Case Title: People v. Pomykala

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93089

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 93089-Agenda 21-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								THOMAS POMYKALA, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 24, 2003.
	 
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Will County,
defendant Thomas Pomykala was convicted of reckless homicide.
The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding
that section 9-3(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720
ILCS 5/9-3(b) (West 2000)) created an unconstitutional
mandatory presumption of recklessness. 326 Ill. App. 3d 390. We
granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
We now affirm the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	Defendant was charged with two counts of reckless homicide
in the death of Taylor Nicole Pirc. Defendant's car allegedly
crossed the median of a divided two-way street and struck an
oncoming car containing Taylor and her grandmother, Bernadine
Pirc. Eyewitnesses testified that defendant was driving too fast and
that his car had crossed the median more than once prior to
striking the Pirc car. No skidmarks were found at the scene.
Defendant told a police officer that he had been having trouble
with his brakes and that they worked only 90% of the time. The
officer saw a line of black liquid on the street running to a spot
under the engine of defendant's car. The officer noticed a strong
odor of alcohol on defendant's breath and he found approximately
18 empty beer cans in defendant's car. Defendant admitted to
drinking several beers that day. He failed field sobriety tests and
an intoxilizer test showed that he had a breath-alcohol
concentration level of  0.21%. At defendant's trial, an auto
mechanic testified that the brake fluid chamber on defendant's car
was only 80% full. The main battery feed for the brake system was
disconnected and the hydraulic pressure for the system was
markedly reduced. Nonetheless, the mechanic testified,
defendant's car should have had 30% braking power prior to the
collision and should have stopped when the brake was applied,
despite the reduced braking power. Defendant presented no
evidence.
	Over defendant's objection, the trial court gave the following
non-Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (IPI) instruction to the jury,
which was taken from the language of section 9-3(b) of the Code:
		"If you find from your consideration of all the evidence
that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol at
the time of the alleged violation, such evidence shall be
presumed to be evidence of a reckless act unless
disproved by evidence to the contrary."
The jury returned guilty verdicts and the trial court sentenced
defendant to 14 years' imprisonment.
	The appellate court agreed with defendant that section 9-3(b)
of the Code creates a mandatory presumption that violates
defendant's right to due process. The court found that the
presumption unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to
defendant to establish that he was not acting recklessly. In
reaching its conclusion, the appellate court relied on a decision of
this court, People v. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d 133 (1998), and noted that
the trial court had relied on People v. Atteberry, 213 Ill. App. 3d
851 (1991), which, the appellate court stated, had effectively been
overruled by Watts. 326 Ill. App. 3d at 394.

ANALYSIS
	The constitutionality of a statute is subject to de novo review.
People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000). Statutes carry a
strong presumption of constitutionality and the challenging party
has the burden of rebutting that presumption. People v. Maness,
191 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (2000). This court has a duty to interpret a
statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality
if it can reasonably be done. People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 448
(1998).
	Section 9-3(b) of the Code provides that:
			"In cases involving reckless homicide, being under the
influence of alcohol or any other drug or drugs at the time
of the alleged violation shall be presumed to be evidence
of a reckless act unless disproved by evidence to the
contrary." 720 ILCS 5/9-3(b) (West 2000).
	A presumption is a legal device that permits or requires the
fact finder to assume the existence of an ultimate fact, after certain
predicate or basic facts have been established. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d  at
141. While due process requires that the State prove every element
of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970)), the
State may be entitled to rely on certain presumptions or inferences.
These devices "play a vital role in the expeditious resolution of
factual questions, with the value of the presumption or inference
resting on the strength of the connection between the elemental or
ultimate fact presumed or inferred and the basic or evidentiary
fact." People v. Hester, 131 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1989).
	Presumptions may be either permissive or mandatory. A
permissive presumption allows, but does not require, the fact
finder to infer the existence of the ultimate or presumed fact upon
proof of the predicate fact. A mandatory presumption requires the
fact finder to accept the presumption. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d  at 142.
Mandatory presumptions may be further classified as conclusive
or rebuttable. The United States Supreme Court has held that
mandatory conclusive presumptions are unconstitutional, as they
conflict with the presumption of innocence. Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 50, 99 S. Ct. 2450,
2459 (1979). The Supreme Court has further held that mandatory
rebuttable presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant are per se unconstitutional, because they relieve the
State of its burden to prove each element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Sandstrom, 442 U.S.  at 524, 61 L. Ed. 2d  at 51,
99 S. Ct.  at 2459. In Watts, this court held that mandatory
rebuttable presumptions that shift the burden of production to the
defendant are also unconstitutional. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d  at 147. Thus,
under Illinois law, all mandatory presumptions are now considered
to be per se unconstitutional.
	The decisions of our appellate court are in conflict on the
question of the constitutionality of section 9-3(b). In addition to
the Third District in this case, the Second District has found the
section to be unconstitutional, although severable from the
remainder of the statute (People v. Singmouangthong, 334 Ill.
App. 3d 542, 546 (2002)). In contrast, the First District has found
that section 9-3(b) does not constitute a mandatory presumption
(People v. Peshak, 333 Ill. App. 3d 1052 (2002)).
	Prior to 1992, section 9-3(b) read as follows:
			"In cases involving reckless homicide, being under the
influence of alcohol or any other drug or drugs at the time
of the alleged violation shall be prima facie evidence of a
reckless act." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9-3(b).
	The General Assembly changed this language to its present
form in 1991 (Pub. Act 87-1198, eff. September 25, 1992),
apparently in response to the Third District's decision in People v.
Atteberry, 213 Ill. App. 3d 851 (1991). See 87th Ill. Gen. Assem.,
Senate Proceedings, July 1, 1992, at 21-22 (statements of Senator
Dart). In Atteberry, the defendant was convicted of reckless
homicide. The trial court gave the jury a non-IPI instruction that
repeated verbatim the statutory language of the prior version of
section 9-3(b), without providing a definition of the term "prima
facie." On appeal, the defendant challenged the instruction as
creating an irrebuttable presumption of recklessness in language
that was either not understood or misunderstood by the jury. The
appellate court stated that a presumption cannot constitutionally
shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant and that the jury
could have understood the term "prima facie" to mean that if the
defendant was under the influence of alcohol, he was conclusively
presumed to be acting recklessly. The court noted the definition of
"prima facie" given in Black's Law Dictionary as "a fact
presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the
contrary" (Black's Law Dictionary 1189 (6th ed. 1990)) and
suggested that this definition should be provided to the jury in its
instructions. Atteberry, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 854.
	Subsequent to Atteberry, this court, in Watts, found
unconstitutional a presumption contained in the Home Repair
Fraud Act. The statute contained a rebuttable presumption of
intent or knowledge of nonperformance if certain specified facts
were established. One of the elements of the offense was a lack of
intent to perform at the time of making a contract for home repair.
Thus, proof of the predicate facts removed the element of intent
from the case unless the presumption was rebutted by other
evidence. This court held that this presumption shifted the burden
of production to the defendant and that if he did not satisfy this
burden, the trial court would, in effect, be required to direct a
verdict against the defendant on the intent element. We noted that
such a result conflicts with the well-established rule that a verdict
may not be constitutionally directed against a defendant in a
criminal case. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d  at 147.
	The State argues here that the alleged presumption in this case
is unlike the presumption in Watts, because it does not require the
fact finder to presume the existence of any element of the offense
of reckless homicide. It merely tells the fact finder that it must
consider the fact of intoxication as evidence of a reckless act in
conjunction with other evidence that may be produced on the issue
of recklessness. However, even though the 1991 amendment to
section 9-3(b) was intended to simply incorporate the definition
of "prima facie evidence," the section is now framed in the
language of a mandatory presumption. This court has interpreted
the word "shall" to connote a mandatory obligation unless the
statute indicates otherwise. People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207, 222
(1996). In addition, the word "presume" in this context means "to
suppose to be true without proof." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary 921 (10th ed. 2000).
	The State argues that cases decided prior to the 1991
amendment to section 9-3(b) did not find the language of that
section to constitute a mandatory presumption. Thus, since the
preamended version of section 9-3(b) did not create a mandatory
presumption, the legislature's use of the definition of prima facie
does not change this fact. However, in reality, the cases are in
conflict on whether the preamended version of section 9-3(b)
created a mandatory presumption. For example, the Atteberry
court, in reversing the defendant's conviction, noted that the jury
instruction telling the jury that evidence of intoxication was
"prima facie evidence of a reckless act" may have led the jury to
believe that evidence of intoxication established a conclusive
presumption of recklessness that shifted the burden of persuasion
to the defendant. Atteberry, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 853.
	In People v. Garofalo, 181 Ill. App. 3d 972, 978 (1989), the
defendant contended that section 9-3(b) created a mandatory
presumption, either conclusive or rebuttable, of recklessness. The
Second District held that no such presumption was created, relying
on this court's decision in People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179
(1987), overruled on other grounds, People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324, 338 (1992). In Jackson, a double jeopardy case, we briefly
discussed the preamended version of section 9-3(b) in the context
of determining whether driving under the influence of alcohol is
an included offense of reckless homicide. We concluded that it
was not, noting that a conviction for driving under the influence of
alcohol does not conclusively establish an essential element of
reckless homicide. However, we stated, the prima facie evidence
of intoxication may be "rebutted" by showing that, although the
defendant was under the influence of alcohol when the act
occurred, the acts were not in fact performed recklessly. Jackson,
118 Ill. 2d  at 190-91. Further illustrating the confusion over the
effect of the "prima facie" language of the preamended version of
section 9-3(b), the Second District appeared to contradict its
earlier decision in Garofalo, when, in People v. Edmundson, 247
Ill. App. 3d 738, 742 (1993), it noted that the reckless homicide
statute "provides a rebuttable presumption that intoxication is
equivalent to recklessness."
	The primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to
the intent of the legislature. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177
(1997). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used
in the statute itself and that language must be given its plain and
ordinary meaning. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d  at 177. The State argues that
the plain language of section 9-3(b) demonstrates that it does not
create an impermissible mandatory presumption because it only
requires the fact finder to consider intoxication as evidence of a
reckless act. According to the State, even if the defendant does not
present any evidence, the fact finder may determine from other
evidence presented by the State that the defendant did not act
recklessly. The State also argues that section 9-3(b) acts more as
a permissive presumption, permitting, but not requiring, the fact
finder to conclude that a reckless act occurred. Thus, the State
concludes, the appellate court here erroneously construed the
phrase "evidence of a reckless act" to be equivalent to a mandated
finding of recklessness and focused exclusively on that phrase,
instead of reading it in concert with the concluding phrase, "unless
disproved by evidence to the contrary."
	We reject this argument. To do otherwise would require an
overly technical reading of the statute. Section 9-3(b) contains
language of a mandatory presumption that a reasonable juror could
conclude requires a finding of recklessness without any factual
connection between the intoxication and the reckless act, unless
this presumed connection is disproved. In fact, the language
"unless disproved by evidence to the contrary" may be reasonably
interpreted as requiring the defendant to rebut the presumption.
Technically, of course, the rebutting evidence could come in the
State's case. But, the presumption contained in section 9-3(b)
must be applied by the fact finder. Thus, the statute and jury
instruction must be read from the perspective of a reasonable juror,
not with the legal expertise of judges and lawyers. A reasonable
juror would assume from a reading of the instruction that, once the
State established that the defendant was intoxicated, it had proved
recklessness, unless the defendant produced sufficient evidence to
disprove it.
	The State's argument that section 9-3(b) may be read as a
permissive presumption is also unavailing. A permissive
presumption is illustrated by the following IPI jury instruction
given in this case:
		"If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the
defendant drove a vehicle that the amount of alcohol
concentration in the defendant's blood or breath was 0.08
or more, you may presume that the defendant was under
the influence of alcohol. You never are required to make
this presumption. It is for the jury to determine whether
the presumption should be drawn. You should consider all
the evidence in determining whether the defendant was
under the influence of alcohol." Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions, Criminal, No. 23.30 (4th ed. 2000).
	The permissive language of the quoted instruction cannot
reasonably be compared to the mandatory language of the non-IPI
instruction involved here. There is simply no permissive language
in the latter instruction. Whether a defendant has been denied due
process by a jury instruction depends upon the way in which a
reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction. Sandstrom,
442 U.S.  at 514, 61 L. Ed. 2d  at 45, 99 S. Ct.  at 2454. A
reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction here as
mandating a finding of recklessness unless the defendant rebutted
that presumption.
	While we recognize our duty to uphold the constitutionality
of statutes if it can be reasonably accomplished (Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d
at 448), we are also mindful of the well-established principle that
penal statutes are to be construed strictly in favor of the defendant
(People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1999)). We agree with
Justice McDade, who stated in her special concurrence in this case
that, although section 9-3(b) may be interpreted in the manner
suggested by the State, to do so would require a "technical
exercise of linguistic parsing that ill serves those-here trial court
judges and jurors-who should be able to rely on the statute to
determine their decisional obligations." 326 Ill. App. 3d at 396
(McDade, J., concurring). Accordingly, we hold that section
9-3(b) of the reckless homicide statute creates an unconstitutional
mandatory presumption of recklessness. Concomitantly, we also
hold that the instruction to the jury on this issue violated
defendant's due process rights.
	We next consider whether section 9-3(b) of the Code may be
severed from the remainder of the reckless homicide statute. We
may do so if what remains is complete in itself and is capable of
being executed wholly independently of the severed portion.
People v. Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d 524, 534 (1998); see 5 ILCS 70/1.31
(West 2000). Section 9-3(b) states an evidentiary rule regarding
the effect on the issue of recklessness of the accused being under
the influence of alcohol or other drugs. Subsection (c) of the
statute (720 ILCS 5/9-3(c) (West 2000)) sets forth the factors to
be considered in determining whether the accused person was
under the influence of alcohol or other drugs at the time of the
incident. Subsections (e) and (e-5) of the statute (720 ILCS
5/9-3(e), (e-5) (West 2000)) provide for enhanced sentencing
where a defendant has been determined to be under the influence
of alcohol or other drugs. The excision of the unconstitutional
presumption in section 9-3(b) does not impair the meaning or
operation of the balance of the statute. The State may still plead
and prove that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or
other drugs at the time of the alleged violation, as defined in
subsection (c), and if the jury finds that the State has proved the
defendant's intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt, the
sentencing provisions in subsections (e) and (e-5) are available to
the trial court. Thus, we conclude that section 9-3(b) may be
severed from the remainder of the statute.
	For the first time on appeal, the State raises a harmless error
argument, maintaining that the evidence was sufficient to convict
regardless of the presumption contained in section 9-3(b) of the
reckless homicide statute and the erroneous jury instruction.
Specifically, the State argues that defendant's conduct in driving
his vehicle when he knew that his brakes did not work 10% of the
time is "absolutely the height of recklessness."
	An error in a jury instruction is harmless if it is demonstrated
that the result of the trial would not have been different had the
jury been properly instructed. People v. Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d 109,
136 (1991). Here, it is clear that the jury was erroneously
instructed as to the presumption contained in the statute. We must
determine, therefore, whether the evidence of defendant's guilt
was so clear and convincing as to render the error harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 95 (1998).
	The State charged defendant with two counts of reckless
homicide. Count I alleged that defendant drove his vehicle in a
reckless manner at a time when his blood-alcohol concentration
was greater than 0.08. Count II alleged that defendant drove his
vehicle in a reckless manner while under the influence of alcohol.
At trial, the jury heard evidence of defendant's intoxication and of
his actions in driving his vehicle. The jury also heard evidence that
defendant's brakes may have malfunctioned at the time of the
accident. The record also contains evidence of defendant's
knowledge that his brakes did not work properly all the time. The
jury was instructed, however, that it must presume recklessness if
the State proved that defendant was under the influence of alcohol
at the time of his actions. This evidence was thus emphasized to
the jury over other evidence heard by it during the trial. The jury
convicted defendant on both counts of reckless homicide. Both
counts alleged that defendant was under the influence of alcohol.
Under these circumstances, we are unable to find that the error in
instructing the jury on the statutory presumption was harmless
error.



CONCLUSION
	We affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which reversed
defendant's conviction and remanded the cause to the circuit court
for a new trial.



Appellate court judgment affirmed.