Case Title: Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. McClain

Citation: 2003-Ohio-3394

Docket Number: 20022224

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. McClain, 99 Ohio St.3d 248, 2003-Ohio-3394.] 
 
 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. MCCLAIN. 
[Cite as Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. McClain, 99 Ohio St.3d 248, 2003-Ohio-
3394.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension to commence from the 
date of first indefinite suspension — Neglect of entrusted legal matters — 
Failure to cooperate in disciplinary investigation of misconduct. 
(No. 2002-2224 — Submitted February 25, 2003 — Decided July 16, 2003.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 02-10. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Respondent, Mark A. McClain of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0013148, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1982.  
On June 5, 2002, we suspended his license indefinitely for professional 
misconduct.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. McClain, 95 Ohio St.3d 488, 2002-Ohio-
2428, 769 N.E.2d 390 (‘McClain I’).  On September 23, 2002, relator, Cuyahoga 
County Bar Association, filed an amended complaint, charging respondent with 
additional violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  A panel of the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause, making 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation. 
{¶2} 
The panel found that a client contacted respondent’s office in April 
1998 to make an appointment with him to discuss her personal-injury and 
medical- malpractice claims.  The client had initially met with another attorney 
with whom respondent was sharing office space, and respondent discovered the 
client’s file in June or July 1998, after the other attorney had moved out.  In 
December 1998, respondent filed a personal-injury action and a separate 
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malpractice action on the client’s behalf in the Cuyahoga County Court of 
Common Pleas.  He did not, however, answer the client’s repeated inquiries about 
the status of her cases. 
{¶3} 
In July 1999, respondent failed to appear at a case-management 
conference in the personal-injury action.  He also failed to attend a hearing on 
August 17, 1999, at which the court considered dismissing the personal-injury 
action for failure to prosecute.  The court subsequently dismissed the client’s 
lawsuit. 
{¶4} 
Also in July 1999, the court dismissed the client’s malpractice 
action for respondent’s failure to comply with discovery and failure to prosecute.  
Respondent did not timely advise his client of these dismissals and did not perfect 
an appeal in either case.  The statute of limitations for both causes of action 
expired before the client was able to refile them. 
{¶5} 
The panel also found that another client retained respondent in 
May 2000 to represent her in a pending race- and sex-discrimination suit.  
Respondent failed to oppose a motion for summary judgment, which led to the 
court’s dismissal of his client’s case.  Respondent moved for relief from the 
court’s judgment, arguing excusable neglect due to his severe depression, but he 
did not substantiate his medical condition.  The court denied the motion for relief 
from judgment as well as respondent’s motion for leave to respond to the motion 
for summary judgment.  Respondent did not appeal the court’s dismissal order 
before the appeal period expired. 
{¶6} 
The panel found that by abandoning the interests of these clients, , 
respondent committed three violations of DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of an entrusted 
legal matter).  Because respondent also did not reply to some initial attempts to 
investigate this misconduct, the panel also found respondent in violation of 
Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (failure to cooperate in an investigation of misconduct). 
January Term, 2003 
3 
{¶7} 
In recommending a sanction, the panel considered as aggravating 
factors that respondent had a significant history of professional misconduct, 
including previous client neglect and lack of cooperation, had lost causes of 
action that his clients were entitled to pursue, and had not refunded $1,000 paid 
by the client with the discrimination claims.  In mitigation, the panel observed 
that respondent had eventually cooperated with relator, had a good reputation as a 
lawyer, was active in his profession and community, and had been attempting to 
repay money owed due to his earlier misconduct.  In addition, respondent 
established that he was suffering from debilitating mental illness during the events 
at issue and that he continued to be treated for this illness.  The panel found that 
respondent’s mental illness contributed to this misconduct, as well as some of the 
misconduct he committed in the earlier case.  The panel also acknowledged 
respondent’s efforts to recuperate through psychotherapy and medication; 
however, it concluded that, for now, he was incapable of practicing law. 
{¶8} 
The panel recommended that respondent receive an indefinite 
suspension from the practice of law, with the suspension to be served 
concurrently with the indefinite suspension that respondent is currently serving.  
The board adopted the panel’s findings of misconduct and recommendation, 
although it clarified that this indefinite suspension should be deemed to have 
commenced as of June 5, 2002, to coincide with the suspension already in effect. 
{¶9} 
In objections to the board’s findings and recommendation, 
respondent challenges the aggravating effect attributed to his history of 
misconduct.  He contends that because he mentioned his depression diagnosis 
during preliminary proceedings in McClain I and then developed a more complete 
record of his condition in this case, he should have been afforded a mental-illness 
suspension under Gov.Bar R. V(7) in the earlier case and not subjected to formal 
disciplinary measures.  Citing a recent medical report indicating his favorable 
response to therapy, respondent urges us to consolidate this case with McClain I 
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and to issue an order that imposes a one-year suspension, provides credit for time 
served, and allows him to apply for reinstatement to the bar under conditions of 
continued monitoring and medical treatment. 
{¶10} We overrule this objection.  The expedited procedure for 
suspending a mentally ill attorney’s license exists for the protection of the public, 
not as a means for an attorney to avoid disciplinary action.  Cincinnati Bar Assn. 
v. Komarek (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 90, 96, 702 N.E.2d 62.  Thus, even if an 
indefinite summary suspension under Gov.Bar R. V(7) had been issued, it would 
not have resolved any charged disciplinary violations.  Id. 
{¶11} Respondent also insists that his clients were not ‘vulnerable’ 
enough for the harm respondent caused them to be considered as an aggravating 
factor in enhancing his sanction.  See Section 10(B)(1)(h) of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.  Basically, respondent contends 
that his clients’ chances of success were poor so that the loss of their claims for 
relief was not too great.  He also asserts that he earned the $1,000 paid by the 
client with the discrimination claims.  We defer to the board’s findings of fact on 
these issues.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-2490, 
769 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 19. 
{¶12} Beyond this, we agree that respondent committed the cited 
misconduct, and, with the sanction recommended by the board.  To determine the 
appropriate sanction, we consider ‘ ‘the duties violated, the actual injury caused, 
the lawyer’s mental state, the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances, and sanctions imposed in similar cases.’ ‘  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Connors, 97 Ohio St.3d 479, 2002-Ohio-6722, 780 N.E.2d 567, ¶16, quoting 
Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 
N.E.2d 818, ¶16.  An indefinite suspension may be an appropriate sanction for 
repeated neglect caused, at least in part, by mental or emotional illness.  
January Term, 2003 
5 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Golden, 97 Ohio St.3d 230, 2002-Ohio-5934, 778 N.E.2d 
564, ¶ 23-25. 
{¶13} Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended indefinitely from the 
practice of law in Ohio, and, consistent with the board’s recommendation, the 
suspension is deemed to have commenced as of June 5, 2002.  In addition, we 
order respondent to reimburse the client who paid him $1,000 to pursue her 
claims for race- and sex-discrimination.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, WISE and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
JOHN W. WISE, J., of the Fifth Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶14} Because I believe that the respondent’s actions and inactions in 
both cases relate to the same course of conduct caused by his mental illness, I 
would remand both cases to the panel to consider all mitigating evidence of 
mental illness in both cases. 
{¶15} Respondent was before this court previously in Cleveland Bar 
Assn. v. McClain, 95 Ohio St.3d 488, 2002-Ohio-2428, 769 N.E.2d 390 
(‘McClain I’) for violating DR 6-101(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not neglect an 
entrusted legal matter), DR 7-101(A)(1) (a lawyer shall not intentionally fail to 
seek the lawful objectives of a client), DR 7-101(A)(2) (a lawyer shall not fail to 
carry out a contract of professional employment), DR 7-101(A)(3) (a lawyer shall 
not prejudice or damage a client), DR 9-102(B)(4) (a lawyer shall promptly 
deliver to the client funds or property to which the client is entitled), and Gov.Bar 
R. V(4)(G) (no attorney shall neglect or refuse to assist or testify in a disciplinary 
investigation or hearing).  At that time, respondent was indefinitely suspended 
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from the practice of law and ordered to pay restitution.  The infractions in 
Cleveland Bar Assn. v. McClain I took place in 1993, 1994, and 1999. 
{¶16} Sometime in 1997, respondent testified, he began to feel that his 
memory was slipping, so he consulted his physician.  His physician dismissed the 
concerns, telling him that everyone forgets things from time to time.  Respondent 
continued practicing law.  In late 1999, respondent was a prosecutor for the city of 
East Cleveland and was on his way to court when he broke down in tears and 
pulled his car off to the side of the road.  Respondent called the Cleveland Bar 
Association because he was under the impression that it had a program for 
assistance.  The bar association informed respondent that it had no such program 
but directed him to Dr. Donald Weinstein, a psychologist.  Before even pulling 
back onto the road, respondent called Dr. Weinstein and made an appointment. 
{¶17} Dr. Weinstein began treating respondent on January 11, 2000, and 
diagnosed respondent with major depression.  After several sessions, Dr. 
Weinstein believed that respondent’s depression was in part a side effect of 
medication respondent was taking for high blood pressure, so Dr. Weinstein sent 
respondent to his physician.  Respondent’s physician lowered the dose of his 
blood pressure medication, and Dr. Weinstein told respondent that he would 
probably feel better in a couple of months.  Respondent continued his practice. 
{¶18} After respondent realized that he was not feeling better, he spoke 
with a judge, who recommended that he call the Ohio Lawyers Assistance 
Program (‘OLAP’).  Respondent contacted OLAP and was ultimately referred to 
the Cleveland Clinic Psychiatry Department, where he was treated by Dr. Jeffery 
Hutzler. 
{¶19} In a November 2002 letter, Dr. Hutzler stated that based on his 
examination of respondent and review of respondent’s medical history, it was his 
opinion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that respondent suffered 
from a mental illness.  He also believed that respondent’s existing mental illness 
January Term, 2003 
7 
substantially impaired his ability to practice law, even though he had shown 
dramatic improvement.  Dr. Hutzler also stated that respondent ‘has a substantial 
disorder [of] mood and with that memory that grossly impairs judgment, behavior 
and capacity to recognize certain kinds of reality and his ability to meet ordinary 
demands of life, particularly his professional life.’  Finally, Dr. Hutzler concluded 
that respondent ‘certainly has been substantially and severely impaired by his 
mental illness since 1998 or 1997.’ 
{¶20} In 2002, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline considered the charges that are the subject of the present case and 
concluded that respondent’s actions constituted three violations of DR 6-
101(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him) and one 
violation of Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (no attorney shall neglect or refuse to assist or 
testify in a board investigation or hearing).  The board recommended an indefinite 
suspension upon conditions, imposed retroactively to be served concurrently with 
the indefinite suspension imposed June 5, 2002. 
{¶21} Respondent contends that his actions in neglecting client matters in 
McClain I and in this case were caused by his mental illness, major depressive 
disorder.  Respondent submits that this causal connection has been established 
through the reports and opinions of Dr. Bea, Dr. Hutzler, and Dr. Weinstein.  I 
agree. 
{¶22} Dr. Hutzler concluded that respondent has been substantially and 
severely impaired by his mental illness since 1997 or 1998.  The allegations of 
neglect in the present case concerned conduct in 1998 through 2001. 
{¶23} Gov.Bar R. V(7) sets forth the procedure for a mental-illness 
suspension and incorporates the definition of mental illness set forth in R.C. 
5122.01(A), which provides:  ‘ ‘Mental illness’ means a substantial disorder of 
thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment, 
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behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of 
life.’ 
{¶24} Gov.Bar R. V(7)(C) provided: ‘If the complaint or answer alleges 
existing mental illness unsupported by a journal entry of a court of competent 
jurisdiction or mental illness otherwise is placed in issue, the Board or hearing 
panel, on its own motion or on motion by either party, may order a medical or 
psychiatric examination of respondent by one or more physicians designated by 
the Board or hearing panel.” (Emphasis added.)  64 Ohio Official Reports XCIX. 
{¶25} Because respondent has a diagnosed mental illness that dates back 
to 1997 or 1998, he was eligible for a mental illness suspension under Gov.Bar R. 
V(7) when he responded to the Cleveland Bar Association’s Notice of Intent and 
Draft Complaint in 2000, notifying the bar association that he was suffering from 
depression.  The Cleveland Bar Association failed to proceed in accordance with 
Gov.Bar R. V(7)(C), which allows for mental illness suspensions.  In light of this 
failure, I believe that to use respondent’s prior disciplinary case as an aggravating 
factor in determining a sanction in this case is unwarranted and flies in the face of 
the enlightened approach to mental illness intended by Gov.Bar R. V(7). 
{¶26} This is not a case where respondent refused to acknowledge that he 
had a mental illness or refused to seek treatment for that mental illness.  
Respondent reached out to the bar association and attempted to find help.  Sadly, 
our court had not yet established the mental health treatment component of the 
Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program, nor had we yet amended Gov.Bar R.V(7), 
effective February 1, 2003, to allow mental illness to be raised at any stage of the 
proceedings.  In other words, our profession and our disciplinary system did not 
yet have the tools in place to deal with respondent’s mental illness.  We should 
not punish respondent for our slow progress in this area. 
{¶27} Respondent’s neglect of client matters in the current case occurred 
during his severe depression.  Respondent’s actions and inactions in this case and 
January Term, 2003 
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some of his actions and inactions in the former case were caused by his major 
depressive disorder.  This causal connection was established through the reports 
and opinions of Dr. Bea, Dr. Hutzler, and Dr. Weinstein. 
{¶28} I agree with the majority that the expedited procedure for 
suspending the license of an attorney with mental illness exists for the protection 
of the public, not as a means for an attorney to avoid disciplinary action.  
However, in this case, I believe that respondent’s mental illness was a major 
mitigating factor, particularly when his misconduct resulted from neglect, which 
is one of the major symptoms of a depressive disorder—the inability to act.  As 
respondent’s psychiatrist, Dr. Weinstein, wrote, “The paradox about Depression is 
that it becomes incapacitating and overwhelming for the individual suffering. The 
simple function of returning phone calls; writing documents that were at one time 
familiar and simple become overwhelming and frustrating; the carrying out of 
daily routine functions that were [once] simple become action fraught with 
potential failure.  Depression is self fulfilling as a disease.” 
{¶29} I believe that respondent’s behavior in both cases relates to his 
mental illness, and I would remand the cause to the panel to consider all 
mitigating evidence of mental illness in both cases and to recommend a sanction 
based appropriately on that evidence.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Robert J. Vecchio, Tina Wecksler and Ellen S. Mandell, for relator. 
 
Mary L. Cibella, for respondent. 
__________________