Case Title: Matter of Estate of Bell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Estate of Bell1986 WY 164726 P.2d 71Case Number: 86-62, 86-63, 86-64, 86-65Decided: 08/18/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
ESTATE OF Marie J. BELL, Deceased.

John MORRIS and Norma 
Morris, Appellants, (Defendants and Crossclaim 
Defendants),

Joe Bell, et al. 
(Defendants),

v.

Joe BELL and Ray Bell 
(Counterclaim and Crossclaim Plaintiffs),

v.

The FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
& TRUST COMPANY OF WYOMING, nka Norwest Bank - Cheyenne, as Testamentary 
Trustee Under the Last Will and Testament of John H. Bell, Deceased, Appellee 
(Plaintiff),

The First National Bank 
& Trust Company of Wyoming, nka Norwest Bank - Cheyenne, as Testamentary 
Trustee of the Bell Trust under the Last Will and Testament of John H. Bell, 
Deceased; et al., Appellees (Counterclaim Defendants), First Wyoming Bank, N.A. 
- Cheyenne, as personal representative of the Estate of Floyd T. Hale, deceased, 
R.O. Corporation, and Melvin Wright, Appellees,

Mary Gergen, et al. 
(Counterclaim Defendants),

DePaul Hospital, et al. (Crossclaim 
Defendants).

In the Matter of the 
ESTATE OF Marie J. BELL, Deceased.

DePAUL HOSPITAL, Appellant, (Defendant 
and Crossclaim Defendant),

Joe Bell, et al 
(Defendants),

v.

Joe BELL and Ray Bell 
(Counterclaim and Crossclaim Plaintiffs),

v.

The FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
& TRUST COMPANY OF WYOMING, nka Norwest Bank - Cheyenne, as Testamentary 
Trustee Under the Last Will and Testament of John H. Bell, Deceased, Appellee 
(Plaintiff),

The First National Bank 
& Trust Company of Wyoming, nka Norwest Bank - Cheyenne, as Testamentary 
Trustee of the Bell Trust under the Last Will and Testament of John H. Bell, 
Deceased; et al., Appellees (Counterclaim Defendants),

First Wyoming Bank, N.A. 
- Cheyenne, as 
personal representative of the Estate of Floyd T. Hale, deceased, R.O. 
Corporation, and Melvin Wright, Appellees,

Mary Gergen, et al. 
(Counterclaim Defendants),

Mrs. Kenneth Bell, et al. 
(Crossclaim Defendants).

In the Matter of the 
ESTATE OF Marie J. BELL, Deceased.

Joe BELL and Ray Bell, 
Appellants, (Defendants, Counterclaim and Crossclaim 
Plaintiffs),

Larry Jordan, et al. 
(Defendants),

v.

The FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
& TRUST COMPANY OF WYOMING, nka Norwest Bank - Cheyenne, as Testamentary 
Trustee Under the Last Will and Testament of John H. Bell, Deceased, Appellee 
(Plaintiff),

The First National Bank 
& Trust Company of Wyoming, nka Norwest Bank - Cheyenne, as Testamentary 
Trustee of the Bell Trust under the Last Will and Testament of John H. Bell, 
Deceased; et al., Appellees (Counterclaim Defendants),

First Wyoming Bank, N.A. 
- Cheyenne, as 
personal representative of the Estate of Floyd T. Hale, deceased, R.O. 
Corporation, and Melvin Wright, Appellees,

Mary Gergen, et 
al.

(Counterclaim 
Defendants),

DePaul Hospital, et 
al.

(Crossclaim 
Defendants).

In the Matter of the 
ESTATE OF Marie J. BELL, Deceased.

ST. JOSEPH'S ORPHANAGE, 
nka St. Joseph's 
Children's Home, Appellant, (Defendant and Crossclaim 
Defendant),

Joe Bell, et al. 
(Defendants),

v.

Joe BELL and Ray Bell 
(Counterclaim and Crossclaim Plaintiffs),

v.

The FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
& TRUST COMPANY OF WYOMING, nka Norwest Bank - Cheyenne, as Testamentary 
Trustee Under the Last Will and Testament of John H. Bell, Deceased, Appellee 
(Plaintiff), The First National Bank & Trust Company of Wyoming, nka Norwest 
Bank - Cheyenne, as Testamentary Trustee of the Bell Trust under the Last Will 
and Testament of John H. Bell, Deceased; et al., Appellees (Counterclaim 
Defendants),

First Wyoming Bank, N.A. 
- Cheyenne, as 
personal representative of the Estate of Floyd T. Hale, deceased, R.O. 
Corporation, and Melvin Wright, Appellees,

Mary Gergen, et 
al.

(Counterclaim 
Defendants),

DePaul Hospital, et al. (Crossclaim 
Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

ARE NOT AN 
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

William D. 
Bagley, of Rooney, Bagley, Hickey, Evans & Statkus, Cheyenne, for appellants John N. and Norma 
Morris.

Thomas N. Long, 
of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for appellant DePaul Hosp. and John J. 
Maier, Torrington, for appellant St. 
Joseph's Orphanage, nka St. Joseph's Children's Home.

Walter M. Kelly, 
II and Phillip C. Gans, of Cogswell and Wehrle, Denver, Colo., and Vincent J. 
Horn, Jr., Cheyenne, for Joseph Bell and 
Ray Bell.

Richard P. 
Boley, of Lathrop & Uchner, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee The First Nat. Bank & 
Trust Co. of Wyoming, nka Norwest Bank - Cheyenne, as Testamentary Trustee of 
the Bell Trust Under the Last Will and Testament of John H. Bell, 
Deceased.

Frederick G. 
Loomis, of Loomis, Lazear, Wilson & Pickett, Cheyenne, for appellee The First Nat. Bank & 
Trust Company of Wyoming, nka Norwest Bank - Cheyenne, as Personal 
Representative and Testamentary Trustee of the Estate of Marie J. Bell, 
Deceased.

Stanley K. 
Hathaway and Rick A. Thompson, of Hathaway, Speight and Kunz, Cheyenne, for appellees, Estate of Floyd T. Hale, 
R.O. Corp. and Melvin Wright.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN and CARDINE, JJ., 
and GUTHRIE and RAPER, JJ., Retired.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In a complex case 
involving mutual and reciprocal wills, we are asked to examine the judgment 
rendered by the district court. Four appeals have been effected to this court 
and we have consolidated them for disposition.

[¶2.]     First National Bank and 
Trust Company of Wyoming (now Norwest Bank of Cheyenne, Wyoming, N.A., 
hereinafter Norwest) as testamentary trustee of the estate of John Bell, filed a 
declaratory action to resolve disputes concerning the interpretations of the 
wills of John H. Bell and Marie Bell. The declaratory judgment action was joined 
with the probate of the will of Marie Bell. Thereafter, various beneficiaries 
under the wills filed numerous counterclaims and cross-claims to settle their 
various legacies.

[¶3.]     Numerous issues have 
been raised by the parties on appeal. We have consolidated and condensed the 
issues into three main areas:

I

Whether the trial court 
was correct in holding the mutual, reciprocal wills of John Bell and Marie Bell 
were not made pursuant to an agreement.

II

Whether the trial court 
was correct in determining the tax apportionment issues.

III

Whether the trial court 
erred in determining the basis for the option price to be paid by John and Norma 
Morris.

[¶4.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶5.]     On November 5, 1971, 
John Bell and Marie Bell executed their wills. The wills were prepared by their 
attorney James O. Wilson. The wills were identical except for name changes, and 
were executed as separate documents. The wills do not contain any agreement or 
reference to any agreement that the wills would be irrevocable by either 
maker.

[¶6.]     John Bell and Marie 
Bell, husband and wife, were very successful ranchers and amassed a substantial 
estate consisting of several ranches and other property. The primary 
beneficiaries under the wills are John and Norma Morris. Norma Morris is the 
niece of John and Marie Bell. The Morrises worked closely with the Bells in the 
ranching operations. As a result, the Morrises were given the option of 
purchasing the John H. Bell Iron Mountain Ranch Company for fifty percent of its 
appraised value. 

[¶7.]     John Bell died on 
September 30, 1972, and his estate was probated. Under his will, all estate 
taxes were to be borne by the residuary estate. Fifty percent of the adjusted 
gross estate went to Marie Bell and the remainder was put into the Bell Trust 
for the benefit of Marie during her lifetime.

[¶8.]     Between March 25, 1974, 
and July 3, 1980, Marie Bell executed five separate codicils. The second, third 
and fourth codicils were each specifically revoked by the fifth codicil, leaving 
only the first and fifth codicils to Marie Bell's will. The codicils were also 
drafted by the Bells' attorney.

[¶9.]     Marie Bell died on 
October 16, 1983. On October 28, 1983, Norwest filed for the admission of Marie 
Bell's will and the codicils to probate. Questions were raised by various 
parties to this action about the effect of the will and subsequent codicils 
thereto. Therefore, Norwest filed an action for a declaratory judgment. 
Questions were raised regarding the validity of the codicils and whether the 
wills were executed pursuant to an agreement between John Bell and Marie Bell 
not to change their wills. Appellants Joe Bell and Ray Bell (brothers of John 
Bell), joined by John and Norma Morris, as well as DePaul Hospital and St. 
Joseph's Orphanage, contend the wills were made pursuant to an agreement. 
Appellants Joe Bell and Ray Bell also ask whether the court erred in its 
determination of the option price to be paid by John and Norma Morris for their 
legacy under the will. Further issues have been raised by DePaulHospital and St. Joseph's Orphanage regarding tax 
apportionment.

I

[¶10.]  The first issue we will address is 
whether the trial court erred in finding that appellants failed to meet their 
burden of proving the wills were executed pursuant to a binding contract or 
agreement for the distribution of the assets of the 
estate.

[¶11.]  The trial court determined that the wills 
were mutual and reciprocal. We defined the terms "joint wills," "reciprocal 
wills," and "mutual wills" in Shook v. Bell, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1320, 1321 
(1979):

"Although the courts have 
not been uniform in their use and definitions of the terms, we define `joint' 
wills, `reciprocal' wills, and `mutual' wills as follows: A `joint' will is a 
single testamentary instrument constituting or containing the wills of two or 
more persons and jointly executed by them. `Reciprocal' wills are those in which 
each of two or more testators makes a testamentary disposition in favor of the 
other. `Mutual' wills are two or more separate instruments, each executed by 
separate testators and manifesting a common intention to dispose of their 
property in a particular manner. We do 
not include as part of the definition of a mutual will, as some courts do, the 
elements of execution by each testator pursuant to an agreement, each in 
consideration of the other. 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, §§ 11.1 and 11.3; 
97 C.J.S. Wills § 1364e(1); 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 754. * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶12.]  It is important to note at the outset of 
our discussion that our definition of mutual wills does not include the element 
that such wills are made pursuant to an agreement. As noted earlier, the wills 
of John Bell and Marie Bell are identical except where differences in gender, 
relationship, or context require otherwise.

[¶13.]  Sometime after John Bell's death in 1972, 
Marie Bell became concerned with certain provisions of her will, prompting her 
to consult with her attorney, Mr. Wilson, as well as Edwin L. Patrick, trust 
administrator for Norwest. The purpose of this first codicil was explained by 
Mr. Patrick as follows:

"The First Codicil was 
probably initiated by Mr. Wilson and myself at the time that it became apparent 
that our value, our appraised value for probate purposes and the federal estate 
tax values in John Bell's Estate were going to be different figures because of 
the Internal Revenue Service's nonacceptance of the probate values for federal 
estate tax purposes. 

The words of `appraised 
value' in the wills, and it became apparent that we had to establish the intent 
of the testators and attempt to clarify which of those two values would be 
utilized in the calculation of the option price."

The first 
codicil directed that the option price paid by John and Norma Morris be based on 
the 1972 appraised values of John Bell's estate. Marie Bell also executed the 
second, third and fourth codicils later, but revoked them all when she executed 
the fifth codicil, which significantly altered the estate plan under the mutual, 
reciprocal wills.

[¶14.]  The fifth codicil changed many specific 
bequests by deleting some legatees and adding others. The debt owed on ranches 
sold to several Bell employees was forgiven under the fifth codicil, and other 
lands were devised to the employees. Furthermore, the fifth codicil set forth 
specific lands to be included in the property available to the Morrises under 
their option.

[¶15.]  One asserting the existence of a contract 
in order to recover on it has the burden of proving it. Miller v. Miller, Wyo., 
664 P.2d 39 (1983); and Black & Yates, Inc. v. Negros-Philippine Lumber Co., 
32 Wyo. 248, 231 P. 398, 37 A.L.R. 1487 (1924). One authority 
states:

"The burden of proof of a 
contract for the execution of wills containing reciprocal bequests is upon the 
party who claims under and asserts such a contract as the basis of his cause of 
action. * * *

"The burden of proof that 
wills strictly reciprocal in their provisions were executed in pursuance of a 
contract between the testators rests upon the contestant in a will contest 
wherein the ground of contest is that the propounded instrument became 
inoperative as the will of the surviving testator upon the death of the other 
testator." 79 Am.Jur.2d Wills § 803, p. 858 (1975).

[¶16.]  No one contends that there is a written 
agreement in existence whereby John Bell and Marie Bell executed their wills. 
The only evidence regarding such agreement, if any, infers a possible oral 
contract between the Bells.

[¶17.]  In the case of an oral contract, the 
party seeking to establish the existence of the contract has a heavy burden. 
Pangarova v. Nichols, Wyo., 419 P.2d 688 (1966); and Slover v. Harris, 77 Wyo. 
295, 314 P.2d 953 (1957).

"Courts accept with 
caution and examine with scrutiny evidence offered in support of a contract to 
make a disposition of property of a deceased person different from that provided 
by law. * * * A high order of proof is required to sustain such contracts, and 
the claimant is held to a strict proof thereof, and the evidence must establish 
that the minds of the parties met on definite terms." 94 C.J.S. Wills § 113(2), 
pp. 868-869 (1956).

[¶18.]  The rule in this state is that the mere 
execution of mutual, reciprocal wills does not, in and of itself, prove the 
existence of an agreement between the testators. But such an agreement may 
appear by express reference thereto in the wills, or by inference. Shook v. 
Bell, supra, at 1324.

"The fact that joint 
wills and mutual wills are usually executed as the result of a common intention 
does not in any way mean that they are always executed pursuant to a contract 
between the parties respecting the making of such wills. * * * The sole fact, 
standing alone, that two wills were executed at or near the same time and bear 
similar provisions should in no way give rise to a presumption or an inference 
that they were made pursuant to a contract." 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills § 
11.1, p. 554 (1960).

[¶19.]  In the early case of Canada v. Ihmsen, et 
al., 33 Wyo. 439, 448, 240 P. 927, 929, 43 A.L.R. 1010 (1925), this court 
stated:

"The great weight of 
authority is to the effect that mutual wills, made by separate instruments, do 
not afford sufficient evidence that the wills were made pursuant to a contract, 
and that hence, if the contract is shown at all, oral evidence is necessary. 
[Citations.] * * *"

[¶20.]  The wills of John Bell and Marie Bell 
fail to recite or make reference to such an agreement. John and Norma Morris 
testified they believed there was an agreement between the Bells. The trial 
court classified the testimony regarding the alleged terms of the agreement as 
"vague and nonspecific, as was testimony regarding the conversations upon which 
that belief was founded." In a comprehensive memorandum opinion, the trial court 
summarized the testimony regarding the alleged existence of an 
agreement:

"* * * For example on 
cross-examination by Mr. Speight, Norma Morris testified as follows beginning at 
of the transcript concerning the alleged agreement between John and Marie 
Bell:

"`Q. Is it a fair 
statement, Mrs. Morris, that the meeting of the minds that you just spoke of is 
really embodied in the two wills that were written in 
1971?'

"`A. 
Yes.'

"`Q. * * * [I]t's 
correct, is it not, that you do not recall any specific conversations wherein 
John Bell said to Marie Bell or Marie said to John, "we will not change our 
wills"?'

"`A. No, I cannot recall 
a conversation exactly like that.'

"Similarly Mr. 
Patrick, the trust administrator and John Sherman, the accountant, both 
testified that the Bells had agreed upon the common scheme or plan contained in 
the wills; however, both Mr. Patrick and Mr. Sherman were unaware of any 
irrevocable contract or agreement or reference to the same in the wills to allow 
all of the Bell property to pass as outlined in the original wills. Mr. Patrick, 
who was present when the drafted wills were read and explained the wills to John 
and Marie Bell for their approval, testified as follows:

"`Q. Okay. In summary, 
Mr. Patrick, would you say that the Bells, when they executed their wills, had a 
common plan, intent and scheme as to how to dispose of their estate? (Objection 
by counsel, overruled by the Court).'

"`A. I believe there was 
a common plan at that time, yes.'

"`Q. A common scheme, a 
common intent?'

"`A. I believe there was 
an agreement on it.'

"Later, during 
cross-examination by Mr. Hathaway, in relation to testimony, Patrick 
testified:

"`Q. Was there any 
discussion held that the wills could not be revoked but with the unanimous 
consent of Mr. and Mrs. Bell?'

"`A. There was no 
discussion that I recall at all along the lines of that.'

"`Q. Was there any 
separate written agreement saying that either Mr. or Mrs. Bell could not change 
their wills?'

"`A. There was none that 
I know of.'

"`Q. Was there anything 
written into those wills that said they could not change 
them?'

"`A. Not that I am aware 
of.'

"`Q. And you heard no 
discussion that any time prior or during execution of the wills that they were 
irrevocable?'

"`A. I recall 
none.'

"Later, also on 
cross-examination by Mr. Hathaway, with regard to the codicils executed by Marie 
Bell, Patrick stated:

"`Q. Now, with respect to 
your administration of Marie Bell's estate you carried it out entirely based 
upon the assumption that her unrevoked codicils were 
proper?'

"`A. That's 
correct.'

"`Q. And were not - did 
not violate any agreement that you had any knowledge of?'

"`A. That's 
correct.'

"`Q. And that you know of 
no written agreement preventing the codicil?'

"`A. That's 
correct.'

"John Sherman 
testified as follows on cross-examination by Mr. Bagley with regard to the 
Bells' estate planning process: 

"`Q. And did they then 
arrive at an agreement for distribution of the estate of the first of them to 
die?'

"`A. 
Yes.'

"`Q. And did they arrive 
at an agreement for distribution of the second or survivor of them to 
die?'

"`A. 
Yes.'

"`Q. And then did they 
execute the wills pursuant to those agreements?'

"`A. I believe they 
did.'

"In response to 
questions by Mr. Hathaway on cross-examination Mr. Sherman further 
testified:

"`Q. Now, you have 
testified that there was a common plan or scheme for the distribution of the 
estate; that was on the date that the November, 1971, wills were executed that 
you are speaking of?'

"`A. 
Yes.'

"`Q. On that date the 
parties arrived at how they were - what wording they were going to have in their 
wills, didn't they?'

"`A. 
Certainly.'

"`Q. Was there any 
wording in the wills that said they were - they were not - that they were 
irrevocable without the consent of the other?'

"`A. Not to my 
knowledge.'

"`Q. Were you aware of 
any written agreement to that effect?'

"`A. 
No.'

"`Q. Were you aware of 
any oral agreement to that effect?'

"`A. 
No.'

"`* * * * 
*

"`Q. So when we talk 
about a common plan, scheme, or whatever, it does not include a plan to have 
irrevocable wills, does it?'

"`A. I don't know - I 
don't know. I can't answer that, Mr. Hathaway, what they had in their 
minds.'"

[¶21.]  In our review of the record, we also are 
unable to find the existence of an agreement. It should be remembered that the 
Bells were successful ranchers with an acumen for business. The wills were 
prepared under their direction by their attorney. If the Bells had wished that 
their wills be executed pursuant to an agreement, such a provision presumably 
would have been included in the wills by express reference thereto or by 
inference.

[¶22.]  Marie Bell is not alleged to have been 
incompetent at any time pertinent to her execution of the codicils. We find the 
trial court was correct in holding that there was a failure in proving that the 
Bells executed their wills pursuant to an agreement. To hold otherwise would be 
tantamount to finding an agreement solely from the execution of mutual, 
reciprocal wills. This is not the law in this state.1

[¶23.]  In the absence of such an agreement, a 
testator has the right to alter, amend or revoke his will. Wills are ambulatory 
in nature, and testators have the inherent right to revoke them until their 
death. In the absence of a contract, there is nothing to hinder a competent 
testator from changing his will as often and in any manner as he sees fit. 
Canada v. Ihmsen, et al., supra.

II

[¶24.]  The second issue we will address is 
whether the trial court correctly determined the tax apportionment issues. 
Appellants DePaul Hospital and St. Joseph's Orphanage apparently contend that 
the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, §§ 2-10-101 through 2-10-110, W.S. 
1977 (July 1980 Replacement), should govern the apportionment of estate taxes. 
Section 2-10-103 of the act provides, "Unless the will otherwise provides, the 
tax shall be apportioned among all persons interested in the estate." (Emphasis 
added.) See, e.g., In re Hilliar's Estate, Wyo., 498 P.2d 1237 
(1972).

[¶25.]  The testamentary intent of Marie Bell was 
expressed in her will as follows:

"* * * All estate taxes, 
federal and state, imposed by reason of my death, with respect to any property 
(whether disposed of by this will or not) required to be included in my gross 
estate for estate tax purposes, and interest or penalties thereon, shall be 
borne by my residuary estate. All legacy, succession, inheritance and like taxes 
(as distinguished from estate taxes), imposed by reason of my death on any 
property (whether disposed of by this will or not), and interest to penalties 
thereon, shall be borne by my residuary estate. So far as practicable and 
reasonable, my Executors shall pay as soon as convenient after my death any of 
the taxes referred to in the preceding sentence on future or contingent 
interests."

[¶26.]  In the case of In re Ogburn's Estate, 
Wyo., 406 P.2d 655 (1965), we recognized that a testator or testatrix reserves 
the right to determine how the estate taxes shall be paid. We determined the 
purpose of the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act:

"The statute accomplishes 
three general purposes. First, it preserves the inherent and recognized right of 
a testator or testatrix to designate the fund from which such taxes are to be 
paid. Secondly, it abrogates the common-law rule that, absent such a 
designation, the burden of payment was first to be imposed upon the residuary 
estate. Thirdly, and again absent a directive in the will to the contrary, it 
apportions the tax - without regard to special or general devises and bequests - 
commensurately to those benefited by the gifts of property upon which the 
Federal tax has been imposed." Id., at 657.

[¶27.]  It is well settled that directions 
against apportionment must be expressed clearly and unambiguously. In re 
Ogburn's Estate, supra. It seems clear that Marie Bell wished the estate taxes 
to be borne by her residuary estate. However, appellants claim Items 6 and 7 of 
Marie Bell's will further complicate the questions they raise. Item 6 
provides:

"I authorize and direct 
my executors to include in the legacies provided for in Item 4 hereof sufficient 
liquid assets to pay all estate and inheritance taxes collectable with reference 
to my estate."

Item 7 
provides:

"In the event my husband 
shall not survive me, then after making the payment of debts, administrative 
expenses, bequests and taxes provided for in ITEM 2, ITEM 4(12)(a), and ITEM 6, 
hereof, I give, devise and bequeath my entire estate to the First National Bank 
and Trust Company of Wyoming, in trust under the terms and provisions of trust 
provided for in ITEM 4 hereof."

[¶28.]  Item 6 does not direct the manner of 
payment, only that sufficient funds shall be available to pay the taxes. Item 7 
determines what course of action should be followed in the event Marie Bell's 
husband predeceases her, which was the case. It does not appear that Item 7 
conflicts in any way with the tax apportionment language of Item 2. The trial 
court so held.

[¶29.]  Appellants complain that their respective 
legacies are substantially reduced by such apportionment, which runs contrary to 
the intent of Marie Bell in her original will. That is true. But we have 
previously held that Marie Bell had the right to execute the codicils changing 
the provisions of her will. These codicils substantially affected the bequests 
to DePaul Hospital and St. Joseph's Orphanage. Edwin L. Patrick testified that 
Marie Bell understood the effect of tax apportionment upon her residuary estate. 

[¶30.]  We find the trial court was correct in 
its disposition of tax apportionment under the express provisions of Marie 
Bell's will, and not according to the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment 
Act.

III

[¶31.]  The third issue we will address is 
whether the trial court erred in determining the basis for the option price to 
be paid by John and Norma Morris. Under the wills of John Bell and Marie Bell, 
the Morrises were granted an option to purchase the John H. Bell Iron Mountain 
Ranch Company for fifty percent of the appraised value. The applicable 
provisions of John Bell's will read as follows:

"ITEM 4. In the event my 
said wife survives me, I direct that from the remainder of my estate there first 
be paid all estate and inheritance taxes, and the balance thereof, I give, 
devise and bequeath to The First National Bank and Trust Company of Wyoming, in 
trust, to be known as the Bell Trust, for the uses and purposes, and with the 
powers and authority and subject to the limitations, conditions and provisions 
as follows:

"(1) To hold, manage, 
control, invest and reinvest the trust estate during the trust term, that is, 
for the life of my wife, Marie J. Bell.

"(2) To pay the entire 
net income of said trust to my wife, Marie J. Bell, in monthly or other 
convenient installments as long as she shall live.

* * * * * 
*

"(c) It is my desire, and 
that of my wife, that the real and personal property, including livestock, owned 
and held by the John H. Bell Iron Mountain Ranch Company and any contiguous real 
property or any real and personal property including livestock, owned by me but 
used in connection with the livestock and ranching operation of said 
corporation, be retained by the Trustee for not to exceed a two year period. The 
Trustee shall give and grant to John N. Morris and Norma Morris an exclusive 
option to purchase all of said property for fifty per cent (50%) of the 
appraised value of said property, including the corporate stock held by me in 
said corporation. Said option shall be exercised by the optionees prior to the 
expiration of said two year period, but in the interim period the Trustee shall 
continue to operate said ranch corporation. "Included in said option shall be 
the original Iron Mountain Ranch first acquired by my wife and me, and located 
in Townships 18 and 19 North, Ranges 70 and 71 West, in Laramie and Albany 
Counties, Wyoming, consisting of approximately 7,000 acres, together with the 
related leases to said ranch with the United States of America and the State of 
Wyoming."

[¶32.]  Marie Bell's will is identical to the 
above except for changes in gender.

[¶33.]  On March 25, 1974, Marie Bell executed 
the first codicil which expressly directed that the option price be based upon 
the valuation of the inventory and appraisement of John Bell's estate. The 
codicil reads:

"I hereby amend ITEM 4, 
paragraph 12(c) of my last Will and Testament, dated the 5th day of November 
1971, by adding the following to the first paragraph thereof, in line 25, 
following the word corporation.

"Due to the constant and 
ever increasing valuation of ranch properties, I have determined that my wishes 
and desires and that of my deceased husband, John H. Bell, may not be 
accomplished in keeping the John H. Bell, Iron Mountain Ranch Company together 
as a `working cattle ranch', unless valuation thereof is stabilized. I direct, 
therefore, that my corporate stock in said ranch company and my interest in 
contiguous real property or any real and personal property including livestock, 
owned by me but used in connection with livestock and ranching operation of said 
corporation, be appraised at the same valuation as that determined in the 
Inventory and Appraisement of the estate of John H. Bell and as set over to the 
trust established by him in his Last Will and Testament. I direct that the 
option granted John N. Morris and Norma B. Morris to purchase said ranch 
property for fifty percent (50%) of the appraised value of the ranch property, 
heretofore described and established by me in the Will, be the same as the 
values appraised in the Inventory and Appraisal of my husbands estate and as set 
over in the trust established by him in his Last Will and Testament at The First 
National Bank & Trust Company of Wyoming, Cheyenne, Wyoming, and in the same 
trust as established by me in this my Last Will and 
Testament.

"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I 
have hereunto set my hand and seal this 25th day of March 
1974."

[¶34.]  In the fifth codicil executed July 3, 
1980, Marie Bell again amended Item 4(12)(c) to add another ranch to the John H. 
Bell Iron Mountain Ranch Company to be purchased under the 
option:

"THIRD. I hereby further 
amend ITEM 4, 12(c) of my Last Will and Testament dated the 5th day of November, 
1971, as amended by the First Codicil to said Last Will and Testament, dated 
March 25, 1974, by adding an additional paragraph following the words `Last Will 
and Testament' of the Amendment to the First Codicil to the Last Will and 
Testament to read as follows:

"The reference to `the 
John H. Bell Iron Mountain Ranch Company and any contiguous real property or any 
real property owned by me but used in connection with the livestock and ranching 
operation of said corporation' is hereby amended to specifically include therein 
what is denominated by me as the Pascoe Ranch, described as 
follows:

"* * * * 
*

"I have not 
specifically described in my Will or in the Codicils thereto, nor did my husband 
in his Last Will and Testament, the lands specifically included in the John H. 
Bell Iron Mountain Ranch Company, and since the Pascoe Ranch is not immediately 
adjacent to the above described ranch company, I have made this clarification 
which will allow John N. Morris and Norma Morris the option to purchase said 
ranch described therein."

[¶35.]  As the first codicil states, the option 
price is to be based upon the 1972 appraised value of the inventory of John 
Bell's estate. The trial court so held:

"* * * Based upon the 
Court's previous rulings, it is its opinion that the first codicil to Marie 
Bell's will governs the value of these properties, dictating that the value be 
determined and appraised at the same valuation as that determined in the 
inventory and appraisement of the estate of John H. Bell. The Morris option 
allows the purchase of these properties for 50% of the appraised value. * 
*"

[¶36.]  Various other issues have also been 
raised by some of the parties which we will address briefly. In answer to 
questions raised regarding jurisdiction, it is to be remembered that the 
declaratory judgment action was joined with the probate matters, and therefore, 
the trial court had jurisdiction to decide equitable matters as well as tax and 
other issues. See, e.g., In re Estate of Lonquest, Wyo., 526 P.2d 994 (1974). 
One of the parties, in passing, raised the question regarding finality of the 
trial court's order. However, we have difficulty identifying matters not 
disposed of in the final order. Insofar as we can tell, the "Judgment and Final 
Order" entered by the court was a "final order" disposing of the claims raised 
for purposes of appellate review. Rule 1.05, Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.

[¶37.]  Questions were also raised regarding the 
property devised to Floyd Hale and the R.O. Corporation by Marie Bell in her 
fifth codicil. This property was previously owned by John Bell and Marie Bell as 
joint tenants by the entireties. The trial court properly concluded that this 
property passed to Marie Bell at the time of John Bell's death, and "* * * was 
not subject to the will of the first person to die, since that property was held 
in joint tenancy, by the entireties." Therefore, this property was Marie Bell's 
to dispose of as she saw fit. See, e.g., Nussbacher v. Manderfeld, 64 Wyo. 55, 
186 P.2d 548 (1947). She saw fit to devise this property to Floyd Hale and the 
R.O. Corporation, and therefore, such was not subject to the option given to the 
Morrises.

[¶38.]  We stated in Sowerwine v. Nielson, Wyo., 
671 P.2d 295, 301 (1983):

"The judge who presided 
at the trial heard and saw the witnesses. He is in the best position to 
determine questions of credibility and weigh and judge the evidence, both expert 
and non-expert. Thus, on appeal, it is a firmly established and oft-stated rule 
that we must accept the evidence of the successful party as true, leave out of 
consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict 
therewith, and give to the evidence of the successful party every favorable 
inference that may fairly and reasonably be drawn from it. Considering the 
evidence in this case in the light of these rules, it is apparent that the 
findings and judgment of the trial court must be sustained unless clearly 
erroneous or contrary to the great weight of evidence. Albin Elevator Co. v. 
Pavlica, Wyo., 649 P.2d 187 (1982); City of Rock Springs v. Police Protection 
Ass'n, Wyo., 610 P.2d 975 (1980)."

[¶39.]  Accordingly, we are unable to find any 
reversible error in the well-reasoned, comprehensive decision of the trial court 
in this complex case. Therefore, the decision is affirmed in all 
respects.

FOOTNOTES

1 Since we find there was 
no agreement, we need not consider the effect of such agreement under the 
statute of frauds. See, e.g., Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 P. 927 
(1925); 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills § 10.10, et seq. (1960). Of further 
interest is the Uniform Probate Code, § 2-701, 8 U.L.A. 155 (1983), which 
reads:

"A contract to make a 
will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate, if 
executed after the effective date of this Act, can be established only by (1) 
provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract; (2) an express 
reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of 
the contract; or (3) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract. 
The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a 
contract not to revoke the will or wills."

ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND PETITION FOR REHEARING

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶40.]  This case came on before the court 
pursuant to appellants Morrises' Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for 
Rehearing, and the court having carefully considered the same, finds that the 
court's original opinion affirmed the district court's decision in all respects. 
This includes, of course, the following portion of the district court's 
memorandum opinion regarding the extent of the Morrises' 
option:

"EXTENT OF 
OPTION

"The defendants, John and 
Norma Morris, have additionally filed on November 22, 1985, a motion and/or 
petition for determining the extent of the exercised option granted John and 
Norma Morris by Item 4, paragraph 12(C) of the last will and testaments of John 
and Marie Bell. Morrises contend that the last wills and testaments of the Bells 
were finely-tuned instruments designed to favor the Morrises as beneficiaries, 
ensuring them that they would not be overburdened with debt in acquiring the 
Iron Mountain Ranch Properties. It will be the view of the Court that the motion 
of the Morrises should generally be denied; and the Court would further 
determine that the option granted to the Morrises extends only to the land and 
personal property, including livestock owned and held by the John H. Bell Iron 
Mountain Ranch Company and contiguous real property or any real and personal 
property, including livestock, owned by Marie Bell used in connection with the 
livestock and ranching operation of the corporation. The Court has previously 
ruled with regard to the question of a binding agreement existing by and between 
John and Marie Bell. My way of listing assets that are subject to the sale 
provisions to Mr. and Mrs. Morris, Exhibit I to the first interim report 
reflects those items from the Marie J. Bell estate. See 
34.

Finally, as to property 
covered by the option, the Court will adopt the position taken by Norwest Bank 
in its memorandum dated December 5, 1985. This disposition among other things 
avoids the requirement that separate hearings be conducted as to individual 
items and further recognizes the Court's opinion concerning the issue of a 
binding agreement between John and Marie Bell."

[¶41.]  Specifically, the Morrises now contend 
that there is personal property and proceeds from the property remaining in the 
Bell Trust not disposed of by the majority opinion. In the court's opinion, our 
rationale for affirming the trial court in its determination regarding the 
disposal of the real property under the Morrises' option, is also applicable to 
the disposition of the personal property, and we so held by affirming the 
district court in all respects. Therefore, it is

[¶42.]  ORDERED that the Motion for 
Reconsideration and Petition for Rehearing be, and it hereby is, 
denied.