Case Title: State v. Brooks

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP001774-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 60 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1774-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Alfonso Lorenzo Brooks, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 622,935 N.W.2d 559 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 25, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 27, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Wagner   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Leon W. Todd, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Leon W. Todd.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Abigail C.S. Potts, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Abigail C.S. Potts.  
 
 
2020 WI 60 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   18AP1774-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF3861) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Alfonso Lorenzo Brooks, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous  
Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   Alfonso Lorenzo Brooks was parked 
on the side of a road after having been stopped for speeding.  
He was alone in the vehicle, and he had been driving with a 
suspended operator's license.  Although he told the Milwaukee 
Sheriff deputies who were issuing him his traffic citations that 
he could have a licensed driver retrieve the vehicle, the 
deputies told him department policy required them to take it to 
an impound lot.  The deputies conducted an inventory search of 
the vehicle prior to the tow.  Mr. Brooks, a convicted felon, 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
2 
 
could not lawfully possess the firearm the deputies found, and 
so he was arrested.  We consider in this case whether the 
deputies were performing a bona fide community caretaker 
function when they seized Mr. Brooks' vehicle without a warrant.  
We conclude they were not, and so we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals because the seizure and ensuing inventory 
search were both unconstitutional.1 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Late one summer night in 2014, Mr. Brooks came to the 
attention of Milwaukee County Sheriff's Deputies Dean Zirzow and 
Travis Thompson because he was traveling the Lake Park freeway 
at a speed of no less than 15 miles per hour above the posted 
speed limit.  The deputies pursued Mr. Brooks and, once he 
exited the freeway, pulled him over in a mixed commercial and 
residential neighborhood.  While performing duties incident to 
the traffic stop, the deputies learned Mr. Brooks' driver's 
license was suspended and that he was a convicted felon.  The 
deputies cited Mr. Brooks for unreasonable and imprudent speed 
and for operating a vehicle with a suspended driver's license.   
¶3 
The deputies did not arrest Mr. Brooks for the traffic 
citations, but neither could he drive away at the conclusion of 
the traffic stop because he did not have a valid license and he 
was alone in the vehicle.  The deputies informed Mr. Brooks 
                                                 
1 This is a review of an unpublished court of appeals 
opinion, State v. Brooks, No. 2018AP1774-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2019) (per curiam), affirming the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner, 
presiding. 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
3 
 
that, under those circumstances, department policy required them 
to tow the vehicle to an impound lot.2  Mr. Brooks asked if his 
girlfriend——to whom the car was registered and who was following 
shortly behind him——could retrieve the car from the scene of the 
traffic stop.  Deputy Zirzow denied the request because 
department policy prohibits non-officials from coming to the 
scene of ongoing police action.3 
¶4 
During the dialogue between Mr. Brooks and Deputy 
Zirzow, Deputy Thompson commenced a warrantless inventory search 
of the vehicle's contents preparatory to the tow.  After 
discovering a firearm in the trunk area, the deputies arrested 
                                                 
2 We do not know whether that is an accurate recitation of 
the Department's policy because the State never introduced it.  
Included with Mr. Brooks' motion for postconviction relief, 
however, is a policy entitled "Arrest Tow," which provides:  "It 
shall be the policy of this agency to tow any vehicle when the 
driver and/or owner is arrested and no responsible person is 
present, at the time of the arrest, to take control of the 
vehicle."  If that is the policy to which the deputies referred, 
it would not apply in this case because Mr. Brooks was not under 
arrest when the deputies made the decision to impound the 
vehicle. 
3 Mr. Brooks' girlfriend arrived on the scene before the 
vehicle was towed. 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
4 
 
Mr. Brooks for possession of a firearm by a felon, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2)(a) (2013-14).4 
¶5 
Mr. Brooks moved to suppress the firearm, arguing the 
warrantless seizure of the vehicle and subsequent inventory 
search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, as well as Article I, Section 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  Specifically, he argued that the 
"community caretaker" exception to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement did not justify seizure of the vehicle.  The 
circuit court denied the motion, after which Mr. Brooks pled 
guilty and received his sentence in due course. 
¶6 
Mr. Brooks pursued postconviction relief, asserting 
that: 
 
(1) 
there 
had 
been 
no 
valid 
"exercise 
of 
law 
enforcement's community caretaker function because the vehicle 
was lawfully parked and not obstructing traffic[]"; and (2) Mr. 
Brooks' trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce 
evidence that Mr. Brooks' vehicle had been lawfully parked, and 
that the Department's written policies did not authorize the 
                                                 
4 "A person specified in sub. (1) is guilty of a Class G 
felony if he or she possesses a firearm under any of the 
following circumstances:  (a) The person possesses a firearm 
subsequent to the conviction for the felony or other crime, as 
specified in sub. (1)(a) or (b)."  Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2)(a) 
(2013-2014).  This provision was repealed after Mr. Brooks' 
conviction, see 2015 Wis. Act 109, and the same offense now 
appears at Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)(a) (2017-2018) ("A person who 
possesses a firearm is guilty of a Class G felony if any of the 
following applies:  (a) The person has been convicted of a 
felony in this state."). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-2014 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
5 
 
decision to tow the vehicle.  The circuit court denied the 
motion without a hearing, and the court of appeals affirmed.  We 
granted Mr. Brooks' petition for review and now reverse. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
"'Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question 
of constitutional fact.'"  State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶11, 377 
Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560 (quoting State v. Knapp, 2005 
WI 127, ¶19, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899).  We will review 
the circuit court's findings of historical fact under the 
clearly erroneous standard, but the circuit court's application 
of historical facts to constitutional principles is a question 
of law we review independently.  
State v. Turner, 136 
Wis. 2d 333, 343-44, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987).  "While we are not 
bound by the circuit court's or court of appeals' decisions on 
questions of law, we benefit from their analyses."  Floyd, 377 
Wis. 2d 394, ¶11 (citing State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, ¶7, 269 
Wis. 2d 1, 675 N.W.2d 449). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶8 
In 
this 
case 
we 
decide 
whether 
the 
"community 
caretaker" doctrine authorizes law enforcement officers to seize 
a vehicle without a warrant when, subsequent to a traffic stop, 
they discover the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle does 
not have a valid driver's license.  Our constitution does not 
prohibit 
all 
governmental 
seizures, 
of 
course, 
just 
the 
unreasonable ones.  Wis. Const. art. I, § 11 ("The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
6 
 
violated[.]").5  Warrantless seizures (as occurred here) are 
presumptively 
unreasonable, 
and 
therefore 
unconstitutional.  
State 
v. 
Asboth, 
2017 
WI 76, 
¶12, 
376 
Wis. 2d 644, 
898 
N.W.2d 541 ("A seizure conducted without a valid warrant is 
presumptively 
unreasonable." 
(internal 
marks 
omitted)).6  
However, 
"because 
the 
ultimate 
touchstone 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
[and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution] is 'reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is 
subject to certain exceptions."  Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 
547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).  One of those exceptions allows law 
enforcement officials to perform a warrantless seizure when 
acting in their "community caretaker" role.  Asboth, 376 
Wis. 2d 644, ¶13. 
                                                 
5 The 
United 
States 
Constitution 
contains 
the 
same 
guarantee, and we generally interpret them coextensively.  U.S. 
Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]"); State v. 
Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶19, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560 (citing 
State 
v. 
Dumstrey, 
2016 
WI 3, 
¶14, 
366 
Wis. 2d 64, 
873 
N.W.2d 502). 
 
6 See, e.g., State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 990-91, 
471 
N.W.2d 24 
(1991) 
(stating 
that 
"[s]earches 
conducted 
pursuant to a warrant are a more reliable safeguard against 
improper searches because the decision to search is made by a 
neutral magistrate who has the opportunity to make an informed 
and deliberate determination regarding the existence of probable 
cause, rather than by officers whose more hurried decisions  may 
be influenced by the competitive nature of their work and their 
desire to discover evidence they suspect may be present at a 
given location[]" and that "[w]arrants are also preferred 
because a 'warrant assures the individual whose property is 
searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing 
officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to 
search.'" (citation omitted)).  
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
7 
 
¶9 
Before evaluating this exception to the warrant 
requirement, we should be clear about which seizure we are 
addressing——there were two in this case.  Although they 
overlapped for a short period of time while the first was ending 
and the second was commencing, they were conceptually distinct.  
It 
is 
essential 
that 
we 
distinguish 
them 
because 
the 
constitutionally-acceptable scope and duration of each seizure 
is inextricably bound up with its justifiable purpose. 
¶10 The first seizure occurred when the deputies stopped 
Mr. Brooks for speeding.  See State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, 
¶24, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369 ("The stop of an automobile 
by law enforcement constitutes a seizure of the vehicle, as well 
as its occupants.").  That seizure could last no longer than 
necessary to complete the purpose of the traffic stop.  Floyd, 
377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶21 ("Traffic stops are meant to be brief 
interactions with law enforcement officers, and they may last no 
longer than required to address the circumstances that make them 
necessary."); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 
354, (2015) ("Because addressing the infraction is the purpose 
of the stop, it may 'last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate th[at] purpose.'" (citation omitted)).  The duration 
of the seizure is, therefore, necessarily co-terminus with the 
purpose of the traffic stop:  "Authority for the seizure thus 
ends 
when 
tasks 
tied 
to 
the 
traffic 
infraction 
are——or 
reasonably should have been——completed."  Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 
354.  The scope of the seizure is similarly delimited by its 
purpose: 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
8 
 
"The scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and 
justified by' the circumstances which rendered its 
initiation permissible."  [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
19 (1968) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310  
(1967) (Fortas, J., concurring))].  The reasonableness 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment requires no less 
when the police action is a seizure permitted on less 
than 
probable 
cause 
because 
of 
legitimate 
law 
enforcement interests.  The scope of the detention 
must 
be 
carefully 
tailored 
to 
its 
underlying 
justification. 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (emphasis added).  So 
the first seizure ended once the deputies accomplished the 
purpose of the traffic stop, to wit, safely issuing the two 
citations to Mr. Brooks.  
¶11 The second seizure occurred when the deputies decided 
that Mr. Brooks' lack of a valid driver's license required them 
to impound the vehicle.  Deputy Zirzow was still in the process 
of issuing the citations to Mr. Brooks (thereby winding down the 
first seizure) when Deputy Thompson began inventorying the 
vehicle in preparation for the tow (which commenced the second 
seizure).  This is the seizure the State says was justified by 
the community caretaker doctrine, and which we now address. 
A.  The Community Caretaker Exception 
¶12 When the State claims law enforcement's community 
caretaker role justifies a seizure, as it does here, we evaluate 
the following three criteria: 
(1) whether a search or seizure within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment has occurred; (2) if so, whether 
the police were exercising a bona fide community 
caretaker function; and (3) if so, whether the public 
interest outweighs the intrusion upon the privacy of 
the individual such that the community caretaker 
function was reasonably exercised[.] 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
9 
 
Asboth, 376 Wis. 2d 644, ¶13 (citation omitted).7  Because there 
is a presumption against warrantless seizures, the State bears 
the burden of proving the community caretaker doctrine justified 
seizure of the vehicle Mr. Brooks was driving.  State v. Payano-
Roman, 2006 WI 47, ¶30, 290 Wis. 2d 380, 714 N.W.2d 548 ("The 
government bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search 
falls within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions."). 
¶13 Our focus in this case is on the second element——
whether the police were performing a bona fide community 
caretaker function.8  "The community caretaker exception to the 
warrant 
requirement[,]" 
we 
have 
said, 
"accounts 
for 
the 
multifaceted nature of police work[]"——"'first aid provider, 
social worker, crisis intervener, family counselor, youth mentor 
and peacemaker, to name a few.'"  Asboth, 376 Wis. 2d 644, ¶15 
                                                 
7 The third element, although not implicated in this case, 
involves "balancing a public interest or need that is furthered 
by the officer's conduct against the degree of and nature of the 
restriction upon the liberty interest of the citizen."  State v. 
Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶40, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598.  This 
"balancing" includes: 
(1) the degree of the public interest and the exigency 
of the situation; (2) the attendant circumstances 
surrounding the seizure, including time, location, the 
degree of overt authority and force displayed; (3) 
whether an automobile is involved; and (4) the 
availability, 
feasibility 
and 
effectiveness 
of 
alternatives 
to 
the 
type 
of 
intrusion 
actually 
accomplished. 
Id., ¶¶40-41. 
8 The parties agree that the deputies "seized" the vehicle 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
10 
 
(citation omitted).  The police are often "'society's problem 
solvers when no other solution is apparent or available.'"  Id. 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
When 
functioning 
as 
a 
"community 
caretaker," a seizure is permissible to "protect persons and 
property"9 so long as it is "totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the 
violation of a criminal statute."10 
¶14 The nature and use of motor vehicles frequently call 
upon police to act in this capacity.  "To permit the 
uninterrupted flow of traffic and in some circumstances to 
preserve evidence, disabled or damaged vehicles will often be 
removed from the highways or streets at the behest of police 
engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control activities."  
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).  The same 
rationale might require towing illegally parked vehicles:  
"Police will also frequently remove and impound automobiles 
which violate parking ordinances and which thereby jeopardize 
both the public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular 
traffic."  Id. at 368-69.  This interaction between individual 
vehicles and the general public means that "[t]he authority of 
police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding 
traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond 
challenge."  Id. at 369. 
                                                 
9 State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶14, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 
N.W.2d 592. 
10 Kramer, 
315 
Wis. 2d 414, 
¶¶19-20 
(quoting 
Cady 
v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
11 
 
¶15 We considered the application of this doctrine in the 
motor vehicle context in Asboth, 376 Wis. 2d 644, upon which the 
State relies heavily in this case.  Mr. Asboth, wanted for armed 
robbery, drove to a private storage facility and parked his car 
in an alley between two storage sheds.  Id., ¶¶2-3.  The car 
"entirely blocked access to one storage unit, and it impeded 
access to several others."  Id., ¶4.  Police found him there, 
placed him under arrest, and towed his car to an impound lot.  
Id.  We concluded the police had justifiably seized the car in 
their community caretaker role for three reasons.  First, we 
explained that leaving Mr. Asboth's vehicle unattended on 
private property "would have inconvenienced a private property 
owner and customers at the storage facility by impeding the 
beneficial use of the property."  Id., ¶18.  Removing the 
vehicle, we said, "remedied a potential disruption created by 
Asboth's arrest at the private storage facility, thus limiting 
the inconvenience to the property owner and customers."  Id.  
Second, we said that "because Asboth was a suspect in a crime 
who also allegedly violated the terms of his probation, he 
likely faced a lengthy detention," and the possibility that the 
vehicle 
would 
remain 
abandoned 
for 
that 
amount 
of 
time 
"counseled in favor of its removal from the premises."  Id., 
¶19.  Finally, we said that because Mr. Asboth was not the 
registered owner of the vehicle and no one else was present to 
take possession, "the possibility existed that officers would 
need to make arrangements to reunite the car with its registered 
owner."  Id., ¶20.  Taken as a whole, we concluded that these 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
12 
 
reasons "establish[ed] that the officers had a bona fide 
community caretaker purpose when impounding Asboth's car."  Id., 
¶21. 
B.  Application Of The Community Caretaker Exception 
¶16 Determining whether law enforcement officials are 
acting in their community caretaker role is an objective 
analysis.  That is, we look to whether "the officer has 
articulated an objectively reasonable basis under the totality 
of the circumstances for the community caretaker function[.]"  
State 
v. 
Kramer, 
2009 
WI 14, 
¶36, 
315 
Wis. 2d 414, 
759 
N.W.2d 598.  Here, the State's argument closely follows our 
analytical structure in Asboth.  It says the seizure "was 
supported by the danger of theft or vandalism to a vehicle left 
unattended for an unanticipated amount of time."  It also notes 
that Mr. Brooks "was not the registered owner of the car, so the 
officers had a duty to the registered owner to protect the 
vehicle."  In addition, it says "[t]he car was parked far from 
the curb, potentially impeding traffic along the side of the 
street," and "[i]t was far enough away from Brooks' residence 
that it could be difficult for a member of his household to 
retrieve it expeditiously if any issues with the car arose."  
Finally, the State says the seizure had nothing to do with any 
investigatory purpose inasmuch as the deputies testified they 
were simply carrying out a department policy that required them 
to tow the vehicle under the circumstances then present. 
¶17 This case bears some superficial similarities to 
Asboth.  In both cases the drivers were alone, they were not the 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
13 
 
registered owners of the seized vehicles, and the initial reason 
for their interaction with law enforcement bore no connection to 
the need to seize the vehicle.  But there is a fundamental 
distinction 
between 
the 
cases 
that 
overshadows 
those 
similarities and deprives them of any instructive value.  To 
wit, law enforcement officers in Asboth arrested the driver 
before they seized the vehicle he was driving, whereas here the 
deputies did not arrest Mr. Brooks until after the seizure.  
That difference sidelines two of the three justifications 
addressed in Asboth, and the factual record does not support the 
third.  We will address each of them in turn. 
¶18 First, the sequence of seizure and arrest in this case 
negates the State's concern that leaving the vehicle unattended 
for an indeterminate amount of time would subject it to the risk 
of theft or vandalism.  There is, in fact, nothing to suggest 
the vehicle would have been unattended at all, much less 
indefinitely.  At the time the deputies decided to impound the 
vehicle, Mr. Brooks was not under arrest, which means he could 
have simply waited in the car until a licensed driver came to 
pick it up.11  And even if he had walked the two miles home to 
summon assistance, nothing in the record suggests that such a 
brief absence would measurably increase the risk of theft or 
                                                 
11 As it turned out, Mr. Brooks' girlfriend arrived on the 
scene before the vehicle was towed (but after Mr. Brooks had 
been arrested). 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
14 
 
vandalism.12  This is markedly different from the circumstances 
obtaining in Asboth, in which the driver's pre-seizure arrest 
guaranteed the vehicle would be indefinitely unattended. 
¶19 Second, the sequence of events in this case means the 
deputies owed no particular duty to the vehicle's registered 
owner.  In Asboth we acknowledged that arresting the driver gave 
rise to the possibility "that officers would need to make 
arrangements to reunite the car with its registered owner."  
Asboth, 376 Wis. 2d 644, ¶20.  But the burden fell to the 
officers only because they had arrested Mr. Asboth, which would 
presumably make it difficult for him to make such arrangements 
himself.  Here, Mr. Brooks was not under arrest and so he was 
free to attend to whatever arrangements were necessary to move 
the car.  And nothing about the situation suggested he might not 
be in lawful possession of the vehicle.  So, unlike Asboth, the 
deputies in this case had no apparent duty to "reunite the car 
with its registered owner." 
¶20 The seizure/arrest sequence in this case, therefore, 
makes two of the three Asboth justifications for a vehicle 
seizure entirely inoperable.  And the record simply does not 
support the third.  The State tried to tie this case to 
Opperman's concern for ensuring "the efficient movement of 
vehicular traffic,"13 and Asboth's14 concern that the vehicle's 
                                                 
12 Every vehicle parked in public is theoretically at risk 
of theft or vandalism.  But that does not mean impounding any 
such vehicle is a bona fide act of community caretaking.  The 
risk must be real, not theoretical. 
13 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
15 
 
placement not impede or inconvenience other members of the 
public as they go about their business.  To this end, it argued 
that Mr. Brooks' vehicle was "potentially impeding traffic along 
the side of the street."  Mr. Brooks, however, has maintained 
ever since the suppression hearing that the car appeared to be 
lawfully parked along the side of the road.  The State faults 
Mr. Brooks for not proving that assertion, pointing to the lack 
of any findings of fact in that regard.  But this gap in the 
record is a problem for the State, not Mr. Brooks.  As mentioned 
above, warrantless seizures are presumptively unconstitutional, 
which 
puts 
the 
burden 
on 
the 
State 
to 
prove 
their 
reasonableness.  Payano-Roman, 290 Wis. 2d 380, ¶30.  If the 
deputies had to act in their community caretaker role to prevent 
the vehicle from impeding traffic flow, it was the State's duty 
to prove such a necessity.  But the record shows it made no 
attempt to do so.  Even now, the State's most definitive 
argument on the subject is that the vehicle "potentially" 
impeded traffic.  Without a supporting factual record, this is, 
at best, speculative.  And we will not base our analysis on 
speculation.  See, e.g., State v. Carter, 2010 WI 77, ¶63 n.48, 
327 Wis. 2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516 ("This court does not resolve 
cases on the basis of speculation, confabulation, or 'theories' 
about what may or may not have occurred.  We resolve this case 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 State v. Asboth, 2017 WI 76, ¶18, 376 Wis. 2d 644, 898 
N.W.2d 541. 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
16 
 
on the basis of the record before us and the circuit court's 
findings of fact based on that record.").15 
¶21 Finally, the State says the deputies "reasonably 
exercised their community caretaker function in towing the car 
and inventorying it, because they did so according to reasonable 
standard criteria articulated by the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s 
Department[.]"  Although this part of the State's argument is 
                                                 
15 The State did not dispute Mr. Brooks' assertion in the 
circuit court that his vehicle appeared to be parked legally on 
the side of the road.  Here, however, the State says the 
deputy's squad-car video shows that "several vehicles that drive 
by have to enter the other lane to avoid the officers' and 
Brooks' car."  To the extent the State means for us to accept 
this as a refutation of Mr. Brooks' assertion that he was parked 
legally, it is too little and too late.  It is commonplace for 
drivers, out of concern for officer safety, to give a wide berth 
to law enforcement officials when they have someone pulled over 
on the side of the road.  They may not have entered the other 
lane had a squad car not been present.   
But even if we accepted the State's interpretation of the 
video footage, this would simply create a factual dispute as to 
whether the car was parked legally.  In such circumstances, we 
review the circuit court's findings of fact to determine whether 
they are clearly erroneous.  See, e.g., State v. Walli, 2011 
WI App 86, ¶17, 334 Wis. 2d 402, 799 N.W.2d 898 ("when evidence 
in the record consists of disputed testimony and a video 
recording, we will apply the clearly erroneous standard of 
review when we are reviewing the trial court's findings of fact 
based on that recording.").  Here, however, there are no factual 
findings to review, so we could not accept the State's position 
without finding facts in the first instance.  This we do not do.  
See, e.g., Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, Inc., 
2005 WI 85, ¶4 n.4, 282 Wis. 2d 69, 698 N.W.2d 643 (remanding to 
the circuit court to determine a factual issue because this 
court "cannot find facts[.]"); State v. Owens, 148 Wis. 2d 922, 
930, 436 N.W.2d 869 (1989) ("Sorting out the conflicts and 
determining what actually occurred is uniquely the province of 
the trial court, not the function of the appellate court."). 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
17 
 
not entirely clear, it appears to suggest that compliance with 
the Department's standardized policy means, ipso facto, that the 
deputies were acting as community caretakers.  But compliance 
with an internal policy has nothing to do with whether they were 
acting in that role when they impounded the car.  A standardized 
policy may provide some evidence that the police performed their 
community caretaker role reasonably, but it cannot establish the 
predicate——that they were acting as community caretakers.  As we 
observed in State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 100, 492 N.W.2d 311 
(1992), law enforcement policies cannot substitute for a case-
by-case application of constitutional requirements to the facts 
at hand.  Even if we were to accept that there is a Departmental 
policy 
that 
explicitly 
requires 
impoundment 
under 
these 
circumstances, the policy's existence is not evidence that the 
deputies were acting as community caretakers. 
¶22 So neither Opperman, nor Asboth, nor the alleged 
Departmental policy tells us that the deputies were acting as 
community caretakers when they impounded Mr. Brooks' vehicle.  
On the other hand, State v. Clark, 2003 WI App 121, 265 
Wis. 2d 557, 666 N.W.2d 112, provides a closer analogy and more 
helpfully illuminates the limitations of the community caretaker 
doctrine in the vehicular context.  There, police responded to a 
report of shots fired and, upon arrival at the scene, discovered 
a spent shell casing several feet from an unlocked and 
unoccupied vehicle.  Id., ¶¶2-4.  The police had reason to 
believe Mr. Clark had been driving the car earlier that day, but 
found that it was registered to someone else.  Id., ¶4.  
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
18 
 
Although the vehicle was neither damaged nor illegally parked, 
the police impounded it for safekeeping simply because it was 
unlocked and unattended.  Id.  The court of appeals rejected the 
State's argument that Opperman justified impounding the vehicle 
under those circumstances as an exercise of the community 
caretaker function.  Clark, 265 Wis. 2d 557, ¶22.  It observed 
that the situation presented none of the "typical public safety 
concerns" identified in Opperman.  Clark, 265 Wis. 2d 557, ¶22.  
Specifically, it said the vehicle was not "(1) involved in an 
accident; (2) interrupting the flow of traffic; (3) disabled or 
damaged; (4) violating parking ordinances; or (5) in any way 
jeopardizing the public safety or the efficient movement of 
vehicular traffic."  Id.  To the contrary, the vehicle was 
"legally parked and undamaged[]" and therefore "posed no 
apparent public safety concern."  Id.16  This case does not even 
rise to Clark's level of concern.  Mr. Brooks was not under 
arrest when the deputies chose to impound his vehicle, so he 
could have stayed with his car after issuance of the traffic 
citations.  If an unlocked, unattended car cannot justify a 
community caretaker seizure, an attended vehicle certainly 
                                                 
16 Clark 
could 
have 
ended 
its 
analysis 
with 
these 
observations because they demonstrate the circumstances did not 
present an actual need for the police to act in their community 
caretaker role.  The Clark court, however, proceeded to the 
third step of the analysis and concluded that, because there 
were available alternatives to impounding the vehicle, the 
seizure was unreasonable.  State v. Clark, 2003 WI App 121, 
¶¶25-26, 265 Wis. 2d 557, 666 N.W.2d 112. 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
19 
 
cannot.  This case presents even less of a caretaking need than 
Clark. 
¶23 We conclude the deputies were not acting as community 
caretakers when they decided to impound Mr. Brooks' vehicle.  To 
justify a seizure pursuant to this doctrine, the State must 
demonstrate the circumstances at hand called upon the police to 
perform one of their non-investigatory functions, such as 
protecting persons or property, providing first aid, intervening 
in a crisis, serving as a peacemaker, or otherwise acting as 
"'society's problem solvers when no other solution is apparent 
or 
available.'" 
 
Asboth, 
376 
Wis. 2d 644, 
¶15 
(citation 
omitted).  But here there was no property or person in need of 
protection, no crisis, and no problem that did not have an 
apparent and available solution.  There was just a man in a car 
on the side of a road making arrangements for someone to take 
him home.  Consequently, the State has not "articulated an 
objectively 
reasonable 
basis 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances for the community caretaker function[.]"  Kramer, 
315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶36.17 
C.  The Search 
¶24 When law enforcement officers have a constitutionally-
legitimate reason for impounding a vehicle, they may inventory 
its contents without a warrant and without violating the 
                                                 
17 Our conclusion that the deputies were not acting as bona 
fide community caretakers when they seized Mr. Brooks' vehicle 
means we need not progress to the third element of the doctrine, 
which considers whether law enforcement officers' performed that 
role reasonably. 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
20 
 
constitution.  The purpose of such a search is "the protection 
of the owner's property while it remains in police custody; the 
protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or 
stolen property; and the protection of the police from potential 
danger." 
 
Opperman, 
428 
U.S. at 
369 
(internal 
citations 
omitted).  "It is also settled that a police inventory search is 
among the few exceptions to the warrant requirement of the 
fourth amendment."  State v. Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 510, 317 
N.W.2d 428 (1982). 
¶25 But the permissibility of such inventory searches 
depends entirely on the constitutionality of the seizures that 
precede them.  See, e.g., Clark, 265 Wis. 2d 557, ¶11 ("An 
analysis of an inventory search involves a two-step process:  
(1) analysis of the reasonableness of the seizure of the car in 
the first instance; and (2) analysis of the reasonableness of 
the inventory search.").  Because the seizure in this case 
violated the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, so did the ensuing inventory search. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶26 The community caretaker doctrine recognizes and makes 
allowance for the multifaceted nature of police work, but it has 
its limits.  Because we conclude the deputies in this case were 
not acting as bona fide community caretakers when they seized 
Mr. Brooks' vehicle, we hold that the court of appeals erred in 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
21 
 
affirming the circuit court's denial of Mr. Brooks' suppression 
motion and we therefore reverse.18 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                 
18 As an alternative basis for reversing the court of 
appeals, Mr. Brooks argues his trial counsel was ineffective 
for:  (1) failing to introduce the Department's written 
policies, which Mr. Brooks asserts did not authorize the tow and 
inventory search under these circumstances because they referred 
only to tows subsequent to arrest; and (2) failing to introduce 
evidence he was lawfully parked.  Because we conclude the 
community caretaker exception does not apply and suppression of 
the firearm is therefore required, it is unnecessary to address 
this alternative argument. 
No. 
2018AP1774-CR   
 
 
 
1