Case Title: Carey v. Board of Overseers of the Bar

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 119

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 119 
Docket: 
Ken-18-22 
Submitted 
On Briefs: July 19, 2018 
Decided: 
August 16, 2018 
Revised: 
October 11, 2018 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
SETH T. CAREY 
 
v. 
 
BOARD OF OVERSEERS OF THE BAR et al. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Seth T. Carey appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court 
(Kennebec County, Anderson, J.) granting motions to dismiss and motions for 
summary judgment.  The court’s order resulted in judgment for all defendants 
on Carey’s wide-ranging complaint against judges and other court employees, 
the Board of Overseers of the Bar, the Maine Commission on Indigent Legal 
Services (MCILS), and the Lewiston Sun Journal.  Carey’s complaint was based 
on the defendants’ actions related to or participation in an attorney disciplinary 
proceeding before the Board that resulted in the court (Brennan, J.) accepting 
an agreed two-year suspended suspension from the practice of law with many 
conditions imposed on Carey’s practice. 
 
 
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[¶2]  Carey appeals, contending that the court improperly ruled that most 
defendants were protected by statutory or common law immunities, that there 
were no disputes of fact regarding his claims against the defendants, and that 
the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  We affirm. 
I.  CASE HISTORY 
[¶3]  In 2016, the Board of Overseers of the Bar brought three 
disciplinary informations, M. Bar R. 13(g), against Seth T. Carey.  Board of 
Overseers of the Bar v. Carey, BAR-16-15 (Nov. 21, 2016) (Brennan, J.).  After 
negotiations, Carey and the Board agreed to the entry of a negotiated order 
“identifying Attorney Carey’s misconduct and the resulting sanctions imposed 
by the court.”  Id. at 1.  The agreed order identified Carey’s misconduct and 
supporting evidence organized by the three disciplinary informations.  Id. 
[¶4]  The first disciplinary action was based on evidence presented by 
four Maine judges at a Grievance Commission proceeding where those “four 
jurists recounted their experiences, observations, and concerns about Attorney 
Carey’s lack of core competence.”1  Id. at 2.  The order recognized that Carey 
had been “adamant that the jurists[’] accounts were inaccurate and that they 
                                         
1  Having observed such concerning performances, the judges may have had an ethical obligation 
to report Carey to the Board of Overseers of the Bar.  See M. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.15(B). 
 
 
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had colluded in a conspiracy against him.”  Id.  The order noted, however, that 
Carey agreed that the testimony of the judges at the hearing before the 
Grievance Commission comprised “sufficient evidence for this Court to find that 
he had demonstrated a lack of core competence in the handling of his clients’ 
respective litigation matters.”  Id. at 3. 
[¶5]  Based on that information, and apparently by agreement, the court 
found that Carey had committed violations of Maine Rules of Professional 
Conduct 1.1 (incompetence), 1.3 (lack of reasonable diligence in representing 
clients), 3.3(a)(3) (offering material evidence that is false), 3.3(b) (failure to 
disclose false evidence to a court), and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).2  Id.  
[¶6]  The second disciplinary action was based on a complaint by a 
physician who had served as an independent medical examiner in a proceeding 
in which Carey represented a claimant before the Maine Workers’ 
Compensation Board.  Id.  The physician’s complaint expressed concern 
regarding Attorney Carey’s conduct both in preparation for and during a 
                                         
2  The court also found violation of Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a) (violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct).  Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Carey, BAR-16-15 (Nov. 21, 2016) 
(Brennan, J.).  Because Rule 8.4(a) makes violation of any other Rule of Professional Conduct a 
separate violation of Rule 8.4(a), the violation of Rule 8.4(a) cannot be considered a distinct violation 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct.   
 
 
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deposition.  Id. at 4.  A hearing officer of the Workers’ Compensation Board 
found that Carey had failed to provide relevant medical reports to the physician 
prior to his deposition and had asked the physician many questions, during the 
deposition, relating to medical evidence that had not been admitted into 
evidence in the proceeding.  Id. at 6. 
[¶7]  The agreed order found that “Attorney Carey’s failure to timely 
provide the necessary medical documents to [the physician]” constituted 
violations of Maine Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (incompetence) and 1.3 
(lack of reasonable diligence in representing a client).  Id. 
[¶8]  The third disciplinary action was initiated by a complaint filed on 
behalf of a bank managing Carey’s client trust accounts (interest on lawyers 
trust accounts (IOLTA accounts)) pursuant to Maine Bar Rule 6 and Maine Rule 
of Professional Conduct 1.15.  Id. at 7.  The complaint asserted that Carey 
improperly used his client trust account to make payments for both personal 
and professional expenses during the course of many months.  Id.  Carey had 
characterized these payments from his client trust accounts as “mistakes.”  Id.  
The agreed order found that even if Carey’s explanation was accurate, 
“Attorney Carey admits that he failed to abide by the rules governing client trust 
accounts.  This failure is troubling because as an attorney licensed for more 
 
 
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than ten years, Attorney Carey knew or should have known that he could not 
comingle funds or draw upon his IOLTA account for personal and other 
nonclient expenses.”  Id. at 7-8. 
[¶9]  Despite this finding, the agreed order did not explicitly find a 
violation of Maine Bar Rule 6 or Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15 
relating to this disciplinary information.  Instead, regarding this information, 
the court found a violation of only Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 
(incompetence).  Id. at 8. 
[¶10]  Proceeding to address sanctions, the court noted that “Attorney 
Carey has previously been sanctioned for misconduct, some of which is similar 
to the instant matters and some of which is unrelated to those concerns.  See 
two Orders of Suspension, February and October 2009, respectively.”  Id. at 8. 
[¶11]  With that background and based on the parties’ agreement 
submitted in the proceeding “as supplemented by the Court,” the court ordered 
Carey suspended from the practice of law for two years but suspended all of 
that suspension—so that no actual suspension from practice was imposed.  Id. 
at 9.  The suspended suspension was subject to twenty-eight conditions that 
primarily required supervision and monitoring of Carey’s practice, 
improvements in his management of his practice, and continuing legal 
 
 
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education and other courses to improve his practice management and 
compliance with his professional ethical obligations.  Id. at 9-17.3 
[¶12]  Less than two months after the entry of the November 2016 
agreed-upon suspended suspension disciplinary order, in January 2017, Carey 
filed in the Superior Court a wide-ranging complaint, later amended, against 
three judges who had presented evidence in the Grievance Commission 
proceedings, several other court employees who had worked with the judges, 
the physician who had filed the complaint against Carey, the Lewiston Sun 
Journal, MCILS and its director, the Board of Overseers of the Bar, the Board’s 
attorneys who had prosecuted the grievance complaint against Carey and 
negotiated the agreed disposition of the grievance complaint, the Maine District 
Court, and the Office of the Clerk of Courts.   
[¶13]  Carey’s amended complaint asserted numerous causes of action 
and allegations against the defendants including: negligence, abuse of process, 
invasion of privacy, false light, malicious prosecution, fraud upon the court, 
misrepresentation, conspiracy, tortious interference with prospective and 
actual economic advantage, tortious interference with contractual relations, 
                                         
3  As a result of an order in a subsequent Bar disciplinary proceeding, Board of Overseers of the Bar 
v. Carey, BAR-18-04 (Apr. 30, 2018) (Warren, J.), Carey is currently subject to an indefinite suspension 
from the practice of law. 
 
 
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violation of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (MUTPA), negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and M.R. Civ. 
P. 80C appeal of an administrative action.   
[¶14]  The court, the Board of Overseers of the Bar and their related 
individual defendants, and the MCILS filed motions to dismiss in February of 
2017; the Lewiston Sun Journal filed a motion to dismiss in May of 2017; and 
the physician filed a motion to dismiss in June of 2017.   
[¶15]  The court (Anderson, J.) granted each of the defendants’ motions to 
dismiss on October 25, 2017.  Specifically, the court concluded that: (1) Carey’s 
tort claims against the judges and court employees were barred by judicial 
immunity, pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(B) (2017); (2) Carey’s tort claims 
against the MCILS director were barred by discretionary immunity, pursuant 
to 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(C); (3) Carey’s tort claims against the Board’s attorneys 
who had prosecuted the disciplinary action against him were barred by 
discretionary function immunity and prosecutorial immunity, pursuant to 
14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(C)-(D); (4) Carey’s tort claims against another Board 
employee were legally insufficient because the claims did not allege anything 
specific that that employee had done to harm him; (5) Carey’s MUTPA and RICO 
 
 
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claims against all defendants were barred by sovereign immunity; (6) Carey’s 
M.R. Civ. P. 80C appeal was not timely filed, and even if it had been timely filed, 
Carey had failed to prosecute the appeal; (7) Carey’s claims against the 
physician were barred pursuant to Maine’s Anti-SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556 
(2017); and (8) Carey’s claims against the Lewiston Sun Journal were dismissed 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), based on his failure to plead all necessary 
elements of his claims.   
[¶16]  The motions to dismiss filed by the governmental entities (the 
Board, the Maine District Court, the Office of Clerk of Courts, and MCILS), “with 
respect solely to the state law tort claims,” were converted to motions for 
summary judgment by the court.  The governmental entities filed their motions 
for summary judgment in November of 2017.  Carey did not file an opposition 
to these motions.  The Superior Court granted the motions for summary 
judgment on January 3, 2018.   
[¶17]  Carey filed a notice of appeal on January 22, 2018.4   
                                         
4  On appeal, Carey primarily challenges the dismissal of his tort claims as being barred by the 
immunities provided by 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(B)-(D) and the court’s dismissal of his claims against the 
Lewiston Sun Journal.  This opinion focuses on those two arguments.  Carey’s arguments presented 
in his brief do not appear to challenge: (1) the court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of 
the government entities; (2) the court’s dismissal of Carey’s claims against a Board employee; (3) the 
court’s dismissal of Carey’s MUTPA and RICO claims based on sovereign immunity; and (4) the court’s 
dismissal of Carey’s claims against the physician pursuant to Maine’s Anti-SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S. 
 
 
 
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II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. 
Board and Judicial/MCILS’s Motions to Dismiss 
[¶18]  Carey does not appear to challenge the court’s specific finding and 
conclusion that the absolute privilege afforded witnesses in judicial 
proceedings, as discussed in Dunbar v. Greenlaw, 152 Me. 270, 277, 
128 A.2d 218 (1956), applies to bar claims against the defendants arising out 
of their statements made during Carey’s Board proceedings.  See Mehlhorn v. 
Derby, 2006 ME 110, ¶ 11, 905 A.2d 290 (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory 
manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are 
deemed waived.”). 
[¶19]  When considering an appeal of a motion to dismiss, “[w]e review 
the legal sufficiency of the complaint de novo and view the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements 
of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief 
pursuant to some legal theory.”  Nadeau v. Frydrych, 2014 ME 154, ¶ 5, 
108 A.3d 1254.  This motion “tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint” and 
                                         
§ 556 (2017).  See Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Bartlett, 2014 ME 37, ¶ 15 n.5, 87 A.3d 741 (stating 
that a party waives any argument that it fails to adequately develop in briefing).  
 
 
 
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“does not probe the merits of the underlying case.”  Haskell v. Phinney, 
460 A.2d 1354, 1359 (Me. 1983). 
B. 
Maine Tort Claims Act  
 
[¶20]  We first consider the application of the immunity provisions of the 
Maine Tort Claims Act as they apply to the claims filed against all defendants 
except the Lewiston Sun Journal.   
[¶21]  The Maine Tort Claims Act, 14 M.R.S. §§ 8101-8118, provides 
broadly that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all 
governmental entities shall be immune from suit on any and all tort claims 
seeking recovery of damages.”  The MTCA also extends personal immunity to 
employees of governmental entities for the following actions: (1) undertaking 
or failing to undertake any judicial or quasi-judicial act; (2) performing or 
failing to perform any discretionary function or duty; and (3) performing or 
failing to perform any prosecutorial function involving civil, criminal, or 
administrative enforcement.  Id. § 8111(1)(B)-(D).  “[L]iability is the rule and 
immunity the exception” when it comes to employees of governmental entities.  
Day’s Auto Body, Inc. v. Town of Medway, 2016 ME 121, ¶ 20, 145 A.3d 1030. 
[¶22]  Title 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(E) further provides that “such immunity 
does not exist in any case in which an employee’s actions are found to have been 
 
 
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in bad faith.”  We have stated that the “bad faith” language does not apply to 
negate the absolute immunities of 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(A)-(D).  Grossman v. 
Richards, 1998 ME 9, ¶ 9, 722 A.2d 371.   
[¶23]  Here, accepting Carey’s factual allegations as true, Carey alleges no 
set of facts that could support the requisite elements of any of the claims he 
asserts against the defendants, who are governmental employees or entities.  
Carey generally states that the defendants “engaged in repeated malfeasance 
and prolonged efforts to wrongfully destroy Carey’s professional career and 
reputation through false and embellished swearing, testimony and 
accusations,” but he never specifically asserts what these efforts were.  Carey’s 
claims asserted against the defendants, even if factually true, are conclusory 
and legally deficient, as he does not provide enough facts to support each 
element of the causes of action he alleges.  See Seacoast Hangar Condo. II Assoc. 
v. Martel, 2001 ME 112, ¶ 16, 775 A.2d 1166 (stating that in reviewing a 
dismissal this Court is not bound to accept the complaint’s legal conclusions).   
[¶24]  Further, Carey states that he “defended against these outlandish, 
dangerously embellished and even completely fabricated allegations” that were 
the basis of his attorney discipline action that resulted in the November 2016 
order finding that Carey had violated provisions of the Maine Rules of 
 
 
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Professional Conduct, see Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Carey, BAR-16-15 
(Nov. 21, 2016) (Brennan, J.).  Carey waived his right to trial on those 
allegations and attempts to relitigate the issues raised during his bar discipline 
hearing, despite the fact that he “agreed to the entry of this negotiated Order 
identifying [his] misconduct and the resulting sanctions imposed by the Court.”  
Id. at 1.   
[¶25]  Separate from the insufficiency of the complaint to state claims 
against these defendants, and contrary to Carey’s contentions, the defendants’ 
actions were protected pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(B)-(D).  The Board and 
Judicial/MCILS defendants are employees of government entities, and their 
actions related to the disciplinary hearing concerning Carey’s conduct as an 
attorney were discretionary functions, judicial functions, or prosecutorial 
functions within the meaning of 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(B)-(D).  The court did not 
err in granting the Board and Judicial/MCILS defendants’ motions to dismiss. 
[¶26]  In addition to the grounds to support dismissal of the action noted 
by the trial court, Carey’s complaint against the judges and other judicial 
employees arises out of their report to the Board of action by Carey that they 
viewed as unethical.  Maine Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.15(B) requires that  
A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation 
of the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial 
 
 
13 
question regarding that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the Board of 
Overseers of the Bar . . . . 
 
 
[¶27]  We have held that “[a]ny person has a qualified privilege to make 
statements to law enforcement or regulatory agencies regarding the conduct of 
others, where the person making the statement believes in good faith that the 
statement is true and indicates that a statutory standard administered by the 
agency may have been violated.”  Truman v. Browne, 2001 ME 182, ¶ 15, 
788 A.2d 168 (citing Baker v. Charles, 919 F. Supp. 41, 44 (D. Me. 1996); Packard 
v. Central Maine Power Co., 477 A.2d 264, 267-68 (Me. 1984); Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 598 (1976)).   
 
[¶28]  Carey agreed to discipline based on the judges’ complaints and the 
physician’s complaint.  Consequently, there can be no question that the 
qualified privilege to report Carey’s misconduct protected the judges’ and the 
physician’s reports in this case.  
C. 
Lewiston Sun Journal’s Motion to Dismiss 
[¶29]  A party may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.  See M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  When considering 
an appeal of a motion to dismiss, we review “the legal sufficiency of the 
complaint de novo and view the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
 
 
14 
plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or 
alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal 
theory.”  Nadeau, 2014 ME 154, ¶ 5, 108 A.3d 1254.  
[¶30]  Carey asserts various causes of action against the Lewiston Sun 
Journal,5 alleging in very general and conclusory terms, the actions of the 
Lewiston Sun Journal as the basis for his claims of negligence, invasion of 
privacy, disclosure, defamation, and false light publicity.   
[¶31]  Carey fails to provide, with specificity, the actual statements or 
actions of the Lewiston Sun Journal that support his claims.  Referencing 
reports about Carey’s then pending public disciplinary proceedings, Carey 
alleges that the “Sun Journal gladly took these lies and did what they do—wrote 
another libelous batch of stories” and that the “Sun Journal (a.k.a. ‘Scum 
Journal’) published these lies and embellishments and published them, 
irreparably damaging Plaintiff’s professional and private reputation.”  These 
are two of the few specific references to the Lewiston Sun Journal in Carey’s 
                                         
5  Carey asserted the following causes of action against the Lewiston Sun Journal: negligence, 
invasion of privacy, disclosure, defamation, false light, malicious prosecution, fraud upon the court, 
conspiracy, tortious interference with prospective and actual economic advantage, tortious 
interference with contractual relations, violation of MUTPA, negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of RICO, M.R. Civ. P. 80C appeal of administrative 
action, and declaratory judgment; and he sought punitive damages, a restraining order, and attorney 
fees.   
 
 
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complaint, and Carey does not state what these “lies” and “embellishments” 
were.   
[¶32]  Newspaper reports of public court filings and proceedings, 
including those proceedings that result in imposition of professional discipline, 
are protected conduct under the First Amendment.  Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975).  In the face of the First Amendment protection, 
allegations to avoid that protection must be stated with particular precision.  
No such precise facts are asserted here.  Even if Carey has presented an 
argument on appeal sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review, we 
conclude that the court did not err in dismissing Carey’s claims against the 
Lewiston Sun Journal pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Seth T. Carey, Esq., L/A Law, Auburn, for appellant Seth T. Carey 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Susan P. Herman, Dep. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellees Office of the Clerk of Courts et al. 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Thomas A. Knowlton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellees Maine Board of Overseers of the 
Bar et al. 
 
Bryan M. Dench, Esq., Stephen B. Wade, Esq., and Amy Dieterich, Esq., Skelton 
Taintor & Abbott, Auburn, for appellee Lewiston Sun Journal 
 
Hillary J. Bouchard, Esq., Thompson Bowie & Hatch LLC, Portland, for appellee 
Matthew J. Donovan 
 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CV-2017-17 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY