Case Title: Apodaca v. Ommen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Apodaca v. Ommen1991 WY 35807 P.2d 939Case Number: 90-137Decided: 03/18/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
Vincent APODACA, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Janet OMMEN, R.N. and 
Archie Kirsch, M.D., Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Larry Lehman, 
J.

Vincent Apodaca, 
pro se.

Terry L. 
Armitage, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Linda Burt, Legal Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee 
Ommen.

David E. 
Westling of Vlastos, Brooks & Henley, P.C., Casper, for appellee Kirsch.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., THOMAS and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, and BROWN, Ret., 
JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant, Vincent 
Apodaca, appeals from orders of the district court which dismissed his complaint 
of medical malpractice against appellees, Archie Kirsch, M.D., a contract 
physician for the Wyoming State Penitentiary, and Janet Ommen, R.N., a prison 
employee who serves as director of the penitentiary's medical services 
department and who provides medical care to prisoners on a day-to-day 
basis.

[¶2.]     We will affirm the 
district court's orders dismissing the complaint for failure to state claims 
upon which relief can be granted. However, because the complaint was not 
dismissed with prejudice and because of the somewhat unusual circumstances of 
this case, we will not treat the dismissals as res judicata, thus, permitting 
Apodaca to refile a complaint if he so desires.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL 
COURT

[¶3.]     On January 9, 1990, 
Apodaca filed his complaint. He alleged that he had been incarcerated in the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary since August 3, 1989. Before his incarceration, he 
was injured in an industrial accident for which he received worker's 
compensation temporary total disability benefits. Before his arrest and 
incarceration, Apodaca was being treated by Milo E. Wilcox, D.C.1, but he had not seen Wilcox for 
treatment since February of 1989. The complaint identified Archie Kirsch, M.D., 
as a physician employed to provide medical services to inmates at the state 
penitentiary and Janet Ommen, R.N., as the director of the medical services 
department at the penitentiary. Apodaca claimed that he had submitted requests 
to the administrators of the penitentiary to permit him to be treated by Wilcox, 
but that these requests were referred to Ommen. In one paragraph of the 
complaint, Apodaca asserted that Kirsch and Ommen attempted to force Apodaca to 
be treated by Kirsch, in lieu of Wilcox. Included in Apodaca's complaint was an 
averment that Kirsch and Ommen have also attempted to force Apodaca to be 
treated by an orthopedic surgeon of their choice, again, in lieu of treatment by 
Wilcox. Apodaca claimed that Wilcox was familiar with his injury and course of 
treatment, but that Kirsch and Ommen were not. Apodaca also included this 
paragraph in his complaint:

18. For reasons unknown 
to plaintiff [Apodaca], the administrators of the Wyoming State Penitentiary and 
the Defendants herein do not want Plaintiff to be treated by Dr. Milo E. Wilcox, 
and these defendants are utilizing their licensure under Wyoming law as health 
care providers to erect a shield against civil rights liability for the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary administrators referred to in 13 above.2

[¶4.]     Apodaca further claimed 
there was no legitimate reason for not allowing him to see Wilcox and that 
Kirsch had used his professional licensure to mask nonmedical decisions as 
medical and to reduce the penitentiary's expenses in providing health care to 
inmates, as well as to cover up and conceal liability for "lack and/or refusal 
of medical attention." In closing, Apodaca claimed the acts of Kirsch and Ommen 
constituted a deliberate and willful interference with his medical treatment and 
with his worker's compensation claim. Finally, Apodaca asserted that the acts 
and omissions of Kirsch and Ommen had caused him great pain and concomitant 
mental anguish and asked for compensatory, exemplary and punitive damages of 
$50,000 from each of them.

[¶5.]     On February 2, 1990, 
citing W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), Ommen filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On February 5, 
1990, Kirsch filed an identical motion. The district court scheduled a hearing 
on these motions for February 27, 1990. A brief was filed in support of Ommen's 
motion to dismiss on February 13, 1990. Although that brief was filed on behalf 
of Ommen, it made reference to the positions of both Kirsch and Ommen. Kirsch 
did not file a brief in support of his motion to dismiss.3 On February 16 and 20, 1990, 
Apodaca filed motions: (1) for an order directing pre-hearing written argument 
and memoranda by Kirsch and rescheduling hearing; and, (2) to restrict argument 
at hearing to those issues upon which written argument has been submitted by the 
defendants. Apodaca also filed traverses to the motions to dismiss on February 
20 and 21, 1990. On February 27, 1990, Apodaca filed a notice and motion for 
restraining order asserting that an accusation had been made, by penitentiary 
administrators as well as the counsel for Ommen, that he might have been guilty 
of tampering with the mails because he had possession of a document mailed by 
Ommen's counsel to her. Apodaca claimed Ommen and her counsel were attempting to 
coerce and frighten him into dropping his lawsuit.

[¶6.]     After conducting a 
hearing in open court on February 27, 1990,4 the district court entered an order 
on March 5, 1990, dismissing the complaint against Ommen and a second order on 
March 8, 1990, dismissing the complaint against Kirsch. This latter order 
constitutes the final order in this case. W.R.C.P. 54(b). On March 15, 1990, 
Apodaca filed a motion for new trial or to alter or amend the judgment pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 59. As noted above, entry of final judgment occurred on March 8, 
1990, and the district court did not rule on the motion or grant a continuance. 
Thus, by operation of W.R.C.P. 59(f), the motion was deemed denied on May 7, 
1990, and notice of appeal was required to be filed not later than May, 22, 
1990. W.R.A.P. 2.01. Apodaca filed his notice of appeal on May 22, 
1990.

ISSUES

[¶7.]     Apodaca raises these 
issues:

1. Whether the complaint 
states a claim for medical malpractice, and whether the district court erred in 
dismissing the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P.

2. Whether the district 
court erred in failing to consider the Appellees' motions to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., as orally argued at the hearing, as motions for summary 
judgment under Rule 56, W.R.C.P.

3. Whether the district 
court erred in allowing the Appellees to orally plead affirmative defenses which 
had not been argued in writing, thus imposing an impermissible surprise upon the 
Plaintiff.

4. Whether the district 
court erred in holding the pro se plaintiff to the same, or higher, standards, 
as an attorney would have been.

[¶8.]     In response, Kirsch 
poses the question of whether the trial court properly dismissed Apodaca's 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.

[¶9.]     Ommen, on the other 
hand, who was represented by the Attorney General of Wyoming, did not address 
the substantive issues raised by Apodaca, but argued only that his notice of 
appeal was not timely filed and, thus, under this court's mandatory rule, 
W.R.A.P. 1.02, the supreme court is deprived of jurisdiction to consider 
Apodaca's appeal.5

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶10.]  A plaintiff is only required to give fair 
notice of his claim against the defendant in his complaint and motions to 
dismiss must be sparingly granted. Pleadings must be liberally construed in 
order to do justice to the parties. W.R.C.P. 8(a) and (b); Johnson v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1980). 
When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, the facts alleged in the complaint are 
admitted and the allegations must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo. 1983); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 734 (Wyo. 
1979). Where a complaint is dismissed on the ground that it fails to state a 
claim, the order of dismissal should also inform the plaintiff of the reasons 
for dismissal so he can make an intelligent choice as to amending his complaint. 
State Highway Commission v. Bourne, 425 P.2d 59, 63 (Wyo. 1967).

DISPOSITION

[¶11.]  Because of its dispositive nature, we 
will address Ommen's issue first. In doing so, we merely refer the reader to the 
statement of the proceedings in the district court, above, which demonstrates 
that Apodaca's notice of appeal was timely filed.

[¶12.]  As a preface to the disposition of 
Apodaca's substantive issues, we will address his claim that he is entitled to 
preferential treatment because he is proceeding pro se in this matter. This 
court has indicated that a certain leniency is accorded to anyone acting pro se; 
however, the proper administration of justice requires reasonable adherence to 
the rules and requirements of the court. Zier v. City of Powell, 526 P.2d 63 (Wyo. 
1974); and see Kost v. Thatch, 782 P.2d 230, 231 (Wyo. 1989) (and cases 
cited therein). There is no more basic requirement in the rules than that a 
complaint must state a cause of action. Likely, Apodaca has confused the 
standards applied to a pro se litigant in a state civil action with the less 
stringent standards applied to pro se litigants in actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. See, for example, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S. Ct. 173, 176, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163, 169 (1980); Hayes v. Cuyler, 475 F. Supp. 1347, 
1349 (D.C.Pa. 1979); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, n. 2188 (1981). The record in this case 
does not reveal anything but that the trial court accorded Apodaca every 
courtesy and consideration to which he was entitled.

[¶13.]  Apodaca asserts that his complaint states 
causes of action for medical malpractice, for his nonconsent to treatment by 
Kirsch and Ommen and gross negligence in the delivery of that 
treatment.

[¶14.]  The last of these we can quickly dispose 
of because it is clear from Apodaca's complaint that no treatment has been given 
him by either Kirsch or Ommen, because he refused treatment by them. For a 
discussion of the elements of negligence see ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 930 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶15.]  The four essential elements of medical 
malpractice are that: (1) there is a duty owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff; (2) failure of the defendant to perform that duty; and (3) failure to 
perform the duty has proximately caused (4) damage to the plaintiff. Fiedler v. 
Steger, 713 P.2d 773, 775 (Wyo. 1986); and see 
Harris v. Grizzle, 625 P.2d 747, 749 (Wyo. 1981). In a theoretical sense, Kirsch and 
Ommen had a duty to Apodaca. He is an inmate of the penitentiary, and the Board 
of Charities and Reform has a statutory, as well as a constitutional, duty to 
provide appropriate care for him. Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 15-16; W.S. 25-1-104 
and 25-1-106 (July 1990 Repl.); and see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 
(1976). One method of fulfilling that obligation is for the board to provide 
adequate medical care. However, Apodaca's complaint fails on the other three 
elements of medical malpractice. He did not allege that Kirsch and Ommen failed 
to perform their duties; indeed, they were trying to, but he refused to permit 
them to provide treatment to him. Thus, they did not fail to perform their 
duties and there could be no resultant damages to Apodaca under these 
circumstances.

[¶16.]  Finally, Apodaca appears to assert that 
his nonconsent to treatment by Kirsch and Ommen states a cause of action and 
that he has the right to be treated by Wilcox.6 Apodaca states no authority for 
this proposition. The authorities extant are quite the opposite, i.e., one of 
the incidences of incarceration is loss of the privilege to demand the medical 
care of the prisoner's choice and submission of his medical needs to the 
practitioners made available by the penal institution. U.S. v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1987); Roberts v. Spalding, 783 F.2d 867, 870 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930, 107 S. Ct. 399, 93 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1986); Harding 
v. Kuhlmann, 588 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 n. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affirmed by 
memorandum 762 F.2d 990 (2nd Cir. 1985); Gahagan v. Pennsylvania Board of 
Probation and Parole, 444 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (E.D.Pa. 1978); Coppinger v. 
Townsend, 398 F.2d 392, 394 (10th Cir. 1968); Cooper v. State, 97 Idaho 781, 554 P.2d 959, 960-61 (1976); Gobert and Cohen, Rights of Prisoners, § 11.10 
(Shepard's/McGraw-Hill 181) (and see 1990 Cum.Supp.). While these decisions are 
couched in terms of there being no constitutional right to treatment of the 
inmate's choice, we hold that an inmate has no right to demand the treatment or 
medical practitioner of his choice. The failure of the prison administrator to 
provide the demanded treatment, by itself, does not state a cause of 
action.

[¶17.]  A rule somewhat to the contrary is 
suggested by Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890-91 (1st Cir. 1980) which 
opined, in dicta, that refusal to provide an inmate with the type of medical 
care requested may raise a colorable claim of negligence. That opinion does not 
go so far as to say that the inmate is entitled to see the physician, 
chiropractor, or other health care provider of his choice, but it does suggest 
that if the inmate demands, for example, to see a chiropractor rather than an 
orthopedic surgeon that that request should be honored. Also, Hazel and Janeen 
Kerper list refusal to provide the kind of medical care demanded by the prisoner 
as one issue that arises in the general area of medical care for prison inmates, 
but no authority is cited for the proposition that a prisoner may demand a 
particular practitioner. H. Kerper & J. Kerper, Legal Rights of the 
Convicted at 435 (1974). However, even assuming the existence of such a claim, 
the proper defendants in such a case would appear to be the warden of the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary and The Board of Charities and Reform. Clearly, 
Kirsch and Ommen are not the proper defendants for such a claim. We note that, 
as a general rule, courts follow a "hands off" policy with regard to the 
administration of penal institutions, recognizing that the care and management 
of prison inmates lies in the hands of the prison administration. Apodaca v. 
Rodriguez, 84 N.M. 338, 503 P.2d 318, 320 (1972) (citing Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1969)). In any event, consistent with our holding above, we 
decline to establish a rule that a prison inmate may demand a particular form of 
treatment or the services of a particular health care provider.

[¶18.]  Apodaca next claims that the district 
court should have converted the motions to dismiss to motions for summary 
judgment because Kirsch and Ommen raised affirmative defenses. We do not 
perceive that any matters outside the pleadings were presented to and not 
excluded by the district court as contemplated by the final sentence of W.R.C.P. 
12(b). In any event, whether the case is treated as one disposed of under 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) or as a motion for summary judgment under W.R.C.P. 56, our 
disposition is the same because the argument would not produce a result any 
different from that we have settled on. Thus, it is not necessary that it be 
further addressed.

[¶19.]  Finally, in response to Apodaca's 
argument that the district court erred, and Apodaca was surprised to his 
prejudice, by the trial court's permitting Kirsch and Ommen to orally argue 
affirmative defenses (for example, immunity), we need only say that the district 
court's decision was that Apodaca's complaint did not state claims upon which 
relief could be granted and there could not possibly be any prejudice to Apodaca 
under these circumstances. Assuming, arguendo, that the district court was in 
error in permitting Kirsch and Ommen to so argue, it is, at worst, an error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights and 
is, thus, harmless. W.R.A.P. 7.04.

[¶20.]  The district court's orders dismissing 
the complaint did not specify whether or not the dismissal was with prejudice. 
Under the language of W.R.C.P. 41(b) the dismissal would appear to be one on the 
merits, thus precluding further pleadings as to Kirsch and Ommen. However, the 
authorities are mixed on this question and we do not perceive this as the 
appropriate case in which to decide the issue with finality. See 9 C. Wright and 
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2373, at 238-42 (1971). Under the 
somewhat unique circumstances of this case, including, but not limited to, that 
the district court did not provide an explanation of its decision to Apodaca 
either in the form of a decision letter or in the form of a brief explanation in 
the orders themselves, we do not perceive the dismissals as res judicata should 
Apodaca choose to file additional pleadings in this matter.

[¶21.]  The orders of the district court 
dismissing the complaint are affirmed.

URBIGKIT, C.J., filed a 
dissenting opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 Both in the complaint 
and in Milo E. Wilcox's yellow pages advertisement, he is referred to as Dr. 
Milo E. Wilcox. We note that § 33-10-109 (1987 Replacement), 
provides:

Chiropractors licensed 
under this act * * * shall have the right to practice chiropractic in accordance 
with the method taught in the chiropractic schools and colleges recognized by 
the chiropractic board of examiners of this state. The prefix "Dr." or "doctor" 
shall not appear on any display sign before the name of the practitioner; but 
shall appear in connection with the title "doctor of chiropractic." Such title 
shall appear in the same size type as name of practitioner.

2 Apodaca never identified 
by name any of the penitentiary administrators that he refers to in his 
complaint.

3 Reference was made in 
Ommen's brief to the position of Kirsch. Moreover, the wording of Rule 301, 
Uniform Rules for the District Courts, does not mandate a brief in all 
cases:

Rule 301. Filing of 
Motions.

     Each motion filed, 
except motions for summary judgment, shall set out the specific point or points 
upon which the motion was brought, and may be accompanied by a concise brief. No 
answer brief is required. There will be no specific motion day. When required, 
hearing of motions will be set on request of counsel or by motion assignment 
issued by the court. Motions may be submitted on brief if desired. All motions 
not called up or set for hearing within 60 days after filing will automatically 
be denied, with 10 days then allowed for pleading.

     The positions of both 
Ommen and Kirsch were clear, whether we give special deference to Apodaca's 
pro se status, or not. His task was to counter assertions that his 
complaint failed to state a claim of malpractice or any other recognizable 
claim. Not only was Apodaca sufficiently on notice of what it was he was called 
upon to do, but under circumstances such as these the district court might have 
sua sponte dismissed the complaint without Kirsch or Ommen having filed a 
motion. Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1989); 5A C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1357, at 301 n. 3 (1990).

     Of course, the most 
important consideration in this instance is that Apodaca did not raise a 
violation of Rule 301 as an issue on appeal.

4 The transcript of the 
hearing, if one was requested to be made, was not included as a part of the 
record on appeal by Apodaca. He did designate the transcript as a part of the 
record on appeal, but there was no certification that the transcript had been 
ordered and arrangements made to pay for it.

5 The decision not to 
brief the case on the merits does not appear to have been prudent, especially 
when a careful reading of the applicable rules demonstrates so clearly that the 
notice of appeal was timely. Nonetheless, under our established precedents we 
can perceive no reason why Ommen should not receive the full benefit of our 
decision. Kvenild v. Taylor, 594 P.2d 972, 978 (Wyo. 1979) [benefit of reversed 
judgment given to nonappealing party because rights of parties were so 
intermingled and interests of justice required such action]. In cases where 
appellees were not heard for one reason or another, this court has nonetheless 
fully disposed of the issues. Fallis v. Louisiana Pacific Corporation, 763 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Wyo. 1988) [court indicated that if appellant could make good cause 
showing why his brief was filed late the court would consider his brief, but 
that the appellee would not be heard in any event because its brief was also 
filed late]; Nuspl v. Nuspl, 717 P.2d 341, 343 n. 2 (Wyo. 1986) [no appearance 
for appellee]; Meeker v. Lanham, 604 P.2d 556, 557 (Wyo. 1979) [appellees not 
heard because their brief was filed late].

6 We note from the record 
that one of Apodaca's primary concerns was that a referral to an orthopedic 
surgeon meant that he would be subjected to some sort of surgical intervention, 
rather than the external treatments provided by a chiropractor. Although most 
people suffer a back problem sometimes in their lives, only about two percent 
require surgical treatment. Moreover, most such problems are treated 
nonsurgically by many of the same treatment modalities employed by 
chiropractors. Carroll, Orthopedics and Trauma Surgery, pp. 11A, 44A-50B (Facts 
on File 1989); Langone, Chiropractors: A Consumer's Guide, Chs. 6-9 
(Addison-Wesley Publishing Company 1982).

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶22.]  Although to a reasonable degree I may 
accept the established idea that in litigation the pro se litigant should not be 
given particular advantage but generally held to the same standard of 
performance as those persons represented by a licensed attorney, Korkow v. 
Markle, 746 P.2d 434 (Wyo. 1987); Nicholls v. Nicholls, 721 P.2d 1103 (Wyo. 
1986); Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984), I would, however, strongly urge 
that he or she be given a chance if not perhaps even an equal chance. Perceiving 
a lack of that result in this case, I dissent.

[¶23.]  We should look at what actually happened 
where one of the two appellees won in district court without supporting a motion 
to dismiss with anything, brief or otherwise, beyond a bare motion prior to the 
date of hearing and the other litigant now succeeds in securing an affirmation 
of the dismissed judgment in this court without addressing the subject in any 
briefing filed in this court.

[¶24.]  Appellant, while incarcerated in the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary, brings this civil action pro se against appellees, 
the medical services director, Janet Ommen, R.N., and a contract doctor for the 
penitentiary, Archie Kirsch, M.D. All of this started so simply. Appellant came 
to the Wyoming State Penitentiary with an established worker's compensation 
benefit entitlement for a temporary disability payment derived in award from 
testimony of a Cheyenne, Wyoming chiropractor, Milo E. Wilcox, D.C. Appellant 
wanted to continue treatment from Dr. Wilcox in order to continue receiving his 
temporary total disability benefits.

[¶25.]  For reasons known only to them and 
certainly not apparent from this record, Ommen and Kirsch wanted appellant to be 
examined by a Casper, Wyoming orthopedic doctor instead of the treating 
Cheyenne 
chiropractor. The danger in discontinuance of worker's compensation injury 
benefits was self-evident to appellant with the result being that he resisted 
and then finally sued Ommen and Kirsch for denial of his civil rights for 
continuation of examination and care by the treating chiropractor. The driving 
distance from Rawlins, Wyoming to Casper as 
compared from Rawlins to Cheyenne was not so notably different that a 
particular cost differential in travel expenses is observable and certainly not 
demonstrated within this record.

[¶26.]  Suit was filed by appellant pro se on 
January 9, 1990, to be followed by a motion to dismiss by Ommen through one law 
firm and a motion to dismiss by Kirsch through another law firm. In accord with 
the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming, Ommen filed a 
memorandum to support the W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion:

     Each motion filed, 
except motions for summary judgment, shall set out the specific point or points 
upon which the motion is brought, and may be accompanied by a concise brief. No 
answer brief is required. There will be no specific motion day. When required, 
hearing of motions will be set on request of counsel or by motion assignment 
issued by the court. Motions may be submitted on brief if desired. All motions 
not called up or set for hea[r]ing within 60 days after filing will 
automatically be denied, with 10 days then allowed for pleading.

Rule 301, Uniform Rules 
for the District Courts. 

[¶27.]  Each motion followed the normal W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) form for "failure to state a claim" and neither defined by the motion 
or by accompanying memorandum in what regard their contentions should be 
sustained as a generic attack on a rather specific complaint of twenty-three 
paragraphs.

[¶28.]  A subsequent brief was filed by Ommen to 
center on the subject of a reasonable care standard for persons confined in a 
penitentiary and in no way addressed the subject of worker's compensation 
evaluation and treatment which, of course, was the subject presented by 
appellant. Kirsch did even less in supporting his W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion and 
clearly did nothing in any way prior to the hearing date by written memorandum 
or otherwise to comply with Rule 301, Uniform Rules for the District Courts. A 
copy of a brief signed by Kirsch's attorney dated February 26, 1990 shows a 
mailing certificate of February 26, 1990 and is found in the record with a 
filing date stamp of February 27, 1990, although the instrument itself is not 
shown in the district court clerk's index of instruments included in the record. 
Obviously the original must have been carried from Casper to the hearing on 
February 27 in Rawlins, and since no record of the hearing is available, there 
is no way to tell when, if ever, appellant received a copy. Appellant certainly 
did not receive a copy in advance of the scheduled Rawlins hearing.

[¶29.]  Following receipt of both motions to 
dismiss and one memorandum, appellant pursued a diligent effort to protect his 
pro se interest in the litigation. Following the February 13, 1990 Ommen 
dismissal memorandum, appellant filed on February 16 a "Motion for Order 
Directing Pre-Hearing Written Argument and Memoranda and Rescheduling Hearing"; 
on February 20, he filed a "Motion to Restrict Argument at Hearing to Those 
Issues Upon Which Written Argument Has Been Submitted by the Defendants" and 
"Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss"; on February 21, he 
filed a "Request for Written Deposition" to secure testimony of his treating 
medical witness Dr. Wilcox, and "Plaintiff's Supplemental Response to 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss"; and on February 27, he filed a "Notice and 
Motion for Restraining Order" followed by the hearing held in Rawlins on 
February 27, 1990.1

[¶30.]  Appellant then filed a "Motion for New 
Trial or to Alter or Amend the Judgment" responsive to the hearing at which the 
district judge had orally advised that the motions to dismiss would be 
sustained. No court order was ever entered in decision of the "Motion for New 
Trial or to Alter or Amend the Judgment" and, consequently, appellant proceeded 
further by the appeal presently pending in this court.

[¶31.]  Appellant filed a comprehensive brief in 
this court addressing the substantive subjects of both W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion 
dismissals and stating four issues:

     1. Whether the 
complaint states a claim for medical malpractice, and whether the district court 
erred in dismissing the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P.

     2. Whether the 
district court erred in failing to consider the Appellees' motions to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., as orally argued at the hearing, as motions for 
summary judgment under Rule 56, W.R.C.P.

     3. Whether the 
district court erred in allowing the Appellees to orally plead affirmative 
defenses which had not been argues [sic] in writing, thus imposing an 
impermissible surprise upon the Plaintiff.

     4. Whether the 
district court erred in holding the pro se plaintiff to the same, or higher, 
standards, as an attorney would have been.

[¶32.]  Appellant also provided a specifically 
requested brief by order of this court addressing timeliness of his appeal. 
Kirsch and Ommen both addressed the timeliness issue, but this time Ommen did 
not address in any way the substantive issues presented by appellant. In 
essence, Ommen submitted her case to this court as appellee without brief, but 
this time Kirsch provided a timely substantive argument which he had not 
provided to secure the original W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal order in district 
court.2

[¶33.]  Perhaps since this court permits 
appellant to replead, which in my analysis was originally sufficient under the 
circumstances in any event to withstand the W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motions, the case 
in its absurd posture does not deserve further appellate time spent in writing 
here. What happened, however, to this pro se litigant is incomprehensible even 
to have been acceptable where each party might have been represented by 
counsel.

[¶34.]  In the first place, I believe the Uniform 
Rules for the District Courts should be enforced within the intended purpose or 
repealed completely. Osborne v. State, 806 P.2d 272 (Wyo. 1991) (

Nos. 90-66, 67, 68, 
decided 2/11/91), Urbigkit, C.J., specially concurring; Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118 (Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, C.J., specially 
concurring; Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, C.J., specially 
concurring. Secondly, there is no proper way that the W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion 
dismissals were justified without reference to extrinsic facts, and proper 
notice for adequate conversion to summary judgment under W.R.C.P. 56 was 
certainly not provided. One of the most concise yet complete analyses of 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is provided in Texas West Oil and Gas Corp. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857, 868 
(Wyo. 1987), 
Thomas, J., dissenting:

"According to our 
standard of review we will sustain a dismissal of a complaint only if it shows 
on its face that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under any set of 
facts. Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1299 (1980). In considering 
such a motion, the `facts alleged in the complaint are admitted and the 
allegations must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.' Moxley v. 
Laramie Builders, Inc., Wyo., 600 P.2d 733, 734 (1979). Dismissal is a 
drastic remedy, and is sparingly granted. Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 599 P.2d 580 
(1979)." Mostert v. CBL & Associates, et al., Wyo., 741 P.2d 1090, 1092 
(1987).

See Torrey v. Twiford, 
713 P.2d 1160 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶35.]  In reflecting on the disposition made by 
this court, I do not know what we do with our often repeated rule that 
contentions unsupported by proper briefing and cogent argument should not avail 
the non-performing litigant. Kipp v. Brown, 750 P.2d 1338 (Wyo. 1988); JonesLand and Livestock Co. v. Federal Land 
Bank of Omaha, 733 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 1987); Zanetti v. Zanetti, 689 P.2d 1116 (Wyo. 1984). We serve in 
this case to represent the represented in denial of justice to the unrepresented 
pro se litigant. Cf. Kipp, 750 P.2d 1338.

[¶36.]  Pro se litigants may not be justified in 
receipt of favored treatment, but equal treatment and some degree of intrinsic 
fairness is required under the rights guaranteed by Wyo. Const. art. 1 and 
amendments, including the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
even to be granted to the incarcerated litigant when he proceeds pro se to seek 
a remedy for a claimed denial of justice.

[¶37.]  Consequently, I would reverse the 
dismissals, send the case back to the district court and then contemplate a more 
adequate performance before a pro se litigant may be precipitously denied his 
search to claim justice. I reject W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal provided without 
justified legal support, opportunity to amend, or even opportunity of the 
litigant to properly respond at an unrepresented hearing. I now reject affirming 
the initial decision when one of the litigants, the State of Wyoming, does not even 
bother to respond by appellate briefing to this court.

[¶38.]  Consequently, I 
dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 The dispositive orders 
provided:

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
JANET OMMEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS

     The above-entitled 
matter having come before the Court on Defendant Janet Ommen's motion to 
dismiss, and the Court having fully and carefully reviewed and considered the 
motion, and after hearing held on February 27, 1990, commencing at 9:00 A.M., 
upon hearing all matters pertinent thereto, and being fully advised in the 
premises, finds:

     That plaintiff's 
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P.

     IT IS THEREFORE 
ORDERED that the complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed; defendant's motion to 
dismiss is granted.

     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that plaintiff's motion for restraining order, and motion to restrict argument 
at hearing, and motion for order directing written argument and rescheduling are 
hereby denied.

DATED this 5 day of 
March, 1990.

ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL

     THIS MATTER having 
come before the Court on Defendant Archie Kirsch's Motion to Dismiss and the 
parties having appeared in person or through counsel; and the Court having heard 
argument and authority in a hearing on February 27, 1990; and the Court being 
advised of the law and facts of the case DOTH FIND:

     1. That the 
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in 
that it fails to allege the necessary elements of medical malpractice or any 
other cause of action.

     2. That the case 
should be dismissed.

     NOW THEREFORE IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Plaintiff's Complaint against the Defendant, Archie 
Kirsch, M.D. be dismissed and Defendant's Motion be granted.

     DATED this 8 day of 
March, 1990.

2 Appellant recognized 
that the State in behalf of Ommen had not filed a brief and consequently, 
lacking the opportunity to appear for oral argument and expecting that the case 
would be heard by expedited docket as it was, filed a motion for order that 
Ommen not be heard on the appeal and a motion for order adopting appellant's 
statement of proceedings as true and correct for purposes of this 
appeal.

With some thoughtfulness, 
appellant stated in his motion:

     The Appellant filed 
his "Brief of Appellant" and "Statement of Proceedings Under Rule 4.03, 
W.R.A.P." on September 7, 1990. Appellee Kirsch did file a brief, but did not 
respond to the Appellant's Rule 4.03 Statement of Proceedings. Appellee Ommen 
has not filed a brief and has not responded to Appellant's Statement of 
Proceedings (Appellee Ommen did file a secondary brief purportedly addressing 
the timeliness of the Appellant's Notice of Appeal, pursuant to this Court's 
June 22, 1990 order, but has not filed a brief addressing the issues of the 
appeal). Pursuant to Rule 5.11, W.R.A.P., Appellee Ommen now may not be heard on 
the appeal. Further, as neither Appellee has contradicted Appellant's Rule 4.03 
Statement of Proceedings, the facts stated therein must now be considered to be 
true for purposes of this appeal.

     Wherefore, Appellant 
moves the Court for Its orders directing that Appellee Ommen may not now be 
heard on the appeal, and adopting the facts stated in Appellant's Rule 4.03 
Statement of Proceedings as true for purposes of this appeal.

The State did not respond 
to the motion.