Case Title: MICHAEL E. BERG V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
MICHAEL E. BERG V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2005 WY 23106 P.3d 867Case Number: No. 04-78Decided: 02/25/2005
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 

                                                                                                
            
_

MICHAEL E. 
BERG, 

Appellant 
(Claimant/Respondent) 

       v.  

STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 

AND 
COMPENSATION DIVISION,            

Appellee 
(Petitioner).           

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable Scott Skavdahl, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

David A. 
Drell of Vlastos, Henley & Drell, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. 
Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kristi M. Radosevich, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Radosevich.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and JAMES, 
DJ.

 
 
HILL, Chief 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The Office of 
Administrative Hearings determined that Michael E. Berg qualified for workers' 
compensation benefits because he had suffered a compensable work-related injury 
when his co-worker's vehicle, in which he was a passenger, was involved in an 
accident while traveling from the worksite to lodging provided by the 
employer.  The District Court 
reversed that decision.  We affirm 
the order of the District Court.

 
 
ISSUES

[¶2]      In his brief, 
Berg sets forth the following statement of the issues:

 
 
1. Whether 
the February 4, 2004 Order reversing the decision of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and 
otherwise not in accordance with law.

 
 

2. Whether 
the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings awarding 
benefits is supported by substantial evidence and whether such decision is 
arbitrary and capricious and otherwise not in accordance with 
law.

 
 
The Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (the Division) replies with these 
statements:

 
 

I. 
Appellant, 
Michael E. Berg, was traveling from employment in a co-worker 's vehicle when he 
sustained back injuries. Mr. Berg was not reimbursed for travel expenses, nor 
was he eligible for reimbursement.  
These facts are undisputed. Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D), provides 
that injuries sustained while traveling to or from employment are not 
compensable unless the employee is reimbursed for travel expenses or transported 
in a vehicle of the employer. Notwithstanding the undisputed facts, the hearing 
examiner found Mr. Berg's injuries were compensable pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).  Did the 
hearing examiner fail to correctly apply Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(D)?

 
 

II. The 
hearing examiner found Mr. Berg was "required" to stay at the camp provided 
by his 
employer.  Based on this finding, 
the hearing examiner determined Mr. Berg's injuries occurred within the course 
of his employment and are, therefore, compensable.  Is the hearing examiner's decision 
supported by substantial evidence?

 
 
FACTS

[¶3]      Berg was employed 
by Cyclone Drilling as a floor hand and was assigned to a drill site near Big 
Piney, Wyoming.  
Cyclone's employees worked a seven days on, seven days off shift.  Since the drill site was located about a 
four-hour drive from Berg's home, daily commutes were impractical.  Cyclone maintained a campsite consisting 
of two trailers about 30 miles from the Big Piney drill site for the convenience 
of the employees.  The campsite was 
available free of charge but the employees were required to comply with certain 
conditions, including no drugs, alcohol, or guns on the premises.  Cyclone did not require its employees to 
stay at the camp as a condition of employment.  Since there was a scarcity of 
alternative housing in the drill site area, many of the employees elected to 
stay at the camp. Cyclone benefited from the arrangement as use of the camp 
reduced commute times, allowing for more rested workers.

 
 
[¶4]      On September 19, 
2001, Berg and his co-workers on the drilling crew met outside of Casper to drive to the 
drill site to begin their shift.  
Berg accepted a ride with a co-worker, Dennis Tintinger (Tintinger).  The vehicle was owned and operated by 
Tintinger.  Neither Berg nor 
Tintinger were paid for their time or mileage for traveling to or from the drill 
site, and they did not transport any of their employer's property.  The crew drove directly to the drill 
site and worked a 12-hour shift.  
After clocking out, Berg rode in Tintinger's vehicle to the 
campsite.  Tintinger fell asleep 
approximately 50 feet from the campsite causing the vehicle to run off the road. 
Berg suffered a severe back injury that eventually necessitated fusion 
surgery.

 
 
[¶5]      Berg filed a 
report of injury with the Division claiming that he had suffered a work-related 
injury.  The Division issued a Final 
Determination denying benefits, citing the statutory definition of a compensable 
injury found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D), which excludes from 
coverage any such injury sustained while traveling to or from employment, unless 
the employee is reimbursed for his travel expenses or was transported in a 
vehicle belonging to the employer.  
Berg objected and a hearing was held before the Office of Administrative 
Hearings.  Berg and the Division 
presented witnesses and exhibits.  
The hearing examiner concluded that Berg was entitled to benefits because 
he had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he had suffered an injury 
during the scope of his employment.  
Specifically, the hearing examiner found that Berg was required by 
Cyclone to stay at the camp as a condition of his employment and, hence, there 
was a "nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or 
requirement of [his] employment." 

 
 
[¶6]      The Division 
appealed the hearing examiner's decision to the District Court, which 
reversed.  The court concluded that 
there was not substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's finding 
that Berg was required to stay at the camp.  The court held that there was no nexus 
or causal connection between Berg's injury and his employment.  Berg has appealed that determination to 
this Court.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7]      Our review of an 
administrative decision is limited to those matters specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2003):

 
 
(c)  To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error. The reviewing court shall:

(i) Compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

(C) In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D) Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial 
evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 
 
The 
standard of review we apply when both parties present evidence at an 
administrative hearing was set forth in Newman v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 91, 49 P.3d 163 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
In appeals 
where both parties submit evidence at the administrative hearing,  Newman mandates that appellate review 
be limited to application of the substantial evidence test. Newman, 2002 
WY 91, ¶22, 49 P.3d 163.  This is 
true regardless of which party appeals from the agency decision.  In addition, this court is required to 
review the entire record in making its ultimate determination on appeal.  Newman, at ¶19 and 
¶¶24-26.

 
 
The 
substantial evidence test to be applied is as follows:

 
 
"In 
reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions. It is more than a scintilla of evidence."

 
 

Newman, at ¶12 
(quoting State ex  rel. Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div. v. Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶10, 24 P.3d 1133, ¶10 
(Wyo. 2001)).

 
 
Even when 
the factual findings are found to be sufficient under the substantial evidence 
test, Newman further concludes this court may be required to apply the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard as a "safety net" to catch other agency action 
which prejudiced a party's substantial right to the administrative proceeding or 
which might be contrary to the other [Wyoming Administrative Procedural Act] 
review standards.

 
 

Loomer v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 
2004 WY 47, 
¶15, 88 P.3d 1036, ¶15 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
DISCUSSION

[¶8]      We begin with the 
language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) (LexisNexis 2003), which 
provides:

 
 

(a) 
As used in 
this act:

.

(xi) 
"Injury" means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging 
and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising 
out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in 
places where the employer' s business requires an employee's presence and which 
subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business.  "Injury" does not 
include:

.

(D) Any 
injury sustained during travel to or from employment unless the employee is 
reimbursed for travel expenses or is transported by a vehicle of the 
employer.

 
 
We have 
construed the introductory paragraph of § 27-14-102(a)(xi) to require tha t 
there be some causal nexus between an injury and some condition, activity, 
environment, or requirement of the employment for an injury to be compensable 
under the Worker's Compensation Act.  
Archuleta v. Carbon County School District No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 92 
(Wyo. 1990); see also State ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. 
Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Wyo. 1999).  With regard to subsection (D), we have 
found that the language used is unambiguous.  Lloyd v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division , 2004 WY 85, ¶13, 93 P.3d 1001, 
¶13 (Wyo. 2004).  Subsection (D) is 
the codification of "a long-standing common law rule that injuries incurred 
while either going to or coming from work are not compensable unless the 
employer has in some fashion provided the employee with transportation or has 
reimbursed him for the costs of those travels."  Archuleta, 787 P.2d at 92-93; 
Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 1241 (Wyo. 1986).  As we stated in Archuleta, in 
terms of our "nexus test," subsection (D) of § 27-14-102(a)(xi) "constitutes a 
legislative determination that, while no compensable nexus with the employment 
is generally present when an employee is traveling between home and work, such a 
nexus is created where the employer has assumed the cost of that travel." 
Id.

 
 
[¶9]      With that context 
in mind, we turn to Berg's arguments.  
He presents two arguments in justification of the hearing examiner's 
determination that his injury was compensable.  First, he argues that the free 
accommodations provided by Cyclone constituted compensation or reimbursement for 
travel expenses under Subsection (D).  
Berg acknowledges that neither he nor Tintinger was reimbursed for 
mileage.  However, he counters that 
the statute encompasses other forms of reimbursement because it uses the phrase, 
"travel expenses," not "mileage."  
To support this contention, Berg cites parts of the Internal Revenue Code 
wherein the term "travel expenses" is defined to include amounts " expended for 
meals and lodging," 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(a)(2) (2002), and the cost of the lodging 
furnished by an employer, or on behalf of an employer, for the convenience of 
the employee is excluded from the employee's gross income, 26 U.S.C.A. § 119(a) 
(2002).

 
 
[¶10]   Our precedent has consistently held 
that § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) requires reimbursement for transportation 
expenses or the employee is not considered within the scope of his 
employment.  Archuleta, 787 
P.2d at 92-93; Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d  at 1241; Matter of 
Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 251 (Wyo. 1977).  There is no evidence in the record that 
Berg or Cyclone considered staying at the camp as a form of compensation for 
travel expenses.  Indeed, as the 
District Court points out, all witnesses, including Berg, agreed that neither he 
nor Tintinger were reimbursed or compensated in any way for their travel.  In the absence of any showing that his 
employer was to compensate Berg for his travel to the camp after he had clocked 
out of the job, we cannot conclude that Berg was acting within the scope of his 
employment when he was injured. Naylor, 723 P.2d  at 
1243.

 
 
[¶11]   Furthermore, Berg's reliance on a 
definition of "travel expenses" lifted from the Internal Revenue Code is simply 
not persuasive.  Berg fails to 
adequately explain why we should apply a definition derived from a statutory 
context  the federal tax laws  that has a purpose that is very different from 
Wyoming's 
worker compensation laws.  Under the 
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the free accommodations offered by 
Cyclone constitute a "travel expense" within the meaning of that term as used in 
§ 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).

 
 
[¶12]   In his second argument, Berg 
contends that the hearing examiner's determination that the injury was 
compensable was justified because the injury he suffered while traveling from 
the drill site to the camp arose out of and was in the course of his employment 
pursuant to § 27-14-102(a)(xi), since he was required to stay at the camp 
by his employer to whose control he was subjected while on the premises.  We do not agree.

 
 
[¶13]   In Chapman v. Meyers, 899 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1995), the claimant Chapman 
commuted daily with three co-employees from a motel in Craig, Colorado, to their work site, a drilling 
rig.  Id. at 50.  The opinion does not disclose whether or 
not the employer paid for the motel accommodations.  Neither Chapman nor his co-employees 
were reimbursed for travel to and from the drill site or paid a travel allowance 
as part of their wages.  Id.  After finishing his shift, Chapman left 
the drill site in a vehicle owned by the wife of a co-employee.  Id.  The road from the drill site was a 
snow-packed, two-lane, graveled public road through a mountainous area.  Id. Approximately one mile from the 
drill site, the vehicle collided head-on with a truck, resulting in severe 
injuries to Chapman. Id.  The hearing examiner determined that 
Chapman was not in the course and scope of his employment and was, therefore, 
denied benefits.  Id. at 49.  On appeal, Chapman contended that his 
employer "required, and contemplated" that its employees would not be able to 
live at the drill site and they would, of necessity, have to live in Craig and 
commute to the work site. Id. at 50.  Accordingly, Chapman insisted, there was 
a sufficient nexus betwee n the injury and his employment to justify 
compensation.  Id.  We summarily rejected Chapman 's 
argument:

 
 
Under the 
factual circumstances outlined above, we are not persuaded Chapman was in the 
course and scope of his employment merely while driving to and from the work 
site under what can only be described as relatively typical (in 
Wyoming/Colorado) commuting circumstances.

 
 

Chapman, 
899 P.2d  at 
50-51.

 
 
[¶14]   Berg attempts to distinguish 
Chapman by arguing that there was no evidence of the employees' motel 
expenses being paid by their employer, while here it was established that the 
employer provided the accommodations.  
The record shows, however, that Berg was not required to stay at the 
camp.  Berg's supervisor, Greg 
Garton, and Cyclone's head of operations, Patrick Hladky, testified that it was 
not a condition of employment that employees stay at the camp.  The camp was a benefit provided to the 
employees that they could use at their discretion.  Berg did not dispute this testimony and 
admitted that he was not aware of any policy requiring him to stay at the 
camp.  Berg attempts to neutralize 
that testimony by arguing that he was "effectively" required to stay at the camp 
because there were no viable, alternative housing facilities within a reasonable 
distance of the drill site.  Berg 
cites the testimony of Garton, declaring that motel accommodations in the 
nearest town, Big Piney, were minimal at best and always booked.  Nevertheless, the fact is that the 
employees were not required to stay at the camp.  While the camp may have been the most 
practical and convenient option, that did not mean that Berg could not have 
stayed elsewhere.  There is no 
evidence in the record that other lodging options were not available.  Practicality and convenience do not 
create an employer mandate.  Our 
holding in Chapman applies equally to the situation before us in this 
case.  We are not persuaded that 
Berg was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his 
injury.

 
 
CONCLUSION

[¶15]   The hearing examiner's decision 
finding that Berg had sustained a compensable injury was not supported by 
substantial evidence.  The District 
Court's order reversing the hearing examiner is affirmed.