Case Title: Santen v. Tuthill

Citation: 

Docket Number: 021781

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
MICHAEL SANTEN 
v.  Record No. 021781  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   April 17, 2003 
ROBERT TUTHILL, T/A WINCHESTER 
FAMILY BILLIARDS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLARKE COUNTY 
John R. Prosser, Judge 
 
 
 
The primary issues in this appeal concern the 
admissibility of certain evidence in a civil proceeding, 
specifically: (1) a defendant’s guilty plea in general 
district court when the defendant subsequently appeals the 
conviction to circuit court; (2) the result of a 
preliminary breath test; and (3) testimony of an expert 
toxicologist.  Because the guilty plea was annulled by the 
appeal to circuit court and because there was not an 
adequate foundation to support the admissibility of the 
other evidence, we find no error in the circuit court’s 
refusal to admit this evidence. 
This case arose out of an alleged altercation between 
Michael Curtis Santen, Sr., and Glenn Richard Wilfong.  The 
incident occurred when Wilfong was assisting Robert 
Tuthill, Jr. (Tuthill, Jr.), in delivering and assembling a 
billiard table at the home of Santen and Norma Katherine 
DeSantos.  Santen and DeSantos had purchased the billiard 
 
1
table from Robert Tuthill, Sr. (Tuthill, Sr.), t/a 
Winchester Family Billiards.  Tuthill, Sr., had asked 
Wilfong to accompany Tuthill, Jr., on this occasion.  
Wilfong had previously assisted the Tuthills in installing 
billiard tables. 
 
Approximately 20 minutes after arriving at the Santen-
DeSantos residence, Tuthill, Jr., realized that he needed 
to return to the store to obtain the correct piece of slate 
for the billiard table.  While Tuthill, Jr., was away, a 
disagreement arose between Santen and Wilfong which 
resulted in DeSantos calling Tuthill, Sr., and informing 
him that he needed to “get [Wilfong] out of [her] basement 
and take the pool table pieces back.”  Tuthill, Sr., 
instructed DeSantos to tell Wilfong to pack up his tools 
and wait outside until Tuthill, Jr., returned.  After 
DeSantos told Wilfong to leave, the situation escalated, 
and Wilfong allegedly struck Santen in the face with a 
hammer. 
 
Local law enforcement officers were dispatched to the 
residence.  They found Santen and Wilfong in the basement 
of the house, with Wilfong lying on the floor and Santen 
“over top of him.”  One of the officers subsequently 
administered a preliminary breath test to Wilfong, using a 
“department issued . . . alcosensor.” 
 
2
 
Wilfong was charged with a misdemeanor as a result of 
the altercation.  He pled guilty to the charge in general 
district court.  Wilfong, however, subsequently appealed 
his conviction to circuit court where he pled not guilty.1
 
Santen then filed an amended motion for judgment 
against Wilfong and Tuthill, Sr., t/a Winchester Family 
Billiards, seeking monetary damages for his injuries 
allegedly resulting from the altercation with Wilfong.  
Prior to trial, the defendants filed motions in limine 
asking the court, among other things, to exclude not only 
testimony from Richard McGarry, an expert in the field of 
toxicology, but also evidence that Wilfong had pled guilty 
to the misdemeanor charge in general district court and 
that his blood alcohol content, as measured by the 
preliminary breath test, was 0.209.2
 
After hearing argument on the motions, the circuit 
court initially stated from the bench that it would allow 
the numerical result of the preliminary breath test to be 
admitted.  However, the court revisited the motions on the 
                     
1 The records concerning the misdemeanor charge are not 
part of the record in this appeal. 
 
2 On brief, Santen uses the phrase “grams per liter of 
breath” as the unit of measure for Wilfong’s blood alcohol 
content.  However, there is nothing in the record to verify 
that “grams per liter of breath” was the unit of measure 
for the preliminary breath test administered to Wilfong. 
 
3
morning of trial and learned, for the first time, that 
Wilfong’s blood alcohol content had been measured by a 
preliminary breath test.  Noting that the results of such 
tests are inadmissible in a criminal prosecution, see Code 
§ 18.2-267(E), the court observed that the issue here was 
whether a different rule should apply in a civil case.  The 
circuit court concluded that results of preliminary breath 
tests are inadmissible because “they’re not deemed to be 
sufficiently reliable,” and that, therefore, the numerical 
result of Wilfong’s preliminary breath test could not be 
admitted into evidence.  However, the court stated that 
“[the officer] can testify that the test indicated that 
[Wilfong] had consumed alcohol, . . . [b]ut the number and 
readings . . . [are] inadmissible for any purpose[.]” 
 
With regard to the other issues raised in the motions 
in limine, the circuit court held that Santen could not 
introduce evidence that Wilfong had pled guilty in general 
district court to the misdemeanor charge.  Finally, the 
court concluded that Santen could “call Richard McGarry to 
testify concerning, and limited to, the matters designated 
by [Santen] in his expert designation herein.”  Continuing, 
the court held that “[a]lthough Richard McGarry [could] 
testify concerning the effects of alcohol on the central 
nervous system in general, he [would] not be permitted to 
 
4
testify as to the effects alcohol did or may have had on 
Defendant Wilfong specifically.”  Despite the court’s 
ruling that McGarry could testify with regard to certain 
matters, Santen elected not to call him as a witness at the 
trial. 
 
At the conclusion of Santen’s evidence, counsel for 
Tuthill, Sr., moved to strike the evidence, arguing that 
Santen had not established the existence of an 
employer/employee relationship between Tuthill, Sr., and 
Wilfong.  After hearing argument from counsel, the court 
granted the motion.  The trial then proceeded against only 
Wilfong.  A jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of 
Wilfong. 
 
On appeal, Santen first argues that the circuit court 
erred in excluding evidence concerning Wilfong’s guilty 
plea in general district court.  Santen contends that, if 
Wilfong had not appealed his conviction to circuit court, 
the guilty plea would have been admissible against him in 
this subsequent civil proceeding pursuant to Code § 8.01-
418.3  According to Santen, the appeal to circuit court 
                     
3 Code § 8.01-418 provides, in relevant part, that 
“[w]henever, in any civil action, it is contended that any 
party thereto pled guilty . . . in a prosecution for a 
criminal offense . . . which arose out of the same 
occurrence upon which the civil action is based, evidence 
 
5
“merely vacat[ed] the judgment of the general district 
court—it [did] not eradicate the record of the 
proceedings.”  Further, Santen asserts that, even if 
evidence of the guilty plea was not admissible pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-418, such evidence should have been admitted 
either as a party admission or as a prior statement that 
was inconsistent with Wilfong’s trial testimony that he had 
acted in self-defense.  We do not agree with Santen’s 
position. 
 
“Any person convicted in a district court of an 
offense not felonious shall have the right . . . to appeal 
to the circuit court” even when the conviction was based on 
a plea of guilty.  Code § 16.1-132.  The appeal is heard de 
novo in the circuit court.  Code § 16.1-136.  The purpose 
of these statutes is to give an accused the benefit of a 
new trial in the circuit court “unhampered and 
unprejudiced” by the guilty plea entered in the district 
court.  Baylor v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 116, 120, 56 S.E.2d 
77, 79 (1949) (decided under former corresponding 
statutes). 
 
This Court has repeatedly held that the effect of an 
appeal to circuit court is to “annul[] the judgment of the 
___________________ 
of said plea . . . as shown by the records of the criminal 
court shall be admissible.” 
 
6
inferior tribunal as completely as if there had been no 
previous trial.”  Gaskill v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 486, 
490, 144 S.E.2d 293, 296 (1965); accord Buck v. City of 
Danville, 213 Va. 387, 388, 192 S.E.2d 758, 759 (1972); 
Baylor, 190 Va. at 119-20, 56 S.E.2d at 78-79; Gravely v. 
Deeds, 185 Va. 662, 664, 40 S.E.2d 175, 176 (1946).  In 
other words, the appeal to circuit court “annuls or wipes 
out the former plea of guilty.”  Baylor, 190 Va. at 120, 56 
S.E.2d at 79.  Thus, it is reversible error to permit the 
former guilty plea and the judgment of the district court 
to be introduced into evidence in the trial of the criminal 
charge on appeal.  Id.; Gravely, 185 Va. at 664, 40 S.E.2d 
at 176. 
 
Since an appeal under Code § 16.1-132 “annuls or wipes 
out” a guilty plea entered in the district court, there no 
longer exists a guilty plea that, otherwise, would be 
admissible in a subsequent civil proceeding under the 
provisions of Code § 8.01-418.  We draw a distinction 
between a guilty plea, which forms the basis of a district 
court’s judgment, and a defendant’s statements made while 
testifying before the district court.  That testimony, 
unlike a guilty plea, is not “wiped out” by an appeal and 
is, therefore, admissible in the subsequent trial of the 
 
7
case.  Harbaugh v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 695, 700, 167 
S.E.2d 329, 334 (1969). 
 
Thus, we hold that a guilty plea entered in district 
court that has been annulled by virtue of an appeal to 
circuit court is not admissible in a civil proceeding, 
either under the provisions of Code § 8.01-418, or as a 
party admission or prior inconsistent statement.  
Consequently, the circuit court did not err in excluding 
evidence of Wilfong’s guilty plea. 
 
Santen next argues that the circuit court erred in 
excluding both the numerical result of Wilfong’s 
preliminary breath test and McGarry’s testimony.4  According 
to Santen, this evidence, taken together, was relevant to 
demonstrate the amount of alcohol consumed by Wilfong on 
                     
4 In the assignment of error regarding McGarry, Santen 
initially stated that “The Trial Court Erred in Excluding 
the Testimony of Richard McGarry, Plaintiff’s Specially 
Retained Expert, who was to Testify Regarding the 
Reliability of the Alcosensor used to Determine Wilfong’s 
Blood Alcohol Content, and was to Testify how Defendant 
Glenn Wilfong’s Elevated Blood Alcohol Content Affected his 
Ability to Control his Actions, and his Ability to 
Accurately Recollect the Events of that Night.”  On brief, 
Santen re-stated the assignment of error and added a phrase 
that McGarry would testify “about the accuracy of the 
Preliminary Breath Test Device and how much Vodka, Ingested 
Five Hours Earlier, would be Required to Result in a Blood 
Alcohol Content of 0.209 Grams Per Liter of Breath in a 
person the Weight and Gender of Wilfong.”  However, an 
appellant may not change the wording of an assignment of 
error.  Hamilton Dev. Co. v. Broad Rock Club, Inc., 248 Va. 
40, 44, 445 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1994). 
 
8
the evening in question, its effect on Wilfong’s ability to 
control his actions and to observe and recall the events 
that occurred at the Santen-DeSantos residence, and to 
impeach Wilfong’s testimony that he had consumed only one 
and one-half alcoholic drinks during the afternoon prior to 
the altercation at issue.  Santen also asserts that, while 
Code § 18.2-267(E) provides that the result of a 
preliminary breath analysis shall not be admitted into 
evidence in any prosecution under Code §§ 18.2-266 and –
266.1, it does not exclude such evidence from all criminal 
or civil actions. 
 
During the initial hearing on the defendants’ motions 
in limine and on the morning of trial, Santen proffered 
McGarry’s testimony to the court.  Santen stated that 
McGarry would testify that, in order to have a blood 
alcohol content of 0.209, Wilfong would have had to consume 
more than one and one-half alcoholic drinks during the 
five-to-six-hour period before the incident with Santen, 
and that Wilfong’s level of intoxication would have 
affected his ability to recall what happened at the Santen-
DeSantos residence.  Santen further proffered that McGarry 
would testify that the type of machine used to administer 
the preliminary breath test “was accurate to a .005 
 
9
percent, assuming it was regularly calibrated.”5  However, 
at no time did Santen proffer any evidence that the actual 
machine used to test Wilfong had, in fact, been calibrated 
or was accurate. 
 
Similarly, Santen proffered that the police officer 
who administered the preliminary breath test to Wilfong 
would testify “that he used the machine that was in his 
vehicle that was normally used in the course of his duties 
as a police officer” and that Wilfong registered a blood 
alcohol content of 0.209.  During the police officer’s 
trial testimony, he was not asked any questions about the 
accuracy of the machine or whether it had been regularly 
calibrated. 
Expert testimony is generally admissible in a civil 
case if it will assist the trier of fact in understanding 
the evidence or determining a factual issue.  Code § 8.01-
401.3; John v. Im, 263 Va. 315, 319, 559 S.E.2d 694, 696 
(2002); Keesee v. Donigan, 259 Va. 157, 161, 524 S.E.2d 
                     
5 In his expert designation, Santen stated that McGarry 
would testify “as to the effect that alcohol will have on a 
person who has a blood alcohol content of .209; the amount 
of alcohol that is needed to cause a person with the age, 
height and weight of Defendant Wilfong to reach a .209 
blood alcohol content; and the effect a .209 blood alcohol 
content would have in terms of the ability to control 
conduct and emotions.”  He also indicated that McGarry 
would discuss the “method by which alcohol is measured by 
 
10
645, 648 (2000); Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Smiley Block 
Co., 250 Va. 161, 166, 458 S.E.2d 462, 465 (1995).  
However, admissibility depends on whether the expert 
testimony satisfies certain fundamental requirements, 
including the requirement that the testimony be based on an 
adequate factual foundation.  Countryside Corp. v. Taylor, 
263 Va. 549, 553, 561 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2002); Tarmac, 250 
Va. at 166, 458 S.E.2d at 465-66. 
In this case, McGarry’s proffered testimony regarding 
the effect of Wilfong’s alcohol consumption and the amount 
of alcohol Wilfong would have had to consume was premised 
upon the specific result of Wilfong’s preliminary breath 
test.  According to the proffer, the type of machine used 
to administer the test was accurate, and thus also the 
result, “assuming [the machine] was regularly calibrated.”  
(Emphasis added.)  But, there was no evidence, by way of 
proffer or otherwise, that the machine actually used to 
give Wilfong the preliminary breath test had been regularly 
calibrated.  Thus, neither McGarry’s testimony nor the 
numerical result of Wilfong’s preliminary breath test was 
based on an adequate factual foundation.  For that reason, 
___________________ 
the type of equipment used on the evening in question by 
the police who were involved in the incident.” 
 
11
we conclude that the circuit court did not err in excluding 
both McGarry’s testimony and the result of the preliminary  
breath test.6
Finally, Santen argues that the circuit court erred in 
ruling as a matter of law that Tuthill, Sr., was not 
vicariously liable for the actions of his servant, Wilfong.  
However, “where master and servant are sued together in 
tort, and the master’s liability, if any, is solely 
dependent on the servant’s conduct, a verdict for the 
servant necessarily exonerates the master.”  Roughton 
Pontiac Corp. v. Alston, 236 Va. 152, 156, 372 S.E.2d 147, 
149 (1988) (citing Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 549, 172 
S.E.2d 751, 757 (1970); Whitfield v. Whittaker Mem’l Hosp., 
210 Va. 176, 183, 169 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1969); Monumental 
Motor Tours, Inc. v. Eaton, 184 Va. 311, 314-15, 35 S.E.2d 
105, 106 (1945); Virginia State Fair Ass’n v. Burton, 182 
Va. 365, 368, 28 S.E.2d 716, 717-18 (1944); Barnes v. 
Ashworth, 154 Va. 218, 228-30, 153 S.E. 711, 713-14 
(1930)).  Because the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Wilfong and because we find no reason, based on the 
assignments of error presented in this appeal, to reverse 
                     
6 Because the evidence concerning the result of the 
preliminary breath test was not based on an adequate 
factual foundation, it is not necessary to reach the issue 
 
12
the judgment of the circuit court, we need not address this 
issue. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
___________________ 
whether such evidence would be admissible in a civil 
action. 
 
13