Case Title: State v. Smith

Citation: 158 Ariz. 222, 762 P.2d 509

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1988-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
158 Ariz. 222 (1988) 762 P.2d 509 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John Arthur SMITH, Appellant. No. 6538. Supreme Court of Arizona. July 14, 1988. *223 Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen., Phoenix by William J. Schafer III, Galen E. Wilkes, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee. George M. Sterling, Jr., Phoenix, for appellant. SHELLEY, Judge. On March 6, 1985, after a jury trial, defendant John Arthur Smith and his codefendant, Julie Lynn Cunningham, were each convicted of one count of armed robbery, A.R.S. § 13-1904. Defendant Cunningham's conviction and sentence were affirmed by a memorandum decision of the court of appeals. State v. Cunningham (Smith), 1 CA-CR 9006, memo. dec. filed Feb. 6, 1986. Because Smith committed this crime while on probation, the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years, A.R.S. § 13-604.01. Defendant appealed his conviction to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3) and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, -4035. On September 17, 1984, the Revco Drug Store in the Ahwatukee Plaza Shopping Center was robbed. Employees and customers inside the store told police that just before 9:00 p.m. a man and woman entered the store wearing nylon stockings over their faces. The couple were armed and ordered everyone to lie face down on the floor. The male robber then ordered the store pharmacist to fill a bag with drugs, including dangerous narcotics. He also took $1,827 in cash receipts from the store office before he and his accomplice fled from the store. Although store employees were able to give a general physical description of the male, they were not able to identify Smith as the robber. Police obtained statements from witnesses inside the store and from those who were in the shopping center parking lot at the time of the robbery. While these statements differed on specific details, they were similar as to the general sequence of events. Witnesses told police that they observed a man and a woman sitting in a light-colored car in the parking area near the drug store. The couple got out of the car, put stockings over their faces, and entered the drugstore. The witnesses next saw the woman leave the drugstore, run towards the parked car, and drive away. A few minutes later, the man followed her out of the store but disappeared on foot behind a nearby Circle K. The woman in the car attempted to catch-up with him but eventually "peeled off" in the opposite direction. One witness was able to obtain the license plate number of the automobile the woman was driving. With this information, *224 police obtained the name and address of Julie Lynn Cunningham. Smith and Cunningham were living together at this address, and both had access to the car. Police placed the house under surveillance and on October 2, 1984, executed a search warrant. Shortly thereafter, Smith was arrested and charged with armed robbery. Following his conviction and sentence, Smith proceeded in propria persona until the time of this appeal. While acting in this capacity, Smith filed a motion to vacate judgment under Rule 24.2, Ariz.R.Crim.P., 17A A.R.S., alleging newly discovered evidence. See Rule 24.2(a)(2). The trial court summarily denied the motion. Although Smith's pleading was framed as a motion to vacate judgment on the basis of newly-discovered evidence, we determined that the facts alleged in the motion presented a serious question as to whether Smith's right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated. In State v. Smith, 158 Ariz. 219, 762 P.2d 506 (Ariz.Sup.Ct. 1986), we remanded the case to the trial court for a full evidentiary hearing to determine whether counsel's representation was deficient under the surrounding circumstances, and if so, whether counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Smith. State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 694 P.2d 222, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143, 105 S. Ct. 2689, 86 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1985); State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 689 P.2d 153 (1984); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). It was the opinion of this court that to decide this appeal on the merits of either the ineffective assistance of counsel issue or the issues raised by Smith in his brief would be premature. The trial court, after holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel, denied Smith's petition. We have consolidated review of this denial with the various evidentiary issues raised in defendant's original appeal. IDENTIFICATION Smith posits that the identification of him as a perpetrator of the crime was so uncertain that as a matter of law, it could not support a criminal conviction. We disagree. At trial, the critical issue before the jury was identification. Although several witnesses from the parking lot testified to the robbers' general description, only three were able to make in-court identifications. The first witness, Larry Hilyard, positively identified Cunningham as the woman he had seen that night. Hilyard, also pointed to Smith but was only "70 percent" sure of his identification. A second witness, Bernadina Rodriguez, similarly identified Cunningham as the robber. Rodriguez told the jury she was "about 50%" sure that Smith was the same man she had seen in the parking lot. On redirect examination, she stated: Finally, Judd Reung, a twelve-year-old witness, positively identified Cunningham, but testified that Smith looked different from the man he had seen both before and after the robbery. Other testimony at trial concerned the existence of physical evidence. Corporal Maggard of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office testified that fingerprint and shoeprint evidence had been taken from inside the store and from an area behind the Circle K where the robber disappeared. An evidence technician with the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office testified that, while she had compared these prints to those of Smith, she could not make a positive match. She also testified that the ground where the tracks were found was such that some portions of it were of a type that would not leave visible footprints. Partial footprints were also seen in the area. Detective Jackson showed Hilyard a photo lineup containing Smith's photo a week after the robbery. Hilyard immediately picked out appellant's picture. He said he was 80% sure about his lineup identification. Reung testified that Cunningham was the girl he saw on the night of the robbery, stating: "I am pretty sure it is her." The *225 store employees' general description of the male robber was similar to Smith's size and build. Additionally we note that Smith and Cunningham were living together, and both had access to the use of the vehicle. We are required to take the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's verdict. State v. Long, 121 Ariz. 280, 589 P.2d 1312 (1979). We review the record to determine whether there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to have found a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Goswick, 142 Ariz. 582, 691 P.2d 673 (1984). In State v. Dutton, 83 Ariz. 193, 198, 318 P.2d 667, 669-70 (1957), the court stated: See also, State v. Norgard, 103 Ariz. 381, 442 P.2d 544 (1968). Sufficient evidence was presented upon which the jury could find Smith guilty of the armed robbery. INSINUATION OF OTHER CRIMINAL ACTS Smith posits that the state insinuated in its examination of Detectives Jackson and Maxwell, with respect to the preparation of the photo lineups, that Smith was guilty of other criminal acts. Smith did not object to any of the questions propounded to Detectives Jackson and Maxwell with respect to the preparation of the photo lineups, nor did he make a request for a mistrial. The defendant must make a timely objection at trial in order to give the trial court an opportunity to correct any error. Smith is therefore precluded from pursuing this issue as error on appeal. State v. Miller, 112 Ariz. 95, 98, 537 P.2d 965, 968 (1975); State v. Coward, 108 Ariz. 270, 271, 496 P.2d 131, 132 (1972). Even if the issue was not precluded, Smith's assertion is incorrect. He based his assertion on the prosecutor's questioning of Detectives Jackson and Maxwell. Detective Jackson testified: Detective Maxwell testified: The questioning did not imply prior criminal acts by either Smith or Cunningham. Police officers know people through sources other than a police investigation. State v. Finn, 111 Ariz. 271, 278, 528 P.2d 615, 622 (1974). The fact that Jackson had never seen Smith or Cunningham when he prepared the photo lineups implies nothing. Also, the fact that the lineups were shown after the various agencies of the police department got together and discussed the evidence and the leads in the case could logically be referable to the case against Smith and Cunningham and does not necessarily imply other criminal activities. It is logical that a robbery detective for the Phoenix Police Department would be involved in the investigation of a robbery and as a result thereof, would discover that Julie Cunningham and Smith resided together at the Morton address. Jackson stated that after discussing the case with the other officers, they were able to put together a photo lineup. This does not suggest prior crimes. In this connection, the jury was informed that the police found out very soon after the robbery that the car bearing the license number given to them by witness Rodriguez belonged to Julie Cunningham's father. He told them that his daughter and Smith were living together and that she had the use of his car. Thus the jury could well have inferred that the source of the photos was Julie Cunningham's father. In State v. Bruni, 129 Ariz. 312, 320, 630 P.2d 1044, 1052 (App. 1981), the court stated: JURY INSTRUCTIONS Smith posits that the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction based on State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 393 P.2d 274 (1964), to the effect that if the jury found that the state destroyed any evidence, the contents or quality of which were in issue, the jury might infer that the evidence would have favored Smith's case. The basis for the requested instruction was that the piece of paper on which Bernadina Rodriquez had written the license number *227 of the car which fled the shopping center was lost. To be entitled to a Willits instruction, a defendant must prove that (1) the state failed to preserve material and reasonably accessible evidence that could have had a tendency to exonerate the accused, and (2) there was resulting prejudice. State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464, 687 P.2d 1214, 1219 (1984). The trial court's decision to forego a Willits instruction for failure to satisfy either or both of the above requirements is not reversible error absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Reffitt, 145 Ariz. 452, 461, 702 P.2d 681, 690 (1985). A Willits instruction must be predicated on a theory supported by the evidence, or else it should not be given, because such would tend to mislead the jury. State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. 383, 393, 646 P.2d 268, 278 (1982). There is only one conceivable way in which the paper with the license number on it might tend to exonerate Smith and his co-defendant. If the number on the paper was not the license number of Smith's and Cunningham's car, it could be inferred that the police made a mistake, that is, they mistakenly transposed a number or numbers and were relying on that mistaken number in tracking down Cunningham and Smith. If that were the case and the number written on the paper correctly recorded the license plate of the robbers, then the real robbers have never been apprehended. There are, however, several things that lead to the conclusion that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a Willits instruction. There is nothing except speculation to suggest that the number on the paper was not Smith's license number. The defense did not, in cross-examining Bernadina Rodriquez, attempt to develop testimony to suggest that she had written down the wrong number or that the police had made a mistake in broadcasting and tracing the number. The number was broadcast to the Maricopa County Sheriff's dispatcher in the presence of Bernadina Rodriquez, who had seen the car and who had written the number down. She did not correct the policeman, and the dispatcher recorded the number on the dispatch log. There was a double check available to the defense on the accuracy of the number the witness wrote down. The number derived from the paper was independently incorporated into a different written police report prepared by Detective Jackson. That report was never admitted in evidence, but it was presumably available. A comparison of it with the number on the dispatcher's report would have either corroborated or damaged the presumption that the number the police traced was the one the witness originally wrote down. This coincidental double recordation occurred before any question arose as to what was written on the paper and at a time when the police would have had every motive to be accurate and no motive to destroy evidence. Under all the circumstances of this case, a Willits instruction was not required. See State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. at 393, 646 P.2d at 278. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL Smith posits that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel did not present an alibi defense and he did not present evidence concerning Smith's back injury. ALIBI At the evidentiary hearing, Smith's trial counsel testified that prior to trial, Smith gave him the name of Nancy Garden as a possible alibi witness. He told his attorney that she had been with him on the night of the robbery but that she could only account for his time up to 8 p.m. The robbery occurred at 9 p.m. in Awahtukee, a 20-minute drive from the Blue Door Bar where she last saw Smith. Counsel testified that an alibi witness should not be presented unless it was air-tight or Smith had nothing else to work with. He felt that he had a good defense of mistaken identity because witnesses were not positive in their identification of the male robber. He discussed the possibility of using Garden as an alibi witness with co-counsel and with Smith. Counsel testified as follows: Smith's counsel decided not to interview Garden. Additionally, his counsel felt that an alibi defense would be particularly weak since Smith was not going to testify at the trial. Nancy Garden testified at the evidentiary hearing that she met Smith at 9 p.m. at the Blue Door Bar and that she based the time on the fact that the band was playing and it was dark. She told the trial court that bands in bars usually start to play at around 9 p.m., therefore it must have been 9 p.m. when she met Smith. On cross-examination she admitted that she had only been at the Blue Door Bar two or three times and did not know when the band started playing. She did not know what time she arrived at the Blue Door Bar on the night in question, other than that it was dark and the band was playing. Smith testified at the evidentiary hearing. He could not recall when he left the Blue Door Bar on the night of the robbery. He could not recall what time he told his counsel during the pretrial interview that he was with Garden at the Blue Door on the night of the robbery. The trial court found: In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a two-pronged test must be met. First, Smith must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Second, he must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 694 P.2d 222 (1985). See also, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. Assuming arguendo, that counsel's failure to interview Garden constituted deficient performance, Smith failed to show that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Garden's testimony that she met Smith at 9 p.m. was based upon her assumption as to when the band would have started to play and the fact that it was dark, which on September 17th would mean very little in respect to a 9 p.m. robbery. Additionally, Smith testified that he did not know when he left Garden's company on the night in question. There was no showing of a reasonable possibility that Garden's testimony would have changed the results. Smith's defense was not prejudiced. Smith asserts that in the case of State v. Tapia, 151 Ariz. 62, 725 P.2d 1096 (1986), this court determined that trial counsel's failure to interview the two people who could testify to Tapia's whereabouts immediately before and after commission of the crime constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, even though evidence from the alibi witnesses had a 4 to 5 hour gap. He asserts that in light of Tapia, we are required to reverse this case. We disagree. We quote from Tapia as follows: Tapia, 151 Ariz. at 64, 725 P.2d at 1098. Defendant Tapia was charged with murder. There was no physical evidence linking him with the murder. Fingerprints found on the pruning shears used by the murderer did not match his prints. Two key prosecution witnesses linking defendant to the crime admitted on the stand that they lied to the police about the case. Defendant testified in his own behalf but no evidence was produced to corroborate any part of his alibi testimony. His testimony covered his whereabouts during the 4-5 hour gap. Since he had recanted his confession, his credibility was questionable. This court held that failure to interview and call the witnesses needed to bolster his alibi prejudiced his case. The Tapia case is inapposite to the facts of this case. Smith does not contend that he would have testified if the alibi evidence had been presented. He merely asserts that Nancy Garden should have been interviewed and called as a witness. In this case, no evidence was needed to corroborate Smith's alibi testimony because he did not testify and his credibility was, therefore, not in issue. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that counsel was effective as to the alibi. BACK INJURY Smith contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed (1) to interview Smith's treating doctor, his therapist, and Nancy Garden, all of whom could testify about Smith's lack of mobility, and (2) to present evidence to the jury on the nature and extent of Smith's back injury. Smith fell from a roof on September 12, 1984 while working as a roofer. He was diagnosed by the doctor as having a low back sprain. Smith was given Parafon Forte, Tylenol and Tolectin, and was started on a course of physical therapy. Trial testimony indicates that the male robber jumped over a counter and some display racks before running from the Revco Drug Store and disappearing on foot. The record does not indicate how high the racks were; however, pictures in evidence showed the racks to be about the height of a normal checkout counter. At Smith's evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he testified that he never told his counsel it would have been impossible for him to jump over a counter and racks at the store. Smith testified that he told counsel he was "pretty much immobile" at the time; however, Smith also testified that he was not certain what he told his counsel. Smith's counsel testified Smith told him only that his back was injured and that he wore a corset occasionally. Counsel said he was *230 also aware Smith had received medical treatment from a doctor and a therapist. The main issue during trial was Smith's identification. Smith alleges that if the jury had known of his back injury, the verdict would have been different because his physical limitations were "totally inconsistent with prosecution's witnesses' testimony that `the male robber was jumping' over racks and counters and that he `ran' from the Revco." Smith alleges his counsel's failure to interview witnesses who could testify about his injury and to mention his injury to the jury constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and reversible error. 1. Did counsel's failure to interview Smith's doctor and therapist as well as Smith's friend, Nancy Garden, result in ineffective assistance of counsel? Smith alleges his doctor and therapist would have supported his claim that, because of his injury, he could not have been the male robber. The doctor and therapist did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, but their reports were admitted in evidence. The doctor's September 24, 1984 report stated that Smith had severe pain in the back and going down into his right buttock and right leg. The report further stated, however: "No sensory or motor defect is noted in the lower extremities." (Emphasis added.) Thus, there is no indication that Smith did not have full use of his legs or that he couldn't jump over the counter as the male robber had done. Smith asserts Nancy Garden's testimony might have helped his case. She testified at the evidentiary hearing that she met Smith at a bar, saw him carefully sit down, and saw him limp, moving slowly, deliberately and carefully. Such testimony does not prove that he could not run and jump in an excited situation such as a robbery. 2. Would discussion at trial of Smith's back injury have aided the prosecution by supporting witness's identification of a limping robber and by providing a motive for the robbery? One witness told defense counsel before trial that the male robber limped as he ran from the drug store. During the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor testified that he knew that a witness had stated that the male robber was limping as he left the drug store. The prosecutor also testified that he thought the limping might be due to something Smith did while running, and if he had known about the bad back, he would have pursued that line of evidence both in his investigation and at trial. A store employee testified at trial that the male robber stated: "Hey, man, I have got a bad back." Testimony about Smith's bad back, coupled with trial testimony that he was limping during the robbery, would have strengthened the prosecution's identification of Smith as the male robber. Also, since Smith had three prescriptions for pain medication, he could have been using them the night of the robbery and been able to jump over the counter and some racks, especially since he had no motor deficiency in his legs. Smith's counsel was also aware that 9 of the 10 drugs obtained by Smith during the robbery were narcotic pain-killers; that Smith told a drugstore employee that he only wanted class 2 and 3 drugs; that Smith repeatedly asked the pharmacist for "the good stuff"; and that Smith asked for Tussionex (which contains codeine) by name. The pharmacist testified that Tussionex is popular with drug abusers. Counsel also knew the prosecution wanted to introduce evidence that the robber stole 2,830 tablets and capsules of narcotic painkilling drugs, 600 tablets of Valium and $1,827 in cash. These facts, coupled with evidence of Smith's back injury, would further implicate him in the robbery. Pursuant to a search warrant issued October 2, 1984, the police found approximately 100 tablets containing narcotics, a syringe with 90 c.c. Oxycodone, a known narcotic drug, other empty syringes, and 13 capsules of a dangerous drug. Also on October 2, Julie Cunningham, the co-defendant, was arrested and searched. Police found in her purse eight Tylenol # 3 pills with codeine, two capsules of Phenaphen with Codeine # 4, eight capsules of Dalmane 15, five tablets of Tylenol *231 # 4 with Codeine, 73 Valium tablets, six Secobarbital tablets (a dangerous drug), marijuana and other drug paraphernalia. After she was released on her own recognizance, Cunningham visited Smith at the jail and was caught passing two balloons containing Diazepain, a combination of Valium and Codeine. Many of the items found in the search and in the balloons were similar to the items taken from Revco during the robbery. Smith's counsel successfully moved to keep the evidence obtained during the two searches together with the two balloons containing Diazepain from being introduced at trial. Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he felt that mentioning Smith's back injury during trial could lead to the introduction of the previously barred evidence and incriminate Smith under Rule 404(b), Arizona Rules of Evidence, which reads: At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found: Counsel's decision not to use evidence of Smith's back injury was a reasonable tactical decision. "Actions which appear to be a choice of trial tactics will not support an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Espinosa-Gamez, 139 Ariz. 415, 421, 678 P.2d 1379, 1386 (1984). In State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 265, 665 P.2d 972, 987 (1983) we stated: We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant received effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the trial is affirmed. FELDMAN, V.C.J., and CAMERON, HOLOHAN and MOELLER, JJ., concur. *232 GORDON, C.J., did not participate in this decision; and pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 3, Melvyn T. Shelley, Judge, Court of Appeals, Division One, was designated to sit in his stead.