Case Title: Henington v. State Board of Bar Examiners

Citation: 291 P.2d 1108, 60 N.M. 393

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1956-01-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
291 P.2d 1108 (1956) 60 N.M. 393 Harry C. HENINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS; and Bryan, G. Johnson, L. C. White, Frank Andrews, Rosser L. Malone, Jr., and W. C. Whatley, who constitutes its members, Defendants-Appellees. No. 5987. Supreme Court of New Mexico. January 3, 1956. Rehearing Denied January 19, 1956. *1109 Jack Love, Roswell, for appellant. Richard H. Robinson, Atty. Gen., Fred M. Standley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul L. Billhymer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Howard F. Houk, Santa Fe, for appellees. LUJAN, Justice. Harry C. Henington, plaintiff (appellant), asked the Board of Bar Examiners to permit him to take the New Mexico bar examination. He tendered his application accompanied by the required examination fee, but did not enclose with said application a diploma or a properly authenticated certificate showing his graduation from an accredited law school, nor a certificate of an attorney of this state that he is a person of good moral character as is provided by rule. Rule 1, § 2 reads as follows: The Board of Bar Examiners rejected plaintiff's application. On June 8, 1954, the plaintiff filed his complaint in the District Court of Santa Fe County and prayed for an alternative writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the Board of Bar Examiners to examine him as to his qualifications for admission to the bar. On June 14, 1954, the District Court issued an alternative writ of mandamus commanding the Board of Bar Examiners to examine the plaintiff as to his qualifications for admission to the State Bar of New Mexico, and to make an independent investigation of his moral character within thirty days or show cause why it has not done so. An answer was filed by the Board of Bar Examiners, and after a hearing, the alternative writ of mandamus was quashed, and plaintiff appeals. Under point two plaintiff contends that the so-called "college" rule violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and § 18 of Article 2 of the New Mexico Constitution. We are of opinion and so hold that the educational qualifications required of applicants before they are permitted to practice law in this state does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment or § 18 of Article 2 of our Constitution, either in regard to the clause requiring due process of law, or that providing for equal protection of the laws. In State v. Rosborough, 152 La. 945, 94 So. 858, the court said: See, also, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of the State of New Mexico, 60 N.M. 304, 291 P.2d 607; Hulbert v. Mybeck, 220 Ind. 530, 44 N.E.2d 830; Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, 209 N.C. 624, 184 S.E. 540; Kraushaar v. La Vin, 181 Misc. 508, 42 N.Y.S.2d 857; In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 65 S. Ct. 1307, 89 L. Ed. 1795. And in the case of Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, 116 Conn. 409, 165 A. 211, 213, 87 A.L.R. 991, the court said: To the same effect, see, Ex parte State Board of Law Examiners of Florida, 141 Fla. 706, 193 So. 753; State v. Graves, 161 Minn. 422, 201 N.W. 933; In re Bergeron, 220 Mass. 472, 107 N.E. 1107; Ex parte Florida State Bar Association Committee on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, 148 Fla. 725, 5 So. 2d 1; 9 Indiana Law Journal 357. The case principally relied upon by the plaintiff is that of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1070, 30 L. Ed. 220, relating to the regulation of laundries in the city of San Francisco. The ordinance in question in that case was held to be illegal and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, because, with reference to the subject upon which it touched, it conferred upon the municipal authorities power, at their will and without regard to discretion in the legal sense of the term, to give or withhold consent as to persons or places for carrying on a laundry, with reference to the competency of the persons applying or the property of the place selected. It was held also that there was a clear and intentional discrimination made against the Chinese in the operation of the ordinance, which discrimination was founded upon the difference of race, and was wholly arbitrary and unjust. It appeared that both petitioners, who were engaged in the laundry business, were Chinese and had complied with every requisite deemed by the law, or by the public officers charged with its administration, necessary for the protection of neighboring property from fire or as a protection against injury to the public health, and yet the supervisors, for no reason other than discrimination against the Chinese, refused to grant the license to the petitioners and to some two hundred other Chinese subjects, while granting them to eighty people who were not such subjects and were working under precisely the same conditions. Such an ordinance, so executed, was held void by the Supreme Court of California. Speaking in that case of the general rights to grant licenses in regard to occupations or trades, Mr. Justice Matthews, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: The rule in question does not grant the Board of Bar Examiners an arbitrary power such as is described in the above mentioned laundry case. In the case at bar, any applicant is permitted to take the bar examination provided he furnishes the Board of Bar Examiners a diploma or a properly authenticated certificate showing his graduation from a law school approved by the American Bar Association. The possession of a legal education is a condition precedent which must be met by all applicants. It is neither an arbitrary or unreasonable one and applies alike to all persons regardless of their religion, race, creed or color. In the instant case the plaintiff is in no position to complain as he is not a graduate from any law school. Under point three plaintiff contends that the so called "moral character" rule violates the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions. This contention is without merit. Rule 2, § 2, reads as follows: Under the above rule an applicant must be shown to be a person of good moral character before he is eligible to take the bar examination. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 304, 291 P. 607. The possession of such character is a condition precedent, and the requirement that he furnish the board a certificate from an attorney of this state touching on his moral character is not unreasonable. The right to take an examination to practice law is a qualified right, and one who seeks permission to take such examination must be prepared to satisfy reasonable requirements as to good moral character and training. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra. What has here been said disposes of plaintiff's point one. The judgment will be affirmed. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and SADLER, McGHEE and KIKER, JJ., concur.