Case Title: Funk v. Rent-All Mart, Inc.

Citation: 2001-Ohio-270

Docket Number: 20001085

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Funk v. Rent-All Mart, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 78, 2001-Ohio-270.] 
 
 
 
FUNK v. RENT-ALL MART, INC. ET AL. 
[Cite as Funk v. Rent-All Mart, Inc. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 78.] 
Workers’ compensation — Intentional tort by employer — Applicable statute of 
limitations is two years established in R.C. 2305.10. 
(No. 00-1085 — Submitted December 13, 2000 — Decided February 28, 2001.) 
ON ORDER from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 
Western Division, Certifying Questions of State Law, No. 3:00 CV 7086. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Unless the circumstances of an action clearly indicate a battery or any other 
enumerated intentional tort in the Revised Code, a cause of action alleging 
bodily injury as a result of an intentional tort by an employer pursuant to 
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chem., Inc. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 
608, 23 O.O.3d 504, 433 N.E.2d 572, will be governed by the two-year 
statute of limitations established in R.C. 2305.10.  (Hunter v. Shenango 
Furnace Co. [1988], 38 Ohio St.3d 235, 527 N.E.2d 871, approved and 
extended.) 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  This matter comes to us as certified state law 
questions from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 
Western Division, pursuant to S.Ct. Prac.R. XVIII.  In its certification order, the 
court stated: 
 
“Plaintiff brings this cause of action asserting an intentional tort against 
his employer.  Plaintiff’s cause of action arose on June 19, 1998 and was filed on 
February 8, 2000.  The Plaintiff asserts his cause of action is based on the 
common law pursuant to Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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[1982], 69 Ohio St.2d 608 [23 O.O.3d 504], 433 N.E.2d 572, cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 857 [103 S.Ct. 127, 74 L.Ed.2d 110] (1982), and it[s] progeny, including 
Fyffe v. Jeno’s Inc., 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108 (1991).  The Defendants 
have moved for dismissal of the action on the basis that it is untimely under Ohio 
Rev.Code § 2305.112, which requires that such an action be brought within one 
year.  This statute, however, is based upon an enabling statute, Ohio Rev.Code § 
2745.01, which was recently declared unconstitutional by the Ohio Supreme 
Court.  See Johnson v. BP Chemicals, Inc., 85 Ohio St.3d 298, 707 N.E.2d 1107 
(1999).  The issue is what impact the Johnson ruling has on the relevant statute of 
limitations, specifically whether the unconstitutionality of the enabling statute, 
Ohio Revised Code § 2745.01, renders the applicable statute of limitations, Ohio 
Rev.Code § 2305.112, ineffective.  Thus, the questions to be presented are as 
follows: 
 
“Is the statute of limitations under Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.112 viable in 
light of the ruling in Johnson v. BP Chemicals, Inc., 85 Ohio St.3d 298, 707 
N.E.2d 1107 (1999), which rendered the enabling statute, Ohio Rev.Code § 
2745.01, unconstitutional?  Does Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.112 apply to a common 
law cause of action brought by an employee against his employer pursuant to 
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 608 [23 
O.O.3d 504], 433 N.E.2d 572, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 [103 S.Ct. 127, 74 
L.Ed.2d 110] (1992) [sic, 1982]?  If the statute of limitations is not one year 
pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.112, what is the applicable statute of 
limitations for such causes of action?”  (Footnote omitted.) 
 
In response to the first question regarding the viability of the statute of 
limitations in R.C. 2305.112 following our opinion in Johnson v. BP Chemicals, 
Inc., this court already addressed that question in Mullins v. Rio Algom, Inc. 
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 361, 708 N.E.2d 706.  In Mullins, the United States District 
January Term, 2001 
3 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, certified the following 
question: 
 
“Is Section 2745.01 of the Ohio Revised Code unconstitutional under state 
law thereby rendering Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.112 null and void?” 
 
We concluded in Mullins that R.C. 2305.112 was null and void upon the 
authority of Johnson v. BP Chemicals.  Therefore, our response to the first 
certified question in this case is in the negative.  R.C. 2305.112 is no longer viable 
in light of Johnson v. BP Chemicals. 
 
The second question certified to us is whether R.C. 2305.112 applies to a 
common-law cause of action brought pursuant to Blankenship v. Cincinnati 
Milacron Chemicals, 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 23 O.O.3d 504, 433 N.E.2d 572.  Our 
response to the second question is also in the negative based on Mullins v. Rio 
Algom.  Furthermore, notwithstanding Mullins, the plain language of the statute 
provides that it applies exclusively to actions for an employer intentional tort 
under R.C. 2745.01.  R.C. 2305.112(A).  R.C. 2305.112 derived its existence 
from R.C. 2745.01.  Because this court in Johnson determined R.C. 2745.01 to be 
unconstitutional in its entirety, it logically follows that R.C. 2305.112 no longer 
has any effect.  There is no statutory basis for the application of the one-year 
limitations period in R.C. 2305.112.  The statute is null and void. 
 
Respondents urge us to consider the legislative history behind the 
enactment of R.C. 2745.01 and 2305.112, in which the General Assembly 
expressed its intent that R.C. 2745.01 and 2305.112 were to “completely and 
solely control” employer intentional tort causes of action.  146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
758.  In addition, Section 4 of H.B. No. 103 stated: 
 
“If any provision of a section of this act or the application thereof to any 
person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other 
provisions or applications of the section or related sections which can be given 
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effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions 
are severable.”  Id. at 759. 
 
Respondents argue that the General Assembly intended for R.C. 2305.112 
to be independent from R.C. 2745.01, and consequently, R.C. 2305.112 remains 
viable despite Johnson and potentially applicable to common-law actions for 
employer intentional tort.  We do not agree.  The language codified in R.C. 
2305.112 confines its application solely to those actions authorized under R.C. 
2745.01.  The General Assembly could have written the statute to mandate a one-
year statute of limitations for all employer intentional tort causes of action, 
including common-law actions arising under Blankenship.  Instead, the General 
Assembly chose words that specifically limit the one-year statute of limitations to 
causes of action arising under R.C. 2745.01.  Our duty as a court is to give effect 
to the words used in a statute, not to delete words used or to insert words not used.  
State ex rel. Preston v. Peabody Coal Co. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 72, 73, 12 OBR 
63, 64, 465 N.E.2d 433, 435.  Therefore, we have no choice but to rely on the 
words of the statute as it is written.  R.C. 2305.112, as written, does not apply to a 
common-law action brought by an employee against an employer pursuant to 
Blankenship. 
 
The third question posed to this court asks,  “If the statute of limitations is 
not one year pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.112, what is the applicable statute 
of limitations for such causes of action?”  In Hunter v. Shenango Furnace Co. 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 235, 527 N.E.2d 871, the issue before the court was the 
appropriate statute of limitations for a cause of action for an employer intentional 
tort that arose prior to the effective date of former R.C. 4121.80, the General 
Assembly’s initial attempt to codify actions against employers for intentional 
torts.  In Hunter, we held that “[u]nless the circumstances of an action clearly 
indicate a battery or any other enumerated intentional tort in the Revised Code, a 
cause of action alleging bodily injury as a result of an intentional tort by an 
January Term, 2001 
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employer * * * will be governed by the two-year statute of limitations established 
in R.C. 2305.10.”  Id. at syllabus.  See, also, Gambill v. Bonded Oil Co. (1990), 
52 Ohio St.3d 90, 556 N.E.2d 177. 
 
We believe that the analysis in Hunter is equally applicable today. 
Although a complaint may label its cause of action an “intentional tort,” we look 
to the actual nature or subject matter pleaded in the complaint.  If the essence of a 
plaintiff’s complaint alleges bodily injury as the result of an employer intentional 
tort, the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.10 should apply.  Hunter, 38 
Ohio St.3d at 237-238, 527 N.E.2d at 873-874. 
 
Therefore, we hold that unless the circumstances of an action clearly 
indicate a battery or any other enumerated intentional tort in the Revised Code, a 
cause of action alleging bodily injury as a result of an intentional tort by an 
employer pursuant to Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, 69 Ohio 
St.2d 608, 23 O.O.3d 504, 433 N.E.2d 572, will be governed by the two-year 
statute of limitations established in R.C. 2305.10. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment. 
__________________ 
 
John K. Fitch, for petitioner. 
 
Earl Warburton Adams & Davis and Thomas L. Davis; Spengler 
Nathanson P.P.L. and James R. Jeffery, for respondents. 
__________________