Case Title: People v. Lindsey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91381

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 91381-Agenda 14-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								JERRY L. LINDSEY, Appellant.
	Defendant, Jerry L. Lindsey, pleaded guilty to the charge of
aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(d) (West
1996)) and was placed on sex offender specific intensive probation
for a period of four years, and further sentenced to 364 days of
work release. Under the terms of his work release, defendant was
confined to the Vermilion County Public Safety Building and only
released from confinement to perform 200 hours of public service
work and attend counseling. Under the terms of his sex offender
specific intensive probation, defendant attended counseling at the
Prairie Center Health Systems (Prairie Center). He began his
treatment in the daytime intensive outpatient group, scheduled to
meet between 9 a.m. and noon, Monday through Friday, for a
period of five weeks. On December 30, 1999, defendant
successfully completed his intensive treatment and was ordered to
attend follow-up outpatient treatment. Defendant's outpatient
sessions were scheduled to meet each Monday from 10 a.m. until
11:30 a.m., beginning Monday, January 3, 2000.
	On January 7, 2000, the State filed a petition to revoke
defendant's probation. The petition stated that defendant violated
probation by signing out of the county jail 1½ hours before his
scheduled counseling session on January 3, 2000, and by signing
out of the county jail on January 4, 2000, when counseling was not
scheduled. At the hearing to revoke defendant's probation, the
State called four witnesses: two Prairie Center counselors,
defendant's probation officer, and defendant. LeAnn Chexem, an
adult addiction counselor at the Prairie Center, testified that
defendant completed the intensive program and was enrolled in the
follow-up program, beginning January 3, 2000. A second
counselor testified that she did not observe defendant at the Prairie
Center until 10 a.m. on January 3, 2000. Defendant's probation
officer testified and described the terms of defendant's probation
and work release, including the conditions and terms for signing
out of the Vermilion County Public Safety Building. When called
as an adverse witness, defendant testified about his conduct on
January 3 and 4, 2000.
	Following the revocation hearing, on February 8, 2000,
defendant's probation was revoked, and defendant was
resentenced to another four years' intensive probation and 364
days of work release to be served at the Vermilion County Public
Safety Building. The trial court denied defendant's motion to
reconsider the sentence. The appellate court affirmed the judgment
of the trial court (319 Ill. App. 3d 586), and we granted
defendant's petition for leave to appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315).
	On appeal to this court, defendant argues that: (1) the State
violated his right against self-incrimination, pursuant to article I,
section 10, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§10), by calling him as an adverse witness to testify against
himself; (2) the State violated his right to a fundamentally fair
probation hearing under the due process clauses of the state and
federal constitutions (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §2) by calling him as an adverse witness because it
denied his right to confront and cross-examine, denied his right to
counsel, and relieved the State of its burden of proof; and (3) the
trial court erred by failing to grant him day-for-day credit for
presentence custody. For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the appellate court, affirming the decision of the trial
court.

ANALYSIS
I. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
	Under article I, section 10, of our state constitution, "No
person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence
against himself ***." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §10. Defendant first
argues that a probation revocation proceeding is "criminal" in
nature within the meaning of article I, section 10, and, therefore,
the protections against self-incrimination apply to probation
revocation hearings. Our review of this issue is de novo. People v.
Carlson, 185 Ill. 2d 546, 551 (1999).
	The United States Supreme Court has resolved a similar issue
in the context of the fifth amendment of the federal constitution,
which provides, in relevant part, that no person "shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
U.S. Const., amend. V. The Court clearly stated that "[p]robation
revocation *** is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, but does
result in a loss of liberty." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782,
36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 661-62, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1759-60 (1973). Relying
on Gagnon, in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984), the Court decided the issue of
whether the fifth amendment privilege is self-executing when a
probationer is questioned by a probation officer about a crime
other than the crime for which he was convicted. In Murphy, the
defendant admitted to his probation officer that he had committed
a rape and murder, and this admission was used against the
defendant in the subsequent criminal prosecution. The Court found
that the privilege is not self-executing and that the defendant's
duty to appear and to answer questions propounded by his
probation officer was no different from the duty of an "ordinary
witness at a trial or before a grand jury who is subpoenaed, sworn
to tell the truth, and obligated to answer on the pain of contempt,
unless he invokes the privilege and shows that he faces a realistic
threat of self-incrimination." Murphy, 465 U.S.  at 427, 79 L. Ed. 2d  at 419, 104 S. Ct.  at 1142. The Court stated:
		"A State may require a probationer to appear and discuss
matters that affect his probationary status; such a
requirement, without more, does not give rise to a self-executing privilege." Murphy, 465 U.S.  at 435, 79 L. Ed. 2d  at 424, 104 S. Ct.  at 1146.
Further, the Court noted that the privilege is not available where
the questions put to the probationer posed only the threat that his
probation would be terminated:
		"Although a revocation proceeding must comport with the
requirements of due process, it is not a criminal
proceeding. [Citations.] Just as there is no right to a jury
trial before probation may be revoked, neither is the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination available
to a probationer. It follows that whether or not the answer
to a question about a residential requirement is compelled
by the threat of revocation, there can be no valid claim of
the privilege on the ground that the information sought
can be used in revocation proceedings.
			Our cases indicate, moreover, that a State may validly
insist on answers to even incriminating questions and
hence sensibly administer its probation system, as long as
it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in
a criminal proceeding ***." Murphy, 465 U.S.  at 435 n.7,
79 L. Ed. 2d  at 425 n.7, 104 S. Ct.  at 1146 n.7.
	This court has followed the reasoning in Murphy to hold that
a defendant cannot claim the privilege against self-incrimination
merely because his answer to a question might result in a
revocation of his probationary status. For example, in People v.
Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 91, 104 (1985), aff'd, 478 U.S. 364, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986), we held that in a sexually dangerous
person proceeding, the defendant was not entitled to refuse to
answer a psychiatrist's questions which might incriminate him. In
People v. Allegri, 109 Ill. 2d 309, 313-14 (1985), we noted that a
probation revocation hearing is not a proceeding at which guilt or
innocence is to be determined; rather, it takes place "only after the
defendant has already been convicted, sentenced to probation, and
then has violated the conditions of the probation."
	Furthermore, our appellate court has relied on Murphy and
Gagnon to hold that probation revocation proceedings are civil,
not criminal, in nature. See People v. Williams, 303 Ill. App. 3d
264 (1999) (probation revocation proceeding is civil); People v.
Bell, 296 Ill. App. 3d 146 (1998) (probation revocation proceeding
is noncriminal); People v. Neckopulos, 284 Ill. App. 3d 660 (1996)
(probation revocation proceeding is not a criminal proceeding);
People v. Martin, 226 Ill. App. 3d 753 (1992) (State was not
precluded from calling defendant as a witness in proceeding to
revoke his probation); People v. Kane, 136 Ill. App. 3d 1030
(1985) (revocation of probation is not a prosecution); People v.
Huff, 44 Ill. App. 3d 273 (1976) (probation revocation proceeding
is qualitatively different from a criminal trial); but see People v.
McNairy, 309 Ill. App. 3d 220 (1999) (probation revocation
proceeding is a criminal proceeding that implicates article I,
section 10, of the Illinois Constitution).
	In this case, the appellate court, relying on Murphy, as well as
Bell, Martin, and Neckopoulos, held that the self-incrimination
privilege under article I, section 10, is inapplicable to probation
revocation proceedings. 319 Ill. App. 3d at 588-91. In so doing,
the appellate court recognized that in McNairy, an appellate panel
in another district held that under the Illinois Constitution a
probation revocation proceeding is a "criminal case" in which a
person may not be compelled to give evidence against himself.
319 Ill. App. 3d at 589-90. However, in this case, the appellate
court declined to follow McNairy, concluding that the State may
call a defendant as an adverse witness to testify at a probation
revocation proceeding. 319 Ill. App. 3d at 590.
	On appeal to this court, defendant urges us to follow McNairy
and reject those appellate court opinions holding that probation
revocation proceedings are civil proceedings. Defendant argues
that our decisions in People v. Grayson, 58 Ill. 2d 260 (1974), and
People v. Peterson, 74 Ill. 2d 478 (1978), warrant a finding that
the proceedings are criminal. Both Grayson and Peterson,
however, are factually distinguishable from the present situation.
In Grayson, the defendant was placed on probation after pleading
guilty to armed robbery. Subsequently, he was indicted for another
armed robbery and was acquitted of that charge in a bench trial.
The State filed a petition to revoke defendant's probation on the
first robbery, alleging as the only grounds the commission of the
second robbery. In holding that collateral estoppel applied, we
acknowledged that there exists a substantial difference between a
probation revocation proceeding and a criminal trial. Grayson, 58 Ill. 2d  at 264-65. We noted that proceedings may be civil in form,
yet criminal in nature, and concluded that the State could not
constitutionally bring defendant before a new court in a probation
revocation proceeding and relitigate an issue previously decided
in a criminal case in which defendant was acquitted of the
underlying charge. Grayson, 58 Ill. 2d  at 265. Our holding in
Grayson, however, was narrowly tailored to the facts of that case.
It involved the specific issue of collateral estoppel and its
application in a probation revocation proceeding. Contrary to
defendant's argument, we did not suggest that probation
revocation proceedings should be considered criminal in nature.
	Likewise, in Peterson, we held that collateral estoppel
prohibited the State from challenging a finding that the
defendant's confession was involuntary at a subsequent probation
revocation hearing. Peterson, 74 Ill. 2d  at 486. The defendant in
Peterson was charged with possession of a hypodermic syringe.
While being questioned by police officers, defendant confessed to
a burglary of a gas station. At the trial on the underlying criminal
charge, the trial court suppressed Peterson's confession to the
burglary. Thereafter, the State filed a petition to revoke
defendant's probation on the underlying charge and sought to
introduce testimony of the confession. We held that an involuntary
confession cannot be admitted against a defendant in a probation
revocation hearing. Peterson, 74 Ill. 2d  at 484. Our holding was
premised on due process principles, which we found prohibited the
use of a coerced confession at a probation revocation proceeding.
Peterson, 74 Ill. 2d  at 485. Neither Peterson nor Grayson persuade
us to depart from the well-reasoned decisions of Murphy and our
appellate court. Accordingly, we hold that a probation revocation
proceeding is a civil proceeding.
	Relying upon People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994),
defendant next maintains that the Illinois Constitution gives its
citizens a greater degree of protection than the federal constitution
and, thus, article I, section 10, applies to probation revocation
proceedings even if they are considered civil in nature.
	In McCauley, we clearly stated that "in the context of deciding
State guarantees, Federal authorities are not precedentially
controlling; they merely guide the interpretation of State law."
McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d  at 436. We held that, rather than "blindly
follow the reasoning of a United States Supreme Court decision at
all costs," this court should rely on its own case law, wisdom and
reason to construe our state constitutional provisions. McCauley,
163 Ill. 2d  at 439; see also Rollins v. Ellwood, 141 Ill. 2d 244, 275
(1990) (This court may, in construing state due process guarantee,
look for "guidance and inspiration" to constructions of federal
guarantee by federal courts, but final conclusions on construction
of state guarantee are for this court to decide). Under certain
circumstances, we may construe our state provisions more broadly
than their federal counterparts. Therefore, the question before us
is whether article I, section 10, should be extended to apply to
probation revocation proceedings. We conclude that it should not.
	Defendant argues that his forced testimony at the probation
revocation hearing incriminated him in other criminal proceedings
in violation of article I, section 10. Specifically, he argues that his
forced admission exposed him to an additional charge of indirect
criminal contempt, which, in turn, exposed him to additional fines
or punishment. See In re Marriage of Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d 26, 44
(1990). We disagree with defendant and find that indirect criminal
contempt is not the type of criminal proceeding contemplated by
article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution.
	A court is vested with the inherent power to enforce its orders
and preserve its dignity by instituting contempt proceedings.
People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 368 (1996), citing In re Baker,
71 Ill. 2d 480, 484 (1978). The purpose of criminal contempt
proceedings is to punish the contemnor for conduct that offends
the dignity of the court, such as disobedience of the court. Warren,
173 Ill. 2d  at 368. Criminal contempt sanctions are retrospective
in nature and punish the contemnor for past acts which he cannot
undo. People v. Kaeding, 239 Ill. App. 3d 851, 854 (1993).
Indirect criminal contempt refers to that subcategory of criminal
contempt where the contemptuous conduct occurred outside the
trial judge's presence. Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 47-48. "When a
probationer violates a condition of probation, he arguably commits
an act of indirect criminal contempt and could be subject to both
contempt sanctions and resentencing on the conviction for which
he is serving probation." People v. Goleash, 311 Ill. App. 3d 949,
957 (2000); see People v. Gallinger, 191 Ill. App. 3d 488, 490
(1989).
	The State concedes that, although the right to self-incrimination applies in indirect criminal contempt proceedings
(In re Marriage of Ruchala, 208 Ill. App. 3d 971 (1991)), in this
case, defendant did not have a realistic expectation that he would
be exposing himself to criminal contempt sanctions. Citing
Murphy, the State asserts that because defendant was unaware of
the possibility that an indirect criminal contempt prosecution could
follow, he could not assert the privilege against self-incrimination
at the probation revocation hearing. Again, in Murphy the Court
noted that if questions posed to a probationer are relevant to his
probationary status and posed "no realistic threat of
incrimination," then the right against self-incrimination would not
attach. Murphy, 465 U.S.  at 435 n.7, 79 L. Ed. 2d  at 425 n.7, 104 S. Ct.  at 1146 n.7. We agree.
	In Martin, the appellate court concluded that the State may
call a defendant to testify at a probation revocation hearing to elicit
testimony which would show that the defendant had violated
conditions of his probation, "but which would not incriminate him
in any other proceedings." Martin, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 759.
Thereafter, the appellate court in Bell concluded that the " 'other
proceedings' " to which Martin referred did not include contempt
proceedings; rather, they included other "contemporaneous or later
criminal proceedings." Bell, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 150. Further, the
appellate court held that because the defendant in that case did not
face a realistic threat that his answers would be used against him,
there was no violation of his fifth amendment privilege. Bell, 296
Ill. App. 3d at 150; see also People v. Baker, 123 Ill. 2d 233, 244
(1988) (a defendant claiming the privilege must have a reasonable
ground to believe that his answers to questions asked might tend
to incriminate him).
	Applying the above principles to the instant case, we find that
defendant's testimony at his probation revocation hearing was not
a violation of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination,
under article I, section 10. Defendant did not face a realistic
expectation that his testimony would subject him to indirect
criminal contempt. Defendant's testimony at the probation
revocation hearing only impacted his probationary status and did
not realistically expose him to any further proceedings, such as
indirect criminal contempt sanctions. We decline to depart from
the well-reasoned decisions enunciated in Murphy, Martin and
Bell.
	In the instant case, defendant was never charged with
contempt; thus, he did not incriminate himself in any additional
proceeding. Further, the petition to revoke defendant's probation
only informed him that he violated probation when he left the
county jail early on January 3, 2000, and left the county jail
without cause on January 4, 2000. The petition did not inform
defendant that he could or would be subject to indirect criminal
contempt charges for failing to follow the court order. See People
v. Waldron, 114 Ill. 2d 295, 302-04 (1986) (notice includes the
requirement that the contemnor be advised of the possibility that
he might be found in contempt). Thus, it is clear that defendant did
not face a realistic threat that his answers at the probation
revocation hearing would incriminate him in any further
proceeding.
	Furthermore, we are unaware of any cases in which a
defendant has had his probation revoked and been subject to
indirect criminal contempt charges as a result of the probation
revocation. Such a result is unheard of because of the stringent
procedural burdens involved in charging and prosecuting a
defendant for indirect criminal contempt. A person who is charged
with indirect criminal contempt, unlike a probationer at a
probation revocation hearing, is entitled to constitutional
protections that are afforded to any other criminal defendant. Betts,
200 Ill. App. 3d at 58; Goleash, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 956. These
protections include the privilege against self-incrimination, the
presumption of innocence, the State's burden to prove the charge
beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to counsel, the right to a
public trial, the right to confront witnesses and to compel
testimony, the right to be present at trial, and the right to testify or
to remain silent. See Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 58; Kaeding v.
Collins, 281 Ill. App. 3d 919, 925 (1996). Moreover, the alleged
contemnor must be accorded notice and a fair hearing. Waldron,
114 Ill. 2d  at 302-04. Due process requires that the alleged
contemnor be informed of the charges against him by information,
notice, citation, or rule to show cause; allowed to file an answer to
the charges; afforded a full hearing thereon; and allowed a jury
trial in serious cases. People v. Javaras, 51 Ill. 2d 296 (1972). It
is unlikely that the State would charge a defendant with indirect
criminal contempt for the same conduct that constituted the
alleged probation violation. Both indirect criminal contempt and
probation revocation seek the same result for identical conduct.
Yet, it is far less burdensome to resentence a probationer pursuant
to a petition to revoke his probation than to seek a criminal
contempt sanction.
	Accordingly, we find that defendant's testimony at his
probation revocation hearing was not a violation of defendant's
right against self-incrimination, pursuant to article I, section 10.

I. Due Process
	Next, defendant relies upon the due process clause of the
Illinois and federal constitutions to argue that the State may not
call a probationer as an adverse witness at a probation revocation
hearing and force him to admit a probation violation. See U.S.
Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2. Defendant
contends that calling him as an adverse witness is fundamentally
unfair because it eliminates the State's burden of proof, denies him
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and denies him
the right to counsel. We apply a de novo standard of review.
People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d 195, 201 (1996).
	Due process concerns principles of fundamental justice and
fairness. Gagnon, 411 U.S.  at 790, 36 L. Ed. 2d  at 666, 93 S. Ct. 
at 1763; see also People v. Acevedo, 216 Ill. App. 3d 195, 201
(1991) (" 'due process requires a fair determination that the acts
which formed the basis for the revocation petition did occur and
that fairness be accorded a defendant during the proceedings' "),
quoting People v. Cox, 197 Ill. App. 3d 239, 243 (1990). However,
due process is a flexible concept, such that " 'not all situations
calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure.' " People v. Beard, 59 Ill. 2d 220, 225 (1974), quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 494, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600 (1972). Thus, what procedures are required by
due process depend upon " 'the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as of the private interest that has been
affected by governmental action.' " Morrissey, 408 U.S.  at 481, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 495, 92 S. Ct.  at 2600, quoting Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230, 1236, 81 S. Ct. 1743, 1748-49 (1961).
	In the context of revocation proceedings, the United States
Supreme Court has outlined what process is due. See Black v.
Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611-12, 85 L. Ed. 2d 636, 642, 105 S. Ct. 2254, 2257-58 (1985); Gagnon, 411 U.S. 778, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656,
93 S. Ct. 1756; Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593. In so doing, the Court has observed that "revocation ***
is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of
rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply ***.
*** Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty
to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional
liberty properly dependent on observance of special ***
restrictions." Morrissey, 408 U.S.  at 480, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 494, 92 S. Ct.  at 2600; see also Bell, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 149 ("A probation
revocation proceeding has not been arbitrarily labeled a
noncriminal proceeding. A sentence of probation is a form of
agreement between a defendant and the criminal justice system
with severe consequences if the agreement is broken"). Thus,
under federal precedent a probationer is entitled to "minimum
procedural safeguards required by due process" at a probation
revocation proceeding. Romano, 471 U.S.  at 610-11, 85 L. Ed. 2d 
at 642, 105 S. Ct.  at 2257; Gagnon, 411 U.S.  at 786, 36 L. Ed. 2d 
at 664, 93 S. Ct. at 1761-62; Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593. These minimum requirements include: (1)
written notice of the claimed probation violation; (2) disclosure to
the probationer of the evidence against him; (3) the opportunity to
be heard in person and present testimonial and documentary
evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
(unless the hearing officer can show good cause for not allowing
confrontation); (5) a neutral arbiter; and (6) a written statement of
the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking probation.
Gagnon, 411 U.S.  at 786, 36 L. Ed. 2d  at 664, 93 S. Ct.  at 1761-62.
	Illinois affords procedural safeguards by statute. 730 ILCS
5/5-6-4(c) (West 2000). Under Illinois law, a probationer is
entitled to notice of the petition charging the violation; a court
hearing on the violation; the right to be heard in person; the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses; and the right to counsel
in all circumstances. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(a) through (c) (West
2000); see also People v. DeWitt, 78 Ill. 2d 82, 85 (1979); Beard,
59 Ill. 2d  at 224-25. Unlike federal law, the right to counsel and
the right to confront and cross-examine are absolute. See, e.g.,
Gagnon, 411 U.S.  at 786, 36 L. Ed. 2d  at 664, 93 S. Ct.  at 1761-62
(under federal law a probationer is entitled to a conditional right
to confront and cross-examine, and the right to counsel does not
attach in all circumstances). Accordingly, in this case we examine
whether calling defendant as a witness against himself at his
probation revocation hearing violated due process. We hold that
it did not.
	First, citing to People v. Steele, 283 Ill. App. 3d 413 (1996),
defendant contends that calling a probationer as an adverse witness
eliminates the State's burden of proof because in order to prove a
probation violation the State must merely force the probationer to
admit to the violation. See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(c) (West 2000)
(providing that "[t]he State has the burden of going forward with
the evidence and proving the violation by the preponderance of the
evidence"). Defendant's reliance upon Steele is misplaced. In
Steele, the adult probation department filed a petition to revoke the
defendant's probation because he failed to report to his probation
officer. At the probation revocation hearing, the State called the
defendant's probation officer to testify. However, during the
hearing, the trial court directed questions to the defendant and
"attempted to induce defendant into admitting a probation
violation." Steele, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 415. On appeal, the appellate
court held that the trial court "assist[ed] the State in satisfying its
burden of proof" and "surrendered its responsibility as the trier of
fact." Steele, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 415. "The trial court's attempt to
provoke defendant into incriminating himself violated his due
process rights ***." Steele, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 416.
	In the instant case, the trial court did not assist the State with
its burden of proof or surrender its responsibility as the trier of
fact. See, e.g., Bell, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 152 (the trial court did not
question the defendant; rather, the State called the defendant as an
adverse witness and asked questions concerning his conduct as it
was required under the terms of his probation). The State
maintained its burden to present the evidence, calling four
witnesses to testify, including defendant. Only the State questioned
the defendant, as the following exchange between the State and
defendant illustrates:
			"Q. [Assistant State's Attorney] And Miss Chezem [the
outpatient counselor] had previously told you that you
would only be going to classes one day a week, right?
			A. [Defendant] Yes.
			Q. Why did you let yourself-or sign yourself out the
next day, January 4?
			A. I just went out to my car and smoked a couple
cigarettes and came back into the building.
			Q. And you knew that you did not have an appointment
at Prairie Center?
			A. That's right."
Only the trial judge determined whether this conduct violated the
terms of defendant's probation. Therefore, we reject defendant's
contention that calling him as an adverse witness relieved the State
of its burden of proof.
	Additionally, although in this case the State called four
witnesses to establish the probation violation, principles of due
process do not prevent the State from calling a single witness, the
probationer, to establish the violation. A probationer's testimony
does not necessarily establish the violation. See, e.g., Bell, 296 Ill.
App. 3d at 153 ("Depending on the actual content of defendant's
testimony, the State may have needed more evidence to prove the
probation violations").
	Second, defendant maintains that calling him as an adverse
witness denies him the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(c) (West 2000). We fail to see
how calling defendant as an adverse witness barred his right to
confront and cross-examine. The record shows that defendant's
counsel was given the opportunity to cross-examine three
witnesses called by the State. Furthermore, on redirect
examination by defendant's own counsel, defendant was given an
opportunity to explain the circumstances of his conduct.
Defendant's contention that he was denied the right to confront
and cross-examine presupposes that probation revocation
proceedings are criminal in nature. As we previously held,
probation revocation proceedings are civil.
	Last, defendant argues that he was denied the right to counsel.
See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(c) (West 2000). Defendant associates the
right to counsel with counsel's advice concerning the decision to
testify. Simply put, defendant states that the most important
function of counsel is the giving of advice whether or not to
testify. He argues that this function is rendered meaningless when,
against the advice of counsel, he is forced to testify as an adverse
witness. Again, defendant's argument rests upon the contention
that probation revocation proceedings are criminal proceedings, in
which he has the right not to testify. In the case of a probation
revocation hearing, the right to counsel exists to render other
important assistance. For example, counsel may cross-examine the
State's witnesses, present witnesses on the defendant's behalf, or
expose weaknesses in the State's evidence. In this matter, counsel
offered this assistance. Defendant was not denied the right to
counsel.
	Accordingly, we find that defendant's due process rights were
not violated by compelling him to testify as an adverse witness for
the State.

III. Day-for-Day Credit
	After the trial court found that defendant violated the terms of
his probation, defendant was resentenced to another four years'
intensive probation, including 364 days of work release to be
served at the Vermilion County Public Safety Building. Relying
upon People v. Welty, 275 Ill. App. 3d 10 (1995), defendant argues
that he is entitled to "day-for-day credit" for time served in pretrial
custody against his later term of periodic imprisonment-the 364
days of work release. Defendant claims that the trial court is
required to award day-for-day credit; if he "serves one day" he
"gets one day off at the end." To support his claim, defendant also
relies upon section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections,
which provides, "a prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment
shall receive one day of good conduct credit for each day of his or
her sentence of imprisonment or recommitment under Section
3-3-9. Each day of good conduct credit shall reduce by one day
the prisoner's period of imprisonment or recommitment under
Section 3-3-9." 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (West 2000).
	As an initial matter, we reject defendant's claim that he is
entitled to day-for-day credit under the reasoning in Welty. Like
the appellate court below, we find that "the language used in Welty
is confusing, [and] the result the court reached did not appear to
grant the defendant 156 days' credit for the 78 that he actually
served in custody prior to sentencing." 319 Ill. App. 3d at 593. To
the extent Welty holds that day-for-day credit applies to terms of
periodic imprisonment, it is overruled. Defendant's claim is best
resolved by examining the statutory language at issue.
	"Day-for-day" credit is a phrase used to describe the system
of mandatory "good conduct credit" contained in section 3-6-3 of
the Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2000);
see also People v. Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d 209, 223 (2000) (noting the
day-for-day good-conduct credit enactment); People v. Cloutier,
178 Ill. 2d 141, 151 (1997) (referring to the day-for-day good-conduct credits contained in section 3-6-3(a)(2)); Johnson v.
Franzen, 77 Ill. 2d 513, 517-18 (1979) (discussing the history of
the credit system). The term "day-for-day" does not appear in the
express language of section 3-6-3. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West
2000). However, the term "day-for-day" is used to describe the
current credit system. Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d  at 223; Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d  at 151. Under the day-for-day system, a felon may earn credit
for good behavior once he or she begins to serve the prison
sentence. For clarity, we note that the credit system contained in
section 3-6-3 was first enacted in 1978 and replaced the system
of indeterminate sentencing. See Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch.
38, par. 1005-8-1. Prior to 1978, under the system of
indeterminate sentencing, the Department of Corrections awarded
mandatory "statutory good time credits," and discretionary good-conduct credits, commonly called "compensatory good time
credits." (Emphases added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par.
1005-8-1, amended by Pub. Act 80-1099, eff. February 1, 1978.
Today, credits are no longer referred to as good-time credits.
	Turning to section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections,
we find that it does not support defendant's claim that the trial
court was required to award him day-for-day credit for time served
in pretrial custody against the later term of periodic imprisonment.
730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (West 2000). Section 3-6-3 of the
Unified Code of Corrections applies only to inmates in the
Department of Corrections. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(1) (West
2000) ("rules and regulations for the early release on account of
good conduct of persons committed to the Department"); 730
ILCS 5/3-1-2(e) (West 2000) (" 'Department' means the
Department of Corrections of this State"). Defendant is not an
inmate in the Department of Corrections, but rather is confined to
the Vermilion County Public Safety Building, a county facility.
The County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act (730 ILCS 130/1
et seq. (West 2000)) governs the diminution of sentence of
prisoners in county facilities. Therefore, section 3-6-3 does not
apply.
	Even if we were to conclude that defendant's confinement to
a county facility did not affect his eligibility for good-conduct
credit contained in section 3-6-3, defendant would still be
ineligible to receive credit because he was confined to "periodic
imprisonment." "A sentence of periodic imprisonment is a
sentence of imprisonment during which the committed person may
be released for periods of time during the day or night or for
periods of days, or both ***." 730 ILCS 5/5-7-1(a) (West 2000).
Defendant's sentence of 364 days of work release is a sentence of
"periodic imprisonment." Section 5-7-1(d) states, "[n]o sentence
of periodic imprisonment shall be subject to the good time credit
provisions of Section 3-6-3 of this Code." 730 ILCS 5/5-7-1(d)
(West 2000).
	Further, because we find that the County Jail Good Behavior
Allowance Act governs inmates in county facilities in this matter,
we examine defendant's contention under its provisions. 730 ILCS
130/1 et seq. (West 2000). Under section 3 of the County Jail
Good Behavior Allowance Act, "[t]he good behavior of any
person who commences a sentence of confinement in a county jail
for a fixed term of imprisonment *** shall entitle such person to
a good behavior allowance ***." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS
130/3 (West 2000). Further, the Act provides that the good-behavior allowance "shall not apply to individuals sentenced for
a felony to probation or conditional discharge where a condition
of such probation or conditional discharge is that the individual
serve a sentence of periodic imprisonment ***." 730 ILCS 130/3
(West 2000). Clearly, defendant's sentence of periodic
imprisonment makes him ineligible for good-behavior allowance
credit. We find that the trial court did not error by denying
defendant's request for day-for-day credit.

CONCLUSION
	For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
affirming the trial court judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
	I join in the result reached by the majority because the State
did not charge defendant with indirect criminal contempt and the
circuit court did not impose any punishment for contempt upon
defendant. I do so with the understanding that where the State calls
a defendant as an adverse witness at a probation revocation
hearing, the defendant's answers may not be used to support a
finding of criminal contempt. 
	At least two Illinois courts have held that sentencing for
contempt of court is a proper sanction for a violation of probation.
See People v. Gallinger, 191 Ill. App. 3d 488, 490 (1989) ("The
contempt power of the circuit court is a proper sanction for a
violation of probation"); People v. Patrick, 83 Ill. App. 3d 951,
954 (1980) ("Because of the court's inherent contempt power and
because the comments of the group drafting the Unified Code of
Corrections indicate that the format of the Code was adopted with
a recognition of the existence of that inherent power as one added
sanction, we deem the court to have possessed power to punish for
contempt in this case"); see also People v. Colclasure, 48 Ill. App.
3d 988, 991 (1977) ("Because of the statutory history of use of the
contempt sanction for probation violations, the similarity between
sentences of probation and periodic imprisonment and analogy to
the common law treatment of sanctioning willful violations of
other court orders by contempt, we conclude that a trial court is
empowered to punish a willful violation of a condition of periodic
imprisonment by holding the violator in indirect criminal
contempt"). Further, as noted in the council commentary to the
probation revocation statute (730 ILCS Ann. 5/5-6-4, Council
Commentary, at 95 (Smith-Hurd 1997)), "the court retains the
sanctions of criminal contempt and fining the offender for
violating the conditions of probation." Because a defendant may
be sanctioned for criminal contempt for a violation of the
conditions of probation, it is imperative that the defendant's
answers at the probation revocation hearing not be used to support
a finding of contempt. Neither may the State use the fruits of the
defendant's testimony against him in a proceeding for contempt.
See McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990 (Alaska 1980) (where the
court used its inherent supervisory powers to exclude the parolee's
testimony as well as the fruits of the parolee's revocation hearing
for purposes of the parolee's subsequent criminal trial). A
defendant may not be required to choose between answering the
State's questions, thus supplying the foundation for a finding of
contempt, and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining
silent. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409,
104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984). However, "a State may validly insist on
answers to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly
administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the
required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and
thus eliminates the threat of incrimination." Murphy, 465 U.S.  at
435 n.7, 79 L. Ed. 2d  at 425 n.7, 104 S. Ct.  at 1146 n.7.
	Article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
provides: "[n]o person shall be compelled in a criminal case to
give evidence against himself ***." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §10.
For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People v.
Miller, No. 91241 (May 23, 2002), probation revocation
proceedings are part of a "criminal case" within the meaning of
that provision. Accordingly, the circuit court should not have
required Lindsey to testify as an adverse witness at his probation
revocation hearing.
	Because Lindsey's privilege against self-incrimination was
violated when he was compelled to testify, we should reverse the
appellate court's judgment affirming the order of the circuit court
which revoked Lindsey's probation and resentenced him. The
cause should be remanded to the circuit court for a new probation
revocation hearing. We should further hold that the circuit court
may not require Lindsay to take the witness stand at the new
hearing and that it is prohibited from making any presumptions
based on the absence of testimony by him. See 725 ILCS 5/115-16
(West 2000) (in a criminal case or proceeding, a defendant's
"neglect to testify shall not create a presumption against [him]"). 	For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.