Case Title: State v. Noling

Citation: 2002-Ohio-7044

Docket Number: 19991524

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. NOLING, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 1999-1524 — Submitted September 17, 2002 — Decided December 20, 
2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, No. 96-P-126. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J. 
{¶1} 
Defendant-appellant, Tyrone Lee Noling, appeals from an 11th 
Appellate District judgment upholding his convictions of two counts of 
aggravated murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of 
aggravated burglary.  For the following reasons, we affirm Noling’s convictions 
and death sentence. 
I. Facts 
{¶2} 
On April 5, 1990, in the course of a burglary and robbery, 
defendant-appellant, Tyrone Noling, shot and killed Bearnhardt and Cora Hartig 
in Portage County, Ohio.  After a 1992 dismissal of charges against Noling, a 
grand jury reindicted him in August 1995 for the Hartig murders.  The state 
proved the offenses charged through the testimony of police officers and others, 
including accomplices Butch Wolcott and Joseph Dalesandro. 
{¶3} 
The testimony adduced at trial revealed that in early April 1990, 
Noling, Gary St. Clair, Dalesandro, and Wolcott stayed at the house of a teenage 
friend, Johnny Trandifer, in Alliance, Ohio.  To obtain money, the group “went 
car shopping   * * * opened up car doors that were unlocked and stole the change 
* * * radios, phones, whatever.” 
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{¶4} 
Noling then suggested “the idea that old people were getting their 
* * * Social Security checks early in the month and * * * would be the best target 
to rob.”  Noling planned to gain entry into the homes by knocking on the door and 
pretending to need to use their telephone to call about his disabled car.  At that 
point, the group was armed with a shotgun and a BB gun. 
{¶5} 
Noling and St. Clair implemented just such a plan in robbing a Mr. 
and Mrs. Hughes in their Alliance home, approximately a quarter of a mile from 
Trandifer’s house.  Noling told Wolcott that he had knocked on the door, asked to 
use the phone because his car was broken down, and when he and St. Clair got in, 
they held the Hugheses up.  According to St. Clair, Noling got inside, “kicked the 
door shut, pulled the sawed off shotgun out,” and told Mr. Hughes, “Don’t move.”  
They used a pillowcase to carry away a VCR, jewelry, and a .25 caliber pistol. 
{¶6} 
Around noon the next day, Noling used this stolen .25 caliber 
pistol to rob the Murphy family in Alliance.  Noling acted alone and said that he 
had had to fire the weapon while inside the house.  Noling stole a VCR, rings, and 
money from the Murphy residence. 
{¶7} 
Around 3:30 to 4:00 p.m. that same day, Dalesandro drove Noling, 
St. Clair, and Wolcott from Alliance into Portage County.  They stopped at the 
Hartigs’ ranch home in Atwater Township.  The Hartigs were both 81 years old.  
When Dalesandro stopped and Noling and St. Clair got out, Bearnhardt Hartig 
was mowing the grass. 
{¶8} 
Noling knocked on the front door, and when Cora Hartig 
answered, Noling “pushed his way in” and St. Clair followed him.  St. Clair had 
the shotgun, and Noling had a .25 caliber semiautomatic, with one clip in the gun 
and another clip in his pocket. 
{¶9} 
After dropping Noling and St. Clair off, Dalesandro and Wolcott 
drove around for a while, returned, and parked in the Hartigs’ driveway.  About 
20 to 30 minutes after Noling and St. Clair had entered the Hartigs’ home, 
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3 
Wolcott “heard some gunshots, * * * heard a lady scream and then * * * a couple 
of more gunshots * * * and then a few seconds later [Noling and St. Clair] came 
running out” and got in the car. 
{¶10} Noling looked “flabbergasted,” and things were hysterical.  He told 
Dalesandro, who was driving, to “[g]et out of here * * * I just killed two old 
people.”  Noling said that “he had to do it, just didn’t have a choice” because “the 
old man wouldn’t stop, that he kept coming at him.”  Noling also claimed that the 
lady “could tell the police who they were.”  Noling put the .25 caliber pistol in the 
glove compartment, and Dalesandro drove back to Alliance. 
{¶11} Once back, Noling was concerned about getting rid of his blood-
stained clothes.  Noling also told Dalesandro that if Dalesandro said anything 
about what had occurred, Noling would kill him.  That night, Noling also put a 
gun to Wolcott’s head and said that “if [Wolcott] talked he would blow [his] head 
off.” 
{¶12} On April 7, 1990, James Davis, the son of neighbors of the Hartigs, 
noticed that the Hartigs’ garage door was open and that the lawn tractor had been 
sitting in the yard for two days.  He checked on the Hartigs and found them lying 
on their kitchen floor.  Davis called the police. 
{¶13} The police found the bodies fully clothed in the kitchen and 
noticed a strong smell, apparently from decaying flesh.  Detectives found ten 
Winchester .25 caliber shell casings near the bodies, and recovered eight .25 
caliber bullets from the crime scene and autopsies.  Nancy Bulger, a firearms 
expert, concluded that a single .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol had ejected all of 
the shells found and that a single weapon had fired all eight bullets recovered.  
Bulger testified that the ammunition clip for most .25 caliber semiautomatics 
carries six or seven rounds, but extended magazines for .25 caliber firearms, 
although not common, do exist. 
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{¶14} In the Hartigs’ master bedroom, detectives found open dresser 
drawers as well as seven empty ring boxes.  In the living room, police found a 
metal box with a lock and key. 
{¶15} Dr. Elizabeth Balraj, the Cuyahoga County Coroner, supervised 
and observed the autopsies.  She testified that Cora Hartig had been shot five 
times and had died “as a result of * * * gunshot wounds to her chest with internal 
injuries.”  Bearnhardt Hartig, shot three times, died from “gunshot wounds to 
[his] right chest with multiple visceral injuries.”  Dr. Balraj found no evidence of 
stippling or gunpowder residue; therefore, Dr. Balraj concluded, the shots had 
been fired from a distance greater than one and one half to three feet. 
{¶16} On the day that police discovered the Hartigs’ bodies, Noling and 
his cohorts had a party at Trandifer’s house.  At the party, Noling was acting 
drunk and bragging about the Alliance robberies, but not about the Atwater 
Township murders.  After a police cruiser drove by, Noling grabbed Wolcott, 
started screaming, and said that “he was going to kill him, he better not have 
told.”  Noling also asked Robyn Elliot if she “had heard anything on the police 
scanner about two old people getting shot in Atwater.”  When she said no, Noling 
was “just laughing and acting like a big shot.”  In fact, the first television news 
reports about the Hartig murders did not air until the evening of the next day. 
{¶17} Two days after the discovery of the Hartigs’ bodies, Alliance 
police arrested Noling and his accomplices in connection with the Alliance 
robberies.  While in police custody with Noling, St. Clair asked Alliance police 
officers the identity of two out-of-town detectives who wanted to interview them.  
After being told their names, St. Clair asked, “Is it about the two old people who 
were killed in Atwater?”  Noling immediately told St. Clair, “Keep your mouth 
shut about that, don’t say another word, keep quiet.” 
{¶18} Noling admitted his involvement in the Hartig murders to two 
fellow jail inmates.  He told inmate Paul Garner that he “didn’t mean to do it.  
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Just happened.  The lady said:  I know who you are.”  St. Clair had “said his 
name, and so they had to kill both of them.”  Noling also described the murders to 
jail inmate Ronnie Gantz.  Noling told Gantz that St. Clair was the shooter, but 
then subsequently recanted, claiming instead that he was the shooter because St. 
Clair “was too weak to shoot anyone.”  Noling told Gantz that he shot Bearnhardt 
with a .25 caliber automatic because “the man tried to be a hero.”  St. Clair denied 
any involvement in the murders to Gantz. 
{¶19} Noling told Corrections Officer Lawrence Kouri that St. Clair was 
“trying to frame” Noling for the Hartigs’ murder.  On May 4, 1990, Noling also 
told Portage County Sheriff Duane Kaley that Wolcott and St. Clair had 
committed the murders, but Noling “knew where the firearm involved” was and 
knew about a bloody shirt and stolen stereo.  Noling talked about two 
semiautomatic .25 caliber weapons.  Based on the information from Noling and 
from a man named Chico, police recovered the .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol 
that Noling had fired during the Murphy robbery.  Police never recovered the 
weapon used to kill the Hartigs. 
{¶20} Noling later told Anthony Travise, a fellow inmate, how St. Clair, 
Dalesandro, Wolcott, and Noling had robbed several people.  Noling admitted that 
he was a suspect in the Hartig murders, but never admitted to Travise that he was 
responsible for their deaths.  Noling also told Travise that if he ever testified 
against Noling, “he would get [him] one way or another.” 
{¶21} At trial, St. Clair described a somewhat different version of events.  
St. Clair testified that the group had stolen items from unlocked cars and that 
Noling had suggested robbing elderly people in their homes by asking to use a 
telephone.  St. Clair also described how he and Noling had robbed the Hughes 
family and what he knew about Noling’s robbery of the Murphy family. 
{¶22} St. Clair admitted that he had pled guilty to aggravated robbery and 
aggravated murder in connection with the Hartig murders, and that he had 
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received a sentence of 20 years to life.  St. Clair denied, however, that Noling or 
he had been in Atwater Township on April 5, 1990, and steadfastly claimed that 
they had no part in the Hartig murders. 
{¶23} The grand jury indicted Noling on two counts of aggravated felony 
murder; Count One charged the murder of Bearnhardt Hartig, and Count Two 
charged the murder of Cora Hartig.  Death specifications in each count charged 
murder in the course of “Aggravated Robbery and/or Aggravated Burglary (spec. 
1),” R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), and murder to escape “detection or apprehension or trial 
or punishment” for another offense (spec. 2), R.C. 2929.04(A)(3).  Counts Three 
and Four both charged aggravated robbery, and Count Five charged aggravated 
burglary.  All five counts included gun specifications.  The trial jury found Noling 
guilty as charged.  Noling was separately convicted and sentenced for the Murphy 
and Hughes robberies. 
{¶24} Following a penalty hearing, the jury recommended that Noling be 
sentenced to death on Counts One and Two.  The trial court sentenced Noling to 
death on both counts and to consecutive prison terms for Counts Three, Four, and 
Five and for the firearms specifications.  The 11th District Court of Appeals 
affirmed the convictions and death sentence. 
{¶25} The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
II. Summarily Rejected Propositions of Law 
{¶26} Noling presents 21 propositions of law for our consideration.  This 
court is not required under R.C. 2929.05, however, to address and discuss in 
opinion form each proposition of law an appellant raises in a capital case.  State v. 
Tibbetts (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 149, 749 N.E.2d 226; State v. Treesh (2001), 
90 Ohio St.3d 460, 463, 739 N.E.2d 749. Accordingly, we summarily overrule 
Noling’s twentieth proposition of law, which challenges the court’s reasonable-
doubt instruction and the statutory definition from R.C. 2901.05 because his 
complaint lacks merit.  See State v. Jones (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 403, 417, 739 
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N.E.2d 300; State v. Van Gundy (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 230, 232, 594 N.E.2d 604; 
State v. Nabozny (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 195, 8 O.O.3d 181, 375 N.E.2d 784, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  Further, the use of the term “firmly convinced of 
the truth of the charge” in the penalty phase was harmless.  State v. Mitts (1998), 
81 Ohio St.3d 223, 233, 690 N.E.2d 522; State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 
15, 29, 676 N.E.2d 82. 
{¶27} We also summarily reject Noling’s twenty-first proposition of law 
challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s death penalty statute.  See State v. 
Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 606-608, 734 N.E.2d 345; State v. Clemons 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 438, 454, 696 N.E.2d 1009; State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 
Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus.  Noling failed to raise his international 
law challenge at the trial court or before the court of appeals and thereby waived 
the claim.  State v. Coley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 271, 754 N.E.2d 1129; State 
v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 22 OBR 199, 489 N.E.2d 277, syllabus.  That 
international law challenge also lacks merit.  State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 
487, 502, 709 N.E.2d 484; State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 103-104, 
656 N.E.2d 643. 
III. Evidentiary Issues 
A. Limits on Cross-examination 
{¶28} In his first proposition of law, Noling argues that the trial court 
improperly precluded him “from cross-examining a witness about a strong motive 
to fabricate testimony” and thereby deprived Noling “of his confrontation and due 
process rights.”  Noling has forfeited this issue, however, by not raising it before 
the court of appeals.  State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 
364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶29} We also find no merit in Noling’s arguments.  Noling claims that 
the trial court unfairly limited his cross-examination of Joseph Dalesandro about 
statements by an assistant prosecutor in July 1992.  At Dalesandro’s sentencing 
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hearing in July 1992, an assistant prosecutor repudiated Dalesandro’s plea bargain 
agreement due to his lack of cooperation and truthfulness.  At trial, Noling wanted 
to cross-examine Dalesandro to elicit that assistant prosecutor’s 1992 opinion 
about Dalesandro’s cooperation and truthfulness in the investigation.  The trial 
court refused to allow the proposed cross-examination because the prosecutor’s 
“opinion whether [Dalesandro] is telling the truth * * * is [an issue] for the jury to 
determine.” 
{¶30} In our view, the trial court correctly excluded evidence about the 
assistant prosecutor’s 1992 opinion as to Dalesandro’s credibility.  As this court 
has commented before, “the trier of fact * * * is burdened with assessing the 
credibility and veracity of witnesses.”  State v. Moreland (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 
58, 62, 552 N.E.2d 894.  See, also, State v. Boston (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 108, 
128-129, 545 N.E.2d 1220 (“an expert may not testify as to the expert’s opinion 
of the veracity of the statements of a child declarant”).  Further, the prosecutor’s 
subjective beliefs were irrelevant, and his out-of-court statements about 
Dalesandro’s veracity would have constituted hearsay.  See Evid.R. 802. 
{¶31} Moreover, Noling extensively cross-examined Dalesandro about 
his motives and the underlying plea agreement.  The slight limitation on cross-
examination to exclude the prosecutor’s opinion on Dalesandro’s credibility 
therefore could not have constituted an abuse of discretion or prejudiced Noling.  
See Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986), 475 U.S. 673, 682, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 
L.Ed.2d 674 (violation of confrontation rights is subject to harmless-error 
analysis).  Accordingly, we overrule Noling’s first proposition of law. 
B. State Treatment of Hostile Witness 
{¶32} In his second proposition of law, Noling argues that the trial court 
erred both in declaring St. Clair a hostile witness and in not restricting the state’s 
cross-examination and impeachment of its own witness.  We reject Noling’s 
contentions that these acts constitute reversible error. 
January Term, 2002 
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{¶33} At trial, St. Clair testified as a prosecution witness about Noling’s 
involvement in the Hughes and Murphy robberies.  St. Clair also confirmed that 
he had pled guilty to aggravated murder and aggravated robbery and received a 
sentence of 20 years to life in connection with the Hartig murders.  St. Clair 
denied, however, that either he or Noling went to Portage County on April 5 or 
that they were involved in the Hartig murders. 
{¶34} After St. Clair’s denial, the state asked the court “to declare the 
witness a hostile witness.”  The court responded, “I suspect you laid the 
groundwork for that.”  The state then asked St. Clair additional leading questions 
about his guilty plea and sentence relating to the Hartig murders. 
{¶35} Over continuing defense objection, the state questioned St. Clair 
about details in his pretrial confession admitting that he and Noling had robbed 
the Hartigs and that Noling had shot them.  St. Clair admitted making the 
statement, but continued to deny involvement in the Hartig murders.  As Noling 
points out, the state asked no “less than sixty-seven (67) questions regarding St. 
Clair’s prior statement, literally reading questions and answers [from the 
statement].”  Thus, the state placed the substance of St. Clair’s confession that 
implicated Noling before the jury. 
{¶36} The state then began to question St. Clair by quoting from a 
narrative of another police interview of St. Clair.  The court asked the prosecutor, 
“Are you suggesting that the jury should accept as true the statements that you are 
now cross examining on, is that what you’re trying to do?”  The prosecutor 
responded, “yes.”  Then the court declared it would “sustain an objection from 
now on.  You have impeached your witness and you established he * * * didn’t 
tell the truth.” 
{¶37} Evid.R. 607(A) allows a party calling a witness to attack the 
witness’s credibility “by means of a prior inconsistent statement only upon a 
showing of surprise and affirmative damage.”  Noling concedes that the state 
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proved the latter requirement of affirmative damage.  But he argues that because 
the state failed to demonstrate the former requirement—that it was surprised by 
St. Clair’s denial of Noling’s guilt—the use of the prior inconsistent statements 
was improper.  Noling further argues that the trial court failed to control the 
state’s cross-examination of St. Clair when the state repeatedly quoted St. Clair’s 
pretrial confession that implicated Noling.  In response, the state contends that 
Noling waived, or forfeited, this complaint by not raising it at the court of 
appeals.  Because Noling did complain at the court of appeals about the court’s 
declaration of St. Clair as a hostile witness, we conclude that he properly 
preserved the issue. 
{¶38} We hold that the prosecutor’s improper cross-examination of St. 
Clair does not require reversal of the jury’s verdict of guilt.  We reach this result 
for several reasons. 
{¶39} First, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that “[i]f 
statements in a transcript or written or typed statements differed from the 
testimony given by the same witness in the courtroom, you may consider them to 
test the credibility or believability of such witness, and for no other purpose.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Noling neither objected to this instruction nor asked for 
additional instructions, and we presume that jurors follow the court’s instructions.  
See, e.g., State v. Williams (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 159, 652 N.E.2d 721.  
Thus, we presume that the jury considered the substance of the inconsistent 
statement only as it reflected upon St. Clair’s credibility. 
{¶40} Second, we cannot say that the prosecutor’s improper tactics 
actually prejudiced Noling in light of the other abundant evidence establishing 
Noling’s guilt.  Noling admitted to Wolcott, Dalesandro, and others that he had 
personally shot and killed the Hartigs.  Wolcott and Dalesandro also directly 
placed Noling inside the Hartigs’ home with a .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol, 
the type of weapon used to kill the Hartigs.  Moreover, St. Clair’s total disclaimer 
January Term, 2002 
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of guilt, on behalf of Noling and himself, lacked any credibility because St. Clair 
had pled guilty to the murder of the Hartigs. 
{¶41} We therefore find no error warranting reversal in relation to 
Noling’s second proposition of law. 
C. “Other Acts” Evidence 
{¶42} In his third proposition of law, Noling argues that the trial court 
erred in admitting, over objection, “other acts” criminal-propensity evidence that 
prejudiced him.  Noling challenges the admission of evidence that he robbed the 
Hughes and Murphy families, stole from unlocked cars, and thought about 
robbing a Dairy Mart.  His arguments regarding this evidence are without merit. 
{¶43} The admission of evidence lies within the broad discretion of a 
trial court, and a reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary decisions in the 
absence of an abuse of discretion that has created material prejudice. State v. Issa 
(2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 752 N.E.2d 904. We must therefore confine our 
inquiry to determining whether the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or 
unconscionably in deciding the evidentiary issues about which Noling complains. 
See State v. Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 23, 759 N.E.2d 1240. 
{¶44} Under Evid.R. 404(B), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is not admissible to prove” a defendant’s character as to criminal propensity.  “It 
may, however, be admissible * * * [to show] motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”  This 
court has declared that “the standard for determining admissibility of such 
evidence is strict.”  State v. Broom (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 533 N.E.2d 682, 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶45} We have also recognized, however, that “[o]ther acts forming a 
unique, identifiable plan of criminal activity are admissible to establish identity 
under Evid.R. 404(B).”  State v. Jamison (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 552 N.E.2d 
180, syllabus.  In order “[t]o be admissible to prove identity through a certain 
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modus operandi, other-acts evidence must be related to and share common 
features with the crime in question.”  State v. Lowe (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 527, 
634 N.E.2d 616, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶46} There were some differences in the offenses against the Hughes 
and Murphy families as contrasted with the offenses against the Hartigs.  But this 
court has held that “[a]dmissibility is not adversely affected simply because the 
other [crimes] differed in some details.”  Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d at 187, 552 
N.E.2d 180.  Accord State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 366, 662 
N.E.2d 311. 
{¶47} In this case, Noling’s robbery of the Hughes and Murphy families 
helped to establish Noling’s identity as a participant in the aggravated robbery and 
aggravated murder of the Hartigs.  That evidence also showed Noling’s “intent, 
preparation, [and] plan” in accordance with Evid.R. 404(B).  Noling had devised a 
scheme of securing entry and robbing elderly persons in their homes by asking to 
use their telephone on the pretense that his car had broken down.  In each 
instance, Noling was armed with a firearm.  Each robbery occurred near the 
beginning of the month when Noling thought that the families would have cashed 
their Social Security checks.  And in each instance, Noling targeted elderly 
persons in their homes because he thought that they would be more vulnerable. 
{¶48} Moreover, we note that the trial court instructed the jury that the 
evidence was “received for a very limited purpose.  * * *  [Y]ou may not consider 
it to prove the character of the defendant in order to show the act in conformity or 
in accordance with the character.”  The court then instructed the jury as to the 
limited purposes for which the jury could consider such evidence.  In fact, the 
court repeated an “other acts” instruction at key points throughout the trial.  In 
light of the instructions given and the probative value of the evidence of the 
Murphy and Hughes robberies, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing this “other acts” evidence. 
January Term, 2002 
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{¶49} The court may have abused its discretion by admitting evidence 
that Noling stole from unlocked cars or contemplated robbing a Dairy Mart.  
Those offenses were not “similar acts” and did not show identity or a common 
scheme or plan.  No prejudicial error exists, however, because the impact of that 
evidence was minimal given the other-acts instruction and the abundant, 
compelling evidence of Noling’s guilt. 
{¶50} Finally, Noling complains that “other acts” evidence also affected 
the penalty phase.  As discussed, the trial court properly admitted the evidence of 
the Murphy and Hughes robberies at trial.  Moreover, this court has recognized 
that a defendant’s prior crimes are directly relevant to his “history, character, and 
background,” R.C. 2929.04(B), which a sentencing jury must consider.  State v. 
Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 428-429, 588 N.E.2d 819.  Accord State v. 
Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 35, 544 N.E.2d 895.  We thus overrule Noling’s 
third proposition of law. 
D. Manifest Weight of the Evidence 
{¶51} Noling argues in his fourth proposition of law that his conviction 
“is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”  However, Noling failed to argue 
that issue before the court of appeals, which was the appropriate forum.  When 
this court reviews a criminal case, including a capital case on appeal from the 
court of appeals, this court weighs “evidence only to determine whether it is of 
sufficient probative force to support a finding of guilt.”  State v. Tyler (1990), 50 
Ohio St.3d 24, 33, 553 N.E.2d 576, citing State v. Nicely (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 
147, 155, 529 N.E.2d 1236. 
{¶52} In this case, we find that substantial evidence supports Noling’s 
conviction for the aggravated burglary, robbery, and murder of the Hartigs.  
Wolcott and Dalesandro saw Noling, who alone was armed with a .25 caliber 
semiautomatic, forcibly enter the Hartig home with St. Clair, and knew that they 
planned to rob the Hartigs.  Wolcott heard shots, and both Wolcott and 
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Dalesandro saw Noling and St. Clair then run from the Hartig home.  Noling told 
both Wolcott and Dalesandro that he had shot the Hartigs and warned them not to 
tell the police.  Noling also told St. Clair in front of the police to keep his mouth 
shut about the Atwater Township murders.  Additionally, Noling admitted to 
fellow inmates Garner and Gantz that he shot the Hartigs and admitted to inmate 
Travise that he had robbed the Hartigs.  Noling additionally admitted to police 
that he knew about the crime, although he tried to blame St. Clair.  Finally, other 
evidence established that Noling had devised the plan to rob elderly individuals in 
their homes and that he had robbed two other couples within a day of shooting the 
Hartigs. 
{¶53} To support his arguments challenging the evidence, Noling points 
to alleged credibility issues concerning Garner, Gantz, Wolcott, and Dalesandro, 
the lack of forensic evidence, the fact that the police never recovered the murder 
weapon, and St. Clair’s avowal of innocence.  Essentially, Noling is rearguing the 
evidence that he believes supported his defense.  But the jury considered and 
rejected each of these arguments when it found him guilty. 
{¶54} The jury has the primary responsibility to weigh the evidence and 
assess the credibility of the witnesses.  See State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 
230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus.  We 
therefore reject this proposition of law as lacking merit. 
E. Victim-impact Evidence 
{¶55} In his sixth proposition of law, Noling argues that the trial court 
wrongfully admitted victim-impact evidence during the trial phase.  Noling refers 
specifically to the testimony of James Davis, who discovered the Hartigs’ bodies.  
Davis testified over defense objection that the Hartigs liked to play cards, talk to 
people, and work around the yard.  Noling also challenges the testimony of 
Bonnie Treesh (also spelled Treash in record), the Hartigs’ niece who spent 
summers with the Hartigs and identified their photograph. 
January Term, 2002 
15 
{¶56} No reversible error exists.  We note that the trial court sustained 
objections to details about the personal lives of the Hartigs.  The testimony 
targeted by overruled objections was admissible.  Davis explained why he went to 
check on the Hartigs.  Because the Hartigs were gregarious and meticulous, the 
fact that their lawn mower had been left out and that their garage door had been 
left open were notable to Davis.  Cf. State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 
633, 653 N.E.2d 675.  Moreover, Davis’s testimony helped to prove the time of 
death.  And Treesh’s testimony simply established that the Hartigs had been 
living persons, an element of the aggravated murder charge. 
{¶57} The foregoing testimony was thus related to the crimes and was 
not simply inflammatory as Noling claims.  As this court noted regarding similar 
evidence in State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 420, 613 N.E.2d 212, 
“this evidence illustrated the nature and circumstances of the crimes.  * * * The 
victims cannot be separated from the crime.”  See, also, State v. Fautenberry 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 435, 440, 650 N.E.2d 878; State v. Combs (1991), 62 Ohio 
St.3d 278, 283, 581 N.E.2d 1071.  Consequently, we overrule the sixth 
proposition of law. 
IV. Indictment and Form of Charges 
A. Missing Element in Indictment 
{¶58} Noling argues in his seventh proposition of law that the felony-
murder death specifications in the indictments were fatally deficient in not 
alleging that Noling “was the principal offender in the commission of the 
aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the aggravated 
murder with prior calculation and design,” as R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) requires.  An 
accused must be the principal offender or act with prior calculation and design to 
be guilty of an (A)(7) death specification.  See State v. Taylor (1993), 66 Ohio 
St.3d 295, 612 N.E.2d 316, syllabus. 
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{¶59} As Noling notes, the indictment refers to R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) but 
simply alleges in Counts One and Two that Noling committed the respective 
murders while “committing Aggravated Robbery and/or Aggravated Burglary.  
Such act being a Specification of Felony Murder.”  At the close of the state’s 
case, Noling noted the deficiency and moved under Crim.R. 29 to dismiss the 
(A)(7) specifications.  The state never moved to amend the indictment, and the 
trial court rejected the motion to dismiss.  The trial court, however, instructed the 
jury that it must determine whether Noling was the principal offender, and the 
jury verdicts specifically found that Noling was the principal offender in each 
murder. 
{¶60} We recognize that every defendant has a due process right to 
notice of the specific charge.  Cole v. Arkansas (1948), 333 U.S. 196, 201, 68 
S.Ct. 514, 92 L.Ed. 644.  Here, the state never amended the indictment to more 
properly allege a death-penalty specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  Compare 
Dunn v. United States (1979), 442 U.S. 100, 99 S.Ct. 2190, 60 L.Ed.2d 743; 
Stirone v. United States (1960), 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252; State 
v. Dilley (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 20, 546 N.E.2d 937. 
{¶61} Noling, however, never complained about the language missing 
from the specifications until the state rested.  Under Crim.R. 12(B), now (C), 
“[d]efenses and objections based on defects” in the indictment must be raised 
before trial.  As then specified in Crim.R. 12(G), now (H), “[f]ailure by the 
defendant to raise defenses or objections” within the time required “shall 
constitute waiver thereof,” although the court may grant relief from such waiver.  
Accord Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364; State v. 
Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 158, 661 N.E.2d 1030; State v. Mills (1992), 
62 Ohio St.3d 357, 362, 582 N.E.2d 972. 
{¶62} We therefore consider whether plain error exists.  “Under Crim.R. 
52(B), ‘[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed 
January Term, 2002 
17 
although they were not brought to the attention of the court.’  We have previously 
explained that this rule ‘places three limitations on a reviewing court’s decision to 
correct an error despite the absence of a timely objection at trial’: (1) ‘there must 
be an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule,’ (2) ‘the error must be plain,’ which 
means that it ‘must be an “obvious” defect in the trial proceedings,’ and (3) ‘the 
error must have affected “substantial rights,” ‘ which means that ‘the trial court’s 
error must have affected the outcome of the trial.’ Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27, 
759 N.E.2d 1240. Further, the decision to correct a plain error is discretionary and 
should be made ‘ “with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and 
only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ‘  Id., quoting State v. Long 
(1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph three of the 
syllabus.”  State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, 
at ¶ 45 (plurality opinion). 
{¶63} We find no plain error because one could not reasonably conclude 
that but for the missing language the trial result would have been otherwise.  And 
because Noling does not argue that the form of the indictment constitutes “a 
special category of forfeited erro[r] that can be corrected regardless of [its] effect 
on the outcome” of his trial, we need not and do not address that issue.  See id. at 
fn. 2.  The form of the indictment has caused no “miscarriage of justice.”  The 
indictment charged only Noling, and the state’s evidence proved that Noling was 
the actual shooter, hence the principal offender.  Moreover, the indictment 
afforded Noling adequate notice of the death penalty because both specifications 
specifically mentioned R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  See State v. Joseph (1995), 73 Ohio 
St.3d 450, 456, 653 N.E.2d 285 (specification is sufficient if defendant knows 
which subsection has been alleged).  Similarly, in State v. Biros (1997), 78 Ohio 
St.3d 426, 436, 678 N.E.2d 891, this court also found the defect waived when the 
accused failed to complain that the indictment did not include the “principal 
offender” language.  Accord Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d at 597, 734 N.E.2d 345 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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(missing element of offense in rape-murder not fatal in view of failure to object).  
Cf. State v. Bonnell (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 179, 184, 573 N.E.2d 1082 (no plain 
error although no instructions or jury finding as to “principal offender” status). 
{¶64} In the present case, unlike Bonnell and Biros, the trial court 
specifically instructed the jury that it must find whether Noling was the principal 
offender, and the jury specifically so found.  Thus, this case differs from the issue 
the federal court recently decided in Esparza v. Mitchell (C.A.6, 2002), 310 F.3d 
414.  In Esparza, the trial judge never instructed the jury to determine whether the 
accused was the principal offender and the jury’s verdict failed to find specifically 
that the defendant was the principal offender. 
{¶65} We reject the seventh proposition of law. 
B. Ambiguous Indictment 
{¶66} In his eighth proposition of law, Noling argues that the indictment 
and the jury’s verdict were deceptive, thereby violating his right to a unanimous 
jury verdict.  In the indictment, both Counts One and Two, and specification 1 in 
both counts, referred to Noling committing the murders in the course of 
“Aggravated Robbery and/or Aggravated Burglary.”  Noling argues that this 
manner of charging “deprived him of his right to a unanimous jury verdict” 
because some jurors might have convicted him of these specifications on the basis 
of aggravated robbery and others on the basis of aggravated burglary. 
{¶67} The form of the charge and the specifications, combining 
“aggravated robbery and/or aggravated burglary,” was unnecessary and perilous.  
Using “and/or” can create ambiguity.  See Garner, Dictionary of Modern Legal 
Usage (2d Ed.1995) 56.  Noling, however, failed to raise this issue at trial or 
before the court of appeals and thus waived the issue save for plain error.  See 
Crim.R. 12(B); 12(G) (now [H]).  Accord Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 
98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus; Brooks, 75 Ohio 
St.3d at 158, 661 N.E.2d 1030. 
January Term, 2002 
19 
{¶68} We find no plain error.  This court previously rejected a similar 
plain-error claim based on the use of a charge of “burglary and/or robbery” in a 
single aggravating circumstance.  State v. Keene (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 664, 
693 N.E.2d 246.  The Keene court ruled that “the outcome would not clearly have 
been otherwise had the indictment been worded differently” because the jury 
there, as in this case, had separately convicted the defendant of aggravated 
burglary and aggravated robbery.  Id.  Accord State v. Berry (1995), 72 Ohio 
St.3d 354, 358, 369, 650 N.E.2d 433.  Thus, jurors did not convict Noling of these 
charges or specifications on alternative theories because the same jury separately 
convicted Noling of both aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary.  See, also, 
State v. Spivey (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 405, 420, 692 N.E.2d 151, fn. 2.  Noling has 
thus failed to satisfy at least the third prong of our plain-error inquiry—that 
prejudicial error exists.  His eighth proposition of law is without merit. 
C. Guilt-phase Instructions 
{¶69} Noling argues in his ninth proposition of law that the trial court’s 
instructions on mens rea improperly reduced the state’s burden of proof.  But 
Noling failed to object at trial, submit alternative instructions, or raise these issues 
before the court of appeals.  He thereby forfeited his complaints absent plain 
error.  See Crim.R. 30(A) and 52(B); State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 
3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus; Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 
98, 364 N.E.2d 1364. 
{¶70} No plain error exists for two primary reasons.  First, Noling 
complains about jury instructions incorporating the following language:   
{¶71} “When the central idea of the offense is a prohibition against 
conduct of a certain nature, a person acts purposely when it is his specific 
intention to engage in conduct of that nature regardless of what he may have 
intended to accomplish by his conduct.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶72} The jurors could not reasonably have been confused by this 
disputed instructional language.  The trial court’s instructions emphasized that 
Noling must have specifically intended to cause the death of another to be guilty 
of murder.  Moreover, Noling’s decision to repeatedly shoot Bearnhardt and Cora 
Hartig left no question as to his intentions.  Finally, this court has previously 
rejected similar arguments in other murder cases.  See, e.g., State v. Wilson 
(1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 381, 392, 659 N.E.2d 292; Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 
545, 552, 651 N.E.2d 965. 
{¶73} Second, Noling argues that the causation instructions included 
inappropriate language for murder cases, as follows:   
{¶74} “The defendant’s responsibility is not limited to the immediate or 
most obvious result of the defendant’s act or failure to act.  The defendant is also 
responsible for the natural, foreseeable consequences or results that follow, in the 
ordinary course of events, from the act or failure to act.” 
{¶75} This court has held that such foreseeability language, while 
inappropriate in murder cases, does not create plain error.  See, e.g., State v. 
Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 196, 702 N.E.2d 866; Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 
100, 656 N.E.2d 643; State v. Frazier (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 330, 652 N.E.2d 
1000. 
{¶76} We thus overrule the ninth proposition of law. 
V. Penalty-phase Issues 
A. Sentence Appropriateness 
{¶77} In his fifth proposition of law, Noling first argues that the state 
failed to prove the charged aggravating circumstances.  For the reasons previously 
discussed, however, the state proved Noling’s identity as the killer of the Hartigs.  
The state also proved that Noling purposefully killed the Hartigs while 
committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  Noling unlawfully entered the Hartig home by force or 
January Term, 2002 
21 
deception, and his motive was robbery.  Additionally, the state proved the (A)(3) 
specification (murder to escape detection or apprehension). 
{¶78} Noling also asks that we give mitigating weight to residual doubt.  
This court has previously rejected residual doubt as a mitigating factor.  State v. 
McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, syllabus.  Moreover, we 
have no doubt that Noling was the actual killer given the abundant evidence 
against him, such as his own admission to several people that he shot the Hartigs. 
{¶79} Noling next argues that in view of his age, history, and 
background, the death penalty is not appropriate.  We will consider these claims 
in connection with our independent sentence evaluation in Part XI, infra. 
B. Duplicative Aggravating Circumstances 
{¶80} Noling argues in his tenth proposition of law that the trial court 
erred in not merging the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) death specifications with the (A)(7) 
specifications.  On appeal, the court of appeals determined that the trial court 
should have merged these specifications relating to Bearnhardt Hartig, but upheld 
the trial court’s decision not to merge the (A)(3) and (A)(7) specifications as to 
Cora Hartig. 
{¶81} This court has stated that “where two or more aggravating 
circumstances arise from the same act or indivisible course of conduct and are 
thus duplicative, the duplicative aggravating circumstances will be merged for 
purposes of sentencing.”  State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 
311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph five of the syllabus.  At times, we have merged 
(A)(3) and (A)(7) specifications.  See, e.g., State v. Wiles (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 
71, 84, 571 N.E.2d 97; Cooey, 46 Ohio St.3d at 39, 544 N.E.2d 895; Jenkins, 15 
Ohio St.3d at 197, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264.  In some situations, however, 
we have found that R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) and (A)(7) specifications can properly be 
viewed as separate and need not be merged.  See, e.g., State v. Sheppard (1998), 
84 Ohio St.3d 230, 232, 242, 703 N.E.2d 286; State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
St.3d 543, 574, 687 N.E.2d 685; Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d at 367, 662 N.E.2d 
311. 
{¶82} In this case, we conclude that the court of appeals correctly upheld 
the trial court’s decision not to merge the (A)(3) and (A)(7) specifications as to 
Cora Hartig.  The facts show a separate motivation and decision to shoot Mrs. 
Hartig.  Noling told Wolcott that after first shooting the “old man,” he later shot 
Cora Hartig because she had “seen them, [and] she could tell the police who they 
were.”  Noling would have had to reload his semiautomatic gun before killing 
Cora Hartig.  When asked why he killed them, Noling told Dalesandro that “he 
didn’t want no witnesses.”  According to Garner, Noling asserted that St. Clair 
“said [Noling’s] name, and so they had to kill both of them.”1  Accordingly, we 
reject Noling’s tenth proposition of law. 
C. Exclusion of Mitigation Evidence 
{¶83} In his eleventh proposition of law, Noling argues that the trial court 
erred in excluding the testimony of Jim Aylward, a public defender.  Aylward 
would have explained the meaning of consecutive, concurrent, and life sentences, 
and the penalties for the firearms specifications.  We reject Noling’s argument 
because he forfeited the issue by not asserting it below.  Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 
112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. 
{¶84} Further, the exclusion of Aylward’s testimony does not constitute 
plain error.  Aylward’s testimony was not relevant because it did not relate to 
Noling’s history, character or background, the circumstances of the offense, or 
Noling’s “moral culpability.”  See Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988), 487 U.S. 164, 
188, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Accord 
Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d at 463, 739 N.E.2d 749, fn. 1 (exclusion of similar expert 
on effect of firearms specifications); State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 
                                          
 
1. 
Because the state did not appeal, the court of appeals’ decision to merge the (A)(3) and 
(A)(7) specifications as to Mr. Hartig stands.   
January Term, 2002 
23 
447, 709 N.E.2d 140 (court can exclude expert testimony about length of life 
sentence in aggravated murder case including effect of firearms specifications); 
State v. Williams (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 660 N.E.2d 724, paragraph two of 
the syllabus (exclusion of attorney’s testimony as to meaning of the lack of 
significant criminal history).  Noling has thus failed to satisfy at least the first 
prong of our plain-error inquiry in that he has failed to identify an error. 
{¶85} Moreover, we note that Noling’s counsel explained to the jury 
without objection that Noling faced at least 29 or 39 years in prison because of the 
gun specifications.  The jury knew that Noling faced lengthy imprisonment and 
nonetheless chose the death penalty. 
{¶86} We accordingly overrule the eleventh proposition of law. 
D. Penalty-phase Instructions 
{¶87} Noling argues in connection with his twelfth proposition of law 
that the sentencing instructions were flawed in failing to (1) delineate evidence 
relevant to the aggravating circumstances; and (2) direct the jury to consider only 
aggravating circumstances relevant to each murder count.  In his thirteenth 
proposition of law, Noling then argues that the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury that a single juror could force the imposition of a life sentence. 
{¶88} Noling never objected on these grounds at trial, nor did he request 
other instructions.  His failure to object “constitutes a waiver * * *, unless, but for 
the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.”  State v. 
Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus.  Noling 
also failed to raise these issues before the court of appeals.  Because the trial 
court’s penalty instructions did not involve plain error, we reject these 
propositions of law. 
VI. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
{¶89} In his fourteenth proposition of law, Noling complains about 
prosecutorial misconduct, but Noling objected on only some points at trial.  Also, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
Noling raised misconduct issues at the court of appeals relating only to the 
prosecutor’s peremptory challenges and penalty-phase arguments, namely, 
comments about Noling’s age, the harm to the Hartigs, sympathy, and a personal 
opinion on the penalty.  Thus, waiver, or forfeiture, applies.  Williams, 51 Ohio 
St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus.  
Noling’s complaints also lack merit. 
A. Peremptory Challenges 
{¶90} Noling argues that the state improperly used peremptory 
challenges against jurors who were hesitant to impose the death penalty.  This 
court has held that prosecutors may use peremptory strikes against prospective 
jurors who are hesitant about the death penalty.  See State v. Cook (1992), 65 
Ohio St.3d 516, 518, 605 N.E.2d 70; State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 
249, 586 N.E.2d 1042.  By failing to identify an error, Noling has thus failed to 
satisfy the first prong of our plain-error inquiry. 
B. Prosecutor’s Guilt-phase Closing 
{¶91} Noling claims that remarks in the prosecutor’s guilt-phase 
argument were improper.  Whether a prosecutor’s remarks constitute misconduct 
requires analysis as to (1) whether the remarks were improper, and (2) if so, 
whether the remarks prejudicially affected an accused’s substantial rights.  State 
v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR 317, 470 N.E.2d 883.  Accord 
State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 165, 555 N.E.2d 293.  The touchstone of 
this analysis “is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”  
Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78. 
{¶92} Here, the prosecutor did not create plain error by declaring, 
without objection, that the gun Noling used to kill the Hartigs carried six bullets.  
Extended magazines for a .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol are uncommon; .25 
caliber guns generally hold only six or seven shells, and ten shells from the same 
weapon were found at the scene.  According to Wolcott, Noling had two clips for 
January Term, 2002 
25 
the murder weapon on his way to the scene.  Thus, the prosecutor’s theory that 
Noling reloaded the weapon is a fair inference based on the evidence.  See State v. 
Richey (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 362, 595 N.E.2d 915. 
{¶93} Further, the prosecutor’s assertion, over defense objection, that 
“these people cannot tell you what happened, they are dead,” was a brief truism of 
no particular significance.  See Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d at 454, 678 N.E.2d 891 
(remark that victim could not testify was “a rather obvious fact of which everyone 
was already aware” and not prejudicial).  Similarly, the prosecutor’s statement 
that “the State doesn’t pick its witnesses, we’re not going to have fine upstanding 
witnesses at scenes like this. * * * [B]irds of a feather fly together” was also of no 
particular significance.  The prosecutor simply pointed out that the state did not 
choose the witnesses, events did.  Instead of arguing “guilt by association,” the 
prosecutor was attempting—without defense objection—to excuse the unsavory 
character of the state’s own witnesses. 
{¶94} Additionally, the prosecutor’s unfinished remark that “if the 
defendant failed to demonstrate or [in] any way, shape or form explain [the 
evidence]” did not constitute a comment on Noling’s failure to testify.  A 
prosecutor’s reference to “uncontradicted evidence is not a comment on the 
accused’s failure to testify.”  State v. Ferguson (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 160, 5 OBR 
380, 450 N.E.2d 265, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Accord State v. Webb 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 329, 638 N.E.2d 1023.  Moreover, isolated comments 
by a prosecutor are not to be taken out of context and given their most damaging 
meaning.  Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974), 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 
40 L.Ed.2d 431.  Rather, an appellate court must review a closing argument in its 
entirety to determine whether prejudicial error exists.  Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d at 
342, 652 N.E.2d 1000.  Even construing the prosecutor’s remark as misconduct, it 
lacks prejudicial effect warranting reversal because the court sustained Noling’s 
objection. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶95} The court’s instructions also negated any potential prejudice 
arising from improprieties in the prosecutor’s argument.  The court instructed the 
jury on the presumption of innocence, the state’s burden of proof, and reasonable 
doubt.  It further instructed the jurors that counsel’s statements, counsel’s 
arguments, and stricken statements were not evidence and cautioned them not to 
speculate on an unanswered question or why an objection was sustained.  We 
conclude that no prejudicial error warranting reversal occurred. 
C. Penalty-phase Questioning 
{¶96} Noling argues that the prosecutor improperly questioned the 
defense psychologist, Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon, about “a witness list from the 
defendant of approximately forty names.”  Over objection, the prosecutor asked 
Dr. Smalldon if he had contacted everyone on the witness list.  Dr. Smalldon said 
that he had not seen the list, and shortly thereafter the trial court declared that the 
prosecutor could not comment about witnesses not called to testify. 
{¶97} Here, the prosecutor attempted to cross-examine Dr. Smalldon by 
suggesting that his opinions were based on limited information because Dr. 
Smalldon had not interviewed a number of individuals who presumably knew 
about Noling.  The prosecutor improperly brought before the jury the topic of the 
defense witness list.  See, e.g., Crim.R. 16(C)(3) (“The fact that a witness’ name 
is on a list * * * and that the witness is not called shall not be commented upon at 
the trial”).  Accord State v. Hannah (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 84, 90, 8 O.O.3d 84, 
374 N.E.2d 1359 (commenting on absence of alibi witness is error).  We find no 
prejudice in the prosecutor’s reference to the witness list in light of the overall 
events at trial and the abundant evidence against Noling. 
{¶98} Noling also argues that the prosecutor improperly cross-examined 
defense witnesses because Noling did not raise the (B)(3) mitigating factor.  
Noling claims that the prosecutor could not ask witnesses, such as Dr. Smalldon, 
whether Noling understood the consequences of his actions and knew right from 
January Term, 2002 
27 
wrong.  Noling is wrong.  Dr. Smalldon testified that Noling had an antisocial 
personality disorder, a learning disability, and a hyperactivity disorder or “brain 
disorder.”  A prosecutor can legitimately examine the parameters of defense 
mitigation evidence, including cross-examining a defense psychologist.  See State 
v. Green (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 374, 738 N.E.2d 1208.  Here, the 
prosecution’s questions enabled the jury to place in context and understand the 
complex defense psychological testimony presented.  Whether Noling understood 
the difference between right and wrong and that what he did was wrong was 
indeed relevant. 
D. Prosecutor’s Penalty-phase Argument 
{¶99} Noling claims misconduct in the prosecutor’s sentencing argument.  
But, as we note, Noling on occasion failed to object and on those points waived 
all but plain error. 
{¶100} First, the prosecutor did improperly suggest, over unsuccessful 
objection, that Noling’s “two-day crime spree” was an aggravating circumstance.  
See, e.g., Green, 90 Ohio St.3d at 362, 738 N.E.2d 1208 (other offenses are “not 
relevant to the specified aggravating circumstance”).  This remark could not be 
said to have prejudiced Noling, given the court’s instruction as to the aggravating 
circumstances to be considered.  And evidence of the two-day crime spree was 
properly before the jury. 
{¶101} In contrast, the prosecutor could appropriately refer to the facts of 
the offense, namely, the plan to commit the crime, the extra ammunition clip, the 
ransacking of the Hartigs’ home, the disposal of the weapon, and the fact that the 
Hartigs were “old and helpless.”  “The facts [of an offense] are relevant in 
determining whether the nature and circumstances of the offense are mitigating.”  
Green, 90 Ohio St.3d at 374, 738 N.E.2d 1208, citing Lorraine, 66 Ohio St.3d at 
420, 613 N.E.2d 212.  Moreover, “both the criminal and his crime are properly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
considered in determining the propriety of imposing a death sentence.” (Emphasis 
sic.)  Id., quoting State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 200, 661 N.E.2d 1068. 
{¶102} The prosecutor’s comments that the crime was “scary” because it 
involved a home invasion, that the crime “horrified” the community or “frightens 
us,” and that Noling should not be allowed to walk the streets again were fair 
comments.  “Prosecutors can be ‘colorful or creative.’ “  Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d at 
399, 659 N.E.2d 292, citing State v. Brown (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 317, 528 
N.E.2d 523.  Moreover, Noling did not object, and because no prejudicial error 
resulted from such comments, Noling has failed to satisfy at least the third prong 
of our plain-error inquiry. 
{¶103} Nor did the prosecutor err by arguing that mitigation evidence, 
unrelated to the crime, should be given little weight.  “Prosecutors can urge the 
merits of their cause and legitimately argue that defense mitigation evidence is 
worthy of little or no weight.”  Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d at 399, 659 N.E.2d 292.  
“The fact that * * * evidence is admissible * * * does not automatically mean that 
it must be given any weight.”  State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 
273, 509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶104} Equally permissible was the prosecutor’s comparing Noling with 
his siblings who had an identical family background.  Even though evidence 
concerning his siblings was scarce, some evidence exists in the record.  Because 
Noling sought to mitigate his offenses by relying on his family background, the 
state could argue that others who had the same family background had not 
committed comparable crimes.  See, e.g., State v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 
320, 343, 738 N.E.2d 1178 (court did not err by comparing law-abiding siblings 
from same abusive home to defendant); Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d at 399, 659 N.E.2d 
292 (arguing that others with deprived backgrounds do not commit such crimes 
was not error). 
January Term, 2002 
29 
{¶105} The prosecutor’s brief comment that mitigation did not outweigh 
Noling’s crimes did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof.  The trial court’s 
instructions, counsel’s argument, and the verdict form clearly reflected the state’s 
burden of proof.  Moreover, Noling did not object. 
{¶106} Finally, Noling’s complaint that reversible error exists because the 
prosecutor expressed a personal opinion that death was the appropriate 
punishment lacks merit.  On three occasions, the court sustained defense 
objections to comments by the prosecutor that might be construed as a personal 
opinion on the death penalty.  The prosecutor then rephrased his argument, and no 
prejudicial error resulted from these inartful comments.  Although limits exist, “ 
‘it is difficult for prosecutors to argue vigorously for the death penalty without 
making what might arguably be statements of personal opinion.’ “  State v. Durr 
(1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 96, 568 N.E.2d 674, quoting Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d at 41, 
553 N.E.2d 576. 
{¶107} Noling received a fair trial, and prosecutorial misconduct did not 
permeate the trial.  Nor did any misconduct deprive Noling of his right to a fair 
and individualized sentencing determination.  We therefore reject his fourteenth 
proposition of law. 
VII. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
{¶108} Noling argues in his fifteenth proposition of law that his counsel 
inadequately investigated his case, failed to question jurors about pretrial 
publicity, failed to make necessary objections to charges, instructions, and 
prosecutorial misconduct, and argued ineffectively to the jury.  Reversal of 
convictions on ineffective assistance requires that the defendant show, first, that 
counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  Strickland v. 
Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Accord  
State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373.  “To establish 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
prejudice, ‘the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability 
that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been 
different.’ “  Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d  at 164, 749 N.E.2d 226, quoting Bradley, 42 
Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶109} Noling has forfeited his claim that trial counsel were ineffective, 
however, because his appellate counsel did not raise that issue before the court of 
appeals.  Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph 
two of the syllabus. 
{¶110} In any event, we find that his claims lack merit.  For example, as 
discussed in connection with his eighth proposition of law, the use of ambiguous 
language—”Robbery and/or Burglary” in the death specifications—did not affect 
Noling’s rights.  See Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d at 664, 693 N.E.2d 246.  The failure to 
object to this language does not constitute ineffective assistance. 
{¶111} Nor does Noling establish either deficient performance or 
prejudice when he argues that his counsel did not adequately voir dire juror 
Renfroe about pretrial publicity.  Renfroe never stated that he had read or knew 
about the case, only that he was “glancing through the newspaper” and noticed 
jury selection had been cancelled the previous week.  Counsel made a reasoned 
tactical decision not to question Renfroe further, and “we will not second-guess 
trial strategy decisions such as those made in voir dire.”  State v. Cornwell (1999), 
86 Ohio St.3d 560, 569, 715 N.E.2d 1144, citing State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio 
St.3d 144, 157, 694 N.E.2d 932. Further, Noling has not explained adequately 
how this decision prejudiced him.  See Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d at 157-158, 694 
N.E.2d 932. 
{¶112} Noling also argues that his counsel inadequately investigated the 
possibility of another pretrial agreement between Dalesandro and the state.  That 
possibility, however, was discussed at trial.  And because the record before us 
does not show what investigation Noling’s counsel undertook, we cannot say that 
January Term, 2002 
31 
it reveals this alleged error. See State v. Nields (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 6, 35, 752 
N.E.2d 859, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; 
State v. Sanders (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 274, 750 N.E.2d 90.  Nor does the 
record show any prejudice arising from any such inquiry or lack thereof.  We 
therefore reject Noling’s claims in this regard as speculative. 
{¶113} Noling’s claims of ineffective assistance for failure to object to 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct also lack merit.  As discussed in connection with 
Noling’s fourteenth proposition of law, see Part VI, supra, Noling had no basis to 
object to the state’s peremptory challenges or to the state’s guilt-phase or 
sentencing arguments.  Thus, Noling has not established either deficient 
performance or prejudice.  Cf. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d at 155, 749 N.E.2d 226 
(there is no ineffective assistance where none of the challenged statements would 
warrant reversal).  In contrast, Noling’s counsel preserved his claim of error as to 
the prosecutor’s cross-examination of St. Clair as previously discussed. 
{¶114} Equally unsuccessful are Noling’s claims that counsel were 
ineffective for failing to object to the guilt-phase or penalty instructions.  
Counsel’s decisions represented reasonable professional judgment.  See our 
discussion on propositions of law nine, twelve, thirteen, and twenty.  
Additionally, Noling offers no basis to find that if he had objected, a “reasonable 
probability” exists that the trial result would have been different.  Bradley, 42 
Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶115} We similarly reject Noling’s complaint that his counsel discussed 
punishment in his opening statement.  Counsel simply made a tactical decision to 
explain the voir dire death-qualification process that had just been concluded.  
“[A] strong presumption [exists] that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  And Noling has failed to demonstrate how counsel’s 
choice prejudiced his case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
{¶116} Noling further argues that his counsel inaccurately described the 
jury’s role by asking the jury to acquit if it doubted “the honesty of the State’s 
case.”  Noling claims that his counsel’s argument was inflammatory, attacked the 
prosecutor’s integrity, and trivialized reasonable doubt.  Noling’s arguments lack 
merit, however, because they accord unreasonable interpretations to phrases 
employed by counsel, interpretations that no reasonable juror would have made.  
By referring to the honesty of the case, counsel simply questioned the credibility 
of the state’s witnesses. 
{¶117} In sum, we reject Noling’s fifteenth proposition of law.  At trial, 
Noling had competent and thorough lawyers who fought hard for their client.  We 
find neither deficient performance nor prejudice as required by Strickland. 
VIII. Trial Court’s Sentencing Hearing and Opinion 
A. Sentencing Hearing 
{¶118} In his sixteenth proposition of law, Noling argues that victim-
impact evidence requires vacation of his death sentence.  Specifically, Noling 
complains that after the jury’s death-penalty verdict, Wilton Treesh, a Hartig 
family representative, asked the trial court to follow the jury’s death-penalty 
recommendation.  This argument is without merit. 
{¶119} The United States Constitution does not prohibit victim-impact 
evidence in capital cases.  Payne v. Tennessee (1991), 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 
2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720.  This court has held, however, that “[e]xpressions of 
opinion by a witness as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence in a capital 
case violate” a defendant’s rights.  State v. Huertas (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 22, 553 
N.E.2d 1058, syllabus.  The same principle applies to family representatives who 
express opinions about the penalty at sentencing hearings.  See State v. Goodwin 
(1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 343, 703 N.E.2d 1251; Fautenberry, 72 Ohio St.3d at 
439, 650 N.E.2d 878. 
January Term, 2002 
33 
{¶120} Here, the remarks about which Noling complains do not require 
reversal.  Not only did Noling fail to object to Treesh’s remarks, but the jury 
never heard the opinion.  Rather, Treesh’s remarks were directed only to the trial 
judge.  We have explained that “where such opinion is expressed to the judge 
only, as was the case here, it is not reversible error unless there is some indication 
that the judge actually considered it in sentencing the defendant to death.”  
(Emphasis added.) State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-5304, 776 
N.E.2d 26, at ¶ 88, citing Fautenberry, 72 Ohio St.3d at 439, 650 N.E.2d 878.  
Noling has failed to identify evidence suggesting that the trial judge actually 
considered the remarks.  Absent evidence of actual consideration, we must 
presume that the trial judge remained uninfluenced in sentencing Noling because 
his sentencing decision never referred to Treesh’s opinion.  Cf. Treesh, 90 Ohio 
St.3d at 486, 739 N.E.2d 749; State v. Allard (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 482, 488-492, 
663 N.E.2d 1277; Fautenberry, 72 Ohio St.3d at 439, 650 N.E.2d 878. 
B. Sentencing Opinion 
{¶121} In his seventeenth proposition of law, Noling argues that the trial 
court erred in considering duplicative aggravating circumstances and improper 
evidence in its sentencing opinion.  He also complains that the trial court failed to 
consider significant mitigating evidence.  We conclude that this proposition 
presents no reversible error for the following reasons. 
{¶122} First, contrary to Noling’s arguments, the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) and 
(A)(7) death specifications are separate aggravating circumstances as to the 
murder of Cora Hartig.  See Part V(B), supra.  As to the aggravated murder of 
Bearnhardt Hartig, the court of appeals determined the (A)(3) and (A)(7) should 
have been merged, but independently reassessed the sentence in light of that error.  
The court of appeals thus corrected this asserted deficiency in the trial court’s 
opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶123} Second, although the trial court may have improperly cited 
impeachment evidence of St. Clair as substantive evidence in describing exactly 
what occurred inside the Hartig home, any such error failed to prejudice Noling.  
That court’s sentencing opinion noted that “[t]he defendant held * * * the Hartigs 
in the kitchen area * * * while St. Clair ransacked the bedrooms * * *.  At some 
point, St. Clair heard shooting and ran from the bedroom to see Noling shooting 
Mrs. Hartig.”  We agree that no direct evidence of those events is in the record.  
Nonetheless, we find that any error was harmless given that other evidence 
established that Noling personally shot the Hartigs, and the jury found that he was 
the principal offender. See Parts IV(A) and V(B), supra. 
{¶124} Third, Noling is wrong in arguing that the trial court misconstrued 
the role that mitigation plays in sentencing and failed to consider relevant 
mitigating evidence.  The trial court’s decision that Noling’s history, character, or 
background did not mitigate the offenses was within its discretion.  “[T]he 
assessment and weight to be given mitigating evidence are matters for the trial 
court’s determination.”  Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 171, 555 N.E.2d 293.  Accord Bey, 
85 Ohio St.3d at 504, 709 N.E.2d 484; State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 
193, 631 N.E.2d 124.  See, also, State v. Stumpf (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 512 
N.E.2d 598, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶125} The trial court’s use of terms such as “explain,” “justify,” or 
“lessen” does not demonstrate constitutional error in the evaluation of mitigation 
evidence.  As this court held in Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 
N.E.2d 383, paragraph two of the syllabus, “The fact that an item of evidence is 
admissible under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) does not automatically mean that it must be 
given any weight.”  Finally, our “independent review of a sentence will cure any 
flaws in the trial court’s opinion.”  Fox, 69 Ohio St.3d at 191, 631 N.E.2d 124.  
Accord McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d at 395, 686 N.E.2d 1112; Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d at 
210, 661 N.E.2d 1068. 
January Term, 2002 
35 
{¶126} We overrule proposition of law seventeen. 
IX. Court of Appeals’ Sentencing Opinion 
{¶127} Noling complains in his eighteenth proposition of law about the 
court of appeals’ sentencing opinion, including its independent review of Noling’s 
death sentence.  We reject his arguments as meritless. 
{¶128} First, Noling argues that the court of appeals relied on nonstatutory 
aggravating circumstances and points to references about Noling’s “plan to steal 
from the weak and infirm,” Noling’s other robberies, and his prior discharge of a 
firearm.  The context shows that, in referring to these circumstances, the appellate 
court was evaluating Dr. Smalldon’s testimony, not piling on aggravating factors.  
Moreover, the court of appeals precisely defined the aggravating circumstances.  
This court has held that “[w]hen a court correctly identifies the aggravating 
circumstances in its sentencing opinion, we will presume that the court relied only 
on those circumstances and not on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances.”  
Clemons, 82 Ohio St.3d at 447, 696 N.E.2d 1009, citing State v. Hill (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 433, 441, 653 N.E.2d 271.  Noling presents us with no persuasive 
reason to stray from that presumption here. 
{¶129} Second, Noling claims that the court of appeals “appears to 
penalize [him] for his failure to meet the arduous standard” in R.C. 
2929.04(B)(3).  We reject this claim.  The context of the opinion shows that the 
court of appeals was evaluating Dr. Smalldon’s testimony and granting it 
mitigating weight, but also pointing out that this testimony failed to establish any 
mental disease or defect within the meaning of R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  The opinion 
never implied that Noling was punished for not meeting that standard, and we 
regard Noling’s contrary inference as incorrectly drawn. 
{¶130} Third, Noling argues that the court of appeals improperly 
minimized mitigation evidence.  It is apparent from the record, however, that the 
court of appeals carefully reviewed the sentence and expressed its views in a 13-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
page independent evaluation.  Further, we have held that “ ‘[a] decisionmaker 
need not weigh mitigating factors in a particular manner.  The process * * * as 
well as the weight, if any, to assign a given factor is a matter for the discretion of 
the individual decisionmaker.’ “  Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d at 31-32, 676 N.E.2d 82, 
quoting Fox, 69 Ohio St.3d at 193, 631 N.E.2d 124.  Accordingly, this argument 
also lacks merit. 
{¶131} Fourth, Noling’s claim that the court of appeals placed the burden 
of proof as to sentencing on him also lacks merit.  The appellate court’s comment 
that Noling’s “age and background [do] not overcome the enormous weight of the 
aggravating circumstances” in context does not reflect misunderstanding of the 
state’s burden of proof.  The court of appeals correctly noted the burden in 
numerous references. 
{¶132} Finally, in regard to the foregoing arguments, we note that our 
independent sentence evaluation will readily correct any deficiencies in the court 
of appeals’ opinion.  See, e.g., Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 102, 656 N.E.2d 643; 
Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d at 343, 652 N.E.2d 1000. 
X. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
{¶133} In proposition of law nineteen, Noling points to examples of 
claimed ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  As with claims of ineffective 
trial counsel, reversal for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel also requires 
demonstration of deficient performance and prejudice.  See, e.g., Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; Spivey, 84 Ohio St.3d at 25, 701 
N.E.2d 696; State v. Reed (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 534, 535, 660 N.E.2d 456. 
{¶134} There is no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel here.  
Appellate counsel raised 15 primary issues before the court of appeals, many with 
subparts, and strongly argued their case.  It is well settled that appellate counsel 
have no constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue.  Jones v. Barnes 
(1983), 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987.  Rather, appellate 
January Term, 2002 
37 
counsel can make a reasoned tactical judgment not to raise issues that lack 
substantial merit.  See, e.g., our discussion on propositions of law one, four, 
eleven, seventeen, supra. 
{¶135} Moreover, as to issues Noling argues that his counsel should have 
raised, no “reasonable probability” of a different result exists even if counsel had 
raised those claims before the court of appeals.  Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 
N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus.  See, e.g., our discussion on 
propositions of law two, fourteen, and fifteen.  Thus, we reject proposition of law 
number nineteen. 
XI. Independent Sentence Evaluation 
{¶136} Having rejected each of Noling’s propositions of law, we now turn 
to our statutory duty to independently weigh the aggravating circumstances 
against the mitigating factors and to determine whether Noling’s sentence is 
disproportionate to sentences in similar cases.  R.C. 2929.05(A). 
A. Penalty-phase Evidence 
{¶137} At the penalty phase of the trial, Noling presented testimony about 
his history, character, and background from his mother, sister, other relatives, and 
friends, as well as from Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon, a clinical psychologist.  We 
summarize that testimony as follows. 
{¶138} Judith Mann, Noling’s mother, was married to Gary Noling for ten 
years.  She had four children with him, including Noling, who was born in 1972.  
Although Gary Noling was an alcoholic, he worked steadily, but the marriage 
broke up when Noling was less than one year old.  Judith later married Wayne 
Allen, also an alcoholic; this union also ended in divorce.  Wayne was cruel to 
Noling, and his father, Gary, expressed little interest in Noling and rarely visited. 
{¶139} As a child, Noling was a hyperactive slow learner, had problems in 
school for stealing and truancy, and spent time in detention and in group homes.  
In 1986, he was adjudged a delinquent for petty theft, felony theft, and breaking 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
and entering.  In 1988, he was adjudged a delinquent for criminal trespass, 
aggravated burglary, and assault, and in 1989, he was found delinquent for 
assault, criminal trespass, and obstructing justice. 
{¶140} Diana Riggs, Noling’s sister, confirmed that their mother had 
raised the children on welfare and that her alcoholic father did not support them.  
Her mother suffered from depression and a variety of ailments. 
{¶141} Scott Brahler, Noling’s cousin, recalled playing baseball, football, 
and other sports with Noling, and that Noling was fine when he visited.  Scott was 
very surprised that Noling had committed these crimes and believes that Noling’s 
life is worth saving.  Dexter Neiswanger, another of Noling’s cousins, grew up 
with him, loves him, and would not want Noling to receive the death penalty.  
Jane Brahler, Noling’s aunt, described Noling as a well-behaved child, a “sweet 
kid” who lacked a father figure.  She never thought that Noling “could ever, ever 
do such a thing.”  She stated that Noling will always have “a place in [her] heart, 
always did and always will.”  Orm Smith, Noling’s uncle, recalled when Noling’s 
father “was smacking the heck out of his mother,” and he stopped it.  While 
growing up, Noling lacked discipline, love, and affection, and was not treated 
fairly. 
{¶142} Sue Ann Dangel and James Dangel manage a campground in 
Wooster and employed Noling one summer for four or five months when Noling 
was 14 to 15 years old.  Noling then lived at a Christian children’s home where a 
juvenile court had placed him.  Noling was a good worker, did a wide variety of 
tasks, was honest and trustworthy, got along well with everyone, and was fun to 
be around. Both were shocked that Noling had committed these crimes.  David 
Miller, a social worker, was Noling’s therapist at the children’s home.  When 
Noling first arrived, he was “agitated” and “very belligerent,” but reportedly 
began to do well in a structured and controlled environment. 
January Term, 2002 
39 
{¶143} Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon, a psychologist, evaluated Noling, related his 
family history to the jury, and reported that as a child Noling was hyperactive, 
suffered from attention deficit disorder, and had a learning disability.  As an 
adolescent, Noling was mouthy, defiant, and difficult.  After a juvenile court 
declared Noling unruly, that court placed him in the children’s home in Wooster 
for a year.  Then he returned to live with his mother, the old problems resurfaced, 
and for a while Noling lived with his father, which did not work out. 
{¶144} When Noling was nine or ten years old, he first got into trouble 
with the law for theft and was arrested for a variety of offenses as an adolescent.  
School records reflected that Noling was unruly, frequently involved in fights and 
verbal altercations, and difficult to control.  Noling experimented with drugs 
when he was 11 to 13 years old, tried hard drugs, and had a history of marijuana 
abuse.  In 1990, when Noling was 18, he was sentenced to prison for aggravated 
robbery (which involved the “other acts” offenses discussed supra). 
{¶145} Dr. Smalldon concluded that Noling suffered from “dysthymia,” 
which is “a longstanding depressive condition.”  His depression manifested in 
“acting out behavior.”  His overall IQ has consistently tested in the 85 to 90 
range, but he gets over 100 in nonverbal skills and only around 80 in verbal skills.  
Noling has “tremendous difficulty with abstract thinking,” and a “very flawed” 
conceptual understanding.  Noling suffers from an antisocial personality disorder, 
which is an enduring pattern of thinking, emotions, feelings, and inter-personal 
behavior.  One psychiatrist described him as a 22-year-old man “with the inner 
controls of a two year old child.”  He noted that Noling could adjust reasonably 
well in prison where he has “a great deal of structure and consistency.” 
{¶146} In an unsworn statement, Noling declared that he was “willing to 
accept any responsibility [for] what I have done and that I’m very sorry.  * * * I 
just beg [you] from the bottom of my heart that you spare my life.” 
B. Sentence Evaluation 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
{¶147} After independent assessment, we determine that the evidence 
proves the aggravating circumstances—that Noling murdered Bearnhardt Hartig 
during an aggravated burglary and an aggravated robbery, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), 
and killed Cora Hartig to escape detection or apprehension, R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), 
and in the course of an aggravated burglary and an aggravated robbery, (A)(7).  
Because the form of the specification charged “aggravated robbery and/or 
aggravated burglary,” we deem it appropriate to treat the felony-murder 
specification as a single specification in each count.  See our discussion in Part 
III(A), supra. 
{¶148} In regard to mitigation, there are no mitigating features in the 
nature and circumstances of the offense.  In the course of a home-invasion 
robbery, Noling murdered an elderly couple by repeatedly shooting them.  Nor 
does Noling’s character offer mitigating features.  There are modest mitigating 
features, however, in Noling’s history and background.  Noling grew up in an 
unstructured home; his mother suffered chronic illnesses, and his father, an 
alcoholic, abandoned the family.  His stepfather was abusive.  Noling was in 
trouble throughout his teenage years and developed an antisocial personality 
disorder, an attention deficit disorder, and a learning disability. 
{¶149} As to statutory mitigating factors, we conclude that the statutory 
factors in R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) to (B)(3), (B)(5), and (B)(6) are not applicable.  
Under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) (“other factors”), we consider as mitigating factors 
Noling’s remorse as expressed in his unsworn statement, the love and concern of 
his relatives, his learning disability, his antisocial personality disorder, and his 
adaptability to a structured environment.  We also recognize that Noling’s age is a 
mitigating factor, R.C. 2929.04(B)(4), because he was born on March 22, 1972, 
and was just two weeks past his 18th birthday when the offenses occurred.  We do 
not, however, necessarily regard age as a strong or compelling mitigating factor.  
This court upheld the death penalty in the following cases when the defendants 
January Term, 2002 
41 
committed murder at the age of 18.  Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-5304, 
776 N.E.2d 26, at ¶ 98; Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d at 611, 734 N.E.2d 345; State v. 
Raglin (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 253, 273, 699 N.E.2d 482; State v. Dennis (1997), 
79 Ohio St.3d 421, 438, 683 N.E.2d 1096; State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 
597, 613, 605 N.E.2d 916; State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 335, 595 
N.E.2d 884. 
{¶150} After weighing the aggravating circumstances against the 
collective mitigating evidence, we have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the aggravating circumstances as to each aggravated murder count outweigh those 
collective mitigating factors.  In the course of a brutal home-invasion robbery, 
Noling repeatedly shot and killed elderly people.  Moreover, Noling planned the 
burglary and robbery and took other youths along to participate in these brutal 
crimes. 
{¶151} We hold that the death penalty is proportionate when compared 
with other aggravated murders committed during the course of an aggravated 
burglary and an aggravated robbery.  See, e.g., State v. Jones (2000), 90 Ohio 
St.3d 403, 739 N.E.2d 300; State v. Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 731 
N.E.2d 159; Spivey, 81 Ohio St.3d 405, 692 N.E.2d 151; Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 
354, 650 N.E.2d 433; Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 605 N.E.2d 916; State v. Murphy 
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 554, 605 N.E.2d 884; Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 555 N.E.2d 
293; and Barnes, 25 Ohio St.3d 203, 25 OBR 266, 495 N.E.2d 922. 
{¶152} We further hold that the death penalty is also proportionate when 
compared with cases involving killings to escape detection.  See, e.g., Sheppard, 
84 Ohio St.3d 230, 703 N.E.2d 286; State v. Burke (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 399, 
653 N.E.2d 242. 
XII. Conclusion 
{¶153} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that none of Noling’s 
propositions of law has merit.  We have also independently weighed the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors as to each murder victim 
and have considered the proportionality of the death sentence.  We affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals and the death sentence imposed against Noling. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
APPENDIX 
{¶154} Proposition of Law No. 1:  Where a trial court precludes a capital 
defendant from cross-examining a witness about a strong motive to fabricate 
testimony, the trial court deprives that capital defendant of his confrontation and 
due process rights as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article 1 §§ 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶155} Proposition of Law No. 2:  A trial court abuses its discretion when 
it declares a witness hostile without the showing required by Ohio Rule of 
Evidence 607.  Further, when a trial court permits a witness to be impeached 
pursuant to Rule 607, the trial court has an obligation to control the nature and 
extent of that cross-examination.  The trial court’s failure to do either violates a 
capital defendant’s due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and § 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
{¶156} Proposition of Law No. 3:  Where evidence of other crimes lacks a 
distinct behavioral fingerprint, such evidence is inadmissible.  Even where such 
evidence may be admissible, undue emphasis on it may prejudice a capital 
defendant’s right to a fair trial and reliable death sentence.  U.S. Const. Amends. 
V, VI, VIII, and XIV. 
January Term, 2002 
43 
{¶157} Proposition of Law No. 4:  A capital defendant’s conviction cannot 
stand where it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.  To allow such a 
conviction to stand violates a capital defendant’s due process rights as guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 
16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶158} Proposition of Law No. 5:  This death penalty is inappropriate and 
in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution as well as Article I, §§ 9, 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶159} Proposition of Law No. 6:  Where the trial court admits victim 
impact evidence during the trial phase unrelated to the crimes, a capital 
defendant’s rights as guaranteed [by the] Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, §§ 16 are violated. 
{¶160} Proposition of Law No. 7:  The state may not obtain a conviction 
for an offense where the indictment for that offense fails to include an essential 
element of the offense.  To do so offends fundamental due process.  U.S. Const. 
Amend. XIV and Article I, §§ 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶161} Proposition of Law No. 8:  A verdict that a defendant committed 
felony murder based on the charge that the murder was committed during an 
“Aggravated Robbery and/or Aggravated Burglary” cannot stand because it is 
duplicitous.  This charge also deprives a defendant of his constitutional right to a 
unanimous jury verdict.  U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, and XIV. 
{¶162} Proposition of Law No. 9:  Reversible error occurs when the trial 
court instructions on mens rea relieve or reduce the state’s burden of proof.  U.S. 
Const. Amend. XIV. 
{¶163} Proposition of Law No. 10:  The trial court’s failure to merge 
duplicative aggravating circumstances prior to the sentencing phase of a capital 
trial deprives a capital defendant of the Eighth Amendment’s protection against 
cruel and unusual punishment and his due process rights as guaranteed by the 
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44 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights the United States Constitution and §§ 9 
and 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶164} Proposition of Law No. 11:  When the trial court precludes a 
capital defendant from pursuing and presenting relevant mitigation evidence, a 
capital defendant’s rights to a fair sentencing proceeding and individualized 
sentencing as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and §§ 9 and 16, Article [I] of the Ohio Constitution are 
violated.  Moreover, when that evidence is relevant to rebut prosecutorial 
argument, the trial court’s prohibition deprives a capital defendant of his right to a 
meaningful opportunity to rebut the state’s case as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 16 of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
{¶165} Proposition of Law No. 12:  Where penalty phase instructions 
allow the jury to decide what evidence is admissible concerning the aggravating 
circumstances and where the instructions do not conform to Ohio and federal law, 
reversal is required.  Furthermore, the trial court must instruct the jury during the 
penalty phase of a capital trial to only consider those aggravating circumstances 
attached to each count of aggravated murder in conducting the weighing process 
for that count.  U.S. Const. Amend. VI, VIII and XIV; Ohio Const.Art. I, § 9, 10, 
and 16. 
{¶166} Proposition of Law No. 13:  A capital defendant is denied his 
rights against cruel and unusual punishment and due process when his sentencing 
jury is told that its life sentence recommendation must be unanimous.  The capital 
defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel is also violated when such 
instruction is not objected to at trial or raised on a first appeal of right.  U.S. 
Const. Amend. V, VI, VIII, XIV. 
{¶167} Proposition of Law No. 14:  A capital defendant is denied his 
substantive and procedural due process rights to a fair trial as guaranteed by the 
January Term, 2002 
45 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as 
Article I §§ 9 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution when a prosecutor commits acts of 
misconduct during voir dire, the trial phase and the sentencing phase of his capital 
trial.  He is also denied his right to reliable sentencing as guaranteed by the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 9 
and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶168} Proposition of Law No. 15:  When trial counsel fail to voir dire on 
pretrial publicity, fail to object to prosecutor misconduct, fail to object to 
improper instructions, fail to follow up on issues of impeachment and argue 
penalty during their trial phase opening statement, a capital defendant is deprived 
of the right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 10 and 
16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶169} Proposition of Law No. 16:  Where the trial court admits victim 
impact evidence in the nature of a family member’s request that a capital 
defendant be sentenced to death, a capital defendant’s rights as guaranteed by the 
Eight[h] and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, §§ 9 and 16 are violated. 
{¶170} Proposition of Law No. 17:  Reversible error occurs when the trial 
court’s sentencing opinion fails to merge duplicative aggravating circumstances, 
relies on facts not properly in evidence, and fails to consider significant mitigating 
evidence.  U.S. Const. Amends. VIII and XIV. 
{¶171} Proposition of Law No. 18:  When the appellate court considers 
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, evaluates mitigation evidence under 
improper standards, minimizes mitigation evidence, and burden shifts, the court’s 
independent sentence review fails to focus on the individual and a capital 
appellant is deprived of the right to individualized sentencing and of his liberty 
interest in the statutory sentencing scheme thus violating rights guaranteed by the 
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46 
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, §§ 9 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶172} Proposition of Law No. 19:  Where appellate counsel fails to 
render effective assistance in the court of appeals, a capital defendant’s right to 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, § 16 of the Ohio Constitution is violated. 
{¶173} Proposition of Law No. 20:  A capital defendant’s right to due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is 
violated when the state is permitted to convict upon a standard of proof below 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
{¶174} Proposition of Law No. 21:  Ohio’s death penalty law is 
unconstitutional.  The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 2, 9, 10, and 16 of the Ohio 
Constitution establish the requirements for a valid death penalty scheme.  Ohio 
Rev.Code Ann. §§ 2903.01, 2929.02, 2929.021, 2929.022, 2929.023, 2929.03, 
2929.04, and 2929.05 (Anderson 1996), do not meet the prescribed Constitutional 
requirements and are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to Tyrone 
Noling.  Further, Ohio’s death penalty statute violates the United States’ 
obligations under international law. 
__________________ 
 
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelli K. 
Norman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
David J. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Stephen A. Ferrell and Kelly L. 
Culshaw, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
__________________