Case Title: Van Mol v. Urban Renewal Agency

Citation: 194 Kan. 773, 402 P.2d 320

Docket Number: 44,063

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1965-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
194 Kan. 773 (1965)
402 P.2d 320
JEREMIAH and ELLA VAN MOL, Appellees,
v.
THE URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY OF KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, and THE CITY OF KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, Appellants.
No. 44,063

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 15, 1965.
John K. Dear, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and David W. Carson, Ernest N. Yarnevich, John William Mahoney, Joseph T. Carey, John H. Fields and C.W. Brenneisen, Jr., all of Kansas City, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
Charles S. Schnider, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and Joseph Cohen, John E. Shamberg, Joseph P. Jenkins, Barton P. Cohen, Jacob F. May, Jr., Frederick K. Cross, Norma Braly and Thomas H. Finigan, all of Kansas City, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from the verdict and judgment rendered in the district court on an appeal from the appraisers' award in a condemnation case.
The appellees, Jeremiah Van Mol and Ella, his wife, owned twenty-four and one-half acres of land located in Wyandotte County, Kansas. The tract fronted on 34th Street on the west and Steele Road on the south. Four and one-half acres of the tract consisted of a building site on which were located four homes belonging to the landowners and their children, and dairy buildings, barns and a garage used in connection with the operations of a dairy. The north and adjoining twenty acres consisted of pasture land on which the dairy cattle were grazed and exercised. The appellants, the Urban Renewal Agency and the City of Kansas City, Kansas, acquired the twenty acres of pasture land by condemnation on June 1, 1962, for *774 urban renewal purposes. Only the four and one-half acres with the buildings above described were left to the landowners.
The landowners were dissatisfied with the appraisers' award and appealed to the District Court of Wyandotte County, Kansas. The condemners were dissatisfied with the verdict of the jury in its award to the landowners and have appealed to this court.
The appellants first contend that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to market value or its absence.
The jury was instructed as follows:
The appellant suggests:
We are forced to agree with appellant's suggestion.
The instruction fails to inform the jury that the instruction is applicable in the absence of market value, it being contended by the landowners that there was no similar property so used from which market value could be determined. The trial court was no doubt trying to follow the rule laid down in Eisenring v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 183 Kan. 774, 332, P.2d 539 where we stated at page 779 as follows:
The court also overlooked the following statement in the Eisenring case which was the meat of the rule:
The rule is not to be used in "determining the reasonable market value" as stated by the lower court, but it is to be used in the "absence of market value to determine reasonable value."
The appellants next contend that the court erred in instructing the jury as to the manner in which they should arrive at a verdict.
The court gave the following instruction:
We must concede that it is quite impossible to determine what was meant by the instruction and the result that would have been reached had it been followed literally.
The first factor, finding the total value of all the property immediately before the taking, could have been proper. However, the second factor, finding the value of all the property immediately *776 after the taking, was meaningless and when subtracted from the first factor could not possibly have given the value of the property taken.
The appellants further contend that the trial court erred in the form of verdict submitted to the jury.
The form of verdict submitted to the jury, without the dollar amounts, was as follows:
The form of verdict is subject to the same criticism as was the instruction just discussed.
The appellee suggests that the figures and calculations used by the jury indicate that it was not confused by the instructions; that it did arrive at a proper verdict, and therefore the verdict and judgment should not be disturbed on appeal.
We do not believe that it can be said as a matter of law that the jury was neither influenced nor confused by the instructions. There was nothing else to guide them unless they used their independent knowledge of the law of eminent domain on values.
Appellees call our attention to the rule that a verdict will not be set aside on the grounds that an instruction might have been more specific if the entire record shows that the jury was not misled. (Schuette v. Ross, 164 Kan. 432, 190 P.2d 198.)
We do not believe the rule is applicable here. We are considering an instruction which was erroneous. The jury could not have arrived at a proper verdict unless it completely ignored the instruction and form of verdict and made its own determination of the law.
An incorrect instruction must be presumed prejudicial unless the contrary is clearly shown. An erroneous instruction, on a material issue such as we have before us, requires a reversal. (Jenkins v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 185 Kan. 665, 347 P.2d 417; Paph v. Tri-State Hotel Co., 188 Kan. 76, 360 P.2d 1055; Cagle Limestone Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 190 Kan. 544, 376 P.2d 809; Allen v. Ellis, 191 Kan. 311, 380 P.2d 408.)
The judgment is reversed with instructions to grant a new trial.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.