Case Title: WILLIAM MARTIN ZANETTI v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-281

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILLIAM MARTIN ZANETTI v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 203783 P.2d 134Case Number: 88-281Decided: 11/22/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
WILLIAM MARTIN ZANETTI, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE 
STATE OFWYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

John A. Zebre 
and John W. James, Rock Springs, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne and Paul S. 
Rehurek, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant William 
Martin Zanetti pleaded nolo contendere to three counts of second-degree sexual 
assault. After being sentenced, Appellant filed motions with the district court 
for withdrawal of his plea, reduction of his sentence, and correction of the 
record. The district court denied the motions, and Appellant appealed to this 
Court.

[¶2.]     We affirm but strike 
that portion of the sentence which conditions Appellant's release from parole 
upon the payment of restitution.

[¶3.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

I

[¶4.]     Whether Appellant has 
demonstrated with particularity the District Court unilaterally changed the 
terms of the plea bargain agreement. 

II

[¶5.]     Whether Appellant has 
met his burden of showing that manifest injustice has resulted from his 
plea.

A. District Court's 
finding that Appellant's reason for appeal to the Supreme Court and his motions 
filed after the appeal are based solely on Appellant being unhappy with his 
sentence was erroneous.

B. Appellant's "Motion to 
Withdraw" a plea of nolo contendere was based on a number of issues giving rise 
to "manifest injustices."

1. Plea agreement 
violation.

2. Innocence as issue on 
motion to withdraw nolo contendere pleas.

3. Misunderstanding as to 
consequences of plea; Mootness/Res Judicata.

4. Excessive 
sentencing/Mootness.

5. Presence of defense on 
the merits.

III

Whether the District 
Court, Third Judicial District, improperly failed to grant Appellant's Motion to 
Correct the Record.

[¶6.]     In his supplemental 
brief, Appellant added the following issue:

I. Whether under the 
circumstances of the case Appellant was denied the right to a speedy 
trial.

Facts

[¶7.]     On October 16, 1986, a 
criminal complaint and warrant was filed against Appellant, charging him with 
three counts of immoral or indecent acts in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105 
(1977) and ten counts of second-degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
§ 6-2-303(a) (1977). Appellant pleaded not guilty to all counts on March 11, 
1987. At the arraignment, the court mistakenly informed Appellant that the 
maximum sentence for second-degree sexual assault was ten years per count.1

[¶8.]     Appellant entered into 
a plea agreement with the county attorney's office. The agreement provided that 
Appellant would plead nolo contendere to three counts of second-degree sexual 
assault in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining ten charges. In addition, 
Appellant agreed to pay $13,831.96 to the Wyoming Department of Public 
Assistance and Social Services and an undetermined amount to the alleged victims 
for expenses incurred in filing the criminal actions, insurance deductible 
payments, airline tickets, accrued medical bills, and child care expenses. The 
parties agreed that the State would rely upon the presentence report and not 
make a sentencing recommendation.

[¶9.]     On June 14, 1988, 
Appellant changed his plea to nolo contendere on three counts of second-degree 
sexual assault, stating, "I deny the charges, Your Honor, for expediency reasons 
only. My plea is being - my plea is based upon the need of defense, to defend 
myself in the civil - the civil case filed against me." At that time, the 
district court informed Appellant of the correct maximum punishment for 
second-degree sexual assault. The court also explained to Appellant that, by 
pleading nolo contendere, he was admitting all the essential facts of the 
charges and that he was waiving his rights to remain silent, to a trial, and to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses. The court informed Appellant that it would 
ask him questions about the offenses and that any responses could be used in a 
prosecution for perjury or false statement. The court determined that the plea 
was voluntary and deferred making the decision as to whether to accept or reject 
the agreement. During the following dialogue, the State deferred the dismissal 
of the remaining charges:

COURT: You've dismissed 
the other 10?

MISS KEARNS: Yes, Your Honor, without prejudice. 

COURT: I would suggest 
that you make that dismissal conditional. That is, if I accept them 
-

MISS KEARNS: We haven't formerly dismissed on the record today 
and there's been no written dismissal and the State would defer the actual 
dismissal until after the sentencing.

MR. ZEBRE: I don't think 
that was part of the plea bargain agreement, Your Honor.

COURT: I haven't accepted 
-

MR. ZEBRE: I understand 
what the Court is saying, but I'm just saying it is my understanding that the 
dismissal was to be conditioned upon the nolo plea today. So if the Court wants 
to defer action on everything that's fine, because -

COURT: Assuming I reject 
any such thing. I assume you'll reject his nolo contendere plea, as I've told 
you. And he wants to withdraw his plea, then he'd still have 13 counts sitting 
there.

MR. ZEBRE: I understand 
that, Your Honor.

[¶10.]  The district court sentenced Appellant to 
three concurrent terms of not less than fourteen years nor more than eighteen 
years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. In addition, the court ordered 
Appellant to pay a $50 surcharge on each count to the Wyoming Crime Victim's 
Compensation Fund, $13,831.96 to the Wyoming Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, and an undetermined amount to each of the three alleged 
victims. The judgment stated that Appellant's restitution would be reduced by 
the amount of any civil damages awarded against Appellant and arising out of the 
same charges. The judgment included a provision which conditioned Appellant's 
release from parole upon his payment of restitution. It also acknowledged that 
the ten remaining charges had been dismissed.

[¶11.]  Appellant thereafter filed motions for 
withdrawal of his plea, reduction of his sentence, and correction of the record. 
The district court heard evidence in support of the motions and denied the 
motions on February 22, 1989. This appeal followed.

[¶12.]  Appellant's issues can be consolidated 
and addressed in the following four categories: withdrawal of a nolo contendere 
plea; excessive sentencing; correction of the record; and the right to a speedy 
trial.

Withdrawal of a Nolo 
Contendere Plea

[¶13.]  W.R.Cr.P. 15 defines the district court's 
authority to accept guilty and nolo contendere pleas.2 Before accepting a nolo contendere 
plea, the court must inform the defendant of the charges against him and 
determine that he understands the consequences of his plea. The court must also 
find that the plea is voluntary.3 If a plea agreement is involved, 
the court may defer its decision to accept or reject the agreement until it has 
considered the presentence report. Id.; 
Angerhofer v. State, 758 P.2d 1041 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶14.]  W.R.Cr.P. 33(d) delineates when a plea 
may be withdrawn.4 That rule 
provides:

Withdrawal of plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere. - A motion to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is 
imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest 
injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment o[f] conviction 
and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.

The standards 
are different for presentence and postsentence withdrawals. A defendant seeking 
to withdraw before sentencing must present the court with a plausible reason for 
withdrawal. Chorniak v. State, 715 P.2d 1162 (Wyo. 1986); Ecker v. State, 545 P.2d 641 (Wyo. 1976). After 
sentencing, the defendant must justify the withdrawal by showing a manifest 
injustice. Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 79 A.L.R.3d 1050 (Wyo. 1975). This Court 
explained the reason for the different standards in 
Hicklin:

"[W]ithdrawal of a guilty 
plea after sentence is conditioned by [W.R.Cr.P. 33(d)] upon a showing of 
`manifest injustice.' This distinction rests upon practical considerations 
important to the proper administration of justice. Before sentencing, the 
inconvenience to court and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is 
ordinarily slight as compared with the public interest in protecting the right 
of the accused to trial by jury. But if a plea of guilty could be retracted with 
ease after sentence, the accused 
might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment, 
and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe. The result would 
be to undermine respect for the courts and fritter away the time and painstaking 
effort devoted to the sentencing process."

Id. 535 P.2d  at 
749 (quoting Kadwell v. United 
States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th 
Cir. 1963) (emphasis in original and footnotes omitted)).

[¶15.]  The denial of a motion to withdraw a plea 
is an exercise of the district court's discretion. United 
States v. Rivera-Ramirez, 715 F.2d 453 
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1215, 104 S. Ct. 2657, 81 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1984); 
United States v. Kobrosky, 711 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 
1983). See also Murphy v. State, 592 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1979). Absent an abuse of that 
discretion, we will not disturb the result. We have previously stated that 
judicial discretion is "a composite of many things, among which are conclusions 
drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard 
to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously." Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986). Further, 
Appellant has the burden of establishing that a manifest injustice existed. 
Angerhofer, 758 P.2d 1041; Chorniak, 715 P.2d 1162.

[¶16.]  Appellant has attempted to demonstrate 
the existence of a manifest injustice with a multitude of contentions ranging 
from noncompliance with the plea agreement to the district court's failure to 
inform Appellant of the res judicata effect of a nolo contendere plea. In 
substance, those arguments challenge the voluntariness of Appellant's plea, 
Appellant's understanding of the consequences of his plea, and the conduct of 
the State and district court while effectuating the plea agreement. Some of 
Appellant's arguments are not supported with cogent argument and authority, and 
none of them indicate there was a manifest injustice. After a careful 
examination of the record and after considering Appellant's argument, we 
conclude that the district court followed the guidelines of W.R.Cr.P. 15 and 
that Appellant voluntarily pleaded nolo contendere. We hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that no manifest injustice 
existed.

Excessive 
Sentencing

[¶17.]  Appellant contends that the district 
court erred when it conditioned his release from parole upon the payment of 
restitution. In Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1979), we held that 
the legislature had not granted courts the authority to impose parole conditions 
in sentences. In that case, the appellant was sentenced to one to four years for 
taking immoral and indecent liberties with a child. The district court 
conditioned the appellant's release from parole upon the requirement that he 
undergo psychiatric treatment. On appeal, this Court declared that, absent 
legislative authorization, general parole power rests with the board of parole 
and not with the courts. Id. Thus, we hold that the portion of 
Appellant's sentence conditioning his release from parole is an illegal 
sentence, and, in accordance with Keller v. State, 771 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1989), we strike it 
and affirm the balance of the sentence.

Correction of the 
Record

[¶18.]  Appellant argues that the district court 
erred when it failed to correct inconsistencies in the record. In his brief, 
Appellant stated, "Appellant's Brief in Support of the Motion to Withdraw Nolo 
Contendere plea, Appellant's Reply Brief, Evidentiary Hearing transcript, and 
the Court's Decision Letter, as well as the discussion in the appeal brief all 
show the record should be corrected." Appellant has failed to support this 
contention with cogent argument and authority; therefore, we refuse to consider 
it. Secrest v. Secrest, 781 P.2d 1339 (Wyo. 
1989); Dawson v. City of Casper, 731 P.2d 1186 (Wyo. 1987).

The Right to a Speedy 
Trial

[¶19.]  Appellant contends that his right to a 
speedy trial under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution was violated. We 
disagree.

[¶20.]  The United States Supreme Court 
summarized the basic effect of a guilty plea in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973):

[A] guilty plea 
represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal 
process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he 
is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter 
raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights 
that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the 
voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea * * 
*.

The Court 
subsequently refined the rule and held that a defendant could not waive a claim 
which "went to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to 
answer the charge brought against him." Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30, 94 S. Ct. 2098, 2103, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1974). In Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2, 96 S. Ct. 241, 244 
n. 2, 46 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1975), the Supreme Court explained:

A guilty plea * * * 
renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent 
with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way 
of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established.

[¶21.]  In this case, Appellant's alleged 
constitutional violation is not inconsistent with the valid establishment of 
factual guilt. See United 
States v. Gaertner, 583 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied 440 U.S. 918, 99 S. Ct. 1238, 59 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1979); and 
United States v. O'Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied 429 U.S. 960, 97 S. Ct. 386, 50 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1976). The primary 
purpose of the right to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution is to prevent 
the defendant's right to a fair trial from being substantially impaired by 
pretrial delay. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972); Gaertner, 583 F.2d 308; and O'Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233. A violation of the right to a speedy trial precludes the 
establishment of guilt by trial, but it does not preclude the valid 
establishment of guilt by a voluntary plea. Gaertner, 583 F.2d 308; O'Donnell, 
539 F.2d 1233.

[¶22.]  This Court has also addressed the issue 
of what rights a defendant forfeits when he pleads guilty or nolo contendere. In 
Tompkins v. State, 705 P.2d 836 (Wyo. 1985), 
cert. denied 475 U.S. 1052, 106 S. Ct. 1277, 89 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1986), we held that defendants cannot enter conditional guilty pleas. We 
also quoted the following statement with approval:

"A plea of guilty waives 
all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceeding. It even bars the later 
assertion of constitutional challenges to the pretrial proceedings. Claims that 
the prosecution obtained evidence unlawfully, or that the defendant was 
illegally detained, or that he was denied 
a speedy trial will not survive a guilty plea, except to the extent that they 
may go to the voluntariness of the plea."

Id. at 839-40 (emphasis 
added) (quoting 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 175 
at 624-27 (1982)).

[¶23.]  In Sword v. State, 746 P.2d 423 
(Wyo. 1987), 
this Court held that the appellant, by pleading guilty, forfeited the right to 
appeal alleged grand jury improprieties. The opinion reiterated that a defendant 
forfeits nonjurisdictional defenses and objections by pleading guilty. We 
stated, "Jurisdictional claims would be those which, if asserted and sustained 
upon pretrial motion, would preclude the State from bringing the defendant to 
trial." Id. at 
425. Since a nolo contendere plea has the same effect in a criminal case as a 
guilty plea, State v. Steele, 620 P.2d 1026 (Wyo. 1980), these principles also apply to 
nolo contendere pleas.

[¶24.]  Although the Sword decision may indicate 
that the right to a speedy trial is a jurisdictional claim, its definition of 
jurisdiction is obiter dictum and is not binding upon our decision in this case. 
Butler v. Halstead by and through Colley, 770 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 
1989). We conclude that the right to a speedy trial is not jurisdictional 
because it does not involve "the very power of the State to bring the defendant 
into court." Blackledge, 417 U.S.  at 30, 94 S. Ct.  at 2103. If the 
State violates a defendant's right to a speedy trial, the State must dismiss the 
information. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 37 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1973); 
Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989). Dismissal is 
a remedy for the violation and not the result of an absence of 
jurisdiction.

[¶25.]  Appellant's claim that he was denied the 
right to a speedy trial is nonjurisdictional. Additionally, we ascertain from 
the record that Appellant voluntarily pleaded nolo contendere in open court 
because he did not want evidence of his guilt to be used as substantive evidence 
in a civil case.5 We hold that Appellant, by 
voluntarily pleading nolo contendere, admitted all the essential elements of the 
offenses, Steele, 620 P.2d 1026, and forfeited his right to appeal on the basis 
of a speedy trial violation.

[¶26.]  Affirmed as 
modified.

URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 The maximum sentence for 
second-degree sexual assault is twenty years. Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-306(a)(ii) 
(1977).

2 Within the criminal 
context, a nolo contendere plea is the equivalent of a guilty plea. Martin v. 
State, 780 P.2d 1354 (Wyo. 1989); State v. 
Steele, 620 P.2d 1026 (Wyo. 1980).

3 W.R.Cr.P. 15 provides in 
pertinent part:

(c) Advice to defendant. - Before accepting 
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant 
personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, 
the following:

(1) The nature of the 
charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by 
law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law; 
and

(2) If the defendant is 
not represented by an attorney, that he has the right to be represented by an 
attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him and, if necessary, one 
will be appointed to represent him; and

(3) That he has the right 
to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, and 
that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the right to 
the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; 
and

(4) That if he pleads 
guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that 
by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the right to a trial; 
and

(5) That if he pleads 
guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him questions about the offense to 
which he has pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on the 
record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used against 
him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement. (d) Insuring that the plea is voluntary. - 
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by 
addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is 
voluntary and not the * * * result of force or threats or of promises apart from 
a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's 
willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions 
between the attorney for the state and the defendant or his 
attorney.

4 In substance, W.R.Cr.P. 
33(d) is the same as the pre-1983 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d), so federal authority must 
be given weight when defining standards for granting or denying withdrawals 
after sentencing. Dobbins v. State, 483 P.2d 255 (Wyo. 
1971).

5 We note the following 
remarks of a commentator on the effect of a nolo contendere 
plea:

The principal difference 
between a plea of guilty and a plea of nolo contendere is that the latter may 
not be used against the defendant in a civil action based upon the same acts. 
The plea is not an admission of guilt and cannot be received as such in a 
subsequent proceeding against the defendant. A defendant who has pleaded nolo 
contendere is not estopped from denying the facts on which the criminal charge 
was based in a subsequent civil proceeding. However an individual defendant who 
takes the stand in a later civil action may be impeached by his earlier 
conviction, even though that conviction was on a plea of nolo contendere, under 
the same conditions as if the conviction had followed a plea of guilty or a plea 
of not guilty. It is the fact of conviction, rather than the plea, that provides 
the basis for impeachment.

1 C. Wright, 
supra, § 177 at 666.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶27.]  I remain convinced a trial court should 
not take either a guilty plea or a nolo contendere plea when the charged 
defendant asserts his factual innocence to any criminal offense and only 
justifies plea on some external "coercion" by failure to be provided a speedy 
trial and a pending civil lawsuit as is demonstrated in this appeal. See Martin 
v. State, 780 P.2d 1354 (Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, J., dissenting. It is 
not the nature of a speedy trial right as either jurisdictional or 
non-jurisdictional in Wyoming, see Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118 (Wyo. 1989); 
Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989); Despain v. State, 774 P.2d 77 (Wyo. 
1989); and United States v. LoFranco, 818 F.2d 276 (2nd Cir. 1987), to be here 
considered, but rather the corrosive effect of delayed disposition which creates 
a non-voluntary coerced result. 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Criminal 2d § 172 at 567-85 (1982). See also Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2, 96 S. Ct. 241, 244 
n. 2, 46 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1975).

[¶28.]  Criminal processes should not be applied 
to incarcerate the innocent and nolo contendere should not alter this sound 
principle of societal responsibility. State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App. 1989). If we 
apply all the detrimental effects of a guilty plea but use nolo contendere to 
avoid collateral estoppel for other purposes, I would require at least an 
absence of denial of guilt to justify acceptance of the plea. I recognize the 
opportunity for exercised discretion in absence of adoption of the proposed 
amendment to the federal rules of criminal procedure, but I continue to believe 
the pleas of nolo contendere should not be accepted if the charged defendant 
continues to actively maintain his innocence of any crime. United 
States v. 
Dorman, 496 F.2d 438 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 419 U.S. 945, 95 S. Ct. 214, 42 L. Ed. 2d 168 (1974). See United States v. Wagner, 256 F. Supp. 574 (D.Conn. 1965). I would find a significant difference between standing mute 
and active assertion of total innocence. I would also agree with English courts 
which have discontinued use of the nolo contendere plea since 1702. See Lenvin 
and Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and Implications, 51 Yale L.J. 1254 
(1942). See also State v. Godek, 182 Conn. 353, 438 A.2d 114 (1980), cert. 
denied 450 U.S. 1031, 101 S. Ct. 1741, 68 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1981); State ex rel. Clark 
v. Adams, 144 W. Va. 771, 111 S.E.2d 336 (1959), cert. denied 363 U.S. 807, 80 S. Ct. 1242, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1960); Annotation, Plea of Nolo Contendere or Non 
Vult Contendere, 89 A.L.R.2d 540 (1963); and 1 C. Wright, supra, § 177 at 661. 
The requirement established in State v. Rhodes, 233 Neb. 373, 445 N.W.2d 622 (1989) should now be adopted for 
Wyoming plea 
practice when the nolo contendere is offered by the charged 
defendant.

[¶29.]  The confining power of a denied speedy 
trial is an obvious example of corrosive pressure which may improperly corrupt 
the voluntariness of a criminal plea.1 Obviously, no effort was made in 
this case to obtain compliance with the time limitations adopted by the district 
court bench in Uniform Rules for the District Courts 204(b), which provides a 
time limitation of 120 days from arraignment to trial. This maximum time 
provided by the district court rule of that 120 days compares with the 
chronology here demonstrated of a complaint filed October 16, 1986, district 
court arraignment on March 11, 1987, and prosecution then completed with entry 
of a plea on June 14, 1988. See Phillips, 774 P.2d 118, Urbigkit, J., specially 
concurring and Despain, 774 P.2d 77.2

[¶30.]  I would reverse to permit a new plea for 
the appellant to either stand trial or admit for the purpose of even the nolo 
contendere plea that he was not innocent of any criminal 
conduct.

FOOTNOTES

1 Affidavits on file in 
this appeal portray a disturbing connotation of desired money recovery as the 
complainant's purpose in criminal prosecution. The suggestion of payment as the 
price for nonprosecution is a supposition which is devilishly disturbing. This 
is an unpleasant case from start to finish - from charged offenses to presently 
denied guilt.

2 Certainly, present 
counsel for appellant has no real responsibility for the prosecutorial delay and 
I will not attribute explanation totally to the lack of activity by one 
disbarred defense attorney. From the standpoint of society, under Wyoming law, this 
criminal prosecution took too long to conclude. From the standpoint of the 
appellant, I would also say the same thing.