Case Title: State v. Gregory C. Moore

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-2-03

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2004-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 2 September Term 2003 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. GREGORY C. MOORE, Defendant-Appellant. Argued January 21, 2004 Decided August 2, 2004 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Gilbert G. Miller, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). JUSTICE WALLACE delivered the opinion of the Court. In this search and seizure case, and in State v. Pineiro, ____ N.J. ____ (2004), also decided today, we consider whether the State had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of defendant. The trial court and the Appellate Division found probable cause for the law enforcement officers to arrest, and to search and seize the evidence from defendant. We agree and affirm. [State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 173-74 (1989).] Here, the State urges that the warrantless search of defendant was valid under the search incident to a lawful arrest exception. See Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 762-63, 89 S. Ct. at 2040, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 694. We agree that that exception provides the relevant framework for analysis. Consequently, we need decide only whether the facts found by the trial court provided probable cause to arrest defendant. The standards for determining probable cause to arrest and probable cause to search are identical. State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 92 (1998). We have often stated that the probable cause standard is not susceptible of precise definition. State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 13 (2003). Nevertheless, our jurisprudence has held consistently that a principal component of the probable cause standard is a well-grounded suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed. State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515 (2003) (quoting State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 211 (2001)). Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within . . . [the officers ] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 361 (2000) (first and second alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146, 121 S. Ct. 1083, 148 L. Ed. 2d 959 (2001). The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. Maryland v. Pringle, ___ U.S. ___, ____, 124 S. Ct. 795, 800, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003); accord State v. Dangerfield, 171 N.J. 446, 456 (2002). In determining whether there is probable cause, the court should utilize the totality of the circumstances test set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548 (1983). Novembrino, supra, 105 N.J. at 122. That test requires the court to make a practical, common sense determination whether, given all of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 544. The factors to be considered in applying that test include a police officer s common and specialized experience, Schneider, supra, 163 N.J. at 362 (citation and quotation marks omitted), and evidence concerning the high-crime reputation of an area, State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 217 (2002). Although several factors considered in isolation may not be enough, cumulatively these pieces of information may become sufficient to demonstrate probable cause. State v. Zutic, 155 N.J. 103, 113 (1998). Plaintiff-Respondent, v. GREGORY C. MOORE, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. Behind a delicatessen, a man handed one small, unidentified item to defendant and another small, unidentified item to another individual, both of whom gave him currency in exchange. This event occurred in a so-called high crime area. Based on those observations, the police claimed that there was probable cause to arrest the two men for involvement in a drug transaction. This, admittedly, is a close case. Nonetheless, however malleable probable cause may be, I cannot conclude on those facts that there was a well-grounded suspicion that a crime had occurred justifying defendant s arrest and the seizure of evidence. See Commonwealth v. Banks, 658 A.2d 752, 753 (Pa. 1995) (finding that mere police observation of an exchange of an unidentified item or items on a public street corner for cash, does not constitute probable cause to arrest ) (emphasis added); People v. Ratcliff, 778 P.2d 1371, 1377-78 (Co. 1989) (finding police officer s observation of exchange of unknown object between two men, one of whom was known to officer as a drug user and dealer, in area known to police for drug trafficking, was insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest defendant); People v. Oden, 329 N.E.2d 188, 191 (N.Y. 1975) (finding the mere passing of a glassine envelope in a neighborhood in which narcotics were known to have been present, unsupplemented by any additional relevant behavior or circumstances found to exist, was insufficient to raise the level of inference from suspicion to probable cause ). Although the police may have had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to make a Terry stop and engage in further inquiry, I cannot find the existence of probable cause for a search or seizure on the bare facts of this case. See State v. Pineiro, __ N.J. (2004) (Albin, J., concurring) (arguing that otherwise innocent conduct is not transformed into criminal activity simply because it occurred in high crime area). I, therefore, respectfully dissent. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-2 SEPTEMBER TERM 2003 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. GREGORY C. MOORE, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED August 2, 2004 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Wallace CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Albin