Case Title: Idaho v. Fox

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2022-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket Nos. 45832, 45833, 45834, & 43835 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
     Plaintiff-Respondent,  
 
v. 
 
MATTHEW MICHAEL FOX,  
 
     Defendant-Appellant. 
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Boise, December 2021 Term 
 
Opinion filed:  September 9, 2022 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of  
Idaho, Kootenai County. Scott Wayman, District Judge.   
 
The decisions of the district court are affirmed.  
 
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. 
Elizabeth A. Allred argued. 
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent.  
Respondent. Jeffery D. Nye argued. 
 
____________________________ 
 
ZAHN, Justice.  
Matthew Michael Fox appeals from his convictions for robbery, aggravated battery, 
possession of marijuana, and possession of methamphetamine. For the following reasons, we 
affirm the convictions.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
On May 17, 2017, Ciena Mulvaney drove Mark Mood to his friend’s house to buy 
methamphetamine. Mulvaney stayed in the car as Mood walked into the house’s garage. After 
entering the garage, Fox approached Mood and hit him in the face with a gun, rendering Mood 
briefly unconscious. After Mood regained consciousness, Fox held a gun to Mood’s head and 
threatened to kill him if he did not give Fox money that Mood owed him. Mood gave Fox money 
that he owed Fox for the methamphetamine. 
After the altercation, Fox ran out of the garage to Mulvaney’s car. Fox told Mulvaney 
that she needed to take Mood to the hospital. He then attempted to take Mulvaney’s keys from 
 
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her car but failed. However, Fox was able to take Mulvaney’s phone from the car and walked 
away. Mood then emerged from the garage with a shirt over his face. Mood got back into 
Mulvaney’s car and told her that “[Fox] has a gun and he hit me.” Mulvaney and Mood then 
drove away. Fox followed Mulvaney and Mood in his own car, with a gun visible on the 
dashboard. Mulvaney, who was scared by the ordeal, pulled into the parking lot of Fernan 
Elementary School and began screaming for someone to call for help.  
Marc Branscome, who was leaving his child’s concert at the school, noticed Mulvaney in 
the parking lot hysterically trying to get someone to call 911. Branscome talked to Mulvaney, 
who conveyed information about the incident, including Fox’s license plate number and vehicle 
information. Branscome subsequently called 911. Officer Procter responded to Branscome’s 911 
call and was directed to Mood and Mulvaney. The officer noted that Mulvaney was distraught 
with “labored breathing,” and that Mood had an abrasion on the right side of his face. Officer 
Proctor received the license plate number and identification of Fox’s car from Branscome and 
transmitted the information over the radio.  
Officers Mortensen and Walther heard the dispatch announcement describing the vehicle 
and started searching for the car. The officers found a car matching the description parked 
outside of a Big Smoke store. The officers saw a woman in the passenger seat and waited for the 
driver. Fox exited the store and returned to the car and the officers arrested him. Fox had a black 
handgun in a holster on his left hip. The officers searched the car for the cell phone that was 
mentioned over dispatch. Additionally, the officers searched for drug paraphernalia because as 
the passenger exited the car the officers saw a broken glass pipe with burnt residue. During the 
search, the officers found (1) a briefcase with methamphetamine, marijuana, and other drug 
paraphernalia, (2) Mulvaney’s cellphone, and (3) a Smith & Wesson handgun.  
The night of May 17, the same day as Fox’s arrest, Fox’s former fiancé, Nicole Walker, 
called the Kootenai County Sheriff’s department to report that her 9mm handgun was missing. 
Walker went into the police station the next day and identified the Smith & Wesson handgun 
found in Fox’s car as hers.  
B. Procedural History 
The State charged Fox with the robbery of Mood (Count I), aggravated battery of Mood 
(Count II), grand theft by possession of stolen property for stealing Walker’s gun (Count III), 
robbery of Mulvaney (Count IV), and possession of marijuana (Count V). On August 3, the State 
 
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moved to join a related case where Fox was charged with possession of the methamphetamine 
found in the vehicle (Count VI). Fox objected to the State’s motion for joinder and moved to 
sever, arguing that Counts I and II should be tried in a separate trial from Counts III, IV, and V. 
At the hearing on the motions, Fox clarified his position, arguing that the district court should 
have three trials, one for Counts I, II, and IV, one for Count III, and one for Counts V and VI.  
On September 22, the district court granted the State’s motion for joinder and denied 
Fox’s motion to sever. The district court explained that joinder pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 
(“I.C.R.”) 8(a) was appropriate because “all of the events described took place on the same date 
and all arose out of the same act or series of transactions that were connected together from the 
original incident, giving rise to each one of those separate counts.” Further, the district court 
denied the motion to sever and set the matter for trial after determining the joinder of the six 
counts would not cause unfair prejudice to Fox pursuant to I.C.R. 14.  
 
The trial commenced on November 1, 2017, and lasted three days. The jury found Fox 
guilty on all counts except Count III, grand theft by possession of stolen property. Following the 
jury verdicts in the case before us, Fox pleaded guilty in three other cases that arose from other 
items recovered on the day of his arrest.  
In the first case, Fox was charged with burglary for stealing a gun and grand theft by 
unauthorized control for selling the stolen gun. Fox pleaded guilty to the grand theft charge and 
the State dismissed the burglary charge.  
In the second case, Fox was charged with grand theft for stealing a credit card, and two 
counts of burglary for using the credit card at Home Depot and Big Smoke. Fox pleaded guilty to 
grand theft by unauthorized control and the State dismissed the burglary charges.  
In the third case, Fox was charged with four counts of possession of counterfeit notes for 
the possession of counterfeit money found in his vehicle, and three counts of grand theft by 
possession for the possession of three stolen guns. Fox pleaded guilty to one count of possession 
of counterfeit notes and one charge of grand theft by possession and the State dismissed the other 
charges.  
The district court held one sentencing hearing on all four cases. On the case before us in 
this appeal, the district court imposed concurrent, unified sentences on each count of 20 years, 
with 10 years fixed. For the other three cases, the district court imposed concurrent, unified 
sentences of fourteen years, with ten years fixed on each count, to be served concurrently with 
 
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the 20-year sentences in this case. About a month after the sentencing hearing Fox filed motions 
pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b) for modification of all the sentences. The district court denied the 
motions.  
Fox timely appealed.  
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred when it granted the State’s motion to join and denied 
Fox’s motion to sever?  
2. Whether the district court erred when it admitted the State’s Rule 404(b) evidence? 
3. Whether the district court erred when it denied Fox’s motion for a mistrial? 
4. Whether the district court erred when it admitted the body camera footage and the 911 
call? 
5. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing argument? 
6. Whether the cumulative error doctrine mandates a retrial? 
7. Whether the district court abused its sentencing discretion? 
8. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Fox’s Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of sentence?  
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The district court did not err when it granted the State’s motion to join and denied 
Fox’s motion to sever. 
Fox argues that the district court erred when it granted the State’s motion to join the 
counts against him and abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever the counts.  
1. Standard of review  
When reviewing trial court rulings on I.C.R. 8 and I.C.R. 14 motions, “a proper and 
complete analysis should analyze each rule separately” and “with their proper standards of 
review.” State v. Nava, 166 Idaho 884, 889–90, 465 P.3d 1123, 1128–29 (2020). Whether a 
district court properly joined charges pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. Nava, 166 Idaho at 891, 465 P.3d at 1130.  
However, this Court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion to sever pursuant to 
I.C.R. 14 for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 890, 465 P.3d at 1129. Under the abuse of discretion 
standard, this Court asks “whether the trial court: ‘(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by 
 
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the exercise of reason.’” State v. Sarbacher, 168 Idaho 1, 4, 478 P.3d 300, 303 (2020) (quoting 
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
2. The district court did not err in granting the State’s motion for joinder. 
Fox argues that the charges against him were improperly joined because they did not 
result from the same act or transaction and were not part of a common scheme or plan. Fox 
maintains that evidence of different crimes that occurred in close temporal proximity to each 
other is insufficient to tie the charges together as part of the same act or transaction. Further, he 
contends that nothing in the allegations demonstrates the existence of a common scheme or plan 
in which the acts are so similar that proof of one tends to prove the others. Finally, Fox argues 
that the State waived the right to present argument on whether all six charges were properly 
joined because the State only presented argument concerning the joinder of Count VI. 
The State claims there are three bases for joinder under I.C.R. 8(a), contending that 
charges may be joined where they (1) are based on the same act or transaction, (2) are based on 
two or more acts or transactions connected together, or (3) constitute parts of a common plan or 
scheme. Based on its interpretation, the State asserts that Fox only provided argument opposing 
the first and third bases, but not the second. The State argues that joinder was proper under a 
“connected together” theory because Fox committed all the acts giving rise to the charges against 
him in rapid succession on May 17, 2017, and there is an overlap in witnesses for all the charges. 
The district court found that joinder was proper because all the events took place on the 
same date and arose out of the same act or series of transactions. Additionally, the district court 
explained that all the charges were connected to the original incident. 
We first address Fox’s argument that the State waived any argument that all charges were 
properly joined because it only addressed the joinder of Count VI in its brief. While Fox is 
correct that the State only explicitly referenced Count VI in its briefing to this Court, the State’s 
analysis of the joinder issue discusses the joinder of all six charges. This is sufficient to preserve 
the argument concerning all six charges on appeal. We now turn to the merits of Fox’s argument.  
a. The plain language of I.C.R. 8(a) provides three bases for joinder. 
In support of its argument that I.C.R. 8(a) allows joinder in three circumstances, the State 
directs this Court to the plain language of the rule. The State contends that the use of the word 
“or” between three different phrases in I.C.R. 8(a) demonstrates there are three bases for joinder.  
 
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Fox, in reply, contends that reading “two or more acts or transactions connected together 
or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan” as two distinct bases for joinder would be 
contrary to ordinary grammar because “constituting parts of a common scheme or plan” is not an 
independent clause and would not make sense on a standalone basis. That is to say, allowing two 
or more charges to be joined if they are based on “constituting parts of a common scheme or 
plan” is not a grammatically correct sentence, but allowing charges to be joined if they are based 
on “two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common 
scheme or plan” is. Fox also argues that I.C.R. 8(a) contains no commas, implying that it is a list 
of two, as opposed to three, permissible bases for joinder.  
Idaho Criminal Rule 8(a) addresses joinder of offenses and provides, in pertinent part:  
Two or more offenses may be charged on the same complaint, indictment or 
information if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, 
are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions 
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. 
When considering joinder, courts may “consider what was alleged by the State, not merely what 
the proof at trial ultimately showed.” State v. Anderson, 168 Idaho 758, 767, 487 P.3d 350, 359 
(2021) (citing Nava, 166 Idaho at 891, 465 P.3d at 1130). 
This Court interprets court rules in largely the same fashion as it interprets statutes. State 
v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 44, 408 P.3d 38, 42 (2017). However, because this Court authors 
the rules, we are not fettered by the constitutional separation of powers in interpreting those 
rules: 
Today we make it clear that while the interpretation of a court rule must always 
begin with the plain, ordinary meaning of the rule’s language it may be tempered 
by the rule’s purpose. We will not interpret a rule in a way that would produce an 
absurd result. Instead, in keeping with the Idaho Criminal Rules’ aim of providing 
for the just determination of every criminal proceeding . . . we construe the rules 
to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and elimination of 
unjustifiable expense and delay. 
Id. (alterations, quotation, and internal citations omitted) (citing I.C.R. 2(a)). “This Court must 
give effect to all the words in [a court rule] so that none will be void or superfluous.” See State v. 
Lantis, 165 Idaho 427, 429, 447 P.3d 875, 877 (2019).  
 
Fairly read, I.C.R. 8(a) demonstrates three bases for joinder. The use of the word “or” 
indicates that charges may be joined where two or more offenses: (1) are based on the same act 
or transaction, (2) are based on two or more acts or transactions connected together, or (3) 
 
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constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. Idaho case law also suggests “connected together” 
is not subsumed within the common scheme or plan language. See State v. Cirelli, 115 Idaho 
732, 734, 769 P.2d 609, 611 (Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]wo or more offenses may be charged on the 
same information if the offenses are based on ‘acts or transactions connected together.’”); State 
v. Cochran, 97 Idaho 71, 73, 539 P.2d 999, 1001 (1975) (“[T]he test for joinder is whether the 
offenses charged are alleged to have been part of a connected series of acts or transactions.”).  
We find this interpretation to be consistent with the Idaho Criminal Rules’ instruction to 
construe the rules “to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and elimination 
of unjustifiable expense and delay,” and their purpose of “provid[ing] for the just determination 
of every criminal proceeding.” I.C.R. 2(a). Our holding today supports principles of judicial and 
trial economy as well as simplicity in criminal procedure. Interpreting I.C.R. 8(a) to allow three 
bases for joinder does not, as Fox contends, eviscerate the purpose of the Criminal Rules. Idaho 
Criminal Rule 14 provides a backstop to prevent joining charges in a manner that may unfairly 
prejudice a defendant. See State v. Wilske, 158 Idaho 643, 644–45, 350 P.3d 344, 345–46 (Ct. 
App. 2015) (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564–65, 165 P.3d 273, 278–79 (2007)) 
(explaining that a “defendant may obtain relief from the joinder pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 14, by showing that joinder will result in unfair prejudice.”). Thus, our holding is 
not at odds with a purpose of providing a “just determination of every criminal proceeding” 
because defendants have adequate procedural safeguards to prevent the prejudicial joinder of 
charges against them. 
Fox also argues the grammar of the rule compels us to conclude there are only two bases 
for joinder. We note, however, that punctuation is not a favored method of interpretation. See, 
e.g., Ewing’s Lessee v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 54 (1837) (“Punctuation is a most fallible standard by 
which to interpret a writing . . . if [the writing’s true meaning is apparent] on judicially 
inspecting the whole, the punctuation will not be suffered to change it.”). As we discussed above, 
the rule is fairly read as identifying three bases for joinder. We decline to employ rules of 
punctuation or grammar to override a fair reading of the rule.   
Finally, Fox contends that our decision in Nava holds there are only two bases for 
joinder. Fox has misread our holding in that case. In Nava, this Court was not asked to consider 
how many bases for joinder existed under I.C.R. 8(a); rather, the issue presented concerned 
whether charges against a defendant were properly joined under a common scheme or plan 
 
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theory. See 166 Idaho at 891, 465 P.3d at 1130. This Court’s language in Nava stating that I.C.R. 
8(a) allowed joinder in two circumstances was not directed at squarely addressing the issue 
before this Court today—whether the “connected together” language is a separate basis for 
joinder under I.C.R. 8(a). To the extent our use of the phrase “two circumstances” created 
confusion, we now clarify that we were not called upon, nor did we, decide that the “same act or 
transaction” language was subsumed within the “common scheme or plan” language. 
Consequently, we did not hold in Nava that there are only two bases for joinder. We now resolve 
the issue that was not raised in Nava and hold that Rule 8(a) sets forth three bases for joinder, 
one of which exists when charges “are based on the same act or transaction.”  
 
Our analysis, however, is not at an end simply because we hold that charges may be 
joined if they are sufficiently connected together. We must also address what standard governs 
joinder under a connected together theory, and whether the charges against Fox satisfy that 
standard.   
b. The charges against Fox were properly joined because they were sufficiently connected 
together. 
The State argues that charges may be joined under a “connected together” theory if they 
stem from a series of acts occurring in rapid succession. The State relies on State v. Gamble for 
the premise that “connected together” means that charges share a “factual connection.” 146 
Idaho 331, 337, 193 P.3d 878, 884 (Ct. App. 2008). However, Gamble is of limited use as the 
Court of Appeals did not expand on or otherwise explain the “factual connection” language in 
that case. See id.  
The State also relies on State v. Anderson, a Court of Appeals decision that applied 
“connected together” as an independent basis for joinder under I.C.R. 8(a). 138 Idaho 359, 362, 
63 P.3d 485, 488 (Ct. App. 2003). In Anderson, the Court of Appeals considered whether a 
resisting arrest charge and a misdemeanor battery charge against a defendant were properly 
joined. Id. at 361–62, 63 P.3d at 487–88. The Court of Appeals held that the offenses did not 
constitute “two or more acts or transactions connected together,” reasoning that the charges 
occurred three months apart, “involved different parties, and occurred in different locations.” Id. 
at 361, 63 P.3d at 487. Conversely, the Court of Appeals noted that charges may be sufficiently 
connected together if they are connected by overlapping evidence or overlapping witnesses and 
would be most efficiently presented by a joint trial. Id. at 362, 63 P.3d at 488.  
 
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The approach suggested by the Court of Appeals in Anderson is both reasonable and 
consistent with how other jurisdictions apply the “connected together” language in their joinder 
rules. For instance, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) provides that two or more offenses 
may be joined if they “are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or 
transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 8(a). In United States v. Richardson, the D.C. circuit interpreted the connected together 
language to allow joinder in cases where there is substantial overlap of evidence to eliminate the 
need to prove essentially the same evidence twice, thus promoting trial economy and 
convenience. 161 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In State v. Dewhitt, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals construed Oregon’s joinder statute as allowing the joinder of charges that are 
“connected together.” 368 P.3d 27, 30 (Or. Ct. App. 2016). The appellate court held that charges 
may be joined on a connected together theory where they are linked by substantial overlapping 
proof, the testimony of the same witnesses, and the general sequence of events leading to the 
charges. Id. at 34.   
 
We find the above authorities well-reasoned and hold that joinder of criminal charges is 
appropriate under a connected together theory when the charges are logically related and involve 
a large amount of overlapping proof. See, e.g., Roberts, 783 F.2d at 769; Anderson, 642 F.2d 
281, 284. Where charges are linked by a common nexus of witnesses, evidence, or time, joinder 
under I.C.R. 8(a) may be appropriate. See Dewhitt, 368 P.3d at 34.  
Applying that rule to the case at hand, we hold that the district court did not err in 
allowing the charges against Fox to be joined because they were logically related and involved a 
large amount of overlapping proof. Here, Officer Proctor responded to the 911 call—relating to 
the battery, assault, and robbery of Mulvaney and Mood—at 6:50 p.m. Fox was subsequently 
arrested at 8:29 p.m. for the aggravated battery. At the same time, officers searched Fox’s car in 
the Big Smoke parking lot and found methamphetamine and marijuana in a briefcase. The 
handgun that gave rise to the grand theft charge was also found in Fox’s vehicle during the same 
search. Therefore, all six charges shared a temporal link, as they were discovered at nearly the 
same time. Further, several of the witnesses overlapped, including Officer Mortensen, who had 
testimony to give on all six charges and the events at issue or preceding each of the charges were 
essentially the same. As such, we hold that the district court did not err in concluding the charges 
were properly joined because they were connected together. 
 
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3. The district court did not err in denying Fox’s motion to sever.  
Fox argues the charges against him should have been severed into three separate trials: 
Counts I, II, and IV in one trial, Count III in one trial, and Counts V and VI in one trial. Fox 
argues that he suffered three sources of prejudice from the district court’s decision to try the 
charges together: the “possible confusion or accumulation of evidence, confounding of defenses, 
and the danger of guilty verdicts based on criminal disposition.” The State argues that Fox failed 
to preserve his arguments on the first and third sources of prejudice and that he failed to establish 
the second source of prejudice was present.  
The district court denied Fox’s motion to sever because it found that Fox was not 
subjected to unfair prejudice by having the charges heard in one trial:  
[w]hether or not to testify is a decision that every defendant has to face in – in 
every case and that decision is up to the defendant with the advice of his counsel. 
I don't find in this case that an unstated desire to testify on one charge versus 
another creates automatic unfair prejudice to a defendant. 
A trial court may grant separate trials of charges when a party is prejudiced by the joinder 
of offenses. I.C.R. 14. When considering a motion to sever pursuant to I.C.R. 14, trial courts 
have considered three potential sources of prejudice in analyzing whether joinder is prejudicial:  
(1) the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence, and convict the defendant of 
one or both crimes when it would not convict him of either if it could keep the 
evidence properly segregated; (2) the defendant may be confounded in presenting 
defenses, as where he desires to assert his privilege against self-incrimination with 
respect to one crime but not the other; or (3) the jury may conclude that the 
defendant is guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the other because of 
his criminal disposition. 
Nava, 166 Idaho at 893, 465 P.3d at 1132 (citation omitted). 
 
We first consider the State’s argument that Fox failed to preserve his claims concerning 
the first and third sources of prejudice identified in I.C.R. 14. “When issues on appeal are not 
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered.” State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996); see also I.A.R. 35. Fox’s argument on the 
first and third sources of prejudice consists of conclusory assertions that such prejudice was 
present but lacks any specific argument supporting his assertions. We conclude that Fox failed to 
preserve these issues for appeal because he failed to support them with sufficient argument or 
authority.  
 
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However, on the second source Fox asserts that his defenses were confounded because he 
wished to testify regarding some of the charges against him, but not others. Idaho case law is 
scant on confounding defenses under I.C.R. 14. However, this Court has held that a defendant 
did not suffer prejudice when the trial record showed that the defendant was able to effectively 
raise and argue his defenses in opening and closing arguments. Anderson, 168 Idaho at 768, 487 
P.3d at 360. 
Both Fox and the State rely on out of jurisdiction cases to support their positions. The 
language of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 is similar, but not identical, to I.C.R. 14.1 “In 
cases where no Idaho case law is directly on point, federal case law interpreting a similar federal 
rule can be persuasive.” State v. Loera, 167 Idaho 533, 538, 473 P.3d 802, 807 (2020) (citation 
omitted).  
The State cites four federal cases—United States v. Cooper, 643 F. App’x 617 (9th Cir. 
2016); Closs v. Leapley, 18 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Alosa, 14 F.3d 693 (1st 
Cir. 1994); and Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968)—for the premise that a 
defendant must show the importance of his testimony on one count and the strong need to refrain 
from testifying on another count to demonstrate prejudice based on confounded defenses. The 
first case, Cooper, is an unpublished disposition, which offers little analysis outside of repeating 
the State’s contention that a defendant must show that he has “important testimony” on one 
count and a “strong need to refrain from testifying” as to the other counts. Cooper, 643 Fed. 
App’x at 617–18. Closs concerned a petition for habeas corpus in which a defendant argued that 
the joinder of charges against him was so prejudicial as to amount to a denial of his right to due 
process. 18 F.3d at 577. The Eighth Circuit noted that to establish prejudice based on 
confounding defenses, a defendant must make a “persuasive and detailed showing regarding the 
testimony [that the defendant] would give on the one count he wishes severed and the reason he 
cannot testify on the other counts.” Id. at 578 (quoting United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 
338 (8th Cir. 1988) (alteration in original). In Alosa, the First Circuit, reviewing the denial of a 
defendant’s motion to sever related gun-charges against him, stated, “a defendant may deserve a 
severance of counts where the defendant makes a convincing showing that he has both important 
testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.” 
 
1 “If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to 
prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, 
or provide any other relief that justice requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a).  
 
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14 F.3d at 695 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, in Baker, the D.C. Circuit 
acknowledged the potential for prejudice stemming from a defendant wishing to testify as to only 
some of the counts against him, but held that “it is essential that the defendant present enough 
information—regarding the nature of the testimony he wishes to give on one count and his 
reasons for not wishing to testify on the other—to satisfy the court that the claim of prejudice is 
genuine[.]” 401 F.2d at 976-77.  
Fox, in turn, cites Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964) for the premise 
that joinder may prejudice a defendant because the defendant cannot weigh the risks and adverse 
effects of testifying separately to each count, risking a defendant being coerced into testifying. In 
Cross, the D.C. Circuit noted the various factors a defendant may balance in choosing whether to 
testify in his defense and discussed how the joinder of multiple charges against a defendant may 
complicate that analysis. 335 F.2d at 989. The court then considered the defendant’s specific 
testimony, concluding that defendant “had ample reason not to testify” as to one count. Id. at 
990. Thus, the court concluded that joinder prejudiced the defendant because it “embarrassed and 
confounded” his defenses. Id. at 991. 
 
We agree with and hereby adopt the approach demonstrated in the cases cited by the 
State. While we do not believe that Fox’s attorney needed to reveal his case strategy in open 
court, Fox needed to provide something more to the district court to establish prejudice than his 
bare assertion that joining the charges would confound his defenses. Here, Fox concedes that he 
did not go into the details of his defenses with the district court but argues it was clear to the 
parties and the district court that he would assert self-defense for the aggravated battery, that the 
passenger in his vehicle possessed the illegal substances, and that he had an ownership interest in 
Walker’s handgun. That said, this does not indicate how his defenses were confounded by the 
joinder of the charges against him. With no explanation concerning the importance of Fox’s 
testimony on certain charges and his strong need to remain silent on others, the district court did 
not err in denying Fox’s motion to sever. The district court perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, acted within that discretion, applied the applicable legal standards and reached its 
decision through the exercise of reason. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision denying 
Fox’s motion to sever.   
We also note that the trial transcript indicates that Fox presented defenses at trial. Fox’s 
counsel asserted self-defense for the battery charge in closing arguments. Further, the jury 
 
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received instructions regarding self-defense. Although Fox was convicted on the battery charge, 
the jury found Fox not guilty on Count III, concerning possession of Walker’s gun.  
B. The district court erred in admitting the State’s I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, however, the 
error was harmless.  
 
Before trial, the State filed a notice of intent to introduce I.R.E. 404(b) evidence at trial. 
Two days after Fox’s arrest officers found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia containing 
methamphetamine residue in a shop on the property, and marijuana in Fox’s bedroom. The State 
claimed the evidence was relevant to prove Fox’s knowledge of the marijuana and 
methamphetamine found in Fox’s vehicle two days earlier—especially if Fox argued that he did 
not know the contraband was in his car. The State reiterated this argument during the trial. Fox 
argued that the probative value of the 404(b) evidence was outweighed by the unfair prejudice 
because: (1) the State failed to establish the evidence as fact since it was found two days after 
Fox’s arrest and other people had access to the areas of Fox’s home where the drugs were 
discovered, and (2) the evidence was offered as propensity evidence.  
The district court granted the State’s motion and admitted the evidence on the basis that it 
was relevant to prove Fox’s knowledge of the possession of drugs. The district court further 
concluded that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice because the fact that there were drugs in Fox’s home did not affect his 
ability to defend against the charges at issue. The district court gave the jury a limiting 
instruction, directing them that the evidence should only be considered for the limited purpose of 
proving the defendant’s motive, intent, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident. 
On appeal, Fox argues the State’s I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, which included drugs and drug 
paraphernalia found at Fox’s residence, was inadmissible because the evidence was irrelevant, 
was offered to show criminal propensity, and was unfairly prejudicial.  
1. Standard of Review 
Evidence of other crimes or wrongs cannot be admitted for purpose of showing a 
defendant’s propensity for criminal behavior. State v. Jones, 167 Idaho 353, 359, 470 P.3d 1162, 
1168 (2020); I.R.E. 404(b). However, 404(b) evidence may be admissible, if the prosecution 
provides notice, to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. To determine whether 404(b) evidence is 
admissible, a court must engage in a two-tiered analysis.  
 
 
14 
 
The first tier concerns whether the evidence is relevant and has two steps: 
First, the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
establish the other crime or wrong as fact. Second, the trial court must determine 
whether the evidence of the other act would be relevant to a material and disputed 
issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. 
Nava, 166 Idaho at 893, 465 P.3d at 1132 (citing State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 
1188 (2009)) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The first tier is reviewed de novo. Id.  
The second tier requires the trial court to perform a balancing test pursuant to I.R.E. 403. 
Id. at 1133. Even if Rule 404(b) evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. The second tier is reviewed under 
the abuse of discretion standard. Id.  
2. The 404(b) evidence was sufficiently established as fact. 
We first examine whether the 404(b) evidence was relevant. The first step in our analysis 
is to determine if the evidence of the drugs found at Fox’s residence was established as fact. See 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188 (“First, the trial court must determine whether there is 
sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact.”). The evidence at trial 
established that the officers found the drugs and drug paraphernalia in Fox’s shop, where only 
Fox had a key, and in Fox’s bedroom. This was sufficient to establish the evidence as fact.  
3. The evidence was not relevant for the proffered purpose. 
We next examine whether the evidence was relevant to a material and disputed issue 
concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. Id. On appeal, the State asserts the evidence 
was admissible to demonstrate Fox’s knowledge that the items in his vehicle were contraband 
because he possessed similar illegal contraband at his home. Fox claims the illegal nature of the 
contraband was not in dispute and, therefore, the only purpose for admitting the evidence was to 
demonstrate his criminal propensity.  
Fox pleaded not guilty to the possession charges, which required the State to 
affirmatively prove that Fox had both knowledge and control of the controlled substances found 
in his vehicle. State v. Cardoza, 155 Idaho 889, 893, 318 P.3d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 2014) (“the 
State [is] required to prove that [the defendant] had both knowledge and control of the 
methamphetamine found in [his vehicle].”); State v. Palmer, 147 Idaho 210, 215, 207 P.3d 186, 
191 (Ct. App. 2009); I.C. § 37-2732. In its notice of intent to introduce 404(b) evidence at trial, 
the State asserted that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove knowledge of the 
 
15 
 
methamphetamine and marijuana found in Fox’s vehicle. When the motion was argued during 
the trial, the State contended: 
The issue, in terms of the two controlled substances charges, possession of 
meth and possession of marijuana, is knowledge. Can I prove that he knew it was 
there? I think it’s very relevant to prove that knowledge if I can show in a shop 
two days later that he had, essentially, exclusive control of and admitted to 
making pipes there, that there was a pipe with methamphetamine that’s similar to 
the pipe that was found in the car. 
I think it also is relevant in terms of knowledge that the marijuana that was 
found in the car, you have marijuana in his bedroom that’s found by the police 
two days afterwards. So I think the drugs that are found in the place where he was 
living a couple of days afterwards go directly to prove knowledge, in terms of the 
drugs found in his car on the 17th. Especially when you have denials as it pertains 
to the methamphetamine. 
In concluding the evidence was relevant for the non-propensity purpose of knowledge, 
the district court stated: 
In this case, I find there is relevance in the fact that the residence and shop 
that were used or occupied by the defendant, shortly after the alleged offense 
occurred here that has been charged have located in them drug paraphernalia, 
glass tubing, scale, and baggies, which were similar to what was found in the 
vehicle and – as well as marijuana that was found at the residence. So I do find 
that there is relevance insofar as that the, if believed by the jury, they could – 
could infer that if the drugs were at his house that he would be unlikely not to 
have knowledge of the drugs in the vehicle if he was there. So it is relevant for the 
purposes of proving knowledge of the possession of the drugs, that in fact, it may 
have been drugs. 
We hold that the district court erred in admitting the evidence because the State failed to 
establish it was relevant for a non-propensity purpose. Courts “can justify the use of uncharged 
misconduct to prove ‘knowledge’ on the grounds that it requires no use of the forbidden 
character inference and where used to prove state of mind, no conduct need follow. But [courts] 
must keep alert that the forbidden propensity inference does not sneak in, particularly in cases 
where ‘knowledge’ supposedly stems from repetitive conduct.” 22B WRIGHT & MILLER, FED. 
PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 5253 (2d ed.) (emphasis added).2 We do not agree that evidence that Fox 
had “similar” items at his home was relevant to establishing Fox’s state of mind concerning the 
items found in his vehicle two days earlier. While the State argued that the evidence was not 
being offered for propensity, the State’s only argument offered at trial in support of admission 
 
2 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) is substantially similar to I.R.E. 404(b). As such, we find this authority 
interpreting the federal rule instructive. See Loera, 167 Idaho at 538, 473 P.3d at 807.  
 
16 
 
was essentially that if Fox had drugs and paraphernalia at his home, then he knew he had drugs 
and paraphernalia in his car two days earlier. This is a propensity purpose.  
Further, although the prosecutor argued in his closing that there were dollar signs on the 
marijuana baggies found in Fox’s room and on the marijuana baggies found in his car, that 
information was not included in the State’s offer of proof made during the argument on the 
motion. Rather, that testimony only came in after the district court granted the State’s motion to 
admit the evidence. We take no position on whether, had the State presented that similarity as 
part of its offer of proof, the State would have established the evidence was admissible to 
establish Fox’s knowledge concerning the marijuana in his car.  
To summarize, the State failed to establish that the evidence of controlled substances and 
paraphernalia found at Fox’s home was relevant for a non-propensity purpose. We therefore 
conclude that the district court erred in admitting the evidence of the contraband found in Fox’s 
shop and bedroom. Given our conclusion, we do not need to conduct a Rule 403 balancing. 
4. The admission of the 404(b) evidence constituted harmless error. 
The State maintains that if this Court determines it was an abuse of discretion to admit 
the 404(b) evidence, the error was harmless because the prosecutor provided overwhelming 
evidence of guilt on both of the drug charges. Fox asserts that the State’s argument ignores half 
of the harmless error standard. He argues that the State only addressed the other evidence in the 
record but failed to evaluate the probative force of the error. Fox maintains that the probative 
force of the error was significant and likely influenced the jury’s decision. He notes that the State 
spent significant time presenting the 404(b) evidence—including three witnesses and seven 
exhibits—and that the State highlighted the 404(b) evidence during closing arguments.  
“A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error shall have 
the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of 
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 
661, 673, 462 P.3d 1125, 1137 (2020) (citing State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 
38, 44 (2017). This Court utilizes a two-part analysis to assess harmless error, considering: (1) 
“[t]he probative force of evidence untainted by error against a defendant” and (2) the weight of 
the untainted evidence “against the probative force of the error itself.” Id. at 675, 462 P.3d at 
1139.  
 
17 
 
Here, the State explains that other evidence admitted at trial proved Fox’s guilt on the 
two possession charges, namely, the fact that Fox did not dispute that the substances were 
methamphetamine and marijuana and that the officers found the “substances in Fox’s car, behind 
Fox’s seat, in a briefcase identified by Fox’s ex-fiancé as Fox’s briefcase.” However, the State 
does not weigh the probative force of the evidence untainted by error against the probative force 
of the error itself. Because the State did not assert or support this argument, Fox urges the Court 
to determine that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the error is harmless.  
Fox relies on State v. Almaraz, where this Court determined that “the State failed to meet 
its burden of proving that the error is harmless” when the State failed to discuss harmless error in 
its briefing and only vaguely referenced harmless error in its oral argument. 154 Idaho 584, 599, 
301 P.3d 242, 257 (2013). This case is unlike Almaraz because here the State raised harmless 
error in its briefing. Yet, Fox correctly points out that the State failed to argue both parts of the 
harmless error test articulated above. In Garcia, which was issued five months before the State 
filed its brief in this matter, we held that the proper showing for harmless error was not 
“overwhelming evidence” of the defendant’s guilt. Garcia, 166 Idaho at 674, 462 P.3d at 1138. 
Rather, the harmless error analysis “requires weighing the probative force of the record as a 
whole while excluding the erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the 
probative force of the error.” Id. Despite the State’s failure to argue the correct standard, and for 
purposes of this case only, we conclude the State has presented sufficient argument to allow us to 
determine whether the district court’s error was harmless in this instance. 
Here, when weighing the error of admitting the 404(b) evidence against the other 
evidence the jury considered, we hold the error is harmless. The jury was presented with 
significant evidence that the drugs and paraphernalia found in the car belonged to Fox, namely, 
that the substances were found in Fox’s car, behind Fox’s seat, and in a briefcase identified by 
Fox’s ex-fiancé as Fox’s briefcase. The fact that controlled substances were found at Fox’s home 
did not significantly prejudice Fox when weighed against the significant evidence indicating that 
the drugs found in the car belonged to Fox. Accordingly, we hold the district court’s error in 
admitting the 404(b) evidence did not affect the jury’s verdict. That being said, we caution the 
State to not read this decision as encouragement to continue to argue the “overwhelming 
evidence” standard for harmless error. It is unlikely this Court will continue to address the 
State’s harmless error arguments on appeal as we have done today and as we did in Garcia.   
 
18 
 
C. The district court did not err in denying Fox’s motion for a mistrial. 
At trial, Officer Mortensen testified concerning his and Officer Walther’s conduct at the 
Big Smoke store, where they located and searched Fox’s car. The prosecutor asked if Officer 
Mortensen went into the Big Smoke store after finding Fox’s parked car. Officer Mortensen 
answered, “I was going – inside the vehicle counterfeit money was found–.” Fox objected on 
relevancy grounds. The district court sustained the objection, concluding the testimony was 
irrelevant, and instructed the jury to disregard the answer. Following the district court’s curative 
instruction the prosecutor continued questioning Officer Mortensen:  
Q. When you went into Big Smoke, were you looking for cash? 
A. I was looking for money spent, yes. 
Q. And what did – what did that pertain to? 
[Overruled objection.] 
Q. Let me ask it this way, Mr. Mortensen. Were you – did you go into Big Smoke 
to further the investigation as it pertained to the – alleged robbery? 
A. No, that was not for the robbery. That was for other items found.  
[Overruled objection.] 
The next day Fox moved for a mistrial based on the testimony and the following day, the district 
court denied the motion, concluding Fox had not been deprived of a fair trial.  
On appeal, Fox argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial 
because Officer Mortensen’s testimony mentioning the counterfeit money found in Fox’s vehicle 
was highly prejudicial. Fox asserts that Officer Mortensen’s testimony indicated that Fox may 
have been involved in other criminal activities, which may have contributed to the jury’s guilty 
verdicts. The danger of prejudice was amplified by the follow-up questions and answers, which 
Fox argues elicited additional questioning concerning an investigation of “money spent.” Fox 
argues that while the district court struck the initial testimony concerning the counterfeit money 
and gave a limiting instruction to the jury to disregard the testimony, the district court did not 
strike the follow-up questions.  
When there is a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial error supported by a 
contemporaneous objection, we review the denial of a motion for mistrial for reversible error. 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007). The Court’s focus when deciding 
whether there is reversible error “is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that 
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only 
 
19 
 
if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.” Id. (citations omitted). In 
this case, Fox’s counsel objected to the alleged misconduct, including making a motion for a 
mistrial. Therefore, we review the record to determine if there was prosecutorial misconduct, and 
if so, whether the error was harmless. Id. 
1. The prosecutor’s continued questioning constituted misconduct. 
The State never provided an admissible purpose for Officer Mortenson’s initial testimony 
about the counterfeit money found in Fox’s vehicle. Accordingly, the district court was correct in 
sustaining Fox’s initial objection to the Officer’s answer and giving the jury a curative 
instruction to disregard the officer’s testimony. The district court, however, did not strike the 
testimony following its curative instruction. The prosecutor’s subsequent questioning suggested 
that Fox had counterfeit money, because the prosecutor specifically asked if the Officer was 
looking for cash after the previous testimony about counterfeit money.  
On appeal, the State does not argue that the prosecutor’s questioning was relevant to a 
material issue. Rather, it asserts that the brevity and vagueness of Officer Mortenson’s 
statements did not deprive Fox of a fair trial. See State v. McClain, 154 Idaho 742, 747, 302 P.3d 
367, 372 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding that even if admitting the 404(b) evidence was an error, when 
considering the “strength of the State’s evidence, and the brevity and vagueness” of the 404(b) 
evidence, the error was harmless.)  
The prosecutor’s continued questioning following the district court’s curative instruction 
was improper, given the district court’s ruling and curative instruction just moments earlier. The 
prosecutor’s questioning and the officer’s testimony was irrelevant to any of the six charges 
against Fox. The district court therefore erred in overruling Fox’s objection to the testimony. 
2. The district court’s error in allowing the testimony was harmless. 
Although the statements were erroneously admitted, the officer’s testimony likely did not 
prejudice Fox. The testimony was vague and brief. As previously discussed, the probative force 
of the State’s evidence untainted by error is significant given the testimony by multiple witnesses 
concerning Fox’s actions and the multiple pieces of evidence indicating that the controlled 
substances in the vehicle belonged to Fox. We conclude that the district court’s error in 
overruling Fox’s objection was harmless because the probative force of the record as a whole 
outweighed the probative force of the erroneously admitted testimony. We therefore affirm the 
district court’s decision denying Fox’s motion for a mistrial. 
 
20 
 
D. The district court did not err in admitting exhibit 1, but did err in admitting exhibit 7; 
however, the error was harmless. 
Fox argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to present 
exhibits 1 and 7, because they contained double and/or triple hearsay. Exhibit 1 is Officer 
Proctor’s body camera video wherein Mulvaney told the officer that Mood was pistol whipped. 
Exhibit 7 is an audio recording of the 911 call, which includes Branscome’s statements 
conveying Mulvaney’s statements to the 911 operator. 
The district court overruled Fox’s trial objections to State’s exhibits 1 and 7 because it 
concluded the hearsay statements fell under the excited utterance exception. With regard to 
exhibit 7, when the district court asked the prosecutor to address the objection, the prosecutor 
stated, “I believe I’ve laid the foundation for excited utterances, Judge.” After the district court 
overruled the general objection to the admission of exhibit 7, Fox then made a specific objection 
to Branscome’s statements to the 911 operator, explaining the excited utterance exception did not 
apply to Branscome’s statements. The district court overruled the objection without asking the 
prosecutor to address the objection.  
1. Standard of Review 
“The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit hearsay evidence under 
one of the exceptions, and this Court will not overturn an exercise of that discretion absent a 
clear showing of abuse.” State v. Stanfield, 158 Idaho 327, 331, 347 P.3d 175, 179 (2015). 
Hearsay is not admissible unless an exception applies. I.R.E. 802. An excited utterance is “[a] 
statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress 
of excitement that it caused.” I.R.E. 803(2). A hearsay statement is properly admitted under the 
excited utterance exception if: “(1) an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render 
inoperative the normal reflective thought process of an observer; and (2) the statement of the 
declarant must have been a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result of 
reflective thought.” State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 732, 240 P.3d 575, 578 (2010) (citation 
omitted). To admit evidence under the excited utterance exception, “a court considers the totality 
of the circumstances, including: the amount of time that elapsed between the startling event and 
the statement, the nature of the condition or event, the age and condition of the declarant, the 
presence or absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was volunteered or made in 
response to a question.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 
21 
 
1. The State established that exhibit 1 was admissible under the excited utterance 
exception. 
With regard to Mulvaney’s statement that Mood had been pistol whipped, Fox only 
disputes one requirement of the excited utterance analysis—that Mulvaney did not experience a 
sufficiently startling event because Mulvaney did not witness the battery on Fox. A startling 
event is one that renders inoperative the normal reflective thought process of an observer. See 
Thorngren, 149 Idaho at 732, 240 P.3d at 578. The reliability is “furnished by the excitement 
suspending the declarant’s powers of reflection and fabrication.” State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 
325, 986 P.2d 346, 348 (Ct. App. 1999). Witnessing a startling event is not a requirement; news 
of a shocking event may also render inoperative the reflective thought process of an observer. 
See Thorngren, 149 Idaho at 733, 240 P.3d at 579 (“[T]his Court recognizes that news of a loved 
one’s unexpected death would be sufficiently shocking to render inoperative the reflective 
thought process of a declarant for a brief period of time.”).  
The evidence presented at trial established that Mulvaney’s experience surrounding the 
robberies and battery was sufficiently startling to render inoperative her normal reflective 
thought process. Mulvaney not only saw Mood bleeding from his face and heard him say that he 
was struck in the face with a gun, but Fox stole Mulvaney’s phone and tried to steal her keys, 
which in turn pulled Mulvaney’s glasses from her face and cut her head. Additionally, Fox 
followed Mood and Mulvaney with a gun on his dashboard. Officer Proctor testified that 
Mulvaney “was distraught – severely distraught and labored breathing. Couldn’t really talk. She 
was just kind of all over the place.” That Mulvaney did not directly observe Fox hitting Mood 
did not render the other surrounding events any less startling. Accordingly, we hold the district 
court did not err in admitting State’s exhibit 1. 
2. The State failed to establish that exhibit 7 was admissible under the excited utterance 
exception.  
Fox asserts that Branscome’s 911 call contained three layers of hearsay: (1) Mood’s 
statements to Mulvaney, (2) Mulvaney’s statements to Branscome, and (3) Branscome’s 
statements to the 911 operator. Fox does not challenge the first layer of hearsay. As to the second 
layer, Fox again argues Mulvaney’s statement to Branscome are not admissible because she had 
not experienced a sufficiently startling event. Our analysis of this argument mirrors our analysis 
regarding Muvaney’s statements to Officer Procter. Because the evidence demonstrated that 
Mulvaney was subjected to a sufficiently startling event to render inoperative her normal thought 
 
22 
 
process, we conclude that Mulvaney’s statements to Branscome also qualify under the excited 
utterance exception.  
With regard to the third layer - Brancome’s statements to the 911 operator, the district 
court found that the excited utterance exception, which was the only exception offered by the 
prosecutor, applied. We conclude that Branscome’s statements to the 911 operator do not fall 
under the exception because he did not experience a startling event or condition. The audio of the 
911 call indicated that Branscome was calm and not under the stress or excitement of a startling 
event. Because Branscome’s statements do not fall under the excited utterance exception, the 
district court erred when it admitted State’s exhibit 7 over Fox’s objection. 
The State also argues for the first time on appeal that Branscome’s statements to the 911 
operator were admissible as present sense impressions. The State concedes that arguments 
brought for the first time on appeal are generally waived but claims that the district court denied 
the State an opportunity to respond to the objection and thereby deprived it of the opportunity to 
state this basis below. The State’s concession on this point indicates its recognition that “issues 
not raised below will not be considered by this [C]ourt on appeal, and the parties will be held to 
the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.” State v. Wolfe, 165 Idaho 338, 
341–42, 445 P.3d 147, 150–51 (2019) (citation omitted).  
We are not persuaded by the State’s argument. The record reveals the district court 
allowed the prosecutor to respond to Fox’s first objection to the entirety of State’s exhibit 7 and 
the prosecutor only asserted the excited utterance theory. Fox then objected to a portion of 
exhibit 7 containing Branscome’s statements and the district court immediately overruled the 
objections without permitting the prosecutor to respond. Contrary to the State’s argument on 
appeal that the prosecutor was never provided an opportunity to respond to the second objection, 
the prosecutor’s first response covered the entirety of exhibit 7 and therefore covered the second 
objection as well. We decline to address the State’s present sense impression argument on appeal 
because it failed to raise the exception below.  
3. The erroneous admission of exhibit 7 constituted harmless error. 
Although the district court erred by admitting State’s exhibit 7, we hold that the district 
court’s admission of State’s exhibit 7 was a harmless error. The State presented substantial 
testimony regarding the battery and robberies through Mood, Mulvaney, Branscome and the 
responding officers. The 911 call contained information that was duplicative of this evidence. As 
 
23 
 
previously mentioned, the record as a whole contained significant evidence establishing Fox 
battered and robbed Mood and Mulvaney. We therefore conclude that the probative force of the 
erroneously admitted 911 call was minimal when weighed against the probative force of the 
record as a whole. Therefore, we hold that the district court’s error was harmless.  
E. The prosecutor committed misconduct during the closing argument, however, the error 
was harmless. 
Fox argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument because 
he “declared that Fox admitted robbing Mood during police interrogation.” Specifically, Fox 
challenges this portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument:  
He doesn’t say it’s an accident to Officer Mortensen, but if you listen to that 
recording, that’s the only conclusion you can draw. That it’s not something else, 
but it just happened as he was pulling his gun and turning around. But then, if you 
listen to it with Detective Hollenbeck, about two weeks later, he is very specific, 
saying, “I jabbed that into his cheek and dropped him.” You’ve got two different 
accounts of what Mr. Fox said he did to Mr. Mood; both conflict with each other. 
And at first, it’s an accident. And second, it’s an intentional, I’m hitting him. I’m 
jabbing it [sic] in the face with that gun and then robbing him.  
(Emphasis added). Fox claims this was a gross misrepresentation of the evidence because Fox 
did not make any admission to robbing Mood. Additionally, Fox argues that the prosecutorial 
misconduct was not harmless and requires his conviction to be vacated because the district 
court’s decision to overrule the objection supported the prosecutor’s statement. Finally, Fox 
asserts that if the error is harmless, this Court should nonetheless remand the case to discourage 
what Fox alleges is “a pattern of repetitious misconduct.”  
The State asserts that the prosecutor did not misrepresent the evidence in his closing 
argument because the prosecutor was speaking to the discrepancy in the different stories Fox had 
given police regarding the battery. The State explains that the statement, “and then robbing him” 
indicated a sequence of events, not the assertion that Fox confessed to robbing Mood. The State 
argues if there was a misrepresentation, the error was harmless because the jury received an 
instruction that the closing arguments of counsel are not evidence. Finally, the State asserts that 
the harmless error rule requires this Court to affirm Fox’s judgment of conviction if it concludes 
the misconduct did not affect the verdict.  
 
During closing arguments, Fox objected to the prosecutor’s statement, “and then robbing 
him,” because the facts in evidence did not indicate that Fox admitted to robbing Mood. The 
district court overruled the objection.  
 
24 
 
When there is a contemporaneous objection to the trial court, this Court determines first 
whether there was prosecutorial misconduct, then whether the error was harmless. State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 219, 245 P.3d 961, 971 (2010). Here, Fox asserts the prosecutorial misconduct 
was a result of the prosecutor’s misrepresentations of the evidence. “It is plainly improper for a 
party to present closing argument that misrepresents or mischaracterizes the evidence. Further, it 
constitutes misconduct for a prosecutor to place before the jury facts not in evidence.” State v. 
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 277, 429 P.3d 149, 165 (2018) (citations and quotations omitted). 
“However, even when prosecutorial misconduct has resulted in fundamental error, the conviction 
will not be reversed when that error is harmless.” Field, 144 Idaho at 571, 165 P.3d at 285 
(2007). 
Here, neither Fox nor Detective Hollenback spoke about the robbery in the police 
interview recordings the prosecutor referenced during his closing argument. Further, there were 
no facts admitted during the trial to establish that Fox admitted to robbing Mood. The 
prosecutor’s use of “I” statements while paraphrasing the audio recording of the conversation 
between Fox and Detective Hollenbeck suggested the prosecutor was quoting Fox or describing 
what Fox said. Therefore, the prosecutor’s statements were misleading and could cause a 
reasonable juror to believe Fox made the statements. We conclude that the prosecutor’s 
statements during his closing argument constituted misconduct because they either 
mischaracterized the evidence or placed before the jury facts that were not in evidence. The 
district court therefore erred when it overruled Fox’s objection to the statements. 
This error, however, was harmless. The jury was instructed that statements during closing 
arguments are not evidence. This Court presumes the jury followed the instruction. See State v. 
Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 125, 443 P.3d 129, 139 (2019) (holding that the prosecutor’s error, by 
mischaracterizing evidence in closing arguments, did not rise to fundamental error because the 
jury was instructed that closing arguments do not constitute evidence and this Court presumes 
the jury followed the instruction). As stated previously, the State presented substantial evidence 
against Fox. The probative force of the prosecutor’s misrepresentation was slight when weighed 
against the probative force of the record as a whole. Therefore, we hold the district court’s error 
in overruling Fox’s objection was harmless. 
Finally, as for Fox’s argument that the case be remanded to discourage the prosecutor’s 
office from further prosecutorial misconduct, this Court is not at liberty to ignore a harmless 
 
25 
 
error determination to “send a message” to the State. Nor will we address Fox’s contention that 
the prosecutor’s office has engaged in repeated misconduct. See I.C.R. 52 (“Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”). We decline 
Fox’s invitation to ignore Rule 52 and discard the jury’s verdicts in this matter. 
F. The cumulative error doctrine does not demand a retrial in this matter.  
Fox argues that the cumulative error doctrine applies if the Court concludes there were 
multiple harmless errors. The State maintains that Fox has failed to show the cumulative error 
doctrine requires a new trial, because even if Fox proves more than two errors, any combination 
of the errors would not require a new trial.   
“Under the cumulative errors doctrine, an accumulation of irregularities, each of which 
might be harmless in itself, may in the aggregate reveal the absence of a fair trial in 
contravention of the defendant’s right to due process.” State v. Samuel, 165 Idaho 746, 778, 452 
P.3d 768, 800 (2019) (quoting State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994)). 
“The presence of errors, however, does not by itself require the reversal of a conviction, since 
under due process a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not an error-free trial.” State v. Capone, 
164 Idaho 118, 127, 426 P.3d 469, 478 (2018) (citation omitted). Application of the cumulative 
errors doctrine requires a finding of more than one error. Samuel, 165 Idaho at 778, 452 P.3d at 
800. Errors are viewed “in relation to the totality of the evidence presented at trial.” State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998).  
While it is troublesome that there were multiple errors committed during Fox’s trial, the 
cumulative error doctrine does not demand a reversal in this case. Fox has not demonstrated his 
due process right to a fair trial has been violated. The State presented substantial evidence at trial 
to establish Fox’s guilt. Mulvaney, Mood, and the responding officers testified to the robbery 
and battery. Additionally, law enforcement testified to the physical evidence of stolen items and 
drug contraband found in Fox’s vehicle, and lab results confirmed that the substances found in 
Fox’s vehicle were methamphetamine or marijuana. Finally, Fox’s ex-fiancé testified that Fox 
owned the briefcase in which the drugs were found. In sum, even in the aggregate, the errors 
described above do not rise to the magnitude of a denial of Fox’s right to a fair trial.   
G. The district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. 
Fox argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion because his unified 
sentences—twenty years, with ten years fixed for the robbery and aggravated battery 
 
26 
 
convictions; seven years fixed, for his possession of methamphetamine conviction; and fourteen 
years, with ten years fixed, for his grand theft and possession of counterfeit notes convictions—
are excessive. Fox asserts that “the district court did not give proper consideration to his family 
support, substance abuse and desire for treatment, health concerns, and remorse.” The State 
maintains that the district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion because the sentences 
were all within statutory limits and reasonable. Additionally, the State explains the district court 
gave proper consideration to the factors argued by Fox, but none of these factors required a 
lesser sentence than the sentence imposed.  
This Court reviews sentencing decisions under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. 
Barr, 166 Idaho 783, 785, 463 P.3d 1286, 1288 (2020). When “a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion by the court imposing 
the sentence.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016) (citation omitted). 
This Court considers all of the facts and circumstances of the case when determining whether a 
trial court abused its sentencing discretion. Id. The greatest consideration is reasonableness and 
whether the sentence is necessary to accomplish the “primary objective of protecting society and 
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” Id.  
Here, Fox concedes the sentences were within the statutory limits. As such, Fox has the 
burden to prove that in light of the governing criteria, his sentences were excessive, considering 
any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria are: “(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of 
the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment 
or retribution for wrongdoing.” Id. (citation omitted).  
The district court considered Fox’s sentences in each of the four cases against him at a 
single hearing. In reaching its sentencing decision, the district court analyzed each of the four 
sentencing goals listed above but did not particularize its analysis to each of the charges against 
Fox. The district court discussed Fox’s mitigating factors, including familial support, his difficult 
childhood, and genuine remorse for his actions, including an apology Fox made at the hearing. It 
also noted that Fox’s prior criminal record was not significant. However, the district court 
recognized the seriousness of Fox’s offenses and determined that a “fairly stiff sentence” was 
appropriate to serve the goals of deterrence and societal protection. Further, it emphasized that 
Fox “chose to use drugs, gave into [his] addiction, let drugs rule [his] life and . . . [went] down a 
path of stealing and robbing and using guns and hanging around with bad people.”  
 
27 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Fox. First, the transcript 
demonstrates that the district court appropriately perceived sentencing as a matter of discretion 
as it considered the various sentencing options. Next, the district court acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion, recognizing statutory limitations on sentences and imposing 
sentences within those boundaries. Further, the district court acted consistently with applicable 
legal standards, discussing the four goals of sentencing and how various factors influenced its 
resulting sentences. Finally, the district court reached its decision through the exercise of reason 
by weighing various factors and reaching a sentence which it believed would serve the four 
sentencing goals. Fox has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion.  
H. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Fox’s Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of sentence.  
The district court denied Fox’s motions for reduction of sentence, which he filed a little 
over a month after his sentencing. Fox argues that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his Rule 35 motions because the district court failed to consider new information and 
mitigating factors in his case. The new information included: another apology for his criminal 
behavior, enrollment in a recovery program and Narcotics Anonymous, obtaining his GED, 
working at the chapel, obtaining Microsoft certification, and the absence of any disciplinary 
offense reports. The State argues that Fox has failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion because the repeat apology is not new information and good behavior in prison is not 
mitigating information, but instead the expectation for any incarcerated individual.  
This Court reviews a district court denial of a defendant’s motion for reduction of 
sentence under the abuse of discretion. State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 
(2008). “If the original sentence is not excessive, then the defendant must show at the trial court 
level that additional facts or information make the sentence excessive in light of that additional 
information.” Id. However, the appeal of a denial of a motion to reduce the defendant’s sentence 
cannot be used “as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new 
information.” Id. at 517, 181 P.3d at 443. 
Fox’s initial sentences were not excessive. Accordingly, Fox must present new evidence 
or information that make the sentences excessive. While Fox’s good behavior during his 
incarceration is laudable, it did not establish that the original sentences were excessive. Good 
behavior by a defendant while in custody is to be expected. Additionally, the district court 
 
28 
 
expressly acknowledged Fox’s remorse as a mitigating factor when it sentenced Fox. Therefore, 
Fox’s second apology for his criminal behavior did not constitute new information. Overall, the 
district court acted within its discretion and consistent with legal standards when it denied Fox’s 
motion for a reduction in sentence. As such, the district court did not err in denying Fox’s Rule 
35 motions.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Fox’s judgments of conviction and sentences.  
Justices BRODY and STEGNER CONCUR. 
BEVAN, Chief Justice, specially concurring:  
While I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the district court, I respectfully 
dissent from the reasoning and conclusion reached by the majority in section III.B that evidence 
of drugs recovered from Fox’s residence was not relevant to prove knowledge of the controlled 
substances and drug paraphernalia in his car.  
As the majority aptly recognizes, whether to admit evidence presents a discretionary 
decision for the district court. “The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and 
exclusion of evidence and its decision to admit evidence will be reversed only when there has 
been a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Diaz, 170 Idaho 79, ___, 507 P.3d 1109, 1113 
(2022) (quoting State v. Lopez-Orozco, 159 Idaho 375, 377, 360 P.3d 1056, 1058 (2015)). To 
that end, I note that Fox failed to argue the district court violated the abuse of discretion 
standard. While the majority correctly points out that Fox asserted the district court abused its 
discretion when it admitted the 404(b) evidence because it did not act consistently with the 
applicable legal standards and did not exercise reason in reaching its decision, Fox’s argument 
did not address these elements. In fact, after reciting the standard at the beginning of his 
argument, Fox never mentioned the word “discretion” again or claimed the district court abused 
its discretion when explaining why this Court should reverse the district court’s decision to admit 
the 404(b) evidence.  
While this Court does not impose a “formalistic requirement that the standard of review 
be recited and the party claiming error attack a particular prong of that standard of review,” Fox 
failed to argue how the district court abused its discretion. See State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 870, 
436 P.3d 683, 691 (2019) (explaining a failure to recite the standard of review is not fatal but the 
parties must argue the district court violated the abuse of discretion standard); State v. Kralovec, 
 
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161 Idaho 569, 575 n.2, 388 P.3d 583, 589 n.2 (2017) (“We note that this Court has seen an 
increasing number of cases where a party completely fails to address the factors we consider 
when evaluating a claimed abuse of discretion.”). And the majority has followed Fox’s lead by 
substituting its judgment for the district court’s discretion. The only question before this Court is 
whether the district court abused its discretion, “not whether this Court would have made the 
same decision.” Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 717, 170 P.3d 375, 382 (2007) (“[t]his Court 
will not attempt to substitute its judgment and discretion for that of the trial court, except in cases 
where the record reflects a clear abuse of discretion.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
The rule is that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a 
defendant’s criminal propensity. I.R.E. 404(b)(1). Even so, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” I.R.E. 404(b)(2) 
(emphasis added).  
When considering the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b), the trial court must 
engage in a two-tiered analysis under State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 
(2009) (citations omitted). Within the first tier are two-steps. Id. First, the trial court must 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact.” Id. 
(citation omitted). Second, the trial court must determine whether the evidence of the other act 
would be relevant to a “material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than 
propensity.” Id. (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569, 165 P.3d 273, 283 (2007)). This 
relevancy determination is reviewed de novo. Field, 144 Idaho at 569, 165 P.3d at 283. The 
second tier requires the district court to engage in a balancing test under Rule 403. Grist, 147 
Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. This balancing test is reviewed under the abuse of discretion 
standard. Id. 
The majority today holds the State failed to establish that the evidence of controlled 
substances and paraphernalia found at Fox’s home was relevant for non-propensity purposes. 
Thus, even though the majority concludes that admitting the evidence amounted to harmless 
error, it holds the district court erred in admitting it as 404(b) evidence.  
I would conclude the district court made a correct determination of the relevancy of this 
evidence to show Fox’s knowledge. A reasonable juror could conclude it would be unlikely Fox 
would not know about the drugs in his car if he had knowledge (via circumstantial evidence) of 
 
30 
 
the same drugs at his residence. This inference means the evidence was relevant for reasons other 
than propensity.  
Contrary to the majority’s view, Fox denied knowing that the substance in his briefcase 
was drugs. Moreover, by pleading not guilty, Fox put “in issue every material allegation of the. . 
. information. . . .”  I.C. § 19-1715; see also State v. Owens, 101 Idaho 632, 634, 619 P.2d 787, 
789 (1979); State v. Cutler, 94 Idaho 295, 486 P.2d 1008 (1971). “[K]nowledge that one is in 
possession of the substance” is an essential element of the offense Fox was charged with. State v. 
Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993). See also State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 
985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999) (quoting Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183 (“the offense requires 
a general intent, that is, the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance”). When Fox 
claimed he did not possess the drugs and disclaimed knowing they were in his briefcase, his 
knowledge became “a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged.” State v. Nava, 
166 Idaho 884, 892–93, 465 P.3d 1123, 1132–33 (2020).  
I agree with the Court of Appeals’ explanation that “in a possession of a controlled 
substance case ‘[t]he greater the amount of controlled substance found in a defendant's 
possession, the greater the inference of knowledge.’” State v. Cardoza, 155 Idaho 889, 893, 318 
P.3d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 152, 983 P.2d 217, 225 
(Ct. App. 1999)). That Fox was in possession of similar paraphernalia and drugs across two 
separate locations is relevant to show he knew the substance inside the briefcase was a controlled 
substance. The State has the burden to prove Fox knew the briefcase contained drugs and drug 
paraphernalia—establishing the drugs evidence in the shop was similar to the drug evidence in 
the briefcase shows Fox had knowledge.  
At Fox’s trial, outside the presence of the jury, the district court heard arguments from 
the State and counsel for Fox about 404(b). The prosecutor argued:  
It's that there was, essentially, pipes and a scale, drug paraphernalia that 
was found in the shop, contemporaneous, around the same time that the stuff was 
found in the car. There was a piece of glass tubing similar to the glass tubing in 
this case, that I expect Dave Sincerbeaux [the forensic scientist] to say contained 
methamphetamine – it contains methamphetamine that was in the shop.  
So, essentially, the situation here is we have methamphetamine and a 
methamphetamine pipe that was in the Nissan. Those both came back as positive 
for meth. In the shop that was searched by the police around the 19th or so, a 
couple of days after this, they found a methamphetamine pipe with 
methamphetamine inside it, as well as marijuana.  
 
31 
 
The issue, in terms of the two controlled substances charges, possession of 
meth and possession of marijuana, is knowledge. Can I prove that he knew it was 
there? I think it's very relevant to prove that knowledge if I can show in a shop 
two days later that he had, essentially, exclusive control of and admitted to 
making pipes there, that there was a pipe with methamphetamine that's similar to 
the pipe that was found in the car.  
 
I think it also is relevant in terms of knowledge that the marijuana that was 
found in the car, you have marijuana in his bedroom that's found by the police 
two days afterwards. So I think the drugs that are found in the place where he was 
living a couple of days afterwards go directly to prove knowledge, in terms of the 
drugs that are found in his car on the 17th. Especially when you have denials as it 
pertains to the methamphetamine. 
I would conclude the district court’s decision to admit the State’s evidence was proper because 
the State has the burden of proving Fox knew the drugs were in his vehicle. As the district court, 
in my view, correctly concluded following arguments from the State and Fox:  
I find there is relevance in the fact that the residence and shop that were 
used or occupied by the defendant, shortly after the alleged offense occurred here 
that has been charged have located in them drug paraphernalia, glass tubing, 
scale, and baggies, which were similar to what was found in the vehicle and -- as 
well as marijuana that was found at that residence. So I do find that there is 
relevance insofar as that the, if believed by the jury, they could -- could infer that 
if the drugs were at his house that he would be unlikely not to have knowledge of 
the drugs in the vehicle if he was there. So it is relevant for the purposes of 
proving knowledge of the possession of the drugs that, in fact, it may have been 
drugs. 
On appeal, Fox argues that marijuana and methamphetamine are common types of drugs 
and the similarities between the drugs found at Fox’s residence and those found inside his car 
cannot prove knowledge. While the drugs may be “fairly common,” the State’s purported 
purpose in offering them at trial was not to show that because Fox allegedly possessed drugs at 
his residence, he therefore possessed them in his car. Indeed, that is the very propensity inference 
the State is prohibited from making. Even if the drugs found in both places are common, the fact 
that Fox had the same two types of drugs in his residence, along with the same drug 
paraphernalia, packaging, and same money bag with a dollar symbol on it makes it more likely 
Fox knew the items in both locations were the same. That distinction, while subtle, is an 
admissible inference we permit jurors to draw—that he had drugs in one place and thus was 
more likely to have them in another is the propensity inference we restrict.  
 
32 
 
Fox also argues the State failed to show no one else had access to the residence and that 
he alone was in exclusive control. But these questions go not to admissibility, but to weight of 
the evidence. The district recognized this and made clear when it admitted the 404(b) evidence 
that Fox was free to raise these issues at trial and challenge the State’s witnesses on Fox’s lack of 
knowledge and exclusive control. Fox chose not to do so.  
Finally, I note that the district court properly exercised its discretion in my opinion by 
issuing a limiting instruction when the evidence was admitted. Indeed, the district court gave two 
such instructions. Instruction 26 noted:  
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the 
defendant committed wrongs or acts other than that for which the defendant is on 
trial.  
Such evidence, if believed, is not to be considered by you to prove the 
defendant's character or that the defendant has a disposition to commit crimes.  
Such evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of 
proving the defendant's motive, intent, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or 
accident.   
And Instruction 27 explained:  
Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. 
At the time this evidence was admitted you were admonished that it could 
not be considered by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which 
it was admitted. 
Do not consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose 
for which it was admitted. 
The district court provided these instructions to explain the evidence should be 
considered only for the limited purposes for which it was admitted. I cannot conclude the district 
court abused its discretion when it properly evaluated the evidence and instructed the jury to do 
the same. For these reasons, I would affirm the district court’s decision to admit the 404(b) 
evidence.   
Justice MOELLER CONCURS.