Case Title: Richter v. Oakland Board of Education

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.

          Mary Richter v. Oakland Board of Education (A-23-19) (083273)

Argued September 14, 2020 -- Decided June 8, 2021 -- Revised June 15, 2021

LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

       Plaintiff Mary Richter, a longtime type 1 diabetic and teacher, experienced a
hypoglycemic event in a classroom. She sustained serious and permanent life-altering
injuries. Richter pursued through this action a claim under the Law Against
Discrimination (LAD), alleging that her employer failed to accommodate her pre-existing
disability. The Court addresses two issues: (1) whether Richter is required to establish
an adverse employment action -- such as a demotion, termination, or other similarly
recognized adverse employment action -- to be able to proceed with an LAD failure-to-
accommodate disability claim; and (2) whether plaintiff’s claim is barred by the
“exclusive remedy provision” of the Worker’s Compensation Act (WCA) because she
recovered workers’ compensation benefits.

        Richter was a science teacher employed by defendant Oakland Board of
Education. At the start of the 2012-2013 school year, Richter received her schedule for
the first marking period and learned that her lunch was scheduled for 1:05 p.m.
Believing that would negatively affect her blood sugar levels, Richter asked defendant
Gregg Desiderio, the principal of the school where she taught, to adjust her schedule so
she could eat lunch during the period beginning at 11:31 a.m. Desiderio told Richter he
would “look into it.” Further communications were exchanged about the requested
accommodation; in the end, no change was made, and Richter attended to her cafeteria
duties and ingested glucose tablets to maintain her blood sugar levels. Adjustment was
made during the second marking period; however, a similar scheduling issue arose during
the third marking period.

       On March 5, 2013, near the end the period before her lunch, Richter suffered a
hypoglycemic event in front of her students. She had a seizure, lost consciousness, and
struck her head on a lab table and the floor, causing extensive bleeding. Richter was
transported to a hospital for treatment. Prior to that, she had never passed out at work.

        Richter filed a workers’ compensation claim for the work-related injuries; she
recovered for her medical bills and for disability benefits. In March 2015, Richter filed
this action rooted in the LAD for failure to accommodate her diabetic condition.
                                             1
       Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the basis that Richter’s bodily
injury claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA. The motion
judge held that under the WCA’s intentional wrong exception, Richter’s bodily injury
claim was not barred. Defendants moved for summary judgment again, alleging that
Richter failed to establish a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD
because she suffered no adverse employment action. A different motion judge granted
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

       The Appellate Division reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendants.  459 N.J. Super. 400, 412-13 (App. Div. 2019). The Court granted
defendants’ petition for certification, limited to “whether an employee alleging
discrimination for failure to accommodate a disability, pursuant to the [LAD], is required
to show an adverse employment action; and whether plaintiff’s claim is barred by the
exclusive remedy provision of the [WCA].”  240 N.J. 58 (2019).

HELD: An adverse employment action is not a required element for a failure-to-
accommodate claim under the LAD. Further, plaintiff’s LAD claim based on defendants’
alleged failure to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition is not barred by the
WCA, and plaintiff need not filter her claim through the required showings of the
“intentional wrong exception.”

1. Although the LAD does not explicitly address a reasonable accommodation
requirement or claim, New Jersey courts have uniformly held that the LAD nevertheless
requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability. That
requirement was codified at N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b) in 1985. Under that regulation, unless
it would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business, an employer must
make a reasonable accommodation to the limitations of an employee who is a person with
a disability. The identification of the elements of the failure-to-accommodate claim
developed in decisions issued by trial and Appellate Division courts. Those courts
identified adverse employment consequence as one element of the prima facie case for
disability discrimination, in part because the factual setting of each case included an
adverse job consequence. (pp. 16-18)

2. In Victor v. State, the Court confronted for the first time a dispute over the required
elements of a failure-to-accommodate claim where a claimant does not allege an adverse
employment action.  203 N.J. 383, 412-13 (2010). The Victor Court noted that a
“disabled employee who is denied a requested reasonable accommodation . . . will
generally, as a result,” suffer an adverse consequence, but “there may be individuals with
disabilities who request reasonable accommodations, whose requests are not addressed or
are denied, and who continue nonetheless to toil on.” Id. at 421. The Victor Court
declined to “foreclose the possibility of circumstances that would give rise to a claim for
failure to accommodate even without an identifiable adverse employment consequence.”
Id. at 422. Ultimately, the holding in Victor did not resolve whether an adverse
                                             2
employment action is a requisite part of a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim
because it rested on other grounds. Id. at 422-24. In two later cases -- Royster v. State
Police,  227 N.J. 482, 500 (2017), and Caraballo v. City of Jersey City Police Department,
 237 N.J. 255, 267-68 (2019) -- the Court recited the elements of a failure-to-
accommodate claim without including adverse employment action as a requirement, but
did not expressly hold that an adverse employment action is not an element of an LAD
claim for failure to accommodate. (pp. 18-21)

3. Many federal courts have recited the elements of a failure to accommodate claim
under the Americans with Disabilities Act without mention of a required adverse
employment action, as the Court did for claims under the LAD in Royster and Caraballo.
And in at least two federal cases, a plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim was
permitted to proceed when no adverse employment action occurred. (pp. 21-25)

4. The Court now formally holds that an adverse employment action is not a required
element for a failure-to-accommodate claim. The wrongful act for purposes of a failure-
to-accommodate claim is the employer’s failure to perform its duty, not a further adverse
employment action that the employee must suffer. To best implement the Legislature’s
stated intent to eradicate discrimination and make the workplace hospitable for persons
with disabilities, the Court concludes that an employer’s inaction, silence, or inadequate
response to a reasonable accommodation request is an omission that can give rise to a
cause of action. Stated otherwise, a failure-to-accommodate claim is not dependent on
causing harm to the employee through an adverse employment action. While a lack of
demonstrable consequences -- whether in the form of an adverse action, of injuries like
those sustained by Richter, or of some other type -- might affect the damages to which an
affected employee might be entitled, an employer’s failure to accommodate is itself an
actionable harm. The Court declines to adopt the approach taken by some courts -- that
the employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate is “the” adverse employment action
for purposes of considering the rights of a person with disabilities in the workplace.
Rather than impose a formalistic hurdle, the better, and simpler, course is to recognize
that an adverse employment action is not an element of a failure-to-accommodate claim.
(pp. 25-29)

5. The Court next turns to whether Richter’s failure-to-accommodate claim is barred by
the WCA’s exclusive remedy provision. The parties’ positions pit against one another
two statutory schemes -- the LAD and the WCA -- both of which are remedial in nature.
Enacted in 1911, the WCA was a historic trade-off whereby employees relinquished their
right to pursue common-law remedies in exchange for automatic entitlement to certain,
but reduced, benefits whenever they suffered injuries by accident arising out of and in the
course of employment. The WCA has an exclusivity requirement and a limited
“intentional wrong” exception whereby, “[i]f an injury or death is compensable under this
article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of
such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same
                                            3
employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong.”  N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.
The LAD’s worthy purpose is no less than eradication of the cancer of discrimination in
our society, and the LAD is given liberal construction. This appeal focuses on the LAD’s
damages provision. In 1990, the Legislature amended the LAD to provide for a right to a
jury trial and punitive damages. And  N.J.S.A. 10:5-13 was amended to add common law
remedies for an LAD statutory violation: “All remedies available in common law tort
actions shall be available to prevailing plaintiffs. These remedies are in addition to any
provided by this act or any other statute.” Legislative history of the 1990 amendments
makes clear that the Legislature’s intent was to reinforce that the LAD supplements the
common law. (pp. 29-38)

6. An overriding principle of statutory construction compels that every effort be made to
harmonize legislative schemes enacted by the Legislature. The Court reviews cases in
which it harmonized the LAD with other statutes when conflicts were perceived. The
WCA was in place when the LAD was enacted, and the Legislature certainly would have
been aware of the WCA when, in 1990, it added the common law remedies to the LAD
and directed that the LAD supplement those remedies. In Schmidt v. Smith, the
Appellate Division relied in part on those 1990 amendments in concluding that the WCA
was not the exclusive means for managing sexual harassment in the workplace and that
an LAD action could be pursued notwithstanding the WCA.  294 N.J. Super. 569, 585-86
(App. Div. 1996), aff’d,  155 N.J. 44 (1998). The Court now makes express Schmidt’s
import, holding that the WCA’s exclusive remedy provision does not attach to Richter’s
LAD claim. Each statute operates to fulfill different purposes, both protective of workers
in the workplace. The statutes can function cumulatively and complementarily; they are
not in tension, much less in conflict, as the Court illustrates by reviewing the facts of the
present case. The two statutory schemes, harmonized, operate to prevent double
recovery. With double recovery averted, there is no possible conflict. Thus, the full-
throated pursuit of remedies available under the LAD for actionable disability
discrimination may proceed unencumbered by the WCA exclusivity bar. (pp. 39-47)

7. The WCA provides a workers’ compensation lien for an employer under  N.J.S.A.
34:15-40. The Appellate Division reviewed that provision’s operation and instructed on
how, if a jury awards damages to Richter on remand, the employer may obtain
reimbursement for workers’ compensation benefits paid.  459 N.J. Super. at 423-26. The
Court reviews those instructions and agrees with the Appellate Division’s direction on
this matter, rejecting defendants’ argument claiming a right to “100% reimbursement.”
The Court also affirms the Appellate Division’s holding that the jury may be presented
with evidence of Richter’s medical expenses and lost wages. (pp. 47-48)

       AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. REMANDED for trial.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-
VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
                                              4
             SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                     A-
23 September Term 2019
                               083273

                            Mary Richter,

                        Plaintiff-Respondent,

                                 v.

                     Oakland Board of Education,

                        Defendant-Appellant,

                                and

                  Gregg Desiderio, individually
          and as Principal of the Valley Middle School,

                        Defendant-Appellant.

             On certification to the Superior Court,
         Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
              459 N.J. Super. 400 (App. Div. 2019).

     Argued                     Decided                Revised
September 14, 2020            June 8, 2021          June 15, 2021

      Aileen F. Droughton argued the cause for appellants
      Oakland Board of Education and Gregg Desiderio (Traub
      Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry, attorneys; Aileen F.
      Droughton, on the briefs).

      Betsy G. Ramos argued the cause for appellant Oakland
      Board of Education (Capehart & Scatchard, attorneys;
      Betsy G. Ramos, on the briefs).

                                 1
Gerald Jay Resnick argued the cause for respondent
(Resnick Law Group, attorneys; Gerald Jay Resnick on
the briefs).

Andrew Dwyer argued the cause for amicus curiae
National Employment Lawyers Association of New
Jersey (The Dwyer Law Firm, attorneys; Andrew Dwyer,
of counsel and on the briefs).

Benjamin Folkman argued the cause for amicus curiae
New Jersey Association for Justice (Folkman Law
Offices, attorneys; Benjamin Folkman, Eve R. Keller,
Lauren M. Law, Sarah Slachetka, and Paul C. Jensen, Jr.,
on the briefs).

Renee Greenberg, Deputy Attorney General, submitted a
brief on behalf of amicus curiae Attorney General of New
Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney;
Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel, Mayur P. Saxena, Assistant Attorney General,
on the brief, and Renee Greenberg and Latoya L. Barrett,
Deputy Attorneys General, on the brief).

Edward G. Sponzilli submitted a brief on behalf of
amicus curiae Rutgers, the State University of New
Jersey (Norris McLaughlin, attorneys; Edward G.
Sponzilli, of counsel and on the brief, and Annmarie
Simeone, and Anthony P. D’Elia, on the brief).

Richard A. Friedman submitted a brief on behalf of
amicus curiae New Jersey Education Association
(Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum & Friedman;
attorneys; Richard A. Friedman, of counsel and on the
brief, and Craig A. Long, on the brief).

Christine P. O’Hearn submitted a brief on behalf of
amicus curiae the New Jersey Municipal Excess Liability
Fund (Brown & Connery, attorneys; Christine P.
O’Hearn, and Kathleen E. Dohn, on the brief).

                          2
          JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

      This appeal raises two compelling issues for resolution by this Court.

Unfortunately, the case arises from a tragic event.

      Plaintiff Mary Richter, a longtime diabetic and teacher, experienced a

hypoglycemic event in a classroom, which she claims happened because her

work schedule prevented her from eating her lunch early enough in the day to

maintain proper blood sugar levels. She fainted, hit her head on a science

laboratory table, and sustained serious and permanent life-altering injuries.

      Although Richter recovered benefits under the Worker’s Compensation

Act (WCA),  N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -146, she pursued through this action a claim

under the Law Against Discrimination (LAD),  N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, alleging

that her employer failed to accommodate her pre-existing disability.

According to Richter, in the months leading up to the incident, she repeatedly

asked her school principal to change her schedule of teaching and cafeteria

monitoring so she could manage her blood sugar levels by having her lunch

earlier in the day, but he failed to accommodate her request.

      The first issue we must address is whether Richter is required to

establish an adverse employment action -- such as a demotion, termination, or

other similarly recognized adverse employment action -- to be able to proceed

                                        3
with an LAD failure-to-accommodate disability claim. According to

defendants, an adverse employment action is a required element of a failure-to-

accommodate claim and Richter’s pleading is fatally deficient for not

including that element. We now put to rest that contention and hold that an

adverse employment action is not a required element for a failure-to-

accommodate claim under the LAD.

      The second issue raised by this appeal is whether plaintiff’s claim is

barred by the “exclusive remedy provision” of the WCA because she recovered

workers’ compensation benefits. According to defendants, to the extent

Richter’s LAD claim includes a demand for damages for bodily injuries or

their equivalent, it is barred under  N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 unless she proves that

defendants engaged in an intentional wrong. For the reasons set forth herein,

we conclude that plaintiff’s LAD claim based on defendants’ alleged failure to

accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition is not barred by the WCA,

and we reject the further contention that plaintiff must filter her claim through

the required showings of the “intentional wrong exception.”

      Accordingly, we affirm with modification the judgment of the Appellate

Division, and we remand this matter for trial.

                                        4
                                         I.

                                        A.

      Because this appeal arises from a summary judgment record, we recite

the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for

judgment, here plaintiff. See Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,  142 N.J.
 520, 540 (1995).

      Richter was working as a science teacher, employed by the Oakland

Board of Education (Board) and assigned to the Valley Middle School (VMS)

at the time of the events that led to this action. Some background on the

structure of the school year and school day at VMS is necessary to unders tand

Richter’s claim that defendants failed to accommodate her disability due to her

pre-existing condition as a type 1diabetic. 1

1
   “Type 1 diabetes, once known as juvenile diabetes or insulin-dependent
diabetes, is a chronic condition in which the pancreas produces little or no
insulin. Insulin is a hormone needed to allow sugar (glucose) to enter cells to
produce energy. . . . Despite active research, type 1 diabetes has no cure.
Treatment focuses on managing blood sugar levels with insulin, diet and
lifestyle to prevent complications.” Mayo Clinic, Type 1 diabetes,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/type-1-diabetes/symptoms-
causes/syc-20353011. See also Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 530 (28th ed.
2006) (defining Type 1 diabetes as “a condition characterized by high blood
glucose levels caused by a total lack of insulin. Occurs when the body’s
immune system attacks the insulin-producing beta cells in the pancreas and
destroys them. The pancreas then produces little or no insulin. Type 1
diabetes develops most often in young people but can appear in adults.”). The
record indicates that Richter developed diabetes as a juvenile.
                                        5
      VMS’s school year is divided into four academic marking periods. Each

school day is divided into eight time periods. Students are assigned to eat

lunch during either the fifth or the sixth time periods, which together last from

11:31 a.m. to 1:02 p.m. During those lunch periods, certain teachers are

assigned to cafeteria monitoring duty, where they are responsible for

supervising the students eating lunch. Accordingly, depending on their overall

schedule, some teachers assigned to lunch duty must wait to eat their own

lunch until seventh period, which is from 1:05 to 1:49 p.m.

      At the start of the 2012-2013 school year, Richter received her schedule

for the first marking period and learned that on Wednesdays and Thursdays she

was assigned to lunch duty during fifth period, followed by an instructional

class during sixth period; accordingly, she would not eat her own lunch until

seventh period. Believing that waiting until seventh period to eat lunch would

negatively affect her blood sugar levels, Richter asked VMS’s principal, Gregg

Desiderio, on the first day of school to adjust her schedule so she could eat

lunch during fifth period. Desiderio told Richter he would “look into it.”

      On September 10, 2012, Richter followed up with an email to Desiderio,

asking if he was “able to figure out a way to flip [her] lunch and duty periods

on Wednesday and Thursday.” Richter explained in the email that she had

“tried a couple different things” to keep her blood sugar regulated, but those

                                        6
steps were of no avail. Desiderio did not respond to the email. Richter asserts

that when she spoke again with Desiderio, he again stated that he would “look

into it.”

       During one conversation with Richter, Desiderio told her that he did not

believe he could “undo what he did” with the schedule; according to Desiderio,

he also told Richter that if she was having trouble on a particular day, she

could go to cafeteria duty late or skip it altogether. Richter denies that

Desiderio ever said she could completely skip cafeteria duty, and it is

undisputed that Desiderio never changed her schedule prior to the accident.

For the remainder of the first marking period, Richter attended to her cafeteria

duties and ingested glucose tablets to maintain her blood sugar levels.

       For the second marking period, Richter’s request for a fifth-period lunch

was accommodated. But when the schedule for the third marking period

issued, Richter was once again scheduled on Tuesdays for cafeteria duty

during fifth period, an instructional class during sixth period, and her lunch

during seventh period. Richter immediately approached Desiderio, who

acknowledged that he had made a mistake when setting the third-marking-

period schedule. Desiderio nonetheless declined to change the schedule,

explaining that he needed three teachers on cafeteria duty each day. He told

Richter that if she was not feeling well, she could sit down, have a snack, and

                                        7
report to duty once she was feeling better. Richter asked for Desiderio’s

instructions to be put in writing. He did not do so, nor did he change the

schedule or direct anyone in the school’s main office to change the schedule.

      Although a union representative told Richter that she would not be

disciplined for skipping cafeteria duty, Richter continued to attend her

assigned cafeteria duty during the third marking period, believing Desiderio’s

additional directions needed to be in writing or the schedule needed to be

changed. Richter feared that if an emergency occurred in the cafeteria while

she was scheduled for duty, but not present, she could be held liable. As a

result, on Tuesdays, Richter’s blood sugar levels often fell below the normal

range by the close of sixth period, requiring her to ingest glucose tablets.

      On March 5, 2013, near the end of one such sixth period, Richter

suffered a hypoglycemic event in front of her students. She had a seizure, lost

consciousness, and struck her head on a lab table and the floor, causing

extensive bleeding. Richter was transported to a hospital for treatment. Prior

to that, she had never passed out at work.

      After the accident, in a text exchange with Desiderio, Richter again

asked him to change her schedule. Desiderio responded that he previously told

her not to attend fifth period cafeteria duty, but he agreed to cross her name off

the schedule for cafeteria duty.

                                        8
      As a result of her fall, Richter suffered serious and permanent injuries,

including: total loss of smell; meaningful loss of taste; dental and facial

trauma; tinnitus; insomnia; tingling in her fingers; extraction of her right front

tooth, implantation of a dental bridge and bone grafts; altered speech; neck

pain and radiation to her posterior shoulder; paranesthesia and dysesthesias;

post-concussion syndrome; vertigo; dizziness; severe emotional distress; and

decreased life expectancy. She also lost sick days and incurred dental costs

not covered by insurance.

      Richter filed a workers’ compensation claim for the work-related

injuries. The Board paid $18,940.94 for Richter’s medical bills and $9,792.40

for temporary disability benefits. Subsequently, she received $77,200 in

partial total permanent disability benefits.

                                      B.

      On March 2, 2015, Richter filed this action rooted in LAD disability

discrimination for failure to accommodate her diabetic condition against the

Board and Desiderio, individually and in his capacity as principal . Richter

sought compensatory damages for her economic, physical, and emotional

injuries, as well as punitive damages.

      Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the basis that

Richter’s bodily injury claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of

                                           9
the WCA. In an oral opinion, the motion judge held that under the WCA’s

intentional wrong exception, Richter’s bodily injury claim was not barred.

      Following that denial, defendants moved for summary judgment again,

alleging that Richter failed to establish a prima facie failure-to-accommodate

claim under the LAD because she suffered no adverse employment action.

Richter filed a cross-motion for summary judgment arguing that she did suffer

an adverse action and could establish a prima facie claim. Defendants also re-

filed a motion to dismiss Richter’s bodily injury claim under the WCA, or in

the alternative, to be entitled to a 100% credit for the WCA award already

paid; defendants additionally sought to bar Richter’s medical bills and lost

wages from being presented at trial.

      In a written opinion, a different motion judge granted defendants’

motion for summary judgment and denied Richter’s motion, determining that

Richter did not suffer an adverse employment action because she was not fired

or reassigned to another position and was thus unable to establish a prima facie

failure-to-accommodate claim.

      Addressing Richter’s argument that she did not need to demonstrate an

adverse employment action, the judge acknowledged that Victor v. State,  203 N.J. 383 (2010), suggested in dicta that an adverse employment action may not

be a necessary element for an LAD failure-to-accommodate claim; the judge

                                       10
nevertheless concluded that “an adverse employment action remains a required

element of a prima facie failure to accommodate claim under the NJLAD.”

      After the court rejected their motions for reconsideration, both parties

appealed.

                                       C.

      In a careful and comprehensive published decision authored by Judge

Sumners, the Appellate Division reversed the grant of summary judgment to

defendants and affirmed the denial of Richter’s summary judgment motion,

sending the matter back for trial. Richter v. Oakland Bd. of Educ.,  459 N.J.

Super. 400, 412-13, 419-20 (App. Div. 2019).

      The court began with the arguments raised in Richter’s appeal,

addressing first whether a prima facie disability-accommodation claim under

the LAD requires establishing an adverse employment action. See id. at 412-

16.

      The court pointed to the analysis in Victor that while an adverse

employment action has generally been recognized as a required element for a

disability-accommodation claim, the LAD’s broad remedial purpose may

“permit plaintiffs to proceed against employers who have failed to reasonably

accommodate their disabilities or who have failed to engage in an interactive

process even if they can point to no adverse employment consequence that

                                       11
resulted.” Id. at 414-15 (quoting Victor,  203 N.J. at 421). The court also

noted that in Royster v. State Police, this Court articulated the elements

required to establish a prima facie LAD failure-to-accommodate claim

“without including the requirement that an adverse employment action must be

proven.” Richter,  459 N.J. Super. at 415-16 (citing  227 N.J. 482, 500 (2017)).

       The Appellate Division’s interpretation of Victor and Royster led it to

conclude “that Richter’s LAD claim for failure to accommodate her diabetes

disability should not have been dismissed on summary judgment based on a

lack of adverse employment action.” Id. at 416. Even so, the court rejected

Richter’s contention “that defendants’ refusal to accommodate an employee’s

disability constitutes an adverse employment action.” Id. at 417. The court

applied a standard for assessing an adverse employment action that examined

whether defendant’s actions “materially alter[ed] the terms and conditions of

. . . employment” and concluded that Richter’s claim did not meet it. Id. at

418.

       Next, the court affirmed the denial of Richter’s summary judgment

motion. Id. at 419-20. The court recognized that it is undisputed that

defendants knew about Richter’s disability and that Richter requested

accommodations, but it found that a reasonable jury could determine that

“defendants participated in the interactive process and made a good faith effort

                                       12
to provide [Richter] with an accommodation.” Id. at 420. The court pointed to

statements by Desiderio and others that “Richter was verbally told at the

beginning of the third marking period -- prior to her fall on March 5, 2013 --

that she did not have to perform her fifth period cafeteria duty if she felt she

needed to eat her lunch.” Ibid. Although it found that summary judgment

could not be entered in favor of Richter, the Appellate Division reinstated

Richter’s claim for punitive damages under the LAD. Ibid.

      The Appellate Division then turned to defendants’ cross-appeal and

addressed whether Richter’s bodily injury claim is barred by the WCA’s

exclusive remedy provision, and, if not, whether her employer “should receive

100% credit for the worker’s compensation payments it made” in the event of

a jury award in Richter’s favor. Id. at 421.

      The appellate court recognized that when an employee pursues remedies

under the WCA, she generally “gives up the right to pursue common law

claims for work-related injuries.” Ibid. However, the court noted the

intentional-wrong carve-out to the exclusivity bar and, applying that exception,

reasoned that Richter’s claim “is not barred by the [WCA’s] exclusive remedy

provision” because, when viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to

Richter, “Desiderio intentionally refused her accommodation request, and it

was substantially certain that she could suffer a hypoglycemic event.” Id. at

                                        13
423. Moreover, as explained by the court, “[t]his is not the 'simple fact of

industrial life’ envisioned by the [WCA].” Ibid. (quoting Laidlow v. Hariton

Mach. Co., Inc.,  170 N.J. 602, 623 (2002)). The court found additional

support for its conclusion in Schmidt v. Smith, in which the Appellate Division

recognized that “there is no language in the LAD that mandates that claims

made by employees against employers under [the LAD] may only be brought”

via the WCA. Richter,  459 N.J. Super. at 423 (quoting Schmidt,  294 N.J.

Super. 569, 585 (App. Div. 1996), aff’d,  155 N.J. 44 (1998)). Accordingly,

the Appellate Division reversed the grant of summary judgment to defendants

and held that “Richter can present her bodily injury claims directly arising

from her LAD claim to the jury.” Ibid.

      Finally, the Appellate Division rejected the argument that defendants

must receive a 100% credit for the workers’ compensation award paid to

Richter. The court held that, under  N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(b) (Section 40), the

employer would be entitled only to a lien -- totaling only two-thirds the

amount it paid in workers’ compensation to Richter in medical payments and

temporary benefits -- on the jury award, with the remaining one-third allocated

to reimburse Richter’s compensation counsel. Id. at 425-26.2

2
 The Appellate Division did not mention the partial total permanent disability
amount paid in settlement to Richter in a final resolution of the compensation

                                       14
      We granted defendants’ petition for certification limited to “whether an

employee alleging discrimination for failure to accommodate a disability,

pursuant to the [LAD], is required to show an adverse employment action; and

whether plaintiff’s claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the

[WCA].”  240 N.J. 58 (2019). We also granted motions by the New Jersey

Association for Justice (NJAJ), the National Employment Lawyers Association

of New Jersey (NELA), and the Attorney General to appear as amici curiae.

                                      II.

      The parties advance the following arguments with respect to whether a

failure-to-accommodate claim requires the showing of an adverse employment

action.

      Defendants argue that the Appellate Division erred in concluding that a

plaintiff can present a prima facie case for a failure to accommodate without

showing an adverse employment action. They contend that the appellate court

misapplied dicta in Victor and Royster. In support, defendants point to state

and federal court decisions that, since Victor was decided in 2010, have

continued to require an adverse employment action as an element for an LAD

failure-to-accommodate claim.

claim. We are unaware from this record of the fees attributable to
compensation counsel for those benefits and whether the settlement addressed
them in any way; thus, we do not comment further on those benefits.
                                     15
       Richter, on the other hand, argues that the Appellate Division rightfully

relied on Victor and Royster in holding that an adverse employment action is

not a requirement for a failure-to-accommodate claim. She contends that the

Appellate Division’s approach is also consistent with several United States

Courts of Appeals’ decisions applying the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213.

       Amici NJAJ, NELA, and the Attorney General all similarly argue that

Richter need not allege a distinct adverse employment action in order to bring

a failure-to-accommodate claim. NELA and the Attorney General both add

that a failure to accommodate may itself constitute an adverse employment

action.

                                       III.

       We turn first to the necessary elements for a failure-to-accommodate

claim brought by an individual claiming disability discrimination under the

LAD.

                                        A.

       “The LAD prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of a

disability.” Potente v. County of Hudson,  187 N.J. 103, 110 (2006) (citing

 N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1, -29.1). Although the LAD does not explicitly address a

reasonable accommodation requirement or claim, “our courts have uniformly

                                        16
held that the [LAD] nevertheless requires an employer to reasonably

accommodate an employee’s” disability. Royster,  227 N.J. at 499 (alteration

in original) (quoting Potente,  187 N.J. at 110). That requirement was codified

in a regulation by the agency charged with administering the LAD and

promulgating regulations for its implementation and enforcement. See

 N.J.S.A. 10:5-8(g) (authorizing the adoption of regulations “to carry out the

provisions of this act”).

      Under N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b), “unless it would impose an undue hardship

on the operation of the business,” an employer must “make a 'reasonable

accommodation to the limitations of an employee . . . who is a person with a

disability.’” Potente,  187 N.J. at 110 (omission in original) (quoting N.J.A.C.

13:13-2.5(b)). The Division on Civil Rights’ promulgation of N.J.A.C. 13:13-

2.5(b) in 1985 marked the genesis of reasonable-accommodation claims under

the LAD. See Victor,  203 N.J. at 400-02.

      Prior to our opinion in Victor, we had approvingly recognized failure to

accommodate as a claim under the LAD and touched upon its contours. See,

e.g., Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., Inc.,  173 N.J. 1, 19-20 (2002) (recognizing

that a plaintiff can affirmatively plead “failure to reasonably accommodate as a

separate cause of action” from a discriminatory discharge or disparate

treatment claim); Potente,  187 N.J. at 110-12; Raspa v. Off. of Sheriff of

                                       17
Gloucester,  191 N.J. 323, 337-40 (2007). However, in none of those cases did

we dwell on the necessary elements of a failure-to-accommodate claim.

        Rather, the identification of elements developed in decisions issued by

the trial courts and the Appellate Division. See, e.g., Seiden v. Marina

Assocs.,  315 N.J. Super. 451, 465-66 (Law Div. 1998); Muller v. Exxon Rsch.

& Eng’g Co.,  345 N.J. Super. 595, 602-03 (App. Div. 2001); Bosshard v.

Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr.,  345 N.J. Super. 78, 91 (App. Div. 2001). And,

as we recognized in Victor, those “courts uniformly identif[ied] adverse

employment consequence as one element of the prima facie case for disability

discrimination.”  203 N.J. at 413. Our discussion in Victor, however, also

noted that “[t]hose opinions [did] so . . . in part because they recite the familiar

elements consistent with any employment discrimination case, and in part

because the factual setting of each case included an adverse job consequence.”

Ibid.

        It was not until Victor that this Court confronted a dispute over the

required elements of a failure-to-accommodate claim where a claimant does

not allege an adverse employment action. Id. at 412-13. In that appeal, after

reviewing the regulatory history of N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b), relevant case law

from this state, and federal court cases interpreting the ADA, we

acknowledged the issue as unsettled and made the following observation:

                                         18
The LAD’s purposes suggest that we chart a course to
permit plaintiffs to proceed against employers who
have failed to reasonably accommodate their
disabilities or who have failed to engage in an
interactive process even if they can point to no adverse
employment consequence that resulted. Such cases
would be unusual, if not rare, for it will ordinarily be
true that a disabled employee who has been
unsuccessful in securing an accommodation will indeed
suffer an adverse employment consequence.

       That is, the disabled employee who is denied a
requested reasonable accommodation necessary to
perform the job’s essential functions will generally, as
a result, not be hired or promoted, or will be discharged.
Indeed, it is difficult for us to envision factual
circumstances in which the failure to accommodate will
not yield an adverse consequence. But there may be
individuals with disabilities who request reasonable
accommodations, whose requests are not addressed or
are denied, and who continue nonetheless to toil on.

      Perhaps in those circumstances the employee
could demonstrate that the failure to accommodate
forced the employee to soldier on without a reasonable
accommodation, making the circumstances so
unbearable that it would constitute a hostile
employment environment. But there also might be
circumstances in which such an employee’s proofs,
while falling short of that standard, would cry out for a
remedy. We cannot foresee all of the factual settings
that might confront persons with disabilities and,
although hard to envision, we therefore cannot entirely
foreclose the possibility of circumstances that would
give rise to a claim for failure to accommodate even
without an identifiable adverse employment
consequence.

[Victor,  203 N.J. at 421-22.]

                           19
      Ultimately, the holding in Victor did not resolve whether an adverse

employment action is a requisite part of a prima facie failure-to-accommodate

claim because the plaintiff in that case was unable to establish the other

indisputably required elements of the claim, and the Court’s holding rested on

those failures. Id. at 422-24. The observation in Victor that an adverse

employment action may not be a necessary element remained dicta.

      Seven years after Victor, this Court demarked the elements of a failure-

to-accommodate claim under the LAD. We stated in Royster that

            [t]o establish a failure-to-accommodate claim under the
            LAD, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she (1)
            “qualifies as an individual with a disability, or [ ] is
            perceived as having a disability, as that has been
            defined by statute”; (2) “is qualified to perform the
            essential functions of the job, or was performing those
            essential functions, either with or without reasonable
            accommodations”; and (3) that defendant “failed to
            reasonably accommodate [his or her] disabilities.”

            [ 227 N.J. at 500 (alterations in original) (quoting
            Victor,  203 N.J. at 410).]

      Clearly absent from that recitation is mention of an adverse employment

action as an element. Two years later, in Caraballo v. City of Jersey City

Police Department, we again recited the elements of a failure-to-accommodate

claim without including adverse employment action as a requirement.  237 N.J.
 255, 267-68 (2019). In neither case, however, did we expressly hold that an

                                       20
adverse employment action is not an element of an LAD claim for failure to

accommodate.

      This appeal, with its pointed joining of issues on the question, presents

the matter head-on and thus provides the vehicle for us to definitively

determine whether a failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD should

require a plaintiff to show an adverse employment action in order to proceed

with such a claim.

                                       B.

      As is often true, federal anti-discrimination cases provide a helpful

“source of interpretive authority.” Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp.,  118 N.J.
 89, 97 (1990). It has proven advantageous to harmonize, to the extent

possible, the LAD’s development with Title VII’s development, in the interest

of “some reasonable degree of symmetry and uniformity.” Id. at 107. That

approach informs us also with respect to the ADA, notwithstanding some

differences in statutory language. See, e.g., Viscik,  173 N.J. at 16, (comparing

the scope of covered disability under federal and state law).

      Victor searched for a consensus among federal courts as to the elements

of a failure-to-accommodate claim, and since then even more federal decisions

have touched on the elements question currently before us. In interpreting the

ADA, many federal courts have recited the elements of such a claim without

                                       21
mention of a required adverse employment action, as we did for claims under

the LAD in Royster and Caraballo. See, e.g., Hill v. Assocs. for Renewal in

Educ.,  897 F.3d 232, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (stating that, in a failure-to-

accommodate claim, “a plaintiff must show . . . (1) that he or she has a

disability under the ADA; (2) that the employer had notice of the disability; (3)

that the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the position . . . ; and

(4) that the employer refused to make the accommodation”); Valle-Arce v.

P.R. Ports Auth.,  651 F.3d 190, 198 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating that, to make out a

reasonable-accommodation claim under the ADA, the plaintiff had to show

“(1) that she suffers from a disability . . . , (2) that she is an otherwise qualified

individual . . . , and (3) that the [employer] knew of her disability and did not

reasonably accommodate it”); Rhoads v. FDIC,