Case Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brown1991 WY 10805 P.2d 830Case Number: 89-134Decided: 01/30/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 

STATE of 
Wyoming, ex rel. 
WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, 

Appellant 
(Objector-Defendant),

 

v.

 

James L. 
BROWN, 

Appellee 
(Employee-Claimant).

 

Appeal from 
the District Court, Fremont 
County, Elizabeth 
A. Kail, J.

 

Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Ron Arnold, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Larry M. Donovan, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for 
appellant.

 

Valerie 
Hafner Phifer, Lander, for 
appellee.

 

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.,* and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

 

[¶1]  The Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division appeals from a district court order restoring legal fees and costs 
billed by the attorney appointed to represent an injured worker. Counsel 
petitioned for review by the district court following an administrative hearing 
examiner's reduction of her compensation by more than thirty-three percent and 
disallowance of about half of her costs. The immediate issue is whether a 
district court can hear an appeal from an order by an administrative hearing 
examiner and modify the order when the district court judge finds the amount 
awarded is unreasonable and is established by an improper legal standard within 
the worker's compensation statutes, W.S. 27-14-101 through 27-14-805, and the 
state constitution.

 

[¶2]  The issues in this case involve the 
right of an injured worker to counsel when pitted against the private attorneys 
who represent the employer in conjunction with state employed attorneys in the 
Attorney General's office who represent the Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division. Also presented is the right of any attorney who represents the injured 
worker to be compensated fairly. Justification for the attorney fee reduction 
and cost denial came from the application of adopted rules supplemented by 
applied practice.

 

[¶3]  We affirm the district court.

 

I. ISSUES 
ARGUED

 

[¶4]  Appellant, 
Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division (Division), asks whether the district court:

 

I. * * * 
lack[ed] statutory authority and jurisdiction to enter an order awarding 
attorney fees for representation of appellee before the Office of Administrative 
Hearings.

II. * * * 
err[ed] as a matter of law in holding a hearing and taking additional evidence 
regarding attorney fees for representation of appellee before the Office of 
Administrative Hearings.

III. * * * 
err[ed] as a matter of law by substituting its judgment on the amount of 
attorney's fees and costs [] reasonably incurred in the representation of 
appellee before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

IV. * * * 
err[ed] as a matter of law by failing to follow W.S. 16-3-114(c) when entering 
its findings and order.

 

[¶5]  Appellee, James L. Brown (Brown), asks 
whether the district court:

 

1. * * * 
lack[ed] authority and jurisdiction to change the order of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings regarding the award of attorney fees and costs for 
representation of appellee?

2. * * * 
err[ed] as a matter of law in holding a hearing and taking additional evidence 
regarding attorney fees for representation of appellee before the Office of 
Administrative Hearings?

3. * * * 
after holding a hearing and taking additional evidence, err[ed] as a matter of 
law by entering an order directing the Workers' Compensation Division to pay the 
amount of attorney fees and costs reasonably incurred in the representation of 
appellee before the Office of Administrative Hearings?

4. * * * 
err[ed] as a matter of law when omitting from its decision specific reference to 
one of the alternate legal conclusions set forth in section 16-3-114(c) of 
Wyoming's 
Administrative Procedure Act?

 

[¶6]  We address these issues within the 
substantive context presented of the injured worker's right to competent counsel 
and the counsel's right to reasonably adequate compensation for legal services. 

 

II. WHAT 
HAPPENED

 

[¶7]  Valerie Hafner Phifer (Phifer) was 
appointed in the summer of 1988 to represent an employee injured during the 
winter of 1986. The case was sufficiently difficult and complex to cause a prior 
attorney to withdraw prematurely. Four months later, Phifer obtained an award of 
approximately $46,000 for her client. The injury claim, resulting from a motor 
vehicle accident, was settled with a stipulated sixty-five percent per annual 
total disability resulting from the initial head injury and succeeding vertigo 
and/or mental problems. Following settlement success, Phifer submitted a motion 
and billing for attorney fees of $1,533.50 and costs of $248.96 to the Office of 
Administrative Hearings. The administrative hearing officer's order reduced her 
attorney fees to $1,000 and her costs to $167.07. The letter from the hearing 
examiner to Phifer explained the reduction in fees by stating that "Section 4, 
Rules of the Office of Administrative Hearings, Practices and Procedures in 
Contested Cases" requires legal fees over $1,000 to be approved in advance and that attorney's 
costs for office copy machine charges and express mail costs are routinely 
denied.1

 
[¶8]  Phifer filed a motion for 
reconsideration. Neither a response to the motion for reconsideration nor a 
factual hearing was provided within the limited time available to request 
judicial review. Consequently, Phifer appealed to the district court where the 
reviewing court heard testimony from Phifer and another attorney, who routinely 
handles worker's compensation cases, each claiming reduction error and 
unreasonableness of the allowance in this 
case for the services furnished. Evidence presented to the district court 
included statements that the current amount of fees generally allowed in 
worker's compensation cases are unreasonably low, so low in fact that a problem 
with broad implications is beginning to emerge in the shrinking pool of 
attorneys who can afford to represent injured wage earners.2 The district court order stated, 
however, that the court did not rely on that hearing testimony in making the 
decision as a conclusion of law rejecting reduction when there was no factual 
basis to determine that the fees billed by Phifer were not reasonable and 
necessary.

 

III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]  Judicial review of an agency action is 
directed by W.S. 16-3-114, under which 16-3-114(a) allows any person aggrieved 
or adversely affected in fact by the actions or inactions of an agency to obtain 
judicial review by the district court. "This court is governed by the same rules 
of review as was the district court." Atchison v. Career 
Service Council of State of Wyoming, 664 P.2d 18, 20 
(Wyo.), cert. 
denied 464 U.S. 982, 104 S. Ct. 424, 78 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1983). See also Banda v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 789 P.2d 124 (Wyo. 1990). 
While this court typically remands an administrative decision back to the agency 
when that decision relies upon findings of fact, Cook v. Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment for the City of Laramie, 776 P.2d 181 (Wyo. 1989); FMC v. Lane, 773 P.2d 163 (Wyo. 1989), remand is not mandatory when the question before the 
district court or this court is a question of law or a mixed question of fact 
and law. Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. McKnight, 764 P.2d 1039, 1049 
(Wyo. 1988). The 
rationale underlying remand when findings of fact by an agency are involved is 
our reliance on the expertise of an agency. "[W]e have indicated we defer to the 
experience and expertise of the agency in its weighing of the evidence and will 
disturb its decisions only where it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence on record." Southwest Wyoming Rehabilitation Center v. Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming, 781 P.2d 918, 921 (Wyo. 1989) (emphasis added) (accord Cody Gas Co. v. Public 
Service Com'n of Wyoming, 748 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Wyo. 1988)).

 

[¶10]  In the case of a question of law, it is the 
courts and not the agencies which display the dominant expertise since courts, 
as a matter of course, deal with questions of law and legislative intent. If an 
agency determination is not in accordance with law, this court corrects the 
determination to assure accordance with law. See Employment Sec. Com'n of 
Wyoming v. Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866 
(Wyo. 1990). Unreasonableness of a compensatory legal fee 
assessment is addressed by the court as a matter of law if the underlying facts 
are not in dispute. The scope of review of the standard that is used for 
calculating the attorney fee is plenary with the appellate court. 
Bell v. United Princeton Properties, Inc., 884 F.2d 713 (3rd 
Cir. 1989).

 

[¶11]  This court in Hohnholt v. Basin Elec. Power 
Co-op, 784 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1989) addressed the specific standard for review in 
worker's compensation cases within the new organizational structure provided by 
the hearing examiner provision of W.S. 27-14-602. The Hohnholt test is 
substantial evidence for support of the findings and conclusions when 
evidentiary issues exist.

 

"We examine the entire record to determine if there is 
substantial evidence to support an agency's findings. If the agency's decision 
is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment 
for that of the agency, and must uphold the findings on appeal. Substantial 
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of 
the conclusions of the agency. It is more than a scintilla of evidence." 
(citation omitted) Trout v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 
(Wyo. 1986).

 

Id. at 234. The standard is similarly applied in the federal 
courts for the administrative agency appeal as one of substantial evidence for 
factual review. Mangus v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 
U.S. Dept. of Labor, 882 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1989). A plenary 
review of questions of law and substantial evidence for questions of fact are 
the general standard of review for worker's compensation attorney fee contest 
actions. Matter of Death of Smithour, 778 P.2d 302 (Colo. App. 1989); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Fillmore, 98 Or. App. 567, 
779 P.2d 1102 (1989).

 

[¶12]  The standard to be applied for assessment of 
the reasonableness of attorney fees is a question of law; reasonableness within 
the legal standard may be discretionary or constitute a factual determination. 
Weyerhaeuser, 779 P.2d 1102. An insufficient record to support the decision made 
may justify the dismissal of the appeal, Johnson v. Statewide Collections, Inc., 
778 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1989), or may merit remand for further hearing by the 
administrative agency. In this case, the hearing examiner provided no factual or 
legal basis to justify the fee reduction.

 

IV. HEARING EXAMINER  SECTION 4 ITS HISTORY AND 
APPLICATION

 

[¶13]  Chapter I of the Rules of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings Practices and Procedures in Contested Cases identifies 
its enabling legislation as W.S. 16-3-102(a)(i) and 16-3-103(b) (Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act), and 27-14-602(a) (contested cases under Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division). W.S. 16-3-102(a)(i) permits an agency to 
"[a]dopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all 
formal and informal procedures available in connection with contested cases; * * 
*." W.S. 16-3-103(b) allows for the adoption of emergency rules for a period no 
longer than 120 days when the emergency rule is signed by the Governor and filed 
with the Secretary of State. W.S. 27-14-602(a) creates the office of independent 
hearing examiners and gives examiners the power to "conduct contested cases" in 
accord with the remaining portions of W.S. 27-14-602. W.S. 27-14-602(b) and (d) 
are relevant to this case. W.S. 27-14-602(b) allows an employer or health care 
provider to argue any objections under a contested case in accord with W.S. 
16-3-107 (contested cases). W.S. 27-14-602(d) provides that "the hearing 
examiner may appoint an attorney * * *."

 

[¶14]  Citing justification within its enabling 
legislation, the agency adopted Chapter I, Section 4 of the Rules of the Office 
of Administrative Hearings Practices and Procedures in Contested Cases providing 
for the appointment of counsel and payment of fees.3 Under the fee 
control provisions of Section 4, legal costs in excess of $500 are to be 
approved in advance, but approval is not necessary for attorney fees which 
exceed $1,000. The reason strangely given by the hearing officer for limiting 
Phifer's fees to $1,000 was she had no prior approval for fees in excess of 
$1,000 which came from an apparently undisclosed policy which "supplemented" the 
published rule. Conversely, actual billed costs did not exceed $500. Phifer 
sought review in the district court in order to have that reviewing court compel 
the agency to abide by its own fee rule. W.S. 16-3-114(c)(i).

 

[¶15]  Phifer contended the decision of the hearing 
examiner reducing her fees and costs was arbitrary and capricious because the 
action was specifically unjustified by the agency rules as written which did not 
contain the pre-approval provision for fees in excess of $1,000. Underlying our 
often repeated statement that "`[i]n determining whether the action of an agency 
is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, the court ascertains 
whether the decision is supported by the record,'" Cook, 776 P.2d  at 185 (accord 
First Nat. Bank of Thermopolis v. Bonham, 559 P.2d 42 (Wyo. 1977) and quoting 
Holding's Little America v. Board of County Com'rs of Laramie County, 670 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Wyo. 1983)), is the assumption that an agency will abide by the 
rules it promulgates. The failure of an agency to abide by its rules is per se 
arbitrary and capricious. "An agency action is arbitrary or capricious if it is 
not based on a consideration of the relevant factors." Tri-State Generation and 
Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. Environmental Quality Council, 590 P.2d 1324, 
1330-31 (Wyo. 1979). Obviously, rules promulgated by an agency are 
relevant factors.

 

[¶16]  The decision of the district court can be 
sustained as a matter of law because the action by the hearing examiner, which 
was reversed, was contrary to law. In this case, we have a rule, an adaptation 
of the rule and a social interest cogently presented in the same decision. The 
conflict is apparent, since the reduction decision did not comport with the 
agency rule and the apparent office policy was ineffective to justify a 
non-compensatory fee decision. Reasonable compensation for the attorney is 
required. In re Petition of Attorney Fees and Partial Reimbursement for Attorney 
Fees Pursuant to M.S. 176.081, 350 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 1984); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1971).

 

[¶17]  In deciding this appeal, we do not understand 
the argument of the Division that the district court lacked jurisdiction and 
statutory authority to consider on appellate review the denial of billed legal 
fees as requested by the counsel appointed to represent the injured employee. 
The scope of review for an award of attorney fees is clearly available as a 
frequently considered subject within the number of fee dispute cases in public 
law activities. By statute, the initial decision maker in this case was the 
hearing examiner. To be tested on appeal was whether his decision was factually 
supported or erroneous as a matter of law. In review, the district court in 
result found no factual basis presented by the hearing examiner to sustain the 
decision rendered. Lacking evidence that the billed amount was either 
unreasonable or unnecessary makes reduction inappropriate, it is recognized that 
the Division posits its case on an agency right to define a "reasonable" fee by 
either an hourly schedule or a capped amount. We concur with the decision of the 
district court that this effort fails to provide a justification as a matter of 
law for denial to the attorney of reasonable compensation for services rendered 
within the amount billed which did not exceed the agency rule.4 The decision 
for fee reduction should assess whether excessive hours were billed, whether an 
improper hourly rate was charged and whether unnecessary costs were incurred. On 
this record, the hourly rate was below the custom and standard, the case was 
difficult, the work necessary and the result extremely favorable. No question 
about counsel's incurrence of the cost is documented.5 

 

[¶18]  The Division misses the point in present 
appeal; the issue confined here is not the existence of authority to control 
amounts to be paid for attorney fees and incurred litigation costs. We only 
consider whether the agency action in amount reduction without development of 
factual basis was arbitrary and capricious. This court's appellate resolution 
constitutes a decision on the law and not a factual analysis when the hearing 
examiner fails to provide any reasonableness of amount analysis by using an 
arbitrary rule as supplemented by unwritten adaptation of advance approval.6

 
[¶19]  The decision of the district court is 
affirmed.

 

URBIGKIT, C.J., filed a specially concurring opinion.

 

THOMAS, J., filed a specially concurring opinion, with whom CARDINE, J., 
joined.

 

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, specially concurring.

[¶20]  Although I recognize and accept a decision of 
the majority of this court that resolution of this appeal can be concluded on 
the simplistic criteria of an agency following its own rules, I further believe 
that the constitutional and statutory questions presented both justify and 
require consideration. The broad based subjects here properly in dispute will 
not permanently leave with the present, almost summary conclusion.

 

[¶21]  Those subjects are adequacy of representation and 
reasonable compensation for appointed attorneys presented here by an 
administrative rule to limit both. I address the constitutional and 
statutory problems intrinsic to this appeal where a $50 per hour cap for 
appointed counsel legal fees is calculated and where the statutory system also 
controls bargaining rights of the injured worker in his search for competent 
representation.

 

[¶22]  Consequently, I specially concur to address 
the underlying issues of validity of the rule arbitrarily limiting legal fees to 
an obviously unreasonably low maximum amount.

 

[¶23]  Constitutional issues are overtly presented 
since the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division in appeal challenges only 
judicial review of the administrative agency award of legal fees which were not 
reasonably compensatory and incurred costs that were not reimbursed.1 

 

[¶24]  The initial decision is whether any appellate 
review should be pursued beyond the affirming decision that no factual basis for 
denial of the requested fee was provided and, consequently, the action of the 
hearing examiner, as an administrative agency, was arbitrary and capricious even 
under his own rule as a matter of law. The problem with this limitation for 
decision is that the basic justification for decision, even if it was not 
followed, was the adopted Section 4, where, within its application in the fixed 
uniform amount of $50 per hour, awarded fees are less than reasonably 
compensable for most lawyers in Wyoming today and, in some cases, are less than 
customary office overhead for the practicing lawyer. See 1989 Survey on Member 
Attitudes, XIII Wyoming Lawyer 7 (February 1990), reflecting that only 3.9 
percent of the state's lawyers charge $50 per hour or less and 18.3 percent 
charge under $71 per hour. See likewise State v. Boyken, 196 Mont. 122, 637 P.2d 1193 (1981) and State v. McKenney, 20 Wn. App. 797, 582 P.2d 573 (1978). The issue is whether an unreasonable rule by 
amount limitation can serve to justify a non-compensable legal fee 
decision.

 

[¶25]  Since the rule adopted and applied is central 
to decision, the question of its validity in use by the agency in my opinion 
should be considered.2 An initiation in basics is foundational to 
assess the rights of the injured employee to secure legal representation and the 
obligation to provide compensation for the services consequently rendered.3 In adopting the worker's compensation amendment 
in 1914, two objectives were identified. First, the employer was to be provided 
an immunity from litigation, which interest is obviously significant considering 
the prevalence of amendments to the statute and present status of litigative 
objection. See Pool v. Dravo Coal Co., 788 P.2d 1146 (Wyo. 1990) and Brebaugh v. Hales, 788 P.2d 1128 
(Wyo. 1990). The second objective was to secure a prompt, cheap 
and summary tribunal to settle disputes and secure benefits. See Governor Joseph 
M. Carey's address to the Twelfth Wyoming State Legislature, 6 House Journal at 
40 (1913). See also n. 4, infra.

 

[¶26]  While the first objective was secured, the 
second still eludes success. One of the reasons voiced to justify the 1986 
recodification was that the benefit payments were excessive and the system was 
being misused by extraordinary and perhaps unnecessary medical procedures. In 
the process, the agency was further transformed from a stakeholder status into 
that of an advocate in resisting payment by becoming an adversary against many 
injured workers. Since the state and the employer come heavily armed with 
expensive legal assistance, due process cannot be achieved without a similar 
opportunity afforded to the injured worker. Other states either provide legal 
fees to appointed counsel, comparable to private legal fees, or a much higher 
contingent fee arrangement. Inevitably, the indispensable criteria of a 
constitutional system demonstrable by the voluminous case law, is competent 
representation by adequately compensated counsel. As frequently recognized in a 
multitude of failed pro se representation cases, with almost minimal exceptions, 
"a man who represents himself, has a fool for a client." Furthermore, the 
injured worker is even less well presented if he is forced to rely on the 
advocacy dispensation of opposition counsel, albeit employer or the state fund, 
or to expect that the hearing examiner simultaneously will provide 
representation and fair and disinterested adjudication. James L. Brown would 
never have recovered his award in this case had it not been for the enthusiasm, 
ingenuity and persistence of the excellent counsel by whom he was 
assisted.

 

[¶27]  The state fund's argument raises both a 
statutory and a constitutional concern when approval of a reasonable fee is 
requested. Our analysis should necessarily address both the sufficiency of the 
services provided to the injured worker if there is a right to legal assistance 
and the correlative right of the practicing bar to be reasonably paid for 
services rendered in worker's compensation cases equally with other 
participants, including specifically, health care professionals. Cline v. 
Warrenberg, 109 Colo. 497, 126 P.2d 1030 (1942).

 

It could not have been the legislative intent to place the 
amount to be allowed as attorney's fees on such a low and unreasonable level as 
would foreclose a claimant from obtaining the legal services of competent 
counsel. It is difficult to conceive that regulatory powers of an administrative 
board, without express legislative sanction, are to be so exercised as to 
prevent the obtaining by a claimant of the assistance of competent counsel. To 
arbitrarily deny a claimant the right of competent legal representation, by 
fixing unreasonably low remuneration for services rendered by attorneys, is a 
serious matter, and may amount to a denial of due process. * * *

From experience gained in reviewing judgments in such 
cases, we know that controversies arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act 
sometimes are highly technical, and where such is the case a claimant requires 
the assistance of counsel possessed of skill and learning. The insurer in such 
cases usually is represented by very able and expert counsel, and in the 
administration of justice a measure of equality in ability of counsel 
representing the litigants is a great aid in arriving at a just solution of the 
issues involved.

 

Id. at 1031.

 

B. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF ATTORNEY FEE COMPENSATION CASES 
IN WYOMING

 

[¶28]  Wyoming's worker's compensation was authorized by a 1914 
constitutional amendment which added three sentences to Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 
4:

 

No law shall be enacted limiting the amount of damages to 
be recovered for causing the injury or death of any person. Any contract or 
agreement with any employee waiving any right to recover damages for causing the 
death or injury of any employee shall be void. As to all 
extrahazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for the 
accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid 
compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each 
person injured in such employment or to the dependent families of such as die as 
the result of such injuries, except in case of injuries due solely to the 
culpable negligence of the injured employee. Such fund or funds shall be 
accumulated, paid into the state treasury and maintained in such manner as may 
be provided by law. The right of each employee to compensation from the fund 
shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any and all rights of action 
against any employer contributing as required by law to the fund in favor of any 
person or persons by reason of the injuries or death.

 

(Emphasis added.) Creation of the compensation program also 
implicitly amended the provisions of Wyo. Const. art. 19, § 7, which had 
outlawed "yellow-dog" labor contracts and similar discriminatory 
arrangements:

 

It shall be unlawful for any person, company or 
corporation, to require of its servants or employes as a condition of their 
employment, or otherwise, any contract or agreement whereby such person, company 
or corporation shall be released or discharged from liability or responsibility, 
on account of personal injuries received by such servants or employes, while in 
the service of such person, company or corporation, by reason of the negligence 
of such person, company or corporation, or the agents or employes thereof, and 
such contracts shall be absolutely null and void.[4]

 

In initiation of the Wyoming Workmen's Compensation 
program, the 1915 law provided for free legal services from the county attorney 
and severely restricted private representation.

 

The Court or Judge shall direct the County and Prosecuting 
Attorney, or other competent attorney appointed by the Court to conduct the 
examination of witnesses on behalf of the injured workman, and it shall be the 
duty of said attorney to appear and perform such service without expense to 
either party.

 

Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 124, § 12 (1915). The further provision was 
made to limit fees:

 

It shall be unlawful for any person or any number of 
persons acting together or separately or in any way, including attorneys, 
agents, interpreters, and all other persons, to receive or agree to receive 
either directly or indirectly from any beneficiary or beneficiaries under this 
act, for services rendered or to be rendered, either jointly or separately, in 
relating to procuring any benefit or benefits under this act, any sum or sums 
aggregating more than fifty dollars or more than five per centum of the whole 
amount received or to be received by such beneficiary or beneficiaries on 
account of injuries to any employee. Every person violating or concerned in the 
violation of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, 
and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than fifty dollars nor more 
than five hundred dollars, to which may be added imprisonment in the county jail 
for a term not exceeding ninety days.

 

Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 124, § 25 (1915).

 

[¶29]  Modest change with regard to attorney's fees 
and legal services occurred in Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 149, § 1 at 253 (1975) to 
provide:

 

27-367. Attorney fees.

(a) No person or attorney shall agree to receive either 
directly or indirectly from any beneficiary under this act more than ten percent 
(10%) of the whole amount received or to be received by a beneficiary on account 
of injuries to any employee, or three hundred dollars ($300.00), whichever is 
less, for services rendered or to be rendered, either jointly or separately, in 
relation to procuring any benefit under this act. An additional attorney's fee 
not in excess of five hundred dollars ($500.00) may be allowed by the court for 
services in the supreme court. In cases of unusual complexity of law or fact the 
court may allow, by specific order, a reasonable fee commensurate with the legal 
services provided.

(b) Every person violating this section is guilty of a 
misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not more than five hundred 
dollars ($500.00), to which may be added imprisonment in the county jail for a 
term not to exceed ninety (90) days.

 

27-368. Duties of county attorney. The county attorney of the county in which the injury 
occurs shall give all necessary legal advice to any injured employee or his 
dependents who may seek advice in making and filing claims for compensation, and 
shall prepare all statement of claims or other papers necessary or advisable to 
be filed by the employee or dependents, free of all charges and 
costs.

 

[¶30]  Even by including the contingency fee 
provision, the legal fees were too low to attract private counsel in most cases 
and serious dissatisfaction existed about the enforced obligation and the 
sufficiency of services provided by the county attorney. Consequently, the law 
was revamped in 1986, eliminating participation of the county attorney and 
providing private attorney representation by creation of the Office of 
Independent Hearing Officers.

 

The hearing examiner may appoint an attorney to represent 
the employee or claimants and may allow him a reasonable fee for his services at 
the conclusion of the proceeding. The attorney shall be paid according to the 
order of the hearing examiner either from the worker's compensation account, 
from amounts awarded to the employee or claimants or from the employer. If the 
employer or division prevails, the attorney's fees allowed shall not affect the 
employer's experience rating.

 

W.S. 27-14-602(d) (1987).

 

[¶31]  This change eliminated the previous reliance 
on clerks of court and provided for administration under the direction of the 
state treasurer with contested cases reviewed by the independent hearing 
examiner agency. Consequently, an administrative proceeding was substituted for 
a judicial process as the fact finding adjudicative function.5 In 1989, the 
statutory provision was again amended to state: 

 

Upon request, the hearing examiner may appoint an attorney 
to represent the employee or claimants and may allow the appointed attorney a 
reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the proceeding. An 
appointed attorney shall be paid according to the order of the hearing examiner 
either from the worker's compensation account, from amounts awarded to the 
employee or claimants or from the employer. If the employer or division 
prevails, the attorney's fees allowed shall not affect the employer's experience 
rating. Fees allowed shall be at an hourly rate established by the hearing 
examiner and any application for attorney's fees shall be supported by a 
verified itemization of all services provided. No fee shall be awarded in any 
case in which the hearing examiner determines the claim to be frivolous and 
without legal or factual justification.

 

W.S. 27-14-602(d).

 

[¶32]  The provision for attorney fees was also 
changed in 1986:

 

(a) If the hearing examiner under W.S. 27-14-602(d) or the 
district court or supreme court under W.S. 27-14-615 set a fee for any person 
for representing a claimant under this act, the person shall not receive any 
additional fee from the claimant.

(b) Any person violating this section is guilty of a 
misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not more than seven hundred fifty 
dollars ($750.00), imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed six 
(6) months, or both.

 

W.S. 27-14-608 (1987). This section was also restated in 
1989 by amendment obviously intended to delete the supervision of fees charged 
by the health care provider by stating:

 

(a) If the hearing examiner under W.S. 27-14-602(d) or the 
district court or supreme court under W.S. 27-14-615 set a fee for any person 
for representing a claimant under this act excluding a health care 
provider, the person shall not receive any additional fee from the 
claimant.

(b) Any person violating this section is guilty of a 
misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined nor more than seven hundred fifty 
dollars ($750.00), imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed six 
(6) months, or both.

 

W.S. 27-14-608 (emphasis added).6

 

[¶33]  While the 1914 constitutional amendment 
eliminated actions by the employee against the employer, it is a statute which 
limits the right of the employee to bargain freely for competent legal services 
and allows the hearing examiner to set fees and disallow accrued costs which 
creates the ingredients for this appeal. Tested are constitutional concerns 
regarding adequacy of representation and sufficiency of compensation for 
attorneys appointed to represent injured workers whose rights to benefits were 
established by the constitutional amendment which eliminated common law rights 
of direct suit. Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4. The basic question is whether an 
injured worker can be denied the right to seek direct redress against the 
employer, be denied opportunity to negotiate freely to obtain adequate 
assistance of counsel and then finally to be faced with a level of compensation 
payable to his counsel which eliminates most practicing attorneys from providing 
this kind of legal service in Wyoming worker's compensation cases. The more 
fundamental issue is created by administrative results which can deny, whether 
intended or unintended, adequate or even any legal representation for job 
injured workers in Wyoming.7

 
[¶34]  The litigative structure for present agency 
proceedings provides opportunity for either the employer or the state fund 
itself to contest benefit claim and benefit payment. With additional agency 
staffing by assigned attorneys, a perceptible and predictable change has 
occurred with active litigative opposition being more frequently provided by the 
state fund where before it was the employer normally found in contested case 
opposition. Although a premium rating system for loss experience does exist, in 
many high risk industries the employer may never reach a level where premium 
rating benefit can occur. Consequently, the economic interest to deny the 
individual's accident claim may rest primarily with the state fund as a state 
agency and not with the employer. We are presented with a concern for the 
constitutional protection of the injured individual against the power and 
financing of the state and its attorneys.

[¶35]  This court interprets statutes in pari 
materia; the provisions of W.S. 27-14-602(d) justify no exception to that 
interpretive rule. The hourly rate established by the hearing examiner for an 
attorney appointed to represent an injured worker should first be factually 
established to be reasonable in the context of hourly fees charged by attorneys 
in Wyoming. Placing a $50 per hour cap on appointed attorneys who 
agree to represent injured hourly wage earners is an invalid exercise of the 
office of the hearing examiner because the cap is not based on substantial 
evidence justifying reasonableness. Actions performed "without [an] adequate 
determining principle" are arbitrary. Corneil v. Swisher County, 78 S.W.2d 1072, 
1074 (Tex.Civ. App. 1935). Otherwise, as later discussed, the statute becomes 
unconstitutional if the hourly rate does not fairly compensate the attorney. 
There is a further problem with the adaptation that the statute provides 
authority for a uniform maximum fee in all areas and all circumstances for all 
attorneys which will not necessarily have any relation to the character, 
sufficiency or validity of the legal services provided. Frazier v. Conagra, 
Inc., 552 So. 2d 536 (La. App. 1989).

 

[¶36]  Even without a cap, the schedule is 
unjustified because the office of independent hearing examiners is without 
statutory authority to promulgate a standard uniform fee schedule. While W.S. 
27-14-602(d) states that "[f]ees allowed shall be at an hourly rate established 
by the hearing examiner and any application for attorney's fees shall be 
supported by a verified itemization of all services provided," there is no 
authority to establish a general fee schedule by rule adaptation. The legal 
action of an administrative agency cannot exceed its statutory authority. 
Moore v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 374 N.W.2d 71 (N.D. 1985). 
Although the statute gives a hearing examiner power to allow an hourly rate, 
there is no authority to establish any fee schedule or a fee which, although 
uniform, may not be reasonably compensable to the attorney. Mack v. City of 
Minneapolis, 333 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1983); Kahn v. State, University of Minnesota, 327 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1982). To construe the agency to be endowed with such 
power would be to invite invalidation of the statute due to an improper 
delegation of power. While we have said previously that "`administrative 
officials need not be supplied with "a specific formula for their guidance in a 
field where flexibility and policy adaptation to infinitely variable conditions 
constitute the essence of the program"'", State ex rel. Stocker v. City of 
Laramie, 737 P.2d 746, 750 (Wyo. 1987) (accord Spiegelberg v. Wyoming Highway 
Dept., 508 P.2d 18, 21 (Wyo. 1973)), some formula or principle is needed. Before 
delegation is permitted, the judicial branch must be able to identify an 
"`intelligible principle' to guide and confine administrative decisionmaking," 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3185, 92 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1986) 
(quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1389 (D.C. 1986)), so the 
judiciary can determine that the agency is acting in accord with legislative 
intent.

 

Precisely because the scope of delegation is largely 
uncontrollable by the courts, we must be particularly rigorous in preserving the 
Constitution's structural restrictions that deter excessive delegation. The 
major one, it seems to me, is that the power to make law cannot be exercised by 
anyone other than Congress, except in conjunction with the lawful exercise of 
executive or judicial power.

 

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 647, 677-78, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714, aff'd sub 
nom. United States v. Willis, 873 F.2d 1446 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1073, 109 S. Ct. 2083, 104 L. Ed. 2d 646 (1989), Scalia, J., 
dissenting. Cf. Comment, In Praise of Judicial Restraint: The Jurisprudence of 
Justice Antonin Scalia, 1989 Det.C.L.Rev. 117 (1989). Those concerns are as 
appropriate for Wyoming as they are for the nation's central 
government.

 

[¶37]  The argument of poverty of the fund as a 
justification to infringe upon the constitutional rights of an injured employee 
and the appointed attorney is non-availing. We do note, however, that in the 
face of this claim to poverty, the legislature did not seek to place a ceiling 
on those legal costs incurred by private counsel for the employer or the 
publicly funded attorneys in the Attorney General's office arrayed to do legal 
battle with appointed attorneys fighting for the benefits possibly due an 
injured worker. The legislature lacks the power to amend the basic 
constitutional stature of the state in denying due process to the weakest among 
us when yielding to conflicting economic and political interests of individual 
segments of the state's society.8

[¶38]  "Prior to the 1914 amendment to Art. 10, § 4, 
Wyoming Constitution, it was constitutional law in 
Wyoming that `No law shall be enacted' limiting the amount of 
damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of any person." Markle 
v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621, 622 (Wyo. 1974). The workmen's compensation provisions of 1914 
automatically allowed an employer civil immunity for causing employee injury and 
death and, in return, not so automatically provided some compensation to an 
injured worker and his family if killed, even without the necessity of proving 
the employer negligent. One dominant characteristic of the system as it has 
evolved is it is still frequently highly adversarial. Defenses in the absence of 
the negligent component remain available and periodically effective.

 

[¶39]  Under W.S. 27-14-601(a) and (b), if the 
Workers' Compensation Division disputes the compensability of an injury, the 
Attorney General's office argues their point in a contested case - a trial-type 
hearing - as provided by W.S. 16-3-107(a) through (r) and continue right of 
appeal to this court. Similarly, if an employer objects to the compensability of 
the injury or death resulting from injury, W.S. 27-14-602(b), a contest by 
representative counsel is available through W.S. 16-3-107(a) through (r). While 
an injured employee may or may not be indigent, most injured employees would be 
unable to afford an attorney to battle the Attorney General representing the 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division and also employer counsel at a time when 
they are unable to work and are faced with medical bills. Additionally, the 
employee is faced with the statutory limitation on the acquisition of counsel 
imposed by W.S. 27-14-608.

 

[¶40]  Due process, "`unlike some legal rules, is 
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances.'" Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S. Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230, reh'g denied 
368 U.S. 869, 82 S. Ct. 22, 7 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1961) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63, 71 S. Ct. 624, 643, 95 L. Ed. 817 (1951)). Because it is "`compounded of history, reason, [and] the past 
course of decisions * * *,'" Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 
473, AFL-CIO, 367 U.S.  at 895, 81 S. Ct.  at 1748 (quoting McGrath, 341 U.S.  at 
162-63, 71 S.Ct. at 643), "the strictures which the [Due Process] Clause imposes 
must be tailored to fit each particular situation." Smethurst v. State, 756 P.2d 196, 202 (Wyo. 1988), Urbigkit, Justice, dissenting. While the contours 
of due process are flexible, the demand that due process be accorded is not 
flexible. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972). The 
touchstone for due process is a process affording fundamental fairness.9

 

[¶41]  Under due process, the controlling question 
is fundamental fairness for an injured employee to participate without the 
benefit of counsel in an adversarial process where other litigants can come 
well-armed, whether with counsel funded by the employer or provided by the 
Attorney General's office or both. Under federal due process analysis, "counsel 
may well be needed to respond to opposing counsel or other forms of adversary in 
a trial-type proceeding, * * *." Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation 
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 333, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3195, 87 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1985) 
(emphasis added). But, as this court demonstrated in Lawrence-Allison and 
Associates West, Inc. v. Archer, 767 P.2d 989, 994-97 (Wyo. 1989), Wyoming's due process clause provides protection not accorded 
under the federal due process clause. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services 
of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 35, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2163, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, reh'g denied 453 U.S. 927, 102 S. Ct. 889, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1023 (1981).10 Analysis of federal due process does not end 
the inquiry in Wyoming as to a potential violation of due process.

 

As a number of recent State Supreme Court decisions 
demonstrate, a state court is entirely free to read its own State's constitution 
more broadly than this Court reads the Federal Constitution, or to reject the 
mode of analysis used by this Court in favor of a different analysis of its 
corresponding constitutional guarantee.

 

City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293, 102 S. Ct. 1070, 1077, 71 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1982). The 
flexibility of due process makes it particularly inappropriate to equate federal 
and Wyoming due process each time the federal courts shift the 
contours of due process.11 See Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, XXI Land & Water L.Rev. 527, 549 (1986).12

 

[¶42]  To assess the status of James L. Brown, 
injured worker, and his right to the assistance of counsel to seek worker's 
compensation benefits, requires identification of the source of his right to 
legal assistance. The answer may not be uniformly derived from each different 
worker's compensation system utilized nationwide, but within the architecture of 
the systems individually chosen by the different states there are constitutional 
aspects of the right to counsel for the individual worker. Powell v. State of 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932); 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 
52 (1974). Cf. Zancanelli v. Coal and Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981 (1918).

 

[¶43]  This court can go no further than the present 
Wyoming system of a state monopoly fund governmentally 
administered, except to identify that there is a constitutional right for the 
worker to be represented and the lawyer to be paid for that representation. 
Considering the history of the program where common rights of the worker were 
extinguished by granted immunity to the employer, Zancanelli, 173 P. 981, it 
becomes apparent that a right to counsel for Wyoming workers injured within the 
confined rights of Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 and the laws adopted pursuant 
thereto create a due process interest constitutionally guaranteed. Note, The 
Right to Appointed Counsel for Indigent Civil Litigants: The Demands of Due 
Process, 30 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 627 (1989). That right is the right to 
adequate assistance by a competently performing attorney.13 Cline, 126 P.2d 1030; State in Interest of Antini, 53 N.J. 488, 251 A.2d 291 
(1969).

 

[¶44]  I contend that, because of the potential 
unfairness of such an unequal contest, the right to counsel in a worker's 
compensation adversarial contest is constitutionally required under Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 6. See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982). Following 
assessment of the constitutional interest, our analysis considers sources for 
the legal assistance, e.g., public official (county attorney duty), as evidenced 
in earlier history in Wyoming, an organization in the nature of public defender 
to represent the interest of the individual against the resistance of the 
state,14 or if neither 
of those arrangements are provided, then the private practicing attorney. That 
choice has been legislatively made by selection of the private lawyers. Attorney 
compensation next requires attention.

[¶45]  Enunciated nearly 140 years ago in Blythe v. 
State, 4 Ind. 525 (1853) and then reannounced and comprehensively emphasized in 
Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854) and quoted in Knox County Council v. State ex 
rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405, 408 (1940):

 

"The gratuitous defence of a pauper is placed upon two 
grounds, viz., as an honorary duty, even as far back as the civil law; and as a 
statutory requirement. Honorary duties are hardly susceptible of enforcement in 
a Court of law. Besides, in this state, the profession of the law was never much 
favored by special pecuniary emoluments, save, some years ago, in the case of 
docket-fees in certain contingencies. The reciprocal obligations of the 
profession to the body politic, are slender in proportion. * * * [A]ny class 
should be paid for their particular services in empty honors, is an obsolete 
idea, belonging to another age and to a state of society hostile to liberty and 
equal rights.

"The legal profession having been thus properly stripped of 
all its odious distinctions and peculiar emoluments, the public can no longer 
justly demand of that class of citizens any gratuitous services which would not 
be demandable of every other class. To the attorney, his profession is his means 
of livelihood. His legal knowledge is his capital stock. His professional 
services are no more at the mercy of the public, as to remuneration, than are 
the goods of the merchant, or the crops of the farmer, or the wares of the 
mechanic. The law which requires gratuitous services from a particular class, in 
effect imposes a tax to that extent upon such class - clearly in violation of 
the fundamental law, which provides for a uniform and equal rate of assessment 
and taxation upon all the citizens.

"It must be matter of congratulation to the profession that 
they are thus relieved from the burden of gratuitous services and useless 
honors; and remitted to the more substantial rewards of other 
citizens."

 

The conception that the ancient so-called majority rule 
required the attorney to serve the cause of justice on behalf of an indigent as 
a professional honor, for which appointed counsel ought not request 
compensation, is now totally out of date. It is stated:

 

We are acutely aware, however, that, under prevailing 
concepts in the field of the administration of criminal justice, the ever 
increasing requirements for legal representation of indigents on appeal in the 
field of criminal law, in the postconviction area, in the juvenile delinquency 
arena, and in related civil commitment situations are rapidly imposing an 
extremely heavy and time consuming burden upon the legal profession. This being 
so, it follows that to require an attorney to process an appeal without any 
prospect of compensation will possibly not only tend to detract from the quality 
of his service to the indigent and to the court, but might ultimately lead to a 
scarcity of counsel willing and able to accept appointment.

 

Honore v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 77 Wn.2d 660, 466 P.2d 485, 496 (1970). The court held that for the purpose of habeas corpus, the 
attorney who is appointed and prosecutes the appeal is entitled to compensation 
for his services from public funds.

 

[¶46]  The Oklahoma court likewise determined in Bias v. State, 568 P.2d 1269 
(Okla. 1977) that an award of $250 was unconstitutional when a 
lawyer undertook a difficult assignment and spent 255 hours in the 
representation. Recognizing the so-called prior majority rule where statutes and 
practices had withstood attack on grounds that the indigent representation 
assignments constituted involuntary servitude, denied equal protection of the 
law, took property without due process of law and took property for public 
purposes without just compensation, the court determined that the denied 
compensation was outdated under the Oklahoma Constitution. The court was guided 
by People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966) that an extraordinary 
burden on the attorney could not be constitutionally imposed by the court. See 
likewise Delisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1971); Lueck v. State, 99 Nev. 717, 669 P.2d 719 (1983); Clark County v. Smith, 96 Nev. 854, 619 P.2d 1217 (1980); and State v. Second Judicial 
Dist. Court In and For Washoe County, 85 Nev. 241, 453 P.2d 421 (1969). Cf. Clark v. Ivy, 240 Kan. 195, 
727 P.2d 493 (1986), which was superceded by State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 
Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816 (1987), where, after an exhaustive review, the Kansas 
Supreme Court determined that the operational system for appointment of counsel 
for indigents violated both the Kansas and United States 
Constitutions.

 

[¶47]  The practice of law in Wyoming is vested in the supervisory responsibility of the Wyoming 
Supreme Court. An examination of that relationship inevitably demonstrates a 
mutuality of responsibility and requires recognition that supervision also 
carries an equivalent responsibility for the court to promote the well being of 
the profession. In recognition of that concept to sustain the well being of the 
legal profession and due process and fairness to its members, we should also 
recognize the discriminatory relationship which has developed between those 
attorneys who provide services under state law compared to those who have the 
munificences of a practice directed towards civil right violations and federally 
imposed attorney fee proceedings.15 An obvious 
difference exists since, in many regards under the federal proceedings as is 
true in many jurisdictions under worker's compensation statutes, the client has 
to win for the attorney to gain fees. However, normally a contingent fee 
relationship is provided which accommodates itself most appropriately within the 
significantly higher fee awards paid. Page v. Green, 758 S.W.2d 173 
(Mo. App. 1988); Gullett v. Stanley Structures, 222 Mont. 365, 722 P.2d 619 (1986). See Standard Guaranty Insurance 
Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990). Cf. Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 
1989), involving both statutory fees and contingent fees.

 

[¶48]  If an adequate level of representation is 
going to be provided to those persons who require court appointed attorneys for 
civil or criminal processes within the purview of the state court system, then 
the quality will be affected by the adequacy of compensation. Two directly 
related yet completely different constitutional interests are at issue. First is 
the right of the client to adequate representation and second is the attorney 
entitlement to make an adequate living if he is expected to perform competently 
and remain in the private practice of law.

 

[¶49]  The client's constitutional interest is 
founded in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 
of right to counsel and due process. The attorney's constitutional interest is 
involved in a property interest and prohibition against taking under the Fifth 
Amendment. In addition to the distribution of powers provided by Wyo. Const. 
art. 2, Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6, due process of law; Wyo. Const. art. 
1, § 8, courts open to all; and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 34, uniform operation of 
the law, address the constitutional interests of the client.

 

[¶50]  Phifer is entitled to seek constitutional 
recognition of her interest in Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6, which states "[n]o 
person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of 
law;" in Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 33, which indicates private property shall not be 
taken or damage for public or private use without just compensation; in Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 34, which states all laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation; and in Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 27, which says that special and 
local laws are prohibited "where a general law can be made applicable no special 
law shall be enacted."

 

[¶51]  The line of contrary persuasion is generally 
referenced to United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied 382 U.S. 978, 86 S. Ct. 550, 15 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1966) which established a 
moral, ethical as well as legal responsibility of the attorney to accept a pro 
bono appointment by judicial compulsion. Differences can be found between civil 
and criminal cases in some jurisdictions. See Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 
Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325, 331 (1943), which states:

 

The attorney, because of his position as officer of the 
court, can be compelled by the court to render gratuitous services in the 
defense of indigents, and an attorney who has been so appointed is not entitled 
to compensation from the public in the absence of a specific statute to the 
contrary.

 

Compare In Interest of D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 
(Fla. 1980); State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 
(Mo. 1985), authenticating that no enforceable donative duty 
exists in civil proceedings; Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc.2d 285, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 
(1974); and Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193, 194-95 (1968).16 

 

[¶52]  A rigorous analysis of a developing judicial 
philosophy for the recognition of responsibility to pay for legal services when 
appointments are made to represent the indigent is found in a current course of 
Florida cases. Board of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County v. 
Scruggs, 545 So. 2d 910 (Fla.App. 1989); White v. Board of County Com'rs of 
Pinellas County, 537 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1989); The Florida Bar In re Roth, 500 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1986) (see also The Florida Bar v. Roth, 471 So. 2d 29 (1985), 
reh'g 500 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1986)); Makemsom v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109 
(Fla. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043, 107 S. Ct. 908, 93 L. Ed. 2d 857 (1987); 
Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1981); In Interest of 
D.B., 385 So. 2d 83. The course of cases establish not only the right to counsel 
and the right for reasonable compensation for counsel in criminal cases, but the 
extension of the Sixth Amendment criminal rights to the due process 
considerations of civil proceedings of a constitutional nature. Scruggs, 545 So. 2d 910; In Interest of D.B., 385 So. 2d 83.

 

[¶53]  A similar recognition of the responsibility 
of the government and not the individual lawyer to provide legal services for 
the indigent was developed in the South Dakota cases. Tappe v. Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit In 
and For Tripp County, 326 N.W.2d 892 (S.D. 1982); Johnson v. City Commission of 
City of Aberdeen, 272 N.W.2d 97 (S.D. 1978). The subject was addressed by 
the Utah Supreme Court for civil law in an involuntary commitment 
context:

 

By requesting the court to appoint counsel, an indigent 
defendant impliedly consents to pay a reasonable fee for the services rendered, 
and thus the lawyer is not entirely forced to render service without 
compensation therefor. However, it must be understood that the assumption of a 
defense of an impecunious defendant by a lawyer is a matter strictly between the 
court and the lawyer, and the legislature can no more require a lawyer to 
represent a client for free than it can compel a physician to treat a sick or 
injured indigent patient without pay. For the legislature to attempt to compel a 
lawyer to work by passing a statute requiring the judge to order it done would 
be to take his property without giving just compensation, or to impose a form of 
involuntary servitude upon him. The legal assistance which an attorney renders 
to a client is his stock in trade; and in order for the attorney to make a 
living, he must sell his service.

Until the legislature provides a method by which a lawyer 
can be paid for compulsory services to an indigent person, a statute requiring 
such services is unconstitutional as requiring one to give services (a form of 
property) without just compensation being paid therefor. It matters not that the 
service is to be rendered to one other than the state. It would still be an 
involuntary taking by the state.

 

Bedford, 447 P.2d  at 194-95. See also Green, 470 S.W.2d 571.

 

[¶54]  The principal case of historical precedent 
rejecting the "involuntary servitude" of an attorney to represent the indigent 
without fee is Blythe, 4 Ind. 525. See likewise Knox County Council, 29 N.E.2d  
at 407-08, in stating:

 

It follows therefore that where one who is without means is 
charged with crime, the question of whether he shall have counsel appointed for 
him has not been left to the discretion of the court or the Legislature. It has 
been determined by the people in their Constitutions, national and state, that 
he shall have counsel, and that there can be no legal prosecution of the charge 
against him unless and until counsel is provided for him. The Constitution of 
this state vests the judicial power in the courts. The judiciary is an 
independent and equal coordinate branch of the government. Courts were 
established for the purpose of administering justice judicially, and it has been 
said that their powers are coequal with their duties. In other words, they have 
inherent power to do everything that is necessary to carry out the purpose of 
their creation. The Constitution contemplates indictment and trial in the courts 
for crime. It is the duty of the court to see that justice is administered 
speedily, without delay, and legally, and in conformity to the constitutional 
mandates. One of these constitutional mandates is that a defendant in a criminal 
case shall have counsel to represent him. It is the duty of the courts therefore 
to see to it that he shall have counsel. In many, if not most, jurisdictions it 
is regarded a part of the general duty of members of the bar to act as counsel 
for destitute persons charged with crime, and it is perhaps the majority rule 
that, when appointed by the court, attorneys must look alone to the possible 
future ability of the accused to pay their compensation when no provision 
therefor is made by statute. 7 Corpus Juris Secundum, Attorney and Client, § 
172, p. 1033; 5 American Jurisprudence, § 157, p. 354. But, from the earliest 
times, this court has held that to require the services of an attorney to 
prosecute and defend without fee is in conflict with section 21 of article 1 of 
the Constitution of Indiana. Blythe v. State, 1853, 4 Ind. 525; Webb, Auditor, 
etc. v. Baird, 1854, 6 Ind. 13. In the latter case it was said that it will not 
be contended that the court had a right to demand the attorney's services in 
defending without reward, and that, if the statute is looked upon as authority 
for the appointment of counsel to defend poor persons without reward, the 
statute is in conflict with the superior constitutional provision.

 

[¶55]  The Supreme Court of Nebraska in Kovarik v. 
Banner County, 192 Neb. 816, 224 N.W.2d 761, 764 (1975), first quoted from Luke v. 
Los Angeles County, 269 Cal. App. 2d 495, 74 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1969), said that 
"[i]f society is to demand representation by counsel in an expanding variety of 
proceedings and to insist on a high level of competency in the performance of 
such representation, then counsel should be paid." Luke, 74 Cal. Rptr.  at 765 then determined:

 

In this case we believe that plaintiff in defending the 
indigent conferred through the services a benefit upon the public, and that in 
accordance with the general rule that when one party renders service of benefit 
to another there is an implied obligation on the part of the recipient to pay 
the reasonable value of the services rendered. The cost involved is not a burden 
which should be made to rest unequally upon the individual, merely because he is 
an attorney.

 

See likewise for parole revocation, State ex rel. Fitas v. 
Milwaukee County, 65 Wis.2d 130, 221 N.W.2d 902 (1974), where the power of 
the judiciary to appoint and the obligation of the state to pay was defined. In 
Iowa, the issue was an indigent facing a jail sentence from a 
contempt of court proceeding for non-support. McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9 
(Iowa 1982). The court found the protection that sheltered the 
defendant "to be found in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 
although sixth amendment decisions of the Supreme Court [were considered]." 
Id. at 11. With appointment, the court found the concomitant 
obligation on the part of the public is to pay for the legal services. In the 
1982 statistical analysis, the court further stated that "[s]ince 1850, 
Iowa has stood among the strong minority of states [16 out of 
34 jurisdictions that have addressed the issue] holding lawyers compelled to 
represent indigents must receive reasonable compensation." Id. at 16 (citing 
Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N YU.L.Rev. 735, 756-62 
(1980) and further citing Hall v. Washington County, 2 Green 473, 474 (Iowa 
1850), the lawyer's "right" to reasonable compensation was similarly defined at 
about the same date as also established in Indiana). See Schmidt v. Uhlenhopp, 
258 Iowa 771, 140 N.W.2d 118 (1966) and Ferguson v. Pottawattamie County, 224 Iowa 516, 278 N.W. 223 (1938).17 In McNabb, 
315 N.W.2d 9, Justice Uhlenhopp, whose relationship to the Schmidt case is 
unrevealed, dissented in unsuccessfully contending that the burden should be 
upon the lawyers pro bono. Illinois has also followed a compensatory fee for comparable 
services in the area with a pro bono factor of a reasonable amount. People v. 
Devin, 123 Ill. 2d 60, 121 Ill.Dec. 250, 525 N.E.2d 56 (1988) (fee increased by 
the Supreme Court to $60 an hour to total $3,500 as originally awarded in total 
amount of $1,500); People v. Ashford, 162 Ill. App.3d 212, 113 Ill.Dec. 202, 514 N.E.2d 1213 (1987); In re Petition for Fees, 148 Ill. App.3d 453, 102 Ill.Dec. 67, 499 N.E.2d 624 (1986); People 
v. Gangestad, 104 Ill. 2d 190, 83 Ill.Dec. 566, 470 N.E.2d 986 (1984), fee in 
excess of statute granted and approved; People v. Devin, 93 Ill. 2d 326, 67 
Ill.Dec. 63, 444 N.E.2d 102 (1982); People v. Johnson, 87 Ill. 2d 98, 57 Ill.Dec. 
599, 429 N.E.2d 497 (1981). For an extraordinary circumstance invoking the 
court's inherent power to appoint counsel with necessarily included power to 
enter an order insuring that counsel does not suffer an intolerable sacrifice 
and burden for the indigent's rights to be protected, see Randolph, 219 N.E.2d 337.

 

[¶56]  A case frequently cited in consideration of 
payment of legal fees for services to the indigent is State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 
399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966). An interesting thesis was developed by the court, 
although the major purpose in the opinion was to secure legislative action. 
See State in Interest of Antini, 251 A.2d 291. The court in Rush 
said that membership in the bar did not carry a duty of its members to indigent 
individuals but only to answer a responsibility to the court when called. If 
that concept is accepted, the question remains whether the judiciary and this 
court, as members of the independent third branch of government, should impose 
the burden on the individual lawyers or require that society in general through 
the public treasury be responsible. Better answers are addressed in cases from 
Kentucky and New Hampshire. In Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 298 
(Ky. 1972) (emphasis in original, that court, in first 
recognizing its prior history of providing no compensation, stated:

 

No other profession in recent years has been expected to 
bear such a burden for services to the indigent without compensation - not even 
reimbursement of necessary expenses was allowed. Therefore, we conclude as did 
the learned trial judge that the time has arrived to declare the burden of such 
service a substantial deprivation of property and constitutionally infirm.

It is in the public interest that the administration of 
criminal justice proceed fairly, impartially, expeditiously and efficiently. 
Therefore, it appears elemental that the public interest in the enforcement of 
the criminal laws and the constitutional rights of the indigent defendant to 
counsel can be satisfied only by requiring the state to furnish the indigent a 
competent attorney whose service does not unconstitutionally deprive him of his property 
without just compensation.

 

And then further recognition from No. 79 of The Federalist 
Papers (Rossiter edition, 1961) of the separation of power, the court then was 
persuaded:

 

[T]hat it is the duty of the executive department to 
enforce the criminal laws, and it is the duty of the legislative department to 
appropriate sufficient funds to enforce the laws which they have enacted. The 
proper duty of the judiciary, in the constitutionally ideal sense, is neither to 
enforce laws nor appropriate money. The judiciary's reason for existence is to 
adjudicate.

 

Id. at 299 (emphasis in original). The answer then provided, 
which was obviously for interim purposes, was that "[a]ttorneys of this 
Commonwealth will no longer be required to accept court appointments to 
represent indigent criminal defendants, nor will they be subject to sanction if 
they decline such appointments." Id. at 300. See likewise Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, but compare 
State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1142, 102 S. Ct. 1000, 71 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1982) and Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757.

 

[¶57]  The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Smith v. 
State of New Hampshire, 118 N.H. 764, 394 A.2d 834 (1978), took a more effective 
posture by determining that the legal profession was to be relieved of the 
burden of uncompensated services which should pass to the citizens of the state. 
Reasonable compensation was considered and determined to be a matter of judicial concern 
alone.

 

Since the obligation to represent indigent defendants is an 
obligation springing from judicial authority, so too is the determination of 
reasonable compensation for court-appointed attorneys a matter for judicial 
determination. The power to regulate officers of the court is a power inherent 
in the judicial branch. Implicit in that power is the authority to fix 
reasonable compensation rates for court-appointed attorneys.

 

Id. 394 A.2d  at 839.

 

The court further stated:

Without proper court control of court-appointed counsel, 
and indeed without adequate compensation for those attorneys, it might be 
impossible to obtain valid criminal convictions in future prosecutions of 
indigent defendants. In addition, if public funding is not forthcoming, the 
ethical duties of the bar to represent indigent defendants may have to be 
reevaluated by this court. In the future, adequate appropriations will have to 
be made in order to comply with this ruling and to ensure the continued 
functioning of the criminal justice system. The legislature is, of course, free 
to adopt an alternative method for funding the defense of indigent defendants. 
The courts, however, must determine the reasonable compensation for 
court-appointed attorneys.

 

Id. at 839. The Missouri court in Green, 470 S.W.2d 571 took a similar perspective 
posture as adopted in Rush and Smith. See also Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64. See 
likewise State v. Robinson, 123 N.H. 665, 465 A.2d 1214 (1983), which addressed 
a maximum fee cap of $500 for misdemeanors and denied costs.

 

[¶58]  In an even more recent decision, 
West Virginia in Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989) declared a compensatory flat fee arrangement and 
capped maximum procedure unconstitutional. Existing systems for providing 
counsel to indigents at state expense was unconstitutional because rates of pay 
for indigents were so low and the volume of appointed cases so burdensome that 
the system took lawyer's property without just compensation. The court then held 
that no lawyer could be involuntarily appointed to a case unless the hourly rate 
of pay was at least $45 for out-of-court work and $65 per hour for in-court 
work. "Although this floor may, at first, appear arbitrary, * * * these rates 
are the minimum compensation constitutionally permissible * * *." 
Id. at 547. The current $20 per hour rate was consequently 
changed to the $65 per hour in court and $45 for office time. The court included 
a thoughtful comment which equally applies to the quality of representation 
which can be expected if adequate compensation is not provided in worker's 
compensation cases and particularly so because of the Wyoming civil and criminal 
statute confining any separate contingent fee agreement between the injured 
worker and his attorney.

 

Perhaps the most serious defect of the present system is 
that the low hourly fee may prompt an appointed lawyer to advice a client to 
plead guilty, although the same lawyer would advise a paying client in a similar 
case to demand a jury trial. Although the master did not have reliable evidence 
concerning this problem in West Virginia, he cited one study showing that 75 percent of defendants 
with court-appointed counsel plead guilty, while only 20 percent of defendants 
with retained counsel plead guilty. R. Hunter, "Slave Labor in the Courts - A 
Suggested Solution," 74 Case & Com. No. 4 at 3 (1969).

* * * * * *

All of this becomes painfully obvious when we analyze the 
grossly unfair distribution of the indigent defense burden. The master found 
that in one county, one lawyer handles over 50 percent of the total appointed 
caseload. In some instances, lawyers who are in solo practice have had 
two-thirds of their entire caseloads allocated involuntarily to 
appointed cases. Of the lawyers who responded to the appointed counsel survey, 
some reported spending an average of 18.62 percent of their office time 
providing indigent representation.

* * * * * *

The fleeing of lawyers from appointed work is now placing 
an unconscionable burden on the 24 percent of the bar who still accept 
appointments.

 

Id. at 540-41 (emphasis in original).18 Gilbert and 
Gorenfeld, The Constitution Should Protect Everyone - Even Lawyers, 12 
Pepperdine L.Rev. 75, 82-83 (1984) (citing Fresno County v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 82 Cal. App. 3d 191, 146 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1978) and footnotes 
omitted) states:

 

The myth that the court has the power to compel an attorney 
to provide free legal services was laid to rest in the state of 
Indiana some 130 years ago in the frequently cited case of Webb v. 
Baird. The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the contention that the bar, being 
granted special privileges, was under a noblesse oblige to provide uncompensated services.

The idea of one calling enjoying peculiar privileges, and 
therefore being more honorable than any other, is not congenial to our 
institutions. And that any class should be paid for their particular services in 
empty honors, is an obsolete idea, belonging to another age and to a state of 
society hostile to liberty and equal rights.

* * * * * *

Today's attorney occupies an even less privileged position 
than in the past, and thus should not be forced to dispense his services 
gratuitously. The cost of contributing free legal services may be prohibitive. 
Recent years have witnessed the removal of a number of obstacles designed by the 
legal profession to prevent competition.

Although the special preserves of the legal profession have 
been reduced in recent years, the cost of running a law office has increased. * 
* *

* * * * * *

To make a decent living today, the attorney has to handle a 
tremendous number of cases * * *. "Furthermore, expanding concepts in law have 
increased the volume of assignments, the complexity of the issues involved, and 
a mushrooming of the duties involved in an appointed case."

 

See also, Comment, The Uncompensated Appointed Counsel 
System: A Constitutional and Social Transgression, 60 Ky. L.J. 710 (1972) and 
Note, The Indigent's "Right" to Counsel in Civil Case, 43 Fordham L.Rev. 989 
(1975).

 

[¶59]  An interesting statement is found in Comment, 
supra, 60 Ky.L.J. at 715:

Just as it would seem that the services of a doctor, a 
plumber, or a barber are his "property" within the constitutional sense of the 
word, it should logically follow that the services of a lawyer constitute his 
"property." For just as a grocer, a clothing store owner, and an automobile 
dealer sell their goods, a doctor, a plumber, a barber, and a lawyer sell their 
services. It would be interesting to observe the uproar if an automobile dealer 
were required to give free cars to indigents or a barber were required to give 
free haircuts.

 

[¶60]  Whatever remnants remain in criminal law 
within the postulation of the Dillon, 346 F.2d 63319 concept, a 
lawyer's obligation to provide free legal service to non-criminal cases finds no 
present fertility in today's environment. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757; Matter of 
Clark, 216 N.J. Super. 497, 524 A.2d 448 (1987); Menin, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721. The 
due process right for representation did not justify a different result from the 
Sixth Amendment requirement in the criminal cases. "[C]ounsel is required in 
each case because fundamental constitutional interests are at stake." Scruggs, 
545 So. 2d  at 912. "[T]he maximum fee limit established [by statute] is a 
constitutionally impermissible legislative encroachment upon the judiciary's 
power of `ensuring adequate representation by competent counsel.'" 
Id. at 912 (quoting Makemson, 491 So.2d at 1113). See 
Cunningham v. Superior Court (Ventura County), 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1986); Luke, 74 Cal. Rptr. 771, narcotic commitment; and Bedford, 447 P.2d 193, involuntary hospitalization. See also Note, 
Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of 
Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 Colum.L.Rev. 366 (1981). In confining this 
decision to the special civil case where constitutionally guaranteed rights to 
assistance of counsel does exist, lawyers equally with doctors under the Wyoming 
Constitution cannot involuntarily be required to provide sustenance of career 
and ability of a lifetime's work on a donated basis. This decision is based on 
an independent application of the Wyoming state statutes and constitution and reference to federal 
precedent is not controlling and provides only relevant authority by factual 
comparison.20

 

[¶61]  This court should not interpret the 
Wyoming statute to require an unconstitutional result by a finding 
that the attorney may either not be paid at all or may be paid an unreasonable 
fee. Until W.S. 27-14-608 is repealed with whatever results that might provide, 
e.g., uncontrolled contingent fees, etc., we would apply a construction to W.S. 
27-14-602(d) requiring both availability of counsel and reasonable compensation 
to the provider of the legal services in equivalency to compensation for 
services provided by the health care industry. 

[¶62]  "Reasonable compensation" within the 
discretionary structure provided to the hearing examiner by statute requires 
analysis. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984). The exhaustive 
precedent reveals two separate concerns in providing the right to the worker and 
the protection to the payment obligor being either the state fund in general or 
the employer's account as a specified source. First is a requirement of a 
standard to determine the reasonable fee and second, a process for submission 
and resolution of any conflicts that develop. In this case, it is the process 
that has been raised primarily on appeal more directly than the standard for 
amount. We address these considerations in order.

 

[¶63]  It is apparent that at least for worker's 
compensation cases, an acceptable standard is not provided by scheduled amount 
which is non-compensatory to the attorney and eliminates most, if not all, of 
the practicing bar from participation. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: 
What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U.Pa.L.Rev. 281 (1977). A reasonable fee has to be 
based on comparable services and the billing practice of the individual attorney 
directly related to the lodestar time requirement. D.C. Circuit Review September 
1987-August 1988, 57 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1063, 1122 (1989). The State of Wyoming has 
an identical interest in fair compensation to be provided to Phifer as was (and 
as is being done) for the tremendously expensive water litigation addressing 
specifically the Big Horn water cases, In re General Adjudication of All Rights 
to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), cert. 
granted 488 U.S. 1040, 109 S. Ct. 863, 102 L. Ed. 2d 987, judgment aff'd 492 U.S. 406, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 106 L. Ed. 2d 342, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 28, 
106 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989), where fees in that one case undoubtedly exceed 
everything ever paid to all attorneys in the history of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act. Additionally, Phifer resides in Wyoming and contributes to our infrastructure and society. Injured 
workers are not second-class citizens and the worker's compensation system 
cannot be second hand in responsiveness to their rights within the justice 
delivery system.

 

[¶64]  We should not ignore a fair fee 
reasonableness factor when payment is not contingent and receipt not delayed. 
The analysis has to be based upon business decisions without applying some 
concept of significant donation by the attorney.21 For present 
purposes in evaluating the statutory system providing a fixed-fee, time-based 
arrangement for a reasonable compensation, the allowance of legal service 
compensation within W.S. 27-14-602(d) should be based on existent national and 
state case law and clear precedent of this court. The standard for determination 
starts with lodestar and accepts further adjustment within concepts directly 
related to reasonableness under the circumstances presented. UNC Teton 
Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584 (Wyo. 1989).22 See UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc., 774 P.2d  at 593-606 and Bueno v. CF & I Steel Corp., 773 P.2d 937, 940-41 
(Wyo. 1989). In UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc., 774 P.2d  
at 594, we specifically adopted the lodestar concept discussed in Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983) for application 
in a case of federal statutory entitlement. After excising the Hensley 
prerequisite of winning on the merits to receive reasonable fees, we continue to 
utilize the lodestar concept as the initial concept for determining attorney 
fees in worker's compensation contested cases. The lodestar standard is the 
product of "reasonable hours times a reasonable rate." UNC Teton Exploration 
Drilling, Inc., 774 P.2d  at 595. "`"[R]easonable fees" under § 1988 are to be 
calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.'" 
In Re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1989)23 (quoting 
Blum, 465 U.S.  at 895, 104 S.Ct. at 1547). In Blum, 465 U.S.  at 893-94, 104 S. Ct.  at 1546, the United States Supreme 
Court indicated Congress intended fees should not produce windfalls for 
attorneys but be adequate enough to attract competent counsel.24 See D.C. 
Circuit Review, supra, 57 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. at 1124-25. This court will not 
presume Wyoming's legislature intended, by W.S. 27-14-602(d),25 for fees to be so low that no competent 
attorney could afford to accept an appointment to represent an injured hourly 
wage earner faced with a battle against the Attorney General's office and/or 
employer counsel. The inquiry does not end with lodestar which, when identified, 
can be enlarged or reduced by a variety of factors. Johnson v. Georgia Highway 
Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original) 
states:26 

 

(1) The time and labor required. * * *

(2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. * * *

(3) The skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly. * * *

(4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to 
acceptance of the case. * * *

(5) The customary fee. * * *

(6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. * * *

* * * * * *

(7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the 
circumstances. * * *

(8) The amount involved and the results obtained. * * *

(9) The experience, reputation, and ability of the 
attorneys. * * *

(10) The "undesirability" of the case. * * *

(11) The nature and length of the professional relationship with 
the client. * * *

(12) Awards in similar cases.[27]

 

[¶65]  We are then guided by ample precedent as to 
the proper process to be followed by the hearing examiner in review of the 
submitted billing and the standard then applied by the court in further 
examination upon any appeal.

 

[¶66]  1. The hearing examiner shall set attorney's 
fees based on a determination of the reasonableness of the fee requested for the 
work product within contemporary standards in that community. Gullett, 722 P.2d 619; In re Petition to Adopt Rule Regarding Atty's. Fees, Costs & 
Investigation Expenses of Private Attys. Appointed to Defend Indigent 
Defendants, 634 P.2d 1185 (Mont. 1981); Smith, 619 P.2d 1217; McKenney, 582 P.2d 573.28

 

[¶67]  2. If the amount is reduced from the claim 
made, the hearing examiner shall provide the appointed counsel an explanation 
for the reduction. Lueck, 669 P.2d 719; McKenney, 582 P.2d 573; 3 A. Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law § 83.13(b) at 15-1305 (1989).

 

[¶68]  3. In the event of a reduction by the hearing 
examiner, appointed counsel may petition for reconsideration and submit 
additional documentation and explanation.29 McDanold v. 
B.N. Transport, Inc., 216 Mont. 447, 701 P.2d 1001 (1985); State v. Longjaw, 307 Or. 47, 
761 P.2d 1331 (1988).

 

[¶69]  4. Based on the detail and documentation 
furnished and any countervailing evidence or information made part of the 
record, the final determination of the hearing examiner shall be entered. 
Longjaw, 761 P.2d 1331.

 

[¶70]  5. Judicial review shall first consider 
whether the test used for determination of the reasonableness of the fee is 
valid as a matter of law. If the standard for determination of reasonableness is 
legally proper, the test of applied decision is a matter of discretion to be 
considered within the standards of review whether substantial evidence in 
support of the decision is afforded pursuant to W.S. 16-3-114(c ). See 
Bell v. United Princeton Properties, Inc., 884 F.2d 713 (3rd Cir. 
1989)30 and Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 102 
N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483 (1985). See also Gullett, 722 P.2d 619, where in 
Montana, a going rate standard was applied of $125 per hour for 
legal services and $35 for paralegal services, which totalled $17,959 in fees. A 
record adequately documented, detailed and defined in decision findings should 
deter the undesired "second trial" fee litigation.31

 

G. CONCLUSION

 

[¶71]  Fundamental issues of the right of citizens 
to have effective assistance of counsel and the right of attorneys to receive 
reasonable compensation was presented by this worker's compensation appeal. For 
all of the foregoing reasons, the action of the district court in rejecting the 
reduction in legal fees and denial of costs incurred by the attorney for James 
L. Brown, was legally justified. 

 

[I]t too often is overlooked that the lawyer and the law 
office are indispensable parts of our administration of justice. Law-abiding 
people can go nowhere else to learn the ever changing and constantly multiplying 
rules by which they must behave and to obtain redress for their wrongs. The 
welfare and tone of the legal profession is therefore of prime consequence to 
society, * * *.

 

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514-15, 67 S. Ct. 385, 395, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947), 
Jackson, J., concurring.

 

THOMAS, Justice, specially concurring, with whom CARDINE, Justice, 
joins.

 

[¶72]  I cannot join in the opinion of the court in 
this instance. The only issues presented by the parties relate to the judicial 
power of the district court to review, pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act, an award of attorney fees allowed by the administrative hearing 
examiner pursuant to the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act. After that 
jurisdictional question is resolved, the only remaining question is whether the 
district court properly ordered the payment of fees as billed by counsel. That 
billing did not implicate the $50 per hour ceiling established by the agency 
rules, but it did exceed the $1,000 limitation invoked by the hearing 
examiner.

 

[¶73]  The majority opinion in this instance 
obviously is intended as only a foreword or prelude to the concurring opinion 
presented by Chief Justice Urbigkit. Its primary function is to expand the scope 
of this case in order to permit the utterance of a polemic regarding adequate 
compensation for attorneys. The majority opinion says:

 

"We address these issues within the substantive context 
presented of the injured worker's right to competent counsel and the counsel's 
right to reasonably adequate compensation for his services." At 838.

 

This case presents no issue of the right of an injured 
workman to competent counsel, and the fact is that Brown had very effective 
counsel.

 

[¶74]  The operative facts in this case are 
essentially included in footnote one of the majority opinion although even that 
footnote extends beyond the material facts. It is clear that the hearing 
examiner, by adding, as gloss to the agency rule, the requirement of approval in 
advance if the $1,000 ceiling were to be exceeded, engaged in action that was 
arbitrary and capricious, and his ruling was reviewable under the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act. While it perhaps would have been appropriate to 
return the case to the hearing examiner with direction to reassess the 
reasonableness of the fee, I have no difficulty in sustaining the order of the 
district court under the circumstances. The exclusive thrust of the agency 
position is that the rule was applied properly, and no attack is made upon the 
number of hours included in the charges reflected in the billing statement. The 
judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

 

[¶75]  Contrary to the suggestion in the majority 
opinion and the position taken in Chief Justice Urbigkit's concurring opinion, 
the case does not raise the adequacy of the $50 per hour ceiling articulated in 
the agency rules. Counsel did not even ask for more than that amount in 
submitting the billing statement. Consequently, whatever the proper amount might 
be for hourly billing for such matters, that issue is not before the court in 
this case. In fact, it is difficult to understand how that issue could ever be 
raised by an attorney who accepted an appointment knowing in advance that the 
amount of fees would be limited to $50 an hour.

 

[¶76]  If Wyoming lawyers should choose not to accept such appointments, 
then some of the interesting questions raised in the majority opinion might well 
emerge. If a challenge were mounted to the rule itself, again, some of the 
interesting questions raised in the majority opinion might be present. The role 
of this court, however, is to address errors of law present in a case before the 
court. We have no justification for creating, or inventing, issues so that we 
may resolve them in an advisory opinion.

 

[¶77]  Perhaps the best evidence of the skewed 
approach in this instance is the fact that counsel for the appellee somehow 
becomes the appellee presenting the issues on appeal. I find no evidence in the 
record that counsel is a party, and she should not be alluded to as such. I have 
difficulty conceptualizing counsel becoming a party to the client's action 
without automatically structuring a conflict of interest.

 

[¶78]  The utilization of judicial opinions to serve 
as a platform for philosophical dialogue by judges or justices is a dangerous 
practice. It does little to serve the law and invites justified criticism. I 
certainly concur in the result, but I write separately to articulate my 
objection to the way in which the majority opinion has been used to serve as a 
platform for the concurring opinion of the Chief Justice.

 

[¶79]  I add, almost as an afterthought, that it 
does seem to me that the thrust of the majority opinion is not only to 
legislate, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine found in Wyo. 
Const. art. 2, § 1, but there is also a manifest invasion of the authority of 
the executive branch of government. Appropriate exercise of judicial restraint 
does not support or justify this opinion. Instead, the effort should be 
foreclosed by applicable and appropriate constitutional constraints.

 

Footnotes

 1 The decision letter stated:

I have issued an Order 
for Payment of Attorney's Fees in the above captioned matter, a copy of which is 
attached, a[n]d it is in that regard I am writing to you.

Based on Section 4, Rules 
of the Office of Administrative Hearings, Practices and Procedures in Contested 
Cases, I have allowed you the maximum allowable limit for your fee, $1,000.00. 
The Rules state that unless a greater sum has been approved in advance by the 
Judge upon motion of the attorney, either written or verbal, the $1,000.00 is 
all that can be allowed. For your further information, $500.00 is the maximum 
allowable limit for costs unless a greater sum is applied for, and approved, in 
advance. In each case, good cause has to be shown why the attorney shall be 
allowed to exceed the maximum allowable limit.

With respect to the costs 
allowed, I have deducted office copy machine charges and the express mail costs 
as our office is denying the application for reimbursement of these costs 
statewide. If you have some specific reason why these should be reimbursed, 
please notify us in your initial application for costs.

Section 4 of the Rules of 
the Office of Administrative Hearings, Practices and Procedures in Contested 
Cases states:

Appointed Attorney. The 
presiding judge [hearing officer] may, upon a showing that the circumstances of 
the case require it, appoint an attorney to represent an employee or claimant. 
The fee allowed by the presiding judge shall be based on a charge not to exceed 
$50.00 per hour for work performed by the attorney and shall not exceed a total 
of $1,000.00. Upon a showing that the $1,000.00 limitation is unreasonable, 
based on the circumstances of the case, the presiding judge may allow a larger 
fee. All requests for attorney fees shall be in detail showing time spent and 
work performed. Appointed attorneys shall be reimbursed for actual expenses 
including deposition costs, expert witness fees and all other costs incurred in 
preparation of and presentation of a case on behalf of the employee up to 
$500.00 unless a greater sum has been approved in advance by the judge. Except 
for good cause shown, attorneys' travel time does not constitute a reimbursable 
expense.

Statements for fees and 
expenses of appointed attorneys shall indicate the source (that is, the 
employer's account, the employer or employee) from which the fees and expenses 
have been proposed to be ordered paid and copies of the statements shall be 
mailed by the attorney to the employer, the Division, and the employee.

The time billing was at $50 per hour which, according to 
the documentation in the record furnished, "reflects a thirty-three percent 
(33%) reduction from the standard hourly rate in Wyoming." The successes of counsel in a very tough case with a 
very difficult client was recognized by the evidence in the district court in 
ruling "[t]hat Fifty Dollars ($50.00) per hour, the basis used to compute the 
attorney's fees is a rate which not only qualifies as a reasonable fee but, as a 
matter of fact, is a very low fee in consideration of the average hourly rate 
charged by attorneys in this area."

In addition to the denied 
costs and reduced fee, the decision of the hearing officer raises a question not 
implicated directly in the billing since Phifer accepted the $50 per hour rate 
and only objected to the fee cap of $1,000.

2 Despite the explosive 
increase in a number of practicing lawyers, the status of representation within 
the categories where the hourly rates for fees is significantly lower has not 
changed since 1965 when Professor Cheatham in Availability of Legal Services: 
The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 
U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 438, 438 (1965), wrote:

A wide gap separates the 
need for legal services and its satisfaction, as numerous studies reveal. Looked 
at from the side of the layman, one reason for the gap is poverty and the 
consequent inability to pay legal fees. Another set of reasons is ignorance and 
fear on the part of those who could pay. There is ignorance of the need for and 
the value of legal services, and ignorance of where to find a dependable 
lawyer.

One thing has changed in 
this state. The 1989 Survey on Member Attitudes, XIII Wyoming Lawyer 1, 2 
(February 1990) reported:

Only 53 percent of the state's attorneys practice outside 
of Casper and Cheyenne. Two years ago, the figure was 62 percent, indicating there has 
possibly been a notable shift of attorneys from smaller towns into the larger 
communities.

(Emphasis added.) This 
means a nine percent shift in the number of attorneys moving to the two 
communities with the largest population in just two years. Those two communities 
contain only about thirty percent of the state's total population. Income 
expectation undoubtedly contributes to this current migration.

By this decision, a 
majority of this court declines to consider the validity on the $50 per hour fee 
rate established by rule since the direct decision can be confined by affirming 
the district court without testing the validity of adopted fee limitation rules 
which arbitrarily limit the amount that can or will be paid for attorneys 
representing worker's compensation claimants.

3 See n. 1, supra.

4 An interesting anomaly 
is created by the amended terms of the no additional fee statute, W.S. 
27-14-608. The statute excluding a health care provider was an amendment to the 
initial 1986 enactment. That original provision stated:

(a) If the hearing 
examiner under W.S. 27-14-602(d) or the district court or supreme court under 
W.S. 27-14-615 set a fee for any person for representing a claimant under this 
act, the person shall not receive any additional fee from the claimant.

W.S. 27-14-608 (1987). 
Subsequently, the change made was to add the phrase, "excluding a health care 
provider." W.S. 27-14-608 (1990 Cum.Supp.). The reference to the bill title of 
Wyo. Sess. Laws. Ch. 264 (1989), does not provide any information about a change 
to the law which would constitute an exclusion of responsibility within whatever 
was intended by the phrase. The apparent purpose of the change is to permit a 
health care provider to charge without supervision by the hearing examiner so 
that only legal fees and not medical fees are controlled. Serious questions of 
equal protection are consequently created which need not now be pursued. The 
file does reflect health care consultation costs in this case for trial 
preparation of $250 for a doctor to meet for one hour with the attorney (who got 
less than $50 for that same hour) totalling $2,288, all of which was paid 
without question by the fund.

The second anomaly is 
that the limitation is triggered only if the hearing examiner or the court "sets 
the fee." If the concept argued by the Division is that the attorney accepts the 
scheduled fee as a matter of negotiation in undertaking the assignment, then, as 
a matter of negotiation, the attorney could properly reach an agreement with the 
department that counsel will not undertake to represent unless the department 
agrees in advance that it will not "set a fee." This would apparently mean that 
the attorney and the injured worker could negotiate for the conventional 
contingent fee, provided that the department agrees that it will not "set a fee" 
as a condition of getting the legal services provided as we would find to be a 
constitutional requirement.

5 Compensatory levels provided by federal litigation cannot 
be totally ignored if the solvency and sufficiency of the Wyoming bar should be maintained for practice in the local towns 
and small counties. See Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1152 
(7th Cir. 1989) (Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 261-634, stipulated damages of $39,673, billed 
fees of $76,252.22 at $100 to $160 per hour to be recomputed on remand for 
possible duplication in excessive time); In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1422, 1430 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ethics in Government Act proceedings where the charged 
individual was exonerated and the independent counsel billed $1,259,072.69 and 
the appellate court authorized $861,589.28 for the legal services provided in 
the three year period); Bell, 884 F.2d  at 716 (ERISA employee retirement income 
security act proceedings, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461, billing $74,804.51 at $150 
per hour and $125 per hour for lawyers and $25 for law clerks following a 
$33,721 pension plan recovery plus $8,139.50 as general damages), Save Our 
Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1270(d), original 
trial court award of $147,670.96 for the public service law firm at an hourly 
rate of $150 an hour); and Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1492, 1493 (10th Cir. 1989) (prison condition proceeding, fees 
billed and allowed of $77,611.38 plus $325,091,97). See also Reazin v. Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 956 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 3241, 111 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1990) (anti-trust, $200 
per hour rate for a total of $2,176,983.75 in attorney fees plus "significant" 
costs).

A state worker's compensation recovery of $335,198.28 in a 
Texas case justified a twenty-five percent attorney fees award 
of $83,799.57. Texas Employers Ins. Corp. v. Keenom, 716 S.W.2d 59, 60 
(Tex. App. 1986). As perhaps more comparable cases, Ganson v. 
State, Dept. of Admin., Office of State Employees' Ins., 554 So. 2d 522, 531 
(Fla.App. 1989) (a contingency risk factor was applied and fees of $48,250 
awarded) and Wattenbarger v. Boise Cascade Corp., 301 Or. 12, 717 P.2d 1175, 
1176-77 (1986) (the fee was set at $80 per hour for fifteen hours with 
obligation to reconsider whether a contingency increase as a risk factor should 
be added). Compare, however, what happens if the lawyers organize, Family Div. 
Trial Lawyers of Superior Court-D.C., Inc. v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (required pro bono civil representation if accepting criminal 
representation appointments), but then see Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. 
F.T.C., 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. granted 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S. Ct. 1741, 104 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1989), reversed in part ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 768, 107 L. Ed. 2d 851 (1990) (lawyer's concerted action violated a section of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act and is not permitted by the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.)

It first must be recognized that any argument premised on 
the guaranteed receipt of compensation for services rendered may also be 
misplaced when the 1989 statutory amendments added the provision, "No fee shall 
be awarded in any case in which the hearing examiner determines the claim to be 
frivolous and without legal and factual justification." W.S. 27-14-602(d). 
Although this may be a very, very difficult decision for an administrative 
hearing examiner to make as a definitive decision constituting a conclusion of 
law, the obvious purport of the provision was to change from a guaranteed right 
of compensation for representation of the injured worker to a status so that 
even if appointed, the compensation is dependent upon the contingent factor of 
ability to later establish a "good case." The result of this contingency 
function is to eliminate the usual justification for a reduced fee based on the 
certainty of payment. Consequently, we have statutory language which more nearly 
justifies the contingent fee arrangement of 33 1/3 percent or forty percent as a 
normalized standard where payment is contingent upon winning the lawsuit. For 
consideration of the contingent fee approach, see Hicks v. Wilson, 391 S.E.2d 350 (W. Va. 1990) (twenty percent of benefits received for 208 
weeks).

6 It is well established 
in the practice of law that an arbitrary cap maximum dollar applied in advance 
of performance as a fee control technique when initially tested by 
reasonableness is frequently unworkable. Only after the case is over is it 
possible to critique the time spent as "unreasonable," but until completion of 
trial or finalization of settlement, no one, including specifically the 
attorney, can know for sure what may be required in time, effort and supporting 
services to provide competent legal assistance to the client. Sometimes what is 
needed to do a good job may not be justified by the results achieved. This case 
reflects extraordinary success within a difficult environment for which a 
realistic minimum fee was requested. If the practicing lawyer cannot accurately 
anticipate what efforts will be required and obstacles encountered, the 
uninformed hearing examiner would be totally at sea without sail or rudder in 
attempting to make the trip. Unreasonableness has to be tested in a very 
uncertain world with the acuity of hindsight empirically applied. Normally, in 
performed legal services, unreasonableness may involve doubled up use of 
personnel or inaccurately maintained time records. The best control is the 
practicing lawyer's recognition that hindsight will be applied to his efforts by 
the authority which has the discretion and fact finding responsibility. See In 
re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415 and Manzanares v. Lerner's, Inc., 102 N.M. 391, 696 P.2d 479 (1985). An inflexible cap normally either produces inadequate legal services 
or unreasonably low compensation or, perhaps, both "slave labor and ineffective 
assistance."

 

Footnotes for the Concurrence

 

1 This court cannot allow its inherent powers under the 
Wyoming Constitution to be curtailed in a manner that will affect its ability to 
assure competent counsel to represent indigent clients, in this case injured 
claimants under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation system. White v. Board of 
County Com'rs of Pinellas County, 537 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1989).

2 One of the more 
cumbersome aspects of legal fee sufficiency consideration in statutory and 
constitutional review is the complexity of cases distributed between civil and 
criminal cases. Scrutiny is injected with the further question whether a 
difference regarding reasonable compensation and obligation to provide adequate 
legal assistance to the indigent is dependent upon the nature of the appointing 
authority, e.g., judicial or administrative. Furthermore, we are faced with the 
quandary as to what happens if competent and complete legal attention cannot be 
secured to protect the rights of the injured worker under the purview of Wyo. 
Const., art. 10, § 4. Ineffective assistance of counsel may not necessarily be 
confined in malpractice or due process/Sixth Amendment concepts to criminal 
cases. If the employee cannot get due process and justice in worker's 
compensation, would the alternative of direct suit against the employer be 
restored?

3 It is another curiosity 
of the present status of the Wyoming statute that the hearing examiner is given 
the right to control the compensation for attorneys whose responsibility it is 
to represent the interests of the injured, while the statutory amendment of 1989 
eliminated a control over compensation provided by the witnesses who are the 
source of the hearing information and testimony. This subject was the apparent 
source of the hearing comment when the district court commented: "And I do think 
that the attorneys are taking a bad rap from the legislature. It's not the 
attorney fees that are causing the problem in the worker's comp system, it's the 
medical fees, if anything."

4 The relationship between Wyo. Const. art. 19, § 7 and the 
amendment provided in Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 when related to the "bargain" 
provided for constitutional loss of rights by the employee and benefit to the 
employer has not been significantly addressed in Wyoming legal history and opinions. The enactment clause for 
submission of the constitutional amendment to the vote of the electorate by Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 79 (1913) simply provided:

AN ACT to submit to the 
qualified voters of the State of Wyoming an amendment to the Constitution of the 
State of Wyoming adding to Section 4 of Article 10 of the Constitution a 
provision authorizing and requiring Workmen's Compensation Acts.

Governor Joseph M. Carey, one of the general statesmen of 
Wyoming history was the father of worker's compensation in 
Wyoming. In his message to the legislature discussing the proposed 
amendment which was then unanimously adopted by both houses of the legislature, 
Governor Carey said:

The examination of damage suits by employees against 
employers shows that they are very costly to the employers and very 
unsatisfactory to the employees. Several of the American states, following the 
example of the United States, are considering the passage of a Workmen's Compensation 
Act.

Germany and England have given the matter great consideration. Such states as 
Massachusetts and Wisconsin already have splendid laws on their statute books and have 
obtained satisfactory results. Under the old system only twenty-nine per cent of 
the damages given for injuries to the employee reached the employee or his 
beneficiary. The delays have been too great and the processes of the court too 
slow, resulting in great injury both to the employer and the employee.

As a rule the person 
injured needs immediate relief. If the injury results in his death, his wife, or 
those dependent upon him, need the compensation that is usually awarded in the 
way of judgment.

The legislative committee 
of the Wisconsin Legislature, through its chairman, says there are four 
important reasons for a Workmen's Compensation Act:

First, to furnish certain 
prompt and reasonable compensation to the injured employee;

Second, to utilize for 
injured employees a large portion of the great amount of money wasted under the 
present system;

Third, to provide a 
tribunal where disputes between employer and employee in regard to compensation 
may be settled promptly, cheaply and summarily;

Fourth, to provide a 
means for minimizing the number of accidents in industrial pursuits.

Some of the states are 
also adopting a system of insurance which will protect the employee and the 
employer.

The constitutional 
convention of this state in making the Constitution went a long way in the right 
direction, when it provided: "It shall be unlawful for any person, company or 
corporation to require of its servants or employees as a condition for their 
employment, or otherwise, any contract or agreement whereby such person, company 
or corporation shall be released or discharged from liability or responsibility 
on account of personal injuries received by such servants or employees, while in 
the service of such person, company or corporation or the agents or employees 
thereof, and such contract shall be absolutely null and void."

I recommend, therefore, that you give a law to this state 
based on justice between employer and employee, following the example of such 
states as Wisconsin and Massachusetts in adopting such a measure.

Governor Joseph M. 
Carey's address to the Twelfth Wyoming State Legislature, supra, at 40.

5 The Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation system is a state monopoly funded by statutorily established 
premium payments by employers. This is different from states where private 
insurance companies write worker's compensation coverage exclusively or by 
alternative choice. States where both a state fund and private carriers exist 
afford a different structure of controversy administration.

Unreasonably low premium amounts for the extraordinarily 
hazardous occupations, such as lumbering and oil well drilling within the 
Wyoming change from a boom economy to a recession in industrial 
activities, has placed tremendous financial pressure on the underfunded Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation program. A comparison of the level of difference is the 
lumber industry where worker's compensation premiums in an adjoining state were 
recently about ten times higher than the amounts collected for the state fund in 
Wyoming.

6 A cruel but clear conclusion is provided about the 
effectiveness of lobbying activities. The health care practitioners were removed 
from supervision and the status of the practicing bar was further decimated. 
Constitutionality of a similar statute in Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 333 N.W.2d 744, 752 (Minn. 1983) was, in part, justified by statutory requirement 
"that reasonable fees be set." Continued resistance by the Minnesota administrative agency required a second appeal after which 
the Supreme Court set the fee twice the amount originally approved in finding 
that the decision of the agency provided fees that were inadequate, arbitrary 
and capricious in failing to apply proper principles for decision. In re 
Petition of Attorney Fees and Partial Reimbursement for Attorney Fees Pursuant 
to M.S. 176.081, 350 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Minn. 1984). The essential factor ignored was the amount of 
benefit involved. The approved amount totaled $55,000 or about seven percent of 
recovery.

A troubling anomaly is 
provided by the present provisions of the statutes. Provisions of W.S. 
27-14-602, by its permissive "may" language, makes the appointment of legal 
representation permissive. Consequently, the hearing examiner in advance of the 
hearing is provided the power to determine whether the worker will be 
represented. If counsel is provided, then the effect of the last sentence of the 
same section is curious: "No fee shall be awarded in any case in which the 
hearing examiner determines the claim to be frivolous and without legal or 
factual justification." W.S. 27-14-602(d).

Does this mean that the appointed counsel is, in effect, on 
a contingent or result basis? See Clark v. Sage, 102 Idaho 261, 629 P.2d 657 (1981); Wight v. Hughes Livestock, Co., 
Inc., 204 Mont. 98, 664 P.2d 303 (1983); and Wattenbarger v. Boise Cascade 
Corp., 301 Or. 12, 717 P.2d 1175 (1986). If so, would the normal contingent fee 
standard of at least 33 1/3 percent be required? The statute provides no 
standard for appointment and seems to contemplate that the hearing examiner 
prejudges the case in exercising discretion for appointment and then determines, 
after the appointment, whether there was merit in the case so that the appointee 
may or may not be compensated. We then have confusion with the relationship of 
those provisions with the terminology of W.S. 27-14-608. Can the attorney at 
least negotiate for a fee from the injured and usually indigent worker if the 
hearing examiner has made the assessment that the application was without legal 
or factual justification? We do not clearly understand what happens if counsel 
is not appointed "upon request" and whether or not, if counsel later appears and 
wins or loses, the attorney in the case can elect a contingency of one-third or 
fifty percent and then submit his bill for fees for payment by the state fund. 
Fortunately, those thoughtful issues are not now presented by the stature of 
this case and decision to affirm the district court to compensate the attorney 
for the minimal fee obviously merited and requested.

An even broader concept 
is previewed considering when the worker requests a desired attorney and the 
designated attorney refuses to accept the responsibility for representation 
unless a contingent fee, which he is willing to take, will be approved. Will it 
matter whether or not the hearing examiner accepts the request if the attorney, 
not having been appointed, undertakes the responsibility and wins and, as a 
consequence, may not be subject to a designated fee limitation?

7 In some of the numerous 
state fee cases involving representation for indigent clients where 
constitutional interests are recognized such as criminal prosecution, loss of 
parental rights and, here, benefits under the worker's compensation 
constitutional amendment, a disturbing nuance is discernible by suggestion that 
adequate representation may be undesirable when resulting either in better 
representation in criminal cases and some acquittals or greater protection for 
the indigent in civil controversies.

8 In statutory provision, 
W.S. 27-14-201(a) (1989 Cum.Supp), it is provided:

The worker's compensation 
program shall be neither more nor less than self-supporting. Employments 
affected by this act shall be divided by the division into classes, whose rates 
may be readjusted annually as the division actuarially determines. Any employer 
may contest his classification as determined by the division following the 
contested case provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act except 
that the division shall carry the burden of proving that the classification is 
correct. Information shall be kept of the amounts collected and expended in each 
class for actuarially determining rates, but for payment of compensation, the 
worker's compensation account shall be one and indivisible.

Thereafter, in W.S. 
27-14-201(c), it is provided, as directly countervailing to both the 
self-supporting criteria and the responsibility for classes to be adjusted in 
equivalency to risk:

Upon compliance with the 
rate making provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, approval by 
the insurance department as provided by W.S. 26-14-119 and written approval by 
the governor, the division shall determine the hazards of the different classes 
of employments and fix the premiums therefor at the lowest rate consistent with 
maintenance of an actuarially sound worker's compensation account and the 
creation of actuarially sound surplus and reserves, and for such purpose shall 
adopt a system of schedule rating in such a manner as to take account of the 
peculiar hazard of each risk, mathematically and equally based on actual costs 
to the program in terms of number and extent of injuries and deaths, and shall 
use consultants or rating organizations as it determines necessary. The maximum 
total annual rate for any employer under this section shall not exceed five and 
one-half percent (5.5%) of the employer's payroll or payrolls including the 
penalty for claim experience. Any rate surcharge imposed under subsection (n) of 
this section is in addition to the maximum total annual rate limitation imposed 
under this section.

Reports of the division 
and information otherwise commonly available reveal that in the high risk 
industries, the cap of five and one-half percent is simply not compensable. See 
1987 Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, Wyoming Department of Labor 
and Statistics (1989). That cap, where similar industries in adjoining states 
are higher and perhaps as much as ten times more, cannot be acclimated within 
the plan unless either benefits are reduced in some fashion or external funding 
is provided. This court cannot constitutionally contribute to the reduction of 
benefits by a determined process which denies equal protection and due process 
to the injured worker by assuring that adequate representation will not be 
available as an answer to fund insolvency by substituting benefit denial.

9 See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, 337, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988), reh'g 
denied 488 U.S. 1051, 109 S. Ct. 885, 102 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (1989) and Lisenba 
v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S. Ct. 280, 290, 86 L. Ed. 166 (1941), reh'g 
denied 315 U.S. 826, 62 S. Ct. 620, 86 L. Ed. 1222 (1942), but see Browning-Ferris 
Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. 492 U.S. 257, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2921, 106 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1989) and State v. Youngblood, 164 Ariz. 61, 790 P.2d 759 (App. 1989).

10 Right to attorney, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987); 
Douglas v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 reh'g denied 373 U.S. 905, 83 S. Ct. 1288, 10 L. Ed. 2d 200 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963); Griffin v. People of the State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891, reh'g denied 351 U.S. 958, 76 S. Ct. 844, 100 L. Ed. 1480 (1956); Powell v. State 
of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932). See also Mallard v. 
United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1821, 104 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1989). See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973); Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593; and Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967). See also 
Walters, 473 U.S. 305, 105 S. Ct. 3180. See, however, Murray v. Giarratano, 
492 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2773, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989), Stevens, J., dissenting, 
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 
2667, 105 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1989), Blackmon, J., dissenting; and Wheat v. United 
States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1704, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140, reh'g denied 487 U.S. 1243, 108 S. Ct. 2918, 101 L. Ed. 2d 949 (1988), Stevens, J., dissenting.

11 Cf. State v. Laude, 654 P.2d 1223, 1228 (Wyo. 1982).

12 The premiere scholarship 
about the attorney in his uncompensated responsibilities is provided by Shapiro, 
The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 735 (1980). He 
recognized in conclusion:

At least absent adequate 
compensation, a lawyer should be able to decline an appointment for financial 
reasons whether or not it would cause "unreasonable" hardship. And regardless of 
compensation, a lawyer should also be able to decline for reasons of conscience 
even if representation of the client would not be impaired.

Id. at 792.

There are a multitude of attorney fees cases. Historically, 
the oldest and most firmly fixed class of cases involving representation of the 
indigent is defense against criminal prosecution. These cases are based upon the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and state constitutional right 
to counsel provisions. That original group was followed by another category in 
public law relating to constitutional interests affected by public action such 
as termination of parental rights and mental commitment. These representation 
cases are founded on a due process - Fourteenth Amendment - criteria and 
equivalent rights guaranteed in state constitutions. In Interest of D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9 
(Iowa 1982). The third class is statutorily based by providing 
fee transfer responsibility where access to courts has been politically 
determined to justify opportunity for the successful claimant to also collect 
attorney fees. These cases include civil rights, Equal Access to Justice (EAJA), 
and handicapped rights as examples and involve more than eighty present federal 
statutes and are not premised on constitutional justification. The 
differentiation factor in the third category in addition to source of authority 
from legislative discretion is the non-application of indigency as a criteria 
for attorney fee reimbursement to the litigant.

13 It is in the teaching of 
adequacy of counsel cases where the right is constitutionally guaranteed that 
the criminal cases provide authority since, if the rights exists, its character 
and provision does not differ between criminal prosecution, Sixth Amendment 
representation and civil proceeding, due process guarantees. See, however, 
Fatally Flawed, 13 National L.J. 1 (Nov. 1990) discussing capped fee cases for 
criminal defense.

14 In State ex rel. Fitas 
v. Milwaukee County, 65 Wis.2d 130, 221 N.W.2d 902 (1974), the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court directly assigned all probation and parole revocation cases to the public 
defender since the representation was required and no funding source for private 
attorney compensation was available. Cf. Johnson v. City Commission of City of 
Aberdeen, 272 N.W.2d 97 (S.D. 1978), where the court determined that if the city 
undertook prosecution, it must also assume the cost of representation of the 
criminally charged indigent; if no defense, then no prosecution.

15 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) provides a cap for EAJA 
(Equal Access to Justice Act) recovery at $75 per hour with adjustment for 
inflation and extraordinary circumstances. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2553, 101 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1988).

16 Among these cases, there 
is clearly a declining number of jurisdictions which follow the general duty 
thesis requiring the attorney to provide free legal services. The total is 
obviously a minority and in continuing decline in general acceptability. Cited 
examples for this concept and authority reference directly to Dillon include 
Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528 (Ala.), appeal dismissed 444 U.S. 803, 100 S. Ct. 22, 62 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1979); State v. Ruiz, 269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d 625 (1980); 
Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143, cert. denied 385 U.S. 958, 87 S. Ct. 393, 17 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1966); and State v. Goolsby, 278 S.C. 52, 292 S.E.2d 180 (1982). Weiner provides a curious analysis in extended syllogism. It 
goes like this:

The right to follow a 
profession, which of course includes the right to be compensated for services 
rendered, is a property right. * * * From this it follows that an attorney from 
whom services are demanded and by whom they are given has a property right in 
his fee for those services, which may be set by contract, or, if not, should be 
based on their just and reasonable value. * * * "Our courts have uniformly 
adopted the practice of assigning counsel to represent indigent criminals in all 
cases when they were unable to employ counsel to represent them." * * * There is 
thus a public necessity and a public purpose; there is a demand by the sovereign 
and compliance by the citizen, and there is in all practical effect a taking of 
the property of that citizen, or, better stated, of a limited class of citizens, 
forcing them "alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole."

Weiner, 148 S.E.2d  at 144-46 (quoting Delk v. State, 99 
Ga. 667, 26 S.E. 752 (1896) and Armstrong v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S. Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554 (1960)). The 
court then said in asserting the duty to serve without compensation:

"This, too, is an old 
common law duty, and has been not only the admitted obligation but the pride and 
glory of the profession from time immemorial. The law recognizes the profession 
and the office. As it confers privileges, it also imposes duties. One of these 
is that he will never reject the cause of the defenseless, and that when the 
presiding Judge of a Court (at which he is in attendance) - the head of his 
profession for the time - presents to his notice a case coming within the sphere 
of his obligation, he will, in good faith as a man and as a lawyer, come to his 
aid. If he fail, he fails in his professional obligations." * * *

* * * We also incline to 
believe that a lawyer, except in unusual circumstances, has no right and will 
make no effort to refuse a case which he is requested to take by a judge of the 
court before whom he regularly appears, and that such request is tantamount to a 
demand. While, therefore, the amount of compensation for the work he does may be 
shaded by the first of these considerations, compliance which not only deprives 
him of a considerable portion of his working time but leaves him financially in 
worse condition through enforced expenditures of personal funds may, under the 
second, amount to confiscation. To this extent, under prevailing conditions 
which result in ever increasing demands for uncompensated service, we are fully 
cognizant that an undue burden is placed on the legal profession as a matter of 
custom, and that this burden is itself borne unequally by members of the 
profession in practice; that the glory of service dims in inverse proportion to 
the demands made upon the time of an individual attorney, and that the very able 
young attorney who has presented this issue so squarely and forthrightly speaks 
not for himself but in the name of justice for all members of his profession and 
ours.

Id. at 146-47 (emphasis in original and quoting 
Elam v. Johnson, 48 Ga. 348, 350 (1873)).

17 One of the most poignant and yet pointed discussions of 
legal fees for criminal representation is found in State v. Ryan, 233 
Neb. 151, 444 N.W.2d 656, 658, 661 (1989) with the increase 
from $8,776 to $33,000.

18 An interesting but 
obviously unworkable adaptation was developed by one appellate court which 
extended the benefits and burdens of providing free legal services from the 
private practicing attorney to all attorneys including those engaged in 
employment by the public instrumentalities of the state. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64. 
See the earlier Missouri case, Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, while more recently, the 
court found Missouri lawyers for civil cases had no enforceable duty to provide 
uncompensated services in civil litigation to represent indigents. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757.

A converse application 
has developed which at least has been applied to non-criminal indigent 
representation. That principle is that if fair compensation is not available to 
the attorney, then the compulsive appointment cannot be made by the judiciary. 
Legal representation becomes dependent upon societal payment responsibility. 
"[U]ncompensated counsel is afforded to indigent matrimonial litigants as a 
matter of public policy, which policy gives way to the superior constitutional 
rights of the attorney to demand compensation as a condition for the 
representation." Menin, 359 N.Y.S.2d  at 730. See also Cudd v. Bass, 771 S.W.2d 3 
(Tex. App. 1989).

The indigent is entitled 
to adequate assistance of counsel and the counsel should be no more obligated to 
contribute his professional work to the performance of public service than would 
be the call for other professions to likewise contribute, including doctors, 
dentists, architects and engineers; or hearing examiners and judges. More 
specifically within the profession, it means that a small segment of the legal 
profession, namely the practicing trial lawyer who practices in the specialties, 
including criminal defense and worker's compensation, cannot be separately 
burdened where an equivalent responsibility is not impressed upon the 
governmental employee, the salaried attorney and the office practitioner.

19 Even by application of Dillon, the contributory 
responsibility of the practicing attorney cannot be extended to cost advanced 
for trial purposes. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982); 
Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64; Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214; Second Judicial 
Dist. Court In and For Washoe County, 453 P.2d 421.

20 Since the obligation to 
make counsel available to the indigent has a constitutional base, representation 
must be full and complete. State in Interest of Antini, 251 A.2d 291. The 
subject was phrased differently in the worker's compensation case of Mitchell v. 
Goodyear Service Store, 63 Md. App. 426, 492 A.2d 984, 988, cert. granted 304 
Md. 362, 499 A.2d 191 (1985), aff'd 306 Md. 27, 506 A.2d 1178 (1986), "the 
Commission may not set fees so cheeseparingly as to deprive claimants of the 
practical ability to obtain competent counsel." See also Cline, 126 P.2d  at 
1030, "[t]o arbitrarily deny a claimant the right of competent legal 
representation, by fixing unreasonably low remuneration * * * may amount to a 
denial of due process".

 

21 
Obviously, the legislature could structure a different system patterned after 
some jurisdictions where the fee payment is essentially contingent on success 
and the allowable percentage ranges are from around twenty percent to 
uncontrolled bargained levels. An adequate contingent fee arrangement would 
undoubtedly expand practitioner availability and interest comprehensively and 
increase the amount of the fees when recovery is secured. See Wattenbarger, 717 P.2d 1175, but see Manzanares v. Lerner's, Inc., 102 N.M. 391, 696 P.2d 479 
(1985), where a percentage factor provided an inadequate fee. Gullett, 722 P.2d 619; Wight, 664 P.2d 303; Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483 (1985). The general practice in Missouri 
is to set a fee not to exceed twenty-five percent of the award. Page, 758 S.W.2d 173. Broad membership worker's compensation claimant bar associations are to be 
found in some jurisdictions with participants including some of the national 
premier trial attorneys. Adaptation of that approach rather than the time fee 
controlled private practitioner is clearly a legislative decision. 
Unfortunately, the hard decision that follows in that status is whether the 
predominating concept of worker's compensation is preserved of whole recovery to 
the claimant. Clark, 629 P.2d 657; Wight, 664 P.2d 303. This is the "who pays" 
decision - the worker, from entitlement to benefit including billings by medical 
care providers, or the employer's account, or finally the fund in general 
itself.

 
 

22 
We are assisted by the very current income statistics for the Wyoming State 
Bar:

Hourly rates for legal services in Wyoming 
have increased somewhat in the past two years. In 1987, the average hourly 
charge was $77.40. This year, it is about $81.30. Nationwide, the average rates 
have also risen slightly. In 1987 the average rate was about $115. This year it 
is closer to $120.

Nationwide, the average attorney earns between $75,000 and 
$90,000, according to ABA 
statistics. Most likely, the average of Wyoming 
attorneys is something closer to the figures for surrounding states like 
Nebraska 
and Colorado. 
Those average between $30,000 and $40,000.

About 80 percent of Wyoming's lawyers work more than 40 hours per week. Economic 
models from the ABA 
and other state bars indicate that attorneys bill between one-third and 
two-thirds of the time they actually spend at work.

The average Wyoming 
attorney spends about 9 hours per month serving pro bono clients. Only about 20 
percent of Wyoming 
attorneys do not accept pro bono cases, and these lawyers tend to be judges or 
government attorneys.

Wyoming Lawyer, supra, at 
2.

23 
A requested $1,259,072.69 fee was reduced on appeal to $861,589.28. Attorney's 
fees were billed between $75 and $225 per hour except for James F. Neal as 
independent consultant at $260 per hour. Law clerks and paralegals were billed 
at "market rates" as a community standard. In Re Olson, 884 F.2d  at 1422, 
1430.

24 
Billed legal fees were requested on an hourly basis from $95 to $105 per hour. 
The principal issue was a bonus of an additional fifty percent as a complexity 
and novelty factor. That adjunct amount granted by the district court was 
reversed by the supreme court to leave the total amount awarded of $79,312 for 
809 hours of legal service. See, however, Florida 
where a multiplier of 1 to 2.5 is used in contingent fee cases. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828.

In Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1152 
(7th Cir. 1989), as a similar example in an aid discrimination in employment act 
claim, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634, damages of $39,673 were awarded and attorney's 
fees of $76,046, although the private fee agreement was not to exceed $5,000. 
The case was remanded for recomputation, but a time billing rate of market was 
considered appropriate between $100 to $160 per hour.

25 
"Upon request, the hearing examiner may appoint an attorney to represent the 
employee or claimants and may allow the appointed attorney a reasonable fee for 
his services at the conclusion of the proceeding." W.S. 27-14-602(d).

26 
An example, although a criminal case and more egregious in circumstance, was 
addressed by the Nebraska court in Ryan, 444 N.W.2d 656, where the trial court 
award was for defense of a double murder capital penalty case and the supreme 
court increased the awarded amount nearly fourfold to total $33,000. Abuse of 
discretion was addressed:

The trial court's finding that applicant is entitled to a 
total of $8,776 for time devoted to the appointed defense of Michael Ryan from 
August 23, 1985, to April 25, 1986, is not supported in any way by the 
undisputed evidence in the record. The order of the trial court as to the fees 
to be awarded applicant is an abuse of discretion and is hereby set aside and 
reversed.

* 
* * * * *

For this court to approve the amount awarded to applicant 
by the trial court would be to send a message that the sixth amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution and article I, § 11, of the Nebraska Constitution have no real 
meaning. This case was a disaster to many, aside from the two victims of Michael 
Ryan. Among those affected are the taxpayers of Richardson 
County 
and of the State. The fact remains, however, that the attorneys appointed to 
represent the defendants in this bestial event are not guilty of any crime. They 
are honorable professional people and have been appointed by a court to perform 
a duty required by the Constitution. It is not appropriate to subject attorneys, 
appointed or otherwise, to the treatment seen in the fee hearing in this 
case.

Id. at 660-61. See 
likewise Jewell, 383 S.E.2d 536.

27 
This record, other litigation involving attorney fees addressed on appeal, 
current literature, national case law and common knowledge uniformly show that a 
fee schedule of $50 court time and $25 office time is not reasonable. That level 
of compensation would, in many cases, be below office cost for maintenance of 
the practice in the modern law firms for experienced and competent trial 
lawyers.

28 
A five factor computation process is identified in Ganson v. State, Dept. of 
Admin., Office of State Employees' Ins., 554 So. 2d 522, 525-28 (Fla.App. 1989) 
(emphasis in original):

1. The number of hours reasonably expended on the 
litigation.

* 
* * * * *

2. The reasonable hourly rate for the services of Ganson's 
attorney.

* 
* * * * *

3. The calculation of the lodestar amount.

* 
* * * * *

4. Effect of "results obtained" on the lodestar amount. * 
* *

* 
* * * * *

5. Application of the "contingency risk" factor to the 
lodestar amount. [This may or may not properly apply in Wyoming 
dependent on whether the agency or the legislature wants to create a contingency 
payment system.]

Cf. What An Idea, Inc. v. Sitko, 505 So. 2d 497 (Fla.App. 
1987), which did not follow lodestar and with a computed benefit recovery of 
$17.6 million. The legal fee awarded was $1.75 million at an hourly rate 
equivalency of $4,000 per hour as a straight contingency fee application. What 
An Idea, Inc., 505 So. 2d  at 504. Conversely, in Greene v. Secretary of Dept. of 
Health and Human Services, 19 Cl. Ct. 57, 66 (1989), lodestar was applied and 
requested fee hourly rate of $300 to $500 per hour was reduced to $175 per hour 
for the attorney, $50 for law clerks and $30 for law assistants.

29 
The adequacy of initially itemized statements and sufficiency of supporting 
proof upon a hearing should not be disregarded. Woodson, 695 P.2d 483. See 
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 893 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1990) after remand and rehearing 
from Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 109 S. Ct. 939, 103 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1989).

30 
Bell 
was an ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) case, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1001-1461, where plaintiff received in settlement a pension payment of $33,721 
and general damages of $8,139.50. The attorney asked for $74,804.51 attorney's 
fees (lawyers $150 and $125, law clerk $25 per hour) plus an enhancement factor. 
Bell, 
884 F.2d  at 716. The magistrate recommended $66,634.01 which the district court 
reduced to $43,423. Plaintiff's attorney appealed the reduced amount. The 
appellate court remanded for recomputation. See similarly a prison condition 
suit against the State of New Mexico 
where the award of fees and costs was $77,611.38 for October 1985 to 
June 30, 1986 
and $325,091.97 for July 1986 to June 1987. Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1492 
(10th Cir. 1989). The amount is nearly as much as was awarded to all 
Wyoming 
attorneys in all cases for all attorney's fees for worker's compensation 
representation, including appeals in fiscal year 1989 (something less than 
$400,000, non-appealed disposition and about $200,000 appealed cases). Fees 
provided for worker's compensation representation is a small part of 
Wyoming 
governmental legal service cost.

31 
Texts, review articles and the many cases identify a number of systems for 
attorney fee compensation in worker's compensation cases. In range, the 
progression is from uncontrolled contracting between attorney and worker, 
supervision by the agency or court as to a level of reasonableness, whether 
contingent or guaranteed, although frequently contingent in the range of a 
typical one-third fee, supervision of amount paid by the worker on a result 
obtained basis, legal services provided by the state in some fashion, and fee 
payment by the agency on a reasonable basis. The system now established for this 
state provides that fees are paid from state fund resources with any private 
agreement constrained by civil and criminal impedances. In application of the 
Wyoming system, the discretion for determination of the amount of legal fees for 
representing worker's compensation claimant, Soldat v. Iowa Dist. Court for 
Emmet County, 283 N.W.2d 497 (Iowa 1979), should not be extended to set amounts 
which provide no actual compensation, and when considered in conjunction with 
office overhead, factually take a property interest of the attorney, his time, 
as a contribution used to defray an obligation of the state and society. Tappe, 
326 N.W.2d 892; Johnson, 272 N.W.2d 97. Reasonableness means fair 
compensation.