Case Title: McLEAN v. BENSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
McLEAN v. BENSON2003 WY 7871 P.3d 750Case Number: 02-88Decided: 06/26/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

ESTATE 
OF THELMA E. McLEAN, by and

through 
its Personal Representative,

DAVID 
A. HALL,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff/Respondent),

 

v.

                                                                                                

EUGENE 
H. BENSON

and 
HEATHER L. BENSON,

 

Appellees(Defendants/Petitioners).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Janet 
L. Tyler, Laramie, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

 

            
Philip 
A. Nicholas and Julie M. Yates of Anthony, Nicholas, Tangeman & Yates, LLC, 
Laramie, Wyoming.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and BURKE, 
D.J.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from an order admitting a will to probate.  
We dismiss the appeal because the order was not a final appealable order 
as contemplated by W.R.A.P. 1.04 and 1.05.

 

FACTS

 

[¶2]      In 1992, Thelma 
McLean (McLean) was "befriended" by EuGene Benson (Benson) and his daughter, 
Heather.  Both Bensons were 
stockbrokers.  From 1992 until her 
death in 1998, McLean transferred practically all of her financial dealings, not 
to mention most of her assets, to the Bensons.  In 1994, McLean signed a Last Will and 
Testament that had been prepared by Benson's brother-in-law, an attorney, and 
typed by Heather.  The Bensons were 
the beneficiaries under the will.

 

[¶3]      In 1999, McLean's 
nephew, David Hall (Hall), petitioned the district court for appointment as 
personal representative of McLean's intestate estate.  Hall then immediately filed, on behalf 
of the estate, a civil action against the Bensons, alleging breach of fiduciary 
duties, undue influence, constructive fraud, constructive trust, breach of 
contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, intentional interference with expected inheritance, civil 
conspiracy, negligence, and fraudulent transfers.  Several months later, Benson filed the 
purported Last Will and Testament of McLean, and eventually sought appointment 
as personal representative of McLean's testate estate.

 

[¶4]      On December 7, 
2001, the district court ordered the two probate actions and the civil suit 
consolidated.  Three months later, 
after summary judgment motions left most of the issues extant, the district 
court signed an Order Admitting Will to Probate and Appointing Personal 
Representative, and a separate Order on Motion for Summary Judgment.  Hall became personal representative in 
both probates.  All proceedings in 
the civil action were stayed pending resolution of any will contest in the 
combined probate.  This appeal 
followed.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶5]      Hall and the 
McLean Estate raise the following issues:

 

I.          
Whether it was error to enter an order admitting a will, about which the 
Court had serious reservations, to probate nearly two and one-half years after 
the will was filed, and three years after an intestate probate was 
opened?

 

II.          
Whether it was error not to hold the order admitting the will to probate 
in abeyance until the conclusion of the civil action instituted by the Personal 
Representative appointed in the intestate proceeding, when that civil action is 
against the devisees under the purported will?

 

III.         
Whether the civil action instituted by the Personal Representative of the 
intestate estate, which action was consolidated into the combined intestate and 
testate probates, acts as a will contest for purposes of W.S. § 
2-6-301?

 

[¶6]      The Bensons raise 
the following issues:

 

A.        Does 
appellant lack standing to object to the probate court admitting the will into 
probate and to bring this appeal?

 

B.        Did 
the probate court, in accordance with the Wyoming Probate Code, properly admit 
the will into probate after letters of administration had been issued to 
appellant at appellant's request and a petition to probate the will had been 
filed?

 

C.        [Are 
appellees] entitled to recover against appellant for costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred by appellee[s] in defending a baseless appeal by 
appellant, in accordance with Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 
[10.05]?

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      We will not 
address most of the issues raised by the parties because this appeal must be 
dismissed for want of a final appealable order.1  W.R.A.P. 1.04 reads, in pertinent 
part:

 

(a)       A judgment 
rendered, or appealable order made, by a district court may be:  reversed, vacated, remanded, or modified 
by the supreme court for errors appearing on the record.

 

In 
turn, W.R.A.P. 1.05 defines "appealable order" as follows:

 

            
(a)        An 
order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, 
determines the action and prevents a judgment; or

 

            
(b)        An 
order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding; 
or

 

            
(c)        An 
order made upon a summary application in an action after judgment; 
or

 

            
(d)        An 
order, including a conditional order, granting a new trial on the grounds stated 
in Rule 59(a)(4) and (5), Wyo. R. Civ. P.; if an appeal is taken from such an 
order, the judgment shall remain final and in effect for the purposes of appeal 
by another party; or

 

            
(e)        
Interlocutory orders and decrees of the district courts 
which:

 

           
(1)        
Grant, continue, or modify injunctions, or dissolve injunctions, or 
refuse to dissolve or modify injunctions; or

 

           
(2)        
Appoint receivers, or issue orders to wind up receiverships, or to take 
steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other 
disposition of property.

 

[¶8]      This Court has 
had numerous occasions to apply this definition to particular 
circumstances.  We have stated, for 
instance, that an order is not final if it does not affect a substantial right 
of either party.  Stone v. Stone, 
842 P.2d 545, 549 (Wyo. 1992).  To be final, the order must determine 
all liabilities of all parties and leave nothing for future consideration.  Id. at 548 (quoting In re 
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River 
System, 803 P.2d 61, 66 (Wyo. 1990)).  
It must determine the merits of the controversy.  Public Service Commission v. Lower 
Valley Power and Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo. 1980).  The purpose of this general rule is to 
avoid fragmentary appeals and decisions made in a piecemeal fashion.  In re General Adjudication of All 
Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 803 P.2d  at 66.  An order that merely determines a 
procedural issue, such as jurisdiction, and leaves the merits for further 
hearing, is not a final order.  
Steele v. Neeman, 6 P.3d 649, 653 (Wyo. 2000).  The denial of a motion for summary 
judgment is not appealable unless it is coupled with the grant of summary 
judgment to the other party, thereby completely resolving the case.  McLean v. Hyland Enterprises, Inc., 
2001 WY 111, ¶ 17, 34 P.3d 1262, 1267 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶9]      The McLean Estate 
contends that the Order Admitting Will to Probate and Appointing Personal 
Representative is a final appealable order under either W.R.A.P. 1.05(a) or 
(b).  First, the McLean Estate cites 
First Wyoming Bank, N.A.Cheyenne v. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of 
Wyoming, 628 P.2d 1355, 1362 (Wyo. 1981), 
for the proposition that probate jurisdiction is limited and special.  Next, the McLean Estate points out 
Rice v. Tilton, 13 Wyo. 420, 80 P. 828 (1905), 
where this Court considered an appeal from an order admitting a will to probate 
and appointing a personal representative, and State ex rel. Murphy v. 
District Court of Second Judicial Dist. within and for Sweetwater County, 38 
Wyo. 382, 267 P. 424 (1928), 
where we considered an appeal from an order staying disposition of the assets of 
a probate estate.  Finally, the 
McLean Estate cites Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 719 P.2d 234, 235 (Wyo. 
1986), 
for the "implication" therein that the "time for appealing an order admitting a 
will to probate is different than the time to appeal an order of final 
distribution."

 

[¶10]   In response, the Bensons rely on 
several cases that define a final order as one that reaches the merits of the 
controversy.  See, for example, 
Woods v. Woods, 2001 WY 131, ¶¶ 8-10, 36 P.3d 1142, 1144-45 (Wyo. 
2001) (order denying immediate distribution of 
trust assets not a final appealable order) and Dexter v. O'Neal, 649 P.2d 680, 681 (Wyo. 1982) (order of default leaving question of 
damages for further adjudication not a final appealable order).  The Bensons also contend that, pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-6-121, 2-6-122, and 2-6-204 (LexisNexis 2003), the 
filing and admission of a will, with or without probate, is merely a clerical 
act mandated by statute.  Such a 
clerical act is not a final appealable order because it does not determine the 
final merits of the case.  Lee v. 
Sage Creek Refining Co, Inc., 876 P.2d 997, 998 (Wyo. 1994); 
Spitzer v. Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587, 592 (Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶11]   This appeal must be dismissed 
because it falls squarely into that category of cases to which W.R.A.P. 1.04 and 
1.05 do not apply.  Deciding whether 
the probate court was correct in admitting the will to probate will not resolve 
any of the substantive issues and will not affect substantial rights of the 
parties.  Whether administration of 
the estate is testate or intestate, the allegations of the civil suit will 
determine what assets belong to the estate.  Where administration of the estate 
remains to be accomplished, an appeal is premature.  Matter of Estate of Campbell, 673 P.2d 645, 648 (Wyo. 1983).  Neither Rice nor State ex rel. 
Murphy nor Taylor, cited by the McLean Estate, conflict with this 
resolution.  In none of those cases 
was the question of the finality or appealability of an order raised.  The issue in Rice, 80 P. 828, was 
the appointment of the administrator, not admission of the will to probate.  Since the contest in that case was 
between two people, each of whom wanted to be the administrator, the order 
appointing one affected the other's substantial rights.  In State ex rel. Murphy, 267 P. 424, this Court declined to issue a writ of mandamus directing the probate court 
to distribute the estate's assets where those assets were contested in a civil 
action.  That is not precedent for 
us now to hear an appeal from a non-final order.  And in Taylor, 719 P.2d 234, the 
issue was the application of the statute of limitations to a claim of fraud 
based upon the forgery of a will.  
Our statement therein, that the time had expired for appealing from the 
order admitting the will to probate, was obiter dictum, in that we were 
not directly addressing the issue of the appealability of such an order.  Taylor, 719 P.2d  at 
235.

 

[¶12]   Although we dismiss this appeal 
because the order from which the appeal was taken was not a final order, we 
decline to impose sanctions under W.R.A.P. 10.05.  The McLean Estate's brief was not so 
lacking in cogent argument or pertinent authority that it constituted that rare 
circumstance where sanctions are appropriate.  See Amen, Inc. v. Barnard, 938 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1997) and Mayflower Restaurant Co. v. 
Griego, 741 P.2d 1106, 1116 (Wyo. 1987).

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The Bensons raised this contention 
as a sub-part of their "standing" argument.