Case Title: ORONA-RANGAL v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-62

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
ORONA-RANGAL v. STATE2002 WY 13453 P.3d 1080Case Number: 01-62Decided: 09/11/2002
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

MARCOS 
ORONA-RANGAL,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Assistant Appellate Counsel 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Attorney General  

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Marcos 
Orona-Rangal drove his vehicle at a high speed through a stop light, killing one 
person and injuring two others.  A 
jury convicted him on one count of aggravated homicide by vehicle under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001) and two counts of reckless 
endangerment under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-504(a) (LexisNexis 2001).  He appeals, claiming the trial court 
erred in admitting testimony regarding the deceased's pregnancy and insufficient 
evidence existed to convict him on each count.  Finding no reversible error, we 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES 

 

[¶2]      Mr. Orona-Rangal 
presents these issues for our review:

 

            
I.  Did the trial court err in allowing irrelevant evidence of 
the deceased's pregnancy; and in the alternative, if relevant, was such evidence 
unduly prejudicial to Appellant?

 

            
II.  Was there insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of 
the charges of reckless endangerment?

 

            
III.  Was there insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of 
the crime of aggravated homicide by vehicle, as the evidence indicated that the 
proximate cause of death was the action of Mr. Gomez, the individual who pursued 
Appellant?

 

The 
State of Wyoming phrases the issues as:

 

            
I.  Did the district court err in admitting relevant evidence of the 
pregnancy of Appellant's victim?

 

            
II.  Does the record contain sufficient evidence to support 
Appellant's convictions?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Mr. Orona-Rangal, 
age twenty-nine, and Christina Gomez, age eighteen, were engaged in a romantic 
relationship.  The record is unclear 
as to whether Ms. Gomez's parents were aware of the relationship.  On February 29, 2000, Ms. Gomez met Mr. 
Orona-Rangal after school at a nearby convenience store.  He then drove her to work where they 
noticed her father, Rufujio Gomez, waiting in the parking lot.  Mr. Orona-Rangal sped out of the parking 
lot.  Mr. Gomez followed, and a 
high-speed chase ensued.  Several 
witnesses recounted that both Mr. Orona-Rangal and Mr. Gomez traveled at high 
rates of speed, passed through multiple red lights, and wove through traffic, 
barely missing other vehicles.  

            

[¶4]      Two accident 
reconstruction experts testified that Mr. Orona-Rangal was traveling at a 
minimum speed of seventy to seventy-two miles per hour in a forty-miles-per-hour 
zone when he reached the intersection where the accident occurred.  Leona Moon was waiting at the 
intersection for her light to change.  
When her light turned green, she entered the intersection to make a 
left-hand turn.  Mr. Orona-Rangal 
drove through his red light, attempted to brake, and crashed into the driver's 
side of Ms. Moon's vehicle.  The 
vehicle was propelled across the intersection where it collided with Joan Suhr's 
vehicle.  Ms. Suhr and Ms. Gomez 
were injured, and Ms. Moon died at the scene of the 
accident.

 

[¶5]      After a three-day 
trial, the jury found Mr. Orona-Rangal guilty on one count of aggravated 
homicide by vehicle and two counts of reckless endangerment.  The trial court sentenced him to serve 
two consecutive one-year terms in the Natrona County Detention Center on the 
reckless endangerment counts plus a consecutive term of twelve to seventeen 
years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary on the aggravated homicide count.  Mr. Orona-Rangal 
appeals.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.        
Admission of Evidence

 

[¶6]      Ms. Moon was 
seven months' pregnant at the time of the fatal accident.  Prior to trial, Mr. Orona-Rangal filed a 
motion, seeking to exclude any reference to her pregnancy.  The trial court denied the motion while 
cautioning the prosecution to refrain from dwelling upon the pregnancy any more 
than necessary.  Mr. Orona-Rangal 
filed a motion to reconsider the denial and additionally offered to stipulate 
that Ms. Moon's death was a direct result of the collision with his 
vehicle.  The state rejected the 
stipulation, and the trial court denied the motion to reconsider but proposed 
the defense submit a cautionary instruction concerning Ms. Moon's 
pregnancy.  The defense did not 
submit a cautionary instruction on this issue.

 

[¶7]      At trial, 
evidence of Ms. Moon's pregnancy arose in four contexts.  In the prosecution's opening statement, 
the prosecutor explained to the jury that Ms. Moon was twenty-one years old, 
seven months' pregnant, and engaged to be married.  The prosecution's first witness was Ms. 
Moon's fiancé.  The prosecutor asked 
him, "[W]hat was her physical condition at the time that you resided with her," 
and he responded that she was seven months' pregnant.  Next, the prosecution asked James 
Thorpen, M.D., the Natrona County coroner, to describe Ms. Moon's injuries.  In addition to his testimony that the 
cause of her death was "[m]assive recent chest, abdominal, and pelvic injuries," 
Dr. Thorpen told the jury the force of the impact caused extensive hemorrhaging 
of the placenta from the uterus which led to the fetus' death.  In closing argument, the prosecutor 
alluded to the pregnancy stating Ms. Moon was "about to engage in the most 
important aspect of her life.  She 
was about ready to start a family, and she was about ready to get 
married."

 

[¶8]      Mr. Orona-Rangal 
argues the evidence of Ms. Moon's pregnancy was irrelevant and inadmissible or, 
in the alternative, if the evidence was relevant, it should have been excluded 
as highly prejudicial because it appealed to the jurors' sympathy for Ms. Moon 
and created a sense of outrage against him.  In response, the state contends the 
evidence was relevant for three reasons.  
First, it tended to prove Ms. Moon's identity.  Second, it showed she was more likely to 
exercise caution while driving and, thus, her actions did not contribute to the 
accident which caused her death.  
And, finally, evidence of her physical condition at the time of the 
accident was relevant to determine the cause of her death.  

 

[¶9]      Evidence is 
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence."  
W.R.E. 401.  Generally, all 
relevant evidence is admissible; however, irrelevant evidence is not 
admissible.  W.R.E. 402.  In criminal cases, "[e]vidence is always 
relevant if it tends to prove or disprove one of the elements of the crime 
charged."  Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 809 
(Wyo. 1980); see also Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶42, 43 P.3d 80, ¶42 (Wyo. 2002); Geiger v. 
State, 859 P.2d 665, 667 (Wyo. 1993).  
Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if "its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."  W.R.E. 403.  For this court to conclude that the 
trial court admitted unduly prejudicial evidence in violation of W.R.E. 403, the 
appellant must demonstrate "that the evidence had little or no probative value 
and that it was extremely inflammatory or introduced for the purpose of 
inflaming the jury."  Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 
(Wyo. 1981).  The trial court is 
given broad discretion in ruling on questions concerning the relevancy of 
evidence, and we will reverse its decision only when there is a clear abuse of 
discretion.  

 

[¶10]   We have said:

 

"Evidentiary 
rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include 
determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, 
materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This court will generally accede to the 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court 
clearly abused its discretion."  Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 
1999) (citation omitted).  We have 
described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the 
reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  "In the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination."  [Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, ¶7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001).]  The 
burden is on the defendant to establish such abuse.

 

Skinner 
v. State, 
2001 WY 102, ¶25, 33 P.3d 758, ¶25 (Wyo. 2001), cert denied, 122 S. Ct. 1554 (2002) 
(some citations omitted).

 

[¶11]   To determine whether the trial 
court erred by allowing evidence of Ms. Moon's pregnancy at the time of the 
accident, we must inquire as to whether the evidence was relevant to the charges 
and, if it was relevant, whether its possible prejudicial effect on the jury 
outweighed its probative value.  The 
state asserts evidence of Ms. Moon's pregnancy was relevant because it tended to 
prove her identity.  Although her 
identity was not in dispute, in every homicide case the state must establish the 
identity of the person killed.  
Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶13, 49 P.3d 975, ¶13 (Wyo. 2002); State v. Broberg, 677 A.2d 602, 610-12 
(Md. 1996); State v. Frederick, 554 So. 2d 1288, 1292 (La. Ct. App. 1989) ("Defendant's contention that he did not 
put the identity of the victim in dispute did not relieve the state of the 
burden of establishing the identity of the victim beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Identification is a material 
issue in any criminal case."  
(Citation omitted.)).  "The 
ultimate test, however, is whether or not the probative value of the description 
outweighs its probable inflammatory effect."  Frederick, 554 So. 2d  at 1292.  This case is not an example of an 
instance where there were any lingering doubts about the victim's identity.  See Frederick, 554 So. 2d 1288 (holding 
victim's pregnant condition was pertinent for identification purposes because 
she was murdered and thrown off a bridge into a body of water.  Law enforcement subsequently required 
dental records and the aid of family and friends to prove her identity).  Ms. Moon's identity was not a 
consequential fact at trial; thus, presentation of evidence regarding her 
pregnant condition to prove her identity was not necessary or 
relevant.

 

[¶12]   Next, the state argues the evidence 
was relevant to show Ms. Moon was more likely driving with great caution and 
was, therefore, not the cause of the accident, presumably relying on a theory 
that pregnant women tend to be more cautious drivers.  This argument is less than compelling 
since the defense did not contend Ms. Moon's driving was responsible for the 
accident.  The state asserts the 
defense's accident reconstruction expert attempted to undermine eyewitness 
testimony that Ms. Moon entered the intersection with great caution and 
legally.  A review of the record 
disproves the state's contention.  
The state's expert concluded Mr. Orona-Rangal was traveling at 
seventy-two miles per hour, the defense's experts concluded his speed was 
seventy miles per hour, and neither suggested Ms. Moon was in any way at 
fault.1 

 

[¶13]   Finally, the state maintains the 
evidence was relevant to explore whether Ms. Moon's pregnancy was a factor, 
apart from Mr. Orona-Rangal's actions, in her death.  However, Mr. Orona-Rangal did not argue 
her pregnancy was the proximate cause of her death.  In fact, he tried to stipulate that the 
collision was the proximate cause of her death.  In its brief, the state asserts Mr. 
Orona-Rangal conceded in his appellate brief that Dr. Thorpen's testimony 
revealed the pregnancy played a part in her death.2  Upon a careful review of Mr. 
Orona-Rangal's brief, it is apparent the state's assertion regarding the 
"concession" is unsupported and misleading.  Moreover, at no time did Dr. Thorpen 
even insinuate Ms. Moon's pregnancy contributed to her death.  The pertinent part of his testimony is 
as follows:

 

She 
was also pregnant, in her third trimester, approximately seven months.  There was extensive hemorrhage to the 
placenta, which was attached inside of the uterus.  The fetus was also dead but exhibited no 
particular traumatic injuries.  The 
. . . cause of the fetal death would be because -- the fetus died 
because the placenta was separated and was due to the high-energy impact.  The fetus is protected within the uterus 
--

 

[Objection 
lodged.]

 

The 
trial court overruled the defense's objection stating the pregnancy evidence was 
an integral part of the medical evidence and it would have been difficult for 
Dr. Thorpen to edit his testimony to exclude it.  Even if it was somehow necessary for Dr. 
Thorpen to reference Ms. Moon's pregnancy to assure a complete evaluation of her 
injuries, the prosecution took undue advantage of that necessity by referring to 
the pregnancy in opening argument, closing argument, and Ms. Moon's fiancé's 
direct testimony.  Any probative 
value of presenting the evidence in those instances was substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice.

 

[¶14]   In Lewek v. State, 702 So. 2d 527, 534 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), a vehicular homicide case, the court held similar 
testimony was unduly prejudicial and could only be calculated to play upon the 
jury's passions and invoke sympathy for the victims of the accident.  In that case, three witnesses testified 
the victim was pregnant, and one witness mentioned the baby was due to be born 
three days after the accident.  702 So. 2d  at 533-34.  Similarly, in People v. Lewis, 651 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. 
1995), the Illinois Supreme Court held the evidence of the victim's pregnancy 
bore no relationship to the appellant's guilt or innocence and was, therefore, 
inadmissible.  The court stated, 
"[E]vidence that a murder victim was pregnant at the time of her murder is no 
more welcome than evidence that the victim left behind a family."  651 N.E.2d  at 84.

 

[¶15]   We are persuaded by this reasoning 
and conclude evidence of Ms. Moon's pregnant condition was irrelevant.  Furthermore, the evidence does not 
satisfy this court's W.R.E. 403 balancing test.  Had the evidence been properly excluded, 
the prosecution's case would not have suffered any significant damage.  Trial courts must exercise great caution 
so defendants will be convicted on the basis of the evidence pertinent to the 
crimes charged and not on the basis of evidence calculated to appeal to the 
jury's passions or prejudices.  
After reviewing the record, we conclude evidence of Ms. Moon's pregnancy 
was irrelevant because it did not make any fact that was of consequence to the 
determination of Mr. Orona-Rangal's guilt more probable or less probable and 
should have been excluded.

 

[¶16]   Having determined the trial court 
committed error, we must ascertain whether the error affected any substantial 
rights of the accused, providing grounds for reversal, or whether it was 
harmless.3  The harmless error standard is set out 
in W.R.A.P. 9.04:  "Any error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall 
be disregarded by the reviewing court."  
See also W.R.Cr.P. 52(a).  An error is harmful if there is a 
reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
defendant had the error never occurred.  
To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under 
"circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct 
which offends the public sense of fair play."  Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 
(Wyo. 1990); see 75A Am. Jur. 
2d Trial § 666 (1991).  The evidence against Mr. Orona-Rangal 
was overwhelming and was strongly supported by multiple eyewitnesses.  There is not a reasonable possibility 
that, but for the evidence of Ms. Moon's pregnancy, the verdict might have been 
more favorable.  We conclude the 
evidence, although prejudicial, was harmless.   However, we want to make it clear 
that we foresee only rare circumstances where the evidence of the victim's 
pregnancy would be relevant in a criminal prosecution.  If the state's evidence is not as 
compelling as in the case before us, the introduction of such evidence may 
necessitate reversal.

 

B.        
Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Reckless Endangerment 
Charges

 

[¶17]   Mr. Orona-Rangal argues there was 
insufficient evidence to support his convictions for reckless endangerment 
because the victims were not seriously injured.  The reckless endangerment statute, § 
6-2-504(a), provides, "A person is guilty of reckless endangering if he 
recklessly engages in conduct which places another person in danger of death or 
serious bodily injury."  He contends 
evidence of actual serious bodily injury is required because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-104(a)(ix) (LexisNexis 2001) defines "recklessly" as the following 
conduct:  "A person acts recklessly 
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
harm he is accused of causing will occur, and the harm results."  Mr. Orona-Rangal claims that, when these 
two provisions are read together, the "harm" contemplated in the definition of 
"recklessly" is death or serious bodily injury.  Thus, he contends death or serious 
bodily injury must result before a person can be convicted of reckless 
endangerment and neither Ms. Gomez nor Ms. Suhr incurred serious bodily 
injury.

 

[¶18]   In deciding this issue, we must 
apply our well established standard for construing 
statutes.

  

We 
attempt to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent.  We begin by making an "inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection.'"  
Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish 
Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. 
Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)).  We construe statutes as a whole, giving 
effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts 
of the statutes on the same subject.  
We give effect to the plain language of unambiguous statutes.  We resort to extrinsic aids of statutory 
interpretation, such as legislative history or intent, only when statutes are 
ambiguous.  

 

Dike 
v. State, 
990 P.2d 1012, 1018 (Wyo. 1999) (some citations omitted).  Although the legislature could have 
written § 6-2-504(a) and § 6-1-104(a)(ix) so the two provisions would dovetail 
more seamlessly, we believe the definition of "recklessly" does not require 
"death or serious bodily injury."  
Rather, the term "harm" in the definition of "recklessly" refers to 
engaging "in conduct which places another person in danger of death or serious 
bodily injury."  It logically 
follows that the harm which must result is actually placing another person in 
danger of death or serious bodily injury.  
This interpretation gives effect to the plain language of § 
6-2-504(a).  Mr. Orona-Rangal's 
interpretation of the statute is simply incorrect. 

 

[¶19]   Using the appropriate 
interpretation of the statutes, we address the claim that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain the convictions for reckless endangerment by examining 
the evidence concerning whether Mr. Orona-Rangal's actions actually put the 
injured victims in danger of death or serious bodily injury, and we apply the 
following standard:

 

This 
Court assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough 
to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State.  We will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our 
only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury 
actually did.

 

Hodges 
v. State, 
904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 1995) (citation omitted); see also Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 
368 (Wyo. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001).  In this instance, 
there was ample evidence for the jury to conclude as it did.  Mr. Orona-Rangal's excessive speed, 
disregard for traffic laws, and erratic driving resulted in a collision of such 
force that Ms. Moon's vehicle was propelled across the intersection and collided 
with Ms. Suhr's vehicle.  That 
collision injured both Ms. Gomez and Ms. Suhr, and only good fortune prevented 
those injuries from being much more serious.  More than sufficient evidence existed to 
prove Mr. Orona-Rangal placed his passengerMs. Gomezand an unsuspecting third 
partyMs. Suhrin danger of death or serious bodily injury.  

 

C.        
Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Aggravated-Homicide-by-Vehicle 
Charge

 

[¶20]   Mr. Orona-Rangal contends 
insufficient evidence existed to support a required element of aggravated 
homicide by vehiclethat he was the proximate cause of Ms. Moon's death.  See § 6-2-106(b)(ii).  Instead, he asserts Mr. Gomez's chase 
was the proximate cause of the collision with Ms. Moon because, if Mr. Gomez had 
not chased him, the collision would not have occurred.  We apply the same 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard as set forth in the previous 
section.

 

[¶21]   The state argues that, at trial, 
Mr. Orona-Rangal specifically disclaimed the defense that Mr. Gomez was the 
proximate cause.  It points to the 
following colloquy:

 

THE 
COURT:  It looks like, [Defense 
Counsel] --correct me if I'm wrong -- that you're going to defend this on the 
grounds he was being chased by Mr. Gomez.

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Obvious -- well, I won't 
say obvious.  I'm not -- I do think 
that could account for lack of attention on his part at -- during different 
parts of the chase, as it were.  
Perhaps what I'm getting at will become clearer during Mr. 
Orona-Rang[a]l's testimony and closing argument.

 

THE 
COURT:  If you're going to assert 
that as a defense, you probably want to have some authority prepared for 
that.

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  I'm not going to assert 
it as a defense.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  He's not?

 

THE 
COURT:  That's what he 
indicated.  He said that would not 
be an affirmative defense.

 

Irrespective 
of the disclaimer, the burden is on the state to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, each element of the crime charged.  
Section 6-2-106(b)(ii) (emphasis added) is explicit and 
provides:

 

(b)  A 
person is guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years, 
if:

 

                        
. . .

 

(ii)  He 
operates or drives a vehicle in a reckless manner, and 
his conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another person. 

 

Therefore, 
whether or not Mr. Orona-Rangal disclaimed the "defense" that Mr. Gomez was the 
proximate cause of the accident, the state still bears the burden of proving 
proximate cause.  See McLaughlin v. State, 780 P.2d 964, 965 
(Wyo. 1989) (holding aggravated homicide by vehicle requires the state to prove 
the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the death of another 
person).  The state also maintains 
Mr. Orona-Rangal cannot raise the issue for the first time on appeal.  We find this argument unpersuasive since 
insufficiency of the evidence is generally raised for the first time on 
appeal.  

 

[¶22]   When the evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find 
the essential element of proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt.  Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo. 
1985).  "Proximate cause" was 
defined for the jury as "a cause which, in continuous sequence, unbroken by an 
independent, intervening cause, produces the injury.  It is one without which the injury would 
not have occurred.  It brings about 
the injury either immediately or through happenings which follow one after 
another."  "Proximate cause is a 
question of fact in the usual case, reserved for . . . determination 
by the trier of fact, unless the evidence is such that reasonable minds could 
not disagree."  Turcq v. Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 52 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

[¶23]   Mr. Gomez's actions were not the 
proximate cause of the victim's death because they did not, in a continuous 
sequence, produce the injury.  When 
Mr. Gomez began to pursue Mr. Orona-Rangal, the latter had many choices other 
than to drive at a high speed on the route he chose, ultimately smashing into 
Ms. Moon's vehicle.  Instead, Mr. 
Orona-Rangal's actions became the intervening cause which ultimately produced 
the injury.  Mr. Orona-Rangal's 
cited authority fails to support his theory.  In Parrish v. State, 97 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1957), a passenger armed with a bayonet forced the driver to 
pursue the victim, the passenger's former wife.  The victim attempted to flee by 
increasing her speed and ultimately disregarded a stop sign, struck another 
vehicle, and died.  97 So. 2d  at 
358.  A jury convicted the passenger 
of second-degree murder.  Id. at 357.  The Florida District Court of Appeal 
held the trial court correctly stated the law in its charge to the jury when it 
stated:  "[A] person who by actual 
assault or threat of violence causes another person to do an act resulting in 
physical or corporal injury causing such other person's death is criminally 
responsible for the homicide."  Id. at 359.  This case is factually distinguishable 
because no evidence was presented that Mr. Gomez brandished a weapon or, in any 
other way, forced Mr. Orona-Rangal to flee.  Mr. Orona-Rangal simply saw Mr. Gomez 
and chose to speed away, thereby causing Ms. Moon's death.  Under these circumstances, the Parrish decision is not 
applicable.

 

[¶24]   Mr. Orona-Rangal also asks this 
court to consider Wyoming decisions involving pursuits of suspects by law 
enforcement which hold an officer's conduct can be a proximate cause of a third 
person's injuries where circumstances indicate an officer's conduct was extreme 
or outrageous.  See Board of County Commissioners of Teton 
County ex rel. Teton County Sheriff's Department v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 
1086 (Wyo. 2000); DeWald v. State, 
719 P.2d 643, 650 (Wyo. 1986).  
These cases are analyzed under the civil concept of comparative fault; 
therefore, we do not find them persuasive.  

 

[¶25]   The state was required to present 
sufficient evidence so a jury could form a reasonable inference that Mr. 
Orona-Rangal's conduct was the cause which, in continuous sequence, unbroken by 
an independent, intervening cause, caused Ms. Moon's death. Considerable 
evidence was introduced through eyewitness testimony to demonstrate that Mr. 
Orona-Rangal drove at excessive speeds, deliberately disregarded multiple stop 
lights, remained steadfast in his attempt to elude Mr. Gomez despite several 
near-misses with other vehicles, and made numerous illegal and dangerous lane 
changes.  The jury clearly rejected 
Mr. Orona-Rangal's attempts to shift responsibility for his actions to Mr. 
Gomez.  These facts are sufficient 
to support a reasonable inference of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. 
Orona-Rangal was indeed the proximate cause of Ms. Moon's death.  We will not second-guess the jury's 
determination and will defer to its ability to fairly resolve conflicts in the 
testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the 
facts.  Willis v. State, 2002 WY 79, ¶8, 46 P.3d 890, ¶8 (Wyo. 
2002).  Based on the 
foregoing reasons, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. 
Orona-Rangal's conviction. 

 

[¶26]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

  1The defense's 
expert criticized the state's data suggesting reliance upon it would result in a 
conclusion that Ms. Moon was traveling twenty-eight miles per hour which was 
inconsistent with an eyewitness' testimony that she was at a complete stop at 
the intersection and, after the light turned green, she waited three seconds 
before proceeding slowly into the intersection.

 

  2In its brief, 
the state specifically states: "Indeed, in his brief, [Mr. Orona-Rangal] 
concedes that testimony showed that the pregnancy played a part in her 
death."  The state even directs this 
court to a specific page number in Mr. Orona-Rangal's appellate brief, yet we 
cannot find such a concession.

 

  3The state 
repeatedly argues that references to the testimony regarding the victim's 
pregnancy were limited and, therefore, not prejudicial.  It bolsters that theory by offering 
statistics as to the number of pages or lines in the transcript that arguably 
constitute error.  Apparently, the 
state erroneously assumes this court undertakes a quantitative rather than a 
qualitative analysis when reviewing whether the admission of certain testimony 
results in prejudicial error.  We 
remind the state of Miller v. State, 
904 P.2d 344, 354 (Wyo. 1995), wherein we held the exposure of a jury panel to a 
single statement by a prospective juror that the accused was a horse thief 
required reversal of the conviction.