Case Title: Jacobson v. Kaforey

Citation: 2016-Ohio-8434

Docket Number: 2015-1340

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Jacobson v. Kaforey, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8434.] 
  
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-8434 
JACOBSON, APPELLEE, v. KAFOREY ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Jacobson v. Kaforey, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8434.] 
Civil actions—R.C. 2307.60(A)(1)—The current version of R.C. 2307.60 
independently authorizes a civil action for damages caused by criminal 
acts, unless otherwise prohibited by law. 
(No. 2015-1340—Submitted April 19, 2016—Decided December 28, 2016.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County, 
No. 26915, 2015-Ohio-2624. 
_________________ 
O’NEILL, J. 
{¶ 1} The Ninth District Court of Appeals identified a conflict between its 
judgment in this case and prior judgments of the Third, Fifth, and Tenth District 
Courts of Appeals.  The court certified to us, and we agreed to answer, the following 
question of law:  “Does the current version of R.C. 2307.60 independently authorize 
a civil action for damages caused by criminal acts, unless otherwise prohibited by 
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law?”  Applying the plain and unambiguous terms of R.C. 2307.60, we answer the 
certified question in the affirmative and affirm the judgment of the Ninth District 
Court of Appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} Jessica Jacobson filed a pro se complaint against defendants-
appellants Ellen C. Kaforey, Akron Children’s Hospital, and Cleveland Clinic 
Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation, alleging, as relevant to this appeal, three 
civil claims brought under R.C. 2307.60.  Each of those claims sought recovery for 
damages arising out of the alleged violation of a criminal statute: unlawful restraint, 
R.C. 2905.03; kidnapping, R.C. 2905.01; and child enticement, R.C. 2905.05.  
Jacobson alleged that the hospitals and Kaforey—an attorney and registered nurse 
who had been appointed by the Summit County Probate Court as a conservator to 
assist Jacobson’s mother in making medical decisions for Jacobson—unlawfully 
restrained her by keeping her mother from visiting her while Jacobson was 
hospitalized in 2001 at the age of seven.  Further, Jacobson alleged that Kaforey, 
aided by Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation, kidnapped her by 
arranging without authority to have her sent that year to live with a family member 
in Florida.  And finally, Jacobson alleged that Kaforey, in concert with the 
hospitals, unlawfully enticed her onto the plane to Florida without obtaining the 
required legal permission from Jacobson’s mother. 
{¶ 3} Kaforey and both hospitals moved to dismiss all counts of the 
complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state claims upon which relief could 
be granted.  The trial court granted the motions as to all claims and dismissed the 
case.  In ruling on the claims brought under R.C. 2307.60, the trial court observed 
that “Ohio courts have established that civil actions for damages may not be 
predicated upon alleged violation of a criminal statute.” 
{¶ 4} Jacobson appealed pro se, raising several assignments of error 
asserting that the trial court should not have dismissed the claims brought under 
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R.C. 2307.60.  She argued that that statute creates a cause of action to recover 
damages caused by a criminal act.  After briefing was completed, the court of 
appeals granted in part a motion filed by Jacobson’s stepfather, Gary Kirsch, to 
substitute himself for her as her guardian, and Kirsch later retained counsel.  A 
divided panel of the court of appeals agreed with Jacobson and Kirsch, holding that 
“the current version of R.C. 2307.60 independently authorizes a civil action for 
damages” caused by criminal acts.  “That is exactly what the plain language of the 
statute authorizes.”  2015-Ohio-2624, 39 N.E.3d 799, ¶ 21 (9th Dist.).  The court 
of appeals remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. 
{¶ 5} Kaforey and both hospitals moved the court of appeals under App.R. 
25 to certify a conflict between its judgment and the judgments of several other 
district courts of appeals, each of which held that R.C. 2307.60 does not create an 
independent cause of action but merely codifies Ohio common law that a civil 
action does not merge into a criminal prosecution.  The court of appeals granted the 
motions, holding that its judgment was in conflict with judgments of the Third, 
Fifth, and Tenth District Courts of Appeals.  Applegate v. Weadock, 3d Dist. 
Auglaize No. 2-95-24, 1995 WL 705214, *3 (Nov. 30, 1995); McNichols v. 
Rennicker, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2002 AP 04 0026, 2002-Ohio-7215, ¶ 17; 
Edwards v. Madison Twp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97APE06-819, 1997 WL 
746415, *7 (Nov. 25, 1997); Groves v. Groves, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-1107, 
2010-Ohio-4515, ¶ 25.  We determined that a conflict exists and ordered briefing.  
143 Ohio St.3d 1496, 2015-Ohio-4468, 39 N.E.3d 1268. 
Analysis 
{¶ 6} We must answer the straightforward question certified to us by the 
court of appeals:  “Does the current version of R.C. 2307.60 independently 
authorize a civil action for damages caused by criminal acts, unless otherwise 
prohibited by law?”  We hold that it does. 
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{¶ 7} The statutory language at the heart of the dispute in this case is current 
R.C. 2307.60(A)(1).  It provides: 
 
Anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act has, 
and may recover full damages in, a civil action unless specifically 
excepted by law, may recover the costs of maintaining the civil 
action and attorney’s fees if authorized by any provision of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure or another section of the Revised Code or under 
the common law of this state, and may recover punitive or 
exemplary damages if authorized by section 2315.21 or another 
section of the Revised Code. 
 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 117, 151 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2274, 2276. 
{¶ 8} When we consider the meaning of a statute, our first step is always to 
determine whether the statute is “plain and unambiguous.”  State v. Hurd, 89 Ohio 
St.3d 616, 618, 734 N.E.2d 365 (2000).  If “the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occasion for 
resorting to rules of statutory interpretation,” because “an unambiguous statute is 
to be applied, not interpreted.”  Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 
(1944), paragraph five of the syllabus.  Ambiguity, in the sense used in our opinions 
on statutory interpretation, means that a statutory provision is “capable of bearing 
more than one meaning.”  Dunbar v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, 
992 N.E.2d 1111, ¶ 16.  Without “an initial finding” of ambiguity, “inquiry into 
legislative intent, legislative history, public policy, the consequences of an 
interpretation, or any other factors identified in R.C. 1.49 is inappropriate.”  Id.; 
State v. Brown, 142 Ohio St.3d 92, 2015-Ohio-486, 28 N.E.3d 81, ¶ 10.  We “do 
not have the authority” to dig deeper than the plain meaning of an unambiguous 
statute “under the guise of either statutory interpretation or liberal construction.”  
January Term, 2016 
 
5
Morgan v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 68 Ohio St.3d 344, 347, 626 N.E.2d 939 
(1994).  If we were to brazenly ignore the unambiguous language of a statute, or if 
we found a statute to be ambiguous only after delving deeply into the history and 
background of the law’s enactment, we would invade the role of the legislature: to 
write the laws. 
{¶ 9} We remain careful, however, not to “pick out one sentence and 
disassociate it from the context.”  Black-Clawson Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 100, 
104, 38 N.E.2d 403 (1941).  We instead focus on everything within “the four 
corners of the enactment” in order to “determine the intent of the enacting body.”  
Id. 
{¶ 10} Applying these principles, we answer the certified question in the 
affirmative.  R.C. 2307.60(A)(1), by its plain and unambiguous terms, creates a 
statutory cause of action for damages resulting from any criminal act.  The wording 
chosen by the Ohio General Assembly is explicit: any person “injured * * * by a 
criminal act has * * * a civil action” unless a civil action “is specifically excepted 
by law.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2307.60(A)(1).  The preamble of the legislation 
originally enacting that language in R.C. 2307.60, which became effective in 1985, 
demonstrates that the General Assembly specifically sought to create a civil cause 
of action for damages resulting from any criminal act: “AN ACT * * * to amend, 
for the purpose of adopting a new section number as indicated in parentheses, 
section 1.16 (2307.60) * * * of the Revised Code to establish a specific statutory 
civil action for the recovery of full damages for personal injury or property loss 
arising from any criminal act * * *.”  (Boldface and capitalization sic.)  
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 426, 140 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3783.  These legislative statements 
are crystal clear.  We need not dig further into the meaning of the statute than the 
language that was signed into law.  Although R.C. 2307.60 has been amended a 
number of times since 1985, current R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) continues to specifically 
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authorize a civil action for damages based on the violation of any criminal statute, 
unless an exception applies. 
{¶ 11} We make no ruling today beyond answering the certified-conflict 
question.  Any ensuing issues regarding how the statute operates or what a plaintiff 
must do to prove a claim under R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) are beyond the scope of this 
appeal.  Resolution of issues of that type by this court must await an appeal in a 
case in which the issues are properly before the court. 
{¶ 12} By holding that R.C. 2307.60 creates a civil cause of action for 
damages resulting from any criminal act, we faithfully apply our precedents on 
statutory construction.  We recognize the concerns expressed by the defendants in 
this case that our ruling today in this regard may open the floodgates of litigation 
and permit a flurry of new civil claims to be raised in perhaps dubious 
circumstances.  But those gates are not ours to open or close.  The decision to create 
a civil cause of action for any person injured by a criminal act has been definitively 
made by the General Assembly. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 13} By its plain and unambiguous language, R.C. 2307.60 creates a civil 
cause of action for damages resulting from any criminal act, unless otherwise 
prohibited by law.  We therefore answer the certified question in the affirmative 
and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, which remanded the cause to the 
trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by JENSEN, 
J. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
JAMES D. JENSEN, of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, sitting for FRENCH, 
J. 
January Term, 2016 
 
7
_________________ 
 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 14} I agree with the majority that R.C. 2307.60 does create an 
independent civil cause of action.  However, because I believe that the statutory 
provision “is, itself, capable of bearing more than one meaning,” Dunbar v. State, 
136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, 992 N.E.2d 1111, ¶ 16, and therefore is 
ambiguous, I disagree with the majority’s analysis and concur in judgment only. 
{¶ 15} Because the statute is ambiguous, we should consider other matters 
under R.C. 1.49 to determine the intention of the General Assembly.  After 
consideration of the factors set forth in R.C. 1.49, I agree that R.C. 2307.60 does 
create an independent civil cause of action.  Therefore, I would answer the certified 
question in the affirmative and affirm the judgment of the Ninth District Court of 
Appeals, albeit on different grounds from those of the majority. 
{¶ 16} The certified-conflict question asks, “Does the current version of 
R.C. 2307.60 independently authorize a civil action for damages caused by criminal 
acts, unless otherwise prohibited by law?”  143 Ohio St.3d 1496, 2015-Ohio-4468, 
39 N.E.3d 1268. 
{¶ 17} The current version of R.C. 2307.60 became effective in 2008.  2008 
Sub.S.B. No. 184.  While R.C. 2307.60 has multiple provisions, the certified-
conflict issue focuses on the language of R.C. 2307.60(A)(1), which provides: 
 
Anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act has, 
and may recover full damages in, a civil action unless specifically 
excepted by law, may recover the costs of maintaining the civil 
action and attorney’s fees if authorized by any provision of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure or another section of the Revised Code or under 
the common law of this state, and may recover punitive or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
exemplary damages if authorized by section 2315.21 or another 
section of the Revised Code. 
 
I.  Statutory Construction 
{¶ 18} “The ultimate inquiry in the interpretation of statutes is to ascertain 
the legislative intent.”  Caldwell v. State, 115 Ohio St. 458, 466, 154 N.E. 792 
(1926).  One of the cardinal rules of statutory construction is that we must first 
examine the language of the statute itself.  Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 
101, 105, 304 N.E.2d 378 (1973).  “ ‘[I]f the words [are] free from ambiguity and 
doubt, and express plainly, clearly, and distinctly the sense of the lawmaking body, 
there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.’ ”  Risner v. Ohio 
Dept. of Natural Resources, Ohio Div. of Wildlife, 144 Ohio St.3d 278, 2015-Ohio-
3731, 42 N.E.3d 718, ¶ 12, quoting Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 
574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 19} “ ‘[T]he General Assembly is not presumed to do a vain or useless 
thing, and * * * when language is inserted in a statute it is inserted to accomplish 
some definite purpose.’ ”  State v. Wilson, 77 Ohio St.3d 334, 336, 673 N.E.2d 1347 
(1997), quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 
479, 159 N.E.2d 756 (1959).  When reviewing a statute, we cannot “ ‘pick out one 
sentence and disassociate it from the context,’ ” but we instead must look at “ ‘the 
four corners of the enactment’ ” to determine the intent of the legislature.  
MacDonald v. Bernard, 1 Ohio St.3d 85, 89, 438 N.E.2d 410 (1982), quoting Black-
Clawson Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 100, 104, 38 N.E.2d 403 (1941).  If a statute is 
ambiguous, then the court may consider “other matters” in determining the 
intention of the legislature.  R.C. 1.49. 
{¶ 20} Because the phrase “has * * * a civil action” in R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) 
is reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning, I disagree with the majority 
that R.C. 2307.60 is unambiguous, and I instead find that R.C. 2307.60 is 
January Term, 2016 
 
9
ambiguous.  See Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 
741 N.E.2d 121 (2001).  Accordingly, it is necessary to consider “other matters” 
under R.C. 1.49.  Reviewing the circumstances of the statutory enactment, R.C. 
1.49(B), the former statutory provisions, R.C. 1.49(D), the available legislative 
history, R.C. 1.49(C), and the consequences of a particular construction, R.C. 
1.49(E), demonstrates the General Assembly’s intent to create an independent civil 
cause of action in R.C. 2307.60. 
A.  Circumstances Surrounding the Statutory Enactment 
{¶ 21} Contrary to old English common law, under Ohio common law a 
criminal action did not merge with a civil action.  See Story v. Hammond, 4 Ohio 
376, 378 (1831), and Howk v. Minnick, 19 Ohio St. 462, 465 (1869).  The General 
Assembly codified this common-law principle in 1877 in the “General Provisions” 
section of the penal code.  See Part Fourth, Title I, Chapter 1, Section 10, 74 Ohio 
Laws 240, 243.  That statute eventually became R.C. 1.16 in 1953.  It provided: 
 
 
Any one injured in person or property by a criminal act may 
recover full damages in a civil action, unless specifically excepted 
by law.  No record of a conviction, unless obtained by confession in 
open court, shall be used as evidence in a civil action brought for 
such purpose. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Former R.C. 1.16, 1953 Am.H.B. No. 1, 125 Ohio Laws 7. 
{¶ 22} The Sixth District Court of Appeals was the first Ohio court to 
conclude in a reported opinion that R.C. 1.16 did not create a civil cause of action, 
but was rather a codification of Ohio common law that a civil action does not merge 
with a criminal prosecution.  Schmidt v. State Aerial Farm Statistics, Inc., 62 Ohio 
App.2d 48, 49, 403 N.E.2d 1026 (6th Dist.1978); see also Peterson v. Scott Constr. 
Co., 5 Ohio App.3d 203, 204, 451 N.E.2d 1236 (6th Dist.1982). 
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10 
B.  Former Statutory Provisions 
1.  R.C. 2307.60 
{¶ 23} Years after Schmidt and Peterson were decided, the General 
Assembly amended R.C. 1.16 through changes that became effective in 1985.  
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 426, 140 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3783, 3787.  In addition to 
renumbering the statute from R.C. 1.16 to become R.C. 2307.60, the General 
Assembly also amended the language of the statute.  As amended in Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 426, former R.C. 2307.60 provided: 
 
ANYONE injured in person or property by a criminal act 
HAS, AND may recover full damages in, a civil action, unless 
specifically excepted by law, AND MAY RECOVER THE COSTS 
OF MAINTAINING THE CIVIL ACTION, EXEMPLARY 
DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IF SPECIFICALLY 
AUTHORIZED BY ANY OTHER SECTION OF THE REVISED 
CODE OR IF AUTHORIZED UNDER THE COMMON LAW OF 
THIS STATE.  No record of a conviction, unless obtained by 
confession in open court, shall be used as evidence in a civil action 
brought PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION. 
 
(Capitalization to indicate revised wording sic; emphasis added.)  140 Ohio Laws, 
Part II, at 3787. 
{¶ 24} After R.C. 2307.60 became effective in 1985 through 2005, the 
legislature amended the statute six times.  See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 142 Ohio Laws, 
Part I, 1661, 1673; Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3867, 3942; 
Sub.H.B. No. 547, 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4392, 4392-4393; Sub.S.B. No. 108, 
149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 382, 429; Sub.S.B. No. 107, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1529, 
1529-1530 (designating the preexisting provisions of the statute as R.C. 2307.60(A) 
January Term, 2016 
 
11 
and adding additional provisions as R.C. 2307.60(B)(1), (2), and (3)); and 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80, 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7915, 7951-7952.  During that time 
the legislature did not disturb the last sentence of former R.C. 2307.60 even though 
the Ohio General Assembly specifically attempted to enact significant tort-reform 
measures in 1996 in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, see 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 3942, 
and then repealed those measures in 2001 in Sub.S.B. No. 108, see 149 Ohio Laws, 
Part I, at 429; see also Section 1, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 384. 
{¶ 25} Effective in 2007, the General Assembly amended R.C. 2307.60(A).  
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 117, 151 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2274, 2276.  Through this 
amendment, the legislature designated former R.C. 2307.60(A) as (A)(1) and 
enacted new provisions that it designated as R.C. 2307.60(A)(2).  Id. 
{¶ 26} With the adoption of the new language in R.C. 2307.60(A)(2), the 
General Assembly deleted the last sentence of the previous version of R.C. 
2307.60(A), which limited the use of a conviction as evidence in a civil action 
brought pursuant to R.C. 2307.60.  Id.  The newly enacted provisions in R.C. 
2307.60(A)(2) broadened the use of a criminal conviction in a civil action to 
establish a presumption of an offender’s liability for the injuries in person or 
property caused by a criminal act.  They also established circumstances under 
which an offender could challenge that presumption of liability.  Id. 
2.  R.C. 2307.61 
{¶ 27} As set forth above, a court’s paramount concern when interpreting a 
statute is legislative intent.  State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 
Ohio St.3d 395, 2003-Ohio-1630, 786 N.E.2d 39, ¶ 12.  “In reviewing a statute, a 
court cannot pick out one sentence and disassociate it from the context, but must 
look to the four corners of the enactment to determine the intent of the enacting 
body.”  Wilson, 77 Ohio St.3d at 336, 673 N.E.2d 1347.  “A court must examine a 
statute in its entirety rather than focus on an isolated phrase to determine legislative 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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intent.”  Massillon City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Massillon, 104 Ohio St.3d 518, 
2004-Ohio-6775, 820 N.E.2d 874, ¶ 37.  See also R.C. 1.42. 
{¶ 28} With this guidance in mind, therefore, other amendments to R.C. 
Chapter 2307 made at the same times as the enactment of R.C. 2307.60 in 1985 and 
the subsequent amendments of R.C. 2307.60 become important in determining the 
intention of the legislature.  When it enacted R.C. 2307.60 in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
426, the General Assembly also enacted R.C. 2307.61.  140 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 
3787-3791.  In R.C. 2307.61, the General Assembly established special recovery 
provisions for the willful destruction of property or for the commission of a theft 
offense.  As originally enacted, R.C. 2307.61(A) provided: 
 
If a property owner brings a civil action pursuant to section 
2307.60 of the Revised Code to recover damages from any person 
who willfully damages the owner’s property or commits a theft 
offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, 
involving the owner’s property, the property owner may recover 
[damages and obtain certain other relief as specified]. 
 
140 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 3787. 
{¶ 29} Since 1985, the legislature has amended R.C. 2307.61 six times.  See 
Sub.S.B. No. 105, 144 Ohio Laws, Part I, 537, 549-553; Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, 
146 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 3942-3948; Sub.H.B No. 294, 148 Ohio Laws, Part II, 
3292, 3297-3301; Sub.S.B. No. 108, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 429-436; Sub.S.B. 
No. 107, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 1530-1534; and 2008 Sub.H.B. No. 545.  Two 
of the six occasions occurred when tort-reform legislation was enacted in 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, see 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 3942-3948, and then repealed 
in Sub.S.B. No. 108, see 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 429-436.  Although the General 
Assembly has amended the wording of the first sentence of R.C. 2307.61(A) to be 
January Term, 2016 
 
13 
slightly different from when it was first enacted, the current version of that sentence 
continues to be substantively the same: “If a property owner brings a civil action 
pursuant to division (A) of section 2307.60 of the Revised Code * * *.” 
C.  Legislative History 
{¶ 30} “Although this court is not bound by” the analyses prepared by the 
Ohio Legislative Service Commission, “we may refer to them when we find them 
helpful and objective.”  Meeks v. Papadopulos, 62 Ohio St.2d 187, 191, 404 N.E.2d 
159 (1980).  When statutes are ambiguous they “ ‘are to be read in light of attendant 
circumstances and conditions, and are to be construed as they were intended to be 
understood, when they were passed.’ ”  Id., quoting Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 
327, 48 N.E.2d 217 (1943), paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 31} The Legislative Service Commission prepared a bill analysis of 
Am.H.B. No. 426, as passed by the House of Representatives on February 21, 1984.  
That bill analysis described the state of the law as it existed prior to the proposed 
legislation, in a section labeled “Existing Law”: 
 
Under existing section 1.16 of the Revised Code, anyone 
who sustains personal injuries or property loss or damage as a result 
of a criminal act can recover full damages in a civil action unless 
specifically excepted by law.  As judicially construed, section 1.16 
does not create statutory civil actions for injury, loss, or damage 
caused by criminal conduct, but instead codifies Ohio common law 
that a civil action arising from conduct that is both criminal and 
tortious (civilly wrong) is not merged in a criminal action and, thus, 
a victim having a common law or statutory civil action is free to sue 
an offender for damages even if criminal proceedings have not been 
completed. 
 
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(Underlining sic.)  Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Bill Analysis of Am.H.B. 
No. 426, as passed by the House of Representatives on February 21, 1984, at 1. 
{¶ 32} A comment accompanying this text stated: “Ohio courts have 
indicated that section 1.16 does not create statutory civil actions for injury, loss, or 
damage caused by criminal conduct.  It codifies Ohio common law that a civil 
action is not barred just because it arises from the same act or acts as a criminal 
action.”  Id. at 2.  The comment then cited Story, 4 Ohio 376; Howk, 19 Ohio St. 
462; Schmidt, 62 Ohio App.2d 48, 403 N.E.2d 1026; and Peterson, 5 Ohio App.3d 
203, 451 N.E.2d 1236. 
{¶ 33} The next section of the bill analysis then delineated the changes 
proposed by the bill.  In general, the bill proposed to recodify R.C. 1.16 (as what 
eventually was enacted as R.C. 2307.60), and the bill proposed to “statutorily create 
civil actions for personal injuries or property loss or damage resulting from a 
criminal act.”  (Underlining sic.)  A comment in a previous bill analysis prepared 
by the Legislative Service Commission stated that in creating these civil actions, 
“the bill would reverse contrary aspects of the court decisions mentioned” 
previously.  Ohio Legislative Service Commission Bill Analysis of H.B. No. 426 
as introduced in the House of Representatives on June 14, 1983, at 2. 
{¶ 34} Moreover, the bill analysis of the legislation as passed by the House 
stated that the bill also proposed to grant victims of property damage or theft a right 
to recover specific types of damages and other relief, including compensatory 
damages, exemplary damages, reasonable attorney fees, and costs of maintaining 
the action. 
{¶ 35} Although H.B. No. 426 was revised several times until it was passed 
in late 1984 and was sent to the governor as Am.Sub.H.B. No. 426 for his signature, 
there were no substantive changes to the wording of this part of the legislation as 
introduced, and that wording was ultimately enacted as R.C. 2307.60 when the 
governor signed the bill in early 1985.  And, later bill analyses prepared by the 
January Term, 2016 
 
15 
Legislative Service Commission as the bill was amended continued to state that the 
bill proposed to change the law in essentially the same way that the changes were 
explained in the bill analysis that was prepared for the legislation as passed by the 
House. 
{¶ 36} As mentioned previously, R.C. 2307.60 remained largely unchanged 
from 1985 until 2007.  In amending the statute in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 117, 151 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, at 2276, which became effective in 2007, the General Assembly 
deleted the last sentence of former R.C. 2307.60(A) and added R.C. 2307.60(A)(2).  
The Legislative Service Commission’s final analysis of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 117 
stated: 
 
Continuing law provides that anyone injured in person or 
property by a criminal act has, and may recover full damages in, a 
civil action unless specifically excepted by law * * *.  Prior law 
prohibited the use of a record of a conviction, unless obtained by 
confession in open court, as evidence in a civil action brought 
pursuant to the provision described above.  (R.C. 2307.60(A)(1).) 
The act removes this prohibition and provides that a final 
judgment of a trial court that has not been reversed on appeal or 
otherwise set aside * * * when entered as evidence in any subsequent 
civil proceeding * * * precludes the offender from denying * * * any 
fact essential to sustaining that judgment, unless the offender can 
demonstrate * * * extraordinary circumstances [or unless an appeal 
from the judgment is pending].  (R.C. 2307.60(A)(2).) 
 
Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Final Analysis of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 117, at 
3 (Dec. 14, 2006).  The wording of R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) and (2) was not changed by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
2008 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 184, so the language of those provisions as amended by 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 117 remains in force today. 
D.  Consequences of a Particular Construction 
1.  Construction should not create a disparity in the treatment of victims of crime 
{¶ 37} Appellants—Ellen C. Kaforey, Akron Children’s Hospital, and 
Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation—all argue in their 
respective briefs that R.C. 2307.60 does not independently authorize a civil action 
for damages caused by criminal acts.  But construing R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) in the 
manner urged by appellants leads to an egregious result because it does not permit 
all crime victims who have been “injured in person or property” to have the same 
statutory right to “recover full damages.”  Construing the statute in that manner 
means that the General Assembly intended for the victims of only certain crimes—
such as theft, property damage, theft of cable services, and identity theft—to have 
a right of recovery that is set forth in a specific statute other than R.C. 2307.60.  
See, e.g., R.C. 2307.61, 2307.62, and 2913.49.  Following that logic, the General 
Assembly also did not intend for all victims of crime to enjoy the presumption of 
liability established in R.C. 2307.60(A)(2). 
{¶ 38} Construing R.C. 2307.60 in this manner means that the victim of a 
theft offense enjoys a statutory right of full recovery and under certain conditions a 
presumption of liability against the criminal perpetrator, but a rape victim must 
bring a common-law-tort cause of action and thereafter re-prove during the civil 
trial the existence of the assault and battery and that the rapist was responsible for 
the assault and battery. 
{¶ 39} Conversely, construing R.C. 2307.60 as creating an independent 
civil cause of action for all victims who have been “injured in person or property” 
by a criminal act to be able to achieve “full recovery” and to be afforded a right to 
rely on the presumption of liability in accord with the provisions of R.C. 
2307.60(A)(2) puts all victims of crime on an equal footing. 
January Term, 2016 
 
17 
2.  Construction should not render other provisions superfluous 
{¶ 40} Moreover, construing R.C. 2307.60 as appellants urge—as a statute 
that authorizes only limited recovery—also renders meaningless or superfluous 
other provisions of the Revised Code, which is an outcome that we should avoid 
under the rules of statutory construction.  See Rhodes v. New Philadelphia, 129 
Ohio St.3d 304, 2011-Ohio-3279, 951 N.E.2d 782, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 41} When a statute is ambiguous and relates to the same subject matter 
as another statute, we construe them in pari materia “to discover and carry out 
legislative intent.”  Sheet Metal Workers’ Internatl. Assn., Local Union No. 33 v. 
Gene’s Refrig., Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 248, 2009-Ohio-
2747, 910 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 38, citing State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, Inc. v. Indus. 
Comm., 115 Ohio St.3d 224, 2007-Ohio-4920, 874 N.E.2d 780, ¶ 13.  This is true 
even if the related statutes were passed at different times.  State ex. rel. Pratt v. 
Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956), paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 42} As set forth above, at the same time the General Assembly amended 
and renumbered former R.C. 1.16 to become R.C. 2307.60 effective in 1985, it also 
enacted a new provision, R.C. 2307.61.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 426, 140 Ohio Laws, 
Part II, at 3787-3791.  The first sentence of R.C. 2307.61(A) remains essentially 
the same today as when it was first enacted and continues to provide, “If a property 
owner brings a civil action pursuant to * * * section 2307.60 of the Revised Code 
* * *.” 
{¶ 43} In 1986, the General Assembly codified the Dram Shop Act in R.C. 
4399.18, which provided that “[n]otwithstanding section 2307.60 [of the Revised 
Code] and except as otherwise provided in this section * * *, no person * * * who 
suffers personal injury, death, or property damage as a result of the actions of an 
intoxicated person has a cause of action against any liquor permit holder * * * 
unless” certain conditions are met.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 759, 141 Ohio Laws, Part III, 
5711. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
{¶ 44} Since its original enactment, the General Assembly has amended 
R.C. 4399.18 on four occasions.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 
4009-4010; Sub.S.B. No. 108, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 488-489; Sub.S.B. No. 
107, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 1536-1537; Am.Sub.H.B. No. 306, 150 Ohio Laws, 
Part III, 3578, 3642-3643.  The General Assembly has never amended R.C. 4399.18 
to delete the phrase “[n]otwithstanding * * * section 2307.60” of the Revised Code. 
{¶ 45} “Notwithstanding” is defined as “in spite of.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 1545 (1993).  Therefore, within the statutory context of 
R.C. 4399.18, the term “notwithstanding” means that “in spite of” the right to relief 
provided for in R.C. 2307.60 to recover damages for personal injury or property 
damage, R.C. 4399.18 places a limitation upon that right of recovery when damages 
are sought against a liquor-permit holder for the actions of an intoxicated person.  
See Brown v. Hyatt-Allen Am. Legion Post No. 538, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-89-336, 
1990 WL 174317 (Nov. 9, 1990); Aubin v. Metzger, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-03-08, 
2003-Ohio-5130, ¶ 14; Gough v. The Galley, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2005-A-
0066, 2006-Ohio-3228, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 46} In 1995, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2307.62.  Am.Sub.S.B. 
No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, 7236-7238.  R.C. 2307.62(B)(1) provides: 
 
An owner or operator of a cable service * * * who is 
aggrieved by conduct that is prohibited by division (B) of section 
2913.04 or division (A) or (B) of section 2913.041 of the Revised 
Code may elect to commence a civil action for damages in 
accordance with division (A) of section 2307.60 or section 2307.601 
of the Revised Code or to commence a civil action under this section 
in the appropriate * * * court * * *. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
January Term, 2016 
 
19 
{¶ 47} After its original enactment, the General Assembly amended R.C. 
2307.62 on two occasions.  Sub.S.B. No. 107, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 1534-1536; 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 327, 149 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7536, 7539-7546.  The General 
Assembly has never amended R.C. 2307.62 to delete the provision giving an 
aggrieved party the option to bring a civil action pursuant to R.C. 2307.60. 
{¶ 48} In 1999, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2913.49, thereby 
making it a crime in Ohio to take the identity of another.  Am.S.B. No. 7, 148 Ohio 
Laws, Part IV, 8193, 8193-8195.  Since the original enactment, the General 
Assembly has amended R.C. 2913.49 on four occasions.  Sub.H.B No. 309, 149 
Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8131, 8133-8135; Sub.H.B. No. 48, 151 Ohio Laws, Part II, 
2851, 2852-2855; 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86; and 2014 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 488. 
{¶ 49} In 2014, the General Assembly added division (J) to R.C. 2913.49.  
2014 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 488.  R.C. 2913.49(J) provides: 
 
In addition to the [criminal] penalties described in division 
(I) of this section, anyone injured in person or property by a violation 
of [specified provisions of this statute] who is the owner of the 
identifying information involved in that violation has a civil action 
against the offender pursuant to section R.C. 2307.60 of the Revised 
Code. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 50} Finally, in conjunction with the amendment of R.C. 2913.49 in 2014, 
the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2307.611.  2014 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 488.  R.C. 
2307.611 specifically refers to the crime of identity theft in R.C. 2913.49 and 
provides that “[a] person who brings a civil action pursuant to division (A) of 
section 2307.60 of the Revised Code to recover damages * * * may recover up to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
five thousand dollars for each violation or three times the amount of actual 
damages, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney’s fees.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 51} We presume that the legislature “knows the existing condition of the 
law, whether common law * * * or statute law.”  Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio 
St. 231, 248, 78 N.E.2d 370 (1948), citing State ex rel. Morris v. Sullivan, 81 Ohio 
St. 79, 90 N.E. 146 (1909); Norris v. State, 25 Ohio St. 217 (1874); Johnson v. 
Johnson, 31 Ohio St. 131 (1876); and S. Sur. Co. v. Std. Slag Co., 117 Ohio St. 512, 
159 N.E. 559 (1927).  So when the General Assembly amended R.C. 2307.60 in 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 117, 151 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2276, effective in 2007, and it 
deleted the last sentence of former R.C. 2307.60(A), one might conclude that it was 
the intention of the legislature to diminish the force of R.C. 2307.60 as the source 
of an independent cause of action.  However, that conclusion is definitively rebutted 
when R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) is read in conjunction with R.C. 4399.18 and 2307.62.  
The legislature has never amended the relevant parts of those provisions, so the 
cause-of-action language in those statutes remains.  Moreover, when R.C. 2913.49 
was amended in 2011 and 2014 and when R.C. 2307.611 was enacted in 
conjunction with the amendment of R.C. 2913.49 in 2014, the legislature chose to 
use that same cause-of-action language.  If it was the intention of the General 
Assembly to limit the force of R.C. 2307.60 as the source of an independent cause 
of action, then the legislature would have amended or would not have enacted these 
provisions of the Revised Code. 
{¶ 52} Obviously, the General Assembly inserted the language that a person 
“has a civil action against the offender pursuant to” R.C. 2307.60 in R.C. 2913.49(J) 
and regarding “[a] person who brings a civil action pursuant to” R.C. 2307.60(A) 
“to recover damages” in R.C. 2307.611 “ ‘to accomplish some definite purpose.’ ”  
Wilson, 77 Ohio St.3d at 336, 673 N.E.2d 1347, quoting State ex rel. Cleveland 
Elec. Illum. Co., 169 Ohio St. at 479, 159 N.E.2d 756.  Our “ultimate inquiry in the 
interpretation of statutes is to ascertain the legislative intent.”  Caldwell, 115 Ohio 
January Term, 2016 
 
21 
St. at 466, 154 N.E. 792.  In so doing, we presume that the General Assembly does 
not “ ‘do a vain or useless thing.’ ”  Wilson at 336, quoting State ex rel. Cleveland 
Elec. Illum. Co. at 479.  Based on the circumstances surrounding the original 
amendments that became effective in 1985, the former statutory provisions, and the 
compelling legislative history, it becomes clear that when the General Assembly 
recodified former R.C. 1.16 as R.C. 2307.60, it intended to create an independent 
civil cause of action for any crime victim injured in person or property.  
Furthermore, the fact that the General Assembly has never changed the key 
language of R.C. 2307.60 at issue in this case and the consequences of interpreting 
R.C. 2307.60 as not creating an independent civil cause of action demonstrate that 
the original intention expressed by the General Assembly in the legislation that 
became effective in 1985 continues today. 
II.  Appellants’ Reliance on Court Decisions is Misplaced 
{¶ 53} Appellants principally rely on six court decisions from 1995 and 
after to support the position that R.C. 2307.60 does not create an independent civil 
cause of action.  However, appellants’ reliance on these cases is misplaced. 
{¶ 54} First, none of these decisions engaged in a meaningful analysis of 
R.C. 2307.60.  Second, five of the six decisions relied on precedent that predates 
the amendments to R.C. 2307.60 that became effective in 1985—precedent that the 
General Assembly consciously repudiated when enacting the modern version of 
R.C. 2307.60 in that legislation.  Third, the sixth decision stated a conclusion of 
law without citing any supporting authority. 
{¶ 55} As set forth above, the General Assembly did not merely renumber 
R.C. 1.16 in the legislation that became effective in 1985 as R.C. 2307.60.  
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 426, 140 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 3787.  The General Assembly 
also significantly modified the language of the statute. 
{¶ 56} As established in the previous discussion in this opinion of the 
legislative history, the reason for the amended language was that the General 
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22 
Assembly intended to create an independent civil cause of action for any person 
injured in person or property as the result of a crime.  The legislative history also 
reveals that the legislature was consciously repudiating the established precedent 
of Story, 4 Ohio 376; Howk, 19 Ohio St. 462; Schmidt, 62 Ohio App.2d 48, 403 
N.E.2d 1026; and Peterson, 5 Ohio App.3d 203, 451 N.E.2d 1236, to the extent that 
the common law and the previous versions of the statute had been judicially 
interpreted to not have that effect. 
{¶ 57} The significance of the historical metamorphosis of R.C. 2307.60 
cannot be overlooked.  Had the court decisions that appellants rely on analyzed the 
language of the statue and traced the historical progression, as suggested by the 
rules of statutory construction, they would have recognized the intention of the 
General Assembly to change the previous law and to repudiate the precedents on 
which those decisions based their conclusions.  Instead the courts in the cases cited 
by appellants either relied on case law that the legislature had abrogated, as indicted 
by the legislative history of R.C. 2307.60, or cited no authority at all. 
{¶ 58} In Applegate v. Weadock, the court cited Schmidt for the proposition 
that R.C. 2307.60 is merely a codification of the common law that a civil action 
does not merge with a criminal action.  Applegate, 3rd Dist. Auglaize No. 2-95-24, 
1995 WL 705214, *3 (Nov. 30, 1995). 
{¶ 59} The Tenth District in Edwards v. Madison Twp. cited Schmidt for 
the same proposition as the Applegate court and then cited Story and Peterson as 
supporting authority.  Edwards, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97APE06-819, 1997 WL 
746415, *7 (Nov. 25, 1997). 
{¶ 60} McNichols v. Rennicker cited Peterson, Edwards, and Applegate for 
the proposition that R.C. 2307.60 does not create an independent cause of action 
and cited Schmidt for the proposition that R.C. 2307.60 is only a codification of the 
common law that a civil action does not merge with a criminal action.  McNichols, 
5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2002 AP 04 0026, 2002-Ohio-7215, ¶ 17. 
January Term, 2016 
 
23 
{¶ 61} In Collins v. Natl. City Bank, the court, without citing any authority, 
held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Collins’s claim for damages 
pursuant to R.C. 2307.60 because “R.C. 2307.60 creates no actionable prohibition, 
being only a jurisdictional statute * * *.”  2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19884, 2003-
Ohio-6893, ¶ 46. 
{¶ 62} The federal district court in Jasar Recycling, Inc. v. Major Max Mgt. 
Corp. cited Peterson for the proposition that R.C. 2307.60 merely codifies the 
common law that civil and criminal actions do not merge and that a separate cause 
of action is not created.  Jasar Recycling, N.D.Ohio No. 4:08CV2830, 2010 WL 
395212, *7 (Jan. 22, 2010).  As supporting authority in addition to Peterson, the 
court cited Peters v. Mabini, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 73373, 1998 WL 474175, *2 
(Aug. 13, 1998).  Id.  The court in Peters stated in a footnote that some courts have 
found that R.C. 2307.60 does not create a cause of action, citing Peterson, Schmidt, 
and Edwards.  In further support of its conclusion, the court in Jasar Recycling 
cited two federal cases, Replogle v. Montgomery Cty., S.D.Ohio No. 3:09-CV-102, 
2009 WL 1406686 (May 19, 2009), and Prior v. Mukasey, N.D.Ohio No. 
3:08CV994, 2008 WL 5076821, *3 (Nov. 21, 2008).  The court in Prior, however, 
relied on Peterson, and the court in Replogle relied on Edwards, while also 
including a quotation from Edwards that cited Schmidt, Story, and Peterson. 
{¶ 63} In Groves v. Groves, the Tenth District Court of Appeals cited as 
supporting authority McNichols, Edwards, Applegate, and Guardianship of 
Newcomb v. Bowling Green, 36 Ohio App.3d 235, 241, 523 N.E.2d 354 (6th 
Dist.1987), for the proposition that R.C. 2307.60 merely codifies the common law 
rule that a civil action and a criminal act do not merge and that R.C. 2307.60 does 
not create a cause of action.  Groves, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-1107, 2010-
Ohio-4515, ¶ 25.  The court in Newcomb, however, relied on Peterson as its 
controlling authority.  See Newcomb at 241. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
{¶ 64} Appellants fail to explain how these court decisions have any 
precedential value when it is clear that the General Assembly specifically 
repudiated the holdings in the cases that the decisions relied on when it enacted the 
modern version of R.C. 2307.60 that became effective in 1985. 
{¶ 65} Moreover, appellants do not address the failure of the courts in 
Edwards and Groves to address or distinguish the reasoning of the Tenth District 
that was stated in Tomas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 79 Ohio App.3d 624, 607 
N.E.2d 944 (10th Dist.1992).  In Tomas, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal 
of the plaintiff’s claim of intentional spoliation of evidence on the ground that the 
plaintiff’s evidence supporting the spoliation allegation was “too tender a reed upon 
which to base a claim for relief.”  Id. at 633.  In affirming the dismissal of the claim, 
the court stated: 
 
Arguably, [the tampering-with-evidence statute, R.C. 2921.12], 
coupled with R.C. 2307.60, does create a civil action for intentional 
spoliation of evidence.  Moreover, R.C. 2307.61 seems more 
specifically to create such an action for willful damage of another’s 
property, for which recovery may be had “in addition to the value of 
the property, any other loss sustained as a result of the willful 
damage.” 
 
Id. at 632, quoting former R.C. 2307.61(A)(1), 140 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 3787. 
III.  The General Assembly’s Public-Policy Decision to Authorize Specific 
Recovery in Some Related Provisions of the Revised Code Does Not Diminish 
the Clause in R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) Authorizing an Independent Civil Cause of 
Action 
{¶ 66} In support of their position, appellants discuss several statutes in 
which the General Assembly has authorized civil causes of action for the violation 
January Term, 2016 
 
25 
of specific criminal statutes.  For example, appellant Cleveland Clinic Children’s 
Hospital for Rehabilitation states in its merit brief: 
 
 
The legislature has clearly set forth civil causes of action for 
certain crimes as noted herein.  If R.C. §2307.60 were interpreted to 
provide for civil causes of action for violation of all criminal 
statutes, [other] statutes * * * would be rendered meaningless, and 
in contradiction of long standing Ohio Law. 
 
Appellants’ assertion that one enactment by the General Assembly precludes the 
effectiveness of another enactment in this way is without any basis in law. 
{¶ 67} “[O]ur role, as members of the judiciary, requires fidelity to the 
separation-of-powers doctrine.”  State v. South, 144 Ohio St.3d 295, 2015-Ohio-
3930, 42 N.E.3d 734, ¶ 28 (O’Conner, C.J., concurring).  Therefore, “we must 
respect that the people of Ohio conferred the authority to legislate solely on the 
General Assembly.”  Id., citing Sandusky City Bank v. Wilbor, 7 Ohio St. 481, 487-
488 (1857), and Article II, Section 1, Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 68} As this court stated in Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., 
L.L.C., 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, ¶ 35: 
 
It is not the role of the courts “to establish legislative policies 
or to second-guess the General Assembly’s policy choices.  ‘[T]he 
General Assembly is responsible for weighing [policy] concerns and 
making policy decisions * * *.’ ”  Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 
Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 212, quoting 
Arbino [v. Johnson & Johnson], 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-
6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 113. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
{¶ 69} In the version of R.C. 2307.60 that became effective in 1985, the 
General Assembly made a conscious policy decision to enact legislation that would 
contravene the decisions in Story, 4 Ohio 376; Howk, 19 Ohio St. 462; Schmidt, 62 
Ohio App.2d 48, 403 N.E.2d 1026; and Peterson, 5 Ohio App.3d 203, 451 N.E.2d 
1236.  Simultaneously, the General Assembly also made the policy decision to 
recodify R.C. 1.16 as R.C. 2307.60 and to “statutorily create civil actions for 
personal injuries or property loss or damage resulting from a criminal act.”  
(Underling sic; emphasis added.)  Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Bill 
Analysis of Am.H.B. No. 426, as passed by the House of Representatives on 
February 21, 1984, at 1. 
{¶ 70} While authorizing a new source of independent civil causes of action 
in R.C. 2307.60, the legislature also enacted R.C. 2307.61.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 426, 
140 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 3787-3791.  As set forth above, current R.C. 2307.61(A) 
continues to provide that “[i]f a property owner brings a civil action pursuant to” 
R.C. 2307.60 for the willful damage of property or for theft, the property owner can 
recover damages as specified.  Other provisions in R.C. 2307.61 set forth in great 
detail how damages and other forms of relief can be pursued. 
{¶ 71} Similarly, in R.C. 2307.62 and 2307.611 the General Assembly has 
enacted provisions that permit an additional amount of recovery.  Under R.C. 
2307.62(B)(1)(b), if an aggrieved owner or operator of a cable service brings a civil 
action for damages pursuant to R.C. 2307.60, the owner or operator is entitled to 
recover the profits made by the person who committed the violation.  Under R.C. 
2307.611, if a person “brings a civil action pursuant to” R.C. 2307.60, the victim 
of identity theft may recover “up to five thousand dollars for each violation or three 
times the amount of actual damages, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney’s 
fees.” 
{¶ 72} The General Assembly’s policy decisions to enact specific 
provisions that afford the victims of certain crimes a different or greater recovery 
January Term, 2016 
 
27 
than the victims of other crimes is clearly within the policymaking province of the 
General Assembly.  See Stetter, 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 
1092, at ¶ 35.  And we have no authority to second-guess those decisions.  Id.  The 
statutory disparities in the recovery available to some crime victims do not diminish 
the force of the General Assembly’s clearly stated intention that R.C. 2307.60 
creates an independent civil cause of action for anyone who is the victim of a 
criminal act, unless that cause of action is “specifically excepted by law.”  R.C. 
2307.60(A)(1). 
IV.  Appellants’ Discussion of the Wrongful-Death Statute is Flawed 
{¶ 73} Lastly, appellants cite the reasoning stated in dissent in this case 
below, Jacobson v. Kaforey, 2015-Ohio-2624, 39 N.E.3d 799, ¶ 37 (9th Dist.) 
(Carr, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), in support of their arguments 
that R.C. 2307.60 does not create an independent civil cause of action.  For 
example, appellant Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation states 
in its merit brief: 
 
The Ninth District’s decision creates further uncertainty as it 
relates to finality of judgments/settlements, as set forth in the 
dissenting opinion * * *.  Specifically, the dissent noted that the 
majority position conflicted with prior Ohio law as it relates to the 
cause of action for wrongful death. 
 
However, this contention is without any basis in the law. 
{¶ 74} An action for wrongful death did not exist at common law.  Sabol v. 
Pekoc, 148 Ohio St. 545, 549, 76 N.E.2d 84 (1947).  If a personal-injury plaintiff 
died before the trial, “the action abated.”  Id.  The first Ohio act that permitted a 
personal representative to file a wrongful-death claim was enacted in 1851.  Id., 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
citing 49 Ohio Laws 117.  Today, the statutory cause of action for wrongful death 
is set forth in R.C. Chapter 2125. 
{¶ 75} R.C. 2125.02(A)(1) permits the recovery by a personal 
representative for the wrongful death of a decedent “[w]hen the death of a person 
is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default which would have entitled the party 
injured to maintain an action and recover damages” under R.C. 2125.01.  The key 
to these provisions is that recovery inures to the “personal representative.”  R.C. 
2125.02(A)(1). 
{¶ 76} Conversely, the cause of action that arises pursuant to R.C. 2307.60 
inures to the injured party.  R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) provides that “[a]nyone injured in 
person or property by a criminal act” has a civil action, unless excepted by law.  
(Emphasis added.)  The plain language of the statute demonstrates that it is only 
the injured person who has a cause of action pursuant to R.C. 2307.60.  As this 
court has said, the wrongful-death statute “is the sole source of the right upon which 
the petition” for wrongful death is based.  Sabol at 552.  Therefore, recognizing a 
cause of action for living injured persons under R.C. 2307.60 does not displace the 
wrongful-death statute as the “sole source” of the right to sue for recovery for a 
death caused by a wrongful act. 
V.  Conclusion 
{¶ 77} The wording of R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) at issue in this case is 
ambiguous.  After consideration of the factors set forth in R.C. 1.49, it is clear that 
R.C. 2307.60 does create an independent civil cause of action.  Therefore, I would 
answer the certified question in the affirmative and affirm the judgment of the Ninth 
District Court of Appeals, albeit on different grounds from those of the majority. 
JENSEN, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 78} Respectfully, I dissent. 
January Term, 2016 
 
29 
{¶ 79} R.C. 2307.60 does not create an independent cause of action for 
damages resulting from a criminal act but merely codifies Ohio common law to the 
effect that a criminal prosecution does not extinguish a civil cause of action, and 
therefore only actions that existed at common law or that have been authorized by 
statute can be commenced to seek damages caused by a criminal act.  Because there 
are no statutes establishing civil causes of action for violations of R.C. 2905.01, 
2905.03, and 2905.05, I would answer the certified question in the negative and 
reverse the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 80} R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) states: 
 
 
Anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act has, 
and may recover full damages in, a civil action unless specifically 
excepted by law, may recover the costs of maintaining the civil 
action and attorney’s fees if authorized by any provision of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure or another section of the Revised Code or under 
the common law of this state, and may recover punitive or 
exemplary damages if authorized by section 2315.21 or another 
section of the Revised Code. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 81} The role of a court of last resort is to resolve conflicts between and 
among appellate districts and to interpret law as written by the legislature, not to 
rewrite it or apply its own conceptions of what it would like the law to be.  See 
Article IV, Section 3(B)(4), Ohio Constitution; see also Cablevision of the Midwest, 
Inc. v. Gross, 70 Ohio St.3d 541, 544, 639 N.E.2d 1154 (1994) (“A court’s role is 
to interpret, not legislate”). 
{¶ 82} In construing a statute, a court must ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of the legislature.  Dircksen v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Revision, 109 Ohio St.3d 
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470, 2006-Ohio-2990, 849 N.E.2d 20, ¶ 16.  “In determining legislative intent, the 
court first looks to the language of the statute.”  Bailey v. Republic Engineered 
Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 741 N.E.2d 121 (2001).  If its meaning is 
unambiguous and definite, it is to be applied as written.  Id.  When a statute is 
reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning, however, it is ambiguous and 
requires judicial interpretation.  Id. 
{¶ 83} In this case, the parties have presented opposing interpretations of 
the following phrase in R.C. 2307.60(A)(1): “Anyone injured in person or property 
by a criminal act has, and may recover full damages in, a civil action unless 
specifically excepted by law.”  Additionally, the conflict among the appellate courts 
regarding the meaning of this phrase further suggests that the language is 
ambiguous.  See, e.g., Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 
553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000).  In accordance with R.C. 1.49, the court may 
consider, among other factors, the common law or former statutory provisions, 
legislative history, and the consequences of a particular construction. 
Legislative History 
{¶ 84} The legislative history and derivation of R.C. 2307.60 are 
instructive.  At common law in Ohio, a civil action did not merge into a criminal 
prosecution.  Story v. Hammond, 4 Ohio 376, 378 (1831). 
{¶ 85} The legislature codified the common law in 1877 within the 
“General Provisions” section of the penal statutes when it enacted Part Fourth, Title 
I, Chapter 1, Section 10, which stated, “Nothing in Part Fourth [the penal statutes] 
contained shall be construed to prevent a party injured in person or property, by any 
criminal act, from recovering full damages.”  74 Ohio Laws 240, 243.  Later, this 
same language was stated in R.S. 6803 in 1880 when the Revised Statutes were 
compiled, and substantially similar language was stated in G.C. 12379 in 1910 
when the General Code was compiled to replace the Revised Statutes, see 1910 
S.B. No. 2.  G.C. 12379 stated: “Nothing contained in the penal laws shall prevent 
January Term, 2016 
 
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any one injured in person or property, by a criminal act from recovering full 
damages, unless specifically excepted by law.” 
{¶ 86} In 1953, when the Ohio Revised Code replaced the General Code, 
see Am.H.B. No. 1, 125 Ohio Laws 7, this provision became R.C. 1.16 and was 
reworded to state, “Any one injured in person or property by a criminal act may 
recover full damages in a civil action, unless specifically excepted by law.”  This 
version of the statute was intended to be substantively the same as G.C. 12379.  See 
former R.C. 1.24, 1953 Am.H.B. No. 1, stating that the provisions of the newly 
adopted Revised Code that corresponded to statutes previously contained in the 
General Code were to be construed as “restatements” and continuations of the prior 
law and not as “new enactments.”  Therefore, all changes to the language of the 
statute that became R.C. 1.16 in 1953 were technical adjustments only and did not 
reflect any intention of the General Assembly to change the meaning of G.C. 12379.  
See Henry v. Cent. Natl. Bank, 16 Ohio St.2d 16, 22, 242 N.E.2d 342 (1968) (“Both 
the General Assembly and the Bureau of Code Revision were adamant * * * that 
there be no new substantive law permitted in the Revised Code at its adoption” in 
1953 [emphasis sic]). 
{¶ 87} In Schmidt v. State Aerial Farm Statistics, Inc., 62 Ohio App.2d 48, 
403 N.E.2d 1026 (6th Dist.1978), the appellate court dealt with a similar question 
involving the interpretation of former R.C. 1.16.  The court affirmed the trial court’s 
dismissal of the complaint, which had been filed under former R.C. 1.16, and held 
that former R.C. 1.16 was “only a codification of the common law in Ohio that a 
civil action is not merged in a criminal prosecution which arose from the same act 
or acts.”  Id. at 49.  See also Peterson v. Scott Constr. Co., 5 Ohio App.3d 203, 204, 
451 N.E.2d 1236 (6th Dist.1982). 
{¶ 88} In 1985, the General Assembly renumbered R.C. 1.16 as R.C. 
2307.60 and amended the statute to read, “Anyone injured in person or property by 
a criminal act has, and may recover full damages in, a civil action * * *.”  (Emphasis 
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added.)  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 426, 140 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 3783, 3787.  This 
provision later became part of R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) through subsequent amendments 
of other parts of R.C. 2307.60.  See Sub.S.B. No. 107, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1529; 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 117, 151 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2274, 2276. 
{¶ 89} Several courts in Ohio have interpreted this statute to continue to be 
a codification of Ohio’s common law rule that a civil action is not merged into a 
criminal prosecution arising from the same act or acts.  Applegate v. Weadock, 3d 
Dist. Auglaize No. 2-95-24, 1995 WL 705214, *3 (Nov. 30, 1995); Edwards v. 
Madison Twp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97APE06-819, 1997 WL 746415, *7 (Nov. 
25, 1997) (“R.C. 2307.60 (formerly R.C. 1.16) is merely a codification of the 
common law that a civil action is not merged in a criminal prosecution”); 
McNichols v. Rennicker, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2002 AP 04 0026, 2002-Ohio-
7215, ¶ 17, quoting Schmidt at 49 (R.C. 2307.60 “ ‘is only a codification of the 
common law in Ohio that a civil action is not merged in a criminal prosecution 
which arose from the same act or acts’ ”); Groves v. Groves, 10th Dist. Franklin 
No. 09AP-1107, 2010-Ohio-4515, ¶ 25 (“R.C. 2307.60 is only a codification of the 
Ohio common law rule that a civil action is not merged in a criminal prosecution 
for the same acts that form the basis for the civil action”); Jasar Recycling, Inc. v. 
Major Max Mgt. Corp., N.D.Ohio No. 4:08CV2830, 2010 WL 395212, *7 (Jan. 22, 
2010) (“Ohio Revised Code § 2307.60, formerly Ohio Revised Code § 1.16, does 
not create a separate civil cause of action and merely codifies the common law that 
a civil action does not merge into a criminal prosecution”).  Similarly, the Second 
District Court of Appeals has held that R.C. 2307.60 is only a jurisdictional statute 
allowing courts to grant relief to persons injured by criminal acts.  Collins v. Natl. 
City Bank, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19884, 2003-Ohio-6893, ¶ 46. 
{¶ 90} It is presumed that the legislature is aware of prior judicial 
interpretations of a statute when enacting an amendment.  Riffle v. Physicians & 
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33 
Surgeons Ambulance Serv., Inc., 135 Ohio St.3d 357, 2013-Ohio-989, 986 N.E.2d 
983, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 91} The legislature has amended R.C. 2307.60 eight times since 1985, 
but never expressed its intent that the statute creates a separate cause of action for 
a violation of a criminal statute.  See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
1661, 1673; Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3867, 3942; Sub.H.B. 
No. 547, 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4392, 4392-4393; Sub.S.B. No. 108, 149 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 382, 429; Sub.S.B. No. 107, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 1529-1530; 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80, 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7915, 7951-7952; Am.Sub.S.B. No. 
117, 151 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2276; 2008 Sub.S.B. No. 184. 
Statutory Interpretation 
{¶ 92} Statutes relating to the same general subject matter are to be read in 
pari materia in order to determine legislative intent.  Sheet Metal Workers’ 
Internatl. Assn., Local Union No. 33 v. Gene’s Refrig., Heating & Air Conditioning, 
Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 248, 2009-Ohio-2747, 910 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 38.  “And, in reading 
such statutes in pari materia, and construing them together, this court must give 
such a reasonable construction as to give the proper force and effect to each and all 
such statutes.”  Johnson’s Mkts., Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of Health, 58 Ohio St.3d 
28, 35, 567 N.E.2d 1018 (1991). 
{¶ 93} Consistent with the view that R.C. 2307.60 does not create a 
separate, independent civil cause of action for violation of a criminal statute, the 
General Assembly has enacted several statutes in Chapter 2307 of the Revised Code 
creating civil causes of action for violations of specific criminal statutes.  See, e.g., 
R.C. 2307.44 (“Any person who is subjected to hazing, as defined in division (A) 
of section 2903.31 of the Revised Code, may commence a civil action for injury or 
damages, including mental and physical pain and suffering, that result from the 
hazing”); 2307.50(B) (“if a minor is the victim of a child stealing crime and if, as a 
result of that crime, the minor’s parents, parent who is the residential parent and 
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legal custodian, parent who is not the residential parent and legal custodian, 
guardian, or other custodian is deprived of a parental or guardianship interest in the 
minor, the parents, parent who is the residential parent and legal custodian, parent 
who is not the residential parent and legal custodian, guardian, or other custodian 
may maintain a civil action against the offender to recover damages for interference 
with the parental or guardianship interest”); 2307.51(A) (“A victim of a violation 
of section 2905.32 [trafficking in persons] of the Revised Code has and may 
commence a civil cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages against 
the trafficker for harm that resulted from the violation of section 2905.32 of the 
Revised Code”); 2307.52(B) (“A woman upon whom an abortion is purposely 
performed or induced or attempted to be performed or induced in violation of 
division (A) of section 2919.17 of the Revised Code has and may commence a civil 
action for compensatory damages, punitive or exemplary damages * * * against the 
person who purposely performed or induced or attempted to perform or induce the 
abortion”); 2307.53(B) (“A woman upon whom a partial birth procedure is 
performed in violation of division (B) or (C) of section 2919.151 of the Revised 
Code, the father of the child if the child was not conceived by rape, or the parent of 
the woman if the woman is not eighteen years of age or older at the time of the 
violation has and may commence a civil action for compensatory damages, punitive 
or exemplary damages * * * against the person who committed the violation”); 
2307.61(A) (“If a property owner brings a civil action pursuant to division (A) of 
section 2307.60 of the Revised Code to recover damages from any person who 
willfully damages the owner’s property or who commits a theft offense, as defined 
in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, involving the owner’s property, the 
property owner may recover as follows”); 2307.611 (“A person who brings a civil 
action pursuant to division (A) of section 2307.60 of the Revised Code to recover 
damages from any person who caused injury to person or property by a violation 
of division (B), (D), or (E) of section 2913.49 [identity fraud] of the Revised Code 
January Term, 2016 
 
35 
may recover damages”); 2307.62(B)(1) (“An owner or operator of a cable service, 
cable system, cable television system, or other similar closed circuit coaxial cable 
communications system who is aggrieved by conduct that is prohibited by division 
(B) of section 2913.04 [unauthorized use of computer, cable, or telecommunication 
property] or division (A) or (B) of section 2913.041 [possession or sale of 
unauthorized cable television device] of the Revised Code may elect to commence 
a civil action for damages in accordance with division (A) of section 2307.60 or 
section 2307.61 of the Revised Code or to commence a civil action under this 
section”); 2307.65(A) (“The attorney general may bring a civil action * * * on 
behalf of the department of medicaid, and the prosecuting attorney of the county in 
which a violation of division (B) of section 2913.401 [Medicaid eligibility fraud] 
of the Revised Code occurs may bring a civil action * * * on behalf of the county 
department of job and family services, against a person who violates division (B) 
of section 2913.401 of the Revised Code for the recovery of the amount of benefits 
paid”); 2307.70(A) (“Any person who suffers injury or loss to person or property 
as a result of an act committed in violation of section 2909.05 [vandalism], 2927.11 
[desecration], or 2927.12 [ethnic intimidation] of the Revised Code has a civil 
action against the offender and may recover in that action full compensatory 
damages”). 
{¶ 94} In Celebrezze v. Hughes, 18 Ohio St.3d 71, 479 N.E.2d 886 (1985), 
this court recognized the longstanding rule that “ ‘ “the General Assembly is not 
presumed to do a vain or useless thing, and that when language is inserted in a 
statute, it is inserted to accomplish some definite purpose.” ’ ”  Id. at 74, quoting 
Brown v. Martinelli, 66 Ohio St.2d 45, 50, 419 N.E.2d 1081 (1981), quoting State 
ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 479, 159 N.E.2d 756 
(1959). 
{¶ 95} Accordingly, if the position asserted by the majority were correct, 
i.e., that R.C. 2307.60 creates an independent civil cause of action for damages 
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resulting from a criminal act, then there would be no need for the General Assembly 
to have specifically statutorily authorized any of the listed causes of action to 
recover damages resulting from those criminal acts.  The fact that it did so, suggests 
that the position being asserted by the majority is not well taken. 
{¶ 96} Similarly, common law civil causes of action already exist for false 
imprisonment, assault, and battery, see Feliciano v. Kreiger, 50 Ohio St.2d 69, 71, 
362 N.E.2d 646 (1977); Smith v. John Deere Co., 83 Ohio App.3d 398, 406, 614 
N.E.2d 1148 (10th Dist.1993); Love v. Port Clinton, 37 Ohio St.3d 98, 99, 524 
N.E.2d 166 (1988), and therefore it is not necessary for the General Assembly to 
create civil actions for violating unlawful restraint, assault, and battery statutes. 
{¶ 97} Further, as pointed out by the dissenting jurist in the appellate court, 
the Ninth District’s interpretation of R.C. 2307.60 also conflicts with the process 
established by the legislature for wrongful death claims.  Jacobson v. Kaforey, 
2015-Ohio-2624, 39 N.E.3d 799, ¶ 37 (9th Dist.) (Carr, P.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  R.C. 2125.02 provides that “a civil action for wrongful death 
shall be brought in the name of the personal representative of the decedent for the 
exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, the children, and the parents of the 
decedent.”  To interpret R.C. 2307.60 as independently authorizing a separate cause 
of action for damages caused by criminal acts would allow a decedent’s 
beneficiaries to each file a cause of action against a wrongdoer independently from 
the statutorily authorized wrongful death claim.  This too is wholly inconsistent 
with legislative intent. 
{¶ 98} Because the General Assembly has created separate statutory causes 
of action to seek damages caused by specific criminal acts, those persons seeking 
recovery are limited to filing actions pursuant to common law or the specific causes 
of action created by the legislature. 
 
 
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37 
Conflict Cases 
{¶ 99} The way the majority answers the certified question is in conflict 
with decisions from the Third, Fifth, and Tenth District Courts of Appeals, which 
have correctly concluded that R.C. 2307.60 does not create a separate cause of 
action and that a separate cause of action must be available to bring a civil claim 
based upon a criminal act.  Applegate, 1995 WL 705214, at *3 (“R.C. 2307.60 does 
not create a separate cause of action.  A separate cause of action must be available 
before this section is invoked”); Edwards, 1997 WL 746415, at *7 (“R.C. 2307.60 
does not create a separate cause of action.  * * * Hence, a separate cause of action 
must be available before this section is invoked”); McNichols, 2002-Ohio-7215, at 
¶ 17 (“Revised Code 2307.60 does not create a cause of action.  * * * [A] separate 
civil cause of action must be available to bring a civil claim based upon a criminal 
act”); Groves, 2010-Ohio-4515, at ¶ 25 (“R.C. 2307.60 does not create a cause of 
action.  * * * A party must rely on a separate civil cause of action, existent either 
in the common law or through statute, to bring a civil claim based on a criminal 
act”). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 100} In this case, the court of appeals improperly reversed the trial 
court’s judgment that had granted motions to dismiss filed by Ellen C. Kaforey, 
Akron Children’s Hospital, and Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital for 
Rehabilitation because R.C. 2307.60 does not independently authorize a civil cause 
of action and there are no statutes establishing civil causes of action for violations 
of R.C. 2905.01, 2905.03, and 2905.05. 
{¶ 101} For these reasons, I would answer the certified question in the 
negative, reverse the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals, follow the 
analysis of the Third, Fifth, and Tenth District Courts of Appeals, and reinstate the 
judgment of the trial court. 
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The Chandra Law Firm, L.L.C., Subodh Chandra, Donald Screen, Ashlie 
Case Sletvold, and Saudhya Gupta, for appellee. 
Janik, L.L.P., Steven G. Janik, and Audrey K. Bentz, for appellant Ellen 
Kaforey. 
Hanna, Campbell & Powell, L.L.P., Gregory T. Rossi, Douglas G. Leak, 
and Carol N. Tran, for appellant Akron Children’s Hospital. 
Bonezzi, Switzer, Polito & Hupp Co., L.P.A., Bret C. Perry, and Brian F. 
Lange, for appellant Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation. 
_________________