Case Title: State v. Illig-Renn

Citation: 

Docket Number: S52633

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: August 24, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
ROSE MARY ILLIG-RENN,
Respondent on Review.
(CC CR0014215; CA A114387; SC S52633)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 4, 2006.
Ryan Kahn, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.  With him on
the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Tammy W. Sun, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on
the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, Office of
Public Defense Services, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Riggs, and Balmer, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Eve Miller,
Judge. 196 Or App 715, 103 P3d 1178 (2004); 199 Or App 124, 110
P3d 137 (2005).
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
This case concerns the constitutionality of ORS
162.247(1)(b), a statute that makes it a crime to "refuse[] to
obey a lawful order by [a] peace officer."  Defendant, who was
charged with that crime, demurred to the charge on the ground
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  The
trial court allowed the demurrer and the Court of Appeals
ultimately affirmed the trial court's judgment.  On the state's
petition for review, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and the judgment of the trial court and remand to the
trial court for further proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with violating ORS 162.247(1)(b)
(1999), which provides:
"A person commits the crime of interfering with a
peace officer if the person, knowing that another
person is a peace officer 
"* * * * *
"(b) Refuses to obey a lawful order by the peace
officer." (1) 
Defendant demurred to the charging instrument, (2) arguing that
ORS 162.247(1)(b) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on
its face, in violation of the free speech and assembly guarantees
in the Oregon and United States constitutions.  The trial court
allowed the demurrer.  The Court of Appeals initially reversed,
State v. Illig-Renn, 189 Or App 47, 73 P3d 307 (2003) (Illig-Renn
I), relying on its decision in State v. Ausmus, 178 Or App 321,
37 P3d 1024 (2001).  In its decision in Ausmus, the Court of
Appeals had rejected a criminal defendant's claim that a part of
Oregon's disorderly conduct statute, ORS 166.025(1)(e), was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad to the extent that it made
it a crime to "refuse[] to comply with a lawful order of the
police to disperse" in certain circumstances.  This court had
allowed review in Ausmus before the Court of Appeals decided
Illig-Renn I.
Ultimately, this court reversed the Court of Appeals
decision in Ausmus:  We held that the "refusal to disperse"
provision in ORS 166.025(1)(e) was unconstitutionally overbroad
because by its terms it restrained conduct (speech and assembly)
that the Oregon Constitution protects.  State v. Ausmus, 336 Or
493, 85 P3d 864 (2003).  Shortly thereafter, we issued an order vacating the Court of Appeals decision in
Illig-Renn and remanding the case to that court for
reconsideration in light of this court's Ausmus decision.  State
v. Illig-Renn, 337 Or 327, 99 P3d 290 (2004) (Illig-Renn II).
The Court of Appeals then issued a second opinion in
Illig-Renn, this time holding that ORS 162.247(1)(b) was
unconstitutionally overbroad.  State v. Illig-Renn, 196 Or App
765, 103 P3d 1178 (2004) (Illig-Renn III).  The Court of Appeals
reached that conclusion by comparing ORS 162.247(1)(b) with the
disorderly conduct provision at issue in Ausmus:
"The disorderly conduct statute prohibits failure
to obey a particular kind of lawful order: a lawful
order to disperse directed to those who are congregated
with others in a public place, intending to cause
public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or
recklessly creating a risk thereof.  The statute
violates Article I, sections 8 and 26, of the Oregon
Constitution because it prohibits a significant amount
of constitutionally protected behavior.  The statute at
issue in the present case, ORS 162.247(1)(b), contains
a much more general prohibition: it proscribes any
refusal to obey a peace officer, as long as the refuser
knows that the person issuing the order is, in fact, a
peace officer.  Thus, the 'interfering with a peace
officer' statute reaches at least all -- or nearly all
-- of the same protected speech and assembly that the
'disorderly conduct' statute reaches."
Illig-Renn III, 196 Or App at 769 (emphasis in original).  The
court then went on to hold that, because ORS 162.247(1)(b)
necessarily also reached a significant amount of constitutionally
protected behavior, the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. 
Id. at 769-70.
Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued yet
another Illig-Renn opinion, this time on the state's petition for
reconsideration.  The court reaffirmed its holding in Illig-Renn
III and specifically rejected the state's objection that,
according to the analysis used in Article I, section 8, cases,
ORS 162.247(1)(b) is not a proper subject of a facial overbreadth
challenge because it does not expressly proscribe
constitutionally protected conduct.  State v. Illig-Renn, 199 Or
App 124, 110 P3d 137 (2005) (Illig-Renn IV).  The court concluded
that nothing in the Article I, section 8, cases foreclosed the
possibility of a facial challenge to a "speech-neutral" statute
and that, in any event, there was no basis for concluding that
the limitations on overbreadth analysis developed in the context
of Article I, section 8, cases would carry over to challenges
(like that raised by defendant in the Illig-Renn cases) under
Article I, section 26, of the Oregon Constitution.  Id. at 127-28.                 
The state sought review of the Court of Appeals
decisions in Illig-Renn III and Illig-Renn IV, arguing that this
court's cases clearly establish that only statutes that expressly
proscribe expression are subject to facial overbreadth challenges
under Article I, section 8, and that, logically, a parallel rule
should apply to right of assembly analysis under Article I,
section 26.  The state also argued that what it described as the
Court of Appeals' "novel" approach to overbreadth in Illig-Renn
III and IV had no basis in the law and unreasonably expanded the
idea of overbreadth.  We allowed the state's petition to consider
those arguments and also to consider defendant's alternative
contention that, if ORS 162.247(1)(b) is not overbroad, it
nonetheless is unconstitutional on its face because it is
impermissibly vague.
We turn first to the issue of overbreadth.  In general
parlance, a statute is said to be "overbroad" if, by its terms,
it reaches conduct that is constitutionally protected and the
statute is not susceptible to a narrowing construction.  See,
e.g., Ausmus, 336 Or at 504-07 (explaining and applying concept). 
However, not every statute that is theoretically overbroad will
be subject to invalidation on that ground.  As we shall explain,
a statute that proscribes protected conduct only at its margins
remains valid, although the statute's application to particular
constitutionally protected conduct may be challenged successfully
on an "as applied" basis.  
Defendant argues that ORS 162.247(1)(b) is facially
overbroad.  The Court of Appeals, in considering that argument,
opined that the courts should invalidate a statute for facial
overbreadth if "it prohibits a significant amount of
constitutionally protected conduct or speech and it is not
susceptible to a narrowing construction that would conform to
legislative intent."  Illig-Renn III, 196 Or App at 767.  As
noted, the Court of Appeals then concluded that ORS 162.247(1)(b)
was facially overbroad.  The court relied on this court's
decision in Ausmus, reasoning that, because this court had
concluded in Ausmus, 336 Or at 506-07, that a different statute -- ORS 166.025(1)(e) -- reaches a significant amount of
constitutionally protected conduct and, thus, was overbroad, and
because (in the view of the Court of Appeals) ORS 162.247(1)(b)
reaches all or most of the same conduct and more, it necessarily
follows that ORS 162.247(1)(b) reaches a significant amount of
conduct that is constitutionally protected and must therefore be
unconstitutionally overbroad.  Id. at 768-70.
The state contends, however, that the Court of Appeals'
facial overbreadth analysis is misplaced because ORS
162.247(1)(b) is not the sort of statute that is susceptible to a
facial challenge under the Oregon Constitution.  The state argues
that, under City of Eugene v. Miller, 318 Or 480, 871 P2d 454
(1994), State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert
den, 508 US 974 (1993), and State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 649
P2d 569 (1982), this court analyzes statutes for facial
overbreadth only if they expressly restrict constitutionally
protected conduct.  It then argues that this court analyzes
statutes like ORS 162.247(1)(b), which do not refer to
constitutionally protected conduct at all, only to determine
whether they violate the constitution as applied.  
Notably, when the state raised that same argument
before the Court of Appeals, that court acknowledged that both
Robertson and Miller contained statements suggesting that
statutes that do not by their terms forbid particular forms of
expression (called  "speech-neutral" statutes by the Court of
Appeals) are to be analyzed to determine whether they violate the
constitution "as applied."  However, the court ultimately
concluded that none of those statements from Robertson and Miller
foreclosed the possibility of a facial challenge to such
statutes.  The court also suggested that the statements pertained
specifically to free expression challenges and arguably were
inapplicable to challenges invoking the free assembly guarantee
of Article I, section 26.  Illig-Renn IV, 199 Or App at 127-28. 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals invited this court to address
that issue explicitly: "If speech-neutral statutes may not be
challenged facially under Article I, section 8, and that rule
extends into the area of free assembly so as to override the
logic of Ausmus and Illig-Renn III, it is up to the Supreme Court
to say so."  Id. at 128.
We respond to that invitation by stating outright that
we already have "said so".  First, our prior cases do foreclose
the possibility of a facial challenge under Article I, section 8,
to a "speech-neutral" statute.  In Robertson, this court
repeatedly signaled that a statute is subject to a facial
challenge only if it expressly or obviously proscribes
expression:  Marginal and unforeseen applications to speech and
expression are left for judicial exclusion through application of
the constitutional rule to the specific facts of a given case. 
293 Or at 417.  In Plowman, this court clarified that point,
noting that Robertson essentially describes three categories of
statutes that implicate expression:  
"In State v. Robertson * * * this court
established a framework for evaluating whether a law
violates Article I, section 8.  First, the court
recognized a distinction between laws that focus on the
content of speech or writing and laws that focus on the
pursuit or accomplishment of forbidden results.  This
court reasoned that a law of the former type, a law
'written in terms directed to the substance of any
"opinion" or any "subject" of communication,' violates
Article I, section 8 [unless the statute falls within
an historical exception].
"* * * * *
"Laws of the latter type, which focus on forbidden
results, can be divided further into two categories. 
The first category focuses on forbidden effects, but
expressly prohibits expression used to achieve those
effects. * * * Such laws are analyzed for overbreadth: 
"* * * * *
"The second kind of law also focuses on forbidden
effects, but without referring to expression at all. 
Of that category, this court wrote:
"'If [a] statute [is] directed only against
causing the forbidden effects, a person
accused of causing such effects by language
or gestures would be left to assert * * *
that the statute could not be
constitutionally be applied to his particular
words or other expression, not that it was
drawn and enacted contrary to Article I,
section 8.'"
Plowman, 314 Or at 163-64 (emphasis in original; citations
omitted); see also Outdoor Media Dimensions v. Dept. of
Transportation, 340 Or 275, 300-01, 132 P3d 5 (2006)
(illustrating doctrine). 
Finally, in Miller, this court used the limitation on
facial challenges to which Robertson and Plowman had alluded:  We
declined to analyze the city ordinances at issue in that case for
facial overbreadth because they did not, "by their terms, purport
to proscribe speech or writing as a means to avoid a forbidden
effect."  Plowman, 318 Or at 490.  Thus, the Court of Appeals'
express reservation as to whether this court truly has meant to
say that "speech-neutral statutes may not be challenged facially
under Article I, section 8," is not well taken.  Put differently,
and at least in the context of challenges under Article I,
section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, this court has limited
facial overbreadth analysis to statutes that more or less
expressly identify protected speech as a statutory element of the
offenses that they define, Robertson, 293 Or at 415, or that
otherwise proscribe constitutionally protected speech "in [their]
own terms," id. at 417 (quoting State v. Blair, 287 Or 519, 523,
601 P2d 766 (1979)).  And, more to the point, we have stated
specifically that, when a statute does not refer to protected
speech "in terms," it is not an appropriate subject for
overbreadth analysis and may only be challenged "as applied." 
Miller, 318 Or at 490.
The foregoing does not mean that we will ignore a clear
case of facial unconstitutionality or overbreadth merely because
the statute manages to avoid any direct reference to speech or
expression.  As this court acknowledged in State v. Moyle, 299 Or
691, 699, 705 P2d 740 (1985), "[t]he constitutional prohibition
against laws restraining speech or writing cannot be evaded
simply by phrasing statutes so as to prohibit 'causing another
person to see' or 'to hear' whatever [speech or expression] the
lawmakers wish to suppress."  But, in general, we will not
consider a facial challenge to a statute on overbreadth grounds
if the statute's application to protected speech is not traceable
to the statute's express terms.  The state is correct insofar as
it invokes that rule.  The Court of Appeals erred in declining to
follow that rule.       
As we have explained, the Court of Appeals, in its
opinion on reconsideration, also suggested that, to the extent
that our Article I, section 8, cases may express the limitation
on facial challenges that the state advances, that limitation
does not necessarily apply to challenges under Article I, section
26.  However, our opinion in Ausmus is to the contrary.  There,
the defendant's facial overbreadth challenge to the disorderly
conduct statute was brought under both sections 8 and 26 of
Article I, yet nothing in the opinion suggests that a distinct
analysis was or should be applied to the section 26 challenge. 
In fact, this court in Ausmus applied a single, undifferentiated
overbreadth analysis that began with the fact that the statute at
issue, ORS 166.025(1)(e), expressly referred to conduct
encompassed within Article I, section 26, and the First
Amendment, and ended with the conclusion that the court could not
narrow the statute to preclude application to constitutionally
privileged conduct in a way that was faithful to the
legislature's apparent intent.  See generally 336 Or at 499-507
(explaining approach).  That parallel treatment was a reflection
of the fact that the freedoms that sections 8 and 26 of Article I
guarantee, speech and assembly, are closely associated.  Indeed,
the right of assembly guaranteed by the latter provision protects
an important aspect of the freedom of expression protected by
Article I, section 8 -- it assures that those who speak may have
an audience.  See 336 Or at 506-07 (suggesting that analysis). 
We think that it follows that the two constitutional provisions
are subject to the same analytical framework, including that part
of the framework that limits facial overbreadth challenges to
statutes that "in terms" proscribe constitutionally protected
conduct.
In summary, the state is correct that only statutes
that by their terms proscribe the exercise of the
constitutionally protected rights of assembly or expression are
susceptible to a facial overbreadth challenge under Article I,
sections 8 and 26.  Of course, the state may apply statutes that
do not expressly or obviously refer to assembly or expression in
a way that restricts the rights guaranteed by sections 8 and 26
in some circumstances, but challengers must attack those
applications of the statutes, and not the statutes themselves.
It follows from the foregoing that the Court of Appeals
erred in its analysis of defendant's overbreadth challenge under
the Oregon Constitution in the present case.  A person charged
with violating that statute is left to challenge the
constitutionality of its application to his or her particular
conduct.         
Before this court, defendant argues in the alternative
that ORS 162.247(1)(b) does expressly restrain expression in
violation of Article I, section 8.  In that regard, defendant
suggests that the statute describes conduct -- "refus[ing] to
obey" -- that necessarily encompasses speech or expression.  She
argues, in particular, that "[t]o refuse is to express
unwillingness to comply or accept; invariably, it conveys a
message of opposition or dissent whether by verbal means or an
expressive act."  However, as we have stated before, the fact
that persons seek to convey a message by their conduct, that
words accompany their conduct, or that the very reason for their
conduct is expressive, does not transform prohibited conduct into
protected expression or assembly.  See, e.g, Huffman and Wright
Logging Co. v. Wade, 317 Or 445, 458, 857 P2d 101 (1993) (making
that point).  In the end, ORS 162.247(1)(b) is concerned with the
act of refusing or failing to obey a lawful order:  The fact that
such acts also may be intended to "send a message" is
irrelevant. (3)  We hold that ORS 162.247(1)(b) is not facially
overbroad under either Article I, section 8, or Article I,
section 26, of the Oregon Constitution. 
We turn, next, to defendant's claim that the statute is
facially overbroad under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  That discussion need not detain us long.  For
purposes of the First Amendment, courts may invalidate a statute 
for facial overbreadth only if the statute proscribes a
substantial amount of protected conduct in relation to its
legitimate sweep.  See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 615, 93
S Ct 2908, 37 L Ed 2d 830 (1973) (so stating).  Defendant
contends that ORS 162.247(1)(b) is overbroad under that standard
because "[i]t reaches vast amounts of constitutionally protected
conduct of any individual engaging in First Amendment activity
who refuses an officer's order that affects that conduct."  In
support of that argument, defendant provides various examples of
acts expressing defiance and opposition that, according to
defendant, would fall within the literal terms of the statute.   
The problem with defendant's argument is that it fails
to acknowledge that the statute pertains only when a person
refuses to obey a police officer's "lawful" order.  The inclusion
of that word removes from the statute's sweep any refusal to
follow an order that is inconsistent with the substantive law,
including constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right of
free expression and assembly.  It may be true that the statute
still might literally apply to some instances of constitutionally
protected conduct, even when the "lawful order" requirement is
taken into account (including a refusal to obey an order to
disperse under circumstances like those discussed in this court's
opinion in Ausmus, 336 Or at 505-07).  However, any such
instances hardly could be called "substantial" when compared to
the statute's legitimate sweep.  We therefore hold that,
consistent with the federal overbreadth analysis, the statute is
not subject to invalidation for facial overbreadth under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
We turn to defendant's contention that ORS
162.247(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague.  Defendant's arguments
in that regard focus on the statutory term "lawful order."  She
contends that that term is impermissibly vague in two respects:
(1) it permits arbitrary and even retroactive punishment and
delegates uncontrolled discretion to judges, juries, and law
enforcement personnel to decide what and whom to punish, thereby
violating the equal privileges guarantee of Article I, section
20, of the Oregon Constitution, the ex post facto prohibition of
Article I, section 21, and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (2)
it fails to provide fair warning of what kind of orders are
unlawful and must be obeyed, also in violation of the Due Process
Clause. (4)  
We turn, first, to the related issues of arbitrary or
unequal application and uncontrolled discretion.  In State v.
Graves, 299 Or 189, 195, 700 P2d 244 (1985), this court described
that aspect of the vagueness problem:  
"[A] criminal statute must not be so vague as to permit
a judge or jury to exercise uncontrolled discretion in
punishing defendants, because this offends the
principle against ex post facto laws embodied in
Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution.  The
equal privileges and immunities clause is also
implicated when vague laws give unbridled discretion to
judges and jurors to decide what is prohibited in a
given case, for this results in the unequal application
of criminal laws.  A criminal statute need not define
an offense with such precision that a person in every
case can determine in advance that specific conduct
will be within the statute's reach.  However, a
reasonable degree of certainty is required by Article
I, sections 20 and 21."  
(Citations omitted.)
Defendant contends that ORS 162.247(1)(b) is
unconstitutionally vague under that standard, because the term
"lawful order" is "indeterminate" and "draws its content from the
infinitely vast array of situations found in police-citizen
encounters."  We disagree.  In our view, the term "lawful order"
itself grants no discretion and, thus, no opportunity for unequal
application, to the persons who are charged with enforcing and
administering that law. (5)  
The term is similar to the one that this court
considered in State v. Florea, 296 Or 500, 677 P2d 698 (1984). 
There, the defendant challenged as vague a statute that made it
criminal for a public servant to "knowingly perform[] an act
constituting an unauthorized exercise in his official duties." 
In holding that the term "unauthorized" did not make the statute
vague, this court focused on the fact that the term looked to
standards contained in outside sources of law:
"The statute does not leave a judge or, under proper
instructions, a jury with unconstrained discretion to
define a crime.  Even though a question of a public
servant's authority may be one of first impression in a
court, it is governed by sources of law and delegated
authorization outside the criminal code itself, sources
to which a public official in any event must turn in
order properly to understand his job.  If there is
vagueness, it does not lie in [the official misconduct
statute]."
Id. at 504. 
For the same reason, the term "lawful order" in ORS
162.247(1)(b) does not create an opening for unequal or
discretionary application.  It leaves nothing to the ad hoc
judgment of the individual police officer, judge, or jury but,
instead, invokes ascertainable standards from an outside source,
i.e., the substantive laws of this state.  It does not invite
unequal treatment in violation of Article I, section 20, of the
Oregon Constitution or ex post facto application in violation of
Article I, section 21.
Neither does the phrase "lawful order" create an
unlawful delegation issue under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  For due process purposes, a statute is
vague in that sense if it either contains no identifiable
standard, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 US 352, 358, 103 S Ct 1855, 75
L Ed 2d 903 (1983), or employs a standard that relies on the
shifting and subjective judgments of the persons who are charged
with enforcing it, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 US 41, 62, 119
S Ct 1849, 144 L Ed 2d 67 (1999).  As just explained respecting
the issue of unequal or discretionary application, however, ORS
162.247(1)(b) does neither of those things.
That leaves us to consider whether ORS 162.247(1)(b) is
vague in the sense that it fails to provide fair warning, in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In the past, we have described that "fair warning" requirement in
the following terms:  "The terms of a criminal statute must be
sufficiently explicit to inform those subject to it of what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties." 
Graves, 299 Or at 195.  In assessing a claim that a criminal
statute fails to give fair warning, we employ the standard that
federal courts have applied to criminal and quasi-criminal
statutes -- whether the statute would "give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited so that he may act accordingly."  Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 US 104, 108, 92 S Ct 2294, 33 L Ed 2d 222 (1972). 
Defendant contends that ORS 162.247(1)(b) fails to give
that degree of fair warning because the touchstone of guilt or
innocence -- the lawfulness of the peace officer's order --
requires sophisticated legal analysis and "ultimately depends on
the factual circumstances and conduct giving rise to the order." 
Defendant suggests that a "person of ordinary intelligence" would
not be able, at the relevant time, to perform the analysis that
would be required to determine whether an order was lawful:
"To know what this law requires, a person must
necessarily conduct sophisticated legal analysis to
determine whether an order was lawful.  Specifically,
the person must (1) possess substantive knowledge of
statutory and constitutional law, (2) apply that
knowledge during an ongoing encounter with an officer,
and (3) determine whether the order is constitutional. 
Although ignorance of the law is not a cognizable
defense against criminal liability, comprehending the
law here is a task more suited to a constitutional
scholar than a person of ordinary intelligence
untutored in the law."
That argument, however, merely expands on an old saw --
that the common man cannot reasonably be expected to know and 
understand the complexities of the law.  We generally have
rejected such arguments, instead presuming that publication and
dissemination of a substantive law is sufficient to inform the
public of its import.  See, e.g., Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314
Or 353, 359-60, 839 P2d 217 (1992) (so stating).  And, to the
extent that the lawfulness of an official's order can be
ascertained by resort to the published substantive law, the
ordinary citizen must be presumed to know and understand the
general parameters of the term "lawful order."  We scarcely could
do otherwise:  If the extent or complexity of the law excuses
obedience, it is no law.  In short, we hold that the fact that
ORS 162.247(1)(b) only requires the public to obey a peace
officer's "lawful" orders does not deny ordinary citizens a
reasonably opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited. 
Defendant argues, finally, that ORS 162.247(1)(b) is
rendered facially vague by the addition of an exception to the
general rule stated in that section.  In particular, after
defining the crime of "interfering with a police officer" at
paragraph (1)(b), and stating in subsection 2 that the crime is a
Class A misdemeanor, subsection (3) provides:
"This section does not apply in situations in
which the person is engaging in 
"(a) Activity that would constitute resisting
arrest under ORS 162.315; or 
"(b) Passive resistance."
That is, paragraph (3)(b) of the statute defines conduct that is
not a violation of its substantive prohibition.  Defendant notes,
however, that the term "passive resistance" is undefined and
argues that it is unclear whether the term encompasses only
nonviolent resistance to arrest or any nonviolent refusal to obey
an order.  Defendant contends that the inclusion of such a vague
exception to the prohibition at ORS 162.247(1)(b) renders the
prohibition itself unconstitutionally vague.   
Assuming that a statutory prohibition that is clear on
its face can be deemed unconstitutionally vague on the ground
that another provision that lessens the statute's sweep is
unclear, defendant has not demonstrated that ORS 162.247(1)(b) is
impermissibly vague on that ground.  Whatever the term "passive
resistance" may encompass, it speaks to particular fact patterns
that will exist at the fringes of the "lawful order" inquiry and,
as such, may be occasions for arguments about the precision of
jury instructions.  Put differently:  While there may be room to
argue about whether certain conduct does or does not fall within
the "passive resistance" exception, the exception is not broad
enough to obfuscate the meaning of the overall prohibition on
"refus[ing] to obey a lawful order by [a] peace officer."  As we
previously have indicated, absolute precision is not required to
overcome a facial vagueness challenge.
We hold that ORS 162.247(1)(b) is not facially
overbroad or vague in any of the ways that defendant has argued. 
It follows that the circuit court erred in allowing defendant's
demurrer on those grounds and the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the circuit court's decision.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. In 2005, the legislature amended ORS 162.247(1)(b) (1999) in ways that do not affect the
present case.  Hereinafter, we refer to the statute simply as ORS 162.247(1)(b).
2. Because the case comes to us on a demurrer, the particular facts underlying the charge are
irrelevant.
3. We do not deny that the term "refuse" sometimes is used to convey a primarily expressive
act.  According to Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (unabridged ed 2002) at 1910, one
definition of the term "refuse," is to "show or express a positive unwillingness to do or comply
with [something asked, demanded or expected]." (Emphasis supplied.)  But the same dictionary
offers other definitions that have no overtly expressive content, e.g., "decline" and "deny."  Id.   
It is clear that when ORS 162.247(1)(b) refers to a person "refus[ing] to obey" a
peace officer's lawful order, the statute is concerned primarily with the act of resisting the order
and not with the idea of unwillingness communicated by that act.  Defendant has suggested that,
if the legislature intended that meaning, it could have chosen a more speech neutral term, such as
"fails to obey."  However, it would seem that the word "refuse" was chosen not for its expressive
connotation but because it conveys a different nuance, viz., that the failure to obey must be
knowing or intentional. 
4. The "fair notice" component of the vagueness analysis  is not an issue under the Oregon
Constitution.  See generally Delgado v. Souders, 334 Or 122, 144 n 12, 46 P3d 729 (2002)
(although prior cases discussed "fair notice" element of vagueness doctrine, those discussions
were concerned with the general nature of the doctrine rather than with any "fair notice"
requirement under the Oregon Constitution).      
5. Of course, police officers may have discretion in deciding not to arrest a person who
literally has violated ORS 162.247(1)(b), but the statute itself is not the source of that discretion.