Case Title: Rash v. Anderson

Citation: 1997-Ohio-338

Docket Number: 19971236

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
RASH, APPELLANT, v. ANDERSON, WARDEN, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Rash v. Anderson (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 349.] 
Habeas corpus to compel petitioner’s release from Grafton Correctional 
Institution — Writ denied, when — Application of R.C. 2969.22 to indigent 
inmates not a violation of constitutional rights of access to courts, due 
process, equal protection, and freedom from double jeopardy. 
(No. 97-1236 — Submitted October 7, 1997 — Decided December 3, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 97CA006728. 
 
On October 2, 1981, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 
convicted appellant, Daniel G. Rash, of three counts of attempted rape and 
sentenced him to terms of two-to-fifteen years’ imprisonment on each count.  In 
the same judgment, the common pleas court suspended Rash’s sentence and placed 
him on five years’ probation.  During this probation period, two capiases were 
issued for Rash’s arrest, including one on January 25, 1985, which was not 
returned until April 11, 1986.  On October 3, 1986, following a hearing, the 
common pleas court entered a judgment that revoked Rash’s probation and 
resentenced him to consecutive terms of five-to-fifteen years’ imprisonment for 
each count of attempted rape. 
 
In April 1997, Rash filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for Lorain 
County for a writ of habeas corpus to compel his immediate release from Grafton 
Correctional Institution.  Rash claimed that the common pleas court lacked 
jurisdiction to sentence him after he had completed his five-year probation period.  
Rash also filed an affidavit of indigency in which he asserted that he was unable to 
pay any costs or fees associated with his habeas corpus action.  Appellee, Grafton 
Correctional Institution Warden Carl Anderson, filed a motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment.  Before the court of appeals ruled on appellee’s motion, the 
 
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clerk of the court of appeals sent a notice to the Grafton Correctional Institution 
Cashier ordering the cashier, in accordance with R.C. 2969.22(A), to remit all 
funds exceeding ten dollars in Rash’s inmate account until the filing fee for his 
habeas corpus action was paid in full.  The court of appeals subsequently granted 
appellee’s motion for summary judgment and denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
____________________ 
 
Daniel Rash, pro se. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Donald Gary Keyser, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
Habeas Corpus Claim 
 
In Rash’s first proposition of law, he asserts that the court of appeals erred 
by denying his writ of habeas corpus.  Rash claims that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to revoke his probation and resentence him, since his five-year 
probation period had expired. 
 
When a court’s judgment is void because the court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction, habeas corpus is generally an appropriate remedy despite the 
availability of appeal.  Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 656 
N.E.2d 1282, 1284, citing In re Lockhart (1952), 157 Ohio St. 192, 195, 47 O.O. 
129, 131, 105 N.E.2d 35, 37, and paragraph three of the syllabus; but, see, State v. 
Pless (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 333, 658 N.E.2d 766, paragraphs one and two of the 
syllabus (jurisdictional defect waived if not raised on direct appeal).  “At the end 
or termination of the period of probation, the jurisdiction of the judge or 
 
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magistrate to impose sentence ceases and the defendant shall be discharged.”  R.C. 
2951.09. 
 
Under R.C. 2951.07, however, “[i]f the probationer absconds or otherwise 
absents himself from the jurisdiction of the court without permission from the 
county department of probation or the court to do so, * * * the probation period 
ceases to run until such time as he is brought before the court for its further 
action.”  As the court of appeals correctly held, the issuance of two capiases for 
Rash during his five-year probation period tolled the running of his probation 
period so that the trial court retained jurisdiction to revoke his probation and 
resentence him on October 3, 1986.  See, generally, State v. Cass (1991), 77 Ohio 
App.3d 697, 700, 603 N.E.2d 319, 321; State v. O’Leary (1987), 43 Ohio App.3d 
124, 125, 539 N.E.2d 634, 636; State v. Wallace (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 262, 263, 
7 OBR 342, 343, 454 N.E.2d 1356, 1358; Columbus v. Keethler (Nov. 7, 1995), 
Franklin App. Nos. 95AP604-399 and 95APC04-400, unreported, 1995 WL 
656921; see, also, In re Townsend (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 136, 138, 554 N.E.2d 
1336, 1338 (R.C. 2951.07 does not require that the probationer leave the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court that imposed probation in order to toll the running of the 
probation period.). 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly denied the writ of 
habeas corpus. 
R.C. 2969.22 
 
Rash contends in his second proposition of law that the court of appeals 
erred in ordering the deduction of funds from his inmate account pursuant to R.C. 
2969.22.  Rash claims that the application of R.C. 2969.22 to indigent inmates 
such as himself violates their constitutional rights of access to courts, due process, 
equal protection, and against double jeopardy.  Although the Attorney General 
 
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filed a brief on behalf of appellee, appellee did not respond to Rash’s R.C. 
2969.22 contention. 
 
R.C. 2969.22 is part of Sub.H.B. No. 455, effective October 17, 1996, and 
sets forth in forma pauperis filing requirements for inmates commencing civil 
actions or appeals against government entities or employees.  R.C. 2969.22 sets 
forth the procedures for payment of costs by inmates initiating these actions or 
appeals. 
 
Rash’s claims are meritless.  Federal courts have rejected similar 
constitutional challenges to the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 
Section 1915, Title 28, U.S.Code, which sets forth analogous in forma pauperis 
requirements for prisoner litigation in federal courts.  See, e.g., Nicholas v. Tucker 
(C.A.2, 1997), 114 F.3d 17 (PLRA’s filing fee provisions do not violate equal 
protection or deny access to courts.); Hampton v. Hobbs (C.A.6, 1997), 106 F.3d 
1281 (PLRA’s filing fee requirements do not violate rights of access to courts, due 
process, equal protection, or against double jeopardy.).  The court of appeals thus 
did not violate Rash’s constitutional rights by applying R.C. 2969.22.  
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.