Case Title: Paton v. Paton

Citation: 2001-Ohio-291

Docket Number: 19990848

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Paton v. Paton, 91 Ohio St.3d 94, 2001-Ohio-291.] 
 
 
 
PATON, N.K.A. SAXTON, APPELLEE, v. PATON ET AL.; ALLEN COUNTY CHILD 
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Paton v. Paton (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 94.] 
Domestic relations — Supplemental security income benefits received by disabled 
child do not constitute a financial resource of the child pursuant to R.C. 
3113.215(B)(3)(f) for purposes of justifying a trial court’s deviation from 
the basic child support schedule. 
 (No. 99-848 — Submitted December 12, 2000 — Decided March 7, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Allen County, No. 1-98-74. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Supplemental security income benefits received by a disabled child do not 
constitute a financial resource of the child pursuant to R.C. 
3113.215(B)(3)(f) for purposes of justifying a trial court’s deviation from 
the basic child support schedule. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  On June 9, 1998, appellant, the Allen County 
Child Support Enforcement Agency, filed a “Motion for Review of Child 
Support, 
Determination 
of 
Arrearages, 
Lump 
Sum 
Judgment, 
Wage 
Withholding,” in a case involving Ann Paton (n.k.a. Ann Saxton) and her former 
husband, Michael Paton. 
 
The Patons’ marriage was dissolved in 1983, and pursuant to the 
separation agreement Michael Paton was obligated to pay child support and to 
maintain major medical and hospitalization insurance for the benefit of his 
children.  Saxton is the residential parent of their youngest daughter, Michelle, 
who was born in 1982 and has a learning disability. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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On August 12, 1998, at a hearing before a magistrate on appellant’s 
motion, Paton and Saxton testified regarding their respective incomes and 
expenses.  At the time of the hearing, Michelle was enrolled in a public high 
school and received supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits in the amount 
of $387 a month ($4,644 a year).  On August 13, 1998, the magistrate filed a 
decision in which Paton’s child support obligation was reduced. 
 
Saxton filed objections to the magistrate’s decision because the magistrate 
treated Michelle’s SSI benefits as a financial resource of the child pursuant to 
R.C. 3113.215(B)(3)(f), and deducted an amount representing Michelle’s annual 
SSI benefits from her parents’ combined annual support obligation.1  The trial 
court overruled Saxton’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision and 
recommendation.  A final order modifying child support was filed on October 5, 
1998. 
 
On appeal from the trial court’s judgment, Saxton argued that the trial 
court erred when it included Michelle’s SSI benefits in the basic child support 
worksheet.  Saxton maintained that these benefits are intended to supplement 
Michelle’s income and should not be used to reduce her parents’ support 
obligation. 
 
On March 16, 1999, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s 
judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the SSI benefits Michelle receives as a consequence of her 
disability “should not be considered when determining the support obligation of 
her parents.  To do so defeats the purpose behind supplemental security income 
                                                          
 
1.  In 1998, Michelle received $387 a month ($4,644 a year) in SSI benefits.  The combined 
annual child support obligation of her parents was $6,676.  The trial court subtracted Michelle’s 
SSI benefits from her parents’ combined annual child support obligation.  The remaining $2,032 
was to be paid by Saxton and Paton according to their proportional share of the total family 
income.  Paton earned seventy percent of the total family income.  Thus, Paton’s annual child 
support obligation was determined to be $1,422.  From this, the court subtracted $642 paid by 
Paton for expenses, leaving $798.  This results in a monthly child support obligation of $66.50. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
benefits, and it also interferes with the eligibility guidelines of the social security 
laws.”  The court of appeals found “as a matter of law that supplemental security 
income benefits should not be used to decrease the parent’s support obligation.”  
The court also noted that the trial court did not comply with R.C. 
3113.215(B)(1)(b) and (B)(2)(c) because it failed to journalize findings of fact 
supporting its deviation from the basic child support schedule. 
 
On April 30, 1999, the Allen County Child Support Enforcement Agency 
filed its notice of appeal in this court.  We allowed the appeal and sua sponte 
ordered that this cause be held for our decision in Williams v. Williams (2000), 88 
Ohio St.3d 441, 727 N.E.2d 895.2  See Paton v. Paton (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 
1465, 715 N.E.2d 568.  We subsequently sua sponte lifted the stay and ordered 
the parties to brief the merits.  See (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 1436, 730 N.E.2d 990. 
 
The issue presented for our determination is whether supplemental 
security income benefits received by a disabled child constitute a financial 
resource of the child pursuant to R.C. 3113.215(B)(3)(f) in order to justify a trial 
court’s deviation from the basic child support schedule. 
 
In any action in which a child support order is issued or modified, a trial 
court is required to determine the amount of the obligor’s child support obligation 
consistent with the basic child support schedule and guidelines set forth in R.C. 
3113.215(D), (E), and (F).  R.C. 3113.215(B)(1).  The figure calculated in 
accordance with these guidelines represents the amount of child support due and 
is rebuttably presumed to be correct.  Id.  A trial court may not deviate from the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
2.  In Williams, we announced that “[a] disabled parent is entitled to a full credit in his or her child 
support obligation for Social Security payments received by a minor child due to the parent’s 
disability.”  Id., 88 Ohio St.3d 441, 727 N.E.2d 895, syllabus. 
 
Williams is distinguishable from the case at bar because in Williams it was the obligor, 
rather than the child, who was disabled.  Moreover, the categories of benefits at issue in each of 
these cases are different.  Thus, in Williams, we found that “Social Security payments are 
tantamount to earnings by the disabled parent.”  Id. at 444, 727 N.E.2d at 898. 
 
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amount calculated using the guidelines, unless the court considers the factors set 
forth in R.C. 3113.215(B)(3)(a) through (p), and determines that such an amount 
“would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the 
child.”  R.C. 3113.215(B)(2)(c)(i).  Additionally, the court must journalize the 
“amount of child support calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule 
and pursuant to the applicable worksheet * * * its determination that that amount 
would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child, 
and findings of fact supporting that determination.”  R.C. 3113.215(B)(2)(c)(ii); 
see, also, Marker v. Grimm (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 139, 601 N.E.2d 496, paragraph 
three of the syllabus. 
 
In order to justify its deviation from the basic child support schedule, the 
trial court, in the case at bar, relied on R.C. 3113.215(B)(3)(f), which allows a 
court to consider the “financial resources and the earning ability of the child.”  
The financial resource attributed to Michelle was the $4,644 that she received in 
annual SSI benefits. 
 
While we do not dispute that SSI benefits are arguably a financial resource 
of a recipient, we do not believe that SSI benefits are the type of “financial 
resource” that justifies a trial court’s decision to deviate from the basic child 
support schedules. 
 
“The basic purpose underlying the supplemental security income program 
is to assure a minimum level of income for people who are age 65 or over, or who 
are blind or disabled and who do not have sufficient income and resources to 
maintain a standard of living at the established Federal minimum income level.”  
Section 416.110, Title 20, C.F.R. 
 
The supplemental security income program provides means-tested public 
assistance to those who qualify.  See, generally, Section 1382a, Title 42, 
U.S.Code.  The amount of SSI an eligible individual receives is determined based 
upon the individual’s income and resources.  Id.  If the recipient of SSI is a child 
January Term, 2001 
5 
who receives child support, the amount of child support received from the absent 
parent must be taken into account when determining the amount of SSI the child 
will receive.  Section 1382a(b)(9), Title 42, U.S.Code.  A recipient’s eligibility for 
continued participation in the program as well as the amount of benefits the 
participant receives is reviewed periodically.  Section 1382(c)(1), Title 42, 
U.S.Code. 
 
A majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue hold that “a 
parent is not entitled to a credit in his [or her] child support obligation for SSI 
benefits received on behalf of a disabled child.”  State ex rel. Dept. of Social Serv. 
Div. of Child Support Enforcement v. Kost (Mo.App.1998), 964 S.W.2d 528, 530, 
citing Hollister v. Whalen (1997), 244 A.D.2d 650, 663 N.Y.S.2d 918; Bennett v. 
Virginia (1996), 22 Va.App. 684, 694-695, 472 S.E.2d 668, 673; Kyle v. Kyle 
(Ind.App.1991), 582 N.E.2d 842, 846; In re Marriage of Thornton 
(Colo.App.1990), 802 P.2d 1194, 1196; and Oatley v. Oatley (1977), 57 Ohio 
App.2d 226, 11 O.O.3d 260, 387 N.E.2d 245. 
 
According to one court, “Congress included disabled children under the 
SSI program in the ‘belief that disabled children who live in low-income 
households are certainly among the most disadvantaged of all Americans and that 
they are deserving of special assistance in order to help them become self-
supporting members of our society.’ ”  Kyle v. Kyle, 582 N.E.2d at 846 (quoting 
H.R.Rep. No. 231, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 4989, 5133-5134). 
 
The factual scenario before us is quite different from one involving a child 
who has independent financial assets such as an inheritance or income derived 
from employment.  While these assets may lessen a child’s need for financial 
support from his or her parents, SSI benefits, which are unlike other types of 
financial resources, do not diminish a child’s need for support.  See Kost, 964 
S.W.2d at 530.  SSI benefits received by a disabled child “are intended to 
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supplement other income, not substitute for it.”  Oatley v. Oatley, 57 Ohio App.2d 
at 228, 11 O.O.3d at 262, 387 N.E.2d at 246.3 
 
The court of appeals correctly observed that reducing a parent’s child 
support obligation by an amount representing the child’s SSI benefits “would 
frustrate the purpose of the federal law by pushing the child’s standard of living 
back below the federal minimum.”  Such an approach would result in a “stair-
step” effect that would increase the child’s reliance on federal assistance while 
decreasing the parents’ financial responsibility, because as the child’s SSI benefits 
increase, the parents’ support obligation simultaneously decreases.  In order to 
avoid this unintended and absurd result, “[t]he amount of supplemental security 
income received is modified as the amount of the recipient’s other income 
changes, not vice versa.”  Oatley, 57 Ohio App.2d at 228, 11 O.O.3d at 262, 387 
N.E.2d at 246. 
 
Parents, to the extent that they are able, have an obligation to support their 
minor children.  In situations where a child is eligible to receive SSI, these 
benefits are intended to supplement the parents’ support obligation, not to reduce 
it.  Consequently, we find that supplemental security income benefits received by 
a disabled child do not constitute a financial resource of the child pursuant to R.C. 
3113.215(B)(3)(f) for purposes of justifying a trial court’s deviation from the 
basic child support schedule.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
                                                          
 
3.  We recognize that Oatley is a pre-guidelines case; however, we find that it remains applicable 
despite subsequent changes in the law. 
 
January Term, 2001 
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Gooding, Huffman, Kelley & Becker and John C. Huffman, for appellee. 
 
David R. Evans, for appellant. 
__________________