Case Title: Ex parte Alabama Department of Human Resources. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Alabama Department of Human Resources v. Ideal Truck Service, Inc.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070042

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
rel: 06/20/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1070042
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama Department of Human Resources
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Alabama Department of Human Resources
v.
Ideal Truck Service, Inc.)
(Mobile Circuit Court, DR-00-501918;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2050625)
COBB, Chief Justice.
1070042
2
On January 9, 2008, this Court granted the petition for
a writ of certiorari filed by the Alabama Department of Human
Resources ("DHR") to review the Court of Civil Appeals'
holding that the sovereign-immunity provision of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901 did not bar the motion filed by Ideal
Truck Service, Inc., seeking to compel the Alabama Child
Support Payment Center ("the payment center"), which is
operated by DHR, to take certain actions to correct an error
in disbursing child-support moneys withheld from the paycheck
of an employee of Ideal Truck Service.  Alabama Dep't of Human
Res. v. Ideal Truck Serv., Inc., [Ms. 2050625, March 23, 2007]
__ So. 2d __ (Ala. Civ. App. 2007).  Because we conclude that
the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, we vacate
the trial court's order and dismiss the appeal.
Facts
On August 10, 2000, Laurie L. Miller ("the mother") filed
a complaint for divorce from William J. Miller ("the father")
in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, case no. DR-00-501918.
Two children had been born of their marriage; one was six
years old and the other four years old at the time the
complaint was filed.  On January 19, 2001, the trial court
1070042
3
issued a judgment of divorce, awarding the mother custody of
the children, allowing the father to visit the children, and
requiring the father to provide a certain sum of money monthly
for the support of the children.  On February 8, 2001, the
trial court issued an income-withholding order for payment of
child support; that order was subsequently amended.
  
Pursuant to the income-withholding order, the father's
employer would regularly withhold the amount of child support
so ordered from his paycheck and remit that amount to the
payment center.  The payment center, in turn, normally
deposited the child-support money withheld from the father's
paycheck into an account held by the mother.  Through a
contract with DHR, Tier Technologies, Inc., operates the
payment center. 
During the years following the divorce, the father
changed jobs and employers several times and was unemployed at
times.  At some point, the father was employed by Ideal Truck
Service.  On March 22, 2005, Ideal Truck Service was served
with a copy of an income-withholding order regarding the
father.  Pursuant to the income-withholding order, Ideal Truck
Service began withholding income from the father's paycheck
1070042
4
and remitting the withheld funds to the payment center.  On
November, 18, 2005, Ideal Truck Service submitted a check to
the payment center in the amount of $837.72.  On November 29,
2005, Ideal Truck Service submitted a second check to the
payment center in the amount of $139.62.  These two checks
represented funds withheld from the father's paycheck pursuant
to his court-ordered support obligations to his children.
However, Ideal Truck Service mistakenly wrote on those two
checks the case number for the divorce action of a former
Ideal Truck Service employee, whose child-support payments had
previously been processed by the payment center.  The payment
center deposited the funds from the two misidentified checks
into the account of the former employee's ex-wife.  As a
result, the father's account showed that he was behind in his
child-support payments in the amount of $977.34 (the combined
value of the misidentified checks) and his account accrued
interest based on that "delinquency."
On December 13, 2005, Ideal Truck Service filed an
"Instanter Third Party Motion to Correct Accounting" in the
divorce action between the mother and the father.  In its
motion, Ideal Truck Service asked the trial court to order the
1070042
5
payment center to credit the proper child-support account with
the money withheld from the father's paycheck and remitted to
the payment center by the incorrectly identified checks.
Ideal Truck Service further requested that the trial court
order the payment center to remove any interest the father had
incurred on his child-support obligations as a result of the
error in crediting the wrong person with the payment and
placing the money in the wrong person's account.  In its
motion, Ideal Truck Service did not ask the trial court to
issue any order to a DHR official or to Tier Technologies.
The certificate of service on Ideal Truck Service's motion
reflects that Ideal Truck Service served the motion on the
mother, the father, and the "Alabama Child Support Payment
Center." 
On December 15, 2005, the trial court issued the
following order:
"UPON CONSIDERATION of the Instanter Motion to
Correct Accounting filed by Ideal Truck Service,
Inc., employer of the Defendant, [the father], and
the Affidavit in Support of the Instanter Motion to
Correct Accounting, it is hereby
"ORDERED AND ADJUDGED BY THE COURT AS FOLLOWS:
"1. The Alabama Child Support Payment Center shall
recover immediately the funds in the amount of
1070042
6
[n]ine hundred seventy-seven and 34/100 Dollars
($977.34) erroneously paid to the recipient [K.J.C.]
(Case number DR 1999------) and said funds shall be
paid back to Ideal Truck Service, Inc. at 60 White
Avenue, Fairhope, Alabama 36532.
"2. Ideal Truck Service, Inc. is hereby ordered to
pay the sum of [n]ine hundred seventy-seven and
34/100 Dollars ($977.34) which it withheld from the
Defendant's wages to [the mother]'s account in the
above referenced case."
(Capitalization in original.)
Subsequently, Ideal Truck Service paid $977.34 to the
payment center to be credited to the mother's account, but the
payment center did not recover the funds it had erroneously
paid to the former employee's wife or return those funds to
Ideal Truck Service.
On January 12, 2006, DHR filed a motion requesting the
trial court to vacate its December 15, 2005, order.  In its
motion, DHR argued that, because DHR is ultimately responsible
for the operation of the payment center, the sovereign-
immunity provision in Article I, § 14, Const. of Ala. 1901, as
construed by this Court, divested the trial court of
jurisdiction to order the payment center to recover the
misapplied funds and credit the correct account.
1070042
7
The trial court denied DHR's postjudgment motion, and DHR
appealed.  The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial
court's order. DHR filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
in this Court, seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals'
decision, and we granted the petition.
Standard of Review
"'[I]f an action is an action against the State within
the meaning of § 14, [Const. of Ala. 1901,] such a case
"presents a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, which
cannot be waived or conferred by consent."'"  Ex parte Davis,
930 So. 2d 497, 499-500 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Haley v. Barbour
County, 885 So. 2d 783, 788 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn
Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142-43 (Ala.
2002)).  On questions of subject-matter jurisdiction, this
Court is not limited by the parties' arguments or by the legal
conclusions of the trial and intermediate appellate courts
regarding the existence of jurisdiction.  Rather, we are
obligated 
to 
dismiss 
an 
appeal 
if, 
for 
any 
reason,
jurisdiction does not exist.  See Ex parte Smith, 438 So. 2d
766, 768 (Ala. 1983) ("Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may
not be waived by the parties and it is the duty of an
1070042
8
appellate 
court 
to 
consider 
lack 
of 
subject-matter
jurisdiction ex mero motu." (citing City of Huntsville v.
Miller, 271 Ala. 687, 688, 127 So. 2d 606, 608 (1958))).
Analysis
The relief sought by Ideal Truck Service against the
payment center--an order compelling the payment center to take
action to correct the erroneous deposit of the child-support
money from the father's paycheck into the wrong account--is in
the nature of an injunction against the payment center.  Cf.
Dawkins v. Walker, 794 So. 2d 333, 335 (Ala. 2001) ("An
injunction is defined as '[a] court order commanding or
preventing an action.' Black's Law Dictionary 788 (7th ed.
1999).  Because the order at issue in this case directs the
[defendant] to take action ... we conclude that the order ...
was injunctive in nature.").  Therefore, will evaluate the
relief Ideal Truck Service seeks as injunctive relief for
purposes of our sovereign-immunity analysis.
Article I, § 14, Const. of Ala. 1901, provides "[t]hat
the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any
court of law or equity."  Section 14 affords absolute immunity
to both the State and State agencies.  Alabama Dep't of
1070042
9
Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., [Ms. 1050271, March 7, 2008]
__ So. 2d __, __ (Ala. 2007) (noting that it "'is now well
established'" that "'absolute immunity ... extends to the
State and to State agencies'" (quoting Raley v.Main, [Ms.
1050553, December 21, 2007] __ So. 2d __, __ (Ala. 2007)
(Murdock, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
result))); Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1206
(Ala. 2006)(citing Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So.
2d 257, 261 (Ala. 2003)) ("When an action is one against the
State or a State agency, § 14 wholly removes subject-matter
jurisdiction from the courts.").  "This absolute immunity from
suit also bars suits for relief by way of mandamus or
injunction."  Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., [Ms. 1060078
July 20, 2007] __ So. 2d __, __ (Ala. 2007) (citing Ex parte
Troy Univ., 961 So. 2d 105, 110 (Ala. 2006)).  The wall of
absolute immunity created by § 14 for protecting the State and
its agencies from liability is "nearly impregnable."  Ex parte
Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 500 (Ala. 2005).  We have long held,
however, that an action for an order or injunction compelling
a State official, in his or her official capacity, to perform
his or her legal duties is not an action against the State
1070042
10
within the meaning of § 14 and, therefore, is not prohibited
by § 14.  See Ex parte Carter, 395 So. 2d 65, 68 (Ala.  1980);
see also Harbert, __ So. 2d at __. 
The Court of Civil Appeals here held that DHR has a legal
duty to recover child support the payment center distributes
to the wrong recipient; thus, according to the Court of Civil
Appeals, Ideal Truck Service's request for relief was not
prohibited by § 14 because the request sought to compel DHR to
perform its legal duty.  In so holding, the Court of Civil
Appeals quoted the following language from our opinion in
State Highway Department v. Milton Construction Co., 586 So.
2d 872, 875 (Ala. 1991):
"'It is true that § 14 of the Constitution
prevents a suit against the state as well as suits
against its agencies.  However, this Court has also
recognized 
that 
there are certain established
exceptions to the protection afforded the state or
its agencies by sovereign immunity.  Among those
recognized are actions brought to force state
employees or agencies to perform their legal
duties.'"
__ So. 2d at ___ (emphasis added).
DHR argues that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in
relying on the above-quoted language from Milton to conclude
that an action against a State agency to compel the agency to
1070042
The Court of Civil Appeals issued its opinion in this
1
case relying on Milton before we issued our opinion clarifying
Milton.  However, as we explained in Ex parte Alabama
Department of Transportation, [Ms. 1060078, July 20, 2007],
___ So. 2d at ___, Milton did not change the law that § 14
prohibits actions against State agencies.
11
perform a legal duty is not barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.  Section 14 prohibits actions against the
State, including actions seeking relief from State agencies.
See Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d at 1206.
"In Ex parte Alabama Department of Transportation,
[Ms. 1060078, July 20, 2007] ___ So. 2d [__,] at ___
[(Ala. 2007) ], this Court clarified the reason for
1
the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction in
[Milton].  The trial court had subject-matter
jurisdiction in [Milton], not because the State
Highway Department was a defendant, but because the
director of the State Highway Department, in his
official capacity, was a defendant, and the action
sought to require the director to perform his legal
duties and to pay for the services rendered pursuant
to the contract."
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., [Ms. 1051661, August 10,
2007] __ So. 2d __, ___ (Ala. 2007).  The Court of Civil
Appeals erred insofar as it held that an action against a
State agency, such as DHR, to compel the agency to perform its
legal duties is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. 
1070042
On March 3, 2008, this Court entered an order striking
2
Ideal Truck Service's responsive brief in this appeal as
untimely filed.
12
We next consider whether Ideal Truck Service's motion for
an order compelling the payment center to credit the amount of
the child support withheld from the father's paycheck to the
correct account and to remove any interest charges attributed
to the father on any "delinquency" in his payments caused by
the misidentification of the account on the check amounts to
an action against a State agency that is prohibited by § 14.
We note that the record contains no indication that, in its
arguments before the trial court and the Court of Civil
Appeals,  Ideal Truck Service offered any basis in law or fact
2
for the conclusion that the relief it seeks against the
payment center falls within the well-recognized exception to
§ 14 that permits actions against State officials to compel
them to perform their legal duties.  Neither has Ideal Truck
Service offered any arguments or support for the conclusion
that precedent prohibiting actions naming State agencies as
defendants should be overruled or modified in any way.  "Even
if we would be amenable to such a request [that we overrule a
line of authority], we are not inclined to abandon precedent
1070042
13
without a specific invitation to do so."  Clay Kilgore
Constr., Inc. v. Buchalter/Grant, L.L.C., 949 So. 2d 893, 898
(Ala. 2006).  "Stare decisis commands, at a minimum, a degree
of respect from this Court that makes it disinclined to
overrule controlling precedent when it is not invited to do
so."  Moore v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 849
So. 2d 914, 926 (Ala. 2002).
The use of the word "State" in § 14 protects only
"immediate and strictly governmental agencies of the State"
from suit.  Rodgers v. Hopper, 768 So. 2d 963, 966 (Ala.
2000).  In determining whether a legislatively created body is
"'an immediate and strictly governmental agency' and thus
entitled to protection from suit under § 14," this Court
considers "several factors ... including ... '(1) the
character of the power delegated to the body; (2) the relation
of the body to the State; and (3) the nature of the function
performed by the body.'"  Ex parte Troy Univ., 961 So. 2d at
109-10 (quoting Rodgers, 768 So. 2d at 966 (citing Armory
Comm'n v. Staudt, 388 So. 2d 991, 993 (Ala. 1980))).  We hold
that the same factors ("the Staudt factors") are informative
in determining whether an entity established by a State agency
1070042
14
at the direction of the legislature is part of that agency for
purposes of sovereign immunity.
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act requires that
"the State agency must establish and operate a unit
(which shall be known as the 'State disbursement
unit') for the collection and disbursement of
payments under support orders ...."
42 U.S.C. 654b(a)(1).
In accordance with the Congressional directives contained
in 42 U.S.C. § 654b(a)(1), § 30-3-195, Ala. Code 1975,
requires DHR, as the State Title IV-D agency, to "establish
and operate a unit, which shall be known as the State
Disbursement Unit, for the collection and disbursement of
payments made under support orders ...."
S e c t i on 30- 3 - 1 9 5
further states that the "accurate identification of payments
received" and the "prompt disbursement of the custodial
parent's share of any payment" are the duties of the "State
Disbursement Unit," i.e., the payment center.   Ala. Code
1975, § 30-3-195(c)(2) and (3).  Section 30-3-195 expressly
places on DHR the responsibility for operating the "State
Disbursement Unit," either "directly" or by a "contractor
responsible directly to" DHR. § 30-3-195(b).  In accordance
with 42 U.S.C. § 654b and Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-195, DHR
1070042
15
established the payment center; it operates the payment center
through its agent, Tier Technologies.  
In considering the character of the power delegated to,
and the nature of the function performed by, the payment
center, it is apparent, in light of the above statutes,  that
the powers, duties, and functions conferred on the payment
center are powers, duties, and functions legislatively
delegated to DHR in conjunction with DHR's role as the State
agency charged with carrying out the provisions of Title IV-D
of the Social Security Act.  See 42 U.S.C. § 654b; Ala. Code
1975, § 30-3-195. Thus, the first and third Staudt factors--
"'the character of the power delegated to the body'" and "'the
nature of the function performed by the body'"--support the
conclusion that the payment center is a unit of DHR for
purposes of sovereign immunity.   See Troy Univ., 961 So. 2d
at 109-10.  In considering the relation of the payment center
to the State agency, we note that DHR established the payment
center and that it is directly and ultimately responsible for
the payment center's operations, Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-
195(b).  Therefore, the second Staudt factor-- "'the relation
of the body to the State'"--also supports the conclusion that
1070042
We note that Ideal Truck Service did not in its motion
3
request the trial court to enter any order directed to Tier
Technologies.  We express no opinion as to the application
sovereign-immunity principles to Tier Technologies.
16
the payment center is part of DHR and shares DHR's immunity.
See Troy Univ., 961 So. 2d at 109.  Accordingly, we must
conclude that an injunction against the payment center  is an
3
injunction against DHR itself, and, therefore, § 14 prohibits
such an injunction.
DHR further argues that the payment center is not
responsible to recoup child-support funds that the payment
center distributes to the wrong person as a result of a third
party's error.  Thus, according to DHR, the Court of Civil
Appeals erred in holding that DHR is legally obligated to
recoup from the former employee's ex-wife the child-support
funds the payment center erroneously deposited in her account.
Because 
sovereign 
immunity 
precludes 
subject-matter
jurisdiction in this case, we are without jurisdiction to
consider whether or to what extent DHR or the payment center
is obligated to recoup incorrectly disbursed child-support
funds. 
 
Thus, 
although 
we 
hold 
that 
subject-matter
jurisdiction is lacking as the case is presently stated, we
express no opinion as to whether Ideal Truck Service could
1070042
17
have obtained relief from a State official pursuant to our
well-recognized authority that a State official may, in his or
her official capacity, be subject to an action to compel him
or her to perform his or her legal duties.
Because sovereign immunity precludes a civil action
against the payment center, the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to entertain Ideal Truck Service's request for
injunctive relief against the payment center, and the trial
court's order granting such injunctive relief is void. Gulf
Beach Hotel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Whetstone, 935 So. 2d 1177,
1182 (Ala. 2006) ("Where 'the trial court ha[s] no subject-
matter jurisdiction, [it has] no alternative but to dismiss
the action.'  '"Any other action taken by a court lacking
subject matter jurisdiction is null and void."'" (quoting
State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029
(Ala. 1999)  (citations omitted))).  Our remedy in such a
situation, when we find no subject-matter jurisdiction in the
trial court, is to dismiss the appeal and vacate the trial
court's judgment.  Therefore, we vacate the trial court's
order granting Ideal Truck Service relief against the payment
center, and we dismiss this appeal.  See Alabama Dep't of
1070042
18
Revenue v. Arnold, 909 So. 2d 192, 193 (Ala. 2005) (citing
Dunning v. New England Life Ins. Co., 890 So. 2d 92, 98 (Ala.
2003)). 
JUDGMENT VACATED; APPEAL DISMISSED.
See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and
Murdock, JJ., concur.