Case Title: Taylor v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 195, 2011

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2011-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANTONIO LEE TAYLOR,  
 
          Defendant Below- 
          Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
                    Plaintiff Below- 
         Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 195, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, in and 
§  for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9404018838 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                       Submitted: June 24, 2011 
 
Decided:  August 16, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 16th day of August 2011, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Antonio Lee Taylor, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s March 25, 2011 order adopting the 
Commissioner’s February 7, 2011 report, which recommended that Taylor’s 
second motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Rule 61 
be denied.1  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to 
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
 
2
face of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.2  We agree and 
affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that in May 1995, Taylor was found guilty 
by a Superior Court jury of two counts of Murder in the First Degree 
(Intentional Murder and Felony Murder), one count of Burglary in the 
Second Degree, two counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the 
Commission of a Felony and one count of Violation of Conditions of Bond.  
He was sentenced to life in prison without the benefit of probation or parole, 
plus 33 years of Level V incarceration.  This Court affirmed Taylor’s 
convictions on direct appeal.3  Taylor’s first postconviction motion was 
denied by the Superior Court.  On appeal, this Court affirmed the Superior 
Court’s judgment.4 
 
(3) 
In his second motion for postconviction relief filed in the 
Superior Court, Taylor claimed that a) his felony murder conviction should 
be vacated under Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2002); b) his 
conviction of intentional murder should be vacated because it could have 
been improperly based upon the jury instructions for felony murder; c) the 
jury instructions for felony murder were faulty; d) he was improperly 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 Taylor v. State, 685 A.2d 349 (Del. 1996). 
4 Taylor v. State, Del. Supr., No. 220, 1999, Berger, J. (Feb. 23, 2000). 
 
3
convicted of a felony when he committed only the misdemeanor offense of 
Breach of Release; and e) the jury was improperly instructed that a defense 
of extreme emotional distress did not apply to the felony murder charge.  In 
his appeal to this Court, Taylor has not briefed either the second or third 
claim he presented to the Superior Court.  As such, those claims are deemed 
to be waived and will not be considered by this Court.5      
 
(4) 
Under Delaware law, the Superior Court must first consider 
whether the defendant has satisfied the procedural requirements of Rule 61 
before considering the merits of his postconviction motion.6  In this case, 
Taylor’s second postconviction motion was filed approximately thirteen 
years after his conviction became final.7  As such, it is time barred under 
Rule 61(i)(1).  Moreover, to the extent that Taylor presents issues regarding 
the jury instructions not previously raised at trial, in his direct appeal or in 
his first postconviction motion, those issues are procedurally barred under 
Rule 61(i)(2) and (3).  Taylor’s claim regarding the defense of extreme 
emotional distress was previously, and unsuccessfully, raised in his first 
postconviction motion.  As such, it is procedurally barred under Rule 
61(i)(4). 
                                                 
5 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
6 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
7 Taylor v. State, 685 A.2d 349 (Del. 1996). 
 
4
 
(5) 
Taylor’s attempts to overcome the time and procedural bars of 
Rule 61 are unavailing.8  There is no merit to his argument that, under 
Williams v. State, his felony murder conviction should be vacated because 
no underlying felony was committed.  The record reflects that Taylor was 
convicted of Burglary in the Second Degree, which constituted the 
underlying felony offense.  There also is no merit to his argument that the 
Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to convict him of Violation of Conditions 
of Bond.  As a court of general jurisdiction, the Superior Court had the 
authority to convict him of that criminal offense.9  
 
(6) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
                                    Justice 
           
 
                                                 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3), (4) and (5). 
9 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 2113; Del. Const. art. IV, § 7; Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 541.