Case Title: HANSULD v. LARIAT DIESEL CORPORATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-258

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
HANSULD v. LARIAT DIESEL CORPORATION2003 WY 16581 P.3d 215Case Number: 02-258Decided: 12/23/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

WILLIAM 
S. HANSULD and

TIA 
J. HANSULD, husband and wife,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

LARIAT 
DIESEL CORPORATION,

a 
Wyoming corporation,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

William 
W. Harden and Larry W. Harrington, Casper, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Thomas 
M. Hogan and Donald L. Painter, Casper, Wyoming

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
Appellants 
William S. Hansuld and Tia J. Hansuld own property adjoining that of Appellant 
Lariat Diesel Corporation.  Shortly 
after Hansulds purchased their property, they denied access to Lariat and 
erected a fence to prevent use.  
Hansulds filed a quiet title and declaratory judgment suit, and Lariat 
counterclaimed to establish its rights.  
Following a bench trial, the district court ruled that Lariat had an 
implied easement for access.  
Hansulds appeal that ruling.

 

[¶2]           
We 
affirm.

 

 

 

[¶3]           
Hansulds 
provide this statement of the issues:

 

1. Did 
the LLC have an interest in the Stateright-of-way that would create a "unity of 
ownership" with the 3100 property when Lariat purchased the 3100 
property?

 

2.  Whether 
or not the trial court erred in ordering an implied easement over the abandoned 
State right-of-way, when unity of ownership was missing between the 3100 
property and the abandoned State right-of-way?

 

3.  
Did 
the court err in granting an implied easement for ingress and egress across the 
3110 property when that property is not contiguous to the East Yellowstone 
Highway?

 

Lariat 
rephrases the issue to state:

 

1.  Did 
the trial court err in granting Lariat an implied access easement across the 
Appellants' 3110 East Yellowstone property?

 

2.  Did 
the trial court err in granting Lariat an implied access easement across the 
Appellants' abandoned State right-of-way contiguous to their 3110 East 
Yellowstone property?

 

3.  Did 
the trial court err in determining the extent and permitted uses of the easement 
across the Appellants' property?

 

FACTS

 

 

[¶5]           
The 
parties agreed that if Lariat would purchase 3100 East Yellowstone, Lariat would 
be allowed access over the 3110 East Yellowstone lot for its truck access.  Access across 3110 East Yellowstone was 
key to Lariat's business located at 3100 East Yellowstone.  Without it, Lariat could not get heavy 
trucks in and out of its shop without great difficulty.  On July 2, 1995, the LLC sold 3100 East 
Yellowstone to Lariat.

 

[¶6]           
A 
little over a year later, on August 5, 1996, the LLC and Gary L. Petley (Petley) 
entered into a Purchase Agreement concerning the property adjoining Lariat, 3110 
East Yellowstone.  American Title 
Company issued a title commitment for the property on August 19, 
1996.

 

[¶7]           
Some 
days before the closing date of the sale of 3110 East Yellowstone to Petley, the 
LLC proposed at a meeting with Lariat that it would give Lariat a formal written 
ingress and egress easement for customers crossing 3110 East Yellowstone in 
exchange for Lariat's giving the LLC a sewer "easement" across the Lariat 
property for the sewer line servicing the adjoining property at 3110 East 
Yellowstone.  Mr. Petley was invited 
to this meeting because this "reciprocal easement" arrangement would both burden 
and benefit 3110 East Yellowstone and his proposed purchase.  No other consideration was 
exchanged.  Petley understood the 
arrangement and had no problems with it.

 

[¶8]           
After 
the meeting and before the closing on 3110 East Yellowstone, the LLC executed 
and filed an "Access Agreement" that contained a legal description granting 
egress and ingress over the southerly 100 feet of 3110 East Yellowstone. The 
Natrona County Clerk filed the "Sewer Easement" at 4:00 p.m. and the "Access 
Agreement" at 4:02 p.m. on August 30, 1996.  Also on that same day, the Petley 
purchase of 3110 East Yellowstone closed, and the warranty deed was filed with 
the Natrona County Clerk at 10:41 a.m.  
The title policy that issued a few days after the closing included the 
recorded access agreement in the policy for informational 
purposes.

 

[¶9]           
Petley 
sold 3110 Yellowstone to Wildcat Whackers on June 25, 1999.  Later, Wildcat Whackers listed it for 
sale with a realtor who noticed the access agreement and consulted an 
attorney.  In the course of 
soliciting Lariat to buy the property, the realtor indicated to it that the 
realtor believed the easement was void because it was outside of the chain of 
title.  Lariat summarily rejected 
the offer to purchase and told the realtor that it believed the easement was 
valid and enforceable.  That same 
realtor advised Hansulds of the easement, and Hansulds purchased the property on 
October 31, 2001.

 

[¶10]      
Immediately 
after purchasing the property at 3110 East Yellowstone, Hansulds notified Lariat 
that any future access across 3110 East Yellowstone would be denied.  Hansulds then constructed a chain link 
fence along the property line between 3110 and 3100 East Yellowstone and along 
the East Yellowstone frontage to insure that Lariat had no access across 3110 
East Yellowstone.  Hansulds filed 
suit to quiet title and sought a declaratory judgment on the validity of the 
access agreement.  Summary judgment 
motions were denied, and the case proceeded to a bench 
trial.

 

[¶11]      
After 
suit was filed, East Yellowstone Highway, the access road to both parties' 
property, was straightened, resulting in the abandonment of a portion of the 
right-of-way by the State of Wyoming.  
The "Resolution for Abandonment" was filed with the county clerk on 
September 20, 2001.  Wildcat 
Whackers conveyed the abandoned property to Hansulds by quitclaim deed.  The land acquired by Hansulds is 
approximately forty feet wide and lies between Hansulds' southern boundary and 
Yellowstone Highway.  

 

[¶12]      
The 
district court found that the abandonment added property to the southerly parts 
of both Hansulds' and Lariat's properties.  
The district court determined that the LLC intended to convey an easement 
for access to the 3100 property and held that an implied easement existed.  Hansulds appeal.

            

 

 

[¶13]      
When 
a trial court in a bench trial makes express findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, we review the factual determinations under a clearly erroneous standard and 
the legal conclusions de novo.  
Rennard v. Vollmar, 977 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Wyo. 1999).  The parties do not dispute the findings 
of fact, and we review de novo the district court's resolution of this 
dispute.  

[¶14]      The 
district court made no findings as to whether an express easement had been 
created by virtue of the access agreement filed a few hours after the warranty 
deed, and the parties speculate whether the district court's silence indicates 
that the access agreement is void.  
The district court also made no findings as to whether the LLC could 
grant an express easement across property that was owned by the State and later 
abandoned and deeded to the parties.  
The Handsulds do not dispute any factual findings by the district court; 
however, they do contend that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-1261 prevented the parties from agreeing 
to an easement at inception and the district court cannot now imply an 
easement.  The district court 
limited its ruling to deciding that at severance, the common owner and Lariat 
intended to provide for access and created an implied easement.  Although we consider the effect of both 
the express access agreement and the state's role in this matter, that 
consideration is limited to whether either are of any consequence in determining 
that an implied easement was created.

 

 

 

[¶15]      Under 
certain circumstances, Wyoming will recognize an implied easement across another 
person's property.  In re Estate 
of Shirran, 987 P.2d 140, 142 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Beaudoin v. Kibbie, 
905 P.2d 939, 941-42 (Wyo. 1995); Corbett v. Whitney, 603 P.2d 1291, 1293 
(Wyo. 1979)).  The elements which 
must be satisfied in order to establish an implied easement are:  (1) common ownership followed by a 
conveyance separating the unified ownership;  (2) before severance, the common owner 
used part of the property for the benefit of the other part, a use that was 
apparent, obvious, and continuous; and (3) the claimed easement is necessary and 
beneficial to the enjoyment of the parcel previously benefitted.  Id. (quoting Beaudoin, 905 
P.2d at 941-42).  

 

[¶16]      
The 
creation of easements by implication is an attempt to infer the intention of the 
parties to a conveyance of land.  
Gray v. Norwest Bank Wyoming, N.A., 984 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Wyo. 
1999).  "This inference drawn from 
the circumstances surrounding the conveyance alone represents an attempt to 
determine the intention of parties who had not thought or had not bothered to 
put the intention into words, or perhaps more often, to parties who actually had 
formed no intention conscious to themselves." Id. (citing Corbett, 
603 P.2d at 1293).  "The doctrine of 
implied easements was created for courts to examine the particular facts 
suggesting the intent of the parties to a conveyance and determine if the 
parties omitted granting an easement reasonably necessary for the use and 
enjoyment of the property."  
Id. The implied easement does not arise where the parties to the 
conveyance expressly agree otherwise or where proof of its elements is not 
established.  
Id.

 

[¶17]      In 
applying the doctrine of implied easements, we must determine the parties' 
intent at the time that the unified property was severed from a single 
possessory interest by conveyance from the common owner to a grantee.  In this particular case, LLC, the common 
owner, severed the property by conveying part of it to Lariat.  That conveyance included an express 
agreement between the parties to permit access.  The express intent of these parties 
controls and, if all elements are satisfied, requires the creation of an implied 
easement based upon previous use.  

 

[¶18]      Hansulds 
contend that this element is not met for two reasons: first, a statute prevented 
the LLC from legally granting an easement across property owned by the State 
and, secondly, they further claim that the State's abandonment of the property 
vacated any rights that Lariat may have had.  The first reason need not be considered 
because we are not addressing whether the LLC legally granted an express 
easement for property not its own.  
The district court did not decide whether the access agreement was valid 
or void; instead, it resolved the issue by deciding that an implied easement was 
created.  In other words, the 
express agreement is of no consequence.  

 

[¶19]      What 
is of consequence is that at the time that the parties expressed their intent in 
the access agreement, both agreed that the access would involve the property 
owned by each.  The later changes in 
the condition of the properties are irrelevant because our general rule is that 
we presume that the parties contracted for the transfer of the property with a 
view to the condition of the property as it actually was at the time of the 
transaction. Shirran, 987 P.2d  at 143.  There was no error by the district court 
on this issue.  

 

[¶20]      Hansulds 
base their second contention on our resolution of a similarly posed question in 
Schott v. Miller, 943 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1997).  In that case, Schott entered into an 
agreement with the county that allowed her to place a water well and pipelines 
on a county road.  Id. at 
1175.  Later, the county vacated 
that part of the county road and quitclaimed its interest in that land to the 
adjacent property owner and did not reserve Schott's interest.  The adjacent property owner revoked 
Schott's right-of-way.  Id. 
at 1175-76.  We held that exclusive 
title passed, and Schott's right-of-way interest had been extinguished.  Id. at 1177.  Hansulds acknowledge the obvious 
distinction between the two cases, that Lariat, unlike Schott, had no agreement 
with a governmental entity.  
Nonetheless, Hansulds assert that Schott's holding, that a 
government abandonment results in extinguishing all rights that are not 
reserved, must apply in this case. 

 

[¶21]      
Schott's 
holding 
was based upon resolution of an express easement that included a procedure to 
permit revocation of the right-of-way.  
The new owners followed that revocation procedure and extinguished 
Schott's right-of-way.  No issue of 
implied easement was presented or discussed.  Hansulds present no argument that 
Schott intended to hold that an implied easement cannot be applied under 
these different facts and we do not further consider it.

 

[¶22]      Whether 
the effect of the state's abandonment has destroyed the unity of ownership that 
is a necessary element to establishing an implied easement must be 
answered.  As provided for by the 
statute, abandoned state highway property reverted to the present owners 
resulting in added property to both parcels that had not been owned by the LLC 
at the time of severance.  Hansulds 
were not aware of the abandonment, and the property was not added until Hansulds 
had denied access and begun litigation.  
Under these rare circumstances, we believe that the district court 
properly concluded that the state property had not altered any of the facts 
establishing an implied easement.  
At the time of the severance, the LLC intended to benefit Lariat's 
property with an access agreement, Lariat properly used the property for access, 
and today, the property would benefit from the continued access granted to it by 
the common owner.  In other words, 
the state's role was of no consequence.  
The record supports this conclusion, and we find no error in the district 
court's ruling.  

 

[¶23]      
The 
district court's order granting judgment to Lariat is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1The 
statute provides in pertinent part:

(a) 
The transportation commission may abandon or relinquish any portion of state 
highways upon the reconstruction or relocation of any portion of an existing 
state highway.

            
* * * *

            
(i) Upon the entry of the resolution of abandonment in the minute record 
of the commission, all title and interest, except as herein provided, to the 
highway right-of-way shall pass to and vest in the present adjacent landowner 
according to the portion contributed by adjacent landowner or his predecessor in 
interest[.]