Case Title: THERESA O'DAY DEROSE V JOSEPH ALLEN DEROSE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 121246

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 31, 2003  
THERESA O’DAY DEROSE, also known as 
THERESA SEYMOUR,  
Plaintiff Third-Party 
Defendant-Appellee,  
v 
No. 121246  
JOSEPH ALLEN DEROSE,  
Defendant-Appellee,  
and  
CATHERINE DEROSE,  
Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
This case presents a dispute under the grandparent  
visitation statute, MCL 722.27b, between a mother, Theresa  
Seymour,1 and a paternal grandmother, Catherine DeRose, who  
sought visitation with her granddaughter.  The trial court  
1Formerly Theresa DeRose.  
 
ordered limited visitation, and the mother appealed.  The  
Court of Appeals held that this statute was unconstitutional.  
We affirm.  
I. Facts  
The child at issue in this case was born during the  
marriage of Theresa and Joseph DeRose.  In 1997, Joseph DeRose  
was sentenced to twelve to twenty years in prison after  
pleading guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC- 
I) involving his stepdaughter.  Theresa filed for divorce, and  
a default judgment of divorce was entered the following year.  
Theresa was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the  
child.  
While the divorce was pending, Catherine DeRose filed a  
petition for visitation under the grandparent visitation  
statute, MCL 722.27b.2  Theresa DeRose opposed visitation  
2  
(1) Except as provided in this subsection, a 
grandparent of the child may seek an order for 
grandparenting time in the manner set forth in this 
section only if a child custody dispute with 
respect to that child is pending before the court. 
. . .  
(2) As used in this section, “child custody 
dispute” includes a proceeding in which any of the 
following occurs:  
(a) The marriage of the child’s parents is 
declared invalid or is dissolved by the court, or a 
court enters a decree of legal separation with 
regard to the marriage.  
2  
 
because the grandmother denied that her son was guilty of the  
crimes he admitted committing and, thus, in Theresa’s view,  
contact with the child was not in the child’s best interest.  
The Friend of the Court, after investigation, concluded  
that Catherine DeRose lacked standing to bring this petition  
for visitation.  After the grandmother objected, another  
Friend of the Court investigation took place resulting in a  
recommendation that the grandmother have two hours of  
supervised visitation with the child on alternate Saturdays,  
* * *  
(3) A grandparent seeking a grandparenting  
time 
order 
may 
commence 
an 
action 
for  
grandparenting time, by complaint or complaint and 
motion for an order to show cause, in the circuit 
court in the county in which the grandchild 
resides. If a child custody dispute is pending, the 
order shall be sought by motion for an order to 
show cause. The complaint or motion shall be 
accompanied by an affidavit setting forth facts 
supporting the requested order. The grandparent 
shall give notice of the filing to each party who 
has legal custody of the grandchild. A party having 
legal custody may file an opposing affidavit. A 
hearing shall be held by the court on its own  
motion or if a party so requests. At the hearing, 
parties submitting affidavits shall be allowed an 
opportunity to be heard. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, if the court finds that it is in the best 
interests of the child to enter a grandparenting 
time order, the court shall enter an order  
providing for reasonable grandparenting time of the 
child by the grandparent by general or specific 
terms and conditions. If a hearing is not held, the 
court shall enter a grandparenting time order only 
upon a finding that grandparenting time is in the 
best interests of the child. . . .  
3 
increasing to four hours after an eight-month period.  
The mother objected to the recommendation, and the case  
proceeded to a hearing in the Wayne Circuit Court.  No  
testimony or evidence was taken at the hearing.  The trial  
court granted the grandmother’s petition, stating:  
But it doesn’t strike me that there is any 
reason here that a child should be deprived of a 
grandmother. Grandmothers are very important. 
Grandmothers are very important. [sic] I don’t say 
that just because I am one, but I do believe they 
are important. I have a niece who doesn’t have any 
and she borrows grandparents and I realize this is 
difficult, a very difficult time for the 12-year­
old, but the 12-year-old is not going to be 
required to see this lady. Not that it necessarily 
would be terrible, but I’m not saying it would be 
good. She is not going to see her. That’s not the 
point.  
This is not a motion for custody so that [the 
child] would be taken away from her sisters for the 
rest of her life or for a long period of time, even 
a weekend.  This is like two hours of supervised 
visitation and I know that mom—now, I’m sure mom 
feels, well, I made a bad choice, I wasn’t  
aware—this, that and the other thing. So now she 
wants to overcorrect.  
It makes no sense to me that this grandmother 
can’t have two hours of supervised visitation and 
even four hours of supervised visitation as  
recommended by the Friend of the Court and that’s 
plenty of time to evaluate whether anything bad or 
wrong happens.  
It’s very troubling that the concept that 
somehow this whole incident can just be erased by 
keeping the child’s actual grandmother away from 
her. It can’t be, and everybody is going to have to 
learn to deal with it which is not happy, it’s not 
good.  
* * *  
4  
It doesn’t strike me that a supervised 
visitation is wrong, so I would affirm the  
recommendation.  
The mother sought relief in the Court of Appeals, arguing  
that the grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional.  
The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the  
decision of the trial court. 249 Mich App 388; 643 NW2d 259  
(2002).  The panel concluded the grandparent visitation  
statute was unconstitutional on the basis of the United States  
Supreme Court decision in Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57; 120  
S Ct 2054; 147 L Ed 2d 49 (2000), which dealt with a somewhat  
similar third-party visitation statute in Washington that the  
Court ruled was unconstitutional.  The Court of Appeals  
approach in deciding this matter was to compare the Washington  
statute to the Michigan statute to determine if the defects  
found by the Supreme Court in the Washington statute were  
mirrored in the Michigan act.  Having done that, the Court of  
Appeals concluded that the Michigan statute was fatally  
similar to the Washington statute and, thus, it was  
unconstitutional pursuant to the Troxel analysis.  As the  
panel said, “Simply put, if a court in Washington cannot  
constitutionally be vested with the discretion to grant  
visitation to a nonparent on the basis of a finding that it is  
in the child’s best interests to do so, then a court in  
Michigan cannot be obligated under statute to do so based upon  
5  
 
 
the same finding.” 249 Mich App 394.  
The Court of Appeals also addressed whether, by means of  
reading “requirements that go beyond the text of the statute,”  
249 Mich App 395, into the statute, it could cure the  
constitutional deficiencies.  The panel declined to do this  
because it believed such actions to be the responsibility of  
the Legislature and beyond the authority of a court.  
Catherine DeRose sought relief in this Court, and we  
granted leave to appeal.3  
II. Standard of Review  
The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo.  
Tolksdorf v Griffith, 464 Mich 1, 5; 626 NW2d 163 (2001).  
Statutes 
are 
presumed 
constitutional 
unless 
the  
unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.  McDougall v Schanz,  
461 Mich 15, 24; 597 NW2d 148 (1999).  
III. Analysis  
In 2000, the United States Supreme Court heard and  
decided the Troxel case concerning the constitutionality of  
third-party visitation. 
At issue was the state of  
Washington’s third-party visitation statute, Wash Rev Code  
26.10.160(3), 
which 
was as expansive in granting third parties  
visitation privileges as can readily be envisioned.  It  
stated:  
3 467 Mich 884 (2002).  
6  
Any 
person 
may 
petition 
the 
court 
for  
visitation rights at any time including, but not 
limited to, custody proceedings.  The court may  
order visitation rights for any person when  
visitation may serve the best interest of the child 
whether or not there has been a change of [sic, 
“in”] circumstances. [Troxel, supra at 61.]  
Operating under this statute, grandparents Jenifer and  
Gary 
Troxel 
sought 
greater 
visitation 
with 
their 
grandchildren  
than the children’s mother would allow.  The trial court  
granted visitation under the act, but the Washington Court of  
Appeals reversed for lack of standing. Troxel, supra at 62;  
In re Visitation of Troxel, 87 Wash App 131, 137; 940 P2d 698  
(1997).  
The 
grandparents appealed, and the Washington Supreme  
Court, 
resting 
its 
decision on the United States Constitution,  
held that the statute was unconstitutional because it  
interfered with the right of parents, pursuant to substantive  
due process, to raise their children.  Troxel, supra at 62-63;  
In re Smith, 137 Wash 2d 1, 13-14; 969 P2d 21 (1998).  The  
statute did this, the court opined, because, contrary to  
relevant, 
constitutional 
doctrines 
on 
substantive 
due 
process,  
the court could order visitation over the parents’ objection  
without 
first 
determining 
that 
court 
intervention 
was 
required  
to prevent harm or potential harm to the child.  Moreover, the  
Washington Supreme Court held that the statute, by allowing  
any person to petition for visitation at any time subject only  
to a judge’s unguided determination of the best interests of  
7  
  
the child, was so overbroad that it violated constitutional  
requirements of due process. Id. at 30. Accordingly, it was  
unconstitutional for the additional reason that, as applied,  
it operated to deprive parents of their constitutionally  
protected rights to due process.  
On appeal the United States Supreme Court also found the  
statute unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court’s holding, while  
clear regarding the outcome, is, unfortunately, written in so  
many voices that a unifying rationale is difficult to discern.  
Initially, in reviewing the decision it is important to note  
that the Court did not, unlike the Washington Supreme Court,  
analyze the case on the basis of theories implicating facial  
invalidities such as a violation of substantive due process  
would entail.  In fact, only Justices Souter, Stevens, and  
Scalia, with three different positions as it developed, used  
that approach to decide the matter. Moreover, the plurality  
of four justices for whom Justice O’Connor wrote4 seemed to  
deal with what were facial-challenge issues while not fully  
acknowledging that such was the case.  Yet, notwithstanding  
these difficulties, the Washington statute, when the smoke  
cleared, was held to be unconstitutional.  It falls to us, as  
it has to other state supreme courts post-Troxel, to attempt  
4 Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer.  
8  
  
  
to determine what at least five of the six justices who came  
to their conclusion did agree upon.  We believe, guardedly,  
that a majority can be found in the Court’s handling of the  
second issue that the Washington Supreme Court discussed,  
namely, the statute’s overbreadth that caused it to violate  
parental liberty interests that are protected by the due­
process guarantees of the United States Constitution.  
The effort to discern where at least five justices agreed  
must begin with Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion.  Its  
discussion of the law began by restating that, pursuant to  
established 
constitutional 
law, 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment’s 
Due  
Process 
Clause 
includes 
a 
substantive 
component 
that  
“‘provides 
heightened 
protection 
against 
government  
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty  
interests.’” 
Troxel, supra at 65, quoting Washington v  
Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 720; 117 S Ct 2258; 138 L Ed 2d 772  
(1997).  One of the liberty interests the Court identified,  
after characterizing it as perhaps the oldest such interest,  
is “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control  
of their children . . . .” Troxel, supra at 65, quoting Meyer  
v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399, 401; 43 S Ct 625; 67 L Ed 1042  
(1923), and Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 534-535;  
45 S Ct 571; 69 L Ed 1070 (1925).  Further, the opinion  
reaffirmed that it is presumed that “so long as a parent  
9  
 
 
adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there  
will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into  
the private realm of the family to further question the  
ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning  
the rearing of that parent’s child.”  Troxel, supra at 68-69.  
See Reno v Flores, 507 US 292, 304; 113 S Ct 1439; 123 L Ed 2d  
1 (1993).  
With this discussion of the rights of parents to  
substantive 
due 
process 
behind 
her, 
Justice 
O’Connor  
apparently decided not to resolve the case on that basis.  
Rather, she continued her discussion by concluding that the  
Washington statute was an unconstitutional infringement of  
parental rights because the statute failed to require that a  
trial court accord deference to the decisions of fit parents  
regarding third-party visitation.  According to Justice  
O’Connor, in order for a nonparental visitation statute to  
allow for such deference, it must articulate a presumption  
that parents act in their children’s best interests.  
Additionally, the statute must place the burden of proof on  
the petitioner. Troxel, supra at 67-70. 
Moreover, Justice  
O’Connor asserted that the statute was overbroad because  
anyone, at any time, could petition for visitation.5  Thus,  
5 Under the statute, as she described it, should the 
trial judge disagree with the parent’s determination, the 
judge’s determination of what would be in the child’s best  
10  
 
her opinion affirmed the Washington Supreme Court decision,  
but, we emphasize, did not hold that all nonparental  
visitation statutes were facially unconstitutional. Troxel,  
supra at 73.  
Justice Souter, in his concurrence, began by asserting  
that he would affirm the Washington Supreme Court on the basis  
that its analysis of the issues relating to substantive due  
process was consistent with the United States Supreme Court  
jurisprudence in this area.  He continued by saying that he  
saw “no error” in the Washington Supreme Court’s second  
justification that the “statute’s authorization of ‘any  
interests would prevail.  Indeed, she concluded that the 
reasons offered in this case by the trial court in granting 
visitation indicated nothing more than a simple disagreement 
with the mother’s decision regarding visitation:  
[T]he Superior Court made only two formal 
findings in support of its visitation order. First, 
the Troxels “are part of a large, central, loving 
family, all located in this area, and the [Troxels] 
can provide opportunities for the children in the 
areas of cousins and music.” Second, “the children 
would be benefitted from spending quality time with 
the [Troxels], provided that that time is balanced 
with time with the childrens’ [sic] nuclear  
family.”
 These slender findings, in combination 
with the court’s announced presumption in favor of 
grandparent visitation and its failure to accord 
significant weight to Granville’s already having 
offered meaningful visitation to the Troxels, show 
that this case involves nothing  more than a simple 
disagreement between the Washington Superior Court 
and Granville concerning her children’s best  
interests. 
[Troxel, 
supra 
at 
72 
(citations 
omitted).]  
11  
 
person’ at ‘any time’ to petition and to receive visitation  
rights subject only to a free-ranging best-interest-of-the­
child standard” because it swept “too broadly and is  
unconstitutional on its face.”  Id. at 76-77.6  As he saw it,  
this meant that the Washington Supreme Court had said  
“[c]onsequently, there is no need to decide whether harm is  
required or to consider the precise scope of the parent’s  
right or its necessary protections.” Id.  
Justice Thomas also concurred that the issues concerning  
substantive due process were not addressed and that he agreed  
with the O’Connor plurality in its “recognition of a  
fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their  
children . . . .”  Id. at 80. He then concluded that he would  
apply strict scrutiny to the “infringements of fundamental  
rights” by the state of Washington and that the statute failed  
this test because Washington “lacks even a legitimate  
governmental 
interest—to 
saying 
nothing 
of 
a 
compelling 
one—in  
6 Justice Souter agreed with the plurality that the 
statute was unconstitutional because it failed to require a 
trial court to accord any deference to a fit parent’s decision 
regarding third-party visitation.  Troxel, supra at 78 n 2  
(Souter, J., concurring), quoting the plurality:  
As Justice O’CONNOR points out, the best­
interests provision “contains no requirement that a 
court accord the parent’s decision any presumption 
of validity or any weight whatsoever. Instead, the 
Washington 
statute 
places 
the 
best-interest  
determination solely in the hands of the judge.” 
[Citation omitted.]  
12  
  
second-guessing a fit parent’s decision regarding visitation  
with third parties.” Id.  
Accordingly, it is from the O’Connor plurality, as well  
as the opinions of Justices Souter and Thomas, that we must  
discern the principles that caused them to conclude that the  
Washington statute was unconstitutional.7  Once accomplished,  
we then apply those principles to the Michigan statute to  
determine if our statute is sufficiently different from the  
Washington statute at issue in Troxel to pass constitutional  
muster.  
First, to isolate the agreed-upon matters between the  
opinion of Justice O’Connor and those of Justices Souter and  
Thomas, it appears to us that all six justices agreed that  
parents have what they described as a “fundamental right” to  
raise their children.8
 Further, on the basis of this  
“fundamental right,” both Justice O’Connor and Justice Souter  
found that parents have the right to make decisions for  
children, and such decisions must be accorded “deference” or  
“weight.” 
Troxel, supra at 67, 78 n 2. 
Therefore, a  
7 We do not review the remaining three opinions by 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, or Stevens because of the lack of 
any relevant shared conclusions by these justices with the 
O’Connor, Souter, or Thomas positions.  
8 
 While the plurality and Justice Thomas, concurring, 
described this as a “fundamental right,” Troxel, supra at 66, 
80, 
Justice 
Souter 
described it as a “substantive interest[].” 
Id., at 75 (Souter, J., concurring).  
13  
 
visitation statute of the sort at issue here must, as we read  
Troxel, require that a trial court accord deference to the  
decisions of fit parents regarding third-party visitation.  
That is, it is not enough that the trial court simply  
disagrees with decisions the parents have made regarding  
third-party visitation. Troxel, supra at 67, 77-78.  
The Michigan statute states, in relevant part  
(1) Except as provided in this subsection, a 
grandparent of the child may seek an order for 
grandparenting time in the manner set forth in this 
section only if a child custody dispute with 
respect to that child is pending before the court. 
. . .  
(2) As used in this section, “child custody 
dispute” includes a proceeding in which any of the 
following occurs:  
(a) The marriage of the child’s parents is 
declared invalid or is dissolved by the court, or a 
court enters a decree of legal separation with 
regard to the marriage.  
* * *  
(3) A grandparent seeking a grandparenting  
time 
order 
may 
commence 
an 
action 
for  
grandparenting time, by complaint or complaint and 
motion for an order to show cause, in the circuit 
court in the county in which the grandchild 
resides. If a child custody dispute is pending, the 
order shall be sought by motion for an order to 
show cause. The complaint or motion shall be  
accompanied by an affidavit setting forth facts 
supporting the requested order. The grandparent 
shall give notice of the filing to each party who 
has legal custody of the grandchild. A party having 
legal custody may file an opposing affidavit. A 
hearing shall be held by the court on its own 
motion or if a party so requests. At the hearing, 
parties submitting affidavits shall be allowed an  
14  
 
 
opportunity to be heard. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, if the court finds that it is in the best 
interests of the child to enter a grandparenting 
time order, the court shall enter an order  
providing for reasonable grandparenting time of the 
child by the grandparent by general or specific 
terms and conditions. If a hearing is not held, the 
court shall enter a grandparenting time order only 
upon a finding that grandparenting time is in the 
best interests of the child. . . . The court shall  
make a record of the reasons for a denial of a  
requested grandparenting time order.  
There is no indication that the statute requires  
deference of any sort be paid by a trial court to the  
decisions fit parents make for their children.9  Thus, like  
the Washington statute at issue in Troxel, it is for this  
reason, the fact that our statute fails to require that a  
trial court accord deference to the decisions of fit parents  
regarding grandparent visitation, that we find our statute is  
constitutionally deficient.10  
9 
Moreover, the clear language of MCL 722.27b(3) 
indicates that the court is only required to make a record of 
the reasons for its decision in a grandparenting visitation 
case if visitation is denied. Apparently, if visitation is 
granted, the trial court need not justify its decision with 
any factual findings or analysis.  Thus, rather than giving 
any “special weight” to the determination of a fit parent, the 
thrust of this provision appears to favor grandparent 
visitation in the face of a contrary preference by a fit 
parent.  
10 It should be noted, however, that the Michigan statute 
is much narrower than Washington’s in conferring standing to 
pursue visitation.  It, thus, appears to us to meet the Troxel  
tests in this regard. Rather than applying to any person at 
any time, it applies only to grandparents, and only in two 
situations: where there is a child-custody dispute before the 
court, or where the unmarried parent is deceased.  MCL  
15  
V. Conclusion  
Aware of the statute’s constitutional infirmities, we  
must declare it constitutionally invalid.  We have not, unlike  
Justice Kelly’s opinion, addressed the “substantive due  
process” argument, i.e., whether a predicate of any such  
intervention into the parent-child relationship is a showing  
of harm or potential harm to the child, because it is not  
necessary to resolve this case under Troxel. Moreover, after  
Troxel it appears that federal constitutional law in this area  
is now not as predictable as it was before Troxel. One cannot  
read the many opinions in Troxel without concluding that an  
equilibrium has not been reached, and that the Supreme Court  
may be moving in the direction of rethinking its “substantive  
due process” jurisprudence so as to make it easier, or more  
difficult, for the state to intervene by ordering visitation  
in the parent-child relationship.  Because we can decide this  
case without endeavoring to read the portents on that matter,  
722.27b(1) and (2).  Further, a grandparent may only file once 
every two years, absent a showing of good cause, MCL 
722.27b(4), under procedures articulated at MCL 722.27b(3). 
Moreover, Michigan’s courts cannot restrict the movement of 
the child solely to allow the grandparent to exercise the 
rights in the statute.  MCL 722.27b(5). Noteworthy also is 
that 
the 
statute 
carefully sets out that a grandparenting-time 
order does not confer parental rights in those to whom the 
visitation is granted, MCL 722.27b(6), and that any orders 
granted under the act may be modified or terminated when in 
the best interests of the child, MCL 722.27b(7).  
16  
we prudentially decline to do so.  
In conclusion, bound as we are by the decision in Troxel,  
we are compelled to affirm the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals and find the Michigan grandparent visitation statute  
unconstitutional as written.  
Affirmed and remanded to the trial court for proceedings  
consistent with this opinion.  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
17  
 
 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
THERESA O’DAY DEROSE, also known as 
THERESA SEYMOUR,  
Plaintiff Third-Party 
Defendant-Appellee,  
v 
No. 121246  
JOSEPH ALLEN DEROSE,  
Defendant-Appellee,  
and  
CATHERINE DEROSE,  
Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring in result).  
I concur in the result only of the majority opinion that  
Michigan’s grandparent visitation statute, MCL 722.27b, is  
unconstitutional on its face.  
I write separately because I recognize the importance of  
the grandparent visitation statute and wish to emphasize that  
grandparent visitation statutes are not unconstitutional per  
se.
 The statutes may be written in such a way that they  
comply with constitutional requirements.  See Troxel v  
Granville, 530 US 57, 73; 120 S Ct 2054; 147 L Ed 2d 49  
 
 
 
(2000).  Therefore, I urge the Legislature to amend Michigan’s  
statute to alleviate the constitutional flaws in the statute.  
While Michigan’s statute is narrower than the statute at  
issue in Troxel,1 the statute is, nonetheless, flawed for the  
1 Michigan’s statute is narrower because it only allows 
grandparents to petition for visitation, rather than any 
party.
 Moreover, the statute, MCL 722.27b, limits when a 
grandparent may petition for visitation, providing in part:  
(1) Except as provided in this subsection, a 
grandparent of the child may seek an order for 
grandparenting time in the manner set forth in this 
section only if a child custody dispute with 
respect to that child is pending before the court. 
If a natural parent of an unmarried child is 
deceased, a parent of the deceased person may 
commence 
an 
action 
for 
grandparenting 
time.  
Adoption of the child by a stepparent under [MCL 
710.21 to 710.70] does not terminate the right of a 
parent of the deceased person to commence an action 
for grandparenting time.  
(2) As used in this section, “child custody 
dispute” includes a proceeding in which any of the 
following occurs:  
(a) The marriage of the child’s parents is 
declared invalid or is dissolved by the court, or a 
court enters a degree of legal separation with 
regard to the marriage.  
(b) Legal custody of the child is given to a 
party other than the child’s parent, or the child 
is placed outside of and does not reside in the 
home of a parent, excluding any child who has been 
placed for adoption with other than a stepparent, 
or whose adoption by other than a stepparent has 
been legally finalized.  
Under the statute, a grandparent may not file more than 
once every two years, absent a showing of good cause.  MCL  
722.27b(4).  
2  
 
 
following reasons: (1) the statute does not provide a  
presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of  
their children, (2) the statute fails to accord the fit  
parent’s decision concerning visitation any “special weight,”  
and (3) the statute fails to clearly place the burden in the  
proceedings on the petitioners, rather than the parents.  See  
Troxel, supra at 67-71 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).  
However, as addressed below, each of these constitutional  
problems can be cured with revisions to the statute and, in  
fact, many other state statutes include provisions that may  
alleviate some or all these concerns.  
These concerns have been addressed by states such as  
Utah, where the visitation statute provides, “[t]here is a  
rebuttable 
presumption that a parent’s decision with regard to  
grandparent visitation is in the grandchild’s best interests.  
. . .”  Utah Code Ann 30-5-2(2). In Nevada, the visitation  
statute 
addresses 
these 
requirements 
by 
providing 
in 
pertinent  
part:  
If a parent of the child has denied or  
unreasonably restricted visits with the child, 
there is a rebuttable presumption that the granting 
of a right to visitation to a party seeking 
visitation is not in the best interests of the  
child.
 To rebut this presumption, the party 
seeking 
visitation 
must 
prove 
by 
clear 
and  
convincing evidence that it is in the best  
interests of the child to grant visitation. [Nev 
Rev Stat 125C.050(4).]  
The Nevada statute explicitly requires the party seeking  
3  
visitation to rebut the presumption that visitation is not in  
the child’s best interests and to prove that it is in the best  
interests of the child to grant visitation.  In Georgia,  
“there shall be no presumption in favor of visitation by any  
grandparent.”  Ga Code Ann 19-7-3(c).  Thus, the burden is on  
the grandparent seeking visitation to prove an entitlement to  
visitation under the standards articulated in the Georgia  
statute.  In New Jersey, the burden in the proceedings is  
explicitly placed on the petitioner.  New Jersey’s statute  
states, “It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove by  
a preponderance of the evidence that the granting of  
visitation is in the best interests of the child.”  NJ Stat  
Ann 9:2-7.1(a).2  Some states also require the grandparent to  
demonstrate some sort of preexisting relationship between the  
grandparent and the child or an effort to establish one as a  
requisite for seeking visitation. Me Rev Stat Ann tit 19-A,  
1803(1); 
Miss 
Code 
Ann 93-16-3(2)(a); Neb Rev Stat 43-1802(2);  
2 The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, 
rejected a party’s constitutional challenge, although there 
was substance in support of the complaint that this statute 
was facially unconstitutional, but it did conclude that the 
statute was unconstitutional as applied in the case before it. 
Wilde v Wilde, 341 NJ Super 381, 386; 775 A2d 535 (2001).  
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that  
“grandparents seeking visitation under the statute must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of the  
visitation they seek would result in harm to the child.  That  
burden is constitutionally required to safeguard the due 
process rights of fit parents.”  Moriarty v Bradt, ___ NJ ___, 
___; ___ A2d ___; 2003 NJ LEXIS 699, 14 (2003).  
4  
 
  
NC Gen Stat 50-13.2A; Tenn Code Ann 36-6-306(b)(1).3  
Also, several states address the concerns of Troxel by  
requiring consideration of the effect of a visitation order on  
the child-parent relationship.4
 See Troxel, supra at 70.  
Several states specifically require the trial court to  
determine 
that 
visitation 
will 
not 
adversely 
affect, 
interfere  
with, or substantially interfere with the parent-child  
relationship.  Neb Rev Stat 43-1802(2); NH Rev Stat Ann  
458:17-d(II)(b); NJ Stat Ann 9:2-7.1(b)(4); ND Cent Code 14­
09-05.1; W Va Code 48-10-501, 48-10-502(5).5  
3 In Rideout v Riendeau, 761 A2d 291, 294 (2000), the  
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine concluded that Maine’s  
Grandparents Visitation Act, Me Rev Stat Ann tit 19-A, 1801­
1805, “as applied to the facts presented to us, is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest, and thus does 
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment  
of the U.S. Constitution.”   
The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected challenges to the 
constitutionality of Miss Code Ann 93-16-3(1) and 93-16-3(2), 
respectively, in Zeman v Stanford, 789 So 2d 798, 803 (2001), 
and Stacy v Ross, 798 So 2d 1275, 1279 (2001).  
4 MCL 722.23(j) does require the court to consider “[t]he 
willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate 
and 
encourage 
a 
close 
and 
continuing 
parent-child 
relationship 
between the child and the other parent or the child and the 
parents.”  However, this language does not explicitly require 
the trial court to assess the effect of visitation on the  
parent-child relationship.  
5 In 1993, the North Dakota Supreme Court declared the 
1993 
amendment 
of 
ND 
Cent Code 14-09-05.1 unconstitutional “to  
the extent that it require[d] courts to grant grandparents 
visitation 
rights 
with an unmarried minor unless visitation is 
found not to be in the child’s best interests, and presume[d] 
(continued...)  
5  
 
 
 
Additionally, some state grandparent visitation statutes  
contain a separate list of best-interest factors to consider  
when deciding whether to award grandparent visitation.  See  
Nev Rev Stat Ann 125C.050; Tenn Code Ann 36-6-307. I do not  
gather from Troxel that a separate list is required; however,  
it may be something the Legislature would wish to consider.6  
5(...continued) 
visitation rights of grandparents [were] in a child’s best 
interests . . . .”  Hoff v Berg, 595 NW2d 285, 291 (1999). 
The Court further declared that the 1983 version of the  
statute was left intact until its valid repeal or amendment. 
Id. at 292. The current version of North Dakota’s statute, 
which does not include a presumption in favor of grandparent 
visitation, took effect on August 1, 2001.  
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that 
its grandparent act was constitutional in State ex rel Brandon  
L v Moats, 209 W Va 752, 754, 762-764 (2001).  The Court noted  
that 
the 
Legislature 
recodified 
the 
grandparent 
visitation 
act 
but that it did not alter the language of the statutory 
provisions it was addressing.  Id. at 754, n 2.  The citations  
in this opinion are to the recodified act.  
6 Michigan’s best-interest statute, MCL 722.23, lists the 
following factors to consider:  
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional 
ties existing between the parties involved and the 
child.  
(b) The capacity and disposition of the  
parties involved to give the child love, affection, 
and guidance and to continue the education and 
raising of the child in his or her religion or 
creed, if any.  
(c) The capacity and disposition of the  
parties involved to provide the child with food, 
clothing, medical care or other remedial care  
recognized and permitted under the laws of this 
(continued...)  
6 
 
 
 
 
 
The various state provisions cited suggest that it is  
6(...continued) 
state in place of medical care, and other material 
needs.  
(d) The length of time the child has lived in  
a 
stable, 
satisfactory 
environment, 
and 
the  
desirability of maintaining continuity.  
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the 
existing or proposed custodial home or homes.  
(f) The 
moral 
fitness 
of 
the 
parties 
involved.  
(g) The mental and physical health of the 
parties involved.  
(h) The home, school, and community record of 
the child.  
(i) The reasonable preference of the child,  
if the court considers the child to be of  
sufficient age to express preference.  
(j) The willingness and ability of each of 
the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and 
continuing parent-child relationship between the 
child and the other parent or the child and the 
parents.  
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether 
the violence was directed against or witnessed by 
the child.  
(l) Any other factor considered by the court 
to be relevant to a particular child custody 
dispute.  
These factors are applicable in the grandparent visitation 
context.  MCL 722.23 states, “As used in this act, “best 
interests of the child” means the sum total of the following 
factors . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
 “This act” refers to the  
Michigan Child Custody Act of 1970. 
The grandparent 
visitation statute, MCL 722.27b, is part of “this act.”  
7  
 
 
  
 
 
possible to draft a statute that would address the  
constitutional concerns expressed in Troxel.7
 I urge the  
7 The Troxel Court declined to address “whether the Due  
Process 
Clause 
requires 
all 
nonparental 
visitation 
statutes 
to 
include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a 
condition 
precedent 
to granting visitation.”  Troxel, supra at  
73.  Because the Troxel Court did not indicate whether it was  
necessary to demonstrate that the child would be harmed if 
grandparent visitation were not granted, I express no opinion 
regarding whether a statute must require such a showing before 
it can be found constitutional.  I do note that some states  
have built such a requirement into their statutes.  In  
Tennessee, for example, the statute states:  
In considering a petition for grandparent 
visitation, the court shall first determine the 
presence of a danger of substantial harm to the 
child. Such a finding of substantial harm may be 
based upon cessation of the relationship between an 
unmarried minor child and the child’s grandparent 
if the court determines, upon proper proof, that:  
(A) The child had such a significant existing 
relationship with the grandparent that loss of the 
relationship is likely to occasion severe emotional 
harm to the child;  
(B) The grandparent functioned as a primary 
caregiver such that cessation of the relationship 
could interrupt provision of the daily needs of the 
child and thus occasion physical or emotional harm; 
or  
(C) The child had a significant existing 
relationship with the grandparent and loss of the 
relationship presents the danger of other direct 
and substantial harm to the child. [Tenn Code Ann 
36-6-306(b)(1).]  
See also Ga Code Ann 19-7-3(c).  As stated in n 2, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court read this requirement into its statute.  
Again, I note that Troxel declined to state that such a  
showing of harm to the child was required per se to alleviate 
(continued...)  
8  
  
Legislature to revise Michigan’s grandparent visitation  
statute to alleviate the constitutional flaws in the statute.8  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
7(...continued) 
concerns of substantive due process.  I cite these statutes  
requiring a finding of harm for informational purposes only.  
8 I note that two House bills were introduced on January 
29, 2003, to amend provisions relating to grandparent 
visitation: House Bill 4104 and House Bill 4105.  See  
“Michigan Legislature,” www.michiganlegislature.org.,  July 
22, 2003.  However, these amendments do not address the 
constitutional concerns discussed in this opinion.  
9  
___________________________________ 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
THERESA O'DAY DeROSE, 
also known as THERESA SEYMOUR,  
Plaintiff/Third-Party Defendant 
Appellee,  
v 
No. 121246  
JOSEPH ALLEN DeROSE,  
Defendant-Appellee,  
v  
CATHERINE DeROSE,  
Third-Party Plaintiff 
Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
The issue in this case is whether Michigan's grandparent  
visitation statute1 is constitutional, either as written or as  
applied by the trial court.  The Court of Appeals held the  
statute unconstitutional as written, relying on the United  
States Supreme Court opinion in Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57;  
1MCL 722.27b.  
 
120 S Ct 2054; 147 L Ed 2d 49 (2000).  249 Mich 388; 643 NW2d  
259 (2002).  
Today, the majority affirms that decision. However, it  
bases its analysis on an interpretation of Troxel that is  
inaccurate and it operates from the premise that Justice  
O'Connor, 
who 
authored 
the 
Troxel 
plurality 
opinion,  
misunderstood her own opinion.  Moreover, in interpreting  
Michigan's grandparent visitation statute, the majority  
invokes fundamental methods of statutory construction, but in  
application abandons those principles.  
While not joining the majority, I do agree that the trial  
court's 
visitation 
order 
impermissibly 
infringed 
Mrs.  
Seymour's privacy and liberty interests in raising her  
children.  Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals  
vacation of the trial court's order granting visitation.  
However, I would reverse the Court of Appeals holding that the  
grandparent visitation statute is unconstitutional. Rather, I  
would hold that it is the trial court's application of the  
statute that is unconstitutional.  
I. THE TROXEL DECISION  
The resolution of this case requires a careful  
examination of the United States Supreme Court opinions in  
Troxel v Granville, supra. The Washington Supreme Court held  
Washington's 
nonparental visitation statute unconstitutional.  
2  
 
 
 
 
On review, a plurality of the members of the United States  
Supreme Court ruled that the trial court's application of the  
statute was unconstitutional. "We . . . hold that the  
application of [the Washington statute] to Granville and her  
family violated her due process right to make decisions  
concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters."  
It did not hold that the statute was unconstitutional.  
Troxel, 530 US 75.  
Thus, the Court left unresolved whether the Washington  
statute, or similar statutes in other states, could survive in  
light of the Constitution's protections of the parent-child  
relationship.
 Because the Washington Supreme Court's  
interpretation of the Washington statute was the subject of  
the Troxel decision, it is important to review that statute  
and understand how it was applied.  
A. THE WASHINGTON STATUTE AND THE OPINION OF THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT  
Section 26.10.160 of the Revised Code of Washington  
provides, in relevant part:  
(3) Any person may petition the court for 
visitation rights at any time including, but not 
limited to, custody proceedings. The court may 
order visitation rights for any person when  
visitation may serve the best interest of the child 
whether or not there has been any change of 
circumstances.  
The facts in Troxel were that Tommie Granville and Brad  
Troxel, although never married, had two daughters.  After  
3  
their relationship ended, Brad lived with his parents and  
frequently brought his daughters to their home for weekend  
visitations.  Two years after Tommie and Brad separated, Brad  
committed suicide.  After his death, Tommie Granville allowed  
Brad's parents extended visitation with the children.  Later,  
however, she informed them that the visitation would be  
limited to one short visit each month.  
The grandparents, the Troxels, brought an action in  
Washington state court for visitation rights pursuant to Wash  
Rev Code 26.10.160(3), Washington's nonparent visitation  
statute.  They requested two weekends of overnight visitation  
per month and two weeks of visitation every summer.  Although  
Granville did not oppose visitation altogether, she asked the  
court to limit it to one day a month with no overnight  
visitation. In re Troxel, 87 Wash App 131, 133-134; 940 P2d  
698 (1997).  The trial court entered an order permitting  
visitation on one weekend a month, one week each summer, and  
four hours on each of the grandparents' birthdays.  In re  
Smith, 137 Wash 2d 1, 6; 969 P2d 21 (1998).  
Granville 
appealed 
from 
this 
decision, 
and 
the 
Washington  
Court of Appeals remanded for findings of fact and conclusions  
of law. In re Smith, supra. 
On remand, the trial court,  
applying the state's best interests test, concluded that  
visitation was in the best interests of the children.  
4  
  
  
  
 
Granville again appealed.  This time, the Washington  
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court order and dismissed  
the petition.  It held that nonparents lack standing under  
Washington's nonparental visitation statute, unless a custody  
action is pending.  Having resolved the matter on the basis of  
standing, the court had no need to address Granville's  
constitutional challenge to the statute.2 
In re Troxel, 87  
Wash App 138.  
The Washington Supreme Court granted the Troxels'  
petition for review and consolidated their case with similar  
cases. 
It then affirmed the Washington Court of Appeals  
decision on a separate basis.  It held that the Troxels had  
standing to petition for visitation under the Washington act.  
However, 
the 
act 
was 
unconstitutional 
because 
it 
impermissibly  
infringed the fundamental rights of parents to raise their  
children.  
In 
reaching 
this 
conclusion, 
the 
Washington 
Supreme 
Court  
stated that the act had at least two fatal flaws: (1) it was  
not limited to situations where there was actual or potential  
harm to the child, which the Washington Supreme Court held  
2The court did state that this limitation on nonparental 
visitation 
is 
"consistent 
with 
the 
constitutional 
restrictions  
on state interference with parents' fundamental liberty 
interest in the 'care, custody, and management' of their 
children." In re Troxel, 87 Wash App 135, quoting Santosky v  
Kramer, 455 US 745, 753; 102 S Ct 1388; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982).  
5  
 
 
 
were 
the 
limits 
of 
legitimate state interference with parental  
rights, and (2) because the statute allowed "any person" to  
petition for visitation rights at "any time," it swept too  
broadly. In re Smith, 137 Wash 2d 15-21.  
The Troxels brought a petition for certiorari to the  
United States Supreme Court.  The Court granted it and  
affirmed the Washington Supreme Court in a plurality opinion  
authored by Justice O'Connor.3  
B. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION  
A review of the various opinions of the justices is  
helpful for the purpose of determining the consistent rule  
among them, if any.  
1. THE OPINION OF THE COURT  
Justice O'Connor began the substantive portion of her  
opinion by noting that demographic changes over the past  
century have altered traditional notions of the family.  
Consequently, 
child 
rearing 
responsibilities 
frequently 
extend  
beyond immediate family members to grandparents. 
In  
recognition of this change, she noted, every state has adopted  
a measure protecting the relationship between grandparents as  
nontraditional caregivers and the children whose lives they  
3Justice O'Connor was joined in the opinion by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.  Justices  
Souter and Thomas concurred on alternative bases.  Justices  
Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy each authored dissents.  
6  
 
  
 
shape. Troxel, 530 US 63-65.  
While acknowledging that "third-party" relationships are  
often 
beneficial 
to 
children, 
Justice 
O'Connor 
also 
recognized  
that nonparental visitation statutes place a substantial  
burden on the parent-child relationship.  Id. at 64. Because  
parents have a constitutionally protected interest in the  
care, custody, and control of their children, these statutes  
risk violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth  
Amendment. Washington v Glucksburg, 521 US 702, 719-720; 117  
S Ct 2258; 138 L Ed 2d 772 (1997); Reno v Flores, 507 US 292,  
301-302; 113 S Ct 1439; 123 L Ed 2d 1 (1993).  
Justice O'Connor relied on the Court's rich history of  
protecting the parent-child relationship4 and concluded that  
the trial court's application of the Washington nonparental  
visitation statute was unconstitutional. Troxel, 530 US 75.  
She emphasized that the statute is broad in scope and that,  
when applying it, the trial court had gone to the full extent  
of the its language in entering the visitation order. Id. at  
73-75.  She noted concern that the order gave visitation that  
4See, e.g., Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390; 43 S Ct 625; 67 
L Ed 1042 (1923); Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510; 45 
S Ct 571; 69 L Ed 1070 (1925); Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 
158; 64 S Ct 438; 88 L Ed 645 (1944); Stanley v Illinois, 405 
US 645; 92 S Ct 1208; 31 L Ed 2d 551 (1972); Wisconsin v  
Yoder, 406 US 205; 92 S Ct 1526; 32 L Ed 2d 15 (1972); 
Quilloin v Walcott, 434 US 246; 98 S Ct 549; 54 L Ed 2d 511 
(1978); Parham v J R, 442 US 584; 99 S Ct 2493; 61 L Ed 2d 101  
(1979); Santosky, supra.  
7  
 
 
 
  
 
exceeded Granville's wishes even though (1) Granville had  
allowed limited visitation to the Troxels, (2) there was no  
indication that Granville was an unfit parent, and (3)  
Granville had made her own legitimate determination of the  
child's best interests. Id. at 68-72.  
2. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS  
Justice Souter concurred in the result and in a portion  
of Justice O'Connor's reasoning. 
He opined that the  
Washington Supreme Court's invalidation of the statute was  
consistent with the Court's jurisprudence on substantive due  
process. Troxel, 530 US 75-76. He relied on the fact that  
the Washington Supreme Court had construed the statute to  
allow any person to petition for visitation at any time,  
subject only to a court's unfettered discretion.  Justice  
Souter differed from Justice O'Connor in that he would have  
held 
that 
the 
Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of the  
statute was conclusive.  Thus, the statute was overbroad  
because it did not limit the discretion of the lower courts.  
As a consequence, it was invalid in all its applications.  Id.  
at 77-79, citing Chicago v Morales, 527 US 41, 71; 119 S Ct  
1849; 144 L Ed 2d 67 (1999).  
Justice Thomas concurred only in the result of the  
plurality opinion.  He stated that, because the Court had  
found a fundamental interest, strict scrutiny must apply and,  
8  
 
under that standard, the statute was invalid.  Troxel, 530 US  
80.  
3. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS  
With 
one 
exception, the dissenting justices did not argue  
that a different result was warranted.  Rather, Justices  
Stevens and Kennedy would have vacated the Washington Supreme  
Court decision because the opinion itself was too broad.  
Common 
to 
both 
these 
opinions 
is 
a 
focus 
on  
arbitrariness.  Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy agreed  
that the Due Process Clause forbids unreasonable state  
intrusion into the parent-child relationship. Both justices  
agreed that, at some point, a parental decision might become  
so arbitrary that judicial intrusion is warranted.  
The question for these justices was whether the best  
interests test, standing alone, is a sufficient indicator of  
arbitrariness.  
Because the Washington Supreme Court failed to  
address this issue, Justices Stevens and Kennedy would have  
vacated 
the 
Washington Supreme Court decision and remanded the  
case for further findings.  
Justice Scalia took a different approach.  He argued  
that, while a parent's interest in directing a child's  
upbringing is among the unalienable rights retained by the  
9  
 
 
 
people,5 the right is not enumerated in the Constitution.  
Accordingly, while a state may have no legitimate power to  
curtail the right, the Court has no power to enforce it.  
Justice Scalia would have reversed the Washington Supreme  
Court decision to the extent that it relied on the Due Process  
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in holding the Washington  
statute invalid.  
4. THE COMPOSITE OPINION  
The 
Troxel 
plurality 
decision 
is 
capable 
of  
reconciliation in, at least, one respect.  With one justice  
dissenting and one concurring in the result only, the Court  
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment  
protects parents' fundamental interest in raising their  
children.
 Thus, a state may not unduly interfere in the  
parent-child relationship. At a minimum, state interference  
in the relationship is not permitted unless a parent has made  
a decision regarding visitation that is not in the child’s'  
best interests.  
II. APPLICATION  
Determining whether the Michigan grandparent visitation  
statute is constitutional requires the following analysis:  
First, the fundamental interest at stake should be defined.  
Second, the statute should not infringe this interest. Third,  
5See US Const, Am IX.  
10  
 
 
 
 
if it infringes, a strict scrutiny test must be applied to it.  
In applying this analysis, we attempt to give effect to  
legislative intent.  Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 466 Mich  
524, 528; 647 NW2d 493 (2002).  
When we review a statute on the basis of a constitutional  
challenge, 
we 
begin 
with 
a 
presumption 
that 
it 
is  
constitutional. Taylor v Gates Pharmaceuticals, 468 Mich 1,  
6; 658 NW2d 127 (2003).  To overcome the presumption of  
constitutionality, 
the 
party 
challenging 
the 
facial  
constitutionality of the act "must establish that no set of  
circumstances exists under which the act would be valid.  The  
fact that the . . . act might operate unconstitutionally under  
some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient . . . ."  
Straus v Governor, 459 Mich 526, 543; 592 NW2d 53 (1999),  
quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745; 107 S Ct  
2095; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987).  
Moreover, we have a duty to construe a statute as  
constitutional, unless its unconstitutionality is clearly  
apparent. 
Taylor, 
supra. 
Beyond 
the 
question 
of  
constitutionality, it is not our province to inquire into the  
wisdom of the legislation. 
Id., citing Council of  
Organizations & Others for Ed About Parochiaid, Inc v  
Governor, 455 Mich 557, 570; 566 NW2d 208 (1997).  
11  
 
A. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT INVOLVED  
The fundamental interest at stake in this case is the  
parent-child relationship. There can be  
no doubt that parents have a fundamental liberty 
interest in caring for and guiding their children, 
and 
a 
corresponding 
privacy 
interest—absent  
exceptional circumstances—in doing so without the 
undue interference of strangers to them and to 
their child.  [Troxel, 530 US 87 (opinion of 
Stevens, J.).]  
"It is cardinal . . . that the custody, care and nurture  
of the child reside first in the parents . . . ."  Prince v  
Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 166; 64 S Ct 438; 88 L Ed 645  
(1944). Thus,  
[i]t is plain that the interest of a parent in the 
companionship, care, custody, and management of his 
or her children "come[s] . . . with a momentum for 
respect lacking when appeal is made to the  
liberties 
which 
derive 
merely 
from 
shifting 
economic arrangements."  [Stanley v Illinois, 405 
US 645, 651; 92 S Ct 1208; 31 L Ed 2d 551 (1972), 
citing Kovacs v Cooper, 336 US 77, 95; 69 S Ct 448; 
93 L Ed 513 (1949) (Frankfurter, J, concurring).]  
Because the Constitution recognizes this fundamental  
interest, a presumption has been created that the "natural  
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests  
of their children."  Parham v J R, 442 US 584, 602; 99 S Ct  
2493; 61 L Ed 2d 101 (1979). Consequently, a state interest  
will rarely be sufficiently compelling to override parents'  
legitimate 
decisions 
regarding 
the 
care, 
custody, or  
management of their children.  
12  
 
 
B. MICHIGAN'S GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE  
Michigan's grandparent visitation statute states:  
(1) Except as provided in this subsection, a 
grandparent of the child may seek an order for 
grandparenting time in the manner set forth in this 
section only if a child custody dispute with 
respect to that child is pending before the court. 
If a natural parent of an unmarried child is 
deceased, a parent of the deceased person may 
commence 
an 
action 
for 
grandparenting 
time.  
Adoption of the child by a stepparent under [MCL 
710.21 to 710.70] does not terminate the right of a 
parent of the deceased person to commence an action 
for grandparenting time.  
(2) As used in this section, "child custody 
dispute" includes a proceeding in which any of the 
following occurs:  
(a) The marriage of the child's parents is 
declared invalid or is dissolved by the court, or a 
court enters a decree of legal separation with 
regard to the marriage.  
(b) Legal custody of the child is given to a 
party other than the child's parent, or the child 
is placed outside of and does not reside in the 
home of a parent, excluding any child who has been 
placed for adoption with other than a stepparent, 
or whose adoption by other than a stepparent has 
been legally finalized.  
(3) A grandparent seeking a grandparenting  
time 
order 
may 
commence 
an 
action 
for  
grandparenting time, by complaint or complaint and 
motion for an order to show cause, in the circuit 
court in the county in which the grandchild 
resides. If a child custody dispute is pending, the 
order shall be sought by motion for an order to 
show cause. The complaint or motion shall be 
accompanied by an affidavit setting forth facts 
supporting the requested order. The grandparent 
shall give notice of the filing to each party who 
has legal custody of the grandchild. A party having 
legal custody may file an opposing affidavit. A 
hearing shall be held by the court on its own  
13  
motion or if a party so requests. At the hearing, 
parties submitting affidavits shall be allowed an 
opportunity to be heard. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, if the court finds that it is in the best 
interests of the child to enter a grandparenting 
time order, the court shall enter an order  
providing for reasonable grandparenting time of the 
child by the grandparent by general or specific 
terms and conditions. If a hearing is not held, the 
court shall enter a grandparenting time order only 
upon a finding that grandparenting time is in the 
best interests of the child. A grandparenting time 
order shall not be entered for the parents of a 
putative father unless the father has acknowledged 
paternity in writing, has been adjudicated to be 
the father by a court of competent jurisdiction, or 
has contributed regularly to the support of the 
child or children. The court shall make a record of  
the 
reasons 
for 
a 
denial 
of 
a 
requested  
grandparenting time order.  
(4) A grandparent may not file more than once 
every 2 years, absent a showing of good cause, a 
complaint or motion seeking a grandparenting time 
order. If the court finds there is good cause to 
allow a grandparent to file more than 1 complaint 
or motion under this section in a 2-year period, 
the court shall allow the filing and shall consider 
the complaint or motion. The court may order 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.  
(5) The court shall not enter an order  
restricting the movement of the grandchild if the 
restriction is solely for the purpose of allowing 
the grandparent to exercise the rights conferred in 
a grandparenting time order.  
(6) A grandparenting time order entered in 
accordance 
with 
this 
section 
shall 
not 
be  
considered to have created parental rights in the 
person or persons to whom grandparenting time 
rights are granted. The entry of a grandparenting 
time order shall not prevent a court of competent 
jurisdiction from acting upon the custody of the 
child, the parental rights of the child, or the 
adoption of the child.  
(7) The court may enter an order modifying or  
14  
 
terminating a grandparenting time order whenever 
such a modification or termination is in the best  
interests of the child. [MCL 722.27b.]  
It is evident that, like the Washington statute,  
Michigan's grandparent visitation statute infringes the  
parents' 
liberty 
interest in directing the upbringing of their  
children. It does this by allowing third parties to insert  
themselves into the relationship over a parent's objection.  
Thus, if the statute is allowed to stand, it must pass the  
strict scrutiny test.  
C. APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY TO THE STATUTE  
In order to meet strict scrutiny, a statute must be  
narrowly 
tailored 
to 
serve 
a 
compelling 
governmental 
interest.  
In the realm of fundamental rights, this test takes on  
substantial weight.  The very concept of a liberty interest  
presumes that there are few, if any, governmental interests  
that will meet this burden. Moreover, a court's application  
of an otherwise valid statute is invalid if it extends beyond  
the limits of constitutional authority.  
The majority holds that our grandparent visitation  
statute 
cannot 
withstand 
constitutional 
scrutiny.  
Specifically, it rules that the unconstitutionality lies in  
its failure to "accord deference to the decisions of fit  
parents regarding grandparent visitation." Ante at 15.  
It is apparent to me that this conclusion rests on an  
15  
 
 
 
unnecessarily strict interpretation of the statute.  It  
violates the principle that "'[a] text should not be construed  
strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should  
be construed reasonably to contain all that it fairly means.'"  
Corrigan & Thomas, "Dice Loading" Rules of statutory  
interpretation, 59 NYU Ann Surv Am L 231, 231-232 (2003),  
quoting 
Scalia, 
A 
Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and  
the Law (Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton University Press, 1997),  
p 23.  
1. FACIAL VALIDITY  
a. COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST  
"A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon  
the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full  
maturity as citizens . . . ."  Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US  
158, 168; 64 S Ct 438; 88 L Ed 645 (1944). Accordingly, "[i]t  
is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's  
interest 
in 
'safeguarding 
the 
physical 
and 
psychological 
well­
being of a minor' is 'compelling.'" New York v Ferber, 458 US  
747, 756-757; 102 S Ct 3348; 73 L Ed 2d 1113 (1982), quoting  
Globe Newspaper Co v Superior Court, 457 US 596, 607; 102 S Ct  
2613; 73 L Ed 2d 248 (1982).  Therefore, we may sustain  
legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional  
well-being of youth even when the legislation impinges on  
constitutionally protected rights. Ferber, supra at 757.  
16  
Our grandparent visitation statute is meant to protect  
children's well-being by providing for visitation when it is  
in their best interests.  Thus, the statute must be upheld if  
it is narrowly tailored to address this compelling interest.  
b. NARROWLY TAILORED  
By 
its 
terms, 
the 
Michigan 
grandparent 
visitation 
statute  
is substantially more narrow than the Washington statute.  For  
instance, the Washington statute allowed any person the  
ability to bring a petition for visitation at any time.  By  
contrast, the Michigan statute allows only grandparents to  
petition for visitation and only under circumstances where a  
prior disturbance in the parent-child relationship limits the  
effect 
of 
the 
intrusion.  The Legislature allows court-ordered  
nonparental 
visitation 
only 
where 
(1) 
the 
relationship 
between  
the child and the petitioner is that of grandchild­
grandparent, and (2) the petition for visitation is made  
during the pendency of a child custody dispute or the natural  
parent of the unmarried child is deceased.  
The crucial fact in this case is that the Michigan  
statute, like the Washington statute, employs a best­
interests-of-the-child standard to determine whether a court  
should issue a visitation order.  The inclusion of this  
standard constituted the ultimate flaw in the Washington  
statute; once a petition was properly before a Washington  
17  
 
court, the act gave the judge unfettered discretion to  
determine whether to award visitation.6  Thus, I would agree  
with the majority that, unless our Legislature has otherwise  
limited 
our 
trial 
courts' discretion in awarding visitation to  
grandparents, we must hold the statute unconstitutional.  
The 
majority 
is 
apparently persuaded by the argument that  
the statute includes a presumption in favor of awarding  
grandparent visitation.  Ante, at 15, n 10. 
However, this  
interpretation runs afoul of the basic tenet that a statute is  
presumed 
constitutional. 
 
The 
majority 
incorrectly 
states 
that  
the statute does not require a trial court to justify its  
decision to award grandparent visitation with any factual  
findings or analysis.  To the contrary, the statute forbids a  
court from entering a grandparent visitation order unless it  
"finds that it is in the best interests of the child . . . ."  
MCL 722.27b(3). Under our court rules, the court must place  
its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record.  
MCR 3.210(D) and 2.517(A)(1).  
The Michigan statute does not include the most  
restrictive terms possible, but it need not do so to pass  
constitutional 
muster. 
Indeed, 
a 
statute 
may 
be  
6Unlike the Michigan grandparent visitation statute, the 
Washington statute never defined the factors to consider  
before a court could find that a visitation order is in the  
"best interests of the child."  
18  
 
constitutional even though it lacks provisions that meet  
constitutional requirements.  As long as it has terms not  
excluding such requirements, a court is justified in finding  
that constitutional requirements are embodied in the statute.  
Council of Organizations, 455 Mich 569, quoting 16 Am Jur 2d,  
Constitutional Law, § 225, p 659.  
Moreover, the grandparent visitation statute does not  
exist in a vacuum.  It is part of an extensive statutory  
scheme, the Child Custody Act of 1970,7 that guides the  
resolution of disputes regarding custody and visitation  
rights.  
The 
grandparent visitation statute cannot properly be  
interpreted without reference to applicable provisions of the  
Child Custody Act.  Cf. Arrowhead Dev Co v Livingston Co Rd  
Comm, 413 Mich 505, 516; 322 NW2d 702 (1982). Specifically,  
the 
grandparent 
visitation statute must be read in conjunction  
with MCL 722.23 and MCL 722.25, which contain the state's best  
interests standard.  
Of 
particular 
importance 
is 
MCL 
722.23(l), 
which 
requires  
that courts take into account any unnamed factor relevant to  
a dispute.  One such factor always present in grandparent  
visitation disputes must be the constitutional rights of the  
7MCL 722.21 et seq.  
19  
 
  
parents.8  
Additionally, MCL 722.25 works collectively with MCL  
722.23 to protect parents' constitutional rights.  MCL  
722.25(1) provides that  
[i]f a child custody dispute is between the  
parents, 
between 
agencies, 
or 
between 
third  
persons, the best interests of the child control. 
If the child custody dispute is between the parent 
or parents and an agency or a third person, the 
court shall presume that the best interests of the 
child are served by awarding custody to the parent 
or parents, unless the contrary is established by 
clear and convincing evidence.  
This 
analysis 
supports 
the 
conclusion 
that 
our  
grandparent 
visitation statute is drawn more narrowly than the  
statute at issue in Troxel. 
It also demonstrates that, in  
drafting the statute, our Legislature was concerned with  
protecting parents' fundamental interest in raising their  
children.  
Accordingly, 
when 
the 
Legislature 
enacted 
the 
grandparent  
visitation statute, it saw fit to explicitly require that  
trial courts give deference to a fit parent's decisions  
regarding grandparent visitation.  The majority's argument  
that the provisions requiring deference are inapplicable in  
the context of grandparent visitation are untenable.  The  
8See Winekoff v Pospisil, 384 Mich 260, 267-268; 181 NW2d  
897 (1970), quoting Lake Shore & M S R Co v Miller, 25 Mich 
274, 
291-292 
(1872)("[C]ourts are bound judicially to know and 
apply such laws and principles as part of the law of the 
land.").  
20  
 
  
Legislature resolved this issue by including grandparent  
visitation within the gamut of custody disputes.9  Therefore,  
because it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling  
governmental interest, the statute is constitutional.  
2. THE TRIAL COURT'S APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE  
Although I believe that the grandparent visitation  
statute is valid, the visitation order must be overturned  
because it unduly infringes Mrs. Seymour's constitutionally  
protected interest in raising her children.  The record  
indicates that the order far exceeded the discretion that the  
Legislature gave the trial court.  The basis for the order was  
the 
court's 
conclusion 
that 
"grandmothers 
are 
very 
important."  
This statement shows that the trial court's decision involved  
"nothing more than a simple disagreement between the [trial  
court and Theresa DeRose] concerning her children's best  
interests." 
Troxel, 530 US 72 (opinion of O'Connor, J.);  
9MCL 722.27(1) provides in pertinent part:  
If a child custody dispute has been submitted 
to the circuit court as an original action under 
this act or has arisen incidentally from another 
action in the circuit court or an order or judgment 
of the circuit court, for the best interests of the 
child the court may do 1 or more of the following:  
* * *  
(f) 
Upon 
petition 
consider 
the 
reasonable  
grandparenting 
time 
of 
maternal 
or 
paternal 
grandparents as provided in section 7b . . . .  
21  
Parham, 442 US 603.10  
Moreover, this case is less difficult than was Troxel.  
Here, Mrs. Seymour not only made a legitimate decision  
concerning her child, she demonstrated that she made the  
decision to protect the integrity of her family.  Had Mrs.  
DeRose 
been 
allowed 
to continue visitation with Mrs. Seymour’s  
daughter, she could have continued to tell the child that Mrs.  
Seymour’s ex-husband was not guilty of sexually abusing the  
child's sister.  The potential harm to both children is a  
legitimate concern.  
Mrs. 
DeRose 
has 
failed to demonstrate that Mrs. Seymour's  
10Compare this statement with those made by the trial 
court in Troxel:  
The burden is to show that it is in the best  
interest of the children to have some visitation  
and some quality time with their grandparents. I 
think in most situations a commonsensical approach 
[is that] it is normally in the best interest of 
the children to spend quality time with the  
grandparent, unless the grandparent, [sic] there 
are some issues or problems involved wherein the 
grandparents, their lifestyles are going to impact 
adversely upon the children. That certainly isn't 
the case here from what I can tell.  
* * *  
I look back on some personal experiences . . . 
. We always spent as kids a week with one set of 
grandparents and another set of grandparents, [and] 
it happened to work out in our family that [it] 
turned out to be an enjoyable experience. Maybe 
that can, in this family, if that is how it works 
out. [Troxel, 530 Us 69, 72.]  
22  
decision was not in the best interests of her children. The  
evidence demonstrated that Mrs. Seymour’s concern for the  
integrity of her family motivated her decision.  This concern  
is the basis of the liberty interest at stake in this case.  
See Caban v Mohammed, 441 US 380, 397; 99 S Ct 1760; 60 L Ed  
2d 297 (1979); Lehr v Robertson, 463 US 248, 260-261; 103 S Ct  
2985; 77 L Ed 2d 614 (1983); Michael H v Gerald D, 491 US 110,  
123; 109 S Ct 2333; 105 L Ed 2d 91 (1989).  Accordingly, I  
would hold that the visitation order is an unconstitutional  
abuse of the discretion granted it by the Michigan grandparent  
visitation statute.  
CONCLUSION  
Parents' fundamental right to control the upbringing of  
their children is protected by the Due Process Clause of the  
Fourteenth Amendment. The state may not interfere with this  
right unless the means of interference are narrowly tailored  
to serve a compelling governmental interest.  
It is beyond dispute that our grandparent visitation  
statute serves a compelling governmental interest.  It  
promotes 
the 
well-being of our children by allowing visitation  
between children and grandparents when visitation is in the  
best interests of the children.  Thus, the statute must be  
upheld if it is narrowly tailored to serve this interest.  
I believe that the Michigan grandparent visitation  
23  
statute is sufficiently narrow in scope to meet this standard.  
As opposed to the statute under scrutiny in Troxel, the  
Michigan statute allows only grandparents to petition our  
courts for nonparental visitation. Also, the only occasions  
when 
grandparents 
may be granted visitation against a parent's  
wishes are during the pendency of a child custody dispute or  
after the death of a natural parent.  
Moreover, the Child Custody Act is written to protect  
parents' fundamental interest in raising their children.  
Under it, grandparents obtain visitation only if they can  
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a parent's  
decision regarding visitation is not in the best interests of  
the children. Additionally, the act limits the discretion a  
court can exercise in determining the children's best  
interests. Therefore, it is narrowly tailored.  
However, the trial court's finding that grandmothers are  
important is insufficient to support the order issued in this  
case.  "[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to  
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make  
childrearing decisions simply because a state judge believes  
a 'better' decision could be made." Id. at 72-73.  
In this case, the trial court substituted its opinion  
concerning the value of grandparent visitation for that of  
Mrs. Seymour.  The trial court overrode Mrs. Seymour's  
24  
legitimate decision concerning the upbringing of her children  
without finding clear and convincing evidence on the basis of  
the 
best 
interest 
factors.  Consequently, the visitation order  
was an undue burden on the relationship between Mrs. Seymour  
and her daughters.  
In the end, I differ significantly with the majority in  
my interpretation of the grandparent visitation statute. In  
my opinion the majority has ignored the text of the Child  
Custody Act. It has chosen instead to follow the example of  
the Washington Supreme Court by needlessly illegitimizing our  
grandparent visitation statute.  Moreover, it has failed to  
provide the Legislature with guidance in drafting a statute  
that the Court could find constitutional.  
Because it is clear to me that the visitation order was  
unconstitutional, I would affirm the decision of the Court of  
Appeals to vacate it.  Troxel, 530 US 75. However, I would  
not find the grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional.  
I would find, merely, that the trial court's application of  
the statute was unconstitutional in this instance.  
Marilyn Kelly  
25