Case Title: Utah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding

Citation: 24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P.2d 1

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1970-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
469 P.2d 1 (1970) 24 Utah 2d 211 UTAH STATE EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Anthony R. RIDING and Anita E. Riding, his wife, Vaughn R. Anderson, and Ilene R. Anderson, his wife, Defendants and Respondents. No. 11695. Supreme Court of Utah. May 8, 1970. Ray M. Harding, Salt Lake City, for appellant. Tex R. Olsen, of Olsen & Chamberlain, Richfield, for respondents. HENRIOD, Justice. Appeal from a judgment vacating summary judgment and order for sale of property. Reversed, with costs to the plaintiff Credit Union. The Credit Union made a loan to the Ridings, who executed a note and an assignment of their purchasers' interest in a time-payment-real-estate contract, which latter was recorded on January 15, 1965. On March 6, 1965, the Ridings purportedly "assigned" their same rights in the same property to defendants Anderson. Such assignment was not recorded. On June 4, *2 1968, plaintiff sued Ridings to foreclose their interest because of default[1] in payments on the note, and joined defendants Anderson to bar any rights they might assert under their purported assignment. The Ridings, who had been served personally in Idaho defaulted and such default was reduced to judgment. Andersons answered the complaint on information and belief and denial, which, as written, amounted to a general denial. On motion for summary judgment plaintiff introduced the note, the purchase contract, the assignment thereof, the ledger account showing payments made and reflecting the resulting delinquency, and the purported second assignment to Andersons. There seems to be no escape from the conclusion that at that time plaintiff had a subsisting, recorded claim against Ridings' interest in the real property, which plaintiff could assert, superior to Andersons, whose pleading and the record up to that time did not reflect otherwise. The trial court, after taking the matter under advisement, signed an order on January 21, 1969, and granted plaintiffs the relief prayed, saying: Thereafter, the court signed an order of foreclosure on January 30, 1969. On February 10, 1969, Andersons moved to vacate this judgment, and supported their motion with a rather lengthy memorandum. The trial judge denied the motion to vacate on May 7, 1969. His reasons, which we think were dispositive here, were as follows: We believe and hold the trial court's orders at this juncture as between the plaintiff and Andersons were correct and in consonance with the record. *3 After the decisions above, the Andersons, on May 28, 1969, filed a Motion to Reconsider the judgment denying the motion to vacate, and to vacate it. Under the record here, we are unaware of any such motion under our rules, but assuming such a motion for some unusual reason could be entertained rather than pursuing an appeal, the only bases for the motion here were 1) that Ridings were indispensable parties to the suit and 2) that evidence should be introduced to determine priority of the assignments, the amount due under the contract and the equity sought to be foreclosed. The trial court, ex parte and without any notice to the plaintiff, granted the Andersons' motion to vacate on May 27, 1969, apparently one day before the motion was filed, but undoubtedly on the same day, and based its vacating order on 1) above: Indispensability of parties. The record shows that matters under 2) supra were in evidence and specifically disposed of in the judgment, and that 1) supra was satisfied, since Ridings already were parties to this action, no one having claimed otherwise before judgment and the Andersons hardly being in a position to act for the Ridings, and certainly vulnerable to principles of estoppel. Andersons' complaint, if any, seems to lie against Ridings, not this plaintiff. We think the motion to reconsider the motion to vacate the judgment is abortive under the rules, but even if it weren't, it was error under the rules to hear and act upon it without notice.[2] We conclude that the judgment of foreclosure, unappealed from, must stand absent any timely appeal. CALLISTER, TUCKETT, and ELLETT, JJ., concur. CROCKETT, C.J., concurs in the result. [1] Ridings have taken bankruptcy in the meantime. [2] See Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.