Case Title: State ex rel. Davis v. Turner

Citation: 2021-Ohio-1771

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Davis v. Turner, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-1771.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-1771 
THE STATE EX REL. DAVIS, APPELLANT, v. TURNER, WARDEN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Davis v. Turner, Slip Opinion No.  
2021-Ohio-1771.] 
Habeas corpus—Erroneous inclusion of a postrelease-control sanction in a 
judgment entry of conviction does not render the sentencing entry void—
Challenges to a sentencing error by a trial court are not cognizable in 
habeas corpus—Liability for court costs and personal-funds exemption 
from judgment execution under R.C. 2329.66(A) distinguished—Judgment 
dismissing petition for writ affirmed—Denial of motion to vacate judgment 
of court costs affirmed. 
(Nos. 2020-0934 and 2020-1130—Submitted March 2, 2021—Decided May 26, 
2021.) 
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Marion County, No. 9-20-12. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Randy H. Davis, is incarcerated in the North Central 
Correctional Complex, where appellee, Neil Turner, is the warden.  In case No. 
2020-0934, Davis appeals the Third District Court of Appeals’ judgment 
dismissing his habeas corpus complaint.  In case No. 2020-1130, Davis appeals 
separately from the court of appeals’ order denying his motion to vacate the 
assessment of court costs against him.  We affirm in both cases. 
I.  Background 
{¶ 2} Davis was convicted of murder in September 2001 and sentenced to 
15 years to life in prison.  The trial court’s judgment entry also stated that Davis 
was subject to postrelease control. 
{¶ 3} In March 2018, the trial court vacated the postrelease-control portion 
of Davis’s sentence because the offense of murder is a special felony that does not 
carry a postrelease-control sanction.  See R.C. 2967.28(B); State v. Clark, 119 Ohio 
St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 36 (offender convicted of murder is 
placed on parole if released from prison).  The trial court stated that the remainder 
of Davis’s sentence “is entirely proper and remains in effect.”  The trial court did 
not journalize a new sentencing entry.  Davis later filed a motion for a “corrected 
judgment entry,” which the trial court denied in July 2018. 
{¶ 4} Davis filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of 
appeals in April 2020.  Davis alleged that his original sentence is “partially void” 
due to its improper inclusion of a postrelease-control sanction.  Turner filed a 
motion to dismiss Davis’s complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).  In a June 2020 
judgment entry, the court of appeals found that Davis failed to state any cognizable 
claim for relief in habeas corpus, dismissed the complaint, and assessed costs 
against Davis.  In case No. 2020-0934, Davis has timely appealed to this court as 
of right from the judgment dismissing his habeas complaint. 
January Term, 2021 
 
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{¶ 5} Following the dismissal of Davis’s complaint, the warden’s collection 
designee sent Davis notice of the court’s judgment against him for the payment of 
court costs.  See Ohio Adm.Code 5120-5-03(C) (requiring the warden’s designee 
to provide notice to an inmate prior to withdrawing any money from the inmate’s 
account to satisfy a court’s judgment).  Davis submitted a timely, written objection 
to the warden’s collection designee.  In his written objection, Davis stated that the 
funds in his account were exempt from collection under R.C. 2329.66(A)(3), which 
exempts certain personal funds from execution, garnishment, or attachment to 
satisfy a judgment or order. 
{¶ 6} Davis then filed a document titled “Objection to Judgment for 
Payment” with the court of appeals, in which he renewed his objection to the 
imposition of costs against him, claiming  an exemption under R.C. 2329.66(A)(3).  
The court of appeals treated Davis’s objection as a motion to vacate court costs and 
denied the motion.  In case No. 2020-1130, Davis has appealed the order denying 
the motion to vacate court costs. 
{¶ 7} The parties have each filed briefs in both appeals.  Because both 
appeals arise from the same proceeding below, we consolidate them for decision in 
this opinion. 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Appeal in Case No. 2020-0934 
{¶ 8} This court reviews the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition under 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo.  State ex rel. Norris v. Wainwright, 158 Ohio St.3d 20, 
2019-Ohio-4138, 139 N.E.3d 867, ¶ 5.  To be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, 
Davis must show that he is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty, R.C. 2725.01, 
and that he is entitled to immediate release from prison or confinement, State ex 
rel. Cannon v. Mohr, 155 Ohio St.3d 213, 2018-Ohio-4184, 120 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 10.  
“A writ of habeas corpus is generally ‘available only when the petitioner’s 
maximum sentence has expired and he is being held unlawfully.’ ”  Leyman v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Bradshaw, 146 Ohio St.3d 522, 2016-Ohio-1093, 59 N.E.3d 1236, ¶ 8, quoting 
Heddleston v. Mack, 84 Ohio St.3d 213, 214, 702 N.E.2d 1198 (1998).  Further, 
habeas corpus is not available when the petitioner has an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law, unless a trial court’s judgment is void for lack of 
jurisdiction.  Id. at ¶ 8-9. 
{¶ 9} Davis contends that he is imprisoned under a judgment entry of 
conviction that is “partially void” due to its inclusion of a postrelease-control 
sanction that was contrary to law.  Even though the trial court vacated the 
postrelease-control sanction in 2018, Davis argues that the trial court failed to issue 
a corrected sentencing entry.  Thus, he argues that his conviction is void because 
“there are two separate judgment entries controlling appellant’s conviction and 
sentence,” in violation of the so-called “one document” rule.  See State v. Baker, 
119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 17-18 (holding that only 
one document can constitute a final, appealable judgment of conviction), modified 
in part on other grounds, State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 
N.E.2d 142, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 10} Davis’s premise that his original judgment of conviction is “partially 
void” is incorrect.  Though the judgment erroneously imposed postrelease control, 
that error did not render the judgment void.  “A sentence is void when a sentencing 
court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or personal jurisdiction 
over the accused.  When the sentencing court has jurisdiction to act, sentencing 
errors in the imposition of postrelease control render the sentence voidable, not void 
* * *.”  State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248,  
¶ 42.  Accordingly, Davis’s sentence is not void.  Id.  And because his maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment has not yet expired, Davis is not entitled to a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
{¶ 11} Davis’s contention that the trial court failed to issue a corrected 
judgment entry of conviction does not change the result.  Davis argues that the 
January Term, 2021 
 
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court’s failure to issue a corrected judgment entry after vacating the postrelease-
control provision means that his conviction violates the “one document rule.”  Even 
if this court accepts Davis’s contention as true, his argument amounts to nothing 
more than a challenge to an arguable sentencing error by the trial court.  But 
sentencing errors are not jurisdictional and, therefore, not cognizable in habeas 
corpus.  State ex rel. Sneed v. Anderson, 114 Ohio St.3d 11, 2007-Ohio-2454, 866 
N.E.2d 1084, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 12} Davis acknowledges that he filed a motion requesting that the trial 
court issue a corrected judgment entry, which the trial court denied.  Davis could 
have appealed the order denying his motion, which would have been an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law that precludes extraordinary relief.  See State 
ex rel. Haynie v. Rudduck, 160 Ohio St.3d 99, 2020-Ohio-2912, 153 N.E.3d 91,  
¶ 12-13. 
{¶ 13} For these reasons, Davis’s claims are not cognizable in habeas 
corpus.  The court of appeals correctly dismissed Davis’s complaint. 
B.  Appeal in Case No. 2020-1130 
{¶ 14} The court of appeals dismissed Davis’s complaint “with costs 
assessed to [Davis] for which judgment is hereby rendered.”  Through the date of 
dismissal, the court costs assessed against Davis totaled $136.95.  Davis filed a 
post-judgment “Objection to Judgment for Payment,” which the court of appeals 
denied as a motion to vacate court costs. 
{¶ 15} Davis contends that the funds in his prison account are exempt from 
execution, garnishment, or attachment to satisfy the judgment for costs.  Davis 
relies on R.C. 2329.66(A)(3), which exempts up to $500 “on deposit with a bank, 
savings and loan association, credit union, public utility, landlord, or other person, 
other than personal earnings.”1  Davis avers that he has less than $400 in his prison 
                                                 
1. R.C. 2329.66(A)(3) exempts up to $400, but the General Assembly has also prescribed that the 
Ohio Judicial Conference shall adjust the exemption amounts every three years to reflect increases 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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account.  And because of the R.C. 2329.66(A)(3) exemption, Davis argues that it 
was improper for the court of appeals to hold him liable for court costs. 
{¶ 16} Davis’s argument, however, confuses the issue of liability for costs 
with the separate issue of executing the judgment for costs.  R.C. 2329.66(A) 
concerns exemptions that could apply upon execution of the judgment for costs.  
See UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Lacava, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106461, 2018-Ohio-
3055, ¶ 46.  The statute does not provide a basis for vacating an assessment of costs 
against the losing party in a civil case.  To the extent that Davis wants to challenge 
the prison’s garnishment of his funds to satisfy the judgment, he should invoke the 
procedures established in Ohio Adm.Code 5120-5-03 and seek judicial relief if the 
prison garnishes funds without following those procedures.  State v. Brown, 156 
Ohio App.3d 120, 2004-Ohio-558, 804 N.E.2d 1021, ¶ 9-12 (10th Dist.). 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, the court of appeals did not err in 
dismissing Davis’s habeas petition or in denying Davis’s motion to vacate the 
judgment of court costs assessed against him. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, 
and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
 
Randy H. Davis, pro se. 
 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Stephanie L. Watson, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
_________________ 
                                                 
in the consumer price index.  See R.C. 2329.66(B).  The current exemption amount for moneys 
described in R.C. 2329.66(A)(3) is $500.  See http://www.ohiojudges.org/Resources/publications 
(accessed Apr. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/V5EN-ZXF2].