Case Title: KENNETH SIEBKEN v. TOWN OF WHEATLAND, WYOMING; CHARLES PARSONS, Individually and in his official capacity as Mayor; JIM DUNHAM, Individually and in his official capacity as Town Clerk; BILL LINDSTROM, HARRY STEVENS, JACK EDDLEMAN and FRANK TUCKER, Individually and in their official capacities as members of the Wheatland Town Council

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
KENNETH SIEBKEN v. TOWN OF WHEATLAND, WYOMING; CHARLES PARSONS, Individually and in his official capacity as Mayor; JIM DUNHAM, Individually and in his official capacity as Town Clerk; BILL LINDSTROM, HARRY STEVENS, JACK EDDLEMAN and FRANK TUCKER, Individually and in their official capacities as members of the Wheatland Town Council1985 WY 71700 P.2d 1236Case Number: 84-152Decided: 06/07/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
KENNETH SIEBKEN, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

TOWN OF WHEATLAND, 
WYOMING; CHARLES PARSONS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR; 
JIM DUNHAM, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS TOWN CLERK; BILL 
LINDSTROM, HARRY STEVENS, JACK EDDLEMAN AND FRANK TUCKER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN 
THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE WHEATLAND TOWN COUNCIL, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Rehearing Denied July 22, 
1985.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, PlatteCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
Robert T. 
Moxley, Wheatland, for 
appellant.

Lawrence G. Orr, 
Guy, Williams, White & Argeris, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ. 

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant appeals from 
a summary judgment entered against him in his action against appellees for 
damages resulting from his discharge by appellees from employment as a garbage 
man for appelleeTown of 
Wheatland.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     AppelleeTown of Wheatland received a complaint 
from one of its residents that while collecting garbage at his residence, the 
appellant and his fellow garbage man had scavenged or rummaged through the 
garbage. The Town of Wheatland had told all of its garbage men, 
including appellant, that scavenging or rummaging through garbage was not 
allowed. Appellant and his fellow garbage man were discharged 
immediately.

TENURE

[¶4.]     Our recent opinions in 
Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 
Wyo., 685 P.2d 25 (1984), and Allen v. Safeway Stores Incorporated, 
Wyo., 699 P.2d 277 (1985), are dispositive of most of the issues presented in this appeal. An 
employee may resign from employment under an at-will contract at any time 
without cause, and an employer may discharge an employee under an at-will 
contract at any time without cause. Also see Lukens v. Goit, Wyo., 430 P.2d 607 (1967); Long v. Forbes, 58 
Wyo. 533, 136 P.2d 242, 158 A.L.R. 224 (1943); 
Casper Nat. Bank v. Curry, 51 
Wyo. 284, 65 P.2d 1116, 110 A.L.R. 360 (1937). Appellant does not contend that he was 
employed under a contract for a definite term. He argues that he was a 
"permanent" employee in that he was paid by the month rather than hourly, in 
that he was allowed paid vacations, and in that he was included in a pension 
program. The failure of such conditions to establish a definite term of 
employment was recognized in Allen v. 
Safeway Stores Incorporated, supra. Without more, appellant's discharge as 
an at-will employee was proper.

[¶5.]     The fact that appellant 
did not have tenure distinguishes this case from Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 
___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985), which holds that a 
pretermination notice and opportunity to respond1 are required when a property right 
of tenure exists as it did in that case in which the employee was a "`classified 
civil servant.'"

STATUTE

[¶6.]     Appellant also contends 
that as a matter of public policy his discharge was improper inasmuch as § 
15-1-103, W.S. 1977 (July 1980 Pamphlet), set terms for discharge which, he 
alleges, were not followed. In this case, the statute need not be considered as 
setting forth public policy; it prescribes that necessary for discharge of 
municipal employees.

[¶7.]     Section 15-1-103(a)2 read in pertinent part: 

"(a) The governing bodies 
of all cities and towns may:

* * * * * 
*

"(xxxvii) Appoint, in 
addition to the appointed officers and employees provided by law, other 
personnel as are necessary for the efficient operation of the city or town 
and:

"(A) Prescribe duties and 
rules of all appointees;

"(B) Determine working 
conditions or pay scales and supplementary benefits, as long as those provisions 
are not in conflict with existing statutes;

"(C) During an emergency 
or special conditions warranting, make additional temporary 
appointments;

"(D) If any person is removed from office for 
incompetency, neglect of duty or otherwise for cause, specify the charges and 
provide the person removed an opportunity for a hearing on the 
charges;

"(E) Make the cause of 
removal a matter of record; * * *" (Emphasis added.)

We considered 
this statute in Carlson v. Bratton, Wyo., 
681 P.2d 1333 (1984), and, while the statute was inapplicable to the employee in 
that case, he being the chief of police, one of the "appointed officers and 
employees provided by law," we said at :

"Absent a discrimination 
amounting to a violation of civil rights, a person does not have tenure in 
employment unless such tenure is established by statute or by contract or by 
rules and regulations pursuant to statute or by rules and regulations having the 
force of a contract. One of the bargaining items in labor contracts concerns the 
causes for termination and the method of establishing the same. Adoption of the 
Little Norris-La-Guardia Act, § 27-7-101 et seq., W.S. 1977, was for the purpose 
of insuring the right of labor to organize and bargain for such items. Personnel 
rules of the several governmental units serve the purpose of contractual labor 
requirements. In all such, there is a recognition of a definite cleavage between 
management and labor. The positions listed in § 15-3-204, supra, are positions 
of management and the appointees thereto serve at the pleasure of the 
mayor."

[¶8.]     Appellant was certainly 
not in a position of management. The statute sets forth the causes for 
termination and the method of establishing the same. It is applicable to 
employees under an at-will contract as well as those having a fixed-term 
contract. Appellant, thus, may have a tort action if his discharge was not in 
accordance with the statute.

[¶9.]     Appellees argue that 
the provisions of § 15-1-103(a) are permissive inasmuch as they indicate that 
which the governing bodies of cities and towns "may" do. Appellees are correct 
in that appointment of "other personnel" may, in the discretion of the governing 
body of a city or town, be made or not, but once an appointment is made, the 
requirements of the subparagraphs of § 15-1-103(a)(xxxvii) are mandatory unless 
otherwise provided in such subparagraphs. Reading the statute as a whole, such 
legislative intent is apparent.

"Then, as this court has 
said (Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 
50 P. 819), 38 L.R.A. 773, `the primary principle underlying an interpretation 
of constitutions or statutes is that the intent is the vital part, and the 
essence of the law.' And the rule requires that the instrument must be construed 
as a whole in order to ascertain its intent and general purpose and also the 
meaning of each part. [Citations.]" Ross 
v. Trustees of University, 31 Wyo. 464, 489, 228 P. 642 
(1924).

 

[¶10.]  If the statute were read as requested by 
appellees, the authorizations in the five subparagraphs of § 15-1-103(a)(xxxvii) 
would be superfluous. Without statutory authorization, the right to prescribe 
duties and rules and to determine working conditions and pay scales not in 
conflict with existing statutes would follow from the authority to appoint 
personnel. The authority to appoint personnel as necessary for the efficient 
operation of the city or town would, by its terms, be authority to make 
temporary appointments in emergency situations. To make it discretionary whether 
or not to require cause for discharge of an employee following specification of 
charges and hearing would be another superfluous provision. Such authority would 
exist even without statutory authorization. The same is true with reference to 
the authorization to make the cause of removal a matter of record. To give 
purpose and meaning to these five subparagraphs, they must be taken to be 
requirements once the appointments are made pursuant to § 15-1-103(a)(xxxvii). 
In construing statutes, we endeavor to give meaning to every word, clause and 
sentence to the end that no part is inoperative or superfluous. Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, Wyo., 651 P.2d 778 
(1982).

[¶11.]  Appellees also place emphasis on the 
words "removed from office" in § 15-1-103(a)(xxxvii)(D), and they contend that 
the provisions thereof apply only to "officers" as distinguished from other 
employees. Again a reading of such words in context with the entire statute 
reflects a contrary legislative intent, as does our holding in Carlson v. Bratton, 
supra.

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶12.]  Before it can be said as a matter of law 
that appellant's discharge was not actionable, it must not have violated that 
set forth in § 15-1-103(a)(xxxvii)(D)3; i.e., if the discharge is for 
"incompetency, neglect of duty or otherwise for cause," the charge must be 
specified, and there must be an opportunity for a hearing after discharge on the 
charges. If there is an issue of fact as to the existence of any one of these 
requirements, a summary judgment may not be rendered.

[¶13.]  Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P., provides in part 
that a summary judgment

"* * * shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. * * *"

[¶14.]  A summary judgment is proper only where 
there is no issue of material fact. Kimbley v. City of Green 
River, Wyo., 642 P.2d 443 
(1982); Timmons v. Reed, Wyo., 569 P.2d 112 
(1977).

[¶15.]  With reference to the first requirement 
of § 15-1-103(a)(xxxvii)(D), appellant was advised both at the time of discharge 
and at the hearing before the town council of the complaint and the identity of 
the complainant. Appellant and his fellow garbage man, Joseph W. Lambert, 
acknowledge in their depositions that there was a rule against scavenging and 
that it was made known to them at a meeting of garbage men. Lambert acknowledges 
taking a belt from the garbage of the complainant. Both Lambert and appellant 
state that appellant took nothing from that garbage. Appellant said he "flipped 
the ashes" with his hand to see if they were hot. Lambert testified that 
appellee Jim Dunham told him that appellant was discharged because he was with 
Lambert. He also testified "[t]hat he didn't want us going through the garbage 
any more, scavenging," and that the "main concern" in the rule was the loss of 
time involved. In their amended answer, appellees deny each instance in which 
appellant alleges the discharge to be for scavenging and assert that the 
discharge was for "rummaging, digging through, and/or looking through garbage," 
which was a prohibited act. There was no disagreement as to these 
facts.

[¶16.]  "Scavenge" is defined in Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary (1971) to mean removing cast-off matter and also to 
mean searching for such matter; i.e., "to dislodge or gather and remove * * * 
from cast-off matter" and "to hunt in for wanted or usable material obtainable 
at no cost." With the rule against scavenging being for the purpose of avoiding 
lost time, searching through the garbage would be as much contrary to the 
purpose as would the removing of the desired material from the garbage. 
Appellant acknowledged that he had removed material from garbage at other times 
and had taken it home.

[¶17.]  Another city council may have properly 
concluded that flipping through the ashes was not a scavenging act. It may have 
believed the purpose of such was truly to see if they were hot - for whatever 
difference that would make. It may not have been as concerned as this town 
council about time lost through scavenging. But this town council did conclude 
that appellant was scavenging contrary to the directive, and there were 
sufficient grounds for such a conclusion.

[¶18.]  The record does not indicate an issue of 
fact relative to the existence of a rule against scavenging with both 
definitions, nor does it indicate that appellant was not fully advised of the 
charge against him and the basis for his discharge.

[¶19.]  The record before us reflects that there 
is no issue of fact over the second requirement of § 15-1-103(a)(xxxvii)(D) - an 
opportunity for a hearing. When appellee Dunham discharged appellant, he 
informed appellant of the complaint which caused the discharge. Appellant did 
not deny the charge, but requested another chance. Later, appellant requested a 
hearing before the town council. At such hearing, he presented his position to 
the town council and had others speak in his behalf. He was represented by 
counsel. The town council took the matter under advisement and agreed that the 
discharge was proper.

[¶20.]  Since appellant was an employee at-will, 
he did not have tenure and was subject to discharge at any time without cause 
unless such discharge was in violation of § 15-1-103(a). The discharge was not 
in violation of such statute. The facts are not in dispute and the summary 
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

1 The Court elaborated on 
these requirements at pages 1495-1496 of 105 S.Ct.:

"* * * [T]he 
pretermination hearing need not definitively resolve the propriety of the 
discharge. It should be an initial check against mistaken decisions - 
essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. 
[Citation.]

"The essential 
requirements of due process * * * are notice and an opportunity to respond. The 
opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed 
action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement. [Citation.] 
The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges 
against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to 
present his side of the story. [Citations.] To require more than this prior to 
termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest 
in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee."

2 Under the present 
statute, the governing body would have had to establish a more formal procedure. 
Section 15-1-103(a)(xxxvii) was amended with an effective date subsequent to the 
discharge in this case and to the discharge in Carlson v. Bratton, Wyo., 681 P.2d 1333 
(1984), to read in pertinent part:

"(xxxvii) In addition to 
the appointed officers and employees provided by law, establish other positions 
as are necessary for the efficient operation of the city or town 
and:

* * * * * 
*

"(D) Specify by ordinance 
that if any person is removed from office for incompetency, neglect of duty or 
otherwise for cause, the charges against that person shall be specified and the 
person removed shall be provided an opportunity for a hearing on the charges 
under procedures established in the ordinance; * * *"

3 We are not here 
concerned with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, § 16-3-101 et seq., 
W.S. 1977 (October 1982 Pamphlet), inasmuch as that Act pertains to procedures 
by an "agency," which by definition excludes the governing body of a city or 
town. Section 16-3-101(b)(i).

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶21.]  I would have reversed the summary 
judgment entered against appellant Kenneth Siebken because significant factual 
questions exist as to whether his discharge as a garbage hauler for the Town of 
Wheatland 
violated state statutes governing the removal of municipal 
employees.

[¶22.]  As discussed in the majority opinion, 
certain rights attached to Siebken's employment by virtue of § 
15-1-103(a)(xxxvii)(D) and (E), W.S. 1977, which provided:

"(a) The governing bodies 
of all cities and towns may:

* * * * * 
*

"(xxxvii) Appoint, in 
addition to the appointed officers and employees provided by law, other 
personnel as are necessary for the efficient operation of the city or town 
and:

* * * * * 
*

"(D) If any person is 
removed from office for incompetency, neglect of duty or otherwise for cause, 
specify the charges and provide the person removed an opportunity for a hearing 
on the charges;

"(E) Make the cause of 
removal a matter of record."

This statute 
authorizes the town council to hire workers necessary for the efficient 
operation of the town and to remove these workers for cause, followed by notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing.1 The post-termination hearing 
affords a discharged employee the opportunity to counter the allegations against 
him and to have his dismissal overturned if unsupported by cause. The cause of 
removal must be made a matter of record. We have said that these statutory 
rights affecting public employment apply to nonmanagerial employees, rather than 
to "appointed officers and employees provided by law," who typically hold 
policy-making positions and are subject to removal without cause. Carlson v. Bratton, Wyo., 
681 P.2d 1333 (1984).

[¶23.]  Pursuant to § 15-1-103(a)(xxxvii)(D), the 
town council of Wheatland conducted an informal hearing at its regular meeting 
on May 2, 1983. Siebken was given an opportunity to make a statement concerning 
the circumstances of his dismissal and to present witnesses and other evidence. 
The town council ultimately upheld his discharge, and appellant initiated this 
lawsuit.

[¶24.]  Appellant's complaint alleges unlawful 
action by the town council, an entity not governed by the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act, § 16-3-101 et seq., W.S. 1977. Section 16-3-101(b)(i), W.S. 1977. 
Accordingly, the judicial-review provisions (§ 16-3-114) of that Act do not 
apply to the town council's decision, and Siebken had a right to a trial de 
novo, entailing an independent inquiry by the district court into the cause of 
his dismissal. See City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, Inc., Wyo., 647 P.2d 1378 
(1982). The district court, however, determined that no statute or other 
provision restricted the town's right to dismiss Siebken at will and declined to 
consider the depositions, affidavits and other evidence relevant to a possible 
violation of § 15-1-103(a).

[¶25.]  According to appellant's deposition, Jim 
Dunham, the Wheatland town clerk, had informed the garbage-collection crew in 
February, 1983, that scavenging or searching through the garbage would no longer 
be permitted. Siebken admitted that he had scavenged during his six and one-half 
years on the job, but testified that he had stopped the practice after receiving 
the warning in February. Appellant described in his deposition the incident that 
precipitated his dismissal:

"Q What happened at 
Wickam's house?

* * * * * 
*

"A * * * We dumped some 
barrels, and there was some ashes in there, and I took my hand and flipped the 
ashes to see if they was hot or not.

"Q And you were at the 
back of the truck?

"A I 
was.

"Q And you dumped the 
barrel in the truck?

"A In the 
truck.

* * * * * 
*

"Q What was Joe Lambert 
doing during this time?

"A He was dumping 
barrels, too.

"Q Did he go through any 
of the trash at Wickam's house?

"A Not that I know of 
other than picking up that belt that was in the trash."

When the two men 
returned to the shop that afternoon, they were dismissed. Appellant 
testified:

"Q Did you talk to Dunham 
then when you went to the shop at three o'clock?

"A Yes, he told us we was 
let go.

"Q What else did he 
say?

"A That was 
it.

"Q He just said you are 
let go?

"A He said because of the 
scavenging we was let go. We had a report. The council wanted us 
fired.

"Q If you could, please, 
think back to that day and that conversation and tell me everything that he said 
and everything that you said from the time you first contacted Mr. 
Dunham?

"A Well, he just called 
us in and said it was the hardest thing he ever had to do, but he had to let us 
go, and I said why. Well, we had a complaint. He finally told us it was Wickams 
that made the complaint, and I said, `God, I am going to lose my home and 
everything else. Give us another chance.' Can't do it; the council wants you 
fired. I told him about the ashes, that I had flipped some ashes is all I had 
done.

"Q You asked him for 
another chance?

"A Yes, I 
did.

"Q Did he say anything 
else?

"A Not that I can recall 
other than we was fired. I wanted to know if we should go empty the truck, and 
he said, no, he would rather we wouldn't. So I just went and got my stuff and 
left.

"Q What else did you say 
that you recall?

"A That's about it that I 
can recall.

"Q Do you recall what, if 
anything, Joe Lambert said?

"A Joe told him that I 
hadn't picked up anything and hadn't went through it."

[¶26.]  Joe Lambert, appellant's co-worker, 
testified as to the circumstances surrounding their 
discharge:

"A Well, about just 
shortly after three o'clock we pulled into the shop down there for a coffee 
break, and we talked in the shop, and Jimmy Dunham was standing in the office 
there, and he stopped us as we were walking in, and he called Ken [Siebken] and 
I in there by ourselves, and he says -

"Q You were all 
alone?

"A Just Ken and I was in 
there, yes, at that time. And he says, `I hate to do it,' he says, `but I have 
got to let you go.' He said, `Joe, has been here longer than I have, but I have 
just got to let you go.'

"And we had a load on the 
truck that was just about loaded, and we had four or five blocks to finish up, 
and we would've been through for that day, and I asked him, I says, `Do you want 
us to take that out and unload it or not?'

"`No,' he says, `go on 
home.'

"Q Is that all he 
said?

"A That was 
it.

"Q Did he tell you why 
you were let go?

"A 
Yes.

"Q What did he 
say?

"A He said, `I got a 
report you was scavenging through the junk, and you also took a 
belt.'

"And I says, `Yes, I 
did.' I admitted it. I got the belt. But then after he had them all out of 
there, or Ken and I went on out, and he called a bunch of them in there I don't 
know how many it was in there, sanitation crews, and they was a-sitting there at 
the table, and Ken had already left, and I was a-sitting there, and I went back 
in and I met him.

"I says, `Jim, why did 
you fire Ken?' I says, `I got the belt.'

"He said, `I fired him 
because he was with you. He was with you.'

"Now, I want to know 
where the man was supposed to be if he wasn't supposed to be with me. I would 
like to know."

[¶27.]  Siebken's complaint alleges that several 
witnesses, including Ruby Wickham, addressed the town council on behalf of 
appellant. The complaint asserts further:

"20. THAT at the said 
meeting Ruby Wickam identified Joe Lambert as being the garbage man about whom 
she had complained, and stated that Joe Lambert's co-worker, the Plaintiff, had 
not been guilty in the incident of taking or scavenging for any items from her 
garbage which had been the basis of her complaint and led to the Plaintiff's 
discharge."

Appellees denied 
this allegation in their answer, but presented no affidavits or other evidence 
to refute the claim.

[¶28.]  The evidence before the trial court 
presented a triable issue of fact as to whether appellant's discharge complied 
with the causation requirements of § 15-1-103(a). The trial court failed to 
consider this evidence because of its misconception concerning the applicability 
of § 15-1-103(a) to appellant's employment situation. A majority of this court, 
while recognizing the relevancy of § 15-1-103(a), nevertheless affirm the 
summary judgment, holding that sufficient evidence supported the town council's 
finding of scavenging:

"Another city council may 
have properly concluded that flipping through the ashes was not a scavenging 
act. It may have believed the purpose of such was truly to see if they were hot 
- for whatever difference that would make. It may not have been as concerned as 
this town council about time lost through scavenging. But this town council did 
conclude that appellant was scavenging contrary to the directive, and there were 
sufficient grounds for such a conclusion." 700 P.2d  at 
1240.

Aside from the 
propriety of a conclusion which equates the testing of potentially ignitable 
material with a scavenging act, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
council's conclusion simply is not an appellate issue, where the district court 
was the trier of fact, obligated to examine the evidence in a trial de novo. I 
would have remanded this case to the district court for a full inquiry into the 
factual basis for appellant's charges.

1 Because of these 
safeguards afforded by § 15-1-103(a)(xxxvii)(D) and (E), appellant's employment 
contract was not a mere "at will" contract, and our discussion of at-will 
employment in Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., Wyo., 685 P.2d 25 (1984) 
has no application to the case at bar.