Case Title: WILSON v. WEBB

Citation: 

Docket Number: 105874

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILSON v. WEBB  WILSON v. WEBB 2009 OK 56 212 P.3d 731 Case Number: 105874 Decided: 07/07/2009 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA BRIAN LEE WILSON, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CARL DANIEL WEBB and BRENT STAPP, Defendants/Appellees. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I Honorable G. Brent Russell, Trial Judge ¶0 On April 17, 2003, Brian Wilson brought an action against Carl Webb and Brent Stapp, alleging the conversion of Wilson's race car parts and accessories. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on February 4, 2008. Wilson dismissed his counsel and moved pro se for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion and also awarded attorney fees and costs to Webb. Wilson appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part and dismissed in part, finding that there was nothing in the record to document that the appellant had taken any action to discharge his counsel, and thus, his motion for new trial was void for the lack of his counsel's signature. Wilson petitioned for certiorari. On certiorari, we hold that Wilson's motion for new trial was effective because he filed a document of record establishing that he had dismissed his counsel before filing the motion. We remand to the Court of Civil Appeals for consideration of the issues raised in the appeal. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; CAUSE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Brian Lee Wilson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Pro se. Jeffrey K. Archer, Duncan, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee Webb, Charles L. Barnes, Duncan, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee Stapp. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 The issue presented is whether the appellant's motion for new trial was ineffective because it was filed without the signature of his counsel. We hold that because he filed a document of record establishing that he had dismissed his counsel before filing the motion, the motion for new trial was not ineffective. We remand the cause to the Court of Civil Appeals for consideration of the issues raised on appeal. ¶2 On April 17, 2003, Brian Wilson (appellant), a prisoner acting pro se, brought a conversion action against his father-in-law, Carl Webb (Webb), and Brent Stapp (Stapp) (collectively, defendants). The appellant was incarcerated at all times pertinent to this cause. The appellant alleged that Webb sold the appellant's race car parts and accessories to Stapp without authorization. It is unclear from the record exactly when the sale occurred, but in his petition, the appellant stated that he learned of the sale on November 21, 2001. On May 21, 2003, also acting pro se, Webb filed an answer stating that the disputed property was the marital property of the appellant and Carla Wilson, Webb's daughter and the appellant's wife. Webb claimed that he facilitated the sale at Carla Wilson's request, in order to satisfy a portion of the Wilsons' marital debt. ¶3 On April 20, 2004, the appellant moved for summary judgment against Webb and Stapp. The trial court granted the motion on May 26, 2004, and awarded the appellant $19,345.98. Webb then retained counsel and moved to vacate the summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion to vacate on September 9, 2004. The appellant and Webb each moved for summary judgment, and the appellant again moved for default judgment against Stapp. The trial court denied the motion for default judgment on September 16, 2005, and denied both motions for summary judgment on September 30, 2005. On October 6, 2005, Stapp retained counsel and filed an answer. On September 18, 2006, the appellant hired Clinton Russell (Russell/counsel) as his attorney. ¶4 The trial court issued its pretrial order on March 27, 2007, and the matter was continued several times. On November 9, 2007, Webb filed his Application for Leave to File Dispositive Motion Out of Time, and the trial court granted the motion. On November 15, 2007, Webb filed a motion for summary judgment, to which he attached a letter sent by the appellant, addressed to Stapp, and dated September 8, 2000. In the letter, the appellant referenced the sale of the race car parts and accessories and demanded $22,750. ¶5 After requesting additional time, the appellant, through his counsel, filed a response to the motion on January 7, 2008. In it, he argued that no statute of limitations defense was listed in the defendants' pleadings, the limitations period should be tolled, the limitations defense was barred by the doctrine of laches, and his action was not frivolous and malicious. On February 4, 2008, the trial court granted Webb's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the cause with prejudice, holding that: 1) the defendants' pleadings did not raise a limitations defense; 2) the defense of limitations was set out in the Pretrial Order; 3) the Pretrial Order superseded the pleadings and governed the trial of the case; ¶6 On February 5, 2008, the appellant discharged Russell and filed a notice of change of address which provided: I, Brian Lee Wilson, the plaintiff herein do hereby advise the Clerk of the District Court of Stephens County, of the change in my mailing address. ALL future notices, rulings or pleadings shall be mailed to me at the below address. Brian Lee Wilson Federal Transfer Center 7-F P.O. Box 898801 Oklahoma City, OK 73189 Russell did not draft or sign any pleadings filed in this matter after that date. On February 11, 2008, the appellant, acting without any association with his counsel, filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the grant of summary judgment. On February 13, 2008, Webb filed a motion to assess attorney fees and costs. The trial court granted Webb's motion for attorney fees and costs on April 22, 2008. The trial court construed the appellant's motion to reconsider as a motion for new trial, ¶7 The appellant filed his petition in error on May 20, 2008, and we assigned the cause to the Court of Civil Appeals on August 21, 2008. The Court of Civil Appeals issued its opinion affirming the trial court on October 16, 2008. Its sole finding was that "(t)here is nothing in the record to document Wilson had taken any action to discharge Russell," and as such, the appellant's motion for new trial, filed without Russell's signature, was "utterly ineffective" according to the teaching of Watson v. Gibson Capital, L.L.C., ¶8 On November 18, 2008, the appellant petitioned the Court of Civil Appeals for rehearing and attached to his petition an affidavit signed by Russell averring that he was dismissed by the appellant on February 4, 2008. The appellant also attached to his petition: 1) A February 5, 2008, letter from Russell acknowledging his termination. 2) The docket sheet that denotes the change of address notice filed on February 5, 2008. 3) A notarized affidavit from the appellant's mother averring that she hand delivered the letter of dismissal to Russell on January 31, 2008, and hand delivered the notice of change of address to the Stephens County Clerk and all counsel of record on February 1. 4) A January 29, 2008, letter of termination from the appellant to Russell, effective February 1, 2008. 5) A January 29, 2008, letter notifying opposing counsel of the appellant's termination of his counsel, effective February 1, 2008. The Court of Civil Appeals denied rehearing on December 5, 2008. The appellant then filed his petition for certiorari on December 18, 2008. We granted certiorari on February 24, 2009. ¶9 Watson v. Gibson Capital, L.L.C., provides at ¶8: The client who wants to take over a lawsuit from the lawyer must first (a) discharge the counsel of record by a document on file in court and then (b) proceed independently (pro se) as an unrepresented party. But while the lawyer continues to hold the status as counsel of record, it is the lawyer alone who holds the position of magister litis - the master of the client's litigation. The Oklahoma Pleading Code, ¶10 There is no question that the appellant discharged Russell before filing his motion for new trial, and neither defendant argued that he lacked notice of the appellant's dismissal of Russell. Watson requires that a litigant file a document evidencing the discharge of counsel. Because it found that there was "nothing in the record" to evince the dismissal when it raised the dual representation issue sua sponte, the Court of Civil Appeals apparently did not consider whether the appellant's notice of change of address met this requirement. We hold that, in this cause, the notice of change of address met the Watson requirement of a document of record evidencing the discharge of counsel. As such, we hold that the appellant's motion for new trial and other post-judgment pleadings are not rendered "utterly ineffective" because they were filed without Russell's signature. ¶11 Because it dismissed the matter on the dual representation issue, the Court of Civil Appeals declined to review the issues presented to it in this appeal. We have not reviewed the issues raised in the appellant's appeal, and so we remand to the Court of Civil Appeals with instructions to review those issues. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; CAUSE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS WITH INSTRUCTIONS. EDMONDSON, C.J., TAYLOR, V.C.J., OPALA, KAUGER, WINCHESTER, COLBERT, and REIF, J.J., concur. HARGRAVE, and WATT, J.J., dissent. FOOT