Case Title: Commonwealth v. Robertson

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12677

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12677 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANDREW ROBERTSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 10, 2022. - February 28, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Evidence, Joint venturer, Acts and 
declarations of conspirator, Photograph, Videotape, 
Opinion, Fingerprints, Relevancy and materiality.  Joint 
Enterprise.  Constitutional Law, Confrontation of 
witnesses.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Confrontation 
of witnesses, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, 
Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 11, 2014. 
 
The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
David H. Mirsky for the defendant. 
Darcy A. Jordan, Assistant District Attorney (Ian 
Polumbaum, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
LOWY, J.  After a mistrial due to a hung jury, the 
defendant, Andrew Robertson, was convicted at a second trial of 
murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
2 
 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.1  He appeals from 
his convictions, arguing that (1) there was insufficient 
evidence to convict him at the first and second trials, (2) the 
defendant's motion to sever should have been allowed, (3) 
various pieces of evidence were admitted erroneously, (4) the 
prosecutor improperly expressed his opinion in closing argument, 
(5) the judge's instruction on accessory after the fact was 
improper, (6) the defendant was denied the right to a fair trial 
when a codefendant attacked him as the verdicts were being read, 
and (7) we should reduce the verdict of murder in the first 
degree pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We affirm. 
 
Background.  Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have found the 
following at both the first and second trials.  See Commonwealth 
v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).2 
The victim, Romeo McCubbin, was shot multiple times and 
killed while sitting in his sport utility vehicle (SUV).  
Surveillance video footage caught the shooting on camera.  In 
the footage, a small SUV parks parallel to a sidewalk.  An 
individual wearing a scarf and white-soled shoes -- the 
defendant -- runs onscreen from the left with his arm extended, 
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of possessing a firearm 
without a license. 
 
2 The evidence at both trials was largely the same. 
3 
 
stops facing the SUV's front driver's side window, and fires 
multiple shots into it.  The vehicle then rolls forward, and the 
victim falls out of the front passenger's side door.  The 
shooter jumps into the front passenger's side of a waiting SUV, 
which speeds away.  A second person then runs up and shoots the 
prone victim multiple times; a third person then kicks the 
victim once. 
 
A detective responding to the shooting followed an SUV 
being driven quickly away from the area of the scene of the 
shooting.  The vehicle eventually turned into a driveway.  Omar 
Bonner and Omar Denton got out of the SUV and were arrested 
after a chase.  While in custody after his arrest, Denton said 
to Bonner that he "told Sophie to call SP" and "called SP" from 
"the wagon."3  The defendant's nickname was "Spoilers," and he 
received a call from Denton around the time that Denton was 
arrested. 
The defendant used his cell phone to communicate or attempt 
to communicate with Bonner immediately before and after the 
killing, and he received calls from Javaine Watson, who was a 
friend of the defendant, the night of the incident.  In the 
month leading up to the shooting, the defendant engaged in 
hundreds of telephone contacts with Watson, Denton, and Bonner.  
 
3 It is unclear from the record who "Sophie" is. 
4 
 
The defendant asked his girlfriend to cancel his cell phone 
number the day after the shooting. 
Police recovered from the property where they had chased 
Denton and Bonner a gun that had fired ballistics found at the 
scene of the shooting, including the bullets found in the 
victim's jacket and in the victim's head.  Police also 
investigated a red SUV blocking a driveway down the street from 
where the chase had occurred.  The SUV was still on, in reverse, 
and resting against a fence.  They took custody of this vehicle, 
as well as the one Denton and Bonner had been driving. 
Watson's cell phone was in the red SUV.  He had borrowed 
the vehicle from his girlfriend that day and had told her it was 
parked in front of a driveway.  His girlfriend had rented the 
vehicle the day before Watson borrowed it.  Photographs 
introduced at trial revealed the SUV to be nearly identical to 
the first shooter's getaway vehicle, as shown in the videotape 
of the shooting.  The defendant's fingerprints were on the SUV, 
including on the front passenger's door's handle.  Bonner's, 
Denton's, and Watson's fingerprints also were on the vehicle. 
 
The defendant was at a nightclub down the street from the 
shooting on the night of the incident, wearing a scarf and 
5 
 
white-soled shoes.4  Denton, Bonner, and Watson also were at the 
club that night, as was the victim.  A photograph from that 
night at the club shows the defendant, Denton, and Bonner 
standing near each other. 
 
The jury could not reach a verdict regarding the charges 
against the defendant after a trial against the defendant, 
Denton, and Bonner.5  Following a second trial, which was against 
the defendant, Denton, Bonner, and Watson, the jury found the 
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, as 
well as unlawfully possessing a firearm. 
Discussion.  1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The 
defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict 
 
4 The evidence of the defendant's clothing in the club was 
clearer in the first trial than in the second trial, but 
sufficient in both to demonstrate what the defendant was 
wearing.  At the first trial, a witness identified an individual 
wearing a scarf and white-soled shoes in two photographs from 
the club, and an individual whose clothing was not as visible in 
a third photograph from the club, as the defendant.  At the 
second trial, that witness identified the defendant only in the 
third photograph, where his scarf and shoes were not visible.  
The other two photographs were introduced in evidence, however, 
and the jury could infer that the individual in the third 
photograph was the same individual as in the first two 
photographs based on the clothing visible in all the images. 
 
5 At this first trial, the jury found Omar Bonner guilty of 
unlawfully possessing a firearm and resisting arrest; they also 
found Omar Denton guilty of unlawfully possessing a firearm.  
Javaine Watson was severed from the first trial due to his 
attorney's illness. 
6 
 
him at both his first and second trials because the Commonwealth 
failed to prove at both trials that he was the first shooter.  
See Berry v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 793, 798 (1985) (pursuant 
to double jeopardy principles, Commonwealth may not retry 
defendant after hung jury if there was insufficient evidence to 
convict).  We disagree. 
As a preliminary matter, the Commonwealth argues that the 
defendant has waived his right to contest the sufficiency of the 
evidence at his first trial because, before his second trial, he 
did not appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss on 
double jeopardy grounds.  This is incorrect.  "[T]he defendant's 
contention that the evidence at his first trial was insufficient 
to warrant a conviction can . . . be raised at least as well in 
the appeal following his second trial as it could have been 
raised under G. L. c. 211, § 3."  Commonwealth v. Preston, 396 
Mass. 1006, 1006 (1985). 
Nevertheless, the defendant's sufficiency argument fails.  
Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the evidence at both trials was sufficient to show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the first 
shooter.  See Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677-678. 
The evidence, along with reasonable inferences therefrom, 
showed that the defendant was associated with Denton and Bonner, 
at least one of whom was in possession of one of the guns used 
7 
 
to shoot the victim, and Watson, whose cell phone was in the 
getaway vehicle.  The defendant communicated with Watson, 
Denton, and Bonner hundreds of times in the month leading up to 
the shooting, including immediately before and after the 
incident.  See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 667 
(2017) (defendant's "telephone calls with his suspected 
coventurers immediately before the shooting and in the thirty 
minutes after . . . allow the reasonable inference of the 
defendant's participation in and shared intent to commit the 
murder").  The defendant, Denton, Bonner, Watson, and the victim 
were at a club near the shooting on the night of the murder.  
The defendant was wearing a scarf and white-soled shoes that 
night, as was the first shooter.  His fingerprints were on the 
door handle of the getaway vehicle, which had been rented the 
day before.  See Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 701-702 
(2003) (fingerprint evidence may suggest defendant's guilt when 
coupled with other evidence).  Finally, the defendant asked his 
girlfriend to cancel his cell phone number the day after the 
shooting, demonstrating consciousness of guilt.  See 
Commonwealth v. Porter, 384 Mass. 647, 653 (1981) (consciousness 
of guilt, coupled with other evidence, may suggest defendant's 
guilt).  This evidence was more than sufficient for a rational 
jury to identify the defendant as the first shooter beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
8 
 
2.  Evidentiary issues.  a.  Hearsay.  The defendant argues 
that Denton's statements that he "told Sophie to call SP" and 
"called SP" from "the wagon" should not have been admitted 
against the defendant, whose nickname was "Spoilers," as they 
were inadmissible hearsay.  The Commonwealth argues that the 
statements were admissible against the defendant under the joint 
venture exemption to the rule against hearsay.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E) (2021).  We conclude that the judge did not 
abuse her discretion in admitting the statement. 
An out-of-court statement presented for its truth is 
exempted from the rule against hearsay if it "is offered against 
an opposing party and . . . was made by the party's 
coconspirator or joint venturer during the cooperative effort 
and in furtherance of its goal, if the existence of the 
conspiracy or joint venture is shown by evidence independent of 
the statement."  Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E).  "To admit the 
statement of a joint venturer, the judge must make a preliminary 
determination, based on a preponderance of the evidence, other 
than the out-of-court statement itself," that the statement was 
made during, and in furtherance of, a joint venture between the 
declarant and the defendant.  Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 
22, 37 (2017).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 104(a). "This determination 
permits the statement to be placed in front of the jury . . . 
but does not suffice for the jury to consider it as bearing on 
9 
 
the defendant's guilt."  Rakes, supra.  "The jury must first 
make their own independent determination, again based on a 
preponderance of the evidence other than the statement itself, 
that a joint venture existed and that the statement was made 
[during and] in furtherance thereof."  Id.6  "We review the 
judge's decision to place a joint venturer's statement before 
the jury for abuse of discretion."  Id. 
Here, as discussed supra, there was sufficient evidence for 
a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant, Denton, Bonner, and Watson were coconspirators in the 
victim's murder.  Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for 
the judge and jury to so conclude by the lesser preponderance of 
the evidence standard.  There also was sufficient evidence for 
the judge and jury to conclude by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Denton's statements were made in furtherance of 
the conspiracy.  Denton's use of the initials "SP" suggests his 
intent to hide the defendant's identity from the police, and his 
comments to Bonner suggest that Denton was trying to conceal the 
crime by reaching out to a coventurer who was still at large and 
by expressing to Bonner a continued camaraderie.  See 
Commonwealth v. Leach, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 758, 764 (2009), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 211 (2005) 
 
6 The judge here gave a proper joint venture instruction 
when submitting the issue to the jury. 
10 
 
("Although the statements were made while the defendants were in 
custody, the conversations occurred shortly after the shooting, 
and clearly, the defendants were sharing information and 'acting 
to conceal the crime that formed the basis of the enterprise'"). 
Additionally, admitting Denton's out-of-court statements 
against the defendant did not offend the confrontation clauses 
of the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions.  "Where an 
individual does not appear at trial, that individual's 
'testimonial' out-of-court statements are not admissible against 
a criminal defendant absent unavailability and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination."  Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 
482 Mass. 454, 463-464 (2019), citing Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).  "Testimonial statements are those made 
with the primary purpose of 'creating an out-of-court substitute 
for trial testimony.'"  Wardsworth, supra at 464, quoting 
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011).  "The test is an 
objective one; we examine 'the primary purpose that a reasonable 
person would have ascribed to the statement, taking into account 
all of the surrounding circumstances.'"  Wardsworth, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 580 (2018).  In 
general, "statements of joint venturers . . . are the type of 
remarks that the [United States Supreme Court has] deemed 
nontestimonial."  Commonwealth v. Burton, 450 Mass. 55, 64 
(2007), citing Crawford, supra at 56. 
11 
 
Although Denton made his statements to Bonner in the 
presence of a police officer, who testified to the statements at 
trial, a reasonable person would not have thought that Denton 
was making a formal statement that constituted an out-of-court 
substitute for trial testimony.  The officer was sitting between 
the cells where Bonner and Denton were being held, and Bonner 
and Denton were shouting back and forth to each other without 
any questioning by the officer.  In addition to the comments 
about "SP," Denton also told Bonner that "when [he] was in [his] 
driveway, [he] seen police, [he] started running."  Denton was 
debriefing with his coconspirator in coded language about what 
had occurred, not trying to create a record of events for the 
observing officer's benefit.  See United States v. Norwood, 982 
F.3d 1032, 1049 (7th Cir. 2020) ("an officer's mere presence" is 
not dispositive of confrontation clause inquiry as is "an 
officer's questioning").  Therefore, the judge did not abuse her 
discretion in admitting Denton's statements.7 
 
7 This conclusion disposes of the defendant's argument that 
the judge should have severed his case from those of the other 
defendants because Denton's statements referring to "SP" 
amounted to an incriminating confession pursuant to Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).  See Commonwealth v. 
DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 629 n.13 (2017) (evidence "properly 
admitted under the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule" 
"does not implicate the Bruton rule").  The defendant also 
argues that the judge should have severed his case because his 
and Watson's defenses were mutually antagonistic, as Watson's 
counsel informed the jury of the defendant's incarceration and 
 
12 
 
b.  Reenactment evidence.  The defendant contends that the 
judge erred in admitting still photographs from a reenactment 
video recording the police created.  He does not, however, 
acknowledge that the photographs were admitted for a limited 
purpose or address that the Commonwealth referred to the 
photographs in closing argument for a purpose other than the 
limited one.  We conclude that regardless of whether the judge 
erred in admitting the photographs for a limited purpose, the 
Commonwealth erred in referring to the photographs substantively 
in closing.  That error, however, did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
"A videotaped demonstration may be admitted in evidence 
provided it sufficiently resembles the actual event so as to be 
fair and informative" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Javier, 481 Mass. 268, 287 (2019).  In making this 
determination, a judge should consider whether the reenactment 
is relevant, whether its "conditions correspond to those of the 
original incident," and whether it "will confuse or mislead the 
 
suggested to the jury that a witness had lied to protect the 
defendant.  We already decided in our review of Watson's 
convictions that his and the defendant's defenses were not so 
antagonistic as to require separate trials.  Commonwealth v. 
Watson, 487 Mass. 156, 167-169 (2021).  As we stated in that 
case, "[t]here was not 'a danger that the jury [would] feel 
compelled to choose between defendants rather than to assess the 
proof against each defendant separately.'"  Id. at 169, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 659 (1982). 
13 
 
jury."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Chukwuezi, 475 Mass. 597, 
603 (2016).  We review decisions to admit reenactment evidence 
for abuse of discretion.  Javier, supra at 288. 
Here, four days after the shooting, the police drove by the 
scene of the incident in the SUVs they had recovered the night 
of the shooting, that is, the SUV Denton and Bonner had been 
driving and the red SUV found near the scene of the chase; they 
then retrieved the recording of this reenactment from the video 
camera that had recorded the shooting itself.  The judge did not 
allow the Commonwealth to play the reenactment video recording, 
concluding that the reenactment was not "sufficiently similar" 
to the conditions of the shooting "to make the simulation of any 
value to the jury."  She was concerned that the reenactment 
occurred four days after the shooting, that there was snow on 
the ground during the reenactment but not during the shooting, 
that the recordings occurred at different times of day, that the 
vehicles in the reenactment were driven past the camera in a 
different manner from that of the vehicles in the video footage 
of the shooting, and that the reenactment video recording was 
"much brighter" than the shooting video footage.  The judge, 
accordingly, told the Commonwealth that it could reference the 
reenactment, without playing the video recording, only as 
evidence of an adequate police investigation.  See Commonwealth 
v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 486 (1980). 
14 
 
The Commonwealth then sought to introduce still photographs 
from the reenactment video recording.  The judge observed that 
some of her concerns applied to both the video recording and the 
still photographs, but not her trepidation about how the 
vehicles were driven by the camera in the video recording.  She 
deferred ruling on the issue.  Later in the trial, she decided 
that the Commonwealth could use the still photographs and 
observed that any differences between the conditions during the 
reenactment and during the shooting went to the weight that the 
jury would give to the photographs, not to the photographs' 
admissibility.  She did not state that the Commonwealth's use of 
the reenactment photographs would be limited to the adequacy of 
the police's investigative process. 
When the photographs were introduced at trial, however, the 
judge instructed the jury that the still photographs were to be 
used "for the limited purpose [of] show[ing] . . . the steps 
that the police took in their investigation, and for that 
purpose only."  Although the judge did not say so expressly, she 
apparently had changed her mind regarding the purpose for which 
the jury could use the photographs.  See Commonwealth v. 
Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 40 n.11 (2013), quoting Luce v. United 
States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1984) ("even if nothing unexpected 
happens at trial, the judge is free, in the exercise of sound 
15 
 
judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling" 
[alteration omitted]).  No party addressed this change at trial. 
Whether the judge abused her discretion in restricting how 
the jury could use the photographs is immaterial.  Her ruling 
was that the evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, and 
that is the only purpose for which the jury could consider the 
evidence. 
 
Contrary to the judge's limiting instruction, and relying 
perhaps on the judge's earlier decision to admit the photographs 
without limitation, the prosecutor argued in closing that the 
still photographs from the reenactment video recording showed 
the same vehicles as the still photographs from the shooting 
video footage.  This was error.  See Commonwealth v. Bregoli, 
431 Mass. 265, 278 (2000), citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 412 
Mass. 318, 321-324 (1992) ("prosecutor may not present to jury 
evidence admitted for limited purpose as if it were substantive 
evidence").  Because there was no objection, we review for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice and conclude 
that there was none.  See Commonwealth v. Moffat, 486 Mass. 193, 
201 (2020). 
The argument was a small part of the prosecutor's closing, 
and the jury were instructed that closing arguments are not 
evidence.  See id. at 202-203.  We presume, moreover, that the 
jury followed the earlier instruction to consider the evidence 
16 
 
for a limited purpose.  See id. at 203.  The prosecutor's 
improper argument also was cumulative, as there was other 
evidence that the red SUV the police recovered was the getaway 
vehicle:  a witness testified at the second trial that he saw a 
red SUV with the same make as the recovered SUV leaving the 
street where the shooting occurred after gunshots were fired.  
See Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 482 Mass. 538, 555 n.16 (2019).  
Accordingly, the error does not require a new trial. 
c.  Enhanced photographs.  The defendant challenges the 
admission at trial of certain enhanced photographs and related 
lay witness testimony.  We conclude that the photographs were 
admitted properly and that any error in the testimony about the 
photographs was not prejudicial. 
Whether the enhanced photographs properly were admitted is 
an issue of authentication and the balancing of probative value 
and prejudicial effect.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 901(a) ("To 
satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item 
of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it 
is").  See also Mass. G. Evid. § 403 ("The court may exclude 
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of," among other things, "unfair 
prejudice" or "misleading the jury").  Although we do not appear 
to have so stated previously, where, as here, a party seeks to 
17 
 
introduce an enhanced image, "there must be testimony by a 
person with some degree of computer expertise, who has 
sufficient knowledge to be examined and cross-examined about the 
functioning of the computer" (quotation and citation omitted).  
State v. Swinton, 268 Conn. 781, 813 (2004).  The judge has 
"broad discretion" in deciding whether to admit an enhanced 
photograph.  Renzi v. Paredes, 452 Mass. 38, 51-52 (2008). 
Here, the Commonwealth introduced enhanced versions of 
photographs, purportedly of the defendant, taken the night of 
the shooting at the club near where the shooting occurred.  A 
witness explained that he enlarged each photograph and used 
computer software to lighten and sharpen shadowed areas.  He 
testified that these modifications did not alter the 
photograph's pixels other than to change their colors. 
Through cross-examination, defense counsel brought out the 
differences between the enhanced photographs and the original 
photographs taken at the club, including with regard to the 
defendant's skin color, and introduced in evidence a comparison 
of the original and enhanced photographs.  He also suggested 
that the enhancements resulted from subconscious bias because 
the witness attempted to match the club photographs to a known 
image of the defendant when performing the enhancements. 
The judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting the 
enhanced photographs.  The original photographs had been 
18 
 
authenticated earlier in the trial by the individual who took 
them, and the direct and cross-examination of the individual who 
enhanced the photographs revealed that the images were not so 
altered as to make them unduly prejudicial or misleading.  
Moreover, the witness who enhanced the photographs was 
sufficiently familiar with the enhancement program to answer 
intelligently the prosecutor's and defense attorney's questions 
about how the program functioned.  See Swinton, 268 Conn. at 
813. 
The defendant also argues that the witness who enhanced the 
images asserted his opinion improperly about similarities 
between an individual in the enhanced photographs and a known 
photograph of the defendant.  A witness may identify a defendant 
in a photograph only "if there is some basis for concluding that 
the witness is more likely to correctly identify the defendant 
from the photograph than is the jury."  Commonwealth v. Vacher, 
469 Mass. 425, 441 (2014).  Because the individual who enhanced 
the photographs was in no better position than the jury to 
identify the defendant, the prosecutor was careful to avoid 
asking the witness to opine about what was in the photographs.  
Despite these efforts, on one occasion the witness testified in 
a manner that arguably came too close to the line of improper 
lay opinion.  The following exchange occurred during direct 
19 
 
examination concerning a photograph purportedly of the defendant 
in the club and a known photograph of the defendant. 
The prosecutor:  "And is it true now, we can't get into 
whatever your opinions might be, that's ultimately for the 
jury, but were you looking to juxtapose certain points of 
comparison in this picture?" 
 
The witness:  "I was looking for similar features in each 
picture." 
 
The prosecutor:  "Okay, and again, without getting into any 
opinion about whether they're the same or not, were you 
trying to focus on a certain location on the body of each 
person, the known person on the right and the person in the 
club?" 
 
The witness:  "I was." 
 
The prosecutor:  "And what was that?" 
 
The witness:  "I was looking at that particular arm, the 
left arm, the left-hand area, and the tattoo that's located 
by the wrist." 
 
The witness's use of the phrase "similar features" might have 
suggested to the jury that the witness believed the individuals 
in the two photographs were comparable, especially regarding the 
left arm, left hand, and wrist tattoo.  This exchange, 
therefore, demonstrates the danger of lay testimony about 
photographic or video evidence that a party wants the jury to 
compare.  However, we need not decide whether the testimony was 
erroneous because, even if it was, it does not require reversal. 
We review for prejudicial error because a codefendant 
objected at trial to the relevant testimony.  See Commonwealth 
v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005).  See also Commonwealth v. 
20 
 
Huan Lieu, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 165 n.3 (2000), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Seminara, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 789, 795 n.4 (1985) 
(codefendant's objection preserves error on appeal if issue was 
"fairly presented to the trial judge in time for him to take 
what action he saw as necessary").  There was no prejudice, as 
the judge instructed the jury during the relevant testimony that 
they were to decide for themselves what the photographs showed.  
This instruction "correct[ed] any error" and "remed[ied] any 
prejudice" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Durand, 475 
Mass. 657, 668 (2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 259 (2017).8  
Additionally, the prosecutor cautioned the witness repeatedly 
not to express an opinion about similarities between the 
photographs, the witness potentially expressed an impermissible 
opinion only briefly, and the jury could have concluded 
independently that the defendant was the individual in the 
photographs of the club.  See Vacher, 469 Mass. at 442 (reversal 
not required where "[t]he [impermissible opinion] testimony, 
brief and fleeting as it was, did not overwhelm the other 
compelling, properly admitted evidence against the defendant," 
 
8 The judge instructed as follows:  "[I]t's for you and only 
you to determine what any exhibit purports to show.  This 
witness is just indicating what points of comparison he used in 
enhancing these photographs.  Again, though, ultimately, it is 
for you and only you, members of the jury, to determine what is 
depicted in any exhibit, including, but not limited to these 
photographs." 
21 
 
and jury "were capable of drawing the same conclusion" as lay 
witness). 
d.  Fingerprint evidence.  The defendant argues that the 
Commonwealth's fingerprint expert improperly asserted her 
conclusions in absolute terms rather than as opinions.  Our case 
law regarding how a fingerprint expert should present his or her 
testimony is less than clear, and we take this opportunity to 
clarify it.  This clarification will affect only trials that 
occur after the date that the rescript in this opinion is 
issued. 
We recognized the potential limitations of fingerprint 
testimony in Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 724 (2010), 
where we addressed the defendant's argument that such testimony 
was unreliable in light of a 2009 report published by the 
National Research Council for the National Academy of Sciences.  
Based on that report, we cautioned that "[t]estimony to the 
effect that a latent print matches, or is 'individualized' to, a 
known print, if it is to be offered, should be presented as an 
opinion, not a fact, and opinions expressing absolute certainty 
about, or the infallibility of, an 'individualization' of a 
print should be avoided."  Id. at 729 n.22. 
This directive means that an expert testifying to a 
fingerprint match must state expressly that the match 
constitutes the expert's opinion based on the expert's 
22 
 
education, training, and experience.  It is not enough, as at 
least one of our opinions has suggested, for the expert to avoid 
testifying that the match is one hundred percent certain.  See 
Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 23, 30 (2015), S.C., 479 
Mass. 479 (2018).  If an expert witness does not clarify that 
his or her fingerprint testimony is an opinion, then the 
prosecutor must elicit this clarification even if the defendant 
does not object.  For instance, the prosecutor may clarify that 
a subjective opinion is being sought and then ask whether the 
witness has an opinion "to a reasonable degree of fingerprint 
analysis certainty."  Cf. Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 
827, 848 (2011) ("The admission of an opinion to a 'reasonable 
degree of ballistic certainty' is similar to the manner in which 
our appellate courts permit other empirically based but 
subjective opinions to be presented . . .").  The prosecutor 
should not wait for the defendant to address the issue on cross-
examination.9 
Here, we do not decide whether the expert's testimony was 
erroneous, because any error does not require reversal.  The 
defendant asserts, incorrectly, that this issue was preserved 
 
9 Here, in the first trial there was vigorous cross-
examination of the fingerprint expert about the reliability of 
fingerprint analysis.  The cross-examination of the fingerprint 
expert at the second trial was more limited and did not address 
reliability. 
23 
 
through a pretrial motion in limine to preclude all fingerprint 
evidence as unreliable.  The judge properly denied that motion, 
as we repeatedly have reaffirmed the reliability of fingerprint 
evidence.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wadlington, 467 Mass. 192, 
205 (2014).  However, because the motion did not give the judge 
an opportunity to rule on the propriety of how the fingerprint 
expert would testify, it did not preserve that issue.  See 
Hobbs, 482 Mass. at 554-555; Abraham v. Woburn, 383 Mass. 724, 
726 n.1 (1981) ("The purpose of requiring an objection is to 
afford the trial judge an opportunity to act promptly to remove 
from the jury's consideration evidence which has no place in the 
trial"). 
Because there was no objection to the form of the 
fingerprint expert's testimony, through motion or otherwise, we 
review for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
and conclude that there was none.  Defense counsel made the 
reasonable decision to concede in closing argument that the 
defendant's fingerprints were on the SUV, and to focus instead 
on arguing that the Commonwealth had not proved when the 
fingerprints were placed.  Thus, the error affected only 
undisputed evidence. 
 
e.  Police radio transmissions.  The Commonwealth moved to 
admit portions of a turret tape, which is a recording of police 
radio transmissions, from the time of the shooting.  The 
24 
 
defendants opposed the motion by arguing, among other things, 
that the recording included false information harmful to the 
defendants.  The judge observed that the defendants could 
highlight any discrepancies on cross-examination and allowed the 
Commonwealth's motion.  The defendant argues on appeal that the 
turret tape should have been excluded as irrelevant because it 
included information that was untrue.10 
The false information on the tape was relayed by the 
detective who followed the SUV driven by Bonner and Denton.  On 
direct examination at a pretrial suppression hearing and at 
trial, the detective testified that although he said over the 
radio that he was following a vehicle leaving the "scene" of the 
shooting, he did not see the vehicle leave the scene and, 
therefore, should have said over the radio that he was following 
a vehicle leaving the "area" of the shooting.  Because it was 
undisputed that the detective did not see the vehicle leave the 
scene of the shooting, any error did not prejudice the 
defendant. 
3.  Opinion in closing argument.  The defendant argues that 
the prosecutor improperly asserted his opinion, and argued facts 
not in evidence, when he stated in closing that the first 
shooter's scarf and white-soled sneakers suggested that the 
 
10 The defendant does not argue on appeal that the turret 
tape was inadmissible hearsay. 
25 
 
defendant was the first shooter.  "[P]rosecutors are entitled to 
marshal the evidence and suggest inferences that the jury may 
draw from it."  Commonwealth v. Drayton, 386 Mass. 39, 52 
(1982), S.C., 450 Mass. 1028 (2008).  That is what the 
prosecutor did here when he pointed to various, in his words, 
"reasonable inferences" connecting the defendant and the first 
shooter, including that they both were wearing a scarf and 
white-soled sneakers on the night of the shooting.  This 
argument was based on the video footage of the shooting and the 
photographs of the defendant at the club on the night of the 
murder, all of which were in evidence.  There was, accordingly, 
no error. 
Because there was nothing improper in the Commonwealth's 
closing argument, defense counsel was not, as the defendant 
contends, ineffective for failing to object to it.  See 
Commonwealth v. Dykens, 438 Mass. 827, 837 (2003). 
 
4.  Jury instruction on accessory after the fact.  The 
defendant asserts that the jury instruction about accessory 
after the fact, which applied to Watson, improperly referred to 
the defendant as the only individual whom Watson could have 
assisted.  According to the defendant, this purported error 
lessened the Commonwealth's burden of proof regarding the 
defendant's guilt.  The argument fails, however, because Watson 
was indicted for being an accessory after the fact to the 
26 
 
defendant's crime in particular.11  See Commonwealth v. 
Iacoviello, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 231, 247-249 (2016) (relevant 
principal for accessory after fact analysis is individual named 
in indictment).  The judge also minimized any prejudicial effect 
when she clarified in her instructions to the jury that "[t]he 
Commonwealth has the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the guilt of each defendant separately and 
independently. . . .  Each defendant is entitled to have his 
case determine[d] solely from the evidence about his own acts 
and statements, if any." 
The defendant also asserts that his counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object to the instruction.  Because there was no 
error in the instruction, defense counsel was not ineffective 
for failing to object.  See Dykens, 438 Mass. at 837. 
 
5.  Physical attack.  The defendant argues that he was 
unable to "establish [the jury's] unanimity" because Watson 
attacked him as the verdicts were being announced.  Immediately 
after the foreperson announced the jury's verdict on the final 
charge, Watson, in the judge's words, "lunged" at the defendant 
"and created incredible pandemonium."  The clerk then polled the 
 
11 Although Watson's indictment is not in the record before 
us, we may take judicial notice of the indictment because Watson 
filed it as part of his appeal in this court.  See Watson, 487 
Mass. 156.  See also Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 530 (2002) 
("a judge may take judicial notice of the court's records in a 
related action"). 
27 
 
jurors, and each juror affirmed the verdicts.  There is nothing 
to indicate that the jury were not unanimous. 
 
6.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having reviewed the 
entire record, we decline to reduce the verdict of murder in the 
first degree to a lesser degree of guilt or order a new trial. 
Judgments affirmed.