Case Title: State v. Fimbres

Citation: 108 Ariz. 430, 501 P.2d 14

Docket Number: 2362

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1972-09-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
108 Ariz. 430 (1972) 501 P.2d 14 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Joseph Madrid FIMBRES, Appellant. No. 2362. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. September 21, 1972. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by William P. Dixon and John S. O'Dowd, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. S. Jeffrey Minker, Tucson, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal by the defendant from the revocation of his probation (§ 13-1657 A.R.S.) and a sentence of from 6 to 7 years for the crime of armed robbery [§§ 13-641 and 13-643, subsec. B, A.R.S.]. We are called upon to determine whether the court violated the defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination when it allowed the probation officer to testify as to statements made to him by the defendant. The facts necessary for a determination of the matter on appeal are as follows. The defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime of robbery on 24 April 1970 after a jury trial and verdict. Imposition of sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for 5 years, "conditioned, however, on good behavior and on compliance with such other conditions of probation as the Court may designate." The court imposed "Additional Conditions" and ordered: On 10 March 1971 a petition to revoke probation was filed by defendant's probation officer which stated: A hearing was held upon the petition at which time defendant was represented by counsel. At the time of the hearing, defendant had been arrested and charged with the burglary but had not been convicted. The defendant testified in his own behalf. For example: The probation officer (Mr. Ryerse) testified in part as follows: The probation officer also stated: It is the contention of the attorney for the defendant that defendant's privilege against self-incrimination was violated when the probation officer was allowed to testify as to statements made to him by the defendant. Although the attorney for *432 the defendant cites some cases concerning the privilege against self-incrimination, all of those cited are pre-arrest, pre-conviction, and pre-probation cases. He has cited no case and we have found none which hold that the rights of a defendant-probationer are violated when the probation officer is allowed to testify at a revocation of probation hearing. We agree with the Maryland court that: Suspension of sentence and the granting of probation is statutory in Arizona, § 13-1657 A.R.S., which reads in part as follows: Requiring the probationer to report to a probation officer is the only practical way that a system of probation can be maintained by the court which, in the case of probation, still retains jurisdiction over the defendant. To hold as defendant would suggest, that the probation officer may not discuss with the court or testify at a revocation of probation hearing as to the statements made by the defendant would completely destroy the system of probation which is just as much for the benefit of the defendant as it is for society as a whole. The probation officer is the agent of the court and the confidential nature of the conversation between the probation officer and the probationer is one for the court to control. There is no privilege against disclosure which is owned or controlled by the probationer. Judgment affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, J., concur.