Case Title: Buckley v. S.D. Warren Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2012-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 104 
Docket: 
WCB-11-297 
Argued: 
April 13, 2012 
 
Decided: 
August 7, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and 
JABAR, JJ. 
Majority: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, MEAD, AND GORMAN, JJ. 
Dissent: 
SILVER and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
WILLIAM BUCKLEY 
 
v. 
 
S.D. WARREN CO. et al. 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
 [¶1]  William Buckley appeals from a decision of a Workers’ Compensation 
Board hearing officer on remand after our decision in Buckley v. S.D. Warren Co., 
2010 ME 53, 997 A.2d 747 (“Buckley I”).  Buckley contends that, when 
determining whether his permanent impairment level is above the threshold for 
receiving partial incapacity benefits for the duration of his incapacity, the hearing 
officer (Collier, HO) misinterpreted our mandate by failing to combine or “stack” 
the percentages of permanent impairment attributable to all of his work injuries.  
See 39-A M.R.S. § 213(1-A)(A) (2011).1  Buckley also asserts that the hearing 
officer’s finding that he suffered 0% permanent impairment from a 2001 injury is 
                                         
1  The Workers’ Compensation Act, 39-A M.R.S. §§ 101-909 (2011), including 39-A M.R.S. § 213 
(2011), has been substantially amended since the hearing officer issued the decree in this case.  P.L. 2011, 
ch. 647 (effective in part Aug. 30, 2012, and in part Jan. 1, 2013). 
   
 
2 
inconsistent with a finding in the prior decree that he suffered 7% permanent 
impairment for that injury.  We affirm the hearing officer’s decision. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Because we set forth the facts and procedural background of this case 
in Buckley I, we restate them here only briefly.  William Buckley worked for 
S.D. Warren from 1981 until 2002, and suffered four work-related injuries that are 
relevant here: (1) an injury in October 1996 to his left shoulder, (2) an injury in 
November 1996 to his left shoulder, (3) an injury in March 2000 to his right 
shoulder, and (4) an injury in October 2001 to both shoulders. 
[¶3]  In a 2005 decree addressing all but the 2000 injury, the hearing officer 
(Sprague, HO) awarded Buckley 100% partial incapacity benefits for the October 
1996, November 1996, and October 2001 injuries.  Subsequently, S.D. Warren 
filed petitions (1) to establish the March 2000 right shoulder injury as compensable 
under the Act, (2) for apportionment, and (3) to determine the extent of permanent 
impairment.  S.D. Warren contended that for each injury, Buckley’s permanent 
impairment level did not exceed the applicable threshold for duration-of-disability 
benefits and therefore the partial benefits awarded for each injury are subject to the 
time limit set forth in 39-A M.R.S. § 213(1) (2011). 
[¶4]  In a 2008 decree, the hearing officer (Collier, HO) granted the petition 
to establish the 2000 injury, finding that Buckley’s right shoulder problems 
 
3 
resulted from his favoring the left arm due to the prior left shoulder injuries.  The 
hearing officer also apportioned responsibility for Buckley’s ongoing incapacity 
equally among the four shoulder injuries. 
[¶5]  The hearing officer further determined in 2008 that Buckley suffers 7% 
permanent impairment in total to the left shoulder resulting from the two 1996 
injuries, and 7% permanent impairment to the right shoulder resulting from the 
2000 and 2001 injuries, with no additional impairment to the left shoulder from the 
2001 injury.  The hearing officer did not “stack” the impairment percentages 
pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 213(1-A)(A) because he found that (1) the 2000 right 
shoulder injury did not cause any additional permanent impairment to the left 
shoulder, and (2) “there is no evidence that the subsequent bilateral shoulder injury 
in 2001 caused any additional permanent impairment or in any other way 
aggravated or accelerated the prior injuries to either shoulder.”  Thus, the hearing 
officer concluded that Buckley’s permanent impairment level fell below the 
threshold for duration-of-disability benefits, and his partial benefit payments for all 
four injuries would be subject to the cap.  See 39-A M.R.S. § 213(1). 
[¶6]  We granted Buckley’s petition for appellate review from the 2008 
decree and issued a decision on June 24, 2010.  We vacated the hearing officer’s 
decision in part, holding that the permanent impairment from the various work 
injuries could potentially be stacked because, pursuant to section 213(1) and (1-A), 
 
4 
Buckley’s permanent impairment to the left and right shoulders was “not 
unrelated,” and all of the permanent impairment resulted from injuries “at issue in 
the determination.”  Buckley I, 2010 ME 53, ¶¶ 14-16, 997 A.2d 747 (quotation 
marks omitted).  We remanded the case for proceedings consistent with our 
opinion. 
[¶7]  On remand, the hearing officer assigned percentages of permanent 
impairment attributable to each injury as follows: 14% to each of the 1996 
shoulder injuries, 7% to the 2000 right shoulder injury, and 0% to the 2001 
bilateral shoulder injury.  Pursuant to this decision, the employer will be relieved 
from paying benefits for the 2000 right shoulder and 2001 bilateral shoulder 
injuries, apportioned at 25% of the benefit each, after it has paid the statutory 
maximum number of partial benefit payments for each of those injuries, but must 
continue to pay benefits for both 1996 left shoulder injuries for the duration of the 
disability.  See Miller v. Spinnaker Coating, 2011 ME 79, ¶ 11, 25 A.3d 954 
(holding that the most recent insurer in a multiple injury case may reduce benefit 
payment by amount attributable to the injury for which the durational limit has 
been reached). 
[¶8]  The hearing officer denied Buckley’s motion for additional findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.  Buckley filed a petition for appellate review, which 
we granted pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 322(3) (2011) and M.R. App. P. 23(c). 
 
5 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶9]  Buckley agrees that the hearing officer correctly stacked the permanent 
impairment from the 2000 right shoulder injury onto the two 1996 left shoulder 
injuries to assign a 14% permanent impairment rating to each of the left shoulder 
injuries.  However, he contends, pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 213(1-A)(A) and our 
mandate in Buckley I, that the 7% permanent impairment rating from the two 1996 
left shoulder injuries should be stacked onto the 7% rating assigned to the 2000 
right shoulder injury and a 7% permanent impairment rating for the 2001 bilateral 
shoulder injuries,2 so that the permanent impairment level for each of the four 
injuries would be 14%.  Pursuant to this scenario, Buckley would receive partial 
benefits for all four of his injuries for the duration of his work-related partial 
disability. 
A. 
Title 39-A M.R.S. § 213(1-A) 
[¶10]  Our inquiry once again involves construction of 39-A M.R.S. § 213,  
which provides in relevant part:  
1.  Benefit and duration.  While the incapacity for work is 
partial, the employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly 
compensation equal to 80% of the difference between the injured 
employee’s after-tax average weekly wage before the personal injury 
and the after-tax average weekly wage that the injured employee is 
able to earn after the injury, but not more than the maximum benefit 
                                         
2  The hearing officer assigned 0% permanent impairment to the 2001 injury.  Buckley is arguing that 
this is an erroneous reading of the 2008 decree.  He contends that in the 2008 decree, the hearing officer 
assigned 7% permanent impairment to the 2001 injury.   
 
6 
under section 211.  Compensation must be paid for the duration of the 
disability if the employee’s permanent impairment, determined 
according to subsection 1-A and the impairment guidelines adopted 
by the board pursuant to section 153, subsection 8 resulting from the 
personal injury is in excess of 15% to the body.  In all other cases an 
employee is not eligible to receive compensation under this section 
after the employee has received 260 weeks of compensation under 
section 212, subsection 1, this section or both. . . .  
 
 1-A. Determination of permanent impairment.  For 
purposes of this section, “permanent impairment” includes only 
permanent impairment resulting from: 
  
A. 
The work injury at issue in the determination and any 
preexisting physical condition or injury that is aggravated or 
accelerated by the work injury at issue in the determination; or 
  
B. 
For dates of injury on or after January 1, 2002, the work 
injury at issue in the determination and: 
  
(1) Any prior injury that arose out of and in the course of 
employment for which a report of injury was completed 
pursuant to section 303 and the employee received a 
benefit or compensation under this Title, which has not 
been denied by the board, and that combines with the 
work injury at issue in the determination to contribute to 
the employee’s incapacity, except that a prior injury that 
was the subject of a lump-sum settlement approved 
pursuant to section 352 that had a finding of permanent 
impairment equal to or in excess of the then applicable 
permanent impairment threshold may not be included; or 
  
(2) Any preexisting physical condition or injury that is 
aggravated or accelerated by the work injury at issue in 
the determination.  
  
Except as set forth in this subsection, “permanent impairment” does 
not include a condition that is not caused, aggravated or accelerated 
by the work injury. 
 
7 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
[¶11]  Section 213 governs partial incapacity benefits and the length of time 
an injured employee may receive those benefits, depending on the extent to which 
the employee has been permanently impaired by his injuries.  Pursuant to 
section 213, if the permanent impairment attributable to the work injuries exceeds 
the threshold percentage established by Workers’ Compensation Board Rules, the 
employee may receive partial benefits for the duration of his disability.  
39-A M.R.S. § 213(1); Me. W.C.B. Rule, ch. 2, § 1.  If it is lower than the 
threshold percentage, the employee may receive benefits for the statutory 
maximum number of weeks.  39-A M.R.S. § M.R.S § 213(1). 
  
[¶12]  If an employee suffers a single, partially-incapacitating injury, the 
inquiry is simple; it involves merely assessing whether the percentage assigned to 
that injury is above or below the current threshold.  The inquiry becomes more 
complicated when the employee has suffered multiple work injuries. 
  
[¶13]  In the case of multiple injuries, the hearing officer assigns a separate 
date of injury to each injury, and payments attributable to different injuries may 
begin at different times.  See, e.g. Jensen v. S.D. Warren Co., 2009 ME 35, ¶ 13, 
968 A.2d 528.  Similarly, the hearing officer must assign a separate percentage of 
permanent impairment to each injury because, in multiple injury cases involving 
 
8 
partial incapacity, an employer may reduce the partial benefit payment by the 
amount attributable to each respective injury after the employer has paid the 
statutory 
maximum 
number 
of 
benefit 
payments 
for 
that 
injury.  
Miller, 2011 ME 79, ¶ 11, 25 A.3d 954; see also Cust v. Univ. of Me., 2001 ME 29, 
¶ 15, 766 A.2d 566.  Take, for example, the case of an employee who suffers a 
partially incapacitating injury to her right ankle in 1998, for which the employer 
begins making benefit payments right away.  If that same employee suffers a 
second, unrelated partially incapacitating injury to her left arm in 2000, and only 
10% permanent impairment is assigned to each injury, the portion of the benefit 
payment attributable to the 1998 injury would time out first. The employer would 
continue to pay the portion attributable to the second injury until that injury expires 
in turn. 
  
[¶14]  The inquiry becomes still more complicated when the employee 
suffers multiple partially incapacitating injuries and one injury aggravates or 
accelerates another, or, as in Buckley’s case, the injuries are related.  In those 
cases, permanent impairment levels for each injury may be stacked or combined as 
section 213(1-A) allows, for the purpose of determining whether the permanent 
impairment for each injury exceeds the threshold. 
  
[¶15]  Buckley, whose work injuries occurred in 1996, 2000, and 2001, is 
entitled to receive partial benefits for the duration of his disability for any injury 
 
9 
for which he suffers greater than the threshold level of 13.4% permanent 
impairment.  39-A M.R.S. § 213(1), (2); Me. W.C.B. Rule, ch. 2, § 1(3).3  If the 
permanent impairment level for any injury is below that threshold, he is limited to 
the maximum number of weekly benefit payments established by statute and rule, 
which at present is 520 weeks, for that injury.4  39-A M.R.S. § 213(1); Me. W.C.B. 
Rule, ch. 2, § 2(9).5 
                                         
3  Me. W.C.B. Rule, ch. 2, § 1(1) provides: “The permanent impairment threshold referenced in 
39-A M.R.S.A. §§ 213(1) and (2) shall be reduced from ‘in excess of 15%’ to 11.8% or greater effective 
January 1, 1998.  This adjustment is based on an independent actuarial review performed by Advanced 
Risk Management Techniques, Inc.” 
 
 
        The Board increased the permanent impairment threshold for cases with dates of injury between 
2002 and 2004 to 13.2%, and for cases with dates of injury after January 1, 2004, to 13.4%.  Me. W.C.B. 
Rule, ch. 2, § 1(2), (3) (effective March 11, 2006), then decreased the threshold to 11.8% for dates of 
injury after January 1, 2006.  Me. W.C.B. Rule, ch. 2, § 1(4) (amended June 17, 2008).  The 11.8% rating 
was invalidated in Maine State Chamber of Commerce v. Workers’ Compensation Board, 
Nos. CV-08-256 and CV-08-262 (Kennebec Cty. Sup. Ct. Aug. 31, 2009).  No rule has been promulgated 
to replace Rule, ch. 2, § 1(4), so the current threshold would appear to stand at 13.4%. 
 
4  The Board has exercised its authority five times pursuant to section 213(4) to extend the 260-week 
limit by fifty-two weeks, such that at present, the durational limit for partial incapacity benefits for 
injured workers with permanent impairment ratings of less than 13.4% is 520 weeks.  Me. W.C.B. Rule, 
ch. 2, § 2(2), (3), (7), (8), (9). 
 
5  These restrictions are intended to result in 25% of workers’ compensation cases involving 
permanent injury being eligible for duration-of-disability benefits, and 75% being subject to the 
durational cap.  39-A M.R.S. § 213(2).  The permanent impairment threshold in section 213 reflects a 
legislative intent to preserve longer-term benefits for those employees who, although only partially 
incapacitated, suffer the most serious injuries.  Harvey v. H.C. Price Co., 2008 ME 161, ¶ 11, 
957 A.2d 960. 
  
 
10 
B. 
 
Buckley I 
  
[¶16]  Because Buckley’s injuries occurred before January 1, 2002, 
subsection 213(1-A)(A) applies when determining whether the permanent 
impairment percentages from different work injuries may be combined.  Buckley I, 
2010 ME 53, ¶ 10, 997 A.2d 747.  In Buckley I, we extensively reviewed the 
legislative history of section 213(1-A), noting that it was added to the statute in 
2002 after our decision in Kotch v. American Protective Services, Inc., 
2002 ME 19, 788 A.2d 582.  2010 ME 53, ¶ 10, 997 A.2d 747; see also P.L. 2001, 
ch. 712, § 2 (effective July 25, 2002).6  In Kotch, we had held that it was 
permissible to include permanent impairment from preexisting, nonwork injuries 
that had merely combined with work-related permanent impairment for purposes 
of applying the durational limit in section 213.  2002 ME 19, ¶¶ 10, 14, 15, 
788 A.2d 582.  We observed in Buckley I that although the 2002 amendment was 
apparently intended to limit Kotch and thereby limit duration of disability 
payments for nonwork-related permanent impairment, its effect was broader; it 
also limited the combination of impairment from separate work-related injuries.  
2010 ME 53, ¶ 13, 997 A.2d 747.  “Section 213(1-A)(A) provides that impairment 
from multiple work injuries occurring before 2002 may be combined only if the 
                                         
6  The amendment was given retroactive application to pending cases and to injuries occurring on or 
after January 1, 1993.  P.L. 2001, ch. 712, § 6. 
 
 
11 
work injury at issue aggravates or accelerates the preexisting condition.”  Id.  As 
we indicated in Buckley I, however, section 213(1-A)(A) does not require that 
permanent impairment from multiple work injuries to different body parts always 
be assessed separately.  See 2010 ME 53, ¶¶ 14-16, 997 A.2d 747. 
  
[¶17]  The hearing officer in Buckley I construed the language in section 
213(1-A)(A) to authorize stacking of permanent impairment (1) only from later 
injuries onto earlier injuries, and (2) only when the later injuries aggravate or 
accelerate the earlier injuries.  See Buckley I, 2010 ME 53, ¶ 4, 997 A.2d 747.  We 
vacated that decision, reasoning that when the Legislature amended section 213, it 
did not intend to prohibit stacking of permanent impairment from related injuries 
that are “personal injuries” resulting from the injury and are therefore part of the 
“injury at issue in the determination.”  Id. ¶¶ 15-16.  Because the 2000 injury 
resulted from the 1996 injuries, the permanent impairment that resulted from the 
2000 injury also resulted from the 1996 injuries; thus, we reasoned, the impairment 
from those injuries should be combined when determining whether the threshold 
has been reached.  Id.  Specifically, we stated: 
The work injuries at issue in this case, although they occurred 
at different times, are not unrelated.  The pertinent language in 
paragraph 1 of section 213 is: “Compensation must be paid for the 
duration of the disability if the employee’s permanent impairment, 
determined according to subsection 1-A and the impairment 
guidelines adopted by the board . . . resulting from the personal injury 
is in excess of [13.4%] to the body.” (Emphasis added.)  Paragraph 
 
12 
(1-A)(A) provides that permanent impairment includes “permanent 
impairment resulting from . . . the work injury at issue in the 
determination.”  Although designated as a separate injury, the hearing 
officer found that the 2000 injury to the right shoulder, and thus the 
permanent impairment to the right shoulder, was due to Buckley’s 
attempts to favor the shoulder injured in 1996, and thus was caused by 
the 1996 injuries to the left shoulder.  Because the impairment from 
the 2000 right shoulder injury “result[ed] from” the 1996 left shoulder 
injuries, and the 1996 work injuries are “personal injur[ies]” referred 
to in subsection (1-A) and “work injur[ies] at issue in the 
determination” referred to in subsection (1-A)(A), it follows that 
permanent impairment to both shoulders should be combined when 
deciding whether the threshold has been reached.  See 39-A M.R.S. 
§§ 213(1), (1-A).  Both shoulder injuries are part of the “work injury 
at issue in the determination.”  See id. § 213(1-A)(A).  Thus, we are 
not addressing multiple unrelated work injuries. 
 
Id. ¶ 15. 
  
[¶18]  We concluded pursuant to sections 213(1) and 213(1-A)(A) that 
“aggravation or acceleration” are not, in every case, the touchstones for 
determining when permanent impairment can be combined, and we remanded for 
the hearing officer to apply this construction to the facts at hand.  See id. ¶ 16. 
[¶19]  On remand, although the hearing officer did stack the impairment 
from the 2000 right shoulder injury onto that from the 1996 left shoulder injuries, 
the hearing officer did not stack the impairment from the 1996 injuries forward 
onto the 2000 and 2001 injuries.  He explained the decision as follows: 
[B]y emphasizing the language of permanent impairment “resulting 
from” the personal injury, the Law Court seems to have relied upon 
the relationship of causation.  Causation flows in only one direction: 
forward rather than backward.  The 2000 injury is causally connected 
 
13 
to the 1996 injuries in that the 1996 injuries caused the 2000 injury, 
and not the other way around.  Therefore, I conclude that the 1996 
injury dates each resulted in 14% permanent impairment because they 
each caused the impairment to both shoulders, but the 2000 injury 
date resulted only in the 7% right shoulder impairment that it caused.  
I further conclude that the 2001 injury resulted in 0% permanent 
impairment because it did not cause any additional impairment to 
either shoulder, nor did it otherwise aggravate or accelerate the earlier 
injuries. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the hearing officer did not err. 
  
[¶20]  First, the hearing officer correctly assigned a percentage of permanent 
impairment to each injury separately.  The hearing officer then concluded that 
when we determined that permanent impairment from separate work injuries that 
“result[ed] from the personal injury” could be stacked, we meant, and the statutory 
language means, that permanent impairment from a subsequent injury that was 
caused by a prior injury could be stacked onto impairment from the prior injury.  
The hearing officer proceeded to establish the permanent impairment level for each 
specific injury.  He then combined impairment levels if he concluded that an injury 
resulted from, or was caused by, another injury. 
  
[¶21]  The hearing officer assigned 7% permanent impairment to each of the 
1996 left shoulder injuries, and to the 2000 right shoulder injury.  Concluding that 
the 2000 right shoulder injury resulted from the 1996 left shoulder injuries, the 
hearing officer stacked the 7% impairment from the 2000 injury onto the 7% 
impairment assigned to the 1996 injuries, and concluded that Buckley suffers 
 
14 
14% permanent impairment for each of the 1996 left shoulder injuries.  Reasoning 
that causation can be prospective only, the hearing officer further concluded that 
the 1996 injuries did not result from the 2000 injury and therefore permanent 
impairment from the 1996 injuries could not be stacked onto that resulting from the 
2000 injury.  He therefore left the permanent impairment rating for the 2000 injury 
at 7%. 
  
[¶22]  The hearing officer’s decision with respect to the 1996 and 2000 
injuries is consistent with our mandate in Buckley I. 
C. 
 
Permanent Impairment Rating for the 2001 Injury  
  
[¶23]  Buckley argues that the finding in the 2011 decree that he suffered 0% 
permanent impairment from the 2001 bilateral shoulder injury contradicts a finding 
in the 2008 decree that he suffered 7% permanent impairment from that injury.  
Buckley further argues that because the left shoulder was also injured in 2001, the 
permanent impairment should be combined with the 1996 impairment to the left 
shoulder, with a 14% rating assigned to the 2001 injury, because the multiple left 
shoulder injuries are related and therefore are part of the “injury at issue in the 
determination.” 
[¶24]  In the 2008 decree, the hearing officer did not clearly parse out the 
percentages of permanent impairment to be assigned to each injury, but instead, 
allocated 7% to the left shoulder and 7% to the right shoulder.  The hearing officer 
 
15 
also made the following specific finding: “[T]he permanent impairment 
attributable to the 2000 and 2001 injuries is 7% to the right shoulder, with no 
additional permanent impairment to the left shoulder from these injuries.”  In the 
current, 2011 decree, the hearing officer stated: “I further conclude that the 2001 
injury resulted in 0% permanent impairment, because it did not cause any 
additional permanent impairment to either shoulder, nor did it otherwise aggravate 
or accelerate the earlier injuries.” 
  
[¶25]  The hearing officer’s 2008 finding that “the permanent impairment 
attributable to the 2000 and 2001 injuries is 7% to the right shoulder, with no 
additional permanent impairment to the left shoulder from these injuries” is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the 2011 finding that 0% impairment is attributable to 
the 2001 injury.  The 2008 finding can be construed to mean that all of the 
impairment to the right shoulder was caused by the 2000 injury, and no impairment 
to the left shoulder was caused by the 2001 injury. 
 
The entry is: 
 
The Workers’ Compensation Board hearing 
officer’s decision is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
JABAR, J., with whom SILVER, J. joins, dissenting. 
 
[¶26]  I respectfully dissent.  I do not believe that the hearing officer’s 
decision is consistent with our mandate in Buckley v. S.D. Warren Co., 
2010 ME 53, 997 A.2d 747 (“Buckley I”).  In that decision we held: 
Because the impairment from the 2000 right shoulder injury 
“result[ed] from” the 1996 left shoulder injuries, and the 1996 work 
injuries are “personal injur[ies]” referred to in subsection (1-A) and 
“work injur[ies] at issue in the determination” referred to in 
subsection (1-A)(A), it follows that permanent impairment to both 
shoulders should be combined when deciding whether the threshold 
has been reached.  
 
Id. ¶ 15 (alterations in original). 
[¶27]  We stated that it was apparent from the plain meaning of 39-A M.R.S. 
§ 213(1-A) (2011) that the Legislature intended to allow “combining impairment 
percentages from multiple work injuries where the impairment from later injuries 
resulted from impairment from earlier work injuries.”  Buckley I, 2010 ME 53, 
¶ 16, 997 A.2d 747.  Buckley I turned on our determination that in enacting 
section 213, the Legislature was overriding Kotch v. American Protective Services, 
Inc., 2002 ME 19, 788 A.2d 582, in which we allowed work injuries to be 
combined with unrelated work and nonwork injuries in determining benefits under 
section 213.  Buckley I, 2010 ME 53, ¶¶ 10-11, 997 A.2d 747.  The facts here 
involve prior related work injuries. 
 
17 
[¶28]  In Buckley I we said: 
The legislative debates on L.D. 2202 reflect that some members 
were concerned that merely repealing Kotch, without doing more, 
would not address the gray area between Churchill [v. Central 
Aroostook Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 1999 ME 192, 
742 A.2d 475] and Kotch, and in effect, would expand section 213’s 
coverage to include permanent impairment from multiple unrelated 
work injuries, instead of merely excluding nonwork-related 
impairment. . . . 
 
2010 ME 53, ¶ 13, 997 A.2d 747 (emphasis added). 
[¶29]  Buckley I discussed the legislative history of section 213 to determine 
its intent.  We concluded that it was clear that section 213 was enacted to override 
Kotch and Churchill to ensure that prior nonwork and nonrelated work injuries are 
not part of a section 213 determination.  Because we were dealing with prior 
related work injuries and the definition of “work injury at issue,” it was not 
necessary to determine whether the prior injuries aggravated or accelerated the 
injury.  Section 213(1-A)(A) indicates that permanent impairment includes 
impairment resulting from “[t]he work injury at issue in the determination and any 
preexisting physical condition or injury that is aggravated or accelerated by the 
work injury at issue in the determination.”  Buckley I held that prior work injuries 
that are related are in fact part of the “work injury at issue”; therefore, it is not 
necessary to consider whether there was any aggravation or acceleration. 
 
18 
[¶30]  We explicitly instructed the hearing officer “that permanent 
impairment to both shoulders should be combined when deciding whether the 
threshold has been reached.”  Buckley I, 2010 ME 53, ¶ 15, 997 A.2d 747.  This 
language makes it very clear that the holding in Buckley I mandated that the 
hearing officer combine the permanent impairment percentages for the two 1996 
injuries with the 2000 injury for purposes of determining whether the employee 
was entitled to extended benefits pursuant to section 213 for the 2000 injury. 
[¶31]  This is not what the hearing officer did on remand.  He did not 
combine the permanent impairment percentages from the 1996 injuries with the 
2000 injury.  Instead he reached backward and stacked the 2000 permanent 
impairment percentage onto the 1996 injuries.  The hearing officer justified the 
stacking by stating: “[T]he Law Court seems to have relied upon the relationship of 
causation.  Causation flows in only one direction: forward rather than backward.  
The 2000 injury is causally connected to the 1996 injuries in that the 1996 injuries 
caused the 2000 injury, and not the other way around.”  This is not what we said in 
Buckley I.  We held that the injuries were related; we did not discuss the concept of 
causation.  We definitively said that permanent impairment to both shoulders 
should be combined when deciding whether the threshold has been reached.  See 
39-A M.R.S. 213(1)(1-A).  We held that both shoulder injuries were part of the 
“work injury at issue in the determination.”  Buckley I, 2010 ME 53, ¶ 15, 
 
19 
997 A.2d 747 (quotation marks omitted).  The essence of Buckley I is that because 
Buckley’s 2000 injury resulted from the two 1996 prior work related injuries, they 
were related; therefore, the permanent impairment percentages should be combined 
because they are part of the “work injury at issue.” 
[¶32]  For purposes of section 213, the hearing officer should have 
combined the 7% permanent impairment to the left shoulder resulting from the two 
1996 injuries with the 7% permanent impairment to the right shoulder resulting 
from the 2000 injury for a total of 14% total permanent impairment for the 2000 
injury.  
[¶33]  I also believe that the hearing officer failed to make the proper 
determination regarding the 2001 injury.  In Buckley I, we clearly indicated that the 
1996 shoulder injuries and the 2000 shoulder injury were related, but we did not 
address any determination regarding the 2001 bilateral shoulder injury.  The 
hearing officer did not make any findings as to whether the 2001 injury was 
“related” to the prior work injuries.  The hearing officer did make findings that the 
2001 injury did not aggravate or accelerate any preexisting physical condition or 
injury.  He also found that no permanent impairment resulted from the 2001 injury.  
However, he did not make any findings as to whether the 2001 injury was related 
to the prior work related injuries.  There is a great deal of evidence pointing in this 
direction because the 2001 injury involved an injury to the same shoulders that 
 
20 
were involved in the 1996 and 2000 injuries.  In the April 13, 2005, decision, the 
hearing officer stated: 
The undersigned further finds that the employee continues to remain 
affected by these three dates of injury[, October 30, 1996, November 
7, 1996, and October 16, 2001].  The Board now must apportion 
between those dates of injury.  When Dr. Hanley was asked to identify 
the respective roles played by the 1996 injuries, his most honest 
answer was “it would really be a guess.”  However, he indicated that 
both of the 1996 injuries were playing a significant role and that either 
injury could have caused the rotator cuff tear.  In addition, Dr. Phillips 
does place a significant amount of responsibility on the 
October 16, 2001 injury.  The most anybody can say in this particular 
instance is that all three injuries are playing a significant role in the 
employee’s ongoing incapacity. 
 
Additionally, in the December 19, 2008, decision, the hearing officer found that 
“all four injuries continue to contribute to Mr. Buckley’s ongoing incapacity.” 
[¶34]  The case should be remanded and the hearing officer directed to 
determine whether the prior 1996 left shoulder injuries and/or the 2000 right 
shoulder injury are related to the 2001 injury to both shoulders.  If he finds that 
they are related, then the “work injury at issue” for the 2001 injury for purposes of 
a section 213(1-A) determination is the combination of the related prior work 
injuries. 
[¶35]  I believe that we should remand this matter to the hearing officer to 
make the proper determinations consistent with Buckley I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
On the briefs: 
 
James J. MacAdam, Esq., Nathan A. Jury, Esq., and David E. Hirtle, Esq., 
MacAdam Jury, P.A., Portland, for appellant William Buckley 
 
Richard D. Tucker, Esq., Tucker Law Group, Bangor, for appellees S.D. 
Warren Company and Constitution State Service Co. 
 
Thomas E. Getchell, Esq., Troubh Heisler, Portland, for appellees S.D. 
Warren Company and CCMSI 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
James J. MacAdam, Esq., for appellant William Buckley 
 
Thomas E. Getchell, Esq., for appellees S.D. Warren Company and CCMSI 
 
Richard D. Tucker, Esq., for appellees S.D. Warren Company and 
Constitution State Service Co. 
 
 
 
Workers’ Compensation Board case numbers 96-016183; 96-017150; 00-011004; 01-016209 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY