Case Title: Ferguson v. City of Chicago

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97218

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 97218-Agenda 5-November 2004.
PIERRE FERGUSON, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, 							Appellee.
Opinion filed November 18, 2004.
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiff, Pierre Ferguson, brought an action in the circuit court
of Cook County to recover damages from defendant, the City of
Chicago (the City), for malicious prosecution. The City moved to
dismiss Ferguson's action, arguing, inter alia, that it was barred by
the one-year limitations period set forth in the Local Governmental
and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS
10/8-101 (West 2000)). The circuit court found the City's limitations
defense to be meritorious and dismissed Ferguson's complaint
pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2000)). The circuit court's judgment was
affirmed by the appellate court. 343 Ill. App. 3d 60. We subsequently
granted Ferguson's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For
the reasons that follow, we now reverse and remand to the circuit
court for further proceedings.
	Because this matter comes before us in the context of a dismissal
under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we must accept
as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and all
inferences that may reasonably be drawn in the plaintiff's favor.
Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 263, 277 (2003). Pursuant to this
standard, and based on the allegations in Ferguson's complaint, the
facts of this case are as follows.
	Ferguson is a resident of the City of Chicago. On July 31, 1999,
he looked out the window of his home and saw an ambulance being
driven the wrong way down a one-way street and strike another
vehicle. When Chicago police officers arrived at the scene to
investigate the collision, Ferguson approached them to report what he
had witnessed. The officers refused to speak with Ferguson and
ordered him to return to his property. Ferguson complied.
	The driver of the ambulance denied, falsely, that he had been
negligent. When it appeared to Ferguson that the investigating officers
were going to accept the ambulance driver's version of what had
taken place, Ferguson told the officers that neither the ambulance's
emergency lights nor its sirens had been activated.
	The officers responded to Ferguson's statements by walking into
his yard and placing him under arrest. According to Ferguson's
complaint, the police subsequently misled the prosecutors assigned to
the case by claiming that Ferguson had been arrested because he was
swearing at them in a loud voice and refused to stop. The officers also
gave false statements that Ferguson had resisted arrest and struck one
of the officers in the chest.
	Ferguson was charged with three misdemeanor offenses. He
retained counsel to represent him. After Ferguson had appeared in
court nine times, the assistant State's Attorney who was prosecuting
the case concluded that the arresting officers had lied. The assistant
State's Attorney therefore requested that the charges be "stricken with
leave to reinstate,"or SOL'd.
	The court granted the State's request and SOL'd the charges on
August 25, 2000. Ferguson's lawyer immediately filed a written
demand for a trial. Pursuant to section 103-5(b) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2000)),
Ferguson was entitled to be tried within 160 days from the date of that
demand. The 160-day speedy-trial period subsequently elapsed on
February 1, 2001, without any further action by the State or the court.
The prosecutor never sought leave to reinstate the charges and no trial
was ever conducted.
	On January 29, 2002, Ferguson filed a one-count complaint for
malicious prosecution against the City based on the foregoing events.
The City made a timely motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2000)). Three arguments were advanced by the
City in support of its motion: (1) Ferguson's cause of action was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations; (2) another action
was pending between the same parties for the same cause in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois; and
(3) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it did not
allege sufficient facts to establish certain elements necessary to prevail
on a claim of malicious prosecution.
	Following a hearing, the circuit court agreed with the City's
contention that Ferguson's cause of action was untimely. It therefore
dismissed the cause of action pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2000)). The
court did not rule on the City's claim that Ferguson failed to state a
cause of action, nor did it reach the question of whether Ferguson's
complaint should be dismissed based on the pendency of his other
lawsuit in federal court.
	The appellate court affirmed. Ferguson sought and obtained leave
to appeal to our court, and the matter is now before us for review. On
this appeal, the State does not argue that dismissal of Ferguson's
cause of action should be sustained on the grounds that his complaint
fails to state a cause of action or because it is the subject of another
pending action between the same parties. The sole question we are
asked to consider is whether plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.
	In determining whether a cause of action is untimely, we are not
bound by the conclusions of either the circuit or the appellate court.
Whether a cause of action was properly dismissed under section
2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure based on the statute of
limitations is a matter we review de novo. See Alicea v. Snyder, 321
Ill. App. 3d 248, 252 (2001).
	As indicated earlier in this opinion, Ferguson's complaint asserts
a civil action for damages against the City of Chicago. Because the
City is a local public entity, and because Ferguson seeks to hold it
liable in tort for injuries he sustained, Ferguson's action is subject to
section 8-101 of the Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 2000)).
Section 8-101 of the Act provides that a civil action sounding in tort
asserted against a local entity or any of its employees must be
"commenced within one year from the date that the injury was
received or the cause of action accrued." 745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West
2000).
	A cause of action for malicious prosecution does not accrue until
the criminal proceeding on which it is based has been terminated in the
plaintiff's favor. See Stanger v. Felix, 97 Ill. App. 3d 585, 586-87
(1981). The point of contention in this case is when the criminal
proceedings against Ferguson should be deemed to have been
terminated. The City's position, with which the circuit and appellate
courts both agreed, is that the proceedings terminated on August 25,
2000, when the circuit court entered its order striking the criminal
charges with leave to reinstate. Ferguson, however, argues that
striking a charge with leave to reinstate is not a final disposition of the
criminal proceedings. He contends that the proceedings remained
pending and that the State remained free to reinstate the charges until
the statutory speedy-trial period expired. Accordingly, he asserts that
expiration of the speedy-trial period, not striking of the charges, is the
operative event for assessing the timeliness of his malicious
prosecution action. After careful consideration, we find Ferguson's
argument to be meritorious.
	An order striking a case with leave to reinstate, while not
provided for by any rule or statute, is common practice in the circuit
court of Cook County. It is used almost exclusively in criminal cases.
See People ex rel. De Vos v. Laurin, 73 Ill. App. 3d 219, 222 (1979).
Where a case is stricken with leave to reinstate, the matter remains
undisposed of. The same charges continue to lie against the accused,
albeit in a dormant state. See People v. Daniels, 190 Ill. App. 3d 224,
226 (1989). The matter may still be placed on the docket and brought
to trial if there is a subsequent motion to reinstate. People v. St. John,
369 Ill. 177, 178 (1938). Accordingly, the courts of Illinois have
consistently recognized that the striking of charges with leave to
reinstate does not terminate the proceedings against the accused.
People v. Bryant, 409 Ill. 467, 470 (1951); see Khan v. American
Airlines, 266 Ill. App. 3d 726, 732 (1994); People v. Rodgers, 106 Ill.
App. 3d 741, 745 (1982); People v. Griffin, 58 Ill. App. 3d 644, 646
(1978). Indeed, our court has expressly held that an SOL order
excludes the conclusion that the case is at an end. People v. St. John,
369 Ill.  at 178.
	Because an SOL order does not finally dispose of criminal
proceedings, the circuit court's order of August 25, 2000, striking the
criminal charges against Ferguson with leave to reinstate did not result
in a termination, favorable or otherwise, of the criminal case against
him. The criminal charges remained pending. It necessarily follows
that Ferguson's malicious prosecution claim had yet to accrue. Entry
of the August 25 order therefore did not trigger commencement of the
limitations period on that claim. As a result, the circuit and appellate
courts erred in holding that Ferguson's action was time-barred
because it was not filed within one year of the August 25 order.
	In urging us to uphold the circuit court's and appellate court's
judgments, the City relies on our decisions in Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504 (1996), and Cult Awareness Network v. Church of
Scientology International, 177 Ill. 2d 267 (1997). Neither of those
decisions, however, raised the question of how soon a plaintiff was
required to bring suit for malicious prosecution where, as here, the
underlying criminal charges were stricken with leave to reinstate.
	In Swick, the underlying criminal charges were not stricken with
leave to reinstate. They were nol-prossed. The two procedures are
qualitatively different. A nolle prosequi is a formal entry of record
whereby the prosecuting attorney declares that he is unwilling to
prosecute a case. People v. Daniels, 187 Ill. 2d 301, 312 (1999). In
contrast to an SOL order, which leaves the criminal proceedings
pending, a nolle prosequi order terminates the charge and requires the
institution of a new and separate proceeding to prosecute the
defendant. See People v. Sanders, 86 Ill. App. 3d 457, 469 (1980).
	The difference in the nature of the two procedures has practical
consequences. Because a case which has been SOL'd remains
pending, the statute of limitations for filing the underlying criminal
charges is tolled (see People v. East-West University, Inc., 265 Ill.
App. 3d 557, 562 (1994)), while the statutory speedy-trial period
continues to run as long as the defendant demands trial (see People v.
East-West University, Inc., 265 Ill. App. 3d at 567). Where the case
has been nol-prossed, the converse is true. Because nol-prossing
terminates the case and returns the matter to the same conditions
which existed before the prosecution commenced (see Swick v.
Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d at 512-13), it does not toll the statute of
limitations. As a general rule, however, it does toll the running of the
statutory speedy-trial period. See People v. Hillsman, 329 Ill. App. 3d
1110, 1117 (2002).
	Because the charges in Swick were nol-prossed, there was no
dispute that the criminal proceeding had been terminated. The real
question in that case was whether the termination was favorable to the
plaintiff, thereby satisfying an essential element for a malicious
prosecution claim. We held that the bare fact that a case has been nol-prossed is not sufficient to establish that the case was terminated
favorably for the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the
prosecutor abandoned the case for reasons indicative of the plaintiff's
innocence. Swick, 169 Ill. 2d  at 513.
	That problem is not presented by the matter under consideration
today. No one disputes that the circuit court's decision to SOL the
charges against Ferguson represented a favorable outcome for him.
The point is that, favorable or not, the decision did not have the effect
of terminating the case. Accordingly, whatever uncertainty may arise
regarding the finality of criminal proceedings when charges are nol-prossed is not present here. The charges in this case were SOL'd.
Under settled Illinois case law, charges stricken with leave remain
pending. Nothing in Swick alters that conclusion.
	Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology International,
177 Ill. 2d 267 (1997), is distinguishable for similar reasons. It did not
involve applicability of the statutory limitations period where criminal
charges had been SOL'd. It did not involve the SOL procedure.
Moreover, in contrast to Swick, it did not even involve criminal
charges. The action arose from a series of civil actions which
defendants had filed against the plaintiff in various jurisdictions around
the United States. After all the actions had concluded, plaintiff sued
defendants, alleging that defendants had conspired with each other to
carry out a campaign of malicious prosecution for the express purpose
of causing plaintiff's bankruptcy and eventual disbandment.
	The circuit court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The
appellate court affirmed. The matter then came before us for review.
The primary issue was whether plaintiff's complaint had alleged
sufficient facts to support a cause of action for conspiracy. Resolution
of that issue, in turn, depended on whether plaintiff had alleged
sufficient facts to satisfy two of the elements of malicious prosecution,
special injury and favorable termination of the underlying suits. Cult
Awareness Network, 177 Ill. 2d  at 272.
	Special injury is not at issue in the present case. As for the
question of favorable termination, the situation in Cult Awareness
Network was similar to Swick, in that there was no question that the
underlying litigation had been terminated. The dispute concerned
whether the termination had been favorable to the plaintiffs who now
sought recovery based on the theory of malicious prosecution. In
resolving that dispute, we adopted the view that, for purposes of a
malicious prosecution action, whether disposition of the underlying
matter constitutes a termination that is favorable to the plaintiff turns
upon the circumstances under which the disposition was obtained.
Cult Awareness Network, 177 Ill. 2d  at 277-80.
	That principle remains good law. As with our decision in Swick,
however, it is simply not relevant to this case. Cult Awareness
Network provides the standard for assessing whether a prior
disposition was favorable. It does not speak to the threshold question
of whether the disposition marked termination of the prior
proceedings. As with Swick, it therefore does not alter our conclusion
the circuit court's SOL order did not terminate the criminal
proceedings against Ferguson. Those proceedings remained pending
even after the SOL order was entered. Accordingly, that order could
not have triggered the statutory limitations period governing
Ferguson's malicious prosecution claim.
	The criminal proceedings against Ferguson did not terminate, and
Ferguson's malicious prosecution claim did not accrue, until such time
as the State was precluded from seeking reinstatement of the charges.
That period was marked by the expiration of the statutory speedy-trial
period. As noted at the outset of this opinion, Ferguson's lawyer made
a speedy-trial demand immediately after the charges were SOL'd on
August 25, 2000. The State had 160 days from that time to bring him
to trial. The 160-day period ended February 1, 2001, with no further
action having been taken by the State or the court. It was then, and
not before, that the underlying criminal proceedings against Ferguson
must therefore be deemed to have terminated. See Velez v. Avis Rent
A Car System, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 923, 929 (1999); Rich v.
Baldwin, 133 Ill. App. 3d 712, 717-19 (1985). Correspondingly, it
was then, and not before, that Ferguson's cause of action for
malicious prosecution accrued.
	Under the limitations period set forth in section 8-101 of the
Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity
Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 2000)), Ferguson had one year from
February 1, 2001, to file his malicious prosecution claim against the
City. The record shows his complaint was filed January 29, 2002,
within the one-year limitations period. Ferguson's cause of action was
therefore timely and should not have been dismissed under section
2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5)
(West 2000)).
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the appellate and
circuit courts are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.