Case Title: STUART CORDELL VIGIL v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0053

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
STUART CORDELL VIGIL v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 15224 P.3d 31Case Number: No. S-09-0053Decided: 02/16/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
STUART 
CORDELL VIGIL,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant 
Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, 
Stuart Cordell Vigil, challenges his conviction of one count of third-degree 
sexual abuse of a minor, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-316(a)(i).1  He contends the district court erred in 
admitting evidence in violation of W.R.E. 404(b).  He also asserts that the jury 
instruction relating to that evidence was erroneous.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
The 
issues on appeal are: 

 
 

1.    
Did 
the district court commit prejudicial error by holding the hearing regarding the 
admissibility of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence during trial?

 
 

2.    
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Appellant's 
prior conviction for sexual contact with a minor under W.R.E. 
404(b)?

 
 

3.    
Was 
the limiting instruction provided to the jury relating to the 404(b) evidence 
erroneous and, if so, has the Appellant established that the error was 
prejudicial?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
The 
charges against Appellant stem from an incident that occurred on November 11, 
2007.  Appellant was 51 and the 
victim was 15.  They were 
neighbors.  On occasion, the victim 
and members of her family visited with Appellant at his home.  The victim also frequently visited 
Appellant's home when no one else, except Appellant, was there.  Appellant employed the victim to help 
clean his home.  He gave her driving 
lessons and took her to restaurants.

 
 

[¶4]        
On 
the morning of November 11, 2007, Appellant invited the victim and her aunt and 
uncle to go out for breakfast.  The 
victim went to Appellant's home to wait for a call from the aunt.  While waiting, Appellant offered to give 
the victim a massage.  He told her 
to go into his bedroom and to take off her clothes.  The victim complied.  She covered herself with a towel and 
laid face down on Appellant's bed.  
Appellant massaged her back, arms, and legs.  At some point during this massage, he 
rubbed the victim's breasts and vaginal area.  He used massage oil or lotion during the 
massage.  Afterward, the victim 
showered and they left to meet the aunt and uncle for breakfast.  Later that day, the victim told her 
boyfriend about the incident.  The 
boyfriend told the victim's parents.  
They called law enforcement.

 
 

[¶5]        
 Deputies from the Laramie County 
Sheriff's Department investigated and spoke with Appellant.  He gave differing versions of the 
incident to the deputies.  The 
deputies testified at trial.  
Appellant told the initial investigating deputy that he gave the victim a 
massage that morning.  He said that 
the massage took place in his living room.  He initially repeated the same story to a 
second deputy during an interview at the sheriff's department.  During that same interview, he said the 
victim was fully clothed and he only massaged her back.  However, he also admitted that he used 
oil during the massage.  When 
questioned by the deputy as to how he could use the oil if the victim was 
clothed, he told the deputy that he had lifted up her shirttail and used the oil 
on the lower part of her back.

 
 

[¶6]        
An 
interview with a third deputy occurred after Appellant's arrest.  In that interview, Appellant admitted to 
the deputy that the massage had occurred in his bedroom and that the victim was 
naked but covered with a towel.  He 
told the deputy that he used oils during the massage.  He denied that anything sexual happened 
but told the deputy that "A little slip and you could be right there  [i]n her 
vagina."

 

[¶7]        
In 
January 2008, Appellant was charged with one count of third-degree sexual abuse 
of a minor in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-316(a)(i).  Shortly after being charged, Appellant 
filed a demand for notice of intent to introduce evidence of uncharged 
misconduct under W.R.E. 404(b).  In 
June 2008, the State replied by filing a notice of intent to introduce evidence 
of Appellant's past conviction for sexual contact with a 13-year-old girl in 
Colorado.  On August 7, 2008, the 
State filed an amended notice of intent.  
In that notice, the State advised that it also intended to introduce 
evidence that Appellant married a 16-year old, after engaging in premarital 
sexual relations.  In both notices, 
the State requested a hearing.  On 
August 12, 2008, the State filed a request for a 404(b) hearing.  Despite the requests, no hearing was 
held prior to trial.

 
 

[¶8]        
The 
404(b) hearing occurred during the first day of trial after the jury had been 
selected but before opening statements.  
During the hearing, the district court ruled that Appellant's prior 
conviction was admissible to refute a claim of mistake or accident and to prove 
sexual intent.  The judge indicated 
that the prior marriage evidence might be admissible in cross-examination if 
Appellant testified, but that he would reserve ruling on the matter until trial. 
 Appellant did not testify and that 
evidence was not admitted.  The jury 
found Appellant guilty.  The 
district court imposed a sentence of twelve to fourteen years.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
Timing 
of the 404(b) Hearing

 
 

[¶9]        
In 
his first issue, Appellant challenges the timing of the 404(b) hearing.  He contends that the court erred by 
failing to hold the hearing prior to trial.  Appellant did not make any objection to 
the timing of the hearing at trial.  
Accordingly, we review for plain error.  To 
establish plain error, Appellant must show: 1) the record is clear about the 
incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law; and 3) he was denied a substantial right which 
materially prejudiced him.  Miller v. State, 2009 WY 125, 
¶ 
10, 217 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2009).  
Appellant has failed to satisfy that burden.  He has not established a violation of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law or that he was prejudiced by the timing of the 
hearing.

 

[¶10]     
We 
have expressed "a firm preference for the pretrial determination of issues 
concerning uncharged misconduct."  Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 18 n.2, 
57 P.3d 332, 340 n.2 (Wyo. 2002) (emphasis in original), citing Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 
42 P.3d 483, 491 (Wyo. 2002).  We 
have recognized that pretrial determination 

 
 
enhance[s] 
the defendant's prospects of receiving due process and a fair trial, it will 
also enhance the district court's ability to reflect and rule upon a significant 
evidentiary issue.  Rulings on 
uncharged misconduct evidence are too important to be made in the heat and 
pressure of a trial, with the jury twiddling its thumbs in the next 
room.

 
 

Howard, 
¶ 23, 42 P.3d  at 491.  We have, 
however, never found reversible error simply because the 404(b) hearing was not 
held prior to trial.  For example, 
in Heywood v. State, 2009 WY 70, 208 P.3d 71 (Wyo. 2009), the 404(b) hearing was held at the same time as the hearing 
in this case, after jury selection and prior to opening statements.  We affirmed the conviction finding that 
Mr. Heywood failed to establish prejudicial error despite late notice of the 
State's intent to use 404(b) evidence.  
Id., ¶ 13, 208 P.3d  at 
74.  Similarly, in this case, 
Appellant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced in any manner as a 
result of the timing of the 404(b) hearing.  He had ample notice of the State's 
intent to introduce the evidence.  
He does not claim that he was surprised by the evidence or that his trial 
preparation was hindered in any manner.  
Appellant has failed to establish plain error.2

 
 
Admissibility 
of 404(b) Evidence

 
 

[¶11]     
"A 
trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to 
considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant 
demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion."  
Leyva 
v. State, 
2007 WY 136, ¶ 17, 165 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 2007).  "[A]s long as there exists a legitimate 
basis for the trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on 
appeal."  Id., quoting Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 20, 142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 2006).  If 
evidence was 
admitted 
in error, we must determine whether the error was prejudicial.  Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 
1999).  Error is prejudicial if 
there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the defendant if the error had not been made.  Id.  

 
 

[¶12]     
Appellant 
contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of 
his prior conviction.  At the time 
of Appellant's trial, Rule 404(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence provided:3

 
 

Other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.

 
 
The 
district court determines the admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b) by 
applying the following test: 

 
 

[B]ecause 
uncharged misconduct evidence carries an inherent danger for prejudice, we have 
also adopted a mandatory procedure for testing its admissibility:  (1) 
the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be 
relevant; (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially 
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the 
trial court must instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be 
considered only for the proper purpose for which it was 
admitted.

 
 

Harris 
v. State, 
2008 WY 23, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Wyo. 2008), quoting Gleason, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d  at 340.  We must determine whether the district 
court's application of the test was an abuse of discretion.  Heywood, ¶ 9, 208 P.3d  at 
73.

 
 

[¶13]     
Appellant 
contends that the district court did not consider the relevance of the prior 
conviction.  

 
 
"Relevant 
evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence.

 
 
W.R.E. 
401.  "For evidence to be relevant, 
we must know the fact question to which it is relevant."  Williams v. State, 2004 WY 117, ¶ 13, 99 P.3d 432, 441 (Wyo. 2004). 

 
 

[¶14]     
In 
order to convict an appellant of sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-316, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the appellant engaged in "sexual contact" with the victim.  "Sexual contact" is defined as 
"touching, with the intention of sexual 
arousal, gratification or abuse, of the victim's intimate parts by the 
actor, or of the actor's intimate parts by the victim, or of the clothing 
covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(vi) 
(emphasis added).  The State 
contended that the evidence was relevant to establish that the touching was made 
with the intent of sexual arousal and to prove the touching was not the result 
of accident or mistake.  

 
 

[¶15]     
Immediately 
prior to trial, Appellant provided the court with insight as to his 
defense.  In response to Appellant's 
request to fire his defense counsel, the court asked Appellant what he hoped to 
accomplish in representing himself.  
Appellant responded: 

 
 
To 
prove that there was no intent in 
the charge.  It says I sexually - - 
let's see here - - I had sexually molested, I think it was.  I could look it up here, but basically, 
it says I had sexually molested somebody or sexual intent, and there was none. 
 All I did was give a massage.  That was it, and the person asked me for 
the massage, and that was given, and so there was no intention. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Appellant further advised 
the court: 

 
 
So 
basically, the reason I needed a massage therapist is because she could tell you 
that when you're massaging certain areas 
of the body, and you're working your way through it, there's times where you accidentally get 
close or even accidentally touch things, but normally, you're trying to sit 
down here, and keep everything clinical, and that's, basically, why I needed the 
massage therapist. 

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  

 
 

[¶16]     
The 
district court denied the request and trial proceeded with defense counsel 
representing Appellant.4  The 404(b) hearing was held after voir 
dire.  After hearing argument from 
counsel, the district court agreed with the State's position.  The court 
explained:

 
 
I'm 
going to turn first to the conviction for what the State will refer to as 
improper sexual contact with a minor in this prior conviction . . . .  Seems to me as is common in these 
determinations this is difficult to arrive at because while we haven't the 
benefit of an evidentiary record at the time, nevertheless, counsel for very 
proper reasons need to know ahead of time what the ruling would 
be.

 
 
Of 
course, such rulings are always provisional in that they could change in view of 
the evidentiary record at the time, but so far I believe it's clear that this 
evidence is offered for a proper purpose in that it is offered according to the 
State to refute a claim of the mistake or accident as going to intent. 

 
 
It's 
clear  -as [Appellant] stated on the record this morning, that he feels this 
could easily have happened accidentally while in the course of giving a 
massage.  That, of course, would 
necessarily include [the] proposition that it was not for any sexual 
gratification.  So I think it purely 
is for a  proper purpose and is relevant.

 
 
I 
never have been able to discern very clearly the difference between one and 
two.  That is, it's for a proper 
purpose and relevant.  It seems to 
me those are one in the same element.  
It is relevant because it is offered for those purposes in view of 
[Appellant]'s apparent position on the matter. 

 
 

[¶17]     
On 
appeal, Appellant asserts that the prior conviction was not relevant because it 
involved a 13-year-old "presumably pre-pubescent" girl and this case involved a 
15-year-old post-pubescent girl.  
Appellant did not raise this issue at trial.  He offers no legal or factual support 
for his position.  We will not 
consider it further.

 
 

[¶18]     
Appellant 
also contends that the district court did not properly weigh the probative value 
of the evidence against the danger for unfair prejudice.  Additionally, he asserts that the 
district court failed to state its findings before determining that the evidence 
was admissible.  We disagree.  

 
 

[¶19]     
Prior 
to ruling on the admissibility of 404(b) evidence, the 
district court must determine if the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice.  In Gleason, ¶ 27, 57 P.3d  at 342, we set 
out the process to be followed:

 
 
In 
determining the probative value of prior bad acts evidence, the trial court 
should consider the following factors:

 
 

1.    
How 
clear is it that the defendant committed the prior bad 
act?

 
 

2.    
Does 
the defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering the prior bad 
acts evidence?

 
 

3.    
Is 
other evidence available?

 
 

4.    
Is 
the evidence unnecessarily cumulative?

 
 

5.    
How 
much time has elapsed between the charged crime and the prior bad 
act?

 
 
The 
district court then must balance the probative value of the uncharged misconduct 
with its potential for unfair prejudice.  

 
 
Evidence 
is unfairly prejudicial if it tempts the jury to decide the case on an improper 
basis.  In balancing against its 
probative value the unfair prejudice created by the evidence, the trial court 
should consider the extent to which the evidence distracts the jury from the 
central question whether the defendant committed the charged crime.  

 
 

Gleason, 
¶ 27, 57 P.3d  at 342.  To determine 
if the evidence is unfairly prejudicial the district court must weigh the 
following factors against the probative value of the evidence: 1) the 
reprehensible nature of the uncharged misconduct; 2) the sympathetic character 
of the alleged victim of the uncharged misconduct; 3) the similarity between the 
charged crime and the uncharged misconduct; 4) the comparative enormity of the 
charged crime and the uncharged misconduct; 5) the comparable relevance of the 
uncharged misconduct to the proper and forbidden inferences; and 6) whether the 
prior act resulted in a conviction.  Id., ¶ 27, 57 P.3d  at 342-43. 

 
 

[¶20]     
We 
have previously recognized that a district court "need not make an express 
finding on every factor."  Williams, ¶ 
13, 99 P.3d  at 442.  We only require that 
the record contain "sufficient findings to support the trial court's 
conclusions."  Id.  The district court performed the 
requisite analysis and determined that the evidence was admissible.  The court explained its 
decision:

 
 
As 
to probative value, apparently, there's no dispute as to the factual basis of 
the prior act. [Appellant] does dispute the issue for which the State is 
offering, that is, his statement this only - - from what he said on the record 
this morning, his position is that if there's any touching of this young lady's 
sexual areas, genital areas, it could well have been [an] unintentional mistake 
in the course of administering a massage.

 

The 
State has committed not to go into the exact nature of the prior conviction. I 
don't see what other evidence in that area would have been available.  It appears not to be unnecessarily 
cumulative. 

 
 
Another 
area that the defense raises I think properly is the time lapse from the date of 
the incident. It is fairly remote from the date of [Appellant]'s release from 
incarceration. It is not - - it seems to me that given the nature of this case 
in that light the lapse of time is not as important as it might be in another 
case. 

 
 
An 
adult's improper sexual contact with a child is not something that necessarily 
would - - or the desire to do so would not necessarily dissipate with the 
passage of time. I don't see how the passage of time would make it any less 
probative in these circumstances than it might otherwise be. 

 
 
As 
to the reprehensible nature, the fact that the prior act involved intercourse, 
that is one we're talking about now in the present one, does not - - would make 
it a more egregious offense, but the State apparently will not go into that part 
of it. We have no information at all as to the sympathetic character or 
otherwise of the victim in the prior act except that she was 13 years old. 

 
 
The 
similarity here, I would take issue with [Defense Counsel]. I think there's 
great similarity, which under this analysis, of course, would militate against 
its admissibility, the theory being the jury would be more tempted the more 
similar. There is considerable similarity; that is, improper sexual contact with 
comparatively quite a young child in isolation or behind closed doors; that is, 
in the bedroom where if one allegedly happen - - or the camping situation of the 
earlier one. 

 
 
There's 
no major disparity in the enormity of these two acts, so I believe that the 
prior conviction is admissible as to the fact of the child with a 13-year-old or 
14-year-old earlier. 

 
 

The 
record demonstrates that the district court conducted an appropriate analysis of 
the 404(b) evidence and establishes a legitimate basis for the court's 
ruling.  We find no abuse of 
discretion in the district court's decision admitting evidence of Appellant's 
prior conviction.

 
 
Jury 
Instruction

 
 

[¶21]     
In 
his final issue, Appellant contends that the district court provided an improper 
limiting instruction to the jury regarding the 404(b) evidence.  Appellant did not object to the limiting 
instruction so we review for plain error.  
Appellant 
provides no plain error analysis of the asserted error.  On this basis alone, we could decline to 
consider his argument.  Causey v. State, 2009 WY 111, ¶ 19, 215 P.3d 287, 293 (Wyo. 2009).  If we 
must supply that analysis, we proceed from the well-established precept that 
plain error will be found "only in exceptional circumstances."  Id.  Under the plain error standard of review, 
we reverse a trial court's decision only if it is so plainly erroneous that the 
judge should have noticed and corrected the mistake even though the parties 
failed to raise the issue.  
Accordingly, reversal is justified under the plain error standard of 
review "only in those rare circumstances where the rights lost by appellant were 
too blatant to assume the trial judge needed them brought to his attention." 
 Id.

 
 

[¶22]     
The 
district court provided an oral limiting instruction regarding the prior 
conviction immediately after the evidence was admitted.  The evidence and oral instruction were 
provided to the jury pursuant to a stipulation of the 
parties.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  [Prosecutor], you're ready 
to proceed?

 
 
[PROSECUTION]:  We are, Your Honor.  Pursuant to stipulation I think the 
Court has a limiting instruction and a brief statement for the 
jury.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Yes.  Ladies and gentlemen, the Court has 
allowed into evidence a prior conviction of [Appellant].  He has a prior conviction in Larimer 
County, Colorado, for sexual contact with a 13-year-old minor girl.  The order and judgment is from February 
of 2000 and stems from an incident occurring in 1997.  [Appellant] was approximately 42 years 
of age at the time of the commission of that offense, and he pleaded guilty in 
December of 1999.

 
 
While 
that evidence is before you, you must also be instructed as to its proper 
use.  Evidence of the character of 
an accused may not be allowed for the purpose of proving that he acted in a way 
consistent with that character or character trait in connection with the offense 
for which he's now on trial.  In 
other words, you can't take into evidence that since he did it, then he must 
have done it this time, but it's allowed for other 
purposes.

 
 
It 
is allowed for other purposes That is, conduct other than that alleged in this 
information is allowed for the purpose of showing motive, intent, plan, absence 
of mistake or accident on the part of the defendant.  The jury must carefully consider that 
evidence keeping in mind that evidence of this other alleged misconduct is 
allowed only for the purposes indicated here; that is, the intent, plan, motive, 
absence of accident or mistake, and not to show that since he did these things 
on that occasion he's a bad person of bad character, must have done the things 
that he is charged with in this case.

 
 
This 
instruction is read to you at this time because it's important that you have it 
at the same time you receive the evidence of the prior conviction.  This instruction will be included in the 
other instructions also.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, just for the 
record, the defense does maintain its objection to that evidence [for] 404(b) 
purposes, but does stipulate to the manner of the 
presentation.

 
 
[PROSECUTION]:  As State's Exhibit 1 we have a certified 
exemplified copy of that conviction for the court file, and with that the State 
would rest its case, Judge.  

 
 

(Emphasis 
added.)  The jury was also provided 
with Jury Instruction 7 that included verbatim portions of the oral 
instruction.  Defense 
counsel was specifically provided the opportunity to object to the instruction 
but advised the court that he had no objection:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  [Defense Counsel] for the 
defense, do you have any objection to the Court's proposed 
instructions?

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  No.  

 
 

[¶23]     
Appellant 
contends that the limiting instruction given by the district court allowed the 
jury to consider the prior conviction for improper purposes.  He 
asserts that the instruction was erroneous because the State did not seek to use 
the uncharged misconduct as evidence of "motive" or "plan."  We disagree.  Appellant has failed to establish that 
he was prejudiced by the instruction.

 
 

[¶24]     
The 
oral limiting instruction was given to the jury pursuant to a stipulation of the 
parties.  The record does not 
reflect how that stipulation came about or how the stipulation was brought to 
the attention of the judge.  We are 
unable to tell from the record why the words "plan" and "motive" were included 
in the instruction.  However, we 
have previously recognized that the State and the district court must identify 
the specific purpose of the 404(b) evidence.  Gleason, ¶¶ 26-27, 57 P.3d  at 342.  At the motion hearing, the State 
indicated that it was seeking admission of the evidence for purposes of 
establishing intent and lack of accident and mistake.  The instruction given goes beyond those 
stated purposes by adding "motive" and "plan" to the instruction.  Because the record does not establish 
clearly that the State sought introduction of the evidence for those purposes, 
we conclude that Appellant has satisfied the first and second prong of the plain 
error analysis.   

 
 

[¶25]     
Appellant, 
however, has failed to establish that he was prejudiced in any manner by 
inclusion of the words "motive" and "plan" in the limiting instruction.  He concedes that "motive" and "intent," 
while technically different, are sufficiently similar and related so that no 
harmful error occurred if the jury considered the prior conviction to prove 
motive.  Additionally, he has not 
demonstrated that inclusion of the word "plan" in the instruction impacted the 
verdict.  The State did not mention 
the word "plan" in closing argument.  
The State only briefly mentioned the prior conviction in its closing 
argument.  Defense counsel and the 
State both agreed in closing that the jury's decision should be based upon the 
credibility of the victim.  The jury 
found her testimony believable.  We 
find no plain error.

 
 

[¶26]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-316 (LexisNexis 2007) provides, in pertinent 
part:

(a) 
Except under circumstance constituting sexual abuse of a minor in the first or 
second degree . . . , an actor commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in 
the third degree if:

(i) 
Being seventeen (17) years of age or older, the actor engages in sexual contact 
with a victim who is thirteen (13) through fifteen (15) years of age, and the 
victim is at least four (4) years younger than the 
actor[.]

We 
recently interpreted the phrase "fifteen years of age" in Crain v. State, 2009 WY 128, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 934, 938-40 (Wyo. 2009), to include all of the months and days over the age 
of fifteen until a person reaches the sixteenth anniversary of his or her 
birth.  The victim in this case was 
15½ years old at the time of the incident. 

2There 
is no suggestion in the record that the State was responsible for the timing of 
the hearing and the State should be commended for its handling of the 404(b) 
evidence issue.  The State provided 
notice of its intent to introduce the 404(b) evidence months before trial and 
requested a hearing on the admissibility of the evidence on at least three 
occasions.  Compare Heywood, ¶ 17, 208 P.3d  at 75 
(Kite, J., specially concurring), where the State "faxed" notice of its intent 
to use 404(b) evidence on the Friday before a Monday trial and added another 
incident of uncharged misconduct to its list during the hearing. 

3Effective 
January 1, 2009, W.R.E. 404(b) now provides:

Other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts.Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.   It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon 
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide 
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence 
it intends to introduce at trial.

 
 

4Appellant 
does not claim that the district court erred in denying his 
request.