Case Title: Ramfjord v. Sullivan

Citation: 222 N.W.2d 541

Docket Number: 44300

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1974-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
222 N.W.2d 541 (1974) James E. RAMFJORD, Individually, and as Father and Natural Guardian of Jamie Ramfjord, a Minor, Appellant, v. Joseph William SULLIVAN, Respondent. No. 44300. Supreme Court of Minnesota. September 20, 1974. *543 MacDonald, Munger, Fillenworth & Bang, and Harry L. Munger, Duluth, for appellant. Applequist, Donovan, Larson, Barnes, Mathias & Magie, and Arnold W. Larson, Duluth, for respondent. Heard before MacLAUGHLIN, YETKA, and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. YETKA, Justice. Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for injuries to his minor daughter, for medical expenses incurred by him, and for loss of companionship of his daughter, arising out of an automobile-pedestrian accident wherein the minor was struck by an automobile driven by defendant. Following a jury trial, plaintiff moved for a new trial. From the denial of this motion plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand for a new trial. On the night of September 26, 1970, Jamie Ramfjord was struck by an automobile driven by defendant as he was driving west on Morris Thomas Road, a Duluth residential street which had no sidewalks. The accident occurred at approximately 9 p.m. The parties admit in their briefs that there is sharp dispute in the record as to the details surrounding the accident. In essence, defendant and three other witnesses testified that a group of approximately eight children were huddled in the street squarely in defendant's lane of traffic. Defendant decreased his speed as he approached these children and attempted to pull around them by moving into the lane of oncoming traffic. As soon as he pulled out, he observed an oncoming vehicle and thus was forced to turn back into his own lane to avoid a head-on collision. As he re-entered his lane, he struck Jamie Ramfjord with the right rear quarter panel of his automobile, knocking her to the ground. *544 The children denied being huddled in the street. They testified they were walking along the shoulder beside defendant's lane of traffic, facing defendant as he approached. They testified that they were strung out for one-quarter to one-half a block in groups of two's and three's. They contradict defendant's testimony that he was swerving and one of the children testified that defendant struck plaintiff with the right front bumper of his automobile. It is noteworthy that Jamie Ramfjord testified that she had one foot on the traveled portion of the roadway. This is corroborated by several other children in the group. It is uncontested that Jamie Ramfjord sustained a fracture of the distal femur of her right leg as a result of the collision. James Ramfjord filed suit against defendant as father and natural guardian of Jamie Ramfjord. Plaintiff contended that the injuries sustained by Jamie were caused by the negligence of defendant and sought to recover as damages: (1) His medical expenses resulting from his daughter's injuries, plus damages for the loss of companionship of his daughter; and (2) Damages on behalf of his daughter for her pain and suffering, past and future emotional distress, and past, present, and future physical disabilities. Trial before a jury was had and the jury returned a verdict finding defendant 60-percent negligent and Jamie Ramfjord 40-percent negligent. Damages to Jamie Ramfjord were awarded in the amount of $5,000 and James Ramfjord was awarded the amount of his medical expenses. Judgment for plaintiff was ordered on December 5, 1972. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for new trial alleging the assignments of error which constitute the issues of the instant appeal. Hearing on this motion was held on December 28, 1972. On February 27, 1973, this motion was denied. The issues raised on this appeal are: (1) Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing plaintiff's request for inclusion of Minn.St. 169.19, subd. 4, in the final charge to the jury? (2) Did the trial court err in refusing to direct the verdict for plaintiff on the issue of negligence? (3) Is an award of $5,000 for damages sustained by a 14-year old girl inadequate and the result of passion, prejudice, or compromise by the jury? (4) Was reversible error committed during the testimony of a witness by the court's failure to properly admonish counsel for his tactics? (5) Does failure to have a court reporter present when the jury returns its verdict constitute reversible error in a case where the court then orders the jury to correct an answer to a special interrogatory? 1. At trial defendant on direct examination testified as follows: He saw the children in the street from a distance of two or three blocks. He continued towards them and eventually reduced his speed to about 10 miles per hour. The children "were right in [his] lane." Defendant went on to state: Defendant further testified that he saw no children on the shoulder. On cross-examination defendant stated that the oncoming car was "on top of me," and that that was the first time he saw this *545 other automobile. He further testified that there were no obstructions to prevent his seeing the oncoming car prior to his turning into the other lane. The cross-examination then continued: Defendant testified that he was traveling at a speed of 5 to 10 miles per hour when he was going around the children. At that speed defendant stated he could have stopped in "maybe two or three feet." He did not sound his horn or blink his lights. Defendant stated later in cross-examination that if he had seen the oncoming car prior to the time he got to the children, he could have stopped and would not have been forced to attempt to pass. A view of the record thus supports the following conclusions: If we are to adopt this testimony as true, we must conclude that the children were in the street, defendant saw them in time to stop, and instead of stopping, he attempted to pass these children without first ascertaining if the way was clear even though he was not forced to make this attempt. Plaintiff requested the court to include in its instructions Minn.St. 169.19, subd. 4, which provides: The two cases cited by plaintiff are relevant; however, perhaps more applicable is the case of Hagen v. Snow, 244 Minn. 101, 106, 69 N.W.2d 100, 103 (1955), which states: In the case at bar, § 169.14, subd.4, appears applicable. However, Hagen vests the trial court with a certain degree of discretion in this area. Thus, the following language from Cameron v. Evans, 241 Minn. 200, 208, 62 N.W.2d 793, 798 (1954), is pertinent: *546 Defendant notes that Minn.St. 169.21, subd. 3, was included in the instructions. This provision appears to cover generally the actions of defendant so as to convey to the jury a clear and correct understanding of the law. Thus, while we believe plaintiff was entitled to the specific instruction requested, the court's instructions when viewed as a whole would not standing alone constitute reversible error. 2. On the issue of directed verdict, defendant's testimony alone was very damaging to his case. However, there was other testimony, often conflicting, which the trial court in its discretion determined required the submission of this issue to the jury. This is a matter of discretion of the trial court which we will not reverse on appeal. 3. Plaintiff also contends that the damages awarded Jamie Ramfjord were the result of a compromise verdict and were inadequate. This is precisely the type of case in which this court has refused to second guess a jury. A trial court's denial of a new trial on grounds of inadequacy of damages is largely discretionary and will not be reversed on appeal unless this ruling is determined to be a clear abuse of that discretion. Boyce v. Herzberg, 296 Minn. 52, 206 N.W.2d 548 (1973). We do not find such abuse here. 4. Plaintiff assigns as error the court's failure to admonish defense counsel in the presence of the jury for the following conduct. During defendant's cross-examination of one of the police officers who investigated the accident the following exchange occurred: The fatal flaw in plaintiff's position on this issue is that he claims admission of improper and highly prejudicial testimony which was never uttered by the witness. In addition, the court instructed the jury as follows: This court has made it clear the questioning of police officers as to whether they did or did not issue a traffic citation is generally improper. Dosh v. Elioff, Minn., 222 N.W.2d 326, filed September 13, 1974. Though the situation in Dosh is not clearly in point, we do feel compelled to hold that it is clearly erroneous to admit into evidence the opinion of an investigating officer as to which party is at fault. However, as plaintiff himself points out, granting a new trial for misconduct of counsel rests almost wholly within the discretion of the trial court and its action will not be reversed except for a clear abuse of discretion. Reese v. Ross & Ross Auctioneers, Inc., 276 Minn. 67, 149 N.W.2d 16 (1967). It appears that no such clear abuse exists in the case at bar. *547 5. The most serious error which occurred and which requires a new trial deals with the failure to have a court reporter present when the jury returned its verdict, and the sending out of that jury to correct the verdict. Following the final charge to the jury, which included an explanation of the effects of a comparative negligence verdict, the jury retired for deliberations. The record ends here. However, the court recalled during the hearing on plaintiff's post-trial motion that the jury returned a verdict which awarded James Ramfjord, for his medical expenses, an amount less than the amount stipulated. The court ordered the jury to retire and correct this error. The court's recollection of these proceedings is as follows: The allegations of plaintiff in regard to the above proceedings appear to raise two questions: (1) Did the trial court merely order the jury to correct an obvious clerical error? (2) Because the proceedings at issue were not transcribed, may this court in effect accept the recollections of the court, or was the court reporter required to be present in order to avoid any possible doubts as to what actually transpired? In support of his argument that error occurred, plaintiff cites Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 258 Minn. 30, 102 N.W.2d 512 (1960), and Booth v. Spindler, 261 Minn. 79, 110 N.W.2d 889 (1961). Cronquist was a personal injury action. After the jury had retired, the foreman requested a definition of what would constitute contributory negligence. The definition *549 by the court was given only to the foreman of the jury over the telephone. The foreman was not in the jury room when this additional instruction was given. He returned to the jury room and relayed the definition of contributory negligence to the other members of the jury. On appeal this court ordered a new trial and stated: It is noteworthy that this court ordered reversal on the basis of the affidavit of the foreman of the jury. The court did not find the lack of a record per se reversible error, but reversed because the error was of such magnitude that prejudice was presumed. Booth v. Spindler, supra, was an action where plaintiff sought rescission of a contract by virtue of an alleged breach of implied warranty of fitness. The case was submitted to the jury in the form of special interrogatories and also general verdicts. The jury returned answers to interrogatories which were inconsistent with the general verdict. In the absence of counsel and the court reporter, the court refused to accept the jury's findings and ordered them to retire and reconcile their findings with the verdicts. On appeal this court stated: The court went on to distinguish the Booth case from Cronquist. The trial court stated that, in the case at bar, the jury error was strictly mathematical or procedural. In addition, the court stated that the jury was carefully questioned as to whether they had made the same mistake with regard to their award of damages for injuries to Jamie Ramfjord. An obvious arithmetical error made by a jury in computing the amount due plaintiff must be corrected by the trial court. Barnard-Curtiss Co. v. Minneapolis Dredging Co., 200 Minn. 327, 274 N.W. 229 (1937). However, this court has consistently held it is error to instruct a jury, or refuse to accept a jury's findings, and order them to retire for further deliberation in the absence of both counsel and a court reporter. In this case we hold it was prejudicial error to do so. When this factor, moreover, is combined with all of the other issues involved in this appeal, we hold that the totality and sum of the individual errors, even though each of them in some cases standing alone might not be prejudicial, denied plaintiff a fair trial. We hold that under the comparative negligence law whenever a jury requests instructions or the court deems it necessary to send the jury out to correct any interrogatory or verdict for any reason, any action should be taken with a court reporter present and a record should be made of the entire proceedings. While it would be desirable to have opposing counsel *550 present as well, we deem it unnecessary for counsel to be present if it is clear in the record that each of them has waived his right to be present and has authorized the court to reinstruct and to send a jury out once again after reporting to correct any interrogatory or mathematical error in a verdict. We do hold that it is necessary that a complete record be made of the proceedings. While there is no indication whatever that the learned trial court in this case did not recite to counsel everything he recalled, the record does indicate that a busy trial judge can forget exactly what transpired. For as the trial court itself stated in this case: We therefore reiterate the language of the Booth case: Reversed and remanded for a new trial. OTIS, Justice (dissenting). Because I fail to see what prejudice plaintiff suffered, I would affirm. PETERSON, Justice (dissenting). I join in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice OTIS.