Case Title: In re Halttunen

Citation: 

Docket Number: S067161

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
360	
December 24, 2020	
No. 49
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Application for Admission of:
NEIL PATRICK HALTTUNEN,
Applicant.
(BBX A172051) (SC S067161)
On review of the recommendation of the Board of Bar 
Examiners.
Submitted on the briefs May 19, 2020.
David J. Elkanich, Holland & Knight LLP, Portland, 
filed the briefs for applicant. Also on the briefs was Nellie 
Q. Barnard.
Theodore W. Reuter, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, 
Tigard, filed the answering brief on behalf of the Oregon 
State Bar. Susan R. Cournoyer, Assistant Disciplinary 
Counsel, filed the supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM
Applicant is conditionally admitted to the practice of law.
Case Summary: Applicant admitted that, from 2009 to 2012, he inappropri-
ately had used the position of trust and authority that he possessed as a police 
officer to pursue romantic and sexual relationships with vulnerable women whom 
he encountered while performing his official duties. He also admitted that he was 
dishonest with his employer about that conduct during an internal investigation. 
After his departure from the police department, applicant underwent therapy, 
through which he gained insight into his past behaviors and their impact on 
others and developed the tools and support network to maintain a successful 
reformation. None of the psychological experts who treated or evaluated appli-
cant believed that he suffers from the kind of fundamental and pervasive per-
sonality challenge that might prevent a successful rehabilitation of his behavior 
and character. His application to the Bar was supported by numerous character 
references, including many members of the Bar. Held: (1) Applicant’s misconduct 
was not so egregious to preclude applicant from admission to the Bar without 
considering the steps that he has taken since 2012 to rehabilitate his charac-
ter; and (2) applicant demonstrated genuine self-improvement and rehabilitation 
since his misconduct to justify conditional admission to the Bar.
Applicant is conditionally admitted to the practice of law.
Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020)	
361
	
PER CURIAM
	
In this contested lawyer admission proceeding, the 
issue is whether applicant Neil Halttunen has proved by clear 
and convincing evidence that he possesses the good moral 
character necessary for admission to the Oregon State Bar. 
A majority of the Board of Bar Examiners (board) issued 
an opinion recommending that the court deny admission; 
a minority opinion recommended conditional admission. 
There is no dispute that, from 2009 to 2012, while working as 
a police officer, applicant engaged in inappropriate, unethi-
cal, and dishonest conduct that raises significant questions 
about his moral character. Applicant admits that he inap-
propriately used the position of trust and authority that he 
possessed as a police officer to pursue romantic and sexual 
relationships with vulnerable women whom he encountered 
while performing his official duties. He also admits that he 
was dishonest with his employer about that conduct during 
an internal investigation. Applicant contends, however, that 
he has demonstrated sufficient reformation since leaving 
the police department to establish his current fitness to 
practice law. We are persuaded, and we conditionally admit 
applicant to the practice of law in Oregon.
I.  INTRODUCTION AND LEGAL STANDARD
	
To be admitted to practice law in this state, an appli-
cant must prove “by clear and convincing evidence that he or 
she is of good moral character and is fit to practice law.” In re 
Zielinski, 341 Or 559, 561, 146 P3d 323 (2006) (stating stan-
dard); see ORS 9.220(2)(a) (establishing “good moral char-
acter and fit to practice law” standard); Rule for Admission 
of Attorneys (RFA) 9.45(6) (in character review proceeding, 
applicant must establish by clear and convincing evidence 
the requisite character and fitness to practice law). “Stated 
differently, applicant must show that it is ‘highly probable’ 
that [applicant] has the good moral character and fitness to 
practice law.” In re Covington, 334 Or 376, 382, 50 P3d 233 
(2002).
	
An applicant may be unable to establish “good 
moral character” if the applicant has engaged in “acts or con-
duct that reflect moral turpitude or * 
* 
* [that] would cause 
a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the 
362	
In re Halttunen
individual’s honesty, fairness and respect for the rights of 
others and for the laws of the state and the nation,” if those 
acts or conduct are “rationally connected to the applicant’s 
fitness to practice law.” ORS 9.220(2)(b); see also In re Carter, 
334 Or 388, 394, 49 P3d 792 (2002) (describing the statutory 
standard). But it is not impossible for such an applicant to 
demonstrate sufficient reformation of character to establish 
that he or she presently has the good moral character and 
fitness to practice law. See, e.g., id. at 394-95 (when consider-
ing the character of an applicant who had engaged in “mis-
conduct involving moral turpitude,” describing the “crucial 
inquiry” as whether the applicant had demonstrated that 
his “character has reformed sufficiently in the interim to 
permit his admission to the Bar”).
	
This court has charged the board with investigat-
ing and evaluating an applicant’s character and fitness. See 
RFA 2.10(2) (board shall investigate and evaluate moral 
character and fitness to practice law of each applicant); RFA 
6.05 (board has authority to conduct investigations, convene 
evidentiary hearings, and issue subpoenas). The board did 
that in this case by reviewing an extensive documentary 
record, interviewing applicant, appointing a special investi-
gator, and conducting an evidentiary hearing that included 
the examination of 25 witnesses. Although the board has 
recommended a disposition, this court reviews the record 
de novo to determine whether applicant has shown that he 
is a person of good moral character. See ORS 9.536(2); ORS 
9.539; Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.6; RFA 9.60(5).
II.  THE CHARACTER-REVIEW RECORD
A.  Prior Misconduct
	
After graduating from high school and serving for a 
few years in the Army as a military police officer, applicant 
moved to Oregon in 1993 to begin a career in law enforce-
ment. He worked first as a corrections officer in Lane County 
and then as a police officer in Roseburg, finally taking a job 
as a police officer with the Springfield Police Department, 
where he worked from 1996 to 2012. During his time at the 
Springfield Police Department, applicant was twice married 
and divorced.
Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020)	
363
	
Applicant’s pattern of misconduct began in 2009, 
while he was still a police officer at the Springfield Police 
Department and was married to his second wife. Applicant 
first pursued a woman whom he had originally encountered 
when he arrested her on a warrant in 2008. He encountered 
the woman again in 2009 when investigating a police report 
that she had made, and he used the woman’s interest in 
the status of that investigation to initiate a personal rela-
tionship. Applicant began calling the woman, texting with 
her, and dropping by her house in his patrol car to chat. He 
made it known to the woman that he was unhappy in his 
marriage and wished to have a relationship with her. Those 
contacts ultimately led to a sexual relationship that began 
in approximately 2010.
	
Between that 2009 incident and the end of 2012, 
applicant pursued numerous other women that he met in 
the course of his duties, many of whom had criminal records. 
According to applicant, that conduct resulted in several 
other sexual relationships and contributed to the end of 
his second marriage. In addition, applicant estimated that 
there were eight to twelve other women, whom he also met 
while performing his official duties, with whom he engaged 
in inappropriate sexual communications—usually through 
text messages.
	
The record is not clear as to the manner in which 
applicant met and pursued each of those women, but the 
circumstances for some are similar to those under which he 
met and pursued the first woman. For example, applicant 
met one woman when he responded to a car accident and 
gave her a ride home. He met her again when he responded 
to a disorderly conduct report at her apartment complex and 
then showed up at her apartment a week or two later, sup-
posedly to check if she had experienced additional problems 
but then shifting the discussion to personal matters. The 
two began a relationship over text messages that eventu-
ally became sexual. Applicant met another woman when 
he responded to a disorderly person complaint near the bar 
where she worked and then met her again when he responded 
to a theft that occurred at the bar. After obtaining the wom-
an’s personal information for purposes of completing his 
report, applicant called the woman on her personal phone, 
364	
In re Halttunen
and the two began a relationship that included texting and 
conversation—while applicant was on duty—and at least 
some sexual contact while he was not on duty.
	
Although those women described their relation-
ships with applicant as consensual, applicant has admitted 
that he knew at the time the relationships were unethical, 
and he has acknowledged that his conduct undermined the 
credibility of the police department and reflects poor moral 
character. Moreover, the record makes plain that applicant 
inappropriately pursued other women who felt that applicant 
was taking advantage of their vulnerability and the power 
that he wielded over them as a police officer. For example, 
applicant twice attempted to pursue an intimate relation-
ship with women whom he met in the course of arresting 
their boyfriend or husband. He called one of the women from 
his personal phone less than an hour after advising her that 
her boyfriend would be spending the night in jail and pres-
sured her into accepting a ride from him, began caressing 
her arm, and suggested that they find a dark place to park. 
Both women let applicant know that the contact was unwel-
come, and he did not persist, but the women reported that 
they had felt vulnerable to and intimidated by applicant’s 
inappropriate contact.
	
Another woman was the manager of an exotic dance 
club that applicant regularly patrolled when he worked in 
the evenings. Applicant frequently tried to engage her in 
conversation when he saw her in the parking lot. Applicant 
texted her on numerous occasions when the woman under-
stood him to be on duty, sending and asking for sexually 
suggestive photos as well as sending at least one sexually 
explicit video. The woman testified that applicant’s advances 
were unwelcome and felt “stalker-ish” but that applicant 
was “the man in charge” (as a police officer), so the woman 
responded enough “to keep him happy a little bit.”
	
Applicant’s unwelcome contacts led to a complaint 
to the Springfield Police Department in November 2012. 
That complaint triggered an internal investigation led by 
Sgt. Rappe, who interviewed applicant and several wit-
nesses. Although applicant now admits to all of the inappro-
priate contact described above, he displayed a lack of candor 
Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020)	
365
during the 2012 investigation. He acknowledged pursuing 
or engaging in sexual contact with several women, includ-
ing two of whom the department had not yet been aware, but 
he admittedly did not disclose other inappropriate sexual 
encounters with women whom he met through his official 
duties.
	
Applicant resigned from the police department 
before Rappe completed his investigation, and the depart-
ment closed its investigation. Soon after applicant’s resig-
nation, the Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards 
and Training (DPSST), which trains and certifies public 
safety officers, opened its own investigation into applicant. 
DPSST staff reviewed materials provided by the Springfield 
Police Department, concluded that applicant’s conduct vio-
lated the moral fitness standards, and referred the case for 
further administrative review to decide whether to revoke 
applicant’s DPSST certifications. However, applicant agreed 
to bring an end to the inquiry by stipulating that he would 
voluntarily relinquish his DPSST certifications and that the 
revocation would be permanent, thus precluding applicant 
from future work as a public safety officer in Oregon.
	
Applicant admits all of the above misconduct. The 
only allegations that he denies were made by JF, who had 
been an exotic dancer at a club in Springfield when appli-
cant arrested her for driving under the influence of intox-
icants (DUII) in 2009. Because JF’s allegations—and 
applicant’s denial of them—were critical to the board’s con-
clusion, we discuss those allegations in detail. It is undis-
puted that applicant was dispatched to the club where JF 
worked to investigate a report of erratic driving made by a 
citizen who followed JF’s car to the club. At the club, appli-
cant first spoke with the bartender, who described JF as 
intoxicated when she arrived, and then asked JF to perform 
field sobriety tests before arresting her. At the police sta-
tion, JF submitted to a breathalyzer test that revealed a 
0.18 blood alcohol content. She claimed—at least later—that 
she began drinking only after she had arrived at the club.
	
JF was not a witness at the hearing, but her state-
ments to other witnesses are part of the record. JF’s con-
cerns about applicant were first reported in detail to the 
366	
In re Halttunen
Springfield Police Department when Rappe interviewed her 
in 2012 in the presence of her attorney.1 JF told Rappe that, 
during the 2009 arrest, applicant had been overly friendly 
with her at the jail and had insisted that she needed to 
remove all of her jewelry in his presence, even after she 
explained that her jewelry included a genital piercing. She 
explained that she had been “creeped” out by applicant’s 
behavior and insisted on the presence of a female deputy 
before she removed the piercing.
	
JF also complained to Rappe that applicant seem-
ingly pursued her after the arrest. JF reported learning 
that, shortly after her arrest, applicant had encountered 
JF’s older sister at one of his son’s baseball games and had 
told the sister that he was keeping an eye on JF and that 
she was being a “good girl.” She also reported that applicant 
began showing up at the club while he was on duty, mostly 
just driving though the parking lot but sometimes walking 
inside, and that he appeared to be staring at her or attempt-
ing to talk to her. JF described that attention as continu-
ing even after she started working at a different club. She 
explained that applicant’s attention made her feel uneasy 
and frightened because “cops are powerful.”
	
JF was interviewed about applicant again in 
2017, this time over the phone by another Springfield offi-
cer. JF largely repeated what she had told Rappe,2 but she 
also described more extensive misconduct, including that 
applicant had visited her club on a daily basis, often try-
ing to talk with her, beginning months prior to her 2009 
	
1  Shortly after her DUII arrest, JF made at least one informal complaint to 
another officer about an unwanted contact by applicant following that arrest, and 
she reported in later interviews that she had fully described applicant’s arrest 
behavior to the lawyer who had represented her on the DUII charge in 2009, 
whom she thought had used that information to obtain what she understood to 
be a favorable disposition of the charge. 
	
2  The board describes JF as stating in the 2017 interview that, at the time 
of her arrest, applicant had taken her to a room at the station “where Applicant 
forced her to undress.” But that understanding of the record appears to be incor-
rect. JF did not report in either interview that applicant had forced her to undress 
in his presence. To the contrary, she told the interviewer in 2017 that she “did not 
recall that she actually removed the jewelry,” and Rappe recorded JF as stating 
only that applicant had been “overly pushy” but that “[s]he demanded to have a 
female deputy present because she wasn’t going to take [her piercing] out unless 
one was present.” 
Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020)	
367
DUII arrest. First, JF suggested to the interviewing offi-
cer that her DUII arrest had been improper. She claimed 
that she had failed the field sobriety tests because appli-
cant had required her to perform the test in the eight-inch 
heels that she wore for dancing; further claimed that she 
had consumed a significant amount of alcohol after arriving 
at the club; and “implied,” according to the interviewer, that 
she had not consumed any alcohol prior to driving, although 
“she acknowledged her driving may have been poor.” JF also 
added in that 2017 interview that applicant had behaved 
inappropriately before taking her into the police station, fol-
lowing her arrest. She reported that applicant had picked 
her up and sat her on the trunk of his car to let her smoke, 
in what the interviewer’s report characterized as an “awk-
ward, sexually-oriented, and inappropriate” maneuver, and 
JF reported that applicant had been “attempting to imply 
there was some way out of her predicament by favor.”
	
Applicant denies JF’s allegations of inappropriate 
conduct. He contends that he had no contact with JF before 
he arrested her in 2009 and that the arrest was entirely 
proper. He points out that he was following up on the citizen’s 
report of erratic driving and that the bartender at the club 
had described JF as intoxicated when she arrived. Applicant 
denies the allegation that he required JF to perform field 
sobriety tests in heels and emphasizes both that the arrest 
report showed that she performed the tests in boots and that 
the chief of police had observed the tests after stopping by to 
serve as backup. He also pointed to inconsistencies between 
JF’s timeline of events and contemporaneous records that 
were either automatically time-stamped or not created by 
applicant—at least one of which is also noted in the 2017 
investigative report. Applicant emphatically denies that he 
asked JF to remove a genital piercing in front of him or that 
he had any inappropriate contact with her prior to taking 
her into the police station.
	
With respect to the allegation that he pursued JF 
after the arrest, applicant testified that he “certainly was driv-
ing through the parking lot [of the club] several times a week, 
if not daily” during his patrols—the club was nearly across 
the street from the police station—but he denied intention-
ally targeting JF and testified that he could only remember 
368	
In re Halttunen
two occasions when he interacted with JF after the arrest. 
He explained his conversation with JF’s sister at their chil-
dren’s baseball game as an effort to mitigate any awkward-
ness resulting from the fact that he had recently arrested 
JF. In his briefing to this court, applicant suggests that JF’s 
description of applicant’s conduct in the 2012 interview with 
Rappe may have been influenced by a recent charge of felony 
resisting arrest in relation to a 2012 DUII. As a defense to 
the resisting arrest charge, JF had asserted that her con-
duct was “something of a post-traumatic stress reaction to 
the police,” resulting from applicant’s alleged misconduct.
B.  Efforts at Reformation
	
Applicant reports that the months following his res-
ignation were a low point in his life. In August 2013, appli-
cant began psychotherapy with Dr. McDonald. At the time, 
applicant felt that he had been treated unfairly because he 
believed that others in the police department engaged in 
misconduct that went unpunished. But applicant’s therapy 
sessions forced him to confront the fact that his life circum-
stances were a result of his own selfish and immature con-
duct. According to Dr. McDonald, applicant “demonstrated 
both the willingness and the ability to engage in critical self-
analysis and insight into his behavior and its impact on oth-
ers.” Dr. McDonald saw applicant for about 10 months and 
concluded that he “took his therapy seriously and displayed 
the courage to examine his choices, thinking patterns, and 
behavior.”
	
Those thinking patterns had included chauvinis-
tic views and objectification of women. As a police officer, 
he was known to make crude comments about sex, and he 
admits that, at the time, he viewed sex as an opportunity 
to prove himself. Further, applicant was unfaithful in both 
marriages during his time as a police officer.
	
Those thinking patterns had also included an 
unwillingness to admit vulnerability. Although applicant 
initially had found work in law enforcement rewarding, it 
took a toll on him emotionally. Specifically, applicant strug-
gled handling his encounters with death while on the job, 
which had increased after he began work as a drug recogni-
tion expert and after he began being regularly dispatched to 
Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020)	
369
fatal car accidents. Despite feeling worn down by the work, 
applicant did not seek help while he worked at the depart-
ment, even though mental health services were available to 
officers in need, because he did not want to be perceived as 
weak.
	
According to applicant, his own harmful patterns of 
thinking were prevalent and promoted at the department. 
His therapy following the resignation allowed him to view 
his misconduct as a combination of his unhealthy views 
about sex and his emotional stress. As he testified during 
the hearing, “I was more worried about making myself feel 
good and not paying attention to the rules or to their emo-
tions. And so I sought that out to kind of feel good about 
myself[.]”
	
During his treatment with Dr.  McDonald, appli-
cant developed new personal and professional goals. He 
knew another former officer from the Springfield Police 
Department who had started law school and turned his 
life around after being similarly worn down by work as a 
police officer. Applicant applied to, and was accepted into, 
Willamette University College of Law to start in the fall of 
2014.
	
Applicant moved to Salem to begin classes at 
Willamette. He did well in law school and developed an 
interest in criminal law. He also began dating a woman 
whom he would later marry. Following his first year of law 
school, applicant worked in the financial fraud section of the 
Oregon Department of Justice and, in his second year, began 
working as a law student at Vidrio Park & Jarvis, LLC, with 
a focus on criminal defense. Applicant volunteered as a men-
tor to new students and won a pro bono award for his work 
on behalf of a disabled veteran through the Willamette Law 
Pro Bono Honors program. In his third year of law school, 
applicant continued to work at Vidrio Park & Jarvis, LLC, 
now as a certified law student, which allowed him to repre-
sent indigent clients facing criminal misdemeanor charges. 
That work included trying eight cases to a jury. The mem-
bers of the firm were impressed with his work and indicated 
a desire to hire him to a full-time position when he became 
a member of the Bar.
370	
In re Halttunen
	
Applicant knew that, in light of his history with the 
Springfield Police Department, his character and fitness to 
practice law would be scrutinized by the board. As a result, 
when entering his third year of law school, applicant con-
tacted a counselor from the Oregon Attorney Assistance 
Program, who recommended that applicant participate in 
additional psychotherapy. Applicant followed that recom-
mendation and saw Dr.  Miller-Moe from September 2016 
through April 2017. According to Dr. Miller-Moe, applicant 
had “used the psychotherapy to explore the impact of work 
culture and the extraordinary stress related to work in law 
enforcement,” and had “developed a variety of tools to main-
tain physical and mental health.” In Dr. Miller-Moe’s opin-
ion, applicant did “not present with any mental or emotional 
barriers which would impair his ability to practice within 
the ethical guidelines of his chosen profession.”
	
Applicant submitted his application to the Bar in 
March 2017. Applicant then graduated from law school in 
May 2017 and passed the July 2017 Bar exam. At about the 
same time, he participated in a psychosexual evaluation con-
ducted by Dr. Linn, hoping to establish that he had no per-
sonality traits that posed a risk of repeating his misconduct 
while a police officer. Dr. Linn reviewed all of the reports 
about applicant from the Springfield Police Department, the 
DPSST investigations, and a recording of applicant’s inter-
view with the three-member board panel. Dr. Linn opined 
that applicant’s “psychiatric history, attitudes, and psycho-
logical testing do not reflect the existence of a personality 
disorder” and rejected a suggestion that applicant suffered 
from a “narcissistic personality disorder.” Rather, accord-
ing to Dr. Linn, applicant “appears capable of empathy and 
insight into his deficits.”
	
Dr. Linn’s report described applicant’s sense of 
shame and guilt for his misconduct. In the report, applicant 
is quoted as acknowledging the power imbalance between 
himself and the women he met in the course of his duties: 
“I was working as a police officer and they see me as an 
authority figure. I didn’t factor that power differential in or 
how they may be perceiving the situation.’ 
” When Dr. Linn 
asked applicant whether he believes that he had been tak-
ing advantage of the women he met, applicant stated, “ 
‘Yes, 
Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020)	
371
but at the time, I didn’t see it that way. I just saw it as 
consensual. With benefit of hindsight [these women] have 
been more vulnerable. I should have paused to see that.’ 
” 
Similarly, applicant stated, “ 
‘I thought it was mutual attrac-
tion. I didn’t pause long enough to think that they weren’t 
talking to Neil but possibly a police officer.’ 
” In his inter-
view with Dr. Linn, applicant acknowledged that there are 
also power differentials between a lawyer and client. But he 
said, “Having gone through that experience of letting people 
down and shaming myself, I looked in the mirror[,] how I 
was, and I don’t want to be that person anymore. I don’t view 
women or sex in the same way that I used to.”
	
Dr. Linn concluded that applicant’s prior miscon-
duct “appear[s] related to a complicated variety of environ-
mental factors, untreated trauma, alcohol abuse, marital 
stress, and unhealthy messages regarding women and sex-
uality through his experience as a soldier and police officer.” 
And Dr.  Linn noted that applicant’s various experiences 
with counseling and psychotherapy “suggest a well above 
average level of commitment to personal growth and relapse 
prevention.” Nevertheless, based on applicant’s previous 
“pattern of acting-out behavior,” Dr. Linn recommended a 
conditional admission for a term, during which applicant 
would continue psychotherapy to further “develop relapse 
prevention strategies and healthy boundaries in his future 
work with potentially vulnerable clients.”
	
As part of that evaluation, Dr. Linn referred appli-
cant for sessions of professional boundary counseling with 
Dr. Shallcross, which applicant attended in 2017. According 
to Dr. Shallcross, applicant “had gained tremendous insight 
into his behavior,” and his current life circumstances cre-
ated a “much different environment” than that out of which 
his misconduct arose. Dr. Shallcross had no concerns about 
applicant’s ability to conduct himself “professionally” in the 
practice of law.
C.  Conduct During Application Process
	
As described above applicant submitted his applica-
tion to the Bar in March 2017. In the application, he acknowl-
edged that he had resigned from the Springfield Police 
Department while under investigation for his relationships 
372	
In re Halttunen
with women whom he met while on duty. He also acknowl-
edged that, while under investigation by the department, 
he had not fully disclosed the extent of those relationships. 
He stated, however, that “[t]hese relationships were consen-
sual and they did not affect any enforcement or investiga-
tive decisions I made as part of my duties.” The application 
went on to describe the steps that applicant had taken since 
leaving the police force to improve himself and avoid similar 
conduct in the future, including his therapy and new life 
circumstances, and highlighted his work at Vidrio Park & 
Jarvis, LLC.
	
A panel of three board members scheduled an inter-
view with applicant at the end of October 2017. Before the 
interview, applicant provided the board with personal and 
professional letters of recommendation and documentation 
from mental health professionals, attesting to applicant’s fit-
ness to practice law. That included Dr. Linn’s report and let-
ters from Dr. McDonald, Dr. Miller-Moe, and Dr. Shallcross, 
all of whom supported applicant’s admission to the Bar.
	
During the interview, applicant repeated many of 
the themes that appeared in Dr. Linn’s report—namely, that 
he “didn’t pause to really think about the power dynamic” 
between him and the women he met while a police officer; 
that he knew that his behavior was wrong at the time, but 
rationalized it because it made him feel better; that therapy 
helped him reflect on his actions and how they affected oth-
ers, including the women he met and his family; and that he 
deeply regretted his conduct.
	
However, one aspect of applicant’s responses 
during the interview caused the board to doubt applicant’s 
veracity. During the panel interview, applicant was asked 
whether he had sexual contact with any other women he 
met in the course of his duties beyond those identified in 
the reports that were prepared by Rappe during the course 
of the Springfield Police Department’s 2012 investigation. 
Applicant replied that there were other women with whom 
he had had “sexual communications,” but that the reports 
identified all the women with whom he had had sexual con-
tact. A few days after the interview, however, applicant sent 
an email to the panel acknowledging that he actually had 
Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020)	
373
had sexual contact with two additional women whom he had 
met through his official duties and who were not identified 
in Rappe’s reports. Applicant provided the women’s names 
and basic details of those encounters.
	
Following the panel interview, the board voted to 
deny applicant admission to the Bar, and he requested a 
formal hearing. At the hearing, applicant again testified 
along the same lines as his earlier interviews with Dr. Linn 
and the board panel. He added that his time representing 
criminal defendants as a certified law student had deepened 
his understanding of the vulnerable position of many of the 
women whom he had met:
“I represented a lot of clients, including women. And I can 
remember having conversations with them, preparing for 
their defense. And they were the kind of conversations I 
never would have had as a police officer and they were tell-
ing me some of the background that led up to why they 
were being represented. And I remember thinking these 
are the same kind of issues that the women I had affairs 
with were probably experiencing. * 
* 
* I did not feel good 
about myself when I, when it dawned on me like that.”
He then tied that vulnerability to understanding how his 
conduct was an abuse of power:
“I feel like it took advantage of the situation that I was 
in because * 
* 
* I didn’t stop and think at the time about 
what was going on in their lives, what their emotional 
needs were, what they were thinking. I was thinking about 
myself. And that abused the power because I was in a posi-
tion of trust that they relied on and then I took advantage 
of it and wound up in relationships with them.”
	
One incident following the evidentiary hearing had 
a significant influence on the board’s ultimate decision. 
The board had left the record open for limited purposes, 
which included allowing its special investigator to contact 
relevant individuals named in the proceedings and allow-
ing applicant to submit declarations from character ref-
erences who had been unable to testify. Before the record 
closed, applicant spoke with a Springfield police officer, 
Detective Weaver, who had testified at the hearing for appli-
cant. The two discussed hearing testimony given by Rappe, 
374	
In re Halttunen
in particular the effort by applicant’s counsel to impeach 
Rappe by asking about complaints of sexual and other mis-
conduct against Rappe over the years.3 Rappe maintained 
that the only recent complaint was no longer being pursued 
against him, and Weaver thought that Rappe’s statement 
was inaccurate. Applicant provided Weaver with a video 
recording of the hearing, from which Weaver extracted only 
Rappe’s testimony and shared it with the Springfield Police 
Association, in order to determine whether Rappe had tes-
tified falsely. The police association showed the video clip to 
the Springfield chief of police, who advised that Rappe had 
accurately described the status of the complaint about his 
conduct. The board viewed applicant’s actions as an effort 
to retaliate against Rappe by giving the police association 
ammunition for an ongoing battle with Rappe.
III.  DISCUSSION
	
Based on that record, a majority of the board rec-
ommended against admission, concluding that applicant 
had failed to accept responsibility for his misconduct as a 
police officer and lacked candor throughout the application 
process. Three dissenting board members, however, recom-
mended conditional admission. They concluded that appli-
cant had accepted responsibility for his actions, that his 
misconduct was not the product of a “fundamental, endur-
ing, and pervasive aspect of his personality,” that his char-
acter references demonstrated that he has made significant 
behavioral and attitudinal change, and that applicant was 
genuine in describing his understanding of, and remorse for, 
how his conduct harmed the women he pursued.
	
As noted above, we review the record de  novo to 
determine whether applicant has shown that he is a person 
of good moral character. See ORS 9.536(2); ORS 9.539; BR 
10.6; RFA 9.60(5). There is no doubt that applicant’s conduct 
while working as a police officer provides a basis for ques-
tioning whether he possesses the good moral character that 
is required to practice law. As applicant acknowledges, his 
	
3  During his hearing testimony, Rappe had disagreed with applicant’s tes-
timony that harmful patterns of thinking were prevalent and promoted at the 
department, so evidence that Rappe himself was the subject of misconduct com-
plaints could have undermined that testimony. 
Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020)	
375
conduct was inappropriate, unethical, and even potentially 
criminal.4 There also is no question that applicant’s abuse of 
his power and position as a law enforcement officer caused 
emotional harm to some of the vulnerable women whom he 
pursued. Moreover, applicant admittedly responded dishon-
estly during the 2012 investigation into his misconduct. The 
crucial inquiry in this case is whether applicant has demon-
strated that, despite his history, he now possesses the char-
acter and fitness to permit his admission to the bar because 
his “character has reformed sufficiently in the interim.” 
 
In re Carter, 334 Or at 395; id. at 394-95 (so describing the 
“crucial inquiry” when considering the character of appli-
cant who had engaged in “misconduct involving moral 
turpitude”).
	
Applicant urges this court to adopt the recommen-
dation of the board minority and conditionally admit him to 
practice law. He argues that he “has completely and totally 
overhauled his life” and that he has demonstrated by clear 
and convincing evidence that he has been successful in his 
efforts at reformation and presently possesses the good 
moral character and fitness that is required for admission 
to the Bar. He emphasizes in particular that 20 members 
of the Bar, including a retired former chief justice of this 
court, have attested to his present character and fitness to 
practice law. The board, on the other hand, urges this court 
to adopt the carefully considered reasoning of the majority 
and to deny applicant admission to the Bar, either because 
his prior misconduct is so significant that his evidence of 
reformation is irrelevant or because petitioner’s words and 
conduct throughout the course of the admission process 
undermine his evidence of reformation.
	
As the split decision of the board reflects, this is a 
close question. This court has repeatedly emphasized that 
“ 
‘[r]eformation is a very difficult matter for a petitioner to 
prove and for [this court] to judge.’ 
” In re Jaffee, 319 Or 172, 
177, 874 P2d 1299 (1994) (insertions in original; quoting 
In re Bernard Jolles, 235 Or 262, 275, 383 P2d 388 (1963)). 
	
4  There was testimony at the hearing that applicant’s conduct satisfied the 
elements of Official Misconduct, which is a class A misdemeanor. ORS 162.415. 
And applicant does not dispute the characterization of his conduct as criminal.
376	
In re Halttunen
Nevertheless, “reformation can be proved to this court’s sat-
isfaction, as this court’s past decisions attest.” Id. (emphasis 
in original). And we are satisfied in this case that applicant 
has demonstrated reformation sufficiently to qualify for con-
ditional admission to the Oregon State Bar.
A.  Whether Applicant Should Be Categorically Barred from 
Admission
	
Before turning to the evidence of reformation, we 
briefly address the board’s argument that applicant’s con-
duct should categorically bar him from admission, regard-
less of his evidence of reformation. In support of that argu-
ment, the board first urges this court to conclude that the 
permanent revocation of applicant’s DPSST certification 
is, itself, grounds to preclude his admission to the Bar. 
As the board points out, DPSST certification—like bar 
 
admission—requires that a person have “moral fitness.” 
OAR 259-008-0010(6) (2013). The board does not exactly 
suggest that the DPSST action reflects a finding that should 
give rise to a form of issue preclusion. It could not, because 
the DPSST did not revoke applicant’s license based on a 
determination that he lacked moral fitness. Instead, DPSST 
revoked applicant’s license because he relinquished his 
license while an investigation was in progress. OAR 259-
008-0070(9)(k) (2013). Although the board asks this court 
to view that relinquishment as equivalent to a “Form B” 
resignation of bar membership, which permanently disqual-
ifies the lawyer from being reinstated, BR 9.4, the board 
has offered no reason that this court—or applicant in this 
court—should be bound by the DPSST’s revocation decision. 
Regardless of any similarity between the standards for 
DPSST certification and membership in the Oregon State 
Bar, this court has an independent obligation to determine 
whether an applicant is presently qualified for membership 
in the Oregon Bar. See generally In re Sanai, 360 Or 497, 
500, 383 P3d 821 (2016) (“[I]n reciprocal discipline cases, we 
have an independent obligation to determine an appropriate 
sanction based upon this state’s disciplinary rules.”).
	
The board also argues that applicant’s conduct was 
so egregious that it would result in automatic disbarment if 
engaged in by a current bar member and, likewise, should 
Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020)	
377
categorically preclude bar membership when engaged in 
prior to an application for Bar membership. The board first 
points to RFA 3.10, which provides that “[a]n applicant shall 
not be eligible for admission to the Bar after having been 
convicted of a crime, the commission of which would have 
led to disbarment in all the circumstances present, had 
the person been an Oregon attorney at the time of convic-
tion.” That rule does not directly control this case, however, 
as the board seemingly recognizes; regardless of whether 
applicant’s conduct could have been prosecuted as a crimi-
nal offense, it was not. As a result, applicant has not been 
convicted of a crime, and RFA 3.10 does not control.
	
Nor is an analogy to conduct that might result in 
disbarment dispositive in this case. The nature, extent, and 
severity of an applicant’s prior misconduct is relevant to 
assessing whether the applicant has the good moral char-
acter necessary to practice law. Indeed, “some prior crimi-
nal actions may be so severe that they would disqualify an 
applicant from admission.” In re Beers, 339 Or 215, 224, 118 
P3d 784 (2005). But the misconduct at issue in this case, 
which was confined to a limited period of applicant’s career 
as a police officer, is not so egregious that we can assess 
applicant’s character without considering the steps that he 
has taken since 2012 to rehabilitate his character.
B.  Whether Applicant Has Established His Moral Character
	
We therefore proceed to the question of whether 
applicant has sufficiently reformed his character to war-
rant admission to the Bar. When an applicant’s prior con-
duct demonstrates a lack of good moral character, the 
 
“[a]pplicant bears the burden of proving by clear and con-
vincing evidence that he has [reformed his character], and 
any significant doubt about an applicant’s character and fit-
ness should be resolved in favor of protecting the public.” 
 
Id. at 225 (internal citation omitted). This court has previ-
ously considered, “as evidence of reformation, character tes-
timony from those who know and have had an opportunity 
to observe the applicant, participation in activities that ben-
efit society, and an applicant’s forthright acknowledgment 
of the wrongfulness of his or her past actions.” In re Carter, 
334 Or at 395.
378	
In re Halttunen
	
In In re Carter, this court agreed with the board’s 
concern that an applicant who had previously committed 
theft—“an act of misconduct involving moral turpitude”—
had failed to prove reformation, in part because he had 
failed to produce “any current personal or professional char-
acter evidence” and had failed to follow a psychologist’s rec-
ommendations for addressing “the underlying psychological 
reasons for his behavior.” Id. at 393-94. As we emphasized 
in that case, the applicant’s claim that his actions since the 
time of the theft showed “good moral character” reduced 
to “remaining crime-free and pursuing his academic goals 
of, among other things, completing law school, passing the 
Oregon Bar Examination, and pursuing an electrical engi-
neering degree,” which we concluded was not “any evidence 
from which this court could conclude that applicant’s char-
acter has reformed sufficiently to permit his admission to 
the Bar.” Id. at 395.
	
But we reached a different conclusion in In re Beers. 
The applicant in that case had a long history of using and 
selling drugs and other associated criminal activity, includ-
ing weapons offenses and driving under the influence. 
During that period of his life, he had failed to appear for 
court hearings on multiple occasions, twice provided police 
officers with a false name, and once hired someone to imper-
sonate him at a court-ordered drug treatment program. 
339 Or at 217-18. By his mid-twenties, the applicant was a 
mid-level drug dealer, buying and selling large quantities of 
cocaine. He was arrested, and he served almost three years 
in prison. Id. at 218.
	
While serving that prison sentence, the applicant 
“began to turn his life around.” Id. He had “stopped using 
drugs, began taking college courses, and dealt with his unre-
solved criminal charges and warrants.” Id. He continued his 
college education after his release from prison and quickly 
found success in business. By the time that he started law 
school, the applicant had been out of prison for four or five 
years and was the Director of Operations for a division of 
Columbia Sportswear. The applicant had attended law 
school at night while working full time and raising three 
children with his wife. During law school, the applicant 
also had passed the Certified Public Accountant exam, had 
Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020)	
379
received his accounting license, and had begun serving as 
a member of the board of directors of the National Crime 
Victims Law Institute. By the time that the applicant grad-
uated from law school and applied for admission to the Bar, 
he had been out of prison for eight years and drug-free for 
ten years. Id. at 220.
	
This court concluded that the applicant had suffi-
ciently reformed to warrant admission to the Bar. Id. at 228. 
The court first characterized the applicant’s earlier criminal 
conduct by noting that it was related to his drug addiction 
and that he was no longer addicted to drugs. As the court 
explained, “[i]f the condition that gave rise to applicant’s 
earlier criminal behavior is in ‘sustained full remission’ and 
if applicant truly has turned his life around, what basis is 
there for saying that he has not reformed?” Id. at 225.
	
This court went on to consider the amount of time 
that had passed since the applicant’s misconduct, his accep-
tance of responsibility for his misconduct, his success in 
“achieving his personal, professional, and educational 
goals,” his participation in “activities for the public good,” 
and his impressive references, which included many “mem-
bers of the Bar who are aware of applicant’s past and are 
sensitive to the board’s considerations,” as well as people 
who knew the applicant both before and after he turned his 
life around. Id. at 228-29.
	
In this case, as in In re Beers, applicant has demon-
strated a marked degree of self-improvement and rehabilita-
tion since his misconduct. None of the psychological experts 
who evaluated applicant believed that he suffers from the 
kind of fundamental and pervasive personality challenge 
that might prevent a successful rehabilitation of his behav-
ior and character. They opined that he has gained insight 
into his past behaviors and their impact on others and has 
developed the tools and support network to maintain a suc-
cessful reformation. And, like the applicant in Beers, appli-
cant has a wide range of references attesting to the fact that 
he has fundamentally changed his behaviors and reformed 
his character.
	
First, as the author of the dissenting board recom-
mendation, Dr. Kolbell, emphasized, the record contains no 
380	
In re Halttunen
evidence that applicant’s behavior between 2009 and 2012 
was attributable to a personality disorder, severe psycholog-
ical condition, or other manifestation of an “enduring aspect 
of his personality or character.” At the hearing, Dr.  Linn 
had opined that applicant’s “psychiatric history, attitudes, 
and psychological testing do not reflect the existence of a 
personality disorder” and that applicant “appears capable of 
empathy and insight into his deficits.” Further, in Dr. Miller-
Moe’s opinion, applicant had “developed a variety of tools to 
maintain physical and mental health” and did “not present 
with any mental or emotional barriers which would impair 
his ability to practice within the ethical guidelines of his 
chosen profession.” And, according to Dr. Shallcross, appli-
cant “had gained tremendous insight into his behavior,” and 
she had no concerns about his ability to conduct himself 
“professionally” in the future. Finally, Dr. McDonald, who 
treated applicant in 2013-2014, reviewed the reports from 
all of applicant’s subsequent mental health providers and 
wrote a special report for the hearing. In Dr. McDonald’s 
opinion, applicant “demonstrated both the willingness and 
the ability to engage in critical self-analysis and insight into 
his behavior and its impact on others.” Dr. McDonald “enthu-
siastically” added his “voice to those who have expressed 
confidence in his fitness to practice law.”
	
The board discounted the significance of those 
expert opinions because they did not—indeed they could 
not—offer an opinion on applicant’s “moral character.” But 
the significance of the expert opinions lies not in their abil-
ity to address the ultimate question; rather, it lies in their 
ability to address whether applicant suffers from a person-
ality disorder, psychological condition, or other enduring or 
pervasive aspect of his personality that would cast serious 
doubt on his ability to evolve and reform his attitudes and 
behavior. That is a question that few members of the board 
and no members of this court are qualified to assess. And, 
without that expert opinion, we would be less persuaded by 
the overwhelming endorsement from applicant’s friends, 
family, and co-workers regarding the outward evidence that 
he has reformed and rehabilitated his character.
	
Those supporters—a large and varied group—
attest to applicant’s present character and fitness to practice 
Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020)	
381
law, and all were given complete access to the underlying 
records in this case. Those who have known applicant since 
before his misconduct, including his first ex-wife, described 
the positive changes that they have seen in applicant since 
he left law enforcement. Those who met applicant after his 
misconduct, including law school classmates, professional 
acquaintances and colleagues, and applicant’s current wife, 
all insisted that applicant’s past bears no resemblance to 
the person that they know today. Not one reference, many of 
whom are women, observed the abuse of power, dishonesty, 
or objectification of women that applicant demonstrated in 
his past misconduct. Applicant testified that the references 
not only describe who he is today, but also serve as motiva-
tion for him to live up to the character that the references 
describe.
	
We place particular weight on the references pro-
vided by the attorneys and staff at Vidrio Park & Jarvis, 
LLC. They are aware of the ethical and professional 
demands on an attorney and have directly observed appli-
cant doing the work of a lawyer as a certified law student, 
including interacting with clients and representing them 
at trial. Although applicant’s work for the firm appears to 
have presented opportunities for him to abuse his position of 
power or to exploit those who were less powerful, none of the 
hearing witnesses from the firm—whether supervisor, col-
league, or support staff—observed any concerning behavior. 
And, despite being aware of applicant’s prior misconduct, 
they have supported him throughout the application process 
and want him to join the firm as a full attorney.
	
The board was unpersuaded by the strength of 
applicant’s character references, however, because it was not 
convinced that applicant had sufficiently accepted responsi-
bility for his misconduct, as illustrated by his characteriz-
ing his victimization of vulnerable women as “consensual” 
contacts or mere “boundary violations.” According to the 
board, the “record does not demonstrate Applicant’s genuine 
remorse, or even understanding, that he used his position to 
take advantage of and victimize vulnerable people.”
	
Although we agree that applicant’s use of the word 
“consensual” on his Bar admission application in March 2017 
382	
In re Halttunen
appears legalistic and is not well chosen in this context, we 
are persuaded that the record as a whole, including appli-
cant’s subsequent descriptions of his behavior, demonstrates 
that applicant understands and appreciates the harmful 
nature of his misconduct. Applicant emphasized numerous 
times that he now understands that the power differen-
tial between himself and the women whom he met while a 
police officer at times affected their willingness to tolerate 
his advances. Applicant repeatedly expressed remorse—the 
“tremendous amount of shame and regret” that he feels—
for how his conduct affected others. Admittedly, it can be 
difficult to distinguish between empty statements of regret 
and true rehabilitation of character. But we do not ques-
tion the genuineness of applicant’s remorse, which appears 
to be the result of critical and extensive self-examination 
that began when he started psychotherapy not long after 
his resignation from the police department. It is significant 
to our assessment that Dr. Kolbell—a public member of the 
board and trained psychologist—had confidence in the gen-
uineness of applicant’s remorse. Dr.  Kolbell was the only 
board member to have heard applicant describe his remorse 
at both the small panel interview and the character review 
hearing, and he authored the minority opinion recommend-
ing admission.
	
It appears that a primary reason the board ques-
tioned applicant’s reformation was his denial of JF’s hearsay 
statements, which the board expressly found to be “credible.”5 
We have difficulty placing that much weight on applicant’s 
denial, however, when there is so little basis for assessing 
the accuracy of the JF allegations.6 Although JF’s lawyer, 
who attended her 2012 interview with Rappe, may have 
credibly described JF’s recounting as involving “indicia of 
	
5  The final board opinion walks a fine line with respect to the JF allegations. 
Although the board cited as evidence of applicant’s lack of candor his denial of 
JF’s allegations, which it expressly “credit[ed] as true,” it also noted that “the 
Board would still recommend denial of admission even if this event had not 
occurred.” 
	
6  We note that the state’s denial of a professional license on the basis of hear-
say allegations can raise due process concerns. See Cole/Dinsmore v. DMV, 336 
Or 565, 588, 87 P3d 1120 (2004) (“[W]hen important governmental decisions are 
based on determinations of fact, due process usually requires an opportunity 
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”). But we resolve this case on 
subconstitutional grounds.
Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020)	
383
believability”—as the board emphasized—JF did not testify 
at the hearing. As a result, she was not available to explain 
the inconsistencies within the allegations themselves or to 
clarify how closely her perception of events—particularly 
years later—aligned with the actual events. Finally, JF’s 
extremely serious suggestion that applicant falsely arrested 
her by manipulating her failure of the field sobriety test and 
then delayed taking her into the station so that he could 
engage in sexually oriented and inappropriate conversation 
“to imply there was some way out of her predicament by 
favor” is contrary to the documentary record of the arrest. 
Under the circumstances, applicant’s continuing denial of 
JF’s hearsay allegations does not cause us to question his 
reformation or candor.
	
The board’s view that applicant lacked credibility 
with regard to JF’s allegations seemingly influenced its view 
of two other incidents to which it pointed as evidence that 
applicant lacks candor, a view that we do not share. First, 
the board highlighted the fact that applicant later corrected 
a statement that he made during his panel interview. As 
noted above, applicant initially told the interview panel that 
Rappe’s reports, although incomplete in some respects, con-
tained the complete list of the women with whom applicant 
had engaged in sexual contact after meeting them in the 
course of official duties. A few days later, applicant volun-
tarily corrected that statement and supplied the names of 
two additional women that he had not disclosed to Rappe. 
In light of all the circumstances, we are inclined to view 
applicant’s statement during the interview as an inadver-
tent error that he promptly took steps to correct, which has 
little effect on the overall analysis.
	
The board also reasoned that applicant lacks can-
dor because the board did not find credible applicant’s 
explanation for sharing Rappe’s hearing testimony with 
Weaver—namely, that applicant was investigating potential 
impeachment evidence against Rappe. The board points out 
that, at the time when applicant shared the video of Rappe’s 
testimony with Weaver, the record remained open only for 
limited purposes, which did not include additional impeach-
ment evidence. The board suggests that applicant was more 
likely seeking retaliation against Rappe for his testimony. 
384	
In re Halttunen
We do not share the board’s skepticism. The board retained 
the discretion to open the record to other relevant evidence. 
In fact, the board further opened the record to investigate 
applicant’s conduct in sharing Rappe’s testimony with 
Weaver. It is not implausible that, if Weaver had been able 
to confirm his suspicion about Rappe’s veracity, the board 
might have admitted that additional impeachment evi-
dence. And, if Weaver’s suspicion about Rappe’s veracity had 
proved accurate, that might have supplied impeachment 
evidence.
	
Thus, we are persuaded by the uniform opinion of 
the psychiatric experts that applicant’s past misconduct was 
not the product of a personality disorder or other enduring 
psychological condition—in other words, that reformation is 
possible. And we are persuaded by applicant’s many and var-
ied character witnesses that he has accomplished the kind 
of transformation of attitudes, mental health, and behavior 
that make him an applicant who presently possesses the 
good moral character and fitness to become a member of the 
Oregon State Bar. Ultimately, although the board’s skepti-
cism of reformation is understandable, we accept the sincer-
ity of applicant’s statement to Dr. Linn:
“Having gone through that experience of letting people 
down and shaming myself, I looked in the mirror[,] how 
I was, and I don’t want to be that person anymore. I don’t 
view women or sex in the same way that I used to.”
And we are persuaded that applicant presently possesses 
the good moral character and fitness to practice law.
	
Although we are convinced that applicant has genu-
inely reformed and has demonstrated that he presently pos-
sesses the good moral character necessary for admission to 
the Oregon State Bar, we appreciate that applicant is not 
asking that we admit him without conditions. Applicant 
has managed to reform his destructive attitudes toward 
women and has developed an awareness of the harm that 
his abuses of power caused, but the public needs assurance 
that applicant will be able to maintain those new patterns 
of thinking and adhere to appropriate behavior through the 
occupational stress that he will undoubtedly encounter as a 
new lawyer. As suggested by Dr. Linn, those concerns can 
Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020)	
385
and should be addressed through a conditional admission. 
Applicant is therefore subject to the following terms of con-
ditional admission:
1.	
The period of conditional admission shall con-
tinue for 48 months from the date of applicant’s 
admission.
2.	
Within 30 days of the date of admission, appli-
cant shall establish an ongoing relationship with a 
mental health treatment provider with experience 
addressing boundary violations and power differ-
entials. For a period of at least two years, applicant 
shall have at least monthly counseling sessions 
with that treatment provider, at his own cost, that 
are at least one hour in length and include support-
ive counseling focusing on boundary violations, 
power differentials, and relapse prevention strat-
egies. After two years, applicant shall follow the 
recommendation of the treatment provider with 
respect to the need for any further counseling.
3.	
During the period of applicant’s conditional admis-
sion, he shall be monitored for compliance by the 
Oregon State Bar’s State Lawyers Assistance 
Committee (SLAC) and shall agree to the terms 
that SLAC considers to be appropriate for appli-
cant’s monitoring agreement.
4.	
Applicant shall submit to SLAC an annual report 
from his mental health treatment provider for each 
of the first two years of admission and thereafter to 
the extent that the provider recommends ongoing 
treatment. The report shall summarize applicant’s 
progress with respect to boundary violations, power 
differentials and relapse prevention strategies, and 
it shall specify the provider’s recommendations for 
future counseling.
5.	
Applicant shall refrain from pursuing a sexual or 
romantic relationship with any current or former 
client.
6.	
SLAC shall submit quarterly reports to Disciplinary 
Counsel of the Oregon State Bar, confirming that 
386	
In re Halttunen
applicant has complied with all conditions of his 
admission. The first of these reports shall be due 
90 days after the date of applicant’s admission.
7.	
In the event applicant fails to comply with any 
term or condition of this opinion, or Disciplinary 
Counsel has reason to believe that applicant has 
failed to comply with the conditions set out in this 
opinion in any regard, Disciplinary Counsel may 
petition this court to revoke the conditional admis-
sion in accordance with procedures set out in BR 
6.2(d).
8.	
If applicant complies with all terms and conditions 
set out in this opinion, the term of his conditional 
admission shall expire 48 months from the date 
of admission, and he shall be admitted to practice 
unconditionally thereafter without further order of 
this court.
	
Applicant is conditionally admitted to the practice 
of law.