Case Title: People v. Pawlaczyk

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87260

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 87260-Agenda 39-September 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellees, v. GEORGE 
PAWLACZYK et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed January 21, 2000.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
The circuit court of St. Clair County appointed a special prosecutor to 
investigate whether two officials from the City of Belleville perjured 
themselves in depositions given in a civil suit entitled Hurst v. Viacom 
Broadcasting of Missouri, Inc., No. 96-L-103. The perjury allegedly occurred 
when the officials denied, under oath, that they furnished information 
concerning a criminal investigation to defendants George Pawlaczyk and Marilyn 
Vise, newspaper reporters employed by the Belleville News-Democrat.
In response to subpoenas issued by a special grand jury for their testimony, 
Pawlaczyk and Vise asserted the "reporter's privilege," codified in article 
VIII, part 9, of the Code of Civil Procedure (Reporter's Privilege Act or Act) 
(735 ILCS 5/8-901 et seq. (West 1998)), and refused to reveal whether 
the City of Belleville officials were defendants' sources for stories published 
in the newspaper. The special prosecutor initiated a separate proceeding in 
equity to divest defendants of their reporter's privilege. 735 ILCS 5/8-903 
(West 1998); People v. Pawlaczyk, No. 97-MR-148; People v. Vise, No. 97-MR-149. 
The circuit court ordered Pawlaczyk and Vise to respond to the special 
prosecutor's questions concerning the City of Belleville officials. The 
appellate court affirmed. No. 5-98-0005 (unpublished order under Supreme Court 
Rule 23). Before this court, Pawlaczyk and Vise request that we reverse the 
circuit court's orders.
BACKGROUND
On October 18, 1995, Lori Nolen contacted the Belleville police department 
and reported that she had been the victim of a sexual assault. On November 29, 
1995, KMOV-TV, Channel 4, a television station that broadcasts in the Belleville 
area, reported that Nolen had identified Robert Hurst, a former chief of the 
Belleville police department, as her attacker. The day after, on November 30, 
1995, the Belleville News-Democrat published a story with the headline "Hurst 
Quizzed in Rape." Defendant George Pawlaczyk wrote the article, which stated in 
pertinent part that KMOV-TV had reported that Hurst was a suspect in the rape of 
Lori Nolen. Subsequent article or articles repeated the same allegations.
No criminal charges were ever filed against Hurst. Results of DNA and 
polygraph tests, as well as witness interviews, prompted the Madison County 
State's Attorney to clear Hurst as a suspect in the Nolen case.
On February 13, 1996, Hurst filed suit in the circuit court of Madison 
County, against Viacom Broadcasting of Missouri, Inc., d/b/a KMOV-TV, Channel 4; 
Mary Phelan, an employee of Channel 4; Capital Cities Media, d/b/a the 
Belleville News-Democrat; Pawlaczyk; Lori Nolen; and Greg Edwards, an editor for 
the News-Democrat. Hurst v. Viacom Broadcasting of Missouri, Inc., No. 96-L-103. 
Hurst's claims sounded in libel, slander, and the tort of false light. As 
finally amended,(1) the 
complaint also named as defendants Roger Cook, mayor of Belleville; James Brede, 
the president of the Belleville board of police and fire commissioners; and Gary 
Berkley, publisher of the Belleville News-Democrat. Hurst dropped Greg Edwards 
from the lawsuit. Further, Hurst's last amended pleading replaced Hurst's 
initial claims with allegations of: a civil conspiracy "to deprive plaintiff of 
his constitutional right to privacy"; invasion of privacy; defamation; and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In the course of discovery conducted in the Hurst lawsuit, Hurst deposed 
Belleville Mayor Roger Cook. Cook testified that he spoke to no one "from any 
media source" about Hurst's identity as a suspect until after November 30, 1995, 
when the Belleville News-Democrat first printed the "Hurst Quizzed in Rape" 
story. Cook testified that he never commented about the Nolen incident to Vise; 
Cook asserted that he did not talk to any reporter for the newspaper about the 
Nolen case until "after it was already in the media."
Hurst also deposed Vise in the Hurst case. In pertinent part, Vise averred 
that, as a reporter for the Belleville News-Democrat in the autumn of 1995, she 
learned from another reporter for the News-Democrat, Doug Moore, that Hurst had 
been named by Nolen as Nolen's attacker. Vise stated that she later confirmed 
this information with another source. She refused to disclose the identity of 
the other source, asserting the privilege granted to reporters under the 
Reporter's Privilege Act (735 ILCS 5/8-901 et seq. (West 
1998)). She would confirm, however, that she talked to the source between 
November 14 and November 23, 1995, that the source was either a police officer, 
someone with connections to the police department, or someone that the police 
department "communicates with." Because she left the paper temporarily on 
medical leave, she did not write a story identifying the source, but she did 
share the information with the "editorial staff" before her departure. She said 
too that the source was not James Brede.
Hurst deposed James Brede of the Belleville board of police and fire 
commissioners on March 25, 1996. Brede denied being a source for the Belleville 
News-Democrat for the stories regarding Hurst. Further, Brede maintained that he 
never discussed Hurst's status as a suspect with David Bauer, the chief of 
police for Belleville, Michael Boyne, a Belleville police officer, or any other 
member of the Belleville police department.
When Hurst deposed Pawlaczyk, Pawlaczyk testified that he was first assigned 
to cover the Nolen matter for the newspaper on November 28, 1995. Prior to that 
date, he had heard rumors around Belleville that Hurst had been named as a 
suspect. On November 28, after his assignment as a reporter, Pawlaczyk confirmed 
these rumors by talking to other sources. Pawlaczyk said his primary source for 
the November 30 story was the November 29 account that appeared on KMOV-TV. 
Excluding KMOV-TV, Pawlaczyk said, he considered his other sources for the story 
to be reliable. Pawlaczyk refused to state how many sources he had, and refused 
to state whether his sources included Roger Cook or James Brede.
On Hurst's motion, the circuit court divested Pawlaczyk and Vise of their 
reporters' privilege (735 ILCS 5/8-903, 8-907 (West 1998)), and ordered them to 
reveal the names of the sources that told them that Hurst was suspected of 
raping Nolen. The court ordered Vise to divulge whether her source was Roger 
Cook. Vise did not seek leave to appeal the circuit court's order, which was 
entered on November 7, 1996. Instead, by affidavit filed November 20, 1996, Vise 
answered the circuit court's query in the affirmative.
In addition, the circuit court ordered Pawlaczyk to reveal whether, "prior to 
publication of the offending article on November 30, 1995, defendant Brede 
discussed with [Pawlaczyk] the alleged fact that Ms. Nolen had identified 
plaintiff Hurst as her attacker. If the question is answered in the negative, no 
further inquiry may be made regarding [Pawlaczyk's] sources except by leave of 
court." Pawlaczyk refused to answer the question in the court's order and 
appealed the order, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (134 Ill. 2d R. 
308).
During the pendency of Pawlaczyk's appeal, Hurst moved to withdraw his 
request to divest Pawlaczyk of his reporter's privilege. Hurst asserted that the 
pending appeal would delay final resolution of the issues litigated in the Hurst 
lawsuit. Hurst stated as well that "plaintiff's counsel's review of the evidence 
has convinced him that the issue can be resolved absent divestiture of 
[Pawlaczyk]." On July 11, 1997, the circuit court granted plaintiff's motion and 
withdrew its order divesting Pawlaczyk of his privilege. The appellate court 
subsequently dismissed Pawlaczyk's appeal.
Also, while the Hurst lawsuit was still pending in the circuit court, the St. 
Clair County State's Attorney moved the circuit court for appointment of a 
special prosecutor to determine whether sufficient evidence existed to charge 
Brede and Cook with perjury. The request for appointment of a special prosecutor 
apparently was prompted by evidence adduced during the discovery stage of the 
Hurst case. Information obtained from the State's Attorney for Madison County 
and from employees of the Belleville police department and the Belleville 
News-Democrat allegedly contradicted Brede's and Cook's sworn deposition 
testimony that they were not sources for Pawlaczyk and Vise.
On December 17, 1996, the circuit court of St. Clair County appointed 
attorney Richard Sturgeon as a special prosecutor to "investigate and prosecute 
if warranted, alleged criminal conduct on the part of Roger Cook, Mayor of 
Belleville, and James Brede, Commissioner for the City of Belleville." A grand 
jury convened to investigate the perjury allegations heard testimony from, among 
others, Brede, Cook, Vise and Pawlaczyk. Brede's testimony before the special 
grand jury differed from his deposition testimony in the Hurst case. In the 
Hurst case, Brede averred that he learned that Hurst was a suspect on or after 
November 29, 1995, the date of the "Hurst Quizzed in Rape" article. Before the 
grand jury, Brede stated that he first learned the information on November 27, 
1995, when Pawlaczyk telephoned Brede to ask him about the allegation. However, 
Brede repeated his contention that he was not a source for any reporter 
concerning the Hurst matter.
Roger Cook testified in the grand jury proceedings that Vise was not truthful 
when she swore, in her affidavit, that Cook was a source that named Hurst as a 
suspect in the Nolen rape. Cook stated that he never gave any information 
regarding the case to Vise.
Vise and Pawlaczyk asserted their reporters' privilege before the grand jury 
and refused to reveal whether Cook and Brede acted as sources of information for 
them.
On March 27, 1999, the special prosecutor filed two "Complaints for 
Divestiture of Reporter's Privilege and to Compel the Answering of Non-Privilege 
[sic] Questions" with the circuit court of St. Clair County. People v. 
Pawlaczyk, No. 97-MR-148; People v. Vise, No. 97-MR-149; 735 ILCS 5/8-903 (West 
1998). As to Vise, the special prosecutor initially alleged that the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel barred Vise from raising the reporter's privilege before the 
special grand jury. The special prosecutor asserted too that Cook's testimony 
before the grand jury was directly contradictory to statements in Vise's 
affidavit filed in the Hurst lawsuit. Only by compelling Vise to answer the 
grand jury's questions, the special prosecutor alleged, could the grand jury 
determine if sufficient evidence existed to charge Cook with perjury.
The special prosecutor further maintained that Pawlaczyk's testimony was 
vital to a determination of whether Brede perjured himself when he stated, at 
deposition and before the grand jury, that he was never a source for Pawlaczyk's 
November 30, 1995, article, "Hurst Quizzed in Rape." Thus, the special 
prosecutor requested that the circuit court divest the reporters of their 
privilege claimed under the Act. The special prosecutor also asked the circuit 
court to order Vise and Pawlaczyk to answer all questions "pertaining to issues 
relating to whether" Cook and Brede were sources of information concerning 
Hurst's status as a suspect in a rape case and, if so, what information they 
gave to the journalists and when they gave it.
Following a hearing, the circuit court entered orders on December 3, 1997, 
compelling Vise and Pawlaczyk to answer whether Cook and Brede were, 
respectively, sources for the reporters. If they answered in the affirmative, 
then the reporters were ordered to indicate the information given to them by 
these individuals and when it was given. The circuit court further found that 
Vise was collaterally estopped from asserting the reporter's privilege, since 
she had filed an affidavit in the Hurst case affirming that Cook was a source of 
information for her, and because she never appealed that order.
Vise and Pawlaczyk appealed the circuit court's orders. In an unpublished 
order, the appellate court consolidated the appeals and affirmed the circuit 
court's orders, with one justice dissenting. No. 5-98-0005 (unpublished order 
under Supreme Court Rule 23). The majority opinion agreed that the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel barred Vise from reasserting the reporter's privilege. The 
majority agreed too that the special prosecutor satisfied the test articulated 
in the Act for divestiture of the privilege. In dissent, Justice Kuehn asserted 
that the special prosecutor failed to meet one of the elements of the statutory 
test, namely, that the privileged information was relevant to the perjury 
allegations under investigation by the special grand jury. We granted leave to 
appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).
ANALYSIS
A. Whether This Court Has Jurisdiction to Dispose of Defendants' 
Appeal
As an initial matter, we must determine whether jurisdiction for defendants' 
appeal properly lies in this court. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 109 Ill. 2d 52, 54 (1985). In their brief, defendants contend that 
the court's jurisdiction derives from Supreme Court Rules 302(b) and 315 (134 
Ill. 2d R. 302(b); 177 Ill. 2d R. 315). Defendants' jurisdictional statement is 
incorrect. Rule 302(b) permits this court to directly transfer an appeal pending 
in the appellate court to the supreme court, when "the public interest requires 
prompt adjudication" of the matter. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b). No order was entered 
in this case predicated on Rule 302(b). Neither party applied for a Rule 302(b) 
transfer and, in fact, the appellate court disposed of this case on the merits, 
an eventuality not contemplated by the transfer mechanism described in Rule 
302(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b)).
Further, Rule 315 merely sets forth the criteria that must be met in order to 
file a petition for leave to appeal to this court. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. It is not 
one of the rules of court that confers jurisdiction on a final order or on an 
interlocutory, but appealable, order. See People ex rel. Scott v. 
Silverstein, 87 Ill. 2d 167, 171 (1981). Thus, the grounds stated by 
defendants for this court's alleged jurisdiction are inadequate.
Unless we conclude that defendants have appealed from a final order (see 155 
Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 304), or from an interlocutory order expressly made appealable 
by supreme court rules (see 166 Ill. 2d Rs. 306, 307; 155 Ill. 2d R. 308), then 
we must dismiss defendants' appeal. Silverstein, 87 Ill. 2d  at 174. A 
final order is one which "determines the litigation on the merits so that, if 
affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with the execution of the 
judgment." Silverstein, 87 Ill. 2d  at 171; see also Flores v. 
Dugan, 91 Ill. 2d 108, 112 (1982).
At bar, Vise and Pawlaczyk appeal from orders entered in two chancery 
actions: People v. Pawlaczyk, 97-MR-148, and People v. Vise, 97-MR-149. The 
special prosecutor initiated these actions, pursuant to the Act, for the 
specific purpose of divesting the reporters of the privilege created by the Act 
(735 ILCS 5/8-903(a) (West 1998)). Thus, the culmination of these proceedings 
would be either the grant or the denial of the relief requested by the special 
prosecutor. The orders from which defendants appeal, entered December 3, 1997, 
divested Pawlaczyk and Vise of the privilege. Because the Pawlaczyk and Vise 
cases were initiated for the limited purpose of divesting defendants of their 
reporters' privilege, nothing remains to be done in the proceedings except to 
execute the judgment of the trial court, namely, that defendants finally respond 
to the grand jury's inquiries. Cf. Silverstein, 87 Ill. 2d  at 
172. Therefore, the circuit court's orders are final and appealable orders. 134 
Ill. 2d R. 301. This court possesses the necessary jurisdiction to decide 
defendants' appeal.
B. The Illinois Reporter's Privilege Act
Illinois allows a qualified privilege of confidentiality for any source of 
information obtained by a reporter. 735 ILCS 5/8-901 (West 1998). "The 
reporter's privilege has evolved from a common law recognition that the 
compelled disclosure of a reporter's sources could compromise the news media's 
first amendment right to freely gather and disseminate information." In re 
Special Grand Jury Investigation of Alleged Violation of the Juvenile Court 
Act, 104 Ill. 2d 419, 424 (1984). The purpose of the privilege is to assure 
reporters access to information, thereby encouraging a free press and a 
well-informed citizenry. Cukier v. American Medical Ass'n, 259 Ill. 
App. 3d 159, 163 (1994); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Arya, 226 Ill. 
App. 3d 848, 852 (1992); see also Comment, Just Between You and Me ... For 
Now: Reexamining a Qualified Privilege for Reporters to Keep Sources 
Confidential in Grand Jury Proceedings, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 739; D. 
Geraghty & A. Raphael, Reporter's Privilege and Juvenile Anonymity: Two 
Confidentiality Policies on a Collision Course, 16 Loy. U. Chi. 
L.J. 43, 52 n.51 (1984) (hereinafter, Reporter's Privilege) (quoting 
Illinois Governor Richard Ogilvie, " '[The Act] assures a better informed 
public, for it allows reporters to seek the truth wherever it is to be found, 
without the fear that their sources will be cut off by unnecessary 
disclosure' ").
A reporter may be divested of the privilege only by the successful completion 
of a multistep process delineated in the Act. 735 ILCS 5/8-903 through 8-907 
(West 1998). A party seeking divestiture of the privilege must identify, in 
pertinent part, the specific information sought, its "relevancy to the 
proceedings," and that a specific public interest would be adversely affected if 
the factual information sought were not disclosed. 735 ILCS 5/8-904 (West 1998). 
The applicant must also prove, by a preponderance of the evidence (735 ILCS 
5/8-905 (West 1998); Arya, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 854), that no state or 
federal secrets are compromised by disclosure of the information requested, that 
all other available sources of information have been exhausted and that 
disclosure of the information is essential to the protection of the public 
interest involved. 735 ILCS 5/8-907 (West 1998). Further, the Act directs that, 
in granting or denying the application for divestiture, the circuit court shall 
consider the nature of the proceedings, the merits of the claim or defense, the 
adequacy of remedies otherwise available, if any, the relevancy of the source, 
and whether alternative means of proof are available. 735 ILCS 5/8-906 (West 
1998).
We will disturb the lower court's findings under the statute only if they are 
against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Lawson v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., 64 Ill. 2d 543, 553 (1976).
1. Whether Defendant Marilyn Vise Is Collaterally Estopped 
From Raising the Reporter's Privilege
Vise asserts that the circuit court erred in ruling that Vise was 
collaterally estopped from asserting her reporter's privilege before the special 
grand jury. The special prosecutor responds that, because the circuit court in 
the Hurst case divested Vise of her privilege, and because Vise failed to appeal 
the Hurst order of divestiture, Vise cannot relitigate the identical issue 
during the special grand jury investigation.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a party from relitigating an issue 
decided in a prior proceeding. Talarico v. Dunlap, 177 Ill. 2d 185, 191 
(1997); Herzog v. Lexington Township, 167 Ill. 2d 288, 294 (1995). The 
doctrine is intended to "promote[] fairness and judicial economy by preventing 
relitigation in one suit of an identical issue already resolved against the 
party against whom the bar is sought." Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 173 Ill. 2d 447, 460 (1996). A party is collaterally estopped from litigating an 
issue when "(1) the issue decided in the prior litigation is identical with the 
one presented in the suit in question, (2) there was a final judgment on the 
merits in the prior adjudication, and (3) the party against whom estoppel is 
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication." 
Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d  at 191; Herzog, 167 Ill. 2d  at 295. For 
the doctrine to apply, the court must be assured that the party to be estopped 
previously had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue." Vroegh 
v. J&M Forklift, 165 Ill. 2d 523, 532 (1995). The court must 
also be assured that the party estopped suffers no unfairness as a result of its 
enforcement. Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d  at 191-92. The decision to apply the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel is entrusted to the circuit court's sound 
discretion, and will not be reversed absent a misapplication of that discretion. 
See Cleveringa v. J.I. Case Co., 230 Ill. App. 3d 831, 848 (1992).
Vise insists that estoppel is inappropriate because the issues litigated in 
the grand jury proceedings and in the Hurst lawsuit are not identical. 
Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d  at 191. The original complaint in the Hurst case 
attempted to state a cause of action for libel, slander and false light. The 
present appeal arises from a grand jury investigation into whether Cook and 
Brede committed perjury.
Vise is correct. As Vise points out, the test for divestiture under the Act 
varies slightly when the divestiture proceedings arise in the course of a 
lawsuit for libel or slander, as opposed to when the divestiture request arises 
in other actions. The chief difference lies in the proof the movant must adduce 
concerning any "public interest" at stake in the proceedings. A court granting 
divestiture in a libel/slander action must be convinced that the public's "need 
for disclosure of the information sought outweighs the public interest in 
protecting the confidentiality of sources of information used by a reporter." 
735 ILCS 5/8-907(2) (West 1998). In all other cases, the movant must demonstrate 
that "disclosure of the information sought is essential to the protection of the 
public interest involved." 735 ILCS 8-907(2) (West 1998). Elsewhere, the Act 
directs a party seeking divestiture in a libel/slander case to make certain 
prima facie showings relevant to the alleged defamation, and 
to demonstrate the necessity for disclosure of the privileged information. 735 
ILCS 5/8-904 (West 1998). Such showings are required only in cases in which 
defamation is an underlying claim. 735 ILCS 5/8-904 (West 1998).
Another difference lies in the application of the "relevance" prong of the 
statutory divestiture test. Section 8-904 obligates the party seeking 
divestiture to demonstrate the relevancy of the privileged information to the 
"proceedings." 735 ILCS 5/8-904 (West 1998). Thus, in the Hurst case, the Act 
required Hurst to show how the identity of Vise's source was relevant to Hurst's 
lawsuit for libel, perjury and false light. Because the special prosecutor filed 
the complaint in the Vise case pursuant to a special grand jury investigation 
into perjury, however, the inquiry becomes, "How is the identity of Vise's 
source relevant to prove whether Cook or Brede perjured themselves?" As a 
result, the processes of divestiture in the Hurst and Vise lawsuits necessarily 
involve analyses of different causes of action and issues, precluding 
application of the collateral estoppel doctrine.
In this case, estoppel is also inappropriate because the record on appeal 
contains little to indicate exactly what arguments were put forth in the Hurst 
lawsuit regarding divestiture of Vise's privilege and what facts and standards 
the Hurst court considered in divesting Vise of the privilege. Unless it can be 
shown with "clarity and certainty" that the identical question was decided in an 
earlier proceeding, collateral estoppel is improper. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Insurance Co. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d 475, 
487 (1998); Hexacomb Corp. v. Corrugated Systems, Inc., 287 Ill. App. 
3d 623, 631 (1997). As this court stated in Kessinger, 173 Ill. 2d  at 
467, "[a]pplication of the doctrine of collateral estoppel must be narrowly 
tailored to fit the precise facts and issues that were clearly determined in the 
prior judgment."
Accordingly, we find that the circuit court erred by finding Vise 
collaterally estopped from reasserting her reporter's privilege. Further, 
because we have determined that the special prosecutor failed to satisfy one of 
the necessary elements of the collateral estoppel doctrine, we need not address 
the remaining arguments Vise raised in opposition to estoppel.
In light of our holding as to Vise, moreover, we will proceed to review the 
propriety of the orders of divestiture entered by the circuit court as to Vise 
and Pawlaczyk. There is no prejudice to Vise if we do not remand her cause to 
the circuit court to determine if Vise should be divested of her reporter's 
privilege. In fact, the circuit court in the Vise case made all of the findings 
prescribed by the Act for an order of divestiture. The pleadings and transcripts 
of record indicate that the special prosecutor raised the estoppel argument 
against Vise in the alternative, so that the question of whether Vise should be 
stripped of her reporter's privilege was joined and litigated by the special 
prosecutor and Vise. Also, the circuit court in the Vise case applied the 
statutory test for divestiture to Vise and found divestiture proper. Thus, we 
conclude that any facts or issues regarding divestiture that Vise and the 
special prosecutor would relitigate on remand have already been adequately 
addressed before the circuit court.
2. Whether the Circuit Court's Decision to Divest Pawlaczyk 
and Vise of Their Reporters' Privilege Was Against the Manifest Weight of the 
Evidence
On appeal, defendants challenge the circuit court's findings as to two 
factors in the multistep process to divest reporters of their statutory 
privilege. Defendants allege that, contrary to the circuit court's ruling, the 
privileged information was not relevant to the grand jury investigation to 
determine whether Brede and Cook committed perjury. 735 ILCS 5/8-904, 8-906 
(West 1998). Defendants assert as well that the circuit court improperly 
concluded that disclosure was "essential" to the "public interest involved." 735 
ILCS 5/8-904, 8-907 (West 1998).
a. Whether the Special Prosecutor Demonstrated the Relevancy of 
the Privileged Information to the Grand Jury Proceedings
Defendants maintain that the special prosecutor did not adequately 
demonstrate the relevancy of the sources' identities to the proceedings in which 
the information was sought. 735 ILCS 5/8-904 (West 1998). In support of this 
contention, defendants first observe that, in order for a person to be convicted 
of perjury, the State must prove, inter alia, that the allegedly false 
statement was "material" to the proceeding in which the statement was uttered. 
Defendants urge that Brede and Cook cannot be convicted of perjury because, when 
Brede and Cook made the allegedly perjurious statements in the Hurst case, the 
statements were not "material" to the underlying lawsuit for libel, slander or 
false light. From this premise, defendants then seem to conclude that, because 
Brede and Cook cannot be convicted of perjury, then there is no need to know 
whether Brede and Cook gave false testimony. In other words, the identity of the 
reporters' sources is not "relevant" to the "proceedings."
We disagree. We think defendants' argument misconstrues the meaning of both 
"proceedings" and "relevancy" in section 8-904. Section 8-904 requires only a 
showing that the information requested is "relevan[t] to the proceedings." 735 
ILCS 5/8-904 (West 1998). Section 8-903(a) of the Act, in turn, defines the 
"proceeding[s]" in which the relevancy must be proved. 735 ILCS 5/8-903(a) (West 
1998). Pursuant to section 8-903(a), the application for divestiture shall be 
filed in the circuit court serving the county hearing "the *** proceeding in 
which the information is sought." 735 ILCS 5/8-903(a) (West 1998).
In this case, the application for divestiture arose from Vise's and 
Pawlaczyk's refusal to identify their sources before a special grand jury 
investigating allegations of perjury against Brede and Cook. Therefore, the 
"proceedings" that define the scope of our relevancy inquiry are the special 
grand jury proceedings.
Furthermore, a fact is "relevant" if it tends to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence. People v. Monroe, 
66 Ill. 2d 317, 321-22 (1977), quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401; see also People v. 
Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458, 477 (1989). The "fact[s] of consequence," or 
"proposition[s]" (M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence 
§401.1, at 132 (6th ed. 1994)), relevant to a perjury charge are whether under 
oath "or affirmation" in any matter in which the oath or affirmation is required 
an individual makes a false statement material to the issue in question and the 
person knows the statement to be untrue. 720 ILCS 5/32-2 (West 1998); People 
v. Davis, 164 Ill. 2d 309, 310 (1995). Thus, if the privileged information 
will make any one of the elements of perjury more or less probable, then it is 
relevant "to the proceedings."
In the present appeal, the identity of defendants' source or sources is 
directly relevant to an element of the perjury charge. Brede and Cook have 
stated under oath that they did not speak to Pawlaczyk or Vise about Hurst 
before the story "Hurst Quizzed in Rape" appeared in the newspaper. However, the 
testimony of several witnesses appearing before the special grand jury was 
directly contrary to the deposition testimony of Brede and Cook, calling the 
veracity of Brede and Cook into question. As a consequence, only the individuals 
allegedly on the receiving end of the officials' disclosures (i.e., 
Pawlaczyk and Vise) can definitively say when Brede and Cook talked to them and 
what their conversations entailed. Indeed, Pawlaczyk admitted before the grand 
jury that only Pawlaczyk knows for sure whether Brede has testified truthfully 
or falsely under oath concerning his interactions with Pawlaczyk. Therefore, the 
identity of Pawlaczyk's and Vise's sources is relevant to the allegation that 
Brede and Cook testified falsely under oath.
We agree with defendants that, in order to convict Brede and Cook of perjury, 
the State would ultimately have to prove more than just a false statement made 
under oath. 720 ILCS 5/32-2 (West 1998). The State must also demonstrate the 
materiality of the supposedly perjurious statement or statements to the claims 
alleged in the Hurst case. Davis, 164 Ill. 2d  at 311-12. However, 
whether the State can prove that element of a perjury charge is not dispositive 
of this court's inquiry in the instant matter. It is sufficient if the 
privileged material is relevant to a "fact of consequence" to the perjury 
allegations. By its materiality to the question of whether Brede and Cook 
testified truthfully or falsely at deposition, the privileged information is 
relevant to a fact of consequence in the "proceedings" in which the proposition 
arose.
Decisions from other jurisdictions construing statutory and common law 
reporter's privileges support our interpretation of the Act. See Davis v. 
Glanton, 705 A.2d 879, 885 (Pa. Super. 1997) (disclosure of privileged 
source materials for newspaper article was proper where it was "material, 
relevant and necessary" to prove an element of plaintiff's defamation claim, 
i.e., that the published remarks referred to plaintiffs); State v. 
Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 577, 581 P.2d 812, 815 (1978) (disclosure 
generally required in criminal cases where privileged information is material to 
prove an element of the offense or to prove a defense asserted by defendant); 
Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 758, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1974) 
(criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to identify witnesses would prevail 
over reporter's claim of privilege, provided defendant could show that 
privileged information was, inter alia, "material to proof of any 
element of a criminal offense, or to proof of the defense asserted by the 
defendant").
We also reject defendants' assertion that divestiture requires proof that the 
privileged facts are "critically relevant" to the proceedings at issue. By its 
terms, the Act only requires proof that the privileged information is 
"relevan[t]" to the proceedings in which they are sought. 735 ILCS 5/8-904 (West 
1998). Nowhere does the Act demand evidence of "critical" relevancy. Applying 
the statute according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms (People 
v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997)), we hold that a showing of 
"relevancy" is sufficient to meet that prong of the statutory test for 
divestiture.
b. Whether the Special Prosecutor Demonstrated an Essential 
Public Interest Necessitating Disclosure of the Privileged Information
Defendants assert next that the circuit court inappropriately found that 
disclosure of the sources' identities was "essential to the public interest 
involved." 735 ILCS 5/8-907(2) (West 1998). The circuit court determined that 
divestiture was essential to the public's interest in the special grand jury 
investigation concerning the purported perjury at the Brede and Cook 
depositions. The fact that perjury is a felony in Illinois seemed to influence 
the circuit court's ruling, as well. The appellate court did not define 
per se the public interest implicated by the motion for 
divestiture, but indicated that it might be "preventing perjury." The appellate 
court held that the special prosecutor satisfied the burden of proof as to all 
necessary elements under the Act, including demonstrating that divestiture was 
essential to protect the public interest involved.
Defendants contend that the circuit and appellate courts erred in allowing 
the special prosecutor to show merely the existence of a "public interest" 
before divesting defendants of their privilege. Defendants insist that the Act 
and applicable first amendment principles demand a finding of a "compelling" 
public interest sufficient to override the public's interest in a journalist's 
unfettered access to confidential sources.
Again, we find that defendants' argument inserts terms into the Act that 
simply do not exist. Proof of a "compelling" interest is not required by the 
Act. Rather, in granting a motion for divestiture, the circuit court must find 
that the requested disclosure is "essential to the protection of the public 
interest involved." 735 ILCS 5/8-907(2) (West 1998). The "public interest 
involved" is a reference to section 8-904 of the Act, which prescribes the 
contents of the application filed by the party seeking divestiture. See 735 ILCS 
5/8-904 (West 1998); Sternberg Dredging Co. v. Estate of Sternberg, 10 Ill. 2d 328, 334 (1957) (to ascertain the intent animating a statute, the court 
must construe all provisions of the act together). Under section 8-904, the 
application must identify a "specific public interest which would be adversely 
affected" by the absence of the information sought. 735 ILCS 5/8-904 (West 
1998). The statute as written, therefore, does not expressly require the party 
seeking divestiture to show that the interest is "compelling."
Defendants also assert that, in order to satisfy the "baseline protections" 
guaranteed by the first amendment, we must interpret the Act as requiring a 
finding of a "compelling public interest." According to defendants, 
constitutional jurisprudence demands a showing of a "compelling" interest before 
a reporter can lawfully be stripped of his reporter's privilege.
The court need not reach this question. Whether the Act should or should not 
be interpreted to require a compelling public interest is immaterial to 
the disposition of this case, since the Unites States Supreme Court has already 
determined that grand jury proceedings constitute a "compelling interest" that 
outweighs the public's interest in the reporter-source privilege. In 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626, 
92 S. Ct. 2646 (1972), the Supreme Court consolidated three appeals brought by 
journalists who had been subpoenaed to testify before grand juries investigating 
crimes that the journalists had personally witnessed. The authorities requested 
each journalist to disclose, inter alia, sources that 
furnished information for the reporters' news accounts published or broadcast in 
the media. The reporters refused.
The precise issue before the Branzburg Court was whether reporters 
were obliged to respond to grand jury subpoenas "as other citizens do" and to 
answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime. 
Branzburg, 408 U.S.  at 682, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 640, 92 S. Ct.  at 2657. The 
reporters urged that a journalist's ability to guarantee confidentiality to 
sources is necessary to preserve the "free flow of information protected by the 
First Amendment." Branzburg, 408 U.S.  at 680, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 638, 92 S. Ct.  at 2656. They did not claim an absolute privilege, but insisted that 
disclosure of confidential sources could only follow a showing by their 
interrogators of the relevancy of the information sought to the crime under 
investigation, that the information is unavailable from other sources, and that 
the need for the information was "sufficiently compelling" to outweigh the first 
amendment interests in preventing disclosure. Branzburg, 408 U.S.  at 
680, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 638, 92 S. Ct.  at 2656.
In a plurality opinion, five members of the Court refused to recognize the 
privilege asserted by the reporters and instead ruled that, unless a journalist 
could prove that a grand jury was convened in bad faith, the journalist bore the 
same duty as any other citizen to respond to a grand jury subpoena. 
Branzburg, 408 U.S.  at 690, 707-08, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 644, 655, 92 S. Ct. 
at 2661, 2670. Significantly, the Court also stated:
See also United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998) 
("Branzburg will protect the press if the government attempts to harass 
it. Short of such harassment, the media must bear the same burden of producing 
evidence of criminal wrongdoing as any other citizen").
Applying this standard to the facts before it, the Branzburg Court 
noted that the grand juries in question had a "necessary interest" in 
discouraging the crimes they were called to investigate, including drug 
trafficking, "violent disorders" in the community, and threats against the 
President. Branzburg, 408 U.S.  at 701, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 651, 92 S. Ct. 
at 2666. Based on news accounts authored or broadcast by the reporters, the 
grand juries subpoenaed the reporters because they likely possessed information 
of use to the grand juries' investigations, thereby establishing a relationship 
between the information sought and a subject of "compelling" interest. 
Branzburg, 408 U.S.  at 701-02, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 651, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2666-67.
The instant appeal presents a factual scenario similar to Branzburg. 
The special grand jury subpoenaed Pawlaczyk and Vise to provide evidence for a 
criminal investigation into the possibly felonious conduct of Belleville city 
officials. The information pursued by the special grand jury was whether 
sufficient evidence existed to charge Brede and Cook with perjury. The newspaper 
accounts and the reporters' own testimony before the special grand jury and 
elsewhere established that Vise and Pawlaczyk possessed information pertinent to 
the investigations. And although defendants' briefs imply that the grand jury 
investigation may be the manifestation of a political feud between Hurst, Brede 
and Cook, defendants do not allege that the subpoenas were issued to harass 
Pawlaczyk and Vise, or that the special grand jury is unlawfully convened. 
Hence, the compelling public interest that Branzburg found inherent in 
the functioning of a grand jury is present here.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the appellate 
court.
Affirmed.
1. 1The record indicates that Hurst obtained 
leave of court to file a fifth amended complaint. However, Hurst's last amended 
complaint in the record on appeal is plaintiff's fourth amended complaint. The 
court relies, therefore, on the fourth amended complaint for this recitation of 
allegations.