Case Title: Ryan v. Palmateer

Citation: 

Docket Number: S51169

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  March 10, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DANNY THOMAS RYAN,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
JOAN PALMATEER,
Superintendent,
Oregon State Penitentiary,
Respondent on Review.
(No. 99C-18624; CA A118415; SC S51169)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 8, 2004.
Stephen A. Houze, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioner on review. 
Kathleen Cegla, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Joseph C. Guimond, Judge. 190 Or App 398, 79 P3d 917 (2003).
BALMER, J.
Petitioner in this post-conviction case alleges that he
received inadequate assistance of counsel under Article I,
section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and ineffective assistance
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution. 
He argues that his trial counsel's errors prejudiced him and
that, even if he cannot prove actual prejudice, this court should
grant post-conviction relief because of "structural error" at his
trial. (1)
  The post-conviction court held that petitioner's
rights had not been violated.  The Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion.  Ryan v. Palmateer, 190 Or App 398, 79 P3d 917
(2003).  We affirm for the reasons stated below.
I.  FACTS AT TRIAL
We begin by describing the proceedings and evidence at
petitioner's underlying trial.  The state indicted petitioner for
sodomy, attempted rape, third-degree theft, and three counts of
menacing. (2)
  All the charges involved allegations by
petitioner's former girlfriend that he had threatened her with a
rifle and forced her to perform oral sex.
A. Pretrial Motions
Initially, petitioner was represented by appointed
counsel who entered a not guilty plea and filed pretrial motions
challenging the application of Ballot Measure 40 (1996) (3)
 and
Ballot Measure 11 (1994) (4)
 to petitioner's case.  Petitioner
dismissed his appointed counsel and retained trial counsel, who
filed a motion in limine seeking, among other things, to suppress
evidence of petitioner's previous convictions for DUII and
solicitation, the victim's testimony that petitioner had told her
that he had AIDS, the victim's testimony regarding telephone
calls to her boyfriend and to her therapist, and the contents of
a note that the victim discovered just before the crime.
The trial court addressed the pretrial motions
immediately before the trial began.  The prosecutor raised the
matter of the motion in limine and informed the court that the
state did not intend to introduce some of the evidence that the
motion challenged, including petitioner's previous convictions
for DUII and solicitation.  Thereafter, the court rejected
several of trial counsel's arguments in the motion in limine and
ruled that the court would admit the victim's testimony that
petitioner had told her that he had AIDS and her testimony
regarding the contents of the note.  (Trial counsel had
challenged the latter testimony as not constituting the best
evidence of the note.)  However, pending offers of proof, the
court withheld decisions regarding the admissibility of other
evidence, such as the content of the victim's telephone calls to
her boyfriend and to her therapist after the crime.
Trial counsel then directed the court's attention to
the Measure 11 and Measure 40 motions that petitioner's previous
counsel had filed, stating that he did not know whether the court
had heard those motions.  The trial court stated that it would
adhere to the uniform rulings of the circuit court's motions
panel concerning Measure 11 and advised trial counsel to reserve
his rights on that issue.  Trial counsel did so and also reserved
his rights regarding Measure 40.  The prosecutor then requested
that the court not rely on any provisions of Measure 40 because
petitioner's alleged crimes had occurred before the passage of
Measure 40.  The trial court agreed.
B. Voir Dire
Jury selection began later that day.  After asking the
potential jurors what person they respected most, what that
person would say about them, and what they would like "to see
come out of this case," trial counsel began to "share [his]
fears" with the jury pool.  When he described a North Carolina
defendant who had been "locked up pending trial" for three and a
half years, the court ordered trial counsel to stop that
discussion. (5)

Trial counsel then asked more specific questions about
cases involving rape and sodomy.
"[Trial Counsel:]  Okay.  If somebody simply says -- if
somebody says -- if somebody makes an accusation, 'I
was raped or sodomized,' do we believe them
automatically?  We do?  [Juror Ten], you're shaking
your head yes.
"[Juror Ten:]  I've had several friends that told me
they have been raped and I believe them.
"[Trial Counsel:]  And-- 
"[Juror Ten:]  But I don't know anything.  It all
happened before I ever knew them.
"[Trial Counsel:]  Why did you believe them?
"[Juror Ten:]  Because they were my friends, and I
(unintelligible).  Something like that.
"[Trial Counsel:]  Would anybody else in the room
require something more than somebody just making an
accusation?  Do we need other evidence?  For instance,
in this case we're talking about Attempted Rape with a
Weapon and Sodomy with a Weapon.  Should we have a
weapon?  What if we didn't have a weapon?"
Trial counsel then talked with the jurors about the
need for proof to support the charges.  Trial counsel did not
challenge the inclusion of Juror Ten on the jury.
After voir dire, the trial judge conferred with trial
counsel, the prosecutor, and petitioner about trial counsel's
implication that some defendants are incarcerated pending trial. 
The court informed petitioner of his right to keep the jury
unaware of his incarceration and of the importance of that right. 
Petitioner personally responded that he wanted the jury to know
that he was in custody, because he believed that he had been
incarcerated unjustly.  Trial counsel agreed, telling the court
that he had disclosed that fact purposely.  The court ordered
trial counsel not to allude to petitioner's incarceration again.  
C. The State's Case
The state's case against petitioner consisted of the
victim's testimony about the crime, the testimony of the victim's
boyfriend and her therapist regarding telephone calls that the
victim had made to them after the crime, and the testimony of
petitioner's friends that petitioner had confessed to them that
he had committed the crimes.
1. The Victim's Testimony
On direct examination, the victim testified that she
ended her intimate live-in relationship with petitioner in June
1996 and started dating her current boyfriend, Klingforth,
several months later.  Klingforth was petitioner's best friend,
and that fact made matters between petitioner and the victim
increasingly acrimonious.  At petitioner's invitation, the victim
agreed to meet petitioner at his home on the evening of September
12, 1996, to finalize the breakup.  Petitioner, a hairdresser,
told the victim that he had an appointment with a client at his
home at 8:00.  
The victim testified that she arrived at 6:40.  Soon
after she arrived, petitioner asked her to have sex with him, but
she refused.  She testified that petitioner insisted that she go
to his bedroom to get a gift that he had left there for her.  On
the bed, she found a "little ring-type box" containing a
handwritten note reading, "Fuck you."  The victim testified that
petitioner then threatened her with a rifle, made her remove her
clothing, and forced her to perform oral sex.  He told her that
he had AIDS and had slept with prostitutes and said, "I think I'm
going to just go ahead and fuck you."  However, instead of
further assaulting the victim, petitioner showed her that the
rifle was not loaded by "breaking it in half, opening it up, and
[sliding] the barrel * * * down."  The victim described the
weapon as an old rifle with a silver barrel.  Petitioner said
that he would call Klingforth to tell him that they had "made
love for the last time and parted as friends."  The victim left
the house and went to her car, but petitioner followed her and
took two letters from her car that she had written to him.  Then
petitioner's client arrived, and the victim drove away.
The victim then described a series of telephone calls
that she had placed and received after leaving petitioner's home. 
From the car, she called Klingforth, telling him that petitioner
would be calling but that she had not consented to anything that
petitioner might describe.  Klingforth asked the victim whether
petitioner had raped her, and she said that he had not.  Upon
arriving home, she called Klingforth again to say that she would
call again shortly, after her son-in-law, who lived with her, had
left the house.  Later, she called Klingforth a third time and
told him that petitioner had used a gun and had forced her to
have oral sex.  She then received a call from petitioner, who
told her that he had placed a call to Klingforth as he had
promised.  Later that night, she called her therapist and left a
message saying that petitioner had used a gun and had forced her
to have oral sex.  The following day, the victim told her
employer about the incident, and he convinced her to call the
police.  Later, petitioner came to the victim's workplace, and
her employer asked him to leave.
2. Testimony Corroborating the Victim
The victim's therapist testified that the victim had
left a message on her office answering machine on the evening of
September 12.  She testified that the victim had been "obviously
very upset."  The therapist had erased the message, but her notes
read that "Boyfriend [petitioner] forced oral sex and threatened
to kill her. [Victim] very shaken, not certain what to do." (6)

Klingforth's testimony corroborated the victim's story
about the times of the telephone calls.  He described her
demeanor in the first telephone call as "terribly shaken up * * *
on the verge of crying."  In the second and third calls, she had
been "a little more relaxed" but still shaky and upset. 
Klingforth did not testify to the specifics of the conversations
with the victim in his direct examination.  He did, however, say
that the conversation concerned the victim's meeting with
petitioner and that he had asked the victim whether petitioner
had raped her.  Klingforth also described petitioner's telephone
call to him, and his story mirrored the victim's account.  On
cross-examination, trial counsel asked Klingforth whether the
victim had told him that petitioner "had held a gun to her head
and forced her to perform oral sex on him."  Klingforth said yes.
The victim's employer testified that the victim had
been crying at work on the day after the incident.  He asked her
about it, and, when she told him about the crime, he convinced
her to call the police.  Later, he heard the victim yelling and
saw that petitioner had entered the office.  He asked petitioner
to leave, and petitioner complied.  The victim's employer
described the victim's reaction as "horrified" and "shaking
beyond belief."
3. Testimony Regarding Petitioner's Confessions
Two of petitioner's friends, Siemens and Dobbins,
testified that petitioner had confessed to forcing the victim to
have sex at gunpoint.  On direct examination, Siemens testified
that, in October or November 1996, while traveling to a mutual
friend's barbecue, petitioner had told him that he had held a gun
to the victim's head and had had sex with her.  On
cross-examination, Siemens testified that he and petitioner had
been drinking beer during that conversation, but that they had
not been drunk because they had just started their first drinks.
Dobbins testified that in the autumn of 1996, while
driving to work together, petitioner had told him that he had
"held a gun  on [a] woman and sodomized her," but that the gun
had not been loaded.  Dobbins testified that a detective later
interviewed him about petitioner, but that he had forgotten to
mention petitioner's confession.  He called the detective and
described the confession in a second interview.  On
cross-examination, Dobbins said that he had forgotten about the
conversation because he had been upset about his recent
separation from his wife. 
D. Motion for Acquittal
After the state rested, trial counsel moved for
acquittal on all charges.  The trial court reviewed the elements
of each charge and granted the motion as to the theft charge
because the state had not presented evidence showing that the
victim's letters to petitioner were items of value.  The court
denied the motion as to the other charges.
E. Petitioner's Case
Petitioner sought to prove that the state's case was
implausible because the state's witnesses were untrustworthy and
because petitioner had not owned a gun matching the victim's
description on the day of the incident.
1. Berardinelli  
Petitioner called Berardinelli, who knew both
petitioner and Klingforth.  Apparently, trial counsel had
intended to cast doubt on Klingforth's credibility by having
Berardinelli describe the breakup between petitioner and the
victim, and the bad blood it had created between petitioner and
Klingforth.  However, trial counsel was unable to elicit any
substantive testimony from Berardinelli because the trial court
ruled that counsel's questions, in the form that counsel put
them, would have elicited only irrelevant evidence. (7)

2. Larson
Petitioner then called Larson, the client who had come
to petitioner's house on the day of the incident.  Larson
testified that, when she had arrived, the victim had been sitting
in the victim's car in petitioner's driveway, and petitioner had
been talking to her.  She said that neither the victim nor
petitioner had appeared upset and that the victim had driven away
normally.  On the state's cross-examination, however, Larson
testified that she had not seen the victim's face; she simply
recognized the victim's car and saw that someone, whom she
assumed to be the victim, was in it.
3. Taylor
Petitioner next called Taylor, his private
investigator.  Trial counsel began questioning Taylor regarding
his interview with Dobbins, and the state objected on hearsay
grounds.  The trial court excused the jury and directed trial
counsel to submit an offer of proof.  Rather than questioning the
witness, trial counsel attempted to describe what Taylor's
testimony would be; the trial court admonished him repeatedly
that, because the jury had left the courtroom, trial counsel
should make his offer of proof by questioning the witness
directly.  
Trial counsel complied.  In response to counsel's
questions, Taylor testified that Dobbins, who was then
petitioner's roommate, had told him that petitioner kept no guns
in the house.  Taylor also testified that he had interviewed the
victim and that he found her "very cold, very calculating * * *
[like] one of those Sharon Stone movies."  The trial court
excluded the testimony regarding Dobbins as hearsay and the
testimony regarding the victim as overly prejudicial. (8)
 
4. Petitioner's Mother
Petitioner's mother testified that petitioner had owned
two guns, both with "blue-black" barrels.  She testified that
neither gun broke in half for loading.
5. Petitioner's Testimony
Finally, petitioner testified that he had owned two
guns, neither of which broke in half for loading.  He said that
he had sold both guns to a friend, Pedersen, in December 1995,
but that he had lost the sales receipt.  Petitioner testified
that Pedersen had moved to Idaho and that neither he nor his
investigator had been able to find him.
Petitioner claimed that he had not harmed the victim on
the night of the incident, but that he had called her a "whore or
prostitute" during their discussion and that she had slapped him.
Petitioner testified that, after the victim left, he had called
Klingforth to say that he and the victim had "made love" but had
"broke[n] off as friends."  Petitioner testified that he also had
called the victim to apologize for insulting her.  After learning
of the victim's charges against him, petitioner had visited her
workplace and asked her to drop the charges.  Petitioner denied
telling Siemens or Dobbins that he had assaulted the victim. 
However, he testified that he and Siemens had been drinking
heavily during the time of his alleged confession. 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor then confronted
petitioner with the evidence that petitioner had told the police
that he had sold the guns, not to Pedersen, but to "an unknown
person."  The prosecutor also suggested that petitioner may have
destroyed the receipt identifying the date and the buyer of the
gun.
After the defense rested, the state brought one
rebuttal witness, a police officer who testified that petitioner
had told him that he had sold the two guns to "an unknown
person." 
F. Closing Statements and Verdict
The state's closing argument emphasized the victim's
credibility as demonstrated by the corroborating testimony of her
therapist, her employer, and Klingforth.  The state noted that
Siemens' and Dobbins' testimony that petitioner had confessed
provided further corroboration.  The state characterized
petitioner's testimony as untrustworthy, because he had given two
different stories about the identity of the gun buyer.  
Trial counsel emphasized the victim's motive to punish
petitioner for his infidelity, the prior sale of the guns
allegedly used in the crime, and the untrustworthiness of Siemens
and Dobbins.  He noted that Siemens had been drinking during
petitioner's alleged confession.
The jury convicted petitioner on all seven counts.  A
jury poll revealed that its verdict was eleven to one on all
counts except for attempted rape, on which its verdict was ten to
two.  Each count required the vote of ten jurors for a
conviction.  Juror Ten was in the majority on each count.
Petitioner did not appeal, but later chose to seek post-conviction relief.
II.  POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
In his post-conviction petition, petitioner claimed
that trial counsel's representation of him violated Article I,
section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  He
alleged that trial counsel had committed numerous errors,
including the failure to challenge Juror Ten.  Among other
evidence, petitioner submitted an affidavit from the trial judge
stating that "trial counsel did the poorest job of any trial
lawyer [that he had] observed" in his entire career.  The trial
judge testified that trial counsel's performance had been
prejudicial to petitioner's case.  Petitioner claimed that,
although there was sufficient evidence to show that trial
counsel's inadequacy had prejudiced him, the post-conviction
court need not find prejudice because trial counsel's performance
had "constructively denied [him the] right to counsel" under both
constitutions.
The post-conviction court rejected petitioner's
arguments and dismissed the petition.  Petitioner sought
reconsideration, but the court adhered to its initial decision.
In both its initial opinion and its denial of reconsideration,
the court made various findings of fact.  The court found that
trial counsel was inexperienced and "did a very poor job" of
representing petitioner.  The court also found that the trial
judge, despite his testimony that trial counsel had performed
poorly, had done nothing to stop the trial or to advise
petitioner that trial counsel was violating his right to
representation.  In fact, the judge had commented several times
towards the end of the trial that he did not want to make any
mistakes that might cause a reversal "after all this work." 
Finally, the court noted that the state's case had been very
strong, in part because the victim had been a credible witness
and because two of the state's witnesses were petitioner's
friends.  The court concluded that the result would have been the
same, even if trial counsel had made no mistakes.
Based on those findings, the post-conviction court
concluded that, although trial counsel's performance was "far
below the acceptable standard of reasonable skill and judgment
required of all attorneys," petitioner had failed to establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel's performance
had caused him actual prejudice.  On reconsideration, the post-conviction court further held that the "'sum' of trial counsel's
errors do not constitute 'structural error' as that term is
defined by federal case law."  As noted, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the post-conviction court's judgment without opinion,
and we allowed review.
III.  OREGON CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
On review, petitioner argues that this court should set
aside his conviction and grant a new trial because trial counsel
made errors that prejudiced his case.  He further argues that
trial counsel's errors, taken together, were so egregious that he
should be granted a new trial without showing actual prejudice,
because the entire underlying trial was infected with "structural
error."  We first address petitioner's theories under the Oregon
Constitution and then review his theories under the federal
constitution.  See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 611, 614, 625 P2d 123
(1981) (explaining order of consideration).
A. Inadequate Assistance of Counsel
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
provides, in part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have the right * * * to be heard by himself and
counsel."  To prevail on his post-conviction claim of inadequate
assistance of counsel under Oregon law, petitioner must
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, the two elements
of that claim:  that trial counsel "failed to exercise reasonable
professional skill and judgment, and that petitioner suffered
prejudice as a result."  Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or 350, 359, 39
P3d 851 (2002).  
A showing that the lawyer's acts or omissions
prejudiced a petitioner's case is an essential element of
establishing a claim of inadequate assistance of counsel. 
Stevens v. State, 322 Or 101, 110, 902 P2d 1137 (1995) ("[O]nly
those acts or omissions by counsel which have a tendency to
affect the result of the prosecution can be regarded as of
constitutional magnitude." (quoting Trujillo v. Maass, 312 Or
431, 435, 822 P2d 703 (1991); emphasis in Stevens)); Trujillo,
312 Or at 437 ("[P]etitioner [must] establish * * * facts
demonstrating that he was prejudiced as a result of counsel's
acts or omissions."); Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or 867, 875,
627 P2d 458 (1981) ("Adequacy of assistance of counsel allows for
errors which are inconsequential in the context of the entire
trial or proceeding.").
Petitioner claims that trial counsel's decision not to
challenge Juror Ten was a lapse of "reasonable professional skill
and judgment" that prejudiced him.  As described above, Juror Ten
asserted during voir dire that "I've had several friends that
told me they have been raped and I believe them."  Petitioner
contends that that statement proves that Juror Ten was biased
against him because she was predisposed to believe accusations of
rape.  The court should exclude a prospective juror for "actual
bias" if the "prospective juror's ideas or opinions would impair
substantially his or her performance of the duties of a juror to
decide the case fairly and impartially on the evidence presented
in court."  State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 74, 969 P2d 1013 (1998). 
Petitioner claims that trial counsel should have challenged Juror
Ten and that his failure to do so was prejudicial because Juror
Ten could have been the deciding vote on the charge of attempted
rape.
We disagree.  For petitioner to prevail, he must be
able to demonstrate either (1) that Juror Ten actually was biased
and therefore that trial counsel erred by failing to challenge
her for cause or (2) that trial counsel failed to exercise
reasonable skill and diligence when he concluded that Juror Ten
would be able to evaluate the evidence impartially and, for that
reason, failed to use one of his peremptory challenges to remove
her from the jury.  As we describe below, petitioner did not make
either showing here.  
As trial counsel's colloquy with the other jurors
reveals, at least one other juror noted the difference between
believing a friend's accusation of rape and evaluating evidence
as a juror in a criminal trial.  
"[Trial Counsel:] * * * I'd like to know if you would
want more than just somebody's accusation of rape or
sodomy. What other kinds of things would you be looking
for?
"[Juror:]  You mean if it weren't a friend?
"[Trial Counsel:]  Yes.
"[Juror:]  Yes.  Well, if it weren't a friend, I'd be
-- if I -- the weapon wasn't there, I'd need other
evidence.  I'd need a -- a witness or something.  I
mean just the word wouldn't be enough for me."
It was not unreasonable for trial counsel to believe that Juror
Ten had recognized the same distinction.  Moreover, trial counsel
did not simply ignore Juror Ten's statement.  Rather, he spent
time during voir dire discussing the dangers of "find[ing]
somebody guilty of a crime based solely on an accusation."  That
discussion allowed trial counsel an opportunity to observe Juror
Ten and further evaluate her fitness for the jury. 
Trial counsel's affidavit indicates that his
observation of Juror Ten led him to believe that she could
evaluate the case impartially.  We cannot say on this record that
that was not a reasonable conclusion for him to reach.  Moreover,
petitioner presented no evidence beyond the voir dire transcript
to substantiate his claim that Juror Ten was actually biased.  
Petitioner did not prove either that Juror Ten was actually
biased or that trial counsel failed to exercise reasonable
professional skill and judgment when he allowed Juror Ten to
remain on the jury.  
In addition to his argument regarding Juror Ten,
petitioner claims that trial counsel committed other errors that
prejudiced him.  As we shall explain, we reject those claims for
several reasons. 
Many of the acts or omissions by trial counsel that
petitioner asserts to be mistakes either did not occur as
petitioner describes them or, in context, do not constitute
lapses of professional skill and judgment.  For example,
petitioner alleges that trial counsel should not have allowed the
state to present the motion in limine.  However, the state's
"presentation" of that motion largely consisted of a statement of
the state's concessions in response to the motion, each of which
benefitted petitioner.  Petitioner also claims that trial counsel
should not have reserved his arguments on Measure 11 and Measure
40.  However, trial counsel's reservation was at the behest of
the trial judge, the state conceded petitioner's argument that
Measure 40 did not apply to the case, and the trial court ruled
that it would follow the decisions of the motions panel regarding 
Measure 11.  In addition, petitioner claims that trial counsel
negligently failed to pursue a "no contest" plea agreement and
that petitioner would have accepted such an agreement.  Trial
counsel, however, stated that petitioner refused to allow him to
negotiate a plea agreement, adamantly insisting on his innocence. 
Petitioner's bare assertion that he would have accepted a
favorable plea agreement is insufficient to carry his burden of
proving that trial counsel failed to provide adequate
representation. 
Other actions of trial counsel that petitioner cites as
error constituted reasonable tactical choices and, therefore, do
not demonstrate a lack of professional skill or judgment.  For
example, as previously noted, trial counsel (with petitioner's
agreement) alluded to petitioner's incarceration in the hope of
eliciting the jury's sympathy.  That tactic, although perhaps
misguided, is not necessarily error.  See Estelle v. Williams,
425 US 501, 508, 96 S Ct 1691, 48 L Ed 2d 126 (1976) (holding
that defendant who appeared before jury in prison uniform had
received fair trial because he was not compelled to appear in
that manner and noting that "it is not an uncommon defense tactic
to produce the defendant in jail clothes in the hope of eliciting
sympathy from the jury").  Similarly, trial counsel's approach to
closing argument -- including, for example, his decision not to
make distinct arguments regarding the separate charges -- and his
choice to use the defense that petitioner sold his guns to
Pedersen were reasonable tactical choices, even if, as petitioner
asserts, they backfired.
We agree with petitioner that trial counsel failed to
exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment in several
respects.  The record reveals that trial counsel appeared to be
unaware of the disposition of pretrial motions filed by
petitioner's previous counsel.  His inexperience and
unfamiliarity with the rules of evidence caused the trial court
to exclude some proffered testimony that might have been helpful
to petitioner and that might have been admitted if he had phrased
his questions differently.  Trial counsel moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, a motion that is unavailable in
criminal cases.  State ex rel Haas v. Schwabe, 276 Or 853, 857,
556 P2d 1366 (1976) ("[N]either under our statutes nor under
common law is there any basis for the entry of a judgment n.o.v.,
or its equivalent, in a criminal case.").  He made an oral motion
for a new trial, a motion that must be presented in writing.  ORS
136.535, ORCP 64 D.  However, the post-conviction court
determined that none of those lapses prejudiced petitioner, and
we conclude that evidence in the record supports that
determination.
In summary, we conclude that trial counsel's failure to
challenge Juror Ten did not demonstrate that trial counsel failed
to exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment in his
representation of petitioner.  We also conclude that, although
trial counsel's conduct of some aspects of the trial fell below
the required standard of skill, petitioner has not proved that
any of those mistakes had a tendency to affect the result of the
prosecution.
B. Structural Error
Notwithstanding his inability to prove that any
particular error by trial counsel tended to affect the result of
the case against him, petitioner nevertheless contends that trial
counsel's performance in this case as a whole was so inadequate
that it undermined the required "adversarial nature" of the
trial.  See United States v. Cronic, 466 US 648, 656-57, 104 S Ct
2039, 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984) (Sixth Amendment rights violated when
criminal trial loses its adversarial character).  Therefore,
petitioner urges this court to apply the doctrine of "structural
error" and order a new trial, without requiring him to show
actual prejudice.  
We first note, however, that structural error is a
doctrine that originated in federal criminal cases and, contrary
to petitioner's assertions, has not been adopted by this court as
an aspect of Oregon law, although this court has discussed
structural error on several occasions.  See, e.g., State v.
Barone, 329 Or 210, 226, 986 P2d 5 (1999) (holding that this
court "has not adopted the doctrine of 'structural' or 'systemic'
error in analyzing questions of Oregon law"); State v. Wilson,
323 Or 498, 505 n 5, 507, 918 P2d 826 (1996) (declining to
address defendant's structural error claims); State v. Cole, 323
Or 30, 37 n 5, 912 P2d 907 (1996) (declining to consider doctrine
of structural error because actual prejudice existed).
Petitioner alternatively urges us now to adopt the
structural error doctrine as part of Oregon criminal law. 
However, as we discuss below in our analysis of petitioner's
federal claims, petitioner's trial did maintain its adversarial
nature and involved no arguable structural error even under the
theory of structural error that petitioner puts forward. 
We pause at this point, however, to comment briefly on
petitioner's request that this court adopt some form of the
structural error doctrine that federal decisions have recognized. 
As discussed above, petitioner advances his structural error
argument as a basis for this court to grant post-conviction
relief even if he cannot demonstrate that his trial counsel's
lack of professional skill and judgment caused him prejudice.  In
other words, petitioner offers "structural error" as an
alternative to our usual inquiry into whether his trial counsel's
acts and omissions at trial were "prejudicial" or, instead,
constituted "harmless error."  Although petitioner's argument
arises in the context of a post-conviction proceeding, the same
inquiry is required in direct criminal appeals when we consider
whether errors at trial require reversal.  See State v. Davis,
336 Or 19, 27-35, 77 P3d 1111 (2003) (discussing "harmless error"
analysis).  Despite petitioner's carefully reasoned argument in
favor of the structural error doctrine, we do not find the
concept helpful in determining whether, in an Oregon criminal
trial, legal error should result in reversal or whether, in a
post-conviction proceeding, trial counsel's mistakes should lead
to a new trial.
The term "structural error," of course, appears in no
statute or constitutional provision, and the substantive content
of the term, as developed in the federal cases, is elusive. 
Indeed, the term appears to state a conclusion more than to
provide an analytical framework for deciding cases.  More
significantly, the addition of the abstract adjective
"structural" to the commonly used legal term "error" diverts
attention from the critical task of determining the existence and
nature of any legal errors at trial.  In our view, the latter
inquiry provides the more appropriate focus and allows a
reviewing court sufficient scope to determine whether legal
errors at trial were prejudicial or harmless.  In Davis, for example, this court considered whether the trial court's
exclusion of certain evidence was prejudicial by closely
examining the "nature of the error" and its context, including
its relationship to defendant's factual theory of the case.  336
Or at 32-34.  Similarly, in Cole, the defendant, without making a valid waiver of his right to counsel, represented himself at a suppression hearing.  In rejecting the state's argument that the lack of counsel was harmless, this court reviewed the context in which the right to counsel was denied, the elements of the
charges against defendant, and the evidence at trial.  Cole, 323
Or at 36-37.  
Finally, we note that the structural error doctrine, at
least as articulated by the federal courts, is not consistent
with Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon
Constitution.  That section provides, in part:
"If the supreme court shall be of opinion, after
consideration of all the matters submitted, that the
judgment of the court appealed from was such as should
have been rendered in the case, such judgment shall be
affirmed, notwithstanding any error committed during
the trial * * *."
This court consistently has held that, under that provision, we
"must affirm a judgment, despite any error committed at trial,
if, after considering all the matters submitted, the court is of
the opinion that the judgment 'was such as should have been
rendered in the case.'" Davis, 336 Or at 28.  Under Article VII
(Amended), section 3, the test for affirmance despite error
consists of a single inquiry:  "Is there little likelihood that
the particular error affected the verdict?"  Id. at 32.
Obviously, the nature of an error will dictate how much
or how little it will take to satisfy us that the error affected
the verdict.  See, e.g., Cole (prejudicial error when defendant
denied counsel at suppression hearing); State v. Cavan, 337 Or
433, 98 P3d 381 (2004) (prejudicial error when defendant's jury
trial for attack on prison guard held in prison where attack
occurred).  In our view, however, the foregoing discussion
demonstrates that the structural error doctrine would not provide
a useful analytical tool for Oregon courts to use in determining
whether legal error in a trial proceeding should result in
reversal.  This court's cases discussing prejudicial and harmless
error appropriately apply the controlling constitutional
requirements and provide sufficient guidance to lower courts and
counsel. 
IV.  FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
A. Structural Error
Petitioner asserts that the mistakes made by his trial
counsel demonstrate that his trial was tainted by structural
error and that that doctrine obviates the need for a showing of
prejudice. (9)
  In Chapman v. California, 386 US 18, 87 S Ct
824, 17 L Ed 2d 705 (1967), the Court held that constitutional
errors, like other errors, could be subject to harmless error
analysis.  Id. at 22. However, it noted that some constitutional
errors, such as deprivation of the right to counsel, could never
be considered harmless.  Id. at 24 n 8.  Twenty years later, the
Court reiterated its view that most constitutional errors could
be reviewed for harmless error, but excluded denial of the right
to counsel from that list.  Rose v. Clark, 478 US 570, 579, 106 S
Ct 3101, 92 L Ed 2d 460 (1986).
Decisions after Chapman and Rose sharply distinguish
between trials in which the defendant was denied the right to
counsel, either actually or constructively, and cases in which
the defendant received the assistance of counsel, but that
counsel was ineffective.  The Court in Strickland v. Washington,
466 US 668, 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), painted a stark
distinction between the two, noting that "[a]ctual or
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is
legally presumed to result in prejudice," Strickland, 466 US at
692, but that "actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a
deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general
requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice," 
id. at 693.
The Court highlighted that same distinction in Cronic,
decided the same day as Strickland.  There, it stated: 
"When a true adversarial criminal trial has been
conducted -- even if defense counsel may have made
demonstrable errors -- the kind of testing envisioned
by the Sixth Amendment has occurred.  But if the
process loses its character as a confrontation between
adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated." 

Cronic, 466 US at 656-57 (emphasis added).  The Court noted three
circumstances in which prejudice is presumed:  the complete
denial of counsel, a representation that "entirely fails to
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial
testing," and cases in which outside circumstances make effective
assistance impossible.  Id. at 659-60.  
The Court first used the term "structural error" in
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 US 279, 111 S Ct 1246, 113 L Ed 2d 302
(1991), when it considered whether a defendant needed to prove
that the introduction of a coerced confession had prejudiced him. 
The Court stated that a defendant could prevail without showing
prejudice only if he complained of a "structural error," which it
defined as an error that "def[ied] analysis by 'harmless-error'
standards" and skewed the trial's ability to determine guilt or
innocence reliably.  Id. at 309-10.   The Court cited five
examples of structural error, including the "total deprivation of
the right to counsel at trial." (10)
  Id. at 309 (emphasis
added). The Court concluded that the admission of a coerced
confession did not constitute a structural error. 
The Court revisited the application of the structural
error doctrine to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in
Bell v. Cone, 535 US 685, 122 S Ct 1843, 152 L Ed 2d 914 (2002). 
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Cronic, rejecting a habeas
corpus petitioner's argument that the court should presume
prejudice in his ineffective assistance claim:  "When we spoke in
Cronic of the possibility of presuming prejudice * * * , we
indicated that the attorney's failure must be complete."  Bell,
535 US at 696-97 (emphasis added).
The Court's precedents are clear.  A defendant who
chooses to assert a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of
counsel claim without proving prejudice must demonstrate that
trial counsel's errors were so egregious as to amount to a
constructive denial of counsel.  
Petitioner's claim does not meet that standard. 
Although, as we described in detail above, trial counsel made
certain mistakes, in fact, his performance served petitioner's
interests in many ways.  His motion in limine forced the state to
address and agree to omit potentially damaging evidence, such as
petitioner's convictions for DUII and solicitation.  He
successfully moved to dismiss the theft charge.  He cast doubt on
Siemens' testimony about petitioner's confession by presenting
testimony that Siemens had been drinking heavily during their
conversation.  He emphasized the suspicious fact that Dobbins had
"forgotten" to tell the investigating officer about petitioner's
surprising confession during the first interview.  He presented
testimony that petitioner's guns did not match the victim's
description.  He argued that it would have been illogical for
petitioner to harm the victim when he risked discovery by the
client who was soon to arrive.
We agree with the post-conviction court that the errors
petitioner enumerates did not affect the adversarial nature of
the trial.  Therefore, we hold that his petition fails to
demonstrate structural error as that concept has been articulated
by the United States Supreme Court.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As we already have noted, petitioner claims that his
trial counsel was ineffective because, inter alia, he failed to
challenge Juror Ten.  The federal constitutional standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel is set out in Strickland, 466
US at 687, and it requires a convicted defendant to show that
"counsel's performance was deficient" and that that deficient
performance "prejudiced the defense."  Although the Article I,
section 11, standard and the federal standard are not identical,
the reasons stated above for denying petitioner's state claim are
sufficient to deny his federal claim as well.  Petitioner has not
shown that trial counsel's performance was "deficient" in failing
to exclude Juror Ten or that the mistakes trial counsel did make
prejudiced him.  Petitioner's federal claims fail.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. In their briefs and pleadings, the parties in this case refer to claims of "structural error" and
"per se" or "presumed" prejudice, and they often use the terms interchangeably.  Although we
acknowledge that those terms may have distinct meanings in other contexts, they do not appear to
mean different things here.  Therefore, we treat the parties' arguments and this opinion's analysis
as applying equally to all those terms.  For simplicity's sake, we refer to "structural error" only.
2. After the initial indictment, petitioner was indicted separately for two counts of witness
tampering because he allegedly asked a friend to write to the victim and ask her to refuse to testify
or to change her testimony.   All the charges were tried together.  We do not discuss the witness
tampering charges because none of petitioner's claims concern them.
3. Ballot Measure 40 contained a number of provisions regarding criminal procedure and
criminal trials.  After the trial in this case, this court held Measure 40 unconstitutional.  Armatta v.
Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 285, 959 P2d 49 (1998).  The legislature later enacted separately certain
provisions of Measure 40.  State v. Fugate, 332 Or 195, 199-201, 26 P3d 802 (2001) (describing
provisions of Oregon Laws 1997, chapter 313, commonly known as Senate Bill 936).  However,
those changes do not apply to this case.
4. Ballot Measure 11 set mandatory minimum sentences for certain felony offenses.  It was
codified as ORS 137.700.  
5. Presumably, trial counsel had intended to tell the prospective jurors that the North
Carolina defendant had been innocent.
6. Over trial counsel's objection, the trial court admitted the therapist's notes regarding the
message under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.  (In this and other instances in
which we describe the trial court's rulings in petitioner's criminal case, the correctness of the
rulings is not at issue, and we express no opinion regarding them.)
7. Again, we recite the trial court's ruling only as part of our review of the events at
petitioner's criminal trial.  The correctness of that ruling is not at issue here, and we express no
opinion regarding it.
8. We note again that the trial court's rulings are not at issue here, and we express no opinion
as to whether or not they were correct.
9. The federal precedents do not always distinguish between "structural error" and "presumed
prejudice."  As we discuss below, the earlier cases speak in terms of presumed prejudice or
prejudice per se, while more recent decisions use the phrase "structural error."  As we noted at the
outset, however, for the purposes of this case those doctrines can be treated as identical.  We
therefore discuss the relevant federal cases together to present a clear picture of the precedents
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.
10. The Court's other examples included the presence of a biased judge, the exclusion of jurors
of the defendant's race, the denial of the defendant's right to self-representation, and the right to a
public trial.  Id. at 310.