Case Title: ANNETTE R. YATES v. CHARLES J. YATES

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
ANNETTE R. YATES v. CHARLES J. YATES1985 WY 79702 P.2d 1252Case Number: 84-226Decided: 07/01/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
ANNETTE R. YATES, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

CHARLES J. YATES, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 
William J. 
Flynn, Green River, for appellant.

Jere Ryckman, 
Green River, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an "Order Modifying Decree of Divorce." The order changed child custody and 
clarified and modified the original decree of divorce regarding alimony. 
According to appellant the issues are:

I

"Did the Trial Court deny 
the Appellant's right to due process when it decided the issue of her daughter's 
custody without giving the Appellant an opportunity to present relevant 
testimony regarding that issue?

II

"Did the Trial Court 
abuse its discretion when it changed the custody of Amy 
Yates?

III

"Did the Trial Court 
commit error when it modified those provisions of the original Decree of Divorce 
and the parties' property settlement regarding periodic monthly payments to the 
Appellant?"

We will 
affirm.

[¶2.]     The parties here were 
divorced in December, 1980. The divorce decree awarded appellant custody of the 
parties' three minor daughters, and awarded appellee visiting privileges. 
Appellant was awarded alimony in eighty monthly installments. The divorce decree 
recited that the parties had stipulated regarding a property settlement. The 
court approved such settlement.

[¶3.]     After the divorce the 
parties had a multitude of problems regarding visitation rights. A phenomenon 
rarely seen by a trial judge, if ever, is a post-divorce squabble where all the 
equities are on one side. This case is no exception.

[¶4.]     In February, 1983, 
appellee filed a petition to modify the divorce decree with respect to alimony 
and visitation. An amended petition to include changing the custody of Amy Yates 
was filed July 14, 1983, during the time Amy was visiting her father. On August 
23, 1983, the district court entered an ex parte order granting temporary 
custody of Amy Yates to appellee. A trial to the court on appellee's amended 
petition was had on June 21 and 22, 1984. The court entered an order on July 24, 
1984, awarding custody of Amy Yates to appellee, and modifying the alimony 
provisions of the divorce decree.

I

[¶5.]     The appellant complains 
on appeal, "The announcement of the judge's decision before the appellant had 
rested her case injected serious procedural error of constitutional dimensions 
into the case." The contention by appellant that the judge decided the case 
before she rested seems to be an afterthought, and perhaps did not occur to 
appellant until she filed her brief.

[¶6.]     True, appellant never 
recited the magic words, "Defendant rests"; however, it appears that everyone 
understood that all the testimony from both sides had been produced and all 
exhibits received in evidence before the judge talked to the minor children. In 
any event, appellant never indicated to the trial judge that she had any 
additional evidence to produce, nor has she told this court what additional 
evidence she wanted to produce. Appellant further complains that the judge told 
the minor children that he was going to let Amy stay with her father before he 
had finished his talk with the children.

[¶7.]     At the June 21-22, 
1984, trial, appellee called several witnesses to testify in support of his 
petition to modify the divorce decree. One of his witnesses was Amy Yates, who 
was cross-examined by appellant's attorney. Appellant called two expert 
witnesses and also testified on her own behalf. After the recross-examination of 
appellant, both appellant and appellee told the court that they had nothing 
further. The court then asked appellant a few questions. After this colloquy the 
record reveals the following:

"THE COURT: Does counsel 
have anything further?

"MR. RYCKMAN: No, Your 
Honor.

"MR. FLYNN: No, Your 
Honor.

"THE COURT: All right. I 
want to see those children. And I'd like to see counsel in chambers and we'll 
arrange a time. We stand adjourned. [Whereupon, court was adjourned at 5:30 
p.m., Thursday, June 21, 1984 * * *.]"

[¶8.]     The following 
afternoon, the judge talked to the three minor daughters of the parties in 
chambers. Only the judge, the three daughters, and the court reporter were 
present. During this in-chambers discussion with the children, the judge said 
that he was going to let Amy stay with her father.

[¶9.]     It should not come as a 
great surprise to counsel that sometimes a trial judge decides the outcome of a 
case before the last word of testimony goes into the record. It would be 
somewhat unusual, however, for the judge to reveal his decision before all the 
testimony is in the record. In the context of the trial judge's interview with 
the three minor children, an early indication of his custody determination was 
logical and was important to the main purpose of the interview, that is, 
preparing the minor children for the changes affecting their 
lives.

[¶10.]  The kindly trial judge had an informal, 
fatherly talk with the three girls. He assured them that both parents loved 
them. He explained to them the purposes of the trial, and tried to condition 
them to the fact that Amy would be living in Wyoming and the other two girls in California. The judge 
talked to them about Amy's visitation in California and Julie's and Molly's visitation in 
Wyoming. The 
judge tried to find out about problems the girls had with each other, with their 
parents and with their step-mother. The judge's final order modifying the decree 
of divorce reflected some of the problems expressed by the girls during the 
in-chambers interview.

[¶11.]  Appellant cites Tanner v. Tanner, Wyo., 482 P.2d 443 
(1971), in support of her first assignment of error. In Tanner the trial court 
modified custody without a hearing. In this case, however, a lengthy hearing was 
held, and appellant was not precluded in any way from producing what evidence 
she desired. Appellant's first assignment of error is without 
merit.

II

[¶12.]  In her second assignment of error 
appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it changed 
the custody of Amy Yates from appellant to appellee. The statutory authority for 
a judge to change the custody of minor children is § 20-2-113, W.S. 
1977:

"(a) * * * On the 
petition of either of the parents, the court may revise the decree concerning 
the care, custody and maintenance of the children as the circumstances of the 
parents and the benefit of the children requires."

In Ayling v. Ayling, Wyo., 
661 P.2d 1054, 1056 (1983), this court said:

"* * * [T]he party 
seeking to modify the child custody provisions of a divorce decree must show 
that there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the 
original decree warranting a modification of the child custody provisions. 
[Citations.] In ruling on the modification of the child custody provisions, the 
district court must strive to achieve a reasonable balance between the rights 
and affections of the parents, while giving paramount consideration to the 
welfare and needs of the children. [Citations.]

"The party moving to 
modify the child custody provisions of a divorce decree has the burden of 
showing that a change in circumstances has occurred, that the change warrants 
modification of the decree, and that the modification will be in the best 
interests of the children. [Citations.] In this respect, we will not interfere 
with the decision of the district court unless there is a procedural error or 
unless there is shown to be a clear abuse of discretion. 
[Citations.]"

[¶13.]  In Ayling we quoted with approval Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980), as follows:

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *"

[¶14.]  There are two other considerations 
applicable to the facts of this case. One, ordinarily there should not be a 
change in custody because of transient circumstances, and two, custodial 
preference by the affected child is a factor to be considered, but such 
preference is not conclusive. Douglas v. 
Sheffner, 79 Wyo. 172, 331 P.2d 840 
(1958).

[¶15.]  Here, some of the changes in 
circumstances since the original divorce decree are: 1) Appellee purchased the 
family home in Green River; 2) appellee married 
Anita Yates who loves and has a good relationship with Amy; 3) appellee 
experienced difficulty with appellant in visiting and communicating with Amy; 
and 4) Amy has been in three different schools. In addition to the identifiable 
changes in circumstances the trial court must also consider the effect these 
changes have had on the child. Here, there was evidence of more stability in 
Amy's life since living with her father. Although the Green River school is more 
difficult than the California school, Amy makes the honor roll. 
She is happy and exhibits more confidence, and the increased stability has 
contributed to increased self-esteem. Additionally, Amy has expressed a strong 
preference to living with her father, and is now back with former childhood 
friends.

[¶16.]  In a custody hearing a minor child will 
ordinarily favor the parent he or she lived with just before the hearing. In 
this case appellant suffered some disadvantage because Amy had lived with her 
father for almost a year before the change of custody hearing. Despite 
appellee's protestations to the contrary, we would be surprised if he did not 
try to ingratiate himself with Amy during the time just before the hearing. 
Ideally, a child should be in a neutral environment before he or she states a 
preference concerning custody.

[¶17.]  However, the trial judge has had long 
experience in custody matters and no doubt scrutinzed Amy's testimony carefully 
when she said her father had not tried to influence her, and when she expressed 
a desire to live with him. The preference of a child of sufficient age and 
maturity is a factor to be considered by a court in ascertaining what is in the 
child's best interests. In Tytler v. 
Tytler, 15 Wyo. 319, 338, 89 P. 1, 6 (1907), the court 
stated:

"* * * Such we think is 
the general rule; for, if the happiness and welfare of the infant is to be 
consulted, nothing could be more potent upon that question than the expression 
of its preference based upon kindness or unkindness, care or want of care, love 
and affection or want thereof, and, as to the surrounding conditions, either 
with one or the other."

"It appears to be the 
almost universal rule that at least when a child is of sufficient age, 
intelligence, and discretion to exercise an enlightened judgment as to its 
future welfare, based upon facts and not mere whims, its wishes are one factor 
which may be considered by the court in determining custody, in doubtful cases 
in any event, usually not because of any legal right in the child to have its 
wishes granted, but because the consideration of such wishes will aid the court 
in making a custodial decree which is for the best interests and welfare of the 
child. * * *" 4 A.L.R.3d 1396, 1402 Custody-Child's Wishes 
(1965).

[¶18.]  Courts in other jurisdictions have taken 
into consideration the wishes of children when determining custody. duPont v. duPont, 59 Del. 206, 216 A.2d 674 (1966); State ex rel. Waslie v. Waslie, 274 
Minn. 564, 143 N.W.2d 634 (1966); In re Marriage of Kramer, 177 Mont. 61, 580 P.2d 439 
(1978). In Kramer the court 
held:

"We are committed to the 
view that the welfare of the children is the paramount consideration in awarding 
custody. [Citations.] We believe the welfare of the children, particularly 
children of the ages involved here [the ages of the children involved were 11, 
13, and 15] is not being served if their wishes are not considered by the trial 
court." Id., 
at 444.

[¶19.]  The older a child becomes, greater weight 
should be given his preference; and as a child grows older, it is much more 
difficult to require him to remain in the custody of a parent he does not 
prefer. In addition, the preference which has a stated basis and is expressed in 
a plain manner should be accorded greater weight than one whose basis cannot be 
described. This is not to say that the preference of a minor child is 
controlling upon the court. See Douglas 
v. Sheffner, supra.

[¶20.]  In determining the weight to be given a 
child's preference several factors should be considered: the age of the child; 
the reason for the preference; the relative fitness of the preferred and 
non-preferred parent; the hostility, if any, of the child to the non-preferred 
parent; the preference of other siblings; and whether the child's preference has 
been tainted or influenced by one parent against the 
other.

[¶21.]  Although custodial preference is not 
conclusive, the court here was entitled to give more consideration to a 
fifteen-year old girl's preference than say, the preference of a six-year old 
child. Also, it should not be overlooked that Amy had stated a preference to 
live with her father as far back as the divorce in 1980, and had not changed 
that preference.

[¶22.]  The judge's finding that there had been a 
substantial change in circumstances is principally a factual determination. We 
accord great deference to a trial judge's factual determination. The judge 
hearing a modification petition is in a better position to determine the 
credibility of a witness and the value of the testimony. Stirrett v. Stirrett, 35 Wyo. 206, 248 P. 1 
(1926).

[¶23.]  With respect to substantial and material 
changes occurring after the divorce, we have said: 

"* * * `Substantial' and 
`material' are words of degree. An exercise of discretion is involved in 
applying them. If the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying these 
words to the matter before it, we cannot second guess its decision." Alying v. Alying, supra, at 
1057.

[¶24.]  The trial judge here could reasonably 
conclude that appellee should have primary custody of Amy, and under the 
circumstances of this case, the judge's determination did not exceed the bounds 
of reason. We hold that there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's 
determination.

[¶25.]  Appellant makes additional complaints not 
raised as issues. The order modifying the decree, paragraph 8, provides: "* * * 
neither party shall file any legal proceedings affecting the custody of any of 
said children while said child is visiting said parent. * * *" Appellant 
complains that the trial judge by the quoted provision in the decree is 
attempting to prohibit appellant from doing exactly what appellee did here, that 
is, petition for a change in custody when Amy was visiting him. Also appellant 
complains that the court entered an ex parte order August 23, 1983, awarding 
temporary custody of Amy to appellee.

[¶26.]  We sympathize with appellant, noting that 
her complaints are not totally without merit. However, these complaints were not 
raised as issues and no authority is cited in support of her contentions. We 
therefore decline to address these two matters.

III

[¶27.]  Since the original decree of divorce in 
December 1980, a problem developed between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of paragraph 13 in the decree of divorce. Succinctly, if the 
payments provided for in paragraph 13 are alimony, an income tax advantage 
inures to appellee. Conversely, if the payments are part of a property 
settlement, then an income tax advantage inures to 
appellant.

[¶28.]  Paragraph 13 in the decree of divorce 
provided:

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that due to Defendant's lack of a college education, lack 
of employable skills and medical condition, Plaintiff be, and he is hereby, 
ordered to pay to Defendant the sum of $300.00 per month alimony, beginning the 
15th day of December, 1980, and continuing on the 15th day of each and every 
month thereafter for a total of eighty (80) months. That should Plaintiff die 
prior to said alimony being paid in full, Plaintiff's estate, assignees and 
devisees shall be liable for the balance."

[¶29.]  The language in the decree is identical 
to the language contained in the parties' stipulation and agreement entered into 
before the decree of divorce. In his petition to modify the "Decree of Divorce," 
appellee asked the court to construe the above provision in the divorce decree 
to the effect that the payments provided for therein are alimony and not 
payments as part of a property settlement.

[¶30.]  In his petition appellee also asked for 
other and alternative relief with respect to the alimony provision in the decree 
of divorce. The court's "Order Modifying Decree of Divorce," paragraph 10 
provides:

"10. That Charles Yates 
shall continue to pay alimony according to the terms of the original Decree of 
Divorce except that the sentence `That should plaintiff die prior to said 
alimony being paid in full, Plaintiff's estate, assignees and devisees shall be 
liable for the balance.', shall be stricken from the Decree to more properly 
reflect the intent of said Decree that said payments are 
alimony.

"That paragraph #13 of 
said Decree concerning alimony shall be amended to properly reflect the intent 
of said paragraph that said payments are, and were, deductible by Charles Yates 
and taxable income to Annette Yates, as said payments were `alimony' and not 
part of a property settlement. * * *"

[¶31.]  In connection with the divorce 
proceedings a stipulation and agreement entered into by the parties purported to 
equitably divide the property interests of the parties. The list of property was 
long and detailed, but there is no indication that appellee received any 
advantage in the property division. As far as we can tell, there was no property 
going to appellee that required the payments by appellee to appellant to make 
the property disposition "just and equitable" as required by statute, § 
20-2-114, W.S. 1977. The payments termed alimony, agreed to by the parties and 
approved by the court, were ordered for the support of appellant due to her 
"lack of a college education, lack of employable skills, and medical condition." 
The reasons recited for making the payments provided for in paragraph 13 of the 
"Decree of Divorce" are consistent with the usual reasons for 
alimony.

[¶32.]  Paragraph 13 in the last sentence of the 
decree of divorce provided: "That should plaintiff (appellee) die prior to said 
alimony being paid in full, plaintiff's estate, assignees and devisees shall be 
liable for the balance." This last sentence is inconsistent with the payments 
being alimony. Warren v. Warren, Wyo., 
361 P.2d 525 (1961). However, there was testimony that this last sentence was 
put in the stipulation and agreement because of appellee's heart 
problem.

[¶33.]  In Warren v. Warren, supra, the decree of 
divorce provided that the wife be granted permanent alimony of $500 per month as 
long as she lived or until she remarried, and the alimony awarded was made a 
charge against the husband's estate. In the Warren case the 
husband received property equivalent to $750,000, while the wife received only 
$54,500. The court in Warren held that 
the portion of the decree awarding alimony was

"* * * somewhat ambiguous 
by phraseology which in some portions indicates that the court was awarding 
alimony and in others that a disposition of the property was being made. The 
court's use of the word `alimony' might in one aspect conceivably refer to 
support and maintenance, had it not been termed permanent and made a charge upon 
the husband's estate * * *." Id., at 527.

The court 
further stated:

"Alimony granted as 
support and maintenance terminates upon the death of either of the parties. 
[Citations.] This is not true, however, of payments which are themselves an 
integral part of the adjustment of property rights. [Citations.] * * 
*

"* * * In Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199, 
201, a distinction was made between alimony as such and payments which are 
termed alimony but in reality constitute a property settlement. * * 
*

"If the provision for the 
wife were to be construed as being alimony in the sense of support and 
maintenance and terminable upon the death of either of the parties, it would be 
inequitable. The disparity in the amounts of the property set over is too great 
* * *. On the other hand, if the provision is to be construed as a disposition 
of property or an adjustment of property rights, and if the alimony be permanent 
in a real sense, the amount which said wife could reasonably expect to receive 
would be such that, although not equal to that taken by the husband, it might 
well have been considered by the court in its discretion as being just and 
equitable.

"We think that a 
reasonable construction of the decree shows it to have been intended as a 
disposition of property or a property settlement * * *." Id., at 
527-528.

[¶34.]  The case before us is distinguishable 
from Warren v. Warren, supra. In 
Warren the 
husband received more than thirteen times the amount of property that the wife 
received. The court determined that it would be inequitable if the $500 per 
month were considered alimony, and therefore concluded that such payment was 
part of the property disposition.

[¶35.]  In the case before us, as in Warren, there is an ambiguous provision in the 
decree of divorce regarding alimony. Unlike Warren, the division of property here was 
nearly equal. At least, no one claims otherwise. The district judge determined 
that paragraph 13 in the decree of divorce provided for alimony and in the 
modification order deleted language originally in paragraph 13 that sounded in 
property settlement. The principles set out in Warren were not violated here by the trial 
judge because of a different factual circumstance.

[¶36.]  The trial court had authority to revise 
and alter the decree concerning alimony. Section 20-2-116, W.S. 1977. The court 
in the modification order clarified its intent regarding support payments. 
Considering the substantially equal division of the marriage property and the 
stated purpose of the "alimony" payments, we cannot say that the trial judge 
erred in his determination that the eighty monthly payments were indeed 
alimony.

[¶37.]  We affirm the district court order in all 
respects.