Case Title: Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 80 
Docket: 
Was-11-389 
Argued: 
February 14, 2012 
Decided: 
June 21, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
Majority: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and LEVY, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ. 
Concurrence: ALEXANDER, SILVER, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
TIMOTHY DANIELS 
 
v. 
 
NARRAGUAGUS BAY HEALTH CARE FACILITY et al. 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
 
[¶1]  Timothy Daniels appeals from the Superior Court’s (Washington 
County, Cuddy, J.) entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, 
Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility and North Country Associates, Inc. 1  
Daniels contends that the court erred in concluding that Narraguagus and North 
Country were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his disability 
discrimination and retaliation claims made pursuant to the Maine Human Rights 
Act (MHRA), 5 M.R.S. §§ 4572(1)(A), 4633(1) (2011).  We agree and vacate the 
judgment.2 
                                         
1  The Superior Court issued a separate judgment to resolve the claims against each defendant.  For 
ease of reference, we refer to these two orders as a single judgment. 
2  As a result, we do not reach Narraguagus’s argument regarding the statutory cap on damages. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts are presented in the light most favorable to Daniels 
as the nonprevailing party and are supported in the summary judgment record.3  
See Cookson v. Brewer Sch. Dep’t, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 2, 974 A.2d 276. 
[¶3]  Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility operates a nursing home in 
Milbridge.  North Country Associates, Inc. provides administrative support 
services, consultation, and advice to Narraguagus for which Narraguagus pays a 
monthly fee.  Although the two do not share common ownership or control, North 
Country has, at least once, assigned one of its employees to serve as the 
administrator at Narraguagus.4 
[¶4]  Timothy Daniels began working for Narraguagus in 2007 as a 
maintenance assistant.  Daniels’s job responsibilities included tasks required to 
achieve regulatory compliance such as floor waxing, buffing, and stripping; 
carpentry, plastering, and painting; testing generators, completing fire drills, and 
checking and recording tap water temperatures; and removing trash, unloading 
incoming supplies, and keeping safety logs. 
                                         
3  The parties’ statements of material facts and responses span ninety pages.  Maine Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(h)(1) requires “separate, short, and concise” statements of material facts, causing us to 
question the applicability of summary judgment practice in such a fact-driven case. 
4  A medical care facility other than a hospital, like Narraguagus, may operate only under the 
supervision of a licensed administrator.  See 32 M.R.S. § 61 (2011).  Thus, it was important for 
Narraguagus to always have a designated administrator. 
 
3 
[¶5]  Daniels suffered a work-related injury to his right shoulder in October 
2007 and thereafter was given work restrictions by his physician that prevented 
him from performing all of the work duties he had previously handled.  In January 
2008, Daniels underwent surgery and then began a leave of absence.  In March 
2008, Daniels delivered a letter to Betty Pomeroy, a Narraguagus employee then 
acting as administrator, noting that he was applying for more leave at her 
insistence.  In that letter, Daniels also reported that he had been cleared for light 
duty work, accused her of refusing to accommodate his disability, and asked for 
light duty work.5  No work was afforded to Daniels as a result of that letter. 
[¶6]  Based upon his allegation that Narraguagus had refused to 
accommodate his work restrictions, Daniels filed a complaint with the Maine 
Human Rights Commission (the Commission) against Narraguagus in August 
2008, which North Country became aware of in September 2008.6  In October 
2008, Daniels’s treating physician released him to return to work without 
restrictions.  In December 2008, Narraguagus rehired Daniels as a maintenance 
assistant because it had filled his former position as maintenance director.  In 
                                         
5  Daniels was receiving workers’ compensation benefits, but the record does not indicate whether he 
requested that he be allowed to return to work pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 218 (2011). 
6  In Daniels’s first Maine Human Rights Commission complaint, he named only Narraguagus.  After 
his termination, Daniels filed a new complaint with the Commission complaining of discrimination and 
retaliation by both Narraguagus and North Country.  At our request, Daniels provided a copy of this 
second complaint to us following oral argument.  The copy we received is undated.  We express no view 
on whether or not this procedural sequence satisfies the requirements of 5 M.R.S. § 4622(1) (2011). 
 
4 
February 2009, it promoted him to maintenance director after that position became 
available. 
[¶7]  Daniels suffered another work-related injury to his right shoulder in 
July 2009, and, although he did not lose any time from work as a result of that 
injury, he was restricted to modified duty for the next three months.  During that 
period, Linda Stephens, a North Country employee, disciplined Daniels for 
performance issues.  Early in November 2009, when Daniels no longer had any 
work restrictions, Narraguagus’s new administrator, Kevin Hachey, gave Daniels a 
performance improvement plan for failing to complete some tasks at all and failing 
to complete other tasks on time.  On November 30, 2009, in response to the 
complaint that he filed in August 2008, the Commission issued Daniels a 
right-to-sue letter pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 4612(6) (2011).  Both Narraguagus and 
North Country were aware of the letter. 
[¶8]  On December 11, 2009, the owner of Narraguagus, Dr. Steven 
Weisberger, wrote an email to Rosanne Tousignant, a North Country employee, 
which read: 
I do think they need to ride hard on [Daniels] as I am not sure if he is 
doing a good job and he is a huge liability with a [bad] attitude and a 
lazy work [ethic] that is well known in the community.  We have to be 
sure that we document everything with him everyday as he is going 
 
5 
forward with that civil suit.  I am sure that he hurt himself lobstering 
and not in the facility.[7] 
Tousignant’s role at Narraguagus is disputed.  In his summary judgment filings, 
Daniels asserted that she was frequently present at Narraguagus, which North 
Country denied.  Both cited different portions of Daniels’s deposition.  In any 
event, the parties agree that she was involved in some of the discipline at issue 
here.  The extent of her involvement, which affects the liability of North Country, 
is an issue for the fact-finder. 
[¶9]  A review letter written by Hachey on December 28, 2009, again 
documented Daniels’s job performance issues related to preventive maintenance 
and having to be asked more than once to complete work, as well as needing to 
prioritize and improve communication and cooperation skills.  On December 30, 
Daniels reported elbow pain to a physical therapist at Narraguagus.  Narraguagus 
claims that he did not timely report that injury, and on January 14, 2010, 
Tousignant recommended to Hachey that Daniels be disciplined for failing to do 
so. 
[¶10]  About two weeks later, state regulators visited Narraguagus to 
conduct a licensing inspection.  The inspection uncovered water temperature issues 
that not only resulted in the imposition of fines but also placed Narraguagus in 
                                         
7  This quotation comes directly from the email, which is part of the summary judgment record.  The 
parties’ statements of material facts included an additional word that does not appear in the email. 
 
6 
jeopardy of losing its license.  Narraguagus blamed Daniels for the negative 
inspection and terminated his employment on January 29, 2010.  Daniels’s 
termination notice referred only to this last disciplinary incident as the reason for 
his discharge.  Tousignant and Hachey were both present at the meeting when 
Daniels was fired.  At the time Daniels was terminated, both Hachey and 
Tousignant knew that Daniels had requested the right-to-sue letter from the 
Commission, which Tousignant interpreted to mean a lawsuit was forthcoming. 
[¶11]  After his termination, Daniels filed a two-count complaint against 
Narraguagus and North Country alleging disability discrimination and retaliation.8  
Narraguagus and North Country moved for summary judgment, which the Superior 
Court granted in their favor.  Daniels filed a timely appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶12]  Daniels alleged various MHRA claims against Narraguagus and North 
Country, including that they discriminated against him due to his disability and that 
they retaliated against him for filing a claim with the Commission.  We consider 
his claims against each entity and conclude that neither Narraguagus nor North 
Country was entitled to summary judgment. 
                                         
8  Daniels’s claim, at its essence, is that his employer mistreated him after he was injured at work.  
There was, however, no discussion of the workers’ compensation system within the parties’ briefs and 
trial court filings. 
 
7 
A. 
Claims Against Narraguagus 
1. 
Discrimination 
[¶13]  Daniels argues that the Superior Court erred in concluding that his 
disability discrimination claim failed as a matter of law.  We review the grant of a 
summary judgment de novo and view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonprevailing party to determine whether there are genuine issues of material 
fact and whether the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
See M.R. Civ. P. 56; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay, 2011 ME 101, ¶ 8, 
28 A.3d 1158. 
[¶14]  We follow a three-step, burden-shifting analysis to evaluate 
employment discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage.  See Cookson, 
2009 ME 57, ¶ 14, 974 A.2d 276; Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 ME 37, 
¶ 9, 895 A.2d 309, superseded by statute on other grounds by P.L. 2007, ch. 385, 
§ 3.  Pursuant to this analysis, an employee must first establish a prima facie case 
that (1) he has a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified, with or without reasonable 
accommodations, to perform the essential functions of his job; and (3) his 
employer adversely treated him based in whole or in part on his disability.  See 
Whitney, 2006 ME 37, ¶ 9, 895 A.2d 309. 
[¶15]  If the employee establishes prima facie evidence of these three 
elements, the burden then shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a 
 
8 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its action.  Doyle v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 
2003 ME 61, ¶ 15, 824 A.2d 48.  If the employer does so, the employee can 
survive a motion for summary judgment by presenting sufficient evidence from 
which a fact-finder could determine “that either (1) the circumstances underlying 
the employer’s articulated reason are untrue, or (2) even if true, those 
circumstances were not the actual cause of the employment decision.”  Cookson, 
2009 ME 57, ¶ 16, 974 A.2d 276.  We are mindful that discrimination claims in 
general are often difficult to assess at the summary judgment stage, and 
particularly that  “the issue of whether an employee has generated an issue of fact 
regarding an employer’s motivation or intent is one heavily dependent on the 
individual facts before the court.”  Id. ¶ 21. 
[¶16]  The Superior Court correctly placed the burden on Daniels to 
demonstrate prima facie evidence of his disability, his ability to perform his job, 
and an adverse action by his employer.  It erred, however, when it concluded: 
“There are no facts to establish the essential functions of plaintiff’s job.”  In fact, 
the parties’ summary judgment filings agree that Daniels’s job responsibilities 
included tasks required to achieve regulatory compliance and provided examples 
of those tasks.  The descriptions of Daniels’s work duties are sufficient to satisfy 
the second element of his prima facie case.  Whether some or all of these 
responsibilities were essential, and whether Daniels can actually perform them, as 
 
9 
he claims, are questions for a fact-finder.  See Pinkham v. Rite Aid of Me., Inc., 
2006 ME 9, ¶ 11, 889 A.2d 1009. 
[¶17]  The motion court further concluded that the summary judgment 
record did not establish the third element of Daniels’s prima facie case—causation.  
This conclusion was in error.  Although there is conflicting evidence on this issue, 
there is some evidence of animus based on Daniels’s disability that could permit a 
fact-finder to conclude that Daniels was fired for discriminatory reasons.  This sort 
of factual dispute must be resolved through fact-finding, even if Daniels’s 
likelihood of success is small.  See Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 7, 
784 A.2d 18. 
[¶18]  The motion court did not address the second and third prongs of the 
burden-shifting analysis, presumably because it concluded that Daniels had not 
established his prima facie case.  The undisputed facts do include a series of 
disciplinary actions against Daniels that could satisfy the employer’s prong of the 
analysis.  Daniels alleges that the discipline was simply a pretext, however, 
pointing to the email from Dr. Weisberger, the fact that he was rehired twice 
during his total employment, and deposition testimony presenting disputed facts. 
[¶19]  The summary judgment filings indicate that Daniels has generated 
prima facie evidence that (1) he has a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to 
perform the essential functions of the maintenance position, with or without 
 
10 
reasonable accommodations; and (3) Narraguagus discharged him.  The summary 
judgment filings also indicate, however, that there is evidence that could lead 
fact-finders in two different directions when considering whether Narraguagus’s 
discharge of Daniels was or was not due to factors related to his claimed disability.  
In addition, there are issues of material fact concerning all aspects of Daniels’s 
claim including, as mentioned above, whether or when Daniels was able to 
perform the core functions of his job.  Therefore, summary judgment is not 
available to Narraguagus on Daniels’s discrimination claim. 
2. 
Retaliation 
[¶20]  Daniels also argues that the Superior Court failed to address his 
retaliation claim against Narraguagus.  The Superior Court did address the claim, 
but in concluding that Narraguagus could not be liable to Daniels for retaliation, 
the court may have conflated the causation analysis of Daniels’s discrimination 
claim with causation in the retaliation context. 
[¶21]  To establish a prima facie retaliation claim, Daniels must demonstrate 
that he engaged in a statutorily protected activity, that Narraguagus made an 
employment decision that adversely affected him, and that there was a causal link 
between the two.  See Doyle, 2003 ME 61, ¶ 20, 824 A.2d 48.  Temporal proximity 
of an employer’s awareness of protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action 
may serve as the causal link for purposes of a prima facie case.  See Watt v. 
 
11 
UniFirst Corp., 2009 ME 47, ¶ 33, 969 A.2d 897; Doyle, 2003 ME 61, ¶ 20, 
824 A.2d 48.  Although Narraguagus argues that the protected activity and 
discharge are too far removed from each other to give rise to an inference of 
causation, only two months passed between the Commission’s issuance of a 
right-to-sue letter, which is the protected activity against which Daniels alleges 
Narraguagus retaliated, and his discharge. 
[¶22]  Even though the Superior Court concluded that Daniels had not 
demonstrated that disability discrimination was the cause of his discharge, 
retaliation is a separate claim that does not require there to have been underlying 
discrimination.  In the discrimination context, causation links disability status to 
discharge, whereas in the retaliation context, causation links protected activity to 
discharge.  Therefore, the Superior Court’s analysis as to causation in the 
discrimination context was not applicable to Daniels’s retaliation claim.  Even if 
one party’s version of events appears more credible and persuasive to the court, the 
competing inferences that could be drawn from the temporal proximity of the 
Commission’s right-to-sue letter and Daniels’s termination, along with 
Dr. Weisberger’s email, create a triable issue precluding summary judgment.  
See Watt, 2009 ME 47, ¶ 35, 969 A.2d 897.  As a result, we vacate the summary 
judgment entered in favor of Narraguagus on Daniels’s retaliation claim. 
 
12 
B. 
Claims Against North Country 
1. 
Discrimination 
[¶23]  The motion court granted summary judgment for North Country on 
the discrimination claim because it concluded that North Country was not 
Daniels’s employer and thus could not be held liable for discrimination.  We 
review this conclusion de novo to determine whether there are genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment.  Gabay, 2011 ME 101, ¶ 8, 
28 A.3d 1158. 
[¶24]  Daniels advances two theories of liability against North Country, first, 
that it can be liable because it is part of an integrated enterprise with Narraguagus, 
and second, that it acted in Narraguagus’s interest in discriminating against him.  
The second argument focuses on the statutory language of the MHRA, which 
defines “employer” as including “any person acting in the interest of any employer, 
directly or indirectly.”  5 M.R.S. § 4553(4) (2011). 
[¶25]  We have not yet decided whether to adopt the integrated enterprise 
theory, 9  see Batchelder v. Realty Res. Hospitality, LLC, 2007 ME 17, ¶ 11, 
914 A.2d 1116, and Daniels’s reading of section 4553(4) is novel.  We need not 
accept or reject either of Daniels’s theories at this early stage of the proceedings, 
                                         
9  Contrary to Daniels’s argument, the existence of an integrated enterprise is not a jury question 
per se.  The authority he cites merely concluded that a factual dispute precluded summary judgment in a 
specific case.  See Phair v. New Page Corp., 708 F. Supp. 2d 57, 69 (D. Me. 2010). 
 
13 
however, because there are multiple issues of disputed fact regarding North 
Country’s involvement in the actions that he claims constituted discrimination and 
retaliation. 
[¶26]  Those issues of disputed fact must be resolved before any court can 
attempt to determine whether Narraguagus and North Country could be found to be 
an integrated enterprise, if such a cause of action were found to exist, or whether 
North Country is liable for discrimination because it acted in the interest of 
Narraguagus in discriminating against Daniels.  For these reasons, we must remand 
the discrimination claim against North Country for the trial court to consider in the 
first instance. 
2. 
Retaliation 
[¶27]  Finally, Daniels argues that the motion court erred in concluding that 
North Country could not be held liable for retaliation.  The motion court concluded 
that any person, including a non-employer, may be liable for a retaliation claim.  
See 5 M.R.S. § 4633(1) (2011) (stating that “[a] person” may not retaliate against 
an individual because the individual asserted rights that the MHRA protects 
(emphasis added)); 5 M.R.S. § 4553(7) (2011) (defining “person” to include 
corporations).  Again, we decline to adopt the legal theories advanced in this case 
 
14 
before adjudication of the underlying facts.10  Daniels argues that the motion court 
erred in concluding that he had presented no facts allowing a reasonable inference 
that North Country, assuming it participated in the decision to discharge him, did 
so because of his complaint to the Commission.  For the same reasons that apply to 
Narraguagus, we agree, which requires us to vacate the Superior Court’s judgment 
in favor of North Country on both Daniels’s discrimination and retaliation claims. 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded to the Superior 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SILVER, J., with whom ALEXANDER and JABAR, JJ., join, concurring. 
[¶28]  First, I commend the Court’s forward-thinking opinion because it 
reiterates that determining credibility and weighing evidence has no place in 
summary judgment practice.  The burden-shifting analysis deals only with burdens 
of production, not of persuasion.  See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 
502, 509 (1993) (stating that “the determination that a defendant has met its burden 
                                         
10  The parties’ summary judgment filings presented the facts as heavily contested.  On a variety of 
points, both parties extensively objected to or denied the factual assertions of the other.  Although parties 
are free to conduct themselves in any way supported by the record and rules of procedure, trial courts are 
more likely to be able to decide portions of cases on summary judgment when the parties dispute fewer of 
the facts.  As our recent amendments to M.R. Civ. P. 56(d) make clear, “a fact admitted or not opposed by 
any party solely for purposes of summary judgment is not deemed admitted for any other purpose if the 
motion for summary judgment is denied.”  M.R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee’s Note to 2012 amend. 
 
15 
of production . . . can involve no credibility assessment” because “the 
burden-of-production 
determination 
necessarily 
precedes 
the 
credibility-assessment stage”); id. at 524 (stating that whether the employer’s 
proffered reason for the adverse treatment is unpersuasive is a question for the 
fact-finder).  At the summary judgment stage, the court cannot decide which party 
has presented stronger evidence when competing plausible inferences can be 
drawn from the facts.  See F.R. Carroll, Inc. v. TD Bank, N.A., 2010 ME 115, ¶ 8, 
8 A.3d 646.  This is especially true with issues of motive or intent that are present 
in employment discrimination cases.  
 [¶29]  I write separately because it is time to simplify the summary 
judgment process and eliminate any burden-shifting analysis.  As has been 
discussed thoroughly in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
and the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the 
continued vitality of the burden-shifting analysis is questionable.  See Wells v. 
Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221-28 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., 
concurring); accord, e.g., Peterson v. City College, 32 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683-84 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell 
Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 
Brook. L. Rev. 659 (1998).  I agree that the analysis is outdated, confusing, and 
 
16 
unworkable.  At this point, it confuses rather than clarifies the ultimate issue in 
employment discrimination cases: whether there is evidence of discrimination.   
[¶30]  The analysis adds a layer to the court’s already difficult task in 
deciding a motion for summary judgment on a discrimination claim.  This analysis 
originated in the United States Supreme Court with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), in which the Court applied the analysis to a 
claim of racial discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
in the context of a trial.  We then adopted the McDonnell analysis for 
discrimination claims pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act in Maine Human 
Rights Commission v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261-62 (Me. 1979).  In that 
case, we expressly noted that although federal case law applies McDonnell during 
a trial, it should be used after a trial when the court is assessing the record as a 
whole.  Id. at 1262 n.13.   
[¶31]  We first extended the analysis to the summary judgment stage in 
Doyle v. Department of Human Services, 2003 ME 61, ¶¶ 14-15, 824 A.2d 48.  
Although in Maine we had only applied the analysis at or after trial, we made 
reference in Doyle to the federal system, see id., which has historically applied 
McDonnell at the summary judgment stage, see, e.g., Cartagena v. Sec’y of Navy, 
618 F.2d 130, 132-33 (1st Cir. 1980).  Following Doyle we have continued to 
apply the analysis at the summary judgment stage.  See Cookson v. Brewer Sch. 
 
17 
Dep’t, 2009 ME 57, 974 A.2d 276; Currie v. Indus. Sec., Inc., 2007 ME 12, 915 
A.2d 400; LePage v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2006 ME 130, 909 A.2d 629 
(applying the analysis in the context of a claim pursuant to the Maine 
Whistleblowers Protection Act); Stanley v. Hancock Cnty. Comm’rs, 2004 ME 
157, 864 A.2d 169 (same).  We have also fastidiously applied the mandates of 
M.R. Civ. P. 56, e.g., Doyle, 2003 ME 61, ¶¶ 10-13, 824 A.2d 48, while at the 
same time recognizing the difficulty inherent in deciding these claims at the 
summary judgment stage, see Cookson, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 21, 974 A.2d 276.  It is this 
precedent that compelled the Superior Court to apply the analysis to Daniels’s 
claims at the summary judgment stage and that, in turn, requires us to review the 
judgment in this framework. 
[¶32]  What our precedent has failed to recognize is that the McDonnell 
analysis is a “procedural device, designed only to establish an order of proof and 
production.”  Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521 (quotation marks omitted).  It is framed as 
three distinct steps in order to help the court conceptually organize the evidence 
before presenting the ultimate question of discrimination to the jury.  See Hicks, 
509 U.S. at 507-08, 517-18 (stating that after the defendant meets his burden of 
production, the plaintiff “has the full and fair opportunity to demonstrate, through 
presentation of his own case and through cross-examination of the defendant’s 
witnesses, that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment 
 
18 
decision” (quotation marks omitted)); Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1261 (“The special 
rules developed by the federal courts provide a sensible, orderly way to evaluate 
the evidence . . . as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.” (quotation 
marks omitted)).  Its purpose is to determine whether there is causation between 
the employee’s disability and the employer’s adverse action.  This is the third 
element of a discrimination claim. 
[¶33]  The analysis is intricate because claims involving motive and pretext 
are complex, nuanced, and often difficult for the fact-finder to parse out.  However, 
it is meant to simplify rather than complicate matters for trial; it “was never 
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.”  Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519 (quotation 
marks omitted).  Accordingly, in discrimination cases “trial courts or reviewing 
courts” should not make the already “sensitive and difficult” inquiry into the 
employer’s mental process “more difficult by applying legal rules which were 
devised to govern the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof 
in deciding this ultimate question.”  U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 
460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶34]  At the summary judgment stage in employment discrimination cases, 
the McDonnell analysis unnecessarily complicates what should be a 
straightforward and objective inquiry pursuant to Rule 56.  Rule 56 provides that 
summary judgment can only be granted to a defendant when (1) there are no 
 
19 
genuine disputes of material fact, and (2) the undisputed evidence fails to establish 
a prima facie cause of action, such that no reasonable view of the evidence would 
permit a fact-finder to find in favor of the nonmoving party.  See M.R. Civ. P. 
56(c); Bonin v. Crepeau, 2005 ME 59, ¶ 8, 873 A.2d 346 (“To survive a 
defendant’s motion for a summary judgment, the plaintiff must establish a prima 
facie case for each element of her cause of action.” (quotation marks omitted)).  In 
these cases, the court’s purview on a motion for summary judgment is limited to 
the prima facie case pursuant to Rule 56.   
[¶35]  To the extent that the McDonnell analysis functions as an overlay on 
our standard summary judgment practice, steadfastly proceeding through its three 
steps is unnecessary and unworkable at the summary judgment stage.  It breaks 
down what is in reality the third element of an employment discrimination claim 
into its own three-prong showing that volleys the burden of production between the 
two parties.  At this stage it does nothing more than organize the record to 
determine whether the plaintiff has offered evidence of causation between the 
employer’s adverse action and the employee’s disability, and whether the 
defendant has offered evidence to put that issue into dispute.  It is not necessary to 
use the McDonnell analysis to make these determinations.  All the court needs to 
do—and all that it can do pursuant to Rule 56—is assess the record to determine if 
 
20 
there are genuine issues of material fact or if the undisputed facts entitle one party 
to judgment as a matter of law. 
[¶36]  Therefore, I would not apply the McDonnell analysis to 
discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage.  On a motion for summary 
judgment, I would limit the inquiry in these cases to that which is provided for by 
Rule 56: whether there are genuine disputes of material fact, and whether the 
undisputed material facts establish a prima facie cause of action.  These are the 
only questions for the court at the summary judgment stage.   
[¶37]  Here, a prima facie case for employment discrimination requires 
Daniels to offer evidence that he has a disability, that he can perform the essential 
functions of his job, and that he was treated adversely because of his disability.  
See Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 ME 37, ¶ 9, 895 A.2d 309, superseded 
by statute on other grounds by P.L. 2007, ch. 385, § 3; see also Auburn, 408 A.2d 
at 1262 (“If the judge finds proof of certain circumstances that the law treats as 
sufficient to support an inference of unlawful discrimination, then a prima facie 
case for the plaintiff is made out . . . .”).  As the majority recognizes, it is 
inherently difficult to assess discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage 
because the third element of the claim requires the court to delve into the 
employer’s motive or intent.  See Cookson, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 21, 974 A.2d 276.  
Issues of motive and intent are often decided on circumstantial evidence that 
 
21 
requires the court to make inferences from the facts and to choose between 
competing inferences generated by the facts.  See, e.g., State v. Pinkham-Murch, 
432 A.2d 1297, 1300 (Me. 1981). 
[¶38]  When analyzed as Rule 56 requires, this record is rife with genuine 
disputes of material fact regarding the second and third elements of Daniels’s 
claim for employment discrimination, which bear on the ultimate issue of whether 
Daniels has been discriminated against.  I would vacate the summary judgment 
against him on that basis alone, as summary judgment practice requires, without 
evaluating the strength of the evidence that each party has offered to prove or 
disprove the third element. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Arthur J. Greif, Esq., and Julie D. Farr, Esq., Gilbert & Greif, P.A., Bangor, 
for appellant Timothy Daniels 
 
Gregg R. Frame, Esq., Taylor, McCormack & Frame, LLC, Portland, for 
appellee Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility 
 
Michael R. Poulin, Esq., and Marc N. Frenette, Esq., Skelton, Taintor & 
Abbott, Auburn, for appellee North Country Associates, Inc. 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Arthur J. Greif, Esq., for appellant Timothy Daniels 
 
Gregg R. Frame, Esq., for appellee Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility 
 
Marc N. Frennette, Esq., for appellee North Country Associates, Inc. 
 
22 
 
Washington County Superior Court docket number CV-2010-4 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY