Case Title: People v. Sivongxxay

Citation: 

Docket Number: S078895

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
SEE CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINIONS 
Filed 6/19/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S078895 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
  
VAENE SIVONGXXAY, 
) 
 
 
) 
Fresno County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. F97590200-2 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Following a bench trial, defendant and appellant Vaene Sivongxxay was 
convicted of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),1 13 counts of 
robbery (§§ 211, 212.5), and two counts of attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211, 
212.5).  The trial court found true the special circumstance allegation that 
defendant committed the murder during the commission of a robbery.  (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(17)(A).)  At the conclusion of the penalty phase bench trial, the court 
imposed a verdict of death.   
This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); § 1239, 
subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment in its entirety.  
I.  FACTS 
Defendant was tried jointly with codefendant Oday Mounsaveng.  Both 
defendants were tried by a judge sitting without a jury. 
                                              
1  
All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
2 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution Evidence 
Defendant and Mounsaveng committed a series of robberies in Fresno 
between July and December 1996. 
 
a.  Thanh Tin Jewelry Attempted Robbery 
On July 31, 1996, Mounsaveng walked into the Thanh Tin Jewelry store, 
asked to examine a gold chain, and then left.  He returned with defendant about an 
hour later.  The men looked around for a long time without buying anything.  
Liem Phu Huynh, the owner of the jewelry store, asked the men why they were 
taking so long.  Mounsaveng and defendant claimed they were brothers and were 
waiting for their sister to arrive.  Eventually, they left.   
When defendant and Mounsaveng returned to the store later that afternoon, 
Huynh was working in a back room, and his wife Phung Ngoc Ho was behind the 
sales counter.  After asking to examine several items, Mounsaveng pulled a 
handgun out of his waistband, grabbed Ho by the collar, and pointed the gun at 
her.  Huynh, who was watching from the back room, set off an alarm.  
Mounsaveng and defendant fled.   
b.  First JMP Mini-Mart Robbery 
On the afternoon of August 16, 1996, Bobbie Her was working behind the 
counter at her parents‘ convenience store, JMP Mini-Mart.  Mounsaveng entered 
and asked whether the store cashed checks.  When Bobbie answered that it did, 
Mounsaveng left.  He eventually returned with defendant, and the two men milled 
about the store.  Bobbie‘s father Xeng Wang Her arrived and began restocking 
drinks in the store‘s refrigerator case.  Defendant walked up to Xeng, pointed a 
handgun at him, and forced him to walk toward the cash register.  Defendant then 
forced Xeng to lie down and kicked him in the back of the head.  Meanwhile, 
Mounsaveng jumped over the counter and forced Bobbie to open the cash register.  
 
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Mounsaveng and defendant took all of the money in the store, ripped a cordless 
phone off the wall, and then fled in a blue pickup truck.   
c.  Phnom Penh Jewelry Robbery 
On October 10, 1996, defendant entered the Phnom Penh Jewelry store.  
Mounsaveng followed a few minutes later and asked the store‘s owner, Kee Meng 
Suy, to repair a Buddha pendant.  Suy recognized Mounsaveng because he had 
brought in the same pendant for repair a few months before.  Suy took the pendant 
to his workbench in the store‘s back room.  While Suy was working, his wife 
Suntary Heng showed Mounsaveng some other pieces of jewelry.  Suy finished 
repairing the pendant and handed it back to Mounsaveng, who said he was not 
satisfied with the work and asked Suy to do it again.  Suy returned to his work 
bench.  Heng then took the couple‘s two young children, who were at the store 
that day, into the back room to get some food.   
At that point, defendant and Mounsaveng forced their way into the back 
room, pointed guns at Suy‘s head, and told him to ―stay still.‖  Defendant and 
Mounsaveng punched Suy, pushed him to the floor, and used tape and an 
extension cord to bind his limbs and cover his mouth and eyes.  Both men then 
punched, kicked, and stomped Suy as Heng and the couple‘s two children 
watched.  Mounsaveng demanded Suy‘s gun and the videotape from the store‘s 
security camera, but Heng explained he had no gun and the camera was broken.  
Eventually, Suy lost consciousness.  As Mounsaveng and defendant cleared out 
the store‘s safe and the jewelry in its display cases, Heng activated a silent alarm.  
The two men fled in a light blue Honda.   
d.  Second JMP Mini-Mart Robbery 
Mounsaveng and defendant returned to the JMP Mini-Mart on 
December 14, 1996.  Xeng Wang Her was working in the store with his wife, 
 
4 
Phayvane Boulome, and there were five or six customers inside.  Upon entering 
the store, both Mounsaveng and defendant pulled out guns, told the customers to 
lie on the ground, and demanded that Xeng and Boulome open the cash register.  
Mounsaveng took money from the cash register and also picked up Xeng‘s gun, 
which was underneath the counter.  Mounsaveng then forced Xeng into a back 
room, where Mounsaveng took cigarettes and change.  After that, Mounsaveng 
grabbed Boulome and demanded that she open a second cash register, but she 
explained it was broken.  Before leaving, Mounsaveng and defendant took money 
and jewelry from the customers at gunpoint.  In the course of robbing the 
customers, defendant kicked an elderly woman in the mouth.  One customer 
recalled seeing an unoccupied white car outside the store with its engine running.   
e.  Sean Hong Jewelry Robbery and Murder 
In November 1996, defendant sold some rings and other items to the Sean 
Hong Jewelry store.  He also left a Buddha pendant to be repaired.   
On December 19, 1996, three days after the second JMP Mini-Mart 
robbery, Mounsaveng and defendant paid a visit to the Sean Hong store.  Seak 
Ang Hor, the wife of store owner Henry Song, was working behind the sales 
counter.  Hor told defendant that his Buddha pendant was ready to be picked up, 
but he said he did not have the money to pay for it.  Mounsaveng asked to see the 
pendant anyway.  Song retrieved the pendant from a safe in the store‘s back room 
and came out to show it to Mounsaveng and defendant.   
After the men were finished looking at the pendant, Song started walking 
toward the back room.  Mounsaveng pulled out a gun and screamed ―give the 
money and gold.‖  Defendant also brandished a gun.  Defendant and Mounsaveng 
forced Song and Hor into the back room; Mounsaveng then left and closed the 
door.  Defendant demanded that Hor open the safe, but she refused.  Song 
 
5 
attempted to grab defendant‘s gun, and the two men engaged in a hand-to-hand 
struggle.  Mounsaveng returned to the back room and beat Song on the head with 
his gun.  Hor pressed a silent alarm button, prompting Mounsaveng to pull her out 
of the back room.  Once in the front area of the store, Hor kicked the wall in an 
effort to alert the business owner next door.  At some point, she heard 
Mounsaveng say ―let‘s go.‖  Defendant forced Hor to give him cash from her 
purse.  He also smashed a display case and took jewelry.   
After Mounsaveng and defendant left, Hor found her husband lying on the 
floor of the back room with blood coming out of his mouth.  Song died within the 
hour.  The cause of death was perforation of the heart and lungs from three 
gunshot wounds.   
Hor did not see either of the robbers shoot her husband, nor did she recall 
hearing the gunshots.  However, the robbery was partially captured on the store‘s 
video camera.  A Fresno Police Department detective testified that in reviewing a 
video of the incident, he could identify a moment when several gunshots were 
audible.  At that moment, defendant and Song were not in the camera‘s frame, but 
Mounsaveng and Hor were.  Mounsaveng was pointing his gun toward the 
location where defendant and Song were fighting.  After the shots were fired, 
Mounsaveng moved out of the frame and toward the back room, where defendant 
and Song had been fighting.  Ballistics evidence showed that all of the bullets 
were fired from the same gun.  In the video, one of the defendants is heard to say, 
―shoot, shoot.‖ 
Defendant was arrested on February 12, 1997, and agreed to be interviewed 
by a Fresno Police Department detective.  He initially denied involvement in the 
robberies.  However, after the detective showed him stills from the Sean Hong 
Jewelry store‘s video camera, defendant admitted he took part in the robbery.  At 
first, he claimed Mounsaveng was the one who shot Henry Song.  Defendant 
 
6 
described his struggle with Song and claimed that Song hit him on the head with a 
chair.  But when the detective asked how the struggle ended, defendant confessed 
that he, not Mounsaveng, had shot Song.  He apologized for lying at the outset of 
the interview and said he was sorry to Song‘s family for what he had done.  
Defendant also told the detective that Mounsaveng forced him to rob the Sean 
Hong Jewelry store and that he was so high on cocaine that day he could hardly 
think.   
2. Defense Evidence 
A toxicologist who screened defendant the day after his arrest testified that 
his blood tested positive for alcohol and cocaine.  The manager of an apartment 
building located near the JMP Mini-Mart (Mini-Mart) testified that on 
December 14, 1996, the day of the second Mini-Mart robbery, he saw two teenagers 
running down the street, one of whom had a ponytail.  Police later found a stolen 
white Toyota Camry in the parking lot of the apartment building.  An officer who 
tested latent fingerprints from the Thanh Tin Jewelry store and the second Mini-
Mart robbery testified that none of the prints matched defendant or Mounsaveng.  
A different officer testified that none of the witnesses to the second Mini-Mart 
robbery mentioned in their initial interviews that the robbers had tattoos.  Finally, 
defense counsel introduced records indicating that defendant was in prison in 
Washington State from 1993 until February 1996, which countered Mounsaveng‘s 
allegation that defendant was among a group of men who threatened him in 
December 1995 and January 1996.  In closing argument, defense counsel challenged 
the eyewitness identifications of his client, suggested that defendant perceived 
himself to be under imminent threat during his struggle with Song, and asserted that 
defendant may have been under the influence of drugs or coerced by Mounsaveng.   
 
7 
Mounsaveng admitted his role in the robberies but claimed he acted under 
duress.   
3. Trial Court’s Findings 
The trial court found both defendants guilty of first degree murder.  The 
court also found ―beyond a reasonable doubt that the special circumstance against 
each defendant ha[d] been proven,‖ stating that ―[t]here is no doubt that this 
murder was committed during the commission of the robbery‖ of the Sean Hong 
Jewelry store.  In addition, the court found both defendants guilty of 13 counts of 
robbery and two counts of attempted robbery, and it found insufficient evidence to 
support either defendant‘s duress defense.   
B. Penalty Phase  
1. Aggravating Evidence 
a.  Victim Impact Evidence 
Seak Ang Hor, Henry Song‘s widow, talked about her husband‘s life and 
described how his murder had affected her.  Hor and Song had been married for 
about 30 years and had five children.  The family emigrated to the United States in 
1981 to escape conflict in Cambodia.  At the time of the murder, Song had owned 
the Sean Hong Jewelry store for about four years.  The family‘s entire life savings 
was invested in the business, and they had no insurance.  Hor closed the jewelry 
store after her husband‘s murder. 
Two of Song‘s adult children, David and Lilly, also testified.  David 
described cleaning up the store after the murder.  He also testified that everyone in 
the family now had to work harder to support their mother and youngest brother.  
Lilly, who had renewed her driver‘s license on the day of the murder, said that 
―every time I use my license, it reminds me . . . of the pain, that he was killed.‖  
She also had to drop out of college because she could not concentrate.   
 
8 
b.  Prior Criminal Activity 
The prosecution introduced evidence of defendant‘s prior criminal activity 
involving the use of force.  (§ 190.3, factor (b).)  On September 8, 1992, defendant 
and several accomplices broke into a home in Kennewick, Washington, and 
robbed the inhabitants at gunpoint.  Defendant was convicted of first degree 
robbery and sentenced to 55 months in prison in Washington State.  However, he 
escaped from custody on February 28, 1996. 
Defendant‘s girlfriend S. K., with whom defendant lived during the 1996 
Fresno robberies, testified that he was violent and abusive.   
On September 5, 1996, Fresno police pulled over a vehicle in which 
defendant was a passenger.  A handgun was found inside the car.  The vehicle‘s 
driver testified that an Asian man carrying a gun had offered him money for a ride 
and that as the police pulled them over, the Asian man offered him more money to 
say that the gun was his.  However, the driver could not say for sure whether that 
man was defendant.   
On January 17, 1997, Ty K., the brother of defendant‘s girlfriend, called the 
police because defendant was acting in a drunk and belligerent manner.  Police 
arrested defendant for unauthorized possession of a firearm, possession of a 
controlled substance, and vandalism.   
When awaiting trial for the charged crimes, defendant was detained at the 
Fresno County Jail.  On March 9, 1997, a correctional officer told defendant that 
he was being placed in isolation due to a fight with another inmate.  Defendant 
became hostile and told the officer, ―I see you all the time on the streets, I‘ll 
remember you.‖  On May 15, 1997, another correctional officer found among 
defendant‘s possessions a piece of metal she described as a ―shank.‖   
 
9 
c.  Prior Felony Convictions 
The prosecution introduced conviction records showing that defendant had 
1992 and 1993 Oregon felony convictions for unauthorized use of a vehicle as 
well as a 1993 Washington State conviction for first degree armed robbery.  
(§ 190.3, factor (c).) 
2. Mitigating Evidence 
Defendant testified on his own behalf.  He was born in Laos, but his family 
was forced to flee the country after the Communists came to power because his 
father and brother had fought alongside the United States Army.  The family 
resettled in a refugee camp in Thailand.  Defendant‘s family was poor, and he 
received no formal education.  He was conscripted into the Thai army for five 
years.  Aside from his stint in the army, defendant lived in the refugee camp until 
he came to the United States in 1987.  When in prison for a prior offense, 
defendant referred himself to a chemical dependency program.   
In his penalty phase closing argument, defendant‘s counsel emphasized his 
client‘s difficult upbringing, his confession and expressions of remorse, and his 
drug addiction, as well as guilt phase testimony suggesting that defendant shot 
Song in the course of a struggle for defendant‘s gun.   
3. Sentencing 
Before announcing its sentencing decisions, the trial court indicated it had 
considered, in mitigation, both defendants‘ difficult backgrounds; defendant‘s 
drug addiction and his ―request for help with chemical dependence‖; his 
confession and expressions of remorse; and the evidence that he may have 
―perceived necessity and self-defense‖ in shooting Song due to the store owner‘s 
resistance. 
 
10 
In aggravation, the trial court found that all of the alleged crimes of 
violence and the prior felony convictions had been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The court observed that ―defendant has shown a long pattern of violent 
crime against many, many victims.‖  The court cited defendant‘s criminal history; 
the violence he exhibited in the charged offenses, including the killing of Henry 
Song; and defendant‘s conduct in custody since his arrest.   
The trial court concluded that ―[r]egarding Mr. Sivongxxay, as unpleasant 
as it is, I find the death sentence to be justified and appropriate.‖ 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
In his appeal, defendant challenges the validity of his jury waiver and the 
trial court‘s consideration of certain evidence at the penalty phase.  He also raises 
several challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty.   
A. Guilt Phase 
 
As previously discussed, the guilt and penalty phases of defendant‘s trial 
proceeded before a court sitting without a jury.  Defendant asserts that he did not 
enter a valid waiver of his right to a jury trial, in derogation of his rights under the 
state and federal Constitutions and state statutory law. 
1.  Waiver of a Jury Trial 
Both defendant and Mounsaveng were present at the pretrial waiver hearing 
and were represented by counsel.  The colloquy proceeded as follows: 
―THE COURT:  Okay.  Oday Mounsaveng and Vaene Sivongxxay. 
―MS. DETJEN:  Jennifer Detjen, appearing for the People. 
―MR. PETILLA:  Rudy Petilla, for Mr. Sivongxxay. 
―MR. KINNEY:  Ernest Kinney, present in court, for Tony Vong [an alias 
of Oday Mounsaveng]. 
 
11 
―THE COURT:  This matter is currently set for trial.  What do we have, the 
11th? 
―MS. DETJEN:  That‘s good. 
―THE COURT:  January 11th.  Status of the case? 
―MR. KINNEY:  Your Honor, I believe we‘re ready to proceed on the 11th.  
I‘ve talked with cocounsel and the DA, and for a variety of reasons — 
we‘re prepared to go.  We‘re prepared to — waive a jury trial and have a 
judge trial in this death penalty case. 
―MR. PETILLA:  That‘s correct, Your Honor, and I have, of course — 
would acknowledge that this particular court would still be hearing the 
case. 
―THE COURT:  Yes, it‘s been assigned to me for all purposes.  Ms. Detjen, 
People‘s position? 
―MS. DETJEN:  People are ready to waive a jury trial in this case. 
―THE COURT:  All right.  And I think the record should show — since this 
is a capital case — that, and the record is void of any in-chambers‘ [sic] 
discussions on this.  We haven‘t had any. 
―MS. DETJEN:  That‘s correct. 
―MR. PETILLA:  Yes. 
―MR. KINNEY:  That‘s correct. 
―THE COURT:  Mr. Mounsaveng, Mr. Sivongxxay, you each have a right 
to a trial, either by a jury of 12 people selected from this community, 
through a process that you would engage in with your attorneys, the district 
attorney and the Court, or a trial in front of a judge, acting alone without a 
jury.  [¶]  The burden of proof remains the same.  The district attorney has 
the burden to go forth with evidence sufficient to prove your guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Then, and only then, would we get to a penalty phase.  
 
12 
[¶]  In a court trial, I would hear the evidence.  I, alone, would make the 
decision on whether that evidence was sufficient to prove your guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  [¶]  In the event I made such a finding, as to either or 
both of you, we would then proceed to a penalty phase, where the district 
attorney would present aggravation evidence.  Through your — you, 
through your attorney, would have a right to present mitigation evidence, 
and it would fall upon me to make the decision as to the appropriate 
punishment, which could result in a death penalty sentence.  [¶]  Do you 
give up your right to a jury trial and agree that this Court, alone, will make 
those decisions, Mr. Mounsaveng? 
―THE DEFENDANT MOUNSAVENG:  Yes. 
―THE COURT:  Mr. Sivongxxay? 
―THE DEFENDANT SIVONGXXAY:  Yes. 
―THE COURT:  Ms. Detjen? 
―MS. DETJEN:  Yes, Your Honor, the People waive the jury trial. 
―THE COURT:  All right.  We‘ll show a jury waiver on all issues, confirm 
the matter for January the 11th.  We‘ll notify the jury commissioner that 
they do not need to send out any summonses, and we will start with the 
pretrial matters on that day. . . .‖ 
 
There was no further discussion of jury waiver throughout the remainder of 
the trial proceedings.   
Under the federal Constitution and our state Constitution, a defendant in a 
criminal prosecution has a right to a jury trial.  (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 16; People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1071 (Weaver).)  
However, a ―jury may be waived in a criminal cause by the consent of both parties 
expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant‘s counsel.‖  (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 16.)  Waiver must be ―express[ed] in words . . . and will not be 
 
13 
implied from a defendant‘s conduct.‖  (People v. Holmes (1960) 54 Cal.2d 442, 
443-444 (Holmes).)  Moreover, ―a defendant‘s waiver of the right to jury trial may 
not be accepted by the court unless it is knowing and intelligent, that is, ‗ ― ‗made 
with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the 
consequences of the decision to abandon it,‘ ‖ ‘ as well as voluntary ‗ ― ‗in the 
sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than 
intimidation, coercion, or deception.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
297, 305 (Collins), quoting Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412.)  ―[W]hether 
or not there is an intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of jury trial by an 
accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case.‖  (Adams v. 
U.S. ex rel. McCann (1942) 317 U.S. 269, 278 (Adams).)  
 
Defendant acknowledges that he expressly stated on the record that he gave 
up his right to a jury trial, and he makes no claim that his purported waiver was 
coerced or otherwise involuntary.  Instead, he asserts that his decision to waive his 
jury trial right was not knowing and intelligent.  Specifically, he contends that as a 
Laotian refugee with no formal education and limited command of the English 
language, he would not have understood what the right to trial by jury entailed 
unless the trial court or counsel explained it to him.  Defendant points out that the 
trial court‘s waiver colloquy did not explain that a jury must be impartial, that its 
verdict must be unanimous, or that the trial court must declare a mistrial if the jury 
fails to reach a verdict.  The trial court also did not ask any questions confirming 
that defendant understood how a jury works, or that defendant had discussed the 
jury waiver with his counsel.   
 
Our precedent has not mandated any specific method for determining 
whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial in 
favor of a bench trial.  We instead examine the totality of the circumstances.  (See 
Adams, supra, 317 U.S. at p. 278; cf. People v. Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 131, 
 
14 
148 [looking to the ―totality of the circumstances‖ in ascertaining whether a 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights in entering a guilty plea]; 
People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175 (Howard) [same].)   
Here, we conclude that defendant entered a knowing and intelligent jury 
waiver.  Although defendant is a Laotian refugee with no formal education and 
limited English proficiency, he was represented by counsel and assisted by a 
translator throughout the trial.  The defense initiated the request for a court trial.  
In response, the trial court advised defendant that he had a right to a jury trial, that 
a jury consists of 12 people from the community, that he would have the right to 
participate in the selection of the jury, and that waiver of the right to a jury would 
mean the judge alone would determine his guilt or innocence and any resulting 
punishment.  After these advisements, defendant answered ―Yes‖ when asked 
whether he wished to ―give up [his] right to a jury trial and agree that this Court, 
alone, will make those decisions.‖  The trial court then observed that the waiver 
applied to ―all issues‖ at trial.2  Additionally, defendant had prior experience with 
the criminal justice system, having pleaded guilty to two prior offenses in Oregon 
and one in Washington State.  In 1993, in connection with his guilty plea in 
Washington, he signed a waiver stating that he ―fully underst[ood]‖ his right to a 
jury trial.  (See Parke v. Raley (1992) 506 U.S. 20, 37 [―evidence of a defendant‘s 
                                              
2  
Although the judge made this observation after defendant orally waived a 
jury trial, the totality of the circumstances approach permits a reviewing court to 
take into account events that follow the entry of a jury waiver to confirm matters 
such as the waiver‘s character and scope.  (See, e.g., U.S. v. Boynes (4th Cir. 2008) 
515 F.3d 284, 287; U.S. v. Page (5th Cir. 1981) 661 F.2d 1080, 1083; State v. 
Clemons (Kan. 2002) 45 P.3d 384, 393; State v. Baxter (Mo. 2006) 204 S.W.3d 
650, 654.)  Here, defendant‘s failure to express any surprise or confusion 
regarding the judge‘s assertion that the waiver applied to ―all issues‖ represents a 
relevant consideration in ascertaining the nature and extent of his waiver.   
 
15 
prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question 
whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights‖]); People v. Langdon (1959) 
52 Cal.2d 425, 432 [observing, in ascertaining whether there had been a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of the jury trial right, that the defendant ―had also been 
before the criminal courts on at least three previous occasions‖]; State v. Rizzo 
(Conn. 2011) 31 A.3d 1094, 1112 (Rizzo) [considering a defendant‘s prior 
experience with the criminal justice system as relevant to whether the defendant 
entered a knowing and intelligent jury waiver]; People v. Bannister (Ill. 2008) 902 
N.E.2d 571, 584 [same]; Poore v. State (Ind. 1997) 681 N.E.2d 204, 207 [same].)  
Viewed holistically, the circumstances surrounding defendant‘s jury waiver 
demonstrate that it was knowing and intelligent. 
Defendant points out that the trial court did not mention that a jury must be 
impartial, and must also be unanimous in order to render a verdict.  But ―[t]he 
United States Supreme Court has never held that a defendant, when waiving the 
right to a jury, constitutionally is entitled to be canvassed by the trial court, let 
alone to require a specifically formulated canvass‖ (Rizzo, supra, 31 A.3d at 
p. 1116; see also U.S. v. Cochran (9th Cir. 1985) 770 F.2d 850, 851 (Cochran)),3 
and we have never insisted that a jury waiver colloquy invariably must discuss 
juror impartiality, the unanimity requirement, or both for an ensuing waiver to be 
knowing and intelligent.  (See People v. Tijerina (1969) 1 Cal.3d 41, 45-46 
[finding a jury waiver knowing and intelligent even though the defendant was not 
advised of the unanimity requirement].)  It is true that in many cases in which we 
have upheld a waiver of a jury trial, we have observed that the defendant had been 
                                              
3  
Our state Constitution, of course, requires as a minimum that a jury waiver 
be ―expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant‘s counsel.‖  
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; see People v. Ernst (1994) 8 Cal.4th 441, 445.)  
 
16 
expressly advised that unanimity among the 12 jurors is necessary to render a guilt 
or penalty verdict.  (See People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 636; 
People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1208 (Scott); People v. Diaz (1992) 3 
Cal.4th 495, 570 (Diaz); People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 37, fn. 5 
(Robertson).)  But under the totality of the circumstances standard, the presence or 
absence of a reference in a colloquy to this particular attribute of a jury trial, or to 
the impartiality requirement, is not necessarily determinative of whether a waiver 
meets constitutional standards.  (See Weaver, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1072-1074 
[rejecting a defendant‘s argument that the failure to advise him of his right to 
participate in jury selection necessarily rendered his jury waiver invalid]; U.S. v. 
DeRobertis (7th Cir.1983) 715 F.2d 1174, 1186 [finding a knowing and intelligent 
jury waiver notwithstanding the trial court‘s failure to advise the defendant of the 
juror vote necessary to convict]; Rizzo, supra, 31 A.3d at p. 1118 [―this court and 
others have rejected claims that an otherwise valid waiver of the right to a jury is 
undermined by the trial court‘s failure to include a specific item of information in 
its canvass‖].)  With the circumstances presented here, we are not persuaded that 
the trial court‘s failure to mention these characteristics of a jury trial renders 
defendant‘s waiver constitutionally infirm.   
At the same time, we use this opportunity to emphasize the value of a 
robust oral colloquy in evincing a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of a 
jury trial.  Although our case law has eschewed any rigid formula or particular 
form of words that a trial court must use in taking a jury waiver, we observe that 
many other courts have offered guidance regarding important components of the 
waiver colloquy.  (See, e.g., U.S. v. Delgado (7th Cir. 1981) 635 F.2d 889, 890 
[trial courts ―should explain that a jury is composed of twelve members of the 
community, that the defendant may participate in the selection of jurors, and that 
the verdict of the jury is unanimous.  The court should inform the defendant that if 
 
17 
he waives a jury, the judge alone will decide guilt or innocence‖]; U.S. v. 
Robertson (10th Cir. 1995) 45 F.3d 1423, 1432 [same]; Marone v. U.S. (2d Cir. 
1993) 10 F.3d 65, 68 [same]; U.S. v. Martin (6th Cir. 1983) 704 F.2d 267, 274-275 
[same]; State v. Blann (N.J. 2014) 90 A.3d 1253, 1253 [same]; State v. Redden 
(W.Va. 1997) 487 S.E.2d 318, 326 [adopting the same advisements and also 
suggesting that a trial court should ―ascertain on the record whether improper 
pressure or inducements, or a confused mental state, have affected the defendant‘s 
decision to waive the right to a jury trial‖]; U.S. v. Duarte-Higareda (9th Cir. 
1997) 113 F.3d 1000, 1002 (Duarte-Higareda) [stating that the district court 
should advise a defendant of these factors and ―question the defendant to ascertain 
whether the defendant understands the benefits and burdens of a jury trial and 
freely chooses to waive a jury‖]; State v. Anderson (Wis. 2002) 638 N.W.2d 301, 
310 [adopting similar advisements and also stating that a trial court must ensure 
that the defendant ―made a deliberate choice, absent threats or promises, to 
proceed without a jury trial” and “had enough time to discuss this decision with 
his or her attorney”].) 
 
Consistent with these decisions, we offer some general guidance to help 
ensure that a defendant‘s jury trial waiver is knowing and intelligent, and to 
facilitate the resolution of a challenge to a jury waiver on appeal.  Going forward, 
we recommend that trial courts advise a defendant of the basic mechanics of a jury 
trial in a waiver colloquy, including but not necessarily limited to the facts that 
(1) a jury is made up of 12 members of the community; (2) a defendant through 
his or her counsel may participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must 
unanimously agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives the 
right to a jury trial, a judge alone will decide his or her guilt or innocence.  We 
also recommend that the trial judge take additional steps as appropriate to ensure, 
on the record, that the defendant comprehends what the jury trial right entails.  
 
18 
A trial judge may do so in any number of ways — among them, by asking whether 
the defendant had an adequate opportunity to discuss the decision with his or her 
attorney, by asking whether counsel explained to the defendant the fundamental 
differences between a jury trial and a bench trial, or by asking the defendant 
directly if he or she understands or has any questions about the right being waived.  
Ultimately, a court must consider the defendant‘s individual circumstances and 
exercise judgment in deciding how best to ensure that a particular defendant who 
purports to waive a jury trial does so knowingly and intelligently. 
 
This guidance, of course, pertains only to waiver of a jury trial in favor of a 
bench trial.  Furthermore, we emphasize that our guidance is not intended to limit 
trial courts to a narrow or rigid colloquy.  We agree with the Connecticut Supreme 
Court that ultimately, a ― ‗defendant‘s rights are not protected only by adhering to 
a predetermined ritualistic form of making the record.  Matters of reality, and not 
mere ritual, should be controlling.‘ ‖  (Rizzo, supra, 31 A.3d at p. 1120.)  
Accordingly, the guidance above is advisory.  As reflected in our determination 
here that defendant entered a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury 
trial, a trial court‘s adaptation of or departure from the recommended colloquy in 
an individual case will not necessarily render an ensuing jury waiver invalid.  (See 
U.S. v. Rodriguez (7th Cir. 1989) 888 F.2d 519, 527 [describing the advisements 
prescribed in U.S. v. Delgado, supra, 635 F.2d 889, as ―called for as a matter of 
prudence,‖ and observing that ―[l]esser (even no) warnings do not call into 
question the sufficiency of the waiver so far as the Constitution is concerned‖]; 
Cochran, supra, 770 F.2d at p. 851.)  Reviewing courts must continue to consider 
 
19 
all relevant circumstances in determining whether a jury trial waiver was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.4 
2.  Jury Waiver for the Special Circumstance Allegation 
 
Defendant also contends that he did not validly waive his right to a jury 
trial with respect to the special circumstance allegation.  He observes that ―the trial 
court made no mention of the special circumstance determination or the right to a 
jury trial thereon,‖ and that defense counsel never stated on the record that he had 
discussed the special circumstance determination with his client.  Defendant 
asserts that he therefore cannot be found to have entered a separate waiver of a 
jury trial for this allegation, as is required under People v. Memro (1985) 
38 Cal.3d 658, 700-704 (Memro), and that his general jury waiver cannot be 
understood as incorporating a knowing and intelligent surrender of his right to 
a jury trial concerning the allegation.   
Defendant‘s argument merges what are in fact two separate questions: 
whether his jury waiver was knowing and intelligent regarding the special 
circumstance allegation, and thereby met constitutional standards; and whether 
state law statutory error occurred under Memro, due to a failure to satisfy that 
decision‘s requirement for complying with certain provisions of the Penal Code.  
We find that there was a knowing and intelligent waiver regarding the special 
circumstance allegation, but agree with defendant that there was error under 
Memro.  On the record before us, however, this error was harmless. 
                                              
4  
Given the importance of this issue, we note that the Judicial Council of 
California may choose to refer the question to its criminal law committee to study 
and propose measures to assist trial courts in ensuring the validity of jury trial 
waivers. 
 
20 
a.  Adequacy of the Jury Waiver for the Special Circumstance 
Allegation Under the Federal and State Constitutions 
 
A defendant who has been convicted of first degree murder is eligible for 
the death penalty only if the prosecution has charged, and the trier of fact has 
found true, one or more statutorily enumerated special-circumstance allegations.  
(§ 190.2, subd. (a).)  ―Whenever special circumstances . . . are alleged and the trier 
of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, the trier of fact shall also 
make a special finding on the truth of each alleged special circumstance.‖  
(§ 190.4, subd. (a).)  With the exception of a prior-murder special-circumstance 
allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)), which requires a separate proceeding, ―[i]f the 
trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, it shall at the same 
time determine the truth of all special circumstances charged . . . .‖  
(§ 190.1, subd. (a).)   
 
Defendant asserts that there was no knowing and intelligent waiver of his 
right to a jury trial concerning the robbery-murder special circumstance alleged 
against him.  He does not argue that he was unaware of the special circumstance, 
or that he did not appreciate that he could receive the death penalty if it were 
found true.  Rather, he emphasizes that the trial court never explicitly told him that 
he had a right to a jury trial for the special circumstance allegation.  Defendant 
argues that this omission, viewed in the context of the record as a whole, means 
that he cannot be understood to have entered a valid waiver of his right to a jury 
trial for this allegation. 
Defendant demands more than the federal and state Constitutions require 
for a valid waiver of the jury trial right.  As discussed, a knowing and intelligent 
jury waiver requires an appreciation of the nature of the jury trial right and the 
consequences of forgoing this right.  (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 305.)  There 
is no additional constitutional requirement that a defendant be specifically advised 
 
21 
of the specific charges, enhancements, allegations, or other issues to which a 
general jury waiver will apply.  On the contrary, with a comprehensive jury waiver 
such as the one entered below, absent unusual circumstances not present here 
― ‗[i]t is settled that where a defendant waives a jury trial he is deemed to have 
consented to a trial of all of the issues in the case before the court sitting without a 
jury.‘ ‖  (People v. Berutko (1969) 71 Cal.2d 84, 94 (Berutko), quoting People v. 
Russell (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 529, 532; see also People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 
Cal.App.4th 1345, 1354-1355;5 see generally 6 LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure 
(4th ed. 2015) § 22.1(h), p. 48 [―A jury waiver generally waives the right to a jury 
determination of all of the elements of an offense, including facts that authorize a 
higher sentencing range, treated as elements under the Court‘s Apprendi line of 
cases‖] and cases cited.)6  Under this prevailing rule, our earlier determination that 
                                              
5  
As will be explained post, Memro construed two statutes as demanding 
more specificity than is constitutionally required for a jury waiver concerning a 
special circumstance allegation.  Memro distinguished the general rule, as stated in 
Berutko, as inapposite as a matter of statutory construction.  (Memro, supra, 38 
Cal.3d at p. 702, fn. 52.)  But the added precision demanded as a matter of state 
statutory law under Memro does not mean that in order to satisfy the constitutional 
standard of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of a jury trial for a special 
circumstance allegation, a jury waiver colloquy must expressly reference the 
allegation. 
6  
The relevant section of the LaFave treatise further provides: ―When a jury 
trial of guilt and enhancements are separated, a defendant convicted by jury at the 
earlier phase should have an opportunity to waive a jury for the enhancement 
phase.‖  (6 LaFave, supra, § 22.1(h), p. 48.)  In this case, of course, there is no 
issue presented with regard to whether a defendant who has invoked a jury trial as 
to guilt or innocence may waive a jury with regard to a charged 
special-circumstance allegation. 
 
Furthermore, the applicable California statutes provide for a separate trial 
of a special-circumstance allegation only when a prior murder special 
circumstance is charged (§ 190.1, subd.(b)); a separate trial is not provided for any 
other special-circumstance allegation, including a robbery-murder 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
22 
defendant‘s general waiver of a jury trial was knowing and intelligent is sufficient 
in itself to defeat defendant‘s contention that his waiver did not meet constitutional 
standards with regard to the special circumstance allegation.7   
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
special-circumstance allegation as involved in this case. (§ 190.1, subd. (a).)   
Even in an instance in which a defendant who has waived a jury as to guilt or 
innocence chooses to invoke the right to a jury with regard to such a 
special-circumstance allegation ― a circumstance that, albeit theoretically 
possible, to our knowledge has not ever occurred in practice― the trial of the 
special-circumstance allegation need not be separated from the guilt trial.  In such 
a case, after the presentation of the relevant evidence before the court and the jury 
concurrently in a single trial, the jury can be required to return a verdict on the 
special-circumstance allegation in the event the trial court finds the defendant 
guilty of the charged murder offense. 
7  
The general rule recognized in Berutko presents no conflict with the results 
reached in State v. Schofield (Me. 2005) 895 A.2d 927 (Schofield) and State v. 
Williams (Or.Ct.App. 2005) 104 P.3d 1151 (Williams), where courts construed 
previously entered jury waivers as limited to charged crimes, and not as extending 
to the adjudication of additional facts that served to lengthen the defendants‘ 
sentences — facts that, due to the state of the law at the time the defendants 
entered their jury waivers, neither they nor their counsel had reason to believe 
were triable by a jury.   
The defendants in both Schofield, supra, 895 A.2d 927, and Williams, 
supra, 104 P.3d 1151, waived their right to a jury trial for criminal charges, were 
convicted, and then were sentenced to extended terms of imprisonment premised 
in part on additional findings made by the trial courts.  (Schofield, at pp. 929-930; 
Williams, at p. 1152.)  After the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely), the defendants challenged 
their respective sentences on the ground that the judicial fact finding that had 
occurred deprived them of their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  In 
Williams, the state responded that the defendant‘s waiver of a jury trial for the 
underlying charge necessarily implied a waiver of his right to a jury trial 
concerning the enhancement; a similar argument was advanced in Schofield.  
(Schofield, at pp. 930-931; Williams, at p. 1152.)   
Each court rejected the state‘s position.  Williams, supra, 104 P.3d 1151, 
emphasized that ―[a]t the time that defendant opted for a court trial, he not only 
was unaware that he had a right to a jury determination of facts used to impose a 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
23 
Defendant‘s argument would fail even if we were to assume that — 
contrary to the conventional rule — a constitutionally sufficient general jury 
waiver does not necessarily incorporate a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury 
trial for a special circumstance allegation in a capital case.  Here, the specific 
advisements the trial court provided to defendant before taking his waiver, 
together with the other surrounding circumstances, confirm that defendant 
knowingly and intelligently relinquished his right to a jury trial for this allegation.8   
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
dangerous offender sentence, but he also did not know of the possibility of such a 
sentence.‖  (Id., at p. 1153.)  Schofield, supra, 895 A.2d 927, determined that 
―[b]ecause Schofield, prior to Blakely, did not know that she had a right to have a 
jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, any facts necessary to increase her 
sentence beyond twenty years . . . her waiver extends only to the findings 
necessary to determine her guilt or innocence to the charge of manslaughter.  It 
does not extend to findings that would serve to double the maximum sentence she 
faced upon conviction.‖  (Id., at p. 931.) 
Assuming, without deciding, that Schofield, supra, 895 A.2d 927, and 
Williams, supra, 104 P.3d 1151, correctly construed the effects of the defendants‘ 
jury waivers, both cases are distinguishable.  Unlike the situation in Williams, here 
defendant most certainly was aware of the possibility he would receive a death 
sentence.  Furthermore, both Schofield and Williams involved an intervening 
change in the law.  In those cases defendants lacked (or were reasonably believed 
to lack, under the law prior to Blakely) a legal right to a jury trial for an 
enhancement or statutory aggravating findings when they entered their respective 
jury waivers.  The Schofield and Williams courts thus declined to construe the 
defendants‘ jury waivers as forgoing a right to a jury trial that had not been 
recognized at the time the waivers were entered.  By contrast, because defendant, 
who was represented by counsel at all pertinent times, had a right to a jury trial 
with regard to the special circumstance allegation at the time he entered his jury 
waiver (see § 190.4, subd. (a)), his comprehensive waiver is properly understood 
as subsuming that right.  And in any event, as discussed post, the trial court‘s 
colloquy with defendant further demonstrates that defendant entered a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of a jury trial for the special circumstance allegation.   
8   
The dissenting justices direct their attacks on perceived deficiencies in the 
judge‘s advisements to defendant, and fail to properly account for other facts that 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
24 
To review, after each defendant, through counsel, stated his desire to waive 
jury trial, the trial judge explained to defendant that he had ―a right to a trial, either 
by a jury . . . or a trial by a judge.‖  The judge described the trial as incorporating 
two phases.  In the first phase, the judge explained, the district attorney bore the 
burden of introducing evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and ―[t]hen, and only then, would we get to a penalty phase.‖  The judge 
also explained that in a court trial he alone ―would make the decision on whether 
that evidence was sufficient to prove [defendant‘s] guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt,‖ and ―In the event [he] made such a finding,‖ the case would proceed to a 
penalty phase, at which time it would ―fall upon [the judge] to make the decision 
as to the appropriate punishment, which could result in a death penalty sentence.‖  
The ultimate question posed to defendant was ―Do you give up your right to a jury 
trial and agree that this Court, alone, will make those decisions . . . ?‖  After 
defendant answered in the affirmative, the trial court observed that the waiver 
applied to ―all issues‖ in the trial.   
Viewed together with all other relevant circumstances, this colloquy 
demonstrates beyond any dispute that defendant‘s waiver incorporated a knowing 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
also connote a knowing and intelligent waiver.  But ―[a] waiver colloquy is a 
procedural device; it is not a constitutional end or a constitutional ‗right.‘ ‖  
(Commonwealth v. Mallory (Pa. 2008) 941 A.2d 686, 697 (Mallory).)  Thus, in 
various contexts in which we have been called upon to ascertain whether a waiver 
of constitutional rights was knowing and intelligent, we have not focused 
myopically on the waiver colloquy in isolation, but instead have conducted a more 
comprehensive assessment of the totality of the circumstances.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 361; Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1175-1178.)  
As we have discussed, here the relevant circumstances include not only the 
colloquy, but also defendant‘s prior criminal history, other events before and after 
the waiver was entered, and the fact that defendant was represented by counsel.  
 
25 
and intelligent declination of a jury trial for the special circumstance allegation.  
The trial court‘s advisement conveyed that defendant had a right to a jury trial 
with regard to all issues as to which an adverse determination could expose him to 
the death penalty — which included the special circumstance allegation — and 
that with his waiver, defendant would be giving up that right.  Defendant‘s 
ensuing assent to a bench trial therefore manifested a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of his jury trial right with regard to the special circumstance allegation. 
Our finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial for the 
special circumstance allegation finds support in our decision in Diaz, supra, 
3 Cal.4th 495.  There, in taking the defendant‘s waiver of a jury trial, the trial 
court informed the defendant, ― ‗[Y]ou‘ll be giving up that right to have the jury in 
two different functions.  First of all, first function is to decide the question of your 
guilt or innocence.  Then the second function, similarly, assuming there are 12 of 
them and they would unanimously agree that you were guilty, then you would 
have 12 jurors who must unanimously agree as to the punishment.  [¶]  They have 
a choice, life without the possibility of parole or death. . . .  And you‘ll be giving 
up that right.‘ ‖  The defendant answered, ― ‗I‘m giving it up.‘ ‖  The court then 
asked the defendant if he understood that his waiver applied to ― ‗both phases . . . 
of the special circumstances case.‘ ‖  The defendant assented.  (Id., at p. 564.)  
The defendant also told the court that he had discussed the matter ― ‗quite 
thoroughly‘ ‖ with his attorney.  (Id., at p. 565.)   
Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th 495, rejected the defendant‘s argument that his 
waiver was invalid, ruling instead that ―the trial court explained to defendant that 
the waiver of his right to trial by jury applied to all aspects of his special 
circumstances case, from beginning to end. . . . Although the trial court‘s 
admonition was not a model of clarity, we believe it was sufficient to advise 
defendant that his waiver, which included all aspects of guilt and penalty, included 
 
26 
within it a waiver of the right to jury trial on the truth or falsity of the special 
circumstance allegation.‖  (Id., at p. 565.)  Diaz reached this conclusion even 
though the trial court never explained to the defendant what a ―special 
circumstance‖ was, and indeed, used the term ―special circumstance‖ only in 
describing the type of case that was involved.  The defendant in Diaz was never 
told by the judge that this ―special circumstance‖ represented a specific allegation 
as to which he had a distinct jury trial right.  Yet the court in Diaz nevertheless 
found a valid jury waiver concerning the special circumstance allegation.  Given 
similar facts, the same reasoning applies here.  Although the court below never 
used the phrase ―special circumstance‖ in its colloquy with defendant, its 
advisement communicated to defendant that his waiver of a jury trial, if entered, 
would encompass the determinations that could make him subject to the death 
penalty as part of a described trial process.  Defendant‘s resulting jury waiver was 
therefore knowing and intelligent with regard to the special circumstance 
allegation.  
 
The dissenting justices apparently read the trial judge‘s advisements 
differently, perceiving the failure to expressly refer to the special circumstance 
allegation as somehow implicitly excluding that allegation from a counseled and 
otherwise comprehensive jury waiver.  (See conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at 
pp. 5-10; conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., post, at pp. 6-8.)  We respectfully 
disagree with this interpretation of the colloquy, for the reasons we have 
previously given.9  The dissenting justices‘ position boils down to the proposition 
                                              
9  
The dissenting justices‘ misreading of the colloquy saturates the remainder 
of their analysis, causing it to go astray in numerous respects.   
 
For example, the error informs Justice Cuéllar‘s inapt analogy of this matter 
to two out-of-state decisions involving deficient penalty-phase waivers in capital 
trials.  (Conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., post, at pp. 9-11.)  In one of these 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
27 
that the judge was constitutionally bound to utter the phrase ―special 
circumstance‖ at some point in the waiver colloquy with defendant, even if the 
judge never went on to explain what this phrase meant.  But our waiver 
jurisprudence rejects the notion that a knowing and intelligent waiver hinges on 
the recitation of a ― ‗talismanic phrase.‘ ‖  (Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1180, 
quoting U.S. v. Sherman (9th Cir. 1973) 474 F.2d 303, 306.)  The fact of the 
matter is that the dissenting justices, like defendant, would require a degree of 
elaboration and specificity in a jury waiver colloquy that has never been demanded 
for a jury waiver to be considered knowing and intelligent under constitutional 
standards. 
b.  Statutory Issues with Jury Waiver / Memro Error 
Defendant‘s related attack on his jury waiver, as it pertains to the special 
circumstance allegation, involves our decision in Memro.  
Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658, reconciled the provisions of sections 190.1, 
subdivision (a) and 190.4, subdivision (a).  The former provides, in pertinent part, that 
in the trial of a capital case, ―The question of the defendant‘s guilt shall be first 
determined.  If the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, it 
shall at the same time determine the truth of all special circumstances charged.‖  
(§ 190.1, subd. (a).)  This provision suggests that the same trier of fact will determine 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
decisions, the judge entered a jury waiver for both phases of a capital trial, even 
though the record suggested that the defendant sought to waive a jury for the guilt 
phase only.  (People v. Brown (Ill. 1996) 661 N.E.2d 287, 297.)  In the other, 
Commonwealth v. O’Donnell (Pa. 1999) 740 A.2d 198, the defendant ―never 
personally waived her right to have a jury determine the penalty.‖  (Id., at p. 211.)  
The discussions of jury waivers in both Brown and O’Donnell must be read in 
light of these distinguishing facts. 
 
28 
guilt and the truth of any special circumstance allegations.  The relevant text within 
the latter provision states, however, that ―[i]f the defendant was convicted by the court 
sitting without a jury, the trier of fact [on the special circumstance allegation(s)] shall 
be a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant and by the people, in which case the 
trier of fact shall be the court.‖  (§ 190.4, subd. (a).)  Memro construed these statutes 
(as enacted by the Legislature in 1977, see Stats. 1977, ch. 316, §§ 7, 12, pp. 1257, 
1261), read together, as requiring a ―separate, personal waiver‖ of the right to a jury 
for a special circumstance allegation, above and beyond the standard guilt phase and 
penalty phase waiver.  (Memro, at p. 704.)   
 
We have since clarified that the ―separate waiver‖ required under Memro 
does not require a second enunciated waiver by the defendant.  In Diaz, this 
court‘s first case applying Memro, we explained that under Memro, ―[t]he waiver 
must be made by the defendant personally, and must be ‗separate‘ — that is, if the 
defendant is to be deemed to have waived the right to jury trial on both guilt and 
special circumstances, the record must show that the defendant is aware that the 
waiver applies to each of these aspects of trial.‖  (Diaz, 3 Cal.4th at p. 565.)  
Because the defendant in Diaz ―told the court that he had discussed the matter 
‗quite thoroughly‘ with his counsel,‖ and the trial court‘s colloquy ―explained to 
defendant that the waiver of his right to trial by jury applied to all aspects of his 
special circumstances case, from beginning to end,‖ Diaz held that Memro was 
satisfied.  (Diaz, at p. 565.)   
 
The Memro rule was construed similarly in People v. Wrest (1992) 
3 Cal.4th 1088 (Wrest).  There, the defendant engaged in an on-the-record 
colloquy with the prosecutor.  In this colloquy, the prosecutor mentioned the terms 
―special circumstances‖ or ―special allegations‖ several times, ultimately asking 
the defendant, ― ‗In other words, you don‘t want a jury trial on the issue of guilt or 
the special circumstances or the enhancements, right?‘ ‖ to which the defendant 
 
29 
answered, ― ‗Yes.‘ ‖  (Id., at pp. 1103-1104, italics omitted.)  Wrest found that the 
record reflected an ―express and personal understanding and waiver of [the 
defendant‘s] right to a jury trial on the special circumstance allegations,‖ 
observing that ―[t]he mere fact that the prosecutor‘s questions combined issues of 
guilt, special circumstances, and enhancements did not vitiate the waiver.‖  (Id., at 
p. 1104.)  In finding no error under Memro, Wrest disapproved three Court of 
Appeal decisions10 to the extent that they might have been read to require a 
specific procedure for complying with Memro.  (Wrest, at pp. 1104-1105.)  Wrest 
explained that Memro does not demand ―that a defendant‘s waiver of his jury-trial 
right on special circumstance allegations be taken in accordance with a prescribed 
ritual, e.g., a separate interrogation of defendant about his special circumstance 
jury trial rights as distinct from his other jury trial rights. . . .  [Memro] simply 
requires that a valid waiver of the jury-trial right on a special circumstance 
actually cover the special circumstance.  It does not require such a waiver to be 
taken in accordance with any particular procedure.‖  (Wrest, at p. 1105; see also 
Weaver, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1074-1075; Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1208.)   
 
The Attorney General urges us to construe the waiver colloquy here as 
sufficient under Memro.  The Attorney General‘s argument finds some support in 
our statement in Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1088, that Memro ―simply requires that a 
valid waiver of the jury-trial right on a special circumstance actually cover the 
special circumstance.‖  (Wrest, at p. 1105.)  Arguably, our conclusion that the trial 
court secured a constitutionally adequate waiver of a jury trial concerning the 
                                              
10  
Specifically, Wrest disapproved People v. Moreno (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 
564, 571-572, People v. Gastile (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1376, 1380-1381, and 
People v. Sandoval (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1428, 1431.  (Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th 
at pp. 1104-1105.)  
 
30 
special circumstance allegation could be equated with a determination that 
defendant‘s waiver covered the charge, in the sense that it encompassed a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of a jury trial for the allegation.  We nevertheless conclude 
the colloquy fell short of what the applicable statutes, as construed in Memro, 
require.  There was no specific reference in the waiver colloquy to the need to 
adjudicate the special circumstance allegation; the term ―special circumstance‖ 
was never mentioned at all.  Although such precision is not required for a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, we believe that Memro‘s requirement 
of a ―separate waiver,‖ even as that rule was subsequently clarified in Diaz and 
Wrest, demands at least that much specificity.  Although we recognize that the line 
we draw is a narrow one, we hold that defendant‘s purported waiver as to the 
special circumstance determination was deficient, as a matter of state law, under 
Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658. 
 
Having identified Memro error, we now consider whether this error is 
amenable to harmless error review or instead requires automatic reversal.   
States are free to apply their own harmless error rules to errors of state law.  
(Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 62 [―when . . . state standards alone 
have been violated, the State is free . . . to apply its own state harmless-error rule 
to such errors of state law‖].)  The California Constitution imposes upon this court 
an obligation to conduct ―an examination of the entire cause‖ and reverse a 
judgment below for error only upon determining that a ―miscarriage of justice‖ has 
occurred.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)  This provision informs the general rule in 
this state that to obtain reversal of the judgment based on a violation of a state 
statute, a defendant must demonstrate that it is ―reasonably probable that a result 
more favorable to [the defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the 
error.‖  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) 
 
31 
 
Defendant argues that the Watson standard does not apply here, and that the 
error below should instead be regarded as structural, or reversible per se.  We 
disagree.  Categorization of an error as structural represents ―the exception and not 
the rule.‖  (Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 578; see also People v. Marshall 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 851 [―[t]here is a strong presumption any error‖ is 
susceptible to harmless error analysis].)  In determining whether a federal 
constitutional error qualifies as structural, courts ―ask whether the error rendered 
the trial ‗fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or 
innocence‘ (Neder [v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 9]), or whether the effect 
of the error is ‗necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate‘ (Sullivan [v. 
Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 282]).‖  (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 
366, italics omitted.)  The fact that an error implicates important constitutional 
rights does not necessarily make it structural.  ―Many statutes . . . set out 
procedures designed to protect constitutional principles.  Broadly construed, many 
of these procedural statutes may be said to protect due process and other 
constitutional safeguards.  Nevertheless, most procedural shortcomings constitute 
trial error‖ and not structural error.  (People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 
555-556 (Anzalone).)  The ―miscarriage of justice‖ language within article VI, 
section 13 of the California Constitution likewise contemplates a limited class of 
structural errors, consisting of ― ‗[t]he kinds of errors that, regardless of the 
evidence, may result in a ―miscarriage of justice‖ because they operate to deny a 
criminal defendant the constitutionally required ―orderly legal procedure‖ (or, in 
other words, a fair trial) — for example, the denial of the defendant‘s right to a 
jury trial or to an impartial trial judge [citation] — [and] all involve fundamental 
―structural defects‖ in the judicial proceedings . . . .‘ ‖  (People v. Alexander 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 896.)  
 
32 
The mistake that occurred here is not such an error.  At the outset, we observe 
that defendant has not directed our attention to any language in section 190.1, 
subdivision (a), in section 190.4, subdivision (a), or in any legislative or ballot 
materials relating to these statutes that indicate the Legislature (in enacting the 1977 
versions of these statutes) or the electorate (in repealing and reenacting these statutes 
as part of a 1978 initiative (Prop. 7, §§ 3-4, 9-10, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec., 
Nov. 7, 1978)) saw a structural error as occurring when a trial court, in taking a 
knowing and intelligent waiver of the jury trial right, fails to explicitly reference the 
special circumstance allegation as encompassed within the waiver, or otherwise 
obtain a separate jury waiver for this allegation.11 
                                              
11  
Justice Cuéllar extracts a rule of per se reversal from language within 
section 190.4, subdivision (a), providing that ―the trier of fact [for a special 
circumstance allegation] shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant 
and by the people, in which case the trier of fact shall be the court.‖  He asserts 
that this phrasing connotes the Legislature‘s and electorate‘s intent that a deviation 
from the specified procedure amounts to a structural error.  (Conc. & dis. opn. of 
Cuéllar, J., post, at pp. 20-21.)   
 
But this text, which closely resembles the statutory phrasing involved in 
Berutko, supra, 71 Cal.2d at page 94, cannot reasonably be read in the manner 
suggested by Justice Cuéllar.  The language conveys that a criminal defendant has 
a right to a jury trial regarding a special circumstance allegation; reading it 
together with the language in section 190.1, subdivision (a), the court in Memro, 
supra, 38 Cal.3d 658 also determined that it conveyed a right to a separate waiver.  
(Id., at pp. 700-704.)  It does not follow from the statutory language, however, that 
a deviation from the procedure recognized in Memro constitutes a structural error, 
and there is no indication whatsoever that the Legislature or electorate saw it as 
such.   
 
Justice Cuéllar‘s opinion reaches its conclusion only by assuming that 
defendant could not have knowingly and intelligently waived a jury trial as a 
matter of constitutional law absent compliance with the specific separate waiver 
that Memro determined was required as matter of statutory law.  The opinion thus 
improperly conflates state statutory procedures with constitutional standards, an 
approach that, as we shall discuss post, has been consistently rejected.   
 
33 
Nor does the analysis in Memro itself support treating the error here as 
structural.  Memro determined that another error required reversal and a remand of the 
matter for additional proceedings.  (Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 704.)  For this 
reason, Memro did not need to and did not determine the consequences of a judge‘s 
failure to elicit a sufficiently specific jury waiver for the trial of a special 
circumstance allegation.  (Id., at pp. 704-705.)  Yet Memro never suggested that a 
failure to obtain such a waiver would fall into the rare class of mistakes that are 
reversible per se.  And indeed, every Court of Appeal that has detected the type of 
error described in Memro has applied a form of harmless error analysis to the mistake, 
rather than finding it reversible per se.  (People v. Moreno, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 579; People v. Gastile, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1383-1384; People v. Granger 
(1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 422, 428-429.)    
The type of Memro error involved here is, in fact, quite different from those 
mistakes that are regarded as structural.  This error did ―not necessarily render 
[defendant‘s] criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for 
determining guilt or innocence.‖  (Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 9.)  
Nor are the effects of this lapse ―necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.‖  
(Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 282.)  On the contrary, we are more than 
capable of scrutinizing the record to ascertain whether it reveals a reasonable 
probability that defendant would have demanded a jury trial for the special 
circumstance allegation, had no Memro error occurred.  
Defendant characterizes such an inquiry as unduly speculative.  But we have 
conducted comparable evaluations of the record in other contexts, assessing whether a 
defendant would have made a different decision absent an error in advisement.  For 
example, we have structured examinations of prejudice around whether a criminal 
defendant still would have entered a guilty or no contest plea had the judge provided 
an adequate advisement regarding the plea‘s immigration consequences (People v. 
 
34 
Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 559 (Martinez); People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 192 (Zamudio)); whether a defendant would have accepted a 
plea bargain offered by the prosecution had his or her attorney provided effective 
assistance of counsel (In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 937); and whether an 
unrepresented defendant would have invoked the right to counsel had he or she been 
readvised of this right upon arraignment after the preliminary examination, as is 
required under section 987, subdivision (a) (People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 
365 (Crayton)).   
Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th 555, is instructive concerning the nature of this 
type of review.  Previously, we had determined in Zamudio, supra, 23 Cal.4th 183, 
that where a trial court fails to supply the advisement required under section 1016.5 
regarding the immigration consequences of a guilty or no contest plea and the 
defendant shows that his or her conviction may result in adverse immigration 
consequences, the court, on the defendant‘s motion, must vacate the judgment and 
allow the defendant to withdraw the plea — provided, however, the defendant also 
could show prejudice by establishing that ―it was reasonably probable he or she would 
not have pleaded guilty if properly advised.‖  (Martinez, at p. 559, citing Zamudio, at 
p. 210.)  Martinez considered ―whether a court ruling on a motion to vacate pursuant 
to section 1016.5 may deny relief, for lack of prejudice, if it concludes the defendant 
would not have obtained a more favorable outcome had he or she chosen not to plead 
guilty or nolo contendere.‖  (Martinez, at p. 559.)  It determined that ―because the 
question is what the defendant would have done, relief should be granted if the court, 
after considering evidence offered by the parties relevant to that question, determines 
the defendant would have chosen not to plead guilty or nolo contendere, even if the 
court also finds it not reasonably probable the defendant would thereby have obtained 
a more favorable outcome.‖  (Ibid.)   
 
35 
This approach recognizes that a defendant may accept or reject a plea for what 
might objectively appear to be unreasonable motives, which must be respected as 
reflections of the defendant‘s autonomy.  Nevertheless, as befits an error under state 
statutory law alone, review occurs under the ―reasonably probable‖ standard of 
Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836, and the defendant bears the burden of showing 
that he or she would have acted differently had the error not occurred.  (Martinez, 
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 562.)  This assignment of the burden can be important, as it 
was in People v. McClellan (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367.  McClellan considered a trial 
court‘s failure to advise the defendant that his guilty plea would make him subject to 
registration as a sex offender under section 290.  (McClellan, at p. 372.)  On appeal, 
the defendant in McClellan argued that the error automatically entitled him to 
withdraw from the plea agreement.  (Id., at p. 374.)  Although this court agreed with 
the defendant that an error occurred under state law (id., at p. 376), it disagreed 
regarding the resulting remedy.  McClellan concluded that the defendant bore the 
burden of showing he would have made a different decision with a proper advisement, 
and determined that he had not met that burden: ―Although defendant alleges that had 
he been properly advised, he would not have entered his plea of guilty, there is 
nothing in the record on appeal to support this contention.  Thus, we conclude 
defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing prejudice.‖  (Id., at p. 378.)   
Our decisions in cases such as Martinez and McClellan manifest the viability 
of the form of harmless error analysis that applies here.  Similarly pertinent is People 
v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1,12 where this court evaluated whether a defendant was 
prejudiced by an error in advisement by considering whether the defendant still would 
                                              
12  
People v. Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th 1, was disapproved on another ground 
in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, footnote 22. 
 
36 
have waived a jury trial absent the mistake.  The defendant in Sanchez received a 
death sentence after he waived a jury trial for the guilt phase of a capital case, opting 
instead for the court to decide guilt on the basis of preliminary hearing transcripts.  
(Id., at pp. 17, 23-27.)  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error because in taking the defendant‘s waiver of a jury trial for the guilt 
phase, it failed to comply with a state law requirement that the defendant be advised 
of the potential maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment.  (Id., at p. 30; see 
People v. Dakin (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033.)  Applying the Watson 
―reasonably probable‖ standard of review to this omission, Sanchez found insufficient 
indicia of prejudice.  (Sanchez, at p. 30.)  The defendant knew that he faced a possible 
death sentence if convicted, it was noted.  (Ibid.)  Furthermore, Sanchez observed, ―It 
is clear from the record that defendant would have waived his right to a jury trial and 
insisted on the submission of the guilt phase on the preliminary hearing transcripts 
even if he was specifically told by the court that he faced a possible death sentence.‖  
(Id., at p. 31.)   
Other courts also consider themselves capable of ascertaining whether a 
defendant would have chosen a jury trial over a bench trial if there had not been an 
error by the judge or counsel in connection with the jury waiver.  In U.S. v. Williams 
(7th Cir. 2009) 559 F.3d 607, for example, faced with a jury waiver that did not 
comply with the requirements of rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (18 U.S.C.) the court declined to characterize the error as structural.  It 
instead ascertained that ―for purposes of determining whether the waiver was, in fact, 
invalid, one can determine whether the defendant adequately understood his right to a 
jury; moreover, if the defendant lacked such an understanding, one can assess the 
likelihood that he would have stood on his right to a jury had he been properly 
admonished of his right.‖  (U.S. v. Williams, at p. 614.)  Later, the court in U.S. v. 
Williams reiterated that, having failed to raise a timely objection to the allegedly 
 
37 
inadequate waiver procedure, the defendant ―must show that he did not have a 
concrete understanding of his right to a jury and that it is reasonably probable that he 
would not have waived a jury had he had such an understanding.‖  (Id., at p. 616.)   
A similar inquiry has also been endorsed for ascertaining whether a defendant 
suffered prejudice due to ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a jury 
waiver.  In State v. Keller (Iowa 2009) 760 N.W.2d 451, for example, the defendant‘s 
written jury waiver did not discuss any of the specific elements of the jury trial right, 
and there was no record of any waiver colloquy between the trial court and the 
defendant.  (Id., at p. 452.)  The defendant in Keller pressed an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, asserting that her counsel provided constitutionally inadequate 
assistance by not ensuring a knowing and adequate waiver.  (Ibid.)  In describing the 
defendant‘s burden of showing prejudice, the Keller court explained that she ―must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, but for counsel‘s failure to assure 
compliance with the rule, she would not have waived her right to a jury trial.‖  (Id., at 
p. 453.)  In Illinois, prejudice from the deficient performance of counsel in connection 
with a jury waiver is assessed by reference to ―whether there exists a reasonable 
likelihood that the defendant would not have waived his jury right in the absence of 
the alleged error.‖  (People v. Maxwell (Ill. 1992) 592 N.E.2d 960, 973.)  And in 
Mallory, supra, 941 A.2d 686, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the 
petitioner‘s argument that counsel‘s alleged ineffective assistance in connection with 
a jury waiver amounted to structural error.  Mallory concluded instead that ―to prove 
trial counsel ineffective . . . . appellant must show that his understanding of the 
written [jury] waiver was constitutionally impaired by his lawyer‘s deficient 
performance, as well as proof that he would have elected a jury but for his lawyer‘s 
performance.‖  (Id., at p. 702; see also Taylor v. Horn (3d Cir. 2007) 504 F.3d 416, 
450 [observing that a habeas corpus petitioner had not shown that he was prejudiced 
 
38 
by the denial of his jury trial right because he ―never asserted that he would have 
elected [a jury], had he known of the option‖].)13   
The purpose of this discussion of relevant authority is not to suggest that all of 
these cases are factually on all fours with the present matter.  It merely establishes 
that, contrary to defendant‘s position that such an inquiry is hopelessly speculative, in 
appropriate circumstances courts can indeed ascertain whether or not a particular 
defendant would have chosen a jury trial instead of a bench trial had an error in 
advisement not occurred.   
Of course, there are limits to the ability of courts to undertake this form of 
analysis.  These limits are suggested by our decision in Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th 297.  
There, in taking the defendant‘s jury waiver, the judge advised him that he would 
receive ―some benefit‖ by forgoing a jury trial.  (Id., at p. 302.)  Collins regarded this 
inducement as violating the defendant‘s federal constitutional rights, because it meant 
that his ensuing waiver of a jury trial could not be understood as voluntary.  (Id., at 
pp. 309, 311.)  This error, Collins determined, was structural, in the same manner as 
the outright refusal to provide any jury trial would be.  (Id., at p. 312.)   
                                              
13  
In another case decided the same year as Mallory, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court applied a similar mode of analysis in addressing a jury waiver 
issue presented on direct appeal.  In Commonwealth v. Houck (Pa. 2008) 948 A.2d 
780, the defendant claimed to have been misled by the trial court‘s misadvisement 
regarding the range of sentences that could adhere upon conviction.  (Id., at 
pp. 785-786.)  The court was ―persuaded that the voluntariness of a jury waiver 
can be undermined where the defendant is informed of a range of potential 
sentences at a jury waiver colloquy that is less than the sentence eventually 
imposed.‖  (Id., at p. 788.)  The court also determined, however, ―that if a 
defendant seeks to invalidate an otherwise valid jury waiver based on a trial 
court‘s recitation of his or her potential sentence, the defendant should be required 
to demonstrate that his or her understanding of the length of the potential sentence 
was a material factor in making the decision to waive a jury trial.‖  (Ibid.) 
 
39 
The situation here is different from that before the Collins court in two 
important respects.  First, the statutory error that arises under state law when a trial 
court fails to meet Memro‘s prophylactic requirement does not necessarily warrant the 
same treatment that a constitutional error would receive.  Our precedent, and that of 
other jurisdictions, has recognized a difference between a failure to comply with a 
statutory requirement that may serve to protect a constitutional right, and a violation 
of the underlying constitutional right itself.  In Anzalone, supra, 56 Cal.4th at 
page 555, for example, we explained that the statutory requirement that a court or 
clerk ask a jury whether it has agreed upon a verdict in a criminal case (§ 1149) is 
―designed to protect the right to a unanimous verdict,‖ a ―core constitutional right.‖  
We nevertheless held that a failure to comply with this statute was subject to harmless 
error analysis under the standard specified in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836.  
(Anzalone, at pp. 555, 560.)  Likewise, in Crayton, supra, 28 Cal.4th at page 364, we 
identified the requirement that an unrepresented defendant be readvised of his or her 
right to counsel upon being arraigned on an information after a preliminary 
examination (§ 987, subd. (a)) as a ―prophylactic safeguard‖ that protects the right to 
counsel.  Yet we determined that a failure to readvise a defendant amounted to 
statutory error, not federal constitutional error, and reviewed the error for prejudice 
under the Watson standard.  (Crayton, at pp. 365-366; see also People v. Vera (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 269, 276, 278 [distinguishing between the forfeiture rules applicable to 
constitutional rights and those applicable to statutory rights].)14   
                                              
14  
Other jurisdictions recognize a similar distinction.  Within the specific 
context of jury waivers, an abundant body of precedent distinguishes between a 
failure to comply with statutory rules, or other rules of procedure with the force of 
law, that prescribe how a jury waiver is to be taken; and a failure to obtain a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary jury waiver.  (See, e.g., U.S. v. Leja (1st Cir. 
2006) 448 F.3d 86, 93 [concluding that a jury waiver that does not comply with 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) (18 U.S.C.) may nevertheless be valid]; 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
40 
 
Second, even granting the existence of Memro error, defendant nonetheless 
personally entered a constitutionally adequate jury waiver, applicable to all phases of 
his trial.15  The presence of a personal jury waiver that met basic constitutional 
standards, if not the heightened requirements recognized as a matter of statutory 
construction in Memro, minimizes any speculation that would otherwise be associated 
with ascertaining whether defendant would have chosen a jury trial for the special 
circumstance allegation, but for the Memro error.  The presence of a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary personal waiver of a jury trial by defendant distinguishes 
the facts of this case from those involved in People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 
1113 (Blackburn) and People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, in which errors of state 
law were treated as structural.  In Blackburn, this court classified as reversible per se a 
failure to obtain any personal jury waiver at all from a defendant in a civil 
commitment proceeding.  (Id., at pp. 1133-1134.)  Tran similarly cast as structural 
error the absence of a personal jury waiver from a defendant prior to proceedings to 
extend his involuntary commitment after pleading not guilty by reason of insanity to a 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
U.S. v. Robertson, supra, 45 F.3d at p. 1431 [same]; State v. Feregrino (Iowa 
2008) 756 N.W.2d 700, 707-708 [ruling that a failure to comply with a state rule 
of criminal procedure providing that a jury waiver must be in writing and on the 
record, does not, by itself, constitute structural error]; State v. Redden, supra, 487 
S.E.2d at p. 327 [determining that a failure to comply with a state law requirement 
of a written jury waiver does not, by itself, invalidate a defendant‘s jury waiver]; 
People v. Mosly (Mich.Ct.App. 2003) 672 N.W.2d 897, 901 [concluding that a 
failure to comply with Michigan statutory law in connection with a jury waiver 
does not require reversal if the ―defendant nonetheless understood that he had a 
right to a trial by jury and voluntarily chose to waive that right‖].) 
 
15  
As we discuss post, defendant entered a knowing and intelligent jury 
waiver as to the penalty phase, as he did for all other components of his trial.  
 
41 
criminal offense.  (Tran, at p. 1163.)  In those decisions, this court‘s view of the 
absence of a personal jury waiver in commitment proceedings as a structural error 
found support in prior decisions treating a comparable absence of a personal jury 
waiver in a criminal proceeding as a structural defect.  (People v. Ernst, supra, 
8 Cal.4th at pp. 444-449; Holmes, supra, 54 Cal.2d at pp. 443-444; see Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 16.) 
Here, in contrast, defendant personally entered a jury waiver, meaning that we 
are not left to ―speculate about whether [defendant] would have chosen a jury trial if 
he . . . had been in a position to make a personal choice.‖  (Blackburn, supra, 61 
Cal.4th at p. 1134.)  Under somewhat analogous circumstances, Blackburn itself 
contemplated the application of harmless error analysis.  The Blackburn majority 
observed that ―a trial court‘s failure to properly advise [a] . . . defendant of the right to 
a jury trial does not by itself warrant automatic reversal.  Instead, a trial court‘s 
acceptance of a defendant‘s personal waiver without an express advisement may be 
deemed harmless if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, that the defendant‘s waiver was knowing and voluntary.‖  (Id., at 
p. 1136.)   
The distinctive facts involved here also render inapposite decisions from other 
jurisdictions that defendant cites for the proposition that a failure to obtain a valid jury 
waiver requires automatic reversal.  In Fortune v. U.S. (D.C. 2009) 59 A.3d 949, 955 
(Fortune) the trial court failed to take any waiver of a jury trial from the defendant 
before proceeding to a bench trial of a charged crime — an error of constitutional 
dimensions.16  Other cases that defendant relies upon, meanwhile, either did not 
                                              
16  
The dissenting justices regard Fortune, supra, 59 A.3d 949, as being on 
point.  (Conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 15-16; conc. & dis. opn. of 
Cuéllar, J., post, at p. 15.)  This position, however, follows from their incorrect 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
42 
involve a personal jury waiver by the defendant (e.g., State v. Hauk (Wis.Ct.App. 
2002) 652 N.W.2d 393, 403-404) or addressed a perceived failure to secure a 
knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury trial (e.g., Duarte-Higareda, 
supra, 113 F.3d at p. 1003) — errors that, as we have explained, differ from the one 
involved here in their magnitude and their susceptibility to harmless error analysis.  
Nor does State v. Little (Minn. 2014) 851 N.W.2d 878 (Little) support 
defendant‘s position that the mistake here defies harmless error analysis.  In Little, the 
prosecution added a new charge after defendant entered a jury waiver.  (Id., at p. 881.)  
The Little court concluded that the earlier waiver did not necessarily encompass the 
later-added charge.  (Id., at p. 883.)17  The court nevertheless conducted harmless 
error review and found the error prejudicial.  (Id., at p. 886.)  In finding prejudice, the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
assertion that there was no knowing and intelligent jury waiver with regard to the 
special circumstance allegation in this case.  There was such a waiver, and we 
perceive a significant difference between a failure to obtain any jury waiver at all, 
and a jury waiver that, although knowing and intelligent, does not satisfy the 
heightened standards described in Memro.  Furthermore, Fortune cannot 
reasonably be read as taking the position that violation of a statutory procedure 
associated with the taking of a waiver is necessarily structural error — a position 
that, as discussed, this court has repeatedly rejected in any event.  (See, e.g., 
Anzalone, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 555-556; Crayton, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 364-
366.)  The fact that the Fortune court appears to have considered a specific and 
grave error‘s inconsistency with a local statute as one of several factors relevant to 
a determination that the mistake was structural in nature (Fortune, at pp. 956-957) 
does not, logically, support the conclusion that any violation of any statutory 
procedure that protects a substantive right is necessarily structural error.  
 
17  
In reaching this conclusion, the court in Little, supra, 851 N.W.2d 878, 
observed that entering a jury waiver, ― ‗[a]ll that [a] defendant waive[s] [is] a jury 
trial of the issues then formed, and not of any and all other issues that might 
possibly be thereafter formed under amended pleadings, and which he could not 
anticipate.‘ ‖  (Id., at p. 883.)  This principle is not pertinent to this case.  
 
43 
court emphasized that although the conduct underlying the new charge was the same 
as that involved with previously charged crimes for which defendant had entered a 
jury waiver, ―the elements to be proved and the penalties are dramatically different.‖  
(Id., at pp. 885-886.)  Thus, whereas Little involved no waiver with regard to an added 
charge that significantly upped the ante of the defendant‘s trial, here defendant 
entered a constitutionally adequate jury waiver applicable to all phases of his trial.  
The cases therefore diverge in both the magnitude of the errors involved, and the 
ability of a reviewing court to evaluate what a defendant would likely have done in 
the absence of the error.  Even so, Little applied harmless error analysis to the error 
before it.  The fact that Little identified the error as prejudicial due to uncertainty 
about that defendant‘s choice between a jury trial and a bench trial does not support 
the wholesale rejection of harmless error analysis in this context.   
Similarly distinguishable is Miller v. Dormire (8th Cir. 2002) 310 F.3d 600, a 
federal habeas corpus case, in which a jury waiver was entered by the petitioner‘s 
counsel.  (Id., at pp. 601-602.)  The petitioner testified at an evidentiary hearing that 
his attorney never explained the right to a jury trial to him, and ―that he would have 
insisted upon a jury trial had he known he had the right to make such a decision.‖  
(Id., at p. 602.)  The prosecution argued that the petitioner could not show prejudice 
because he could not establish that a jury would have reached a verdict different from 
the one that resulted from the petitioner‘s bench trial.  (Id., at p. 604.)  The court 
determined that the attorney‘s complete failure to counsel his client regarding a jury 
trial constituted ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and ―presumed‖ that prejudice resulted from this ―structural‖ 
error.  (Miller, at p. 604.)  Thus, Miller also involved constitutional error, not statutory 
error under state law, the petitioner had made a showing of prejudice, and the court‘s 
characterization of the error before it as structural connoted its rejection of a form of 
harmless error analysis that we do not endorse here.  Significantly, after Miller was 
 
44 
decided, that same federal appellate circuit rejected another federal habeas corpus 
petitioner‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a jury waiver 
on the ground that the petitioner had ―not established that he would have insisted on a 
jury trial in any event.‖  (Nelson v. Hvass (8th Cir. 2004) 392 F.3d 320, 324.) 
We therefore conclude that at least where, as here, a defendant has personally 
entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary jury waiver as to all aspects of his or her 
trial, Memro error admits of harmless error analysis.  This assessment entails a review 
of the record to ascertain whether it reveals a reasonable probability that defendant 
would have opted for a jury trial of the special circumstance allegation, had no Memro 
error occurred.  In undertaking this inquiry, we consider ―what the defendant would 
have done‖ (Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 558, italics omitted), not what we 
believe he should have done (id., at p. 562, italics omitted).  As we explain, on this 
record we conclude that defendant has not shown that there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the trial judge expressly referenced the special circumstance allegation in the 
waiver colloquy or otherwise sought a separate waiver regarding the allegation, 
defendant would have refused to enter such a waiver, and instead would have sought a 
jury trial for this aspect of his case.  (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)  
Defendant personally entered what we have determined to be a knowing and 
intelligent jury trial waiver, and did so with the assistance of counsel.  The record 
reveals no hesitation by defendant in entering the waiver, nor uncertainty or confusion 
about its scope or consequences, even when the trial judge advised him that it applied 
―to all issues‖ in the case.  Nor does the record reflect any concern or objection by 
defendant when the attorneys offered argument to the court concerning the 
relationship of the evidence adduced at trial to the special circumstance allegation — 
first in connection with section 1118 motions, and again in the parties‘ closing 
statements — or when the court found the special circumstance allegation to be true.  
Finally, to the degree such evidence is useful in ascertaining what defendant would 
 
45 
have done (see Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 564), we perceive nothing in the 
nature of the allegations or the proof at trial that suggests a basis for seeking a 
decision maker for the special circumstance allegation different from the one who 
would decide the charged crimes and penalty.  The proof of the special circumstance 
allegation was overwhelming, and overlapped with the evidence establishing 
defendant‘s guilt of felony murder.   
In conclusion, because the record before this court on appeal provides no 
basis for concluding that defendant would have chosen a jury trial for the special 
circumstance allegation had the trial judge avoided Memro error, we find the error 
harmless under the Watson standard. 
B. Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Penalty Phase Jury Waiver Issues 
Defendant also asserts that his waiver of a jury trial for the penalty phase 
was invalid or incomplete.  His argument is twofold.  First, he renews his 
argument concerning the absence of a knowing and intelligent jury waiver, 
stressing that the trial judge failed to adequately apprise him of essential features 
of the penalty phase.  Additionally, relying on People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 983 (Hovarter), defendant argues that the court was required to reaffirm at 
the outset of the penalty phase any jury waiver entered prior to trial.  These 
arguments lack merit.   
a.  Adequacy of the Jury Waiver for the Penalty Phase Under the 
Federal and State Constitutions 
Defendant‘s argument that he did not enter a knowing and intelligent 
waiver as to the penalty phase is not well taken.   
As previously related, the trial court‘s advisement explained to defendant 
that he had a right to a trial by jury, and discussed two ―decisions‖ that would be 
made by the court if this right were waived.  First, the court would make ―the 
 
46 
decision on whether [the] evidence was sufficient to prove . . . guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.‖  The court further explained that in the event it made such a 
finding, the case ―would then proceed to a penalty phase‖ in which the district 
attorney would present aggravation evidence, defendant would have a right to 
present mitigation evidence, and it would fall on the court to make ―the decision as 
to the appropriate punishment, which could result in a death penalty sentence.‖  
After this explanation, the court asked defendant, ―Do you give up your right to a 
jury trial and agree that this Court, alone, will make those decisions . . . ?‖  (Italics 
added.)  Defendant assented.   
With the trial court‘s phrasing leaving no question that defendant‘s right to 
a jury trial extended to any penalty phase — at which time the court, if a jury was 
waived, would make the second ―decision‖ — defendant principally critiques the 
colloquy on the ground that the trial court did not tell defendant prior to taking his 
jury waiver that a death sentence could only result from a unanimous jury verdict.  
(See § 190.4, subd. (b).)   
Under the totality of the circumstances presented here, we do not believe 
that this omission, or any other attribute of the colloquy, directs a conclusion that 
defendant did not enter a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury for the penalty 
phase.  The better practice may be for a trial judge to provide such an advisement 
before taking a jury waiver.  Yet a failure to do so does not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation where, as in this case, the other circumstances surrounding 
a jury waiver adequately establish that it was knowing and intelligent.18  Even 
                                              
18  
As Justice Liu observes in the dissenting portion of his opinion (conc. & 
dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 19-20), some courts have held that, as a 
prerequisite to taking a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial in a capital 
case, a trial court must advise the defendant of juror unanimity rules pertinent to 
sentencing.  (E.g., State v. Martinez (N.M. 2002) 43 P.3d 1042, 1048-1049.)  
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
47 
though defendant was not told by the judge that a jury would have to unanimously 
agree on a death sentence for such a sentence to be imposed, he was advised of 
other elements of a jury trial and he was represented by counsel in connection with 
the jury waiver.  These and other attendant circumstances suffice to defeat 
defendant‘s claim of constitutional error.  (See Weaver, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 
1072-1074; Robertson, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 36-38 [rejecting a defendant‘s argument 
that the trial court‘s failure to advise him of the consequences of a jury deadlock at 
the penalty phase rendered his jury waiver invalid, and observing that ―[a]bsent an 
assertion or evidence to the contrary, we presume that competent counsel would 
have informed defendant of the effect of a jury deadlock‖]; Sowell v. Bradshaw 
(6th Cir. 2004) 372 F.3d 821, 834-836 [finding a constitutionally effective jury 
waiver notwithstanding a failure to advise the defendant that a jury‘s decision to 
recommend the death penalty had to be unanimous]; State v. Foust (Ohio 2006) 
823 N.E.2d 836, 851-852 [finding a knowing and intelligent jury waiver in a 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
Other courts have rejected the argument that such an advisement is required as a 
matter of constitutional law, however.  (E.g., People v. Whitehead (Ill. 1987) 508 
N.E.2d 687, 697; State v. Bays (Ohio 1999) 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1135.)  We consider 
the latter approach more consistent with the touchstone principles that whether a 
waiver is knowing and intelligent is to be ascertained by reference to the totality of 
the relevant circumstances, and that ―the law ordinarily considers a waiver 
knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the 
nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the 
circumstances — even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed 
consequences of invoking it.‖  (United States v. Ruiz (2002) 536 U.S. 622, 629 
[discussing a waiver of rights attendant to the entry of a guilty plea].)  
 
48 
capital case even though the defendant was not advised that a jury‘s vote for a 
death sentence must be unanimous].)19 
b.  Failure to Reaffirm Defendant’s Jury Waiver 
Defendant‘s other challenge to his jury waiver as it relates to the penalty 
phase faults the trial judge for failing to reaffirm the waiver at the outset of this 
phase.  Defendant gleans the need for such a reaffirmation from our decision in 
Hovarter.   
In Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th 983, the first trial of a capital case resulted 
in a mistrial at the penalty phase when the jury was unable to reach a verdict.  
Upon retrial, the defendant waived his right to a jury, and the trial court returned a 
verdict of death.  (Id., at p. 989.)  On appeal, the defendant argued that permitting 
him to waive a jury for the penalty phase retrial violated section 190.4, subdivision 
(b) as well as his constitutional rights.  (Hovarter, at p. 1024.)  Section 190.4, 
subdivision (b), provides, ―If defendant was convicted by the court sitting without 
a jury[,] the trier of fact at the penalty hearing shall be a jury unless a jury is 
waived by the defendant and the people, in which case the trier of fact shall be the 
court.  If the defendant was convicted by a plea of guilty, the trier of fact shall be a 
jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant and the people.  [¶]  If the trier of fact 
is a jury and has been unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty 
shall be, the court shall dismiss the jury and shall order a new jury impaneled to 
try the issue as to what the penalty shall be.  If such new jury is unable to reach a 
unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court in its discretion shall 
                                              
19  
Justice Liu also asserts that the colloquy misadvised defendant that he 
could not seek a bench trial for the guilt phase of trial, but a jury trial for the 
penalty phase of trial.  (Conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 22-23.)  We do not 
believe that the colloquy is reasonably susceptible to this interpretation.    
 
49 
either order a new jury or impose a punishment of confinement in state prison for 
a term of life without the possibility of parole.‖ 
The defendant in Hovarter read the first sentence of the second paragraph 
of section 190.4, subdivision (b) as imposing upon the court a mandatory duty to 
empanel a new jury for a penalty phase retrial.  (Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 
p. 1025.)  We disagreed with this interpretation, determining that ―[b]ecause the 
default position in criminal cases is a trial by jury, with a jury trial waiver the 
exception, the first paragraph of section 190.4, subdivision (b) must be read to 
mean that, despite the fact an accused waived his right to a jury for the guilt phase, 
the trial court must presume the defendant wants a jury to try the penalty phase 
unless a jury is again waived.  In other words, as an added protection for criminal 
defendants, a single jury trial waiver given early in the trial process is insufficient; 
a defendant must reaffirm his waiver for the penalty phase.  This view of section 
190.4, subdivision (b) explains why the first paragraph includes an explicit 
mention of waiver.  [¶]  The meaning of the second paragraph dovetails with the 
first: If a jury was not waived for the penalty phase of trial, it shall be presumed 
the defendant also desires a jury for any retrial of that phase.  This presumption, 
however, can — as in all situations in which the jury trial right attaches — be 
overcome with a knowing and intelligent waiver, personally given in open court.‖  
(Id., at pp. 1026-1027.) 
Defendant construes our analysis in Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th 983, as 
announcing a rule that the trial court must reaffirm the defendant‘s jury trial 
waiver at the outset of the penalty phase of all capital trials, regardless of whether 
an initial jury waiver entered prior to the guilt phase incorporated an adequate 
waiver of the jury trial right for the penalty phase.  This view misreads Hovarter.  
There, our discussion of the inadequacy of ―a single jury waiver given early in the 
trial process‖ presupposed a jury waiver as to the guilt phase only.  (Id., at 
 
50 
pp. 1026-1027.)  When a pretrial jury waiver encompasses the penalty phase of a 
trial, as the waiver here did, there is no need for reaffirmation of the waiver as 
extending to the penalty phase before that later stage of trial proceedings. 
The more relevant precedent here is Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th 495, which held 
that a pretrial waiver of the right to a jury trial sufficed to waive a jury trial on a 
special circumstance allegation and penalty determination where ―the trial court 
explained to defendant that the waiver of his right to trial by jury applied to all 
aspects of [the defendant‘s] special circumstances case, from beginning to end.‖  
(Id., at p. 565; see id., at pp. 570-571.)  Similarly, here the trial judge expressly 
distinguished between the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial in his 
advisement prior to taking defendant‘s jury waiver, and asked defendant whether 
he agreed to waive his ―right to a jury trial and agree that this Court, alone, will 
make those decisions.‖  (Italics added.)  The trial court‘s advisement was 
sufficient to make defendant ―aware that the waiver applie[d] to each of these 
aspects of trial.‖  (Id., at p. 565.)  No reaffirmation of the waiver before the start of 
the penalty phase was required in Diaz; nor was it here. 
2.  Consideration of Aggravating Evidence 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously considered three types of 
aggravating evidence at the penalty phase.  He asserts these errors violated his 
rights under state law as well as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution, and that, considered individually or cumulatively, they 
require reversal.   
a.  Prior Criminal Activity Involving Use of Force 
 
At the penalty phase, the prosecution may present evidence showing ―[t]he 
presence . . . of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or 
attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or 
 
51 
violence.‖  (§ 190.3, factor (b).)  ―The prosecution bears the burden of proving the 
factor (b) other crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  (People v. Moore (2011) 51 
Cal.4th 1104, 1135.)  As relevant here, the term ―criminal activity‖ does not 
require that defendant was actually convicted.  ―However, no evidence shall be 
admitted regarding other criminal activity by the defendant which did not involve 
the use or attempted use of force or violence or which did not involve the express 
or implied threat to use force or violence.‖  (§ 190.3.)  Moreover, ―the term 
‗criminal activity‘ includes only conduct that violates a penal statute.‖  (People v. 
Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1133.)  Yet ―the proper admission of evidence under 
factor (b) is not based on the abstract, definitional nature of the offense, but on the 
conduct it involves.‖  (People v. Delgado (2016) 2 Cal.5th 544, 583; see also 
People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 363.)   
 
―The question whether the acts occurred is . . . a factual matter . . . but the 
characterization of those acts as involving an express or implied use of force or 
violence, or the threat thereof, would be a legal matter properly decided by the 
court.‖  (People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 720; see also People v. 
Delgado, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 588-590.)  Similarly, ―whether the prosecution‘s 
proposed evidence in aggravation was an actual crime‖ is a legal question.  
(People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 656.)   
i.  Possession of Metal Object 
 
First, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously considered evidence 
that he possessed a metal object while in jail.  The prosecution contended that the 
item was a ―dirk or dagger or sharp instrument‖ that defendant was prohibited 
from possessing while in confinement.  (§ 4502, subd. (a).)  Defendant argues, 
however, that the evidence introduced at the penalty phase failed to establish that 
 
52 
the item was sharp, and therefore his possession of the object should not have been 
considered in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b). 
 
As background, Terry Bardwell, a correctional officer at the Fresno County 
Jail, testified at the penalty phase that she inspected defendant‘s property upon his 
arrival at the jail.  Officer Bardwell ―found — we consider it contraband, which 
would be a shank.  Umm, it was approximately five-and-a-half inches long and 
one inch in width.‖  She wrote in her incident report that the object was made of 
metal.  She discarded the object because it ―was not of evidentiary value.‖  On 
cross-examination, Bardwell conceded that she could not remember whether the 
object was sharpened, nor did she record anything in her report other than its size 
and material.   
 
Defense counsel moved to strike Bardwell‘s testimony on the ground that 
there was insufficient evidence that the object had been sharpened to establish a 
violation of section 4502, subdivision (a).  The trial court denied the motion, 
explaining, ―I think it‘s admissible.  It‘s contraband.  It is contraband because it is 
an item that can be used as a weapon.  So there‘s case law that says even if there‘s 
a reasonable inference that the item seized was in fact a tattoo needle and not a 
stabbing utensil, that it still is admissible as a weapon because it can be used as a 
weapon.  Might have been a shoe horn, about five-and-a-half inches long, inch 
wide.‖  Later, the trial court mentioned the shank when determining that a death 
sentence was justified, stating, ―The incidents in jail following Mr. Sivongxxay‘s 
arrest have been considered:  threats to correctional officers after discipline was 
meted out or explained; the presence of a shank, which under jail rules was a 
weapon, and as an inmate can be considered by the Court as including a threat of 
violence.‖  
 
In asserting that the trial court erred in considering possession of the item 
among the circumstances in aggravation, defendant emphasizes that although 
 
53 
Officer Bardwell described the item as a ―shank,‖ she acknowledged on cross-
examination that she could not recall if it was sharp.  Under the circumstances, 
defendant argues, ―this small piece of metal of unknown characteristics cannot 
qualify as a sharpened or stabbing instrument under section 4502 as a matter of 
law.‖    
 
We need not decide whether the trial court erred in considering the 
evidence regarding the ―shank‖ in aggravation, however, because even if we were 
to assume that defendant has correctly identified error, the mistake was harmless.  
Our determination whether state law error at the penalty phase prejudiced the 
defendant turns on whether ―there is a reasonable (i.e., realistic) possibility that the 
[sentencer] would have rendered a different verdict had the error or errors not 
occurred.‖  (People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448.)  ― ‗When evidence has 
been erroneously received at the penalty phase, this court should reverse the death 
sentence if it is ―the sort of evidence that is likely to have a significant impact on 
the [sentencer‘s] evaluation of whether defendant should live or die.‖ ‘ ‖  (People 
v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 917.)  Here, we have a clear indication of the 
sentencer‘s decisionmaking process because the trial court stated on the record the 
aggravating and mitigating evidence it considered in reaching its decision.   
 
Defendant‘s ―long pattern of violent crime against many, many victims‖ 
served as the organizing theme behind the trial court‘s summary of aggravating 
evidence.  As the trial court put it, ―[h]is life of victimization carried through from 
the first act of violence in Washington State until the ultimate death of Henry 
Song.‖  Within that framework, defendant‘s postarrest conduct was an 
afterthought; it involved no acts of physical violence, and thus no victims, but only 
the threat of violence.  The trial court‘s lack of emphasis on the metal object 
mirrors the prosecution‘s use of that evidence:  It was only one of nine incidents 
introduced under section 190.3, factor (b), and it merited only a brief mention in 
 
54 
the prosecutor‘s penalty phase closing argument.  To the extent the trial court 
placed any weight on defendant‘s conduct in custody and the future dangerousness 
it might have portended, the properly admitted evidence that defendant threatened 
a correctional officer, discussed post, conveyed that same theme.  Thus, even 
assuming the trial court erred in considering evidence of the metal object, its error 
does not require reversal of the death sentence. 
ii.  Statements to Correctional Officer 
Defendant also challenges the admission of evidence under section 190.3, 
factor (b) that he threatened a correctional officer at the Fresno County Jail. 
Eulalio Gomez, a correctional officer at the jail, testified that following an 
altercation between defendant and other inmates, defendant was moved to 
isolation.  Officer Gomez was assigned the task of telling defendant that he was 
being removed from the general population and explaining the reasons why.  
Gomez testified that when he informed defendant that he was being placed in 
isolation, ―[h]e became very hostile towards me.  He began threatening me.‖  
Specifically, defendant said to him, ― ‗I see you all the time in the streets, I‘ll 
remember you,‘ ‖ and he repeated that statement several times.  Gomez explained 
that defendant ―faced towards me, his hands clenched and very hostile, yelling at 
me and approximately three feet away from me.‖  Gomez described this as a 
―combative stance, being a stance that would create an opinion or a belief that this 
person was going to attack you, assault you.‖  However, defendant did not touch 
Gomez, nor did Gomez ask defendant what he meant by ― ‗I see you all the time in 
the streets, I‘ll remember you.‘ ‖  
The prosecutor sought to admit this evidence under section 190.3, factor (b) 
―as a violation of section 69 of the Penal Code.‖  Defense counsel objected, 
suggesting that defendant‘s comments represented a ―communications problem‖ 
 
55 
rather than a threat.  The trial court decided that it would ―probably just hear 
[Gomez‘s testimony] and see whether it amounts to a threat in my mind.‖  The 
trial court apparently concluded that the evidence was admissible because in 
explaining its decision to sentence defendant to death, it said it had considered as 
aggravating evidence ―threats to correctional officers after discipline was meted 
out or explained.‖  
On appeal, defendant contends that his conduct did not constitute criminal 
activity, and was therefore inadmissible, because it did not violate section 69.  In 
relevant part, section 69 makes it a criminal offense to ―attempt[], by means of any 
threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from performing any 
duty imposed upon such officer by law.‖  We have explained that a ―threat, 
unaccompanied by any physical force, may support a conviction‖ under this part 
of section 69, but that to ―avoid the risk of punishing protected First Amendment 
speech . . . the term ‗threat‘ has been limited to mean a threat of unlawful violence 
used in an attempt to deter the officer.‖  (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 806, 
814-815.)  ―The central requirement . . . is an attempt to deter an executive officer 
from performing his or her duties imposed by law; unlawful violence, or a threat 
of unlawful violence, is merely the means by which the attempt is made.‖  (Id., at 
p. 815.)  Accordingly, a violation of section 69 through a threat ―requires a 
specific intent to interfere with the executive officer‘s performance of his duties.‖  
(People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1153 (Gutierrez).)  ―[A] present 
ability to carry out threats is not required if . . . the target of the threat could 
reasonably fear retaliatory action on some future occasion.‖  (People v. Hines 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1060 (Hines).) 
In arguing that his conduct did not constitute a violation of section 69, 
defendant points to cases where the Attorney General declined to contest 
admissibility, where our observations about section 69 appeared in dicta, or that 
 
56 
are clearly distinguishable for other reasons.  (See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 
8 Cal.4th 1060, 1169-1170 [although ―defendant verbally abused [correctional 
officer] and threatened to ‗kick [his] ass,‘ ‖ Attorney General declined to argue on 
appeal that this constituted a criminal threat]; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 
569,  590 [noting defendant‘s reliance on the ―general notion that abusive and 
even threatening language does not violate a penal statute‖]; People v. Pinholster 
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 961-962 [defendant‘s statement to sheriff in county jail that 
―if he were not sent to state prison he would ‗go out on the streets and do 
something to get back in‘ ‖ was ―arguably inadmissible‖], disapproved on another 
ground in People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459; People v. Silva (1988) 
45 Cal.3d 604, 636 [where defendant told officer that ―he would kill the first 
police officer to step inside his cell if he was not permitted to visit with his wife,‖ 
Attorney General conceded erroneous admission but argued it was harmless]; 
People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 787-788 [though it was ―not clear‖ that 
defendant‘s threat to correctional officer constituted criminal activity, defendant‘s 
claim was forfeited because he failed to object].)  Defendant fails to identify any 
case squarely holding that statements akin to those he made to Officer Gomez fall 
outside the scope of section 69.  
As defendant recognizes, ―threats must be placed and understood in their 
context.‖  (People v. Iboa (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 111, 119.)  Here, the trial court 
could have reasonably inferred from defendant‘s comments that he sought to use a 
threat of future violence ―to interfere with [Officer Gomez]‘s performance of his 
duties‖ (Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1153), namely, Gomez‘s task of telling 
defendant he had been reassigned to an isolation unit.  When Gomez explained 
that defendant was being moved to isolation, defendant repeatedly yelled the ―I‘ll 
remember you‖ statement while standing three feet away from Gomez with his 
fists clenched in a ―combative stance‖ that Gomez perceived as ―very hostile.‖  
 
57 
Defendant thereby ―underscored his words with action,‖ and ―[h]is conduct gave 
context to his threatening speech.‖  (Iboa, supra, at p. 120; see ibid. [concluding 
that defendant‘s ―threatening statements, combined with his physical conduct of 
pacing, clenching his fists, showing off his gang tattoos, and aggressively 
approaching [a firefighter], constituted the type of threat of unlawful violence 
section 69 prohibits‖]; see also Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1059-1060 [where 
defendant told correctional officer attempting to restrain him that the officer 
―would be sorry [he] ever saw‖ him, ―the jury could reasonably infer that the 
purpose of this threat was to prevent [the officer] from restraining defendant‖].)  
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting and considering defendant‘s 
statements under section 190.3, factor (b) as a violation of section 69.  
b.  Escape from Custody 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in considering his status as a prison 
escapee under section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the prosecution to present 
evidence regarding ―[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was 
convicted in the present proceeding.‖ 
In its opening statement and again in closing argument at the penalty phase, 
the prosecution noted that defendant escaped on February 26, 1996, from a 
Washington State prison where he was serving a 55-month sentence for first 
degree robbery.  Defendant had introduced evidence of the escape during the guilt 
phase in an attempt to rebut Mounsaveng‘s allegation that defendant threatened 
him in December 1995 and January 1996.  The prosecution invoked this evidence 
at the penalty phase to show that defendant began his Fresno crime spree ―just five 
months after his escape from Washington State Prison, which demonstrates . . . 
Mr. Sivongxxay‘s lack of willingness to learn from his prior punishment, and 
shows his incarceration did not change his violent character.‖  The prosecutor‘s 
 
58 
penalty phase closing argument referenced People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668 
and People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183 (Johnson), in which we held that 
evidence that a defendant had been released from felony incarceration shortly 
before the commission of charged crimes was admissible under section 190.3, 
factor (a).  (Turner, at pp. 713-714; Johnson, at p. 1243 [―[t]hat defendant 
committed [the present] crimes only six days after his release from prison on a 
prior homicide conviction supports the inference that incarceration had failed to 
change his violent character.  The jury could properly consider this inference in 
determining his sentence‖].)   
In announcing its sentencing decision, the trial court here said that although 
it was ―not considering any circumstances of his escape itself,‖ it had considered 
the fact that defendant committed the charged crimes ―while he was on escape 
status as a previously convicted felon.‖   
Defendant attacks the trial court‘s consideration of his escape status 
because, in his words, ―[t]he walkaway was simply unrelated to the circumstances 
of the capital crime.‖  We need not decide whether this is correct, or whether a 
sufficient connection existed between the escape and the circumstances of the 
capital crime here for evidence of defendant‘s status as an escapee to be 
considered under section 190.3, factor (a).  Defendant failed to raise a timely 
objection to admission and consideration of this evidence.  The claim is therefore 
forfeited.  (People v. Lewis (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1052; Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 
at p. 1243.)20   
                                              
20  
Defendant asserts that the prejudice from the multiple evidentiary errors he 
perceives to have occurred at the penalty phase must be assessed cumulatively.  
Since we have identified and assumed only one error as to which a claim on 
appeal has not been forfeited, and have concluded that the assumed error was 
harmless, no further review of prejudice is necessary.    
 
59 
3.  Miscellaneous Challenges to the Death Penalty 
 
Defendant raises numerous challenges to the constitutionality of the death 
penalty.  He acknowledges that we have previously rejected each of these 
contentions.  We do so again here, as detailed below. 
 
Section 190.2 is not impermissibly vague, nor is it overbroad in a manner 
that fails to meaningfully narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death 
penalty.  (People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1224-1225.) 
 
Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the sentencer to consider the 
―circumstances of the crime,‖ is not impermissibly vague or overbroad.  (People v. 
Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 213 (Mills).)  
 
Section 190.3, factor (b) does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth or 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution in allowing the sentencer to 
consider previously unadjudicated criminal activity.  (People. v. Jones (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 899, 980.)   
 
Section 190.3‘s use of the terms ―extreme‖ and ―substantial‖ does not erect 
unconstitutional barriers to the sentencer‘s consideration of mitigating evidence.  
(People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 180 (Valdez).)   
 
Section 190.3, factor (i) does not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution by permitting the sentencer to consider 
the defendant‘s age at the time of the crime.  (Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 214.) 
 
Section 190.3, factor (k) is not unconstitutionally vague.  (Weaver, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at p. 1092.)   
 
The relative culpability of codefendants is not a constitutionally required 
mitigating factor.  (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 549.)   
 
California‘s sentencing statute sets forth a constitutionally adequate burden 
of proof concerning the aggravating factors and the sentencer‘s ultimate decision.  
(People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1207 (Banks).) 
 
60 
 
The instructions and standards relevant to the sentencing decision are not 
impermissibly vague or ambiguous on any of the following grounds:  CALJIC No. 
8.88 uses the phrases ―so substantial‖ and ―warrants‖ (Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 
p. 180); CALJIC No. 8.88 fails to explain that the sentencer‘s ultimate 
determination is whether death is the appropriate penalty (Valdez, at p. 179); 
section 190.3 fails to guide the sentencer‘s discretion (People v. Booker (2011) 51 
Cal.4th 141, 196); CALJIC No. 8.88 fails to state that life without possibility of 
parole is mandatory if the aggravating factors do not outweigh the mitigating 
factors (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 407); and the sentencer is not 
instructed to presume that life without possibility of parole is the appropriate 
sentence (Valdez, at p. 179).   
 
The trial court was not required to make written findings before reaching its 
sentencing decision.  (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1097.)   
 
Neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution, nor international law, mandates the use of intercase 
proportionality review.  (Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1207.)  Nor does the 
California death penalty sentencing scheme violate equal protection for failing to 
provide certain procedural safeguards present in noncapital cases; as we have 
explained, ―[t]he two groups of defendants are not similarly situated.‖  (People v. 
Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 657.) 
 
Finally, we once again reject the contention that California‘s use of the 
death penalty, at all or as actually implemented in this state, violates international 
law and the Eighth Amendment.  (People v. Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 658.) 
 
61 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR:   
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
In California, not all first degree murders are punishable by death or by life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  The gateway to these sanctions is 
the finding of a ―special circumstance,‖ a circumstance that sets the murder apart 
from other murders and makes it eligible for the law‘s most severe penalties.  
(Pen. Code, § 190.2; see People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 703 (Memro) 
[― ‗The fact or set of facts to be found in regard to the special circumstance is no 
less crucial to the potential for deprivation of liberty on the part of the accused 
than are the elements of the underlying crime . . . .‘ ‖].)  The special circumstance 
allegation in this case was that the murder was committed during the commission 
of a robbery.  (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A); all undesignated statutory 
references are to this code.) 
A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial on the truth 
of a special circumstance allegation.  (See Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 
609; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 256–257.)  A defendant may waive a 
jury trial, but as a constitutional matter, a trial court may not accept a voluntary 
waiver ―unless it is knowing and intelligent, that is, ‗ ― ‗made with a full 
awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of 
the decision to abandon it.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 305 
(Collins); see Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412.)  In addition, the Penal Code 
provides:  ―The trier of fact shall make a special finding that each special 
 
2 
circumstance charged is either true or not true. . . .  [¶] If the defendant was 
convicted by the court sitting without a jury, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless 
a jury is waived by the defendant and by the people, in which case the trier of fact 
shall be the court.‖  (§ 190.4, subd. (a) (section 190.4(a)).)  In Memro, we held that 
under section 190.4(a) ―an accused whose special circumstance allegations are to 
be tried by a court must make a separate, personal waiver of the right to a jury 
trial.‖  (Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 704.)  In this case, defendant Vaene 
Sivongxxay was denied a jury trial on the special circumstance allegation in 
violation of these constitutional and statutory guarantees.  This unlawful denial of 
a jury trial is a structural error requiring automatic reversal. 
Today‘s opinion concludes otherwise.  The court reprints Sivongxxay‘s 
waiver colloquy in its entirety (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 10–12) and acknowledges 
that ―[t]here was no specific reference in the waiver colloquy to the need to 
adjudicate the special circumstance allegation; the term ‗special circumstance‘ was 
never mentioned at all‖ (id. at p. 30).  Yet the court finds no constitutional 
violation, reasoning that Sivongxxay‘s assent to a jury trial waiver on ―all issues‖ 
meant he understood he was waiving a jury trial on the special circumstance 
allegation.  (Id. at p. 25.)  This is a remarkably loose interpretation of what it 
means to make a ―knowing and intelligent‖ waiver.  (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 
p. 305.)  How can it be said that Sivongxxay waived a jury trial on the special 
circumstance allegation ― ‗ ― ‗with a full awareness both of the nature of the right 
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it‘ ‖ ‘ ‖ (ibid., 
italics added) when the special circumstance ―was never mentioned at all‖ (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 30) in the waiver colloquy? 
Sivongxxay‘s waiver was also deficient under section 190.4(a) because he 
made no separate waiver of a jury trial on the special circumstance allegation.  On 
this point, the court agrees; it concludes that the waiver colloquy lacked the 
 
3 
―precision‖ and ―specificity‖ required by the statute.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 30.)  
But the court goes on to find this error harmless on the ground that Sivongxxay 
has not shown a reasonable probability that he ―would have chosen a jury trial for 
the special circumstance allegation had the trial judge avoided [the] error.‖  (Id. at 
p. 45.)  This latter holding may understandably cause a bit of whiplash:  The court, 
having found error under the statute, excuses the error through reasoning that 
defeats the statute‘s very purpose. 
Section 190.4(a) provides that even if a defendant waives a jury trial on 
other aspects of a capital case, the trier of fact on the special circumstance 
allegation ―shall be a jury‖ unless the defendant executes a separate waiver.  
(§ 190.4(a); see Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 704.)  The Legislature, recognizing 
the gravity of a special circumstance allegation, expressly mandated a jury trial 
unless the defendant forgoes it specifically through a separate waiver.  What is left 
of this requirement if, upon proof of a violation, the burden is on the defendant to 
show he would have wanted a jury trial had the trial court not violated the statute?  
Here, as in People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1131 (Blackburn) and 
People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1169 (Tran), ―[t]he statute does not 
require the defendant to affirmatively show he or she wanted a jury trial; a jury 
trial is the default procedure absent a personal waiver.‖  When a statute expressly 
guarantees a jury trial on a specific matter unless the defendant waives a jury trial 
on that matter, the deprivation of a jury trial without a waiver on that matter is a 
―miscarriage of justice‖ that requires automatic reversal.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 13; see Blackburn, at p. 1136; Tran, at p. 1169.) 
From today‘s opinion, one would not get the sense that the jury trial 
guarantees in federal and state law ―reflect a fundamental decision about the 
exercise of official power — a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life 
and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges.‖  (Duncan v. 
 
4 
Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 156.)  I would not have thought that such a 
fundamental right — what Justice Scalia called ―the spinal column of American 
democracy‖ (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 30 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Scalia, J.)) — could be so easily relinquished or, more accurately, wrested from a 
criminal defendant by the very institution whose potential for overreach the right 
is meant to protect against.  ―The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State 
Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be 
enforced and justice administered. . . .  Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our 
State and Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal 
law in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt 
or innocence.‖  (Duncan, at pp. 155–156.)  Today‘s decision breaks faith with this 
constitutional judgment and undermines an important safeguard of California‘s 
death penalty scheme. 
For these reasons, and because Sivongxxay‘s jury trial waiver as to the 
penalty phase was also invalid, I respectfully dissent from the court‘s affirmance 
of the special circumstance finding and the death judgment. 
I. 
In addressing Sivongxxay‘s constitutional claim before his statutory claim, 
today‘s opinion inverts the usual order of analysis.  (See, e.g., People v. Brown 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 534; People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 610.)  
Perhaps this is because the court‘s overall approach to the jury trial waiver on the 
special circumstance allegation flows from its conviction that the waiver was 
knowing and intelligent.  This conviction, however, finds no support in the law or 
the record before us. 
The court cites People v. Berutko (1969) 71 Cal.2d 84 (Berutko) for the 
proposition that a defendant who ― ‗waives a jury trial . . . is deemed to have 
consented to a trial of all of the issues in the case before the court sitting without a 
 
5 
jury.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 94.)  Under Berutko, the court says, the finding that 
Sivongxxay‘s guilt phase waiver was ―knowing and intelligent is sufficient in 
itself to defeat defendant‘s contention that his waiver did not meet constitutional 
standards with regard to the special circumstance allegation.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 22.)  But a glance at Berutko makes clear that this is a stretch. 
Although the court implies that Berutko set forth a ―general rule‖ of 
constitutional law (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 21–22, fns. 5, 7), that case did not 
address any constitutional issue concerning the jury trial waiver.  Instead, Berutko 
addressed the scope of a jury trial waiver in the context of a specific statute, 
former section 969 1/2 (now section 969.5), which provided that ― ‗the question 
whether or not [the defendant] has suffered such previous conviction must be tried 
by a jury impanelled for that purpose, unless a jury is waived, in which case it may 
be tried by the court.‘ ‖  (Berutko, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 94.)  The statutory nature 
of Berutko‘s holding was confirmed in Memro, where we found Berutko 
―inapposite‖ to interpreting section 190.4.  (Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 702, 
fn. 52.)  Berutko never discussed whether the jury trial waiver in that case was 
knowing or intelligent as a constitutional matter.  (See Loeffler v. Target Corp. 
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1134 [― ‗ ―cases are not authority for propositions not 
considered‖ ‘ ‖].)  Indeed, Berutko‘s entire analysis of the waiver issue consisted 
of just three sentences:  The first said, ―This contention is without merit,‖ and the 
other two quoted Court of Appeal opinions addressing jury trial waivers only in 
the context of prior conviction allegations.  (Berutko, at p. 94.)  Berutko is not 
authority for a ―general rule‖ applicable to a special circumstance allegation in a 
capital trial. 
The real heart of the court‘s analysis is its claim that ―the specific 
advisements the trial court provided to defendant before taking his waiver, 
together with the other surrounding circumstances, confirm that defendant 
 
6 
knowingly and intelligently relinquished his right to a jury trial for this 
allegation.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  The court asserts:  ―The trial court‘s 
advisement conveyed that defendant had a right to a jury trial with regard to all 
issues as to which an adverse determination could expose him to the death penalty 
— which included the special circumstance allegation — and that with his waiver, 
defendant would be giving up that right.‖  (Id. at p. 25, italics added.) 
Let us compare this assertion, particularly the italicized phrase, with the 
waiver colloquy:  ―THE COURT:  Mr. Mounsaveng, Mr. Sivongxxay, you each 
have a right to a trial, either by a jury of 12 people selected from this community, 
through a process that you would engage in with your attorneys, the district 
attorney and the Court, or a trial in front of a judge, acting alone without a jury.  
[¶] The burden of proof remains the same.  The district attorney has the burden to 
go forth with evidence sufficient to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Then, and only then, would we get to a penalty phase.  [¶] In a court trial, I would 
hear the evidence.  I, alone, would make the decision on whether that evidence 
was sufficient to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  [¶] In the event I 
made such a finding, as to either or both of you, we would then proceed to a 
penalty phase, where the district attorney would present aggravation evidence.  
Through your — you, through your attorney, would have a right to present 
mitigation evidence, and it would fall upon me to make the decision as to the 
appropriate punishment, which could result in a death penalty sentence.  [¶] Do 
you give up your right to a jury trial and agree that this Court, alone, will make 
those decisions . . . ?  [¶] . . . [¶] THE COURT:  Mr. Sivongxxay?  [¶] THE 
DEFENDANT SIVONGXXAY:  Yes.  [¶] THE COURT:  Ms. Detjen?  [¶] MS. 
DETJEN:  Yes, Your Honor, the People waive the jury trial.  [¶] THE COURT:  
All right.  We‘ll show a jury waiver on all issues . . . .‖ 
 
7 
Today‘s opinion acknowledges, as it must, that ―[t]here was no specific 
reference in the waiver colloquy to the need to adjudicate the special circumstance 
allegation; the term ‗special circumstance‘ was never mentioned at all.‖  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 30.)  What, then, is the basis for the assertion that ―[t]he trial 
court‘s advisement conveyed that defendant had a right to a jury trial with regard 
to all issues as to which an adverse determination could expose him to the death 
penalty — which included the special circumstance allegation — and that with his 
waiver, defendant would be giving up that right‖?  (Id. at p. 25, italics added.)  
Simply put, there is none. 
The court relies on People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495 (Diaz), but that 
case is easily distinguished.  The colloquy in Diaz expressly mentioned the special 
circumstance.  (Id. at p. 564 [trial judge asked Diaz whether he understood that his 
waiver applied to ― ‗both phases . . . of the special circumstanceS case‘ ‖].)  
Further, the record showed that Diaz told the court he had discussed the matter 
― ‗quite thoroughly‘ ‖ with his attorney.  (Id. at p. 565.)  The case before us does 
not involve ―similar facts.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 26.) 
The court says that to distinguish Diaz from this case is to endorse ―the 
proposition that the judge was constitutionally bound to utter the phrase ‗special 
circumstance‘ at some point in the waiver colloquy with defendant.‖  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 26–27.)  I agree that a trial judge need not recite any ― ‗ ―talismanic 
phrase‖ ‘ ‖ (id. at p. 27) when discussing a special circumstance jury waiver.  But 
it is unusual, to say the least, to explain a thing without naming the thing being 
explained.  This is especially true here in light of our recognition that the special 
circumstance is a ―unique‖ feature of California‘s capital scheme.  (People v. 
Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 468 (Bacigalupo); see People v. Garcia (1984) 
36 Cal.3d 539, 552 [―special circumstances are sui generis — neither a crime, an 
enhancement, nor a sentencing factor‖].)  As noted, the ultimate test is whether a 
 
8 
waiver was made ― ‗ ― ‗with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being 
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (Collins, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 305.)  The point of a waiver colloquy, however phrased, is 
to inform the defendant that he is entitled to a jury trial on a separate allegation 
that makes him eligible for the death penalty.  The trial court‘s failure in this case 
to even mention the special circumstance allegation is surely probative of whether 
Sivongxxay‘s jury waiver on that allegation was knowing and intelligent.  
The court says that focusing ―on perceived deficiencies in the judge‘s 
advisements to defendant‖ ignores other relevant circumstances, such as 
―defendant‘s prior criminal history, other events before and after the waiver was 
entered, and the fact that defendant was represented by counsel.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at pp. 23–24, fn. 8.)  But these other considerations do not tend to show that 
Sivongxxay‘s special circumstance jury waiver was knowing and intelligent.  Why 
is Sivongxxay‘s criminal history relevant when he has never been subject to 
California‘s ―unique‖ capital scheme?  (Bacigalupo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 468.)  
And what ―other events before and after the waiver was entered‖ is the court 
referring to? 
As for the fact that Sivongxxay was represented by counsel, our cases have 
found this relevant when the record indicates that counsel discussed the 
implications of the waiver decision with the defendant.  (See People v. 
Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 636 (Cunningham) [upholding waiver where 
defendant ―confirm[ed] he had discussed the issue with his counsel, who 
concurred in the waiver‖]; People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1070–1071 
[upholding waiver where defense counsel ―stated that he, the other defense 
attorney, defendant, and defendant‘s father had discussed the matter together the 
day before for about two hours, and that the attorney believed waiving a jury was 
in defendant‘s best interest‖]; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1208 (Scott) 
 
9 
[upholding waiver where ―[d]efense counsel stated that he and defendant had 
discussed the matter, and both agreed that the waiver was in defendant‘s best 
interests ‗in terms of trial tactics‘ ‖]; Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 565 [upholding 
waiver where defendant ―told the court that he had discussed the matter ‗quite 
thoroughly‘ with his counsel‖]; People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 36 
(Robertson) [upholding waiver where defendant ―was represented by two 
apparently competent counsel who over the course of several days discussed with 
him ‗at length‘ the consequences and nature of his proposed waiver‖]; People v. 
Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 354, 357, 359 [defense counsel ―explained at length to the 
court why he permitted his client . . . to waive a penalty jury‖ and affirmed that 
―defendant ‗knows what would happen if the case went to jury trial‘ ‖].)  Nothing 
in the record here indicates that Sivongxxay discussed the nature or consequences 
of his jury waiver with his attorney. 
The court adds that Sivongxxay‘s ―failure to express any surprise or 
confusion regarding the judge‘s assertion that the waiver applied to ‗all issues‘ 
represents a relevant consideration in ascertaining the nature and extent of his 
waiver.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14, fn. 2.)  But if Sivongxxay had expressed 
surprise or confusion, presumably the trial judge or counsel would have clarified 
the issue, and we would not be here discussing it on appeal.  In essence, the court 
would require the record to affirmatively demonstrate that Sivongxxay did not 
know he was entitled to a jury trial on the special circumstance allegation.  That is 
not what the law requires, and for good reason:  Where a defendant claims he did 
not understand the nature of his jury trial right and the consequences of waiving it, 
it makes no sense to say the defendant can prevail only if the record shows that he 
did not know what he did not know. 
In sum, the waiver colloquy did not mention the special circumstance 
allegation, and nothing else shows that Sivongxxay understood the nature of the 
 
10 
allegation before he waived his right to a jury trial.  On this record, I do not see 
how the court can conclude that Sivongxxay waived a jury trial on the special 
circumstance allegation ― ‗ ― ‗with a full awareness both of the nature of the right 
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  
(Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 305.)  Sivongxxay was denied a jury trial on the 
special circumstance allegation in violation of the federal and state Constitutions. 
II. 
Notwithstanding its constitutional holding, today‘s opinion concludes that 
the trial court, in proceeding to a bench trial on the special circumstance 
allegation, violated section 190.4(a) by failing to take ―a ‗separate‘ waiver‖ with 
the ―specificity‖ required by the statute.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 30.)  But the court 
holds that the error does not require automatic reversal.  To obtain relief, the court 
says, Sivongxxay must demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have 
chosen a jury trial on the special circumstance allegation if the trial court had 
sought a separate waiver.  (Id. at p. 33.)  The court concludes that Sivongxxay has 
not carried this burden and therefore finds the error harmless.  (Id. at pp. 44–45.) 
At the outset, it bears mention that no party mentioned this theory of 
harmless error in the principal briefs.  Sivongxxay maintained that the statutory 
error is structural; the Attorney General argued only that any error was harmless 
because, given the overwhelming evidence in support of the robbery-murder 
allegation, a jury would have found the allegation to be true.  It was not until well 
after oral argument, when this court vacated submission and invited supplemental 
briefing on the theory adopted today, that the Attorney General embraced it.  
Although this court is not limited to the parties‘ arguments in conducting harmless 
error review (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), the fact that no party thought to advance 
the court‘s theory suggests its novelty. 
 
11 
(As an aside, I find it troubling that the Attorney General‘s supplemental 
brief contends — at the eleventh hour, with no explanation for its belated epiphany 
— that our precedent ―virtually compels‖ the harmless error analysis in today‘s 
opinion.  The absence of any explanation risks the perception that the Attorney 
General‘s new contention is opportunistic or that his initial briefing, having missed 
a theory ―virtually compel[led]‖ by our precedent, was of questionable 
competence.  Neither does wonders for the government‘s credibility.  (See People 
v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 589 [the prosecutor ― ‗ ―is in a peculiar and 
very definite sense the servant of the law‖ ‘ ‖ and must exercise his or her 
functions ― ‗with the highest degree of integrity and impartiality‘ ‖]; Corrigan, On 
Prosecutorial Ethics (1986) 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 537, 537 [―the integrity of 
the prosecutor‖ ―lies at the heart of our criminal justice system and is the 
foundation from which any prosecutor‘s authority flows‖].)  This is not the first 
time this concern has arisen in recent years.  (See People v. Grimes (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 698, 720 [Attorney General did not argue harmless error in her briefing 
but then, without explanation, argued harmless error after this court requested 
supplemental briefing]; People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 367, fn. 13; id. at 
p. 379 (conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [Attorney General conceded in her answer 
brief that instructional error required reversal but then, without explanation, 
switched her position after this court requested supplemental briefing].)) 
In any event, the court‘s theory of harmless error does not withstand 
scrutiny.  The reasoning of our recent decisions in Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th 
1113, and Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th 1160, makes clear that a violation of section 
190.4(a) is structural error.  In Blackburn, we interpreted the statutory scheme 
governing involuntary commitment proceedings for mentally disordered offenders.  
Under section 2972, subdivision (a), a hearing to extend an offender‘s 
commitment beyond the termination of parole ―shall be by jury unless waived by 
 
12 
both the person and the district attorney.‖  Although Blackburn‘s lawyer had 
submitted a request for a bench trial, we concluded that the trial court erred in 
failing to elicit a personal jury trial waiver from Blackburn.  (Blackburn, at 
p. 1130.)  This error, we said, ―defies ordinary harmless error analysis.  To 
speculate about whether a defendant would have chosen a jury trial if he or she 
had been in a position to make a personal choice would pose insurmountable 
difficulties, as would an inquiry into what effect, if any, that choice would have 
had on the outcome of the trial. . . .  ‗[W]here a case improperly is tried to the 
court rather than to a jury, there is no opportunity meaningfully to assess the 
outcome that would have ensued in the absence of the error.‘  [Citation.]  
Accordingly, we treat a trial court‘s failure to obtain a required personal jury trial 
waiver as tantamount to the denial of a jury trial, and as such, it constitutes a 
‗miscarriage of justice‘ under California Constitution, article VI, section 13.  
[Citations.]‖  (Blackburn, at p. 1134.) 
Importantly, we observed that the Court of Appeal in Blackburn had said 
―the trial court could ‗reasonably expect counsel to discuss all pertinent matters 
that will arise or that have arisen in pretrial hearings, including the right to a jury 
trial and whether to have one.‘  The Court of Appeal added that ‗this was not the 
first extension of defendant‘s MDO commitment, and the record does not suggest 
that defendant was unaware of his right to a jury trial notwithstanding the lack of a 
judicial advisement.  Nor does the record suggest that defendant was unaware that 
counsel intended to waive a jury and had done so or that defendant wanted a jury 
trial and objected (or would have objected) to counsel‘s waiver.‘ ‖  (Blackburn, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1130.)  Despite these circumstances, however, we declined 
to place the burden on the defendant to show he wanted a jury trial:  ―The statute 
does not require the defendant to affirmatively show he or she wanted a jury trial; 
a jury trial is the default procedure absent a personal waiver.‖  (Id. at p. 1131.)  
 
13 
Our decision in Tran reached the same holding on the same reasoning with respect 
to the jury trial guarantee of section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(4), which governs a 
commitment extension proceeding for a person who pleaded not guilty by reason 
of insanity.  (Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1169.) 
In the case before us, section 190.4(a) guarantees a jury trial on a special 
circumstance allegation even if the defendant waives a jury for other phases of the 
trial:  ―If the defendant was convicted by the court sitting without a jury, the trier 
of fact [on the special circumstance allegation] shall be a jury unless a jury is 
waived by the defendant and by the people, in which case the trier of fact shall be 
the court.‖  In Memro, we made clear that section 190.4(a) mandates a jury trial on 
a special circumstance allegation unless the defendant makes ―a separate, personal 
waiver.‖  (Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 704.)  The court today holds that a 
defendant is not entitled to a jury trial on a special circumstance allegation, even if 
he has made no separate waiver, unless he can affirmatively show on the record 
that he wanted a jury trial.  This holding inverts the rule stated in section 190.4(a):  
Whereas the statute requires a jury trial unless the record shows the defendant did 
not want one, the court allows the denial of a jury trial unless the record shows the 
defendant did want one.  Here, as in Blackburn and Tran, a jury trial is the default 
procedure mandated by statute.  Here, as in Blackburn and Tran, a defendant is 
entitled to a jury trial without an affirmative showing that he wanted one.  And 
here, as in Blackburn and Tran, a trial court‘s failure to obtain a valid waiver 
before conducting a bench trial is a structural error requiring automatic reversal. 
The court purports to distinguish Blackburn and Tran on the ground that the 
trial court in those cases did not obtain any waiver of a jury trial, whereas the trial 
court in this case did obtain a jury trial waiver as to the guilt and penalty phases.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 40–41.)  Here, according to today‘s opinion, the trial court 
committed ―an error in advisement.‖  (Id. at pp. 33, 35, 38.)  This characterization 
 
14 
of the error leads the court to rely on case law holding that errors in advisement do 
not warrant reversal unless the defendant can show he would have made a 
different choice had he been properly advised.  (Id. at pp. 33–38.) 
Taking this reasoning on its own terms, I find it telling that the court does 
not bother to spell out what constituted the ―error in advisement‖ here.  Were the 
court to do so, it would have to acknowledge that the waiver colloquy, culminating 
in the trial court‘s acceptance of ―a jury waiver on all issues,‖ nowhere advised 
Sivongxxay that the waiver covered the special circumstance allegation.  But this 
would run directly counter to the court‘s earlier determination that ―[t]he trial 
court‘s advisement conveyed that defendant had a right to a jury trial with regard 
to all issues as to which an adverse determination could expose him to the death 
penalty — which included the special circumstance allegation — and that with his 
waiver, defendant would be giving up that right.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 25.)  How 
can the court find ―an error in advisement‖ arising from the trial court‘s failure to 
mention the special circumstance allegation and yet rely on what ―[t]he trial 
court‘s advisement conveyed‖ to show that Sivongxxay knowingly and 
intelligently waived a jury trial on the special circumstance allegation?  Although I 
recognize there is an analytical distinction between the statutory and constitutional 
validity of a trial court‘s advisement in this context, the distinction is narrow to the 
point of nonexistent on the facts here. 
As to the applicability of harmless error analysis, to describe the error here 
as ―an error in advisement‖ is a euphemistic play on words.  Sivongxxay was 
―misadvised‖ only in the sense that the trial court told him nothing at all that 
would have informed him that his jury trial waiver on ―all issues‖ covered the 
special circumstance allegation.  Against the backdrop of a statute requiring a 
separate waiver, this is tantamount to a complete failure to obtain a proper jury 
trial waiver on the special circumstance allegation.  Sivongxxay did not suffer a 
 
15 
mere error in advisement; he suffered an unlawful deprivation of the jury trial 
guaranteed by section 190.4(a). 
The circumstances here do not resemble the contexts in which we have 
―assess[ed] whether a defendant would have made a different decision absent an 
error in advisement.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 33.)  In People v. Martinez (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 555, People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, and In re 
Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, this court evaluated whether a defendant would 
have accepted a plea deal had the trial court or counsel properly advised the 
defendant of the consequences.  In People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, we held 
that a defendant‘s jury trial waiver was valid despite the trial court‘s failure to 
inform him of the potential maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment.  And 
U.S. v. Williams (7th Cir. 2009) 559 F.3d 607 held that under the federal plain 
error standard, a district court‘s failure to conduct a proper colloquy before taking 
a jury trial waiver does not warrant reversal unless the defendant can show he 
would have chosen a jury trial had he been properly advised.  All of these cases 
presented scenarios in which an error in advisement occurred in the course of the 
defendant‘s actual decision to waive a particular right.  None involved a scenario 
in which trial court error resulted in no actual decision by the defendant to waive a 
particular right.  It is one thing for a reviewing court to assess how an error might 
have affected a waiver decision that the defendant actually made; it is quite 
another for a reviewing court to imagine what decision the defendant would have 
made if he had been given an opportunity to make a decision at all. 
The more pertinent authority is Fortune v. U.S. (D.C. 2013) 59 A.3d 949 
(Fortune).  There the trial court held a jury trial for each of defendant‘s offenses 
except for his felon in possession charge, which proceeded to a bench trial even 
though the defendant had not entered a jury waiver.  (Id. at p. 954.)  District of 
Columbia Code section 16–705, subdivision (a) provides that where a defendant is 
 
16 
constitutionally entitled to a jury, a ―trial shall be by jury, unless the defendant in 
open court expressly waives trial by jury and requests trial by the court, and the 
court and the prosecuting officer consent thereto.‖  On appeal, the court explained 
that ―the importance of the right to a jury trial, the explicit statutory command in 
this jurisdiction that trial shall be by jury absent an express waiver by the 
defendant in open court, and the relative inability of a reviewing court to engage in 
review of whether the error affected the defendant‘s rights, all counsel in favor of 
holding that the failure to make the prescribed determination of waiver is a 
structural error, one that obviates the need for further inquiry into whether the 
defendant‘s substantial rights were affected by the error.‖  (Fortune, at pp. 956–
957.)  In reaching this conclusion, the court ―reject[ed] as speculative the 
government‘s argument that ‗[q]uite obviously, [Mr. Fortune] was aware that he 
was entitled to have a jury trial.‘  The record does not tell us what Mr. Fortune did 
or did not know, and we decline to ascribe knowledge to Mr. Fortune based on the 
representations of his counsel or the procedural posture of his case.‖  (Id. at p. 955, 
fn. 5.) 
Today‘s opinion says Fortune is distinguishable because it involved ―an 
error of constitutional dimensions.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 41.)  But Fortune did 
not address constitutional error; it addressed ―the trial court‘s error in failing to 
seek a waiver of the jury trial‖ in accordance with procedures mandated by a 
specific statute and by judicially articulated rules pursuant to the statute.  (Fortune, 
supra, 59 A.3d at p. 955; see id. at p. 957 [describing the error as ―the failure to 
make the prescribed determination of waiver‖].)  The court in Fortune declined to 
look behind the statutory error to ask whether the defendant would have waived a 
jury trial if the trial court had followed the appropriate waiver procedure.  The 
same approach applies here. 
 
17 
At the core of today‘s decision is the court‘s intuition that there is no basis 
to think Sivongxxay, having waived a jury trial on the charged crimes and penalty, 
would not have waived a jury trial on the special circumstance allegation as well.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 44–45.)  But suppose counsel had advised Sivongxxay not 
to waive a jury trial on the special circumstance allegation.  If Sivongxxay then 
claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, would we be prepared to say there was 
― ‗no rational tactical purpose‘ ‖ for the choice?  (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 876, 926.)  Our general reluctance to second-guess defense tactics is one 
reason why it makes no sense ―[t]o speculate about whether a defendant would 
have chosen a jury trial if he or she had been in a position to make a personal 
choice.‖  (Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134.) 
More fundamentally, the Legislature has determined that in the context of a 
capital trial, waiver of a jury trial as to some determinations should not be 
understood to imply waiver of a jury trial as to others.  Section 190.4(a) makes 
clear that even ―[i]f the defendant was convicted by the court sitting without a 
jury,‖ the trier of fact on the special circumstance allegation ―shall be a jury unless 
a jury is waived.‖  And section 190.4, subdivision (b) (section 190.4(b)) says that 
even ―[i]f [the] defendant was convicted by the court sitting without a jury[,] the 
trier of fact at the penalty hearing shall be a jury unless a jury is waived . . . .‖  In 
the face of these statutory commands, we should not indulge in ―two-out-of-three‖ 
reasoning to excuse a failure to take a separate jury trial waiver on the special 
circumstance allegation, just as we would not indulge such reasoning to excuse a 
failure to take a separate jury trial waiver on the penalty determination.  With all 
that is at stake in a capital trial, the Legislature saw fit to require a degree of 
precision in eliciting the defendant‘s choices as to whether a judge or a jury should 
decide the issues at each step of the proceeding.  This court should faithfully 
enforce the Legislature‘s directive. 
 
18 
Today‘s harmless error analysis changes the rules governing a capital 
defendant‘s right to a jury trial on a special circumstance allegation.  Despite the 
plain language of section 190.4(a) and our decision in Memro, it does not really 
matter whether the trial court takes a separate jury trial waiver; that is now a mere 
technicality.  What ultimately matters is whether the defendant has made a record 
showing that he wanted a jury trial on the special circumstance allegation.  To be 
sure, the premise of harmless error doctrine is that ―few if any trials are entirely 
free from error, and an appellate court would impair the basic functioning of the 
criminal justice system if it were to reverse a conviction whenever some slight 
misstep occurred.‖  (People v. Jackson (2014) 58 Cal.4th 724, 789–790 (conc. & 
dis. opn. of Liu, J.).)  But even if most types of error can be harmless, we must be 
cautious in deploying this doctrine because ―to say that a conviction may stand in 
spite of underlying error is at odds with the norm of legality that justifies the 
state‘s imposition of criminal punishment in the first place.  A declaration that an 
error is harmless is, in essence, a conclusion that even though a legal right has 
been violated, there will be no remedy for that violation.‖  (Id. at p. 790.)  Here, 
the court‘s particular form of harmless error inquiry does not merely foreclose a 
remedy; it negates the legal right itself. 
Because there was no valid jury trial waiver under section 190.4(a), the true 
finding on the special circumstance allegation and the death judgment should be 
reversed. 
III. 
I also disagree with the court‘s conclusion that Sivongxxay knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to a jury trial on the penalty determination.  The trial 
court advised Sivongxxay that upon a finding of guilt, ―we would then proceed to 
a penalty phase, where the district attorney would present aggravation evidence.  
Through your — you, through your attorney, would have a right to present 
 
19 
mitigation evidence, and it would fall upon me to make the decision as to the 
appropriate punishment, which could result in a death penalty sentence.‖ 
Sivongxxay was not advised that a jury must achieve unanimity in order to 
render a penalty verdict.  The significance of this omission must be considered in 
light of the jury‘s function at the penalty phase.  Unlike its role at the guilt phase, 
the jury‘s role in a capital penalty trial ―is not merely to find facts, but also — and 
most important — to render an individualized, normative determination about the 
penalty appropriate for the particular defendant — i.e., whether he should live or 
die.‖  (People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448; see People v. Manriquez 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 589 [― ‗ ―the sentencing function is inherently moral and 
normative, not factual‖ ‘ ‖].)  This inherently ― ‗moral endeavor‘ ‖ (People v. 
Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 40), which is designed ― ‗to maintain a link between 
contemporary community values and the penal system‘ ‖ (Woodson v. North 
Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 295), renders a defendant‘s decision to waive a 
jury trial at the penalty phase particularly consequential. 
The crux of the waiver decision is whether to submit the life-or-death 
penalty decision to a judge for his or her sole determination or to 12 lay jurors of 
differing backgrounds who must unanimously agree on a death sentence before it 
may be imposed.  The importance of jury unanimity in the normative 
determination of the appropriate penalty has a character distinct from the 
importance of jury unanimity in the factual adjudication of guilt.  Other courts 
have recognized as much.  In Commonwealth v. O’Donnell (Pa. 1999) 740 A.2d 
198, the trial court had made clear during its penalty phase waiver colloquy that 
the defendants were ―entitled to a jury trial in the death penalty phase‖ and that 
they had the right to present evidence ―in mitigation of the application of the death 
penalty.‖  (Id. at p. 212.)  The Pennsylvania high court nonetheless found the 
defendants‘ jury trial waiver constitutionally inadequate, principally because the 
 
20 
trial court had not explained that a sentencing jury must be unanimous in its 
verdict:  ―Given the unique role a sentencing jury plays in the penalty phase of a 
capital case [citation], it . . . seems appropriate for any colloquy preceding a trial 
court‘s acceptance of a capital defendant‘s waiver to a penalty-phase jury to 
inform the defendant of the requirement under Pennsylvania law that a penalty-
phase jury render a unanimous verdict.  The defendant should be asked, in other 
words, whether he understands that, if elected, a twelve member jury would be 
required to unanimously agree that a sentence of death is appropriate before 
imposing such a verdict on a defendant.‖  (Id. at p. 213; see also State v. Martinez 
(N.M. 2002) 43 P.3d 1042, 1048–1049 [―As a matter of pure probability, the 
requirement of jury unanimity means that while a defendant who is sentenced by a 
judge has only one chance of avoiding the death penalty, a defendant who is 
sentenced by a jury has twelve.  [Citation.]  We agree with Defendant that a 
waiver of the right to be sentenced by a jury cannot be considered knowing and 
intelligent unless the defendant is aware of this critical aspect.‖]; Miller v. Beard 
(E.D.Pa. 2016) 214 F.Supp.3d. 304, 358 [granting habeas corpus relief to 
defendant whose waiver of a penalty phase jury was not knowing and voluntary 
because trial court failed to explain state unanimity requirements for sentencing 
juries].) 
In this case, not only did the trial court give no advisement concerning 
unanimity; the record also contains no indication that Sivongxxay discussed the 
waiver with counsel or that the trial court, prosecutor, or defense counsel ever 
asked Sivongxxay whether he understood the nature of the right he was giving up.  
Further, because capital sentencing is the only context in which California law 
authorizes a jury to decide the appropriate punishment for a criminal offense, 
Sivongxxay‘s prior convictions for noncapital offenses in other jurisdictions 
 
21 
provide no basis to infer that he understood the significance of a waiver of his 
right to a jury trial at the penalty phase. 
The circumstances in this case differ markedly from those in which we 
have found a knowing and intelligent penalty phase waiver.  In People v. Weaver 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1076, the trial court was ―exceptionally careful in taking 
defendant‘s jury waiver‖; the court accepted a written penalty phase waiver form 
and asked defendant to reaffirm his waiver before the start of the penalty phase.  In 
Scott, the trial court ―explained the nature of a penalty trial,‖ including the jury 
unanimity requirement; the defendant confirmed he had discussed the waiver with 
counsel; and both the prosecutor and trial court described in detail the penalty 
phase procedure.  (Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1208.)  In Diaz, the trial court 
explained the jury unanimity requirement; ―defendant acknowledged that he had 
thoroughly discussed the jury waiver with his attorney‖; and ―when the court 
asked whether he had any questions regarding the waiver, or wished to discuss it 
further with counsel, defendant answered in the negative.‖  (Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th 
at p. 571.)  And in Robertson, the trial court explained the jury unanimity 
requirement, and the defendant‘s ― ‗length[y]‘ ‖ consultation with counsel ―over 
the course of several days‖ allowed us to infer that counsel properly advised the 
defendant of the nature of a penalty phase jury and the consequences of waiver.  
(Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 36–37 & fn. 5.)   
We have never upheld a penalty phase jury trial waiver on a record of 
advisement as thin as the one here.  The record does not show that Sivongxxay 
waived his right to a jury trial on the penalty determination ― ‗ ― ‗with a full 
awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of 
the decision to abandon it.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 305.)  Because 
Sivongxxay was unconstitutionally denied a jury trial at the penalty phase, the 
penalty judgment cannot stand. 
 
22 
Finally, the penalty phase waiver has an additional infirmity:  The waiver 
colloquy suggested, contrary to section 190.4(b), that Sivongxxay had no separate 
right to a jury trial at the penalty phase if he elected a bench trial at the guilt phase.  
After briefly describing how a jury is selected and stating that the district attorney 
has the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court said:  ―In a 
court trial, I would hear the evidence.  I, alone, would make the decision on 
whether that evidence was sufficient to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  [¶] In the event I made such a finding, . . . we would then proceed to a 
penalty phase . . . .  [A]nd it would fall upon me to make the decision as to the 
appropriate punishment, which could result in a death penalty sentence.‖  (Italics 
added.)  The italicized language conveyed that in the event that a bench trial 
resulted in a finding of guilt, the prerogative to decide the appropriate punishment 
would remain with the court. 
Yet section 190.4(b) makes clear that ―[i]f defendant was convicted by the 
court sitting without a jury[,] the trier of fact at the penalty hearing shall be a jury 
unless a jury is waived . . . .‖  It is not uncommon for capital defendants who opt 
for a bench trial on guilt to have a jury trial on the penalty determination.  (See, 
e.g., Cunningham, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 616–617; People v. Mai (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 986, 993–994.)  The trial court‘s advisement erroneously implied that the 
jury trial waiver was an all-or-nothing decision; at the very least, it did not make 
clear that Sivongxxay had the right to a jury trial on penalty even if he chose to 
waive a jury trial on guilt.  Today‘s opinion says ―[w]e do not believe that the 
colloquy is reasonably susceptible to this interpretation.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 48, fn. 19.)  But what other reasonable interpretation is there?  The court has 
no answer, let alone an answer more plausible than Sivongxxay‘s straightforward 
interpretation.  As with the trial court‘s violation of section 190.4(a), the failure to 
elicit a separate waiver as to the penalty determination as required by section 
 
23 
190.4(b) resulted in a complete deprivation of a jury trial, warranting automatic 
reversal. 
IV. 
 
I agree with the court‘s conclusion that Sivongxxay‘s guilt phase waiver 
was valid, and I agree with the court‘s guidance on advisements that trial judges 
should give when eliciting jury trial waivers in the future.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 17.)  But I do not think we should rely on Sivongxxay‘s ―prior experience with 
the criminal justice system‖ as evidence that he was familiar with the right to a 
jury trial.  (Id. at p. 14.)  We have no record of what advisements he received 
before entering the Oregon pleas, and the written waiver he signed in Washington 
State merely said he understood he had ―the right to a speedy and public trial by an 
impartial jury,‖ not that he understood what that right entailed.  Nor is there any 
indication that he discussed his prior waiver decisions with counsel.  (Cf. U.S. v. 
Shorty (9th Cir. 2013) 741 F.3d 961, 968; State v. Baker (Ariz.Ct.App. 2007) 170 
P.3d 727, 730.) 
In sum, I join today‘s affirmance of Sivongxxay‘s convictions, but I would 
reverse the special circumstance finding and the judgment of death. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
A special circumstance allegation is the means by which the trier of fact 
determines whether a first degree murder trial will continue to a penalty phase, at 
which the convicted murderer‘s fate — death or life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole — will be decided.  The federal Constitution guarantees a 
defendant the right to have a jury decide the truth of the special circumstance 
allegation.  (See Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 589.)  California law 
likewise mandates that the trial of the special circumstance allegation shall be by 
jury, unless the right is waived separately and personally by the defendant and the 
People.  (Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (a); all subsequent statutory references are to 
this code.)  In this case, defendant was never advised of his separate right to have a 
jury decide the truth of the special circumstance allegation.  Nor did he ever waive 
this right.  Nonetheless, the trial court proceeded to resolve the special 
circumstance in a bench trial and, after a penalty phase, to sentence defendant to 
death.   
Despite these omissions, what the majority concludes is that defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to have a jury decide the truth of the 
special circumstance allegation, and the court‘s failure to elicit a ― ‗separate 
waiver‘ ‖ of that right was harmless.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 30.)  Unlike the 
majority, I do not believe we can meet our obligation to safeguard the right to a 
jury trial while minimizing — let alone ignoring — the failure to obtain 
 
2 
defendant‘s waiver of his right to a jury trial on the special circumstance 
allegation.  (See Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 612 (conc. opn. of Scalia, 
J.) [―[O]ur people‘s traditional belief in the right of trial by jury is in perilous 
decline.  That decline is bound to be confirmed, and indeed accelerated, by the 
repeated spectacle of a man‘s going to his death because a judge found that an 
aggravating factor existed.  We cannot preserve our veneration for the protection 
of the jury in criminal cases if we render ourselves callous to the need for that 
protection by regularly imposing the death penalty without it.‖].)  Under the 
federal Constitution and state law, the failure to obtain a jury waiver requires 
reversal of the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding and the death 
judgment.  I concur in the judgment to the extent it affirms defendant‘s 
convictions for murder, robbery, and attempted robbery, but otherwise respectfully 
dissent.   
I. 
Crowded dockets, constrained budgets, and overwhelming caseloads for 
public attorneys create undeniable pressure to speed criminal cases along.  A jury 
trial may be the hallmark of our criminal justice system — and the quintessential 
event that continues to grab the attention of movie and television viewers — but it 
is also the most burdensome and inefficient means of resolving a criminal 
accusation.  So it is no surprise that over 95 percent of felony cases are resolved 
before trial.  (Judicial Council of Cal., 2016 Court Statistics Rep., Statewide 
Caseload Trends 2005-2006 Through 2014-2015 (2016) p. 47.)   
Even when cases go to trial, judges and attorneys are well aware that not all 
trials are created equal.  A bench trial offers considerable savings of time and 
resources.  Lawyers in a bench trial sidestep the need to spend time selecting a 
jury, presenting opening statements, addressing legal issues at sidebar, crafting 
jury instructions and limiting instructions, and waiting in suspense for the outcome 
 
3 
of a jury‘s deliberation.  A bench trial also obviates the need to worry about the 
risk of a mistrial if the jury is divided or subject to improper influences.  Indeed, 
one study of courts in California and two other states found that the median length 
of criminal jury trials was roughly three times that of criminal bench trials.  (Nat. 
Center for State Courts, On Trial:  The Length of Civil and Criminal Trials (1988) 
pp. 8-9.) 
This backdrop helps explain why the Legislature in 1977 erected –– and the 
voters in 1978, although repealing the statute, retained –– an elaborate procedural 
framework protecting a capital defendant‘s right to a jury trial at each stage of the 
proceeding.  In restoring the death penalty following its invalidation by this court 
and the United States Supreme Court, the Legislature and the voters took special 
care to ensure that a jury trial would be had at each phase of the death penalty trial 
unless the defendant personally and with specificity waived it:  ―If the defendant 
was convicted by the court sitting without a jury, the trier of fact [on the truth of 
each alleged special circumstance] shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by the 
defendant and by the people.‖  (§ 190.4, subd. (a), italics added.)  Likewise, ―[i]f 
the defendant was convicted by a plea of guilty, the trier of fact [on the truth of 
each alleged special circumstance] shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by the 
defendant and by the people.‖  (Ibid., italics added.)  And even if the defendant 
was convicted of murder and any special circumstance found true in a bench trial, 
―the trier of fact at the penalty hearing shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by 
the defendant and the people . . . .  If the defendant was convicted by a plea of 
guilty, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant and 
the people.‖  (Id., subd. (b), italics added.)  Thus, a capital defendant will have a 
jury decide the truth of any special circumstance allegations and the appropriate 
penalty, despite having waived a jury in prior proceedings, unless ―by the consent 
 
4 
of both parties expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant‘s 
counsel‖ a jury is waived.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) 
Nothing about this scheme indicates or even suggests a tether between the 
right to have a jury decide the truth of a special circumstance allegation and a 
defendant‘s right to a jury trial on guilt or innocence of the underlying offenses, or 
any other right.  To the contrary:  Even if the defendant waived a jury at the guilt 
phase (or pleaded guilty), the law requires a jury to decide the truth of the special 
circumstance, unless the defendant waives that right.  The separate nature of the 
jury trial right articulated in section 190.4 places it outside ―the general rule‖ (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 21, fn. 5) on which the majority relies — i.e., that a jury waiver is 
deemed to be consent ― ‗ ―to a trial of all issues in the case before the court sitting 
without a jury.‖ ‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 21, quoting People v. Berutko (1969) 71 Cal.2d 84, 
94 (Berutko).)  In Berutko, we analyzed three statutes governing the right to a jury 
trial for a prior conviction allegation.  In stark contrast to section 190.4, not one of 
these statutes created an independent right to a jury notwithstanding the 
defendant‘s waiver of a jury with respect to the underlying substantive offense.1  
                                              
1  
Former section 969 1/2 (now section 969.5) then provided in pertinent part 
that ― ‗the question whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction must 
be tried by a jury impanelled for that purpose, unless a jury is waived, in which 
case it may be tried by the court‘ ‖ (Berutko, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 94, quoting 
former § 969 1/2, added by Stats. 1935, ch. 203, § 1, p. 862); former section 1025 
then provided in pertinent part that ―the question whether or not he has suffered 
such previous conviction must be tried by the jury which tries the issue upon the 
plea of not guilty, or in case of a plea of guilty, by a jury impaneled for that 
purpose, or by the court if a jury is waived‖ (Stats. 1951, ch. 1674, § 88, p. 3844); 
and section 1158 provided, as it does today, that ―[w]henever the fact of a previous 
conviction of another offense is charged in an accusatory pleading, and the 
defendant is found guilty of the offense with which he is charged, the jury, or the 
judge if a jury trial is waived, must unless the answer of the defendant admits such 
previous conviction, find whether or not he has suffered such previous 
conviction.‖ 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
5 
In rejecting Berutko‘s contention that his general jury waiver encompassed only 
the substantive offenses and did not extend to the prior conviction allegation, we 
concluded that ― ‗[t]he whole spirit and intent of these statutes appear to be that a 
prior conviction charge is to be determined solely as one of the issues in the trial 
for the new offense.‘ ‖  (Berutko, at p. 94.)  Section 190.4, on the other hand, is 
not premised on the idea that the truth of the special circumstance allegation or the 
choice of penalty is merely one among the many issues in a ― ‗one trial‘ ‖ system.  
(People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1354.)  No matter which decision 
maker a defendant chooses for the guilt phase, the trier of fact shall be a jury when 
it comes to the special circumstance allegation or the penalty determination, unless 
a jury is waived.  (§ 190.4, subds. (a), (b).)  Accordingly, a jury waiver directed at 
the guilt phase of a capital trial does not suffice to waive jury trial for the special 
circumstance or the penalty.  (See generally People v. Redwine (1958) 166 
Cal.App.2d 371, 376 [―waiver of the right of trial by jury should be strictly 
construed in favor of the preservation of the right‖].)     
This is what we made clear in Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658 as to the 
special circumstance allegation.  We held that section 190.4, subdivision (a) 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
Although section 190.1, subdivision (a) does state that (except for the prior 
murder special circumstance) ―[i]f the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of 
first degree murder, it shall at the same time determine the truth of all special 
circumstances charged,‖ we have previously explained that a broad reading of this 
provision ―would render the jury trial guarantee in section 190.4, subdivision (a) 
meaningless in many special circumstance cases.‖  (People v. Memro (1985) 38 
Cal.3d 658, 702 (Memro).)  Indeed, section 190.1, subdivision (a) plainly has no 
application any time the trier of fact at the guilt phase and the special circumstance 
phase are different, since it would be impossible for ―the trier of fact‖ in such a 
situation to determine guilt of first degree murder and the truth of any special 
circumstances ―at the same time.‖  (See Memro, at p. 701.)      
 
6 
requires ―that an accused whose special circumstance allegations are to be tried by 
a court must make a separate, personal waiver of the right to a jury trial.‖  
(Memro, at p. 704, italics added.)  We distinguished Berutko‘s general rule and the 
prior conviction statutes on which it relied, and for good reason.  The prior 
conviction statutes reflected an entirely different ― ‗spirit and intent‘ ‖ than what 
could be gleaned from the ―separate jury waiver . . . necessary for special 
circumstance allegations in death penalty legislation.‖  (Memro, at p. 702, fn. 52.)  
Under the death penalty scheme, a separate waiver requires a showing that ―the 
defendant is aware that the waiver applies to each of these aspects of trial‖ (People 
v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 565 (Diaz)) — i.e., guilt and special circumstances 
— as well as proof that the ―waiver of the jury-trial right on a special circumstance 
actually cover[s] the special circumstance.‖  (People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 
1088, 1105.) 
No such waiver occurred here.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 29-30.)  So it is 
quite puzzling that even as the majority concedes the lack of a waiver, it 
nonetheless concludes defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his federal 
constitutional right to have a jury decide the truth of the special circumstance 
allegation.  What makes a jury waiver knowing and intelligent is that it was ―made 
with full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the 
consequences of the decision to abandon it.‖  (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 
412, 421; accord, People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1071-1072 [applying 
this standard to a jury waiver].)  In this case, though, nothing made defendant 
aware that he had the right to a jury trial on the truth of the special circumstance 
allegation.  Indeed, defendant was given the misimpression that his capital trial 
would consist only of an initial guilt phase, during which the court ―would make 
the decision whether that evidence was sufficient to prove your guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt,‖ and ―[t]hen, and only then, would we get to a penalty phase.‖  
 
7 
He was never informed that if the prosecutor established his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the trier of fact would then, and only then, consider the truth of 
the special circumstance allegation, nor did anyone ever refer to a ―special 
circumstance‖ or other type of ―allegation‖ whose truth would make him eligible 
for the death penalty.  And of course, defendant was never informed that his 
waiver encompassed the right to a jury trial on such an allegation. 
Recognizing the colloquy‘s inadequacies, the majority deploys vague 
references invoking ―other events before and after the waiver was entered‖ (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 24, fn. 7) as evidence of what it repeatedly — and inaccurately — 
calls a ―comprehensive‖ jury waiver.  (Id. at pp. 21, 23, fn. 7, 26.)  The record‘s 
deficiencies are not so easily evaded.  Defendant‘s out-of-state convictions for 
robbery and unauthorized use of a vehicle provide no basis for inferring that he 
understood his trifurcated right to a jury under California‘s death penalty scheme 
in general or his right to have a jury decide the truth of the special circumstance in 
particular.  (See People v. Brown (Ill. 1996) 661 N.E.2d 287, 301 [―The record 
reveals . . . that the defendant had no previous experience which involved a death 
penalty hearing and, thus, there is no basis to presume that the defendant 
understood that he had the right to a jury for death sentencing and, in particular, 
that he had this right even if he chose a bench trial‖].)   
The majority also purports to rely on silence –– specifically, the 
defendant‘s silence in response to the trial court‘s assertion that ―[w]e‘ll show a 
jury waiver on all issues, confirm the matter for January the 11th.‖  (See maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 14 & fn. 2.)  Given the trial court‘s erroneous description of the ―issues‖ 
to be tried as consisting solely of a guilt phase and a penalty phase, however, it is 
difficult to comprehend how the trial court‘s summary could somehow have 
expanded the preceding waiver to encompass the special circumstance allegation.  
In any event, silence here is the problem, not the solution:  It is well-established 
 
8 
under the California Constitution that neither silence nor acquiescence implies a 
waiver of the right to a jury trial.  The defendant must instead expressly waive the 
right.  (People v. Ernst (1994) 8 Cal.4th 441, 445.)  Accordingly, cases from 
jurisdictions allowing counsel to waive jury on the defendant‘s behalf shed no 
light on the issue before us.  (See U.S. v. Boynes (4th Cir. 2008) 515 F.3d 284, 287 
[defendant ―insisted‖ on waiving jury and explained to counsel why he ―would 
have a better chance‖ with a judge]; U.S. v. Page (5th Cir. 1981) 661 F.2d 1080, 
1083; [defendant conferred with counsel ―at length‖ and made a ―considered, 
tactical decision that a bench trial would be to [his] advantage‖]; State v. Baxter 
(Mo. 2006) 204 S.W.3d 650, 654 [where counsel waived jury, and the prosecutor 
announced ―in open court that there was an agreement that the charges would be 
reduced in exchange for a waiver,‖ ―[t]here is no reason to require that the judge 
question the defendant on the record . . . .‖].)  
The only exchange involving defendant — and the one on which the 
majority is therefore forced to place principal reliance — is defendant‘s assent to 
the trial court‘s final question at the pretrial waiver hearing:  ―Do you give up your 
right to a jury trial and agree that this Court, alone, will make those decisions 
. . . ?‖  (Quoted by maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.)  But where no one — not the trial 
court, not the prosecutor, and not defense counsel — ever mentioned that a trial 
would also occur on the truth of the special circumstance and that he was being 
asked to waive his right to a jury trial at such a proceeding, it is difficult to credit 
the majority‘s contention that the ―advisements the trial court provided to 
defendant before taking his waiver, together with the other surrounding 
circumstances, confirm that defendant knowingly and intelligently relinquished his 
right to a jury trial for this allegation.‖  (Id. at p. 23.)  In short, the majority fails to 
identify anything in the record supporting its conclusion that defendant was aware 
of the nature of the right he was abandoning or the consequences of abandoning it.     
 
9 
Those consequences depend in part on a given jurisdiction‘s law.  The 
majority‘s approach, for example, seems to track Ohio’s death penalty scheme, 
which provides for an all-or-none waiver of what the statute treats as a unitary jury 
trial right:  The sentencer will be ―the trial jury and the trial judge, if the offender 
was tried by jury,‖ but otherwise must be ―the panel of three judges that tried the 
offender upon the offender‘s waiver of the right to trial by jury.‖  (Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2929.03(C)(2)(b).)  Thus, under Ohio law, the ―[t]he waiver of the right to 
trial by jury in a capital case applies to both the guilt phase and the penalty phase 
of the trial.‖  (State v. Foust (Ohio 2006) 823 N.E.2d 836, 852.)     
But Ohio law is materially different from California‘s, which maintains a 
jury trial as the default even if the defendant has waived jury at a previous phase 
of the trial.  (See People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1027.)  So Foust 
sheds no light on what constitutes a knowing and intelligent waiver in the context 
of the California death penalty scheme.  If we are going to look beyond California 
for insight, we should instead train attention on statutory schemes resembling our 
own –– such as those in Illinois and Pennsylvania.  In People v. Brown, supra, 661 
N.E.2d 287 (Brown) and Commonwealth v. O’Donnell (Pa. 1999) 740 A.2d 198 
(O’Donnell), the Supreme Courts of Illinois and Pennsylvania each held that a jury 
waiver at the initial phase of a death penalty trial did not constitute a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of a jury at the penalty phase.  (Brown, at pp. 298-299; 
O’Donnell, at pp. 212-214.)  Like California — and unlike Ohio — Illinois and 
Pennsylvania provide for a jury trial at the penalty phase even if the defendant was 
convicted at a bench trial.  (See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-1(d) [―The proceeding 
shall be conducted: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the 
proceeding if: [¶] A. the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; or [¶] B. 
the defendant was convicted after a trial before the court sitting without a jury 
. . . .‖]; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(b) [―If the defendant has waived a jury or 
 
10 
pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury 
impaneled for that purpose unless waived by the defendant with the consent of the 
[prosecution]‖].)  Both state supreme courts construed their statutory schemes to 
require a jury trial at the penalty phase unless the defendant specifically waived 
that right.  (Brown, at p. 298 [―The statute further provides that the death 
sentencing proceeding may be conducted before the trial judge alone only if the 
defendant ‗waives a jury for the separate proceeding‘ ‖]; O’Donnell, at p. 211 [the 
statute ―clearly indicates that if the defendant has waived a jury trial in the guilt 
phase, as Appellant did here, the defendant is still entitled to have a jury determine 
his sentence unless he specifically waives that right without objection by the 
Commonwealth‖].)  Although neither court then believed that the defendant had a 
federal constitutional right to a jury trial at the penalty phase (see Spaziano v. 
Florida (1984) 468 U.S. 447, 464-465, overruled by Hurst v. Florida (2016) ___ 
U.S. ___, ___ [136 S.Ct. 616, 623]), they nonetheless imposed a requirement that 
the jury waiver be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  (Brown, at p. 298; 
O’Donnell, at p. 212.) 
These state supreme courts held that a jury waiver made without specifying 
what was being waived was insufficient.  In the Illinois case, the defendant was 
advised –– and indicated he understood –– that he would lose his ― ‗constitutional 
right to a jury trial in this case, and this case will then be heard and decided by 
this court without a jury[].‘ ‖  (Brown, supra, 661 N.E.2d at p. 297.)  In finding the 
waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent as to the penalty phase, the Supreme 
Court of Illinois stated that it was ―incumbent upon the trial judge to admonish the 
defendant in order to clarify the scope of his intended jury waiver,‖ and that ―at a 
minimum the trial judge should have advised the defendant of his right to a jury 
for sentencing.‖  (Id. at p. 299.)  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
found an inadequate waiver when the record failed to show that the defendant 
 
11 
understood she ―ha[d] the right to be sentenced by a penalty-phase jury‖ and was 
―devoid of any inquiry indicating that [she] had sufficient knowledge of what, in 
fact, she was waiving.‖  (O’Donnell, supra, 740 A.2d at p. 213; accord, Taylor v. 
Horn (3d Cir. 2007) 504 F.3d 416, 449 [―we cannot presume, based on a silent 
record, that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his state law right to a penalty 
phase jury‖].)  
Here, of course, defendant had a federal constitutional right to require that a 
jury decide the truth of the special circumstance.  (People v. Weaver, supra, 53 
Cal.4th at p. 1074; see Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 589.)  So the failure 
to obtain a knowing and intelligent jury waiver — or any waiver at all — with 
respect to the special circumstance was federal constitutional error.  But Brown 
and O’Donnell are otherwise similar to this case in all important respects:  The 
trial court record failed to show that defendant understood the proceedings would 
require a separate phase, during which his eligibility for the death penalty would 
be determined; that he was aware he had a right to a jury at that phase of the trial; 
or that he was aware he was waiving jury trial as to that part of the proceedings.  
Indeed, the existence of the special circumstance was never mentioned.  That 
makes for quite a contrast with Diaz –– on which the majority misplaces reliance 
— where the defendant (who was charged with 12 multiple-murder special 
circumstances) acknowledged that his waiver ―applied to ‗both phases . . . of the 
special circumstances case‘ ‖ (Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 564) and stated that ―he 
had discussed the matter ‗quite thoroughly‘ with his counsel‖ (id. at p. 565).   
It should be crystal clear that no decision by this court or the high court has 
ever found a knowing and intelligent waiver of the trifurcated right to a jury 
without proof that the defendant was aware of his right to a jury trial at each of the 
three stages.  We distort the meaning of the words ―knowing‖ and ―intelligent‖ 
when we find such a waiver even where the defendant fails to grasp that he has a 
 
12 
right to have a jury decide the truth of the separate allegation that will render him 
eligible for the death penalty.   
The gist of defendant‘s claim is that the record fails to show he was aware 
of his right to a jury trial on this phase of the trial or that he waived it.  State v. 
Williams (Or.Ct.App. 2005) 104 P.3d 1151 presents an analogous situation.  
Williams similarly was unaware that he had the right to a jury finding of the facts 
that could trigger an enhanced sentence; his trial had predated Blakely v. 
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, which held that a criminal defendant has a 
federal constitutional right to have a jury find the facts that could subject him to a 
sentence greater than the statutory maximum.  The Williams court reasoned that no 
waiver could be implied in those circumstances unless the record showed that the 
defendant was aware both of ― ‗the right to have a jury determine the aggravating 
factors‘ ‖ and that ― ‗he was waiving that right.‘ ‖  (Williams, at p. 1152; accord, 
People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 48 [because the defendant entered his plea 
pre-Blakely, his jury waiver on the substantive offense ―did not encompass his 
right to a jury trial on any aggravating circumstances‖]; State v. Schofield (Me. 
2005) 895 A.2d 927, 930-931.)  Unlike the majority, I see no meaningful 
distinction in the fact that Williams was unaware of his jury trial right because of 
an intervening change in the law, while defendant was unaware of his jury trial 
right because it was never mentioned anywhere in the colloquy.  (Cf. maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 22, fn. 7.)  In neither situation does the record show that ―the defendant 
‗knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.‘ ‖  (Iowa v. Tovar 
(2004) 541 U.S. 77, 88.)     
From all these reasons I draw an unremarkable conclusion.  A defendant 
does not knowingly and intelligently waive his federal constitutional right to have 
a jury determine the truth of a special circumstance allegation where there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant was aware of the right to have a 
 
13 
jury determine the truth of the special circumstance or that the defendant intended 
to waive that right. 
II. 
Even if considered solely as an error under state law, though, the trial 
court‘s decision to conduct a bench trial on the special circumstance allegation 
requires reversal of the special circumstance and the death judgment.  As the 
majority readily concedes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 28), there was no ―separate, 
personal waiver‖ of defendant‘s right to have a jury determine the truth of the 
special circumstance allegation as required by section 190.4, subdivision (a).  
(Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 704.) 
How should we measure the effect of that error?  We typically interpret the 
miscarriage of justice provision of our state Constitution (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 13) to require a party challenging the judgment to demonstrate that ―it is 
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have 
been reached in the absence of the error.‖  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 
818, 836.)  But not always.  Certain errors — such as the erroneous denial of a 
jury trial — can constitute a miscarriage of justice and thus require reversal of the 
judgment ―without inquiry into the strength of the evidence in a particular case.‖  
(People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1133 (Blackburn).)  Rightly so, 
because such errors deny ― ‗an orderly legal procedure, in which the substantial 
rights belonging to defendants shall be respected.  For example, if a court should 
undertake to deny a defendant charged with a felony the right of trial by jury, and 
after a hearing of the evidence render a judgment of conviction, it cannot be 
doubted that such judgment should be set aside even though there had been the 
clearest proof of guilt.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 1139, quoting People v. O’Bryan (1913) 165 
Cal. 55, 65-66.) 
 
14 
We recently examined the effect of the failure to obtain a valid jury waiver 
in the context of a trial to extend the civil commitment of a mentally disordered 
offender (MDO) (Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th 1113) and a person originally 
committed after pleading not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) to a criminal 
offense (People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160).  The MDO and NGI 
commitment statutes, like section 190.4, subdivision (a), provide that ―[t]he trial 
shall be by jury unless waived by both the person and the [People].‖  (§§ 1026.5, 
subd. (b)(4), 2972, subd. (a), italics added.)  In neither case, however, had the trial 
court advised the committee of his right to a jury trial or elicited a personal jury 
waiver from the committee.  (Blackburn, at pp. 1123-1125; Tran, at pp. 1166-
1168.)  We held that the failure to obtain the statutorily required jury trial waiver 
qualified as a structural defect in the proceedings that could not be cured by resort 
to harmless error analysis.  (Blackburn, at pp. 1133-1136; Tran, at pp. 1169-1170.)   
In words that have special force here, we declared that ―[i]f the case now 
before us were a criminal matter involving the invalid waiver of a state or federal 
constitutional jury trial right, there could be no doubt that the error would 
constitute a ‗miscarriage of justice‘ requiring reversal without regard to the 
strength of the evidence.‖  (Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th 1133; see People v. 
Ernst, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 443 (Ernst) [―a judgment in a criminal case resulting 
from a court trial must be reversed if the defendant did not expressly waive the 
right to a trial by jury‖].)  We then reasoned that ―[t]he failure to obtain a valid 
jury trial waiver‖ — regardless of whether the source of the jury trial right was 
constitutional or merely statutory — ―defies ordinary harmless error analysis.‖  
(Blackburn, at p. 1134.)  Indeed, ―[t]o speculate about whether a defendant would 
have chosen a jury trial if he or she had been in a position to make a personal 
choice would pose insurmountable difficulties . . . .  Accordingly, we treat a trial 
court‘s failure to obtain a required personal jury trial waiver as tantamount to the 
 
15 
denial of a jury trial, and as such, it constitutes a ‗miscarriage of justice‘ under 
California Constitution, article VI, section 13.‖  (Ibid.; see People v. Holmes 
(1960) 54 Cal.2d 442, 444.)   
Our sister courts are in accord.  (Fortune v. U.S. (D.C. 2009) 59 A.3d 949, 
956-957 [―the importance of the right to a jury trial, the explicit statutory 
command in this jurisdiction that trial shall be by jury absent an express waiver by 
the defendant in open court, and the relative inability of a reviewing court to 
engage in review of whether the error affected the defendant's rights, all counsel in 
favor of holding that the failure to make the prescribed determination of waiver is 
a structural error‖]; State v. Williams, supra, 104 P.3d at p. 1153 [―We cannot 
assume that defendant, by waiving a jury trial on the burglary charge, intended to 
waive the right to have a jury determine the facts required for imposition of an 
enhanced dangerous offender sentence‖].)   
Despite widespread agreement that harmless error analysis does not apply 
— chiefly because it is impossible to reconstruct what choice a defendant would 
have made when he was never actually presented with the choice — the majority 
nonetheless contends that the trial court‘s failure to obtain a jury waiver covering 
this critical stage of a death penalty proceeding is always harmless, unless the 
defendant can demonstrate a reasonable probability he would not have waived jury 
trial if actually offered the opportunity to do so.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 44.)  To 
subject the failure to elicit a defendant‘s waiver of his jury trial right to 
retrospective speculation of what the defendant would have decided is to dilute the 
importance of a right with abiding structural significance.  So it is not surprising 
that the majority is unable to cite even a single case holding that this harmless 
error analysis applies when, as here, a defendant has properly preserved his claim 
that he never waived his right to a jury trial.  The majority relies instead on cases 
 
16 
— easily distinguishable from this one — where the defendant waived a jury, but 
claimed his jury waiver was a product of a misadvisement.  
In U.S. v. Williams (7th Cir. 2009) 559 F.3d 607, for example, the 
defendant knew he had a right to a jury trial and twice waived it in open court.  
The Seventh Circuit determined that the defendant had not preserved his claim that 
the trial court erred in failing to secure a written jury waiver and to mention 
certain advisements.  (Id. at pp. 607-609.)  Only then did the court conclude that 
the defendant had failed to discharge his burden under plain error review to 
establish prejudice.  (Id. at p. 613.)  In State v. Keller (Iowa 2009) 760 N.W.2d 
451, the defendant executed a written jury waiver, but any oral colloquy went 
unreported.  The court concluded that counsel‘s failure to ensure that the 
advisements were made on the record was not prejudicially ineffective.  (Id. at pp. 
452-453; accord, People v. Maxwell (Ill. 1992) 592 N.E.2d 960, 974 [the 
defendant executed a written jury waiver and waived jury trial in open court; 
counsel‘s erroneous view about the admissibility of other-crimes evidence was 
―irrelevant‖ to her advice to the defendant about the jury waiver; and even if 
counsel were ineffective, ―[i]t is clear in this case that defense counsel would have 
offered the same recommendation‖ regardless of the evidence‘s admissibility]; 
Commonwealth v. Houck (Pa. 2008) 948 A.2d 780, 788 [the defendant executed a 
written jury waiver and waived jury trial in open court; he was not entitled to relief 
on his claim of misadvisement because he failed ―to demonstrate that his . . . 
understanding of the length of the potential sentence was a material factor in 
making the decision to waive a jury trial‖]; Commonwealth v. Mallory (Pa. 2008) 
941 A.2d 686, 697 [the defendants ―explicitly waived their rights to a jury, in 
writing, on the record‖ but claimed their attorneys were ineffective in failing to 
arrange an oral colloquy].)   
 
17 
Notice how in each of these cases, the defendant actually waived jury trial.  
The question was simply whether some deficiency in the advisement might have 
affected a decision the defendant had already made.  Here, though, defendant 
never waived his right to a jury trial on the special circumstance allegation.  
Without a waiver, ―it is impossible for [a defendant] to establish what he would 
have done at the time,‖ and thus one ―can only speculate now about what he would 
have done then.‖  (State v. Little (Minn. 2014) 851 N.W.2d 878, 885, fn. 3; accord, 
State v. Hauk (Wis.Ct.App. 2002) 652 N.W.2d 393, 403-404 [distinguishing 
between the situation ―when a defendant has waived the right to a jury but the 
colloquy was deficient‖ and the situation ― ‗where a defendant has not made a 
waiver that is personal and otherwise valid in terms of statutory and case law‘ ‖].)  
In the absence of a waiver, ―[t]here is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-
error scrutiny can operate.‖  (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 280.)2 
In part because defendant actually waived jury trial in all these situations, 
the analysis in these misadvisement cases did not demonstrate that harmless error 
analysis was possible — instead of merely conveying that the applicable doctrine 
                                              
2  
Notice how precisely the opposite is true of the failure to readvise an 
unrepresented defendant, who has already knowingly and voluntarily waived 
counsel, of the right to counsel at the time of arraignment under section 987, 
subdivision (a).  A reviewing court can easily determine whether the failure to 
readvise a defendant about the right to counsel and to obtain a renewed waiver of 
that right was prejudicial where (1) a magistrate has already advised the defendant 
about the right to counsel and cautioned the defendant about the pitfalls of self-
representation at the preliminary hearing as well as trial, and (2) the defendant 
expressed an understanding of the risks and a desire nonetheless to proceed 
without the assistance of counsel throughout the proceedings.  (People v. Crayton 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364-366.)  That‘s a far cry from what occurred here, 
though.  Defendant was never advised of — and never waived — his right to have 
a jury determine the truth of the special circumstance allegation in the first place.  
Nor does he claim that he ought to have been readvised of his jury trial right 
before the trial court began the special circumstance phase.  
 
18 
for examining the claim (whether plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel) 
required it in the situations before the court.  Indeed, in U.S. v. Williams, supra, 
559 F.3d 607, which reviewed a challenge to the jury waiver only for plain error, 
the court readily admitted there was ―no way to assess [the defendant‘s] mental 
state on this record‖ and that ―the burden of production and persuasion [for plain 
error] dictates the outcome.‖  (Id. at p. 613; cf. State v. Little, supra, 851 N.W.2d 
at pp. 883-884 [finding plain error in the trial court‘s failure to obtain a personal 
jury waiver after the charging document was amended, rendering it unnecessary to 
decide whether the error was structural].)  In Commonwealth v. Mallory, supra, 
941 A.2d at page 698, the court explained that ―[w]hen a presumptively-valid 
waiver is collaterally attacked under the guise of ineffectiveness of counsel, it 
must be analyzed like any other ineffectiveness claim,‖ including an assessment of 
whether the defendant suffered prejudice from counsel‘s deficient performance.  
(See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694; cf. In re Alvernaz (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 924, 937 [requiring prejudice for an ineffective assistance claim arising 
from misadvisement relating to a plea bargain]; Taylor v. Horn, supra, 504 F.3d at 
p. 450 [requiring prejudice for an ineffective assistance claim arising from a 
failure to waive jury at a penalty trial].)3 
In contrast, here the trial court failed entirely ―to obtain a valid jury 
waiver.‖  (Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134.)  Never before have we 
examined whether the defendant would have waived the right to a jury had he 
actually been offered the opportunity to choose.  In Ernst, for example, the 
                                              
3  
The high court granted certiorari last fall to decide whether a defendant 
asserting ineffective assistance of counsel that results in structural error must 
establish prejudice from the ineffectiveness.  (Commonwealth v. Weaver (Mass. 
2016) 54 N.E.3d 495, cert. granted sub nom. Weaver v. Massachusetts (2016) ___ 
U.S. ___ [137 S.Ct. 809].)   
 
19 
defendant was present in court when his attorney announced ― ‗we‘re prepared to 
waive a jury as to both phases of the trial [guilt and sanity] at this time, and my 
client is prepared to go on the record to that effect‘ ‖; when his attorney 
subsequently stated that ― ‗We are prepared to waive jury as to both issues‘ ‖; and 
when the trial court declared ― ‗Jury waived by both sides.  It‘s been done.  [¶]  Is 
this going as a nonjury case?‘ ‖ and ―[b]oth sides responded affirmatively.‖  
(Ernst, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 444.)  We unanimously rejected the People‘s 
invitation to examine the totality of the circumstances and ―find, under that test, 
that defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial despite his failure to do so 
expressly.‖  (Id. at p. 448.)  Similarly, in People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 
where we found a jury waiver involuntary because the trial court had advised the 
defendant he would receive ― ‗some benefit‘ ‖ by forgoing a jury trial, we did not 
inquire whether the defendant would have waived jury trial in the absence of the 
unspecified benefit.  (Id. at p. 302, italics omitted.)  In both instances, the failure to 
obtain a proper jury waiver was structural error that defied harmless error analysis.  
(Ernst, at pp. 448-449; Collins, at pp. 310-313.)  The same is true here.  
Practical considerations also distinguish the misadvisement cases from the 
situation now before us.  In the misadvisement context, we assign the burden to 
demonstrate prejudice to the defendant because of the ease by which a defendant 
might assert, after the fact, that virtually any kind of misadvisement induced the 
defendant‘s jury waiver (or plea), and the difficulty in refuting such a claim.  (See 
In re Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 938; accord, Commonwealth v. Houck, supra, 
948 A.2d at pp. 788-789.)  But the issue here is more subtle:  not whether 
defendant would have made the same choice had he been properly advised, but 
what choice he might have made had he actually been offered the opportunity to 
choose.  Just as we do not inquire (after the fact) whether a defendant would have 
entered a plea to an offense for which the defendant was never asked to enter a 
 
20 
plea, we do not inquire (after the fact) whether a defendant would have waived 
jury trial when the defendant was never presented with the opportunity to waive it.   
The majority finds it significant — in fact, determinative — that defendant 
entered some kind of jury waiver, and seeks to relegate the remainder of 
defendant‘s claim to a dispute about the adequacy of the advisement he received.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 40.)  But the defect here goes well beyond merely an error 
in the advisement.  This is not a situation like Berutko, where the defendant was 
unaware that his jury waiver as a matter of law included a waiver of jury as to the 
prior conviction allegation.  The jury waiver here did not, as a matter of law, 
include a waiver of his right to a jury trial as to the special circumstance.  Under 
California law, the right to a jury trial for the special circumstance is divisible 
from the other jury trial rights — and unless there is ―a ‗separate, personal‘ waiver 
of the right to a jury for a special circumstance allegation, above and beyond the 
standard guilt phase and penalty phase waiver‖ (maj. opn., ante, at p. 28), the 
defendant is entitled to a jury trial on the special circumstance allegation.  
(§ 190.4, subd. (a).)  Thus, despite a waiver of jury at the guilt phase, ―the trial 
court must presume the defendant wants a jury‖ to try the subsequent phases of a 
capital trial.  (People v. Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1026, italics added.)  The 
majority‘s harmless error test, which places the burden on a defendant who has 
waived a jury at the guilt phase to show that he would not have waived jury trial at 
a subsequent phase, improperly nullifies the effect of that presumption.  
The majority also contends that nothing in the language, structure, or 
context of section 190.4, subdivision (a) would support the conclusion that the 
failure to obtain a separate, personal waiver constitutes structural error.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 32.)  I disagree.  In four different sentences, section 190.4 
emphatically declares that the trier of fact ―shall be a jury, unless a jury is 
waived,‖ notwithstanding a waiver of jury (or entry of a plea) at a prior phase.  
 
21 
Moreover, the language guaranteeing a jury trial for the special circumstance 
allegation tracks almost verbatim the language guaranteeing a jury trial for the 
penalty determination.  (Compare § 190.4, subd. (a) with id., subd. (b).)  There is 
thus no indication that the Legislature in 1977, or the voters in 1978, wanted to 
extend a lesser form of protection to the jury trial right for special circumstances 
than to the jury trial right for the penalty determination.  Surely the majority does 
not mean to suggest that the failure to obtain a capital defendant‘s jury waiver for 
the penalty trial would necessarily be harmless under section 190.4, unless the 
defendant could demonstrate that he would not have waived jury trial had he been 
offered the opportunity.   
The language used in section 190.4 also differs substantially from those 
statutory provisions supporting the general rule ― ‗that where a defendant waives a 
jury trial he is deemed to have consented to a trial of all of the issues in the case 
sitting before the court sitting without a jury.‘ ‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21; cf. 
People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 277 [applying the general rule ―[w]here the 
whole cause — substantive offenses and sentencing allegations — is tried in a 
unitary proceeding . . . .‖ (italics added)].)  By creating a completely different 
structure for the death penalty law — one much more protective of a defendant‘s 
right to a jury trial — the Legislature and the voters signaled that a defendant‘s 
right to a jury trial for the special circumstance and penalty phases merited more 
respect than a defendant‘s right to a jury trial on a mere sentencing allegation or 
enhancement.  A rule rendering the failure to elicit a separate, personal jury waiver 
invariably harmless on appeal would plainly undermine the statute‘s purpose.   
What section 190.4 does is set an exacting standard for the waiver of a jury 
at each step of a death penalty proceeding –– and for good reason.  Protecting the 
constitutional right to a jury trial in a death penalty proceeding is the responsibility 
of this court.  So is ensuring that statutory protections for that right enacted by the 
 
22 
Legislature and the voters are effective, and enforced.  As the majority falls short 
in this task, I respectfully dissent from the judgment affirming the special 
circumstance finding and the death judgment.   
 
  
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Sivongxxay 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S078895 
Date Filed: June 19, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Fresno 
Judge: Gene M. Gomes 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Douglas Ward, 
Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Sean M. 
McCoy, Ryan B. McCarroll and Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Douglas Ward 
Deputy State Public Defender 
P.M.B. #199, 350 Bay Street 
San Francisco, CA  94133 
(415) 494-9252 
 
Lewis A. Martinez 
Deputy Attorney General 
2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090 
Fresno, CA  93721 
(559) 477-1677