Case Title: State v. Davalos. ICA s.d.o., filed 07/11/2006 [pdf], 111 Haw. 73. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 12/01/2006 [pdf].

Citation: 113 Haw. 385

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘s++F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS#*

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘T

 

‘o0o---

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.

HANIN DESWYN DAVALOS, Petitioner/Defendant~Appellant
and

PATSY B. KAHAUNAELE, Defendant

 

8

 

Wo. 27270

 

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEAtS
(CR. NO, 04-1-0844)

FEBRUARY 28, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Hanin Deswyn Davalos

(Petitioner) filed an application for writ of certiorari? on

Pursuant to Hawai" Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-59 (Supp. 2006),

fa party may appeal the decision of the intermediate appellate court (the ICR)

only By an application to this court for s wit of certiorari. Seo HRS § 602~
59(a).. In determining whether to accept or reject the application for writ of
Certiorarl, this court reviews the ICA decision for!

     

(2) Grave errors of law of of facts or

(2) Gbvious inconsistencies in the decision of the [ICAI
ith that of the supreme court, federal decisions, or
its own ‘decision,

land the nagnitue of such errors or inconsistencies

Gictating the need for further sppesl

 

(continued...)

qa
 

‘s+4POR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ § HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

October 23, 2006, requesting that this court review the Summary
Disposition Order (SDO) of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (the
IcA),? affirming the April 4, 2005 judgment of the first circuit
court (the court)? convicting Petitioner of promoting a dangerous
drug in the second degree (PD02), Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)
§ 712-1242(2) (c) (1993). Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee state of
Hawai'i (Respondent) did not file a response to Petitioner's
application. On February 15, 2007, oral argument was held.

We hold that (1) there was substantial evidence upon
which to conclude that Petitioner was a distributor of drugs, see.
HRS § 712-1240 (1993),? in violation of HRS § 712-1242(1) (2):

(2) however, Petitioner was entitled to a procuring agent defense
instruction inasmuch as (a) a jury instruction must be given on
every defense if there is any support in the evidence “no matter

how weak, inclusive or unsatisfactory the evidence may be,” State

 

\(, seontinued)
biks § 602-59(b)." “The grant or denial of a petition for certiorari is
Giscretionary with this court. ggg HRS § €02-£9(a)-

+ the Summary Disposition Order was Sssued by Chief Judge Janes 8.
nd Associate Judges John §.K. Lim and Craig #. hekamus

 

 

>The Honorable Virginia Lea Crandall presided.
«ins § 722-2242(2) (c) stated as follows

(2) A person commits the offense of promoting =
Gangerous Grug in the second degree if the person knowingly:

(c) ° Distributes anv danserous drug in any amount.

 

(Esphesis added.)
+ RS § 712-1240 states in pertinent part
“To distribute” means to sell, transfer, prescribe,

give, of deliver to another, ox to leave, Derter, oF
exchange with snother, or £0 offer of sgree to co the some.

 

2
 

‘s++fOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!

 

vs O'Daniel, 62 Haw. 518, 527-28, 616 P.1d 1383, 1390 (1980);

(b) @ defendant’ s participation in the negotiation of a drug
traneaction or in the touching of the drugs or money involved
does not in and of itself foreclose a procuring agent defense;
(c) the determination of whether a defendant is considered to be
an agent of the buyer is @ factual question ordinarily for the
fact finder; and (d) there was support in the evidence for a
procuring agent defense in the instant case.

I

 

Initially it may be observed that under the procuring
agent defense, “‘one who acts merely as a procuring agent for the
buyer is a principal in the purchase, not the sale, and,
therefore, can be held liable only to the extent that the
purchaser is held liable.’” State v. Balanza, 93 Hawai'i 279,
264, 1 P.3d 281, 286 (2000) (quoting State v. Reed, 77 Hawai'i
72, 18, 881 F.2d 1218, 1225 (1994)).* A buyer or the agent of

 

‘the procuring agent defense ie not an affirmative defense. see
uns § 701-115(3)" (1999) explaining thet "[a) defense is an affirmative
defense if: (a) [i]t de specifically #0 designated by the (Hawal'l Penal)
Code or ancther statute; or (b) [i]f the Code or ancther statute pleinly
Fequires. the defendant to prove the defense by « preponderance of the
evidence”). Hence, like all nenvaffirnstive defenses, tne prosecution must
Gisprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. ges Commentary to HRS § 701-
{15° (2583) "explaining that the Hawai'i Penal Code “places an initial burden
on the defendant to cone forward with tone credible evidence of facts
Consticuting the defence, unle "those facts ere suppiied by the
prosecution's witnesses. he to the burden of persuasion, =. + (1]n the ca
Of defenses which are not affirmative, the defendant need Cniy ra:
Feasonsble doubt es to the defendant's guilt.”

‘Thereafter, “the prosecution must prove beyond @ reasonable doubt
fects negotiving the defense.’ The prosecution in fact does this when the jury
believes its case and disbelieves the cefense.” State v, Gabrilla, 10 Haw.
Bop. 446, 455, 677 P.24 891, od-95 (2994) [internas qootataon marke,
citation, and’ ellipses points caitted) (concluding that “[i)f affirmative
Gefenaes’ are not involved and the defendant introduces evidence of » defens
the Gefendant becomes “entities to an acquittal if the trier of fact finde

(continued...)

 

 

 

   

         

 

    

 

 
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the buyer cannot be convicted of distributing a dangerous drug,
HRS § 712-1242(1) (c), since “‘to buy’ [or to offer to buy]
clearly falls outside the meaning of ‘to distribute’ as that term
is defined in HRS § 712-1240." State v. Auli, 76 Hawai‘ 317,
323, 993 P.2d 168, 174 (1995)

On April 30, 2004, Petitioner was charged by complaint
with PDD2, HRS § 712-1242(1) (c). ‘The matters following were
adduced at trial. Officer Wilson Atud (Atud) related that on
April 21, 2004, he was involved in an undercover operation at the
Jack-in-the-Box restaurant in Wahiawa and had been given “buy

money” to purchase illicit drugs. Atud testified that he

 

approached Petitioner and asked, “You get?” or something to that
effect which, according to Atud, is street vernacular for
“£iguring out if someone’s got drugs to sell.” Petitioner then
asked, “How much?” and after Atud responded “$20,” Petitioner
instructed Atud to wait.

Petitioner saw codefendant Patsy Kahaunaele and asked
Af she had any drugs to sell. Kahaunaele replied that she had a
“quarter gram [bag] for $30." Kahaunaele owed Petitioner $10, so
Petitioner offered to contribute the $10 that Kahaunaele owed him
with the $20 from Atud to purchase the $30 bag, to which
Kahaunaele agreed. According to Atud, Petitioner returned and

instructed Atud to follow him around the corner. Petitioner told

 

*{..-continuea)
thet the evidence, when considered in the light of any contrary prosecution
evidence, raises a reasonable coubt 22 to the defendant's guilt’= (quoting, HRS
701-115 (2) (31)
‘s*4FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS**

 

the officer he knew somebody with a $30 bag and that he wanted
$10 worth of drugs out of that bag. Atud and Petitioner agreed
that the officer would “get the 20” and Petitioner would “get the
10” “breakdown of the bag.”

Atud testified that Petitioner pointed out Kahaunaele.
Atud handed the $20 bill to Petitioner, which Petitioner then
passed to Kehaunaele. Kahaunaele then handed a napkin to
Petitioner, which Petitioner passed to Atud. A ziploc packet of
crystal methamphetamine was wrapped in the napkin.

Petitioner testified that after speaking to Kahaunaele,
he returned to Atud and explained to him that he knew a person
who was selling a $30 bag, but that he would put in $10 of his
own money so that they could jointly purchase it. Atud agreed.
When they walked over to Kahaunaele, Petitioner introduced Atud
as “the person I’m putting in with.” Atud gave Petitioner the
$20, which he handed to Kahaunaele, Kahaunaele then handed the

d it to Atud.

 

napkin containing the drugs to Petitioner, who pas:
As they were walking away, Petitioner testified that he asked
Atud for his $10 worth of drugs. Atud told Petitioner to follow
him to his car, where Petitioner was arrested.

At the close of the case of Respondent and at the close
of evidence, the defense moved for judgments of acquittal, which
were denied. During the settling of jury instructions, the
defense proposed an instruction on the procuring agent defense.

The court refused the instruction over objection. The jury found
 

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Petitioner guilty. On April 4, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced.
on May 3, 2005, Petitioner filed his notice of appeal.
qr.

Before the ICA, Petitioner argued that (1) Respondent
“failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that [Petitioner]
knowingly distributed a dangerous drug as required by HRS § 712-
1242(1) (c) because HRS § 712-1242(1) (c) does not proscribe the
act of buying crystal methamphetamine” and (2) the “court
reversibly erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the
procuring agent defense.”

‘The ICA affirmed the conviction, stating in its
July 11, 2006 SDO as follows:

After a cedulous review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties, and giving careful consideration
‘goments Scvanced and the iseues raised by the
lege we resolve (Petitioner's) pointe of err on appeal

i. "Evigence was adduced at trial sufficient to enable
person of reasonable caution to conclude that [Petitioner]
Exansferrea crystal methamphetamine to an undercover police
officer on behalf of the seller~
2.."mne circuit court oie not err in refusing

(Petitioner's) jury instruction on the procuring agent

Gefense because the evidence aadyced st tris] did not prove
only 2 sale.

 

   

 

S00 at 1, 2.
qn,
In his application Petitioner raises two questions:

1. wether the ICA gravely erred in holding that
there mag sufficient evidence adduced at trial to enable @
person of reasonable caution to conclude thet (Petitioner)
had distributed crystal methanphetenine to an undercover
police officer on Behalf ef the seller?

2. Whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the
circuit court oid not ext in refusing [Petitioner's] Jury
instruction on the procuring agent defense, besed on the
ICK's determination thet the evidence saduced st trial did
ot prove cnly Sele?
‘*++F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S KAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*##
wv.

As to the first question Petitioner contends (1) “HRS

§ 712-1242(1) (c) states that a defendant commits the offense of

 

promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree if the person
knowingly *(d]istributes any dangerous drug in any amount”;

(2) “*[d}istribute’ is defined as ‘to sell, transfer, prescribe,
give, or deliver to another, or to leave, barter, or exchange
with another, or to offer or agree to do the same’"; (3) “the act
of buying is not included in distributing,” citing Aluli, 78
Hawai'i 317, €93 P.2d 168; (4) “[aJt the close of [Respondent's]
case, [Respondent] contended that the ‘hand-to-hand transfer’ of
the drugs from [Petitioner’s] hand to Atud constituted the
‘distribution’; (5) “[hJowever, . . . no distribution occurs
when drugs are physically transferred from one joint owner to
another,” (citing State v. Moore, 529 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Iowa 1995)
(citing United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1977))7
People v. Edvards, 702 P.2d 555, 561 (Cal. 1985) (en banc);

(6) “[Petitioner] was a joint purchaser of drugs with Atud . . .
using the $20 cash from Atud and the $10 IOU he contributed”; and
(7) “even Atud’'s testimony establishes that immediately after
Kahaunaele gave the drugs to Atud, [Petitioner] asked for his $10
share.” Hence, Petitioner maintains that “the . . . court erred
as a matter of law in denying (Petitioner's) motion for judgment
of acquittal because the act of purchasing drugs does not

constitute an act of distribution under HRS § 712-1242(1) (c)."
‘*#4OR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+®

vy.

Respondent argues that (1) “Atud testified . . . he
asked [Petitioner] if he had any crystal methamphetamine to sell,
[Petitioner] inquired, “How much?”; (2) “Atud handed [Petitioner]
2 twenty dollar bill, which [Petitioner] gave to Kahaunaele”;

(3) “Kahaunaele then handed [Petitioner] a napkin containing the
crystal methamphetamine, which he gave to (Atud]”; (4) “a juror
could have reasonably inferred that [Petitioner] was the
Gistributor or seller of the drugs.” According to Respondent,
“{Petitioner] participated in the negotiation of the purchase
price and quantity, when he asked [Atud) how much he wanted[,)
+ + + [he] subsequently proceeded to acquire the . . .drugs and
in the process physically handled both the money and the crystal
methamphetamine[,] . . . suggest{ing] that [Petitioner] was a
partner with Kehaunaele[,]" and, “[a]s such, no reasonable juror
could have found that [Petitioner] did not, at the very least,
act on the seller's behalf.”

vr.

On appeal the test for the denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal is that applied to determine sufficiency of
‘the evidence to support the conviction. See State v, Okumura, 78
Hawai" 363, 403 n.15, 894 P.2d 80, 100 n.15 (1995) (stating that
“[alithough different language is sometimes used to describe the
standard of review when the denial of a motion for judgment of

acquittal is appealed, the test on appeal is actually identical--
 

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‘++470R PUBLICATION IN WES:

 

if there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, the
motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied; if there
was insufficient evidence, the denial of the motion was error”
(citation omitted)). “Substantial evidence as to every material
elenent of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of
sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of
reasonable caution to support conclusion.” State v. Aplaca, 96
Hawai'i 17, 21, 25 P.34 792, 796 (2001) (citations omitted).

Viewing the evidence as stated above, i.e., in a light most

 

favorable to Respondent, and in full recognition of the trier of
fact’s role, it may be concluded that the evidence was sufficient
to enable a reasonable juror to conclude guilt. Id, at 21, 25
P.3d at 796 (citations omitted). Inasmuch as there was evidence
sufficient to convict Petitioner of PDD2, we consider whether
there was trial error, as posited in Petitioner's second
question. See State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai'i 382, 413, 910 P.2d
695, 726 (1996) (stating that “[rjeversal for trial error, as
distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, . . . is a
determination that a defendant has been convicted through a
judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect,
Sug. . . . incorrect instructions” (quoting Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978).
vit.
As to the second question, Petitioner argues that the

court’s refusal of the procuring agent defense instruction was
 

‘**47OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

error. Petitioner reasons that (1) “[t]he principle behind the

procuring agent defense is that ‘one who acts merely as a

 

procuring agent for the buyer is a principal in the purchase, not
the sale, and, therefore, can be held liable only to the extent
that the purchaser is held liable(,]’ Balanza, 93 Hawai'i at
285, 1 P.3d at 287"; (2) “[Petitioner] testified that he had been
a joint purchaser of the drugs from Kahaunaele, not her agent”?
(3) “it was Atud who approached [Petitioner] and solicited the
purchase”; (4) “(Petitioner) said that he would try to find
someone who was selling”; (5) “there was no evidence that

[Petitioner] made any profit off of the sale or that he received

 

a ‘cut’ from Kehaunaele”? (6) “Atud confirmed that (Petitioner)
asked him, not Kahaunaele, for his $10 share of the drugs”;

(7) “a reasonable juror could have concluded that [Petitioner]
was not acting on behalf of the seller, Kahaunaele”; (8) under

Daniel, 62 Haw. at 527, 616 P.2d at 1390, a defendant in a

 

criminal case “is entitled to an instruction on every defense or
theory of defense having any support in the evidence[.]”
As to the second question, Respondent maintained in its

(1) “*{wJhen jury instructions or the

 

answering brief that:
omission thereof are at issue on appeal, the standard of review
is whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions
given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or
misleading’” (quoting State v, Valentine, 93 Hawai'i 199, 204,
998 P.2d 479, 484 (2000)) (citations omitted); (2) in State v

10
 

**47OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®}

 

Kim, 71 Haw. 134, 136, 785 P.2d 941, 942 (1990), “the defendant
+ admitted to accepting money from the agent and delivering a
napkin which she knew ‘maybe contained cocaine’” (brackets

omitted); (3) in Reed, 77 at 75-77, 881 P.2d at 1221-23, “the

 

defendant negotiated the terms of the deal with the undercove
officer, took the officer’s money, delivered the cocaine... ,
and . . . admitted to providing the officer with cocaine”; (4) in
Balanza, 93 Hawai'i at 289, 1 P.3d at 287, “[this c]ourt opined
that ‘under the evidence adduced in Kim and Reed, a reasonable
juror could have found that the defendants were, at 2 minimun,
acting on behalf of the sellers” (brackets omitted); (5) in
Balanza, in which this court deemed the evidence insufficient to
convict, this court had noted that “the defendant ‘did not
participate in the negotiation of the purchase price and
quantity, nor did he come into contact with the money or the
drugs’” (quoting Balanza, 93 Hawai'i at 289-90, 1 P.3d at 287-88)
(footnote omitted); (6) in this case Petitioner did participate
in negotiations and delivery of the drugs and, thus, (7) “the
[court’s] instructions . . . were not prejudicially insufficient,
erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading.”
vii.
The instruction requested by Petitioner was as follows:

It is a defense to Promoting 2 Dangerous Drug in the
Second Gegree that the defendant war merely acting 2 the
procuring

Ripe: a procuring agent for the
buyer is'a principal in the purchase, not the sale, and,
therefore, can be held 2iable only to the extent thet the
purchaser is held liable.

   

 

 

ua
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**+

 

If you find that the defendant was merely acting as
the procuFing agent for the buyer, then you must find th
Gefensant not guilty of Promoting’ Dangerous Orug in the
Second degres

 

 

According to Respondent, “(during the settlenent of jury
instructions, . . . [Petitioner] conceded he did come into
physical contact with the money and the drugs in this case.
[Respondent] maintained that the procuring agent defense was
unavailable to [Petitioner] insofar as: (1) [Petitioner] and the
undercover officer agreed on a price and quantity, and

(2) [Petitioner] physically handled the money and the drugs.”

‘The court refused the instruction on such grounds:

THE COURT: Court refuses the instruction over the

objection of [Petitioner] having reviewed

ang the factors set forth therein and the facts of this case

With respect to [Petitioner] == negotiated the purchase with
jotermined the anount the officer wanted

 

 

  

those negotiations and dia actually physically touch both
the money and the drug.

Respondent asserts, again relying on Balanza, that “the evidence
adduced at trial proved [Petitioner] participated in the
distribution and/or sale of crystal methamphetamine. .
[Petitioner] was, at a minimum, acting on behalf of Kahaunaele.”

Respondent argues that because

 

 

(Petitioner! proceeded to acquire the desired drugs
ang in the process, aa in Ein ond Bese

ee we)
Feasonable jurcr could have found that [Petitioner] did not,
athe very least, act on the seller's behalf{]. =. (and)
the procuring agent defense wes not available to

[Peefesoneri=
(Emphasis in original.)
In opposition, Petitioner in his opening brief had

maintained that “[Petitioner] was entitled to instructions on the
‘+#+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAZ' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERY+#

 

procuring agent defense because a reasonable juror could have
concluded that [Petitioner] merely acted to purchase drugs.”
Petitioner points out that “in (Balanzal, the (court held, ‘in
the absence of a bill of particulars, where the evidence adduced
at trial proves only a sale and a reasonable juror could find
that the defendant did not act on the seller's behalf, the
defendant is entitled to @ jury instruction on the procuring
agent defense.’” (Quoting Balanza, 93 Hawai'i at 288, 1 P.3d at
290.) Petitioner concedes that in Balanza this court said:

Unser the evidence adduced in Kim and Bead, a reasonable
Juror souls have found that the defendants wer

Aininuns acting on behalf of the sellers: However in the
Present case, Ealanza did not participate in the negotiation
SL the purchase price and quantity, nor did he come into
Physical contact with the money or the cocaine. Under these
Edgeunstances, the procuring agent defense should have been
available to hin.

(Quoting Balanza, 93 Hawai" at 287, 1 P.3d at 290.) However,

 

 

 

 

 

 

Petitioner argues that “evidence that [Petitioner] ‘was involved
in. . . negotiations end did actually physically touch both the
money and the drug,’ does not mean that a reasonable juror could
not find that [Petitioner] was not acting on behalf of the seller
and thus, was not grounds for depriving [Petitioner] of the
defense.” Petitioner maintains that the question is one of fact
for the jury, citing the following:

It is inportant to note thet the determination of whether @

defendant is considered to be an agent of the buyer is

generally # question for the jury, not the judg

Therefore, as long ss there is “some reasonable view of the

evicence”’ that s defendant acted purely on behalf of a buyer

of drugs, & judge is required to submit the agency defense
fo the jury in those Jurisdictions accepting the defense.

(Quoting Scott W. Parker, An Argument for Preserving the Agency

 

 

13
 

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Defense as Anplied to Prosecutions for Unlawful Sale, Delivervia
nd Possession of Drugs, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2649, 2657 (May

1996).) Within that framework Petitioner argues that negotiation
and contact with the money and drugs would not be inconsistent
with Petitioner acting as an agent for the buyer:

The evidence showed that [Petitioner] physically handled the
rugs and the money because he was acting as a Duyer of
‘drugs along with [Atud), The ssaue of whether (Petiticner)
negotiated the price and quantity on behalf of Fahaunasle
showld have been up to the jury as the trier of fact to
decide, not the judge. A reascnable juror could have
concluded that (Petitioner) dia not act on the seller's
behalf, and merely acted to purchase drugs

 

m

In Balanza, this court stated that in Kim and Reed “the
respective trial courts were correct, based on the evidence
adduced at trial, to refuse @ procuring agent instruction.” 93
Hawai'i at 287, 1 P.3d at 289 (emphasis added). According to
this court, “(u)nder the evidence adduced in Kim and Reed, @
reasonable juror could have found that the defendants were, at a
minimum, acting on behalf of the sellers.” Id. Referring to the
facts in Balanza, it was said, “However, in the present case,
Belanza did not participate in the negotiation of the purchase
price and quantity, nor did he come into physical contact with

the money or the cocaine. Under these circumstances, the

 

procuring agent defense should have been available to him.” Ide
at 287-86, 1 P.3d at 289-90.

This court did state that “where the evidence adduced
at trial proves only a sale and a reasonable juror could find

that the defendant did not act on the seller's behalf, @

14
/#*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAMAY'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS**
defendant is entitled to @ jury instruction on the procuring

agent defense.” Id. at 288, 1 P.3d at 290.” However, the

 

> th Ate S00 the ICA affirmed the court “because the evidence

adduced at trial did not prove gnlya sale.” S00 at 2. (emphasis added).
$8 Haw. 834, 298, S6 P.2d 1370, 1373 (1979), this court

Retnowledged that “appellant hed acted not for himself, but for the undercover
police officer in purehsring the cocaine (and) invoke(4) as a defense, the
theory of the procuring agent.” Tt was nevertheless held that the procuring
agent defense ‘would be inapplicable aginst a charge of knowingly snd
Oniawfully distributing a dangerous drug in violation of Section 1242(1) (c) of
the Code-” “Id, at 240, $66 Pi2a at 1573 (emphasis added) (citation omitted)

Subsequently, State v. Erickson, 60 Haw. 8, 9 S86 P.2d 1022, 1023
(1978), inaicated that where the prosecution had given’a bill of particulars
thet. "Confined the State to proof that appellant ‘offered or agreed to
Sell(,}’" “the State is Limited to proving the particulars specified in the
BLL." (citations omitted.) Recognizing that "to sell does not mean to buy
fand that one who acts es the agent of the buyer... does not commit the
cefense of selling the crugl,]* id. at 10, S86 P.2d at 1024, this court
Goncluded that because “the State wes limited by the bill of particulars to
proving a ‘sale',” ig. at il, “the ‘procuring agent’ defense which we held in
(kelsey), supra st 235, 566 P.28 et 137%, to be unavailable under a charge of
distributing @ drug Le evailable to appellant(,)" Exickaan, 60 Haw, at 10, 586
Pda at 1028.

‘Kim confirmed that Exickson decided that in light of the bill of
particulars, "he charge [of distribution} could net be proved by evidence of
Sny act other than a sale” and, thus, this court “accept (ed) the procuring
Agent defense where a sole ie charged(.J”" However, in Baad, 77 Wawa at. 73,
Ge1 F.2d at 1225, it wes said that “we held in Kelgcy that the procuring agent
defense, which negates aolya sale, was inapplicable to a charge of
Gistribsting a dangerous drag.” (Esphases onitted and enpheels added.)
(Citation caitted.) Bead indicated that “the procuring agent defense becomes
available only when a bill of particulars alleges that the defendant
Sietributes a dangerous drug exclusively by selling it(.]” Id. st £0, 881
Pda at 1226

‘he view that the procuring agent defense wee available only if
the defendant wes charged with a sale, however, was altered by Aluli-
held that the term "co cistribute in ARS §-712-1240 [(which included “to
feli"}} die not include ‘to Buy’ or ‘to offer to buy.'” luli, 78 Hawai at
525, 099 Pr2d at 17. Because distribution in ite various prescribed forms
(including selling) did not include buying or offering to buy prohibited
Grogs, the purchase of such contraband waa catside the scope of conduct
failing within the definition of distribution. Consequently, the purchase of
Gruge, shether by the principal of the principal's agent (Lies, the procuring
agent), could be raised as 2 defense to's charge of cistribution under HRS §
‘erizko. tn Balanag, this court reiterated that “[t]he procuring sgent
Gefense rensins svaileble where the efendant 1s charged with the sele of
Sroge|+]" 93 Hawel's at 267, 1 P.30 at 269, and ebrogated the requirement that
S'biil of particulars alleging » sale was a necessary prerequisite to the
Considerstion of the defense at trial

he reiterated in the text, Balanza did declare that “where the
evidence acguced at trial proves only'e sale and a ressonable juror could find
that the defendant did not act on the seller's behalf, the defendant i
entitled to's jury instruction on the procuring agent defense.” 1d. at 286, 1
P.3d at 290. That statenent, in light cf Alull, was not = limitation on the
Consideration cf the defense by the fact finder, but a vestige of the “ale”

fSnguage stening from the bil) of paresculars context in Ersckson and
Teontinved. -)

 

In

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

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holding referred to “these circumstances,” making the outcone
rest on the specific facts of each case. In analyzing Kim and
Reed, this court also referred to “the evidence received at
trial.” Id. at 269, 1 P.3d at 291. Acting conscientiously, the
court in the instant case apparently viewed the reference in
Balanza to Balanza not participating in the negotiation of the
transaction, or coming into contact with the money or the drugs
as precluding the defense.

x.

To clarify, the question of whether a defendant was
acting on the seTler‘s behalf or on the purchaser's behalf rests
on the specific facts of the case. Generally these are questions
of fact for the fact finder -- in this case, for the jury. See
2.02, People v, McGhee, 677 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983)
(stating that “the jury, as the sole judge of credibility, must
determine the validity of the procuring agent defense” (citing
People v. Smith, 623 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1981)); People v. Lam Lek
Chong, 379 N.£.2d 200, 206 (N.¥. 1978) (stating that “(t]he
determination as to whether the defendant was [an agent of the
buyer] is generally a factual question for the jury to resolve on
the circumstances of the particular case”); People v, Foskit, S64
N.¥.8.2d 912, 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (concluding that

“[w)hether defendant was @ seller of narcotics or merely a

 

*(.. continues)
reiterated in subsequent cases. Moreover, that the stotenent
Sle” rested on the specific facts ef Belansa is undersesred by

ebservation thet “the evidence sdduced st trial proved only &

16

 

 

to “only @
‘chis court’
Ta ide

        

 
‘S*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS

 

purchaser assisting a friend presented a factual issue for the
jury to resolve under the circumstances of this case” (citing
People v. Scott, $20 N.Y.8.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)). But if
the court refuses the instruction as to the procuring agent
defense, the jury is precluded from determining such questions.

‘The evidence arguably conflicted as to whether
Petitioner was acting on behalf of Atud and himself as buyers
when he handed the drugs to Atud, or on behalf of Kahaunaele as
fan agent of the drug seller. At the least there was support in
the evidence no matter how weak, inconclusive or unsatisfactory
it may be thought to be, for the jury to find that “the
[Petitioner] did not act on the sellers behalf” but on behalf of
Atud and himself. See State v. Locaviao, 100 Hawai'i 195, 205,
58 P.3d 1243, 1252 (2002); State v, McMillen, 83 Hawai'i 264,
265, 925 P.12d 1088, 1089 (1996); State v. Maeleaa, 60 Hawai'i
172, 178-79, 907 P.24 758, 764-65 (1995); State v. Pinero, 70
Haw. 509, $25, 778 P.2d 704, 715 (1989); Q*Daniel, 62 Haw. at
527-28, 616 P.2d at 1390. For that reason it appears the
instructions were “prejudicially insufficient.” Valentine, 93
Hawai'i at 204, 998 P.2d at 484. Therefore, the court was wrong
in refusing the procuring agent instruction and the ICA gravely
erred in affirming the conviction.

xr.
Based on the foregoing, the ICA’s SDO is reversed, the

court’s April 4, 2005 judgment is vacated, and the case is

Vv
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS+®

 

remanded to the court for proceedings consistent with this

opinion,

Summer M.M. Kupau, Deputy Gi

Public Defender (Jon N. .
Tkenaga, Deputy Public Blan vce
Defender, on the

application), for Aesetes CV certae te=

pet itioner/defendant-

Prosecuting Attorney, City &
County of Honolulu, for Yowene, Duster +
respondent /plaintiff-

appellee.

18