Case Title: Jaccard v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 031507

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
DOUGLAS ALBERT JACCARD 
 
      OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 031507             JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
        June 10, 2004 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether evidence of a prior 
probation revocation is admissible in the penalty determination 
phase of a bifurcated criminal jury trial as part of “the record 
of conviction” of the defendant’s “prior criminal convictions” 
pursuant to Code § 19.2-295.1. 
On July 15, 2002, the grand jury of Wythe County indicted 
Douglas Albert Jaccard on a charge of malicious wounding in 
violation of Code § 18.2-51.  Prior to his trial on that 
indictment in the Circuit Court of Wythe County, the 
Commonwealth provided Jaccard with notice of its intention to 
introduce evidence of his prior criminal convictions during the 
penalty determination phase of the trial in accord with the 
requirements of Code § 19.2-295.1.  The notice listed five 
criminal convictions on two separate dates, all in the Circuit 
Court of Wythe County. 
Jaccard was tried before a jury on September 4, 2002.  
After the jury returned its verdict finding Jaccard guilty of 
malicious wounding, the penalty determination phase of the trial 
 
 
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immediately commenced.  The Commonwealth sought to introduce 
into evidence certified records of Jaccard’s five prior criminal 
convictions and “a probation revocation conviction.”  Jaccard’s 
counsel objected to the introduction of evidence of the 
probation revocation, stating:  “A history of his prior 
convictions is certainly proper at this point but a probation 
revocation proceeding [is] not a conviction.”  The trial court 
responded that “a violation of probation is an offense” and 
overruled the objection. 
The jury sentenced Jaccard to ten years of imprisonment and 
a fine of $30,000.  The trial court imposed the jury’s sentence 
in a final order dated November 12, 2002.  Jaccard appealed his 
conviction to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.  In an 
unpublished order dated May 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals 
refused Jaccard’s petition for appeal, citing Merritt v. 
Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 506, 528 S.E.2d 743 (2000).  We 
awarded Jaccard this appeal. 
In relevant part, Code § 19.2-295.1 provides that: 
In cases of trial by jury, upon a finding that 
the defendant is guilty of a felony . . . a separate 
proceeding limited to the ascertainment of punishment 
shall be held as soon as practicable before the same 
jury.  At such proceeding, the Commonwealth shall 
present the defendant’s prior criminal convictions by 
certified, attested or exemplified copies of the 
record of conviction . . . . 
 
 
 
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In Merritt, addressing the application of Code § 19.2-295.1, the 
Court of Appeals held that “[a] probation violation is not 
itself a criminal conviction.  It is, however, a continuation 
and part of the sentencing process imposed for a criminal 
conviction and is, thus, admissible as part of the sentence 
imposed for the prior conviction.”  Merritt, 32 Va. App. at 509, 
528 S.E.2d at 744. 
Although neither Jaccard nor the Commonwealth cites them in 
support of their positions in this appeal, we are of opinion 
that two of our decisions rendered subsequent to Merritt guide 
our resolution of this appeal.  In Green v. Commonwealth, 263 
Va. 191, 557 S.E.2d 230 (2002), we considered whether an appeal 
from a circuit court order revoking a defendant’s probation 
initially lies within the jurisdiction of this Court or the 
Court of Appeals.  Id. at 192, 557 S.E.2d at 231.  We concluded 
that the Court of Appeals initially has jurisdiction in 
probation revocation appeals.  In reaching that conclusion, we 
held that “[a]lthough a probation revocation hearing is not a 
stage of a criminal prosecution, and thus does not afford a 
convict all rights attending a criminal prosecution, such 
revocation hearing is nevertheless a criminal proceeding.”  263 
Va. at 195-96, 557 S.E.2d at 233 (citation omitted). 
 
 
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Subsequently, following the Court of Appeals decision in 
the present case, we applied our decision in Green in 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 267 Va. 226, 590 S.E.2d 518 (2004).  In 
doing so, we expressly stated that “[o]ur decision in Green 
overrules any implication to the contrary in Merritt” that a 
probation revocation proceeding is a continuation of the prior 
criminal conviction.  Id. at 229, 590 S.E.2d at 519.  The issue 
we considered in Jackson was whether a trial judge, who had 
served as Commonwealth’s Attorney at the trial in which the 
suspended sentence and terms of probation were imposed, was 
required to recuse himself from the subsequent probation 
revocation proceeding.  Because the initial trial and the 
subsequent probation revocation proceeding were not the same 
proceeding, we held that the issue of recusal was properly 
within the discretion of the trial judge.  Id. at 229-30, 590 
S.E.2d at 520. 
While we did not expressly address the issue raised in 
Merritt regarding the admissibility of a probation violation in 
either Green or Jackson, it is nonetheless certain that the 
Court of Appeals’ stated rationale for the holding in Merritt 
has been rejected by this Court.  Moreover, we are of the 
opinion that a probation revocation is not a criminal conviction 
and, accordingly, we hold that a probation revocation is not 
 
 
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part of the “record of conviction” contemplated by the 
provisions of Code § 19.2-295.1.  Thus, we further hold that the 
record of Jaccard's probation revocation was not admissible in 
the penalty determination phase of his criminal jury trial.  In 
reaching this holding, we now expressly overrule Merritt. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
will be reversed, the sentence imposed upon Jaccard will be set 
aside, and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals with 
direction to remand the case to the trial court for a new 
sentencing hearing. 
Reversed and remanded.