Case Title: STANG v. McVANEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-107

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
STANG v. McVANEY 2002 WY 5344 P.3d 41Case Number: 01-107Decided: 04/10/2002
 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

ANDINA 
MARIE STANG, a/k/a

ANDINA 
MARIE RAMSEY and

KEVIN 
RAMSEY, 

Appellants(Defendants),

 

v.

 

TIMOTHY 
McVANEY, as Guardian for

SHANNON 
McVANEY, and

KRISTOPHER 
McVANEY, 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellants: 

            
Fred W. Phifer, Wheatland, Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellees: 

            
Kendal R. Hoopes of Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, 
Wyoming.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

            
VOIGT, Justice. 

[¶1]      The First 
Interstate Bank of Sheridan (the Bank) filed an interpleader action on December 
7, 2000, to determine the ownership of a payable on death certificate of deposit 
(CD).  Mike Keeler (Keeler), the 
CD's purchaser, had named his great niece and nephew, Shannon and Kristopher 
McVaney (the appellees), as payees under the CD.  Keeler committed suicide on November 4, 
2000.  An undated letter purportedly 
written by Keeler changing the names of the payable on death payees to Andina 
Marie Stang and Kevin Ivan Ramsey (the appellants) arrived at the Bank two days 
after Keeler's death.  The McVaneys, 
Stang, and Ramsey all claim ownership of the CD.  Stang and Ramsey appeal the district 
court's granting of the appellees' motion for summary judgment.  We affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The appellants 
state the issues as:

 

            
1.         
Was the delivery of the request for change of beneficiary on the 
Certificate of Deposit complete when it was mailed with the original Certificate 
of Deposit one day prior to the owner of the CD committing suicide and was 
received by First Interstate Bank of Sheridan on the first business day after it 
was mailed?

 

            
2.         
Did the trial court err in granting Appellees' Motion for Summary 
Judgment?

 

            
3.         
Did the trial court err in awarding the Certificate of Deposit to the 
Appellees?

 

            
4.         
Did the depositor and owner of the Time Certificate of Deposit, Mike 
Keeler, have the right and the authority to change the "Payable on Death" names 
at any time during his lifetime?

 

The 
appellees present the following issues:

 

1.         
Whether Shannon and Kristopher McVaney, who were the payable-on-death 
payees on the certificate of deposit at the time of death of Mike Keeler, are 
the owners of the funds represented by the certificate of 
deposit.

 

2.         
Whether the request for a change of the payable-on-death payees on the 
certificate of deposit was effective in changing the terms of the account when 
it was not received by First Interstate Bank until after the death of Mike 
Keeler.

 

3.         
Whether Mike Keeler's request for a change of the payable-on-death payees 
constitutes an inter vivos gift or a gift causa mortis.[1]

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The Bank filed an 
interpleader action in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District to 
determine the ownership of approximately $30,000.00 held as a CD by the 
Bank.  The action named Shannon 
McVaney, Kristopher McVaney, Andina Marie Stang, and Kevin Ivan Ramsey as 
defendants.  Because Shannon McVaney 
was a minor, the district court appointed her father, Timothy McVaney, as her 
guardian for purposes of the lawsuit.

 

[¶4]      Keeler had 
obtained a CD at the Bank of Commerce, now First Interstate Bank, on May 10, 
1982.  At that time, Keeler named 
his sister, Velta Schaefer, as the payable on death beneficiary.  On December 3, 1998, Keeler gave the 
Bank written instructions to reissue the CD making it payable on death to the 
appellees.  The Bank complied with 
those instructions.

 

[¶5]      The relevant 
facts in this case are not complex.  
Keeler met Stang, a waitress, at the Breakfast Inn restaurant in 
Wheatland where he went for breakfast every day at 5:00 a.m.  They became friends.  When he failed to show for breakfast one 
morning, Stang went to check on him.  
He was ill, and she rushed him to a hospital.  Stang began taking care of Keeler on a 
daily basis starting in February 1995.  
She took him to doctors' appointments, picked up his prescriptions, took 
him to the hospital, took him shopping, cleaned his house, did his laundry, 
cooked him dinner, and occasionally made him breakfast.  Stang also provided home health care 
pursuant to his doctors' and nurses' instructions.  Stang received no compensation for her 
services during the first four years she cared for Keeler.  The last two years before his death, she 
received between $600.00 and $700.00 per month, depending upon the amount Keeler 
could afford.

 

[¶6]      During August 
2000, Keeler allegedly requested that Stang prepare a letter to the Bank to 
change the payable on death beneficiaries from the McVaneys to Stang and her 
husband, Kevin Ramsey.  Stang stated 
in an affidavit that she did not write the letter because she did not want to 
cause problems between Keeler and his family.  Stang further stated in her affidavit 
that on November 3, 2000, Keeler insisted that Stang write the letter, and 
insisted that she take him to the post office that day to mail it.  The next day, Keeler, age 77, shot and 
killed himself.

 

[¶7]      Two days after 
his death, on November 6, 2000, the Bank received an undated typed letter 
purportedly from Keeler, directing the Bank to change the payable on death 
beneficiaries from the McVaneys to Stang and Ramsey.  Without knowledge of Keeler's death, the 
Bank issued a new CD naming Stang and Ramsey as the payable on death 
beneficiaries.  Stang notified the 
Bank of Keeler's death on November 10, 2000.  Because there were multiple claims to 
the CD, the Bank filed an Interpleader Complaint to determine ownership of the 
CD.

 

[¶8]      The McVaneys 
answered the Interpleader Complaint and filed a cross-claim against Stang and 
Ramsey on January 11, 2001.  The 
cross-claim alleged that the McVaneys were the rightful owners of the CD.  Stang and Ramsey filed an answer to the 
cross-claim and also brought a cross-claim against the McVaneys.  Both cross-claims sought the district 
court's determination of the CD's ownership.  The district court dismissed the Bank 
from the action without prejudice on May 3, 2001.  The district court then realigned the 
parties; McVaneys as plaintiffs, Stang and Ramsey as 
defendants.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      The appellants' 
first issue is whether delivery of the letter requesting the change in 
beneficiary was completed when it, along with the original CD, was mailed to the 
Bank.  The appellants argue that 
delivery was effective when Keeler placed the written request with the original 
CD in a properly addressed envelope, with correct postage, and placed it in the 
mail.  The appellants assert that 
this created a gift causa mortis, and title to the CD passed to the 
appellants upon Keeler's death.

 

[¶10]   CDs are inherently contractual, and 
if they are non-negotiable, as in the instant case, they are to be construed in 
light of general contract law principles.  
Rose v. Rose, 849 P.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Wyo. 1993).  A change in title to a CD in effect 
terminates the existing account and replaces it with a new one.  Washington County Mercantile Bank v. 
Kennedy, 855 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Mo.App. 1993).  Therefore, changing the payable on death 
beneficiaries from the McVaneys to the appellants would have terminated the 
existing account and created a new contract between the parties.  Keeler's request to alter the terms of 
the CD was an offer for a new contract, which the Bank had yet to accept at the 
time of Keeler's death.

 

[¶11]   In contract law, the mailbox rule 
provides that unless otherwise agreed to or provided by law, an offer is 
accepted when the acceptance is properly addressed and placed in the mail.  Liquorama, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank 
and Trust Co. of Chicago, 86 Ill.App.3d 974, 41 Ill.Dec. 951, 408 N.E.2d 373, 375 (1980); 
Black's Law Dictionary 964 (7th ed. 1999).  In the situation before this Court, the 
mailbox rule would apply not to Keeler's letter, but to the Bank's response, if 
such had been mailed.  Keeler mailed 
an offer to the Bank.  A new 
contract could not be created until acceptance by the 
Bank.

 

[¶12]   We do not believe that a gift 
causa mortis was created.  A 
gift causa mortis is effected if the following conditions are met:  "There must be a clear and manifest 
intention of the owner to give, a subject capable of passing by delivery, and an 
actual delivery at the time, in contemplation of death."  Hecht v. Shaffer, 15 Wyo. 34, 85 P. 1056, 1057 (1906).  The burden of proving a gift causa 
mortis is on the alleged donee, and it must be shown by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Where the donee is not a 
relative, positive and unequivocal proof is necessary.  In re King's Estate, 49 Wyo. 453, 
57 P.2d 675, 678 (1936).  This Court has 
stated:

 

[I]t 
does not follow that gifts causa mortis can be made more easily than the 
other gifts, for an additional compensating requirement becomes necessary in 
connection with the former not found in connection of the latter, and that is 
the showing that the gift was made in contemplation of death, so as to lend 
credibility to the making of the gift.

 

Begovich 
v. Kruljac, 38 
Wyo. 365, 267 P. 426, 430 (1928).

 

[¶13]   Whether Stang and Ramsey sustained 
their burden of proof was for the district court to determine.  We will not reverse such a finding 
unless it was manifestly against the weight of the evidence.  Produit v. Produit, 2001 WY 123, 
¶ 18, 35 P.3d 1240, 1245 (Wyo. 2001).  Other than the fact that he killed 
himself the next day, there is nothing in the record of the instant case to 
indicate that Keeler's "gift" of the CD to the appellants, if such it was meant 
to be, was made in contemplation of death.  
The first indication that Keeler was thinking about suicide occurred on 
November 4, 2000, the day after the letter was written.  Stang stated in her 
affidavit:

 

At 
approx. 10:45 when I got to Mike's [the decedent] house he had his gun in his 
hand, I told him to put the gun away.  
He told me the pain wouldn't stop and I asked him to please take the pain 
pill like Dr. Thalkin told him to do, I broke his percocet in half and gave him 
one half to take.  I asked Mike 
again to put the gun away and I told him that I would leave if he didn't.  Mike ignored me and I turned to leave 
and he shot himself.

 

[¶14]   With nothing more in the record, 
the district court could reasonably conclude that there was no contemplation of 
death on November 3, 2000, meaning that this element of a gift causa mortis was not sufficiently proved.  Unless all of the elements of a gift 
causa mortis are met, the gift 
fails.

 

[¶15]   The next issue raised by the 
appellants is whether the district court erred in granting the appellees' motion 
for summary judgment.2  Summary judgment motions are determined 
under the following language from W.R.C.P. 56(c):

 

The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 

[¶16]   The purpose of summary judgment is 
to eliminate the necessity of formal trials where only questions of law are 
involved.  Blagrove 
v. JB Mechanical, Inc., 
934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1997).  The initial burden is upon the movant to 
demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact.  Hronek 
v. St. Joseph's Children's Home, 
866 P.2d 1305, 1307 (Wyo. 1994).  A fact is material if proof of that fact 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the 
cause of action or a defense.  
Id.  If a prima facie showing is made that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the 
motion to present specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists.  Boehm v. 
Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 
748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987).

 

[¶17]   Where a party has made a prima 
facie showing in favor of summary judgment, it takes more than "a scintilla of 
evidence in support of the [other party's] position . . . to defeat a properly 
supported motion for summary judgment.'"  
Moncrief 
v. Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co., 
880 F. Supp. 1495, 1505 (D.Wyo. 1995), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part, and remanded on other grounds, 
174 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Moya v. United States, 
35 F.3d 501, 503 (10th Cir. 1994)).  "A party must affirmatively set forth 
material facts in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.  He cannot rely only on his allegations 
and pleadings."  Hyatt v. 
Big Horn School Dist. No. 4, 
636 P.2d 525, 530 (Wyo. 1981).  Pleading allegations do not create an 
issue as against a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits.  W.R.C.P. 56(e); Vipont 
Min. Co. v. Uranium Research & Development Co., 
376 P.2d 868, 870 (Wyo. 1962).

 

[¶18]   Upon hearing the respective summary 
judgment arguments of counsel and upon review of the record, the district court 
found that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The appellants argue that there are 
genuine issues of fact concerning ownership, intent, and delivery of the 
CD.  There is no doubt that Keeler 
owned the CD, and during his lifetime he could change the beneficiaries, as he 
did from his sister to the McVaneys in 1998, with written notification to the 
Bank.  It is well established in 
contract law, on the other hand, that the death of either party before 
acceptance is communicated causes an offer to lapse.  17 C.J.S. Contracts 
§ 65(c) at 527-28 (1999); 
First 
Home Sav. Bank, FSB v. Nernberg, 
436 Pa.Super. 377, 648 A.2d 9, 15 (1994).  In the instant case, while it might have 
been Keeler's intent to change the names of the beneficiaries, the offer to do 
so had not even been received by the Bank, so the Bank had certainly not 
communicated its acceptance of the offer, and the offer lapsed upon Keeler's 
death on November 4, 2000.

 

[¶19]   The appellants rely on the mailbox 
rule to argue that the offer was effectively delivered when it was mailed.  We earlier discussed the mailbox rule, 
and need not address it again.  
However, even if this constituted effective delivery, as a matter of law, 
the purported request to change the payable on death beneficiaries to the 
appellants is not enforceable because it was received by the Bank after Keeler's 
death.

 

A 
party may alter the terms of the account by a notice signed by the party and 
given to the financial institution to change the terms of the account or to stop 
or vary payment under the terms of the account.  To be effective, the notice must be 
received 
by the financial institution during 
the party's lifetime.

 

Uniform 
Multiple-Person Accounts Act § 13(a), 8B U.L.A. 22-23 (2001) (emphasis 
added).  An account may be altered 
"by written order given by a party to the financial institution to change the 
form of the account.'  . . .  The request must be signed by a party 
and received by the bank during a party's lifetime."  In re 
Conservatorship of Gobernatz, 
603 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn.App. 1999) (quoting 
Minn. Stat. § 524.6-205).  We agree with the district court that 
summary judgment was appropriate and the funds represented by the CD should be 
awarded to the appellees.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶20]   Under the contract existing between 
Keeler and the Bank, ownership of the CD vested in the appellees upon Keeler's 
death.  That contract was not 
amended by Keeler's unilateral action prior to his death.  Further, there was insufficient proof 
that Keeler's conduct was in contemplation of death, so the elements of a gift 
causa 
mortis 
were not proven.  The decision of 
the district court is affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The appellants 
have not argued that this was an inter vivos gift, so that theory will 
not be addressed.

  2In large part, 
this is the same issue that has just been addressed.  Because the appellants treat the matter 
as two separate issues, we will do likewise.