Case Title: Swain v. C & S BANK OF ALBANY

Citation: 258 Ga. 547, 372 S.E.2d 423

Docket Number: 

State: georgia

Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Date: 1988-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
258 Ga. 547 (1988) 372 S.E.2d 423 SWAIN et al. v. CITIZENS & SOUTHERN BANK OF ALBANY et al. 45549. Supreme Court of Georgia. Decided October 5, 1988. Freeman & Hawkins, William H. Major III, for appellants. Watson, Spence, Lowe & Chambless, G. Stuart Watson, Stephen S. Goss, for appellees. BELL, Justice. This is a medical malpractice case arising from the death of Dixon H. Swain. The trial court denied the defendants' motion in limine to prevent Swain's widow and stepson from testifying to statements they claim the deceased made to them. The Court of Appeals granted interlocutory review and reversed the trial court's ruling, holding that the statements were inadmissible hearsay. C & S Bank of Albany v. Swain, 185 Ga. App. 881 (366 SE2d 191) (1988). We granted a writ of certiorari to consider the admissibility of the testimony *548 of Mrs. Swain and her son. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1. The underlying facts of the case and contentions of the parties, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follow: C & S Bank of Albany v. Swain, supra, 185 Ga. App. at 881-882. The Court of Appeals proceeded to hold the hearsay testimony in *549 question was too untrustworthy to be admissible because the propounding witnesses were interested in the outcome of the trial. Id. at 883. Judge Beasley, with three judges joining her, dissented. Although she agreed with the majority that the self-interest of the propounding witnesses was a relevant factor, she argued that it was not determinative. C & S Bank of Albany v. Swain, supra, dissent, 185 Ga. App. at 883-887. Both the majority and dissenting opinions applied the case of Irby v. Brooks, 246 Ga. 794 (I) (273 SE2d 183) (1980). Irby, in turn, applied this court's decision in Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, 226 Ga. 221 (173 SE2d 691) (1970). After reconsidering the Irby decision, we are of the opinion that it misinterpreted the Chrysler Motors precedent, and should be overruled. In Chrysler Motors, we said: Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, supra, 226 Ga. at 224-225. As can be seen from the preceding passage, in Chrysler Motors this court focused on whether the declaration was self-serving when the deceased made it, holding that it must be excluded if it was self-serving. We did not address the question whether the self-interest of a propounding *550 witness was relevant to the issue of trustworthiness. However, in Irby v. Brooks, supra, 246 Ga., we indicated that the interest of the propounding witness was a relevant factor in ascertaining trustworthiness. We now hold that the Irby holding was erroneous in looking to the interest of the witness in determining the trustworthiness of the declarant's statement. We reach this conclusion because circumstances indicating that a witness has an interest in the case, as do Mrs. Swain and her son, should merely go to the credibility of the witness, not to the admissibility of the declarant's statement. As with all questions of witness credibility, opposing counsel has the right to draw the jury's attention to these circumstances through cross-examination of the witness and argument to the jury. Accordingly, we conclude that the reason given by the majority of the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial court the self-interest of Mrs. Swain and her son in propounding the alleged declaration of the deceased was erroneous. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 2. Having determined that the self-interest of the propounding witness is not relevant to the admissibility of the declaration in question, there remains to be considered the factor of trustworthiness, under the rule enunciated in Chrysler Motors, supra, 226 Ga. See Higgs v. State, 256 Ga. 606 (351 SE2d 448) (1987). In her dissent Judge Beasley listed several elements of the record that she felt were circumstantial guarantees of the truthfulness of the declaration when the deceased made it. C & S Bank of Albany v. Swain, supra, 185 Ga. App. at 885. After examining the elements we find that taken as a whole they were sufficient to support the trial court's decision to deny the motion to exclude the declaration of the deceased. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the motion in limine. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Marshall, C. J., who dissents.