Case Title: State ex rel. Lawson v. Mondie Forge

Citation: 2004-Ohio-6086

Docket Number: 20031992

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Lawson v. Mondie Forge, 104 Ohio St.3d 39 , 2004-Ohio-6086.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. LAWSON, APPELLANT, v. MONDIE FORGE ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as  State ex rel. Lawson v. Mondie Forge, 104 Ohio St.3d 39, 2004-Ohio-
6086.] 
Workers’ compensation — Permanent total disability compensation — Evidence 
of recipient’s activity insufficient to show capacity for sustained 
remunerative 
employment 
— 
Commission 
ordered 
to 
reinstate 
compensation. 
(No. 2003-1992 — Submitted August 17, 2004 — Decided December 1, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals of Franklin County, No. 03AP-157, 2003-
Ohio-5347. 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Throughout his working career, appellant-claimant, Donald E. 
Lawson, did heavy labor.  During much of this time, claimant was also a council 
member for the village of West Elkton, Ohio, a community of approximately 270 
people. 
{¶ 2} In 1985, claimant’s allowed workers’ compensation conditions of 
lumbosacral strain, herniated disc L4-5, and mild depression forced him from the 
labor market.  Claimant was awarded permanent total disability compensation 
(“PTD”) effective in 1994, after appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio 
concluded that the low-stress sedentary jobs to which claimant’s conditions 
limited him were foreclosed to anyone with his lack of skills and education. 
{¶ 3} In 2001, for reasons not specified, appellee Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation reopened claimant’s case.  The ensuing investigation produced 
written and recorded evidence that became the cornerstone of the bureau’s efforts 
to terminate PTD. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 4} The most extensive documentation was an “activity spreadsheet” 
that contained 207 activities engaged in by the claimant from 1993 through 2001, 
almost all allegedly for the benefit of the village.  The predominant activity listed 
was refuse disposal, which will be explained more fully below.  Each year, 
claimant also put up flags in village streets for July 4th, Labor Day, and Memorial 
Day.  Other miscellaneous activities included plowing snow, purchasing hardware 
and gas, unspecified truck and plow maintenance, and hauling gravel.  The parties 
agree that claimant did almost all of this work for free, receiving from the village 
a salary of at most $200 to $300 per year for his council activities plus a bonus 
amounting to $6 per hour for plowing. 
{¶ 5} The second piece of evidence was a surveillance videotape and  
accompanying surveillance log.  According to the log, the tape covered a total of 
about five and a half hours over two consecutive Saturdays during the annual 
village clean-up.1  Most of the documented activity involved driving a dump truck 
and loading unspecified items into the truck.  Log entries stated that claimant had 
helped load a couch and a lawn mower onto the truck’s bed.  Another stated that 
claimant “kicked and broke apart a table.”  He allegedly hoisted a chair of 
unknown description and weight, but left the lifting of an appliance to others.  
Again, remuneration, if any, was part of the minimal compensation mentioned 
earlier. 
{¶ 6} The final piece of evidence consisted of affidavits from three 
village residents, including the mayor and police chief.  Much of their testimony 
repeated that of the spreadsheet.  There was also evidence that claimant 
occasionally did some lawn mowing with both a push and riding mower. 
{¶ 7} This surveillance evidence was given to Dr. David R. Dunkin to 
review.  He concluded:   
                                                 
1. The videotape in the record is only 20 minutes long and of poor quality.  It showed three men, 
without specifying which one was claimant.  Overall, it showed very little. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
{¶ 8} “Claimant has been well documented through both still photos and 
videorecordings performing activities which far exceeded restrictions of activity 
which were the grounds for granting permanent and total disability, i.e. 
restrictions of lifting no greater than 10 pounds, repeated bending or lifting 
objects below the level of the knee, repeated rotary movement of the lumbar spine 
and lifting objects above the level of the shoulders.  Violations of all these 
restrictions have been documented and are not consistent with the injured worker 
being permanently and totally disabled based upon these restrictions.” 
{¶ 9} The bureau responded with a three-part motion that asked the 
commission to (1) terminate further PTD, (2) declare all prior PTD to be 
overpaid, and (3) issue a declaration of fraud.  A staff hearing officer (“SHO”) 
declined: 
{¶ 10} “The claimant, although sitting on the Village Council, 
sporadically shoveling snow and mowing lawns for friends and neighbors, driving 
a maximum of 2½ to 7 miles a day, and accepting between $200.00 to $300.00 a 
year from the City of West Elkton for such services, has not been engaged in 
sustained remunerative employment and therefore has not committed any 
fraudulent activity which would warrant a finding of fraud or an overpayment of 
permanent total disability benefits.” 
{¶ 11} The bureau appealed, arguing that the SHO’s analysis was fatally 
flawed.  It cited the SHO’s failure to determine whether the activities established 
a capacity for sustained remunerative employment and urged reconsideration.  
The commission granted reconsideration and, ultimately, the bureau’s motion: 
{¶ 12} “It is the finding of the Industrial Commission that the injured 
worker has been engaged in physical activity since 1993 which demonstrates that 
he is capable of performing sustained remunerative employment.  In reaching this 
decision, the Commission relies upon the evidence submitted with the 
Administrator’s motion, including, but not limited to, the affidavits and videotape 
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evidence.  This evidence substantiates a regular pattern of work activity over the 
past nine years, some of which was physical activity well in excess of the 
sedentary restrictions relied on in the decision to grant the injured worker’s 
permanent total disability application. The Commission further relies on the 
report of Dr. Dunkin, dated 08/27/2001, in support of this finding.” 
{¶ 13} The commission also made a declaration of fraud. 
{¶ 14} Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals 
for Franklin County.  The court of appeals found evidence supporting the 
commission’s order and denied the writ, prompting claimant’s current appeal. 
{¶ 15} Three questions are posed directly:  Did the commission abuse its 
discretion in (1) terminating PTD, (2) declaring overpaid all PTD after May 14, 
1994, and (3) finding that claimant committed fraud?  Cumulatively, they invoke 
a critical issue that has always lurked in the periphery of the PTD debate:  How 
active can a person be and still be deemed eligible for  PTD? 
{¶ 16} PTD pivots on a single question:  Is the claimant capable of 
sustained remunerative employment?   State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. 
(1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 31 OBR 369, 509 N.E.2d 946.  Payment of PTD is 
inappropriate where there is evidence of (1) actual sustained remunerative 
employment,  State ex rel. Kirby v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 427, 2002-Ohio-
6668, 780 N.E.2d 275; (2) the physical ability to do sustained remunerative 
employment,  State ex rel. Schultz v. Indus. Comm., 96 Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-Ohio-
3316, 770 N.E.2d 576; or (3) activities so medically inconsistent with the 
disability evidence that they impeach the medical evidence underlying the award.  
See State ex rel. Timmerman Truss, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 244, 
2004-Ohio-2589, 809 N.E.2d 15, ¶ 26. 
{¶ 17} The first criterion is the cleanest.  Nothing demonstrates capacity 
better than actual performance.  No speculation or residual doubt is involved.  
Unfortunately, that is not always the case where the other two criteria are 
January Term, 2004 
5 
involved, and it is not the case here.  Ultimately, our review persuades us that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the commission’s decision, and, for this reason, 
we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and order reinstatement of PTD. 
{¶ 18} The commission declined to classify claimant’s activities as 
remunerative, characterizing them instead as potentially remunerative and 
medically inconsistent with his allegation of PTD.  It based this conclusion on 
what it deemed to be a “regular pattern of work activity.”  This denomination of 
claimant’s activities as both a pattern — i.e., sustained — and as work, however, 
invites scrutiny.  See Kirby, 97 Ohio St.3d 427, 2002-Ohio-6668, 780 N.E.2d 275, 
at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 19} Neither “sustained” nor “work” has been conclusively defined for 
workers’ compensation purposes.  As to the latter, clearly, labor exchanged for 
pay is work.  Schultz also teaches that unpaid activity that is potentially 
remunerative can be considered for purposes of establishing a physical capacity 
for remunerative employment.  This principle, however, should always be 
thoughtfully approached, particularly when PTD is at issue. 
{¶ 20} One of the most enduring (though not often explicitly stated) 
misconceptions about PTD is that once it is granted, the recipient must thereafter 
remain virtually housebound.  This is a fallacy.  PTD exempts no one from life’s 
daily demands.  Groceries must be purchased and meals cooked.  Errands must be 
run and appointments kept.  The yard must be tended and the dog walked.  Where 
children are involved, there may be significant chauffeur time.  For some, family 
and friends shoulder much of the burden.  Others, on the other hand, lack such 
support, leaving the onus of these chores on the PTD claimant. 
{¶ 21} These 
simple 
activities 
can 
nevertheless 
often 
generate 
considerable controversy.  That is because all of these tasks are potentially 
remunerative.  From the school cafeteria to the four-star restaurant, people are 
paid to prepare meals.  People are paid for lawn and child care.  Many people earn 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
their living behind the wheel.  State ex rel. Parma Comm. Gen. Hosp. v. 
Jankowski, 95 Ohio St.3d 340, 2002-Ohio-2336, 767 N.E.2d 1143, acknowledged 
this and cautioned against an automatic disqualification from compensation based 
on the performance of routine tasks, regardless of their potential for payment.  We 
instead compared the activities with claimant’s medical restrictions to determine 
whether they were so inconsistent as to impeach the medical evidence underlying 
the disability award. 
{¶ 22} In the case at bar, the commission relied on physical restrictions 
limiting claimant to sedentary work without repetitive bending or lifting, and 
noted that “some” of claimant’s activities exceeded these limitations.  While that 
is true, isolating these incidents conflicts with State ex rel. Vanover v. Emery 
Worldwide (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 367, 686 N.E.2d 518.  There, the commission, 
in addressing an application for wage-loss compensation, invalidated a substantial 
job search, half of which involved jobs beyond claimant’s vocational 
qualifications.  We found an abuse of discretion: 
{¶ 23} “The problem, in our eyes, with invalidating the entire search on 
this basis, however, is that it ignores the number of legitimate contacts that 
claimant did make.  If half the total contacts are bad, then half of them are good, 
and, in this case, half of the total is substantial.”   Id. at 369, 686 N.E.2d 518. 
{¶ 24} This prohibition against viewing activities out of context applies 
even more forcefully here.  Some of the randomly logged activities were beyond 
claimant’s restrictions.  The vast majority of the cited activities, however, were 
not.  Claimant’s 1993 through 2001 activity spreadsheet has 207 confirmed 
activities, none of which contains sufficient information to conclusively establish 
that any of them conflicted with claimant’s restrictions. 
{¶ 25} The predominant activity listed on the spreadsheet, for example, is 
refuse disposal, but there is no evidence that claimant did anything other than 
drive a truck – an activity within claimant’s sedentary limitations.  There was no 
January Term, 2004 
7 
proof contradicting claimant’s testimony that others loaded the truck, nor is there 
evidence indicating the weight and contents thereof.  Only the video surveillance 
log — and supposedly the full tape — demonstrates that claimant did some 
lifting, and while some of that lifting exceeded claimant’s restrictions, most of it 
did not.  Only claimant’s assistance in lifting a mower and a couch could 
conclusively be said to exceed his medical limitations.  The balance of the log 
entries listed miscellaneous debris of unspecified weight or objects expressly 
denominated as small. 
{¶ 26} Evidence of other activities is similarly deficient.  Three times a 
year claimant put up flags for federal holidays.  No one has alleged more than 
light exertion.  Other activities included driving a snowplow, buying hardware or 
gas, hauling gravel, and even buying an unspecified six-pack.  None of these 
entries demonstrates work beyond sedentary. 
{¶ 27} These, of course, are just the spreadsheet activities.  There was also 
the videotape, the surveillance log, and resident affidavits.  This evidence does 
show some activity inconsistent with claimant’s medical restrictions, as is 
apparent from both the log and from Dr. Dunkin’s report.  That activity, however, 
is irrelevant absent evidence that claimant could do it on a sustained basis, and, on 
this point, the commission’s position again fails. 
{¶ 28} Dr. Dunkin’s report derived from evidence documenting 
claimant’s activities on two days, and establishes only that on those two days 
claimant engaged in some physical activity inconsistent with his medical 
restrictions.  That does not equate to establishing claimant’s ability to do so on a 
sustained basis, nor can that ability be inferred from the other evidence, most 
notably the spreadsheet.  If the spreadsheet contained sufficient explanation of 
claimant’s activities from 1993 to 2001 to conclude that claimant’s actions then 
were comparable to those seen in the videotape, then certainly the commission’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
case would be stronger.  Even then, however, it would not be enough to establish 
sustained conduct or capabilities. 
{¶ 29} The prevailing spreadsheet activity is refuse disposal.  As the 
evidence shows, however, months passed without any record of claimant hauling 
trash.  Other periods recorded only minimal activity.  Between June 30, 1997, and 
March 30, 1998, for example, claimant made only five trips to the landfill.  The 
same is true from July 31, 2000, to March 1, 2001, and May 31, 1996, to 
November 30, 1996.  Of 71 months recorded, only five saw more than four trips 
in any given month.  Evidence regarding claimant’s other activities is even more 
scant.  He plowed snow three times between 1994 and 2001.  He purchased gas 
12 times during these years and 12 times hauled gravel. 
{¶ 30} In State ex rel. Midmark Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 78 Ohio 
St.3d 2, 676 N.E.2d 73, the employer challenged claimant’s PTD application with 
surveillance evidence of claimant walking unassisted, raking leaves, and doing 
minor house repairs.  The commission was not persuaded by Midmark’s evidence 
and ordered PTD.  The case eventually came before this court, which upheld the 
commission: 
{¶ 31} “First, the [surveillance] material does not establish a medical 
capacity for work greater than sedentary.  It simply shows claimant walking 
unassisted or doing fairly unstrenuous domestic chores.  * * * 
{¶ 32} “Second, these documented activities, even if deemed inconsistent 
and work-amenable, do not establish that claimant can do sustained remunerative 
employment.  Midmark’s investigation spanned approximately fifteen months, yet 
it could show only five days in which claimant was performing allegedly 
questionable activities.  There is no evidence of claimant’s performing even any 
medium-exertion labor, nor is there any evidence of claimant’s doing the recorded 
activity on anything other than rare occasions.  The surveillance package, 
therefore, proved very little.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 11, 676 N.E.2d 73. 
January Term, 2004 
9 
{¶ 33} As in Midmark, the present claimant’s spreadsheet records 
establish — when viewed over eight years — only irregular activity.  When 
coupled with the absence of any evidence indicating that these spreadsheet 
activities exceeded claimant’s physical limitations, the commission’s conclusion 
is even more hollow. 
{¶ 34} Unquestionably, the commission has substantial leeway in both 
interpreting and drawing inferences from the evidence before it.  This is 
especially relevant in surveillance situations where financial and privacy concerns 
generally prevent the extensive weeks- or months-long surveillance that could 
produce irrefutable evidence of sustained prohibited activity.  This evidentiary 
latitude, on the other hand, is not unlimited and, in this case, does not permit the 
conclusion that claimant’s actions constituted a pattern of sustained behavior.  It 
also does not permit the conclusion that claimant engaged in significant activity 
inconsistent with his medical restrictions. 
{¶ 35} In the end, no one wishes to discourage the commission’s vigorous 
investigation and prosecution of PTD cases in which evidence eventually shows 
that the claimant has received or is receiving benefits to which he is not entitled.  
The evidence in this case, however, does not support a cessation of compensation 
or a declaration of fraud.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and order the commission to reinstate PTD and vacate its declaration of 
fraud. 
Judgment reversed and 
writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and O’CONNOR, JJ., 
concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
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10 
{¶ 36} The majority has concluded that the court of appeals erred in its 
decision to affirm the Industrial Commission’s termination of Donald Lawson’s 
permanent total disability (“PTD”) benefits.  The proper legal test to be applied in 
reviewing cases of this distinction is whether the record “contains some evidence 
which supports the commission's factual findings.”  State ex rel. Fiber-Lite Corp. 
v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 202, 522 N.E.2d 548, syllabus.  Upon 
review, I would assert that the record before us does contain some evidence 
supporting the commission’s findings.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from 
the decision reached by the majority and would affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
{¶ 37} The record here reveals that Lawson received PTD compensation 
in 1995 for a lumbosacral strain, mild depression, and a herniated disc at L4-5, 
which resulted from a lower-back injury in 1975 while working for Mondie 
Forge.  The Industrial Commission made the award after finding that Lawson’s 
limited education, lack of transferable work skills, and medical restrictions 
precluded him from sustaining remunerative employment.  In its award of PTD, 
the Industrial Commission utilized the opinion of Dr. Jeffrey L. Mikutis, an 
orthopedic surgeon who examined Lawson.  Mikutis opined that the claimant 
“would be expected to have difficulty in jobs lifting greater than 10 lbs, repeated 
bending, lifting objects from below the level of the knee, repeated rotary 
movements of the lumbar spine, [and] lifting objects above the level of the 
shoulders. * * * Walking greater than 10 to15 minutes at a time or standing 
greater than this time would be likely to aggravate his discomfort.” 
{¶ 38} The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation reopened Lawson’s case in 
2001, and a staff hearing officer (“SHO”) examined evidence offered to refute 
Lawson’s PTD status consisting of a videotape, still photographs, numerous 
affidavits, documents, and an opinion of a medical expert.  Investigators for the 
bureau demonstrated that Lawson had engaged in varied moderate physical 
January Term, 2004 
11 
activities between 1993 and 2001.  The SHO determined that Lawson had “not 
been engaged in sustained remunerative employment.”  The commission, 
however, vacated that order and determined that the SHO had made an error of 
law and had applied an incorrect legal standard.  The commission therefore 
terminated PTD, declared all payments since May 14, 1994 to be overpayments, 
and determined that Lawson fraudulently obtained the PTD award.  Lawson 
sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth District Court of Appeals, compelling 
the commission to vacate its order and to reinstate his PTD.  The court, however, 
denied the writ. 
{¶ 39} To obtain a writ of mandamus, a relator must show a clear legal 
right to the relief requested and a clear legal duty on the part of the commission to 
provide the relief.  State ex rel. Hughes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1986), 
26 Ohio St.3d 71, 73, 26 OBR 61, 498 N.E.2d 459.  “To show the clear legal 
right, relator must demonstrate that the commission abused its discretion by 
entering an order unsupported by some evidence in the record.”  Id.  When the 
record contains some evidence to support the commission’s factual findings, a 
court may not disturb the commission’s findings in mandamus.  State ex rel. 
Fiber-Lite, 36 Ohio St.3d 202, 522 N.E.2d 548, syllabus.  Furthermore, the 
commission alone has the responsibility of assessing evidentiary weight and 
credibility.  State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 
20-21, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936. 
{¶ 40} In light of this standard of review, I would assert that the record 
contains more than “some evidence” to support the commission’s factual findings.  
In fact, this record is replete with evidence that supports the commission’s 
decision to terminate Lawson’s PTD because he is capable of sustained 
remunerative employment. 
{¶ 41} An investigator for the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation 
prepared a video showing Lawson and another person lifting a full-sized couch 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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and loading it into the back of a dump truck during the West Elkton village clean-
up day on April 28, 2001.  Lawson lifted the couch above his head to get it over 
the sides of the dump truck, which stood six feet off the ground.  After helping to 
hoist the couch into the truck bed, Lawson climbed into the bed, without 
displaying any pain or discomfort, and repositioned the couch with the help of 
another man.  The video log and tape show Lawson repeatedly bending down to 
the ground to pick up pieces of debris of various weights and sizes, and then 
loading or hurling them into the back of the dump truck. 
{¶ 42} After taping these activities, the bureau retained the services of Dr. 
David R. Dunkin, who reviewed Lawson’s file and the tape and observed that 
Lawson, over a two-hour period on April 28, 2001, loaded a broken eight-foot-
long wooden table, a lawn mower, and a steel deck chair by hoisting the items 
over the side of the dump truck.  Dunkin also reviewed videotape from May 5, 
2001, showing Lawson “throwing a rope across a load of trash in the same truck 
and tightening it down to secure the load.” 
{¶ 43} In his report, Dunkin opined that the documented acts exceeded 
Lawson’s medical restrictions in the PTD award.  Lawson was “picking up items 
which far exceeded his 10 pound weight limit from the ground which also 
exceeded restrictions for repeated bending, twisting and lifting items below the 
level of his knee.” 
{¶ 44} Dunkin concluded that Lawson had been documented “performing 
activities which far exceeded restrictions of activity which were the grounds for 
granting permanent and total disability * * * [and were] not consistent with the 
injured worker being permanently and totally disabled.” 
{¶ 45} Despite the videotape and Dunkin’s opinion, the majority disputes 
the Industrial Commission’s findings because only some of Lawson’s acts 
exceeded his PTD restrictions.  However, the law only requires “some” evidence 
to support the commission’s findings awarding or revoking PTD, and the record 
January Term, 2004 
13 
here contains more than just a videotape to support the commission’s decision.  
For instance, the bureau presented three affidavits from other townspeople who 
stated that Lawson frequently performed physical work, in addition to the 
videotaped activities during the village clean-up, all seemingly beyond his 
restrictions. 
{¶ 46} For example, Charles Pennington, Mayor of West Elkton, stated 
that Lawson frequently helped load West Elkton’s dump truck with refuse.  
Pennington stated, “I have seen Lawson assist in loading the dump truck and he is 
the only person that takes the loads to the landfill.”  Jerry Combs, Chief of the 
West Elkton Police Department, corroborated Pennington’s statement that 
Lawson loaded the truck on several occasions.  “I have seen Lawson load and 
assist in loading the dump truck and haul the load to the landfill.” 
{¶ 47} The “activity spreadsheet” created as result of the bureau’s 
investigation reveals that Lawson’s refuse loading, collection, and dumping were 
not isolated incidents.  While the majority cites several six- or eight-month time 
periods in which Lawson made only five trips to the landfill, a closer examination 
reveals that Lawson made 17 such trips in 1995 — the year in which the 
commission awarded PTD — 19 trips in 1996, 23 trips in 1997, 21 trips in 1998, 
23 trips in 1999, 18 trips in 2000, and 9 trips in the first half of 2001.  The bureau 
not only logged these trips on the spreadsheet but also corroborated them by 
invoices or load tickets from the Preble County landfill.  This evidence suggests a 
pattern of activity that appears to be more than what the majority describes as 
“minimal.” 
{¶ 48} In addition to Lawson’s refuse hauling, he also performed other 
tasks for the village.  Pennington stated that, as part of his duties as a councilman 
on the streets committee, “Lawson [would] buy and lay coal patch to fill pot 
holes.”  Also, every year, Lawson decorated the town’s 30 telephone poles with 
flags on Memorial Day, Labor Day, and the Fourth of July.  “Lawson [drove] the 
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14 
dump truck to each post or telephone pole, [got] in the back of the dump truck, 
[raised] the dump bin * * * and [put] the flags in place. * * * Lawson remove[d] 
the flags as well.”  Combs further stated that Lawson hauled gravel, hauled brush, 
cut downed tree limbs, and emptied garbage cans for the village on a regular 
basis. 
{¶ 49} Additionally, Lawson attached and removed a snow plow from the 
village’s truck every year.  Lawson plowed the village streets, the driveways of 
some local residents, and, on at least one occasion, the Preble-Shawnee school 
district. 
{¶ 50} In addition to these tasks, Lawson mowed several properties with a 
push mower.  Combs averred, “I have seen Lawson use the village push lawn 
mower and weed eater and cut grass on village property during the summer 
months for the past 10 years.”  Pennington stated that Lawson “additionally cut[ ] 
approximately five law[n]s for residents of the village.”  Combs formerly owned a 
gun shop where Lawson mowed the lawn for $10 in cash each time. 
{¶ 51} Combs’s affidavit provided two other examples of Lawson’s 
capability to perform work.  He stated, “Approximately 7 years ago I knew 
Lawson to make wood furniture in the basement of his brother-in-law’s shop.  * * 
* Lawson made furniture by request only and made it for other people.”  Aside 
from constructing furniture, Lawson assisted another village resident with a 
roofing project, although he denied both activities when confronted at the 
Industrial Commission hearing.  Combs stated that  “at least 5 or 6 years ago, I 
saw Lawson assist with putting metal peeks on the roof [of a garage].  To do this, 
Lawson was on the roof of the building.” 
{¶ 52} Under similar fact patterns, this court has upheld cases in which 
the Industrial Commission terminated a claimant’s PTD status after consideration 
of evidence demonstrating the claimant’s capability to engage in sustained 
remunerative employment.  For example, a claimant lost PTD status after 
January Term, 2004 
15 
concealing intermittent paid overnight or multinight babysitting services, selling 
tickets and conducting walking tours in exchange for free travel, and answering 
phones, filing, and faxing for her brothers’ businesses.  See State ex rel. Alesci v. 
Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 210, 2002-Ohio-5932, 777 N.E.2d 835.  Another 
PTD recipient lost an award because he regularly performed paid home 
improvement and maintenance jobs and specifically denied engaging in sustained 
remunerative work until confronted with the evidence against him. See State ex 
rel. Kirby v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 427, 2002-Ohio-6668, 780 N.E.2d 275. 
{¶ 53} Here, Lawson unquestionably sustained a major back injury that 
caused him pain and suffering and prevented him from performing certain kinds 
of work.  However, as with the aforementioned claimants, the commission 
terminated Lawson’s PTD after it determined from the evidence that he could 
engage in sustained remunerative activity.  And this record, in my view, does 
contain evidence supporting that determination. 
{¶ 54} Finally, the record also contains evidence supporting the 
commission’s finding that Lawson fraudulently induced the commission to award 
him PTD compensation in 1995.  As part of the application process, Lawson 
completed a vocational evaluation questionnaire, a major component for 
determining whether the claimant is eligible for PTD compensation.  Question 
6(e) of the questionnaire asked him to “list other activities you do or have done 
that may be related to work.  Describe volunteer work or other services you 
haven’t mentioned elsewhere in this questionnaire.”  Lawson responded that he 
“watched [his] wife’s shop for a while daily (1 hour) when she went to work.”  
Also on the questionnaire, Lawson claimed to have “done no physical labor in ten 
years.” 
{¶ 55} At the hearing regarding the revocation of PTD compensation, the 
bureau presented evidence that Lawson dumped two loads of refuse in the landfill 
one day before he completed the vocational evaluation questionnaire.  The bureau 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
questioned Lawson why he did not list these activities or any other work he 
performed in his questionnaire responses.  Lawson replied that he did not 
remember why he had failed to disclose this information. 
{¶ 56} Based on the foregoing, I would affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Casper & Casper and Douglas W. Casper, for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Phil Wright Jr., Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
______________________