Case Title: Richards v. Town of Norwich

Citation: 169 Vt. 44, 726 A.2d 81

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Richards v. Town of Norwich  (98-074); 169 Vt. 44; 726 A.2d 81

[Filed 29-Jan-1999]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as  formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify  the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont  05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to  press.

                                 No. 98-074

Stuart Richards                                  Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Windsor Superior Court

Town of Norwich and	                         September Term, 1998
Paul Z. Nowicki

Alan W. Cheever, J.

       C. Daniel Hershenson of Hershenson, Carter, Scott & McGee, Norwich,
  for Plaintiff- Appellant.

       Laura O'Connor of Miller & Candon, Norwich, for Defendant-Appellee
  Nowicki.

       Gary R. Wieland, White River Junction, for Defendant-Appellee Town of
  Norwich.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Stuart Richards appeals a Windsor Superior Court order
  dismissing  his Rule 75 appeal of the Town of Norwich Selectboard's
  decision authorizing an on-site septic  system permit for Paul Nowicki. 
  Richards argues that he alleged facts in his complaint sufficient  to
  assert standing and, therefore, the superior court erred when it dismissed
  his Rule 75 action for  failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
  granted.  We reverse.

       In 1973, the Town of Norwich ("town") adopted an ordinance ("1973
  ordinance") that  established minimum standards regulating the design,
  construction and installation of new on-site  septic systems to be located
  on any town lot.  The minimum standards were intended to ensure  that waste
  discharged from individual septic systems does not contaminate water,
  create a health  hazard or constitute a nuisance.  The 1973 ordinance also
  included a special-cases provision which  allowed for the issuance of
  permits for septic systems which did not meet the standards, 

 

  if the town septic administrator determined that the substandard septic
  systems were consistent  with the protection of public health and safety.

       Ten years later, the Legislature adopted 24 V.S.A.  3631-3635
  ("state sewage statute")  requiring the Secretary of Natural Resources to
  establish minimum standards for municipal  ordinances regulating on-site
  septic systems.  See 1983, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.).  Under the state  sewage
  statute, a municipality may adopt an ordinance regulating septic systems,
  but it must be  at least as stringent as the minimum standards developed by
  the Secretary of Natural Resources  in order to obtain the approval
  necessary to validate it.  See id. at  3633(b) (requiring  certification
  to that effect by Department of Environmental Conservation).

       The town amended the 1973 ordinance in 1994 and adopted a modified
  septic ordinance  ("modified ordinance") even though the design
  specifications in the modified ordinance did not  satisfy the state minimum
  standards and were not approved by the Department of Environmental 
  Conservation.  The non-compliance provision remained unaltered in the
  modified ordinance.  In  1996, Paul Nowicki, a resident of the town, filed
  an application for a permit to install a new on- site septic system on his
  residential lot.  His proposed septic system did not meet the minimum 
  standards established by the modified ordinance.  Nowicki requested and was
  granted approval  of his septic system pursuant to the special-cases
  provision.

       Stuart Richards appealed the decision authorizing Nowicki's
  sub-standard septic system  to the Norwich selectboard.  He complained that
  the septic administrator could not issue a permit  for a septic system that
  failed to comply with the design specifications set out in the modified 
  ordinance or the state minimum standards.  After a hearing, in which
  Richards participated, the  selectboard upheld the Nowicki septic system
  permit.

       In April 1997, Richards filed a complaint in the superior court
  pursuant to V.R.C.P. 75  and the Declaratory Judgments Act, 12 V.S.A. 
  4711-4725, seeking review of the selectboard's  decision.  Richards'
  complaint alleges that Nowicki's proposed septic system fails to meet state 
  and local minimum standards governing the design, construction and
  installation 

 

  of new on-site septic systems and, therefore, has the potential to
  contaminate water, constitute a  health hazard and create an olfactory
  nuisance.  The complaint further alleges that Richards is the  owner of
  land directly abutting the property where Nowicki intends to install his
  proposed septic  system.   Subsequently, Nowicki filed a motion to dismiss
  pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and  12(b)(6).  The superior court granted
  the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the case.

       In its order granting Nowicki's motion, the court stated that on the
  face of the complaint,  a plaintiff must allege at least the threat of an
  injury in fact to some protected interest in order to  establish standing
  to seek declaratory relief.  The court held that Richards did not satisfy
  the  standing requirements for a declaratory judgment action because he did
  not allege any threat of  actual injury and "Rule 75 does not cure the
  deficiency."  The present appeal followed.

                                     I.

       As a threshold matter, we must determine whether Richards has the
  right under Rule 75  to appeal the selectboard's decision before we can
  decide whether the superior court erred in  granting Nowicki's Rule
  12(b)(6) motion.  Nowicki argues that Richards is not entitled to a Rule 
  75 appeal of the selectboard's decision because he seeks review of issues
  of fact.

       In relevant part, Rule 75 permits the appeal of (1) any action by a
  political subdivision of  the state, including any board, (2) which is not
  appealable under Rule 74, (3) if review is  otherwise available by law. 
  See V.R.C.P. 75(a).  This Court has interpreted the Rule 75  requirement
  that review must be "otherwise available by law" to include situations
  where review  was formerly available through a writ of certiorari.  See
  Vermont State Employees' Ass'n, Inc.,  v. Vermont Criminal Justice Training
  Council, 167 Vt. 191, 195,