Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF ANDREA L. MCCALL PRESSE, AN EMPLOYEE OF WYOMING WOMEN'S BUSINESS CENTER:

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0186

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF ANDREA L. MCCALL PRESSE, AN EMPLOYEE OF WYOMING WOMEN'S BUSINESS CENTER:2011 WY 34Case Number: No. S-10-0186Decided: 02/25/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF ANDREA L. MCCALL-PRESSE, AN 
EMPLOYEE OF WYOMING WOMEN'S BUSINESS CENTER:ANDREA L. 
MCCALL-PRESSE,Appellant (Claimant),v.STATE OF WYOMING, ex 
rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION,Appellee 
(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sean 
W. Scoggin of McKellar, Tiedeken & Scoggin, LLC, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; James Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kelly 
Roseberry, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Andrea L. 
McCall-Presse (the appellant) alleged an injury arising from exposure to a 
chemical cloud while driving in the course of her employment.  The Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division (the Division) denied benefits to the appellant for her 
alleged injuries.  The case was 
referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for a contested case 
hearing, after which the OAH denied benefits.  The appellant now appeals from the 
district court's affirmance of the OAH's denial of benefits.  Finding substantial evidence in the 
record to support the OAH's denial, we will affirm. 

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Was the OAH's 
decision denying benefits to the appellant supported by substantial 
evidence?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On April 14, 
2008, as part of her employment with the Wyoming Women's Business Center (WWBC), 
the appellant was driving to Lyman, Wyoming, to meet with a client.1  According to the appellant, as she was 
driving on Interstate Highway 80 (I-80) west of Rock Springs, Wyoming, she 
noticed a chemical cloud being pulled through the car vents.  The appellant allegedly inhaled some of 
the chemicals which she claimed caused immediate problems with her eyes, skin, 
nose, sinuses, mouth, throat, and lungs.  
The appellant pulled her car over to the side of I-80, rolled her windows 
down to get fresh air, and flushed her eyes with water.  The appellant did not notice any other 
cars pulling over as she had.  The 
appellant did not call anyone for help, nor did she seek medical treatment that 
day.  At some point, the appellant 
continued toward Lyman to meet with her client.

 
 
[¶4]      Upon returning to 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, on April 15, 2008, the appellant called the Poison Control 
Center, which advised her to go to the emergency room.  The appellant went to the Cheyenne 
Regional Medical Center emergency room on April 16, 2008, complaining of gas 
exposure.  A chest x-ray revealed 
"[m]ild hyperinflation [of the lungs], otherwise unremarkable chest."  The treating physician, Dr. Michael 
Means, diagnosed the appellant with "[p]ossible gas exposure" and 
"[i]nhalation."  On April 18, 2008, 
the appellant filled out a Wyoming Report of Injury, which was signed by her 
supervisor, Rosemary Bratton.  In 
the months following the alleged incident, several other physicians evaluated 
the appellant.  More will be said 
about the examinations and subsequent reports prepared by these physicians in 
the discussion section.  

 
 
[¶5]      In a Final 
Determination dated May 9, 2008, the Division denied the appellant's claim.  The Division concluded that there was no 
evidence linking the appellant's alleged injury to her employment.  The appellant timely objected to the 
Division's denial and requested a hearing.  
The matter was referred to the OAH and a contested case hearing was held 
on March 3, 2009, and June 15, 2009.2  On July 15, 2009, the OAH issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, denying the appellant's claim 
for worker's compensation benefits.  
Specifically, the OAH concluded that the appellant proved that she 
suffered an injury, but failed to prove that the injury was causally related to 
her employment.  Details regarding 
the evidence presented and the OAH's specific findings and conclusions will be 
discussed below.  The appellant 
appealed the OAH's decision to the district court which affirmed the OAH's 
decision on June 3, 2010.  This 
timely appeal followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      Our review of 
agency action is governed by W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) and the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedures Act, found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2009).  We give no special deference to the 
district court's findings and conclusions, but rather we review the case as if 
it came directly from the administrative agency.  State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & 
Comp. Div. v. Kaczmarek, 2009 WY 110, ¶ 7, 215 P.3d 277, 280 (Wyo. 2009); Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d 163, 166 (Wyo. 2002).  When factual findings are challenged, as 
they are in this case, "we will affirm those findings if they are supported by 
substantial evidence."  Newman, 2002 WY 91, ¶ 26, 49 P.3d  
at 173.  We have said the following 
regarding the use of the substantial evidence test:

 
 
Thus, 
in the interests of simplifying the process of identifying the correct standard 
of review and bringing our approach closer to the original use of the two 
standards, we hold that henceforth the substantial evidence standard will be 
applied any time we review an evidentiary ruling. . . .  If the hearing examiner determines that 
the burdened party failed to meet his burden of proof, we will decide whether 
there is substantial evidence to support the agency's decision to reject the 
evidence offered by the burdened party by considering whether that conclusion 
was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record as a 
whole.  See, Wyo. Consumer Group 
v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wyo., 882 P.2d 858, 860-61 (Wyo. 1994); 
[Bd. of Trustees, Laramie County Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 v.] Spiegel, 549 P.2d [1161,] 1178 [(Wyo. 1976)] 
(discussing the definition of substantial evidence as "contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence").  If, in the course of its decision making 
process, the agency disregards certain evidence and explains its reasons for 
doing so based upon determinations of credibility or other factors contained in 
the record, its decision will be sustainable under the substantial evidence 
test.  Importantly, our review of 
any particular decision turns not on whether we agree with the outcome, but on 
whether the agency could reasonably conclude as it did, based on all the 
evidence before it.

 
 

Dale 
v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 
WY 84, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (Wyo. 2008).  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      The appellant 
argues that substantial evidence was presented at the contested case hearing to 
meet her burden of proving that she suffered a work related injury.  In order to meet that burden, the 
appellant was required to prove that she suffered an injury as defined by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (LexisNexis 2009).  In pertinent part, that statute 
provides:

 
 
"Injury" 
means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and 
includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out 
of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in 
places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and which 
subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the 
business.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi).  In 
order to prove that the injury "ar[ose] out of and in the course of employment," 
a causal connection between the injury and the appellant's employment must 
exist.  Haagensen v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Comp. Div., 949 P.2d 865, 867 (Wyo. 1997).  "A causal connection exists between the 
employee's injury and the course of employment when there is a nexus between 
the injury and some condition, activity, environment or requirement of the 
employment.'"  Id. (quoting Stuckey v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. 
Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Wyo. 1995)).  The employee-claimant has the burden to 
prove all of the statutory elements by a preponderance of the evidence.  Thornberg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Comp. Div., 913 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 1996).  "A preponderance of the evidence' is 
defined as proof which leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of 
the contested fact is more probable than its non-existence.'"  Judd v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 
WY 85, ¶ 31, 233 P.3d 956, 968 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Anastos 
v. Gen. Chem. Soda Ash, 2005 WY 122, ¶ 20, 120 P.3d 658, 666 (Wyo. 2005)); 
see also Kenyon v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2011 WY 14, ¶ 22, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (Wyo. 2011) 
("preponderance of the evidence" is the same as more probable than not). 

 
 
[¶8]      There is no 
dispute in this case as to whether the appellant suffered an injury, but rather 
the issue is whether the appellant's injury arose out of and in the course of 
her employment.3  Stated differently, the issue is whether 
the appellant presented sufficient evidence to prove the causal connection 
between her injury and her employment.  
The appellant points to medical records and reports prepared by three 
medical professionals, the testimony of a naturopath doctor, and correspondence 
written by business associates to support her contention that she met her burden 
of proving that a causal connection existed.  We will address each of these pieces of 
evidence in turn.

 
 
[¶9]      The appellant 
relies on medical records prepared by Dr. Means, Dr. Hoyt, and Dr. Pacheco.  Dr. Means, the attending physician at 
the time appellant visited the emergency room at Cheyenne Regional Medical 
Center, noted a diagnosis as "[p]ossible gas exposure" and 
"[i]nhalation." (Emphasis added.)  
Dr. Hoyt, who evaluated the appellant two days after her visit to the 
emergency room, diagnosed the appellant with "chemical bronchitis," but did not 
provide an opinion as to the source of the injury.  These doctors' diagnoses help prove the 
existence of an injury, but fail to prove a causal connection between the injury 
and the appellant's employment.  
Neither of these doctors were able to say that it "was more probable than 
not" that the appellant's injury "arose out of and in the course of her 
employment."  Consequently, the OAH 
determined that the doctors' opinions were not sufficient to meet the 
appellant's burden.

 
 
[¶10]   The appellant also relies on the 
medical records prepared by Dr. Pacheco, from whom the appellant sought 
treatment nearly six months after the alleged injury.  Dr. Pacheco diagnosed the appellant with 
"[a]n acute chemical exposure, with both central nervous system (CNS) and 
respiratory effect occurring abruptly while en route on the highway between Rock 
Springs, Wyoming, and Green River, Wyoming."  In response to Dr. Pacheco's opinions, 
the hearing examiner made the following observations: 

 
 
[A]lthough 
Dr. Pacheco stated it was her opinion that [the appellant]'s [injuries] were 
caused by [the appellant']s April 14, 2008, alleged chemical exposure, her 
opinion was dependent on the credibility of [the appellant]'s history regarding 
her injury and dependent on proof of the existence of some substance which could 
cause the injuries.  In her initial 
assessment of [the appellant], Dr. Pacheco incorrectly stated she was diagnosed 
with acute chemical inhalation by Dr. Means at the emergency room; instead, Dr. 
Means diagnosed [the appellant] with possible gas exposure and inhalation.  As previously indicated, [the 
appellant]'s stated history of her injury and accident was not entirely 
believable due to unexplained significant differences between the seriousness of 
the events and immediate symptoms as described by [the appellant] and her 
failure to seek immediate medical care, as well as the lack of objective medical 
evidence of any significant injury at the emergency room.  Moreover, [the appellant] did not 
provide any credible or concrete evidence as to the existence of the substance, 
the nature of the substance, the location of the substance or the source of the 
substance, which Dr. Pacheco speculated was hydrogen sulfide, without any 
evidence to support her speculation.  
In addition, [the appellant] demonstrated a willingness to be evasive 
during questioning.

 
 
The 
hearing examiner disregarded Dr. Pacheco's opinion regarding the cause of the 
appellant's injury due to unsupported speculation as to the existence of a 
chemical capable of inflicting the injury, an incomplete medical history of the 
appellant, and the lack of corroborating evidence to support the appellant's 
self-reporting of her injury and the cause of that injury.  We have said, "a hearing examiner is 
entitled to disregard an expert opinion if he finds the opinion is unreasonable, 
not adequately supported by the facts upon which the opinion is based, or based 
upon an incomplete and inaccurate medical history provided by the 
claimant."  Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 
148, ¶ 15, 123 P.3d 143, 148 (Wyo. 2005).  
Furthermore, it is the hearing examiner's duty to weigh the credibility 
of witnesses.  Herrera v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 103, ¶ 15, 236 P.3d 277, 282 (Wyo. 
2010).  The OAH disregarded Dr. 
Pacheco's opinion and provided sufficient reasoning for doing so.  Accordingly, we find that it was 
reasonable for the OAH to find that Dr. Pacheco's opinion did not provide the 
evidence necessary to establish the causal connection between the appellant's 
injury and her employment.

 
 
[¶11]   Similar to the conclusions made 
relating to Dr. Pacheco's opinions, the OAH found that Dr. Minard's testimony 
was unhelpful and unpersuasive.  Dr. 
Minard is a naturopathic doctor4 who examined the appellant before 
and after the appellant's alleged injury, and who the appellant points to as 
providing evidence that she met her burden of proving a compensable injury.  Dr. Minard conducted an EAV/Biomeridian 
test on the appellant which showed a change in the balance of her overall 
health.5  Dr. Minard's testimony was given no 
weight because, "[Dr.] Minard acknowledged she is simply a consultant providing 
advice to her clients, she is not a medical doctor, she does not diagnose and 
she could not explain the EAV/Biomeridian testing process."  Furthermore, the OAH noted that "there 
was no evidence provided regarding the accuracy or general acceptance of the 
EAV/Biomeridian testing."  As we 
stated above, it is the hearing examiner's duty to weigh the credibility of 
witnesses and the hearing examiner may disregard expert testimony that is 
unreasonable.  Herrera, 2010 WY 103, ¶ 15, 236 P.3d  at 
282; Taylor, 2005 WY 148, ¶ 15, 123 P.3d  at 148.  Dr. Minard is not a 
medical doctor and she relied on a non-traditional means of treatment, which was 
unaccompanied by evidence corroborating its general acceptance as a reliable 
means of testing, and she was unable to explain with satisfactory detail how the 
testing works.  Therefore, we find 
it reasonable for the OAH to give no weight to Dr. Minard's 
testimony.

 
 
[¶12]   The appellant also relies on 
correspondence from three business associates to support her contention that she 
met her burden of proving that her injury was causally related to her 
employment.  The first is the 
Wyoming Report of Injury which the appellant prepared and which was signed by 
Rosemary Bratton, the appellant's supervisor.  The document contained a checked box 
indicating that Ms. Bratton believed the appellant's injury was work 
related.  However, this document 
alone does not do much to corroborate the appellant's story.  Ms. Bratton was not with the appellant 
at the time the injury purportedly occurred, nor is Ms. Bratton's opinion as to 
the cause of the injury based on anything other than the appellant's 
self-reporting.  In short, the fact 
that Ms. Bratton checked the box indicating that she believed the injury was 
work related is not evidence of anything other than that Ms. Bratton had no 
reason to believe that it was not work related.  The appellant also relies on a letter 
from the client she saw on April 14, 2008, at Little America just east of Lyman, 
Wyoming.  The appellant argues that 
this letter proves the causal connection between her injury and her 
employment.  We disagree.  In that letter, the client indicates 
that the appellant complained that she had encountered "some kind of gas or 
something" on her way to meet with him.  
The client's letter, much like the injury report filled out by Ms. 
Bratton, does little to corroborate the appellant's story, because the client's 
observations are entirely based on the appellant's self-reporting.  Furthermore, the client states in his 
letter that at the time the appellant complained about encountering the gas, he 
"didn't think much of it," which leaves the impression that the appellant did 
not seem that affected by the alleged encounter with the gas or chemical 
cloud.

 
 
[¶13]   The final letter upon which the 
appellant relies was written by Steve Despain, the Wyoming District Director for 
the U.S. Small Business Administration.  
In short, Mr. Despain's letter indicates that as part of the appellant's 
job, she is sometimes required to travel around the state to meet with 
clients.  Simply put, this letter 
does nothing to support the appellant's contention that her alleged injury was a 
result of exposure to a chemical or gas cloud or that it was causally related to 
her employment.  We conclude that it 
was reasonable for the OAH to give little weight or wholly disregard these 
letters for the reasons stated above.

 
 
[¶14]   Given the lack of other evidence 
supporting a causal connection between the injury and the appellant's 
employment, the appellant's credibility was vitally important to prove the 
causal connection between her injury and her employment.  We have said that a claimant can prove 
her claim in some instances through her own testimony.  Ikenberry v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Comp. Div., 5 P.3d 799, 803 (Wyo. 2000).  However, the claimant's testimony alone 
may not be sufficient if the claimant's testimony is impeached, discredited, or 
if it is not supported by surrounding circumstances.  Id.  Regarding the appellant's testimony, the 
OAH made the following findings:

 
 
First, 
[the appellant]'s account of the incident was not supported by the corroborating 
evidence.  [The appellant] testified 
there were no other vehicles on I-80 in the vicinity when she encountered 
the mysterious chemicals.  No 
evidence was presented as to the precise or even general location of the 
incident and there was no evidence of any possible source of the mysterious 
chemicals.  For instance, there was 
no evidence of a nearby mine, gas well, oil well, train, or tank of some 
sort.  In addition, there was no 
testing performed on her vehicle or clothes to try to determine the presence of 
any chemical or substances which could cause her injuries.  Simply put, more evidence was needed to 
establish the existence and nature of [the] mysterious substance which allegedly 
caused [the appellant]'s injuries.  
Dr. Wodushek [6] candidly acknowledged the lack of 
evidence when he noted:

 
 
. 
. . . Unfortunately [the appellant]'s event was not witnessed and there does not 
seem to be indications that anyone else was exposed in a similar way that 
day.  As such, it seems there is not 
[sic] way to confirm whether this gas was in fact the cause of [the appellant]'s 
symptoms.  [The appellant] noted 
that she received conflicting information from one physician who suggested 
exposure at one time but later suggested that her symptoms may be secondary to 
allergies or asthma.  I really have 
no understanding of whether this type of gas is actually released in the area 
that [the appellant] was driving through.  
I also have no idea as to how much exposure she may have 
been subject to while driving her car on the expressway. . . .  

 
 
            
Second, [the appellant]'s rendition of the incident on April 14, 2008, 
and her subsequent reactions to the event were difficult to believe.  [The appellant] described a significant 
event involving a "horrible smell" which caused her to experience serious 
symptoms, required her to pull off of the highway, caused her to lose track of 
time and perhaps lose consciousness, yet she did not seek medical care until two 
days later after meeting with her client and driving all the way back to 
Cheyenne.  In addition, when she was 
examined in the emergency room, the physical exam revealed normal vital signs, 
no heart problems, no lung problems, no eye or nose problems and no visible 
rash.

 
 
[¶15]   The OAH found the appellant's story 
"difficult to believe," and unsupported by the surrounding circumstances.  As indicated above, the duty and 
responsibility to weigh and judge the credibility of witnesses and evidence lies 
with the OAH as the fact-finder, and we will not re-weigh or second guess those 
determinations.  Herrera, 2010 WY 103, ¶ 15, 236 P.3d  at 
282.  We agree with the OAH and note 
the questionable behavior of the appellant following the alleged incident as 
well as the absence of any evidence corroborating the appellant's story.  Consequently, it was reasonable for the 
OAH to conclude that the appellant's testimony alone was insufficient to prove 
the causal connection between her injury and her 
employment.

 
 
[¶16]   In denying the appellant's claim, 
in addition to rejecting the appellant's evidence, the OAH relied on evidence 
presented by the Division, which further supports our finding that substantial 
evidence exists in the record to affirm the OAH's findings.  The Division introduced an investigative 
report by Zach Barnett, who was employed by Bonacue Investigative Services, as 
well as Mr. Barnett's testimony from the contested case hearing.  Mr. Barnett was hired by the Division to 
investigate the possible sources of the alleged chemical cloud reported by the 
appellant.  Mr. Barnett summarized 
his findings in the following manner: 

 
 
After 
contacting all possible sources of information pertinent to a chemical cloud 
including WYDOT Highway Patrol, OSHA [(Wyoming Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration)], DEQ [(Department of Environmental Quality)], HOMELAND 
SECURITY, the three HAZMAT responders for this section of Interstate 80 [(Green 
River Fire Department, Sweetwater County Fire Department, and Rock Springs Fire 
Department)], Sweetwater County Public Health, as well as two newspapers, The 
Wyoming Tribune Eagle and The Rocket Miner, we were unable to find any incident 
in that time frame that would potentially cause a "chemical cloud" as described 
by [the appellant]. 

 
 
Mr. 
Barnett's report emphasizes the primary defect in the appellant's case and 
ultimately why she has failed to meet her burden: the lack of evidence 
demonstrating a possible source or existence of a chemical cloud to corroborate 
her story, which evidence would causally connect her injury to her 
employment.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   The OAH's denial of benefits was 
supported by substantial evidence.  
The OAH concluded that the medical professionals who evaluated the 
appellant were unable, without mere speculation, to opine that the appellant's 
injury more probably than not arose out of her employment.  The letters provided by the appellant's 
business associates were insufficient to prove a causal connection between the 
appellant's injury and her employment.  
Furthermore, the appellant's story was incredible and uncorroborated, and 
the Division's investigation produced no possible source of the alleged chemical 
cloud.  Consequently, we affirm the 
OAH's denial of benefits to the appellant.

 
 
[¶18]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The appellant is the director of client services and micro-lending for 
WWBC.

 
 

2There were two hearing dates in order to provide the appellant with 
additional time to gather evidence supporting her 
claim.

 
 

3The OAH concluded that the appellant proved that she had suffered an 
injury, namely chemical bronchitis and an inhalational injury, as diagnosed by 
Dr. Hoyt.  However, the OAH also 
concluded that the appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that her injuries "arose out of her employment and were suffered in the course 
of her employment while at work for WWBC."

 
 

4Dr. Minard is not a medical doctor, but she has a doctorate degree in 
naturopathy.  Dr. Minard is also a 
massage therapist and an occupational therapist.

 
 

5Dr. Minard testified that she conducted EAV/Biomeridian testing on the 
appellant on April 17, 2008.  Dr. 
Minard described the test generally as "a technique where you put a small 
current with a stylus into acupuncture points, and then the machine reads how 
much current or energy comes back out, and from that the programs in the 
computer make -- ascertain what systems are out of balance and what systems are 
in balance."

 
 

6Dr. Wodushek is the Director of Neuropsychology at the Center for 
Neurorehabilitation Services, P.C., in Fort Collins, Colorado.  Dr. Wodushek evaluated the appellant on 
December 30, 2008.