Case Title: People v. Laubscher

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83518

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
People v. Laubscher, No. 83518 (9/24/98) 
                              Docket No. 83518--Agenda 11--May 1998. 
           THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
                              ANTHONY LAUBSCHER, Appellee. 
 
             CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the 
           court: 
             Defendant, Anthony Laubscher, was found guilty by the 
           circuit court of Champaign County of unlawful use of a weapon 
           and aggravated assault following a dispute on the premises of 
           his residence. Defendant appealed from his conviction for 
           unlawful use of a weapon, and the appellate court reversed, 
           concluding that the State failed to prove that at the time 
           defendant possessed the weapon, he was not either "on his land" 
           or in his "fixed place of business" as provided in the exceptions 
           to the unlawful use of weapons statute (720 ILCS 5/24--1(a)(4) 
           (West 1994)). 288 Ill. App. 3d 438. We granted the State's 
           petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now 
           affirm the appellate court. 
 
                    I. BACKGROUND 
             The altercation giving rise to this case transpired on 
           September 10, 1995, on the lawn area abutting an apartment 
           building located at 807 South Randolph in Champaign, Illinois. 
           Both defendant and complainant, Chris Darvin, resided in the 
           building. Defendant lived in "unit 3" and Darvin resided in an 
           apartment on the second floor. The State's case consisted of the 
           testimony of Darvin, defendant's friend Amanda Hinkle, and 
           Officer Chase Leonhard. Darvin testified that the two-story 
           apartment building contained eight units, and a balcony that ran 
           the length of the second floor. From the section of the balcony 
           outside his apartment, Darvin could see over bushes onto the 
           lawn area, which also ran the length of the building and 
           extended from the side of the building to the sidewalk. Darvin 
           testified that there was no fence enclosing the lawn area, and 
           that it was commonly used by people to traverse from the street 
           to the apartment building. 
             At approximately 8:30 on the night of the occurrence, 
           Darvin noticed defendant engaged in an argument with two 
           young males on the lawn area. Darvin testified that he had just 
           moved into the building at that time and had had no prior 
           contact with defendant. Darvin approached defendant and the 
           young males in an effort to break up the fight, but defendant 
           warned him to "stand back and stand fast." As Darvin began 
           backing up towards the building, he saw a gun protruding from 
           the rear waistband of defendant's pants. Darvin testified that 
           although he did not hear the entire argument, he heard defendant 
           yell to the boys, "If you have a problem with it, I got something 
           for you." Darvin believed defendant was intoxicated, so he ran 
           up behind defendant and pulled the gun out of his waistband. 
           Defendant and the two boys then fled in opposite directions, and 
           Darvin went to a nearby first-floor apartment and discussed the 
           occurrence with two female occupants. Darvin testified that after 
           about 30 to 45 seconds, defendant emerged from another 
           apartment with an SKS rifle in his hands and ran towards 
           Darvin. Darvin fled around the building in an effort to outrun 
           defendant, while defendant continued chasing Darvin with the 
           rifle. Darvin eventually succeeded in escaping into his own 
           apartment, where his fiancée telephoned the police. The police 
           arrived and placed hand restraints on defendant and Darvin, who 
           still had defendant's .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol. Darvin 
           testified that when he was on the ground in restraints he noticed 
           that defendant's gun was "cocked back" and loaded. Darvin 
           testified that he had seen defendant around the apartment 
           "complex" since the occurrence, but that at the time of the 
           incident, he was unaware defendant lived in the building. 
             The State then presented the testimony of Amanda Hinkle, 
           who indicated only that she was present in defendant's 
           apartment at the time of the occurrence, and that defendant lived 
           at the apartment building. Finally, Officer Leonhard indicated 
           that he responded to the call regarding the altercation, and 
           testified regarding his search of defendant's apartment and 
           confiscation of the weapons wielded by defendant. The defense 
           rested without presenting any evidence. 
             Following arguments, the court found defendant guilty of 
           unlawful use of weapons and aggravated assault, sentencing him 
           to 24 months' probation and 150 hours of public service. The 
           appellate court reversed the unlawful use of weapons conviction, 
           finding that the State failed to prove that at the time defendant 
           was observed in possession of the weapon, he was not either 
           "on his land" or in his "fixed place of business" as provided in 
           the exceptions to the unlawful use of weapons statute. 720 ILCS 
           5/24--1(a)(4) (West 1994). 
 
                    II. ANALYSIS 
             The State initially asserts that it presented sufficient 
           evidence that defendant was not on his land at the time Darvin 
           observed him with the weapon. Section 24--1(a)(4) of the 
           Criminal Code of 1961 provides: 
               "(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of 
                        weapons when he knowingly: 
                        * * * 
               (4) Carries or possesses *** concealed on or about his 
                        person except when on his land or in his own abode or 
                        fixed place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or 
                        taser or other firearm ***." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 
                        5/24--1(a)(4) (West 1994). 
           As can be seen, the legislature has included the above-italicized 
           exceptions within the statutory definition of the offense of 
           unlawful use of weapons. When an exception appears as part of 
           the body of a substantive offense, the State bears the burden of 
           disproving the existence of the exception beyond a reasonable 
           doubt in order to sustain a conviction for the offense. Cf. People 
           v. Saltis, 328 Ill. 494, 500-01 (1927); People v. Chmilenko, 44 
           Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1062 (1976); see generally Mullaney v. 
           Wilbur,  421 U.S. 684 , 44 L. Ed. 2d 508, 95 S. Ct. 1881 (1975). 
           It is well established that, in sustaining this burden, the State 
           may rely upon circumstantial evidence, as long as it provides 
           proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crime 
           charged. People v. Campbell,  146 Ill. 2d 363 , 379 (1992). 
           However, there must be some evidence giving rise to a 
           reasonable inference of defendant's guilt; the State may not 
           leave to conjecture or assumption essential elements of the 
           crime. Cf. People v. Magnafichi,  9 Ill. 2d 169 , 173 (1956); In re 
           Whittenburg, 37 Ill. App. 3d 793, 795 (1976). 
             In reversing defendant's conviction, the appellate court 
           noted a complete lack of evidence regarding the nature of 
           defendant's interest in the land encompassing the apartment 
           building. The court concluded that, although it was not 
           unreasonable for the trial court to assume defendant had no 
           ownership interest in the premises, permitting such an inference 
           without any evidentiary basis would effectively shift the burden 
           to defendant to prove that he was on his land or that he 
           otherwise fell within an exception to section 24--1(a)(4). We 
           agree with the appellate court's reasoning. The sole evidence 
           offered by the State regarding defendant's connection with the 
           property was that he "lived in the building." There was no proof 
           of his interest in his unit or the surrounding land, or as to the 
           ownership of the property in general. Although, on one 
           occasion, Darvin loosely referred to occupants of the building 
           as "tenants," this was insufficient to establish beyond a 
           reasonable doubt defendant's particular interest in the premises. 
             The State alternatively asserts that, even if defendant did 
           possess some fee interest in the premises, he would still not be 
           protected under the "on his land" exception because the lawn 
           was a common area of the property that was readily accessible 
           to the public and residents of the building. In support of this 
           position, the State points to Darvin's testimony that the lawn 
           area was commonly traversed by people to get to and from their 
           apartments. 
             In several jurisdictions with statutory language comparable 
           to that of section 24--1(a)(4), courts have construed the phrase 
           "on his own premises" or "on his own lands" to exclude public 
           lands, including those portions of an individual's property which 
           that individual has opened to the public. See, e.g., State v. 
           Perry, 120 N.C. 580, 26 S.E. 915 (1897); Moss v. State, 65 Ark. 
           368, 45 S.W. 987 (1898). One court has held that an exception 
           for any individual carrying a weapon on "land possessed by 
           him" did not encompass the common areas of that individual's 
           apartment building or areas of the premises over which the 
           accused lacked "exclusive control and possession." White v. 
           United States,  283 A.2d 21 ,  24  (D.C. 1971); see also Fortune v. 
           United States, 570 A.2d 809 (D.C. 1990); Hines v. United 
           States,  326 A.2d 247  (D.C. 1974). We find that the 
           interpretation advanced by these courts is not justified under the 
           plain meaning of section 24--1(a). The legislature's intent in 
           enacting a statute must first be ascertained by reference to the 
           statutory language itself. Where an enactment is clear and 
           unambiguous, this court is not at liberty to read into it 
           exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not 
           express; nor should this court search for any subtle or not 
           readily apparent intention of the legislature. People v. Woodard, 
           175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997). Further, because section 24--1 is a 
           penal statute, it must be strictly construed in favor of the 
           accused, and nothing should be taken by intendment or 
           implication beyond the obvious or literal meaning of the statute. 
           Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d  at 444; People v. Shinkle,  128 Ill. 2d 480 , 
           486 (1989). 
             Section 24--1(a)(4) broadly excepts from culpability any 
           individual carrying a weapon while on "his land," meaning land 
           over which he enjoys some ownership interest. There is nothing 
           in the statute limiting the meaning of this phrase based upon the 
           exclusivity of the individual's possession of the land, or the 
           degree of public access he permits on the property. We believe 
           that, had the legislature intended such a restriction, it would 
           have explicitly provided for it. Further, to interpret this 
           exception as the State suggests would be to expand the scope of 
           the offense of unlawful use of weapons beyond the clear intent 
           of the legislature. 
             The interpretation proposed by the State is further 
           undermined by section 24--1(a)(10) of the statute, which makes 
           it a criminal offense for an individual to "[carry or possess] *** 
           upon any public street, alley, or other public lands within the 
           corporate limits of a city, village or incorporated town, *** 
           except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of 
           business, any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other 
           firearm." 720 ILCS 5/24--1(a)(10) (West 1994). This section 
           would permit an individual to carry or possess a firearm even on 
           land classified as "public," as long as that individual had an 
           ownership interest in the property. Seemingly, section 24-- 
           1(a)(10) was intended to eliminate any restriction of a person's 
           right to carry a weapon on areas of his property which are 
           readily accessible to or open for use by the public. Construed 
           together, sections 24--1(a)(4) and (a)(10) provide no basis for 
           the interpretation argued by the State. Thus, the State's 
           argument must fail. In light of our decision on this issue, we do 
           not reach the question of whether defendant was in his fixed 
           place of business under section 24--1(a)(4). 
 
 
                   III. CONCLUSION 
             For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate 
           court is affirmed. 
 
                                            Affirmed.