Case Title: State v. Porfirio Jimenez

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-50-05

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2006-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Ten-year-old W.C. of Morristown was reported missing after he failed to return home from a visit to a carnival on May 20, 2001. His body was discovered two days later near the Whippany River. W.C. had been bludgeoned and stabbed, and there also was evidence that he had been sexually assaulted. Police focused on defendant, Porfirio Jimenez, whose DNA matched DNA found on W.C. s underpants. Jimenez confessed to the crime on May 28, 2001. By pretrial motion, Jimenez claimed that he is mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the death penalty pursuant to Atkins. On March 7, 2005, the trial court issued its decision setting forth the procedure for adjudicating an Atkins claim. First, the judge would hold a pretrial hearing in which Jimenez would have the burden of proving mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. If Jimenez demonstrates that it is more likely than not that he is mentally retarded, the trial court would proceed as a capital case. If Jimenez is found guilty of the murder, a sequential trial would be conducted where the State would have the burden of disproving mental retardation unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt. If the State fails to meet this burden, the jury s finding on the Atkins claim would be considered the equivalent of a final verdict. If the State did meet its burden, Jimenez would be eligible for the death penalty and the penalty phase would continue. Jimenez would be permitted to raise mental retardation as mitigating evidence in the penalty phase. Finally, if Jimenez proves his mental retardation claim in the pretrial hearing by clear and convincing evidence, the State would be foreclosed from seeking the death penalty. The trial court imposed this higher standard of proof to justify depriving the State of an opportunity to present its position to the jury on the retardation issue. If Jimenez was unable to meet even the preponderance standard, the issue of mental retardation would be available to Jimenez only as a mitigating factor that could be presented to the jury at the penalty phase on a determination of the court that the evidence of the alleged condition has been adequately and sufficiently raised. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal the trial court s decision and reversed, in part. 380 N.J. Super. 1 (2005). It determined that the New Jersey constitution embraces the principles of Apprendi v. N.J., 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (200), Blakley v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), and related cases, and requires their application in an Atkins case. Those principles require that facts necessary to the imposition of a sentence above the statutory maximum, other than a prior conviction, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The panel reasoned that when a defendant with a colorable claim of mental retardation is found not retarded, that finding is tantamount to a sentencing enhancer. Therefore, it held that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury that the defendant is not retarded. In respect of the procedures for adjudicating the Atkins issue, the Appellate Division stated: In summary, we reverse the order of the trial court as it relates to pre-trial procedures designed to resolve the issue of whether Jimenez is mentally retarded, finding that a judge can make that decision pre-trial only in those rare occasions in which reasonable minds cannot differ as to the existence of retardation. We affirm his order as it relates to proceedings after the guilt phase, finding on state constitutional and policy grounds that when the issue of retardation has been properly raised, the lack of retardation functions in a manner similar to a triggering factor to be determined by a jury in the second, post-guilt, phase of a capital prosecution, with the State bearing the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if the defendant is found by a jury not to be mentally retarded, evidence of his mental status can be introduced as a mitigating factor. The Supreme Court granted the State s motion for leave to appeal. It also granted the amicus curiae motions of the Attorney General of New Jersey and the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey. HELD: The absence of mental retardation is not akin to a capital trigger, and Jimenez has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is retarded. 1. In Atkins, the United States Supreme Court determined that objective evidence of contemporary values, tempered by the Court s own judgment, prevented as excessively punitive the execution of mentally retarded persons. The Atkins Court declined to establish minimum standards to guide the states, but anticipated that the states would develop appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction. (pp. 10-14) 2. After Atkins a number of states implemented procedures for determining whether a capital defendant is mentally retarded and, therefore, ineligible for execution. Every state that has addressed the issue has found that the defendant should bear the burden of proof in an Atkins claim, and most require proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The State argues for that position, as well. It contends that a claim of mental retardation should be presented to and decided by a judge in a pretrial hearing. Jimenez argues that he has a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury decide the Atkins claim and that a hearing on the claim should take place after the guilt phase of the trial. (pp. 14-18) 3. The Court finds that the absence of mental retardation is not akin to a capital trigger, and that the defendant has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is retarded. The potential for the imposition of a death penalty inheres within the statute and to that extent death constitutes the statutory maximum. In some sense, the finding of mental retardation is like a dispositive mitigating factor. Once mental retardation is found it automatically tips the scale against death in the weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors. (pp. 18-20) 4. A claim of mental retardation is also in many respects akin to a claim of insanity. Insanity is an affirmative defense which a defendant must prove. This burden is properly placed on defendants because the claim is unrelated to the underlying elements of the crime that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in every case. In the case of mental retardation, the State also must prove all of the elements of the crime of capital murder, including a capital trigger, but if the defendant proves mental retardation, the punishment is reduced. The Appellate Division found that a mental retardation claim was more like a diminished capacity claim than a claim of insanity. Diminished capacity, however, refers to a mental disease or defect that negates the mental state necessary for the commission of the crime . A defendant claiming diminished capacity argues that the State cannot prove that he had the requisite intent to commit the crime. In contrast, the insanity defense exculpates an actor from guilt for conduct that would otherwise be criminal. (pp. 20-23) 5. The Court also holds that Jimenez must prove his claim of mental retardation to the jury by a preponderance of the evidence at the close of the guilt phase trial and before the penalty phase trial begins. The requirement that the jury decide the issue is not constitutionally based, but rather, is imposed by the Court in the exercise of its general supervisory authority over trial administration. If the jury finds that Jimenez has met his burden, he will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. If Jimenez does not meet his burden, a penalty-phase trial will be held and the jury must determine whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Jimenez then may present evidence of mental retardation during the penalty phase as mitigation. (pp. 23-25) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. JUSTICE ALBIN has filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE LONG joins, expressing the view that by placing the burden of proving mental retardation on the defendant, the majority unnecessarily and unconstitutionally increases the likelihood of wrongly executing a mentally retarded person. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORI TZ s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE LONG joins. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 50 September Term 2005 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PORFIRIO JIMENEZ, Defendant-Respondent. Argued November 29, 2005 Decided October 24, 2006 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 380 N.J. Super. 1 (2005). John K. McNamara, Jr., Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Michael M. Rubbinaccio, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney). Joseph E. Krakora, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Krakora and Susan Remis Silver, Special Counsel to the Public Defender, on the letter briefs). Paul H. Heinzel, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney). Jeffrey S. Mandel argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Pitney Hardin, attorneys). CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents an issue of first impression in New Jersey. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002), the United States Supreme Court held that the execution of a mentally retarded person violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment found in the Eighth Amendment. Atkins left to the states the procedures to be followed by the courts when a capital defendant raises a claim of mental retardation. This case requires that we establish such procedures in New Jersey. In summary, we reverse the order of the trial court as it relates to pre-trial procedures designed to resolve the issue of whether Jimenez is mentally retarded, finding that a judge can make that decision pre-trial only in those rare occasions in which reasonable minds cannot differ as to the existence of retardation. We affirm his order as it relates to proceedings after the guilt phase, finding on state constitutional and policy grounds that when the issue of retardation has been properly raised, the lack of retardation functions in a manner similar to a triggering factor to be determined by a jury in the second, post-guilt, phase of a capital prosecution, with the State bearing the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if the defendant is found by a jury not to be mentally retarded, evidence of his mental status can be introduced as a mitigating factor. [Jimenez, supra, 380 N.J. Super. at 34.] In a concurring opinion, Judge Fisher suggested that the result reached by the majority was compelled not only under New Jersey law, but by the federal constitution. Id. at 45-46. We granted the State s motion for leave to appeal on October 5, 2005. 185 N.J. 286 (2005). We also granted amicus curiae status to the Attorney General of New Jersey and the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey. [Id. at 311-12, 122 S. Ct. at 2247, 153 L. Ed. at 344 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01, 78 S. Ct. 590, 597-98, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630, 642 (1958)).] Through that prism, the Court determined that 'objective evidence of contemporary values[,]' tempered by the Court s own judgment, prevented as excessively punitive the execution of mentally retarded persons. Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. at 312-13, 321, 122 S. Ct. at 2247-48, 2252, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 344-45, 350 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2953, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256, 286 (1989). In so deciding, the Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in Penry, supra, 492 U.S. at 340, 109 S. Ct. at 2958, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 292, which had held that a national consensus against executing the mentally retarded had not yet emerged. Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of the 1996 abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder of Eric Nesbitt. In the penalty phase of his trial, defendant presented one witness, a forensic psychologist who had evaluated Atkins before trial and who testified that Atkins had a Full Scale I.Q. of 59 and was 'mildly mentally retarded.' Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. at 308-09, 122 S. Ct. at 2245, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 342. The jury returned a death sentence that was overturned by the Virginia Supreme Court for reasons unrelated to the question of mental retardation. At the second penalty-phase hearing, the defense again presented the testimony of its forensic psychologist. The State, in turn, offered an expert rebuttal witness who testified that Atkins was of 'average intelligence, at least,' and was not mentally retarded. The jury sentenced defendant to death a second time, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. Id. at 307-10, 122 S. Ct. at 2244-46, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 341-43. In reaching its decision in Atkins, the United States Supreme Court noted that, since Penry, a growing number of states had passed legislation banning the execution of the mentally retarded, and that the death penalty had been rarely used during that period for offenders with a known I.Q. below seventy. Id. at 314-16, 122 S. Ct. at 2248-49, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 346-47. The Court found additional support for a new understanding of the issue from the official positions of organizations with germane expertise, representatives of widely diverse religious communities, the international community, and national polling data, id. at 316 n.21, 122 S. Ct. at 2249 n.21, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 347 n.21, and determined that a country-wide consensus had emerged since Penry against the imposition of capital punishment on the mentally retarded. In the Court's view, that broad consensus reflected a judgment about the relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, . . . the relationship between mental retardation and the penological purposes served by the death penalty[,] and the efficacy of procedural protections when a mentally retarded defendant s life is at stake. Id. at 317-21, 122 S. Ct. at 2250-52, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 348-50. The Court pointed out that [m]entally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability. [Id. at 318, 122 S. Ct. at 2250-51, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 348 (footnotes omitted).] Because of those factors, the Court found that neither the justification of retribution nor the justification of deterrence is applicable to mentally retarded defendants. Because those defendants are not likely to be fully capable of assisting counsel in their defense, of providing convincing testimony, or of showing remorse before a jury, they face a special risk of wrongful execution. Id. at 321, 122 S. Ct. at 2252, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 350. The Court concluded that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State s power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender. Ibid. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2599, 91 L. Ed. 335, 343 (1986)). As in Ford, supra, in respect of the insanity defense, the Atkins Court declined to establish minimum standards to guide the states, but rather, anticipated that the states would develop[] appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction. See footnote 5 Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S. Ct. at 2250, 153 L. Ed 2d at 348 (quoting Ford, supra, 477 U.S. at 416-17, 106 S. Ct. at 2605, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 351). See Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6, 126 S. Ct. 9, 163 L. Ed. 2d 6 (2005) (reaffirming Atkins). First, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant purposefully or knowingly caused death or serious bodily injury resulting in death. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), (2). Second, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt one of the capital triggers in order to advance the defendant to the penalty-phase trial....Third, in the penalty-phase trial, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any alleged statutory aggravating factors. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(a). If the jury finds one or more aggravating factors, it must then determine whether those outweigh all of the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(3)(a). Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PORFIRIO JIMENEZ, Defendant-Respondent. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids the State from executing a criminal defendant who is mentally retarded. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335, 350 (2002). In Atkins, supra, the United States Supreme Court left to the States the task of developing ways to enforce the constitutional restriction against executing mentally retarded defendants. Id. at 317, 122 S. Ct. at 2250, 153 L. Ed 2d at 348. Relying on recent developments in federal and state constitutional sentencing jurisprudence, as well as notions of fundamental fairness, the Appellate Division concluded that when mental retardation is at issue, the State should bear the burden of proving a capital defendant s lack of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt as a precondition to carrying out an execution. State v. Jimenez, 380 N.J. Super. 1, 26 (App. Div. 2005) (basing decision on State Constitution); see also id. at 37 (Fisher, J., concurring) (basing decision on Federal Constitution). In reversing the Appellate Division, the majority has placed on the defendant the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence his mental retardation. Ante at __ (slip op. at 19). By shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, the majority unnecessarily, and in my opinion unconstitutionally, increases the likelihood of wrongly executing a mentally retarded person. Because that is a level of error that our system of justice should not be willing to tolerate, I respectfully dissent. Our judicial system demands a high degree of confidence in a correct outcome in a criminal case because the stakes are enormous - the potential loss of freedom. For that reason, even in a run-of-the-mill criminal case, the most rigorous standard of proof applies, requiring the State to bear the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard recognizes an unwillingness to tolerate a wide margin of error when a person s liberty hangs in the balance. That standard accepts that it is better to err and let a guilty person go free, than to wrongly incarcerate an innocent person. In a capital case, the stakes are considerably higher than in the typical criminal case. Life itself hangs in the balance. See State v. Feaster, 184 N.J. 235, 249 (2005) ( Not only the defendant, but the state and its citizens have an overwhelming interest in insuring that there is no mistake in the imposition of the death penalty. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). It therefore stands to reason that the finding of any fact that is a necessary precondition to the execution of a criminal defendant, including lack of mental retardation, should likewise be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. That conclusion is compelled by our federal and state constitutional sentencing jurisprudence. Because the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a mentally retarded person, a finding of lack of mental retardation is a fact that must be submitted to a jury and proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt before a death sentence can be imposed. The majority s construct requires that the mental retardation claim must be submitted to the jury after a defendant is found guilty of murder in the guilt phase portion of a capital trial. Ante at __ (slip op. at 23). At that stage, without any further factual finding, the defendant cannot receive a sentence greater than life. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b, c; State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540 (2004) (Fortin II). Instead of requiring the State to carry the burden of proving lack of mental retardation, the majority permits the defendant to be subject to execution if he fails to prove by a preponderance of evidence his mental retardation. Ante at __ (slip op. at 24). That standard cannot be squared with federal or state case law. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 455 (2000); State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 466 (2005). The Federal Due Process Clause requires that the State bear the burden of proving all elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2080, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182, 188 (1993). Once an element of an offense has been identified, it is never permissible to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699-702, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 1890-91, 44 L. Ed. 2d 501, 520-22 (1975). In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court declared: Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455. In refining that formulation, the Court in Blakely v. Washington explained that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. 542 U.S. 296, 303, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403, 413 (2004) (emphasis omitted). In Ring v. Arizona, the Court applied the Apprendi test in striking down provisions of Arizona s capital sentencing scheme that allowed a judge to impose the death penalty based solely on a judicial finding of aggravating circumstances. 536 U.S. 584, 588-89, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2432, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556, 563-64 (2002). In that case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder. Id. at 591-92, 122 S. Ct. at 2433-34, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 565. In the absence of any additional judicial factfinding, the maximum allowable sentence under Arizona law was life imprisonment. Id. at 582, 122 S. Ct. at 2434, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 566. Defendant was sentenced to death based on a judicial finding of aggravating circumstances. Id. at 594-95, 122 S. Ct. at 2435-36, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 567-68. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate[d] as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, increasing a sentence of life to death, the Court found that the Sixth Amendment required that those factors be submitted to a jury, which under the Apprendi formulation also requires that all elements be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 609, 122 S. Ct. at 2443, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 576-77 (internal quotation marks omitted); Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455; Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 473; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375 (1970) (holding that under Due Process Clause, State must prove all elements of crime beyond a reasonable doubt). As with the aggravating factors in Ring, the finding of lack of mental retardation is the functional equivalent of an element of an offense because without that factfinding a sentence of life imprisonment cannot be increased to death. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b, c; Fortin II, supra, 178 N.J. at 635-36. Before the death penalty can be imposed in New Jersey, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any alleged statutory aggravating factors in the penalty-phase trial. Fortin II, supra, 178 N.J. at 635 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(a)). If the jury finds one or more aggravating factors, it must then determine whether those outweigh all of the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 3C:11-3c(3)(a)). Without those findings, life imprisonment is the maximum allowable sentence under the capital-murder statute. Id. at 636. The absence of mental retardation functions in a way similar to an aggravating factor in our capital sentencing system. Lack of mental retardation, like an aggravating factor, is a fact necessary to increase a sentence beyond life imprisonment, the maximum sentence authorized by a murder conviction in the guilt phase of the trial. Because information regarding mental retardation may be in the exclusive control of the defendant, I would place on him the initial burden of production of evidence to raise the issue. Once the defendant raises the issue, however, the State should be required to prove the absence of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 200 (1984) (requiring that once issue of self-defense is adduced in State or defendant s case, State is required to prove absence of self-defense beyond reasonable doubt). Without a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt finding by a jury, a defendant should not be subject to the death penalty. Stated differently, a reasonable doubt about a defendant s mental retardation must weigh in favor of life. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that this State s statutory insanity defense is the proper paradigm for allocating the burden of proof when lack of mental retardation is a constitutional prerequisite for the execution of a criminal defendant. See ante at (slip op. at 21-23). To say that the defendant bears the burden of proving insanity as a defense at trial pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1 is quite different from saying that the State can execute an insane person if a jury has a reasonable doubt about his insanity. In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2602, 91 L. Ed. 2d 335, 346 (1986), the United States Supreme Court declared that insane defendants could not be executed under the Eighth Amendment. There too the Court left it to the States to develop ways to implement its decision. Id. at 416-17, 106 S. Ct. at 2605, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 351. In my view, because neither an insane nor mentally retarded defendant can be executed under Ford, supra, and Atkins, supra, when the issue is properly raised, the State must carry the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of those disabling conditions of the mind. Even if I were persuaded that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard was not constitutionally compelled, I would maintain that this Court should mandate that standard pursuant to the Court s general supervisory authority over trial administration. See State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533, 539 (2004). This Court should take every reasonable precaution to minimize the potential of wrongly executing a mentally retarded defendant. The majority s approach today is not in keeping with the rigorous procedural protections that should apply in capital cases. See Feaster, supra, 184 N.J. at 250 ( We are mindful that a death sentence is profoundly different from all other penalties, and of the heightened need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). In conclusion, I agree with the Appellate Division that when a defendant adequately raises the issue of mental retardation, our federal and state constitutional jurisprudence require that the State bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury that the defendant is not mentally retarded. See Jimenez, supra, 380 N.J. Super. at 26, 37. Because I believe that the majority has unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, therefore increasing the likelihood of an erroneous execution, I respectfully dissent. Justice Long joins in this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-50 SEPTEMBER TERM 2005 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PORFIRIO JIMENEZ, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED October 24, 2006 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Chief Justice Poritz CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Albin