Case Title: Stockmeier v. Nevada

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 19

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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427 Nev. Advance Opinion 14
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ROBERT LESLIE STOCKMEIER, | No. 52099
Appellant/Cross-Respondent,

va.
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA, BOARD OF FILED

PAROLE COMMISSIONERS AND.
DIVISION OF PAROLE & PROBATION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY; PAROLE CHAIRMAN
DORLA M. SALLING; PAROLE, my,
COMMISSIONER TAMI BASS;
PAROLE COMMISSIONER M. SILVA;
PAROLE COMMISSIONER YOLANDA.
MORALES; DIVISION CHIEF OF
PAROLE AND PROBATION JOHN A.
GONSKA; AND DPS SGT. MAURY
REICHELT,
Respondents/Cross-Appellants.

may 19 2011

 

Proper person appeal and counsel cross-appeal from a district
court summary judgment in a tort and civil rights action, Sixth Judicial
District Court, Pershing County; John M. Iroz, Judge.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded,

Robert Leslie Stockmeier, Lovelock,
in Proper Person.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Alicia L. Lerud, Deputy

Attorney General, Carson City,
for Respondents/Cross-Appellants.

BEFORE DOUGLAS, C.J., PICKERING and HARDESTY, JJ.

MN 14753

 
oe

 

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

‘This proper person appeal and counsel cross-appeal arise from
appellant's attempts to have certain factual statements in his
presentence investigation report (PSI) amended to correct alleged factual
inaccuracies. The primary question we are called on to decide is whether,
under Nevada law, a prisoner may seek to amend his PSI after he has
been sentenced, Because Nevada lacks a statutory or administrative
process by which a prisoner may challenge alleged inaccuracies in his PSI
post-senteneing, we conclude that any claimed inaccuracy in a PSI must
be made to the district court at or before sentencing and, if not resolved in
the defendant's favor, on direct appeal to this court after sentencing
‘Thus, in these appeals, neither respondent/cross-appellant Division of
Parole and Probation nor the district court had the authority to amend
appellant’s PSI after he was sentenced, and respondent/eross-appellant
Parole Board may properly rely on the PSI when it makes any future
parole determinations concerning appellant,

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1990, appellant Robert Leslie Stockmeier pleaded guilty to

two counts of sexually assaulting a nine-year-old boy. Neither count

 

alleged the threat or use of a weapon. Stockmeier’s PSI, however, stated
that the victim had reported that Stockmeier threatened him with a

weapon during the course of the offense. At his sentencing hearing,

'The PSI apparently stated that the victim's seven-year-old brother
made the statement regarding the weapon, but Stockmeier and the State
continued on next page...

 
Stockmeier objected to this statement, as well as other factual allegations
in the PSI, including a statement regarding an advertisement found in a
search of Stockmeier’s home during the criminal investigation. ‘The
sentencing court noted Stockmeier’s objections to the PSI, but did not rule
on them, ‘The court sentenced Stockmeier to two consecutive life
sentences, and he did not file a direct appeal. Instead, Stockmeier filed
two post-conviction petitions, neither of which challenged the weapon
allegation or the statement about the advertisement.

‘Ten years later, in 2000, after being denied parole eligibility
by the Psychological Review Panel, Stockmeier filed a district court action
raising, for the first time since his sentencing hearing, his objections to
the PSI's factual statements regarding the weapon allegation and the
advertisement, The district court denied the petition, concluding that it

 

lacked jurisdiction to amend the PSI based on an untimely post
conviction petition,

Stockmeier then requested that respondent Division of Parole
and Probation of the Department of Public Safety amend his PSI, but the
Division ultimately denied his request as well. Thereafter, Stockmeier
attempted to present evidence to respondent Board of Parole
Commissioners that contradicted the statements in the PSI. The Parole
Board stated that its policy was not to consider challenges to a PSI and
that, despite Stockmeier's assertions, it would nonetheless rely on the PST

in making any parole determinations.

‘continued
agreed in the district court that the PSI was supposed to refer to the
victim, instead of his brother.

 

 
os

 

Between 2003 and 2006, Stockmeier successfully litigated an
action against the Psychological Review Panel on claims unrelated to his
PSI, He was again eligible for parole in 2006, when the Parole Board, for
the first time, found that his offense had involved a weapon and
considered the involvement of the weapon in evaluating whether he
would receive parole. The Parole Board denied Stockmeier parole based
on the nature and severity of his crimes and public safety concerns,

Following the 2006 parole denial, Stockmeier filed the instant
action in the district court, asserting (1) a tort claim against the Division
for declining to amend his PSI, (2) a tort claim against the Parole Board
for knowingly relying on the PSI after he presented evidence that it
contained incorrect factual statements, and (3) a retaliation claim against
the Parole Board for denying him parole in 2006 based on his successful
litigation against the Psychological Review Panel. Respondents moved
for dismissal; Stockmeier opposed the motion.

Ata hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court stated
that it believed that any inaccuracies in the PSI needed to be corrected.
Respondents asserted that the Division generally will not change a PST
once a defendant has been sentenced. Nevertheless, respondents agreed
that if the PST was inaccurate, it should be corrected. Respondents
further indicated that they would be open to meeting with Stockmeier to
discuss possible amendments if the court ordered them to do so.
‘Thereafter, the district court ordered the parties to confer as to whether
any of the factual statements in the PSI should be amended. ‘The parties
met and agreed, among other things, that the statement regarding the
advertisement found in a search of Stockmeier's home was misleading,
but they could not agree on wording for an amendment.

 
om ie

During a subsequent hearing on the matter, the district court
stated that it would order the PSI to read that the search revealed “a
multiple page advertisement depicting family nudism.” Stockmeier
agreed to the district court's wording. No agreement on the weapon
allegation was reached, as respondents contended that the statement was
accurate, The district court considered evidence on the issue and declined
to amend the statement as to the weapon allegation. The court

 

ordered additional amendments as agreed upon by the parties. The court

 

then treated the motion for dismissal as one for summary judgment and
granted respondents summary judgment on all of Stockmeier's claims.

 

‘This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
DISCUSSION

Standard of review

When a district court considers matters outside the pleadings
in support of an NRCP 12(b)(5) motion, this court reviews the district
court’s order dismissing the complaint as if it had granted summary
judgment. NRCP 12(b). We review a district court's summary judgment
de novo. Stalk v. Mushkin, 125 Nev. 21, 24, 199 P.3d 838, 840 (2009).
Summary judgment must be granted when the pleadings and record
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
demonstrate that there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and
‘the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Witherow v,

State, Bd. of Parole Comm'rs, 123 Nev. 305, 308, 167 P.3d 408, 409
(2007). Conjecture and speculation do not create an issue of fact. Wood v.
Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 732, 121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005).

Summary judgm mt vision of Parole and Probation

On appeal, Stockmeier contends that summary judgment in
favor of the Division of Parole and Probation was improper because the

 

 
Division had a duty to correct his PSI. Stockmeier does not identify any
express authority that permits the Division to amend a prisoner's PSI
after sentencing, yet he insists that the Division has inherent authority to
correct its own mistakes and an implied power to amend a prisoner's PSI
at any time. These contentions are not supported by Nevada law.

An administrative agency's powers are generally limited to the
powers set forth by statute, although “certain powers may be implied
even though they were not expressly granted by statute, when those
‘enumerated

 

powers are necessary to the agency's performance of i
City of Henderson v. Kilgore, 122 Nev. 331, 334, 131 P.3d 11, 13
(2006). In other word:

 

duties.

for implied authority to exist, the implicitly

 

‘authorized act must be essential to carrying out an express duty. Id, at
835, 131 P.3d at 14. Thus, in order to determine whether the Division
had express or implied authority to amend Stockmeier's PSI, it is
necessary to review the relevant statutes.

‘The Division of Parole and Probation is mandated by statute
to prepare a PSI to be used at sentencing for any defendant who pleads
guilty to or is found guilty of a felony. NRS 176.135(1). A PSI contains
information about the defendant's prior criminal record, the
circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior and the offense, and the
impact of the offense on the victim. NRS 176.145(1). Because the
sentencing court will rely on a defendant's PSI, the PSI must not include
information based on “impalpable or highly suspect evidence.” Goodson
¥. State, 98 Nev. 493, 495-96, 654 P.2d 1006, 1007 (1982). To that end,
after preparing a PSI, the Division must disclose the report's factual

content to the prosecuting attorney, defense counsel, and the defendant,
and give the parties the opportunity to object to any of the PSI's factual

 

 
allegations? NRS 176.156(1); see also Shields v. State, 97 Nev. 472, 472-
78, 634 P.2d 468, 468-69 (1981) (reversing and remanding a defendant's

 

sentence because he was not provided with police reports that were
included in the PSI and were material to the district court's sentencing
decision). Once a defendant is sentenced, the Division has no further
statutory duties with regard to the defendant's PSI See generally NRS
176.133-.159; NRS 213,1071-.1078; NRS 213.1092-.10988,

  

Apart from the duties identified in the statute set out above,
the Division does not have any statutory duties with regard to a
prisoner's PSI. Thus, the Division has no express statutory authority to
amend a prisoner's PSI after sentencing. See NRS 176.133-.159; NRS
213.1071-.1078; NRS 219.1092-.10988. And because the Division does not

 

have any express post-sentencing duties related to a prisoner's PSI, the
Division does not have any implied authority to amend a prisoner's PST
once he has been sentenced. See City of Henderson, 122 Nev. at 335, 131
P.3d at 14, Given that the Division had no authority to amend
Stockmeier's PSI, it could not have been liable in tort for declining to do
s0, and thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment to
the Division on Stockmeier’s tort claim.

2At the time that Stockmeier was sentenced, NRS 176.156 required
the court, rather than the Division, to disclose the content of the PSI to
the relevant parties and give them the opportunity to object. 1985 Nev.
Stat., ch. 69, § 3, at 149. Because the earlier statutes provided the
Division with fewer duties than the current statutes, this change does not
affect our analysis in this appeal.

 

8Additionally, based on our de novo review of the record, we conclude
that Stockmeier made statements at a district court hearing waiving any
monetary damages claims.

 

 
‘Amendments ordered by the district court
‘The district court directed respondents to discuss possible PSI

corrections with Stockmeier. Subsequently, based on the parties’
agreement, the district court ordered cortain amendments to the PSI. On

cross-appeal, respondents contend that the district court lacked authority

 

to order such amendments. We agree. The district court's final statutory
duty with regard to a defendant's PSI is to cause a copy of the report to be
transmitted to the Director of the Department of Corrections once the
defendant is sentenced, NRS 176.159(1), and, as with the Division,
nothing in Nevada law gives the district court express, implied, or
inherent authority to amend a prisoner's PSI post-sentencing.* See
generally NRS 176.133-.159; NRS 213.1071-.1078; NRS 213.1092-.10988.
Because Nevada law does not provide any administrative or
judicial scheme for amending a PSI after the defendant is sentenced, it is
imperative that a defendant contest his PSI at the time of sentencing if
he believes that his PSI contains inaccuracies. We recognize that the
process by which the district court must resolve objections to a PSI is not
entirely clear. Apart from requiring the Division to give the defendant an
opportunity to object to his PSI, NRS 176.166(1), the Nevada statutes are
silent as to the process to be followed by either the Division or the district

‘The statutes in effect at the time of Stockmeier’s sentencing did not
address transmission of the PSI to the Department of Corrections.
Instead, NRS 176.107 directed the district attorney who prosecuted the
case to transmit a “written statement of facts surrounding the
commission of the offense” to the Department. 1977 Nev. Stat., ch. 430, §
66, at 859. Again, this difference does not change our analysis because,
even under the earlier laws, no authority existed for the district court to
amend a defendant's PSI post-sentencing.

 

 
court for allowing the defendant to make such objections, or for resolving
the objections, and communicating the resolution to interested parties.°
In the absence of any post-sentencing authority of either the
Division or the district court to address alleged inaccuracies in a PSI, any
objections must be resolved prior to sentencing, and, if not resolved in the
defendant's favor, the objections must be raised on direct appeal. We
emphasize that even if disputed factual statements do not affect a
defendant's sentence, any significant inaccuracy could follow a defendant
into the prison system and be used to determine his classification,
placement in certain programs, and eligibility for parole, and thus, the
defendant must promptly seek to correct any alleged inaccuracies to
prevent the Department of Corrections from relying on a PSI that could
not later be changed.® See NRS 176.159(1); see also United States Dept,

°The federal system, as well as other states, provides detailed
procedures for addressing any objections to a defendant's PSI. See Fed.
R. Crim, P. 32 (setting forth the federal procedure giving a defendant
time before sentencing to object to his PSI and requiring the federal
district court to make express findings regarding disputed portions of the
PSI; People v, Waclawski, 780 N,W.2d 321, 357 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009)
(discussing the Michigan scheme for resolving challenges to a PSI); State
v. Waterfield, 248 P.3d 57, 59 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (noting the Utah
sentencing courts’ statutory duty to consider a party's objections to a PST
and make findings on the record as to the accuracy and relevancy of the
disputed information); State v. Craft, 490 S.E.2d 315, 319 (W. Va. 1997)
(explaining that West Virginia's criminal procedure rules require a
district court to make a finding as to PSI disputes or expressly determine
that no such finding is necessary).

 

While this court generally will not grant relief to a defendant with
regard to an alleged factual inaccuracy in the PSI that did not affect the
defendant's sentence, ef, Chavez v. State, 125 Nev. __, __, 213 P.3d 476,
489 (2009) (explaining that this court generally will only interfere with a
continued on next page . .

 

 

 

 
comm <e

 

of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1988) (noting that PSIs are used for
determining status of an inmate, choosing treatment programs, deciding
eligibility for privileges, and making parole decisions). Additionally, to
allow a defendant to wait and challenge a PSI in a later action would
open courts to a flood of litigation from prisoners seeking amendments to
their PSIs long after being sentenced. Limiting such actions is important
because the passage of time erodes the reliability of factual

determinations, as evidence can become stale and witnesses may become

 

unavailable.

Here, Stockmeier took advantage of the opportunity to object
to his PSI at sentencing. When the district court did not address the
objections, however, Stockmeier failed to seek a ruling from the district
court as to the disputed issues, and he failed to raise these issues on
direct appeal in order to give this court an opportunity to address the
allegations, Therefore, Stockmeier waived his opportunity to have the
alleged inaccuracies addressed. Because the district court did not have

continued
defendant's sentence if the record reveals prejudice based on the district
court's consideration of information supported by impalpable or highly
suspect evidence), we recognize that some inaccuracies may be so harmful
that, even if they do not actually affect the defendant's sentence, they still
may be materially prejudicial because of their potential effect on the
defendant's prison classification or parole eligibility. Nevertheless, we do
not address the question of whether the alleged inaccuracies in
Stockmeier’s PSI reached the level of being materially prejudicial, Such a
consideration may have been proper on direct appeal from Stockmeier's
sentence, but Stockmeier did not appeal from his sentence, and, as
discussed herein, alleged PSI inaccuracies are not appropriately
considered in a post-sentencing civil action.

10

 
any post-senteneing authority to order the amendments to Stockmeier's
PSI, we reverse the portion of the district court's judgment ordering such
amendments.?

Summary judgment in favor of the Parole Board
Tort claim

 

Stockmeier asserts that the Division's refusal to amend his

 

PSI has caused him to be subjected to greater punishment by the Parole
Board because of the allegedly false information contained in the PSI. In
his district court complaint, Stockmeier alleged that he informed the
Parole Board that his PSI contained factual inaccuracies and asked the
Board to correct them, but the Board declined to do so. He further stated
that he appealed the 2006 denial of parole, attaching evidence that he
contended supported his claims that the PSI was inaccurate, but the
Parole Board ignored his evidence and relied on the PSI in making its
determination. Thus, Stockmeier asserted that the Parole Board

"Because the district court lacked authority to make additional
changes to the PSI, we do not reach Stockmeier's arguments that the

district court violated his due process rights or otherwise erred by using a
confidential Navy report to decide whether to order the changes.

 

On appeal, Stockmeier argues, and respondents agree, that the
district court improperly included in its order irrelevant information
taken from the confidential Navy report. On pages six and seven of the
district court's order, the court included information from the confidential
report that was not included elsewhere in the record and was immaterial
to the instant proceedings. We agree that this information should not
have been included in the order. Accordingly, we reverse this portion of
the judgment to the extent that it included this information, and we
remand the matter to the district court with instructions that the court
strike the first and third paragraphs of the section of its judgment
entitled “Allegations of Other Abuse.”

 

 
 

knowingly relied on false information in violation of NRS Chapter 213,
the Board's operating policies, and the common law. Stockmeier asked
the district court for injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the
Parole Board from relying on the allegedly false information in his PSI.
‘The Parole Board is required to adopt standards for
determining whether to grant or deny parole. NRS 213.10885(1). Parole
is an act of grace, however, and no one has a right to parole, NRS
213.10705; NRS 213.1099(1); soe also Severance v. Armstrong, 96 Nev.
836, 839, 620 P.2d 369, 370 (1980) (recognizing that Nevada statutes
“dol ] not confer a legitimate expectation of parole release and therefore

do[] not create a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to

 

invoke due proce

 

"), In considering a prisoner

 

eligibility for parole, the
Parole Board may consider the prisoner's PSI and evidence submitted by
the prisoner, but nothing in the Nevada Statutes gives the Parole Board
‘the power to amend a prisoner's PSI or requires the Parole Board to
consider evidence presented by a prisoner regarding the accuracy of his
PSI. See generally NRS 213.108-.1089; NRS 213.1099-.142,

Stockmeier had the opportunity, at sentencing and on direct
appeal, to challenge the alleged inaccuracies in his PSI, but he failed to
pursue his objections then. Moreover, as discussed above, no entity had
post-sentencing authority to amend Stockmeier's PSI, and thus, the
Parole Board is entitled to rely on the original PSI. As a result, we affirm
the district court's summary judgment to the Parole Board on
Stockmeier’s tort claim.

Retaliation claim

Finally, Stockmeier argues that because absolute immunity is
not a bar to declaratory or injunctive relief, the district court improperly
granted summary judgment to the Parole Board on his retaliation claim

12

 

 
based on absolute immunity. Respondents acknowledge that absolute
immunity does not bar declaratory or injunctive relief, but they argue
that Stockmeier was not entitled to either, and thu:

 

summary judgment
was proper.

As acknowledged by the parties, the Parole Board enjoyed
quasi-judicial immunity for its decision to deny Stockmeier parole. See
Witherow v, State, Bd, of Parole Commirs, 123 Nev. 305, 312, 167 P.3d
408, 412 (2007); State of Nevada v, Dist, Ct, (Ducharm), 118 Nev. 609,
616, 55 P.3d 420, 424 (2002). While such immunity did not preclude
declaratory or injunctive relief, see Baer v, Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 357 (6th
Cir. 2003), Stockmeier still had to satisfy the summary judgment
standard in order to move forward on his retaliation claim.

‘To state a claim for retaliation in the prison context, an
inmate must assert that a state actor has taken adverse action that
chilled the inmate’s protected exercise of his First Amendment rights
without reasonably advancing a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v.
Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). If an inmate does not
allege “a chilling effect,” his claim may survive if he establishes that he
has suffered harm. Id, at 567 n.11.

Here, the record evidence showed that Stockmeier was denied
parole based on allegations in the PSI and the seriousness of his crime,
In response to this evidence, Stockmeier argued that the Parole Board
first found that the offense involved a weapon only after his successful
litigation against the Psychological Review Panel. He further asserted
that one of the Parole Board members mentioned the litigation during his

parole hearing. Stockmeier’s arguments, however, only amounted to

conjecture and speculation. See Wood v. Safeway. Inc, 121 Nev. 724,

 

 
782, 121 P.8d 1026, 1081 (2005) (stating that conjecture and speculation
will not defeat a motion for summary judgment). Stockmeier did not
present any evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the Parole Board denied him parole based on his exercise of his
right to litigate his claims, and thus, the Parole Board was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on the retaliation claim, See Rhodes, 408
F.3d at 567-68; Wood, 121 Nev, at 732, 121 P.3d at 1031, Thus, we also
tummary judgment in favor of the Parole Board

 

 

affirm the district cow
on appellant's retaliation claim.

For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm in part and
reverse in part the district court's judgment and remand the matter to

the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

(Mas tout

Hardesty

 

We concur:

Deca

Douglas

Pickering