Case Title: Born v. Mayers

Citation: 514 N.W.2d 687

Docket Number: 930330

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1994-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
514 N.W.2d 687 (1994) Jody L. BORN, individually, and Jody L. Born, as mother and natural guardian of Joseph J. Born, Jacob A. Born, Jessica E. Born, Jedediah K. Born, Joshua D. Born, Jeremiah B. Born, Jason N. Born, and Jeanette E. Born, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Dan MAYERS, Wheat-Land Elevator Corp., f/k/a Coprograin Elevator Corporation, d/b/a Rogers Grain, Defendants and Appellees. Dan MAYERS, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Kevin R. BORN and Jody L. Born, individually and d/b/a Rogers Bar & Cafe, and Todd Fuglestad, Third-Party Defendants. Civ. No. 930330. Supreme Court of North Dakota. April 5, 1994. *688 Leo F.J. Wilking (argued), of Nilles, Hansen & Davies, Ltd., Fargo, for defendant and appellee Wheat-Land Elevator. Steven L. Marquart (argued), of Cahill & Marquart, Moorhead, MN, for defendant, third-party plaintiff and appellee Dan Mayers. Tyrone Patrick Bujold (argued), of Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiffs and appellants. NEUMANN, Justice. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota certified, under Rule 47, N.D.R.App.P., the following questions of law to this court: Our answer to both questions is yes. The federal court submitted a statement of facts, which we quote here in relevant part: Section 5-01-06.1, N.D.C.C., states, in part: The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, to be answered by the court. Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151 (N.D. 1989). Words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense unless a contrary intention plainly appears. Section 1-02-02, N.D.C.C. When a statute is clear and unambiguous the letter of the statute cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit, because the legislative intent is presumed clear from the face of the statute. Section 1-02-05, N.D.C.C.; Dist. One Republican Comm. v. Dist. One Democrat Comm., 466 N.W.2d 820 (N.D.1991). When statutory language is free from ambiguity, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to delve into legislative history to determine legislative intent. See State v. Bower, 442 N.W.2d 438 (N.D.1989). Section 5-01-06.1, N.D.C.C., like its predecessor (Section 5-01-02.1, N.D.R.C.1943), is remedial in character and should be liberally construed to advance its remedy. Section 1-02-01, N.D.C.C.; Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665 (N.D.1957). We conclude that Section 5-01-06.1, N.D.C.C., is clear and free of ambiguity. It creates a cause of action against any person who knowingly provides alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person. The language could not be more clear that the claim for relief is against anyone, without limitation, who knowingly commits the prohibited conduct. During oral argument the appellees' attorney urged us to construe this statute as allowing claims to be brought only against "professional merchants of alcohol." The clear language of this statute simply does not support such an interpretation. Similar statutes in other jurisdictions have consistently been construed as unambiguously creating a cause of action against anyone committing the prohibited conduct. Martin v. Watts, 513 So. 2d 958 (Ala.1987); Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972) compare Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Minn.1985) (subsequent legislative changes render the Ross decision "ineffective"); Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972). The Supreme Court of Alabama in Martin, supra, 513 So. 2d at 961, interpreting a statute substantively identical to Section 5-01-06.1, N.D.C.C., explains that the language clearly does not limit the class of defendants: In construing a statute, we presume that the Legislature did not intend an absurd or ludicrous result. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dickinson Econo-Storage, 474 N.W.2d 50 (N.D.1991). The appellees assert that it is a ludicrous and absurd result to impose liability upon a social host who gratuitously provides alcoholic beverages to a friend or relative. We disagree. In construing a similar Minnesota statute as creating a claim against anyone, including a social host, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained in Ross, supra, 200 N.W.2d at 153, why this result is quite reasonable: To construe Section 5-01-06.1, N.D.C.C., as appellees' attorney has urged, "would neither `suppress the mischief' sought to be suppressed by the Dram Shop Act, nor `advance the remedy' provided." Meshefski v. Shirnan Corp., 385 N.W.2d 474, 478 (N.D.1986), quoting Iszler v. Jorda, supra, 80 N.W.2d at 667. Also, the limitations our statute places upon liability preclude a ludicrous result when a social host is sued under the statute. The statute imposes liability only upon those persons "who knowingly" provide alcoholic beverages to a minor, an incompetent, or an "obviously intoxicated" person. The statute also expressly places the claim for relief "under section 32-03.2-02,"[2] thereby permitting the factfinder to compare the conduct or "fault" of all persons involved in the particular incident from which the claim arises. These limitations act as safeguards against indiscriminately imposing liability upon a person who gives someone else an alcoholic beverage. We conclude that Section 5-01-06.1, N.D.C.C., creates a claim for relief against any person who knowingly provides alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person for any purpose, including acts of hospitality and acts to promote business good will. QUESTIONS ANSWERED. VANDE WALLE, C.J., NEUMANN, SANDSTROM and MESCHKE, JJ., and DONALD L. JORGENSEN, District Judge, concur. DONALD L. JORGENSEN, District Judge, sitting in place of LEVINE, J., disqualified. [1] The Alabama statute, Code 1975, § 6-5-71(a), states: "`Every wife, child, parent or other person who shall be injured in person, property or means of support by an intoxicated person or in consequence of the intoxication of any person shall have a right of action against any person who shall by selling, giving or otherwise disposing of to another, contrary to the provisions of law, any liquors or beverages, cause the intoxication of such person for all damages actually sustained, as well as exemplary damages.'" [2] Section 32-03.2-02, N.D.C.C., provides in relevant part: "Contributory fault does not bar recovery in an action by any person to recover damages for death or injury to person or property unless the fault was as great as the combined fault of all other persons who contribute to the injury, but any damages allowed must be diminished in proportion to the amount of contributing fault attributable to the person recovering."