Case Title: Sullivan v. Tardiff

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015 ME 121

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2015-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2015 ME 121 
Docket: 
Kno-14-371 
Submitted 
On Briefs: July 23, 2015 
Decided: 
September 3, 2015 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and 
HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
KATHERINE E. (TARDIFF) SULLIVAN 
 
v. 
 
LAWRENCE D. TARDIFF 
 
 
HJELM, J. 
[¶1]  Lawrence D. Tardiff appeals from two post-divorce judgment orders, 
entered by the District Court (Rockland, Worth, J.), modifying Tardiff’s child 
support obligation and granting Katherine E. Sullivan’s motion for contempt.  
Tardiff contends that the court erred when it ordered an increase in his weekly 
child support payment instead of ordering the reduction that he had requested, and 
when it found him in contempt of the divorce judgment and imposed remedial 
sanctions.  We affirm both judgments.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Sullivan and Tardiff were divorced in December 2011 pursuant to a 
divorce judgment entered by the District Court after the parties reached a 
settlement agreement.  The judgment provided that primary residence of the 
 
2 
parties’ minor child would be with Sullivan and that Tardiff would have contact 
with the child at least two days per week.  The judgment also required Tardiff to 
pay $132 per week in child support.  That obligation was a downward deviation, 
by agreement of the parties, from $141 that was calculated pursuant to the child 
support guidelines, see 19-A M.R.S. § 2006 (2010), based on Tardiff’s income of 
$59,497 per year and Sullivan’s reported income of $18,000 per year.  The 
judgment further required that Tardiff pay Sullivan for his proportionate share of 
the child’s daycare expenses and that he pay her $13,500 to equalize the division of 
marital property.1  
 
[¶3]  In October 2012, Sullivan filed a motion for contempt, alleging, among 
other things, that Tardiff had not complied with the divorce judgment by failing to 
pay his share of the child’s daycare expenses, the property settlement, and attorney 
fees.  In January 2013, while Sullivan’s motion for contempt was pending, Tardiff 
filed a motion to modify the judgment, stating that he had lost his job at the Maine 
State Prison and that, as a result, the visitation schedule and child support award 
should be modified.  Sullivan filed an opposition to Tardiff’s motion and a 
cross-motion to modify the provisions of the judgment relating to Tardiff’s contact 
with the child.   
                                         
1  Although the parties agreed to the divorce judgment, Tardiff appealed from it.  We dismissed the 
appeal after Sullivan filed a motion to dismiss that Tardiff did not oppose. 
 
3 
 
[¶4]  Tardiff’s motion to modify and Sullivan’s motion for contempt and 
cross-motion to modify were appropriately consolidated for hearing.  A two-day 
hearing was held in January 2014, and Tardiff and Sullivan both appeared with 
counsel.  A representative of the Department of Corrections, Tardiff’s former 
employer, was also present at the hearing, and she alerted the court that Tardiff had 
received a $24,000 settlement in 2013 after leaving his position with the 
Department—something that Tardiff had not disclosed in his responses to 
Sullivan’s discovery requests.  Moreover, Tardiff failed to file an updated child 
support affidavit and financial statement disclosing this income prior to the 
hearing, even though he was required to do so by M.R. Civ. P. 108(d)(4).  On 
February 13, 2014, the court issued an order adjudicating the parental rights issues 
by denying Tardiff’s motion to modify and granting Sullivan’s cross-motion.2  
Because of the newly disclosed information that Tardiff had received a settlement 
from the Department of Corrections, however, the court, with agreement of the 
parties, deferred its decision on all of the financial issues that were addressed at the 
hearing, stating that “the record remains open on financial issues.” 
                                         
2  In that order, the court awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities to Sullivan and limited 
Tardiff’s contact with the child to supervised visits.  Tardiff appealed the order in June 2014 following 
the court’s denial of his motion for findings of fact.  We affirmed the order in a memorandum of decision 
issued on March 3, 2015.  See Katherine E. (Tardiff) Sullivan v. Lawrence D. Tardiff, Mem-15-18.  We 
therefore do not address Tardiff’s arguments on this appeal that pertain to the court’s February 2014 
order.  
 
4 
 
[¶5]  On July 10 and 11, 2014, the court issued two orders: one modifying 
the child support provisions of the divorce judgment, and the other granting 
Sullivan’s motion for contempt.  With regard to child support, the court entered an 
order finding that there had been a substantial change in circumstances and 
modifying the child support to the amount provided by the child support 
guidelines, see 19-A M.R.S. § 2006 (2014), based on Tardiff having an income of 
$60,700 and Sullivan having an income of $14,016.  Specifically, the court ordered 
that Tardiff’s retroactive 2013 child support obligation would be $152.28 per 
week, see 19-A M.R.S. § 2009(2) (2014) (authorizing child support orders to be 
modified retroactive to the date the motion was served on the opposing party), and 
that his child support obligation for 2014 and beyond would increase to $161.19 
pursuant to the revised child support table that became effective in February 2014, 
see 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-16 to -33 (2014).  
[¶6]  On the motion for contempt, the court found that, although Tardiff was 
no longer working at the prison, he remained capable of working full-time and 
receiving a total of approximately $60,000 per year.  The court also found that, 
contrary to Tardiff’s assertions at the hearing, he had spent a significant amount of 
money in 2013 on online betting and trading sports cards.   
[¶7]  Based on those findings, the court concluded that Tardiff was able to 
comply with the provisions of the divorce judgment that required him to pay the 
 
5 
property settlement, daycare expenses, and attorney fees, and ordered him to pay 
$600 per month towards those obligations beginning immediately.  The court also 
ordered that Tardiff turn over his sports card collection to Sullivan and authorized 
her to sell the items in a commercially reasonable manner and apply the proceeds 
to Tardiff’s outstanding debts to her.  The court further required Tardiff to give 
Sullivan and her attorney access to his bank account information and other 
financial records.  To enforce those orders, the court imposed a remedial sanction 
of ninety days in jail, but suspended the sentence for thirty-six months as long as 
Tardiff complied with the payment obligations created by the order.   
 
[¶8]  Tardiff filed a motion for findings of fact pursuant to M.R. 
Civ. P. 52(b) (Tower 2013) on July 25, 2014,3 which the court denied in December 
2014.  Prior to that, on August 27, 2014,4 Tardiff filed this appeal of the court’s 
                                         
3  The version of M.R. Civ. P. 52(b) in effect when Tardiff filed his motion set a filing deadline of “not 
later than 10 days after notice of findings made by the court.”  M.R. Civ. P. 52(b) (Tower 2013) 
(M.R. Civ. P. 52 was amended to increase the time for filing the motion to fourteen days from entry of the 
judgment, but the amendment did not go into effect until September 1, 2014.  See 2014 Me. Rules 05 
(amending M.R. Civ P. 52) (effective September 1, 2014)).  Here, Tardiff contends that he did not receive 
actual notice of the order and the findings until July 18, 2014.  Because his July 25, 2014, motion was 
filed fewer than ten days “after notice,” see Gosselin v. Better Homes, Inc., 256 A.2d 629, 633 
(Me. 1969), the motion was timely.   
 
4  Even though Tardiff’s appeal had already been docketed, the court was authorized to rule on the 
motion pursuant to M.R. App. P. 3(b)(4).   
 
6 
July 2014 orders modifying child support and granting Sullivan’s motion for 
contempt, bringing both matters before us.5  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Modification of Child Support 
[¶9]  Tardiff first contends that the court erred when, rather than granting his 
motion to reduce child support, it increased his child support obligation from $132 
per week that the parties agreed to in the divorce judgment to $161 per week as 
provided by the child support guidelines.  “We review a child support modification 
for an abuse of discretion and the factual findings underlying the court’s judgment 
for clear error.”  Weston v. Weston, 2012 ME 50, ¶ 11, 40 A.3d 934.  “A party 
moving to decrease the amount of child support . . . must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the decrease is necessitated by a substantial change in 
circumstances that either reduces the payor spouse’s ability to contribute to the 
support of the minor child or reduces the payee spouse’s need to receive support.”  
Jabar v. Jabar, 2006 ME 74, ¶ 13, 899 A.2d 796 (quotation marks omitted).   
[¶10]  Tardiff argues that his separation from employment with the 
Department of Corrections presented a substantial change in circumstances 
warranting a reduction of his child support obligation, and that the court erred by 
                                         
5  Because the filing of a timely motion pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52 tolls the running of the normal 
twenty-one-day appeal period, Tardiff’s appeal is timely even though it was filed more than a month after 
the court issued the two original orders.  See M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3).   
 
7 
attributing to him an annual income of $60,700.  The court based Tardiff’s income 
on his April 2014 child support affidavit, which states that his income for 2013 was 
$60,700.6  His total income for 2013 therefore only represented a slight increase of 
$1,203 from his income of $59,497 at the time of the divorce judgment, and thus 
there was not a substantial change in Tardiff’s financial circumstances between the 
divorce judgment and January 2013, when Tardiff filed the motion to modify.  See 
Twomey v. Twomey, 2005 ME 124, ¶ 15, 888 A.2d 272 (upholding the trial court’s 
finding that the defendant’s new income of $58,500 was “substantially the same” 
as the defendant’s previous income of $60,000).   
[¶11]  Tardiff contends, however, that the court erred when it also 
determined that his earning capacity from employment in 2014 would remain at 
$40,000, which was approximately the amount he had earned annually while 
employed by the Department of Corrections, even though he was actually earning 
only approximately $15,000 annually at his new job at Pen Bay Medical Center.  
Tardiff’s argument calls for us to consider whether the court erred in finding that 
he was voluntarily underemployed, and, after finding that he was, attributing to 
him a total income of $60,000, consisting of approximately $20,000 from his Navy 
pension and imputed employment income of $40,000. 
                                         
6  Following the January 2014 hearing, Tardiff produced additional financial discovery to account for 
the $24,000 of back pay he had received in September 2013 from the Department of Corrections, and he 
also submitted a new child support affidavit in April 2014 to fully reflect his 2013 income.  
 
8 
[¶12]  “It is within the trial court’s discretion to impute earning capacity to a 
parent who the court finds is voluntarily underemployed.”  Koszegi v. Erickson, 
2004 ME 113, ¶ 14, 855 A.2d 1168.  “The determination of whether a party is 
voluntarily underemployed is a question of fact that we review for clear error.”  
Stacey-Sotiriou v. Sotiriou, 2014 ME 145, ¶ 20, 106 A.3d 417 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Here, Tardiff testified that he remained underemployed in order to have 
more time for visitation with the child and that he was “sure there are plenty” of 
available jobs that pay more than his current job at Pen Bay.  He also testified that 
he had not been searching for jobs because he wanted to keep his schedule flexible.  
That testimony is sufficient support for the court’s conclusion that Tardiff was 
voluntarily underemployed. 
[¶13]  Having properly found Tardiff to be voluntarily underemployed, the 
court next determined how much income to impute to him.  In doing so, the court 
was entitled to look at a variety of factors, including his “qualifications, income 
history, and the earning or income opportunities that are reasonably available to 
[him].”  See Wrenn v. Lewis, 2003 ME 29, ¶ 18, 818 A.2d 1005.  Tardiff earned 
$38,147 annually while working at the Maine State Prison, and the court did not 
err in finding that, with Tardiff’s military background and work experience, he was 
capable of finding a similar job with a similar salary.  The court’s finding that 
Tardiff had an earning capacity of approximately $40,000 per year in addition to 
 
9 
his roughly $20,000 military pension, for a total of $60,000, was therefore not 
clearly erroneous, and it did not err when it concluded that there was thus no 
substantial diminution in his ability to pay child support.   
[¶14]  Although Tardiff did not prove a substantial change in his ability to 
pay child support, the court nevertheless found that “[c]ircumstances have changed 
substantially, and it would be appropriate to modify the child support order.”  The 
court did not specify which circumstances had changed substantially, and Tardiff 
contends that finding was erroneous.   
[¶15]  Tardiff moved for further findings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52 and, 
because the court had already issued some findings in support of its decision to 
modify child support, his motion must be viewed as governed by M.R. 
Civ. P. 52(b).  See Young v. Young, 2015 ME 89, ¶ 10 n.3, --- A.3d ---.  Pursuant to 
that Rule, he was required to submit proposed findings on the issues that he wanted 
the court to develop further.  See id.; Bell v. Bell, 1997 ME 154, ¶ 6, 697 A.2d 835 
(stating that, when a judgment contains findings, “it is incumbent on the party to 
set forth specifically any further findings of fact or conclusions of law the party is 
by motion, pursuant to Rule 52, requesting of the court”).  Because Tardiff’s 
motion did not propose any findings regarding whether there was a substantial 
change in circumstances that would warrant an increase in child support payments, 
“we will infer that the trial court made any factual inferences needed to support its 
 
10 
ultimate conclusion.”  Pelletier v. Pelletier, 2012 ME 15, ¶ 20, 36 A.3d 903.  As 
discussed above, the court found that there was no substantial change in Tardiff’s 
financial circumstances.  We therefore can only infer that the court found a 
substantial change in Sullivan’s financial circumstances.  See Twomey, 
2005 ME 124, ¶ 13, 888 A.2d 272.  That finding is supported by the record.   
[¶16]  In the divorce judgment and accompanying child support worksheet, 
Sullivan’s income is listed as $18,000.7  In the modified child support order, the 
court found that Sullivan’s income was $14,016 per year, which was the amount of 
Social Security Disability Insurance benefits that she reported receiving.  There 
was thus a change of approximately $4,000 between the income that was attributed 
to Sullivan in the divorce judgment and the income that she reported in 2014.  
Although a change of $4,000 in absolute numbers may not be considered 
substantial in every circumstance, here it represents a decrease of more than 
20 percent in Sullivan’s income since the divorce judgment.  The court was 
entitled to conclude that, for someone already on the economic margin with an 
income of $18,000, a $4,000 decrease would have a material impact on the need 
for support.  The court’s implicit conclusion that such a decrease represented a 
                                         
7  This figure differs from the information in Sullivan’s 2011 child support affidavit, which states that 
her income for that year was approximately $13,107.  Nonetheless, the parties agreed to the issuance of 
the divorce judgment and the child support worksheet, which means that Tardiff also agreed that 
Sullivan’s income was $18,000.  He cannot now be heard to challenge that figure post hoc.  Additionally, 
the motion court was entitled to rely on the findings in the divorce judgment when determining whether 
there had been a substantial post-judgment change in circumstances. 
 
11 
substantial change in circumstances was therefore not erroneous.8  Because the 
court’s findings regarding the decrease in Sullivan’s income support its conclusion 
that there was a substantial change in circumstances, the court did not err in 
modifying Tardiff’s child support payments.  
B. 
Motion for Contempt 
[¶17]  Tardiff contends that the court erred by finding him in contempt of the 
divorce judgment and by imposing contempt sanctions, including ordering that he 
turn over his sports card collection for sale, ordering that he allow access by 
Sullivan and her attorney to his bank accounts and financial records, and imposing 
a suspended jail sentence contingent upon his compliance with the divorce 
judgment.  “We review the factual findings that form a basis for a court’s decision 
regarding civil contempt for clear error,” and “review the judgment of civil 
contempt for an abuse of discretion.”  Lewin v. Skehan, 2012 ME 31, ¶ 18, 
39 A.3d 58.   
 
[¶18]  In order to find contempt, “the court must find by clear and 
convincing evidence that: (i) the alleged contemnor has failed or refused to 
perform an act required . . . by a court order, and (ii) it is within the alleged 
                                         
8  We recognize that the court’s finding of a substantial change in circumstances modifies the structure 
of the parties’ agreement at the time of the divorce that Tardiff’s child support obligation would be a 
downward deviation from the amount calculated under child support guidelines.  However, when Tardiff, 
the beneficiary of that agreement, filed a motion to modify and asked the court to find a substantial 
change in circumstances, he created the opportunity for the court to recalculate child support based on the 
child support guidelines rather than the agreement of the parties.  
 
12 
contemnor’s power to perform the act required.”  M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(2)(D).  
Tardiff does not dispute that he has not paid daycare fees, attorney fees, and the 
property settlement as required by the divorce judgment.  He does, however, 
contest the court’s finding that he earned or had the capacity to earn at least 
$60,000 and that he has the present ability to meet those obligations.   
[¶19]  The child support affidavit that Tardiff submitted in April 2014, see 
supra n.6, stated that he earned $60,700 in 2013.  Additionally, as we have 
discussed, the record supports the court’s decision to attribute to Tardiff an earning 
capacity of approximately $60,000 for each year thereafter.  The court therefore 
did not err in finding that Tardiff earned enough money—and continues to be able 
to earn enough money—to comply with the divorce judgment and the 
post-judgment payment order.  Moreover, the record supports the court’s finding 
that Tardiff spent a significant amount of money on online betting and eBay 
purchases while not making the required payments to Sullivan, constituting further 
evidence of Tardiff’s ability to comply with the judgment.  Thus, the court did not 
err in finding Tardiff in contempt.    
[¶20]  Tardiff contends that the court also erred when it required him to turn 
over his sports card collection to Sullivan and to allow Sullivan and her attorney 
access to his bank account information and other financial records.  “We review a 
court’s findings made in connection with its remedial order for clear error, and we 
 
13 
review the remedies themselves for an abuse of discretion.”  Hogan v. Veno, 
2006 ME 132, ¶ 18, 909 A.2d 638.   
[¶21]  The court found that, pursuant to the divorce judgment, Tardiff owed 
more than $15,000 to Sullivan, that he had not made any payments since January 
2013, and that he had the ability to pay $600 per month.  It also found that Tardiff 
spent money on his substantial sports card collection when he was required to 
make payments pursuant to the divorce judgment.  Those findings were supported 
by the record, and the court therefore did not abuse its discretion in requiring 
Tardiff to turn over the sports cards to Sullivan.  See M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(3) (“The 
court may also order such additional relief as has heretofore been deemed 
appropriate to facilitate enforcement of orders . . . .”).   
[¶22]  Additionally, the court extensively documented Tardiff’s dishonesty 
and deception, during both discovery and the January 2014 hearing, regarding his 
finances, including his concealment of the 2013 settlement agreement with the 
Department of Corrections, and its findings were supported by the record.  It was 
therefore well within the court’s discretion to order Tardiff to provide Sullivan and 
her attorney access to his bank statements and other financial records in order to 
ensure that Sullivan will be able to obtain reliable third-party information about 
Tardiff’s financial circumstances.  
 
14 
[¶23]  Finally, Tardiff contends that the court abused its discretion when it 
sentenced him to ninety days in jail, which was suspended contingent upon his 
compliance with the order.  Coercive imprisonment is specifically contemplated in 
M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(3)(A) as a remedial sanction for civil contempt.  Tardiff argues, 
however, that, pursuant to the reasoning in Murphy v. Bartlett, 2014 ME 13, ¶ 17, 
86 A.3d 610, coercive imprisonment is improper in this case.  In Murphy, we held 
that the trial court erred in finding that the defendant was currently able to make 
the payments required by a divorce judgment.  See id. ¶ 15.  Because “the 
imposition of coercive imprisonment as a remedy for contempt is premised upon 
the requirement that the contemnor have the ability and opportunity to purge 
himself of contempt,” we held that coercive imprisonment was improper where the 
contemnor could not afford the court-ordered payments.  See id. ¶ 17.   
[¶24]  Here, Tardiff’s earning capacity of $60,000 sufficiently exceeds his 
living expenses to allow him, without hardship, to pay the $600 per month as 
ordered by the court.9  This is in contrast to the situation in Murphy, where the 
defendant’s basic living expenses combined with his obligations pursuant to the 
divorce judgment exceeded his income by approximately $5,000 annually.  Id. 
                                         
9  Based on the living expenses that Tardiff reported in his financial statement, he will have more than 
$1,300 left over every month after paying the amount required by contempt order, child support, and 
living expenses.  
 
15 
¶ 15.  Thus, the court did not err by imposing coercive imprisonment as a sanction 
for Tardiff’s contempt.10 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Lawrence D. Tardiff, appellant pro se 
 
Christopher K. MacLean, Esq., Elliott & MacLean, LLP, 
Camden, for appellee Katherine E. Sullivan 
 
 
 
Rockland District Court docket number FM-2010-59 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
10  Sullivan argues that Tardiff should be sanctioned for filing a frivolous appeal, and that she should 
be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs caused by the appeal pursuant to M.R. App. P. 13(f).  
Although Sullivan correctly states that Tardiff has attempted to relitigate many issues already decided in 
his previous appeal, he also raises new, meritorious arguments regarding the court’s two additional orders 
not addressed there.  The portions of this appeal that arise from the two July 2014 orders are not frivolous, 
and we decline to award sanctions.