Case Title: Webster v. Hartman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89076

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89076-Agenda 15-January 2001.
ROBERT EUGENE WEBSTER, Appellant, v. EDWIN
HARTMAN, Appellee.
Opinion filed April 19, 2001.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiff, Robert Eugene Webster, filed a personal injury
action against defendant, Edwin Hartman, in the circuit court of
Sangamon County. Several years later, the circuit court granted
defendant's motion to enforce a settlement agreement against
plaintiff and dismissed plaintiff's cause of action with prejudice.
Plaintiff appealed. The appellate court affirmed the order of the
circuit court, holding that, absent a sufficient record on appeal, it
must presume that the order of the circuit court enforcing the
settlement agreement was in conformity with the law and had a
sufficient factual basis. 309 Ill. App. 3d 459, 460. The appellate
court also held that, regardless of where the burden of proof may
lie in the trial court, the burden of providing a sufficient record on
review always lies with the party who is claiming that the trial
court erred: in this case, the plaintiff. 309 Ill. App. 3d at 461. We
granted plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal and now affirm the
judgment of the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
	On February 10, 1994, plaintiff sued defendant for injuries he
allegedly sustained during an automobile collision at an
intersection in Springfield, Illinois, in February 1992. Litigation
ensued until 1998, when, according to the court docket, the "case
settled."
	Prior to settlement, the common law record indicates, the
parties repeatedly quarreled over discovery issues. During a three-
year period, defendant filed multiple motions to compel discovery
responses. On December 6, 1995, defendant filed a motion for
judgment resulting from plaintiff's failure to comply with a
discovery order entered by the trial court. Two weeks later,
plaintiff's attorney, with permission of court, withdrew as counsel
for plaintiff. Plaintiff's attorney withdrew because "[plaintiff] has
substantially failed to fulfill obligations to me and has made it
unreasonable [sic] difficult for my firm to represent him, in
particular, my client has failed to communicate and respond to
correspondence in a timely manner and has failed to follow
instructions and act upon affiant's advice." Approximately one
month later, a second attorney, Kevin Harris, entered his
appearance for plaintiff. Defendant withdrew his motion for
judgment. On December 2, 1996, Harris moved to withdraw as
counsel for plaintiff because "[p]laintiff's failure to assist counsel
by providing information imperative to his case precludes
counsel's effective representation." The court granted Harris'
motion to withdraw, and again, defendant filed a motion for
judgment on the basis that no attorney entered an appearance in
the action.
	On February 20, 1997, at the scheduled hearing on
defendant's motion for judgment, a third attorney represented
plaintiff. The common law record is void of information regarding
the proceedings at this hearing. Briefs by the parties indicate that
the motion was either withdrawn or continued for hearing and
never argued. Notwithstanding, plaintiff's lawsuit continued and
defendant filed supplemental interrogatories on April 14, 1997.
Plaintiff failed to answer these interrogatories and defendant,
again, moved to compel plaintiff to answer them.
	Prior to June 1997, plaintiff's second attorney, Harris,
returned as counsel for plaintiff. The date of his return is unclear
but not disputed by the parties. After June 1997, Harris appeared
on behalf of plaintiff at various court hearings, is listed as
plaintiff's counsel on various court documents, signed and filed
multiple court motions, and is listed as the recipient of discovery
served by defendant.
	The trial court initially set the case for a jury trial on
November 19, 1997. By agreement of both parties, the matter was
continued to January 12, 1998. On December 23, 1997, plaintiff
moved to continue the trial a second time. Harris appeared before
the court for a hearing on plaintiff's motion to continue. The trial
court entered a case management order specifying, in part, the
following schedule: (1) plaintiff to disclose opinion witnesses by
March 15, 1998; (2) all discovery to be concluded by September
15, 1998; and (3) cause set for docket call September 1998.
	After the close of discovery, on September 23, 1998, plaintiff
moved to amend the case management order to extend discovery
to January 1, 1999. Plaintiff claimed that his referral to five new
treating physicians warranted additional time to conduct discovery
and evidence depositions. Specifically, plaintiff sought to depose
Dr. Charles Aprill of the Magnolia Clinic in New Orleans,
Louisiana, and Dr. Stephen Pneda of the Memorial Medical Center
Pain Management Clinic in Springfield, Illinois. Defendant
responded with a motion to "set a trial date certain," a motion to
compel, and a motion to bar plaintiff's expert testimony.
Defendant argued that the case inactivity, the age of the case,
plaintiff's failure to seek the extension prior to the discovery cut-off, and plaintiff's continued failure to comply with discovery
warranted an order setting a trial date certain, as well as an order
barring plaintiff's experts. On October 6, 1998, the trial court
granted defendant's motion to "set a trial date certain," motion to
compel, and motion to bar expert testimony. The court further
denied plaintiff's motion to amend the case management order.
	On November 5, 1998, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider
the trial court's order denying his motion to amend the case
management order and extend discovery. In support of this
motion, plaintiff attached a copy of a report by Dr. Aprill. In this
report Dr. Aprill diagnosed plaintiff with "Tired Neck Syndrome."
Plaintiff argued that the trial court should reconsider its previous
order and extend expert discovery because this report contained
the "first definitive diagnosis" causally relating his symptoms to
the accident.
	The trial court docket states that five days later, on November
10, 1998, the "case settled." On November 13, 1998, defendant
filed a motion to enforce settlement stating: "[a]fter receiving the
court's ruling [the October 6, 1998, order barring plaintiff from
offering any opinion testimony] this matter was settled for
$10,000.00." Defendant sought to enforce settlement through the
court because plaintiff failed to execute and return dismissal and
release documents. On December 7, 1998, Harris and counsel for
defendant appeared in court for a hearing on defendant's pending
motion to enforce settlement. The Sangamon County docket entry
for this hearing states, "Present attorneys Koepke and Harris.
Cause called for hearing on defendant's motion to enforce
settlement. Motion allowed. Plaintiff's motion to reconsider
denied. Case dismissed with prejudice. Cause stricken."
	On January 5, 1999, plaintiff filed a timely pro se notice of
appeal on the basis that he did not agree to the settlement. The
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. 309 Ill.
App. 3d 459. The appellate court explained that it had no record
of the evidence presented at the hearing on defendant's motion to
enforce settlement and no basis for holding that the trial court's
finding-that settlement occurred-was against the manifest weight
of the evidence. 309 Ill. App. 3d at 460. The appellate court also
held that the defendant-appellee had no burden to ensure that a
complete record was filed in the reviewing court. 309 Ill. App. 3d
at 461. The appellate court denied the petition for rehearing and
this court allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS 
	Plaintiff first argues that the appellate court misapprehended
the sufficiency of the record on review. Both parties argue we
should review this issue under the manifest error standard of
review. Typically, the manifest error standard is appropriate to
review findings of fact made by a trial judge. People v. Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d 366, 384-85 (1998); Reese v. E.M. Melahn, 53 Ill. 2d 508, 512-13 (1973). In this instance, however, there is no record
to review the basis for the trial court's determination. The question
is a legal one-whether in the absence of a record the appellate
court correctly held that it must presume the trial court's holding
had a sufficient legal and factual basis. Accordingly, we review
such legal questions de novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388.
	This court has long held that in order to support a claim of
error on appeal the appellant has the burden to present a
sufficiently complete record. Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389,
391-92 (1984). In fact, "[f]rom the very nature of an appeal it is
evident that the court of review must have before it the record to
review in order to determine whether there was the error claimed
by the appellant." Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d  at 391. Where the issue on
appeal relates to the conduct of a hearing or proceeding, this issue
is not subject to review absent a report or record of the proceeding.
Instead, absent a record, "it [is] presumed that the order entered by
the trial court [is] in conformity with the law and had a sufficient
factual basis." Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d  at 392.
	In Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389 (1984), defendant's
motion to vacate judgment was denied by the trial court.
Defendant failed to present a complete record of the hearing on
review. Specifically, the record was devoid of a transcript or report
of the proceedings, a bystander's report, or an agreed statement of
facts (166 Ill. 2d Rs. 323(c), (d)). This court held that "[a]s there
[was] no transcript of the hearing on the motion to vacate here,
there is no basis for holding that the trial court abused discretion
in denying the motion." Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d  at 392.
	Similarly, in Skaggs v. Junis, 28 Ill. 2d 199 (1963), this court
rejected the argument that where the record lacks information of
evidence presented at a hearing, we must assume none was heard
and that the court's order, therefore, was improper. Instead, we
held that "it is presumed that the court heard adequate evidence to
support the decision that was rendered" unless the record indicates
otherwise. Skaggs, 28 Ill. 2d  at 201-02.
	In the instant case, the record contains no transcript of the
hearing on defendant's motion to enforce settlement, no report of
the proceedings, no bystander's report, and no agreed statements
of facts. 166 Ill. 2d Rs. 323(c), (d). Additionally, plaintiff never
filed a response to defendant's motion to enforce settlement or a
motion to reconsider the order granting that motion. As such, we
know only that on December 7, 1998, counsel for both parties
were present and that the "cause was called for hearing on
defendant's motion to enforce settlement." We do not know what
evidence or arguments were presented at that hearing. We do not
know the basis for the trial court's decision. We do know,
however, that the trial court granted defendant's motion.(1) Under
these circumstances, as correctly held by the appellate court, we
will presume that the trial court heard adequate evidence to
support its decision and that its order granting defendant's motion
to enforce settlement was in conformity with the law. Foutch, 99
Ill. 2d at 391-92; Skaggs, 28 Ill. 2d  at 201-02.
	Plaintiff urges this court to consider the statements in his pro
se notice of appeal in determining the sufficiency of the record on
review and as evidence that the trial court judgment was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. We decline to do so. Plaintiff
states in his notice of appeal that "no *** settlement was agreed to
by either the plaintiff or his attorney." A notice of appeal is filed
in the trial court after the trial court rules. 155 Ill. 2d R. 303. The
purpose of the notice of appeal is not to place new "evidence" into
the record. Its purpose is more limited-to preserve the right of
review. Regardless of the veracity of statements contained in a
notice of appeal, these statements are not usable as evidence. To
consider a notice of appeal as evidence a court of review would
make credibility determinations to assess its trustworthiness and
accuracy. This outcome directly conflicts with well-established
precedent of this court. The trial court "as the trier of fact *** in
a position superior to a court of review" makes determinations
based on the evidence and weighs the credibility of participants to
the litigation. Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 37 Ill. 2d 352, 356
(1967).
	Plaintiff also requests this court consider evidence regarding
the January 24, 2000, disbarment of his attorney, Harris, for
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,
as evidence that plaintiff did not give Harris authority to settle.
Essentially, plaintiff argues that because Harris engaged in
wrongful conduct in other litigation, his conduct must have been
deceitful or fraudulent when he represented plaintiff. We cannot
make such an assumption. This court will not reverse a trial
court's decision on the basis of speculation and conjecture. Harris
was disbarred for conduct unrelated to this litigation and
subsequent to the December 7, 1998, hearing on defendant's
motion to enforce settlement. This information was not available
to the trial judge when he made his determination, as the
disbarment occurred one year after the trial court granted
defendant's motion to enforce settlement.
	Plaintiff cites People v. McDuffee, 187 Ill. 2d 481 (1999), as
support for the proposition that defendant's burden in the trial
court to establish the opposing counsel's authority to settle extends
to the appeal. Specifically, plaintiff argues that it is defendant's
burden to provide a sufficient record on appeal to show that Harris
had authority to settle.
	Plaintiff incorrectly relies on McDuffee to support this
proposition. In McDuffee a defendant filed a motion for
substitution of judge seven days after his first appearance in court.
The State opposed the motion as untimely, arguing that the
defendant learned the identity of the judge 22 days before he filed
his motion to substitute judge by receipt of a mailed trial docket.
The record on appeal did not contain the trial docket letter
allegedly mailed to the defendant. The trial court denied the
defendant's motion as untimely, and the decision was affirmed on
appeal. We reversed the appellate court and held that absent
evidence in the record to show the defendant had knowledge of the
trial judge before his first appearance, his motion to substitute
seven days after his first appearance was within the statutorily
required 10-day period. McDuffee, 187 Ill. 2d  at 491.
	McDuffee is inapposite because it does not address extending
a party's trial court burden to the appellate stage. Rather, it stands
for the proposition that a reviewing court cannot look beyond the
record and speculate on what may have occurred in the trial court.
A court of review is limited to the record before it. In McDuffee,
there was no evidence in the record that a trial docket letter existed
or was ever mailed. This court refused to speculate and find that
the defendant had knowledge of the judge's identity 22 days
before he filed his motion to substitute. Instead, based on the
record one could only discern that defendant first learned the
judge's identity when he appeared seven days before he filed his
motion. Likewise, this court will not look beyond the record on
appeal to find that plaintiff's attorney lacked his authority to settle.
There must be evidence in the record that his attorney, Harris,
lacked authority.
	The defendant's burden of proof in the trial court is not at
issue. On appeal it is always the appellant's burden to provide the
court of review with a sufficient record in order to establish error.
Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d  at 391-92. Plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden.
	In light of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to address
plaintiff's additional contention. The judgment of the appellate
court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
 
1.      1In order to grant a motion to enforce an out-of-court settlement, this
court has long held that counsel must possess express consent or
authorization to compromise or settle a case. Danziger v. Pittsfield Shoe
Co., 204 Ill. 145, 149 (1903). The trial court does not presume authority
to settle; rather, the burden rests with the party alleging authority to
show that fact. Danziger, 204 Ill.  at 149.