Case Title: State v. Bailey

Citation: 2022-Ohio-4407

Docket Number: 2021-1432

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Bailey, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4407.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4407 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BAILEY, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Bailey, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4407.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2941.25—Plain-error doctrine—A defendant who fails to 
preserve the issue of merger of allied offenses under R.C. 2941.25 by raising 
an objection in the trial court forfeits all but plain error—Defendant failed 
to establish that trial court’s decision not to merge kidnapping and rape 
counts for purposes of sentencing constituted plain error—Judgment 
reversed and sentence imposed by trial court reinstated. 
(No. 2021-1432—Submitted July 13, 2022—Decided December 14, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-200386, 
2021-Ohio-3664. 
__________________ 
DONNELLY, J. 
{¶ 1} This case turns on the proper application of the plain-error doctrine.  
We conclude that the plain-error doctrine was not properly applied by the First 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
District Court of Appeals in this matter.  We, therefore, reverse the court of appeals’ 
judgment. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Tytus Bailey, approached a group of three—one woman 
and two men—in downtown Cincinnati with the intent to rob them.  When he 
learned they did not have much of value to take, Bailey knocked the two men 
unconscious and threatened to do the same to the woman.  He then forced the 
woman to walk the distance of about one city block to a parking garage where he 
raped her.  Bailey was arrested and indicted in the Hamilton County Court of 
Common Pleas for one count each of robbery, kidnapping, and abduction and two 
counts of rape.  A jury found Bailey guilty on all counts. 
{¶ 3} For purposes of sentencing, the trial court merged the abduction and 
kidnapping counts.  The court concluded that the kidnapping and rape counts did 
not merge, because kidnapping the victim and forcing her walk to the parking 
garage was an offense independent of the subsequent rapes.  The court sentenced 
Bailey to prison terms of 11 years for each rape count, 11 years for the kidnapping 
count, and 8 years for the robbery count—the maximum sentences available—and 
ordered that the sentences be served consecutively.  Bailey did not object at 
sentencing to the trial court’s failure to merge the kidnapping and rape counts. 
{¶ 4} Bailey appealed to the First District.  The court of appeals denied three 
of Bailey’s assignments of error, which are no longer at issue in this case, and 
reversed on the fourth, concluding that the kidnapping and rape counts were allied 
offenses of similar import that should have been merged and that the trial court 
committed plain error by failing to merge them. 
{¶ 5} We accepted appellant the state’s appeal on the following proposition 
of law: 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
3 
A trial court’s judgment to sentence two offenses separately 
is due deference by a reviewing court where: the record strongly 
supports the determination that the movement of the rape victim was 
substantial enough to attain independent significance; the reviewing 
court was not present at trial to view the demeanor of the defendant 
or the victim; the defendant waived the issue and caselaw supports 
separate sentences in similar cases.  When a reviewing court 
reverses, not for any apparent “manifest injustice”—but because it 
subjectively disagrees with the trial court’s determination—it is 
simply substituting its judgment for that of the trial judge.  Under 
such circumstances, the reviewing court’s reversal is itself properly 
reversed. 
 
See 166 Ohio St.3d 1405, 2022-Ohio-461, 181 N.E.3d 1194. 
ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 6} We review de novo whether certain offenses should be merged as 
allied offenses under R.C. 2941.25.  State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482, 2012-
Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 1. 
Plain-Error Doctrine 
{¶ 7} The question before this court is whether the First District properly 
determined that the trial court erred by not merging the kidnapping and rape counts 
as allied offenses.  Because it is undisputed that Bailey failed to preserve the issue 
of merger at trial, we review the issue for plain error.  See State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio 
St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 28 (“the failure to raise the allied 
offense issue at the time of sentencing forfeits all but plain error”). 
{¶ 8} Under the plain-error doctrine, intervention by a reviewing court is 
warranted only under exceptional circumstances to prevent injustice.  State v. Long, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4 
53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus (“Notice 
of plain error * * * is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional 
circumstances and only to prevent a miscarriage of justice”).  To prevail under the 
plain-error doctrine, Bailey must establish that “an error occurred, that the error 
was obvious, and that there is ‘a reasonable probability that the error resulted in 
prejudice,’ meaning that the error affected the outcome of the trial.”  (Emphasis 
added in Rogers.)  State v. McAlpin, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1567, ___ 
N.E.3d ___, ¶ 66, quoting Rogers at ¶ 22; see also State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 
359, 2018-Ohio-1562, 114 N.E.3d 1092, ¶ 52. 
{¶ 9} The elements of the plain-error doctrine are conjunctive: all three 
must apply to justify an appellate court’s intervention.  State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio 
St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002) (“By its very terms, the rule places three 
limitations on a reviewing court’s decision to correct an error despite the absence 
of a timely objection at trial”). 
{¶ 10} First, there must be error—i.e., “ ‘a deviation from a legal rule’ that 
constitutes ‘an “obvious” defect in the trial proceedings.’ ”  Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 
385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, at ¶ 22, quoting Barnes at 27.  In this case, 
Bailey challenged the trial court’s determination to not merge the kidnapping and 
rape counts as error.  And the First District agreed, concluding that the trial court’s 
failure to merge those counts constituted an obvious error.  The test to determine 
whether allied offenses should be merged is well known: 
 
We have applied a three-part test under R.C. 2941.25 to 
determine whether a defendant can be convicted of multiple 
offenses: “As a practical matter, when determining whether offenses 
are allied offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 
2941.25, courts must ask three questions when defendant’s conduct 
supports multiple offenses: (1) Were the offenses dissimilar in 
January Term, 2022 
 
5 
import or significance? (2) Were they committed separately? and (3) 
Were they committed with separate animus or motivation?  An 
affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separate 
convictions.  The conduct, the animus, and the import must all be 
considered.” 
 
State v. Earley, 145 Ohio St.3d 281, 2015-Ohio-4615, 49 N.E.3d 266, ¶ 12, quoting 
State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 31. 
{¶ 11} Although determining whether R.C. 2941.25 has been properly 
applied is a legal question, it necessarily turns on an analysis of the facts, which 
can lead to exceedingly fine distinctions.  See State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 
2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 52 (“this analysis may be sometimes difficult 
to perform and may result in varying results for the same set of offenses in different 
cases”), abrogated in part by Ruff at ¶ 1 (holding that “offenses resulting in harm 
that is separate and identifiable are offenses of dissimilar import” for purposes of 
merger under R.C. 2941.25(B)). 
{¶ 12} In this case, Bailey forced the victim to walk about a city block to a 
parking garage where he raped her.  He had informed the victim that his intention 
was to rape her.  The trial court determined that Bailey’s kidnapping of the victim 
by forcing her to walk to a different location was a separate offense from the rape 
that he committed once they reached the parking garage—in other words, the 
kidnapping was not merely incidental to the rape.  This issue has arisen previously, 
see, e.g., State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 397 N.E.2d 1345 (1979), and 
culminated in the three-part test elucidated in Ruff and Earley. 
{¶ 13} Because the trial court’s ruling here involved a legal determination 
premised on the specific facts of this case, the court of appeals properly reviewed 
the issue de novo.  See Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 
1245, at ¶ 16-27.  Indeed, there is no dispute about the facts in this case; the dispute 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6 
is over the import of those facts.  Finding that the facts of this case are most similar 
to those in Logan—based in large part on the distance that Bailey forced the victim 
to walk before reaching the location where he raped her—the First District 
concluded that the kidnapping here “was merely incidental to the rape.”  2021-
Ohio-3664, ¶ 12.  But the three-part test is not a factual test centered on distance or 
any other fact.  Nor should it be.  See Johnson at ¶ 52. 
{¶ 14} The second element of the plain-error test requires the error to be 
obvious.  The trial court concluded that Bailey’s motivation for making the victim 
walk to the parking garage was not incidental to the rape; the First District 
concluded that it was.  Even if we were to assume that the trial court erred by not 
merging the kidnapping and rape counts, the facts of the case indicate that such an 
error was not obvious. 
{¶ 15} The second element of the three-part test gives teeth to our belief 
that the plain-error doctrine is warranted only under exceptional circumstances to 
prevent injustice.  See Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804, at paragraph three 
of the syllabus; see also United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 
80 L.Ed. 555 (1936) (“In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, 
appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to 
which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise 
seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings”). 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 16} Application of the law governing the merger of allied offenses is 
dependent on the specific facts of each case.  Here, it is clear to us that in an area 
of law so driven by factual distinctions, any asserted error was not obvious.  
Because Bailey failed to preserve the issue of merger of allied offenses by raising 
an objection in the trial court, he forfeited all but plain error, which he has not 
January Term, 2022 
 
7 
established.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the First District Court of 
Appeals and reinstate the sentence imposed by the trial court. 
Judgment reversed. 
DEWINE and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs, with an opinion joined by O’CONNOR, C.J. 
KENNEDY and STEWART, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 17} I agree with the majority opinion that the First District Court of 
Appeals erred when it found that the trial court committed plain error by refusing 
to merge the offenses of kidnapping and rape.  I write separately to address the First 
District’s reliance on this court’s decision in State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 
365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923. 
{¶ 18} The First District noted that it was required to apply plain-error 
analysis because appellee, Tytus Bailey, had failed to object at sentencing to the 
trial court’s decision not to merge the kidnapping and rape counts.  2021-Ohio-
3664, ¶ 7.  Then, relying on its own decision in State v. Merz, 1st Dist. Hamilton 
No. C-200152, 2021-Ohio-2093, and this court’s decision in Underwood, the First 
District held: “A trial court’s failure to merge allied offenses ‘necessarily affects a 
substantial right’ that constitutes plain error.”  Id., quoting Merz at ¶ 7.  I write to 
point out that this court’s holding in Underwood is not as broad as the First District 
suggests and does not support the First District’s conclusion that a failure to merge 
allied offenses of similar import always constitutes plain error, even if the error is 
not obvious. 
{¶ 19} In Underwood, Richard Underwood committed two acts of theft and 
was indicted on four counts: two counts of theft and two counts of aggravated theft.  
Id. at ¶ 2.  Underwood entered into a plea deal with the state and pled no contest to 
each of the four counts.  Id. at ¶ 4.  The state filed a sentencing recommendation as 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
part of the deal; in that sentencing recommendation, the state noted, “ ‘The two 
counts in each of the different categories of thefts would be considered allied 
offenses of similar import and would require the Court to sentence the defendant to 
only one of the thefts.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 5.  Despite the state’s sentencing recommendation, 
the trial court sentenced Underwood to separate prison terms on each count and 
made no mention of allied offenses.  Id. at ¶ 6. 
{¶ 20} On appeal, Underwood argued that the trial court had improperly 
imposed separate sentences for allied offenses of similar import.  Underwood, 124 
Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, at ¶ 7.  The state argued that 
Underwood’s sentence was not reviewable on appeal because it was imposed 
pursuant to a plea agreement.  Id.  Therefore, the issue before this court was whether 
an agreed-upon sentence is reviewable when it includes separate sentences for 
allied offenses of similar import.  Id. at ¶ 9.  This court held that a defendant’s plea 
to multiple counts does not affect the sentencing court’s mandatory duty to merge 
allied offenses of similar import.  Id. at ¶ 30.  Therefore, we held that a court of 
appeals may review a defendant’s claim that the court imposed separate sentences 
for allied offenses of similar import, even when the defendant had agreed to the 
sentence.  Id. at ¶ 33.  It was within that context that this court held that a trial 
court’s failure to merge allied offenses of similar import may be considered plain 
error, even if the parties jointly agreed upon the sentence. 
{¶ 21} In Underwood, the trial court’s failure to merge the allied offenses 
was clearly plain error because the state had conceded that the offenses were allied 
offenses of similar import in its sentencing report.  But nowhere in Underwood did 
this court hold that a reviewing court may forego a plain-error analysis when allied 
offenses are involved.  To the contrary, this court made clear that plain-error 
analysis still applies, id. at ¶ 31-32, and that the party arguing plain error must show 
that there was “ ‘a deviation from a legal rule’ that constitutes an ‘obvious’ defect 
in the trial proceedings,” State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 
January Term, 2022 
 
9 
N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 
(2002). 
{¶ 22} As the majority opinion points out, even if we were to assume that 
the trial court erred by not merging the kidnapping and rape counts, the facts of the 
case indicate that such an error was not obvious.  Therefore, the facts in this case 
do not support a finding of an obvious defect in the trial proceedings that would 
constitute plain error. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. 
Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
The Law Office of John D. Hill, L.L.C., and John D. Hill Jr., for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Kimberly E. Burroughs, 
Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public 
Defender. 
_________________