Case Title: In re Grand Jury Investigation

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12869

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12869 
 
IN THE MATTER OF A GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 7, 2020. - September 8, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Grand Jury.  District Attorney.  Police Officer.  Evidence, 
Grand jury proceedings, Testimony before grand jury, 
Immunized witness, Exculpatory, Disclosure of evidence, 
Impeachment of credibility.  Practice, Criminal, Grand jury 
proceedings, Immunity from prosecution, Disclosure of 
evidence.  Witness, Immunity, Impeachment, Police officer. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on October 2, 2019. 
 
 
The case was reported by Cypher, J. 
 
 
 
William T. Harrington (Edward P. Harrington also present) 
for the petitioners. 
 
Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Scott P. Lewis, Samuel B. Dinning, Matthew R. Segal, 
Jessica J. Lewis, & Daniel L. McFadden, for American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In 2019, the district attorney learned through 
immunized grand jury testimony that two police officers, the 
petitioners in this case, knowingly made false statements in 
their police reports that concealed the unlawful use of force by 
a fellow officer against an arrestee and supported a bogus 
criminal charge of resisting arrest against the arrestee.  The 
district attorney, to his credit, prepared a discovery letter 
describing the petitioners' misconduct and asked a Superior 
Court judge to authorize its disclosure to defense counsel as 
potentially exculpatory information in unrelated criminal cases 
where the petitioners might be witnesses.  The judge authorized 
the disclosure.  The petitioners appealed, claiming that the 
information should not be disclosed to defense counsel in 
unrelated cases because disclosure is not constitutionally 
required and would reveal information obtained from immunized 
testimony before a grand jury.  We affirm the judge's order of 
disclosure.1 
 
Background.  We recite the facts of this case based upon 
the information contained in the G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition and 
the parties' agreed upon statement of facts.  The petitioners 
are Fall River police officers who were present when fellow 
                                                          
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., and the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc. 
3 
 
 
police officer, Michael Pessoa, used force while arresting an 
individual (arrestee) on February 12, 2019.  Pessoa submitted an 
arrest report concerning the arrest; the petitioners did not.  A 
few hours after the arrest, the petitioners were ordered by 
their superiors to each complete the police department's Use of 
Defensive Tactics Report (use-of-force report) because the 
arrestee was observed to have a bloody lip while being booked at 
the police station.  The petitioners are not themselves alleged 
to have used force during this incident. 
 
The use-of-force report is a preprinted two-page form that 
a police officer must complete after using force on a suspect or 
arrestee.  The kinds of use-of-force range from the use of a 
firearm or pepper spray, to the use of certain hands-on force, 
such as an "arm bar take down".  A use-of-force report is not an 
incident report or an arrest report; rather, it is an internal 
police department report generated to memorialize an officer's 
use of force during an encounter with an individual.  Each of 
the petitioners executed a use-of-force report that, in essence, 
adopted Pessoa's version of events as set forth in his incident 
report -- namely, that the arrestee was noncompliant, threatened 
to punch the officers, and was then taken to the ground by 
Pessoa in making the arrest.2 
                                                          
 
2 One of the petitioners wrote:  "Subject was non-compliant, 
and threatened to punch Officers.  He then refused to comply 
4 
 
 
 
After the arrestee was charged with various offenses, 
including resisting arrest, his defense attorney provided the 
district attorney for the Bristol district with a videotape of 
surveillance footage that showed the arrest and Pessoa's use of 
force on the arrestee.3  The footage of the incident was 
inconsistent with the descriptions the petitioners provided in 
their use-of-force reports.4  Specifically, the footage showed 
that the arrestee was physically compliant when one of the 
petitioners removed his handcuffs, and that Pessoa then struck 
the arrestee on the left side of his head-shoulder area, causing 
the arrestee, according to the agreed upon statement of facts, 
"to be taken to the ground in a violent manner."5 
Prompted by the videotape, the district attorney initiated 
a criminal investigation into Pessoa's conduct.  This 
investigation resulted in a grand jury returning fifteen 
                                                          
 
with verbal commands and was taken to the ground in an effort to 
effect an arrest."  The other petitioner wrote:  "Subject was 
disorderly, non-compliant, and threatened to punch officers in 
the face.  Subject was subsequently taken to the ground via an 
arm bar take down."  Officer Michael Pessoa's incident report is 
not part of the record on appeal. 
 
3 The arrestee was charged with assault and battery by means 
of a dangerous weapon (a shod foot), disorderly conduct 
(subsequent offense), disturbing the peace, threat to commit a 
crime, assault, and resisting arrest. 
 
 
4 The videotape is not part of the record on appeal. 
 
 
5 The force used by Pessoa was inconsistent with an arm bar 
take down. 
5 
 
 
indictments against Pessoa for crimes involving four separate 
arrestees, including charges for assault and battery by means of 
a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, assault and 
battery, civil rights violations, witness intimidation, filing 
false police reports, and malicious destruction of property.6 
During the criminal investigation of Pessoa, the district 
attorney subpoenaed the petitioners to testify before the grand 
jury.  In light of the apparent inconsistencies between their 
use-of-force reports and the videotape, the petitioners each 
asserted his privilege against self-incrimination under the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The district attorney 
then sought and obtained orders of immunity pursuant to 
G. L. c. 233, §§ 20C-20G, from a Superior Court judge.  The 
judge found that each petitioner "did validly refuse to answer 
questions or produce evidence on the grounds that such testimony 
or such evidence might tend to incriminate him."  The immunity 
orders provided that the petitioners 
"be granted immunity from prosecution, and not be 
subjected to any penalty or forfeiture with respect to 
the transaction, matter or thing concerning which he 
is compelled to testify or produce evidence, and no 
testimony concerning said crimes shall be used as 
evidence against the witness in any Court of the 
Commonwealth, except in a prosecution for perjury or 
                                                          
 
6 Following the return of indictments against Pessoa, the 
district attorney entered a nolle prosequi on the charges 
against the February 2019 arrestee. 
6 
 
 
contempt committed while giving testimony or producing 
evidence under compulsion of this order." 
 
The grant of immunity compelled the petitioners to "give 
testimony and produce evidence" before a "jury in these 
proceedings."  During interviews prior to their grand jury 
testimony and during their grand jury testimony, the petitioners 
admitted that their use-of-force reports were false. 
On August 13, 2019, the district attorney's office filed 
two motions in the Superior Court.  A Superior Court judge 
ordered both motions impounded, and they were not served on the 
petitioners.  In the first motion, the district attorney sought 
authority to disclose information from a petitioner's grand jury 
testimony to defense counsel for criminal defendants in cases 
unrelated to the prosecution of Pessoa where the petitioner was 
"a potential witness," asserting that it was obligated to make 
such disclosures under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 
(1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155 (1972) 
(Brady disclosure motion).  Attached to the motion was a 
proposed discovery letter that identified the relevant 
petitioners and stated that each is a police officer with the 
Fall River police department who "has been given a grant of 
immunity as part of the Pessoa grand jury investigation," and 
7 
 
 
who "admitted to filing a false police report" as part of that 
case.7 
 
In the second motion, the district attorney sought an order 
authorizing the disclosure of information concerning the 
petitioners' grand jury testimony to their municipal employer, 
the Fall River police department (employer disclosure motion).  
Attached to the employer disclosure motion was a proposed letter 
to the Fall River police chief, setting forth the same 
statements in the proposed Brady disclosure letter. 
 
On or about August 16, 2019, counsel for the petitioners 
learned that the district attorney's office had filed an 
                                                          
 
7 The proposed discovery letter stated in relevant part: 
 
"Please be advised of the following potentially exculpatory 
discovery from an unrelated criminal proceeding: 
 
"1.  Michael Pessoa, a Fall River police officer, was 
indicted on June 27, 2019 with a 15-count indictment, numbered 
1973CR00182.  The indictment includes allegations that he beat 
arrestees and that he filed false police reports. 
 
"2.  [PETITIONER 1], a Fall River police officer, has been 
given a grant of immunity as part of the Pessoa grand jury 
investigation.  [PETITIONER 1] admitted to filing a false police 
report. 
 
"3.  [PETITIONER 2], a Fall River police officer, has been 
given a grant of immunity as part of the Pessoa grand jury 
investigation.  [PETITIONER 2] admitted to filing a false police 
report. 
 
". . . 
 
"This disclosure is not for public dissemination." 
8 
 
 
internal affairs complaint against the petitioners with the Fall 
River police department, and learned of the employer disclosure 
motion.  Shortly thereafter, the petitioners filed a motion in 
the Superior Court seeking standing to oppose the employer 
disclosure motion.  Petitioners subsequently learned of, and 
sought to object to, the Brady disclosure motion. 
 
The Superior Court judge allowed the petitioners to oppose 
both motions.8  After oral argument, the judge allowed the 
district attorney's motion to make the Brady disclosure but 
denied the employer disclosure motion.  In allowing the Brady 
disclosure motion, the judge concluded that the proposed 
discovery letter "is potentially exculpatory evidence as it may 
tend to negate the guilt of criminal defendants against whom the 
officers may be witnesses at trial."  The judge ordered the 
Commonwealth to "notify by means of the proposed discovery 
letter, all defendants of cases not yet tried and cases now 
disposed that were tried after the date of the filing of the 
false police reports, for which the identified officer either 
prepared a report or is expected to be a witness at trial." 
 
In denying the employer disclosure motion, the judge 
concluded that the Commonwealth had not "shown that the need for 
                                                          
 
8 The judge also ordered impounded all filings related to 
the two motions, as well as the recording of the argument on the 
motions. 
9 
 
 
disclosure outweigh[ed] the need for continued secrecy."  The 
judge noted: 
"It is apparent from the public nature of the 
indictments against Michael Pessoa, the public 
statements of the Fall River [p]olice [c]hief, and the 
media coverage on the topic, that the department has 
substantial information on which to commence 
disciplinary proceedings, and that the proposed 
statement the Commonwealth seeks to disclose to the 
department will provide no additional material 
information." 
 
 
The petitioners sought and were granted a stay with respect 
to the allowance of the Brady disclosure motion, enabling them 
to seek relief from a single justice of this court pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The Commonwealth did not petition for relief 
from the denial of the employer disclosure motion.  After a 
hearing, the single justice reserved and reported the case to 
the full court.  The single justice directed the parties to 
address the following questions:  (1) whether there is a Brady 
obligation in these circumstances to disclose information to 
unrelated defendants; (2) whether, if there is a Brady 
obligation, the Commonwealth may disclose the information even 
if it was obtained as a result of a judicial order of immunity 
or in the course of the petitioners' grand jury testimony; (3) 
whether, if there is a Brady obligation, the Commonwealth must 
seek prior judicial approval for disclosure; (4) whether the 
process by which the Commonwealth obtained the petitioners' 
testimony precludes disclosing information to the petitioners' 
10 
 
 
municipal employer -- the police department -- concerning the 
petitioners' invocation of the right against self-incrimination, 
grant of immunity, and admitted conduct, for purposes of 
administrative disciplinary proceedings, employee training, or 
otherwise; and (5) whether, if disclosure to the police 
department is permissible, the Commonwealth must seek prior 
judicial approval. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Disclosure of Brady information to other 
defendants.  Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, a prosecutor must disclose 
exculpatory information to a defendant that is material either 
to guilt or punishment.  See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Committee 
for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Attorney Gen., 480 Mass. 700, 731 
(2018) (CPCS).  "When the 'reliability of a given witness may 
well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of 
evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule."  
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 
264, 269 (1959).  See Commonwealth v. Hill, 432 Mass. 704, 715 
(2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 386 Mass. 1, 8 (1982) 
("Evidence tending to impeach the credibility of a key 
prosecution witness is clearly exculpatory").  Therefore, in the 
parlance of the criminal justice bar, Giglio information is 
Brady information:  "[t]he Brady obligation comprehends evidence 
11 
 
 
which provides some significant aid to the defendant's case, 
whether it furnishes corroboration of the defendant's story, 
calls into question a material, although not indispensable, 
element of the prosecution's version of the events, or 
challenges the credibility of a key prosecution witness."  
Commonwealth v. Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 22 (1978). 
 
Apart from the constitutional obligations of disclosure, 
our rules of criminal procedure require a prosecutor, as part of 
automatic discovery, to disclose to a defendant "[a]ny facts of 
an exculpatory nature."9  Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (iii), 
as amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005).  And our rules of 
professional conduct require prosecutors to "make timely 
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known 
to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused 
                                                          
 
9 In Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Attorney Gen. 
(CPCS), we noted that while Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 "envisions a 
broad disclosure requirement for exculpatory facts, the rule 
explicitly identifies only a few specific categories of 
potentially exculpatory information that a prosecutor must 
disclose."  CPCS, 480 Mass. 700, 732 (2018), citing Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (i), (viii), (ix) ("Commonwealth must 
disclose defendant's statements, 'promises, rewards or 
inducements' given to prosecution witnesses, and statements made 
during and about identification procedures").  To provide more 
detailed guidance to prosecutors, we asked the Supreme Judicial 
Court's standing advisory committee on the rules of criminal 
procedure "to draft a proposed Brady checklist to clarify the 
definition of exculpatory evidence" and establish "a more 
thorough baseline of the most likely sources and types of 
exculpatory information for prosecutors to consider."  Id.  Rule 
14 has not yet been amended to include a Brady checklist. 
12 
 
 
or mitigates the offense."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (d), as 
appearing in 473 Mass. 1301 (2016).  See also Mass. R. Prof. C. 
3.4 (a), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1425 (2015) (lawyer 
prohibited from concealing evidence or unlawfully obstructing 
another party's access to evidence); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (g) 
(prosecutor may not avoid pursuit of evidence that may aid 
accused); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (i) (prosecutor's obligation to 
disclose postconviction exculpatory evidence). 
The petitioners, in essence, make four arguments in support 
of their position that the district attorney should be barred 
from making the requested disclosure to criminal defendants in 
cases where a petitioner either prepared a report or is expected 
to be a witness at trial:  (1) that the information falls 
outside the scope of a prosecutor's Brady obligation; (2) that 
the information would not be admissible at trial and therefore 
is not exculpatory; (3) that disclosure would violate each 
petitioner's immunity order; and (4) that disclosure is barred 
by the rules governing grand jury secrecy.  We address each 
argument in turn. 
a.  Scope of a prosecutor's Brady obligation.  The 
petitioners contend that the information the district attorney 
seeks to disclose is not Brady information because the failure 
to disclose this information would not require a new trial if 
the defendant were to be convicted.  This argument incorrectly 
13 
 
 
equates a prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence 
with the standard applied in determining whether the 
prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence is so 
prejudicial that it requires a new trial. 
 
Under Federal constitutional law, a prosecutor's failure to 
disclose exculpatory information is not a breach of a 
prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose unless the 
"omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial 
of the defendant's right to a fair trial."  United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985), quoting United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976).  Under the standard of 
materiality applied by the Supreme Court, "[t]he evidence is 
material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different."  Bagley, supra at 682.  
"A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome."  Id.  This materiality 
standard applies regardless of whether the undisclosed 
information was requested by the defendant, either generally or 
specifically.  See id. at 682-83. 
 
This court declined to adopt the Bagley "one size fits all" 
test as a matter of State constitutional law and instead 
"adhered to the Agurs test for determining the consequences of a 
prosecution's failure to comply with a specific request for 
14 
 
 
exculpatory evidence," which was the test the Supreme Court had 
supplanted in Bagley.  Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 
406 (1992), citing Commonwealth v. Gallarelli, 399 Mass. 17, 21 
n.5 (1987).  Consequently, under our Declaration of Rights, 
where the defendant had made a specific request for the 
information, "a new trial would be required if the undisclosed 
evidence 'might have affected the outcome of the trial.'"  
Tucceri, supra at 405, quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104.  Where 
there was no request for the information, or only a general 
request was made, "a new trial would be required only if the 
undisclosed evidence 'create[d] a reasonable doubt which did not 
otherwise exist.'"  Tucceri, supra, quoting Agurs, supra at 112. 
 
The petitioners contend that a prosecutor should not 
disclose exculpatory information unless the prosecutor has a 
constitutional duty to disclose, and that duty is triggered only 
where the information would create a reasonable doubt which 
would not otherwise exist.  See Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 405.  This 
argument fails for two reasons. 
First, prosecutors have more than a constitutional duty to 
disclose exculpatory information; they also have a broad duty 
under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a)(1)(iii) to disclose "[a]ny facts 
of an exculpatory nature."  This duty is not limited to 
information so important that its disclosure would create a 
reasonable doubt that otherwise would not exist; it includes all 
15 
 
 
information that would "tend to" indicate that the defendant 
might not be guilty or "tend to" show that a lesser conviction 
or sentence would be appropriate.  See CPCS, 480 Mass. at 731, 
quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (prosecutor may not withhold 
evidence that "would tend to exculpate [a defendant] or reduce 
the penalty"); Collins, 470 Mass. at 267 ("The Commonwealth is 
required to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant, 
including, as is relevant here, evidence that would tend to 
impeach the credibility of a key prosecution witness").  
Therefore, in Massachusetts, when we speak of a prosecutor's 
Brady obligation, we mean not only the constitutional obligation 
to disclose exculpatory information but also the broad 
obligation under our rules to disclose any facts that would tend 
to exculpate the defendant or tend to diminish his or her 
culpability. 
 
Second, even if prosecutors had only their constitutional 
obligation to disclose, and not the broad duty under our rules, 
we would not want prosecutors to withhold exculpatory 
information if they thought they could do so without crossing 
the line into a violation of the defendant's right to a fair 
trial.  It is true that the constitutional duty of a prosecutor 
to disclose derives from the defendant's due process right to a 
fair trial.  See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 ("unless the omission 
deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was no 
16 
 
 
constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set 
aside; and absent a constitutional violation, there was no 
breach of the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose").  
Therefore, a finding regarding a breach of that obligation looks 
backward in time, at whether the failure to disclose deprived 
the defendant of a fair trial.  But a prosecutor who is deciding 
whether to disclose exculpatory information must look forward in 
time, to a trial that has yet to occur, where even an 
experienced prosecutor may be unsure about the defenses that the 
defendant will offer or that will emerge from the evidence.  As 
the Supreme Court declared in Agurs, supra: 
"[T]here is a significant practical difference between the 
pretrial decision of the prosecutor and the post-trial 
decision of the judge.  Because we are dealing with an 
inevitably imprecise standard, and because the significance 
of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately 
until the entire record is complete, the prudent prosecutor 
will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure." 
 
See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) ("a prosecutor 
anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a 
favorable piece of evidence. . . . This is as it should be" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
A prosecutor should not attempt to determine how much 
exculpatory information can be withheld without violating a 
defendant's right to a fair trial.  Rather, once the information 
is determined to be exculpatory, it should be disclosed -- 
period.  And where a prosecutor is uncertain whether information 
17 
 
 
is exculpatory, the prosecutor should err on the side of caution 
and disclose it.  See Commonwealth v. St. Germain, 381 Mass. 
256, 262 n.10 (1980), quoting Commentary to A.B.A. Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure 
Before Trial 2.1(d) (Approved Draft 1970) ("We reiterate[] that 
'prosecuting attorneys [should] become accustomed to disclosing 
all material which is even possibly exculpatory, as a 
prophylactic against reversible error and in order to save court 
time arguing about it'").10 
 
b.  Consequence of admissibility of impeachment information 
on Brady obligation.  The petitioners also argue that 
prosecutors have no obligation to disclose the petitioners' 
false statements because their prior misconduct would not be 
admissible in evidence at trial in any unrelated criminal case.  
We disagree. 
 
The petitioners are correct that, in the absence of a 
conviction, "[i]n general, specific instances of misconduct 
showing the witness to be untruthful are not admissible for the 
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness's credibility."  
                                                          
 
10 Where a prosecutor recognizes information to be 
exculpatory, but is unsure whether it should be disclosed, "due 
to a concern regarding privilege or work product, or for any 
other reason, the prosecutor must file a motion for a protective 
order and must present the information for a judge to review in 
camera."  CPCS, 480 Mass. at 733, citing Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 
(a) (6). 
18 
 
 
Mass. G. Evid. § 608(b) (2020), citing Commonwealth v. Bregoli, 
431 Mass. 265, 275 (2000), and Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 414 
Mass. 146, 151 (1993).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 609(a) (2020) ("A 
party may seek to impeach the credibility of a witness by means 
of the court record of the witness's prior conviction or a 
certified copy").  But we have "chiseled a narrow exception" to 
this general rule, "recognizing that in special circumstances 
the interest of justice forbids strict application of the rule."  
LaVelle, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 
94 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982).11 
 
In Bohannon, 376 Mass. at 94, we declared, "[w]hen evidence 
concerning a critical issue is excluded and when that evidence 
might have had a significant impact on the result of the trial, 
the right to present a full defense has been denied."  In that 
case, a critical issue at trial was the credibility of the 
complainant, who testified that she did not consent to sexual 
intercourse with the defendant, and the evidence that might have 
                                                          
 
11 In Commonwealth v. Almonte, 465 Mass. 224, 241 (2013), we 
noted that "under the Fed. R. Evid. 608(b), a party on cross-
examination of a witness may inquire into the details of prior 
instances of misconduct if probative of the witness's character 
for veracity."  Because the benefit to the defendant in that 
case "of an expanded evidentiary rule concerning impeachment on 
the issue of veracity would be marginal at best," we left "to 
another day the question whether we should follow the guide of 
the Fed. R. Evid. 608(b), and adopt such a rule more generally."  
Id. at 242.  This is not the day, or the case, where we need to 
address that question. 
19 
 
 
had a significant impact on the result of the trial were 
hospital records that revealed that "the complainant had made a 
number of unsubstantiated, and apparently false, accusations of 
rape."  Id. at 93.  We concluded that it was reversible error 
for the judge to have prevented the defendant from impeaching 
the victim-witness with this evidence of prior false 
accusations.  See id. at 95. 
 
A judge has the discretion to decide whether the 
credibility of a police officer is a critical issue at trial and 
whether the officer's prior false statements in a separate 
matter might have a significant impact on the result of the 
trial, such that the prior misconduct should be admitted in the 
interest of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 
606 (2018).  In Lopes, we concluded that the judge did not abuse 
his discretion by preventing the defendant from impeaching a 
police officer who was one of the Commonwealth's key 
eyewitnesses in a homicide case "with information that the 
Boston police department had suspended [the police officer] five 
years earlier for, among other things, lying in an internal 
affairs investigation on a personal matter."  Id.  We noted that 
the alleged conduct was "not material" to the homicide 
investigation where it took place five years before the murder, 
"did not result in a criminal conviction or even a criminal 
20 
 
 
charge," and was "not related to how [the officer] conducted 
police investigations."  Id. 
Our delineation of these factors suggests that a judge, in 
deciding whether to allow a police officer witness in the 
interest of justice to be impeached with prior misconduct, may 
consider the age of the prior misconduct, the strength of the 
evidence of the prior misconduct and the simplicity of 
establishing it, and whether the prior misconduct is probative 
of how the officer conducts police investigations.12  As to the 
age of the misconduct, if it happened so long ago that it would 
not be admissible for impeachment had it resulted in a criminal 
conviction, see Mass. G. Evid. § 609, it would not likely be 
admissible in the absence of a conviction.  As to the strength 
of the evidence of the prior misconduct and the simplicity of 
establishing it, a judge may consider whether admitting evidence 
of the misconduct will result in a trial within a trial to 
resolve whether it happened or how it happened.  As to whether 
the prior misconduct is probative of how the officer conducts 
police investigations, a judge may consider whether the 
misconduct reflects a willingness to lie to win a conviction or 
                                                          
 
12 We also note that our conclusion in Commonwealth v. 
Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 606 (2018), that the judge did not abuse 
his discretion in barring such impeachment, does not mean that 
it would have been an abuse of discretion for the judge to have 
admitted such evidence. 
21 
 
 
instead involves matters that, although serious, do not bear on 
the integrity of police investigations, such as taking 
unauthorized sick time or inflating overtime hours.  Concealing 
police brutality against an arrestee, whether by the officer or 
a fellow officer, or making false statements that might lead to 
an unjust conviction are for law enforcement officers the 
equivalent of high crimes and misdemeanors in this regard.  All 
of these factors suggest that the petitioners' prior false 
statements might be admissible in a case where the credibility 
of their testimony is a critical issue. 
We do not conclude that the exculpatory information at 
issue will always be or could never be admissible as impeachment 
evidence in an unrelated criminal case where one of the 
petitioners is a witness.  All we conclude is that the 
information should be disclosed to unrelated defendants so that 
the trial judge may rule on its admissibility if the defendant 
were to seek its admission. 
Moreover, the ultimate admissibility of the information is 
not determinative of the prosecutor's Brady obligation to 
disclose it.  Where the information, as here, demonstrates that 
a potential police witness lied to conceal a fellow officer's 
unlawful use of excessive force or lied about a defendant's 
conduct and thereby allowed a false or inflated criminal charge 
to be prosecuted, disclosing such information may cause defense 
22 
 
 
counsel, or his or her investigator, to probe more deeply into 
the prior statements and conduct of the officer to determine 
whether the officer might again have lied to conceal the 
misconduct of a fellow police officer or to fabricate or 
exaggerate the criminal conduct of the accused. 
 
c.  Consequence of order of immunity on Brady obligation.  
The petitioners contend that, where exculpatory information is 
obtained from a witness's immunized testimony, prosecutors 
should not disclose the information to defendants in unrelated 
cases because the orders of immunity protect immunized witnesses 
from the adverse consequences that might result from such 
disclosure.  This argument misreads the scope of immunity 
provided by the immunity order. 
The Fifth Amendment states in relevant part:  "No person 
. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself."  Article 12 states in part:  "No subject shall 
be held to answer for any crimes or offense, until the same is 
fully and plainly, substantially and formally, described to him; 
or be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself."  
As is apparent from the language of the Fifth Amendment and art. 
12, a witness's right to refuse to testify before a tribunal by 
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination is available 
only where the witness's testimony might incriminate the witness 
with respect to a crime, either by the testimony itself or by 
23 
 
 
evidence derived from that testimony.  See Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 502 (1996), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 289 (1979) ("The privilege afforded not 
only extends to answers that would in themselves support a 
conviction . . . but likewise embraces those which would furnish 
a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute").  A 
witness may not invoke the privilege simply because the 
testimony, when it becomes known, will cause the witness to be 
fired from a job or injure the witness's reputation in the 
community.  See Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827, 832 
(2009), citing Martin, supra at 502-503 (circumstances for 
invoking privilege "must clearly indicate a possibility of self-
incrimination"). 
 
An immunity order is sometimes referred to as a compulsion 
order because it grants immunity to the witness that is 
"coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-
incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony 
over a claim of the privilege."  Kastigar v. United States, 406 
U.S. 441, 453 (1972).  Under the Fifth Amendment, testimony may 
be compelled through an order granting use immunity that 
prohibits only the use, in any criminal case, of compelled 
testimony and the use of any evidence directly or indirectly 
derived from that compelled testimony.  See id. at 453.  
However, under the Massachusetts Constitution and the governing 
24 
 
 
statutes, G. L. c. 233, §§ 20C-20G, testimony may be compelled 
only through an order granting transactional immunity that 
provides "absolute immunity from subsequent prosecution based 
upon any transaction, matter, or occurrence about which an 
immunized witness testified or produced evidence."  Attorney 
Gen. v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 795 (1982).  See Commonwealth 
v. Austin A., 450 Mass. 665, 668 (2008).  The scope of 
transactional immunity is set forth in G. L. c. 233, § 20G: 
"A witness who has been granted immunity as provided 
in section 20E shall not be prosecuted or subjected to 
any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any 
transaction matter, or thing concerning which he is so 
compelled, after having claimed his privilege against 
self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, 
nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence 
in any criminal or civil proceeding against him in any 
court of the commonwealth, except in a prosecution for 
perjury or contempt committed while giving testimony 
or producing evidence under compulsion, pursuant to 
section 20C or 20E" (emphasis added).13 
 
"[I]t would be difficult to imagine an immunity more complete."  
Matter of a John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 405 Mass. 125, 
130 (1989), quoting Cabot v. Corcoran, 332 Mass. 44, 51 (1954). 
                                                          
 
13 The immunity orders in this case similarly stated that 
the petitioners "be granted immunity from prosecution, and not 
be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture with respect to the 
transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled to 
testify or produce evidence against the witness in any Court of 
the Commonwealth, except in a prosecution for perjury or 
contempt committed while giving testimony or producing evidence 
under compulsion of this order." 
25 
 
 
 
Under § 20G, a witness with immunity may not be criminally 
prosecuted for any transaction about which the witness is 
compelled to testify.  Nor may the Commonwealth seek any civil 
penalty or forfeiture regarding such a transaction.  And apart 
from the prohibition against criminal and civil prosecution 
regarding matters raised during compelled testimony, the 
testimony itself may not be "used as evidence in any criminal or 
civil proceeding against" the witness in a court of law, except 
where the immunized testimony itself is the subject of a 
prosecution against the witness for perjury or contempt of 
court.  See G. L. c. 233, § 20G. 
 
If an immunized witness testifies at trial, however, the 
testimony is as public as the trial itself, and nothing in the 
order of immunity protects the witness from other adverse 
consequences that may arise from the content of the witness's 
testimony.  If the witness, in the course of providing immunized 
testimony, admits that he lied, cheated, or killed, the witness 
may not be prosecuted for that illegal conduct, criminally or 
civilly; but nothing in the immunity statute or order protects 
the witness from being fired by his employer or shunned by his 
community because of the misconduct he revealed.  And with 
respect to all persons other than the witness, immunized 
testimony is no different from any other testimony, except that 
it was compelled. 
26 
 
 
 
The petitioners argue that the disclosure of their 
testimony would "penalize them for invoking their privilege 
against self-incrimination" in violation of their orders of 
immunity and the statute.  But disclosure is not the penalty 
from which they are protected by the immunity orders; the 
petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution, not from 
publication or disclosure.  Therefore, the fact that testimony 
was compelled is irrelevant to the prosecutor's Brady obligation 
to provide exculpatory information.  An immunized witness, like 
others who are not immunized, may prefer that the testimony not 
be disseminated by the prosecutor, especially if it would reveal 
the witness's dirty deeds, but that preference does not affect 
whether the information is exculpatory or whether it should be 
furnished to other defendants.  Once disclosed, the immunized 
testimony may be used to impeach the immunized witness, provided 
that the testimony is not being used against the witness in a 
criminal or civil prosecution other than for perjury.  In sum, a 
prosecutor's obligation to disclose exculpatory information is 
the same for immunized testimony as for all other testimony.  
There is no higher Brady standard applied for a prosecutor to 
disclose immunized testimony. 
 
d.  Consequence of grand jury secrecy on Brady obligation.  
Finally, the petitioners argue that, "[g]iven that Brady does 
not compel the disclosure of the information, the Commonwealth 
27 
 
 
should not be permitted to disclose it in light of the rule that 
grand jury proceedings are to remain secret."  As discussed 
supra, the premise of this argument is incorrect -- a prosecutor 
is required to disclose the information at issue to unrelated 
defendants pursuant to the obligation to disclose exculpatory 
information.  The petitioners, however, present an alternative 
argument -- that the Commonwealth should be required to obtain 
judicial approval before making such a disclosure.  We address 
the alternative argument.14 
 
It is certainly true that "[t]he requirement that grand 
jury proceedings remain secret is deeply rooted in the common 
law of the Commonwealth."  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm'r 
of Boston, 419 Mass. 852, 865 (1995), quoting WBZ-TV4 v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 408 Mass. 595, 599 
(1990).  It is also true that "[s]ecrecy is of fundamental 
importance to grand jury proceedings."  Commonwealth v. Holley, 
476 Mass. 114, 118 (2016). 
"[S]everal interests are served by maintaining strict 
confidentiality, 'such as protection of the grand jury 
from outside influence, including influence by the 
news media; protection of individuals from notoriety 
and disgrace; encouragement of free disclosure of 
information to the grand jury; protection of witnesses 
                                                          
 
14 After the immunity order issued, the petitioners agreed 
to be interviewed by the prosecutor prior to their grand jury 
appearance.  In view of the conclusions we draw, we need not 
address whether these interviews are protected by the rules 
governing grand jury secrecy. 
28 
 
 
from intimidation; and enhancement of free grand jury 
deliberations.'" 
 
Globe Newspaper Co., supra at 865-866, quoting Matter of a John 
Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 415 Mass. 727, 729 (1993). 
 
Under Mass. R. Crim. P. 5 (d), as appearing in 442 Mass. 
1505 (2004), "[a] person performing an official function in 
relation to the grand jury may not disclose matters occurring 
before the grand jury except in the performance of his or her 
official duties or when specifically directed to do so by the 
court."  A prosecutor presenting evidence at a grand jury is 
certainly "performing an official function in relation to the 
grand jury," so the issue presented is whether the disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence to defense counsel is within the scope of 
the "the performance of his or her official duties." 
 
There can be no doubt that the use of inculpatory grand 
jury testimony to prosecute a defendant in a criminal case is 
within the scope of the performance of a prosecutor's official 
duties.  The disclosure of exculpatory grand jury testimony to 
defense counsel is equally within the scope of the performance 
of a prosecutor's official duties.  For a prosecutor, disclosure 
of information that may permit a defendant to prove his or her 
innocence should be equally as important as securing the 
conviction of a guilty party: 
"The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
29 
 
 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, 
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, 
but that justice shall be done.  As such, he [or she] is in 
a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, 
the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer." 
 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  See Jackson, 
The Federal Prosecutor, reprinted in 24 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 18, 20 
(1940) ("A sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship is 
perhaps the best protection against the abuse of power, and the 
citizen's safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with 
human kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves the 
law and not factional purposes, and who approaches his [or her] 
task with humility").15 
 
We therefore conclude that the disclosure to defense 
counsel of exculpatory information arising from a grand jury 
proceeding is as much a part of a prosecutor's official duty as 
the presentation of inculpatory evidence at trial.  Because the 
disclosure of exculpatory grand jury information is within the 
performance of a prosecutor's official duties under rule 5 (d), 
it may be disclosed without an order of a court.  A judge would 
have to review the disclosure to defense counsel only if the 
                                                          
 
15 United States Attorney General Robert H. Jackson 
delivered this address at the Second Annual Conference of United 
States Attorneys in Washington, D.C., on April 1, 1940.  See 
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, reprinted in 24 J. Am. Jud. 
Soc'y 18, 18 (1940). 
30 
 
 
prosecutor sought a protective order limiting further 
dissemination of the information. 
 
Consequently, as to the first three issues identified by 
the single justice, we conclude, as did the district attorney, 
that the prosecutors here have a Brady obligation to disclose 
the exculpatory information at issue to unrelated criminal 
defendants in cases where a petitioner is a potential witness or 
prepared a report in the criminal investigation.  That 
obligation remains even though that information was obtained in 
grand jury testimony compelled by an immunity order.  And the 
district attorney may fulfill that obligation without prior 
judicial approval; a judge's order is needed only for issuance 
of a protective order limiting the dissemination of grand jury 
information. 
 
More broadly, we conclude that where a prosecutor 
determines from information in his or her possession that a 
police officer lied to conceal the unlawful use of excessive 
force, whether by him- or herself or another officer, or lied 
about a defendant's conduct and thereby allowed a false or 
inflated criminal charge to be prosecuted, the prosecutor's 
obligation to disclose exculpatory information requires that the 
information be disclosed to defense counsel in any criminal case 
where the officer is a potential witness or prepared a report in 
the criminal investigation. 
31 
 
 
We note that the United States Department of Justice, 
through its "Policy Regarding the Disclosure to Prosecutors of 
Potential Impeachment Information Concerning Law Enforcement 
Agency Witnesses," known as its "Giglio Policy," has established 
a procedure whereby Federal prosecutors obtain potential 
impeachment information from Federal investigative agencies, 
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, regarding law 
enforcement agents and employees who may be witnesses in the 
cases they prosecute.  United States Department of Justice, 
Justice Manual, Tit. 9-5.100 (updated Jan. 2020) (Manual), 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-5000-issues-related-trials-and-
other-court-proceedings [https://perma.cc/NKL2-YZ2J].  According 
to the policy: 
"Prosecutors should have a candid conversation with 
each potential investigative agency witness and/or 
affiant with whom they work regarding any on-duty or 
off-duty potential impeachment information, including 
information that may be known to the public but that 
should not in fact be the basis for impeachment in a 
federal criminal court proceeding, so that prosecuting 
attorneys can take appropriate action, be it producing 
the material or taking steps to preclude its improper 
introduction into evidence." 
 
Id. at Tit. 9-5.100(1).  In addition, each United States 
Attorney's office designates a "requesting official" who may ask 
an investigative agency's official to provide potential 
impeachment information regarding an agency employee associated 
with the case or matter being prosecuted.  Id. at Tit. 9-
32 
 
 
5.100(2)-(4).  When a case is initiated within the United States 
Attorney's office, the prosecutor responsible for the case, to 
supplement the information obtained directly from the agency 
employees involved in the case, may ask the office's requesting 
official to obtain from the agency's designated official any 
potential impeachment information regarding those agency 
employees.  Id. at Tit. 9-5.00(4).  Potential impeachment 
information may include, but is not limited to: 
"i) any finding of misconduct that reflects upon the 
truthfulness or possible bias of the employee, 
including a finding of lack of candor during a 
criminal, civil, or administrative inquiry or 
proceeding; 
 
"ii) any past or pending criminal charge brought 
against the employee; 
 
"iii) any allegation of misconduct bearing upon 
truthfulness, bias, or integrity that is the subject 
of a pending investigation; 
 
"iv) prior findings by a judge that an agency employee 
has testified untruthfully, made a knowing false 
statement in writing, engaged in an unlawful search or 
seizure, illegally obtained a confession, or engaged 
in other misconduct; 
 
"v) any misconduct finding or pending misconduct 
allegation that either casts a substantial doubt upon 
the accuracy of any evidence -- including witness 
testimony -- that the prosecutor intends to rely on to 
prove an element of any crime charged, or that might 
have a significant bearing on the admissibility of 
prosecution evidence . . . ;  
 
"vi) information that may be used to suggest that the 
agency employee is biased for or against a 
defendant . . . ; and 
 
33 
 
 
"vii) information that reflects that the agency 
employee's ability to perceive and recall truth is 
impaired." 
 
Id. at Tit. 9-5.100(c)(5). 
 
This policy is not intended to grant any rights to 
defendants and does not have the force of law.  Id. at Tit. 9-
5.100 (preface).  But it reflects the department's recognition 
of the need for prosecutors to learn of potential impeachment 
information regarding all the investigating agents and employees 
participating in the cases they prosecute, so that they may 
consider whether the information should be disclosed to defense 
counsel under the Brady and Giglio line of cases.  See id.  We 
do not possess the authority to require the Attorney General and 
every district attorney in this Commonwealth to promulgate a 
comparable policy, but we strongly recommend that they do.16 
                                                          
 
 
16 WBUR radio recently reported that three of the eleven 
district attorneys in Massachusetts maintain some form of a list 
of police officers who were "flagged by prosecutors as either 
having engaged in or been accused of misconduct that the 
[district attorney's] office might legally need to disclose" to 
defense counsel because the information is relevant to the 
credibility of the officers.  See WBUR News, "Few Mass. DAs Keep 
Police Watch Lists.  Constitutional Questions Exist For Those 
Who Don't," Aug. 18, 2020, https://www.wbur.org/news 
/2020/08/18/police-brady-lists-middlesex-district-attorney 
[https://perma.cc/NE45-4444]. 
 
In addition, we note that prosecutive offices in a number 
of other States have established policies or protocols governing 
the discovery and disclosure of potential exculpatory 
impeachment information regarding law enforcement witnesses.  
See, e.g., Memorandum of the New Jersey Attorney General, 
Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Evidence in Criminal 
34 
 
 
2.  Disclosure of false statements to police department.  
As earlier noted, the judge denied the district attorney's 
motion for an order authorizing the disclosure of information 
concerning the petitioners' grand jury testimony to the Fall 
River police department.  The judge concluded that the 
department already had substantial information to commence 
disciplinary proceedings and that the information the district 
attorney sought to disclose would provide the department with 
"no additional material information."  Although the district 
attorney does not challenge the judge's order, the single 
justice asked the parties to address in their briefs, in 
essence, whether disclosure to the police chief would have been 
permissible if the police department did not already know of the 
                                                          
 
Cases, Brady and Giglio Practical Application, Investigative 
Employees and Potential Giglio Material (June 18, 2019), at 5, 
https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/policies.html [https://perma.cc/YP9W-
LY2R ] (noting that "[i]t is imperative that investigative 
personnel assist with the prosecuting agency's legal duty to 
review and, if necessary, disclose evidence that may impact the 
credibility of potential investigative State witnesses," and 
providing examples of Giglio material); Memorandum of the New 
Hampshire Attorney General, The Exculpatory Evidence Protocol 
and Schedule (March 21, 2017), https://www.doj.nh.gov/criminal 
/documents/exculpatory-evidence-20170321.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/GU6X-HUK9 ] (creating protocol for an exculpatory evidence 
schedule); Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, 
Model Policy, Disclosure of Potential Impeachment Evidence for 
Recurring Investigative or Professional Witnesses (June 19, 
2013), http://waprosecutors.org/manuals/ [https://perma.cc/RHE2-
L3Q8] (model guidelines for creation and maintenance of 
potential impeachment evidence lists for law enforcement 
witnesses). 
35 
 
 
petitioners' false statements, and whether any such disclosure 
would require prior judicial approval. 
 
We generally are reluctant to address issues that are not 
the subject of a live dispute, or orders that have not been 
challenged by any of the parties, but we respect the single 
justice's implicit recognition that guidance on these matters is 
needed.  We therefore will provide guidance, albeit limited to 
the type of false statements at issue in this case.  In 
providing this guidance, we do not evaluate the merits of the 
judge's decision in the case.  Indeed, we address a factual 
circumstance quite different from that addressed by the judge -- 
where the police chief, in the absence of the requested 
disclosure by the district attorney, would not know that 
immunized grand jury testimony revealed the misconduct of two 
police officers in the department. 
 
We have already declared, supra, that where a prosecutor 
determines that a potential police witness lied to conceal a 
police officer's unlawful use of excessive force, or lied about 
a defendant's conduct and thereby allowed a false or inflated 
criminal charge to be prosecuted, the prosecutor's obligation to 
disclose exculpatory information requires that the information 
be disclosed to defense counsel in any case where the officer is 
a potential witness or prepared a report in the criminal 
investigation.  Where this disclosure must be made to defense 
36 
 
 
counsel, it must also be made to the police chief of the 
department because the consequence of such disclosure is to 
jeopardize or, at a minimum, complicate the successful 
prosecution of any criminal case where the police officer played 
a significant role.  It would make no sense for the prosecutor 
and defense counsel to possess this information, and for the 
police chief to be deprived of the same information.  The police 
chief needs this information to determine whether to fire or 
otherwise discipline the officer, place the officer on desk 
duty, or take other steps to ensure the integrity of the 
department and its criminal cases.  Because the disclosure of 
this information arises from the prosecutor's Brady obligation, 
no prior judicial approval is required to make this disclosure, 
even if it arises from immunized grand jury testimony. 
 
If, however, other police misconduct is revealed through a 
grand jury investigation that does not require the prosecutor 
under his or her Brady obligation to disclose the misconduct to 
defense counsel in any case where the officer is a potential 
witness or prepared a report in the criminal investigation, 
prior judicial approval should be obtained before this grand 
jury information may be revealed to the officer's police chief.  
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 6 (d).  See also Petition of Craig v. 
United States, 131 F.3d 99, 102-103 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 [e] [3] contains permissive, not exhaustive, 
37 
 
 
list of reasons for release of grand jury materials, and 
affirming nonexhaustive list of factors judges may consider when 
evaluating "special circumstances" motions to release grand jury 
materials).  In the absence of a live dispute, and the facts 
that would accompany such a dispute, we do not opine as to the 
circumstances when, if at all, such approval should be granted. 
 
Conclusion.  The case is remanded to the county court for 
entry of a judgment denying the petition under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, thereby leaving intact the judge's order allowing the 
district attorney's motion to make the Brady disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.