Case Title: NextEra Energy Resources, LLC v. Department of Public Utilities

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12886

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12886 
 
NEXTERA ENERGY RESOURCES, LLC  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
UTILITIES & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 9, 2020. - September 3, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Electricity.  Electric Company.  Public Utilities, Electric 
company, Electrical transmission line, Sale of electric 
power.  Administrative Law, Agency's interpretation of 
statute, Agency's interpretation of regulation. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on July 22, 2019. 
 
 
The case was reported by Lowy, J. 
 
 
 
Donald E. Frechette for the petitioner. 
 
Gerald J. Petros, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
the respondent. 
 
Jared S. des Rosiers, of Maine, Andrew O. Kaplan, Joshua D. 
Dunlap, Jed M. Nosal, & Jesse S. Reyes, for Central Maine Power 
Company, intervener, submitted a brief. 
                     
1 Central Maine Power Company, intervener; NSTAR Electric 
Company, doing business as Eversource Energy, intervener; 
Massachusetts Electric Company and Nantucket Electric Company, 
each doing business as National Grid, interveners; and Fitchburg 
Gas and Electric Light Company, doing business as Unitil, 
intervener. 
2 
 
 
John K. Habib, Matthew S. Stern, Danielle C. Winter, 
Matthew Campbell, & Patrick H. Taylor, for NSTAR Electric 
Company & others, interveners, submitted a brief. 
 
Mark C. Kalpin, Brett D. Carroll, & Christopher M. 
Iaquinto, for New England Power Generators Association, Inc., 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  This case concerns recent legislation intended 
to facilitate the development of hydroelectric and other clean 
energy sources by requiring electricity distribution companies 
in the Commonwealth to contract for the purchase of electricity 
generated through environmentally friendly means.  The 
challenged power purchase agreements (PPAs) would allow 
electricity distribution companies to purchase clean electricity 
generated hydroelectrically by Hydro-Québec Energy Services 
(U.S.), Inc. (HQUS); this electricity would be supplied to New 
England via a transmission line running from Québec to Maine.  
According to the petitioner, NextEra Energy Resources, LLC, the 
PPAs at issue are inconsistent with statutory requirements that 
such agreements provide for "firm service" hydroelectric 
generation -- a term referring to hydroelectric power that is 
provided without interruption -- and that such generation be 
solely hydroelectric.  Additionally, the petitioner objects to 
the PPAs' use of the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) Generation 
Information System (GIS), a tracking system intended to account 
for each unit of electricity transmitted, claiming the tracking 
system is inadequate to ensure statutory compliance.   
3 
 
 
In its order, the Department of Public Utilities 
(department) concluded that the PPAs allowed for electricity 
delivery to be interrupted only in limited circumstances, and 
that provisions requiring HQUS to cure delivery shortfalls or 
pay damages create an appropriate incentive for HQUS to deliver 
energy and fulfill firm service requirements.  Shortfalls were 
carefully circumscribed by the agreements, encompassing only a 
narrow set of circumstances outside HQUS's control.  The 
department also concluded that the PPAs provide for delivery of 
energy generated by sixty-two specified hydroelectric generating 
facilities operated by HQUS, and the NEPOOL GIS tracking system 
was sufficient as it was the industry standard. 
We affirm the department's order approving the PPAs.  We 
conclude that the department reasonably and realistically 
interpreted the firm service requirement.  We also uphold the 
department's conclusions that the PPAs guarantee electricity 
generated solely from hydroelectric generation and that the 
NEPOOL GIS tracking system is an adequate means to ensure the 
required accounting.  These rulings were supported by 
substantial evidence and sufficient rationale.2 
                     
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by New England 
Power Generators Association, Inc.  As is "[u]sually" the case, 
amicus argument "is limited to only those issues addressed by 
the parties" (citation omitted).  Teamsters Joint Council No. 10 
v. Director of the Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., 447 Mass. 
100, 100 n.2 (2006).  We therefore decline to address the 
4 
 
1.  Background.  In 2008, the Legislature passed St. 2008, 
c. 169, entitled "An Act relative to green communities," to 
"provide forthwith for renewable and alternative energy and 
energy efficiency in the commonwealth."3  In 2016, the 
Legislature passed St. 2016, c. 188, entitled "An Act to promote 
                     
argument that the power purchase agreements (PPAs) did not 
contract for incremental clean energy, i.e., more energy than is 
otherwise available to the market in the Commonwealth, as this 
argument was raised only by the amicus.  See Finch v. 
Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 459 Mass. 655, 669 
n.13 (2011); General Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 440 
Mass. 154, 167 n.7 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 973 (2004). 
 
3 The Legislature passed this act the same year that it 
passed St. 2008, c. 298, the Global Warming Solutions Act 
(GWSA).  "Each act addresses a separate but related piece of the 
clean energy economy," and both "provide policymakers with a 
broad array of tools, including 'targeted and technology-
specific policies[,] . . . economy-wide and market-based 
mechanisms,' and renewable energy portfolio standards and energy 
efficiency improvements, to advance a clean energy economy while 
reducing emissions and addressing the unique threats that 
climate change poses to the Commonwealth."  Kain v. Department 
of Envtl. Protection, 474 Mass. 278, 282 (2016), quoting Report 
of the Senate Committee on Global Warming and Climate Change, No 
Time to Waste, at 10 (Feb. 13, 2015); Executive Office of Energy 
and Environmental Affairs, Massachusetts Clean Energy and 
Climate Plan for 2020, Executive Summary, at 7 (Dec. 29, 2010).  
The GWSA was "designed to make Massachusetts a national, 
and even international, leader in the efforts to reduce the 
greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change," and 
"establishes significant, ambitious, legally binding, short- and 
long-term restrictions on those emissions" (quotation omitted).  
New England Power Generators Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. 
Protection, 480 Mass. 398, 399 (2018).  The GWSA mandates a 
twenty-five percent reduction from 1990 greenhouse gas emission 
levels by 2020 and an eighty percent reduction by 2050.  G. L. 
c. 21N, §§ 3, 4.  Statute 2018, c. 169, and the provisions at 
issue in this case play an essential role in achieving these 
objectives by requiring the generation of clean energy. 
5 
 
energy diversity,"  which, among other changes, amended St. 
2008, c. 169, by setting up a competitive bidding process for 
contracts to finance the production of clean energy.  St. 2016, 
c. 188, § 12.  This amendment was effectuated by adding §§ 83B 
and 83D to St. 2008, c. 169 (Sections 83B and 83D).  Id. 
Section 83D required electric distribution companies to 
jointly and competitively solicit proposals for eligible clean 
energy generation resources no later than April 1, 2017, and, 
provided reasonable proposals had been received, to enter into 
cost-effective, long-term contracts -- known as PPAs -- to 
facilitate the financing of clean energy generation resources 
equal to approximately 9.45 million megawatt-hours (MWh) per 
year by December 31, 2022.  As required by statute, the 
department must approve a PPA before it can become effective.  
See Section 83D (e); 220 Code Mass. Regs. § 24.03 (2017).  
"Clean energy generation" includes "firm service hydroelectric 
generation," which Section 83B defines as "hydroelectric 
generation provided without interruption for [one] or more 
discrete periods designated in a long-term contract."4  The 
                     
4 Regulations promulgated by the Department of Public 
Utilities (department) define firm service hydroelectric 
generation as "hydroelectric generation provided without 
interruption for one or more discrete periods designated in a 
long-term contract, including but not limited to multiple 
hydroelectric run-of-the-river generation units managed in a 
portfolio that creates firm service though the diversity of 
multiple units."  220 Code Mass. Regs. § 24.02 (2017).  That 
6 
 
phrase "without interruption" is not defined by statute or the 
accompanying regulations. 
On July 23, 2018, NSTAR Electric Company, doing business as 
Eversource Energy; Massachusetts Electric Company and Nantucket 
Electric Company, each doing business as National Grid; and 
Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company, doing business as 
Unitil (companies), filed separate petitions with the 
department, pursuant to Section 83D and 220 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 24.00 (2017), for approval of individual PPAs for the 
purchase of hydroelectric generation and associated 
environmental attributes from HQUS.  The PPAs were negotiated 
and submitted to the department after the companies and the 
Department of Energy Resources (DOER) selected a project 
submitted jointly by Hydro Renewable Energy, Inc., an HQUS 
affiliate, and Central Maine Power Company (CMP) after a three-
stage bidding process.5 
Under the PPAs, the power will be delivered to New England 
over a transmission line that starts at a substation in Thetford 
                     
description applies here, as Hydro-Québec Energy Services 
(U.S.), Inc. (HQUS), will provide the energy guaranteed under 
the PPAs from sixty-two specified hydroelectric generating 
facilities. 
 
5 The three-stage bidding process, initiated by a request 
for proposals, met the requirements of St. 2008, c. 169, § 83D, 
as inserted by St. 2016, c. 188, § 12 (Section 83D), and is not 
at issue in this appeal. 
7 
 
Mines, Québec, and runs sixty-five miles to the Canada-Maine 
border.  The power would then be transmitted by means of a new 
transmission line owned by CMP, named New England Clean Energy 
Connect, that travels another 145 miles to a substation in 
Lewiston, Maine.  The PPAs specifically provide for a twenty-
year service term beginning on the commercial operation date. 
The material terms of the three PPAs are nearly identical.  
We describe those terms only as they relate to this appeal.  The 
PPAs provide that HQUS's obligations to sell and deliver 
hydroelectric-generated energy, and the companies' obligations 
to buy the same, "are firm and not subject to interruption 
except to the extent caused by Force Majeure, excused under 
Section 4.2(a)[6] or cured in accordance with Section 4.3(c) 
[governing curable delivery shortfalls]." 
"Curable delivery shortfalls" under section 4.3(c) of the 
PPAs are shortfalls that result from (1) nonexcused outages, 
i.e., outages or reductions in total transfer capacity other 
than outages or reductions caused by force majeure, scheduled 
maintenance, regulatory decisions, or outages in the 
transmission line from Québec to the Canada-Maine border; or 
(2) outages or reductions in that same transmission line due to 
                     
 
6 Outages or reductions below capacity caused by force 
majeure, scheduled maintenance, regulatory decisions, or outages 
in the transmission line from Québec to the Canada-Maine border 
are referred to as "excused outages" in the PPAs. 
8 
 
a physical condition affecting its transfer ability.  The PPAs 
allow HQUS to cure these shortfalls by delivering qualified 
shortfall energy7 during the shortfall cure period.8 
 
Under the PPAs, "uncured delivery shortfalls" are delivery 
shortfalls HQUS has not cured by the delivery of qualified 
shortfall energy.  Shortfalls that are not cured must be 
remedied by cover damages.  These damages include any penalties 
or additional costs incurred by the companies as a result of 
having to purchase replacement energy.  Additionally, under 
section 9.2(f) of the PPAs, if "[t]he aggregate Uncured Delivery 
Shortfalls in any Shortfall Cure Period are more than twenty 
percent (20%) of the Guaranteed Qualified Clean Energy for such 
Shortfall Cure Period (a 'Defaulted Delivery Shortfall')," HQUS 
has defaulted on the PPAs.  Only shortfalls due to transmission 
line failures are counted when calculating the ratio of 
defaulted delivery shortfalls.  In other words, section 9.2(f) 
                     
7 Qualified shortfall energy is hydroelectric energy 
delivered over any transmission line to the companies during the 
twenty-year term of the PPAs.  This energy must also be tracked 
in GIS to ensure it is hydroelectric-generated energy. 
 
8 A shortfall cure period is defined in the PPAs as "the 
same Contract Year in which the Curable Delivery Shortfall 
occurred or in the immediately succeeding Contract Year." 
 
9 
 
does not encompass any decision by HQUS to sell the power to a 
third party.9 
The PPAs further provide that HQUS is responsible for 
maintaining participation in NEPOOL GIS "to register, monitor, 
track, and transfer Environmental Attributes" in order to 
demonstrate that the energy delivered is qualified clean energy.  
NEPOOL is an industry association of energy market participants 
in the New England region.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.75(2) 
(2020).  NEPOOL GIS is a database and certificate system 
operated by NEPOOL.  See id.; Jones, James, & Huebner, Do You 
Know Who Owns Your Solar Energy?  The Growing Practice of 
Separating Renewable Attributes from Renewable Energy 
Development and Its Impact on Meeting Our Climate Goals, 28 
Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 197, 216-217 (2017) (Jones).  The NEPOOL 
GIS tracking system has been employed and relied on by State and 
Federal regulators and generators for nearly twenty years to 
track renewable energy generation and its environmental benefits 
in New England.  The system accounts for the environmental 
attributes associated with each MWh of electricity produced.  
Jones, supra.  Those attributes are recorded in the form of a 
certificate, which may be used to substantiate and track 
                     
9 Instead, a decision by HQUS to sell the power to a third 
party would constitute a breach of the agreements, and would not 
constitute a delivery shortfall remediable by cover damages. 
10 
 
compliance with environmental regulations.10  Id.  See 310 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 7.75(2). 
The department held a joint public hearing and procedural 
conference for the companies' petitions on August 15, 2018.  It 
granted the petitioner's petitions to intervene as a full party 
in each of the three dockets.  The department held joint 
evidentiary hearings on the three dockets in February 2019.  It 
received testimony from fourteen witnesses at the hearings, 
including three witnesses called by the petitioner. 
                     
10 These certificates, also referred to as credits, function 
as an independent form of property right and may be sold to 
third parties separately from the electricity to which the 
certificates relate:  the certificates have value to these third 
parties because they may use those certificates to comply with 
environmental regulations or qualify for legal benefits.  See, 
e.g., Indeck Me. Energy LLC v. Comm'r of Energy Resources, 454 
Mass. 511, 512–513 (2009) (explaining that certificate, "once 
purchased, is counted toward [an] electricity supplier's 
compliance" with environmental laws); Jones, James, & Huebner, 
Do You Know Who Owns Your Solar Energy?  The Growing Practice of 
Separating Renewable Attributes from Renewable Energy 
Development and Its Impact on Meeting Our Climate Goals, 28 
Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 197, 197–198 (2017) (Jones). 
 
 
NEPOOL GIS users are bound by a complex set of operating 
rules that, among other things, govern how certificates are 
created, how certificates may be transferred, and how the 
department, DEP, and other regulatory agencies may access 
information on the system's database.  See, e.g., New England 
Power Pool Generation System Operating Rules, Rules 2.1, 3.1, 
5.3 (Jan. 1, 2020).  The department (formerly the Department of 
Telecommunications and Energy Resources) helped develop these 
rules.  New England Generation Information System, D.T.E. 03-62-
A, at 9, 24 n.14 (2004). 
11 
 
On June 25, 2019, the department issued its order approving 
the PPAs.  It concluded that the PPAs provide firm service 
hydroelectric generation without interruption from hydroelectric 
generation alone as required by Section 83D.  It further found 
that the PPAs included "a schedule of guaranteed qualified clean 
energy to be delivered from HQUS on a monthly basis for each 
year of the contract term." 
The department determined that the PPAs allowed electricity 
delivery to be interrupted in only three circumstances:  (1) 
force majeure; (2) deliveries excused during negative locational 
marginal pricing (LMP) periods11; and (3) curable delivery 
shortfalls.  The department explained that the provisions in the 
PPAs requiring HQUS to cure delivery shortfalls were consistent 
with Section 83D's firm service requirement.  It reasoned that, 
"[g]iven the nature of electricity transmission, delivery 
                     
 
11 Locational marginal pricing (LMP) is a method of pricing 
electricity based on its value at different times and locations.  
See Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Comm'n, 616 F.3d 520, 524-525 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("LMP consists of 
three components:  [i] the cost of generation; [ii] the cost of 
congestion; and [iii] the cost of transmission losses").  
Negative LMP periods are periods in which the supply of 
electricity is greater than demand.  The department concluded 
that the delivery of electricity generated in such periods would 
be wasteful.  Cf. Barton Windpower, LLC vs. Northern Ind. Pub. 
Serv. Co., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 13-CV-5329 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 
2018) ("When the LMP is negative, market participants . . . can 
stop generating power, or they can continue to generate power 
and sell it to [the system operator] at the negative price 
[i.e., pay [the system operator] to take the power]"). 
12 
 
shortfalls will occasionally happen," and therefore "any long-
term contract for renewable energy generation requires 
reasonable provisions to address them."  The department found 
that the PPAs' curable delivery shortfall provisions 
appropriately "allow HQUS to fulfill its firm delivery 
obligations while reasonably accommodating transmission outages 
that are not within its direct control." 
Relatedly, the department also found that the cover damages 
provisions requiring HQUS to pay damages in the event that it 
fails to cure a shortfall "reasonably support the PPAs' firm 
energy delivery provision by (1) providing an appropriate 
incentive for HQUS to deliver energy during the winter months 
(and otherwise)[12] and (2) making ratepayers financially whole in 
the event that an uncured delivery shortfall should occur." 
The department also concluded that the PPAs require HQUS to 
deliver, and the companies to purchase, energy derived solely 
from hydroelectric generation, as required under Section 83D.  
                     
12 The PPAs contain provisions that guarantee energy 
delivery on a year-round basis, including in winter months.  The 
department rejected the petitioner's argument that the delivery 
shortfall provisions would allow HQUS to curtail delivery during 
winter months because it found that the PPAs "limit the delivery 
of qualified shortfall energy to the same season-peak period as 
when the curable delivery shortfall occurred, in [either] the 
same year or the immediately succeeding contract year."  
Additionally, the PPAs provide a method for reconciling 
differences in the economic value of the energy that was to be 
delivered when the shortfall occurred and the energy actually 
delivered to cure the shortfall. 
13 
 
It based this finding on the fact that the PPAs require all 
energy deliveries to derive from "energy produced by a 
hydroelectric generating resource," particularly the sixty-two 
specified hydroelectric generating facilities operated by HQUS.  
Although the PPAs describe these facilities as "consist[ing] 
predominantly of low-carbon and renewable hydro-electric energy" 
(emphasis added), the department dismissed the petitioner's 
argument that the use of the term "predominantly" would leave 
HQUS free to deliver energy from non-hydroelectric sources.  It 
rejected this argument because the PPAs "unambiguous[ly]" 
require that any energy sold be from clean, hydroelectric 
generation. 
Finally, the department concluded that the PPAs provide the 
energy generated must "be tracked in the NEPOOL GIS to ensure a 
unit-specific accounting" of the delivery of qualified clean 
energy (footnote omitted).13  The department therefore concluded 
that the PPAs complied with Section 83D (j)'s requirement of 
unit-specific accounting for clean energy delivery.  The 
department also found that NEPOOL GIS, "a well-established power 
                     
13 "Unit energy" is energy imported into New England that is 
generated by specifically identified generation units assigned 
certificates for their respective, specific environmental 
attributes.  "System energy," on the other hand, is power 
imported into New England without specifically identifying the 
specific generation unit.  For such energy, NEPOOL GIS assigns 
the characteristics of the over-all mix of the fuel source and 
emissions of the source control area. 
14 
 
generation and associated environmental attribute tracking 
system used in the New England region," adequately ensured that 
"the Companies purchase clean energy generation as defined by 
statute, and not system energy that contains non-clean energy 
generation." 
After the department issued its order, the petitioner 
appealed to a single justice of this court.  The department and 
the intervening parties moved to reserve and report the matter 
to the full court, which the petitioner did not oppose.  The 
matter was reserved and reported to the full court on January 
27, 2020. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  This court may 
set aside or modify an agency's decision if it violates the 
Constitution, is in excess of the statutory authority or 
jurisdiction of the agency, is based upon an error of law, is 
made upon unlawful procedure, is unsupported by substantial 
evidence, is unwarranted by the facts found on the record as 
submitted, or is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.  G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14 (7). 
To enable this court to carry out its judicial review 
function, the agency must provide adequate subsidiary findings 
and reasoning to support its decision:  although the agency may 
"evaluate evidence in light of its expertise, it cannot simply 
15 
 
use its expertise as a substitute for evidence in the record" 
(citation omitted).  Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. 
Department of Pub. Utils., 460 Mass. 800, 812 (2011).  
Nevertheless, the agency decision is supported by substantial 
evidence so long as the record contains "such evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion."  Id., quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6).  See G. L. 
c. 30A, § 11 (5) ("Agencies may utilize their experience, 
technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the 
evaluation of the evidence presented to them"). 
When reviewing an administrative decision, "we must 
apply all rational presumptions in favor of the validity of the 
administrative action and not declare it void unless its 
provisions cannot by any reasonable construction be interpreted 
in harmony with the legislative mandate."  New England Power 
Generators Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 480 
Mass. 398, 408 (2018), quoting Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. 
Department of Pub. Health, 372 Mass. 844, 855 (1977).  In 
analyzing the legislative mandate, we first determine whether 
the Legislature has spoken with certainty on the topic in 
question by using conventional tools of statutory 
interpretation.  New England Power Generators Ass'n, Inc., supra 
at 404.  If the statute is unambiguous, we give effect to the 
Legislature's intent.  Id.  "[I]f the Legislature has not 
16 
 
addressed directly the pertinent issue, we determine whether the 
agency's resolution of that issue may 'be reconciled with 
the governing legislation.'"  Id., quoting Goldberg v. Board of 
Health of Granby, 444 Mass. 627, 633 (2005).  In making this 
determination, "we afford 'substantial deference' to agency 
expertise," and will uphold the agency decision "unless a 
statute unambiguously bars the agency's approach."  New England 
Power Generators Ass'n, Inc., supra at 405, quoting Goldberg, 
supra. 
b.  Firm service.  The first issue is whether the PPAs 
include provisions that contradict Section 83D's "firm service" 
requirement.  The petitioner argues that they do, pointing to 
certain clauses in the PPAs that, under the petitioner's 
reading, permit HQUS to interrupt service.  Specifically, it 
points to (1) the contract provision allowing HQUS to cure 
delivery shortfalls; (2) the provision relating to cover 
damages; and (3) the provision allowing HQUS to decline to sell 
electricity during negative LMP periods.  The department and the 
interveners counter that these provisions are necessary to deal 
with unforeseen shortfalls and other developments beyond its 
control, and that including these clauses in the PPAs is 
therefore consistent with the purpose of St. 2016, c. 188.  We 
agree with the interpretation of the department and the 
interveners. 
17 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that an 
interpretation of firm service without interruption to require 
no interruptions whatsoever, even if those interruptions are 
outside the parties' control, would amount to an otherworldly, 
unrealistic interpretation of the statute.  See Wallace W. v. 
Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789, 793 (2019).  These are twenty-year 
contracts; some interruptions over twenty years are unavoidable.  
Further, the contingencies in place are reasonable, reflecting 
industry practices and practical realities, including the need 
to provide electricity during periods of inevitable interruption 
and strong disincentives against noncompliance or gamesmanship. 
At issue is the meaning of the phrase "without 
interruption" in Section 83B's definition of firm service.  We 
begin by recognizing that this court gives "great deference" to 
the department's expertise in cases involving "interpretation of 
a complex statutory and regulatory framework."  Alliance to 
Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 461 
Mass. 166, 178 (2011), quoting Cambridge v. Department of 
Telecomm. & Energy, 449 Mass. 868, 875 (2007).  We must also be 
"careful to 'avoid any construction of statutory language which 
leads to an absurd result, or that otherwise would frustrate the 
Legislature's intent.'"  Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 793, quoting 
Bellalta v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Brookline, 481 Mass. 372, 
378 (2019). 
18 
 
While Section 83B defines "firm service," it does not 
define "without interruption."  Here, the department drew on its 
specialized expertise when it explained that, "[g]iven the 
nature of electricity transmission, delivery shortfalls will 
occasionally happen," and as a result, "any long-term contract 
for renewable energy generation requires reasonable provisions 
to address them."  In essence, the department has interpreted 
"without interruption" to mean that energy must have guaranteed 
availability to the maximum extent feasible, with contingencies 
in place to minimize the impact of unavoidable disruptions, as 
opposed to reading the phrase literally to mean without any 
interruption whatsoever for any reason at all, even if outside 
of the parties' control.  The department's interpretation is a 
commonsense reading of the statute:  the real world is 
unpredictable, especially over twenty years, and this court 
properly defers to the department's view that at least some 
shortfalls are inevitable.  "Firm service" (or "firm power") is 
a common term in the energy industry and among regulators:  the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit has explained that "[f]irm service is contractually 
guaranteed; non-firm service is scheduled on an 'as available' 
basis and is subject to interruption."  Sacramento Mun. Utils. 
Dist. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 428 F.3d 294, 295 n.3 
(D.C. Cir. 2005).  See North Star Steel Co. v. United States, 58 
19 
 
Fed. Cl. 720, 723 n.2 (2003) (firm service means power that is 
guaranteed to always be available, while non-firm service may be 
interrupted for any reason at any time). 
In contrast, it would be absurd, or at least unrealistic, 
to force clean energy providers to guarantee that their service 
will never be interrupted for any reason:  even the petitioner 
acknowledges that "occasional delivery shortfalls may occur in a 
force majeure context."14  Thus, all the parties understand that 
a literal interpretation of "without interruption" is 
inappropriate. 
The question then becomes whether the particular 
contingencies provided in the PPAs to deal with potential 
interruptions facilitate the firm service requirement rather 
than frustrate it.  We examine each in turn. 
i.  Cure of delivery shortfalls.  In ruling that the 
delivery shortfall provisions of the PPAs were consistent with 
Section 83D's firm service requirement, the department focused 
on the fact that the events triggering this clause are outages 
and reductions in transmission capacity outside the parties' 
control.  The department also cited several contract provisions 
that minimize opportunities for HQUS or the companies to profit 
                     
 
14 Force majeure is defined in section 10.1 of the PPAs, and 
includes (among other circumstances) mechanical or equipment 
breakdown caused by hurricanes, floods, blizzards, terrorism, 
and the like. 
20 
 
from interrupting delivery of electricity through use of the 
shortfall delivery clause.  For example, the PPAs require any 
shortfall deliveries to be made "in the same Contract Year in 
which the Curable Delivery Shortfall occurred or in the 
immediately succeeding contract year," and any shortfall 
occurring in a winter or summer month may only be cured by a 
shortfall delivery in another winter or summer month, 
respectively.15  The PPAs also provide a formula for reconciling 
price differences in the electricity that was supposed to be 
delivered and the electricity that was actually delivered, 
meaning that any profits that could be made through an 
opportunistic breach of the PPAs are likely to be reallocated. 
Together with the exclusivity provision, which bars HQUS 
from selling energy guaranteed to the companies under the PPAs 
to a third party, these requirements restrict the ability of any 
party to the PPAs to take advantage of seasonal or time-of-day 
price differences.  This comports with the department's 
interpretation of the firm service requirement.  The PPAs 
therefore do not contradict the requirement; nor do they create 
a "right" for HQUS to interrupt delivery in any period, as the 
petitioner contends. 
                     
15 The PPAs further specify that shortfall energy that was 
to be delivered between 8 A.M. and 11 P.M. must be delivered 
during this same time frame in such a winter or summer month. 
21 
 
ii.  Cover damages.  Provisions in the PPAs governing cover 
damages also do not permit HQUS to simply not deliver energy and 
pay damages instead, as the petitioner argues.  On the contrary, 
the cover damages clauses provide incentive for HQUS to fulfill 
its firm service requirements and to cure any delivery 
shortfalls.  They are typical of long-term contracts like the 
ones before us, as experts for the companies testified in the 
departmental proceedings. 
Cover damages are triggered by shortfalls outside HQUS's 
control, such as those caused by a physical condition of the 
transmission line.  As the department found in its order, cover 
damages help make the companies whole, and also minimize 
situations in which the companies are in a position where they 
need to purchase power elsewhere.  Cover damages are also not 
only compensatory:  they include penalties.  Thus, even if HQUS 
could theoretically charge a higher price for its energy 
elsewhere, this benefit could be financially outweighed by 
having to pay penalties to the companies on top of the value of 
the electricity HQUS was to deliver.  And as with the shortfall 
delivery clause, this portion of the contract must be understood 
in light of the exclusivity portions of the PPAs, which restrict 
HQUS from selling its hydroelectric generation to other buyers. 
The cover damages provisions thus create a favorable 
economic outcome for the companies, as HQUS is financially 
22 
 
responsible for any favorable price differences resulting from 
the shortfall and any later make-up delivery.  It is therefore 
unrealistic to assume that HQUS would first commit a breach of 
the agreement by selling the power guaranteed the companies 
elsewhere, charge a higher price to the third-party buyer, and 
still make a profit after both compensating the companies and 
paying them penalties.16  Instead, we conclude that the cover 
damages provisions in the PPAs further guarantee firm service by 
providing a strong incentive for HQUS to deliver energy and 
fulfill firm service requirements. 
The petitioner also argues that section 9.2(f) of the PPAs 
-- which it claims allows for interruptions of up to twenty 
percent of the annually contracted-for energy delivery -- goes 
beyond the occasional outage to which the department referred in 
its order, and cannot comport with the firm service requirement.  
The petitioner contends that the department does not support its 
conclusion that this provision addresses only what the 
department calls "occasional outages" with adequate subsidiary 
findings. 
                     
16 Moreover, it is not the role of this court to read a 
contract under the assumption that the parties will shirk their 
respective obligations.  See Rigs v. Sokol, 318 Mass. 337, 343 
(1945) (court's assumption in interpreting contracts is that 
parties ordinarily contemplate contract will be performed and 
provisions for penalties are "intended as security for 
performance and not as a price for the privilege of 
nonperformance"). 
23 
 
The petitioner's interpretation of section 9.2(f) of the 
PPAs is misguided.  The petitioner argues that this provision 
allows for interruption of service for twenty percent of every 
contract year -- i.e., seventy-three days a year for the twenty-
year term of the PPAs -- so long as HQUS remedies the 
interruption by way of cover damages.  This interpretation reads 
this clause in isolation, ignoring all of the other provisions 
requiring compliance and penalizing noncompliance.  The 
petitioner's interpretation of section 9.2(f) denies the reality 
that HQUS reaps no benefit from having to pay cover damages 
under the agreements, as discussed supra.  The twenty percent 
figure does not identify a target performance measure, but a 
figure identifying a contractual default, triggering all kinds 
of other consequences, including those related to financing.17 
We therefore reject the petitioner's arguments and conclude 
that these provisions are in line with Section 83D's firm 
service requirement. 
                     
17 As the department states in its order, "Section 83D 
requires an electric distribution company to demonstrate that 
any proposed long-term contract will facilitate the financing of 
the clean energy generation resource.  To satisfy this 
requirement, an electric distribution company need not 
demonstrate that the long-term contract is necessary to secure 
project financing, only that it will assist in securing project 
financing," citing NSTAR Elec. Co., D.P.U. 12-30, at 40 (Nov. 
26, 2012); Massachusetts Elec. Co. & Nantucket Elec. Co., D.P.U. 
10-54, at 52-53 (Nov. 22, 2010). 
24 
 
iii.  Negative LMP periods.  Finally, the PPA provisions 
allowing HQUS to forgo delivery during negative LMP periods do 
not interfere with or contradict Section 83D's firm service 
requirement.  That is because additional electricity 
transmission would not benefit either party during negative LMP 
periods. 
LMP methodology is "used by electricity market operators 
across the country."  Black Oak Energy, LLC v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Comm'n, 725 F.3d 230, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  LMP is a 
way to price a given unit of electricity at a particular time 
and location.  "Under LMP, the price any given buyer pays for 
electricity reflects a collection of costs attendant to moving a 
[unit] of electricity through the system to a buyer's specific 
location on the grid."  Id. at 233–234.  See Sacramento Mun. 
Util. Dist. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 616 F.3d 520, 
524 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("With an LMP-based rate structure, prices 
are designed to reflect the least-cost of meeting an incremental 
[unit of demand for energy] at each location on the grid, and 
thus prices vary based on location and time").  "The cost of 
generation can be thought of as the 'baseline cost' of serving 
electricity (known in the industry as 'load') to another 
location on the system in a hypothetical, congestion-free 
environment.  Congestion, in turn, drives up costs because it 
requires [electricity providers] to dispatch more expensive 
25 
 
generators to meet demand.  The cost of congestion results in 
different prices at different nodes of the system, depending on 
how congested the wires leading to those nodes are" (citations 
omitted).  Black Oak Energy, LLC, supra at 234. 
The PPAs specify that, if "the LMP at the Delivery Point is 
negative, or, in the reasonable opinion of [HQUS], is likely to 
become negative, then [HQUS] . . . shall be under no obligation 
to schedule or transfer Deliveries of Qualified Clean Energy to 
the Delivery Point during such period."  Alternatively, Exhibit 
D of the PPAs allows the companies to take a credit against the 
contract price for negative LMP periods.  Given that LMP 
measures the value of an additional unit of electricity at a 
particular time and location, a negative LMP period is one in 
which this value is negative.  In other words, at the relevant 
time and location, the supply of energy exceeds the demand for 
it, and there is a surplus.  In such a scenario, it would be 
wasteful to deliver additional hydroelectric generation.  The 
negative LMP provisions therefore comport with Section 83D's 
requirement that contracts procured be "cost-effective," Section 
83D (d) (5) (iii); see 220 Code Mass. Regs. § 24.03(1), and 
provide a form of price protection for the companies and -- by 
extension -- ratepayers in the Commonwealth.18 
                     
18 We disagree with the petitioner's argument that the 
department was required to make some subsidiary finding 
26 
 
Beyond the fact that such delivery would be cost-
ineffective, it would also not serve the Legislature's purpose 
in enacting Section 83D.  It was not the purpose of the 
Legislature to require generation of hydroelectric energy for 
its own sake; instead, the purpose was to generate clean 
electricity that meets the energy demands of the Commonwealth, 
thus reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving other 
environmental goals.  See St. 2008, c. 169, preamble; Kain, 474 
Mass. at 281-282.  Delivering energy during negative LMP periods 
serves neither the Commonwealth's energy needs nor the 
environmental purposes promoted by Section 83D. 
None of the provisions cited by the petitioner and 
discussed supra permits unilateral interruptions.  They are 
instead aimed at maintaining cost-effectiveness and making the 
companies and their customers financially whole in case of 
interrupted service.  We therefore conclude that the 
department's interpretation of Section 83D's firm service 
requirement was reasonable, and that interpretation was 
                     
regarding its conclusion that delivery of energy in these 
periods would be wasteful.  The concept of negative LMP periods 
speaks for itself, and the department's commonsensical 
conclusion is one that is reflected in other PPAs and the rules 
of system operators.  See Barton Windpower, LLC, U.S. Dist. Ct., 
No. 13-CV-5329 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2018) (explaining custom when 
LMP is negative for market participants to stop generating power 
or to continue to generate power and sell it to system 
operator). 
 
27 
 
correctly applied to the PPAs in this case.19  The department's 
conclusions were supported by substantial evidence, adequate 
findings, and sufficient rationale. 
c.  Hydroelectric generation alone.  The next issue is 
whether the department's finding that the PPAs provide the 
delivery of energy produced through hydroelectric generation 
alone was supported by substantial evidence, adequate subsidiary 
findings, and sufficient rationale.  We conclude that it was. 
The record contains "substantial evidence" supporting the 
department's finding that the PPAs provide for hydroelectric 
generation "alone."  For example, the PPAs provide that HQUS is 
"solely responsible" for demonstrating that "the Hydro-Québec 
Power Resources from which the Products are Delivered are 
Qualified Clean Energy Generation Units."  The "Hydro-Québec 
Power Resources" are the sixty-two specified hydroelectric 
                     
19 We similarly reject the petitioner's argument that the 
PPAs do not identify one or more discrete periods in which HQUS 
is to deliver firm service.  To the extent discrete periods are 
meant to be limited to temporal periods other than the entire 
contractual term, as the petitioner claims, each of the PPAs 
provides a monthly schedule for the entire twenty-year life of 
the agreements that surely meets this requirement.  The 
department made such a finding in its order.  Additionally, 
provisions in the PPAs requiring HQUS to cure delivery 
shortfalls within a defined shortfall cure period do not invite 
interruptions by allowing HQUS to "defer cure anywhere from 
[twelve] months and [one] day up to a maximum of [twenty-three] 
months and [twenty-nine] days," as the petitioner claims, but 
instead provide a remedy for the inevitable occurrence of 
interrupted service. 
28 
 
generating stations; "Qualified Clean Energy Generation Units" 
are electricity generating facilities "capable of producing 
Qualified Clean Energy, or Qualified Shortfall Energy"; and both 
"Qualified Clean Energy" and "Qualified Shortfall Energy" are 
defined as energy produced by the "Hydro-Québec Power Resources" 
and tracked by the NEPOOL GIS "to ensure unit-specific 
accounting" of the delivery of hydroelectric energy.  The PPAs 
thus unambiguously require HQUS to make available to the 
companies generation capacity from hydroelectric facilities, and 
to continuously verify this generation through a tracking system 
(NEPOOL GIS).  The PPAs also excuse the companies from accepting 
or paying for any certificate from HQUS that does not evince 
generation from the specified hydroelectric sources.  Beyond 
such contractual clauses, the department also made an undisputed 
subsidiary finding that HQUS's hydroelectric generation 
facilities have adequate capacity to provide the statutorily 
mandated 9.45 million MWh of purely hydroelectric generation. 
The petitioner argues nonetheless that the department's 
reliance on the language of the PPAs and the use of NEPOOL GIS 
tracking was insufficient.  Instead, the petitioner claims that 
the department was required to make a finding that, "under the 
laws of physics," energy delivered by HQUS and flowing through 
the transmission line comes solely from hydroelectric 
generation.  The department rejects the contention that it was 
29 
 
required to "predict whether HQUS might breach its contractual 
obligation in the future, or expound on 'the laws of physics.'"  
Instead, the department's position is that it was sufficient 
that the PPAs contractually required HQUS to deliver only 
hydroelectrically generated energy.  The department explains 
that this is the "only analysis that it reasonably could 
conduct," because once electricity enters the New England power 
grid, it is impossible to distinguish the source of any given 
unit of energy, unless there is a dedicated power line for a 
given source of electricity.  No such dedicated power line was 
required by the relevant statute or regulations.  Again, we 
conclude that the department's interpretation of the statutory 
and regulatory requirements is reasonable and supported by the 
evidence. 
 
Although framed by the petitioner as a question about the 
laws of physics or the sufficiency of the evidence, the issue 
whether the PPAs provide for hydroelectric generation "alone" is 
necessarily linked to a question of statutory construction, 
namely, what it means for electricity to come from 
"hydroelectric generation alone."  Under Section 83D, the 
companies were required to enter into "long-term contracts" to 
purchase "hydroelectric generation" deriving "from hydroelectric 
generation alone."  Sections 83B, 83D (a).  See 220 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 24.02, 24.03(1).  If the use of the word "alone" is 
30 
 
important, then the use of the word "generation" -- as opposed 
to "transmission" -- is no less significant.  Both terms clearly 
support the department's interpretation of the statutory and 
regulatory requirements. 
Fortunately (for this court), the laws of physics are not 
in dispute.  Nor is there any inconsistency between the laws of 
physics and the contractual requirements. See Northern Ind. Pub. 
Serv. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 954 F.2d 736, 737 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) ("When electricity reaches an intersection of 
several alternative transmission paths, it will flow 
along . . . guided by the laws of physics rather than the 
intention of [contractual] parties . . .").  The petitioner and 
the department essentially agree on the physics involved in 
transmitting electricity from Canada to Maine for distribution 
in Massachusetts. 
 
The department analogizes the physics involved as follows:  
"It is like [forty] people pouring water into an Olympic 
swimming pool.  Someone later drawing water from the pool cannot 
distinguish between the molecules contributed by each person.  
Not surprisingly, the association of market participants in the 
electric grid that helps guide matters affecting the system 
calls itself the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL)."  In the 
Olympic pool analogy, one can identify the individual sources of 
water that are poured into the pool, and can therefore measure 
31 
 
what each person is contributing to the pool.  One cannot, 
however, trace water that is already in the pool to a particular 
contributor. 
 
In this vein, the department's order focuses on the fact 
that the PPAs require the generation of the purchased 
electricity to occur at sixty-two specified hydroelectric 
sources.  So long as this generation can be verified and the 
amount that is generated is received by the companies, the 
department does not understand the statute to require that the 
delivery system for this electricity (i.e., the transmission 
lines) be exclusive of other sources.  This is a reasonable 
reading of the phrase "hydroelectric generation alone" (emphasis 
added), particularly in light of the physics involved.  It is 
also unclear why imposing the requirement of a dedicated 
transmission line for hydroelectric generation would serve the 
Legislature's purpose in enacting Section 83D if the fact of 
hydroelectric generation can be verified in other ways, 
particularly given the additional cost and environmental harm 
caused by developing such a line.  Such a requirement is absent 
from the language of Sections 83B and 83D, which refer only to 
hydroelectric generation.20 
                     
20 The petitioner argues that without ensuring that the 
transmitted energy is from hydroelectric generation only, the 
Commonwealth would be paying for clean energy that is being used 
elsewhere.  However, that is a fiction so long as the 
32 
 
In sum, the department's construction of the statute and 
the regulations is reasonable and supported by the evidence.  It 
serves the environmental purposes promoted by the act, and is 
consistent with the "laws of physics." 
d.  NEPOOL GIS tracking system.  As discussed supra, 
Section 83D (j) requires PPAs to "utilize an appropriate 
tracking system to ensure a unit specific accounting of the 
delivery of clean energy" to accurately measure progress in 
achieving the Commonwealth's environmental goals.  The purpose 
of Section 83D's tracking requirement is to allow DEP, in 
consultation with DOER, to "accurately measure progress in 
achieving the commonwealth's [emissions-related] goals."  
Section 83D (j).  The NEPOOL GIS tracking system employed in the 
instant case is the industry standard developed for such 
measurement.  It has been developed by regulators, and it has 
been universally accepted by the industry just for such purpose.  
See, e.g., Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with 
Care:  The Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of 
Renewable Power, 7 Tex. J. Oil Gas & Energy L. 59, 62-63 (2011) 
(Ferrey) (explaining how tracking systems for renewable energy 
                     
Commonwealth is paying for what is being generated, what is 
being generated is actually clean energy, and the Commonwealth 
maintains ownership of the environmental attributes associated 
with that energy.  See Jones, 28 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. at 206-
207. 
33 
 
certificates are essential to success of -- and operation of -- 
renewable portfolio standard [RPS] programs); N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 362-F:6 (2014) (mandating electric RPS program to use 
NEPOOL GIS certificate tracking). 
The department provided a relatively short yet sufficient 
explanation of its finding that use of the NEPOOL GIS is 
consistent with Section 83D (j).  The department concluded that 
the use of NEPOOL GIS is "well-established" and that the PPAs 
require HQUS to utilize it "in compliance with all relevant 
NEPOOL GIS operating rules."  The department was entitled to 
draw on its expertise to conclude that the NEPOOL GIS is an 
appropriate tracking system under Section 83D (j).  See New 
England Power Generators Ass'n, Inc. 480 Mass. at 405; Goldberg, 
444 Mass. at 635.  The department's expertise in this arena 
includes knowledge and experience specific to the NEPOOL GIS 
itself, as the department (formerly the Department of 
Telecommunications and Energy Resources) participated in the 
development of NEPOOL GIS's operating rules.  See New England 
Generation Info. Sys., D.T.E. 03-62-A, at 9, 24 n.14 (2004).  
Indeed, the department's role in developing the NEPOOL GIS 
operating rules was to ensure the NEPOOL GIS's efficacy as an 
emissions labeling tool in accordance with the emissions 
labeling statute that the department is charged with 
administering.  See id. at 1; 220 Code Mass. Regs. § 11.06 
34 
 
(2016).  These operating rules include rules relating to the use 
of certificates for unit-specific tracking of how electricity is 
generated as well as rules for coordinating with the department 
and DEP.  See New England Power Pool Generation System Operating 
Rules, Rule 2.1(a) & Appendix 5.3 (Jan. 1, 2020).  See also 
Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc., 461 Mass. at 178 
(describing "great deference" owed to department's expertise in 
cases involving "interpretation of a complex statutory and 
regulatory framework"). 
The department also concluded that the PPAs provide 
sufficient protections to ensure adequate tracking of energy 
attributes.  The PPAs define "Certificate" as "an electronic 
certificate generated pursuant to the [NEPOOL] GIS Operating 
Rules . . .  to represent certain generation attributes of each 
[unit of electricity] generated."  The PPAs require HQUS to 
"transfer to [the companies] all of the right, title[,] and 
interest in and to . . . any and all Certificates[] associated 
with Qualified Clean Energy or any Qualified Shortfall Energy."  
Further, as discussed supra, the PPAs require HQUS to "comply 
with all [NEPOOL] GIS Operating Rules including, without 
limitation, such rules relating to the creation, tracking, 
recording and transfer of all Environmental Attributes 
associated with Qualified Clean Energy or Qualified Shortfall 
Energy" purchased under the agreements, where "Environmental 
35 
 
Attributes" is a defined term that refers to "any Certificates 
issued pursuant to the [NEPOOL] GIS in connection with Energy 
generated by [HQUS's hydroelectric generating systems]." 
The record provides additional support for the department's 
finding.  Specifically, in September 2018, upon request from the 
companies pursuant to 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.09 (2004), DEP 
issued an advisory ruling, concluding that NEPOOL GIS tracking 
of energy units and attributes satisfies Section 83D (j)'s 
requirements.  This ruling was in the record before the 
department.  While such rulings are not binding, Massachusetts 
courts give them deference when they relate to a statute that 
the agency is charged with interpreting and applying, and so 
long as they are consistent with the text and purpose of that 
statute.  See Brookline v. Medical Area Serv. Corp., 8 Mass. 
App. Ct. 243, 258–259 (1979).  Cf. Sullivan v. Sleepy's LLC, 482 
Mass. 227, 232 n.11 (2019).  It is particularly appropriate to 
give weight to DEP's advisory ruling approving of the use of the 
NEPOOL GIS, as the stated purpose of Section 83D (j)'s tracking 
requirement is to allow DEP to monitor the Commonwealth's 
progress in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
A contrary conclusion -- that NEPOOL GIS is not an 
appropriate tracking system for these PPAs -- flies in the face 
of industry practice relying on tracking systems to comply with 
36 
 
RPS programs.  See New England Generation Info. Sys., D.T.E. 03-
62-A, at 5-9; Ferrey, 7 Tex. J. Oil Gas & Energy L. at 62-63. 
NEPOOL GIS not only issues and tracks certificates for all 
MWh of generation and load produced in the control area of the 
Independent System Operator for New England (ISO-New England), 
as well as imported MWh from adjacent control areas, but 
provides emissions labeling for the New England load serving 
entities by tracking the emissions attributes for the region's 
generators.  Market participants in New England commonly use and 
rely on NEPOOL GIS to track clean energy generation and its 
associated environmental attributes, and have long done so.21  
Market participants also use NEPOOL GIS to trade renewable 
energy credits, which are vital to enforcing RPS programs.  See 
Ferrey, 7 Tex. J. Oil Gas & Energy L. at 62-63; Jones, 28 
Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. at 216-217 & n.8. 
The NEPOOL GIS tracking system is not just the industry 
standard, but the only mechanism recognized as sufficient to 
identify supplier-specific labeling information for identifying 
resources.  See Massachusetts Elec. Co. & Nantucket Elec. Co., 
D.P.U. 08-51, at 2 & n.7 (June 13, 2013).  Concluding that 
                     
21 DOER relies on NEPOOL GIS to track the Commonwealth's 
renewable energy portfolio standards.  225 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 14.09 (2016); 225 Code Mass. Regs. § 15.09 (2014); 225 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 16.09 (2019).  DEP similarly relies on NEPOOL GIS 
to monitor compliance with its clean energy standard.  310 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 7.75 (2020). 
37 
 
NEPOOL GIS's tracking system does not satisfy Section 83D's 
requirements would require the creation of an entirely new 
system, which is both impractical and incompatible with the 
Commonwealth's goals to advance renewable energy.22 
Because the department's conclusions were supported by 
substantial evidence, and the department relied on its expertise 
and knowledge of the NEPOOL GIS system to conclude that the 
system's tracking mechanism was adequate to "ensure that the 
Companies purchase clean energy generation as defined by 
statute, and not system energy that contains non-clean energy 
generation," we affirm the department's decision. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The department applied a reasonable 
interpretation of Section 83D's firm service requirement, 
concluding that the words "without interruption" must 
accommodate the reality of inevitable outages, even while 
delivery of energy must be guaranteed to the maximum extent 
                     
22 Any argument that NEPOOL GIS does not physically track 
the energy HQUS will deliver back to the hydroelectric 
generation station is a repeat of the argument addressed supra, 
i.e., that the PPAs do not adequately ensure that HQUS will 
generate and deliver hydroelectric power alone.  The 
petitioner's arguments seem to misunderstand how the tracking 
system works:  NEPOOL GIS tracks the attributes associated with 
the energy HQUS delivers into the system, while the meters at 
the delivery point measure the quantity of energy.  Requiring 
more, i.e., that the parties ascertain the attributes of the 
energy already in the transmission line, or construct a new 
transmission line devoted solely to energy generated by HQUS, is 
at worst an exercise in futility and at best unnecessary and 
cost-ineffective. 
38 
 
possible.  The provisions allowing HQUS to cure delivery 
shortfalls, pay cover damages for uncured shortfalls, and forgo 
delivery during negative LMP periods all comply with this 
reasonable interpretation of the statute.  The department's 
conclusion in this regard, as well as its conclusions that the 
PPAs provide for the procurement of energy from hydroelectric 
generation alone and that the NEPOOL GIS tracking system is an 
appropriate system to meet Section 83D's requirements, were 
supported by substantial evidence, adequate findings, and 
sufficient rationale.  We therefore affirm the department's 
approvals of the PPAs pursuant to Section 83D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.