Case Title: State ex rel. Preschool Dev., Ltd. v. Springboro

Citation: 2003-Ohio-3999

Docket Number: 20021785

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Preschool Dev., Ltd. v. Springboro, 99 Ohio St.3d 347, 2003-Ohio-3999.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. PRESCHOOL DEVELOPMENT, LTD. v. CITY OF SPRINGBORO. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Preschool Dev., Ltd. v. Springboro, 99 Ohio St.3d 347, 
2003-Ohio-3999.] 
Mandamus to compel city of Springboro to bring appropriation proceedings 
after it eliminated a curb cut from relator’s property to State Route 73 — 
Writ denied. 
(No. 2002-1785 — Submitted April 15, 2003 — Decided August 13, 2003.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶1} 
State Route 73 is a five-lane highway that runs through the city of 
Springboro, Ohio, respondent, for approximately 3.3 miles.  S.R. 73, which is also 
known as East Central Avenue and West Central Avenue, is the primary east-west 
highway in the region.  Most commercial activity in Springboro occurs along S.R. 
73. 
{¶2} 
Relator, Preschool Development, Ltd. (“PDL”), is a limited 
liability company that operates a daycare facility located on property it owns on 
S.R. 73 in Springboro.  No public street other than S.R. 73 abuts or otherwise 
adjoins PDL’s property. 
{¶3} 
In 1998, when a daycare center was anticipated on the site, a curb 
cut providing for vehicular access between the property and S.R. 73 was 
constructed.  All necessary permits to develop the property, including the permit 
for the construction of the curb cut, had been obtained.  In 1999, the chief 
executive officer of PDL transferred the property to PDL and sought to convert 
the property from single-family use to commercial use.  Raj K. Sharma, the City 
Engineer for Springboro, advised the city that although left turns in and out of 
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PDL’s existing curb cut had been acceptable for the low traffic volumes 
associated with a single-family residence, these left turns would be hazardous for 
business-generated traffic volumes. 
{¶4} 
Subsequently, the city advised PDL that the safest alternative 
would be to grant PDL and its customers access to S.R. 73 through the property of 
Discount Drug Mart Plaza, an adjacent shopping center then being constructed. 
{¶5} 
In June and July 2002, the Ohio Department of Transportation 
(“ODOT”) began repaving S.R. 73 near PDL’s property.  During this process, on 
the city’s instruction, ODOT removed PDL’s curb cut to S.R. 73 after 
determining that closing the curb cut would best maximize safety and traffic flow.  
ODOT replaced the curb cut with a four-inch concrete barrier. 
{¶6} 
Springboro and the general public received a permanent easement 
for vehicular and pedestrian traffic between PDL’s property and the curb cut for 
Discount Drug Mart Plaza that allows access to S.R. 73.  The distance from the 
center line of the original PDL curb cut to the center line of the Discount Drug 
Mart Plaza curb cut is approximately 207 feet.  The distance from the eastern 
boundary of the PDL property to the center of the Discount Drug Mart Plaza curb 
cut is approximately 94 feet.  According to Sharma, traffic to and from the 
shopping center and the PDL property now maintains a reasonable traffic flow. 
{¶7} 
On July 23, 2002, PDL filed a complaint in the Warren County 
Court of Common Pleas claiming that Springboro’s elimination of its curb cut 
onto S.R. 73 violated a written contract as well as the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions.  PDL sought a writ of mandamus to compel Springboro to bring 
appropriation proceedings under R.C. Chapter 163 and to grant access to certain 
documents.  PDL also raised claims for trespass, declaratory judgment, and relief 
under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code.  After Springboro notified PDL of 
removal of the case to a federal district court, PDL dismissed its complaint 
without prejudice on July 29, 2002. 
January Term, 2003 
3 
{¶8} 
Nearly three months later, in October 2002, PDL filed this action 
for a writ of mandamus to compel Springboro to bring an appropriation action for 
the elimination of the curb cut.  The city answered, and following the issuance of 
an alternative writ, the parties submitted evidence and briefs. 
{¶9} 
This cause is now before the court upon the city’s request for oral 
argument and on the merits. 
Oral Argument 
{¶10} We deny Springboro’s request for oral argument.  The city does 
not specify why oral argument would be beneficial.  Johnson v. Timmerman-
Cooper (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 614, 615, 757 N.E.2d 1153.  Furthermore, this case 
does not involve any conflict between courts of appeals or complex legal or 
factual matters that would benefit from oral argument.  State ex rel. Stacy v. 
Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 269, 2002-Ohio-6322, 779 
N.E.2d 216, ¶ 13.  And although this case does raise a constitutional issue, we 
have resolved comparable takings cases without oral argument.  See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 529, 532-533, 
751 N.E.2d 1032; State ex rel. Painesville v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2001), 93 
Ohio St.3d 566, 569, 757 N.E.2d 347. 
Mandamus—Appropriation 
{¶11} PDL asserts that it is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel 
Springboro to commence appropriation proceedings. 
{¶12} The United States and Ohio Constitutions guarantee that private 
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.  Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Section 19, Article I, 
Ohio Constitution.  “Mandamus is the appropriate action to compel public 
authorities to institute appropriation proceedings where an involuntary taking of 
private property is alleged.”  State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2002), 95 Ohio 
St.3d 59, 63, 765 N.E.2d 345, reconsideration granted in part on other grounds, 96 
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Ohio St.3d 379, 2002-Ohio-4905, 775 N.E.2d 493, certiorari denied (2003), ___ 
U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 1484, 155 L.Ed.2d 226.  As the relator, PDL has the burden of 
proving its entitlement to the writ.  Elsass, 92 Ohio St.3d at 533-534, 751 N.E.2d 
1032. 
{¶13} PDL claims that the city’s elimination of its curb cut denied its 
right of access to the abutting public highway, S.R. 73, and constituted a 
compensable taking.  “ ‘In cases of * * * destruction of a fundamental attribute of 
ownership like the right of access, the landowner need not establish the 
deprivation of all economically viable uses of the land.’ ” (Emphasis sic.)  State 
ex rel. Sekermestrovich v. Akron (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 536, 537-538, 740 N.E.2d 
252, quoting State ex rel. BSW Dev. Group v. Dayton (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 
342, 699 N.E.2d 1271.  Instead, the landowner must demonstrate “a substantial or 
unreasonable interference with a property right.”  State ex rel.  OTR v. Columbus 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 203, 206, 667 N.E.2d 8. 
{¶14} Consistent with these holdings, “[a] property owner’s right of 
access to his property from a street or highway upon which it abuts cannot be 
lawfully destroyed or unreasonably affected * * *.”  State ex rel. McKay v. Kauer 
(1951), 156 Ohio St. 347, 46 O.O. 204, 102 N.E.2d 703, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
{¶15} Here, however, the city did not destroy or unreasonably interfere 
with PDL’s right of access to and from S.R. 73.  It is true that PDL no longer has 
access to and from S.R. 73 directly from its property.  It does, however, have 
access to and from S.R. 73 via a route that runs parallel to S.R. 73 from its 
property to the center line of the curb cut of an adjacent shopping center for a total 
length of 94 feet.  The fact that drivers must negotiate one additional turn and 
travel 207 feet along a secondary access route rather than on S.R. 73 to reach the 
PDL parking lot does not warrant a finding of a compensable taking.  See State ex 
rel. Merritt v. Linzell (1955), 163 Ohio St. 97, 56 O.O. 166, 126 N.E.2d 53, 
January Term, 2003 
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paragraph two of the syllabus (“Mere circuity of travel, necessarily and newly 
created, to and from real property does not of itself result in legal impairment of 
the right of ingress and egress to and from such property * * *”). 
{¶16} We reached a similar conclusion in State ex rel. Noga v. Masheter 
(1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 471, 71 O.O.2d 484, 330 N.E.2d 439.  In that case, we 
denied a writ of mandamus to compel the Director of Highways to commence 
appropriation proceedings.  We ruled that the state’s elimination of the 
landowners’ direct access to a highway by constructing a curb barricade along the 
edge of the highway fronting their property did not constitute a compensable 
taking.  In that case, the state had constructed a service road that gave the 
landowners access to the highway, which was approximately 500 feet from their 
property.  In the case at bar, the city and the public were granted a perpetual 
easement across the adjacent shopping center property to a curb cut to S.R. 73, 
which is only about 207 feet from PDL’s original curb cut.  In Noga, the distance 
involved was more than twice as long, yet we did not find the elimination of the 
owner’s direct access from its property to result in a compensable taking. 
{¶17} PDL’s reliance on OTR is misplaced.  In OTR, 76 Ohio St.3d 203, 
667 N.E.2d 8, syllabus, we held that an “owner of a parcel of real property has a 
right to access public streets or highways on which the land abuts.  Therefore, any 
governmental action that substantially or unreasonably interferes with this right 
constitutes a taking of private property * * *.” (Emphasis added.)  Although OTR 
referred to the denial of access to the abutting public roadway along the frontage 
of the property, we do not view this language as controlling here.  This reference  
was made in an appreciably different factual context in which the government’s 
action of building a railroad overpass not only significantly changed the grade of 
the property frontage, but also involved the building of massive concrete retaining 
walls precluding the property owner from ever developing any access routes onto 
the abutting road—an action which the majority found “destroyed or at the very 
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least substantially impaired” the owners’ right of access to its properties.”  Id. at 
209, 667 N.E.2d 8.  We reject the argument that OTR stands for the proposition 
that a substantial or unreasonable interference with access to abutting roads 
necessarily occurs when that access no longer is direct from the frontage of the 
parcel itself. 
{¶18} Because the elimination of PDL’s curb cut onto S.R. 73 did not 
substantially or unreasonably interfere with its access to the property from S.R. 
73, we deny the writ.  PDL has not established that the city’s elimination of the 
curb cut represented a compensable taking.  By so holding, we need not address 
the city’s alternative argument that PDL’s previously dismissed action constituted 
an adequate remedy at law that precludes its entitlement to the writ here. 
Writ denied. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶19} Because the property at issue will not house a preschool forever, 
and because this damaging decision will be around forever, I respectfully dissent. 
{¶20} The determination of this case comes down to whether the 
applicable precedent is State ex rel. OTR v. Columbus (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 203, 
667 N.E.2d 8, or State ex rel. Noga v. Masheter (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 471, 71 
O.O.2d 484, 330 N.E.2d 439.  The majority’s reliance on Noga is misplaced; 
OTR, on the other hand, is directly analogous. 
{¶21} In Noga, the appellees owned property abutting U.S. Route 422, a 
four-lane highway in Trumbull County.  Until 1968, the appellees had direct 
access to the westbound lanes of Route 422.  In 1968, however, the state changed 
the entire character of the roadway, widening it and transforming it into a limited-
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access highway.  However, the state constructed a service road to which each 
property owner had its own access, and that road connected to Route 422. 
{¶22} In this case, S.R. 73’s character was not transformed.  Other 
property owners along S.R. 73 retained their direct access to the roadway, unlike 
in Noga, where every property owner was affected.  Most important, in Noga, 
each property owner ended up with its own direct access to a public road; here, 
PDL is left without its own direct access to a public road. 
{¶23} State ex rel. Merritt v. Linzell (1955), 163 Ohio St. 97, 56 O.O. 
166, 126 N.E.2d 53, the case cited by the majority for the proposition that “[m]ere 
circuity of travel, necessarily and newly created, to and from real property does 
not of itself result in legal impairment of the right of ingress and egress to and 
from such property * * *,” also addresses a situation completely different from the 
case at bar.  In Merritt, aggrieved property owners had abutted U.S. Highway 50 
in Athens County until the state relocated five miles of that highway to avoid a 
long, sweeping curve.  These property owners found themselves on the old 
portion of the road, which became a part of the Athens County highway system.  
Access lanes were built to connect the former U.S. 50 to the new U.S. 50.  Again 
in Merritt, as in Noga, while the entire character of the roadway was changed, all 
landowners retained their own direct ingress and egress from a public road. 
{¶24} OTR is the case that is more directly on point.  OTR held two 
parcels of real property on East Campus View Boulevard in Columbus.  Neither 
property had established driveways along the properties’ frontage on Campus 
View Boulevard.  Both properties were accessible by other driveways not going 
through OTR’s Campus View frontage.  The city of Columbus decided to extend 
Campus View Boulevard, and that project involved changing the grade of the 
road and constructing an overpass over railroad tracks.  Those changes in the road 
prevented OTR from ever developing access routes along the building’s frontage 
on Campus View Boulevard.  Despite the fact that direct access onto Campus 
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View did not yet even exist, this court held that the city had substantially or 
unreasonably interfered with OTR’s right of access.  This court rejected the 
holding of the appellate court that “ ‘[o]nly where the denial of an undeveloped 
right of access results in a complete loss of access to the property * * * will the 
denial be found to constitute a “substantial interference.” ’ ” OTR, 76 Ohio St.3d 
at 206, 667 N.E.2d 8. 
{¶25} In OTR, as here, another way of entering the property remained.  
But the city “interfered with an existing property right—the right to access 
Campus View Boulevard from appellants’ abutting properties.” Id., 76 Ohio St.3d 
at 209, 667 N.E.2d 8.  As the court held in OTR, “The law in Ohio is clear.  An 
owner of a parcel of real property has a right to access public streets or highways 
on which the property abuts.” Id. at 211, 667 N.E.2d 8.  That law applies just as 
clearly to PDL as it did to OTR. 
{¶26} A complete denial of direct access to the abutting street 
substantially interferes with a property possessor’s ownership rights.  Here, we 
are not dealing with mere potential access to the abutting thoroughfare, but 
existing access.  Based on OTR, PDL has established a compensable taking.  “An 
owner of property abutting on a public highway possesses, as a matter of law, not 
only the right to the use of the highway in common with other members of the 
public, but also a private right or easement for the purpose of ingress and egress to 
and from his property, which latter right may not be taken away or destroyed or 
substantially impaired without compensation therefor.”  Merritt, 163 Ohio St. 97, 
56 O.O. 166, 126 N.E.2d 53, paragraph one of the syllabus.  When the abutting 
property owner’s access-easement is extinguished, a compensable taking occurs.  
Rothwell v. Linzell (1955), 163 Ohio St. 517, 56 O.O. 431, 127 N.E.2d 524. 
{¶27} We should not approach this case by merely asking how 
unreasonable it is for a daycare business to have its means of street entry moved 
207 feet onto an adjoining property.  We must consider whether a complete 
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removal of access directly from this property to the street is a substantial 
impairment of the right of access.  One might dispute the value of this taking, but 
that is a matter properly determined in an appropriation proceeding. 
{¶28} Part of the wisdom of OTR is its recognition that unused access is 
still valuable.  The PDL property will most likely not house a daycare center in 
perpetuity.  When the owners sell the property, would its value be diminished 
without its own curb cut?  When faced with properties in a similar location, which 
would a buyer choose, the property with or without its own access to the 
roadway?  The age-old adage is that the three most important considerations in 
determining the value of a piece of property are location, location, and location.  
From the standpoint of real estate values (excepting residential), direct access to a 
busy street or highway is among the most important aspects of location. Renne, 
How Industry Changes Are Affecting Restaurant Property Values (Sept./Oct. 
1998), Assessment J. 31; Smalley, Measuring the Convenience of Gas Stations 
(Oct. 1999), Appraisal J. 399. 
{¶29} Our holding today will affect property owners statewide, not 
merely the owners and operators of this daycare center.  The majority’s holding 
that a local government may take away a property owner’s direct access to the 
roadway without compensation undermines the value of every piece of 
commercial property.  It affects owners, lenders, and developers by creating a 
cloud on value.  No one can be certain what the owner actually owns. 
{¶30} The question may arise, as a practical matter, as to how often 
takings like the one in this case might actually happen.  The answer is: Often, if 
you don’t have to pay.  The great restraint on this type of arbitrary taking is the 
knowledge of governments that they are constitutionally required to pay for what 
they take.  Our state’s commitment to that idea is so fundamental as to be 
explicitly set forth in the Ohio Constitution.  Section 19, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution states: 
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{¶31} “Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to 
the public welfare.  When taken in time of war or other public exigency, 
imperatively requiring its immediate seizure, or for the purpose of making or 
repairing roads, which shall be open to the public, without charge, a compensation 
shall be made to the owner, in money, and in all other cases, where private 
property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefor shall first be made 
in money, or first secured by a deposit of money, and such compensation shall be 
assessed by a jury, without deduction for benefits to any property of the owner.” 
{¶32} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is equally 
applicable here. The Fifth Amendment declares, “No person * * * shall be * * * 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 
{¶33} Here, there was no due process and no compensation.  Over a July 
weekend in 2002, the entrance to PDL simply disappeared, replaced by a four-
inch barrier.  Springboro gave PDL no prior notice or warning.  While ODOT was 
in the neighborhood resurfacing S.R. 73, the city simply instructed the ODOT 
contractor to curb over PDL’s entry. 
{¶34} The majority’s decision invites cities to curb over any driveway in 
the interest of safety, as long as there remains a plausible, indirect way to reach 
the abutting roadway.  It establishes the possibility of competitive advantages for 
certain landowners.  What Wendy’s owner wouldn’t say, “For the good of the 
town, and the safety of its citizens, please close off the driveway to McDonald’s.  
If you do that, out of our sense of civic responsibility, we will grant McDonald’s 
an easement, so that anyone hungry for a hamburger can enter through our 
driveway.  And feel free to ‘biggie size’ that curb!” 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2003 
11 
 
Finney, Stagnaro, Saba & Klusmeier Co., L.P.A., Mark H. Klusmeier and 
Paul T. Saba, for relator. 
 
Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis, L.L.P., Wilson G. Weisenfelder Jr. and 
James J. Englert; and Roger C. Eckert, Springboro Law Director, for respondent. 
__________________