Case Title: Green River Development Co. v. FMC Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5770

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Green River Development Co. v. FMC Corp.1983 WY 20660 P.2d 339Case Number: 5770, 5771Case Number: 5770, 5771Decided: 03/02/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
GREEN RIVER DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, APPELLANT (PETITIONER/RESPONDENT),

and

PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT 
COMPANY, A CORPORATION, (RESPONDENT),

v.

FMC CORPORATION; TEXAS 
GULF, INC.; ALLIED CHEMICAL CORPORATION; CHURCH & DWIGHT COMPANY, INC.; AND 
CHARLES PRICE, JOSEPH MURDOCK, MIKE NOBLE, EDNA MAE SWAIN, DORIS LUMAN, JOHN E. 
WARDELL, ALBERT P. SOMMERS, TED L. HIGGINS, HARRY STEELE, MARTIN WARDELL, JR., 
LANCE HILL AND J.P. BARLOW, APPELLEES 
(PETITIONERS/RESPONDENTS).

THE WYOMING STATE ENGINEER, 
APPELLANT (RESPONDENT),

v.

GREEN RIVER DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY; FMC CORPORATION; TEXAS GULF, INC.; ALLIED CHEMICAL CORPORATION; CHURCH 
& DWIGHT COMPANY, INC.; AND CHARLES PRICE, JOSEPH MURDOCK, MIKE NOBLE, EDNA 
MAE SWAIN, DORIS LUMAN, JOHN E. WARDELL, ALBERT P. SOMMERS, TED L. HIGGINS, 
HARRY STEELE, MARTIN WARDELL, JR., LANCE HILL AND J.P. BARLOW, APPELLEES 
(PETITIONERS/RESPONDENTS),

PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT 
COMPANY, A CORPORATION, (RESPONDENT). Nos. 5770, 5771

Appeal from the Board of 
Control.

Wm. R. Jones of 
Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for Green River Development Co., 
appellant in No. 5770 and appellee in No. 5771; Lawrence J. Wolfe, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Cheyenne, for The Wyoming State 
Engineer, appellant in No. 5771.

James E. 
Fitzgerald and Sharon A. Fitzgerald, Cheyenne, for appellee FMC Corp.

John Sundahl of 
Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, for appellees Texas Gulf, Inc. and 
individual Ranchers.

Robert H. 
Johnson, Rock 
Springs, for 
appellees Allied Chemical Corp. and Church & Dwight Co., 
Inc.

John D. Erdmann, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, filed a brief in behalf of the State 
Board of Control.

Before ROONEY, C.J.*, and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE** and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice since 
January 1, 1983.

** Chief Justice 
at time of oral argument.

ROSE, Justice.

NATURE OF THE 
CASES

[¶1.]     On December 27, 1977 
Green River Development Company (sometimes called Green River, or GRDC), 
petitioned the Wyoming State Engineer, seeking to amend four Green River water 
permits that it had acquired in 1948. These permits carry the following priority 
dates: December 22, 1908; December 28, 1910; March 23, 1920; and January 21, 
1921.

[¶2.]     Under the authority 
alleged to be contained in § 41-4-514, W.S. 1977,1 the petition asked the State 
Engineer to change the use of 131.22 cfs of permit water during the irrigation 
season to 20.18 cfs year-round for industrial purposes and to change the place 
of use, point of diversion and means of conveyance.

[¶3.]     The purpose for the 
requested change from SubletteCounty to SweetwaterCounty - some 134 miles away - was to 
enhance the water supply and thus the steam power generation capabilities of 
Pacific Power and Light Company's Jim Bridger Power Plant. The request was 
opposed by affected industrial and agricultural appropriators Allied Chemical 
Corporation, Church & Dwight Co., Inc., FMC Corporation, Texas Gulf, Inc., 
Charles Price, Joseph Murdock, Mike Noble, Edna Mae Swain, Doris Luman, John E. 
Wardell, Albert P. Sommers, Ted L. Higgins, Harry Steele, Martin Wardell, Jr., 
Lance Hill and J.P. Barlow (sometimes called Contestants). These parties urged 
that § 41-4-514(a) did not authorize the State Engineer to enter the order 
requested, and that change of use, place of use, point of diversion and means of 
conveyance of the state's water could only be accomplished through compliance 
with the standards established by § 41-3-104, W.S. 19772 and § 41-3-114(a), W.S. 1977.3

FACTS

[¶4.]     The water utilization 
in question is that part of the water embraced by the permits which has never 
been used, which is to say that the lands described by the petition as being 
included in the permits have never been irrigated, farmed or applied to ranching 
purposes.4 There has, in fact, been no 
beneficial application of the water which is sought to be transferred in this 
action even though a part of the original permit water has been appropriated and 
applied to beneficial use. Since none of the water in litigation here has been 
diverted, there is no historic rate of diversion and no historic consumptive 
use. Additionally, GRDC does not own any of the lands embraced by the petition. 
The United States of 
America owns 8,104 acres of the land and it has 
not consented to the petition. The State of Wyoming is the owner of the remaining 1,012 
acres and, while the State Board of Land Commissioners did consent to 
appellant's filing the petition, the State did not join in the petition as a 
party and took no position with respect to its ultimate success or failure. The 
State Land Commissioner described the State's consent as being equivalent to "a 
quitclaim deed to the BrooklynBridge."

[¶5.]     Green River Development 
Company acquired the subject water permits in order to develop an agricultural 
irrigation project on some desert lands in SubletteCounty. The record shows that at the 
inception of the project in the late 1950's, GRDC expended some money to 
construct facilities to irrigate some 10,100 acres of land and, at any time 
relevant to this litigation, approximately 7,410 acres of this land have been 
and are presently being irrigated by permit water that was authorized for 
agricultural purposes. However, Green River is 
not attempting to transfer any of the water which has been applied to a 
beneficial use. Even so, it is to be noted that to irrigate the land from which 
it does wish to transfer water, additional facilities would have to be 
constructed. Part of the permit water in question is for lands where desert land 
entries have been denied because the federal government determined, pursuant to 
federal standards, that these lands were not irrigable.

[¶6.]     By order dated February 
4, 1981 and amended February 24, 1981, the State Engineer authorized a change in 
use, place of use, point of diversion and means of conveyance to the Pacific 
Power and Light plant for that part of appellant's original permit water which 
had not previously been beneficially utilized. This directive contemplated a 
change on the order of 2,000 acre feet of water per year; it authorized a change 
in means of conveyance; it assessed a 25% conveyance loss, leaving an annual 
entitlement of 1,500 acre feet, and allowed diversion for a maximum period of 92 
days, from May 1 through July 31 of each year.

[¶7.]     Throughout the course 
of this litigation, it has been and it continues to be the appellant's position 
that the provision of § 41-4-514(a), supra, which says the State Engineer is 
authorized

"to amend water permits prior to adjudication 
for the purpose of correcting errors or otherwise when in his judgment such 
amendment seems desirable or necessary," (emphasis added)

is sufficient 
authority for the entry of the Engineer's orders in question here.

[¶8.]     Since the Engineer's 
decision was unacceptable to either Green River 
or the Contestants, the Contestants appealed to the Board of Control while Green 
River Development Company appealed directly to the district court. This latter 
appeal sought to put in issue not only the substantive aspects of the order but 
also the jurisdiction of the Board of Control to hear the appeal. Undeterred, 
the Board of Control assumed jurisdiction under authority of § 41-4-517, W.S. 
19775 and Article 8, § 2 of the Wyoming 
Constitution,6 thus rejecting Green River's contention that the appeal should be taken 
directly to the district court.

[¶9.]     Since the Board of 
Control assumed jurisdiction, Green River also 
filed a notice of appeal which sought to have the Board of Control modify 
several aspects of the State Engineer's decision. After a hearing, the Board 
reversed the order of the State Engineer.

[¶10.]  All parties appealed from the Board of 
Control's order, and the district court thereafter consolidated the appeals, 
heard all contentions from whatever source and upheld the Board of Control's 
reversal of the State Engineer's orders. From this judgment the Wyoming State 
Engineer appeals the trial court's decision in Case No. 5771, and Green River 
Development appeals in Case No. 5770. The appellees in each appeal are the 
following persons and entities: FMC Corporation, Texas Gulf, Inc., Allied 
Chemical Corporation, Church & Dwight Company, Inc., Charles Price, Joseph 
Murdock, Mike Noble, Edna Mae Swain, Doris Luman, John E. Wardell, Albert P. 
Sommers, Ted L. Higgins, Harry Steele, Martin Wardell, Jr., Lance Hill, and J.P. 
Barlow; Green River Development Company is also an appellee in Case No. 
5771.

THE ISSUES

[¶11.]  Both sides in both appeals identify 
numerous issues for resolution here but the determinative question is that which 
asks whether § 41-4-514(a) is applicable for purposes of authorizing the State 
Engineer's orders of February, 1981 or whether the State Engineer is without 
this or any such authority whatsoever. In other words, this appeal addresses 
itself, in the main, to a statutory interpretation question.

[¶12.]  In the course of deciding whether the 
State Engineer had the authority to change the use, place of use, point of 
diversion and means of conveyance under § 41-4-514(a), we must ask: What is the 
difference between a water right and a water permit where the water has not been 
applied to a beneficial use?7 In the event we find that 
significant differences do exist, we must then identify and evaluate the salient 
change of use and diversion inconsistencies which pertain to any such perceived 
differences. The reason we say this inquiry must be made is because GRDC and the 
State Engineer press for a theory which holds that, since we are concerned with 
amending "permits" to apply the waters of the state of Wyoming to beneficial use 
at some future date (and therefore "water rights," which are conditioned upon 
the predicate that water has been applied to beneficial use are not involved), 
the State Engineer was not bound under § 41-4-514(a) to the change of use, place 
of use, point of diversion and means of conveyance constraints which are imposed 
upon the Board of Control when considering water right transfers under the 
provisions of § 41-3-104, § 41-3-114(a) and the case law relating to these 
statutes - nor was he bound by any other inhibiting factors except his own 
"judgment." (§ 41-4-514(a)).

[¶13.]  To hold as urged by Green River and the 
State Engineer would be to give the State Engineer almost unbridled authority 
under § 41-4-514(a) to change use, place of use, point of diversion and means of 
conveying permit waters of this state while the Board of Control is, by reason 
of the directives of § 41-3-104 and § 41-3-114(a), and our opinion which 
interprets these statutes,8 severely restricted in the exercise 
of its discretion with respect to changing use, place of use, point of diversion 
and means of conveyance of water rights. For example, where water rights are 
concerned § 41-3-104 confines change of use and place of use to situations where 
it can be shown

"* * * that the quantity of water transferred by 
the granting of the petition shall not exceed the amount of water historically 
diverted under the existing use, nor exceed the historic rate of diversion under 
the existing use, nor increase the historic amount consumptively used under the 
existing use, nor decrease the historic amount of return flow, nor in any manner 
injure other existing lawful appropriators." (Emphasis added.)

In interpreting 
this statute in Basin Electric Power 
Cooperative v. State Board of Control, Wyo., 578 P.2d 557 (1978), we said an 
appropriator obtained a transferable water right only to the extent that he has 
put his appropriation to beneficial use. The appellants here urge that this 
restraint does not apply to water permit transfers. Additionally, where a 
transfer of a water right is in issue, the Board of Control may, under § 
41-3-104, W.S. 1977, consider the potential economic loss to the community and 
the state, the extent to which such economic loss will be offset by the new use, 
and whether other sources of water are available for the new use. In this case, 
GRDC must somehow be able to avoid the impact of § 41-3-104 because it is unable 
to comply with any of the standards and safeguards contained therein. Nor could 
it comply with § 41-3-101, infra n. 11, which requires an application to 
beneficial use.

[¶14.]  Such a resolution of the question as is 
urged by the appellants would allow water permittees to assign parts and parcels 
of their permit water to beneficial use while speculating with the balance of 
the waters embraced by their permits, providing they were successful - as they 
were in this case for 60 or more years - in convincing the State Engineer to 
extend the time within which the statute orders the permit water works completed 
and the appropriation perfected.9 Speculation with the right to use - 
or not use - and beneficially apply - or not beneficially apply - the waters of 
this state through such utilization of the State Engineer's discretionary 
authority is plainly contrary to the public water policy of Wyoming. Scherck v. Nichols, 55 Wyo. 4, 95 P.2d 74 
(1939), and Basin Electric Power 
Cooperative v. State Board of Control, supra. The scheme that appellants 
advocate would circumvent historical change of consumptive use and diversion 
concepts which are near, dear and integral to the water law of Wyoming as 
exemplified by the requirements for water rights transfers and diversion changes 
contained in § 41-3-104 and § 41-3-114. If we were to agree to the 
interpretation of the controversial language of § 41-4-514(a) which is urged by 
the appellants, the result would be that the philosophy of beneficial use and 
priority protections that mothered these aforementioned statutory constraints 
for water right changes would stand rejected where permit waters are 
concerned.

[¶15.]  For this court to hold as the appellants 
suggest would be for it to slash the warp and woof of this state's hard-won 
water policy with a knife sharpened upon the whetstone of standardless, 
unbridled agency authority and inequity. This we cannot do.

[¶16.]  We will affirm the trial court through a 
holding that says that the State Engineer may not, under any present statutory 
authority, change the use, place of use, point of diversion and means of 
conveyance of waters embraced by a bare permit to appropriate the waters of the 
state of Wyoming. This holding involves a recognition 
that § 41-4-514(a) grants the State Engineer authority to amend permits for the 
purpose of

"correcting errors or 
otherwise, when in his judgment such amendment appears desirable or 
necessary."

However, our 
decision will require the restriction of the exercise of the Engineer's 
discretion to the business of error-correcting. We will hold that the State 
Engineer's error-correcting discretion must be limited to the correction of such 
errors as are contained in the original permit as those errors are established 
by proof that the permit was not originally - or by any valid extension - issued 
in conformity with the intent of the applicant and/or the State Engineer.10

[¶17.]  The facts here disclose that there was no 
application of the permit waters that are in contest here to beneficial use and 
therefore appellant GRDC owned no transferable water right. Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State 
Board of Control, supra. Additionally, there being no such error of record 
as is contemplated by the statute for amending permits (e.g., § 41-4-514(a), 
supra n. 1), the appellant GRDC has no such interest in the permit waters at 
issue here as could be considered eligible for transfer - the State Engineer has 
no authority to undertake the transfer and the only administrative agency 
authorized by statute to transfer the use, place of use and to change points of 
diversion and means of conveyance for the waters of the state of Wyoming, is the 
Board of Control under the authority contained in § 41-3-104 and § 
41-3-114(a).

THE LAW

Jurisdiction

[¶18.]  Even though the parties make jurisdiction 
arguments, we find that there is no legitimate issue before us having to do with 
which court or agency had jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the orders of the 
State Engineer because Judge Hamm, in the review process, very wisely accepted 
appeals from whatever agency first considered the complaints - whether it be the 
State Engineer or the Board of Control - and then proceeded to decide all 
relevant issues without respect to technical jurisdiction objections. Thus, the 
questions bearing upon whether the State Engineer or the Board of Control had 
original subject-matter jurisdiction and whether appeals should or should not 
have gone to the Board of Control from the ruling of the State Engineer and then 
to the District Court, or whether they should have originated in the Board of 
Control with an appeal to the district court, are not now important to our 
concerns here. These issues are moot since all parties have had and are having 
their contentions considered at all agency and court levels.

The State Engineer's 
authority with reference to change of use, place of use, point of diversion and 
means of conveyance of water embraced by water permits

[¶19.]  Our considerations here remain ever 
mindful of the fact that the Wyoming state legislature - as it has with water 
rights (e.g., § 41-3-104 and § 41-3-114(a)) - has never adopted a statute 
authorizing the change of use, place of use, point of diversion and means of 
conveyance of whatever right to use the waters of Wyoming a water permit carries 
with it. The legislature has, of course, authorized the State Engineer to amend 
permits to correct errors (§ 41-4-514(a)). It is this statute that the State 
Engineer says is broad enough to include the power to change the use, place of 
use, point of diversion and means of conveyance of permit water authorized 60 to 
70 years ago and never put to use, in circumstances where it is not even 
contended that errors occurred in the original authorization. Appellants' 
position is that the permits in issue are not water rights since the waters 
envisioned by the permits have never been so adjudicated - have not been the 
subject of a certificate of appropriation - nor have they been put to beneficial 
use as required by § 41-3-101, W.S. 1977.11 From this predicate the appellant 
State Engineer argues that the provisions of § 41-3-104 and § 41-3-114 do not 
therefore impact upon the exercise of his discretion to change the use, place of 
use, point of diversion and means of conveyance of water embraced by water 
permits as that discretionary authority is given him by § 
41-4-514(a).

[¶20.]  We assume that the appellants mean that a 
permittee's interest in the waters of the state - although real and valuable - 
is not a "water right" in the appropriated and adjudicated sense of the word for 
the reason that the permit water has not been diverted and applied to a 
beneficial use and therefore the holders of the permit would not be eligible to 
receive a certificate of appropriation. See: § 41-4-511, W.S. 1977, and 
Trelease, Water Law Cases and Materials, p. 36, (3d ed. 1979), where it is said 
that an appropriative water right has been said to consist of (1) the intent to 
appropriate water, (2) notice to others of the appropriation, (3) compliance 
with state prescribed formalities, (4) a diversion of water, and (5) application 
of the water to a beneficial use. Also see: Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing 
Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 P. 764, 770 (1925), where it is 
held:

"By a statute passed in 
1909, a `water right' is defined as `a right to use the water of the state, when 
such use has been acquired by the beneficial application of water under the laws 
of the state relating thereto, and in conformity with the rules and regulations 
dependent thereon.' C.S. 1920 § 832."

[¶21.]  We agree with appellants when they say 
that here we are concerned with permits for the future use of water and not adjudicated 
"water rights" under which water has been beneficially used. Therefore this 
court is comfortable with a proposition which avers that the statutes pertaining 
to change of use, place of use, point of diversion and means of conveyance of 
"water rights" (emphasis added) (§ 
41-3-104 and § 41-3-114(a)) may indeed not be regarded to be literally applicable - at least this 
would be so if it were conceded that applicability depends upon an admission 
that those statutes speak only of adjudicated water rights. Even so - and 
remembering that we are involved in a statutory-interpretation question - while 
these water right statutes may not have literal applicability as we contemplate 
the properties of a water permit, they are, in light of the fact that they have 
been enacted for the purpose of carrying out the beneficial-use policy of 
Wyoming's water law as announced in § 41-3-101, possessed of telling relevance 
as an aid to deciding whether or not the appellant State Engineer possesses the 
authority to change the use, place of use, point of diversion and means of 
conveyance of permit water under § 41-4-514(a). This is so because, as announced 
in § 41-3-101, W.S. 1977, the statutorily proclaimed water policy of this state 
is that

"* * * beneficial use shall be the basis, the 
measure and limit of the right to use water at all times * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶22.]  In Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 505, 
44 S. Ct. 182, 184, 68 L. Ed. 407 (1924), the United States Supreme Court held: 

"* * * In Wyoming, an 
appropriation which is not useful is of no effect, for, under the law of that 
State beneficial use is the basis, measure, and limit of all 
appropriation."

[¶23.]  This beneficial-use concept has been 
acknowledged in numerous decisions of this court including Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State 
Board of Control, supra, State ex 
rel. Christopulos v. Husky Oil Company of Delaware, Wyo., 575 P.2d 262, 275 
(1978), and Budd v. Bishop, Wyo., 543 P.2d 368, 373 (1975). It was said in LincolnLand 
Co. v. Davis, 27 F. Supp. 1006, 1008 (D.Wyo. 1939) that

"* * * beneficial use is 
the ultimate foundation of every water right under the priority of appropriation 
system prevailing in the arid states."

[¶24.]  While it is true that the cases which 
constitute this body of authority were, in the main, concerned with water 
rights, they are nonetheless useful to this decision for the purpose of 
ascertaining the public water policy of this state.

[¶25.]  In our search for the legislative intent 
extant at the time of the enactment of this state's water statutes together with 
their various amendments,

"* * * we must look to 
the mischief the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting 
surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of 
the law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances. Carter 
v. Thompson Realty Co., 58 Wyo. 279, 131 P.2d 297." Basin Electric Power 
Cooperative v. State Board of Control, 578 P.2d  at 563.

[¶26.]  The State Engineer's authority under § 
41-4-514(a) cannot be exercised outside the parameters of the state's 
beneficial-use policy. That is, even though § 41-4-514(a) gives the Engineer the 
authority to

"* * * amend any permit 
to appropriate water * * * for the purpose of correcting errors or otherwise, 
when in his judgment such amendment appears desirable or necessary * * 
*,"

this authority 
cannot operate in a vacuum in such a way as to leave it unimpressed with and 
impervious to the state's water policy which conditions the "right to use the 
water" (emphasis added) upon its beneficial application.

[¶27.]  It follows, then, that all Wyoming water 
statutes which are structured to identify, explain and further the state's water 
policy will be considered to have special relevance to our consideration of any 
given water statute - such as § 41-4-514(a) - which may appear to be 
inconsistent with that policy, or under which statute a state official is 
charged with exercising his or her authority in a way that is alleged to be in 
excess of the powers granted thereby. It is in this sense that § 41-3-104, and § 
41-3-114(a) are relevant to our considerations here because, in the absence of 
statutes pertaining to water permits, these are the only extant legislative 
enactments which contemplate the manner in which "the right to" beneficially 
"use the water" (§ 41-3-101) of Wyoming will be utilized in situations where an 
agency or court has under its consideration issues which pertain to changing 
use, place of use, point of diversion and the means of conveying the waters of 
Wyoming. These are the legislative directives, in other words, which tell us 
what protective measures the legislature expects will be taken when 
considerations involving water-use transfers are up for resolution by the courts 
and appropriate administrative agencies.

[¶28.]  With these thoughts in mind, we are here 
moved to the observation that for us to hold that § 41-3-104 and § 41-3-114(a) 
and the cases interpreting their meaning have no public policy overtone and 
applicability to the interpretation of the State Engineer's authority under § 
41-4-514(a), would be as though we were to accede to a theory which advocates 
that a water-right acquisition does not, in the permit stage, contemplate the 
beneficial use of the waters of the state (e.g., § 41-3-101) - is not, in other 
words, entitled to the kind of protection and demanding of the sort of standards 
and safeguards which are applicable to the use of water under an adjudicated 
water right, all as contemplated by § 41-3-104 and § 41-3-114. To so hold would 
constitute an acknowledgment that this court finds the permit phase of water 
right acquisition to be a kind of never-never land in which the authority of the 
State Engineer is indefinable, indiscernible and indescribable. It would be as 
though we were to say that this authority may be exercised absent the burden of 
inhibiting standards or protective restrictions, and with respect to which the 
State Engineer is possessed of all such leeway in these matters as will allow 
him to do whatever pleases him. The appellants in fact suggest that this is the 
nature of the broad discretionary powers possessed by the State Engineer where 
transfer of permit rights is under consideration, since § 41-4-514(a) provides 
that the Engineer is authorized to amend a permit "when in his judgment such 
amendment appears desirable or necessary." According to the Engineer and GRDC, 
this authority, unrestrained by legislative standards limiting the parameters of 
its application, envisions, for purposes of this case, the Engineer's authority 
to change the use, place of use and point of diversion of agricultural permit 
water to a point 134 miles away to be utilized for industrial purposes when the 
waters embraced by these permits - now to be assigned to another place and a 
different use - have not been beneficially applied to the land or the use for 
which they were granted for 60 to 70 years. The appellants argue that this 
authority exists free from any such restrictions as would, under the same or 
similar circumstances, impede the exercise of the Board of Control's authority 
where the transfer of a water right is under consideration.

[¶29.]  That is not what the water law of this 
state envisions.

What is a water 
permit?

[¶30.]  The State Engineer says in his brief 
that

"The permits * * * 
represent inchoate rights, [that] have not ripened into a complete water right 
but they are valid and are entitled to legal recognition and 
protection."

This may be a 
fairly accurate description of what a permit to put the state's water to 
beneficial use actually is. Campbell v. 
Wyoming Development Co., 55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124, 142, reh. denied 55 Wyo. 
347, 102 P.2d 745 (1940) uses the word "inchoate" when speaking of a water 
permit. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., defines "inchoate" as something that 
is

"[i]mperfect; 
partial; unfinished; begun, but not completed * * *."

An "inchoate 
right" as distinguished from a "vested right" is that which is not yet completed 
or finished, Hutton v. Autoridad Sobre 
Hogares de la Capital, 78 F. Supp. 988, 999, (D.C. Puerto Rico (1948)). In 
Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & 
Development Co., 106 Colo. 384, 106 P.2d 363, 367 (1940), the Colorado 
Supreme Court said:

"So long as no water has 
been applied to beneficial use, we are concerned only with an inchoate and an 
unperfected right."

When the 
statutes pertaining to the application for and the issuing of a water permit are 
taken into account, (e.g., §§ 41-4-501 through 512) a water permit may then be 
described as the authority to pursue a water right - a conditional but 
unfulfilled promise on the part of the state to allow the permittee to one day 
apply the state's water in a particular place and to a specific beneficial use 
under conditions where the rights of other appropriators will not be impaired. 
In the meantime, the state withholds the property interest in the water 
described by the permit as well as the final adjudication as to the place of its 
use and the point of diversion for the ultimate benefit of the applicant, 
pending completion of certain statutory requirements and the construction of the 
water works. When the petitioner has complied with statutory requirements, the 
state's promise is directed by statute to be fulfilled with the issuing of a 
certificate of appropriation, the date of priority to be the date upon which the 
application for the permit was filed. The application for and the obtaining of a 
water permit is the necessary first step which has the effect of temporarily 
reserving certain of the state's waters in order that a certificate of 
appropriation for a water right may be later acquired by the petitioner. The 
permit requirement is mandatory before a lawful appropriation may be made. 
Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., supra, 236 P. 764.

[¶31.]  In order to gain perspective of the 
magnitude of the State Engineer's discretion for which the appellants contend, 
it is helpful for us to review the statutes pertaining to the granting of a 
water permit. It is these statutes and the water policy for which they stand 
that the State Engineer's change of use, place of use, point of diversion and 
means of conveyance order would circumvent because, if the State Engineer's 
position with respect to his powers in this area were to be sustained, the 
transfer of permit water could be effected through an amendment-of-error 
exercise without application for a new permit while all the time retaining the 
priority dates of the permits in question here. § 41-4-512. It is only when 
these water permit statutes are taken into account that it is possible for us to 
see the wisdom behind the legislature's refusal to enact a change of use, place 
of use and point of diversion statute applicable to water permits - as it did 
for water rights - and why the language of § 41-4-514(a) cannot possibly be 
interpreted to give the State Engineer any such broad powers as are contended 
for by appellants where water permits are concerned.

Water permit 
statutes

[¶32.]  Any person, association or corporation 
seeking to acquire a certificate of appropriation must, before commencing 
construction pertaining to any water works, apply to the State Engineer for and 
receive a permit to make such appropriation. The application must describe 
source of water supply, nature of the proposed use, location of ditches, canals, 
etc., the time when construction begins and when it is estimated it will be 
completed, and the time estimated for the complete application of the water to 
the proposed use. § 41-4-501, W.S. 1977.

[¶33.]  When an application for a permit to 
acquire the right to the beneficial use of the public water of the state of 
Wyoming is received by the State Engineer, he must date it and record it. He 
must see that the application contains all necessary information to show the 
location, nature and amount of the proposed beneficial use. Where the proposed 
use is for irrigation purposes, the application shall give the total acreage to 
be irrigated and the location thereof. If defective, the application shall be 
returned with reasons, and the time within which correction must be made is 90 
days. If not so returned with proper corrections, the State Engineer shall 
cancel the filing or - for cause - grant an extension. § 41-4-502, W.S. 
1977.

[¶34.]  The State Engineer must approve all 
applications which comply with the statutes and which contemplate the 
application of the water to beneficial use where the proposed use does not tend 
to impair the value of existing rights, or is otherwise detrimental to the 
public welfare. Those applications for permits to apply the waters of the state 
to beneficial use which do not meet these qualifications shall be disapproved. § 
41-4-503, W.S. 1977.

[¶35.]  If the application for permit is 
approved, the applicant may proceed to construct the necessary works and take 
all steps necessary to apply the water to beneficial use and to perfect the 
proposed appropriation. § 41-4-504, W.S. 1977.

[¶36.]  The statutes provide for the Engineer to 
set time limits for completion of the works and application of water for 
beneficial use, and the Engineer is given authority to cancel the permit if the 
time limits are not complied with. § 41-4-506, W.S. 1977.

[¶37.]  Section 41-4-507, W.S. 1977 provides for 
the filing of maps and plats of lands to be irrigated showing location of 
streams, proposed reservoirs, canals and other relevant data.

[¶38.]  When the above statutory requirements 
have been complied with, final proof under oath for the appropriation of water 
may be made in the form and manner prescribed by statute. Notice of the proofs 
will be given by advertisement in the community where "the water right involved 
is situated" (emphasis added), § 41-4-511, W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum.Supp., and which 
notice will contain the permit number, the date of priority (which is the date 
the application is filed § 41-4-512, W.S. 1977), the name of the ditch, canal or 
reservoir, the name of the appropriator, the name of the stream from which the 
appropriation is made, and the amount of appropriation. The advertisement will 
say when the proofs are to be opened for public inspection and any party who 
claims an interest in any water right from the stream or streams to which the 
proofs refer shall have the right to protest the proposed adjudication. No 
contest having been instituted, the Board of Control will receive the proofs and 
if satisfied that the appropriation has been perfected in accord with the 
permit, it shall be the duty of the Board to issue a certificate of 
appropriation of water. § 41-4-511, W.S. 1977. The priority of such 
appropriation shall date from the filing of the application in the Engineer's 
office. § 41-4-512, W.S. 1977.

[¶39.]  From this statutory summary, it can be 
seen, first, that there is no provision for a change of use, place of use or 
point of diversion of the waters authorized for a water permit. Secondly, it 
appears vividly clear that the legislature has taken extraordinary precautions 
to assign the permit waters to specific locations and use purposes with notice 
to all concerned as to how the water is to be utilized - how much will be taken 
from the water course and when and where the water course will be deprived of 
the water. The statutes also make room for protest by affected water users; they 
contemplate an efficient procedure for construction and completion of the works 
conceived by the permit, and it is provided that the Board of Control will 
receive proof and, if satisfied that all requirements have been met, issue a 
certificate of water appropriation with a priority date to be that upon which 
the original application was filed.

[¶40.]  Under the heavy shadow of these statutory 
requirements for the acquisition of a permit to appropriate water, and the 
protection of all of those appropriators on the water course who are in any way 
affected, the State Engineer and GRDC nevertheless argue that the Engineer's 
authority which is described by the amendatory language in § 41-4-514(a), should 
be interpreted by this court to be broad enough to authorize the change of use, 
place of use, point of diversion and means of conveyance as contemplated by the 
Engineer's orders of February 1981, absent the safeguards provided water-rights 
holders. The result of such action would be to retain the priority dates of the 
permit applications while changing the entire purpose for which the permits here 
issued in the first instance, with the further and most devastating consequence 
of ignoring other existing and future users of the water course. Such a scheme 
would obviate the necessity of reapplying for water permits for the industrial 
use contemplated by Pacific Power and Light Company under the statutes 
applicable to the issuing of water permits. It would circumvent the safeguards 
contemplated for the transfers involving water rights as contemplated by § 
41-3-104 and § 41-3-114(a), and it would give such unbridled, standardless 
authority to the Wyoming State Engineer as is not even reserved to the Board of 
Control where ripened and fully matured water rights are being considered for 
transfer.

[¶41.]  A mere reading of these permit statutes 
should make clear that the legislature did not intend to grant transfer powers 
to the State Engineer under such a standardless, vague and indefinite grant of 
authority as is found to be contained in § 41-4-514(a).

[¶42.]  In Basin Electric Cooperative v. State Board of 
Control, supra, we were concerned with the philosophy behind the change of 
use, place of use and point of diversion statutes (§ 41-3-104 and § 41-3-114(a)) 
which applied to water rights. That opinion found its genesis in the public 
policy of the state which contemplates the application of reserved water to a 
beneficial use, and we said that only so much of a water right could be 
transferred as had been historically beneficially used - that it was not 
possible to enlarge upon the historic beneficial use of an appropriated water 
right through the device of changing use, place of use and point of diversion. 
We explained that the key to understanding the application of beneficial-use 
concepts to a change-of-use proceeding

"* * * is a recognition 
that the issues of nonuse and misuse 
are inextricably interwoven with the issues of change of use and change in the 
place of use. This is true even without the formal initiation of abandonment 
proceedings under the statutes. If an appropriator, either by misuse or failure 
to use, has effectively abandoned either all or part of his water right through 
noncompliance with the beneficial-use requirements imposed by law, he could not 
effect a change of use or place of use for that amount of his appropriation 
which had been abandoned. See Rocky 
Mountain Power Company v. White River Electric Association, 151 Colo. 45, 
376 P.2d 158, 161, and Flasche v. 
Westcolo Co., 112 Colo. 387, 149 P.2d 817." (Emphasis added.) 578 P.2d  at 
564.

[¶43.]  In support of our conclusion that "nonuse 
and misuse are inextricably interwoven with the issues of change of use and 
change in the place of use" of a right to use water, we said:

"* * * An appropriator 
obtains a transferable water right only to the extent that he has put his 
appropriation to a beneficial use." 578 P.2d  at 563.

In the same 
opinion we said:

"* * * The water right of 
an appropriator is limited to beneficial use even though a larger amount has 
been adjudicated.", (with citations) 578 P.2d  at 563,

and

"`* * * an appropriator 
of water obtains by his appropriation that only of which he makes a beneficial 
use * * *.'" 578 P.2d  at 563, quoting from Johnston v. Little Horse Creek Irrigating 
Co., 13 Wyo. 208, 79 P. 22, 24 (1904).

[¶44.]  With these considerations at hand, we 
reach the following conclusion: There being no specific statutory authority for 
changing the use, place of use, point of diversion and means of conveyance of 
waters contemplated by a water permit, we go in search of the legislature's 
intention with respect to this issue as that intent is reflected in other 
provisions of the statute. The statutory authority for the granting of the 
permit is definite and explicit as regards the amount and place of water 
diversion, the use and place to which application of the water is to be made and 
the rights of other appropriators. In this case, the permittees have never 
applied the permit waters which they seek to transfer to any beneficial use 
whatever even though the permits have been granted for 60 or more years. This 
means that the permittees are possessed of nothing which qualifies for transfer 
since only water which has been beneficially applied is subject to sale and 
transfer. Basin Electric Power 
Cooperative v. State Board of Control, supra.

[¶45.]  The reasoning for this conclusion is 
sound because the statutes disclose that - had the legislature intended that the 
interest of a permittee in the waters of the state was a transferable item - it 
would have established the standards and boundaries for such assignments of 
water interests as it did where adjudicated water rights are concerned, e.g., § 
41-3-104 and § 41-3-114(a). But the legislature did not do this, and we are 
constrained to assume that it was because it was never intended that such 
interests would be qualified for transfer.

[¶46.]  These considerations bear, then, upon our 
interpretation of § 41-4-514(a). If the only transferable interest in water is 
one that has been put to beneficial use,12 it cannot, therefore, be 
successfully argued that the State Engineer has the right to transfer permit 
water which admittedly has never been utilized beneficially. We conclude that 
the appellants' position in this regard is untenable.

[¶47.]  Section 41-4-514(a) must be said not to 
include the change of use, place of use, point of diversion and means of 
conveyance authority for yet another reason. 

[¶48.]  The appellants argue that the following 
language authorizes the State Engineer to make the changes that his orders 
contemplate:

"The state engineer is 
hereby authorized, upon written petition of the owner, to amend any permit to 
appropriate water prior to adjudication by the state board of control for the purpose of correcting errors or 
otherwise, when in his judgment such amendment appears desirable or 
necessary; provided that the total area of lands may not exceed the area 
described in the original permit." (Emphasis added.) § 41-4-514(a), W.S. 1977 
(December 1977 pamphlet.)

[¶49.]  That provision of the statute speaks to 
the correcting of error contained in 
a permit. We are at a loss to understand how it can seriously be argued that the 
State Engineer, when contemplating change and place of use, point of diversion 
and means of conveyance for these agriculture permits from Sublette County to 
industrial usage in Sweetwater County - 134 miles away - was involved in a 
mistake-correcting exercise. If that is the contention of the appellants, it 
borders on the ridiculous. The fact of the matter is that GRDC and the State 
Engineer, while utilizing an error-correcting statute to accomplish their 
purpose, do not really take the position that a mistake was involved with the 
issuing of the original permits. The record is clear that the original permits 
were issued to the applicants to be utilized in the place and for the purposes 
indicated and therefore the State Engineer, by his order and amendment thereto, 
did not undertake to correct errors in the original permits. Instead, he simply 
assumed the authority to assign them to a different purpose and place of use 
altogether.

[¶50.]  We held in John Meier & Son, Inc. v. 
Horse Creek Conservation District of Goshen County, Wyo., 603 P.2d 1283, 1286 
(1979) that this statute (§ 41-4-514) "is self-limiting and narrow in its 
application." We said, "[i]t cannot be broadened and other elements added or 
injected by parties to the proceedings." While we also held that the statute 
grants the State Engineer broad discretion to amend the permit (as indicated by 
the thought that amendment may be made when in the opinion of the Engineer it is 
"desirable or necessary"), the exercise of this authority must nonetheless be 
limited to those situations where the Engineer had authority to act in the first 
instance, i.e., where there had been an error "or otherwise" which, in Meier v. 
Horsecreek, we found included ambiguity in the permit's authority-granting 
clause. That is the kind of correction that is contemplated by the word 
"otherwise" as it is included in the phrase,

"for the purpose of 
correcting errors or otherwise." 
(Emphasis added.)

In John Meier & Son, supra, it seems to 
be conceded that the ambiguous language contained in the disputed permits could 
not really be said to be "errors" but the ambiguities were nevertheless accepted 
by this court as presenting a problem which could be logically considered as 
having been contemplated by the "correcting errors or otherwise" language of the 
statute. We held that the ambiguity should be clarified to conform to the 
intention of the appropriators and the State Engineer and the Board of Control 
at the time the permits and certificates of appropriation were issued. It can 
hardly be said that this is the kind of error correcting "or otherwise" that 
even remotely approaches the assumption of authority which leads to a change 
from the place and purpose contemplated by the original permits to another place 
and another purpose 60 to 70 years later and 130 miles away. That is not "correcting errors or 
otherwise"! (Emphasis added.)

[¶51.]  Here, unlike John Meier & Son (where 
the language in the original permits was ambiguous), the changes sought have 
nothing to do with the correction of original permit errors and therefore do not 
fall within the contemplation of the statute in question. Thus, the appellant's 
reliance upon John Meier & Son is misplaced. That case does not support 
their position. 

EJUSDEM GENERIS13

[¶52.]  In ferreting out the meaning to be given 
the term "or otherwise" in § 41-4-514(a), the district court found that the 
doctrine of ejusdem generis is germane. We agree. This rule of statutory 
construction requires that the phrase "or otherwise" embrace only those things 
which are covered by the statute. In the case at bar, this means "correction of 
errors." We have long recognized the ejusdem generis rule of statutory 
construction which requires that

"* * * [w]hen a specific 
enumeration concludes with a general term, it is held to be limited to things of 
the same kind. [Sutherland] § 270. `It is restricted to the same genus as the 
things enumerated.'" People ex rel. School Dist. No. 3 v. Dolan, 5 Wyo. 245, 39 P. 752, 755 (1895).

See also: Lazy D Grazing Association v. Terry Land and 
Livestock Company, 641 F.2d 844, 849-850 (10th Cir. 1981).

[¶53.]  In 
People ex rel. School Dist. No. 3 v. Dolan, 39 P.  at 755, the court outlined 
the rules of statutory construction that require an examination of

"* * * the intent of the 
legislature in enacting the statute; but that we must do by a consideration of 
the context, other sections or acts in pari materia, and by the application of 
the usual and well-known rules of construction of words or terms employed. 
Unless, therefore, the context forces a different construction, or other 
provisions exist affecting this matter which lead to such a result, we are 
inclined, and indeed we are bound, to give to these words that construction 
which is required by the rules * * *."

The title to § 
41-4-514, W.S. 1977 is:

"Correction of errors in 
permits; petition for amended certificate of appropriation; hearings on 
petition; notice; costs; * *."

[¶54.]  The forerunner of this statute provided 
only for the correction of errors in the description of land. It was amended in 
1929 to permit the correction of errors other than in land description, and 
again amended in 1945 to include the word "otherwise." In Scherck v. Nichols, supra, 95 P.2d  at 
80, we said of the 1929 amendment that the "amendment, we think, merely 
broadened the scope of the correction." This also appears to be the effect of 
the 1945 amendment.

[¶55.]  Article 3, § 24 of the Wyoming 
Constitution requires:

"No bill, except general 
appropriation bills and bills for the codification and general revision of the 
laws, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly 
expressed in its title; but if any subject is embraced in any act which is not 
expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as 
shall not be so expressed."

[¶56.]  The title to Chapter 118, S.L. of Wyoming 
1945 which is essentially § 41-4-514, W.S. 1975, insofar as the word "otherwise" 
is concerned, reads in pertinent part:

"AN ACT to amend and 
re-enact Section 122-415, Wyoming Revised Statutes, 1931 relating to correction 
of errors in permits by State Engineer and correction of certificates of 
appropriation of water by State Board of Control * * *."

[¶57.]  It is to be noted that the word 
"otherwise" is not mentioned in the title. The title refers only to "correction 
of errors in permits" and "correction of certificates of appropriation." 
Therefore, it seems clear that the word "otherwise" must be read in conjunction 
with the word "correction" and may not extend beyond that. It has been held in 
many Wyoming cases that the object of the constitutional provision was to 
prevent surprise or fraud in legislation by means of provisions in bills the 
titles of which gave no intimation as to their real content. Chapter 102, S.L. 
of Wyoming 1929, which was amended by Chapter 118, S.L. of Wyoming 1945, bore 
virtually the same title: 

"AN ACT to amend and 
re-enact Section 846 and Section 847, Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1920, 
authorizing state engineer to correct errors in permits."

[¶58.]  Amendments subsequent to 1945 all 
referred to "correction of errors." Hodgson v. Mountain & Gulf Oil Co., 
297 F. 269, 272 (D.C.Wyo. 1924), in interpreting the inuring clause, 
states:

"`All permits or leases 
hereunder shall inure to the benefit of the claimant and all persons claiming 
through or under him by lease, contract, or otherwise, as their interests may 
appear.' [Comp.St.Ann. Supp. 1923, § 4640-1/4j.]

* * * * * *

"What is the 
interpretation of the term `otherwise' with respect to the classification which 
immediately precedes it? The ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction is 
that a `clean-up' phrase of this character will include only things of a like or 
similar kind, and nothing of a higher class than that which it immediately 
follows."

The court then 
said:

"* * * Unless, therefore, 
the court should disregard the ordinary and well-defined rule of statutory 
construction in its acceptance and meaning of the term `otherwise,' as here 
presented, it would be necessary to exclude plaintiff from any rights or 
benefits accruing under the inuring clause."

[¶59.]  State v. Douglas, 70 S.D. 203, 16 N.W.2d 489, 495 (1944) quoted from Hodgson v. 
Mountain Gulf Oil Co., supra, with approval, and added:

"In Myers v. Seaberger, 45 Ohio St. 232, 12 N.E. 796, 798, the phrase `or otherwise controlled by him' in a statute 
requiring the listing for taxation of `all moneys invested, loaned, or otherwise 
controlled by him as agent or attorney, or on account of any other person or 
persons', must be construed to mean controlled in a manner similar to the 
loaning and investing of money. In a statute prohibiting the selling, giving or 
otherwise disposing of intoxicating liquors without a license, the words `or 
otherwise dispose of' must be construed to refer to a disposition of the same 
class as a sale or gift. Roberson v. 
State, 100 Ala. 37, 14 So. 554, 555. `Otherwise improve' following the words 
`to open, widen, and extend' a street refers only to such improvements as are 
like opening and widening and must be limited to the preceding language of the 
section. Methodist Episcopal Church v. 
City of Wyandotte, 31 Kan. 721, 3 P. 527, 530.

"General and specific 
words in a statute which are associated together and which are capable of an 
analogous meaning take color from each other so that the general words are 
restricted to a sense analogous to the less general. The general words are 
deemed to have been used not to the wide extent which they might bear if 
standing alone, but as related to words of more definite and particular meaning 
with which they are associated. The term `otherwise' when preceded by a specific 
enumeration is commonly given a restricted meaning and limited to articles of 
the same nature as those previously described. 50 Am.Jur. 244-246, and cases 
thereunder cited."

[¶60.]  Other cases holding similarly are Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. Washington & 
Berkeley Bridge Co., 194 F. 1011, 1017 (D.C. 1912); Hickman v. Cabot, 183 F. 747, 106, 10 
E.C.A. 183 (1910); and Reiche v. 
Smythe, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 162, 20 L. Ed. 566 (1872).

[¶61.]  We then conclude that the word 
"otherwise" must be read in conjunction with the word "correction" and that the 
facts of this case show that the State Engineer was not involved in the 
correction of errors or anything like correction of errors when he assumed 
jurisdiction to change the use, place of use, point of diversion and means of 
conveyance of the waters embraced by the permits in question here. It was more 
akin to filing a whole new application for a permit at a distant point to create 
a new purpose for the appropriation - to sell waters for industrial purposes and 
not irrigation as originally intended. 

[¶62.]  In conclusion, we hold that § 
41-4-514(a), W.S. 1977, does not contain authority for the Wyoming State 
Engineer to change the use, place of use, point of diversion or means of 
conveyance of the water envisioned by the permits in contest here, and there is 
no other statute which grants him any such authority. The only way that such 
transfers may be made, according to the statutes extant, is through the 
utilization of § 41-3-104 and § 41-3-114(a), W.S. 1977. Since these statutes 
pertain only to transfers where water rights are concerned, and since the waters 
embraced by the permits before this court cannot qualify as water rights since 
they have not been applied to a beneficial use as conceived by § 41-3-101, W.S. 
1977, it follows that there exists no statutory authority to transfer such 
interest in the waters of the state of Wyoming as are contemplated by a water 
permit.

[¶63.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 At the time of the 
filing of the petition, § 41-4-514(a), W.S. 1977 provided in pertinent part - 
and in all material respects still provides:

"Correction of errors in 
permits; petition for amended certificate of appropriation; hearings on 
petition; notice; costs.

"(a) The state engineer 
is hereby authorized, upon written petition of the owner, to amend any permit to 
appropriate water prior to adjudication by the state board of control for the 
purpose of correcting errors or otherwise, when in his judgment such amendment 
appears desirable or necessary; provided that the total area of lands may not 
exceed the area described in the original permit."

The balance of 
the section has nothing to do with an application to the State 
Engineer.

2 Section 41-3-104, W.S. 
1977 provides:

"Procedure to change use 
or place of use. "(a) When an owner of a water right wishes to change a water 
right from its present use to another use, or from the place of use under the 
existing right to a new place of use, he shall file a petition requesting 
permission to make such a change. The petition shall set forth all pertinent 
facts about the existing use and the proposed change in use, or, where a change 
in place of use is requested, all pertinent information about the existing place 
of use and the proposed place of use. The board may require that an advertised 
public hearing or hearings be held at the petitioner's expense. The petitioner 
shall provide a transcript of the public hearing to the board. The change in 
use, or change in place of use, may be allowed, provided that the quantity of 
water transferred by the granting of the petition shall not exceed the amount of 
water historically diverted under the existing use, nor exceed the historic rate 
of diversion under the existing use, nor increase the historic amount 
consumptively used under the existing use, nor decrease the historic amount of 
return flow, nor in any manner injure other existing lawful appropriators. The 
board of control shall consider all facts it believes pertinent to the transfer 
which may include the following:

"(i) The economic loss to 
the community and the state if the use from which the right is transferred is 
discontinued;

"(ii) The extent to which 
such economic loss will be offset by the new use;

"(iii) Whether other 
sources of water are available for the new use.

"(b) In all cases where 
the matter of compensation is in dispute, the question of compensation shall be 
submitted to the proper district court for determination."

3 Section 41-3-114(a), 
W.S. 1977 provides:

"(a) Petition to board of control or state 
engineer. - Any person, association or corporation having heretofore 
acquired a right to the beneficial use of the water of any stream in the state 
of Wyoming, either adjudicated or unadjudicated, who desires to change the point 
of diversion of his or their appropriation or the point of diversion and means 
of conveyance of such appropriation, shall petition therefor to the state board 
of control if the water right has been adjudicated, or to the state engineer if 
the water right is unadjudicated."

4 GRDC says in its 
brief:

"Beneficial application 
has begun, but it has not yet been completed for all of the water or lands under 
the permits."

5 Section 41-4-517, W.S. 
1977, 1982 Cum.Supp. provides:

"Appeal from action of 
state engineer or order of board of control.

"Any applicant feeling 
himself aggrieved by the endorsement made by the state engineer upon his 
application, may, in writing, in an informal manner and without pleadings of any 
character, appeal within sixty (60) days of the date of such endorsement, and 
notice thereof to the applicant, to the board of control for an examination and 
reversal of any such action of the state engineer. Upon receipt of such an 
appeal, the secretary of the board of control shall notify the members of the 
board of control and upon receipt of replies from them shall fix a date, as 
early as may be possible, when such appeal shall be heard before the board. All 
parties directly interested in the appeal and those who claim an adverse 
interest thereto, shall be duly notified and shall be heard at such hearing if 
appearance is made. Any person or persons feeling himself or themselves 
aggrieved by any order or determination of the board of control in cases 
embracing such appeals from the state engineer, may within six (6) months from 
the date of such action by the board of control, and notice thereof to the 
applicant take an appeal to the district court of the county in which the 
greatest use of water is proposed to be made under the application. The 
procedure in such appeals shall be in conformity with the provisions of sections 
874 [§ 41-4-401], 875 [§ 41-4-402], 876 [§ 41-4-403], 877 [§ 41-4-404], 878 [§ 
41-4-406], 879 [§ 41-4-407], 880 [§ 41-4-408], 881 [§ 41-4-405], 882 of the 
Revised Statutes of 1899 and section 1, chapter 104, Session Laws of 1903 [§ 
41-4-207]. The attorney general shall, in such cases, represent the state board 
of control."

6 Article 8, § 2 of the 
Wyoming Constitution provides in part:

"There shall be 
constituted a board of control, to be composed of the state engineer and 
superintendents of the water divisions; which shall, under such regulations as 
may be prescribed by law, have the supervision of the waters of the state and of 
their appropriation, distribution and diversion, and of the various officers 
connected therewith. Its decisions to be subject to review by the courts of the 
state."

7 In some, but not all, 
cases, the certificate of appropriation contemplated by § 41-4-511, W.S. 1977, 
1982 Cum.Supp. will not issue until the water has been beneficially applied. See 
§ 41-4-506, W.S. 1977. In this case it is admitted that there has never been a 
beneficial application of the permit water which the Green River Development 
Company seeks to transfer even though there has been a beneficial use of some of 
the water embraced by the permits.

8 See Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State 
Board of Control, Wyo., 578 P.2d 557 (1978).

9 See § 41-4-506, W.S. 
1977 entitled "Time limits for commencing and completing construction work; 
extensions; forfeiture of rights; cancellation of permit; notice of date of 
expiration to appropriator."

10 See our discussion of John Meier & Son, Inc. v. Horse Creek 
Conservation District of Goshen County, Wyo., 603 P.2d 1283 (1979), 
infra.

11 At the time of the 
filing of the petition, § 41-3-101, W.S. 1977 read:

"A water right is a right to use the water of 
the state, when such use has been acquired by the beneficial application of 
water under the laws of the state relating thereto, and in conformity with 
the rules and regulations dependent thereon. Beneficial use shall be the basis, 
the measure and limit of the right to use water at all times, not exceeding the 
statutory limit except as provided by section 122-117 Revised Statutes of 
Wyoming, 1931, as amended by chapter 105, section 1, Session Laws of Wyoming, 
1935 [§ 41-4-317]. Water being always the property of the state, rights to its 
use shall attach to the land for irrigation, or to such other purposes or object 
for which acquired in accordance with the beneficial use made for which the 
right receives public recognition, under the law and the administration provided 
thereby. Water rights for the direct use of the natural unstored flow of any 
stream cannot be detached from the lands, place or purpose for which they are 
acquired, except as provided in sections 122-402 [§ 41-3-102] and 122-403 [§ 
41-3-103], Revised Statutes of Wyoming, 1931, pertaining to a change to 
preferred use, and except as provided in section 1 of this act [§ 41-4-514]." 
(Emphasis added.)

12 Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State 
Board of Control, supra.

13 We are in the debt of 
Judge Hamm for the aid furnished by his excellent memorandum opinion on this 
aspect of the law.

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶64.]  The majority opinion holds 
that:

1. The State Engineer has 
no express statutory authority to approve a change in use, a change in the place 
of use, a change in the point of diversion and a change in the means of 
conveyance with respect to a water permit.

2. The State Engineer has 
no implied authority to approve a change in use, a change in the place of use, a 
change in the point of diversion and a change in the means of conveyance with 
respect to a water permit arising out of his statutory authority to amend 
permits. Section 41-4-514(a), W.S. 1977.

a. Such an implication 
would be contrary to the intent of the legislature manifested in the statutory 
scheme providing for the appropriation of water to beneficial use.

b. Such an implication 
would be contrary to the policy of the State of Wyoming relating to the 
appropriation of water to beneficial use.

c. Such an implication 
would be contrary to the recognized precept of statutory interpretation which we 
style ejusdem generis.

With all of 
these holdings I agree.

[¶65.]  This concurring opinion is motivated by 
the conclusion of the majority to treat as moot the questions which relate to 
the appropriate roles of and the relationship between the State Engineer and the 
Board of Control. These were treated as issues of import by the state 
authorities in connection with this case. Since a resolution, at least in part, 
of these questions provides an additional ground for affirming the trial court, 
I would treat with them in this way. A comparison of Art. 8, § 2 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming1 with Art. 8, § 5,2 suggests to me that the 
Constitutional Convention intended that the State Engineer should be the chief 
administrative officer in connection with the supervision of the waters of the 
state and the officers connected with its distribution. As such he is a member 
of the Board of Control, which is the state agency to which is granted 
discretionary authority with respect to the supervision of the waters of the 
state and of their appropriation, distribution and diversion, and of the 
officers connected therewith. 

[¶66.]  Turning then to the statutory provisions 
relating to the State Engineer, found in §§ 9-1-901, et seq., W.S. 1977, and 
comparing those with the statutes relating to the Board of Control found in §§ 
41-4-201, et seq., W.S. 1977, I am persuaded that the suggestion made by the 
Constitutional Convention has been effectuated by the legislature. An 
examination of the manner in which our statutory scheme relating to the 
beneficial use of the waters of the state functions leads to the conclusion that 
discretionary authority is afforded only to the Board of Control. The functions 
of the State Engineer are essentially administrative and ministerial in nature. 
The State Engineer has no discretionary authority relating to the waters of the 
state except for whatever discretion may be exercised in determining the manner 
in which his ministerial functions will be performed. For this additional reason 
I would hold that the State Engineer had no authority to approve a change in 
use, a change in place of use, a change in the point of diversion and a change 
in the means of conveyance for water permits because such authority would 
require the exercise of discretion which I conclude the legislature has not 
afforded to the State Engineer. This approach is consistent with the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming.

[¶67.]  I would agree that the Board of Control 
did not have jurisdiction to review the purported decision of the State Engineer 
pursuant to § 41-4-517, W.S. 1977. Obviously this case does not fit within the 
language of that particular statute. I would, however, use that statute as an 
example of a legislative manifestation of the roles which I have ascribed to the 
State Engineer and the Board of Control. The language of § 41-4-517, W.S. 1977, 
fits neatly into a management scheme in which the State Engineer exercises only 
ministerial functions, and discretion is exercised by the Board of Control. At 
this juncture I must sound one discordant note with respect to the majority 
opinion. Since I am persuaded that the discretionary authority which the 
appellants ascribe to the State Engineer resides, if anywhere, in the Board of 
Control, I find error in the action of the district court in entertaining the 
appeal from the order of the State Engineer. That order lacks the requisite 
administrative finality to vest the district court with jurisdiction to 
review.

FOOTNOTES

1 Art. 8, § 2, Wyoming 
Constitution, provides:

"There shall be 
constituted a board of control, to be composed of the state engineer and 
superintendents of the water divisions; which shall, under such regulations as 
may be prescribed by law, have the supervision of the waters of the state and 
of their appropriation, distribution and diversion, and of the various officers 
connected therewith. Its decisions to be subject to review by the courts of 
the state." (Emphasis added.)

2 Art. 8, § 5, Wyoming 
Constitution, provides:

"There shall be a state 
engineer who shall be appointed by the governor of the state and confirmed by 
the senate; he shall hold his office for the term of six (6) years, or until his 
successor shall have been appointed and shall have qualified. He shall be 
president of the board of control, and shall have general supervision of the waters of the 
state and of the officers connected with its distribution. No person shall 
be appointed to this position who has not such theoretical knowledge and such 
practical experience and skill as shall fit him for the position." (Emphasis 
added.)