Case Title: DeSantis v. State

Citation: 384 Md. 656

Docket Number: 141/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Case No.: 03-C-01-005484
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 141
September Term, 2003
WILLIAM L. DESANTIS, JR.
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Greene
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J.
 Eldridge, J., dissents
Filed:    January 19, 2005
1Unless otherwise indicated, all future statutory references to § 297 will be to Md.
Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 297.  Art. 27 was repealed and
recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2001), § 12-101 through § 12-505 of the
Criminal Procedure Article. Throughout this opinion, we will refer to the statute as it was
designated at the time of the forfeiture.
The United States Attorney General has authorized the federal Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) to “adopt” seizures of property made by state or local authorities in the course
of drug investigations, generally after the state or local authorities request the DEA to do so.
See 21 U.S.C. § 873.  After the DEA completes federal forfeiture proceedings on the
property, the DEA is further authorized to distribute a large percentage of the proceeds from
the forfeited property back to the state or local authority that requested federal adoption.  See
21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A). 
The question presented for our review is whether the Maryland State Police may,
consistent with Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 297(e),1
deliver custody of such seized property to the DEA after the request for adoption has been
granted but without first obtaining a formal order from a Maryland court permitting the
transfer of the property.
I.
On September 10, 1999, a Maryland State Police trooper stopped a car traveling
northbound on I-95 in Cecil County for tailgating.  After conducting several sobriety tests
on the vehicle’s sole occupant, William DeSantis, Jr., the trooper determined that DeSantis
had been driving while intoxicated and arrested him.  During a search of the car, incident to
2
the arrest, the trooper discovered a substantial amount of marijuana as well as a tan suitcase
containing $20,000 in cash.  The trooper charged DeSantis with possession with intent to
distribute, possession of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia.  Pursuant to authority
granted the State Police in § 297(d) and (e), the trooper seized the $20,000 as illicit drug
proceeds.  The money was then deposited into an account controlled by the State Police.
On September 30, 1999, the Office of the Attorney General of Maryland sent a letter
to the DEA advising the federal agency that “the State of Maryland does not plan to initiate
forfeiture action on [the $20,000 seized]” and “requesting that the Drug Enforcement
Administration handle the forfeiture proceedings concerning the seizure of this currency.”
On October 8, 1999, the DEA granted the State’s request for federal adoption and instructed
the State Police to send a certified check in the amount of $20,000 to its office in
Washington, D.C.  The State Police, without obtaining any court authorization, complied
with the DEA’s instruction.  Upon receipt of the check in Washington, the DEA assigned the
currency an identification and case number and initiated federal administrative forfeiture
proceedings.  
On November 30, 1999, the DEA provided DeSantis with notice of the federal seizure
of the property as required by federal law.  DeSantis did not contest the federal forfeiture.
On March 14, 2000, the money was forfeited to the United States pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §
881.  On April 12, 2000, the DEA paid to the State Police an amount representing 80% of
the amount forfeited, minus administrative expenses.  
3
Fourteen months after the federal forfeiture had been completed, on May 22, 2001,
DeSantis filed a complaint against the State in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County,
alleging that the State Police unlawfully had deprived him of $20,000.  Before the Circuit
Court, the parties stipulated to the facts and moved for summary judgment.  Judge J. Norris
Byrnes granted the State’s motion for summary judgment.  DeSantis noted a timely appeal
to the Court of Special Appeals, and we granted certiorari on our own initiative to consider
whether the State Police may deliver custody of such seized property to the DEA without first
obtaining an order from a Maryland court.  380 M d. 617, 846 A.2d 401 (2004).
II.
The United States may adopt seizures of property initially seized by non-federal law
enforcement agencies and declared by federal statute subject to forfeiture.  See Dodge v.
United States, 272 U.S. 530, 47 S.Ct. 191, 71 L.Ed. 392 (1926); United States v. One Ford
Coupe Auto., 272 U.S. 321, 47 S.Ct. 154, 71 L.Ed. 279 (1926).  Such adoptions cloak the
initial seizure with federal authority, as if federal, not state, officials had made the seizure.
See One Ford Coupe Auto., 272 U.S. at 325, 47 S.Ct. at 155; Madewell v. Downs, 68 F.3d
1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 1995).  With respect to the illicit drug trade, the Attorney General of the
United States  is authorized to cooperate with local and state police departments in combating
the traffic of controlled substances and in suppressing drug abuse.  See 21 U.S.C. § 873.  To
facilitate such cooperation, the United States Department of Justice has established so-called
2In Cavaliere v. Town of North Beach, 101 Md. App. 319, 646 A.2d 1058 (1994), the
Court of Special Appeals explained “pot-splitting” as follows:
“The ‘pot-splitting’ noted in Johnson [v. Johnson, 849 P.2d 1361, 1362
(Alaska 1993)]is specifically allowed by 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A), which
authorizes the Attorney General, among other things, to transfer forfeited
property ‘to any State or local law enforcement agency which participated
directly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property.’ The ground rules for the
splitting are set forth in the Department of Justice Guide cited above. The
split is based on the net proceeds of the forfeiture, after deduction of
Federal expenses, and the degree of pre-seizure activity performed by the
State or local agency.”
4
“equitable sharing programs” whereby local or state officials request that the DEA adopt the
seizure of and commence federal forfeiture proceedings against property subject to forfeiture
under 21 U.S.C. § 881.  After the federal forfeiture process has been completed and the
property forfeited to the United States, the DEA disburses a large portion of the forfeited
property back to the local or state law enforcement authority, minus administrative expenses.
See 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A).  This practice of “pot-splitting” between the federal and state
law enforcement authorities is widespread and well-established.2  See, e.g., In re United
States Currency, $844,520.00, 136 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (Loken, J.,
concurring); United States v. Winston-Salem/Fortsyth County Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 267,
269-70 (4th Cir. 1990); Johnson v. Johnson, 849 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Alaska 1993); Franz J.
von Kaenel, Missouri Ups the Ante in the Drug Forfeiture “Race to the Res,” 72 Wash.
U.L.Q. 1469, 1473 (Fall 1994) (noting that “[a]s of April 1993, over $1.1 billion had been
distributed to more than 3000 agencies through equitable sharing programs”).
3The State forfeiture procedure for seized monies in § 297 is more burdensome than
the federal forfeiture procedure found in 21 U.S.C. § 881.  This is the obvious reason why
the State Police might prefer, in many instances, federal adoption over State forfeiture
proceedings.  For example, under § 297, forfeiture proceedings against money must be
initiated by the Attorney General, or some other officer of appropriate jurisdiction, and
cannot be delegated to another authority.  § 297(d)(2).  A formal complaint must be filed in
the district or circuit court, accompanied by an affidavit, in accordance with the procedural
formalities of Md. Rules 2-121 to 2-122 or 3-131(a) to (c). Id.  In contrast, under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881, forfeiture proceedings are much less burdensome for amounts under the statutory
minimum, primarily because they are administrative in nature and do not require all the
formal procedures afforded a judicial forfeiture proceeding.  See 21 C.F.R.§§ 1316.71-
1316.81.
5
The legality of equitable sharing programs in the State of Maryland was addressed in
Cavaliere v. Town of North Beach, 101 Md. App. 319, 646 A.2d 1058 (1994).  In that case,
the issue was whether a local police department had the authority to circumvent the state
forfeiture procedure set forth in § 297 and opt instead for federal forfeiture procedures by
requesting federal adoption of the local officer’s seizure.  The Court of Special Appeals held
that following the seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to § 297 by a local police officer, the
local police department had the authority either to proceed under the forfeiture proceedings
set forth in § 297 or to request federal adoption and have the federal authorities initiate
forfeiture proceedings under the federal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881.3  Id. at 330, 638
A.2d at 1063.  
Petitioner does not challenge the holding of Cavaliere but presents the more subtle
argument that the Department of State Police, after federal adoption has been duly authorized
by the DEA and the Maryland Attorney General, is bound to abide by § 297(e), which,
4In the Circuit Court, petitioner also argued several other issues relating to the
deprivation of the property, but those issues are, as conceded by petitioner’s counsel at oral
argument before this Court, either subsumed by the § 297 issue or abandoned.
6
petitioner argues, requires a so-called “judicial turnover order” to validate the transfer.
Petitioner’s theory is not novel, and other courts, both state and federal, have considered it.
See, e.g., Madewell, 68 F.3d at 1040-44; United States v. One 1987 Mercedes Benz Roadster,
2 F.3d 241, 243-45 (7th Cir. 1993); Scarabin v. DEA, 966 F.2d 989, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1992);
United States v. One 1986 Chevrolet Van, 927 F.2d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1991); United States
v. One 1979 Chevrolet C-20 Van, 924 F.2d 120, 122-23 (7th Cir. 1991); Winston-Salem, 902
F.2d at 272; United States v. $490,920 in United States Currency, 911 F.Supp. 720, 724
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re $3,166,199, 987 S.W.2d 663, 668 (Ark. 1999); Commonwealth v.
Rufo, 708 N.E.2d 947, 949 (Mass. 1999); Johnson, 849 P.2d at 1364-65.
Petitioner argues that the State Police could not deliver custody of the seized property
to the federal government without complying with the statutory authority by which the
property was seized.4  He contends that the Maryland statute authorizing the seizure of his
property, § 297, requires the seizing authority to obtain a court order, a “turnover order,”
before relinquishing custody of the property to the federal government. 
The State disagrees on two grounds.  First, the State, relying on Cavaliere, argues that
the State Police lawfully could proceed under either Maryland or federal law when it decided
to subject the property to forfeiture.  Because the State Police decided ultimately to proceed
under federal forfeiture law, § 297, according to the State, “never came in to play,” and thus,
7
the State Police was not required to comply with its provisions, including any requirement
for a turnover order.  Second, the State argues that even if the State Police were required to
comply with the provisions in § 297(e) before delivering custody of the property, the State
Police did comply because the plain language of the statute indicates a turnover order is not
required.
III.
We begin by considering the State’s contention that the State Police had authority to
circumvent § 297(e) entirely when it opted to pursue federal adoption and allow the DEA to
forfeit the money under federal law.  The State’s primary argument is that it is not bound by
the strictures of § 297 because when the State Police opted for federal adoption and federal
forfeiture, the State statute “never came into play.”  We disagree. 
The State Police is not free to circumvent State law altogether when it decides to forgo
State forfeiture proceedings in favor of federal forfeiture proceedings.  When the State Police
seized the cash in petitioner’s car, it was operating under State, not federal, law, because the
State trooper seized the property pursuant to the statutory authority granted him under § 297.
Furthermore, when the State Police took custody of the property, it did so pursuant to State
law, without any federal involvement whatsoever.  At the time of the seizure and during the
State Police’s custody of the property, the State Police was operating under § 297, not 21
U.S.C. § 881.  There is no evidence that federal authorities were involved in, or even had
5Section 297(d) provides, in relevant part:
“Seizure of property subject to forfeiture. — (1) Any property
subject to forfeiture under this subheading may be seized upon
process issued by any court having jurisdiction over the property
except that seizure without such process my be made when:
* * *
(iv) There is probable cause to believe that the
property has been used or intended to be used in
violation of this subheading [Health — Controlled
Dangerous Substances].”
8
knowledge of, the seizure of petitioner’s property.  Thus, whatever authority the State Police
exercised in seizing and detaining the property emanated from State law, see § 297(d)(iv),5
and not from the auspices of federal authority.  Because the property was “taken or detained
under [§ 297],” § 297(e) is applicable to the State Police.  Indeed, almost all of the cases
having considered this issue have assumed that state authorities cannot avoid their own state
laws when they transfer the property to federal officials.  See, e.g., In re United States
Currency, $844,520.00, 136 F.3d at 583-84 (Loken, J., concurring); One 1987 Mercedes
Benz Roadster, 2 F.3d at 243-44; One 1979 Chevrolet C-20 Van, 924 F.2d at 122-23;
Johnson, 849 P.2d at 1363; In re $3,166,199, 987 S.W.2d at 667.  But see Madewell, 68 F.3d
at 1040-43;  Winston-Salem, 902 F.2d at 272-73.  The U.S. Department of Justice has also
urged deference to state law in this area.  See In re United States Currency, $844,520.00, 136
F.3d at 583-84; United States Department of Justice, Asset Forfeiture Law and Practice
Manual, 2-21 to 2-22 (June 1998).  We are in accord with these cases, and hold that the State
Police cannot avoid the strictures of § 297(e) merely by asserting its right to request federal
9
adoption and forfeiture under Cavaliere. 
IV.
Petitioner maintains that § 297(e) requires the State Police to obtain a turnover order
from a Maryland court before it delivers custody of seized property to the federal
government.  Petitioner claims that the section, by its plain language, grants to a Maryland
court exclusive authority to dispose of any seized property.  We disagree.
Section 297(e) of Article 27 provides as follows:
“Seized property not repleviable; sealing and removal of seized
property. — Property taken or detained under this section shall
not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of
the seizing agency subject only to the orders, judgments, and
decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction thereof.
Whenever property is seized under the provisions of this
subheading, the seizing agency may:
(1) Place the property under seal; and
(2) Remove the property to a place designated by
the court.”
Two initial observations can be made from a reading of this section.  First, § 297(e) limits
the seizing agency’s options for disposal of the property.  It may either place it under seal or
remove it to a place designated by the court in whose jurisdiction the property resides.  Those
actions appear from the statute to be the only ones a seizing agency may execute on property
seized pursuant to § 297.  While the seizing agency has limited powers over the seized
property, other officials are not so limited.  Section 297(e)’s plain language indicates,
contrary to petitioner’s assertion, that a court is not the only entity to whom the property is
6Section 297(a)(5) defines “forfeiting authority” as follows:
“(i) ‘Forfeiting authority’ means the office or person designated,
from time to time, by agreement between the State’s Attorney
for a county and the chief executive officer of the governing
body having jurisdiction over the assets subject to forfeiture.
“(ii) The Attorney General or the Attorney General’s designee
when the seizing agency is an instrumentality of the State, may,
by agreement with any State’s Attorney, or county or municipal
attorney, designate an office or person as forfeiting authority to
act on behalf of the State regarding any assets subject to
forfeiture by the State.”
10
subject.  Section 297(e) states that the seized property shall stay within the custody of the
seizing agency — here, the State Police, see § 297(a)(13) — “subject only to the orders,
judgments, and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction thereof.”  The “official
having jurisdiction thereof” obviously refers to someone other than a judge on a Maryland
court.
Although § 297(e) does not explicitly state who this official is, a careful reading of
the statute leads to the conclusion that the official is a person who has direct authority over
the seizing agency and who is granted authority to dispose of the property in other provisions
of the statute.  For example, § 297(j) provides that the “forfeiting authority” 6 may determine,
independent of the seizing agency, that a motor vehicle was wrongfully seized and that it
should be returned to the owner.  This determination operates independent of any judicial
authority, and no court order is required to surrender the property back to the owner.  Indeed,
it is arguable that a forfeiting authority’s decision to return seized property is not reviewable
7Although § 297(d)(3)(i) requires the owner to “petition” for return of the money, it
is clear that this does not mean a formal petition, as in a court filing.  Compare the current
statutory codification of § 297(d)(3)(i) in Md. Code (2001, 2003 Cum. Supp.), § 12-304(c)(2)
of the Criminal Procedure Article (“If the State or political subdivision does not file
proceedings about money within the 90-day period, the money seized under this title shall
be returned to the owner on request by the owner” (emphasis added)).
11
at all by a court.  Cf. § 297(k)(1) (providing for judicial review over forfeiting authority’s
refusal to surrender vehicle to owner or decision to pursue forfeiture proceedings, but silent
on judicial review over decision to return vehicle); State v. 1982 Plymouth, 67 Md. App. 310,
319-20, 507 A.2d 633, 637-38 (1986) (rejecting de novo review over police officer’s
determination to seize automobile and recommend forfeiture pursuant to statute).  Thus, in
§ 297(j), we have an example of an official who may surrender property seized, and take it
out of the custody of the seizing agency, without receiving permission from a court.  A
similar example occurs in § 297(d)(3)(i), which requires surrender of seized currency back
to the owner when forfeiture proceedings are not instituted within 90 days.  There is again
no mention of a court order to validate the surrender of the property.7  These provisions
would seem to defy petitioner’s contention that a court order is necessary for the seizing
agency to lawfully relinquish custody of the property.
These examples show that §297(e), read in context, limits the seizing agency’s ability
to deliver custody of seized property, but does not speak to the authority of other officials
with jurisdiction over the property.  Indeed, that is the only logical understanding of the
qualification that the property shall be “subject to the orders, judgments, and decrees . . . of
8Nor do we accept the argument that although the forfeiting authority or the Attorney
General is not bound by § 297(e), the State Police is so bound, and that therefore, the State
Police was required to obtain the court order, notwithstanding the Attorney General’s
authorization of the transfer.  Such a strained interpretation would serve only as a back-door
equivalent to restraining the powers of the Attorney General in a manner not at all
contemplated by § 297(e).  It would, in effect, nullify the language “or the official having
jurisdiction thereof,” a result highly disfavored by the canons of statutory interpretation.   
9While § 297(a)(5)(ii) permits the Attorney General, by agreement with local officials,
to designate a forfeiting authority to act on his behalf with respect to seized property other
than money, when the property seized is money, that authority cannot be so delegated.  See
(continued...)
12
the official having jurisdiction thereof.”  Were we to accept petitioner’s contention that the
only way to deprive the seizing agency of custody is to get a court order, then § 297(e)
essentially would serve to hamper a forfeiting authority’s ability to obey § 297(j).  As
explained infra, § 297(j) clearly contemplates no judicial intervention over the forfeiting
authority’s ability to return mistakenly seized vehicles.  It would make no sense to read §
297(e) as creating such an implicit restriction on the forfeiting authority, and we do not
interpret § 297(e) to restrict entities, other than the seizing agency, to whom § 297 grants
authority over the property and forfeiture proceedings.8  See § 297(a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(6);
cf. § 297(b)(6) (vesting all “rights, title and interest in and to the money . . . in and to
Baltimore City or the county in which it was seized if it was seized by a county or Baltimore
City law enforcement agency, . . . the municipal corporation, if seized by municipal
authorities, or, if it was seized by State law enforcement authorities, the State”).  
Under § 297(d)(2)(ii), the State Attorney General has the authority to initiate forfeiture
proceedings against property seized by the State Police in the form of money.9  This authority
9(...continued)
§ 297(d)(2)(ii); § 297(h)(1).      
13
includes the discretion not to institute forfeiture proceedings, and, under the holding of
Cavaliere, it also includes the authority to request federal adoption.  None of this authority
is circumscribed by the restrictions of § 297(e) regarding the custodial placement of the
property, which apply only to the seizing agency.
Our holding is in accord with a similar case from a federal district court in Illinois.
In United States v. $62,600.00, 899 F. Supp. 378 (N.D.Ill. 1995), the district court considered
the same argument presented by petitioner in light of two earlier cases, One 1987 Mercedes
Benz Roadster, 2 F.3d at 243, and One 1979 Chevrolet C-20 Van, 924 F.2d at 122-23, which
held that the Illinois statute required a turnover order from a court prior to transferring
custody to the federal government for adoptive forfeiture proceedings.  The district court
noted that “those cases were grounded in the lack of authority for such a transfer under state
law, and since then the Illinois General Assembly has amended the relevant statutes . . . to
give State’s Attorneys the power, (concurrently with the state circuit courts) to dispose of the
contraband.” $62,600.00, 899 F. Supp at 379.  
The version of the statute considered by One 1987 Mercedes Benz Roadster and One
1979 Chevrolet C-20 Van had provided: “Property taken or detained under this Section shall
not be subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of the Director subject only to
the order and judgments of the circuit court having jurisdiction over the forfeiture
14
proceedings.”  One 1979 Chevrolet C-20 Van, 924 F.2d at 122 (emphasis omitted); see One
1987 Mercedes Benz Roadster, 2 F.3d at 244.  This provision was amended to conform to
its current version by inserting “and the decisions of the State’s Attorney under the Drug
Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act” at the end of the sentence.  See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat.
570/505(d) (2003); Illinois Public Act 86-614, § 4 (1991).  The amended version was deemed
by the district court to permit transfer of the property without a court order.  $62,600.00, 899
F. Supp. at 379.  We think § 297(e), which substantively is identical to the amended version
of the Illinois statute, also permits such a transfer without a turnover order.
In the case sub judice, the Attorney General declined to pursue forfeiture proceedings
under § 297.  It had authority to do so under § 297(d)(2)(ii).  The Attorney General also had
the authority to request for federal adoption of the seizure.  Finally, because the Attorney
General was not bound by § 297(e) in transferring the property, he had the authority to
deliver custody of currency to the DEA, through the State Police, without obtaining a court
order.  All of these actions were permitted by the State forfeiture statute. 
Because § 297(e) does not, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, require a turnover order
when an official having jurisdiction over the property has ordered a transfer of the money to
the DEA, the State Police acted lawfully.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
BALTIMORE
COUNTY AFFIRMED.  COSTS
TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 141
September Term, 2003
_________________________________________
WILLIAM L. DESANTIS, JR.
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
__________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
       
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Greene
Eldridge, John C.
   (retired, specially assigned),
                 
 JJ.
________________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
       Filed: January 19, 2005
Eldridge, J., dissenting:
I dissent.