Case Title: Alabama Power Co. v. Neighbors

Citation: 402 So. 2d 958

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1981-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
402 So. 2d 958 (1981)
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY,
v.
John K. NEIGHBORS.
80-217.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 21, 1981.
*959 S. Allen Baker, Jr. and James A. Bradford of Balch, Bingham, Baker, Hawthorne, Williams & Ward, Birmingham, John P. Oliver, II of Oliver & Sims, Dadeville, for appellant.
Ruth Sullivan, Dadeville, Tom Radney of Radney & Morris, Alexander City, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This is a malicious prosecution action against Alabama Power Company wherein the plaintiff John Kimbro Neighbors, Jr. alleges that APCo instigated a criminal proceeding against him which resulted in his criminal indictment before the Tallapoosa grand jury on the following felony charge:
Because the critical question presented in this case involves whether APCo initiated the criminal proceeding and whether there was probable cause, we set out the facts extensively.
APCo owns several hundred acres of timberland in Tallapoosa County. In November 1979 APCo discovered that someone had cut and carried away what agents testified were at least ten large, green pine trees off its property on either side of a county dirt road known as Dead Timbers Road. In the same area approximately one quarter of a mile away, APCo discovered four more of its pine trees that had been recently cut. These trees were still lying on the ground next to their stumps and were cut up in pulpwood lengths. Plaintiff, a pulpwooder by profession, lived in a house at the end of Dead Timbers Road a short distance from APCo's land where the pine trees had been cut and carried away. When the illegal cutting was discovered, APCo agents contacted the Tallapoosa County Sheriff's Department and requested help in their investigation. Jimmy Collins, Benny Vinson and Billy McCullus, APCo foresters in Dadeville, Alabama, met with Deputy Sheriff Bennie Hallman at the subject property on Sunday, November 18, to investigate the tree cutting. They counted and measured the diameters of the stumps on the subject property. Later, APCo personnel measured the distance of the stumps from Dead Timbers Road. The trees had been freshly cut. On *960 that same day, Sunday, November 18, Jimmy Collins traveled down Dead Timbers Road to the plaintiff's house where he observed a pulpwood truck sitting in plaintiff's front yard loaded, at least partly, with freshly cut pine trees cut up in pulpwood lengths which appeared to have been cut from APCo's property. There was evidence that dead timber was also on the truck.
Early the next morning, Monday, November 19, Benny Vinson and Eugene Phillips, another power company forester in Dadeville, went back to the subject property to see if anyone was coming back to pick up the four pine trees which had been observed the previous day lying on the ground by Collins and Vinson. Vinson hid in the woods where he observed the plaintiff and his employee, Harvey Garrett, drive up in a Blazer truck to the spot where the four cut trees were lying on the ground, stop the truck, sit there for a few minutes and then leave.
After Vinson observed the plaintiff and Garrett leave the area of the four trees, he called the Sheriff's Department and spoke to a Deputy Neighbors (no relation to the plaintiff), explaining that he expected the pine logs on the plaintiff's truck were going to be taken to Langley Pulpwood Yard near Camp Hill, Alabama and requested that he meet him there. Vinson then instructed Eugene Phillips to follow the plaintiff's pulpwood truck and to get ahead of it so as to meet it when it arrived at the pulpwood yard, which he did.
Garrett drove the plaintiff's truck to Langley Yard and sold the logs in the name of the plaintiff. After the truck arrived and the wood was removed, the sheriff's deputy had the power company's pine logs set aside. Deputy Neighbors and the power company representatives talked to Harvey Garrett about the pine logs. In the presence of APCo's foresters, Benny Vinson and Eugene Phillips, Garrett advised Deputy Sheriff Neighbors that he was working for the plaintiff, it was the plaintiff's truck and all he did was drive the truck from the plaintiff's house to the wood yard. Garrett then left the yard and later found the plaintiff and explained what happened. Plaintiff went to the wood yard, walked up to Deputy Sheriff Hallman in the presence of Vinson and Phillips and allegedly said, "I'm the guilty party," or "I'm the thief." Plaintiff's version of what he said was: "I'm responsible. I'm guilty. This is my truck. My man cut the wood." The next day, Tuesday, November 20, Collins and Phillips, in the presence of Deputy Sheriff Hallman, by matching stumps with logs, concluded that at least ten of the pine logs which came off the plaintiff's truck at the pulpwood yard came from power company land on Dead Timbers Road.
At this point, an APCo Security Department representative from Anniston, Joe Kirk, was called in to investigate the alleged stealing of the APCo timber. Kirk arrived in Dadeville on Wednesday, November 21. He talked with power company forester Benny Vinson first. Kirk, in the company of Vinson, then left the power company's forestry office in Dadeville to perform his investigation. They saw the plaintiff on the highway, motioned for him to stop his vehicle, and plaintiff got out and talked to Kirk and Vinson. According to Vinson, plaintiff again stated that he was responsible for the timber's being cut and that he wanted to make a deal and pay them off and get it out of the way. Kirk replied that he was not in a position to make a deal, that his only job was to investigate the facts and that he needed to interview everybody involved. Plaintiff then responsed that if they would not make a deal, then he was not going to talk without his attorney present and he turned and got back in his truck. Apparently, changing his mind, he walked back to Kirk and Vinson, who were sitting in their car, and stated that it was his employee (Monkey Jones), using his truck and his equipment, who did the cutting of power company timber. Kirk asked the plaintiff of the whereabouts of Monkey Jones and plaintiff stated that he did not know. At this time Kirk took a written statement from the plaintiff which plaintiff would not sign, but which plaintiff introduced into evidence at trial. It reads:
November 21, 1979
*961 I, John Kimbro Neighbors, Jr., give this free and voluntary statement to Joe Kirk, III and Bennie Vinson who have identified themselves as employees of Alabama Power Co. On Saturday of this week I sent Monkey Jones to cut pulp wood for me, I told him to go and cut wood in the Pace area and to cut wood which was damaged by the County. That night when I came home, Jones had a load of pulpwood on my truck; later that night Jones told me that he had cut some of the wood on the upper side of my road. On Monday morning me and Harvey Garrett drove up the road to look for the wood that Jones had cut. I noticed several green trees along the road and I realized that this was Alabama Power Co. timber. Later on Monday morning Garrett drove my truck to Camp Hill and sold the timber to Scott Langley Pulpwood Yard. I was not sure where it came from. I have read this statement and it is true and correct.
Witness: /s/ Joe Kirk Witness:
Witness: [illegible]
Kirk had the plaintiff draw in his own hand a map depicting Dead Timbers Road, his house, where the cutting took place and where the four green trees were left on the ground.
In addition to interviewing the plaintiff and taking his unsigned written statement, Kirk interviewed other people, took several statements, took photographs of the cut timber and the stumps. After his investigation was completed, Kirk contacted APCo's manager of security in Birmingham who in turn called Tom Young, the then District Attorney of Tallapoosa County, Alabama. Tom Young set up an appointment with Joe Kirk in his office for the first week of December 1979. Kirk met with District Attorney Tom Young, showed him his investigation materials and asked him his advice and opinion as to whether a crime had been committed or what course of action should be taken. Tom Young testified that he told Kirk that he "thought there was probable cause ... but I would give it to the grand jury and let them make the determination...." Young took the investigation file and presented the matter to the next session of the Tallapoosa County Grand Jury. The investigation file included witness statements, photos, and the plaintiff's statement. Thereafter, the district attorney's office conducted its own investigation.
In February 1980, the Tallapoosa County Grand Jury met at Dadeville. Tom Young subpoenaed Joe Kirk and Benny Vinson to testify. Other witnesses were subpoenaed, but it is not clear if they actually testified. During the grand jury proceedings, District Attorney Tom Young and his assistant Chase directed the questions to Kirk and Vinson when they were called to testify. The actual questions and answers and documentary evidence presented in this grand jury proceeding were not revealed before or during the trial because of the warning given to the parties and their attorneys by District Attorney Tom Young regarding grand jury secrecy, citing Code 1975, § 12-16-214, et seq.
Code 1975, § 12-16-215, in pertinent part says:
Code 1975, § 12-16-225Penalties, in pertinent part says:
The grand jury returned criminal indictments against the plaintiff and his employee, Harvey Garrett, accusing them of grand larceny of APCo's timber.
*962 Plaintiff and Garrett were caused to be arrested and booked as a result of these indictments. The grand larceny charges against the plaintiff and Garrett were called for trial in May of 1980 before the Tallapoosa County Circuit Court. Joe Kirk and Benny Vinson were subpoenaed to testify at the trial. Before trial, the State of Alabama, on the decision of Tom Young, District Attorney, moved to nol-pros both cases. No one at APCo ever suggested or requested that the cases be dismissed. Tom Young stated that he made a mistake in the indictment which accused the plaintiff and Garrett of grand larceny. The State's motion to dismiss was granted. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed suit against APCo for malicious prosecution, the case was tried and a jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $150,000. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and after its motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial was denied, APCo appealed.
To successfully maintain an action for malicious prosecution in Alabama, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that a prior judicial proceeding was instigated by the defendant without probable cause and with malice, such proceeding ending in favor of the plaintiff, but nevertheless causing the plaintiff damages. Brown v. Parnell, 386 So. 2d 1137 (Ala.1980); Birwood Paper Co. v. Damsky, 285 Ala. 127, 229 So. 2d 514 (1969). All of these elements being essential, the plaintiff must prove them in order to prevail because an action for malicious prosecution is not favored at law. This Court stated its reasoning for such a rule in Birwood Paper Co., supra, citing Boothby Realty Co. v. Haygood, 269 Ala. 549, 114 So. 2d 555 (1959);
If a defendant merely gives the district attorney's office information regarding an alleged crime, leaving the decision to prosecute entirely to the uncontrolled discretion of the district attorney, who thereafter makes his own independent investigation and thereupon takes the information before the grand jury which returns indictments against the suspects, the defendant, in a malicious prosecution action, is not regarded as having instigated the criminal proceeding.
The power company's first and foremost defense in this malicious prosecution action is that it did not instigate the criminal proceedings against the plaintiff, John K. Neighbors. It is axiomatic that there can be no cause of action for malicious prosecution unless the evidence shows that the judicial proceeding was instigated by the defendant. Brown v. Parnell, 386 So. 2d 1137 (Ala.1980); Kresge Co. v. Ruby, 348 So. 2d 484 (Ala.1977); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 119, pp. 835-38 (4th ed. 1971).
This Court, in American Surety Co. v. Pryor, 217 Ala. 244, 115 So. 176 (1927), discussed the rule as follows:
217 Ala. at 247, 115 So. 176.
In American Surety, this Court, quoting the following passage from Ryan v. Orient Insurance Co., 96 Vt. 291, 119 A. 423 (1923), held that plaintiff must show that defendant was the proximate and efficient cause of the proceeding:
In the American Surety case, an agent of the defendant gave information to the state's solicitor regarding a possible act of embezzlement by plaintiff. The solicitor took the information, conducted his own investigation, and prosecuted the matter to the grand jury which indicted the plaintiff. The facts clearly showed that it was the solicitor, not the defendant, who instigated the prosecution. Indeed the solicitor testified at trial as follows:
217 Ala. at 246, 115 So. 176.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court applied the foregoing rule and held that "the affirmative charge should have been given for the defendant, and its refusal was error." 217 Ala. at 249, 115 So. 176.
The American Surety opinion is additionally important for its explicit recognition of the public policy supporting this rule of law, namely that "[i]t is of public concern that a citizen having reason to believe, or even suspect, that a crime has been committed, be permitted to direct the attention of the prosecuting officer towards its investigation, without exposure to the peril of being held liable for malicious prosecution in case of a failure of conviction." 217 Ala. at 248, 115 So. 176 (quoting Ryan v. Orient Insurance Co., 96 Vt. 291, 119 A. 423 (1923). This Court adopted the following passage from the Ryan case, declaring it to be an "excellent statement of the reasons which underlie the rule":
217 Ala. at 248, 115 So. 176.
The American Surety opinion was followed in Dismukes v. Trivers Clothing Co., 221 Ala. 29, 127 So. 188 (1930), where the trial court charged the jury that if it believed that the defendant merely gave the information to the officers investigating an alleged check forger, upon which information the officers acted of their own volition, then the jury should return a verdict for the defendant. This Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the trial court erred in giving this charge, stating as follows:
221 Ala. at 32, 127 So. 188.
The American Surety opinion has been recently cited with approval in Jordan v. *965 Empiregas, Inc., 337 So. 2d 732 (Ala.1976), but its rationale is traceable to the earlier case of Shannon v. Simms, 146 Ala. 673, 40 So. 574 (1906), where this Court held that if a defendant fairly submits the facts to the prosecution authority, then signs the affidavit "upon his advice," he has a "complete defense to an action for malicious prosecution." 146 Ala. at 677, 40 So. 574. In Bennett v. Black 1 Stew. (Ala.) 494 (1828), this Court held that a defendant in a malicious prosecution case could not be held responsible for the mistaken issuance of a felony warrant where the facts did not amount to that offense. Permitting liability to attach in such a case, said the Court, "is too unreasonable to be admitted." Id. at 497.
A set of facts strikingly similar to those of the instant case appeared in King v. Second National Bank & Trust Co. of Saginaw, Michigan, 234 Ala. 106, 173 So. 498 (1937), where the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action had been charged with willfully and knowingly and without the consent of the owner entering upon and cutting and carrying away standing timber of the value of $25 or more, which was a grand larceny charge. There was no question that the offense had been committed. Defendant's employee, upon discovering that the timber had been cut and carried away, was directed to bring the matter to the attention of the solicitor and the grand jury. He went before the grand jury, reported the commission of the offense and that the plaintiff was the guilty party. He furnished names of witnesses to the grand jury all of which resulted in the indictment of the plaintiff. This Court found that the defendant did not initiate the criminal prosecution of the plaintiff, thereby affirming the trial court's action in granting the affirmative charge for the defendant, saying:
In King, there was evidence that before the matter was taken to the grand jury the defendant was informed by those accused or one of their employees that they denied cutting the timber, that the logs in question were cut from an adjoining tract of land by authority of the owner, and were loaded out from about the same point as those complained of. In King, the plaintiff in the malicious prosecution action accused the witnesses who had testified before the grand jury as being the guilty parties. There was further evidence that those accused had cut more merchantable trees at another point on this land. The cutting was promptly admitted and the trees paid for. In this regard, the Court said:
In Birwood Paper Co. v. Damsky, 285 Ala. 127, 229 So. 514 (1969), this Court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution suit where the evidence showed that the magistrate and not the defendant issued a warrant for the plaintiff for a non-existing criminal offense, stating that the instigation of the matter was the act of the magistrate and not the defendant, coupled with the fact that there was probable cause for the defendant to seek a peace warrant against the plaintiff.
In Smith v. Dollar, 223 Ala. 661, 138 So. 277 (1931), this Court squarely addressed the issue of whether the defendant (in a malicious prosecution action) had instigated the criminal proceedings which resulted in the plaintiff's grand jury indictment. In affirming the trial court's action in giving the defendant the affirmative charge, the Court said:
223 Ala. at 662 and 663, 138 So. 277.
It is clear from the evidence that the decision to start the criminal proceeding against Neighbors and the decision to nolpros it were both made independently by the district attorney.
APCo also claimed that there was probable cause to believe that the plaintiff had committed a crime. The burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff to show that there was a want of probable cause when the criminal matter against him was instigated. In S. S. Kresge Co. v. Ruby, 348 So. 2d 484 (Ala.1977), this Court opined:
348 So. 2d  at 487.
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each and every one of the above elements to be successful in an action for malicious prosecution. Crim v. Crim, 39 Ala.App. 413, 101 So. 2d 845 (1958) (burden of proof on plaintiff to show want of probable cause); United States Cast Iron Pipe & *967 Foundry Co. v. Henderson, 22 Ala.App. 448, 116 So. 915, 917 (1928) (burden of proof on plaintiff to show that defendant instituted the judicial proceeding). If the plaintiff fails to prove any one of those items, then the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Birmingham R. L. & P. Co. v. Ellis, 5 Ala.App. 525, 58 So. 796 (1912); Elliott v. Caheen Bros., 228 Ala. 432, 153 So. 613 (1934); Molten Realty v. Murchison, 212 Ala. 561, 103 So. 631 (1925); Green v. Norton, 233 Ala. 489, 172 So. 634 (1937); Brackin v. Reynolds, 239 Ala. 419, 194 So. 876 (1940). As we have already determined, APCo did not instigate the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff, but, of equal importance is the undisputed evidence that there was probable cause to believe that the plaintiff had committed a crime. In Hanson v. Couch, 360 So. 2d 942 (Ala.1978), "probable cause" as the term is used in a malicious prosecution was defined as:
The fact that the plaintiff's case upon trial in the circuit court was nol-prossed and the charge of larceny of timber dismissed does not create an inference or presumption that there was a "want of probable cause" at the time criminal prosecution against him was instigated. In Kresge v. Ruby, supra, the Court said:
348 So. 2d  at 488.
Neighbors was indicted by the grand jury. What effect did this have on the question of "want of probable cause" in the malicious prosecution?
In Union Indemnity Co. v. Webster, 218 Ala. 468, 118 So. 794 (1928), this Court opined:
218 Ala. at 478, 118 So. 794.
We need not delineate the facts which show the existence of probable cause, but a review of the facts set out in this opinion are sufficient to show that, as the district attorney concluded, probable cause did exist.
Whether the facts would have been sufficient to convict the plaintiff of grand larceny is not the question. Had the district attorney not nol-prossed the charge, plaintiff may or may not have been convicted, but APCo's liability on the malicious prosecution claim cannot be predicated on whether there was a conviction or not, only upon a lack of probable cause.
Because we conclude that APCo did not initiate the criminal proceeding, as the law uses the term "initiate" in malicious prosecution actions, and because there was probable cause, we conclude that the judgment of the trial court is due to be reversed.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
TORBERT, C. J., and SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
JONES, J., concurs specially.
JONES, Justice (concurring specially):
I concur in the Court's opinion; however, I do not believe it is necessary to hold that *968 Alabama Power Company did not initiate the prosecution. In an action for malicious prosecution the initial determination is whether the prior judicial proceeding was initiated with probable cause. Having found, as a matter of law, that under "the undisputed evidence ... there was probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had committed a crime...," the Court need not have made further findings on the issue of the identity of the initiating party. The question of who instituted the judicial proceedings is of importance only when it has first been determined that there was no probable cause and that the malicious prosecution action should proceed against an identified defendant.