Case Title: Gibson v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 131256

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2014-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
DONALD GIBSON 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 131256  
CHIEF JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 April 17, 2014 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jan L. Brodie, Judge 
 
The Commonwealth filed a petition for the civil commitment 
of Donald Gibson as a sexually violent predator pursuant to the 
Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA), Code 
§§ 37.2-900 through -921.  After the fact finder determined that 
Gibson is a sexually violent predator, the circuit court shifted 
to Gibson the burden of proof to establish that he satisfies the 
criteria for conditional release.  Because the burden of proof 
does not shift, we will reverse the circuit court's judgment. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The Commonwealth filed its petition pursuant to Code 
§ 37.2-905 and requested the circuit court to hold that Gibson 
is a sexually violent predator under Code § 37.2-908 and to find 
that no suitable less restrictive alternative to involuntary 
secure inpatient treatment is available.  See Code § 37.2-
908(D).  Following its determination that probable cause existed 
to believe that Gibson is a sexually violent predator, see Code 
§ 37.2-906(A), the court circuit conducted a two-day jury trial.  
Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found that Gibson 
 
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is a sexually violent predator as defined in Code § 37.2-900.1  
The circuit court entered an order in accord with the jury's 
verdict.  Pursuant to Code §§ 37.2-908(D) and (E), the circuit 
court ordered that the trial be continued to receive additional 
evidence on possible alternatives to commitment and to determine 
whether Gibson meets the criteria for conditional release or 
should be committed to the custody of the Department of 
Behavioral Health and Developmental Services (DBHDS). 
At the commencement of the reconvened trial to determine 
Gibson's suitability for conditional release, the circuit court 
stated: "[W]e go forward with the second phase of this hearing 
and I believe [Mr. Gibson], the burden is on you to proceed."  
Gibson objected, arguing that the burden was on the Commonwealth 
to prove the elements of Code § 37.2-912 are not satisfied.  
Gibson stated: "It's the burden of the Commonwealth . . . to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is not a 
conditional release plan that will meet [the] factors" outlined 
in Code § 37.2-912.  In response, the Commonwealth, 
citing Commonwealth v. Bell, 282 Va. 308, 714 S.E.2d 562 (2011), 
argued that the burden is on Gibson to prove by a preponderance 
                                                        
1 In relevant part, the term "[s]exually violent predator 
means any person who (i) has been convicted of a sexually 
violent offense . . . ; and (ii) because of a mental abnormality 
or personality disorder, finds it difficult to control his 
predatory behavior, which makes him likely to engage in sexually 
violent acts."  Code § 37.2-900. 
 
3 
of the evidence that he meets the criteria for conditional 
release.  The circuit court agreed with the Commonwealth.  
Relying on Bell and Code § 37.2-912, the circuit court shifted 
to Gibson the burden of proof to demonstrate that he satisfies 
the criteria for conditional release. 
Gibson offered evidence in support of a conditional release 
plan, including testimony from his family members who, under the 
plan, would be tasked with his supervision if he were 
conditionally released.  After reviewing the conditional release 
plan and hearing the evidence, which included a report from the 
Commissioner of DBHDS as required by Code § 37.2-908(E), the 
circuit court found that Gibson does not meet the criteria in 
Code § 37.2-912(A).  The court concluded that Gibson needs 
inpatient treatment as a sexually violent predator and that the 
conditional release plan does not "provide appropriate 
outpatient supervision."  The court also doubted that Gibson 
"would comply with the conditions specified" and believed that 
"he would present an undue risk to public safety."  The court 
ordered that Gibson be committed to the custody of DBHDS for 
appropriate treatment and confinement.  See Code § 37.2-908(D). 
We granted Gibson's appeal on the sole issue whether the 
circuit court erred in holding that Gibson bore the burden of 
proof to establish the criteria for conditional release under 
Code § 37.2-912(A). 
 
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ANALYSIS 
The SVPA sets forth the statutory scheme that permits a 
person convicted of a sexually violent offense to be declared a 
sexually violent predator and committed to involuntary secure 
inpatient treatment in a mental health facility after release 
from prison.  Although a proceeding under the SVPA is civil, it 
nevertheless entails the potential involuntary loss of liberty, 
and therefore a respondent subject to such a proceeding is 
afforded certain rights typically available in a criminal 
proceeding.  McCloud v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 242, 253-54, 609 
S.E.2d 16, 21-22 (2005); see Code § 37.2-901.  "[I]nvoluntary 
civil commitment is a significant deprivation of liberty to 
which federal and state procedural due process protections 
apply."  Jenkins v. Director, Va. Ctr. for Behav. Rehab., 271 
Va. 4, 15, 624 S.E.2d 453, 460 (2006); accord Townes v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 234, 240, 609 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2005) ("Civil 
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation 
of liberty that requires due process protection.") (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 
71, 79 (1992) ("'The loss of liberty produced by an involuntary 
commitment is more than a loss of freedom from confinement.'") 
(quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980)). 
When a proceeding under the SVPA reaches the trial stage, 
the fact finder must determine "whether, by clear and convincing 
 
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evidence, the respondent is a sexually violent predator."  Code 
§ 37.2-908(C).  Upon such a finding, the trial court then 
determines whether to commit the respondent or to continue the 
trial to receive additional evidence regarding possible 
alternatives to commitment.  Code §§ 37.2-908(D) and (E).  When 
the trial court decides to continue the trial to receive such 
additional evidence, as the circuit court did in this case, the 
court shall "reconvene the trial and receive testimony on the 
possible alternatives to commitment."  Code § 37.2-908(E).  At 
the conclusion of such testimony, the court 
shall consider: (i) the treatment needs of 
the respondent; (ii) whether less 
restrictive alternatives to commitment have 
been investigated and deemed suitable; (iii) 
whether any such alternatives will 
accommodate needed and appropriate 
supervision and treatment plans for the 
respondent, including but not limited to, 
therapy or counseling, access to 
medications, availability of travel, and 
location of proposed residence; and (iv) 
whether any such alternatives will 
accommodate needed and appropriate regular 
psychological or physiological testing, 
including but not limited to, penile 
plethysmograph testing or sexual interest 
testing. If the court finds these criteria 
are adequately addressed and the court finds 
that the respondent meets the criteria for 
conditional release set forth in § 37.2-912, 
the court shall order that the respondent be 
returned to the custody of the Department of 
Corrections to be processed for conditional 
release as a sexually violent predator 
pursuant to his conditional release plan. 
 
Code § 37.2-908(E). 
 
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Pursuant to Code § 37.2-912(A), when the trial court 
considers a respondent's need for secure inpatient treatment, 
it shall place the respondent on conditional 
release if it finds that (i) he does not 
need secure inpatient treatment but needs 
outpatient treatment or monitoring to 
prevent his condition from deteriorating to 
a degree that he would need secure inpatient 
treatment; (ii) appropriate outpatient 
supervision and treatment are reasonably 
available; (iii) there is significant reason 
to believe that the respondent, if 
conditionally released, would comply with 
the conditions specified; and (iv) 
conditional release will not present an 
undue risk to public safety. In making its 
determination, the court may consider (i) 
the nature and circumstances of the sexually 
violent offense for which the respondent was 
charged or convicted, including the age and 
maturity of the victim; (ii) the results of 
any actuarial test, including the likelihood 
of recidivism; (iii) the results of any 
diagnostic tests previously administered to 
the respondent under this chapter; (iv) the 
respondent's mental history, including 
treatments for mental illness or mental 
disorders, participation in and response to 
therapy or treatment, and any history of 
previous hospitalizations; (v) the 
respondent's present mental condition; (vi) 
the respondent's response to treatment while 
in secure inpatient treatment or on 
conditional release, including his 
disciplinary record and any infractions; 
(vii) the respondent's living arrangements 
and potential employment if he were to be 
placed on conditional release; (viii) the 
availability of transportation and 
appropriate supervision to ensure 
participation by the respondent in necessary 
treatment; and (ix) any other factors that 
the court deems relevant. 
 
 
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If, after considering the factors in Code § 37.2-912(A), the 
trial court concludes that there is "no suitable less 
restrictive alternative to involuntary secure inpatient 
treatment," the court shall "order that the respondent be 
committed to the custody of [DBHDS] for appropriate inpatient 
treatment in a secure facility."  Code § 37.2-908(D). 
The issue in this appeal is whether the burden of proof 
remains with the Commonwealth during the reconvened trial to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that no suitable less 
restrictive alternative to involuntary secure inpatient 
treatment exists, or whether the burden of proof shifts to the 
respondent to establish that he meets the criteria for 
conditional release under Code § 37.2-912(A).  That issue is a 
question of law reviewed de novo on appeal.  Gallagher v. 
Commonwealth, 284 Va. 444, 449, 732 S.E.2d 22, 24 (2012). 
Recognizing that the SVPA is silent with regard to the 
burden of proof regarding the criteria for conditional release 
in Code § 37.2-912(A), the Commonwealth asserts that the burden 
of proof shifts to the respondent to establish those factors.  
The Commonwealth contends that the Court's decision in Bell, 
which involved an annual review under Code § 37.2-910, governs 
Gibson's reconvened trial because the plain language of Code § 
37.2-912(A) requires a trial court to address the criteria for 
conditional release "any time the court considers the 
 
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respondent's need for secure inpatient treatment."  The 
Commonwealth further argues that the "wording" of the four 
criteria for conditional release in Code § 37.2-912(A), which 
require the trial court to make affirmative findings, indicates 
that the burden of proof rests on the respondent. 
In Bell, the Commonwealth challenged, among other things, 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial court's 
judgment at the first annual review.  282 Va. at 310, 714 S.E.2d 
at 563; see Code § 37.2-910.  The trial court found that 
although the respondent remained a sexually violent predator, he 
nevertheless satisfied the criteria for conditional release in 
Code § 37.2-912(A).  282 Va. at 310, 714 S.E.2d at 563.  At 
trial, the respondent had conceded that it was his burden to 
establish the criteria for conditional release, and he made the 
same concession on brief to this Court, asserting that his 
burden was by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 313, 714 
S.E.2d at 564.  In response, the Commonwealth noted on brief 
that this Court had already addressed the burden of proof when 
determining whether to civilly commit or conditionally release a 
sexually violent predator in McCloud and that the respondent 
cited no authority for a different burden of proof depending on 
whether that determination was made at an initial sexually 
violent predator trial or during an annual review hearing.  
Although allocation of the burden of proof was not the subject 
 
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of the Commonwealth's assignments of error in Bell, this Court 
stated: "We agree with [the respondent's] allocation of the 
burden of proof, and recognize it as the appropriate allocation 
on conditional release in sexually violent predator cases."  Id. 
at 313, 714 S.E.2d at 564. 
That statement appears to be contrary to our earlier 
decision in McCloud.  There, we held that "the burden of proving 
that there is no suitable less restrictive alternative to 
involuntary confinement rests with the Commonwealth, and that 
burden cannot be shifted to the [respondent]." 269 Va. at 261, 
609 S.E.2d at 26.  The Commonwealth argues that Bell tacitly 
overruled McCloud on this point, while Gibson argues that Bell 
addressed the burden of proof only in an annual review hearing 
and that McCloud still governs as to an initial sexually violent 
predator trial. 
The SVPA expressly addresses allocation of the burden of 
proof in only one place.  Code § 37.2-910(C) provides that at 
the mandatory review hearings conducted periodically after the 
initial date of commitment, the Commonwealth must establish "by 
clear and convincing evidence that the respondent remains a 
sexually violent predator."  Code § 37.2-908(C), however, 
implicitly addresses the burden of proof by providing that the 
fact finder must "determine whether, by clear and convincing 
evidence, the respondent is a sexually violent predator."  In 
 
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upholding the constitutionality of the SVPA and finding that it 
satisfies due process requirements, we have emphasized that the 
"individual's interest in the outcome of a civil commitment 
proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process 
requires the state to justify confinement by proof more 
substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence" and that 
"the 'clear and convincing' evidentiary standard is the minimum 
standard that may be used in a civil commitment 
proceeding."  Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 126, 613 
S.E.2d 570, 578 (2005) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418, 427, 432-33 (1979)).  The burden of proof by clear and 
convincing evidence rests on the Commonwealth, not the 
respondent, and never shifts.  See Dobson v. Commonwealth, 260 
Va. 71, 74-75, 531 S.E.2d 569, 571 (2000) (recognizing that an 
impermissible shifting of the burden of proof implicates due 
process rights). 
Thus, we reiterate our holding in McCloud: 
[T]he burden of proving that there is no 
suitable less restrictive alternative to 
involuntary confinement rests with the 
Commonwealth, and that burden cannot be 
shifted to the [respondent].  However, when 
. . . the Commonwealth has adduced evidence 
sufficient to satisfy the trial court that 
involuntary confinement is necessary and, 
thus, less restrictive alternatives are 
unsuitable, the [respondent] then has the 
burden of going forward with his case if he 
is to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence. 
 
 
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269 Va. at 261, 609 S.E.2d at 26. 
The criteria for conditional release in Code § 37.2-912(A) 
must be satisfied "[a]t any time the court considers the 
respondent's need for secure inpatient treatment pursuant to 
[the SVPA]." (Emphasis added.)  We discern no reason to draw a 
distinction between an initial sexually violent predator trial 
and an annual review hearing in terms of which party bears the 
burden of proof on the issue whether there are no suitable less 
restrictive alternatives to involuntary confinement.2  In both 
instances, when the Commonwealth presents a prima facie case 
showing that there is no suitable less restrictive alternative 
to involuntary commitment, the respondent then has the burden to 
produce evidence to rebut the Commonwealth's case by showing 
                                                        
2 In Bell, the question as to which party had the burden of 
proof to establish the criteria for conditional release was not 
at issue and thus our statement regarding the burden of proof 
was dicta.  But, to the extent Bell is contrary to our holding 
today, it is overruled.  We are mindful of the doctrine of stare 
decisis and the critical role it serves in ensuring stability in 
the law.  However, stare decisis "'is not an inexorable 
command.'"  Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer, 282 Va. 
412, 419, 718 S.E.2d 762, 766 (2011) (quoting McDonald v. City 
of Chicago, 561 U.S. ___, ___ 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3063, (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  And thus, when warranted, "we have 
not hesitated to reexamine our precedent in proper cases and 
overrule such precedent."  Nunnally v. Artis, 254 Va. 247, 253, 
492 S.E.2d 126, 129 (1997).  "[S]tare decisis cannot possibly be 
controlling when" the rule at issue "does not serve as a guide 
to lawful behavior" and "has been proved manifestly erroneous."  
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995). 
 
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that the respondent meets the criteria for conditional release 
in Code § 37.2-912(A).3 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circuit 
court erred by requiring Gibson to bear the burden of proof to 
establish that he satisfies the criteria for conditional release 
in Code § 37.2-912(A).  We will reverse the circuit court's 
judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
                                                        
3 The burden of proof is not to be confused with the burden 
of going forward to produce evidence.  The burden of proof, also 
referred to as the burden of persuasion, never shifts.  Vahdat 
v. Holland, 274 Va. 417, 424, 649 S.E.2d 691, 695 (2007); Darden 
v. Murphy, 176 Va. 511, 516, 11 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1940); see also 
Bacon v. Bacon, 3 Va. App. 484, 488 n.1, 351 S.E.2d 37, 40 n.1 
(1986).  When a plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the 
burden of producing evidence to overcome that prima facie case, 
also referred to as the burden of going forward, then shifts to 
the defendant.  Darden, 176 Va. at 516, 11 S.E.2d at 581.  The 
same is true in a criminal prosecution.  See Neal v. 
Commonwealth, 124 Va. 842, 848, 98 S.E. 629, 631 (1919) (holding 
that "[t]he evidence may shift from one side to the other," but 
Commonwealth always has the burden to prove a defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt).