Case Title: CASA 94, L.P. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2000-Ohio-3

Docket Number: 19991312

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as CASA 94, L.P. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 89 Ohio St.3d 622, 2000-Ohio-3.] 
 
 
 
 
 
CASA 94, L.P., APPELLEE, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as CASA 94, L.P. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 622.] 
Taxation — Real property valuation — True value of apartment development — 
R.C. 5715.19(G) precludes a property owner from testifying about the terms 
and conditions of a sale before the Board of Tax Appeals, when. 
(No. 99-1312 — Submitted July 6, 2000 — Decided September 13, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 97-S-632. 
 
On March 8, 1996, appellant, Board of Education of the Westerville City 
School District (“BOE”), filed a property valuation complaint with the Franklin 
County Board of Revision (“BOR”) for tax year 1995, regarding four parcels of 
property improved with an apartment development known as Remington Station 
Apartments.  In its complaint, the BOE contended that there had been a recent 
arm’s-length sale of the property for $18,300,000. 
 
The property owner, CASA 94, L.P. (“CASA”), filed a countercomplaint 
stating that the auditor’s valuation of $13,329,800 was correct.  In response to the 
question on the countercomplaint form asking if the property had been sold within 
the last three years, CASA stated that the property sold in April 1995 for 
$18,300,000. 
 
 
2
 
At the hearing before the BOR, the BOE introduced two exhibits: a copy of 
a limited warranty deed from Phoenix Home Life Mutual Insurance Company 
(“Phoenix”) to CASA, and a conveyance fee statement that set forth a cash 
consideration of $18,300,000. 
 
To refute this, CASA’s counsel proffered a copy of a document with some 
attachments entitled “Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Real Property” by and 
between Phoenix and CASA, dated April 7, 1995, without calling a witness as to 
the document.  Counsel for the BOE objected to the proffer and to the narrative 
given by CASA’s counsel of what the documents showed. 
 
The only person testifying at the BOR hearing on behalf of CASA was a 
non-employee agent, William M. McVeigh, who admitted that the only 
information he had concerning the transaction was what someone had told him.  
McVeigh represented that he would be sending certain recorded public records to 
the BOR.  However, the only document McVeigh sent to the BOR was a non-
recorded copy of the Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of 
CASA 94, L.P., with some attachments, dated April 5, 1995. 
 
A handwritten note on McVeigh’s transmittal letter states that the BOE 
objected and that the documents “[were] not relied upon by BOR.”  The BOR 
determined that the property should be valued at $18,300,000. 
 
 
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CASA filed an appeal with the BTA.  The only witness presented by CASA 
at the BTA hearing was Brian Murdy, a senior vice president of Phoenix Realty 
Advisers and a managing director of Phoenix, the seller of the Remington Station 
property.  At the start of Murdy’s testimony, counsel for the BOE objected on the 
basis of R.C. 5715.19(G).  The BTA reserved ruling on the objection.  However, in 
its decision, the BTA overruled the objection and admitted Murdy’s testimony. 
 
Murdy testified that the Franklin County property was included as one of ten 
properties sold by Phoenix to CASA.  Murdy explained why Phoenix sold the 
property, identified the entities comprising CASA, and how Phoenix and CASA 
determined the sale price. 
 
Murdy was not asked to identify any documents at the BTA hearing, and 
CASA did not enter any documents into evidence.  The BTA found that the 
documents presented by CASA to the BOR were not considered by it because 
CASA did not provide a witness at the BOR hearing to authenticate or lay a proper 
foundation for the documents. 
 
At the close of the BTA hearing, the BOE presented certified copies of the 
deed and conveyance fee statement for the property showing a sale price of 
$18,300,000.  Over objection, the BTA admitted these documents into evidence. 
 
 
4
 
The BTA found that there was a relationship “between the buyer, a limited 
partnership, and the seller, a 9% owner and limited partner of the buyer.”  In 
addition, the BTA found that the sale may have been part of a bulk sale and that 
there was no evidence that the property was offered for sale on the open market.  
The BTA consequently found that the sale was not an arm’s-length transaction and, 
therefore, it could consider the auditor’s valuation set forth on the property record 
cards in the transcript from the BOR.  Accordingly, the BTA adopted the auditor’s 
valuation of $13,329,800 as the true value. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Wayne E. Petkovic, for appellee. 
 
Ronald J. O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, Matthew H. 
Chafin and Paul M. Stickel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellants 
Franklin County Board of Revision and Franklin County Auditor. 
 
Teaford, Rich, Crites & Wesp, Jeffrey A. Rich and James R. Gorry, for 
appellant Board of Education of the Westerville City School District. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. The appellants contend that R.C. 5715.19(G) precludes a 
property owner from testifying about the terms and conditions of a sale before the 
 
 
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BTA if (1) the owner did not testify or otherwise present admissible evidence 
concerning the sale to the board of revision and (2) the owner does not show good 
cause for the failure to do so.  We agree. 
 
R.C. 5715.19(G) provides: 
 
“A complainant shall provide to the board of revision all information or 
evidence within the complainant’s knowledge or possession that affects the real 
property that is the subject of the complaint.  A complainant who fails to provide 
such information or evidence is precluded from introducing it on appeal to the 
board of tax appeals or the court of common pleas, except that the board of tax 
appeals or court may admit and consider the evidence if the complainant shows 
good cause for the complainant’s failure to provide the information or evidence to 
the board of revision.” 
 
This court has had occasion to rule on R.C. 5715.19(G).  In Coventry 
Towers, Inc. v. Strongsville (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 120, 18 OBR 151, 480 N.E.2d 
412, the city revised a report it had presented to the board of revision before the 
city presented it to the BTA.  The property owner objected to the admission of the 
revised appraisal.  Nevertheless, the BTA admitted the city’s revised appraisal into 
evidence. 
 
On appeal, we affirmed the BTA’s ruling because the property owner 
presented no evidence that the city had the information contained in the revised 
 
 
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appraisal within its knowledge or possession when it appeared before the board of 
revision.  In fact, the appraiser testified that much of the information presented in 
the revised appraisal “was obtained as a result of the hearing before the board of 
revision.”  Id. at 122, 18 OBR at 152, 480 N.E.2d at 413.  In applying R.C. 
5715.19(G) we held, “This provision requires a complainant before the board of 
revision to submit all pertinent information affecting the property in question 
within his knowledge or possession at that time.”  Id. at 121, 18 OBR at 152, 480 
N.E.2d at 413. 
 
CASA’s counsel stated that Murdy’s testimony was being presented only “to 
amplify the documents that are already of record.”  The documents referred to by 
CASA’s counsel were those presented to the BOR and contained in the transcript 
sent to the BTA, but “not relied on by the BOR.” 
 
The BTA accepted Murdy’s testimony, stating that it was “merely intended 
to amplify evidence previously submitted to, but not considered by the BOR,” and 
that it was not “the type of ‘new’ information contemplated” by R.C. 5715.19(G). 
 
The BTA erred because it accepted Murdy’s testimony “to amplify evidence 
previously submitted to, but not considered by the BOR.”  CASA proffered the 
documents at the BOR, which had not admitted them into evidence.  The BTA 
observed that the BOR did not consider the documents “because appellant [CASA] 
did not provide a witness at the BOR hearing to authenticate or lay a proper 
 
 
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foundation for these documents.”  The BTA should have excluded Murdy’s 
testimony because it did not pertain to any evidence or information provided to the 
BOR.  Further, CASA did not attempt to show good cause why it had not presented 
the evidence or information Murdy testified about to the BOR. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the decision of the BTA is unreasonable and 
unlawful and it is reversed. 
Decision reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents.