Case Title: Action Ads, Inc. v. Judes

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-4

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Action Ads, Inc. v. Judes1983 WY 110671 P.2d 309Case Number: 83-4Case Number: 83-4Decided: 11/01/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
ACTION ADS, INC., APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

KENNETH R. JUDES, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District Court,LaramieCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

E. James 
Burke of Hanes, Gage & Burke, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Rex O. Arney 
of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER*, 
THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, JJ.

* Retired June 13, 
1983, but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case 
pursuant to order of the court entered June 13, 1983.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]      Appellee Kenneth 
Judes brought this action against his employer, appellant Action Ads, Inc., to 
enforce a term of the employment contract which required appellant to provide a 
medical insurance program for appellee. The determinative question on appeal is 
whether the agreement by Action Ads, Inc. to provide insurance coverage was 
sufficiently definite and certain to constitute an enforceable contract. We hold 
that it was not and will reverse.

FACTS

[¶2.]      Action Ads, Inc. 
is a Wyoming corporation with its principal 
place of business in Cheyenne, Wyoming. On April 23, 1981, the corporation 
hired Kenneth Judes as a salesman for the Sheridan area. The contract of employment 
contained the following term:

"In addition, sixty 
days from your date of hire, Action Ads Inc. will provide a medical insurance 
program for you and your dependents."

Action Ads 
failed to provide any insurance coverage, and on November 14, 1981, Mr. Judes 
was seriously burned in a gas explosion in a mobile home. He brought this action 
against his employer to recover his medical expenses on the ground that Action 
Ads breached the employment contract by failing to maintain a medical insurance 
program for him. The trial court determined that Mr. Judes was entitled to 
recover the total amount of his medical expenses, $18,824.86, plus 
costs.

THE 
ISSUE

[¶3.]      Appellant 
presents the following questions for our review:

1. Whether the 
district court erred in finding that Action Ads had breached its employment 
contract with Mr. Judes;

2. Whether failure by 
the plaintiff to mitigate damages precludes recovery in this 
case;

3. Whether plaintiff 
failed to establish damages that he suffered as a result of Action Ads' breach 
of contract; and

4. Whether plaintiff 
should be denied recovery under the equitable doctrines of laches and 
estoppel.

[¶4.]      We perceive the 
initial question to be whether the contract, as established by 
plaintiff-appellee, is sufficiently definite to permit the court to determine 
with reasonable certainty the extent of the promissor's contractual duties. 
Where the terms of a contract are not sufficiently definite to permit this 
initial determination, the court lacks the information necessary to rule on the 
issues of breach of contract, damages, or duty to mitigate 
damages.

CONTRACT TO PROCURE 
INSURANCE

[¶5.]      It is a general 
principle of contract law that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the 
terms of a contract. Madrid v. Norton, Wyo., 
596 P.2d 1108 (1979). Where the plaintiff seeks to recover for breach of a 
contract to procure insurance, the general elements of the promised insurance 
policy are an essential part of the plaintiff's case.1 18 Couch on 
Insurance 2d, § 74:61, pp. 293-294; 7B Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 
4621, pp. 188-190. The following rule was set out in Howarth v. First 
National Bank of Anchorage, Alaska, 596 P.2d 1164, 1167-1168 
(1979):

"* * * In a contract 
for the procurement of insurance, the party proving the contract has the burden 
of showing the subject matter of the contract, the risk insured against, the 
amount of coverage, the duration of the coverage, and the premiums to be 
paid."

[¶6.]      A similar rule 
was applied in Forster-Davis Motor Co. v. 
Slaterbeck, 186 Okla. 395, 98 P.2d 17 (1939), a case 
comparable on its facts to the case at bar. There, the employee, following a 
job-related injury, sued his employer for damages on the theory that the 
employer had agreed, as additional compensation, to furnish the plaintiff with 
insurance that would provide the same protection as workmen's compensation would 
provide. The jury decided that since the defendant had not procured any such 
insurance, the plaintiff was entitled to damages.

[¶7.]      On appeal, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the verdict violated the 
well-established rule that a valid contract must be sufficiently definite to 
lead to a clear conclusion as to the full duties required to constitute 
compliance, or to permit the accurate measurement of damages for its breach. 98 P.2d  at 18. The court found that the employment contract, as proven by the 
plaintiff, provided no details concerning the promised insurance 
policy:

"* * * There was no 
agreement or statement as to when the defendant was to procure such an insurance 
policy, or when or whether such a policy was to be delivered to the plaintiff, 
nor any designation as to the insurance company or the character of the 
insurance company from which any such policy was to be procured. There was no 
suggestion as to the length of time any such policy should continue in force or 
operate, or the term for which it was to be procured in the first instance; nor 
was anything said as to the details, amounts or provisions to be included in any 
such insurance policy to be furnished by the defendant.

"In fact, if this 
contract was made as the plaintiff contends it was, we regard it as a practical 
impossibility to state what acts on the part of the defendant would constitute a 
clear or complete compliance therewith; nor can we see any sound or logical rule 
by which the damage for the breach thereof could be logically and reasonably 
measured. * * * If the plaintiff thought he was protected by a statement of his 
employer placing him in the status of an employee covered by the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, it is * * * unfortunate, for any such promise, if it existed, 
must be measured by this court for sufficient certainty to justify compensation 
for its breach. When tested by the applicable rules this promise or contract is 
wholly indefinite and uncertain and cannot be relied upon to compensate 
plaintiff for his physical injuries upon plaintiff's theory of a valid contract 
breached to his damage." 98 P.2d  at 19.

[¶8.]      The same 
conclusion was reached by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Maryland Casualty Company v. Clean-Rite 
Maintenance Co., 380 F.2d 166 (9th Cir. 1967). There, the casualty company, 
claiming to be subrogated to the rights of the building owners, sought to 
enforce an agreement by the maintenance company

"`to provide 
insurance protection' which would have indemnified the building owners against 
`any and all claims of any kind and nature arising out of the window washing 
operations,' * * *." 380 F.2d  at 167.

The 
appellate court applied Oregon law and concluded that "no promise of 
reasonable certainty" existed. The court said further:

"The only real thrust 
of any promise, as such can be seen from the testimony of [the representative of 
the building owners], is that the insurance coverage provided by Clean-Rite was 
`extra heavy' or `complete.' These descriptions are so vague that only 
speculation could support a determination of the precise terms and extent of 
that coverage and resolution of the question of whether or not it would afford 
indemnity against many different types of loss, including that which was 
sustained here. We therefore hold that the alleged contract is, for lack of 
certainty in its terms, unenforceable, and that the district judge properly 
granted the appellee's motion for a directed verdict." 380 F.2d  at 
168-169.

[¶9.]      These cases stand 
for the principle that in a suit on a contract to procure insurance, the 
plaintiff has the burden of proving the elements of the insurance policy with 
sufficient certainty to enable the court to establish damages in the event of 
breach. The corollary to that principle is a well-known rule: The measure of 
damages for breach of a contract to obtain insurance is that amount which would 
have been recovered had the insurance been furnished as agreed. Mid-America 
Corporation v. Roach, Okla., 412 P.2d 188, 191 
(1966); Les Shellabarger Chevrolet, Inc. v. Romero, Colo. 
App., 490 P.2d 98, 99 (1971).

[¶10.]    In the present case, the 
extent of the undertaking of Action Ads to furnish insurance is contained in the 
following term of the parties' employment contract:

"In addition, sixty 
days from your date of hire, Action Ads Inc. will provide a medical insurance 
program for you and your dependents."

The appellee 
offered no evidence as to the risks insured against, the amount of coverage, or 
any other details of the "insurance program" that Action Ads, Inc. was obligated 
to provide. There was no proof of the insurance carrier contemplated by the 
parties. Most important, there was no showing that the injury actually sustained 
by Mr. Judes would have been covered by the insurance program had Action Ads 
fully complied with the employment contract.

[¶11.]    It is apparent that the 
pertinent contract term is not sufficiently definite and certain to permit this 
court to determine the extent of the promised performance. Without that 
information, we are unable to measure the damages to which the promisee might 
reasonably be entitled in the event of a breach. The indefiniteness of the 
agreement is due to the absence of any evidence whatsoever concerning the 
elements of the insurance coverage that Action Ads was obligated to provide. 
Since the plaintiff failed to show to what extent, if any, the promised 
insurance program would have compensated him for his injury, we hold that the 
agreement to provide insurance was too uncertain and indefinite to be 
enforceable.

[¶12.]    
Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The instant case and 
the cases cited in this opinion are concerned with the obligation of one who is 
not an insurance agent or broker to procure insurance for the benefit of 
another. A different rule may apply where an insurance broker or agent is 
involved, since such persons hold themselves out as experts in the field and 
generally are committed to obtaining insurance on terms favorable to the 
purchaser. In those cases, an enforceable contract to procure insurance may 
arise even though it remains to the broker to supply some of the terms essential 
to the formation of the ultimate insurance policy. See Maryland Casualty Company v. Clean-Rite 
Maintenance Co., 380 F.2d 166, 167 (9th Cir. 1967); Bulla v. Donahue, 174 Ind. App. 123, 366 N.E.2d 233, 236 (1977).

RAPER, Justice, Retired, 
concurring.

[¶13.]    I am in concurrence with the 
majority opinion. The only purpose of this opinion is to enlarge upon that of 
the majority.

[¶14.]    This court has already 
decided that:

"The law is clear 
that a broker or agent who, with a view to compensation for his services, 
undertakes to procure insurance for another and through fault or neglect fails 
to do so, will be held liable for any damage resulting. His liability arises 
under the concept that he is agent for the insured in negotiating for a policy 
and owes a duty to his principal to exercise reasonable skill, care and 
diligence in causing the issuance of a policy. His liability may arise either 
for breach of contract or negligent default in the performance of a duty imposed 
by contract, at the election of his client. 43 Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 139, pp. 
221-222; Annot., Liability of Insurance Broker or Agent to Insured for Failure 
to Procure Insurance, 64 A.L.R.3d 398 §§ 2 and 3 in particular; 3 Anderson, 
Counch on Insurance 2d §§ 25:46, 25:47, 25:57-25:60; Arceneaux v. Bellow, La. App., 395 So. 2d 414 (1981), cert. denied 400 So. 2d 669; Sloan v. Wells, 296 N.C. 570, 251 S.E.2d 449 (1979); Keller Lorenz Co., Inc. v. 
Insurance Associates Corp., 98 Idaho 678, 570 P.2d 1366 (1977); Insurance Management of Washington, Inc. v. 
Eno & Howard Plumbing Corp., D.C.App., 348 A.2d 310 (1975). * * *" Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, 
Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 27, 32 
(1983).

As pointed 
out in footnote 1 of the majority, we do not apply the same rules applicable to 
one in the business of selling insurance to one in the position of Action Ads, 
Inc. carrying on a business other than selling insurance.

[¶15.]    In such case the ordinary 
rules of contract law would apply and are controlling. 1 Restatement of the Law, 
Second, Contracts 2d § 33 (1979) provides:

"(1) Even though a 
manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot 
be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are 
reasonably certain.

"(2) The terms of a 
contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the 
existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate 
remedy.

"(3) The fact that 
one or more terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain may show that 
a manifestation of intention is not intended to be understood as an offer or as 
an acceptance."

[¶16.]    While the parties appear to 
agree that there was an agreement that appellant would furnish to appellee a 
policy of health insurance from an objective point of view by a judiciary called 
upon to furnish a remedy, the "agreement" was too nebulous, too vague and too 
uncertain to be a contract. The letter from appellant to appellee notifying 
appellee the terms of his employment with respect to health insurance merely 
stated:

"In addition, sixty 
days from your date of hire, Action Ads Inc. will provide a medical insurance 
program for you and your dependents."

[¶17.]    An applicable definition of a 
"program" is a plan of procedure. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
(1971). There are many types of health insurance plans. In some, the employee 
pays the entire premium. In some, the employer pays part and the employee part. 
There is a wide variation of coverages: total coverage, a percentage is covered 
and there are fixed amounts per day for hospitalization and various medical 
procedures. Some cover hospitalization but not a physician's or surgeon's 
medical attention, etc., etc.

[¶18.]    There was no reasonable 
certainty as to the type of insurance coverage which, if any, would be afforded 
appellee. It is reasonable to believe that in view of the 60-day waiting period, 
such would depend on the kind of a producer the appellee turned out to be. He 
did not produce. His total commissions over several months starting April 23, 
1981, amounted to only $580.09.

[¶19.]    On August 27, 1981, appellee 
inquired of appellant whether he was covered by health insurance. He was advised 
by letter that he was not. No objection was made. The details of insurance 
coverage were never discussed between the parties. After August 1981, appellee 
did no soliciting of business. Prior to November 1981, he conducted no business 
for appellant. Even while appellee was purportedly working for appellant, he 
held himself out as unemployed and collected $2,448 in unemployment benefits. 
Under those circumstances, there is simply no way for a court to fashion an 
appropriate remedy contemplated by "(2)" of the Restatement rule, supra. While 
courts do their best to award damages whenever possible, the impossible is not 
required. Though contracts are construed most strongly against the drafter, McGinnis v. General Petroleum 
Corporation, Wyo., 385 P.2d 198, 201 (1963), courts will not permit parties 
to strain construction to bring the contract within that rule, Reed v. Wadsworth, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1024 
(1976). Courts cannot write a contract which the parties have not made. Quin Blair Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien 
Construction Company, Wyo., 597 P.2d 945 (1979). There must be some 
reasonable basis for computation in the evidence if not in the 
contract.

[¶20.]    The rule of definiteness is 
applied to all types of contracts and, contrary to the views of the dissent in 
this case, the court must find something to hang its hat on before damages can 
be determined. There is nothing of that sort here. Under the Restatement rule, 
supra, some employment contracts which are analogous have been decided. In Douglass v. Panama, Inc., Tex. Civ.App., 
487 S.W.2d 228 (1972), aff'd 504 S.W.2d 776 (1974), it was held that a statement 
by the company president when he hired various employees that there would be a 
salary and a bonus is too indefinite to be enforceable as to the bonus. The 
corporation paid bonuses when it had profitable years but did not when it had a 
year of loss. The promise was not considered sufficiently definite to require 
payment of a bonus in a year of loss but was too vague and indefinite to result 
in a legally enforceable contract even in the event of a profit. It was held in 
Petersen v. Pilgrim Village, 256 Wis. 
621, 42 N.W.2d 273, 274, 18 A.L.R.2d 206 (1950), that an agreement that the 
plaintiff would be paid a stated salary and that he "would share in the profits 
of the corporation" was too indefinite as to compensation to establish a valid 
and enforceable contractual obligation in that there is no basis for 
computation.

[¶21.]    The appellee in this case 
produced no evidence other than the employment contract and his medical expense. 
It is suggested that if he had produced a policy of insurance of the type 
purchased by appellant to cover employees of appellant similarly situated, then 
the court may have been able to make reasonably certain that which is 
uncertain.

[¶22.]    I have another concern, 
though not controlling. I seriously question that there was any competent 
evidence to support the proposition that appellee was even employed by appellant 
at the time of his injury. The explosion in the mobile home, which injured 
appellee, did not occur until November 14, 1981. The last order placed by 
appellee with appellant was in October 1981. Any employment relationship between 
them thereafter was only a windup of their affairs. That, coupled with appellee 
drawing unemployment benefits and going into a trucking business, terminated 
appellee's employment.

[¶23.]    I can see no justice in law 
or fact to stick appellant as an insurer of all of appellant's hospital and 
medical expense.

[¶24.]    I 
concur.

BROWN, Justice, 
dissenting, joined by THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶25.]    I cannot agree with the 
majority. Appellant promised to provide appellee a "medical insurance program." 
However, appellant failed to carry out this promise. The majority allows 
appellant to use this dereliction to defeat appellee's claim. As a result, 
appellee gets no recovery for the $18,824.86 he incurred in medical 
expenses.

[¶26.]    The majority talks a great 
deal about the indefiniteness of the contract. The contract was to provide 
medical insurance. Medical insurance is not some new and mysterious phenomenon. 
It should be an unnecessary statement of the obvious that medical insurance 
provides coverage for medical expenses. The majority seems to say that the 
agreement between the parties was indefinite because it did not spell out: 1) 
The elements of an insurance policy, 2) the amount to be received had the 
insurance been furnished, 3) the risks covered, 4) the contemplated insurance 
carrier, and 5) the specific injuries covered by the insurance appellant was to 
provide.

[¶27.]    The majority concludes that 
there was a failure of proof in these indefinite areas of the contract of the 
parties. It is no wonder that there was a "failure of proof." The majority wants 
appellee to conjure up an insurance policy where none existed. But, what did 
exist was a contract between appellant and appellee. There is no indefiniteness 
regarding appellant's obligation to provide "medical insurance" under the 
contract.

[¶28.]    A contract is construed most 
strongly against the party who drafted it. McGinnis v. General Petroleum 
Corporation, Wyo., 385 P.2d 198 (1963). Here the agreement 
was produced by appellant and on its letterhead. Appellee had nothing to do with 
the language of the agreement. Appellant caused all the indefiniteness referred 
to in the majority opinion.

[¶29.]    Appellee did prove the terms 
of the contract between appellant and appellee by introducing the letter 
agreement of April 23, 1981, which was clear on its face: "In addition, sixty 
days from your date of hire, Action Ads will provide a medical insurance program for 
you and your dependents." (Emphasis added.) The contract does not state the 
type of program which was to be provided, only that a coverage would be 
provided. Appellant, in effect, became the insurer, since the term of the 
contract was that coverage would be provided. The only uncertainty in this 
contract concerns the amount of coverage.

[¶30.]    In essence then, appellant 
breached its contract with appellee. As a result, appellant was damaged because 
he had no insurance coverage. The only question left was the amount of the 
damage.

[¶31.]    In Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Kimmel, 
68 F.2d 520, 522 (10th Cir. 1934), the court stated:

"`A party, who has 
broken his contract, will not be permitted to escape liability because of the 
lack of a perfect measure of the damages caused by his breach. * * 
*

"`A reasonable basis 
for computation, and the best evidence which is obtainable under the 
circumstances of the case and which will enable the jury to arrive at an 
approximate estimate of the loss, is sufficient. * * *'"

[¶32.]    In Shannon v. Shaffer Oil & Refining 
Co., 51 F.2d 878, 881-882 (10th Cir. 1931), the court 
stated:

"* * * [W]here there 
is proof, within the permissible range of certainty, that a right of plaintiff 
has been invaded, he should not be denied a substantial recovery because of the 
difficulty in accurately measuring his damages. The later authorities recognize 
the distinction between the case where uncertainty exists as to whether any 
substantial damage resulted, and the case where the uncertainty exists only as 
to the extent of such damage. * * *

* * * * * 
*

"`* * * But when it 
is certain that damages have been caused by a breach of contract, and the only 
uncertainty is as to their amount, there can rarely be good reason for refusing, 
on account of such uncertainty, any damages whatever for the breach. A person 
violating his contract should not be permitted entirely to escape liability 
because the amount of the damage which he has caused is uncertain. * * 
*'"

"`The constant 
tendency of the courts is to find some way in which damages can be awarded where 
a wrong has been done. Difficulty of ascertainment is no longer confused with 
right of recovery. [Citations.]'

"* * * Furthermore, a 
defendant whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the 
precise damages suffered by the plaintiff, is not entitled to complain that they 
cannot be measured with the same exactness and precision as would otherwise be 
possible."

[¶33.]    An injured party may recover 
all damages which were foreseeable at the time of the contract as a probable 
result of the breach. These damages may be foreseeable "either because they were 
a natural result or because they were a contemplated result of the breach." Pipkin v. Thomas & Hill, Inc., 33 
N.C. App. 710, 236 S.E.2d 725 (1977).

"`In awarding 
damages, compensation is given for only those injuries that the defendant had 
reason to foresee as a probable result of his breach when the contract was made. 
If the injury is one that follows the 
breach in the usual course of events, there is sufficient reason for the 
defendant to foresee it * * *.'" (Emphasis added.) Arctic Contractors, Inc. 
v. State, Alaska, 564 P.2d 30, 44 (1977), citing Hadley 
v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 (1854).

[¶34.]    In the usual course of 
events, the result which occurred here was eminently foreseeable, and 
compensation should be given to appellee. The difficulty concerns the exact 
amount of compensation which he should receive.

"The measure of 
damages for breach of contract is that which would place plaintiff in the same 
position as he would have been had the contract been performed, less proper 
deductions. * * *" Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company v. Smith, Wyo., 637 P.2d 1020, 1025 
(1981).

[¶35.]    Here, if appellant had 
performed, appellee would have had some of his expenses covered. He cannot prove 
the exact amount of his damages because of the nature of appellant's breach. 
Where one claims damages, other than nominal, he must prove them, but exact 
proof of the amount is not necessary in all instances. Western National Bank of Lovell v. 
Moncur, Wyo., 
624 P.2d 765 (1981).

"The existence of 
damages must be proved; the amount of damages must be decided with all the 
certainty the case permits. * * *

* * * * * 
*

"`There are many 
cases in which, by reason of the ordinary experience and belief of mankind, the 
trial court is convinced that substantial pecuniary harm has been inflicted, 
even though its amount in dollars is incapable of proof. If the defendant had 
reason to foresee this kind of harm and the difficulty of proving its amount, 
the injured party will not be denied a remedy in damages because of the lack of 
certainty. * * *' [Citation.]" Panhandle 
Eastern Pipe Line Company v. Smith, supra, at 1026.

[¶36.]    Some courts go so far as to 
place the burden of proof of the amount of damages on the defendant when the 
plaintiff has proved the existence of damage and when the amount is uncertain 
because of the defendant's wrongdoing. Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music 
Corporation, 557 F.2d 918 (2nd Cir. 1977). Other jurisdictions hold that, in 
the case of lost profits, a somewhat comparable situation, once a plaintiff 
raises a reasonable inference as to the amount of lost profits caused by 
defendant's breach of a covenant not to compete, the defendant is liable for 
such amount unless it presents evidence to rebut the inference and establish 
that the loss was not caused by the breach. Atlas Ready-Mix of    Minot v. White Properties, N.D., 306 N.W.2d 212 (1981); 
and B & Y Metal Painting, Inc. v. 
Ball, Minn., 279 N.W.2d 813 
(1979).

[¶37.]    I do not go so far as to 
suggest that the burden of proof or persuasion shifts in such situations. I 
merely reiterate that,

"* * * there is a 
clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to prove that the 
plaintiff has sustained some damage and the measure of proof necessary to allow 
the factfinder to fix the amount of damages. * * *" Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company v. 
Smith, supra at 1026.

[¶38.]    Appellee proved that he 
suffered some damage. A plaintiff will not be denied a substantial recovery if 
he has produced the only evidence available and it is sufficient to afford a 
reasonable basis for estimating loss. Johnson v. Flammia, 169 Conn. 491, 363 A.2d 1048 
(1975). Here, the only evidence available was that appellant failed to provide a 
medical insurance program, and that appellee incurred medical expenses of 
$18,824.26. Appellee simply could not prove the exact portion of his expenses 
which would have been covered had appellant not breached the 
contract.

[¶39.]    This case is different from 
Albin Elevator Company v. Pavlica, 
Wyo., 649 P.2d 187 (1982), a lost-profits case, where we held that appellant had 
not supported his claim because he did not present any evidence that his farm 
was a profitable operation, which he could have done, and because he did not 
present any testimony which connected his farming practices with his neighbor 
who had testified that he had made a profit for the same year. Appellant there, 
then, was denied recovery because he did not present available evidence which 
would have shown the amount, if any, of lost profit; appellee here proved the 
terms of the contract, presented evidence of damage and the only available 
evidence of amount of loss. Since he did, I would affirm the trial court's 
determination of the amount of damages.