Case Title: People v. Mitchell

Citation: 

Docket Number: S147335

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
LOUIS MITCHELL, JR., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S147335 
 
San Bernardino County Superior Court 
FSB051580 
 
 
June 24, 2019 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
 
S147335 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
 
A jury in San Bernardino County convicted defendant 
Louis Mitchell, Jr., of three counts of first degree murder of 
Mario Lopez, Patrick Mawikere, and Susano Torres (Pen. Code, 
§ 187, subd. (a); all undesignated references are to this code), 
and three counts of first degree attempted murder of Juan 
Bizzotto, Jerry Payan, and Armando Torres (§§ 664, 187, 
subd. (a)), arising from two shootings committed by Mitchell on 
August 8, 2005.  The jury found true special circumstance 
allegations that Mitchell committed multiple murders and the 
enhancements that in each offense Mitchell personally and 
intentionally discharged a firearm.  (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), 
12022.53, subd. (d).)  The jury returned a verdict of death.  The 
trial court then sentenced Mitchell to death for the three counts 
of conviction of first degree murder and imposed an additional 
sentence of 150 years to life in prison for the three counts of 
conviction of first degree attempted murder and the firearm 
enhancements.  This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 11; § 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment in all respects. 
 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
 
I.  
FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
(a)   Mitchell and Small’s Visit to Car Dealership 
on August 8, 2005 
In August of 2005, Mitchell and Dorene Small were living 
together in an apartment in Rialto, along with Small’s five 
children and three of Mitchell’s children.  Small had recently 
been in a car accident and received a settlement from her 
insurance company.  She intended to use the settlement 
proceeds to buy another car.   
On August 8, 2005, after Small picked up the settlement 
check from her insurance company, she and Mitchell went to 
California Auto Specialist (CAS), a used car dealership in 
Colton, to shop for a replacement vehicle.  They arrived at CAS 
between 10:00 and 10:30 in the morning in Small’s white 
Chevrolet Lumina.  Small testified that although she owned the 
Lumina, it was often driven and used by Mitchell.   
At first, they were helped by CAS salesman Juan Bizzotto.  
Because Bizzotto could not speak English well, he referred them 
to his colleague, Mario Lopez.  Ultimately, Lopez helped Small 
complete paperwork to purchase a used Dodge Durango truck.  
According to the testimony of another CAS salesman Jerry 
Payan, it appeared that Mitchell tried to dissuade Small from 
buying the Durango because he preferred a larger truck.  But 
Small did not like the bigger truck, and her poor credit status 
prevented her from qualifying for the more expensive truck that 
Mitchell preferred. 
Mitchell left CAS, leaving Small to finalize the car 
purchase with Lopez on her own.  There was conflicting 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
 
testimony as to Mitchell’s demeanor when he left Small.  Payan 
recalled that Mitchell was angry with her over her choice.  
Bizzotto, on the other hand, remembered Mitchell acting “fine” 
during the deal, despite his disagreement with Small’s decision.   
Small then told Lopez that she needed to cash a check at 
a bank in order to make the downpayment.  Lopez agreed to 
allow Small to drive the Durango to the bank, and Bizzotto 
followed Small in a separate car.  On the way back to the 
dealership, the Durango broke down and could not be restarted.  
They left the Durango on the side of the road for repairs, and 
Bizzotto drove Small back to the dealership.   
Small testified that she was not upset about the 
breakdown of the Durango, and Bizzotto confirmed in his 
testimony that Small had reacted calmly.  According to Bizzotto, 
Small went ahead with the purchase of the Durango, even 
though she had the right to back out of the deal.  Small chose to 
take a loaner car and allow the dealership to fix the Durango.  
While still at the dealership, Small called home to tell her son 
Kenrod Bell that she had bought a car but was not coming home 
with it because it broke down. 
When Small arrived home, Mitchell was not there, and she 
did not see her Chevy Lumina.  Small noticed that Mitchell had 
left his cell phone, which was unusual for him.  Small then left 
for work, arriving there around 2:30 p.m.  But she left shortly 
thereafter because she was not feeling well, and she returned 
home around 4:00 p.m. 
Around 2:00 p.m., Mitchell called Christina Eyre, who at 
the time of trial was Mitchell’s girlfriend.  Eyre testified that she 
and Mitchell had been in a relationship for about two years, 
including the time that Mitchell was together with Small.  Their 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
 
conversation lasted less than five minutes.  Mitchell mentioned 
to Eyre that he and Small had been “screwed over” in a car deal; 
according to Eyre, Mitchell did not say he was mad, but noted 
that Small had insisted upon buying the defective Durango.  
Eyre further stated that she heard Romen Williams, also known 
as “Chrome,” and Small’s son Bell in the background.   
(b) Shooting at the Car Dealership 
Between 2:15 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. on August 8, 2005, 
Payan, Lopez, and Patrick Mawikere were gathered at Payan’s 
desk facing the window overlooking the car lot.  They saw 
Mitchell return to the dealership driving the same white 
Lumina in which he and Small had arrived earlier that day.  
Bizzotto, who was on his desk phone talking with his wife at the 
time, also noticed Mitchell.  Bizzotto saw that Mitchell was not 
alone; he was accompanied in the Lumina by two other people.  
Bizzotto described the two as African American men between 25 
and 35 years of age; they remained in the car as Mitchell entered 
the dealership. 
There were no customers in the dealership at the time.  
Payan and Bizzotto both testified that they saw Lopez meet 
Mitchell at the entrance of the dealership office.  Mitchell 
repeatedly asked Lopez where Small was.  Lopez replied that 
Small had left to go to work.  Both Payan and Mawikere stood 
up, intending to assist Lopez.  Although Payan was not alarmed 
by Mitchell’s behavior at this time, Bizzotto testified that 
Mitchell was excited and angry, in contrast to his behavior 
earlier that day. 
Payan then saw Mitchell pull a gun out of his pants pocket 
and shoot Lopez.  Payan testified that Mitchell was looking at 
Payan while he shot Lopez.  When Payan heard a second 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
 
gunshot, he ran toward a window looking to escape.  Because 
Mitchell was standing in front of the only exit, Payan decided to 
escape by jumping through the closed window.  Before he 
crashed through the window, Payan heard two or three more 
gunshots and was shot in the right arm.  Payan landed between 
two large cars parked outside the office and crouched between 
them.  Mitchell pointed his gun outside the window and shot at 
him.  Payan heard one or two more gunshots, but he was not hit.  
As he continued to crouch between the two cars, Payan heard 
another series of gunshots coming from inside the dealership.  
He also noticed that Mitchell’s white Lumina was in front of 
him, with a man sitting in the front seat.  Payan made eye 
contact with him, and the man exited the Lumina.  According to 
Payan, the man was a tall, thin African American man, perhaps 
18 or 19 years old.  Payan saw that this man had his hand down 
by his side, and it looked like he had a gun.  Payan then ran 
across the dealership lot and across the street, seeking help.  
Payan ultimately caught the attention of an ambulance and was 
given medical assistance on the street before being transported 
to a hospital. 
Bizzotto testified that he saw Mitchell push Lopez back 
from the front door of the dealership as Lopez was attempting 
to escort him outside, pull out a gun, and shoot Lopez in the 
abdomen.  Bizzotto then saw Payan jump through a window 
while Mitchell shot at Payan.  When Mawikere tried to 
intervene, Bizzotto saw Mitchell point his gun at Mawikere, and 
Mawikere asked Mitchell not to shoot him.  Mitchell then shot 
Mawikere in the head and turned toward Bizzotto.  Bizzotto 
attempted to hide underneath his desk, and Mitchell started 
shooting at him.  Bizzotto was shot in the right arm and the 
right thigh.  Mitchell fired another seven times at Bizzotto, 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
 
causing Bizzotto to suffer shrapnel wounds to his left leg.  After 
he heard two additional shots, the sound of the door opening, 
and a car being driven away, Bizzotto emerged from underneath 
his desk.  He saw that Lopez was injured and told him to remain 
calm.  He saw that Mawikere had been shot and was 
unresponsive.  Bizzotto instructed his wife, who was still on the 
phone, to call 911.  Bizzotto also called 911 himself. 
John Vasquez was driving by the dealership around 2:30 
p.m., when he saw Bizzotto come out of the dealership with blood 
running down his arm.  He testified that Bizzotto was 
staggering and being assisted by another man who was holding 
his arm up.  Vasquez noticed a broken window and thought that 
Bizzotto had fallen through it, so he stopped to offer help.  
Bizzotto told Vasquez that he had been shot by two black men 
and that he feared for his life. 
Responding to the 911 calls, officers from the Colton Police 
Department arrived at CAS at approximately 2:45 p.m.  They 
found that a window in front of the dealership office had been 
smashed, and there was a trail of blood outside the window 
leading south toward the street.  Officers encountered Bizzotto 
outside the dealership and saw that he had been shot in the arm.  
Bizzotto told them that the person responsible was a black man 
who had been at the dealership earlier that day to buy a black 
Durango.  Inside the office of the dealership, officers found 
Lopez lying on the floor on his back, near the front door.  Lopez 
was conscious and in pain from two gunshot wounds but able to 
relate that a lone black man, who had arrived in a white 1997 
Chevy Lumina, had shot him.  The officers then found Mawikere 
behind a desk, dead and facedown with a gunshot wound to the 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
 
head.  Lopez died later that night at the hospital as a result of 
three gunshot wounds.   
The police interviewed Payan and Bizzotto at the hospital 
where they were being treated for their injuries.  Payan was 
shown photo displays of two suspects.  At first, Payan was 
unable to cooperate because he was under the influence of 
morphine.  Thereafter, Payan identified a photograph of 
Mitchell as the shooter.  Bizzotto was physically unable to talk 
to the officer who visited him at the hospital.  After his discharge 
from the hospital, Bizzotto was shown a display of six 
photographs and identified Mitchell’s photograph as the person 
who shot him. 
(c) Shooting at the Yellows Apartment Complex 
The Yellows was the colloquial name given to an 
apartment complex in San Bernardino.  On August 8, 2005, 
around 3:00 p.m, Armando Torres was at the complex visiting 
his mother and his brother Susano Torres.  Mitchell had 
previously lived at the complex and still visited it frequently.  
Armando and Susano knew Mitchell from around the complex 
and had not had any problems with him. 
On his way to a friend’s apartment, Armando saw Susano 
speaking to Rita Ochoa through the window of her apartment.  
Armando told Susano that their mother was looking for him.  
Armando then went to his friend’s apartment, where he smoked 
methamphetamine. 
As Armando came out of his friend’s apartment, Mitchell 
walked towards him and said, “Hey devil, let me talk to you,” 
and repeatedly told Armando to “come here.”  Armando had an 
unusual tattoo of horns on his head.  Armando testified that 
Mitchell appeared to be upset.  Armando asked what Mitchell 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
 
wanted, and Mitchell demanded that Armando come to him.  
Armando refused and Mitchell pulled out a gun and said, “You 
fucked up.”  Mitchell shot at Armando at least three times, 
hitting him once in the leg as a woman managed to pull him 
inside her apartment and call 911.  Armando stated that he 
heard more shots fired about 30 seconds later.   
Susano was joined by his friend Phillip Mancha, and they 
were talking to Ochoa outside her window when they heard 
shots.  Mancha climbed through Ochoa’s window, and he and 
Ochoa got down on the ground.  Susano went to check what was 
happening and encountered Mitchell.  According to the 
testimony of another resident of the Yellows, Valerie 
Hernandez, Mitchell shot Susano.  He was with Romen 
Williams, and one of them said something to the effect of “[f]uck 
that.  That’s what they get.”  Hernandez could not see Mitchell’s 
face because it was obscured by the leaves of a tree in her line of 
sight, but she saw his body and a gun in his hand when the shots 
were fired.  Then after the shots were fired, she saw Mitchell 
pull down the gun to his side and walk away between the 
apartments toward the parking area.  Mancha testified that he 
heard Susano getting hit and yelling for help.  Ochoa testified 
that she looked outside and saw Susano on the ground bleeding 
from the nose.  The bullet passed through both of Susano’s 
lungs, and he died shortly thereafter from internal bleeding.  
Neither Ochoa nor Mancha identified Susano’s shooter. 
Just before 3:00 p.m., Rosalba Villaneda, Armando’s 
sister-in-law and a resident of the Yellows, heard several 
gunshots being fired.  She testified that about five minutes later, 
Mitchell walked by them with a gun in his right hand, 
unaccompanied.  Although Villaneda did not know him by name, 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
 
she was familiar with Mitchell.  Mitchell then entered a car on 
the passenger side and left the area.   
Shortly thereafter, San Bernardino police officers arrived 
at the Yellows to respond to the incident.  Officer James Voss 
saw a group of people by Torres, who was lying in a dirt area 
with no pulse.  Voss called for medical assistance.  A resident of 
the Yellows then directed Voss to her apartment, where he 
found Armando on the floor.   
(d) Mitchell’s Arrest 
On the next day, August 9, 2005, Mitchell went to the Del 
Mar apartment complex in San Bernardino.  He was at Tracy 
Ruff’s apartment, where he and another person were smoking 
marijuana and cigarettes.  Suddenly, Mitchell pulled out his gun 
and fired it into the air six or seven times.  Then Mitchell walked 
out in front of the apartment complex, waving his gun in the air.  
A nearby resident, Patricia Conger, saw Mitchell pointing his 
gun at other cars, people, and houses.  Around the same time, 
another nearby resident, James Morrison, was outside his house 
working on a car and heard several gunshots.  He then saw 
Mitchell waving a gun, so Morrison ran into his house.   
Ruff followed Mitchell to the street and saw Mitchell wave 
his gun in the air and say, “I killed the devil.”  Ruff told Mitchell 
that the police were going to come and asked Mitchell to give 
him the gun.  Ruff returned to the apartments and hid the gun 
in the tire well of a van in the rear parking structure.   
Officer Thomas Adams arrived on the scene, and Mitchell 
immediately started yelling at him.  Officer Adams testified that 
he made numerous commands that Mitchell ignored.  Instead of 
complying, Mitchell kept approaching the officer and said, “My 
gun is bigger than yours.  Fuck it.  I’ll just take your gun.”  
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
 
Officer Adams then shot Mitchell in the leg to stop him from 
advancing.   
Officer Kevin Jeffery testified that Mitchell was agitated 
when officers were handcuffing him and in the ambulance on 
the way to the hospital.  During this time, Mitchell told Officer 
Joshua Cogswell that if he was going to die, the officer was going 
to go with him.  He also told Officer Jeffery, “God would not 
judge him for killing the devil.”   
(e) Forensic Evidence 
Criminalist Heather Harlacker located one fired cartridge 
case outside the CAS office building and 10 more fired cartridge 
cases and bullet fragments inside the building.  According to 
Harlacker’s expert testimony, all 11 cartridge casings were from 
the same nine-millimeter caliber gun.  Seven cartridge casings, 
all nine-millimeter casings of the same brand, and nine bullet 
fragments were collected at the Yellows.  At the Del Mar 
complex crime scene, a forensic technician recovered a nine-
millimeter gun containing an empty magazine concealed in the 
wheel well of a van, with Mitchell’s DNA on it.  Criminalist Kerri 
Heward concluded that six of the seven cartridge casings had 
definitely been fired from the same nine-millimeter gun 
retrieved, and the other cartridge probably was.    The 
technician also recovered a second empty nine-millimeter 
magazine inside the pocket of Mitchell’s pants.  Furthermore, 
Heward opined that the casings recovered from the car 
dealership, the Yellows, and the Del Mar complex were all fired 
from Mitchell’s gun.   
2. Defense Evidence 
The defense case focused on inconsistencies in the 
witness’s testimony and the lack of scientific evidence.  Defense 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
 
counsel argued that Payan’s account of Lopez’s death conflicted 
with the medical examiner’s findings.  Counsel challenged the 
credibility of Armando’s testimony on account of the fact that he 
was under the influence of methamphetamine and his brother 
was killed, and additionally pointed out inconsistencies in his 
recitation of the facts.  Counsel also challenged Hernandez’s 
recitation of the facts as inconsistent.  Finally, defense counsel 
underscored that the bullets recovered from the victims could 
not be matched to the casings at the crime scenes and to 
Mitchell’s gun.   
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Prosecution Evidence in Aggravation 
(a) Criminal Activity Involving Force or Violence 
(1) July 10, 1998 Carjacking 
The prosecution presented evidence that Mitchell was 
involved in a carjacking on July 10, 1998.  Around 5:30 p.m. on 
that day, Rebecca Davis and Lupe Chavez were parked at a store 
in San Bernardino, talking to each other.  Chavez was in the 
driver’s seat, Davis was in the passenger seat, and Davis’s infant 
daughter was sitting in between them.  Davis noticed two black 
males talking to each other.  One of them approached the 
driver’s side, and the other, Mitchell, approached the 
passenger’s side of the car.  The man on the driver’s side was 
wearing brass knuckles and told Chavez to get out of the car.  
When she refused, he pulled her out of the car and she fell to the 
ground.  Mitchell told Davis to get out and get her baby out of 
the car, and she complied.  The men then drove away in the car.   
(2) August 9, 2005 Firing of Gun 
The prosecution then presented evidence about the events 
at the Del Mar complex on August 9, 2005.  Around 3:00 p.m., 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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Mitchell was in the middle of 19th Street with a gun.  Brenda 
Wierenga and David Roark were in a car on the street at the 
time.  Wieranga saw Mitchell pointing a gun at her and ducked 
under the steering wheel.  Mitchell fired the empty gun five to 
six times at the car’s passenger side where Roark was seated.  
Mitchell made a number of threatening and racially charged 
statements at Wieranga and Roark, such as: “Hey, anybody 
want to come out here and fight me?  We can get down right 
now”; “All you whites and Mexicans stay inside”; and “Where is 
all my n–––––?”  As Wieranga drove the car away, Mitchell said, 
“See y’all don’t want none.”  Mitchell then pointed his gun at the 
sky, took out the clip, and pointed it at his head and said, “See, 
I’ll even shoot myself.”  He also said to himself, “Go back inside.  
You all need to go back inside.  The devil is talking to me.”   
Armando DeSantiago, who worked for Federal Express, 
was delivering a package on 19th Street when he heard 
gunshots.  He testified he saw Mitchell in the middle of the 
street pointing his gun indiscriminately and yelling, “I’m the 
devil.  I’m going to shoot everybody.  Just come out wherever you 
are.”  Mitchell saw DeSantiago, pointed the gun at him, said, 
“I’m going to kill you” and to “get out of there”; Mitchell then 
pulled the trigger three times from a short distance away.  In 
fear, DeSantiago hid behind his truck.   
Mitchell then went back inside the apartment complex 
and came back out.  He was followed by Ruff telling him to calm 
down.  Mitchell and Ruff struggled over the gun and finally 
Mitchell gave it to him.  When the officer arrived, Mitchell 
walked toward the officer, pantomiming that he had a gun in his 
hand and was firing it.  Mitchell said to the officer, “Come on, 
you’re a cop.  You’re supposed to kill me.”  Mitchell was arrested 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
 
soon thereafter, and he told an officer to remove his handcuffs 
and said he would “kick his ass.”   
(b) Victim Impact Evidence 
(1) Murder of Mario Lopez 
Rene Lopez, one of Mario Lopez’s four sons, testified about 
his father.  Rene described Mario as a caring, happy man.  He 
described Mario as “the best mechanic in the world.  The best 
father.  The best grandfather.”  Mario doted on his grandson and 
loved spending the holidays with Rene’s family.  He also loved 
spending time with his wife Cecelia.   
Rene traveled to the hospital when he heard Mario was 
shot and stayed with him until he died.  Since his father’s death, 
Rene said there are “times I lose myself” when he goes through 
bouts of depression.  Rene also misses the relationship his father 
had with his son.   
Cecelia Lopez had been Mario’s partner for nine years.  
She described Mario as a family man, always concerned about 
his children and grandchildren.  She described him as a 
gentleman and very hardworking.   
Since his death, Cecelia had to sell their house, move in 
with her daughter, and give up her two dogs.  Cecelia said that 
what she missed most about Mario was his presence, his caring, 
and how he looked after her.  For example, he used to remind 
her to take her medication.  Furthermore, she testified that her 
medical problems have gotten worse since Mario was murdered 
due to high blood pressure and anxiety.   
Payan had known Mario Lopez for over five years.  He 
described Mario as always concerned about everybody else.  He 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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missed Mario’s advice and encouragement, like when Mario 
would tell him not to worry about the small things.   
(2) Murder of Patrick Mawikere 
Several witnesses testified about the impact of Patrick 
Mawikere’s murder on their lives.  Patrick’s father, John 
Mawikere, testified about his son.  Patrick had an apartment 
with his brother Sandy, but often visited his parents on his days 
off.  John testified that Patrick loved working and was very 
generous with his money.  Patrick had a lot of friends; more than 
1,600 people attended his funeral.  Patrick loved to take his 
niece and nephew out.  Patrick and his mother, Mary Mawikere, 
were very close; they spoke every day.  Mary had to go to 
counseling to cope with Patrick’s death.  Payan testified that he 
had known Patrick for two years, and they became friends.  He 
said Patrick was raised very well by his parents, was hard 
working, and had set a number of goals for himself.   
(3) Attempted Murder of Jerry Payan 
Prior to being shot, Payan was a very active person.  He 
testified that he has lost some function in his right arm and is 
still suffering from the injury to his knee.  He testified that he 
was frustrated and angry because he could no longer do things 
like hug his wife, hold his children, and play sports with his son.  
Payan’s wife, Doris Payan, described the changes in their 
lifestyle since the shooting.  Instead of spending days off taking 
their son to the amusement park and doing other activities, they 
spent that time going to therapy.  She further testified that 
Jerry was no longer the calm person he once was; he used to be 
jovial and joke with people, but he became easily agitated.  He 
was also uneasy at home; he did not feel safe and often worried 
that he would not be able to protect her if something happened.   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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(4) Attempted Murder of Juan Bizzotto 
When Bizzotto was shot, he had one-year-old twins.  He 
testified that the injury from his gunshot wound severely 
limited the use of his right hand and arm such that he could no 
longer lift his children or feed them with his right arm.  
Furthermore, Bizzotto’s mental and emotional health was 
adversely affected by the shooting.  He testified that he had 
trouble going out in public.  Moreover, he was no longer able to 
work.   
(5) Murder of Susano Torres and Attempted 
Murder of Armando Torres 
Rafaela Navarete testified about her sons, Susano and 
Armando Torres.  She testified that Susano loved playing with 
her grandchildren and that he helped watch them.  She said 
Susano was a happy child who loved to work with his hands; he 
liked to take things apart and put them back together.  Navarete 
knew Mitchell, as he was friends with her children and would 
come by and ask for them.  She testified that Mitchell even 
called her “mom.”  She was angry at Mitchell and did not 
understand why he killed Susano.  As a result of the stress, she 
had to go to the hospital.  Navarete thereafter moved from the 
Yellows complex.  Following Susano’s death, she went to the 
cemetery every day to visit him, where she cried and talked to 
him.   
Sergio Quintero, Susano and Armando’s older brother, 
also testified.  At one point, Susano lived with Quintero in 
Redlands before Susano moved in with their mother.  Quintero 
said Susano was his friend and they spent a lot of time hanging 
out together.   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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Beatriz Lopez, Susano’s older sister, recalled that Susano 
was a good child.  Whenever she went to their mother’s house, 
Susano was often playing with the kids.  She recalled that when 
she was cooking, Susano would come up from behind her, hug 
her, and say, “I love you, sis.”  She said that she misses 
everything about Susano and that they had a great relationship.  
She also testified that this last Christmas, her mother did not 
want to be with the family and instead spent time alone in her 
room.   
Armando Torres testified that he missed Susano’s smile, 
how Susano used to treat him, and the time they spent hanging 
out together.  He said Susano was a nice person and a good kid.  
Armando had not returned to the Yellows since the shootings 
because he did not want to remember it.  Armando testified that 
when he thought about his brother, he used drugs to make his 
thoughts 
go 
away. 
 
After 
the 
shootings, 
Armando’s 
methamphetamine use became worse; he testified that he kept 
“messing up,” resulting in further arrests.  Armando testified 
that at the time of his testimony, he was in custody for criminal 
charges relating to an assault, possession of drugs, and 
possession of a firearm. 
2. Mitigation Evidence 
(a) Mitchell’s Family and Childhood 
Mitchell’s mother, Kathy Joiner, was 16 years old when 
she married Mitchell’s father, Louis Mitchell, Sr.  Mitchell, the 
first of their three children together, was born in 1970.  
Mitchell’s father returned from service in the Marines in 1971.  
Mitchell’s parents had a tumultuous marriage and separated 
three times before their divorce in 1975.   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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Mitchell and his younger brother, Dante Mitchell, were 
ages six and five, respectively, when their father went to jail.  
Mitchell’s uncle, John Mitchell, and his wife took Mitchell and 
Dante in and cared for them.  They stayed with John for about 
four and a half months until the state placed them in the foster 
system.  John described Mitchell’s father as an “absentee dad,” 
even to this day.  John said that Mitchell’s parents were both 
very young and inexperienced, and incapable of raising children.  
Joiner testified that she failed her son as a mother.   
Dante Mitchell testified that when he was eight and 
Mitchell was ten, they lived with a couple named Matty and Big 
Jim until they moved back in with their father.  Things began 
to deteriorate from there, and at their father’s request, they 
went back into foster care.  They were then returned to their 
mother in 1979 and, shortly thereafter, removed from her care 
when she was arrested for alleged child abuse and neglect.  The 
last time Dante had seen Mitchell was on the morning of August 
9, 2005.  Mitchell came to Dante’s house in Los Angeles just 
before Dante was leaving for work around 8:00 a.m.  He told 
Dante that he looked like Mitchell’s children and that he loved 
him.   
Wendy Williams was Mitchell’s stepmother but had been 
separated from Mitchell’s father for about 22 years.  She 
testified that Mitchell and Dante had lived with her and 
Mitchell, Sr., on two occasions for relatively short periods of time 
when they were younger.  She further testified that Mitchell, 
Sr., had poor parenting skills and that he did not interact with 
any of his children.  Williams last saw Mitchell when he was 17 
years old.   
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
 
Lashona Blue, with whom Mitchell has three children, 
also testified.  Their children were 11-year-old twins Hasan and 
Amena, and eight-year-old Mustafa.  Blue and Mitchell met in 
1994 and lived together in Los Angeles for three to four years.  
She testified that Mitchell loved their children, was a good 
father, and never abused her in any way.  Blue said she had 
some great times with Mitchell and their children, and that he 
was never vicious.  She stated that her sons were having 
problems and acting out because of their father’s situation.   
Mitchell’s daughter Amena testified that she loved her 
father but knew he was in a lot of trouble.  She promised she 
would stay in touch with him and send him letters.   
(b) Mitchell’s Criminal and Mental Health History 
Mitchell was convicted in August 1988 for unlawfully 
taking a motor vehicle and placed on felony probation.  In 
December 1989, he was convicted of possession of cocaine for 
sale.  He was arrested in March 1990 for possession of cocaine 
and convicted in August 1990.  Mitchell was arrested in August 
1992, and ultimately convicted in November 1992 of possession 
of cocaine base for sale.  His probation for the carjacking offense 
in 1988 was revoked, and he was sentenced to four years in 
prison.  In December 1996, Mitchell was convicted of possession 
of marijuana for sale and granted probation.  He was convicted 
of possession of PCP in July 2000, sentenced to two years in 
prison, and released in January 2002.  Thereafter, he was 
arrested again for possession of cocaine base for sale, convicted 
in December 2002, and sentenced to prison for four years.   
Karen Hofmeister of the University of California, San 
Diego psychiatry department interviewed Mitchell in June 2004 
at the California Institute for Men, in advance of Mitchell being 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
 
paroled in order to gather information for the Parole Outpatient 
Clinic.  She wrote in her report that Mitchell appeared 
depressed.   
While still incarcerated, Mitchell came under the care of 
Dr. William Lawrence, who treated Mitchell for depression and 
prescribed a number of medications for Mitchell while he was in 
prison, including the antidepressant Wellbutrin.  According to 
Dr. Lawrence’s notes, there did not appear to be any change in 
Mitchell’s mood or mental status from July 2004 to February 
2005, and his medication did not change.  The last time he saw 
Mitchell was in March 2005; his mental status exam was, 
according to Dr. Lawrence, “in essence, normal.”  He had a 
diagnosis of dysthymia, or persistent depressive disorder, and 
was on the same dose of Wellbutrin.   
Dr. Nuingyu Kim, a psychiatrist for the Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, met with Mitchell on June 24, 
2005, and Mitchell told him that he had stopped taking 
Wellbutrin.  Before the meeting, Dr. Kim read a brief summary 
of his social background.  It stated that Mitchell had a long 
history of being institutionalized, abused as a child, and a long 
history of substance abuse, including PCP.  Dr. Kim was 
concerned that Mitchell stopped taking his medication, but Dr. 
Kim could not force Mitchell to take it.  As a result, they agreed 
that Mitchell would continue to see Dr. Kim once a month in 
case he needed medication, but then Mitchell did not show up 
for his next scheduled appointment.   
Parole Agent Steven Day supervised Mitchell for a short 
period of time and said Mitchell appeared compliant with his 
parole.  He testified that during those three months or so, 
Mitchell never tested positive for any kind of narcotics.  The last 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
 
time he was tested was two to three days prior to his arrest for 
the three murders.   
(c) Mitchell’s PCP Use 
After Mitchell’s encounter with the police on August 9, 
2005, Dr. Jeff Grange treated Mitchell at the hospital for a 
gunshot wound and psychiatric symptoms.  Mitchell arrived in 
an almost catatonic state and then later exhibited bizarre 
behavior.  Based on this and the events with the paramedics and 
law enforcement, Mitchell was tested for drugs.  A presumptive 
urine test was positive for PCP and marijuana.  It was Dr. 
Grange’s opinion that Mitchell likely had PCP in his system and 
that he exhibited behavior consistent with being on PCP.  An 
independent laboratory confirmed that Mitchell had PCP in his 
system.   
Felix D’Amico testified as a drug recognition expert.  He 
said that symptoms of PCP appear almost immediately after 
smoking it and usually peak two to three hours later.  He further 
noted that clinical symptoms continue for up to four to six hours 
and that behavioral manifestations continue for up to 11 hours.  
He noted that because PCP is stored in fatty cells and can be 
released by adrenaline, behavioral manifestations can reoccur 
even weeks later.  Some of the behaviors he has observed in 
people under the influence of PCP include being agitated or 
excited, having hallucinations or delusions, and paranoia.  Their 
vital signs (pulse, body temperature, blood pressure) are 
extremely high.  Other symptoms include abnormal eye 
movements, blank stare, and inability to verbalize.  He testified 
that these symptoms tend to cycle, such that one moment the 
individual will be calm and another moment something might 
set them off.  He noted that when PCP is used with marijuana, 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
 
a user may experience greater impairment in terms of 
misperception of time, space, and distance, in addition to the 
possible symptoms from the PCP.  Based on his review, D’Amico 
stated his opinion that Mitchell was under the influence of PCP 
on August 9, 2005.   
Dr. Alan Abrams examined Mitchell and testified as an 
expert on psychopharmacology.  He also reviewed Mitchell’s 
childhood school records and concluded they were consistent 
with Mitchell growing up in a highly unstable, abusive, and 
neglectful home.  Mitchell and his siblings were in and out of 
foster care and group homes because of their mother’s abuse and 
neglect and their father’s inability to care for them.  As a child, 
Mitchell tested average to above average in intelligence, but his 
academic performance was poor.   
Review of Mitchell’s health records disclosed that Mitchell 
had a psychiatric diagnosis of dysthymia and was prescribed a 
variety of antidepressants including Remeron, Paxil, Prozac, 
and Wellbutrin.  Dr. Abrams described dysthymic disorder as a 
type of depression that people experience when they have been 
unhappy their whole life, but not to the extremes of 
contemplating suicide or the inability to get out of bed.  People 
so afflicted “have a lowgrade alienation feeling that something 
is missing, joylessness.”  He opined that it usually has to do with 
genetic predisposition and problems in child rearing.   
Regarding PCP, Dr. Abrams said the drug is unlike almost 
any other abused drug because it makes people catatonic, 
insensible, and excitable.  Dr. Abrams stated his opinion that 
the level of Mitchell’s drug test administered at the time of his 
arrest — PCP in the amount of 11 nanograms per milliliter — 
indicated Mitchell most likely smoked a substantial amount of 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
 
PCP within the 24 to 72 hours before his arrest.  Dr. Abrams 
explained that Mitchell’s blood level of PCP and his irrational, 
violent, senseless, and out-of-control behavior suggested that 
after noon on August 8, 2005, Mitchell’s behavior was strongly 
influenced by the effects of PCP.  Dr. Abrams noted that one side 
effect of PCP is that it prevents the formation of memories.  Dr. 
Abrams reported that Mitchell told him only that he “was 
driving around that day” and that he could not remember any 
involvement in the shootings.  Dr. Abrams stated his view that 
Mitchell was intoxicated at the time of the shootings, but 
whether he acted with premeditation or malice “would be up for 
grabs.”   
II. 
GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A. CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72 Instructional Error  
1. Background 
Mitchell contends that his convictions for first degree 
murder, with the special circumstance finding, should be 
reversed because the jury was instructed incorrectly.  Mitchell 
was found death-eligible based on the multiple-murder special 
circumstance, which required that he be convicted of at least one 
first degree murder and one second degree murder in the same 
proceeding.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)  Mitchell was charged with 
three murders during the two incidents — first the killing of 
Lopez and Mawikere at CAS, and thereafter the killing of 
Susano Torres at the Yellows.  The prosecution proceeded solely 
on the theory that all three homicides were premeditated and 
deliberate first degree murder.  That is the only theory of first 
degree murder on which the jury was instructed. 
At the close of the guilt phase, the trial court gave the jury 
instructions on voluntary manslaughter, first degree murder, 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
 
and second degree murder, as the various possible theories of 
crimes that the evidence at trial supported.  The trial court then 
gave the jury the 1996 revised versions of CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 
8.72.  These instructions concern how the jury is to proceed if it 
finds reasonable doubt with respect to a greater offense. 
The given version of CALJIC No. 8.71 reads:  “If you are 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree 
that the crime of murder has been committed by a defendant, 
but you unanimously agree that you have a reasonable doubt 
whether the murder was of the first or of the second degree, you 
must give defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a 
verdict fixing the murder as of the second degree.”  The trial 
court appears to have slightly misstated the language of 
CALJIC No. 8.71 in its oral pronouncement by using the phrase 
“but you unanimously agree and you have a reasonable doubt” 
instead of “but you unanimously agree that you have a 
reasonable doubt.”  But there does not appear to be any 
substantive difference between the two formulations that would 
have affected the outcome.  (See People v. Osband (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 622, 717 [“as long as the court provides the jury with the 
written instructions to take into the deliberation room, they 
govern in any conflict with those delivered orally”].)   
The given version of CALJIC No. 8.72 reads:  “If you are 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree 
that the killing was unlawful, but you unanimously agree that 
you have a reasonable doubt whether the crime is murder or 
manslaughter, you must give the defendant the benefit of that 
doubt and find it to be manslaughter rather than murder.”   
Mitchell contends that the 1996 versions are flawed and 
that these instructions lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
 
and undermined the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, 
thereby violating his state and federal constitutional rights.  
Specifically, Mitchell observes that the versions of the 
instructions required that in order for the jury to return a 
verdict on the lesser charge, the jury must “unanimously agree 
that [they] have a reasonable doubt” as to whether the 
defendant was guilty of the greater charge or lesser charge.  
Mitchell contends this conveyed to jurors who harbored 
reasonable doubt that unless the doubt was shared by all of the 
other jurors, the duty to give the benefit of the doubt did not 
arise.  As such, this conveyed to the jury that first degree murder 
was the default finding and thus lowered the prosecution’s 
burden of proof by reassigning the benefit of the doubt to the 
prosecution.   
2. Analysis 
A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo.  (People 
v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210.)  An appellate court 
reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses 
whether the instruction accurately states the law.  (People v. 
Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)  In reviewing a claim of 
instructional error, the court must consider whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions caused 
the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution.  
(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 & fn. 4; People v. 
Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 287.)  The challenged instruction 
is viewed “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the 
trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible 
manner.”  (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229.) 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
 
Preliminarily, because Mitchell failed to object below, his 
state law claims asserting error on the instructions have been 
forfeited.  (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 327.)  But 
failure to object to instructional error will not result in forfeiture 
if the substantial rights of the defendant are affected.  (§ 1259; 
People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 287.)  Here, Mitchell 
claims that the flawed instructions deprived him of due process, 
and because this would affect his substantial rights if true, his 
claim is not forfeited. 
In support of his claim, Mitchell cites People v. Moore 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, where we stated that “the better practice 
is not to use the 1996 revised versions of CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 
8.72, as the instructions carry at least some potential for 
confusing jurors about the role of their individual judgments in 
deciding between first and second degree murder, and between 
murder and manslaughter.”  (Id. at p. 411.)  However, we 
expressly did not decide whether other jury instructions, such 
as CALJIC No. 17.40, dispel any confusion that might arise from 
CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72 because the jury in Moore had found 
true 
burglary-murder 
and 
robbery-murder 
special 
circumstances and thus had an alternative basis to find that the 
defendant was guilty of first degree murder.  (Moore, at p. 412.) 
In this case, unlike in Moore, the prosecution only relied 
on the premeditation theory to prove the charge of first degree 
murder against Mitchell.  We hold that the instructions as a 
whole made clear the role of the juror’s individual judgments in 
deciding between first and second degree murder, and between 
murder and manslaughter, thereby negating any potential 
confusion arising from CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72. 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
 
Mitchell’s principal complaint is that the instructions’ 
reference to unanimity confused jurors into thinking that even 
if they had reasonable doubt as to the greater charge in the 
instruction, they should defer to another juror’s finding of no 
reasonable doubt.  We rejected a similar argument in People v. 
Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 246–248 (Salazar).  The only 
pertinent difference between Salazar and this case is that the 
trial court in Salazar instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.10 
and omitted CALJIC No. 2.61.  But Salazar remains relevant 
and instructive in its determination that “while we have 
disapproved the unanimity terminology in the 1996 revised 
versions of CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72 because of the potential 
for confusion, the instructions were not erroneous in this case 
when considered with the rest of the charge to the jury.”  (Salazar, 
at p. 248, italics added.)  Mitchell contends that the instructions 
conveyed that “[i]f just one juror was convinced the homicides 
were the greater offense, then the other eleven jurors, who did 
have doubt that it was murder or first degree murder, would 
have no obligation to vote for the lesser offense.”  However, the 
jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 17.40, which made clear 
that “[t]he People and the defendant are entitled to the 
individual opinion of each of you. . . .  Each of you must decide 
the case for yourself, but do so only after discussing the evidence 
and the instructions with your fellow jurors.”  (Italics added.)  
(See People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 430 [“In the 
scenario defendant envisions, a jury’s reasonable understanding 
of the instructions as a whole would result in a hung jury, not a 
directed verdict for first degree murder”].) 
Mitchell’s further arguments that CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 
8.72 improperly shifted the burden from the prosecution or set 
first degree murder as the default finding are similarly 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
 
unavailing.  With regard to the prosecution’s burden of 
persuasion, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.61, 
which made clear that the prosecution must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt every element or charge against Mitchell.  
Also, in addition to CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72, the jury was 
instructed with CALJIC No. 8.74, which explains the 
determinations that the jury must unanimously make in order 
to render a guilty verdict for first degree murder:  “Before you 
may return a verdict in this case you must agree unanimously 
not only as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, but 
also if you should find him guilty of an unlawful killing, you 
must agree unanimously as to whether he is guilty of murder of 
the first degree or murder of the second degree or voluntary 
manslaughter.”  This instruction makes clear that the jury must 
unanimously find that the defendant was “guilty of murder of 
the first degree or murder of the second degree or voluntary 
manslaughter,” without preferring any of the options. 
Mitchell argues that these other instructions fail to rectify 
the potential confusion because CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72 are 
the more specific instructions and thus, insofar as there was an 
inconsistency between CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72 and other 
instructions, the jury would have applied CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 
8.72.  This is mistaken.  Although it is true that CALJIC 
Nos. 8.71 and 8.72 are more specific in addressing the crimes 
with which Mitchell was charged, they are not more specific 
than CALJIC Nos. 17.40, 2.61, and 8.74 in addressing the 
subject matter at issue. 
For each of the possible sources of confusion identified by 
Mitchell in CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72, the other jury 
instructions — CALJIC Nos. 17.40, 2.61, and 8.74 — addressed 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
 
those points more specifically:  As to any potential confusion 
about whether each juror was to exercise his or her individual 
judgment or defer to another juror’s judgment on whether there 
is reasonable doubt that Mitchell committed the greater crime, 
CALJIC No. 17.40 made clear that jurors are required to 
exercise 
their 
individual 
judgment 
in 
making 
this 
determination.  CALJIC No. 2.61 more specifically addressed 
whether the prosecution bore the burden of proving the 
elements of the greater crimes; it expressly stated that the 
prosecution bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt every element or charge against Mitchell.  And CALJIC 
No. 8.74 more specifically addressed whether the jury is to treat 
first degree murder as the default finding; it explained that the 
jury must be unanimous in deciding whether the defendant is 
guilty of first degree murder, second degree murder, or 
manslaughter, with no default among them.  (See People v. 
Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 302 [any juror confusion arising 
from CALJIC No. 8.71 was remedied by CALJIC Nos. 17.40 and 
8.74].) 
We find no error in the jury instructions because when 
they are viewed as a whole, there is no reasonable likelihood 
that they caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the 
Constitution. 
 
B. CALJIC No. 8.73.1 Instructional Error  
1. Background 
Mitchell next contends that the trial court erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.73.1.  On 
August 3, 2006, at the guilt phase jury instruction conference, 
defense counsel requested that the trial court give CALJIC No. 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
 
8.73.1.  That instruction states:  “A hallucination is a perception 
that has no objective reality. [¶] If the evidence establishes that 
the perpetrator of an unlawful killing suffered from a 
hallucination which contributed as a cause of the homicide, you 
should consider that evidence solely on the issue of whether the 
perpetrator 
killed 
with 
or 
without 
deliberation 
and 
premeditation.”  (CALJIC No. 8.73.1.)   
Without immediately deciding the question, the trial court 
first noted that there was no medical evidence that Mitchell was 
hallucinating, but that there was evidence that Mitchell was 
“yelling about shooting the devil” and that Armando Torres had 
tattoos of horns on his head.  The prosecutor argued that 
because Armando actually had horn tattoos, Mitchell’s 
statements about shooting the devil were not hallucinations.  
Defense counsel countered that despite the tattoos, Mitchell’s 
statements about shooting the devil did not necessarily refer to 
Torres.  The prosecutor agreed that Mitchell may not have been 
referring to Armando.  The trial court then deferred deciding the 
issue to hear counsel’s arguments on the applicability of People 
v. Padilla (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675, a case cited in reference 
to CALJIC No. 8.73.1.   
On August 7, 2006, when the trial court revisited the 
issue, defense counsel informed the trial court that Mitchell had 
instructed him “not to present a psychiatric defense or a drug 
defense” at the guilt phase and that he had decided for tactical 
reasons not to oppose his client’s decision.  However, defense 
counsel stated that he was still requesting that CALJIC No. 
8.73.1 be given.  The prosecutor maintained that the evidence 
only arguably showed that Mitchell might have been under the 
influence of some drug on August 9, 2005, the day after the 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
 
charged homicides.  Thus, the prosecutor argued that the 
instruction was irrelevant.  The trial court agreed and refused 
to give the instruction.   
Mitchell argues that there was evidence that he was 
suffering from hallucinations during the shootings of August 8, 
2005, evidenced by the fact that he called Armando “devil” and 
that he was behaving erratically the next day, including making 
statements that he had killed the devil.  Accordingly, he claims 
that the jury should have been instructed and consequently 
could have determined that there was no deliberation or 
premeditation in the homicides.  Mitchell claims that the trial 
court’s denial of his requested instruction violated state law and 
his due process right to a fair trial and a meaningful opportunity 
to present a defense. 
2. Analysis 
In general, a trial court must give a requested jury 
instruction if there is substantial evidence in the record 
supporting such an instruction.  (See People v. Cunningham 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1008 [so holding with respect to 
instructions on lesser included offenses].)  “In determining 
whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, 
the trial court does not determine the credibility of the defense 
evidence, but only whether ‘there was evidence which, if 
believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.’ ”  
(People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.)  “On appeal, we 
likewise ask only whether the requested instruction was 
supported by substantial evidence — evidence that, if believed 
by a rational jury, would have raised a reasonable doubt as to” 
an element of the crime in question.  (People v. Mentch (2008) 45 
Cal.4th 274, 288. 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
 
Here, there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the trial 
court giving the requested instruction at the time of the request.  
Mitchell points to only two facts that could support the 
requested instruction:  (1) that he called Armando Torres “devil” 
before shooting him; and (2) that he was behaving erratically, 
possibly under the influence of PCP, on the day after his 
shooting sprees, including making statements that he had killed 
the devil.  Notably, at the guilt phase, counsel chose not to 
present a psychiatric or drug defense and did not dispute the 
trial court’s statement that there was no medical evidence of 
hallucination. 
The fact that Mitchell called Armando “devil” does not 
alone 
provide 
sufficient 
evidence 
that 
Mitchell 
was 
hallucinating.  In using the term “devil,” Mitchell may have been 
referring to Armando because of his horn tattoos.  Moreover, 
although Armando initially testified on direct examination that 
Mitchell had never called him the devil before, later on redirect 
Armando stated that Mitchell “always” called him the devil 
despite Armando telling him not to.   
Mitchell’s erratic behavior on the day after the shootings 
also does not show he was suffering from hallucinations.  Even 
assuming Mitchell was under the influence of PCP on August 9, 
2005, both parties agree that there is no medical evidence in the 
record to indicate that he was under the influence on the day of 
the shootings.  Mitchell also presented no evidence that he had 
suffered hallucinations during any prior use of PCP.  Mitchell 
notes he was “crazily” shooting his gun into the air, screaming 
about killing the devil and being the devil, and saying that God 
would not judge him for killing the devil.  But Mitchell’s 
indiscriminate shooting into the air does not imply he was 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
 
hallucinating, and his usage of the word “devil” does not imply 
that he was in fact perceiving a “devil” as opposed to simply 
referring to the concept or referring to Armando by a nickname. 
The cases Mitchell relies upon to support this claim 
offered significantly more compelling evidence that a defendant 
suffered from hallucinations, including medical evidence.  (See 
People v. Mejia-Lenares (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1444 
[medical evidence showed defendant was diagnosed with major 
depression with “psychotic features, including delusions,” and 
defendant testified that he suffered specific hallucinations in 
which he witnessed the victim transforming into the devil]; 
People v. Duckett (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1118 [medical 
expert testified that defendant suffered from chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia and that defendant experienced “ ‘command 
hallucinations’ ” in an “acute phase” of his illness at the time of 
the killing]; People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 512 
[medical expert testified, in the context of assessing defendant’s 
competence for trial, that defendant was suffering from 
hallucinations indicative of schizophrenia and stated that “he 
had observed defendant go into a fit of ‘psychotic furor’ ”].) 
It is of course possible that Mitchell was hallucinating, but 
a mere possibility is not enough.  There must be substantial 
evidence to warrant the instruction.  In light of the absence of 
evidentiary support for Mitchell’s argument, coupled with the 
support for the alternative explanation, we believe no 
reasonable jury would have credited Mitchell’s explanation.  The 
trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 8.73.1 
did not deny Mitchell his due process rights to a fair trial or a 
meaningful opportunity to present a defense. 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
 
C. Cumulative Error at the Guilt Phase  
Because we reject Mitchell’s claims of error at the guilt 
phase, there is no cumulative error requiring reversal of his 
convictions. 
III. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A. CALJIC No. 2.20 Instructional Error  
1. Background 
Mitchell contends the trial court erred at the penalty 
phase by failing to instruct the jury properly on witness 
credibility.  At the jury instructions hearing for the penalty 
phase, the trial court discussed CALJIC No. 2.20, the jury 
instruction addressing what jurors may consider in assessing 
witness credibility.  That pattern instruction says:  “Every 
person who testifies under oath [or affirmation] is a witness.  
You are the sole judges of the believability of a witness and the 
weight to be given the testimony of each witness. [¶] In 
determining the believability of a witness you may consider 
anything that has a tendency reasonably to prove or disprove 
the truthfulness of the testimony of the witness, including but 
not limited to any of the following:  [¶] The extent of the 
opportunity or ability of the witness to see or hear or otherwise 
become aware of any matter about which the witness testified; 
[¶] The ability of the witness to remember or to communicate 
any matter about which the witness has testified;  [¶] The 
character and quality of that testimony; [¶] The demeanor and 
manner of the witness while testifying; [¶] The existence or 
nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive; [¶] The 
existence or nonexistence of any fact testified to by the witness; 
[¶] The attitude of the witness toward this action or toward the 
giving of testimony[.][;] [¶] [A statement [previously] made by 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
 
the witness that is [consistent] [or] [inconsistent] with [his] [her] 
testimony][.][;] [¶] [The character of the witness for honesty or 
truthfulness or their opposites][;] [¶] [An admission by the 
witness of untruthfulness][;] [¶] [The witness’ prior conviction of 
a felony][;] [¶] [Past criminal conduct of a witness amounting to 
a misdemeanor][;] [¶] [Whether the witness is testifying under 
a grant of immunity].”  (CALJIC No. 2.20.) 
The last six paragraphs of CALJIC No. 2.20 may be 
omitted based on the evidence presented at trial.  In discussion 
with counsel, the trial court reviewed whether evidence 
supported the inclusion of any of the six bracketed paragraphs 
in the instruction.  The trial court stated that “no witness had a 
felony conviction,” defense counsel agreed, and the prosecutor 
remained silent.  As a result, the trial court fashioned an 
instruction, ultimately delivered to the jury, which eliminated 
the last six paragraphs of the pattern CALJIC No. 2.20 
instruction, as well as the reference to “affirmation” in the 
instruction’s introductory paragraph.   
It appears that the trial court and the parties failed to 
recall that witness Armando Torres, who testified for the 
prosecution at the guilt phase and would testify at the penalty 
phase, had admitted that he had been convicted of felony 
robbery.  As a result, the penalty phase jury was not instructed 
that a witness’s prior conviction of a felony bore on his 
credibility, as set forth in CALJIC No. 2.20 and CALJIC 
No. 2.23.  Although the jury did receive the version of CALJIC 
No. 2.20 containing the language pertaining to felony 
convictions as well as CALJIC No. 2.23 at the guilt stage, the 
jury was specifically instructed at the penalty phase to 
disregard the guilt phase instructions.   
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
 
Consequently, 
Mitchell 
contends 
the 
incomplete 
instructions denied his state and federal constitutional rights to 
a fair penalty trial, due process, and a fair penalty 
determination mandating the reversal of his death judgment.  
We reject this claim, as the error in failing to reinstruct on 
principles relating to evaluating the credibility of a witness in 
the penalty phase was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
2. Analysis 
“A trial court has a sua sponte duty to ‘instruct on general 
principles of law that are closely and openly connected to the 
facts and that are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the 
case,’ including instructions relevant to evaluating the 
credibility of witnesses.”  (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
769,845–846; see also §§ 1093, subd. (t), 1127.)  This duty 
includes giving correct instructions regarding the credibility of 
witnesses.  As we have stated, “[T]he court should give the 
substance of CALJIC No. 2.20 in every criminal case, although 
it may omit factors that are inapplicable under the evidence.”  
(People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 910.) 
As discussed, Mitchell’s counsel assented to the trial 
court’s formulation of CALJIC No. 2.20, omitting the bracketed 
language regarding a witness’s prior felony convictions.  
Therefore, any claim of state law error has been forfeited and 
has not been preserved for appeal.  (People v. Bolin, supra, 18 
Cal.4th at p. 328.)  That said, under section 1259, a reviewing 
court has the authority to review any question of law involving 
an instruction if the defendant’s substantial rights were 
affected, notwithstanding a failure to preserve the issue for 
appeal.  Thus, we will consider Mitchell’s claim that the 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
 
omission of the portion of CALJIC No. 2.20 was constitutional 
error. 
Here, any error in the failure to instruct the jury on the 
impact of a felony conviction on a witness’s credibility was 
undoubtedly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury was 
aware that Armando was a felon, as he testified at the guilt 
phase that he had a prior felony conviction for robbery.  The jury 
was instructed that it could consider evidence from any phase of 
the trial, and although the jury was not specifically instructed 
about the impact of felony convictions on a witness’s credibility, 
the jury was instructed that it could “consider anything that has 
a tendency reasonably to prove or disprove the truthfulness of 
the testimony of the witness.”  Thus, the jury was well appraised 
of Armando’s felony conviction and equipped to assess 
Armando’s credibility in light of his criminal past. 
Moreover, the subject of Armando’s testimony at the 
penalty phase was not controversial.  Armando testified that he 
liked his younger brother and missed him.  He testified that 
when he thinks about his brother, he uses drugs to make his 
thoughts go away, that his methamphetamine use has gotten 
worse, and that as a result he has ended up in custody.  The jury 
was also made aware that Armando was currently in custody 
relating to charges involving great bodily injury, drugs, and a 
firearm.  The fact that Armando was a convicted felon at the 
time of his testimony bore little relevance to the subject of his 
testimony about how Susano’s murder had affected his life.  
Furthermore, given what the jury knew about Armando’s drug 
use and criminal behavior, the fact that his prior felony 
conviction was not specifically called to the jury’s attention had 
marginal relevance in negatively impacting Armando’s 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
 
credibility.  Consequently, it is not reasonably possible that the 
jury would not have returned a death verdict had it been 
expressly told it could consider Armando’s felony conviction in 
assessing his credibility. 
B. Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty 
Statute  
Mitchell raises several constitutional challenges to 
California’s death penalty scheme.  We have rejected these 
claims before, as follows, and we decline to revisit our prior 
holdings: 
“The death penalty law adequately narrows the class of 
death-eligible defendants.” (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 
672, 723; Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 255.) 
Consideration of the circumstances of the crime during the 
penalty phase pursuant to section 190.3, factor (a), does not 
result in an arbitrary and capricious application of the death 
penalty and does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.  (People v. 
Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 489 (Winbush); see also Tuilaepa 
v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976 [§ 190.3, factor (a) does 
not violate the Eighth Amendment and is not unconstitutionally 
vague].) 
The jury need not make findings beyond a reasonable 
doubt that aggravating factors were present (other than Penal 
Code section 190.3, factor (b) or (c) evidence), that they 
outweighed the mitigating factors, or the factors were 
substantial enough to warrant a judgment of death under 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, Blakely v. 
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 530 U.S. 
584, and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270.  (See 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
38 
 
People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 106; People v. Griffin 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 
753.) 
The federal Constitution does not require the court to 
instruct the jury that the prosecution has the burden of 
persuasion regarding the existence of aggravating factors, nor is 
the court required to instruct the jury that there is no applicable 
burden of proof.  (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 916; 
People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1136–1137; People v. 
Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 682–684.) 
The jury is not required to unanimously find that certain 
aggravating factors warrant the death penalty under the federal 
Constitution, and the equal protection clause does not compel a 
different result.  (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 769; 
People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 854.)  The court is also 
not required to instruct the jury that it need not unanimously 
find particular facts in mitigation.  (People v. Cage (2015) 62 
Cal.4th 256, 293 (Cage).) 
CALJIC No. 8.88 does not improperly instruct the jury 
that a verdict of death is required if the factors in aggravation 
outweigh the factors in mitigation.  (People v. Arias (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 92, 170–171.) 
The use of adjectives like “extreme” and “substantial” in 
the list of mitigating factors in section 190.3 does not act as a 
barrier to the jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence in 
violation of the federal Constitution.  (People v. McKinnon 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 692; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 
614–615.) 
The court’s use of CALJIC No. 8.88, which instructs that 
jurors must be “persuaded that the aggravating circumstances 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
39 
 
are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating 
circumstances” to warrant a death judgment, is not 
unconstitutionally vague, appropriately informs jurors, and 
does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution.  (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 
122–123 (Landry); People v. Williams (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1166, 
1204–1205.) 
The trial court has no obligation to delete from CALJIC 
No. 8.85 inapplicable mitigating factors, nor must it identify 
which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating.  (People 
v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 618; People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 469, 509 [“The aggravating or mitigating nature of the 
factors is self-evident within the context of each case.”].)  “We 
again conclude that the instruction is ‘not unconstitutional for 
failing to inform the jury that:  (a) death must be the appropriate 
penalty, not just a warranted penalty [citation]; (b) [a sentence 
of life without the possibility of parole] is required, if it finds that 
the mitigating circumstances outweigh those in aggravation 
[citation] or that the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh 
those in mitigation [citation]; (c) [a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole] may be imposed even if the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh those in mitigation [citation]; (d) 
neither party bears the burden of persuasion on the penalty 
determination.’ ”  (Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 122.) 
“The impact of a defendant’s execution on his or her family 
may not be considered by the jury in mitigation.”  (People v. 
Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 601; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 936, 1000 [“ ‘Sympathy for a defendant’s family is not a 
matter that a capital jury can consider in mitigation’ ”].) 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
40 
 
The trial court need not instruct the jury that life without 
parole was presumed the appropriate sentence; “[t]here is no 
requirement jurors be instructed there is a ‘ “ ‘presumption of 
life’ ” ’ or that they should presume life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole is the appropriate sentence.”  (People v. 
Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1233.)  And “[j]urors need not 
make written findings in determining penalty.”  (People v. 
Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 180.) 
The federal Constitution does not require intercase 
proportionality review among capital cases.  (Winbush, supra, 2 
Cal.5th at p. 490; see Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50–
51.)  “California’s death penalty law does not violate equal 
protection by treating capital and noncapital defendants 
differently.”  (People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 488.)  
California’s use of the death penalty does not violate 
international law, the federal Constitution, or the Eighth 
Amendment’s 
prohibition 
against 
cruel 
and 
unusual 
punishment in light of “evolving standards of decency.”  (Cage, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 297; see People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 327, 373.) 
IV. 
CUMULATIVE ERROR 
Because we have only found one error in the proceeding — 
at the penalty phase regarding the trial court’s failure to 
instruct the jury that a witness’s prior conviction of a felony bore 
on his credibility — and because we have determined that the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we find there is 
no cumulative error requiring reversal of Mitchell’s convictions 
or penalty of death. 
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
41 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, we affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J.  
 
We Concur:  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Mitchell 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S147335 
Date Filed: June 24, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Brian S. McCarville 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, Harry Gruber and Maria Morga, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, 
Holly D. Wilkens and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Maria Morga 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA  94607-4139 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 525-4232