Case Title: STATE v RYAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1979-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 14224 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTAN 1978 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellant, -vs- ELWOOD WILLIAM RYAN, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana James D. Walen, argued, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Berger, Anderson, Sinclair and Murphy, Billings, Montana Chris J. Nelson argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: December 11, 1978 Decided: JAN 1 6 ;$73 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of the Court. his appeal i s brought by the S t a t e of Montana from an order of the D i s t r i c t Court, Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , suppressing c e r t a i n statements made by defendant Elwood Ryan during the execution of a search warrant a t h i s home. The appeal i s authorized by section 95-2403(2) ( f ) , R.C.M. 1947, which permits t h e S t a t e t o appeal from any court order i n a criminal case which r e s u l t s i n the suppression of a confes- sion o r admission. A t approximately 1 0 : O O a.m. on September 22, 1977, two detectives from the Yellowstone County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e and two s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e r s from Garfield County arrived a t defendant's home i n Jordan, Montana. The detectives were i n p l a i n clothes and drove an unmarked car while the Garfield County o f f i c e r s were i n uniform and drove a s h e r i f f ' s vehicle. When the o f f i c e r s arrived, defendant and h i s stepson were outside the house working on a vehicle parked i n the yard. Detective E l l i s presented defendant with a search warrant authorizing the o f f i c e r s t o search h i s home f o r various firearms which defendant had e a r l i e r reported stolen and f o r which he had received insurance compensation. Upon reading a copy of the warrant defendant reportedly t o l d the o f f i c e r s , "Well, you guys have g o t m e anyway. I w i l l j u s t show you where the guns a r e a t . " ~t the time the statement was made defendant had not been given a Miranda warning. Inside the house defendant requested t h e o f f i c e r s t o wait while h i s wife got out of bed and dressed. When she had done so, he escorted them i n t o h i s bedroom where he pointed t o the c l o s e t saying "the guns a r e i n there." A t t h i s point the o f f i c e r s had been a t defendant's home approximately ten minutes and s t i l l had not informed defendant of h i s r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t o r t o consult with an attorney. When the o f f i c e r s began checking the s e r i a l numbers on t h e various weapons they found i n t h e c l o s e t , defendant t o l d them t h a t there was no sense i n writing them down because he had a l t e r e d them a f t e r turning i n the burglary report. I t was only a f t e r t h i s statement by defendant t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s placed defendant under arrest and informed him of h i s r i g h t s . A t t h e suppression hearing held February 17, 1978, t h e D i s t r i c t Court held t h a t a l l the statements made by defendant p r i o r t o h i s a r r e s t were inadmissible f o r f a i l u r e t o give the Miranda warning. The s o l e issue on t h i s appeal is whether the statements made by defendant p r i o r t o h i s a r r e s t were the product of custodial interrogation and therefore inadmissible f o r lack of a Miranda warning, The S t a t e argues t h a t defendant's statements before a r r e s t were completely voluntary and t h a t u n t i l t h e t i m e of h i s a r r e s t , defendant had not been deprived of h i s freedom i n any s i g n i f i c a n t way. The S t a t e f u r t h e r argues t h a t the o f f i c e r s had not i n i t i a t e d any s o r t of interrogation o r focused t h e i r investigation on defendant. Under these circumstances, it contends, the Miranda requirement is not applicable. Defendant argues t h e D i s t r i c t Court's suppression order should be affirmed because the presence of four armed o f f i c e r s with a search warrant deprived him of h i s freedom i n a s i g n i f i c a n t way and t h a t he should have been informed of h i s r i g h t s t o remain s i l e n t p r i o r t o making any s t a t e - ments. I n Escobedo v. I l l i n o i s (1964), 378 U.S. 478, 490-91, 1 2 L Ed 2d 977, 986, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1765, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court held t h a t where t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of a crime has begun t o focus on a p a r t i c u l a r suspect, t h e suspect is i n custody, t h e p o l i c e i n t e r r o g a t e t h e suspect thereby e l i c i t i n g incriminating statements , t h e suspect has re- quested and been denied an opportunity t o c o n s u l t with counsel, and t h e p o l i c e have n o t e f f e c t i v e l y warned t h e suspect of h i s r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t , t h e suspect has then been denied h i s S i x t h Amendment r i g h t t o " t h e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel" and t h e r e f o r e "no statement e l i c i t e d by t h e p o l i c e during t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n may be used a g a i n s t him a t a criminal t r i a l . " This r u l e was developed f u r t h e r i n Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 726, t o r e q u i r e t h a t when an i n d i v i d u a l is "taken i n t o custody o r otherwise deprived of h i s freedom by t h e a u t h o r i t i e s i n any s i g n i f i c a n t way and i s subjected t o questioning," t h e a u t h o r i t i e s must employ procedural safe- guards t o " n o t i f y t h e person of h i s r i g h t of s i l e n c e and t o a s s u r e t h a t t h e e x e r c i s e of t h e r i g h t w i l l be scrupulously honored . . . 11 1 1 . . . [Ulnless and u n t i l such warnings and waiver a r e demonstrated by t h e prosecution a t t r i a l , no evidence obtained as a r e s u l t of i n t e r r o g a t i o n can be used a g a i n s t him." 384 U.S. a t 479, 86 S.Ct. a t 1630, 16 L Ed 2d a t 726. The Escobedo and Miranda holdings both applied t o i n t e r r o g a t i o n s which w e r e conducted a f t e r t h e suspect had been taken t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n . However, i n 1969, t h e Supreme Court applied t h e Miranda r u l e t o an i n t e r r o g a t i o n conducted a t a boarding house i n t h e room of a suspect. Orozco v. Texas (1969), 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L Ed 2d 311. I n Orozco four o f f i c e r s entered t h e s u s p e c t ' s room a t 4:00 a.m. and questioned him concerning a shooting, without a r r e s t i n g him o r informing him of h i s r i g h t s . During t h e questioning, t h e suspect admitted t h a t he had been a t t h e r e s t a u r a n t where the shooting occurred and revealed t h e location of h i s p i s t o l which was l a t e r shown t o be t h e one used i n t h e shooting. The Supreme Court d i s - missed t h e prosecution's argument t h a t Miranda did not apply t o those statements because they w e r e made while t h e defen- d a n t w a s on h i s own bed and i n f a m i l i a r surroundings. Instead, t h e Court emphasized the words from Miranda which declare t h a t t h e warnings are required when t h e person being questioned i s " i n custody a t the s t a t i o n - o r otherwise de- prived -- of h i s freedom of - a c t i o n - i n w s i g n i f i c a n t w ~ . " 394 U.S. a t 327, 89 S.Ct. a t 1097, 22 L Ed 2d a t 315. (Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . ) I n t h e present case defendant argues t h a t t h e r a t i o n a l e of Orozco a p p l i e s because four o f f i c e r s descended upon h i s premises a t once and while n o t technically placing him under a r r e s t , deprived him of h i s freedom of a c t i o n i n a s i g n i f i - c a n t way. The S t a t e focuses on t h e t i m e , place, and circum- stances of both t h e execution of t h e search and t h e making of t h e incriminating statements. I n p a r t i c u l a r it points o u t t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s a r r i v e d a t defendant's home a t 10:OO a.m., t h a t defendant w a s not incommunicado and was i n t h e presence and company of h i s wife and stepson, and t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s d i d not a c t u a l l y i n t e r r o g a t e defendant about an alleged crime b u t made t h e i r purpose known by serving a search warrant on him. Of p a r t i c u l a r significance t o t h i s set of f a c t s is t h e lack of questioning by t h e o f f i c e r s . I n B r e w e r v. Williams (1977), 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L Ed 2d 424, t h e Supreme Court held inadmissible t h e statements of a suspect who gave incriminating evidence even a f t e r he had been informed of h i s r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t because, a f t e r h i s lawyer had refused t o permit i n t e r r o g a t i o n , he was questioned i n t h e lawyer's absence. I n B r e w e r , t h e defendant, while r i d i n g across Iowa with two d e t e c t i v e s , was questioned once a t t h e beginning of t h e t r i p . Sometime l a t e r i n t h e journey he made t h e incriminating statements. 430 U.S. a t 392-93, 97 S.Ct. a t 1236-37, 51 L Ed 2d a t 432-33. Having once a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t t o s i l e n c e i n t h e absence of h i s lawyer, t h e defendant could n o t again be questioned absent a strong showing of waiver. 430 U.S. a t 404-06, 97 S.Ct. a t 1242-43, 51 L Ed 2d a t 439-41. Thus, where questioning takes place i n a c u s t o d i a l s e t t i n g t h e d i c t a t e s of Miranda must be c a r e f u l l y followed. I n t h e same t e r m a s t h e Brewer d e c i s i o n , however, t h e Supreme Court considered t h e case of Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L Ed 2d 714. I n Mathiason it held t h a t a parolee who v o l u n t a r i l y came t o a p o l i c e s t a t i o n was n o t subjected t o c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n when he was questioned about a crime because he had been t o l d t h a t he was n o t under a r r e s t when t h e questioning began and was f r e e t o l e a v e a half hour l a t e r when t h e interview ended. 429 U.S. a t 495, 97 S.Ct. a t 714, 50 L Ed 2d a t 719. The Court reasoned t h a t a noncustodial s i t u a t i o n is n o t "converted i n t o one i n which Miranda a p p l i e s " simply because t h e questioning t a k e s p l a c e i n a "coercive environment": "Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a p o l i c e o f f i c e r w i l l have coercive as- p e c t s t o it, simply by v i r t u e of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r is p a r t of a law en- forcement system which may u l t i m a t e l y cause t h e suspect t o be charged with a crime. But police o f f i c e r s a r e not required t o administer Miranda warnings t o everyone whom they ques- tion. Nor i s the requirement of warnings t o be imposed simply because the questioning takes place i n the s t a t i o n house, or because the questioned person i s one whom the police sus- pect. Miranda warnings a r e required only where there has been such a r e s t r i c t i o n on a person's freedom a s t o render him ' i n custody.' It was t h a t s o r t of coercive environment t o which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and t o which it is limited." 429 U.S. a t 495, 97 S.Ct. a t 714, 50 L Ed 2d a t 719. Thus, Miranda applies t o a questioning which takes place i n a coercive environment i n which the suspect's freedom of action has been significantly r e s t r i c t e d . From t h e f a c t s of the present case, defendant argues t h a t h i s freedom had been so r e s t r i c t e d by the presence of the o f f i - cers. However, the other c r u c i a l element of the Escobedo, Miranda, Orozco, and Brewer cases is missing here--that i s , t h e questioning by the officers. A s was pointed out i n Miranda, a confession which i s t r u l y voluntary is not fore- closed from evidence because made before the person confes- sing has been warned of h i s r i g h t s : "Any statement given f r e e l y and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible i n evidence. The funda- mental import of the privilege while an individual is i n custody i s not whether he is allowed t o t a l k t o the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no require- ment t h a t police stop a person who enters a police s t a t i o n and s t a t e s t h a t he wishes t o confess t o a crime, o r a person who c a l l s the police t o o f f e r a confession o r any other statement he desires t o make. Volunteered statements of any kind a r e not barred by the F i f t h Amendment and t h e i r admissibility i s not affected by our holding today." 384 U.S. a t 478, 86 S.Ct. a t 1630, 16 L Ed 2d a t 726. A s applied t o the f a c t s of t h i s case, t h e holdings of Escobedo, Miranda, Orozco, and Brewer do not require t h a t t h e statements of defendant be excluded from the prosecu- t i o n ' s evidence. Defendant was not questioned. H e simply decided t o admit t h a t he still had t h e firearms. Where t h e e n t i r e s i t u a t i o n w a s f r e e from any coercion o r d e p r i v a t i o n of freedom of a c t i o n by t h e l a w enforcement o f f i c e r s and t h e statements were n o t t h e r e s u l t of i n t e r r o g a t i o n , t h e require- ments of Miranda w e r e n o t applicable. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. a t 495, 97 S.Ct. a t 714, 50 L Ed 2d a t 719; Beckwith v. United S t a t e s (1976), 425 U.S. 341, 347-48, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1616-17, 48 L Ed 2d 1, 8; United S t a t e s v. Shelby ( 7 t h C i r . 1978), 573 F.2d 971, 975-76; United S t a t e s v. Long S o l d i e r ( 8 t h C i r , 1977), 562 F.2d 601, 603, n.1(2) ; Annot. 31 A.L. R. 3d 565, 676-80 (1970). The holdings i n S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t Court of Eighth Jud. D i s t . (1978), Mont . , 577 P.2d 849, 35 St.Rep. 481, and S t a t e ex rel. Kotwicki v. D i s t r i c t Court (1975), 166 Mont. 335, 532 P.2d 694, are n o t d i r e c t l y i n p o i n t with t h i s case b u t lend considerable s t r e n g t h t o t h e S t a t e ' s p o s i t i o n . I n those cases t h e statements o r confessions made by t h e accused occurred while i n custody. Due t o t h e spe- c i a l circumstances i n each, however, t h e confession was held admissible. I n t h e f i r s t c a s e t h e accused made a spontaneous confession a f t e r he had been informed of h i s r i g h t s , Though t h e accused was i n a p o l i c e v e h i c l e a t t h e t i m e he made t h e confession, t h e p o l i c e had n o t e l i c i t e d a statement as i n B r e w e r . 577 P.2d a t 854, 35 St-Rep. a t 487. I n Kotwicki t h e defendant had n o t been informed of h i s r i g h t s t o s i l e n c e and an a t t o r n e y , b u t t h i s Court found t h e confession o r admission appeared uncoerced and spontaneous. 166 Mont. a t 344, 532 P.2d a t 698-99. I n n e i t h e r Kotwicki nor D i s t r i c t Court of Eighth Jud. D i s t . d i d t h i s Court at- tempt t o expand t h e scope o r a p p l i c a t i o n of Miranda beyond t h e f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements established by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is reversed and t h e cause remanded f o r f u r t h e r proceedings. W e Concur: ' % & 4 A C & & Chief ' J u s t i c e