Case Title: MVA v. Shepard

Citation: 399 Md. 241

Docket Number: 88/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Motor Vehicle Administration v. Scott H. Shepard
No. 88, September Term, 2006.
ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 
AND 
PROCEDURE 
– 
JUDICIAL 
REVIEW: 
The
administrative law judge’s finding that respondent violated § 16-
205.1 of the Transportation Article was supported by substantial
evidence to show that the officer possessed reasonable grounds to
request an alcohol concentration test where the administrative law
judge found that respondent had an odor of alcohol on his breath as
well as watery and bloodshot eyes, respondent admitted using
alcohol earlier in the evening, respondent was driving at an
excessive speed over 132 miles per hour, and respondent performed
poorly on field sobriety tests.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE – HEARINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS –
DRIVER’S 
LICENSE 
SUSPENSIONS: 
Under 
§ 
16-205.1 
of 
the
Transportation Article, the “reasonable grounds” required for an
officer to request a licensee to submit to alcohol concentration
testing is equivalent to “reasonable articulable suspicion”; the
term “reasonable grounds” does not require an officer to either
possess probable cause to believe a driver is intoxicated or show
that the driver is intoxicated by a preponderance of the evidence.
In the Circuit Court for M ontgomery County
Case No. 269435
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 88
September Term, 2006
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION
v.
SCOTT H. SHEPARD
Raker
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C.
(Retired, specially assigned),
Wilner, Alan M.
(Retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J.
Greene and Eldridge, JJ., Concur.
Filed: May 15, 2007
1 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent statutory references herein shall be to Md.
Code (1977, 2006 Rep. Vol., 2006 Supp.) of the Transportation Article.
This case involves the suspension of a driver’s licence pursuant to Md. Code (1977,
2006 Rep. Vol., 2006 Supp.) § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article.1  Respondent’s license
was suspended after he refused to take an alcohol concentration test following a traffic stop
for speeding.  Respondent challenged the suspension before the Office of Administrative
Hearings.  The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found respondent to be in violation of §
16-205.1.  The Circuit Court for Montgomery County vacated that ruling.  Because we find
that the administrative ruling was based on substantial evidence and was not rendered on the
basis of an erroneous conclusion of law, we shall reverse.
I.
Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, commonly known as Maryland’s
Implied Consent Law, provides the statutory structure for suspending the license of a driver
who refuses to submit to testing for alcohol concentration.  Section 16-205.1(a)(2) states as
follows:
“Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on
a highway or on any private property that is used by the public
in general in this State is deemed to have consented, subject to
the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a test if the
person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting
to drive while under the influence of alcohol . . .”
-2-
Section 16-205.1(b)(2) requires a police officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that
a person has been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol to:
“(i) Detain the person;
(ii) Request that the person permit a test to be taken;
(iii) Advise the person of the administrative sanctions that shall
be imposed for test results indicating an alcohol concentration
of at least 0.08 but less than 0.15 at the time of testing;
(iv) Advise the person of the administrative sanctions, including
ineligibility for modification of a suspension or issuance of a
restrictive license unless the person participates in the Ignition
Interlock System Program under § 16-404.1 of this title, that
shall be imposed for refusal to take the test and for test results
indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time
of testing; and
(v) Advise the person of the additional criminal penalties that
may be imposed under § 27-101(x) of this article on conviction
of a violation of § 21-902 of this article if the person knowingly
refused to take a test arising out of the same circumstances as
the violation.”
Notwithstanding the implied consent to take a test, a driver is generally not compelled to
submit to testing to determine alcohol concentration.  § 16-205.1(b)(1).  Section 16-
205.1(b)(3), however, directs a police officer to respond to a driver’s refusal to take a test by
seizing the person’s driver’s license, serving a temporary order of suspension, issuing a
temporary driver’s license, and informing the driver of his or her right to a hearing and
possible administrative sanctions.
-3-
Section 16-205.1(f)(8)(i) requires the Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) to
suspend an individual’s driver’s license if the ALJ makes certain findings at an
administrative hearing.  The section states as follows:
“After a hearing, the Administration shall suspend the driver’s
license or privilege to drive of the person charged under
subsection (b) or (c) of this section if:
1. The police officer who stopped or detained the
person had reasonable grounds to believe the
person was driving or attempting to drive while
under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by
alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any
combination of drugs, or a combination of one or
more drugs and alcohol that the person could not
drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a
controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an
alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of
this title;
2. There was evidence of the use by the person of
alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a
combination of one or more drugs and alcohol, or
a controlled dangerous substance;
3. The police officer requested a test after the
person was fully advised, as required under
subsection (b)(2) of this section, of the
administrative sanctions that shall be imposed;
and
4. A. The person refused to take the test; or B. A
test to determine alcohol concentration was taken
and the test result indicated an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of
testing.”
2 Form DR-15A, “Officer’s Certification and Order of Suspension,” contains general
factual information about the driver and the incident giving rise to a license suspension under
§ 16-205.1.  Section 16-205.1(b)(3) requires that the officer personally serve the order of
suspension upon the driver if the person refuses to take the chemical test or if the test results
in an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher.
-4-
An aggrieved driver whose license has been suspended may seek judicial review of the
administrative decision before a circuit court of this State.  § 16-205.1(j).
II.
Respondent’s license was suspended pursuant to § 16-205.1(f)(8)(i) following a
hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings.  At the hearing, the ALJ issued an
opinion and order based upon a form DR-15A2 filed by the arresting officer and the
testimony of respondent.  The DR-15A indicated that at 1:03 a.m., on October 7, 2005,
Gaithersburg City Police Officer Finch saw respondent driving in excess of 132 miles per
hour, that he stopped the vehicle, there was a strong odor of alcohol on respondent’s breath,
respondent had bloodshot and watery eyes, respondent blew a preliminary breath test of 0.10,
and respondent admitted drinking two beers.  Based on this evidence, the ALJ made the
following findings of facts.
On October 7, 2005, at 1:03 a.m., Officer Finch observed a Porsche Boxster traveling
at a speed in excess of 132 miles per hour on Route I-270 in Montgomery County, Maryland.
The officer initiated a traffic stop, at which time he identified respondent as the driver of the
Porsche.  Respondent had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, as well as watery and
3 Form DR-15, “Advice of Rights and Administrative Penalties for Refusal to Submit
to a Chemical Test Statement,” is derived from § 16-205.1(b) and contains warnings required
under Maryland’s Implied Consent Law.
-5-
bloodshot eyes.  Officer Finch asked respondent if he had been drinking, and respondent
stated that he had two beers earlier that evening.  After the officer administered a preliminary
breath test, respondent performed a standard field sobriety test, which included a horizontal
gaze nystagmus test, a walk and turn test, and a one leg stand test.  Officer Finch arrested
respondent for driving under the influence of alcohol, and indicated in his report that
respondent failed the field sobriety test.
Back at the police station, Officer Finch requested that respondent take a breathalyzer
test to determine his alcohol concentration level.  The officer advised respondent of
administrative and criminal sanctions he would face for either refusing to submit to testing
or submitting to testing where the results showed an alcohol concentration level above the
legal limit.  Respondent signed a form DR-15,3 thus acknowledging that the officer advised
him of the possible sanctions he would face for refusing the test.  Respondent refused the
breath test.  Pursuant to the statute, and acting on behalf of the MVA, Officer Finch served
an order of suspension of respondent’s driver’s license.
At the administrative hearing, the ALJ determined that Officer Finch had reasonable
grounds to believe respondent had been driving under the influence of alcohol on the night
in question.  The ALJ ruled orally as follows:
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“I’ve considered the evidence and the testimony presented in
this case, and I find by a preponderance of the evidence the
following facts.  The police officer who stopped or detained
you, Mr. Shepard, did have reasonable grounds to believe that
you were driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol because when he first came upon
you, you were speeding 132 miles per hour, and there was
further evidence of the use of alcohol based upon the fact that it
was early morning hours, you had an odor of alcohol, you had
bloodshot, watery eyes, the standard field sobriety tests were
performed unsatisfactorily, and you admitted drinking.
***
The issue was alcohol in this case pretty clearly.  And in any
event the issue is not probable cause.  That is the issue in a
criminal proceeding.  The issue in this case is reasonable
grounds.  The reasonable grounds as stated by the officer are
much more than sufficient.  He has stated more than sufficient
reasonable grounds to request that you take a test.  That’s what
he was doing here.  The standard field sobriety tests are
identified contrary to counsel’s statement.  Horizontal gaze
nystagmus, walk and turn, one leg stand, he says that those tests
were done.  He said based on the results arrested.  There is also
a reasonable inference that I am going to draw that based upon
that language that the tests were done not to his satisfaction
which is why he arrested you for driving while under the
influence of alcohol.  The officer did fully advise you of the
sanctions to be imposed, requested that you take a test which
you refused.  Therefore, you are in violation of § 16-205.1”
The ALJ filed written findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which she stated § 16-205.1
was violated based upon the following: “early A.M. hours, odor alcohol, bloodshot, watery
eyes, SFSTS [standard field sobriety tests] performed unsatisfactorily, admitted drinking.”
The ALJ imposed a one year suspension of respondent’s driver’s license, stayed on the
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condition that he participate in the Ignition Interlock Program for a period of eighteen
months.
Respondent filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County.  Before the Circuit Court, respondent argued as follows:
“[T]he operative allegations upon which the administrative law
judge premised his decision were, ‘standard field sobriety tests,
the nystagmus gaze, walk and turn, one leg stand were done,
based on results, arrested.’  We argued before the administrative
law judge, and we argue here, that those test results, that are not
enumerated in the certification of the officer, do not constitute
competent evidence upon which an administrative agency may
base its decision that a reasonable person would have believed
that the individual in question had operated a motor vehicle
while impaired.  That is the central thrust of our argument.”
Respondent maintained that an officer must state the factual basis upon which he concludes
that field sobriety tests are not done to his satisfaction.  He argued that the evidence presented
and the inferences drawn by the ALJ were incompetent and therefore, the factual decision
of the ALJ was not based upon substantial evidence.
The Circuit Court agreed.  The Circuit Court vacated the ruling after determining that
the ALJ based her ruling solely on the results of the field sobriety test.  The court concluded
that the results of the sobriety test constituted incompetent evidence because particular facts
regarding respondent’s performance on the field sobriety test were not identified on the form
DR-15A.  The court reasoned as follows:
“He expressly states the basis of his ruling on the unsatisfactory
performance of enumerated roadside sobriety tests, we have no
clue of what that was.  And I don’t believe the law is that the
-8-
Court should say, well, because the defendant failed, and in any
kind of test, because the blood test failed or you could come in
on a criminal case and say, because the DNA indicated you were
there without getting any results, without saying what it was at
all . . .
But what we have here is unsatisfactory performance.  Now, we
hear it all the time in guilty pleas, but that’s an entirely different
scenario.  But not when this Court is here to make its decision
based upon, look at the findings of the administrative law judge,
and says it is not my role to sit here and decide that a finding of
stepping off line and weaving, whether that’s reasonable
grounds to make an arrest or not, that is not the role of this Court
to go back like an instant replay, second-guess that, and say that
shouldn’t have been reasonable grounds.  That’s just not the role
of this Court.  But this Court doesn’t have before it what the
grounds were at all.
And for those reasons, the findings of the administrative law
judge will be vacated, and the petition is sustained.”
The MVA filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court.  We granted the petition
to address the following question:
“Did the ALJ have substantial evidence to find the arresting
officer who stopped Shepard had reasonable grounds to request
a chemical breath test under [§ 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(1)], when the
ALJ considered that Shepard was stopped for speeding 132
miles per hour, was observed at the time of his stop to have a
strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath, as well as
watery bloodshot eyes, had a preliminary breath test result of
0.10 and was arrested based on the result of field sobriety tests,
which the officer did not describe in detail in his written
statements?”
MVA v. Shepard, 396 Md. 9, 912 A.2d 646 (2006).
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III.
Before this Court, the MVA argues that there was substantial evidence to support the
ruling of the ALJ that respondent violated § 16-205.1.  The MVA argues that the statute
does not require an officer to provide a detailed written description of how a person performs
on a field sobriety test and that the DR-15A upon which the ALJ relied contained sufficient
information and reasonable grounds to ask respondent to take the alcohol concentration test.
Alternatively, the MVA argues that even without the results of the field sobriety test, the
officer’s certification indicated that respondent was traveling at an excessive rate of speed,
had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, had watery and bloodshot eyes, and admitted to
drinking, all of which are indicia of intoxication.
In his initial argument, as noted in his brief before this Court, respondent states that
the ALJ found that “the only bases upon which the officer had reasonable grounds to believe
that Shepard was attempting to drive while under the influence is articulated in the
Administrative Law Judge’s written finding of fact, i.e., that Shepard was speeding at 132
miles per hour.”  Somewhat inconsistently, respondent then argues that the ALJ relied solely,
and improperly, on the conclusory statement of the officer as to the results of the field
sobriety test.  Respondent’s second argument is that the ALJ applied the wrong legal
standard.  In his brief before this Court, respondent states that “reasonable grounds” as used
in the statute means “probable cause.”  At oral argument, based upon this Court’s ruling in
Volodarsky v. Tarachanskaya, 397 Md. 291, 916 A.2d 991 (2007), a case filed after
-10-
respondent’s brief, he maintained that the term “reasonable grounds” as seen in § 16-205.1
means “a preponderance of the evidence standard.”
IV.
We consider first whether the evidence at the administrative hearing was sufficient
for the ALJ to conclude that Officer Finch possessed the reasonable grounds necessary to
request a test to determine respondent’s alcohol concentration.  We hold that the ALJ’s ruling
was supported by substantial evidence to show that the officer possessed the requisite
reasonable grounds required by § 16-205.1.
Maryland courts play a limited role when reviewing adjudicatory decisions of
administrative agencies.  See Fowler v. MVA, 394 Md. 331, 342, 906 A.2d 347, 353 (2006).
The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.)
§ 10-201 et seq. of the State Government Article, sets out the framework for judicial review
of administrative agency decisions, as follows:
“Decision — In a proceeding under this section, the court may:
(1) remand the case for further proceedings;
(2) affirm the final decision; or
(3) reverse or modify the decision if any
substantial right of the petitioner may have been
prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or
decision:
(i) is unconstitutional;
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(ii) exceeds the statutory authority
or jurisdiction of the final decision
maker;
(iii) results from an unlawful
procedure;
(iv) is affected by any other error of
law;
(v) is unsupported by competent,
material, and substantial evidence
in light of the entire record as
submitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary or capricious.”
Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.) § 10-222(h) of the State Government Article.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a court’s role in reviewing an agency adjudicatory
decision is very narrow.  Aviation Administration v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 570-71, 873 A.2d
1145, 1154 (2005).
In Board of Physician v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 729 A.2d 376 (1999), we discussed the
standard of review of administrative agency decisions.  We noted as follows:
“A court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency
adjudicatory decision is narrow; it is limited to determining if
there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support
the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the
administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous
conclusion of law.
“In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing
court decides whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have
reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.  A reviewing
court should defer to the agency’s fact-finding and drawing of
inferences if they are supported by the record.  A reviewing
court must review the agency’s decision in the light most
favorable to it; . . . the agency’s decision is prima facie correct
and presumed valid, and . . . it is the agency’s province to
-12-
resolve conflicting evidence and to draw inferences from that
evidence.”
Id. at 67-68, 729 A.2d at 380-81 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  See also MVA
v. Illiano, 390 Md. 265, 274-75, 888 A.2d 329, 335 (2005).  A court may set aside an
agency’s factual finding only when the finding is “unsupported by competent, material, and
substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted.”  Spencer v. Board of
Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 529, 846 A.2d 341, 349 (2004).
In the case sub judice, the substantial evidence test was not applied properly by the
Circuit Court to the ALJ’s final decision.  The ALJ did not err in concluding that respondent
violated § 16-205.1.  The ALJ’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence to
support the finding that the police officer who initiated the traffic stop had reasonable
grounds to believe respondent was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol.  Contrary to the conclusion of the Circuit Court, the record reflects that the ALJ
considered the totality of the officer’s observations when she determined whether he
possessed the requisite reasonable grounds.  In the judge’s oral findings of fact, she stated
that she considered the odor of alcohol, respondent’s physical condition, his admitted use of
alcohol earlier that evening, his excessive speed of 132 miles per hour, and his performance
on the field sobriety tests.  See c.f., State v. Orvis, 465 A.2d 1361, 1362 (Vt. 1983) (holding
that a “mild odor of alcohol, defendant’s excited state and his admission of alcohol
consumption, in conjunction with the fact of the 3:00 a.m. automobile accident and admitted
-13-
operation, would appear to provide reasonable grounds for further inquiry by a law
enforcement officer”).
Respondent’s assertion that the ALJ considered only the “factually unsupported field
sobriety test” or the fact that respondent was traveling in excess of 132 miles per hour is
simply wrong and unsupported by the record.  The Circuit Court’s conclusion is erroneous
as well.  The Circuit Court determined that the ALJ based her decision exclusively on the
results of the field sobriety test.  The court found that because the field sobriety test results
were not explained in sufficient detail, the ruling was based on incompetent evidence and
could not be sustained.  The test is whether there is substantial evidence to support the
decision of the agency.  As the ALJ made clear, she considered the combined evidence at the
hearing “more than sufficient . . . to request that [respondent] take a test.”  She did not simply
consider the field sobriety test and the evidence she considered was clearly more than
sufficient to request respondent to take a test to determine his alcohol concentration.
V.
We turn now to respondent’s argument that the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard
in construing the meaning of “reasonable grounds” as used in § 16-205.1.  Based on our
recent opinion in Volodarsky, 397 Md. 291, 916 A.2d 991, he argues that “reasonable
grounds” means “a preponderance of the evidence standard” or at the very least, probable
-14-
cause.  We disagree and hold that the term “reasonable grounds” as used in § 16-205.1 means
“reasonable articulable suspicion” and not preponderance of the evidence or probable cause.
In interpreting a statute, we have stated repeatedly that the cardinal rule of statutory
construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.  See Oakland v.
Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006).  In Mountain Lake,
we explained as follows:
“In ascertaining legislative intent, we first examine the plain
language of the statute, and if the plain language of the statute
is unambiguous and consistent with the statute’s apparent
purpose, we give effect to the statute as it is written.  If a statute
has more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous.  If
the language of the statute is ambiguous, we resolve the
ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, considering the
legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose.  We consider
both the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute and
how that language relates to the overall meaning, setting, and
purpose of the act.  We avoid a construction of the statute that
is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.
We construe a statute as a whole so that no word, clause,
sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous,
meaningless, or nugatory.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court addressed the threat to public safety caused by
drunk drivers in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748
(1983).  The Court stated as follows:
“The situation underlying this case—that of the drunk driver—
occurs with tragic frequency on our Nation’s highways.  The
carnage caused by drunk drivers is well documented and needs
no detailed recitation here.  This Court, although not having the
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daily contact with the problem that the state courts have, has
repeatedly lamented the tragedy.  See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352
U.S. 432, 439 (1957) (“The increasing slaughter on our
highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the
astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield”); Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401 (1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring)
(deploring “traffic irresponsibility and the frightful carnage it
spews upon our highways”); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,
657, 672 (1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring) (footnote omitted)
(“The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the
death toll of all our wars”); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1,
17-19 (1979) (recognizing the “compelling interest in highway
safety”).”
Neville, 459 U.S. at 558-59, 102 S.Ct. at 920.
In response to the public concern about the dangers of drunk driving, the Maryland
General Assembly rewrote § 16-205.1, referring to the rewritten statute as Maryland’s
“implied consent” and “administrative per se” law against drunk driving.  See Fowler, 394
Md. at 343 n.10, 906 A.2d at 354 n.10.  The statute was enacted in 1989 to allow a driver’s
license to be suspended promptly for suspected drunken driving if the person refused a test
to determine alcohol concentration.  See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454,
460-62, 597 A.2d 939, 941-43 (1991).  The purpose of the statute was to reduce the incidence
of drunk driving and to protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take alcohol
concentration tests; the statute was not meant to protect drivers.  MVA v. Richards, 356 Md.
356, 374, 739 A.2d 58, 68 (1999).
4 Some of our sister states require an arrest before an officer may request a driver to
take a chemical test.  Those states have generally interpreted their implied consent, per se
statutes to require probable cause because of the arrest requirement.  See e.g., State v. Collier,
612 S.E.2d 281, 284 (Ga. 2005) (holding that the Georgia implied consent law contemplates
arrest, and therefore requires probable cause to conduct an alcohol concentration test);
Verdoorn v. Director of Revenue, 119 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (noting that
Missouri law requires an arrest supported by probable cause before an officer may conduct
an alcohol concentration test); Pooler v. MVD, 755 P.2d 701, 702 (Or. 1988) (en banc)
(noting that Oregon law requires an arrest supported by probable cause before an officer may
request an alcohol concentration test).
-16-
Section 16-205.1 does not require an arrest to precede an officer’s request for the
driver to take a test. 4  Richards, 356 Md. at 374, 739 A.2d at 68 (stating that § 16-205.1
requires that the police officer who stops or detains the individual to have reasonable grounds
to believe the individual was driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of
alcohol and does not require that the police officer have probable cause to arrest).  Rather,
the statute requires that “the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting
to drive while under the influence of alcohol.”  § 16-205.1(a)(2).
As we have noted in the context of criminal cases, there are three types of police
encounters: an arrest, an investigatory stop or detention, and a consensual encounter.  Swift
v. State, 393 Md. 139, 150, 899 A.2d 867, 873 (2006).  An arrest requires probable cause;
an investigatory detention, which is a seizure of limited duration, does not require probable
cause but instead requires reasonable articulable suspicion; and a consensual encounter need
not be supported by any level of suspicion.  Id.  Given the underlying purpose and plain
language of § 16-205.1 requiring a detention and not an arrest, we conclude that the use of
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the word “detained,” combined with the word “suspicion,” means reasonable articulable
suspicion and not probable cause.
Respondent argues alternatively that, based on our recent decision in Volodarsky, 397
Md. 291, 916 A.2d 991, the term “reasonable grounds” in § 16-205.1 means “preponderance
of the evidence.”  We disagree.
Volodarsky was a child custody case in which one parent accused the other of child
sexual abuse.  The issue before the Court was the construction of Md. Code (1984, 2006
Repl. Vol.) § 9-101 of the Family Law Article.  Section 9-101 requires, in any custody or
visitation proceeding, that, if the court has “reasonable grounds to believe” that a child has
been abused or neglected by a party to the proceeding, the court must determine whether
abuse or neglect is likely to occur if custody or visitation rights are granted to that party.  §
9-101(a).  The statute states that, unless the court finds specifically that there is no likelihood
of further child abuse or neglect by the party, the court must either deny custody or visitation
rights to that party or approve a supervised visitation arrangement that assures the safety and
physiological, psychological, and emotional well-being of the child.  § 9-101(b).  In holding
that “reasonable grounds” means the same as preponderance of the evidence under § 9-101,
we reasoned as follows:
“The two subsections of § 9-101 must be read together.
Subsection (a) requires that, if, in a custody or visitation
proceeding, the court has reasonable grounds to believe that a
child has been abused or neglected by a party to the proceeding,
the court must determine whether abuse or neglect is likely to
occur if custody or visitation rights are granted to the party.
-18-
Subsection (b) then states the consequence of the court’s
determination that reasonable grounds for such a belief exist.  In
that event, the court must deny custody or visitation, except in
a secure, supervised setting, unless it specifically finds ‘that
there is no likelihood of further abuse or neglect by the party.’
(Emphasis added).  To require a specific finding that ‘further
abuse or neglect’ is not likely clearly implies that there must be
some sort of finding or determination by the court that abuse or
neglect likely occurred in the first instance.  The question is
whether, at a minimum, that finding must be made by at least a
preponderance of the evidence.
***
It defies logic and reason to permit a court to make what is
essentially a finding of fact, especially one that may lead to the
deprivation of a Constitutionally-based right of access to one’s
child, when the court is unable to find, even by the slimmest
margin, that the fact is more likely so than not.  How can a court
have reasonable grounds for it to believe that an act occurred if
it is not persuaded, from whatever evidence is properly before
it, that the act more likely occurred than not?  Under the Court
of Special Appeals rationale, a court could find reasonable
grounds to believe that which, in its own mind, it does not
believe because, in its view, the credible evidence does not
support the fact, and that strikes us as the antithesis of
reasonableness.”
Volodarsky, 397 Md. at 304-06, 916 A.2d at 999-1000 (emphasis in original).
The decision required by a circuit court judge under § 9-101 of the Family Law
Article and that of the police officer on the road under § 16-205.1 of the Transportation
Article are very different.  The Family Law Article requires the judge to make a finding of
fact—one which necessarily must be by a preponderance of the evidence.  The police officer
-19-
on the road need only have suspicion of intoxication to justify further investigation and
further detention under § 16-205.1.
We pointed out in Volodarsky that the determination of reasonable grounds for a
belief can involve either an objective or subjective analysis, depending on the circumstances.
Id. at 306, 916 A.2d at 1000.  When a police officer is called upon to make a preliminary
determination based on incomplete and often non-testimonial hearsay evidence as to whether
probable cause or reasonable grounds or reasonable suspicion exists to justify some further
step in an investigation, the officer may take the evidence at face value and simply decide
whether, if true, it leads to a reasonable belief that an offense was committed.  See id. (noting
that an “objective analysis is most often used in situations in which only a preliminary
determination need be made, based on incomplete and often non-testimonial hearsay
evidence”).  The result of such a determination is not an ultimate finding of fact, but simply
a basis for taking a further procedural step—an arrest, a detention, a search, or, as in this
case, a request to take a test to determine alcohol concentration.  When a court is called upon
to make a judicial finding, a different analysis may be required.  The court often must make
credibility determinations and weigh the value of the evidence.  Id. at 307, 916 A.2d at 1000-
01.  Because the judicial finding has preclusive effect, the court, unless required to use a
higher standard, must find its conclusion supported by at least a preponderance of the
evidence, for anything less would necessarily be arbitrary.  Id. at 305-06, 916 A.2d at 1000.
We are not dealing here with that kind of analysis.
-20-
As we have indicated, reasonable grounds means less than probable cause.  Ipso facto,
it does not mean preponderance of the evidence.
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
MONTGOMER Y
COUNTY 
REVERSED. 
 
CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM
T H E  
R U L I N G  
O F  
T H E
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
PRESIDING OVER RESPONDENT’S
LICENSE SUSPENSION HEARING.
C O S T S  
T O  
B E  
P A I D  
B Y
RESPONDENT.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 88
September Term, 2006
_________________________________________
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION
v.
SCOTT H. SHEPARD
________________________________________
Raker
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned),
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
                  JJ.
________________________________________
Concurring Opinion by Eldridge, J.
which Greene, J., joins.
_________________________________________
Filed: May 15, 2007
Eldridge, J., concurring:
I concur in the judgment and in Parts I through IV of the Court’s opinion.  I
disagree, however, with Part V of the opinion.  The issue discussed by the Court in
Part V, namely whether “the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard in construing the
meaning of ‘reasonable grounds’ as used in § 16-205.1,” is not properly before the
Court because it was not raised before the administrative agen cy.  Moreover, even if
the issue were properly before us, the “reasonab le grounds” standard in a civil statute
should be applied by the administrative trier of facts as a matter of common sense,
without becoming entangled in the intricacies of criminal law and the law of arrest.
The “reasonableness” standard has been applied by triers of fact in a multitude of civil
proceedings without courts or agencies delving into the criminal law of arrests,
detentions, police encounters, etc.
I.
It is a settled principle of Maryland administrative law that, in an action for
judicial review of an adjudicatory administrative agency decision, the reviewing courts
should decline to consider “an issue not raised before the agency,” Brodie v. Motor
Vehicle Administration, 367 Md. 1, 4, 785 A.2d 747, 749 (2001).  Chief Judge Bell for
the Court explained in Department of Health v. Campbell, 364 Md. 108, 123, 771 A.2d
1051, 1060 (2001):
-2-
“Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.) § 10-222(a) of the
State Government Article provides that ‘a party who is aggrieved
by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial
review of the decision.’  Thus, it is the final decision of the final
decision maker at the administrative level . . . that is subject to
judicial review.  Accordingly, the reviewing court, restricted to the
record made before the administrative agen cy, see Cicala v.
Disability Review Bd. for Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 254,
260, 418 A.2d 205, 209 (1980), may not pass upon issues presented
to it for the first time on judicial review and that are not
encompassed in the final decision of the administrative agen cy.
Stated differently, an appellate court will review an adjudicatory
agency decision solely on the grounds relied upon by the agency.
See County Council of Prince George’s County v. Brandywine
Enterprises, Inc., 350 Md. 339, 349, 711 A.2d 1346, 1350-51
(1998) and cases cited in note 1, supra.”
See, also, e.g., Board of Education v. Heister, 392 Md. 140, 147 n.5, 896 A.2d 342, 346
n.5 (2006) (“‘It is the function of the reviewing court to review only the materials that
were in the record before the agency at the time it made its final decision,’” and an
appellate court should not review a question which was “interjected in the case” in the
circuit court); Motor Vehicle Administration v. Weller, 390 Md. 115, 128, 887 A.2d
1042, 1050 (2005) (“‘Because the issue of alleged error was not raised during the
administrative proceeding, it was not properly raised in the judicial review proceeding,
and therefore is not properly before us,’” quoting Cicala v. Disability Rev. Bd. for
Prince George’s Co., 288 Md. 254, 263, 418 A.2d 205, 210-211 (1980)); Rockville v.
Woodmont C. C., 348 Md. 572, 582 n.3, 705 A.2d 301, 305 n.3 (1998) (“Judicial review
of administrative decisions is limited to issues raised before the agency”); Insurance
Commissioner v. Equitable, 339 Md. 596, 634, 664 A.2d 862, 881 (1995) (“We have
-3-
repeatedly pointed out that judicial review of administrative decisions is limited to the
issues or grounds dealt with by the administrative agency”), and cases there cited.
No issue concerning the interpretation or “meaning of ‘reasonable grounds’ as
used in § 16-205.1” (majority slip opinion at 14) was ever raised or decided at the
administrative hearing in the instant case.  Although counsel for the respondent
Shepard, in oral argument before the ALJ, used both the phrase “probable cause” and
the statutory phrase “reasonab le grounds” in arguing that the police officer did not have
a sufficient basis to believe that Shepard was driving his motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, counsel for Mr. Shepard made absolutely no argument with
respect to the meaning of the phrase “reasonab le grounds.”  Furthermore, although the
ALJ, in the oral ruling rejecting counsel’s arguments, pointed out that the statutory
standard was “reasonab le grounds” rather than “probable cause,” the ALJ rendered no
opinion or legal conclusion with respect to the meaning of the “reasonab le grounds”
standard.  It was not an issue at the administrative hearing but was raised for the first
time in the Circuit Court.
At the administrative hearing, on February 9, 2006, counsel for Mr. Shepard
(Mr. John F. X. Costello) made what he categorized as three argumen ts relating to
whether Mr. Shepard should be sanctioned pursuant to § 16-205.1 of the Transportation
Article.
Mr. Costello initially argued that Mr. Shepard’s preliminary breath test (PBT)
results, included in the police officer’s certification (Form DR-15A ), should not be
admitted into evidence.  Counsel relied upon a Court of Special Appeals opinion
-4-
1Harmon v. State, 147 Md. App. 452, 809 A.2d 696 (2002).
2Motor Vehicle Administration v. Weller, 390 Md. 115, 887 A.2d 1042 (2005).  
holding that PBT results were inadmissible in circuit court criminal cases.1  The ALJ
pointed out that a recent Court of Appeals opinion held that PBT results were
admissible in administrative hearings.2  Nevertheless, the ALJ ruled that, “if you don’t
want me to consider the PBT, I have no problem not considering it.  I’ll just read
everything but the PBT.”
Counsel’s next argumen ts at the administrative hearing concerned the
certification form.  Mr. Costello argued that the refusal to take an alcohol concentration
test “was not signed by the test technician” and that, because of the police officer’s
punctuation in the certification, the certification did not comply with § 16-205.1.  This
latter contention seemed to be that, because of the absence of a comma, it was not clear
whether “this officer is certifying under his reasonable grounds that this man was under
the influence of alcohol” or whether “he’s certifying that based on the reasonable
grounds he was driving a motor vehicle after consuming a controlled dangerous
substance.  There’s absolutely no indication whatsoever that he was operating a motor
vehicle after consuming a controlled dangerous substance.”  The ALJ, without ruling
upon these contentions at the time, asked respondent’s counsel to make “your third
argument.”
The third and final argument by respondent’s counsel was that the evidence was
insufficient for the police officer to have had reasonable grounds to believe that
-5-
Mr. Shepard was driving while under the influence of alcohol.  In particular, counsel
contended that “[t]here is absolutely no evidence before the Court [the ALJ] as to what
the standard field sobriety test results were.”  While Mr. Shepard’s attorney at times
used the phrase “probable cause,” as well as the statutory phrase “reasonab le grounds,”
he at no time made or intimated any contention regarding the meaning or interpretation
of the statutory language “reasonab le grounds.”  The argument was completely factual,
based on the asserted absence of substantial evidence.  Counsel’s entire argument was
as follows:
“ATTORNEY JOHN F. X. COSTELLO:
“The third argument is when the Court looks at the
reasonable grounds and excludes the impermissible PBT from [our]
standpoint as the Court has agreed to do so the four corners of the
reasonable grounds certification does not amount to probable
cause.  There is absolutely no evidence before the Court as to what
the standard field sobriety test results were.  They’re not outlined
at all.  All the Court has before Your Honor is driving a motor
vehicle at a high rate of speed with a strong odor of alcohol and
bloodshot watery eyes.  The fact that the officer chooses not to give
you the test results is an indication of his own disbelief in either
the test results or his belief that the test results would be indicative
of something other than probable cause of intoxication.  As Your
Honor knows, the whole purpose for field sobriety tests is that odor
of alcohol and bloodshot eyes standing alone is not evidence of
probable cause of an individual’s inability to operate a motor
vehicle safely.  Here we got a man that is driving a vehicle very
well at a very high rate of speed.  That in and of itself militates
against any inference of probable cause of impaired ability to drive
due to alcohol, number one.  Number two, the officer chooses not
to give this Court any benefit of what the field sobriety test results
showed.  To the extent that they don’t, that is an inference against
the officer and to the extent that the officer needs those field
sobriety tests upon which to base his certification of probable
cause to arrest, and that’s the whole reason that they’re done, a
-6-
failure is indicative of probable cause but compliance with or a
successful completion of field sobriety tests is an indication of just
the opposite.  When he purposely chooses not to give you the
benefit of those results there’s got to be an honest inference that
they would not have been helpful.  Whether the Court wants to
argue or whether you want to accept it under a spoliation theory or
just a failure to certify under a reasonable grounds theory.  He
could have come in and said nystagmus gaze constitutes a failure,
that the man could not walk safely, he could not do walk-and-turn,
he could not do the one-leg stand.  He hasn’t given you the benefit
of any of that.  And the whole reason that he had to do them was
that candidly you and I both know that it does not amount to
probable cause if an individual is lawfully operating a motor
vehicle, i.e. within the lanes, at a high rate of speed and simply has
an odor of alcohol and bloodshot eyes.  If that were the case then
there would be no need for the field sobriety test.”
Immediately following the above argumen t, the ALJ asked whether counsel had
any additional arguments; the ALJ did not want to be “sandbagged” by some additional
contention made later.  The following colloquy occurred:
“ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE FRIEDMAN:
“Okay.  Anything else?
“ATTORNEY JOHN F. X. COSTELLO:
“Not at this time.
“ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE FRIEDMAN:
“Okay.  I’m going to rule so I want to know whether
there are any other arguments.  You stated three.  I’m going to rule
on all three of your arguments.  I don’t want you then to be telling
me that you have another argument so I want to have all the
argumen ts at once.
“ATTORNEY JOHN F. X. COSTELLO:
-7-
“I appreciate that.  And what I meant by not at this time
is if you don’t rule in our favor and I put on evidence, I have a
right to renew my motion.  Nothing more.”
Counsel then had Mr. Shepard testify.  At the conclusion of that testim ony,
counsel reiterated his argument that there was insufficient evidence and asserted that
Mr. Shepard’s testimony confirmed the alleged insufficiency.  Again, no statutory
interpretation argument was made.
The ALJ thereupon delivered an oral ruling, rejecting those argumen ts which the
ALJ had not previously ruled upon.  With respect to the principal argument by
Mr. Shepard’s counsel, the ALJ stated:
“The issue in this case is reasonable grounds.  The reasonable
grounds as stated by the officer are much more than sufficient.  He
has stated more than sufficient reasonable grounds to request that
you take a test.  That’s what he was doing here.  The standard field
sobriety tests are identified contrary to counsel’s statement.  HGN,
walk-and-turn, one-leg stand, he says that those tests were done. ”
At no time did the ALJ make any conclusions concerning the interpretation of
“reasonab le grounds” as used in the statute.  As previously mentioned, the ALJ did
point out that the statutory standard was “reasonable grounds” and not “probable
cause.”  Nothing was said, however, about the meaning of “reasonab le grounds.”
Finally, no statutory interpretation issue was mentioned in the ALJ’s written
conclusions of law.
As emphasized time after time in our cases, courts should not judicially review
adjudicatory administrative decisions on grounds not raised before the administrative
-8-
3If, at first glance, this seems unrealistic, it should be noted that Mr. Shepard was
driving a Porsche.
agen cy.  The General Assembly, as a matter of public policy, has determined that
administrative agencies and administrative law judges should initially rule upon issues
falling within the jurisdiction of the agencies and ALJs.  Permitting agencies and ALJs
to be “sandbagged” by new legal issues raised for the first time in circuit courts is
directly contrary to the legislative policy.
III.
Even if the statutory interpretation issue were before us, there is no good reason
to utilize the somewhat complicated criminal law concepts of arrest, “probable cause,”
“reasonab le articulable suspicio n,” etc., with their federal law and state law
components, and apply such concepts to a “reasonableness” standard in a state law civil
proceeding.
There is no issue presented in this case, and rationally there could be no issue,
that Mr. Shepard was lawfully arrested under Maryland law.  He committed a
misdemeanor in the presence of a police officer, i.e., driving a motor vehicle in excess
of 132 miles per hour.3  See Maryland Code (2001), § 2-202(a) of the Criminal
Procedure Article.  No other criminal law issue is involved.  The license suspension
proceeding, based upon Mr. Shepard’s refusal to take an alcohol concentration test, is
entirely a civil administrative proceeding, subject to a statutory civil action for judicial
review.  While three or four issues may have been raised at the administrative hearing,
the only surviving issue is whether the police officer had “reasonab le grounds to
-9-
believe” that Mr. Shepard was “driving . . . while under the influence of alcohol [or]
while impaired by alcohol . . . ,” § 16-205.1(b)(2) of the Transportation Article.
Courts and adjudicatory agencies have traditionally applied the “reasonableness”
standard in civil proceedings without utilizing or drawing analogies to criminal law
concepts.  A multitude of negligence cases, of all types, require triers of fact to
determine the “reasonableness” of defendants’ conduct.  See, e.g., Polakoff v. Turner,
385 Md. 467, 477, 479-480, 869 A.2d 837, 843, 845 (2005) (“The trier of fact must . . .
evaluate whether the actions taken by the defendant were reasonable under all the
circumstances.  * * * [T]he trier of fact must determine whether the defendant acted
reasonably given the circumstances”); Brooks v. Lewin Realty, 378 Md. 70, 84-85, 835
A.2d 616, 624 (2003).  Similarly, in the present case, the ALJ as trier of fact should
decide whether the police officer had “reasonab le grounds” under all of the
circumstances.  The ALJ did find that “reasonab le grounds” were present, and that
finding was supported by substantial evidence.  This should be the end of the matter.
Judge Greene joins this concurring opinion.