Case Title: Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker

Citation: 2014 WI 98

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 98 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1652   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, Voces de La 
Frontera, Ricky  
T. Lewis, Jennifer T. Platt, John J. Wolfe, 
Carolyn  
Anderson, Ndidi Brownlee, Anthony Fumbanks, 
Johnnie M.  
Garland, Danettea Lane, Mary McClintock, Alfonso 
G.  
Rodriguez, Joel Torres and Antonio K. Williams, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Scott Walker, Thomas Barland, Gerald C. Nichol, 
Michael  
Brennan, Thomas Cane, David G. Deininger and 
Timothy Vocke, 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
Doris Janis, James Janis and Matthew Augustine, 
          Intervenors-Co-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 31, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 24, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit  
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel T. Flanagan III 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.) 
CROOKS, BRADLEY, JJ., dissent. (Opinion filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants, the cause was argued by 
Clayton P. Kawski, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs (in the court of appeals) was Thomas C. Bellavia, Carrie 
M. Benedon, and Maria S. Lazar, assistant attorneys general; and 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
2 
  
 
 
For the intervenors-co-appellants, the cause was argued by 
Michael T. Morley, Washington D.C.; with whom on the briefs (in 
the court of appeals) was Joseph Louis Olson and Michael Best & 
Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee.  
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, the cause was argued by 
Richard Saks, with whom on the brief (in the court of appeals) 
was B. Michele Sumara, and Hawks Quindel, S.C., Milwaukee.  
 
An amicus curiae brief (in the court of appeals) was filed 
by Helen Marks Dicks and AARP Wisconsin, Madison; and Daniel B. 
Kohrman and AARP Foundation Litigation, Washington, D.C., on 
behalf of AARP. 
 
An amicus curiae brief (in the court of appeals) was filed 
by Jennifer A. Lohr, Madison, on behalf of Disability Rights 
Wisconsin. 
 
An amicus curiae brief (in the court of appeals) was filed 
by Rebecca K. Mason and Rebecca Mason Law LLC, Racine, on behalf 
of Institute for One Wisconsin, Inc. 
 
An 
amicus 
curiae 
brief 
was 
filed 
by 
Kristin 
M. 
Kerschensteiner, 
Madison, 
on 
behalf 
of 
Disability 
Rights 
Wisconsin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 98
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP1652 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV5492) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, Voces de la 
Frontera, Ricky T. Lewis, Jennifer T. Platt, 
John J. Wolfe, Carolyn Anderson, Ndidi 
Brownlee, Anthony Fumbanks, Johnnie M. Garland, 
Danettea Lane, Mary McClintock, Alfonso G. 
Rodriguez, Joel Torres and Antonio K. Williams, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Scott Walker, Thomas Barland, Gerald C. Nichol, 
Michael Brennan, Thomas Cane, David G. 
Deininger and Timothy Vocke, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
Doris Janis, James Janis and Matthew Augustine, 
 
          Intervenors-Co-Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 31, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL 
from 
a 
circuit 
court 
judgment 
and 
permanent 
injunction. 
 
Judgment 
reversed; 
permanent 
and 
temporary 
injunctions vacated.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This appeal arises 
from a judgment of the Dane County Circuit Court1 granting 
                                                 
1 The Honorable David T. Flanagan, III presided. 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
2 
 
declaratory and injunctive relief based on the circuit court's 
conclusion that 2011 Wis. Act 23, Wisconsin's voter photo 
identification act, violates the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶2 
Plaintiffs 
challenge 
Act 
23 
under 
Article 
III, 
Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.2  They contend that the 
law is invalid because "it would severely burden a significant 
number of qualified voters but [is] not reasonably necess[ary] 
or designed to deter fraud or otherwise effect an important 
government interest."  Plaintiffs identify burdens of time, 
inconvenience and costs associated with Act 23.  Emphasizing the 
difficulties 
that 
facial 
challenges 
to 
a 
statute 
bear, 
defendants contend plaintiffs have not shown that Act 23 is 
anything more than a reasonable, election-related regulation or 
that the law's requirements amount to a denial of the right to 
vote.   
                                                 
2 Article III, Section 1 provides: 
Electors.  Section 1.  Every United States 
citizen age 18 or older who is a resident of an 
election district in this state is a qualified elector 
of that district. 
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Act 23 also 
violated Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
which guarantees equal protection and due process under the law 
in a manner similar to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  In their brief to us, plaintiffs refer 
only to Article III, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
However, they also contend that there is "a single standard to 
apply to all challenges to restrictive voting laws, whether 
brought as equal protection and due process challenges or under 
the fundamental right to vote," and their arguments are in most 
respects consistent with arguments made in due process and equal 
protection challenges.   
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
3 
 
¶3 
We conclude that plaintiffs have failed to prove Act 
23 unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  In League of 
Women Voters of Wisconsin Education Network, Inc. v. Walker, 
2014 WI 97, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __, also released today, we 
concluded that requiring an elector to present Act 23-acceptable 
photo identification in order to vote is not an additional 
elector qualification.  Id., ¶__.  In the present case, we 
conclude that the burdens of time and inconvenience associated 
with obtaining Act 23-acceptable photo identification are not 
undue burdens on the right to vote and do not render the law 
invalid.   
¶4 
We conclude, as did the United Stated Supreme Court in 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), 
that "the inconvenience of making a trip to [a state motor 
vehicle office], gathering the required documents, and posing 
for a photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden 
on the right to vote."  Id. at 198.  Furthermore, photo 
identification is a condition of our times where more and more 
personal interactions are being modernized to require proof of 
identity with a specified type of photo identification.  With 
respect to these familiar burdens, which accompany many of our 
everyday tasks, we conclude that Act 23 does not constitute an 
undue burden on the right to vote.  Payment to a government 
agency, however, is another story.   
¶5 
Act 23 provides that the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) "may not charge a fee to an applicant for the initial 
issuance, renewal, or reinstatement of an identification card" 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
4 
 
when "the applicant requests that the identification card be 
provided without charge for purposes of voting."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.50(5)(a)3. (2011-12).3  On its face, then, the law 
prohibits a government or its agencies from requiring any 
elector, rich or poor, to pay a fee as a condition to obtaining 
a DOT photo identification card to vote.4  See Harper v. Va. Bd. 
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) ("payment of any fee [may 
not be] an electoral standard").  The mandate of Act 23 is 
consistent with the Wisconsin tradition of "jealously guard[ing] 
and protect[ing]" the fundamental right to vote.  See State ex 
rel. Frederick v. Zimmerman, 254 Wis. 600, 613, 37 N.W.2d 473 
(1949).  
¶6 
Plaintiffs produced evidence at trial that, in the 
course of obtaining a DOT photo identification card for voting, 
government agencies charged them fees to obtain supporting 
documents for their applications.  A common example is a birth 
certificate, which is satisfactory proof of name, date of birth 
and citizenship, and can cost $20 to obtain.  E.g., Wis. Stat. 
§ 69.22(1)(a) and (c).  The requirement for such documents arose 
under Wisconsin administrative rules that implement Act 23.  
E.g., Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(3)(a).   
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.   
4 We address only the financial burden incurred while 
obtaining a DOT photo identification card for voting, see Wis. 
Stat. § 343.50, because the other forms of Act 23-acceptable 
identification are required for purposes other than voting, 
e.g., driver licenses are required to lawfully drive a vehicle. 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
5 
 
¶7 
In order to resolve the conflict between Act 23 and 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ Trans 
102.15(3)(a), 
we 
interpret 
the 
administrative rules and explain that the discretion of the 
Division 
of 
Motor 
Vehicles 
(DMV) 
administrators 
must 
be 
exercised in a constitutionally sufficient manner.  Such 
exercise of discretion requires the issuance of DOT photo 
identification cards for voting without requiring documents for 
which an elector must pay a fee to a government agency.5  See 
Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(3)(b) and (c) (permitting 
issuance of DOT photo identification cards for voting without 
the 
documents 
described 
in 
§ Trans 
102.15(3)(a)). 
 
Our 
conclusion 
employs 
a 
saving 
construction 
of 
§ Trans 
102.15(3)(b), conforms to Act 23's mandate and relieves a severe 
burden on the right to vote that would otherwise exist.  Because 
with a saving construction of § Trans 102.15(3)(b) Act 23 does 
not place a severe burden on the right to vote, we apply 
rational basis scrutiny and conclude that Act 23 is reasonably 
related to the State's significant interests.   
                                                 
5 Put simply, the right to vote cannot require payment to a 
government or its agencies.  This includes, of course, a "poll 
tax," where a government directly requires and itself collects a 
payment in order to vote.  See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663 (1966).  It also includes, however, fees that a 
government agency other than a Wisconsin agency may charge for 
documents necessary to obtain a DOT photo identification card 
for voting.  We cannot require other governments or their 
agencies to refrain from charging such fees.  We can, however, 
explain that in order to constitutionally administer Act 23, the 
DMV may not require documents in order to issue a DOT photo 
identification card for voting that require payment of a fee to 
any government agency.  
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
6 
 
¶8 
We have been mindful that the task before us is not to 
determine whether "Act 23 is the best way to preserve and 
promote the right to vote."  League of Women Voters, __ Wis. 2d 
__, ¶55.  Such "policy determinations . . . are not properly 
addressed to the members of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin."  
MTI v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶181, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ 
(Crooks, J., concurring).     
¶9 
Instead, 
we 
apply 
judicial 
restraint 
and 
constitutional principles to the case at hand.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court and vacate the 
injunctions the circuit court issued.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Parties 
¶10 Plaintiffs are the Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, 
Voces de la Frontera and numerous individuals residing either in 
Milwaukee County or in Polk County.  The NAACP, an incorporated 
association with its business address in the City of Milwaukee, 
contends that "Act 23 will force the Milwaukee Branch of the 
NAACP to divert substantial resources away from traditional 
voter registration and voter turnout efforts in order to educate 
and assist voters in procuring Act 23-acceptable photo ID."  
NAACP alleges that Act 23 unconstitutionally burdens Wisconsin 
African-American residents' right to vote.  
¶11 Voces is Wisconsin's preeminent immigration rights 
organization.  It expresses strong concerns about the burden Act 
23 will place on the Latino community and its members as they 
seek to exercise their franchise.  Voces alleges that "Act 23 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
7 
 
will force Voces to divert substantial resources away from 
traditional voter registration and voter turnout efforts in 
order to educate and assist voters in procuring Act 23-
acceptable photo ID." 
B.  Act 23 
¶12 Act 23, with a few limited exceptions, requires 
electors to identify themselves by presenting Act 23-acceptable 
photo identification in order to vote.  Stated generally, these 
include:  DOT issued driver's license; DOT issued photo 
identification card; an unexpired DOT photo identification card 
receipt; United States uniformed service identification card; 
United States passport; United States naturalization certificate 
issued within two years preceding the election; federally 
recognized Wisconsin Native American tribe's identification 
card; Wisconsin university or college student identification 
card; and citation or notice of driver's license suspension.  
Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m).  Our review focuses on the second form of 
acceptable identification, which we refer to as a DOT photo 
identification card for voting.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.50.    
¶13 The DMV is the division of the DOT charged with 
issuing DOT photo identification cards for voting spoken to in 
Act 23.  DOT administrative rules governing DMV's process for 
issuing these cards require an applicant to document name, birth 
date, identity, residence and citizenship.  A social security 
card and numerous other documents are proof of identity.  
Wisconsin Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(4)(a)13.  An applicant may 
prove residence by items such as a utility bill, paycheck stub 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
8 
 
or similar document that shows name and address.  § Trans 
102.15(4m).   
¶14 A certified copy or an original birth certificate is 
satisfactory proof of name, date of birth and citizenship.  Wis. 
Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(3)(a).  Wisconsin Stat. § 69.21 
describes how to obtain vital records, including certified 
copies of birth certificates, for those applicants born in 
Wisconsin.  Wisconsin Stat. § 69.22(1)(a) and (c) permit a 
government agency to assess a $20 fee for a certified copy of a 
birth certificate.6  Other states presumably have their own 
procedures, which may similarly allow a government agency to 
charge a fee. 
C.  Procedural History 
¶15 On March 6, 2012, the 
circuit court temporarily 
enjoined the enforcement of Act 23.  On April 16-19, April 30, 
and May 4, 2012, the court conducted a bench trial.  During the 
trial, plaintiffs testified about the burdens of time and 
inconvenience 
of 
going 
to 
DMV 
offices 
to 
obtain 
Act-23 
acceptable identification.  They also testified about the cost 
of documents the DMV requires in order to issue a DOT photo 
identification card for voting.  These costs included payment to 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 69.22(6) provides that the "register of 
deeds may provide free searches and free copies [of vital 
records] to agencies in his or her county at the direction of 
the county board."  However, there is no mention in § 69.22 of 
providing free certified copies of birth certificates or other 
vital records that have been required to obtain DOT photo 
identification cards to vote.   
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
9 
 
government agencies in various states, including Wisconsin, to 
secure a certified copy of a birth certificate.   
¶16 On July 17, 2012, the circuit court declared Act 23's 
photo identification requirements unconstitutional, and granted 
permanent injunctive relief.  The circuit court reasoned that 
"[t]he cost and the difficulty of obtaining documents necessary 
to apply for a DMV Photo ID is a significant burden upon the 
opportunity of Wisconsin citizens to vote."  It further 
concluded 
that 
these 
burdens 
"constitute 
a 
substantial 
impairment of the right to vote" and are therefore "inconsistent 
with, and in violation of Article III, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution."    
¶17 The circuit court made extensive findings of fact.  
For example, the court found that 80 percent of Wisconsin voters 
had a DOT-issued driver's license, which is an Act 23-acceptable 
identification, but that there were potentially thousands of 
otherwise qualified voters who currently lack Act 23-acceptable 
identification.  The court made no finding of how many of those 
otherwise qualified voters could not obtain Act 23-acceptable 
identification.  The court found that two electors, Ruthelle R. 
Frank and Ricky T. Lewis, had not secured photo identification 
cards due to problems in obtaining corrected birth certificates.  
The court also found that obtaining a certified copy of a birth 
certificate required payment to a government agency.   
¶18 On November 20, 2013, after briefing was completed in 
the court of appeals and pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 and 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
10 
 
Wis. Const. Art. VII, § 3(3), we took jurisdiction of the appeal 
on our own motion.7    
II.  DISCUSSION  
¶19 Plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to Act 23 under 
the Wisconsin Constitution, arguing that the time, inconvenience 
and 
costs 
incurred 
in 
obtaining 
Act 
23-acceptable 
photo 
identification 
impermissibly 
burden 
their 
right 
to 
vote.  
                                                 
7 We note that the District Court for the Eastern District 
of 
Wisconsin 
declared 
that 
Act 
23 
violated 
the 
federal 
constitution in Frank v. Walker, Nos. 11CV1128 and 12CV185, 2014 
WL 1775432 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 29, 2014).  The court did so knowing 
that the question of whether the voter identification law is 
constitutional was before us.  Id. at *42 n.1.  Federal court 
interpretation of a state statute prior to precedential state 
court interpretation is most unusual because if a saving 
construction by the state court is possible, then facial 
invalidation of the statute is inappropriate.  See, e.g., 
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959) (concluding that "no 
principle has found more consistent or clear expression than 
that 
the 
federal 
courts 
should 
not 
adjudicate 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
state 
enactments 
fairly 
open 
to 
interpretation until the state courts have been afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to pass upon them").  This is known as 
"Pullman abstention."  See R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 
312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941).   
Pullman abstention requires federal courts to abstain 
from deciding an unclear area of state law that raises 
constitutional 
issues 
because 
state 
court 
clarification 
might 
serve 
to 
avoid 
a 
federal 
constitutional ruling. . . . [F]ederal courts should 
retain jurisdiction over the case, but stay the 
proceedings so that state courts can rule on the state 
law question.  If the state court fails to resolve the 
issue, however, the parties may then return to federal 
court for a ruling on the constitutional issue.  
Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(citation omitted).  
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
11 
 
Plaintiffs do not assert that the actual presentation of photo 
identification violates their constitutional right to vote.  
Therefore, their challenge is made on a different legal basis 
than that of the plaintiffs in League of Women Voters.  
¶20 Defendants maintain that Act 23 is constitutional. 
They argue that the burdens imposed on electors to obtain a DOT 
photo identification card are minimal when compared to the 
State's significant interest in protecting the integrity and 
reliability of the electoral process, in maintaining public 
confidence 
in 
election 
results 
and 
in 
preventing 
voter 
impersonation fraud.  
A.  Standard of Review 
¶21 Plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to Act 23.  A 
facial challenge presents a question of law that we review 
independently, but benefitting from the discussion of the 
circuit court.  Custodian of Records for the Legislative Tech. 
Servs. Bureau v. State, 2004 WI 65, ¶6, 272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 
N.W.2d 792; State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 
N.W.2d 63.  Because this appeal follows a trial to the circuit 
court, we will uphold that court's historic findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, 
¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748. 
¶22 If we conclude that a voter regulation creates a 
severe burden on electors' right to vote, we will apply strict 
scrutiny to the statute, and conclude that it is constitutional 
only if it is narrowly drawn to satisfy a compelling state 
interest.  See Wagner v. Milwaukee Cnty. Election Comm'n, 2003 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
12 
 
WI 103, ¶77, 263 Wis. 2d 709, 666 N.W.2d 816; see also Milwaukee 
Cnty. v. Mary F.-R., 2013 WI 92, ¶35, 351 Wis. 2d 273, 839 
N.W.2d 581.  On the other hand, if we conclude that the burden 
on the electors' right to vote is not severe, the legislation 
will be presumed valid, and we will apply a rational basis level 
of judicial scrutiny in determining whether the statute is 
constitutional.  Mary F.-R., 351 Wis. 2d 273, ¶35. 
B.  Challenge to Act 23 Burdens 
1.  Foundational principles 
¶23 Without question, the right to vote is a fundamental 
right and in many respects, it is protective of other rights.  
Frederick, 254 Wis. at 613; Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 
599 (2005).  As Justice Brennan explained so long ago, "the 
right to vote is 'a fundamental political right, because [it is] 
preservative of all [other] rights.'"  Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 
724, 756 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). 
¶24 Foundational legal principles are our starting point 
when fundamental rights are at issue.  One such principle is 
that generally, statutes are presumed to be constitutional.  
Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶46, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 
N.W.2d 854.  However, the way in which we address this 
presumption 
may 
vary 
depending 
on 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
constitutional claim at issue.  See League of Women Voters, 2014 
WI 97, ¶16, __ Wis. 2d __.  The presumption of constitutionality 
is based on the court's respect for a co-equal branch of 
government, and it is meant to promote due deference to 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
13 
 
legislative acts.  Dane Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ponn P., 
2005 WI 32, ¶16, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344.  In addition, 
given a choice of reasonable interpretations of a statute, we 
must 
select 
the 
interpretation 
that 
results 
in 
constitutionality.  Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. DOR, 222 Wis. 2d 
650, 667, 586 N.W.2d 872 (1998). 
¶25 One who challenges a statute on constitutional grounds 
has a very heavy burden to overcome.  Dowhower v. W. Bend Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2000 WI 73, ¶10, 236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 N.W.2d 557.  To 
succeed, 
the 
challenger 
must 
prove 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Cole, 2003 
WI 112, ¶11, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2 328.  While this burden 
of proof is often associated with the requisite proof of guilt 
in a criminal case, in the context of a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute, the phrase "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" expresses the "force or conviction with which a court 
must conclude, as a matter of law, that a statute is 
unconstitutional before the statute or its application can be 
set aside."  Ponn P., 279 Wis. 2d 169, ¶18.  Furthermore, courts 
must resolve any doubt about the constitutionality of a statute 
in favor of upholding the statute.  Monroe Cnty. Dep't of Human 
Servs. v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ¶16, 271 Wis. 2d 51, 678 N.W.2d 
831. 
2.  Voter rights 
¶26 When courts approach constitutional challenges that 
allege a burden on the right to vote, we focus first on how the 
right is burdened.  The analysis by which we do so is more 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
14 
 
nuanced than that set out above.  Decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court, as well as our own decisions that relate to 
voting, provide discussions helpful to determining how to 
structure our examination of the plaintiffs' claims and the 
circuit court's conclusions.   
¶27 For example, in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 
(1983), the Supreme Court examined whether an Ohio statute's 
requirement that an independent candidate for President file his 
statement of candidacy and nominating petition more than five 
months before party candidates were required to file, placed an 
unconstitutional burden on voting and associational rights of 
the candidate's supporters under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Id. at 786 n.7, 790-91.   
¶28 The Supreme Court began by noting that "as a practical 
matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if 
they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather 
than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes."  Id. at 
788 (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 730).  The Court then explained 
that voter regulation laws "inevitably affect[]——at least to 
some degree——the individual's right to vote and his right to 
associate with others for political ends.  Nevertheless, the 
State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient 
to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions."  Id.   
¶29 The Court said that there was no "litmus-paper test" 
that can separate valid from invalid voting regulations.  Id. at 
789.  Instead, a court must first consider "the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
15 
 
First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to 
vindicate.  It then must identify and evaluate the precise 
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the 
burden imposed by its rule."  Id.  The Court analyzed the facts 
supporting the alleged burdens on supporters of independent 
candidates and concluded that "[t]he inquiry is whether the 
challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the 
availability of political opportunity."  Id. at 793 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).   
¶30 The 
Court 
then 
took 
up 
the 
precise 
interests 
identified by the State:  "voter education, equal treatment for 
partisan and independent candidates, and political stability," 
and examined the "legitimacy" of the stated interests and the 
extent 
to 
which 
the 
early 
filing 
deadline 
served 
those 
interests.  Id. at 796.  The Court concluded that given modern 
communications, particularly those that occur in presidential 
elections, it was not clear that the early filing requirement 
aided voter education.  Id. at 798.  The Court also concluded 
that there was "no merit in the State's claim that the early 
filing" assisted in treating partisan and independent candidates 
equally.  Id. at 799.   
¶31 Nowhere in the majority opinion did the Court describe 
whether it was applying rational basis or strict scrutiny to the 
Ohio statute.  Rather, the Court seemed to balance the burden on 
the individual's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights with the 
specific interests the State sought to promote.  However, it is 
important to note that although the law directly limited how one 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
16 
 
could become a nonpartisan candidate, it was the indirect 
restriction on the voters' right to have a choice of candidates 
that drove the Court's decision.   
¶32 In Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), another 
case related to burdens on the right to vote, the Supreme Court 
continued to focus its discussion on the rights being burdened.  
There, Hawaii's lack of a provision to permit write-in voting 
was 
challenged 
as 
an 
impermissible 
burden 
on 
First 
and 
Fourteenth Amendment protections.  Because only one candidate 
filed nomination papers for a state legislative seat, the 
petitioner wanted to mount a write-in campaign and was told that 
Hawaii made no provision for write-in candidates.  Id. at 430.   
¶33 As the Court began its discussion, it explained that 
"Petitioner proceeds from the erroneous assumption that a law 
that imposes any burden upon the right to vote must be subject 
to strict scrutiny.  Our cases do not so hold."  Id. at 432.  
The Court instructed that only "severe restrictions" by the 
State would require a compelling state interest and that 
"reasonable, nondiscriminatory" regulations were permissible.  
Id. at 434.   
¶34 The Court concluded that the burden imposed by 
Hawaii's lack of a provision for write-in voting was "slight"; 
therefore, the State "need not establish a compelling interest 
to tip the constitutional scales in its direction."  Id. at 439.  
The Court then applied rational basis scrutiny and concluded 
that "[t]he State has a legitimate interest . . . and the write-
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
17 
 
in voting ban is a reasonable way of accomplishing this goal."  
Id. at 440.     
¶35 In Crawford, the Supreme Court decided a challenge to 
Indiana's statutory requirement that an elector identify himself 
by presenting a government-issued photo identification in order 
to vote.  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 185.  The complainants, who 
represented among others, "groups of elderly, disabled, poor, 
and minority voters," alleged that the law "substantially 
burdens the right to vote in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment" and that it will "arbitrarily disfranchise qualified 
voters who do not possess the required identification and will 
place an unjustified burden on those who cannot readily obtain 
such identification."  Id. at 187.   
¶36 In upholding the constitutionality of the Indiana 
statute, six members of the Court applied the Burdick/Anderson 
analysis, although the lead opinion, authored by Justice 
Stevens, and the concurrence, authored by Justice Scalia, 
applied the analysis somewhat differently.  In the first step of 
that analysis, six justices examined whether requiring a 
government issued photo identification burdens the right to 
vote.  Id. at 189-90; id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring).  The 
lead opinion concluded that the requirement did not impose 
"excessively burdensome requirements on any class of voters" and 
that "the statute's broad application to all Indiana voters 
. . . imposes only a limited burden on voters' rights."  Id. at 
202-03 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
concurrence evaluated and upheld a single burden that was 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
18 
 
uniformly 
imposed 
on 
all 
voters, 
without 
regard 
to 
classifications of voters and took issue with the lead opinion's 
consideration of "class of voters."  Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., 
concurring).   
¶37 Given that the burdens imposed were not "severe," both 
the lead opinion and the concurrence applied rational basis 
scrutiny in determining that the law was reasonably related to 
the State's legitimate interests and therefore, upheld the photo 
identification law.  Id. at 204; id. at 209 (Scalia, J. 
concurring). 
¶38 In Wagner, a Wisconsin case affecting voting, we 
applied the Burdick/Anderson burden analysis to a constitutional 
challenge to an enforced delay in becoming a candidate.  Wagner, 
263 Wis. 2d 709, ¶¶1, 76.  Judge Wagner claimed a deprivation of 
"liberty and equal protection of the law" under both the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the United States Constitution 
brought about by the enforced delay of his opportunity to be a 
candidate for a non-judicial office during the judicial term for 
which he had been elected.8  Id., ¶76.   
¶39 We began by first considering "the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected."  Id., 
                                                 
8 We note that Judge Wagner's due process and equal 
protection claims under the Wisconsin Constitution related to 
Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution and that 
plaintiffs' challenge to Act 23 is based on Article III, Section 
1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  However, the method of 
analysis of burdens employed in Wagner v. Milwaukee Cnty. 
Election Comm'n, 2003 WI 103, 263 Wis. 2d 709, 666 N.W.2d 816, 
is appropriate here too.   
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
19 
 
¶77 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).  We then considered the 
"legitimacy and strength" of the State's specifically identified 
interests, that of maintaining the integrity and independence of 
the judiciary.  Id., ¶83.  In so doing, we imported the United 
States Supreme Court's method of focusing first on the burden 
placed on a right related to voting and from that determination, 
deciding what level of judicial scrutiny would be required.  
After concluding that the burden on the right to become a 
candidate was not severe, we applied rational basis scrutiny to 
the challenged limitation and concluded that the State's 
significant interest supported the delay.  Id., ¶¶84-85.   
C.  Burdens of Act 23  
¶40 We structure our discussion of plaintiffs' challenges 
to Act 23 consistent with the method of analysis employed in 
Burdick and Anderson, as we did in Wagner, where the challenge 
related to when a candidate could be submitted for voters' 
consideration and how the protections of both the Wisconsin 
Constitution and the United States Constitution were implicated.  
Id., ¶76.  Accordingly, we first consider whether the burden on 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
20 
 
the right to vote is severe.9  We begin by examining whether the 
time and inconvenience of going to DMV offices to secure DOT 
photo identification cards for voting is a severe burden.  We 
then consider whether payments for transportation to DMV offices 
and for documents that DMV has required before it would issue 
the requested photo identification cards are severe burdens on 
the exercise of the franchise.  Finally, we consider the precise 
interests identified by the State for enacting Act 23.   
                                                 
9 In Frank, the district court repeatedly cited to Anderson 
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 
U.S. 428 (1992), but it did not follow the legal standard those 
cases provide.  Frank, Nos. 11CV1128 and 12CV185, 2014 WL 
1775432, at *5.  The district court did not employ the 
Anderson/Burdick analytic framework because the court did not 
first determine whether the Wisconsin act severely burdened 
exercise of the franchise.  Id. at *6.  Rather, the court merely 
concluded that the act placed an "unjustified" burden on the 
right to vote.  Id. at *18.  It arrived at its conclusion by 
first deciding that Walker had failed to prove the significance 
of the State's interests.  Id. at *6-11.  Because the State's 
interests were not significant, the district court concluded 
that the burden was "unjustified."  Id. at *18.  
The district court's reasoning stands the Anderson/Burdick 
analysis on its head.  Anderson and Burdick require that the 
statutory challenger first prove whether the burden on the 
franchise is severe because it is this initial determination 
about the severity of the burden that drives the level of 
scrutiny courts then apply to the State's asserted interests.  
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 440; see also Crawford v. Marion Cnty. 
Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008); id. at 205 (Scalia, J., 
concurring).  It is only when a statute imposes a severe burden 
on the right to vote that the State's asserted interests are 
subject to strict scrutiny.  Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.  
Accordingly, 
Frank 
provides 
no 
guidance 
as 
we 
address 
plaintiffs' claims.  
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
21 
 
1.  Time/Inconvenience 
¶41 The record provides extensive testimony about trips to 
DMV offices by individuals who sought to obtain Act 23-
acceptable photo identification for voting.  Some of these trips 
were at quite a distance and many trips were repeats because 
either the line to obtain a photo identification card was too 
long or the applicant did not have the documents that DMV 
required in order to issue a photo identification card.  Some 
witnesses testified that they had spent in excess of six hours 
in their efforts.   
¶42 No one who testified thought the process of obtaining 
a DOT photo identification card was easy.  However, all were 
successful, except two applicants, Ruthelle R. Frank and Ricky 
T. Lewis.  They were unable to obtain photo identification cards 
because of problems with their birth certificates that may 
require court action to correct.   
¶43 Few cases have parsed the constitutional significance 
of time and inconvenience burdens on the right to vote.  
However, Crawford did, to some extent, when it considered the 
burden that "life's vagaries" can impose and noted that:  
[a] photo identification requirement imposes some 
burdens on voters that other methods of identification 
do not share.  For example, a voter may lose his photo 
identification, may have his wallet stolen on the way 
to the polls, or may not resemble the photo in the 
identification because he recently grew a beard.   
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197.  Crawford also went on to explain 
that "the inconvenience of making a trip to [a state motor 
vehicle office], gathering the required documents, and posing 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
22 
 
for a photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden 
on the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase 
over the usual burdens of voting."  Id. at 198.  We agree with 
that assessment.   
¶44 Moreover, we note that photo identification is, to 
some extent, a condition of our times.  Many important personal 
interactions are being modernized to require proof of identity 
with photo identification.  For example, years ago, driver 
licenses did not require a photograph of the licensee, now 
Wisconsin driver licenses do.  Photo identification is now 
required to purchase a firearm, to board a commercially operated 
airline flight, to enter some federal buildings and to obtain 
food stamps.  Photo identification is often required to obtain a 
book from a public library, to cash a check, to purchase 
alcoholic beverages, to be admitted to many places of employment 
and to be seen by one's own physician for a personal 
appointment.  Elector identification is certainly as important 
an identification as any of the above examples.  
¶45 The federal government also has directed states to 
require photo identification in circumstances where the federal 
government was not involved in the past.  For example, the REAL 
ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109-13, sets forth requirements for state 
driver licenses wherein underlying documents are required to 
obtain or renew a driver's license in a state that has 
implemented the REAL ID Act, as Wisconsin has.10  See, e.g., Wis. 
                                                 
10 The REAL ID Act also applies to those ID cards for 
boarding commercially operated airline flights, entering federal 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
23 
 
Stat. § 343.165.  As inconvenient as it may be, photo 
identification is here to stay.  It is a fact of life to which 
we all have to adjust.   
¶46 We do not minimize the difficulties that some who 
applied 
for 
Act 
23-acceptable 
photo 
identification 
have 
encountered in the past or will encounter in the future.  
However, the time and inconvenience incurred are not severe 
burdens on the right to vote.  In many cases, these familiar 
burdens are no more of an imposition than is the exercise of the 
franchise itself, which can involve waiting in long lines and 
traveling distances in order to personally cast a ballot on 
election day.11    
¶47 In addition, we note that the NAACP and Voces are two 
of Wisconsin's most conscientious and capable organizations in 
regard to encouraging and facilitating voting.  They will know 
what 
documentation 
DMV 
requires 
to 
issue 
DOT 
photo 
identification cards for voting and will work to assure that 
members of the African-American and Latino communities will be 
well prepared for their trips to DMV.  NAACP and Voces have seen 
the power that the voting booth can give to their communities 
                                                                                                                                                             
buildings and nuclear power plants.  It does not apply to DOT 
photo identification cards issued for use in voting. 
11 While our focus is on DOT issued photo identification 
cards, we note that some of those who testified had obtained a 
Wisconsin 
driver's 
license. 
 
Any 
payments 
to 
Wisconsin 
government agencies in order to obtain a driver's license are 
not relevant to our discussion because that license confirms the 
privilege to drive; it is not obtained solely for elector 
identification. 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
24 
 
and will continue to work to assure that all eligible voters 
have the opportunity to exercise their franchise. 
¶48 The Government Accountability Board (GAB) also is 
poised to assist in educating the electors about how to obtain a 
DOT-issued 
photo 
identification 
card. 
 
The 
GAB 
received 
legislative approval for a $1.9 million appropriation to 
implement Act 23 and to educate Wisconsin voters on where and 
how to obtain Act 23-acceptable photo identification.  Although 
some of these efforts have been put on hold due to circuit court 
injunctions, 
the 
GAB 
remains 
a 
significant 
resource 
for 
information and education.    
2.  Costs  
¶49 We now turn to the other burden that the plaintiffs 
identified and the circuit court found, which are the costs 
incurred in obtaining a DOT-issued photo identification card for 
voting.  Some costs involved payments for transportation to DMV 
offices or time taken from work.  They are not costs paid to a 
government agency nor are they regulated by Act 23.  In some 
respects, they are similar to those costs incurred in casting an 
in-person ballot.  They are not a severe burden on the right to 
vote. 
¶50 Plaintiffs also provided evidence of payments to 
government agencies to obtain documents required by DMV to issue 
DOT photo identification cards to vote.  Plaintiffs do not 
employ the term "poll tax" in regard to those payments and we do 
not define them as poll taxes.  Plaintiffs assert, however, that 
those payments are an unconstitutional burden on the right to 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
25 
 
vote.  Because other jurisdictions have characterized payments 
to government agencies to obtain documents necessary to voting 
as a de facto poll tax and because there are compelling reasons 
to assure that Wisconsin does not impose an unconstitutional fee 
as a condition of voting, we interpret Act 23 with both 
characterizations in mind.   
¶51 Act 23 provides that DOT "may not charge a fee to an 
applicant for the initial issuance, renewal, or reinstatement of 
an identification card" when "the applicant requests that the 
identification card be provided without charge for purposes of 
voting."  Wis. Stat. § 343.50(5)(a)3.  This provision prohibits 
DOT from causing any elector, rich or poor, to pay a fee as a 
condition to voting.   
¶52 However, plaintiffs incurred costs due to payments to 
government agencies for documents that DMV required in order to 
issue DOT photo identification cards for voting.  These costs 
were not paid to DOT or its division, DMV; they were paid to 
other government agencies.  One example of such a cost is the 
payment for certified copies of birth certificates that DMV has 
required as proof of name, date of birth and citizenship.12  See 
Wis. Stat. § 69.22.   
¶53 Payments required to be made to a Virginia government 
agency in order to exercise the right to vote were held 
unconstitutional in Harper, where a $1.50 poll tax was examined.  
                                                 
12 Copies of other vital records, Wis. Stat. § 69.21, may 
also have been required.  For convenience of discussion, we 
refer only to birth certificates. 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
26 
 
The Supreme Court concluded that "payment of any fee" to a 
Virginia government entity could not be required as a condition 
of voting.  Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.  Although the Court talked 
about the uneven impact such a fee may have on those with 
limited financial resources, the Court struck down the fee for 
all voters.  Id.   
¶54 More recently, state supreme courts have examined 
claims that fees paid to state agencies to obtain documents 
required as part of the application process for state photo 
identification cards violated electors' constitutional rights.  
For example, in In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding 
Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 2007), 
the Michigan Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to a 
Michigan statute that required potential voters to identify 
themselves with a government-issued photo identification card.  
Id. at 451.  As part of its discussion, the court examined 
whether ancillary charges for documents necessary to obtaining 
the required photo identification card operated as a de facto 
poll tax that violated the Michigan Constitution or United 
States Constitution.  Id. at 463-66.   
¶55 In concluding that the Michigan statute was not a 
de facto poll tax, the court explained: 
[T]he statute does not condition the right to vote on 
the payment of any fee.  A voter who does not 
otherwise possess adequate photo identification is not 
required to incur the costs of obtaining photo 
identification as a condition of voting.  Instead, a 
voter may simply sign an affidavit in the presence of 
an election inspector.  Nothing in the statute 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
27 
 
contemplates that a voter is required to incur any 
costs in the execution of an affidavit.  
Id. at 464-65.  Therefore, the Michigan statute differed from 
the Wisconsin law because Act 23 requires elector identification 
by presenting a government-issued photo identification and does 
not permit an elector to vote after signing an affidavit of 
identity at the polls.13    
¶56 In City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. 
2013), the Tennessee Supreme Court considered a Tennessee 
statute that required, with limited exceptions, electors to 
provide photographic proof of identity.  Id. at 92.  Under the 
Tennessee law, an elector who attempted to vote in person, but 
was unable to produce valid evidence of identification and did 
not fall within the exceptions to the law, may cast a 
provisional ballot, which would be counted if the voter 
presented valid proof of identity within two days after the 
election.  Id. at 93.   
                                                 
13 The affidavit alternative available to Michigan electors 
provides: 
If the elector does not have an official state 
identification card, operator's or chauffeur's license 
as required in this subsection, or other generally 
recognized picture identification card, the individual 
shall sign an affidavit to that effect before an 
election inspector and be allowed to vote as otherwise 
provided in this act.   
In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality 
of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 451 (Mich. 2007) (quoting Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 168.523). 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
28 
 
¶57 Two 
voters 
presented 
non-compliant 
photo 
identifications 
issued 
by 
the 
City 
of 
Memphis 
and 
cast 
provisional 
ballots 
when 
their 
identifications 
were 
not 
accepted.  Id. at 93-94.  Those voters and the City then 
challenged the statute, bringing both facial and as-applied 
constitutional challenges.  Id. at 94-95.  In upholding the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
Tennessee 
statute 
against 
the 
challenges, part of which contended that the law amounted to a 
de facto poll tax, the court pointed out that: 
[T]his state's Act contains an exception for any in-
person voter who "is indigent and unable to obtain 
proof of identification without payment of a fee[.]"  
By its plain language, this provision exempts from the 
photo ID requirement any voter unable to pay the fees 
needed to obtain valid evidence of identification, 
including any fee associated with the documentation 
necessary to obtain a "free" photo ID card pursuant to 
section 55-50-336(g)(1).  Because of this provision, 
we cannot endorse the Plaintiffs' characterization of 
the photo ID requirement as a poll tax.     
Id. at 106 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  There, 
indigency operated as an exception to payment of direct and 
ancillary fees while preserving the right to vote.   
¶58 In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court also 
mentioned ancillary fees.  It noted that, "Indiana, like most 
States, charges a fee for obtaining a copy of one's birth 
certificate.  This fee varies by county and is currently between 
$3 and $12."  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198 n.17.  However, the 
Court did not consider whether an ancillary payment to an 
Indiana government agency in order to obtain a birth certificate 
was a de facto poll tax because "the record does not provide 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
29 
 
even a rough estimate of how many indigent voters lack copies of 
their birth certificates."  Id. at 202 n.20.  Additionally, 
indigent electors could avoid paying that fee by casting a 
provisional ballot and then executing an affidavit before the 
circuit court clerk within ten days of the election.  Id. at 
186. 
¶59 The voter identification laws of Michigan, Tennessee 
and Indiana all included a provision by which a voter could cast 
a ballot without paying money to a government agency.  Act 23 
similarly provides that DOT "may not charge a fee to an 
applicant for the initial issuance, renewal, or reinstatement of 
an identification card" when "the applicant requests that the 
identification card be provided without charge for purposes of 
voting."  Wis. Stat. § 343.50(5)(a)3.  
¶60 Requiring payment to a government agency to obtain a 
DOT photo identification card for voting puts the administrative 
regulation on a collision course with Act 23's directive that 
DOT "may not charge a fee."  It also would be a severe burden on 
the right to vote.   
¶61 Why is this burden severe?  The usual payment of $20 
for a certified copy of a birth certificate is modest and does 
not approach the sizeable costs parsed in other cases that bear 
on voting.  See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 710, 719 (1974) 
(concluding that $701.60 filing fee was unconstitutional); see 
also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 
145, 149 (1972) 
(explaining that a primary filing fee that at times reached 
$8,900 was constitutionally impermissible).   
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
30 
 
¶62 The modest fees for documents necessary to prove 
identity would be a severe burden on the constitutional right to 
vote not because they would be difficult for some to pay. 
Rather, they would be a severe burden because the State of 
Wisconsin may not enact a law that requires any elector, rich or 
poor, to pay a fee of any amount to a government agency as a 
precondition 
to 
the 
elector's 
exercising 
his 
or 
her 
constitutional right to vote.  See Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 
(concluding that the "payment of any fee [may not be] an 
electoral standard").14   
¶63 Given our conclusion that it would be contrary to Act 
23 and a severe burden on the right to vote if an elector were 
obligated to pay a fee to a government agency in order to obtain 
documents required for a DOT photo identification card to vote, 
we now consider whether a saving construction that is consistent 
with the statutory mandate and the Wisconsin constitution is 
possible.15  If a saving construction of the administrative rule 
                                                 
14 Although 
Harper 
was 
based 
on 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, Wisconsin's protection of the right to vote is 
even stronger because in addition to the equal protection and 
due process protections of Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, the franchise for Wisconsin voters is expressly 
declared 
in 
Article 
III, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.   
15 We have broad subject matter jurisdiction as a "court of 
last resort on all judicial questions under the constitution and 
laws of the state; a court of first resort on all judicial 
questions affecting the sovereignty of the state, its franchises 
or prerogatives, or the liberties of its people."  Attorney Gen. 
v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 518 (1874).   
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
31 
 
preserves the constitutionality of the statute, we will employ 
it.  See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 180 
(2003) (concluding that where a saving construction is "fairly 
possible," the court will adopt it) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 
285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).   
¶64 We do so in order to avoid a constitutional conflict.  
See, e.g., Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 
497, 503 (2001) (avoiding an interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 
41(b) that "would arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation 
of the Rules Enabling Act").  Stated otherwise, when we 
determine that there is a statutory flaw that may have 
constitutional significance, we ascertain whether the government 
rule or statute can be interpreted in a manner that will avoid a 
constitutional conflict.  See State ex rel. Strykowski v. 
Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 506, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).  As the 
Supreme Court has explained, it is best to "limit the solution 
to the problem" rather than enjoining the application of an 
entire statute due to a limited flaw.  Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328-29 (2006).   
                                                                                                                                                             
It is true that courts may lack subject matter jurisdiction 
to review administrative agency decisions if the petition for 
review is not timely filed.  Schiller v. DILHR, 103 Wis. 2d 353, 
355, 309 N.W.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that circuit court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review LIRC decision 
because petition was not timely filed); Kegonsa Joint Sanitary 
Dist. v. City of Stoughton, 87 Wis. 2d 131, 150, 274 N.W.2d 598 
(1979) (same).  However, this line of cases has nothing to do 
with the issues presented in this appeal.   
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
32 
 
¶65 Here, the potential to impose a severe burden on the 
right to vote is not stated in Act 23 itself.  Rather, the flaw 
is in the administrative rules that DMV has applied to 
applicants 
for 
DOT 
photo 
identification 
cards 
to 
vote.  
Accordingly, we do not initially weigh the burden identified, 
i.e., the fees paid to government agencies to obtain documents 
that DMV has required prior to issuing DOT photo identification 
cards 
for 
voting, 
because 
a 
saving 
construction 
of 
the 
administrative rule must be considered first.     
3.  Saving construction 
¶66 Wisconsin statutes and administrative regulations that 
address the same subject matter must be construed in a way that 
harmonizes them.  Cnty. of Milwaukee v. Superior of Wisconsin, 
Inc., 2000 WI App 75, ¶21, 234 Wis. 2d 218, 610 N.W.2d 484.  
Here, Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(3)(a) requires documents 
for "Proof of Name and Date of Birth," that other statutes, such 
as Wis. Stat. § 69.22, require payment to provide.  This creates 
a conflict with Act 23's directive to provide DOT photo 
identification cards for voting without charge.   
¶67 However, DMV administrators have discretion under Wis. 
Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(3)(b) to excuse the failure to 
provide documents referenced in § Trans 102.15(3)(a) when DOT 
photo identification cards for voting are requested.  Section 
Trans 102.15(3)(b) and (c) provide: 
(b) 
If 
a 
person 
is 
unable 
to 
provide 
documentation under [§ Trans 102.15(3)](a), and the 
documents are unavailable to the person, the person 
may make a written petition to the administrator of 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
33 
 
the division of motor vehicles for an exception to the 
requirements of par. (a).  The application shall 
include supporting documentation required by sub. (4) 
and: 
 
1. A certification of the person's name, date of 
birth and current residence street address on the 
department's form; 
 
2. An explanation of the circumstances by which 
the person is unable to provide any of the documents 
described in par. (a); and 
 
3. Whatever documentation is available which 
states the person's name and date of birth. 
(c) 
The 
administrator 
may 
delegate 
to 
the 
administrator's subordinates the authority to accept 
or reject such extraordinary proof of name and date of 
birth.   
¶68 Because 
the 
exercise 
of 
a 
DMV 
administrator's 
discretion has constitutional ramifications when a DOT photo 
identification card for voting is requested, we note that we are 
obliged to choose the interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 
102.15(3)(b) 
that 
does 
not 
conflict 
with 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  See Am. Family, 222 Wis. 2d at 667.   
¶69 In order to harmonize the directive of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.50(5)(a)3., which says no fees; statutes such as Wis. 
Stat. § 69.22, which impose payment of fees; and Wis. Admin. 
Code § Trans 102.15(3)(a), which requires certain documents for 
which electors may be required to pay fees to government 
agencies, we construe § Trans 102.15(3)(b).  We do so to 
preserve the constitutionality of § 343.50(5), as follows:  One 
who petitions an administrator pursuant to § Trans 102.15(3)(b) 
for an exception is constitutionally "unable" to provide those 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
34 
 
documents and they are constitutionally "unavailable" to the 
petitioner within our interpretation of § Trans 102.13(3)(b), so 
long as petitioner does not have the documents and would be 
required to pay a government agency to obtain them.16     
¶70 Stated 
otherwise, 
to 
invoke 
an 
administrator's 
discretion in the issuance of a DOT photo identification card to 
vote, an elector:  (1) makes a written petition to a DMV 
administrator 
as 
directed 
by 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ Trans 
102.15(3)(b) set forth above; (2) asserts he or she is "unable" 
to provide documents required by § Trans 102.15(3)(a) without 
paying a fee to a government agency to obtain them; (3) asserts 
those documents are "unavailable" without the payment of such a 
fee; and (4) asks for an exception to the provision of § Trans 
102.15(3)(a) documents whereby proof of name and date of birth 
that have been provided are accepted.  § Trans 102.15(3)(b) and 
(c).  Upon receipt of a petition for an exception, the 
administrator, or his or her designee, shall exercise his or her 
discretion in a constitutionally sufficient manner.17   
¶71 We further conclude that filing a Wis. Admin. Code 
§ Trans 102.15(3)(b) petition for an exception with a DMV 
                                                 
16 Our ruling in this regard applies to the provision of an 
elector's initial, renewal and reinstatement of a DOT photo 
identification card.  It does not apply to replacements for DOT 
photo identification cards that have been lost or misplaced.    
17 We do not address the straw man of personal jurisdiction 
because it is not the DMV administrator's rights that are at 
issue in this lawsuit.  It is the electors' constitutional right 
to vote.   
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
35 
 
administrator, as set forth above, is not a severe burden on the 
right to vote.  Accordingly, because the burdens of time, 
inconvenience and costs upon electors' right to vote are not 
severe under our interpretation of § Trans 102.15, we apply a 
rational basis level of scrutiny in determining whether Act 23 
is constitutional.  Mary F.-R., 351 Wis. 2d 273, ¶35; Wagner, 
263 Wis. 2d 709, ¶84.  As the Supreme Court has explained, it is 
erroneous to assume that a law that regulates voting must be 
subject to strict scrutiny.  Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432.  Strict 
scrutiny applies only when a statute imposes a severe burden on 
the exercise of the franchise.  Id. at 434.  
D.  State Interests 
¶72 Defendants 
have 
identified 
state 
interests 
of 
protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral 
process, maintaining public confidence in election results and 
preventing voter fraud as significant and compelling interests 
that underlie Act 23. 
¶73 It should be beyond question that the State has a 
significant and compelling interest in protecting the integrity 
and reliability of the electoral process, as well as promoting 
the public's confidence in elections.  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 
196.  As we learn of elections that are currently occurring 
around the world in troubled nations, the integrity and 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
36 
 
reliability of the electoral process and the public's confidence 
in elections are always exceedingly important.18   
¶74 The circuit court found there was no evidence of 
"recent" voter impersonation fraud in Wisconsin.  However, that 
finding cannot overcome the State's interest in preventing voter 
fraud.19  As the Supreme Court has held, "[v]oter fraud drives 
honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds 
distrust of our government.  Voters who fear their legitimate 
votes 
will 
be 
outweighed 
by 
fraudulent 
ones 
will 
feel 
disenfranchised."  Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006).     
¶75 We agree that the identified interests are significant 
and compelling.  Id. (explaining that the "State indisputably 
has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its 
election process" (quoting Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic 
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989) and that "[c]onfidence in 
the integrity of our electoral process is essential to the 
functioning of our participatory democracy").  However, because 
the burden on exercise of the franchise is not severe, the 
defendants need show only a legitimate state interest and that 
                                                 
18 A recent filing in Milwaukee County demonstrates that 
voter fraud is a concern.  See State v. Monroe, 2014CF2625 
(June 20, 
2014), 
wherein 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
District 
Attorney's office filed a criminal complaint against Robert 
Monroe that alleged 13 counts of voter fraud, including multiple 
voting in elections and providing false information to election 
officials in order to vote.  
19 We note that Wisconsin was one of the states identified 
in Crawford, where there is a record of voter fraud having 
occurred.  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195 n.12. 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
37 
 
requiring elector identification by the use of a government-
issued photo identification is a reasonable means of serving 
that interest.  See Wagner, 263 Wis. 2d 709, ¶¶77-78; Crawford, 
553 U.S. at 196-97; 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 440.   
¶76 We conclude that the use of Act 23-acceptable photo 
identification is a reasonable means of furthering the stated 
interests.  It may help to assure the public that the electoral 
process is followed and that results of elections held in 
Wisconsin validly represent the will of the electors.  In 
addition, those who would attempt to defraud the electors 
through misrepresentations to election officials will find that 
task more difficult.    
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶77 We conclude that the burdens of time and inconvenience 
associated with obtaining Act 23-acceptable photo identification 
are not severe burdens on the right to vote and do not 
invalidate the law.  The burdens of time and inconvenience of 
obtaining Act 23-acceptable photo identification are in many 
respects no more of an imposition than is casting an in-person 
ballot on election day.  Furthermore, photo identification is a 
condition of our times where more and more personal interactions 
are being modernized to require proof of identity with a 
specified type of photo identification before proceeding.   
¶78 However, to require payments to government agencies 
for documents necessary to obtain DOT photo identification cards 
for voting would severely burden the right to vote because it 
No. 
2012AP1652   
 
38 
 
would condition that right on payment to a government agency.  
Act 23 explicitly prohibits payment to a government agency to 
obtain a DOT photo identification card for voting.   
¶79 The 
payments 
at 
issue 
arise 
under 
Wisconsin 
administrative rules that implement Act 23.  Therefore, we 
construed those rules and explained how the discretion of the 
DMV administrator must be exercised in a constitutionally 
sufficient manner.  Such exercise of discretion requires the 
issuance of DOT photo identification cards for voting without 
requiring documents for which a fee continues to be charged by a 
government agency.  In so doing, we employ a saving construction 
of Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(3)(b) and relieve the severe 
burden that would otherwise exist due to costs levied by 
government agencies.   
¶80 Because Act 23 does not place a severe burden on the 
exercise of the franchise, we apply rational basis scrutiny and 
conclude that Act 23 is reasonably related to the State's 
significant interests.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 
the circuit court and vacate all injunctions the court issued. 
By the Court-The judgment of the circuit court is reversed 
and the permanent and temporary injunctions are vacated. 
 
No.  2012AP1652.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶81 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I have 
written in dissent in League of Women Voters v. Walker, 2014 WI 
97, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  That dissent also applies 
to the instant case.  Indeed I incorporate my entire dissent in 
League of Women Voters in this dissent.  The instant case, like 
League of Women Voters, is a facial challenge to Act 23, 
although it presents a richer factual record than does League of 
Women Voters. 
¶82 Like 
the 
majority 
opinion1 
and 
Justice 
Crooks' 
dissent,2 I agree that Act 23 creates a severe burden on the 
exercise of the right to vote.  I join the reasoning set forth 
in Justice Crooks' dissent concerning the substantial burden 
placed on the right of qualified voters to vote; the failure of 
the State to advance a compelling state interest; and the 
failure of the majority opinion in NAACP to remedy the burdens 
it identifies.3  In particular, I agree with Justice Crooks' 
dissent that the record in the instant case demonstrates that a 
substantial number of constitutionally qualified registered 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶7 (noting that the statute creates a 
"severe burden on the right to vote"). 
2 See Justice Crooks' dissent, ¶92. 
3 See also Frank v. Walker, No. 11-CV-01128, 2014 WL 1775432 
(E.D. Wis. Apr. 29, 2014).  Although the instant case provides a 
slightly different record and the challenge in the instant case 
is raised under the Wisconsin Constitution, not the United 
States Constitution, the Frank court's reasoning that Act 23 
imposes burdens on the right to vote and that the State failed 
to meet the requirements of the test laid out in Burdick v. 
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 
U.S. 780 (1983), is instructive. 
No.  2012AP1652.ssa 
 
2 
 
voters in Wisconsin do not possess the required government-
issued identification4 and that the costs of obtaining such 
identification constitute a severe burden.5   
¶83 I write separately, however, because as I wrote in my 
dissent in League of Women Voters, the NAACP opinion is confused 
and confusing regarding the standard of review.6  Moreover, 
Wisconsin case law sets forth a stringent standard of review for 
voting rights cases applicable to both League of Women Voters 
and the instant case under the Wisconsin Constitution.  The 
League of Women Voters case and the instant case ignore 
Wisconsin's 
jurisprudence 
regarding 
review 
of 
legislation 
regulating voting rights. 
 
¶84 Nevertheless, whether I apply the Burdick/Anderson 
standard of review or any variation thereof or the standard in 
Wisconsin's case law regarding review of legislation regulating 
voting rights, I conclude that Act 23 is unconstitutional.  The 
State "may not burden the right to vote merely by invoking 
abstract interests, be they legitimate, or even compelling, but 
must make a particular, factual showing that threats to its 
interests outweigh the particular impediments it has imposed.  
The State has made no such justification here, and as to some 
aspects of its law, it has hardly even tried."7   
                                                 
4 See Justice Crooks' dissent, ¶¶114-118. 
5 See Justice Crooks' dissent, ¶¶119-134. 
6 See League of Women Voters v. Walker, 2014 WI 97, ¶¶112-
136 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
7 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 209 
(2008) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
No.  2012AP1652.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶85 Like Justice Crooks' dissent, I would hold that 
invalidating Act 23 is the only appropriate remedy.  This court 
should not rule on administrative regulations not before us or 
rewrite a statute.  For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
 
 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
1 
 
¶86 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  The question of 
whether Act 23 violates the Wisconsin Constitution is at the 
intersection of profound democratic principles: the right of 
qualified Wisconsin citizens to vote, as explicitly guaranteed 
by the Wisconsin Constitution,1 and the undisputed principle that 
the state has a legitimate interest in safeguarding the 
integrity 
of 
elections 
through 
regulations.2 
 
Voter 
identification provisions are one way the state may choose to 
protect the legitimacy of elections.  Such provisions may be 
constitutionally imposed even if they severely burden a person's 
right to vote as long as they are narrowly tailored to advance a 
compelling 
state 
interest. 
 
However, 
Act 
23's 
photo 
identification requirements severely burden eligible voters 
without 
being 
narrowly 
tailored 
to 
achieve 
the 
state's 
compelling interests of reducing voter fraud and increasing 
                                                 
1 The Wisconsin Constitution guarantees the right to vote to 
qualified citizens.  It states, "Every United States citizen age 
18 or older who is a resident of an election district in this 
state is a qualified elector of that district."  Wis. Const. 
art. III, § 1.  
2 Dells v. Kennedy and Others, 49 Wis. 555, 557, 6 N.W. 246 
(1880) ("For the orderly exercise of the right [to vote] . . . 
it is admitted that the legislature must prescribe necessary 
regulations as to the places, mode and manner, and whatever else 
may be required to insure its full and free exercise."); State 
ex rel. Wood v. Baker (Baker), 38 Wis. 71, 86 (1875) ("Statutes 
cannot impair the right [to vote], though they may regulate its 
exercise.  Every statute regulating it must be consistent with 
the constitutionally qualified voter's right of suffrage when he 
claims his right at an election.  Then statutes may require 
proof of the right, consistent with the right itself.").  
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
2 
 
voter confidence in the outcomes of elections.3  For that reason, 
Act 23 is an unconstitutional election regulation, and I 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
¶87 The United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford 
v. Marion County Election Board,4 which upheld Indiana's voter 
identification statute, does not persuade me that Act 23 is 
constitutional. 
 
This 
is 
because 
there 
are 
substantial 
differences between this case and the Crawford case.  First, the 
record in the Crawford case was not nearly as developed as the 
record in this case.  This factor certainly influenced the 
Supreme 
Court's 
decision.5 
 
Second, 
Indiana's 
voter 
identification statute is not as stringent as Act 23.  Most 
importantly, the Indiana law provides for an affidavit exception 
that 
allows 
certain 
individuals 
to 
vote 
without 
photo 
identification.6  In upholding Indiana's voter identification 
law, Justice Stevens' lead opinion commented that the severity 
of the burden imposed by the photo identification requirement 
                                                 
3 The 
balancing 
test 
under 
which 
I 
find 
Act 
23 
unconstitutional is addressed in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 
U.S. 780, 789 (1983), and further discussed by Burdick v. 
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).   
4 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 
(2008). 
5 Id. at 200 ("But on the basis of the evidence in the 
record it is not possible to quantify either the magnitude of 
the burden on this narrow class of voters . . . . [T]he record 
does not provide us with the number of registered voters without 
photo identification."). 
6 Id. at 186 (describing the affidavit procedure available 
to indigent voters as well as individuals with a religious 
objection to being photographed). 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
3 
 
"is, of course, mitigated by the fact that, if eligible, voters 
without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that 
will ultimately be counted."7  Finally, while Act 23 applies to 
both 
in-person 
and 
absentee 
voting, 
Indiana's 
photo 
identification requirements do not apply to absentee voting.  
Therefore, 
the 
Crawford 
case 
is 
neither 
controlling 
nor 
persuasive.     
¶88 The 
majority 
opinion 
claims 
to 
approach 
the 
plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to Act 23 as a purely 
facial challenge.8  In doing so it purports to evaluate Act 23 
using the framework outlined by the United States Supreme Court 
in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. 
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).  However, it ultimately turns to a 
different legal theory to conclude that Act 23 imposes an 
unconstitutional de facto poll tax9 on voters, which imposes a 
severe burden.10  The de facto poll tax to which it refers is not 
the cost of the identification card itself, which is available 
free of charge, but the cost of obtaining a birth certificate, 
which a voter is required to have to obtain an identification 
                                                 
7 Id. at 199. 
8 Majority op., ¶¶19, 21. 
9 Although the majority sometimes asserts that it does not 
define the payments at issue as poll taxes, it acknowledges that 
it interprets Act 23 with this "characterization[] in mind."  
Id., ¶50.  Regardless of what the majority calls the costs at 
issue, it is clear that the majority relies on poll tax 
jurisprudence. 
10 Id., ¶¶62-63 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 
U.S. 663, 666 (1966)). 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
4 
 
card for voting.11  After concluding that the costs of obtaining 
a birth certificate impose an unconstitutional de facto poll tax 
that severely burdens eligible Wisconsin voters, the majority 
then crafts a remedy which allows individuals to obtain 
certified copies of their birth certificates free of charge.12  
The majority concludes that its remedy lessens the burden 
imposed by Act 23 on eligible Wisconsin voters to such a degree 
that Act 23 easily passes constitutional muster.13   
¶89 I 
cannot 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
characterization and analysis of the plaintiffs' challenge.  The 
majority incorrectly characterizes the challenge as a purely 
facial challenge.  It fails to apply the Anderson/Burdick 
framework correctly.  It improperly relies on poll tax case law.  
Even if I were to assume that poll tax analysis applied, the 
majority's attempt to alleviate the de facto poll tax for 
eligible Wisconsin voters results in an unworkable solution that 
fails to cure the unconstitutionality of Act 23.  Specifically,  
the majority opinion's remedy appears to leave in place the 
discretion of DMV administrators to issue or refuse to issue Act 
23-compliant 
identification 
where 
a 
fee 
is 
required 
for 
supporting documents.  If the majority opinion leaves in place 
                                                 
11 See id., ¶63.  The majority states, "Copies of other 
vital records, Wis. Stat. § 69.21, may also have been required.  
For 
convenience 
of 
discussion, 
we 
refer 
only 
to 
birth 
certificates."  See majority op., ¶52 n.12.  I employ the same 
term. 
12 See id., ¶¶7 n.5, 70. 
13 See id., ¶¶79-80. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
5 
 
the discretion of DMV administrators to issue exceptions to 
those 
burdened 
by 
the 
cost 
of 
obtaining 
underlying 
documentation,14 then it fails to guarantee constitutional 
protections against poll taxes.  On the other hand, if the 
majority opinion requires DMV administrators to issue photo 
identification cards to individuals who are burdened by the cost 
of obtaining required underlying documentation,15 it is directing 
a non-party to take specific action, which it has no authority 
to do.  In sum, the remedy imposed by the majority, under either 
approach, is flawed.  It impinges on the legislature's role by 
interpreting administrative code provisions that are not part of 
this challenge and by directing an administrative agency that is 
not a party to this case.  I urge the legislature to take action 
to cure the unconstitutionality of Act 23.  Without such action, 
the 
remedy 
crafted 
by 
the 
majority 
leaves 
Act 
23 
unconstitutional.  
¶90 The appropriate framework to analyze the plaintiffs' 
challenge to Act 23 is the modified facial challenge approach, 
which the United States Supreme Court has applied16 in comparable 
                                                 
14 See id., ¶70. 
15 See id., ¶7, ¶7 n.5. 
16 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 
310, 333-35 (2010) (applying a modified facial challenge 
approach and concluding, in part, that independent corporate 
political expenditures cannot be limited under the First 
Amendment); 
see 
also 
Wash. 
State 
Grange 
v. 
Wash. 
State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008) (applying a 
modified facial challenge approach and holding that Washington 
State's primary system did not violate political parties' 
associational rights under the First Amendment). 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
6 
 
cases.  Under a modified facial challenge, a "law may be 
overturned as impermissibly overbroad because a 'substantial 
number' of its applications are unconstitutional, 'judged in 
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.'"17  This 
differs from a purely facial challenge, which necessarily fails 
if any application of the challenged law is constitutional.   
¶91 A modified facial challenge is appropriate in this 
type of case because neither a purely facial challenge nor an 
as-applied challenge is practical in these circumstances.  A 
purely facial challenge requires that a party prove that a law 
is unconstitutional under all circumstances.18  Based on the 
burden that it imposes, a purely facial challenge to Act 23 
fails 
without 
question 
because 
the 
photo 
identification 
requirements of the law could be constitutionally applied to any 
Wisconsin 
voter 
who 
already 
possesses 
the 
appropriate 
identification.  In contrast to a purely facial challenge, an 
as-applied challenge looks at whether a law violated the 
constitutional rights of a particular person under the facts 
presented.19  Here, the record developed before the circuit court 
established that a substantial number of eligible Wisconsin 
voters lack Act 23-compliant identification and are severely 
burdened by its requirements.  A requirement that each burdened 
                                                 
17 Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 n.6 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).    
18 State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 
N.W.2d 63. 
19 Id. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
7 
 
individual bring an as-applied challenge would perpetuate 
uncertainty about the constitutionality of Act 23, as well as 
result in an extreme volume of litigation that would take a 
significant amount of time and resources to conclude.  Since the 
purely facial and as-applied frameworks cannot appropriately 
address the constitutionality of Act 23, I would apply a 
modified facial approach as utilized by the United States 
Supreme Court in analogous situations discussed in more detail 
herein.      
¶92 Under a proper application of the Anderson/Burdick 
framework, 
a 
modified 
facial 
challenge 
to 
Act 
23's 
constitutionality succeeds in establishing a violation of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  The only proper remedy is invalidation 
of the law.  This is because Act 23 imposes severe burdens on a 
substantial number of eligible Wisconsin voters who do not 
currently possess an Act 23-compliant form of identification, 
and that burden cannot be remedied by this court.  First, and 
most importantly, even though the identification card itself can 
be obtained at no cost, there are costs associated with 
acquiring the underlying documents required to obtain an 
identification card.  Those costs impose a severe burden on 
certain eligible Wisconsin voters, both those born in Wisconsin 
and those born in other states and other countries.  Second, for 
certain voters the time and effort required to obtain Act 23-
compliant identification adds to the severity of the burden.   
¶93 The majority recognizes that a severe cost burden 
exists, 
but 
instead 
of 
considering 
such 
burden 
in 
a 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
8 
 
straightforward 
manner 
under 
the 
well-established 
Anderson/Burdick framework, it applies poll tax analysis and 
crafts a remedy that purports to alleviate the burden imposed by 
Act 23.  The majority concludes that the costs associated with 
obtaining a free voter identification card are the functional 
equivalent of an unconstitutional poll tax.  No party or amicus 
brief advanced this argument.  Instead all recognized the 
Anderson/Burdick test as the applicable framework.  That test 
requires that a heightened level of scrutiny apply to any voting 
regulation that imposes a severe burden.20  I conclude that Act 
23 imposes such a burden on a substantial number of eligible 
Wisconsin voters.  This means Act 23 must be narrowly tailored 
to achieve compelling governmental interests if it is to be 
upheld.  I conclude that Act 23 does not meet this standard. 
¶94 In contrast to my approach, the majority opinion makes 
a radical departure from the well-established Anderson/Burdick 
framework.  This is because instead of balancing the benefits 
and burdens of Act 23 as the Anderson/Burdick framework 
instructs and reaching the conclusion compelled by the record, 
the majority intervenes to lessen the severity of the burden by 
crafting a remedy that allows for individuals to obtain a 
certified copy of their birth certificate, a document necessary 
to obtain a free voter identification card, free of charge.  
Furthermore, the majority opinion's remedy reworks the framework 
in which Act 23 operates, which is not the court's role.  It is 
                                                 
20 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 
788). 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
9 
 
the 
legislature 
and 
not 
this 
court 
that 
must 
craft 
a 
constitutional 
voter 
identification 
law 
considering 
the 
framework in which that law operates, policy objectives, and 
budgetary constraints.  For these reasons, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I. 
THE MODIFIED FACIAL CHALLENGE APPROACH 
¶95 The majority opinion asserts that it is addressing a 
purely facial challenge to Act 23.21  The majority's analysis, 
however, reveals that it is not actually doing so.  We have 
consistently said that a purely facial challenge to a law may 
succeed only when the challenger proves that the law cannot be 
constitutionally applied under any circumstance.22  Because Act 
23 imposes a minimal burden on eligible Wisconsin voters who 
already possess an approved form of identification, the law 
would survive a purely facial challenge on that basis alone.  
However, the challenge before this court is not purely facial.  
Instead, it is better understood and analyzed as a modified 
facial challenge. 
¶96 In certain contexts, the United States Supreme Court 
has recognized the existence of a modified approach to facial 
challenges.23  "Our cases recognize a second type of facial 
                                                 
21 Majority op., ¶¶19, 21. 
22 Wood, 323 Wis. 2d 321, ¶13.  United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739 (1987), first established this approach to the 
evaluation of a purely facial constitutional challenge. 
23 See Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 n.6 (discussing 
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine); see also Sabri v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 600, 609-10 (2004) (listing cases in which the 
United States Supreme court applied a modified or relaxed facial 
analysis).    
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
10 
 
challenge in the First Amendment context under which a law may 
be overturned as impermissibly overbroad because a 'substantial 
number' of its applications are unconstitutional, 'judged in 
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.'"24  
¶97 The United States Supreme Court used this type of 
analysis in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 
U.S. 310, 333-35 (2010).  There, the Court reasoned, "In the 
exercise of its judicial responsibility, it is necessary then 
for the Court to consider the facial validity of § 441b.  Any 
other 
course 
of 
decision 
would 
prolong 
the 
substantial, 
nationwide chilling effect caused by § 441b's prohibitions on 
corporate expenditures."25  Essential to the Court’s reasoning 
was that requiring plaintiffs to bring as-applied challenges to 
the law would cause uncertainty and prolonged litigation, which 
would not be appropriate considering the importance of speech in 
the context of elections.26 
¶98 A 
discussion 
of 
purely 
facial 
constitutional 
challenges and as-applied constitutional challenges demonstrates 
why the modified facial approach is appropriate in this case.  A 
purely facial challenge requires that the party challenging the 
law prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the law is 
unconstitutional under all circumstances.27  "If a challenger 
                                                 
24 Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 n.6 (quoting 
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615). 
25 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 333. 
26 Id. at 333-35. 
27 Wood, 323 Wis. 2d 321, ¶¶13, 15. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
11 
 
succeeds in a facial attack on a law, the law is void 'from its 
beginning to the end.'"28  Furthermore, in considering a purely 
facial constitutional challenge, we presume that the law is 
constitutional.29   
¶99 An 
as-applied 
challenge, 
in 
contrast, 
determines 
whether a law violated the constitutional rights of a particular 
person under the facts presented.30  "Under such a challenge, the 
challenger must show that his or her constitutional rights were 
actually violated. If a challenger successfully shows that such 
a violation occurred, the operation of the law is void as to the 
party asserting the claim."31  Therefore, in an as-applied 
challenge, a court should not presume that the statute has been 
applied in a constitutional manner.32   
                                                 
28 Id., ¶13 (quoting State ex rel. Comm'rs of Pub. Lands v. 
Anderson, 56 Wis. 2d 666, 672, 203 N.W.2d 84 (1973)). 
29 See id., ¶15. 
30 Id., ¶13. 
31 Id. 
32 This statement is supported by Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 
2011 WI 30, ¶49, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 N.W.2d 854, in which we 
stated, "[T]he analysis that is employed for an as-applied 
challenge contains no presumption in regard to whether the 
statute was applied in a constitutionally sufficient manner."  
Similarly, we have explained that "[w]hile we presume a statute 
is constitutional, we do not presume that the State applies 
statutes in a constitutional manner."  Soc'y Ins. v. Labor & 
Indus. Review Comm'n, 2010 WI 68, ¶27, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 
N.W.2d 385.   
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
12 
 
¶100 The majority opinion's claim that it is treating this 
challenge as a purely facial challenge upsets the well-drawn 
distinction between purely facial and as-applied challenges.   
Treating this as a purely facial challenge is not appropriate 
because the plaintiffs do not actually allege that Act 23 is 
unconstitutional under all applications.  They acknowledge that 
the photo identification requirements of the law could be 
constitutionally applied to any eligible Wisconsin voter who 
already possesses Act 23-compliant identification.33  Instead of 
making a purely facial challenge, the plaintiffs argue that Act 
23 presents a severe burden on a substantial number of eligible 
voters. 
¶101 Similarly, because the challenge here alleges a 
potential burden to hundreds of thousands of eligible voters,34 
                                                                                                                                                             
In the context of the modified facial challenge approach, 
some 
scholars 
have 
suggested 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality that applies to purely facial challenges has 
no application to the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.  
Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal 
Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 261-283 (1994)  ("Thus, when the 
court considers the overbreadth challenge, applying the Salerno 
presumption entails judging the litigant by an unconstitutional 
rule of law——unconstitutional because, at least for the time 
being, it chills the behavior of third parties."). 
33 The circuit court found that "[t]he majority of Wisconsin 
voters, some 80%, possess a driver's license that meets the 
Photo ID requirements of Act 23."  This means that Act 23 
operates constitutionally in regard to the approximately 80% of 
Wisconsin voters who face little or no burden in complying with 
the law's identification requirements.   
34 The circuit court found that approximately 333,276 
eligible voters in Wisconsin lack identification that would 
comply with Act 23.   
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
13 
 
it is inappropriate to require that each affected individual 
bring an as-applied challenge.  While the exact number of 
individuals without identification who would be substantially 
burdened or unable to obtain identification is not established, 
requiring an as-applied approach would mean that each burdened 
individual or group of individuals would have to challenge Act 
23 separately.  This would lead to an unnecessarily large volume 
of litigation that would take a substantial amount of time and 
resources to conclude.  Requiring that individuals bring as-
applied challenges would perpetuate uncertainty 
about the 
application of the law to different groups and could strip 
individuals with unresolved but meritorious cases of the right 
to vote at election time. 
¶102 This court should look to the United States Supreme 
Court's modified facial challenge approach, which stems from the 
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine because it fits equally 
well in the election regulation context.  As I have previously 
discussed, this approach makes sense because of the problems 
associated with treating the plaintiffs' challenge to Act 23 as 
either a purely facial challenge or as an as-applied challenge. 
¶103 In addition to these practical reasons, a modified 
facial challenge approach to laws that allegedly burden the 
right to vote is justified because of the importance of the 
right as well as the Anderson/Burdick framework in which voting 
regulations are analyzed.35  When a voting regulation is 
                                                 
35 See Dorf, supra note 32, at 264-68 (discussing the 
potential application of the overbreadth doctrine to all 
fundamental rights). 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
14 
 
challenged as unconstitutional because of an alleged chilling 
effect on a large number of eligible voters, the challengers 
should not be required to prove that the law is invalid in all 
circumstances.  This is due to the significance of the right, 
which requires a court to fully consider the challenge and the 
record before it to carefully and fully analyze the voting 
restriction 
under 
the 
Anderson/Burdick 
framework, 
which, 
depending on the severity of the burden imposed, may require the 
use of a heightened level of scrutiny.  In other words, a purely 
facial challenge approach is unnecessarily rigid and simply does 
not recognize the fundamental importance of the right to vote.  
Therefore, under a modified facial challenge approach, I 
evaluate whether a substantial number of Act 23's applications 
are unconstitutional "judged in relation to the statute's 
plainly legitimate sweep."36 
II. 
PROPER APPLICATION OF THE ANDERSON/BURDICK BALANCING TEST 
¶104 I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion37 
that 
the 
plaintiffs' challenge to Act 23 must be evaluated under the 
balancing test set forth in Anderson38 and Burdick.39  Under the 
Anderson/Burdick test, a court addressing a constitutional 
challenge to a voting regulation weighs the benefits and the 
burdens of the particular regulation at issue.40  Not all voting 
                                                 
36 See Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 n.6.     
37 Majority op., ¶¶27-34, 40. 
38 Anderson, 460 U.S. 780. 
39 Burdick, 504 U.S. 428. 
40 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
15 
 
regulations are subject to strict scrutiny.41  Instead, the level 
of judicial scrutiny that a court applies to a challenged voting 
regulation depends on the severity of the burden imposed by that 
regulation.42  Therefore, a court must first consider the burden 
imposed by the voting regulation under review.  A voting 
regulation that imposes a severe burden is constitutional only 
if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state 
interest.43  On the other hand, a voting regulation that does not 
impose a severe burden on voters will be found constitutional as 
long as it is reasonably related to a governmental interest.44  
¶105 Although 
the 
majority 
opinion 
cites 
to 
the 
Anderson/Burdick balancing test,45 it does not engage in a 
straightforward application of the framework.  Rather, instead 
of directly discussing the cost burden imposed by Act 23, as 
evidenced by the record, it unnecessarily considers whether the 
fees associated with obtaining a certified copy of a Wisconsin 
                                                 
41 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. 
42 Id. at 434. 
43 Id. 
44 See id. (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).  The 
Anderson/Burdick test, which I apply, is consistent with this 
court's precedent.  Prior Wisconsin Supreme Court cases that 
have evaluated election regulations have not identified the 
level of scrutiny that this court should apply, nor do these 
cases directly engage in a balancing test.  More typically, this 
court has considered whether the election regulation under 
review was reasonable.  See also State ex rel. Van Alstine v. 
Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 337, 125 N.W. 961 (1910) (citing State ex 
rel. Runge v. Anderson, 100 Wis. 523, 533-34, 76 N.W. 482 
(1898)); Baker, 38 Wis. at 87. 
 
45 Majority op., ¶¶27-34, 40. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
16 
 
birth certificate, a requirement to obtain a free identification 
card for voting purposes, function as an unconstitutional poll 
tax.   
¶106 The discussion of poll tax case law is misplaced for 
two reasons.  First, the plaintiffs did not challenge Act 23 as 
an unconstitutional de facto poll tax; therefore, this issue was 
not briefed or argued by the parties.  Second, and more 
importantly, the plaintiffs' challenge, brought under the 
Anderson/Burdick framework, requires this court to carefully 
evaluate the cost burden that Act 23 places on eligible voters.  
The Anderson/Burdick framework, rather than poll tax analysis, 
is appropriate because the photo identification requirements at 
issue are related to election qualifications.46  In contrast, 
poll tax analysis is appropriate when the cost imposed on voters 
is not related to voter qualifications.47  By evaluating the cost 
burden through the framework of poll tax cases, the majority 
opinion conflates two separate types of analysis and fails to 
consider 
sufficiently 
the 
cost 
burdens, 
which 
are 
well-
established by the record, under the Anderson/Burdick balancing 
test.  Although the majority concludes that the costs associated 
with 
obtaining 
Act 
23-compliant 
identification 
impose 
an 
unconstitutional de facto poll tax that results in a severe 
burden, it improperly crafts a remedy, which purports to 
                                                 
46 See League of Women Voters v. Walker, 2014 WI 97, ¶¶4-5, 
__ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. 
47 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 189; see also Harper, 383 U.S. 
at 670. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
17 
 
alleviate the burden by eliminating the cost of certified 
Wisconsin birth certificates under some circumstances.  This 
remedy allows the majority to conclude that the burdens of Act 
23 are minimal.  By applying poll tax analysis and by crafting 
this remedy in the midst of the Anderson/Burdick framework, the 
majority has unnecessarily muddled an otherwise straightforward 
and tested analytical framework.  
¶107 Even if I were to assume that poll tax analysis 
applied to this case, I am not persuaded that the majority 
opinion's remedy cures the unconstitutionality of Act 23.  
Anyone who thinks Act 23's constitutional problem is that it 
creates a de facto poll tax should want to guarantee that such a 
de facto poll tax is not imposed on any eligible voter.  The 
majority concludes that Act 23 imposes a de facto poll tax; 
however, there is no support in the law for the proposition that 
a court may leave to the discretion of a governmental agency 
whether to approve an exception to a poll tax.  If the majority 
leaves in place the discretion of DMV administrators to issue or 
refuse to issue Act 23-compliant identification where a fee is 
required for supporting documents,48 it fails to guarantee 
constitutional protections against poll taxes.  Such an approach 
also leaves the potential for future litigation brought by 
individuals who were denied the exception.  This leaves the 
constitutionality of Act 23 unsettled unless the legislature 
acts to repair this defect.   
                                                 
48 See majority op., ¶¶67, 70. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
18 
 
¶108 If, however, the majority opinion is requiring DMV 
administrators to issue photo identification to individuals who 
cannot afford to obtain underlying documentation,49 it is 
directing a non-party to take specific action, which it cannot 
do.   
¶109 Therefore, 
rather 
than 
relying 
on 
the 
majority 
opinion's poll tax analysis, I would  apply the well-established 
Anderson/Burdick framework, which requires the conclusion that 
Act 23 places a severe burden on a substantial number of 
eligible Wisconsin voters.  The severity of the burden dictates 
that this court may uphold Act 23 only if it is narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.  The 
record demonstrates that Act 23 is not narrowly tailored to the 
state's goals of reducing voter fraud or increasing the public's 
confidence in elections because the Act is unlikely to further 
either of these goals in any meaningful way.  Therefore, Act 23 
is unconstitutional. 
A. THE BURDENS IMPOSED BY ACT 23 ARE SEVERE 
 
¶110 The plaintiffs allege that the costs, time, and effort 
associated 
with 
obtaining 
an 
Act 
23-compliant 
form 
of 
identification impose a significant burden on a substantial 
number of eligible Wisconsin voters.  I agree with the circuit 
court that these burdens are severe.   
                                                 
49 See majority op., ¶7, ¶7 n.5. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
19 
 
1. A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE WISCONSIN VOTERS LACK ACT 
23-COMPLIANT IDENTIFICATION 
 
¶111 The circuit court found that "[a] reasonable, reliable 
and accurate estimate of the number of people eligible to vote 
in Wisconsin who do not have a form of identification that would 
permit them to vote under Act 23 is 333,276."50  Before reaching 
this conclusion, the circuit court heard the expert testimony of 
Professor Kenneth R. Mayer, the plantiffs' expert, as well as 
the testimony of Professor M.V. Hood and Dr. Peter Morrison, who 
both served as expert witnesses for the state. 
¶112 The circuit court found Professor Mayer and Professor 
Hood to be qualified experts in terms of establishing the number 
of 
eligible 
Wisconsin 
voters 
who 
lack 
Act 
23-compliant 
identification.  In contrast, the circuit court did not find Dr. 
Morrison qualified to give expert testimony on the number of 
eligible 
voters 
in 
Wisconsin 
lacking 
Act 
23-compliant 
identification.  Although the circuit court considered the 
testimony of both Professor Mayer and Professor Hood, the 
circuit court ultimately relied on Professor Mayer's expert 
testimony. 
                                                 
50 The circuit court opinion carefully explained how it came 
to this conclusion and described the data upon which it relied.  
In reviewing this data, it appears that a mathematical error 
occurred and that the number of estimated eligible Wisconsin 
voters who lack Act 23-compliant identification should be 
333,296. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
20 
 
¶113 As the majority opinion correctly states, this court 
will uphold a circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.51  The circuit court's reliance on Professor 
Mayer's estimate that 333,276 eligible Wisconsin voters lack Act 
23-compliant identification was not clearly erroneous.   
¶114 Professor Mayer utilized the "exact-match" method to 
estimate the number of registered voters who lacked Act 23- 
compliant identification.  Under this method, Professor Mayer 
matched the records of registered voters appearing in the 
Statewide Voter Registration System (SVRS), maintained by the 
Government 
Accountability 
Board 
(GAB), 
with 
records 
of 
individuals listed as having either a Wisconsin driver's license 
or 
a 
Wisconsin 
identification 
card 
in 
a 
Department 
of 
Transportation (DOT) database.  The comparison of the SVRS 
database with the DOT database allowed Professor Mayer to form 
an initial estimate of the total number of registered voters who 
lack 
two 
of 
the 
primary 
forms 
of 
Act 
23-compliant 
identification.  Professor Mayer also estimated the number of 
non-registered, but otherwise eligible, voters who lacked proper 
identification and the number of individuals who possessed 
student, tribal, or military identification that would allow 
them to vote under Act 23.  
                                                 
51 Majority op., ¶21 (citing State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, 
¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748). 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
21 
 
¶115 Professor Mayer's estimates controlled for individuals 
who appeared in the DOT database but who had either moved out of 
state or who had passed away.  For example, he utilized census 
data from the American Community Survey (ACS) to estimate that 
277,000 individuals listed as having a Wisconsin driver's 
license in DMV records had moved out of state.  Professor Mayer 
also relied on a sample of obituaries and the rate at which 
licenses and identification cards expire each year to determine 
that approximately 114,690 individuals listed in the DOT 
database as having photo identification are actually deceased.  
Finally, 
Professor 
Mayer 
removed 
duplicate 
listings 
of 
individuals who appeared in the DOT database as having both a 
driver's license and a state identification card. 
¶116 Professor Mayer presented clear and concise testimony 
that relayed his expert report findings to the circuit court.  
These findings pointed out a variety of imperfections with the 
DOT database upon which Professor Mayer and Professor Hood 
relied.  In contrast to Professor Mayer, Professor Hood was 
unable to provide an estimate of the number of eligible 
Wisconsin voters who lack Act 23-compliant identification.  In 
reference to relying on Professor Mayer instead of Professor 
Hood, the circuit court logically explained that Professor Hood 
did not "adequately explain or justify [his] conclusion that the 
Wisconsin data available, when evaluated using the 'exact 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
22 
 
[m]atch' method was not sufficiently reliable to estimate the 
number of eligible voters who lack the required Photo ID." 
¶117 Furthermore, 
the 
circuit 
court 
was 
not 
clearly 
erroneous in finding that the state's other expert witness, Dr. 
Morrison, did not "possess sufficient training or experience to 
prepare or to offer reliable expert testimony as to election 
procedures generally nor, specifically, the proportion of 
persons eligible to vote in Wisconsin who lack a Photo ID 
required by Act 23."  The circuit court identified several 
problems with Dr. Morrison's testimony.  These included Dr. 
Morrison's 
failure 
to 
consider 
a 
"significant 
source 
of 
relevant, reliable information, the SRVS listing of eligible 
Wisconsin voters" and his failure to "recognize or take into 
account the limitations of the WisDOT data." 
¶118 Although the circuit court found that an estimated 
333,276 eligible Wisconsin voters do not possess Act 23-
compliant identification, this finding alone does not indicate 
the severity of the burden that individuals would face in 
obtaining a compliant form of identification.  However, the 
record provides ample evidence of the severity of the burden Act 
23 imposes. 
2. THE COST INCURRED BY ELIGIBLE WISCONSIN VOTERS OBTAINING 
ACT 23-COMPLIANT IDENTIFICATION IMPOSES A SERVERE BURDEN 
 
¶119 The most significant burden that Act 23 imposes on 
individuals lacking Act 23-compliant identification is the cost 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
23 
 
burden that results from the administrative framework in which 
Act 23 operates.  As the majority opinion explains, typically, 
an individual must produce a certified copy of his or her  birth 
certificate, among other documents, to receive a no-cost 
identification card for voting purposes.52  The legislature has 
dictated, under the current administrative framework, that a 
certified copy of a Wisconsin birth certificate costs $20.53  The 
majority concludes that the $20 cost of a certified Wisconsin 
birth certificate functions as an unconstitutional fee or poll 
tax that imposes a severe burden.54  However, this conclusion 
unnecessarily 
muddles 
poll 
tax 
analysis 
with 
the 
Anderson/Burdick framework.  In addition, the majority opinion 
does not fully address the cost burden imposed on eligible 
Wisconsin voters who need to obtain a birth certificate from 
another 
state 
to 
obtain 
photo 
identification 
for 
voting 
purposes.  Finally, the majority opinion does not consider the 
severity of the burden that Act 23 places on naturalized 
                                                 
52 See majority op., ¶52 n.12. 
53 Id., ¶¶14, 61; Wis. Stat. § 69.22(1)(a),(c). 
54 Majority op., ¶62. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
24 
 
citizens who are eligible to vote in Wisconsin.55  In sum, the 
majority's remedy does not relieve the cost burden placed on 
eligible Wisconsin voters born in other states or countries. 
¶120 The circuit court found that "[t]he cost and the 
difficulty of obtaining documents necessary to apply for a DMV 
Photo ID is a substantial burden which falls most heavily upon 
low income individuals."56  The circuit court's finding is 
supported by the record; therefore, it is not clearly erroneous. 
¶121 The circuit court specifically noted the cost burden 
that Act 23 imposed upon several different individuals in its 
decision and order.  For example, the experiences of Ruthelle R. 
Frank and Ricky T. Lewis indicate that they would be forced to 
incur significant costs to correct errors in their birth 
certificates to obtain Act 23-compliant photo identification.  
At the time Lewis sought photo identification, his affidavit 
indicated that his sole income is his fixed veteran's pension of 
                                                 
55 One form of Act 23-compliant identification includes a 
certificate of naturalization issued "not earlier than 2 years 
before the date of an election at which it is presented."  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 5.02(6m)(b). 
 
This 
means 
that 
a 
certificate 
of 
naturalization that is more than two years old cannot be used as 
a compliant form of identification at the polls under Act 23.  
Therefore, it appears that a naturalized citizen may be required 
to obtain another form of Act 23-compliant identification, which 
in some cases could require foreign-born individuals to obtain a 
foreign certificate of birth. 
56 The amicus curiae briefs submitted by AARP and Disability 
Rights Wisconsin provide convincing arguments that Act 23 
disproportionally burdens Wisconsin residents over the age of 65 
and Wisconsin residents with disabilities, respectively.  
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
25 
 
$986 per month and that he has no savings.57  He stated that his 
attempts to obtain identification have resulted in what he 
considered to be "substantial costs."  Additionally, the circuit 
court noted that Sequoia Cole's only income is $600 per month in 
Social Security benefits, and in her deposition she stated that 
the $20 fee for a birth certificate was a burden.   
¶122 The record also contains numerous affidavits and 
depositions from individuals regarding the cost burden that Act 
23 imposes.  The majority of these individuals have low incomes.  
For example, Ndidi Brownlee's deposition indicates that she has 
no savings and that she lives month to month on her income.  
Johnnie Garland's affidavit states that she relies on Social 
Security benefits that total $678 per month to cover her 
essential expenses and that she was required to pay $28 to 
obtain her birth certificate from another state.  Kristen Green 
was unemployed at the time she obtained photo identification, 
and her deposition indicates that she could not afford the extra 
bus fare she needed to travel to a DMV office.  Danettea Lane's 
affidavit indicates that she had to pay $20 to obtain her birth 
certificate and that she supports herself and her four children 
on $608 per month.  In addition, Willie Watson and Eldridge King 
both indicated in their depositions that they lived on fixed 
amounts of $683 per month and $1000 per month, respectively.   
                                                 
57 The circuit court later stated that Lewis' monthly income 
was $1021, which it based on his deposition. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
26 
 
¶123 In Frank v. Walker, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin recently considered a  
challenge to Act 23 brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Federal Voting Rights Act.58  While I do not rely on the 
district court's analysis in Frank, the similarities between the 
Frank case and this case make many of the district court's 
findings quite persuasive.  In Frank, the district court made 
persuasive findings in regard to the cost burden that Act 23 
imposes.59  Like the circuit court in this case, the district 
court considered the testimony of individuals lacking Act 23-
compliant photo identification to conclude that the cost burden 
imposed by the Act is severe.60  The district court concluded, 
[I]n light of the evidence presented at trial, it is 
also clear that for many voters, especially those who 
are low income, the burdens associated with obtaining 
an ID will be anything but minor.  Therefore, I 
conclude that Act 23 will deter a substantial number 
of eligible voters from casting a ballot."61  
 
 
¶124 Based on the record in this case, which is remarkably 
similar to the record before the district court in Frank, it was 
                                                 
58 Frank v. Walker, No. 2011-CV-1128, slip op. at 1 (E.D. 
Wis. Apr. 29, 2014).   
59 Id. at 31-34.  Seven of the eight people who testified in 
Frank are low-income individuals and an expert witness who 
testified at that trial established that "[a] substantial number 
of the 300,000 plus eligible voters who lack a photo ID are low-
income." Id. at 24. 
60 Id. at 37. 
61 Id. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
27 
 
not clearly erroneous for the circuit court to conclude that Act 
23 places severe cost burdens on a substantial number of 
eligible 
Wisconsin 
voters 
who 
lack 
Act 
23-compliant 
identification. 
3. THE TIME AND EFFORT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN ACT 23-COMPLIANT 
IDENTIFICATION CONTRIBUTES TO THE SEVERITY OF THE BURDEN  
 
¶125 Contrary to the majority opinion, I conclude that the 
time spent and difficulties encountered by individuals trying to 
obtain Act 23-compliant identification are significant and 
contribute to the severity of the burden.62  The fact that the 
majority of the plaintiffs in this case eventually obtained a 
photo identification card for voting purposes does not mean that 
no burden exists.63  This is because the burden analysis requires 
the court to consider the time spent, the obstacles encountered, 
and the costs paid in obtaining the identification, and not 
merely the end result of these efforts. 
¶126 Here, the circuit court found, "Procuring a DMV Photo 
ID can easily be a frustrating, complex, and time-consuming 
process."  It further concluded that "[t]he cost and the 
difficulty of obtaining documents necessary to apply for a DMV 
Photo ID is a significant burden upon the opportunity of 
Wisconsin citizens to vote."   
                                                 
62 See majority op., ¶¶41-48. 
63 See id., ¶42. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
28 
 
¶127 The circuit court relied on affidavits and depositions 
from numerous individuals who described the time spent and 
difficulties incurred in obtaining or attempting to obtain Act 
23-compliant identification.  In its decision and order, the 
circuit court specifically relied upon the experiences of 
Ruthelle R. Frank and Ricky T. Lewis who each had frustrating 
experiences in attempting to obtain photo identification.  
Errors 
on 
birth 
certificates 
caused 
this 
difficulty 
and 
prevented both individuals from obtaining photo identification.  
Lewis estimated in his deposition that he spent 10 to 15 hours 
attempting to obtain identification.  The circuit court also 
relied upon the experiences of Sequoia Cole, Brittany Cramer, 
and 
Joel 
Torres 
who 
all 
explained 
that 
obtaining 
photo 
identification took a substantial amount of time——up to 6.5 
hours in one case.  A majority of the individuals cited by the 
circuit court made multiple trips to DMV service centers and 
other state agencies in attempting to obtain Act 23-compliant 
photo identification.   
¶128 In addition to the individuals cited in the circuit 
court's decision, the record also contains a number of other 
affidavits and depositions that describe the time and difficulty 
burden that Act 23 imposes.  For example, Ndidi Brownlee spent 
several hours traveling to and then waiting at the DMV.  Cheryl 
Edwards' affidavit states that she spent roughly nine hours 
assisting 
family 
members 
who 
needed 
to 
obtain 
photo 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
29 
 
identification for voting purposes.  Kristen Green's affidavit 
indicates that she made multiple trips to the DMV to obtain 
photo identification and that her combined trips totaled almost 
five hours.  Danettea Lane's affidavit states that she spent 
nearly 10 hours during the process of obtaining identification.  
Mary McClintock, who uses a wheelchair, was required to arrange 
special transportation and spent approximately nine hours in the 
process of obtaining identification.  The record also reflects 
that Jennifer Platt's trip to the DMV took three hours.  
Speciall Simmons stated in his affidavit that it took him three 
hours 
to 
obtain 
identification. 
 
Willie 
Watson 
spent 
approximately four hours arranging transportation that would 
allow him to apply for identification.  John Wolfe's affidavit 
and deposition testimony indicated that the closest DMV was 30 
to 40 miles out of his way.   
¶129 As the previous discussion demonstrates, the record 
fully supports the circuit court's conclusions pertaining to the 
time, effort, and difficulty burdens.  Therefore, the circuit 
court's determination that the difficulties imposed by Act 23 
result in a severe burden was not clearly erroneous. 
¶130 In coming to the opposite conclusion, the majority 
opinion notes that photo identification is part of the reality 
of daily life.64  This may be true; however, that does not 
                                                 
64 Id., ¶44. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
30 
 
diminish the burdens that Act 23 imposes on individuals who 
accomplish their daily responsibilities without any form of 
photo identification that would meet the requirements of Act 23.  
In Frank, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin addressed the impact that Act 23 has on 
individuals who currently conduct their daily lives without any 
form of Act 23-compliant identification.65  The district court 
stated,  
[A] person whose daily life did not require possession 
of a photo ID prior to the imposition of the photo ID 
requirement is unlikely to derive any benefit from 
possessing a photo ID other than the ability to 
continue voting.  Yet that person must pay the same 
costs——in the form of the hassle of obtaining the 
underlying documents and making a trip to the DMV——as 
the person who obtained the ID for driving.66 
 
¶131 The district court in Frank, relying on the 
testimony of numerous individuals lacking Act 23-compliant 
identification, also specifically considered the time and 
difficulty burden imposed by Act 23.  In doing so, it 
considered the number of DMV service centers in the state 
and noted that only two centers in the entire state are 
open past 5 p.m. and that only one DMV service center in 
                                                 
65 Frank v. Walker, No. 2011-CV-1128, slip op. at 11 (E.D. 
Wis. Apr. 29, 2014). 
66 Id. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
31 
 
the state is open on the weekend.67  This fact led the 
district court to conclude that individuals will likely 
have to take time off of work and forfeit hourly wages to 
obtain a voter identification card from a DMV center during 
business hours.68  If an individual is required to obtain 
underlying documents from other state agencies, then the 
amount of time and lost wages increases.69 
¶132 The district court also heard testimony that 
indicated that not all DMV centers are accessible by public 
transportation.70  In reaching its conclusion that Act 23 
imposes severe burdens on individuals, it considered these 
transportation difficulties especially in light of low-
income Wisconsin residents who rely primarily on public 
transportation.71 
                                                 
67 Id. at 30.  The amicus brief submitted by Institute for 
One Wisconsin similarly explains that "the DMV services centers 
are open for limited hours.  Indeed, 41 are open just two days 
each week, seven are open just a few hours for one day each 
month, and three are open just one day every quarter."    
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 31. 
70 Id.  Disability Rights Wisconsin's amicus brief also 
notes transportation difficulties for eligible Wisconsin voters 
living with disabilities as well as eligible voters living in 
rural areas. 
71 Id. at 30. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
32 
 
¶133 The majority opinion's reliance on the Crawford72 
decision's discussion of the time required and other 
obstacles faced, such as "life's vagaries,"73 fails to 
convince me that the circuit court's findings were clearly 
erroneous.  The majority opinion cites to Crawford for the 
proposition that trips to the DMV and other difficulties 
suffered to obtain a voter identification card cannot 
constitute a severe burden.74  However, the majority 
opinion's selective reliance on portions of 
Crawford 
ignores the fact that the United States Supreme Court was 
satisfied that the affidavit exception75 to Indiana's voter 
ID 
law 
alleviated 
some 
of 
the 
burdens 
of 
"life's 
vagaries."76  In addition, the majority opinion ignores the 
following language from Crawford,  
Both evidence in the record and facts of which we may 
take 
judicial 
notice, 
however, 
indicate 
that 
a 
                                                 
72 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
73 Majority op., ¶43. 
74 Id.  
75 The Indiana voter identification law provides that "[a] 
voter who is indigent or has a religious objection to being 
photographed may cast a provisional ballot that will be counted 
only if she executes an appropriate affidavit before the circuit 
court clerk within 10 days following the election."  Crawford, 
553 U.S. at 186 (2008) (citing Ind. Code Ann. §§ 3-11.7-5-1 
(West Supp. 2007), 3-11.7-5-2.5(c) (West 2006)).  In contrast to 
the Indiana voter identification law, Act 23 provides no such 
affidavit exception. 
76 Id. at 197-98. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
33 
 
somewhat heavier burden may be placed on a limited 
number of persons. They include elderly persons born 
out of State, who may have difficulty obtaining a 
birth certificate; persons who because of economic or 
other personal limitations may find it difficult 
either to secure a copy of their birth certificate or 
to assemble the other required documentation to obtain 
a state-issued identification; homeless persons; and 
persons 
with 
a 
religious 
objection 
to 
being 
photographed. If we assume, as the evidence suggests, 
that some members of these classes were registered 
voters 
when 
SEA 
483 
was 
enacted, 
the 
new 
identification requirement may have imposed a special 
burden on their right to vote.77 
 
¶134 In sum, both the record in this case and the 
Frank decision support the circuit court's finding that the 
time, effort, and difficulty burden that Act 23 imposes is 
severe.  
B. ACT 23 IS NOT NARROWLY TAILORED TO ACHIEVE ANY COMPELLING 
STATE INTEREST 
 
¶135 The circuit court's finding that Act 23 places a 
severe burden on a substantial number of eligible Wisconsin 
voters who lack Act 23-compliant identification must be upheld; 
therefore, the Act is constitutional only if it is narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.78  
¶136 The state asserts that Act 23 has two primary and 
compelling benefits: the reduction of voter fraud and the 
                                                 
77 Id. at 199 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
78 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.  As previously discussed, the 
majority opinion interprets administrative rules to craft a 
remedy that attempts to reduce the burden placed on voters.  
This does not follow from the Anderson/Burdick framework.  
Because of the majority opinion's approach, it concludes that 
rational basis scrutiny applies. See majority op., ¶¶72-80 
(discussing the benefits of Act 23). 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
34 
 
increase of voter confidence in the outcome of elections.  In 
considering these alleged benefits, the circuit court found that 
"[t]he Photo ID requirements of Act 23 are unlikely to protect 
the electoral process" and "[t]he Photo ID requirements of Act 
23 are not narrowly tailored to achieve a goal of voter 
verification."  Specifically, the circuit court found,  
Since 2004, voter fraud investigations have been 
undertaken by the Milwaukee Police Department, by the 
Mayor of Milwaukee and by the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice, 
working 
with 
various 
county 
prosecutors 
working through the Attorney General's Election Fraud 
Task Force.  None of these efforts have produced a 
prosecution of a voter fraud violation that would have 
been prevented by the voter ID requirements of Act 23. 
 
  ¶137 Finally, in referencing voter fraud and summarizing 
its holding, the circuit court stated,  
Act 23 addresses a problem which is very limited, if 
indeed it exists.  It does not appear to recognize or 
to account for the difficulty its demands impose upon 
indigent and elderly citizens who are eligible under 
the constitution to vote.  It offers no flexibility, 
no 
alternative 
to 
prevent 
the 
exclusion 
of 
a 
constitutionally qualified voter.  Given the sacred, 
fundamental interest at issue, it is clear that Act 
23, while perhaps addressing a legitimate concern, is 
not 
sufficiently 
narrow 
to 
avoid 
needless 
and 
significant impairment of the right to vote.  The 
enactment steps beyond the proper authority of the 
legislature and is in violation of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, Article III, Section 1. 
 
The circuit court's findings in regard to the lack of benefits 
associated with Act 23 and its determination that the Act is not 
narrowly tailored to achieve these benefits are supported by the 
record, and thus, are not clearly erroneous; therefore, the 
circuit court's findings must be upheld. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
35 
 
¶138 In regard to the allegation that Act 23 reduces voter 
fraud, the circuit court heard testimony regarding incidents of 
voter fraud and considered the current penalties in place to 
deter voter fraud.79  One indication that Act 23 is not narrowly 
tailored to reduce voter fraud is that incidents of voter fraud 
in general are almost non-existent.  An even greater indication 
that Act 23 is not narrowly tailored to prevent voter fraud is 
that the photo identification requirements of the Act would not 
prevent the types of voter fraud that have been uncovered during 
recent investigations.  
¶139 The circuit court heard testimony from Professor Mayer 
regarding a lack of voter fraud in Wisconsin generally as well 
as a lack of impersonation voter fraud, which Act 23 is most 
likely to prevent.  Professor Mayer based his testimony on 
academic studies of voter fraud, as well as studies conducted in 
2004 and 2008 of voter fraud in Wisconsin.  He concluded and 
testified that "there is virtually no evidence at all that in-
                                                 
79 Wisconsin statutes criminalize voter fraud as Class I 
felonies and impose penalties of up to 3.5 years in prison or up 
to a $10,000 fine, or both.  See Wis. Stats. §§ 12.13 (governing 
various forms of election fraud), 12.60 (detailing the penalty 
structure 
for 
crimes 
related 
to 
election 
fraud), 
939.50 
(outlining the classification structure of felonies).  In 
reference to the strict penalties imposed on fraudulent voting, 
the district court in Frank stated, "As the plaintiffs' 
unrebutted evidence shows, a person would have to be insane to 
commit voter-impersonation fraud."  Frank v. Walker, No. 2011-
CV-1128, slip op. at 8 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 29, 2014).     
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
36 
 
person voter impersonation at the polling places occurs with any 
frequency, if it occurs at all." 
¶140 Professor Mayer also reviewed incidents of voter fraud 
detected by a 2008 Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation.  
The DOJ investigation followed the 2008 presidential election.  
As a result of the investigation, the State brought charges in 
20 cases of election fraud.  These charges included eleven cases 
of felons voting, two double voting cases, six cases of 
misconduct related to voter registration, and one fraudulent 
case of absentee voting.  This investigation resulted in no 
charges of impersonation voter fraud.   
¶141 Professor 
Mayer 
testified 
that 
the 
photo 
identification requirements of Act 23 would not have prevented 
any of the types of voter fraud identified in the 2008 DOJ 
investigation. 
 
For 
example, 
the 
photo 
identification 
requirements of Act 23 would not prevent a felon from voting 
because any felon with Act 23-compliant photo identification 
could cast a ballot.  In the two cases of double-voting, 
individuals voted absentee and were also allowed to vote in-
person because of poor record keeping.  In Professor Mayer's 
expert opinion, photo identification would not have prevented 
these two individuals from voting in person, since poll workers 
had 
no 
record 
that 
they 
had 
already 
voted 
absentee.  
Furthermore, the photo identification requirements of Act 23 
would 
not 
have 
prevented 
the 
cases 
of 
fraudulent 
voter 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
37 
 
registration 
because 
there 
is 
no 
photo 
identification 
requirement to register to vote.  
¶142  Furthermore, 
the 
circuit 
court 
found 
that 
"a 
comprehensive study of voter attitudes has found that state 
photo ID requirements appear to have no effect upon public 
confidence in the process."  In reaching this conclusion, the 
circuit court relied on Professor Mayer's January 16, 2011, 
report in which he reviewed the findings of the Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study (CCES).  Professor Mayer's report 
explains a study of the CCES, which stated, "ID laws will have 
little or no effect on the confidence in the electoral system or 
the belief in the incidence of fraud.  Those beliefs . . . are 
not different when a stricter ID law is in place and enforced 
than when less invasive voter-authentication methods are used."  
There is nothing in the record that disputes Professor Mayer's 
interpretation of the CCES or the circuit court's finding that 
Act 23 does not increase voter confidence in election outcomes. 
¶143 The majority opinion asserts that the "State has a 
significant and compelling interest in protecting the integrity 
and reliability of the electoral process, as well as promoting 
the public's confidence in elections."80  However, both the 
majority opinion and the record in this case fail to demonstrate 
how Act 23's photo identification requirement promotes either of 
                                                 
80 Majority op., ¶73 (citing Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196). 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
38 
 
these state interests in any meaningful way.  Therefore, I agree 
with the circuit court's findings that Act 23 is not narrowly 
tailored to the State's interests of decreasing voter fraud or 
increasing public confidence in the outcome of elections.  The 
result is that Act 23 is unconstitutional.   
III. THE PROPER REMEDY 
¶144 Consideration of the proper remedy is appropriate 
after considering the burdens of Act 23, the applicable level of 
judicial scrutiny, and the benefits of the Act.  In the midst of 
discussing the Anderson/Burdick framework, however, the majority 
opinion interprets administrative rules in a way that allows for 
an exception to the cost of obtaining a certified copy of a 
birth certificate for some individuals.  There is no dispute 
that a court must determine whether legislation challenged as 
unconstitutional 
may 
be 
interpreted 
in 
a 
way 
to 
avoid 
invalidation.81  However, the majority's approach is absolutely 
contrary to the role of this court and essentially invades the 
legislative function because it is not actually interpreting Act 
23, the challenged legislation, in a way that cures the Act's 
unconstitutionality.  Instead, the majority reaches outside of 
the 
challenged 
legislation 
and 
interprets 
existing 
                                                 
81 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) ("When the 
validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and 
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a 
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether 
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the 
question may be avoided."). 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
39 
 
administrative code provisions in its attempt to salvage an 
unconstitutional Act.  This approach results in a direction to 
an administrative agency that is not a party in this case.  The 
majority cites no authority that supports this novel approach. 
¶145 The majority opinion directs DMV administrators to 
deem any document requiring a payment to a government agency 
"unavailable" for purposes of the Wisconsin Administrative Code 
§ Trans 102.15(3)(b) exception.82  The majority may also be 
directing DMV administrators to accept an individual's written 
petition for the exception.83  Either approach involves directing 
a non-party.  
¶146 The conclusion that the majority opinion cannot direct 
agency administrators who are non-parties to this case is 
supported by Wisconsin civil procedure and our case law.  For 
example, Wis. Stat. § 801.05 governs personal jurisdiction and 
provides that a court has "jurisdiction over a person served in 
an action . . . ."84  This court has explained,  
A summons serves two purposes.  First, a summons 
provides notice to the defendant that an action has 
been commenced against the defendant. Indeed, notice 
that apprises a party of the pendency of an action 
against it and affords the opportunity to present 
objections 
is 
regarded 
as 
"[a]n 
elementary 
and 
fundamental 
requirement 
of 
due 
process." 
Second, 
                                                 
82 Majority op. ¶¶69-70. 
83 Majority op., ¶¶7, 7 n.5, 70. 
84 Wis. Stat. § 801.05. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
40 
 
consistent with Wis. Stat. §§ 801.05 and 801.11, a 
summons confers personal jurisdiction on a court over 
the defendant served.85   
In addition, "[i]f a person is not named in a lawsuit, that 
person is a stranger to the court and cannot be bound by it."86  
These are essential principles governing jurisdiction that the 
majority 
opinion 
fails 
to 
consider 
when 
directing 
DMV 
administrators to take action.  The issue of directing a non-
party to exercise discretion or to take action is not a "straw 
man,"87 but rather it involves basic principles of jurisdiction 
and civil procedure.     
¶147 The majority's approach is also inconsistent with how 
courts typically interact with administrative agencies.  For 
example, courts tasked with reviewing agency actions must adhere 
to strict statutory guidelines that allow the court to maintain 
subject matter jurisdiction.88  No court, including our court, 
has any authority to direct action by an administrative agency 
unless that court has jurisdiction to do so.  We have no 
jurisdiction to act here as the majority attempts to do so. 
                                                 
85 Johnson v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 2012 WI 31, ¶24, 339 Wis. 
2d 493, 811 N.W.2d 756 (citations omitted).   
86 Bulik v. Arrow Realty, Inc. of Racine, 148 Wis. 2d 441, 
444, 434 N.W.2d 853 (Ct. App. 1988).   
87 Majority op., ¶71 n.17. 
88 See Wis. Stat. § 227.53; see also Schiller v. DILHR, 103 
Wis. 2d 353, 355, 390 N.W.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1981) (citing Kegonsa 
Joint Sanitary Dist. v. City of Stoughton, 87 Wis. 2d 131, 274 
N.W.2d 598(1979)). 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
41 
 
¶148 Contrary to the majority opinion, I conclude that the 
appropriate remedy is invalidation of Act 23.  If the 
legislature chooses, it may enact a constitutional version of 
Act 23 considering the administrative framework in which the Act 
functions——that is, one that does not severely burden any 
eligible Wisconsin voter.  To avoid the unconstitutionality of 
the majority's remedy and put in place a voter identification 
law that is unquestionably enforceable, the legislature should 
look to Indiana's voter identification law, which the United 
States Supreme Court upheld in Crawford.  A clear legislative 
directive preserves the essential separation of legislative and 
judicial powers that the Wisconsin Constitution requires.89 
¶149 Constitutional 
issues 
that 
"are 
peppered 
with 
political perceptions and emotionally laden views" require 
courts to exercise judicial restraint.90  This court exercised  
judicial restraint in the context of public school funding in 
Kudor v. Grover,91 and this court should likewise exercise 
caution in its review of Act 23.  This is because voter 
identification laws such as Act 23 involve highly politicized 
issues that concern complicated matters of public policy. 
                                                 
89 Wagner Mobil, Inc. v. City of Madison, 190 Wis. 2d 585, 
594 n.4, 527 N.W.2d 301 (1995). 
90 Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 504, 436 N.W.2d 568 
(1989) (addressing a constitutional challenge to public school 
funding). 
91 Id. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
42 
 
¶150 In discussing remedy in Frank the district court came 
to a similar conclusion.  The district court remarked, 
The 
plaintiffs 
suggest 
that 
I 
could 
order 
the 
defendants to allow eligible voters without photo IDs 
to vote without showing an ID or by signing an 
affidavit affirming their identities and lack of an 
ID. However, ordering such relief would be the 
functional equivalent of enjoining the current law and 
replacing it with a new law drafted by me rather than 
the state legislature. . . . To grant this remedy, I 
would need to make a policy judgment as to whether 
eligible voters who do not have IDs should be required 
to sign affidavits of identity before receiving a 
ballot. And, if I found that an affidavit was 
required, I would need to decide what language the 
affidavit should contain. Once I issued this relief, I 
would 
have 
to 
supervise 
the 
state's 
election-
administration officials to ensure that they were 
properly implementing my instructions. These tasks are 
outside the limited institutional competence of a 
federal court, and therefore I may not rewrite the 
photo ID requirement to conform it to constitutional 
requirements.92 
¶151 A Wisconsin statute allows unconstitutional portions 
of laws to be severed under certain circumstances;93 however, 
                                                 
92 Frank v. Walker, No. 2011-CV-1128, slip op. at 39 (E.D. 
Wis. Apr. 29, 2014).    
93 Wis. Stat. § 990.001 states, "In construing Wisconsin 
laws the following rules shall be observed unless construction 
in accordance with a rule would produce a result inconsistent 
with the manifest intent of the legislature: . . . ."  
Subsection (11) provides,  
The provisions of the statutes are severable. The 
provisions of any session law are severable. If any 
provision of the statutes or of a session law is 
invalid, or if the application of either to any person 
or circumstance is invalid, such invalidity shall not 
affect other provisions or applications which can be 
given 
effect 
without 
the 
invalid 
provision 
or 
application. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
43 
 
this remedy is not applicable to Act 23.  This is because the 
unconstitutionality of Act 23 is a result of how the law 
functions within a greater body of administrative rules.  In 
other words, there is no portion of Act 23 that could be severed 
that would cure the unconstitutionality of the Act. 
¶152 The United States Supreme Court has explained that 
courts must avoid judicial legislation and should avoid editing 
statutory text.94  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has illuminated 
three key principles underlying remedies.95  First, a court 
should seek to invalidate as little of the legislature's work as 
possible.96  Second, a court must refrain from rewriting 
unconstitutional state laws.97  Third, a court must consider 
legislative intent in attempting to salvage an unconstitutional 
law.98  
¶153 After considering these principles and the inability 
of this court to sever a specifically unconstitutional portion 
of Act 23 that would save the law, I conclude that the only 
applicable remedy is invalidation of Act 23.  Act 23 functions 
within a regulatory framework established by the Wisconsin 
legislature, which imposes a cost for birth certificates.  I 
                                                 
94 United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 
454, 478-79 (1995). 
95 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 
320, 329 (2006).     
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 330. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
44 
 
agree with the majority opinion that the legislature could 
eliminate this cost.99  It could also institute another type of 
exception to the Act's requirements that could lessen the 
severity of the burden imposed on certain eligible Wisconsin 
voters, such as the affidavit exception found in Indiana's voter 
identification law.100  However, it is the role of the 
legislature and not this court to institute such changes to Act 
23 or to the framework in which the Act operates.  It is unknown 
whether the majority opinion's remedy will function effectively 
or how that remedy will be enforced.  Finally, the majority 
opinion's remedy fails to consider policy considerations, 
budgetary constraints, and legislative intent.  It is the 
legislature 
and 
not 
this 
court 
that 
should 
address 
the 
unconstitutionality of Act 23.    
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶154 I 
cannot 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
characterization and analysis of the plaintiffs' challenge.  The 
majority incorrectly characterizes the challenge as a purely 
facial challenge.  It fails to apply the Anderson/Burdick 
framework correctly.  It improperly relies on poll tax case law.  
Even if I were to assume that poll tax analysis applied, the 
                                                 
99 Majority op., ¶62. 
100 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 186, 199 (discussing the 
affidavit exception to Indiana's voter identification law).  
Specifically, part of the affidavit exception to Indiana's voter 
identification law allows provisional ballots cast by indigent 
voters to be counted if the voter "executes an affidavit before 
the circuit court clerk or county election board" in accordance 
with statutory requirements.  Ind. Code Ann. § 3-11.7-5-2.5 
(West 2011).      
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
45 
 
majority's attempt to alleviate the de facto poll tax for some 
eligible Wisconsin voters results in an unworkable solution that 
fails to cure the unconstitutionality of Act 23.  Specifically, 
the majority opinion's remedy appears to leave in place the 
discretion of DMV administrators to issue or refuse to issue Act 
23-compliant 
identification 
where 
a 
fee 
is 
required 
for 
supporting documents.  If the majority opinion leaves in place 
the discretion of DMV administrators to issue exceptions to 
those 
burdened 
by 
the 
cost 
of 
obtaining 
underlying 
documentation, it fails to guarantee constitutional protections 
against poll taxes.  On the other hand, if the majority opinion 
requires DMV administrators to issue photo identification cards 
to individuals who are burdened by the cost of obtaining 
required underlying documentation, then it is directing a non-
party to take specific action, which it has no authority to do.  
In sum, the remedy imposed by the majority, under either 
approach, is flawed.  Furthermore, its remedy impinges on the 
legislature's 
role 
by 
interpreting 
administrative 
code 
provisions that are not part of this challenge and by directing 
an administrative agency that is not a party to this case.  I 
urge 
the 
legislature 
to 
take 
action 
to 
cure 
the 
unconstitutionality of Act 23.  Without such action, the remedy 
crafted by the majority leaves Act 23 unconstitutional.   
 
¶155 The United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford 
v. Marion County Election Board,101 which upheld Indiana's voter 
identification statute, does not persuade me that Act 23 is 
                                                 
101 Crawford, 553 U.S. 181. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
46 
 
constitutional. 
 
This 
is 
because 
there 
are 
substantial 
differences between this case and the Crawford case.  First, the 
record in the Crawford case was not nearly as developed as the 
record in this case.  This factor certainty influenced the 
Supreme 
Court's 
decision.102 
 
Second, 
Indiana's 
voter 
identification statute is not as stringent as Act 23.  Most 
importantly, the Indiana law provides for an affidavit exception 
that 
allows 
certain 
individuals 
to 
vote 
without 
photo 
identification.103  In upholding Indiana's voter identification 
law, Justice Stevens' lead opinion commented that the severity 
of the burden imposed by the photo identification requirement 
"is, of course, mitigated by the fact that, if eligible, voters 
without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that 
will ultimately be counted."104  Finally, while Act 23 applies to 
both 
in-person 
and 
absentee 
voting, 
Indiana's 
photo 
identification requirements do not apply to absentee voting.  
Therefore, 
the 
Crawford 
case 
is 
neither 
controlling 
nor 
persuasive. 
¶156 The question of whether Act 23 violates the Wisconsin 
Constitution is at the intersection of profound democratic 
                                                 
102 Id. at 200 ("But on the basis of the evidence in the 
record it is not possible to quantify either the magnitude of 
the burden on this narrow class of voters . . . . [T]he record 
does not provide us with the number of registered voters without 
photo identification . . . ."). 
103 Id. at 186 (describing the affidavit procedure available 
to indigent voters as well as individuals with a religious 
objection to being photographed). 
104 Id. at 199. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
47 
 
principles: the right of qualified Wisconsin citizens to vote, 
as explicitly guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution, and the 
undisputed principle that the state has a legitimate interest in 
safeguarding the integrity of elections through regulations.  
Voter identification provisions are one way the state may choose 
to protect the legitimacy of elections.  Such provisions may be 
constitutionally imposed even if they severely burden a person's 
right to vote, as long as they are narrowly tailored to advance 
a 
compelling 
state 
interest. 
 
However, 
Act 
23's 
photo 
identification requirements severely burden eligible voters 
without 
being 
narrowly 
tailored 
to 
achieve 
the 
state's 
compelling interests of reducing voter fraud and increasing 
voter confidence in the outcomes of elections.  For that reason, 
Act 23 is an unconstitutional election regulation, and I 
therefore respectfully dissent.  
¶157 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
No.  2012AP1652.npc 
 
1