Case Title: State ex rel. Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Div. v. McNeese

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Div. v. McNeese1986 WY 98718 P.2d 38Case Number: 85-263Decided: 04/24/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
The 
STATE ofWyoming ex rel. 
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Appellant 
(Respondent),

v.

Bruna Granaas McNEESE, 
Appellee (Petitioner).

Appeal from District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Michael R. O'Donnell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellant.

David A. 
Hampton, Rock 
Springs, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellee Bruna Grannaas 
McNeese was convicted in municipal court of violating Rock Springs Municipal 
Ordinance 5-201(a). After receiving a record of this conviction, the Motor 
Vehicle Division of the Department of Revenue and Taxation (Division) proposed 
to revoke appellee's driver's license. A hearing on the proposed revocation was 
held in April 1985, which resulted in the decision to revoke the 
license.

[¶2.]     Appellee petitioned the 
district court for review of this decision. The district court concluded that 
the Division had no authority to revoke appellee's driver's license based on her 
conviction under the municipal ordinance, and accordingly reversed the 
Division's order. From this order the Division has 
appealed.

[¶3.]     We will affirm the 
order of the district court.

[¶4.]     The parties state the 
issue as:

"I. Did the district 
court err in concluding, as a matter of law, that State ex rel. Motor Vehicle 
Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732 (Wyo. 1983) is controlling and the Motor 
Vehicle Division does not have the authority to revoke a driver's license based 
upon a municipal conviction of hit-and-run?"

[¶5.]     The Division revoked 
appellee's license pursuant to § 31-7-126(a)(iii), W.S. 1977, (November 1984 
Replacement) which stated:1

"(a) The division shall 
revoke the license or privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle in the 
state, upon receipt of a record of conviction of such person of any of the 
following violations:

"* * * * 
*

"(iii) Failure to stop 
and render aid when involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in personal 
injury or death, as required by W.S. 31-5-1101."

[¶6.]     Section 31-5-1101(a), 
W.S. 1977, (November 1984 Replacement) provides:

"(a) The driver of any 
vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person 
shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close 
thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall 
remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of 
W.S. 31-5-1103. * * *"

This subsection 
was adopted by reference as Rock Springs Municipal Ordinance 5-201(a), under 
which appellee was convicted. Subsection (b) of § 31-5-1101 which provides for a 
penalty of up to $5,000 or one year imprisonment, or both, was not adopted; the 
penalty provided by the municipal ordinance is a fine of up to $750. We must 
answer the question whether the phrase "as required by W.S. 31-5-1101" means 
that the conviction must be under § 31-5-1101, or under the ordinance which 
adopts § 31-5-1101 by reference.

[¶7.]     In a case similar to 
the present one, State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, Wyo., 674 P.2d 732 (1983), we dealt with license revocation in the context of DWUI convictions. 
The statute, as it then existed, provided in part:

"Every person convicted 
under this section shall * * * have his driver's license suspended at the time 
of conviction by the court. * * *" § 31-5-233(e), W.S. 1977, 1983 
Cum.Supp.

[¶8.]     This court concluded 
that the language was plain and unambiguous. We held that convictions under 
other state's DWUI statutes, or convictions under municipal ordinances could not 
be the basis for suspending a license since such convictions were not "under 
this section." State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, supra, at 742. In 
reaching the holding we stated:

"* * * Convictions in 
municipal courts are for violations of ordinances and not state statutes. This 
is true even if a state statute is copied verbatim in the ordinance or even if 
it is adopted as the ordinance by reference to it." Id., at 
737.

[¶9.]     From our holding in 
Holtz, appellee successfully argued in the district court that under § 
31-7-126(a)(iii), the Division could only revoke her license if she had been 
convicted of violating the state statute. Appellee maintains that the decision 
in Holtz controls, and that § 31-7-126 clearly requires a conviction under § 
31-5-1101. Appellant argues that the statute clearly does not require a 
conviction under § 31-5-1101.

[¶10.]  We do not find the pertinent language as 
clear as either party claims. Unlike the phrase "under this section", the phrase 
"as required by W.S. 31-5-1101" is susceptible to at least two meanings. First 
is that which appellee claims. A second meaning is that the driver need only be 
convicted of failing to stop and render aid under any state statute or ordinance 
which requires the driver to take the same action as required by § 
31-5-1101.

[¶11.]  "When a word or phrase in a statute is 
susceptible of more than one meaning, it must be considered ambiguous." State 
Board of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 97, 99 (1985). In construing 
ambiguous statutes the primary consideration is to reach the legislative intent. 
Recognizing this goal, courts presume legislative enactments to be reasonable 
and logical, and further assume that it is the intent of the legislature to 
enact only that which is just. Mauler v. Titus, 
Wyo., 697 P.2d 303 (1985); McGuire v. 
McGuire, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278 (1980). Finally we note 
that it is as important to recognize what is not in the statute as well as what 
is. Matter of Adoption of Voss, Wyo., 
550 P.2d 481 (1976). Because the statute is susceptible of more than one meaning 
we must construe it, searching for the legislature's 
intent.

[¶12.]  In arguing that municipal convictions 
under ordinances adopting the statutory language of § 31-5-1101(a) should 
suffice, appellant relies heavily on the fact that § 31-5-1101 is a part of the 
Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways. § 31-5-101, et. seq. According to 
appellant, because municipalities may adopt parts of the Uniform Act, but may 
not place themselves in conflict with the same, violations of ordinances 
adopting statutes by reference within the Act must trigger the same penalty the 
statute triggers. Any other result violates the comprehensive scheme 
contemplated by the Uniform Act.

[¶13.]  We are not persuaded by appellant's 
argument. Ordinances prohibiting the same conduct as a statute may provide 
different penalties without being in conflict with the statute. 1 Antieau, 
Municipal Corporation Law § 5.35, p. 5-103 (1986). Here the legislature could 
not have intended that the same penalty, in terms of fine and imprisonment, be 
imposed for convictions under § 31-5-1101 and municipal ordinances adopting that 
statute, since it provides for punishment in excess of the jurisdiction of 
municipal courts. See § 5-6-201, W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp. Nor do we think that 
the legislature intended that a person's driver's license would be revoked when 
he is convicted of failing to stop and render aid under a municipal ordinance, 
even though that is the result of a conviction under § 
31-5-1101.

[¶14.]  It is significant that § 31-7-126(a)(ii) 
provided that the division shall revoke the license upon receipt of a record of 
the driver's "third conviction of reckless driving in violation of any state 
statutes or local ordinances." 
(Emphasis added). In subsection (a)(iii), however, no mention is made of failing 
to render aid as required by local ordinances, and only the state statute is 
referred to.

[¶15.]  Likewise, after the Holtz decision, the 
statute dealing with suspensions for DWUI convictions was amended to include 
convictions under the statute "or other law prohibiting driving while under the 
influence." § 31-7-127(d), W.S. 1977 (November 1984 Replacement). These 
references to local ordinances or other laws, as well as a reference to a 
"conviction under W.S. 6-2-106, or a similar statute in another jurisdiction", 
all appear in the most recent statute concerning mandatory revocation of 
licenses, § 31-7-127, W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum. Supp., which consolidates older 
versions of the revocation statutes. Even after this consolidation, no reference 
to statutes of other states or ordinances appears in the subsection revoking 
licenses for failing to stop and render aid, as required by § 31-5-1101. The 
absence of such reference, included in three other subsections, leads us to 
conclude that the legislature intended "as required by § 31-5-1101" to require a 
conviction under § 31-5-1101 itself.

[¶16.]  In reaching this conclusion we are also 
persuaded by the different penalties imposed by the statute and the ordinance. 
Section 31-5-1101(b) allows for both one year imprisonment, or a $5,000 fine, or 
both, while the ordinance provides for a maximum fine of $750. Arguably, because 
the penalties vary so drastically, a person charged under the state statute 
realizes the seriousness of the charge while a person charged under the 
ordinance might well believe he is faced with nothing more serious than an 
ordinary traffic violation.

[¶17.]  The different penalties also result in 
different procedures. In the present case appellee appeared before a municipal 
court judge, who convicted her of violating the ordinance and imposed the $100 
fine. Appellee was not given a jury trial although she contended at the 
subsequent revocation hearing that she requested one. Although the record from 
appellee's conviction is not part of the record in this proceeding, we think it 
quite possible that such request was denied under Rule 5(d), Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure for Justices of the Peace Courts and Municipal Courts, 
(W.R.Cr.P.J.C.) 1985 Cum.Supp.2. Nor did appellee have the right to 
counsel, stated in Rule 6(a), W.R.Cr.P.J.C. In this regard, we are confident in 
assuming that many people charged under an ordinance providing for a maximum 
penalty of $750 might not retain an attorney, while most would obtain counsel 
when the possible penalty is one year imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.3 Thus, the rules which govern the 
municipal court proceedings involving the ordinance here provide minimal 
safeguards to the person charged. In short, when one is charged with a violation 
of the ordinance, the matter is not treated by either the state or the accused 
as seriously as when one is charged with a violation of the 
statute.

[¶18.]  Despite the different safeguards 
provided, appellant would read § 31-7-126 as requiring revocation of the license 
for one year, upon conviction under either the statute or ordinance. We believe 
that construing the statute in this manner would have the effect of reading into 
the statute words which are not there. More importantly, to construe the statute 
as appellant wishes would produce a result which we do not believe the 
legislature could possibly have intended.

[¶19.]  We read § 31-7-126(a)(iii) as requiring a 
conviction under § 31-5-1101. Since a conviction under a municipal ordinance, 
even one copying the state statute verbatim or adopting the statute as the 
ordinance, is not a conviction under the statute, the Division had no authority 
to revoke appellee's license pursuant to § 
31-7-126(a)(iii).

[¶20.]  The district court was correct in holding 
that appellee's license could not be revoked for her conviction under the 
municipal ordinance. The order of the district court is therefore 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 This section has been 
consolidated with other statutes providing for mandatory license revocation and 
now appears in § 31-7-127(a)(iv), W.S. 1977, 1985 
Cum.Supp.

2 We do not consider the 
question of whether an automatic revocation of a driver's license is a penalty 
serious enough to afford a right to jury trial, just as we did not decide the 
question in Lapp v. City of Worland, Wyo., 612 P.2d 868, 874 n. 7 (1980). We 
note, however, that this question has produced a split in the courts. See e.g., 
Baker v. City of 
Fairbanks, Alaska, 471 P.2d 386 (1970); Smith v. State, 17 Md. App. 217, 301 A.2d 54 
(1973). See also, Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1373 (1967).

3 The record does not 
indicate whether appellee was represented by counsel before the municipal 
court.