Case Title: Bigelow v. Bigelow

Citation: 171 Vt. 100, 759 A.2d 67

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bigelow v. Bigelow (99-116); 171 Vt. 100; 759 A.2d 67 

[Filed 16-Jun-2000]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 19-Jul-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-116

Harold and Sheila Bigelow	                 Supreme Court
(Randy Olley, Appellee)
                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Rutland Family Court

Carolyn Bigelow	                                 December Term, 1999
(Marvin Wolf, Appellant)

Ben W. Joseph, J.

A. Jeffry Taylor of Abatiell & Valerio, Rutland, for Appellee Olley.

Marvin Wolf, White River Junction, Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.  Appellant Marvin Wolf appeals from a family court order
  imposing  sanctions of attorney's fees and expenses, totaling $3610,
  payable to appellee Randy Olley, Ph.D.,  and a further fine of $2500,
  payable to the court, for violations of V.R.C.P. 26(g).  Appellant 
  contends: (1) the court failed to provide proper notice that sanctions
  would be imposed under Rule  26; (2) the evidence failed to support an
  award of sanctions; (3) the sanctions awarded were  excessive; and (4)  the
  court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions after its recusal from
  the  case.  We affirm that portion of the order awarding the remedial
  sanction of attorney's fees and  expenses, and reverse that portion
  imposing the punitive sanction of $2500.  

       A full recitation of the procedural history is necessary to appreciate
  the tortured and  convoluted road this case has traveled.  It originated as
  two petitions filed by Harold and Sheila  Bigelow requesting emergency
  relief from abuse on behalf of their two grandchildren against their 

 

  daughter, the children's mother.  By order dated January 23, 1997, the
  court ordered a  psychiatric evaluation of mother by Otto Marx, M.D.  The
  order provided that the results of the  examination, including reports or
  other documents in connection therewith, should be made available  to
  counsel for plaintiffs, counsel for defendant mother, counsel for the minor
  children, and the  guardian ad litem. As part of the psychiatric
  evaluation, a psychologist, Randy Olley, performed  psychological testing
  of mother.

       Following a hearing in June 1997,  the court issued a final
  relief-from-abuse order, awarding  grandparents temporary custody of the
  minors.  All of the parties were represented by counsel at the  hearing
  except mother, who appeared  pro se.  Thereafter, mother obtained counsel,
  appellant, who  filed a motion under V.R.C.P. 60(b) to vacate the order. 
  The court denied the motion, and mother  appealed.  (FN1)   Coinciding with
  the appeal, the grandparents filed a guardianship petition in the  probate
  court, which, in January of 1998, was transferred to the family court and
  merged with the  abuse docket.

       In December 1997, while the appeal was pending, appellant wrote to
  Olley  requesting copies  of her testing data, notes, and all other
  documents in her files pertaining to mother, and enclosed a  medical
  release signed by mother.  Olley's attorney, Jeffry Taylor, wrote back and
  reported that his  client declined to supply the material requested because
  Olley had performed only a forensic  evaluation, rather than treatment, and
  therefore mother was not a patient entitled to the materials.   Appellant
  responded with a motion to compel Olley to produce the requested records. 
  Attorney 

 

  Taylor filed an opposition, arguing that mother's letter and subsequent
  motion to compel had  no basis in law, and suggesting that appropriate
  discovery procedures be utilized.

       Appellant's response to the opposition characterized Olley's position
  that mother was not a  patient as "ludicrous," argued that Olley and Dr.
  Marx were "indispensable parties" who could be  joined in the action,
  ridiculed the "supposed mental health experts [who] are busy playing
  symantical  (sic) games," and asserted that Olley's position  "reeks of
  bias and un-professionalism."  Attorney  Taylor responded with a motion for
  sanctions under V.R.C.P. 11(b),  (FN2) arguing that the motion  to compel
  had no legal basis, that the allegation that Olley and Marx could be joined
  as parties was

 

  frivolous and unsupported by existing law, and that the personal attacks
  against Olley and  her attorney were reckless and unwarranted.   Appellant
  responded, describing Attorney Taylor's  motion as "vexatious and inane."
  Attorney Taylor filed a supplemental memorandum in support of  the motion
  for sanctions, again claiming that the legal and factual allegations in the
  response to the  opposition were frivolous, reckless, unsupported by law,
  and "blind, personal attacks" warranting  sanctions under Rule 11.  
  Appellant filed a supplemental response in which he declined to "bore the 
  Court with the all too easy attacks that it could launch against Mr. Taylor
  and this insidious motion  for sanction" but noted that, as the request for
  documentation from Olley was a discovery request,  Rule 11 was 
  inapplicable.  See V.R.C.P. 11(d) (making subdivisions (a) through (c) of
  the Rule  inapplicable to  "discovery requests, responses, objections, and
  motions that are subject to the  provisions of Rules 26 through 37"). 
  (FN3) One day later, attorney Taylor filed a supplemental

 

  memorandum arguing that  appellant's motions, "unique though they may be,"
  were not  founded on discovery rules and therefore were subject to Rule 11. 

       In March 1998, the court held a hearing on the motion to compel and
  the motion for  sanctions.  The court questioned counsel at the threshold
  as to whether Rule 11 or Rule 26 applied  and whether it mattered,
  observing that "whether you had chosen [Rule] 11 or [Rule] 26, we were 
  kind of coming to the same issues."  The court then strongly admonished
  appellant for the tone of his  pleadings, explaining that there was no
  place for such language  in court, and that he would not  tolerate
  "repeated filings of pleadings that really get down to name-calling."  The
  court indicated that  appellant's "lack of civility is going to be
  punished."  The court also observed that the materials  sought by appellant
  were discoverable through proper discovery procedures and urged appellant
  to  channel his efforts in that direction.  The court thus denied the
  motion to compel and granted the  motion for sanctions.  The court reserved
  ruling on the amount of sanctions to be imposed, but   stated that they
  would not be "anything Draconian." 

       Appellant subsequently served a request to produce on Olley, which
  triggered a new round of  responses and counter-responses.  Appellant also
  filed a motion to reconsider the decision granting  sanctions.  Attorney
  Taylor responded with a motion for monetary sanctions, requesting that 
  appellant be ordered to pay some or all of the reasonable attorney's fees
  and expenses incurred as a  result of the Rule 11 violation.

       On August 26, 1998,  the court issued its opinion and order regarding
  sanctions.  The court 

 

  determined that  Rules 26 and 37,  rather than Rule 11,  governed.  The
  court further found   that there was no legal basis for either the motion
  to compel or for the assertion that Olley and Dr.  Marx could be joined as
  parties; and that appellant had engaged in personal attacks and
  name-calling  intended to harass Olley and her attorney.  The court thus
  concluded that appellant had violated Rule  26(g) by signing the pleading,
  thereby certifying falsely that it was "warranted by existing law" and 
  "not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass."  V.R.C.P.
  26(g).  The court imposed  two sanctions against appellant, ordering him to
  reimburse Olley for attorney's fees and expenses,  and to pay the Rutland
  Family Court the sum of $2500  "as an appropriate sanction for his
  egregious  violations of Rule 26(g) of the Vermont Rules of Civil
  Procedure." Attorney Taylor subsequently  submitted a statement of 
  attorney's fees and expenses, and the court ordered appellant to pay Olley
  a  total of $3610.   

       In September, appellant moved to reconsider the order on sanctions,
  which led in turn to new  charges of misconduct by Attorney Taylor based
  upon allegations that appellant had  fabricated and  misrepresented the
  law.  In January 1999, the court issued a decision denying the motion for 
  reconsideration, and ordering appellant to show cause why he should not be
  held in contempt for  failure to pay the $2500  sanction, and for further
  misrepresentations contained in the reconsideration  motion.  In February,
  appellant filed a notice of appeal from the court's denial of the motion
  for  reconsideration.  We  subsequently stayed execution of the order
  imposing sanctions and the order to  show cause pending resolution of the
  appeal. (FN4)
  
       Appellant first contends the court abused its discretion and violated
  his due process rights  

 

  by awarding sanctions under V.R.C.P. 26(g) notwithstanding the fact that
  the motion for  sanctions was predicated  on V.R.C.P. 11. We note at the
  outset that appellant was clearly entitled to  avail himself of the
  traditional discovery procedures.  Rules 4 and 9 of the Family Court Rules
  make  clear that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to actions for abuse
  prevention, which is how this  matter started, and to family court
  proceedings in general.  See V.R.F.P. 4(a) & (g), 9(a)(1).  Thus,  when a
  mental evaluation is ordered pursuant to V.R.F.P.  5, as occurred here, the
  rules of civil  procedure govern.  See V.R.F.P. 5(a).  The rules assume
  that copies of an examiner's report,  including the results of all tests
  made, diagnoses and conclusions, will be available from the  requester of
  the examination.  See V.R.C.P. 35(b)(1).  The rules also provide that the
  subdivision  does not preclude discovery of a report of an examiner or the
  taking of a deposition of the examiner  in accordance with the provisions
  of any other rule.  See id. § 35(b)(3).  Thus, V.R.C.P. 30  (depositions)
  or 34 (production of documents) could have been utilized to obtain access
  to the  documents which appellant sought.  We note, as well, that the order
  for psychiatric evaluation  provided that the results would be made
  available to counsel for the parties.  Therefore, appellant  could have
  served a proper request for production and, if unsuccessful, could then
  have sought relief  pursuant to VR.C.P. 37.

       Although appellant did not properly avail  himself of these
  established discovery procedures,  we agree with the trial court that
  appellant's efforts to obtain the materials from Olley were in the  nature
  of discovery requests.  Therefore,  the sanctions motion was properly
  governed by V.R.C.P.  26 and 37.  See V.R.C.P. 11(d) (Rule 11 sanctions "do
  not apply to discovery requests, objections,  and motions that are subject
  to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37" ).  Violation of Rule 26(g) was 
  not, however, specifically alleged or noticed by Attorney Taylor or the
  court, although the latter did  consider its applicability at the hearing. 
  Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that appellant was  prejudiced by the
  omission.  Both Rule 11 and Rule 26 treat signed papers as certifying that
  the 

 

  pleading is not offered for any improper purpose, such as to harass, that
  the claims and  contentions therein have a basis in existing law, and that
  the contentions have evidentiary support.    Thus,  actions that violate
  Rule 11(b) also violate the provisions of Rule 26(g), and sanctions 
  imposed pursuant to either rule are reviewed under identical abuse of
  discretion standards.  See, e.g.,  In re Byrd, Inc., 927 F.2d 1135, 1137
  (10th Cir. 1991) (courts apply Rule 11 standards and case law   to Rule
  26(g));  Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of New York, Inc., 855 F.2d 1009, 1015
  (2d Cir. 1988)  (in interpreting and applying Rule 26(g), courts look to
  case law and standards under Rule 11); Estate  of Miles v. Miles, 994 P.2d 1139, 1146 (Mont. 2000) (since Rule 26(g) contains same language as  Rule
  11 to the effect that pleading or discovery request or objection may not be
  "interposed for any  improper purpose," same standard of review applies);
  see also Jerome v. Pardis, 783 P.2d 919, 922-23 (Mont. 1989) (although
  trial court erred in imposing sanction under Rule 37(b) in the absence of a 
  prior discovery order, sanction would be affirmed under Rule 26(g)).  
  Accordingly,  we find no  prejudicial error resulting from the court's
  imposition of sanctions under Rule 26(g) for the actions  alleged,
  notwithstanding the fact that the evidence and argument to the court at the
  hearing on the  motion for sanctions was offered in the erroneous belief
  that the procedure was governed by Rule 11. 

       Appellant next asserts that the evidence failed to demonstrate a
  violation of Rule 26.  The  claim is without merit.  As noted, the trial
  court found that appellant's  motion to compel was   without support in
  existing law, as was the threat to join Olley and Dr. Marx as parties to
  the  litigation, and that the language and tone of appellant's response to
  attorney Taylor's opposition was  unwarranted and intended to harass.  The
  law and the record evidence fully support these findings.   See Bissonnette
  v. Wylie, 166 Vt. 364, 370,