Case Title: Williams v. Condit

Citation: 

Docket Number: 020476

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
KATHLEEN MORIARTY WILLIAMS 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 020476 
January 10, 2003 
 
KATHARINA CONDIT, AS PERSONAL  
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF  
ROSS R. CONDIT, JR. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Henry E. Hudson, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred by granting the defendant's motion to strike the 
plaintiff's evidence on the basis that the plaintiff failed to 
present corroborating testimony as required by Code § 8.01-
397, commonly referred to as the dead man's statute. 
 
Plaintiff, Kathleen Moriarty Williams, filed her motion 
for judgment in the circuit court against Katharina Condit, 
personal representative of the estate of Ross R. Condit, Jr.  
Plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries that she 
allegedly sustained as a result of an automobile accident that 
was purportedly caused by the negligence of Ross Condit, who 
died after the accident from unrelated causes. 
 
At a jury trial, plaintiff was the only witness who 
testified in her case-in-chief about the circumstances 
surrounding the accident.  Plaintiff testified that she was 
involved in an automobile accident on December 17, 1997 as she 
was driving her car south on Dolly Madison Boulevard in 
Fairfax County.  Plaintiff stated that as she approached the 
intersection of Dolly Madison Boulevard and Ingleside Avenue, 
a car entered her lane of travel and collided with her 
vehicle. 
 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, defendant made 
a motion to strike the evidence on the basis that plaintiff 
failed to satisfy the requirements of Code § 8.01-397 because 
she did not present any evidence that corroborated her version 
of how the accident occurred.  The circuit court took the 
motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence under advisement. 
 
The defendant presented the testimony of Katharina 
Condit, who was married to the decedent and was a passenger in 
a car driven by him when the accident occurred.  She testified 
that when Mr. Condit was driving his car, he approached an 
intersection, "came to a complete stop and he tried to get 
across.  And I looked, too.  There was no car coming.  We 
didn't see anything.  And then he proceeded and we got hit." 
 
After Katharina Condit concluded her testimony, the 
circuit court took a recess.  After the recess, the court 
granted the defendant's motion to strike.  Subsequently, the 
court entered a final judgment, and plaintiff appeals. 
 
Code § 8.01-397, in pertinent part, provides that: 
 
"In an action by or against a person who, from 
any cause, is incapable of testifying, or by or 
against the committee, trustee, executor, 
administrator, heir, or other representative of the 
person so incapable of testifying, no judgment or 
decree shall be rendered in favor of an adverse or 
 
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interested party founded on his uncorroborated 
testimony." 
 
 
Plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred by granting 
the motion to strike because once Katharina Condit, who was a 
witness to the accident, testified, her testimony satisfied 
the corroboration requirement of Code § 8.01-397.  Responding, 
defendant argues that the circuit court was required to 
consider only the evidence presented at the time that the 
court took her motion to strike under advisement, and that the 
court could not consider any evidence subsequently presented 
by the defendant when deciding whether plaintiff satisfied 
Code § 8.01-397.  The defendant contends that when the 
plaintiff's evidence is considered alone, plaintiff failed to 
provide any evidence of corroboration as required by Code 
§ 8.01-397. 
 
We disagree with defendant's contention that the circuit 
court was not required to consider the defendant's evidence 
when the court ruled on her motion to strike the plaintiff's 
evidence.  We have repeatedly held that if a circuit court 
grants a defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence 
at the conclusion of a trial, we will consider all the 
evidence, including evidence presented by the defendant.  
Austin v. Shoney's, Inc., 254 Va. 134, 138, 486 S.E.2d 285, 
287 (1997); Estate of Taylor v. Flair Prop. Assoc., 248 Va. 
410, 414, 448 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1994); Kendrick v. Vaz, Inc., 
 
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244 Va. 380, 384 n.*, 421 S.E.2d 447, 450 n.* (1992); Hadeed 
v. Medic-24, Ltd., 237 Va. 277, 280, 377 S.E.2d 589, 590 
(1989); Spangler v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 436, 438, 50 S.E.2d 
265, 266 (1948).  Similarly, we hold that when a defendant 
makes a motion to strike at the conclusion of the plaintiff's 
case based upon plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with the 
dead man's statute, but for some reason, the motion is taken 
under advisement, the circuit court is required to consider 
all the evidence that has been admitted before ruling on the 
motion.*  Therefore, in determining whether plaintiff in this 
appeal satisfied the corroboration requirement in Code § 8.01-
397, we will consider all the testimony adduced during the 
trial, including defendant's testimony presented during her 
case. 
 
We have stated that "Code § 8.01-397 is designed to 
prevent a litigant from having the benefit of his own 
testimony when, because of death or incapacity, the personal 
representative of another litigant has been deprived of the 
testimony of the decedent or incapacitated person.  The 
statute substitutes a requirement that testimony be 
corroborated in place of the harsher common law rule which 
                     
* We note that the defendant could have rested her case 
without presenting any evidence and then renewed her motion to 
strike the plaintiff's evidence.  Had the defendant done so, 
the circuit court would have been required to consider only 
the plaintiff's evidence when the court ruled on the motion to 
strike. 
 
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disqualified the surviving witness for interest."  Diehl v. 
Butts, 255 Va. 482, 488, 499 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1998); accord 
Vaughn v. Shank, 248 Va. 224, 229, 445 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1994); 
Hereford v. Paytes, 226 Va. 604, 607-08, 311 S.E.2d 790, 792 
(1984). 
 
We hold that plaintiff satisfied the corroboration 
requirement of Code § 8.01-397 because Katharina Condit, who 
was a passenger in the decedent's car, testified about the 
facts surrounding the accident.  And, we note that the 
defendant does not contend that plaintiff failed to provide 
sufficient corroboration once defendant's testimony is 
considered. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment appealed from, 
and we will remand this case to the circuit court for a new 
trial. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE LACY, with whom JUSTICE KINSER and JUSTICE LEMONS 
join, concurring. 
 
The trial court in this case dismissed the plaintiff's 
motion for judgment holding that Code § 8.01-397, the dead 
man's statute, applied and that the plaintiff failed to 
provide sufficient corroboration as required by that statute 
to allow a judgment to be entered in her favor.  In her appeal 
from this judgment, the plaintiff asserted two assignments of 
error: 
 
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I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY APPLYING VA CODE 
§ 8.01-397 OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA, 1950, AS 
AMENDED. 
 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE WHEN IT FOUND THAT NO 
CORROBORATION AS REQUIRED BY VA CODE § 8.01-397 OF 
THE CODE OF VIRGINIA, 1950, AS AMENDED, WAS 
PRESENTED. 
 
I. 
 
The first assignment of error unequivocally challenges 
the application of the dead man's statute to this case.  The 
record reflects that the plaintiff argued the inapplicability 
of the statute at the trial level and repeated those arguments 
in the petition for appeal and brief she submitted in this 
Court, yet the majority inexplicably fails to address this 
assignment of error and the issues it raises. 
 
The principles for the application of Code § 8.01-397 
have been well established and discussed in a number of our 
prior cases.  One must be sensitive to the distinction between 
those principles addressing compliance with the statute and 
those addressing whether the statute is applicable in the 
first place.  The first assignment of error addresses the 
latter proposition. 
Our jurisprudence establishes that the dead man's statute 
will not prevent entry of a judgment in the absence of 
corroboration in all instances because there are circumstances 
in which the statute simply is not applicable.  One of those 
circumstances is when another interested party testifies to a 
 
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version of the facts on behalf of the party unable to testify.  
Epes' Adm'r v. Hardaway, 135 Va. 80, 86, 92-93, 115 S.E. 712, 
714, 716 (1923).1  The interest of the testifying party must be 
a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation.  
Merchants Supply Co., Inc. v. Ex'rs of the Estate of John 
Hughes, 139 Va. 212, 216, 123 S. E. 355, 356 (1924).2
Six months ago this Court in Johnson v. Raviotta, 264 Va. 
27, 563 S.E.2d 727 (2002), reaffirmed this exception to the 
application of the dead man's statute.  In Johnson, we 
discussed and approved the holding of the federal district 
court in Paul v. Gomez, 118 F.Supp.2d 694, 696 (W.D.Va. 2000), 
that "Virginia's dead man's statute does not require 
corroboration of a party's testimony regarding certain facts 
if another interested party testified to a version of the 
facts on behalf of the decedent."  264 Va. at 34, 563 S.E.2d 
at 732.  We stated that this principle "accurately states 
Virginia law."  Id.  Applying this principle to the testimony 
adduced in that case, we concluded that Code § 8.01-397 did 
not apply to the defendant's testimony in defense of one 
                     
 
1 Another exception to the application of the statute 
is where an adverse party is called by the representative of 
the incapacitated party and testifies regarding the facts in 
dispute and that testimony is uncontradicted and not 
inherently improbable.  Brown v. Metz, 240 Va. 127, 393 S.E.2d 
402 (1990); Balderson v. Robertson, 203 Va. 484, 125 S.E.2d 
180 (1962). 
 
2 The source and development of this exception is 
discussed in Epes' Adm'r, 135 Va. at 92-93, 115 S.E. at 76, 
 
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instance of alleged negligence because an interested party 
testified to the disputed facts on behalf of the decedent but 
that the statute did apply and corroboration was required for 
the defendant's testimony in defense of another instance of 
alleged negligence because there was no such testimony of an 
interested party as to that allegation.  Id. at 35, 563 S.E.2d 
at 733. 
The plaintiff's argument under her first assignment of 
error here is that this exception is applicable to the facts 
of this case.  Mrs. Condit, the personal representative of the 
decedent, was in the decedent's car at the time of the 
accident and testified regarding the facts surrounding the 
accident.  As personal representative of the decedent's 
estate, Mrs. Condit has the requisite pecuniary interest 
derived from the decedent.  See, id.  The plaintiff argues 
that the decedent's estate was not deprived of the decedent's 
version of the facts and that the exception to the application 
of the dead man's statute applies, relieving her of the 
corroboration requirement. 
 
While the plaintiff correctly recites the law, there is 
an additional factor that is crucial to the resolution of this 
assignment of error.  This case was resolved on a motion to 
strike the plaintiff's evidence.  The testimony of the 
                                                                
and Johnson v. Raviotta, 264 Va. 27, 34, 563 S. E. 2d 727, 732 
(2002). 
 
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interested party, Mrs. Condit, occurred after the defendant 
made the motion to strike but before the trial court ruled on 
the motion.  Therefore, at the time of the motion, no 
interested party had testified as to the decedent's version of 
the facts.  The fact that an interested party "is available to 
testify" to the decedent's version of the facts is not 
sufficient to invoke the exception to the application of the 
dead man's statute; the interested party must testify to those 
facts in order to avoid the application of Code § 8.01-397.  
See Johnson, 264 Va. at 34, 563 S.E.2d at 732.  Whether the 
plaintiff can prevail on her first assignment of error then 
depends on whether the trial court was required to consider 
all the evidence before it at the time the court ruled on the 
motion. 
 
Normally, when ruling upon a motion to strike raised at 
the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the trial court 
considers only that evidence produced in the plaintiff's case-
in-chief.  The standard applied is whether the plaintiff has 
presented a prima facie case, considering the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.  That standard, if 
applied to this case, would have required the trial court to 
deny the motion to strike because the plaintiff's evidence 
here established a prima facie case.  The motion in this case 
however, did not involve the establishment of a prima facie 
 
9
case but, instead, involved compliance with the corroboration 
requirement of Code § 8.01-397. 
 
The statute recites that "no judgment shall be entered" 
without the requisite corroboration.  The import of this 
requirement is that, strategically, a party faced with the 
possible application of the statute should through his or her 
case-in-chief provide either sufficient corroboration or 
provide testimony from an interested party to invoke the 
exception to the application of the statute.  Indeed, if the 
defendant in this case had rested following the motion to 
strike and not produced Mrs. Condit's testimony, the plaintiff 
could not claim the exception to the application of the 
statute and corroboration of her testimony would have been 
required.  Trial strategies, however, do not resolve the 
matter. 
Determinations of whether a judgment can be issued under 
the dead man's statute are not dependant on a plaintiff 
establishing a prima facie case.  Neither the statute nor our 
cases imply or require that the requisite corroboration be 
produced by the party whose testimony must be corroborated.  
Rather, we have held that corroboration for purposes of the 
statute can come from any source, need not be presented by the 
plaintiff, and may be by documentary or physical evidence.  
See Hereford v. Paytes, 226 Va. 604, 608, 311 S.E.2d 790, 792 
(1984).  Thus, the statute and our cases suggest that the 
 
10
trial court should review all the evidence, regardless of its 
source, to determine whether the statute is applicable and, if 
it is, whether the corroboration requirement has been met.  
Under these circumstances, the normal rules used in 
considering motions to strike the plaintiff's evidence are not 
appropriate. 
Furthermore, the corroboration requirement is not a 
requirement limited to the plaintiff's testimony.  The 
plaintiff could be the party deprived of the testimony of an 
incapacitated person, in which case the defendant's version of 
the facts would require corroboration.  A motion to strike the 
defendant's evidence for failure to provide the required 
corroboration would be made at the end of the defendant's 
evidence and, in ruling on such a motion, a trial court would 
consider all the evidence before it, not just evidence adduced 
by the defendant.  To adopt a rule that limits a plaintiff 
faced with a motion to strike based on the application of Code 
§ 8.01-397 to the evidence produced solely by the plaintiff, 
but allows all the evidence to be considered in ruling on a 
motion to strike the defendant's evidence based on the 
application of the same statute, in my opinion, is not a fair 
rule.  Such a rule gives a defendant a decided advantage when 
Code § 8.01-397 is implicated. 
For these reasons, I concur with the majority's 
determination that the trial court was required to consider 
 
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all evidence before it at the time it ruled on the motion to 
strike and could not simply restrict its review to the 
evidence produced by the plaintiff in her case-in-chief. 
Because all the evidence produced at the time of the 
ruling, including the testimony of Mrs. Condit, had to be 
considered, I conclude that the trial court erred by applying 
Code § 8.01-397, as the plaintiff asserts in her first 
assignment of error.  Mrs. Condit, an interested party 
deriving her interest from the decedent, testified as to the 
disputed events, and, therefore, Code § 8.01-397 and its 
requirement of corroboration was not implicated.  Johnson, 264 
Va. at 34-35, 563 S.E.2d at 732-33. 
II. 
 
In holding that "the plaintiff satisfied the 
corroboration requirement of § 8.01-397," the majority agrees 
with the plaintiff's second assignment of error that the trial 
court erred in finding that no corroboration of plaintiff's 
testimony was presented.  For the reasons set out above, I 
believe this holding not only ignores the first assignment of 
error, it implicitly overrules the longstanding and recently 
reaffirmed exception to the application of Code § 8.01-397.  
Assuming for this discussion only, however, that the statute 
applies, I cannot agree with the majority's statement that the 
corroboration requirement was satisfied by Mrs. Condit's 
testimony. 
 
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The majority does not explain how Mrs. Condit's testimony 
satisfied the corroboration requirements of Code § 8.01-397 
other than stating that she "testified about the facts 
surrounding the accident."  No prior case has ever held that 
testifying about the event alone satisfies the corroboration 
requirement of Code § 8.01-397.  Corroboration for purposes of 
the dead man's statute requires testimony or other evidence 
that tends to support some issue or allegation advanced by the 
party able to testify which is essential to sustain a judgment 
in such party's favor.  Rice v. Charles, 260 Va. 157, 166, 532 
S.E.2d 318, 323 (2000). 
In this case, the plaintiff testified that the accident 
occurred at an intersection uncontrolled by a traffic light; 
that she saw Condit's car coming the opposite direction; and 
that she saw the car enter the left hand turn lane, stop, and 
then turn into her lane, causing her to collide with the car.  
The plaintiff maintained that the decedent failed to maintain 
a proper lookout, failed to keep his car under control, failed 
to yield the right of way, was exceeding a reasonable speed, 
and was "otherwise negligent." 
Mrs. Condit testified that the decedent brought the car 
to a complete stop before he turned left, and that there were 
no oncoming cars.  "And then [the deceased] proceeded and we 
got hit."  Nothing in Mrs. Condit's testimony corroborates the 
plaintiff's testimony or assertions of the decedent's alleged 
 
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negligence.  At best, Mrs. Condit's testimony merely verified 
that the accident happened.  This testimony meets none of the 
standards previously established by this Court to meet the 
corroboration requirement of Code § 8.01-397. 
Thus, if Code § 8.01-397 applies, which for the reasons 
stated above I conclude it does not, I would hold that the 
corroboration requirement was not met and would reject the 
plaintiff's second assignment of error.  The statement in the 
majority opinion that the "defendant does not contend that the 
plaintiff failed to provide sufficient corroboration once 
[Mrs. Condit's] testimony is considered" does not eliminate 
the necessity of addressing the plaintiff's assertion that the 
testimony was sufficient.  Furthermore, the defendant argued 
exclusively that the trial court was required to consider the 
motion to strike solely on the plaintiff's evidence; she did 
not address that nature of Mrs. Condit's testimony at all. 
We have repeatedly affirmed our strong adherence to the 
principles of stare decisis and we have overturned precedent 
only in rare instances and for reasons fully explained.  In 
this case, the majority has ignored principles applied in 
prior relevant cases, adopted positions at odds with, or 
contrary to, precedent without explanation, and arguably has 
adopted new principles of law regarding the dead man's statute 
and issues of corroboration.  Thus, although I agree with the 
majority that the trial court erred in granting the 
 
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defendant's motion to strike and that the plaintiff is 
entitled to a new trial, I do so for the reasons stated above. 
 
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