Case Title: Captain Lori Albunio v. The City of New York

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2011-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 43  
Captain Lori Albunio, et al.,
            Respondents,
        v.
The City of New York, et al.,
            Appellants.
---------------------------------
Robert Sorrenti,
            Plaintiff,
        v.
The City of New York, et al.,
            Appellants.
Julie Steiner, for appellants.
Mary D. Dorman, for respondents.
SMITH, J.:
A jury found that two members of the New York City
Police Department, Captain Lori Albunio and Lieutenant Thomas
Connors, were subjected to retaliation because they opposed
discrimination against a third member of the department, Sergeant
Robert Sorrenti, on the basis of Sorrenti's perceived sexual
orientation.  We hold that there is sufficient evidence in the
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No. 43
record to support the verdict.
I
Albunio was commanding officer of the Youth Services
section of the police department.  Connors was operations
coordinator of the section, and reported to Albunio.  Sorrenti,
then serving in another command, applied in 2001 to be
transferred into the Youth Services section.  Albunio interviewed
him, and was favorably impressed; when a position opened in April
2002 in a Youth Services program known as DARE, in which police
officers educate New York City school children about the dangers
of drugs, she requested that Sorrenti be chosen to fill the
vacancy.  The request was submitted to Inspector James Hall, who
had recently become commanding officer of Community Affairs, and
Albunio's immediate supervisor.  Hall decided to interview
Sorrenti himself, and did so, with Albunio present, on May  13,
2002. 
From this point on, the facts were sharply disputed at
trial, but the jury could have found the following: At the May 13
interview, Hall asked Sorrenti whether he was married, and
whether he had children.  He also questioned Sorrenti
aggressively about Sorrenti's relationship with another male
police officer to whom Sorrenti had loaned money, saying loudly,
among other things: "You were more than just friends."  Sorrenti
became visibly uncomfortable with the questions.  After the
interview, Hall told Albunio "that there was something not right
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No. 43
about that guy."  Hall later chose another person for the open
position with DARE, telling Albunio that he "found out some
fucked up shit about Sorrenti and . . . wouldn't want him around
children."  Albunio's interpretation of this statement was:
"[T]he guy must think the guy is gay and for some reason doesn't
want him around kids." 
In June or July of 2002, Hall called Connors into
Hall's office and began to speak to him about Sorrenti, angrily
and with the use of many expletives.  He talked about Sorrenti's
loan to his fellow officer, saying "There must be more between
this cop and Sergeant Sorrenti," and added that he "wouldn't be
able to sleep at night knowing that Sorrenti is going to be
working around kids."  Connors responded that he thought Sorrenti
"would be more than qualified to work around kids" and showed
Hall a favorable evaluation Sorrenti had received.  Connors
inferred from the conversation that Hall "believed that Sergeant
Sorrenti was a child molester and homosexual." 
In the fall of 2002, Albunio began to hear rumors that
she would be removed from the command of the Youth Services
section.  She asked for a meeting to discuss this subject with
Hall's superior, Deputy Commissioner Frederick Patrick.  The
meeting took place on October 31, and Hall was present at it with
Patrick.
At the October 31 meeting, Patrick confirmed that he
and Hall "were contemplating" replacing Albunio, to which she
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No. 43
responded: "[W]hy am I losing my command?"  Hall interjected to
say that Albunio "utilized poor judgment when requesting
personnel," citing Sorrenti as the primary example.  Albunio told
Hall that "Sorrenti was the better candidate," adding: "If I had
to do it all again, I would have recommended Sorrenti again." 
Albunio was told that it would be in her best interest to find
another assignment, which she soon did -- an assignment much less
desirable than the one she left.
Albunio told Connors that she had been directed to go
elsewhere.  Connors, on November 8, 2002, filed a complaint with
the police department's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity
alleging that Hall had discriminated against Sorrenti because of
Sorrenti's perceived sexual orientation.  Soon after that,
Connors was contacted about the complaint by someone who worked
directly for Hall, leading Connors to believe that Hall knew of
Connors's accusation.  Connors put in for a transfer from the
Youth Services section, believing that with Albunio's forced
departure "[t]he writing was on the wall for me."  During his
remaining time with Youth Services, he suffered a number of
adverse employment actions: geographical assignments and hours of
work were changed in ways he did not like; and he was shunned and
excluded from meetings by Hall and Hall's other subordinates. 
When his transfer finally came through, he got a less desirable
job than he had expected.  
Albunio and Connors brought this action against the
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City, Hall and Patrick, alleging violations of the anti-
retaliation section of the New York City Human Rights Law, New
York City Administrative Code § 8-107 (7).  (Sorrenti also
brought a discrimination lawsuit, which was tried with Albunio's
and Connors's case, but which is not involved in this appeal.) 
The jury found that the City and Hall had retaliated against both
plaintiffs, and awarded damages.  A judgment was entered on the
verdict, which the Appellate Division affirmed, with one Justice
dissenting as to Albunio.  The Appellate Division granted leave
to appeal to this Court, and we now affirm.
II
New York City Administrative Code § 8-107 (7) says, in
relevant part:
"It shall be an unlawful discriminatory
practice . . . to retaliate or discriminate
in any manner against any person because such
person has . . . opposed any practice
forbidden under this chapter."
The dispositive question on this appeal is whether the
record supports the jury's finding that Albunio and Connors
"opposed" discrimination against Sorrenti on the basis of
Sorrenti's perceived sexual orientation (a practice forbidden by
Administrative Code § 8-107 [1] [a]).  In answering this
question, we must be guided by the Local Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 2005 (LCRRA), enacted by the City Council "to clarify the
scope of New York City's Human Rights Law," which, the Council
found "has been construed too narrowly to ensure protection of
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No. 43
the civil rights of all persons covered by the law" (Local Law
No. 85 [2005] of City of New York § 1).  The LCRRA, among other
things, amended Administrative Code § 8-130 to read:
"The provisions of this title [i.e., the New
York City Human Rights Law] shall be
construed liberally for the accomplishment of
the uniquely broad and remedial purposes
thereof, regardless of whether federal or New
York State civil and human rights laws,
including those laws with provisions
comparably-worded to provisions of this
title, have been so construed."
The application of the LCRRA provision to this case is
clear: we must construe Administrative Code § 8-107 (7), like
other provisions of the City's Human Rights Law, broadly in favor
of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a
construction is reasonably possible.  We interpret the word
"opposed" according to this principle, and conclude that the
evidence supports a finding that both Albunio and Connors opposed
discrimination against Sorrenti.
As to Connors, the case is easy.  Connors filed a
discrimination complaint on Sorrenti's behalf; there is evidence
from which the jury could find that Hall knew of the complaint;
and, after the complaint was filed, Connors was subjected to a
series of adverse employment actions.  Indeed, defendants, after
arguing that neither Albunio nor Connors engaged in protected
activity by advocating Sorrenti's transfer into the Youth
Services section, concede that the filing of Connors's
discrimination complaint in November 2002 was protected.  Thus,
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as to Connors, defendants effectively give the case away, making
only a perfunctory -- and meritless -- argument that the jury
could not find that the actions taken against Connors were the
result of his protected activity, or that they were adverse.
As to Albunio, the case is closer, because she had
neither filed a discrimination complaint nor explicitly accused
anyone of discrimination before she was ousted as commanding
officer of the Youth Services section.  Indeed, we see nothing in
the record to support a finding that Albunio "opposed"
discrimination before her October 31, 2002 meeting with Hall and
Patrick.  So far as the record shows, Albunio observed and
listened to Hall's mistreatment of, and unfavorable remarks
about, Sorrenti, but uttered no word of protest before October
31.
The record might, it is true, support a finding that,
before October 31, Hall was displeased with Albunio and decided
she should be removed from her command because she had
recommended an applicant who Hall thought was gay.  We do not
suggest that, if that happened, Hall's conduct was either
appropriate or legal, but we do not see how it can be called
retaliation for opposition to discrimination.  There is no
evidence that Albunio knew, when she advocated Sorrenti's
transfer, either that Sorrenti was or would be perceived as gay
or that Hall was prejudiced against gay people.  If Albunio was
removed for being Sorrenti's advocate, she could perhaps have
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proved a violation of Administrative Code § 8-107 (20), which
prohibits "discrimination against a person because of the actual
or perceived . . . sexual orientation . . . of a person with whom
such person has a known relationship or association."  But
Albunio brought no claim under that section of the City Human
Rights Law.  
Since her claim is limited to retaliation, she can
prevail only if she shows that she "opposed" discrimination.  She
did so, if at all, only at the October 31 meeting.1  At that
meeting, Albunio reacted to Hall's criticism of her
recommendation of Sorrenti by telling Hall that Sorrenti was the
better candidate for the job and that "[i]f I had to do it all
again, I would have recommended Sorrenti again."  While she did
not say in so many words that Sorrenti was a discrimination
victim, a jury could find that both Hall and Albunio knew that he
was, and that Albunio made clear her disapproval of that
discrimination by communicating to Hall, in substance, that she
thought Hall's treatment of Sorrenti was wrong.  Bearing in mind
the broad reading that we must give to the New York City Human
Rights Law, we find that Albunio could be found to have "opposed"
the discrimination against Sorrenti at the October 31 meeting.
1Defendants might argue, but have not argued, that by the
time of that meeting the decision to remove Albunio from command
had already been made.  The parties appear to assume, and we
accept the assumption, that the jury could find a causal
connection between the October 31 meeting and her removal from
command.
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Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division,
insofar as appealed from, should be affirmed, with costs.  The
certified question is unnecessary and need not be answered. 
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, with costs, and
certified question not answered upon the ground that it is
unnecessary. Opinion by Judge Smith. Chief Judge Lippman and
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided March 31, 2011    
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