Case Title: HELM v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1559

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
HELM v. STATE2000 WY 561 P.3d 635Case Number: 99-21, 99-22, &, 99-23Decided: 03/24/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
JAMES BRYAN HELM, 
Appellant (Defendant), v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Teton County, Honorable D. Terry Rogers, 
Judge.

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Michael 
Dinnerstein, Assistant Appellate Counsel,*Representing 
Appellant.Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and 
James L. Radda, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Representing 
Appellee.

* Order Granting 
Dinnerstein's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on Behalf of the Appellant entered 
May 18, 1999.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, JJ.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] James Bryan 
Helm (Helm) appeals from his convictions for forgery and obtaining property by 
false pretenses. He claims he was denied his constitutional rights to due 
process and a fair trial because the trial court refused to order production of 
exculpatory evidence, the prosecutor committed misconduct, and the court induced 
him to plead guilty by misrepresenting its sentencing authority. Finding no 
judicial error or prosecutorial misconduct, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Helm 
presents this statement of the issues:

I. Did the court deprive 
Appellant of his constitutional rights to exculpatory evidence by refusing to 
order production of the complainant's tax records?

II. Did the prosecution 
deprive Appellant of his due process right to a fair trial by urging the jury to 
convict Appellant because he was a professional while the complainant was not, 
since Appellant had not presented a handwriting expert of his own, and on a 
theory that the evidence precluded?

III. Did the court 
deprive Appellant of his constitutional right to due process by inducing him to 
plead guilty by falsely representing that it had the power to suspend sentences 
imposed by a California federal court?

[¶3] The state 
presents the following arguments:

Argument 
I

Defense counsel abandoned 
any claim to the victim's tax records; the prosecution did not suppress the 
records in that the prosecution never possessed the records; the prosecution had 
no duty to seek out information not in its possession; and defense counsel had 
access to the tax returns before trial through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence.

Argument 
II

The state did not urge 
the jury to convict Appellant based on his status as a professional; nor did the 
state shift the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense; nor did the 
state urge the jury to convict Appellant on a theory precluded by the 
evidence.

Argument 
III

The record of the change 
of plea and sentencing hearing has been corrected, there is no evidence that the 
district court deprived Appellant of his constitutional right to due process by 
inducing him to plead guilty by falsely representing that it had the power to 
suspend the defendant's federal sentence.

FACTS

[¶4] In January 
1995, a federal district court in California sentenced Helm on several felony 
counts. In June of that year, he was free on bond pending appeal and living in 
Wyoming. He started a business consulting firm called International Management 
Corporation, which he ran from his home and of which he was the sole 
employee.

[¶5] The victim 
in this case owned a small business and hired Helm in June 1995 as a business 
consultant and bookkeeper. Helm's bookkeeping duties included paying the 
victim's bills with checks drawn on the victim's account. Helm filled in the 
date, amount, and payee sections of the checks and then submitted them to the 
victim to be signed. He was also responsible for maintaining and balancing the 
victim's checkbook and keeping a computer record of the credits and debits to 
the checking account.

[¶6] Helm and 
the victim agreed on a fee of $850 per month for Helm's services, but the first 
payment Helm received was in the amount of $1,200. The victim later explained: 
"I think I was going to pay him a little bit more to start off because the books 
were a little bit behind and getting the books going." The victim subsequently 
signed five $850 checks payable to Helm for his monthly fee. After becoming 
convinced that Helm was forging his signature on unauthorized checks, the victim 
fired Helm on December 23, 1995, and informed the county sheriff's 
office.

[¶7] On July 12, 
1996, the state charged Helm with five counts of forgery and five counts of 
obtaining property by false pretenses. The Information was later amended to 
include six counts of forgery and two counts of obtaining property by false 
pretenses. Those charges are identified as Case No. 1559. While Helm was 
awaiting trial on Case No. 1559, the state filed two more cases against him. In 
Case No. 1599, it charged Helm with nine counts of forgery involving another 
victim. In Case No. 1603, the state charged Helm with a single count of forgery 
against yet another victim.

[¶8] The trial 
court held a jury trial on Case No. 1559 on April 27 through May 5, 1998. The 
jury found Helm guilty on all eight counts. On August 7, 1998, pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Helm pleaded guilty to the charges in Case No. 1599 and Case No. 
1603. In Case No. 1559, the trial court sentenced Helm to eight concurrent 
prison terms of eight to ten years, to run consecutively to his federal 
sentence. In Case No. 1599, Helm received nine prison terms of six to ten years, 
to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to that in Case No. 1559 
and the federal sentence. For Case No. 1603, the court imposed a six- to 
ten-year prison sentence, to run consecutively to the other sentences. Helm 
appeals from his conviction and sentences to this Court.

DISCUSSION

Discovery 
Motion

[¶9] Helm 
attempts to validate this claim of error on several bases. The gist of the 
asserted error is that Helm was not provided with certain of the victim's income 
tax returns and that those income tax returns might have demonstrated the victim 
treated Helm's alleged monetary crimes as legitimate business expenses rather 
than losses. Helm goes on to contend that the information would have been vital 
for him to demonstrate that the crimes he was accused of simply did not occur 
and the victim had acknowledged this in his tax returns.

[¶10] First, 
Helm contends he was denied the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him 
- in particular, the victim of his crimes. For this proposition, he relies on 
State v. Salazar, 898 P.2d 982, 987-88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). In that case, the 
trial court granted a motion in limine prohibiting the defense from impeaching 
two of the principal witnesses against the defendant with their juvenile 
records. The appellate court held that grant of the motion in limine was an 
abuse of discretion, that the circumstances of the juvenile convictions and the 
presence of those two witnesses at the scene of the crime inclined them to 
testify favorably for the state in hopes of avoiding proceedings to revoke their 
probation, and that the error in disallowing the evidence in dispute could not 
be considered harmless because it was so central to the defense's theory of its 
case. Of course, none of those circumstances appear in this case. Indeed, the 
record discloses that Helm was afforded a full opportunity to cross-examine the 
victim in this case.

[¶11] Helm also 
claims that he was entitled to the tax returns pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
16(a)(1)(C). Helm apparently contends the tax returns were discoverable under 
that rule. However, the rule provides that only such documents "which are within 
the possession, custody or control of the state, and which are material to the 
preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended for use by the state as 
evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the 
defendant" are subject to discovery and inspection under that rule. W.R.Cr.P. 
16(a)(1)(C). It was, and continues to be, the position of the state that it 
never had possession of the victim's tax returns, and there is nothing in the 
record to suggest to the contrary. Thus, the disputed tax records were not 
subject to discovery under W.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(1)(C).

[¶12] Next, Helm 
asserts that he specifically asked for discovery/production of the tax returns 
in a motion for discovery. In response to that motion, the state contended the 
tax returns were not relevant to any issues raised in the case. In the hearing 
on pending motions, the trial court specifically asked if there were "any issues 
pertaining to discovery," and the defense responded: "I think it's resolved, 
judge."

[¶13] Finally, 
Helm alludes to a Brady1 violation, contending that the 
state withheld exculpatory evidence from him. The exculpatory evidence alluded 
to are the tax returns requested in the defense's discovery motion. Our 
decisions with respect to Brady violations are very clear. Rodriguez v. State, 
962 P.2d 141, 145 (Wyo. 1998). The burden of establishing the Brady violation is 
on Helm. Id. The first element of that burden is to prove the suppression of 
evidence. Id. This record simply does not disclose that any evidence was 
suppressed by the state. The second element Helm has to prove is that the 
evidence would have been favorable to him. Id. The theory proposed by Helm in 
this regard is at most speculation that the victim's tax returns might have 
shown that all sums paid to Helm were treated as business expenses rather than 
losses. Exactly what difference that would make under the Internal Revenue Code 
is not included in the argument, and we decline to attempt to ferret out that 
information. Helm worked for the victim during only the calendar year 1995. The 
crimes Helm committed occurred in 1995, and his Judgment and Sentence was not 
entered until September of 1998. Helm's discovery request was for tax returns 
for the years 1994, 1995, and 1996. Even if it were to be presumed that those 
tax returns might show Helm's crimes being treated as ordinary business 
expenses, that would not go to disproving any element of the crimes with which 
Helm was charged, nor could it serve to impeach the victim. The third element 
Helm had to prove was that the evidence was material. In the context of a Brady 
challenge, materiality is a mixed question of law and fact, and a reviewing 
court should conduct an independent examination of the record in determining 
whether the suppressed evidence is material. Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 638 
(Wyo. 1996).

[¶14] The United 
States Supreme Court has also held that "`evidence is material only if there is 
a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A "reasonable 
probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.'" Relish [v. State], 860 P.2d [455,] 460 [(Wyo. 1993)] (quoting United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 
(1985)).

Spencer v. 
State, 925 P.2d 994, 998 (Wyo. 1996).

[¶15] To the 
extent Helm has raised an issue with respect to the application of the Brady 
rule, we conclude he has failed to demonstrate that the state suppressed 
evidence which was favorable to him. Our comprehensive examination of the record 
reveals that, even if the disputed tax returns had been made available through 
discovery or through Helm's Brady request, they likely would not have been 
admissible as to any matter or issue in dispute in this case and there is not a 
reasonable probability their admission would have resulted in a different 
outcome to these proceedings. We are unable to discern any error with respect to 
Helm's inability or failure to obtain copies of the disputed tax 
records.

Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

[¶16] Helm next 
claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by urging the jury to convict him 
because he was a professional, because he did not present his own handwriting 
expert, and on a theory precluded by the evidence. We review claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct under the following standard:

The general rule in 
Wyoming is that a failure to interpose a timely objection to improper argument 
is treated as a waiver, unless the prosecutor's misconduct is so flagrant as to 
constitute plain error, requiring reversal. Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 
1115 (Wyo. 1992). A plain error analysis requires the appellant to demonstrate 
the violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, clearly reflected in the 
record, resulting in the abridgment of a substantial right of the party to his 
material prejudice. Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 232 (Wyo. 1997). We are 
reluctant to find plain error in closing arguments "lest the trial court becomes 
required to control argument because opposing counsel does not object." James v. 
State, 888 P.2d 200, 207 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 659 
(Wyo. 1993)).

[¶17] In 
analyzing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we consider the prosecutor's 
argument in the context in which it was made and with regard to the evidence 
produced at trial. Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 659 (Wyo. 1993). Although 
counsel are allowed great latitude in the argument of cases, argument must be 
kept within the evidence. Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384 (Wyo. 1992). 
Statements calculated to inflame, prejudice or mislead the jury are not 
permitted. Taul, 862 P.2d  at 659. Montoya v. State, 971 P.2d 134, 136 (Wyo. 
1998).

[¶18] Helm 
begins his prosecutorial misconduct argument by contending the prosecutor urged 
the jury to convict him because he was a professional and his victim was not. He 
points to ten instances where the prosecutor allegedly sought to inflame the 
jurors by appealing to class prejudice. In his opening statement, the 
prosecutor: (1) described Helm's crime as "[s]tealing with a pen and paper"; (2) 
said the victim was not academically inclined but worked with his hands; and (3) 
said the victim, despite his lack of formal education, could recognize his own 
signature. On direct examination of the victim, the prosecutor elicited 
testimony that: (4) the victim could read and write only "[s]o-so"; and (5) 
worked with his hands and hired Helm to work as a bookkeeper, not to work with 
his hands. On cross-examination of Helm, the prosecutor: (6) elicited testimony 
that Helm, unlike the victim, never got his hands dirty at work; (7) elicited 
testimony that Helm had more computer expertise than the victim; and (8) 
attempted to elicit testimony that the victim was a good mechanic but had 
minimal verbal skills. In closing arguments, the prosecutor: (9) told a 
fictional story about a well-dressed gentleman pickpocket, to whom he compared 
Helm; and (10) told the jury: "The bad news is this: I have to go through many 
of these exhibits, and I promise not to take one more minute than I have to. The 
good news is that you're going to see how white collar crime is committed in 
this country, with a pen and a paper." Helm contends these instances invited the 
jury to convict him based on dislike for the well-educated or sympathy for those 
who work with their hands.

[¶19] Of the 
instances complained of here, defense counsel objected at trial to only number 
eight, an attempt to have Helm testify that his verbal skills were far superior 
to those of the victim. The trial court overruled that objection, but the 
prosecutor was unable to get Helm to agree that he found the victim's verbal 
skills inferior. Helm was not impermissibly prejudiced by this exchange for two 
reasons. First, evidence of a disparity in verbal skills was relevant to show 
why the victim became reliant upon Helm's allegedly superior abilities. Second, 
the jurors had ample opportunity to hear both Helm and the victim testify 
extensively, which provided them a basis for assessing their relative verbal 
abilities independent of the prosecutor's assertion.

[¶20] Defense 
counsel did not object to the remainder of the instances that Helm now cites as 
misconduct. Absent a timely objection at trial, we review claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct under the plain error standard and assign to appellant 
the burden of proving prejudice. Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339, 346 (Wyo. 
1990). The three instances in the prosecutor's opening statement accurately 
reflected evidence that the prosecutor intended to present and prepared the jury 
for the victim's testimony that his signatures on the questioned checks were not 
genuine. The victim's direct examination testimony and Helm's cross-examination 
testimony were relevant to show the disparity in education and expertise that 
led the victim to rely on Helm's bookkeeping services.

[¶21] The 
prosecutor's characterization, in closing arguments, of Helm as a gentleman 
pickpocket is almost flattering compared to the closing argument we reviewed in 
Tennant. There, we declined to find plain error in a closing argument wherein 
the prosecutor referred to the defendant as "a leech, a blood sucker, and a 
predator on society" and suggested he "might go out and find crippled children 
to pick on next." 786 P.2d  at 346. Finally, the "bad news, good news" portion of 
the prosecutor's closing argument simply summarized for the jury what he planned 
to say. A plain error analysis requires the appellant to demonstrate the 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, clearly reflected in the 
record, resulting in the abridgment of a substantial right to his material 
prejudice. Because Helm has not shown such, we hold that none of the challenged 
instances were prosecutorial misconduct.

[¶22] Helm next 
contends the prosecutor impermissibly urged the jury to convict him because he 
did not present a handwriting expert at trial. The challenged statement occurred 
during the prosecutor's rebuttal argument:

Now, sometimes you can 
tell more about someone's position by what they don't say as opposed to what 
they say. And, you know, the State doesn't have a monopoly on getting an expert 
witness, on getting a question[ed] documents examiner. The defense could have 
gotten another question[ed] documents examiner. They didn't. What [the 
prosecution's expert witness] said is that these were simulations. And he gave 
very concrete evidence.

[¶23] Helm 
claims the statement shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the 
defense. Viewed in context, however, the statement was a comment on the absence 
of evidentiary support for the defense's theory that the victim actually signed 
all the questioned checks himself. As this Court has said: "`It is not improper 
for the government to draw attention to the failure of lack of evidence on a 
point if it is not intended to call attention to the failure of the defendant to 
testify.'" Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 358 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Stanton v. 
State, 692 P.2d 947, 949 (Wyo. 1984)). We hold the challenged statement was not 
misconduct.

[¶24] In his 
final assertion of prosecutorial misconduct, Helm argues the prosecutor, in his 
closing argument, urged the jury to convict him on a theory that was precluded 
by the evidence. The state presented a theory that the initial payment to Helm 
of $1,200 was for his bookkeeping services during the months of June and July 
1995. In the argument to which Helm objects, the prosecutor argued that Helm had 
received checks bearing the victim's genuine signature sufficient to compensate 
him for the months of August through December and, therefore, was not entitled 
to two $850 checks which bore forged signatures. The defense responded with its 
theory that the $1,200 was a fee for a separate analysis of the victim's 
business and Helm was entitled to monthly payments of $850 for his bookkeeping 
fees beginning in June. According to Helm, the seven checks in the amount of 
$850 compensated him for his bookkeeping services in the months of June through 
December 1995, and the state should have been precluded from arguing otherwise. 
Because defense counsel did not offer a timely objection, we review using the 
plain error standard.

[¶25] The 
evidence shows that Helm received three checks in the amount of $850 each, dated 
in the month of November 1995, and that two of them bore forged signatures. 
Helm's argument here does not account for the multiple payments or forgeries. We 
hold the jury could have reasonably concluded from the evidence presented that 
the victim paid Helm $1,200 for June and July and $850 for each of the next five 
months. That conclusion leaves Helm with no legitimate claim to the two 
remaining $850 checks, from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that 
he was the person who forged them. Because the evidence supported the state's 
theory, we hold the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by urging the jury to 
convict on that theory.

False Representations by 
Trial Court

[¶26] In his 
final assignment of error, Helm claims the trial court deprived him of due 
process by inducing him to plead guilty by falsely representing that it had the 
power to suspend a sentence imposed by a federal court in California. He bases 
that claim on a transcript of his sentencing hearing in which the trial court is 
reported to have said: "The Court has the discretion to order the sentences in 
number 1599 and 1603 to run concurrently with or consecutively with the sentence 
in criminal number 1559; and suspend the sentence in the United States District 
Court in California in case number 93-545(A)." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶27] Both the 
official court reporter and a freelance reporter attended and reported Helm's 
change of plea and sentencing hearing on August 7, 1998. In preparing his brief 
for this appeal, Helm relied on the transcript of the freelance reporter. Upon 
receipt of Helm's brief, the state examined the transcript from the official 
reporter and found a discrepancy. The state then filed a Motion to Correct 
Record, asking the trial court to find the freelance reporter had erred and the 
official reporter had correctly reported the hearing. The court so ordered. As 
corrected, the contested portion of the record now reads: "The Court has the 
discretion to order the sentences in number 1599 and 1603 to run concurrently 
with or consecutively to the sentence in criminal number 1559; and the 
defendant's sentence in the United States District Court of California in case 
number 93-545(A)." (Emphasis added.)

[¶28] The 
corrected record accurately reflects the contents of a plea agreement signed by 
Helm and the state prior to the hearing. The record having been corrected, 
Helm's argument is unsupported and must fail.

[¶29] The 
judgments and sentences of the trial court are affirmed in all 
respects.

1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).