Case Title: Ricketts v. Ricketts

Citation: 393 Md. 479

Docket Number: 136/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ricketts v. Ricketts, No. 136, September Term, 2003.  Opinion by Bell, C.J.
FAMILY LAW - LIMITED DIVORCE - CONSTRUCTIVE DESERTION - CUSTODY
A complaint for a limited divorce alleging constructive desertion based on lack of marital
relations may be maintained when both parties continue to live under the same roof, albeit
not in the same bedroom and without cohabitation.  Moreover, in such a circumstance, a
complaint for custody and visitation of the parties’ children may be maintained.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 136
September Term, 2003
______________________________________
ROBERT M. RICKETTS, JR.
v.
MARY C. RICKETTS
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
        
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
           
  
                            
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
______________________________________
  
Filed:   July 28, 2006
1 By the phrase “live under the same roof,” we mean that the parties are technically
living together but are not cohabitating, sharing the same bedroom or engaging in marital
relations.  “Cohabitation,” we have explained, describes a relationship of living together
“as man and wife,” and connotes the mutual assumption of the duties and obligations
associated with marriage. Gordon v. Gordon, 342 Md. 294, 308, 675 A.2d 540, 547
(1996).   See Black's Law Dictionary 260 (6th ed.1990) (citations omitted) (“[t]o live
together as husband and wife. The mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties and
obligations which are usually manifested by married people, including but not necessarily
dependent on sexual relations.”). 
The issues presented by this case are: first, whether a spouse’s complaint for a limited
divorce alleging constructive desertion based on lack of marital relations may be maintained
when both parties continue to live under the same roof, albeit not in the same bedroom and
without cohabitation; and, second, whether, notwithstanding the parties’ continued living
under the same roof,1 a complaint for custody and visitation of the parties’ children may be
maintained. We shall hold that, under these circumstances, all of the relief sought by the
complaint is available to a complainant and, therefore, the complaint in this case should not
have been dismissed.
I.
The appellant, Robert M. Ricketts, Jr. (sometimes, “the appellant” or “Mr. Ricketts”),
and Mary C. Ricketts, the appellee (sometimes, “the appellee” or “Mrs. Ricketts”), were
married on June 13, 1981 and that union produced three children: Robert III, now
emancipated and, thus, not subject to this Court’s jurisdiction, Kathryn, who was born in
2Maryland Rule 2-322 provides:
“(b) Permissive. The following defenses may be made by motion to dismiss
filed before the answer, if an answer is required: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (3) failure to join a party under Rule 2-211, (4) discharge in
bankruptcy, and (5) governmental immunity. If not so made, these defenses
and objections may be made in the answer, or in any other appropriate
manner after answer is filed.”
3Although not entirely clear, it does not appear that Mrs. Ricketts is alleging that
she and Mr. Ricketts, in addition to living under the same roof, have cohabited, i.e., lived
together as husband and wife.  Even had she done so, however, it would not affect the
result in this case.  That is so because this case must be resolved on the pleadings. 
Therefore, it simply is not required that we resolve the facts.   Whether the parties
cohabited, or not, is clearly a question of fact.
2
1987 and is emancipated, and Lawrence, who was born in 1989.  It is unclear from the record
when the parties’ relationship began to deteriorate, but at some point, according to Mr.
Ricketts, Mrs. Ricketts “forced [him] out of the bedroom, thus terminating their marital
relationship.” Since that time, he alleges, the parties have not had marital relations, although
they have continued to reside in the marital household with their children, albeit in separate
bedrooms. 
On July 16, 2002, Mr. Ricketts filed a complaint seeking a limited divorce  and
custody of their two minor children.  He alleged, as grounds for the divorce, constructive
desertion, offering in support, Mrs. Ricketts’s alleged denial of marital relations.  On October
16, 2002, Mrs. Ricketts filed a Motion to Dismiss,2 arguing that because the parties continued
to live under the same roof, had not separated and, therefore, were not living separate and
apart,3 Mr. Ricketts’s complaint for divorce was “fatally defective” and, thus, “must be
4We do not construe the appellant’s use of the term, “together,” to be an admission
that he and Mrs. Ricketts were  cohabiting, although that may appear to be the
connotation.
5Before enactment of the Family Law Article, see Acts 1984, ch. 296, § 2, eff. Oct.
1, 1984, a limited divorce was denominated a divorce a mensa et thoro.  See Md. Code
(1957) Art. 16, § 25.  That section provided:
“Divorces a mensa et thoro may be decreed for the following cases, to wit:
First, cruelty of treatment; secondly, excessive vicious conduct; thirdly,
abandonment and desertion; and the court may decree such divorces
3
dismissed.” She made the same argument with regards to Mr. Ricketts’s complaint for
custody, stating that it too was “fatally defective ... because the parties had not separated and
were not living apart at the time of the filing of the Complaint.”  Responding to the
appellee’s motion, the appellant admitted that the parties were still living together in the same
house, under the same roof,4 but stated that this did not affect the validity of his complaint
or the availability of the relief sought, i.e. limited divorce and custody.
The Circuit Court for Carroll County held a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss and the
Response to the Motion to Dismiss.  The court granted the appellee’s Motion to Dismiss,
without explanation.
Mr. Ricketts timely noted an appeal of the judgment dismissing his complaint to the
Court of Special Appeals.   While the case was pending in that court and prior to any
proceedings, this Court, on its own initiative, issued the writ of certiorari. Ricketts v.
Ricketts, 380 Md. 230, 844 A.2d 427 (2004).
II.
 A limited divorce,5 which may be decreed for a limited or an indefinite period, Md.
forever, or for a limited time; and in all cases where divorce a mensa et
thoro is decreed, it may be revoked at any time thereafter by the court
granting the same, upon joint application of the parties to be discharged
from the operation of the decree; and the court may decree a divorce a
mensa et thoro in cases where a divorce a vinculo matrimonii is prayed, it
the causes proved to be sufficient to entitle the party to the same; and in all
cases where a divorce is decreed, the court passing the same shall have full
power to award the wife such property or estate as she had when married, or
the value of the same, or of such part thereof as may have been sold or
converted by the husband, having regard to the circumstances of the
husband at the time of the divorce, or such part of any such property as the
court may deem reasonable; and shall also have power in all cases in which
the care and custody of the children of parties forms part of the relief prayed
whether a divorce a divorce is decreed or denied to order and direct who
shall have the guardianship and custody of the children pendente lite or
permanently, and be charged with their support and relation to the children”
A divorce a mensa et thoro has been defined by Black's Law Dictionary 431 (5th ed.1979)
as a “partial or qualified divorce, by  which the parties are separated and forbidden to live
or cohabit together, without affecting the marriage itself.”  The 8th Edition notes that “a
mensa et thoro” is derived from the Latin, “from board and hearth,” thus, such a divorce
is the forerunner of the judicial separation, “A partial or qualified divorce by which the
parties were separated and allowed or ordered to live apart, but remained technically
married.”
4
Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 7-102 (c) is “one from bed and board. It grants unto the
injured spouse the right to live separate and apart from the one at fault. However, the parties
remain man and wife, and there is no severance of the marital bonds.” Courson v. Courson,
213 Md. 183, 188, 129 A.2d 917, 920 (1957). See Thomas v. Thomas, 294 Md. 605, 609,
618, 451 A.2d 1215, 1217, 1222 (1982), noting, in addition, that “[t]his Court has said that
‘a divorce a mensa et thoro is practically nothing more than judicial permission to live
separate and apart,’” quoting  Dougherty v. Dougherty, 187 Md. 21, 31, 48 A.2d 451 (1946).
6Prior to enactment of the Family Law Article, the term used to refer to an absolute
divorce was “a vinculo matrimonii.” See Art. 16, § 24 (as pertinent, “Upon a hearing of
any bill for a divorce, the court may decree a divorce a vinculo matrimonii for the
following causes ....”).   A divorce a vinculo matrimonii has been defined as “[a] total
divorce of husband and wife, dissolving the marriage tie and releasing the parties wholly
from their matrimonial obligations.”   Black’s Law Dictionary, Divorce, (8th Ed. 2004). 
See Crise v. Smith, 150 Md. 322, 326, 133 A. 110, 111(1926) (divorce a vinculo
matrimonii ends all rights of either spouse dependent on marriage); Millar v. Millar, 200
Md. 14, 21, 87 A.2d 838, 841 (1952) (noting that the former spouses became tenants in
common as result of Maryland law operating on their changed status); Reed v. Reed, 72
A. 414, 415 (1909); Tyson v. Tyson, 54 Md. 35, 37-38(1880).
7Md. Code (1957, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 7-102(a) of the Family Law Article
provides:
“(a) Grounds for limited divorce – The court may decree a limited divorce
on the following grounds:
“(1) cruelty of treatment of the complaining party or of a minor child
of the complaining party;
“(2) excessively vicious conduct to the complaining party or
to a minor child of the complaining party;
“(3) desertion; or
“(4) voluntary separation, if:
“(i) the parties are living separate and apart without
cohabitation; and
“(ii) there is no reasonable expectation of
reconciliation.”
5
This is in contrast to an absolute divorce,6 which effects  a complete severance of the marital
bond and entitles either of the parties, or both, to remarry.  Crise v. Smith, 150 Md. 322, 326,
133 A. 110, 111 (1926) (divorce a vinculo matrimonii ends all rights of either spouse
dependent on marriage).  See also Black’s Law Dictionary, Divorce, (8th Ed. 2004), equating
an absolute divorce with a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. 
Among the grounds for a limited divorce is desertion.  Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl.
Vol.), § 7-102(a) (3) of the Family Law Article.7   Desertion may be constructive or actual.
 
6
See, e.g., Walker v. Walker, 209 Md. 428, 431, 121 A.2d 195, 198 (1956). We have defined
actual desertion as 
“the voluntary separation of one of the married parties from the other, or the
refusal to renew suspended cohabitation, without justification either in the
consent or the wrongful conduct of the other party... [Furthermore,] the
separation and intention to abandon must concur, and desertion does not exist
without the presence of both. The two need not begin at the same time, but
desertion begins whenever to either one the other is added.”
Boyd v. Boyd, 177 Md. 687, 688, 11 A.2d 461, 464 (1940) (citations omitted).  
What is required to constitute constructive desertion was addressed in Scheinin v.
Scheinin, 200 Md. 282, 89 A.2d 609 (1952).  In that case, we said
“It is accepted that any conduct of a husband that renders the marital relation
intolerable and compels the wife to leave him may justify a divorce on the
ground of constructive desertion, even though the conduct may not justify a
divorce on the ground of cruelty. Sullivan v. Sullivan, [199 Md. 594, 600], 87
A.2d 604, 607 [(1952)]. Any misconduct of the husband will justify the wife
in leaving him when it makes it impossible for her to live with him without
loss of her health or self-respect, or gives her reasonable apprehension of
bodily injury. If the husband's misconduct has been such as to render
continuance of the marriage relation unbearable, justifying the wife in leaving
him, he is the one who is guilty of desertion. Polley v. Polley, 128 Md. 60,
[66,] 97 A. 526, [529 (1916)]; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 158 Md. 80, 90, 148 A.
259[, 262-63 (1930)]; Singewald v. Singewald, 165 Md. 136, [147,]166 A.
441[, 446 (1933)]; Kline v. Kline, 179 Md. 10, [13,] 16 A.2d 924[, 925
(1940)]; Fischer v. Fischer, 182 Md. 281, [286,] 34 A.2d 455[, 457 (1943)];
Hockman v. Hockman, 184 Md. 473, [478,] 41 A.2d 510[, 513 (1945)]; Miller
v. Miller, 185 Md. 79, [82,] 42 A.2d 915[, 917 (1945)]; Bradshaw v.
Bradshaw, 189 Md. 322, [325,] 55 A.2d 719[, 720 (1947)]; Gold v. Gold, 191
Md. 533, 539, 62 A.2d 540[, 543 (1948)].” 
7
Id. at 290, 89 A.2d at 612-13.  See Murphy v. Murphy, 248 Md. 455, 460, 237 A.2d 523,
525-526 (1968); Ballan v. Ballan, 251 Md. 737, 740-743, 248 A.2d 871, 872 (1969), both
cited by Deckman v. Deckman, 15 Md. App. 553, 560, 292 A.2d 112, 115-116 (1972), for
the proposition that it is constructive desertion when the misconduct of one spouse “makes
it impossible for the other to continue to live with the erring spouse without loss of his or her
health, or self respect or gives reasonable apprehension of bodily injury will justify the
innocent spouse in leaving the other on the grounds of ‘constructive desertion.’”   Unlike
actual desertion, where it is the party deserted who has the cause for divorce, in instances of
constructive desertion, it is the departing party who has the cause of action for divorce.
To be sure, both actual desertion and constructive desertion generally require that one
of the spouses physically leave the marital home. We have held, however, that constructive
desertion may occur where both parties continue to live under the same roof.  In Scheinin,
we were emphatic and clear:
“It is beyond question that there may be a desertion although the husband and
wife continue to live under the same roof.  For desertion, as applied to husband
and wife, signifies something more than merely ceasing to live together. It
means ceasing to live together as husband and wife.”
Id., at 290-91, 89 A.2d at 613.  See  Mower v. Mower, 209 Md. 413, 417, 121 A.2d 185, 186-
187 (1956); Kelsey v. Kelsey, 186 Md. 324, 326, 46 A.2d 627, 628 (1946); Dotterweich v.
Dotterweich, 174 Md. 697, 200 A. 523, 523-524 (1938); Fries v. Fries, 166 Md. 604, 607-
608, 171 A. 703, 704 (1934); Klein v. Klein, 146 Md. 27, 33, 125 A. 728, 730 (1924); Roth
v. Roth, 145 Md. 74, 125 A. 556 (1924); Fleegle v. Fleegle, 136 Md. 630, 633, 110 A. 889,
8
890 (1920).  We have explained: 
“the true doctrine is believed to be that the statutory term ‘desertion,’ as
applied to husband and wife, means a cessation of the marital relation; and this
doctrine is in accord with the general principles of the divorce law...
[d]esertion implies something more than merely ceasing to cohabit or live
together; for, as applied to husband and wife, it means the ceasing to live
together as husband and wife.” 
Fleegle, 136 Md. at 634, 110 A. at 890. See also Crumlick v. Crumlick, 164 Md. 381, 381,
165 A. 189, 189 (1933). Thus, “it is unquestionably the law in this State that permanent
refusal of either the husband or the wife to have sexual intercourse with the other spouse,
from no consideration of health or other good reason, constitutes matrimonial desertion
although the parties continue to live in the same house.” Mower v. Mower, 209 Md. 413,
417, 121 A.2d 185, 186-187 (1956) (citations omitted).  The fact that the spouses sleep in
separate bedrooms or that they have ceased engaging in sexual relations does not per se
establish constructive desertion, however.  Whitehurst v. Whitehurst, 257 Md. 685, 690, 264
A.2d 822, 825 (1970); Parsons v. Parsons, 255 Md. 602, 604, 258 A.2d 437, 438 (1969);
Fortman v. Fortman, 250 Md. 355, 360, 243 A.2d 517, 520 (1968); Jones v. Jones, 186 Md.
312, 314, 46 A.2d 617, 618 (1946) ; Wysocki v. Wysocki, 185 Md. 38, 41, 42 A.2d 909, 910
(1945); Ruckle v. Ruckle, 141 Md. 207, 214, 118 A. 472, 474 (1922).  Additionally, when
a husband and wife continue to live together without marital relations and yet neither makes
any effort towards reconciliation, it is presumed that both spouses prefer to live under such
circumstances, and, therefore, neither has a cause for divorce on the grounds of constructive
desertion. Davey v. Davey, 202 Md. 428, 432, 96 A.2d 606, 608 (1953). 
8To the extent that Mrs. Ricketts disputes the appellant’s allegations that they are
not living together as husband and wife or that she forced him from the marital bed or that
she wished to terminate the marriage, having rebuffed his attempts at reconciliation, that
does not change the focus of the analysis.  As we shall see, although the appellant will not
be relieved of his obligation to prove the allegations he makes, the appellee’s
disagreement with those allegations does not determine the adequacy of the complaint.
9
In the instant case, it is alleged by the appellant that Mrs. Ricketts denied him marital
relations and forced him from the marital bedroom. Under Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl.
Vol.), § 7-102(a) (3) of the Family Law Article and, pursuant to the aforementioned case law,
if those allegations are established, the appellant is able to prove that they are true, Mr.
Ricketts has cause for a limited divorce, notwithstanding that he and Mrs. Ricketts are still
living under the same roof, those allegations, and the necessary inferences, may sufficiently
establish, for pleading purposes, constructive desertion.  
To be sure, as we have seen, Mrs. Ricketts disputes Mr. Ricketts’s entitlement to a
limited divorce on the grounds of constructive desertion.  It is her view and position that
there is a “fatal flaw” in the appellant’s allegations.  That flaw is, she submits, the allegation
that the parties are living under the same roof, not, therefore, separate and apart.8
Constructive desertion, the appellee contends, in other words, may only be established when
the parties are living separate and apart, that, in the absence of separation, there is no ground
for divorce on that ground.  Accordingly, her motion to dismiss. 
This is thus an appeal from a judgment granting a motion to dismiss.   As we made
clear in Afamefune ex rel. Afamefune v. Suburban Hosp., Inc. 385 Md. 677, 683, n. 4, 870
10
A.2d 592, 595 n. 4 (2005), 
“A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the sufficiency of the
pleadings. Md. Rule 2-322(b)(2); see Converge Services Group, LLC v.
Curran, 383 Md. 462, 475, 860 A.2d 871, 878-79 (2004) ( ‘consideration of
the universe of “facts” pertinent to the court’s analysis of the motion are
limited generally to the four corners of the complaint and its incorporated
supporting exhibits, if any’); Paul V. Niemeyer & Linda M. Schuett, Maryland
Rules Commentary, 206 (3d ed.2003) (‘[t]he object of the motion is to argue
that as a matter of law relief cannot be granted on the facts alleged’).”
Thus, when reviewing the grant of such a motion, a court  “must assume the truth of all well-
pled facts in the complaint as well as the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those
relevant and material facts.”  Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 374 Md. 402, 414, 823 A.2d 590,
597 (2003) (indicating that the we accept all well-pled facts in the complaint, and reasonable
inferences drawn from them, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party).  See Benson
v. State, 389 Md. 615, 626, 887 A.2d 525, 531 (2005);  Bobo v. State, 356 Md. 706, 707-708,
697 A.2d 1371, 1372-1373 (1997);  Allied Invest. Corp. v. Jasen, 354 Md. 547, 555, 731
A.2d 957, 961 (1999) (reviewing motions to dismiss, trial and appellate courts “assume the
truth of all well-pleaded, relevant, and material facts in the complaint and any reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom.”); Bennett Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 342
Md. 169, 674 A.2d 534 (1996) (“the facts to be [considered are] those that are well pleaded
by the plaintiffs, including those facts that may fairly be inferred from the matters expressly
alleged”); Board of Education v. Browning, 333 Md. 281, 286, 635 A.2d 373, 376 (1994) (in
evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court “must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and
allegations in the complaint”); A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 333 Md.
11
245, 249, 634 A.2d 1330, 1332 (1994) ( “the truth of all well-pleaded relevant and material
facts as well as all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom” must be assumed).
Dismissal is proper only if the alleged facts and permissible inferences, so viewed, would,
if proven, nonetheless fail to afford relief to the plaintiff. Allied Invest. Corp. v. Jasen, 354
Md. at 555, 731 A.2d at 961;  Bobo v. State, 346 Md. at 709, 697 A.2d at 1373;  Morris v.
Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 531, 667 A.2d 624, 630 (1995). “On appeal, a
reviewing court must determine whether the trial court was legally correct, examining solely
the sufficiency of the pleading.”  Benson v. State, 389 Md. at 626, 887 A.2d at 531.
There is no contention by the appellee that the allegations made by the appellant, and
the permissible inferences drawable therefrom, are not material or relevant or that they
involve  trivial matters.   Nor is there any contention made that the allegations are not well-
pled.   Accordingly, viewing the well-pled allegations and the permissible inferences as true
and in the light most favorable to the appellant, the appellant’s complaint should not have
been dismissed.   The trial court erred in doing so.   
The appellant does, however, have the burden of proving the facts he has alleged,
Owings v. Owings, 148 Md. 124, 128 A. 748, 749 (1925); Lent v. Lent, 202 Md. 240, 244-
245, 96 A.2d 14, 16 (1953), as well as of introducing evidence of his attempt to renew
marital relations and of Mrs. Ricketts’s intent to end the marriage, Moran v. Moran, 219 Md.
399, 149 A.2d 399 (1959), and must also properly corroborate his allegations. Md. Code
(1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 7-101(b) of the Family Law Article.
9Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.) § 1-201 of the Family Law Article, as relevant,
provides:
“(a) In general. An equity court has jurisdiction over:
*     *     *     *
“(4) divorce;
“(5) custody or guardianship of a child except for a child who
is under the jurisdiction of any juvenile court and who
previously has been adjudicated to be a child in need of
assistance;
“(6) visitation of a child;
“(9) support of a child.
*     *     *     *
“(b) In exercising its jurisdiction over the custody, guardianship, visitation,
or support of a child, an equity court may:
“(1) direct who shall have the custody or guardianship of a
child, pendente lite or permanently;
“(2) determine who shall have visitation rights to a child;
“(3) decide who shall be charged with the support of the
child, pendente lite or permanently.”
Its predecessor provision, repealed and re-codified as a part of Code Revision, see Acts
1984, c. 296, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1984, was Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol., 1983
Cum Supp.) § 3-602 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 
12
III. 
It is undisputed that the Circuit Court has jurisdiction to determine the custody and
support of children and establish the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent.  Md. Code
(1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.) § 1-201 of the Family Law Article.9   And that jurisdiction exists
without regard to whether one of the parties has been granted, or is entitled to, a limited
divorce. See Koger v. Koger, 217 Md. 372, 376, 142 A.2d 599, 601 (1958) (noting that Md.
Code (1957), Art. 16, § 25 made it plain that the Chancellor must retain jurisdiction for the
purpose of deciding custody, when custody is prayed, even where a divorce is denied);  Smith
10Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, § 80 then provided:
“The several equity courts of this State shall have original jurisdiction in all
cases relating to the custody or guardianship of children and may on bill or
petition filed by father or mother or relative or next of kin or next friend of
any child or children to direct who shall have the custody or guardianship of
such child or children, and who shall be charged with his, her or their
support and maintenance, and may from time to time thereafter annul, vary
or modify its decree or order in relating to such child or children.”
This provision was originally enacted in 1920.  See Acts of 1920, ch. 573.  At that time,
Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, § 39 provided that “in all cases where a divorce is decreed, the
court passing the same shall have full power to award to the wife such property or estate
as she had when married, or the value of the same, or of such part thereof as may have
been sold or converted by the husband, having regard to the circumstances of the husband
at the time of the divorce, or such part of any such property as the court may deem
reasonable; and shall also have power to order and direct who shall have the guardianship
and custody of the children, and be charged with their support and maintenance, and may
at any time thereafter annul, vary or modify such order in relation to the children.”  By
Acts of 1920, ch. 574, that provision was amended to provide that the equity courts “shall
also have power, in all cases in which the care and custody of the children of parties
forms [sic] part of the relief prayed, whether a divorce is decreed or denied.”  Hood v.
Hood, 138 Md. 355, 363, 113 A. 895, 898 (1921).  In Hood, this quotation is cited as Md.
Code (1924), Art. 16, § 38, as opposed to the correct section, § 39.
13
v. Smith, 216 Md. 141, 145, 140 A.2d 58, 60 (1958); Mower, 209 Md. at 419, 121 A.2d at
187; Sause v. Sause, 192 Md. 88, 93, 63 A.2d 632, 634 (1949); Stirn v. Stirn, 183 Md. 59,
64, 36 A.2d 695, 697-698 (1944); Crumlick v. Crumlick, 164 Md. 381, 387-388,165 A. 189,
192 (1933); Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 145 A. 614 (1929); Hill v. Hill, 79 Md. App.
708, 711-12, 558 A.2d 1231, 1233 (1989).  Indeed, prior to the amendment of the statute in
1929, the issue in this case would appear to have been decided.  In Barnard, supra, referring
to Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, § 80,10 this Court observed:
11Acts of 1929, ch. 561 provided:
“The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their minor child
and are equally charged with its care, nurture, welfare and education. They
shall have equal powers and duties, and neither parent has any right superior
to the right of the other concerning the child's custody.   If either the father
or mother dies, or abandons his or her family, or is incapable of acting, the
guardianship devolves upon the other parent.  Where the parents live apart,
the court may award the guardianship of the child to either of them.” 
Md. Code (1924) Art. 72A, § 1, at which the provision was codified, was amended by
Acts of 1951, ch. 678, by striking the word “equally” and charging the parents, “jointly
and severally,” not only with the care, nurture, welfare, and education of their minor
child, but also with its “support.”  Thus, § 5-203 (b), the successor to Art. 72A, § 1, now
provides:
“(b) The parents of a minor child ...:
“(1) are jointly and severally responsible for the child’s
support, care, nurture, welfare, and education; and
“(2) have the same powers and duties in relation to the child.”
14
“From this language it will be seen that courts of equity in this state have full
power, and it is their duty, to determine who shall have the custody, control
and guardianship of minor children, and who shall be charged with their
maintenance and support, when applied to by any of the persons mentioned in
the statute; and this without regard to the question of whether or not the
parents of said child or children have been divorced or are living apart.” 
Id., at 267, 145 A. at 615.  
Pertinent to the issue of parental custody over minor children, a provision addressing
the subject was added to the Maryland Code in 1929.   In addition to acknowledging and
mandating that “[t]he father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their minor child”
and charging them equally with its support, care, nurture, welfare and education, Acts of
1929, ch. 56111 provided, with respect to the award of custody to a parent, that “[w]here the
12This section addresses only the issue of the custody of the minor child or
children, not support or visitation.   Custody, however, is the threshold: until there is an
award of custody, there ordinarily is no need or occasion to consider or decide the
ancillary and dependent issues of support and visitation.
15
parents live apart, the court may award the guardianship of the child to either of them.” 
Captioned, “Parent and Child,” it was effective June 1, 1929 and was codified at Md. Code
(1924) Article 72A, § 1.   As a result of Code Revision, the applicable section now is § 5-203
of the Family Law Article, having been re-codified without substantive change, Acts of 1986,
ch. 65; Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 301 n. 9, 508 A. 2d 964, 969 n. 9 (1986).   As
pertinent to the issue this case presents for decision, § 5-203 (d)12 provides: 
“(d)(1) If the parents live apart, a court may award custody of a minor
child to either parent or joint custody to both parents.
“(2) Neither parent is presumed to have any right to custody that is
superior to the right of the other parent.”
It is the fact that § 5-203(d)(1) uses the proviso, “if the parties live apart,” when
addressing a court’s award of custody to a parent that is at the heart of the appellee’s
argument and, apparently, was the basis for the Circuit Court’s decision to dismiss the
appellant’s complaint for custody.   The appellee thus argues that this introductory proviso
limits the court’s power to award custody to one parent over the other  to those situations in
which the parents are living apart, i.e those in which they are actually separated and not
living under the same roof.    She maintains this position notwithstanding  § 1-201 and its
clear and simple, though general, statement of the court’s jurisdiction in parent-to-parent
16
custody matters.   
The appellant sees the matter quite differently.   He submits, on the contrary,  that §
1-201 does more than simply describe the court’s jurisdiction; it instead is a grant of power,
imbuing the courts with the responsibility to determine custody, visitation, and support
regardless of whether the parents are divorced or physically separated.   He relies on this
Court’s cases, decided both before and after the passage of  Acts of 1929, ch. 561, reviewing
the Circuit Courts’ decisions with respect to parental custody where the parents were still
living under the same roof.   
The appellant has the better of the argument.
As we have seen, it cannot be doubted that the fact that the parties are living under the
same roof, have not physically separated, is not, alone, sufficient to justify the court in
refusing to grant either party a divorce.   On the contrary, as we have also seen, this Court
has held, see Kelsey, 186 Md.  at 326, 46 A.2d at 628:
“Abandonment, within the contemplation of the divorce statute means
something more than merely ceasing to live together; it means a cessation of
the marital relation. Thus we recognize that a desertion may exist although the
husband and wife live under the same roof.”
If a divorce may be decreed when the parties are living under the same roof, it would make
no sense, indeed, it would be illogical, to deny the court the right to determine the custody,
and support of the children of that marriage and, to the extent required, establish visitation
with respect to them.   
To be sure, § 5-203 (d) (1) unmistakably contains the requirement that “the parents
17
live apart” as a condition of the court awarding custody to either parent.   And, viewing the
statute in this context, as a self contained unit, that condition is both clear and unambiguous.
It is well settled that when that is the case, we give effect to the words of the statute as
written, we do not seek meaning or intent from any other source.   Where, in other words, a
statute is clear and unambiguous, logic will not substitute for, or trump, the clarity of the
words.   Stanley v. State,  390 Md. 175, 182, 887 A.2d 1078, 1082 (2005); Gillespie v. State,
370 Md. 219, 222, 804 A.2d 426, 427 (2002); Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429, 701 A.2d
419, 421 (1997). 
Section 5-203 (d) (1) may not be read in isolation, however.  Adventist Health Care
Inc. v. Maryland Health Care Comm’n, 392 Md. 103, 125 n. 13, 896 A.2d 320, 333 n. 13
(2006), citing Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004); Navarro-Monzo
v. Washington Adventist, 380 Md. 195, 204, 844 A.2d 406, 411 (2004).   It must be read in
light of, and in conjunction with, the court’s jurisdiction in divorce and custody matters, §
1-201 (a) and (b), the relationship between divorce and custody, as defined by this Court, see
Barnard v. Godfrey, supra, 157 Md. at 267, 145 A. at 615-616,  and the applicable grounds
for divorce.  § 7-102 (a). Waddell v. Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52, 60, 626 A.2d 353, 357 (1993)
(“the Legislature is presumed to be aware of the interpretation that this Court has placed
upon its enactments”); see Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 257, 808 A.2d
795, 803 (2002); Blevins v. Baltimore County, 352 Md. 620, 642, 724 A.2d 22, 33 (1999).
In Barnard, just months before the enactment of the predecessor legislation to § 5-203
18
(a), requiring “living apart” as a condition for the award of custody to one parent over the
other, we construed the then applicable statute as empowering the equity courts, whenever
application for that relief was sought by one or both parents, to determine custody, support
and visitation “without regard to the question of whether or not the parents of said child or
children have been divorced or are living apart.” 157 Md. at 167, 145 A. 2d at 615 (emphasis
added).    We also acknowledged that section “as declaratory of the inherent power of courts
of equity over minors, and [that] in the exercise thereof it should be exercised with the
paramount purpose in view of securing the welfare and promoting the best interest of the
children.”   Id.  The Legislature did not disturb the courts’ right to determine custody, support
or visitation when a divorce was not decreed, even though, when it enacted Acts of 1929, ch.
561, it knew that it was the law that parties living under the same roof could be divorced.
Klein v. Klein, 146 Md. 27, 33, 125 A. 728, 730 (1924); Roth  v. Roth, 145 Md. 74, 125 A.
556 (1924).    
When so viewed, rather than clear and unambiguous, the phrase is ambiguous.
Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 689, 861 A.2d 727, 730 (2004); Gardner v. State, 344 Md.
642, 648, 689 A.2d 610, 613 (1997)(“[s]tatutes that are clear when viewed separately may
well be ambiguous where their application in a given situation, or when they operate
together, is not clear.”). See also Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 508, 667 A.2d
617, 619 (1995) (construing contract terms); Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69,
74, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986) (same).  Given the purpose of the courts’ power over minors,
19
to promote their best interest, and the connection between custody decisions and divorce, the
logic of the result the legislation will effect may be considered when trying to discern the
Legislature’s intent.  
This approach is consistent with the Court’s decision in 
Scheinin v. Scheinin, 200 Md.
282, 89 A.2d 609 (1952). There, Mrs. Scheinin filed a complaint for a divorce a mensa et
thoro, now a limited divorce pursuant to §7-102,  on the grounds of desertion and cruelty of
treatment and, in addition, alimony, for custody of the children of the marriage, support, and
counsel fees. Id. at 285, 89 A.2d at 610.  There was much dissatisfaction between Mr. and
Mrs. Scheinin.   At the center of the dissatisfaction was Mr. Scheinin’s relationship with his
secretary, which Mrs. Scheinin alleged was the cause of his abandonment and ill-treatment
of  her.    After her insistence that the secretary leave the marital home gained success, Mr.
Scheinin, she stated, treated her “with great cruelty,” spoke abusively to her, ridiculed her in
front of the children and struck her “many times.”  Subsequently, Mr. Scheinin told Mrs.
Scheinin that “he did not want to have anything more to do with her,” whereupon Mrs.
Scheinin, “in consequence of that demand,” moved to a back bedroom which she used as her
bedroom, thereafter.   She remained under the same roof with Mr. Scheinin, however, but
without co-habitation, id. at 286-287, 89 A.2d at 611, and despite Mr. Scheinin’s cruelty and
disregard.  Id.   When asked why she did not leave with her children, Mrs. Scheinin stated
that “she had no place to go.” Id. at 291, 89 A.2d at 613. 
The chancellor granted Mrs. Scheinin a limited divorce on the ground of constructive
13Appellee argues that Mower v. Mower, 209 Md. 413, 121 A.2d 185 (1956),
because the bill of complaint for divorce in that case was based on actual, not
constructive, desertion, is not completely relevant to the analysis of the case sub judice.
While it is not entirely clear from the opinion whether the ground was actual or
constructive, the court simply noted that “[c]omplainant sought a divorce on the ground
that her husband abandoned her bedroom,” Mower, 209 Md. 416, 121 A.2d at 186, we
fail to see how either scenario would make any difference in the analysis.
20
desertion and awarded her alimony, custody of the children, and child support. Id. at 290-
291, 89 A.2d at 612-613. We affirmed the decree granting Mrs. Scheinin a limited divorce,
noting that “[i]t is beyond question that there may be a desertion although the husband and
wife continue to live under the same roof.”   Without referring to Art. 75A, § 1, which then
prescribed the “living apart” requirement, but defining desertion in the marital context in
terms of “ceasing to live together as husband and wife,” id. at 290-91, 89 A. 2d at 613, the
Court also affirmed the custody and support decision, thus sanctioning the determination  of
custody and support where the parents, rather than living apart, are living under the same
roof.
  Mower v. Mower, 209 Md. 413, 121 A.2d 185 (1956), though by no means identical,
is nevertheless instructive.13 In that case, Mrs. Mower sought a limited divorce from Mr.
Mower, pendente lite alimony, custody of their child, child support, and attorney’s fees. Id. at
415, 121 A.2d at 185.  When Mrs. Mower filed for divorce and also when the case was tried,
both parties were living under the same roof, but had not had marital relations in several
years. Id. at 416, 121 A.2d at 185. Since neither party had made an effort at reconciliation,
the trial court refused to grant a divorce to either party, finding that both of them were at
21
fault, as they were content to live in a state of animosity and estrangement and that, therefore,
no desertion had occurred. Id. at 416-17, 121 A.2d at 186.   It then dismissed the bill of
complaint.   This Court agreed that neither party was entitled to a divorce, id. at 417-19, 121
A. 2d at 186-87; however, it reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Mrs. Mower’s bill of
complaint.  Id. at 419, 121 A. 2d at 187.  Referring to Art. 16, § 34, empowering the equity
courts to decide custody issues presented in a divorce action, whether a divorce is decreed
or not, the Court opined:
“Where a bill for divorce a mensa et thoro also prays for custody of a minor
child and for its support and maintenance, and the divorce is denied, the bill
should not be dismissed but custody should be awarded and jurisdiction should
be retained for the purpose of awarding support and maintenance if the
circumstances should warrant such action.”
Id. at 419-20, 121 A.2d at 188.  The record does not reflect that the parties’ living
arrangements changed during the proceedings.   Consequently,  it must be presumed that this
Court, in directing the trial court to consider the wife’s bill for custody, did so
notwithstanding that M r. and Mrs. Mower were living under the same roof. 
This result and this approach are consistent with the primacy of the interests of the
child and the courts’ paramount concern “to secure the welfare and promote the child’s best
interests.” Stancill v. Stancill, 286 Md. 530, 534-5, 408 A.2d 1030, 1033 (1979), citing
Glading v. Furman, 282 Md. 200, 383 A.2d 398 (1978); Burns v. Bines, 189 Md. 157, 162-
163, 55 A.2d 487, 489 (1947); Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 267, 145 A. 614, 615
(1929). See also Kemp v. Kemp, 287 Md. 165, 170, 411 A.2d 1028 (1980); Ross v. Hoffman,
22
280 Md. 172, 174-75, 372 A.2d 582 (1977); Krebs v. Krebs, 255 Md. 264, 266, 257 A.2d
428 (1969); Montgomery County Department of Social Services et al. v. Sanders, 38 Md.
App. 406, 381 A.2d 1154 (1977); Md. Code (1957, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 1-201 of the Family
Law Article.  The trial court, in short, whether, or not, it concludes that Mr. Ricketts is
entitled to a divorce, has the jurisdiction and power to determine the custody, visitation, and
support of the Ricketts’ children.
 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
CARROLL COUNTY REVERSED.  CASE
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT 
COURT 
FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION.   COSTS TO BE PAID
BY THE APPELLEE.