Case Title: State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking County Common Pleas Court

Citation: 2021-Ohio-4453

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4453.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-4453 
THE STATE EX REL. OGLE, APPELLANT, v. HOCKING COUNTY COMMON PLEAS 
COURT ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court, Slip 
Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4453.] 
Mandamus—Prohibition—Motion for Disqualification—Sixth Amendment—A 
petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition seeking to have a sentencing 
entry rendered void survives when the petitioner states a colorable claim 
for a violation of her Sixth Amendment right to counsel—Motion for 
disqualification correctly denied when the attorney against whom 
disqualification is sought never represented the movant and therefore owed 
her no duty of loyalty—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed in part and 
reversed in part and cause remanded. 
(No. 2021-0234—Submitted August 3, 2021—Decided December 21, 2021.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hocking County, No. 20CA9. 
________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Melanie A. Ogle, appeals the judgment of the Fourth 
District Court of Appeals dismissing her complaint for writs of mandamus and 
prohibition against appellees, Judge Dale A. Crawford and the Hocking County 
Common Pleas Court, and denying her motion for disqualification of attorney 
Randall L. Lambert.  We affirm the denial of the motion for disqualification.  
However, we reverse the dismissal of the prohibition and mandamus claims and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
I. Background 
{¶ 2} In August 2011, a Hocking County jury found Ogle guilty of 
assaulting a peace officer, in violation of R.C. 2903.13.  State v. Ogle, Hocking C.P. 
No. 09CR0125 (Sept. 28, 2011).  Ogle was represented by counsel at trial. 
{¶ 3} On September 16, 2011, prior to sentencing, Judge Crawford placed 
Ogle on house arrest.  Judge Crawford’s order stated, in part, that Ogle would be 
“released on a Recognizance Bond with the conditions as follows: (1) the 
Defendant is to have no contact, direct or indirect, with any juror, witness, lawyer 
or the Court while on bond.”  (Emphasis added.)  On September 21, Ogle filed a 
“Notice of Pro Se Appearance.” 
{¶ 4} On September 27, Judge Crawford held a sentencing hearing.  At the 
outset, Ogle refused to sign a waiver-of-counsel form, insisting that she did not 
waive her right to counsel but had “an inability to obtain counsel.”  Judge Crawford 
asked Ogle three times whether she wished for the court to appoint counsel to 
represent her.  Ogle did not directly answer the judge’s question but responded each 
time that she did not waive her right to counsel.  Ogle did not explain why she was 
unable to obtain counsel, but she apparently believed that Judge Crawford’s 
September 16 order forbade her from speaking to an attorney.  Judge Crawford told 
Ogle, “I will take your notice of pro se appearance as a voluntary waiver of your 
right to counsel at this point in time because you have not requested the Court 
January Term, 2021 
 
3
appoint counsel on your behalf.”  Ogle continued to assert that she did not waive 
her right to counsel, prompting Judge Crawford to say the following: 
 
Well, as I said, I could have ten different hearings, Mrs. 
Ogle, with you, and you could say the same thing, ‘I haven’t waived 
my right to counsel’ and then I don’t know what I am supposed to 
do.  I can’t force counsel upon you.  I have asked you if you want 
the Court to appoint counsel since you can’t afford one.  You won’t 
answer yes under that question so I am going to proceed with 
sentencing. 
 
Judge Crawford then conducted the hearing, at the end of which he imposed a 
sentence of six months in the county jail and ordered Ogle to pay a $2,500 fine, 
$792.65 in restitution, and court costs.  When asked if she had anything else to say, 
Ogle again stated: “I do not waive my right to counsel.  I have an inability to obtain 
counsel and this hearing is being held in violation of my Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to the Constitution of the United States.”  On September 28, 
Judge Crawford journalized the sentencing entry. 
{¶ 5} The court of appeals affirmed Ogle’s conviction.  State v. Ogle, 4th 
Dist. Hocking Nos. 11CA29, 11CA32, 12CA2, 12CA11, 12CA12, and 12CA19, 
2013-Ohio-3420. 
{¶ 6} On September 30, 2020, Ogle filed a complaint for writs of mandamus 
and prohibition in the court of appeals.  She alleged that Judge Crawford had no 
jurisdiction to hold the September 27, 2011 sentencing hearing, because she had 
not waived her right to counsel.  She asked the court of appeals for writs of 
mandamus and prohibition as a means to void the September 28, 2011 sentencing 
entry. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
{¶ 7} Judge Crawford and the Hocking County Common Pleas Court, 
represented by Lambert, filed a motion to dismiss Ogle’s complaint.  Ogle filed a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss and a motion to disqualify 
Lambert as counsel.  Ogle claimed that Lambert had represented Trent Woodgeard 
in a lawsuit that she had filed against Woodgeard in federal court.  Woodgeard, a 
Hocking County sheriff’s deputy, was the peace officer whom Ogle was convicted 
of assaulting in 2011.  See Ogle at ¶ 41.  Ogle argued that it was a conflict of interest 
for Lambert to represent both Judge Crawford, who presided over her criminal trial, 
and Deputy Woodgeard, who was “the false accuser, alleged victim, and sole 
witness against” her in that same criminal trial. 
{¶ 8} On January 7, 2021, the court of appeals granted the motion to 
dismiss.  4th Dist. Hocking No. 20CA9.  The court of appeals held that prohibition 
would not lie, because Judge Crawford had general jurisdiction over Ogle’s felony 
case.  In addition, the court held that Ogle was not entitled to mandamus relief, 
because she had an adequate remedy by way of direct appeal to assert her right-to-
counsel claim.  The court of appeals denied the motion to disqualify Lambert 
because there was no evidence that an attorney-client relationship had ever existed 
between Lambert and Ogle. 
{¶ 9} Ogle appealed to this court as of right. 
II. Legal analysis 
A. The dismissal of Ogle’s prohibition complaint 
{¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Ogle must establish the 
exercise of judicial power, the lack of authority for the exercise of that power, and 
the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Elder v. 
Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13.  However, 
if the absence of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, she need not establish the 
third prong—the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State 
ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-
January Term, 2021 
 
5
2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15.  We review de novo a decision granting a motion to 
dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).  Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co., 152 
Ohio St.3d 303, 2018-Ohio-8, 95 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 11} There is no dispute that Judge Crawford exercised judicial authority.  
The court of appeals reasoned that his exercise of that authority was lawful because 
R.C. 2931.03 vests the common pleas court with original jurisdiction over most 
criminal matters, including the felony charge against Ogle.  But according to Ogle, 
the issue is not Judge Crawford’s general jurisdiction, but whether she alleged facts 
to suggest that her sentencing entry was void. 
{¶ 12} Ogle’s argument rests on the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).  
Johnson was convicted in federal court of counterfeiting money, following a trial 
at which he was not provided counsel.  Id. at 459-460.  Johnson later filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus based on the denial of his constitutional right to counsel.  
The district court denied relief on the ground that any such deprivation was an error 
to be corrected on appeal, not a defect that rendered the judgment of the trial court 
void.  Id. at 459.  The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[a] 
court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost ‘in the course of the 
proceedings’ due to failure to complete the court—as the Sixth Amendment 
requires—by providing counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, 
who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or 
liberty is at stake.”  Id. at 468.  If these requirements are not met, the trial court no 
longer has jurisdiction and the judgment of conviction is void.  Id. 
{¶ 13} We recently clarified that “[a] sentence is void only if the sentencing 
court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or personal jurisdiction 
over the accused,” State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 
N.E.3d 776, ¶ 27, but the declaration in Zerbst that a Sixth Amendment violation 
renders an associated conviction void remains in force. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
{¶ 14} Appellees argue that the United States Supreme Court overruled 
Zerbst in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 
(1981).  This is incorrect.  Edwards changed the standard for what constitutes a 
waiver of the right to counsel (in the context of a police interrogation), but it did 
not overrule the holding in Zerbst that if there is no valid waiver of the right to 
counsel at trial, then the resulting conviction is void. 
{¶ 15} Alternatively, appellees contend that Ogle’s claim is barred by res 
judicata, either because she raised the issue that the trial court erred by sentencing 
her in violation of her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in her direct appeal 
or because she did so unsuccessfully in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.  
However, res judicata is an affirmative defense and is not a proper basis for 
dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  State ex rel. 
Neguse v. McIntosh, 161 Ohio St.3d 125, 2020-Ohio-3533, 161 N.E.3d 571, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 16} Next, appellees suggest that this court should affirm the dismissal of 
Ogle’s complaint for failure to state a claim.  They contend that Ogle never asserted 
her Sixth Amendment right to counsel and therefore waived it.  But the transcript 
of the sentencing hearing shows that Ogle never expressly waived her right to 
counsel; to the contrary, she repeatedly asserted it and expressly invoked the Sixth 
Amendment at least four times during the hearing.  Courts disfavor self-
representation and will therefore “ ‘indulge in every reasonable presumption 
against waiver [of counsel].’ ”  (Brackets added in Hackett) State v. Hackett, 164 
Ohio St.3d 74, 2020-Ohio-6699, 172 N.E.3d 75, ¶ 56 (Stewart, J., concurring), 
quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 44 
(1977).  Ogle has at least pleaded a colorable claim that she did not waive her Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and, in fact, she expressly asserted it. 
{¶ 17} Alternatively, appellees contend that Ogle waived her right to 
counsel because she failed to complete an affidavit of indigency.  But the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is not limited only to indigent defendants.  The Sixth 
January Term, 2021 
 
7
Amendment guarantees a defendant “the right to be represented by an otherwise 
qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire, or who is willing to 
represent the defendant even though he is without funds.”  Caplin & Drysdale, 
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624-625, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 105 L.Ed.2d 
528 (1989).  And when a court wrongfully denies a defendant her counsel of choice, 
the court has committed structural error.  United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 
140, 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006); see also State v. Chambliss, 128 
Ohio St.3d 507, 2011-Ohio-1785, 947 N.E.2d 651, ¶ 18 (“the erroneous deprivation 
of a defendant’s choice of counsel entitles him to an automatic reversal of his 
conviction”).  In this case, Ogle has alleged that Judge Crawford’s September 16, 
2011 order prevented her from retaining or consulting with any counsel, regardless 
of her ability to pay. 
{¶ 18} Finally, appellees argue that Judge Crawford subsequently cured any 
constitutional defect in the bond order.  On November 22, 2011, Judge Crawford 
conducted another hearing in order to clarify any misunderstanding that Ogle may 
have had regarding the September 16, 2011 order and her ability to have contact 
with a lawyer.  Judge Crawford informed Ogle, “If you want a lawyer, I would be 
happy to appoint [a] lawyer for you for purposes of your appeal,” and he informed 
Ogle that he would appoint counsel for her bond argument, so long as she filled out 
an affidavit of indigency.  (Emphasis added.)  But this offer did not cure the alleged 
problem, because it did not vacate the sentencing entry.  Judge Crawford issued an 
order and notice on November 22, 2011, stating that the September 16 bond order 
“did not, and does not, prohibit her from contacting counsel to represent her on any 
matter.”  But that modification of the September bond order only freed Ogle to 
retain counsel for her appeal; it did not vacate the unlawful sentencing entry. 
{¶ 19} In sum, Ogle has stated a colorable claim that Judge Crawford 
violated her Sixth Amendment rights when he ordered her to not communicate with 
any lawyer and then sentenced her and that this error rendered the sentencing entry 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
void.  Judge Crawford may (or may not) have a meritorious res judicata defense, 
but that issue is premature at this stage of the proceedings.  We reverse the court of 
appeals’ judgment dismissing Ogle’s complaint for a writ of prohibition and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
B. The dismissal of Ogle’s mandamus complaint 
{¶ 20} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a party must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear 
legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6, 13.  For a court to dismiss a 
mandamus complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that 
the relator can prove no set of facts warranting relief after all factual allegations of 
the complaint are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in the 
relator’s favor.  State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assoc. v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 
83 Ohio St.3d 179, 181, 699 N.E.2d 64 (1998).  This court reviews de novo a 
decision granting a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).  Alford, 152 Ohio 
St.3d 303, 2018-Ohio-8, 95 N.E.3d 382, at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 21} The court of appeals dismissed Ogle’s mandamus complaint 
pursuant to the general rule that mandamus will not lie when the petitioner has an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  But there is an exception to this 
rule: “[W]hen there is a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, [mandamus] 
relief is warranted ‘to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and 
to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions, notwithstanding 
the availability of appeal.’ ”  State ex rel. Davis v. Janas, 160 Ohio St.3d 187, 2020-
Ohio-1462, 155 N.E.3d 822, ¶ 10, quoting State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford, 78 
Ohio St.3d 391, 393, 678 N.E.2d 549 (1997).  The logic of our prohibition analysis 
applies with equal force to the mandamus claim.  We therefore reverse the judgment 
January Term, 2021 
 
9
of the court of appeals dismissing the mandamus complaint and remand this case 
for further proceedings. 
C. Ogle’s motion to disqualify opposing counsel 
{¶ 22} Lambert represented Deputy Woodgeard in federal litigation filed 
by Ogle.  According to Ogle, Lambert knows that false testimony was presented in 
that proceeding and that she was framed in the underlying criminal proceedings; 
she therefore contends that Lambert has an interest in not allowing the truth to come 
to light in the present case.  Whatever the truth of these allegations, they do not 
describe a conflict of interest that would warrant disqualification. 
{¶ 23} A conflict of interest is “a ‘struggle to serve two masters.’ ”  State v. 
Strickland, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25673, 2014-Ohio-5451, ¶ 17, quoting Cuyler 
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980).  “The 
possibility of a conflict of interest exists when counsel has a reason to further or 
serve interests that are different from those of his client.  An actual conflict of 
interest exists when counsel is actively representing, furthering, or serving those 
other interests (that are different from those of his client).”  (Emphasis added.)  State 
v. Caulley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-100, 2012-Ohio-2649, ¶ 21.  Because 
Ogle has never been a client of Lambert’s, she is not owed any duty of loyalty by 
Lambert, and she has no standing to complain of a conflict in his representation of 
Judge Crawford and the Hocking County Common Pleas Court.  See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Parisi v. Dayton Bar Assn. Certified Grievance Commt., 159 Ohio St.3d 211, 
2019-Ohio-5157, 150 N.E.3d 43, ¶ 11.  For this reason, the court of appeals 
properly denied the motion to disqualify Lambert. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 24} We affirm the court of appeals’ denial of Ogle’s motion to disqualify 
Lambert.  We reverse the court of appeals’ dismissal of Ogle’s complaint for writs 
of mandamus and prohibition for the reasons stated herein and remand this matter 
for further proceedings on Ogle’s petition for extraordinary relief. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DEWINE, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 25} The deprivation of counsel at a critical phase of a criminal 
proceeding is structural error and is automatically reversible if asserted on direct 
appeal, but a violation of the Sixth Amendment does not divest the common pleas 
court of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Because appellee Judge Dale A. Crawford did 
not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to sentence appellant, Melanie A. 
Ogle, after she was found guilty of assaulting a peace officer, I would affirm the 
judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals.  Therefore, I dissent. 
{¶ 26} The majority opinion omits some important facts.  After the jury 
found Ogle guilty of assaulting a peace officer, Ogle’s attorneys withdrew from the 
case.  See State v. Ogle, Hocking C.P. No. 09 CR 0125 (Sept. 27, 2011).  While 
Ogle awaited sentencing, the trial court placed her on house arrest.  The own-
recognizance-bond (“OR bond”) order prohibited her from having “contact, direct 
or indirect, with any juror, witness, lawyer or the Court while on bond.”  The state 
moved to revoke the OR bond because Ogle allegedly “had direct, confrontational 
contact with a juror” in her criminal case.  In response to the state’s motion, Ogle 
filed a “Notice of Pro Se Appearance” with appellee Hocking County Common 
Pleas Court.  In that notice, she stated that she “knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily waives her right of counsel.”  Ogle also stated in the notice that she had 
recently retained three attorneys “for the purpose of defending a maliciously filed 
motion to revoke bond, an illegal arrest warrant issued by the Court against 
January Term, 2021 
 
11 
Defendant, and violation of Defendant’s rights to due process regarding the same.”  
However, she informed the court that because she was no longer able to pay for 
their representation, she was proceeding pro se “at this time, or until subsequent 
notice.” 
{¶ 27} At the sentencing hearing, Ogle appeared without counsel and 
asserted that she was revoking her waiver of her right to counsel.  When the trial 
court asked her whether she had attempted to retain counsel, she replied, “I have an 
inability to obtain counsel.”  The trial court asked her whether she was requesting 
that counsel be appointed, and she again replied, “I have an inability to obtain 
counsel.”  The trial court asked Ogle a second time whether she was requesting that 
counsel be appointed, but she answered only, “I have an inability to obtain counsel” 
and “I do not waive my right to counsel.”  The court advised Ogle of her right to be 
represented by counsel at the sentencing hearing and that the court would appoint 
counsel for her if the court determined that she was unable to afford an attorney.  
The court again asked her if she wanted counsel to be appointed, and Ogle 
responded, “I do not waive my right to counsel and I have an inability to obtain 
counsel.”  The trial court therefore treated Ogle’s notice of pro se appearance as a 
voluntary waiver of her right to counsel.  The trial court could not appoint counsel 
when Ogle had not requested counsel, and it could not determine her eligibility for 
appointed counsel when she did not first fill out an affidavit of indigency. 
{¶ 28} During the sentencing hearing, Ogle never asserted that she had not 
been able to obtain counsel because the OR-bond order prohibited her from 
contacting any attorney.  Notwithstanding the majority’s finding to the contrary, 
Ogle’s notice of pro se appearance stated that she had retained three attorneys to 
challenge the state’s motion to revoke her bond.  The OR-bond order, therefore, did 
not stop Ogle from seeking representation. 
{¶ 29} Rather, at another hearing almost two months later, Ogle raised the 
argument that the OR-bond order barred her from contacting any attorney.  Yet 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
even after the trial court informed her that the OR-bond order did not preclude her 
from contacting an attorney, she again asserted that she did not waive her right to 
counsel, that she was unable to obtain counsel, and that the court therefore had no 
jurisdiction to hold a sentencing hearing or a bond hearing. 
{¶ 30} Based on these facts, it is not reasonable to conclude that Ogle’s 
belief that the OR-bond order prohibited her from contacting an attorney was the 
reason she failed to obtain representation for the sentencing hearing or the reason 
she refused Judge Crawford’s offer to appoint counsel for her.  Ogle does not have 
the right to stonewall the court by asserting her right to counsel, failing to obtain 
counsel, and refusing to complete an affidavit of indigency to allow the court to 
appoint counsel for her.  The accused’s parallel rights to counsel  and to self-
representation “cannot be manipulated to frustrate the orderly processes of the trial 
court.”  Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir.2004).  Moreover, Judge 
Crawford did not prevent Ogle from obtaining her counsel of choice, and Ogle had 
no right to “insist on representation by an attorney [she] cannot afford or who for 
other reasons declines to represent [her],” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 
159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988).  And because Ogle failed to establish 
her indigence in the first instance, she had no right to appointed counsel.  See 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). 
{¶ 31} “[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have 
counsel present at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings,” Montejo v. 
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009), and 
sentencing is a critical stage of the proceedings, Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 
358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977).  But even if Judge Crawford had denied 
Ogle the right to counsel at sentencing, doing so would not have divested the court 
of subject-matter jurisdiction or rendered her judgment of conviction void ab initio. 
{¶ 32} In the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the United States 
Supreme Court construed the law so that the court could not issue a writ of habeas 
January Term, 2021 
 
13 
corpus unless the trial court had lacked jurisdiction.  See United States v. Cotton, 
535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002).  “The Court’s desire 
to correct obvious constitutional violations led to a ‘somewhat expansive notion of 
“jurisdiction.” ’ ”  Id., quoting Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 494, 114 S.Ct. 
1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994).  The Supreme Court therefore relaxed the rule that 
a writ of habeas corpus was unavailable “by the device of holding that various 
illegalities deprived the trial court of jurisdiction.”  Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 
680, 719, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  For example, the Supreme Court held that trial courts 
lacked jurisdiction to violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 
163, 176, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1873), to try the accused for the violation of an 
unconstitutional law, Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-377, 25 L.Ed. 717 
(1879), and relevant here, to completely deny the accused the assistance of counsel 
in violation of the Sixth Amendment, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 
S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).  Notably, these cases addressed the jurisdiction 
of federal courts.  They did not hold that a violation of the United States 
Constitution affects the subject-matter jurisdiction of Ohio courts, which is 
conferred by the Ohio Constitution and by statute, State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 
480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 24-25. 
{¶ 33} The Supreme Court departed from its earlier cases in Waley v. 
Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-105, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302 (1942), holding that 
“the use of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a 
conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment of 
conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it.”  In Waley, 
the Supreme Court “openly discarded the concept of jurisdiction” that was 
articulated in cases such as Zerbst as a concept that had become “more a fiction 
than anything else.”  Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 
L.Ed.2d 594 (1977).  As the Supreme Court explained in Cotton, its prior “elastic 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
concept of jurisdiction is not what the term ‘jurisdiction’ means today, i.e., ‘the 
courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  
535 U.S. at 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860, quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for 
Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998).  
Subject-matter jurisdiction refers only to “the classes of cases * * * falling within 
a court’s adjudicatory authority,”  Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S.Ct. 
906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004), and it is not dependent on the rights or obligations of 
the parties,  Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 
L.Ed.2d 229 (1994); see also Rockwell Internatl. Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 
457, 467, 127 S.Ct. 1397, 167 L.Ed.2d 190 (2007) (“It is true enough that the word 
‘jurisdiction’ does not in every context connote subject-matter jurisdiction”). 
{¶ 34} The Supreme Court, therefore, no longer treats denying an accused 
the assistance of counsel—either entirely or during a critical phase of the 
proceeding—as an error divesting the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.  
Rather than a jurisdictional error, denying an accused the assistance of counsel at a 
critical phase of trial is a structural error from which a presumption of prejudice 
arises.  See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 
L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), fn. 25.  The existence of structural error, however, does not 
render the conviction void ab initio but rather, “[i]t means only that the government 
is not entitled to deprive the defendant of a new trial by showing that the error was 
‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,’ ” Weaver v. Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___, 
___, 137 S.Ct. 1899, 1910, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017), quoting Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 
{¶ 35} The presence of a structural error is therefore distinguishable from 
the trial court’s lacking subject-matter jurisdiction.  In Weaver, for example, the 
existence of a structural error (the denial of a public trial by closing the courtroom 
during jury selection) did not permit a collateral attack on the conviction based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel absent a showing of prejudice.  Id. at __, 137 S.Ct. 
January Term, 2021 
 
15 
at 1913.  In contrast, subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited and 
may be asserted at any time.  State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880, 
951 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 10.  And when subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking, the case 
must be dismissed, not remanded.  See Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-
Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 21; compare United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 
U.S. 140, 152, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (remanding for further 
proceedings after holding that the trial court had violated the accused’s right to 
counsel of choice). 
{¶ 36} Our cases have not treated the denial of the right to the assistance of 
counsel as a jurisdictional error either.  We have explained that “[c]laims involving 
* * * the alleged denial of the right to counsel are not cognizable in habeas corpus.”  
State ex rel. Rackley v. Sloan, 150 Ohio St.3d 11, 2016-Ohio-3416, 78 N.E.3d 819, 
¶ 8, quoting Bozsik v. Hudson, 110 Ohio St.3d 245, 2006-Ohio-4356, 852 N.E.2d 
1200, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 37} Further, like the United States Supreme Court, we have recognized 
that subject-matter jurisdiction involves the question whether the judicial forum is 
competent to hear a particular type or class of case, and it “ ‘is determined without 
regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case.’ ”  Harper, 
160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, at ¶ 23, quoting Bank of 
Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 38} “[P]ursuant to R.C. 2931.03, ‘a common pleas court has subject-
matter jurisdiction over felony cases.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 25, quoting Smith v. Sheldon, 157 
Ohio St.3d 1, 2019-Ohio-1677, 131 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 8.  The trial court, then, was the 
proper forum to sentence Ogle for committing a felony, and consideration of 
whether the court denied her the assistance of counsel addresses the rights of the 
parties, not the adjudicatory power of the court.  The trial court therefore had 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, and “when a specific action is within a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction 
renders the court's judgment voidable, not void,” id. at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 39} Today, the majority propagates the confusion we have recently 
sought to dispel between the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction (which 
involves only whether the court has the constitutional and statutory power to hear 
a specific type of case) and errors in the exercise of that subject-matter jurisdiction 
(which render the judgment voidable on appeal, not void ab initio), such as denying 
an accused the assistance of counsel.  See id.; State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 
285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 34; see also Kuchta at ¶ 18 (“The often 
unspecified use of this polysemic word [‘jurisdiction’] can lead to confusion and 
has repeatedly required clarification as to which type of ‘jurisdiction’ is applicable 
in various legal analyses”). 
{¶ 40} Ogle has not shown that Judge Crawford patently and 
unambiguously lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when he imposed a sentence on 
her more than a decade ago.  Therefore, I dissent and would affirm the appellate 
court’s judgment dismissing Ogle’s complaint for a writ of prohibition. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Melanie A. Ogle, pro se. 
Lambert Law Office, Randall L. Lambert, and Cassaundra L. Stark, for 
appellees. 
_________________