Case Title: Burger v. Cleveland Hts.

Citation: 1999-Ohio-319

Docket Number: 19971870

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Burger v. Cleveland Hts., 87 Ohio St.3d 188, 1999-Ohio-319.] 
 
 
 
 
 
BURGER, APPELLEE, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND HEIGHTS, APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Cite as Burger v. Cleveland Hts. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 188.] 
Tort reform — Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 — Appellate procedure — Final appealable 
orders — Sovereign immunity — Amendment to R.C. 2501.02 and newly 
enacted R.C. 2744.02(C) — Judgment of court of appeals affirmed on 
authority of State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward. 
(No. 97-1870 — Submitted September 29, 1998 — Resubmitted August 25, 1999 
— Decided November 17, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 72675. 
__________________ 
 
Javitch, Block, Eisen & Rathbone and Michael D. Linn, for appellee. 
 
John H. Gibbon, Director of Law, and Laure A. Wagner, First Assistant 
Director of Law, for appellant. 
 
McDonald, Hopkins, Burke & Haber Co., L.P.A., and Thomas C. Schrader, 
for Payto Architects, Inc. 
 
McCarthy, Palmer, Volkema, Boyd & Thomas and Michael S. Miller, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
Walter & Haverfield, P.L.L., and R. Todd Hunt, urging reversal for amici 
curiae Ohio Township Association and Cuyahoga County Law Directors 
Association. 
 
John E. Gotherman and Malcolm C. Douglas, urging reversal for amici 
curiae Ohio Municipal League, Ohio Municipal Attorneys Association and County 
Commissioners Association of Ohio. 
__________________ 
 
 
2
 
The judgment of the court of appeals dismissing the appeal for lack of a final 
appealable order is affirmed on the authority of State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial 
Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur separately. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.  I concur with the majority in affirming the 
judgment of the court of appeals.  I write separately to comment on the jurisdiction 
question arising out of State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062, which has been distorted beyond 
recognition by some of the print media, the dissents in Sheward, and the dissents 
herein.  Notwithstanding incessant pounding, the justices making up the majority 
in Sheward have remained silent, letting the opinion speak for itself.  It is now time 
for that silence on the jurisdiction question to be broken.  In doing so I am guided 
by the words of Henri Frédérick Amiel (1821-1881), a nineteenth century Swiss 
poet and philosopher, who once said:  “Truth is not only violated by falsehood; it 
may be equally outraged by silence.”  The International Dictionary of Thoughts 
(1969) 734. 
I 
A 
Jurisdiction 
 
The lead dissent herein states, “In view of irregularities in the assumption of 
jurisdiction * * * I cannot agree that Sheward should control the outcome of this 
case.”  The other dissent says that “Sheward should never have been accepted as an 
original action.”  Based on clear precedent, the dissenters and other like critics are 
 
 
3
in error.  Given these statements and a number of others in the printed media, it is 
time for the silent majority to break its silence. 
B 
Precedent 
 
The main complaint seems to be that this court should not have accepted 
jurisdiction over a case that seemed to seek a declaratory judgment as to the 
constitutionality of a legislative enactment.  That argument, of course, misses the 
point that Sheward was an action seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus, over 
which this court has original jurisdiction.  Section 2(B)(1), Article IV, Ohio 
Constitution.  Where extraordinary circumstances exist and declaratory judgment 
might not (as it would not on all the issues raised in Sheward) provide an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law, “the constitutionality of a statute may * * * 
be challenged by mandamus.”  State ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 341, 673 N.E.2d 1351, 1354.  This is not new 
law invented by the Sheward majority for nefarious purposes as seemingly alleged 
in some quarters.  As long ago as 1956, over forty years ago, this court held, in 
State ex rel. Michaels v. Morse (1956), 165 Ohio St. 599, 608, 60 O.O. 531, 536, 
138 N.E.2d 660, 666, that “[t]he right of relator to question, by mandamus, the 
constitutionality of [a] statute is recognized in Ohio.”  While Purdy was an election 
case, Morse was not, and there are a number of other examples. 
 
State ex rel. Pub. Institutional Bldg. Auth. v. Griffith (1939), 135 Ohio St. 
604, 14 O.O. 533, 22 N.E.2d 200, was an original action in mandamus filed in this 
court.  The General Assembly had created the Public Institutional Building 
Authority, and the authority sought to issue bonds to raise revenue to support some 
of its  projects.  The Secretary of State refused to attest the bonds, and the authority 
brought suit – an original action in this court seeking mandamus – to require the 
Secretary of State to sign the bonds and attest them.  The court said that the sole 
 
 
4
issue before the court was whether the enactments of the General Assembly 
violated the constitutional prohibition against the creation of public debt beyond a 
stated limit.  The question was answered by saying that “[t]he court also holds that 
Sections 2332-3a, 2332-4 and 2332-5, of the General Code, are unconstitutional 
and void * * *.”  Id. at 623, 14 O.O. at 541, 22 N.E.2d at 208.  Clearly, the case 
was an original action, was filed in this court, sought a writ of mandamus, and 
involved a declaration as to the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. 
 
State ex rel. State Bridge Comm. of Ohio v. Griffith (1940), 136 Ohio St. 
334, 16 O.O. 467, 25 N.E.2d 847, was an original action in this court, mandamus 
was sought, and the issue was the constitutionality of certain statutes.  The court 
held that “it is clear that no constitutional provisions are violated in the issuance of 
these refunding bonds, and the writ will be granted.”  Id. at 339, 16 O.O. at 469, 25 
N.E.2d at 850.  Yet again a declaration as to the constitutionality of a legislative 
enactment. 
 
Then in 1951, this court entertained an original action in mandamus seeking 
a declaration that the Act creating the Ohio Turnpike did not contravene several 
provisions of the Ohio Constitution.  The Auditor of State was the respondent, and 
the court stated that “[t]he auditor contends that the turnpike act is unconstitutional 
because it purports to authorize the appropriation of private property for the 
construction of roads or turnpikes upon which tolls are to be charged in violation 
of Section 19 of Article I of the Constitution.”  State ex rel. Allen v. Ferguson 
(1951), 155 Ohio St. 26, 35, 44 O.O. 63, 67, 97 N.E.2d 660, 666.  After analysis 
the court then said, “It follows that, even if these portions of the act are 
unconstitutional, the remaining portions must be sustained.”  Id. at 45, 44 O.O. at 
71, 97 N.E.2d at 670.  Once more we have an original action in this court seeking 
mandamus and a declaration of constitutionality.  Obviously, original actions in 
this court in mandamus seeking a declaration of constitutionality or 
 
 
5
unconstitutionality are not new, unknown, or unheard of, as some would have us 
believe.  But there is more. 
 
In 1981, a relator brought an original action in this court seeking an order 
compelling respondent, the Treasurer of State, to issue certain bonds pursuant to 
R.C. Chapter 166.  By way of affirmative defense, the Treasurer asserted that R.C. 
Chapter 166 violated Section 13, Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution.  The court 
said, “We find that respondent has failed to meet this burden and hold that R.C. 
Chapter 166 complies with Section 13, Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Duerk v. Donahey (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 216, 219, 21 O.O.3d 
135, 138, 423 N.E.2d 429, 432.  Clearly, a declaration of constitutionality of a 
statute, and a writ was granted. 
 
In August 1987, after both Chief Justice Moyer and I had become members 
of this court, the Director of Budget and Management brought an original action in 
this court seeking a writ of mandamus.  In State ex rel. Shkurti v. Withrow (1987), 
32 Ohio St.3d 424, 513 N.E.2d 1332, the issue presented was whether R.C. 
4141.251 and 4141.48 were constitutional.  R.C. 4141.48 directed the Treasurer of 
State to issue bonds to repay outstanding advances made by the federal 
government to the Ohio unemployment compensation program.  R.C. 4141.251 
provided for a surcharge on employer contributions to pay the bond service 
charges. 
 
The director determined that issuance of the bonds ($315,400,000) would be 
cost-effective.  However, the Treasurer refused to issue the bonds, citing 
provisions of the Ohio Constitution and previous decisions of this court prohibiting 
the incurrence of indebtedness.  The director brought an original action in 
mandamus in this court to compel the Treasurer to issue the bonds.  After 
considering the director’s arguments, a majority of the court said that “[w]e reject 
both of these contentions and find that the proposed bond issuance would violate 
 
 
6
Sections 1 and 3 of Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution.”  Id. at 425, 513 N.E.2d 
at 1334.  Again, an original action in this court seeking a writ of mandamus and a 
declaration of unconstitutionality. 
 
Other language from Shkurti is instructive.  The court also said that “[w]hile 
the relator is correct about the deference this court owes to legislative acts, his 
reliance on the statute’s declaration is misplaced.  Such reliance would make the 
General Assembly and not this court the final and conclusive authority of the 
constitutional debt question.  The interpretation of the Ohio Constitution is, 
however, not a legislative but a judicial question, which ultimately this court must 
decide.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 429, 513 N.E.2d at 1337.  Some might say that 
this sounds strangely like the opinion of Justice Resnick and the majority of this 
court in Sheward. 
 
In the final example from this nonexhaustive selection, in 1994, with five of 
the present seven members of this court present and participating, we accepted 
jurisdiction and decided State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 225, 631 N.E.2d 582.  Voinovich was a case brought in mandamus, 
prohibition, and quo warranto.  Three cases were consolidated for decision.  All of 
the cases involved the biennial appropriations for the Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation and the Industrial Commission. 
 
Case No. 93-2057 sought a writ of prohibition to prevent new 
commissioners of the Industrial Commission, authorized pursuant to Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 107, from acting or hearing cases as the Industrial Commission. 
 
Case No. 93-2059, an action in mandamus and quo warranto, sought an 
order that the relator was the rightful public member of the Industrial Commission. 
 
In case No. 93-2060, the relators sought a writ of mandamus compelling the 
bureau and the commission not to implement the nonappropriation provisions of 
 
 
7
1993 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 and to require the processing of claims under the old 
law. 
1 
Voinovich Majority Opinion 
 
Justice Wright, as author of the majority opinion, commenced his discussion 
by saying:  “[T]hese three cases challenge the constitutionality of Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 107 of the 120th Ohio General Assembly.  The cases present the following 
constitutional issues:  (1) whether Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 violates the one-subject 
rule of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution; (2) whether the bill 
violates the three-consideration provision of Section 15(C), Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution; (3) whether the bill denies the citizens of this state their right to a 
referendum under Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution; and (4) whether 
abolishing the old Industrial Commission and creating a new one deprives the 
former commission members of their positions without due process of law and 
violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.  Case No. 93-2059 
presents the further question of whether the Governor violated former R.C. 
4121.02(E) by failing to grant relator Geltzer an annual salary increase of five 
percent.”  69 Ohio St.3d at 228, 631 N.E.2d at 585-586. 
 
Five members of the court, Chief Justice Moyer,1 Justice Douglas, Justice 
Wright, Justice Resnick, and Justice Pfeifer, concurred in the Voinovich majority 
opinion. 
 
Justice Wright, with the concurrence of the aforementioned justices, made a 
number of points interesting for our purposes here: 
 
(1)  “On October 15, 1993, relators filed the following three original actions 
in this court, all of which make various challenges to the constitutionality of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 226, 631 N.E.2d at 585. 
 
 
8
 
(2)  “Case No. 93-2057 is an original action in mandamus and prohibition 
filed by the Ohio AFL-CIO, a citizen taxpayer, and a board member * * *.  
Relators seek a writ of mandamus * * * declaring the nonappropriations provisions 
unconstitutional and void.  Relators [also] seek a writ of prohibition * * *.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 226-227, 631 N.E.2d at 585. 
 
(3)  “Relator asks this court to * * * (2) find that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 is 
void because it violates the three-consideration provision of Section 15(C), Article 
II of the Ohio Constitution.  Relator seeks a writ of mandamus * * *.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id. at 227, 631 N.E.2d at 585. 
 
(4)  “Relators seek a writ of mandamus compelling the bureau and the 
commission not to implement the nonappropriation provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 107 * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 227, 631 N.E.2d at 585. 
 
(5)  “However, although we are most reluctant to interfere in the legislative 
process, we will not ‘abdicate [our] duty to enforce the Ohio Constitution.’ ”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 229, 631 N.E.2d at 586. 
 
(6)  “[W]e therefore hold that such provision violates Section 15(D), Article 
II of the Ohio Constitution.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 230, 631 N.E.2d at 587. 
 
(7)  “Likewise, we determine that the provisions creating an exemption for 
the employment of minors violate Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution.  * * * We therefore find that the inclusion * * * was an actionable 
violation * * * of the Ohio Constitution.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 230, 631 
N.E.2d at 587. 
 
(8)  “Having found that the intentional tort and child labor exemption 
provisions * * * violate * * * the Ohio Constitution,* * * [w]e therefore grant 
relators’ request for a writ of mandamus * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 230, 631 
N.E.2d at 587. 
 
 
9
 
(9)  “Relators in all three cases argue * * * violation * * * of the Ohio 
Constitution.”  Id. at 23l, 631 N.E.2d at 587. 
 
(10)  “Relators * * * argue * * * that the enactment * * * unconstitutionally 
deprived the citizens of Ohio of their right of referendum.  We agree * * *.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 234, 631 N.E.2d at 590. 
 
(11)  “Thus, we grant relators’ request for a writ of mandamus on the issue 
of whether Am.Sub.H.B. No 107 violates * * * the Ohio Constitution.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id. at 237, 631 N.E.2d at 591. 
 
(12)  “We disagree with each of these assertions, and therefore deny relators’ 
requests for writs of mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto with respect to these 
issues.”  Id. at 237, 631 N.E.2d at 591-592. 
2 
Voinovich – Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
 
In his concurring opinion in Voinovich, Justice Pfeifer said that “[t]he 
majority opinion does effectively and pragmatically resolve the legitimate 
constitutional concerns raised by relators.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 69 Ohio St.3d 
at 247, 631 N.E.2d at 598. 
 
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Voinovich, Chief 
Justice Moyer said, “I concur in the majority opinion, except that I believe there 
exists a sufficient common purpose or relationship between the child labor 
exemption provision of R.C. 4109.06, the workplace intentional tort provision of 
R.C. 2745.01 and the balance of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107.  Therefore, these 
provisions should also be upheld.”  Id. at 248, 631 N.E.2d at 599.  This is clearly a 
declaration of constitutionality of a legislative Act in an original action in this 
court. 
 
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Voinovich, Justice 
A. William Sweeney said that “the 1993 enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 
 
 
10
clearly violates the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution * * *.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Id. at 249, 631 N.E.2d at 599-600.  Again, an unambiguous declaration as to 
constitutionality of a legislative Act and determined in an original action in this 
court. 
 
In his opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part in Voinovich, Justice 
Francis E. Sweeney said, “Because I believe that the 1993 enactment of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 is unconstitutional, I vigorously dissent from the bulk of the 
majority’s opinion.”  69 Ohio St.3d at 250, 631 N.E.2d at 601.  There can be no 
question that Justice Sweeney, along with the rest of the court, was giving a 
declaration of constitutionality of a legislative Act pursuant to an original action 
filed in this court. 
 
Moreover, in Voinovich, many of our same detractors with regard to 
Sheward in general, and the jurisdiction issue in Sheward in particular, the Ohio 
Manufacturers Association, Ohio Self-Insurers Association, Ohio Council of Retail 
Merchants, Ohio Chamber of Commerce, National Federation of Independent 
Business, Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, Ohio Business Roundtable, and Council 
of Smaller Enterprises, appeared and participated before this court as amici curiae.  
At no time did any of them question the court’s taking jurisdiction of an original 
action in this court seeking writs of mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto and 
a declaration as to the constitutionality of an Act of the General Assembly.  In fact, 
in their joint brief filed on December 2, 1993, in Voinovich, these amici said, “The 
constitutionality of Am.Sub.House Bill 107 should be affirmed, and the requests 
for writs of mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto should be denied by this 
Court.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Why did they not question this court’s taking jurisdiction in Voinovich?  
Only they could answer, but it is not unreasonable to assume that they conceded 
that we had jurisdiction or, alternately, that their interests and those of their 
 
 
11
constituent members required a favorable and rapid declaration as to the 
constitutionality of legislation (premium credits and refunds) that has proven to be 
very beneficial to them — certainly a legitimate interest. 
 
Accordingly, based upon a legion of precedents, jurisdiction in Sheward was 
properly vested in this court.  To continue to play the tired and worn-out tune of 
“judicial activism” in opposing jurisdiction is, at best, misleading. 
II 
Original Jurisdiction of the Ohio Supreme Court Pursuant to Ohio Constitution 
Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(f) 
 
Section 2, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution establishes the Supreme 
Court.  Subsection (B) of Section 2 defines the court’s jurisdiction and is further 
divided into Subsections 1 and 2.  Subsection (B)(1) is further divided into 
Subsections (a) through (g).  Subsection (B)(2) is further divided into Subsections 
(a) through (f). 
 
Subsection (B)(1) establishes the original jurisdiction of this court.  
Subsection (B)(2) provides for the appellate jurisdiction of this court. 
 
Section 2(B)(1)(f), Article IV, Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]he 
supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in the following: * * * (f) In any 
cause on review as may be necessary to its complete determination.”  While the 
phrase “any cause on review” will sound to some, I am sure, like language of 
appellate jurisdiction, it is clearly not so.  Had the drafters meant the subsection to 
apply to the appellate jurisdiction of this court, it would have been easy enough to 
so provide.  All that would have been needed was to drop down five or so lines and 
place the provision in Section (B)(2) – the appellate jurisdiction section.  Since this 
was not done, the section obviously pertains to the court’s original jurisdiction. 
 
That having been established, what then does Subsection (f) mean? 
 
 
12
 
As recently as 1994, Chief Justice Moyer, writing for a unanimous court in 
State v. Steffen (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 407, 639 N.E.2d 67, 74, said: 
 
“The relief requested by the state is unprecedented and extraordinary.  The 
reasons to grant the relief are compelling.  We can and do hereby grant that relief 
to the extent allowed by the Constitution and statutes of Ohio. 
 
“Section 2(B)(1)(f), Article IV of the Constitution of Ohio grants original 
jurisdiction to this court ‘[i]n any cause on review as may be necessary to its 
complete determination.’  We have interpreted this provision to authorize 
judgments in this court that are necessary to achieve closure and complete relief in 
actions pending before the court.  We conclude * * * that Section 2(B)(1)(f), 
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution authorizes this court to enter such judgments in 
causes it hears on review as are necessary to provide a complete and final 
determination thereof. 
 
“We have exercised our original jurisdiction conferred by Section 2(B)(1), 
Article IV to prevent the abuse of the trial and appellate courts by repeated and 
vexatious lawsuits.  * * * We emphasized that prohibition was a writ to be used 
with great caution and only in the presence of extraordinary circumstances.”  
(Citations omitted.) 
 
All of the above could have been written as pertaining to jurisdiction in 
Sheward.  In fact, and again, that which was written in Steffen sounds strangely 
like Sheward and Justice Resnick’s opinion. 
 
The morass of the thousands of cases affected by the Act in question needed 
to be cleared once and for all by the court’s action in Sheward.  Comments on the 
need for finality in another context are relevant here:  “A procedural system which 
permits an endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for 
ultimate certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibilities of justice that 
cannot but war with the effectiveness of underlying substantive commands. * * * 
 
 
13
There comes a point where a procedural system which leaves matters perpetually 
open no longer reflects humane concern but merely anxiety and a desire for 
immobility.”  Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners (1963), 76 Harv.L.Rev. 441, 452-453.  In addition, the author comments 
that “[s]urely the answer runs, in the first place, in terms of conservation of 
resources — * * * not only simple economic resources, but all of the intellectual, 
moral, and political resources involved in the legal system.  The presumption must 
be * * * that if a job can be well done once, it should not be done twice. * * * Why 
should we duplicate effort?”  Id. at 451. 
 
The issues involved in Sheward cried out for closure and complete relief; the 
relief sought was unprecedented and extraordinary.  The tests set forth in Steffen 
for exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Section 2(B)(1)(f), Article IV, Ohio 
Constitution were met, and the reasons to grant the relief were compelling. 
 
The history of Subsection (f) reinforces this interpretation.  By joint 
resolution adopted March 1, 1968, the General Assembly submitted to the electors 
a proposition to amend the Ohio Constitution at an election held May 1968.  
Included in that submission, presumably read and understood by the legislators, 
was the language in Subsection (f).  The proposal received a favorable vote of the 
electorate and Subsection (f) became a part of the Constitution of Ohio, the 
supreme law of our state. 
 
The analysis of the resolution by the Legislative Services Commission stated 
that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Supreme court is augmented * * *.”  Ohio Legislative 
Service Commission Bill Analysis:  Sub.H.J.R 42 (1968).  “Augment” is defined 
as “to enlarge or increase esp. in size, amount, or degree.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (1986) 143.  The report of the commission and this 
definition speak for themselves, but clearly the new language in the court’s original 
 
 
14
jurisdiction section had to be intended to mean something.  The next fact makes it 
even clearer. 
 
The drafters and the members of the General Assembly (and ultimately the 
electors) used the word “cause” in Subsection (f).  In contrast, the word “case” is 
used, six times, in the appellate jurisdiction section.  The difference, I believe, was 
quite intentional.  It was recognized that in our more modern, fastmoving, and 
technological world, long waits for judgments in “causes” involving unprecedented 
and extraordinary matters needing closure and complete relief could bring about 
personal, professional, and business disasters before any meaningful and/or 
effective relief would be granted.  For example, the reforms at issue in Voinovich 
were brought directly to this court to help eliminate problems in a workers’ 
compensation system that had been called the “silent killer of jobs.”  The final 
decision in that “cause,” rendered in a relatively short period of time, made clear 
that the new procedures urged by the Governor and enacted by the General 
Assembly were, for the most part, constitutional and could stay in full force and 
effect, and no person, including some current members of this court, ever raised 
the question of this court’s assuming jurisdiction over the cause. 
 
Thus, the use of the word “cases” indicates the routine way in which matters 
come before this court.  Use of the word “cause” is broader and can include the 
extraordinary and unprecedented.  Therefore, it is also clear why, in Section 
2(B)(3), we find that “[n]o law shall be passed or rule made whereby any person 
shall be prevented from invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court.” 
 
Accordingly, in those causes where four or more members of this court (and 
at any particular point in time—not just the current court) agree that the matters to 
be resolved are unprecedented and extraordinary and are in need of closure and 
complete determination and relief, Section 2(B)(1)(f), Article IV, Ohio 
Constitution is there and available for use.  To find otherwise would be to thwart 
 
 
15
the will of the General Assembly, the body that proposed the language in question, 
and the will of the electorate of Ohio, which adopted, by way of amendment to our 
Constitution, the language in question, and would read right out of the Constitution 
Subsection (f) of Section 2(B)(1), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.  Obviously, each 
of us should give deference to all sections of the Constitution—not just those with 
which we agree at any given moment. 
 
Thus, considering all of the foregoing, the cause was properly before us as 
an original action, there were no irregularities in the assumption of jurisdiction, 
and we have not “thrown out the baby with the bath water,” but, instead, with 
Justice Resnick’s opinion we have remained true to our oath to uphold the 
Constitution of the State of Ohio.  I respectfully concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
1.  Chief Justice Moyer concurred in part and dissented in part but agreed 
that all of the constitutional issues were properly presented for decision. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  I disagree with the decision of the majority, 
which affirms the judgment of the court of appeals on the authority of State ex rel. 
Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 
1062.  The parties in this case did not challenge the constitutionality of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, and, therefore, I believe that the case should have been 
decided on the issue raised.  While it is true that if Sheward is to be followed in the 
instant case, the question whether R.C. 2744.02(C) as amended by Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 350 should be applied retroactively to the instant case would be rendered 
moot, I would not want a vote of concurrence in this case to in any way suggest 
that I believe Sheward should necessarily be followed by this court in the future.  
Therefore, I dissent. 
 
 
16
 
It is not unusual for this court to summarily decide pending cases that raise 
legal issues dependent on those recently decided by the court in another case.  It 
has been my past practice in such circumstances to follow the law announced in 
the earlier case, even where I dissented from the decision of the majority in that 
earlier case.  My reason is based on my belief that once this court announces its 
opinion on an issue of law, that principle of law should be applied consistently to 
all persons similarly situated, whether or not I agree with that principle. 
 
Regrettably, I am compelled to make an exception to that practice in this 
case.  In view of irregularities in the assumption of jurisdiction and the inclusion of 
inappropriate references to the conduct of the General Assembly in State ex rel. 
Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, as is more fully described in my 
dissent therein, I cannot agree that Sheward should control the outcome of this 
case. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I continue to disagree with the 
majority’s decision in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062, upon which the majority relies herein 
in affirming the appellate court’s dismissal of the city of Cleveland Heights’ 
appeal.  Thus, I join in Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent and agree that Sheward 
should never have been accepted as an original action.  I also reiterate my belief 
that 1996 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, including the amendments made to R.C. 
2744.02(C) and 2501.02, at issue in this case, addresses the single subject of tort 
reform. 
 
Burger was fully briefed and argued before this court, and, as Chief Justice 
Moyer indicates, neither party challenged the constitutionality of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
 
 
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350.  Nor were any other constitutional issues raised.  The only issue in Burger is 
whether R.C. 2744.02(C) and 2501.02, which allow for an immediate appeal of an 
order denying political subdivisions immunity pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744, 
apply to orders that are issued after those statutes went into effect in cases that 
were filed prior to the effective date.  Clearly, this procedural issue pertaining to 
the timing of appeals was within the province of the General Assembly to decide. 
 
But rather than addressing this issue, this court has summarily discarded the 
amendments made to R.C. 2744.02(C) and 2501.02 pursuant to Sheward.  The 
majority’s wholesale dismantling of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 under the pretext of a 
violation of the one-subject rule will preclude this court from individually 
considering important issues like the one presented in this case.  At the very least, 
R.C. 2744.02(C) and 2501.02, which are clearly related to tort litigation, should 
have been preserved, while any unconstitutional provisions could have been 
severed. 
 
By failing to preserve at least these sections, the court has promoted 
inefficiency in our civil justice system.  From a practical perspective, 
determination of whether a political subdivision is immune from liability is usually 
pivotal to the ultimate outcome of a lawsuit.  Early resolution of the issue of 
whether a political subdivision is immune from liability pursuant to R.C. Chapter 
2744 is beneficial to both of the parties.  If the appellate court holds that the 
political subdivision is immune, the litigation can come to an early end, with the 
same outcome that otherwise would have been reached only after trial, resulting in 
a savings to all parties of costs and attorney fees.  Alternatively, if the appellate 
court holds that immunity does not apply, that early finding will encourage the 
political subdivision to settle promptly with the victim rather than pursue a lengthy 
trial and appeals.  Under either scenario, both the plaintiff and the political 
 
 
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subdivision may save the time, effort, and expense of a trial and appeal, which 
could take years. 
 
Without the benefit of immediate appealability of this issue, these cases are 
more likely to proceed through a lengthy trial, as well as subsequent appeals, only 
to have the appellate court nullify the holding of the trial court on the issue of 
immunity.  As the General Assembly envisioned, the determination of  immunity 
could be made prior to investing the time, effort, and expense of the courts, 
attorneys, parties, and witnesses pursuant to amendments made to R.C. 2744.02(C) 
and 2501.02.  Because of this court’s wholesale dismantling of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
350, the benefits of the immediate appealability of the denial of immunity to a 
political subdivision will not be realized, even though neither section was 
challenged on a constitutional basis by the parties in this case.  We have thrown 
out the baby with the bath water. 
 
For all the aforementioned reasons I respectfully dissent. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.