Case Title: Wessel v. Mapco, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wessel v. Mapco, Inc.1988 WY 46752 P.2d 1363Case Number: 87-146Decided: 03/30/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
LEIGHTON WESSEL, PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JOEL McGLYNN, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE HEIRS AT 
LAW OF JOEL McGLYNN, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

MAPCO, INC., A DELAWARE 
CORPORATION; MID-AMERICA PIPELINE COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION; CHESTER 
DRYER; ERWIN E. HISSEY; HARVEY J. HENDERSON, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS), CHARLES 
NEFF AND JOHN DOES 1-10 (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

Richard H. 
Honaker of Honaker & Hampton, Rock 
Springs, for 
appellant.

Carl L. Lathrop 
of Lathrop & Uchner, P.C., Cheyenne, Timothy Knaus, Robert Bruce Wark, and 
Thomas P. Johnson of Mayer, Brown & Platt, Denver, Colo., for appellees.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal presents a 
wrongful-death/motion - to - dismiss/summary - judgment decision granted to the 
employer and to the employer's grandparent corporation, as well as to 
culpable-negligence claims against co-employees. With the death occurring in 
Colorado, 
worker's-compensation conflict-of-law issues resulted.

[¶2.]     We affirm in part, and 
reverse in part, holding that § 27-12-208, W.S. 1977, 1983 Replacement, is 
applicable to these facts, and find that it was proper to grant summary judgment 
to the employer (Mid-America), and that it was proper to dismiss the action 
against the grandparent company (Mapco). However, we find error in the 
trial-court application of Colorado law to the culpable-negligence claims 
asserted against the co-employees, and reverse the order granting the motion to 
dismiss granted in contravention of § 27-12-208, W.S. 1977, 1983 Replacement, by 
our conclusion that a cause of action was properly presented for trial 
decision.

[¶3.]     Initially it is noted 
that the litigants focused discussion primarily on general rules of choice of 
law. We will not broaden the scope to encompass that 
inquiry.

[¶4.]     Appellant stated as 
issues:

"1. Whether, with regard 
to the choice of substantive law in wrongful death and tort actions, Wyoming 
should abandon the doctrine of lex loci delicti, and adopt the `modern rule' 
under which applicable law is determined by weighing various factors indicating 
which jurisdiction has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and 
the parties.

"2. Whether this Court 
should except intentional and reckless misconduct from the immunity granted 
employers under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act."

[¶5.]     While this court 
recognizes this case as one involving a wrongful-death allegation, it still must 
be examined against the backdrop of the facts which indicate it is more 
appropriately a worker's compensation-conflict case. Originally, when worker's 
compensation laws were first passed, many courts applied tort conflict 
principles and lex loci delicti, such as in In re American Mutual Liability 
Insurance Co., 215 Mass. 480, 102 N.E. 693 (1913), the first American case 
involving a claim for compensation when the injury occurred outside the state. 
Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws - The Restatement and 
Other Recent Developments, 20 Minn.L.Rev. 19 (1935). However, currently it is 
recognized worker's compensation law-conflict issues present unique policy 
questions since the process is neither tort nor contract, but a statutory 
hybrid, so the traditional conflict theories are inept.

"As a result, virtually 
all workmen's compensation statutes today contain their own choice of law 
provisions and cover out-of-state injuries." Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 
(1983).

See 4 A. Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, § 84; Storke and Sears, Reciprocal Exemption 
Provisions of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 67 Yale L.J. 982 (1958); Note, Recent 
Legislation Workmen's Compensation: Injury by Accident: Insurance Costs to 
Employer: Denial of California Benefits to Employees Temporarily 
in the State: Labor Code Section 3600.5, 44 Calif.L.Rev. 387 (1956); Note, 
Choice of Law in Workmen's Compensation Cases, 34 Ill.L.Rev. 226 
(1939).

[¶6.]     In declining to address 
the variegated, general conflict-of-law theories, we direct our analysis to the 
applicable and dispositive out-of-state injuries or extraterritoriality 
provision in Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act (state fund) found in § 
27-12-208.

FACTS

[¶7.]     Joel McGlynn, age 25 in 
1985, was employed by Mid-America Pipeline Company as a pipeliner/welder on a 
maintenance crew stationed at Rock 
Springs, Wyoming. One of 
the company pipelines, used to transport heavy gasses, begins at two points in 
Wyoming, one near Evanston and the other near Wamsutter, converging at 
Rock Springs into a single pipeline to continue 
south to Hobbs, New Mexico.

[¶8.]     Present 
summary-judgment/motion-to-dismiss documentary status suggests for the factual 
panorama of this case that in the early morning hours of April 17, 1985, a 
pressure problem was detected in the pipeline and localized as a leak just north 
of the summit of BaxterPass in Colorado.1 McGlynn and his co-employees were 
dispatched from Rock 
Springs to the site to conduct the repairs. The area near 
BaxterPass is very mountainous 
and rugged, and the sides of the ditch were steep with a ditch around the 
pipeline only about eight feet wide and seven feet deep, necessitating equipment 
to raise and lower the workers into the ditch. Persons present as the pipeline 
crew at leak site included two supervisors, defendants Dryer and Hissey; and 
workers: David Anderson, who was unconscious when delivered by helicopter to a 
hospital; Scott Renck, who was in a coma for ten days; William Sanger; Steven 
Postle; and Robert O'Neal, all, including decedent McGlynn, receiving medical 
attention.

[¶9.]     The alleged facts of 
the death occurrence are such that a justiciable jury issue of culpable 
negligence sufficient for trial may be presented. Upon arrival, decedent and 
other crew members were directed into the ditch for repair by Chester Dryer and 
Erwin Hissey, who were employed by Mid-America as the maintenance supervisor and 
area supervisor respectively. Henderson, the other defendant and safety officer, 
and senior vice president for Mid-America, may not have been present. Working 
conditions for repair were unfavorable since the vapors of the highly volatile 
liquid transported by the pipeline were heavier than air and after leakage would 
collect close to the ground, resulting in exclusion of oxygen sufficient to 
cause suffocation for workers unprotected by oxygenation 
equipment.

[¶10.]  Unfortunately, neither protective 
clothing nor respiratory equipment was brought with the crew to the site. The 
"safety" procedures used were crude at best, as the workers without lifelines 
were directed to hold their breath and go down into the ditch for about 30 
seconds to work, before coming back out of the ditch for air. When repair first 
started in the afternoon, there was a slight breeze in the area; however, as the 
afternoon wore on, the breeze stopped, and the liquid vapors collected and 
visibly radiated from the ground like heat waves. As the work continued until 
around 7:00 p.m., crew members began to pass out in the ditch. Because of the 
terrain and the dimensions of the ditch, it was difficult to remove the 
unconscious men who lacked lifelines, and most had to be pulled out by a 
sideboom on a dozer hooked to their belts. McGlynn, who was not wearing a belt, 
was the last one retrieved, only to be extracted by a chain tied around his 
legs. The rescue helicopter did not reach the area, because of its remoteness, 
until two hours after the accident, and was untimely for his 
survival.

[¶11.]  A claim on behalf of McGlynn was asserted 
in Wyoming by 
Mid-America through its compensation fund which made claim payments. Disability 
and medical benefits were also paid to the other injured members of the crew. 
Wessel, the personal representative for McGlynn's estate, filed this 
wrongful-death action in District Court for SweetwaterCounty, against Mapco,2 its second-tier subsidiary, 
Mid-America, and three employees of Mid-America, for culpable negligence in 
causing the death of McGlynn.

[¶12.]  The pleading issue was quickly joined 
when the individual defendants filed separate motions to dismiss pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., claiming that Colorado law was applicable because 
Wyoming's choice of law doctrine - lex loci delicti - required the law of the 
place of the injury to govern, i.e., Colorado, and Colorado does not allow 
co-employees to be sued for culpable negligence. Mid-America filed a separate 
motion to dismiss, contending that both Colorado and Wyoming law barred the suit against the 
employer for work-related injuries. Mapco filed a motion seeking dismissal or, 
in the alternative, summary judgment, alleging that their only connection with 
McGlynn's death was that they were a grandparent company of Mid-America and, 
lacking involvement or control over the operation or employees of the 
subsidiary, had no liability. Responding to these defenses, the trial court 
granted Mid-America's motion to dismiss, finding that regardless of which 
state's law applied, the employer would be immune from suit, and also dismissing 
the suit against the co-employees by applying lex loci delicti and concluding 
that the Colorado law which did not include co-employee culpable-negligence 
coverage was applicable, thus effectively barring the suit against Dryer, 
Hissey, and Henderson. Subsequently, summary judgment in favor of Mapco was 
granted. Appeal is taken from the two sustained Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss 
and the Rule 56, W.R.C.P. summary judgment.3

EMPLOYER AND 
CO-EMPLOYEES

[¶13.]  The claims against Mid-America, Dryer, 
Hissey, and Henderson were dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This court will 
again restate the standard for review:

"`* * * In appraising the 
sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim which would entitle him to relief." Warren 
v. Hart, Wyo., 747 P.2d 511, 512 (1987), 
quoting from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99 [102] 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957).

See also Fiscus 
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., Wyo., 742 P.2d 198 
(1987), and Torrey v. Twiford, Wyo., 
713 P.2d 1160 (1986).

[¶14.]  The statutory provision then in effect, § 
27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977, 1983 Replacement, provided:

"The rights and remedies 
provided in this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] for an employee and his 
dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of 
all other rights and remedies against any employer making contributions required 
by this act, or his employees acting within the scope of their employment unless 
the employees are culpably negligent, but do not supersede any rights and 
remedies available to an employee and his dependents against any other 
person."

[¶15.]  Article 10, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution states:

"* * * The right of each 
employee to compensation from such fund shall be in lieu of and shall take the 
place of any and all rights of action against any employer contributing as 
required by law to such fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of any 
such injuries or death."

Mid-America:

[¶16.]  Appellants urge that an intentional tort 
was committed, thus allowing suit against Mid-America regardless of the 
employer-employee relationship and any Worker's Compensation Act immunity. This 
we decline to provide. A similar argument was advanced without success in Parker 
v. Energy Development Co., Wyo., 691 P.2d 981 (1984), where we held that the 
employer's immunity was absolute regardless of whether the behavior amounted to 
culpable negligence or an intentional tort. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 
Wyo., 641 P.2d 1247 (1982), had earlier determined that a contributory employer is immune from 
suit regardless of its ordinary or culpable negligence. The pervasive immunity 
of the contributing employer from employee civil liability claims occurring 
within the scope of employment is settled in Wyoming statutes and specifically authorized 
by Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.

[¶17.]  Since coverage was clear, contributions 
to the fund were made, and death benefits paid, the court correctly granted the 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion in favor of Mid-America as a matter of 
law.

[¶18.]  Mapco:

[¶19.]  Based on affidavits as documenting 
evidence, Mapco, the twice-removed, grandparent company of the actual employer, 
Mid-America, was granted summary judgment. The standards to be followed 
concerning the review of summary judgment are established in the six-stage 
analysis in Cordova v. Gosar, Wyo., 719 P.2d 625, 639 (1986). The sixth stage, 
as defined in Matter of Estate of Obra, Wyo., 749 P.2d 272, 274 (1988), is 
"Substantive sufficiency of responsive affidavits." See also, Davenport v. Epperly, 
Wyo., 744 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1987); Williams v. 
Blount, Wyo., 741 P.2d 595, 596 
(1987).

[¶20.]  In determining the propriety of any 
summary judgment, this court will examine the record in the light most favorable 
to the respondent, with all inferences which can properly be drawn from the 
evidence. Cordova v. Gosar, supra, 719 P.2d  at 625; Rompf v. John Q. Hammons 
Hotels, Inc., Wyo., 685 P.2d 25 
(1984).

[¶21.]  It is settled Wyoming law that the 
immunity provisions in the Act should be narrowly construed to extend "to `"any employer contributing, as required by 
law."'" Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 742 P.2d  at 200, quoting 
from Bence v. Pacific Power and Light Company, Wyo., 631 P.2d 13 (1981). 
Additionally, in Fiscus, supra, 742 P.2d  at 200-201, the issue of parent company 
liability was explored, and this court there recognized that the parent entity, 
as not being an employer contributing to the fund, was not provided immunity. 
However, this court further recognized that "`[a] parent corporation can be 
liable in tort only if it has 
independently assumed and breached a duty distinct from that charged to the 
subsidiary.'" Id. at 201.

[¶22.]  By this reasoning, the parent corporation 
was analogized as being similar to an owner of a work site who retained the 
right to direct or assume affirmative safety duties with respect to an 
independent contractor and his employees, in concluding that a parent 
corporation exercising operational control of activities of its subsidiary could 
be liable: 

"* * * A corporation that 
chooses to carry on some of its business through a subsidiary corporation must 
gain some advantage in separateness, operation, perhaps tax consequences; 
otherwise, it would not create the subsidiary corporation. But with the 
advantage gained may come some potential liability. Thus, when the parent 
retains control of some part of the enterprise, it also retains responsibility; 
and it may have potential liability for the part it controls." Id. at 
202.

[¶23.]  This record is devoid of any evidence of 
control by Mapco over Mid-America sufficient factually to materialize that 
potentiality. In the complaint, the allegations concerning Mapco 
were:

"10. THAT Defendant 
Henderson was at all times relevant hereto, a co-employee of Joel McGlynn, and 
was an officer of the Defendant MAPCO, Inc., and was an individual responsible 
for, and in charge of, safety procedures, policies and equipment for Plaintiff's 
deceased and other employees of MAPCO, Inc. and Mid-America Pipeline 
Company.

* * * * * 
*

"12. * * * As 
[Mid-America's] parent company, MAPCO, Inc. had ultimate responsibility for the 
acts and omissions of [Mid-America].

* * * * * 
*

"14. THAT at all times 
relevant hereto, MAPCO, Inc. and Mid-America Pipeline Company owned and 
maintained [the pipeline].

* * * * * 
*

"18. * * * MAPCO had 
excavated a total of about 1,000 feet of line, and an open ditch was left around 
the pipeline to relieve pressure on the pipeline on June 13, 1984. Mud slides in 
the area had caused pressure on the pipeline and MAPCO had excavated a ditch 
around the pipeline to relieve the pressure.

* * * * * 
*

"21. THAT MAPCO and 
Mid-America Pipeline Company have recognized that the vapors of highly volatile 
liquids create a dangerous situation for personnel during pipeline leaks. * * 
*

* * * * * 
*

"25. THAT MAPCO, Inc. and 
Mid-America Pipeline Company have a duty to monitor their supervisors * * * to 
ensure that the supervisors are correctly carrying out Company safety policies 
and procedures, and using Company-mandated policies and procedures in their 
work."

[¶24.]  Mapco factually refuted these pleading 
allegations as substantiated by the affidavit of Henderson relating that he was an employee of 
Mid-America and not of Mapco. Another of movant's affidavits established that 
Mapco never assumed the duty to provide a safe working environment for 
Mid-America employees since the operational-control criteria was absent.4 The case came down dispositively to 
weighing a pleading assertion that the grandparent company was ultimately 
responsible against affidavits from the individuals asserting that Mapco lacked 
relevant operational connection, and that no sufficient nexus was shown to 
conclude that Mapco independently assumed and breached a safety duty in 
functional control of Mid-America. No issue of fact requiring summary judgment 
denial is presented. Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, Wyo., 748 P.2d 704 (1987); Davenport v. Epperly, supra. No evidence 
responsive to movant's affidavit was presented sufficient to raise an issue of 
fact as required to deny summary judgment.

CLAIM OF CO-EMPLOYEE - 
CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE - CONFLICT OF LAW COLORADO 
OR WYOMING?

[¶25.]  Any claim against the co-employees was 
dismissed with trial-court application of the doctrine of lex loci delicti - 
therefore causing Colorado's law to govern the place of the 
injury where co-employees cannot be sued in the worker's compensation immunity 
context. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-52-108 (1973); Kandt v. Evans, Colo., 645 P.2d 1300 (1982). To the contrary 
was Wyoming 
law in effect at death, presenting the determinative inquiry of which state rule 
to apply. We hold that the trial court improvidently dismissed the claims 
against Dryer, Hissey and Henderson because 
Wyoming's 
provision governing out-of-state injuries is applicable providing a litigable 
case of culpable negligence asserted against the co-employees by context of 
pleaded facts provided in the complaint.

[¶26.]  While § 27-12-208, W.S. 1977 has never 
been separately construed,5 our cases have long held that 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation statutes should be applicable extra-territorially 
for injuries to a Wyoming worker occurring outside this state. In Re Byrne, 53 
Wyo. 519, 86 P.2d 1095 (1939). The circumstances in Byrne are similar to the ones in the case 
at bar. Byrne, a Wyoming resident and employee, 
was a truck driver who was killed in Colorado in an automobile accident while 
unquestionably in the scope of his employment. This court recognized the modern 
trend in finding that the phrase "injuries occurring elsewhere," id. at 1100, 
set no territorial limits on the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act's 
coverage.

"* * * The court in 
Hilding v. Department of Labor and Industries, 162 Wn. 168, 298 P. 321, said []: 
The authorities generally hold that, 
unless the Workmen's Compensation Act expressly provides that it shall have no 
extra-territorial effect, it applies to workmen employed in a state to do work 
outside of the territorial limits of that state. Gooding v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 
487, 87 S.E. 862, L.R.A. 1916D, 637; McGuire v. Phelan-Shirley Co., 111 Neb. 
609, 197 N.W. 615; Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106, 170 N.W. 275, 171 N.W. 935; Saunders' Case, 126 Me. 144, 136 A. 722. See, also, State of 
Minnesota ex rel. Chambers v. DistrictCourtofHennepinCounty, 139 Minn. 205, 166 N.W. 185, 3 A.L.R. 1347, and 
extensive note.' * * *

* * * * * 
*

"`The weight of authority in this country 
sustain the assertion that a Workmen's Compensation Act will apply to injuries 
to workmen employed in the state and injured while temporarily out of its 
limits, unless there is something in the act making it inapplicable or clearly 
denying the right of the employee to recover in such case. Grinnell v. 
Wilkinson, 39 R.I. 447, 98 A. 103, 106, L.R.A. 1917B, 767, Ann.Cas. 1918B, 618; 
Gooding v. Ott, supra [77 W. Va. 487, 87 S.E. 862, L.R.A. 1916D, 637]; Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 A. 372, 
L.R.A. 1916A, 436. * * *' [Quoting from State ex rel. Loney v. State Industrial 
Accident Board, 87 Mont. 191, 286 P. 408, 409 
(1930).]

* * * * * 
*

"* * * [T]he trend of modern authority favors the 
allowance of a proper claim for compensation under Workmen's Compensation Acts, 
even though the accident and injuries flowing therefrom took place without the 
jurisdiction of the forum where compensation is claimed but nevertheless in the 
regular course of an employment entered into within the state and between 
residents thereof." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1098-1099.

[¶27.]  Additionally, the applicability of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause to the worker's compensation-conflict area has 
yielded a number of interesting law review articles.6 

[¶28.]  At the time of the McGlynn incident, § 
27-12-208(a), W.S. 1977, 1983 Replacement, provided:

"If an employee, while 
working outside of the territorial limits of this state, suffers an injury on 
account of which he, or in the event of his death, his dependents, would have 
been entitled to the benefits provided by this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 
27-12-804] had the injury occurred within this state, the employee, or in the 
event of his death resulting from the injury, his dependents, are entitled to 
the benefits provided by this act, if at the time of the 
injury:

"(i) His employment is 
principally localized in this state;

"(ii) He is working under 
a contract of hire made in this state in employment not principally localized in 
any state; or

"(iii) He is working 
under a contract of hire made in this state in employment principally localized 
in another state whose worker's compensation law is not applicable to his 
employer."

Since it is 
undisputed that McGlynn was injured outside the territorial limits of Wyoming while in the 
course of his employment, we apply this three-step statutory criteria as a 
matter of law unless factual dispute is presented.

[¶29.]  Although neither the repealed act nor the 
new 1987 Worker's Compensation Act define "principally localized," the phrase is 
defined in the Model Worker's Compensation Act, Section 7, referring to 
extraterritorial coverage which is almost identical7 to the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act's extraterritorial provision. The model act defines 
"principally localized" as follows:

"(4) A person's 
employment is principally localized in this or another State when (1) his 
employer has a place of business in this or such other State and he regularly 
works at or from such place of business, or (2) if clause (1) foregoing is not 
applicable, he is domiciled and spends a substantial part of his working time in 
the service of his employer in this or such other State." 4 A. Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, Appendix H at 629, 649-650 (Model Act) 
(1987).

[¶30.]  A case involving this issue is Patton v. 
Industrial Commission, 147 Ill. App.3d 738, 101 Ill.Dec. 215, 498 N.E.2d 539 (1986), appeal denied 113 Ill. 2d 577, 106 Ill.Dec. 49, 505 N.E.2d 355 
(1987), where that court found that a truck driver was principally localized in 
Missouri, where he worked out of a terminal, and that his employment was not 
principally localized in Illinois, where he was only a 
resident.

[¶31.]  The Illinois Court of Appeals in Patton 
was faced with a case similar to the one at bar, and the Illinois Worker's 
Compensation Act provided coverage if the employment was principally localized 
in Illinois yet no definition of "principally localized" was given in the Act. 
That court, while mindful that the Illinois legislature did not adopt the Model 
Code, reasoned that the absence of the definition was not an explicit rejection 
of the Model's definition. Id. at 101 Ill.Dec. at 742, 498 N.E.2d  at 543. 
Likewise, even though the Wyoming legislature also did not adopt the Model 
Worker's Compensation Act in its entirety, the same strong similarity between 
the Wyoming Act and the Model Act makes the Model Act's definition of 
"principally localized" highly persuasive.

[¶32.]  Given the undisputed record, it is 
evident that McGlynn, as a member of a maintenance crew stationed at Rock Springs, Wyoming, was compensated from that office, 
through which worker's compensation taxes and state unemployment taxes on his 
account were paid to the state funds. Considering these factors, including base 
of operation, center of work, formation of the contract, source of remuneration, 
existence of a facility from which the employee gets his assignments and 
control, and post-job return base, we find that the first criterion is met for 
Wyoming state law application. Patton v. Industrial Commission, supra, 101 
Ill.Dec. at 742, 498 N.E.2d  at 543; Davis v. 
Wilson, Ky.App., 
619 S.W.2d 709 (1980); Phillips v. Oneida Motor Freight, Inc., 163 N.J. Super. 
297, 394 A.2d 891 (1978); Nashko v. Standard Water Proofing Co., 4 N.Y.2d 199, 
173 N.Y.2d 565, 149 N.E.2d 859 (1958); Jackson v. Tillamook Growers Co-op, 39 Or. App. 
247, 592 P.2d 235 (1979); Robbins v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board 
(Mason-Dixon Line, Inc.), 91 Pa. Commw. 269, 496 A.2d 1349 (1985). These 
cases are to be compared with Petrilli v. District of Columbia Department of 
Employment Services, D.C.App., 509 A.2d 629 (1986); Hughes v. District of 
Columbia Department of Employment Services, D.C.App., 498 A.2d 567 (1985); 
George H. Wentz, Inc. v. Sabasta, Iowa, 337 N.W.2d 495 (1983); Jarrell v. 
Employers Casualty Ins. Co., La. App., 499 So. 2d 947, writ denied 501 So. 2d 199 
(1986); Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., La. App., 473 So. 2d 394 (1985); State 
ex rel. Stanadyne, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 12 Ohio St.3d 199, 466 N.E.2d 171 (1984); Minus v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Tastykake 
Baking Co.), 91 Pa. Commw. 281, 496 A.2d 1340 (1985); Loomer v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeal Board, 36 Pa. Commw. 591, 388 A.2d 788 (1978), where the 
employment was found not to be principally localized. While we recognize that 
pipeline-maintenance employment could be a transitory type of employment that 
would not be principally located in any one state, that status is not evidenced 
here, where all of the localization factors were centered in Wyoming.8

[¶33.]  The second part of this test, the viable 
claim, requires determination whether the appellant would have been entitled to 
the relief requested under the Wyoming act, if the injury had actually 
occurred in-state. In Simaitis v. Flood, 182 Conn. 24, 437 A.2d 828 (1980), the Connecticut Supreme Court 
was faced with a nearly identical situation. A Connecticut employee was injured in Tennessee during the scope of his employment, while the 
Connecticut Act allowed co-employee suits and the Tennessee law did not. 
The Connecticut court held that the employment 
relation existed in Connecticut so that the 
Tennessee 
denial law would not be applied. See, however, Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 1180 
(5th Cir.), reh. denied 779 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1985); and Saharceski v. Marcure, 
373 Mass. 304, 
366 N.E.2d 1245 (1977), where the law of the forum court forbade co-employee 
suits but the state of injury allowed them. Clearly, appellant's dependents, by 
the law then in effect, would have been entitled to maintain a Wyoming suit for 
co-employees' culpable negligence. Meyer v. Kendig, Wyo., 641 P.2d 1235 (1982); Markle v. Williamson, Wyo., 518 P.2d 621 (1974); Note, Torts - Workmen's 
Compensation - Liability of Fellow Employees Under the Wyoming Workmen's 
Compensation Law. Markle v. Williamson, X Land & Water L.Rev. 263 (1975). In 
this conflict-of-law analysis, the in-state viable-claim criteria would be 
met.

[¶34.]  Finally, we consider if the employee's 
departure was a permanent assignment or transfer.9 The record is devoid of any 
evidence indicating that McGlynn had been permanently assigned or transferred to 
Colorado. This 
status is not changed by the nature of his work in going to Colorado on a regular 
basis for pipeline maintenance. An employee can go into another state on a 
regular basis to work and still only be temporarily outside of his domicile and 
work-site state. Fischer v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 303 Minn. 1, 225 N.W.2d 542, 
545 (1975). Obviously, without regard for work scope in Colorado or Utah, McGlynn 
was not permanently assigned or transferred to Colorado when he left that early morning to go 
to the mountain area repair site.

[¶35.]  In his treatise, Professor Larson has 
addressed the area of out-of-state injuries in reasoning that jurisdiction 
should be present only where the employment relationship is centered, and that 
the site of that relationship should be governed by rules similar to those 
governing questions concerning domicile:

"The big question under 
this theory is: What is meant by existence or localization of the relation 
within the State? The location of an injury is easy to identify; the location of 
a contract less so, but still subject to well-known legal rules; but the 
whereabouts of a relation between two people has somewhat more mystic 
quality.

"The making of the 
contract within the state is usually deemed to create the relation within the 
state. The relation, having thus achieved situs, retains that situs until 
something happens that shows clearly a transference of the relation to another 
State. This transfer is usually held to occur when either a new contract is made 
in the foreign state, or the employee acquires in the foreign state a fixed and 
non-temporary employment situs. The analogy to the law governing residence is 
apparent, with the old residence persisting until the new one becomes fixed. In 
some kinds of employment, like trucking, flying, selling, or construction work, 
the employee may be constantly coming and going without spending any longer 
sustained periods in the local state than anywhere else; but having rooted his 
status in the local state by the original creation of the relation there, he 
does not lose it merely on the strength of the relative amount of time spent in 
the local state as against foreign states. He loses it only when his regular 
employment becomes centralized and fixed so clearly in another state that any 
return to the original state would itself be only casual, incidental and 
temporary by comparison. This transference will never happen as long as his 
presence in any state, even including the original state, is by the nature of 
his employment brief and transitory." 4 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 
87.42 at 16-102 through 16-104 (1987).

[¶36.]  By application of these principles, we 
determine that § 27-12-208, W.S. 1977, 1983 Replacement is applicable, and that 
the death of Joel McGlynn was an out-of-state injury covered by Wyoming's 
statutes including co-employee provisions.

[¶37.]  We are fortified in analysis, as was the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi in LaDew v. LaBorde, 216 Miss. 598, 63 So. 2d 56 
(1953) in similar circumstance, that an estoppel is created when this employer 
paid and the state fund accepted the premiums for the employment as intended to 
include as covered duties the job duties in an adjacent state. See also 1C A. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 46.45 (1986), and 100 C.J.S. Workmen's 
Compensation § 401, on insurance coverage creating an estoppel. Additionally, 
see Lawrence v. Atlanta Door Company, 171 Ga. App. 741, 320 S.E.2d 627 (1984) 
(and cases cited therein), where an insurer who has collected premiums is 
estopped to deny coverage on the basis that the claimant is exempt from the 
worker's compensation act's provisions. In Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Begley, 
Ky. App., 314 S.W.2d 552 (1958), that court was faced with a situation where an 
employer paid worker's compensation premiums on all of his employees. When the 
insurance company questioned whether Begley was a covered employee, the Court of 
Appeals of Kentucky succinctly espoused the 
view:

"* * * It is well 
established that liability for workmen's compensation may be based on estoppel. 
Smith Coal Co. v. Feltner, 
Ky., 260 S.W.2d 398. So far as the 
employer in this case is concerned, there can be little doubt that estoppel 
binds him." Id. at 556.

See also Hall v. 
Spurlock, Ky., 
310 S.W.2d 259 (1957); and Herndon v. Slayton, 263 Ala. 677, 83 So. 2d 726 
(1955), where the payment of premiums on the individual was sufficient to create 
an estoppel.

[¶38.]  Mid-America compensated the other workers 
injured in this incident through the Wyoming fund, which fact sustains the 
conclusion that it cannot pick and choose who is or is not a Wyoming-law covered 
employee by distinguishing the deceased individual from persons who are merely 
injured. Herndon v. Slayton, supra; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Dudley, 180 Tenn. 191, 173 S.W.2d 142 
(1943). See also Erie Insurance Exchange v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 
56 Pa. Commw. 
77, 423 A.2d 1145 (1981); Carter v. Hodges, 175 Tenn. 96, 132 S.W.2d 211 
(1939).

[¶39.]  Employer and its supervisory personnel 
seek the best of two worlds (or states' laws), which this court should not 
properly provide. They seek immunity by application of the Wyoming law in favor of the employer by coverages 
maintained and actual benefits paid, but then seek immunity for the co-employees 
under Colorado 
law. If we were to accede to the latter request, then we would necessarily have 
to consider whether the Wyoming immunity for the employer initially 
would exist if applying the same law to both for immunity.

[¶40.]  An election was made on behalf of the 
employer by application of Wyoming law, to afford coverage under the 
Wyoming Act through paid premiums, social security taxes and benefits, with 
consequent claim for employer immunity. When Mid-America elected to treat 
McGlynn as its Wyoming employee for coverage, it was bound to 
the domicile law for immunity. Ala-Miss Enterprises, Inc. v. Beasley, Ala. Civ. App., 446 So. 2d 644 
(1984).

"Here we have evidence of 
an employer deducting from the worker's pay a fee for workers' compensation 
insurance over an extended period of time. It is implicit in the circumstances 
that the worker relied upon the declaration that he is to be covered by workers' 
compensation insurance. It would contravene any sense of justice to allow the 
employer to disavow his declaration that the worker is covered by this 
insurance." Hartford Insurance Group v. Voyles, 149 Ga. App. 517, 254 S.E.2d 867, 869 (1979).

[¶41.]  Summary judgment in favor of Mapco is 
affirmed; the order granting the motion to dismiss in favor of Mid-America is 
affirmed; the order granting a motion to dismiss in favor of the co-employees is 
reversed; and the case is remanded for further proceedings in conformity 
herewith.

BROWN, C.J., filed an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

BROWN, Chief Justice, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[¶42.]  I would affirm the trial court in all 
respects.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

1 The location of the 
pipeline leak was at aerial marker 716, which is approximately two miles east of 
the Utah-Colorado border, within a mountain-site mud-slide 
area.

2 Mid-America is owned by 
Mapco Pipeline Investment, Inc. (Mapco Investment), which in turn is owned by 
Mapco, Inc. Mapco Investment was never made a party to this case, and Mapco is 
twice removed from Mid-America.

3 Present Wyoming statutory 
provisions (unitary state fund system) by 1987 repeal do not provide for 
co-employees' suits by contention of culpable negligence. Applying prior law to 
the 1985 death effectuates the statute then in effect and permits maintenance of 
the action since the governing provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act are 
the ones in force at the time of the injury. Swasso v. State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Division, Wyo., 751 P.2d 887 
(1988); State ex rel. Director, Worker's Compensation Division v. Tallman, Wyo., 589 P.2d 835 (1979). The change, 
deletion of co-employee liability, has not yet been subjected to constitutional 
inquiry.

4 It is interesting to 
note that initially appellant's opposition to Mapco being awarded summary 
judgment was that discovery had not been conducted. The trial court, in a 
decision letter dated February 9, 1987, specifically reserved ruling on the 
motion to allow the appellant to conduct further discovery to refute Mapco's 
affidavits. Apparently, no advantageous developments occurred in discovery since 
the record remained unimproved, and the summary-judgment order was 
entered.

5 See Venes v. Heck, 642 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1981) for a case involving the converse of the present 
situation: a Colorado employee temporarily in 
Wyoming during the course of his employment was 
injured in Wyoming.

6 Although not exhaustive 
here, a bibliography of the articles which have dealt with this subject include: 
Brenton, Worker's Disability Compensation, 8 Workmen's Compensation L.Rev. 184 
(1984-1985); Miletti, Conflicts of Laws - The Scope of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause in Successive Workers' Compensation Awards, 7 Workmen's Compensation 
L.Rev. 111 (1983-1984); Dahl, The Iowa Workmen's Compensation Law and Federal 
Recommendations, 24 Drake L.Rev. 336 (1975); Storke and Sears, Reciprocal 
Exemption Provisions of Workmen's Compensation Acts, supra; Note, Workmen's 
Compensation: Injury By Accident, supra; Comment, Conflict-of-Laws Problems in 
Workmen's Compensation: Carroll v. Lanza, 23 U. Of Chicago L.Rev. 515 (1956); 
Note, Exclusive Workmen's Compensation Acts and Conflict of Laws, 10 Wyo.L.J. 
149 (1956); Comment, Extraterritorial Application of Workmen's Compensation Laws 
- A Suggested Solution, 33 Tex.L.Rev. 917 (1955); Note, The Conflicts Problem As 
Applied to Workmen's Compensation in Colorado, 22 Rocky Mtn.L.Rev. 77 (1949); Note, 
Conflict of Laws, Workmen's Compensation, 23 Ind.L.J. 214 (1948); Note, 
Workmen's Compensation - Conflict of Laws, 23 Notre Dame Law. 261 (1948); Note, 
Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to Workmen's Compensation Awards, 47 
Colum. L.Rev. 846 (1947); Note, Workmen's Compensation: Full Faith and Credit: 
Previous Award Held No Bar to Subsequent Award in Another State, 33 Cornell L.Q. 
310 (1947); Note, Res Judicata - Denial of Recovery By Workmen's Compensation 
Board of One State Does Not Preclude Recovery in State of Making of Contract of 
Employment, 60 Harvard L.Rev. 473 (1947); Note, Conflict of Laws - Full Faith 
and Credit - Choice of Law - Workmen's Compensation, 39 Colum.L.Rev. 1024 
(1939); Note, Choice of Law in Workmen's Compensation Cases, supra; Note, 
Workmen's Compensation - Conflict of Laws - Application of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, 23 Minn.L.Rev. 866 (1939); Note, Conflicts of Laws - Workmen's 
Compensation, 4 Mo.L.Rev. 203 (1939); Note, Extraterritorial Application of 
Workmen's Compensation Acts, 26 Va.L.Rev. 95 (1939); Note, Conflict of Laws - 
Workmen's Compensation, 17 Neb.L.Bull. 386 (1938); Dwan, Workmen's Compensation 
and the Conflict of Laws, supra; Hall, Extraterritorial Application of Workmen's 
Compensation Acts, 13 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 114 (1935); Dunlap, The Conflict of Laws 
and Workmen's Compensation, 23 Calif.L.Rev. 381 (1935).

7 The Model Worker's 
Compensation Act provides:

"Section 7. 
[Extraterritorial coverage.] (a) If an employee, while working outside the 
territorial limits of this State, suffers an injury on account of which he, or 
in the event of his death, his dependents, would have been entitled to the 
benefits provided by this act had such injury occurred within this State, such 
employee, or in the event of his death resulting from such injury, his 
dependents, shall be entitled to the benefits provided by this act, provided 
that at the time of such injury (1) his employment is principally localized in 
this State, or (2) he is working under a contract of hire made in this State in 
employment not principally localized in any State, or (3) he is working under a 
contract of hire made in this State in employment principally localized in 
another State, whose Workmen's Compensation law is not applicable to his 
employer, or (4) he is working under a contract of hire made in this State for 
employment outside the United States and Canada." 4 A. Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, Appendix H at 629, 648 (Model Act) 
(1987).

8 For an analysis of 
situations where the employment is not principally localized in any state, see 
United Pipeline Construction Co. v. Kaelin, Ky.App., 602 S.W.2d 176 (1980); 
Pilot v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Corning Glass Works), 86 Pa. 
Commw. 432, 485 A.2d 514 (1984); and Interstate Carriers Co-operative v. 
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 66 Pa. Commw. 288, 443 A.2d 1376 
(1982).

9 Section 27-12-208(c), 
W.S. 1977, 1983 Replacement provided:

"This section does not 
apply to an employee whose departure from this state is caused by a permanent 
assignment or transfer."

Section 
27-14-204(c), W.S. 1977, 1987 Replacement, is identical to the repealed 
section.