Case Title: State of Indiana v. Robert Jeffrey Pelley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 71S03-0403-CR-134

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Steve Carter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
George E. Horn, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
Jesse M. Barrett 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barnes & Thornburg 
Jodi Kathryn Stein 
 
 
 
 
 
South Bend, Indiana 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 71S03-0403-CR-134 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT JEFFREY PELLEY, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Defendant below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Interlocutory Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court, No. 71D08-0208-MR-00016 
The Honorable R.W. Chamblee, Jr., Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 71A03-0305-CR-163 
_________________________________ 
 
June 14, 2005 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
 
 
Because of a statutorily created privilege, communication to a social worker from the 
social worker’s client is protected from disclosure.  But the privilege does not extend to 
communication taking place before the statute was enacted.  
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 
In 2002, Robert Jeffrey Pelley (“Pelley”) was charged with the April 29, 1989 slayings of 
his father—Reverend Robert Pelley, stepmother—Dawn Pelley, and two minor stepsisters—
Janel Pelley and Jolene Pelley.  From May 27, 1986 until April 27, 1989, two days before the 
murders, Pelley, his father, and his stepmother received group and individual counseling from 
the Family and Children’s Center (“Center”) located in South Bend.  During the course of the 
counseling sessions, Center compiled and maintained various records.  They included: intake 
records for Robert Pelley, Reverend Pelley and Dawn Pelley; progress notes from meetings with 
Robert Pelley, Reverend Pelley and Dawn Pelley; a psychological evaluation of Robert Pelley; 
and billing and payment records.  The record is silent as to who compiled the intake, billing and 
payment records.  However, Mabel Davis, a social worker then employed by Center, authored 
the progress notes.  The psychological evaluation bears the signature of Jackson Turner, whose 
status is not revealed by the record, and Dr. A. Joseph Schwab, a psychologist.  
 
 
On August 22, 2002, the State served a subpoena duces tecum on Center requesting 
“[a]ny and all counseling records from the . . . Pelley family from 1986 – 1989.”  Appellant’s 
App. at 30(a).  Center responded with a motion to quash.  At a hearing on the motion Center 
argued that the records authored by Mabel Davis were protected by the counselor/client privilege 
as codified in Indiana Code § 25-23.6-6-1; the psychological evaluation performed by Dr. 
Schwab was protected by the psychologist/patient privilege as codified in Indiana Code § 25-33-
1-17; and none of the records fell within the “homicide exception” codified in both I.C. § 25-
23.6-6-1 and I.C. § 25-33-1-17.  Following the hearing, and after conducting an in camera 
inspection of the documents, the trial court granted Center’s motion and quashed the subpoena.  
 
The State pursued an interlocutory appeal arguing: (i) the statute creating the 
counselor/client privilege did not exist when the records were created and thus the statute does 
not extend to communications made to Mabel Davis by members of the Pelley family; (ii) the 
statute is not retroactive; and (iii) the requested documents may have come within the “homicide 
exception” to both the counselor/client and the psychologist/patient privileges.  On this latter 
point, the State also complained that the trial court reviewed the documents in camera without 
 
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affording the State the opportunity to review the documents for the purpose of determining 
whether the homicide exception was applicable.  
 
Affirming the trial court, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals determined that: (1) 
although the statute conveying the counselor/client privilege did not exist at the time of the 
counseling sessions, the date of disclosure is the determinative date for discovery requests 
regarding privileges; (2) notwithstanding the foregoing determination, the statute applies 
retroactively; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reviewing the requested 
documents in camera.  State v. Pelley, 800 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).  Having previously 
granted transfer, we now affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court. 
 
Discussion 
 
I.  The Relevant Date: the Date of Communication or the Date of Disclosure. 
 
Indiana Code section 25-23.6-6-1 provides in pertinent part:   
Matters communicated to a counselor1 in the counselor’s official 
capacity by a client are privileged information and may not be 
disclosed by the counselor to any person, except under the 
following circumstances:   
(1)  In a criminal proceeding involving a homicide if the disclosure 
relates directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of the 
homicide. 
This statute was enacted effective July 1, 1990.  Center contends that because I.C. § 25-23.6-6-1 
prohibits a counselor from disclosing communications, the critical time for determining the 
applicability of the statute is when the communications are sought to be disclosed, not when the 
communications are originally made.  According to Center, because the communications made 
                                                 
1 Although referred to in the record as a “social worker,” Tr. at 23, Mabel Davis identified herself in the 
contested documents as a “counselor.”  The discrepancy is of no consequence here for at least two 
reasons: (1) “social worker” is included in the definition of “counselor,” see I.C.§ 25-23.6-1-3.8, and (2) 
the trial court specifically found that Mabel Davis “was a social worker within the meaning of I.C. 25-
23.6.6-1,” Appellant’s App. at 308-09, a finding that neither party challenges on appeal.   
 
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by Pelley and members of his family were sought to be disclosed well after the statute was 
enacted, the trial court correctly quashed the subpoena. 
 
When construing a statute our main objective is to determine, give effect to, and 
implement the intent of the legislature.  Melrose v. Capitol City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 
985, 989 (Ind. 1998).  This jurisdiction generally recognizes that privileges are statutory in 
nature and that it is within the power of the legislature to create them.  Terre Haute Reg’l Hosp., 
Inc. v Trueblood, 600 N.E.2d. 1358, 1360 (Ind. 1992).  Most privileges were unknown at 
common law and, as a result, are to be strictly construed to limit their application.  Id.  
 
In Matter of C.P., 563 N.E.2d 1275 (Ind. 1990), this Court interpreted the then current 
version of the statutorily created physician/patient privilege.2  Noting that such a privilege did 
not exist at common law and therefore the statute was to be strictly construed, we determined 
among other things, “The privilege is intended to inspire full and complete communication by 
patients so as to further trustful and successful treatment.  [T]his Court has long recognized that 
the privilege covers both physicians and those who aid physicians, other persons whose 
intervention is strictly necessary to enable the parties to communicate with each other.”  Id. at 
1278 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Ley v. Blose, 698 N.E.2d 381, 383-84 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1998) (“By safeguarding the confidentiality of communications, the physician-patient 
privilege seeks to inspire full and complete disclosure of knowledge pertinent and necessary to a 
trustful and proper relationship.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted).  In essence we 
have determined that the underlying purpose of the physician/patient privilege is to inspire full 
and complete communication.  If that purpose is to be served, then the participants in a 
confidential conversation must be able to predict with some degree of certainty that the particular 
communications will be protected.  
 
By enacting I.C. § 25-23.6-6-1 the Legislature extended to counselors the same privilege 
that exists for physicians.  The intent and dominant purpose of the statute is to grant a privilege 
                                                 
2 The statute read in relevant part, “Except as otherwise provided by statute, the following persons shall 
not be competent witness: . . . (3) [p]hysicians, as to matters communicated to them, as such, by patients, 
in the course of their professional business, or advice given in such cases.”  I.C. § 34-1-14-5(3) 
(recodified as I.C. § 34-46-3-1 without substantial change). 
 
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to protect confidential communication between a counselor and the counselor’s client.  It is of 
course true the counselor/client privilege speaks in terms of “disclosure” while the 
physician/patient privilege does not.  Still, the focus of both privileges is the same, namely, 
protecting communication.  Consequently, because the focus of the statute is on the underlying 
communications and not, as Center contends, on the ultimate disclosure of the communications, 
the statute only protects communications made after the effective date.  To exclude 
communications made prior to this date would be, in effect, to apply the statute retroactively.  
That brings us to our next point.  
 
II.  The Retroactivity of Indiana Code section 25-23.6-6-1  
 
The general rule of statutory construction is that unless there are strong and compelling 
reasons, statutes will not be applied retroactively.  Martin v. State, 774 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ind. 
2002).  Statutes are to be given prospective effect only, unless the legislature unequivocally and 
unambiguously intended retrospective effect as well.  Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Judd, 554 
N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).  There is an exception to this general rule for remedial 
statutes, that is, statutes intended to cure a defect or mischief that existed in a prior statute.  
Bourbon Mini-Mart, Inc. v. Gast Fuel & Servs., Inc., 783 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ind. 2003) (citing 
Martin, 774 N.E.2d at 44).  Relying on our statement in Bourbon and Martin that “remedial 
statutes will be applied retroactively to carry out their legislative purpose unless to do so 
violates a vested or constitutional guaranty,” (emphasis added), Center argues that I.C.§ 25-
23.6-6-1 was enacted to cure a defect in the physician/patient privilege statute and thus it is 
remedial and applies retroactively to bar disclosure of communications between Center’s 
counselor and the Pelley family.  
 
We first observe that it is not at all clear to us that the counselor/client privilege statute is 
remedial.  It is true the statute was enacted following the Court of Appeals’ decision in Matter 
of C.P., 543 N.E.2d 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), aff’d in part, 563 N.E.2d 1275 (Ind. 1990), which 
held that the physician/patient privilege did not protect communications between a counselor 
and a client.  However, it is equally true, as the State points out, that the statute was enacted as 
part of a much broader scheme to regulate social workers as professionals.  Public Law 186-
 
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1990 created Article 23.6, “Marriage and Family Therapists.”  This article created a 
credentialing board for social workers and marriage family therapists, and addressed 
certification, examinations, unlawful practices, privileged communications, and mandatory 
disclosures.  See I.C. § 25-23.6.  It is reasonably plausible that by creating Article 23.6 under 
Title 25, the Legislature intended to recognize social workers as mental health professionals 
who were afforded state recognition and subject to state regulation, much the same as 
psychologists under Title 25, Article 33.  We have no legislative history to inform us either 
way. 
 
In any event, even assuming the counselor/client privilege statute is remedial, Center’s 
retroactivity argument still fails.  Despite language in Bourbon and Martin suggesting otherwise, 
not all remedial statutes are automatically applied retroactively.  It has long been the law in this 
jurisdiction that although statutes and rules concerning procedural and remedial matters may be 
made to operate retroactively, it is not the case that they must apply retroactively.  State ex rel. 
Uzelac v. Lake Crim. Ct., 247 Ind. 87, 212 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1965).  As we held in Gosnell v. 
Indiana Soft Water Service, Inc.:  
 
Unless there are strong and compelling reasons, statutes will 
normally be given prospective application.  While statutes 
addressing merely procedural and remedial matters may be applied 
retroactively, such application is not required. 
 
*                      *                      * 
 
Even under [the] argument that the statute is merely procedural or 
remedial, retroactive application is the exception, and such laws 
are normally to be applied prospectively absent strong and 
compelling reasons. 
 
503 N.E.2d 879, 880 (Ind. 1987) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
 
Like the physician/patient privilege, the statutorily created counselor/client privilege is 
also in derogation of common law.  So it too must be strictly construed.  Trueblood, 600 N.E.2d 
at 1360.  For this reason, and because laws creating privileges “prohibit the ascertainment of 
 
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truth in many controversies,” courts do not extend the scope of the privilege by implication.  
Matter of C.P., 563 N.E.2d at 1277 (discussing the physician/patient privilege).  This approach is 
consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s rule that privileges “are not lightly created nor 
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”  Id. (citing United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).  In this case, even assuming I.C. § 25-23.6-6-1 is 
remedial or procedural, the Legislature did not expressly make the statute retroactive.  And we 
decline to construe the privilege contained in the statute as applying retroactively.  Rather, absent 
clear legislative intent to the contrary we apply here the general rule favoring prospective 
application.  In sum, the counselor/client privilege is not applicable in the case before us.  
Accordingly the trial court erred in quashing the State’s subpoena requesting documents 
revealing communications between Center’s counselor and the Pelley family.  On this issue we 
reverse the judgment of the trial court. 
 
III.  The Homicide Exception 
 
Both the counselor/client privilege and the psychologist/patient privilege contain 
exceptions to the non-disclosure of confidential communication.  At issue here are what are 
commonly referred to as the “homicide exceptions.”  For the counselor/client privilege the 
exception applies, “[i]n a criminal proceeding involving a homicide if the disclosure relates 
directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of the homicide.”  I.C. § 25-23.6-6-1(1).  Worded 
only slightly differently the exception for the psychologist/patient privilege applies in “[t]rials for 
homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of said 
homicide.”  I.C. § 25-33-1-17(1).  After conducting an in camera inspection of the contested 
documents, the trial court determined that the homicide exceptions did not apply.  The State 
contends that the trial court abused its discretion in making this determination.  Although not 
necessarily raising the issue as error, the State makes a related claim that it “has not been able to 
review the documents, even for the limited purpose of arguing whether the documents fall within 
an exception to the privilege.”  Appellant’s Pet. to Trans. at 11.   
 
We first observe that we have already determined that the counselor/client privilege is not 
applicable in this case.  Thus, our focus here is on the psychologist/patient privilege, which pre-
 
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dated the time the Pelley family received counseling.  Unless the homicide exception applies, 
any communication between Center’s psychologist and the Pelley family is privileged and not 
discoverable.  As for the State’s claim that it has not been afforded the opportunity to review the 
privileged documents to determine if they contain non-privileged information, we conclude the 
State is not entitled to review the documents.  And this is so because the very nature of the 
psychologist/patient privilege precludes the State from gaining access to confidential 
communications absent an exception.  Rather, a determination must be made in the first instance 
as to whether the State has a right of access to the documents.  Allowing the State itself to review 
the documents in order to make that determination would eviscerate the reason the privilege 
exists in the first place, namely: to protect confidential communications between psychologists 
and patients.  
 
In essence we entrust trial courts rather than sparring litigants with the authority to 
preserve the inviolability of privileged information.  And although the trial court may have 
allowed the State to review the requested documents in this case under a confidential protective 
order, it was not compelled to do so.  See Van Meter v. Zimmer, 697 N.E.2d 1281, 1284-85 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1998) (observing that the trial court could either conduct an in camera inspection of a 
joint tax return or allow discovery by the opposing party under a confidential protective order).  
Further, the notion of a trial court conducting an in camera inspection of documents to determine 
whether information contained in them is or is not discoverable is not particularly remarkable.  
For example in Owen v. Owen, 563 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. 1990), we addressed the physician/patient 
privilege declaring: 
[I]n those rare cases where the physician-patient privilege is 
properly invoked, it is incumbent on the party seeking to assert the 
privilege to identify to the court specifically which documents are 
believed to remain within the privilege, after which the court will 
review the contested documents in camera to ascertain their 
entitlement to the protection of the privilege. 
 
Id. at 608 (emphasis added); see also Hulett v. State, 552 N.E.2d 47, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), 
trans. denied, (ruling the trial court erred in failing to conduct an in camera inspection of a 
counselor’s file, because “[w]ithout such inspection, it was not possible for the trial court to 
 
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exercise its discretion in ruling upon the presence of discoverable evidence as opposed to 
irrelevant or immaterial matter.”); Sturgill v. State, 497 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) 
(ruling the trial court erred in denying defendant’s pre-trial discovery request.  “At the very least, 
the trial court should have conducted an in camera inspection of [the victim’s] statements given 
to the welfare department . . . to determine whether any of the statements benefited [Defendant’s] 
defense.”).  In sum, the State has not shown any entitlement to review the contested documents, 
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by conducting the in camera inspection.   
 
Concerning the State’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that 
the contested documents did not fall within the homicide exception, the case of Jorgensen v. 
State, 574 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. 1991) is instructive.  In Jorgensen, after a trial by jury the defendant 
was convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder.  The conviction was affirmed on 
appeal and the defendant sought transfer raising a number of issues.  We remanded the cause to 
the trial court for further proceedings after finding one issue dispositive: whether the trial court 
erred in denying the defendant an opportunity to depose two people.  
 
The essential facts were these.  While married to the murder victim, the defendant was 
involved in a relationship with Gary Cochran.  There was testimony at trial that Cochran told a 
friend that he wanted to kill the victim.  Cochran had also supplied written confessions admitting 
to having committed the murder.  Defendant claimed that William Ball, a social worker, and Dr. 
Robert Greenburg, a psychologist, counseled Cochran.  Claiming these two people had 
information that might tend to show that Cochran rather than the defendant committed the 
murder, the defendant moved to take their depositions.  The trial court denied the request 
apparently on the grounds that the information possessed by both Ball and Dr. Greenburg was 
privileged or that the defendant had not shown that the information requested was material to her 
defense.  Addressing the homicide exception to the psychologist/patient privilege, we noted the 
privilege did not protect the communications made to the social worker,3 and that to the extent 
the defendant was seeking information relating to the facts or immediate circumstances of the 
homicide, the psychologist/patient privilege may not exist.  Id. at 917. 
 
                                                 
3 At the time of the defendant’s trial the counselor/client privilege did not exist. 
 
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We went on to explain that with respect to non-privileged information, there are two 
principal questions a trial court must consider when ruling on discovery matters in a criminal 
trial: (1) is there a sufficient designation of the items to be discovered; and (2) are the items 
sought material to the defense?  Id.  Noting that the answer to the first question was affirmative, 
we then said:  
However, we cannot determine whether the information sought is 
material to her defense because we do not know what information 
Ball or Dr. Greenburg have relative to the homicide.  The “catch-
22” is that there is no method of determining what information 
they may hold unless some discovery is conducted.  
*                       *                       * 
Although the trial court has wide discretion in discovery matters, 
we conclude that the court should have allowed some discovery in 
order to make possible the determination of whether Ball and Dr. 
Greenburg possessed information which would have been material 
to Jorgensen’s defense. It was error for the trial court to have 
concluded that whatever information they possessed was 
privileged without a factual basis for arriving at such a conclusion. 
Similarly, it was error to have denied discovery because of no 
showing of materiality where the only method for Jorgensen to 
have met the materiality requirement was to have the information 
made available to her.  
 
Id. (emphasis added).  
 
Among other things Jorgensen stands for the proposition that “some discovery” is 
permissible in order to make the determination whether a witness may have information not 
subject to a privilege.  Here, the State makes no claim that it has sought discovery in this case 
and that its efforts to do so have been thwarted.  Indeed the State readily admits that it has 
interviewed several witnesses, which has given the State reason to believe that the documents it 
requests “should include information concerning the facts and immediate circumstances of the 
murders.”  Appellant’s Pet. to Trans. at 12.  But the State does not elaborate further to explain 
what information the State obtained from these witnesses that formed the basis for its belief.  In 
fact, had the State presented such evidence to the trial court then there may have been evidence 
of record before this Court to evaluate the State’s contention that the trial court abused its 
 
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discretion in determining that the homicide exception did not apply.  However, on this record 
there is simply nothing before us to support the State’s claim.  A trial court is accorded broad 
discretion in ruling on issues of discovery.  Vernon v. Kroger Co., 712 N.E.2d 976, 982 (Ind. 
1999).  On review, we presume that the trial court’s decision is correct, and the party challenging 
the decision has the burden of persuading us that the trial court abused its discretion.  Sears 
Roebuck & Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2001).  In this case the State has failed 
to carry its burden.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  This cause is 
remanded.  
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur. 
 
 
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