Case Title: Town of Bridport v. Sterling Clark Lurton Corp.

Citation: 166 Vt. 304, 693 A.2d 701

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Town of Bridport v. Sterling Clark Lurton Corp.  (96-083); 166 Vt. 304; 
693 A.2d 701

[Filed 14-Mar-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 96-083

Town of Bridport                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                           Addison Superior Court

Sterling Clark Lurton Corp.                       September Term, 1996

Matthew I. Katz, J.

       John B. Webber and John H. Klesch of Hull, Webber & Reis, Rutland, for
  plaintiff-appellant

       Allan R. Keyes and Marion T. Ferguson of Ryan Smith & Carbine, Ltd.,
  Rutland, for defendant-appellee

PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.  Plaintiff, the Town of Bridport, brought suit against
  defendant Sterling Clark Lurton Corp. after its town hall was destroyed by
  a fire caused by the spontaneous combustion of products manufactured by
  defendant.  Plaintiff appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment
  in favor of defendant, arguing that (1) an inadequate warning may be a
  proximate cause of an injury even though the user did not read the warning
  given; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the adequacy
  of the warnings given in this case. Defendant urges us to accept the
  court's conclusion that plaintiff failed to show proximate cause, and also
  argues that it had no duty to warn on these facts.  We agree with the trial
  court that, as a matter of law, the warnings on defendant's products were
  adequate to alert a reasonable consumer to the risk of spontaneous
  combustion, and therefore affirm.

                                I.

       Summary judgment is appropriate only if defendant has established
  first, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and second, that
  defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

 

  law.  See Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621, 628, 587 A.2d 975, 979 (1991). 
  Plaintiff must be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences
  and all allegations opposing the motion for summary judgment that are
  supported by evidence must be taken as true.  Messier v. Metropolitan Life
  Ins. Co., 154 Vt. 406, 409, 578 A.2d 98, 99-100 (1990).

       Viewing the parties' allegations in light of this standard, the facts
  are as follows.  With the help of grants, donations and volunteer labor,
  the Bridport Restoration Project Committee was gradually restoring the old
  town hall.  Although plaintiff owned the hall, the Masonic Lodge leased the
  second floor of the building as a meeting room.  In preparation for an
  upcoming dinner, several Masons decided to work on the floor, which was in
  poor condition as a result of the renovations.

       One of the Masons, Robert Grant, volunteered to purchase the chemicals
  needed to prepare the floor.  He bought two products, a gallon container of
  gum turps and a gallon container of boiled linseed oil, both manufactured
  by defendant.  Grant stated in his deposition that he did not read the
  labels "to any extent" but that he thought he had "briefed the label" for
  application instructions.  On the advice of a store clerk, he mixed the
  products using a 50/50 ratio.

       Another volunteer, Gary Barkley, joined Grant at the hall.  Barkley
  never looked at the product containers.  The two men spread the mixture of
  linseed oil and gum turps on the floor and swept or mopped it up with
  sawdust that was provided by Margaret Sunderland, the Secretary of the
  Restoration Project Committee.  When Barkley and Grant left the hall, they
  left behind the materials used to clean the floor, including a bucket
  containing the wet, oily sawdust, the product containers, and possibly a
  mop used to clean the floor.  The building burst into flames the next day,
  and the fire was traced to the materials used to clean the floor.

       The appearance and content of the warnings labels on the products are
  not in dispute. The front of the gum turps container stated "DANGER! 
  FLAMMABLE.  HARMFUL OR FATAL IF SWALLOWED.  VAPOR HARMFUL.  SKIN AND EYE
  IRRITANT.  See other

 

  cautions on back panel."  These capitalized warnings were set forth in
  large, bold print directly beneath the identifying product label.  The back
  panel contained a box with several warnings regarding dangers from
  breathing, swallowing, and suffering skin or eye contact with the product,
  as well as an instruction to "Keep away from heat, sparks and flame." 
  Under the box, a paragraph labeled "USES" noted "When mixed one part Gum
  Turpentine to two parts Boiled Linseed Oil it makes an excellent furniture
  polish.  Be sure to wash and dispose of oily rags in a safe place to avoid
  spontaneous combustion."

       Similarly, the front of the linseed oil container displayed a box
  measuring nearly 1" by 3", which stated "READ CAUTION ON BACK PANEL BEFORE
  USE."  The back of the panel displayed a box about 1" by 4", printed in two
  colors, which set forth this warning: "CAUTION: Oily cloths are subject to
  spontaneous combustion.  All oily cloths should be spread to dry in airy
  spot or burned promptly after using."

       Plaintiff alleged that these warnings were inadequate, and that the
  manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings was a proximate cause
  of the fire.  Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff
  could not show that inadequate warnings were a proximate cause of the fire
  where the users of the products did not read the warnings given.  The trial
  court accepted this reasoning, and awarded summary judgment to defendant. 
  Plaintiff moved for relief from judgment on the grounds that one factor in
  determining the adequacy of a warning is its conspicuousness on a label. 
  The court rejected this argument, noting that plaintiff's failure to
  "present[] . . . evidence of what a reasonable linseed oil warning should
  be. . . . [left] no triable question of fact for resolution by the jury,"
  and holding that the warnings given were sufficient as a matter of law. 
  This appeal followed.

                                II.

       Plaintiff's claims are premised on a manufacturer's duty to warn of
  known product defects, which "`arises when the product manufactured is
  dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
  ordinary purchaser, i.e., a consumer possessing the

 

  ordinary and common knowledge of the community as to the product's
  characteristics.'" Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 144 Vt. 305, 308,