Case Title: State ex rel. Tapp v. Parsec, Inc.

Citation: 1998-Ohio-227

Docket Number: 19952364

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. TAPP, APPELLEE, v. PARSEC, INC.; INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Tapp v. Parsec, Inc. (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission not bound by an approved 
closed period interlocutory order issued by a commission deputy who has 
determined that a claimant is permanently and totally disabled — Options 
available to court of appeals on remand. 
(No. 95-2364 — Submitted May 26, 1998 — Decided July 29, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 95APD01-13. 
 
On December 6, 1984, appellee, Joseph R. Tapp, sustained injuries in the 
course of and arising from his employment with Parsec, Inc.  Appellee had also 
suffered industrial injuries in 1978 and 1981, and his workers’ compensation 
claims were allowed.  A workers’ compensation claim resulting from the 
December 1984 injury was recognized for “[f]racture of left ankle, non-displaced 
fracture, intervertebral disc displacement L4, and subluxation L4.”  As a result of 
his injuries, appellee, on January 20, 1993, filed an application for permanent and 
total disability compensation. 
 
On March 18, 1993, appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio held a hearing 
on the issues of temporary total and permanent total disability compensation.  The 
staff hearing officer terminated temporary total disability compensation, finding 
that appellee’s condition had become permanent.  In a separate interlocutory order, 
the same hearing officer, acting as a commission deputy, awarded appellee 
permanent total disability compensation for the closed period from March 19, 
1993 to June 28, 1993.  In the order, the deputy wrote: 
 
“The reports of doctor(s) Hanington, King and Rolfes [sic] were reviewed 
and evaluated. 
 
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“This order is based particularly upon the report(s) of Dr. Rolfes [sic], DC, 
Chiropractor, for the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, dated 8/21/92, who 
found the claimant will be unable to perform any occupational duties[;]  Dr. King, 
DC, for the claimant, dated 12/7/92, who found the claimant will never perform 
any gainful employment[; and a] consideration of the claimant’s age of 61, his 8th 
grade education, a work history which included work as a truck driver, the 
evidence in the file and the evidence adduced at the hearing.” 
 
The interlocutory order was signed and approved by the commission.  
Thereafter, the commission conducted a hearing with respect to appellee’s 
application for permanent total disability.  In an order mailed August 27, 1993, the 
commission denied appellee’s application, stating: 
 
“That the Commission find from proof of record that the claimant is not 
permanently and totally disabled for the reason that the disability is not total; that 
is, the claimant is able to perform sustained remunerative employment, that 
therefore the Permanent Total Disability Application, filed 1/20/93 be denied. 
 
“The reports of Doctors(s) King, Tecklenburg, Rohlfs, and Hannington [sic] 
were reviewed and evaluated.  The order is based particularly upon the reports 
[sic] of Doctor Hannington [sic], evidence in the file and/or evidence adduced at 
the hearing. 
 
“The claimant is 61 years old[;] he completed the eighth grade.  He has 
work experience as a truck driver, crane operator, and warehouseman.  The 
claimant can read, write, and do basic math.  The claimant continued to work for 
approximately five years after the most recent date of injury.  Dr. Hannington [sic] 
supports work restrictions against activities involving repetitive bending, stooping, 
lifting, squatting, or carrying of weights in excess of 20 to 30 pounds.  The 
claimant could engage in work activities which involve the use of his upper 
 
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extremities, walking, sitting, or standing, as long as the latter two were not 
required constantly throughout the work day.  Based upon all the above factors, 
including the claimant’s ability to read, write, and do basic math, it is concluded 
that the claimant retains the physical and mental abilities to engage in sustained 
remunerative employment within the restrictions listed by Dr. Hannington [sic].  
Therefore, the claimant is not Permanently and Totally disabled.” 
 
On January 5, 1995, appellee filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that there was no evidence to support the 
commission’s order denying his application for permanent total disability 
compensation.  The court of appeals, citing its own decision in State ex rel. 
Draganic v. Indus. Comm. (Sept. 22, 1994), Franklin App. No. 93APD10-1491, 
unreported, 1994 WL 521157, granted the requested writ of mandamus, directed 
the commission to vacate its order, and ordered the commission to grant appellee 
permanent total disability compensation. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Butkovich, Schimpf, Schimpf & Ginocchio Co., L.P.A., James A. Whittaker 
and Stephen P. Gast, for appellee. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Steven P. Fixler, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellants. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  The court of appeals’ decision, granting appellee’s requested 
writ of mandamus, was based upon State ex rel. Draganic v. Indus. Comm. (Sept. 
22, 1994), Franklin App. No. 93APD10-1491, unreported, 1994 WL 521157.  
However, this court has since reversed the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ 
Draganic decision in State ex rel. Draganic v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 75 Ohio 
 
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St.3d 461, 663 N.E.2d 929.  A majority of this court in Draganic held that the 
commission is not bound by an approved closed-period interlocutory order issued 
by a commission deputy who has determined that a claimant is permanently and 
totally disabled.  Moreover, we also recognized in Draganic that a commission’s 
order denying permanent and total disability compensation may be vacated in 
accordance with State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 315, 626 N.E.2d 
666, or State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 
245. 
 
Accordingly, in the case now before us, the judgment of the court of appeals 
is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court to determine the merits of 
appellee’s request for a writ of mandamus.  Upon remand, the court of appeals has 
the option to deny the requested writ, to vacate the order of the commission and 
order further proceedings pursuant to Noll, or to grant the writ and relief pursuant 
to Gay. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.