Case Title: State ex rel. Miller v. Brady

Citation: 2009-Ohio-4942

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Miller v. Brady, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4942.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-Ohio-4942 
THE STATE EX REL. MILLER, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. BRADY, 
JUDGE, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Miller v. Brady,  
Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4942.] 
R.C. 149.43 — Appeal and cross-appeal from court of appeals’ judgment 
granting writ of mandamus to compel judge and clerk of common pleas 
court to make available for inspection a filing in a guardianship case and 
awarding attorney fees — Writ of mandamus upheld but remanded for 
determination of additional attorney fees. 
(No. 2009-0313 ─ Submitted September 16, 2009 ─  
Decided September 24, 2009.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Logan County, 
 No. 8-08-10. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a judgment granting a writ 
of mandamus to compel appellant and cross-appellee, Michael L. Brady, in his 
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capacities as judge and clerk of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas, 
Family Court, Probate Division, to make an assessment that was filed in a 
guardianship case in the probate court available for inspection and copying under 
the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, awarding appellee and cross-appellant, 
Rosanna Miller, $3,250 in attorney fees, and denying statutory damages.  Because 
Brady fails to specifically challenge all of the court of appeals’ reasons for 
granting the writ and determining that Miller was entitled to an award of attorney 
fees, we affirm that portion of the judgment.  Regarding Miller’s cross-appeal, we 
affirm the denial of an award of statutory damages.  Finally, we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals insofar as it denied Miller’s request for an 
additional award of attorney fees for the preparation of a response to Brady’s 
motion to vacate the fee award, and we remand the cause to that court to 
determine a reasonable amount for both those fees as well as the fees incurred in 
defending against Brady’s appeal. 
Case Background 
{¶ 2} Miller is a party to a guardianship proceeding concerning her 
father in the Logan County Probate Court, and Brady presides over the case.  On 
May 29, 2008, a consultation summary assessment of Miller’s father by Dr. J. 
Tennenbaum, Ph.D., was filed in the guardianship case.  On that same date, Brady 
ordered that the assessment could not be copied or released and that it could be 
reviewed only in the presence of court officers. 
{¶ 3} Miller requested copies of the assessment by letter dated May 31 
and facsimile dated June 2.  Brady effectively refused Miller’s requests by failing 
to respond to them within a reasonable period of time. 
{¶ 4} Miller filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Logan County 
for a writ of mandamus to compel Brady, in his capacities as judge and clerk of 
the probate court, to provide her with access to, including the right to inspect and 
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copy, the assessment that was filed in the guardianship case.  She also requested 
an award of reasonable attorney fees.  Brady submitted an answer. 
{¶ 5} The court of appeals issued an alternative writ and ordered Brady 
to file a response in the form of a trial brief setting forth good cause why the 
requested relief should not be granted.  More specifically, the court of appeals 
stated that the judge “shall set forth good cause why the Assessment at issue is not 
a ‘public record’ subject to [Miller’s] request to inspect and be provided a copy 
pursuant to R.C. 149.43.”  Brady filed a response to the alternative writ in which 
he claimed solely that then-proposed amendments to Sup.R. 45, which he 
conceded were not yet effective, supported his denial of Miller’s requests.  Miller 
submitted a reply brief to the judge’s response. 
{¶ 6} In November 2008, the court of appeals issued a decision granting 
the writ of mandamus to compel the judge to make the assessment filed in the 
guardianship case available for inspection and copying during regular business 
hours.  The court of appeals also denied an award of statutory damages, which 
Miller had not specifically requested in either her complaint or her reply brief.  
Finally, the court of appeals granted Miller’s request for attorney fees and 
instructed Miller’s counsel to submit an affidavit and documentation in support. 
{¶ 7} After Miller’s attorney filed affidavits in support of the request for 
attorney fees, Brady first filed an objection to the reasonableness of the amount 
requested.  Shortly thereafter, however, the judge secured a new attorney as co-
counsel and filed a motion to vacate the award of attorney fees and to revise the 
court’s previous decision.  In his memorandum in support of the motion, Brady 
sought reconsideration of the court’s previous decision, arguing that the court was 
free to revise the decision because it was not a final order.  Brady raised for the 
first time his claim that the court’s application of the Public Records Act to his 
decision to limit access to the assessment report violated the separation-of-powers 
doctrine.  Miller filed a memorandum in opposition and also requested leave to 
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supplement her request for attorney fees to include the attorney fees incurred in 
opposing the judge’s motion to vacate. 
{¶ 8} In February 2009, the court of appeals denied Brady’s motion to 
vacate because (1) the judge waived his separation-of-powers argument when he 
failed to raise it in response to the alternative writ to show cause why the 
assessment was not subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43 and (2) the General 
Assembly intended that the public-records statute apply to judicial records and 
courts regularly apply the statute when deciding whether judges lawfully closed 
records and in determining whether to award attorney fees in such cases.  The 
court of appeals awarded Miller $3,250 in attorney fees against Brady, but denied 
relators’ request for an additional award for preparation of her response to the 
judge’s motion to vacate. 
{¶ 9} This cause is now before the court upon Brady’s appeal and 
Miller’s cross-appeal. 
Appeal:  Waiver of Claim 
{¶ 10} In his appeal, Brady asserts that we should reverse the court of 
appeals’ judgment denying his motion to revise and vacate the attorney-fee award 
because, based on the separation-of-powers doctrine, “the Public Records Act 
does not apply to judges’ decisions when exercising their power to adjudicate.” 
{¶ 11} We need not address this constitutional claim, however, because it 
is not absolutely necessary to do so.  See State ex rel. Carr v. Akron, 112 Ohio 
St.3d 351, 2006-Ohio-6714, 859 N.E.2d 948, ¶ 57, quoting Smith v. Leis, 106 
Ohio St.3d 309, 2005-Ohio-5125, 835 N.E.2d 5, ¶ 54 (“ ‘courts decide 
constitutional issues only when absolutely necessary’ ”). 
{¶ 12} The court of appeals’ judgment granting the writ and determining 
that Miller is entitled to an award of attorney fees is not subject to reversal, 
because Brady does not challenge all of the independent reasons given by the 
court of appeals for granting the writ.  State ex rel. Schmidt v. School Emps. 
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5 
 
Retirement Sys., 100 Ohio St.3d 317, 2003-Ohio-6086, 798 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 5; 
Stewart v. Corrigan, 97 Ohio St.3d 80, 2002-Ohio-5316, 776 N.E.2d 103, ¶ 4 
(“even if the court’s rationale on this ground was incorrect, its judgment denying 
the writ based on the grounds that Stewart does not contest on appeal was 
proper”).  Brady does not expressly contest the court of appeals’ ruling that he 
waived his separation-of-powers claim by failing to raise it in response to the 
court’s alternative writ to show cause why Miller should not be granted the 
requested relief. 
{¶ 13} Moreover, even if the issue of waiver were properly before us, the 
court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in holding that the judge waived his 
separation-of-powers claim by failing to raise it in response to the court’s 
alternative writ and show-cause order.  Because of the interlocutory nature of the 
court of appeals’ initial order granting the writ and awarding attorney fees while 
deferring the determination of the amount of fees pending the submission of 
evidence,1 Brady’s motion to vacate was in the nature of a motion for 
reconsideration requesting that the court of appeals revise its interlocutory order.  
“A trial court’s decision whether to reconsider a previous interlocutory order is a 
matter of discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that 
discretion.”  Kott Ents., Inc. v. Brady, Lucas App. No. L-03-1342, 2004-Ohio-
7160, ¶ 50; Helman v. EPL Prolong, Inc. (2000), 139 Ohio App.3d 231, 241, 743 
N.E.2d 484. 
{¶ 14} In addition, although Brady cites our plenary power in 
extraordinary-writ cases to consider them de novo, in his appeal, he has not 
                                                 
1. See, e.g., Internatl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. Union No. 8 v. Vaughn Industries, L.L.C., 116 
Ohio St.3d 335, 2007-Ohio-6439, 879 N.E.2d 187, paragraph two of the syllabus (“When attorney 
fees are requested in the original pleadings, an order that does not dispose of the attorney-fee 
claim and does not include, pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B), an express determination that there is no just 
reason for delay, is not a final, appealable order”); see also State ex rel. Beacon Journal 
Publishing Co. v. Akron, 100 Ohio St.3d 1405, 2003-Ohio-4948, 796 N.E.2d 534, citing Ft. Frye 
Teachers Assn. v. Ft. Frye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 840, 843, 623 
N.E.2d 232. 
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established any error by the court, which is generally a prerequisite for the 
invocation of this authority.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio 
Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 577, 579, 728 
N.E.2d 395.  Moreover, “our exercise of plenary authority is not automatic; it is 
within our discretion.”  State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2009-Ohio-
4149, ___ N.E.2d ___, ¶ 16.  And as we reiterated in Doe, in an appeal of a 
judgment granting or denying fees in a public-records case, we have consistently 
applied an abuse-of-discretion rather than a de novo standard.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 15} Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals granting 
the writ of mandamus to compel Judge Brady to make the assessment filed in the 
guardianship case available for copying and awarding attorney fees to Rosanna 
Miller. 
Cross-Appeal:  Statutory Damages and Attorney Fees 
{¶ 16} In the cross-appeal, Miller first challenges the court of appeals’ 
failure to award statutory damages. 
{¶ 17} Her contention lacks merit for two reasons.  First, she waived this 
argument by failing to claim entitlement to statutory damages in either her 
complaint or in her various filings in the court of appeals.  See, e.g., McGhan v. 
Vettel, 122 Ohio St.3d 227, 2009-Ohio-2884, 909 N.E.2d 1279, ¶ 26.  Second, she 
did not introduce sufficient evidence establishing that she transmitted either of her 
written requests for copies of the assessment “by hand delivery or certified mail,” 
as required by R.C. 149.43(C)(1).  State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Toledo-Lucas 
Cty. Port Auth., 121 Ohio St.3d 537, 2009-Ohio-1767, 905 N.E.2d 1221, ¶ 35.  
Therefore, Miller is not entitled to a reversal of the court’s denial of statutory 
damages. 
{¶ 18} Miller also contends that the court of appeals erred in failing to 
grant her leave to supplement her request for attorney fees under R.C. 
149.43(C)(2) to include attorney fees incurred in responding to the judge’s motion 
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to vacate the attorney-fee award.  She also now claims that she is entitled to 
additional fees in opposing the judge’s appeal from the court of appeals’ judgment 
denying the motion.  We agree. 
{¶ 19} Under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c), reasonable attorney fees awarded 
under the current version of the Public Records Act “shall include reasonable fees 
incurred to produce proof of the reasonableness and amount of the fees and to 
otherwise litigate entitlement to the fees.”  (Emphasis added.)  The judge’s motion 
to vacate filed in the court of appeals and his appeal from that court’s denial of the 
motion involved the issue whether Miller was entitled to the requested fees.  
Therefore, fees incurred by Miller in defending against the judge’s motion and 
appeal were incurred to “litigate entitlement to the fees.”  The court of appeals 
thus erred in denying any additional fees. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 20} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals granting a writ of 
mandamus to compel Judge Brady to permit Rosanna Miller to inspect and make 
copies of the assessment filed in the guardianship case, awarding attorney fees to 
Miller, and denying statutory damages.  We reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals denying Miller’s request for additional attorney fees, and remand the 
cause to that court to determine the reasonable amount of additional fees to which 
Miller is entitled.  We also deny the parties’ joint request for oral argument. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
_____________________ 
 
Wolfe & Russ, L.L.C., and Grant A. Wolfe, for appellee and cross-
appellant. 
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Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., and David L. Marburger; and Gerald L. 
Heaton, Logan County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant and cross-appellee. 
_____________________