Case Title: P. v. Athar

Citation: 

Docket Number: S119975

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 7/14/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S119975 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1  D037485 
SYED ABIEDA ATHAR, 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SCD145045 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
A jury found defendant Syed Abeida Athar guilty of conspiracy to engage 
in money laundering in violation of the general conspiracy statute, Penal Code 
section 182, subdivision (a)(1).1  Defendant was not charged with (or convicted 
of) money laundering itself under section 186.10, subdivision (a).  The trial court 
sentenced him to a two-year term for the base crime of conspiracy, and imposed a 
four-year enhancement under section 186.10, subdivision (c)(1)(D). 
We granted review to decide whether the trial court may impose an 
enhancement under section 186.10, subdivision (c), for money laundering when 
the defendant is not convicted of money laundering under section 186.10, 
subdivision (a), but is convicted of conspiracy to commit that offense under 
section 182.  Under section 182, subdivision (a), a conspirator is to receive 
                                              
1  Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.  
 
2
punishment “in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for the 
punishment of” the target felony.  Applying this provision, we conclude that the 
enhancement provisions of section 186.10, subdivision (c), do apply when the 
defendant has been convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering but not 
of money laundering itself. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history as presented by the 
Court of Appeal. 
Beginning in July 1994, defendant and some friends began to sell 
counterfeit Microsoft software.  The partners established various fictitious 
businesses to conceal the unlawful sales and took the profits for themselves.  They 
distributed the profits by depositing them into various bank accounts and 
transferring them by check, cashier’s check, and cash to other accounts. Between 
August 1994 and September 1996, defendant and his partners engaged in nearly 
300 transactions, and over $2,500,000 was eventually transferred.  
Since June 1996, Microsoft had been receiving complaints about the 
counterfeit software and had alerted the San Diego Police Department of the 
scheme.  Based on the information received, police arrested defendant on 
September 6, 1996.  The search following arrest turned up 1,100 to 1,300 units of 
counterfeit software in defendant’s possession. 
An indictment was filed in 1999, charging defendant and his partners with 
conspiracy to engage in money laundering and to manufacture a counterfeit mark.  
(§§ 182, 350, subd. (d)(3).)  The indictment alleged approximately 55 overt acts, 
some occurring as early as July 1994.  The indictment further alleged that “the 
value of the transaction or transactions exceeds two million five hundred thousand 
dollars ($2,500,000), in violation of Penal Code section 186.10 (c)(1)(D).”  The 
indictment did not charge defendant with money laundering under section 186.10, 
 
3
subdivision (a), although several of his partners were so charged. Defendant was 
charged, however, with possession for sale of 1,000 or more counterfeit marks in 
violation of section 350, subdivision (d)(3).  
As relevant here, a jury convicted defendant of conspiracy to commit 
money laundering.  (§ 182, subd. (a)(1).)  The jury also found that the value of the 
transactions was in excess of $2,500,000, the statutory minimum required for 
imposing a four-year enhancement following a conviction for the substantive 
crime of money laundering.  (§ 186.10, subd. (c)(1)(D).)  The trial court sentenced 
defendant to two years for conspiracy and four years for the money laundering 
enhancement under section 186.10, subdivision (c)(1)(D).  The court then stayed 
the entire sentence and imposed five years’ probation conditioned on one year in 
the county jail and various fines and restitution.  
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.  Defendant petitioned for 
review raising certain issues but failed to question whether he should have 
received the money laundering enhancement because he was not charged or 
convicted of money laundering.  We granted and transferred the case so the Court 
of Appeal could consider that issue. 
A majority of the Court of Appeal held that money laundering 
enhancements apply to the charge of conspiracy to commit money laundering.  We 
granted defendant’s petition for review limited to the money laundering 
enhancement issue. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 182, subdivision (a), provides that conspiracy to commit felonies 
other than those specifically identified “shall be punishable in the same manner 
and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony.”  (§ 182, 
subd. (a).)  Section 186.10, subdivision (c)(1), provides possible enhancements for 
money laundering, stating, among other things, that “Any person who is punished 
 
4
under subdivision (a) by imprisonment in the state prison shall also be subject to 
an additional term of imprisonment in the state prison as follows:  [¶] . . . [¶] (D) If 
the value of the transaction or transactions exceeds two million five hundred 
thousand dollars ($2,500,000), the court . . . shall impose an additional term of 
imprisonment of four years.”  (§ 186.10, subd. (c)(1).) 2  
                                              
2   When defendant’s conduct began, the enhancement provision in section 186.10 
stated, in pertinent part: 
 
“(a)  Any person who conducts or attempts to conduct a transaction or more 
than one transaction within a 24-hour period involving a monetary instrument or 
instruments of a total value exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000) through one 
or more financial institutions (1) with the intent to promote, manage, establish, 
carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of 
any criminal activity, or (2) knowing that the monetary instrument represents the 
proceeds of, or is derived directly or indirectly from the proceeds of, criminal 
activity, is guilty of the crime of money laundering. . . .  [¶]  A violation of this 
section shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one 
year or in the state prison, by a fine of not more than two hundred fifty thousand 
dollars ($250,000) or twice the value of the property transacted, whichever is 
greater, or by both that imprisonment and fine.  [¶] . . . [¶] 
 
“(c)(1)  Any person who is punished under subdivision (a) by imprisonment in 
the state prison shall also be subject to an additional term of imprisonment in the 
state prison as follows:  [¶] . . . [¶] 
 
“(D)  If the value of the transaction or transactions exceeds two million five 
hundred thousand dollars ($2,500,000), the court, in addition to and consecutive to 
the felony punishment otherwise prescribed by this section, shall impose an 
additional term of imprisonment of four years. 
 
“(2)(A)  An additional term of imprisonment as provided for in this 
subdivision shall not be imposed unless the facts of a transaction or transactions, 
or attempted transaction or transactions, of a value described in paragraph (1), are 
charged in the accusatory pleading, and are either admitted to by the defendant or 
are found to be true by the trier of fact. 
“(B) An additional term of imprisonment as provided for in this subdivision 
may be imposed with respect to an accusatory pleading charging multiple 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
5
The Court of Appeal majority upheld defendant’s conspiracy conviction 
and application of the money laundering enhancement based on the fact that  
conspirators under section 182, subdivision (a), must be punished “in the same 
manner and to the same extent” as those convicted of the “target felony,” i.e., 
money laundering.  
The Court of Appeal, relying on the plain meaning rule, concluded that 
section 186.10, subdivision (c), requires the enhancement because it does not 
specifically prohibit it.  (See People v. Gardeley (1997) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621 
(Gardeley) [when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and not 
susceptible of more than one meaning, courts should not engage in statutory 
construction].) The court observed that “[h]ad the Legislature intended to apply 
the money laundering enhancements to only those persons convicted of the 
substantive offense of money laundering, it would have so provided in subdivision 
(c) of section 186.10.”  Therefore, the court reasoned, because the Legislature did 
not exclude conspiracy actions from the enhancement provisions, the enhancement 
here was mandatory.  
The People agree, asserting that the requirement of the conspiracy statute 
that one convicted of conspiracy must be punished “in the same manner and to the 
same extent” as provided for the punishment of the target offense, means that 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
violations of this section, regardless of whether any single violation charged in 
that pleading involves a transaction or attempted transaction of a value covered by 
paragraph (1), if the violations charged in that pleading arise from a common 
scheme or plan and the aggregate value of the alleged transactions or attempted 
transactions is of a value covered by paragraph (1).”  (Stats. 1994, ch. 1187, § 2, 
pp. 7167-7168.)  
 
 
6
defendant is deemed punished under section 186.10.  As the People observe, by its 
terms, section 186.10, subdivision (c), does not require a court to convict 
defendant of the target offense, but instead that he be punished under section 
186.10, subdivision (a).  Relying on People v. Kramer (2002) 29 Cal.4th 720 
(Kramer), the People add that section 182’s requirement that a defendant be 
punished for, as opposed to convicted of, the felony with the “greater maximum 
term” (§ 182, subd. (a)) demonstrates a legislative intent to incorporate 
enhancements into any conspiracy conviction.  
Justice McDonald’s dissent argued that the mere fact that section 182 refers 
to the target crime to determine the punishment for conspiracy does not mean one 
is deemed punished for the target crime.  “[Defendant] did not commit the crime 
of money laundering . . . he committed the crime of conspiracy.  Therefore, he was 
punished under the conspiracy statute for committing the crime of conspiracy; he 
was not punished under the money laundering statute because he did not commit 
the crime of money laundering.” 
We agree with the Court of Appeal majority and the People.  It is true, as 
defendant contends, that conspiracy is separate and distinct from the substantive 
crime that is its object.  But we cannot ignore the fact that the punishment for a 
conspiracy to commit the felony of money laundering is the same as that for 
money laundering.  (§ 182, subd. (a).) 
Kramer, supra, 29 Cal.4th 720, supports the People’s contention.  In 
Kramer, we applied amended section 654 to decide the proper punishment in a 
case in which the defendant fired a gun at a moving car containing two occupants, 
and was convicted of both discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle (§ 246), 
and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)).  (Kramer, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 
722.)  Amended section 654 provides that when an act or omission is punishable 
in different ways by different provisions of law, it “shall be punished under the 
 
7
provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment . . . .”  (§ 
654, subd. (a).)  Kramer observed that the punishment for violating section 246 is 
three, five, or seven years, while the punishment for violating section 245, 
subdivision (a)(2), is two, three, or four years.  (Kramer, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 
722.) 
Viewed in isolation, section 246 provided for the longest potential term of 
imprisonment and, under section 654, would be the applicable statute for 
sentencing defendant.  (Kramer, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 722.)  However, because 
the section 245, subdivision (a)(2), count was eligible for the firearm-use 
enhancement of section 12022.5, subdivision (a), while the section 246 count was 
not, we held that the assault charge under section 245, subdivision (a)(2), provided 
for a longer potential term of imprisonment as long as the firearm-use 
enhancement was included as part of the defendant’s punishment.  We concluded 
that “[t]he statutory language seems clear.  Nothing in that language excludes 
enhancements.”  (Kramer, at p. 723.)  We therefore determined that the court must 
consider enhancements in determining which penal provision provides for the 
longest potential term of imprisonment for the target felony.  (Ibid.; § 654, subd. 
(a).)  As the People observe, Kramer’s conclusion that a “term” is not limited to 
the base term applies with equal force to the punishment for the crime of 
conspiracy under section 182, subdivision (a).  
Defendant relies on People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835 
(Hernandez), where we considered to what extent a court can attach a special 
penal provision to conspiracy rather than to the underlying crime itself.  The 
substantive question in Hernandez was whether the punishment specified for a 
financial-gain special circumstance could be added to the penalty for conspiracy to 
commit murder.  (Id. at p. 864.)  We held that the special circumstance does not 
apply to conspiracy to commit murder.  (Id. at p. 870.) 
 
8
In Hernandez, the jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder and 
conspiracy to commit murder under section 182, subdivision (a).  (Hernandez, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 864.)  Finding that the defendant committed the crimes in 
exchange for heroin and cocaine, the jury applied the financial-gain special 
circumstances for a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 
the crime of conspiracy.  At issue were two statutory provisions:  (1) section 182, 
subdivision (a), which states that when two or more persons conspire to commit 
murder, “the punishment shall be that prescribed for murder in the first degree”; 
and (2) section 190.2, subdivision (a), which provides that “ ‘[t]he penalty for a 
defendant who is found guilty of murder in the first degree is death or 
imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or 
more . . . special circumstances has been found . . . true . . . .’ ”  (Hernandez, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 865.) 
Hernandez recognized that the question whether the penalty for the special 
circumstances in section 190.2 may apply to the crime of conspiracy to commit 
murder turned on statutory construction.  (Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 865.) 
Applying standard rules of statutory construction, we held that the penalty for the 
special circumstances does not apply to conspiracy to commit murder.  (Id. at p. 
870.)  First, nothing in the wording of the statutes governing special circumstances 
indicated that the voters who enacted the death penalty law intended for the 
special circumstances to apply to conspiracy.  (Id. at pp. 865-866.)  Scrutinizing 
the wording of the initiative, we held that the provisions strongly implied that 
special circumstances may be charged as to the crime of murder only.  (Id. at p. 
866.) 
Hernandez next observed that the crime of conspiracy was not mentioned 
in either the text of the 1978 death penalty measure, or the official ballot pamphlet 
for the election adopting that measure.  (Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 866.)  
 
9
Indeed, it was not clear in 1978 that capital punishment for an unsuccessful 
conspiracy to commit murder was permitted under the federal Constitution.  (Id. at 
p. 867.)  We noted that were we to construe section 190.2 to include conspiracy, 
that crime would require a substantially more severe punishment than that 
imposed for attempted premeditated murder, thus creating an irreconcilable 
disparity between the otherwise similar offenses of attempt and conspiracy.  
(Hernandez, at pp. 867-868.)  After also finding that allowing the death penalty 
for crimes not involving murder could raise potential constitutional problems, we 
concluded that the 1978 law should not be read to allow capital punishment for the 
conspiracy to commit murder.  (Id. at pp. 869-870.) 
In addition, Hernandez reasoned that the rule of construction that requires 
us to resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of the defendant bolstered the 
conclusion that the special circumstances enhancement should not apply to the 
crime of conspiracy.  (Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 869.)  What we term the 
rule of lenity compels this result when the statute “is susceptible of two 
constructions.”  (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896; see also People 
v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 627.)  Therefore, Hernandez held that the 
enhancement does not apply to the crime of conspiracy.  (Hernandez, supra, 30 
Cal.4th at p. 870.)  
We find initially that the statutory construction principles we addressed in 
Hernandez do not help defendant.  The purpose of the amendment adding the 
enhancements to section 186.10 was to stop “the deluge of drug proceeds being 
laundered through California based financial institutions” and “further deter 
money laundering [and] more effectively punish launderers.”  (Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3205 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) June 2, 1994, 
pp. 2-3.)  Because the money laundering process typically involves more than one 
person, and often large criminal networks, it is reasonable for us to find that the 
 
10
enhancements under section 186.10, subdivision (c), were intended to control 
large-scale laundering and the conspiracies that necessarily underlie the criminal 
operation.  In Hernandez we found just the opposite, that there was nothing to 
indicate that the voters who enacted the 1978 death penalty law intended for the 
special circumstances to apply to conspiracy.  (Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 
865-866.) 
The rule of lenity also does not assist defendant.  Under that principle, 
when “two reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in relative 
equipoise, i.e., that resolution of the statute’s ambiguities in a convincing manner 
is impracticable,” we construe the provision most favorably to the defendant.  
(People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 599.)  Defendant urges us to apply this 
rule because, he argues, section 182, subdivision (a), is susceptible of two equally 
convincing interpretations:  (1) the enhancement provisions apply to an individual 
who “conducts or attempts to conduct” (§ 186.10, subd. (a)) money laundering 
and not to those who engage in the crime of conspiracy only; or (2) because 
section 182, subdivision (a), states that the conspiracy is “punishable in the same 
manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony,” 
the enhanced punishment of section 186.10, subdivision (c)(1)(D), is part of the 
punishment for the felony of conspiracy to engage in money laundering. 
As the People observe, however, our holding in Hernandez was informed 
only partially by the rule of lenity.  Unlike Hernandez, here the application of the 
section 186.10, subdivision (c), enhancements does not involve imposition of the 
death penalty without a murder, or any penalty that would raise serious 
constitutional concerns.  In addition, if we apply the enhancements to defendant’s 
conspiracy conviction, there will be no disparity between the punishment for 
attempt to launder money and for conspiracy.  An attempt, like a conspiracy, is 
also punished under section 186.10, subdivision (c). 
 
11
Defendant next contends that the legislative mandate of section 182, 
subdivision (a), that conspiracy to commit a felony is punishable “in the same 
manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony” 
(italics added), refers to the felony of money laundering without any 
enhancements, i.e., to the base term.  We are not convinced.  The statute 
specifically refers to the “punishment of that felony” (§ 182, subd. (a)) and thus 
includes all punishment for money laundering, including enhancements, 
depending on how much money was laundered, and whether the amount laundered 
was pled and proven.  (§ 186.10, subd. (c).) 
Defendant also relies on Health and Safety Code section 11370.4, 
subdivision (a).  There, the Legislature specifically provided for enhancements 
where a “person [has been] convicted of a violation of, or of a conspiracy to 
violate,” certain other drug trafficking offenses.  (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.4, 
subd. (a).)  Defendant reasons that had the Legislature intended for the 
enhancement provisions to apply to conspiracy to engage in money laundering, it 
would have so indicated.  According to defendant, nothing in the legislative 
history of section 186.10 demonstrates the Legislature intended to apply the 
enhancements to a conspiracy charged under section 182, subdivision (a).  He 
contends that if we construe the punishment provision of the conspiracy statute 
under section 182, subdivision (a), as including the enhancement provisions of 
section 186.10, subdivision (c), we would render superfluous the Legislature’s 
express reference to conspiracy in the drug trafficking enhancement statute.  (See 
Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.4, subd. (a).) 
The Court of Appeal and the People, however, rely on statutory plain 
language to distinguish Health and Safety Code section 11370.4 from Penal Code 
section 186.10, subdivision (c), because the former statute refers to someone 
“convicted” of a drug offense, while section 186.10, subdivision (c), applies to 
 
12
anyone who is “punished under” section 186.10, subdivision (a).  Prior to 1989, 
Health and Safety Code section 11370.4 enhancements applied to persons 
“convicted” of the specified drug trafficking offenses only, and did not include 
persons convicted of conspiracy to violate those sections who were punished 
under those sections.  (Stats. 1985, ch. 1398, § 3, pp. 4948-4949; see People v. 
Duran (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 923, 939-940.)  The Legislature then amended the 
statute in 1989 specifically to include conspiracies to violate the relevant drug 
trafficking offenses.  (See Stats. 1989, ch. 1326, § 2.5, pp. 5327-5328.)  Therefore, 
because the initial statutory language may have created some doubt as to its 
applicability, the Legislature could have believed it was necessary to amend the 
statute in order to apply the statutory enhancements to conspirators because those 
enhancements had been limited specifically to persons convicted of the target 
offense.  The general plain meaning expressed in section 182, subdivision (a), that 
a conspirator will be punished in the same manner and to the same extent as one 
convicted of the underlying felony, does not require additional legislative clarity.  
(See Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 621 [clear statutory language does not 
require construction].) 
The People also rely on the reasoning in People v. Villela (1994) 25 
Cal.App.4th 54.  Villela extended the registration requirement for narcotics 
offenders under Health and Safety Code section 11590 to those convicted of 
conspiracy to commit a drug offense. (Villela, at pp. 59-60.)  The defendant 
maintained that the registration requirement should not apply to a conspiracy 
conviction under Penal Code section 182 because the Health and Safety Code did 
not list a section 182 conspiracy as an included offense.  (Villela, at p. 57.)  Villela  
reasoned that the registration requirement, though not an enhancement, was a 
punishment and concluded that the Legislature intended to subject conspirators to 
the same punishment as that imposed for perpetrators of the underlying felony.  
 
13
(Id. at pp. 60-61; § 182, subd. (a).)  Villela held, therefore, that it would be 
appropriate to punish the defendant to the same extent as one convicted of the 
target felony, which included registration as a narcotics offender.  (Id. at pp. 60-
61.) 
Defendant contends that Villela erred in concluding that the additional 
registration requirement was equal to a punishment.  (See People v. Castellanos 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 785 [sex offender registration is not punishment for ex post 
facto purposes].)  As the People observe, however, even if we assume the court 
incorrectly called the additional registration requirement a punishment, the court 
was correct in reasoning that section 182 requires sentencing to the same extent as 
the underlying target offense, and that the sentencing is not limited to the base 
term of that offense. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying the principles discussed above, we conclude that the 
enhancements set forth in section 186.10, subdivision (c), apply to a conviction of 
conspiracy to commit money laundering under section 182, subdivision (a).  We 
therefore affirm the Court of Appeal judgment.  
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
Penal Code section 186.10, subdivision (c)(1)(D), requires that in 
sentencing a defendant convicted of money laundering, a trial court must impose 
an additional four-year prison term if the value of the unlawful transactions 
exceeded $2.5 million.  Although the defendant here was not convicted of money 
laundering, the majority concludes that the trial court properly imposed an 
additional four-year term to be served consecutive to defendant’s two-year prison 
sentence for the crime of conspiracy.  I disagree.  Analysis of the wording of the 
statutory provisions at issue, comparison of that wording with analogous 
sentencing laws, and review of the legislative history of the money laundering 
statute leave me highly doubtful that the Legislature intended for the additional 
prison term for high-value money laundering transactions to attach to a sentence 
for the crime of conspiracy.  Under the rule of lenity, doubts of this magnitude and 
nature must be resolved in defendant’s favor. 
Subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 186.10 defines the crime of money 
laundering and states that it “shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail 
for not more than one year or in the state prison . . . .”  When a crime is made 
punishable by imprisonment in state prison, and the term is not otherwise 
specified, the state prison term may be 16 months (the lower term), two years (the 
middle term), or three years (the upper term).  (Pen. Code, § 18.)  Thus, the 
punishments that a trial court may impose for the crime of money laundering, 
 
2 
without more, are imprisonment in a county jail for one year or imprisonment in 
the state prison for a term of 16 months, two years, or three years.  If the trial court 
imposes a state prison sentence, rather than a county jail sentence, the crime is a 
felony.  (Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (a).) 
The money laundering statute, Penal Code section 186.10, further states, in 
subdivision (c)(1), that when a person is “punished under subdivision (a) [of the 
same section] by imprisonment in the state prison,” that person “shall also be 
subject to an additional term of imprisonment,” if the value of the money 
laundering transaction or transactions exceeds certain monetary amounts.  If the 
value of the transaction or transactions exceeds $2.5 million, the additional term of 
imprisonment is four years.  (Pen. Code, § 186.10, subd. (c)(1)(D).)  Under 
California’s determinate sentencing laws, additional terms of this sort are known 
as enhancements.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405(c); People v. Briceno (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 451, 460, fn. 7.)  
Having reviewed the relevant punishment provisions for the crime of 
money laundering, including the sentence enhancements for high-value 
transactions, I now turn to the punishment provisions for the crime of conspiracy. 
Under subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 182, when “two or more 
persons conspire” to commit a felony, they “shall be punishable in the same 
manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony.”  
Under this provision, therefore, a person convicted of conspiracy to engage in 
felony money laundering is to be punished “in the same manner and to the same 
extent as is provided for the punishment of” felony money laundering.  This 
necessarily includes the alternative prison terms of 16 months, two years, or three 
years prescribed by subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 186.10.  But does it also 
include the high-value-transaction enhancements under subdivision (c) of that 
section?  That is the issue here. 
 
3 
When resolving an issue of statutory construction, a court’s goal is to 
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the enacting legislative body, and the first 
step is to examine the statutory text, which is generally the most reliable indicator 
of legislative intent, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.  (People 
v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 865.)  If the statutory language is 
unambiguous, in the sense that it is not reasonably susceptible of more than one 
meaning on the question at issue, a court generally adopts that construction 
without further inquiry or analysis.  (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 
621.)  If the language is ambiguous, a court may consult extrinsic sources and use 
a variety of interpretive techniques and construction rules to resolve the 
ambiguity.  (People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94.) 
On the question at issue here, Penal Code section 182 would be 
unambiguous if it expressly stated, for example, that conspiracy to commit a 
felony is punishable “in the same manner and to the same extent” as the target 
felony is punishable, “including any enhancement.”  Language like that appears in 
the Three Strikes law, which provides that the minimum term for an indeterminate 
life term imposed on a third strike defendant is the greatest of three alternatives, 
one of which is “[t]he term . . . for the underlying conviction, including any 
enhancement . . . .”  (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(iii), italics added.)  The 
absence of similar wording in Penal Code section 182, although not conclusive, is 
sufficient to raise a doubt about the underlying legislative intent. 
The provision of Penal Code section 182 making conspiracy to commit a 
felony punishable “in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for 
the punishment of that felony” is reasonably susceptible of more than one 
meaning.  It could mean either that conspiracy to commit a felony is punishable in 
the same manner and to the same extent as the target felony alone, excluding 
punishments that a trial court may impose only when the trier of fact has made 
 
4 
additional findings beyond the essential elements of the target felony itself, or it 
could mean that conspiracy to commit a felony is punishable by the full range of 
punishments available for the target felony, including punishments that may be 
imposed only after additional findings are made.  Neither of these constructions, 
however, is entirely and unfailingly correct. 
Conspiracy to commit a felony is not always punishable by the full range of 
punishments available for the target felony, including punishments that may be 
imposed only after additional findings are made.  For example, the full range of 
punishments for murder includes death and imprisonment for life without 
possibility of parole (Pen. Code, § 190, subd. (a)), yet neither of those 
punishments may be imposed for a conspiracy to commit murder.  (People v. 
Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 865-870.)  But neither is it correct to say that 
the punishments that may be imposed for conspiracy to commit a felony are 
limited to those that could be imposed for the target felony alone and may never 
include punishments that could be imposed only upon the making of additional 
findings.  For example, Health and Safety Code section 11370.4 establishes 
enhancements for certain felonies involving illegal drugs, based on the weight of 
the illegal drug involved in the crime, and it expressly makes these enhancements 
applicable to anyone “convicted of a violation of, or of a conspiracy to violate” 
any of the listed drug offenses.  (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.4, subds. (a), (b), 
italics added.) 
What conclusions may one draw about the proper interpretation of Penal 
Code section 182’s provision making conspiracy to commit a felony punishable 
“in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of 
that felony”?  The conclusions one must draw are, first, that the punishments a 
court may impose for conspiracy to commit a felony sometimes but not always 
include punishments, such as enhancements, that require findings beyond the 
 
5 
essential elements of the target felony itself, and, second, that whether a court may 
impose an enhanced or increased punishment of this sort requires construction and 
analysis of the punishment provisions relating to the target felony.  Accordingly, I 
turn my attention to the punishment provisions for the crime of money laundering. 
On the question at issue here, Penal Code section 186.10, subdivision (c), 
would be unambiguous if it expressly stated, for example, that the transaction-
value enhancements applied not only to the crime of money laundering, but also to 
the crime of conspiracy to engage in money laundering.  As I mentioned earlier, 
language like that appears in the statutory provisions that establish weight 
enhancements for certain illegal drug crimes and make those enhancements 
expressly applicable to anyone “convicted of a . . . conspiracy to violate” any of 
the listed drug offenses.  (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.4, subds. (a), (b).)  The 
absence of similar wording in Penal Code section 186.10, subdivision (c), 
although not conclusive, is sufficient to raise a doubt that the Legislature intended 
that the money laundering high-value enhancements could be applied to a 
conviction for conspiracy.  This doubt derives from the rule of statutory 
construction that when the Legislature uses a critical word or phrase in one statute, 
the omission of that word or phrase in another statute dealing with the same 
general subject generally shows a different legislative intent.  (In re Jennings 
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 273; In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900, 907.) 
Like the majority, I have reviewed the legislative history of Penal Code 
section 186.10 relating to the high-value-transaction enhancements for money 
laundering.  But I find nothing in the available documents showing that the 
Legislature considered whether those enhancements should apply to conspiracy 
convictions or that it formed or expressed any intent on that question. 
The majority relies in part on People v. Kramer (2002) 29 Cal.4th 720, in 
which this court construed the language of Penal Code section 654 stating that 
 
6 
“[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of 
law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential 
term of imprisonment . . . .”  (Italics added.)  Relying on the statute’s purpose and 
legislative history, as well as its wording, this court concluded that the italicized 
words included enhancements.  (People v. Kramer, supra, at pp. 723-724.)  But 
very similar language in another provision of the Penal Code has received a very 
different construction.  For a defendant with one prior conviction that qualifies as 
a “strike,” the Three Strikes law provides that “the determinate term . . . shall be 
twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony.”  (Pen. 
Code, § 667, subd. (e)(1).)  The italicized language in this provision has been 
construed as not including enhancements.  (People v. Hardy (1999) 73 
Cal.App.4th 1429, 1433; People v. Dominguez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 424.)  
Thus, consideration of similar language in other sentencing laws provides no 
conclusive or satisfactory resolution of the ambiguity at issue here. 
The majority also relies in part on the wording of subdivision (c) of Penal 
Code section 186.10, the money-laundering statute, which states that the high-
value-transaction enhancements apply to anyone “who is punished under 
subdivision (a) by imprisonment in the state prison.”  (Italics added.)  The 
majority adopts as its own the People’s argument that a person who is convicted of 
conspiracy to engage in money laundering, and who is sentenced to state prison 
for that crime, has necessarily been punished “under” subdivision (a) of Penal 
Code section 186.10.  Well, yes and no.  Because the conspiracy statute requires 
that persons convicted of that crime be punished “in the same manner and to the 
same extent” as persons convicted of the target crime, one could say, with equal 
accuracy, that a defendant who has received a state prison sentence for money 
laundering has been punished “under” the money-laundering statute or “under” the 
conspiracy statute.  The language is reasonably susceptible of either meaning. 
 
7 
In this situation, I would apply the rule of lenity, a rule of construction for 
laws relating to crimes and punishments.  That rule states that when “two 
reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in relative equipoise, i.e., 
. . . resolution of the statute’s ambiguities in a convincing manner is 
impracticable,” a court adopts the interpretation that is more favorable to the 
defendant.  (People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 599; accord, People v. 
Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 869.)  Because the statutory provisions at issue 
here are ambiguous, and this ambiguity cannot otherwise be convincingly 
resolved, I would construe them as not allowing a court to impose a high-value-
transaction enhancement when the defendant has not been convicted of money 
laundering, but instead of conspiracy to engage in money laundering. 
For this reason, I would reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
I CONCUR: 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Athar 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 112 Cal.App.4th 73 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S119975 
Date Filed: July 14, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: William D. Mudd 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Beatrice C. Tillman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Chris Truax, under appointment by the 
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary R. Schons, 
Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. Foster, Jeffrey J. Koch and Steven T. Oetting, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Beatrice C. Tillman 
Appellate Defenders, Inc. 
555 West Beech Street, Suite 300 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 696-0282 
 
Steven T. Oetting 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2206