Case Title: Commonwealth v. Preston P.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12706

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12706 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PRESTON P., a juvenile. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 5, 2019. - January 7, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Delinquent Child.  Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency 
proceeding, Probation, Revocation of probation.  Juvenile 
Court, Delinquent child, Probation. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Middlesex County 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on December 19, 2016. 
 
 
A proceeding for revocation of probation was heard by Jay 
D. Blitzman, J., a motion for reconsideration was also heard by 
him, and questions of law were reported by him to the Appeals 
Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Benjamin L. Falkner for the juvenile. 
 
Timothy Ferriter, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Nina L. Pomponio for the probation service. 
 
Michelle Menken, for youth advocacy division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  A Juvenile Court judge may place a juvenile on 
pretrial probation with the consent of the juvenile and the 
Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Tim T., 437 Mass. 592, 596-
597 (2002).  As part of pretrial probation, the juvenile agrees 
to abide by certain conditions for a specified period of time.  
See id.  In exchange, the case is removed from the trial 
calendar.  See id. at 596.  If the juvenile successfully 
completes the probationary period, the charges are dismissed.  
See id. at 597.  This practice is distinct from pretrial 
conditions of release, which may be supervised by the probation 
service, but do not lead to dismissal or removal from the trial 
calendar.  See Jake J. v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 70, 71, 74-75 
(2000); G. L. c. 276, § 87.  In this case, we are asked to 
determine the standard of proof and procedural requirements 
necessary for the revocation of pretrial probation in the 
Juvenile Court. 
 
We conclude that, for a revocation based on a new criminal 
offense, the Commonwealth must prove that there is probable 
cause to believe that the juvenile committed the offense.  
Probable cause may be established at a nonevidentiary hearing 
based on the application for a complaint.  For a revocation 
based on any violation other than a new criminal offense, the 
Commonwealth must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, at 
an evidentiary hearing, that the juvenile violated the 
3 
 
 
condition.  For any revocation of a juvenile's pretrial 
probation, due process requires written notice of the claimed 
violation, the opportunity to be heard, and a judicial finding 
that the juvenile committed the violation.  The other 
evidentiary principles that govern postdisposition probation 
revocation hearings, see Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 
113, 118 (1990), do not apply.1 
 
Background.  The juvenile was charged with assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon for allegedly "whipping" 
a remote control at another juvenile.  With the consent of the 
juvenile and the Commonwealth, a Juvenile Court judge 
subsequently placed the juvenile on pretrial probation in 
anticipation of the case being dismissed after a specified 
probationary period.2  The pretrial probation agreement included 
the condition that the juvenile obey all local, State, and 
Federal laws.  Before the probationary period ended, the 
probation service served the juvenile with a notice of pretrial 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
2 The juvenile was placed on pretrial probation twice during 
the duration of the proceedings in this case.  The Juvenile 
Court judge terminated his pretrial probation once, and 
subsequently placed the juvenile on pretrial probation for a 
second time.  The alleged violation in this appeal occurred 
during the second period of pretrial probation. 
4 
 
 
probation violation alleging new charges for tagging and 
defacing property.3  At a hearing on the Commonwealth's motion to 
revoke pretrial probation, the judge found probable cause that 
the juvenile had committed the offense of tagging.  Based on 
this finding, the judge revoked the juvenile's pretrial 
probation and put the case back on the trial calendar. 
 
The juvenile filed a motion to reconsider the revocation; 
he argued that the judge's application of the probable cause 
standard violated the juvenile's due process rights.  The 
juvenile maintained that a violation must be proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and that the hearing must comply 
with the evidentiary requirements of Durling, 407 Mass. at 113, 
118.  The judge heard argument on these questions of law in a 
series of nonevidentiary hearings.  He then allowed the motion 
to reconsider, set a date for a revocation hearing, and stayed 
the matter pending the resolution of three questions that he 
reported to the Appeals Court.  We transferred the case to this 
court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  The judge reported the following questions: 
"1.  Where a juvenile has been placed on pretrial probation 
under [G. L. c. 276, § 87,] and Commonwealth v. Tim T., 437 
Mass. 592 (2002)[,] in contemplation of the Commonwealth's 
dismissal of the case upon the juvenile's successful 
completion, does [G. L. c. 276, § 58B,] govern the 
                     
 
3 The notice of violation also contained an asserted 
noncriminal violation.  The judge did not make findings on this 
additional violation, and it is not at issue before us. 
5 
 
 
revocation of said pretrial probation? 
 
"2.  Where the Commonwealth seeks revocation of pretrial 
probation in contemplation of dismissal, pursuant to [G. L. 
c. 276, § 87,] and Commonwealth v. Tim T., 437 Mass. 592 
(2002), must a violation of any condition be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence? 
 
"3.  Do the evidentiary principles in Commonwealth v. 
Durling, [407] Mass. 108, 111 (1990)[,] apply to such a 
hearing?" 
 
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004). 
 
We answer the first question, "No."  Based on the 
incongruence between the language of G. L. c. 276, § 58B, and 
pretrial probation, we conclude that the statute does not govern 
the revocation of a juvenile's pretrial probation.  We answer 
the second question, "No," in part.  For a violation based on a 
new criminal offense, a judicial finding of probable cause 
satisfies the requirements of due process.  For a violation of 
any other condition, however, due process requires proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  We also answer the third 
question, "No," in part.  For revocation of a juvenile's 
pretrial probation, due process necessitates notice of the 
alleged violation, the opportunity to be heard, and a judicial 
finding that the violation occurred.  Violations based on new 
criminal offenses may be established at a nonevidentiary hearing 
based on the application for a complaint, while other violations 
require an evidentiary hearing.  The additional evidentiary 
principles from Durling, 407 Mass. at 113, 118, are not 
6 
 
 
requisites in the context of pretrial probation. 
 
1.  Terminology.  A Juvenile Court judge may place a 
juvenile on pretrial probation based on the statutory 
authorization of G. L. c. 276, § 87.4  See Tim T., 437 Mass. 
at 596-597.  General Laws c. 276, § 87, also establishes 
statutory authorization for pretrial conditions of release, 
Jake J., 433 Mass. at 71, which are distinct from pretrial 
probation.  Notwithstanding this distinction, our jurisprudence 
at times has used the term "pretrial probation" in discussing 
pretrial conditions of release.  See id. at 75 ("Juvenile Court 
judge had authority to place the juvenile on pretrial probation 
with conditions for his release on bail").  We take this 
opportunity to delineate the differences between the two.5 
 
a.  Pretrial probation.  With the consent of the juvenile 
                     
 
4 General Laws c. 276, § 87, states, in relevant part, 
 
"The . . . [J]uvenile [C]ourt may place on probation in the 
care of its probation officer any [juvenile] before it 
charged with an offense or a crime for such time and upon 
such conditions as it deems proper, with the [juvenile's] 
consent, before trial and before a plea of guilty . . . ." 
 
 
5 These two practices also are distinct from pretrial 
diversion, see G. L. c. 119, § 54A; drug rehabilitation 
diversion, see G. L. c. 111E, § 10; and continuances without a 
finding, see G. L. c. 278, § 18.  Nothing in this opinion should 
be taken to govern statutory diversion programs or continuances 
without a finding.  Nor should this opinion be taken to govern 
any agreements to dismiss cases, made by the Commonwealth and a 
juvenile with the approval of a judge, that do not involve 
probation. 
7 
 
 
and the Commonwealth, a judge may place a juvenile on pretrial 
probation pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 87.  See Tim T., 437 Mass. 
at 597.  A pretrial probation agreement specifies conditions 
with which the juvenile must comply for a specified period of 
time.  See id. at 596-597.  When a juvenile is placed on 
pretrial probation, the case is removed from the trial calendar.  
See id. at 596.  If the juvenile successfully completes the 
probationary period, the charges are dismissed.  See id. at 597.  
A judge may not order a juvenile detained based on a violation 
of pretrial probation, because "the only recourse [is] to return 
the case to the trial calendar."  See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
441 Mass. 1002, 1003 (2004), quoting Tim T., supra at 596.  
General Laws c. 276, § 87, does not provide a procedure for the 
revocation of pretrial probation.  As we discuss, neither does 
any other statute. 
 
b.  Pretrial conditions of release.  General Laws c. 276, 
§ 87, also allows for a distinct type of supervision known as 
pretrial conditions of release.  See Jake J., 433 Mass. at 71. 
The confusion between pretrial probation and pretrial conditions 
of release is understandable.  Both occur prior to trial, and 
both involve supervision by the probation service.  Nonetheless, 
they are distinct procedures that serve different functions. 
 
As with pretrial probation, a defendant must consent to the 
conditions of pretrial release, but by contrast to pretrial 
8 
 
 
probation, the Commonwealth's consent is not required.  Compare 
Jake J., 433 Mass. at 71, with Tim T., 437 Mass. at 594, 597.  
Unlike pretrial probation, pretrial conditions of release do not 
remove the case from the trial calendar or lead to a future 
dismissal.  Compare Tim T., supra at 596-597, with Jake J., 
supra.  Further, and distinct from a violation of a condition of 
pretrial probation, a violation of pretrial conditions of 
release may lead to detention.  Compare Tim T., supra at 596, 
with G. L. c. 276, § 58B (authorizing detention of up to ninety 
days).  Finally, the adjudication of violations of pretrial 
conditions of release, but not pretrial probation, is governed 
by statute.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58B, and discussion, infra. 
 
While the terms at times have been used interchangeably in 
earlier jurisprudence, for clarity, we will not use the term 
"pretrial probation" to refer to pretrial conditions of release. 
 
A Juvenile Court judge also may impose pretrial conditions 
of release without supervision by the probation service.  See 
G. L. c. 276, § 58.  Although we held in Commonwealth v. Dodge, 
428 Mass. 860, 863-866 (1999), that judges did not have 
statutory or inherent authority to impose conditions of release 
under G. L. c. 276, § 58, the Legislature amended the statute in 
2006 and 2014, thereby allowing for the imposition of certain 
conditions of release.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58, as amended 
through St. 2006, c. 48, § 8 (juvenile "may be ordered to abide 
9 
 
 
by specified restrictions on personal associations or conduct 
including, but not limited to, avoiding all contact with an 
alleged victim of the crime and any potential witness or 
witnesses who may testify concerning the offense, as a condition 
of release"); G. L. c. 276, § 58, as amended through St. 2014, 
c. 260, § 32 (allowing in cases involving domestic violence or 
abuse for "conditions on a person's release in order to ensure 
the appearance of the person before the court and the safety of 
the alleged victim, any other individual or the community").  
Here, our discussion of conditions of release refers only to 
conditions imposed which include supervision by the probation 
service, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 87, and not those imposed 
without supervision by the probation service, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 276, § 58. 
 
2.  Statutory landscape.  a.  Whether G. L. c. 276, § 58B, 
governs revocation of pretrial probation.  Pretrial probation 
and pretrial conditions of release are both authorized by G. L. 
c. 276, § 87, but the statute does not contain procedures for 
addressing violations of either.  General Laws c. 276, § 58B, 
provides, in part, 
"A person who has been released after a hearing pursuant to 
[§§] 42A, 58, 58A or 87 and who has violated a condition of 
his release, shall be subject to a revocation of release 
and an order of detention.  The judicial officer shall 
enter an order of revocation and detention if after a 
hearing the judicial officer finds (1) that there is 
probable cause to believe that the person has committed a 
10 
 
 
[F]ederal or [S]tate crime while on release, or clear and 
convincing evidence that the person has violated any other 
condition of release; and (2) the judicial officer finds 
that there are no conditions of release that will 
reasonably assure the person will not pose a danger to the 
safety of any other person or the community; or the person 
is unlikely to abide by any condition or combination of 
conditions of release." 
 
The statutory language thus makes clear that G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58B, governs violations of pretrial conditions of release.  
Three incongruences between pretrial probation and the language 
of G. L. c. 276, § 58B, however, lead us to conclude that, in 
referencing G. L. c. 276, § 87, the Legislature intended to 
encompass solely pretrial conditions of release, and not 
pretrial probation. 
 
First, G. L. c. 276, § 58B, applies only when a juvenile 
"has been released after a hearing."  Pretrial probation, on the 
other hand, is not a mechanism by which a juvenile is released 
from confinement.  Rather, pretrial probation is a court-
enforced agreement regarding probation conditions and an 
anticipated future dismissal that is distinct from any terms of 
release.  See Tim T., 437 Mass. at 597.  For example, a juvenile 
might be released on personal recognizance at arraignment, and 
months later, a judge could impose pretrial probation.  In that 
situation, pretrial probation clearly is not the method by which 
the individual is released. 
 
Second, a juvenile who is found in violation of conditions 
11 
 
 
of release pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58B, "shall be subject to 
a revocation of release and an order of detention."  The only 
recourse for a violation of pretrial probation, by contrast, is 
a return to the trial calendar, not detention.  See Rodriguez, 
441 Mass. at 1003, citing Tim T., 437 Mass. at 596. 
 
Third, revocations under G. L. c. 276, § 58B, require a 
judge to find that "there are no conditions of release that will 
reasonably assure the person will not pose a danger to the 
safety of any other person or the community . . . [or that] the 
person is unlikely to abide by any condition or combination of 
conditions of release."  Such findings are not relevant in the 
context of a revocation of pretrial probation.  If the 
Commonwealth moves to revoke pretrial probation, and the judge 
finds that the juvenile has violated the conditions of pretrial 
probation, the judge must revoke.  See Tim T., 437 Mass. at 596-
597.  No finding of dangerousness or future unlikeliness to 
abide by conditions of release is necessary.  See id. 
 
Taken together, these three incongruences demonstrate that 
G. L. c. 276, § 58B, does not govern the revocation of pretrial 
probation. 
 
b.  Statutory guidance.  Because the Legislature has not 
prescribed a method in G. L. c. 276, § 87, for the revocation of 
pretrial probation, we look to other statutes for guidance.  In 
Jake J., 433 Mass. at 77-79, we held that courts could look to 
12 
 
 
statutes that were "especially relevant" when filling in a 
similar statutory gap.6  Here, we conclude that G. L. c. 119, 
§ 54A, the juvenile pretrial diversion statute, is particularly 
relevant and therefore can provide needed guidance. 
 
Pretrial diversion is particularly relevant because it is 
so similar to pretrial probation.  Both pretrial diversion and 
pretrial probation involve a stay or continuance of the 
                     
 
6 At the time of Jake J. v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 70, 71, 
77-79 (2000), the Legislature had allowed courts to set pretrial 
conditions of release, but had not provided an enforcement 
mechanism to handle violations of those conditions.  We 
concluded that courts could look to G. L. c. 276, § 58B, for 
procedures to use in addressing violations of pretrial 
conditions.  Subsequent to our decision in Jake J., supra, the 
Legislature amended G. L. c. 276, § 58B, to apply to violations 
of pretrial conditions of release that were imposed pursuant to 
G. L. c. 276, § 87.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58B, as amended through 
St. 2014, c. 260, § 39. 
 
 
In Jake J., 433 Mass. at 77-78, we also observed that it 
would be irrational for the Legislature to give courts the 
authority to set pretrial conditions of release without also 
providing the authority "to enforce those conditions or sanction 
their violation."  Therefore, we concluded that courts had 
inherent authority to revoke a juvenile's bail for violations of 
pretrial conditions of release.  See id.  See also Brach v. 
Chief Justice of the Dist. Court Dep't, 386 Mass. 528, 535 
(1982), quoting Sheriff of Middlesex County v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 383 Mass. 631, 636 (1981) (courts may exercise their 
inherent power when it is "essential to the function of the 
judicial department, to the maintenance of its authority, or to 
its capacity to decide cases").  The same rationale applies with 
respect to pretrial probation.  Through G. L. c. 276, § 87, the 
Legislature allowed pretrial probation without creating a method 
for its revocation.  Just as with pretrial conditions of 
release, because G. L. c. 276, § 87, allows for pretrial 
probation, courts have inherent authority to revoke pretrial 
probation despite the absence of an explicit statutory 
authorization. 
13 
 
 
proceedings.  See G. L. c. 119, § 54A (c) (1) 
("proceedings . . . shall be stayed for [ninety] days"); Tim T., 
437 Mass. at 597 ("judge may . . . continue the case for a 
probationary period").  Both involve supervision by the 
probation service.  See G. L. c. 119, § 54A (f) (1) ("probation 
officer or the program director shall . . . [indicate] 
successful completion of diversion . . . [or recommend] 
extension"); Tim T., supra ("judge may place a defendant on 
pretrial probation").  Both lead to the dismissal of the case 
upon successful completion.  See G. L. c. 119, § 54A (f) (2); 
Tim T., supra.  In both types of proceedings, the only recourse 
for a violation is to return the case to the trial calendar.  
See G. L. c. 119, § 54A (e); Rodriguez, 441 Mass. at 1003, 
quoting Tim T., supra at 596. 
 
The pretrial diversion statute identifies probable cause as 
the standard of proof for violations based on new criminal 
offenses.  See G. L. c. 119, § 54A (e).  Therefore, we conclude 
that the standard of probable cause should apply to revocations 
of pretrial probation based on new criminal offenses.  As 
discussed infra, this standard complies with the mandates of due 
process.  General Laws c. 119, § 54A, however, does not contain 
a standard of proof for noncriminal violations.  Without 
statutory guidance on this point, we turn to principles of due 
process to determine the required standard of proof for such 
14 
 
 
violations. 
 
3.  Procedural due process.  The doctrine of procedural due 
process mandates that deprivations of life, liberty, or property 
be "implemented in a fair manner."  Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 
Mass. 691, 703 (2017), citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
335 (1976).7  Due process "is a flexible concept . . . [that] 
depend[s] on the circumstances of each case."  Durling, 407 
Mass. at 113-114.  To determine the constitutionality of the 
procedures at issue, we apply the test discussed in Mathews, 
supra at 334-335, which balances "the private interests 
affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the probable value 
of additional or substitute safeguards, and the governmental 
interests involved" (citation omitted).  See Noe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 5340 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 480 Mass. 
195, 202 (2018) (Noe). 
 
In Durling, 407 Mass. at 113, we concluded that the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution required the following procedural protections at 
probation revocation hearings: 
"(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation 
or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee 
of the evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in 
                     
 
7 As the parties do not make any argument regarding 
substantive due process, see generally Paquette v. Commonwealth, 
440 Mass. 121, 124-125 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 
(2004) (discussing substantive due process), we do not reach the 
issue. 
15 
 
 
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; 
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds 
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a neutral 
and detached hearing body such as a traditional parole 
board, members of which need not be judicial officers or 
lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as 
to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking 
[probation or] parole." 
 
Id., quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973).  We 
observed that "[u]nsubstantiated and unreliable hearsay 
cannot . . . be the entire basis of a probation revocation."  
Durling, supra at 118.  Subsequent to our decision in Durling, 
supra, we further determined that probation violations must be 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. 
Holmgren, 421 Mass. 224, 226 (1995), citing Commonwealth v. 
Maggio, 414 Mass. 193, 198 (1993). 
 
With these standards in mind, we undertake the analysis set 
forth in Mathews to determine whether these requirements also 
should apply to pretrial probation revocation hearings.  See 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-335.  The threshold inquiry under 
Mathews is whether the revocation of pretrial probation 
constitutes a deprivation of life, liberty, or property.  See 
id. at 332; Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 674–675 (1993).  
Here, when the Commonwealth promised to dismiss the case upon 
successful completion of pretrial probation, the juvenile gained 
an interest in maintaining the benefit of that agreement.  Cf. 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) ("mutually 
16 
 
 
explicit understandings" can create due process interests that 
did not exist previously).  If that benefit is revoked, the 
juvenile is re-exposed to a delinquency prosecution, which can 
result in incarceration.  See G. L. c. 119, § 58.  Therefore, a 
liberty interest is at stake, and we must balance the factors 
set forth in Mathews, supra, to determine the process that is 
due.  See Querubin v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 108, 112 (2003), 
citing Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 503 (2000) 
("Freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental right"). 
 
a.  Private interests.  A juvenile clearly has a 
substantial interest in avoiding incarceration.  See In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (noting severity of incarceration 
in juvenile detention home); Querubin, 440 Mass. at 112.  
Although revocation does not lead directly to incarceration, 
placing the case back on the trial calendar allows for the 
possibility of a delinquency finding and commitment to a locked 
facility of the Department of Youth Services.  See G. L. c. 119, 
§ 58 (outlining sentencing tools available in Juvenile Court). 
 
Even if the juvenile were never incarcerated, a delinquency 
proceeding exposes the child to the "stigma of being perceived 
to be a criminal."  See Commonwealth v. Newton N., 478 Mass. 
747, 755 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 
562, 576 (2013); Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 816 
(2013) ("avoidance of attaching the stigma of a criminal to the 
17 
 
 
child is of great importance" [citation omitted]); Commonwealth 
v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 467 (2012) (noting "stigma and 
collateral consequences of a delinquency adjudication"). 
 
A delinquency complaint, with or without a finding of 
delinquency, also can have harmful collateral consequences for a 
juvenile.  Once a delinquency case is arraigned, "the juvenile's 
name and delinquency charge become part of the juvenile's 
permanent [court activity record information (CARI)]."  Newton 
N., 478 Mass. at 755, quoting Humberto H., 466 Mass. at 572.  A 
CARI record is "accessible to the justices and probation 
officers of the courts, to the police commissioner for the city 
of Boston, to all chiefs of police and city marshals, and to 
such departments of the [S]tate and local governments as the 
commissioner [of probation] may determine."  Humberto H., supra 
at 572–573, quoting G. L. c. 276, § 100.  Even a sealed record 
"may . . . be made available to a judge 'for the purpose of 
consideration in imposing sentence.'"  Humberto H., supra at 
573, quoting G. L. c. 276, § 100B.8  "'[P]rior records or lack 
                     
 
8 Additionally, juvenile arrest and adjudication records can 
be accessed by the Department of Children and Families, G. L. 
c. 6, § 172B; specific agencies that establish, modify, or 
enforce child support payments, G. L. c. 6, § 172D; the 
Department of Early Education and Care, G. L. c. 6, § 172F; 
children's camps, G. L. c. 6, § 172G; and other children's 
programs, G. L. c. 6, § 172H.  Certain delinquency adjudications 
for drug trafficking result in driver's license suspensions.  
G. L. c. 90, § 22 1/2.  See G. L. c. 94C, § 32E.  If a juvenile 
18 
 
 
thereof may be significant in the initial decision' whether to 
charge a juvenile with a crime."  Humberto H., supra, quoting 
Police Comm'r of Boston v. Municipal Court of the Dorchester 
Dist., 374 Mass. 640, 656 n.10 (1978).  Moreover, juvenile 
adjudications can be predicate offenses for sentencing 
enhancements.  See Commonwealth v. Foreman, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 
801, 802 (2005).  Therefore, a juvenile's interest in 
maintaining the benefit of the pretrial probation agreement is 
significant. 
 
Nonetheless, the juvenile's liberty interest here is less 
than that in a postdisposition probation revocation hearing, 
where a juvenile faces immediate incarceration.  See Juvenile 
Court Standing Order 1–17(VIII)(e), (f) (2017).  As stated, the 
only direct recourse for a violation of pretrial probation is 
return to the trial calendar.  See Tim T., 437 Mass. at 596.  
Although the stigma and collateral consequences associated with 
a delinquency adjudication are detrimental to the juvenile, many 
of those consequences attached when the initial charges were 
                     
is adjudicated delinquent on a felony charge, and a school 
believes that the presence of that juvenile in the school would 
have a "substantial detrimental effect on the general welfare of 
the school," the school may expel the juvenile.  See G. L. 
c. 71, § 37H 1/2.  Any juvenile who is "adjudicated a youthful 
offender [for] an offense that would be punishable by 
imprisonment in the [S]tate prison if committed by an adult" 
must submit a deoxyribonucleic acid sample to the probation 
service.  G. L. c. 22E, § 3. 
19 
 
 
brought, and only increase to a limited degree upon the 
revocation of pretrial probation.  Therefore, revocation 
implicates a lesser private interest in the pretrial context 
than in the postdisposition context. 
 
b.  Erroneous deprivation.  We next examine "the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of [these private interests] through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards."  See Noe, 480 Mass. 
at 203, quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-335.  In the context of 
postdisposition probation revocation, a probationer has no 
remaining procedural safeguards after the revocation process.  
If a judge revokes postdisposition probation, the judge may 
sentence the probationer immediately.  See Juvenile Court 
Standing Order 1–17(VIII)(e), (f). 
 
This risk stands in sharp contrast to the pretrial 
probation revocation setting.  As discussed supra, the 
resumption of a prosecution can have detrimental effects on the 
juvenile, apart from any potential later finding of delinquency.  
The most significant interests at stake for the juvenile, 
however, are the avoidance of a delinquency finding and the 
possible incarceration that could follow.  Those interests are 
protected by the full array of trial rights, even if a judge 
revokes pretrial probation.  Therefore, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation is much lower in the pretrial probation context, and 
20 
 
 
the probable value of additional safeguards is reduced. 
 
c.  Government interests.  The government's interests in 
the pretrial probation context are quite similar to those in the 
postdisposition probation revocation context.  In both contexts, 
the government has an interest in achieving an "efficient and 
economic administration of its affairs" (citation omitted).  
Querubin, 440 Mass. at 117.  See Durling, 407 Mass. at 116 
("Commonwealth has an interest in expeditiously dealing with 
[probation violations]").  The application of the Durling 
procedures could frustrate this interest by delaying revocation 
proceedings.  See Commonwealth v. Pena, 462 Mass. 183, 185 & n.3 
(2012) (thirteen months between initial violation notice and 
revocation hearing); Durling, supra at 110 (five months between 
violation notice and revocation hearing). 
 
The government may have an even greater temporal interest 
in the pretrial context because a lengthy revocation process 
could lead to the Commonwealth prosecuting "a stale case, with 
all the difficulties that plague such a delayed trial -- 
disintegrating evidence, fading memories, inability to locate 
crucial witnesses."  See Commonwealth v. Powell, 453 Mass. 320, 
327 (2009), quoting Tim T., 437 Mass. at 596.  This concern does 
not exist in the postdisposition probation context, where the 
underlying charges already have been adjudicated. 
 
In addition, the government has an interest in ensuring 
21 
 
 
compliance with the lawful orders of its courts.  See Paquette 
v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 129 (2003), cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 1150 (2004).  Application of the postdisposition 
requirements could result in fewer revocations, which might 
weaken incentives for compliance with pretrial conditions of 
probation.  On the other hand, the government also has an 
interest in ensuring a "reliable, accurate evaluation of whether 
the probationer indeed violated the conditions of his [or her] 
probation."  See Durling, 407 Mass. at 116.  Overall, the 
government interests in the pretrial probation context are 
similar to those in the postdisposition probation context. 
 
d.  Balancing.  The balance of the interests in the 
pretrial probation context is quite different from those in the 
postdisposition context.  Avoiding incarceration, the foremost 
private interest in each context, is only indirectly at stake in 
the context of pretrial probation.  The risk of erroneous 
deprivation also is lower in the pretrial context, as the 
juvenile retains all trial rights.  As stated, the government 
interest is similar in the two contexts.  Therefore, balancing 
all these interests, the full procedural requirements set forth 
in Durling, 407 Mass. at 113, 118, are not required. 
 
The juvenile, however, retains certain procedural due 
process rights.  "An essential principle of due process is that 
a deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by 
22 
 
 
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of 
the case.'"  Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 
542 (1985), quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).  Given the juvenile's substantial 
interest in maintaining the benefit of the pretrial probation 
agreement, the juvenile must receive written notice of the 
alleged violations and an opportunity to contest those 
allegations.  The type of hearing and the standard of proof, 
however, depend on the type of violation. 
 
We derived the probable cause standard of proof for 
violations based on new criminal offenses from G. L. c. 119, 
§ 54A, as discussed supra.  Probable cause generally can be 
established based on the "four corners" of the application for a 
complaint, without an evidentiary hearing.  See Newton N., 478 
Mass. at 751, quoting Humberto H., 466 Mass. at 565 (motion to 
dismiss for lack of probable cause is based on "four corners of 
the complaint application").  See also Commonwealth v. Orbin O., 
478 Mass. 759, 762 (2018).  To determine whether probable cause 
and nonevidentiary hearings comply with due process here, we 
compare the revocation of pretrial probation with predisposition 
proceedings that utilize those procedures.  Probable cause is 
the standard of proof constitutionally required for arrests, 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975), and delinquency 
complaints, Humberto H., supra at 565-566.  Nonevidentiary 
23 
 
 
proceedings, without the right to confrontation, are 
constitutionally sufficient in bail hearings, Querubin, 440 
Mass. at 118; motions to dismiss for lack of probable cause, 
Humberto H., supra at 565; and motions for continuances prior to 
dangerousness hearings, Commonwealth v. Lester L., 445 Mass. 
250, 251 (2005). 
 
Based on the balancing test set forth in Mathews, 424 U.S. 
at 334-335, those predisposition proceedings require at least as 
much procedural protection as does a proceeding for the 
revocation of pretrial probation.  Arrests, delinquency 
complaints, and motions for continuances of dangerousness 
hearings all can lead to immediate incarceration.  See Gerstein, 
420 U.S. at 111 (arrest); G. L. c. 276, § 58 (delinquency 
complaint can result in juvenile being held on bail); G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (4) (continuance of dangerousness hearing).  
Pretrial probation involves a lesser private interest because it 
cannot result directly in immediate incarceration.  See 
Rodriguez, 441 Mass. at 1003, citing Tim T., 437 Mass. at 596.  
Some of those predisposition proceedings also involve greater 
government interests than are present in the pretrial probation 
context.  For example, continuances of dangerousness hearings 
involve the government's interest in preventing dangerous 
persons from committing acts of violence.  See G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A (4).  But the common thread in all these contexts is that 
24 
 
 
trial rights remain intact, providing a safeguard against more 
serious erroneous deprivations.  We therefore conclude that the 
revocation of a juvenile's pretrial probation, without an 
evidentiary hearing, based on probable cause that a new criminal 
offense was committed, complies with due process. 
 
The issuance of a complaint, of course, does not allow the 
Commonwealth unilaterally to revoke a juvenile's pretrial 
probation.  The imposition of pretrial probation is a court 
order that can be revoked only by the judge who is considering 
the revocation.  Cf. Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 50 Mass. App. 
Ct. 220, 223 n.8 (2000), S.C., 435 Mass. 1005 (2001) (noting 
that probation term negotiated by parties as part of plea 
agreement is "independently enforceable as an order of the 
court").9  In order to revoke pretrial probation based on a new 
offense, the judge must make an independent finding of probable 
cause.10 
                     
 
9 We note as well that the Commonwealth clearly is not 
required to bring a motion to revoke pretrial probation whenever 
a new delinquency complaint is issued.  The Commonwealth can use 
its executive discretion to allow pretrial probation to 
continue, notwithstanding the new complaint. 
 
 
10 In a revocation hearing based on a new delinquency 
complaint, the subject of debate will be whether the application 
for the complaint establishes probable cause.  This is the same 
subject matter as a potential motion to dismiss the new 
complaint for lack of probable cause.  See Commonwealth v. 
Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 564-565 (2013) (juvenile can bring 
motion to dismiss complaint for lack of probable cause).  
25 
 
 
 
The juvenile in this case argues that he was not given 
sufficient notice that his pretrial probation could be 
terminated based solely on a finding of probable cause.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 453 Mass. 474, 479 (2009) (due process 
"requires that a defendant sentenced to probation receive fair 
warning of conduct that may result in the revocation of 
probation").  Although we conclude that the judge's actions here 
complied with due process, we recognize that warnings regarding 
the standard of proof of a pretrial probation violation would be 
helpful.  Therefore, we urge that, when a judge places a 
juvenile on pretrial probation, the judge warn the juvenile that 
the pretrial probation can be terminated if a judge finds 
probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed a new 
criminal offense.  Cf. Paquette, 440 Mass. at 126, quoting G. L. 
c. 276, § 58 (juvenile "must be advised that . . . 'should [he 
or she] be charged with a crime[,] . . . bail may be revoked'"). 
 
Noncriminal violations require different procedures.  By 
definition, there is no complaint or police report, so evidence 
must be introduced to establish a violation.  The balancing of 
                     
Despite the overlapping subject matter, the motion to dismiss is 
a separate proceeding and a separate judicial determination.  If 
the Commonwealth establishes at a revocation hearing probable 
cause that a violation occurred, the juvenile is not foreclosed 
from later bringing a motion to dismiss under Humberto H., 
supra.  If a subsequent motion to dismiss is successful, 
pretrial probation need not be reinstated. 
26 
 
 
the factors from Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-335, also is 
different.  Violations of noncriminal terms of probation are 
generally less harmful to society than criminal violations.  
Compare Juvenile Court Standing Order 1–17(III) (requiring 
probation service to issue notice of violation whenever juvenile 
probationer is charged with new offense) with Juvenile Court 
Standing Order 1–17(IV) (giving probation service discretion 
whether to issue notice of violation for noncriminal conduct).  
See Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.1, 7B1.4 (updated 
Nov. 2010) (shorter sentences for violations of noncriminal 
conditions of probation); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 537 
(2011) (implying that noncriminal violations are less harmful).  
Therefore, the government interest in revocations based on 
noncriminal violations is reduced, and procedural due process 
requires greater protections.  See Mathews, supra.  We conclude 
that proof by a preponderance of the evidence, a higher standard 
than probable cause, is required.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Brennan, 481 Mass. 146, 149 (2018) (probable cause is 
established by "reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to 
warrant a reasonable or prudent person in believing that the 
defendant has committed the offense"), with Commonwealth v. 
Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 434 & n.19 (2012) (preponderance means 
"more likely than not").  Because of the diminished government 
interest, and because an evidentiary hearing must be held, we 
27 
 
 
also conclude that the juvenile must be given the opportunity to 
introduce evidence to rebut allegations of noncriminal 
violations.  Although the juvenile's right to present rebuttal 
evidence occasionally may require the revocation hearing to be 
continued to the next court date, we anticipate that such delays 
will not be protracted. 
 
Conclusion.  We answer the reported questions as follows: 
 
1.  "General Laws c. 276, § 58B, does not govern the 
revocation of pretrial probation of a juvenile." 
 
2.  "To revoke a juvenile's pretrial probation based on a 
new criminal offense, a judge must find probable cause that the 
juvenile committed the offense.  All other violations must be 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence." 
 
3.  "For a revocation of a juvenile's pretrial probation, 
due process requires notice of the alleged violations, 
opportunity to be heard, and a judicial finding that a condition 
was violated.  The other evidentiary requirements in 
Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108 (1990), do not apply to 
juvenile pretrial probation revocation hearings." 
 
The matter is remanded to the Juvenile Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.