Case Title: Gene William Cheshire v. Pearl Putman; Alexander Akins, a minor, by and through his legal guardian and parent, Steve Lewis Akins; and Morgan Akins, a minor, by and through her legal guardian and parent, Steve Lewis Akins

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1071678

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel 07/23/10
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
_________________________
1071678
_________________________
Gene William Cheshire
v.
Pearl Putman; Alexander Akins, a minor, by and through his
legal guardian and parent, Steve Lewis Akins; and Morgan
Akins, a minor, by and through her legal guardian and
parent, Steve Lewis Akins
_________________________
1071679
_________________________
Allstate Electric Company, Inc.
v.
Pearl Putman; Alexander Akins, a minor, by and through his
2
legal guardian and parent, Steve Lewis Akins; and Morgan
Akins, a minor, by and through her legal guardian and
parent, Steve Lewis Akins
Appeals from Walker Circuit Court
(CV-06-468)
PER CURIAM.
In two separate appeals, Gene William Cheshire and
Allstate Electric Company, Inc. ("Allstate Electric"), the
defendants below, appeal the trial court's judgment, entered
following jury verdicts in the plaintiffs' favor, and its
subsequent denial of their renewed motions for a judgment as
a matter of law ("JML").  We affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand.  
Facts and Procedural History
Cheshire is an employee of Allstate Electric, an
electrical contractor headquartered in Birmingham.  On August
25, 2006, Cheshire, who lives in Hanceville, was in Jasper,
working as a supervisor at an Allstate Electric job site.
Cheshire, who is paid hourly, ended his workday at 3:30 p.m.
Cheshire left the job site in his personal truck, which he
uses in the course of his employment with Allstate Electric;
Allstate Electric furnishes the gasoline for Cheshire's truck.
Cheshire was hauling a trailer behind his truck that did not
belong to Allstate Electric.  On his way home, Cheshire drove
1071678; 1071679
3
to a Home Depot building-supply store to buy drywall for his
personal use.  After leaving the Home Depot store, Cheshire
stopped at a convenience store to purchase a soft drink.
Leaving the convenience store, Cheshire began driving north on
Highway 69 to Hanceville.  Having worked for approximately
eight weeks at the Jasper job site, Cheshire had driven
Highway 69 numerous times.  Cheshire testified that he was
familiar with Highway 69 and knew that "on both sides of the
road there are driveways and roads and places to turn all
along the way."  Shortly after 4:00 p.m., Cheshire drove his
vehicle into the back end of a vehicle being driven by Pearl
Putman, who had stopped to make a left-hand turn off Highway
69.  The force of the collision propelled Putman's vehicle
forward, causing it to collide with a utility pole.  Cheshire
testified that "he didn't realize the vehicle was stopped
until the last minute."  Putman was stopped just over the
crest of a hill.  
Riding as passengers in Putman's vehicle were two of her
minor grandchildren, Alexander Akins and Morgan Akins (Putman,
Alexander Akins, and Morgan Akins are hereinafter referred to
collectively as "the plaintiffs").  All three of the
1071678; 1071679
4
plaintiffs were injured in the accident.  Morgan Akins, who
was not wearing her seatbelt at the time of the accident, was
the most severely injured; she suffered a traumatic brain
injury.  Putman suffered a fractured rib.  Alexander Akins
briefly lost consciousness and suffered cuts and bruises.  
Cheshire stated that, before the impact, he was traveling
between 55 and 60 miles per hour.  Cheshire testified that he
was not "paying that much attention" to whether Putman's
vehicle was in front of his truck on Highway 69 until he saw
her vehicle stopped in the road about 50 yards ahead of him;
Cheshire testified that he was "focusing on driving [his]
car," and not on which specific car was in front of him.
Cheshire also testified that he knew that Highway 69 is a two-
lane road with numerous intersecting driveways and crossroads.
Cheshire stated that he was aware that a driver making a left
turn off Highway 69 onto one of the numerous intersecting
driveways or crossroads might have to come to a complete stop
and wait for traffic to clear before proceeding.  Cheshire
stated that he misjudged the time he would need in order to
stop his truck and trailer to avoid hitting Putman's vehicle.
Cheshire also testified that he was aware that it would take
1071678; 1071679
5
more time to stop his truck than it normally would because he
was hauling a trailer.  Cheshire stated that he was aware that
he "would have to alter [his] driving habits to be more safe
if [he was] pulling a trailer than if [he did not] have a
trailer."  The Alabama state trooper who responded to the
scene of the accident testified that he told Cheshire at the
scene of the accident that, in his opinion, Cheshire was
driving too fast considering the weight of the trailer he was
hauling.   
There was no evidence indicating that Cheshire was
intoxicated, impaired, or driving erratically at the time of
the accident.  Charlotte Bates testified that she was driving
behind Cheshire's truck before the accident and that she saw
nothing unsafe or unusual about his driving.  Similarly, Audra
Borden was also driving behind Cheshire's truck at the time of
the accident and testified that Cheshire showed no erratic
behavior while driving and that he was not driving at an
excessive speed.  
The plaintiffs presented evidence indicating that there
was sufficient room on the shoulder of Highway 69 for Cheshire
to have maneuvered his truck off Highway 69 onto the shoulder,
1071678; 1071679
6
thereby 
avoiding 
the 
collision with Putman's vehicle.
Cheshire agreed that swerving off Highway 69 onto the shoulder
would have been a prudent maneuver, but he stated that
everything happened so quickly he did not have time to respond
in that manner.  
On August 29, 2006, the plaintiffs sued Cheshire and
Allstate Electric.  The plaintiffs alleged against Cheshire
negligence and wantonness.  The plaintiffs alleged against
Allstate Electric negligent and wanton hiring, training, and
supervision.  The plaintiffs also sought to hold Allstate
Electric 
vicariously 
liable 
for 
Cheshire's 
allegedly 
negligent
and/or wanton conduct.  
The case went to trial in April 2008.  At the close of
the plaintiffs' evidence, Cheshire and Allstate Electric each
filed a motion for a JML on all the claims against them, which
motions were denied.  At the close of all the evidence,
Cheshire and Allstate Electric each expressly renewed their
motions for a JML.  The trial court denied Cheshire's motion
for a JML.  The trial court granted Allstate Electric's motion
for a JML as to the plaintiffs' claim for wanton hiring,
training, and supervision, but denied the motion as to the
1071678; 1071679
7
remaining claims against Allstate Electric.  
The jury returned general verdicts in favor of the
plaintiffs and against Cheshire and Allstate Electric on all
claims.  The jury awarded the plaintiffs damages, as follows:
Putman was awarded compensatory damages in the amount of
$25,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $25,000;
Alexander Akins was awarded compensatory damages in the amount
of $30,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $25,000; and
Morgan Akins was awarded compensatory damages in the amount of
$150,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $6,000,000.  On
May 28, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial
alleging, in pertinent part, that the compensatory-damages
award to Morgan was inadequate.  
Allstate Electric renewed its motion for a JML on the
vicarious-liability claims against it arguing that the
evidence that the accident occurred while Cheshire was acting
in the scope of his employment with Allstate Electric was
insufficient.  Allstate Electric sought a JML on all claims
seeking punitive damages because, Allstate Electric argued,
punitive damages could not be awarded against Allstate
1071678; 1071679
Section 6-11-27(a) provides:
1
"A principal, employer, or other master shall not be
liable for punitive damages for intentional wrongful
conduct or conduct involving malice based upon acts
or omissions of an agent, employee, or servant of
said principal, employer, or master unless the
principal, employer, or master either: (i) knew or
should have known of the unfitness of the agent,
employee, or servant, and employed him or continued
to employ him, or used his services without proper
instruction with a disregard of the rights or safety
of others; or (ii) authorized the wrongful conduct;
or (iii) ratified the wrongful conduct; or unless
the acts of the agent, servant or employee were
calculated to or did benefit the principal, employer
or 
other 
master, 
except 
where 
the 
plaintiff
knowingly participated with the agent, servant, or
employee to commit fraud or wrongful conduct with
full knowledge of the import of his act."
Section 
6-11-21(d) 
limits 
punitive 
damages 
in 
a 
personal-
2
injury case to "three times the compensatory damages of the
party claiming punitive damages or one million five hundred
thousand dollars ($1,500,000), whichever is greater."
8
Electric under § 6-11-27, Ala. Code 1975.   Cheshire and
1
Allstate Electric sought a JML on all claims seeking punitive
damages because, they argued, the plaintiffs failed to present
clear and convincing evidence of Cheshire's wantonness.
Alternatively, Cheshire and Allstate Electric sought a
reduction in the punitive-damages award to Morgan Akins so
that the award would comply with § 6-11-21, Ala. Code 1975,2
and with constitutional due-process limits.  Cheshire and
1071678; 1071679
9
Allstate Electric did not move for a new trial.  
The plaintiffs conceded that Morgan Akins's punitive-
damages award was excessive.  The plaintiffs submitted a
proposed order denying Cheshire's and Allstate Electric's
renewed motions for a JML, reducing each of the plaintiffs'
punitive-damages awards, and permitting the plaintiffs either
to accept the reduction of the punitive-damages awards or to
elect a new trial.  The trial court entered the plaintiffs'
proposed order as its judgment.  The plaintiffs then elected
a new trial.  Cheshire and Allstate Electric separately
appealed.  The appeals have been consolidated for purposes of
writing one opinion.  
Standard of Review
In American National Fire Insurance Co. v. Hughes, 624
So. 2d 1362 (Ala. 1993), this Court set out the standard that
applies to the appellate review of a trial court's ruling on
a motion for a JML:
"The standard of review applicable to a ruling
on a motion for JNOV [now referred to as a renewed
motion for a JML] is identical to the standard used
by the trial court in granting or denying a motion
for directed verdict [now referred to as a motion
for a JML]. Thus, in reviewing the trial court's
ruling on the motion, we review the evidence in a
light most favorable to the nonmovant, and we
1071678; 1071679
10
determine whether the party with the burden of proof
has produced sufficient evidence to require a jury
determination."
624 So. 2d at 1366 (citations omitted).  Further, in Cessna
Aircraft Co. v. Trzcinski, 682 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 1996), this
Court held: 
"The motion for a J.N.O.V. [now referred to as
a renewed motion for a JML] is a procedural device
used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury's verdict. See, Rule 50(b), [Ala.]
R. Civ. P.; Luker v. City of Brantley, 520 So. 2d
517 (Ala. 1987). Ordinarily, the denial of a
directed verdict [now referred to as a JML] or a
J.N.O.V. is proper where the nonmoving party has
produced 
substantial evidence to support each
element of his claim. However, if punitive damages
are at issue in a motion for a directed verdict or
a J.N.O.V., then the 'clear and convincing' standard
applies. Senn v. Alabama Gas Corp., 619 So. 2d 1320
(Ala. 1993)."
682 So. 2d at 19 (footnote omitted).  "[S]ubstantial evidence
is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded
persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably
infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved."  West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co., 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).
See § 12-21-12(d), Ala. Code 1975.  
Discussion
First, Allstate Electric argues that the plaintiffs did
not present substantial evidence that Cheshire was acting
1071678; 1071679
11
within the course and scope of his employment when the
accident occurred.  Allstate Electric cites Shaw v. C.B.& E.,
Inc., 630 So. 2d 401, 404 (Ala. 1993), for the general
proposition that "[a]ccidents that occur while an individual
is travelling to and from work are not considered to have
arisen out of and in the course of employment."  However, Shaw
goes on to acknowledge that "[a]n exception to this rule
arises when the driver/worker's transportation expenses
constitute a part of the consideration paid for his services."
630 So. 2d at 404.  Although it is undisputed that Allstate
Electric pays for the gasoline for Cheshire's truck, Allstate
Electric, in its initial brief, does not address this
exception.
In arguing that there was substantial evidence supporting
Allstate 
Electric's 
liability 
for 
Cheshire's 
tortious 
conduct,
the plaintiffs rely, in pertinent part, upon the fact that
Allstate Electric pays for Cheshire's gasoline for his truck,
which he uses to travel to and from the job site.  In reply,
Allstate Electric concedes that there is an "exception to
[the] rule that going to and from work is not in [the] course
and scope of employment ... when [the] employer 'reimburses
1071678; 1071679
12
[the employee] for travel expenses.'" Allstate Electric's
reply brief, at 7 (quoting Ex parte Shelby County Health Care
Auth., 850 So. 2d 332, 336 (Ala. 2002)).  However, because
Allstate Electric itself pays for the gasoline for Cheshire's
truck, it argues that "Cheshire ... is not 'reimbursed' for
gas expenses as is required to fall under the exception."
Allstate Electric's reply brief, at 7.  "We decline to
consider an argument made for the first time in a reply
brief."  City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 2d 1061, 1079
(Ala. 2006). At any rate, Allstate Electric does not explain
why the distinction between direct payment and reimbursement
of transportation expenses is material, and it cites no
authority supporting such a conclusion. "This Court will not
'create legal arguments for a party based on undelineated
general propositions unsupported by authority or argument.'"
S.B. v. Saint James School, 959 So. 2d 72, 89 (Ala. 2006)
(quoting Spradlin v. Spradlin, 601 So. 2d 76, 79 (Ala. 1992)).
Allstate Electric also argues, relying on Newsome v. Mead
Corp., 674 So. 2d 581 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995), that Cheshire was
engaged in a personal errand at the time of the accident and
that he was not accomplishing any objective of Allstate
1071678; 1071679
13
Electric's.  Thus, Allstate Electric argues, Cheshire was not
operating within the course and scope of his employment.  In
Newsome, an employee drove his personal vehicle from his place
of employment to a restaurant to pick up food for himself and
his coworkers.  The employee was "on the clock" during this
errand, and the employee's supervisor gave him permission to
run the errand.  While on this errand, the employee was
involved in an accident with another vehicle.  The driver of
the other vehicle sued the employee's employer under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.  The employer moved for a
summary judgment based on the employee's and the employer's
affidavit testimony that the employee was not accomplishing
any objective of the employer's but was on a personal errand
at the time of the accident.  The trial court entered a
summary judgment in favor of the employer.  In a 3-2 decision,
the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment, holding that the plaintiff did not present
substantial evidence in opposition to the employer's motion
for a summary judgment.  
In the present case, Allstate Electric argues that
Cheshire was not "on the clock" when the accident occurred;
1071678; 1071679
14
that Cheshire did not drive straight home from work, but
stopped first at a Home Depot store to pick up supplies for a
personal project and then at a convenience store to buy a soft
drink before continuing home; and that Cheshire was driving
his personal truck at the time of the accident.  These facts,
Allstate Electric argues, show that Cheshire, like the
employee in Newsome, was on a personal errand at the time of
the accident and, thus, was not operating within the course
and scope of his employment.  However, the present case is
distinguishable from Newsome.  Unlike Allstate Electric, the
employer in Newsome provided no compensation for the
employee's use of his personal car.  In contrast, Allstate
Electric provided the gas for Cheshire's personal truck.  
Also, nothing in the record indicates that Cheshire was
traveling a substantially different route home than he
normally traveled when he drove home.  Instead, it appears
that Cheshire was taking the same route home he always did,
whether or not he had made a stop or two for personal reasons.
We conclude that the plaintiffs presented substantial
evidence indicating that Cheshire was operating within the
course and scope of his employment with Allstate Electric at
1071678; 1071679
15
the time of the accident.  Therefore, the trial court properly
denied Allstate Electric's renewed motion for a JML as to the
issue of its vicarious liability for Cheshire's conduct under
the doctrine of respondeat superior.  
Next, Cheshire and Allstate Electric argue that, as a
matter of law, the plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive
damages.  Cheshire and Allstate Electric contend that the
plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages should not have gone
to the jury because, they say, the plaintiffs did not satisfy
their burden of proof of presenting clear and convincing
evidence of Cheshire's allegedly wanton conduct.  Cheshire and
Allstate Electric do not challenge the compensatory-damages
awards on appeal.
In Cessna Aircraft Co., supra, this Court held:  
"Section 6-11-20(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides
that punitive damages may be awarded in tort actions
'where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant consciously or deliberately
engaged in ... wantonness' that caused injury to the
plaintiff. 
'Clear 
and convincing evidence' is
defined in the Code:
"'Evidence that, when weighed against
evidence in opposition, will produce in the
mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction
as to each essential element of the claim
and 
a 
high 
probability 
as 
to 
the
correctness of the conclusion. Proof by
1071678; 1071679
16
clear and convincing evidence requires a
level of proof greater than a preponderance
of the evidence or the substantial weight
of the evidence, but less than beyond a
reasonable doubt.'
"Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4).
"Thus, the 'clear and convincing' standard
requires the trial judge to do more than merely
determine whether the nonmoving party has presented
substantial evidence to support the claim for
punitive damages. It is not the trial judge's
function when ruling on a directed verdict [now
referred to as a JML] or J.N.O.V. [now referred to
as a postverdict JML] motion to weigh the evidence;
rather, he must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. If in viewing the
evidence in that light the judge reasonably can
conclude that a jury could find the facts in favor
of the nonmovant and that the jury could be firmly
convinced of that decision after considering the
evidence in opposition, then the judge should deny
the motion.
"....
"'Wantonness' is defined by § 6-11-20(b)(3) as
'[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others.' Furthermore, this Court has held on more
than one occasion that 'wantonness' is not merely a
higher degree of negligence; instead, it is a
'qualitatively different tort concept of actionable
culpability.' Lynn Strickland Sales & Service Inc.
v. Aero-Lane Fabricators, Inc., 510 So. 2d 142 (Ala.
1987). While a party claiming wantonness does not
have to prove an intent to injure, this Court has
held that wantonness requires proof of some degree
of conscious culpability. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. v.
Thornton, 579 So. 2d 619, 623 (Ala. 1991). See also,
Hamme v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 621 So. 2d 281
1071678; 1071679
17
(Ala. 1993)."
682 So. 2d at 19-20.  
In Ex parte Anderson, 682 So. 2d 467 (Ala. 1996), this
Court discussed wantonness in the context of operating a
vehicle:
"What constitutes wanton misconduct depends on
the facts presented in each particular case. Central
Alabama Electric Cooperative v. Tapley, 546 So. 2d
371 (Ala. 1989); Brown v. Turner, 497 So. 2d 1119
(Ala. 1986); Trahan v. Cook, 288 Ala. 704, 265 So.
2d 125 (1972). A majority of this Court, in Lynn
Strickland Sales & Service, Inc. v. Aero-Lane
Fabricators, Inc., 510 So. 2d 142 (Ala. 1987),
emphasized that wantonness, which requires some
degree of consciousness on the part of the defendant
that injury is likely to result from his act or
omission, is not to be confused with negligence
(i.e., mere inadvertence):
"'Wantonness is not merely a higher
degree of culpability than negligence.
Negligence and wantonness, plainly and
simply, are qualitatively different tort
concepts 
of 
actionable 
culpability.
Implicit in wanton, willful, or reckless
misconduct is an acting, with knowledge of
danger, or with consciousness, that the
doing or not doing of some act will likely
result in injury....
"'Negligence is usually characterized
as an inattention, thoughtlessness, or
heedlessness, a lack of due care; whereas
wantonness is characterized as an act which
cannot exist without a purpose or design,
a conscious or intentional act. "Simple
negligence is the inadvertent omission of
1071678; 1071679
18
duty; and wanton or willful misconduct is
characterized as such by the state of mind
with which the act or omission is done or
omitted." McNeil v. Munson S.S. Lines, 184
Ala. 420, [423], 63 So. 992 (1913)....
"'....
"'"Willful 
and 
wanton
conduct 
has 
a 
well-defined
meaning at law. It is sometimes
expressed in terms of 'reckless
disregard 
of 
the 
safety 
of
another.' 
Willful 
and 
wanton
conduct should not be confused
with negligence. It has been
correctly stated that the two
concepts are as 'unmixable as oil
and water.'
"'"....
"'"... 
Willfulness 
or
wantonness 
imports 
premeditation,
or knowledge and consciousness
that the injury is likely to
result from the act done or from
the omission to act, and strictly
speaking, 
is 
not 
within 
the
meaning of the term 'negligence,'
which 
conveys 
the 
idea 
of
inadvertence, as distinguished
from 
premeditation 
or 
formed
intention."'
"510 So. 2d at 145-46 (citations omitted). See also,
Central Alabama Electric Cooperative v. Tapley, 546
So. 2d 371 (Ala. 1989)." 
682 So. 2d at 470.  
This Court has also stated that "[i]f there is any
1071678; 1071679
19
evidence from which a jury can reasonably infer wantonness,
the issue should be presented to the jury."  Sellers v.
Sexton, 576 So. 2d 172, 175 (Ala. 1991) (citing McDougle v.
Shaddrix, 534 So. 2d 228 (Ala. 1988)).  See also Clark v.
Black, 630 So. 2d 1012 (Ala. 1993).  
On appeal, Cheshire claims that the facts in this case
are similar to the facts in Ex parte Essary, 992 So. 2d 5
(Ala. 2007), an automobile-accident case in which this Court
held there was no evidence of wantonness.  In Essary, the
defendant was driving his vehicle west and approached an
intersection where a stop sign obligated traffic traveling in
her direction to stop and yield to traffic traveling north or
south on the intersecting road.  There was no stop sign
halting 
the 
northbound 
or 
southbound 
traffic 
on 
the
intersecting road.  As the defendant proceeded through the
intersection, his vehicle collided with a vehicle traveling
north on the intersecting road.  The driver and occupants of
the northbound vehicle sued the defendant, asserting, among
other claims, a claim of wantonness.  The trial court entered
a summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the wantonness
claim.  The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Civil
1071678; 1071679
20
Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment.  The defendant
petitioned this Court for certiorari review of the Court of
Civil Appeals' decision.  In reversing the Court of Civil
Appeals' decision, this Court held that, even when the
evidence was viewed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, there was no evidence of wantonness on the
defendant's part:
"The evidence, viewed, as it must be, in a light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, the nonmovants,
shows that [the defendant] slowed to a 'rolling
stop' at the intersection and attempted to cross the
intersection 
between two moving vehicles. The
plaintiffs' characterization of [the defendant's]
attempt to cross the intersection between two
vehicles as 'accelerating' after a 'rolling stop' to
'shoot the gap' does not elevate [the defendant's]
actual conduct -- as observed by the plaintiffs --
from the negligent failure to exercise good judgment
to a wanton act constituting reckless indifference
to a known danger likely to inflict injury. At best,
the plaintiffs' evidence shows that [the defendant]
... made an error in judgment when he attempted to
'beat the traffic' or 'shoot the gap' by passing
between [two vehicles]. ...
"Although the evidence indicates that [the
defendant] knowingly entered the intersection, there
is nothing from which the trier of fact could infer
that, 
in 
moving 
his 
vehicle 
through 
the
intersection, 
[the defendant's] state of mind
contained the requisite consciousness, awareness, or
perception that injury was likely to, or would
probably, result. ...
"The facts here presented do not establish any
1071678; 1071679
21
basis from which to conclude that [the defendant]
was not possessed of his normal faculties, such as
from 
voluntary 
intoxication, 
rendering 
him
indifferent to the risk of injury to himself when
crossing the intersection if he collided with
another vehicle. Nor is the act ... so inherently
reckless that we might otherwise impute to [the
defendant] a depravity consistent with disregard of
instincts 
of 
safety and self-preservation. We
therefore conclude that, as a matter of law, the
plaintiffs failed to offer substantial evidence
indicating that [the defendant] was conscious that
injury would likely or probably result from his
actions."  
992 So. 2d at 12.  
In the present case, a review of the evidence, viewed in
a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, convinces us that
the plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence as to
each essential element of the claim of wantonness and to show
a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion
that Cheshire's operation of his vehicle amounted to "a wanton
act constituting reckless indifference to a known danger
likely to inflict injury."  Essary, 992 So. 2d at 12.  The
plaintiffs' evidence indicates that Cheshire was familiar with
the road on which the accident occurred, that Cheshire knew
that vehicles were often stopped in the roadway waiting for
traffic to clear in order to make a left turn, that Cheshire
does not recall seeing Putman's vehicle in front of him before
1071678; 1071679
22
the accident, that Cheshire was aware that, in order to safely
operate his truck while pulling a trailer, he needed to alter
his driving habits, that Cheshire misjudged the distance it
would take to stop his vehicle and the trailer, that
maneuvering his vehicle onto the shoulder of Highway 69 would
have been a prudent response if he had had the time to
respond, and that a driver should keep a proper lookout while
driving.  The evidence is insufficient to produce in the mind
of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential
element of wantonness, which requires some degree of conscious
culpability.  George v. Champion Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 852, 854
(Ala. 1991).  There is no evidence to convince a trier of fact
that Cheshire consciously disregarded his familiarity with
Highway 69 and operated his vehicle in such a manner that
injury to someone was likely to occur.  Cheshire's familiarity
with Highway 69, coupled with the fact that he caused an
accident to occur, is not clear and convincing evidence from
which a jury could reasonably infer that Cheshire operated his
vehicle wantonly.  Instead, as in Essary, the evidence merely
establishes that Cheshire made an error in judgment.
Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Cheshire's and
1071678; 1071679
23
Allstate Electric's motions for a JML as to the wantonness
claim.  
The plaintiffs also presented evidence of Cheshire's
conduct immediately following the accident.  Specifically, the
plaintiffs presented evidence showing that Cheshire did not
check on the occupants of Putman's vehicle and that he did not
attempt to help in any way.  However, such evidence is not
germane to determining whether Cheshire was possessed of his
normal faculties before or at the time of the accident.
Therefore, such evidence is irrelevant to whether Cheshire was
operating his vehicle wantonly at the time of the accident. 
Cheshire and Allstate Electric also present arguments
concerning the amount of the punitive damages, which are
rendered moot in light of our holding that the trial court's
denial of Cheshire and Allstate Electric's renewed motions for
a JML was error as to the plaintiffs' wantonness claim against
Cheshire. 
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial
court's judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.  The plaintiffs presented substantial evidence that
1071678; 1071679
24
Cheshire was operating within the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the accident; thus, we affirm the
trial court's judgment insofar as it held that Allstate
Electric was vicariously liable for Cheshire's conduct.
However, the plaintiffs failed to present evidence sufficient
to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction
as to each essential element of the claim of wantonness and a
high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion that
Cheshire was operating his vehicle in a wanton manner when the
accident occurred; thus, we reverse the trial court's judgment
as to the plaintiffs' wantonness claim against Cheshire.  As
a result, the punitive-damages awards are set aside.  Further,
Rule 50(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., grants us the authority to remand
a case for the trial court to determine whether a new trial
should be granted in a case in which the trial court's denial
of a motion for JML is reversed.  Rule 50(d), Ala. R. Civ. P.
(providing that, "[i]f the appellate court reverses the
judgment [denying the motion for a JML], nothing in this rule
precludes it from determining that the appellee is entitled to
a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine
whether a new trial shall be granted"); see also State Farm
1071678; 1071679
25
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 319 (Ala. 1999)
(holding that "Rule 50(d) grants us the authority to award the
appellee a new trial in a case in which we reverse the trial
court's denial of a motion for JML").  Therefore, in light of
the fact that the jury returned a general verdict in favor of
the plaintiffs and our reversal of the trial court's denial of
Cheshire's and Allstate Electric's 
motions for a JML
concerning the plaintiffs' claim of wantonness against
Cheshire, we remand this case to the trial court to determine
whether to grant a new trial on the remaining issues. 
1071678 –- AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND
REMANDED.
1071679 –- AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND
REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
1071678; 1071679
26
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
I concur in the result because of the manner in which the
issue of payment of or reimbursement for transportation
expenses to and from work appears to have been addressed in
the trial court, but not in the appellant's initial brief to
this Court.  In so doing, I do not wish to be understood as
suggesting that the exception to the general rule (that an
employee's negligence while traveling to and from work does
not subject an employer to vicarious liability) when the
employee's transportation expenses are paid or reimbursed, as
it is described in the main opinion, is generally applicable
to third-party respondeat-superior claims against employers.
It appears that few, if any, cases, other that Shaw v. C.B. &
E., Inc., 630 So. 2d 401 (Ala. 1993), apply this rule outside
the workers' compensation context, i.e., when an employer's
liability to a third party under common-law principles of
vicarious liability is at issue.  Even if this exception to
the general rule were properly applicable to such non-workers'
compensation cases, it appears to be a rule applicable only
under narrow circumstances.  See generally Gilmore v. Rust
Eng'g Co., 289 Ala. 46, 265 So. 2d 591 (1972); Ammons v.
1071678; 1071679
27
McClendon, 263 Ala. 651, 83 So. 2d 239 (1955); and 1 Terry A.
Moore, Alabama Workers' Compensation § 11.38 Payment of Travel
Expenses (1998).