Case Title: CC Walker Grading & Hauling v. SRF Mgmt. Corp.

Citation: 316 S.E.2d 298

Docket Number: 77A84

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1984-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
316 S.E.2d 298 (1984) C.C. WALKER GRADING & HAULING, INC. v. S.R.F. MANAGEMENT CORP., a/k/a Sitting Rock Management Corp., and Helen C. Stanley, Trustee for the Benefit of the Children of John David Stanley. No. 77A84. Supreme Court of North Carolina. June 5, 1984. *301 Leigh Rodenbough, Madison, for plaintiff-appellant. John T. Weigel, Jr., Greensboro, for defendant-appellee, Helen C. Stanley, Trustee. MARTIN, Justice. Plaintiff appeals as of right, pursuant to N.C.G.S. 7A-30, from an opinion of the Court of Appeals which notes a dissent but does not include a dissenting opinion. We take this opportunity to set forth the relevant portion of an amendment to the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure adopted by this Court on 3 November 1983, effective with notices of appeal filed in the Supreme Court on and after 1 January 1984: 309 N.C. ___ (1983). The intent of this provision is to further ensure that in appeals of right based solely upon dissent, review by this Court shall be limited to those questions on which there was division in the intermediate appellate court. Such review has never been intended for claims on which that court has rendered unanimous decisions. State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 191 S.E.2d 752 (1972); Hendrix v. Alsop, 278 N.C. 549, 180 S.E.2d 802 (1971). Where an appeal of right is taken to this Court based solely on a dissent in the Court of Appeals and the dissenter does not set out the issues upon which he bases his disagreement with the majority, the appellant has no issue properly before this Court. Such appeals are subject to dismissal. Application of this procedural *302 amendment to the case at bar precludes further review by appeal of right. Nevertheless, in this case, we deem it preferable to certify for discretionary review, on our own motion, the following determinative questions: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that plaintiff was a "general contractor" within the statutory definition and that the services rendered at Sitting Rock Farms between March and June 1979 were governed by the statute? (2) If plaintiff's noncompliance with the above requirement does not bar recovery, does defendant Helen Stanley share liability with defendant S.R.F. Management Corporation for the spring 1979 improvements on the property? We answer each of these issues in the affirmative and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. With regard to the statutory provision at issue, this Court has held: Builders Supply v. Midyette, 274 N.C. 264, 270, 162 S.E.2d 507, 510-11 (1968). N.C.G.S. 87-1 (Cum.Supp.1983) defines a "general contractor" as: (Emphases ours.) One who acts as a general contractor must be licensed pursuant to N.C.G.S. 87-10 (Cum.Supp.1983), which provides, in part, as follows: N.C.G.S. 87-13 provides for a criminal penalty for violation of the licensing requirement: This Court has held that the statute must be strictly construed because of the criminal penalties imposed, and its scope may not be extended by implication beyond the meaning of the language so as to include offenses not clearly described. Vogel v. Supply Co. and Supply Co. v. Developers, Inc., 277 N.C. 119, 177 S.E.2d 273 (1970); Sand and Stone, Inc. v. King, 49 N.C.App. 168, 270 S.E.2d 580 (1980); Fulton v. Rice, 12 N.C.App. 669, 184 S.E.2d 421 (1971). Construing a statute requiring the licensing of real estate brokers and salesmen, the Court has taken care to note: McArver v. Gerukos, 265 N.C. 413, 417, 144 S.E.2d 277, 280 (1965). Defendants argue that the legislature, by the use of the words "grading or any improvement," intended to include the activities undertaken by plaintiff in this case. We do not agree. The guiding principle of statutory construction has been articulated as follows by Justice Barnhill: Watson Industries v. Shaw, Comr. of Revenue, 235 N.C. 203, 210, 69 S.E.2d 505, 511 (1952). This Court has already applied the above principle to construe the word "improvement" in N.C.G.S. 87-1 as follows: We hold, following the reasoning in Vogel, that the term "improvement" as used in N.C.G.S. 87-1 has no application to the facts in this case where the word is used with reference to land. Applying this same analysis, we further conclude that the "grading" intended for coverage by the statute and the "grading" undertaken by this plaintiff are clearly distinguishable. Construed in the context of the language of N.C.G.S. 87-1 and -10, quoted above, the word "grading" connotes an activity which is a part of, or preparatory for, work properly termed "building and construction." See generally 13 Am.Jur.2d Building and Construction Contracts § 131 (1964). Plaintiff has described his occupation as follows: These activities are best summarized as putting in pasture and are purely agricultural.[1] In its opinion, the Court of Appeals states: "The statute is equally applicable to the clearing and grading required for agricultural purposes as it is to the clearing and grading required for building purposes." 63 N.C.App. at 172, 310 S.E.2d at 616. We do not agree and decline to hold that plaintiff's activities were intended by the legislature to be subjected to the licensing requirements of Chapter 87 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. Defendant Stanley argues there was no agency relationship between her and S.R.F. Management Corporation upon which to base her liability to plaintiff and points to the following portion of C.C. Walker's deposition testimony. We note that throughout the fall of 1978 and spring of 1979, plaintiff dealt directly with neither defendant in this lawsuit in performing the services for which he seeks reimbursement. The constant and apparent source of authority was John Stanley or, at the latter's direction, Cox, the foreman. *305 After Helen's purchase of the farm, there was no noticeable change in authority. John remained "in ultimate control." Creditors who were aware of the corporate shift from Sitting Rock Farms, Inc. to S.R.F. Management Corporation were led to believe "that nothing had really changed." Helen herself, as new owner of the property, made it clear that "what he [John] says goes," expressing apparent approval and assent to the vast improvements taking place in the spring of 1979. Where, as here, the defendant specifically denies the agency relationship and argues that plaintiff had no knowledge that the alleged agent existed, is the jury thereby precluded from considering the issue? The applicable law is clear and well settled: Trollinger v. Fleer, 157 N.C. 81, 87, 72 S.E. 795, 797 (1911). Where a principal accepts the benefits of unauthorized acts of his alleged agent, with knowledge that the agent was acting on his behalf, the principal thereby ratifies such acts and is bound thereby. Trust Co. v. Gill, State Treasurer, 286 N.C. 342, 211 S.E.2d 327 (1975). Pursuant to this analysis, we find that there is ample evidence from which a jury might conclude that after 1 January 1979 John Stanley acted as agent for defendant Helen Stanley. A careful and prudent person might perceive that John had the authority to contract for the spring 1979 work on the farm or that Helen had ratified these acts. There was a direct conflict between the plaintiff and the defendant in their testimony on this question, and it is for the jury to pass upon the evidence and to find the truth of the matter. The above rule applies equally when a corporation holds out or permits a person to hold himself out as its agent. Moore v. WOOW, Inc., 253 N.C. 1, 116 S.E.2d 186 (1960). See also 19 Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 1164 (1965). Thus, a jury might find in this case that John Stanley, as president, acted to bind the S.R.F. Management Corporation in making and delivering the promissory note to plaintiff. The evidentiary facts of the lease agreement provision giving Helen, as lessor, responsibility for capital expenditures and the loan repayment agreement item wherein $60,000 was advanced to the trust for improvements to the farms are relevant to a jury determination of this issue. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to that court for further remand to the Superior Court, Rockingham County, for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. [1] Under the facts of this case, we are not faced with and do not decide the applicability of the statute to a contract for the construction of a farm dam for an amount of $30,000 or more.