Case Title: Goldmas v. Acme Markets, Inc.

Citation: 393 Pa. Super. 245, 574 A.2d 100

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1990-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
393 Pa. Superior Ct. 245 (1990) 574 A.2d 100 Lorenzo GOLDMAS, Appellee, v. ACME MARKETS, INC. Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 7, 1990. Filed May 3, 1990. *247 John O'Brien, Philadelphia, for appellant. David E. Sternberg, Philadelphia, for appellee. Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and CERCONE, JJ. MONTEMURO, Judge: This appeal, filed by Acme Markets, Inc., stems from the trial court's refusal to grant to Acme a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial following a December 1988 jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We affirm. The appellee, Lorenzo Goldmas, instituted a negligence action against Acme following his fall at an Acme store on April 11, 1983. He claimed that his fall was caused by negligently maintained conditions at the store. Goldmas claimed that, in addition to mental anguish, he had been physically injured as follows: R.R. at 7a. Acme denied the allegations of negligence set forth against them, and, by way of new matter, set forth claims of comparative negligence and assumption of the risk. Following a two day jury trial, a verdict in the amount of $25,000.00 was returned in favor of Goldmas. *248 On appeal, Acme presents six issues for our review. First, Acme claims that the trial court abused its discretion in not charging the jury in conformance with the decision of this Court in Matteo v. Sharon Hill Lanes, Inc., 216 Pa.Super. 188, 263 A.2d 910 (1970). Matteo is distinguishable from the present case. It is well established that although the defendant has the burden to prove the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, "[i]f in presenting his case against the defendant the plaintiff reveals factors which convict him of contributory negligence he may not recover." Id., 216 Pa.Superior Ct. at 191, 263 A.2d at 912 (citations omitted). In finding that the trial court had erred in charging the jury in Matteo so as to necessitate the grant of a new trial, we opined: Id., 216 Pa.Superior Ct. at 192-193, 263 A.2d at 913 (emphasis in original). In the instant case, we have reviewed the jury charge as a whole and have found no language which would have indicated to the jury that only the evidence presented by the defendant could be considered in deciding whether Goldmas had been negligent. In fact, we find that the court's instructions complied with Acme's request pursuant to Matteo. The trial court instructed the jury as follows: R.R. 170a, 174a-175a (emphasis added). The jury instruction given in the case at bar correctly informed the jury that it was their function to decide what evidence was supportive of Goldmas's claim of negligence, and which was supportive of Acme's claim of contributory negligence, without indicating any restriction on which party presented the evidence to the jury in the first place. This case is analogous to Calhoun v. Jersey Shore Hospital, 250 Pa.Super. 567, 378 A.2d 1294 (1977), wherein the *250 defendant hospital claimed on appeal that the trial court had erred in failing to follow the Matteo decision and to thus advise the jury that the plaintiff's case may establish contributory negligence without the production of any evidence by the defendant. This Court in Calhoun rejected this claim of trial court error and in so doing, we stated: Calhoun, supra at 573-574, 378 A.2d at 1297. As a second issue, Acme contends that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial on the grounds that the jury verdict was irreconcilable, evidencing juror confusion. Acme bases this claim upon the jury's answer to question five on the jury verdict slip, which was not read in court based upon the jury's answer to the preceding questions: R.R. 2229a-230a. "It is well established law in Pennsylvania that there is a presumption of consistency with respect to a jury's findings which can only be defeated when there is no reasonable theory to support the jury's verdict." Giovanetti v. Johns-Manville Corp., 372 Pa.Super. 431, 440, 539 A.2d 871, 875 (1988) (citation omitted). The instant case is unlike the *252 situation addressed by our Supreme Court in Ferrick Excavating v. Senger Trucking, 506 Pa. 181, 484 A.2d 744 (1984). In Ferrick, the jury had, in answer to special interrogatories, determined that while the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent, this negligence had not been a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. However, the jury, when asked to determine the question of causal negligence, attributed 80% to the defendant and 20% to the plaintiff. In affirming this Court's grant of remittitur, the Supreme Court reasoned: Id., 506 Pa. at 187, 484 A.2d at 747. Instantly, the presumption of the consistency of the jury verdict may stand. There is no question as to the jury's finding that Acme was negligent, and that the negligence of Acme was a proximate cause of Goldmas's injuries. Thus, Acme is properly held liable for all of Goldmas's damages. Further, there is no confusion apparent on the verdict slip with reference to Goldmas's contributory negligence. This is the crux of Acme's issue. Acme is claiming that because the jury placed the "75%" in question 5, they intended to make a finding that Goldmas was contributorily negligent. On the contrary, the defense of contributory negligence was consistently rejected by the jury in questions three, four, and five. Indeed, in question 5, the jury placed a line through the answer blank indicating that the question seeking a determination of the plaintiff's causal negligence was inapplicable or irrelevant. Thus, the "75%" figure appearing in question 5 is mere surplusage and has no effect on the valid verdict rendered by the jury. We find no error in *253 the trial court's failure to grant Acme a new trial on this claim. Next, Acme claims that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury to disregard certain statements made by Goldmas's counsel during his closing argument. Specifically, Acme claims that it was prejudiced by counsel's claims that Goldmas had unpaid medical bills. Apparently, Acme contends that this argument was not supported by the evidence and was made by Goldmas's counsel for the sole purpose of eliciting juror sympathy. The trial court dismissed this claim on the grounds that there is evidence of medical bills in the record. A review of the exhibits admitted during trial does include some medical bills. In any event, we are convinced that even if some of these bills were actually paid at the time of trial, Acme was not unduly prejudiced by counsel's closing remarks. There is no dispute that Goldmas received medical treatment for which he was charged, and for which he was entitled to seek contribution in his suit against Acme. Under the circumstances, Acme was not prejudiced by counsel's comments even assuming, arguendo, that some of the medical bills had been paid. We likewise find no merit in Acme's claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury concerning Acme's duty under the law of negligence. "It is now well established in this Commonwealth that portions of a jury charge are not reviewed for error in isolation. Rather, an appellate court is bound to examine the charge in its entirety against its evidentiary background. From the examination we must determine, first, whether any error was committed and, if so, whether the error was prejudicial to the complaining party." McKee By McKee v. Evans, 380 Pa.Super. 120, 143-144, 551 A.2d 260, 271 (1988) (citations omitted). Instantly, we find no error in the court's accurate and precise explanation regarding Acme's duty under the circumstances of the instant case. Contrary to Acme's claim that the court indicated that Acme was an insurer of the safety of its customers, the court stated to the jury: R.R. at 169a. During the trial, Acme attempted to introduce a letter from a physician, Dr. Zimmerman. Acme claimed that the introduction of this evidence was necessitated by surprise resulting from Goldmas's trial testimony regarding his glaucoma. R.R. at 135a. The letter purportedly states that Dr. Zimmerman treated Goldmas for glaucoma while he was in Chestnut Hill Hospital during April 1983, and thereafter. The trial court rejected Acme's contention that it was "surprised" by Goldmas's testimony, and refused to admit the letter on the grounds that it was inadmissible hearsay. Acme is entitled to no relief on this claim. Goldmas testified that he was seen by Dr. Zimmerman for glaucoma on the last day of his stay at Chestnut Hill Hospital, and that Dr. Zimmerman had advised him that he had glaucoma in one eye. Id. at 66a and 82a. Further, hospital records admitted into evidence indicate that Goldmas was suffering from glaucoma at the time he fell in the Acme store. Id. at 258a. Dr. Zimmerman's letter was thus cumulative evidence which did not come within an exception to the hearsay rule. The jury was provided with ample evidence concerning Goldmas's glaucoma condition, which existed at the time of his fall, and the jury had in evidence hospital records indicating that Goldmas did not suffer eye injury as a result of his fall. Id. at 234a. With this evidence, the jury was thus able to evaluate Goldmas's testimony in light of other evidence, specifically hospital records, which did indicate that part of his stay at Chestnut Hill Hospital was focused upon his pre-existing glaucoma condition which obviously was not related to his fall. See R.R. at 291a, 294a, 300a, 301a. *255 Finally, Acme claims that the verdict rendered by the jury was against the weight of the evidence. A new trial will not be granted unless the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock the court's sense of justice. We find no error in the trial court's refusal to grant Acme relief. Acme's claim is based upon its review of the testimony of Goldmas, which it argues contains "glaring `inconsistencies' [which] elevate . . . plaintiff's testimony into the realm of perjury. . . ." Brief for Acme at 33. Credibility is for the finder of fact to determine. Although the jury may not have believed all of the testimony of Goldmas, it was free to accept some of the testimony as credible while it, at the same time, rejected other portions of the testimony. We note that many of the inconsistencies in Goldmas's testimony emphasized by Acme concern collateral issues: the number of Goldmas's children, his birthplace, his marriage history, his knowledge of his own body weight. Other inconsistencies may well have been dismissed as inconsequential by the jury, such as Goldmas's testimony regarding which hand he had used to reach up to the grocery shelf and what type of glass he noticed on the floor after his fall, in light of the rest of his testimony concerning his fall in the Acme store. See R.R. at 47a-48a. Further, Mr. Williams, store supervisor for Acme, testified that he had approached Goldmas immediately after his fall in the store and had observed oil on the floor. Id. at 125a-126a. Under these circumstances, the jury's verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. A new trial should not be granted on a mere conflict in the testimony. See Baldino v. Castagna, 505 Pa. 239, 478 A.2d 807 (1984). Order affirmed.