Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Fumich

Citation: 2007-Ohio-6040

Docket Number: 20070733

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Fumich, 116 Ohio St.3d 257, 2007-Ohio-6040.] 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. FUMICH. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Fumich,  
116 Ohio St.3d 257, 2007-Ohio-6040.] 
Attorneys at law – Misconduct – 12-month suspension, all stayed. 
(No. 2007-0733 – Submitted August 14, 2007 – Decided November 15, 2007.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 05-076. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, William Mark Fumich Jr. of Westlake, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0022600, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1976.  The 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we 
impose a 12-month stayed suspension of respondent’s license to practice law 
based on findings that he committed several disciplinary violations.  On review, 
we adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 2} On June 15, 2006, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a two-count 
amended complaint charging respondent with several violations of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility.  Respondent stipulated to all the violations of the 
Disciplinary Rules charged in Count I and to one of the two violations charged in 
Count II.  A panel of the board held a hearing on the complaint on February 22, 
2007.  Based on the stipulations and other evidence, the panel made findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation, which the board adopted. 
Stipulated Facts 
Count I 
{¶ 3} In 1998, respondent was hired to probate the will of a relative, 
Janko Klepac.  Shortly after Klepac’s death, his daughters, Nada Bukszar and 
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Danica Jelovic, asked respondent to review the circumstances that led to the 
amputation of Klepac’s toe prior to his death.  Respondent reviewed the matter 
and agreed to pursue a medical-malpractice action on behalf of the estate. 
{¶ 4} In March 1999, respondent filed a medical-malpractice action 
seeking $500,000 in damages.  According to a case-management order, 
respondent was required to submit a report of a medical expert showing the 
purported negligence.  Despite his efforts, respondent was unable to find a 
medical expert willing to testify that substandard care was the cause of Klepac’s 
gangrenous toe. 
{¶ 5} In February 2002, the trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants in the malpractice action.  Respondent had not responded 
to the motions for summary judgment and took no further action in the case.  
Moreover, respondent never advised his clients that the case had been dismissed. 
{¶ 6} In May 2004, Jelovic telephoned respondent to inquire about the 
status of the case.  During this conversation, respondent did not inform Jelovic 
that the case had been dismissed in February 2002.  On June 4, 2004, Jelovic 
again telephoned respondent and asked that he settle the case for $25,000.  Rather 
than tell Jelovic that the case had been dismissed two years earlier, respondent 
told her that the case could be settled for $16,000. 
{¶ 7} After Jelovic agreed to accept the $16,000 “settlement,” 
respondent withdrew $16,000 from a personal retirement account and deposited 
that amount into his IOLTA account.  On June 11, 2004, respondent wrote a 
check from his IOLTA account to Jelovic for $16,000.  Respondent also had 
Jelovic execute a form authorizing respondent to close the case file. 
Count II 
{¶ 8} Respondent represented Kathleen Neubig, his first cousin, on 
several legal matters.  On July 26, 2005, Neubig sent a letter to respondent 
January Term, 2007 
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requesting all of her legal documents in respondent’s possession.  Respondent 
received the letter, but did not return any documents to Neubig. 
Stipulated Misconduct 
{¶ 9} Respondent admitted and the board found that he had violated DR 
1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting an entrusted legal 
matter), 9-102(A) (prohibiting a lawyer from depositing personal funds in law 
firm accounts), and 9-102(B)(4) (failing to promptly deliver client’s property in 
lawyer’s possession). 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 10} In recommending a sanction, the board considered the aggravating 
and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations 
Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). 
{¶ 11} The board found no aggravating factors applicable to respondent’s 
misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a) to (i).  In mitigation, the board 
found (1) the absence of a prior disciplinary record, (2) respondent’s restitution to 
the Klepac estate, (3) respondent’s cooperation in the disciplinary process, and (4) 
his excellent character and reputation.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (c), (d), and 
(e).  The board further found that respondent acted without a dishonest or selfish 
motive relative to personal financial gain.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(b).  
The board also noted that respondent acknowledged the wrongful nature of his 
conduct and that he had not caused financial harm to his clients. 
{¶ 12} The relator recommended that respondent be suspended from the 
practice of law for 12 months with six months stayed.  Respondent requested a 
12-month suspension with the entire suspension stayed.  The panel recommended 
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that respondent receive a 12-month suspension, all stayed.  The board adopted the 
panel’s recommendation. 
Review 
{¶ 13} Respondent does not challenge the board’s findings of misconduct 
or the recommended sanction.  Relator, however, challenges the board’s 
recommendation for a stay of the entire suspension.  Relator contends that 
respondent’s actions warrant an actual suspension from the practice of law and it 
urges us to impose a 12-month suspension with only six months stayed. 
{¶ 14} We have reviewed the board’s record and its report, and we agree 
that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(6), 6-101(A)(3), 9-102(A), 
and 9-102(B)(4).  We also find that the board’s recommended sanction is 
appropriate. 
{¶ 15} A violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) usually requires an actual 
suspension from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 190, 658 N.E.2d 
237.  We have held, however that an abundance of mitigating evidence can justify 
a lesser sanction.  Dayton Bar Assn. v. Kinney (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 77, 78, 728 
N.E.2d 1052 (attorney’s misrepresentations to government agencies that did not 
harm clients or change outcome of representation warranted a six-month stayed 
suspension).  See also Disciplinary Counsel v. Markijohn, 99 Ohio St.3d 489, 
2003-Ohio-4129, 794 N.E.2d 24, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Carroll, 106 Ohio 
St.3d 84, 2005-Ohio-3805, 831 N.E.2d 1000. 
{¶ 16} In this case, the mitigating evidence demonstrates that respondent 
has no prior disciplinary record, has fully cooperated in the disciplinary process, 
and has accepted responsibility for his wrongful conduct.  The panel also received 
several letters attesting to his reputation, professionalism, and competence.  
Furthermore, respondent made restitution to the Klepac estate as part of a legal 
malpractice action against him.  Moreover, although respondent lied to the Klepac 
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estate clients by telling them that the case could be “settled,” the clients received 
$16,000 from respondent even though an adverse judgment had already been 
entered against them.  Thus, while we do not condone such dishonesty, 
respondent did not act with a motive to exploit his clients.  See Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-6510, 858 N.E.2d 368, ¶ 13 
(attorney did not deliberately deceive in order to generate funds not earned or to 
collect for services not rendered).  Cf. Disciplinary Counsel v. Holland, 106 Ohio 
St.3d 372, 2005-Ohio-5322, 835 N.E.2d 361, ¶ 21-22 (attorney acted with an 
exploitive motive by double-billing). 
{¶ 17} We find that respondent’s mitigating evidence weighs against 
imposing an actual suspension.  Dishonesty toward a client in any form is 
misconduct, and respondent’s conduct was a clear violation of DR 1-102(A)(4).  
However, we have consistently recognized that “in determining the appropriate 
length of the suspension and any attendant conditions, we must recognize that the 
primary purpose of disciplinary sanctions is not to punish the offender, but to 
protect the public.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-
Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 53; see also Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Weaver 
(1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 97, 100, 70 O.O.2d 175, 322 N.E.2d 665. 
{¶ 18} Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of 
law for 12 months with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he 
commit no further misconduct during that term.  If respondent violates the 
condition, the stay will be lifted and respondent will serve the entire term of 
actual suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
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MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 19} Attorney dishonesty is a serious problem, one that we have chosen 
to combat with real suspensions from the practice of law: “[W]hen an attorney 
engages in a course of conduct that violates DR 1-102(A)(4), the attorney will be 
actually suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 
187, 191, 658 N.E.2d 237.  In imposing a 12-month stayed suspension, the 
majority suggests that the mitigating evidence warrants an exception to this 
general rule.  Because I cannot overlook the serious dishonesty committed by 
respondent, I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 20} Respondent was faced with a difficult situation.  Unable to find a 
required expert witness to support his clients’ medical-malpractice case, he knew 
that the claim would fail.  The right thing to do would have been to call his clients 
and apprise them of the bad news.  Instead, respondent did nothing.  When the 
case was dismissed after he chose not to respond to a motion to summary 
judgment, he should have informed his clients of this new development.  Instead, 
respondent gave his clients no information for over two years.  When they finally 
sought a status update, he should have told them the truth about their case.  
Instead, respondent fabricated a story, telling them that the case was ongoing and 
that he could settle it for them.  He ultimately gave them $16,000 of his own 
money, but funneled it through his IOLTA account to continue the illusion he had 
crafted. 
{¶ 21} Exceptions from the general suspension rule may be warranted 
when an “abundance of mitigating evidence” requires a different result.  See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Markijohn, 99 Ohio St.3d 489, 2003-Ohio-4129, 794 
N.E.2d 24, ¶ 8.  The type of evidence needed to escape suspension is not present 
here. 
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{¶ 22} While I respect the fact that respondent has no prior disciplinary 
record, fully cooperated in the proceedings, and accepted responsibility for his 
actions, these factors are not enough on their own to overcome an extended 
pattern of unabashed dishonesty toward a client.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Rooney, 110 Ohio St.3d 349, 2006-Ohio-4576, 853 N.E.2d 663, ¶ 9-13.  
Likewise, the fact that respondent did not seek to financially exploit his clients 
does not warrant an exception.  Dishonesty to cover one’s embarrassment of the 
truth is still unacceptable; dishonesty is dishonesty, regardless of the motive.  See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. King, 103 Ohio St.3d 438, 2004-Ohio-5470, 816 N.E.2d 
1040, ¶ 28.  The absence of financially motivated deception certainly warrants a 
lesser actual suspension, but it does not eliminate the requirement altogether. 
{¶ 23} Therefore, I see no evidence to support a fully stayed sanction but 
also recognize the mitigating factors favoring respondent.  Weighing his 
multiyear course of dishonest behavior culminating in a fabricated settlement 
against his previously unblemished record, full cooperation in these proceedings, 
and acceptance of responsibility as well as the lack of financial harm to his 
clients, I would suspend him from the practice of law for 12 months with six 
months stayed. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Philip A. King, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., C. David Paragas, and 
Ronald L. House, for respondent. 
______________________