Case Title: Dixon v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 041952

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
RODNEY L. DIXON, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 041952   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
    Record No. 041996 
 
 
 
  June 9, 2005 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In these appeals, we consider the denial of a defendant’s 
motion to suppress certain statements he made to the police 
before being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966).  The central issue we resolve is whether a 
suspect detained at the scene of a traffic accident was in 
police custody for purposes of the Miranda rule after the 
suspect was placed in handcuffs and locked in a police patrol 
car. 
 
Rodney Lee Dixon, Jr. was charged in the City of Norfolk 
with driving under the influence (DUI), third offense within the 
past five years, in violation of Code § 18.2-270(C); driving on 
a suspended license, in violation of Code § 18.2-272; and 
refusing to submit to a breath or blood alcohol test, in 
violation of Code § 18.2-268.3.  Before trial in the circuit 
court, Dixon filed a motion to suppress certain statements he 
made to the arresting officer, claiming a violation of his 
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the 
 
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Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution and Code 
of Virginia.  The circuit court denied the motion. 
Dixon entered a conditional guilty plea to all the charges, 
reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress.  See Code § 19.2-254.  The circuit court accepted 
Dixon’s pleas and sentenced him to a total of six years’ 
imprisonment and a $1,000 fine, five years and $500 of which 
were suspended.  The court also suspended Dixon’s driver’s 
license for one year. 
The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished order, denied 
Dixon’s petition for appeal of his convictions for DUI and 
driving on a suspended license.  Dixon v. Commonwealth, Record 
No. 3261-03-1 (July 29, 2004).  The Court stated that Dixon was 
not in police custody at the time he made incriminating 
statements to the police and that, therefore, the circuit court 
did not err in denying the motion to suppress.  The Court also 
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Dixon’s 
appeal of the circuit court’s judgment on the charge of refusing 
to submit to a breath or blood alcohol test, and transferred 
that case to this Court. 
We consolidated Dixon’s appeal of the circuit court’s 
judgment on the refusal charge with his appeal of his criminal 
convictions from the Court of Appeals.  Under established 
principles of appellate review, we will state the evidence in 
 
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the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 
party in the circuit court.  Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 
568, 570, 570 S.E.2d 836, 837 (2002); McCain v. Commonwealth, 
261 Va. 483, 486, 545 S.E.2d 541, 543 (2001). 
On February 23, 2003, at about 2:40 a.m., Virginia State 
Trooper Christopher S. Jackson arrived at the scene of a motor 
vehicle accident and fire on Interstate Route 64 in Norfolk.  As 
Trooper Jackson approached officers from the Norfolk Police 
Department who initially had responded to the accident scene, 
Jackson saw that the officers had placed handcuffs on Dixon and 
were standing near him.  Trooper Jackson observed that Dixon 
appeared “upset,” was acting “unruly” toward the officers, and 
had a “strong odor” of an alcoholic beverage emanating from his 
person. 
After the Norfolk officers removed the existing handcuffs, 
Trooper Jackson placed his own set of handcuffs on Dixon, 
thereby securing Dixon’s hands behind his back.  Jackson then 
placed Dixon in the front passenger seat of his patrol car and 
locked the car door.  Jackson told Dixon that he was not under 
arrest but “was being detained for investigative reasons [and] 
for [Dixon’s and Trooper Jackson’s] safety.” 
After verifying Dixon’s name and date of birth, Trooper 
Jackson began questioning Dixon about the accident.  Jackson 
asked Dixon whether he was operating the vehicle that caught 
 
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fire, and whether he “had anything to drink during the evening.”  
Dixon replied that he had consumed four or five beers about an 
hour earlier, and that he had “pulled” his car over to the side 
of the road because the car was malfunctioning. 
Trooper Jackson administered several “field sobriety 
tests,” some of which Dixon refused to complete.  Dixon also 
refused to submit to a preliminary breath alcohol test.  At that 
point, Trooper Jackson informed Dixon that he was under arrest 
and advised him of his Miranda rights. 
Before trial, Dixon filed a motion to suppress the 
statements he made to Trooper Jackson about his alcohol 
consumption and operation of the vehicle.  Dixon argued that he 
was in police custody when he was handcuffed and locked in the 
patrol car and, thus, that any statements he gave before being 
advised of his Miranda rights were obtained in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
The circuit court denied Dixon’s motion.  The court 
concluded that Trooper Jackson had reasonable suspicion that 
Dixon had been involved in criminal activity, and that Jackson’s 
actions in securing the handcuffs on Dixon and placing him in 
the locked patrol car did not convert the investigative 
detention into a custodial arrest. 
In its order denying Dixon’s petition for appeal of his 
criminal convictions, the Court of Appeals stated that Dixon was 
 
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not in custody when he made the incriminating statements because 
Trooper Jackson repeatedly advised Dixon that he was not under 
arrest, and placed him in handcuffs due to concerns for safety 
and possible escape.  The Court concluded that, therefore, 
Trooper Jackson was not required to advise Dixon of his Miranda 
rights before questioning him about the accident. 
On appeal to this Court, Dixon argues that his Fifth 
Amendment rights were violated because a reasonable person in 
his situation would have concluded that he was not free to leave 
the scene of the accident.  According to Dixon, the conduct of 
the officers at the scene converted what normally would be 
considered an investigative detention into a custodial arrest.  
Dixon contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation, 
within the meaning of Miranda, because he was placed in 
handcuffs and involuntarily locked in the patrol car before 
being questioned by the police. 
In response, the Commonwealth argues that Trooper Jackson’s 
actions were consistent with an investigative detention 
permitted under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and were 
necessary under the circumstances.  The Commonwealth asserts 
that reasonable restraint is permissible during an investigative 
detention, and that Trooper Jackson placed Dixon in handcuffs 
for safety reasons due to Dixon’s “hostile" and “defiant" 
attitude.  The Commonwealth also contends that it was necessary 
 
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to place Dixon in the locked patrol car because of the dangerous 
highway location and Dixon’s prior attempts to leave the scene.  
Thus, the Commonwealth argues that under the circumstances 
presented, the circuit court correctly concluded that Dixon was 
not in police custody at the time he made the incriminating 
statements. 
In resolving this issue, we review settled principles of 
constitutional law that govern our inquiry.  Under Miranda, 
before a suspect in police custody may be questioned by law 
enforcement officers, the suspect must be warned that he has a 
right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used 
as evidence against him, and that he has the right to have an 
attorney, either retained or appointed, present to assist him.  
384 U.S. at 444.  Statements obtained by law enforcement 
officers in violation of this rule generally will be subject to 
exclusion for most proof purposes in a criminal trial.  Id. at 
479; see Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994).  But 
see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (exception for second 
statement obtained as a result of prior, unwarned statement); 
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public safety 
exception); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (impeachment 
exception). 
The safeguards required by Miranda must be afforded to a 
suspect as soon as the police have restricted his freedom of 
 
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action to a “degree associated with formal arrest.”  Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting California v. 
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)); see Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 
322; Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 605, 450 S.E.2d 124, 
129 (1994).  Therefore, “[i]f a motorist who has been detained 
pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment 
that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be 
entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by 
Miranda.”  Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440; see Oregon v. Mathiason, 
429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). 
Because the determination whether a suspect is “in custody” 
requires an objective focus, the only relevant inquiry is how a 
reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would have 
understood his circumstances.  Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; see 
Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-25; George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 
264, 272, 411 S.E.2d 12, 17 (1991).  Thus, the subjective 
perspective of either the suspect or the interrogating police 
officer has no bearing on the issue whether the suspect was “in 
custody” at the time he was questioned by the police.  
Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324; Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; George, 
242 Va. at 272, 411 S.E.2d at 17. 
As the Supreme Court observed in Berkemer, the ordinary 
traffic stop is more analogous to a “Terry stop” than to 
restrictions associated with a formal arrest.  468 U.S. at 439.  
 
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Because both ordinary traffic stops and “Terry stops” are 
comparatively brief and noncoercive in nature, the Supreme Court 
has held that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such 
stops generally are not “in custody” for purposes of the Miranda 
rule.  Id. at 440.  However, because a suspect may be “in 
custody” for purposes of Miranda before he actually has been 
arrested, we consider the circumstances of Dixon’s detention 
under the test stated by the Supreme Court in Berkemer to 
determine whether a reasonable person in Dixon’s position would 
have concluded that his freedom was being curtailed to a degree 
associated with a formal arrest.  Id. at 442; see Stansbury, 511 
U.S. at 322; Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125; Burket, 248 Va. at 605, 
450 S.E.2d at 129; George, 242 Va. at 272, 411 S.E.2d at 17. 
This detention occurred around 3:00 a.m. on the shoulder of 
an interstate highway.  Although Trooper Jackson told Dixon that 
he was not under arrest, Jackson secured Dixon’s hands in 
handcuffs behind his back and placed him in the front seat of 
the locked patrol car.  Jackson informed Dixon that he was being 
detained for investigative and safety considerations.  We 
conclude that under these circumstances, a reasonable person in 
Dixon’s position would have understood that his freedom was 
being restricted to a degree associated with a formal arrest.  
See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322; 
 
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Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125; Burket, 248 Va. at 605, 450 S.E.2d at 
129; George, 242 Va. at 272, 411 S.E.2d at 17. 
Our conclusion in this regard is influenced most strongly 
by the combined factors of Dixon being restrained in handcuffs 
and being locked in a police patrol car.  While the presence of 
either of these factors, in the absence of the other, may not 
result in a curtailment of freedom ordinarily associated with a 
formal arrest, the presence of both factors compels the 
conclusion that a reasonable person subjected to both restraints 
would conclude that he was in police custody. 
This holding is in accord with decisions from several other 
states which, under varying other circumstances, have concluded 
that a suspect was “in custody” for purposes of the Miranda rule 
after being placed in handcuffs and secured in a police patrol 
car.  See State v. Frank, 986 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1999); Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2000); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 716 N.E.2d 1036, 1038 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1999); State v. Johnston, 572 S.E.2d 438, 441 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2002).  The decisions of these courts, and our holding today, 
reflect the observation in Berkemer that although the 
determination whether a suspect is in custody for purposes of 
Miranda is not an “easily administered” rule, the rule serves 
well to protect both the constitutional rights of detained 
 
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citizens and the legitimate interests of law enforcement.  See 
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441. 
Accordingly, under the facts and circumstances before us, 
we hold that Trooper Jackson was required to give Miranda 
warnings to Dixon before questioning him, and that the circuit 
court erred in denying Dixon’s motion to suppress with regard to 
the criminal charges pending against him.  Because the charge of 
refusing to submit to a breath or blood alcohol test, Code 
§ 18.2-268.3, is civil, rather than criminal in nature, see 
Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 290, 170 S.E.2d 199, 202 
(1969), our holding does not affect the circuit court’s 
adjudication of that charge.* 
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment on the refusal charge.  We will reverse the Court of 
Appeals’ judgment on the criminal convictions under Code § 18.2-
270(C) and Code § 18.2-272, and remand the criminal charges for 
a new trial, if the Commonwealth so elects, in accordance with 
the principles expressed in this opinion. 
Record No. 041996 - Affirmed and final judgment. 
  Record No. 041952 - Reversed and remanded. 
                     
* Dixon’s counsel conceded at oral argument that our 
resolution of the issue whether the circuit court erred in 
denying the motion to suppress would not affect the circuit 
court’s judgment on the refusal charge.