Case Title: Illinois Casualty Co. v. Burciaga

Citation: 

Docket Number: 23S-PL-00180

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2024-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 23S-PL-180 
Illinois Casualty Company, 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
–v– 
B&S of Fort Wayne Inc., Showgirl III, Inc., Reba 
Enterprises LLC, Jessica Burciaga, Jessica Hinton, 
Jamie Middleton Eason, Lucy Pinder, Abigail 
Ratchford, Emily Scott, Denisa Trlica, Sara 
Underwood, Jennifer Walcott Archuletta, Paola 
Canas, Camila Davalos, Mariana Davalos, Jaime 
Edmondson, Cielo Jean Gibson, Hillary Hepner, 
Krystal Hipwell, Melanie Iglesias, Joanna Krupa, 
Arianny Celeste Lopez, Brooke Marrin, Ursula Mayes, 
Carrie Minter, Anya Monzikova, Andra Cheri 
Moreland, Caitlin O’Connor, Lina Posada, Laurie 
Romeo, Ina Schnitzer, Cora Skinner, Alana Souza, 
Irina Voronina, Jennifer Zharinova, and Rachel 
Koren.  
Appellees (Defendants below).  
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jun 10 2024, 1:40 pm
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Argued: October 10, 2023 | Decided: June 10, 2024 
Appeal from the Allen Superior Court 
No. 02D02-2107-PL-273 
The Honorable Craig J. Bobay, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
22A-PL-432 
Opinion by Justice Massa 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Slaughter and Molter concur. 
Justice Goff concurs in result and dissents in part with separate opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Massa, Justice. 
Who decides? That is the fundamental question before us today. Of 
course, the answer depends on who decides what. See First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (explaining that “‘who has 
the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon what the parties 
agreed about that matter”). If we are talking generally about arbitration 
agreements, courts can determine whether one “exists.” Henry Schein, Inc. 
v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63, 69 (2019). But if we are talking 
more specifically about threshold arbitrability—the power to decide 
whether a dispute must be first resolved by arbitration—parties may 
choose to delegate that matter to an arbitrator through agreement. Id. at 67–
68. To establish an intent to delegate arbitrability, the parties must also 
satisfy the “clear and unmistakable evidence” requirement, an additional 
interpretive rule imposed by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 72 
(citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 944). 
Today, Illinois Casualty Company (“ICC”) and thirty-three Models 
contest on the surface whether arbitration is proper based on the 
assignment of several business insurance policies that ICC issued to B&S 
of Fort Wayne, Inc., Showgirl III, Inc., and Reba Enterprises, LLC 
(collectively, “Insured Clubs”). But on a deeper level, this case is about 
whether the parties agreed to have an arbitrator, rather than the courts, 
resolve whether their arbitration agreement requires arbitration. Here, 
two questions exist: First, does the incorporation of American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”) rules constitute “clear and unmistakable” intent to 
delegate arbitrability to an arbitrator? Second, did ICC and the Insured 
Clubs—and the Models by way of assignment—agree to arbitrate 
arbitrability for the claims asserted by each Model?  
We address each issue in sequence. First, we hold, as a matter of first 
impression in Indiana, that an agreement to arbitrate in accordance with 
AAA or similar rules reflects “clear and unmistakable” evidence of an 
intent to delegate arbitrability to an arbitrator. Our rule adopted today 
tracks most jurisdictions to have answered this question left open by the 
Supreme Court in Henry Schein. But applying our rule to the agreement 
here yields a nuanced disposition, which leads to our second point. For 
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2016 and later claims, the trial court must defer to the arbitrator because 
the agreement incorporates the AAA rules. But because no agreement to 
arbitrate existed between ICC and the Insured Clubs before 2016, the 
Models cannot compel arbitration for claims deriving from this period.  
We affirm in part and reverse in part.  
 
Facts and Procedural History 
The Models are from around the globe, but their alleged injuries took 
place from acts taken by strip clubs in Ft. Wayne, where the Models had 
no prior affiliation or connection. The Models allege the Insured Clubs 
obtained their pictures and converted them into social media 
advertisements without the Models’ approval between December 2014 
and October 2020.  
In October 2020, eight of the thirty-three Models filed a complaint 
against the Insured Clubs in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Indiana. They alleged that the Insured Clubs wrongly 
used their images and likenesses without authorization or payment, 
asserting claims (1) under the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, (2) 
under Indiana's Right of Publicity Law, Ind. Code § 32-36-1, and (3) for 
unjust enrichment. They later added other Models to the suit.  
Of course, the Insured Clubs had insurance policies protecting them 
from the risk and cost of litigation. So they tendered the suit to ICC for 
defense and indemnification. Until this point, ICC had issued ten 
“Businessowners” insurance policies (“Policies”) to the Insured Clubs for 
coverage between 2014 and 2020.1 Each of the Policies contained similar 
language guaranteeing that ICC would pay the “sums” if the Insured 
 
1 These included: (1) annual policies to Showgirl with effective dates of November 15, 2014, 
through November 15, 2016, and August 29, 2017, through August 29, 2018; (2) annual 
policies to B&S with effective dates of October 16, 2014, through October 16, 2019; and (3) 
annual policies to Reba Enterprises with effective dates of August 29, 2018, through August 
29, 2020.  
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Clubs became “legally obligated to pay as damages” resulting from 
“bodily injury,” “property damage,” or “personal and advertising injury.” 
Appellant’s App. Vol. IX, p. 106. ICC agreed to defend them “against any 
‘suit’ seeking those damages.” Id. 
In 2016, ICC added a Cyber Protection Endorsement (“CPE”) that 
limited the personal and advertising injury coverage. The CPE, relevant 
here, included the following arbitration clause: 
Notwithstanding any provision of this form or the Policy, 
any irreconcilable dispute between us and an “insured” is to 
be resolved by arbitration in accordance with the then 
current rules of the American Arbitration Association, 
except that the arbitration panel shall consist of one 
arbitrator selected by the “insured,” one arbitrator selected 
by us, and a third independent arbitrator selected by the first 
two arbitrators. Judgment upon the award may be entered in 
any court having jurisdiction. The arbitrator has the power 
to decide any dispute between us and the “insured” 
concerning the application or interpretation of this form. 
However, the arbitrator shall have no power to change or 
add to the provisions of this form. The “insured” and us will 
share equally in the cost of arbitration.  
Appellant’s App. Vol. IV, p. 136. Because the CPE was added in 
2016, it only applied to six of the ten Policies.  
In response to the suit, ICC twice sent coverage denial letters, 
disclaiming any defense or obligations related to the Models’ suit. After 
ICC’s last round of letters, the Insured Clubs and the Models entered into 
a Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”), effective May 25, 2021. The 
Agreement assigned the Insured Clubs’ “rights, claims, and causes of 
action against ICC” to the Models. Appellant’s App. Vol. IX, p. 188. The 
release, payment, assignment, and covenant terms of the Agreement 
required a consent judgment to be entered before those terms could take 
effect. The Insured Clubs and the Models jointly moved to approve the 
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consent judgment, which the district court denied. The parties jointly 
renewed their motion, which the court later granted.  
Before the consent judgment was approved by the federal district court, 
ICC filed a declaratory judgment action in the Allen Superior Court 
against the Insured Clubs and the Models. ICC sought a declaration that it 
had no duty to defend or indemnify the Insured Clubs under any of the 
Policies. The Insured Clubs and the Models moved to compel arbitration, 
which ICC opposed. The trial court held a hearing, and ICC voluntarily 
moved to dismiss the Insured Clubs without prejudice. The trial court 
granted both motions and compelled arbitration for ICC and the Models.2  
ICC successfully moved to certify the order for interlocutory appeal 
and to stay arbitration pending appeal. But the Court of Appeals reversed, 
finding one issue dispositive: whether this dispute fell within the scope of 
the arbitration provision between the parties. The panel held that none of 
the Models’ claims fell within the provision, and ICC could not be forced 
to arbitrate. Ill. Cas. Co. v. B & S of Ft. Wayne Inc., 201 N.E.3d 690 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2023). The Models sought rehearing, which was denied. In turn, they 
sought transfer before our Court, which we granted, 212 N.E.3d 1233 (Ind. 
2023), thus vacating the appellate opinion, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).  
 
Standard of Review 
Because contract interpretation issues are pure questions of law, we 
review them de novo. Lake Imaging, LLC v. Franciscan All., Inc., 182 N.E.3d 
203, 206 (Ind. 2022). “And we do not defer to a trial court’s decision on a 
 
2 The trial court found that (1) Indiana and federal law favored arbitration; (2) ICC 
ambiguously drafted the arbitration clause; (3) the arbitration clause should be construed 
against ICC; (4) Insured Clubs properly assigned its claims against ICC to the Models under 
the post-loss exception to insurance agreement “consent-to-assignment” clauses; (5) 
inconsistent results would emerge from distinguishing between the Models regarding their 
ability to arbitrate Insured Clubs’ claims against ICC; (6) the declaratory judgment action 
should be stayed pending arbitration; (7) arbitration should commence; and (8) final 
judgment regarding ICC’s obligation to arbitrate should be entered under Trial Rule 54(B).  
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motion to compel arbitration but likewise review it anew.” Decker v. Star 
Fin. Grp., Inc., 204 N.E.3d 918, 921 (Ind. 2023).  
 
Discussion and Decision 
To begin, the parties disagree about whether the appellate opinion here 
clashes with Henry Schein. The Models say yes, ICC says no. Both parties 
point to language from that case, but the Models have the better reading.  
I. 
Arbitrability and the AAA Rules  
A. Arbitration Law  
The Federal Arbitration Act reflects the elementary principle that 
“arbitration is a matter of contract,” and that contracts must be enforced 
“according to their terms.” Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 
(2010). Indiana has a robust policy favoring such agreements. MPACT 
Constr. Grp., LLC v. Superior Concrete Constructors, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 901, 905 
(Ind. 2004). But this policy comes with a basic limitation: the parties must 
have “agreed to arbitrate their disputes.” Id. at 907 (emphasis added); see 
also Decker, 204 N.E.3d at 920 (noting the “qualification” that parties 
cannot be required to submit to arbitration unless they agreed to do so). 
Courts, as neutral and detached arbiters, will not enlarge arbitration 
agreements “beyond” their plain language, nor stretch them by 
“construction or implication.” Progressive Se. Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & 
Marine Ins., 88 N.E.3d 188, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. not sought. We 
must apply the plain meaning of words and avoid engrafting new 
meaning onto otherwise clear language in arbitration agreements. Reuille 
v. E.E. Brandenberger Constr., Inc., 888 N.E.2d 770, 771 (Ind. 2008) 
(explaining the plain meaning canon must be applied when “the language 
is clear and unambiguous” (quotations omitted)). The goal of our 
interpretation is to discover and unlock the “intent of the parties at the 
time the contract was made by examining the language used to express 
their rights and duties.” Progressive Se. Ins., 88 N.E.3d at 194. We are 
bound by the parties’ words, not our own interpretive gloss on them.  
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A “corollary” principle also exists in arbitration law. See Blanton v. 
Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, 962 F.3d 842, 844 (6th Cir. 2020). The 
United States Supreme Court has recognized that “parties may agree to 
have an arbitrator decide not only the merits of a particular dispute but 
also gateway questions of arbitrability, such as whether the parties have 
agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular 
controversy.” Henry Schein, 586 U.S. at 67–68 (cleaned up). Above all, an 
agreement to delegate arbitrability functions as “an additional, antecedent 
agreement” about who decides. See Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 70. So when 
parties agree to arbitrate arbitrability, a court may not disturb their 
ratified agreement, “even if the argument for arbitration appears to be 
wholly groundless.” Blanton, 962 F.3d at 844 (cleaned up).   
If, for example, the parties contractually agreed to delegate arbitrability 
disputes to an arbitrator, courts must enforce their agreement—regardless 
of the merits, even if the claim cries out for frivolousness and appears to 
be baseless by all reasonable metrics and standards. Henry Schein, 586 U.S. 
at 68. The inverse is just as true: if the parties did not delegate arbitrability 
in an agreement, then the court has the power to resolve the issue 
“independently.” First Options, 514 U.S. at 943. The delegation of 
arbitrability to an arbitrator presupposes the existence of an agreement 
between parties. Suppose a party never signed an agreement in dispute 
and opposed being compelled to participate in arbitration. In that case, the 
question would necessarily strike at the “existence of [an arbitration 
agreement]” and a court would be within its wheelhouse to answer 
whether an agreement even exists. Blanton, 962 F.3d at 848; see also Henry 
Schein, 586 U.S. at 69 (noting that, “before referring a dispute to an 
arbitrator, the court determines whether a[n] . . . agreement exists” (citing 
9 U.S.C. § 2)). These foundational contract principles are simple enough. 
But how must we decide whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability? Typically, state law provides courts with the rules of the 
road for interpreting arbitration agreements. See Doe v. Carmel Operator, 
LLC, 160 N.E.3d 518, 521 (Ind. 2021) (explaining that “traditional state 
contract law principles will control the Agreement’s scope” (citing Arthur 
Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009))). State law also helps courts 
determine the validity of these agreements. Id. at 525 (explaining this 
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determination is the same “just like other contracts”). But when the 
federal question of who decides arbitrability is presented, federal law 
commands the analysis. To facilitate this evaluation, the Supreme Court 
has employed an additional interpretative rule to help courts resolve that 
antecedent question. This rule requires parties to agree by “clear and 
unmistakable evidence” that an arbitrator will decide arbitrability. 
Blanton, 962 F.3d at 844 (cleaned up). As a practical matter, this rule flips 
the ordinary policy “presumption in favor of arbitration when it comes to 
questions of ‘arbitrability.’” Id. (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 944–45).  
B. Incorporation of Arbitration Rules 
And this brings us to the main issue today: whether an agreement that 
incorporates the federal AAA rules clearly and unmistakably delegates 
arbitrability to an arbitrator. The Models argue that the arbitration clause, 
“in accordance with the then current rules of the American Arbitration 
Association,” constitutes “clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ 
intent to delegate” arbitrability to an arbitrator. Pet. to Trans. at 2. Thus, in 
the face of such an agreement, courts must “refrain” from reaching the 
merits under Henry Schein and defer to the arbitrator. Id. To be sure, ICC 
does not engage directly with the clear and unmistakable rule but 
contends that since no valid arbitration agreement existed at all, the trial 
court’s decision does not conflict with Henry Schein. Both arguments 
involve separate but related inquiries about (a) existence and (b) 
delegation. The latter presupposes the former. We thus first address the 
Models’ contention that an agreement incorporating the AAA rules 
satisfies the clear and unmistakable rule for arbitrability. We agree, 
finding two reasons in support of that view: text and precedent.  
1. Text of AAA Rules 
Start with text. By its terms, AAA Rule 7(a) grants arbitrators the 
exclusive “power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any 
objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration 
agreement or to the arbitration of any claim or counterclaim.” R-7(a). A 
couple textual points merit special attention.  
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First, just because an agreement “merely refers to the AAA rules or 
permits the parties to request assistance from the AAA” does not 
necessarily bind them to the rules. TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf 
of Mexico, LLC, 667 S.W.3d 694, 708–09 (Tx. 2023). This intuitive point does 
not require a lengthy exposition. See, e.g., Dist. No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist., 
Marine Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 998 F.3d 449, 
461–62 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (holding an agreement that mentioned in passing 
reference that the parties may request the AAA to designate a replacement 
arbitrator did not clear the “clear and unmistakable” hurdle). Simply 
referencing the AAA rules is not enough to obey this federal decree. The 
parties must evince a clear and unmistakable intent to incorporate them. 
Second, Rule 7(a) vests that the arbitrator “shall have the power to rule 
on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the 
existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the 
arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.” R-7(a). This broad grant of 
power gives arbitrators absolute power to decide arbitrability. True, Rule 
7(a) does not include the word “exclusive” to modify this power. But as 
the Sixth Circuit explained in this area, “in law the expression of one thing 
often implies the exclusion of other things.” Blanton, 962 F.3d at 849 (citing 
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 232–33 (2011)). We agree: “the 
power” to resolve arbitrability rests exclusively with the arbitrator once 
the rules are incorporated by the parties. Airbnb, Inc. v. Doe, 336 So. 3d 698, 
705 (Fla. 2022) (quotations omitted). Additional language from Rule 7(a) 
gives us a glimpse into this power. The term “including,” which is 
followed by a list of issues, such as “existence, scope or validity,” displays 
rather than “exhaust[s]” the arbitrator’s “jurisdiction,” which is broad 
once placed into motion and agreed to by the parties. Blanton, 962 F.3d at 
848. At its core, the text of Rule 7(a) shows that, once the parties delegate 
arbitrability to an arbitrator, the arbitrator has the exclusive power to 
decide arbitrability without court interference.  
2. Precedent Incorporating Rules  
What the text says, precedent from elsewhere validates. Admittedly, 
this Court has not addressed the issue about the delegation of arbitrability 
before us today. Recent arbitration cases have dealt with other issues. See, 
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e.g., Decker, 204 N.E.3d at 923 (holding an addendum with an arbitration 
provision was not a valid amendment to account agreement); Doe, 160 
N.E.3d at 526 (holding that a non-party was not entitled to arbitration 
under equitable estoppel). But the Supreme Court has illuminated a path. 
Henry Schein clarified that the AAA rules “provide that arbitrators have 
the power to resolve arbitrability questions.” 586 U.S. at 66. Elsewhere, the 
Court has relied on parties’ incorporation of the AAA rules to decide what 
the parties agreed to. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 362–63 (2008) 
(explaining that the “incorporation of the AAA rules, and in particular 
Rule 7(b), weighs against inferring from the choice-of-law clause an 
understanding shared by [the parties] that their disputes would be heard, 
in the first instance, by the Labor Commissioner”). Indeed, while the 
nation’s highest court “has yet to put these pieces together” to conclude 
that an arbitration provision’s incorporation of the AAA rules reflects 
clear and unmistakable evidence of an agreement to arbitrate arbitrability, 
there is “little doubt about the final picture.” Blanton, 962 F.3d at 845.  
Our decision today is supported by most federal and state courts that 
have addressed this exact question.3 Over the last four decades,4 nearly 
every federal circuit court—except possibly the Seventh Circuit—has held 
that an agreement to arbitrate in accordance with the AAA rules, or rules 
substantively akin to granting the arbitrator the power to decide 
arbitrability, constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of an intent to 
 
3 We thank the Supreme Court of Texas in TotalEnergies, 667 S.W.3d at 704 n.11, which 
conducted an extensive survey of these cases.  
4 This first view traces its origins back to 1981, when the First Circuit held that a contract 
delegated arbitrability issues to the arbitrator by compelling arbitration in accordance with 
the International Chamber of Commerce arbitration rules, which ensured that “any decision 
as to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction shall be taken by the arbitrator himself.” Societe Generale de 
Surveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon Eur. Mgmt. & Sys. Co., 643 F.2d 863, 869 (1st Cir. 1981). This 
decision was later reaffirmed by the First Circuit under the “clear and unmistakable” 
standard in 1989. See Apollo Comput., Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989). 
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arbitrate arbitrability.5 While the Seventh Circuit has leaned in the other 
direction,6 we find firm footing with nearly every other federal circuit to 
have reached the same conclusion as we do today.  
State courts have reached broad consensus, too. For example, as the 
Supreme Court of Texas in TotalEnergies, 667 S.W.3d at 705 n.12, 
catalogued, ten of the fifteen state supreme courts that have faced this 
question have reached the same conclusion reached by the near unanimity 
 
5 See, e.g., Bosse v. N.Y. Life Ins., 992 F.3d 20, 29 (1st Cir. 2021) (“This Court is clear that 
incorporation of the AAA arbitration rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of the 
parties’ intent to delegate arbitrability issues to the arbitrator.”); Emilio v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 
508 F. App’x 3, 5 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding incorporation of JAMS rules “clearly and 
unmistakably delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator”); Richardson v. Coverall N. 
Am., Inc., 811 F. App’x 100, 103–04 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding incorporation of AAA rules reflects 
clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability), cert. denied, 
141 S. Ct. 1685 (2021); Simply Wireless, Inc. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., 877 F.2d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(holding “that, in the context of a commercial contract between sophisticated parties, the 
explicit incorporation of JAMS Rules serves as ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence of the 
parties’ intent to arbitrate arbitrability”), abrogated by Henry Schein, 586 U.S. 63; Mendoza v. Fred 
Haas Motors, Ltd., 825 F. App’x 200, 202–03 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding incorporation of AAA rules 
reflects clear and unmistakable evidence of delegation of arbitrability to the arbitrator); Ciccio 
v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, 2 F.4th 577, 584 (6th Cir. 2021) (“The text of the Agreement, including 
the AAA rules, shows that the parties intended to send gateway questions of arbitrability 
exclusively to an arbitrator.”); Eckert/Wordell Architects, Inc. v. FJM Props. of Willmar, LLC, 756 
F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir. 2014) (“We have previously held the incorporation of the AAA Rules 
into a contract requiring arbitration to be a clear and unmistakable indication the parties 
intended for the arbitrator to decide threshold questions of arbitrability.”); Caremark, LLC v. 
Chickasaw Nation, 43 F.4th 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding incorporation of AAA rules 
evinces clear and unmistakable evidence that contracting parties agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability); Goldgroup Res., Inc. v. DynaResource de Mex., S.A. de C.V., 994 F.3d 1181, 1191 
(10th Cir. 2021) (holding incorporation of AAA rules “constitutes clear and unmistakable 
evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability issues, including the issue of 
waiver”); Attix v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC, 35 F.4th 1284, 1298 (11th Cir. 2022) (“By 
incorporating [the] AAA rule about the arbitrator’s ‘power to rule on his or her own 
jurisdiction’ into their agreement, [the parties] clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate 
threshold arbitrability disputes.”); Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. AT&T Inc., 6 F.4th 1344, 1347 
(D.C. Cir. 2021) (holding a bilateral contract incorporating the AAA rules clearly and 
unmistakably delegated threshold arbitrability to the arbitrator); ROHM Semiconductor USA, 
LLC v. MaxPower Semiconductor, Inc., 17 F.4th 1377, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (holding a bilateral 
contract between sophisticated parties incorporating the CCCP rules clearly and 
unmistakably delegated arbitrability to the arbitrator). 
 
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6 It has held that an arbitration agreement’s incorporation of the NASD Code, which provided 
that the “arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and determine the applicability of all 
provisions under this Code,” did not reflect “a clear and unmistakable expression of the parties’ 
intent to have the arbitrators, and not the court, determine which disputes the parties have 
agreed to submit to arbitration.” Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 514 n.6 (7th Cir. 
1992). But the Northern District of Illinois has reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Ali v. 
Vehi-Ship, LLC, No. 17-CV-02688, 2017 WL 5890876, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2017) (“Rule 7(a) of 
the AAA rules could not be clearer about the power of the arbitrator to decide gateway 
arbitrability issues.”); Bayer CropScience, Inc. v. Limagrain Genetics Corp., No. 04-C-5829, 2004 WL 
2931284, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2004) (holding incorporation of the AAA rules clearly and 
unmistakably delegated arbitrability to the arbitrator); but see Taylor v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 
No. 19-C-4526, 2020 WL 1248655, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2020) (“[T]he Seventh Circuit has not 
addressed the point, and this Court does not find [the contrary] decisions persuasive.”). At 
most, the picture is clouded.  
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of federal courts.7 The remaining five state supreme courts have held that 
incorporation of AAA rules might delegate arbitrability based on context.8 
The picture could not be clearer from a national perspective. These 
authorities reveal “a strong indication of how parties would have 
understood incorporation of the AAA rules when these parties” entered 
this arbitration agreement. TotalEnergies, 667 S.W.3d at 711–12; see also 
Blanton, 962 F.3d at 851 (explaining that “at the time [the party] signed his 
arbitration agreement, he not only had the benefit of the text of the 
agreement but also judicial precedent . . . telling him . . . incorporation of 
arbitral rules can provide clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties 
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability” (quotations omitted)). 
 
7 Texas became the eleventh state supreme court in this camp. For others, see, e.g., Uber Techs., 
Inc. v. Royz, 517 P.3d 905, 910 (Nev. 2022) (“[A]s many courts have found, incorporating the 
AAA’s rules, even without more, constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of intent to 
submit the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator.”); Airbnb, Inc., 336 So. 3d 704 (holding 
incorporation of AAA clearly and unmistakably evinces parties’ intent to empower an 
arbitrator to resolve arbitrability); Wiggins v. Warren Averett, LLC, 307 So. 3d 519, 523 (Ala. 
2020) (“When an arbitration provision indicates that the AAA rules will apply to the 
arbitration proceedings, we have held that it is ‘clear and unmistakable’ that substantive-
arbitrability decisions are to be made by the arbitrator . . . .”); Ally Align Health, Inc. v. 
Signature Advantage, LLC, 574 S.W.3d 753, 758 (Ky. 2019) (holding incorporation of the AAA 
rules delegates arbitrability to the arbitrator even if an agreement carves out claims for 
equitable relief); State ex rel. Pinkerton v. Fahnestock, 531 S.W.3d 36, 45 (Mo. 2017) (holding 
incorporation of AAA rules delegates arbitrability to the arbitrator), abrogated on other grounds 
by Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 591 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Mo. 2020); Garthon Bus. Inc. v. Stein, 86 
N.E.3d 514, 514 (N.Y. 2017) (holding incorporation of the London Court of International 
Arbitration rules clearly and unmistakably delegated arbitrability to the arbitrator); W. Va. 
CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. McDowell Pharmacy, Inc., 796 S.E.2d 574, 588 (W. Va. 2017) (applying 
Arizona law and holding “that incorporation of the AAA rules into the arbitration agreements 
is sufficient evidence that the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability”); 26th St. Hosp., LLP v. Real Builders, Inc., 879 N.W.2d 437, 446 (N.D. 2016) (“The 
incorporation of the AAA Rules is clear and unmistakable evidence the parties agreed to 
arbitrate the question of arbitrability.”); HPD, LLC v. TETRA Techs., Inc., 424 S.W.3d 304, 308, 
310–11 (Ark. 2012) (holding clause incorporating AAA rules that required arbitration “to the 
exclusion of any court of law” clearly and unmistakably delegated arbitrability, even though 
severability clause and default provision allowed “resort[ing] to all remedies at law or in 
equity”); Smith Barney, Inc. v. Keeney, 570 N.W.2d 75, 78 (Iowa 1997) (holding incorporation of 
the NASD Code “clearly and unambiguously commits the interpretation and application of 
all of its provisions to the arbitrator”).  
 
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 Today, we, too, embrace the text of the AAA rules and precedent 
supporting that understanding and adopt the following general rule in 
Indiana: an agreement to arbitrate in accordance with the AAA or similar 
rules represents “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the arbitrator 
“shall have the power” to exclusively decide “the arbitrability of any 
claim.”9 Thus, if the parties entered into an arbitration agreement that 
incorporated these rules, arbitrability must be decided by an arbitrator.  
II. 
Applicable Arbitration Agreement 
The larger picture has been painted: an arbitration agreement that 
incorporates AAA rules is clear and unmistakable evidence that the 
parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability. Simple enough. But what about 
the arbitration agreement between ICC and the Insured Clubs, and, in 
turn, the Models through assignment? We must now ensure the 
arbitration agreement satisfies our rule and see if it applies to each Model. 
But before answering those questions, we acknowledge a key 
concession from ICC: an arbitration agreement existed with itself and the 
 
8 See, e.g., Hoyle, Tanner & Assocs., Inc. v. 150 Realty, LLC, 215 A.3d 491, 498 (N.H. 2019) 
(holding incorporation of AAA rules did not clearly and unmistakably delegate arbitrability 
to the arbitrator when the agreement granted both parties an option to file suit); Nethery v. 
CapitalSouth Partners Fund II, L.P., 257 So. 3d 270, 274–75 (Miss. 2018) (applying Delaware law 
and holding incorporation of the AAA rules did not delegate arbitrability because the 
agreement carved out claims for injunctive relief and specific performance); Glob. Clients Sols., 
LLC v. Ossello, 367 P.3d 361, 369 (Mont. 2016) (holding an agreement to resolve disputes 
through arbitration administered by the AAA and under “its rules and procedures” did not 
clearly and unmistakably delegate arbitrability when it involved an unsophisticated 
consumer and a debt-relief organization, and where neither party stated “which of the 
multiple sets of commercial or consumer AAA rules are supposedly incorporated here”); 
James & Jackson, LLC v. Willie Gary, LLC, 906 A.2d 76, 80–81 (Del. 2006) (adopting “[a]s a matter 
of policy” the “majority federal view,” but only when the clause broadly requires arbitration 
to all disputes between the parties); Flandreau Pub. Sch. Dist. # 50-3 v. G.A. Johnson Constr., Inc., 
701 N.W.2d 430, 437 n.6 (S.D. 2005) (rejecting “a per se finding of intent to arbitrate 
arbitrability based solely upon the incorporation of AAA Rule 8 in the agreement”). 
9 Because this case concerns the general rule, we decline to recognize possible exceptions, 
which other jurisdictions have debated concerning (1) unsophisticated parties, (2) class 
actions, and (3) carve-out claims within arbitration agreements. TotalEnergies, 667 S.W.3d at 
706–07 (listing cases). 
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Insured Clubs. ICC instead challenges the scope of the arbitration 
agreement and the validity of the assignment from the Insured Clubs to 
the Models. In turn, the Models argue that arbitrators have “exclusive 
jurisdiction” to decide arbitrability. Appellees’ Br. at 37. Each argument is 
related but requires an independent assessment. Here, there are three 
broad issues at play: (1) the merits of the underlying controversy, (2) 
whether the merits must be resolved through arbitration or through a 
court, and (3) who decides arbitrability. But each question must be 
properly separated in our analysis. See Henry Schein, 586 U.S. at 71 
(explaining that courts must sort between “the question of who decides 
arbitrability” and the “separate question of who prevails on arbitrability”). 
And because each question must be answered in reverse order, we start 
with the third question and conclude that an arbitrator must decide 
arbitrability based on the terms of this agreement. Since the dispositive 
question is who decides arbitrability, we do not express a view on (1) the 
underlying merits and (2) whether an arbitrator must resolve this dispute.  
A. Models with 2016 and Later Claims  
Applying our new rule, we first conclude the Models with 2016 and 
later claims fit within our rule and thus are entitled to arbitrate 
arbitrability with ICC.  
To begin, the Insured Clubs’ assignment to these Models was valid. 
While federal law governs the substance of an arbitration agreement, state 
law controls “‘who is bound’” to one. Doe, 160 N.E.3d at 521 (quoting 
Arthur, 556 U.S. at 630). Typically, “only contracting parties, or those in 
privity with them, have rights under an arbitration agreement.” Id. at 522.  
Here, when the Insured Clubs settled the Models’ claims, they assigned 
to the Models “all of their rights, claims, and causes of action against 
ICC,” as well as “any applicable insurance policy or policies.” Appellant’s 
App. Vol. IX, p. 188. In other words, the Models were given the chance to 
step into the shoes of the Insured Clubs as assignees of the claims under 
the Policies with ICC. This assignment took effect after entry of stipulated 
consent judgments against the Clubs. Thus, these Models are in privity 
with ICC as assignees of the Policies. See Gelbach v. Hawkins, 654 N.E.2d 
877, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (assignees “are in privity of contract with the 
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[assignor’s contractual counter-party] and are bound by the agreements”); 
Trinkle v. Leeney, 650 N.E.2d 749, 753 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (assignee of 
promissory note “stands in the shoes of the assignor”).  
There is a dispute about whether the Insured Clubs’ assignment of 
their post-loss claims against ICC to the Models was also valid under state 
law. Here, the consent-to-assignment clause in the Policies required ICC’s 
consent, which was never obtained. While consent-to-assignment clauses 
are generally enforced as “boilerplate” clauses in insurance contracts, 
courts also “widely recognize an exception to the enforcement of consent-
to-assignment clauses for assignments made after a loss has occurred.” 
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States Filter Corp., 895 N.E.2d 1172, 1178–
79 (Ind. 2008); see also New v. German Ins., 21 N.E. 475, 476 (1892) (“[A]fter 
a loss has occurred the policy becomes a chose in action and is assignable 
as other choses in action are.”). We have embraced this exception with 
open arms because “once a loss occurs, an assignment of the 
policyholder’s rights regarding that loss in no way materially increases 
the risk to the insurer.” 895 N.E.2d at 1179 (quoting Samuel Williston & 
Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 49:126 (4th ed. 
2000)). And so once a loss occurs, “the indemnity policy is no longer an 
executory contract of insurance,” but instead “a vested claim against the 
insurer and can be freely assigned.” Id. Thus, given our widely recognized 
post-loss exception, the Insured Clubs were entitled to assign their claims 
against ICC to the Models, notwithstanding the consent-to-assignment 
clause here.  
We turn next to the substance of the arbitration agreement to see if it 
satisfies our new rule. The agreement here is clear and unambiguous: ICC 
agreed to arbitration “in accordance with the then current rules of 
American Arbitration Association.” Appellant’s App. Vol. IX, p. 165. 
Those rules include Rule 7(a), which grants the arbitrator “power to rule 
on his or her own jurisdiction,” which includes determining the 
“existence, scope, or validity” of the agreement. R-7(a). By its plain terms, 
this agreement reveals the parties incorporated the AAA rules, which in 
turn constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence they agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability. And while these “agreements may be less fun than a night 
out with friends,” the “same rules of English apply.” Blanton, 962 F.3d at 
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849. Thus, because the parties embraced the AAA rules by including this 
key incorporating language in their arbitration agreement, see id. at 851; 
TotalEnergies, 667 S.W.3d at 712, the arbitrator must decide arbitrability for 
these Models.   
We thus affirm the trial court’s order compelling arbitration for them.  
B. Models with Pre-2016 Claims   
The Models with pre-2016 claims, however, are not entitled to compel 
arbitration for a single reason: ICC and the Insured Clubs never agreed to 
arbitration for pre-2016 claims. The Models, therefore, cannot compel 
arbitration for these claims even if the assignment to them was valid.  
Here, ICC correctly points out that, even if the Insured Clubs’ 
assignment to the Models was proper, nearly a third of them do not allege 
a publication of their images after the 2016 addition of the CPE, which 
included the arbitration provision. What ICC suggests, the Models’ 
amended complaint confirms. The first effective date for any ICC policy 
issued to the Insured Clubs that contained the CPE form’s arbitration 
clause was on October 16, 2016, August 29, 2017, and August 29, 2018, 
respectively.10 Thus, because the Insured Clubs would not have a right to 
arbitrate before these dates, the Models asserting any claims before 2016 
could likewise not have been assigned any right to do the same. See Brown 
v. Ind. Nat’l Bank, 476 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that 
an assignee takes no greater rights than those possessed by assignor), reh’g 
and trans. denied. These Models therefore have no legal “basis to compel 
arbitration” because the Insured Clubs never agreed to arbitration with 
ICC. Appellant’s Br. at 28. Because our rule presupposes the existence of 
an agreement, we must defer to an arbitrator only when the parties agreed 
to incorporate the AAA rules, which is clear and unmistakable evidence. 
 
10 The ICC’s policies containing the CPE form within the arbitration agreement included the 
following: (1) Policy No. BP30280, first date with CPE form (10/16/2016) with B&S of Fort 
Wayne Inc.; (2) Policy No. BP40588, initial effective date (8/29/2017) with Showgirl III, Inc.; 
and (3) Policy No. BP42338, initial effective date (8/29/2018) with Reba Enterprises, LLC.  
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See Decker, 204 N.E.3d at 920 (noting we will not force a party “to submit 
to arbitration unless it has agreed to do so”).  
The trial court erred when it did not distinguish between the Models 
because the relevant question is whether an arbitration agreement existed 
with each Model, not the Models as a whole. We acknowledge that, as a 
matter of policy, our conclusion today about these Models may sanction 
an inefficient and costly piecemeal litigation campaign. But the Federal 
Arbitration Act “requires enforcement of arbitration agreements, even if 
the result is piecemeal litigation and ‘notwithstanding the presence of 
other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the 
arbitration agreement.’” Welty Bldg. Co. v. Indy Fedreau Co., 985 N.E.2d 792, 
803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983)). Here, the trial court focused too 
heavily on “the principle of equal justice,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 46, 
and not enough on the principle that “a party cannot be required to 
submit to arbitration unless he or she has agreed to do so,” Progressive Se. 
Ins., 88 N.E.3d at 194. We take no position on this policy outcome. We are 
simply applying traditional contract principles to protect the parties’ 
bargained-for exchange as umpires of the agreement. Because ICC and the 
Insured Clubs never “agreed to arbitrate their disputes” before 2016, the 
Models cannot compel arbitration for claims during this period. See 
MPACT Constr. Grp., 802 N.E.2d at 907. 
We thus reverse the trial court’s order compelling arbitration for them.  
 
Conclusion 
We affirm in part and reverse in part.  
Rush, C.J., and Slaughter and Molter, JJ., concur. 
Goff, J., concurs in result and dissents in part with separate opinion.  
 
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A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  
Thomas J. Costello III 
Best, Vanderlaan & Harrington 
Chicago, Illinois 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE ES  
Edmund S. Aronowitz 
Aronowitz Law Firm PLLC 
Royal Oak, Michigan 
Brad A. Catlin 
Williams & Piatt, LLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-180 | June 10, 2024 
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Goff, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part. 
Nobody can be compelled to arbitrate a dispute without their 
agreement. Courts must, therefore, determine whether a valid arbitration 
agreement covers both the parties and the dispute for which arbitration is 
sought. When a valid arbitration agreement clearly and unmistakably 
delegates the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator, however, courts must 
compel the parties to arbitrate the question of whether their agreement 
covers the dispute. 
Here, the Court determines that Models with claims arising in 2016 and 
after (the 2016 Models)—but not Models with claims arising before 2016 
(the pre-2016 Models)—may compel Illinois Casualty Company (ICC) to 
arbitrate the arbitrability of their dispute. In my view, the Court makes 
two missteps in reaching these conclusions. 
First, the Court holds that the arbitration agreements’ references to the 
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures of the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA Rules or just Rules) clearly and 
unmistakably demonstrate the parties’ intent to delegate arbitrability. I 
disagree that reference to the Rules necessarily suffices to show such 
intent, although I find that other language in the agreements 
independently, and much more clearly, delegates arbitrability. 
Second, the Court decides for itself that the pre-2016 Models’ claims are 
outside the scope of their arbitration agreements. But that question isn’t 
ours to answer because it’s delegated to the arbitrator. 
Ultimately, I would hold that each Model is entitled to compel 
arbitration on the question of whether her claim falls within the scope of 
an arbitration clause. 
I. A reference to the AAA Rules is not necessarily 
sufficient to delegate arbitrability. 
The first question is whether the arbitration agreements clearly and 
unmistakably delegate the arbitrability of the Models’ claims to an 
arbitrator. The evidence of such delegation must be “clear and 
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unmistakable” because parties “often might not focus upon that question 
or upon the significance of having arbitrators decide the scope of their 
own powers.” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 945 
(1995) (cleaned up). As “a party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues 
it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration,” courts “hesitate to 
interpret silence or ambiguity” in favor of delegation. Id. at 945. 
The arbitration agreements here provide for arbitration of “any 
irreconcilable dispute between [ICC] and an ‘insured’ … in accordance 
with the then current rules of the American Arbitration Association,” 
subject to certain stated variations. App. Vol. IX, p. 165. Rule R-7(a) of the 
2013 AAA Rules states that the “arbitrator shall have the power to rule on 
his or her own jurisdiction,” including “the arbitrability of any claim.” 
Am. Arb. Ass’n, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures 
13 (2013). These two facts, the Court holds, suffice to show a clear and 
unmistakable delegation of arbitrability. Ante, at 9–10, 15. 
I disagree. 
The 2013 version of the AAA Rules was in force when these agreements 
were made. Rule R-1(a) recognized then, as it does in the current 2022 
version, that the Rules might change. Compare 2013 AAA Rules at 10 with 
Am. Arb. Ass’n, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures 
10 (2022) (the 2022 AAA Rules). It is difficult to credit contracting parties 
with the clear and unmistakable intent to conform to rules not yet known. 
See Imre S. Szalai, Fixing a Power Struggle in America's Civil Justice System, 
27 Harv. Negot’n L. Rev. 209, 246–47 (2022). 
What’s more, the Rules have changed. The 2013 version of Rule R-7(a) 
did not contain the words which now appear at the end of that Rule: 
“without any need to refer such matters first to a court.” Compare 2013 
AAA Rules at 13 with 2022 AAA Rules at 14. These words were 
presumably added to clarify what was unclear: whether an arbitrator had 
power to determine their own jurisdiction absent a prior judicial decision 
on the matter. 
It’s also unclear whether the 2013 Rule R-7(a) contemplated exclusive 
arbitral jurisdiction to determine arbitrability, as opposed to concurrent 
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jurisdiction with the courts. See Taylor v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., No. 
19 C 4526, 2020 WL 1248655 at *4 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 16, 2020) (finding no 
agreement to give the arbitrator “sole authority”); Szalai, supra, at 245 
(stating that “arguably this provision is not intended to displace the 
concurrent power of a court to rule on arbitrability”); George A. Bermann, 
Arbitrability Trouble, 23 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 367, 376 (2012) (noting that 
arbitral rules conferring power to determine jurisdiction do “not 
necessitate depriving courts” of the same power). Indeed, once a federal 
court and scholarly commentators interpret Rule R-7(a) as not (or likely 
not) conferring exclusive jurisdiction, I find it hard to declare that it 
“unmistakably” means the very opposite. 
Lastly, it’s notable that Rule R-7(a) purports to give the arbitrator 
power to determine the “existence” of an arbitration agreement, although 
this power belongs in the first instance to the courts. This provision 
undercuts a reading of Rule R-7(a) as a grant of exclusive powers. 
In sum, the arbitration agreements here referenced an ambiguous 
jurisdictional rule that the AAA subsequently decided to clarify. I am 
conscious of taking a minority position contrary to the great weight of 
citations marshalled by the Court. See ante, at 12 n.5, 14 n.7. Yet, I cannot 
conclude that the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated arbitrability 
to an arbitrator simply by referencing the AAA Rules. I note, however, 
that the Court leaves open the possibility of cabining its “general rule” by 
recognizing “exceptions,” including limiting the rule’s scope to 
sophisticated parties. See id. at 15 n.9. 
Although I don’t find the reference to the AAA Rules sufficient here, I 
believe other language in the arbitration agreements did make a clear and 
unmistakable delegation of arbitrability. The text of those agreements 
provides not only that “any irreconcilable dispute” is to be “resolved by 
arbitration,” but also that the arbitrator specifically has “the power to 
decide any dispute between [ICC] and the ‘insured’ concerning the 
application or interpretation of this form.” App. Vol. IX, p. 165 (emphases 
added). Unlike the reference to the AAA Rules, the quoted language—
taken as a whole—plainly delegates to the arbitrator alone the issue of 
whether and how the arbitration agreement applies to any given issue. See 
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Jones v. Waffle House, Inc., 866 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that 
a term submitting to exclusive arbitration a dispute concerning an 
agreement’s “applicability” delegated arbitrability); Momot v. Mastro, 652 
F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2011) (reaching the same conclusion for a term 
submitting to exclusive arbitration the “application” of an agreement). 
II. 
This Court shouldn’t decide the arbitrability of 
the Pre-2016 Models’ claims. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a court has no power to set aside 
a valid delegation of arbitrability, “even if the court thinks that the 
argument that the arbitration agreement applies to a particular dispute is 
wholly groundless.” Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 
S.Ct. 524, 529 (2019). 
Here, when the Clubs settled the Models’ claims, they assigned to all of 
the Models “all of their rights, claims, and causes of action against ICC,” 
as well as “any applicable insurance policy or policies.” App. Vol. X, pp. 
71, 76.1 Because some of the Clubs’ insurance policies included arbitration 
agreements, all the Models are now parties to such agreements. See Asset 
Allocation & Mgmt. Co. v. W. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 892 F.2d 566, 574 (7th Cir. 
1989) (explaining that assignment of a contract substitutes the assignee “in 
the arbitration clause as in the contract’s other clauses”); 1 Domke on 
Comm. Arb. § 13:38 (2023) (stating that the “assignee, as a successor in 
interest to the contract, generally is entitled to the benefit of the arbitration 
clause in the agreement”). And, as explained above, those arbitration 
agreements delegate to the arbitrator the question of whether they apply 
to any given issue. 
Nevertheless, the Court holds that ICC “never agreed to arbitration for 
pre-2016 claims.” Ante, at 18. Under Henry Schein, we can’t make that 
 
1 The words “any applicable insurance policy or policies” do not limit which insurance claims 
were assigned, in light of the preceding words transferring “all of [the Clubs’] rights, claims, 
and causes of action against ICC.” See App. Vol. X, p. 76 (emphases added). 
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decision. The arbitrability of the pre-2016 claims is a matter for the 
arbitrator alone, regardless of our view. For that reason, we are bound to 
affirm the trial court’s order compelling arbitration of all the Models’ 
claims. 
III. 
Conclusion 
Courts ruling on motions to compel arbitration must ensure that parties 
are not forced to arbitrate disputes without their agreement. First, there 
must exist an arbitration agreement binding the party. Second, only when 
the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated the arbitrability of their 
dispute to an arbitrator must the arbitrator decide that question. Mere 
reference to the AAA Rules won’t necessarily suffice to make that 
showing, but more express or precise language may do so. 
Applying these principles here, I would hold that all the Models are 
parties to arbitration agreements that clearly and unmistakably delegate 
arbitrability. For this reason, I respectfully concur in result in part and 
dissent in part.