Case Title: Wallace v. Broyles

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jacqueline WALLACE, Individually and as the
Administrator of the Estate of Larry Shannon
Wallace v. J. Frank BROYLES, Individually;
Dean Weber, Individually; James Woody
Woodell, Individually; Harp's Food Stores,
Inc., Dr. John P. Park, Dr. Tom Philip Coker,
Dr. Tom Patrick Coker, Dr. Walter "Duke"
Harris, and Ozark Orthopaedic Sports Medicine
Clinic, Ltd. 

97-170                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered January 15, 1998


1.   Trial -- trial court used wrong standard when deciding to
     grant summary judgment. -- The trial court used the wrong
     standard when deciding to grant summary judgment where it
     determined there was no evidence upon which reasonable minds
     could differ that the decedent consumed any significant amount
     of Darvocet prior to his suicide, or that the defendants' acts
     caused his suicide; in its oral findings, the trial court also
     said that there was no evidence of any malice, and if there
     was any evidence, reasonable minds could not differ as to the
     conclusions to be drawn that there was no malice shown; the
     trial court further held that "there is no evidence,
     sufficient evidence, to show that the actions of the
     defendants proximately caused suicide because there is no
     evidence that reasonable minds could differ to the fact that
     he was using Darvocet at the time of his suicide, which was
     the proximate cause of that suicide." 


2.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- when properly granted. --
     Summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when
     it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact
     to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a
     matter of law; once the moving party has established a prima
     facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must
     meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a
     material issue of fact; the standard to be applied in summary-
     judgment cases is whether there is evidence sufficient to
     raise a fact issue, rather than evidence sufficient to compel
     a conclusion on the part of the factfinder. 

3.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- factors on review. -- On
     review, the supreme court determines if summary judgment was
     appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented
     by the moving party in support of the motion leave a material
     fact unanswered; the supreme court views the evidence in a
     light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was
     filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving
     party; the court's review focuses not only on the pleadings,
     but also on the affidavits and other documents filed by the
     parties. 

4.   Motions -- correct standard for review of summary judgment --
     trial court committed prejudicial error. -- The standard to be
     applied in summary-judgment cases is whether there is evidence
     sufficient to raise a fact issue, rather than evidence
     sufficient to compel a conclusion on the part of the
     factfinder; when using the correct standard applicable to the
     granting of summary judgment, the trial court committed
     prejudicial error.  

5.   Negligence -- defined -- what constitutes. -- Negligence is
     the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person
     would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful
     person would not do; to constitute negligence, an act must be
     one from which a reasonably careful person would foresee such
     an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to
     do the act, or to do it in a more careful manner; to
     constitute actionable negligence, it is not necessary that the
     actor foresee the particular injury which occurred, only that
     the actor reasonably foresee an appreciable risk of harm to
     others; proximate cause in a negligence action may be shown
     from circumstantial evidence, and such evidence is sufficient
     to show proximate cause if the facts proved are of such a
     nature and are so connected and related to each other that the
     conclusion therefrom may be fairly inferred.

6.   Appeal & error -- review of trial court's grant of summary
     judgment -- standard of review. -- Because the supreme court's
     review was of the trial court's granting of a summary
     judgment, the court needed only to decide if the pleadings and
     evidentiary documents raised a fact issue concerning whether
     the defendants' acts or omissions were negligence in the
     circumstances described, and whether they should have
     reasonably foreseen an appreciable risk of harm to others.

7.   Negligence -- fact issue as to existence of negligence existed
     -- controlled drugs dispensed in illegal and careless manner.
     -- Given their expressed and inferred knowledge of the
     potential harm that would result to others who would be the
     recipients of illegally dispensed drugs, and from the evidence
     presented, a fact issue clearly existed concerning whether the
     appellees were negligent in the illegal and careless manner in
     which they dispensed controlled drugs to university athletes;
     to be negligent, the defendants need not be shown to have
     foreseen the particular injury which occurred, but only that
     they reasonably could be said to have foreseen an appreciable
     risk of harm to others.
     
8.   Negligence -- proximate-cause evidence -- decedent had been
     supplied with controlled drugs. -- It was clear from the
     record that proximate-cause evidence existed to show that the
     decedent had been supplied or had consumed the controlled
     drugs in controversy; considerable circumstantial evidence was
     presented. 
9.   Torts -- statutory immunity -- liability in tort would stand
     if actions of coaches found to be malicious. -- The supreme
     court found that the proximate-cause evidence that the
     defendant coaches had illegally permitted large orders of
     supposedly prescription drugs to be indiscriminately
     accessible to anyone entering the athletes' training program
     had bearing on the legal issue concerning whether the coaches'
     actions were malicious; if so, they would be liable in tort
     even though, as state employees, they would otherwise be
     statutorily immune from suit.

10.  Negligence -- malice -- when inferred. -- Malice may be
     inferred where the evidence indicates that the defendant acted
     wantonly in causing the injury or with a conscious
     indifference to the consequences. 


11.  Evidence -- seven items of evidence presented at summary-
     judgment hearing -- sufficient evidence presented creating
     fact issue of whether decedent consumed drugs from the
     university athletic department. -- Where at least seven
     different items of evidence were produced at the summary-
     judgment hearing from which a fact issue could arise regarding
     whether the decedent had consumed Darvocet from the university
     athletic department, the supreme court, in viewing the
     evidence in the light most favorable to the appellant, the
     nonmoving party, was compelled to hold that a genuine issue of
     material fact existed regarding whether the decedent, prior to
     his suicide, had been consuming Darvocet from the university's
     supply of the drug.

12.  Evidence -- eight items of evidence presented at summary-
     judgment hearing -- material issue existed regarding whether
     appellees' acted with conscious indifference as to harmful
     consequences university athletes could suffer due to athletic
     department's drug-dispensing policies. -- In determining
     whether the appellees knew or had reason to believe their
     conduct would likely cause injury, and whether they had reason
     to believe harm could result to the decedent, at least eight
     evidentiary items were found that, when viewed in the light
     most favorable to the appellant, created a material issue as
     to whether the appellees acted with such conscious
     indifference to the harmful consequences of the drug-
     dispensing procedures employed by the athletic department that
     malice could be inferred.

13.  Motions -- trial court committed prejudicial error -- trial
     court's grant of defendant-appellees' motions for summary
     judgment reversed and remanded. -- The trial court committed
     prejudicial error in utilizing the wrong standard when ruling
     on the defendant-appellees' summary-judgment motions, and
     specifically erred in failing to hold the evidence raised fact
     issues as to whether the decedent consumed Darvocet illegally
     dispensed by the athletic department and whether those drugs
     contributed to or caused his death; at the summary-judgment
     stage of this litigation, the appellees were not statutorily
     immune from suit for tort liability; the trial court's grant
     of the defendant-appellees' motions for summary judgment was
     reversed and remanded.

     Appeal from Washington Circuit Court; Kim M. Smith, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Joey McCutcheon, Gary L. Richardson and Chad R. Richardson, 
for appellants.
     Jeffrey A. Bell and Woody Bassett, III, for appellee J. Frank
Broyles. 
     Jeffrey A. Bell, for appellee Dean Webber.
     Davis, Cox & Wright, P.L.C. , by:  Walter Cox, Jeffrey A. Bell
and Woody Bassett, III, and Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Angela
S. Jegley, Asst. Att'y Gen., for appellees James Woody Woodell and
Harp's Food Stores, Inc.
     Davis, Cox & Wright, P.L.C. , by:  Walter Cox and Constance G.
Clark, for appellees, Dr. John P. Park, Dr. Tom Philip Coker, Dr.
Tom Patrick Coker, Dr. Walter "Duke" Harris, and Ozark Orthopaedic
Sports Medicine Clinic, Ltd. 
     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     Shannon Wright was a varsity football player at the University
of Arkansas who died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound on
October 13, 1993.  Shannon's mother, Jacqueline Wallace, filed suit
on March 10, 1995, and an amended complaint on May 11, 1995,
against the nine defendant-appellees, alleging that their
negligent, wilful, wanton, and malicious acts caused Shannon's
death.  
     In her complaint, Wallace alleged that controlled substances
were stored and dispensed from the Broyles Athletic Complex without
a proper registration from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). 
Wallace asserted that, through the DEA registration of defendant-
appellee Dr. John Park, defendant-appellee Dean Weber and others
placed orders for Tylenol #3, Darvocet, and other drugs through
defendant-appellees James Woodell and Harp's Food Stores, and they
had these controlled substances delivered to the athletic
department at the University.  Wallace further alleged that, over
a fifteen-month period between November 1992 and January 1994 --
relevant to when and immediately after Shannon played football --
the Arkansas State Police and DEA conducted an audit of these
controlled substances purchased by the athletic department.  Their
audit was alleged to reveal that 13,079 dosage units had been
purchased and dispensed, but only 3,352 dosage units could be
documented and accounted for.  Wallace also charged that the
controlled substances were kept in an unlocked metal cabinet in the
athletic training room and that University employees and athletes
obtained controlled substances from the athletic department without
prescriptions, labels, instructions, or warnings as to dangers or
side effects.  Wallace's complaint further alleged that defendant-
appellees Drs. Tom Philip Coker, Tom Patrick Coker, and Walter
Harris, through defendant-appellee Ozark Orthopaedic Clinic,
authorized Weber to dispense controlled drugs to athletes; they
kept no accurate records on the dosage units dispensed; and they
failed to attend rehabilitation sessions of injured athletes.
     Wallace further claimed that the foregoing improper dispensing
of controlled substances took place even though, as early as June
1992, the NCAA had issued guidelines to defendant-appellees Frank
Broyles, Director of Athletics, and Dean Weber, Head Athletic
Trainer, providing that physicians could not delegate the authority
to dispense prescription medications to athletic trainers.  Even
though these guidelines and warnings concerning possible dangers to
athletes were given to University personnel, Wallace alleged no
action was taken to avoid those dangers or to comply with the
guidelines.  Wallace specifically stated that Broyles and Weber
knew or should have known of the potential harm to the athletes,
but instead they proceeded with conscious indifference to the
possibility of injury to student athletes and others.
     Finally, Wallace alleged that Shannon sustained a severe
shoulder injury during a football game on September 11, 1993, which
later resulted in his undergoing extensive physical therapy
treatments and taking heavy dosages of Darvocet supplied by
University personnel and others without advice or warning of the
drug's potentially dangerous side effects or of dangerous
interactions with other drugs.  Wallace's complaint concluded with
allegations asserting that Broyles's and Weber's conduct, which
proximately caused Shannon's death, was negligent, malicious,
wilful and wanton, because among other things, they knew of the
illegal dispensing of drugs in the athletic training room and knew
of its danger to athletes.  Wallace further concluded that Drs.
Park, Tom Philip Coker, Tom Patrick Coker, Harris and the Ozark
Orthopaedic Clinic were negligent in illegally dispensing narcotics
with dangerous side effects, and that Shannon was given and he
consumed such drugs, causing his death.
     One year after the filing of Wallace's amended complaint, the
appellee doctors and the Ozark Orthopaedic Clinic filed a motion
for summary judgment wherein they claimed no credible evidence
existed upon which a jury could find Shannon had consumed any
Darvocet prior to his suicide on October 13, 1993.  Moreover, they
claimed that Joe T. Barnes, a toxicologist, determined that there
was no evidence that Shannon had any Darvocet or other drug except
alcohol in his system at the time of his death.  The appellee
doctors asserted it was undisputed that Shannon, upset over
breaking up with his girlfriend, Kit Carson, committed suicide
after consuming large quantities of alcohol.  Finally, the doctors
submitted an affidavit given by Dr. Don McMillan, Chairman of the
University Pharmacy and Toxicology Department, wherein McMillan
averred that, based upon Barnes's test, no Darvocet was found in
Shannon's body at the time of death.  McMillan opined no depressive
effect could have been present from Darvocet even if the drug had
been consumed by Shannon prior to the forty-eight-hour period
preceding his death.  
     One day after the doctors filed the motion for summary
judgment, Woodell and Harp's Food Stores filed theirs, also
claiming that there was no evidence that Shannon had taken Darvocet
prior to his suicide or that any of the defendants had provided
Darvocet to Shannon.  Subsequently, Broyles and Weber separately
filed motions for summary judgment that essentially adopted the
defenses asserted in the earlier summary judgment motions.  Broyles
added that, under Ark. Code Ann.  19-10-305(a) (Repl. 1994), he is
a state employee and immune from suit and civil liability for
damages, from acts or omissions, other than malicious acts or
omissions, occurring within the course and scope of his employment,
except to the extent that he may be covered by liability insurance.
Because he had no liability insurance coverage, Broyles asserted he
was statutorily immune from suit and liability.  In his summary
judgment motion, Weber also adopted the defenses contained in the
other defendants' motions, but like Broyles, claimed statutory
immunity.  However, because Weber conceded having insurance
coverage, he claimed immunity except to the extent of his coverage.
     On October 18, 1996, the circuit court undertook review of the
defendant-appellees' motions for summary judgment, plaintiff-
appellant's responses, along with the parties' respective, numerous
pleadings, affidavits, depositions and exhibits, and after doing so
granted the defendant-appellees' motions.  First, the trial court
dismissed suit with prejudice against Broyles, finding him to be a
state employee who enjoyed statutory immunity from tort liability,
since he had no insurance coverage and there was no evidence of
malicious acts or conduct on Broyles's part.  Second, the court
found Weber a state employee and, as such, immune from suit, since
there was no evidence of malice on his part.  However, because
Weber had liability insurance, the court found suit could lie
against Weber to the extent of his insurance coverage, provided
there was evidence showing he had been negligent.  The circuit
court next dismissed with prejudice the plaintiff-appellant's suit
against all defendant-appellees, finding no evidence of negligence
and stating its reasons as follows:
          (1)  There is no evidence before the court upon
     which reasonable minds could differ that [Shannon]
     consumed any significant amount of Darvocet prior to his
     suicide on October 13, 1993.
          (2)  There is no evidence before the court upon
     which reasonable minds could differ that Darvocet, even
     if consumed by [Shannon], caused or contributed to [his]
     suicide on October 13, 1993.
          (3)  There is no evidence before the court upon
     which reasonable minds could differ that any act or
     omission of any of the defendants caused or contributed
     to [Shannon's] suicide on October 13, 1993.
     We initially point out the trial court's use of the wrong
standard when deciding to grant summary judgment.  As discerned
from the foregoing findings, the trial court determined there was
no evidence upon which reasonable minds could differ that Shannon
consumed any significant amount of Darvocet prior to Shannon's
suicide, or that the defendants' acts caused his suicide. 
(Emphasis added.)  
     In its oral findings, the trial court also said that there is
no evidence of any malice, and if there is any evidence, reasonable
minds could not differ as to the conclusions to be drawn that there
was no malice shown.  (Emphasis added.)  In addition, the trial
court further held that "there is no evidence, sufficient evidence,
to show that the actions of the defendants proximately caused
[Shannon's] suicide because there is no evidence that reasonable
minds could differ to the fact that he was using Darvocet at the
time of his suicide, which was the proximate cause of that
suicide."  The law is well settled that summary judgment is to be
granted by a trial court only when it is clear that there are no
genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Pugh v. Griggs, 327 Ark.
577,