Case Title: Gunter v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 336, 2015

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KEVIN D. GUNTER, 
 
 
§ 
§ 
No. 336, 2015 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below–Superior Court    
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware  
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 1310014746  
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
  
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted: February 17, 2016 
Decided: 
May 9, 2016 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices.  
 
ORDER 
 
This 9th day of May 2016, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief under 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, and the State’s 
response, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In 2013, the appellant, Kevin D. Gunter, and two co-defendants were 
indicted on multiple counts of drug and drug-related offenses.  Gunter was tried 
and convicted in 2015 of Drug Dealing in Heroin, Aggravated Possession of 
Heroin, Possession of Oxycodone, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and 
Resisting Arrest.  The Superior Court sentenced Gunter to a total of ten years at 
Level V suspended after five years for two years at Level IV suspended after six 
months for eighteen months at Level III.  This is Gunter’s direct appeal. 
2 
 
(2) 
On appeal, Gunter’s Appellate Counsel1 has filed a no-merit brief and 
a motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  Appellate Counsel asserts 
that, based upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no 
arguably appealable issues.  Appellate Counsel provided Gunter with a copy of the 
motion to withdraw and the no-merit brief in draft form and advised Gunter that he 
could submit written points for the Court’s consideration.  Gunter submitted 
written points that are included in the brief.  In response, the State has moved to 
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(3) 
When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief 
under Rule 26(c), this Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel has made 
a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.2  Also, 
the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine whether “the 
appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary 
presentation.”3 
(4) 
In early 2014, the former Office of the Chief Medical Examiner 
(“OCME”) came under investigation for employee misconduct and lax security 
practices.  As a result of the investigation, all drug evidence submitted to the 
OCME, including the drug evidence seized in Gunter’s case, was removed from 
                                
1 Gunter was represented by different counsel at trial.  
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 
429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. at 81. 
3 
 
the OCME and transported to the Delaware State Police, where it was audited.  In 
Gunter’s case, after the evidence was audited it was transferred to an independent 
lab in Pennsylvania and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, where it was tested. 
(5) 
In June 2014, Gunter’s appointed Trial Counsel filed a motion in 
limine, arguing that the drug evidence should be excluded because the breakdown 
in security at the OCME made the evidence unreliable.  Gunter’s motion in limine 
was denied on December 11, 2014, following the Superior Court’s decision in 
State v. Irwin, which denied similar motions in cases such as Gunter’s, where the 
drug evidence was stored but not tested by the OCME.4  Gunter’s case was 
scheduled for trial in February 2015. 
(6) 
On December 23, 2014, Gunter filed a pro se “motion to dismiss 
current counsel and/or appoint new counsel.”  Trial Counsel asked the Superior 
Court to conduct a colloquy on Gunter’s representation.  At the January 12, 2015 
case review, Trial Counsel advised the court that Gunter wished to withdraw the 
motion.   
(7) 
At the call of the calendar on February 10, 2015, Gunter complained 
to the Criminal Assignment Judge that Trial Counsel did not plan to argue that the 
drug evidence was inadmissible.  Gunter asserted that there were discrepancies in 
the audit conducted by the State Police.  Trial Counsel told the court that his trial 
                                
4 State v. Irwin, 2014 WL 6734821 (Del. Super. Nov. 17, 2014).  
4 
 
strategy in Gunter’s case did not include an admissibility argument because the 
court had denied Gunter’s motion in limine under Irwin and Trial Counsel was 
without a good faith basis to argue against that decision.  Trial Counsel further 
explained that the discrepancies in the audit were not worth raising at trial, and that 
there were better, more credible arguments to make, having to do with Gunter’s 
lack of knowledge about the existence of the drugs.  After hearing from Gunter and 
Trial Counsel, the Criminal Assignment Judge ruled that the “motion to dismiss 
[Trial Counsel] is denied.”5   
(8) 
During jury selection the next day, Gunter complained to the Trial 
Judge that he did not “want to move forward with [Trial Counsel] because we’re 
not seeing eye-to-eye.”6  The Trial Judge advised Gunter that the court would not 
appoint new counsel to represent him, but that if he wanted to discharge Trial 
Counsel and proceed pro se, the trial would be continued and he would be given 
additional time to prepare for trial.  Later, during a break in voir dire, the Trial 
Judge conducted a colloquy with Gunter on the risks of proceeding pro se at trial 
and gave Gunter time to discuss the matter with Trial Counsel.  After voir dire, the 
Trial Judge asked Gunter what he had decided about his representation.  The Judge 
stated: “The train is about to leave the station here.  You need to make a decision.  
Are you going to represent yourself or are you going to have [Trial Counsel] 
                                
5 Colloquy Tr. at 11 (Feb. 10, 2015).  
6 Trial Tr. at 5 (Feb. 11, 2015). 
5 
 
represent you?”7  Gunter responded, “I’m going to have [Trial Counsel] represent 
me.”8 
(9) 
When trial resumed after the lunch recess, Trial Counsel advised the 
court that Gunter wanted to proceed pro se “so that he can present the OCME 
issues that he raised earlier.”9  The Trial Judge allowed Gunter to address the court 
even though the court had given him “ample opportunity to proceed on his own” 
and the jury was empaneled and sworn.10  Gunter told the court that he wanted to 
retain new counsel.  The Trial Judge denied the request. 
(10) The following morning, which was midway through the trial, Gunter 
complained again about Trial Counsel’s defense strategy and asked the Trial Judge 
to declare a mistrial because Trial Counsel had stipulated to the chain of custody of 
the drug evidence.  Gunter told the court, “All I want is a chance to talk to my 
family and hire a new lawyer.  That’s it.”11  The court denied Gunter’s request for a 
mistrial, and the trial proceeded to its conclusion. 
(11) Gunter claims on appeal that the Superior Court should have 
appointed new counsel or allowed him to retain new counsel when it became clear 
that he had a fundamental disagreement with Trial Counsel about the trial strategy.  
                                
7 Trial Tr. Excerpt at 53 (Feb. 11, 2015). 
8 Id. 
9 Trial Tr. at 32 (Feb. 11, 2015). 
10 Id. 
11 Trial Tr. at 11 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
6 
 
The claim is without merit.  Although a criminal defendant is entitled to the 
assistance of counsel,12 a criminal defendant does not have a right to dictate to 
counsel trial strategy13 or how best to proceed in the case.14 
(12) When faced with a request for a change in counsel shortly before or 
during a criminal trial, the Superior Court must determine if the reasons for a 
change in counsel justify a continuance of the trial to make such a change.15  If the 
court determines, in its discretion, that the defendant is not entitled to a 
continuance to obtain new counsel, a defendant has two options:  to proceed with 
his existing counsel or to proceed pro se.16 
(13) In this case, the Criminal Assignment Judge and the Trial Judge 
considered Gunter’s requests for new counsel.  The requests for new counsel were 
made shortly before trial and during trial, which would have disrupted the trial 
proceedings.  Gunter was also given the choice of a continuance and the chance to 
proceed pro se.  He chose to stay with his existing counsel.  Finally, Gunter’s last 
request for new counsel was made after the jury had been empaneled and sworn.  
                                
12 Zimmerman v. State, 2010 WL 546971 (Del. Feb. 12, 2010) (citing Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 
803, 840-41 (Del. 2009) citing U.S. Const. amend. VI; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 
(1938); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 
365, 380 (1986)).  
13 Id. (citing Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 763 (Del. 2006) citing Wheat v. United States, 486 
U.S. 153, 160 (1988)). 
14 Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d at 763 (citing Muto v. State, 2004 WL 300441, *2 n.9 (Del. Feb. 12, 
2004) citing Austin v. State, 2001 WL 898621, at *2 (Del. Aug. 6, 2001)). 
15 Stevenson v. State, 709 A.2d 619, 630-31 (Del. 1998).  
16 Zimmerman v. State, 2010 WL 546971 (citing Bultron, 897 A.2d at 763). 
7 
 
As the trial judge found, the request came too late.  The Superior Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Gunter’s request for new counsel.     
(14) Gunter’s remaining points on appeal concern the consequences of 
Trial Counsel’s decision to stipulate to the chain of custody of the drug evidence.  
Gunter’s claims about Trial Counsel’s trial strategy are allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, which are not reviewable by this Court in the first instance 
on direct appeal.17 
(15) The Court has conducted “a full examination of all the proceedings” 
and found “no nonfrivolous issue for appeal.”18  The Court is satisfied that 
Appellate Counsel made a conscientious effort to examine the record and the law 
and properly determined that Gunter could not raise a meritorious claim on appeal.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to 
withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                
17 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 
18 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. at 80.