Case Title: State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Edn.

Citation: 2006-Ohio-5512

Docket Number: 20041668

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Edn., 111 Ohio St.3d 
568, 2006-Ohio-5512.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. OHIO CONGRESS OF PARENTS & TEACHERS ET AL., 
APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL., 
APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Edn., 
111 Ohio St.3d 568, 2006-Ohio-5512.] 
Schools—Community-school legislation constitutional—R.C. Chapter 3314. 
(No. 2004-1668 – Submitted November 29, 2005 – Decided October 25, 2006.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 03AP-508, 2004-Ohio-4421. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. Chapter 3314, relating to the establishment and operation of community 
schools as part of the state’s educational system, is constitutional, both on its face 
and as applied. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this action, while recognizing that the challengers retain their 
ability to litigate alleged statutory violations against particular schools, we hold 
that community schools, also known as “charter schools,” in and of themselves, 
are not unconstitutional. The appellants and cross-appellees are the Ohio 
Federation of Teachers, the Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, the Ohio 
School Boards Association, other education associations and teachers’ unions, 
certain parents, taxpayers, school district boards of education, and residents of 
various school districts (“appellants”).  Their lawsuit challenges the 
constitutionality of laws for the establishment and operation of Ohio’s community 
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schools enacted by the General Assembly by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215 in 1997 and 
codified at R.C. Chapter 3314.1 
{¶ 2} The appellees and cross-appellants include the State Board of 
Education, Ohio’s Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Ohio Department of 
Education, various Ohio community schools, Ohio community-school operators, 
and White Hat Management, L.L.C., a company that manages 28 community 
schools in the state (“appellees”). 
{¶ 3} The parties filed jurisdictional memoranda asking us to accept this 
case as a discretionary appeal to determine the constitutionality of R.C. Chapter 
3314.  We accepted the appeal and the cross-appeals solely to determine the 
constitutional issues.  Appellants’  charges regarding the establishment and 
operation of community schools are still pending at the trial court. 
{¶ 4} After first providing an overview of the enabling legislation and 
the history of this case, this opinion will analyze the constitutional claims arising 
under the Ohio Constitution, specifically (1) Section 2, Article VI, the Thorough 
and Efficient Clause, (2) Section 3, Article VI, governing city school districts, (3) 
Section 5, Article XII, limiting proceeds of taxes to their stated purposes, and (4) 
Sections 4 and 5, Article VIII, restricting the lending of the state’s credit and the 
state’s assumption of debt. 
I.  Overview of the Community-Schools Act, R.C. Chapter 3314 
{¶ 5} Ohio adopted charter-school legislation when the Ohio General 
Assembly enacted R.C. Chapter 3314 in 1997. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215, 147 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 909, 1187.  As legislatively created, community schools are 
independently governed public schools that are funded from state revenues 
pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3314. 
                                                 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs filed in this matter.   
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3 
{¶ 6} In enacting R.C. Chapter 3314, the General Assembly declared that 
its purposes included “providing parents a choice of academic environments for 
their children and providing the education community with the opportunity to 
establish limited experimental educational programs in a deregulated setting.” 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215, Section 50.52, Subsection 2(B), 147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
2043.  Community schools are permitted to target and tailor programs for small 
student populations such as learning-disabled students or dropouts from 
traditional schools.  R.C. 3314.06(B), 3314.03(A)(2), and 3314.04. 
{¶ 7} The General Assembly explained that “[a] community school 
created under this chapter is a public school, independent of any school district, 
and is part of the state’s program of education.”  R.C. 3314.01(B).  Community 
schools are state-funded, R.C. 3314.08(D), but each is privately run, R.C. 3314.01 
and 3314.02(B) and (C)(1).  Each community school must be formed as either a 
nonprofit corporation or a public-benefit corporation.  R.C. 3314.03(A)(1).  
Community schools cannot charge tuition, R.C. 3314.08(I), and must be 
nonsectarian, R.C. 3314.03(A)(11)(c), with enrollment policies that comply with 
R.C. 3314.06.  While community schools are exempt from certain state laws and 
regulations, R.C. 3314.04, they must comply with many of the same statewide 
academic standards, R.C. 3314.03(A)(11).  Community schools contract with 
sponsors, which are responsible for monitoring their performance and compliance 
with applicable standards and requirements. R.C. 3314.03(A)(4).  In turn, 
sponsors are monitored and overseen by the Ohio Department of Education  
(“ODE”).  R.C. 3314.015. 
{¶ 8} Formerly, sponsors were required to be public entities (i.e., local 
boards of education, the ODE, educational service centers, or trustees of 
universities or their designees).  Former R.C. 3314.02(A)(1) and (C)(1), 1999 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 282, 148 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2022-2023. Since April 8, 2003, 
certain other approved, nonprofit, education-oriented entities may also be 
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sponsors. R.C. 3314.02(C)(1)(f), 2002 Sub.H.B. No. 364, 149 Ohio Laws, Part V, 
10,208 and 10,210.   Under R.C. 3314.015(A), the ODE must approve sponsors, 
monitor the effectiveness of their oversight of their schools, and issue reports on 
the effectiveness of the schools’ academic programs, operations, and legal 
compliance and on their financial condition.  Sponsors must seek ODE approval, 
according to criteria, procedures, and deadlines established by ODE.  R.C. 
3314.015(B).  If a sponsor becomes unwilling or unable to complete its duties, 
ODE may revoke approval to act as a sponsor and assume direct sponsorship of 
the community school in question for up to two years.  R.C. 3314.015(C). 
{¶ 9} Each community school is governed by a contract between the 
governing authority of the school and its sponsor.  R.C. 3314.03.  The initial 
contract term may last no more than five years.  R.C. 3314.03(A)(13). If the 
school does not meet its contract objectives, the sponsor may choose not to renew 
the contract. Alternatively, the sponsor may terminate the contract for good cause 
before the end of the contract’s term.  R.C. 3314.07. 
{¶ 10} Ohio is not alone in adopting charter-school legislation.  As of 
1992 a majority of states allow for the creation of charter schools, typically 
allowing those schools to use a per-pupil funding stream from government 
sources (either state or local) to pay for the schools.  With the increasing 
prevalence of charter schools has come increased statutory oversight and 
regulation, especially for licensing, regulatory inspections, and academic testing.  
50 State Statutory Survey, “Charter School Licensing Requirements, Inspections, 
and Testing” (2006).  R.C. Chapter 3314 has been amended frequently since it 
was enacted,2  and the law governing community schools continues to evolve. 
                                                 
2 Revisions to R.C. Chapter 3314 have included Am.Sub.S.B. No. 55, 147 Ohio Laws, Part III, 
6542, 6567, which expanded the ability to create community schools;  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 770, 147 
Ohio Laws, Part III, 5609, 5638, which extended the maximum term of sponsorship contracts 
from three to five years; Am.Sub.H.B. No. 282, 148 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1956, 2020, which 
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II. Procedural History of Case 
{¶ 11} The appellants filed suit on May 14, 2001, requesting declaratory 
and injunctive relief and writs of mandamus, raising several constitutional 
challenges to various aspects of R.C. Chapter 3314.  The appellants filed a third 
amended complaint asserting ten different claims, including several as bases for 
the trial court to issue a declaratory judgment stating that R.C. Chapter 3314 is 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied. 
{¶ 12} At a status conference on November 9, 2001, the trial judge 
bifurcated the litigation to reduce the potential burden on the parties.  In the first 
phase, they were to focus solely on legal issues that could be decided without 
discovery—these issues relate to the constitutional challenges to Ohio’s 
community-school program. In the second phase, which is still pending, the trial 
court will examine the factual claims that address compliance with statutes and 
with sponsorship contracts.  As already noted, the first phase is the subject of the 
parties’ discretionary appeal and cross-appeals, which we accepted solely to 
decide the constitutional challenges.3 
{¶ 13} On May 20, 2002, several motions were filed:  (1) the appellants 
filed motions for summary judgment on counts four, five, seven, eight, nine, and 
ten, (2) the state appellees filed a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint 
and for summary judgment, (3) the community-school appellees filed a motion for 
                                                                                                                                     
changed certain features of community schools, requiring them to have fiscal officers and 
requiring the ODE to issue an annual report card for each school;  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 94, 149 Ohio 
Laws, Part III, 4126, 4555, which created a loan-guarantee program; 2002 Sub.H.B. No. 364, 
which made the ODE responsible for the oversight and approval of sponsors.  This list is not 
comprehensive, but serves to show some of the amendments to charter-school legislation.   
3 Had we waited to consider all issues as Justice O’Donnell suggests, the parties would have been 
back before this court later, with most of the same claims.  (The court of appeals remanded most 
of the claims but affirmed the dismissal of two.  If we had not accepted review of that appellate 
decision or if we dismissed the case now, the decision on those claims would remain standing as 
res judicata, and those claims would not be subject to further litigation on remand or a subsequent 
appeal.)  The constitutional  issues have been joined and have been fully briefed.  With respect to   
those legal issues, there is no fact-finding to be done.   
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judgment on the pleadings on counts three, four, five, six, seven, and eight, and 
(4) White Hat  filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court 
identified counts four, five, six, and seven of the third amended complaint as the 
legal claims to be resolved based on the pleadings and motions filed by the 
parties. 
{¶ 14} In its decision, the trial court first considered count four of the 
third amended complaint.  This count is a facial challenge to R.C. Chapter 3314, 
alleging that the statute violates both Section 3, Article VI and Section 5, Article 
XII of the Ohio Constitution, sections that deal with the powers of city school 
boards and restrictions on the use of tax revenue.  Count four contains two 
underlying claims.  First, the appellants allege that Section 3, Article VI has been 
violated because R.C. Chapter 3314 has “usurped this constitutional right of local 
educational self-determination by allowing the creation of privately owned 
‘community schools’ not authorized or governed by locally elected school 
boards.”  The trial court disagreed and held that the General Assembly has the 
power to create and modify school districts as it believes necessary, without the 
approval of the school districts. Second, the appellants claim that the method of 
funding community schools violates Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution by 
in effect diverting local tax dollars to community schools.  The trial court 
disagreed again and found that the appellants “cannot show a diversion of local 
tax levies to community schools in violation of Section 5, Article XII of the Ohio 
Constitution.” 
{¶ 15} Counts five and six are challenges to R.C. Chapter 3314 on its face 
and as applied.  In these counts, the appellants allege that community schools 
violate Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution, the Thorough and Efficient 
Clause.  The appellants argue that community schools are not part of the thorough 
and efficient system of common schools, because they have been allowed to 
operate with different standards.  They also claim that the manner in which 
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7 
community schools are funded takes money away from traditional school 
districts, making them less thorough and efficient.  The trial court found these 
claims barred by res judicata because DeRolph v. State (2002), 97 Ohio St.3d 434, 
2002-Ohio-6750, 780 N.E.2d 529, had  determined already that the public school 
system, of which community schools are part, is not constitutionally thorough and 
efficient. 
{¶ 16} Count seven alleges that R.C. 3314.08(J), 3318.50, and 3318.52 
violate Sections 4 and 5, Article VIII, which restrict the lending of the state’s 
credit and the state’s assumption of debt.  The statutory provisions at issue under 
this count allow community schools to borrow money in anticipation of state 
payments and to receive state-guaranteed loans for buildings and other facilities.  
Because community schools are organized for a public purpose (educating 
children), the trial court found that R.C. 3314.08(J), 3318.50, and 3318.52 permit 
community schools to borrow money and the state to guarantee loans without 
constitutional violation. 
{¶ 17} The trial court granted the state appellees’ motion to dismiss, the 
community-school appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, and White 
Hat’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on counts four through seven.  The 
trial court denied appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment. 
{¶ 18} The Court of Appeals for Franklin County  agreed with the trial 
court on count four that the General Assembly’s exercise of its broad power to 
create, change, or modify the state’s school districts does not impinge on Section 
3, Article VI.  However, the court disagreed with the decision to dismiss the 
portion of count four that implicates Section 5, Article XII, the constitutional 
provision that requires that local levy funds go to their intended purpose.  The 
court of appeals found that the appellants’ claim that the method of funding 
community schools diverts state funds from local school districts raises issues of 
fact.  Accordingly, the court remanded this claim, as well as counts five, six, and 
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seven.4  Both sides filed jurisdictional memoranda asking this court to address the 
legal merits of all of appellants’ constitutional claims.  We accepted all 
propositions of law (except the proposition addressing the res judicata effects of 
DeRolph). 
III. Legal Analysis 
A.  Summary of Constitutional Claims 
{¶ 19} The complaint in this case asserted that numerous constitutional 
provisions were implicated in this case, so we will first summarize the 
constitutional provisions and the relevant standards of proof before analyzing 
each claim in turn.  We are asked to determine whether R.C. Chapter 3314 
violates Section 2, Article VI, which contains the Thorough and Efficient Clause; 
Section 3, Article VI, which governs the organization of city school districts; 
Section 5, Article XII, which limits tax proceeds to their stated purposes; and 
Sections 4 and 5, Article VIII, which restricts the state’s lending of credit and 
assumption of debt.5     
B.  Standard of Proof 
{¶ 20} Initially, we must acknowledge that legislative enactments are 
entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality. N. Ohio Patrolmen’s 
Benevolent Assn. v. Parma (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 375, 377, 15 O.O.3d 450, 402 
N.E.2d 519. When the constitutionality of legislation is attacked, we must 
                                                 
4 The court of appeals determined that res judicata did not bar litigation of counts 5 and 6 and 
remanded these counts to the trial court for further proceedings.  The court of appeals also 
remanded count seven, advising that the trial court may at the same time examine the issues in this 
count, even if only as a part of the remaining claims. 
5 Other states, like Michigan, California, Utah, and New Jersey,  have considered similar claims 
under similar constitutional provisions and have rejected them.  Council of Orgs. & Others for 
Edn. about Parochiaid, Inc. v. Engler (1997), 455 Mich. 557, 566 N.W.2d 208; Wilson v. State 
Bd. of Edn. (1999), 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 745; Utah School Bds. Assn. v. Utah 
State Bd. of Edn. (Utah 2001), 17 P.3d 1125, 1129, 1131; and In re Grant of Charter School 
Application of Englewood on the Palisades Charter School (2000), 164 N.J. 316, 753 A.2d 687.   
 
January Term, 2006 
9 
interpret the applicable constitutional provisions and acknowledge that “a court 
has nothing to do with the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive 
concern of the legislative branch of the government.  When the validity of a 
statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to 
determine whether it transcends the limits of legislative power.”  State ex rel. 
Bishop v.  Mt. Orab Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn.  (1942), 139 Ohio St. 427, 
438, 22 O.O. 494, 40 N.E.2d 913.  A statute should not be declared 
unconstitutional “unless it ‘appear[s] beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
legislation and constitutional provision are clearly incompatible.’ ”  Kelleys Island 
Caddy Shack, Inc. v. Zaino, 96 Ohio St.3d 375, 2002-Ohio-4930, 775 N.E.2d 489, 
¶ 10, quoting State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 
O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Furthermore, a statute 
“must be enforced unless it is in clear and irreconcilable conflict with some 
express provision of the constitution.”  Spivey v. Ohio (N.D.Ohio 1998), 999 
F.Supp. 987, 999.  Thus, in reviewing these constitutional claims, we must give 
due deference to the General Assembly.  But this still means, of course, that we 
must conduct an independent review. 
{¶ 21} The constitutional challenges to the statutes involve facial 
challenges as well as challenges to the application of R.C. Chapter 3314. The two 
types of challenges require different standards of proof.  To prevail on a facial 
constitutional challenge, the challenger must prove the constitutional defect, using 
the highest standard of proof, which is also used in criminal cases, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 
O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus.  To prevail on a 
constitutional challenge to the statute as applied, the challenger must present clear 
and convincing evidence of the statute’s constitutional defect.  Belden v. Union 
Cent. Life Ins. Co. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 329, 28 O.O. 295, 55 N.E.2d 629, 
paragraph six of the syllabus.  “ ‘Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or 
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degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of evidence,” but not 
to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in 
criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm 
belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’ ” Lansdowne v. 
Beacon Journal Publishing Co. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 176, 180-181, 512 N.E.2d 
979, quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469, 53 O.O. 361, 120 N.E.2d 
118, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 22} With this background in mind, we turn to the appellants’ specific 
claims. 
C. Counts Five and Six:  The “common schools” argument 
1. Introduction 
{¶ 23} Because counts five and six both implicate the Thorough and 
Efficient Clause of the Ohio Constitution, we will discuss both counts in this 
section.  The appellants claim that R.C. Chapter 3314, the Ohio Community-
Schools Act, violates the Thorough and Efficient Clause of Section 2, Article VI 
of the Ohio Constitution. Section 2 provides: 
{¶ 24} “The General Assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, 
or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a 
thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state * * *.” 
{¶ 25} The appellants argue in count five that community schools violate 
the Thorough and Efficient Clause because they are not part of the system of 
common schools, being publicly funded but privately owned and not subject to 
uniform statewide standards.  Count six provides the second part of their 
argument, asserting that because community schools are state-funded, they have 
diverted money from local school districts, thus depriving the districts of the 
ability to provide a thorough and efficient educational system.  Both claims allege 
that the statutes, as applied, are unconstitutional.  Thus, the appellants must 
present clear and convincing evidence of the statutes’ constitutional defect.  
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Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, 28 O.O. 295, 55 N.E.2d 
629. 
{¶ 26} In response to the argument that community schools are 
unconstitutional because they are privately owned and subject to different 
standards, the appellees contend that the General Assembly is authorized by the 
Thorough and Efficient Clause to create community schools as part of Ohio’s 
system of common schools.  The appellees maintain that community schools do 
not have to be owned or operated by the public to be part of the common-school 
system.  Community schools have been declared to be “public schools, 
independent of any school district, and * * * part of the state’s program of 
education.”  R.C. 3314.01(B).  Furthermore, the appellees assert that because the 
term “common schools” is not defined in the Constitution, and because there is no 
constitutional requirement that all public schools must be governmentally owned 
and operated, the General Assembly should be allowed to determine the 
requirements of “common schools.” 
 
2. Count Five: Different standards for schools under private ownership 
{¶ 27} Throughout time, new educational movements have faced 
opponents and detractors.  But just as the common-school movement of the 1800s 
increasingly gained supporters throughout the United States, so too has the 
charter-school movement. 
{¶ 28} The Thorough and Efficient Clause was adopted at the 1851 
Constitutional Convention, largely in response to the common-school movement.  
Before Section 2, Article VI was adopted, Ohio had officially encouraged, but had 
not required, education. Section 3, Article VIII, Ohio Constitution of 1802.  
Originally, “[s]chools received no public aid except through revenues from lands 
set aside by Congress for the purpose in the Northwest Territory. * * * Early Ohio 
schools were private, organized by individual schoolmasters, a group of 
neighbors, a church, or a charitable society.  Some were free, but many charged 
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tuition in addition to receiving a share of the school lands revenue * * *.”  
Editor’s Comment to Section 2, Article VI, in Baldwin’s Ohio Revised Code 
Annotated (2004).The common-school movement, originating in Massachusetts 
through the work of Horace Mann, held the basic ideology that all citizens should 
have “a common foundation of literacy, morality, and patriotism, regardless of 
their origins, through free public schools supported by taxes, with compulsory 
school attendance and supervision at the state level.”  Id.  Common schools were 
highly controversial at first, but gained wide acceptance after 1841.  By 1851, the 
common-school movement had wide support in Ohio, leading to the adoption of 
the Thorough and Efficient Clause.  Id. 
{¶ 29} As early as 1923, this court had the opportunity to interpret this 
clause and to set forth a standard for evaluating a thorough and efficient system of 
common schools.  Miller v. Korns (1923), 107 Ohio St. 287, 140 N.E. 773.  We 
recognized that the purpose of providing a thorough and efficient system was 
statewide in nature and “[w]ith this very state purpose in view, regarding the 
problem as a state-wide problem, the sovereign people made it mandatory upon 
the General Assembly to secure not merely a system of common schools, but a 
system thorough and efficient throughout the state.”  Id. at 297–298, 140 N.E. 
773.  Furthermore, in DeRolph v. State, Chief Justice Moyer noted that “our 
Constitution commits the responsibility for ascribing meaning to the phrase 
‘thorough and efficient’ to the General Assembly and not to this court.”  DeRolph 
v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193 at 264, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Moyer, C.J., 
dissenting).  As the statewide body, the General Assembly has the legislative 
authority and latitude to set the standards and requirements for common schools, 
including different standards for community schools.  In fulfilling its 
governmental role, it must still function  according to  its constitutional directive. 
{¶ 30} In enacting community-school legislation, the General Assembly 
added to the traditional school system by providing for statewide schools that 
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have more flexibility in their operation. Community schools were designed to 
give parents a choice and give educators “the opportunity to establish limited 
experimental educational programs in a deregulated setting.” 1997 Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 215, Section 50.52, Subsection 2(B), 147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2043. 
Deregulation implies exemption, and while it is true that community schools are 
exempted from certain state standards,6 there are others to which the schools must 
also adhere.  Community school students must pass the same graduation test that 
students in traditional public schools must pass.  R.C. 3314.03(A)(11)(f).  
Community schools must administer proficiency and achievement tests, R.C. 
3314.03(A)(11)(d), and diagnostic tests, R.C. 3314.03(A)(3), maintain adequate 
facilities and meet all health and safety standards, R.C. 3314.05, and comply with 
numerous Revised Code sections as if they were school districts, R.C. 
3314.03(A)(11)(d). (See Appendix A for additional requirements from which 
community schools are not exempt.) Community-school sponsors are monitored 
and supervised by the ODE, the same department that oversees traditional public 
schools.  R.C.  3314.015. Although Justice Resnick’s dissent focuses on the 
requirements that community schools are exempted from, upon closer 
examination, many of these exemptions are picayune in nature. 
{¶ 31} The Ohio Community-Schools Act was drafted with the intent that 
parental choice and sponsor control would hold community schools accountable, 
in a fashion similar to traditional school management. In exchange for enhanced 
flexibility, community schools face heightened accountability to parents and 
sponsors. Either can threaten shutdown, sponsors by suspending operations 
pursuant to R.C. 3314.072, and parents by withdrawing their children.  In fact, 
                                                 
6 R.C. 3314.04 exempts community schools from most state laws and regulations dealing with 
public schools except the state laws that grant certain rights to parents and laws specified in the 
sponsor contract and in R.C. Chapter 3314 itself.  See Appendix A for a list of those laws that 
community school must still comply with.   
 
 
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internet- or computer-based community schools lose their funding if they do not 
show expected gains for two years, and any community school will be 
permanently shut down if it fails to meet expected goals for three years.  R.C. 
3314.36.  Traditional schools, on the other hand, may not be shut down no matter 
how poorly they perform (although they will face decreased funding). R.C. 
3302.04(F).  Because community schools may serve a targeted student 
population, their requirements may be more narrowly tailored.  This idea is not 
totally new to Ohio’s system of education.  In the past, for example, the General 
Assembly has permitted different requirements for vocational education and 
special education and has allowed traditional schools to establish magnet schools 
and specialized schools in arts and science.  The General Assembly’s statutory 
scheme sets forth a framework, in keeping with its constitutional directive, for 
alternative accountability and academic standards for community schools. 
{¶ 32} Contrary to Justice Resnick’s statement in dissent, we do not 
approve of just “any schooling arrangement.”  ¶ 82.  The Ohio Constitution 
requires establishment of a system of common schools. This requirement is 
grounded in the state’s interest in ensuring that all children receive an adequate 
education that complies with the Thorough and Efficient Clause.  To achieve the 
goal of improving and customizing public education programs, the General 
Assembly has augmented the state’s public school system with public community 
schools. The expressed legislative intent is to provide a chance of educational 
success for students who may be better served in their educational needs in 
alternative settings.  Requiring community schools to be operated just like 
traditional public schools would extinguish the experimental spirit behind R.C. 
Chapter 3314. 
{¶ 33} While the wide discretion granted to the General Assembly is not 
without limits,  Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio 
St.2d 368, 387, 12 O.O.3d 327, 390 N.E.2d 813, we hold that the General 
January Term, 2006 
15 
Assembly has not transgressed the limits of its legislative power so as to render 
R.C. Chapter 3314 unconstitutional under the Thorough and Efficient Clause.  
Over time, the General Assembly has increased the number of state requirements 
with which community schools must comply,7 and has also enacted additional, 
specific, and unique requirements such as control and oversight by sponsors, R.C. 
3314.03, mandated forms of entity status, R.C. 3314.03(A)(1), and annual 
reporting requirements on fiscal, operational, and academic issues, R.C. 
3314.03(A)(11)(g) and 3314.03(D). 
{¶ 34} The General Assembly is the branch of state government charged 
by the Ohio Constitution with making educational policy choices for the 
education of our state’s children.  Our personal choices are not relevant to this 
task.  The appellants have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is 
unconstitutional on its face; nor have they met their high burden of presenting 
clear and convincing evidence of the statute’s unconstitutionality as applied. We 
hold that the General Assembly has the authority to set the standards and 
requirements for a system of common schools.  In providing for community 
schools within that system, the state legislature has not exceeded its powers. 
3. Count Six: Funding community schools and a thorough and efficient 
system 
{¶ 35} Count six of the complaint alleges that the funding method used to 
support community schools diverts funds from city school districts, depriving 
them of the ability to provide a thorough and efficient system of common schools.  
Once again, as this claim is a constitutional challenge to R.C.  Chapter 3314 as 
applied, the appellants must present clear and convincing evidence that R.C. 
Chapter 3314 is unconstitutional.  State v. Renalist, Inc. (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 
276, 279, 10 O.O.3d 408, 383 N.E.2d 892.  
                                                 
7 Compare R.C. 3314.03(A)(11)(d) with the original 1997 version in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215, 147 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 1190.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
{¶ 36} Appellants argue that the community schools have made urban 
districts more reliant on local property taxes because when a student leaves a 
district for a community school, the state reduces the state funding that the district 
receives for the student.  Nothing in the Constitution, however, prohibits the 
General Assembly from reducing funding because a school district’s enrollment 
decreases.  If a child moves out of the district altogether, the state is permitted to 
reduce its funding to that child’s district because state money follows the child. 
For example, if a child leaves a school district to attend private school, or to be 
schooled at home, the state is required to reduce its funding to that district.8  The 
same thing occurs when a child opts to attend a community school.  R.C. 3314.08. 
Whenever a student leaves, for any reason, the school district’s funding is 
decreased, and the district continues to receive state funding based on the students 
actually attending.  Traditional schools still receive the full amount of state funds 
for the actual number of students enrolled. 
{¶ 37} The state adjusts its level of funding to a school district based on 
enrollment, but the local share works differently, as a constant.  The local share of 
funding remains the same no matter who attends the district school.  If district 
enrollment decreases, the local share, being constant, constitutes a higher 
percentage of district funding.  On the other hand, if district enrollment increases, 
the local share constitutes a lower percentage of district funding.  In dissent, 
Justice Pfeifer argues that community schools unconstitutionally increase reliance 
on local funding for district schools, invoking DeRolph v. State.  The dissent’s 
citation of DeRolph is a red herring. DeRolph focused on R.C. Chapter 3317, the 
School Foundation Program, for the allocation of state basic aid.  The School 
Foundation Program conditioned the receipt of state aid on the levy of local 
property tax revenues.  R.C. 3317.01(A).  What the DeRolph majority found so 
                                                 
8  State funding of school districts depends on enrollment. R.C. 3317.022 and 3317.03. 
January Term, 2006 
17 
egregious was Ohio’s public schools’ heavy dependence upon local property taxes 
for their support.  That simply is not the case here.  Community schools do not 
rely on local property taxes, as they are funded entirely by the state, under an 
entirely different formula, set forth in a different statute.  Community schools 
cannot levy or spend local taxes.  Furthermore, Ohio’s traditional school system is 
not made more reliant on local taxes because of community schools. The state 
treats community-school students in the same way it has treated any student who 
has ever left a school district.  It reduces its per-pupil funding to the school 
district, just as it does when students leave for private schools, for other school 
districts, or for home schooling. 
{¶ 38} The mere increase or decrease in the local share percentage does 
not violate the Thorough and Efficient Clause, because the district still receives 
state funding for the children actually attending the district traditional schools.  
Community schools never receive any local tax money.  In fact, the Legislative 
Office of Education Oversight stated that “it should be clarified that community 
schools do not take locally-generated tax dollars away from districts * * *.”  
(Emphasis 
sic.) 
LOEO, 
Community 
Schools 
in 
Ohio: 
Second-Year 
Implementation Report, Volume I:  Policy Issues (Apr. 2001) 27.  It explained 
that “[o]nce the local share is subtracted from the total base cost funding, the state 
is responsible for providing any amount thereafter.”  In other words, the state still 
fulfills its obligation to fund each student at a specific level according to the 
statutory formula. 
{¶ 39} Section 2, Article VI expressly provides that the General Assembly 
shall make provisions to secure a thorough and efficient system of common 
schools.  The General Assembly has the exclusive authority to spend tax revenues 
to further a statewide system of schools compatible with the Constitution.  
Exercising its discretion, the General Assembly made provisions for community 
schools when it directed that the state would be the sole source of funding for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
community schools for their base formula amounts.  R.C. 3314.08.  Community 
schools cannot levy local taxes or charge tuition. R.C. 3314.08(H) and (I). When a 
student leaves a traditional school to attend a community school, the state funds 
follow the student.  Accordingly, we find that R.C. Chapter 3314, as applied, is 
constitutional. The appellants have not presented clear and convincing evidence 
that community schools are raiding local funds that school districts are otherwise 
entitled to receive. 
{¶ 40} The next claim that we will examine contains two constitutional 
provisions: one dealing with the authority of city school boards, and the other 
with the levy of local taxes. 
 
D. Count Four:  Section 3, Article VI and Section 5, Article XII 
authority of city school boards and diversion of local tax money 
{¶ 41} Count four of the third amended complaint is a facial challenge to 
the statutes, claiming that R.C. Chapter 3314 violates local citizens’ rights under 
Section 3, Article VI because community schools within city school districts are 
not under the control of local voters or of  school boards.  Count four also 
contends that the statute offends Section 5, Article XII because local tax dollars 
are in effect diverted to community schools.  To overcome the presumption of 
constitutionality, the appellants must prove that the statute is unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the highest standard of proof.  State ex rel. Dickman v. 
Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of 
the syllabus. 
1. Authority of city school boards 
{¶ 42} Section 3, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution provides: 
{¶ 43} “Provision shall be made by law for the organization, 
administration and control of the public school system of the state supported by 
public funds: provided, that each school district embraced wholly or in part within 
any city shall have the power by referendum vote to determine for itself the 
January Term, 2006 
19 
number of members and the organization of the district board of education, and 
provision shall be made by law for the exercise of this power by such school 
districts.” 
{¶ 44} Under R.C. 3314.01(B), a community school is a “public school, 
independent of any school district.”  The appellants argue that citizens of cities 
have the exclusive right to exercise authority over public education through the 
election of school boards and approval of local school tax levies, and because 
community schools are not authorized or governed by city school boards, this 
constitutional right of local educational self-determination is usurped. 
{¶ 45} This court has held that the General Assembly has the power to 
create and modify school districts.  In State ex rel. Core v. Green (1953), 160 
Ohio St. 175, 51 O.O. 442, 115 N.E.2d 157, the court stated, “The General 
Assembly has the power to provide for the creation of school districts, for changes 
and modifications thereof, and for the methods by which changes and 
modifications may be accomplished.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  An 
Ohio federal court recognized the General Assembly’s authority to provide for the 
modification of school districts when it approved the creation of a new 
classification of school districts called “municipal school districts.” Spivey v. 
Ohio, 999 F.Supp. at 997.  In Spivey, the legislation under review gave the mayor 
of Cleveland authority to appoint members of the Cleveland City School District 
Board of Education, and local voters were not given the opportunity to 
preapprove any changes in the school board.  R.C. 3311.71 et seq. 
{¶ 46} In analyzing this specific issue in the case before us, the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County opined that the plain language of Section 3, Article 
VI “does not give those [local] voters more power than the General Assembly to 
create policy and organize and administer a system of public education 
throughout the state.”  2004-Ohio-4421, ¶ 39.  We agree with this statement. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
{¶ 47} Voters in city school districts have the right to vote on the number 
of members and the organization of their city school boards.  In turn, the school 
boards have authority over the districts they are elected to serve.  Section 3, 
Article IV governs questions of size and organization, not the power and 
authority, of city school boards.  In Marion Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Marion Cty. Bd. of Edn. (1958), 167 Ohio St. 543, 545, 5 O.O.2d 216, 150 N.E.2d 
407, this court held that “[b]oards of education have only such powers as are 
conferred by statute.”  A board of education is “a mere instrumentality of the state 
to accomplish its purpose in establishing and carrying forward a system of 
common schools throughout the state.”  Cincinnati Bd. of Edn. v. Volk (1905), 72 
Ohio St. 469, 485, 74 N.E. 646.  By choosing to create community schools as part 
of the state’s program of education but independent of school districts, the 
General Assembly has not intruded on the powers of city school boards.  
Applying the facial-challenge standard, we hold that the appellants have not 
proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the powers of city school districts have 
been usurped, rendering R.C. Chapter 3314 unconstitutional.  Section 3, Article 
VI of the Ohio Constitution does not prevent the General Assembly from creating 
additional schools that are located within city school districts but are not part of 
the district. 
2. Diversion of local tax money 
{¶ 48} Count four also alleges that R.C. Chapter 3314 violates Section 5, 
Article XII of the Ohio Constitution by diverting local tax dollars to community 
schools, a contention similar to the constitutional claim asserted under the 
Thorough and Efficient Clause. 
{¶ 49} Section 5, Article XII of the Ohio Constitution provides:   
{¶ 50} “No tax shall be levied, except in pursuance of law; and every law 
imposing a tax, shall state, distinctly, the object of the same, to which only, it 
shall be applied.” 
January Term, 2006 
21 
{¶ 51} In support of this claim of diversion of local tax dollars, the 
appellants maintain that the community-school funding scheme violates voters’ 
rights by taking the locally voted property taxes approved for the local school 
districts and giving them to community schools.  While the appellants admit that 
“the money given to community schools comes from the State’s bank account,” 
they contend that deducting the full per-pupil formula amount from the school 
district’s money when a student leaves for a community school is equivalent to 
taking local tax money. 
{¶ 52} Community schools are funded differently than are traditional 
schools.  Funding for traditional schools is set forth in R.C. 3317.012; funding for 
community schools is set forth in R.C. 33314.08.  Community schools are 
primarily funded by a per capita subsidy taken from the state’s basic aid to the 
school districts that the students in community schools are entitled to attend.  R.C. 
3314.08 clearly confirms that funding for community schools comes from state 
funds pursuant to the funding formula.  Funds raised by local school districts, 
such as funds derived from local levies, are never sent from the local school 
district to the community schools, nor are any funds from the local school district 
to the state ever redirected to the community schools. 
{¶ 53} Funding formulas for traditional and community schools are 
complex, although we may summarize them by saying that state money follows 
the student.  In general, under both formulas, the state guarantees a basic 
minimum level of funding for each student, called the “formula amount.”  R.C. 
3317.02. The General Assembly has determined the formula amount for both 
school districts and community schools, and these amounts have been codified in 
separate sections of the Revised Code.  For community schools, the formula 
amount of R.C. 3314.03 can never exceed the traditional schools’ amount of R.C. 
3317.02(B).  Community schools must set forth this amount in their annual 
financial plans under R.C. 3314.03(A)(15).  Each district and each community 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
school also has a cost-of-doing-business factor assigned to it, which varies from 
county to county.  R.C. 3317.02(N) and 3314.08(A)(2)  and (C)(1)(a). 
{¶ 54} Under the school districts’ formula, they are funded from a 
combination of state and local tax dollars.  To reach the state and local amount for 
a school district, the state multiplies the formula amount by the cost-of-doing-
business factor to reach a preliminary amount.  R.C. 3317.022. 
{¶ 55} The “charge-off amount,” representing the local tax dollars raised, 
comes into play next in the formula.  Local property-tax contributions are not 
determined on a per-student basis, but are instead determined by property wealth 
and the tax rate within a district.  Each district is assumed to contribute 23 mills 
times the value of local tax base to its funding level, R.C. 3317.022, and as stated 
earlier, this local district share is a constant amount that does not fluctuate based 
upon student population.  The charge-off amount is then subtracted from the 
preliminary amount.  Once the charge-off amount is deducted, the remaining 
funding comes from the state in order to reach the formula amount specified in 
R.C. 3317.12 by the General Assembly.   
{¶ 56} In using the formula for community schools,9 the ODE multiplies 
the number of students enrolled in a community school times the base formula 
amount times the cost-of-doing-business factor.  R.C. 3314.08(D).  For each 
student, the state then deducts the formula amount, adjusted by the cost-of-doing-
business factor, from the funding for the school district that the student would 
have attended. R.C. 3314.08(C).  Consequently, when a student transfers to a 
community school from a school district, the district loses as much funding as it 
would if the student leaves for another school district, for a private school, or to 
be home schooled. 
                                                 
9 R.C. 3314.08 offers many adjustments to the formula, including the possibility of proration in 
R.C. 3314.08(D), but for ease of discussion we have excluded the nuances and possible 
permutations to the formula.   
January Term, 2006 
23 
{¶ 57} The appellants argue that because the state deducts the entire 
formula amount for any student who leaves a traditional school for a community 
school, the deduction has the effect of increasing school districts’ local share.  
However, a change in the number of students does not affect the amount of the 
school district’s local share, because local tax dollars are contributed by the 
district’s taxpayers  and do not depend upon the number of students attending the 
school. R.C. 3314.08 and 3317.022.  The full amount of the local tax money will 
continue to be available to the local school district.  In other words, state funds 
follow the student; local funds do not. 
{¶ 58} We are not persuaded by appellants’ argument that local tax money 
is diverted to community schools under the funding formula.  Certain traditional 
schools may rely more on local tax dollars, but students who leave the district 
leave with their own per-student allocation of state money, so this means that 
local tax dollars are never actually paid to community schools.  Under the funding 
provisions of R.C. 3314.08(D), the tax dollars that fund community schools come 
entirely from the state. 
{¶ 59} The appellants are concerned that students are leaving traditional 
schools for community schools and that traditional schools are bearing the burden 
of competition.  Community-school opponents point to certain community 
schools that have experienced financial and operational issues as reason for 
rejection of the whole concept.  Today’s question, however, is not whether 
particular schools are operating within the law but whether R.C. Chapter 3314, as 
enacted, satisfies the Constitution.  Any allegations about the manner in which 
certain community schools are run are properly addressed in the appellants’ 
second cause of action, pending in the trial court.  School funding continues to be 
an educational policy matter of immense concern and heated debate.  Educational 
policy matters, however, are best left to the General Assembly, which is charged 
with enacting legislation that reflects the policy choices of the state’s constituents. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
{¶ 60} We are now considering only the constitutional challenges in this 
case, and from a constitutional perspective, we conclude that appellants have not 
proved a violation of the prohibition in Section 5, Article XII against the 
application of local taxes, because local tax dollars are not diverted to the state-
funded community schools. 
{¶ 61} The final claim at issue in this case deals with the financial 
relationship between the state and community schools under two constitutional 
provisions. 
 
E. Count Seven:  Sections 4 and 5, Article VIII:  Community schools 
and state credit and loans 
{¶ 62} Count seven of the third amended complaint alleges that R.C. 
3314.08(J), which permits community schools to borrow money from the state, 
and R.C. 3318.50 and 3318.52, which provide loan guarantees to community 
schools, are unconstitutional. 
1. Extending state credit to community schools 
{¶ 63} Section 4, Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution provides: 
{¶ 64} “The credit of the state shall not, in any manner, be given or loaned 
to, or in aid of, any individual association or corporation whatever; nor shall the 
state ever hereafter become a joint owner, or stockholder, in any company or 
association, in this state, or elsewhere, formed for any purpose whatever.” 
{¶ 65} The provisions of the statutes at issue here, R.C. 3314.08(J),  
3318.50, and 3318.52, allow community schools to borrow money in anticipation 
of state funding,  establish a classroom-facilities loan-guarantee program, and 
establish a community-school loan-guarantee fund. Citing Section 4, Article VIII, 
the appellants contend that guaranteeing loans and funding to community schools 
constitutes an unconstitutional lending of the state’s credit to aid individual 
associations or corporations.  In challenging the statute on its face, they must 
prove its constitutional defect beyond a reasonable doubt.  State ex rel. Dickman 
January Term, 2006 
25 
v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of 
the syllabus. 
{¶ 66} Section 4, Article VIII has generally been interpreted to prohibit 
lending the state’s credit to private business enterprises, but not to organizations 
created for a public purpose, even if they are corporations.  State ex rel. Kauer v. 
Defenbacher (1950), 153 Ohio St. 268, 282, 41 O.O. 278, 91 N.E.2d 512.  In 
opposing the appellants’ argument, the appellees argue that community schools 
are not private business enterprises, so statutory provisions for the state’s 
guarantee of loans to community schools are constitutional.  The plain language 
of R.C. 3314.03(A)(1) does not permit for-profit entities to become community 
schools.  Community schools may be organized only as nonprofit corporations or 
as public-benefit corporations. R.C. 3314.03(A)(1). 
{¶ 67} We have held that Section 4, Article VIII is satisfied where the 
state’s credit is used by a public organization to advance a “public purpose.”  
State ex rel. Kauer v. Defenbacher, 153 Ohio St. at 282, 41 O.O. 278, 91 N.E.2d 
512 (“whether it is a corporation or not, the turnpike commission is * * * a public 
organization created for a public purpose,” and so advancement of state funds to 
the commission is constitutional).  See State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 
Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59 (state grants to veterans’ organizations 
are constitutional); State ex rel. Leaverton v. Kerns (1922), 104 Ohio St. 550, 554, 
136 N.E. 217 (county grant to a county agricultural fair is constitutional because it 
is “a public institution designed for public instruction”); Perkins v. Stockert 
(1975), 45 Ohio App.2d 211, 74 O.O.2d 334, 343 N.E.2d 340 (funding of 
legislatively created “new community authorities” to assist private entities in 
community development is constitutional because each authority is created for a 
public purpose).  In State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, we held that under 
Section 4, Article VIII, the legislature could validly appropriate public funds to a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
private entity for a public purpose.  164 Ohio St. at 151, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 
59.  
{¶ 68} Community schools were developed to further the state’s public 
school system of education. We cannot imagine a greater public purpose than 
educating our state’s children.  Applying the facial-challenge standard to R.C. 
3314.08(J), 3318.50, and 3318.52, we hold that the appellants have not 
established that the statutes are unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.   
2. Funding community schools through loan guarantees 
{¶ 69} Under this claim, the appellants assert that the loan guarantees for 
community schools allowed by R.C. 3318.50 and 3318.52 violate the provisions 
of the Constitution that prohibit the state’s assumption of the debt of any 
corporation unless certain exceptions apply.  Section 5, Article VIII of the Ohio 
Constitution provides: 
{¶ 70} “The state shall never assume the debts of any county, city, town, 
or township, or of any corporation whatever, unless such debt shall have been 
created to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or defend the state in war.” 
{¶ 71} Turning to the plain language of the Constitution, the appellants 
highlight the statement “The state shall never assume the debts * * * of any 
corporation whatever.” Because community schools must be formed as nonprofit 
or public-benefit corporations, R.C. 3314.03(A)(1), they argue that the statute 
offends this constitutional provision. 
{¶ 72} Ohio’s school districts are not included within this provision’s 
prohibition, for Section 5, Article VIII does not forbid the state’s assumption of 
the debt of political subdivisions that are not of the types named. Butler Cty. 
Transp. Improvement Dist. v. Tracy (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 346, 359, 697 
N.E.2d 1089 (Section 5, Article VIII does not apply to many types of political 
subdivisions in Ohio, such as school districts, regional water and sewer 
authorities, solid waste authorities, or transportation-improvement districts). The 
January Term, 2006 
27 
appellees argue that community schools are regarded as school districts because 
they are required to comply with certain Ohio laws as if they were school 
districts. See, e.g., R.C. 3314.03(A)(11)(d) and 3314.08(F). Earlier in this 
opinion, we concluded that community schools belong to the state’s system of 
common schools.  By statute, they are “part of the state’s program of education.” 
R.C. 3314.01(B).  Like traditional schools, community schools are funded by the 
state, cannot charge tuition, and are charged with educating Ohio children.  As a 
result, they are not private business corporations the debt of which the state is 
prohibited from assuming under Section 5.  Therefore, community schools are 
also exempt from this provision.  Accordingly, we do not find a constitutional 
violation beyond a reasonable doubt under Section 5, Article VIII of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 73} We hold that the appellants in this case have not shown 
constitutional defects in R.C. Chapter 3314, on its face or as applied. When the 
General Assembly enacted Ohio’s Community-Schools Act, it was entrusted with 
making complicated decisions about our state’s educational policy.  These policy 
decisions are within the purview of its legislative responsibilities, and that 
legislation is entitled to deference. Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio 
St.3d 624, 632, 576 N.E.2d 722 (a court has nothing to do with the policy or 
wisdom of a statute.  That is the exclusive concern of the legislature).  The 
General Assembly always has the prerogative to determine that Ohio’s 
community schools are not meeting the purpose for which they were established 
and, consequently, has the ongoing opportunity to modify or dismantle them.  
After full consideration, we cannot say that the concept of community schools 
itself violates the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 74} We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County to dismiss part of count four, as community schools do not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
violate Section 3, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution.  We reverse the court of 
appeals’ decision to remand the remaining constitutional claims under Section 5, 
Article XII; Section 2, Article VI; Section 4, Article VIII; and Section 5, Article 
VIII for further proceedings.  As there were no disputed issues of fact, we hold as 
a matter of law that R.C. Chapter 3314, relating to the establishment of 
community schools as part of the state’s educational system, is constitutional both 
on its face and as applied. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would dismiss the appeal as having been 
improvidently accepted. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 75} In my opinion, R.C. Chapter 3314, the Ohio Community-Schools 
Act, violates Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution because it produces a 
hodgepodge of uncommon schools financed by the state.  Rather than “add[ing] to 
the traditional school system,” ¶ 30, or “providing for community schools within 
that system” of common schools, as the majority postulates, ¶ 34, R.C. Chapter 
3314 effects a schismatic educational program under which an assemblage of 
divergent and deregulated privately owned and managed community schools 
competes against public schools for public funds. 
{¶ 76} Section 2, Article VI provides: 
{¶ 77} “The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or 
otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a 
thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state * * *.” 
January Term, 2006 
29 
{¶ 78} Since this provision does not prescribe a specific method for 
securing a system of common schools, it necessarily grants the General Assembly 
broad discretion in fulfilling its obligation.  Accordingly, I agree with the majority 
that “the General Assembly has the authority to set the standards and 
requirements for a system of common schools.”  ¶ 34. 
{¶ 79} But the General Assembly’s discretion under Section 2, Article VI 
is not unlimited.  “To state that the General Assembly must be granted wide 
discretion and that it is not the function of this court to question the wisdom of the 
statutes, is not to say that the General Assembly’s discretion in this area is 
absolute.”  Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio 
St.2d 368, 386, 12 O.O.3d 327, 390 N.E.2d 813. 
{¶ 80} Specifically, the General Assembly does not have the authority 
under Section 2, Article VI to establish something other than a system of common 
schools.  It is empowered to do only what it is charged with doing, which is to 
secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state.  
Thus, as the court explained in Simmons-Harris v. Goff (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 1, 
11, 711 N.E.2d 203, “It can be argued that implicit within this obligation is a 
prohibition against the establishment of a system of uncommon (or nonpublic) 
schools financed by the state.” 
{¶ 81} Nor does Section 2, Article VI displace the power of judicial 
review.  While the General Assembly has the exclusive authority and duty to 
establish a system of common schools, it is for the courts to determine the 
constitutional criteria against which the exercise of that power is to be measured.  
We may act with deference to legislative pronouncements,10 but we are still 
obliged to make an independent determination of what constitutes a system of 
                                                 
10 The General Assembly declares in R.C. 3314.01(B), “A community school created 
under this chapter is a public school, independent of any school district, and is part of the state’s 
program of education.” 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
common schools.  Defining the parameters of legislative power under Section 2, 
Article VI, and ensuring conformity thereto, remains a judicial function.  See 
Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d at 382-387, 12 O.O.3d 327, 390 N.E.2d 813. 
{¶ 82} While the majority describes some of the history leading to the 
adoption of the Thorough and Efficient Clause, it nevertheless treats the mandate 
for a system of common schools as standardless, denoting any schooling 
arrangement that the General Assembly decides to support by general taxation.  
Yet the formative history of Section 2 discloses that the common-schools 
requirement does impose an articulable and meaningful standard upon the 
legislature and that R.C. Chapter 3314 recreates much of the mischief that the 
clause was intended to avoid. 
{¶ 83} As generally explained by Molly O’Brien and Amanda Woodrum, 
The Constitutional Common School (2004), 51 Cleve.St.L.Rev. 581: 
{¶ 84} “Recent school reform initiatives have adopted the mechanisms of 
vouchers and charters to provide public funding for parental choice of schools. * * 
* Virtually all of these programs, however, envision a proliferating variety of 
available schools, competition among schools for tax support, and attendance by 
parental selection, rather than by public assignment.  Even though charter and 
voucher schools are prohibited from discriminating in admissions on the basis of 
religion, by statute and by the federal Constitution, they permit like-minded 
people to flock together.  They permit parental choice of a school based on the 
parents’ unique set of values and priorities, biases and prejudices. 
{¶ 85} “* * *  
{¶ 86} “The constitutional ‘common school’ has specific meaning that 
must be referenced in the evaluation of school reform programs.  Central to that 
meaning is the requirement that the publicly-supported school system educate 
children of all classes, religions, and ethnic backgrounds together.  * * * For the 
framers of the Ohio Constitution’s education clauses, the only education worthy 
January Term, 2006 
31 
of public support was a ‘common’ education, not in the sense that it was provided 
for the common folks, but in the sense that it would bring diverse people together.  
They chose the common school concept to promote social harmony, create a 
sense of national identity, and develop affinity. * * * 
{¶ 87} “Moreover, in choosing to mandate the creation of a system of 
common schools, the constitutional framers rejected the idea of simply 
subsidizing the existing diverse, parent-initiated and tuition-based schooling 
arrangements in favor of creating state organization and oversight.  They viewed 
the diversity of the existing arrangements as an impediment to educational 
progress.  The constitutional framers rejected the proliferation of diverse schools 
in favor of a single system.  They also rejected the idea of competition among 
school districts and a variety of sectarian schools, viewing competition as 
inefficient, divisive, and ineffective.  The rivalry among schools was seen as the 
greatest impediment to the advancement of education.  Indeed, the problems 
created by the continuing disparities and competition among local districts 
generated further constitutional amendments in 1912.  These amendments [i.e., 
Sections 3 and 4, Article VI] centralized state oversight of the system of public 
schools by creating a state superintendent; they further provided for public 
oversight of the districts through election.  Thus, programs that create competition 
among schools for public funds or remove schools from state and public oversight 
also run counter to the constitutional vision and mandate.”  (Emphasis sic; 
footnotes omitted.)  Id. at 638-641. 
{¶ 88} Community schools under R.C. Chapter 3314 are nonprofit or 
public-benefit corporations that operate independently of any school district.  R.C. 
3314.01(B) and 3314.03(A)(1).  They are governed by the terms of their 
individual contracts, have their own governing authorities, and are directly 
accountable to their sponsors.  R.C. 3314.02(D) and (E), 3314.03(D), 3314.04, 
and 3314.07.  Any qualified tax-exempt entity under Section 501(c)(3) of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
Internal Revenue Code that has been in operation for five years, has assets of 
$500,000, and is considered by the Department of Education to be an education-
oriented entity may sponsor up to 50 community schools (potentially more for 
some sponsors) and receive from each an “oversight and monitoring” fee of up to 
three percent of the payments for operating expenses that the school receives from 
the state.  See R.C. 3314.015(B)(1), 3314.02(C)(1)(f), and 3314.03(C). 
{¶ 89} Community schools were originally introduced in Ohio on a 
limited basis through a pilot project in the Lucas County area.  1997 Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 215, Section 50.52, Subsection 2(B), 147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2043.  They have 
since grown at a steady rate.  According to a preliminary report on community 
schools in Ohio that was issued on April 11, 2002, by the Legislative Office of 
Education Oversight (established by R.C. 3301.68), “Since 1998, the number of 
community schools in Ohio has increased annually, from the first 15 that began 
operating during the 1998-1999 school year to 92 schools during the 2001-2002 
school year.  The number of participating students has grown tenfold from 2,245 
to over 23,000 during these years.”  Based on the listings in the March 2005 
School Directory issued by the Office of Community Schools (see R.C. 3311.11) 
and information contained in a research bulletin published by the Ohio Education 
Association (“OEA”) in March 2005, there were over 62,000 students enrolled in 
approximately 250 community schools throughout Ohio during the 2004-2005 
school year. 
{¶ 90} Community schools receive state funds that are deducted from 
payments to the school districts in which the enrolled students are entitled to 
attend school.  R.C. 3314.08.  In an affidavit filed on behalf of appellants in the 
trial court, William P. Driscoll, a former Ohio Deputy Tax Commissioner from 
1985 to 1991, calculated that community-school deductions in fiscal year 2002 
amounted to more than $133 million.  According to Ohio Department of 
Education records, state funding for community schools for fiscal year 2005 totals 
January Term, 2006 
33 
over $400 million.  In its March 2005 research bulletin, OEA calculated that “[b]y 
the end of the current [2004-2005] school year, Ohio’s charter schools will have 
received over $1.2 billion * * * in funding since the inception of the state’s 
charter school program.” 
{¶ 91} Yet community schools are exempt from the bulk of state 
standards and regulations that govern the operation of public schools.  In fact, the 
stated purpose of R.C. Chapter 3314 is to establish “independent community 
schools throughout the state * * * in a deregulated setting.”  1997 Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 215, Section 50.52, Subsection 2(B), 147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2043.  
Accordingly, R.C. 3314.04 provides: 
{¶ 92} “Except as otherwise specified in this chapter and in the contract 
between a community school and a sponsor, such school is exempt from all state 
laws and rules pertaining to schools, school districts, and boards of education, 
except those laws and rules that grant certain rights to parents.” 
{¶ 93} On October 23, 2003, the Legislative Service Commission issued a 
research memorandum, No. R-125-1824, on the “Laws from Which Community 
Schools Are Exempt and Specifically Not Exempt.”  The memo enumerates over 
150 state measures from which community schools are exempt, which run the 
gamut of education laws from curriculum and enrollment requirements to 
discipline policies and building standards.  These are not random exclusions from 
insubstantial provisions.  The exemptions are pervasive, extensive, and diffused 
throughout the entirety of Title 33 of the Revised Code.  See Appendix B. 
{¶ 94} Largely unregulated and privately operated, community schools 
are free to adopt their own specific instructional approaches, educational goals, 
and philosophical agendas.  Indeed, they are exempt from the provisions of R.C. 
3313.602(B) and (C), which require public schools to ensure that “the principles 
of democracy and ethics are emphasized and discussed wherever appropriate in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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all parts of the curriculum” and to encourage all employees to be aware of their 
roles “in instilling ethical principles and democratic ideals in all district pupils.” 
{¶ 95} Section 2, Article VI was intended to bring order to the chaos of 
individualized approaches that resulted from the nascent mélange of loosely 
regulated and diverse schooling arrangements by mandating the creation and 
funding of a uniform and coherent body of governmentally controlled schools.  
R.C. Chapter 3314 contravenes that intent by reversing the process.  It creates a 
jumble of ad hoc community schools that flourish on state funds otherwise inuring 
to the account of district schools. 
{¶ 96} Although I disagree with the majority’s view of Section 2, Article 
VI on a fundamental level, our differences are primarily grounded in 
constitutional analysis.  However, I find the following passage in the majority’s 
opinion to be questionable: 
{¶ 97} “Throughout time, new educational movements have faced 
opponents and detractors.  But just as the common-school movement of the 1800s 
increasingly gained supporters throughout the United States, so too has the 
charter-school movement.”  ¶ 27. 
{¶ 98} This court’s function is to determine the constitutionality of charter 
schools as established by statute in Ohio, not to promote their cause.  Whether the 
“charter-school movement” has truly gained supporters or opponents, nationally 
or in Ohio, is a subject of social discourse for the political branches of our 
government.  I also point out that the common-school movement of the 1800s 
resulted in a constitutional amendment, i.e., Section 2, Article VI and eventually 
also Sections 3 and 4, Article VI.  That is not the case with charter schools. 
{¶ 99} I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
January Term, 2006 
35 
{¶ 100} Although I agree with the main premise of the majority opinion, 
that the Ohio Constitution does not prohibit the establishment of charter schools, I 
write separately because I conclude that charter schools as currently established 
are unconstitutional. 
{¶ 101} To many, the establishment of an alternative to public schools is 
a noble experiment, designed to enable students to escape failing public schools.  
Sadly, in many instances, the cure is worse than the disease.  An August 16, 2006 
article in the Columbus Dispatch indicates that 50 percent of the charter schools 
in Franklin County received the lowest possible rating:  emergency.  Presumably, 
most of the students attending charter schools in Franklin County left the 
Columbus School District, the largest school district in Franklin County and the 
school district that met the lowest percentage of state standards:  20 percent.  In 
aggregate, the charter schools in Franklin County met even fewer state standards:  
18.5 percent.  In Franklin County, only three charter schools that met more than 
one state standard met 50 percent of the standards that were calculated:  Graham 
School met nine of 12 standards, Great Western met five of six, and Upper 
Arlington I.B. met six of six.  The other 33 charter schools in Franklin County 
met only 12.4 percent of state standards. 
{¶ 102} Whether charter schools are the answer to failing public schools 
has not been settled, though the early results are not especially encouraging.  Still, 
the Ohio Constitution does not prohibit the establishment of charter schools.  
What the Ohio Constitution does prohibit is an excessive reliance on locally 
raised funds to finance public schools.  DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 
193, 677 N.E.2d 733; DeRolph v. State (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 728 N.E.2d 993; 
and DeRolph v. State, 97 Ohio St.3d 434, 2002-Ohio-6750, 780 N.E.2d 529.  
Irrespective of the noble intentions of charter-school legislation, one undeniable 
effect is that public schools receive less state money than they would in the 
absence of charter schools.  The mathematically unavoidable result is that public 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
schools receive a greater percentage of their funding from local sources, which is 
unconstitutional pursuant to our DeRolph decisions. 
{¶ 103} Finally, if charter schools are to be part of a thorough and 
efficient system of common schools – as they must – then they should be held to 
the same standards as public schools.  Though the General Assembly has taken 
steps in that direction, it is clear, as the majority opinion concedes and as Justice 
Resnick’s dissenting opinion explains in detail, that charter schools are currently 
exempt from many standards that public schools are required to meet. 
{¶ 104} I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 105} In my view, this court has prematurely accepted review over a 
very limited but important constitutional issue regarding the establishment and 
operation of community schools statewide, and the majority has considered it on a 
scant record.  Even a cursory reading of the majority and dissenting opinions 
reveals the complexity of the issue and the divergent positions taken by the 
members of the judiciary who have reviewed it at all levels.  Regrettably, 
appellants have not fully developed this record, as the trial court originally 
bifurcated the case into the legal issues, which are allegedly before us, and the 
remaining factual issues, which are still before the trial judge. 
{¶ 106} The better course would have been to deny review and later 
accept the case in its entirety.  The majority opinion states, “The appellants have 
not presented clear and convincing evidence that community schools are raiding 
local funds that school districts are otherwise entitled to receive.” ¶ 39.  Justice 
Resnick’s opinion assumes the point, stating that R.C. Chapter 3314 “creates a 
jumble of ad hoc community schools that flourish on state funds otherwise inuring 
to the account of district schools.” ¶ 95. 
January Term, 2006 
37 
{¶ 107} I cannot understand how a constitutional review of a legal issue 
may be resolved on a yet-to-be-developed record of whether local or state tax 
money is or is not being diverted to community schools under the funding 
formula.  This appears to me to be a factual question capable of being resolved by 
presentation of evidence, and the court of appeals, at least in part, so held. 
{¶ 108} I did not vote to accept this case, because I believed the record 
needed development, despite the entreaties from both parties to resolve the 
constitutional issue.  I still believe that to be the correct course for this court to 
follow, i.e., to dismiss this appeal as having been improvidently accepted, to await 
further record development, and to approach the entire case on a complete record. 
{¶ 109} I would therefore dismiss this appeal as having been 
improvidently accepted. 
__________________ 
 
Ulmer Berne, L.L.P., and Donald J. Mooney Jr., for appellants and cross-
appellees. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Stephen P. 
Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor, and Roger F. Carroll, Assistant Attorney 
General, for state appellees and cross-appellants. 
 
Jones Day, Fordham E. Huffman, and Chad A. Readler, for community-
school appellees and cross-appellants. 
 
Isaac, Brandt, Ledman & Teetor, L.L.P., David G. Jennings, and Mark 
Landes, for appellee University of Toledo Charter School Council. 
 
Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, L.L.P., Donald C. Brey, and Charles R. Saxbe;  
Brennan, Manna & Diamond, L.L.C., John B. Schomer, and Leigh A. Maxa, for 
appellee and cross-appellant White Hat Management. 
 
Louis B. Geneva Co., L.P.A., and M. Jayne H. Geneva, supporting 
appellants and cross-appellees for amici curiae Coalition for School Funding 
Reform, Community Advocates for Public Education, Cleveland Heights–
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
University Heights City School District, Lakewood City School District, and 
Shaker Heights City School District. 
Rachelle Johnson, supporting appellants and cross-appellees for amicus 
curiae Ohio Education Association. 
Carpenter & Lipps, L.L.P., Jeffrey A. Lipps, and Michael N. Beekhuizen, 
supporting appellees and cross-appellants for amicus curiae Buckeye Community 
Hope Foundation. 
McNamara, Hanrahan, Callender & Loxterman, James S. Callender Jr., 
and Sheila M. Sexton, supporting appellees and cross-appellants for amici curiae 
Ohio Counsel of Community Schools, Lucas County Educational Service Center, 
Reynoldsburg Board of Education, Ashe Cultural Center, and National 
Association of Charter School Authorizers. 
Nicola, Gudbranson & Cooper, L.L.C., Timothy L. McGarry, Arthur L. 
Clements III, and Becky M. Scheiman, supporting appellees and cross-appellants 
for amici curiae parent-teacher organizations of the following schools:  Hope 
Academy–Canton 
Campus; 
Hope 
Academy–University 
Campus; 
Parma 
Community School; Summit Academy–Akron; Summit Academy–Dayton; 
Summit Academy–Parma; W.E.B. DuBois Academy; Ohio Coalition of E School 
Families, Inc.; Summit Academy–Xenia; and The Edge Academy. 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, James B. Hadden, and Anne M. Hughes, 
supporting appellees and cross-appellants for amici curiae Charter School 
Leadership Council, Alliance for School Choice, Thomas B. Fordham Institute, 
and state charter-school organizations. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Susan B. Greenberger, Anne Marie Sferra, and 
Jennifer A. Flint, not in support of the position of any party for amicus curiae Tri-
Rivers Educational Computer Association. 
__________________ 
 
January Term, 2006 
39 
APPENDIX A 
{¶ 110} According to the Legislative Service Commission memorandum 
No. R-125-1824, community schools are not exempt from the requirements of the 
following Revised Code sections: 
{¶ 111} “9.90 and 9.91 Provision regarding insurance benefits for 
educational employees. 
{¶ 112} “Chapter 102  Ohio Ethics Law (except that a member of a 
community school governing board specifically may also be an employee of the 
board and may have an interest in a board-executed contract that is not a contract 
with a for-profit firm for the operation of management of a school under the 
auspices of the governing board (R.C. 3314.03(A)(11)(e)). 
{¶ 113} “109.65, 3313.672, and 3313.96  Requirements for missing 
children reporting, information, and student fingerprinting. 
{¶ 114} "Chapter 117.  State fiscal auditing requirements. 
{¶ 115} “121.22   The Public Meetings (‘Sunshine’) law. 
{¶ 116} “149.43   The Public Records Law. 
{¶ 117} “Chapter 1347.  Ohio Privacy Law. 
{¶ 118} “2151.358 Procedures pertaining to school records of adjudicated 
delinquents after their court records are expunged. 
{¶ 119} “2151.421 Child abuse reporting requirements. 
{¶ 120} “2313.18  Employment protection for employees on jury duty. 
{¶ 121} “Chapter 2744.  The Sovereign Immunity Law for public 
employees. 
{¶ 122} “3301.0710 and 3301.0711  Statewide achievement testing. 
{¶ 123} “3301.0712  Phase-in of achievement tests. 
{¶ 124} “3301.0714  Education Management Information System (EMIS) 
requirements (as prescribed by Department of Education rules adopted under R.C. 
3314.17). 
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{¶ 125} “3301.0715  Administration and scoring of statewide diagnostic 
assessments and provision of intervention services. 
{¶ 126} “3302.04  Requirement to develop a continuous improvement 
plan for certain schools that fail to meet annual yearly progress and to take other 
actions (such as installing a new curriculum  and reconstituting schools) for 
schools that persistently do not demonstrate improvement, to the extent and 
manner prescribed in R.C. 3314.03(A)(24). 
{¶ 127} “Chapter 3307.  State Teachers Retirement System. 
{¶ 128} “Chapter 3309.  School Employees Retirement System. 
{¶ 129} “3313.205  Requirement to adopt a policy on notification of a 
parent when the parent’s child is absent from school. 
{¶ 130} “3313.375  Authorization and procedures for entering into lease-
purchase contracts for the acquisition of facilities (in the same manner as school 
districts and educational service centers). 
{¶ 131} “3313.450  Requirement to adopt a policy on parent involvement 
in schools. 
{¶ 132} “3313.50  Record requirements relating to student hearing and 
vision testing. 
{¶ 133} “3313.602(D)  Requirement that each school devote one hour to 
observance of Veteran’s [sic] Day. 
{¶ 134} “3313.608  ‘Third grade reading guarantee.’ 
{¶ 135} “3313.6012  Requirement to have policy on academic 
‘prevention/intervention’ services. 
{¶ 136} “3313.61, 3313.611, 3313.614, and 3313.615  Requirement to 
award diploma to students meeting the testing criteria and completing the high 
school curriculum.  (Community schools are not subject to the Revised Code’s 
curriculum requirements.  They set their own curricula.) 
January Term, 2006 
41 
{¶ 137} “3313.643  Requirement that students and teachers wear 
industrial eye protection in certain industrial courses or activities. 
{¶ 138} “3313.648  Prohibition on offering monetary payment of other 
in-kind gift to a student or a student’s parent or guardian as an incentive for that 
student to enroll in a school. 
{¶ 139} “3313.66, 3313.661, and 3313.662  Student suspension, 
expulsion, and permanent exclusion requirements. 
{¶ 140} “3313.67 Requirement to keep records of student immunizations. 
{¶ 141} “3313.671  Prohibition against allowing a student to remain in 
school longer than 14 days without submitting immunization records or evidence 
that immunization is in progress (except that the parental right to excuse a child 
from immunization for religious reasons applies). 
{¶ 142} “3313.672  Requirement to request records from a child’s 
previous school. 
{¶ 143} “3313.673  Screening of new kindergartners and first-graders in 
hearing, vision, speech and communication, and health. 
{¶ 144} “3313.69  Requirement to include hearing and vision screening if 
school opts to have any dental and medical screening. 
{¶ 145} “3313.71  Tuberculin testing requirements. 
{¶ 146} “3313.712  Requirement to provide the parent of every enrolled 
student a statutorily prescribed blank emergency medical authorization form. 
{¶ 147} “3313.716  Requirement that public schools permit students to 
self-administer asthma medication. 
{¶ 148} “3313.80  Requirement to display the national flag. 
{¶ 149} “3314.011 
Community 
school 
fiscal 
officer 
education 
requirements. 
{¶ 150} “3314.03(A)(6)(b) Requirement that a community school 
automatically withdraw from enrollment any student who has failed without 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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legitimate excuse to participate in 105 consecutive hours of offered learning 
opportunities. 
{¶ 151} “3314.031  Requirement that ‘Internet and other computer-based 
community schools’ use a filtering device or software to block access to materials 
that are obscene or harmful to juveniles on all computers provided to students for 
instructional use. 
{¶ 152} “3314.032  Requirement that an ‘Internet and other computer-
based community schools’ provide one computer to each student enrolled in the 
school unless a parent with more than one child from the parent’s household 
enrolled in the school waives that right. 
{¶ 153} “3314.041  Requirement that each community school distribute 
to parents of students at the time the students enroll in school a written statutorily-
prescribed statement explaining that the school is a public school and that students 
are subject to achievement testing and other statutory requirements. 
{¶ 154} “3319.073  Requirement for teacher in-service training in child 
abuse prevention. 
{¶ 155} “3319.22 
to 
3319.30 
and 
3319.301 
Teacher 
licensing 
requirements. 
{¶ 156} “3319.321  Requirements for confidentiality of student 
information. 
{¶ 157} “3319.39  Requirements for criminal records checks of job 
applicants. 
{¶ 158} “3321.01  Requirements relating to admittance of children to 
kindergarten and first grade. 
{¶ 159} “3321.13  Reporting requirements related to a child withdrawing 
from school; requirement to report certain withdrawn students to the Registrar of 
Motor Vehicles. 
January Term, 2006 
43 
{¶ 160} “3321.14, 
3321.17, 
3321.18, 
3321.19, 
and 
3321.191  
Compulsory School Law enforcement requirements. 
{¶ 161} “Chapter 3323.  Requirements related to special education. 
{¶ 162} “3327.10   School bus driver qualifications. 
{¶ 163} “Chapter 3365.  Requirement to participate in Post-Secondary 
Enrollment Options Program. 
{¶ 164} “3365.041  Requirement that governing authority of a 
community school that expels a student notify the pertinent higher education 
institution that the student attends under the Post-Secondary Enrollment Options 
Program. 
{¶ 165} “Chapter 3742.  Requirements to take actions to prevent lead 
poisoning and to control lead hazard in schools. 
{¶ 166} “4111.17 Ohio Equal Pay Law (anti-discrimination related to 
wages). 
{¶ 167} “Chapter 4112.  Ohio Civil Rights Act. 
{¶ 168} “4113.52  Ohio Whistleblower Law. 
{¶ 169} “Chapter 4117.  The state Collective Bargaining Law (as 
prescribed in R.C. 3314.10(A)(2) and (3)). 
{¶ 170} “Chapter 4123.  Workers’ Compensation Law. 
{¶ 171} “Chapter 4141.  Unemployment Compensation Law. 
{¶ 172} “Chapter 4167.  State Occupational Safety and Health Law. 
{¶ 173} “5705.391  Requirements for five-year projections of school 
district revenues and expenditures. 
{¶ 174} “In addition, community schools must comply with any laws or 
rules that ‘grant certain rights to parents’ [R.C. 3314.04] and with health and 
safety standards established by law for school buildings [R.C. 3314.05].”  
(Footnotes omitted.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 175} “It should be noted that community schools are subject to any 
and all federal laws which apply to schools and employers generally—for 
example, FERPA [the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, Section 1232g, 
Title 20, U.S.Code] and the various federal anti-discrimination laws.  Moreover, 
as public schools, community schools are subject to all the constitutional 
constraints that apply to governmental bodies—for example, the obligation to 
recognize freedom of speech and association, and to provide due process and 
equal protection of the laws.  It is also important to recognize that community 
schools are subject to the federal law relating to the education of children with 
disabilities (IDEA) [Sections 1401 et seq., Title 20, U.S.Code] and to have the 
primary responsibility for providing a free appropriate public education (FAPE) 
[Sections 1401(8) and 1412(a)(1), Title 20, U.S.Code] for such children under the 
provisions of that law.”  (Footnotes omitted.)  Carey, Anderson’s Ohio School 
Law Guide (2006) 48, Section 2.27. 
__________________ 
APPENDIX B 
{¶ 176} According to Legislative Service Commission memorandum No. 
R-125-1824, community schools are exempt from the following requirements: 
{¶ 177} “124.01 et seq.  Civil Service Law (related to nonteaching 
employees in city school districts). 
{¶ 178} “133.01 et seq.  Uniform Public Securities Law (However, other 
than borrowing for facilities acquisition under loans guaranteed by the state, 
community schools may not issue notes with a duration longer than one fiscal 
year.). 
{¶ 179} “Chapter 135.  Uniform Depository Act. 
{¶ 180} “149.351 and 149.41  Requirements on retention of school 
records and establishing a records commission. 
January Term, 2006 
45 
{¶ 181} “3301.07  State Board of Education minimum standards covering 
the assignment of professional personnel according to training and qualifications; 
instructional materials and equipment, including library facilities; proper 
organization, administration, and supervision of schools; buildings and grounds 
(other than any building health and safety standards); admission and promotion of 
students; driver education courses; phonics instruction; instruction in energy and 
resource conservation; and reporting requirements. 
{¶ 182} “3301.072  Training requirements for school treasurers and 
business managers. 
{¶ 183} “3301.073  Required receipt of State Board technical assistance 
in school budgeting and finances. 
{¶ 184} “3301.078  25-pupil class size limit for bilingual multicultural 
classes. 
{¶ 185} “3301.0719  Required receipt of services under any educational 
service center plan of service. 
{¶ 186} “3301.16  School chartering requirements. 
{¶ 187} “3301.17  Driver education course standards. 
{¶ 188} “3301.52 to 3301.59  Preschool program standards and licensing 
(other than parental access rights). 
{¶ 189} “Chapter 3302.  Performance indicators for school districts, 
except that community schools ‘to the extent possible’ must comply with R.C. 
3302.04, which requires continuous improvement plans and other actions and 
sanctions for schools that fail to meet annual yearly progress, in the manner 
prescribed in R.C. 3314.03(A)(24). 
{¶ 190} “Chapter 3311.  Requirements related to the formation and 
territory of school districts and educational service center financing districts. 
{¶ 191} “3311.29  Requirement to maintain grades kindergarten through 
twelve. 
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{¶ 192} “3313.01 to 3313.17 and 3313.18  Requirements related to the 
membership, organization, and operation of school boards. 
{¶ 193} “3313.174  Requirement to appoint a business advisory council. 
{¶ 194} “3313.20  Requirement to make rules necessary for the 
governing of employees, students, and other persons entering a school; to post the 
school entry rules; and to have a written policy on employees' attendance at 
professional meetings. 
{¶ 195} “3313.201  Requirement to purchase liability insurance (though 
the community schools law has its own provision requiring a community school 
to purchase liability insurance (3314.03(11)(b))). 
{¶ 196} “3313.202  Requirements related to the provision of life, health, 
accident, and legal insurance benefits for school district employees. 
{¶ 197} “3313.208 and 3313.209  Latchkey program operating 
requirements. 
{¶ 198} “3313.211  Requirement to pay full-time employees while on 
jury duty. 
{¶ 199} “3313.22 to 3313.32  Requirements related to the appointment, 
conduct, and duties of school district treasurers. 
{¶ 200} “3313.35  Requirements concerning who is legal counsel for 
school boards. 
{¶ 201} “3313.372  Requirements related to installment payment 
contracts for energy conservation measures for school facilities.  
{¶ 202} “3313.373  Requirements related to shared-savings contracts for 
energy savings measures for school facilities. 
{¶ 203} “3313.41  Disposal of real and personal property requirements. 
{¶ 204} “3313.44  Real and personal property tax exemption for school 
districts. 
January Term, 2006 
47 
{¶ 205} “3313.46 (and related sections in Chapter 153)  Competitive 
Bidding Law regarding school building projects 
{¶ 206} “3313.47  Vesting of management and control of schools in the 
board of education. 
{¶ 207} “3313.471  Prohibition of nonuniform restrictions on the 
presentation of career information to students. 
{¶ 208} “3313.48  Standards for minimum school year and minimum 
school day (although community schools are required to provide 920 hours of 
instruction annually (R.C. 3314.03(A)(11)(a))); requirement that education be 
provided free of charge (though a community school is prohibited from charging 
tuition (R.C. 3314.08(I))). 
{¶ 209} Requirements related to alternative calendars for schools. 
{¶ 210} “3313.482  Contingency plan requirement for making up 
calamity days. 
{¶ 211} “3313.483, 3313.487 to 3313.4810  Prohibition against closing 
schools for financial reasons; requirements and procedures related to school 
financial crises and resulting loans. 
{¶ 212} “3313.49  Student assignment requirements when a school is 
suspended. 
{¶ 213} “3313.51  Check writing and deposit requirements related to 
school treasurers. 
{¶ 214} “3313.53  Requirements related to employing certificated 
persons for pupil-activity programs. 
{¶ 215} “3313.531 and 3313.532  Adult high school continuation 
program requirements. 
{¶ 216} “3313.534  Requirement for ‘zero-tolerance’ discipline policies; 
requirement that Big 8 and certain other school districts establish alternative 
schools. 
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{¶ 217} “3313.536  Requirement to adopt comprehensive school safety 
plan. 
{¶ 218} “3313.55  Requirements related to schooling for persons with 
epilepsy. 
{¶ 219} “3313.56  Part-time schooling requirements for programs 
provided to students with age and schooling certificates. 
{¶ 220} “3313.60  School course of study requirement (except that the 
parental rights to excuse a child from certain instructional topics and to examine 
instructional materials and other documents apply). 
{¶ 221} “3313.601  Prohibition against barring teachers from providing 
periods for programs or meditation on moral, philosophical, or patriotic themes 
(except that the parental right to excuse a child from these programs applies). 
{¶ 222} “3313.602(A)  Requirement to have a policy regarding the 
recitation of the pledge of allegiance to the flag. 
{¶ 223} “3313.602(B) and (C)  Requirement that the ‘principles of 
democracy and ethics’ are emphasized and discussed in appropriate parts of the 
curriculum and to encourage a school's employees to be cognizant of their roles to 
instill in students ‘democratic and ethical ideals.’ 
{¶ 224} “3313.603  High school curriculum requirements. 
{¶ 225} “3313.604  Recognition of American Sign Language as a foreign 
language in schools. 
{¶ 226} “3313.605  Implementation requirements for school districts 
electing to offer community service education programs under federal law. 
{¶ 227} “3313.609  Requirements to retain certain chronic truants. 
{¶ 228} “3313.6011  Requirement that venereal disease education, which 
is a component of health education, emphasize sexual abstinence. 
January Term, 2006 
49 
{¶ 229} “3313.613  Requirement to award high school credit to a student 
for successful completion of a post-secondary course outside of regular school 
hours. 
{¶ 230} “3313.62  Definitions of ‘school year,’ ‘school month,’ and 
‘school week.’ 
{¶ 231} “3313.63  Specification of school holidays. 
{¶ 232} “3313.64 and 3313.65  School admission requirements related to 
the payment of tuition; tuition payment and charging requirements between 
school districts. 
{¶ 233} “3313.642  Requirement for certain districts to furnish needy 
students with materials used in a course of instruction other than the necessary 
textbooks or electronic textbooks. 
{¶ 234} “3313.646 
Requirements 
and 
prohibitions 
related 
to 
establishment of preschool programs. 
{¶ 235} “3313.70  Prohibition against appointment of a school board 
member as school physician, dentist, or nurse. 
{¶ 236} “3313.713  Requirements related to administering prescription 
drugs to students (except that the parental right to have a school administer 
prescription drugs to a child only after requesting it in writing applies). 
{¶ 237} “3313.714  Requirement, upon request from the Department of 
Job and Family Services, to operate a ‘healthcheck’ program for students covered 
by Medicaid (except that the parental right to excuse a child from a healthcheck 
examination applies). 
{¶ 238} “3313.75  Prohibition against renting or leasing a school building 
so as to interfere with the public schools of the district or for any purpose other 
than authorized by law. 
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{¶ 239} “3313.751  Prohibition against students smoking in any area 
controlled by a school board; requirement that a school board have a disciplinary 
policy to enforce the smoking prohibition. 
{¶ 240} “3313.752  Requirement that a warning about anabolic steroids 
be posted in school locker rooms. 
{¶ 241} “3313.76 to 3313.79  Requirements related to the use of school 
buildings by the public when not being used for school purposes. 
{¶ 242} “3313.81  Requirements related to food service operations and 
meals for the elderly. 
{¶ 243} “3313.811  Prohibition against the sale of anything for profit on 
school premises unless all profits are used for a school purpose or for a school 
activity. 
{¶ 244} “3313.813  State Board of Education standards for school food 
programs (except that any health or safety standards related to school facilities 
apply). 
{¶ 245} “3313.814  Requirement for school boards to have a policy 
governing the types of food sold on school premises. 
{¶ 246} “3313.815  Requirement to have an employee trained in the 
Heimlich Maneuver during periods food is being served to students. 
{¶ 247} “3313.841 and 3313.842  Requirements related to sharing certain 
services cooperatively with other districts and operating joint education programs. 
{¶ 248} “3313.843  Requirements related to receiving services provided 
by educational service centers. 
{¶ 249} “3313.85  Requirement that the probate court, or in some cases 
the educational service center, perform functions that a school board fails to 
perform. 
{¶ 250} “3313.871  Fee limits for school district participation in 
accrediting associations. 
January Term, 2006 
51 
{¶ 251} “3313.90, 3313.91, and 3313.911  Vocational education 
requirement. 
{¶ 252} “3313.92  Requirements related to joint construction projects 
between school districts. 
{¶ 253} “3313.93  Prohibition against students being paid for work in a 
school district occupational work adjustment laboratory from being considered 
employees for purposes of school employee retirement law, nonteaching 
employee contract law, unemployment compensation law, and workers' 
compensation law (apparently meaning that students in such a program operated 
by a community school are considered employees and, therefore, presumably are 
subject to whatever law is applicable to other community school employees). 
{¶ 254} “3313.941  Requirement to include a ‘multiracial’ category in 
any statistics on race gathered for state or school district purposes. 
{¶ 255} “3313.95  Contract requirements for police services in alcohol 
and drug prevention programs. 
{¶ 256} “3313.97 Intradistrict open enrollment requirements (except the 
requirement that parents receive information about the program—presumably in 
the district in which the community school is located—applies). 
{¶ 257} “3313.98, 3313.981, 3313.982, and 3313.983  Interdistrict open 
enrollment requirements (except the requirement that parents receive information 
about the program applies). 
{¶ 258} “3315.02 to 3315.05  Requirements related to the administration 
of funds for bond indebtedness (other than bonds secured by tax revenues, which 
community schools are prohibited from issuing (R.C. 3314.08(H))). 
{¶ 259} “3315.062  Requirements related to the provision and funding of 
student activity programs. 
{¶ 260} “3315.07  Requirements related to the publishing of school 
materials for the public; prohibition against using public funds to support or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
52 
oppose the passage of a school levy or bond issue or to compensate any district 
employee for time spent on supporting or opposing a levy or bond issue. 
{¶ 261} “3315.08  Requirements related to the payment of employee 
salaries and the administration of a payroll account. 
{¶ 262} “3315.09  Limitation of only a one-year contract with a college 
or museum for the provision of instructional programs to students. 
{¶ 263} “3315.091  Requirements and limitations related to contracting 
with a driver training school for the provision of driver education. 
{¶ 264} “3315.10  Requirements related to the management and control 
of certain property held in trust for educational purposes. 
{¶ 265} “3315.11 to 3315.14  Requirements related to establishing and 
administering a school building replacement fund. 
{¶ 266} “3315.15  Requirements related to school board service funds for 
paying school board members' expenses in the performance of their duties. 
{¶ 267} “3315.17 and 3315.171  Requirement to maintain a Textbook 
and Instructional Materials Fund. 
{¶ 268} “3315.18 and 3315.181  Requirement to maintain a Capital and 
Maintenance Fund. 
{¶ 269} “3315.19  Requirements regarding election of set-aside amounts. 
{¶ 270} “3315.29 to 3315.31  (and related 501.01 to 501.14)  
Requirements related to common school funds. 
{¶ 271} “3315.37  Requirements related to school district teacher 
education loan programs. 
{¶ 272} “3315.40 to 3315.42  Requirements related to establishing and 
maintaining a school district education foundation fund. 
{¶ 273} “3317.01  Requirements for the receipt of state education funds, 
including levying 20 mills, providing instruction for the minimum number of 
school days, and paying teachers according to the state minimum teachers salary 
January Term, 2006 
53 
schedule; requirement to comply with all school law and State Board rules in 
order to participate in the state basic aid funding program.  
{¶ 274} “3317.011 to 3317.0213  Requirements that school districts be 
paid specified amounts of state funds (section 3314.08 establishes a method of 
calculating the amount of state funding for community schools). 
{¶ 275} “3317.022(C)(5)  Requirement that a school district spend the 
total amount of per pupil state funding (formula and weighted additional amounts) 
it receives for disabled students on special education and related services for those 
students. 
{¶ 276} “3317.023(B) and (C)  Requirement that a school district's 
districtwide pupil to teacher ratio be no more than 25 to 1. 
{¶ 277} “3317.023(D)  Requirement that a school district employ five 
full-time-equivalent educational service personnel (including elementary school 
art, music, and physical education teachers, counselors, librarians, visiting 
teachers, school social workers, and school nurses) for each 1,000 pupils in the 
regular student population. 
{¶ 278} “3317.029  Spending restrictions on disadvantaged pupil impact 
aid (DPIA). 
{¶ 279} “3317.03 and 3317.033  Requirements related to reporting school 
average daily membership and maintaining school records (except that under R.C. 
3314.08, in order to receive state payments, community schools must report the 
number of students enrolled). 
{¶ 280} “3317.04  Funding requirements related to the transfer of school 
district territory or the consolidation of districts. 
{¶ 281} “3317.06  Funding, requirements, and prohibitions related to 
auxiliary services for chartered nonpublic schools. 
{¶ 282} “3317.061  Requirement to annually report licensed employees 
to the State Board. 
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54 
{¶ 283} “3317.07  Funding for school bus purchases. 
{¶ 284} “3317.08 to 3317.082  Tuition calculation requirements. 
{¶ 285} “3317.11  Requirements to receive services from an educational 
service center (formerly county school boards). 
{¶ 286} “3317.12  Nonteaching employee salary schedule requirement. 
{¶ 287} “3317.13  State minimum teachers salary schedule requirement. 
{¶ 288} “3317.14  School district teachers salary schedule requirement. 
{¶ 289} “3317.15  Requirements specifying the number of speech-
language pathologists and school psychologists a school district must hire. 
{¶ 290} “3317.62 to 3317.64  Requirements related to loans from the 
lottery profits education fund under certain circumstances. 
{¶ 291} “Chapter 3318.  School Facilities Assistance Law (except for a 
program under which community school loans for classroom facilities may be 
guaranteed by the state for up to 15 years (R.C. 3318.50)). 
{¶ 292} “3319.01 and 3319.011  Requirements related to school 
superintendent employment. 
{¶ 293} “3319.02  Requirements related to employment of assistant 
superintendents, principals, assistant principals, and other administrators. 
{¶ 294} “3319.03 to 3319.06  Requirements related to employment of 
school district business managers. 
{¶ 295} “3319.07, 3319.08, and 3319.09 to 3319.111  Teacher 
employment and contract requirements. 
{¶ 296} “3319.071 Prohibition against requiring teachers to participate in 
professional development programs. 
{¶ 297} “3319.072  Teacher lunch period requirement. 
{¶ 298} “3319.081 to 3319.087  Employment requirements for 
nonteaching employees. 
{¶ 299} “3319.088  Educational aide employment requirements. 
January Term, 2006 
55 
{¶ 300} “3319.10  Substitute teacher employment requirements. 
{¶ 301} “3319.12  Annual professional staff salary notice requirements; 
requirements related to the transfer of administrators to other positions. 
{¶ 302} “3319.13 to 3319.143  Leave of absence requirements for 
teachers and nonteaching employees, including professional development leave, 
sick leave, military leave, personal leave, and assault leave. 
{¶ 303} “3319.15  Teacher termination of contract requirements. 
{¶ 304} “3319.16 and 3319.161  School board termination of teacher 
contract requirements. 
{¶ 305} “3319.17  Reduction in teaching force requirements. 
{¶ 306} “3319.171  Requirements related to administrative personnel 
suspension policy. 
{¶ 307} “3319.18 and 3319.181  Requirements related to employment of 
teachers and nonteaching employees when school district territory is transferred 
or districts are consolidated. 
{¶ 308} “3319.21  Prohibition against a school board participating in a 
contract employing a relative of a school board member; requirement that these 
contracts and any contracts in which a board member has a pecuniary interest are 
void. 
{¶ 309} “3319.32  Student record keeping requirements. 
{¶ 310} “3319.322  Student photograph requirements for student records. 
{¶ 311} “3319.33  Statistical reporting requirements to the State Board. 
{¶ 312} “3319.35 and 3319.37  Penalties and consequences for failure to 
submit reports to the State Board. 
{¶ 313} “3319.36  Prohibition against paying a nonlicensed teacher 
(except R.C. 3314.03(A)(10) requires teachers in community schools to be 
licensed under sections 3319.22-3319.31). 
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{¶ 314} “3319.41  School corporal punishment policy requirements and 
authorization 
{¶ 315} “3319.45  Requirement that school principal report certain 
offenses committed by students. 
{¶ 316} “3321.02 to 3321.12  Requirements related to the enforcement of 
student compulsory attendance law; requirements related to students with age and 
schooling certificates. 
{¶ 317} “Chapter 3324.  Identification of gifted children and 
development of service plan. 
{¶ 318} “3327.01 to 33276.05  Student transportation requirements 
(Sections 3314.09 and 3314.091 require a school district to transport its students 
to community schools in the same manner districts are required to transport 
students to other schools unless the district has entered into an agreement with a 
community school under which the community school provides student 
transportation). 
{¶ 319} “3327.06  Tuition collection requirements and provisions related 
to the unauthorized attendance of students. 
{¶ 320} “3327.08  Competitive Bidding Law regarding school bus 
purposes. 
{¶ 321} “3327.09  Motor vehicle insurance requirement (though 
community 
schools 
must 
provide 
for 
liability 
insurance 
(R.C. 
3314.03(A)(11)(b))). 
{¶ 322} “3327.11  Requirements related to paying the cost of a student’s 
room and board in certain circumstances. 
{¶ 323} “3327.13  Requirements related to leasing buses for transporting 
nonpublic school students to and from school activities. 
{¶ 324} “3327.14  Requirements related to providing transportation for 
senior citizen and adult education groups. 
January Term, 2006 
57 
{¶ 325} “3327.15  Restrictions on use of school vehicles out of state. 
{¶ 326} “3327.16  Requirements related to volunteer bus rider assistance 
programs; requirement to provide school bus rider instruction programs. 
{¶ 327} “3329.01 to 3329.08  All requirements related to the selection 
and purchase of school textbooks and electronic textbooks. 
{¶ 328} “3329.09  Requirements related to the accessibility and 
distribution of textbooks to students (except the parent's right to buy textbooks for 
a child at no more than 10% over the school district's cost applies). 
{¶ 329} “3329.10  Prohibition against a superintendent, supervisor, 
principal, or teacher acting as a school textbook sales agent. 
{¶ 330} “Chapter 3331.  Requirements related to the issuing and 
administration of age and schooling certificates (except the parental right, under 
3331.13, to obtain a child's school records upon request for purposes of an age 
and schooling certificate applies). 
{¶ 331} “Title 35 (various sections)  Elections Law related to school 
board elections and elections on tax levies and bond issues. 
{¶ 332} “4104.05(A) and (B)  Requirement to employ a licensed boiler 
operator under certain circumstances unless, this requirement is considered to be a 
facility safety issue. 
{¶ 333} “5705.412  Requirement to attach certificate of available 
resources to school district appropriation measures, contracts, and purchase 
orders.”  
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