Case Title: People v. Williams

Citation: 

Docket Number: S030553

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 5/6/13 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S030553 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
GEORGE BRETT WILLIAMS, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. TA006961 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A Los Angeles County jury found defendant George Brett Williams guilty of 
two first degree murders and found true the special circumstance allegations of 
multiple murder and that the murders were committed while defendant was 
engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery.  (Pen. Code, 
§§ 187, 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17).1  The jury further found defendant guilty of 
two counts of second degree robbery and found true that defendant personally 
used a firearm in the commission of the felony offenses.  (§§ 211, 12022.5.)  After 
the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.  The trial court denied 
defendant‘s motion for new trial (§ 1181) and for modification of the penalty 
(§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced him to death.  This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. 
Const., art. VI, § 11; § 1239, subd. (b).) 
We affirm the judgment. 
                                              
1 
Hereafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 2, 1990, Willie Thomas and Jack Barron were fatally shot at 
close range in a house on Spring Street in Los Angeles.  Their bodies were 
dragged to a truck parked in the garage, where they were found when the police 
arrived in response to a neighbor‘s call reporting gunshots.  The prosecution‘s 
theory was that defendant shot both victims in the course of a robbery that had 
begun as a drug transaction.  According to prosecution witnesses, earlier that 
evening defendant had planned to scam the victims through a fraudulent drug 
transaction at a bar parking lot by trading fake money for drugs.  The victims met 
defendant at the bar parking lot, but, for reasons unknown, the transaction did not 
occur there.  Instead, later that evening, the victims came to the Spring Street 
house, which was a frequent hangout for defendant and three associates.  
According to the testimony of the three associates, all of whom had pleaded guilty 
in prior proceedings, defendant shot both victims.  Additionally, two neighbors to 
the Spring Street house testified that defendant was present at the house on the 
night of the killings.  The prosecution presented evidence that the pager found at 
the scene of the crime was defendant‘s, and that his fingerprints were found in the 
room where the victims had been shot and on the truck to which the victims‘ 
bodies had been dragged.  The prosecution also presented evidence that defendant 
fled Los Angeles after the shooting, and that, upon his return two weeks later, he 
sought to pay some new acquaintances to fabricate an alibi for him for the night of 
the killings. 
 
3 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case 
The prosecution presented evidence of the murders and the drug deal 
surrounding it largely through the testimony of two of defendant‘s accomplices, 
Patrick Linton and Dauras Cyprian.2  Their testimony was corroborated by the 
testimony of other witnesses, telephone records, and physical evidence. 
a.  Background 
Defendant socialized with Patrick Linton, Dauras Cyprian, and Dino Lee.  
This group often gathered at a house on Spring Street, where Cyprian‘s half 
brother, Ernie Pierre, lived.3  On the upstairs floor of the house was a vacant small 
apartment, where victims Willie Thomas and Jack Barron were shot on January 2, 
1990.  Cyprian and his mother, Marcella Pierre, lived in a house across the street. 
b.  Preparations for the Drug Deal 
In the week prior to the killings, defendant mentioned to Linton that he 
intended to ―jack someone for some money,‖ meaning that he intended to scam 
someone through a fraudulent drug deal.  On the day of the killings, defendant was 
socializing with Linton and Cyprian at the Spring Street house.  Defendant told 
Linton he was going to set up a drug deal with victims Jack Barron and Willie 
Thomas.  Telephone records indicated that, on the day of the killings, three calls 
                                              
2 
Dino Lee, the third accomplice, did not testify for the prosecution, but was 
called by the defense.  As summarized below in the defense case, Lee‘s testimony 
also incriminated defendant and was substantially the same as the testimony of 
Linton and Cyprian. 
3 
Ernie Pierre was not at home on the night of the murders and played no role 
in the case.  
 
4 
were made between defendant‘s house and an air conditioning business called 
A.R.A.  Victims Barron and Thomas worked at A.R.A.  Fellow A.R.A. employee 
Londell Richardson testified that, on the day of the killings, he overheard a 
telephone conversation by Thomas and Barron indicating that, after work, they 
were planning to go to a bar to transact a drug deal involving $50,000 and three or 
four kilos of cocaine. 
In preparation for the drug transaction, defendant, Linton, and Cyprian went 
to defendant‘s house, where defendant assembled packages of torn-up phonebook 
pages, which he wrapped to resemble bundles of cash and then placed in a plastic 
bag.  Defendant also brought three guns, which were later found at the scene of the 
crime, a .38-caliber Smith & Wesson revolver, a .380-caliber Titan automatic 
pistol, and a carbine rifle. 
c.  Meeting at a Bar Parking Lot 
Linton testified to the following events:  Linton drove defendant and Cyprian 
in Linton‘s truck, a blue Chevy Blazer, to the parking lot of a bar.  Defendant got 
out of the truck and went over to talk to Barron, whose truck was parked in the 
back of the lot.  Thomas stood next to Barron‘s truck.  Defendant spoke with the 
victims, Barron and Thomas, for 30 to 45 minutes.4  Defendant returned to 
Linton‘s truck and told Linton that they were going to follow Barron and Thomas 
                                              
4 
For the events at the bar, in addition to the testimony of Linton and 
Cyprian, the prosecution presented the testimony of Jose Pequeno, a former 
coworker of Barron‘s and Thomas‘s.  Pequeno worked at the bar and was present 
that night.  Pequeno identified Linton‘s Blazer as being there that night and 
identified defendant from a photographic lineup as the person who got out of the 
Blazer and talked with Barron and Thomas.  Pequeno‘s in-court identification of 
defendant was more tentative; he stated that he ―thought‖ defendant was the 
person who had talked to Barron and Thomas in the bar parking lot that night. 
 
5 
to a house in South Gate.  Barron and Thomas drove out of the parking lot 
together in a blue Chevy Sprint, an A.R.A. company car that Thomas often drove.  
Defendant, Linton, and Cyprian followed the Sprint as far as the freeway, but 
defendant decided at the last moment not to follow it to the house in South Gate, 
and told Linton to drive instead back to defendant‘s house.  There they dropped 
off the guns and the plastic bag of fake cash. 
Cyprian gave a slightly different account than Linton of the events at the bar 
parking lot, testifying as follows:  While he was waiting in Linton‘s truck, he saw 
a Camaro drive in.  A Hispanic man got out of the Camaro and approached 
Linton‘s truck.  After the Hispanic man walked away, Linton said, ―That was 
Tony.‖  ―Tony‖ then went over and talked to defendant and Barron.  Barron left 
with Tony in the Camaro.  Linton, however, denied seeing someone named Tony 
that night.   
Jose Pequeno‘s testimony was in accord with Linton‘s that Barron and 
Thomas left together in the blue Sprint. 
d.  Shootings at the Spring Street House 
Linton and Cyprian gave substantially similar testimony concerning the 
events at the Spring Street house later that night.  Defendant and Linton drove to 
the Spring Street house in separate cars.  Defendant drove his Mercedes 190, 
which he parked in the driveway.5  Linton drove his Chevy Blazer, with Cyprian 
as his passenger, and parked in front of the house.  Defendant, Linton, and Cyprian 
stayed in front of the house drinking beer for about an hour.  They eventually 
made their way to the vacant upstairs apartment and continued to drink and smoke 
                                              
5 
Both Linton and Cyprian testified that defendant drove a Mercedes 190 on 
the night of the murders. 
 
6 
marijuana.  At some point, defendant received a page and made a call.  Defendant 
told Linton that Barron wanted to come to the house to do the drug deal.  In the 
meantime, Dino Lee had arrived and joined the others in the upstairs apartment.6  
About 10 minutes after Lee arrived, Barron and Thomas arrived in the blue Sprint.  
Defendant went outside to talk to them.  Defendant returned and told Linton that 
they should go to defendant‘s house to get the guns and the fake cash.  They left 
and returned while Barron and Thomas waited in their car parked outside. 
Defendant, Linton, Barron, and Thomas then went to the upstairs apartment, 
where Cyprian and Lee were waiting.  Linton entered the apartment first, and 
heard someone say, ―Get down.‖  Cyprian testified that defendant said, ―Don‘t 
nobody move,‖ and pulled out a .38-caliber revolver.  Linton was armed with a 
.380-caliber weapon.  Barron and Thomas lay prone on the floor.  Defendant took 
shoestrings out of his coat pocket and instructed the others to tie the victims‘ 
hands and feet.  Cyprian went through the victims‘ pockets and removed their 
wallets. 
Defendant propped up Barron, who was now bound, against one of the walls, 
with his feet in front of him and his hands behind his back.  Defendant put the .38-
caliber revolver up to Barron‘s face and told him he wanted three kilos of cocaine.  
At this point, defendant told Cyprian to move the victims‘ car, which was parked 
in front of the Spring Street house, in case the victims‘ associates came looking for 
them.  Cyprian left the apartment and went to re-park the victims‘ car around the 
block. 
                                              
6 
As Lee testified in the defense case, he had not been involved with the drug 
deal meeting at the bar parking lot and came to the Spring Street house 
independently.   
 
7 
Defendant told Barron to talk to his associates on the phone, say that Barron 
had counted the money, and convince them to give defendant the cocaine.  
Defendant warned Barron not to speak any Spanish.  Kneeling and holding his 
gun, defendant dialed the phone and held the receiver up to Barron‘s ear.  Barron 
told him that the phone was not making a connection.  Still holding his gun, 
defendant brought the phone down and started redialing the number.  While 
defendant was dialing, his gun discharged and shot Barron in the chest.  Defendant 
exclaimed, ―Ah, shit, Ah, shit, man.‖  Defendant then got up off his knees, walked 
over to Thomas, who was lying bound on the floor across the room, and shot him 
twice in the head.  He then walked back over to Barron and shot him in the head 
once. 
After the shootings, defendant, Linton, and Lee went to the backyard, and 
were standing around when Cyprian returned from moving the victims‘ car.  
Linton testified that defendant told Cyprian:  ―I had to kill a man, I had to kill 
him.‖  Cyprian testified that defendant told him:  ―I shot ‗em.  It was an accident 
so I killed the other one because I didn‘t want a witness.‖ 
Defendant proposed moving the bodies.  Linton moved the Blazer from the 
street into the garage of the Spring Street house and closed the garage doors.  All 
four of them worked to move the dead bodies of Barron and Thomas into the back 
of the Blazer.  Cyprian unsuccessfully attempted to clean up some of the blood on 
the garage floor by throwing a bucket of water on it.  Defendant and the others 
were ready to drive off with the bodies, but Lee cried out a warning that the police 
were coming.  About 20 to 30 minutes had elapsed between the shootings and the 
arrival of the police.  Defendant and the three others fled, leaving the Blazer with 
the victims‘ bodies in the backseat, where police discovered them. 
 
8 
e.  Testimony of the Neighbors 
(1)  Marcella Pierre 
Marcella Pierre was the mother of Dauras Cyprian (who, as described above, 
was one of defendant‘s accomplices who testified against him) and of Ernie Pierre, 
who lived at the house on Spring Street in which the killings occurred.  Mrs. Pierre 
lived with Cyprian across the street.  She came to know defendant, Linton, and 
Lee because they visited Cyprian almost daily in the five-month period before the 
killings. 
On the evening of the killings, January 2, 1990, Mrs. Pierre testified that she 
had seen defendant, Linton, Lee, and Cyprian at Ernie Pierre‘s house.  About 
10:00 p.m., she was at her home across the street.  She heard three or four sounds 
that sounded like gunshots.  Approximately 10 to 15 minutes before she heard 
these shots, she had seen defendant, Linton, and two men she did not know 
standing at the gate of the house.  Immediately after the shots, she looked out her 
window, but did not see anyone.  Approximately five to 10 minutes after the shots, 
however, she saw defendant, Cyprian, Linton, and Lee talking loudly and arguing 
out on the street.  She heard Cyprian ask defendant, ―What did you do that for, 
man?‖  Cyprian then came across the street and filled a bucket of water from her 
front yard and took the bucket back toward the house.  Shortly after that, the 
police arrived. 
(2)  Irma Sazo 
Irma Sazo lived on Spring Street next door to the house where the killings 
occurred.  Shortly after 10:00 p.m. on the night of the killings, Sazo heard three or 
four shots and telephoned the police.  In the six months before the crime, Sazo had 
seen defendant visit Ernie Pierre at the house almost every day.  The men would 
congregate in front of the house with Linton, Cyprian, and Lee.  They often drank, 
smoked marijuana, and played loud music late into the night. 
 
9 
On the night of the killings, Sazo arrived home at 7:00 p.m. and saw what she 
recognized as defendant‘s car, a new-looking black BMW, parked next door to her 
house.7  Around 10:00 p.m., she heard three or four shots coming from the house 
next door.  Looking out her window at the street, she saw that defendant‘s black 
BMW was no longer parked there, but Linton‘s blue Chevrolet Blazer truck was 
there.  She then saw four individuals in the house‘s front yard, whom she later 
identified as defendant, Linton, Cyprian, and Lee.  When defendant moved closer 
to her house and saw her watching inside, he said, ―Oh, oh, the lady is in the 
window.‖  She saw Cyprian trying to open the lock on the garage door at the 
house where the killings occurred.  Sazo also saw Cyprian go get a bucket of water 
from Marcella Pierre‘s house and bring it to the house next door. 
At trial Sazo testified she saw defendant, Linton, and Lee leave the scene in 
Linton‘s Blazer.8  However, the officer who interviewed her on the night of the 
killings testified that she told him she did not see those three leave the scene, but 
only noticed they were gone when she returned to the window after calling the 
police. 
f.  Defendant and Cyprian Leave Los Angeles 
Cyprian testified regarding his actions with defendant after the killings.  
Initially Cyprian fled the crime scene by foot, but defendant picked him up in a 
                                              
7 
As described, post at page 16, the defense submitted evidence that 
defendant had owned a black BMW, but had sold it before the night of the 
killings.  As noted ante at footnote 5, Linton and Cyprian testified that defendant 
drove a Mercedes 190 on the night of the murders. 
8 
This testimony was inconsistent with the fact the Blazer containing the 
victims‘ bodies was found at the scene, and with the testimony of Linton and 
Cyprian.   
 
10 
car.  They drove to defendant‘s house, where they removed their bloody clothing, 
which they placed in a bag that they gave to defendant‘s girlfriend (later wife) 
Monique Williams, who took the bag away in her car to dispose of it.  Defendant 
and Cyprian then drove in defendant‘s car, the Mercedes 190, to a motel in Long 
Beach, where they stayed the night.  The next day, defendant sold the Mercedes.  
Monique drove them to buy new clothing and took them to a Travelodge where 
defendant arranged to buy tickets for a flight to New York.9  Monique brought 
suitcases and drove them to the airport, where defendant and Cyprian departed for 
New York.  In New York, they registered at the Hotel Stanford as Michael and 
Mark Cole.  After two or three days they moved to another hotel down the street.  
After another two days, they left New York.  Defendant went to the airport and 
flew to an undisclosed destination, while Cyprian took a Greyhound bus to Las 
Vegas.  Defendant and Cyprian eventually met in Las Vegas along with their 
respective girlfriends.  The two couples spent two or three days together there.  
Cyprian returned to Los Angeles on January 14 or 15.  Defendant returned to Los 
Angeles by January 17. 
g.  Defendant’s Attempts to Fabricate an Alibi 
Raymond Valdez and his girlfriend Kathleen Matuzak testified about 
defendant‘s efforts to get them to fabricate an alibi for him for the night of the 
killings.  In January 1990, Valdez lived with Matuzak in an apartment complex in 
Wilmington.  By mid-January, defendant and Monique had moved into the 
complex, and Valdez had become acquainted with defendant; they frequently 
                                              
9 
The prosecution introduced a registration card for this Travelodge dated 
January 3, 1990, and signed by defendant.  A handwriting expert confirmed that it 
was defendant‘s signature. 
 
11 
played pool at the apartment recreational center.  Valdez and Matuzak testified 
they initially knew defendant as ―Patrick,‖ and later as ―George.‖  Valdez bought 
marijuana from defendant.  Defendant offered Valdez $1,500 and a substantial 
amount of marijuana to come to court and testify that he was with defendant on 
January 2, 1990 (the night of the killings).  Defendant made the same offer to 
Matuzak and to another pair of neighbors.  Valdez, however, had not even known 
defendant on January 2, 1990. 
Valdez initially agreed because he believed defendant when he said he had 
been framed for the crime by a friend.  After defendant was arrested, Monique 
Williams frequently visited Valdez and Matuzak and talked to them about getting 
their stories ―right.‖  Valdez also received about six telephone calls from 
defendant while he was in jail expressing concern that Valdez and Matuzak get 
their stories straight.  At one point during this period, three African-American 
males, who Valdez thought were Rollin 60s10 gang members, came to Valdez‘s 
apartment late at night and asked Valdez whether he was still going to testify for 
defendant.  Defendant had told Valdez that he was a Rollin 60s gang member.  
The visit made Valdez fear for his and Matuzak‘s lives.  Valdez was eventually 
evicted from the Wilmington apartment complex for failure to pay rent.  In the 
week before Valdez was to testify at defendant‘s trial, Monique ran into Valdez in 
his new neighborhood and inquired whether he was still planning to testify for 
defendant.11 
                                              
10  
Various forms of gang names are extant, and we conform to the record 
throughout this opinion.   
11 
As specified later in the trial, this incident took place at a liquor store in 
Harbor City on the third day of defendant‘s trial.  In her testimony for the defense, 
Monique denied seeing Valdez on that day. 
 
12 
h.  Testimony About the Pager Found at the Crime Scene 
The prosecution contended that the pager found at the crime scene belonged 
to defendant.  To prove this, the prosecution called Deitrich Francheska Pack, an 
employee of Delcomber Communications, the store that sold and provided service 
for the pager.  Pack personally knew both defendant and defendant‘s girlfriend 
Monique Williams, with whom she had attended high school.  Pack knew Linton 
because she had dated his cousin.  Pack testified that defendant and Linton came 
to the Delcomber store sometime in 1989.  She identified a Delcomber‘s contract 
for the purchase of a Panasonic Vanguard pager filled out by ―Patrick Cole‖ and 
dated October 30, 1989.  The model and serial numbers of the pager found at the 
crime scene matched this contract.  Pack had not, however, personally sold that 
pager.  At some point after defendant‘s arrest, Monique called Pack to ask her 
whether she could locate and destroy the Delcomber file on ―Patrick Cole‖ in 
return for $100.  Pack said she did not think she could do that, and had no further 
contact with Monique. 
i.  Monique Williams’s Testimony for the Prosecution 
Monique Williams was defendant‘s girlfriend at the time of the crime and 
married him after his arrest.  Although defendant had many tattoos on his body 
referring to the Rollin 60s gang, Monique testified that, since first meeting him at 
the end of 1988, she had never known him to be a gang member.  She denied that 
defendant ever owned any guns, although she also stated that defendant told her he 
lent Linton a gun on the night of January 2, 1990 (the night of the killings).  She 
maintained that defendant was constantly in her company from Christmas Eve 
1989, through mid-January 1990 (including the time of the killings) and had never 
 
13 
left her presence longer than the time it took to get something from the store.12  
She testified that, on January 3, 1990 (the day after the killings), Cyprian came to 
their house and defendant asked her to drive Cyprian to the airport.  Monique, 
defendant, and Cyprian first stopped at a hotel where Cyprian picked up a suitcase.  
Monique testified that she dropped Cyprian at the airport, but defendant stayed 
with her in Los Angeles through January 8, 1990.13  She testified that on 
January 9, 1990, she and defendant travelled to Las Vegas by Greyhound bus and 
stayed there through January 15, 1990.  While in Las Vegas, they saw Cyprian and 
his girlfriend.  Upon returning to Los Angeles, they moved into the apartment 
complex in Wilmington on January 20, 1990.  She admitted to speaking with 
Raymond Valdez and Kathleen Matuzak about testifying falsely on defendant‘s 
behalf.  She denied, however, asking Deitrich Pack at Delcomber Communications 
to destroy the paperwork on a pager. 
j.  Telephone Records 
In order to further link the pager found at the crime scene with defendant, the 
prosecution introduced telephone records showing that numerous phone calls were 
placed to the pager from Monique Williams‘s parents‘ house between 
December 1989 and January 3, 1990.  The prosecution also presented phone 
records to connect defendant to the victims.  Records showed that, on January 2, 
1990 (the day of the killings), three calls were placed from defendant‘s house to 
                                              
12 
Her testimony was thus contrary to that of several witnesses who testified 
that defendant was present at the Spring Street house on the night of the murders. 
13 
Her testimony was thus contrary to Cyprian‘s testimony that defendant 
checked in at a Travelodge with him and they stayed there the night before they 
both flew to New York.  As noted above, the prosecution admitted into evidence a 
registration card for the Travelodge for January 3, 1990, signed by defendant. 
 
14 
A.R.A. Automotive Accessories, where the victims, Barron and Thomas, worked.  
Two calls were made in the morning, and one in the afternoon.  Phone records also 
showed that, on the afternoon of the same day, one phone call was placed from 
A.R.A. to defendant‘s house. 
k.  Condition of the Bodies 
A medical examiner testified that Thomas died from two gunshot wounds to 
the upper right side of his head.  The presence of soot or powder burns indicated 
the muzzle of the gun had been pressed against the skin when it was fired.  Barron 
had likewise died from two contact wounds, one behind the left ear and one in the 
chest. 
l.  Gun Evidence 
Police investigators discovered two guns in the upstairs apartment where the 
killings occurred:  a .38-caliber Smith & Wesson revolver, and a .30-caliber 
carbine rifle.  A third gun, a .380-caliber Titan automatic pistol, was found in the 
garage.14  The prosecution theory was that the .38-caliber Smith & Wesson 
revolver was the murder weapon. 
A police investigator observed blood spatters on the .38-caliber Smith & 
Wesson revolver, which were evident in a photograph of the gun taken at the 
crime scene.  These spatters were consistent with blood being blown back in the 
opposite direction of the trajectory of a bullet.  A firearms examiner analyzed the 
projectiles retrieved from the bodies of both victims and determined they were 
                                              
14 
These are the three guns that Linton testified that defendant took from his 
home.  A fourth gun, a .30-caliber Röhm revolver, was found in Ernie Pierre‘s 
downstairs apartment. 
 
15 
fired from either a .38 Special or a .357 Magnum revolver.15  The projectiles 
recovered from the bodies had markings consistent with the .38-caliber Smith & 
Wesson revolver found at the crime scene.  The examiner, however, could not 
conclusively determine that it was the weapon that fired the bullets because the 
projectiles were damaged. 
m.  Fingerprints 
Defendant‘s fingerprint was found on the outside driver‘s side mirror of 
Linton‘s Blazer, which police discovered parked in the garage with the bodies of 
the two victims in the backseat.  Defendant‘s fingerprints were found on the base 
of a telephone in the apartment where the shootings took place.  His fingerprint 
was also found on a cabinet in the apartment.  Fingerprints of Linton, Cyprian, and 
Lee also were found at the crime scene. 
2.  Defense Case 
The defense contended through various witnesses, except Lee, that the 
defendant was not present that night at the scene and that defendant did not 
commit any of the charged crimes. 
a.  Dino Lee 
The defense called Dino Lee, the third of defendant‘s accomplices.  Lee had 
not testified for the prosecution.  Lee‘s testimony, however, hurt rather than 
helped the defense case.  Lee testified that he saw defendant shoot Barron and 
                                              
15 
As the examiner testified, one cannot differentiate between these two types 
of guns when one has only projectiles and no cartridges for analysis.  Both guns 
use the same type of projectiles, although each uses a different (and incompatible) 
type of cartridge. 
 
16 
Thomas.16  Lee‘s account of the evening was substantially similar to the testimony 
of the prosecution witnesses Linton and Cyprian. 
b.  Detective Herrera 
The defense called Detective Herrera, who investigated the crimes and who 
had testified for the prosecution on various details of the crime scene.  Herrera 
testified that defendant phoned the police and voluntarily surrendered to them on 
February 8, 1990. 
c.  Monique Williams 
Monique Williams‘s defense testimony largely repeated her prosecution 
testimony, namely, that she had never seen defendant with guns and had no 
knowledge of his participation in any criminal activities.  Additionally, she 
testified defendant had sold his black BMW before Christmas 1989 (that is, before 
the killings in January 1990).  The defense introduced a Department of Motor 
Vehicles record that showed defendant had transferred title to the BMW on 
December 21, 1989.  Monique testified defendant had never owned or driven a 
Mercedes 190.  She also specifically denied that, on the third day of defendant‘s 
trial, she had approached Ray Valdez in a liquor store in Harbor City to encourage 
him to testify falsely at defendant‘s trial. 
                                              
16 
Lee‘s initial version of the shooting differed slightly from Linton‘s.  Lee 
testified that defendant shot Barron twice in a row — an accidental shot followed 
by an intentional shot — before he went over to shoot Thomas twice.  But upon 
further questioning, Lee gave the same sequence of shots as in Linton‘s testimony; 
that is, defendant first accidentally shot Barron, then went over and shot Thomas 
twice, then returned to shoot Barron a second time. 
 
17 
d.  Ingrid Tubbs 
Ingrid Tubbs was Monique Williams‘s aunt.  Tubbs testified that, during the 
first week of defendant‘s trial, Monique was staying at the home of Monique‘s 
parents in Gardena and babysitting Tubbs‘s children.  Tubbs‘s testimony was 
intended to support Monique‘s denial that she had approached Ray Valdez in 
Harbor City on the third day of defendant‘s trial. 
e.  Stipulation 
The parties stipulated that, before testifying at defendant‘s trial, Linton, 
Cyprian, and Lee had pleaded guilty to second degree murder on January 23, 
1991, January 24, 1991, and July 9, 1990, respectively. 
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case 
The prosecution presented evidence of four incidents in aggravation under 
section 190.3, factor (b):  three assaults and the possession of a firearm. 
a.  Assault on Kenneth Moore 
Latrece Abraham and Kermit Richmond testified that on May 28, 1983, a 
group of boys about 13 to 15 years old from the 59 Hoover Crips gang attacked a 
group of bicycle riders about the same age, including Kenneth Moore.  Gang 
member Eddie Jackson then shot and killed Moore.  Abraham testified that 
defendant was among the gang members who hit and kicked Moore.  A police 
detective testifying as a gang expert stated that defendant was a member of the 59 
Hoover Crips gang at the time of the assault on Moore.  The prosecutor stipulated 
that defendant was charged with and convicted of misdemeanor assault with a 
deadly weapon, namely, fists and feet.  He further stipulated that neither the 
charge nor the conviction involved possession or personal use of a firearm. 
 
18 
b.  Shots Fired at Officer Sims 
Police Officer Carl Sims testified that, on December 3, 1983, shots were fired 
at him.  He was in full uniform standing outside his squad car when the gunfire 
erupted from behind him.  He saw an African-American male standing behind a 
palm tree 50 to 75 feet away facing in the direction the shots were fired.  When 
Officer Sims aimed a shotgun at him, the suspect ran.  Sims followed the suspect, 
who joined a group of 10 to 11 individuals dressed in gang attire who were 
attempting to get into a flatbed pickup truck.  Sims ordered all of them to raise 
their hands and they were taken into custody.  Sims identified defendant as the 
suspect behind the palm tree whom he followed to the truck.  A search of the truck 
revealed a fully loaded .38-caliber Smith & Wesson revolver.  A search of the 
defendant revealed that he had six rounds of live .38-caliber ammunition in his left 
front trouser pocket.  The prosecutor stipulated that no criminal charges were ever 
filed against defendant in connection with this incident. 
c.  Robbery and Assault on Mona Thomas and her Father 
Mona Thomas testified that on the evening of July 7, 1985, she and her father 
were assaulted and robbed by a group of men when their car broke down.  Around 
30 men surrounded the car carrying guns.  Someone threw a brick at the window.  
Another person demanded money.  The group pulled Thomas and her father from 
the car.  They were both beaten and bloodied. 
Police Officer Michael Daly was on patrol and came across Mona Thomas 
and her father immediately after the assault.  She told the officer that the group 
that had just assaulted her was standing in front of an apartment building about 
100 feet away.  As the officer approached the group, it began to disperse, but the 
officer managed to detain several individuals, including defendant, whom Officer 
Daly identified in court.  At the scene, Mona Thomas stated that the individuals 
that Officer Daly had detained were the ones who had beaten and robbed her and 
 
19 
her father.  Mona Thomas was unable to identify defendant in court or identify 
him from an arrest photograph from the incident. 
d.  Possession of Concealed Weapon 
Detective Michael Bowers testified that, on December 7, 1985, he conducted 
a traffic stop of defendant‘s car.  He found a Smith & Wesson .38-caliber revolver 
containing five live rounds inside the car, between the console and the driver‘s 
seat.  He arrested defendant for possession of a concealed weapon, but (as 
stipulated by the prosecutor) no criminal charges were ever filed. 
2.  Defense Case 
The defense case in mitigation presented the testimony of defendant‘s mother 
and his two sisters. 
Betty Williams Hill and Edna Williams Vickers, defendant‘s two sisters, 
testified about defendant‘s family background, which Betty described as ―upper 
middle class or upper class.‖17  Defendant‘s parents, Jessie and Charles Williams, 
took in defendant as a foster child when he was about one year old, and adopted 
him at age three or four.  The Williams family later became foster parents for 
several mentally disabled children.  Defendant was friendly with these children 
and would help his parents care for them.  Defendant was respectful toward his 
parents, and helped care for his aunt when she was ill with cancer.  Defendant was 
the father of five children, ranging in age at the time of trial from two to six years 
of age.18  His sister described him as a ―faithful father.‖  Both sisters stated they 
were unaware of defendant‘s previous arrests and gang-related activities. 
                                              
17 
Defendant‘s mother was a real estate broker.  The house he grew up in had 
six bedrooms, five baths, a den, and a living room. 
18 
At the time of trial, defendant was 28 years old. 
 
20 
Defendant‘s mother, Jessie Mae Williams, presented a profile of defendant 
similar to that given by his two sisters.  She testified that defendant had no 
disciplinary problems at school, but that he dropped out of high school around the 
10th or 11th grade.  She stated she was unaware of defendant‘s previous arrests 
and gang activity, although she did recall a time in the early 1980s when he was 
incarcerated.  During cross-examination, she stated she did not remember any 
incidents in which the police had returned defendant to her custody after he was 
arrested for criminal activity as a juvenile. 
3.  Rebuttal 
The prosecutor entered the following stipulation:  On July 2, 1980, defendant 
was arrested for possession of a deadly weapon.  Because defendant was a 
juvenile, he was booked and transported home, where the arresting officer turned 
over custody of defendant to his mother and advised her of the nature of the arrest. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Pretrial Issues 
1.  Asserted Batson/Wheeler Error  
Trial counsel brought three separate motions under Batson v. Kentucky 
(1986) 476 U.S. 79, 84-89 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277 
(Wheeler) in connection with the prosecutor‘s use of peremptory challenges 
against five African-American women prospective jurors.  The three-stage 
procedure of a Batson/Wheeler motion is now familiar.  ―First, the defendant must 
make out a prima facie case ‗by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives 
rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.‘  [Citations.]  Second, once the 
defendant has made out a prima facie case, the ‗burden shifts to the State to 
explain adequately the racial exclusion‘ by offering permissible race-neutral 
justifications for the strikes.  [Citations.]  Third, ‗[i]f a race-neutral explanation is 
 
21 
tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike 
has proved purposeful racial discrimination.‘ ‖  (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 
U.S. 162, 168, fn. omitted.) 
The trial court denied all three Batson/Wheeler motions at the third stage.  
Defendant contends the trial court erred.  ―Review of a trial court‘s denial of a 
Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, examining only whether substantial 
evidence supports its conclusions.‖  (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 613.)  
―We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional 
manner and give great deference to the trial court‘s ability to distinguish bona fide 
reasons from sham excuses.‖  (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864.)  
As long as the court ―makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the 
nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference 
on appeal.‖  (Ibid.)  As explained below, we discern no error in the trial court‘s 
denial of the Batson/Wheeler motions. 
a.  Background 
(1)  First Batson/Wheeler Motion 
The first motion was brought after the prosecutor had exercised peremptory 
challenges against three African-American women prospective jurors:  H. R., 
T. C., and P. C.  The prosecutor offered to justify the excusals, and the trial court 
requested him to do so, remarking that ―I have to say that I did have some of them 
marked that I expected to be exercised on.‖  The prosecutor explained the excusals 
as follows:  He employed a ratings system by which he rated the reluctance of a 
prospective juror toward answering questions he had posed about the death 
 
22 
penalty, which he considered reflective of reluctance to impose that penalty.19  
During individual questioning, he had rated all three prospective jurors as very 
reluctant in terms of their ability to impose the death penalty.  ―They would either 
say, well, I think I might be able to, or I could, but their reluctance to impose it 
was evident not only from the answers they gave [but also] from the time that it 
took them to respond to the question, their general demeanor in answering the 
questions, and my impression from each of them.‖  The prosecutor‘s general 
impression from their answers was that ―in spite of what they said, they wouldn‘t 
have the ability to impose it when it actually came down to it.‖  Trial counsel 
noted that, of the 40 prospective jurors called to the box so far, only four were 
African-American, and the prosecutor had dismissed three of them (all of whom 
were women), leaving one African-American male on the jury.  The trial court 
denied the Batson/Wheeler motion. 
(2)  Second Batson/Wheeler Motion 
Trial counsel made a second Batson/Wheeler motion when the prosecutor 
exercised a peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror R. P., an African-
American woman.  Trial counsel noted that four out of the six African-Americans 
called to the box had been peremptorily challenged, and all four of them had been 
women.  The trial court called on the prosecutor to state his reasons.  The 
prosecutor said that, from R. P.‘s initial written questionnaire, he had rated her a 
―two plus‖ on his reluctance scale, but downgraded her to a 1 after hearing her 
voir dire responses.  The prosecutor noted that he had written next to her name on 
his list, ―ambivalent, no opinions,‖ which he stated was distinctive because he 
                                              
19 
On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 showing the most reluctance) he rated H. R. a 
one, T. C. a 3 minus, and P. C. a 2 minus. 
 
23 
usually did not write anything next to the names.  He read to the court three of 
R. P.‘s voir dire responses that had given him the impression that she would be 
hesitant to impose the death penalty.20 
In response, trial counsel argued that R. P.‘s answers to other questions 
indicated she was willing to impose the death penalty.  The prosecutor replied that 
his impression ―had a lot more to do with not what she said but how I read what 
she was saying from being present in court with her and observing her demeanor 
and the way she answered questions.  It clearly isn‘t from the words that are 
written down.  It was my general impression from the way she answered the 
questions, not what she said.‖ 
The trial court denied the motion.  It stated that, though it had taken notes 
relating to the demeanor and manner of responding of some of the prospective 
jurors, it did not have any notes on R. P., but would accept the prosecutor‘s 
explanation. 
(3)  Third Batson/Wheeler Motion 
Trial counsel made a third Batson/Wheeler motion when the prosecutor 
peremptorily challenged Prospective Juror R. J., an African-American woman.  
Trial counsel observed that five out of six African-American prospective jurors 
had thus far been challenged and noted that R. J. was on the panel at a time when 
the prosecutor had accepted it.  The prosecutor replied that he had accepted this 
prospective juror because ―the [jury] composition was somewhat satisfactory to 
me,‖ but that he reviewed his notes, and had seen that he had rated her as very 
reluctant to impose the death penalty.  The prosecutor‘s impression, which he 
                                              
20 
These voir dire responses are quoted in the part concerning R. P., post, at 
pages 30-33. 
 
24 
stated was formed not only from her answers to the questions but from her 
demeanor and the fashion in which she answered them, was that she would not be 
able to impose the death penalty in any case. 
The trial court denied the Batson/Wheeler motion.  It did not recall R. J.‘s 
responses and, as observed earlier, had stopped taking notes by the time she was 
questioned.  The trial court stated that it could only go by what the prosecutor was 
saying, and it accepted the prosecutor‘s explanation. 
Defense counsel then asked the trial court ―to respond to the numbers,‖ 
arguing that they ―speak for themselves.‖  The trial court replied, ―I have to say in 
my other death penalty cases I have found that the black women are very reluctant 
to impose the death penalty; they find it very difficult no matter what it is.‖  The 
trial court then made clear, however, that it was not making its ruling based on that 
observation. 
The final composition of the jury, which the prosecutor put on the record, 
was seven Caucasians and five African-Americans, of whom four were men and 
one was a woman. 
b.  Analysis 
(1)  Asserted Bias of Trial Court 
Defendant acknowledges the ―great deference‖ an appellate court gives to the 
trial court‘s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from ―sham excuses.‖  (People 
v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 864.)  Defendant argues, however, that no 
deference should be given here to the trial court‘s evaluation of the prosecutor‘s 
professed race-neutral reasons because, he asserts, the trial court itself was biased 
against African-American women, as indicated by its comment quoted directly 
above. 
 
25 
The trial court‘s observation came in specific response to trial counsel‘s 
question about the numbers of such peremptories at that point in voir dire.  The 
court clarified that its general observation did not influence its ruling.  The trial 
court quickly made clear that its observation played no role in its ruling on the 
Batson/Wheeler motion:  ―I am just making a little point.  I just wanted to tell you 
my observation that I have seen this before and I can understand why.  That‘s 
why.  But I am not making my ruling based on that.‖  Further, it was an isolated 
comment, and the record as a whole does not support defendant‘s contention that 
the trial court was biased against African-American women.  We have no reason 
to doubt that the trial court made its rulings on the Batson/Wheeler motions based 
on the evidence before it.  On this record, we perceive no bias on the trial court‘s 
part, and we therefore grant its rulings their usual deference. 
(2)  Adequacy of the Trial Court’s Review of the Prosecutor’s 
Race-neutral Reasons 
Defendant contends the trial court failed to adequately clarify or probe the 
prosecutor‘s explanations about the demeanor of the prospective jurors.  In 
particular, he points to the two jurors challenged in the second and third 
Batson/Wheeler motions, R. P. and R. J., as to whom the trial court indicated it 
had not taken notes and had no independent recollection at the time of those 
Batson/Wheeler motions.   
―Although we generally ‗accord great deference to the trial court‘s ruling that 
a particular reason is genuine,‘ we do so only when the trial court has made a 
sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate each stated reason as applied to each 
challenged juror.‖  (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 385-386.)  ―When the 
prosecutor‘s stated reasons are both inherently plausible and supported by the 
record, the trial court need not question the prosecutor or make detailed findings.  
But when the prosecutor‘s stated reasons are either unsupported by the record, 
 
26 
inherently implausible, or both, more is required of the trial court than a global 
finding that the reasons appear sufficient.‖  (Id. at p. 386.)  However, we also have 
stated that a trial court is not required ―to make explicit and detailed findings for 
the record in every instance in which the court determines to credit a prosecutor‘s 
demeanor-based reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge.‖  (People v. 
Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 929.)  With these principles in mind, we will 
review the record below of the five challenged prospective jurors.21 
The prosecutor‘s stated race-neutral reason for striking the challenged 
prospective jurors — reluctance to impose the death penalty — was not 
―inherently implausible.‖  As we have stated, ―[a] prospective juror‘s views about 
the death penalty are a permissible race- and group-neutral basis for exercising a 
peremptory challenge in a capital case.‖  (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 
946, 970-971.)  We therefore examine the record to see whether it supports the 
prosecutor‘s stated race-neutral reason that these prospective jurors appeared 
reluctant to impose the death penalty.  The prosecutor‘s stated reason has both a 
semantic aspect and a demeanor aspect, that is, a prospective juror‘s hesitancy to 
impose the death penalty can be reflected in both what the prospective juror said 
and how he or she said it.  At certain points during his explanation the prosecutor 
emphasized the demeanor aspect over the semantic aspect.  As we discuss below, 
the trial court stated that it did not recollect the demeanor of two of the challenged 
prospective jurors, R. P. and R. J.  However, as we further discuss below, the 
prosecutor based his explanation on both words and demeanor.  In reviewing the 
                                              
21 
Justice Liu‘s dissent acknowledges that the approach the majority opinion 
follows is based on our precedents as expressed in People v. Silva, supra, 25 
Cal.4th at pages 385-386, and People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 929.  
(Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 21-22.)  Those decisions guide us until the United 
States Supreme Court articulates a contrary rule. 
 
27 
correctness of a trial court‘s ruling on a Batson/Wheeler motion, we consider ―all 
the circumstances of the case.‖  (People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 908, 
citing Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280.)  The circumstances of the case include 
what the jurors said and wrote in connection with voir dire and the reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from those statements.  We conclude that the record 
supports the prosecutor‘s stated reasons for exercising the peremptory challenges. 
(i) Prospective Juror H. R. 
In her jury questionnaire, in response to a question about her general feelings 
concerning the death penalty, Prospective Juror H. R. wrote:  ―I feel the death 
penalty should only be enforced only under certain hardcore murders.‖  As to 
whether the death penalty is used too often, she wrote:  ―I really don‘t know of a 
case in which it was used.‖  As to whether California should have the death 
penalty today, she marked ―yes,‖ and as to why, she wrote:  ―Under certain 
circumstances.‖  As to what she saw as the purpose of the death penalty, she 
wrote:  ―No comment.‖  As to her attitude toward the proposition that all 
intentional unlawful and non-self-defense killings should receive the death 
penalty, she circled ―disagree somewhat,‖ and wrote:  ―Not everyone, but hardcore 
murders.‖  As to whether she believed that life in prison without the possibility of 
parole was a more severe punishment than the death penalty, she circled ―Don‘t 
Know.‖ 
When questioned during voir dire what she meant by ―hardcore murders,‖ 
she replied:  ―You know, like cruel murders, where they [mutilate] bodies and . . . 
burn people up for no reason.‖  Asked by the prosecutor whether these were the 
only types of murders as to which she personally would be able to impose the 
death penalty, she answered that she was not sure, but they were the first ones that 
came to mind when she thought of the death penalty.  When asked further about 
 
28 
what she meant by the term ―hardcore murders,‖ she answered:  ―I mean burning 
of bodies and mutilating body parts, I would probably think of that, but besides 
that I really can’t say what other reasons I would consider the death penalty.‖  
(Italics added.) 
The record supports the prosecutor‘s stated race-neutral reason for excusing 
H. R.  (People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 386.)  Even on a cold record, 
H. R.‘s comments suggest some degree of ambivalence toward the imposition of 
the death penalty, especially her comments about what kind of ―hardcore murders‖ 
came to mind as appropriate for the death penalty. 
(ii) Prospective Juror T. C. 
T. C.‘s responses on the written questionnaire generally indicated willingness 
to impose the death penalty.  However, she answered ―yes‖ to the question 
whether she would, at the penalty phase, vote for life in prison without the 
possibility of parole regardless of the evidence.  During voir dire, she said she had 
misunderstood this question, and that she would answer no.  She answered ―yes‖ 
to the question whether she believed that life in prison without the possibility of 
parole was a more severe penalty than the death penalty.  During voir dire she also 
clarified that she actually believed the death penalty was more severe than life in 
prison without the possibility of parole. 
T. C.‘s voir dire answers reflect equivocation and hesitancy.  Defense 
counsel asked her:  ―Some people may say the death penalty is a good thing but 
wouldn‘t want to be a juror in that situation where they actually vote for it.  Are 
you in that particular situation?‖  T. C. answered:  ―No, I wouldn‘t want to vote 
for it — I mean, I would vote for it, but if, like I was on the jury, I wouldn‘t want 
to put myself in that predicament to vote for a death penalty if I were a juror.‖  
This lead to the following exchange: 
 
29 
―Defense counsel:  If you are on this jury you‘re in that predicament.  Could 
you impose the death penalty. 
―T. C.:  I could but I wouldn‘t. 
―Defense counsel:  You wouldn‘t under any circumstances. 
―T. C.:  No. 
―Defense counsel:  So if you are a juror in this case you wouldn‘t impose the 
death penalty under any circumstances? 
―T. C.:  Well, like I said, like I told her in certain situations but I can‘t say I 
would just vote for the death penalty.  But in certain situations.‖ 
The prosecutor asked T. C. whether she thought she was the type of juror 
who could actually impose the death penalty if it was justified by everything she 
had heard.  Her answer again reflects equivocation and hesitancy:  ―If I heard 
everything in the evidence and if I feel that I opposed it and then I changed my 
mind on it, I would overrule it, you know.  Like say if I heard more evidence and I 
say I was wrong in thinking this and I heard a little more and I decide that the 
death penalty shouldn‘t be then I would overrule it.‖ 
The record supports the prosecutor‘s stated race-neutral reason for excusing 
T. C.  (People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 386.) 
(iii) Prospective Juror P. C. 
In her jury questionnaire, in response to a question about her general feelings 
about the death penalty, P. C. wrote:  ―It‘s fair in some cases.‖  As to whether 
California should have a death penalty, she wrote:  ―Have not decided as of yet.‖  
As to whether every intentional unlawful and non-self-defense killing should 
receive the death penalty, she circled ―agree somewhat,‖ and wrote as an 
explanation:  ―Every case has different circumstances.‖ 
 
30 
In voir dire, when the prosecutor asked about her response that she had not 
decided as yet regarding the death penalty, she answered:  ―I haven‘t decided.  I 
really don‘t know.‖  Asked how she would vote on a ballot initiative determining 
whether California should have the death penalty, she answered:  ―I don‘t know if 
I would.‖  Asked whether she would include the death penalty if she were the 
hypothetical ruler of an island who determined the laws, she answered:  ―I think I 
would, yeah.‖  Asked whether, if the circumstances warranted it and after hearing 
all the evidence, she could see herself imposing the death penalty on another 
person, she answered:  ―I think I could.‖ 
The record supports the prosecutor‘s stated race-neutral reason for excusing 
P. C.  (People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 386.)  Even on a cold record, P. C.‘s 
comments suggest some ambivalence and equivocation toward imposing the death 
penalty, such as her indecision about whether California should have a death 
penalty, and the qualification of her answers with the phrase ―I think.‖ 
(iv) Prospective Juror R. P. 
R. P.‘s written questionnaire generally indicated a willingness to impose the 
death penalty.  As to her general feelings regarding the death penalty, she wrote:  
―It is sometimes necessary.‖  Some of her voir dire answers, however, suggest the 
equivocation and hesitancy described by the prosecutor in justifying the use of a 
peremptory challenge against her.  The following exchange, which the prosecutor 
quoted in substantial part during the discussion of the second Batson/Wheeler 
motion, reflects this: 
―Prosecutor:  Do you think the death penalty serves a deterrent value in our 
society? 
―R. P.:  It‘s possible that it might.  As I said it would depend on the case.  It‘s 
not something that I could say yes or no on without — just a broad statement. 
 
31 
―Prosecutor:  I just want your feelings.  Do you think the death penalty serves 
a deterrent value to yourself?  Do you think it does? 
―R. P.:  I hadn’t really pinned it down. 
―Prosecutor:  You don‘t have feelings one way or the other as to whether it 
serves a deterrent value or not? 
―R. P.:  Sometimes it would and sometimes it would not.  With some people it 
would and with some people it would not. 
―Prosecutor:  In terms of your own feelings on the death penalty, you can‘t 
give me any more guidance on how you feel about it other than you haven‘t really 
thought about it? 
―R. P.:  No, I really haven’t.  It is just not something that I would  — could 
say yes, it would, or no, it wouldn’t, because I hadn’t thought of it in that terms 
seriously.‖  (Italics added.) 
Based on R. P.‘s statements, we conclude the record supports the 
prosecutor‘s stated race-neutral reason for excusing R. P.  (People v. Silva, supra, 
25 Cal.4th at p. 386.) 
Defendant contends, however, that, even though the prosecutor referred in 
detail to the voir dire responses quoted above, the prosecutor focused on R. P.‘s 
demeanor, rather than the statements themselves.  Indeed at one point, the 
prosecutor stated:  ―It clearly isn‘t from the words that are written down.  It was 
my general impression from the way she answered the questions, not what she 
said.‖  Defendant contends therefore that the prosecutor‘s stated reason stands or 
falls on R. P.‘s demeanor alone.  Defendant acknowledges that an appellate court 
normally grants great deference to a trial court‘s evaluations of demeanor.  
Defendant notes, however, that the trial court stated it had stopped taking notes on 
the prospective jurors after a certain point and had no notes on R. P.  
Consequently, defendant contends we can grant no deference to the trial court‘s 
 
32 
ruling because it was based entirely on the demeanor of a prospective juror that it 
admitted it could not recall. 
We reject both premises of defendant‘s argument here.  First, we reject the 
contention that the prosecutor‘s stated reason of R. P.‘s hesitancy to impose the 
death penalty stands or falls on her demeanor alone.  As noted above, the 
prosecutor quoted and referred to R. P.‘s voir dire answers.  In the course of a 
series of back- and forth exchanges with defense counsel, the prosecutor 
emphasized the demeanor aspect and stated that it had more weight than R. P.‘s 
words alone.  But such remarks did not represent that he was withdrawing any 
reference to the words and was depending on demeanor alone.  We are not 
therefore precluded from considering R. P.‘s words and the reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from them. 
Second, the trial court‘s apparent lack of personal recollection of R. P.‘s 
demeanor does not remove any and all basis for deference to the trial court‘s 
ruling on the Batson/Wheeler motion.  (Thaler v. Haynes (2010) 559 U.S. 43, __ 
[130 S.Ct. 1171, 1175].)  Although the United States Supreme Court has stressed 
the importance of a trial court‘s firsthand observation of the prospective juror‘s 
demeanor (Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 477), the high court has, 
however, also stated that ―the best evidence of the intent of the attorney exercising 
a strike is often that attorney‘s demeanor.‖  (Thaler v. Haynes, supra, 559 U.S. at 
p. __ [130 S.Ct. at p. 1175].)  Similarly, this court has listed contemporaneous 
observations of voir dire as one among several important factors by which the trial 
court can assess the credibility of the prosecutor‘s explanations:  ― ‗Credibility can 
be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor‘s demeanor; by how 
reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered 
rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.‘  (Miller-El [v. Cockrell (2003) 
537 U.S. 322,] 339.)  In assessing credibility, the court draws upon its 
 
33 
contemporaneous observations of the voir dire.  It may also rely on the court‘s 
own experiences as a lawyer and bench officer in the community, and even the 
common practices of the advocate and the office that employs him or her.‖  
(People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613, fn. omitted.)  Even though we find 
the prosecutor‘s stated race-neutral reason adequately supported by R. P.‘s 
statements alone, we do not discount the trial court‘s ability to assess the 
credibility of the prosecutor, even absent the trial court‘s personal recollection of 
R. P.‘s demeanor. 
(v) Prospective Juror R. J. 
The ruling on the Batson/Wheeler motion as to R. J. raises issues similar to 
those of R. P., just discussed.  The prosecutor explained that his peremptory as to 
R. J. was based on his impression that she would be unable to impose the death 
penalty because of her answers and the demeanor and fashion in which she 
answered his questions.  The trial court stated that it did not recall the responses of 
this prospective juror.  We therefore review R. J.‘s voir dire statements to ascertain 
whether they support the prosecutor‘s stated reason and conclude that they do. 
R. J.‘s written questionnaire generally expressed support for the death 
penalty, but contained qualifying language that can reasonably be interpreted as 
showing equivocation or hesitation.  As to her general feelings regarding the death 
penalty, R. J. wrote:  ―Capital punishment has never been a deterrent to crime but 
it is necessary in our society because so many people think it is.‖  (Italics added.)  
She marked ―yes‖ as to whether she felt that California should have the death 
penalty today, and wrote as an explanation:  ―Even though it would take a long 
time between sentencing and actual execution, the penalty would be somewhat of 
a solace to the friends, family of the victim.‖  (Italics added.)  During voir dire, she 
clarified that she did not think that capital punishment was a deterrent to crime 
 
34 
because ―there are so many people in jail for capital crimes.‖  As to whether every 
intentional unlawful and non-self-defense killing should receive the death penalty, 
she circled ―agree somewhat,‖ and wrote as an explanation:  ―I just don’t strongly 
agree or disagree so [‗]somewhat[‘] comes closest to any answer I could give at 
this point.‖  (Italics added.)  She marked ―don‘t know‖ in response to the question 
whether she believed that life in prison without the possibility of parole was a 
more severe punishment than the death penalty. 
Finally, we note the fact that the prosecutor had previously accepted three 
panels with R. J. on each of them, a fact that was raised during the discussion of 
the Batson/Wheeler motion.  Although this is not a conclusive factor, we have 
stated that ―the passing of certain jurors may be an indication of the prosecutor‘s 
good faith in exercising his peremptories, and may be an appropriate factor for the 
trial judge to consider in ruling on a Wheeler objection.‖  (People v. Snow (1987) 
44 Cal.3d 216, 225.) 
(vi) Prospective Juror D. J. 
As just discussed, we conclude that the record supports the prosecutor‘s 
stated race-neutral reason for peremptorily challenging R. J.  The record, however, 
also presents the possibility that the prosecutor mistook R. J. for another 
prospective juror, D. J., also an African-American woman, who happened to have 
the same last name.  Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that 
this act of mistaken identity is the most probable explanation of the events 
disclosed in the record and that there was no violation of Batson/Wheeler. 
 
 
 
 
(a)  Background 
As discussed, post, in part D., following defendant‘s conviction and sentence 
of death, defense counsel brought a motion for new trial, the central claim of 
which was ineffective assistance of counsel, but which also included a claim of 
 
35 
Batson/Wheeler error.  In the hearing on the Batson/Wheeler portion of the new 
trial motion, the trial court stated that it had not made a very good record on this 
topic and asked the prosecutor to put on the record the notes he had taken during 
juror voir dire, which had been alluded to during the sidebar discussions of the 
Batson/Wheeler motions.  The prosecutor stated he wished to incorporate all the 
statements he made during the colloquy on the Batson/Wheeler motions as to why 
he excused the jurors in the first place and he then went on to provide a 
chronological narrative of the 16 peremptory challenges he had used, providing 
the name and a description of each of the prospective jurors he had excused.  
Relevant here is his description of the 14th challenge as being to D. J., ―a married 
39-year-old black female.‖  No mention is made of R .J., who, according to her 
jury questionnaire, was ―remarried‖ and 65 years old.  D. J.‘s juror questionnaire 
indeed indicates that she was ―married‖ and 39 years old.  The prosecutor then 
discussed the five prospective jurors who were the subjects of the Batson/Wheeler 
motions.  For the fifth African-American woman excused, he erroneously named 
D. J., not R. J., and stated the following reasons:  ―I‘ve got her responses 95 
through 107, and 103 and I have a note to myself, ‗plus look at her responses to 
my voir dire at the Hovey,‘ and I had made a challenge for cause so apparently I 
felt that she shouldn‘t have been around even by the time we got to general voir 
dire.‖ 
At the new trial motion hearing, the apparent discrepancy between the 
prosecutor‘s discussion of D. J. as the fifth African-American woman juror 
excused rather than R. J., as listed in the reporter‘s transcript, was not raised by 
defense counsel or commented on by the trial court.22 
                                              
22 
As discussed in part D., post, defense counsel for the new trial motion was 
an attorney named Douglas Otto, who had been appointed because the motion 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
36 
The record supports the prosecutor‘s representations regarding D. J.  Her 
responses in her written questionnaire about the death penalty (responses 95 
through 107 as noted by the prosecutor) reflect opposition to the death penalty.  
When asked about her general views regarding the death penalty, she wrote:  ―I‘m 
not for the death penalty.  Life in prison is what I‘m for.  I don‘t think know [sic] 
one has right to take someone [sic] life.  I feel if the person is guilty, they should 
do there [sic] time.‖  She answered that her views were based on religious 
conviction, and in response to the question whether California should have the 
death penalty, she wrote:  ―I believe that there [sic] time spent in prison . . . [is] all 
the punishment we should be able to give.  Death to me should be when God call 
[sic] them home.‖  For question 103, (highlighted by the prosecutor in his notes), 
which asked whether she would automatically, in every case, regardless of the 
evidence, vote for the death penalty, she circled ―don‘t know,‖ and wrote in the 
margin:  ―I‘m against the death penalty.‖ 
In her individual voir dire, the prosecutor asked D. J. about her ―death to me 
should be when God calls them home‖ comment.  After a series of questions in 
which she appeared to indicate that she would always vote for life in prison 
without the possibility of parole in spite of the evidence, the prosecutor made a 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
asserted that trial counsel, Ronald J. LeMieux, had rendered ineffective assistance.  
Otto had not been present during any of defendant‘s trial.  LeMieux had also filed 
a new trial motion based on Batson/Wheeler error and identified R. J. as the fifth 
excused African-American woman based on the transcript.  But LeMieux himself 
had not been present during jury selection either.  An associate attorney, Douglas 
E. McCann, conducted jury selection.  An additional factor that may have led to 
the confusion of identities was that R. J. did not write her name in the space 
provided on the first page of her juror questionnaire; she only signed the 
questionnaire at the end. 
 
37 
challenge for cause.  In a sidebar discussion, defense counsel argued that D. J.‘s 
religious views were not necessarily incompatible with the death penalty.  The 
court then allowed defense counsel to engage in a series of questions to 
rehabilitate D. J.  The trial court asked her a final question to which D. J. stated 
that she felt she could impose the death penalty if it was appropriate.  The trial 
court then asked her to return for general jury selection, impliedly denying the 
prosecutor‘s excusal for cause. 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Analysis 
In People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 188, a Batson/Wheeler motion 
challenged the excusal of a juror whom the prosecutor stated he had excused ―in 
error.‖  We found no violation of Batson/Wheeler, holding that ―a genuine 
‗mistake‘ is a race-neutral reason.‖  (Id. at p. 189.)  In another case, the prosecutor 
gave a reason for excusing a juror, which, the prosecutor later discovered and 
informed the court, was mistakenly based on information in the questionnaire of 
another juror with the same last name.  (People v. Phillips (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 
810, 814.)  Citing our holding in Williams, the Court of Appeal found no violation 
of Batson/Wheeler.  (Phillips, at p. 819.) 
Here, unlike Williams and Phillips, the court and the parties were never made 
aware of the prosecutor‘s possible error in excusing the prospective juror.  This 
difference, however, does not in itself affect the determination whether the 
prosecutor‘s excusal was based on a race-neutral reason.  The information 
disclosed at the new trial motion hearing strongly supports the race-neutral reason 
the prosecutor gave at the time of the motion — hesitancy to impose the death 
penalty.  Therefore, assuming that the prosecutor mistakenly excused R. J. because 
he thought she was D. J., there was no violation of Batson/Wheeler. 
 
38 
(3) Comparative Juror Analysis 
Defendant argues that the excluded jurors addressed in the Batson/Wheeler 
motions gave answers that were no more equivocal than the jurors who were 
ultimately seated.  Defendant contends that if the prosecutor were indeed as 
concerned about equivocal answers and reluctance to impose the death penalty as 
he professed to be, he would have struck some of the jurors he left on the jury, 
because he had three peremptory challenges left when he accepted the jury. 
As we have stated, comparative juror analysis must be considered for the first 
time on appeal while reviewing third stage Batson/Wheeler claims when a 
defendant relies on such evidence and the record is adequate to permit the 
comparisons.  (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 607.)  But we have warned 
of the inherent limitations of such evidence.  ―On appellate review, a voir dire 
answer sits on a page of transcript.  In the trial court, however, advocates and trial 
judges watch and listen as the answer is delivered.  Myriad subtle nuances may 
shape it, including attitude, attention, interest, body language, facial expression 
and eye contact.‖  (Id. at p. 622.)  ―A transcript will show that the panelists gave 
similar answers:  it cannot convey the different ways in which those answers were 
given.  Yet those differences may legitimately impact the prosecutor‘s decision to 
strike or retain the prospective juror.‖  (Id. at p. 623.) 
Defendant contends the seated jurors expressed as much or greater 
―reluctance‖ to impose the death penalty compared with the African-American 
women the prosecutor struck.  Defendant reviews the comments of five of the 
seated jurors and focuses on any statement that could possibly be interpreted as 
showing some reservation or equivocation in imposing the death penalty.23  The 
                                              
23 
Defendant points to the following: 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
39 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
 
(1) When asked if she thought she could impose the death penalty against 
defendant if the prosecutor asked her to, Seated Juror L. B. replied:  ―Well, if he‘s 
going to do it that doesn‘t mean I have to vote for death.‖  When asked if she had 
the ability to impose the death penalty, L. B. stated:  ―Yes, I think so.‖ 
 
(2) The following voir dire interchange between the prosecutor and Seated 
Juror D. H.: 
―Prosecutor:  What do you think about being asked to sit on a jury where 
ultimately if we get to the end I‘m going to stand up and look at you as a juror and 
ask you to put this man here to death; what do you think about that? 
―D. H.:  Well, it‘s a big decision to make, but if the evidence is there and it‘s true, 
if that‘s the decision that has to be made I think I can make it. 
―Prosecutor:  Okay, it would be a tough decision? 
―D. H.:  It would be.  It‘s something you don‘t like to do. 
―Prosecutor:  Of course not.  Do you think the death penalty serves a deterrent 
value? 
―D. H.:  I think, I think so far as I am concerned, and that is about all I can answer, 
I think so.‖ 
 
(3) Seated Juror W. J. gave the opinion that life in prison without the 
possibility of parole was a more severe sentence than death because ―it would be 
with them all the time, instead of giving them death and it would just be over with.  
When asked about his feelings toward the death penalty, W. J. stated he thought it 
would apply to really horrible crimes such as murder with no remorse.  When 
asked whether if he came to the conclusion that the death penalty was the 
appropriate verdict, he would be able to impose it, he answered:  ―Yes, I think so.‖ 
 
(4) Seated Juror L. S. did not think the death penalty should be imposed for 
crimes of passion. 
 
(5) Seated Juror B. H. told the court that he would prefer not to be a juror 
because it caused him some discomfort.  When asked his views on the death 
penalty, he stated that be believed some people could be rehabilitated and others 
could not but he would need to decide on a case by case basis.  When asked 
whether he would have the ability to impose the death penalty, he answered:  
―Never having done it before, I believe I could.  Without having that experience, 
you know, it‘s kind of a hard thing to say, ‗yeah, I definitely will,‘ but I believe 
that I could do that if that‘s what I felt was necessary.‖ 
 
40 
People, in turn, point to statements by the same seated jurors indicating their 
willingness to impose the death penalty.24  We are not persuaded by defendant‘s 
argument.  We see no instances in the cold record reflecting that the seated jurors 
expressed as much or greater a reluctance to impose the death penalty as the 
excluded prospective jurors. 
(4)  Prosecutor’s Comments on Exercising Challenges Against 
Caucasian Prospective Jurors 
Defendant points to comments the prosecutor made about challenging 
Caucasian jurors as evidence that the prosecutor challenged the five African-
American women prospective jurors for race-based reasons.  The prosecutor made 
the following comments during the course of stating for the record the final racial 
composition of the jury:  ―First of all, I would like to indicate the last number of 
challenges I exercised were against White jurors, to be replaced by Black jurors.  
The reason they were exercised was, first of all, I wanted a greater mix of racial 
diversification on this jury.  [¶]  Second, they just happened to be a couple of 
Black jurors I rated very high because of their answers where they indicated they 
had an ability to impose the death penalty in a particular case.‖  Defendant did not 
raise below, nor does he now raise, a Batson/Wheeler claim based on peremptory 
                                              
24 
(1) L. B. said that she could impose the death penalty, that she strongly 
supported the death penalty, and that she had voted for the death penalty in a 
recent election. 
 
(2) D. H. indicted she was willing to impose the death penalty. 
 
(3) W. J. stated he could impose the death penalty if it was ―the appropriate 
thing.‖  When the prosecutor directly asked if Jackson could impose the death 
penalty, Jackson responded, ―Yes.‖  
 
(4) L. S. indicated she was willing to impose the death penalty.  
 
(5) B. H. said he could impose the death penalty in ―certain kinds of 
situations.‖  He later added that he believed that he could impose the death penalty 
―if that‘s what I felt was necessary.‖ 
 
41 
challenges to Caucasian jurors.  Defendant raises the prosecutor‘s comments only 
to the extent they cast the prosecutor as someone liable to discriminate on the basis 
of race.  On this record, however, the prosecutor‘s comments about seeking a 
greater mix of racial diversification do not appear to us to show that he 
discriminated against African-American women jurors.  Finally, as noted, the 
ultimate composition of the jury was seven Caucasians and five African-
Americans (four men, one woman).  Although ― ‗the fact that the jury included 
members of a group allegedly discriminated against is not conclusive, it is an 
indication of good faith in exercising peremptories, and an appropriate factor for 
the trial judge to consider in ruling on a Wheeler objection.‘ ‖  (People v. Stanley 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 938, fn. 7.) 
2.  Asserted Witt Error 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in granting the prosecutor‘s for-
cause challenge to two prospective jurors, and in denying defense counsel‘s for-
cause challenge to a juror who eventually sat.  As we explain, the trial court did 
not err in these rulings. 
The federal constitutional standard for dismissing a prospective juror for 
cause based on his or her views of capital punishment focuses on ― ‗[w]hether the 
juror‘s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties 
as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.‘ ‖  (Uttecht v. Brown 
(2007) 551 U.S. 1, 7, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.)  
Applying Witt, we have stated:  ― ‗ ― ‗[a] prospective juror is properly excluded if 
he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, 
including the death penalty where appropriate.‘  [Citation.]‖  [Citation.]  In 
addition, ― ‗[o]n appeal, we will uphold the trial court‘s ruling if it is fairly 
supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court‘s determination as to 
 
42 
the prospective juror‘s true state of mind when the prospective juror has made 
statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.‘  [Citations.]‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Blair 
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 743 (Blair), quoting People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th, 
900, 987.)  ―The same analysis applies to claims involving erroneous juror 
exclusion or inclusion.‖  (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 905.) 
a.  Granting of Prosecution’s For-cause Challenges 
(1)  Prospective Juror G. R. 
Prospective Juror G. R.‘s written questionnaire expressed strong opinions 
against the death penalty.  As to his general feelings regarding the death penalty, 
G. R. wrote:  ―I do not believe the death penalty is morally just.‖  Regarding 
whether he felt the death penalty was used too often, he circled ―yes‖ and wrote:  
―Once is too much.‖  He marked ―no‖ to the question whether California should 
have a death penalty.  Concerning whether every intentional unlawful and non-
self-defense killing should receive the death penalty, he circled ―strongly 
disagree‖ and explained:  ―Don‘t believe in the death penalty.‖ 
Defense counsel sought to rehabilitate G. R. during a lengthy voir dire.  G. R. 
stated that he could ―see himself voting for the death penalty if that‘s what the law 
had dictated.‖  Defense counsel informed him that ―the law never dictates that you 
must vote for the death penalty‖ and ―always gives you that option to do what you 
feel is appropriate under the circumstances.‖  G. R. stated, ―If it were completely 
my option, I would not vote for the death penalty.‖  Defense counsel stated that 
the law ―doesn‘t say it‘s completely your decision.  It says that you‘re supposed to 
impose the appropriate sentence.  Appropriate will go towards the evidence that 
you see.‖  G. R. stated:  ―I believe I could go with the appropriate sentence.‖ 
The prosecutor also engaged in extensive questioning.  G. R. stated that ―on a 
personal level‖ he did not think the death penalty was an appropriate punishment 
 
43 
but stated that in the judgment process his prejudices would not be strong enough 
to sway his decision.  The prosecutor asked G. R. whether he could think of any 
circumstance that would cause him to believe that the appropriate sentence for 
anyone would be the death penalty.  G. R. said he could think of none that would 
cause him to ―personally believe‖ that the death penalty was appropriate. 
After the prosecutor moved to excuse G. R. for cause, the court asked G. R. 
further questions and held two sidebar conferences, in which the prosecutor and 
defense counsel elaborated their positions.  Defense counsel summed up the 
seeming contradiction presented by G. R.‘s answers at voir dire as follows:  G. R. 
was personally opposed to the death penalty, could not imagine a situation in 
which he personally felt it should be imposed, but also maintained he could follow 
the law, do what was appropriate, and be fair and impartial.   
At the second sidebar conference, the prosecutor contended that no matter 
what questions he asked, G. R. would not acknowledge that the death penalty 
could, under any circumstances, be the appropriate sentence.  The trial court 
agreed that G. R.‘s views regarding the death penalty substantially impaired his 
ability to serve as a juror:  ―He would like to think he was not, and he was trying 
to get us to believe that he can be very objective and forget his own feelings, but 
his answer keeps coming back to his own convictions.  Personally, he cannot do 
it.‖  Defense counsel responded that G. R. had never indicated on the record that 
he could not personally impose the death penalty as a juror.  The prosecutor 
agreed, but added:  ―[O]n a personal level he can never accept any situation as 
calling for [the death penalty] being an appropriate penalty, which precluded him 
from ever being faced with that issue, and that‘s why he doesn‘t have to say that.‖  
The trial court agreed.  Over defense counsel‘s objection, the trial court found 
G. R.‘s ability to serve as a juror to be substantially impaired and excused him for 
cause. 
 
44 
Defendant contends the trial court erred.  We disagree.  Based on our review 
of the record, we uphold the ruling as fairly supported, and we accept the trial 
court‘s determination as to G. R.‘s state of mind given his conflicting or 
ambiguous statements.25  (Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 743.) 
(2)  Prospective Juror E. C. 
In her written questionnaire, Prospective Juror E. C. wrote that she had mixed 
feelings regarding the death penalty, and circled ―no‖ to the question whether she 
felt California should have a death penalty.  During voir dire questioning, she 
stated she had ―very mixed feelings‖ about the death penalty, would prefer to live 
in a state that did not have the death penalty, and, if it were to come up on the 
ballot, she would not vote for it.  She acknowledged that, although it would be 
difficult to impose the death penalty, ―if it came right down to it,‖ she ―probably 
could.‖  (Italics added.)  After the prosecutor pressed her on this point, however, 
she equivocated in the other direction, stating she probably could not vote for a 
verdict of death.  When asked by the court what she meant by ―probably,‖ she 
responded:  ―There is still a part of me that thinks that I could but I‘m just not 
                                              
25 
Defendant asks us to reconsider our long-standing formulation that, if fairly 
supported by the record, we will accept as binding the trial court‘s determination 
as to a prospective juror‘s state of mind when the prospective juror has made 
statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.  (Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 743.)  
Defendant contends our formulation reverses the state‘s burden, citing Wainwright 
v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at page 423, which states:  ―it is the adversary seeking 
exclusion who must demonstrate, through questioning, that the potential juror 
lacks impartiality.‖  But we see no conflict with Witt, which ―does not require that 
a juror‘s bias be proved with ‗unmistakable clarity.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 424.)  Despite a 
―lack of clarity in the printed record . . . there will be situations where the trial 
judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable 
to faithfully and impartially apply the law. . . .  This is why deference must be paid 
to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.‖  (Id. at pp. 425-426.) 
 
45 
certain.  I‘m really not.‖  When the trial court asked whether she would prefer not 
to sit on a case in which she had to make a death determination, she answered, ―I 
probably shouldn‘t,‖ and began to cry. 
The prosecutor challenged E. C. for cause based on her answers and 
emotional reaction to the questions.  Defense counsel objected, but the trial court 
made a finding that her views and reactions would substantially impair the 
performance of her duties as a juror.  Based on our review of the record, we 
uphold the ruling as fairly supported, and we accept the trial court‘s determination 
as to E. C.‘s state of mind.  (Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 743.) 
b.  Denial of Defense For-cause Challenge:  Juror R. C. 
Defense counsel unsuccessfully challenged for cause R. C., who eventually 
sat as a juror at defendant‘s trial.  Defendant contends the trial court erred in 
denying the challenge.  Preliminarily, the People contend defendant has forfeited 
this claim.  ―[A] defendant challenging on appeal the denial of a challenge for 
cause must fulfill a trio of procedural requirements:  (1) the defense must exercise 
a peremptory challenge to remove the juror in question; (2) the defense must 
exhaust all available peremptory challenges; and (3) the defense must express 
dissatisfaction with the jury as finally constituted.‖  (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 876, 910-911.)  As the People observe, and defendant does not contest, 
although defendant had peremptory challenges available to him when R. C. was 
seated on the jury, he did not use them to dismiss R. C.26  Defendant also failed to 
                                              
26  
After R. C. was placed in the jury box, defense counsel exercised 13 
peremptory challenges before accepting the jury.  He then exercised four more 
peremptory challenges before again accepting the jury.  He exercised his final two 
peremptory challenges before the jury was finally selected with R. C. as one of the 
jurors. 
 
46 
communicate his dissatisfaction regarding the jury to the trial court.  Defendant 
has therefore forfeited this claim.  (Ibid.)  
Even were we to reach the merits of this claim, we would find no error.  The 
trial court and the parties engaged R. C. in an extended voir dire on the issue of 
whether he would automatically vote for the death penalty regardless of the 
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.  In the initial rounds of questioning, 
R. C.‘s answers appeared conflicting.  Although he initially stated he would 
automatically impose the death penalty if the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances, he later said he could impose life in 
prison without the possibility of parole if he believed that sentence was 
appropriate, even if the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances.  When defense counsel noted that R. C. had previously stated he 
would automatically vote for death if the aggravating circumstances outweighed 
the mitigating circumstances, R. C. said he now wanted to retract that statement 
because the prosecutor‘s explanations had made him better understand the penalty 
phase process.  In denying the defense motion, the trial court observed the final 
round of questioning had clarified R. C.‘s position.  The record supports the trial 
court‘s conclusion that R. C. did not hold views that would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.  (Blair, supra, 36 
Cal.4th at p. 743.)  To the extent R. C.‘s statements were conflicting or 
ambiguous, we accept the trial court‘s determination as binding.  (Ibid.) 
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Failure to Give a Limiting Instruction Regarding Guilty Pleas of 
Defendant’s Accomplices 
Defendant‘s accomplices Linton, Cyprian, and Lee were charged with 
noncapital first degree murder, eventually pleaded guilty to second degree murder, 
and subsequently testified at defendant‘s trial.  Defendant contends his United 
 
47 
States Constitution Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights were violated 
because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it could not infer defendant‘s 
guilt from the accomplices‘ guilty pleas.  Defendant‘s claim fails because Linton, 
Cyprian, and Lee testified in person and were subjected to defense cross-
examination.  Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, and its progeny, on 
which defendant relies, are inapplicable, because these cases involve the use of 
out-of-court statements by un-cross-examined codefendants to incriminate a 
defendant at a joint trial.  (See Nelson v. O’Neil (1971) 402 U.S. 622, 629-630 
[codefendant‘s extrajudicial statement implicating the defendant need not be 
excluded when the codefendant testifies and is available for cross-examination].) 
Defendant‘s reliance on a Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Halbert (9th 
Cir. 1981) 640 F.2d 1000 is also unpersuasive.  Preliminarily, decisions by the 
federal courts of appeal are not binding on us.  (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
598, 653.)  Second, the premises underlying the ruling in Halbert do not apply 
here.  In Halbert, codefendants testified against the defendant and were asked by 
the prosecutor during direct examination about their guilty pleas to conspiracy to 
commit mail fraud.  (Halbert, supra, at p. 1004.)  Over defense objection, both of 
the codefendants were allowed to tell the jury they pleaded guilty to the 
conspiracy for which the defendant was on trial.  (Ibid.)  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed, holding that, ―[w]ithout instruction, it is possible the jury could use the 
pleas as evidence of [Halbert‘s] guilt,‖ and that the trial court erred by failing to 
give an instruction limiting the use of this evidence to witness credibility.  (Id. at 
p. 1006.) 
In this case, by contrast, defendant did not object to the admission of the 
evidence regarding Linton‘s, Cyprian‘s, and Lee‘s guilty pleas.  Indeed, he 
requested and received a stipulation from the prosecution regarding the dates of 
the pleas.  Thus, far from objecting to the facts of the pleas as prejudicial to 
 
48 
defendant, defense counsel sought to incorporate them into the defense case.  
Because defendant cites no authority that the trial court had a duty to give a 
limiting instruction on its own motion, and because trial counsel failed to object to 
the admission of the pleas and failed to request a limiting instruction, we find no 
merit in this claim. 
2.  Refusal to Allow Questioning Regarding Jury Verdict as to 
Accomplice Linton 
Defendant contends his United States Constitution Sixth Amendment 
confrontation clause rights were violated because the trial court upheld the 
prosecutor‘s objection to defense counsel‘s questioning of Linton concerning the 
annulled jury verdicts in his first trial.  As we explain below, the trial court did not 
err in upholding the objection, and defendant‘s constitutional rights were not 
violated. 
a.  Background 
Linton, who was initially charged along with defendant for the capital crimes, 
was one of the main prosecution witnesses against defendant.  Linton pleaded 
guilty to second degree murder before defendant‘s trial.  When Linton was cross-
examined during defendant‘s trial, defense counsel sought to challenge Linton‘s 
credibility by asking him about the circumstances surrounding his acceptance of 
the plea agreement.  Linton acknowledged that he had been charged with two 
counts of first degree murder for the murders of Barron and Thomas.  Linton also 
acknowledged that he had proceeded to trial on these charges in September 1990.  
But, when defense counsel asked Linton about the verdict in that first trial, the 
prosecutor objected on the grounds of relevance.  The trial court sustained the 
objection and then engaged in a sidebar discussion with the parties. 
The parties discussed the history of Linton‘s first trial.  There the jury had 
convicted him of two counts of first degree murder, but the verdict was 
 
49 
subsequently overturned because of jury misconduct.  Linton was tried a second 
time for first degree murder (in January 1991) but, before the jury began to 
deliberate, the prosecutor agreed to accept Linton‘s plea of guilty to second degree 
murder. 
Defense counsel stated he wanted to ask about the verdict in Linton‘s first 
trial to show that the circumstances surrounding Linton‘s acceptance of his plea 
agreement at the second trial reflected an implicit agreement that Linton would 
testify against defendant.  The text of the plea agreement contained no express 
agreement that Linton must cooperate with the prosecution in a future prosecution 
of defendant.  Nevertheless, defense counsel argued that the guilty verdict in 
Linton‘s first trial showed the strength of the prosecution case, and he contended 
that the prosecutor would not have allowed Linton to plead guilty to second degree 
murder absent an understanding that Linton would testify against defendant. 
The prosecutor responded that he had made no promises to Linton and that 
the plea agreement clearly stated that the prosecution‘s offer of a sentence of 15 
years to life was ―independent of anything [Linton] chose to do later.‖  The 
prosecutor also stated that, contrary to what defense counsel seemed to assume, it 
was the prosecutor who had approached Linton about a plea agreement, not vice 
versa.  The prosecutor argued that to ask Linton why he thought the prosecutor 
was willing to accept a second degree conviction after he had previously obtained 
a first degree conviction would be to invite speculation. 
The trial court agreed that defense counsel‘s argument concerning the 
circumstances surrounding Linton‘s acceptance of the plea agreement was 
speculative.  Accordingly, it allowed defense counsel to ask Linton what he 
thought was expected of him when he entered into the plea agreement, but 
cautioned defense counsel not to ask about the verdict in the first trial because this 
would require an explanation of how the verdict was nullified through jury 
 
50 
misconduct.  The trial court sustained the prosecutor‘s objection, stating it did not 
want defense counsel to leave ―an inference in front of the jury as to something 
that cannot be explained.‖ 
Defense counsel resumed cross-examination of Linton and asked him, 
whether, at the time he entered into the plea, he had ―some sort of understanding 
or belief‖ that the prosecutor might ask him to testify against defendant.  Linton 
responded that, when he entered into the plea, he understood that the prosecutor 
might ask him to testify in defendant‘s case, but that he was not required to do so. 
b.  Analysis 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecutor‘s 
relevancy objection to the admission of Linton‘s annulled jury verdict at his first 
trial.  Defendant contends that the definition of relevant evidence is broad enough 
to include those verdicts.  (See Evid. Code, § 210 [― ‗Relevant evidence‘ means 
evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay 
declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action.‖].)  For the reasons 
explained below, we disagree with defendant‘s contention.   
Defense counsel‘s argument concerning the relevance of the annulled first 
degree murder jury verdicts was based on the premise that these verdicts showed 
the strength of the prosecution case against Linton.  Defendant reasoned that 
because of the strength of the case, both Linton and the prosecutor would have 
expected Linton to receive the same verdict in his second trial.  Defense counsel 
further reasoned that because of the strength of the prosecutor‘s case against 
Linton, the prosecutor was in a strong bargaining position in relation to Linton and 
would have been able to dictate the terms of a plea agreement, including requiring 
 
51 
him to testify against defendant, even though this was never expressly stated in the 
plea agreement. 
We are not persuaded by the highly speculative nature of this argument.  The 
nature of the jury misconduct that necessitated nullification of the verdict is 
unspecified in this record.  Therefore, the fact of the nullified first degree murder 
verdicts tells us nothing about the strength of the underlying case.  Consider, for 
example, a case in which the verdict was nullified because they were obtained by 
means of lot.  (See § 1181, subd. 4.)  The underlying case could have been strong 
or weak; the verdict in such a case would tell one nothing about the underlying 
strength of the prosecutor‘s case precisely because the verdict was arrived at 
through misconduct, not through the strength of the evidence.  The annulled first 
degree murder verdicts in Linton‘s first trial therefore do not in themselves tell us 
anything about the underlying strength or weakness of the prosecutor‘s case 
against Linton.27  Defense counsel failed to show the relevance of the annulled 
verdicts to his argument for impeaching Linton‘s account of his acceptance of the 
plea agreement.  The trial court did not err in sustaining the objection. 
3.  Asserted Impugning of the Integrity of Defense Counsel 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by denigrating 
defense counsel during closing and rebuttal arguments.  As discussed below, 
defendant forfeited these claims by failure to object, and, considered on the merits, 
none of the asserted actions rose to the level of misconduct. 
The standards governing review of misconduct claims are settled.  ―A 
prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury 
                                              
27 
We need not and do not decide whether an annulled jury verdict can ever be 
relevant legal evidence.   
 
52 
commits misconduct, and such actions require reversal under the federal 
Constitution when they infect the trial with such ‗ ―unfairness as to make the 
resulting conviction a denial of due process.‖ ‘  (Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 
U.S. 168, 181; see People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 733.)  Under state law, a 
prosecutor who uses such methods commits misconduct even when those actions 
do not result in a fundamentally unfair trial.‖  (People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
1277, 1328.)  ―In order to preserve a claim of misconduct, a defendant must make 
a timely objection and request an admonition; only if an admonition would not 
have cured the harm is the claim of misconduct preserved for review.‖  (Ibid.)  
When a claim of misconduct is based on the prosecutor‘s comments before the 
jury, ― ‗the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable 
fashion.‘ ‖  (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960, quoting People v. 
Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841.) 
Defendant acknowledges that, concerning all of the instances he now claims 
to have been misconduct, defense counsel failed to object and request an 
admonition.  Defendant contends that the failure to object should be excused as 
futile under People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 821.  And yet he fails to show 
how objecting would have been futile under the circumstances of this trial.  
Consequently, his claims are forfeited.  (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 
79, 130.) 
Furthermore, were we to consider the claims, we would find them to lack 
merit.  Defendant contends that the prosecutor‘s opening comments in the closing 
argument constituted misconduct:  ―I gave a lot of thought on how to proceed in 
my closing argument.  I had a hard time sleeping last night because part of me 
really wants to come in here and attack the defense for the methods which they 
used to try and mislead you, deceive you, give you false insinuations.  And I 
 
53 
started by writing out all the things that he had done from the beginning in his 
opening statement, from the defendant, all the way back to when he started trying 
to falsify evidence.  [¶]  And I decided that‘s not the way to proceed in this case.  
See, my obligation here is trying to present the truth to the jury.  And the truth has 
a way of coming out when you view everything in totality.  So what I‘m going to 
do is I‘m going to focus on the case which I presented . . . .‖  (Italics added.) 
Defendant objects to the portions italicized above as attacking the integrity of 
defense counsel, casting aspersions on him, and suggesting that he had fabricated a 
defense.  (See People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846.)  Importantly, 
however, the prosecutor was referring to actions of both defendant and defense 
counsel.  Although his syntax was a bit awkward, the reference to falsifying 
evidence encompassed defendant‘s actions or actions that might reasonably be 
attributed to defendant.  As discussed, ante at pages 10-11, Raymond Valdez and 
Kathleen Matuzak testified about defendant‘s efforts to induce them to fabricate 
an alibi for him for the night of the killings.  Furthermore, ante at page 12, after 
defendant‘s arrest, defendant‘s wife called an employee of the pager store to ask 
her to destroy the paperwork on defendant‘s pager.  The prosecutor‘s comments 
about defendant‘s efforts to falsify evidence were founded on evidence in the 
record and fell within the permissible bounds of argument.  (People v. Friend 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 32.) 
Turning now to the prosecutor‘s reference to defense counsel‘s opening 
statement, we note that this apparently concerned defense counsel‘s remarks that 
defendant had been framed for the murders by a police officer named Tony 
Moreno for whom defendant had worked as an undercover informant.  Although 
no direct evidence was ever presented about Tony Moreno at trial, the issue was 
raised in various objections entertained by the court.  During Cyprian‘s testimony, 
outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor objected under Evidence Code 
 
54 
section 352 to defense‘s counsel‘s asking Cyprian whether Linton had identified 
someone named ―Tony‖ as talking to defendant in the bar parking lot.  (See ante, 
at p. 5.)  The prosecutor argued that defense counsel was attempting to confuse the 
jury by implying that the ―Tony‖ mentioned by Cyprian was Tony Moreno, even 
though defense counsel had presented no evidence that this ―Tony‖ was Tony 
Moreno.  The trial court allowed Cyprian‘s statement regarding Linton‘s reference 
to ―Tony‖ to come in based on defense counsel‘s representation that defendant 
would testify to Tony Moreno‘s involvement in the case.  Subsequently, defense 
counsel never called defendant to the stand, never called Tony Moreno to the 
stand, and failed to produce any evidence indicating that Tony Moreno was 
involved in the events of the capital crimes.  In closing, defense counsel sought to 
refer to the ―Tony‖ mentioned by Cyprian, and the prosecutor objected based on 
the trial court‘s prior ruling and asked the court to strike the reference to ―Tony.‖  
After reviewing the record, the trial court sustained the prosecutor‘s objection and 
granted his motion to strike, finding that mentioning the name ―Tony‖ would be 
asking the jury to speculate and would create confusion. 
The prosecutor therefore had a basis for being concerned that defense counsel 
would try to get the name of Tony Moreno in front of the jury, even though 
defense counsel had presented no evidence of Moreno‘s involvement in the capital 
crimes.  This forms the background of the prosecutor‘s allusions to defense 
counsel‘s attempts to mislead the jury.  Indeed, the prosecutor‘s concern proved 
prescient when, as described above, defense counsel did try to do exactly that 
during closing argument. 
In any event, the prosecutor‘s comments did not rise to the level of 
misconduct.  The prosecutor quickly shifted from the theme of defense deception 
and focused on ―the case which I presented,‖ namely, evidence of defendant‘s 
guilt.  The same analysis also applies to the following passage of the prosecutor‘s 
 
55 
argument:  ―And his defense, when he stood up in opening argument, is my client 
wasn‘t there.  The only thing for you to decide, was my client there.  So, that‘s 
what I‘m going to focus on.  He says his client wasn‘t there.  I say he‘s lying.‖  
Although the prosecutor did state ―I say he‘s lying,‖ his remarks are reasonably 
understood as a comment on the weakness of the defense evidence, which the 
prosecutor went on to discuss. 
Finally, defendant claims the following comment in the prosecutor‘s rebuttal 
constituted misconduct:  ―You see, the problem for defense counsel and for his 
client is he can‘t change the phone records.  He can‘t deceive the phone records.  
He can‘t manipulate them.  He can‘t confuse them.  He can‘t cross-examine them 
because . . . they speak for themselves.‖  The prosecutor‘s statements were in 
response to defense counsel‘s assertion during closing argument that the telephone 
records for the apartment where the killings occurred showed no calls ―after the 
afternoon.‖  The prosecutor rebutted this comment by noting that Cyprian had 
testified that he had called someone from that apartment‘s phone just before the 
shooting and that the telephone records showed a call at 9:05 p.m.  The 
prosecutor‘s remarks constituted fair comment on the evidence, and fell within the 
permissible bounds of argument.  (People v. Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 32.) 
4.  References to Facts not in Evidence 
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by referring to 
inadmissible hearsay and facts not in evidence.  Defendant‘s claims involve 
references to records from New York hotels that were never admitted into 
evidence.  As we conclude below, none of the references constituted misconduct. 
As described, ante at pages 9-10, Cyprian testified that, after the killings, he 
and defendant flew to New York where they registered at the Hotel Stanford under 
the names Michael and Mark Cole.  The prosecutor obtained a copy of the Hotel 
 
56 
Stanford registration card, which he intended to introduce into evidence.28  The 
prosecutor also obtained copies of hotel records of calls made from the room 
registered to Michael and Mark Cole.  The admissibility of the hotel registration 
card and the hotel phone records was first raised during the prosecutor‘s case-in-
chief when he was questioning Shelia Jones, the aunt of defendant‘s wife, 
concerning whether she had received any telephone calls from defendant from the 
Hotel Stanford in New York.  Defense counsel objected to this line of questioning, 
and at a sidebar proceeding stated he objected to the introduction of the 
registration card and other writings from New York in the absence of any 
foundation to authenticate them as falling under the business records exception to 
the hearsay rule.  The prosecutor responded that he intended to produce an 
employee from the Hotel Stanford to authenticate the hotel records, but that he did 
not intend to use the records in questioning Jones beyond asking her whether she 
had received telephone calls from defendant.  Defense counsel objected to any 
reference to the phone records in front of the witness, but suggested that the 
prosecutor could write down the information on a legal pad and refer to that.  The 
jury was sent out while the prosecutor copied the information.  Thereafter, the jury 
returned and the prosecutor resumed questioning Jones.  She denied receiving 
telephone calls from defendant on January 4 or 5, 1990, stating that she was out of 
town at that time. 
                                              
28 
The prosecutor described some details from the Hotel Stanford registration 
card during his opening statement.  Defense counsel did not object.  Defendant 
does not assert that this description of the card in itself constituted misconduct, 
although, as discussed below, he contends that this ultimately misled the jury 
because the card was never admitted into evidence. 
 
57 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly 
displaying the phone records within view of the jury, pulling them out of the 
envelope, and permitting the jury to infer that the prosecutor would be offering 
documentary evidence to underscore his assertions.  What the record shows, 
however, is that the prosecutor initially had some telephone records in his hands 
and may have started to refer to them during his examination of Jones, but he did 
not complete his question, did not have the records in his hands for more than a 
few moments, and placed the items into an envelope after defense counsel 
objected.  We discern no misconduct in this.   
The next instance at trial in which the hotel records were raised was during 
Cyprian‘s testimony that, after the killings, he and defendant stayed at a 
Travelodge before flying to New York.  The prosecutor sought to have Cyprian 
identify a receipt from the Travelodge.  In a sidebar proceeding, defense counsel 
objected to the prosecutor‘s questioning Cyprian about the Travelodge receipt 
until it could be authenticated.  Defense counsel also objected to the prosecutor‘s 
asking Cyprian about a photographic enlargement of the Hotel Stanford receipt 
that the prosecutor had brought to court and was apparently prepared to display to 
the jury on a bulletin board.  Defense counsel acknowledged that the prosecutor 
could ask Cyprian if he had registered at either the Travelodge or the Hotel 
Stanford, but objected to the introduction of any registration documents unless 
Cyprian testified to personal knowledge of registering.  The trial court agreed to 
allow the prosecutor to proceed in this way.  The prosecutor questioned Cyprian 
about registering at the Travelodge and the Stanford, but Cyprian stated he could 
not remember watching defendant fill out any registration paperwork at either 
hotel. 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by ―repeatedly 
displaying the Hotel Stanford registration card blowup in open court before the 
 
58 
jury.‖  But the record does not support defendant‘s contention.  Defense counsel 
phrased his objection at trial as follows:  ―The objection would be to asking this 
witness any questions about the contents of that writing [i.e., the Travelodge 
receipt] or putting that blowup on the bulletin board.‖  (Italics added.)  This 
phrasing indicates that the prosecutor had either not yet displayed the enlargement 
to the jury or had just very recently put it up.  The record therefore does not 
support defendant‘s contention that the enlargement was displayed for the jury for 
weeks during the trial.  Defendant points to the prosecutor‘s later statement that he 
had the enlargement in court ―every day since the proceedings began.‖  But taken 
in context, the prosecutor was stating that he had brought the enlargement to court 
every day — not that he had continuously displayed it to the jury every day.29  We 
therefore discern no misconduct. 
The Hotel Stanford registration card was next mentioned at trial during the 
testimony of Robert Greenwood, a handwriting expert who testified for the 
prosecution.  On cross-examination, defense counsel raised the issue by 
questioning Greenwood about any documents he had reviewed that he had been 
unable to conclude were written by defendant.  Greenwood mentioned the Hotel 
Stanford registration card as one such item, and defense counsel proceeded to ask 
Greenwood about his comparisons of the signature on this registration card to 
other documents.  On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Greenwood about 
the Hotel Stanford registration card, and Greenwood clarified that he had never 
attempted to compare the signature on it to any other documents because it was 
                                              
29 
As discussed below, the reason the prosecutor brought the enlargement to 
court every day was because defense counsel had represented that defendant was 
going to testify; the prosecutor was waiting until defendant took the stand to 
question him about the hotel registration card. 
 
59 
crammed into a small signature box on the registration form.  Defendant contends 
that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting testimony concerning 
inadmissible evidence.  We discern no misconduct.  The prosecutor‘s redirect 
examination briefly touched on the Hotel Stanford registration card only because 
defense counsel had first raised and pursued it during defense cross-examination. 
The issue of the Hotel Stanford registration card was raised one final time, 
after the defense had rested its case and the prosecutor was preparing to present his 
rebuttal.  The defense requested an offer of proof as to the rebuttal.  The 
prosecutor stated that he was planning to produce the custodian of records from 
the two hotels at which defendant had stayed in New York (the Hotel Stanford and 
the Aberdeen Hotel) to authenticate the hotel registration cards.  The prosecutor 
stated that he decided not to present this evidence during his case-in-chief because 
he had relied on defense counsel‘s representations that defendant would testify.  
He explained that he decided to save the expense of flying witnesses from New 
York to California by first attempting to get defendant to authenticate the 
registration forms during cross-examination.  Because defendant never took the 
stand, the prosecutor now wanted to authenticate the records during his rebuttal 
case.  Defense counsel objected to the presentation of this evidence during 
rebuttal, and the trial court agreed.  The prosecutor then requested to reopen his 
case-in-chief to present the evidence, which the trial court also denied. 
In the course of arguing that he should be allowed to present the 
authenticating evidence about the registration cards, the prosecutor reminded the 
court that he had mentioned at least one of the registration cards during his 
opening statement and that it would be misleading the jury if the prosecution was 
not allowed to present the authenticating evidence during the rebuttal case.  
Defendant points to this comment as a concession that the prosecutor‘s failure to 
admit the New York hotel receipts into evidence after mentioning them in opening 
 
60 
statement was misconduct because it misled the jury.  But the prosecutor was not 
conceding that he had committed misconduct.  Rather, he was trying to convince 
the trial court of the importance of allowing him to present evidence that he 
possessed, but which, for tactical reasons, he had not presented in his case-in-
chief.  Defendant also points to the prosecutor‘s later comment during the new 
trial motion that his decision not to produce the custodian of records for the New 
York hotels during his case-in-chief was a ―tactical error.‖  Once again, this was 
not a concession of misconduct, but rather the prosecutor‘s appraisal of his 
decision to rely on defense counsel‘s representations that defendant would testify.  
In any event, we see no possible prejudice to defendant.  The prosecutor‘s 
admitted tactical error had the effect of hurting only the prosecutor‘s case. 
5.  Instructions on Flight, and Instructions on Fabricating and 
Suppressing Evidence as Evidence of Guilt 
At the prosecutor‘s request, the trial court instructed the jury pursuant to 
CALJIC Nos. 2.04, 2.06, and 2.52, which state that efforts to fabricate and 
suppress evidence may be considered circumstances tending to show 
consciousness of guilt and that flight after the crime may be considered in light of 
all proved facts in deciding guilt or innocence.  Defendant contends these 
instructions violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution because they allowed the jury to draw arbitrary 
inferences from the evidence of defendant‘s flight and efforts to fabricate an alibi.  
As defendant acknowledges, we have previously rejected this and related claims, 
and we decline defendant‘s request to reconsider our past decisions.  (People v. 
Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 127-128.) 
 
61 
6.  Challenges to the Accomplice Testimony and the Robbery-murder 
Special-circumstance Allegation 
a.  Adequacy of CALJIC No. 3.11 
As described, Linton, Cyprian, and Lee, defendant‘s accomplices, testified 
against him at trial.  The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with the full 
set of standard jury instructions on accomplices.30  Defendant challenges the 
adequacy of CALJIC No. 3.11 (5th ed. 1988), which stated:  ―A defendant cannot 
be found guilty based upon the testimony of an accomplice unless such testimony 
is corroborated by other evidence which tends to connect such defendant with the 
commission of the offense.‖  As defendant acknowledges, the language of 
CALJIC No. 3.11 closely tracks that of section 1111, which governs the treatment 
of accomplice testimony and states:  ―A conviction cannot be had upon the 
testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as 
shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the 
corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or 
the circumstances thereof.‖  Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 3.11 omits 
another requirement that we have frequently articulated concerning accomplice 
corroboration, namely that the corroborating evidence ― ‗ ―must relate to some act 
or fact which is an element of the crime.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 
929, 982.)  Defendant contends that the reference to an ―element of the crime‖ 
makes this a more demanding standard than the one set out in CALJIC No. 3.11. 
Defendant presents no authority for this argument.  Our statement that the 
corroborating evidence must ― ‗ ―relate to some act or fact which is an element of 
                                              
30 
The jury was instructed in accordance with CALJIC Nos. 3.10 to 3.14, 
3.18, and 3.19, which defined ―accomplice,‖ instructed the jury to determine 
whether Linton, Cyprian, or Lee were accomplices, and set forth the standard for 
determining whether accomplice testimony was corroborated. 
 
62 
the crime‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 982) means no more than 
the evidence must ―tend[] to connect [the] defendant with the commission of the 
offense,‖ as stated in CALJIC No. 3.11.  As we have further stated in explaining 
the corroboration requirement, ― ‗ ―it is not necessary that the corroborative 
evidence be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense 
charged,‖ ‘ ‖ and ― ‗[t]he requisite corroboration may be established entirely by 
circumstantial evidence.‘ ‖  (People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 982.)  We 
therefore find no merit in defendant‘s claim that CALJIC No. 3.11 inaccurately or 
inadequately states the law on accomplice corroboration. 
b.  Adequacy of the Corroborating Evidence 
Defendant contends the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence to 
corroborate the accomplices‘ testimony regarding the robbery.  We conclude that 
the prosecution presented sufficient corroborating evidence.   
The law on the corroboration of accomplice testimony is well established:  
― ‗The trier of fact‘s determination on the issue of corroboration is binding on the 
reviewing court unless the corroborating evidence should not have been admitted 
or does not reasonably tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the 
crime.‘ ‖  (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 505.)  ― ‗The corroborating 
evidence may be circumstantial or slight and entitled to little consideration when 
standing alone, and it must tend to implicate the defendant by relating to an act 
that is an element of the crime.  The corroborating evidence need not by itself 
establish every element of the crime, but it must, without aid from the 
accomplice‘s testimony, tend to connect the defendant with the crime.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  
―The evidence is ‗sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the crime in 
such a way as to satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth.‘ ‖  (People 
v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 303.) 
 
63 
Ample, and indeed very strong, evidence corroborated the testimony of 
Linton, Cyprian, and Lee and connected defendant with the robbery.  The 
telephone records between defendant‘s home and the victims‘ place of 
employment, A.R.A., corroborated the accomplice testimony that defendant set up 
the drug deal with the victims.  This also was corroborated by the testimony of an 
A.R.A. employee who overheard the victims say they were going to a bar to 
transact a drug deal.  Additionally, Jose Pequeno, who was working at the bar that 
night, testified that the victims were there and talked to someone who looked like 
defendant.  The two neighbors of the Spring Street house crime scene, Irma Sazo 
and Marcella Pierre saw defendant, Cyprian, Linton, and Lee exiting the apartment 
where the robberies occurred.  Defendant‘s pager was found at the crime scene.  
Defendant‘s fingerprints were found in the room where the victims had been shot 
and on the truck to which the victims‘ bodies had been dragged.  The victims‘ 
wallets were found in the kitchen cabinet at the crime scene, corroborating the 
accomplice testimony that the wallets were taken from the victims before they 
were killed. 
Furthermore, evidence of defendant‘s flight after the crimes were committed 
supports an inference of consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied 
admission, which may properly be considered as corroborative of the accomplice 
testimony.  (People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 983.)  The nonaccomplice 
evidence that corroborated defendant‘s flight includes the Travelodge receipts 
showing that defendant did not go home after the crimes and the telephone records 
showing that no telephone calls were made on defendant‘s home telephone from 
January 3, 1990, through January 15, 1990.  Defendant‘s consciousness of guilt 
was further shown by the testimony of the nonaccomplice witnesses Raymond 
Valdez and Kathleen Matuzak, who testified about defendant‘s attempts to induce 
them to fabricate an alibi for him for the night of the killings. 
 
64 
c.  Attempted Robbery Theory of the Robbery-murder Special 
Circumstance 
The prosecution argued to the jury that a true finding on defendant‘s robbery-
murder special-circumstance allegation could be based on either of two robbery 
theories:  (1) the completed robberies of the victims‘ wallets or (2) the attempted 
robbery of the cocaine, which was the transaction defendant was engaged in when 
he sought to compel Barron at gunpoint to tell his associates to deliver the drugs.  
Defendant contends that the prosecutor‘s use of this second theory to support the 
special circumstance violated defendant‘s rights because he was not given notice 
of it in the charging document and because the trial court failed to instruct the jury 
that it must unanimously determine the basis for the finding.  As we conclude 
below, defendant‘s rights were not violated. 
(1)  Background 
The information charged defendant with two counts of murder and two 
counts of robbery.  Regarding the two murder counts, the information alleged a 
special circumstance under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) — that is, murder 
while ―engaged in the commission of the crime of robbery within the meaning of 
Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17).‖  (Ibid.)  Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision 
(a)(17) in turn states this special circumstance applied to murders committed 
―while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, 
attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting 
to commit,‖ a robbery.  
During trial, Linton and Lee testified that the victims‘ wallets were taken 
from them before they were killed.  In addition, the prosecution also introduced 
evidence of an attempted robbery.  As described, ante at pages 6-7, defendant put 
a gun to the head of Barron and told him to convince his associates over the phone 
that they should deliver the drugs to defendant.  It was during the course of dialing 
 
65 
the phone that defendant discharged the first, apparently accidental, shot, 
wounding Barron, after which defendant followed with a second shot killing 
Barron. 
During a discussion about proposed jury instructions, the prosecutor stated 
that the robberies charged in counts three and four were based on the taking of the 
victims‘ wallets.  He also asserted that the jury could use the attempted robbery of 
the cocaine as a basis for finding true the robbery-murder special-circumstance 
allegation.  The prosecutor therefore requested instructions on constructive 
possession.  Defense counsel objected to that instruction and to any instruction 
based on either theory of robbery (that is, both the completed robbery of the 
wallets and the attempted robbery of the cocaine), citing a purported lack of 
evidence to support either.  The trial court ruled there was sufficient evidence to 
support the instructions. 
During his closing argument, the prosecutor turned to the robbery-murder 
special-circumstance allegation, describing both the robbery of the wallets and the 
attempted robbery of the cocaine.  He characterized them as ―two robberies 
actually occurring at the same time‖ and argued that the jury could rely on either 
to find the felony-murder special-circumstance allegation true. 
(2)  Asserted Lack of Notice 
Defendant contends he did not have sufficient notice that the special 
circumstance allegation could be based on attempted robbery because that crime 
had not been charged in the information.  Initially, we note that defendant has 
forfeited the claim for failure to object below.  (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 
1158, 1205.)  As recounted, defense counsel did object to all the instructions based 
on robbery according to either theory.  His objection, however, was based on the 
contention that insufficient evidence supported either theory of robbery; he did not 
 
66 
object on the basis that attempted robbery had not been alleged or that he received 
inadequate notice. 
We also reject defendant‘s claim on the merits.  ―Both the Sixth Amendment 
of the federal Constitution and the due process guarantees of the state and federal 
Constitutions require that a criminal defendant receive notice of the charges 
adequate to give a meaningful opportunity to defend against them.‖  (People v. 
Seaton, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 640.)  Defendant received adequate notice that the 
robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation could be based on robbery or 
attempted robbery.  As described above, the information referenced section 190.2, 
subdivision (a)(17), which includes attempted robbery.  Furthermore, even 
assuming for the sake of argument that the information provided inadequate notice 
on this point, defendant received notice of the facts underlying the attempted 
robbery theory at his preliminary hearing, which we have stated generally provides 
adequate notice of the prosecutor‘s theory.  (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 
p. 1205.)  At the preliminary hearing, Lee testified to the same essential facts 
about the attempted robbery of the cocaine; namely, that Barron was bound and 
defendant told him to call ―his people‖ to deliver the narcotics while threatening 
him with a gun.  At trial, defendant was given notice of the attempted robbery 
theory by Linton‘s testimony and the discussions about jury instructions.  This was 
not a case, therefore, ―in which the prosecution ambushed the defense‖ with a 
theory.  (Id. at p. 1206.) 
(3)  Asserted Lack of Unanimity Instruction 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it 
must unanimously decide which robbery offense — the completed robbery of the 
wallets or the attempted robbery of the cocaine — supported the robbery-murder 
special-circumstance allegation.  We have explained that a ― ‗unanimity 
 
67 
instruction is not required when the acts alleged are so closely connected as to 
form part of one transaction.‘ ‖  (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 98.)  
Specifically, ―[t]he ‗continuous conduct‘ rule applies when the defendant offers 
essentially the same defense to each of the acts, and there is no reasonable basis 
for the jury to distinguish between them.‖  (People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 
72, 100.)  Here, as in Benavides, in which we applied the continuous conduct rule, 
the ―criminal acts . . . took place within a very small window of time.‖  (People v. 
Benavides, supra, at p. 98.)  The testimony supported the prosecutor‘s 
characterization of the event as ―two robberies actually occurring at the same 
time.‖  Defendant did not offer a defense based on a showing that he committed 
either the attempted robbery or the completed robbery, but not both.  Rather, his 
defense was that he was not present at the scene of the crime and therefore played 
no role whatsoever in any of the crimes committed there.  A unanimity instruction 
therefore was not required.  (Ibid.)31 
C.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Colloquy Concerning Self-representation 
Defendant contends the trial court gave him materially inaccurate 
information that adversely affected his decision whether to represent himself at the 
penalty phase.  We conclude that the trial court engaged in a proper colloquy with 
defendant concerning the dangers of self-representation, and no error occurred. 
                                              
31  
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the 
jury that it must unanimously agree on whether the underlying felony for the 
theory of felony murder was a robbery or an attempted robbery.  We have held 
that, although ―a jury must unanimously agree that the defendant is guilty of the 
statutory offense of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt . . . it need not 
decide which of several proffered theories of first degree murder liability governs 
the case.‖  (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 654.) 
 
68 
a.  Background 
After the verdicts were read in the guilt phase, defense counsel informed the 
court and the prosecutor, outside the presence of the jury, that defendant wished to 
represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.  Defense 
counsel explained that defendant did not want him to produce any mitigating 
evidence, and had instructed him in the strongest possible terms not to call any 
family members to testify.  Defense counsel also explained that defendant had lost 
confidence in him as an attorney because he had not proved defendant was not the 
shooter, had talked defendant out of testifying, and had failed to produce Tony 
Moreno as a witness.32  The trial court stated it would not make an immediate 
ruling on the Faretta motion, but scheduled a hearing for the next morning, and 
asked defendant to consult his family about the wisdom of such a decision in the 
meantime. 
At the hearing, defendant confirmed that he wanted to represent himself.  He 
expressed disappointment that he did not get everything he wanted in the trial, 
noting that he had not testified on his own behalf and that Moreno was not called 
to testify.  He felt that the penalty phase was scheduled to start too quickly (just 
after he had been found guilty) and he did not want to ―throw his family up on the 
stand‖ because they were not ready for it. 
The trial court engaged in a colloquy with defendant about the dangers of 
self-representation.  It noted that his attorney had taken the case for the entire trial 
and had announced that he was prepared to go forward.  The court observed that it 
did not make any sense to dismiss counsel at this important point of the trial, 
especially in light of the difficulties that defendant would face in trying to prepare 
                                              
32 
For discussion concerning Tony Moreno, see part D., post. 
 
69 
himself for the penalty phase.  It further stated that defense counsel knew all about 
the case and had done ―a great job.‖  Defendant had an off-the-record discussion 
with defense counsel, and then told the court he would retain defense counsel for 
his representation. 
b.  Analysis 
Pointing to the trial court‘s statements that defense counsel knew about the 
case, was prepared to move forward, and was prepared for the penalty phase, 
defendant contends the court gave him materially inaccurate information that 
adversely affected his decision whether to represent himself.  Incorporating 
arguments from his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in his 
related petition for writ of habeas corpus, he contends that none of the trial court‘s 
statements about counsel were accurate.  As discussed in part D., post, defendant‘s 
petition for writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate avenue for resolution of such 
claims.  We reject defendant‘s attempt here to incorporate those claims as 
background material that the trial court did not know and could not have known at 
the time it engaged in what we view as a proper colloquy with defendant regarding 
the dangers of self-representation. 
That said, we also conclude the trial court‘s opinions were not inaccurate.  
They were observations, based on defense counsel‘s representations, that were 
certainly true in a general sense:  counsel did know about the case and he was 
willing and able to prepare the penalty phase.  Defendant also contends that the 
trial court‘s description of defense counsel as having done ―a great job‖ was 
misleading.  But, once again, the trial court‘s statement was a general description 
based on its own observations.  In People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 
pages 958-963, we discussed a defendant‘s contention that the trial court coerced 
him into withdrawing his motion for self-representation.  As in Jenkins, we 
 
70 
likewise conclude that, instead, the record supports a conclusion that ―the court 
properly advised defendant of the pitfalls of self-representation.‖  (Id. at p. 961.)  
We therefore find no error in the trial court‘s colloquy with defendant. 
2.  Claims Concerning Factor (b) Evidence 
As described ante at pages 17-19, the prosecutor presented four instances of 
prior violent criminal acts as evidence in aggravation under section 190.3, 
factor (b):  (1) an assault on Kenneth Moore; (2) the firing of gunshots at Officer 
Sims; (3) robbery and assault on Mona Thomas and her father; and (4) possession 
of a concealed weapon.  Defendant makes various arguments against the use of 
this evidence, all of which he forfeited by failing to raise them below (People v. 
Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 867), with the exception of his jury instruction 
claim, which requires no objection.  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 
503.)  We also reject each claim, below, on the merits. 
a.  Statute of Limitations 
Defendant contends that, by the time of trial, the statue of limitations had run 
on the Kenneth Moore and the Officer Sims incidents, and that their use therefore 
violated his right to due process and the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  Defendant acknowledges that we have held that section 190.3, factor 
(b) evidence ―is not subject to exclusion on the ground that prosecution for those 
acts would be barred by a statute of limitations‖ (People v. Heishman (1988) 45 
Cal.3d 147, 192) but requests that we reconsider our holding.  We decline to do so. 
b.  Asserted Violation of Double Jeopardy 
Defendant notes that he pleaded guilty to misdemeanor assault in connection 
with the assault on Kenneth Moore, and contends the prosecutor violated the 
double jeopardy clause of the federal Constitution by presenting testimony of the 
incident at defendant‘s penalty phase.  Defendant acknowledges that in People v. 
 
71 
Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 756, footnote 17, we concluded that double jeopardy 
does not apply ―when the details of misconduct which has already resulted in 
conviction or punishment, or in dismissal pursuant to a plea bargain . . . are 
presented in a later proceeding on the separate issue of the appropriate penalty for 
a subsequent offense.‖  (Italics omitted.)  Defendant requests that we reconsider 
our holding.  We decline to do so. 
c.  Accomplice Liability as the Basis for Factor (b) Crimes 
Defendant contends that some of the evidence the prosecutor introduced 
concerning the section 190.3, factor (b) crimes concerned actions committed not 
by defendant, but by others.  He points to evidence that Eddie Jackson was the 
person who shot and killed Kenneth Moore.  He also points to evidence that an 
unidentified person assaulted Mona Thomas and her father with a brick.  He 
contends the introduction of this evidence was improper because the Legislature 
did not intend to authorize accomplice liability for factor (b) crimes.  He 
acknowledges that in People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 633, we stated:  
―Evidence that a defendant in a capital punishment case has previously aided and 
abetted a violent criminal offense is admissible under the language of factor (b) of 
section 190.3, whether or not the defendant‘s actions were themselves violent,‖ 
and he requests that we reconsider our holding.  We decline to do so.  As we have 
further stated:  ―The sentencer in a capital proceeding is entitled to know about 
other incidents involving the use or threat of violence for which the defendant is 
shown to be criminally liable beyond a reasonable doubt, whether he participated 
as an actual perpetrator or in some other capacity.‖  (People v. Ray (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 313, 351.) 
 
72 
d.  Asserted Misinstruction on Accomplice Liability 
Defendant contends that, even if accomplice liability is appropriate under 
section 190.3, as we held in People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at page 633, the 
trial court misinstructed the jury on the principles of accomplice liability.  As 
described below, at defense counsel‘s request, the trial court altered the phrasing 
of CALJIC No. 8.87, which defendant now contends had the result of 
misinstructing the jury on the principles of accomplice liability.  We conclude that, 
although the altered version of CALJIC No. 8.87 was ambiguous, there was no 
reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in the complained of manner. 
(1)  Background 
CALJIC No. 8.87 is the standard jury instruction for section 190.3, factor (b) 
crimes, and at trial, in relevant part, was given as follows:  ―Evidence has been 
introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant has committed the 
following criminal acts or activity [list of acts ] which involved the express or 
implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence.  Before a juror 
may consider any of such criminal acts or activity as an aggravating circumstance 
in this case, a juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did in fact commit such criminal acts or activity.‖ 
Before closing argument in the penalty phase, the parties discussed jury 
instructions, and defense counsel questioned the applicability of this standard 
instruction to the four section 190.3, factor (b) acts for which the prosecutor had 
presented evidence.  Specifically, defense counsel argued the standard instruction 
did not apply to two of the acts, namely, the shots fired at Officer Sims and the 
assault on Mona Charles and her father.  He argued that the evidence supporting 
those two acts amounted to only a suspicion that defendant was ―involved‖ in 
them, as opposed to showing that he had ―committed‖ them.  Counsel therefore 
requested a change in the wording of the instruction.  The prosecutor objected to 
 
73 
defense counsel‘s request, arguing that circumstantial evidence showed defendant 
had committed the two acts at issue.33  The trial court suggested amending the 
instruction to refer to acts that defendant ―has committed or was involved in.‖  
(Italics added.)  The prosecutor agreed to the trial court‘s amendment. 
The trial court subsequently instructed the jury as follows (italics added):  
―Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant . . . 
has committed or was involved in the following criminal acts or activity . . . [list of 
acts] . . . which involved the express or implied use of force or violence or the 
threat of force or violence.  Before a juror may consider any of such criminal acts 
or activity as an aggravating circumstance in this case, a juror must first be 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant . . . did in fact commit such 
criminal acts or activity or was involved in such criminal acts or activity.‖ 
(2)  Analysis 
Defendant contends that the effect of adding the ―or was involved in‖ 
language lowered the prosecutor‘s burden in proving the section 190.3, factor (b) 
crimes.  He contends the language conveyed that his mere presence at the scene of 
a crime was sufficient.  He asserts the trial court had a duty to clarify on its own 
motion the standard for accomplice liability by instructing the jury pursuant to 
CALJIC No. 3.01, as given, which stated:  ―A person aids and abets the 
[commission] [or] [attempted commission] of a crime when he or she:  [¶]  (1) 
With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and [¶]  (2) With the 
intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of 
                                              
33  
The prosecutor‘s point appears correct.  The language of the standard jury 
instruction simply states that evidence has been introduced for the prosecutor‘s 
purpose of showing that defendant committed the criminal acts.  The jury retains 
the task of evaluating the prosecutor‘s evidence. 
 
74 
the crime, and [¶]  (3) By act or advice, [or, by failing to act in a situation where a 
person has a legal duty to act,] aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the 
commission of the crime.‖  It also informs the jury:  ―Mere presence at the scene 
of a crime which does not itself assist the commission of the crime does not 
amount to aiding and abetting.‖ 
As an initial matter, defendant attempts to explain why the claim is not 
forfeited in view of the circumstance that the alteration to CALJIC No. 8.87 came 
at the insistence of defense counsel.  Defendant contends that, although defense 
counsel requested ―or involved in‖ be inserted only in the first sentence of 
CALJIC No. 8.87, the trial court inserted it in both the first and second sentences.  
He contends that inserting ―or involved in‖ in only the first sentence would not 
have raised the problems he now complains of.  There is some support in the 
record for defendant‘s contention that defense counsel intended to have the trial 
court insert ―or involved in‖ only in the first sentence.  The trial court and the 
parties never expressly addressed the issue of the second sentence.  Had they done 
so, defense counsel would have had to address why the phrase ―or involved in‖ 
could legitimately be added to the first sentence, but not the second, given that the 
second sentence precisely addresses the acts mentioned in the first.  Furthermore, 
adding ―or involved in‖ to the first sentence but not to the second would have 
created its own ambiguities — what burden of proof would apply to those criminal 
acts introduced for the purpose of showing that defendant was ―involved in‖ them?  
Was the jury simply to ignore them or could it consider them without any burden 
of proof? 
In any event, assuming the insertion of ―or involved in‖ in the instruction 
created an ambiguity, we conclude that the trial court had no duty to instruct on its 
own motion pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.01, nor was there a reasonable likelihood 
the jury interpreted the jury instruction in the complained of manner.  We have 
 
75 
repeatedly held that the trial court has no duty, absent a request, to instruct on 
elements of crimes proved under factor (b).  (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 
72.)  Defendant did not request an instruction on the elements of aider and abettor 
liability in connection with the section 190.3, factor (b) crimes, but he contends 
that the alteration to CALJIC No. 8.87 gave rise to a duty to so instruct.  We 
disagree:  ―[T]he instructions were not so vital to the jury‘s evaluation of 
defendant‘s prior actions as to require that they be given without a request.‖  
(People v. Cain, supra, at p. 72.)  As in People v. Cain, ―the jury had before it 
evidence and argument from which it could rationally assess the degree of 
culpability [the] defendant bore in the prior incident.  The proper focus for 
consideration of prior violent crimes in the penalty phase is on the facts of the 
defendant‘s past actions as they reflect on his character, rather than on the labels to 
be assigned the past crimes . . . .‖  (Id. at p. 73.) 
Concerning the asserted ambiguity of the instruction, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated:  ―[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . we 
inquire ‗whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the 
challenged instruction in a way‘ that violates the constitution.‖  (Estelle v. 
McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 
[adopting this test for examining instructions under California law]. 34)  Defendant 
contends alteration of the instruction allowed the jury to find him liable as an 
accomplice for merely being present at the scene of the crime during the assaults 
                                              
34 
The high court has applied this analysis to ambiguous instructions at both 
the guilt phase (Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at pp. 67-68) and penalty 
phase (Boyd v. California (1989) 494 U.S. 370, 374 ) of a trial, when those 
instructions implicated a federal constitutional right.  We have applied this 
analysis to ambiguous instructions at both the guilt and penalty phases, even when 
the instructions arguably implicated only a state law issue.  (See People v. Rogers 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 873; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 957, 1021.) 
 
76 
on Kenneth Moore, and Mona Thomas and her father, and during the attempted 
shooting of Officer Sims.  But the prosecutor never made such an argument.  
Rather, he argued that defendant was a direct participant in the crimes or acted 
with knowledge and purpose in aiding others in the crimes.  (See Middleton v. 
McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 438 [reviewing court can consider that counsel‘s 
arguments clarified an ambiguous jury charge, particularly when the prosecutor‘s 
arguments resolve an ambiguity in favor of the defendant].)  Regarding the assault 
on Kenneth Moore, the prosecutor asserted:  ―He [defendant] is one of the main 
perpetrators of this attack on this boy [Kenneth Moore].  He‘s one of the volitional 
people that is involved in kicking and beating this young boy.  But for his and the 
conduct of all of them collectively this boy never would have been killed because 
he would have got away.  It was the group atmosphere that put him in a position 
where he couldn‘t escape, which led to his beating, which led to his death.‖  For 
the attempted shooting of Officer Sims, the prosecutor argued that the 
circumstantial evidence showed that defendant was the shooter.  For the assault on 
Mona Thomas and her father, the prosecutor argued that defendant had been one 
of the participants in the beatings. 
Defense counsel‘s closing argument likewise made clear to the jury that the 
prosecutor had to show knowledge, purpose, and direct participation or assistance 
in order for the jury to hold defendant responsible for the section 190.3, factor (b) 
crimes.  Defense counsel‘s argument was predicated on asserting that the 
prosecutor had failed to show these things.  Regarding the assault on Kenneth 
More, defense counsel argued that it ―was certainly not my client‘s fault‖ that 
Eddie Jackson shot Kenneth Moore:  ―You‘ve heard no evidence that my client 
instructed him to do it, encouraged him to do it or even knew that Eddie had a gun 
in his pocket.‖  Counsel argued that it was ―pure speculation‖ that defendant shot 
at Officer Sims, in view of the circumstance that Sims did not see who shot at him.  
 
77 
Regarding the assault on Mona Thomas, counsel argued there was no proof that 
defendant ―actually committed a crime.‖  Nowhere did either the prosecutor or 
defense counsel imply that defendant‘s mere presence at the scene of a crime was 
sufficient for the jury to find that he was ―involved in‖ the factor (b) crimes.  
There was no reasonable likelihood, therefore, that the jury construed the 
challenged instruction in this way.  (Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 
72.)35 
e.  Asserted Lack of Notice  
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that defendant‘s participation in 
the assault on Kenneth Moore made him as culpable as an actual murderer, even 
though defendant was only charged with and convicted of misdemeanor assault.36  
Defendant claims he did not receive notice that his involvement in the assault on 
                                              
35  
We likewise reject several subsidiary arguments that defendant asserts 
concerning the instruction.  Defendant‘s discussion of the unconstitutional 
vagueness of sentencing factors under Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967 
is inapplicable because the asserted vagueness of section 190.3, factor (b) 
generally as a sentencing factor is not at issue here; rather the issue is the asserted 
ambiguity of this particular instruction.  (Tuilaepa, supra, at pp. 976-977 [holding 
that factor (b) is not unconstitutionally vague.])  We also reject defendant‘s 
argument that the instruction violated his right to notice about the penalty phase 
evidence in aggravation.  Defendant received notice of all the incidents that were 
presented at the penalty phase.  Defendant‘s contention that the instruction‘s 
asserted ambiguity expanded the scope of his accomplice liability does not 
transform these incidents into new ones requiring separate notice. 
36  
The prosecutor stated:  ―[I]t has been minimized ever since 1983 when the 
defendant was charged and convicted with assault with a deadly weapon for 
hitting and kicking a boy.  What I‘m trying to spell out for you as a jury in terms 
of his true culpability for the crime, he is a murderer.  Because if someone dies 
during the course of a robbery — and that‘s what I submit was going on here — 
. . . his culpability for the crime was that of a murderer.‖ 
 
78 
Kenneth Moore would be characterized as a murder, and contends that this 
amounted to lack of notice of a separate section 190.3, factor (b) crime.   
Defendant did not object on the asserted ground and has therefore forfeited 
the claim.  (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 175.)  Furthermore, we 
reject the claim on the merits.  Defendant acknowledges the prosecutor gave 
notice of his intent to use the Moore assault at the penalty phase, but argues that 
the prosecutor surprised him with a characterization of that evidence that he could 
not have anticipated.  Defendant presents no authority (and we are aware of none) 
that the notice requirement of section 190.3 requires a prosecutor to give notice 
about the precise way he or she will characterize or argue a noticed incident during 
closing argument.  As discussed in the prior part, in his closing argument defense 
counsel vigorously presented his own characterization of the Moore incident, 
arguing that defendant should not be considered culpable for Moore‘s death.  We 
conclude therefore that defendant was given proper notice. 
D.  Motion for New Trial Based on Asserted Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel 
The trial court appointed Attorney Douglas W. Otto to assist defendant‘s trial 
counsel, Ronald LeMieux, in preparing a motion for new trial.  Otto was assigned 
to investigate whether LeMieux was ineffective in representing defendant and to 
prepare a motion for new trial on those grounds.  Otto‘s motion contained 
declarations from LeMieux, defendant, and others involved in the case.  LeMieux 
also prepared a motion for new trial, which alleged other errors that occurred at 
trial.  After an extensive hearing at which LeMieux, defendant, and several other 
witnesses testified, the trial court denied the motions for new trial.  It found that 
LeMieux performed competently and that it was not reasonably probable that the 
jury would have reached a different result based on the asserted errors shown by 
the testimony at the hearing. 
 
79 
On appeal, defendant again contends that LeMieux was ineffective.37  To 
establish such a claim, he must show counsel‘s representation was ―deficient‖ in 
that it ―fell below an objective standard of reasonableness‖ (Strickland v. 
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688) ―under prevailing professional norms‖ 
(id. at p. 688).  In addition, defendant is required to show prejudice from counsel‘s 
deficient representation — that is, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel‘s deficiencies, the result would have been more 
favorable.  (Id. at p. 694.) 
Defendant acknowledges that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 
ordinarily best raised and reviewed on habeas corpus, but argues the current case 
is unusual in that there was a lengthy evidentiary hearing in support of defendant‘s 
motion for a new trial, at which counsel testified and filed supporting materials.  
As an initial argument, defendant contends that pursuant to United States v. Cronic 
(1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659, he does not need to show prejudice because counsel 
entirely failed to subject the prosecutor‘s case to meaningful adversarial testing.  
We reject this contention.  LeMieux gave an opening statement and closing 
argument, cross-examined the prosecution‘s witnesses, objected to testimony and 
exhibits, and presented a number of witnesses on defendant‘s behalf during the 
guilt and penalty phases of the trial.  Defendant therefore fails to show a complete 
lack of adversarial testing under Cronic. 
Regarding prejudice, defendant acknowledges that the only arguments related 
to that issue raised at the hearing for the motion for new trial concerned the effect 
the testimony of Police Officer Tony Moreno would have had if trial counsel had 
                                              
37 
Defendant does not challenge the trial court‘s denial of the motion for new 
trial. 
 
80 
called him as a witness.  We discuss the Moreno testimony below and conclude 
that, based on this record, even if we assume deficiency for the sake of argument, 
defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice.  First, however, we will briefly review 
defendant‘s other ineffective assistance claims, which, we reiterate, can be fully 
addressed only in a habeas corpus petition because they require investigation of 
evidence outside the record in order to potentially establish prejudice. 
1.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
a.  Qualifications to Represent Defendant 
Defendant contends LeMieux was deficient because he lacked the legal 
knowledge and experience to handle a capital case, and lacked an office staff and 
resources.  LeMieux testified that he had practiced law (predominantly criminal 
law) for 20 years before representing defendant.  Although he had handled capital 
cases before representing defendant, he had never litigated a penalty phase in 
those cases because the defendants were either acquitted or their cases ended in a 
plea.  He had not received any special training in capital case work through 
courses, lectures, or attending conferences, although he owned manuals from the 
California Public Defender‘s Association death penalty conferences.  At the time 
of defendant‘s trial, LeMieux was practicing out of his house and had a small 
library of law materials.  He used a local law library for additional materials.  He 
did not have a secretary, a paralegal, or any kind of support staff. 
Although LeMieux had not previously handled a capital case that resulted in 
a penalty phase, this does not in and of itself establish deficient performance.  (See 
People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 412-413.)  The admission of an attorney to 
the state bar establishes that the state deems him competent to practice law in all 
types of actions, and, when a defendant is represented by a licensed attorney, a 
 
81 
presumption exists in favor of the effectiveness of counsel.  (People v. Majors 
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 430-431.) 
Defendant puts great emphasis on the fact that LeMieux failed to conform to 
the American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.  These guidelines were adopted in 1989, 
two years before LeMieux‘s representation of defendant.  Among other things, the 
guidelines include recommendations for staffing and for specialized training in 
death penalty cases.  As we have recently noted, however, the guidelines ―are not 
congruent with constitutional standards for effective legal representation.‖  (In Re 
Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 467.)  We have also noted that the United States 
Supreme Court criticized the Sixth Circuit for treating the guidelines ― ‗not merely 
as evidence of what reasonably diligent attorneys would do, but as inexorable 
commands with which all capital defense counsel ― ‗must fully comply.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (Id. 
at p. 468 citing Bobby v. Van Hook (2009) 558 U.S. 4, 17 (per curiam).)  We 
therefore reject defendant‘s argument that failure to conform to the guidelines is 
sufficient to establish deficient performance by counsel. 
Defendant also contends that LeMieux was deficient for hiring an associate 
attorney, Douglas McCann to exclusively conduct jury selection.  McCann alone 
conducted jury selection; LeMieux was not present during any of it.  Defendant 
fails, however, to show that McCann was deficient or that LeMieux was therefore 
deficient in hiring him.  LeMieux testified that he hired McCann because he had 
previously worked with him and regarded him highly.  LeMieux discussed capital 
case jury selection with McCann, reviewed typical voir dire questions, and 
provided him materials.  According to McCann‘s declaration submitted for the 
new trial motion, although he had never previously handled a death penalty case, 
he had worked for the Los Angeles County Public Defender‘s Office and, after 
establishing a solo practice specializing in criminal law, he had handled a number 
 
82 
of felony cases, including at least two murder cases.  As discussed above, we 
presume the effectiveness of a licensed attorney.  (People v. Majors, supra, 18 
Cal.4th at p. 431.) 
b.  Asserted Failure to Investigate 
Defendant contends that LeMieux‘s performance was deficient because he 
failed to undertake sufficient investigation.  Defendant points to the fact that 
LeMieux did not seek court funding of cocounsel or an investigator.  Although 
LeMieux retained the services of an investigator from defendant‘s previous 
attorney on the case, defendant contends he did not utilize his investigator 
sufficiently.  Defendant contends that LeMieux should have hired experts to 
analyze the physical evidence in the case.  Defendant contends LeMieux was 
deficient because he failed to interview any of the guilt phase witnesses prior to 
trial, including the ones he called for the defense.  Although defendant 
acknowledges that LeMieux had several discussions with defendant‘s parents to 
gain information about defendant‘s background for the penalty phase, defendant 
contends that LeMieux should have spent more time talking to members of 
defendant‘s family before having them testify at the penalty phase. 
In all these areas, on this record, even if we assume deficiency for the sake of 
argument, defendant fails to show prejudice.  No evidence was produced at the 
hearing on the motion for new trial regarding the evidence that LeMieux would 
have uncovered had he done further investigation in the manner defendant urges 
above.  Defendant‘s contentions must therefore be raised in a habeas corpus 
petition. 
c.  Counsel’s Physical and Mental State During Trial 
Defendant contends that LeMieux was ineffective because he was subject to 
medical problems during the trial.  LeMieux testified at the motion for new trial 
 
83 
that he did not take notes while in court because he had a tremor in his arms that 
left him unable to write.  He would instead rely on his memory of the day‘s 
testimony and type a summary of the testimony in the evening.  Defendant also 
contends LeMieux‘s performance at trial was adversely affected because of stress 
in his personal life.  He had just remarried and faced stress in mediating between 
his children and the children of his new wife.  He also was being investigated by 
the State Bar for mishandling of client funds in approximately a dozen cases.  The 
investigation spanned the full tenure of his representation of defendant.  LeMieux 
testified to suffering from panic attacks that would occur at least once a week 
during the trial. 
Once again, defendant can establish these claims only on habeas corpus.  
LeMieux‘s testimony highlighted factors that might have caused his representation 
to be deficient.  Defendant‘s claim is that an undistracted and unstressed counsel 
would have done something during trial that the distracted and stressed LeMieux 
failed to do.  But this is essentially a restatement of defendant‘s claim that 
LeMieux failed to investigate and prepare the case adequately.  The record on 
appeal does not reveal what evidence LeMieux failed to present or how the 
presentation of such evidence would have resulted in a more favorable 
determination for defendant.  Defendant‘s contentions therefore must be raised in 
a habeas corpus petition. 
2.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Involving Tony Moreno 
The hearing on the motion for new trial focused on Anthony (Tony) Moreno, 
a Los Angeles County police officer with whom defendant had worked as an 
informant.  LeMieux testified that he first became aware of defendant‘s 
relationship with Moreno when, about three weeks before opening statement, the 
prosecutor sent him an F.B.I report describing an interview between defendant and 
 
84 
an F.B.I. agent concerning the prosecution of certain sheriff‘s deputies and police 
officers in narcotics skimming cases. 
LeMieux explained that he decided to discuss Moreno in his opening 
statement even though he had not yet interviewed him, served him with a 
subpoena, or investigated the facts of defendant‘s activities as an informant.  
LeMieux based his discussion of Moreno in his opening statement on the F.B.I. 
report and on his conversations with defendant.  In the opening statement, 
LeMieux told the jurors that defendant had been an informant working for the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff‘s Department and the Los Angeles County Police 
Department, and defendant had set up narcotics deals for various officers, 
including one named Tony Moreno.  LeMieux told the jury to ―write that name 
down‖ and stated that they would learn more at trial about how defendant worked 
very closely on a day-to-day basis with Moreno. 
After the opening statement, LeMieux attempted, both personally and 
through an investigator, to subpoena Moreno, but was unsuccessful.  LeMieux 
testified that he did not consider asking the trial court for a continuance to secure 
Moreno.  He believed that the best way to proceed under the circumstances was to 
present a reasonable doubt defense.  LeMieux produced no evidence pertaining to 
Moreno at trial, although, as discussed, ante at pages 5 and 53-55, he convinced 
the trial court to admit Cyprian‘s testimony that Linton had mentioned that 
someone named ―Tony‖ was present at the bar parking lot. 
Moreno testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial, and his testimony 
is discussed in detail below. 
a.  Discussing Tony Moreno During Opening Statement 
Defendant asserts LeMieux performed deficiently by discussing Moreno 
during the opening statement and emphasizing his importance to the case, but then 
 
85 
failing to produce any evidence during trial on this issue.  Defendant contends that 
this circumstance alone is sufficient to establish prejudice, yet he fails to provide 
authority for this proposition.  Defendant is required to demonstrate prejudice by 
indicating what evidence defense counsel did not present about Tony Moreno that 
would have made it reasonably probable that the results of the guilt and penalty 
phases would have been different. 
b.  Failure to Present Tony Moreno at Trial 
Based on the testimony of Tony Moreno at the hearing on the motion for new 
trial, defendant contends that, if LeMieux had called Moreno to testify, it is 
reasonably probable that the outcome of the guilt and penalty phases would have 
been different.  We conclude that, even assuming LeMieux performed deficiently 
for failing to produce Moreno at trial, defendant fails to establish prejudice. 
(1)  Testimony at the Motion for New Trial 
Detective Anthony R. Moreno testified that he was employed by the Los 
Angeles Police Department and, in January 1990 (the time of the killings), he was 
assigned to the Organized Crime Intelligence Division, where his specialty was 
―black organized crimes,‖ including gangs.  Moreno had known defendant since 
1987, but it was not until the middle of 1988 that he began using him as an 
informant.  On at least one or two occasions, Moreno picked up defendant at 
defendant‘s home.  Defendant contacted Moreno by paging him.  Sometimes 
defendant would page him as often as every day for several days in a row, but 
there were periods in which defendant did not page him at all.  Moreno would 
sometimes return defendant‘s pages.   
Moreno did not recall being with defendant on January 2, 1990 (the date of 
the killings).  Although he had no independent recollection of where he was that 
 
86 
day, his log indicated that he went to a ―Protective League‖ meeting and then 
spent approximately five and a half hours undertaking administrative duties. 
On February 7 or 8, 1990, defendant paged Moreno.  When Moreno phoned 
him back, defendant told him he was concerned about his safety because some 
homicide detectives were looking for him.  Moreno contacted the detectives, and 
then told defendant to select a location where he wanted to surrender.  Defendant 
chose to be arrested at his mother‘s house.  Moreno was not involved in making 
the arrest.  After the arrest, South Bureau homicide detectives called Moreno on 
February 8, 1990 and, at their request, he visited defendant in custody.  Moreno 
was at the South Bureau station for about three and one-half hours.  One of the 
homicide investigators requested that Moreno stay, so that he could assist if 
defendant named people that Moreno knew.  At some point, Moreno spoke with 
defendant for 10 to 15 minutes, and may have talked with him a second time. 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Moreno about the truth of 
the following statements that defendant made in a declaration after his conviction 
and sentence of death:  At the end of 1989 and the first two days of 1990, 
defendant helped set up a drug deal with Willie Thomas, Jack Barron, Patrick 
Linton, Dauras Cyprian, and himself.  Defendant told Moreno about the drug deal 
and that they agreed to ―rip off‖ the ―dope‖ and divide it between themselves.  On 
January 2, 1990, he and Moreno were driving in the vicinity of the Spring Street 
House, where the deal was supposed to take place.  They saw Barron and Thomas 
pull up close to the Spring Street House in a car, park, get out of the car, and walk 
to the apartment.  Moreno then got a tool from the trunk of his car, broke into 
 
87 
Barron and Thomas‘s car and stole three kilos of cocaine, which Moreno and 
defendant divided between them.38   
Moreno denied the truth of any of the above statements.  He testified that he 
had no personal knowledge of any fact, event, or circumstance leading to or 
involving the death of either Barron or Thomas, or of any crime that took place at 
the Spring Street House on January 2, 1990.  He further testified he had no 
personal knowledge of the involvement or lack of involvement of defendant in the 
capital homicides. 
(2)  Analysis 
Defendant contends that if Moreno had testified at defendant‘s trial as he did 
at the hearing on the motion for new trial, the outcome of the guilt phase likely 
would have been different.  We conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that 
Moreno‘s testimony at the new trial motion, if delivered at trial, would have 
changed the outcome of any stage of the trial. 
Defendant points to Moreno‘s testimony as establishing that he had a 
professional relationship with defendant, and knew where defendant lived and 
how to contact him.  Defendant points to the fact that he contacted Moreno when 
he was being sought by the police, and that Moreno talked to him after he was 
taken into custody.  Defendant contends that a competent attorney could have 
woven this information into a compelling argument casting considerable doubt on 
the prosecutor‘s theory of the case.  But Moreno‘s testimony provided no new 
                                              
38  
Defendant also presented essentially the same account in his testimony at 
the new trial motion hearing.  Defendant does not refer to his own testimony in 
advancing his argument concerning the prejudicial effect of defense counsel‘s 
failure to present Tony Moreno‘s testimony at trial. 
 
88 
information beyond the fact that defendant may have occasionally acted as an 
informant for the police.   
Defendant also points to Moreno‘s inability to recall his exact whereabouts 
for every hour on the day of the killings, contending it left open the possibility 
that, on the night of the killings, Moreno and defendant might have been together, 
a fact that could have been used by defense counsel to create reasonable doubt.  It 
is true that on direct examination, Moreno testified he had no independent 
recollection of where he was every hour of that day, but the prosecutor‘s cross-
examination of Moreno elicited his denials that he had any involvement in or 
knowledge of the capital crimes.  Specifically, the prosecutor asked, in eliciting 
Moreno‘s denial of defendant‘s assertions that defendant and Moreno had planned 
and executed a ―rip-off‖ of the ―dope deal‖ — ―If you‘d done something like that 
on January 2nd, do you think you might remember that?‖ — to which Moreno 
responded affirmatively.  On this record, we conclude that defendant has not 
shown a reasonable likelihood that the Moreno‘s testimony would have changed 
the outcome of the guilt phase.39 
Defendant also contends that Moreno‘s testimony would have changed the 
outcome of the penalty phase because the information that defendant had been an 
informant for the Los Angeles Police Department would have been strong 
mitigating evidence.  Defendant acknowledges that being a run-of-the-mill drug 
offender informant might have only minimal value as mitigating evidence, but 
asserts that he was distinguished as a valued informant, who worked for a series of 
high-ranking officers and detectives over a period of several years.  But Moreno‘s 
                                              
39 
Similarly, we also reject defendant‘s contention that Moreno‘s testimony 
would have changed the penalty phase outcome by introducing lingering doubt. 
 
89 
testimony at the new trial hearing did not describe defendant‘s undercover work in 
any detail.  Once again, on this record, defendant fails to establish a reasonable 
likelihood of a different outcome had Moreno‘s testimony been presented for 
consideration at the penalty phase. 
E.  Miscellaneous Challenges to the Death Penalty 
Defendants raise various challenges to California‘s death penalty law.  We 
affirm the decisions that have rejected similar claims and decline to reconsider 
them, as follows: 
California law adequately narrows the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty.  (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730.) 
The jury need not make written findings, achieve unanimity as to specific 
aggravating circumstances, find beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating 
circumstance is proved (except for § 190.3, factors (b) and (c)), find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
circumstances, or find beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate 
penalty.  (People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731; People v. 
Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459.)  Moreover, the jury need not be instructed 
as to any burden of proof in selecting the penalty to be imposed.  (People v. 
Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 885.)  The United States Supreme Court‘s 
decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment‘s jury trial guarantee (Cunningham v. 
California (2007) 549 U.S. 270; United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220; 
Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584; 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466) have not altered our conclusions in 
this regard.  (People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 167; People v. Hoyos, supra, 
41 Cal.4th at p. 926.) 
 
90 
CALJIC No. 8.85 is not unconstitutionally vague.  (People v. Perry (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 302, 319.)  The trial court has no obligation to modify the instruction to 
delete assertedly inapplicable aggravating and mitigating factors.  (Ibid.)  
―Section 190.3, factor (a), is neither vague nor overbroad, and does not 
impermissibly permit arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.‖  
(People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1165.) 
The absence of intercase proportionality review does not violate the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  (People v. 
Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 143.)  
―International law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in 
accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.‖  
(People v. Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 90.) 
III.  DISPOSITION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  I agree with the dissenting opinion by Justice Liu 
that under the circumstances of this case no appellate deference is due the trial 
court‘s determination the prosecutor‘s peremptory challenges were exercised on 
nondiscriminatory grounds (dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 22-25); I agree as well 
that an independent review of the record discloses a likelihood that as to at least 
two African-American women called as prospective jurors, the prosecutor engaged 
in purposeful discrimination in exercising his challenges, in violation of Batson v. 
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (dis. 
opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 26-38).  Unlike my colleague in dissent, however, I find 
it unnecessary to suggest that in general no deference is owed a trial court‘s 
credibility determination unless the court has made explicit findings upholding the 
prosecutor‘s stated reasons for exercising a challenge in light of all the 
circumstances bearing on the question of discrimination.  (See id. at pp. 16-21, 
25.)  The egregious circumstances of the present case—the trial court‘s 
acknowledged inability to evaluate the prosecutor‘s primarily demeanor-based 
explanations due to lack of notes or recollection, the court‘s resulting 
determination that it could ―only go by what [the prosecutor] is saying,‖ and the 
court‘s supporting observation, purportedly based on its own experience, that in 
general ―Black women are very reluctant to impose the death penalty‖—amply 
establish that the trial court failed to make the ―sincere and reasoned attempt to 
evaluate each stated reason‖ required for appellate deference under People v. Silva 
 
2 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 386.  What deference would be appropriate when the trial 
court has denied the motion without explicit findings regarding the prosecutor‘s 
explanations, but without giving positive indications it has failed to carefully 
scrutinize those explanations, is a question for another day. 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
The court today affirms a judgment of death that followed a trial in which 
the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove the first five black women in the 
jury box.  Defendant, who is black, was charged with robbery and murder, and the 
principal defense witness was a black woman, defendant‘s wife.  When the trial 
judge asked the prosecutor to state his reasons for striking the five black female 
jurors, the prosecutor said he believed each of them would be hesitant to impose 
the death penalty.  The prosecutor gave vague explanations for his belief, stating 
that it was ―just my general impression from their answers . . . in spite of what 
they said,‖ ―[i]t was my general impression from the way she answered questions, 
not what she said,‖ and ―sometimes you get a feel for a person that you just know 
that they can‘t impose it based upon the nature of the way that they say 
something.‖  The trial judge accepted the prosecutor‘s explanations despite the 
fact that she had ―stopped taking notes‖ by the time at least two of these 
prospective jurors were questioned and thus could ―only go by what [the 
prosecutor] is saying.‖  In the course of ruling on one of defendant‘s Batson 
claims, the trial judge said she had noticed in past cases that ―black women are 
very reluctant to impose the death penalty; they find it very difficult no matter 
what it is.‖  The prosecutor ultimately accepted a jury that included one black 
woman, and the jury convicted defendant of murder and returned a penalty verdict 
of death. 
 
2 
 
My colleagues conclude that the trial court did not err, ― ‗giv[ing] great 
deference to the trial court‘s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham 
excuses.‘ ‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.)  But deference in these circumstances all 
but drains the constitutional protection against discrimination in jury selection of 
any meaningful application.  Here the prosecutor relied largely on vague 
references to the jurors‘ demeanor; the trial judge, who had ―stopped taking 
notes,‖ had no way to independently evaluate the prosecutor‘s explanations; and 
the trial judge gave no legitimate reason for finding the prosecutor or his 
explanations to be credible.  This record provides no basis for deferring to the trial 
court‘s acceptance of the prosecutor‘s explanations, for there is no indication that 
the trial court made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate ―all of the 
circumstances that bear upon the issue‖ of purposeful discrimination.  (Snyder v. 
Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 478 (Snyder); see Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 
U.S. 231, 239 (Miller-El); Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 96 (Batson).)  
The upshot of this erroneous application of deference is the denial of defendant‘s 
Batson claim despite the fact that no court, trial or appellate, has ever conducted a 
proper Batson analysis. 
Today‘s decision deepens a split of authority among federal and state 
appellate courts on the adequacy of a Batson ruling where the trial court has 
engaged in no explicit analysis of the validity of the prosecutor‘s facially neutral 
explanation.  Some cases have held that a trial court‘s denial of a Batson 
challenge, by itself, constitutes an implicit finding at the third step of the Batson 
analysis that the prosecutor‘s explanation was credible; these cases accord 
deference to this implicit finding.  (See, e.g, Edwards v. Roper (8th Cir. 2012) 688 
F.3d 449, 457; Messiah v. Duncan (2d Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d 186, 198; State v. 
Angelo (Kan. 2008) 197 P.3d 337, 347.)  Other cases have held that when a trial 
court has not provided any explicit analysis of the credibility of a prosecutor‘s 
 
3 
 
explanation, a reviewing court has no basis for deferring to the trial court‘s ruling 
at Batson‘s third step.  (See, e.g., U.S. v. McAllister (6th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3d 572, 
581; U.S. v. Rutledge (7th Cir. 2011) 648 F.3d 555, 558–559; Coombs v. 
Diguglielmo (3d Cir. 2010) 616 F.3d 255, 261–265; Green v. LaMarque (9th Cir. 
2008) 532 F.3d 1028, 1031.)  Our court has aligned itself with one side of this 
split, but not the side that reflects the United States Supreme Court‘s teachings on 
the careful scrutiny that trial courts and reviewing courts must apply to ferret out 
unlawful discrimination in jury selection — a harm that ―compromises the right of 
trial by impartial jury,‖ perpetuates ― ‗group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective 
of, historical prejudice,‘ ‖ and ―undermines public confidence in adjudication.‖  
(Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 237–238.)  Because the goal of extirpating such 
discrimination cannot be reconciled with deference to a trial court‘s Batson ruling 
when there is no indication that the trial court conducted the inquiry necessary to 
support that ruling, and because the totality of circumstances here gives rise to a 
strong inference of unlawful discrimination, I respectfully dissent. 
I. 
Defendant was charged with robbing and murdering two men in South 
Central Los Angeles after a fraudulent drug transaction went awry.  Defendant‘s 
wife, who is black, was the principal witness for the defense and attempted to shift 
the blame for the murders to defendant‘s accomplices.   
 
The case was tried in Compton.  Jury selection took place in August and 
September of 1991, a few months after the nationally televised police beating of 
Rodney King, a black man, had escalated racial tensions in Los Angeles.  The trial 
court referred to these events during voir dire, asking prospective jurors:  ―Is there 
anyone here who feels because of the Rodney King case that it‘s affected you to a 
point where you would not be able to impartially listen to the testimony of a police 
officer?‖ 
 
4 
 
After the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike the first three 
black women seated on the jury panel, defendant raised an objection pursuant to 
Batson and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.  While observing that ―I did 
have some of [these three jurors] marked that I expected to be exercised on,‖ the 
trial court asked the prosecutor to give reasons for these challenges.  The 
prosecutor said each of the jurors had ―demonstrated a reluctance in terms of 
answering direct questions which called for the requirement of the imposition of 
the death penalty with an affirmative answer that they would impose it.  They 
would either say, well, I think I might be able to, or I could, but their reluctance to 
impose it was evident not only from the answers that they gave from the time that 
it took them to respond to the question, their general demeanor in answering the 
questions and my impression from each of them.‖  He continued:  ―It was just my 
general impression from their answers that in spite of what they said they wouldn‘t 
have the ability to impose it when it actually came down to it.  That is my reasons 
[sic] for excusing them.‖  After briefly hearing additional arguments from both 
parties, the trial court simply stated:  ―The motion is denied.‖ 
The prosecutor used another peremptory challenge to strike the next black 
woman seated in the jury box, prospective juror R.P.  Defendant made a second 
Batson/Wheeler objection, and the trial court again directed the prosecutor to 
explain.  The prosecutor said he struck R.P. for the same reason he struck the prior 
three black women; he had marked R.P. very low on a scale he used to rate a 
juror‘s willingness to impose the death penalty.  The trial court said it did not 
recall whether R.P. had displayed any such hesitation.  The court went on to say 
that although it had made notes on certain jurors who appeared to be reluctant to 
impose the death penalty, ―I stopped making marks after a point.  I‘m sorry that I 
did that but at this point I did forget to.‖  
 
5 
 
During a recess, the prosecutor reviewed the reporter‘s transcript of the voir 
dire of R.P. and his own notes.  He read portions of the transcript to the court, 
highlighting an exchange in which R.P. said that she had not ―pinned down‖ when 
the death penalty would serve as a deterrent and that ―[w]ith some people it would 
and with some people it probably would not.‖  Defense counsel questioned 
whether these responses indicated that R.P. would be reluctant to impose the death 
penalty.  The prosecutor, agreeing that the answers themselves did not show R.P. 
to be reluctant, explained:  ―It was just my impression she didn‘t have the ability 
in spite of what her answers were.  It had a lot more to do with not what she said 
but how I read what she was saying from being present in court with her and 
observing her demeanor and the way she answered questions.  It clearly isn‘t from 
the words that are written down.  It was my general impression from the way she 
answered questions, not what she said.‖ 
The trial court then denied the Batson/Wheeler motion:  ―And I‘m going to 
say that there is sufficient explanation on [R.P.].  [¶]  As I indicated earlier, I had 
made notes on some of them and that was by their demeanor and their manner of 
responding.  I don‘t have anything on this one at this time, but I would accept [the 
prosecutor‘s] explanation as to his exercise of the peremptory, so I would not 
make a finding that there is a Wheeler violation.‖ 
 
Thereafter, when the prosecutor struck the fifth black woman seated in the 
jury box, prospective juror R.J., defendant made his third Batson/Wheeler 
objection.  At sidebar, defense counsel argued that this strike was particularly 
suspicious because the prosecutor had previously accepted a jury panel that 
included R.J.  The prosecutor explained:  ―I did accept her because the 
composition was somewhat satisfactory to me. . . .  [¶]  I was somewhat reluctant 
to kick her out of fear of making a Wheeler motion. . . .  Additionally I was a little 
more concerned about offending the blacks on the jury for them thinking I was 
 
6 
 
making the same — doing the same thing.  But I went down to my office and 
thought about it, and it doesn‘t make any sense to me to go through this entire 
process with a juror that I honestly don‘t believe because of her responses and the 
way she answered me during the individual voir dire, it doesn‘t make sense to me 
to try this case in front of that person when I think going in they don‘t have the 
ability to render a death verdict if that‘s what the case calls for.  [¶]  . . . [I]f that 
means excusing her because she was rated as being low for her inability to impose 
the death penalty then that‘s what I‘m going to do.  It has nothing to do with the 
color of her skin.  I can‘t emphasize that enough.  It has to do with her responses.‖ 
 
At this point, the trial court interjected:  ―I don‘t recall her responses at all.‖  
The prosecutor then explained further:  ―It is my impression not only from her 
answers to the questions but her demeanor and the fashion in which she answered 
them, I don‘t think she can impose the death penalty on any case.  It doesn‘t matter 
the circumstances regardless.  [¶]  I don‘t know how to exactly express it for the 
record.‖  He continued: ―But sometimes you get a feel for a person that you just 
know that they can‘t impose it based upon the nature of the way that they say 
something.‖ 
After hearing argument from defense counsel, the trial court said:  ―I have 
to say in my other death penalty cases I have found that the black women are very 
reluctant to impose the death penalty; they find it very difficult no matter what it 
is.  I have found it to be true.  [¶]  But as I said I cannot say anything about these.  
I can only go by what [the prosecutor] is saying because I stopped making notes . . 
. .‖  The court then added:  ―I am just making a little point.  I just wanted to tell 
you my observation that I have seen this before and I can understand why.  That‘s 
all.  But I am not making my ruling based on that.‖  When defense counsel pointed 
out that it would be improper to base a ruling on such a rationale, the trial court 
said:  ―Of course it is improper.  I am just giving it for your information, what I 
 
7 
 
have observed.‖  The court then rejected defendant‘s motion, stating only:  ―And 
at this point I will accept [the prosecutor‘s] explanation.‖ 
 
Immediately following this hearing at sidebar, the prosecution said to the 
prospective jurors in open court:  ―It is not a mystery at all, you now.  Everybody 
here, everybody recognizes when we go up to the bench after I kick a female 
black, for example, a number of times we‘re up there talking about the fact that 
I‘m doing that.‖  He explained that he had struck these jurors because of their 
beliefs regarding the death penalty. 
Ultimately, the prosecutor exercised 17 peremptory challenges, 13 of which 
were directed at women, including the five black women discussed above.  After 
the 12 seated jurors had been selected, the prosecutor at sidebar referred again to 
defense counsel‘s Batson/Wheeler motions, stating for the record:  ―First of all, I 
would like to indicate the last number of challenges I exercised were against white 
jurors, to be replaced by black jurors.  The reason they were exercised was, first of 
all, I wanted a greater mix of racial diversification on this jury.  [¶]  Secondly, they 
just happened to be a couple of black jurors I rated very high because of their 
answers where they indicated they had an ability to impose the death penalty in a 
particular case.  [¶]  The racial makeup is five black and seven whites.  There are 
four male blacks and one female black.‖  The jury found defendant guilty as 
charged and returned a penalty verdict of death. 
II. 
Proper analysis of the trial court‘s rulings in this case must proceed from an 
understanding of applicable high court precedent, beginning with Batson.  In 
Batson, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle, long recognized 
since Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) 100 U.S. 303, that ―[p]urposeful racial 
discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant‘s right to equal 
protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to 
 
8 
 
secure.‖  (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 86.)  Although a defendant is not entitled 
to a jury of any particular racial composition, and ―[a]lthough a prosecutor 
ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges ‗for any reason 
at all, as long as that reason is related to his view concerning the outcome‘ of the 
case to be tried, [citation], the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to 
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that 
black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State‘s case 
against a black defendant.‖  (Id. at p. 89.)  The high court observed that violations 
of this constitutional principle implicate not only the fairness of individual trials 
but also our system of criminal justice more broadly:  ―The harm from 
discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and 
the excluded juror to touch the entire community.  Selection procedures that 
purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the 
fairness of our system of justice.‖  (Id. at p. 87.) 
Before Batson, the high court in Swain v. Alabama (1965) 380 U.S. 202 
had considered the evidentiary burden that a defendant must meet in order to 
prove racial discrimination in jury selection.  Swain had been interpreted to hold 
that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination only 
by showing that in case after case the prosecution had systematically excluded 
black prospective jurors.  (See id. at pp. 223–224.)  Because this ―crippling burden 
of proof‖ had rendered ―prosecutors‘ peremptory challenges . . . largely immune 
from constitutional scrutiny‖ (Batson, 476 U.S. at pp. 92–93), the high court in 
Batson reformed the inquiry used to assess whether the prosecution had exercised 
a peremptory strike in a racially discriminatory manner. 
Batson set forth a three-stage inquiry that is now familiar.  First, a 
defendant must make out a prima facie case by pointing to facts that raise the 
inference that the prosecution has engaged in impermissible discrimination.  
 
9 
 
(Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 96–97.)   In determining whether the defendant has 
raised such an inference, the court must consider ―all relevant circumstances,‖ 
including whether the prosecution has engaged in a ― ‗pattern‘ of strikes‖ against 
jurors of a particular race or has made statements during voir dire or in exercising 
his challenges that ―may support or refute an inference‖ of discrimination.  (Ibid.)  
Second, once the defendant has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to 
the prosecution ―to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging‖ these 
jurors.  (Id. at p. 97.)  While ―the prosecutor‘s explanation need not rise to the 
level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause‖ (ibid.), the prosecutor ―must 
articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried‖ and may 
not ―rebut the defendant‘s case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory 
motive or ‗affirm[ing] [his] good faith in making individual selections.‘  
[Citation.]‖  (Id. at p. 98.)  Finally, at step three, the court must determine whether 
―the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.‖  (Ibid.)  A Batson 
motion will be granted if ―it was more likely than not that the challenge was 
improperly motivated.‖  (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 170 
(Johnson); see Williams v. Beard (3d Cir. 2011) 637 F.3d 195, 215 [―At step three 
of the Batson analysis, the petitioner must show that ‗it is more likely than not that 
the prosecutor struck at least one juror because of race.‘ ‖].) 
After Batson, the high court in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994) 511 
U.S. 127 (J.E.B.) held that ―the Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional 
discrimination on the basis of gender, just as it prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of race.‖  (Id. at p. 129.)  ―All persons, when granted the opportunity to serve 
on a jury, have the right not to be excluded summarily because of discriminatory 
and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and reinforce patterns of historical 
discrimination.‖  (Id. at pp. 141–142.)  The high court observed that because 
―gender and race are overlapping categories, gender can be used as a pretext for 
 
10 
 
racial discrimination,‖ and thus ―[f]ailing to provide jurors the same protection 
against gender discrimination as race discrimination could frustrate the purpose of 
Batson.‖  (Id. at p. 145; see also id. at p. 145, fn. 18 [noting that the ―temptation to 
use gender as a pretext for racial discrimination may explain why the majority of 
the lower court decision extending Batson to gender involve the use of peremptory 
challenges to remove minority women‖].) 
In more recent years, the high court has refined the Batson inquiry to better 
effectuate the constitutional protection against unlawful discrimination in jury 
selection.  Because the trial court in Batson had rejected the defendant‘s claim 
without even requiring the prosecution to explain its strikes, Batson had no 
occasion to examine how a court should assess whether purposeful discrimination 
has been proven at the third step of the analysis.  (See Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 
p. 98.)  Since Batson, the high court has addressed this question in Miller-El, 
supra, 545 U.S. 231 and Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. 472.  Those cases demonstrate 
the careful analysis of all relevant circumstances that trial courts and appellate 
courts must apply in assessing the validity of the prosecution‘s stated reasons for 
striking a juror and in ultimately determining whether the defendant has proven 
purposeful discrimination. 
In Miller-El, the Supreme Court granted the federal habeas corpus petition 
of a Texas death row inmate where the prosecution had used peremptory 
challenges to remove 10 black veniremembers, leaving one black juror.  (Miller-
El, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 236, 240.)  The prosecution had offered race-neutral 
explanations for each of these challenges, the trial court had accepted those 
explanations, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had affirmed.  (Id. at 
pp. 236–237.)  Because petitioner‘s Batson claim had been rejected on the merits 
by the Texas courts, the high court could grant relief under the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) only if petitioner could rebut by 
 
11 
 
― ‗clear and convincing evidence‘ ‖ the Texas courts‘ presumptively correct 
factual finding that the prosecution had not engaged in impermissible racial 
discrimination.  (Miller-El, at p. 240, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).)  
Even under this deferential standard of review, the high court in Miller-El 
granted habeas relief, applying a careful and comprehensive Batson stage three 
analysis of the prosecution‘s peremptory challenges.  The high court first observed 
that the sheer number of strikes the prosecution had used against black panelists 
provided grounds to believe that the prosecution had discriminated on the basis of 
race.  (Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 240–241.)  Then, in order to determine 
whether the facially neutral reasons given by the prosecutor were false or 
pretextual, the high court engaged in a detailed comparative juror analysis.  ―If a 
prosecutor‘s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an 
otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to 
prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson‘s third step.‖  (Id. at p. 
241.) 
Focusing on two black jurors whom the prosecution claimed to have struck 
because of their statements regarding the death penalty, the high court in Miller-El 
found that the statements of the two jurors were comparable to those of a number 
of veniremembers whom the prosecution did not strike, including some who 
ultimately served on the jury and others who were accepted by the prosecution but 
struck by the defense.  (See Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 244–245, 248–249.)   
Further, the high court rejected outright another of the prosecution‘s stated reasons 
for striking one of the two black jurors as mere ―makeweight‖ because it was 
proffered only after defense counsel had called into question the prosecution‘s 
originally stated reason.  (Id. at p. 246.)  Finally, the high court highlighted a 
number of other facts that were suggestive of discrimination:  the prosecution had 
―shuffled‖ the venire panel in a manner that would make it less likely for black 
 
12 
 
panelists to serve on the jury (id. at pp. 253–254), the prosecution had posed 
different voir dire questions to black and nonblack panel members (id. at pp. 255–
263), and the county prosecutor‘s office had employed a policy of striking black 
prospective jurors for decades prior to the trial (id. at pp. 263–264).  Upon 
considering all of these circumstances, Miller-El held:  ―The state court‘s 
conclusion that the prosecutors‘ strikes of [these two jurors] were not racially 
determined is shown up as wrong to a clear and convincing degree; the state 
court‘s conclusion was unreasonable as well as erroneous.‖  (Id. at p. 266.) 
The Supreme Court conducted a similarly careful inquiry in Snyder, a 
capital case where the prosecution had used peremptory challenges to strike all 
five black prospective jurors who could have served on the jury.  (Snyder, supra, 
552 U.S. at p. 476.)  The high court focused on the prosecution‘s proffered reasons 
for striking one of these five jurors, Mr. Brooks.  (See id. at 478 [― ‗[T]he 
Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory 
purpose,‘ ‖ quoting U.S. v. Vasquez-Lopez (9th Cir. 1994) 22 F.3d 900, 902].)  The 
prosecution had given two reasons for striking Mr. Brooks:  first, he appeared to 
be nervous during voir dire, and second, he might vote to convict the defendant of 
a lesser crime in order ― ‗to go home quickly‘ ‖ and attend to his obligations as a 
student teacher.  (Snyder, at p. 478.)  The trial court had allowed the prosecutor‘s 
challenge to Mr. Brooks without explanation.  (Ibid.) 
Snyder concluded that the trial court committed clear error in rejecting the 
defendant‘s Batson objection to the strike of Mr. Brooks.  (Snyder, supra, 552 
U.S. at p. 474.)  As to the prosecutor‘s first reason for the strike, the high court 
acknowledged that ― ‗nervousness cannot be shown from a cold transcript‘ ‖ and 
that ―deference is especially appropriate where a trial judge has made a finding 
that an attorney credibly relied on demeanor in exercising a strike.‖  (Id. at p. 479.)  
But the high court emphasized that ―[h]ere . . . the record does not show that the 
 
13 
 
trial judge actually made a determination concerning Mr. Brooks‘ demeanor.‖  
(Ibid.)  ―It is possible that the judge did not have any impression one way or the 
other concerning Mr. Brooks‘ demeanor. . . .  [T]he trial judge may not have 
recalled Mr. Brooks‘ demeanor.  Or, the trial judge may have found it unnecessary 
to consider Mr. Brooks‘ demeanor, instead basing his ruling completely on the 
second proffered justification for the strike.  For these reasons, we cannot presume 
that the trial judge credited the prosecutor‘s assertion that Mr. Brooks was 
nervous.‖  (Ibid.) 
As to the prosecutor‘s second proffered reason, the high court observed that 
the possibility that Mr. Brooks would have been willing or able to tailor the jury‘s 
verdict in order to shorten the duration of trial was ―highly speculative‖ and that 
the same concerns could have been raised with respect to jurors accepted by the 
prosecution who had ―disclosed conflicting obligations that appear to have been at 
least as serious‖ as those of Mr. Brooks.  (Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at pp. 482–
483.)  The high court concluded that the ―prosecution‘s proffer of this pretextual 
explanation naturally [gave] rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.‖  (Id. at 
p. 485.)  Because the trial court had made no finding on the record as to the 
prosecution‘s demeanor-based reason, and because there was no indication that the 
prosecution would have challenged Mr. Brooks ―based on his nervousness alone‖ 
or that this ―subtle question of causation could be profitably explored further on 
remand . . . more than a decade after petitioner‘s trial,‖ the high court reversed the 
conviction.  (Id. at pp. 485–486.) 
In Thaler v. Haynes (2010) 559 U.S. 43 [130 S.Ct. 1171] (Haynes), the 
high court issued a brief per curiam opinion clarifying that Snyder did not hold 
that a trial court must invariably reject a proffered demeanor-based reason if the 
trial court had not personally observed the aspect of juror demeanor identified by 
the prosecution.  (Id. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 1174].)  In Haynes, the Fifth Circuit 
 
14 
 
had relied on Snyder in granting a state prisoner‘s federal habeas corpus petition 
on the ground that the trial judge who had accepted some of the prosecution‘s 
demeanor-based reasons for exercising peremptory challenges was not the same 
trial judge who had presided during voir dire.  (Id. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at 
pp. 1172–1173].)  The precise question in Haynes was whether the Fifth Circuit 
had correctly applied AEDPA‘s requirement that such a habeas corpus petition 
may be granted only if the state court‘s decision ― ‗was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court.‘ ‖  (Haynes, at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 1173], quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1).)  As the high court has made clear, AEDPA‘s deferential standard 
turns not on the actual merits of a constitutional claim but rather on what the high 
court itself has explicitly said regarding the constitutional claim.  (See Haynes, at 
p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 1173]; see also Marshall v. Rodgers (Apr. 1, 2013, No. 12-
382) ___ U.S. ___ , ___ [2013 U.S. LEXIS 2546 at pp. *10–*11]; Harrington v. 
Richter (2011) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [131 S.Ct. 770, 786].)  Haynes reversed the Fifth 
Circuit‘s decision because ―no decision of this Court clearly establishes the 
categorical rule on which the Court of Appeals appears to have relied.‖  (Haynes, 
at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 1175].)  While noting that ―the best evidence of the intent 
of the attorney exercising a strike is often that attorney‘s demeanor,‖ Haynes 
remanded for further consideration of whether the state court‘s rejection of the 
petitioner‘s Batson claim was nevertheless unreasonable.  (Ibid.) 
To sum up this review of applicable precedent, the three-step inquiry set 
forth in Batson eased the ―crippling burden of proof‖ that Swain had been 
understood to impose on defendants challenging racially discriminatory strikes.  
(Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 92.)  J.E.B. extended Batson to discrimination in 
jury selection on the basis of gender.  (J.E.B., supra, 511 U.S. at pp. 141–142.)  
Miller-El made clear the thorough and careful scrutiny of all relevant 
 
15 
 
circumstances that trial and appellate courts must apply at the third step of the 
Batson analysis in light of the ―practical difficulty of ferreting out discrimination 
in selections discretionary by nature.‖  (Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 238.)  
Snyder applied this careful scrutiny to invalidate a Batson ruling where the trial 
court had made no explicit determination as to the validity of the prosecutor‘s 
demeanor-based explanation and where consideration of all relevant circumstances 
showed that another explanation offered by the prosecution was ―highly 
speculative‖ and ―pretextual.‖  (Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at pp. 482, 485.)  
Although Snyder did not establish any ―categorical rule‖ (Haynes, supra, 559 U.S. 
at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 1175]), it is instructive to observe the detailed and 
expansive analysis at Batson‘s third step that the high court undertook in Snyder, 
as in Miller-El, ―even under [a] highly deferential standard of review.‖  (Snyder, at 
p. 479; see Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 240 [applying AEDPA].)  The 
development of this line of doctrine over the past three decades evinces the high 
court‘s ―unceasing efforts to eradicate [unlawful] discrimination in the procedures 
used to select the venire from which individual jurors are drawn.‖  (Batson, at 
p. 85.) 
III. 
It remains the case that appellate courts reviewing Batson claims 
―ordinarily‖ should accord ―great deference‖ to a trial court‘s findings of fact, 
including any finding as to the ultimate question of whether a strike was racially 
motivated.  (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 21; see Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. 
at p. 477; Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 365 (plur. opn.).)  It makes 
good sense that appellate courts should generally defer to such findings; a trial 
court, unlike an appellate court, is in a position to evaluate the non-verbal 
demeanor of the jurors who are struck and to assess the credibility of the 
prosecutor as he or she explains the strikes.  (See Snyder, at p. 477 
 
16 
 
[―determinations of credibility and demeanor lie ‗ ―peculiarly within a trial judge‘s 
province‖ ‘ ‖].) 
There is a split of authority, however, as to how the deference ordinarily 
accorded to a trial court‘s Batson ruling should be reconciled with the obligation 
of trial courts ―to assess the plausibility of [the prosecution‘s proffered] reason in 
light of all evidence with a bearing on it.‖  (Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 252.)  
This issue has arisen in a number of cases where the trial court, after hearing the 
prosecutor‘s facially neutral explanation for a strike, gave little or no explanation 
on the record in support of its denial of a Batson challenge.  The present case 
implicates this very issue:  the trial court did not make any explicit findings 
regarding the prosecution‘s proffered reasons for striking five black women jurors, 
nor did it provide any explicit analysis of all relevant circumstances bearing on 
defendant‘s Batson motions.  Instead, as to each of the three Batson motions, the 
trial court either summarily stated that ―[t]he motion is denied‖ or simply asserted 
that it would ―accept‖ the prosecution‘s explanation for the strike.  The closest the 
trial court came to making a specific finding regarding any of the strikes was when 
it observed that although it could not say ―anything‖ about whether the black 
women struck were reluctant to impose the death penalty, it had observed in prior 
cases that ―black women are very reluctant to impose the death penalty‖ — which 
of course is not a proper basis for crediting the prosecutor‘s explanations for the 
strikes. 
My colleagues nevertheless accord the trial court‘s Batson rulings ―their 
usual deference.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 25.)  Instead of conducting a de novo 
review of the record to determine ―whether it was more likely than not that the 
challenge was improperly motivated‖ (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 170), 
today‘s opinion applies a form of substantial evidence review.  The court 
presumes that the trial court credited those aspects of the prosecutor‘s explanations 
 
17 
 
that cannot be fully evaluated on a cold record (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 31–33) 
and affirms the trial court‘s rulings on the grounds that the prosecutor‘s stated 
reasons were not ― ‗inherently implausible‘ ‖ and that there is some evidence in 
the record that ―supports‖ those reasons (id. at p. 26; see also id. at pp. 27–40.)  As 
explained below, the court errs and, in so doing, deepens the split of authority 
regarding the deference owed to a trial court that fails to explicitly engage in the 
analysis required at Batson‘s third step. 
A. 
On one side of the split, a number of courts have held that where, as here, 
the trial court does not demonstrate on the record that it has evaluated the 
prosecutor‘s explanation in light of all the circumstances bearing on the issue of 
purposeful discrimination, the trial court‘s denial of a Batson challenge is not 
entitled to deference. 
In U.S. v. Rutledge, supra, 648 F.3d 555 (Rutledge), the prosecutor struck 
two black jurors and, as to the first juror, explained that he was worried the juror 
would be biased due to the juror‘s stated concern during voir dire that other jurors 
would not listen to him because he shared the race of the defendant.  (Id. at p. 
558.)  As to the second juror, the prosecutor explained that she appeared agitated 
and frustrated during voir dire.  (Id. at p. 557.)  After hearing argument, the district 
court simply said:  ― ‗I think that does it then.  Those are both nonracial-related 
reasons.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 558.)  The court then permitted the two jurors to be excused.  
(Ibid.)  The Seventh Circuit refused to accord any deference to the district court‘s 
denial of defendant‘s Batson challenge.  Observing that the district court had not 
made any explicit findings with respect to the credibility of the prosecution‘s 
proffered race-neutral reasons, the court of appeals concluded that ―if there is 
nothing in the record reflecting the trial court‘s decision, then there is nothing to 
which we can defer.‖  (Id. at p. 559.)  The appropriate remedy, the court 
 
18 
 
determined, was to remand the case to allow the district court to fill the ―void‖ 
created by its failure to make explicit findings.  (Id. at p. 557.) 
In U.S. v. McAllister, supra, 693 F.3d 572, the Sixth Circuit reached a 
similar conclusion.  At Batson‘s second step, the prosecutor claimed to have struck 
the challenged juror because the juror was unemployed and because his prior 
service in the military police might lead him to be sympathetic to the defendant, a 
former FBI agent.  (Id. at p. 577.)  In response to this explanation, the district court 
simply said:  ― ‗All right.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  The Sixth Circuit observed that ―[f]rom a 
review of the record, it is unclear to what extent the district court engaged in the 
third step [of the Batson analysis], if it did at all.‖  (Id. at p. 580.)  ―The district 
court did not consult with the defense counsel to hear a response to the 
Government‘s race-neutral explanation, nor did it engage the prosecution to 
independently assess the plausibility of its argument.  [(Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 
at pp. 251–252.)]  Gauging from the district court‘s two-word analysis and finding 
— ‗all right‘ — it is doubtful that the district court consulted all circumstances that 
bear upon the issue of racial animosity.  [(Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 478.)]  We 
have no way of reviewing the district court‘s reasoning for rejecting McAllister‘s 
Batson challenge.‖  (McAllister, at p. 582.)  The Sixth Circuit remanded for the 
district court to make ―explicit on-the-record findings as to whether McAllister 
established the existence of purposeful race discrimination in the selection of his 
jury.‖  (Ibid.) 
The Third Circuit confronted a similar situation in Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 
supra, 616 F.3d 255 (Coombs).  The prosecutor in Coombs, upon striking two 
black female jurors from the panel, explained that he struck one because she was 
an eyewitness to a shooting and because her mother had been robbed, and that he 
struck the other because her brother had been charged with robbery.  (Id. at p. 
258.)  The state trial court denied the defendant‘s Batson motions, stating:  ― 
 
19 
 
‗These are what lawyers do with peremptory challenges. They‘re not race-
based. . . .  As long as we have peremptory challenges, lawyers are going to make 
judgments maybe based on hunches, maybe based on prior experiences, maybe 
based on feelings, but they‘re not based on race.  Both of you are much too good 
lawyers to do something like that.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  The defense made another Batson 
motion after the prosecutor struck three additional black jurors.  The prosecutor 
explained that one juror‘s cousin had been a witness to a robbery and that another 
juror had a nephew who had been shot, a nephew in jail, and a friend who was a 
defense attorney.  (Ibid.)  As to the final juror, the prosecutor said that he ― ‗just 
didn‘t like him‘ ‖ because of the ― ‗way he was looking at me‘ ‖ and added that the 
juror had failed to ― ‗check off many boxes‘ ‖ on the jury questionnaire.  (Ibid.)  In 
response to these explanations, the trial court said, ― ‗Let‘s go.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  Defense 
counsel then asked ― ‗Your Honor is going to accept the Commonwealth‘s 
assertions and deny my motion?‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  The trial court responded:  ― ‗Yes.‘ ‖  
(Ibid.) 
The Third Circuit held that the trial court ―failed to conduct a full and 
complete Batson step three analysis.‖  (Coombs, supra, 616 F.3d at p. 263.)  It 
observed that the trial court had improperly limited defense counsel‘s opportunity 
to respond to the prosecution‘s proffered reasons.  (Id. at pp. 263, 265.)  
Furthermore, the trial court had not made ―the findings required under Batson.‖  
(Id. at p. 263.)  Rather, ―[r]elying upon its view of counsel‘s competence and/or 
professionalism, the court failed to inquire into whether the prosecutor‘s purported 
reasons for striking the jurors were pretextual.‖  (Ibid.)  This failure to inquire into 
the validity of the prosecutor‘s reasons was particularly troubling given the 
prosecutor‘s vague explanation for striking the fifth juror.  (Id. at pp. 263–264.)  
Accordingly, the Third Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing that would 
 
20 
 
permit the district court to conduct the analysis that the state trial court had 
apparently failed to conduct in the first instance.  (Id. at p. 265.) 
In Green v. LaMarque, supra, 532 F.3d 1028, the prosecutor struck six 
black prospective jurors and offered race-neutral reasons for each strike.  The state 
trial court denied the defendant‘s Batson motion without providing any analysis on 
the record as to whether the prosecution‘s proffered reasons were pretextual.  (Id. 
at p. 1030.)  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial court had ―failed to 
undertake ‗ ―a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of 
intent as may be available,‖ ‘ including a comparative analysis of similarly 
situated jurors.‖  (Ibid.)  The court of appeals rejected the state‘s argument that it 
should ―presume the trial court found the prosecution‘s race-neutral reasons for 
striking [one of these jurors] to be genuine when it denied‖ the defendant‘s Batson 
motion, instead holding that ―we must not make such a presumption where ‗the 
court never fulfilled its affirmative duty to determine if the defendant had 
established purposeful discrimination.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 1031.)  Accordingly, the Ninth 
Circuit ―conduct[ed] that analysis de novo.‖  (Ibid.; see also McGahee v. Alabama 
Department of Corrections (11th Cir. 2009) 560 F.3d 1252, 1260 [state trial court 
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in failing to make a ruling on 
the credibility of the prosecution‘s proffered race-neutral reasons].) 
Each of the decisions above declined to accord deference to the trial court‘s 
denial of a Batson claim because the trial court did not demonstrate on the record 
that it had engaged in the comprehensive inquiry required to make such a ruling at 
Batson‘s third step.  A number of state high courts have also followed this 
approach.  (See, e.g., Jones v. State (Del. 2007) 938 A.2d 626, 633–636; People v. 
Davis (Ill. 2008) 899 N.E.2d 238, 249–250; Commonwealth v. Rodriguez (Mass. 
2010) 931 N.E.2d 20, 33; State v. Pona (R.I. 2007) 926 A.2d 592, 608 [―If this 
Court is to ensure that a trial justice has properly considered the credibility of each 
 
21 
 
proffered race-neutral reason and has addressed each of a defendant‘s arguments 
that a peremptory strike actually was a pretext for purposeful discrimination, we 
must be presented with an adequate record to review on appeal.‖].) 
Other courts, however, have taken a different approach.  In Edwards v. 
Roper, supra, 688 F.3d 449, the prosecutor claimed that he struck one juror 
because he was a postal worker and might see jury service as an opportunity to 
― ‗not follow the rules.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 456.)  In rejecting the defendant‘s Batson 
challenge, the trial court said only:  ― ‗The Batson challenge will be denied . . . .‘ ‖  
(Id. at p. 457.)  Before the Eighth Circuit, the petitioner argued that the Missouri 
Supreme Court had erred in concluding that the trial court had made a factual 
finding regarding the ultimate question of the prosecutor‘s discriminatory intent.  
(Ibid.)  The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument.  Relying on circuit precedent, 
the court said:  ―The denial of a Batson challenge . . . ‗is itself a finding at 
[Batson‘s] third step that the defendant failed to carry his burden of establishing 
that the strike was motivated by purposeful discrimination,‘ [(Smulls v. Roper (8th 
Cir. 2008) 535 F.3d 853, 863)], and it ‗includes an implicit finding that the 
prosecutor‘s explanation was credible.‘  [(Taylor v. Roper (8th Cir. 2009) 577 F.3d 
848, 856)].‖  (Ibid.) 
Similarly, the Second Circuit has held that the ―unambiguous rejection of a 
Batson challenge will demonstrate with sufficient clarity that a trial court deems 
the movant to have failed to carry his burden to show that the prosecutor‘s 
proffered race-neutral reason is pretextual.‖  (Messiah v. Duncan, supra, 435 F.3d 
186, 198.)  In Messiah, the prosecutor said he struck a black juror because the 
juror had a background in social work and because the juror‘s wife was a lawyer.  
(Id. at p. 190.)  The trial court, after hearing argument, said only:  ― ‗That‘s five, 
five by the People‘ ‖ — a reference to the number of jurors the prosecutor had 
struck, including the juror who was the subject of the defendant‘s Batson motion, 
 
22 
 
and an implicit ruling that the strike would be allowed.  (Id. at p. 199)  The Second 
Circuit held that this statement made it ―evident that the trial judge did not 
discredit or find unpersuasive the prosecution‘s race-neutral explanations‖ and 
thus constituted ―a succinct but adequate Batson ruling‖ entitled to ― ‗great 
deference.‘ ‖  (Id. at pp. 199, 200.)  Messiah postdates Miller-El and continues to 
be followed after Snyder.  (See, e.g., Meikle v. Dzurenda (D.Conn. Jan. 17, 2009, 
No. 3:05-CV-742) 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11883, at pp. *10–*12; Perez v. Smith 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) 791 F.Supp.2d 291, 308–310; cf. Dolphy v. Mantello (2d Cir. 
2009) 552 F.3d 236, 239 [adhering to Messiah but declining to defer to the trial 
court‘s Batson ruling where the trial court ―seemed to assume that a race-neutral 
explanation (Batson step two) was decisive and sufficient‖ (italics added)].) 
State v. Angelo, supra, 197 P.3d 337, which postdates Snyder, provides 
another example of this approach.  In Angelo, the prosecutor struck three black 
jurors because, as the prosecutor subsequently explained, one had previously 
served on a hung jury, another was familiar with the scene of the crime and had a 
brother who had been arrested for drug distribution, and the third had an 
― ‗unfavorable disposition‘ ‖ and had frowned when the prosecution mentioned 
― ‗certain aspects of the case.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 347.)  The trial court observed that it 
had ― ‗not detected a pattern of racial[ly motivated] strikes‘ ‖ and then rejected the 
defendant‘s Batson motion.  (Id. at pp. 346–347.)  With respect to the first two 
jurors, the trial court said only:  ― ‗And so far [the prosecutor] has stated race 
neutral reasons for striking juror number 8 and 31.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 347.)  With respect 
to the third juror, the trial court said:  ― ‗The Court is going to find that again that 
[the prosecutor] has stated a race neutral reason for striking that particular 
juror . . . .‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  Later, the trial court told defense counsel that the ― ‗Batson 
challenge [was] noted for the record‘ ‖ and was ― ‗overruled.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  On 
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court had failed to perform the analysis 
 
23 
 
required at Batson‘s third step.  The Kansas Supreme Court ―acknowledge[d] the 
record does not reflect a clearly articulated identification of the third step.‖  (Ibid.)  
But, emphasizing that the trial court had heard the prosecution‘s proffered reasons 
and the defense‘s responses, the high court concluded that ―the trial court 
considered this information and impliedly held [the defendant] failed to prove that 
the State‘s reasons were pretextual and that he therefore failed in his ultimate 
burden to prove purposeful discrimination.‖  (Id. at p. 348.) 
 
These latter decisions, among others, take the view that even when a trial 
court does not make explicit its reasons for rejecting a defendant‘s Batson claim, a 
reviewing court may presume that the trial court engaged in a Batson step three 
analysis sufficient to determine whether the prosecution had actually discriminated 
on the basis of race, and thus the trial court‘s denial of the claim should be 
accorded deference.  (See also Stevens v. Epps (5th Cir. 2010) 618 F.3d 489, 499 
[holding Mississippi Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly 
established federal law in concluding that trial court had implicitly credited 
prosecution‘s stated reason when rejecting Batson challenge]; State v. Sparks (La. 
2011) 68 So.3d 435, 474–475; People v. Robinson (Colo.Ct.App. 2008) 187 P.3d 
1166, 1173–1174.) 
B. 
This court has aligned itself with the latter approach.  Although we have 
said that deference to a trial court‘s Batson ruling is appropriate only when the 
trial court ―makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory 
justifications offered‖ (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864), our cases 
clearly hold that a trial court need not ―make explicit and detailed findings for the 
record in every instance in which the court determines to credit a prosecutor‘s 
demeanor-based reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge‖ so long as the 
reasons are not inherently implausible and are supported by the record.  (People v. 
 
24 
 
Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 929; see People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 
385–386.)  Applying this approach, which predates Miller-El, today‘s opinion 
accords the trial court‘s Batson rulings ―their usual deference‖ (maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 25) and affirms those rulings upon combing the record for evidence that might 
support the prosecutor‘s explanations for the strikes (id. at pp. 27–40).  The court 
does this even though the trial judge made no explicit findings and engaged in no 
explicit analysis regarding the validity of the prosecutor‘s proffered reasons, and 
even though the trial judge acknowledged her inability to make such findings as to 
at least two and most likely three of the five black women whom the prosecutor 
struck.  As explained below, the court errs.  Deference is unwarranted because 
here, as in cases like Rutledge and Coombs (see ante, at pp. 16–18), a reviewing 
court cannot conclude on this record that the trial court actually performed the 
thorough inquiry at Batson‘s third step required by Snyder and Miller-El.  
When a prosecutor relies on a juror‘s demeanor to justify a peremptory 
strike, the trial court, having observed the proceedings, is ordinarily in a better 
position than an appellate court to determine whether the prosecutor‘s reason is 
valid.  Here, however, the trial court made clear that it did not recall the demeanor 
of prospective jurors R.P. or R.J.  The trial judge stated on the record that she had 
―stopped making marks after a point‖ during voir dire and thus ―couldn‘t say 
anything‖ about either R.P.‘s or R.J.‘s demeanor.  In addition, the trial court‘s 
comments suggest that it was unable to make any findings regarding the demeanor 
of prospective juror P.C., one of the first three black women struck.  When the 
defense made its Batson/Wheeler motion after the first three black women were 
struck, the trial court observed that it had notes on ―some‖ of them.  P.C.‘s voir 
dire had taken place after the voir dire of R.P. — in other words, after the ―point‖ 
at which the trial court had ―stopped making marks.‖  In all likelihood, the reason 
the trial court said it had marks on ―some‖ but not all of the first three black 
 
25 
 
women jurors struck was that it had no notes on P.C.  Even if a trial court does not 
necessarily err any time it cannot or does not make an independent finding 
regarding a juror‘s demeanor after the prosecutor proffers a demeanor-based 
explanation (see Haynes, supra, 559 U.S. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 1173]), it is 
beyond cavil that absent such a finding, there is no basis in the record for a 
reviewing court to accord deference to the trial court‘s customary advantage in 
evaluating the juror‘s demeanor.  (See Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 479.) 
Nor is there any basis for concluding that the trial court in this case 
carefully examined other relevant considerations in assessing the validity of the 
prosecutor‘s proffered explanations.  Only with prospective juror R.P. did the trial 
court ever consult the transcript of the voir dire proceedings to determine if there 
was support for the prosecutor‘s claim that the stricken jurors had expressed 
reluctance to impose the death penalty.  And consulting the transcript resulted in 
the prosecutor admitting that his perception of R.P.‘s reluctance ―clearly‖ wasn‘t 
supported by ―the words that are written down.‖  Because the trial court said it had 
taken notes on ―some‖ of the first three black women struck, it presumably had 
some basis to assess the validity of the prosecutor‘s explanation without 
consulting the voir dire transcript.  But the trial court had no such notes on R.J. 
and, in all likelihood, no such notes on P.C.  With regard to P.C., it is a fair 
inference that the trial court did not recall her demeanor or her responses; with 
regard to R.J., the trial court explicitly said ―I don‘t recall her responses at all.‖  In 
this respect, the trial court was in a worse position than this court to evaluate the 
prosecutor‘s stated reasons, for we have before us the record of voir dire and can 
evaluate whether the prospective jurors said what the prosecutor claimed they said. 
The sole advantage the trial court had in this case was the opportunity to 
observe the prosecutor‘s demeanor.  The prosecutor‘s demeanor in explaining a 
strike is certainly a relevant factor at Batson‘s third step.  (See Haynes, supra, 559 
 
26 
 
U.S. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 1175]; Snyder, supra, 522 U.S. at p. 477.)  But the 
trial court here did not make any explicit finding regarding the prosecutor‘s 
demeanor, and there is no reason to think the trial judge accepted the prosecutor‘s 
explanations because she implicitly found his demeanor to be credible rather than 
because his explanations for striking the black women jurors fit her own 
preconceptions about the ability of black women to impose the death penalty.  
(See post, at pp. 24–25.)  Moreover, even if the trial court had made a finding as to 
the prosecutor‘s demeanor, it is questionable how much weight such a finding 
would have at the third step of the Batson analysis under the circumstances in this 
case.  A trial judge‘s statement to the effect that ―I am unable to independently 
evaluate the prosecutor‘s explanation, so I can only go by what the prosecutor is 
saying but he looks honest to me‖ provides little reason for a reviewing court to 
defer to the trial court‘s Batson ruling.  The important fact remains that the trial 
court did not provide any indication that it actually conducted the thorough and 
careful inquiry required at Batson‘s third step to determine whether the 
prosecutor‘s strikes were impermissibly discriminatory.  (See Rutledge, supra, 648 
F.3d at p. 559 [―if there is nothing in the record reflecting the trial court‘s decision, 
then there is nothing to which we can defer‖].) 
Finally, if any additional reason were needed for why a reviewing court 
cannot defer to the trial court‘s Batson rulings in this case, it is the following:  
While stating that she could not ―say anything‖ regarding some of the black 
female jurors struck by the prosecution, the trial judge observed that in her 
experience ―black women are very reluctant to impose the death penalty.‖  This is 
precisely the sort of reliance on racial and gender stereotypes that Batson is 
intended to eliminate.  Prospective minority jurors may not be excluded from jury 
service based upon ―assumptions [ ] which arise solely from the jurors‘ race‖ or 
gender.  (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98; see J.E.B., supra, 511 U.S. at pp. 141–
 
27 
 
142.)  The fact that the trial judge engaged in such race- and gender-based 
speculation in the course of ruling on the validity of the prosecutor‘s strike — 
speculation that the judge went on to justify by saying ―I have seen this before and 
I can understand why‖ — leads to the obvious concern that the trial judge accepted 
the prosecutor‘s explanations precisely because she believed ―black women are 
very reluctant to impose the death penalty.‖  Although the trial judge subsequently 
backpedaled and said ―I am not making my ruling based on that,‖ it is, to put it 
bluntly, pretty hard to unring that bell.  Why would the trial judge have offered 
this observation in the first place unless she thought it was relevant to whether the 
prosecutor had properly removed five black women from the venire?  For this 
reason as well as the others discussed above, the trial court‘s Batson rulings are 
not entitled to deference on appeal. 
In sum, when a trial court fails to make explicit findings or to provide any 
on-the-record analysis of the prosecution‘s stated reasons for a strike, a reviewing 
court has no assurance that the trial court has properly examined ―all of the 
circumstances that bear upon the issue‖ of purposeful discrimination.  (Snyder, 
supra, 552 U.S. at p. 478.)  When a trial court has not made clear that it conducted 
the analysis necessary to determine whether a strike was motivated by race or 
gender, an appellate court should not treat its ruling as though it had.  The problem 
with doing so is illustrated by this case:  Because the trial court does not appear to 
have conducted a proper Batson step three inquiry, and because this court has 
limited its review to a deferential search of the record for any evidence that might 
support the trial court‘s Batson rulings, no court — trial or appellate — has yet 
performed the careful analysis required by Snyder and Miller-El to determine 
whether it was more likely than not that the prosecutor‘s strikes of five black 
female jurors were discriminatory.  A proper analysis at Batson‘s third step reveals 
strong evidence of purposeful discrimination, as I now explain. 
 
28 
 
IV. 
In conducting this analysis, I focus on R.P. and R.J., two jurors for whom 
the trial court had no notes and thus no basis for independently evaluating the 
prosecutor‘s explanations.  Upon reviewing the record, I conclude that it was more 
likely than not that the prosecutor‘s challenges of R.P. and R.J. were based upon 
impermissible discrimination.  This conclusion follows from the prosecutor‘s 
pattern of strikes against black women, the vagueness of the prosecutor‘s 
explanations for striking these jurors, and other facts in the record that support an 
inference of discrimination. 
A. 
The trial judge properly found that the prosecutor‘s pattern of strikes 
against black female jurors raised an inference of racial discrimination, and the 
fact that the prosecutor ended up striking five of the six black women seated in the 
jury box is of course relevant to the ultimate question of whether one or more 
strikes were in fact motivated by discrimination.  (See Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 
at p. 241 [― ‗Happenstance is unlikely to produce this disparity.‘ ‖].) 
The court emphasizes that the jury ultimately included one black woman.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 40–41.)  But the fact that the prosecution allowed a single 
black woman to remain on the jury does little to negate the inference that the 
prosecutor‘s prior strikes were discriminatory.  As the prosecutor explained after 
having struck the fifth black woman in the venire (R.J.), he was worried about 
―making a Wheeler motion‖ and ―offending the blacks on the jury.‖  The 
prosecutor‘s failure to strike a sixth black female juror is therefore hardly 
surprising and not especially probative of his motivations in striking the prior five.  
As the high court observed when considering a comparable situation in Miller-El:  
―This late-stage decision to accept a black panel member . . . does not . . . 
neutralize the early-stage decision to challenge a comparable venireman . . . .  In 
 
29 
 
fact, if the prosecutors were going to accept any black juror to obscure the 
otherwise consistent pattern of opposition to seating one, the time to do so was 
getting late.‖  (Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 250.) 
Other relevant circumstances support an inference of discrimination.  The 
racial overtones of this trial, in which a black man was charged with capital 
murder, were apparent to all those present in the courtroom.  For example, the trial 
judge mentioned the Rodney King case and asked prospective jurors whether it 
would affect their ability to impartially listen to testimony by a police officer.  The 
prosecutor, speaking to the entire venire after striking the fifth black woman, said 
it was not a ―mystery‖ that every time he struck ―a female black‖ the trial court 
held a hearing, and he insisted the strikes were not racially motivated.  
Notwithstanding his protestations of good faith, it is clear that the prosecutor was 
quite cognizant of the race of the jurors he struck, and he was also aware that the 
principal defense witness was going to be a black woman. 
Moreover, the prosecutor explicitly acknowledged that race had played a 
role in his exercise of peremptory challenges.  At the close of jury selection, the 
prosecutor indicated for the record that he had used his last peremptory challenges 
to strike ―white jurors‖ and that he had done so in part because he ―wanted a 
greater mix of racial diversification on [the] jury.‖   My colleagues say these 
comments ―do not appear to . . . show that [the prosecutor] discriminated against 
African-American women jurors.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 40.)  But the fact that the 
prosecutor consciously selected some jurors on the basis of race reasonably 
supports an inference that his strikes of the five black female jurors were informed 
by similar considerations. 
B. 
The reasons given by the prosecutor to explain his strikes warrant 
particularly close scrutiny and provide good cause to doubt their validity.  The fact 
 
30 
 
that the prosecutor apparently believed that every single one of the first five black 
women in the jury box should be struck for precisely the same reason is itself 
cause for suspicion.  This suspicion is heightened by the vagueness and generality 
of the prosecutor‘s stated explanations.  He described his concerns regarding each 
of these five prospective jurors in almost exactly the same way, saying that their 
responses and demeanor had led him to believe they would be reluctant to impose 
the death penalty.  Only once, when he invoked R.P.‘s statements regarding the 
deterrent value of the death penalty, did he attempt to refer specifically to a 
response that any of these jurors had given in their questionnaires or during voir 
dire — and in that case, as noted, the prosecutor ended up admitting that R.P.‘s 
statements did not support his belief that she would be reluctant to impose the 
death penalty. 
The prosecutor‘s vague references to the jurors‘ demeanor are especially 
suspect.  With respect to the first three challenged jurors, he said ―their reluctance 
to impose it was evident not only from the answers that they gave but from the 
time that it took them to respond to the question, their general demeanor in 
answering the questions and my impression from each of them.‖  He added that it 
was his ―general impression from their answers that in spite of what they said they 
wouldn‘t have the ability to impose it.‖  With respect to R.P., the prosecutor said:  
―It was my general impression from the way she answered questions, not what she 
said.‖  And with respect to R.J., the prosecutor said:  ―It is my impression not only 
from her answers to the questions but her demeanor and the fashion in which she 
answered them . . . .  I don‘t know how to exactly express it for the record. . . .  
But sometimes you get a feel for a person.‖  The prosecutor did not point to a 
single specific aspect of R.P‘s or R.J.‘s demeanor that supported his belief.  The 
prosecutor did not say, for example, that either juror had paused before answering 
 
31 
 
a particular question, had failed to make eye contact, or had appeared nervous or 
upset. 
An attorney may rely on a juror‘s demeanor in justifying a peremptory 
strike, but demeanor-based reasons warrant careful scrutiny.  ―Nonverbal conduct 
or demeanor, often elusive and always subject to interpretation, may well mask a 
race-based strike.  For that reason, trial courts must carefully examine such 
rationales.‖  (Davis v. Fisk Electric Co. (Tex. 2008) 268 S.W.3d 508, 518; see 
Smith v. U.S. (D.C. 2009) 966 A.2d 367, 383; Commonwealth v. Maldonado 
(Mass. 2003) 788 N.E.2d 968, 973; State v. McFadden (Mo. 2007) 216 S.W.3d 
673, 676 fn. 17; Raphael & Ungarvsky (1993) Excuses, Excuses: Neutral 
Explanations under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 229, 246 
[studying all published cases applying Batson in the first five years after that 
decision and concluding:  ―A juror‘s demeanor is an extremely frequent neutral 
explanation in our study.  It is also the most subjective type of explanation and 
thus, the easiest and most likely pretext for striking black jurors.‖].)  Careful 
scrutiny is especially appropriate where, as here, the prosecutor‘s descriptions of 
the jurors‘ purported demeanor are entirely non-specific.  (See Brown v. Kelly (2d 
Cir. 1992) 973 F.2d 116, 121.) 
In this respect, the prosecutor‘s explanation for striking R.P. is particularly 
questionable.  The prosecutor, after reviewing R.P.‘s voir dire transcript, 
disclaimed any reliance on R.P.‘s responses and then rested his explanation on the 
following general assertion regarding R.P.‘s demeanor:  ―It was my general 
impression from the way she answered questions, not what she said.‖  This 
proffered reason is the sort of vague and conclusory explanation for a peremptory 
challenge that is particularly susceptible to masking improper discrimination.  If 
the prosecutor had some valid basis for this strike, one would expect him to have 
been able to articulate it.  ―It is true that peremptories are often the subjects of 
 
32 
 
instinct, [citation], and it can sometimes be hard to say what the reason is.  But 
when illegitimate grounds like race are in issue, a prosecutor simply has got to 
state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons 
he gives.‖  (Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 252.)  ― ‗Clearly the most vulnerable 
reasons are those based on hunches and intuitions.‘ ‖ (Caldwell v. Maloney (1st 
Cir. 1998) 159 F.3d 639, 651; see also U.S. v. Bentley-Smith (5th Cir. 1993) 2 F.3d 
1368, 1375 [―An attorney who claims that he or she struck a potential juror 
because of intuition alone, without articulating a specific factual basis such as 
occupation[,] family background, or even eye contact or attentiveness, is more 
vulnerable to the inference that the reason proffered is a proxy for race.‖].)   
C. 
There is ample reason to believe that this ―vulnerable‖ explanation for the 
strike of R.P., along with those given for the prosecutor‘s strike of R.J., in fact 
masked an improper discriminatory purpose.  Examination of these jurors‘ 
responses in their questionnaires and during voir dire demonstrates that the 
prosecutor lacked any firm basis for believing they would have been reluctant to 
impose the death penalty, which further strengthens the inference of purposeful 
discrimination in this case.   
Today‘s opinion examines the record and reaches the opposite conclusion.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 27 [―We conclude that the record supports the prosecutor‘s 
stated reasons for exercising the peremptory challenges.‖].)  But the court does not 
perform the careful analysis required by and demonstrated in Snyder and Miller-
El.  Instead of thoroughly examining the record to determine whether it was more 
likely than not that the prosecutor struck one or more of the five black female 
jurors based on purposeful discrimination, the court merely scours the record for 
statements by the struck jurors that might support the prosecutor‘s explanations 
(even though the prosecutor did not specifically rely on any of the statements that 
 
33 
 
the court cites) and dismisses in a footnote the comparable statements made by 
other jurors.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 27–37, 38–40 & fn. 22.) 
The court‘s analysis reflects the erroneously deferential standard that it 
applies in reviewing the trial court‘s Batson rulings.  (See ante, at pp. 15, 22.)  It 
also appears to reflect the court‘s understanding of the ―inherent limitations‖ of 
comparative juror analysis.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 38.)  To be sure, ― ‗[a] transcript 
will show that the panelists have similar answers: it cannot convey the different 
ways in which those answers were given.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  But here the cold transcript is 
what we must examine because the trial court did not make any findings regarding 
the ― ‗different ways in which . . . answers were given‘ ‖ by R.P. or R.J.  Although 
―retrospective comparisons of jurors based on a cold appellate record may be very 
misleading‖ when the ―alleged similarities‖ between the struck jurors and seated 
jurors were not explored in the trial court (Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 483), that 
is not the case here.  The reason given by the prosecutor for striking R.P. and R.J. 
had to do with a personal characteristic — an individual‘s ability to impose the 
death penalty — that had been the central focus of the lengthy jury selection 
process conducted to that point.  Because the ―shared characteristic . . . was 
thoroughly explored by the trial court‖ and by the parties, it provides a relatively 
strong basis for concluding that jurors who appeared to be similar were in fact 
―comparable.‖  (Ibid.)  As detailed below, comparative juror analysis casts 
significant doubt on the prosecutor‘s stated reasons for striking R.P. and R.J. 
1. 
 
As the court acknowledges, R.P.‘s questionnaire ―generally indicated a 
willingness to impose the death penalty.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 30.)  She wrote 
that the death penalty is ―sometimes necessary,‖ that it is not imposed too often in 
this state, and that California should have the death penalty because ―more people 
would think before committing a serious crime.‖  She believed that the death 
 
34 
 
penalty‘s purpose is to be ―a deterrent to crime.‖  She also indicated that crime 
was a ―very serious‖ problem and that she would like to be a juror in this capital 
case.   
 
Contrary to the court‘s contention, R.P.‘s voir dire answers did not suggest 
that she was any less willing to impose the death penalty than her questionnaire 
responses showed her to be.  R.P. said she would be able to follow the law and 
could impose the death penalty.  When asked whether she could vote to put 
defendant himself to death, she answered:  ―I feel I could.‖ 
 
In its search for any hint of reluctance, the court focuses entirely on an 
exchange with the prosecutor in which R.P said the death penalty would serve as a 
deterrent to some people when imposed in some cases.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 30–
31.)   As R.P. put it during voir dire:  ―Sometimes it would and sometimes it 
would not.  With some people it would and with some people it would not.‖  
Instead of demonstrating R.P.‘s reluctance to impose the death penalty, these 
comments simply show that R.P. understood the concept of deterrence.  Few if any 
people would seriously contend that imposing the death penalty in a given case 
will deter all potential future criminals who might otherwise commit similar 
crimes.  The fact that R.P. had not seriously considered how or when the death 
penalty might serve such a deterrent purpose has little bearing on her ability to 
impose it.  Indeed, having claimed that he struck R.P. because of her reluctance to 
vote for the death penalty, the prosecutor admitted after reviewing R.P.‘s voir dire 
transcript that any reluctance he perceived ―clearly [wasn‘t] from the words that 
are written down.‖ 
 
A number of other jurors whom the prosecution allowed to remain on the 
jury expressed similar views.  ―If, indeed, [R.P.‘s] thoughts on [deterrence] did 
make the prosecutor uneasy, he should have worried about a number of . . . panel 
 
35 
 
members he accepted with no evident reservations.‖  (Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at 
p. 244.)  
 
Most of seated juror B.H.‘s questionnaire answers regarding the death 
penalty were almost identical to those of R.P.  He wrote that the death penalty is 
―necessary sometimes,‖ that California should have the death penalty ―to deter 
would-be criminals,‖ and that the purpose of the death penalty was to be a 
―deterant [sic].‖  But he also said the death penalty would be inappropriate in 
cases where the defendant could be rehabilitated, writing:  ―Some people can be 
rehabilitated.  Death penalty should not apply to those.‖  He elaborated during voir 
dire:  ―I do believe in rehabilitation, I believe in that, that some people can be 
rehabilitated.  I also believe that some people can‘t.  So based on that kind of 
thinking that would allow me to go along with the death penalty in certain kinds of 
circumstances, and I don‘t have any canned ideas of what the circumstances would 
be.  I would try to deal with it on a case by case basis.‖  When asked during voir 
dire whether he would vote for death, B.H. responded:  ―Never having done it 
before I believe I could.  Without having that experience, you know, it‘s kind of a 
hard thing to say, yeah, I definitely will, but I believe that I could do that if that‘s 
what I felt was necessary.‖  This response is arguably more, and certainly not less, 
equivocal than R.P.‘s succinct and direct response to the same question (―I feel I 
could‖). 
 
Seated juror W.J. also gave responses that suggested at least as much 
reluctance to impose the death penalty as did those of R.P.  In his questionnaire, 
W.J. wrote that life imprisonment was a more severe punishment than the death 
penalty, and he explained during voir dire:  ―[L]ife imprisonment, I think would 
just let the person, you know, just see how they really mess up, you know.  I 
believe it would just be over with.‖  These comments led the prosecutor to express 
―concern‖ that W.J. would impose ―life in prison without the possibility of parole 
 
36 
 
because [he thought] that‘s worse than the death penalty.‖  When asked by the 
prosecutor whether he would be able to ―return the death penalty‖ if he came to 
the conclusion that it was ―the appropriate verdict,‖ W.J. responded:  ―Yes, I think 
so.‖  After the prosecutor slightly rephrased the question, W.J. responded:  ―If that 
was the appropriate thing.‖  These less than firm responses apparently were 
sufficient to dispel the prosecution‘s ―concern‖ with respect to W.J.‘s ability to 
impose the death penalty. 
 
Seated juror W.C. also appears to have given the prosecution at least as 
much cause for concern as R.P.  On his questionnaire, W.C. indicated that he did 
not know whether he would refuse to find the defendant guilty of first degree 
murder in order to avoid the issue of the death penalty.  He also circled ―no‖ in 
response to a question asking whether, if the trial reached the penalty phase, he 
―would automatically, in every case, regardless of the evidence, vote for the death 
penalty,‖ but circled ―don‘t know‖ in response to the question asking whether he 
would ―regardless of the evidence, vote for life in prison without the possibility of 
parole.‖  By contrast, R.P. answered ―no‖ to both questions.  During voir dire, 
when asked by defense counsel where on the spectrum he was between someone 
who would never impose the death penalty and someone who would impose it on 
all murderers, W.C. responded:  ―Probably split down the middle.  I would want to 
hear all the circumstances and the evidence to determine, you know, if it was 
appropriate.‖ 
 
Finally, alternate juror D.V.‘s views on the death penalty were somewhat 
equivocal.  He wrote on his questionnaire and repeatedly stated in voir dire that he 
was ―neither for nor against it.‖  D.V. was definitive, however, in his belief that 
the death penalty was not a deterrent.  When asked by the prosecutor, ―Do you 
think the death penalty serves any deterrent value at all?‖ D.V. simply responded:  
―No.‖   
 
37 
 
2. 
The record similarly belies the prosecutor‘s stated reasons for striking 
prospective juror R.J.  As an initial matter, the court offers an implausible reading 
of the record when it suggests that the prosecutor, in striking R.J., likely believed 
it was striking D.J., another black woman with the same last name.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 34–37.)  It is true that during the hearing on a motion for new trial that 
occurred 15 months after jury selection, the prosecutor mistakenly referred to D.J. 
in explaining his strike of R.J.  Such a mistake is understandable, as the jury 
selection process was no longer fresh in the parties‘ minds, and at that point they 
had before them only the written record of the proceedings.   
But there is no reason to think that the prosecution had made this same 
mistake 15 months earlier.  R.J. was more than 25 years older than D.J., a 
significant difference that the prosecutor would have recognized when making 
peremptory challenges with all prospective jurors sitting before him in the 
courtroom.  Moreover, if the prosecutor had actually believed that R.J. was D.J., 
he would have proceeded very differently.  As the court observes, D.J. was 
emphatic in her opposition to the death penalty.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 36–37.)  
She wrote on her questionnaire, ―I‘m against the death penalty,‖ and repeatedly 
suggested during voir dire that she would choose life without the possibility of 
parole over the death penalty no matter what evidence was presented at the penalty 
phase.  During voir dire, the prosecutor said to her, ―Clearly you don‘t believe in 
the death penalty,‖ and she responded, ―Right.‖  For these reasons, the prosecutor 
made a motion to challenge her for cause, which the trial court denied only after 
prompting D.J. to affirm that she could impose the death penalty ―if she felt the 
penalty was appropriate.‖  Had the prosecutor believed that D.J. rather than R.J. 
was sitting in the jury box, in all likelihood he would have challenged her as soon 
as he could instead of accepting three panels on which she was seated.  He also 
 
38 
 
would have given a different explanation for this strike.  As noted, the prosecutor 
explained that he struck this juror because he did not believe she would be able to 
impose the death penalty, but that he did not ―know how to exactly express it for 
the record.‖  He further explained:  ―[S]ometimes you get a feel for a person that 
you just know that they can‘t impose it based upon the nature of the way that they 
something.‖  Had he believed he was striking D.J. instead of R.J., he would have 
had no such difficulty describing his perception.  He would have cited D.J.‘s 
statements that she was against the death penalty, that she did not believe in it, and 
that she would choose life without the possibility of parole over the death penalty.  
Certainly, he would have mentioned that he had previously challenged D.J. for 
cause based on her inability to impose the death penalty.  The fact that the 
prosecutor gave none of these obvious explanations confirms that he understood 
he was striking R.J. 
 
There is little basis in the record to support the prosecutor‘s explanation for 
this strike.  As the court admits, ―R.J.‘s written questionnaire generally expressed 
support for the death penalty.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 33.)  She indicated that the 
death penalty was not imposed too often, that she believed that this state should 
have capital punishment, and that she would like to serve as a juror in this capital 
case.  She wrote that the death penalty is justified:  ―So that perpetrators and 
victims‘ families & friends could end experiences with finality.  To let the 
punishment fit the crime.‖  Her answers at voir dire confirmed her willingness to 
impose the death penalty.  She answered ―Yes, I would‖ when asked whether she 
would have the ability to return a death verdict if it was warranted. 
The court concludes that some of R.J.‘s questionnaire responses ―contained 
qualifying language that can reasonably interpreted as showing equivocation or 
hesitation.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 33.)  But the court cites a number of responses 
that either display no such ―equivocation or hesitation‖ or fail to distinguish her 
 
39 
 
from other jurors who were permitted to serve.  In the course of explaining why 
she believed that California should have the death penalty, R.J. said ― ‗the penalty 
would be somewhat of a solace to the friends, family of the victim.‘ ‖  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 33, italics added by maj.)  The court does not explain how R.J.‘s slight 
qualification of the degree to which the penalty would provide solace to the 
victim‘s family constituted a qualification of her support for the death penalty or 
her willingness to impose it.  Few would argue that the execution of a victim‘s 
killer would provide complete consolation for the victim‘s family or friends.   
 
The court also observes that R.J. circled ― ‗agree somewhat‘ ‖ (maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 33) in response to the statement:  ―Anyone who intentionally kills 
another person without legal justification, and not in self-defense, should receive 
the death penalty.‖  The other available choices were ―strongly agree,‖ ―strongly 
disagree,‖ or ―disagree somewhat.‖  As R.J. explained, she did not ―strongly agree 
or disagree‖ with the statement, so ―somewhat comes closest to any answer I could 
give at this point.‖  It is difficult to see why the court believes this response 
showed R.J.‘s hesitancy to impose the death penalty.  Among the available 
options, ―agree somewhat‖ was the answer that both demonstrated support for the 
death penalty and comports with California‘s capital punishment scheme, which 
does not provide that anyone who intentionally kills without legal justification will 
be sentenced to death.  (See Pen. Code, §§ 190.2, 190.3.)  Perhaps more 
importantly, it was also the answer circled by six of the 12 seated jurors. 
The court also relies on the fact that R.J. indicated on her questionnaire that 
she did not know whether life in prison was a more severe punishment than the 
death penalty.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 33–34.)   Even if this answer suggests 
reluctance to impose the death penalty, it did not distinguish her from a number of 
seated jurors, four of whom also circled ―not sure‖ in response to this question and 
 
40 
 
another three of whom indicated that they believed that life imprisonment was 
actually a more severe punishment than the death penalty. 
 
Finally, as with R.P., the court relies on R.J.‘s comments regarding the 
deterrent value of the death penalty.  On her questionnaire, R.J. wrote:  ―Capital 
punishment has never been a deterrent to crime but it is necessary in our society 
because so many people think it is.‖  During voir dire, defense counsel asked her 
to elaborate on this statement, and she responded:  ―Oh, there is no elaboration on 
it.  I just don‘t think that it is a deterrent to crime and that is based on the fact that 
there are so many people in jail for capital crimes.‖  R.J.‘s statements regarding 
deterrence provide little basis to question her willingness to impose the death 
penalty, especially since R.J. made clear her belief that capital punishment ―is 
necessary in our society‖ even if it does not deter crime.  That these comments 
were not cause for concern is further evidenced by the fact that the prosecutor 
never questioned R.J. regarding her beliefs about the deterrent value of the death 
penalty.  In light of her expressed ―support for the death penalty, we expect the 
prosecutor would have cleared up any misunderstanding by asking further 
questions before getting to the point of exercising a strike.‖  (Miller-El, supra, 454 
U.S. at p. 244.) 
Comments made by other prospective jurors whom the prosecutor did not 
strike provided a stronger basis to infer reluctance.  As noted, seated juror B.H. 
said the death penalty should not be imposed on those who could be rehabilitated.  
When asked if he personally could vote to impose the death penalty, his response 
was more equivocal than R.J.‘s straightforward answer to the same question 
(―Yes, I would‖).  Similarly, the record provides no reason to think that R.J. was 
any more hesitant than seated jurors W.J. and W.C., whose reservations about the 
death penalty have been discussed above.  And if R.J.‘s beliefs about the deterrent 
value of the death penalty were such a particular cause for concern, one would 
 
41 
 
have expected the prosecutor to have challenged alternate juror D.V., who flatly 
denied that the death penalty ―serves any deterrent value at all.‖ 
D. 
In sum, a strong inference of purposeful discrimination arises from the 
pattern of the prosecutor‘s strikes of the first five black women in the jury box, 
from the uniformity, vagueness, and generality of the prosecutor‘s explanations, 
and from the questionnaire and voir dire responses of prospective jurors R.P. and 
R.J. considered by themselves and  
 
42 
 
in comparison with the responses of seated jurors.  Any residual uncertainty about 
this conclusion attributable to a void in the record concerning R.P.‘s and R.J.‘s 
demeanor can hardly be construed against defendant when neither the trial court 
nor the prosecutor made a single specific observation about either juror‘s 
demeanor in support of the prosecutor‘s demeanor-based reason for his strikes.  
Because the void cannot be addressed by a remand more than two decades after 
the trial, defendant‘s conviction must be reversed.  (See Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at 
p. 486.) 
This court has put itself on the wrong side of a split among federal and state 
courts on how to treat a trial court‘s denial of a defendant‘s Batson motion when 
the trial court has not made clear on the record that it considered all relevant 
circumstances bearing on the issue of purposeful discrimination in jury selection.  
A summary, unexplained denial in a case such as this does not indicate that the 
trial court understood and fulfilled its obligation to conduct the Batson inquiry 
with the degree of thoroughness and care demonstrated and required by Snyder 
and Miller-El.  Under this court‘s approach, a Batson claim may be rejected even 
though no court, trial or appellate, has ever conducted a proper Batson step three 
analysis.  In this case, such an analysis shows that with respect to at least two of 
the five black women struck, it was more likely than not that the prosecutor‘s 
strikes were impermissibly discriminatory.  Thus, the jury that convicted 
defendant and sentenced to him to death was selected in a manner that violates the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Williams 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S030553 
Date Filed: May 6, 2013 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Madge S. Watai 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Daniel N. Abrahamson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Bill Lockyer and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Pamela C. Hamanaka and Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorneys General, 
John R. Gorey, Jamie L. Fuster and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Daniel N. Abrahamson 
918 Parker St., Bldg. A21 
Berkeley, CA  94710 
(510) 229-5212 
 
Stephanie A. Miyoshi 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-8784