Case Title: State v. Everhart

Citation: 231 S.E.2d 604, 291 N.C. 700

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1977-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
231 S.E.2d 604 (1977) 291 N.C. 700 STATE of North Carolina v. Diane EVERHART. No. 118. Supreme Court of North Carolina. January 31, 1977. *605 Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten and Associate Atty. Norma S. Harrell, Raleigh, for the State. Robert M. Davis, Salisbury, for defendant-appellant. MOORE, Justice. Defendant assigns as error the overruling of her motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence. As used in G.S. 15-173, there is no difference in legal significance between a "motion to dismiss" and a motion "for judgment as in case of nonsuit." See State v. Cooper, 275 N.C. 283, 167 S.E.2d 266 (1969). The rule to be applied when considering whether the State has introduced sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for nonsuit is well settled in this jurisdiction. A motion for nonsuit is properly denied when there is any evidence, whether introduced by the State or defendant, *606 which will support the charges contained in the bill of indictment or warrant, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and drawing every reasonable inference, deducible from the evidence, in favor of the State. See State v. Sauls, 291 N.C. 253, 230 S.E.2d 390 (1976); State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 208 S.E.2d 506 (1974); 4 Strong, N.C.Index 3d, Criminal Law §§ 104, 106 (1976), and the plethora of cases cited therein. Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter has been defined as the unlawful and unintentional killing of another human being without malice and which proximately results from the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony or not naturally dangerous to human life, or from the commission of some act done in an unlawful or culpably negligent manner, or from the culpable omission to perform some legal duty. State v. Rummage, 280 N.C. 51, 185 S.E.2d 221 (1971); State v. Massey, 271 N.C. 555, 157 S.E.2d 150 (1967); State v. Neal, 248 N.C. 544, 103 S.E.2d 722 (1958); State v. Hovis, 233 N.C. 359, 64 S.E.2d 564 (1951). See also 4 Strong, N.C.Index 2d, Homicide § 6 (1968). In instant case, the State had the burden of proving that defendant killed her child by an act done in a culpably negligent manner. Culpable negligence in the criminal law requires more than the negligence necessary to sustain a recovery in tort. Rather, for negligence to constitute the basis for the imposition of criminal sanctions, it must be such reckless or careless behavior that the act imports a thoughtless disregard of the consequences of the act or the act shows a heedless indifference to the rights and safety of others. As is stated in 1 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, § 291 at 613 (1957), "There must be negligence of a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of human life.. . ." Defendant contends that the baby's death was caused at most by an unavoidable accident, and that she is not guilty of any culpable negligence. Defendant's assertion of accidental killing is not an affirmative defense and in a prosecution for an unlawful homicide the burden is always upon the State to prove an unlawful slaying. State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 166 S.E.2d 652 (1969); State v. Griffin, 273 N.C. 333, 159 S.E.2d 889 (1968). For example, in State v. Church, 265 N.C. 534, 144 S.E.2d 624 (1965), defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter on evidence tending to show that decedent had been shot and killed by defendant. It was shown that decedent and defendant were good friends and there was no ill will between the two. The only evidence introduced at trial regarding how the shooting occurred was defendant's exclamation, "It was an accident. I didn't mean to." This Court reversed defendant's conviction, holding that the evidence showed only that the shooting had occurred by accident. The statement by defendant that the shooting occurred by accident was not, standing alone, sufficient evidence to support a finding of culpable negligence. At trial in the present case, Dr. William Warga, the physician who performed the autopsy, read from his report as follows: Dr. Warga further testified: In instant case, the evidence shows that defendant was a young girl, with an I.Q. of 72. She gave birth to the baby while lying on the floor and dropped the newborn infant while attempting to place him upon the bed. Thinking the baby was dead, she wrapped him in a blanket. At this time, the defendant had just delivered a baby without any assistance; was ill; and was scared. The doctor found no evidence of trauma or a purposeful act upon the body of the baby. He concluded that the child was accidentally smothered or died of neonatal respiratory failurethe failure to have proper stimulation to cause continued breathing. Under these facts there was not sufficient evidence to show that defendant acted in such a manner as to import a thoughtless disregard of the consequences of her act or heedless indifference to the rights and safety of the baby. We hold, therefore, that the trial court erred when it denied defendant's motion to dismiss. State v. Massey, supra; State v. Hancock, 248 N.C. 432, 103 S.E.2d 491 (1958). The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the superior court is reversed. The Court of Appeals will remand the cause to the Superior Court of Rowan County with instructions that it reverse the judgment denying defendant's motion to dismiss. Reversed.