Case Title: BARZELLONE v. PRESLEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 102427

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
BARZELLONE v. PRESLEY  BARZELLONE v. PRESLEY 2005 OK 86 126 P.3d 588 Case Number: 102427 Decided: 11/29/2005 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA TIMOTHY M. BARZELLONE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. PATRICIA PRESLEY, in her capacity as the Oklahoma County Court Clerk, Defendant/Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY ¶0 The plaintiff/appellant, Timothy M Barzellone, filed a class action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the $349.00 jury fee imposed by AFFIRMED. David L. Thomas, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for plaintiff/appellant, Richard N. Mann, Assistant District Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Timothy E. Rhodes, Oklahoma County Court Clerk's Office, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for defendant/appellee Kenneth G. Cole, Burch & George, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for amicus curiae, Oklahoma Trial Lawyers Association. WATT, C.J.: ¶1 Three issues are presented on appeal. The first is whether the imposition of a jury fee violates the Okla. Const. art. 2, §19 ¶2 We determine that the collection of jury fees, which may be charged as a prerequisite to accepting the first motion to enter for filing and docketing in a pending action, is constitutional under art. 2, §§6 and 19 of the Oklahoma Constitution. This holding conforms with the teachings of Barnes v. Smith, ¶3 The Constitution was never intended to guarantee the right to litigate entirely without expense to the litigants, nor to impose upon the public the entire burden of the expense of the maintenance of the courts. ¶4 The highest courts in three states have addressed the issue of whether jury fees must be returned where jury service is not ultimately required. The sole decision requiring a refund has been limited by subsequent opinions and by the general practice of the state. UNDISPUTED FACTS ¶5 On March 5, 2004, Barzellone filed a class action challenging the constitutionality of the $349.00 jury fee imposed by ¶6 Barzellone moved for summary judgment. In response, the court clerk filed an objection to the motion and filed for summary judgment. The court clerk argued that the fee statute was not unconstitutional and that she was required to collect the fee both under the statutory provision and pursuant to Administrative Directive 2003-79 issued on October 20th, 2003. ¶7 On July 14, 2005, after a hearing, the trial court overruled Barzellone's motion and granted the court clerk summary judgment. Barzellone filed his petition in error and motion to retain on August 12, 2005. The motion was granted on the 30th and the parties were ordered to file briefs. The order setting the briefing schedule also notified the Attorney General of the filing of the appeal attacking the constitutionality of state statutes. The order informed the Attorney General DISCUSSION ¶8 a. The collection of jury fees is constitutional under the Oklahoma Constitution, art. 2, §§6 and 19. ¶9 Although Barzellone seems most concerned with the amount of the jury fee, he also argues that the guarantee of art. 2, §19 ¶10 The court clerk did not address the constitutional arguments in the brief in chief or in the reply. Nevertheless, we presume her position to be in opposition to that of Barzellone and the Association. ¶11 As early as 1917, the Court determined that the collection of a $25.00 docketing fee to be deducted from a non-refundable advance payment to the Supreme Court Clerk of $40.00 dollars in appellate cases was not a sale or denial of justice ¶12 The controversy in Barnes v. Smith, ¶13 Royalpark-Moore v. Hubbard, ¶14 This Court has upheld a variety of fees, either collected by the court clerk or taxed as costs, against constitutional challenge. ¶15 Most recently, in Mehdipour v. State ex rel. Dept. of Corrections, ¶16 Almost uniformly, courts faced with the issue of the constitutionality of jury fee collection statutes have upheld the collections. ¶17 b. The amount of the jury fee imposed by ¶18 Having determined that the imposition of a jury fee is not unconstitutional, we now address Barzellone's and the Association's contentions that the $349.00 fee imposed by 28 O.S. Supp. 2004 §152.1(A)(7)29 is too high. They argue that the fee unreasonably limits the access to justice guaranteed by the Okla. Const. art. 2, §630 and art. 2, §19's31 promise of an inviolate right to jury trial.32 ¶19 Historically, the pre-payment of jury fees ranging from $6.00 to $100.00 has been upheld against constitutional attack.33 Over ten years ago, Maine's highest court ruled that the imposition of a $300.00 jury fee did not unreasonably restrict the right to a civil jury trial, violate due process or deny the parties equal protection.34 ¶20 The constitutional requirement to waive court fees in civil cases is the exception, not the general rule.35 In determining what is reasonable within the realm of assessments for jury fees, a court may presume that the amount set is to be determined by the legislative branch and that the amount, so promulgated, is fair unless it is so high that it operates as a practical prohibition of the right.36 A commonly used practice for determining the reasonableness of jury fees is to compare the fee charged with the jury compensation expended in an average length civil proceeding.37 It is also generally understood that the payments for the jury's time are only one of the costs of conducting a jury trial.38 Statutory jury fees also cover the time of the court personnel, the judge, the clerk, and the court reporter, among others. Office machines and supplies must be made available and utilities must be paid. These are only some of the many expenses involved in running a courtroom and these costs are constantly on the rise.39 ¶21 Several studies indicate that the median length of jury trials averages three days40 and that jury proceedings last forty percent (40%) longer than non-jury trials.41 Furthermore, the failure to impose substantial fees systematically results in the overuse of jury dockets.42 Finally, there is no requirement that the courts calculate whether a specific individual has suffered burdens in excess of the benefits of government services.43 By imposing a fee for the empaneling of a jury, clearly the Legislature intends the fee to defray generally the cost of the jury system and not just the expense of a particular jury's services provided to the party paying the fee.44 ¶22 Oklahoma jurors are entitled to $20.00 for each day's attendance before any court of record. ¶23 In Oklahoma, the purpose of the jury fee is to reimburse the state for the expenses incurred in providing and maintaining all of the officers and other facilities of the court, and is intended as compensation to the state for services rendered -- not by the clerk only, but by the entire court. ¶24 The right to obtain justice does not mean that litigation may be conducted free of reasonable fees. ¶25 Fees which are not unduly burdensome cannot be said to abridge the otherwise fundamental right to jury trial. ¶26 We note that on September 23, 2005, the Court of Civil Appeals issued an opinion destined for publication by order of that court, ¶27 c. The $349.00 jury fee collected pursuant to ¶28 Title 28 O.S. Supp. 2004 §152.1(A)(7)59 is silent on the issue of retaining the $349.00 jury fee where jury services are not required.60 Fairly comprised within Barzelone's arguments is an assertion that the Legislature did not intend for retention of the fee when no jury trial occurs. We disagree. ¶29 Barzellone relies primarily on State v. Graf, 72 Wis.2d 179, 240 N.W.2d 387 , 391 (1976). Graf was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. He entered a plea of not guilty and demanded a jury trial. The Wisconsin Court determined that Graf was entitled to a jury trial and that prepayment of jury fees and other costs as a condition for a jury trial in a civil forfeiture action was not a violation of the constitutional preservation of the right to jury trial. Nevertheless, the Graf Court held that retention of the fees and costs against a successful defendant was unconstitutional. It reached this result because jury fees were a cost assumed by the unsuccessful prosecution in criminal and quasi-criminal actions prior to Wisconsin's statehood. ¶30 Graf is distinguishable both on the law and on the facts. The genesis of Barzelone's suit does not center on a claim involving a criminal or quasi-criminal action. Rather, he seeks a declaration that the Oklahoma Constitution forbids the retention of the $349.00 jury fee charge imposed by 28 O.S. Supp. 2004 §152.1(A)(7)61 in civil actions. Furthermore, Graf has been overruled on the issue of the constitutional right to a jury trial in forfeiture actions.62 Finally, despite the Wisconsin Court's pronouncement, as a matter of practice, fees are not refunded in that state.63 ¶31 In re Lee, 1917 OK 458, 168 P. 53 involved the issue of whether the collection of a $25.00 docketing fee to be deducted from a non-refundable advance payment to the Supreme Court Clerk of $40.00 in appellate cases was a sale or denial of justice within the meaning of art. 2, §6.64 In determining that such fees did not violate Oklahoma's Constitution, the Lee Court took an even longer historical view than was applied in Graf. Lee considered the Magna Carta in explaining that provisions similar to art. 2, §6 were not intended to prohibit the collection of reasonable fees. Rather, the provision prohibited practices of the Exchequer Madox where fines were paid for the purpose of speeding up or slowing down litigation or to guarantee the outcome of a cause. ¶32 Research reveals two other well-reasoned opinions that have addressed the issue of whether a party who has paid a jury-demand fee is entitled to a refund of the fee when the case is terminated without the services of a jury. Neither of these courts aligned themselves with Graf. ¶33 In Fried v. Danaher, 46 Ill. 2d 475 , 263 N.E.2d 820 , appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902, 91 S. Ct. 1382, 28 L. Ed. 2d 643 (1971), the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the practice of retaining jury demand fees was consistent, long-continued and reasonable. The Illinois statute, like 28 O.S. Supp. 2004 §152.1(A)(7), made no provision for a refund and did not speak to retention of the fee. Nevertheless, the Fried Court determined that the most reasonable interpretation of the statutory language was recognition of a legislative intent that the fee be utilized to defray generally the cost of the jury system and not just the expense of a particular jury's services to a denominated party paying the fee. At all times, the party submitting the fee was entitled to a jury trial. Whether those services were ultimately utilized was based on the party's conscious decision. ¶34 Maine's highest court applied strict scrutiny in Butler v. Supreme Judicial Court, 611 A.2d 987 (1992) in holding that requiring civil litigants who demanded, but did not use juries, to pay the same fee as those who did use the jury system did not violate equal protection. The Butler Court reasoned that: 1) providing a civil jury trial system was a compelling state objective; 2) requiring absolute equivalence between the fee charged and the benefit received was impractical; and 3) the act of requesting a jury trial caused administrative and maintenance costs to the system. Applying the rational basis standard of review, the Maine Court found no constitutional barrier to collection of the fee from all who demanded a jury trial -- but who did not use the procedure -- did not violate equal protection because payment of a reasonable fee for the service was a rational method of maintaining the civil jury system. ¶35 Unlike its counterpart, 28 O.S. Supp. 2004 §152,65 which specifically provides that none of the flat fees charged in civil cases "shall ever be refundable," §152.1 is silent on the issue of whether fees collected may be refunded or, if so, the circumstances which would allow their disbursement. However, subsection (B) of §152.166 requires, in clear and mandatory language,67 that a portion of the jury fee collected be forwarded to the credit of the Child Abuse Multidisciplinary Account (Account). The Legislature's intent that the jury fees collected not be refundable is made clear by statutory provisions governing the Account -- 10 O.S. Supp. 2002 §7110.1(A)(3) and subsection (B)(2),68 respectively, provide that: 1) all monies accruing to the Account are appropriated, budgeted and expended by the Department of Human Services (DHS); and 2) the monies shall at no time become monies of the state, part of the DHS's or any other Department or state agency's budget, or be transferrable to any other state agency or account of the Department, or be utilized to reimburse any other state agency for any expense. The Court Clerk has no avenue to retrieve the portion of the fee transferred to the Account. If the Legislature had intended a refund, it would be a full, not a partial, return of the fees collected. ¶36 Graf's efficacy has been limited both by a subsequent decision of the Wisconsin court and by the general practice in the state. Additionally, it does not coincide with the Lee Court's determination that a non-refundable filing fee passed constitutional muster. The better reasoned opinions in Fried and Danaher are more consistent with both Lee and the expressed legislative intent found in the interplay between 28 O.S. Supp. 2004 §152.1(A)(7) and 10 O.S. Supp. 2002 §7110.1 that jury fees be non-refundable. ¶37 It would be unreasonable to require the return of jury fees, especially when a number of cases are "settled on the courthouse steps" and after potential jurors have been called to service. To do so would create a bookkeeping nightmare for court clerks and thereby increase the administrative costs associated with handling of causes set for jury trial. There is no legislative avenue available to retrieve the portion of the fees forwarded to the Child Abuse Multidisciplinary Account.69 ¶38 The Legislature is never presumed to have acted vainly or uselessly in enacting laws.70 Clearly, in requiring the pre-payment of jury fees, the Legislature intended to defray governmental costs rather than to create a system which would increase revenue outlays. We determine that the $349.00 jury fee imposed by 28 O.S. Supp. 2004 §152.1(A)(7) is not subject to refund if jury services are not utilized. CONCLUSION ¶39 This opinion should not be read as a rubber stamp for any decision the Legislature might make on the amount of fees levied in association with jury trials. The Oklahoma Constitution does not anticipate that litigants will be burdened with the entire bill for maintenance of the court system.71 Our research indicates that Oklahoma's jury trial charges may be the highest in the nation to have been put to the "reasonableness test".72 The constitutional right to a jury trial is a personal right73 which the Legislature cannot waive74 through creating a fiscal barrier so unreasonable as to eliminate the right itself. When comparing the jury fee charge with a jury proceeding utilizing 6 jurors, it would appear that the $349.00 fee charge approaches the barrier beyond which the charge could not survive constitutional scrutiny. ¶40 Nevertheless, we recognize that a statute is the solemn act of the Legislature.75 Although the Supreme Court is the protector of the constitution,76 in construing the constitutionality of a statute we are not authorized to consider its propriety, wisdom, or practicability as a working proposition. Those questions are clearly and definitely established by our fundamental law to a certainty as functions of the legislative department.77 This Court has a duty to interpret statutes to make their application constitutional rather than unconstitutional.78 We uphold legislative enactments unless the statute is clearly, palpably and plainly inconsistent with the constitution.79 ¶41 Applying these principles, considering Oklahoma jurisprudence and the majority position, we hold that the collection of a jury fee, as contemplated by AFFIRMED. WATT, C.J., WINCHESTER, V.C.J., LAVENDER, OPALA, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR, COLBERT, JJ. - concur. KAUGER, J. - concurs in result. HARGRAVE, J. - concurs in part, dissents in part. FOOT