Case Title: State v. Marchand Grady

Citation: 2009 WI 47

Docket Number: 2007AP000672-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 47 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP672-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Marchand Grady, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 11, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 6, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Charles F. Kahn, Jr.   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Carl W. Chesshir, Eagle, and oral argument by Carl W. Chesshir. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Warren 
D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 47
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP672-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2005CF2809) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Marchand Grady, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 11, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of an opinion and order of the court of Appeals.  
Affirmed   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.  This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 summarily affirming 
the entry of a judgment of conviction by the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Charles F. Kahn, Judge, against Marchand Grady 
("Grady").  Grady was convicted of first-degree intentional 
homicide while armed with a dangerous weapon as a party to a 
crime, possession of a short-barreled shotgun as a party to a 
crime, and possession of a firearm by a felon.  Grady contends 
                                                 
1 State v. Grady, No. 2007AP672-CR, unpublished order (Wis. 
Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2008). 
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
2 
that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress 
inculpatory statements that he made to police officers while in 
custody.  The court of appeals disagreed and upheld the denial 
of Grady's motion.   
¶2 
The issue we decide today is whether Grady's Fifth 
Amendment rights were violated when Miranda2 warnings were given 
to him before the start of his noncustodial interrogation, but 
not administered again after his interrogation became custodial 
during the same interview two-and-one-half hours later.  Grady 
argues that he was entitled to be readvised of his Miranda 
rights after his interrogation became custodial, and because 
those 
warnings 
were 
not 
readministered, 
his 
inculpatory 
statements should have been suppressed.  
¶3 
We reject Grady's bright-line rule approach, and 
reiterate 
that 
the 
proper 
framework 
for 
analyzing 
the 
sufficiency of the timing of Miranda warnings is a totality of 
the circumstances test.  In this case, we hold that Grady was 
not entitled to a readministration of the Miranda warnings after 
he was arrested.  The evidence shows that Grady was read his 
Miranda warnings only two-and-one-half hours prior to the 
commencement of the custodial portion of his interrogation, 
there 
was 
no 
significant 
change 
in 
the 
nature 
of 
his 
interrogation after it became custodial, Grady showed no signs 
of mental impairment, he was familiar with Miranda warnings from 
his past, and, though not readministered, Grady was reminded of 
his Miranda rights after he was taken into custody.  In sum, it 
                                                 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
3 
is clear that the Miranda warnings as administered made Grady 
sufficiently aware of his rights during questioning.  Grady's 
motion to suppress his inculpatory statements was therefore 
appropriately denied by the circuit court, and we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals upholding that denial.   
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The underlying facts are undisputed.  On May 16, 2005, 
Allen Jemison was found dead in his apartment as the result of 
two 
shotgun 
wounds. 
 
Jemison's 
roommate, 
Marcus 
Ward, 
immediately became the subject of the police investigation.  The 
police also made contact with Grady, who reported that he knew 
Ward.  Grady agreed to call the police if and when he saw Ward.  
Later that evening, Grady did call the police and assisted them 
in finding Ward.  Grady then voluntarily went to the police 
station and agreed to answer some questions.  The police 
repeatedly told Grady that he was not under arrest; he was not 
handcuffed during the ride to the station or once he arrived at 
the station.  Grady was provided with food, water, cigarettes, 
and bathroom breaks throughout the ensuing questioning. 
¶5 
At 8:16 p.m., Detective Corbett began the interview by 
administering Miranda warnings to Grady so as to be "better safe 
than sorry," and Grady indicated that he understood the rights 
he was read.  Grady had received Miranda warnings on at least 
one prior unrelated occasion.  For the next two-and-one-half 
hours, Grady answered questions from Detectives Corbett and 
Gastrow, denying any involvement in Jemison's death.  It is 
undisputed that Grady was not in custody at this time. 
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
4 
¶6 
At approximately 10:45 p.m. that evening, Ward, who 
was being questioned separately, told the police that Grady was 
the person who shot and killed Jemison.  At this point, Grady 
was 
placed 
under 
arrest. 
 
Miranda 
warnings 
were 
not 
readministered to Grady upon his arrest, though Grady did 
testify at the hearing on his motion to suppress that, when he 
was arrested, Detective Gastrow slid a card to him across the 
table with the Miranda warnings printed on it and asked Grady if 
he knew the rights referenced therein.  Grady claimed that he 
looked at the card and slid it back to Gastrow, who picked it up 
and put it away.  Neither party alleges that this episode 
constituted an administration of the Miranda warnings. 
¶7 
From 10:45 p.m. on May 16 until 5:25 a.m. on May 17, 
Detectives 
Corbett 
and 
Gastrow 
conducted 
a 
custodial 
interrogation of Grady.  At some point prior to 12:25 a.m., 
Grady 
began 
making 
inculpatory 
statements 
regarding 
his 
involvement in Jemison's death.  The detectives suspended the 
interrogation between 12:25 a.m. and 12:55 a.m. in order to 
brief the incoming shift of officers.  Detectives Corbett and 
Gastrow then resumed their custodial interrogation of Grady, who 
continued to make inculpatory statements.  Detective Corbett 
spent several hours during the interrogation reducing Grady's 
statement to writing.  While Grady declined to sign the 
statement, he orally acknowledged that it was true and correct.  
¶8 
Grady was booked into detention immediately following 
the conclusion of the interrogation on the morning of May 17, 
2005.  In total, Grady’s all-night questioning (the "first 
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
5 
interrogation") lasted slightly more than nine hours, with the 
noncustodial portion composing the first two-and-one-half hours 
of the interrogation.  Grady continued to receive food, 
cigarettes, water, and restroom breaks throughout the first 
interrogation. 
¶9 
Later that night, Detectives Corbett and Gastrow began 
another round of questioning (the "second interrogation") to 
clarify inconsistencies from the first interrogation.  It is 
undisputed that this second custodial interrogation began with 
Detective Corbett administering the Miranda warnings to Grady, 
who stated that he remembered being read his rights the previous 
day, understood them, and was willing to speak to the police 
without an attorney.  Grady spoke with the detectives from 7:33 
p.m. 
until 
11:17 
p.m., 
during 
which 
he 
made 
additional 
inculpatory statements.  Detective Corbett prepared another 
written statement based upon Grady's answers, which Grady 
indicated was true and correct.  Grady then initialed each page 
and signed the statement. 
¶10 Prior to trial, Grady moved to suppress the statements 
he made and signed during the interrogations on the grounds that 
they were the involuntary products of police coercion.  The 
circuit court found the statements to be voluntary and denied 
the motion, stating that Grady understood his rights, and that 
he "knew exactly what he was doing and was not the subject of 
improper police coercion when he provided the information to the 
police."  
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
6 
¶11 At trial, both of Grady's statements were admitted 
into evidence during the State's case-in-chief.  The jury 
returned guilty verdicts on all three counts, and the circuit 
court correspondingly entered a judgment of conviction on all 
three counts.  
¶12 Grady appealed the circuit court's denial of his 
motion to suppress.  On appeal, Grady conceded that he was not 
improperly coerced by the police, but maintained that his 
statements should be suppressed because he was not given his 
Miranda warnings after he was placed into custody.  The court of 
appeals summarily affirmed the circuit court's judgment of 
conviction, rejecting Grady's argument "that Miranda warnings 
have no effect simply because officers take the precaution of 
reading Miranda rights before they are required."  The court of 
appeals concluded: "[T]he record amply supports the circuit 
court's findings that the Miranda admonitions were fully 
understood 
and 
the 
postcustodial 
statement 
by 
Grady 
was 
voluntary and intelligently given." Grady then sought review 
before this court. 
 II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 
¶13 In reviewing a motion to suppress, we uphold the 
circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous, 
and 
review 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles to those facts de novo.  See State v. Eason, 2001 WI 
98, ¶9, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625. 
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
7 
¶14 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees the privilege against compelled self-incrimination,3 
and the Fourteenth Amendment requires state courts to observe 
this privilege.  See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).  The 
United States Supreme Court created procedural safeguards to 
protect the right 
against compelled self-incrimination in 
Miranda v. Arizona, holding as follows: 
[W]hen 
an 
individual 
is 
taken 
into 
custody 
or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities 
in 
any 
significant 
way 
and 
is 
subjected 
to 
questioning . . . [h]e must be warned prior to any 
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, 
that anything he says can be used against him in a 
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of 
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney 
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning 
if he so desires. 
384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).  Failure to comply with these 
constitutional 
safeguards 
renders 
the 
person's 
statements 
inadmissible against that person.  Id.  
III. DISCUSSION 
¶15 Grady advances a creative, but not heretofore unheard 
of argument.  He asks us to adopt a bright-line rule requiring 
the administration of Miranda warnings after a person is placed 
in official custody, and asks us to declare any and all Miranda 
                                                 
3 The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person 
. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law."  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
8 
warnings prior to custody ipso facto ineffective.4  We are 
unpersuaded that a bright-line rule is necessary or even 
desirable, 
and 
reiterate 
that 
the 
proper 
approach 
for 
determining whether a suspect has effectively received his 
Miranda warnings is a totality of the circumstances test.  Grady 
did receive the requisite Miranda warnings at the beginning of 
his noncustodial interrogation, and in light of the facts of 
this case, we do not believe the police were required to 
readminister those 
warnings once his interrogation became 
custodial two-and-one-half hours later. 
A.  Totality of the Circumstances Test 
¶16 Grady's argument is basically this——because Miranda 
warnings 
are 
required 
before 
a 
custodial 
interrogation 
commences, and are not required for noncustodial interrogations, 
Miranda warnings are effective only after a person has been 
placed in custody.  In our opinion, this argument constitutes an 
inaccurate interpretation of the requirements of Miranda and 
poor public policy.  We do not find much merit in this approach, 
and neither have the overwhelming majority of other courts who 
have considered this question.  A sound interpretation of 
Miranda and sound public policy require the application of the 
totality of the circumstances test rather than a bright-line 
rule, and that is what we do here. 
                                                 
4 The Miranda court repeatedly referred to the valid and 
legally sufficient advisement of a suspect's constitutional 
rights as an "effective" advisement or warning.  See, 384 U.S. 
at 467, 470, 473, 494, 498.  We use the terms "effective" and 
"ineffective" in this same sense.  
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
9 
¶17 The United States Supreme Court has made clear its 
reluctance to adopt per se rules in the context of Miranda 
warnings.  Instead of delineating bright-line rules, the Supreme 
Court has embraced a more flexible approach whereby courts 
consider the totality of the circumstances.  See Wyrick v. 
Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 47-49 (1982) (per curiam) (rejecting a per 
se rule that Miranda rights be readministered before questioning 
a suspect about the results of a polygraph examination, and 
reiterating that the proper framework is a totality of the 
circumstances inquiry). 
¶18 Grady nonetheless argues that his bright-line rule is 
required by Miranda.  It is true that Miranda necessitates the 
administration of the warnings only after custody, and that 
precustodial warnings are not required.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 478-79.  This plainly does not mean, as Grady contends, that 
Miranda warnings before custody are per se ineffective.  The 
Miranda opinion sets no requirement as to the earliest time that 
the warnings may be given; it requires only that the warnings be 
given at some time "prior to any [custodial] questioning."  Id.; 
see also, State v. Burge, 487 A.2d 532, 543 (Conn. 1985) ("The 
disclosure that Miranda requires must be made no later than the 
time when an accused is taken into custody." emphasis added).  
Grady's argument, then, trips on its own logic.  The fact that 
Miranda warnings are required before the commencement of a 
custodial interrogation does not mean that precustodial warnings 
are always ineffective. 
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
10 
¶19 Numerous other jurisdictions have considered this same 
question, and all but one have rejected Grady's approach.5  The 
weight of authority, indeed the overwhelming consensus, agrees 
that precustodial administration of Miranda warnings can be 
sufficient under certain circumstances.6  
                                                 
5 The only case we were able to find where a court did 
create a bright-line rule deeming all precustody Miranda 
warnings per se ineffective is State v. Bradshaw, 457 S.E.2d 456 
(W. Va. 1995).  As our opinion today makes clear, we do not find 
the reasoning in Bradshaw persuasive. 
 
6 See, e.g., Guam v. Dela Pena, 72 F.3d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 
1995) 
(holding 
that 
precustodial 
Miranda 
warnings 
were 
sufficient when the defendant confessed 15 hours later and did 
not allege that anything diminished the effectiveness of the 
warnings other than the passage of time); Jarrell v. Balkcom, 
735 
F.2d 
1242, 
1253-54 
(11th 
Cir. 
1984) 
(holding 
that 
precustodial Miranda warnings were sufficient when the defendant 
confessed less than four hours after the warnings and there was 
no evidence that the defendant was unaware of his rights, that 
he 
was 
pressured, 
or 
that 
he 
did 
not 
understand 
the 
interrogation process); Upton v. State, 36 S.W.3d 740, 743-44 
(Ark. 2001) (holding that precustodial Miranda warnings were 
sufficient when the defendant was questioned by the same officer 
after arrest, confessed within two hours of being given the 
warnings, and there was no evidence that the defendant did not 
understand the warnings); State v. Burge, 487 A.2d 532, 542-43 
(Conn. 1985) (holding that precustodial Miranda warnings were 
sufficient when the defendant was mentally aware, "continuously 
in the company of the police, questioned on the same subject by 
the same officers throughout that time, and confessed within 
four hours of having been given the warnings"); State v. 
Tolbert, 850 A.2d 1192, 1200 (Md. 2004) (holding that the 
precustodial Miranda warnings were "sufficiently proximate in 
time and place to custodial status to inform" the defendant of 
his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and 
thus 
readministration 
of 
the 
rights 
was 
not 
required); 
Commonwealth v. Colby, 663 N.E.2d 808, 810-11 (Mass. 1996) 
(holding that precustodial Miranda warnings were sufficient when 
given less than two hours prior to the defendant's confession 
and there was no break in the interrogation process); State v. 
Monroe, 
711 
A.2d 
878, 
886-87 
(N.H. 
1998) 
(holding 
that 
defendant's 
pre-polygraph, 
precustodial 
Miranda 
warnings 
sufficiently safeguarded his rights where defendant's "conduct 
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
11 
¶20 Though the precise framing of the analysis varies from 
state to state, the general approach is the same.  The main 
thrust of the inquiry is whether the suspect being questioned 
was sufficiently aware of his or her rights during the custodial 
interrogation. 
 
Though 
still 
under 
a 
"totality 
of 
the 
circumstances" rubric, courts have considered multiple factors 
in making this determination,7 including whether the same officer 
                                                                                                                                                             
gave no indication that his comprehension and volition had been 
affected so as to render the warning ineffective," and where 
interrogation did not become significantly more coercive); State 
v. Dispoto, 913 A.2d 791, 801 (N.J. 2007) (holding that no 
further warnings were required when "precustodial warnings have 
been given to a defendant as part of a continuing pattern of 
interactions between the defendant and the police, and during 
that continuing sequence of events nothing of an intervening 
nature occurs that would dilute the effectiveness of the 
warnings that had been given"); State v. Rogers, 188 S.W.3d 593, 
606-08 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that no new administration of 
Miranda rights was required when there was a five-hour lapse 
between defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights and the 
confession, 
where 
the 
same 
two 
officers 
conducted 
the 
precustodial and postcustodial questioning, where the subject 
matter remained the same throughout, where the defendant was 
familiar with the criminal justice system, and where nothing 
indicates the confession was involuntary); State v. Rupe, 683 
P.2d 571, 581 n.4 (Wash. 1984) (holding that precustodial 
Miranda warnings were sufficient in light of the short period of 
time between advisement of his rights and being placed in 
custody); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 
6.8(b), at 807 nn.62-63 (3d ed. 2007) (citing Burge and other 
cases for the proposition that precustodial Miranda warnings may 
be sufficient). 
 
7 For example, Tennessee has proffered the following 
approach: 
 
Factors to be considered when assessing the 
totality of the circumstances include: (1) the amount 
of time that has passed since the waiver; (2) any 
change in the identity of the interrogator, the 
location of the interview, or the subject matter of 
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
12 
or officers conducted the questioning, whether the location 
changed, whether the subject matter of the questioning was 
consistent, whether a reminder of the Miranda rights was given 
before the custodial interrogation began, whether the suspect 
was mentally or emotionally impaired, whether more coercive 
tactics were used when the suspect was placed in custody, the 
suspect's past experience with law enforcement, and how much 
time elapsed between the administration of the Miranda warnings 
and the custodial interrogation or confession.  The Miranda 
warnings would tend to go "stale" sooner, that is, they would be 
more likely to be forgotten by the suspect, if the suspect has 
had little familiarity with the warnings than if the suspect has 
had experience with the warnings. 
¶21 We do not here adopt any formulaic test.  The above 
factors are helpful, but not individually or collectively 
determinative or exhaustive.  We prefer a flexible approach that 
examines all relevant facts in an effort to determine whether a 
                                                                                                                                                             
the questioning; (3) any official reminder of the 
prior advisement; (4) the suspect's sophistication or 
past experience with law enforcement; and (5) any 
indicia that the suspect subjectively understands and 
waives his rights. 
 
Rogers, 188 S.W.3d at 606 (citing People v. Mickle, 814 P.2d 
290, 305 (Cal. 1991)).  The Eleventh Circuit inquires into 
whether the suspect was aware of his rights, pressured, or 
"mentally deficient or naive about the process that was under 
way." Jarrell, 735 F.2d at 1254.  Connecticut similarly asks 
whether the warnings given were "sufficiently proximate in time 
and place to custodial status to serve as protection" against 
coercion.  Burge, 487 A.2d at 543.  
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
13 
suspect was sufficiently aware of his or her constitutional 
rights.  
¶22 Another problem with Grady's bright-line approach is 
that it does not align with the purpose of Miranda warnings.  
Miranda warnings are designed to make a suspect who is in 
custody aware of his or her constitutional rights before 
interrogation, and relatedly, to inform the suspect that the 
interrogators will recognize his or her rights if exercised.  
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468; see also Hughes v. Commonwealth, 87 
S.W.3d 850, 854 (Ky. 2002).  The goal is to protect the 
privilege against self-incrimination, or said another way, to 
ensure that a confession is free and unconstrained.  See State 
v. Hambly, 2008 WI 10, ¶48, 307 Wis. 2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48 
(noting 
that 
Miranda 
is 
designed 
to 
prevent 
"government 
officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to 
extract confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained 
environment") (quoting State v. Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d 272, 
280-81, 423 N.W.2d 862 (1988)).  As the Connecticut Supreme 
Court has noted:  
The purpose of Miranda warnings is to assure that a 
confession is "the product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker."  No such choice is 
"free and unconstrained" unless the accused, before 
making statements to the police, is aware that he has 
the constitutional right to remain silent.  Adequate 
disclosure of the jeopardy in which the accused is 
being placed is therefore important to alert him to 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
14 
the importance of the constitutional rights which he 
is being asked to forego.  Burge, 487 A.2d at 542-43 
(citations omitted).  
¶23 Given this purpose, a rule that assumes a suspect is a 
blank slate with no awareness of his or her rights as soon as he 
or she is placed in custody is a head-in-the-sand approach.  In 
addition, application of Grady's bright-line rule would focus 
the analysis on the custody status of a suspect rather than on 
the individual's comprehension and waiver of his rights.  It is, 
in short, form over substance.  A rule that says warnings given 
one minute before custody are ineffective per se because they 
were not given when the suspect was actually in custody is 
manifestly unreasonable. 
¶24 Finally, beyond its lack of fidelity to the purposes 
and principles behind Miranda, Grady's approach is unworkable.  
One of its major flaws is that it assumes that the precise point 
of custody is fixed and known at the time of questioning.  While 
this may sometimes be the case, it is not always true.  In 
practice, it is not always clear when a suspect is officially 
under arrest.  See Burge, 487 A.2d at 543 ("When the police are 
conducting a good faith precustodial investigation at police 
headquarters, they may have difficulty in determining the 
precise 
moment 
when 
questioning 
turns 
into 
custodial 
interrogation and Miranda warnings are required.").  Because of 
this indeterminacy, officers currently have an incentive to 
provide early warnings in order to ensure both maximum awareness 
of rights and the admissibility of subsequent statements.  
Grady's rule might have the perverse effect of eliminating the 
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
15 
"better safe than sorry" approach, leading to suspects who are 
less apprised of their rights than under the current system. 
¶25 Grady’s bright-line rule, then, must be rejected.  The 
policies and purposes underlying Miranda require a flexible 
approach that examines the totality of the circumstances to 
determine the sufficiency of Miranda warnings. 
B.  Application to the Facts of This Case 
¶26 In view of the totality of the circumstances in the 
case at bar, it is clear that Grady was not denied his Fifth 
Amendment rights.  Grady was questioned by the same officers, in 
the same place, on the same subjects during his precustodial and 
postcustodial interrogation.  His postcustodial interrogation 
was merely a continuation of the precustodial questioning, the 
only differences being his formal arrest and new status as a 
suspect in the homicide. 
¶27 There is also no evidence in the record to suggest 
that the questioning became more coercive once Grady was 
arrested.  In fact, the record indicates Grady remained 
cooperative and voluntarily conversational.8  He was given 
frequent breaks and food both before and after he was arrested. 
                                                 
8 Our discussion of voluntariness is not meant to implicate 
the type of voluntariness discussed in State ex rel. Goodchild 
v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965).  Though they 
are related, Goodchild considers the voluntariness of statements 
obtained through physical and psychological coercion.  Grady 
initially alleged this type of coercion, but abandoned these 
claims on appeal.  Miranda is concerned with a suspect's 
awareness of his or her rights.  In this inquiry, as discussed 
above, whether the interrogation became more coercive is a 
factor to be considered in evaluating whether the suspect was 
aware of his or her rights and voluntarily waived them.  
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
16 
¶28 Additionally, we have no indication that Grady was 
impaired in any way, or any suggestion that his comprehension of 
his 
rights 
was 
diminished 
when 
he 
made 
his 
inculpatory 
statements.  The time factor here, a mere two-and-one-half hours 
between the Miranda warnings and his arrest, also supports his 
awareness of his rights.  Grady, having been given Miranda 
warnings on at least one other separate occasion, understood 
what was at stake.  He was even reminded of his rights in an 
informal way at the beginning of his custodial interrogation——
the Miranda card that had been read to him earlier was shown to 
him again (though not read). 
¶29 Based 
upon 
these 
facts, 
we 
see 
no 
intervening 
circumstances that would have rendered Grady's precustodial 
Miranda warnings ineffective.  We conclude there is no evidence 
to support the notion that Grady's inculpatory statements were 
made without being sufficiently aware of his rights.  Grady may 
regret his admissions, but "[a]bsent some officially coerced 
self-accusation [or unknowing or unintelligent waiver], the 
Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most 
damning admissions."  United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 
187 (1977) (emphasis omitted).  Grady knew and understood his 
rights before he was arrested mid-interrogation.  Grady still 
knew and understood his rights after his arrest.  Nothing in the 
record demonstrates any diminishment of that understanding.  
¶30 Therefore, the inculpatory statements made during 
Grady's first interrogation were not obtained in violation of 
Grady's Fifth Amendment rights.  In light of this conclusion, we 
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
17 
need 
not 
address 
Grady's 
argument 
that 
the 
inculpatory 
statements he made during his second interrogation should be 
suppressed as well.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶31 We reject Grady's bright-line rule approach, and 
reiterate 
that 
the 
proper 
framework 
for 
analyzing 
the 
sufficiency of the timing of Miranda warnings is a totality of 
the circumstances test.  In this case, we hold that Grady was 
not entitled to a readministration of the Miranda warnings after 
he was arrested.  The evidence shows that Grady was read his 
Miranda warnings only two-and-one-half hours prior to the 
commencement of the custodial portion of his interrogation, 
there 
was 
no 
significant 
change 
in 
the 
nature 
of 
his 
interrogation after it became custodial, Grady showed no signs 
of mental impairment, he was familiar with Miranda warnings from 
his past, and, though not readministered, Grady was reminded of 
his Miranda rights after he was taken into custody.  In sum, it 
is clear that the Miranda warnings as administered made Grady 
sufficiently aware of his rights during questioning.  Grady's 
motion to suppress his inculpatory statements was therefore 
appropriately denied by the circuit court, and we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals upholding that denial.     
By the Court.—The opinion and order of the court of appeals 
is affirmed. 
 
 
No. 2007AP672-CR 
 
 
 
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