Case Title: McCoy v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC10-2206

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-2206 
____________ 
 
RICHARD MCCOY,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[May 2, 2013] 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Richard McCoy appeals an order that denied his motion to vacate a 
judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 
3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A jury convicted McCoy of the first-degree murder of Shervie Ann Elliott 
and recommended the death penalty by a vote of seven to five.  See McCoy v. 
State, 853 So. 2d 396, 400-01 n.3 (Fla. 2003).  Following that recommendation, the 
trial court sentenced McCoy to death for the murder.  Id.  In the opinion affirming 
 
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the conviction and sentence, this Court detailed the facts of the murder and the 
subsequent trial: 
On the morning of June 13, 2000, Shervie Ann Elliott was 
found dead in the storage room of the Jacksonville ABC Liquors store 
in which she worked, and $415 was missing from the store’s two 
safes.  The evidence adduced at the appellant’s trial established that 
the victim had been shot once in the abdomen, a wound which 
disabled her; once in the neck, resulting in paralysis; and once in the 
face, the fatal wound.  The store’s surveillance tape showed the 
robbery and murder occurring from 8:20 a.m. to 8:33 a.m. on June 13. 
The initial investigation of the alcoholic beverage store performed by 
law enforcement officers and evidence technicians revealed no 
evidence of a physical struggle. 
Both circumstantial and direct evidence linked the appellant to 
the crime scene.  Three latent fingerprints found on an ABC Liquors 
cash and receipt pouch within the non-public store office were 
matched to McCoy.  While the latent fingerprint examiner could not 
form any conclusions regarding when the fingerprints were deposited 
on the pouch, ABC Liquors employees testified that the money 
pouches were kept within the store office at all times, and only store 
managers were involved with the pouches.  Additionally, the store 
surveillance camera revealed that an African-American male had 
committed the robbery and murder. 
On June 19, ABC Liquors advertised a $10,000 reward for 
information leading to the arrest and conviction of the person who had 
robbed and murdered Elliott.  The following day, Zsa Zsa Marcel 
contacted ABC Liquors and spoke with Teresa Johnson, the ABC 
Liquors regional manager for the Jacksonville area.  Johnson directed 
Marcel to Dale Gilbreath, the detective leading the Sheriff’s Office 
investigation of the robbery and murder.  She related to Gilbreath that 
on June 14, her boyfriend, [n.1] Richard McCoy, [n.2] had told her 
that he had been involved in the armed robbery of an ABC Liquors 
store in which a woman was killed.  He had detailed to Marcel the 
manner in which he and his accomplice “rushed” the manager of the 
store as she opened the back door . . . and made Elliott open the 
store’s safes.  Additionally, McCoy had told Marcel that the inside of 
the store was very dimly lit at the time of the robbery, his accomplice 
 
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had actually shot the store manager, and he and his partner had netted 
$4,000 from the venture. 
[N.1.] Marcel was married to a different man throughout 
the relationship she had with McCoy. 
[N.2.] McCoy is also known as Jamil Rashid, the name 
he adopted upon Islamic conversion.  For ease of 
presentation, we refer only to the appellant’s birth name, 
Richard McCoy. 
Following her discussion with Gilbreath, Marcel agreed to 
initiate a conversation with McCoy regarding the ABC Liquors 
robbery while wearing a recording device . . . .  Subsequently, she 
listened to the tape recording of her conversation with McCoy, agreed 
that it was a fair and accurate depiction of their discussion . . . and 
helped the State prepare a transcript of the conversation.   
On July 13, 2000, McCoy was indicted by a Duval County 
grand jury on charges of first-degree murder, armed burglary, and 
armed robbery.  [n.3]  In addition to the testimony of Marcel, the ABC 
Liquors employees, and law enforcement officers related above, 
McCoy’s trial jury heard testimony during the guilt phase from the 
medical examiner, detailing the succession of the gunshot injuries 
sustained by Elliott . . . . 
 
[N.3.]  As McCoy does not contest his armed robbery 
conviction, and was not convicted of armed burglary, we 
address only the appellant’s conviction and sentence for 
first-degree murder. 
 
Following the trial court’s denial of McCoy’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal, the defense presented evidence in support of 
the appellant’s claim that he was at the home of his girlfriend, 
Dorothy Small, on the morning of June 13, 2000.  Sherry Cross, 
Small’s neighbor and a Raven Transport long-haul truck driver, 
testified that she had spoken with McCoy for approximately five 
minutes outside her home on the morning of the thirteenth between 
8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m.  On cross examination, however, she admitted 
that she was estimating, and that the conversation could have taken 
place either after 8:30 a.m., or before 8 a.m.  . . .  Additionally, the 
defense presented the testimony of Dorothy Small, who related that 
 
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after spending the night at her house, McCoy had left her home early 
on the morning of the 13th of June, and John Bailey, a Krystal Burger 
employee who testified that McCoy ate breakfast at his restaurant 
nearly every morning.  Bailey could not, however, remember whether 
McCoy ate breakfast at Krystal Burger on the morning of June 13.  
The defense then called Clarence Williams, the father of a child with 
Zsa Zsa Marcel, who testified that Marcel had a reputation for 
dishonesty in their Louisiana community. 
Finally, McCoy testified in his own defense.  He testified that 
on the morning of June 13, 2000, he left Small’s house at 6:45 a.m. 
and went home.  He returned to Small’s house at around 8 a.m. to take 
trash to the curb, and spoke with Cross at that time.  After completion 
of this chore, McCoy went to Krystal Burger, ate breakfast, and then 
proceeded to an interview.  He and Marcel had a relationship, and he 
knew that she was “tough”—she had confessed to him that she robbed 
a restaurant on June 10.  McCoy testified that, therefore, he lied to her 
and claimed that he had robbed ABC Liquors in an effort to impress 
her.  He explained that his fingerprints were on the ABC Liquors 
receipt pouch because he had once found one of the pouches in 
another ABC store parking lot, and mailed it to ABC Liquors 
headquarters in Orlando. 
 
. . . . [T]he jury found McCoy guilty of premeditated first-
degree murder.  Additionally, the jury specifically found that “the 
killing was done during the commission or attempted commission of a 
robbery.” 
 
Id. at 399-401. 
 
In imposing the death sentence, the trial court found the following 
aggravating factors: (1) McCoy had been convicted of prior violent felonies (three 
counts of armed robbery and one count of attempted armed robbery); (2) McCoy 
was under a sentence of imprisonment or on community control at the time of the 
murder; (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated 
manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP); (4) the murder 
 
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was committed for pecuniary gain and was committed while engaged in the 
commission of an armed robbery (the trial court merged these aggravating 
circumstances); and (5) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest (this aggravating circumstance was merged with CCP).  
Id. at 401.  The court found no statutory mitigators, but determined that the 
following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances had been established: 
(1) The defendant suffered an abusive childhood; (2) the defendant 
suffered an emotionally deprived childhood; (3) the defendant 
suffered an economically deprived childhood; (4) the defendant’s 
mother had relationships with different abusive and non-abusive 
males; (5) the defendant suffered from unstable living conditions in 
his childhood; (6) the defendant’s parents’ divorce at age ten 
devastated him; (7) the defendant received poor and inadequate 
medical care, particularly when he suffered from a high fever; (8) the 
defendant is a caring son to his mother, providing her food, renting 
movies for her, and spending time with her; (9) the defendant had a 
good relationship with his father; (10) the defendant was a caring 
brother to his sisters, Barbara McCoy and Dorothy McCoy Robertson; 
(11) the defendant was a caring parent, before his incarceration, to his 
two sons, Andre (age 17) and Kenny (age 15); (12) as a child, the 
defendant did poorly in school; (13) as a child, the defendant did not 
receive the psychological counseling recommended by school 
officials; (14) there is no evidence that the defendant has ever been 
violent or abusive in his personal relationships with family members 
or friends; (15) the defendant is a member of the Muslim faith; (16) 
the defendant successfully held employment as a welder; (17) the 
defendant performed laudable humanitarian deeds for Paul Gillians, 
Diane Peterson, and Trina Rivers; (18) the defendant demonstrated 
good behavior during the trial after the verdict was rendered; (19) for 
the eleven months that he was on conditional release prior to the 
commission of this robbery and murder, the defendant apparently did 
well and complied with the requirements of conditional release; and 
(20) the defendant would die in prison regardless of the sentence 
imposed. 
 
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Id. at n.5.  The trial court gave each mitigating factor “some weight.”  Id. at 401-
02.   
Direct Appeal 
On direct appeal, McCoy presented the following issues:  (1) the trial court 
erred when it admitted into evidence the audiotape of the conversation between 
McCoy and Zsa Zsa Marcel because it was inaudible; (2) the trial court erred when 
it allowed the State to use a transcript of the recorded conversation between 
McCoy and Marcel as a demonstrative aid during trial; (3) Marcel was 
incompetent to testify due to the ABC Liquors reward; (4) the trial court 
improperly limited McCoy’s cross-examination of Marcel; (5) the trial court 
erroneously found that CCP had been established; (6) the trial court erred when it 
denied McCoy’s motions for judgment of acquittal; and (7) Florida’s death penalty 
structure is unconstitutional.  See id. at 402-09.  This Court denied relief on all 
claims and affirmed McCoy’s conviction and sentence of death.  Id. at 409. 
Postconviction Proceedings 
 
On June 23, 2004, McCoy filed his initial Motion to Vacate Judgment of 
Conviction and Sentence.  McCoy’s Second Amended Initial Motion for 
Postconviction Relief, the denial of which is currently under review by this Court, 
was filed on April 20, 2006.  The motion presented twenty claims: trial counsel 
was ineffective for the failure to (1) present key witnesses; (2) use depositions and 
 
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sworn statements to impeach State witnesses; (3) object to the prosecutor’s 
comment that the State had predetermined the death penalty is appropriate in this 
case, and the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct; (4) develop and present 
“other perpetrator” evidence; (5) object to the use of both McCoy’s birth name and 
his new Islamic name; and (6) object to references to religion and McCoy’s 
unemployment status, as well as a Golden Rule argument; trial counsel was 
ineffective for (7) conceding that a robbery had occurred; (8a) allowing Teresa 
Johnson to testify that $415 was stolen without establishing a foundation as to how 
the amount had been determined, and (8b) failing to raise a chain of custody claim 
with regard to the audiotape of the recorded conversation between McCoy and 
Marcel; the failure to (9a) use an expert court reporter to create an alternate 
transcription of the recorded conversation, and to offer an opinion as to whether 
the inaudible portions of the recording were so substantial as to deprive the audible 
portions of relevance, (9b) use an audio-recording expert to testify as to whether 
the recording had been altered, and whether the recording could be professionally 
filtered to render it more audible, and (9c) allege prosecutorial misconduct for 
presenting the false testimony of Marcel, as well as a transcript of the recorded 
conversation; (10a) have victims of an unrelated robbery identify Marcel as the 
perpetrator of that robbery, and (10b) present Marcel as a witness during the 
defense’s case; (11) advise McCoy about the advantages of not testifying; and (12) 
 
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present the jury with a chronology of key events during closing statements; (13) 
the death penalty in Florida is unconstitutionally vague; (14) the death penalty in 
Florida is unconstitutional pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); trial 
counsel was ineffective for the failure to (15a) obtain and present store surveillance 
videotapes and still photos taken of McCoy during the month prior to the murder, 
and (15b) create and use enlargements of key frames of the surveillance videotape 
of the actual incident; (16) highlight during closing statements the inconsistencies 
between McCoy’s “bragging” version of the incident and the actual facts of the 
incident; and (17) ensure that store surveillance videotapes were included in the 
direct appeal record; (18) cumulative error; and trial counsel was ineffective for the 
failure to (19) object to comments by the prosecutor that denigrated the sentencing 
role of the jury; and (20)1
 
McCoy subsequently filed a supplemental sworn addendum to his second 
amended initial motion, which presented four additional claims:  (S1) the 
prosecutor failed to establish that McCoy’s fingerprints were left on the ABC 
Liquors pouch at the time of the murder, and trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to adequately challenge the State’s case; under this claim, McCoy also 
asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for the failure to present the director of 
 utilize a defense fingerprint expert.   
                                         
 
1.  McCoy inadvertently marked this claim as number 22.  Claims 20 and 21 
do not exist in the motion. 
 
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safety and security for ABC Liquors as a witness; (S2) the prosecutor violated 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), when she told the jury during 
opening statements that (a) the victim was the first person to arrive at the store on 
the morning of the robbery, (b) McCoy rushed the victim at gunpoint, robbed her, 
and then murdered her, and (c) fingerprints are not subject to human error or 
mistakes; under this claim, McCoy also asserted that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object to these statements; (S3) Florida’s lethal injection protocol 
violates the Eighth Amendment; and (S4) Florida’s lethal injection protocol 
violates McCoy’s First Amendment right to free speech.   
The postconviction court held a Huff2
 
This review follows.  
 hearing, and determined that an 
evidentiary hearing should be held on claims 1 (in part), 2 (in part), 4-7, 8 (in part), 
9-12, 15, 16, 20 (renumbered), and supplemental issues S1 and S2.  During the 
evidentiary hearing, McCoy presented the following witnesses: Diana Peterson, a 
friend of the McCoy family; one of the two prosecuting attorneys from McCoy’s 
trial; the lead defense attorney during McCoy’s trial; and Zsa Zsa Marcel.  McCoy 
also testified.  On October 19, 2010, the postconviction court issued an order that 
denied all claims presented by McCoy in his second amended initial motion and 
supplemental addendum.  
                                         
2.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review—Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
 
McCoy’s first five claims on appeal, which are divided into multiple 
subclaims, challenge the effectiveness of trial counsel.  We recently described the 
requirements to demonstrate ineffective counsel as:   
First, counsel’s performance must be shown to be deficient.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  Deficient 
performance in this context means that counsel’s performance fell 
below the standard guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Id.  When 
examining counsel’s performance, an objective standard of 
reasonableness applies, id. at 688, and great deference is given to 
counsel’s performance.  Id. at 689.  The defendant bears the burden to 
“overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id.  
(quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  This Court 
has made clear that “[s]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”  See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 
1048 (Fla. 2000).  There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s 
performance was not ineffective.  See Strickland
Second, the deficient performance must have prejudiced the 
defendant, ultimately depriving the defendant of a fair trial with a 
reliable result.  
, 466 U.S. at 669. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  A defendant must do 
more than speculate that an error affected the outcome.  Id. at 693.  
Prejudice is met only if there is a reasonable probability that “but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  Both 
deficient performance and prejudice must be shown.  Id.  Because 
both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and 
fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the 
circuit court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence, but reviewing the circuit court’s legal 
conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State
 
, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 
(Fla. 2004). 
 
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Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 671-72 (Fla. 2010).  Further, a court evaluating a 
claim of ineffectiveness is not required to issue a specific ruling on the 
performance component of the test when it is evident that the prejudice component 
is not satisfied.  See Ferrell v. State
Failure to Present “Alibi” Witnesses 
, 29 So. 3d 959, 969 (Fla. 2010). 
In his first claim on appeal, McCoy contends that trial counsel was 
ineffective for the failure to present the testimony of three witnesses.   
Birthday Party Witnesses
It should be noted that both the postconviction court’s order and the State’s 
brief addressing this subclaim rely upon incorrect facts.  The postconviction 
court’s order provides, in part: 
—McCoy asserts that, if presented during trial, his 
mother and Diana Peterson, a family friend, would have testified that McCoy was 
at a birthday party for his sister during the time when Marcel claimed McCoy 
confessed to her that he participated in the robbery/murder.  According to McCoy, 
this would have damaged Marcel’s credibility and caused the jury to doubt the 
veracity of her testimony. 
Defendant claims that counsel should have presented the testimony of 
. . . Josie McCoy, to show that the Defendant was with her on the 
evening of the murder.  The Defendant claims that this testimony 
would have undermined Zsa Zsa Marcel’s statement that the 
Defendant was with her on the evening of the murder, and would have 
contradicted Ms. Marcel’s testimony that the Defendant confessed to 
her on that evening.  At the time of this conversation, Ms. Marcel and 
 
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the Defendant were under surveillance by the Jacksonville Sheriff’s 
Office, and this confession was tape recorded.   
(Emphasis supplied.)  First, this Court’s decision on direct appeal reflects that 
according to Marcel, McCoy confessed to her the day after the murder, June 14, 
2000, the same day that McCoy allegedly attended a birthday party for his sister.  
See McCoy, 853 So. 2d at 399.  Second, our decision reflects that Marcel had two 
conversations with McCoy during which the pair discussed the murder at the ABC 
Liquors store.  The first occurred on the day after the murder, June 14, 2000, and 
the second, during which Marcel was in possession of a hidden recording device, 
occurred on June 20, 2000.  Id.   
Further, in his postconviction motion, McCoy asserted that the testimony of 
his mother would have impeached Marcel’s assertion that McCoy confessed to her 
on June 14, 2000.  In the motion, he stated that Marcel “made a vague claim about 
[McCoy] being with her in the evening of the day after the murder,” and that his 
mother could have impeached Marcel with testimony that McCoy was actually at a 
birthday party from 5 p.m. until 7 p.m.  (Emphasis supplied.)  Therefore, this claim 
was not directed to the conversation that occurred on June 20, which was recorded 
and occurred under police surveillance.  Accordingly, the State’s assertion that 
McCoy’s first claim was without merit because the occurrence of this conversation 
could have been proven by undercover officers is incorrect.  Similarly, to the 
extent the postconviction court’s denial of this subclaim is based upon the fact that 
 
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the June 20 conversation was recorded by police, the order is also incorrect.  
Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed below, this subclaim was properly denied.   
During the evidentiary hearing, Diana Peterson testified that on June 14, 
2000, she was with McCoy and his mother at a birthday party for McCoy’s sister 
between 5 p.m. and 7 p.m.3
Trial counsel admitted that he did not have all of his notes from McCoy’s 
trial.  However, he acknowledged that he spoke with the mother, and she told him 
that McCoy was with her and other family members on June 14 at a birthday party.  
Trial counsel explained during cross-examination that he did not present the 
mother as a witness because he did not believe that her testimony would have 
assisted McCoy’s defense.  Confusion about which conversation the mother’s 
testimony would have impeached—the June 14 conversation or the June 20 
conversation—permeated cross-examination of trial counsel: 
  However, Peterson also exhibited confusion with 
regard to dates.  When asked during cross-examination what year the birthday 
party occurred, Peterson replied that she thought it occurred during 2005 or 2006.  
Peterson also testified that she did not know where McCoy had been before the 
party or where he went once he left.   
STATE:  Were you aware that at the time Ms. Marcel was 
alleged to have had this conversation with your client that was 
                                         
 
3.  McCoy’s mother did not testify during the evidentiary hearing due to 
illness. 
 
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recorded that the two of them were being surveilled by Jacksonville 
Sheriff’s Office personnel? 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  Yes, I knew. 
STATE:  So that those people could have identified his voice 
from the tape as seeing him with Ms. Marcel? 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  That’s possible, yeah. 
STATE:  And at anytime did you have doubts about whether or 
not it was Mr. McCoy’s voice on the tape that you were furnished? 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  No.  
 
Despite this confusion, McCoy’s claim of ineffectiveness fails because he cannot 
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to present his mother 
or Diana Peterson as witnesses.  See generally Ferrell, 29 So. 3d at 969 (holding 
that a court is not required to issue a specific ruling on the performance component 
of Strickland when it is evident that the prejudice component is not satisfied).  The 
record reflects that their testimonies would not have actually discredited that of 
Marcel.   
 
The direct appeal record evidences that Marcel fluctuated as to when she 
saw McCoy on June 14, 2000.  In Marcel’s sworn statement, the following 
discussion occurred: 
STATE ATTORNEY:  Do you remember about what time of 
day it was? 
MARCEL:  It was, like, evening
 
 
STATE ATTORNEY:  Was it daylight or was it still— 
. 
MARCEL:  It was light.  It was, like, afternoon
 
.   
 
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(Emphasis supplied.)  During her deposition, Marcel indicated that she and McCoy 
met during the evening of June 14, but also noted that she could not designate an 
exact time: 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  And what time of the day was it that you 
were with him? 
 
MARCEL:  Evening
 
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  After 6? 
. 
 
MARCEL:  Maybe. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  And how long do you think you were with 
him on that day, the day he told you he had hit the ABC? 
 
 
MARCEL:  Maybe three or four hours.   
 
. . . . 
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  Do you have any idea what time it was 
when you were eating, was it the normal dinner hour? 
 
MARCEL:  Well it’s like a buffet place so it wasn’t—we didn’t 
go there actually for dinner.  It was just to eat off a buffet.  So I don’t 
know exactly a time
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  Was it dark? 
. 
 
MARCEL:  No, almost but not dark, no.  No, it wasn’t dark.   
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Finally, during trial, Marcel testified that she saw McCoy on 
the afternoon of June 14, 2000, and they spent three or four hours together.   
In none of these prior proceedings did Marcel state that McCoy confessed to 
her specifically between the hours of 5 p.m. and 7 p.m.—the time of the birthday 
party.  In fact, during her deposition Marcel stated that she could not specify a 
precise time when she and McCoy were together.  Given the vagueness of her 
statements, and the three-to-four hour timeframe that Marcel asserts she and 
McCoy were together, the pair could have met on June 14, 2000 at 1 p.m., i.e., 
 
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before the birthday party, or at 7:30 p.m., i.e., after the birthday party.  In support 
of the latter, the conversation occurred during the summer, and therefore, it would 
have still been daylight well after 7:30 p.m.    
Thus, the mother’s and Diana Peterson’s testimonies with regard to 
McCoy’s appearance at the birthday party do not actually contradict, nor are they 
diametrically inconsistent with, Marcel’s sworn statement, her deposition, or her 
trial testimony as to the time on June 14 that McCoy confessed to her.  Indeed, the 
events of the day can be reconciled such that McCoy both attended his sister’s 
birthday party and met with Marcel for three to four hours on June 14, 2000.  
Given this lack of definitive conflict, McCoy cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of 
Strickland because he has failed to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that ‘but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.’ ”  Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 672 (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694).  Our confidence in the outcome of McCoy’s trial has not been 
undermined. 
Moreover, even if these witnesses had testified, this would not change the 
fact that Marcel was able to recount specific facts about the robbery that were not 
public knowledge.  Arguably the most compelling fact relayed by Marcel was the 
following:  
 
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[T]hey went to the safe and that they had [the victim] open the safe.  
[McCoy] said after they opened the safe he told the guy to take the 
lady in another part of the store.  He said as he was getting the money 
he heard seven gunshots.  [McCoy] said he went—when he heard the 
gunshots he went straight to the VCR to see if they were being 
recorded.  He said the VCR was on pause like it had been paused the 
night before, and he said that he didn’t think they were being recorded 
so he left the store
(Emphasis supplied.)  Detective Gilbreath testified that when he entered the store 
office after the murder he observed a VCR, and the counter display on that VCR 
was not moving.
.   
4
                                         
4.  There was also a second VCR in the store office that was hidden in a 
locked cabinet.  The visible VCR recorded from a camera that was positioned 
toward the drive-through window.  The hidden VCR recorded from a camera that 
was positioned toward the store lobby.  Detective Gilbreath testified that the 
display counter on the VCR secured inside the locked cabinet was moving.   
  When asked if it had been released to the media that “one of the 
surveillance cameras in the store had been put on pause” at the time that Gilbreath 
spoke with Marcel on June 20, he answered in the negative.  Thus, Marcel had 
knowledge of a very specific detail about the crime before that detail was released 
to the public.  Despite discrepancies between McCoy’s “bragging” description of 
the robbery/murder and the actual facts of the crime, Marcel’s testimony with 
regard to this particular detail of the crime scene as it was observed by law 
enforcement confirms that McCoy was the person who robbed the liquor store and 
murdered the victim.   
 
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In further support of our conclusion that McCoy has failed to demonstrate 
prejudice is the fact that powerful evidence—independent of Marcel’s testimony of 
her conversation with McCoy on June 14—was introduced during trial to establish 
that McCoy was the perpetrator of the robbery and murder, including the 
following: (1) a surveillance camera from the ABC Liquors store revealed that an 
African-American male committed the robbery and murder; (2) during the June 20, 
2000 recorded conversation between Marcel and McCoy, he related details of his 
involvement in the crime; (3) during trial, McCoy admitted that it was his voice on 
the recording; and (4) although ABC Liquors store pouches were “kept within the 
store office at all times, and only store managers were involved with the pouches,” 
three of McCoy’s fingerprints were discovered on a pouch recovered from the 
crime scene.  McCoy, 853 So. 2d at 399.  
In light of the foregoing, McCoy has failed to satisfy Strickland, and he is 
not entitled to relief under this subclaim.   
ABC Liquors Witness—McCoy next claims that, if presented as a witness, 
Victor Lynn Williams would have testified that at 8:14 a.m. on the morning of the 
murder, he was placing garbage in the ABC Liquors store dumpster, and he saw 
the victim alone in the store parking lot.  According to McCoy, this testimony 
would have contradicted Marcel’s testimony that McCoy and a second perpetrator 
“rushed” the victim as she opened the back door.   
 
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Victor Lynn Williams did not testify during the evidentiary hearing.  
However, trial counsel provided the following qualified explanation as to why he 
did not present Williams as a witness: 
I don’t have all of my notes where I could figure out whether I even 
wrote it down.  But as I understand it and as I remember it, that 
dumpster was not in view of the back door where the victim in this 
case usually entered the business, and he would not have been able to 
see her at the back door, and I think that the point was whether she—
whether anybody else, whether it was one person or two people, or 
whether he could have seen the person who rushed her at the door.   
 
McCoy has failed to establish under either prong of Strickland that trial 
counsel was ineffective under this subclaim.  First, counsel offered a reasonable 
explanation with regard to why he did not present Williams as a witness—his 
testimony would not have refuted that of Marcel because Williams could not see 
the back of the store from the dumpster.  This was a reasonable strategic decision 
and does not evidence any deficiency on the part of trial counsel.  See Occhicone, 
768 So. 2d at 1048 (noting that “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel”).   
 
Although Williams did not testify during the evidentiary hearing, a copy of 
his deposition was attached to a pro se motion for postconviction relief submitted 
by McCoy, and this deposition supports trial counsel’s explanation.  In his 
deposition, Williams stated that the dumpster in which he disposed of his garbage 
was in front of the ABC Liquors store, but during trial, various witnesses testified 
 
- 20 - 
that the victim entered the store through a door located at the back of the building.  
Further, although Williams spoke with the victim on the morning of the murder, he 
departed as she was walking through the parking lot and did not see which door 
she used to enter the building: 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  Okay.  When you pulled off that morning 
after you talked with her, were you able to see where she went? 
WILLIAMS:  She had just got her stuff out of the trunk and she 
was closing the trunk.  And she went around the passenger side and 
was walking towards the [store]. 
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  Did you see what door she went in or did 
you see her approach a door? 
 
WILLIAMS:  No.  Because her car is parked far away from the 
front door.  She was just walking across the parking lot.  
 
Because Williams did not see the victim enter the store, nor did he see which door 
she used, his testimony would not have discredited Marcel’s testimony that McCoy 
confessed that he and another perpetrator “ ‘rushed’ the manager of the store as she 
opened the back door.”  McCoy
Additionally, we conclude that McCoy cannot demonstrate prejudice.  
Williams’ testimony would not have contradicted that of Marcel and, therefore, no 
reasonable probability exists that, but for trial counsel’s failure to present 
Williams, the outcome of McCoy’s trial would have been different.  Our 
confidence in the outcome has not been undermined.  See Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 
672 (noting that the prejudice prong of Strickland is satisfied only where a 
reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the 
, 853 So. 2d at 399.   
 
- 21 - 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  “A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)).  
In light of the foregoing, we hold that McCoy is not entitled to relief under 
his first claim of ineffectiveness. 
Religious References 
 
In his second claim, McCoy asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for the 
failure to object to religious references during voir dire and the penalty phase.  
While we hold that this claim of ineffectiveness fails, we address two specific 
challenges by McCoy in detail. 
 
“God Given Common Sense”—During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the 
prospective jurors with regard to arriving at a verdict, “Will all of you promise to 
apply your God given common sense in that deliberation?”  Trial counsel did not 
object to the phrasing of the question.  The postconviction court denied this 
ineffectiveness subclaim on two bases.  First, it noted that McCoy failed to rely 
upon any legal authority prohibiting the use of the phrase “God given common 
sense.”  Second, the postconviction court found that the phrase was not 
objectionable and, in fact, noted “in the Jacksonville community, any objection by 
defense counsel to the State’s mention of ‘God given common sense,’ could have 
adversely affected the panel’s view of the defense.”   
 
- 22 - 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to object 
to statements by the prosecution, a defendant “must first show that the comments 
were improper or objectionable and that there was no tactical reason for failing to 
object.”  Stephens v. State, 975 So. 2d 405, 420 (Fla. 2007).  Here, the 
postconviction court expressly found that this phrase was not objectionable.  
McCoy fails to reference a single case which holds that the use of the phrase “God 
given common sense” by a prosecutor constitutes reversible error, or that a trial 
attorney’s failure to object to the use of this phrase constitutes deficient 
performance.   
Further, we conclude that trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s 
single, fleeting reference to “God given common sense” did not prejudice the 
outcome of McCoy’s trial.  To the contrary, had trial counsel objected to this 
phrase, that objection likely would have harmed McCoy’s defense.  According to 
the postconviction court, an objection to a reference to common sense in this 
fashion would have caused the jury to view the defense negatively.  At the time the 
order denying postconviction relief was signed, the author had served as a judge in 
Duval County for approximately twenty-two years.  It is not unreasonable to 
conclude that a judge with such extensive service in one community would have a 
fairly accurate perspective on how its members would react to certain actions by 
attorneys during a trial.  Even McCoy acknowledged in his brief that the 
 
- 23 - 
Jacksonville community is “very religious.”  Thus, although trial counsel did not 
object to this phrase, the failure to do so actually operated to protect McCoy from a 
negative perception by the jury and, possibly, prejudice against his defense. 
Based on the foregoing, this subclaim of ineffectiveness fails.   
Comments by Prospective Juror about Islam—McCoy also contends that 
trial counsel was ineffective for failure to move to strike the entire venire after one 
prospective juror made negative comments about Islam.  During voir dire, the 
following diaologue occurred: 
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  [Y]ou said yesterday that you were against 
the death penalty. 
 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:  Yes, sir. 
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  And I am not going to try to change your 
mind or anything.  I just want to see how strong your feelings are.  
Can you think of a situation where you could vote for a death sentence 
for someone convicted of first degree murder? 
 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:  No, sir, not necessarily.  Coming 
into this Court[,] I abide by the laws of this state and this county[,] so 
the point is to find the truth, but in my heart and searching my soul I 
am still going to vote for a life sentence due to the fact if, you know, 
the defendant is guilty or even if he is not[,] the point is[,] from what I 
gathered so far by the change of his name[,]5 
                                         
5.  During voir dire, the trial court advised the venire that McCoy had 
changed his legal name: 
he is of a Moslem 
You have heard me refer to the defendant in this case by two names . . . Jamil 
Rashid formally [sic] known as Richard Lee McCoy.  The indictment refers to the 
defendant by these two names. 
Several years ago the defendant changed his legal name from Richard Lee 
McCoy to Jamil Rashid.  [To s]ome people he is still known by his birth name, 
Richard Lee McCoy, and to some he is known by his new legal name, Jamil 
 
- 24 - 
descent . . . and what I know of the Moslems is that death isn’t that 
big of a deal.  The penalty of death, to be killed[,] is not that big of a 
deal
Me as a Christian faith I have learned that him living a life, 
giving of himself to someone else to better their life is more of a 
punishment and a learning system for him than to take his life. 
. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  This was the only reference during voir dire to the Muslim 
faith.  Trial counsel did not move to strike the entire jury panel in response to the 
comment; however, the prospective juror did not serve because of his statement 
that he could not impose a sentence of death for any reason.   
 
We have explained that “[a] venire member’s expression of an opinion 
before the entire panel is not normally considered sufficient to taint the remainder 
of the panel.”  Johnson v. State, 903 So. 2d 888, 897 (Fla. 2005) (citing Brower v. 
State, 727 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).  McCoy has failed to establish 
that the prospective juror’s statements tainted the entire jury, such that trial counsel 
should have moved to strike the entire venire.  First, we note that after the 
prospective juror made the comment, not a single juror referenced or inquired into 
McCoy’s religion, i.e., whether he was a member of the Islamic faith.  Second, as 
noted by the postconviction court in its order, McCoy’s trial occurred prior to the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.  Even after those attacks, two federal courts 
have held that the simple reference to a defendant either as a Muslim or by his 
                                                                                                                                   
Rashid.  Both names are included in the indictment so that there will be no 
confusion. 
 
- 25 - 
Muslim name was insufficient to taint a jury or compromise a trial.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Malik, 241 Fed. Appx. 873, 875-76 (3d. Cir. 2007) (holding that 
the government’s referral to defendant as “the Muslim guy” thirteen times before 
counsel objected did not require a mistrial); Mack v. Cain, 2008 WL 1901715, at 
*9 (W.D. La. 2008) (challenge to prosecutor’s referral to defendant by his Muslim 
name “necessarily implies that 9/11 had so prejudiced the jurors that they were 
biased against all Muslims regardless of their race, national origin, allegiance, or 
non-involvement in the attacks.  By the time of the May 2002 trial [in Mack], some 
eight months had passed since 9/11, and [this court] simply cannot ascribe such 
irrational prejudice to the jurors.”).   
 
The prospective juror’s assertions about McCoy’s name change and tenets of 
the Muslim faith constituted unsubstantiated opinions—not details presented and 
asserted as true by the prosecutor.  As noted by the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
in Brower, “[p]rospective jurors are frequently exposed, before and during voir 
dire, to innumerable comments, attitudes, and points of view, the subscription to 
which would be improper for an unbiased juror.”  727 So. 2d at 1027.  Were 
excusal of an entire panel required for every allegedly biased or improper comment 
by a prospective juror, selecting a jury in a case—especially a capital case—would 
be exceedingly difficult.  Thus, we agree with the postconviction court’s 
 
- 26 - 
determination that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to request that the 
entire venire be struck, and this subclaim of ineffectiveness fails. 
Concession that a Robbery Occurred 
 
In his third claim, McCoy contends that trial counsel was ineffective for 
conceding during voir dire that a robbery of the ABC Liquors store had occurred.  
Trial counsel stated to the venire: “[T]here is no question . . . that there was a 
robbery and that there was a murder.  The issue in this trial will be is [McCoy] the 
one who did it, have they arrested the right guy or the wrong guy.”   
 
When asked during the evidentiary hearing why he conceded that a robbery 
had occurred, trial counsel offered a detailed explanation: 
[There] was a tape, number one, of someone in the store who didn’t 
appear to be an employee leading someone who appeared to be the 
employee around the store.  There was testimony that there was 
money missing from the store. . . .  It looked like a crime on the tape.  
A robbery, of course, requires something to be taken, and I guess the 
key was testimony that money was missing. 
 
. . . . 
 
[Y]ou have to make decisions to make the defense that you 
have the most persuasive that you can, and I think you lose points 
with the jury on the main issue if you contest those issues which you 
don’t have a good argument on.  In looking back on the case, I think 
that to argue it wasn’t a robbery is a weak argument.  To argue that it 
wasn’t Mr. McCoy who did this is a somewhat stronger argument.  
It’s all we had.  And you just—you want to keep your argument—
your main argument as strong as you can and not lose credibility with 
the jury.   
 
In denying this claim, the postconviciton court concluded that trial counsel’s 
actions constituted a reasonable tactical decision.  We agree. 
 
- 27 - 
In Belcher v. State
Obviously, and quite tragically, Ms. Embry is dead.  There’s no 
dispute about that . . . .  [A] lot of the evidence that you’ll be hearing 
will be important for your consideration.  But the evidence, that kind 
of evidence, will not show you what the ultimate question is.  It won’t 
answer the ultimate question for you, which is who did it.  And that’s 
what you need to be concerned with.   
, 961 So. 2d 239, 249 (Fla. 2007), trial counsel made the 
following comments during opening statements: 
In holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for conceding that the victim was 
deceased, this Court noted that during the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel 
explained “his strategy in the opening statement was to build credibility with the 
jury by not disputing the fact that the victim was dead.”  Id.  We concluded that 
trial counsel’s actions constituted a strategic decision which “provides no basis for 
an ineffectiveness claim.”  Id.   
 
In the instant case, a video of the crime was played for jurors.  It reflects 
someone leading the victim—the store manager—through the store.  While in the 
store office, someone appears to bend down in the area of one of the store safes.  
Someone also walks over to a bag in which the ABC Liquors store pouches are 
delivered.  After exiting the office, the victim and the intruder proceed to the cash 
registers and then enter the storeroom, where the victim is later found dead.  The 
intruder exits the storeroom alone.  The regional manager for ABC Liquors 
testified during trial that $415 was missing from the store’s two safes.   
 
- 28 - 
 
Given that trial counsel’s theory of the defense was that McCoy had an alibi 
for the time of the murder, we conclude that it was a strategic decision to concede 
that a robbery had occurred.  See generally Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048 
(“strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel”).  In light 
of the previously discussed evidence presented at trial, it would have been a weak 
argument to assert that no robbery of the ABC Liquors store occurred.  For trial 
counsel to present such an argument likely would have caused the defense to lose 
credibility with the jury.  Because counsel will not be deemed deficient for making 
a strategic decision to maintain credibility with a jury, this claim of ineffectiveness 
fails.  See Hutchinson v. State, 17 So. 3d 696, 702 (Fla. 2009). 
Decision to Testify During Trial 
 
McCoy next contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to warn 
him about the dangers of testifying on his own behalf.  During trial, counsel 
attempted to cross-examine Zsa Zsa Marcel about her purported involvement in the 
robbery of Lee’s Chicken restaurant.  He also sought to have two witnesses to the 
restaurant robbery identify Marcel as the perpetrator.  Trial counsel’s reason for 
seeking to question Marcel and these two other witnesses was to demonstrate “that 
[Marcel] had a motive to rat on [McCoy] before he rat[t]ed on her and to make up 
a story that he had committed this robbery at the ABC Liquors, so it goes to her 
 
- 29 - 
motive and bias, her interest in making him a non-credible witness by becoming a 
witness against him in the ABC case.”   
The trial court refused to allow counsel to question Marcel about the Lee’s 
Chicken restaurant robbery on cross-examination as a State witness, but stated that 
trial counsel could present her as a defense witness if McCoy were to first testify 
about her confession to him that she robbed the restaurant.  The trial court’s 
explanation for this ruling was as follows: 
My concern is what if we go through all of this great exercise 
and we put [Marcel] on trial for the armed robbery and we have all the 
people testify and all that kind of stuff and your client decides he 
doesn’t want to testify what have we done at that point? 
. . . . 
We have created a mistrial because we have introduced gobs of 
totally irrelevant and very damaging evidence for the state that is 
totally irrelevant because there is at that point no evidence that she 
told him about [the restaurant robbery]. 
. . . . 
So I have a suspicion that if you are entitled to put this on at all 
you would only be entitled to put it on in your case and only then after 
you have had [McCoy] testify that [Marcel] confessed this to him 
which then makes it become relevant. 
. . . I am not inclined to let all—let this secondary trial go on 
unless and until it becomes record evidence that [McCoy] knew about 
it and that [Marcel] knew anything about it. 
 
McCoy testified, but before he did so, the trial court conducted the following 
colloquy: 
COURT:  Mr. McCoy, do you understand, sir, that in this trial 
you have the absolute right to testify and you have an equally absolute 
right not to testify? 
MCCOY:  Yes, sir. 
 
- 30 - 
COURT:  And do you understand that the decision with regard 
to whether or not you testify must be yours and yours alone? 
MCCOY:  Yes, sir. 
COURT:  Are you satisfied, sir, that the defense that I have just 
been told about that you wish to testify is your decision and yours 
alone? 
MCCOY:  Yes, sir, it is. 
COURT:  Would I be correct then in assuming that no one has 
forced you to testify and no one is compelling you in this case to 
testify? 
MCCOY:  No, sir.  No one is compelling me to testify, sir. 
COURT:  Okay.  
 
MCCOY:  
And you have been advised of the 
consequences of testifying such as being cross examined about prior 
felony convictions and the like, is that right? 
COURT:  And are you satisfied taking all those things in 
balance that it’s in your best interest to testify in the case? 
Yes, sir, I have. 
MCCOY:  For the truth to come out, yes, sir. 
COURT:  All right.  Thank you.   
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  McCoy testified that Marcel confessed to him she had 
robbed Lee’s Chicken restaurant.  McCoy admitted that it was his voice on the 
recorded conversation that was played for the jurors, but testified that he lied to 
Marcel about being involved in the ABC Liquors robbery in an attempt to 
“impress” her because he saw that “this is the kind of lifestyle she was . . . into.”   
 
With regard to the ABC Liquors pouch that was discovered in the store 
office after the murder, the following dialogue occurred during cross-examination 
as to why McCoy’s fingerprints were on that pouch: 
PROSECUTOR:  You said you have been to that ABC two 
times? 
 
MCCOY:  Yes, sir. 
 
- 31 - 
 
PROSECUTOR:  They ever let you into the office to touch one 
of these [pouches]? 
 
MCCOY:  I ran across one of those [in] April of 2000. 
 
PROSECUTOR:  You ran across one? 
 
MCCOY:  Yes, sir, I did. 
 
PROSECUTOR:  Where was that? 
 
MCCOY:  The ABC Liquors on Roosevelt.  I was coming from 
the Days Inn hotel next to the dog track on Orange Park on the 8th of 
April.  I had a flat tire.  I pulled over and changed my tire. 
 
. . . . 
 
It was in the parking lot.  Nothing was in it and it was unzipped 
and I did touch it and I mailed it in. 
 
McCoy testified that on April 7, 2000 (more than one month before the 
robbery/murder), he spent the night with a woman named Gwendolyn Brown at the 
Days Inn in room 112.  He left the next morning without Ms. Brown, and 
thereafter discovered the pouch in the parking lot of a different ABC Liquors store 
than the one where the robbery/murder occurred.  The State subsequently 
presented the guest services manager for the Days Inn referenced by McCoy in his 
testimony.  The manager testified that on April 7, 2000, room 112 was reserved by 
a woman named Betty White.   
 
During the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel explained his rationale for 
having McCoy testify:  “[I]f you’re raising an alibi, which is what we were doing, 
it helps to have the defendant explain where he was at the time of the crime.  If 
they have your fingerprints on the bank bag, it can help to try and give an 
explanation for why the fingerprints are there.”  Nonetheless, trial counsel 
explained that he always leaves the decision whether to testify up to the client.   
 
- 32 - 
The decision as to whether McCoy would testify had not been established or 
determined prior to trial.  With regard to that issue, the following discussion 
occurred during the evidentiary hearing: 
 
STATE:  All right.  You were asked some questions . . . 
regarding the defendant’s decision to testify.  And you said this was a 
difficult case.  Did you mean for the defense when you said that? 
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  Yeah. 
 
. . . . 
 
STATE:  Did you, as best you could, in your professional 
judgment and experience, discuss that decision with Mr. McCoy prior 
to his colloquy with Judge Dearing about testifying? 
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  I don’t have a specific memory of it as I 
sit here and I didn’t see notes about it in the notes that I reviewed, but 
that has always been my practice
 
. . . .  
.   
 
And I specifically remember at some point, whether it was 
during trial or before trial, telling Mr. McCoy that explanation of the 
fingerprint was going to be very hard. 
 
STATE:  And, in fact, would it not be your practice to discuss 
the defendant’s right to testify with him on multiple occasions prior to 
a capital case
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  
? 
 
Oh, yeah. 
(Emphasis supplied.)    
Trial counsel acknowledged that McCoy’s admission that the fingerprints on 
the pouch were his undermined the defense’s efforts to discredit the State 
fingerprint expert.  With regard to McCoy’s testimony that he found the ABC 
Liquors pouch in a parking lot, the evidentiary transcript reflects: 
 
POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL:  When you told [McCoy] we 
need to have an explanation for your fingerprints found on the receipt 
bag— 
 
. . . .  
 
- 33 - 
 
—prior to trial or during trial, did he offer you an explanation, 
prior to testifying, if you can recall. 
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  I can’t recall.  . . .  I know for sure that 
some of the details that came out in his testimony were new to me,[6
 
POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL:  Well, let me ask you about 
the details he testified to in his trial testimony to the effect that he 
found the bag in a parking lot and mailed it back to ABC.  Do you 
recall that?   
] 
but I can’t remember how many of them are. 
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  I recall that trial testimony.  I’d have to 
look at my notes to see if it was told to me in that way at anytime in 
the past.  
 
POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL:  Did you ever discuss 
whether you thought that was a good explanation or not?  Not 
suggesting that you can change his testimony, but when he told you 
that, whether or not that might be something—if that’s what your 
explanation is, maybe we just won’t present it. 
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  . . . Normally when I talk to a client I take 
notes and I jot down things about what we talk about.  I’ve not seen 
that in these notes that I reviewed.
 
  
(Emphasis supplied.)   
 
McCoy testified during the evidentiary hearing that he did inform trial 
counsel as to why his fingerprints were on the ABC Liquors pouch, but trial 
counsel never discussed this explanation with McCoy before he testified.  In 
denying this claim, the postconviction court concluded that the testimony of trial 
counsel was more credible than that of McCoy, and that counsel did advise McCoy 
of the consequences of testifying.   
                                         
 
6.  The State relies upon this testimony to assert that McCoy’s explanation 
as to why his fingerprints appeared on the bank pouch was a total fabrication that 
caught trial counsel completely by surprise.   
 
- 34 - 
 
This issue amounts to a matter of witness credibility.  Trial counsel testified 
that as a matter of course he discusses with a defendant the decision to testify on 
multiple occasions.  Conversely, McCoy contended that no such discussion 
occurred during his capital case.  We have explained that “[a]s long as the trial 
court’s findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, ‘this Court will 
not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise 
of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the evidence 
by the trial court.’ ”  Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997) (quoting 
Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. 1984)); see also Cox v. State, 966 So. 
2d 337, 357-58 (Fla. 2007) (noting that the trial court is frequently in a superior 
position to evaluate the testimony based upon its observation of the bearing, 
demeanor, and credibility of witnesses).   
Here, the postconviction court concluded that trial counsel was the more 
credible witness and accepted his testimony.  This decision is supported by the fact 
that the trial court conducted a colloquy with McCoy to determine whether the 
decision to testify was his own.  During that colloquy, McCoy himself admitted 
that he had been advised of the consequences of testifying, and he concluded that 
testifying was in his best interest.  Further, during the evidentiary hearing, McCoy 
acknowledged that the trial court cautioned him that if he testified, he would be 
subject to cross-examination.  Based upon these acknowledgements by McCoy 
 
- 35 - 
during both trial and the evidentiary hearing, we conclude that the postconviction 
court’s finding of credibility is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  This 
finding refutes the assertion that trial counsel failed to advise McCoy of the 
consequences of testifying, and therefore, we reject this claim of ineffectiveness.    
Failure to Present Zsa Zsa Marcel and Other Witnesses  
to Impeach her Testimony 
 
The background for this challenge is complex and rather unique.  The 
postconviction court’s order provides a comprehensive summary: 
Prior to trial, defense counsel had reason to believe that Ms. 
Marcel was involved in the Lee’s Chicken robbery.  Defense counsel 
filed a motion to compel investigation of Ms. Marcel and argued that 
the State’s refusal to investigate her was a deliberate attempt to 
prevent the defense from impeaching her with pending charges. 
Defense counsel requested that this Court either dismiss the charges 
against the Defendant or prohibit Ms. Marcel from testifying during 
the trial. 
The detective investigating the Lee’s Chicken robbery 
conducted a photo lineup, which included Ms. Marcel’s photo, but the 
victims were unable to identify her as the perpetrator.  Defense 
counsel sent his investigator to interview an employee from Lee’s 
Chicken, who stated that the perpetrator was a woman with a scar on 
her neck.  Defense counsel’s investigator showed a photograph of Ms. 
Marcel to two other victims of the Lee’s Chicken robbery and they 
thought that she could have been the perpetrator, however, they 
wanted to see her in person and look at her neck before they would 
positively identify her. 
 
Defense counsel requested that Ms. Marcel be presented to the 
victims of the Lee’s Chicken robbery.  Defense counsel argued that 
Ms. Marcel had motive to lie because if the Defendant was convicted 
in this case, he would not be a credible witness against her in any 
prosecution for the Lee’s Chicken robbery.  Defense counsel further 
argued that the State’s refusal to investigate the Lee’s Chicken 
robbery was distorting the fact finding process.  The State asserted 
 
- 36 - 
that there was not enough evidence to charge Ms. Marcel.  This Court 
denied defense counsel’s motion, finding that there was no 
prosecutorial misconduct and that the State’s actions were reasonable.   
At trial, during Ms. Marcel’s cross-examination, defense 
counsel attempted to ask her if she told the police about the 
Defendant’s involvement in the ABC Liquors robbery and murder 
because she was afraid that he would turn her in for a crime.  The 
State objected.  At sidebar, defense counsel argued that he was going 
to try to show Ms. Marcel’s bias and to try and prove that she had a 
motive for turning the Defendant in.  
Defense counsel then proffered questions to Ms. Marcel.  
During the proffer, Ms. Marcel testified that she did not implicate the 
Defendant out of fear that he would turn her in for a crime she 
committed.  Ms. Marcel testified that she did not confess her 
involvement in the Lee’s Chicken restaurant robbery to the Defendant.  
Ms. Marcel further testified that her purpose in wearing a turtleneck to 
court was not to cover the scar on her neck.  
Defense counsel proffered the rest of his argument outside the 
presence of Ms. Marcel.  Defense counsel had two victims of the 
Lee’s Chicken restaurant robbery in the hall outside of the courtroom 
to attempt to identify Ms. Marcel.  Defense counsel instructed the 
victims to pay careful attention to every African American female 
who walked by.  One of the witnesses wanted to see Ms. Marcel’s 
neck.  The other witness stated that Ms. Marcel had the same build, 
mannerisms, and features as the perpetrator, but noted that she was 
wearing a turtleneck and that he wanted to see if she had the birth 
mark [FN] on her neck.  Defense counsel was concerned that another 
Lee’s Chicken restaurant employee . . . had alerted Ms. Marcel to 
defense counsel’s attempt to have her identified in the courthouse and, 
therefore, Ms. Marcel attempted to disguise herself.  Defense counsel 
requested that this Court allow him to ask Ms. Marcel to show her 
neck to the jury and the audience.  This Court noted that if Ms. Marcel 
was put on secondary trial regarding the Lee’s Chicken robbery, and 
the Defendant chose not to testify regarding her confession, then a 
mistrial would result, as irrelevant and damaging evidence would have 
been introduced.  This Court stated that once the Defendant testified 
regarding the confession, then defense counsel could continue this 
cross-examination of Ms. Marcel.  
 
 
- 37 - 
[FN] Although this witness referred to the mark on Ms. 
Marcel’s neck as a birth mark, the remainder of the 
record refers to it as a scar. 
 
Defense counsel stated that he planned to put the Defendant on 
the stand.  Defense counsel stated that he would not call the Lee’s 
Chicken restaurant robbery victims to testify unless they could 
identify Ms. Marcel.  The State and defense counsel conducted re-
direct and re-cross and then Ms. Marcel was allowed to step down, but 
was kept under subpoena.   
When court reconvened the next morning, Ms. Marcel returned 
and was not wearing a turtleneck.  Defense counsel stated that he 
wanted the two witnesses to look at Ms. Marcel’s neck and noted that 
if they did not make an identification, he could not make an argument 
to put them on the stand.  Defense counsel suggested that Ms. Marcel 
be asked if she would allow the witnesses to look at her neck.  This 
Court stated that it would not ask her, but defense counsel could ask 
her.  Defense counsel then requested this Court’s assistance in 
procuring the identification of Ms. Marcel and asked that this Court 
direct the two witnesses to view Ms. Marcel close enough to see the 
scar on her neck.  This Court did not grant defense counsel’s request, 
but did allow time for defense counsel to have the witnesses identify 
Ms. Marcel.  The witnesses did not want to do so and they left. 
 
(Citations to record omitted.) 
 
 
Although Marcel was not presented as a defense witness, during closing 
statements trial counsel addressed her potential bias in testifying against McCoy: 
 
Well, then there is another reason you may want to distrust 
what Zsa Zsa Marcel says.  Mr. McCoy testified that Zsa Zsa 
confessed to him that she had robbed Lee’s Chicken on June the 10th 
just three days before this homicide, so she perhaps had another 
reason that she would want Mr. McCoy out of the picture because she 
would tell a lie about him before he could turn her in for something he 
knew that she had done, and . . . you know from the testimony she has 
got a scar on her neck.  For some reason when she came in here and 
testified she wore a turtle neck and she wore a wig . . . . 
 
 
- 38 - 
Failure to Present Marcel as a Defense Witness—Trial counsel offered the 
following explanation as to why he did not present Marcel as a defense witness: 
 
[W]e were trying to discredit [Marcel], but—and I don’t 
remember what my thinking was at the time, but right now my 
thinking would be why call her back, she’s just going to deny it, she’s 
going to say no, and what I already had in the record was obvious 
evasion by her by wearing a wig and wearing a turtleneck and I had 
Mr. McCoy saying that she admitted [her involvement in the robbery] 
to him so I’ve got things in the record that are not controverted.  If I 
call her back and [she says] no, that’s crazy, I didn’t do that, then I’ve 
got something that is controverted rather than something that is 
unrebutted. 
The postconviction court denied this ineffectiveness subclaim on the basis that trial 
counsel made a tactical decision not to present Marcel as a defense witness.   
 
This Court has previously held that “the strategic decision of trial counsel 
not to present a certain witness does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel 
if that decision was the product of a reasonable trial strategy.”  Taylor v. State, 87 
So. 3d 749, 763 (Fla. 2012).  During trial, counsel questioned Marcel out of the 
presence of the jury, and it became clear that Marcel would not concede her 
participation in the robbery or that she confessed same to McCoy: 
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  Ms. Marcel, isn’t [it] true that you told the 
police this story about Mr. McCoy partly because you were afraid that 
he would turn you in for a crime that you committed? 
 
MARCEL:  No. 
 
TRIAL COUNSEL:  Isn’t it true that a few days before June the 
13th of 2000 you confessed to Mr. McCoy that you had robbed the 
Lee’s Chicken on San Juan Avenue and you had shot a man? 
 
MARCEL:  No, I didn’t. 
 
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TRIAL COUNSEL:  Isn’t it true you were afraid that he would 
turn you in so you told the police that he did this crime at the ABC? 
 
MARCEL:  No. 
 
 
This proffer reveals that, even if trial counsel had presented Marcel as a witness, 
she would have only contradicted McCoy’s testimony.  Counsel’s decision not to 
present Marcel so that McCoy’s testimony with regard to her involvement in the 
Lee’s Chicken robbery remained unrebutted constitutes a matter of trial strategy.  
Because “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,” 
this subclaim fails.  Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048; see also Taylor, 87 So. 3d at 
763.   
Failure to Present the Witnesses of the Lee’s Chicken Robbery—When 
asked by postconviction counsel why he waited until mid-trial to attempt to have 
the Lee’s Chicken witnesses identify Marcel, trial counsel testified that McCoy 
first notified him of Marcel’s alleged participation in the robbery in August 2000, 
approximately nine months before the trial.  Trial counsel was unable to recall how 
long after McCoy’s revelation it was before he was able to pinpoint the robbery 
and then locate the witnesses.  However, counsel knew that he worked on this issue 
prior to trial because, otherwise, the witnesses to the robbery would not have 
appeared at the courthouse.  On cross-examination, trial counsel conceded that 
Marcel’s purported involvement in the Lee’s Chicken robbery would not have 
changed the fact that McCoy’s fingerprints had been located on an ABC Liquors 
 
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pouch discovered at the crime scene.  The postconviction court denied this claim, 
concluding that trial counsel “made diligent attempts to procure the identification 
of Ms. Marcel and have the victims of the robbery testify.”   
Neither of the witnesses to the Lee’s Chicken robbery who appeared at the 
courthouse during McCoy’s trial testified during the evidentiary hearing.  As such, 
there has never been a definitive identification of Zsa Zsa Marcel as the person 
who robbed the restaurant and shot the manager.  Counsel even admitted during 
trial that if the witnesses could not identify Marcel as the perpetrator, he had no 
reason to present them as part of McCoy’s defense.  Thus, there is no definitive 
evidence that, had these witnesses testified, they would have corroborated 
McCoy’s testimony that Marcel robbed the Lee’s Chicken restaurant and 
demonstrated her bias in testifying for the State.  On this basis alone, we hold that 
McCoy has failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s 
performance.7
                                         
7.  Further, even if the witnesses to the Lee’s Chicken robbery had identified 
Marcel as the perpetrator, and even if we were to conclude that counsel was 
deficient for the failure to present these witnesses—which we do not—there is no 
reasonable probability that, but for this failure, the result of McCoy’s trial would 
have been different, and our confidence in the outcome has not been undermined.  
See Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 672 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  As previously 
discussed, Marcel knew specific details about the crime before they were released 
to the media.  Further, compelling evidence was presented to establish that McCoy 
was the perpetrator of the robbery and murder, including fingerprint evidence and a 
surveillance video of the crime.   
  
 
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Further, the postconviction court’s description of the facts surrounding this 
issue demonstrate that trial counsel diligently and repeatedly attempted to have the 
Lee’s Chicken robbery witnesses identify Marcel as the perpetrator.  During the 
State’s case, McCoy’s counsel asked the trial court if it would allow him to ask 
Marcel 
to show her neck to the jury and to the audience and allow the two 
witnesses that we have out in the hall into the courtroom so they can 
look at her neck.  I know that’s unusual but, Your Honor, I have got 
no way to prove that she did this robbery unless the two eye witnesses 
[sic] to the robbery can look at her, and there is no other way they are 
going to be able to look at her . . . .  
The trial court denied the request, stating that only if McCoy first testified as to 
what Marcel allegedly told him about the Lee’s Chicken robbery would this 
evidence possibly be admissible. 
 
During the defense’s case, the trial court refused counsel’s request to compel 
the witnesses to “view Ms. Marcel from a distance close enough that they can see 
the scar on her neck.”  The trial court stated, “I do not consider that I have the 
jurisdiction to compel subpoenaed witnesses to go outside of the courtroom and 
conduct any investigation of their own.”  The trial court did afford counsel time to 
have the victims look at Marcel if they were willing to do so.  That viewing did not 
occur because, as stated by trial counsel: 
[T]he witnesses were advised by . . . the Justice Coalition not to walk 
down and look at Ms. Marcel, and I asked them—I told them I 
 
- 42 - 
couldn’t compel them.  I told them what the Court said and I think 
they have left now.  They don’t want to do it. 
 
Given these diligent—albeit unsuccessful—efforts to have the witnesses to 
the Lee’s Chicken robbery identify Marcel, we conclude that the performance of 
trial counsel was not deficient.  In further support of our conclusion is the fact that 
postconviction counsel failed to present any evidence to indicate that trial counsel 
was remiss or untimely in locating the witnesses.   
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the decision below and reject McCoy’s 
claims of ineffectiveness under this issue.   
Cumulative Error 
 
When a defendant fails to prevail on any individual claim of ineffectiveness, 
a claim of cumulative error cannot succeed.  See Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 
(Fla. 2003).  Because we have rejected each of McCoy’s allegations of 
ineffectiveness, he is not entitled to relief under this claim.8
Ring Claim 
    
In his final claim, McCoy contends that Florida’s capital sentencing 
structure violates the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Ring v. 
                                         
8.  To the extent that this issue can be interpreted as a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, on direct appeal we held that sufficient evidence 
existed in the record to support McCoy’s conviction for first-degree murder.  
McCoy, 853 So. 2d at 408.  Accordingly, such a challenge would be both 
successive and without merit. 
 
- 43 - 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  In support of this claim, McCoy relies upon Evans 
v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Case No. 08-14402-CIV-
MARTINEZ (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2011), in which the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida held that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme 
does not comply with constitutional jury trial requirements and violates Ring.   
 
In his direct appeal, McCoy raised multiple constitutional challenges to the 
death penalty in Florida.  One such challenge asserted that “The Florida Death 
Penalty Statute is Unconstitutional Because the Decision as to ‘Life’ or ‘Death’ is 
made by a Judge, Rather than a Jury.”  Under this subheading, McCoy contended 
that Florida’s capital sentencing structure violates the right to trial by jury under 
the Sixth Amendment.  In affirming McCoy’s death sentence, we rejected all 
challenges to Florida’s death penalty statute: 
Having examined his assertions, we conclude that each of them has 
failed in previous cases before this Court, and McCoy advances no 
basis to justify revisiting settled jurisprudence.  Of note, McCoy has 
asserted that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates both the 
United States and Florida Constitutions under the holding of Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  This Court addressed a similar 
contention in Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 1070 (2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert. 
denied
McCoy, 853 So. 2d at 409.  Accordingly, this challenge is both procedurally barred 
and without merit.  See Ferrell v. State, 918 So. 2d 163, 178 (Fla. 2005) (holding 
, 537 U.S. 1067 (2002), and denied relief.  We conclude that 
McCoy is likewise not entitled to relief on this claim.   
 
- 44 - 
that issues raised and rejected on direct appeal are procedurally barred in a 
postconviction proceeding). 
 
Moreover, although the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida previously held that Florida’s capital sentencing statute violates the 
Sixth Amendment, that decision has now been reversed by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit.  See Evans v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of 
Corr., 699 F.3d 1249, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-11 
(U.S. Mar. 18, 2013).  Thus, federal precedent does not support McCoy’s claim for 
relief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of McCoy’s rule 3.851 
motion.  
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Peter Lennings Dearing, Judge - Case No. 16-2000-CF-008117-AX 
 
 
 
 
- 45 - 
David W. Collins, Monticello, Florida 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida 
 
 
for Appellee