Case Title: State v. Hale

Citation: 

Docket Number: 76543-0

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
#28268-r-GAS 
2018 S.D. 9 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
 
* * * * 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
 
v. 
 
LANDON LYNDALE HALE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* * * * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
 MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
THE HONORABLE SUSAN M. SABERS 
Judge 
 
* * * * 
 
 
MARTY J. JACKLEY 
Attorney General 
 
PATRICIA ARCHER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Pierre, South Dakota 
Attorneys for plaintiff  
 
and appellee.  
 
 
D. SONNY WALTER 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
Attorney for defendant 
 
and appellant. 
 
* * * * 
 
 
 
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
 
ON JANUARY 8, 2018 
 
OPINION FILED 01/24/18 
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SEVERSON, Justice 
 
[¶1.]  
The State and defendant entered into a plea agreement.  At the change 
of plea hearing, the circuit court accepted defendant’s guilty plea and the factual 
basis to support the plea.  The circuit court did not indicate specific acceptance or 
rejection of the plea agreement at that hearing; nor did the court defer its decision 
to order a presentence investigation.  Approximately two weeks later, the circuit 
court informed the State and defendant that it intended to reject the plea 
agreement.  The State and defendant objected, contending that the court had 
previously accepted the agreement.  After a hearing, the court entered an order 
rejecting the plea agreement.  Defendant filed a petition for an intermediate appeal, 
which we granted.  On appeal, defendant claims the circuit court was bound by the 
plea agreement, and the State agrees.  We reverse and remand. 
Background 
[¶2.]  
The State indicted Landon Lyndale Hale on nineteen counts related to 
the kidnapping and robbery of Caden Jackson on July 23, 2016.  In February 2017, 
the State and Hale reached a plea agreement.  The agreement required Hale to 
plead guilty to a single count of aggravated assault and to cooperate in any 
upcoming trials against Hale’s two codefendants.  In exchange, the State would 
dismiss the remaining charges, including a part II habitual offender information.  
The plea agreement contained an agreed-upon disposition; specifically, a sentencing 
cap of suspended prison time. 
[¶3.]  
On February 15, 2017, the circuit court held a change of plea hearing.  
The parties informed the court that a plea agreement had been reached and 
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presented the plea agreement to the court.  The court re-arraigned Hale on the 
charge of aggravated assault.  It explained the nature of the charge and that the 
maximum possible punishment was 15 years in prison and a $30,000 fine.  The 
court then remarked, 
THE COURT: The plea agreement here does not let me use any 
of that penitentiary time immediately.  The most it let’s [sic] me 
do is send you to county jail for 180 days.  I can suspend up to 
the full 15 years in the penitentiary.  You’d be out on my 
probation.  As long as you comply with the terms of my 
probation, you can keep yourself out of the pen.  But if you mess 
up on probation, I’ll have the 15 years or whatever amount I’ve 
suspended waiting for you.  The state can bring you back to 
court and ask that I send you to the pen.  You understand that? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
 
THE COURT: So Mr. Walter’s plea negotiation keeps you out of 
the pen here today.  But moving forward when you’re on my 
probation the only thing that keeps you out of the pen is you not 
doing stuff like this.  You got that? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
 
THE COURT: The Part II, which would have increased that 
felony-level charge, will be dismissed by the state, as will all of 
the remaining charges, including the kidnapping charge which 
would have had a life sentence attached to it.  You understand 
that? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  Knowing what you know now, would you 
like to go ahead and take the plea agreement today? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
THE COURT: I’m going to re-remind you of your rights before I 
take that plea. 
 
The court then canvassed Hale on his rights.  Hale indicated that he understood 
that by pleading guilty he would be giving up those rights.  The court then asked, 
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“Have you discussed the effect of this plea agreement with your lawyer?”  Hale 
responded that he had and indicated his satisfaction with his attorney’s advice and 
performance.  The court asked Hale if he had any questions.  Hale indicated that he 
did not.  The court asked Hale, “What is your plea to Count 5 of the indictment, 
Aggravated Assault with a gun?”  Hale responded, “Guilty.”  After ensuring that 
Hale pleaded guilty of his own free will, the court then asked Hale whether “[a]ny 
promises [were] made to [him] to get [him] to enter the plea other than the plea 
agreement that we talked about?”  Hale replied, “No, ma’am.” 
[¶4.]  
The court asked for the facts to support the plea.  The State indicated 
that it had an affidavit from Hale to offer as the factual basis.  The court read the 
affidavit on the record.  Afterward, the court confirmed with Hale that Hale agreed 
with the facts and that it was his signature on the affidavit.  The court accepted the 
affidavit “as a valid factual basis” and found “that it adequately meets with the 
statutory requirements for aggravated assault.”  The court found that Hale “has 
been advised and understands the nature of the charges” and “the penalties which 
can be imposed.”  The court then accepted the plea and found Hale “guilty of 
aggravated assault.” 
[¶5.]  
Hale’s codefendants also pleaded guilty: one on February 23, 2017, and 
the other on February 24.  Then, on March 6, the circuit court ordered a 
presentence investigation report to be completed on Hale.  The court also informed 
the State and counsel for Hale via email that it intended to reject the plea 
agreement.  The State and Hale’s counsel requested that the circuit court reconsider 
its decision to reject the plea agreement. 
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[¶6.]  
The circuit court held a hearing on April 21, 2017.  At the hearing, the 
State and Hale again requested that the court reconsider its decision.  They both 
argued that the court had accepted the plea agreement at the change of plea 
hearing in February and that Hale cooperated in the prosecution of his 
codefendants as required by the plea agreement.  The court disagreed that it had 
accepted the plea agreement.  It referred to the transcript from the change of plea 
hearing.  The court also distinguished cases cited by the parties.  At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the court rejected the plea agreement.  It informed Hale that he 
could withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial or continue to plead guilty. 
[¶7.]  
Following the hearing, the circuit court issued findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and an order.  The court found that although it had “expressly 
accepted [Hale’s] plea at the plea hearing, it did not accept the plea agreement—
either expressly or impliedly.”  The court rejected the claim that by accepting Hale’s 
guilty plea and the factual basis for that plea, the court thereby accepted the plea 
agreement.  The court likewise rejected the argument that outlining the particulars 
of the plea agreement to Hale during the change of plea hearing meant that the 
court was bound to honor the agreement. 
[¶8.]  
The circuit court distinguished this Court’s past cases concerning plea 
agreements.  The court cited SDCL 23A-7-11 (Rule 11(e)(4)) as authority for 
rejecting the plea agreement.  It emphasized that it complied with SDCL 23A-7-11 
(Rule 11(e)(4)) because it informed the parties of its intent to reject the plea 
agreement and gave Hale the opportunity to withdraw his plea. 
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[¶9.]  
After the circuit court entered an order rejecting the plea agreement, 
the State filed written objections.  The court denied the State’s objections, and Hale 
filed a petition with this Court for an intermediate discretionary appeal.  We 
granted Hale’s petition.  On appeal, Hale asserts that the circuit court erred when it 
rejected the plea agreement.  The State agrees with Hale’s position and requests 
that the matter be remanded for Hale to be sentenced consistent with the terms of 
the plea agreement. 
Analysis 
[¶10.]  
Because this is an intermediate appeal, the circuit court has not yet 
sentenced Hale.  Nor has Hale withdrawn or persisted in his guilty plea following 
the circuit court’s entry of an order rejecting the plea agreement.  Therefore, we 
need only decide whether the circuit court accepted a binding plea agreement at the 
February 2017 change of plea hearing. 
[¶11.]  
Whether the circuit court accepted a binding plea agreement is a 
question of law reviewed de novo.  State v. Shumaker, 2010 S.D. 95, ¶ 5, 792 N.W.2d 
174, 175.  Chapter 23A-7 governs plea agreements.  Under SDCL 23A-7-8, the 
prosecuting attorney and counsel for the defendant (or the defendant if pro se) may 
engage in discussions in an attempt to reach a plea agreement.  The prosecuting 
attorney has discretion to: 
(1) 
Move for dismissal of other charges or not file additional 
charges arising out of a different occurrence; 
(2) 
Make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the 
defendant’s request, for a particular sentence, with the 
understanding that such recommendation or request shall 
not be binding upon the court; 
(3) 
Agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate 
disposition of the case; or 
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(4) 
Perform other specified acts to be made a part of the 
agreement. 
 
Id.  We have consistently said that a plea agreement accepted under subsection (2) 
does not restrict the court’s discretion when sentencing a defendant.  Shumaker, 
2010 S.D. 95, ¶ 6 n.1, 792 N.W.2d at 175 n.1; State v. Reaves, 2008 S.D. 105, ¶ 7, 
757 N.W.2d 580, 582.  However, a plea agreement accepted under subsection (3) 
restricts the court to sentencing the defendant within the bounds of the plea 
agreement.  Shumaker, 2010 S.D. 95, ¶ 6, 792 N.W.2d at 175; Reaves, 2008 S.D. 
105, ¶ 7, 757 N.W.2d at 582. 
[¶12.]  
Both the State and Hale contend that the plea agreement in this case 
falls under SDCL 23A-7-8(3) because the parties negotiated an agreed disposition 
(suspended penitentiary time), rather than a recommended sentence.  At the change 
of plea hearing, counsel for Hale informed the court that “Mr. Hale will be entering 
a plea of guilty to Count IV Aggravated Assault [(counsel later explained that the 
proper count was Count V, rather than IV)], a cap of a suspended execution of 
sentence.  The other charge, charges, and the Part II Information will be dismissed, 
and he will cooperate in any upcoming trial of the codefendants.”  The State agreed 
with counsel’s summary of the terms of the agreement. 
[¶13.]  
We note and find problematic that neither the State nor defense 
counsel specifically informed the circuit court that they intended the agreement to 
be a binding plea agreement under SDCL 23A-7-8(3).  Indeed, in its appellate brief, 
the State recognizes that “the plea agreement, orally stated on the record, is not a 
model of clarity.”  Nevertheless, from our review of the transcript, the plea 
agreement was a binding plea agreement under SDCL 23A-7-8(3).  It contained an 
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agreed-upon disposition—a suspended execution of sentence, with no immediate 
penitentiary time, and with placement on probation.  And the court recognized its 
binding effect.  The court stated, “The plea agreement here does not let me use any 
of that [15 years] penitentiary time immediately.  The most it let’s [sic] me do is 
send [Hale] to county jail for 180 days.” 
[¶14.]  
A question remains, however, whether the circuit court accepted the 
binding agreement such that it must honor the agreed disposition when sentencing 
Hale.  The State and Hale assert that the circuit court accepted the agreement at 
least implicitly.  The circuit court, however, informed the parties that it had only 
accepted Hale’s guilty plea and the factual basis to support that plea, not the plea 
agreement. 
[¶15.]  
Under SDCL 23A-7-9 (Rule 11(e)(2)), when a plea agreement has been 
reached, “the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in 
open court, or on a showing of good cause, in chambers, at the time the plea is 
offered.”  (Emphasis added.)  The statute further provides that “[t]hereupon, the 
court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the 
acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the 
presentence report.”  Id. (emphasis added).  “If a court accepts the plea agreement, 
it shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the 
disposition provided for in the plea agreement.”  SDCL 23A-7-10 (Rule 11(e)(3)).  “If 
a court rejects the plea agreement, it shall, on the record, inform the parties of this 
fact, advise the defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in 
chambers, that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant 
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the opportunity to then withdraw his plea, if a plea has been entered, and advise 
him that if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of 
the case may be less favorable to him than that contemplated by the plea 
agreement.”  SDCL 23A-7-11 (Rule 11(e)(4)). 
[¶16.]  
It is undisputed that during the change of plea hearing the circuit 
court did not expressly accept or reject the plea agreement and did not defer its 
decision to consider a presentence report.  However, in Shumaker, we recognized 
that a circuit court can implicitly accept a plea agreement at a change of plea 
hearing.  2010 S.D. 95, ¶¶ 7-8, 792 N.W.2d at 176; accord Reaves, 2008 S.D. 105, ¶ 
7, 757 N.W.2d at 582 (“The court, in fact, implicitly accepted the plea agreement.”).  
To determine whether the circuit court accepted the plea agreement in Shumaker, 
we examined the court’s statements made during the change of plea hearing.  2010 
S.D. 95, ¶¶ 7-8, 792 N.W.2d at 176.  We recognized that the court had advised the 
defendant of the charges against her, her rights, and the penalties she faced under 
the statute as well as under the plea agreement.  We noted that the court had 
informed the defendant that her attorney saved her from two years in the 
penitentiary.  We further recognized that the court did not explicitly reject the plea 
agreement or advise the defendant as required under SDCL 23A-7-11 (Rule 
11(e)(4)).  Relying on the circuit court’s reference to “this plea agreement” and lack 
of explicit rejection, we concluded that the court had accepted the binding plea 
agreement.  Shumaker, 2010 S.D. 95, ¶ 7, 792 N.W.2d at 176. 
[¶17.]  
Similarly, here, we conclude that the circuit court implicitly accepted 
the binding plea agreement at the change of plea hearing.  At the beginning of the 
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hearing, after defense counsel described the plea agreement to the court, the court 
asked Hale, “Mr. Hale, does that sound like what you’re here today to agree to?”  
Hale responded, “Yes.”  The court read the charged offense; aggravated assault.  
The court also informed Hale of his maximum possible punishment for that offense.  
However, the court then explained to Hale that the plea agreement restricted the 
court’s imposition of punishment to a suspended sentence and probation.  It 
remarked, “The plea agreement here does not let me use any of that penitentiary 
time immediately.  The most it let’s [sic] me do is send you to county jail for 180 
days.  I can suspend up to the full 15 years in the penitentiary.  You’d be out on my 
probation.”  (Emphasis added.)  The court further informed Hale that “Mr. Walter’s 
plea negotiation keeps you out of the pen here today.  But moving forward when 
you’re on my probation the only thing that keeps you out of the pen is you not doing 
stuff like this.  You got that?”  (Emphasis added.)  The court specifically asked Hale, 
“Knowing what you know now, would you like to go ahead and take the plea 
agreement today?”  (Emphasis added.)  Hale responded, “Yes.” 
[¶18.]  
Although the circuit court did not specifically “inform the defendant 
that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the 
plea agreement” as required by SDCL 23A-7-10 (Rule 11(e)(3)), the context of the 
court’s statements at the change of plea hearing informed Hale that the court 
accepted the agreement and intended to sentence Hale as provided in that 
agreement.  Also, the colloquy between Hale and the circuit court supports Hale’s 
claim that the court’s implicit acceptance of the plea agreement induced him to 
waive his fundamental rights and plead guilty.  And the State agreed that Hale 
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cooperated in the prosecution of his codefendants as he agreed to do as part of the 
plea agreement. 
[¶19.]  
In State v. Lohnes, we explained that “the duty of the state to perform 
its part of a plea bargain applies with equal force to the trial court[.]”  344 N.W.2d 
686, 688 (S.D. 1984); accord Brewer II v. Starcher, 465 S.E.2d 185, 192-92 (W. Va. 
Sup. Ct. 1995).  Indeed, “once the defendant has given up his ‘bargaining chip’ by 
pleading guilty, due process requires that the defendant’s expectations be fulfilled.”  
State v. Waldner, 2005 S.D. 11, ¶ 13, 692 N.W.2d 187, 191 (quoting State v. Howard, 
630 N.W.2d 244, 250 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001)); see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 
257, 261-62, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971).  This is not to say we believe the 
circuit court intentionally misled Hale.  See, e.g., Lohnes, 344 N.W.2d at 689 
(explaining that our disagreement “stems from our belief that in the circumstances 
of this case the promise to impose a sentence of less than life imprisonment implied 
a sentence with a release date certain within the defendant’s life expectancy”).  We 
further recognize that as set out in the court’s findings of fact, the court was greatly 
troubled by the severity of Hale’s culpability in the events leading to the kidnapping 
and robbery of Jackson.  However, in light of the record and the circumstances of 
this case and because the circuit court at the time of the plea did not reject the 
agreement and did not defer its decision to accept or reject the agreement, the 
circuit court was required to sentence Hale within the bounds of the plea 
agreement.  We reverse the circuit court’s order rejecting the plea agreement.  On 
remand, the circuit court is directed to sentence Hale consistent with the 
agreement. 
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[¶20.]  
Reversed and remanded. 
[¶21.]  
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and ZINTER, KERN, and JENSEN, 
Justices, concur.