Case Title: Rhoads v. Sommer

Citation: 401 Md. 131

Docket Number: 127/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lori Denise Rhoads v. Fred S. Sommer, et al.
No. 127, September Term, 2006.
BANKRUPTCY - EFFECT OF DISCHARGE - STATUTORY ATTORNEY’S LIEN:
Statutory attorney’s lien survives bankruptcy discharge because
lien takes effect at commencement of attorney’s services before
client’s bankruptcy, and in rem claims remain intact after
bankruptcy 
discharge 
even 
though 
in 
personam 
claims 
are
extinguished.  Md. Code, Business Occupations and Professions, §
10-501; Md. Rule 2-652.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - STATUTORY ATTORNEY’S LIEN: The
provisions of Md. Rule 2-652 adequately provide for notice and an
opportunity to be heard and protect a client’s procedural due
process rights.
STATUTORY ATTORNEY’S LIEN - WAIVER: Attorney's right to statutory
attorney’s lien takes effect upon commencement of representation,
Md. Code, Business Occupations and Professions, § 10-501.  In
instant case, nothing in the language of the parties’ retainer
agreement can reasonably be interpreted to mean that attorney
waived his right to assert a statutory attorney’s lien.
In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 257439
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 127
September Term, 2006
Lori Denise Rhoads
v.
Fred S. Sommer, et al.
Bell, C.J.
Raker
        *Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan, M.
(Retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J. 
Filed:   August 27, 2007
*Cathell, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being recalled
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, he participated also in the decision and
adoption of this opinion.
1 All subsequent statutory references herein shall be to the Business Occupations &
Professions Article, Md. Code (1999, 2006 Cum. Supp.), unless otherwise indicated.
2 The facts of this case have been recited in several other opinions.  See Rhoads v.
F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2001); Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 286 F.Supp.2d 532 (D. Md.
(continued...)
Respondents Fred S. Sommer, an attorney, and Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, Pordy &
Ecker, P.A., his law firm, (collectively referred to in the singular as “Sommer”) filed a
complaint to enforce an attorney’s lien against Lori D. Rhoads, petitioner.  We granted
certiorari to consider three questions.  Rhoads v. Sommer, 396 Md. 524, 914 A.2d 768
(2007).  First, we consider whether respondents’ right to a statutory attorney’s lien, as set
forth in Md. Code (1999, 2006 Cum. Supp.), § 10-501 of the Business Occupations &
Professions Article, was waived by the language of the parties’ retainer agreement.1  We shall
hold that the retainer agreement did not waive respondents’ right to a statutory attorney’s lien
under § 10-501.  Second, we consider whether a § 10-501 attorney’s lien survives a
bankruptcy discharge even if no notice of the intent to claim a lien was given prior to the
bankruptcy.  We shall hold that the § 10-501 lien survives the bankruptcy discharge and that
Sommer properly gave notice of the lien under Maryland Rule 2-652.  Finally, we consider
whether petitioner’s constitutional due process rights were violated.  We shall hold that
petitioner did not suffer any due process violations.
I.
Rhoads, a financial analyst, began work for Standard Federal Savings Bank (SFSB)
in September of 1987.2  Rhoads was terminated from her position as Director of Financial
2(...continued)
2003); Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., No. CCB-94-1548, 2002 WL 31755427 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2002).
This opinion provides only those facts necessary for our consideration of the questions for
which certiorari was granted.
3 Rhoads was briefly represented by another attorney before retaining Sommer.
4 Rhoads sued the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in its capacity as
receiver for Standard Federal Savings Bank (SFSB) and Standard Federal Savings
Association (SFSA).
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Analysis at Standard Federal Savings Association (SFSA), the successor to SFSB, on
September 15, 1993.  In December 1993, Rhoads initiated a charge of discrimination with
the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Maryland
Commission on Human Rights, asserting that she was wrongfully discharged.
In January 1994, Rhoads retained Sommer3 to file an employment discrimination
lawsuit against her former employers, SFSB and its successor SFSA.4  Sommer filed a
federal suit on behalf of Rhoads alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000) (FMLA), the employment provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117, 12203 (2000) (ADA), the common-law duty to
provide a safe workplace, and the county human rights law arising from Rhoads’ exposure
to second-hand smoke in her workplace and her employer’s allegedly retaliatory termination
after she threatened to file an ADA discrimination claim.  See Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d
373, 377-79 (4th Cir. 2001).
In February 1997, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted
summary judgment to the former employer on nine of Rhoads’ ten claims including Rhoads’
5 These post-trial motions, including a motion for judgment as a matter of law or
alternatively for a new trial, were filed before Rhoads filed for bankruptcy.  The motions
were not decided until after Rhoads’ bankruptcy filing was discharged.
6 Fred S. Sommer represented Rhoads as a sole practitioner until June 1998, and
continued to represent Rhoads when he joined Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, Pordy, & Ecker,
P.A. until he withdrew from the case after the first trial.  Sommer’s law firm, a respondent
in this case, was not listed or referenced in Rhoads’ bankruptcy schedules because Sommer
was not associated with the firm at the time of the bankruptcy filing.
-3-
ADA claims — for failure to make reasonable accommodations, discriminatory termination,
and retaliation — as well as the state law claims.  See Rhoads v. FDIC, 956 F.Supp. 1239
(D.Md. 1997).  A jury subsequently found in the employer’s favor on the remaining FMLA
claim.  See Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d at 376.  Sommer filed various post-trial motions on
Rhoads’ behalf, including a motion for judgment as a matter of law or alternatively for a new
trial.5
On March 27, 1998, Rhoads filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  In
her bankruptcy schedules, Rhoads listed Fred S. Sommer, Esq. as a creditor holding an
unsecured nonpriority claim in the amount of $190,000 for legal services.6  Sommer was
individually identified as a creditor and was served with Rhoads’ petition, but he did not file
any response or other claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.  Rhoads also disclosed on her
petition’s statement of financial affairs that she was party to a “[c]ivil claim for damages,”
which had resulted in a “judgment for defendant 3/4/96, time for appeal has not expired.”
7 Rhoads’ motion to stay the district court case was formally granted on April 20,
1998. 
-4-
Any action on the civil case, however, was automatically stayed when Rhoads filed the
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.7  See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
After reviewing Rhoads’ petition, the bankruptcy trustee concluded there was “no
property available for distribution from the estate.”  Based on this conclusion, the trustee
filed a report of no distribution on May 8, 1998, releasing to Rhoads any interest she might
have in the stayed litigation.  On July 2, 1998, the bankruptcy court granted Rhoads a
discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2000).
From April to August 1998, Rhoads and Sommer exchanged several letters
concerning whether Sommer would continue to represent Rhoads.  The correspondence
began with Sommer asking whether Rhoads wanted him to file a reply brief or take some
other action on her behalf regarding her motion for judgment as a matter of law and her
motion for new trial, originally filed in March 1998 and now active again because the
bankruptcy trustee relinquished her claim.  Sommer stated that he was “willing to file a reply
brief on the motion for new trial (and if the motion is granted, try the case),” but that he was
“not willing to incorporate into the reply brief [Rhoads’] suggested revisions.”  In response,
Rhoads asserted that the reply brief should “include all relevant arguments available to us”
but that “it is preferable to have some response rather than no response at all.”  Thus,
Sommer filed the reply brief on May 27, 1998.  On August 12, 1998, the motions for
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judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial were denied.  See Rhoads v. F.D.I.C.,
257 F.3d at 376.
Sommer discussed with Rhoads an appeal of the district court judgment.  On August
14, 1998, Sommer wrote Rhoads that he was “willing to bring an appeal challenging the
special verdict form used” to try the FMLA claim, and, pending further research, “might also
be willing to challenge the district court’s summary judgment ruling” dismissing the ADA
claim and limiting the period of back pay.  Sommer stated that he was “not willing to raise
any other issues or arguments on appeal.” In addition, Sommer proposed that Rhoads “would
remain responsible for all unpaid fees and costs incurred to date and any future fees and
costs, pursuant to the terms of our original fee agreement.”  Rhoads responded that “[b]efore
being able to seriously consider your letter of today, I must know whether you intend to sent
[sic] the record straight on the malicious verbal and written attacks that have been perpetrated
against me by the Defense.”  Rhoads also questioned, inter alia, whether a new retainer
agreement would revive the debt that she believed had been discharged in bankruptcy.  In
response, Sommer stated that although he did “not intend to seek recovery from you of the
unpaid attorney’s fees and costs incurred prior to bankruptcy filing,” he still had “a statutory
lien for those fees and costs against any recovery you obtain in this case,” and that this lien
was not discharged in bankruptcy.  Disagreements between Sommer and Rhoads continued.
As a result, Sommer officially withdrew as Rhoads’ attorney, effective August 29, 1998.
On September 28, 1998, Sommer sent notice of his attorney’s lien to Rhoads and to
counsel for the FDIC.  Sommer stated that pursuant to § 10-501 and Md. Rule of Civil
8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court
in every respect except for its award of summary judgment on the ADA retaliation claim.
Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d at 394(4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 933, 122 S.Ct.
1309, 152 L.Ed.2d 219 (2002). 
9 According to Rhoads, Sommer refused to pursue the ADA retaliation claim on
appeal, while the FMLA arguments that Sommer advocated as grounds for appeal were
rejected as contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.  Sommer disputes Rhoads’
contentions, asserting that she prevailed by relying on theories and evidence that he
developed in discovery, pleadings, and trial.
-6-
Procedure 2-652, he “has a lien on any judgment, award, or settlement” Rhoads may receive
in connection with the instant litigation, Rhoads v. FDIC, Civil Action No. B-94-1548 (D.
Md. 1998).  Sommer asserted a right to “no less than (i) $159,729.74 or (ii) the amount of
any attorney’s fees awarded for legal services provided by Sommer prior to August 28,
1998.” 
On September 9, 1998, Rhoads filed notice that she was appealing the judgment of
the district court.  Rhoads proceeded with the appeal largely pro se.  On July 12, 2001, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court on one
issue, holding that Rhoads had presented evidence sufficient to preclude a grant of summary
judgment to the employer on Rhoads’ retaliation claim under the ADA.8  See Rhoads, 257
F.3d at 394.  The Fourth Circuit remanded the case for a new trial on that cause of action.9
Id.
Rhoads continued to represent herself during the second trial on her remaining
retaliation claim under the ADA.  In December 2002, more than four years after Sommer
withdrew as Rhoads’ attorney, a federal jury found that Rhoads proved “‘by a preponderance
-7-
of the evidence that the reasons given by the FDIC for her termination were false and that
retaliation for her protected conduct under the ADA was the true reason for that
termination.’”  Rhoads v. FDIC., 286 F.Supp.2d 532, 537 (D. Md. 2003) (quoting the Verdict
Form).  The jury awarded Rhoads damages of $120,006.  Id.
As a prevailing party in an ADA action, Rhoads then moved for an award of
attorney’s fees and costs.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000); see also Mammano v. Pittston Co.,
792 F.2d 1242, 1244 (4th Cir. 1986).  Rhoads requested a total award of $175,744.99, which
included fees and expenses for legal work performed by her first attorney, Sommer, and
herself.  In her memorandum in support of her claim for attorney’s fees, Rhoads cited
Sommer’s “statutory lien in the amount of $159,729.74” and stated that she had already paid
Sommer a total of $20,398.52.  Rhoads asserted that during the five years of Sommer’s
representation he billed “approximately 270 hours per year” and that “the number of hours
Sommer expended on this case was, in all regards, reasonable.”
In June 2003, Sommer moved to intervene for the limited purpose of being heard on
the fee issue.  Sommer asserted two interests in the lawsuit: (1) an interest in any attorney’s
fee awarded to Rhoads for his work; and (2) an interest in any final judgment entered by the
court, by virtue of the attorney’s lien.  See Rhoads, 286 F.Supp.2d at 544.  The FDIC
responded by opposing Sommer’s motion to intervene.
The federal district court denied Rhoads’ claim for fees and costs and denied
Sommer’s motion to intervene.  Rhoads v. FDIC, 286 F.Supp.2d at 543, 545.  The district
court agreed that Rhoads was a prevailing party, but considered several factors in
10 The district court noted that Sommer vehemently disputed Rhoads’ contention that
she alone raised the argument upon which the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s
summary judgment on her ADA retaliation claim.  Nevertheless, the court relied upon the
representations Rhoads made in the course of the litigation.
11 The court took “no position whatsoever on the merits of [Rhoads’] allegations,” but
stated that it had “no choice but to value [Sommer’s] work at zero for purposes of this
motion.”  Rhoads v. FDIC, 286 F.Supp.2d at 543.
-8-
determining whether an award of attorney’s fees should be granted to Rhoads for her former
counsel’s work in the case.  Id. at 543.
In its ruling, the federal district court first stated that any entitlement to attorney’s fees
belonged to Rhoads alone, rather than her attorney or former attorney.  Id. at 542.  The court
then considered whether Sommer performed services that contributed to Rhoads’ success in
the lawsuit.  Noting that Rhoads repeatedly asserted that her former counsel performed no
services that contributed to the ultimate success of the litigation, the court concluded that
Rhoads was not entitled to receive attorney’s fees for any work performed by her former
counsel.10  Id. at 542-43.  The court also concluded that since “the purpose of awarding
attorney’s fees is to enable plaintiffs to retain ‘competent counsel,’” it would be improper to
allow fees when Rhoads repeatedly characterized her former counsel as incompetent.11  Id.
at 543.
Even assuming that the district court were to allow fees, it pointed out that the fees
allowed would be very small because “the prevailing party is not entitled to fees incurred in
pursuing unsuccessful claims” and “[o]f the approximately ten original claims, only one was
ultimately successful.”  Id. at 541 n.7.  Thus, due to Sommer’s withdrawal “before Rhoads
-9-
prevailed at the Fourth Circuit and second trial,” Sommer “would need to establish that [his]
efforts, and not those of Rhoads or amicus, produced the final judgment in favor of Rhoads.”
Id.
Finally, the court analyzed whether the award of fees would be unjust.  The court
noted that, shortly after the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Rhoads filed a malpractice suit against Sommer in state court, praying for recovery of fees
paid to Sommer and dismissal of his lien.  Id. at 543.  The federal district court
acknowledged that if Rhoads’ malpractice suit against former counsel is successful, she could
potentially recoup all of the attorney’s fees she paid to Sommer.  Id.  Thus, Rhoads could
receive a windfall if she were to be awarded fees in both forums.  Id.
Furthermore, the court noted that Rhoads herself proffered that she owes nothing to
Sommer as a result of her bankruptcy discharge.  The court did not opine on the effect of the
bankruptcy court’s discharge on Sommer’s attorney’s lien, but acknowledge that it “would
be manifestly unjust to award her attorney’s fees to cover expenses that already have been
discharged.”  Id.  For all of those reasons, the federal district court denied Rhoads’ motion
for attorney fees and, given that, determined that Sommer’s interest in the fees was moot.
Id. at 543, 544.
Sommer also asserted, in his motion to intervene, an interest in any final judgment
entered by virtue of an attorney’s lien.  The court noted that Rhoads and her former counsel
did not state that their fee arrangement addressed entitlement to a statutory attorney’s lien.
The court noted that the interest to the attorney’s lien was in dispute, but concluded that it
-10-
did not have jurisdiction over an action to execute a statutory attorney’s lien.  Id. at 544.
Moreover, the court reasoned that its denial of fees would not impair or impede any interest
Sommer may have by way of the attorney’s lien.  Id.  Thus, the court denied Sommer’s
motion to intervene and made no holding regarding the statutory attorney’s lien.  Rhoads’
second appeal to the Fourth Circuit was unsuccessful and the district court’s judgment
became final.  See Rhoads v. FDIC, 286 F.Supp.2d at 545 (D. Md. 2003), aff'd, 94 Fed.
Appx. 187 (4th Cir. 2000).
On December 20, 2004, Sommer filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, seeking a declaration “that the attorney’s lien is valid and enforceable
against the” $120,006 judgment Rhoads obtained in the second federal district court trial, and
asking the court to “enforce the attorney’s lien against” that judgment.  Sommer claimed a
lien of $159,729.74, the same amount Sommer claimed when he gave notice to Rhoads and
the FDIC after he withdrew as counsel in 1998.  Along with the complaint, Sommer filed a
motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to ensure payment of his
fees from any FDIC payment made to satisfy the judgment in favor of Rhoads.  In response,
the Circuit Court ordered the FDIC to pay $40,000 of the $120,000 judgment into the court
registry.
Rhoads moved to dismiss Sommer’s lawsuit.  While that motion was pending,
Sommer moved for summary judgment.  After briefing and oral argument, the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County granted judgment in favor of Rhoads, treating her motion to dismiss
as one for summary judgment.  The Circuit Court noted that “generally an attorney’s lien is
-11-
perfected upon the commencement of the representation.  Therefore, such liens typically
would not be extinguished in bankruptcy.”  The court concluded, however, that a plain
reading of the retainer agreement led it to conclude that Sommer had waived his right to a
statutory lien in the event that he did not obtain a judgment in favor of his client.  The court
held that Sommer agreed to forego his statutory lien rights by agreeing that, if his
representation did not yield a judgment or settlement in Rhoads’ favor, she would not be
obligated to pay more than $500 per month toward the outstanding fee balance.  The court
noted that “in general [Sommer’s] position is the correct one,” and that “it is only because
of the wording of this particular agreement that the court has concluded that [Sommer]
waived his right to assert the lien and therefore, his claim was extinguished.”  Sommer filed
a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
On October 31, 2006, the Court of Special Appeals reversed.  Sommer v. Rhoads, 171
Md. App. 392, 910 A.2d 514 (2006).  The Court of Special Appeals reviewed the parties’
retainer agreement, Maryland attorney lien law, and bankruptcy law in its analysis.  The court
concluded that nothing in the retainer agreement could reasonably be interpreted to mean that
Sommer waived his right to assert a lien after a loss in the first trial and his later withdrawal
because no language in the agreement says or implies such a waiver.  Id. at 407-08, 910 A.2d
at 522-23.  The court held also that the lien took effect upon the commencement of Sommer’s
services, was not lost by Sommer’s failure to serve written notice under Md. Rule 2-652
before the bankruptcy petition, was not dependent on the viability of an in personam claim,
and was not extinguished in the bankruptcy despite the fact that Sommer did not file proof
-12-
of claim in bankruptcy.  Id. at 408-17, 910 A.2d at 523-29.  Furthermore, the court concluded
that Rhoads’ procedural due process rights were not violated.  Id. at 419-29, 910 A.2d at 530-
36.  Rhoads filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted.  Rhoads v. Sommer, 396
Md. 524, 914 A.2d 768 (2007).
II.
Rhoads and Sommer entered into a retainer agreement on January 31, 1994.  The
agreement provides for both a “guaranteed fee” and, in the event that Rhoads obtains a
judgment or settlement in her favor, a “contingent premium.”  The agreement states, in
pertinent part, as follows:
“Guaranteed Fee.  Client will pay Attorney $100 per hour as a
Guaranteed Fee for all hours worked.  This Guaranteed Fee is
payable regardless of whether a judgment or settlement is
obtained in Client’s favor.  Attorney will obtain authorization
from Client in any calendar month that he anticipates working
in excess of 10 hours.  Attorney has advised Client that, absent
settlement, he anticipates it is very likely that he will be required
to work in excess of 10 hours in many months.
“Contingent Premium.  In the event that Client obtains a
judgment or settlement in her favor, Client will pay Attorney a
Contingent Premium, in addition to the Guaranteed Fee, of
$100 per hour for all hours worked.  The Contingent Premium
shall not result in total fees (i.e., the Guaranteed Fee and the
Contingent Premium) exceeding 30 percent of the Total
Recovery.
“The Total Recovery is the total amount recovered by settlement
or judgment, including any amount recovered as interest,
attorney’s fees and punitive damages with respect to any claims
brought or asserted on behalf of Client, whether brought or
-13-
asserted separately or together, and whether brought or asserted
in a lawsuit, a charge with an administrative agency (including
Client’s pending EEOC and Department of Labor charges) or
informally.”
With respect to the payment of fees and costs, the Agreement provides:
“Monthly Payments.  Client will be billed monthly for all fees
and costs incurred.  Except for certain additional fee payments
set forth below, Client will be required to pay within 30 days of
the monthly bill:
“—Either the balance of the fees outstanding or $500 toward the
outstanding balance, whichever is less, plus
“—all costs advanced by Attorney
“In addition to the $500 monthly installment toward fees, Client
will also be required to pay on a monthly basis for all hours
worked in excess of 25 in a calendar month, provided that
Attorney has obtained authorization for Client from such
hours....
“Payment Upon Receipt Of Judgment Or Settlement
Proceeds Or Conclusion Of Case
“Attorney will be entitled to payment of all fees and costs owed
upon Client’s receipt of the proceeds of a judgment or
settlement upon the conclusion of any action brought by
Attorney upon Client’s behalf.  If there is no judgment or
settlement in favor of Client, Client will pay the outstanding
balance to Attorney in $500 monthly installments.
***
“Termination.  Attorney may withdraw his representation of
Client if Client fails to pay any amount owed when due.  In such
event, Client will remain responsible for all outstanding charges,
and such charges will become due and payable immediately, or
payable on a mutually acceptable payment schedule to include
interest at the prime rate.
-14-
“Attorney may withdraw his representation of Client for any
other reason, subject to any required court approval, and upon
reasonable notice.  In such event, Client will remain responsible
for all outstanding charges in accordance with the monthly
payment schedule set forth above.
“Client may terminate Attorney’s representation at any time for
any reason.  In the event that Client does so, Client will remain
responsible for all outstanding charges, and such charges will
become due and payable immediately, or payable on a mutually
acceptable payment schedule to include interest at the prime
rate.”
III.
Before this court, petitioner argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred by
reversing the trial court’s holding that the plain language of the retainer agreement precludes
preservation of an attorney’s lien.  Rhoads asserts that the language of the agreement limits
Sommer’s right to assert a lien under § 10-501 in the event of an unsuccessful conclusion to
the initial trial and, therefore, Sommer was limited to collecting the outstanding attorney’s
fees in $500 monthly installments from Rhoads in personam.  Rhoads argues also that the
Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that Sommer could assert an attorney’s lien after
Rhoads’ bankruptcy discharge and without pre-bankruptcy notice.  Finally, Rhoads contends
that application of the attorney’s lien statute is a violation of her Constitutional due process
rights.
Sommer responds that the parties’ retainer agreement is consistent with the attorney’s
lien statute, and that there was no waiver of his statutory lien.  Sommer asserts also that
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Rhoads’ discharge of her in personam debts does not affect Sommer’s attorney’s lien, which
is an in rem claim created at the time the action began.  Furthermore, Sommer asserts that
notice of the lien is not required before a bankruptcy case is filed because the lien was
already in existence and Md. Rule 2-652(b) governs only the enforcement or execution of
the lien.  Finally, Sommer contends that the attorney lien statute is constitutional and that its
application in this case does not violate Rhoads’ due process rights.
IV.
Whether summary judgment was entered properly is a question of law, which we
review de novo.  See River Walk v. Twigg, 396 Md. 527, 541, 914 A.2d 770, 778 (2007).
Maryland Rule 2-501 governs the entry of summary judgment and provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
“The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the
moving party if the motion and response show that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in
whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”
Md. Rule 2-501 (f).  We review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts against the
moving party.  Harford County v. Saks, 399 Md. 73, 82, 923 A.2d 1, 6, (2007).
V.
12 Attorney’s liens are categorized as either a retaining lien or a charging lien.  See
Ashman v. Schechter, 196 Md. 168, 173-74, 76 A.2d 139, 141-42 (1950) (noting that a
charging lien binds to a judgment recovered through the attorney’s efforts, whereas a
retaining lien is a general lien, dependent on possession, that gives an attorney the right to
retain all papers, securities and money belonging to his client which comes into his
possession until all his charges against his client are paid.).  Under Maryland common law,
attorneys do not have a charging lien, but a retaining lien is recognized.  See Md. Rule 2-
652(a); Tucker v. Dudley, 223 Md. 467, 472, 164 A.2d 891, 895 (1960).  The charging lien
has only been available in Maryland since 1985, when the General Assembly established a
statutory attorney’s lien.  See 1985 Md. Laws, ch. 723; Consolidated Construction v.
Simpson, 372 Md. 434, 460-61, 813 A.2d 260, 276 (2002).
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We first consider whether the language of the parties’ retainer agreement waived
Sommer’s right to a statutory attorney’s lien as set forth in Maryland Business Occupations
& Professions Article § 10-501.12  Section 10-501 provides, in pertinent part:
“(a) In general. — Subject to subsection (b) of this section, an
attorney at law has a lien on:
“(1) a cause of action or proceeding of a client of the attorney at
law from the time the cause of action arises or the proceeding
begins; and
“(2) a settlement, judgment, or award that a client receives as a
result of legal services that the attorney at law performs.
“(b) Limited fee agreement. — A lien under this section attaches
only if, and to the extent that, under a specific agreement
between an attorney at law and a client, the client owes the
attorney at law a fee or other compensation for legal services
that produced the settlement, judgment, or award . . . .
“(d) Execution. — An attorney at law may retain property
subject to a lien under this section and bring an action for
execution under the lien only in accordance with rules that the
Court of Appeals adopts.”
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To assert a lien under § 10-501, an attorney must follow the procedures set forth in Md. Rule
2-652 (b).  The rule states, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(b) Statutory lien.  An attorney who has a lien under Code,
Business Occupations and Professions Article, § 10-501, may
assert the lien by serving a written notice by certified mail or
personal delivery upon the client and upon each person against
whom the lien is to be enforced.  The notice shall claim the lien,
state the attorney’s interest in the action, proceeding, settlement,
judgment, or award, and inform the client or other person to
hold any money payable or property passing to the client
relating to the action, proceeding, settlement, judgment, or
award.
“(c) Adjudication of rights and lien disputes.  (1) When a
circuit court action has been filed.  If a lien asserted pursuant to
this Rule relates to an action that has been filed in a circuit court
of this State, on motion filed by the attorney, the attorney’s
client in the action, or any person who has received a notice
pursuant to section (b) of this Rule, the court shall adjudicate the
rights of the parties in relation to the lien, including the
attorney’s entitlement to a lien, any dispute as to the papers
subject to a lien under section (a) of this Rule, and the amount
of the attorney’s claim.
“(2) When no circuit court action has been filed. If a lien is
asserted pursuant to this Rule and a related action has not been
filed in a circuit court of this State, the attorney, the attorney’s
client, or any person who has received a notice pursuant to
section (b) of this Rule may file a complaint with a circuit court
to adjudicate the rights of the parties in relation to the lien,
including the attorney’s entitlement to a lien, any dispute as to
the papers subject to a lien under section (a) of this Rule, and the
amount of the attorney’s claim.”
Maryland’s statutory attorney’s lien takes effect upon the commencement of
representation.  § 10-501 (a) (“an attorney at law has a lien on: (1) a cause of action  . . . from
the time the cause of action arises or the proceeding begins”) (emphasis added).  There is
13 See Part VI for a further discussion of this issue.
-18-
no question that Sommer represented Rhoads in the federal district court proceeding.
Therefore, an inchoate statutory lien was effective from the time Sommer began his efforts
on behalf of Rhoads.13
Rhoads argues, however, that the language of the retainer agreement provides that
Sommer waived his right to assert a lien if Rhoads lost at the first trial.  Rhoads relies on the
following language:
“Attorney will be entitled to payment of all fees and costs owed
upon Client’s receipt of the proceeds of a judgment or
settlement upon the conclusion of any action brought by
Attorney upon Client’s behalf.  If there is no judgment or
settlement in favor of Client, Client will pay the outstanding
balance to Attorney in $500 monthly installments.”
Rhoads interprets “the conclusion of the action brought by the Attorney upon Client’s
behalf” to refer to the judgment entered in favor of the FDIC after the first district court trial.
Thus, Rhoads interprets this portion of the agreement to mean that Sommer did not have a
security interest, whether in the form of lien or otherwise, in what remained of Rhoads’ cause
of action because there was not a judgment or settlement in her favor at the conclusion of the
initial trial.  Therefore, Rhoads asserts, the agreement provides that Sommer was limited to
collecting the $500 monthly payments from Rhoads in personam.  Moreover, because the in
personam debt was discharged in bankruptcy, Rhoads argues that Sommer has no remaining
claim on the judgment in her favor.
14 The latter portion of this language is located in a paragraph in the retainer agreement
entitled, “Payment Upon Receipt Of Judgment Or Settlement Proceeds Or Conclusion Of
Case.”  The plain meaning of this heading also refers to the conclusion of the action as a
whole, not merely the initial trial.
-19-
We disagree with Rhoads’ reading of the retainer agreement.  As we have often stated,
Maryland adheres to the objective interpretation of contracts; because the agreement is clear
and unambiguous, we give effect to its plain meaning.  See, e.g., Cochran v. Norkunas, 398
Md. 1, 16-17, 919 A.2d 700, 709-710, (2007); Slice v. Carozza Properties, Inc., 215 Md.
357, 368, 137 A.2d 687, 693 (1958).  Nothing in the language of the agreement can
reasonably be interpreted to mean that Sommer waived his right to assert a lien if Rhoads did
not win at the first trial.  First, the agreement makes no mention of a waiver of the right to
assert a lien; in fact, it makes no mention of a lien at all.  We do not presume that the contract
intended to waive a statutory right when there is no waiver in the language of the agreement.
Furthermore, nothing in § 10-501 or Md. Rule 2-652 requires that a retainer agreement note
the right to an attorney’s lien, and such requirement will not be inferred.  Maryland’s
statutory attorney’s lien takes effect upon the commencement of representation regardless
of whether the right to an attorney’s lien is addressed in the parties’ retainer agreement. 
Second, the Party’s agreement at no point refers merely to the initial trial, or a
judgment or settlement from the initial trial.  Instead, the agreement consistently uses
language such as “in the event that Client obtains a judgment or settlement in her favor” and
“Client’s receipt of the proceeds of a judgment or settlement upon the conclusion of any
action brought by Attorney upon Client’s behalf.”14  (emphasis added).  The plain meaning
15 Rhoads’ judgment partially was a result of the legal services performed by Sommer,
as he filed the initial claims in the case.  The issue of how much Sommer’s work directly
contributed to the final judgment is not before us and therefore we do not address this issue.
-20-
of this language is that it refers to any judgment or settlement that results at the final
conclusion of the lawsuit that Sommer filed in district court on Rhoads’ behalf in 1994, not
merely the conclusion of the initial trial where judgment was entered in favor of the FDIC.
Indeed, the 1994 action was concluded in 2004 when Rhoads’ second appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was unsuccessful, not when Rhoads lost her
initial district court trial.  We note also that the language in the retainer agreement
corresponds with the language in § 10-501(a), which states that an attorney at law has a lien
on “a settlement, judgment, or award that a client receives as a result of legal services that
the attorney at law performs.”15  § 10-501 (a) (2).  The language of § 10-501 (a) (2) makes
clear that an attorney may claim a lien on legal services performed — at any time throughout
the action — so long as there is a judgment, settlement, or other award. 
Finally, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the Circuit Court relied
improperly on the clause regarding the $500 per month payment schedule.  The agreement
states, “[i]f there is no judgment or settlement in favor of Client, Client will pay the
outstanding balance to Attorney in $500 monthly installments.”  The Circuit Court
interpreted this language only in the context of the first trial and concluded that, because
judgment was entered initially for the FDIC, Rhoads’ was relieved of any obligation to pay
the entire sum outstanding in the event she obtained a judgment in her favor at some future
date upon a retrial.  We disagree for several reasons.
16 Sommer argues that Rhoads was obligated to pay all amounts she owed
immediately, without the $500 per month payment schedule, because Rhoads breached the
retainer agreement 1) by failing to make timely payments under the agreement, and 2)
because she filed bankruptcy.  These arguments were not grounds on which the Circuit Court
entered summary judgment, and we decline to consider them.  Sadler v. Dimensions, 378 Md.
509, 537 n.10, 836 A.2d 655, 671 n.10 (2003) (“Ordinarily, an appellate court should review
a grant of summary judgment only on the grounds relied upon by the trial court.” (quoting
Blades v. Woods, 338 Md. 475, 478, 659 A.2d 872, 873 (1995))); see also Md. Rule 2-501.
-21-
As we have noted, the judgment in favor of the FDIC at the district court was not the
conclusion of the action.  Because there was a judgment in Rhoads’ favor, this language is
not applicable.  In no way does this language expressly waive Sommer’s right to assert a lien
against the subsequent judgment in Rhoads’ favor.  The agreement provided specifically that
monthly payments of $500 were expected, and it is reasonable to structure a retainer
agreement such that a guaranteed and immediate stream of $500 payments is received if there
is not a settlement or judgment in the client’s favor.16  There is no inconsistency between
payment by installments over a period of time and holding a security for payments, i.e., a lien
against the cause of action.  Finally, although the Circuit Court reasoned that a monthly
payment schedule of $500 per month was inconsistent with the notion that the payment
would be secured by any judgment and, therefore, inferred a waiver, we conclude that there
is nothing in § 10-501 or Md. Rule 2-652 that precludes the filing of a lien where the retainer
agreement also provides for a monthly payment obligation.  We agree with the Court of
Special Appeals that Rule 2-652 allows the Circuit Court to direct that, for example, the
appropriate part of the amount owed under the judgment or settlement be paid into court or
an escrow account and held as security or paid to the attorney in monthly increments.
-22-
As we have noted previously, the attorney’s lien was created “to protect attorneys
from being cheated by their clients by preventing the clients from receiving the fruits of
recoveries without paying for the valuable services by which the recoveries were obtained.”
Consolidated Construction v. Simpson, 372 Md. 434, 461, 813 A.2d 260, 277 (2002)
(quoting Ashman v. Schechter, 196 Md. 168, 174, 76 A.2d 139, 142 (1950)).  Sommer
provided legal services that contributed to the judgment in Rhoads’ favor.  We hold that
Sommer has the right to assert an attorney’s lien on Rhoads’ judgment.
Our conclusion that Sommer may assert the lien, however, does not address the
question of what portion of the judgment resulted from Sommer’s legal services.  The
Maryland statute states clearly that an attorney may assert a lien from the time the action or
proceeding begins on a “judgment or award that a client receives as a result of legal services
that the attorney at law performs.” § 10-501 (emphasis added).  Sommer is entitled to assert
an attorney’s lien on the judgment, even though he was not representing the client at the time
of judgment, because he provided some legal services (e.g., filing the initial complaint, at a
minimum) that contributed to the judgment.  We leave the question of what portion of the
judgment was a result of legal services performed by Sommer to be addressed by the Circuit
Court upon remand.
VI.
Whether a § 10-501 attorney’s lien survives a bankruptcy discharge even if no notice
of the intent to claim a lien was given prior to the bankruptcy is a matter of first impression
17 We note that, as pointed out by the Court of Special Appeals, many courts
interpreting attorney’s liens have agreed that although the lien does not attach until after the
bankruptcy, once it does attach, it relates back and takes effect from the commencement of
the attorney’s services or the action.  See In re Pac. Far E. Line, Inc., 654 F.2d 664, 669 (9th
Cir.1981) (“Under California law, the lien takes effect from the date it was created; upon the
fund’s production, the lien attaches to the specific asset”); Hanna Paint Mfg. Co. v. Rodey,
Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, 298 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1962) (“The lien of an attorney
for services rendered in an action relates back to, and takes effect from, the time of the
commencement of the services; when it attaches to a judgment, it is superior to the claim of
a creditor in whose favor execution has been levied, or to a subsequent attachment,
garnishment, or trustee process”); In re Reinhardt, 81 B.R. 565, 569 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1987)
(attorney’s pre-bankruptcy charging lien related back to the date the services commenced,
(continued...)
-23-
before this court.  Rhoads argues that any debt owed to Sommer under the retainer agreement
and that could have been redeemed under a § 10-501 lien was discharged in bankruptcy
before any lien was claimed or created.  Sommer asserts that the lien came into existence at
the beginning of his representation, that notice is required only to assert the lien, and Rhoads’
bankruptcy had no effect on his ability to enforce an in rem lien.
We consider first when the lien is established and what notice is required, if any, to
establish the lien.  As we have noted, the plain language of § 10-501 states that “an attorney
at law has a lien on: (1) a cause of action or proceeding of a client of the attorney at law from
the time the cause of action arises or the proceeding begins . . .” (emphasis added).  Rhoads
asserts that this language creates only a right to assert a lien, as opposed to an actual
enforceable lien, and that § 10-501 requires an attorney to give notice under Rule 2-652 and
bring an action to establish the lien.  We disagree.
The plain language of § 10-501 establishes a lien from the inception of a cause of
action.17  Moreover, § 10-501 (d), entitled “Execution” states that an attorney may bring an
17(...continued)
and despite failure to give notice, and without explicit relation-back language, lien survived
bankruptcy discharge); In re Kleer-Span Truss Co., Inc., 76 B.R. 30, 31 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y.
1985) (relation back applied when statute provided: “From the commencement of the action,
. . . the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client’s cause of action, claim,
or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, [or] . . . decision, judgment or final order in his
client’s favor, and the proceeds thereof”); In re TLC of Lake Wales, Inc., 13 B.R. 593, 595
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (“Although the charging lien does not attach until after judgment
or recovery has been obtained, it relates back and takes effect from the date of the attorney's
first commencement of services”); In re E.C. Ernst, Inc., 4 B.R. 317, 320 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y.
1980) (“The lien relates back and takes effect from the time the attorney’s services were
commenced”).  These courts did not require that the statute or common law expressly use a
term like “relates back.” Rather they rested their decisions on their interpretation of the
statute or common law as to the effective date of the lien. See, e.g.,  In re Reinhardt, 81 B.R.
at 569 (noting lack of relation back language in North Dakota and Alaska attorney’s lien
statutes).
-24-
action under the lien only in accordance with the rules that the Court of Appeals adopts.
Under Md. Rule 2-652, “[a]n attorney who has a lien under [§ 10-501] may assert the lien
by serving a written notice by certified mail or personal delivery upon the client and upon
each person against whom the lien is to be enforced.” (emphasis added).  Rule 2-652
presumes that an attorney actually has a lien, as set forth in § 10-501, and that the attorney
merely is asserting the lien in accordance with this Court’s rules.  Nothing in Rule 2-652
requires an attorney to perfect the lien or lose the lien for failing to serve written notice
within a particular time or before a bankruptcy proceeding.  Indeed, the Rule presumes a lien
exists and provides for a method to enforce or assert the lien.  Thus, we hold that Sommer’s
lien was created before Rhoads filed her bankruptcy case, even though Sommer had not
18  We note that the lien could not have been asserted in accordance with Md. Rule 2-
652 prior to the bankruptcy because a final judgment had not yet been entered in Rhoads’
favor.  The distinction between whether Sommer actually had the lien, however, in the sense
that the lien had attached, or whether he had a right to a lien, is not our focus.  What is
material is that Maryland law intended that the attorney’s lien be effective at a time prior to
Rhoads’ bankruptcy.  Md. Rule 2-652 (b) does not affect the date the attorney’s lien was
created, as it concerns only the enforcement of an already existing lien.
19 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was concerned with a New
York attorney’s lien statute.  The New York statute stated as follows:
“Attorney’s lien in action, special or other proceeding.  From the
commencement of an action, special or other proceeding in any
court or before any state, municipal or federal department,
except a department of labor, or the service of an answer
containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party
has a lien upon his client’s cause of action, claim or
counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, determination,
decision, judgment or final order in his client’s favor, and the
proceeds thereof in whatever hands they may come; and the lien
cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties before
or after judgment, final order or determination.  The court upon
the petition of the client or attorney may determine and enforce
the lien.”
N.Y. Judiciary Law § 475 (McKinney 2005).
-25-
asserted the lien by providing notice in accordance with Rule 2-652 until after the bankruptcy
discharge.18
Before analyzing whether Sommer’s lien survived Rhoads’ bankruptcy discharge, we
consider whether the § 10-501 attorney’s lien is an in rem or an in personam claim.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has noted that “proceedings to enforce
such [attorney’s] lien[s] are considered as proceedings in rem and may be enforced only
against the proceeds of a judgment secured in the particular case.”19  Hoxsey v. Hoffpauir,
20 Many courts that have held that an attorney’s lien relates back and takes effect from
the commencement of the attorney’s services or the action, even though the lien does not
attach until after bankruptcy, acknowledge implicitly that the attorney’s lien is an in rem
claim.  See In re Pac. Far E. Line, Inc., 654 F.2d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 1981); Hanna Paint Mfg.
Co. v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, 298 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1962); In re
Albert, 206 B.R. 636, 640 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997); In re Reinhardt, 81 B.R. 565, 569 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1987); In re Kleer-Span Truss Co., Inc., 76 B.R. 30, 32 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1985); In
re Sea Catch, Inc., 36 B.R. 226, 233 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1983); In re TLC of Lake Wales, Inc.,
13 B.R. 593, 595 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981); In re E.C. Ernst, Inc., 4 B.R. 317, 320 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980).
-26-
180 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir. 1950), cert denied, 339 U.S. 953, 70 S.Ct. 841, 94 L.Ed. 1366.  We
agree.  An attorney’s lien under § 10-501(b) is an action in rem.  Although § 10-501(b)
recognizes the lien only “to the extent that, under a specific agreement between an attorney
at law and a client, the client owes the attorney at law a fee or other compensation for legal
services that produced the settlement, judgment, or award” this requirement does not change
the in rem nature of the claim.20
As Rhoads notes, a bankruptcy discharge releases the debtor from personal liability
for pre-petition debts.  Rhoads listed Sommer as a creditor holding an unsecured nonpriority
claim in the amount of $190,000 for legal services.  This in personam claim was discharged
after her bankruptcy filing.  The discharge did not affect Sommer’s in rem claim, however.
See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 2154, 115 L.Ed.2d 66
(1991) (holding that, in a case involving a mortgage on real property, a bankruptcy discharge
“extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim — namely, an action against the debtor
in personam — while leaving intact another — namely, an action against the debtor in
rem.”). 
-27-
In her bankruptcy filing, Rhoads acknowledged an asset that could potentially subject
her to an in rem claim, namely, that she was party to an active civil case.  The bankruptcy
trustee concluded there was no property available for distribution from the estate, and
released to Rhoads any interest she might have in the stayed litigation.  Because the trustee
relinquished the action back to Rhoads, the property became unaffected by the bankruptcy
and was available to debtors or creditors.  11 U.S.C. §§ 506(d), 522(c)(2) (2000); see
Hernandez v. Suburban Hosp., 319 Md. 226, 236-37, 572 A.2d 144 (1990)(“‘We instead
follow the majority of courts which hold that the Bankruptcy Code and its legislative history
plainly establish the better rule of law — that valid liens that have not been disallowed or
avoided survive the bankruptcy discharge of the underlying debt.’”) (quoting Estate of
Lellock v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 811 F.2d 186, 189 (3rd Cir. 1987); see also In re
Moody, 277 B.R. 858, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001) (“The effect of abandonment by a trustee
is to divest the bankruptcy estate of control over the abandoned property and revest title in
the debtor.  In doing so, the property becomes part of the debtor’s non-bankruptcy estate, just
as if no bankruptcy occurred.”(citations omitted)); Saltarelli & Steponovich v. Douglas, 40
Cal. App. 4th 1, 5, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 686 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1995) (“[T]he discharge of
an obligation to pay an attorney for prepetition legal services does not prevent the attorney
from enforcing a lien securing payment for those services unless the lien has been disallowed
or avoided during bankruptcy.”).
Rhoads argues that Sommer was notified that his claim for legal services was
classified as unsecured and that Sommer failed to file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy
-28-
proceeding.  Sommer did not contest the unsecured in personam debt and, as we have
discussed, he cannot recover it because it was discharged in bankruptcy.  Because the in rem
claim was abandoned and reverted to a status such that no bankruptcy had occurred, Sommer
was not obligated to file any proof of claim in the bankruptcy estate in order to make his
statutory attorney’s lien claim.  As a result, Sommer’s lien, an in rem claim on any judgment
or recovery in Rhoads’ civil action, survived Rhoads’ bankruptcy discharge of her in
personam debts even though notice of the lien under Md. Rule 2-652 was not provided until
after the bankruptcy.
VII.
We turn to whether petitioner’s constitutional due process rights were violated.  The
federal due process claim asserted here is based on the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution; the State claim derives from Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.  We have previously held that these two provisions “have the same meaning; and .
. . Supreme Court interpretations of the federal provision are authority for interpretation of
Article 24.”  Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 415-416, 474 A.2d
191, 203 (1984).
Rhoads asserts that a statute that creates a lien “without notice and opportunity for a
prior hearing” deprives the owner of her property without procedural due process.  Rhoads
argues that for § 10-501 to be constitutional, no lien can “exist” until the opposing party has
notice and an opportunity to be heard in opposition.  Sommer responds that the statute is
21 At oral argument, respondents argued, relying on Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978), that the attorney’s lien statute does not
constitute state action.  In Flagg, the Supreme Court held that a warehouseman’s proposed
sale of goods entrusted to him for storage, as permitted by the self-help provision of New
(continued...)
-29-
constitutional and that Rhoads did not suffer a violation of due process rights because (1) she
knew of the attorney’s lien several years before Sommer’s complaint was filed, (2) Rhoads
was not deprived of a substantial property interest, and (3) Md. Rule 2-652 provides both
notice and a mechanism to adjudicate the lien.
Although constitutional due process is not a technical concept, there are established
principles for analyzing whether the procedural protections demanded by a particular
situation are present.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47
L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).  The analysis focuses on the governmental and private interests that are
affected.  See id.  Specifically, it is well accepted that “identification of the specific dictates
of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”  Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903.  To invoke
protections of procedural due process, however, a party must show that state action has been
involved to deprive that party of a substantial interest in property.  Golden Sands Club v.
Waller, 313 Md. 484, 488 n.4, 545 A.2d 1332, 1334 n.4 (1988) (citations omitted).21
21(...continued)
York’s Uniform Commercial Code, was not an action attributable to the State of New York
and thus did not constitute state action.  Id. at 151-53, 98 S.Ct. At 1731-32.  Rhoads counter
argued that, similar to mechanics’ liens, attorney’s liens involve state action because they are
created, regulated and enforced by the State.  See Barry Properties v. Fick Bros., 277 Md.
15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976).  In their briefs to this Court, the parties did not address the state
action element of due process.  Because we hold that there was no substantial deprivation of
a property right and therefore that no due process violation occurred, we need not reach the
issue of whether the attorney’s lien constitutes state action. 
22 All references to the mechanics’ lien statute are to the mechanics’ lien statute in
effect at the time  Barry Properties v. Fick Bros., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976) was
decided.
-30-
We consider whether the imposition of an attorney’s lien statute deprived Rhoads of
a substantial property right.  In Barry Properties v. Fick Bros., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222
(1976), we held that Maryland’s mechanics’ lien statute22 was unconstitutional because it
allowed prejudgment seizures of a debtor’s property “without notice and opportunity for a
prior hearing.”  Id. at 19, 353 A.2d at 225.  Rhoads asserts that the attorney’s lien statute, like
the mechanics’ lien statute, creates a lien “without notice and opportunity for a prior
hearing.”  We disagree.
The mechanics’ lien in Barry was created as soon as work was performed or materials
were supplied, with no requirement of prior notice to the owner.  Under the statute, “a lien
is created and attaches to the property as soon as work is performed or materials are supplied,
and lasts until ‘the expiration of 180 days after the work has been finished or the materials
furnished, although no claim has been filed for them (with the clerk of the court).’”  Id. at 19,
353 A.2d at 225-26 (citations omitted).
23 The subcontractor was required to provide the owner with notice on an intent to
make a lien claim within 90 days of furnishing labor or materials, but such notice was not a
condition precedent to filing the claim.  Id. at 30, 353 A.2d at 231; see also Accrocco v. Fort
Wash. Lumber, 255 Md. 682, 684, 259 A.2d 60, 61 (1969).
-31-
In order to secure a mechanics’ lien, the statute provided that the contractor or
subcontractor must file a claim, within 180 days after the work is finished or the materials
furnished, containing specified information concerning the claim with the clerk of the circuit
court of the county where the property is located, at which time the lien was recorded on a
special “Mechanics’ Lien Docket.”  Id. at 20, 353 A.2d at 226.  Once filed with the clerk, the
lien subsisted for one year from the date of its filing, unless a proceeding to enforce the lien
was commenced, the validity of the lien was challenged or a bond was substituted for the
lien.  Id.  The statute allowed a subcontractor, even if the owner had no contract or contact
with the subcontractor and may not even have known that the subcontractor was working on
the property, to file his claim with the Clerk of the Court before providing the owner with
notice of intent to claim a lien.23  Id. at 30, 353 A.2d at 231; see also Accrocco v. Fort Wash.
Lumber, 255 Md. 682, 684, 259 A.2d 60, 61 (1969).
Because the mechanics’ lien made it extremely difficult for the owner to sell or
encumber his or her land — the lien constituted a cloud on the property owner’s title — this
Court concluded that the owner was deprived of a “significant property interest” when the
mechanics’ lien was imposed and, thus, the limitations of due process were applicable.  Id.
at 24, 353 A.2d at 228.  We reviewed Supreme Court precedents and concluded that, “lacking
extraordinary circumstances, statutory prejudgment creditor remedies which even
-32-
temporarily deprive a debtor of a significant property interest without notice and an
opportunity for a prior probable-cause-type hearing are . . . unconstitutional . . . .”  Id. at 30,
353 Md. A.2d at 231; see North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606,
95 S.Ct. 719, 722, 42 L.Ed.2d 751 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 614,
94 S.Ct. 1895, 1903-04, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97, 92
S.Ct. 1983, 2002-03, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 338-42, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 1821-23, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969).  Thus, we held that the
mechanics’ lien statute was unconstitutional because it permitted an owner to be deprived
of a significant property interest without notice or a prior hearing.  Barry, 277 Md. at 31, 353
A.2d at 232.
The attorney’s lien at issue in the case sub judice differs in several important ways
from the mechanics’ lien at issue in Barry.  At the outset, we note that the attorney’s lien
applies only to parties — the attorney and the client — who are in a contractual relationship
with each other, whereas in Barry the subcontractor did not have a contractual relationship
with the owner.  Barry, 277 Md. at 21, 353 A.2d at 226.  Additionally, the attorney’s lien
differs from the mechanics’ lien because, although the attorney’s lien commences upon the
start of representation, the attorney’s lien is inchoate until proceeds from a settlement,
judgment, or award exist to which the lien can attach.  In order to execute the lien, the
procedures set forth in Md. Rule 2-652 (b) must be followed.  § 10-501 (d).
The provisions of Md. Rule 2-652 (b) and (c) provide for notice and an opportunity
to be heard.  Importantly, the Rule requires that an attorney assert a lien by “serving a written
24 We note that the Rules Committee was aware of and considered due process
requirements before it recommended Md. Rule 2-652 to the Court of Appeals.  For example,
the minutes of the Rules Committee meeting on June 17, 1994 include a member stating that
the rule “includes appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard.” 
-33-
notice by certified mail or personal delivery upon the client and upon each person against
whom the lien is to be enforced.”  Md. Rule 2-652 (b).  Only after providing this notice is
the lien asserted and, thus, is the client potentially deprived of his or her right to the proceeds.
Prior to the attorney serving notice, the third party is free to pay any proceeds to the client
or any other person entitled to the proceeds.  Furthermore, the Rule provides an opportunity
to be heard because the client may immediately file an action in the “circuit court to
adjudicate the rights of the parties in relation to the lien, including the attorney’s entitlement
to a lien . . . and the amount of the attorney’s claim.”  Md. Rule 2-652 (c) (2).  If an
adjudication action is filed, the attorney may not seize or take possession of his or her portion
of the proceeds until after the adjudication of the dispute.  We conclude that the provisions
of Md. Rule 2-652 (b) and (c) adequately provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard
and protect the procedural due process rights of the client.24
Sommer complied with the requirements of Md. Rule 2-652 by serving notice of his
lien and Rhoads exercised her right under the Rule to adjudicate the lien.  The Rule protects
the dual interests of the creditor and the debtor in the property.  Rhoads did not have an
opportunity to be heard before notice of the lien was given, but upon notice she has the right
to adjudicate the claim before any money may be transferred.  These provisions do not allow
a deprivation of property without procedural due process; the procedural protections are
25 The retainer agreement defines the total recovery as “the total amount recovered by
settlement or judgment, including any amount recovered as interest, attorney’s fees and
punitive damages with respect to any claims brought or asserted on behalf of Client, whether
brought or asserted separately or together, and whether brought or asserted in a lawsuit, a
charge with an administrative agency (including Client’s pending Federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and Department of Labor charges) or informally.” 
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adequate for the demands of this particular situation.  See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35, 96
S.Ct. at 902-03.  We hold that Rhoads was not significantly deprived of property without
notice and that she has had an opportunity to be heard regarding the adjudication of her
claim.
Because we have held that there was no deprivation of a substantial property right
without notice or the opportunity to be heard, we need not analyze whether state action was
involved.  We hold that invocation of Maryland’s statutory attorney’s lien did not violate
Rhoad’s procedural due process rights.
VIII.
Based on our analysis of § 10-501 and Md. Rule 2-652, we hold that Sommer is
entitled to assert an attorney’s lien against Rhoads’ judgment.  Sommer’s lien, however, is
limited by the terms of the parties’ retainer agreement.  The retainer agreement specifically
states that Sommer may be entitled to a contingent premium if Rhoads obtains a judgment,
but that the “Contingent Premium shall not result in total fees (i.e. the Guaranteed Fee and
the Contingent Premium) exceeding 30 percent of the Total Recovery.”25  Thus, Sommer is
entitled to up to 30% of the $120,006 judgment obtained by Rhoads.  In Rhoads’ December
26 At oral argument before this Court, the parties confirmed this information.
27 Section 10-501 states that Sommer is to be compensated from the judgment that
Rhoads receives “as a result of legal services that the attorney at law performs.”  § 10-501
(a) (2).  We note that the trial court did not address the statutory requirement that Sommer’s
legal services must have contributed to the judgment.  Because it did not reach this question
in granting summary judgment, we will not address it in this appeal.  See PaineWebber v.
East, 363 Md. 408, 422, 768 A.2d 1029, 1036-37 (2001).
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3, 2001 Motion and Affidavit for Permission to Appeal In Forma Pauperis filed with the
Supreme Court, Rhoads acknowledged that she had already paid $35,000 to Sommer.26
Consequently, we note that Sommer has received almost all of the contingent premium he
may redeem.  On remand, the Circuit Court should resolve the accounting of costs, in
accordance with this opinion.27
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.
CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REMAND THE CASE TO THE
C I R C U I T  
C O U R T  
F O R
MONTGOMERY COUNTY FOR
F U R T H E R  
P R O C E E D I N G S .
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EVENLY
BETWEEN 
PETITIONER 
AND
RESPONDENTS.