Case Title: Harris v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 022168

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
LEON THOMAS HARRIS 
 
v.  Record No. 022168     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 6, 2003 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether Leon Thomas Harris 
was illegally detained by police and whether evidence obtained 
in a search of his truck should have been suppressed because 
it was obtained as a result of the illegal detention. 
FACTS 
 
On May 25, 2000, at approximately 4:00 a.m., Officer 
Blaine Davis initiated a traffic stop based on a broken 
license plate light he observed on a truck.  Harris, the 
driver, and a single passenger were in the truck.  Shortly 
after Officer Davis stopped the truck, a second police officer 
arrived on the scene.  Both police vehicles were marked cars, 
and their flashing lights were activated. 
 
Officer Davis asked Harris for his driver's license and 
vehicle registration, but Harris produced only his social 
security card.  Harris told Officer Davis that he knew he had 
been stopped because he had no license plate light.  Officer 
Davis told Harris to get out of the truck.  While they were 
standing outside of the truck, Officer Davis asked Harris 
questions to confirm Harris' identity.  After confirming 
Harris' identity and, using a hand-held radio, verifying that 
Harris had a valid driver's license with the Virginia 
Department of Motor Vehicles, Officer Davis returned the 
social security card to Harris.  He did not charge Harris with 
a traffic offense. 
The officer then asked Harris if he had anything illegal 
in the truck or on his person.  Harris replied that he did 
not.  When Officer Davis asked Harris if he could search the 
truck, Harris consented.  Officer Davis performed a pat down 
search on Harris and, after finding no weapons, told Harris to 
sit in the front passenger seat of Officer Davis' patrol car.  
The passenger in the truck was told to get out of the vehicle.  
The passenger complied and stood beside the passenger side of 
Officer Davis' vehicle. 
Officer Davis testified that during this time he had no 
reasonable articulable suspicion that either Harris or his 
passenger "had done anything illegal" and that Harris was free 
to go.  However, Officer Davis did not tell either Harris or 
his passenger that they were free to go. 
Officer Davis found several stolen items when he searched 
the vehicle.  Harris was subsequently charged with two counts 
of grand larceny. 
 
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Prior to his trial, Harris filed a motion to suppress all 
evidence seized during the search of his truck, maintaining 
that the search and seizure violated his rights under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and under Article I, § 10 of the Constitution of 
Virginia.  The trial judge denied Harris' motion, finding that 
the stop was a "Terry-stop with a consent to search."  
Following a bench trial, Harris was convicted of two counts of 
petit larceny and sentenced to twelve months in jail on each 
count, with eleven months suspended, and the sentences to run 
concurrently. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, finding 
that the officer returned Harris' social security card, 
terminating the original traffic stop, the continuing 
encounter was a consensual encounter, and that Harris' 
subsequent consent to the search was voluntary.  The Court of 
Appeals also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to 
support the convictions.  See Harris v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. 
App. 680, 568 S.E.2d 385 (2002).  We granted Harris an appeal 
limited to the issues concerning whether Harris was illegally 
detained and whether the evidence obtained in the search of 
Harris' truck should have been suppressed. 
THE DETENTION 
 
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Harris does not challenge the legality of the initial 
traffic stop.  He contends that Officer Davis violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights when the officer extended a lawful 
detention for a traffic infraction into an unlawful, non-
consensual seizure.  Harris further contends that his consent 
to the search was not voluntary and, therefore, the evidence 
obtained as a result of his illegal seizure must be 
suppressed. 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Police 
officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they stop 
and question an individual if they have reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity, 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), or when the person's 
encounter with the police is consensual.  Florida v. Bostick, 
501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 
(1983).  There is no "litmus test" for determining whether an 
encounter is consensual or constitutes an illegal seizure.  
Id. at 506.  If, however, a reasonable person would not feel 
free to decline an officer's requests or would not feel free 
to leave, the encounter is not consensual and constitutes an 
illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1980). 
 
4
 
Various factors have been identified as relevant in 
determining whether a seizure has occurred, including the 
threatening presence of a number of police officers, the 
display of weapons by officers, physical contact between an 
officer and a citizen, an officer's language or tone of voice 
compelling compliance, the retention of documents requested by 
an officer, and whether a citizen was told that he or she was 
free to leave.  See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 36 (1996); 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 504; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.  The 
decision whether the encounter was consensual must be made 
based on the totality of the circumstances.  Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. at 554. 
 
On appeal, we apply a de novo standard of review in 
determining whether a person has been seized in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.  McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 
489, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001).  However, we also must review 
findings of historical fact for clear error and give due 
weight to inferences drawn from those facts.  Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); Reittinger v. 
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 232, 236, 532 S.E.2d 25, 27 (2000). 
In this case, when Harris was stopped initially, he told 
Officer Davis that he knew his license plate light was not 
working.  Harris also knew that, when asked for his driver's 
license and vehicle registration card, he handed Officer Davis 
 
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only his social security card.  Although Officer Davis, after 
returning Harris' social security card, considered Harris free 
to go, he did not tell Harris that he could leave.  
Furthermore, Officer Davis testified that he did not suspect 
Harris of any other criminal activity when he asked Harris for 
consent to search the truck. 
The traffic stop was concluded when Officer Davis 
returned the social security card to Harris and, as stated by 
the Court of Appeals, "the detention supported by reasonable 
articulable suspicion ended."  Harris, 38 Va. App. at 687, 568 
S.E.2d at 388.  Thus, lawful continuation of the encounter 
between Harris and Officer Davis required that it proceed on a 
consensual basis.  The Court of Appeals found that the ensuing 
encounter was consensual because there was no indication that 
Harris was restrained.  Id. at 688, 568 S.E.2d at 389.  We 
disagree. 
At the time Harris was questioned about possession of 
illegal goods, he had not been told that he was free to leave 
or that Officer Davis was not going to charge him with a 
traffic violation.  The failure to affirmatively inform Harris 
that he was free to leave does not by itself require a finding 
that the ensuing encounter was non-consensual.  Robinette, 519 
at 39-40.  But in this case Harris knew he had committed a 
traffic violation and knew he had not complied with the 
 
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officer's request for his driver's license and vehicle 
registration.  The officer did nothing to indicate to Harris 
that he was no longer subject to detention for a traffic 
violation.  Additionally, Harris remained in the presence of 
two armed, uniformed police officers and two patrol vehicles 
with activated flashing lights. 
Under these circumstances, we believe that a reasonable 
person would not have known that the investigation of the 
traffic offense had terminated and, thus, would not have felt 
free to disregard the officer's questions or have felt free to 
leave.  Therefore, when Officer Davis began questioning Harris 
about possession of contraband, the encounter was not 
consensual and Harris was seized for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Because Officer Davis had neither a warrant nor 
reasonable suspicion to believe that Harris was engaged in any 
criminal activity, this seizure violated Harris's Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE 
Harris maintains that because the evidence obtained in 
the search of his vehicle was obtained as a result of a 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, it should have been 
suppressed under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.  
That doctrine, initially discussed in Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963), provides that "statements 
 
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given during a period of illegal detention are inadmissible 
even though voluntarily given if they are the product of the 
illegal detention and not the result of an independent act of 
free will."  Royer, 460 U.S. at 501. 
In this case, both the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals found that Harris' consent to search was voluntary.  
The validity of this finding is suspect, however, because both 
courts considered Harris' consent to have taken place during a 
legal encounter between Officer Davis and Harris.*  
Nevertheless, as stated above, voluntariness alone is not 
sufficient to overcome the taint arising from the unlawful 
seizure.  Evidence obtained in the search of Harris' truck is 
admissible only if it is not the product of an illegal seizure 
and is the result of an independent act of free will. 
Here, the consent to search occurred within minutes of 
the illegal detention and under circumstances in which Harris 
was not free to leave or disregard the officer's inquiry.  The 
consent, search, and evidence recovered were the products of 
an illegal detention.  Furthermore, nothing on this record 
indicates that the evidence in issue was obtained by the 
police pursuant to an independent act of free will.  See Hart 
                                                          
 
* The trial court considered the consent to search part of 
a lawful "Terry-stop."  The Court of Appeals held that the 
consent to search was part of a consensual encounter.  
 
 
8
v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 283, 289, 269 S.E.2d 806, 810 (1980).  
But see Reese v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1035, 1040, 265 S.E.2d 
746, 749 (1980). 
The Commonwealth has the burden to establish that Harris' 
consent to search was not "obtained by exploitation of the 
illegal action."  Hart, 221 Va. at 288, 269 S.E.2d at 809.  
Based on this record, we conclude that the Commonwealth failed 
to meet this burden.  Thus, the evidence obtained as a result 
of the illegal seizure should have been suppressed as the 
"fruit" of an illegal seizure.  Accordingly, we will reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate Harris' 
conviction, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals with 
direction that the case be remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings if the Commonwealth be so advised. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom SENIOR JUSTICE CARRICO joins, 
dissenting. 
 
 
Unlike the majority, I conclude that the encounter that 
ensued between Officer Blaine Davis and the defendant, Leon 
Thomas Harris, after Officer Davis returned the social 
security card to Harris was consensual because a reasonable 
person in those circumstances would have felt free to leave 
and to refuse Officer Davis’ request to search the vehicle. I 
 
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further conclude that Harris voluntarily consented to the 
search.  Thus, I respectfully dissent. 
 
“Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by 
approaching individuals on the street or in other public 
places and putting questions to them if they are willing to 
listen.”  United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002).  
Even when a law enforcement officer has no basis to suspect 
that a particular individual is engaged in criminal activity, 
the officer “may pose questions, ask for identification, and 
request consent to search . . . provided [the officer does] 
not induce cooperation by coercive means.”  Id. at 201.  “[T]o 
determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a 
seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances 
surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police 
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that 
the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or 
otherwise terminate the encounter.”  Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 439 (1991).  “If a reasonable person would feel free 
to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been 
seized.”  Drayton, 536 U.S at 201.  The “reasonable person” 
test is objective and “presupposes an innocent person.”  
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437-38. 
 
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When determining whether a reasonable person would feel 
free to terminate an encounter, a court may consider the 
language and tone of voice used by the police officer, whether 
the officer displayed a weapon, and whether there was physical 
contact between the officer and the individual.  United States 
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); see also, Bolden v. 
Commonwealth 263 Va. 465, 471, 561 S.E.2d 701, 704 (2002).  
Other relevant factors include the number of officers present, 
the location, time and duration of the encounter, United 
States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996), and 
whether the police officer retained the individual’s 
identification or personal property, United States v. Weaver, 
282 F.3d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
123 S.Ct. 186 (2002). 
 
In Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 232, 532 S.E.2d 25 
(2000), this Court considered whether a defendant was 
unlawfully seized following a routine traffic stop.  A deputy 
sheriff stopped a van being operated by Reittinger because the 
van had “ ‘only one operable headlight.’ ”  Id. at 234, 532 
S.E.2d at 26.  After Reittinger displayed a new headlight that 
he planned to install on the van, the deputy issued only a 
verbal warning and told Reittinger that he was “ ‘free to 
go.’ ”  Id.  The deputy then asked Reittinger if he had any 
illegal weapons or drugs in the vehicle.  Id.  When Reittinger 
 
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replied that he did not, the deputy asked to search the van 
and repeated the request twice more while Reittinger consulted 
with the passengers in the vehicle.  Id.  Reittinger never 
answered the deputy’s repeated requests to search but simply 
exited the vehicle.  Id. During a subsequent “pat down” search 
of Reittinger, the deputy found a smoking pipe containing 
marijuana residue.  Id.
 
In considering the circumstances of the encounter, we 
noted that Reittinger had been stopped in a rural area in the 
nighttime, was in the presence of two armed deputies, and was 
asked repeatedly for consent to search the vehicle.  Id. at 
236-37, 532 S.E.2d at 27.  We determined that, in those 
circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt “free 
to disregard the deputies and simply drive away.”  Id. at 237, 
532 S.E.2d at 28. 
 
In the present case, the majority notes that, although 
Officer Davis returned Harris’ social security card, he did 
not inform Harris that he was free to leave or state whether 
he would be charged with a traffic offense.  Further noting 
that Harris was in the presence of two armed police officers 
and two patrol vehicles with activated flashing lights, the 
majority concludes that a reasonable person would not have 
felt free to terminate the encounter.  I disagree. 
 
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In my view, the majority ignores several important 
factors that demonstrate that Harris was not seized after the 
traffic stop ended.  The encounter between Harris and Officer 
Davis occurred at 4:00 a.m.  Thus, the flashing lights on the 
patrol cars served an important safety function, i.e., they 
alerted other drivers to the presence of vehicles and people 
along the roadside.  The encounter here, unlike that in 
Reittinger, took place in “a built-up commercial area.”  
Although two officers were present, that fact is not 
dispositive.  See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 205 (presence of second 
officer at front of bus did not “tip the scale in respondents’ 
favor”); Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 
U.S. 210, 219 (1984) (no seizure even though several uniformed 
INS agents were positioned near exits of factory).  In this 
case, the second officer’s participation in the encounter was 
limited to “watching” the passenger.  Further, there is no 
evidence that either officer brandished his weapon, physically 
touched Harris, or used a tone of voice or language indicating 
that Harris was not free to leave or that compliance with the 
request to search was compelled. 
 
Instead, Officer Davis returned Harris’ social security 
card to him after verifying that Harris had provided accurate 
information about his identity and had a valid driver’s 
license.  Only then did Officer Davis ask Harris whether he 
 
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had anything illegal in the vehicle or on his person.  See 
Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 653.  Finally, in my view, the most 
important distinction between this case and Reittinger is the 
fact that Harris, unlike Reittinger, was asked only once for 
permission to search his vehicle and that he expressly 
consented in response to that single request.  See United 
States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1499 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(“ ‘accusatory, persistent, and intrusive’ questioning may 
turn an otherwise voluntary encounter into a coercive one if 
it conveys the message that compliance is required”) (quoting 
United States v. Little, 60 F.3d 708, 712 (10th Cir. 1995)).  
Thus, I conclude that Harris was not unlawfully seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
I must now determine whether Harris’ consent to search 
was valid.  “The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to 
search is that the consent be voluntary, and ‘[v]oluntariness 
is a question of fact to be determined from all the 
circumstances.’ ”  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) 
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 
(1973)).  Where, as here, “the question of voluntariness 
pervades both the search and seizure inquiries, the respective 
analyses turn on very similar facts.”  Drayton, 536 U.S. at 
206. 
 
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The evidence shows that Harris expressly consented to the 
search of his truck.  All the circumstances demonstrating that 
the encounter between Harris and Officer Davis was consensual 
also establish that Harris’s consent to search was voluntarily 
given.  The only additional step Officer Davis could have 
taken to ensure that Harris’ consent was voluntary would have 
been to inform Harris of his right to refuse the request to 
search the vehicle.  However, “ '[w]hile knowledge of the 
right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into 
account, the government need not establish such knowledge as 
the sine qua non of an effective consent.’ ”  Robinette, 519 
U.S. at 39 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). 
 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, I conclude 
that Harris’ consent to search was voluntary.  Therefore, the 
search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Other courts 
have found that consents to search given in similar 
circumstances were voluntary.  E.g., United States v. Erwin, 
155 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding consent to search 
given following lawful traffic stop was voluntary where 
evidence showed that deputies did not show force or use 
threatening language); State v. Ready, 565 N.W.2d 728, 733 
(Neb. 1997) (finding that the totality of the circumstances 
established defendant’s consent was voluntary where evidence 
showed that he agreed to let the officer search his vehicle 
 
15
and no evidence of coercion was presented); Burgos-Seberos v. 
State, 969 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Wyo. 1998) (finding that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to 
suppress where evidence showed defendant “voluntarily 
grant[ed] his permission for [the officer] to search his car” 
and there was no evidence of coercion although “two officers 
were present and the hour was late”). 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
 
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