Case Title: Olpinski v. Clement

Citation: 442 P.2d 260, 73 Wash. 2d 944

Docket Number: 39055

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1968-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
73 Wn.2d 944 (1968) 442 P.2d 260 TADEK W. OLPINSKI, Respondent, v. JOSEPH R. CLEMENT, Appellant.[*] No. 39055. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. June 6, 1968. Horswill, Keller, Rohrback, Waldo & Moren and Dwayne A. Richards, for appellant. Bogle, Gates, Dobrin, Wakefield & Long and Robert V. Holland, for respondent. BRADFORD, J.[] What began as an ordinary, run-of-the-mill *945 intersection automobile accident has now become deeply involved in the nebulous and highly sensitive area surrounding the interpretation of Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 59.04W, RCW vol. 0. The accident occurred about 3:30 p.m. on November 23, 1962, at the uncontrolled intersection of 26th Avenue West and West Armour Street in Seattle. Olpinski, the plaintiff, was the favored driver, and was proceeding south on 26th Avenue West, and Clement, the defendant, was driving west on West Armour Street. Defendant's vehicle struck plaintiff's vehicle in the left door and rear-quarter panel. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defendant was negligent in failing to yield the right of way to plaintiff's vehicle. The answer alleged that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, which was a proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff replied, denying any contributory negligence. The defendant confessed his negligence in his opening statement to the jury and, therefore, the case was tried and submitted to the jury on the issues of contributory negligence and damages only. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. After hearing argument, the court entered an order denying plaintiff's motion for judgment n.o.v., but granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The pertinent portion of the order reads as follows: It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed: .... Defendant commenced a timely appeal and assigns error to the grant of the new trial for the following reasons: (a) The case did present a jury question as to the contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. (b) Plaintiff took no exceptions to the court's instructions, which included several (including some requested by plaintiff), on the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence. (c) Plaintiff made no motion for a directed verdict. (d) The jury verdict for the defendant constituted substantial justice. (e) No prejudicial error was committed in the course of trial. We have searched the record, and we are unable to find sufficient evidence to justify submission of the issue of contributory negligence to the jury. The complete testimony of the plaintiff concerning the accident consists of a portion of the cross-examination: The passenger in plaintiff's vehicle merely corroborated the speed testified to by the plaintiff of not more than 10 miles per hour and that the plaintiff was in low gear. There was no cross-examination of this witness. The defendant testified on direct examination that the plaintiff was on his right and southbound on 26th Avenue West as the defendant was proceeding west on West Armour Street. The following is that portion of the record which could possibly be interpreted as showing contributory negligence. Clement, the defendant, testified: *948 Defendant's passenger testified: On cross-examination, the same witness testified: [1] The evidence is uncontradicted that, as the plaintiff was entering the intersection, he glanced to his left, which was a down grade at that point, he then glanced to his right, and was proceeding through the intersection looking ahead, when his vehicle was struck by the defendant's vehicle in the left rear door and quarter-panel. The plaintiff was entitled to rely on the defendant's yielding the right of way. Even after it becomes apparent to the favored driver that the right of way will not be yielded, a reasonable reaction time must be allotted the favored driver to permit him to act in the exercise of due care. Golub v. Mantopoli, 65 Wn.2d 361, 397 P.2d 433 (1964); Tobias v. Rainwater, 71 Wn.2d 845, 431 P.2d 156 (1967); Petersavage v. Bock, 72 Wn.2d 1, 431 P.2d 603 (1967). [2] If the jury chose to disbelieve plaintiff's testimony entirely, there was no basis upon which they could find him guilty of contributory negligence, because the defendant's testimony failed to establish plaintiff's contributory negligence. The defendant saw the plaintiff looking to the right as he entered the intersection. The accident occurred not more than two or three seconds later. Defendant's passenger, Mr. Russell, gave testimony more favorable than this *950 to establish that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. Defendant has the burden of proof on the issues of his affirmative defense and he failed to present more than a scintilla of evidence. He did not sustain his burden. We hold, as a matter of law, that there is neither evidence nor reasonable inference from the evidence to justify submitting the issue of contributory negligence to the jury. Pritchett v. Seattle, 53 Wn.2d 521, 335 P.2d 31 (1959); Cooper v. Gallaher, 50 Wn.2d 588, 313 P.2d 702 (1957). After both parties had rested, plaintiff failed to move for a directed verdict on liability, nor did he take any exceptions to the court's instructions. The defendant relies very heavily upon Agranoff v. Morton, 54 Wn.2d 341, 340 P.2d 811 (1959), which we find is not applicable to the instant case. The cases are very similar from a procedural standpoint, but in the Agranoff case, the reasons given by the court in granting a new trial were not borne out by the record. [3] The failure of the plaintiff to challenge in any way the sufficiency of defendant's evidence on contributory negligence or to take exceptions to the court's instructions was precariously close to invited error. We have carefully scrutinized the record and conclude that the record reflects the trial court was correct in the reasons given for granting a new trial, there was no evidence of contributory negligence, and the jury misinterpreted the facts and did not follow the instructions given. This is apparent, since the jury found that plaintiff was contributorily negligent, although there was no evidence to sustain the finding. By so doing, the jury arrived at an erroneous verdict. Cyrus v. Martin, 64 Wn.2d 810, 394 P.2d 369 (1964). [4] An order granting or denying a new trial is not to be reversed, except for an abuse of discretion. A much stronger showing is required to reverse an order granting a new trial than is required to reverse an order denying a new trial. State v. Taylor, 60 Wn.2d 32, 371 P.2d 617 (1962), and cases cited therein; Johnson v. Howard, 45 Wn.2d 433, 275 P.2d 736 (1954); Nelson v. Martinson, 52 *951 Wn.2d 684, 328 P.2d 703 (1958); Baxter v. Greyhound Corp., 65 Wn.2d 421, 397 P.2d 857 (1964). There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff's counsel was speculating upon a favorable verdict or was secretly nurturing an error which might be asserted for the first time on a motion for a new trial. [5] The trial court has the duty to see that justice prevails. He has the power in the exercise of his discretion to grant a new trial where substantial justice has not been done, but, to facilitate appellate review, he must state his reasons. We stated, in Baxter v. Greyhound Corp., supra at 440: The trial court concluded that substantial justice had not been done and stated his reasons. Upon the basis of the record, we agree. The order granting a new trial is affirmed. Defendant's negligence having been admitted, and there being no evidence of contributory negligence, the order of the trial court is affirmed, and, on retrial, the jury *952 will be limited to the issue of damages only. Costs will abide the results of the retrial. FINLEY, C.J., HILL, HUNTER, and NEILL, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 442 P.2d 260. [] Judge Bradford is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.