Case Title: Harkleroad v. Linkous

Citation: 

Docket Number: 092299

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
SHANNON HARKLEROAD, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 092299 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
January 13, 2011 
THEODORE K. LINKOUS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF BRISTOL 
Larry B. Kirksey, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
correctly determined that a co-tenant with an undivided one-
half interest in an improved parcel of real property had 
established the necessary elements to prove adverse possession 
as against the other co-tenants and, thus, was entitled to a 
judgment granting quiet title to the entire property in fee 
simple. 
BACKGROUND 
The parties do not dispute the relevant facts which 
reflect the chain of title to the property involved in this 
case.  That property, located within the City of Bristol, 
consists of three lots with a dwelling now collectively known 
as 1101 Vermont Avenue.  These facts were set out in cross-
complaints filed by the parties in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Bristol. 
In 1952, Pauline J. Smith and her husband, David H. 
Smith, by deed each acquired an undivided one-half interest in 
the property.  In 1976, David Smith by his will conveyed his 
undivided one-half interest in the property to Louise Hensley, 
his daughter, and Kathy Talley Poore, his granddaughter, 
subject to a life estate in favor of Pauline Smith.  In 1990, 
Louise Hensley died leaving her interest in the property to 
her children, Shannon Harkleroad and David Rhea.  In 2004 upon 
the death of David Rhea, his interest in the property passed 
to his widow, Connie Rhea.  As a result of these conveyances, 
Kathy Poore claims a 25% ownership interest in the property, 
Shannon Harkleroad claims a 12.5% ownership interest in the 
property, and Connie Rhea claims a 12.5% ownership interest in 
the property.  For clarity, we will hereafter refer to these 
parties as the “Appellants” with the understanding that they 
collectively claim an undivided one-half interest in the 
property. 
Pauline Smith occupied the dwelling on the property until 
1982, when by deed she conveyed her undivided one-half 
interest in the property to D.H. Frackelton.  The deed is 
silent as to her life estate interest but purports to convey 
the property to Frackelton “in fee simple forever.”  
Thereafter, apparently Frackelton did not pay certain income 
taxes.  In 1990 to satisfy its lien for these delinquent 
income taxes, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) sold 
Frackelton’s interest in the property at a public sale to 
Theodore K. Linkous and his wife, Mary H. Linkous.  By deed 
 
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dated March 21, 1991, the IRS conveyed “all right, title, and 
interest” of Frackelton to David and Mary Linkous (hereafter 
collectively “the Linkouses”).  The Linkouses then took 
possession of the property, made renovations to the dwelling, 
and rented the dwelling until sometime in 2007 when their 
ownership interest was questioned by prospective purchasers of 
the property. 
On November 25, 2008, the Linkouses filed an amended 
complaint in the circuit court against Appellants to quiet 
title to the property, asserting fee simple ownership on the 
grounds of adverse possession for the statutory period of 15 
years provided for by Code § 8.01-236.  Appellants filed a 
cross-complaint against the Linkouses in which they asserted 
that they were the joint owners of an undivided one-half 
interest in the property.  They sought an accounting for rents 
collected by the Linkouses and a partition of the property by 
sale. 
Although the two complaints were not formally 
consolidated, the circuit court conducted a joint ore tenus 
hearing on February 3, 2009, subsequently issuing a single 
opinion letter dated June 17, 2009, and entering concurrent 
decrees resolving both matters on August 18, 2009.  Additional 
facts relevant to the issue raised in this appeal were adduced 
 
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at the February 3, 2009 hearing, and are admirably recited in 
the circuit court’s opinion letter: 
At the time of purchase from the IRS, the subject 
property was in [a] severe state of decline and 
disrepair.  Thereafter, [the] Linkous[es] expended 
significant funds to repair, improve and maintain the 
property, greatly increasing its value to the present 
state.  In addition, [the] Linkous[es] leased the 
subject property to tenants who occupied the house 
continuously.  Rents were collected by [the] 
Linkous[es], and the property managed by them to the 
exclusion of anyone.  Real property taxes, delinquent 
as of the purchase date from [the] IRS, were paid by 
[the] Linkous[es] and kept current in payment 
thereafter by them.  No assertion of ownership was 
made by Hark[le]road, Rhea and [Poore] until being 
alerted of [the] Linkous[es]’ action herein which was 
necessitated as a result of a proposed sale and 
transfer by [the] Linkous[es] to other persons. 
 
The evidence further supported the circuit court’s 
finding that “[f]ollowing the sale by [the] IRS, [the] 
Linkous[es] awaited for others to claim ownership, and no one 
came forward to do so, despite its sale being widely 
publicized and the dominion by [the] Linkous[es] being plainly 
visible.”  However, during cross-examination, Theodore Linkous 
conceded that he had not performed a title search at the time 
he acquired his interest in the property in 1991. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, Appellants contended 
that the Linkouses had not established adverse possession for 
the statutory period of 15 years because their possession of 
the property did not become hostile until they were advised 
that the conveyances in their chain of title did not convey a 
 
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fee simple interest in the property and until they became 
aware of the Appellants’ claim to an undivided one-half 
ownership interest of the property.  Appellants maintained 
that possession of the property by the Linkouses without 
knowledge or notice that Appellants had a joint right to 
occupy the property could not be hostile to the ownership 
interests of Appellants.  Rather, they contended that one co-
tenant may not assert a hostile possession of the property 
unless the other co-tenants are ousted from the property, 
either in fact or by affirmative notice of the intent to 
exclude them. 
The circuit court rejected Appellants’ contentions.  
Quoting Grappo v. Blanks, 241 Va. 58, 62, 400 S.E.2d 168, 171 
(1991), the court noted that “[o]ne is in hostile possession 
if his possession is under a claim of right and adverse to the 
right of the true owner.  One’s possession is exclusive when 
it is not in common with others.  Possession is visible when 
it is so obvious that the true owner may be presumed to know 
about it.”  (Internal citations omitted.)  Applying this 
standard, the court concluded that the Linkouses had met their 
burden of proof to establish ownership of Appellants’ interest 
in the property by adverse possession.  Accordingly, the court 
granted the Linkouses title to the property in fee simple and 
 
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granted a judgment in their favor on Appellants’ complaint for 
an accounting of rents and partition by sale of the property. 
Appellants noted appeals in both cases and filed a 
consolidated petition for appeal.  Rule 5:17(g).  We awarded 
Appellants this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
“‘To establish title to real property by adverse 
possession, a claimant must prove actual, hostile, exclusive, 
visible, and continuous possession, under a claim of right, 
for the statutory period of 15 years.  A claimant has the 
burden of proving all the elements of adverse possession by 
clear and convincing evidence.’”  Helms v. Manspile, 277 Va. 
1, 7, 671 S.E.2d 127, 130 (2009) (quoting Grappo, 241 Va. at 
61, 400 S.E.2d at 170-71).  Appellants concede that the 
Linkouses were in actual, exclusive, visible, and continuous 
possession of the property since 1991.  Appellants contend, 
however, that the circuit court erred in finding that the 
Linkouses’ possession of the property was “hostile” for the 
period between 1991 and 2007 because the Linkouses were 
unaware that their title gave them only an undivided one-half 
interest in the property during that time.  Thus, Appellants 
contend that the Linkouses’ “claim of right” did not create a 
hostile possession as to Appellants’ interest in the property, 
because neither the Linkouses nor Appellants were on notice 
 
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that Appellants were being excluded from the property.  We 
disagree. 
Appellants are correct that when two parties acquire 
property as co-tenants, one co-tenant may not rely on adverse 
possession to obtain exclusive fee simple title to the 
property unless notice, actual or constructive, is given to 
the other co-tenant of the intent to oust, thus making the 
occupying co-tenant’s possession hostile.  See Leake v. 
Richardson, 199 Va. 967, 979, 103 S.E.2d 227, 236 (1958); 
Shenandoah National Bank v. Burner, 166 Va. 590, 593-594, 186 
S.E. 92, 93 (1936) Stonestreet v. Doyle, 75 Va. 356, 378-79 
(1881).  Indeed, there is a presumption against any occupancy 
of a co-tenant being hostile possession as to other co-tenants 
with whom he is in privity.  See Rutledge v. Rutledge, 204 Va. 
522, 529, 132 S.E.2d 469, 474 (1963); Sanford v. Sims, 192 Va. 
644, 651-52, 66 S.E.2d 495, 499 (1951) Braxton v. Phipps, 183 
Va. 771, 774, 33 S.E.2d 650, 651 (1945). 
However, this presumption does not apply when, as here, a 
stranger to the original co-tenancy takes possession of the 
property through a conveyance that on its face purports to 
give the new co-tenant the right to possess the whole property 
and he claims ownership of the whole.  Shenandoah National 
Bank, 166 Va. at 593, 186 S.E. at 93.  This is so because the 
stranger to the original co-tenancy is not in privity with the 
 
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other co-tenants and when he “enters into the exclusive 
possession of the land, claiming title to the whole, it is an 
ouster of the other co-tenants and the grantee so entering and 
claiming title may rely upon his adversary possession if 
continued [for] the statutory period.”  Id.; see also Preston 
v. Virginia Mining Co., 107 Va. 245, 248, 57 S.E. 651, 652 
(1907); Johnston v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., 96 Va. 158, 163, 
31 S.E. 85, 86-87 (1898). 
Contrary to Appellants’ contention, under the 
circumstances of this case it was not necessary for the 
Linkouses, as the parties claiming adverse possession, to 
discover the fact of Appellants’ co-tenancy and then give 
actual notice to Appellants of the Linkouses’ intent to 
possess the property exclusively.  Rather, the “intention to 
claim the land to the exclusion of the co-tenant may be shown 
by the acts of the claimant.”  Shenandoah National Bank, 166 
Va. at 594, 186 S.E. at 94.  Here, the acts of the Linkouses 
regarding their possession of the property to the exclusion of 
all others was so obvious that Appellants may be presumed to 
have known about it and, thus, had constructive notice of the 
Linkouses’ intent to oust them.  Moreover, we are of opinion 
that inherent in the doctrine of adverse possession is the 
concept that the law will not permit an owner to be so 
dilatory as to remain unaware of the exclusive use of his 
 
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property by a stranger claiming title for the statutory period 
of time.  That ignorance is not a defense to the occupier’s 
assertion of adverse possession. 
Next, we turn to an issue apparent from the undisputed 
facts, but not raised by the parties in the trial court or on 
appeal to this Court.  We address the issue, however, so that 
title to the property will be clear in the land records of the 
City of Bristol. 
Although Appellants in their complaint state that Pauline 
Smith is deceased, the record does not establish when she 
died.  In Rutledge, 204 Va. at 528, 132 S.E.2d at 473, we held 
that “the possession of a life tenant, or one acquiring [her] 
interest, is not adverse to the remainderman during the term 
of the life estate.”  Thus, in the present case it was 
necessary initially to resolve the continuing validity of 
Pauline Smith’s life estate in Appellants’ undivided one-half 
ownership interest in the property after 1982 in order 
completely to resolve the Linkouses’ adverse possession claim. 
As previously recited, in 1952 Pauline Smith owned an 
undivided one-half interest in the property.  Her husband, 
David Smith also owned an undivided one-half interest.  In 
1976, under David Smith’s will Pauline Smith acquired a life 
estate in David Smith’s interest.  In 1982, Pauline Smith 
conveyed by deed her undivided one-half interest to 
 
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Frackelton.  That deed was silent as to her intent with regard 
to a conveyance of her life estate.  In 1991, the Linkouses 
acquired by deed from the IRS Frackelton’s interest in the 
property that he had acquired by the deed from Pauline Smith.  
Thus, the question becomes whether Pauline Smith retained her 
life estate in 1982 or whether her life estate was conveyed by 
these deeds so that in 1991 the Linkouses held an undivided 
one-half interest in the property and a life estate in the 
Appellants’ interests in the property measured by the lifetime 
of Pauline Smith. 
In determining the effect of these deeds, we are guided 
by familiar principles.  “In construing deeds, the intent of 
the grantor should be ascertained through the words used in 
the conveyance, where possible.”  Vicars v. First Virginia 
Bank-Mountain Empire, 250 Va. 103, 106, 458 S.E.2d 293, 295 
(1995); see also Trailsend Land Co. v. Virginia Holding Corp., 
228 Va. 319, 325-26, 321 S.E.2d 667, 670 (1984).  “Where the 
terms of a deed are not ambiguous, [the Court] look[s] no 
further than the four corners of the instrument under review.”  
Vicars, 250 Va. at 106, 458 S.E.2d at 295 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
The 1982 deed from Pauline Smith to Frackelton is not 
ambiguous.  It purports to convey the entire property in fee 
simple.  However, it only conveys her undivided one-half 
 
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interest in the property which she had acquired in 1952.  It 
conveys that interest “in fee simple,” a term which is not 
applicable to a life estate because a life estate in property 
is not a fee interest in property.  Additionally, the deed 
does not contain the familiar terms “all right, title, and 
interest” which would include a life estate.  Accordingly, we 
are of opinion that Pauline Smith retained her life estate in 
1982 and, thus, neither Frackelton nor the Linkouses obtained 
that life estate by their deeds. 
Under these circumstances, Frackelton’s possession of the 
property from 1982 until 1991 was not adverse to Pauline 
Smith’s life estate interest in the property because their 
interests were in privity.  However, when the Linkouses 
acquired Frackelton’s interest in the property by the March 
21, 1991 deed from the IRS that privity was severed as to 
Pauline Smith’s life estate interest.  That severance of 
privity permitted the statutory period for adverse possession 
to begin to run against Pauline Smith’s life estate interest 
in 1991, when the Linkouses’ possession of the property was 
hostile to all ownership interests in the property.  
Therefore, regardless of the date of Pauline Smith’s death 
under these circumstances, the statutory period of 15 years 
necessary to establish adverse possession as to her life 
estate interest would have run by March 22, 2006. 
 
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At common law applicable in Virginia, an adverse 
possessor who occupies property for the statutory period 
acquires title against the life tenant but not as against the 
remainderman.  This is so because during the life tenancy the 
remainderman has no right to eject the adverse possessor.  See 
e.g., Matthews v. W. T. Freeman Co., 191 Va. 385, 398, 60 
S.E.2d 909, 915 (1950); Duggins v. Woodson, 117 Va. 299, 303-
04, 84 S.E. 652, 653 (1915); Layne v. Norris, 57 Va. (16 
Gratt.) 236, 241 (1861).  Thus, in the present case if Pauline 
Smith remained alive in 1991, the Linkouses’ adverse 
possession of the property at that time was only against her 
life estate, and not against the property interests of 
Appellants as remaindermen.  Moreover, the statutory period 
necessary for the Linkouses to obtain title as against the 
property interests of Appellants would only have begun to run 
upon the date of Pauline Smith’s death if that event occurred 
prior to the running of the statutory period otherwise 
necessary to extinguish her life estate.  Fitzgerald v. 
Fitzgerald, 194 Va. 925, 929, 76 S.E.2d 204, 207 (1953); 
Matthews, 191 Va. at 398, 60 S.E.2d at 915. 
As we already have noted above, the parties did not raise 
the issue of Pauline Smith’s life estate in the context of 
when the statutory period for adverse possession began to run 
as against Appellants’ interests in the property.  The 
 
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Linkouses had the burden to prove when their claim of adverse 
possession accrued and they asserted that this occurred in 
1991.  Appellants did not challenge that assertion but, 
rather, maintained that the Linkouses’ possession was not 
adverse because they were co-tenants.  Likewise, in briefing 
this appeal Appellants have not raised any issue concerning 
the failure of the record to establish the date of Pauline 
Smith’s death as relevant to when the statutory period for 
adverse possession by the Linkouses commenced as against 
Appellants’ interests in the property.  Rather, this issue was 
first raised by this Court sua sponte during oral argument.  
Accordingly, because Appellants did not raise this issue in 
the circuit court, Rule 5:25, or in their assignments of 
error, Rule 5:17, we are left to assume for purposes of our 
resolution of this appeal that the parties have agreed that 
the statutory period of 15 years under Code § 8.01-236 began 
to run against Appellants’ interests in the property when the 
Linkouses took exclusive possession of the property in 1991. 
The record in this case amply demonstrates that for more 
than fifteen years the Linkouses improved and maintained the 
property, paid the property taxes, and leased the property to 
tenants who were in open occupation thereon.  During this 
time, Appellants made no effort to ascertain the condition of 
the property, to take responsibility for its upkeep, assume 
 
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their share of the tax burden, or demand a proportionate share 
of the rents collected.  That they may have been unaware of 
their ownership rights is not relevant, since this lack of 
knowledge did not arise from any purposeful effort by the 
Linkouses to fraudulently keep them in ignorance.  Rather, 
their rights in the property arose through the normal 
operation of the law of real property, wills, and intestate 
succession, and could have been ascertained by them at any 
time through a minimal act of due diligence. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not 
err in ruling that the Linkouses had established by clear and 
convincing evidence all the necessary elements to obtain title 
to Appellants’ one-half interest in the property by adverse 
possession.  Accordingly, the decrees granting the Linkouses 
title in fee simple to the entire property and denying 
Appellants an accounting for rent and partition of the 
property by sale will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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