Case Title: Kreuter v. Kreuter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kreuter v. Kreuter1986 WY 211728 P.2d 1129Case Number: 86-111Decided: 12/10/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Susan Elizabeth KREUTER, 
now Susan Elizabeth Disney, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

Jeffrey John KREUTER, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, CrookCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

Fred W. Phifer, 
Wheatland, for 
appellant.

Mark L. Hughes 
of Hughes & Dumbrill, Sundance, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., BROWN, CARDINE, URGIBKIT, 
JJ., and RAPER, J., Retired.

RAPER, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     The district judge, 
following a hearing, denied appellant's Motion for Modification of a divorce 
decree with respect to the custody of the child of the 
parties.

[¶2.]     Appellant states the 
issues to be:

"1. Was Appellant[']s 
agreement to allow Plaintiff to have custody of the parties['] minor child 
obtained by fraud and duress?

"2. Did the Court abuse 
it's [sic] discretion in finding there has not been sufficient change in 
circumstances since the Decree of Divorce was entered to warrant a change in 
custody?

"3. Would a change in 
custody to her mother be in the best interests of the child, Amber 
Kreuter?"

[¶3.]     Appellee believes the 
issues are: 

"I. WAS APPELLANT'S AGREEMENT TO GRANT APPELLEE CUSTODY OF 
THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILD OBTAINED BY FRAUD AND DURESS?

"II. WAS THERE SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE REGARDING CUSTODY OF 
THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILD PURSUANT TO WYOMING STATUTE § 20-2-113(a) [Cum.Supp. 
1986]?"

[¶4.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶5.]     The parties each filed 
a complaint for divorce on the same date, for temporary custody, alimony, child 
support, and attorney's fees. Appellant dismissed her proceedings and executed a 
property settlement, child custody, and support agreement, which granted custody 
to appellee. Entry of default was had, and a decree of divorce was entered 
shortly thereafter. Such decree approved the agreement entered into and its 
provisions were incorporated into the decree of divorce.

[¶6.]     Section 20-2-113(a), 
W.S. 1977, Cum. Supp. 1986,1 provides for modification of 
provisions for custody and support in divorce decrees but the "circumstances" 
there referred to must be a substantial or material change of circumstances 
which outweigh society's interest in applying the doctrine of res judicata to a 
final decree of divorce. There must be an end to litigation at some point, or 
the legal system would become bogged down so that nothing would ever remain 
decided. Mentock v. Mentock, 
Wyo., 638 P.2d 156 (1981). The 
burden of proof lies with the party seeking the modification that a substantial 
or material change has occurred subsequent to the decree. Nuspl v. Nuspl, Wyo., 717 P.2d 341 
(1986); Cubin v. Cubin, Wyo., 685 P.2d 680, 684 
(1984).

[¶7.]     Decisions regarding 
child support and custody rest largely with the district court which we will not 
disturb in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion or violation of some legal 
principle. Nuspl v. Nuspl, supra; Harrington v. Harrington, Wyo., 660 P.2d 356, 360 
(1983).

[¶8.]     Remarriage by one of 
the divorced parents, standing alone, does not constitute a material change in 
circumstances sufficient to justify a change of custody. The best interests of 
the child are the paramount consideration in determining custody of a child. If 
changes in custody are made with every change in marital status of divorced 
parents, the lives of children of broken homes would be made miserable through 
recurrent efforts of parents to satisfy their own desires to have custody, and 
the paramount purpose would be defeated. This is particularly true where both 
parents are good and proper parents to have custody. Laughton v. Laughton, 71 
Wyo. 506, 259 P.2d 1093 (1953).

"* * * emotional 
involvement of the parties tends to, in their eyes, magnify out of proportion 
the importance of all matters in connection therewith." Harrington v. 
Harrington, supra, 660 P.2d  at 361.

[¶9.]     We now apply the 
foregoing settled principles of law to the record and facts, adding such further 
citations and facts as may appear necessary.

I

[¶10.]  Appellant at the time of filing her 
complaint for divorce was represented by counsel. She was not employed and had 
no funds for attorney's fees, but was advised by her counsel that she could seek 
attorney's fees from her husband, but if not allowed by the court, she would be 
required to pay them from funds she would have to obtain from wherever she 
could.

[¶11.]  At the time appellant's complaint for 
divorce was filed, she did not know that her husband had preceded her in filing 
a complaint for divorce. Both requested custody of the child of their marriage, 
a daughter one year of age.

[¶12.]  Appellant testified that appellee had 
given her money to go for groceries at a nearby town. While returning, she 
observed her husband driving down the highway in the opposite direction with 
their daughter with him. Appellant thought at the time he was going after some 
building material. She later determined from a note left by the appellee that he 
was on his way to his mother's home in Minnesota.

[¶13.]  Appellant further testified that when 
appellee returned from Minnesota, he did not get in touch with her 
but she found out when she called his employer that he was back. He had 
arranged, prior to departing, for a trailer home and was living there with their 
daughter and his mother who had returned with him.

[¶14.]  Appellant asserts that appellee and his 
mother kept after her to sign the necessary papers, so he could go ahead with 
the divorce and have custody of their daughter. It is the claim of appellant 
that she was threatened by appellee that if she did not sign, her name would be 
"blackened" around town. This is disputed by appellee who testified that he had 
only told her he was going to fight hard to obtain 
custody.

[¶15.]  Appellant's further claim was that 
appellee had represented to her that they would get together again and both 
would then have their daughter. Appellee denied such representations and stated 
that he had never made promises to do so.

[¶16.]  Appellant eventually requested her 
attorney to dismiss her divorce action and signed the agreement. She did not 
have advice of counsel nor was he present when she signed the 
agreement.

[¶17.]  In explaining why she signed the 
agreement she testified she had no money, she had no place right then, and did 
not know where she would be and when she did, it would be "for temporary." She 
further testified that she knew appellee would not hurt her daughter and wanted 
to leave her with him, because the child had those necessities which she 
(appellant) could not provide. She has remarried and can now provide a 
home.

[¶18.]  No serious question arose as to whether 
either of the parents was now unfit to have custody.

[¶19.]  Aligning the law and the facts, the trial 
judge was correct in all respects in finding no material change in the 
circumstances of the parents which would justify a change of custody of their 
child. The district court did not abuse its discretion.2 We consider this disposition 
reasonable under the circumstances.

[¶20.]  In summary then, the only change is her 
remarriage and that, alone, is not a material change, particularly when both 
parties to a divorce are fit parents. That the child is a little girl is no 
consideration in the light of § 20-2-113(a), supra, stating that "no award of 
custody shall be made solely on the basis of gender of the parent." The best 
interests of the child are being served, as is the judicial principle of 
finality in its decrees.

II

[¶21.]  With respect to the issue of fraud, the 
appellant asserted that the agreement for custody of the minor child in appellee 
was obtained by fraud and duress imposed by appellee and his mother upon 
appellant with assurances that the parties would remarry and that if appellant 
did not agree, appellee and his mother would "blacken her name all over town and 
obtain custody anyway."

[¶22.]  Rule 60(b)(3), W.R.C.P., provides for 
relief from a final judgment or proceeding for: "fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of 
an adverse party;".

[¶23.]  While Rule 60(b) is a method by which a 
judgment or proceeding may be attacked, we fail to find it cited anywhere in the 
district court files and transcript, though both counsel agreed in oral argument 
to this court that the fraud issue was tried to the trial court. While not 
cited, its principles and authority are applicable for setting aside a decree of 
the district court in whole or in part, on the basis of the fraud alleged and 
proved to have occurred.

[¶24.]  While the trial judge never uses the 
words "fraud", "misrepresentation", or "other misconduct", it is obvious that he 
found that none of those conditions were present, even though he makes no direct 
reference to the language of the rule. For example, in his oral holding and 
written order, he stated that the evidence disclosed that when appellant filed 
her complaint for divorce, she was aware of her right to counsel and to seek 
custody of the child, support for herself, her child, and attorney's fees from 
her husband. The trial judge further found that appellant 
had

"voluntarily entered into a Property 
Settlement, Child Custody and Support Agreement based upon the petitioner's 
[appellant's] belief it would be in the child's best interest for the father to 
have custody of the parties' minor child as he could provide for her basic needs 
and his family, friends, relatives, etc. were in the 
area."

[¶25.]  There is substantial evidence in the 
record to support the trial judge's findings. This court has had occasion to 
deal with Rule 60(b) in the context of a divorce case in which fraud and 
misconduct were questions; the court after citation of authority in McBride v. 
McBride, Wyo., 598 P.2d 814, 816-817 (1979), stated that:

"* * * Since the granting 
of relief pursuant to that rule is a matter of the exercise of discretion by the 
trial court, on review the appellate court is limited to the question of whether 
there has occurred an abuse of the trial court's discretion. It was the 
appellant's burden before the trial court to bring her cause within the claimed 
grounds for relief and to substantiate by adequate proof the grounds that she 
claimed for relief. The rule applies to special situations justifying 
extraordinary relief, but a showing of such exceptional circumstances should be 
made. A reversal of an order denying relief under Rule 60(b) will be ordered 
only if the trial court clearly was wrong.

* * * * * 
*

"* * * fraud must clearly 
be established by adequate proof."

See also Lewis 
v. Lewis, Wyo., 716 P.2d 347, 351, 
supra.

[¶26.]  We are not convinced that the trial court 
abused its discretion or that appellant carried her burden of proving fraud by 
clear proof.

[¶27.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. § 20-2-113 in 
pertinent part:

"§ 20-2-113. Disposition 
and provision for children in decree; * * *.

"(a) In granting a 
divorce or annulment of a marriage, the court may make such disposition of the 
children as appears most expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the 
children. The court shall consider the relative competency of both parents and 
no award of custody shall be made solely on the basis of gender of the parent. 
On the petition of either of the parents, the court may revise the decree 
concerning the care, custody and maintenance of the children as the 
circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children 
requires."

2 In Lewis v. Lewis, Wyo., 716 P.2d 347, 351 (1986), there was laid 
out the rule of this court with respect to determining when there has been an 
abuse of discretion:

"`A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances.' Booker v. Booker, Wyo., 626 P.2d 561, 563 (1981) (quoting Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980))."