Case Title: Jarvis v. Gillespie

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-529


Royal W. Jarvis                              Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      Lamoille Superior Court

Hubert Gillespie                             October Term, 1990


Linda Levitt, J.

Polow & Polow, Hyde park, for plaintiff-appellee

Molde & Black, P.C., Johnson, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant, grantee of a quitclaim deed from the Town of
Waterville for a 1.2-acre parcel of land, contests the trial court's ruling
that title to the parcel had previously passed from the Town of Waterville
to plaintiff by way of adverse possession.  We affirm.
     The Town of Waterville acquired title to the parcel in 1935 from the
administrator of the estate of the then owner.  In 1932, the owner had
mortgaged the parcel to the Town in order to receive public assistance. (FN1)
The Town provided support for the owner until his death, after which the
administrator of the owner's estate deeded the parcel over to the Town.
     In 1947, plaintiff purchased over 200 acres of land which surround the
disputed parcel on three sides.  The fourth side of the parcel is bounded by
a road.
     On May 7, 1986, the Town of Waterville, by quitclaim deed, conveyed the
disputed parcel to defendant.  Shortly thereafter, defendant went to the
property and removed "No Trespassing" signs which plaintiff had posted on
the property.  Plaintiff replaced the signs and built a wooden fence on the
property.
     On February 24, 1988, plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action to
establish his ownership of the disputed parcel by way of adverse possession
or, in the alternative, to obtain a prescriptive easement over a roadway
which crosses the parcel.  Defendant contested the action by denying
plaintiff's claims and by asserting as an affirmative defense that plaintiff
could not gain title to, nor a prescriptive easement over, the parcel
because lands given to a public use are exempted from adverse possession
claims by 12 V.S.A. { 462.
     The trial court found that at various times between the years 1947 and
1986 plaintiff had used the land for a variety of purposes, such as grazing
cattle and horses, parking vehicles, as a staging area for a logging
operation on surrounding property, and to store slab wood from a sawmill
which was located on adjacent property.  The court also found that during
that period plaintiff, at various times, maintained a fence on the roadside
boundary of the parcel, tapped maple trees on the parcel, planted trees on
the parcel, cut Christmas trees and firewood from the parcel, posted no
trespassing signs on the parcel, and built a loading ramp on the parcel for
the logging operation which remained in use to load and unload his tractor
after the logging operation ceased.  The court found that these uses were
clearly visible from the road which abutted the parcel.  Further, the court
found that plaintiff was the only person to make use of the property for any
reason during the period and that neither the Town of Waterville nor the
public made any use of the parcel during that time.
     From these facts, the court concluded that plaintiff had established
title to the property by adverse possession.  The court further concluded
that the exemption provided in 12 V.S.A. { 462 did not apply in this
instance because the property was not given to a public use.  Defendant then
brought this appeal contesting both of these conclusions.
                                    I.
     We first address defendant's assertion that the trial court's findings
numbered 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 30 are clearly erroneous. (FN2)
     When reviewing the factual findings of a trial court, this Court will
view them in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below,
disregarding the effect of modifying evidence, and will not set aside the
findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  Brown v. Whitcomb, 150 Vt. 106,
109,