Case Title: Devaney v. Zucchini Gold, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13176

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13176 
 
RUTCHADA DEVANEY & others1  vs.  ZUCCHINI GOLD, LLC,2 & another.3 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 7, 2022. - April 14, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts Wage Act.  Labor, Wages, Overtime compensation, 
Federal preemption, Damages.  Federal Preemption.  Statute, 
Federal preemption.  Evidence, Expert opinion.  Witness, 
Expert. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 21, 2015. 
 
 
The case was tried before Paul D. Wilson, J., and motions 
to alter or amend the judgment were considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Christopher F. Hemsey for the defendants. 
 
Michaela C. May (Eric R. LeBlanc also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
1 Thewakul Rueangjan and Thanyathon Wungnak. 
 
 
2 Doing business as Rice Barn. 
 
3 Chalermpol Intha. 
2 
 
 
Ben Robbins & Daniel B. Winslow, for New England Legal 
Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Osvaldo Vazquez, of Florida, Hillary Schwab, Joseph 
Michalakes, & Audrey Richardson, for Massachusetts Employment 
Lawyers Association & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  This case presents the question whether the 
comprehensive remedial scheme provided by the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., for recovery of 
damages when an employer violates the Federal overtime law, 29 
U.S.C. § 207, precludes an employee from alternatively pursuing 
remedies under the wage act, G. L. c. 149, § 148, for the 
untimely payment of overtime wages due solely pursuant to the 
FLSA.  Because awarding such State law remedies would actually 
conflict with the Federal remedies provided in the FLSA, and 
because we must construe our State laws to avoid preemption if 
possible, we conclude that such State law remedies are not 
available in these circumstances.  Further concluding that the 
jury instructions for the calculation of overtime wages under 
the FLSA contained a methodological error resulting in an award 
to the plaintiff employees of two and one-half times their 
regular rate and that the defendants' remaining claims lack 
merit, we remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.4 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs filed by the New England 
Legal Foundation and the Massachusetts Employment Lawyers 
Association, Immigrant Worker Center Collaborative, Justice at 
Work, Matahari Women Workers Center, Massachusetts Jobs with 
3 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict.  See O'Brien v. Pearson, 449 
Mass. 377, 383 (2007).  The plaintiffs, Rutchada Devaney, 
Thewakul Rueangjan, and Thanyathon Wungnak, were employees of a 
Needham-based restaurant called the Rice Barn, which was owned 
and operated by the defendant Zucchini Gold, LLC, which in turn 
was owned by the defendant Chalermpol Intha (collectively, Rice 
Barn).  The restaurant was open seven days each week, including 
for lunch and dinner on weekdays and for dinner on weekends. 
Rice Barn failed to keep complete, contemporaneous records 
of the plaintiffs' hours of work or of wages paid.5  
Nevertheless, the parties agree that the plaintiffs routinely 
worked more than forty hours per week.6  Devaney's work 
responsibilities generally included packing and preparing food, 
as well as coordinating orders with customers and the kitchen.  
She typically worked six or seven days per week, for a total of 
 
Justice, Fair Employment Project, Inc., and Massachusetts AFL-
CIO. 
 
5 Accordingly, the plaintiffs relied on testimony and their 
own records to establish their hours, work responsibilities, and 
wages. 
 
6 The restaurant was open to the public for 44.5 hours every 
week, and the plaintiffs worked additional hours to prepare for 
each shift and clean afterwards. 
 
4 
 
fifty to sixty hours per week.7  Rueangjan worked as a chef, 
preparing and cooking hot meals.  He also was responsible for 
cleaning his work station.  Between lunch and dinner, Rueangjan 
worked on food preparation and took a ten minute break.  He 
worked seven days per week, for approximately sixty-four to 70.5 
hours per week on average.  Wungnak's primary responsibility was 
making appetizers.  On days when she worked on catering 
projects, Wungnak arrived at around 6 A.M.  She worked seven 
days per week, rarely taking breaks during her shifts, for a 
weekly total of between sixty-four and 72.25 hours worked. 
The plaintiffs ostensibly were paid a fixed daily rate on 
weekdays; on weekends, when the restaurant was open for dinner 
only, the plaintiffs were paid one-half the daily rate.  The 
record showed, however, that the plaintiffs were not always paid 
flat sums per day or per half day.  For example, pay stub 
records for Devaney and Rueangjan reflect that, rather than 
paying a fixed day rate regardless of the hours worked, Rice 
Barn paid the plaintiffs fractions of their daily rates to 
account for plaintiffs' absences on any given day.  For Wungnak, 
Rice Barn kept no records whatsoever.  In order to be paid their 
wages, the plaintiffs submitted to Rice Barn weekly 
documentation of days they had worked; these documents include a 
 
7 Devaney rarely took a break during the day, often eating 
her own meals while working. 
5 
 
column for setting forth the number of hours worked on any given 
day. 
The plaintiffs were paid additional sums for extra cleaning 
and for catering.  Rice Barn also did not have records of these 
additional sums. 
2.  Procedural history.  In September 2015, the plaintiffs 
brought the present action against Rice Barn, alleging 
violations of the FLSA for failure to pay overtime wages, 
violations of the wage act for failure to pay the FLSA overtime 
wages in a timely manner, and violations of the Federal and 
State minimum wage laws.8  On the plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment, a Superior Court judge (motion judge) allowed summary 
judgment as to Rice Barn's liability under the Federal overtime 
law and the wage act. 
Thereafter, a jury trial commenced before a different 
Superior Court judge (trial judge) solely on the issue of 
damages.  The trial judge instructed the jury that damages under 
the Federal overtime law should be calculated by multiplying the 
plaintiffs' regular rate by one and one-half times.  The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of each plaintiff.  The trial judge 
 
8 See 29 U.S.C. § 206; G. L. c. 151, § 1.  The plaintiffs' 
minimum wage law claims were not part of the trial for damages, 
and they are not raised on appeal. 
6 
 
trebled the damages awards and awarded attorney's fees and costs 
pursuant to the wage act. 
The trial judge declined Rice Barn's posttrial request for 
remittitur but amended the award of prejudgment interest.  Rice 
Barn timely appealed.  We transferred the matter sua sponte from 
the Appeals Court. 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Availability of wage act remedies for 
violations of Federal overtime law.  The wage act requires 
timely payment of "wages earned."  G. L. c. 149, § 148.  Rice 
Barn maintains that the trial judge erred in permitting the 
plaintiffs to elect the remedies provided by the wage act where, 
as here, the plaintiffs did not pursue a claim for violation of 
the State overtime law, G. L. c. 151, § 1A,9 and the sole basis 
for Rice Barn's liability was pursuant to the Federal overtime 
law, which itself provides a remedy.10  The plaintiffs respond 
 
9 The State overtime law, G. L. c. 151, § 1A, specifically 
exempts restaurant workers, like the plaintiffs, from its 
provisions.  The wage act was modeled after the FLSA.  See 
Arias-Villano v. Chang & Sons Enters., Inc., 481 Mass. 625, 630 
(2019).  However, while the overtime exemption for restaurant 
workers initially present in the FLSA was eliminated in a 1977 
amendment, Pub. L. No. 95-151, 91 Stat. 1245, 1252 (1977), the 
Commonwealth has not yet followed suit.  Two bills currently 
pending in the Legislature, 2021 House Doc. No. 1960 and 2021 
Senate Doc. No. 1225, would eliminate this exception. 
 
10 Contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion, Rice Barn did not 
waive this argument.  Rice Barn appealed from "all aspects of 
the 'Amended Judgment on Jury Verdict,'" which included the 
motion judge's partial grant of summary judgment on liability.  
7 
 
that a "host of cases" have construed the wage act to allow 
employees to recover under the act when their employers failed 
to timely pay overtime compensation owed exclusively under the 
FLSA. 
While these cases construe the phrase "wages earned" in the 
wage act to include overtime wages due under the FLSA11 and, on 
that basis, conclude that the wage act provides an alternative 
avenue for relief for violations of the Federal overtime law,12 
 
Nor was the argument waived by Rice Barn's acknowledgement in 
pretrial filings that the motion judge had held it to be liable. 
 
11 See, e.g., Lambirth v. Advanced Auto, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 
3d 108, 111 (D. Mass. 2015), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1716 
(9th ed. 2009) ("wage" includes "every form of remuneration 
payable for a given period to an individual for personal 
services, including salaries . . . and any similar advantage 
received from the employer").  See Tze-Kit Mui v. Massachusetts 
Port Auth., 478 Mass. 710, 712 (2018), quoting Water Dep't of 
Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 740, 744 
(2010) ("the 'principal source of insight into legislative 
intent'" is "the plain language of the statute"). 
 
12 The cases rely on the oft acknowledged legislative intent 
of the wage act "to prevent the unreasonable detention of 
wages."  Lipsitt v. Plaud, 466 Mass. 240, 245 (2013), quoting 
Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Mass. 164, 170 (2012).  See Harvard 
Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 
Mass. 745, 749 (2006), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 
447 (1934) ("a statute must be interpreted according to the 
intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated").  See, e.g., Li v. Foolun, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 
3d 289, 292 (D. Mass. 2017) ("A failure to pay overtime wages 
under the FLSA is also a violation of the [w]age [a]ct"); 
Lambirth, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 111 (there is "no indication that 
8 
 
they do not address the more salient question presented by Rice 
Barn's argument -- namely, whether the FLSA's comprehensive 
remedial scheme for recovery of damages when an employer 
violates the Federal overtime law precludes an employee from 
alternatively pursuing wage act remedies for the untimely 
payment of overtime wages due solely under the FLSA.  Instead, 
these cases highlight that, if the wage act is construed to 
permit application of its remedial scheme for violations of the 
Federal law, a conflict between the two laws may arise.  See, 
e.g., Carroca vs. All Star Enters. & Collision Ctr., Inc., U.S. 
Dist. Ct., No. 12-11202-DJC (D. Mass. July 10, 2013) (noting 
potential for "windfall" if employee is allowed to recover under 
both wage act and FLSA, and opting to award wage act's more 
generous remedy -- treble damages).  In these circumstances, our 
construction does not end with the plain meaning analysis; 
instead, if possible, "[w]e must . . . seek to avoid [the] 
conflict with Federal law and possible preemption under the 
supremacy clause."13  Wright's Case, 486 Mass. 98, 108 (2020). 
 
[the wage act] was meant to exclude overtime wages" required 
under FLSA); Carroca vs. All Star Enters. & Collision Ctr., 
Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 12-11202-DJC (D. Mass. July 10, 2013) 
("Defendants are liable under [the wage act] where they did not 
pay all of 'the wages earned by [employee]' within the statutory 
pay period," including overtime wages owed under FLSA). 
 
13 Under the supremacy clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, 
"[F]ederal statutes and regulations properly enacted and 
promulgated can nullify conflicting [S]tate or local actions" 
9 
 
In doing so, we start with the "basic assumption that 
Congress [does] not intend to displace [S]tate law" (citation 
omitted).14  Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 192 (4th 
Cir. 2007).  That presumption is "particularly strong [in the 
present context] given [S]tates' lengthy history of regulating 
employees' wages and hours."  Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 
F.3d 249, 262 (3d Cir. 2012), citing California Div. of Labor 
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 
U.S. 316, 330 (1997).  See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 
482 U.S. 1, 21 (1987) ("pre-emption should not be lightly 
inferred in this area, since the establishment of labor 
standards falls within the traditional police power of the 
State").  Significantly, the FLSA sets forth a "savings clause," 
expressly providing that the FLSA does not preempt State laws 
establishing a higher minimum wage or shorter maximum work week.  
See 29 U.S.C. § 218(a).  Thus, we are concerned with neither 
express preemption nor field preemption.  See Knepper, supra.  
 
(citation omitted).  Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 
191 (4th Cir. 2007).  Conflicts between Federal and State laws, 
where they exist, are governed by the principles of preemption.  
See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Communications 
Comm'n, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986); Roma, III, Ltd. v. Board of 
Appeals of Rockport, 478 Mass. 580, 587 (2018). 
 
14 "The purpose of Congress is . . . the 'ultimate 
touchstone' of a preemption analysis."  Anderson, 508 F.3d at 
192, quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 
(1992). 
10 
 
Moreover, an employer can comply with both the wage act's 
requirement that wages earned be paid timely and the FLSA's 
requirement that overtime hours be paid at one and one-half 
times the regular rate.15  See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 
U.S. 72, 79 (1990); Aldridge v. Mississippi Dep't of 
Corrections, 990 F.3d 868, 875 (5th Cir. 2021) ("It is not 
'impossible' to comply with both [F]ederal and [S]tate law . . . 
overtime compensation requirements").  Accordingly, we confine 
our analysis to considering whether recovery under the wage act 
"actually conflicts" with the FLSA in the sense that doing so 
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress" (citations 
omitted).  English, supra. 
A brief overview of both laws guides our analysis. 
i.  Federal overtime law.  Congress enacted the Federal 
overtime law in 1938 "to protect workers . . . by establishing 
[F]ederal minimum wage, maximum hour, and overtime guarantees 
that could not be avoided through contract."  Knepper, 675 F.3d 
at 253-254.  It aimed "to guarantee compensation for all work or 
employment engaged in by employees covered by the [FLSA]" 
(alteration and citation omitted).  Reich v. New York City 
Transit Auth., 45 F.3d 646, 648-649 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 
 
15 See 29 U.S.C. § 207, discussed infra. 
11 
 
The FLSA "provides an unusually elaborate enforcement 
scheme."  Anderson, 508 F.3d at 192, quoting Kendall v. 
Chesapeake, 174 F.3d 437, 443 (4th Cir. 1999).  It authorizes 
workers to file private actions against employers,16 in State or 
Federal court, to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated 
damages in an additional equal amount, and costs and attorney's 
fees.  29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  An employer may escape liquidated 
damages by showing to the court's satisfaction that it acted in 
good faith and had a reasonable ground for believing that it did 
not violate the FLSA.  See 29 U.S.C. § 260.  A claim for unpaid 
overtime brought under the Federal overtime law is subject to a 
two-year statute of limitations period, unless the claim arises 
from "a willful violation," in which case a three-year 
limitations period applies.  See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a); Anderson, 
supra. 
The FLSA also authorizes criminal penalties for willful 
violations.  29 U.S.C. § 216(a). Significantly, the FLSA 
mandates that an employee's right of action "shall terminate 
upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor."  29 
U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 
16 Corporate officers with "operational control of a 
corporation's covered enterprise" may be deemed "employer[s] 
along with the corporation, jointly and severally liable under 
the FLSA for unpaid wages."  Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 
1511 (1st Cir. 1983). 
12 
 
ii.  Wage act.  The wage act aims to "protect wage earners 
from the long-term detention of wages by unscrupulous employers 
as well as [to] protect society from irresponsible employees who 
receive and spend lump sum wages."  Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 
Mass. 164, 170 (2012), quoting Cumpata v. Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of Mass., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 164, 167 (D. Mass. 2000).  It 
thus requires timely payment of "wages earned."  G. L. c. 149, 
§ 148.  See Donis v. American Waste Servs., LLC, 485 Mass. 257, 
261 (2020), quoting G. L. c. 149, § 148 ("the Wage Act requires 
that '[e]very person having employees in his [or her] service 
shall pay . . . each such employee the wages earned by him [or 
her]' within a prescribed time period"). 
The wage act provides its own enforcement scheme.  It 
empowers the Attorney General to bring a civil action against 
wage act violators.  See Melia, 462 Mass. at 170.  Employers, 
including certain officers of corporations, who violate the wage 
act are subject to civil and criminal sanctions.  See G. L. 
c. 148, § 149; G. L. c. 149, § 27C. 
Pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150, employees also have a 
private right of action against employers who violate the wage 
act.  The remedies available under the wage act are, in some 
instances, more generous than those available under the FLSA.  
For example, employers who violate the wage act are strictly 
liable.  Also, successful employees are entitled to a mandatory 
13 
 
award of treble damages, as liquidated damages, for any lost 
wages and other benefits.  G. L. c. 149, § 150.  Civil actions 
under the wage act are subject to a three-year statute of 
limitations.  G. L. c. 149, § 150. 
iii.  Statutory construction in view of preemption 
concerns.  From this overview, it is clear that allowing an 
employee aggrieved by a violation of the Federal overtime law to 
elect State wage act remedies for untimely payments of wages due 
solely under the FLSA would present an "obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives" of the FLSA.  See Sawash v. Suburban Welders Supply 
Co., 407 Mass. 311, 314 (1990).  Crucially, where the source of 
the required overtime premium is exclusively pursuant to the 
FLSA, the wage act claims for untimely payments depend entirely 
on showing the employer violated the FLSA; the employees "invoke 
[S]tate law only as the source of remedies for the alleged FLSA 
violations."  Anderson, 508 F.3d at 193.  The timeliness claim 
under the wage act is based on the same proof, the same facts, 
and the same underlying liability; there is "no basis for their 
[w]age [a]ct claims other than this violation of" the FLSA.  
Donis, 485 Mass. at 265.  See Anderson, supra. 
In these circumstances, allowing the plaintiffs to pursue 
wage act remedies for FLSA violations would amount to 
14 
 
circumvention of the remedy prescribed by Congress.17  As 
discussed supra, the FLSA enforcement scheme for Federal 
overtime violations permits, at most, double damages, and 
employers may avoid such damages if they can establish, to the 
court's satisfaction, that they acted in good faith and upon a 
reasonable basis.  Actions under the FLSA generally must be 
brought within the two-year limitations period, and the 
Secretary of Labor can step in to police employers' violations, 
which in turn forecloses a private enforcement action.  By 
contrast, under the wage act, employers are strictly liable and 
assessed mandatory treble damages for violations.  It provides a 
three-year statute of limitations and has no provision for the 
treatment of private actions upon a Federal agency's enforcement 
decisions. 
 
17 While our decision in Donis concerned a conflict between 
two State laws (as opposed to a potential conflict between 
Federal and State laws), it provides a useful analogue.  There, 
the "central thrust" of the employees' wage act claims for 
untimely payment of wages earned was the substantive right to 
payments established by the prevailing wage act, "which itself 
already provides its own remedy."  Donis, 485 Mass. at 265.  
Because the two acts provided "conflicting mechanisms to recover 
the same underpayment of wages," we saw "no reason why a 
plaintiff should be able to evade procedural limitations that 
the Legislature ha[d] adopted [under the prevailing wage act], 
simply by stating a duplicative statutory claim [under the wage 
act]."  Id. at 267, 268.  Similarly, here, where the sole basis 
for the employees' claim is a violation of the Federal overtime 
law, allowing them to proceed under the wage act would vitiate 
Congress's decision to create its own enforcement scheme under 
the FLSA. 
15 
 
Indeed, while Federal "courts are all over the map on 
whether plaintiffs may bring [S]tate law claims in addition to 
FLSA claims for the same conduct, . . . [t]he common thread is 
this:  When the FLSA provides a remedial measure, it conflicts 
with similar [S]tate law causes of action and thus preempts 
them; when the FLSA does not provide a remedial measure, there 
is no preemption."  Aldridge, 990 F.3d at 872.  See, e.g., id. 
at 876 (concluding FLSA preempts redundant State law negligence, 
conversion, and other tort-based claims, and stating that 
plaintiffs "may not sue simultaneously under both [S]tate law 
and the FLSA . . . if [S]tate law does not independently provide 
for such a cause of action"); Anderson, 508 F.3d at 194 (finding 
that FLSA preempted State contract, negligence, and fraud claims 
that were merely duplicative of FLSA-based claims); Fuller vs. 
Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 4:16-cv-1476 
(D.S.C. July 12, 2016) (concluding that because plaintiff's 
causes of action for minimum wage and overtime arise solely out 
of FLSA, duplicative State claims were preempted; "in order for 
Plaintiff's [wage law] claim to survive Defendant's motion to 
dismiss, she must have alleged that Defendant did more than 
violate the FLSA"); Moeck vs. Gray Supply Corp., U.S. Dist. Ct., 
No. 03-1950 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2006) (holding State fraud and 
misrepresentation claims were preempted by FLSA, because "claims 
16 
 
directly covered by the FLSA [such as overtime], must be brought 
under the FLSA").18 
To avoid this conflict, we conclude that where, as here, 
the plaintiffs' sole claim for overtime wages rests on the FLSA, 
they are limited to the remedies provided under the FLSA.  See 
Wright's Case, 486 Mass. at 108.  Thus, the trial judge's 
trebling of damages pursuant to the wage act was error, and a 
determination of the appropriate damages under the Federal 
overtime law is necessary. 
b.  Day rate.  Rice Barn next challenges the trial judge's 
instruction that the amount of overtime wages owed to the 
plaintiffs is calculated, inter alia, by multiplying their 
regular rate by one and one-half.19  We review the methodology of 
 
18 Some of these cases concern Federal preemption of State 
common-law claims; however, we have previously acknowledged that 
there is no basis to treat State statutory claims any 
differently when analyzing whether an actual conflict exists.  
See Donis, 485 Mass. at 268. 
 
19 Contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, Rice Barn preserved 
this objection.  Prior to trial, Rice Barn submitted a proposed 
jury instruction setting forth its position that one-half was 
the proper multiplier for the determination of the overtime 
wages due to the plaintiffs.  Rice Barn also objected to the use 
of the one and one-half multiplier during trial.  In considering 
Rice Barn's position, the trial judge expressly stated his 
understanding that regardless of his decision, the issue would 
likely be appealed.  See Flood v. Southland Corp., 416 Mass. 62, 
67 (1993) ("there can be circumstances where the request [for a 
jury instruction], the pretrial ruling, and the objection to the 
ruling are so explicit that a postcharge objection need not be 
made"). 
17 
 
computing overtime wages de novo.  See Plymouth Retirement Bd. 
v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 603-604 
(2019).  See also Dacar v. Saybolt, L.P., 914 F.3d 917, 924 (5th 
Cir. 2018). 
The FLSA imposes an "absolute duty" on employers to pay 
nonexempt employees subject to the statute "'at a rate not less 
than one and one half times the regular rate' at which employed" 
for all hours worked over forty in a week.  George Lawley & Son 
Corp. v. South, 140 F.2d 439, 442 (1st Cir. 1944), quoting 29 
U.S.C. § 207.  See Lalli v. General Nutrition Ctrs., Inc., 814 
F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2016), quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  The 
first step in the determination of the overtime wages due is the 
determination of the "regular rate."  The regular rate "refers 
to the hourly rate actually paid the employee for the normal, 
non-overtime workweek for which he [or she] is employed."  
Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424 
(1945).  The regular rate is an "actual fact.  Once the parties 
have decided upon the amount of wages and the mode of payment 
the determination of the regular rate becomes a matter of 
mathematical computation."  Id. at 424-425. 
Where an employer pays an employee an hourly rate, the 
regular rate generally is the hourly rate.  29 C.F.R. § 778.110.  
The FLSA, however, does not require compensation to be based on 
an hourly rate; instead, earnings may be determined on another 
18 
 
basis, such as a piece rate, day rate, salary, or commission.  
29 C.F.R. § 778.109.  In such cases, however, the regular rate 
must nevertheless be expressed in terms of an hourly rate; thus, 
the quotient that is the "rate per hour" must be derived 
mathematically.  Id.  Conveniently, the Federal regulations set 
forth examples detailing the necessary calculations for certain 
scenarios. 
Rice Barn contends that because the plaintiffs ostensibly 
were paid a daily rate for each day worked, the outstanding 
overtime wages owed to the plaintiffs fall within the 
illustrative example codified in 29 C.F.R. § 778.112.  Section 
778.112 applies to employees who are paid "a flat sum for a 
day's work . . . without regard to the number of hours worked in 
the day . . . and [who] receive[] no other form of compensation 
for services."  29 C.F.R. § 778.112.  See Dufrene v. Browning-
Ferris, Inc., 207 F.3d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 2000) (describing day 
rate employees as those employees "guaranteed a day's pay, 
regardless of the number of hours worked that day").  Where an 
employer's payment methodology falls within § 778.112, the 
"regular rate is determined by totaling all the sums received at 
such day rates . . . in the workweek and dividing by the total 
hours actually worked."  29 C.F.R. § 778.112.  The employee "is 
then entitled to extra half-time pay at this rate for all hours 
worked in excess of [forty] in the workweek."  Id. 
19 
 
The record does not support Rice Barn's contention that the 
plaintiffs were paid a flat sum for a day's work regardless of 
the hours the plaintiffs actually worked in a day.  Rather, the 
testimony and other evidence showed that the plaintiffs' day 
rate was offset by the hours they were absent from work during 
the workday, and their wages were halved when the restaurant was 
open for dinner only.  See, e.g., Thomas vs. Waste Pro USA, 
Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., Case No. 8:17-CV-2254-T-36CPT (M.D. Fla. 
Sept. 30, 2019) ("To the extent that [employer] would pay 
[employees] only the half day rate if their daily task took less 
than four hours, instead of the full day rate for their daily 
task, the Court finds that this is not consistent with paying a 
day rate, or compliant with the FLSA"); Turner v. BFI Waste 
Servs., LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 831, 838 (D.S.C. 2017) (because 
employee was "not paid the day rate for a partial day of work, 
it is clear that [employee] was not a day-rate employee");  
Solis v. Hooglands Nursery, LLC, 372 Fed. Appx. 528, 529 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (where employees' wages "were reduced 
when the employees worked less than a full day," employer did 
not have valid day rate plan under 29 C.F.R. § 778.112).  
Accordingly, Rice Barn's payment scheme does not fall within the 
exemplary day rate scheme set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 778.112. 
Given the hybrid pay structure utilized by Rice Barn, the 
plaintiffs' regular rate -- their rate per hour -- must be 
20 
 
computed so as to allow calculation of the overtime wages due in 
view of that regular rate.  See Serrano v. Republic Servs., 
Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d 768, 771 (S.D. Tex. 2017), quoting 29 
C.F.R. § 778.109 ("[T]he FLSA does not prohibit particular pay 
structures.  It merely requires that they be properly 
interpreted for minimum wage and overtime calculations.  And the 
regulations 'give some examples of the proper method of 
determining the regular rate of pay in particular instances'").  
The numerator of the rate per hour quotient is defined by the 
FLSA "to include all remuneration for employment paid to . . . 
the employee" for a given week subject to enumerated exceptions 
not applicable here.  29 U.S.C. § 207(e).  See Walling, 325 U.S. 
at 424 ("The regular rate by its very nature must reflect all 
payments which the parties have agreed shall be received 
regularly during the workweek . . .").  Significantly, however, 
the statute does not set forth the divisor required to calculate 
the regular rate.  Instead, the divisor has been defined by 
regulation and case law, which provide that the regular rate "is 
determined by dividing [the employee's] total remuneration for 
employment . . . in any workweek by the total number of hours 
actually worked by [the employee] in that workweek for which 
such compensation was paid."  29 C.F.R. § 778.109.  See Bay 
Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 464 (1948) ("We 
think the most reasonable conclusion is that Congress intended 
21 
 
the regular rate of pay to be found by dividing the weekly 
compensation by the hours worked . . ."); Chavez v. Albuquerque, 
630 F.3d 1300, 1312-1313 (10th Cir. 2011) ("proper divisor is 
hours worked" in workweek). 
Rice Barn is correct that because the calculation of the 
regular rate (as set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 778.109, supra) was 
based on the employee's actual hours worked, including any hours 
over forty that the plaintiffs worked,20 the plaintiffs 
effectively have already been paid for a portion of the overtime 
wages due to them under the FLSA.  As such, when calculating 
damages for failure to pay overtime as required by the FLSA, the 
plaintiffs are entitled only to the remaining "one-half" 
outstanding balance in the "time and one-half" calculation.21  
 
20 If, instead, the divisor were forty hours, then the 
regular rate would only include the employee's compensation for 
the first forty hours during the workweek.  However, the use of 
forty hours as the divisor is not supported by the "actual 
fact[s]" of the employment relationship in the present case, see 
Walling, 325 U.S. at 424, and, in any event, is not what is 
prescribed by the regulations or applicable Federal case law. 
 
21 A simplified mathematical example is illustrative.  If an 
employee is paid $600 per week and works fifty hours per week, 
her regular rate is twelve dollars per hour ($600 divided by 
fifty hours actually worked in a week).  The employee's overtime 
rate is eighteen dollars per hour (one and one-half times the 
employee's regular rate of twelve dollars).  The total 
renumeration to which the employee is entitled under the FLSA is 
$660, which is derived by one of two equivalent methods. 
 
The employer can pay the employee the regular rate (twelve 
dollars) for nonovertime hours (forty hours), resulting in $480 
per workweek in regular wages, and one and one-half the regular 
22 
 
 
rate (eighteen dollars) for overtime hours (ten hours, which is 
the number of hours in excess of forty hours that the employee 
worked per week), resulting in an additional $180 per workweek 
in overtime wages.  In total, the employee would receive $660 
($480 in regular wages plus $180 in overtime wages). 
 
Alternatively, the employer can pay the employee the 
regular rate (twelve dollars per hour) for all hours worked 
(fifty hours) plus an additional one-half the regular rate (six 
dollars, which is one-half times twelve dollars) for overtime 
hours (ten hours, which is the number of hours in excess of 
forty hours that the employee worked per week) to arrive at the 
same renumeration owed to the plaintiff, $660.  Accord Chavez, 
630 F.3d at 1313 ("The same result is achieved if the [employer] 
pays straight time for all hours and an additional one-half 
straight time on overtime hours, or if the [employer] pays 
straight time for nonovertime hours and one and one-half 
straight time on overtime hours").  Under either scenario, 
because the employee was already paid $600, the employee's 
damages (prior to the addition of any liquidated damages) are 
sixty dollars. 
 
In this case, however, the trial judge improperly mixed 
these two methods, resulting in the plaintiffs receiving two and 
one-half times their regular rate for overtime hours.  
Specifically, the plaintiffs already received their regular rate 
for all hours worked, including overtime hours (as in the second 
scenario above).  The trial judge, however, instructed the jury 
to use the one and one-half multiplier (as in the first scenario 
above) to calculate the overtime wages. 
 
Using the numbers from our example, the hypothetical 
employee already received $600 in wages during the workweek, 
$120 of which were attributable to overtime hours (twelve 
dollars times ten hours of overtime).  The trial judge's 
instruction would result in an additional overtime compensation 
of $180 (or eighteen dollars per hour times ten hours of 
overtime).  Thus, in the example, the employee would get a total 
renumeration of $600 plus $180, or $780, rather than the $660 
owed under the FLSA.  This was error.  As this example shows, 
the employee received $300 ($120 plus $180) for the ten overtime 
hours; this resulted in an overtime rate of thirty dollars per 
hour, or two and one-half times the employee's regular rate of 
twelve dollars per hour instead of the eighteen per hour 
required under the FLSA. 
23 
 
See, e.g., Kliger vs. Liberty Saverite Supermkt., Inc., U.S. 
Dist. Ct., No. 17-CV-02520 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2018) (plaintiff, 
who had already been paid regular hourly rate for overtime 
hours, was owed only one-half times his regular rate for all 
hours over forty).  Thus, the trial judge's instruction to 
multiply the regular rate by one and one-half in calculating 
damages overcompensated the plaintiffs, effectively giving the 
plaintiffs a windfall of two and one-half times their regular 
rate for each overtime hour worked.  "The FLSA does not require 
this."  Turner, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 837 (rejecting argument "that 
the FLSA requires that [employee] receive the regular rate for 
all hours worked and one and one-half of the regular rate for 
overtime hours, [because] this would lead to [employee] 
receiving two and one-half times his regular rate for overtime 
hours").  For this reason, we remand the matter to the trial 
court to reduce the damages award appropriately, using the one-
half multiplier. 
c.  Plaintiffs' expert witness.  We need not dwell long on 
Rice Barn's objection to the trial judge's allowance of expert 
testimony on the issue of damages.  It was not an abuse of 
discretion to allow the plaintiffs' expert to supplement his 
report and to testify to the overtime wages owed in view of the 
trial judge's adoption of Rice Barn's own position that the 
regular rate should be calculated using the actual hours worked 
24 
 
(rather than forty hours), and Rice Barn suffered no prejudice.  
See Hammell v. Shooshanian Eng'g Assocs., Inc., 73 Mass. App. 
Ct. 634, 638 (2009) ("The admissibility of belatedly disclosed 
expert opinion rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
judge"); Resendes v. Boston Edison Co., 38 Mass. App. Ct. 344, 
350 (1995), quoting Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co., KG, 399 Mass. 
790, 799 (1987) ("The conduct and scope of discovery is within 
the sound discretion of the judge," and it "will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a 'showing of prejudicial error 
resulting from an abuse of discretion'").  The expert disclosed 
his methodology prior to trial and conformed it to Rice Barn's 
own position and the trial judge's adoption of the same, and 
Rice Barn took advantage of the opportunity to cross-examine 
him.22 
d.  Weight of the evidence.  Rice Barn also argues that the 
jury's verdict on the plaintiffs' damages is unsupported by the 
weight of the evidence.  We review the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict, assessing whether "anywhere 
in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination 
of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable 
 
22 Rice Barn's further objection to the expert's testimony, 
on the basis that it was unnecessary, was not raised.  Indeed, 
when asked, Rice Barn's counsel specifically said, "I'm not 
questioning that."  Accordingly, the objection is waived.  See 
Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 649 (1986). 
25 
 
inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff."  Dobos v. 
Driscoll, 404 Mass. 634, 656, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989), 
quoting Poirier v. Plymouth, 374 Mass. 206, 212 (1978). 
Rice Barn's records of the plaintiffs' working time were 
incomplete, at best, violating its duty to maintain such 
records.  See 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) ("Every employer . . . shall 
make, keep, and preserve such records of the persons employed by 
[the employer] and of the wages, hours, and other conditions and 
practices of employment maintained by [the employer], and shall 
preserve such records for [prescribed] periods of time . . ."); 
Vitali v. Reit Mgt. & Research, LLC, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 99, 109 
(2015), quoting Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 363 
(2d Cir. 2011) ("an employer's duty under the FLSA to maintain 
accurate records of its employees' hours is non-delegable").  In 
such cases, "[t]he employer cannot be heard to complain that the 
damages lack the exactness and precision of measurement that 
would be possible had [it] kept records" in accordance with the 
FLSA.  Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 688 
(1946), superseded by statute on other grounds.  Instead, 
employees can rely on general testimony and estimates to show 
the time they worked.  Id. at 687-688. 
The plaintiffs testified as to the hours they worked on 
average, along with their job descriptions and tasks.  Based on 
26 
 
this evidence, the jury reasonably could have approximated the 
plaintiffs' damages. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the case is 
remanded for recalculation of damages consistent with this 
opinion.23 
So ordered. 
 
23 We deny the plaintiffs' request for appellate costs and 
attorney's fees, because the plaintiffs are not the prevailing 
party on appeal.  See G. L. c. 149, § 150.