Case Title: Suen v. Greene

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dr. James Y. SUEN v. Kenneth GREENE

96-702                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered July 11, 1997


1.   New trial -- decision to grant new trial should not be
     disturbed absent manifest abuse of discretion -- burden on
     party moving for new trial. -- While a trial court's
     discretion is much broader where the question is whether a
     jury verdict is supported by a preponderance of the evidence,
     still, its discretion when granting a new trial under other
     provisions of Ark. R. Civ. P. 59 should not be disturbed
     absent manifest abuse of discretion, or "discretion
     improvidently exercised"; the party moving for a new trial
     under these provisions must show that his rights have been
     materially affected by demonstrating that a reasonable
     possibility of prejudice resulted from the misconduct.

2.   New trial -- grounds for -- misconduct of prevailing party
     includes misconduct of that party's attorney. -- The supreme
     court has held that the misconduct of the prevailing party
     includes the misconduct of the prevailing party's attorney;  
      a new trial may be granted because prejudice results from the
     cumulative effect of opposing counsel's conduct.  

3.   New trial -- plaintiff's and defendant's counsel vigorously
     and professionally advocated interests of their clients --
     grant of new trial was manifest abuse of discretion. -- Where
     it was clear that counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant
     vigorously and professionally advocated the interests of their
     clients and the trial court maintained a firm control over the
     proceeding, the supreme court was unable to find any
     reasonable possibility of prejudice against appellee's rights
     to a fair trial resulting from the actions of appellant's
     attorney; absent any showing that counsel's conduct prevented
     appellee from having a fair trial, the trial court's action in
     ordering a new trial for that reason was a manifest abuse of
     discretion.

4.   New trial -- failure to strike physician's testimony not error
     -- appellee not deprived of fair trial. -- The trial court did
     not commit error which deprived appellees of a fair trial by
     failing to strike the physician's testimony where appellee's
     attorney, through frequent objections, most of which were
     sustained by the court, insisted upon great precision in
     phrasing questions and answers; the supreme court failed to
     find any examples where the answers provided by the physician
     or the rulings of the trial court constituted irregularities
     in the proceedings that prevented appellee from having a fair
     trial; in many instances, the physician, whose primary
     language was not English, was seeking to answer fully and
     completely; the trial court imposed sufficient discipline upon
     his answers to ensure that the appellee was not prevented from
     having a fair trial because of the physician's tendency to
     ramble. 

5.   New trial -- verdict may not be set aside arbitrarily and
     without reasonable cause -- granting new trial on basis that
     witness was unresponsive was arbitrary and unreasonable. -- A
     verdict may not be set aside arbitrarily and without
     reasonable cause; granting a new trial on the basis that a
     witness was generally "nonresponsive" is arbitrary and
     unreasonable. 

6.   New trial -- trial court should not substitute its view of
     evidence for that of jury -- decision to order new trial was
     manifest abuse of discretion. -- The trial court should not
     substitute its view of the evidence for that of the jury; the
     grounds for granting a new trial (a) because of the conduct of
     appellee's counsel, and (b) because the trial court decided it
     committed error in not striking the testimony of the
     physician, did not reflect a material irregularity that
     prevented appellee from having a fair trial; therefore, the
     decision of the trial court in ordering a new trial on those
     grounds was a manifest abuse of discretion.  

7.   New trial -- doctor's comments on standard of care stricken
     from record -- ruling did not prejudice appellee. -- Where the
     expert witness testified concerning the appropriate standard
     of care for the surgery, which was supported by several other
     witnesses, yet upon objection, his statement that the standard
     of care used by appellant was the "standard of care for ENT
     surgeons in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1986," was stricken from
     the record and the jury instructed to ignore it, no prejudice
     to appellee resulted from this ruling.

8.   New trial -- physician's entire testimony stricken from record
     -- motion for mistrial never renewed after testimony stricken
     -- trial court did not commit error in failing to order
     mistrial. -- Where the physician was abrasive while on the
     witness stand; appellee moved that the testimony be stricken
     or in the alterative for a mistrial; the testimony was
     stricken and the jury was instructed to disregard it; it was
     clear that the physician was unresponsive and resistant to
     answering hypothetical questions which were predicated upon
     assumptions that he could not accept as correct and the trial
     court struck his entire testimony, after which appellee never
     renewed his motion for a mistrial, the trial court utilized an
     extreme remedy in striking all of the witness's testimony, and
     appellee agreed that the matter was properly handled; the
     supreme court found no reasonable possibility that appellee
     was prejudiced or prevented from having a fair trial because
     of the stricken testimony; the trial court did not commit an
     error in failing to order a mistrial.

9.   New trial -- trial court acted to insure appellee fair trial -
     - jury verdict upheld -- grant of motion for new trial
     overruled. -- Where the trial court exercised great discipline
     and required strict compliance with rules of procedure; and
     where, when confronted with difficult decisions, the court
     reacted in such a way as to ensure that appellee received a
     fair trial, the supreme court found no reasonable possibility
     that appellee was deprived of a fair trial by reason of the
     conduct of appellant's attorney or by the actions of the trial
     court in failing to grant a mistrial and failing to strike one
     physician's testimony; the order of the trial court granting
     a new trial on those grounds was a manifest abuse of
     discretion; the supreme court overruled the grant of the
     motion for a new trial; the case was reversed and dismissed.


     Appeal from Crawford Circuit Court; Don Langston, Judge;
reversed and dismissed.
     Shaw, Ledbetter, Hornberger, Cogbill & Arnold, by: Charles R.
Ledbetter; and Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by: Philip Malcom and
Robert S. Shafer, for appellant.
     Robert S. Blatt; Morgan & Weisbrod, by: Les Weisbrod, Michael
S. Box, and William A. Newman; and The Keenan Law Firm, by: Don C.
Keenan, for appellee.
     
     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     This is a medical malpractice case.  Mr. Kenneth Greene,
appellee, was injured during surgery performed by Dr. James Y.
Suen, appellant, in November of 1986.  He filed this complaint in
July of 1990, and the matter was tried before a jury in Crawford
County in a fifteen-day trial, which lasted from September 23 to
October 13, 1995.  The jury returned a verdict absolving appellant
of medical malpractice.  On appellee's motion, the trial court
granted a new trial, and appellant appeals from that order.      
     The record in this case consists of thirty-four bound volumes
containing more than 7,400 pages together with a box of exhibits. 
We have reviewed the trial court's decision to grant a new trial
because of side-bar comments by appellant's counsel, its
determination that it had erred in not striking the testimony of
one expert witness, and that it had erred in refusing to declare a
mistrial after another witness for appellant gave unresponsive
answers in testimony.  We have concluded that these irregularities
do not meet the standard set forth in Ark. R. Civ. P. 59; that is,
they do not "materially affect the substantial rights of [the]
party."  Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a); Diemer v. Dischler, 313 Ark. 154,