Case Title: Carr v. Diamond

Citation: 192 Kan. 377, 388 P.2d 591

Docket Number: 43,353

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1964-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
192 Kan. 377 (1964)
388 P.2d 591
TERRANCE CARR d/b/a CARR AIR CONDITIONING, Appellee,
v.
GRACE DIAMOND, Defendant, and R.H. MACY & CO., INC., "INNES," a corporation (Additional Party Defendant), Appellant.
No. 43,353

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 25, 1964.
Harold A. Zelinkoff, of Wichita, appeared on the briefs for the appellant.
Robert W. Kaplan and Calvin L. McMillan, both of Wichita, appeared on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is a continuation of the controversy involved in Carr v. Diamond, 192 Kan. 336, 388 P.2d 589. Defendant, R.H. Macy & Co., Inc., "Innes," appeals from a judgment dismissing the action with prejudice while its appeal from a judgment overruling its demurrer to the petition and other procedural matters were pending.
The plaintiff appealed to the district court from a judgment of the court of common pleas of Sedgwick County, Kansas. After perfecting his appeal, plaintiff filed a motion to have R.H. Macy & Co., Inc., "Innes" made an additional party defendant. The motion was allowed and service of summons was duly made. Macy appeared specially and moved to quash the summons for the reason that the court had no jurisdiction of it as an added defendant. The motion was overruled.
Following other procedural steps, which are not material to the disposition of the controversy, plaintiff filed an amended bill of particulars. Macy filed a demurrer which was overruled.
*378 The defendant, Macy, appealed, specifying as error the overruling of the demurrer, the order making Macy an additional party defendant, and the refusal to quash the service of summons. The appeal was taken on December 15, 1961.
Additional facts material to the determination of the controversy may be found in the motion for approval of the journal entry of dismissal and the journal entry. The former reads:
The journal entry concludes:
The defendant, Macy, has appealed from the judgment dismissing the action.
Among other contentions, the defendant, Macy, specifies as error on the part of the trial court the approval of the journal entry of dismissal with prejudice after an appeal had been perfected on December 15, 1961, and the abstract of record filed, and in assuming jurisdiction of the case after an appeal to this court had been perfected. The appellant states:
The appellant misapplies a valid statement of the law. The statement deals with the dismissal of the appeal, not the dismissal of the case in the lower court. In some jurisdictions, under certain circumstances, the trial court has a voice in whether or not an appeal will be allowed. The statement announces the rule that once the appeal is allowed and perfected under such circumstances, a motion to dismiss the appeal may be heard only in the appellate court. Such a situation is not present in this appeal.
The appellant calls our attention to the case of Pugsley v. Railway Co., 69 Kan. 599, 600, 77 Pac. 579, in which this court stated:
In the above case the appeal was from an order refusing to dismiss without prejudice after a demurrer to the evidence had been taken under consideration. A much different situation would have existed had the plaintiff moved to dismiss with prejudice and thus ended the controversy.
An appeal to this court does not of itself operate as a stay of further proceedings in the trial court. The filing of a supersedeas bond under the provisions of G.S. 1949, 60-3323, will stay the execution of a final judgment but it does not stay other proceedings in the trial court. The trial court may proceed to set aside or correct its judgment or grant a new trial. (Barstow v. Elmore, 177 Kan. 30, 276 P.2d 360.)
In Heizer v. Pawsey, 47 Kan. 33, 27 Pac. 125, it was stated:
This court disposed of the question raised by the present appeal in Owen v. Stark, 175 Kan. 800, 267 P.2d 948, where it was held in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the syllabus as follows:
We cannot find, and appellant has not suggested, any possibility of it being prejudiced by the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal with prejudice freed the appellant of any possible liability to the appellee now and for all time as to the issue in controversy. The only possible thing that could be accomplished would be to furnish counsel with a forum from which to debate what may be an interesting question. Appellate courts do not entertain appeals for such purpose. Reviewing courts do not decide questions which no longer exist merely to make a precedent.
It was held in Christ v. Fischer, 118 Kan. 586, 235 Pac. 841:
The judgment of the trial court dismissing the action with prejudice as to all defendants disposed of the entire controversy. The appeal brought nothing to this court but moot issues. (Carr v. Diamond,) 192 Kan. 336, 388 P.2d 589.
The appeal is dismissed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.
JACKSON, J., not participating.