Case Title: Lee v. City of Norfolk

Citation: 

Docket Number: 092385

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Carrico and Koontz, S.JJ.* 
 
JOSEPH C. LEE  
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
v.   Record No. 092385 
 
 
      
March 4, 2011 
 
CITY OF NORFOLK 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Junius P. Fulton, III, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we review the circuit court’s dismissal, 
upon demurrer and pleas in bar, of a property owner’s claims 
for compensation and damages following the demolition of a 
residential building by the City of Norfolk. 
FACTS 
 
The circuit court dismissed the case below on demurrer and 
pleas in bar without taking evidence.  “Where no evidence is 
taken in support of a plea in bar, the trial court, and the 
appellate court upon review, consider solely the pleadings in 
resolving the issue presented.”  Lostrangio v. Laingford, 261 
Va. 495, 497, 544 S.E.2d 357, 358 (2001).  The facts as stated 
in the plaintiff’s pleadings are taken as true for the purpose 
of resolving the special plea. Id. 
 
Joseph C. Lee (“Lee”) owned a duplex (“the building”) in 
Norfolk.  On June 2, 2006, the City of Norfolk (“the City”) 
                     
* Justice Koontz presided and participated in the hearing 
and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 1, 2011; Justice Kinser was sworn in as 
Chief Justice on February 1, 2011. 
issued a building permit to Lee to repair damage caused by an 
accidental fire.  On August 25, 2006, the permit was revised to 
include authorization for elevation of the building out of a 
floodplain to prevent water intrusion. 
 
On or about September 5, 2006, while repairs were ongoing, 
the City’s Occupancy Inspector inspected the building.  
According to the City, Lee’s duplex was observed with most of 
the roof missing, an unsecured roof gable, shattered brickwork 
(some of which was falling off), glass windows pulled loose 
from their frames, rotten portions along the base of certain 
walls, some walls raised off the foundation with improperly 
used jacks, dangling electric wires at the point where the 
service was connected to the house, and piles of dangerous 
debris strewn about. 
 
The next day, Lee received a telephone call from a City 
employee who informed him that his building permits had been 
revoked because he had exceeded the “50 percent rule.”  This 
rule limits repairs to non-conforming structures, such as Lee’s 
duplex, to 50% of the value of the structure.  Lee never was 
informed in writing that his permits had been revoked. 
 
On September 20, 2006, Lee received a letter by certified 
mail, dated September 12, 2006, from James A. Rogers 
(“Rogers”), the Acting Chief of the Division of Neighborhood 
 
2
Preservation for the City.  The letter informed Lee that the 
building  
was inspected and found to be open providing a 
haven for undesirable & criminal activities.  
THE STRUCTURE HAS BEEN RENDERED UNSAFE BY 
ATTEMPTED REPAIRS.  The property is in violation 
of health and safety regulations of Section 
130.0 of the Virginia Uniform Statewide Building 
Code (USBC) and Article I, Chapter 27, Section 
27-8 of the Code of the City of Norfolk.  
Therefore it has been declared UNSAFE AND A 
PUBLIC NUISANCE. 
 
Rogers directed Lee to board and secure the property by 
September 20 and to have the building demolished by September 
27.  Rogers then stated: “If there are sound reasons why this 
limit cannot be met, or you are not in agreement with the 
interpretation or application of the code, you must contact me 
immediately.”  Later in the letter, Rogers outlined Lee’s right 
of appeal:  
Any owner who is aggrieved by the Code 
Official’s decision concerning the application 
of the USBC or refusal to grant modification to 
the provisions of the USBC may appeal that 
decision pursuant to Section 106.5 of the USBC.  
The appeal must be filed with the appropriate 
authority in writing, with a filing fee within 
twenty-one (21) days of this notice. 
 
 
Lee promptly retained counsel.  One week later, on 
September 27, Lee and his attorney met with the Assistant City 
Attorney and several other City employees to discuss the issues 
raised in the September 12 letter.  At the meeting, Lee agreed 
to make certain changes requested by the City to alleviate the 
 
3
safety concerns.  The record does not indicate any questions or 
discussions by Lee or his attorney at this meeting or 
subsequently regarding his right to appeal the public nuisance 
finding or the demolition directive.  
 
Following the September 27 meeting, Lee made some efforts 
to comply with the City’s requirements.  However, the City 
deemed them to be unsatisfactory.  Lee also hired a structural 
engineer to evaluate the building, who filed a report with the 
City on November 10, 2006.  The report concluded that the 
building was not in danger of immediate collapse and 
recommended the reissuance of the permits.  The City requested 
additional information from Lee’s engineer, who declined to 
provide it or work further on the matter.  Lee then hired a 
second engineer, who provided some but not all requested 
information to the City six weeks after the initial engineer’s 
report, on December 21, 2006. 
 
However, on December 19, 2006, Rogers had mailed another 
letter to Lee.  In it, Rogers reiterated the deficiencies in 
Lee’s proposed engineering plan and informed Lee that “[t]he 
extensions to date have expired, and no further extensions will 
be granted.  The City of Norfolk will be demolishing the 
structure under the emergency provisions of the Uniform 
Statewide Building Code.”  He explained that “[t]his action is 
a continuum of the certified letter to you dated September 12, 
 
4
2006, declaring the structure UNSAFE AND A PUBLIC NUISANCE.”  
The City demolished the building 17 days later, 107 days after 
Lee received the initial letter that gave notice it was a 
public nuisance, directed the demolition, and outlined the 
right of appeal. 
During those 107 days, Lee did not file an appeal.  The 
record does not reflect any inquiries or other communications 
from him or his attorney regarding his right to do so.  
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
Lee filed suit against the City in the Circuit Court of 
the City of Norfolk.  His complaint consisted of three counts.  
First, he claimed deprivation of his federal due process rights 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006 & Supp. I 2007).  Second, he 
brought a state claim for violation of his due process rights 
under Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, 
alleging that the City had taken his property for public use 
without just compensation by inverse condemnation.  Third, he 
brought a common law claim sounding in tort for property 
damages. 
 
The City demurred to count one and filed pleas in bar to 
counts two and three.  In its demurrer, the City argued that 
“the availability of the inverse condemnation procedure, per 
se, provide[d] Lee with due process of law in satisfaction of 
the U.S. Constitution.”  In its pleas in bar, the City argued 
 
5
that Lee did not have a viable inverse condemnation claim 
because he never appealed the City’s determination that the 
property was a nuisance.  On count three, the City argued that 
Lee did not give timely notice to the City as required by Code 
§ 15.2-209.  It further argued that, under the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, the City is immune from liability for all 
acts or omissions made by City personnel engaged in the 
governmental function.  The circuit court sustained the 
demurrer to count one with leave to amend, and deferred 
judgment on the inverse condemnation and property damage counts 
so the record could be more fully developed. 
 
The court’s order also stated that “[t]he demurrer is 
sustained with respect to . . . count two of the Complaint.”  
Since the Court in the same ruling deferred a ruling on the 
inverse condemnation claim in count two, apparently the court 
interpreted count two as including a distinct state due process 
claim in addition to the inverse condemnation claim and 
therefore sustained the demurrer as to both federal and state 
due process claims based on the availability of the inverse 
condemnation remedy. 
Lee subsequently filed an amended complaint, alleging 
federal claims in count one that the City violated 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, and his “constitutionally guaranteed property and civil 
rights.”  He stated that the City’s conduct violated both due 
 
6
process and equal protection guarantees: it was “arbitrary, 
unreasonable, irrational, and without legitimate basis or 
purpose” and it “intentionally regulated and treated the 
subject property differently from other similarly-situated 
properties . . . without legitimate reason or rational basis.”  
Specifically, he pointed to his active negotiations with the 
City and the engineering reports that concluded the property 
was not in danger of collapse. 
In his amended complaint, Lee alleged numerous defects 
with the notice provided by the September 12, 2006 letter, as 
follows: the letter cited a provision of law that did not exist 
and omitted required elements of proper notice; the letter or a 
similar notice was not sent to the lienholder on the property 
and the City did not publish notice in a newspaper of general 
circulation once a week for two consecutive weeks, both as 
required by Code § 15.2-906; and the letter did not contain a 
statement requiring the person receiving it to accept or reject 
the terms of the notice as is required by § 118.3 of the 
Virginia Construction Code. 
 
Lee did not modify his claims for inverse condemnation or 
property damage, except to include the Constitution of the 
United States as additional authority for his inverse 
condemnation claim.  The City again filed a demurrer and pleas 
in bar relying on the same grounds as previously.  However, the 
 
7
demurrer now stated that it was encompassing the due process 
and equal protection claims. 
The circuit court, from the bench, sustained the demurrer 
as to the equal protection claim with leave to amend.  Later, 
the court issued a letter opinion sustaining the demurrer to 
the due process claims without leave to amend.  In the letter, 
the court stated that Lee “cannot, as a matter of law make a 
case for due process deprivation while he is entitled to 
postdeprivation relief under his Count II claim for relief for 
inverse condemnation.” 
Lee then filed a second amended complaint consisting of a 
renewed equal protection claim, as well as restating the 
existing claims for inverse condemnation and property damage.  
It also continued to include federal and state due process 
allegations and claims.  In response to the second amended 
complaint, the City filed an answer with affirmative defenses, 
including that Lee had failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.  The City also filed an “Objection to Second Amended 
Complaint and Motion to Dismiss” in which it argued that Lee 
failed to replead his equal protection claim within 14 days, 
and that Lee had again alleged violations of due process after 
the court denied Lee leave to do so.  The court heard argument 
and, ruling from the bench, denied the motion to dismiss.  
However, the order denying the motion to dismiss stated:  
 
8
it appearing to the Court that [Lee], without 
waiving and while expressly reserving his 
exception and objection to the Court’s prior 
ruling dismissing [his] due process claims, 
acknowledges and agrees that as the result of 
said prior ruling of the Court Count One of the 
Second Amended Complaint states only an equal 
protection claim.  
 
The City subsequently filed a revised answer to the second 
amended complaint and a demurrer to Lee’s equal protection 
claim.  The circuit court heard argument on the demurrer and 
reserved its ruling.  Later, the circuit court heard argument 
on the pending pleas in bar, initially filed in response to the 
first amended complaint, to the inverse condemnation and 
property damage claims.  From the bench, the court granted the 
City’s plea as to the property damage claim and reserved ruling 
on the inverse condemnation claim.   
By letter opinion dated June 25, 2009, the circuit court 
granted the plea in bar to Lee’s inverse condemnation claim and 
also analyzed in detail the due process “notice and appeal” 
issues that are pleaded in conjunction with the inverse 
condemnation claim and that underlie Lee’s first assignment of 
error.1 
                     
1 The court later issued a letter opinion overruling the 
outstanding demurrer to Lee’s only remaining claim, alleging 
violation of his equal protection right.  However, Lee then 
nonsuited that claim. 
 
9
Lee appeals the various adverse rulings and assigns error, 
without elaboration as to the nature of the error, as follows 
(verbatim): 
1. 
The trial court erred in dismissing Lee’s due process 
claim. 
 
2. 
The trial court erred in dismissing Lee’s inverse 
condemnation claim. 
 
3. 
The trial court erred in dismissing Lee’s property 
damage claim. 
 
DISCUSSION 
A. DUE PROCESS 
 
We review de novo the circuit court’s sustaining of the 
demurrer, observing familiar principles: 
The purpose of a demurrer is to determine 
whether a motion for judgment states a cause of 
action upon which the requested relief may be 
granted.  A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency 
of facts alleged in pleadings, not the strength 
of proof. 
 
Augusta Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mason, 274 Va. 199, 204, 645 S.E.2d 
290, 293 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
On brief, Lee argues that he stated a cause of action for 
a violation of his due process rights because of the defects he 
listed in the September 12 letter.  These defects, Lee argues, 
resulted in the denial of his constitutional right to notice 
and an opportunity to be heard prior to the demolition of the 
building. 
 
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First, Lee notes that the letter, while alleging violation 
of the Uniform Statewide Building Code (“USBC”), erroneously 
cited § 130.0 of the USBC, a section that does not exist.  
Second, he argues that the letter stated that he had a 21-day 
window to appeal under the Maintenance Code of the USBC,2 but 
that the appeal period should have been controlled by the 
Construction Code of the USBC,3 which provides for a 90-day 
appeal period.  Third, Lee argues that § 118.3 of the 
Construction Code requires that an inspection report be 
prepared and filed in the records of the local building 
department, and that the notice to him should have contained “a 
statement requiring the person receiving the notice to 
determine whether to accept or reject the terms of the notice.”  
Finally, Lee argues that Code § 15.2-906 requires notice to be 
given to the owner and lienholder of the affected property, and 
be published once a week for two successive weeks in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the locality before 
demolition may occur.  Such notice to lienholder and 
publication were not done. 
The City responds that, regardless of any notice 
deficiencies, a demolition of private property for public use 
cannot constitute a due process violation because of the 
                     
2 The Maintenance Code is set out in Part III of the USBC. 
3 The Construction Code is set out in Part I of the USBC. 
 
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availability of a post-deprivation action for inverse 
condemnation.  The City further responds that the alleged 
defects in the notice are unrelated to the question of whether 
due process was provided, relying upon Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (requiring 
notice calculated to apprise parties of the pending action and 
an opportunity to present objections). 
The United States Constitution guarantees that no state 
shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV.  “In 
procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action 
of a constitutionally protected interest in ‘life, liberty, or 
property’ is not in itself unconstitutional; what is 
unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without 
due process of law.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 
(1990) (emphasis in original).  “The constitutional violation 
actionable under § 1983 is not complete when the deprivation 
occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to 
provide due process.”  Id. at 126. 
While the Supreme Court of the United States “usually has 
held that the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing 
before the State deprives a person of liberty or property,” Id. 
at 127,”[i]n some circumstances, however, the Court has held 
that a statutory provision for a postdeprivation hearing, or a 
 
12
common-law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation, satisfies due 
process.”  Id. at 128. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that because 
“aggrieved property owners may file an inverse condemnation 
action pursuant to Virginia’s declaratory judgment statute,” 
they are afforded procedural due process as a matter of law.  
Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 490 (4th Cir. 
2006) (citing Richmeade, L.P. v. City of Richmond, 267 Va. 598, 
594 S.E.2d 606 (2004)); see also Tri-County Paving v. Ashe, 281 
F.3d 430, 438 (4th Cir. 2002) (availability of post-deprivation 
procedures bars landowner’s procedural due process claim). 
We do not address whether, as a general principle, upon a 
taking for public use the availability of a post-deprivation 
inverse condemnation action by statute affords an aggrieved 
landowner due process of law.  See Presley, 464 F.3d at 490.  
The circuit court concluded that the availability of an inverse 
condemnation action by statute afforded Lee due process of law 
per se, despite also finding that Lee could not avail himself 
of an inverse condemnation action because there was no taking 
but only the abatement of a nuisance. 
As discussed below, we agree with the circuit court that 
the City’s demolition of Lee’s property was not a taking, but 
rather the abatement of a nuisance for which no compensation is 
due.  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 
 
13
470, 492 (1987).  Consequently, even if a post-deprivation 
hearing would satisfy due process, Lee was not entitled to such 
a hearing because there was no compensable taking.  The circuit 
court therefore erred in sustaining the demurrer to count one 
of the amended complaint on that basis.  However, for reasons 
discussed below, that error was harmless. 
This Court has previously explained:  
The abatement of a nuisance often requires 
prompt and summary proceedings, and where the 
abatement is authorized under the police power 
of the State and due process of law has been 
observed, the owner of the property destroyed 
for the public good has no constitutional rights 
beyond those provided in the statute under which 
the abatement is made. 
 
Stickley v. Givens, 176 Va. 548, 562, 11 S.E.2d 631, 638 
(1940).  Lee does not contest that the demolition was 
“authorized under the police power of the State.”  Likewise he 
does not challenge the constitutionality of the statute, 
regulations, or municipal ordinances under which the City 
acted.  Id.  Rather, on brief his only contention is that, by 
its September 12 letter and subsequent conduct, the City did 
not observe due process of law because it provided 
“insufficient” notice.  In doing so, Lee conflates unrelated 
regulatory deficiencies with the alleged constitutional 
violation of his right to be notified of the City’s decision 
and to present his objection.  It is possible for a state 
 
14
agency to fail to adhere strictly to its regulations without 
violating the constitutional right to due process.  See Bates 
v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325, 329-30 (6th Cir. 1976) (“it is only 
when the agency’s disregard of its rules results in a procedure 
which in itself impinges upon due process rights that a federal 
court should intervene in the decisional processes of state 
institutions”). 
 
The circuit court specifically addressed in detail the 
“notice and hearing” grounds for Lee’s assignment of error in 
its June 25, 2009 letter opinion, which granted the plea in bar 
to the inverse condemnation claim that was grounded upon due 
process principles.  The circuit court stated: “The September 
letter represented the notice to demolish under § 118.3 and it 
stipulated the time period in which the building needed to be 
demolished and gave a 21 day time period during which Lee could 
appeal the unsafe designation. . . . Lee’s due process rights 
were safeguarded by the opportunity to appeal the decision of 
the City that his property constituted a public nuisance.” 
 
Based upon Lee’s own pleadings and the record, we agree 
with the circuit court that Lee’s constitutional due process 
rights to notice and an opportunity to object were not violated 
by the deficiencies of the September 12 letter.  In Mullane, 
the Supreme Court of the United States explained the notice 
required to satisfy due process: 
 
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An elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process in any proceeding which is to be 
accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections.  The notice must be of 
such nature as reasonably to convey the required 
information, and it must afford a reasonable 
time for those interested to make their 
appearance. 
 
339 U.S. at 314.4    
The September 12 letter incorrectly cited the controlling 
section of the USBC,5 and we take as true Lee’s allegations that 
the City failed to send notice to lienholders or publish the 
notice in a newspaper of general circulation.  Nonetheless, it 
cannot be said that the letter failed to apprise Lee “of the 
pendency of the action” or to “afford [him] an opportunity to 
present [his] objections.”  Id.  The letter informed Lee that 
the City had found the property to be “unsafe and a public 
                     
4 More recently, the United States Supreme Court reiterated 
the core principle of Mullane, holding that due process did not 
require actual notice in a forfeiture proceeding, but only 
notice “reasonably calculated” to “inform those affected.”  
Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002).  See also 
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 
130 S.Ct. 1367, 1378 (2010) (no due process violation where a 
failure to hold an adversary proceeding and serve notice 
through summons and complaint did not deprive creditor of 
adequate notice that its interest will be adversely affected). 
5 Section 105.1 of the Virginia Maintenance Code states, in 
part: “[W]hen the code official determines that an unsafe 
structure or a structure unfit for human occupancy constitutes 
such a hazard that it should be razed or removed, then the code 
official shall be permitted to order the demolition of such 
 
16
nuisance” in violation of the USBC, and that Lee had a right to 
appeal that determination.  It is clear that Lee actually 
received the notice and appreciated its gravity, since he 
immediately retained counsel and met with City officials to 
discuss the condition of the property.  Upon these specific 
facts, it is immaterial whether the appeal period was 21 days 
or 90 days, since during the 107 days that elapsed from receipt 
of the notice until demolition Lee made no inquiries about his 
appeal rights and took no actions to avail himself thereof.  
 
Lee next argues, relying on Jones v. Board of Governors, 
704 F.2d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 1983), that he was deprived of due 
process as a result of the City’s deviation from its own 
procedures and previous assurances.  In Jones, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that “significant 
departures from stated procedures of government and even from 
isolated assurances by governmental officers which have induced 
reasonable and detrimental reliance may, if sufficiently unfair 
and prejudicial, constitute procedural due process violations.”  
Id. (citing United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 752-53 & 
n.15 (1979)) (secret audio recordings admissible despite being 
made in violation of IRS regulations, as taxpayer had no reason 
to rely on those regulations). 
                                                                 
structures in accordance with applicable requirements of this 
code.” 
 
17
 
Here Lee neither alleged in his pleadings nor asserted in 
his assignments of error or on brief that he “reasonably relied 
on agency regulations promulgated for his guidance or benefit 
and has suffered substantially because of their violation by 
the agency.”  Caceres, 440 U.S. at 752-53.  Likewise, Lee 
neither alleged nor argued that he relied on the “assurances 
[of] governmental officers which have induced reasonable and 
detrimental reliance.”  Jones, 704 F.2d at 717.  See also Cox 
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965) (individual could not be 
punished for demonstrating near courthouse where the highest 
police officials of the city had advised the demonstrators that 
they could meet where they did).  While Lee stated that he met 
with the City and “agreed to make certain changes requested by 
the [City] to alleviate [its] safety concerns,” he did not 
allege that the City told him that doing so in any way vitiated 
his obligation to appeal within the required time-frame 
(whether 21 days or 90 days), or that the City induced him not 
to appeal. 
 
Accordingly, we agree with the circuit court in its June 
25, 2009 letter opinion that Lee actually received 
constitutionally adequate notice and an opportunity to appeal.  
Lee’s due process claims therefore fail to state a cause of 
action upon which the requested relief may be granted.  Augusta 
Mutual Ins. Co., 274 Va. at 204, 645 S.E.2d at 293. 
 
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B. INVERSE CONDEMNATION 
 
Lee assigns error to the circuit court granting the City’s 
plea in bar to his claim for inverse condemnation for failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies.  “A plea in bar presents a 
distinct issue of fact which, if proven, creates a bar to the 
plaintiff’s right of recovery.”  Station #2, LLC v. Lynch, 280 
Va. 166, 175, 695 S.E.2d 537, 542 (2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
The Constitution of Virginia guarantees that “the General 
Assembly shall not pass any law . . . whereby private property 
shall be taken or damaged for public uses, without just 
compensation.”  Va. Const. art. I, § 11.  The General Assembly 
has afforded those aggrieved by a taking with a statutory 
remedy for inverse condemnation.  See Code § 8.01-187. 
 
By letter opinion, the circuit court found that Lee’s 
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, i.e. appeal to 
the local administrative body, barred his inverse condemnation 
claim.  Lee does not dispute the legal effect of his failure to 
appeal. Rather, he argues that, in the absence of proper 
notice, an appeal period cannot begin to run.   
 
As discussed above, the City’s September 12 letter 
constituted sufficient notice to apprise Lee of his right to be 
heard by way of an appeal to the Board of Building Code 
Appeals.  See Code § 36-105.  Having failed to appeal the 
 
19
City’s determination that the property was a nuisance, Lee 
acquiesced in that determination as a “thing decided.”  Lily v. 
Caroline County, 259 Va. 291, 296, 526 S.E.2d 743, 745 (2000) 
(dismissal of declaratory judgment action based on failure to 
file appeal with board of zoning appeals) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
The law is well settled that the abatement of a nuisance 
by a public body is not a compensable taking.  Keystone 
Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S. at 492 (“the State has not ‘taken’ 
anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like 
activity.”); Stickley, 176 Va. at 561, 11 S.E.2d at 63 (“In the 
abatement of a public nuisance, it is not necessary to provide 
any compensation to the owner of the property which creates the 
nuisance.”); Jeremy Improvement Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Va. 
482, 490, 56 S.E. 224, 227 (1907) (“The abatement of such a 
nuisance for the public safety comes under the police power of 
the State, and is not a taking of private property for a public 
use in the sense contemplated by the constitution, for which 
compensation must be allowed.”).  Therefore, the circuit court 
properly granted the City’s plea in bar to Lee’s inverse 
condemnation claim.   
C. PROPERTY DAMAGE 
 
Lee argues that the trial court erred in granting the 
City’s plea in bar to his property damage claim.  The City’s 
 
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plea in bar consisted of two grounds: the application of Code 
§ 15.2-209 and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Because no 
evidence was taken in support of the plea in bar, we review 
Lee’s claim taking all material factual allegations as true.  
Station # 2, LLC, 280 Va. at 169, 695 S.E.2d at 539.   
 
Code § 15.2-209(A) requires that “[e]very claim cognizable 
against any county, city, or town for negligence shall be 
forever barred unless the claimant . . . has filed a written 
statement of the nature of the claim . . . within six months 
after such cause of action accrued.”  In his amended complaint 
and second amended complaint, Lee alleged that his counsel 
notified the City Attorney, in writing, of the time, place, and 
location of the demolition on or about May 2, 2007, less than 
six months after the demolition.  Taking that allegation as 
true, and in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, Code 
§ 15.2-209 could not serve as the basis for sustaining the plea 
in bar. 
 
Lee further argues that sovereign immunity could not serve 
as a bar to his property damage claim against the City.  We 
have previously explained the standard of review in a sovereign 
immunity case: 
Where no evidence is taken in support of the 
plea, the trial court, and the appellate court 
upon review, must rely solely upon the pleadings 
. . . in resolving the issue presented. The 
 
21
existence of sovereign immunity is a question of 
law that is reviewed de novo. 
 
City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 268 Va. 624, 633, 604 S.E.2d 
420, 426 (2004) (internal citation omitted).  In City of 
Chesapeake, we explained that “[s]overeign immunity protects 
municipalities from tort liability arising from the exercise of 
governmental functions,” id. at 634, 604 S.E.2d at 426, which 
include exercises of the “police power.”  Id. at 638, 604 
S.E.2d 429.  See also Edwards v. City of Portsmouth, 237 Va. 
167, 171, 375 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1989) (city immune for exercise 
of police power). 
We have long recognized that the abatement of a public 
nuisance is an exercise of the police power.  See, e.g., 
Stickley, 176 Va. at 562, 11 S.E.2d at 638 (abatement 
authorized under the police power of the state); Bunkley v. 
Commonwealth, 130 Va. 55, 68, 108 S.E. 1, 5 (1921) (abatement 
of nuisance proper exercise of Commonwealth’s police power).   
In City of Chesapeake, we explained that “[a] function is 
governmental if it entails the exercise of an entity’s 
political, discretionary, or legislative authority.”  268 Va. 
at 634, 604 S.E.2d at 426.  “[W]hen a municipality plans, 
designs, regulates or provides a service for the common good, 
it performs a governmental function.”  Id. at 634, 604 S.E.2d 
426.  On the other hand, “[i]f the function is a ministerial 
 
22
act and involves no discretion, it is proprietary.”  Id.  For 
example, “routine maintenance or operation of a municipal 
service is proprietary.”  Id. at 634, 604 S.E.2d at 427.  In 
Fenon v. Norfolk, 203 Va. 551, 556, 125 S.E.2d 808, 812 (1962), 
we explained: 
The underlying test is whether the act is for 
the common good of all without the element of 
special corporate benefit, or pecuniary profit. 
If it is, there is no liability, if it is not, 
there may be liability. That it may be 
undertaken voluntarily not under compulsion of 
statute is not of consequence. 
 
Applying the foregoing principles to this case, it is 
clear that the City is immune for exercising its police power 
to abate the public nuisance that it had deemed Lee’s building 
to pose.  See Stickley, 176 Va. at 562, 11 S.E.2d at 638.  
Furthermore, the City’s demolition of Lee’s building was not a 
ministerial act or routine maintenance of a municipal service.  
See City of Chesapeake, 268 Va. at 633, 604 S.E.2d at 426.  
Rather, the demolition entailed the exercise of the City’s 
discretionary authority, id. at 634, 604 S.E.2d at 426, and was 
performed “without the element of special corporate benefit, or 
pecuniary profit.” Fenon, 203 Va. at 556, 125 S.E.2d at 812.   
 
Accordingly, we find that the City’s demolition of Lee’s 
building was an exercise of the governmental function and that 
the City enjoyed sovereign immunity for its actions.  
 
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Therefore, the circuit court did not err in granting the plea 
in bar to Lee’s claim for property damage. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit 
court will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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