoon.  Wes was arrested several 
times for abusing his family.   
18 
 
 
Both Yates and Leroy testified about a time when Yates‟s family, who 
lived in Richmond, went to live with Betty and her family in Bakersfield.  When 
Leroy attended school with defendant, defendant‟s grades and behavior improved 
so much that the teachers asked Leroy to stay.  Yates, however, would not allow 
Leroy to stay because of the drinking and violence in Betty‟s house.  This greatly 
disappointed defendant.  Later, when defendant was a teenager, Wes took 
defendant to bars and started him drinking.   
 
Yates testified the defendant she knew was not the type who would murder 
two people.  Yates did not believe in the death sentence except in extreme cases.  
Leroy did not believe defendant should be put to death because he had to have 
been on drugs or alcohol to commit the murders and because he did not get a fair 
shake in life.   
 
Defendant‟s girlfriend, Brenda H., first met defendant in 1993, and she and 
her five children lived with him for about eight months until he was arrested.  At 
that time, defendant was supporting the family with his Supplemental Security 
Income money.  When Brenda H. first met defendant, they both were involved 
with drugs.  Together they decided to quit, and they both were getting off drugs 
when defendant was arrested.  Brenda H. went into drug rehabilitation and got a 
job.  Brenda H. had been off drugs for close to a year when she testified.    
 
Brenda H. testified she did not see the incident in April 1993 in which 
defendant had allegedly picked up her son Robert by the hair, but afterwards 
Robert was not physically hurt.  Brenda H. further testified that defendant never 
hurt her and that he treated her children as if they were his own.  He was kind to 
them, helped them with schoolwork, played guitar and sang to them, and took 
them camping and fishing and to watch fireworks on the Fourth of July.  Brenda 
H. testified she loved defendant and would be “devastated” if he were sentenced to 
death.   
19 
 
 
Three of Brenda H.‟s children, Robert, Michael and Melody, testified about 
their relationship with defendant.  Their testimony is described in further detail 
below in part II.D.7.   
3. Rebuttal 
 
Michael Rascoe, the Kern County deputy sheriff who investigated 
defendant‟s alleged abuse of Robert H. on April 9, 1993, testified about statements 
Robert and Michael H. made to him regarding the incident.  His testimony is 
discussed in greater detail below in part II.D.7. 
 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Prearrest Delay 
 
Defendant contends the nearly 10-year delay between the Merck killings in 
September 1984 and his arrest in August 1994 prejudiced his ability to defend 
against the murder charges, violating his rights to a fair trial and to due process of 
law under the state and federal Constitutions.9  As we shall explain, we find no 
constitutional violation.   
1. Factual Background 
 
 
Defendant first moved to dismiss the complaint in August 1994, arguing the 
10-year delay between the murders and his arrest prejudiced him because of his 
own faded memory and that of critical defense witnesses.  In support, defendant‟s 
attorney, Michael Sprague, declared in pertinent part, “Due to the passage of time, 
the defendant does not [know], and is unable to recall, where he was, who he was 
with, or where he was living, or located at the time of the . . . homicides.”   
                                              
9 
Because the jury did not return a verdict on the charge involving Russell, 
defendant confines his claim of prejudice to the Merck charges.  We limit our 
discussion accordingly. 
20 
 
 
An evidentiary hearing on defendant‟s motion was held concurrently with 
the preliminary examination in September 1994.  At the hearing, Criminalist 
Nerida, Detective Diederich, Detective Fraley, Investigator Christopher Hillis, and 
Detective Christopherson each testified about his respective role in the 
investigation and the evidence uncovered along the way.  The testimony of these 
witnesses at the hearing largely anticipated that presented at trial regarding the 
course of the Merck homicide investigation.  (See ante, pp. 4-10.)  Thus, their 
testimony revealed that by early 1985, law enforcement had gathered evidence 
linking several items of the Mercks‟ property with defendant, including Clifford‟s 
lighter, wallet, identification, and Colt .25-caliber pistol, as well as Alma‟s 
turquoise ring and the couple‟s Social Security checks.  However, fingerprint 
comparisons, including a comparison of the latent prints lifted at the crime scene 
with defendant‟s rolled prints by sheriff‟s department criminalist Jerry Roper in 
November 1984, and a 1987 comparison of several of the latent prints with prints 
in a computerized fingerprint database, were negative.   
 
Detective Fraley was assigned to investigate the Merck case from 
December 1984 through September 1987.  He testified that in February 1985 
defendant called him and offered to discuss the case.  Fraley declined defendant‟s 
offer, however, because he “was still looking at the circumstances surrounding the 
homicide and right at that point in time I was not prepared to take him on, so to 
speak, from an investigator‟s point of view.”   
 
In late 1985 or early 1986 Detective Fraley presented the Merck case to the 
District Attorney‟s office.  After reviewing the file, two deputy district attorneys 
told Fraley that all of the evidence was circumstantial and that they could not issue 
a complaint without evidence linking defendant directly to the murders.  Similarly, 
Deputy District Attorney Barton Hegeler told Christopher Hillis, the district 
21 
 
attorney‟s investigator who worked on the Merck case in 1986, that there was not 
enough evidence against defendant to go to a jury.   
 
Upon his transfer to a different department in September 1987, Detective 
Fraley gave the Merck case file to his supervisor for reassignment.  At that time, 
he did not believe he had probable cause to arrest defendant.  He had done little 
work on the case in the preceding few months because his leads had dried up.  
 
When Detective Christopherson reopened the Merck investigation in 1994,  
no detective was assigned to the case and the Kern County Sheriff‟s Office had 
done no active investigation since 1987.  In May 1994, Christopherson asked the 
technical investigations unit to recompare the latent prints from the Merck crime 
scene with the rolled prints of defendant, his brother and one other suspect.  
Criminalist Sharon Pierce found that latent print No. 10 matched defendant‟s left 
thumbprint and latent print No. 44 matched his left middle fingerprint.  
Christopherson then presented the case to the district attorney, who decided there 
was sufficient evidence to arrest and charge defendant.   
 
The defense called Jerry Roper, who testified that he had no independent 
recollection of the fingerprint comparisons he performed in the Merck case in 
1984 and could not presently recreate them because his eyesight had deteriorated 
over the years.   
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion to dismiss, 
explaining, “I don‟t find any deliberate acts by law enforcement or the agencies 
not to bring this case to trial or to push forward with it as soon as they could.  It 
would appear there was an inadvertent failure to detect a critical fingerprint 
analysis.  It appears that even as late as ‟86, ‟87 there were other people seriously 
considered as suspects in the case that were being investigated at the time before 
then.  And also . . . the fingerprint connect[ing defendant] with the case certainly 
added [a] substantial amount to the body of evidence against the defendant[].” 
22 
 
 
Shortly after his arraignment in superior court in September 1994, 
defendant moved to dismiss the information based on prejudicial prearrest delay.  
As sources of prejudice, he identified his own faded memory and that of crucial 
witnesses, as well as Roper‟s present inability to explain the basis for his 1984 
conclusion that defendant‟s rolled prints did not match the latent prints from the 
Merck crime scene.  In support, defendant submitted, among other evidence, his 
own sworn declaration that he had “no present memory due to the lapse of time as 
to his whereabouts or activities between 9-1-84 to 9-10-84.”  Defendant further 
asserted that during the 10 years between the crimes and his arrest, the Kern 
County Sheriff‟s Department had lost several items of evidence taken from the 
Mercks‟ service porch area and living room.  He argued the loss prejudiced him 
because he could not now test the items for fingerprints.   
 
At an evidentiary hearing the following January, William Thompson, the 
property control officer for the Kern County Sheriff‟s Department, testified that 
according to his records, as of July 1985 property from another case had been 
placed on the shelf where the missing items from the Merck case had been located, 
and that property “was of sufficient amount that the other [Merck] property would 
have had to have been missing at that time.”  The trial court denied defendant‟s 
motion without explanation. 
 
Defendant renewed his motion to dismiss for prearrest delay several 
additional times, including in January 1996 when he joined codefendant Gerald 
Cowan‟s motion; in February 1996 during the conditional examination of James 
Woodin; in March 1996 when he filed supplemental motions; and during the trial 
testimony of prosecution witness Mitzi Cowan.  Among the issues raised was the 
destruction of evidence seized in the October 1984 raid at the Caravan Inn during 
which Danny Phinney and Robert Lutts were arrested.  Each of these motions was 
unsuccessful. 
23 
 
2. Discussion 
 
The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution 
protect a defendant from the prejudicial effects of lengthy, unjustified delay 
between the commission of a crime and the defendant‟s arrest and charging.  
(People v. Nelson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1242, 1250 (Nelson); People v. Morris (1988) 
46 Cal.3d 1, 37, disapproved on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 
Cal.4th 535, 543, fn. 5; see also United States v. Lovasco (1977) 431 U.S. 783, 
789-792; United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307, 324-325.)  Such prearrest 
or precharging delay does not implicate the defendant‟s state and federal speedy 
trial rights (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15, cl. 1), as those rights 
do not attach until a defendant has been arrested or a charging document has been 
filed.  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1250.)    
 
When, as here, a defendant does not complain of delay after his arrest and 
charging, but only of delay between the crimes and his arrest, he is “not without 
recourse if the delay is unjustified and prejudicial.  „[T]he right of due process 
protects a criminal defendant‟s interest in fair adjudication by preventing 
unjustified delays that weaken the defense through the dimming of memories, the 
death or disappearance of witnesses, and the loss or destruction of material 
physical evidence.‟ [Citation.]  Accordingly, „[d]elay in prosecution that occurs 
before the accused is arrested or the complaint is filed may constitute a denial of 
the right to a fair trial and to due process of law under the state and federal 
Constitutions.  A defendant seeking to dismiss a charge on this ground must 
demonstrate prejudice arising from the delay.  The prosecution may offer 
justification for the delay, and the court considering a motion to dismiss balances 
the harm to the defendant against the justification for the delay.‟ [Citation.]”  
(Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1250.)   
24 
 
 
Prejudice may be shown by “ „loss of material witnesses due to lapse of 
time [citation] or loss of evidence because of fading memory attributable to the 
delay.‟ ”  (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 107, quoting People v. Morris, 
supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 37.)  And although the federal constitutional standard for 
what constitutes sufficient justification for delay is unclear (Nelson, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at pp. 1251-1254), we have noted that “the law under the California 
Constitution is at least as favorable for the defendant in this regard” as federal law.  
(Id. at p. 1251.)  Accordingly, as in Nelson, we apply California law here. 
 
Under the California standard, “negligent, as well as purposeful, delay in 
bringing charges may, when accompanied by a showing of prejudice, violate due 
process.  This does not mean, however, that whether the delay was purposeful or 
negligent is irrelevant.”  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1255.)  Rather, “whether 
the delay was purposeful or negligent is relevant to the balancing process.  
Purposeful delay to gain advantage is totally unjustified, and a relatively weak 
showing of prejudice would suffice to tip the scales towards finding a due process 
violation.  If the delay was merely negligent, a greater showing of prejudice would 
be required to establish a due process violation.”  (Id. at p. 1256.)  The 
justification for the delay is strong when there is “investigative delay, nothing 
else.”  (Ibid.)   
 
We review for abuse of discretion a trial court‟s ruling on a motion to 
dismiss for prejudicial prearrest delay (People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 
p. 38), and defer to any underlying factual findings if substantial evidence supports 
them (cf. People v. Hill (1984) 37 Cal.3d 491, 499 [concerning right to speedy 
trial]).  Because defendant last renewed his motion to dismiss during Mitzi 
Cowan‟s trial testimony, we will consider all of the evidence that was before the 
court up to that time, including the evidence presented at the preliminary 
25 
 
examination, the various hearings on defendant‟s motions and supplemental 
motions, and at trial.   
Defendant‟s showing of prejudice is “relatively weak.”  (See Nelson, supra, 
43 Cal.4th at p. 1256.)  Defendant first claims prejudice due to Jerry Roper‟s 
inability, after 10 years, to recall the differences he had found in 1984 between 
defendant‟s rolled fingerprints and the latent prints recovered from the Merck 
crime scene, or to recompare the prints due to his failing eyesight.  Because of the 
delay, defendant argues, Roper was unable to rebut the implications, raised by 
other witnesses and exploited by the prosecutor, that he was incompetent.  But 
from 1994 through the time of trial in 1996, both the latent prints and defendant‟s 
rolled prints were still in existence and available for examination by defense 
experts; if the prints did not match, the defense could have presented its own 
expert to so testify.  Thus, this case is fundamentally unlike People v. Hartman 
(1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 572, on which defendant relies.  There, both the testimony 
of the coroners who had examined the victim‟s body immediately after his death 
and ascribed the death to natural causes (and who had since died), and the victim‟s 
body itself, which had decomposed beyond the point of useful testing, were 
unavailable at the time of trial.  (Id. at p. 580.)  Here, by contrast, while Roper‟s 
testimony was no longer very useful to the defense, the prints themselves were 
readily available for retesting.   
 
Defendant argues that an expert hired and paid by the defense would have 
been less persuasive to a jury than the Kern County Sheriff‟s Department‟s own 
technician.  But if there were differences between defendant‟s rolled prints and the 
latent prints, any expert should have been able to point them out to the jury.  
Accordingly, any prejudice defendant suffered from the unavailability of Roper‟s 
explanatory testimony was minimal.   
26 
 
 
Defendant next argues the delay prejudiced him because of his own lost 
memory; by 1994, he was unable to recall where he was or what he was doing 
during the first weeks of September 1984 and could not identify alibi witnesses or 
explain how he came into possession of the Mercks‟ property.  But defendant was 
aware by at least February 1985, when he offered to talk to Detective Fraley, that 
he was a suspect in the Merck murders.  He therefore had an incentive to record 
any exculpatory information he had regarding his whereabouts, the property, or 
the identity of alibi witnesses.10  On the other hand, if by early 1985 defendant had 
already lost the ability to recall his whereabouts in September of the previous year 
— whether due to drug use or some other cause (see People v. Butler (1995) 36 
Cal.4th 455, 464) — any claim that he would have been able to construct an alibi 
defense had the prosecution commenced sooner is speculative.  (See People v. 
Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 38.)  In any event, in light of the strong evidence of 
defendant‟s guilt and the public interest in bringing him to trial, his “bare 
statement” of inability to recall “realistically cannot be considered more than 
minimal prejudice.”  (People v. Vanderburg (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 526, 533, 
italics omitted.) 
 
Defendant next argues that by the time of his arrest in 1994, the memories 
of witnesses had faded regarding his alleged possession of the Mercks‟ property, 
                                              
10 
At oral argument, defense counsel argued nothing in the record shows that, 
at the time he offered to speak to Fraley, defendant was aware of the Mercks‟ 
identity or the date or location of the murders.  To the contrary, Gerry Tags 
testified that Detective Fraley discussed both the Merck and Russell cases when he 
interviewed her after her return from Oklahoma.  Fraley testified it was his 
interview with Tags that prompted defendant to call him to offer to talk.  
Moreover, Tags testified that defendant responded in the negative when she asked 
him, “did you do the two old people on McClean Street?”  Thus, the record 
suggests that defendant knew exactly which murders he was suspected of 
committing and, at a minimum, where they occurred.   
27 
 
depriving him of the ability to effectively cross-examine these witnesses.  For 
example, at the preliminary examination and at trial, Alma‟s son Robert Johnson 
could not completely describe certain items allegedly stolen from the Mercks.  But 
Johnson testified at the preliminary examination that his ability to describe the 
property had been no better in 1984 when he spoke to law enforcement officers.  
Defendant further points out that his sister Catherine Glass could not determine if 
the ring shown to her at the preliminary examination and at trial was the same ring 
she had given to Detective Fraley and identified as coming from defendant.  But 
contemporaneous police reports documented Glass‟s conversations with Fraley, 
Glass confirmed at trial that she told Fraley the truth, and Fraley testified that the 
ring Glass gave him was the ring produced at trial.  Thus, Glass‟s ability to 
identify the ring at trial was not critical to the prosecution‟s case.  (Cf. Scherling v. 
Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493, 506 [prejudice from fading witness 
memories due to delay is diminished where contemporaneous police reports exist 
that may be introduced into evidence or used to refresh the witnesses‟ 
recollection].) 
 
Defendant also complains about Jerry Jones‟s inability to identify the 
lighter shown to him at trial as Clifford‟s, and Ronnie Woodin‟s failure to 
positively identify the lighter shown to him at trial as the one defendant had sold 
to him.  Again, however, contemporaneous police reports documented Detective 
Fraley‟s 1985 conversations with these witnesses, Fraley testified the lighter 
produced at trial was the one Woodin had given him, and both Woodin and Jones 
testified that they had told Fraley the truth.  Again, the witnesses‟ ability to 
identify the items at trial was not critical.   
 
Defendant further complains about the faded memories of Phinney and 
Lutts at trial regarding the origins of the Colt .25-caliber pistol seized in the 
October 1984 raid on the Caravan Inn.  Defendant claims he was deprived of the 
28 
 
ability to cross-examine these witnesses to show that they did not obtain the gun 
from him.  But Phinney‟s December 21, 1984, interview with Detective Diederich, 
in which he identified defendant as the source of the gun, was tape-recorded and 
transcribed.  Thus, Phinney‟s ability at trial to independently recall what had 
happened in 1984 was not critical to the prosecution‟s case.  Moreover, although 
Lutts refused to talk to police after his arrest in 1984, his testimony about the gun 
was cumulative.  Again, any prejudice due to the faded memories of these 
witnesses was minimal. 
 
Defendant next claims the delay prejudiced him because, when Emma 
Foreman was interviewed by Lieutenant Porter in January 1990, she could not 
recall whether defendant had confessed to killing an elderly couple in Bakersfield 
a month after Russell was murdered, or a month before the murder.  Defendant 
argues that if he confessed a month before Russell was killed, he could not have 
been referring to the Mercks.  But even if defendant had confessed to killing some 
other elderly couple in Bakersfield, that would not mean he did not kill the Mercks 
as well.  Moreover, Foreman‟s testimony was “not of crucial significance” to the 
prosecution‟s case.  (See Scherling v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 506.)  
The case rested primarily on the fingerprint and ballistics evidence coupled with 
defendant‟s possession of items of the Mercks‟ property.  Foreman‟s testimony 
added little to the strong body of evidence implicating defendant in the murders.    
 
Defendant further claims the delay prejudiced him because during the time 
between the crimes and his arrest, law enforcement lost material evidence — 
including jewelry boxes, a radio, purses, and cut pieces of lamp cord — taken 
from the Mercks‟ service porch and living room after the murders.  Defendant 
argues he was deprived of the ability to test those items for fingerprints.  But the 
trial court reasonably could have concluded, based on the testimony of Officer 
Thompson, the property control officer, that the property had been missing as of 
29 
 
July 1985.  Thus, a more prompt prosecution would not have benefited defendant 
unless it was initiated in early 1985.  Moreover, even if some other suspect‟s 
fingerprints were on the items, defendant still would have been linked to the 
murders because his own fingerprints were found at the crime scene.  Accordingly, 
any prejudice flowing from the loss of these items was minimal. 
 
Defendant finally points to the property seized in the October 1984 raid on 
the Caravan Inn in which Danny Phinney and Robert Lutts were arrested, which 
the Bakersfield Police Department destroyed around 1991.  Defendant contends he 
lost the ability to determine whether any of the property had been stolen from the 
Mercks, which would have supported the defense theory that Lutts and Phinney 
committed the murders.  But none of that property matched the Merck family‟s 
descriptions of property that was missing from the Mercks‟ home after the 
murders.11  Accordingly, the possibility that defendant could have shown that any 
of the destroyed property had belonged to the Mercks seems remote.  Moreover, 
defense counsel was able to exploit the destruction of this evidence by pointing 
out, in closing argument, that it had never been examined to determine if it came 
from the Mercks‟ home.  Again, any prejudice from the loss of this evidence was 
minimal.   
 
Against defendant‟s weak showing of prejudice, the prosecution‟s 
justification for the delay was strong.  The delay was “investigative delay, nothing 
else.”  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1256.)  Here, as in Nelson, although “the 
police may have had some basis to suspect defendant of the crime shortly after it 
                                              
11 
The only items from the Merck home that possibly could have been 
correlated with items seized in the raid were an onyx ring and a birthstone ring 
that had belonged to Alma; several rings with their stones removed were recovered 
in the raid. 
30 
 
was committed . . . law enforcement did not fully solve the case” until 1994, when 
criminalist Sharon Pierce recompared the latent fingerprints from the Merck 
murder scene with defendant‟s rolled prints and found a match.  (Ibid.)  Once in 
possession of evidence tying defendant to the Merck crime scene, the prosecution 
promptly charged him with the murders.   
 
Defendant argues the prosecution had enough evidence to arrest him in 
early 1985, including Phinney‟s statements linking him to Clifford‟s gun, as well 
as Clifford‟s lighter and Alma‟s ring, which witnesses said they had obtained from 
defendant.  But as we said in Nelson, “[a] court should not second-guess the 
prosecution‟s decision regarding whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant 
bringing charges.  „The due process clause does not permit courts to abort criminal 
prosecutions simply because they disagree with the prosecutor‟s decision as to 
when to seek an indictment. . . .  Prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as 
soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able to 
establish the suspect‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.‟ ”  (Nelson, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 1256, quoting People v. Dunn-Gonzalez (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 
899, 914-915; see United States v. Lovasco, supra, 431 U.S. at pp. 790-796.)  
Indeed, “ „[a] prosecutor abides by elementary standards of fair play and decency 
by refusing to seek indictments until he or she is completely satisfied the 
defendant should be prosecuted and the office of the prosecutor will be able to 
promptly establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.‟ ”  (People v. Nelson, supra, 
43 Cal.4th at p. 1256.)  Here, the evidence law enforcement possessed in 1985 was 
all circumstantial and connected defendant only to the Mercks‟ property, not to the 
Merck crime scene.  The prosecution was justified in waiting until it had evidence 
connecting defendant to the crime scene before arresting him and charging him 
with murder.   
31 
 
 
Defendant further argues that Detective Fraley could have gained direct 
evidence linking him to the murders (and also could have allowed defendant to 
preserve his version of events) by accepting defendant‟s offer in February 1985 to 
discuss the case.  But as we explained in Nelson, “[a] court may not find 
negligence by second-guessing how the state allocates its resources or how law 
enforcement agencies could have investigated a given case. . . . It is not enough 
for a defendant to argue that if the prosecutorial agencies had made his case a 
higher priority or had done things a bit differently they would have solved the case 
sooner.”  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1256-1257, italics added.)  Here, Fraley 
testified that he declined to interview defendant in February 1985 because he did 
not yet have enough information about the crimes to be able to detect if defendant 
was lying.  Fraley‟s tactical decision to put off interviewing defendant until he had 
more information was quintessentially the type of law enforcement decision that 
courts should not second-guess. 
 
Defendant next contends that in light of questions about Roper‟s 
competence that arose in 1984, the Merck case latent prints should have been 
reexamined sooner.  He argues there is no explanation for why the Merck case was 
not included in Thomas Jones‟s reexamination of Roper‟s work that took place 
sometime before 1987.  (See fn. 4, ante.)  But the record is unclear as to whether 
the Merck case comparisons were not included in the recheck, or were included 
but found not to be in error.  Neither Jerry Grimes, who supervised the technical 
investigations unit at that time, nor Jones, who performed the reexamination, could 
pinpoint the precise span of time it included.  Grimes could confirm only that 
Jones found no additional problems.  In any event, defendant‟s argument ignores 
that the department did doublecheck Roper‟s work in a different way — several of 
the latent prints from the Merck case were compared with prints in a computerized 
fingerprint database, with negative results. 
32 
 
 
Defendant also argues it was negligent not to doublecheck Roper‟s work in 
light of Nerida‟s testimony that in 1984 it was the technical investigations unit‟s 
policy to have two people sign off on every fingerprint comparison.  But both 
Grimes and Roper testified that there was no such policy for fingerprint 
comparisons that the initial examiner concluded did not match.  Thus, substantial 
evidence supports the conclusion that there was no blanket doublechecking policy 
in 1984.  In any event, defendant‟s argument amounts to the very type of Monday 
morning quarterbacking that we condemned in Nelson.  
 
The same can be said for defendant‟s claim that the Merck case should have 
been reassigned after Detective Fraley left the robbery-homicide unit in September 
1987, rather than being left dormant.  The case was not dormant:  Detective 
Christopherson testified that the supervisor of the unit was responsible for the case 
after Fraley left.  Again, we will not second-guess the Department‟s decision to 
allocate its resources in this manner.  (See Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1256-1257.) 
 
In sum, the investigation of the Merck murders was not perfect; no 
investigation is.  Like the trial court, however, we find no evidence that law 
enforcement or the prosecution deliberately delayed the investigation in order to 
gain a tactical advantage over defendant.  Nor do we find evidence of negligence.  
Rather, at worst the Kern County Sheriff‟s Department simply erred when it failed 
to determine before 1994 that defendant‟s fingerprints matched the Merck scene 
latent prints.  That being the case, balancing defendant‟s weak showing of 
prejudice against the strong justification for the delay (see Nelson, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 1257), we find no due process violation.  Accordingly, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant‟s many motions to dismiss 
due to prearrest delay.      
33 
 
B. Jury Selection Issues 
1. Exclusion of prospective jurors for cause  
Defendant asserts the trial court erroneously excused for cause two 
prospective jurors based on their views about the death penalty, violating his right 
to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the California Constitution.  (See 
Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 726-728; Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 
U.S. 412, 422-424; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 666-667.)  “To 
achieve the constitutional imperative of impartiality, the law permits a prospective 
juror to be challenged for cause only if his or her views in favor of or against 
capital punishment „would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his 
[or her] duties as a juror” ‟ in accordance with the court‟s instructions and the 
juror‟s oath.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 741.)  
 “ „ “A prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to 
conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death 
penalty where appropriate.” ‟ ”  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987.)  
“ „ “[O]n appeal, we will uphold the trial court‟s ruling if it is fairly supported by 
the record, accepting as binding the trial court‟s determination as to the 
prospective juror‟s true state of mind when the prospective juror has made 
statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.”  [Citations.]‟ ”  (Ibid.; accord, 
People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 483.)  “Deference to the trial court is 
appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of 
the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the 
attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.”  (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 
1, 9 [167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224]; accord, Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 
469 U.S. at p. 426.)  Moreover, “when there is ambiguity in a prospective juror‟s 
statements, „the trial court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the 
34 
 
venireman‟s] demeanor, [is] entitled to resolve it in favor of the State.‟ ” (Uttecht 
v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 7 [127 S.Ct. at p. 2223], quoting Wainwright v. 
Witt, supra, at p. 434; accord, People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 483.) 
Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s conclusion that 
Prospective Juror Nos. 041853 and 045969 held views that would prevent or 
substantially impair their ability to perform their duties as jurors. 
a. Prospective Juror No. 041853 
On her questionnaire,12 Prospective Juror No. 041853 described her 
feelings about the death penalty as follows:  “It never really bothered me before 
yesterday, when I heard the judge mention it and pictured myself in the jury as one 
who handed such a verdict in.  I really don‟t feel it‟s my right to decide weather 
[sic] or not somebody dies.  It would bother me the rest of my life.”  She noted 
that in the past she had held a different view of the death penalty, writing: “Like I 
said I was pretty much OK with it but I never gave it deep thought until yesterday.  
I don‟t feel it‟s the right thing.  Life and death should be left in God‟s hands not 
ours.”  She next wrote that she believed the death penalty was imposed too often, 
explaining: “Along with downright guilty people who have received it there have 
been innocent ones as well and how those jurors live with theirselves [sic] I‟ll 
never know.”  She also indicated she felt the death penalty was wrong for religious 
reasons, expounding: “I am not a really religious person to the point of going to 
church every Sunday but I do believe in God and I‟ve never seen or heard him say, 
we can take his place for the day and sentence someone to their death.”  Finally, 
                                              
12 
Each prospective juror who survived screening for hardship and familiarity 
with the case filled out a 20-page questionnaire.  Individual sequestered voir dire 
was then conducted.  At the beginning of the voir dire, the court instructed the 
prospective jurors regarding the phases of a death penalty case and the nature and 
purpose of the death qualification process.     
35 
 
when asked to select a statement which described her attitude toward serving as a 
juror on a death penalty case, she chose “I could never vote to impose the death 
penalty in any case no matter what the facts and the circumstances of the case.”   
On voir dire by the court, Prospective Juror No. 041853 affirmed that her 
views regarding the death penalty would not cause her to refuse to vote for a 
verdict of guilty.  However, when asked if such views would prevent her from 
finding a special circumstance true even if it was proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, she answered, “I — do I have to answer yes or no?”  Prompted to explain, 
she said “I don‟t know what I would do to tell you the truth.  I don‟t like the idea 
of it but, on the other hand, I don‟t like the other end of it either, you know, as far 
as the crime or whatever, so I don‟t know.”  Asked for further clarification, she 
added: “I just personally wouldn‟t want to be the one to hand that judgment 
down.”  The court then asked, “Now if I understand you . . . your view is this . . . . 
You are not opposed to the death penalty, you just don‟t want to be in a position 
where you have to make that decision.”  She responded, “Basically, yes.”    
Upon questioning by defense counsel, Prospective Juror No. 041853 
affirmed that she was not opposed to the death penalty, but she did not want to be 
the one who makes the decision.  Upon further questioning, however, she twice 
indicated that she could impose the death penalty, albeit “with sadness and 
reluctance.”  She then affirmed that she “might be able to impose the death penalty 
in the appropriate case depending on the facts and circumstances.” 
The prosecutor then asked Prospective Juror No. 041853 what had changed 
since she filled out her questionnaire.  Prospective Juror No. 041853 explained 
that the questions regarding the death penalty had caught her off guard, and that 
she felt “conflicted inside” because she previously had been in favor of the death 
penalty.  Asked if she was still conflicted, she said “Yeah, and I am getting more 
onto the religious side lately, and I just — it is hard.  I am going through a lot.”  
36 
 
The prosecutor reassured Prospective Juror No. 041853 that there was no right 
answer, but asked her to think “very carefully” about whether she realistically 
could impose the death penalty.  The following colloquy then occurred: 
“Q [by the prosecutor]:  No one is going to drag you into making you — to 
make you say that, but what I want to know is if you really can do it.  When you 
think about it, think very carefully about it.  [¶]  Can you write down, „I vote for 
death,‟ and then can you come back out here and face the defendant and say, „I 
voted for death‟? 
“A: 
Again, without saying yes or no, just if I can picture these crimes 
and the people, what they do, I say, „yes.‟  It is going to have to be presented in 
such a way that it is — that‟s terrible and —  
“Q: 
All murder is terrible [Prospective Juror No. 041853].  I mean there 
is no murder that‟s pleasant, and there‟s never a time —  
“A: 
And I had to deal with that in my life and —  
“Q: 
The way you feel, is it going to make it more difficult for me?  I am 
going to be standing up and presenting certain evidence to you and arguing that 
this defendant should die and with your feelings, is my task going to be more 
difficult than, say, as [defense counsel‟s] task who is going to argue that the 
defendant should live because of your feelings, because of your religious beliefs? 
“A: 
I don‟t really want to — 
“Q: 
If you can‟t and don‟t want to make that decision, if you cannot 
make that decision, this is the time to say so.  There is nothing wrong with it, and 
there are people before you who have made it, and there will be people after you 
that has [sic] said that very same thing.  [¶]  There are other people who without 
any feeling at all can say, „Yes, I can do it every time,‟ but it is up to you to make 
the decision.  You have to tell us.   
“A: 
I don‟t want to sit through this and see all that — 
37 
 
“Q: 
You don‟t think you could handle that? 
“A: 
I have seen — ”   
At that point, the court interjected “Counsel, I have seen enough on this.”  
The court then excused Prospective Juror No. 041853. 
After Prospective Juror No. 041853 had left, the court stated that it wanted 
to “fill out the record a little bit” regarding her excusal.  The court explained, 
“Toward the end of the questioning by [the prosecutor], [Prospective Juror No. 
041853] was breaking down.  She was crying.  During the questioning 
[Prospective Juror No. 041853‟s] head would go back and forth from shoulder to 
shoulder, she would cover her mouth when she answered questions by [the 
prosecutor], she was obviously — she‟s obviously given conflicting answers, she 
has been very candid that she is in conflict over this.  [¶]  She is going through 
some kind of personal change which is leading her toward a more religious view 
of her life, which it sounded to me that she‟s having real problems coming to 
terms with the responsibilities of a juror in a case such as this.  [¶]  For all of these 
reasons and each of them, I concluded she was inappropriate — I concluded I 
guess sua sponte that she was an inappropriate juror on this case.”  Defense 
counsel objected to the excusal “because of the nature of the case.”    
Substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s conclusion that Prospective 
Juror No. 041853‟s views regarding capital punishment would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror.  Several of her 
questionnaire responses indicated strongly held religious opposition to the death 
penalty, and several times during voir dire she very clearly indicated that, because 
of her religious views, she did not want to have to make the decision whether to 
sentence someone to death.  Based on these statements, the trial court determined 
that Prospective Juror No. 041853 was going through a personal religious change 
and was having trouble coming to terms with the responsibilities of a juror in a 
38 
 
capital case.  A prospective juror‟s “great reluctance in undertaking her duties,” 
coupled with her demeanor, may justify the conclusion that the juror would be 
substantially impaired.  (People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 846.) 
Moreover, the trial court was careful to note that the excusal was based in 
part on Prospective Juror No. 041853‟s demeanor, including crying, shaking her 
head from side to side, and covering her mouth when responding to the 
prosecutor‟s questions.  Deference to the trial court is particularly appropriate in 
these circumstances.  (See Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 426 
[“deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror”].)  As we 
have explained, “appellate courts recognize that a trial judge who observes and 
speaks with a prospective juror and hears that person‟s responses (noting, among 
other things, the person‟s tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and 
demeanor), gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the 
record.”  (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 451.)   
Defendant argues in effect that the prosecutor caused Prospective Juror No. 
041853‟s tears by questioning her aggressively and cutting off her responses.  
Although defendant‟s interpretation of the record is plausible, there is another 
equally plausible interpretation:  Prospective Juror No. 041853‟s inability to finish 
her answers to the prosecutor‟s questions may well have been due to a preexisting 
state of great emotional conflict.  We note in this regard that Prospective Juror No. 
041853 indicated on her questionnaire that someone close to her had been 
murdered.  Under these circumstances, we defer to the trial court‟s implied 
determination that the questioning was fair and did not cause the substantial 
impairment. 
Defendant argues that Prospective Juror No. 041853‟s voir dire responses 
suggested she could serve on the jury and impose the death penalty.  But 
Prospective Juror No. 041853‟s “assurances that [s]he would consider imposing 
39 
 
the death penalty and would follow the law do not overcome the reasonable 
inference from [her] other statements that in fact [s]he would be substantially 
impaired in this case.”  (Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 18.)  Defendant 
asserts the trial court incorrectly concluded Prospective Juror No. 041853‟s 
answers were conflicting.  We disagree.  On her questionnaire, and during voir 
dire by the court, Prospective Juror No. 041853 said she did not want to have to 
decide whether defendant should suffer the death penalty — and indeed could 
never vote to impose the death penalty — because determining punishment was 
for God alone.  Later, during questioning by defense counsel and the prosecutor, 
Prospective Juror No. 041853 said she could impose the death penalty, albeit 
reluctantly, if the facts were “terrible.”  The trial court was in the best position to 
determine which of these two conflicting versions represented her true state of 
mind.  (People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 451; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 
Cal.4th at p. 987; see also Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 426.)    
b. Prospective Juror No. 045969 
 
On her questionnaire, Prospective Juror No. 045969 wrote she felt that the 
death penalty is “good, if the jury is 110% sure without a doubt that the defendant 
is guilty of the crime.”  Regarding the frequency with which the death penalty is 
imposed, she wrote “I feel that its [sic] not done too often or to[o] seldom.  I[f] the 
evidence is there and theres [sic] no doubt then the punishment should fit the 
crime.”  She indicated no “religious, moral or ethical” opposition to the death 
penalty and described her attitude toward serving as a death penalty juror as 
follows:  “I might be able to impose the death penalty in an appropriate case 
depending on the facts and circumstances.” 
 
During voir dire by the court, Prospective Juror No. 045969 indicated her 
views regarding the death penalty would not cause her to refuse to vote for a 
40 
 
verdict of guilty or for the truth of the special circumstances, and would not cause 
her to vote automatically for or against the death penalty if the case reached a 
penalty phase.  When questioned by defense counsel, she indicated she was not 
opposed to the death penalty and that she could vote for it “If there is no doubt in 
my mind whatsoever.”  The prosecutor then took up the questioning, and the 
following colloquy occurred:  
 
“Q: 
That is the main point I need to talk to you about.  I‟m only required 
by law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Are you going to require more 
of me than the law requires?  You said, „If there was no doubt‟? 
 
“A: 
If you prove to me that there is no doubt that you know he did it. 
 
“Q: 
If I prove it beyond a reasonable doubt — there is doubt in almost 
everything, but you are saying no doubt, which leads me to believe that you expect 
me to do more than the law requires.  You expect me to wash away all doubt 
completely.  I believe, in your questionnaire, you said „110 percent‟?   
 
“A: 
That‟s right. 
 
“Q: 
If I can‟t do that, then you would not vote for the death penalty; is 
that correct? 
 
“A: 
No, I guess it is — I have to hear it. 
 
“Q: 
Let‟s get back to the doubt part, because I can‟t prove anything to 
where there is no doubt.  Because . . . in everything there is always some doubt, so 
if you expect me to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt to a 110 percent no doubt, 
then I can‟t do that, and therefore you could never vote for the death penalty.  [¶]  
If what you said in your questionnaire is correct, that‟s how you would feel?  
 
“A: 
That‟s true.  I think it is impossible that you could prove it to me 
under [sic] 110 percent.”   
 
The prosecutor then challenged Prospective Juror No. 045969 for cause, 
and the court took up the questioning: 
41 
 
 
“Q: 
You are going to require the prosecution to prove completely the 
appropriateness of death as the proper punishment? 
 
“A: 
Yes. 
 
“Q: 
That is not what the law provides.  You understand that? 
 
“A: 
Yes. 
 
“Q: 
And even though that is not what the law provides, that‟s what you 
would require [the prosecutor] to do? 
 
“A: 
Yes.”   
 
The court then took a different tactic, explaining that a capital case 
proceeds in two phases and that at the penalty phase neither party bears the burden 
of proof; rather, the jurors choose what they feel is the appropriate penalty based 
on the facts in the case.  Following this explanation, Prospective Juror No. 045969 
stated that she could impose the death penalty if she felt it was an appropriate 
verdict, that she also could impose a verdict of life without possibility of parole, 
and that her choice would depend on the facts and circumstances.   
 
Defense counsel opposed the challenge to Prospective Juror No. 045969.  
The court indicated its tentative decision was to grant the challenge.  When neither 
party had anything to add, the court excused Prospective Juror No. 045969 without 
explanation. 
 
Substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s conclusion that Prospective 
Juror No. 045969 held views about capital punishment that would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror.  On her 
questionnaire, and repeatedly during questioning by defense counsel, the 
prosecutor and the court, Prospective Juror No. 045969 indicated that she would 
not even consider imposing the death penalty unless she had “no doubt 
whatsoever” and defendant‟s guilt had been proved “110%.”  Setting aside for the 
moment the circumstance that guilt could never be proved to that level of certainty 
42 
 
— as Prospective Juror No. 045969 herself seemed to acknowledge — substantial 
evidence supports the conclusion that her statements on the subject of doubt 
indicated an unwillingness to consider all of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
at play in the case and to engage in the weighing process required at the penalty 
phase. 
As we have explained, a prospective juror must be willing to 
“ „ “conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death 
penalty where appropriate.” ‟ ”  (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 987.)  
As part of that conscientious consideration, jurors are required to consider and 
weigh all of the aggravating and mitigating factors supported by the evidence in 
the case.  (See § 190.3.)  Here, Prospective Juror No. 045969 indicated that rather 
than weighing all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence to determine the 
appropriate penalty, she would not even consider the death penalty unless guilt 
had been proved beyond all doubt.  Certainly, jurors are entitled to consider any 
lingering doubt they may have about the defendant‟s guilt as one of the many 
factors to be weighed at the penalty phase.  (See People v. Medina (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 694, 743; People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 966-967.)  Moreover, 
a juror‟s “concern regarding the risk of error in the criminal justice process” is not 
in itself disqualifying.  (People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 449.)  What a 
juror may not do, however, is set up an artificial barrier to consideration of the 
death penalty by requiring the presence or absence of any particular factor — here, 
the absence of any doubt whatsoever — before the penalty will even be 
entertained.  (Cf. id. at p. 446 [prospective juror whose predilection to give more 
weight than average to certain mitigating evidence “would preclude him from 
engaging in the weighing process” may be excluded for cause (italics omitted)].)  
Here, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that Prospective Juror No. 
43 
 
045969 would set up such a barrier.  Accordingly, the court was justified in 
excusing her for cause. 
 
A separate basis for excluding Prospective Juror No. 045969 for cause was 
her apparent unwillingness to follow the law and the trial court‟s instructions.  In 
response to the trial court‟s questions regarding whether she would require the 
prosecution to “prove completely the appropriateness of death as the proper 
punishment,” Prospective Juror No. 045969 responded that she would, even when 
the trial court explained that her view was “not what the law provides.”  As the 
court later recognized, its question was rather imprecise; under California law, 
neither the prosecution nor the defense bears the burden of proof at the penalty 
phase.  Nonetheless, Prospective Juror No. 045969‟s insistence on following her 
own view of the law, even after the trial court informed her that her view was 
incorrect, independently justified the trial court‟s conclusion that her ability to 
perform the duties of a juror “in accordance with the court‟s instructions and the 
juror‟s oath” was impaired.  (People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 741.) 
 
Defendant points out that Prospective Juror No. 045969 at one point 
indicated that she would not require 110 percent proof of guilt before considering 
the death penalty.  In response to the prosecutor‟s question whether she would 
require such proof, she responded, “No, I guess it‟s — I would have to hear it.”  
Moreover, after the trial court explained that a capital case proceeds in two phases 
and that there is no burden of proof at the penalty phase, Prospective Juror No. 
045969 stated that she would consider imposing the death penalty in this case if 
the facts warranted it.  However, these assurances do not overcome the reasonable 
inferences from her other statements that she would impose her own view of the 
law and would fail to engage in the weighing process in the absence of “110 
percent” proof of guilt.  (Cf. Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 18; People v. 
Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 431-432 [when prospective juror has made 
44 
 
statements that support exclusion for cause, the fact that the juror also made 
statements that might have warranted retaining her on the jury does not mean no 
substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s ruling].)  Accordingly, the trial court 
did not err in excusing Prospective Juror No. 045969 for cause. 
2. Alleged improper exercise of peremptory challenges 
 
During jury selection, defendant made two motions under People v. 
Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, contesting the prosecutor‟s use of peremptory 
challenges to remove three African-American prospective jurors from the panel.  
As to each motion, the trial court expressly found no prima facie case had been 
established, but allowed the prosecutor to place her reasons for each challenge on 
the record.  The jury that tried defendant included no African-American jurors.  
Defendant now contends that the prosecutor‟s use of peremptory challenges to 
remove African-Americans from the jury violated his rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the 
California Constitution.  (See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79; People v. 
Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258.)  We conclude no violation occurred. 
a. Facts 
Following the exercise of challenges for cause, 60 prospective jurors 
remained in the jury venire, four of whom were African-American.  Twelve of the 
60 were randomly selected to sit in the jury box.  Prospective Juror No. 045921, an 
African-American man, was among the 12 initially selected.  The court and 
counsel for both parties questioned the 12 prospective jurors, and the parties 
commenced exercising peremptory challenges.  After the prosecution and the 
defense each had exercised one peremptory challenge, Prospective Juror No. 
042519, an African-American woman, was called to the jury box.  The prosecutor 
used her next peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror No. 042519.  
45 
 
After the defense had used one more challenge, the prosecutor used her third 
peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror No. 045921.   
After each side had exercised five peremptory challenges, defendant made 
his first Wheeler motion.13  Defense counsel pointed out that the prosecutor had 
dismissed the only two African-American prospective jurors who had been called 
to the jury box.  The prosecutor countered that other African-Americans remained 
among the prospective jurors not yet called.  The court stated it was not “satisfied” 
that a prima facie case had been established, but invited the prosecutor to “make 
whatever record you wish to make.”  The prosecutor explained that Prospective 
Juror No. 042519 had stated on her questionnaire that “she‟s Islamic, that she does 
not sit in judgment, however since the questionnaire she changed her mind.  
Because of that, I feel that there is a very good chance that she could, between 
now and the time that the case is over, change her mind back and say that she 
cannot or does not sit in judgment on anyone.  [¶]  She was also arrested for 
welfare fraud, and I have feelings that she would not be a fair juror to the People.”  
Prospective Juror No. 045921, the prosecutor explained, “on his questionnaire 
wrote down he does not believe in the death penalty but he could vote for it.”  The 
prosecutor concluded, “It had nothing to do with either‟s race.  It has to do with 
their feelings on the death penalty.  I do not feel that this is subject to Wheeler.” 
When the selection process resumed, the prosecutor accepted the jury after 
exercising a total of 15 peremptory challenges.  Defendant, however, exercised a 
challenge.  After the prosecutor and the defense had each challenged one more 
                                              
13 
Although defendant cited only People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, in 
his motion, both the Wheeler issue and the parallel issue under Batson v. Kentucky, 
supra, 476 U.S. 79, were properly preserved for appeal.  (People v. Yeoman 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117-118.) 
46 
 
prospective juror, Prospective Juror No. 045787, an African-American woman, 
was called to the jury box.  The prosecutor used her next challenge to excuse 
Prospective Juror No. 045787.  Following voir dire of the replacement, both sides 
accepted the panel, and the jury was sworn.  Two alternate jurors were chosen and 
sworn shortly after each side had exercised one more peremptory challenge.   
After the jurors had been released for the day, defendant renewed his 
Wheeler motion.  Defendant pointed out that Prospective Juror No. 045787 was 
African-American, and noted that the prosecution had challenged all three 
African-American prospective jurors who had been called to sit on the jury.  The 
court again stated it was “not prepared to find a prima facie case,” noting that one 
African-American prospective juror had not been called.  Nonetheless, the court 
again invited the prosecutor to “make a record . . . for purposes of review.” 
The prosecutor explained she had excused Prospective Juror No. 045787 
because, “[o]n her questionnaire and during the time that she was interviewed, 
[Prospective Juror No. 045787] said that the police were unkind to her brother.  
She knows three people that were falsely accused of crimes, and in the 
questionnaire, she said that she could not sit in judgment.  She was not God.  And 
then when she got in the courtroom she could sit in judgment, . . . but I cannot 
imagine that this woman would continue with one decision that she could keep for 
any length of time, because in a period of a week, she changed her mind from not 
being able to sit in judgment and not being God, to being able to sit in judgment of 
her fellow man.”  The prosecutor also noted that there was another African-
American woman in the audience whom she had “no intention of kicking.”  After 
the trial court ascertained defense counsel had nothing to add, the Wheeler motion 
was not discussed again.   
47 
 
b. Discussion 
“It is well settled that „[a] prosecutor‟s use of peremptory challenges to 
strike prospective jurors on the basis of group bias — that is, bias against members 
of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar 
grounds — violates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from 
a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the 
California Constitution.  [Citations.]  Such a practice also violates the defendant‟s 
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  [Citations.]‟ ”  (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 898; see 
also Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 
258.)   
When a defendant asserts at trial that the prosecution‟s use of peremptory 
strikes violates the federal Constitution, the following procedures and standards 
apply.  “First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case „by showing that the 
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.‟  
[Citations.]  Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the 
„burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion‟ by offering 
permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.  [Citations.]  Third, „[i]f a 
race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether 
the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.‟  
[Citation.]”  (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, fn. omitted; see also 
Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 476-477 [128 S.Ct. 1203, 1207]; Miller-
El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 239.)  The identical three-step procedure applies 
when the challenge is brought under the California Constitution.  (People v. 
Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 136.)   
Here, we assume without deciding that defendant established a prima facie 
case by pointing out that the prosecutor used three of the 18 peremptory 
48 
 
challenges she exercised to strike all of the African-American prospective jurors 
called to the jury box, resulting in no African-Americans serving on defendant‟s 
jury.  (See People v. Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 137; People v. Zambrano 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1106 [assuming prima facie case established where 
prosecutor used five of 15 peremptory challenges to excuse the only African-
Americans called to the box], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; see also Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. 
at pp. 164, 173 [inference of discrimination, sufficient to satisfy Batson‟s prima 
facie standard, arose where prosecutor in interracial murder case used three of 12 
peremptory challenges to remove all eligible African-American prospective jurors 
from a pool of 43, resulting in an all-White jury].)  Because the prosecutor 
explained her dismissals at the court‟s invitation, we proceed to the second and 
third steps of the Batson/Wheeler analysis.  (See People v. Salcido, supra, 44 
Cal.4th at p. 137; People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1106.)  We 
conclude the prosecutor‟s stated nondiscriminatory reasons for excusing 
Prospective Juror Nos. 045921, 042519, and 045787 were “amply supported.”  
(People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1106.)   
Preliminarily, we note that “ „[T]he critical question in determining whether 
[a party] has proved purposeful discrimination at step three is the persuasiveness 
of the prosecutor‟s justification for his peremptory strike.‟  (Miller-El v. Cockrell 
(2003) 537 U.S. 322, 338-339.)  The credibility of a prosecutor‟s stated reasons 
[for exercising a peremptory challenge] „can be measured by, among other factors 
. . . how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the 
proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.‟  (Id. at p. 339.)”  
(People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 900.) 
Defendant contends the prosecutor‟s reasons for excusing Prospective Juror 
No. 045921 were not plausible, and that her pretextual explanation for her 
49 
 
challenge to Prospective Juror No. 045921 calls into doubt the legitimacy and 
credibility of her proffered reasons for excusing Prospective Juror Nos. 042519 
and 045787 as well.  We disagree.  The prosecutor excused Prospective Juror No. 
045921 because he wrote on his questionnaire that he did not believe in the death 
penalty.  The prosecutor‟s reason was both credible and based on a permissible 
race-neutral factor.  On his questionnaire, when asked to describe his feelings 
about the death penalty, Prospective Juror No. 045921 wrote flatly, “I don‟t 
believe in it.”  Although he also indicated that he might be able to vote to impose 
the death penalty in an appropriate case, the prosecutor reasonably could have 
believed that he would be reluctant to impose it because he did not believe in it.  
We previously have recognized that a prospective juror‟s scruples regarding the 
death penalty “are reasonably related to trial strategy (see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 
supra, 537 U.S. at p. 339) and are a legitimate race-neutral reason for exercising a 
peremptory challenge.”  (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 472; accord, 
People v. Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 139-140.) 
Defendant argues Prospective Juror No. 045921‟s attitude toward the death 
penalty was not unfavorable to the prosecution.  Prospective Juror No. 045921 
wrote on his questionnaire that he had served as a military police officer in the Air 
Force, had no complaints about the criminal justice system, and did not know 
anyone who had been falsely accused of a crime.  Further, Prospective Juror No. 
045921 had himself been, or knew someone else who had been, a crime victim.  
Prospective Juror No. 045921 also wrote he did not feel the death penalty was 
wrong for any “religious, moral or ethical” reason and had “no belief” as to 
whether the death penalty was imposed too often or too seldom.  But none of these 
responses was “inherently in conflict with” (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 474) the prosecutor‟s assessment that Prospective Juror No. 045921 might be 
reluctant to vote for the death penalty because he did not “believe in it.”   
50 
 
Defendant also points out that during voir dire, Prospective Juror No. 
045921 said that although he did not believe in the death penalty, he could impose 
it if the law required it because “if I‟m going to participate in the system, you have 
to play by all of the rules.”  However, after the prosecutor explained that “the law 
does not tell you how to vote . . . . [¶] The law says you listen to everything and 
then you make the choice yourself,” Prospective Juror No. 045921 began to 
express concern about the risk of error in the trial process.  For example, he said, 
“I need more to go along with the death [penalty] because my thought is we all 
make mistakes, and if you go to the death penalty, I‟m not willing to put my 
representation [sic] and say this is absolute.  It has to be.  And then somewhere 
down the line something comes up, and you know what?  We didn‟t know that at 
the time.  It is too late then and to me, that is a waste.”  When asked whether he 
would be more inclined to vote for life without the possibility of parole “because 
some day there might be a mistake,” he commented, “you have to be sure enough 
that I‟m willing to put somebody‟s life in danger.” Asked the same question again, 
he responded “yes.”  On this record, the prosecutor reasonably could have 
believed that Prospective Juror No. 045921 would not be a favorable juror for the 
prosecution in this case, in which all the evidence of guilt was circumstantial. 
Because substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the prosecutor‟s 
reason for excusing Prospective Juror No. 045921 was credible and race-neutral, 
the legitimacy of the prosecutor‟s reasons for excusing Prospective Juror Nos. 
042519 and 045787 is not called into doubt.  Nonetheless, having examined the 
prosecutor‟s justifications for those excusals, we find them amply supported as 
well. 
As noted above, the prosecutor stated that she excused Prospective Juror 
No. 042519 in part because she had changed her mind about whether she could sit 
in judgment of another person and in part because she had been arrested for 
51 
 
welfare fraud.  The record supports the credibility of these reasons.  On her 
questionnaire, when asked whether she had any “moral or religious beliefs” that 
would affect her “ability to sit in judgment of another person as a trial juror,” she 
wrote, “My religion is that of Islam.  I don‟t sit in judgment of others.”  On voir 
dire, however, Prospective Juror No. 042519 stated she could imagine herself 
voting for the death penalty as a juror.  Prospective Juror No. 042519 also 
repudiated other statements she had made in her questionnaire, including that she 
did not believe in the death penalty, that the death penalty was wrong, and that she 
could never vote for the death penalty regardless of the facts of the case.  When 
asked why she had changed her mind, she explained, “I got to thinking about so 
many things going on that if a person — if I done something, I should be punished 
and that‟s the way I feel about life.  If I am guilty, why not punish me because 
everybody should know right from wrong.”  Under the circumstances, the 
prosecutor reasonably could have been concerned that Prospective Juror No. 
042519 was subject to changing her mind and, when pressed, would revert to the 
views she stated in her questionnaire.   
Moreover, on her questionnaire, Prospective Juror No. 042519 wrote that 
she had been arrested for welfare fraud.  A prospective juror‟s negative experience 
with the criminal justice system, including arrest, is a legitimate, race-neutral 
reason for excusing the juror.  (People v. Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 140; 
People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 442.) 
As noted above, the prosecutor said she excused Prospective Juror No. 
045787 because she indicated that police had been unkind to her brother; she knew 
people who had been falsely accused of crimes; and, like Prospective Juror No. 
042519, she had changed her mind about whether she could sit in judgment.  The 
record supports these reasons.  On her questionnaire, when asked to describe her 
feelings about the way law enforcement handled the arrest of someone close to 
52 
 
her, Prospective Juror No. 045787 wrote “Police — unkind.”  She also wrote that 
she believed her ex-husband, brother and son all had been falsely accused of 
crimes.  Finally, on her questionnaire, in response to a question whether she had 
“any moral or religious beliefs that would affect you[r] ability to sit in judgment of 
another person as a trial juror,” she wrote “I‟m not God.”   
When questioned on voir dire, Prospective Juror No. 045787 consistently 
indicated that although it was possible that she could vote to impose the death 
penalty, it would be very difficult for her to do so.  In response to a question from 
the court, she said, “[C]ertain people are put here to do certain things, and judging 
another person is not mine.”  She then clarified that she was willing to decide 
whether someone was telling the truth, but was “uncomfortable” with “telling 
somebody that we have to take your life.”  After the court had fully explained the 
trial process, she conceded it was “possible” she could vote for the death penalty, 
but repeated it would be “hard” to “tell[] someone that I have to take your life.”  
Finally, when the prosecutor asked Prospective Juror No. 045787 about the “I‟m 
not God” statement on her questionnaire, she explained, “It depends on the 
circumstances, or whatever, but I still feel like God is the one that is supposed to 
judge.  He is the judge. . . . [¶] . . . [therefore] when it comes to taking somebody‟s 
life, it would be hard.”  The record thus provides ample support for the 
prosecutor‟s concern that Prospective Juror No. 045787 would not be a favorable 
juror for the prosecution.  
Defendant contends that the prosecutor‟s failure to question Prospective 
Juror Nos. 042519 and 045787 about the matters later used to justify her 
challenges for cause demonstrates that the reasons were pretextual.  (See Miller-El 
v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 246, 250, fn. 8 [a party‟s failure to engage in 
meaningful voir dire on a topic the party says is important can suggest the stated 
reason is pretextual].)  Here, although the prosecutor did not question Prospective 
53 
 
Juror Nos. 042519 and 045787 about their negative experiences with the justice 
system, she did engage them extensively on the topic that apparently concerned 
her most: their ability, because of their religious views, to sit in judgment of others 
and to impose the death penalty.  The prosecutor even unsuccessfully challenged 
Prospective Juror No. 045787 for cause.  Under the circumstances, the 
prosecutor‟s failure to question the prospective jurors about each and every area of 
articulated concern does not undermine the conclusion that her stated race-neutral 
reasons for excusing these prospective jurors were genuine and not pretextual.14   
C. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Alleged judicial bias and related errors    
 
During the noon recess on the second day of the prosecution‟s guilt phase 
case-in-chief, the trial judge, Judge Stephen P. Gildner, discovered that two 
upcoming prosecution witnesses were his close friends.  Judge Gildner did not 
immediately disqualify himself, however.  Rather, he continued to preside 
throughout that afternoon; the following morning he recused himself and 
transferred the case to another judge.  Defendant contends that Judge Gildner‟s 
continuing to preside over the case after he became aware of facts requiring his 
disqualification violated state statutory law as well as defendant‟s due process 
right to an impartial judge under the state and federal Constitutions.  Defendant 
further contends that the substitution of another judge who was not familiar with 
the trial testimony already presented violated state law and defendant‟s rights to 
                                              
14 
Defendant does not ask us to compare the responses of the stricken 
prospective jurors to those of the jurors and prospective jurors whom the 
prosecution accepted.  Accordingly, we will not do so on our own motion.  (See 
People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 622 [“evidence of comparative juror 
analysis must be considered for the first time on appeal if relied upon by 
defendant” and the record is adequate to permit comparison (italics added)].)   
54 
 
due process of law, trial by jury, and a reliable penalty determination under the 
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.  For the 
reasons explained below, we reject each of defendant‟s claims.   
a. Factual background 
 
Danny Phinney testified on May 15, 1996, the second day of the 
prosecution‟s guilt phase case-in-chief.  At the end of the lunch recess that day, 
Judge Gildner informed the parties that he had just realized that two upcoming 
prosecution witnesses, Jerry and Terri Jones, were close family friends.  Although 
he had seen their names on the witness list, he had not realized that they were his 
friends until he met them in the hallway during the recess.  Moreover, the Joneses 
were not just “casual family friends,” but rather “their older son and my older son 
are very close personal friends, have been since about fourth grade.”  The judge 
acknowledged learning during a brief conversation with them that Terri Jones was 
related to Alma Merck, and noted that he might possibly be called upon to judge 
their credibility in the future.  After stating he was “not sure what my obligations 
are beyond this point,” the judge called a brief recess to allow counsel to confer 
with defendant.   
 
Following the recess, Judge Gildner confirmed that the Joneses were close 
family friends whom he had known for at least 10 years.  Defense counsel then 
announced that although he believed the judge would make every effort to be fair, 
defendant had instructed him to move for a mistrial.  Upon questioning from Judge 
Gildner, the prosecutor confirmed that the Joneses would testify regarding items of 
the Mercks‟ property that defendant allegedly had possessed.  Defense counsel 
added that the Joneses also were potential penalty phase witnesses, and Judge 
Gildner acknowledged that if the jury returned a death penalty verdict, he would 
be required to assess their credibility in ruling on the automatic motion to modify 
55 
 
the verdict under section 190.4, subdivision (e).  At the conclusion of this 
discussion, the judge stated he was “not going to precipitously rule,” but would 
call another 25-minute recess to think about the matter.   
 
Following the second recess, Judge Gildner expressed his opinion that he 
was “not required to do anything other than preside over the trial” because he had 
been, and would continue to be, fair to both sides.  However, because the situation 
implicated the “appearance of justice and fairness,” he would continue to assess 
the situation through the end of the day.  He explained, “I am unwilling at this 
point to grant the motion for a mistrial but it is chiefly because I am trying to buy 
some time, to be frank with you, to think about this a little bit more.”  He further 
explained that “if the motion for a mistrial should be granted at this moment, it 
should be granted for the same reasons at a later moment,” that he could not think 
of a matter that might arise that afternoon that would prejudice either side, and that 
he was “extremely reluctant to disrupt” the cross-examination of Phinney, who 
was “clearly hostile yesterday when he was ordered back” for continued 
testimony.   
 
Defendant objected to any further proceedings before Judge Gildner, who 
acknowledged a continuing objection.  After stating he wanted to think about 
whether he could “set aside my personal feelings” in the matter, and ascertaining 
that the Joneses would not be testifying that day, the judge directed that the trial 
continue. 
 
That afternoon, the cross-examination of Danny Phinney was completed, 
with Judge Gildner ruling on various objections by both the defense and the 
prosecution.  The parties and Judge Gildner then reconvened to discuss the 
mistrial motion.  The judge noted that a new Code of Judicial Ethics had been 
approved a month earlier which required a judge to disqualify himself or herself 
whenever required by law or when “the judge‟s impartiality might reasonably be 
56 
 
questioned.”  He further noted that then section 170.1, former subdivision 
(a)(6)(C) (now subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii)) of the Code of Civil Procedure required 
disqualification if “ „a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt 
that the judge would be able to be impartial.‟ ”  The judge stated in light of these 
provisions, he intended to recuse himself; however, he was unwilling to declare a 
mistrial because only the appearance of bias was at issue and because defendant 
refused to waive any right he might have to claim that double jeopardy barred a 
retrial.  After discharging the jury for the day, the judge repeated that “given that 
[judicial] canon and given the [Code of Civil Procedure] and given the present 
circumstances of this case and the possibility that I may have to assess the 
credibility of people who appear to be central to the prosecution‟s case, a recusal 
may be appropriate.  It may even be required.”   
 
The following morning, May 16, 1996, the parties again convened outside 
the jury‟s presence, and Judge Gildner again expressed his concern that absent 
defendant‟s express consent to a mistrial, double jeopardy might bar a retrial.  He 
therefore denied the motion for a mistrial “without prejudice,” recused himself, 
and transferred the case to Judge Lee Felice.      
b.  Discussion 
 
Defendant contends that once Judge Gildner realized that his close friends 
Jerry and Terri Jones were both prospective witnesses and relatives of one of the 
victims, he should have refrained from presiding over the trial for the remainder of 
the afternoon of May 15, 1996.  He asserts Judge Gildner should have either 
recused himself immediately or, if he needed more time to determine whether to 
recuse himself, continued the trial while he considered the issue.  Defendant 
argues that Judge Gildner‟s continuing to preside over the trial while he was aware 
of facts that might require his recusal violated state statutory law as well as 
57 
 
defendant‟s right to an impartial judge under the due process clauses of the state 
and federal Constitutions.   
 
If defendant is entitled to relief under state statutory law, there will be no 
need to address his federal constitutional claim.  Accordingly, we address his 
statutory claim first.  Defendant argues that by continuing to preside over 
Phinney‟s cross-examination and ruling on the motion for mistrial after grounds 
for his disqualification arose, Judge Gildner failed to comply with Code of Civil 
Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (a)(1).  That subdivision provides that when 
“a judge determines himself or herself to be disqualified, the judge shall notify the 
presiding judge of the court of his or her recusal and shall not further participate in 
the proceeding, except as provided in [Code of Civil Procedure section] 170.4, 
unless his or her disqualification is waived by the parties as provided in 
subdivision (b).”  When the issue is properly raised, Code of Civil Procedure 
section 170.3, subdivision (a)(1), invalidates actions taken by a judge after 
voluntary disqualification other than those permitted by Code of Civil Procedure 
section 170.4, unless the disqualification is waived.15  (See Geldermann, Inc., v. 
Bruner (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 662, 665-666 [judgment based on statement of 
decision issued by judge who had voluntarily disqualified himself after presiding 
over non-jury trial and issuing tentative decision must be reversed].)   
 
Here, there was no waiver; defendant objected to Judge Gildner continuing 
to preside over the case after learning facts that might require disqualification, and 
he moved for a mistrial.  Nonetheless, Judge Gildner did not violate Code of Civil 
Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (a)(1), when he continued to preside over 
Phinney‟s cross-examination.  By its terms, the statute requires a judge to cease 
                                              
15 
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4 permits a disqualified judge to take a 
limited number of actions not implicated here. 
58 
 
participating in the proceeding only after the judge “determines himself or herself 
to be disqualified.”  Here, Judge Gildner did not “determine[]” himself to be 
disqualified until after Danny Phinney‟s cross-examination was completed, when 
he stated, “[h]aving considered the mandate which falls upon me . . . as approved 
by the California Supreme Court and then having considered [Code of Civil 
Procedure section 170.1, former subdivision (a)(6)(C)], I think it is appropriate to 
recuse myself.”  Up until that time, the judge expressed concern about the 
situation, but he did not decide his recusal was required until he discovered the 
applicable judicial canon and code section.  After determining to recuse himself, 
Judge Gildner did not further participate in the proceedings except to rule on 
defendant‟s mistrial motion and refer the case to Judge Felice.   
 
Defendant does not argue that Judge Gildner was not authorized to refer the 
case to Judge Felice.  Nor could he, because Code of Civil Procedure section 
170.4, subdivision (a)(2), expressly permitted Judge Gildner to “[r]equest any 
other judge agreed upon by the parties to sit and act in his or her place.”  
Defendant does complain that the statute did not permit Judge Gildner to rule on 
the mistrial motion.  However, defendant did not object to Judge Gildner ruling on 
the motion or ask Judge Felice to reconsider Judge Gildner‟s ruling, even though 
Judge Gildner denied the motion “without prejudice.”  To the contrary, defendant 
affirmatively sought a ruling from Judge Gildner.  Accordingly, defendant 
forfeited any claim that Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (a)(1), 
prohibited Judge Gildner from ruling on the mistrial motion.  In any event, 
because as we explain below (see post, pp. 63-64), a mistrial was not required, any 
statutory violation did not prejudice defendant.  (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [error of state law requires reversal only if it is reasonably 
probable the jury would have returned a different verdict absent the error].) 
59 
 
 
Because defendant is not entitled to relief on his claimed statutory 
violation, we turn to his federal constitutional claim. A criminal defendant has due 
process rights under both the state and federal Constitutions to be tried by an 
impartial judge.  (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. (2009) 556 U.S. __, __ 
[129 S.Ct. 2252, 2259] (Caperton); People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1140.)  
Indeed, “[i]t is axiomatic that „[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement 
of due process.‟ ”  (Caperton, supra,  556 U.S. at p. ___ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2259], 
quoting In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133, 136.)   
 
Defendant argues that his federal due process right to an impartial judge 
was violated when Judge Gildner continued to preside over his case after learning 
facts that might require his disqualification.  As we understand it, defendant 
reasons as follows: Judge Gildner recused himself under Code of Civil Procedure 
section 170.1, former subdivision (a)(6)(C) (now subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii)), which 
requires disqualification if, “[f]or any reason  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  . . .  [a] person aware of 
the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be 
impartial.”  The doubt about Judge Gildner‟s ability to be impartial arose when he 
first learned that his friends the Joneses were both potential witnesses and relatives 
of victim Alma Merck.  We have said former subdivision (a)(6)(C) of Code of 
Civil Procedure section 170.1 “appears to codify [federal] due process grounds for 
challenging the impartiality of a judge.”  (People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 
322, 334, citing In re Murchison, supra, 349 U.S. at p. 136, and Tumey v. Ohio 
(1927) 273 U.S. 510, 533; see also People v. Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 336 
[Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, former subdivision (a)(6)(C) “is drafted 
broadly enough to include „due process‟ grounds of relief for judicial bias”].)  
Accordingly, because there was a doubt about Judge Gildner‟s ability to be 
impartial at the time he presided over Danny Phinney‟s cross-examination, and 
because such a doubt constitutes a “due process ground[] for challenging the 
60 
 
impartiality of a judge” (People v. Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 334), defendant‟s 
federal due process right to an impartial judge was violated.   
 
We recently rejected a similar claim in People v. Freeman (2010) 47 
Cal.4th 993.  There, the defendant was tried before a judge who had previously 
disqualified himself based on an appearance of bias — his friendship with a judge 
whom the defendant was rumored to have been stalking — but who later was 
reassigned to the defendant‟s case after the stalking rumors proved unfounded.  On 
appeal, the defendant argued that her trial before the previously disqualified judge 
violated her due process right to an impartial judge.  We rejected the claim, relying 
upon the United States Supreme Court‟s recent decision in Caperton, supra, 556 
U.S. at page __ [129 S.Ct. 2252].  As we explained, Code of Civil Procedure 
section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii) provides “an explicit ground for judicial 
disqualification” based on “a public perception of partiality, that is, the appearance 
of bias.”  (People v. Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1001.)  Caperton, however, 
clarified that the due process clause operates more narrowly:  “while a showing of 
actual bias is not required for judicial disqualification under the due process 
clause, neither is the mere appearance of bias sufficient.  Instead, based on an 
objective assessment of the circumstances in the particular case, there must exist 
„ “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker [that] is 
too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” ‟ (Caperton, supra, 556 U.S. at p. __ 
[129 S.Ct. at p. 2259].)  Where only the appearance of bias is at issue, a litigant‟s 
recourse is to seek disqualification under state disqualification statutes: „Because 
the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due process requires, 
most disputes over disqualification will be resolved without resort to the 
Constitution.‟  (Id. at p.__ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2267].)  Finally, the court emphasized 
that only the most „extreme facts‟ would justify judicial disqualification based on 
61 
 
the due process clause.  (Id. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at pp. 2265, 2266].)”  (People v. 
Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 996.)   
 
Turning to the facts before us, we concluded in Freeman that the 
defendant‟s case did not implicate any of the concerns — such as “pecuniary 
interest, enmeshment in contempt proceedings, or the amount and timing of 
campaign contributions” — that had motivated the high court‟s decisions finding 
that due process required judicial disqualification.  (People v. Freeman, supra, 47 
Cal.4th at p. 1006.)  Further, the circumstances were not so extreme as to warrant 
a finding of a probability of actual bias.  “At most, [the judge‟s] decision to accept 
reassignment of defendant‟s case may have violated the judicial disqualification 
statutes that limit the actions that may be taken by a disqualified judge.  
[Citations.]  But, without more, this does not constitute the kind of showing that 
would justify a finding that defendant‟s due process rights were violated.”  (Ibid.)    
 
Similarly here, it does not necessarily follow that due process was violated 
when Judge Gildner presided over the trial for a brief period after learning of facts 
that he later concluded gave rise to an appearance of bias sufficient to warrant his 
recusal under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, former subdivision (a)(6)(C), 
because such statutes “ „provide more protection than due process requires.‟ ”   
(People v. Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1005, quoting Caperton, supra, 556 
U.S. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2267].)  Nor would any possible violation of the 
statutes that limit the actions a disqualified judge may take, without more, amount 
to a due process violation.  (People v. Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1006.)  
Rather, defendant must make the “heightened showing of a probability, rather than 
the mere appearance, of actual bias to prevail.”  (Ibid.)  This he cannot do.    
As the high court explained in Caperton, a constitutionally intolerable probability 
of actual bias exists only when the circumstances “ „would offer a possible 
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to 
62 
 
convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear 
and true between the State and the accused.‟ ”  (Caperton, supra, 556 U.S. at p. __ 
[129 S.Ct. at p. 2260], quoting Tumey v. Ohio, supra, 273 U.S. at p. 532.)  This 
inquiry is an objective one, based on whether “ „under a realistic appraisal of 
psychological tendencies and human weakness,‟ the interest „poses such a risk of 
actual bias and prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden.‟ ”  (Caperton, 
supra, 556 U.S. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2263], quoting Withrow v. Larkin (1975) 
421 U.S. 35, 47.) 
 
Defendant‟s showing falls short.  Defendant argues there was a risk of bias 
because Judge Gildner would be reluctant to disbelieve his friends when ruling on 
motions contesting the sufficiency of the evidence of guilt or the propriety of a 
death sentence.  But Judge Gildner recused himself before the Joneses testified 
and did not rule on any such motions; there was no such risk of bias during the 
brief period he presided over Danny Phinney‟s testimony while knowing the 
Joneses would be witnesses later.   
 
Defendant also argues there was a risk of bias because Judge Gildner was 
aware that Alma Merck was a relative of his friends the Joneses, who had been 
greatly saddened by her death.  But these facts are not so extreme or extraordinary 
that they would tempt “ „the average . . . judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, 
clear and true between the State and the accused.‟ ”  (Caperton, supra, 556 U.S. at 
p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 2260].)  On this point, Richardson v. Quarterman (5th Cir. 
2008) 537 F.3d 466, is instructive.  There, the wife of the judge in a murder case 
was a friend of the victim.  The Fifth Circuit determined that the judge “did not 
face a significant temptation to be biased against Richardson.  He did not stand to 
gain personally or professionally if Richardson were sentenced more harshly by 
the jury.  It may have pleased his wife or her friends and acquaintances . . . if 
Richardson received a harsh sentence, but this is not the type of „possible 
63 
 
temptation‟ that would lead the average judge „not to hold the balance nice, clear 
and true.‟ ”  (Richardson v. Quarterman, supra, 537 F.3d at p. 476.)  Similarly 
here, while it might have pleased the Joneses if Judge Gildner had ruled solely in 
favor of the prosecution on objections during Danny Phinney‟s cross-examination 
— which, we note, he did not do  — such a temptation was too remote and 
insubstantial to violate the due process clause.  (See also People v. Williams, 
supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 651-653 [no due process violation established when the 
nephew of the judge‟s son-in-law was both a witness and the grandson of the 
victim in a murder case].)   
 
In sum, neither defendant‟s rights under Code of Civil Procedure section 
170.3, subdivision (a)(1), nor his federal due process right to an impartial judge, 
were violated when Judge Gildner continued to preside over a brief period of the 
trial after learning that his close friends the Joneses were both upcoming witnesses 
and relatives of Alma Merck.16 
 
Defendant next argues that Judge Gildner erred when he denied defendant‟s 
motion for a mistrial and instead transferred the case to Judge Lee P. Felice, who 
presided over the remainder of the trial.  Defendant contends the federal 
Constitution‟s due process and jury trial guarantees require the same judge to 
preside over all stages of a criminal trial.  (See Freeman v. U.S. (2d Cir. 1915) 227 
F. 732; Randel v. Beto (5th Cir. 1965) 354 F.2d 496, 500.)  
 
As defendant acknowledges, we have rejected this precise contention.  
(People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 829; see also People v. Gonzalez (1990) 
51 Cal.3d 1179, 1211-1212.)  As we explained in Espinoza, section 1053, which 
                                              
16 
Because defendant identifies no analytical difference between his federal 
and state constitutional claims, we deny the latter for the same reasons as the 
former. 
64 
 
provides for the substitution of a new judge when the original judge in a criminal 
trial is unable to proceed, is not unconstitutional.17  This rule is now settled law.  
(E.g., People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 427-428; People v. Lewis 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 225-226; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 892; 
People v. Moreda (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 507, 515-517.)  Accordingly, we 
decline defendant‟s invitation to revisit this issue.  Because substitution of another 
judge was permissible once Judge Gildner had disqualified himself, the court did 
not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant‟s motion for a mistrial, to the 
extent the motion was based on this ground.  (See People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 
324, 428 [abuse of discretion standard applies to review of denial of mistrial 
motion]; People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 713 [mistrial should be granted 
only if the defendant will suffer prejudice that is “ „ “incurable by admonition or 
instruction” ‟ ”].) 
 
Defendant argues nonetheless that he was entitled to a substitute judge who 
had thoroughly familiarized himself with the prior proceedings, and that Judge 
Felice had not done so.  For example, on May 20, 1996, the first day Judge Felice 
presided over the trial, he acknowledged during a hearing on the admissibility of 
Danny Phinney‟s prior statements to police that he was “not as swift on the 
uptake, if you will, [as] if I had been here during the trial,” and later noted he had 
reviewed only “certain portions” of Phinney‟s trial testimony.  Defendant argues 
that without reviewing the entire transcript of the prior proceedings, including the 
testimony of the eight witnesses who testified before Judge Gildner recused 
                                              
17 
Section 1053 provides in pertinent part, “If after the commencement of the 
trial of  a criminal action or proceeding in any court the judge or justice presiding 
at the trial shall die, become ill, or for any other reason be unable to proceed with 
the trial, any other judge or justice of the court in which the trial is proceeding 
may proceed with and finish the trial . . . .” 
65 
 
himself, Judge Felice could not exercise his discretion in an informed manner 
when ruling on the admissibility of Danny Phinney‟s prior statements and Gerry 
Tags‟s preliminary examination testimony; nor could he properly rule on 
defendant‟s automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict under section 190.4, 
subdivision (e).   
 
Defendant relies on People v. Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pages 829-830.  
There, the defendant contended that a substitute judge who had not personally 
heard all of the guilt phase testimony could not fully exercise independent 
judgment when ruling on an automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict under 
section 190.4, subdivision (e); therefore, the denial of the motion was inherently 
unreliable under the federal Constitution‟s Eighth Amendment.  We rejected the 
contention, noting that the substitute judge had reviewed the transcripts of the trial 
proceedings before his substitution.  (Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 829-830.)  
Defendant also relies on rules from other jurisdictions requiring a substitute judge 
to certify that he or she is familiar with the trial record before proceeding.  (E.g., 
Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., rule 25(a), 18 U.S.C.; Iowa Ct. Rules, Crim. Proc., rule 
2.19(7)(b)(1); Md. Rules, rule 4-361(b); Hood v. State (Md. 1994) 637 A.2d 
1208.) 
 
Preliminarily, we note that section 1053 imposes no requirement that a 
substitute judge certify his or her familiarity with the record, and defendant points 
to no other California statute or rule of court that does so.  The authorities from 
other jurisdictions are inapplicable.   
 
In any event, defendant forfeited any claim of error based on Judge Felice‟s 
lack of familiarity with the record by failing to object on that ground at trial.  (Cf. 
People v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 427 [by failing to object at trial, 
defendant forfeited his claim that, because the record did not reflect that the 
original judge was unable to proceed, substitution of judges violated section 
66 
 
1053].)  In fact, at the outset of the hearing regarding the admissibility of 
Phinney‟s prior statements, Judge Felice proposed taking a 15-minute recess to 
read the transcript of Phinney‟s trial testimony, but defendant‟s counsel rejected 
that proposal and offered instead to “go through the transcript page by page and 
delineate for you the basis of my argument.”  Had counsel objected, the matter 
could have been continued to give Judge Felice time to read the entire transcript.  
(See People v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 429 [had defense counsel 
objected, record would reflect reasons why original judge was unable to proceed, 
or original judge would have presided].)  Nor did defendant object to Judge Felice 
ruling on the automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict on the ground that 
the judge was unfamiliar with the record.   
 
Were we to reach the merits, we would conclude that any error in Judge 
Felice‟s not having read the entire trial transcript before ruling on the admissibility 
of Phinney‟s prior statements and Tags‟s testimony was harmless.  (Cf. People v. 
Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 429 [harmless error analysis applies to claim of 
improper substitution of a judge under § 1053].)  Judge Felice had presided over 
some pretrial proceedings in this case before becoming ill and transferring the 
matter to Judge Gildner for trial.  (See Cowan v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.4th 
367.)  Accordingly, he was familiar with defendant and with some of the issues in 
the case.  Further, Judge Felice had a copy of the transcript of Phinney‟s trial 
testimony before him during the hearing on Phinney‟s prior statements, and he 
read the relevant portions as they were pointed out by counsel.  He proceeded in 
the same manner during the hearing on Tags‟s testimony.  Thus, Judge Felice was 
familiar enough with the pertinent portions of the record to exercise his discretion 
in an informed manner.  Defendant complains that ruling on the admissibility of 
Phinney‟s prior statements required Judge Felice to assess the credibility of 
Phinney‟s trial testimony without having seen him testify, but defendant fails to 
67 
 
explain how reading the transcript would have aided the judge in that task.  
Moreover, if there was any error in Judge Felice‟s rulings on the admissibility of 
Phinney‟s and Tags‟s testimony, defendant would be entitled to relief on that 
ground.  (See pts. II.C.3 and II.C.7, post.) 
 
Finally, defendant makes no showing that Judge Felice had not thoroughly 
familiarized himself with the trial record by the time he considered defendant‟s 
automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict under section 190.4, subdivision 
(e).  During the hearing on the admissibility of Phinney‟s statements, Judge Felice 
announced his intention to use the time before trial began in the mornings to read 
the daily transcripts and “try to catch up with where you folks are at.”  In the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary, we presume Judge Felice did exactly 
what he said he was going to do.18  For all of these reasons, defendant is not 
entitled to relief based on the midtrial substitution of Judge Felice for Judge 
Gildner. 
2. Alleged improper admission of Emma Foreman’s hearsay 
statement 
 
On direct examination, Emma Foreman, the mother of defendant‟s former 
girlfriend, Gerry Tags, testified in pertinent part as follows: 
 
“Q:  
Did [defendant] ever say anything to you about murdering anybody? 
 
“A: 
Not specifically to me, but I overheard the conversation between him 
and Gerry, my daughter. 
 
“Q: 
What did he say to Gerry about murdering anybody? 
                                              
18 
Defendant also argues that without reading the trial transcript Judge Felice 
was unprepared to rule on other substantive issues that arose during the trial, but 
he does not identify any particular issue.  We therefore decline to consider the 
matter. 
68 
 
 
“A: 
He kept on telling her that if she didn‟t do what he wanted her to do, 
he would cut her motherfucking throat. 
 
“Q: 
Did he ever mention any elderly people that had he [sic] harmed? 
 
“A: 
Well, one time he did. 
 
“Q: 
Did he say that to you or to your daughter? 
 
“A: 
It was to my daughter. 
 
“Q: 
What did he say then? 
 
“A: 
He said that he would — he said he would cut her motherfucking 
throat.”   
 
Over defendant‟s objection, Officer Porter then testified that in January 
1990, Foreman told him that defendant had admitted to her that he had “killed an 
old couple in Bakersfield” whom he “found . . . in a bedroom, and . . . beat . . . to 
death.”    
 
Defendant contends Foreman‟s statement to Porter was inadmissible 
hearsay because it was not inconsistent with her trial testimony, and that its 
admission into evidence violated state hearsay rules as well as his federal 
constitutional rights.  We review the trial court‟s rulings on the admission of 
evidence for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724.)  
We find no abuse of discretion here.    
 
“A statement by a witness that is inconsistent with his or her trial testimony 
is admissible to establish the truth of the matter asserted in the statement under the 
conditions set forth in Evidence Code sections 1235 and 770.”19  (People v. 
                                              
19 
Evidence Code section 1235 provides: “Evidence of a statement made by a 
witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is 
inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with 
Section 770.”  Evidence Code section 770 in turn provides: “Unless the interests 
of justice otherwise require, extrinsic evidence of a statement made by a witness 
(footnote continued on next page) 
69 
 
Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1219.)  “The „fundamental requirement‟ of section 
1235 is that the statement in fact be inconsistent with the witness‟s trial 
testimony.”  (Ibid.)  “ „Inconsistency in effect, rather than contradiction in express 
terms, is the test for admitting a witness‟ prior statement . . . .‟ ”  (Ibid., quoting 
People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 988.)    
 
Here, the trial court properly found that Foreman‟s statement to Porter was 
inconsistent with her trial testimony in two ways.  First, it was inconsistent 
regarding to whom defendant purportedly spoke about killing an elderly couple: in 
her statement to Porter, Foreman said defendant spoke to her, while in her trial 
testimony, Foreman said she overheard defendant speaking with her daughter, 
Gerry Tags.  Second, it was inconsistent as to what defendant purportedly said: in 
her statement to Porter, Foreman said defendant admitted killing an elderly couple 
he had found in a bedroom, while in her trial testimony Foreman reported that 
defendant said only that he would cut Tags‟s throat. 
 
Defendant argues Foreman‟s response at trial was not inconsistent, but 
rather was merely nonresponsive.  However, a witness‟s deliberate evasion of 
questioning can constitute an implied denial that amounts to inconsistency, 
rendering a prior statement admissible under Evidence Code section 1235.  
(People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 1219-1220; People v. Green, supra, 3 
Cal.3d at pp. 988-989.)  Normally, the question of evasiveness arises when a 
witness claims memory loss about the subject of the questioning.  (E.g., People v. 
Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 84-85; People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
that is inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the hearing shall be excluded 
unless:  [¶]  (a) The witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an 
opportunity to explain or deny the statement; or  [¶]  (b) The witness has not been 
excused from giving further testimony in the action.” 
70 
 
pp. 1219-1220; People v. Green, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 988-989.)  Answering 
questions in a deliberately nonresponsive manner, however, also can rise to the 
level of evasion.  Here, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that 
Foreman was being deliberately evasive when she twice answered questions about 
what defendant had purportedly said about “murdering anybody” or harming an 
elderly couple in a nonresponsive manner.  Under the circumstances, her 
nonresponsive answers could be deemed an implied denial that defendant had 
admitted killing an elderly couple.   
 
Defendant argues that admitting Porter‟s testimony about Foreman‟s 
hearsay statements violated his rights to confront the witnesses against him and to 
due process of law under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution.  Assuming these claims are preserved for review (see People v. 
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-439; People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 
p. 117), they lack merit.  The Sixth Amendment‟s confrontation clause does not 
prohibit admitting into evidence “testimonial” hearsay statements against a 
defendant if the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial.  (Crawford v. 
Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 59 & fn. 9.)  Here, although Foreman testified 
before Porter did and was not asked about her statements to him, she was released 
subject to recall.  Accordingly, defendant was free to recall and cross-examine her 
about the discrepancy between her trial testimony and her statements to Porter.  
No Sixth Amendment violation occurred.   
 
For similar reasons, admitting Porter‟s testimony did not render the trial 
fundamentally unfair.  (See People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439 [the 
admission of evidence results in a due process violation only if it renders the trial 
fundamentally unfair].)  Here, Porter‟s testimony was properly admitted under 
state law, and defendant was free to confront the evidence if he so chose.  
Furthermore, Porter‟s testimony was only a small part of the prosecution‟s case; 
71 
 
the prosecutor did not even mention the testimony in her guilt phase summation.  
Finally, Foreman admitted telling Detective Fraley that she hated defendant “with 
a purple passion.”  The jury thus was well aware that Foreman may have had 
reason to fabricate statements by defendant.  We find no error or unfairness.20   
  
3. Alleged improper admission of Danny Phinney’s hearsay 
statements  
 
On direct examination during the prosecution‟s guilt phase case-in-chief, 
Danny Phinney testified that on a date and time that he could not independently 
recall, he met defendant at an auto parts store.  Defendant owed Phinney money.  
Phinney went to defendant‟s brother‟s house, where he looked at some items, 
including two jewelry boxes, jewelry, coins, a tooled leather wallet containing a 
                                              
20  
With respect to this and many other claims raised on appeal, defendant 
urges that the error or misconduct he is asserting infringed on various federal 
constitutional rights to a fair and reliable trial.  In most instances, insofar as 
defendant raised the issue at all in the trial court, he failed explicitly to make some 
or all of the constitutional arguments he now advances.  In each instance, unless 
otherwise indicated, it appears that either (1) the appellate claim is of a kind (for 
example, failure to declare a doubt concerning defendant‟s competence, failure to 
instruct the jury sua sponte, or erroneous instruction affecting defendant‟s 
substantial rights) that required no trial court action by the defendant to preserve it, 
or (2) the new arguments do not invoke facts or legal standards different from 
those the trial court itself was asked to apply, but merely assert that the trial 
court‟s act or omission, insofar as erroneous for the reasons actually presented to 
that court, had the additional legal consequence of violating the federal 
Constitution.  To that extent, defendant‟s new constitutional arguments are not 
forfeited on appeal.  (See People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 433-439; see 
also People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1195, fn. 6; People v. Yeoman, supra, 
31 Cal.4th at p. 117.) 
“On the merits, no separate constitutional discussion is required, or 
provided, where rejection of a claim that the trial court erred on the issue 
presented to that court necessarily leads to rejection of any constitutional theory or 
„gloss‟ raised for the first time here.”  (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 19, 
fn. 6.) 
72 
 
driver‟s license bearing the name Mirck or Merck and a birth date in the early 
1900‟s, and two Social Security checks with the name Merck on them.  Phinney 
testified that he “would not have remembered any of” these facts had he “not seen 
the paperwork” — i.e., a transcript of an interview he had given police in 
December 1984 about the events described above.  However, he remembered “out 
of my mind” that a 1922 silver dollar was among the coins he saw at the house.   
 
Over defendant‟s hearsay objection, Detective Diederich testified that he 
interviewed Phinney on December 21, 1984, while Phinney was in custody 
following his arrest in October.  The interview was tape-recorded and transcribed.  
During the interview, Phinney stated that the meeting with defendant at the auto 
parts store occurred during the first week of September 1984.  Phinney also 
described various items of property he had seen at defendant‟s brother‟s house, 
including coins (one bearing the date 1922), costume jewelry, two government-
type checks totaling about $600 made out to someone named Merck with an 
address on McClean Street, and a leather wallet with a driver‟s license and some 
other cards inside.  After the interview, Phinney pointed out for Diederich the 
house in which he had seen the items.   
 
Defendant contends Phinney‟s December 1984 statement to Diederich was 
hearsay inadmissible under any exception.  The trial court held a lengthy hearing 
and concluded the statement was admissible in part as a prior inconsistent 
statement (Evid. Code, § 1235), in part as a prior consistent statement (id., 
§ 1236), and alternatively as a past recollection recorded (id., § 1237).  Because 
we conclude the statement was admissible on the latter ground, we do not address 
the first two.  
 
Evidence Code section 1237 permits evidence of a witness‟s past statement 
“if the statement would have been admissible if made by him while testifying, the 
statement concerns a matter as to which the witness has insufficient present 
73 
 
recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, and the statement is 
contained in a writing which:  [¶]  (1) [w]as made at a time when the fact recorded 
in the writing actually occurred or was fresh in the witness‟ memory;  [¶]  (2) 
[w]as made . . . (ii) by some other person for the purpose of recording the witness‟ 
statement at the time it was made;  [¶]  (3) [i]s offered after the witness testifies 
that the statement he made was a true statement of such fact; and  [¶]  (4) [i]s 
offered after the writing is authenticated as an accurate record of the statement.”  
(Evid. Code, §1237, subd. (a).)  Here, Phinney testified he “had no idea” of when 
his meeting with defendant at the auto parts store occurred, and that he “would not 
have remembered any” of what he had seen at defendant‟s brother‟s house, other 
than a 1922 silver dollar but for having read a transcript of his December 1984 
interview with police.  He also testified he could not remember what he told 
officers during the December 1984 interview.  Accordingly, the first requirement 
of the statute is met:  Phinney had insufficient independent recollection to testify 
“fully and accurately” about the events in 1984. 
 
Defendant contends nonetheless that Phinney‟s December 1984 statement 
was inadmissible because it was not made at a time when the facts recorded were 
fresh in Phinney‟s memory.  (Evid. Code, § 1237, subd. (a)(1).)  Defendant notes 
the interview with Diederich took place over three months after Phinney‟s meeting 
with defendant supposedly occurred.  But defendant did not argue below that the 
three-month lapse rendered the statement inadmissible; he may not do so now.  
(Evid. Code, § 353; see People v. Miller (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 412, 422, 
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1240.)  
In any event, the argument lacks merit.  Defendant points to no authority for the 
proposition that such a lapse of time between the events recorded and the time of 
the recording renders a past statement inadmissible under Evidence Code section 
1237, and we are aware of none.  (Cf. People v. Miller, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at 
74 
 
p. 422 [recorded statement made at least three weeks after recorded events 
occurred was admissible under Evid. Code, § 1237].)  Indeed, federal courts have 
admitted statements made after even greater lapses of time under the federal 
counterpart to section 1237, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5).21  (United States v. 
Patterson (9th Cir. 1982) 678 F.2d 774, 778-779 [10 months]; United States v. 
Williams (6th Cir. 1978) 571 F.2d 344, 348-350 [six months]; United States v. 
Senak (7th Cir. 1975) 527 F.2d 129, 139-142 [three years].)  These courts reason 
that district courts should have the flexibility to consider all pertinent 
circumstances in determining whether the matter was fresh in the witness‟s 
memory when the statement was made.  (United States v. Patterson, supra, 678 
F.2d at p. 779.)  We see no reason why a similar approach should not govern 
under Evidence Code section 1237.  Here, Phinney‟s statement to Diederich 
describing the items he saw and when he saw them was fairly detailed, and he had 
sufficient recollection to lead Diederich to the house in which he had seen the 
items.  Accordingly, there was a sufficient basis for concluding the events were 
reasonably fresh in Phinney‟s mind at the time he spoke to Diederich.  
 
Defendant next argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 
statement because Phinney could not reliably vouch for its truthfulness, as 
Evidence Code section 1237, subdivision (a)(3) requires.  We disagree.  Phinney 
repeatedly testified that he told Diederich the truth to the best of his ability.  
Defendant points out that Phinney admitted that his memory in 1984 was 
                                              
21 
That rule permits the admission into evidence of “[a] memorandum or 
record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now 
has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to 
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in his 
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly.”  (Fed. Rules Evid., rule 803(5), 
28 U.S.C.) 
75 
 
“jumbled” and “scrambled” because of the drugs he had been taking; that he 
sometimes suffered from delusions; that he had talked to Diederich only to 
“exonerate [him]self” from his association with the Colt .25-caliber pistol and to 
give the officers enough information so that he could get out of jail; and that he 
had seen a newspaper article about the Merck murders before he spoke to 
Diederich.  Phinney further admitted that he might have lied to Diederich about his 
personal involvement in the trade of the Colt .25-caliber pistol between defendant 
and Lutts.  But by the time Phinney spoke to Diederich he had been in custody for 
over two months, and Diederich testified that Phinney did not appear delusional or 
to be on drugs or going through withdrawal.  Phinney admitted he spoke with the 
officers because he wanted to get out of jail, but pointed out that he had to give the 
officers “enough fact to be substantiated.”  Furthermore, the only subject about 
which Phinney said he might have lied was his involvement in the gun transaction, 
which was not the subject of the portion of Phinney‟s statement the prosecution 
sought to introduce, and when confronted with the inconsistency between his 1984 
and 1994 statements on the subject Phinney forthrightly admitted he might have 
lied in 1984.  Finally, defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined Phinney about 
his multiple motives and opportunity to lie to Diederich, and a copy of a 
newspaper article Phinney might have read was admitted into evidence.  The jury 
no doubt considered all of these factors in deciding the weight to be accorded to 
Phinney‟s 1984 statement.  Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial 
court abused its discretion in determining the statement was sufficiently reliable to 
be admitted under section 1237.  (Cf. People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 
1293-1294 [statement admissible under Evidence Code, § 1237 despite witness‟s 
delusions and drug problems at time of trial, where witness had sufficient recall of 
the events surrounding the statement that the trial court could conclude it was 
reliable]; United States v. Edwards (9th Cir. 1976) 539 F.2d 689, 691-692 
76 
 
[witness‟s statement to police admissible under rule 803(5) of the federal evidence 
rules notwithstanding witness‟s admission that he was drunk when he made the 
statement].)   
 
Defendant next asserts that because Judge Felice did not personally observe 
Phinney‟s testimony, he was not in a position to rule on the reliability of Phinney‟s 
assurance that he had told Diederich the truth.  As we have explained, “whether an 
adequate foundation for admission” of a statement under Evidence Code section 
1237 has been established turns on whether the declarant‟s “testimony that the 
statement was true was reliable,” and the trial court who hears the declarant‟s 
testimony has “the best opportunity” to assess its credibility.  (People v. 
Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1293-1294.)  But we have never held that the 
judge who heard the declarant‟s testimony is the only judge who may assess its 
credibility, particularly where, as here, that judge is no longer available.  Here, 
Judge Felice read the relevant portions of Phinney‟s testimony and entertained 
extensive argument regarding the statement‟s trustworthiness.  Based on Phinney‟s 
testimony that he had told Diederich the truth, Judge Felice ruled the statement 
would be admissible, but only assuming Diederich could testify that Phinney did 
not appear delusional or intoxicated at the time he made the statement.  Diederich 
did so testify.  Again, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.   
 
Defendant finally contends that admitting Phinney‟s statement to Diederich 
pursuant to Evidence Code section 1237 violated his rights to confront and cross-
examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  As 
defendant acknowledges, we have in the past rejected this precise contention.  
(People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1292, fn. 32; see also People v. Miller, 
supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 424.)  Defendant urges us to reconsider Cummings in 
light of Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 36, but that case does not aid 
him.  As the high court there explained, admitting a witness‟s testimonial hearsay 
77 
 
statement does not violate the Sixth Amendment where, as here, the witness 
appears at trial and is subject to cross-examination about the statement.  
(Crawford, supra, at pp. 59-60, fn. 9; see also California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 
149, 162.)  Defendant contends there can be no constitutionally effective cross-
examination when the witness cannot recall the facts related in the hearsay 
statement.  (See People v. Simmons (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 677 [finding a 
confrontation clause violation due to witness‟s memory lapse]; but cf. California 
v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. at pp. 168-170 [leaving question open].)  But the high 
court has squarely rejected that contention, concluding that “when a hearsay 
declarant is present at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination,” “the 
traditional protections of the oath, cross-examination, and opportunity for the jury 
to observe the witness‟ demeanor satisfy the constitutional requirements,” 
notwithstanding the witness‟s claimed memory loss about the facts related in the 
hearsay statement.  (United States v. Owens (1988) 484 U.S. 554, 559-560.)  
Nothing in Crawford casts doubt on the continuing vitality of Owens.   
 
Here, as in Cummings, Phinney was cross-examined extensively about his 
drug use, mental illness, multiple motives to lie, and other factors potentially 
affecting his truthfulness at the time he made his 1984 statement.  (Cf. People v. 
Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1292, fn. 32.)  The weight of these factors, and 
their effect on the statement‟s credibility, was for the jury to decide.  We find no 
constitutional violation.   
4. Alleged improper admission of expert ballistics testimony  
 
During jury selection, at a hearing outside the presence of prospective 
jurors, the prosecutor made known that criminalist Gregory Laskowski had very 
recently concluded that the Colt .25-caliber pistol recovered in the October 1984 
raid on the Caravan Inn had fired the bullets recovered from Clifford Merck‟s 
78 
 
body.  Laskowski briefly testified that, after learning the previous week from 
Detective Christopherson that the barrel of the gun had been tampered with, he 
had made a mold of the barrel using a casting compound, compared the mold with 
the bullets taken from Clifford‟s body, and concluded the bullets had been fired 
from that gun.   
 
Later during trial, defendant moved under People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 
24, to exclude Laskowski‟s testimony about the comparison and his conclusions.22  
As relevant here, the Kelly rule provides that the “admissibility of expert 
testimony based on a „new scientific technique‟ requires proof of its reliability — 
i.e., that the technique is „ “sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs.” ‟ ”  (People v. Venegas 
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 76, quoting People v. Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30; 
accord, Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1257.)   
 
At an Evidence Code section 402 hearing,23  Laskowski testified that in 
1984 he had excluded the Colt pistol as the source of the bullets recovered from 
Clifford‟s body based on a comparison of those bullets with test-fired bullets.  A 
few weeks before trial, however, Detective Christopherson had informed him that 
the inside of the barrel had been altered.  Laskowski reexamined the gun and 
                                              
22 
Defendant‟s motion included a reference to Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 
1923) 293 F. 1013, which we relied upon for the rule announced in the Kelly 
decision.  Because the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579, ruled that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (28 U.S.C.) superseded Frye, we refer here solely to Kelly.  (See People 
v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 545; People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 598-
604.) 
23 
Subdivision (b) of that section provides in pertinent part that the “court may 
hear and determine the question of the admissibility of evidence out of the 
presence of the jury.”  (Evid. Code, § 402, subd. (b).) 
79 
 
determined that the land impressions near the crown of the barrel had been 
damaged to such an extent that comparison with test-fired bullets was impossible.  
Laskowski therefore made a cast of the interior of the barrel using Mikrosil, a 
silicone rubber compound routinely used in the casting of tool marks.  He then 
compared the markings on the cast that had been recorded from the inside of the 
barrel with the two bullets recovered from Clifford‟s body, and determined the 
bullets had been fired from the Colt pistol.   
 
On cross-examination, Laskowski admitted that neither he nor any other 
ballistics expert he was aware of had ever testified in court regarding ballistics 
comparisons using Mikrosil casting.  However, at least a dozen or more experts he 
had spoken with told him that the method was “acceptable.”  Moreover, he 
explained, the technique was not new, because “the recording of tool marks with 
an elastomeric material has been done,” and firearms examination was essentially 
a subset of tool mark comparison. 
 
Defendant called no witnesses.  Based on Laskowski‟s testimony, the court 
ruled the method Laskowski had used to compare the gun barrel with the bullets 
recovered from Clifford‟s body was not a new scientific technique and therefore 
was not subject to the Kelly test.  The court explained, “What we‟re dealing with 
here is simply — is an old procedure that has been employed for years in terms of 
identifying . . . a firearm as being that which fired a slug, that has been with us for 
years and a little bit different technique, possibly, but the basic science, if you will, 
is the same, it is not a new technique and new process.”   
 
Defendant contends the trial court‟s ruling was erroneous.  We disagree.  
Kelly applies only to “ „that limited class of expert testimony which is based, in 
whole or in part, on a technique, process, or theory which is new to science and, 
even more so, to the law.‟ ”  (People v. Leahy, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 605, quoting 
People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1156.)  Here, defendant does not claim that 
80 
 
either the technique of ballistics comparisons or the technique of identifying tool 
marks using molds made of elastic material is new.  Laskowski simply combined 
these two existing techniques to compare the Colt pistol‟s barrel with the bullets 
recovered from Clifford‟s body.  As Laskowski testified, “the recording of tool 
marks with an elastomeric material has been done” and “firearms examination is 
essentially a tool mark type of examination when one looks at impressed or 
striated materials, marks, and that is not a new technique.”   
 
Moreover, neither technique is “so foreign to everyday experience as to be 
unusually difficult for laypersons to evaluate.”  (See People v. Venegas, supra, 18 
Cal.4th at p. 81 [contrasting DNA evidence, which requires validation under Kelly, 
with “fingerprint, shoe track, bite mark, or ballistic comparisons, which jurors 
essentially can see for themselves”].)  As we have explained, the Kelly rule “is 
intended to prevent lay jurors from being unduly influenced by procedures which 
seem scientific and infallible, but which actually are not.”  (People v. Webb (1993) 
6 Cal.4th 494, 524; see also People v. Leahy, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 606 [Kelly 
applies only to techniques that “ „appear[] in both name and description to provide 
some definitive truth which the expert need only accurately recognize and relay to 
the jury.‟ ”].)  Thus, in People v. Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th 494, we held that expert 
testimony regarding a fingerprint match based on a laser-derived image of a latent 
fingerprint was not subject to the Kelly test.  (Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 523-
524.)  There, an expert witness explained in detail how he had derived the image 
and compared it to defendant‟s known fingerprint.  Slides and photographs of each 
stage of the chemical and laser process were introduced, and the expert explained 
the points of similarity he found.  There was “no dispute” that the method 
produced the image “without tampering or alteration.”  (Id. at p. 524.)  We 
concluded, “[w]here, as here, a procedure isolates physical evidence whose 
existence, appearance, nature, and meaning are obvious to the senses of a 
81 
 
layperson, the reliability of the process in producing that result is equally apparent 
and need not be debated under” the Kelly rule.  (Ibid.)   
Similarly, here, the procedure Laskowski used merely “isolated physical 
evidence” — specifically, the pattern of lands and grooves and associated 
imperfections on the inside of the Colt pistol‟s barrel, as well as the corresponding 
markings on the recovered bullets — “whose appearance, nature and meaning 
[were] obvious to the senses” of the lay jurors.  (People v. Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th 
at p. 524.)  At the Evidence Code section 402 hearing and at trial, Laskowski 
explained in detail the process he had used to create the barrel cast and compare it 
to the bullets recovered from Clifford Merck‟s body.  Laskowski showed 
photographs of the gun, the barrel cast, the test-fired bullets and the recovered 
bullets to the jury  and identified the points of similarity he found between the cast 
and the recovered bullets.  Although there was some dispute about whether the 
method Laskowski used produced a cast of the barrel “without tampering or 
alteration” due to possible bubbling or shrinkage of the Mikrosil, that possibility 
was fully explored on cross-examination and the jury had the opportunity to weigh 
its effect on the validity of Laskowski‟s conclusions.  Thus, here too there was no 
need to debate the reliability of the method under the standards of Kelly.  (People 
v. Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 524; see also People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 
1017-1019 [“blood-spatter” evidence not subject to Kelly because it is common 
knowledge that inferences can be drawn from spatter patterns of blood expelled 
from the human body], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin, supra, 
45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22; People v. Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1157  [“absent 
some special feature which effectively blindsides the jury, expert opinion 
testimony is not subject to Kelly/Frye”].) 
Defendant contends that although the science of ballistics is not new, the 
accepted technique involves comparison of a test-fired bullet with bullets 
82 
 
recovered from a crime scene.  He contends there are critical differences between 
the identification of stationary impressions of tool marks using casts or molds, and 
the identification of marks produced by the dynamic forces acting on a bullet as it 
is propelled through the barrel of a gun.  He argues that by combining tool mark 
comparison technique with ballistics comparison technique, Laskowski created a 
new technique, the reliability of which should have been proved under the Kelly 
standards.   
Defendant did not raise this argument in the trial court, and that court had 
no opportunity to evaluate it.  In any event, the difference between static tool mark 
comparison and dynamic ballistics comparison was not a matter so beyond 
common understanding that lay jurors could not give it proper weight in 
evaluating Laskowski‟s opinion.  Defendant could have raised this issue on cross-
examination, or he could have presented his own expert to contest Laskowski‟s 
findings before the jury.  He did neither.  We conclude there was no error.       
5. Alleged error in excluding defendant’s “consciousness of 
innocence” evidence  
 
Before calling Detective Fraley to the stand, the defense sought to introduce 
evidence that on February 14, 1985, defendant had telephoned Fraley and offered 
to “come down right now” and speak to him about the Merck case.  Defense 
counsel argued the evidence showed “lack of consciousness of guilt” and either 
was not hearsay, or was hearsay admissible under the state-of-mind exception.  
The court, however, excluded the evidence on the ground that it was not probative 
of defendant‟s state of mind at the time of the killings and therefore was not 
relevant.   
 
Defendant renews his argument that the proffered evidence was nonhearsay 
circumstantial evidence of his mental state and was relevant to show 
consciousness of innocence.  Alternatively, he argues that even if the evidence was 
83 
 
hearsay, it was admissible under the hearsay exception for evidence offered to 
prove the declarant‟s state of mind when that state of mind is “itself an issue in the 
action.”  (See Evid. Code, § 1250.)   
 
We agree that defendant‟s offer to speak with Detective Fraley was not 
hearsay.  Hearsay is “evidence of a statement that was made other than by a 
witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the 
matter stated.”  (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).)  Unless subject to an exception, 
hearsay evidence is inadmissible.  (Id., subd. (b).)  Here, defendant‟s offer to talk 
to Detective Fraley was not hearsay but “simply verbal conduct” consisting of a 
proposal to perform an act, and therefore was “neither inherently true nor false.”  
(People v. Curl (2009) 46 Cal.4th 339, 362.)  Furthermore, the statement was 
“offered for the nonhearsay purpose of demonstrating consciousness of” 
innocence.  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, sections 1200 and 1250 of the Evidence Code are 
inapplicable.  
 
Nonetheless, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
excluding the evidence that defendant had offered to talk to Detective Fraley.  In a 
line of cases dating back over a century, this court has held that evidence that the 
defendant did not flee from a crime scene is inadmissible to show consciousness 
of innocence, even though such evidence has “some „tendency in reason‟ to prove 
this fact.”  (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 39, fn. 25; People v. Montgomery 
(1879) 53 Cal. 576; see also People v. Doran (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 316, 321.)24  
As we explained in People v. Green, the inferences arising from evidence of the 
                                              
24 
People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, was overruled on other grounds in 
People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 239, and People v. Hall (1986) 41 
Cal.3d 826, 834, footnote 3.  People v. Doran, supra, 24 Cal.App.3d 316, was 
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, and 
Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617. 
84 
 
absence of flight are ambiguous because “there are plausible reasons why a guilty 
person might also refrain from flight,” such as fear of recapture or confidence that 
flight will be unnecessary because there is no strong proof of guilt.  (People v. 
Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 37, discussing People v. Montgomery, supra, 53 Cal. 
at pp. 577-578.)  Moreover, such evidence also creates a “substantial danger „of 
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.‟ ” (People v. Green, supra, 27 
Cal.3d at p. 38, quoting Evid. Code, § 352.)  Because “the absence of flight is so 
ambiguous, [and] so laden with conflicting interpretations . . . in all cases the 
scales tip so heavily against admission of evidence of absence of flight that it must 
be excluded as a matter of law.”  (People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 39, fn. 
omitted.) 
 
By parity of reasoning, other consciousness of innocence evidence, such as 
defendant‟s offer here, although relevant, properly may be excluded on the ground 
that its slight probative value is outweighed by the risk of confusing the issues.  
(Accord, People v. Harvey (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 90, 115.)  Indeed, there are 
numerous plausible reasons why a guilty person might offer to talk to the police.  
(Ibid. [“Just as there are numerous reasons why a guilty defendant would not flee, 
there are also numerous reasons he would appear to be cooperative with the 
police”].)  He may desire to appear innocent, or he may desire to lie to the police 
to deflect suspicion from himself or to present a false alibi.  Against such slight 
probative value, the risk of confusing the issues or of delaying the trial is strong, 
since if the evidence were admitted, the prosecution would have to be given the 
opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding the defendant‟s offer and to 
present evidence negating an inference of innocence.  (See People v. Green, supra, 
27 Cal.3d at pp. 38-39, fn. 4 [discussing similar concerns regarding absence-of-
85 
 
flight evidence].)  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
excluding evidence of defendant‟s offer to speak to Fraley.25 
 
Defendant argues nonetheless that the exclusion of the evidence of his offer 
to speak to Detective Fraley violated his federal constitutional right to present a 
defense.  But the trial court‟s ruling “did not constitute a refusal to allow 
defendant to present a defense, but merely rejected certain evidence concerning 
the defense.”  (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1325; see People v. 
Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 305.)  Although the evidence of defendant‟s offer to 
speak to Fraley was excluded, defendant was not otherwise precluded from 
presenting his defense through admissible testimony and evidence.  (See People v. 
McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 363-364.)  Defendant also contends the 
disparate treatment afforded consciousness-of-guilt and consciousness-of-
innocence evidence under California law independently offends notions of due 
process and fairness.  (See Wardius v. Oregon (1973) 412 U.S. 470, 476 [due 
process mandates reciprocal discovery rights in criminal cases].)  We note at the 
outset, however, that when it comes to evidence of an accused‟s contacts with law 
enforcement, the federal Constitution places strict limits on the prosecution‟s 
ability to exploit any lack of cooperation, at least after the accused has been given 
the warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.  (See Doyle 
v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610 [prosecutor violated due process by cross-examining 
defendants regarding their postarrest silence]; see also Griffin v. California (1965) 
380 U.S. 609 [prosecutor‟s comment on defendant‟s failure to testify violates self-
incrimination clause of 5th Amend.].)  To the extent evidence of a defendant‟s 
                                              
25 
Although our analysis differs from that of the trial court, “ „we review the 
ruling, not the court‟s reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we 
affirm.‟ ”  (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 351, fn. 11.) 
86 
 
prearrest lack of cooperation would be admissible, moreover, the defendant would 
be entitled to explain any such evidence the prosecution offered.  (People v. 
Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 40, fn. 26.)  Accordingly, we perceive no unfairness 
in refusing to allow defendant to present evidence of his offer to talk to the police.  
(Cf. People v. Williams (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 648, 653 [“[s]ince flight and the 
absence of flight are not on similar logical or legal footings, the due process 
notions of fairness and parity . . . are inapplicable”].)   
 
Finally, even assuming error, it was harmless under any standard.  The 
proffered evidence, although relevant to consciousness of innocence, was “less 
than compelling . . . since, if [defendant] had been involved in [the Mercks‟] 
murder, it can be assumed he would have lied to a police detective questioning 
him about it.”  (People v. Curl, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 362.)  The ambiguous 
nature of the evidence thus counsels against any finding that its exclusion affected 
the verdicts.   
6. Alleged error in admitting photographs of the victims  
 
Over defendant‟s objection, the trial court admitted into evidence at the 
guilt phase 10 graphic photographs of the Merck crime scene and the bodies of the 
Mercks as they were found, including closeup views of the bound arms and legs of 
the victims — the flesh discolored and bloated due to decomposition — and a 
close-up view of the back of Alma‟s head with a telephone cord wrapped around 
her neck.  The trial court also admitted a single, somewhat blurry, full-length 
photograph of Alma taken when she was alive, wearing a ring on one of her 
fingers.    
 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting these 
photographs because their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.  
(Evid. Code, § 352.)  Evidence Code section 352 permits the trial court, in its 
87 
 
discretion, to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger 
of undue prejudice or confusing the issues or of misleading the jury.”  As we have 
explained, “ „ “[M]urder is seldom pretty, and pictures, testimony and physical 
evidence in such a case are always unpleasant” ‟ [citations], and we rely on our 
trial courts to ensure that relevant, otherwise admissible evidence is not more 
prejudicial than probative [citation].  A trial court‟s decision to admit photographs 
under Evidence Code section 352 will be upheld on appeal unless the prejudicial 
effect of such photographs clearly outweighs their probative value.”  (People v. 
Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 624.)   
 
We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the postmortem 
photographs of the Mercks.  Defendant was charged with first degree, 
premeditated murder.  The challenged photographs showed how the victims had 
been restrained before they were killed, as well as the manner of the killings 
themselves — gunshots to the head, and strangulation.  They thus were relevant to 
establish that the perpetrator intended to kill and that the killing was premeditated 
and deliberate. The photographs also clarified the testimony of Laskowski, Nerida 
and the coroner regarding the victims‟ restraints and wounds, and the locations 
and positions in which their bodies were found.  (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 
1153, 1199; People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 18.)   
 
Nor did the prejudicial effect of these photographs “clearly outweigh[]” 
their probative value (People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 624).  Evidence is 
prejudicial within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352 if it “ „uniquely 
tends to evoke an emotional bias against a party as an individual‟ ” (People v. 
Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 19, quoting People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 
140, 178) or if it would cause the jury to “ „ “prejudg[e]” a person or cause on the 
basis of extraneous factors‟ ” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 958).  We 
88 
 
have examined the photographs and agree with the trial court that they are not 
unduly prejudicial.  As the trial court noted, the photographs “do not have 
dismembered parts, these are people not [sic] laid out on a slide and cut up to 
show trajectories or probes inside of organs or body parts.”  (Cf. People v. Allen 
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1258 [photographs that did not show bodies “grossly 
disfigured during autopsy” were not unduly prejudicial].)  They do not depict the 
victims‟ faces; only the back of Alma‟s head and ear are visible in one 
photograph, and Clifford‟s head is hidden by the pillow over it.  (See People v. 
Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 615; People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 19.)  
There are no closeup views of Clifford‟s fatal wounds, and although some blood is 
visible in the photographs, there are not copious amounts.  Moreover, given the 
time that passed between the murders and the discovery of the bodies, it was 
inevitable that the photographs would depict some decomposition.  In any event, 
we do not find the photographs unduly gruesome.  (See People v. Davis, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at pp. 558, 615 [photograph of victim‟s badly decomposed body not 
gruesome].)  For all of these reasons, the trial court reasonably could find that the 
probative value of these photographs outweighed any potentially prejudicial effect.   
 
Defendant asserts that the manner and cause of the victims‟ deaths and the 
intent of the perpetrator were not disputed at trial; rather, the only seriously 
contested issue was the perpetrator‟s identity, and the photographs were irrelevant 
to that question.  But defendant‟s not guilty plea put in issue all of the elements of 
the charged offenses, including the elements he conceded.  (People v. Steele 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1243; see also Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 69 
[the “prosecution‟s burden to prove every element of the crime is not relieved by a 
defendant‟s tactical decision not to contest an essential element”].)  Thus, the 
prosecution was “still entitled to prove its case and especially to prove a fact so 
central to the basic question of guilt as intent.”  (People v. Steele, supra, 27 
89 
 
Cal.4th at p. 1243; see also People v. Scheid, supra,16 Cal.4th at pp. 15-17.)  
Defendant also contends that the manner of restraint and the cause of death were 
amply described in oral testimony; therefore the photographs were cumulative.  
But a prosecutor is not required to rely solely on oral testimony when a visual 
image would enhance the jury‟s understanding of the issues.  (See People v. 
Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 624 [the “jury is entitled to see details of the 
victims‟ bodies to determine if the evidence supports the prosecution‟s theory of 
the case”]; People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 16, 19.)   
 
Defendant argues that the record does not show that the trial court 
discharged its duty under Evidence Code section 352 to weigh the probative value 
of each photograph against its individual prejudicial effect.  Rather, the court 
relied on generalities in admitting the photographs “en masse.”  But defendant has 
forfeited any claim of error in this respect.  Before jury selection began, defendant 
made a blanket motion to exclude “any and all” postmortem photographs of the 
victims.26  After examining all of the photographs the prosecutor wanted to have 
available to introduce at trial, the trial court properly overruled defendant‟s pretrial 
objection to the extent it was based on relevance, because without knowing what 
the evidence at trial would be, the court could not conclusively say that any of the 
photographs would be irrelevant.  The court‟s ruling left open the possibility that, 
upon proper objection, it might later conclude that any particular photograph was 
irrelevant.  The trial court also properly denied petitioner‟s motion to exclude the 
photographs as more prejudicial than probative, because it concluded they had no 
prejudicial effect in the sense encompassed by Evidence Code section 352, and 
                                              
26 
In the alternative, defendant requested that the color photographs be 
converted to black-and-white form.  The trial court rejected that request, and 
defendant does not renew the argument here. 
90 
 
therefore there was no possibility that their probative value, if any, could be 
outweighed by any prejudicial effect.  Thereafter, defendant did not object to the 
photographs when they were marked as exhibits during trial; nor did he object 
when they were moved into evidence.  Accordingly, defendant has forfeited any 
claim that the trial court erred by failing to weigh each photograph‟s individual 
probative value against its individual prejudicial effect. 
 
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the 
photograph of Alma Merck while alive.  Although the photograph is somewhat 
grainy, defendant concedes, as he must, that it was relevant to show that Alma had 
worn a ring similar to the ring recovered from defendant‟s sister, Catherine Glass.  
Moreover, defendant fails to persuade us that the photograph, which the trial court 
described as “grandmotherly,” was unduly inflammatory.  (See People v. Davis, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 615 [school portrait of young female victim not “unduly 
inflammatory”].)  Indeed, the “possibility that [the photograph] generated 
sympathy for the victim[] [was] not enough, by itself, to compel its exclusion” 
given its relevance.  (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1230; but see 
People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 963-964 [“marginally relevant” photograph 
of young victim “probably should have been excluded”].)  
 
Even assuming error, it was harmless under any standard.  The jury was 
well aware from other testimony that the Mercks were a frail elderly couple who 
spent time with their children and grandchildren.  In this respect, the photograph 
would have generated no more sympathy for the victims than Alma‟s children and 
grandchildren testifying live from the witness stand.  (See People v. Scheid, supra, 
16 Cal.4th at p. 20; People v. DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1230.)  Moreover, 
there was strong evidence connecting defendant to the Merck murders, including 
the presence of his fingerprints at the crime scene and his connection to the murder 
91 
 
weapon.  We are confident the admission of the photograph had no effect on the 
verdicts finding defendant guilty of the Merck murders. 
7.  Alleged error in admitting Gerry Tags’s preliminary examination 
testimony and related instructional error  
Defendant‟s former girlfriend, Gerry Tags, testified for the prosecution at 
defendant‟s preliminary examination.  On cross-examination, Tags admitted that 
she hated defendant.  When defendant‟s counsel asked why, Tags explained she 
hated defendant because, among “other things,” he beat her and forced her to 
prostitute herself.   
On redirect examination the prosecutor asked Tags to elaborate on the 
“other” reasons she hated defendant, and the following colloquy occurred: 
“A.  
Why is because me havin‟ it in my own mind that — what I think he 
has done, you know; and other things too.  [¶]  And I can‟t say that he done it 
because I wasn‟t there or nothing; but in my own mind, I would — I would always 
hate him, you know, because — he — man, I tell you, I always hate him. 
“Q. 
What do you think that he did?  
“A. 
Well, he hurt people that shouldn‟t have been hurted [sic]. 
“Q. 
Are you talking about the people in this case? 
“A. 
Yes. 
“Q. 
Does that bother you? 
“A. 
Both of the cases.”   
At that point defense counsel objected.  The magistrate accepted the 
prosecutor‟s explanation that the testimony was relevant to Tags‟s state of mind, 
but stated it would not be admitted for its truth.    
Tags died before trial.  Over defendant‟s objection, the trial court granted 
the prosecutor‟s motion to admit, under Evidence Code section 1291, Tags‟s 
preliminary examination testimony that she believed defendant had “hurt” the 
92 
 
people in “both of the cases.” 27  The prosecutor and defendant‟s counsel shared 
the task of reading of Tags‟s preliminary examination testimony to the jury, with 
defendant‟s counsel reading the portion regarding Tags‟s belief in defendant‟s 
guilt.  No limiting instruction was given except CALJIC No. 2.09, which instructs 
the jury generally that evidence admitted for a limited purpose should be restricted 
to that purpose.   
Defendant now argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
Tags‟s testimony about her belief in defendant‟s guilt because the evidence was 
more prejudicial than probative.  (See Evid. Code, § 352.)  We disagree.  The 
evidence was relevant to show the reasons Tags hated defendant and therefore was 
probative of her bias against defendant.  Defendant argues it was the fact of Tags‟s 
hatred that was relevant; the reasons for her hatred were not.  But defendant‟s 
counsel opened up this line of inquiry by questioning Tags about her reasons.  The 
prosecutor therefore was entitled to explore the issue fully.  (See Evid. Code, 
§ 356.)  
Nor was the evidence particularly prejudicial.  “Evidence is prejudicial 
within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352 if it encourages the jury to 
prejudge defendant‟s case based upon extraneous or irrelevant considerations.”  
(People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 863.)  Here, the evidence did not 
encourage the jury to prejudge defendant‟s case; rather, it merely invited the jury 
to infer that Tags hated defendant, and therefore might be biased against him, 
                                              
27 
Subdivision (a)(2) of Evidence Code section 1291 provides, “Evidence of 
former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness and  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  [t]he party against whom the former 
testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony 
was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with 
an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing.”   
93 
 
because she believed he was guilty.  Defendant argues the evidence was 
prejudicial because Tags was the person closest to defendant in 1984; therefore the 
jury would have assumed she based her belief on facts unknown to the jury.  But 
Tags herself admitted that she couldn‟t “say that he done it” because she “wasn‟t 
there or nothing.”  Accordingly, the jury may well have concluded that she was 
expressing no more than an unfounded belief.    
Defendant claims the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury 
regarding the limited purpose for which Tags‟s testimony about her belief in 
defendant‟s guilt was admitted.  Absent a request, a trial court generally has no 
duty to instruct as to the limited purpose for which evidence has been admitted.  
(People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 516; People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 1040, 1051; see Evid. Code, § 355 [“When evidence is admissible . . . for 
one purpose and is inadmissible . . . for another purpose, the court upon request 
shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”  
(Italics added.)].)  We have recognized a narrow exception to this rule in the 
“ „occasional extraordinary case‟ ” in which the evidence at issue “ „is a dominant 
part of the evidence against the accused, and is both highly prejudicial and 
minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose.‟ ”  (People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at pp. 1051-1052, quoting People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 63-64; see 
also People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 864.)  The exception is inapplicable 
here because Tags‟s brief testimony about her belief in defendant‟s guilt was not a 
dominant part of the prosecution‟s case and, as discussed above, was neither 
highly prejudicial nor minimally relevant.  The trial court therefore had no duty to 
instruct absent a timely request. 
Here, defendant requested a limiting instruction at the hearing on the 
admissibility of Tags‟s testimony.  The trial court agreed, directing that the 
preliminary examination magistrate‟s statement limiting the purpose of Tags‟s 
94 
 
testimony about her belief be read to the jury, and stating that it would give “any 
other limiting instruction” at “the appropriate time.”  But when  defendant‟s 
counsel read the challenged portion of Tags‟s preliminary examination testimony 
to the jury three days later, he inexplicably failed to include the magistrate‟s 
statement limiting the purpose of the evidence.  Any error in failing to include the 
magistrate‟s statement in the reading therefore must be ascribed to defendant.   
Moreover, defense counsel did not remind the court that it had agreed to 
give a limiting instruction either at the time the testimony was read, or when 
discussing jury instructions before the case was submitted to the jury.  Nor did 
defense counsel submit any proposed written limiting instruction.  “Because 
defendant[] did not specifically request a limiting instruction at the appropriate 
time, the court had no sua sponte duty to give one.”  (People v. Hernandez, supra, 
33 Cal.4th at p. 1052.)   
Finally, even assuming evidentiary or instructional error, defendant was not 
prejudiced at the guilt phase.  As noted, Tags admitted that her belief in 
defendant‟s guilt had no factual basis.  She also admitted that defendant had told 
her, contrary to her belief, that he did not kill the Mercks.  Under these 
circumstances, it is unlikely the jury assigned much weight to her testimony about 
her belief.  Moreover, there was strong evidence of defendant‟s guilt of the Merck 
murders, including his fingerprints found at the crime scene and his connection to 
the murder weapon.  For these reasons, admission of Tags‟s testimony about her 
belief that defendant had “hurt” the Mercks was harmless under any standard.   
Defendant argues the error prejudiced him at the penalty phase because the 
jury had deadlocked nine to three as to his guilt of the Russell murder.  Therefore, 
he reasons, at least three jurors must have believed he was guilty of Russell‟s 
murder, and the penalty phase jury instructions permitted those jurors to consider 
that murder as an aggravating circumstance.  Had Tags‟s testimony about her 
95 
 
belief not been admitted, he asserts, those jurors may well have concluded that his 
guilt of Russell‟s murder had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  But 
Tags gave much more damaging testimony about the Russell murder, including 
that the night before she learned that Russell had been killed, defendant left Gerald 
and Mitzi‟s apartment in the early evening and returned in the early morning 
wearing different clothes; that a week or two later Tags saw the clothes defendant 
had been wearing when he left the apartment in the trunk of her car, bloodied and 
wrapped around a knife; and that after Russell‟s murder Tags, Gerald and 
defendant took a two-week trip to Oklahoma and Florida, during which defendant 
admitted killing Russell.  Furthermore, Tags was extensively cross-examined 
about her drug use, lack of recall, and the inconsistencies between her various 
accounts of the events of September 1984.  In light of the whole of Tags‟s 
testimony, admission of her statements about her admittedly unfounded belief in 
defendant‟s guilt could have not prejudiced defendant under any standard.    
8. Alleged error in admitting Mitzi Cowan’s testimony   
Mitzi Cowan, who was Jewell Russell‟s daughter and in 1984 the girlfriend 
of defendant‟s brother Gerald, testified that one day during the first week of 
September defendant and Gerry Tags came to visit the apartment Mitzi shared 
with Gerald.  About 5:00 p.m., defendant and Gerald left the apartment together.  
Gerald returned alone about 10:00 p.m. and asked Mitzi if he could use her car; 
she agreed and gave him the keys.  Gerald returned alone again about 1:00 a.m.  
About two hours later defendant knocked on the door.  Gerald rushed downstairs 
and yelled at defendant, “Where did you go?  Where did you go?  Why did you 
leave me?”  Defendant was wearing different clothes than those he had on when 
he left.  A few days later, Mitzi learned her father had been killed.   
96 
 
Over defendant‟s objection and mistrial motion, Mitzi further testified that 
when Gerald returned alone about 1:00 a.m., he threw “two hundred some odd 
dollars” on the bed.  The money was folded in half.  Earlier, Mitzi had testified 
that her father always carried his money in his front pocket, the bills folded neatly 
in half.   
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Mitzi‟s 
testimony that when Gerald returned at 1:00 a.m., he threw $200 in folded 
currency on the bed.  He contends the evidence was irrelevant in the absence of 
independent evidence of a conspiracy between defendant and Gerald to kill 
Russell.  (Cf. People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 430; People v. Herrera 
(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 46, 61.)  He asserts the testimony prejudiced him because 
those jurors who believed his guilt of Russell‟s murder had been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt were permitted to consider that murder in aggravation at the 
penalty phase.  He argues that absent Mitzi‟s testimony about Gerald‟s possession 
of the folded currency, which linked the suspicious activities of defendant and 
Gerald to the murder of Russell, there would have been fewer or no jurors who 
believed defendant‟s guilt of Russell‟s murder had been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
Defendant confuses the question of relevance with that of the admissibility 
of hearsay.  Under Evidence Code section 1223, evidence of a hearsay “statement” 
of a coconspirator is inadmissible against the defendant absent “ „independent 
evidence to establish prima facie the existence of . . . [a] conspiracy.‟ ”  (People v. 
Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 139, quoting People v. Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 
p. 430; see also Evid. Code, § 1223, subd. (c).)  A “statement” for these purposes 
may include conduct, but only conduct that is “intended . . . as a substitute for oral 
or written verbal expression.”  (Evid. Code, § 225; see People v. Lewis, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at pp. 497-498.)  Here, defendant does not argue that Gerald‟s possession 
97 
 
of $200 in folded currency was intended as a substitute for oral or written verbal 
expression.  Nor could he.  Gerald‟s conduct in possessing the currency was 
simply that: conduct, without any associated expression of meaning.   
That being the case, the heightened standards for the admission of hearsay 
do not apply, and defendant points to no other principle of law that would require 
proof of a conspiracy before evidence of the nonassertive conduct of someone 
other than the defendant may be admitted into evidence.  The only question, then, 
is whether the evidence was relevant.  We recently summarized the applicable 
principles:  “Only relevant evidence is admissible (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 350), and 
all relevant evidence is admissible unless excluded under the federal or state 
Constitutions or by statute.  (Evid. Code, § 351; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, 
subd. (d); People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 972-973 (Heard).)  The test of 
relevance is whether the evidence „tends “logically, naturally, and by reasonable 
inference” to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive.‟  (People 
v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 177.)  The trial court has broad discretion in 
determining the relevance of evidence, but lacks discretion to admit irrelevant 
evidence.  (See People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 132.)  We review for 
abuse of discretion a trial court‟s rulings on the admissibility of evidence.  (Heard, 
at pp. 972, 974; People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 
841 P.2d 897.)”  (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 90.) 
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that 
Mitzi‟s testimony regarding Gerald‟s possession of the $200 in folded currency 
was relevant to the question whether defendant was involved in killing Russell.  
Because the money was folded in half the way Russell folded his money, the 
evidence tended to show that Russell was the person from whom Gerald had 
obtained the money.  Other evidence — including Mitzi‟s testimony that Gerald 
and defendant left the apartment together at 5:00 p.m. and that when defendant 
98 
 
returned at 3:00 a.m. Gerald was angry with defendant for having left him — 
tended to show that Gerald and defendant had been involved in some activity 
together between the hours of 5:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m., when Gerald had returned 
alone.  Accordingly, the evidence in its totality had some tendency to establish that 
between those hours, defendant and Gerald had engaged in some activity 
connected to Russell.  We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting Mitzi‟s testimony that Gerald possessed the folded currency.   
D. Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Victim impact testimony    
 
During the prosecution‟s penalty phase case-in-chief, Alma Merck‟s 
granddaughter, Shelley Denise Cox, described how she often thought about what 
Alma must have gone through before her death, “pleading for her life, the terror, 
the fear of this evil people or person in the house, and I envision her hearing her 
husband, my grandfather, being murdered in the other room . . . .”  When 
defendant‟s counsel objected that the testimony was “very prejudicial and not 
evidence,” the prosecutor interjected, “I believe this is how she feels.”  The trial 
court stated, “I think the jury understands that.  It is impact-type testimony, and it 
is not to be considered by the jury.  Obviously this witness was not a percipient 
witness.  You may proceed with that understanding.”   
 
Defense counsel objected several more times to various aspects of Cox‟s 
testimony.  Thus, when Cox stated she could not understand “why anyone would 
brutally murder” her grandparents, defense counsel interjected, “I think it has 
become argument.”  Cox then testified that the murders had “affected the entire 
family . . . our friends and now it has affected you [the jury], and you have been a 
part of this, and this is something that I feel you will never forget either.  It is like 
a disease.  It grows and grows and doesn‟t stop.”  At that point, defense counsel 
99 
 
objected, stating, “There is no question pending.  This is speculation and 
conjecture.”  The trial court overruled each of these objections.  Cox then testified, 
“I pray for [defendant] because right now I believe his heart is hard and he has no 
remorse, and he does not realize what he has done.  [¶]  I pray that his heart 
softens, because he will feel the pain, and I want him to feel the pain of what he 
has done, and the guilt, and yes, we‟re asking for the death penalty, and it is not 
out of revenge.  We‟re not vengeful people.  It is out of justice and fairness.  An 
eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth.  He made the choice.  He should suffer the 
consequences, and thank you for listening to me.”   
 
As Cox was leaving the witness stand, defense counsel asked to “take 
something up outside the presence of the jury.”  The court agreed to take up the 
issue after the lunch recess.  The prosecution‟s next witness, Alma‟s daughter, 
Betty Turner, testified that she “knew Cliff tried to do the best he could to protect 
my mother that day [of the murder], but he couldn‟t,” that she knew her mother 
“was terrified that day,” and that “they must have gone through pure hell before it 
was all over with.”  The trial court overruled defendant‟s objection that Turner‟s 
testimony went “beyond the victim impact.”    
 
At the recess, defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that “the 
testimony of Denise Cox, and Betty Turner, is way beyond that which is permitted 
by the Supreme Court a[s] to victim impact testimony.”  The court denied the 
motion, but invited defense counsel to propose a limiting instruction.  Counsel 
declined.  After the jury had returned its verdict of death for Alma‟s murder and 
life without possibility of parole for Clifford‟s murder, defendant moved for a new 
trial, arguing the victim impact testimony violated federal and state law on several 
additional grounds.  The trial court denied that motion as well.        
 
Defendant renews his contention that the testimony of Cox and Turner went 
beyond the scope of permissible victim impact testimony as determined by the 
100 
 
United States Supreme Court and therefore violated his Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.  (See Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808 (Payne); Booth 
v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 494.)  In Payne, the high court clarified that in the 
penalty phase of a capital case, the admission of evidence about the victim and the 
impact of the murder on the victim‟s family and friends does not per se violate the 
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.  (Payne, supra, 501 
U.S. at pp. 827, 830, fn. 2; People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 781.)  
However, the admission of such evidence will violate the due process clause of the 
federal Constitution if it is “ „so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial 
fundamentally unfair.‟ ”  (People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 781, quoting 
Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825.)  Moreover, the scope of constitutionally 
permissible victim impact testimony does not include “characterizations or 
opinions about the crime, the defendant, or the appropriate punishment, by the 
victim‟s family members or friends.”  (People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 
1180; see People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 622, citing Payne, supra, 501 
U.S. at p. 830, fn. 2.)   
The Attorney General initially contends that defendant forfeited the 
constitutional basis of his claims by failing to object on such grounds below.  We 
disagree.  When defendant objected to Turner‟s testimony on the ground that it 
“goes beyond the victim impact,” he used a well-recognized term commonly 
understood as referring to the United States Supreme Court‟s Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the permissible scope of victim 
testimony at the penalty phase of a capital case.  Further, when defendant later 
moved for a mistrial, he specifically referred to “that which is permitted by the 
[United States] Supreme Court a[s] to victim impact testimony.”  Under these 
circumstances, defendant made the federal constitutional bases of his motion 
sufficiently clear to preserve the issue for review. 
101 
 
 
Nonetheless, defendant‟s claim fails.  Defendant first contends Cox and 
Turner should not have been permitted to speculate as to what the Mercks had felt 
and experienced immediately before their deaths.  (Cf. Evid. Code, § 702, subd. 
(a) [a witness must have personal knowledge of the subject matter of his or her 
testimony].)  He asserts such testimony constituted constitutionally impermissible 
“characterizations or opinions about the crime.”  (People v. Pollock, supra, 32 
Cal.4th at p. 1180; see Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 830, fn. 2.)  But as the trial 
court concluded, the testimony was admissible not to establish what the Mercks 
had actually experienced, but to explain what Cox and Turner imagined they had 
experienced.  The latter was relevant to the witnesses‟ own state of mind and the 
effect that the murders had upon them personally, and therefore was permissible 
victim impact testimony.  (See People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1182 
[testimony by son of murder victims that he imagined his parents must have 
suffered greatly during their final minutes was admissible to show the harm caused 
by the killings].)  Nor was the testimony so inflammatory or prejudicial as to 
render the trial fundamentally unfair.  (See People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at 
p. 781; Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825.)  Rather, that family members of murder 
victims might imagine the victims‟ horror would have been obvious to the jurors, 
and the challenged portions of the testimony were brief and not graphic.    
 
Defendant complains the trial court‟s explanation to the jury — that the 
challenged portion of Cox‟s testimony would be permitted only as “impact-type 
testimony” because Cox “[o]bviously . . . was not a percipient witness”  — was 
insufficient to convey the limited purpose of the evidence.  But defendant refused 
the trial court‟s invitation to propose a further limiting instruction; therefore he 
may not complain on appeal of the court‟s failure to provide one.  (People v. 
Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 197.)   
102 
 
 
Defendant further contends the trial court erred in permitting Cox to testify 
that she believed defendant‟s “heart is hard and he has no remorse,” and that the 
family was asking for the death penalty “out of justice and fairness.  An eye for an 
eye, a tooth for a tooth.”  Defendant contends that Cox‟s reference to defendant‟s 
perceived lack of remorse constituted an unconstitutional “characterization[] or 
opinion[] about . . . the defendant” (People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 
p. 1180; see Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 830, fn. 2) and also fell outside the scope 
of permissible aggravating evidence under section 190.3 (see People v. Jones 
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1265 [evidence of postcrime remorselessness is not an 
aggravating factor under section 190.3]; People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 
772-776).  Defendant further contends that Cox improperly appealed to biblical 
sources (cf. People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 836-837 [prosecutor may not 
invoke biblical teachings]), and improperly voiced the family‟s “opinion[] 
about . . . the appropriate punishment” in violation of his constitutional rights 
(People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1180; see People v. Smith, supra, 30 
Cal.4th at p. 622; Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 830, fn. 2).  Defendant did not 
object to Cox‟s testimony on any of these grounds below, however, even during 
the recess when, out of the jury‟s presence, he moved for a mistrial.  Rather, the 
sole articulated basis of his objection and motion was that the witnesses were 
improperly narrating and speculating about what had happened to the victims in 
the minutes before they died.28  Defendant therefore forfeited his right to complain 
                                              
28 
At the mistrial hearing, defense counsel argued, “These witnesses were 
allowed to narrate and speculate as to what did or did not happen with the victims, 
and I think it is beyond the permissible bounds of victim impact, and there was a 
lot of speculation as to what happened at the time that the victims were killed, and 
I could appreciate where they are coming from, but I think it is not admissible, and 
I make a motion for a mistrial, particularly as to the testimony of Denise Cox and 
Betty Turner.”   
103 
 
on appeal that Cox‟s testimony that she believed defendant lacked remorse and 
that the family was asking for the death penalty based on the eye-for-an-eye 
principle was improper.  (See People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1181-
1182.)  Further, defendant‟s filing of a motion for new trial did not revive these 
claims that had not been preserved by a timely and specific objection.  (People v. 
Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 794; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 
254.) 
 
In any event, any error in permitting Cox‟s testimony about defendant‟s 
lack of remorse and the family‟s desire for the death penalty was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)  The 
challenged portion of Cox‟s testimony constitutes only a few sentences out of 
more than 25 pages of reporter‟s transcript comprising the prosecution‟s penalty 
phase case-in-chief.  Even in the absence of such testimony, jurors might assume 
that the family of a murder victim would want the murderer to express remorse 
and to be sentenced to death.  Moreover, the strong aggravating evidence included 
not only the circumstances surrounding the brutal murders of Alma and Clifford 
Merck during a burglary and robbery, but also evidence that defendant had 
committed another, similar burglary and robbery — one that well could have 
resulted in murders — about a year after the Merck murders.  There also was 
evidence that defendant had picked up his girlfriend‟s son by the hair and thrown 
him to the ground, and had been convicted of robbery in 1970.  By contrast, 
defendant‟s mitigating evidence was not particularly strong.  The evidence about 
defendant‟s allegedly abusive upbringing came only from an aunt and a cousin; 
there was no testimony from those closest to defendant, including his mother and 
siblings.  And the testimony of defendant‟s girlfriend and her children about the 
children‟s relationship with defendant might have struck the jurors as somewhat 
insincere, since they all repeated a similar script.  
104 
 
 
Defendant argues the difference between the verdicts — death for Alma‟s 
murder and life without possibility of parole for Clifford‟s murder — indicates the 
victim impact testimony from Alma‟s relatives was the pivotal factor that 
influenced the jury to return a verdict of death for Alma only.  We disagree.  The 
testimony pertained to the impact of both victims‟ deaths, and Betty Turner 
testified that Clifford was as much a family member as Alma was.  Rather than 
reflecting the effect of the impact testimony, the difference in the verdicts most 
likely reflects the jury‟s careful consideration of the difference between how Alma 
and Clifford were killed.  The forensic pathologist, Dr. Dollinger, testified that 
Clifford‟s death from the gunshot wounds to his head probably was nearly 
instantaneous.  By contrast, Alma may have lived for four to five minutes before 
succumbing to strangulation.  The jurors thus reasonably could have concluded 
that Alma suffered more than Clifford.  Under these circumstances, any error in 
the admission of Cox‟s testimony regarding defendant‟s lack of remorse and the 
family‟s desire for a death sentence based on a biblical reference was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.           
2.  Failure to give a reasonable doubt instruction with respect to 
evidence of the Russell murder   
 
As explained above, at the guilt phase, the trial court declared a mistrial on 
the Russell count because the jury could not reach a verdict.  The final vote was 
nine to three, although the trial court did not inquire whether the split favored a 
guilty verdict or a not guilty verdict.  Following the mistrial, defendant moved to 
impanel a new penalty phase jury, arguing the penalty jury should not include 
jurors who believed he was guilty of Russell‟s murder.  The court denied the 
motion.   
 
The penalty phase evidence showed that in 1985 defendant had burglarized 
the home of James Foster and robbed Foster and his coworker Jessie Cruz.  The 
105 
 
evidence also included testimony that in 1993 defendant had picked up his 
girlfriend‟s young son, Robert, by the hair and flung him to the ground.   
 
The jurors were instructed that in determining the penalty to be imposed on 
defendant they should consider “all of the evidence which has been received 
during any part of this trial.”  The jurors were further instructed to “consider and 
take in to [sic] account and be guided by” a list of aggravating and mitigating 
factors, including “the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant 
other than the crimes for which the defendant has been tried in the present 
proceedings, which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence, or the 
express or implied threat to use force or violence.”  (See § 190.3, factor (b).) 
 
Regarding the evaluation of evidence of other criminal activity, the jurors 
were instructed, without objection from defendant, pursuant to a modified version 
of CALJIC No. 8.87 (1989 rev.):  “Evidence has been introduced for the purpose 
of showing that the defendant has committed the following criminal acts.  One, 
residential burglary, two, residential robbery, and three, child abuse, which 
involved the express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or 
violence.  Before a juror may consider any of such criminal acts as an aggravating 
circumstance in this case, a juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant did, in fact, commit such criminal acts.  A juror may not 
consider any evidence of any other criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance.  
[¶]  It is not necessary for all jurors to agree.  If any juror is convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that such criminal activity occurred, that juror may consider that 
activity as a fact in aggravation.  If a juror is not so convinced, that juror must not 
consider that evidence for any purpose.”    
 
Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel mentioned the Russell murder 
during penalty phase opening statements or closing arguments.  However, during 
deliberations on the afternoon of June 13, 1996, the jurors requested a readback of 
106 
 
the testimony of Dr. Dollinger, the forensic pathologist who had examined the 
bodies of the Mercks and Russell.  The readback commenced the following 
morning.  Defendant objected to the readback of any testimony about victim 
Russell, arguing such testimony would be irrelevant and prejudicial, given the 
mistrial on the Russell charge.  After some discussion, the court sent a note to the 
jurors asking if they wished the readback to include testimony about Russell.   
When the jurors responded in the affirmative, defendant moved for a mistrial.  The 
court denied the motion, reasoning that those jurors who believed defendant‟s guilt 
of Russell‟s murder had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt were permitted to 
consider that murder as an aggravating factor in the penalty phase.  The testimony 
was reread.  That afternoon, the jury returned its verdicts of death for the murder 
of Alma Merck and life without the possibility of parole for the murder of Clifford 
Merck.   
 
Defendant contends the trial court had a duty to instruct on its own motion 
that the jurors could not consider evidence of the Russell murder in aggravation 
unless they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had 
committed that murder.  He asserts the instruction regarding other criminal activity 
was erroneous because it failed to identify the Russell murder as criminal activity 
that could be considered only if proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Section 190.3, factor (b), permits the jury to consider in aggravation violent 
criminal activity by the defendant other than the crimes of which he or she has 
been convicted in the capital trial, regardless of whether such activity led to a 
conviction, but precludes consideration of crimes for which the defendant has been 
prosecuted and acquitted.  (People v. Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 112-113; 
People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 526-532, disapproved on other grounds 
in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 933, fn. 4; People v. Melton (1988) 
44 Cal.3d 713, 754-756.)  Because evidence of other crimes may be particularly 
107 
 
important to a jury considering penalty, state law provides that no juror may 
consider such evidence unless first convinced of its truth beyond a reasonable 
doubt.   (People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 132; People v. Robertson 
(1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 54; see also People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal.2d 820, 840 
[construing pre-1977 version of § 190.3]; People v. Polk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 443, 
450-451 [same].)  There is no requirement, however, that penalty phase jurors 
unanimously agree on the existence of aggravating factors that support the 
imposition of the death penalty, including the existence of other criminal activity 
under factor (b).  (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 533; People v. Miranda 
(1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 99, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Marshall, 
supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 933, fn. 4.)  Accordingly, it would have been proper for 
those jurors who believed defendant‟s guilt of Russell‟s murder had been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt to consider that murder as an aggravating factor to be 
weighed against the mitigating evidence in determining the appropriate penalty.   
(See People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1057-1058; People v. Miranda, supra, 
44 Cal.3d at p. 99.) 
 
We have long held that the trial court must give a reasonable doubt 
instruction on its own motion whenever evidence of other crimes is presented at 
either the guilt or penalty phases of a capital trial and the evidence is “introduced 
or referred to as an aggravating factor pursuant to” section 190.3, factor (b).  
(People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 60-63 (conc. opn. of Broussard, J.); 
see also id. at pp. 53-55 [evidence presented at guilt phase]; People v. Yeoman, 
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 132; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 965-967 
[penalty phase]; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 97-98 [same]; People 
v. Stanworth, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 841 [same]; People v. McClellan (1969) 71 
Cal.2d 793, 806-807 [guilt phase; construing pre-1977 law]; People v. Polk, supra, 
63 Cal.2d at pp. 450-451 [penalty phase]; accord, People v. Champion (1995) 9 
108 
 
Cal.4th 879, 949 [guilt phase], disapproved on another point in People v. Ray 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 369, fn. 2 (conc. opn. of George, C.J., joined by a majority 
of the court).)  We have further held that when such evidence is presented at either 
phase but is neither introduced nor referred to as an aggravating factor under 
factor (b) at the penalty phase, there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on reasonable 
doubt.29  (E.g., People v. Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 113 [guilt phase]; 
People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 967 [same]; People v. Rich (1988) 45 
Cal.3d 1036, 1121 [same]; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 958-959 
[guilt, sanity and penalty phases]; see also People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 
964 [no sua sponte duty to instruct on reasonable doubt with respect to guilt phase 
evidence not “ „clearly introduced‟ ” under factor (b), quoting People v. Maury 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 443], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.)   
 
Here, evidence of the Russell murder was not introduced as an aggravating 
factor, and neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel referred to it as an 
aggravating factor during opening statements or closing arguments.  The only 
reference to the Russell murder during the penalty phase occurred when, at the 
jury‟s request, testimony about the Russell murder was included in the readback of 
Dr. Dollinger‟s testimony.  Even were we to conclude, however, that this 
constituted a reference to the Russell murder as an aggravating factor sufficient to 
trigger a sua sponte duty to instruct that individual jurors could not consider 
evidence of that murder in aggravation unless convinced beyond a reasonable 
                                              
29 
To “avoid potential confusion” over which other crimes the prosecution is 
relying on as aggravating circumstances in a given case, we have encouraged 
prosecutors to “request an instruction enumerating the particular other crimes 
which the jury may consider as aggravating circumstances in determining 
penalty.”  (People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 55, fn. 19.) 
109 
 
doubt of defendant‟s guilt, any error in failing to give such an instruction was 
harmless.  At the penalty phase of a capital case, the failure to instruct that other 
criminal acts may not be considered in aggravation unless proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt is not error of federal constitutional dimension.  (People v. 
Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 430; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 98.)  
Any error here was less serious than the failure to give any reasonable doubt 
instruction at all; here, such an instruction was given, it just was not expressly 
related to the Russell murder.  In any event, whether or not the federal 
Constitution is implicated, we find no basis for reversal.  As we have explained, 
state law error at the penalty phase of a capital case requires reversal only when 
there is a “reasonable (i.e., realistic) possibility” the error affected the verdict.  
(People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 447-448.)  That standard is “the same, in 
substance and effect,” as the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of 
Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.  (People v. Jones, supra, 29 
Cal.4th at p. 1264, fn. 11; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 479.)   
 
Any instructional error was harmless under either standard.  Defendant 
contends he was prejudiced because the instructions given permitted even those 
jurors who did not find his guilt of Russell‟s murder proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt to consider that murder as an aggravating factor at the penalty phase.  He 
further posits that the Russell murder very well may have been the deciding factor 
that tipped the scales in favor of the death penalty for those jurors.  We find this 
scenario unrealistic for several reasons.  First, as noted above, the jurors were 
instructed not to consider as an aggravating factor any criminal activity other than 
residential burglary, residential robbery, and child abuse, and to consider even 
those acts only if they were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  The direction that 
only the enumerated criminal acts could be considered in aggravation was 
reinforced because the court instructed on the elements of burglary, robbery and 
110 
 
child abuse but did not instruct on the elements of any other offense.  Moreover, 
the instruction that laid out the aggravating and mitigating factors stated that the 
jury could consider only criminal activity “other than the crimes for which the 
defendant has been tried in the present proceedings.”  Defendant had been tried for 
the Russell murder in the present proceeding; he just had not been convicted.30  
Finally, the jury was told that “the only factors that can be considered by you as 
aggravating factors are those upon which you have previously been instructed.”  
The instructions as a whole then, reasonably read, excluded the Russell murder 
from the other criminal activity that could be considered in aggravation.  We must 
presume the jurors followed these instructions, unless the record leads us to 
believe otherwise.  (People v. Smith, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 517; People v. Waidla, 
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 725.)   
 
Here, it is possible, though unlikely, that the trial court‟s acquiescence in 
the jurors‟ request to have Dr. Dollinger‟s testimony about Russell‟s autopsy read 
back during the penalty phase deliberations may have led the jurors to believe 
(correctly, as noted above) that, contrary to the instructions, they could consider 
the Russell murder as an aggravating circumstance.  Even assuming that was the 
case, however, we find it extremely unlikely that individual jurors then believed 
they could consider the Russell murder as an aggravating factor even if it had not 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rather, the most logical response to the 
                                              
30 
This instruction was based on the then-current version of CALJIC No. 8.85.  
The present version of CALJIC No. 8.85 contains identical language delineating 
the scope of section 190.3, factor (b).  As we have shown, the pattern instruction is 
incorrect insofar as it excludes from individual jurors‟ consideration at the penalty 
phase evidence of crimes for which defendant was charged and tried in the capital 
proceeding, but as to which the jury could not reach a verdict.  In the future, trial 
courts should modify CALJIC No. 8.85 by substituting the word “convicted” for 
the word “tried” in the language describing factor (b).       
111 
 
absence of a specific instruction would have been to conclude that the Russell 
murder was subject to the same reasonable doubt standard as the other criminal 
activity included in the instruction based on CALJIC No. 8.87.  After all, the trial 
court‟s acquiescence in the readback request intimated nothing one way or the 
other about the standard under which the evidence of Russell‟s murder was to be 
judged.  Nor would anything in counsel‟s argument have misled the jurors on this 
point; as explained, neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel mentioned the 
Russell murder in summation.   
 
Furthermore, even assuming the jurors misunderstood the applicable 
standard, we find no realistic possibility that consideration of the Russell murder 
by those jurors who concluded that murder had not been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt would have caused those jurors to vote for the death penalty 
when they otherwise might not have done so.  During the guilt phase deliberations, 
after the jurors informed the court that they could not agree on defendant‟s guilt of 
Russell‟s murder, the court brought the jurors into the courtroom and asked the 
foreman and each juror whether he or she felt further deliberations would result in 
a verdict.  After the jurors had responded in the negative and had returned to the 
jury room, the prosecutor remarked that the jurors “sounded extremely emphatic,” 
and the court commented that the foreman was “pretty adamant about the jurors 
having basically taken their relative positions.”  It seems highly unlikely that a 
juror who “emphatic[ally]” or “adamant[ly]” believed defendant‟s guilt of 
Russell‟s murder had not been proved would then turn around and use that murder 
as the deciding factor in the penalty calculus.   
Moreover, as noted above, the aggravating evidence aside from Russell‟s 
murder was voluminous, while the mitigating evidence was not particularly strong.  
Even defense counsel acknowledged in closing argument, without referring to 
112 
 
Russell‟s murder, that the jurors reasonably might find that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.   
Here, the record reflects that the jurors carefully weighed the difference 
between how Alma and Clifford were murdered in deciding to impose the death 
penalty for Alma‟s murder and life without possibility of parole for Clifford‟s 
murder.  The difference between the verdicts suggests that even those jurors who 
believed beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant murdered Russell did not use 
that fact to vote for death.  It therefore is even more unlikely that those jurors who 
had not been willing to vote for guilt on the Russell murder count then used that 
evidence to vote for death with regard to Alma‟s murder but not with regard to 
Clifford‟s.   
For all of these reasons, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility that 
any instructional error affected the penalty verdict (People v. Brown, supra, 46 
Cal.3d at pp. 447-448), and that any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24).31   
                                              
31 
We also reject defendant‟s alternative claim that his counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to point out the omission of the Russell murder 
from the reasonable doubt instruction.  To establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant must show both:  (1) that counsel‟s performance was deficient; 
and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  (Wiggins v. Smith 
(2003) 539 U.S. 510, 521; Strickland v. Washington (1986) 466 U.S. 668, 687-
692; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.)  While generally we do 
not reach claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, defendant contends 
we may do so here because his trial counsel had “ „no conceivable tactical 
purpose‟ ” for failing to request a correct instruction.  (People v. Hines (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 997, 1065, quoting People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 558.)  Even were 
we to assume counsel‟s performance was deficient, however, for the reasons set 
forth above there is no reasonable probability of a different result had counsel 
requested and received the instruction. 
113 
 
3. Failure to define reasonable doubt  
 
At the conclusion of the penalty phase evidence, the trial court instructed 
the jury using the 1989 version of CALJIC No. 8.84.1 in pertinent part as follows:  
“You will now be instructed as to all of the law that applies to the penalty phase of 
this trial.  [¶]  You must determine what the facts are from the evidence received 
during the entire trial unless you are instructed to the contrary or otherwise.  You 
must accept and follow the law that I shall state to you.  You are to disregard all 
other instructions given to you in other phases of this trial.”  The trial court also 
instructed the jury, as pertinent here, in the language of CALJIC No. 8.84, the 
introductory penalty phase instruction; No. 8.85, the list of aggravating and 
mitigating factors for the jury‟s consideration; No. 8.86, requiring proof of a prior 
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt; No. 8.87, requiring proof of other criminal 
activity beyond a reasonable doubt; No. 8.88, the penalty phase concluding 
instruction; and defendant‟s special instruction 26.32  Contrary to the 
                                              
32 
That instruction, an amalgamation of concepts from CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 
8.84, 8.84.1, and several cases, stated (somewhat confusingly) in its entirety:  “The 
defendant in this case has been found guilty of murder in the first degree.  The 
allegation was that the murder was committed under special circumstances which 
have found — which have been found true by you, the jury.  [¶]  It is the law of 
this state that the penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree 
with special circumstances shall be death or confinement in state prison for life 
without the possibility of parole in any case in which the special circumstance 
charged has been found to be true.  [¶]  Under the law of this state you must 
determine, if you can, which of said penalties shall be imposed on the defendant.  
[¶]  During the first phase of the trial, you were given instructions concerning the 
law applicable to this case.  It will not be necessary to repeat at this time most of 
those instructions, with one notable exception.  [¶]  That exception is that in this 
part of the trial the law permits you to be influenced by mercy, sympathy, 
compassion or pity for the defendant or his family in arriving at a proper penalty 
in this case.  [¶]  However, you must not be prejudiced against the defendant.  You 
must not be biased against the defendant on the issue of penalty because he has 
been arrested for this offense, charged with a crime, or brought to trial.  None of 
these circumstances determines the appropriate penalty and you must not infer or 
(footnote continued on next page) 
114 
 
recommendation in the Use Note to CALJIC No. 8.84.1, however, the trial court 
did not reinstruct the jury with CALJIC No. 2.90, defining reasonable doubt.  
Defendant asserts that the failure to redefine reasonable doubt violated state law as 
well as his rights to due process of law and a reliable penalty determination under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.   
 
The omission was error.  As we recently explained in addressing a similar 
claim, “if a trial court instructs the jury at the penalty phase not to refer to 
instructions given at the guilt phase, it later must provide the jury with those 
instructions applicable to the evaluation of evidence at the penalty phase,” 
including CALJIC No. 2.90.  (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 535; accord, 
People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 408.)   
 
As in Lewis, however, we find the error here harmless under either the state 
“reasonable possibility” standard for penalty phase error (see People v. Brown, 
supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 446-448), or the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard for federal constitutional error set forth in Chapman v. California, supra, 
386 U.S. at page 24.  (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 535.)   Defendant 
speculates that in the absence of an instruction defining reasonable doubt, and in 
light of the instruction to disregard the guilt phase instructions, individual jurors 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
assume from any or all of them that the death penalty is more likely to be 
appropriate than the punishment of life without the possibility of parole.  You 
must not be influenced by mere conjecture, passion, prejudice, public opinion or 
public feeling.  This means that you may not indulge in prejudice against the 
defendant arising out of some perception that the public sentiment favors the death 
penalty in this case or any other case.  The law has no preference as to which 
punishment is appropriate in any particular case.  Both the People and the 
defendant have a right to expect that you will consider all of the evidence, follow 
the law and exercise your discretion conscientiously, and reach a just verdict.”     
115 
 
likely applied legally incorrect and possibly inconsistent standards of proof to the 
evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity.  But as defendant acknowledges, the 
jury was instructed that before it could consider unadjudicated criminal activity as 
aggravating, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had engaged 
in that activity.  “There is no reasonable possibility the jury would have believed 
that the reasonable doubt standard it was required to apply at the penalty phase 
was any different than the standard it had just applied at the guilt phase,” under 
which at least three and possibly nine jurors had found defendant‟s guilt of the 
Russell murder had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See People v. 
Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 536; see also People v. Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th 
at p. 408.)  Defendant points out that penalty phase deliberations began six days 
after guilt phase deliberations ended, and speculates that the jurors may have 
forgotten the definition within that timeframe.  We find that possibility unrealistic, 
given that the question whether defendant‟s guilt of Russell‟s murder had been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt evidently was hotly disputed, and the jurors 
were “emphatic” and “adamant” in their views.  (Cf. People v. Rogers, supra, 39 
Cal.4th at p. 905 [no reasonable possibility jury forgot reasonable doubt 
instruction given two weeks earlier].)   
 
 
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests the absence of an instruction 
defining reasonable doubt caused the jurors to apply a legally incorrect standard or  
inconsistent standards.  Nothing in counsel‟s closing arguments suggested that 
anything other than the definition given at the guilt phase applied, and the jurors 
did not ask any questions or request clarification of the reasonable doubt concept.  
(See People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 535; People v. Chatman, supra, 38 
Cal.4th at p. 408.)   
 
Finally, defendant stipulated that he committed the offenses against James 
Foster and Jessie Cruz.  Defendant disputed whether he had abused his girlfriend‟s 
116 
 
son, and of course he disputed whether he had killed Russell.  (Cf. People v. 
Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 535-536.)  However, in light of the considerations 
outlined above, the strength of the uncontroverted aggravating evidence, and the 
relative weakness of the case in mitigation, we find no reasonable possibility that 
the trial court‟s failure to redefine reasonable doubt affected the penalty verdict.  
The error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
4. Alleged error in including both burglary and robbery in instruction 
regarding other criminal activity  
 
During the prosecution‟s penalty phase case-in-chief, James Foster testified 
that in October 1985 he lived in an apartment in Bakersfield.  One day that month, 
Foster came home from work around lunchtime to change clothes.  A coworker, 
Jessie Cruz, was with him.  When Foster went to the bedroom, he noticed the 
sliding glass door was open.  He turned around and saw defendant coming out of 
the closet carrying a small handgun.  Defendant pointed the gun at Foster and said 
something like “don‟t move or I‟m going to shoot you.”  At defendant‟s direction, 
Foster then called Cruz into the bedroom.  Defendant pointed the gun at both of 
them and forced them to lie down.  He then bound their hands and feet with cords 
and clothing he found in the room.  While Foster was tied up, he heard defendant 
going through the room, pulling out the phone cords and cocking and uncocking 
the gun.  Foster feared for his life.  After about 10 or 15 minutes, defendant left, 
taking with him a portable personal stereo and other household items. 
 
The prosecution also presented evidence that defendant once picked up his 
girlfriend‟s young son by the hair and pushed him to the ground.  The prosecution 
presented no evidence of any other unadjudicated criminal activity by defendant.   
 
As previously noted, the jurors were instructed pursuant to a modified 
version of CALJIC No. 8.87 that they could consider, as aggravating 
circumstances, the crimes of residential burglary and residential robbery, if they 
117 
 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had committed those crimes.   
Defendant now asserts the trial court erred by including both residential burglary 
and residential robbery in the instruction because both the burglary and the 
robbery of Foster and Cruz were based on the same act of violence.  He contends 
the instruction should not have included burglary, and argues the error violated his 
rights under state law and the federal Constitution.   
 
We perceive no error.  The basic principles are well established.  Although 
any prior felony conviction may be considered in aggravation (§ 190.3, factor (c)), 
evidence of criminal activity for which the defendant has not been convicted may 
be considered only if it “involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or 
the express or implied threat to use violence” against a person.  (§ 190.3, factor 
(b); see People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776-777.)  Residential burglary is 
entering a residence with the intent to steal or to commit any other felony.  
(§§ 459, 460.)  Force or violence against a person thus is not an essential element 
of residential burglary.  However, a burglary perpetrated in a violent or threatening 
manner may be considered under section 190.3, factor (b).  (See, e.g., People v. 
Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 176 [evidence that defendant, armed with a pipe, 
attempted to break into victim‟s hotel room and threatened victim with the pipe 
was admissible under factor (b)]; see generally People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 
829, 851 [§ 190.3, factor (b) includes both crimes that are necessarily violent and 
crimes that were perpetrated in a violent or threatening manner].)   
 
Here, there was no evidence that defendant used force or violence or the 
threat of force or violence against any person at the time he entered Foster‟s 
residence.  But defendant concedes, as he must, that evidence of the burglary was 
properly admitted as part of a course of conduct that included the forceful and 
violent robbery of Foster and Cruz.  (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 840-
841; see also People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 110.)  
118 
 
Defendant also concedes, as he must, that his “burglary of Foster‟s residence was 
considered a crime of violence because after entering the residence appellant used 
a gun to rob the victims.”  Accordingly, the circumstance that the entry itself was 
not violent did not compel the trial court to omit instructions on burglary.  (See 
People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 676-677; see also id. at p. 680 [evidence of 
burglary was admissible under § 190.3, factor (b) where the jury reasonably could 
find that defendant was not armed at the time he entered but, after entering, he 
took up a knife and used it to impliedly threaten anyone who might interfere]; but 
see People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 841 [although evidence of nonviolent 
crimes committed during the same course of conduct as violent crimes was 
properly admitted, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the elements of 
the nonviolent crimes such as burglary].)   
 
Defendant‟s argument thus boils down to a claim that the instruction 
impermissibly allowed the jury to count the burglary and the robbery as two 
aggravating circumstances even though both crimes arose from a only single act of 
violence.  He explains:  “Th[e] use of force by appellant that rendered the burglary 
a crime of violence [i.e., his use of a gun to rob the victims] was the same conduct 
that was the basis of the residential robbery.  In other words, appellant committed 
one act of violence that resulted in a residential robbery and a residential burglary 
that involved the use of force.  Under these circumstances, appellant‟s criminal 
conduct should have been considered as only one aggravating circumstance.  The 
court‟s instruction, however, indicated to the jury that it should view the 
residential burglary and residential robbery as separate aggravating circumstances 
in determining penalty, thus permitting the multiple use of the same act of 
violence.  This double use of both the residential burglary and residential robbery 
119 
 
as aggravating circumstances artificially inflated the prosecution‟s case for the 
death penalty.”33   
 
Defendant cites no authority that directly supports his argument, and we are 
aware of none.  Certainly, the language of section 190.3, factor (b), does not by its 
terms prohibit instructions on both a burglary and a robbery that arose out of the 
same course of conduct and involved the same act of violence.  That factor permits 
the jury to consider as aggravating “[t]he presence . . . of criminal activity by the 
defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the 
express or implied threat to use force or violence.”  (Ibid.)  Nothing in this 
language prohibits the jury from considering separate aggravating circumstances 
based on separate crimes involving the same acts of violence or threats of 
violence.  Nor does defendant point to evidence of any legislative intent to prohibit 
such consideration.    
 
Defendant asserts such double-counting of a single act of violence in the 
penalty calculus violates the principles of section 654, which bars multiple 
punishment for separate offenses arising out of a single occurrence when all of the 
offenses were incident to one objective (see Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 
Cal.2d 11, 19), as well as his rights to a reliable penalty determination and due 
process of law under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution.  Defendant relies on People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, but in 
that case we rejected a claim similar to defendant‟s claim here.  The defendant in 
Melton was convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances of robbery 
murder and burglary murder (see § 190.2, factor (a)(17)(A) & (G)) and sentenced 
                                              
33 
The Attorney General argues the claim is forfeited.  We disagree.  (See 
§ 1259; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247; People v. Slaughter (2002) 
27 Cal.4th 1187, 1199.) 
120 
 
to death.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the Eighth Amendment barred the 
jury from considering the two special circumstances as separate aggravating 
factors under section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider in 
aggravation “[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was 
convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances 
found to be true,” because both the robbery and the burglary arose from a single 
indivisible course of conduct with a single criminal intent.  We rejected the claim, 
concluding it is “constitutionally legitimate for the state to determine that a death 
eligible murderer is more culpable, and thus more deserving of death, if he not 
only robbed the victim but committed an additional and separate felonious act, 
burglary, in order to facilitate the robbery and murder.  Robbery involves an 
assaultive invasion of personal integrity; burglary a separate invasion of the 
sanctity of the home.  Society may deem the violation of each of these distinct 
interests separately relevant to the seriousness of a capital crime.”  (People v. 
Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 767.)  We also rejected defendant‟s claim based on 
section 654, holding that section “does not preclude a capital penalty jury from 
considering that the murder was committed in the course of both a robbery and a 
burglary.”  (People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 768; see also People v. Ervine 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 790-791.) 
 
Similarly here, we perceive no constitutional impediment to the jury‟s 
consideration under section 190.3, factor (b) of both a robbery and a burglary that 
arose out of a single violent act.  The purpose of the penalty phase is to enable the 
jury to make an individualized determination of the appropriate penalty based on 
the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime.  (See People v. 
Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 699.)  Just as society may deem the invasion of 
personal integrity and the invasion of the sanctity of the home separately relevant 
to the seriousness of a capital crime (see People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at 
121 
 
p. 767), so may it deem the violation of these distinct interests separately relevant 
to the seriousness of an unadjudicated criminal offense offered in aggravation.  
Further, that the defendant invaded both of these separate interests in one incident 
is relevant to an assessment of his character regardless of whether both criminal 
acts involved the same use of force.   
 
Nor does section 654 prohibit a penalty phase jury from considering 
separate crimes based on the same act or acts of force or violence.  The death 
penalty statutes “employ principles manifestly at odds with the sentencing rules 
derived from section 654” and, “[t]o the extent they diverge, section 190.3, the 
more specific, must prevail over section 654.”  (People v. Melton, supra, 44 
Cal.3d at pp. 767-768.)  As explained above, nothing in section 190.3, factor (b), 
prohibits the consideration of multiple criminal acts based on the same act of 
violence.  To the extent section 654 would limit such consideration, section 190.3 
rather than section 654 controls.   
 
To the extent defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct the 
jury not to “double-count” the violence underlying the burglary and robbery, his 
claim lacks merit.  In Melton, we acknowledged a “theoretical problem” presented 
by the language of section 190.3, factor (a), which tells the jury to consider both 
the “circumstances” of the crime and the “special circumstances” found true.  We 
agreed that a jury given no clarifying instructions might conceivably double-count 
any circumstances that were also special circumstances, and we held that, upon the 
defendant‟s request, a trial court should instruct the jury not to do so.  (People v. 
Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 768.)  It is doubtful whether the same principles 
apply here; defendant complains not that the jury might double-count the 
circumstance that defendant committed a burglary or the circumstance that 
defendant committed a robbery, but rather that it might give undue weight to the 
violence underlying both criminal acts.  In any event, defendant did not request a 
122 
 
clarifying instruction; he therefore cannot complain of the trial court‟s failure to 
provide one.  (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171.)    
 
Finally, even assuming instructional error, it was harmless under any 
standard.  “The jury was fully aware of the facts of the [Foster and Cruz offenses] 
and could validly consider them in deciding penalty.”  (People v. Melton, supra, at 
pp. 768-769; accord People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 841.)  Further, the 
jury was instructed that “the weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side 
of an imaginary scale or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them.  You 
are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to 
each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider.”  In light of this 
instruction, it is unlikely that the jurors, exercising common sense, believed they 
should “ „weigh‟ ” the violence underlying the burglary and the robbery “twice on 
the penalty „scale.‟ ”  (People v. Melton, supra, at p. 769.)  The prosecutor did not 
exploit any ambiguity in the instructions or ask the jury to double-count the 
violence underlying the two crimes; rather, she simply emphasized that defendant 
had brutally tied up and callously threatened the victims, for no reason other than 
to steal a few items.  (See People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 769.)  
Accordingly, there is no reasonable possibility that any conceivable error affected 
the penalty verdict (People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 447-448), and any 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 
U.S. at p. 24).    
5. Denial of requested instruction regarding guilty verdict  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing his request to instruct 
the jurors that they could not consider the guilty verdict and special circumstance 
findings as an aggravating factor.  He asserts the error violated his rights under the 
123 
 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.  But we have 
concluded that such an instruction is “unnecessary in light of the other 
instructions, and [] inconsistent with CALJIC No. 8.85, which allows the jurors to 
consider all the evidence in the case, including the circumstances of the crime and 
the existence of any special circumstances found true.”  (People v. Cook (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 1334, 1363.)  As we have explained, CALJIC No. 8.85 does not tell the 
jury that it may “consider the crime itself, but only the circumstances surrounding 
the crime, as an aggravating circumstance.”  (People v. Cook, supra, at p. 1363, 
citing People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 581, fn. 11.)  Accordingly, the 
jury was not misled, and there was no need for a clarifying instruction.  (See 
People v. Siripongs, at p. 581, fn. 11.)  
6. Denial of requested instruction on severity of the death penalty  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing his request to instruct 
the jury that death is the “ultimate” or “most serious penalty that can be imposed,” 
and that life without possibility of parole is a “less serious” or “less severe” 
punishment.  He asserts the error violated his rights under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.  We repeatedly have held, 
however, that there is no legal requirement that penalty phase jurors be instructed 
that death is the greater punishment, because the penalty trial itself and the jury 
instructions given, particularly CALJIC No. 8.88, make clear that the state views 
death as the most extreme penalty.  (People v. Cook, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1363; 
People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 478-479.)  We decline to revisit these 
holdings.   
7. Alleged error in admitting Deputy Rascoe’s testimony about 
Michael H.’s statement  
 
During the prosecution‟s penalty phase case-in-chief, Betty Jean Abney 
testified that in 1993 she lived next door to defendant and Brenda H.  On April 9 
124 
 
of that year, Abney was across the street at a friend‟s house when suddenly she 
saw defendant lift Brenda‟s young son, Robert, by the hair and throw him to the 
ground.  Abney told her friend to call the police, then crossed the street and yelled 
at defendant to stop.  The police came and arrested defendant.   
 
Brenda H. testified for the defense that in April 1993 her son Robert and 
some other boys had been jumping onto moving cars.  The boys ignored Brenda 
H.‟s order to stop, so she asked defendant to go get them.  Brenda H. went into the 
house, then heard hollering.  When she went back outside, her next door neighbor 
Betty was yelling and had called the police.  Robert had no bruises, scrapes, stiff 
neck or other problems, but he was upset because the police had taken defendant 
to jail. 
 
Robert H., who was 12 years old at the time of trial, testified that on the day 
in question he had tripped over a tree stump while running in the yard, and that 
defendant had picked him up by the hand and then “got my chin.”  Defendant did 
not hurt Robert.  Robert also said he had been jumping on a moving van.34   
   
 
Ten-year-old Michael H. testified that he called defendant “Dad” and that 
defendant treated the children with respect and was not mean.  Defendant took 
them camping and fishing and to the fair.  Defendant never hurt Michael, but 
spanked him if he “sassed” his mom.  When he was arrested, defendant was 
                                              
34 
Robert further testified that he called defendant “Dad” because defendant 
treated him with respect.  Defendant took care of him, helped him with 
schoolwork when he needed it, took him fishing once and camping, and played 
guitar and sang songs.  Defendant never beat him, but spanked him when he got in 
trouble.  He missed defendant, and if defendant were killed it would feel like his 
mother being killed.   
125 
 
making a guitar for Michael and teaching him how to play guitar.  Michael said 
that he loved defendant and would feel sad if he were killed.35   
 
In rebuttal, Kern County Deputy Sheriff Michael Rascoe testified that on 
April 9, 1993, he went to Brenda H.‟s house and spoke with Robert, who was 
about 8 or 9 years old at the time.  Robert told Rascoe that he had been playing 
with some other children in the front yard, and they had been told to stay off of a 
van parked outside.  Defendant emerged from the house, angry because he thought 
Robert had been playing on the van.  Robert said that defendant grabbed him by 
the hair, shook him and pushed him backwards to the ground.  Rascoe examined 
Robert but found no injuries, although Robert said his neck hurt.   
 
Over defendant‟s objection, Rascoe further testified that he also spoke with 
Michael H., who said that defendant had grabbed Robert by the hair, picked him 
up off the ground, and thrown him backward causing Robert to fall on his back.   
 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Deputy Rascoe‟s 
testimony recounting Michael H.‟s hearsay statement.  He asserts the statement 
was not admissible under the hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements 
because it was not inconsistent with any part of Michael‟s trial testimony.36  As 
previously explained, under Evidence Code sections 1235 and 770, a hearsay 
                                              
35 
Seven-year-old Melody H. similarly testified that defendant treated the 
children “good,” sang songs to them, and did not hurt them.    
36 
Defendant objected to Rascoe‟s testimony about Michael‟s statement on the 
grounds of “lack of foundation” and that there was “no showing that Michael ever 
saw anything.”  The trial court apparently understood the objections as 
encompassing a hearsay objection, for it asked whether Michael was subject to 
recall, which is one of the prerequisites for admission of a prior inconsistent 
statement.  (See Evid. Code, § 770, subd. (b).)  The Attorney General does not 
contend the hearsay claim was forfeited, and we agree the claim was preserved for 
review. 
126 
 
statement of a witness that is inconsistent with his or her trial testimony is 
admissible to establish the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.  (People v. 
Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1219.)  A statement is inconsistent for this purpose 
if it has “ „a tendency to contradict or disprove the [witness‟s trial] testimony or 
any inference to be deduced from it.‟ ”  (People v. Spencer (1969) 71 Cal.2d 933, 
942.)  Further, “ „ “[i]nconsistency in effect, rather contradiction in express terms, 
is the test for admitting a witness‟ prior statement.” ‟ ”  (People v. Hovarter (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 983, 1008.)   
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion (see People v. Hovarter, supra,  
44 Cal.4th at pp. 1007-1008) in admitting the evidence.  The trial court reasonably 
could have concluded that Michael‟s statement to Rascoe that defendant had 
grabbed Robert by the hair, lifted him off the ground, and thrown him backward 
was inconsistent with Michael‟s trial testimony that defendant was “kind” and not 
“mean” and treated “all of us kids” with “respect.”  A reasonable inference arising 
from Michael‟s testimony was that defendant did not mistreat the children.  His 
statement to Rascoe tended to contradict or disprove that broad assertion by 
showing that defendant had mistreated Robert on at least one occasion.  Although 
Michael was not asked, and did not testify, about the incident on April 9, 1993, or 
about defendant‟s treatment of Robert in particular, it is enough that Michael‟s 
statement to Rascoe served to dispel the broad inference from Michael‟s testimony 
that defendant was kind and respectful and not “mean” to the children.   
 
Defendant contends nonetheless that the admission of Michael‟s hearsay 
statement violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses under the 
Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  Assuming this claim is preserved 
for review (see People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 433-439; People v. 
Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 117), it lacks merit.  As explained, the 
confrontation clause does not prohibit the admission into evidence of testimonial 
127 
 
hearsay statements against a defendant if the declarant appears for cross-
examination at trial.  (Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S.  at p. 59 & fn. 9.)  
Here, Michael could have been recalled and cross-examined about his statement to 
Deputy Rascoe. 
 
Moreover, even assuming error, it was harmless under either the state 
“reasonable possibility” standard for penalty phase error (see People v. Brown, 
supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 446-448), or the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard for federal constitutional error (see Chapman v. California, supra, 386 
U.S. at p. 24).  Michael H.‟s statement to Rascoe was largely cumulative of 
Robert‟s statement, and because Robert was the alleged victim, the jury likely 
assigned more weight to his statement than to Michael‟s.  Furthermore, although 
the defense disputed Abney‟s account of the incident, Brenda H.‟s testimony 
revealed that she did not actually see the alleged abuse, and the jury may have 
been skeptical of Robert‟s exculpatory testimony, given his relationship to 
defendant.  Although we cannot know whether any juror or jurors concluded 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had abused Robert, we find no realistic 
possibility that any juror would have been less inclined to do so absent Rascoe‟s 
testimony about Michael‟s statement.  Furthermore, even if the jurors did not 
believe defendant had abused Robert, the aggravating evidence — including the 
brutal nature of the Merck murders and the undisputed evidence of defendant‟s 
burglary of Foster‟s home and robbery of Foster and Cruz — was still strong in 
comparison with the mitigating evidence.  For all of these reasons, there is no 
reasonable possibility of a different result absent the admission of Michael H.‟s 
statement to Rascoe, and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
128 
 
8. Alleged failure to adequately investigate potential juror misconduct  
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to adequately investigate 
potential juror misconduct, and that the error requires reversal of the penalty 
judgment.  We conclude defendant is not entitled to relief. 
 
The jury began its penalty phase deliberations at 3:35 p.m. on June 12, 
1996, and continued deliberating through the day on June 13, 1996.  Shortly after 
the jury resumed deliberations following the readback of Dr. Dollinger‟s 
testimony on the morning of June 14, 1996, the jury foreman sent a note indicating 
that Juror No. 040149 wished to speak with the court.  Juror No. 040149 was 
summoned to the courtroom at 9:30 a.m.  With defendant, defense counsel and the 
prosecutor present, Juror No. 040149 related the following:  “I wanted the court to 
be aware of something that has been eating at me.  We have a juror that in the 
conviction part of it . . . was very adamant in her decisions in all three verdicts 
and, you know, which is fine, everybody is.  Now she is adamant in her verdict 
now, but she is claiming that she has some kind of second thoughts about her 
original verdict in the two convictions, and I — yesterday, I don‟t know exactly 
when it was, it was on return back to the courthouse, she was sitting right next to 
two of [defendant‟s] relatives, his aunt and then another — another person.  All I 
could see is the back of her head.  I don‟t know if she was conversing with them.  I 
did note that they were talking and it was maybe purse room between the three.  I 
don‟t know if maybe she heard something that she is now, you know, holding up 
or trying to recant or whatever.  I just feel that that needs to be brought to the 
court‟s attention.”   
 
The court stated that it “appreciated you bringing that to the court‟s 
attention” and asked Juror No. 040149 if there was anything else he wished to say.  
When Juror No. 040149 responded in the negative, the court sent him back to the 
jury room.  After ascertaining that the accused juror was Juror No. 045829, the 
129 
 
court inquired whether counsel had “any suggestions.”  The prosecutor responded 
in the negative, and defense counsel said “I think that we just have to play it out 
and see what happens.”   
 
Very shortly thereafter, the court received a second note stating that Juror 
Nos. 045829 and 024178 wished to speak with the court.  Juror No. 045829 was 
summoned, and the following exchange took place:  
 
“Juror No. 045829:  Well, the other juror said I was talking, he thought I 
was talking to the — 
 
“The court:  He didn‟t say that.  He didn‟t say that.  He said that he — he 
saw you sitting in the hallway, sitting next to some members of the defendant‟s 
family.  He did not indicate that he saw you talking to anyone, [Juror No. 045829]. 
 
“Juror No. 045829:  That is what he said in there. 
 
“The court: I don‟t know what was said in there.  I don‟t want to know 
what was said in there.  I can only tell you that the Court wasn‟t going to take any 
further action as a result of anything that was told or spoken to the Court by that 
juror because there wasn‟t anything indicated by that juror that would have 
suggested any impropriety on your part.  [¶]  Is there anything else that you 
wanted to speak with the Court about? 
 
“Juror No. 045829:  No.”   
 
After the court sent Juror No. 045829 back to the jury room, Juror No. 
024178 was summoned, and the following colloquy occurred: 
 
“Juror No. 024178:  Now I just — no, I am fine.”   
 
“The court:  You‟re fine? 
 
“Juror No. 024178:  Yes.”   
 
The court then told Juror No. 024178 that it was available to speak with her  
if there was “a problem,” and sent her back to the jury room.   
130 
 
 
After Juror No. 024178 had left, the court queried counsel as to whether 
there were any “comments or objections or anything that you want to put on the 
record.”  Defense counsel responded in the negative.  About four and one-half 
hours later, at 2:10 p.m., the jury returned its verdicts of death for the murder of 
Alma Merck and life without possibility of parole for the murder of Clifford 
Merck. 
 
Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing, sua sponte, to conduct an 
investigation adequate to determine if Juror No. 045829 had been speaking with 
defendant‟s family members or had overheard anything connected with the trial.  
We recently summarized the law applicable to claims of this type:  “Section 1089 
provides in part:  „If at any time . . . a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good 
cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a 
juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order the 
juror to be discharged . . . .‟  In construing this statute, we have held that „ “[o]nce 
a trial court is put on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist, it is the 
court‟s duty „to make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary‟ to determine 
whether the juror should be discharged.” ‟  [Citations.]”  (People v. Martinez 
(2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 941-942.) 
 
However, “ „not every incident involving a juror‟s conduct requires or 
warrants further investigation.  “The decision whether to investigate the possibility 
of juror bias, incompetence, or misconduct — like the ultimate decision to retain 
or discharge a juror — rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” ‟  
(People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 478, quoting People v. Ray, supra, 13 
Cal.4th at p. 343.)  „ “[A] hearing is required only where the court possesses 
information which, if proven to be true, would constitute „good cause‟ to doubt a 
juror‟s ability to perform his duties and would justify his removal from the case.  
(Ibid.)” ‟ ”  (People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 942.) 
131 
 
 
The Attorney General asserts defendant forfeited his claim by failing to 
request additional inquiry.  We disagree.  The duty to conduct an investigation 
when the court possesses information that might constitute good cause to remove a 
juror rests with the trial court whether or not the defense requests an inquiry, and 
indeed exists even if the defendant objects to such an inquiry.  For example, in 
People v. Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at page 519, we held that the trial court had 
erred by failing to conduct an investigation after a juror brought it to the court‟s 
attention that another juror appeared to be intoxicated during deliberations, even 
though defense counsel objected to questioning the accused juror or other jurors.  
We stated that “an inquiry sufficient to determine the facts is required whenever 
the court is put on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist.”  (Ibid., 
italics added; see also id. at p. 520 [“once the court is put on notice of the 
possibility a juror is subject to improper influences it is the court’s duty to make 
whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary to determine if the juror should be 
discharged” (italics added)].)  Other cases are in accord.  (People v. Adcox (1988) 
47 Cal.3d 207, 253 [cases place the “ultimate responsibility upon the court to 
make [an] inquiry” when the trial court is “alerted to facts suggestive of potential 
misconduct”]; see also People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th 313, 342-344 [addressing 
the merits of a claim that the trial court had erred by failing to investigate a juror‟s 
relationship with the victim‟s daughter, even though the defendant had objected to 
any inquiry]; People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 694; People v. Keenan 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 532 [“when a trial court learns during deliberations of a 
jury-room problem which, if unattended, might later require the granting of a 
mistrial or new trial motion, the court may and should intervene promptly to nip 
the problem in the bud”].)  Accordingly, because defendant‟s claim is that trial 
court erred by failing, sua sponte, to conduct an adequate inquiry, no trial court 
132 
 
action by the defense was required to preserve the claim.  (Cf. People v. Lewis, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 446, fn. 6.)   
Accordingly, we turn to the merits.  A juror‟s unauthorized contact with a 
witness is improper.  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 175; see also § 1122, 
subd. (a) [jurors should not converse with anyone on any subject connected to the 
trial].)  However, contact between a juror and a witness or between a juror and the 
defendant‟s family may be nonprejudicial if the contact was “de minimis” (People 
v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 175) or if there is no showing that the contact 
related to the trial (cf. People v. Cobb (1955) 45 Cal.2d 158, 161 [mere showing 
that juror had communicated with defendant‟s relative did not raise a presumption 
that juror was improperly influenced]; People v. Woods (1950) 35 Cal.2d 504, 512 
[mere fact that juror conversed with a witness is insufficient to raise a presumption 
of prejudice]; but cf. People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1175 [juror‟s out-
of-court comment to two witnesses regarding their testimony was “clearly 
misconduct”]; People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 207-209 [where juror 
discussed state of the evidence and prosecutor‟s tactics with police officer witness, 
reversal was required]).  Further, a juror‟s “receipt of information about a party or 
the case that was not part of the evidence received at trial” also is “misconduct” 
that raises a presumption of prejudice (People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 
578), even if that receipt was passive or involuntary (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 273, 294-295). 
Here, the trial court acted within its discretion when it declined to inquire 
further into Juror No. 045829‟s alleged contact with defendant‟s family members 
who also were witnesses.  At best, the trial court possessed ambiguous information 
suggesting that Juror No. 045829 may or may not have been talking to defendant‟s 
relatives who also were witnesses at the penalty phase.  Critically, Juror No. 
040149 told the court, “I don‟t know if she was conversing with them [defendant‟s 
133 
 
aunt and another person],” but then immediately said “I did note that they were 
talking.”  Under the circumstances, the court reasonably could have construed the 
“they” in Juror No. 040149‟s second remark as referring only to defendant‟s 
relatives, not to Juror No. 045829.  This is especially so since Juror No. 040149 
followed that remark with the comment that Juror No. 045829 might have 
“overheard” something that influenced her.  Juror No. 045829‟s own comments 
seem to suggest that she was about to deny speaking with the witnesses.  Although 
Juror No. 045829 probably should not have been sitting near defendant‟s relatives 
who also were witnesses, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that 
there were no grounds for believing that Juror No. 045829 had actually been 
engaged in a conversation with them.  Moreover, there was no suggestion, other 
than Juror No. 040149‟s speculation, that anything that Juror No. 045829 said or 
heard had anything to do with the trial.  Accordingly, the court reasonably could 
have concluded that there were no grounds for believing good cause to excuse 
Juror 045829 might exist.  (See People v. Cobb, supra, 45 Cal.2d at p. 161 [trial 
court did not abuse discretion in failing to investigate communication between 
juror and defendant‟s relative, where it did not appear that the communication 
related to the trial].)  
Defendant further argues the court should have conducted an inquiry into 
whether other jurors were coercing Juror No. 045829 into voting for the death 
penalty.  He contends the circumstances, including Juror No. 040149‟s apparent 
frustration with Juror No. 045829‟s “holding up or trying to recant or whatever,” 
suggest other jurors may have been berating Juror No. 045829 in order to coerce 
her to change her vote.  But defendant‟s assertions about possible coercion are 
speculative.  Further, “jurors can be expected to disagree, even vehemently, and to 
attempt to persuade disagreeing fellow jurors by strenuous and sometimes heated 
means.  To probe as defendant suggests, in the absence of considerably more 
134 
 
cogent evidence of coercion, would „ “deprive the jury room of its inherent quality 
of free expression.” ‟  [Citations.] . . . Moreover, any such inquiry could in itself 
have risked pressuring the dissenting juror to conform her vote to that of the 
majority.”  (People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1255.)  Accordingly, the trial 
court did not err in declining to inquire about possible coercion.   
 
9. Challenges to death penalty statute  
Defendant attacks the constitutionality of California‟s death penalty statute 
on a number of grounds.  We have in the past rejected each of these contentions.  
Thus, we have concluded: 
Section 190.2 adequately narrows the class of offenders eligible for the 
death penalty in conformance with Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
requirements.  (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1429; People v. 
Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 892.) 
Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider the 
“circumstances of the crime” in determining whether to impose the death penalty, 
is not unconstitutionally vague, arbitrary or capricious.  (People v. Leonard, supra, 
40 Cal.4th at p. 1429; accord, People v. Curl, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 362.) 
“ „The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require that a jury 
unanimously find the existence of aggravating factors or that it make written 
findings regarding aggravating factors.‟ [Citations.]  „[N]either the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, nor the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that aggravating circumstances exist or that aggravating circumstances outweigh 
mitigating circumstances or that death is the appropriate penalty. [Citations.]‟ ”  
(People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 893.)  Moreover, the statute “ „is not 
unconstitutional because it does not contain a requirement that the jury be given 
135 
 
burden of proof or standard of proof instructions for finding aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in reaching a penalty determination.‟ ”  (People v. Curl, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 362.)  On the other hand, the trial court is not required to 
instruct the jury that neither party bears the burden of proof.  (People v. Leonard, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1429.)  Nothing in the United States Supreme Court‟s 
recent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment‟s jury trial guarantee (e.g., 
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 
584; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466) compels a different answer to 
these questions.  (People v. Curl, supra, at p. 362; People v. Rogers, supra, at 
p. 893.)  Further, “Evidence Code section 520, establishing that a party „claiming 
that a person is guilty of crime or wrongdoing has the burden of proof on that 
issue,‟ does not apply to the normative decision on penalty that is performed by 
the trier of fact at the penalty phase of a capital trial.”  (People v. Dykes, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at p. 814; People v. Leonard, supra, at p. 1429.) 
The failure to require intercase proportionality review does not violate due 
process, equal protection or the Eighth Amendment.  (People v. Curl, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at p. 362; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 538.)  The use of 
unadjudicated criminal activity as an aggravating factor at the penalty phase is not 
unconstitutional.  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 507; People v. 
Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205 & fn. 32.)  And the use of restrictive 
adjectives such as “extreme,” “reasonabl[e] belie[f],” and “impaired” in section 
190.3, factors (d), (f), (g) and (h) does not prevent the consideration of 
constitutionally relevant evidence.  (People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 
pp. 893, 895; see People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 776.) 
136 
 
 
The jury need not be instructed that section 190.3, factors (d), (e), (f), (g), 
(h) and (j) are relevant only as possible mitigators.  (People v. Leonard, supra, 40 
Cal.4th at p. 1430.)  Nor is the trial court required to instruct that the absence of a 
particular mitigating factor is not aggravating.  (People v. Rogers, supra, 39 
Cal.4th at p. 897.)  In any event, the jury here was instructed that “[t]he absence of 
mitigation does not amount to the presence of aggravation.”   
 
The availability of certain procedural protections in noncapital sentencing 
— such as a burden of proof, written findings, jury unanimity and disparate 
sentence review — when those same protections are unavailable in capital 
sentencing, does not signify that California‟s death penalty statute violates 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection principles.  (People v. Leonard, supra, 40 
Cal.4th at p. 1430; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 754.)   
 
The death penalty, when applied in accord with state and federal statutory 
and constitutional requirements, does not violate international law.  (People v. 
Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 539.)  International norms of human decency do not 
render the death penalty, applied as a regular form of punishment, violative of the 
Eighth Amendment.  (People v. Curl, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 362-363; People v. 
Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 538.)   
E. Cumulative error 
Defendant contends that the cumulative impact of all of the errors at his 
trial caused him substantial prejudice and rendered his trial fundamentally unfair 
in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law, requiring 
reversal of the guilt and penalty judgments.  (See People v. Lewis, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 537; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 572-573.)  We have 
found no errors with respect to the guilt phase.  As for the penalty phase, we have 
found two errors or assumed errors: the trial court‟s failure to instruct regarding 
137 
 
reasonable doubt with respect to the Russell murder, and its failure to redefine 
reasonable doubt in its penalty phase instructions.  We conclude that even when 
considered cumulatively, any instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24), and there is no 
reasonable possibility of a different result at the penalty phase in its absence.  
(People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 447-448.)  As we have explained, even 
if the jurors believed — contrary to their explicit instructions — that they could 
consider the Russell murder in aggravation, we find it highly unlikely that they 
would conclude that any standard other than reasonable doubt applied to the 
consideration of that murder, or that those jurors who did not believe Russell‟s 
murder had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt would use that murder as the 
deciding factor in their penalty calculus.  Moreover, we find no indication in the 
record that the jurors at the penalty phase were confused about the meaning of the 
reasonable doubt standard to be applied to evidence of other criminal activity, and 
it is unlikely the jurors would have forgotten the meaning of that term, given that 
the question of defendant‟s guilt of the Russell murder was hotly disputed at the 
guilt phase.  Under all the circumstances, and considering the strength of the 
aggravating evidence, we conclude any errors both singly and in combination were 
harmless under any standard and did not render defendant‟s penalty trial 
fundamentally unfair.  (See People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 538; People v. 
Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 572-573.)  
138 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Cowan 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S055415 
Date Filed: August 5, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Kern 
Judge: Lee Phillip Felice 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Mark Goldrosen, under appointment by the Supreme Court; Weinberg & Wilder and Nina Wilder for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans, Eric L. Christoffersen, John A. 
Thawley and Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark Goldrosen 
139 Townsend Street, Suite 201 
San Francisco, CA  94107 
(415) 495-0112 
 
Lewis A. Martinez 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 323-6879