Case Title: Sugarland Run Homeowners Ass'n v. Halfmann

Citation: 

Docket Number: 992331

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
SUGARLAND RUN HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION 
 
Record No. 992331  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
    September 15, 2000 
WALTER D. HALFMANN, ETC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 
Jean Harrison Clements, Judge 
 
 
 
In this wrongful death case, the dispositive issue is 
one of proximate cause.  We review a judgment entered 
against a homeowners’ association in favor of the personal 
representatives of the estate of a child who was struck and 
killed by a motorist as the child was riding his bicycle 
from a pathway located in the common areas owned by the 
homeowners’ association onto a public street.  Because we 
conclude that there was insufficient evidence as a matter 
of law to establish that any alleged defects in the pathway 
and its intersection with the street proximately caused the 
accident, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court 
and enter final judgment for the homeowners’ association. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
Walter R. Halfmann (Halfmann) was killed in January 
1995 as he rode his bicycle from a multi-purpose, private 
pathway1 onto Sugarland Run Drive, a public street in 
Loudoun County, and was struck by a motor vehicle driven by 
Trina Kabiri.  The bike path was located in a residential 
subdivision and was part of the common areas owned by 
Sugarland Run Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association). 
 
Halfmann’s parents, Walter D. Halfmann and Barbara B. 
Halfmann, as personal representatives of their eight-year-
old son’s estate, filed this action against Kabiri, the 
Association, and several other defendants.2  The personal 
representatives alleged that the Association had notice or 
knowledge of “the unreasonably dangerous condition” 
existing at the intersection between the pathway and the 
street where the accident occurred, and that the 
Association failed to take “reasonable and necessary” steps 
to ensure that people utilizing the common areas could do 
so safely. 
 
After the personal representatives presented evidence 
at trial, the Association moved to strike that evidence 
because, inter alia, the alleged defects in the pathway 
were not a proximate cause of the accident.  The circuit 
                     
1 Bicyclists, pedestrians, in-line skaters and 
skateboarders used the paved path. 
 
2 At the time of trial, only Kabiri and the Association 
remained as party defendants. 
 
 
2
court denied the motion initially and again when the 
Association renewed its motion to strike at the conclusion 
of all the evidence. 
 
A jury then returned a verdict against the Association 
in favor of the personal representatives and awarded 
damages to Halfmann’s estate and his statutory 
beneficiaries pursuant to Code §§ 8.01-52 and –53.  The 
jury, however, found in favor of Kabiri.3  After denying the 
Association’s motion to set aside the jury verdict, the 
circuit court entered judgment for the personal 
representatives.4  This appeal followed. 
The bike path at issue in this case was designed and 
constructed no later than the summer of 1974, but not by 
the Association.  The path intersects Sugarland Run Drive 
and continues on the opposite side of the street.  No signs 
or markings were placed along the pathway or on Sugarland 
Run Drive to warn a bicyclist or a motorist about the 
intersection.  Nor were any barriers or devices installed 
at the end of the path to prevent or impede a bicyclist’s 
                     
3 The personal representatives did not appeal the 
judgment in favor of Kabiri, and she is not a party to this 
appeal. 
 
4 The circuit court’s judgment was in accordance with 
the jury verdict except that the court remitted a portion 
of the jury’s award for funeral expenses and for the care, 
 
3
travelling from the path onto Sugarland Run Drive.  The 
only change to the pathway since its construction was the 
installation of curb cuts, or wheelchair ramps, on both 
sides of Sugarland Run Drive.  The Virginia Department of 
Transportation constructed the curb cuts in approximately 
1994. 
On the afternoon of the accident, as Halfmann was 
riding his bicycle down the descending pathway and 
approaching the intersection with Sugarland Run Drive, the 
intersection and street were clearly visible to him.  
However, several objects were on his left side between the 
path and that portion of the street where Kabiri was 
operating her vehicle.  Two large, electrical 
switch/transformer boxes were located within a few feet of 
the edge of the pathway and approximately 10 to 15 feet 
from the edge of Sugarland Run Drive.5  Two vehicles were 
parked on the side of the street nearest Halfmann about 30 
to 40 feet down Sugarland Run Drive.  A house was likewise 
located about 70 feet down the street from the point of 
impact between Halfmann’s bicycle and Kabiri’s car.  Bushes 
had been planted along one side of the driveway of that 
__________________ 
treatment, and hospitalization of Halfmann.  The personal 
representatives did not object to the remittitur. 
 
 
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house.  All these objects, as well as the pathway upon 
which Halfmann was riding his bicycle, were to Kabiri’s 
right as she drove her vehicle along Sugarland Run Drive. 
While no testimony established Halfmann’s speed as he 
rode his bicycle on the path toward Sugarland Run Drive, 
Rachel Susan Toepfer, who was driving along Sugarland Run 
Drive in the direction opposite to that in which Kabiri was 
travelling at the time of the accident, testified that 
Halfmann’s speed did not change as he approached the 
intersection, nor did he stop or look to his left in the 
direction of Kabiri’s vehicle.  According to Toepfer, 
Halfmann entered the street and almost travelled past 
Kabiri’s vehicle before the left front of her vehicle (the 
driver’s side) struck the rear wheel of his bicycle.  
Another witness to the accident likewise testified that 
Halfmann did not stop at the intersection and did not 
appear to look to his left, the direction from which 
Kabiri’s vehicle was approaching. 
When the accident occurred, Kabiri was on her way to 
pick up her child from school.  Kabiri testified that 
Halfmann passed in front of her car and that she could not 
do anything to avoid hitting his bicycle.  She further 
__________________ 
5 The switch/transformer boxes were in place before the 
pathway was constructed. 
 
5
stated that, if she had seen him, she would have stopped 
but she was not aware of anything in the street until the 
impact occurred.6  However, she knew that children who 
attended the nearby school often walked or rode bicycles to 
that school. 
Jennifer L. Toole, an expert in the field of bicycle 
and pedestrian planning, testified that there were two 
major “flaws” in the design of the pathway and the 
intersection where the accident at issue occurred.  First, 
she stated that there should have been a sign inscribed 
with the warning “Bike Crossing” or “Pedestrian Crossing” 
on Sugarland Run Drive at its intersection with the 
pathway.  She also recommended that a crosswalk be painted 
on the street. 
The second defect, according to Toole, was the 
inadequacy of “sight lines” between an approaching motorist 
and a bicyclist on the pathway.7  Toole identified the 
                     
6 The investigating police officer testified that he 
found no skid marks on Sugarland Run Drive that would 
indicate Kabiri applied her brakes before the impact.  
Likewise, the officer did not find any indication on the 
bike path that Halfmann braked or slowed before entering 
the street. 
 
7 Toole testified that “appropriate sight lines” 
provide an “adequate visual distance” for a motorist to see 
a pedestrian and stop in time to avoid hitting the 
pedestrian, based on the speed limit or the prevailing 
 
6
switch/transformer boxes as the factor that significantly 
blocked the sight lines for Halfmann and Kabiri on the day 
of the accident.  However, Toole admitted that, in order to 
analyze whether sight lines are adequate, the respective 
likely speeds of a motorist and bicyclist must be 
determined.  Toole further testified that only by removing 
the switch/transformer boxes could proper sight lines have 
been established.  If the pathway itself were moved further 
from the boxes, Toole could say only that the sight lines 
would have been “better” since she had not analyzed that 
possibility. 
Toole also stated that the pathway’s downward slope to 
the intersection caused both motorists and bicyclists to 
have only a “narrow window” of visibility in which to see 
each other as they approached the intersection.  Toole 
indicated that the pathway should have had only a grade of 
five to eight degrees, but instead, it sloped between 10 
and 15 degrees.  Nevertheless, she testified that if 
Halfmann had stopped at the intersection, he would have had 
a clear line of sight down Sugarland Run Drive in the 
direction from which Kabiri was travelling for “quite a 
distance.”  Finally, Toole stated that the location of the 
__________________ 
speed of motorists on the road.  The term also applies when 
a bicyclist is approaching an intersection with a road. 
 
7
curb cut was not appropriate because it did not exit into a 
crosswalk.8
ANALYSIS 
Several principles guide our analysis of this case.  
On appeal, we review the facts in the light most favorable 
to the prevailing party at trial, in this case the personal 
representatives of Halfmann’s estate.  Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. St. John, 259 Va. 71, 76, 524 S.E.2d 649, 651 
(2000).  “[A] party who comes before us with a jury verdict 
approved by the trial court ‘occupies the most favored 
position known to the law.’ "  Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. 
Woodyard, 244 Va. 51, 57, 419 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1992) 
(quoting Pugsley v. Privette, 220 Va. 892, 901, 263 S.E.2d 
69, 76 (1980)).  A trial court’s judgment is presumed to be 
correct, and on appeal, we will not set it aside unless the 
judgment is plainly wrong or not supported by the evidence.  
Ravenwood, 244 Va. at 57, 419 S.E.2d at 630.  However, when 
these principles are applied, if it appears that the 
judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
it, we must set it aside.  Evaluation Research Corp. v. 
                     
8 The curb cut was not directly in front of Halfmann as 
he rode down the path.  Instead, the curb cut was located 
to the side of the path, thus requiring Halfmann to make a 
turn to his left followed by another similar turn to his 
right in order to access the curb cut and Sugarland Run 
Drive from the path. 
 
8
Alequin, 247 Va. 143, 147-48, 439 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1994) 
(citing Thompson v. Bacon, 245 Va. 107, 111, 425 S.E.2d 
512, 514 (1993); Whichard v. Nee, 194 Va. 83, 89, 72 S.E.2d 
365, 369 (1952)). 
 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the 
alleged defects in the design of the pathway and its 
intersection with Sugarland Run Drive were a proximate 
cause of the accident.  In order to hold the Association 
liable for that alleged “unreasonably dangerous condition,” 
the evidence must establish that such condition was a 
proximate cause of the accident.  See Cannon v. Clarke, 209 
Va. 708, 711, 167 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1969) (to hold owner 
liable for injuries sustained because of alleged unsafe 
condition of premises, it must be shown that such condition 
was a proximate cause of injuries).  The personal 
representatives had the burden of proving not only that the 
Association was negligent but also that its negligence was 
a proximate cause of the accident.  Commercial 
Distributors, Inc. v. Blankenship, 240 Va. 382, 395, 397 
S.E.2d 840, 847 (1990) (citing State-Planters Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Gans, 172 Va. 76, 81, 200 S.E. 591, 593 (1939)); 
Boyd v. Brown, 192 Va. 702, 711, 66 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1951). 
A proximate cause of an event is that “act or omission 
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an 
 
9
efficient intervening cause, produces the event, and 
without which that event would not have occurred.”  Beale 
v. Jones, 210 Va. 519, 522, 171 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1970); 
accord Jenkins v. Payne, 251 Va. 122, 128, 465 S.E.2d 795, 
799 (1996); Banks v. City of Richmond, 232 Va. 130, 135, 
348 S.E.2d 280, 282 (1986).  Generally, the issue of 
proximate causation is a question of fact to be resolved by 
a jury.  Jenkins, 251 Va. at 128, 465 S.E.2d at 799 (citing 
Brown v. Koulizakis, 229 Va. 524, 531, 331 S.E.2d 440, 445 
(1985)).  However, when reasonable people cannot differ, 
the issue becomes a question of law for the court to 
decide.  Jenkins, 251 Va. at 128, 465 S.E.2d at 799 (citing 
Hadeed v. Medic-24, Ltd., 237 Va. 277, 285, 377 S.E.2d 589, 
593 (1989)); Alexander v. Moore, 205 Va. 870, 875, 140 
S.E.2d 645, 648-49 (1965). 
With regard to the issue of proximate cause, the 
Association argues that, while the personal 
representatives’ expert, Toole, identified several alleged 
“flaws” in the design of the pathway and its intersection 
with Sugarland Run Drive, she never explained the causal 
connection between those particular defects and the 
accident at issue.  To the contrary, the Association points 
out several facts that show that those defects were not a 
proximate cause of the accident.  First, Toepfer, who 
 
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witnessed the accident, stated that Halfmann never altered 
the speed of his bicycle as he approached the intersection, 
and neither stopped at the intersection nor looked to his 
left for oncoming traffic.  Second, the intersection and 
the street were visible to anyone travelling on the pathway 
toward Sugarland Run Drive.  Finally, Toole admitted that 
if Halfmann had stopped at the intersection, he could have 
seen Kabiri’s oncoming vehicle. 
The personal representatives respond that there was 
“far more than a sufficient basis to show a causal 
connection” between the defects in the pathway and the 
accident.  They point to the inadequate sight lines between 
motorists on Sugarland Run Drive and bicyclists on the 
pathway, the excessive slope of the path, the lack of 
warning signs or a crosswalk, the absence of any barrier on 
the pathway to stop or slow a bicyclist, and the improperly 
located curb cut.  The personal representatives also 
contend that the question of proximate cause is actually an 
issue of contributory negligence, and argue that the jury 
found that Halfmann was not contributorily negligent when 
it returned a verdict against the Association.9  We agree 
with the Association. 
                     
9 Since Halfmann was eight years old at the time of the 
accident, the circuit court instructed the jury that 
 
11
Assuming, without deciding, that there was an 
unreasonably dangerous condition at the intersection 
between the pathway and Sugarland Run Drive, and that the 
Association knew or should have known of that condition, 
the burden of proving proximate causation remained with the 
personal representatives.  In this case, the evidence did 
not establish that the “flaws” identified by Toole were an 
“omission which, in natural and continuous sequence, . . . 
produce[d] the [accident], and without which [the accident] 
would not have occurred.”  Beale, 210 Va. at 522, 171 
__________________ 
Halfmann was presumed to be incapable of contributory 
negligence but that the presumption could be rebutted.  The 
court further instructed the jury to find its verdict for 
either defendant if it concluded, as to that defendant, the 
personal representatives failed to prove either negligence 
or proximate cause, or if it found that Halfmann was 
contributorily negligent and that such contributory 
negligence was a proximate cause of Halfmann’s death. 
Although the personal representatives contend that the 
jury verdict in favor of the Association established that 
Halfmann was not contributorily negligent, under the 
instructions given, the jury could have found either that 
Halfmann was not capable of being contributorily negligent 
or that he was not contributorily negligent in this 
instance.  The verdict form was a general form that simply 
stated that the jury found in favor of the personal 
representatives and against the Association.  Thus, we 
reject the contention that the jury necessarily decided 
that Halfmann was not contributorily negligent.  
Furthermore, an analysis of the question whether a 
tortfeasor’s primary negligence proximately caused an 
accident and, if so, the consequent question whether a 
victim was contributorily negligent often involves review 
of the same or overlapping evidence.  That the evidence is 
the same or overlapping does not obviate the necessity of 
an independent examination of each question. 
 
12
S.E.2d at 853.  We reach this conclusion because of the 
particular facts of the accident at issue.  See Banks, 232 
Va. at 135, 348 S.E.2d at 283 (in applying rules of 
proximate cause, each case must be decided upon its own set 
of facts). 
First, there is no evidence that Halfmann attempted to 
stop at the intersection and could not do so because of the 
grade of the path, the absence of a barrier or device to 
slow his speed, or the location of the curb cut.  In fact, 
according to Toepfer, Halfmann did not alter his speed, 
never stopped, and did not even look to his left for 
oncoming vehicles as he approached the intersection.  Next, 
the evidence was uncontradicted that Sugarland Run Drive 
and the intersection were clearly visible to Halfmann as he 
proceeded along the pathway toward the street.  Finally, 
Toole admitted that a determination regarding adequate 
sight lines depends on the respective speeds of a motorist 
and bicyclist, but the evidence did not demonstrate either 
Halfmann’s speed or that of Kabiri.10
However, the evidence did establish that if Halfmann 
had stopped at the intersection of Sugarland Run Drive and 
                     
10 The speed limit on Sugarland Run Drive was 30 miles 
per hour, and the record contained no evidence that Kabiri 
was speeding. 
 
 
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the pathway, he could have seen Kabiri’s car approaching 
that intersection.  This case is not one where Halfmann had 
to ride his bicycle into the edge of Sugarland Run Drive 
and look around the switch/transformer boxes in order to 
determine whether any vehicle was approaching from his 
left.  Those boxes were 10 to 15 feet back from the edge of 
the street. 
Although all accidents, however “tragic and 
deplorable,” Clark v. Hodges, 185 Va. 431, 438, 39 S.E.2d 
252, 256 (1946), must have some factual cause, “often 
described as the ‘but for’ . . . rule[,] [g]enerally a 
person is not liable to another unless but for [that 
person’s] negligent act the harm would not have occurred.”  
Wells v. Whitaker, 207 Va. 616, 622, 151 S.E.2d 422, 428 
(1966).  In this case, the personal representatives failed 
to carry their burden to establish that “but for” the 
Association’s alleged negligence, the accident would not 
have occurred.  Id. at 622, 151 S.E.2d at 428. 
For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence was 
insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the 
alleged defects in the design of the pathway and its 
intersection with Sugarland Run Drive were a proximate 
 
14
cause of the accident.11  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court, set aside the jury verdict 
in favor of the personal representatives, and enter final 
judgment here in favor of the Association. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
11 In light of our decision, we need not address the 
Association’s other assignments of error. 
 
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