Case Title: State v. Mario Santiago Sanchez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP000208-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-0208-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Mario Santiago Sanchez, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 MAY 21, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
ROLAND B. DAY, C.J.  This is a review of an unpublished 
decision of the court of appeals affirming a judgment of the 
circuit court for Waukesha County, Joseph E. Wimmer, Judge.  A 
jury found Mario Santiago Sanchez guilty of conspiring to deliver 
a controlled substance and failing to obtain a tax stamp for the 
controlled substance.  Mr. Sanchez (defendant) appealed, claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial.  The court of 
appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant had failed to meet 
his burden, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), 
of showing that his counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his 
defense.  The issue on this appeal is whether the Wisconsin 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
2 
Constitution or cases of this court require the state, and not the 
defendant, to bear the burden of proving prejudice in ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.  We conclude that the defendant does 
bear the burden of proving prejudice in ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims under both the Wisconsin and United States 
Constitutions, and thus the court of appeals correctly applied the 
Strickland standard in this case.  We therefore affirm. 
 
The following is a summary of the facts relevant to the 
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; further 
facts will be noted as necessary in this opinion.  The defendant's 
claim arises from the testimony of a police officer, Detective 
Steven Werner, at the defendant's trial.  Detective Werner 
testified that he spoke with the defendant following the 
defendant's arrest.  Detective Werner advised the defendant of his 
right to remain silent, and then asked the defendant about the 
drug sale which led to the defendant's arrest.  The defendant 
denied involvement in the conspiracy to sell the drugs.  Detective 
Werner then testified as follows: 
 
I told him he was probably a go-between for Mr. 
Rodriguez and the person that actually had supplied the 
marijuana, and also that he was waiting for this money 
to come from Mr. Rodriguez in order for the rest of the 
marijuana to be delivered, and Mr. Sanchez [the 
defendant] did not respond.  I asked Mr. Sanchez then if 
I was lying when I said that.  And Mr. Sanchez did not 
respond again.  I then said, you know, I'm telling you 
the truth.  And at this time Mr. Sanchez nodded very 
slightly indicating, I felt, that he agreed with me what 
I was saying, but in my report I also write [sic] that 
it should be noted that at no time did Mr. Sanchez 
actually state this to me, but that was the gist of our 
conversation.  
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
3 
 
In a post-conviction motion, the defendant claimed that the 
admission and use during closing arguments of this testimony was 
erroneous because the state cannot use the fact that the defendant 
exercised his privilege against self-incrimination by remaining 
silent.  Defendant further claimed that the failure of his 
attorney to object to this testimony or to file a pre-trial motion 
for its suppression constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 The circuit court denied the motion and the defendant appealed.  
The court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the 
circuit court.  The court of appeals applied the two-part test 
articulated in Strickland, which requires that a defendant seeking 
to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel show 
that his or her counsel performed deficiently and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687.  The court of appeals held that the defendant's 
attorney had performed deficiently but this deficiency did not 
prejudice the defendant's defense because the prosecutor had 
downplayed the importance of the testimony and the other evidence 
in the case was "overwhelmingly probative of Sanchez's guilt."   
 
On this review, the defendant argues that the Wisconsin 
Constitution requires the burden of showing prejudice from 
deficient performance to be placed on the state.  Defendant thus 
argues that the circuit court and court of appeals erred in 
applying the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
4 
in Strickland, which places the burden of showing prejudice on the 
defendant.  The interpretation of a provision of the Wisconsin 
Constitution presents a question of law which this court decides 
without deference to the courts below.  Polk County v. State Pub. 
Defender, 188 Wis. 2d 665, 674, 524 N.W.2d 389 (1994) (citing 
State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 136-38, 341 N.W.2d 668, 674 
(1984)).  The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,
1 
provides: 
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
 
Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
 
Rights of accused.  SECTION 7.  In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be 
heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him; to meet the 
witnesses face to face; to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and in 
prosecutions by indictment, or information, to a speedy 
                     
     
1  The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: 
 
 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
5 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district wherein the offense shall have been committed; 
which county or district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law. 
 
 
The language relevant to this case is each constitution's 
guarantee of the right to counsel.  The federal Constitution 
phrases the right as: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defence."  Our state constitution provides: "In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by 
himself and counsel . . . ."  This court has noted the difference 
in language between the two provisions, but has not considered 
whether the state constitution provides a different right to 
counsel than its federal counterpart.  See State v. Pitsch, 124 
Wis. 2d 628, 646-48, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985) (stating that issue was 
not considered because not raised in parties' briefs).   
 
The defendant argues that there should be a substantive 
difference in the protection afforded by these two provisions.  In 
his brief, counsel for the defendant concedes that he has not 
found any evidence "as to why the drafters of the Wisconsin 
Constitution used different language than that found in the Sixth 
Amendment," but he nonetheless asserts that "it is safe to assume 
that whatever the intent of the drafters in Wisconsin, it was not 
identical to the protections contained in the Sixth Amendment."  
We do not share this assumption.  The language of the Wisconsin 
provision, on its face, does not appear to differ so substantially 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
6 
from the federal Constitution's guarantee of the right to counsel 
so as to create a different right.  Furthermore, the fact that our 
constitution chooses different wording in expressing a right than 
the federal Constitution has not prevented this court from 
concluding that the rights are substantially similar, and are to 
be interpreted identically.  See, e.g., Reginald D. v. State, 193 
Wis. 2d 299, 306-07, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995) (due process and equal 
protection 
guarantees 
of 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
have 
their 
functional equivalent in art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
even though art. I, § 1 does not use words "due process" or "equal 
protection").   
 
This court has also concluded that another phrase within the 
section of the Wisconsin Constitution at issue in the present case 
is equivalent to its federal counterpart in the Sixth Amendment.  
In State v. Burns, 112 Wis. 2d 131, 141-44, 332 N.W.2d 757 (1983), 
this court held that the confrontation clause of Article I, § 7 of 
the state constitution, which provides "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the 
witnesses face to face . . . ," provides a right identical to that 
stated in the federal Constitution's confrontation clause, which 
provides "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him 
. . . ."  See also State v. Martinez, 150 Wis. 2d 62, 75 n.6, 440 
N.W.2d 783 (1989).  This does not compel us to hold that every 
phrase in Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution has its 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
7 
equivalent in the Sixth Amendment.  "Certainly, it is the 
prerogative of the State of Wisconsin to afford greater protection 
to the liberties of persons within its boundaries under the 
Wisconsin Constitution than is mandated by the United States 
Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .  This court 
has never hesitated to do so."  State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 171, 
254 N.W.2d 210 (1977) (citation omitted).  However, we find it 
relevant in this case to note that this court has previously found 
another right in Article I, § 7 to be equivalent to its federal 
counterpart, despite a difference in the particular words chosen 
to express the right in the two constitutions. 
 
Although unable to provide any textual support for his 
arguments, the defendant nonetheless argues that cases of this 
court and the court of appeals, which will be discussed below, 
interpret our state constitution as providing a more expansive 
right to counsel than provided in the federal Constitution.  The 
state in turn argues that cases of this court, including Carpenter 
v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 249 [*274], 251 [*276] (1859), and 
Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 511, 129 N.W.2d 175, 131 N.W.2d 
169 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1004 (1965), have described the 
state constitution's right to counsel as being similar in purpose 
to the federal right.  As this court observed in Pitsch, 124 
Wis. 2d at 647, ineffective assistance of counsel cases decided in 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court prior to Strickland were generally 
unclear as to whether they relied on the state or the federal 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
8 
constitution in determining the scope of the right to counsel.  
The court cited, inter alia, State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 205 
N.W.2d 1 (1973); State v. Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d 224, 325 N.W.2d 703 
(1982); and State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 329 N.W.2d 161 
(1983).  In Felton, the court specifically based its discussion of 
ineffective assistance of counsel on both the state and federal 
constitutions, without noting any difference between the right to 
counsel granted in each: 
 
The United States Constitution and the Constitution of 
the State of Wisconsin guarantee the right to counsel.  
The right to counsel is more than the right to nominal 
representation.  Representation must be effective.  
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); State v. 
Koller, 87 Wis. 2d 253, 274 N.W.2d 651 (1979); State v. 
Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973).   
 
Felton, 110 Wis. 2d at 499.  Thus, although the standard 
formulated in Felton may have differed in some particulars from 
that later articulated in Strickland, that does not necessarily 
mean that the Wisconsin Constitution dictated a different 
standard.  The Felton court did not note any such distinction; 
furthermore, we note that one of reasons for the Supreme Court's 
grant of certiorari in Strickland was the fact that lower courts 
differed on the manner in which they applied the prejudice test, 
see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684, and thus, before Strickland, it 
was unclear whether the federal Constitution required that the 
defendant show prejudice in order to prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  We cannot conclude from Felton 
or the other pre-Strickland cases cited by the defendant that the 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
9 
Wisconsin Constitution provides any right to counsel of a nature 
or type distinct from the federal Constitution's right.  The 
defendant cannot point to any clear statement that such a 
distinction exists; and, if anything, the cases themselves seem to 
view 
the 
right 
granted 
by 
the 
two 
constitutions 
as 
interchangeable.   
 
This court's ineffective assistance of counsel cases since 
Strickland was decided have either not reached or not mentioned 
the state constitutional issue.  In Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d at 647, 
and State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 224, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986), 
this court concluded that it need not address any possible state 
constitutional claims because it held that the defendant's rights 
under the Sixth Amendment were violated.  Both cases applied 
Strickland as the test for ineffective assistance of counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment.  See Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d at 641; Johnson, 133 
Wis. 2d at 216-17.  Other cases, such as State v. Moats, 156 
Wis. 2d 74, 100-02, 457 N.W.2d 299 (1990), and State v. Resio, 148 
Wis. 2d 687, 697-99, 436 N.W.2d 603 (1989), have applied 
Strickland without specifically noting whether the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel was based on the state or 
federal constitution.  Finally, in State v. Vennemann, 180 Wis. 2d 
81, 86, 97, 508 N.W.2d 404 (1993), this court cited both the Sixth 
Amendment and Article I, § 7 as the basis for the claim of 
ineffective assistance, and then applied Strickland as the test. 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
10 
 
The defendant also argues that State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 
525, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985), may require the state, and not the 
defendant, to bear the burden for the prejudice inquiry on claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.  This argument has appeared, 
but has not been resolved, before this court.  In State v. 
Moffett, 147 Wis. 2d 343, 433 N.W.2d 572 (1989), another case 
finding ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland and the 
federal Constitution, this court stated: 
 
[T]he defendant urges that this court apply State v. 
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985), to hold 
that the party with the benefit of the error (here, the 
state) should have the burden of proving that the error 
committed by counsel was not prejudicial.   
 
We need not reach or discuss the state constitutional 
issue the defendant raises, because in this case we 
conclude 
that 
the 
Dyess 
harmless 
error 
test 
is 
satisfied. 
 
Moffett, 147 Wis. 2d at 358. 
 
 
Dyess did not involve a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The defendant, Dyess, had been convicted of homicide by 
negligent use of a motor vehicle.  Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 526.  
Dyess argued that an instruction to the jury at his trial 
misstated the applicable law.  Id. at 533.  This court concluded 
that the instruction was erroneous, and that the error was not 
harmless.  Id. at 540.  The court first observed that it had 
previously relied on various formulations of the test for harmless 
error.  Id. at 540-43.  The court then concluded that the 
prejudice inquiry articulated in Strickland was "substantively the 
same" as Wisconsin's test for harmless error, id. at 544, though 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
11 
the court noted that the harmless error test in Wisconsin placed 
the burden of showing a lack of prejudice on the beneficiary of 
the error (in Dyess, the state) rather than on the defendant as in 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  Id. at 544 n.11 (citing 
State v. Billings, 110 Wis. 2d 661, 667, 329 N.W.2d 192 (1983)).   
 
Nothing in Dyess implies that Strickland should not be 
applied as the test for ineffective assistance of counsel under 
the state constitution, as it already is under the federal 
Constitution.  Dyess is limited to the harmless error inquiry, 
which is distinct from a defendant's claim that a constitutional 
error was committed when he or she received ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 n.2 
(1993); see also State v. Flynn, 190 Wis. 2d 31, 51 n.7, 527 
N.W.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1389 (1995); 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Pierce, 
527 
A.2d 
973, 
980-81 
(Pa. 
1987) 
(Hutchinson, 
J., 
concurring). 
 
If 
anything, 
Dyess 
is 
an 
endorsement of the Strickland methodology.  The only difference 
between the two applications of the prejudice test is the burden. 
 Dyess remains the test for harmless error, see State v. Harris, 
198 Wis. 2d 227, 256, 544 N.W.2d 545 (1996), and the burden rests 
on the beneficiary of the error in claims of harmless error to 
show that it was harmless.   
 
The defendant also points to a case of the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals, State v. Marty, 137 Wis. 2d 352, 404 N.W.2d 120 (Ct. App. 
1987), which, according to him, stands for the proposition that 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
12 
Dyess may place the burden of showing a lack of prejudice in an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the state.  However, 
the court of appeals in that case did not reach the state 
constitutional issue of which side should bear the burden of 
showing prejudice.  See Marty, 137 Wis. 2d at 364 n.3.  The court 
of appeals only applied the tests for prejudice as articulated in 
Dyess; the court of appeals in Marty did not shift the burden of 
showing prejudice to the state.  Id. at 364-65.  Nonetheless, the 
court of appeals in Marty may have created some confusion by 
appearing to apply Dyess to an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  Dyess is the proper test for harmless error, whereas 
Strickland is the proper test for ineffective assistance of 
counsel, even though the two tests overlap at many points.  See 
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544 n.11.  Those portions of Marty which 
applied Dyess as the test were in error, and are hereby overruled. 
 See Marty, 137 Wis. 2d at 364-65. 
 
For several reasons, we conclude that in ineffective 
assistance of counsel cases the burden is properly placed on the 
defendant to show that his or her counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.  First, as already noted, we find little 
or nothing in the wording of our state constitution and in the 
cases of this court supporting the defendant's contention that the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides a different right to counsel, and 
hence requires us to place the burden of showing prejudice on the 
state rather than the defendant.  Second, we note that various 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
13 
practical considerations encourage us to follow the federal rule 
under Strickland.  First among these considerations is the fact 
that the source of the violation, and thus much of the information 
necessary to establish and prove a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, is on the side of the defendant rather than the state. 
 As the Supreme Court stated in Strickland:  
 
[A]ctual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in 
attorney 
performance 
are 
subject 
to 
a 
general 
requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove 
prejudice.  The government is not responsible for, and 
hence not able to prevent, attorney errors that will 
result in reversal of a conviction or sentence.   
 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (emphasis added).  Placing the burden 
on the prosecution to show prejudice, then, would serve no 
deterrent purpose because the government cannot avoid the errors 
in the future.   
 
The Strickland Court also noted that the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, in the opinion reviewed by the Strickland Court, had 
placed the burden of showing prejudice on the defendant in "cases 
of deficient performance by counsel, where the government is not 
directly responsible for the deficiencies and where evidence of 
deficiency may be more accessible to the defendant than to the 
prosecution."  Id. at 682 (citing Washington v. Strickland, 693 
F.2d 1243, 1262 (5th Cir. 1982)).  As a practical matter, we note 
that investigating claims of prejudice arising from ineffective 
assistance of counsel is often far more difficult, if not 
impossible, for the state than for the defendant.  Claims of 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
14 
ineffective assistance may involve conversations between the 
defendant and counsel, which may be protected by the attorney-
client privilege, or may involve matters on which the defendant 
would invoke his or her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.  Asking the state to bear the burden of showing 
prejudice in such situations is unrealistic.   
 
As another example of a practical consideration in favor of 
placing the burden on the defendant to show prejudice, consider 
the following hypothetical.  A defendant is convicted of a crime. 
 The defendant appeals, claiming that she received ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and makes a showing that defense counsel 
was deficient in failing to contact any possible alibi witnesses 
before the trial.
2  If the burden is on the prosecution to show a 
lack of prejudice, the state would have to prove a negative, that 
is, demonstrate that no witness that the defendant could possibly 
                     
     
2  The concurrence claims that making a showing of deficient 
performance in such a case would "presumably require the defendant 
to come forward with the alibi witness and explain why that 
witness's testimony was integral to the defendant's case," 
Concurrence at 6, but this is not the case.  The deficiency here 
alleged is that defendant's counsel failed to contact any 
witnesses.  Proof of deficiency, therefore, could consist of 
showing 
that 
counsel 
made 
no 
such 
efforts, 
most 
easily 
demonstrated by counsel's own testimony.   
 
The concurrence is perhaps making a point which its author 
has 
previously 
noted, 
that 
"[s]eparating 
the 
concepts 
of 
`ineffectiveness' and `prejudicial' is a difficult and perhaps 
futile task."  See Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d at 252 (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring).  If so, then there is all the more reason to place 
the burden of proof on one side for both deficiency and prejudice—
as we do in this opinion—rather than placing on circuit court 
judges the "difficult and perhaps futile task" of determining 
which side bears the burden on a particular point. 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
15 
have called would have prejudiced the state's case.  Making such a 
case would present difficulties and complexities of proof to the 
point of impossibility.  If, on the other hand, the defendant 
bears the burden, the defendant must simply come forward with a 
witness or witnesses whose testimony is "sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome" of the case.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694.  If the defendant (who is more likely than the state to be 
aware of alibi witnesses) cannot provide any such witnesses, the 
defendant fails to meet the burden.  The inquiry would end, 
avoiding the difficulties and unreasonableness of requiring the 
prosecution to prove a negative.  Placing the burden of showing 
prejudice on the defendant, then, facilitates and streamlines the 
prejudice inquiry of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
 
We also note that another advantage of conforming our state 
rule to the federal rule is uniformity.  In the context of the law 
of search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, this court has stated: 
 
We may interpret Article I, sec. 11 differently than the 
Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment.  State v. 
Weide, 155 Wis. 2d 537, 547, 455 N.W.2d 899 (1990).  
However, we have consistently and routinely conformed 
the law of search and seizure under the Wisconsin 
Constitution to the law developed by the United States 
Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment; in part 
because the text of Article I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution and the text of the Fourth Amendment are 
identical, except for a few inconsequential differences 
in punctuation, capitalization, and the use of the 
plural, and in part to avoid confusion concomitant with 
the use of different standards.  State v. Fry, 131 
Wis. 2d 153, 172-73, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986), cert. 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
16 
denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986); accord Weide, 155 Wis. 2d 
at 546-47. 
 
State v. Guzman, 166 Wis. 2d 577, 586-87, 480 N.W.2d 446 (1992), 
cert. denied, 504 U.S. 978 (1992) (footnote omitted).  In the same 
manner, conforming our state test for prejudice in ineffective 
assistance of counsel cases to the federal standard avoids 
possible confusion arising from multiple standards. 
 
Thus, for the reasons stated, we conclude that the test for 
ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland and 
Johnson should also be the test for claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel under our state constitution.  We must next 
apply this test to the case at bar.   
 
Under the Strickland test, we may reverse the order of the 
two tests and, if the defendant has failed to show prejudice, omit 
the inquiry into whether counsel's performance was deficient.  
Moats, 156 Wis. 2d at 102 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).  
In order to show prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  We are 
to consider the totality of the circumstances before the trier of 
fact.  Id. at 695.   
 
Determining whether particular actions constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.  State 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
17 
ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 609, 516 N.W.2d 362 
(1994).  "An appellate court will not overturn a trial court's 
findings of fact concerning the circumstances of the case and the 
counsel's conduct and strategy unless the findings are clearly 
erroneous."  State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 514 n. 2, 484 
N.W.2d 540 (1992).  However, whether counsel's performance was 
deficient and whether the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense are questions of law which this court decides without 
deference to the court of appeals or the circuit court.  Flores, 
183 Wis. 2d at 609. 
 
We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances in 
the present case, the defendant's defense was not prejudiced.  
Even if the performance of the defendant's counsel was deficient 
in failing to object to or suppress the police officer's testimony 
about the defendant's silence in response to certain accusatory 
statements, the evidence against the defendant was, in the words 
of the court of appeals in its unpublished decision in this case, 
"overwhelmingly probative" of his guilt, and thus the defense was 
not prejudiced by the admission of the testimony.   
 
This evidence may be summarized as follows.  Craig Moser 
("Moser"), an undercover police officer, testified that he had 
purchased marijuana from Ricardo Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") on 
approximately four occasions prior to January 9, 1991.  Moser 
testified that he told Rodriguez that he wanted to buy two pounds 
of marijuana.  Rodriguez said that Moser would have to take him to 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
18 
his supplier in order to get the marijuana.  Moser testified that 
on the evening of January 9, 1991, he picked up Rodriguez at his 
home.  Moser drove Rodriguez to the Eastside Pub in Waukesha, 
where Rodriguez said he would meet his supplier. 
 
Moser testified that he parked about seventy-five feet from 
the entrance to the pub.  Although it was dark, Moser testified 
that he was able to see the area because it was lit by 
streetlights.  Rodriguez told Moser to wait in the car while he 
went into the pub to speak to his supplier.  Rodriguez entered the 
pub.  Less than five minutes later he returned to the car and told 
Moser that his supplier was speaking to someone else and that they 
would have to wait a short while.  Rodriguez subsequently re-
entered the pub; shortly thereafter he came back to the car and 
told Moser that the supplier was going to come outside and provide 
a one-ounce sample of the marijuana to Moser so that Moser could 
check its quality.   
 
Moser testified that he and Rodriguez left the car, and 
Rodriguez then walked towards the pub.  Moser saw Rodriguez meet 
another male, whom Moser identified as the defendant.  Moser saw 
the two men talk and then walk over to a large gray automobile.  
Moser saw the defendant open the front door of the car, reach 
inside, grab something, and hand it to Rodriguez.  Rodriguez 
placed the object in his jacket pocket.   
 
Moser testified that Rodriguez then walked back to him, took 
a small baggie out of his jacket pocket, and handed it to Moser, 
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
19 
saying it was "real good stuff from Texas."  Moser testified that 
the baggie appeared to contain marijuana.  Moser also testified 
that Rodriguez said that the rest of the marijuana was in the 
vehicle near where his supplier was standing.  Moser told 
Rodriguez that he didn't want to perform the deal out on the 
street, and they drove a short distance down the street to another 
parking lot.  Moser then retrieved a wallet from the trunk of his 
car containing $4040, which he showed to Rodriguez.  Rodriguez 
whistled and signaled towards where the defendant was standing.  
Other officers on the scene then arrested Rodriguez and the 
defendant, who was still standing in the parking lot near the gray 
automobile.   
 
Moser testified that he could no longer see the defendant 
when he moved his car to the parking lot.  Detective Steven Werner 
("Werner"), another officer on the scene, testified that he was 
inside a surveillance van parked across the street from the Pub 
and was able to observe the defendant up to the time of his 
arrest.  Werner also testified that he searched the defendant 
after his arrest, and found a piece of paper with the name "Rick" 
and Rodriguez's telephone number written on it.  Werner also found 
car keys on the defendant which fit the gray automobile that Moser 
had observed.  Another officer found a paper bag containing 925 
grams (approximately 2.02 pounds) of marijuana in the back seat of 
the gray automobile.   
 
No. 94-0208-CR 
 
 
 
20 
 
The defendant told Werner that the bartender at the pub had 
given him Rodriguez's telephone number and that he had found the 
keys in the bathroom at the pub.  The defendant acknowledged that 
he knew Rodriguez, but 
said that 
Rodriguez 
was only an 
acquaintance.  The defendant told Werner that he was outside the 
pub because he was on his way home.   
 
We conclude that, even assuming that the defendant's counsel 
was deficient in allowing the disputed testimony into evidence, 
the remainder of the evidence in this case leaves no doubt of the 
defendant's guilt.  We therefore hold that the defendant has not 
met his burden of showing that he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
representation.   
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 94-0208-CR SSA 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (concurring).   I agree that 
Sanchez's conviction should be affirmed.  Regardless of who bears 
the burden of proving prejudice in an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, evidence of guilt described by the court of appeals 
as "overwhelmingly probative" demonstrates that Sanchez was not 
prejudiced by the State's violation of his right to remain silent. 
 
I nevertheless write separately because I conclude that under 
Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin constitution
3 and this court's 
longstanding harmless error analysis, see, e.g., State v. Dyess, 
                     
     
3  This court's interpretation of the right to counsel 
inscribed 
in 
Article I, 
§ 7 
has 
long 
differed 
from the 
interpretation which the U.S. Supreme Court has given to the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  As early as 1859, more than one 
hundred years before the United States Supreme Court announced a 
similar principle in federal constitutional law, Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held 
that indigent defendants were entitled to counsel furnished at the 
government's expense.  Carpenter v. Dane Co., 9 Wis. 249 [*274] 
(1859). 
 
Interpreting 
Article 
I, 
§ 7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
constitution, Justice Cole reasoned that it would be "mockery to 
secure to a pauper these solemn constitutional guaranties for a 
fair and full trial of the matters with which he was charged, and 
yet to say to him when on trial, that he must employ his own 
counsel, who could alone render these guaranties of any real 
permanent value to him."  Id. at 251 [*276].  See also State v. 
Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 171-72, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977) (citing 
Carpenter in noting that "it is the prerogative of the State of 
Wisconsin to afford greater protection to the liberties of persons 
within its boundaries under the Wisconsin Constitution than is 
mandated by the United States Supreme Court under the Fourteenth 
Amendment"); Sparkman v. State, 27 Wis. 2d 92, 98, 133 N.W.2d 776 
(1965) (noting that "Wisconsin from early statehood . . . has not 
depended upon or awaited the increasing scope of the commands of 
the 
Fourteenth 
amendment" 
in 
interpreting 
the 
Wisconsin 
constitution's right to counsel provision).  
 
No. 94-0208-CR SSA 
 
 
 
2 
124 Wis. 2d 525, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985), the State should have been 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the errors caused 
by Sanchez's trial counsel did not prejudice his defense.
4  
 
As the majority opinion correctly states, this court's 
harmless error analysis places upon the beneficiary of the error 
the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless.  To 
satisfy this burden, the beneficiary of an error must "establish 
that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed 
to the conviction."  Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 543.  Conversely, under 
the test fashioned by the United States Supreme Court in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 
1267 (1984), and adopted by this court today, it is the defendant 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel who "must show . . . a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
5   
                     
     
4  The court of appeals concluded that the State violated 
Sanchez's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and that his 
counsel's failure to object rendered his counsel's performance 
ineffective.  State v. Sanchez, No. 94-0208-CR, unpublished slip 
op. at 4-5 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 1995).  The majority opinion 
concludes that even assuming arguendo that his counsel performed 
ineffectively, 
Sanchez 
failed 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
he 
was 
prejudiced by his counsel's performance.  Majority op. at 16.  
     
5  For criticism of the Strickland decision, see Richard L. 
Gabriel, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel:  Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the 
Guise of Due Process, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1259 (1986); William S. 
Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn:  Doctrinal and 
Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel,  4 Wm. & Mary Bill 
 
No. 94-0208-CR SSA 
 
 
 
3 
 
The discrepancy between how the burden of proof is assigned 
when a defendant alleges error as opposed to ineffective 
assistance of counsel presents a paradox.  If, on appeal, a 
defendant alleges error, the state must prove that the defendant 
was not prejudiced thereby and that the error was therefore 
harmless.  But if a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of 
counsel because trial counsel failed to object to the same error, 
the rule we announce today requires that defendant to prove that 
the error was prejudicial and therefore harmful.   
 
Hence if the error which allegedly harmed Sanchez had been 
framed in terms of a violation of the defendant's right to remain 
silent rather than as a violation of his right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, the State would have been compelled to 
demonstrate that this error was harmless.
6 
(..continued) 
Rts. J. 91 (1995). 
     
6  See State v. Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d 224, 232-240, 325 N.W.2d 
703 (1982) (defendant's trial counsel did not object to state's 
references at trial to the defendant's prearrest silence; because 
the court addressed the claim raised on appeal under the Fifth 
rather than the Sixth Amendment, the state was required to carry 
the burden of persuasion demonstrating that the error was 
harmless); Rudolph v. State, 78 Wis. 2d 435, 441-43, 254 N.W.2d 
471 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (state's reference at trial 
to defendant's election to remain silent raised as Fifth Amendment 
constitutional error rather than as ineffective assistance of 
counsel; defense counsel had objected to reference at trial but 
had failed to request an admonitory instruction and failed to 
renew objection on post-conviction motion; the state was required 
to carry the burden of persuasion demonstrating that the error was 
harmless); Odell v. State, 90 Wis. 2d 149, 155-57, 279 N.W.2d 706 
(1979) (although defense counsel had failed to object, state's 
reference at trial to defendant's election to remain silent raised 
 
No. 94-0208-CR SSA 
 
 
 
4 
 
The majority opinion suggests that the defendant rather than 
the state should be required to prove that a defendant has been 
prejudiced by ineffective counsel because ordinarily a defendant 
will possess much of the information necessary to establish such a 
claim.  Majority op. at 12.  While I agree that in many cases 
knowledge concerning whether counsel has been ineffective will 
initially be more accessible to the defendant, I disagree with the 
majority's conclusion that the defendant must therefore shoulder 
the burden of persuasion to demonstrate prejudice.   
 
In shifting the burden of proving prejudice to the defendant, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
emphasizes 
the 
"difficulties 
and 
complexities" the state would encounter in proving that a 
defendant was not prejudiced by defense counsel's serious error, 
and downplays the difficulty of the defendant's initial burden to 
prove that counsel was indeed ineffective.  Yet, as the court has 
indicated, a defendant cannot demonstrate that counsel has been 
ineffective by merely alleging error; even if a defendant's 
counsel makes several errors which competent counsel would have 
(..continued) 
and addressed on appeal as Fifth Amendment constitutional error 
rather than as ineffective assistance of counsel; court applied 
harmless error analysis, placing the burden of persuasion to 
demonstrate that the error was harmless on state); State v. 
Kircher, 189 Wis. 2d 392, 404-05, 525 N.W.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(although defense counsel failed to object, state's reference at 
trial to defendant's election to remain silent raised and 
addressed on appeal as Fifth Amendment constitutional error rather 
than as ineffective assistance of counsel; state was required to 
prove that the error was harmless).  
 
No. 94-0208-CR SSA 
 
 
 
5 
avoided, 
"[t]he 
fact 
that 
[counsel] 
should 
have 
acted 
differently . . . does not establish that his assistance was 
ineffective."  State v. Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d 224, 228, 325 N.W.2d 
703 (1982) (citing State v. Rock, 92 Wis. 2d 554, 560, 285 N.W.2d 
739 (1979)); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-690 (to meet the 
ineffective assistance of counsel prong "requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment").
7 
                     
     
7  Ordinarily, then, errors "so serious" as to establish an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim will either be of 
constitutional magnitude or will be plain errors.  A plain error 
is an error so plain that it affects an appellant's substantial 
rights.  State v. Sonnenberg, 117, Wis. 2d 159, 176-77, 344 N.W.2d 
95, 99 (1984).  While appellate courts find plain error 
"impossible to define," "they know it when they see it."  Id. at 
177 (citation omitted).  The court will, at its discretion, 
address both plain and constitutional errors raised for the first 
time on appeal.  Id. at 176-77; Wis. Stat. § 901.03(4) (1993-94) 
(plain error); In Interest of Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 448, 
335 N.W.2d 846 (1983); State v. Johnson, 60 Wis. 2d 334, 343, 210 
N.W.2d 735 (1973) (constitutional error).   
 
 
Hence, when defense counsel makes timely objection to any 
errors, the state must prove that those errors were harmless.  
Similarly, when defense counsel fails to object to such errors but 
the court nevertheless decides to take them up on appeal, the 
state must prove that those errors were harmless.  When, 
conversely, defense counsel fails to object to such errors and an 
appellate court declines to consider them, the rule the court 
announces today for ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
requires 
the 
defendant 
to 
prove 
that 
those 
errors 
were 
prejudicial.  This rule rewards defendants whose counsel are 
competent and object while frequently increasing the burden of 
proof for those whose counsel are incompetent, even when the same 
error is at issue in both situations.  
 
No. 94-0208-CR SSA 
 
 
 
6 
 
Thus in the hypothetical alibi case posed by the majority 
opinion, Majority op. at 13-14, the state would not be required to 
prove prejudice until the defendant had first presented sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that trial counsel's failure to produce a 
particular witness represented an error "so serious" as to render 
trial counsel's performance ineffective.
8   
 
Evidence sufficient to meet this initial burden--which would 
presumably require the defendant to come forward with the alibi 
witness and explain why that witness's testimony was integral to 
the defendant's case--would eliminate any "difficulties and 
complexities" the state might have otherwise faced in meeting its 
own, subsequent burden of demonstrating that the defendant was not 
 prejudiced by counsel's failure to produce this witness.   
 
For the reasons set forth, I concur.  
                     
     
8  When a defendant satisfies the burden of proving that 
trial counsel has made an error of this magnitude, the defendant 
has ipso facto raised the possibility that he has been prejudiced. 
 See Briones v. State, 848 P.2d 966, 976-77 (Haw. 1993) (rejecting 
the Strickland test; a defendant who has established that trial 
counsel was ineffective raises the prospect that he or she has 
been prejudiced and need not show actual prejudice). 
 
No. 94-0208-CR SSA 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-0208-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Mario Santiago Sanchez, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  191 Wis. 2d 827, 532 N.W.2d 145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
May 22, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 1, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
JOSEPH E. WIMMER 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there was a 
brief by Matthew H. Huppertz and Carlson & Huppertz, S.C., 
Waukesha and oral argument by Matthew H. Huppertz. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Stephen 
W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general.