Case Title: Puckett v. Stuckey

Citation: 633 So. 2d 978

Docket Number: 91-CA-0318

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1993-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
633 So. 2d 978 (1993) Steve PUCKETT, Superintendent of Mississippi State Penitentiary, Ed Hargett, Deputy Superintendent of Treatment at Mississippi State Penitentiary, and Christopher Epps, Chief of Security at Mississippi State Penitentiary v. Frank STUCKEY, Jr. No. 91-CA-0318. Supreme Court of Mississippi. December 9, 1993. Rehearing Denied April 14, 1994. Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., John L. Clay, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, Leonard C. Vincent, Parchman, for appellants. Frank Stuckey, pro se. Before HAWKINS, C.J., and PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ. PITTMAN, Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal by State Respondents from an adverse decision rendered by the Circuit Court of Sunflower County in a prisoner's rights case. On October 11, 1990, Frank Stuckey, Jr. (Stuckey), inmate of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, filed this action against Steven William Puckett, Superintendent of Mississippi State Penitentiary; Ed Hargett, Deputy Superintendent of Treatment at Mississippi State Penitentiary, and Christopher Epps, Chief of Security at Mississippi State Penitentiary. Stuckey alleged the parties, without just cause or reason, denied him visiting privileges by his wife, Phyllis. The circuit court magistrate ordered a response to be filed to Stuckey's petition. The State Respondents answered by filing a document entitled "Report to the Court" *979 which admitted that Phyllis' visiting privileges had been suspended because she received the proceeds of an altered money order in a case under investigation by the postal authorities. The Report further recited, "visiting is a privilege and not a right at this institution and ... the Mississippi Department of Corrections has penological interest and discretion in giving permission or preventing an ex-correctional officer or anyone who is under investigation by the postal authorities."[1] The State respondents filed a supplemental report which alleged that the Mississippi Highway Patrol Criminal Investigation Division developed intelligence information that Phyllis was trafficking drugs, contraband, and money to Stuckey in the penitentiary. The report further alleged that Phyllis and Stuckey were involved in the U.S. Postal money order fraud scheme being investigated by the U.S. Postal authorities. The supplemental report admitted that "the Mississippi Department of Corrections has terminated the visiting rights of Mrs. Stuckey." The cause was set for hearing before the circuit court magistrate. On March 5, 1991, subsequent to a hearing, the magistrate rendered her "Findings and Recommendations" which state inter alia: The following objections to the magistrate's findings were filed by the State respondents: (1) Visitation is a privilege subject to the discretion of prison officials; and (2) The magistrate erred as a matter of law by assuming jurisdiction of this matter, and ruling that Mississippi Department of Corrections had to present a valid basis for the suspension of visiting privileges. The circuit court, Honorable Howard Q. Davis, Jr. presiding, after reviewing the file, approved and adopted the magistrate's findings and recommendations, and rendered an order restoring Stuckey's visitation privileges with his wife. The order states, inter alia: The State respondents appeal, presenting the following issues: (1) Whether the trial court correctly ruled that a prisoner is entitled to due process of the law when his visiting privileges are restricted or terminated; (2) Whether a prisoner has a constitutional right to visitation when incarcerated; and (3) Whether a prisoner's constitutional right must yield to prison administrative rules and regulations when exercised in furtherance of legitimate penological objectives. The circuit court's ruling and the issues presented on appeal by the State respondents miss the rationale of the magistrate's findings of fact and resulting conclusions. It is not necessary that we address the constitutional issues discussed in the appellate briefs for proper resolution of the controversy. While the circuit court erroneously hinged its decision on due process rights, we are not restricted to the court's rationale or its reasons for the result it reached. On appeal, we will affirm a decision of the circuit court where the right result is reached even though we may disagree with the reason for that result. Stewart v. Walls, 534 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Miss. 1988). As admitted by appellee in his brief, this Court in Terrell v. State addressed the visitation rights of inmates: Terrell, 573 So. 2d 730, 732 (Miss. 1991). In McFadden v. State, 580 So. 2d 1210, 1215-16 (Miss. 1991) reh'g denied (June 19, 1991), we considered and rejected McFadden's claim of a protected liberty interest in visitation rights and stated: In Thorne v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270 (5th Cir.1985) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S. Ct. 1198, 89 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1986), the federal court held that inmates have no visitation rights with their parents or anyone else grounded in the First Amendment. In Thorne, the court stated: 765 F.2d at 1272-73. The circuit court erroneously concluded the issue rested upon determination of whether application of the Mississippi Department of Corrections' visitation policy violated due process rights of Stuckey. Wolff, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (cited by the Circuit Court as authority for Circuit Court decisions) is not authority for holding that suspension of a prisoner's visitation privileges necessarily implicates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to our Constitution. In Wolff, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected any notion that inmates have an inherent constitutional right to good-time credits, but recognized that a state may nevertheless create a liberty interest protected by the due process clause through its enactment of certain statutes or regulatory measures. The Court held that Nebraska had not only provided a statutory right to good-time credits for inmates, but provided the instances of forfeiture. Under those circumstances the Court stated: 418 U.S. at 557, 94 S. Ct. at 2975, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 951. Unlike Wolff, there is no evidence or issue in this case of prisoner's rights created by legislative enactment. *982 Inexplicably, the MDOC visitation policy was not made a part of the record in the circuit court. A purported copy is included in appellee's brief but may not be considered in the present posture of the case. We have stated on many occasions that each case must be decided by the facts shown in the record, not assertions in the brief. Facts asserted to exist must and ought to be definitely proved and placed before us by a record certified by law, otherwise, we cannot know them. Britt v. State, 520 So. 2d 1377, 1379 (Miss. 1988). Although prisoners do not enjoy an absolute constitutional right to unrestricted visitation, Lynott v. Henderson, 610 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir.1980), and their visitation privileges are subject to the discretion of prison officials, Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1376-77 (5th Cir.1981), restrictions on an inmate's visitation privileges should not be imposed arbitrarily or discriminatorily. Morgan v. De Robertis, 582 F. Supp. 271, 273 (N.D.Ill. 1984). See also Thomas v. Brierley, 481 F.2d 660 (3d Cir.1973). Having said this, we direct our attention to the proper resolution of the true issues in this cause. The magistrate heard and considered the facts. She found that the reasons given by the correction officials for suspending visitation privileges by Stuckey with his wife did not exist and that "no valid basis for suspension was shown." These findings of fact adopted and approved by the circuit court judge may not be disturbed unless manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. A circuit court judge sitting without a jury is accorded the same deference with regard to his findings as a chancellor. Kight v. Sheppard Building Supply, Inc., 537 So. 2d 1355, 1358 (Miss. 1989). The magistrate's findings, adopted by the circuit court, are supported by credible evidence. The findings, in effect, support the conclusion that the correction officials, without a valid reason, arbitrarily suspended Stuckey's visitation privileges with his wife. While the prison officials have a wide range of discretion concerning the authorization and suspension of visitation privileges, they should not be permitted to act arbitrarily or discriminatorily. The very definition of the word "discretion" includes "the ability to make responsible decisions" and "the power of free decision of latitude of choice within certain legal bounds." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 362 (1984). It is not necessary that we decide the parameters of the legal limits of the discretion accorded prison authorities since their actions in this case were clearly outside appropriate bounds. In sum, the magistrate found MDOC officials abused their discretion. The findings are supported by credible evidence. The Circuit Court adopted and approved those findings. Under our limited scope of review, we have no authority to disturb them. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed, but for the reasons set forth in this opinion. AFFIRMED. HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and SULLIVAN, BANKS, McRAE, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., and SMITH, JJ., concur. [1] Phyllis, wife of Stuckey, was an ex-corrections officer at the MDOC.