Case Title: Riffle v. Worthen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-1239

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wayne RIFFLE and Charles Mitchell, a/k/a M.R.
Properties, a Partnership v. George G.
WORTHEN, William B. Worthen, Mary Fletcher
Worthen, Renee B. Fletcher, as Executor of
the Estate of Thomas B. Fletcher, Deceased,
Renee B. Fletcher, Evan M. Fletcher, Heidi F.
Nichols, and John Does 1-10

95-1239                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered March 3, 1997


1.   Easements -- easements appurtenant and easements in gross distinguished. -
     - Easements appurtenant run with the land, and easements in
     gross are personal to the grantors; an appurtenant easement
     serves a parcel of land known as the dominant tenement, while
     the parcel of land on which the easement is imposed is known
     as the servient tenement; an easement in gross does not have
     a servient tenement because it benefits a person or an entity,
     not the land.

2.   Deeds -- interpretation -- primary consideration. -- When interpreting
     a deed, the appellate court gives primary consideration to the
     intent of the grantor; the grantor's intent should be
     determined solely from the language of the deed unless the
     language of the deed is ambiguous, uncertain, or doubtful.

3.   Easements -- language of quitclaim deed was clear and unambiguous -- intent
     to convey personal right of access. -- The supreme court declared
     clear and unambiguous the language of a 1971 quitclaim deed
     from appellees' predecessors in title to the grantees from
     whom appellants purchased their land; the use of the words
     "heirs and assigns forever" in the conveyance of the actual
     land coupled with the absence of similar words of reservation
     in the conveyance of the right of ingress and egress indicated
     that the intent of the grantors was to convey a personal right
     of access or an easement in gross.

4.   Easements -- chancellor did not err in ruling that deed did not establish
     appurtenant easement. -- Where it was clear that a 1971 quitclaim
     deed was an attempt to settle a boundary dispute between
     relatives, the supreme court concluded that the corresponding
     conveyance of the right of ingress and egress was intended for
     the personal use and benefit of the grantees; accordingly, the
     supreme court could not say that the chancellor erred in
     ruling that the deed did not establish an appurtenant easement
     to appellants' land.

5.   Appeal & error -- argument not raised below not addressed on appeal. --
     An argument not raised below is not addressed on appeal.

6.   Easements -- existence -- burden of proof. -- The person who asserts
     an easement has the burden of proving the existence of the
     easement.

7.   Easements -- easement of necessity -- prerequisities. -- To establish
     an easement of necessity, appellants had the burden of proving
     unity of title in the sense that the same person or entity
     once held title to both tracts, that the unity of title was
     severed by a conveyance of one of the tracts, and that the
     easement was necessary so that the owner of the dominant
     tenement might use his land, with the necessity existing both
     at the time of the severance of title and at the time the
     easement was exercised. 

8.   Easements -- easement of necessity -- degree of necessity must be more
     than convenience. -- The degree of necessity for an easement of
     necessity must be more than mere convenience; when a parcel of
     land is accessible by a navigable body of water but not by
     road and motor vehicle, the accessibility by way of the water
     does not defeat a showing of necessity.

9.   Easements -- easement of necessity -- appellants did not meet burden --
     could not raise easement of necessity. -- Appellants did not meet
     their burden, in establishing an easement of necessity, of
     proving unity of title; the evidence in the record fell short
     of establishing that the two tracts of land at issue were once
     held under the same title and were subsequently severed into
     the current two tracts; the joint ownership of one of the two
     tracts of land did not meet this requirement; in addition, the
     joint ownership of one of the two tracts did not establish
     that either of the tracts was ever burdened as a servient
     estate; consequently, appellants were strangers to the title
     of appellees' land and therefore could not raise an easement
     of necessity; the supreme court found no error in the
     chancellor's ruling in this regard and affirmed the decree.


     Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court, Fifth Division; Ellen B.
Brantley; affirmed.
     Arnold, Grobmyer & Haley, by: Robert R. Ross, for appellants.
     Wright & Bonds, by: Edward L. Wright, for appellees.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellants, Wayne Riffle and Charles Mitchell, a/k/a M. R.
Properties, a partnership, appeal the decree of the Pulaski County
Chancery Court declaring that they were not entitled to an
appurtenant easement or an easement of necessity over land
adjoining their land and owned by Appellees, George C. Worthen,
William B. Worthen, Mary Fletcher Worthen, Renee B. Fletcher
individually and as executor of the estate of Thomas B. Fletcher,
Evan M. Fletcher, Heidi F. Nichols, and John Does 1-10.  The court
of appeals certified this case to us as one involving the
construction of a deed.  Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup.
Ct. R. 1-2(a)(16) and (d) (as amended by per curiam order July 15,
1996).  We find no merit and affirm.
     Appellants own approximately 270 acres of real property in
Pulaski County bordering the Arkansas River south of the David D.
Terry Dam.  It is not disputed that the only public access to
Appellants' land is through the Arkansas River.  Appellees own
approximately 2,400 acres of real property, which they commonly
refer to as the Fletcher Farm.  The Fletcher Farm is contiguous to
Appellants' property with Appellants' property lying on the
southern boundary of the Fletcher Farm.  Appellants filed this suit
for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging they were entitled
to an appurtenant easement or alternatively an easement of
necessity over the Fletcher Farm.  Appellants claimed that roadways
existed on the Fletcher Farm that would provide access to their
land without further action on Appellees' or Appellants' part and
without any further burden to Fletcher Farm.  Appellants further
requested that Appellees be enjoined from interfering with their
right of access to their land.  
     After a bench trial, the chancellor found that the deed in
which Appellants claimed they were granted an appurtenant easement
only granted an easement that was personal to the grantees therein
and thus ruled that Appellants were not entitled to an appurtenant
easement.  The chancellor also found that there was no unity of
title to the two tracts of land and therefore ruled Appellants were
not entitled to an easement of necessity.  The chancellor entered
a decree consistent with these rulings.  This appeal followed.
     Appellants' first point for reversal is a challenge to the
chancellor's ruling that they did not have an appurtenant easement.
Appellants rely on a quitclaim deed dated June 4, 1971, as the
source of their alleged appurtenant easement.  The quitclaim deed
states in pertinent part:
                         QUITCLAIM DEED

                            Preamble

          . . . .

          The Grantors and Grantees herein are relatives and
     wish by an exchange of conveyances to establish amicably
     and with certainty the lands each owns . . . and to
     relocate a portion of the boundary between their
     respective properties for purposes of convenience.  Now,
     Therefore, KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

          THAT We, Mary Fletcher Worthen, a married woman
     conveying in my own right, and Thomas Fletcher, Jr. and
     Renee B. Fletcher, his wife, Grantors, for and in
     consideration of the sum of $1.00 and other good and
     valuable consideration in hand paid by the Grantees, the
     receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do hereby grant,
     convey, sell and quitclaim unto Albert L. Fletcher, Helen
     Frame Kilgallon and Marie Frame Van Alen, Grantees, and
     unto their heirs and assigns forever, all our right,
     title, interest and claim in and to the following lands
     lying in Pulaski County, Arkansas, to-wit:

          The SW¬ of the SW¬ and the W« of the SE¬ of
          the SW¬ of Section 13;

          The S« of the SE¬ of Section 14 except the
          North 330 feet thereof;

          The NE¬ of Section 23; and

          The N« of the SW¬ and the NW¬ of Section 24
          except the North 1076 feet of the E« of the
          NE¬ of the NW¬ of said section,

          All of said lands lying in Township 1 South,
          Range 11 West.

          . . . .

          After this conveyance, the Grantors and the Grantees
     will have a common East/West boundary line in the SE¬ of
     the aforesaid Section 14, 330 feet South of the North
     line of the S« of the SE¬ of the section.  The Arkansas
     River is the West boundary of the Grantors' and Grantees'
     lands at the common boundary line. . . .  [T]he Grantors
     covenant that if their lands are added to by accretion or
     avulsion and thereby extend South of the present common
     boundary line if extended Westward, the present common
     boundary as so extended shall remain the East/West
     boundary between the lands of the Grantors and Grantees,
     and Grantors shall not claim land South of the boundary. 
     This shall be a covenant to run with the land and against
     the Grantors, their heirs or assigns, as owners of the
     lands North of the aforesaid common boundary.

          The Grantors own certain lands which lie between the
     lands herein conveyed and a public roadway known as
     Steele Bend Road.  Therefore, by this instrument, the
     Grantors also convey to the Grantees the right of ingress
     to and egress from said public road across the Grantors'
     intervening lands. Said right may be exercised along any
     roadway existing on the Grantors' lands from time to time
     and/or along field boundaries, but if the Grantees
     establish a roadway along field boundaries, they may not
     in so doing damage or destroy crops or timber without
     making just compensation for the damage done.  Provided,
     however, if a public road is ever established upon or
     abutting the lands herein conveyed by the Grantors, the
     rights given to the Grantees by this paragraph shall
     terminate.

     Appellants purchased their land from two of the three grantees
in the quitclaim deed, Helen Kilgallon and Marie Stagmer, formerly
Marie Van Alen.  The Grantors in the quitclaim deed are Appellees'
predecessors in title.
     Appellants contend that the language of the quitclaim deed
clearly and unambiguously creates a dominant and servient tenement
in that the lands of the Grantors are burdened with providing
access to the Grantees' lands until such time as a public road is
established upon or abutting the lands conveyed in the deed. 
Appellees respond that the quitclaim deed does not grant an
easement that runs with the land, but rather grants a right of
ingress and egress that was personal to the Grantees thereof.  As
did the chancellor, we agree with Appellees. 
     Appurtenant easements run with the land and easements in gross
are personal to the grantors.  Wilson v. Brown, 320 Ark. 240,