Case Title: Arguello v. Sunset Station, Inc.

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 29

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
427 Nev, Advance Opinion 24
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

MARCOS ARGUELLO, No. 54823

Appelt, FIL ED

SUNSET STATION, INC., A NEVADA
CORPORATION D/B/A SUNSET JUN 922011
STATION HOTEL & CASINO,
Respondent.

 

Appeal from a district court summary judgment in a tort
action, Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Timothy C.
Williams, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Law Office of Julie A. Mersch and Julie A. Mersch, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Cisneros Clayson & Marias and Scott B. Van Alfen, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

BEFORE SAITTA, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ,

OPINION
PER CURIAM:

In this appeal, we primarily consider the scope of NRS
651.010(1), which limits the liability of hotels for “the theft, loss, damage
or destruction of any property brought by a patron upon the premises or
left in a motor vehicle upon the premises...in the absence of gross

neglect by the owner or keeper” of the hotel. In particular, we consider

a M0106

 

 
whether NRS 651.010(1) shields a hotel from liability arising out of the
theft of and damage to a guest's motor vehicle that was parked in the
hotel's valet parking lot. We conclude that it does not.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2006, appellant Marcos Arguello drove his vehicle to

respondent Sunset Station, Inc., d.b.a. Sunset Station Hotel & Casino,

 

gave his keys to a valet attendant, and received a claim ticket for his
vehicle. A few hours later, when Arguello attempted to retrieve his
vehicle, it was dotermined that an unknown party had stolen it from the
valet parking lot, The vehicle was recovered the following day in a
stripped condition. Arguello then submitted a claim for the loss of his
vehicle to his insurer, Farmer's Insurance, and Farmer's issued a check to
Arguello in the amount of $20,434.98,

‘Thereafter, Arguello filed a lawsuit in district court against
Sunset Station, alleging negligence and breach of a bailment contract.
Arguello sought damages exceeding $10,000 for, among other things, the
loss of the use of his vehicle and the cost of customizations made to the
vehicle.

Sunset Station moved for summary judgment, arguing that
NRS 651.010 shielded it from liability for the theft of Arguello’s vehicle
and that Arguello did not have standing to sue because Farmer's became

subrogated to the rights of Arguello when it issued a check for his
insurance claim. The district court determined that NRS 651.010())
shielded Sunset Station from liability arising out of the theft of Arguello's

 

 
vehicle and entered summary judgment in favor of Sunset Station.! This
appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Standard of review
We review de novo whether the district court appropriately
granted summary judgment, Wood v, Safeway, Inc,, 121 Nev. 724, 729,
121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate “when the

pleadings and other evidence on file demonstrate that no ‘genuine issue as

 

to any material fact [remains] and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Id, (alteration in original) (quoting NRCP
56(0).

Standing is a question of law reviewed de novo. Citizens for
Cold Springs v, City of Reno, 125 Nev. _, __, 218 P.3d 847, 850-51
(2009) (applying de novo review in deciding upon whom a statute
conferred standing). “[QJuestions of statutory construction, including the
meaning and scope of a statute, are questions of law, which this court
reviews de novo.” City of Reno v. Reno Gazette-Journal, 119 Nev. 55, 58,
63 P.8d 1147, 1148 (2003).
‘Standing and subrogation

Asa threshold argument, Sunset Station asserts that Arguello
lacks standing to sue because he accepted compensation from Farmer's for
the theft of his vehicle, Thus, according to Sunset Station, pursuant to the
doctrine of subrogation, Farmer's is the only party that has standing to

'The district court did not specifically address whether Arguello has
standing to file suit.

 
bring a lawsuit for damages arising from the theft of Arguello's vehicle.
We disagree,

 

 

ty in interest with standing to
NRCP 17(a) provides that “[elvery action shall be prosecuted

   

e

 

in the name of the real party in interest.” A real party in interest “is one
who possesses the right to enforce the claim and has a significant interest
in the litigation.” Szilagyi v, Testa, 99 Nev. 834, 838, 673 P.2d 495, 498
(1983). ‘The inquiry into whether a party is a real party in interest
overlaps with the question of standing. Id.

Subrogation is “[tJhe principle under which an insurer that
has paid a loss under an insurance policy is entitled to all the rights and
remedies belonging to the insured against a third party with respect to
any loss covered by the policy.” Black's Law Dictionary 1563-64 (9th ed.
2009). “[AJn insurer that pays its insured in_full for claimed losses is
subrogated by operation of law to the rights, if any, which the insured may
have had against the tortfeasor before payment was made.” Duboise v,
State Farm Mut, Auto. Ins, 96 Nev. 877, 879, 619 P.2d 1223, 1224 (1980)
(emphasis added). Such a circumstance is known as “total subrogation.”
Valley Power Co, v. Toivabe Supply, 80 Nev. 458, 461, 396 P.24 137, 138
(1964). “In such a case the insurer . . . is the sole party in interest, and the
only one who may assert a claim against those thought to be ultimately
liable.” Id. It is widely recognized, however, that if the insurer “has paid
only part of the loss, both the insured and insurer... have substantive

rights against the tortfeasor which qualify them as real parties in
interest.” United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 381 (1948); see
Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 903 P.2d 834, 838 (NM. 1995) (“When the
amounts paid by the insurer under the policy cover only part of the

 

 
insured’s loss, leaving an excess loss to be made good by the tortfeasor, the
insured retains the right of action for the entire loss.”)..

Arguello received a check for $20,434.98 from Farmer's, This
his $500
deductible. In his complaint, Arguello sought damages for, among other

figure constitutes Farmer's valuation of Arguello's vehicle, les

 

things, the loss of the use of the vehicle and the amount he had paid for

 

customizations to his vehicle. Arguello had not been compensated by
Farmer's for these alleged damages. As such, Arguello was only partially
compensated by Farmer's, and therefore, he retains the right to pursue an
action against Sunset Station for the full amount of his recoverable losses.
If Arguello receives a damages award that fully compensates him for such
losses, then Farmer's may be entitled to reimbursement of its payments to
him, but his right to first sue Sunset Station for those losses is unaffected.
See Max v. Allright Corp,, 930 P.2d 1010, 1013 (Ariz, Ct. App. 1997) (“The
general rule is that where the loss exceeds the amount of insurance paid,
the insured may sue in his own name and recover the full amount of the
loss, the question of the distribution [of the proceeds] being a matter
between the insured and the insurer only.” (quoting Bryan v, Southern
Pacific Company, 286 P.2d 761, 766-67 (Ariz. 1955))). Accordingly,
because Arguello possesses the right to enforce his claims and has a
significant interest in the litigation, we conclude that he is a real party in
interest with standing to sue Sunset Station for the loss of his vehicle.
‘NRS 651.010 does not shield Sunset Station from potential liability
Arguello contends that the district court erred when it granted
summary judgment based on its determination that NRS 651.010
protected Sunset Station against liability arising from the theft of

Arguello's vehicle from its valet parking lot. We agree and reverse.

 

 
NRS 651.010 does not apply to motor vehicles
Our goal in construing statutes is to effectuate the

Legislature's intent. Salas v. Allstate Rent-A-Car, Ine, 116 Nev. 1165,
1168, 14 P.3d 511, 513 (2000). When interpreting a statute, we look first
to its plain language. Id, at 1168, 14 P.3d at 513-14. As we have

 

explained, “this court must give [a statute's) terms their plain meaning,

 

considering its provisions as a whole so as to read them in a way that
would not render words or phrases superfluous or make a provision
nugatory.” Southern Nev. Homebuilders v. Clark County, 121 Nev. 446,
449, 117 P.34 171, 173 (2005) (internal quotation omitted).

NRS 651.010 provides:

1. An owner or keeper of any hotel, inn,
motel, motor court, boardinghouse or lodging
house in this State is not civilly liable for the theft,
loss, damage or destruction of any property
brought by a patron upon the premises or left in a
motor vehicle upon the premises because of theft,
burglary, fire or otherwise, in the absence of gross,
neglect by the owner or keeper.

2. An owner or keeper of any hotel, inn,
motel, motor court, boardinghouse or lodging
house in this State is not civilly liable for the theft,
loss, damage or destruction of any property of a
guest left in a guest room if:

 

(a) The owner or keeper provides a fireproof
safe or vault in which guests may deposit property
for safekeepi

() Notice of this service is personally given
to a guest or posted in the office and the guest's
room; and

(©) The property is not offered for deposit in
the safe or vault by a guest,

 

 

is the owner or keeper is grossly negligent.

 

 
8, An owner or keeper is not obligated to

receive property to deposit for safekeeping which

exceeds $750 in value or is of a size which cannot

easily fit within the safe or vault.

4, The liability of the owner or keeper does

not exceed the sum of $750 for any property,

including, but not limited to, property which is not,

deposited in a safe or vault because it cannot

easily fit within the safe or vault, of an individual

patron or guest, unless the owner or keeper

receives the property for deposit for safekeeping

and consents to assume a liability greater than

$750 for its theft, loss, damage or destruction in a

written agreement in which the patron or guest

specifies the value of the property.

We have not had occasion to construe the most recent
amendment to NRS 651.010, which revised the language of subsection 1 to
provide that it covers “any property brought by a patron upon the

"2 1995 Nev. Stat.,

 

 

premises or left in a motor vehicle upon the premise:
ch, 691, § 9, at 2670.

Read in isolation, the broad language in NRS 651.010(1)
referencing “any property” might give the impression that the statute
applies to all property—including motor vehicles. Read as a whole,
however, the statute unambiguously places motor vehicles outside of its

scope by including the phrase “or left in a motor vehicle upon the

"In Cloward v. Pappas, 79 Nev. 482, 483 n.1, 387 P.2d 97, 97 nl
(1963), Tienda v, Holiday Casino, Inc., 109 Nev. 507, 510-11, 858 P.2¢ 106,
108 (1993), and Nadjarian v. Desert Palace, Inc., 111 Nev. 763, 764 n.1,
895 P.2d 1291, 1292 n.1 (1995), we considered prior versions of NRS
651.010,

 

 
nee

premises.”> NRS 651.010(1). If the Legislature intended NRS 651.010(1)
to protect innkeepers from civil liability for damage to motor vehicles, it
would not have needed to include the phrase “or left in a motor vehicle
upon the premises” because the preceding phrase, “any property brought
by a patron upon the premises,” would necessarily have included motor
vehicles. Moreover, interpreting NRS 651.010(1) to extend to motor
vehicles would lead to the illogical conclusion that a motor vehicle is
among the type of property that could be “loft in a motor vehicle.” In other
words, the inclusion of the language “or left in a motor vehicle upon the

 

premises” shows that the Legislature neither contemplated nor intended
for the statute to apply to the theft of or damage to motor vehicles.

‘Thus, the statute cannot be read to extend to motor vehicles
because doing so would require us to ignore the Legislature's inclusion of
the phrase “or left in a motor vehicle upon the premises,” which, as
discussed above, absurdly limits the scope of the statute, Under well-
established canons of statutory interpretation, we must not render any of
the phrases of NRS 651.010(1) superfluous. See Southern Nev.
Homebuilders, 121 Nev. at 449, 117 P.3d at 173.

Furthermore, reading the provisions of NRS 651.010 as a
whole, as we must, reveals other indications that NRS 651.010(1) was not
intended to apply to motor vehicles. Subsections 2 and 3 discuss safes and
vaults in which items can be deposited for safekeeping. Subsection 4
imposes a $750 liability limit for gross neglect, an amount dwarfed by the

ANRS 651.005 provides that “premises’ includes, but is not limited
to, all buildings, improvements, equipment and facilities, including any
parking lot .

 

 

 
value of most vehicles. Subsection 4 also provides that a hotel cannot be
held liable in an amount greater than $750 unless it consents and the
guest specifies, in writing, the value of the property for which the hotel is
assuming responsibility. The foregoing provisions lead to the
unmistakable conclusion that the intent behind the enactment of NRS.
651.010 was to limit liability for the lo
motor vehicle, not the motor vehicle itself. ‘Therefore, we hold that based
upon the plain language of the statute, NRS 651.010(1) does not shield a

 

of personal property within a

hotel from civil liability arising from the theft of or damage to a guest's

motor vehicle.*
CONCLUSION

Arguello is a real party in interest with standing to sue Sunset

Station because his insurer only partially compensated him for his claimed

losses. ‘The district court erred in granting Sunset Station summary

judgment based on its determination that NRS 651.010(1) shielded Sunset

Station from liability for the theft of and damage to Arguello's vehicle.

4Arguello asserts that NRS 651.010 also does not shield a hotel from
liability for breach of bailment, as opposed to other forms of civil liability.
In Nadiarian, we concluded that NRS 651.010 does not limit common law
bailment liability. 111 Nev. at 766, 895 P.2d at 1293. That conclusion,
however, was based upon a version of NRS 651.010 that only limited
liability from the loss of property left in guests’ rooms, which differs
substantially from the current version of NRS 651.010. Id, at 764 n.1, 895
P.2d at 1292 n.1, Thus, we have not determined whether the current
version of NRS 651.010 abrogates common law bailment liability. Because
we conclude that NRS 651.010 does not apply to motor vehicles, it follows
that the statute does not abrogate common law bailment liability as it
relates to motor vehicles. We need not reach the issue of whether NRS
651.010 abrogates common law bailment liability as it concerns other
property.

 

 
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment

against Arguello and remand this matter for further proceedings.

tNes bak 4

Hagslgsty

Parraguirre