Case Title: People v. Edwards

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87930

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 87930-Agenda 6-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								DONALD EDWARDS, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 20, 2001.
	 
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Donald Edwards, filed a pro se post-conviction petition in the circuit court of Champaign County
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1
et seq. (West 1998)) in which he alleged that, following the entry
of his guilty plea, his court-appointed attorney refused his request
to "file an appeal" and became "totally unavailable in regard to the
case." The circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous or
patently without merit. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West
1998). The appellate court affirmed. 305 Ill. App. 3d 853. For the
reasons that follow, we reverse the judgments of the circuit and
appellate courts.
BACKGROUND
	Defendant was indicted in 1997 on one count of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance and one count of unlawful
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. In October
1997, while before the circuit court, defendant stated that he
wished to plead guilty to the count of unlawful possession with
intent to deliver a controlled substance. In exchange for
defendant's plea, the State agreed to drop the remaining count and
recommend a term of imprisonment not to exceed six years. The
circuit court admonished defendant of his rights, accepted the plea,
and sentenced defendant to six years' imprisonment.
	The circuit court then informed defendant that, although he
had pled guilty, he retained the right to appeal. Pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 605(b) (145 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)), the circuit
court explained to defendant the conditions to pursuing an appeal
from a guilty plea that are set forth in Supreme Court Rule 604(d)
(145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)). Rule 604(d) requires a defendant who
wishes to appeal from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea to
first file a motion in the circuit court to withdraw his guilty plea
within 30 days of sentencing. 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). Such a motion
must specify the grounds for withdrawal of the plea. 145 Ill. 2d R.
604(d) ("The motion shall be in writing and shall state the grounds
therefor"). In the case at bar, the circuit court properly admonished
defendant that he could appeal from "the judgment of conviction
on [the] plea, or the sentence imposed," but only after filing "a
written motion to withdraw or take back your plea."
	No further pleadings were filed after sentencing.
	In February 1998, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725
ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1996)). Defendant made a number of
allegations within his petition including, inter alia, an allegation
that his attorney failed to subpoena witnesses that defendant had
requested and an allegation that his attorney showed a lack of
interest in his case. Defendant also alleged the following:
		"I requested to [my attorney] Lenik to file an appeal, after
the Judge (DeLaMar) explained to me that I could do so.
Atty. Lenik stated in regard to the appeal, quote [sic] On
what grounds? unquote [sic] Atty. Lenik had taken it or
decided for herself not to file an appeal, in spite of my
numerous requests to. She (Atty. Lenik) also became
totally unavailable in regard to the case in spite of the
repeated calls by my wife on my behalf."
	The circuit court found that "[t]his allegation [was] in essence
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to allow the
Petitioner to appeal." After reviewing pertinent case law relating
to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and Rule 604(d), the
circuit court concluded that "it would appear that the Petitioner
cannot just make the bare allegation that he requested counsel to
file a motion to withdraw his plea. The Petitioner must show
prejudice. In the least, [this] would apparently mean that the
Petitioner would have to show grounds for a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea." The circuit court determined that "[t]he Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief as provided to this Court does not show
*** [any] recognized issues that can be raised in a Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Plea." The circuit court then dismissed
defendant's petition as frivolous or patently without merit. See 725
ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998).
	Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in
concluding that defendant had to show how he was prejudiced by
his attorney's failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Relying upon this court's decision in People v. Moore, 133 Ill. 2d 331 (1990), defendant contended that prejudice should be
presumed. In Moore, this court held that the prejudice prong of the
test for ineffective assistance of counsel (see Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984)) need not be established where counsel fails to perfect a
defendant's appeal after trial and the defendant subsequently seeks
post-conviction relief. In such cases, prejudice is presumed.
Moore, 133 Ill. 2d  at 339.
	The appellate court, however, distinguished Moore on the
ground that the defendant in that case was convicted following a
trial. Citing People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93 (1988), and People v.
Wendt, 283 Ill. App. 3d 947 (1996), the appellate court concluded
that prejudice should not be presumed for a defendant who has
pleaded guilty and agreed to a specific sentence. 305 Ill. App. 3d
at 857-58. Finding no grounds for withdrawing the guilty plea set
forth in defendant's pro se petition, or any explanation of how
defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to file the
motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the appellate court affirmed
the judgment of the circuit court. 305 Ill. App. 3d at 858.
	We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a)) and, on November 16, 2000, issued an opinion
affirming the judgment of the appellate court. Defendant
subsequently filed a petition for rehearing, which we allowed. 155
Ill. 2d R. 367; 134 Ill. 2d R. 612(p).
ANALYSIS
I
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1
et seq. (West 1998)) provides a remedy for defendants who have
suffered a substantial violation of their constitutional rights at trial.
Under the Act, a post-conviction proceeding not involving the
death penalty contains three stages. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). At the first stage, the circuit court must
independently review the post-conviction petition within 90 days
of its filing and determine whether "the petition is frivolous or is
patently without merit." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998).
If the court determines that the petition is either frivolous or
patently without merit, the court must dismiss the petition in a
written order. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998). A post-conviction petition is considered frivolous or patently without
merit only if the allegations in the petition, taken as true and
liberally construed, fail to present the "gist of a constitutional
claim." Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d  at 418, citing People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 74 (1988). The "gist" standard is "a low threshold."
Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d  at 418. To set forth the "gist" of a
constitutional claim, the post-conviction petition "need only
present a limited amount of detail" (Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418)
and hence need not set forth the claim in its entirety. Further, the
petition need not include "legal arguments or [citations] to legal
authority." Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d  at 418.
	In his special concurrence, Justice Fitzgerald notes that
several decisions from our appellate court have stated that, under
the "gist" standard, the pro se defendant must " 'plead sufficient
facts from which the trial court could find a valid claim of
deprivation of a constitutional right.' " (Emphasis in original.) Slip
op. at 18 (Fitzgerald, J., concurring), quoting People v. Lemons,
242 Ill. App. 3d 941, 946 (1993). In our view, the "sufficient
facts" test used in Lemons and other appellate decisions is at odds
with this court's holdings and should be avoided.
	On its face, the "sufficient facts" test requires a pro se
defendant to file a factually complete petition at the first stage of
the post-conviction proceedings. In other words, the defendant
must allege facts that would support all the elements of a
constitutional claim. This conclusion follows from the
requirement, as stated in Lemons, that the facts alleged must be
such that the "trial court could find a valid claim of deprivation of
a constitutional right." Lemons, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 946.
Necessarily, if facts supporting all the elements of a constitutional
claim are not included in the petition, the circuit court could not
"find a valid claim."
	However, requiring this type of full or complete pleading is
contrary to this court's holding that the pro se defendant "need
only present a limited amount of detail" (Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at
418) to survive summary dismissal at the first stage of the post-conviction proceedings. It is also at odds with the "gist" standard
itself since, by definition, a "gist" of a claim is something less than
a completely pled or fully stated claim.
	Further, the "sufficient facts" test imposes too heavy a  burden
on the pro se defendant. While in a given case the pro se
defendant may be aware of all the facts pertaining to his claim, he
will, in all likelihood, be unaware of the precise legal basis for his
claim or all the legal elements of that claim. In many cases, the pro
se defendant will be unaware that certain facts, which in his mind
are tangential or secondary, are, in fact, critical parts of a complete
and valid constitutional claim. Under the "sufficient facts" test,
however, the pro se defendant must recognize the facts that need
to be pled to support a "valid claim." This is an unrealistic
requirement. Accordingly, we decline to adopt the "sufficient
facts" test.
	If the circuit court does not dismiss the post-conviction
petition as frivolous or patently without merit, then the petition
advances to the second stage. Counsel is appointed to represent the
defendant, if necessary (725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 1998)), and the
State is allowed to file responsive pleadings (725 ILCS 5/122-5
(West 1998)). At this stage, the circuit court must determine
whether the petition and any accompanying documentation make
a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. See People v.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998). If no such showing is made,
the petition is dismissed. If, however, a substantial showing of a
constitutional violation is set forth, then the petition is advanced
to the third stage, where the circuit court conducts an evidentiary
hearing (725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 1998)). Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d  at
418.
	Although the circuit court in the instant case dismissed
defendant's petition at the first stage of the post-conviction
proceedings, we note that the appellate court, in reviewing the
circuit court's decision, applied both the first and second stage
standards for determining whether a noncapital, post-conviction
petition should be dismissed. At the outset of its opinion, the
appellate court correctly indicated that the issue presented in this
case is whether defendant's petition is frivolous or patently
without merit. 305 Ill. App. 3d at 855. At the conclusion of its
opinion, however, the appellate court stated: "We affirm the trial
court's dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition. Under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act, defendant has the burden of
showing a substantial violation of his constitutional rights
occurred in the proceedings that resulted in his conviction.
Defendant's petition failed to state a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel ***." 305 Ill. App. 3d at 858.
	These latter statements are inappropriate, given the procedural
posture of this case. The relevant question in the case at bar is not
whether defendant's petition makes a substantial showing of a
constitutional violation; that is a second stage inquiry. Rather, the
question we must address is whether, pursuant to section
122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act, defendant's petition was properly
dismissed at the first stage of the post-conviction proceedings.
Thus, the issue before us is limited solely to whether defendant's
"petition is frivolous or is patently without merit." 725 ILCS
5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998).
	Our review of the circuit court's dismissal of defendant's
post-conviction petition is de novo. As we have explained, "[d]ue
to the elimination of all factual issues at the dismissal stage of a
post-conviction proceeding, the question is, essentially, a legal
one, which requires the reviewing court to make its own
independent assessment of the allegations. Thus, a court of review
[is] free to substitute its own judgment for that of the circuit court
in order to formulate the legally correct answer." Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388.



II
	Defendant argues that his post-conviction petition should not
have been dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit by the
circuit court because the petition raises a nonfrivolous claim that
his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and appeal. As noted, the
appellate court rejected this argument. The appellate court
concluded that defendant's petition was properly dismissed as
frivolous because the petition failed to include any explanation of
"how defendant was prejudiced or why his guilty plea should be
withdrawn." 305 Ill. App. 3d at 858. Drawing a distinction
between convictions obtained following a trial and convictions
obtained by guilty plea, the appellate court rejected defendant's
contention that prejudice should be presumed for a pro se
defendant who alleges he has been deprived of his right to appeal
by his trial counsel's failure to file a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea. In so holding, the appellate court distinguished the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Rodriquez v. United States,
395 U.S. 327, 23 L. Ed. 2d 340, 89 S. Ct. 1715 (1969).
	In Rodriquez, the defendant was convicted following a jury
trial on several narcotics charges (see Rodriquez v. United States,
387 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1967)). The defendant's trial counsel
subsequently failed to submit a notice of appeal within the
appropriate time period. Although the defendant thereafter
attempted to file a notice of appeal himself, the trial court ruled
that the expiration of the appeal period deprived the court of
jurisdiction over the matter. The defendant subsequently pursued
post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. §2255, alleging that he had
been improperly denied his right to appeal. Both the District Court
for the Northern District of California and the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth District denied the defendant's petition, holding that
he had failed to disclose what errors he would have raised on
appeal. In rejecting this reasoning, the Supreme Court held:
		"The Ninth Circuit seems to require an applicant under 28
USC §2255 to show more than a simple deprivation of
[the right to appeal] before relief can be accorded. It also
requires him to show some likelihood of success on
appeal; if the applicant is unlikely to succeed, the Ninth
Circuit would characterize any denial of the right to
appeal as a species of harmless error. We cannot
subscribe to this approach.
			Applicants for relief under §2255 must, if indigent,
prepare their petitions without the assistance of counsel.
[Citation.] Those whose education has been limited and
those, like petitioner, who lack facility in the English
language might have grave difficulty in making even a
summary statement of points to be raised on appeal.
Moreover, they may not even be aware of errors which
occurred at trial. They would thus be deprived of their
only chance to take an appeal even though they have
never had the assistance of counsel in preparing one. ***
Those whose right to appeal has been frustrated should be
treated exactly like any other appellants; they should not
be given an additional hurdle to clear just because their
rights were violated at some earlier stage in the
proceedings. Accordingly, we hold that the courts below
erred in rejecting petitioner's application for relief
because of his failure to specify the points he would raise
were his right to appeal reinstated." Rodriquez, 395 U.S. 
at 330, 23 L. Ed. 2d  at 344, 89 S. Ct.  at 1717.
	The appellate court in the case at bar limited Rodriquez to
those instances where a pro se defendant alleges that he was
denied a right to appeal following trial. Recognizing that "[m]ost
defendants are not trained in the law," the appellate court
concluded that "defendants convicted after trial should not be
denied appellate counsel." 305 Ill. App. 3d at 858. According to
the appellate court, "[f]or a defendant convicted after trial, who
has always professed innocence, the right to appeal insures due
process and provides an important safety net to those who may
have been wrongly convicted." 305 Ill. App. 3d at 858.
	In contrast, the appellate court reasoned, "a defendant who has
admitted guilt [does not] need a safety net to protect against a
wrongful conviction." 305 Ill. App. 3d at 858. The court noted
that, on appeal from a guilty plea, "[w]ith certain exceptions, the
defendant is 'limited to structural challenges to the plea
proceedings themselves, i.e., whether the plea was entered
voluntarily and intelligently based on competent advice from
counsel.' " 305 Ill. App. 3d at 858, quoting Wendt, 283 Ill. App. 3d
at 957. According to the appellate court, "[a] defendant does not
need appellate counsel or legal expertise to allege his plea was
involuntary or that he was tricked into pleading guilty." 305 Ill.
App. 3d at 858. Thus, the appellate court declined to presume
prejudice and, instead, concluded that it was appropriate to place
the burden on the pro se defendant to explain why his guilty plea
should be withdrawn.
	Shortly after the appellate court filed its opinion in this case,
the Supreme Court issued its decision in Roe v. Flores-Ortega,
528 U.S. 470, 145 L. Ed. 2d 985, 120 S. Ct. 1029 (2000). In that
decision, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that
Rodriquez is limited to those cases where a defendant's conviction
is obtained following a trial.
	In Flores-Ortega, the defendant was charged by the State of
California with various crimes and entered a plea of guilty to
second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to 15 years
to life in prison and, at that time, advised the defendant of his right
to appeal within 60 days. Although defense counsel wrote "bring
appeal papers" in her file, no notice of appeal was filed within the
applicable time period. Four months after he was sentenced, the
defendant attempted to file a pro se notice of appeal, which was
rejected by the clerk of court. Having exhausted state habeas
corpus proceedings, the defendant filed a federal habeas corpus
petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis of
his attorney's failure to file the notice of appeal after allegedly
promising the defendant that she would do so.
	The Supreme Court held that Strickland provided the proper
framework for evaluating the defendant's claim. With respect to
the performance prong of Strickland, the Court observed that it has
been "long held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions
from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that
is professionally unreasonable." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 477,
145 L. Ed. 2d  at 995, 120 S. Ct.  at 1035. The Court explained that
this is so because counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal cannot
be considered a strategic decision: "filing a notice of appeal is a
purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to
the defendant's wishes." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 477, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 995, 120 S. Ct.  at 1035. Moreover, a defendant who
instructs counsel to initiate an appeal reasonably relies upon
counsel to do so. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 477, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at
995, 120 S. Ct.  at 1035.
	The Court went on to explain, however, that it could not
determine from the record before it whether the defendant had
conveyed his wishes regarding whether to appeal. Given this fact,
the Court concluded, "we believe the question whether counsel has
performed deficiently by not filing a notice of appeal is best
answered by first asking a separate, but antecedent, question:
whether counsel in fact consulted with the defendant about an
appeal." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 478, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 995, 120 S. Ct.  at 1035. Thus, in the Court's words, the question at "the
heart of this case" was "[u]nder what circumstances does counsel
have an obligation to consult with the defendant about an appeal?"
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 478, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 996, 120 S. Ct. 
at 1035. After setting out these circumstances, the Court
determined that, based on the limited record before it, a conclusion
could not be reached as to whether counsel in that case had a duty
to consult. The Court therefore remanded the cause to the district
court for further consideration of this issue. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 487, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 1001-02, 120 S. Ct.  at 1040.
	With respect to the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the
Court stated that whether a defendant is required to show actual
prejudice or whether prejudice is presumed "turns on the
magnitude of the deprivation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 482,145 L. Ed. 2d  at 998,
120 S. Ct.  at 1037. Where a defendant alleges that during a critical
stage of a judicial proceeding he was denied the assistance of
counsel altogether, " '[n]o specific showing of prejudice [is]
required,' because 'the adversary process itself [is] presumptively
unreliable.' " Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 483,145 L. Ed. 2d  at 999,
120 S. Ct.  at 1038, quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
659, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 668, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047 (1984). In
Flores-Ortega, the Court explained that defense counsel's "alleged
deficient performance arguably led not to a judicial proceeding of
disputed reliability, but rather to the forfeiture of a proceeding
itself." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 483,145 L. Ed. 2d  at 999, 120 S. Ct.  at 1038. In other words, the "deficiency deprived
[defendant] of the appellate proceeding altogether." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 483,145 L. Ed. 2d  at 999, 120 S. Ct.  at 1038.
This, the Court held, "demands a presumption of prejudice."
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 483,145 L. Ed. 2d  at 999, 120 S. Ct.  at
1038.
	The Court went on to note, however, that although prejudice
was presumed, the defendant still had to show that counsel's
deficient performance "actually cause[d] the forfeiture of the
defendant's appeal." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 484,145 L. Ed. 2d 
at 999, 120 S. Ct.  at 1038. Accordingly, the Court held that the
defendant would have to demonstrate a reasonable probability that,
"but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him about an
appeal, he would have timely appealed." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 
at 484, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 999, 120 S. Ct.  at 1038. The Court
recognized that showing nonfrivolous grounds for appeal might
help establish that the defendant would have, in fact, appealed.
Critically though, the Court stated:
			"[A]lthough showing nonfrivolous grounds for appeal
may give weight to the contention that the defendant
would have appealed, a defendant's inability to 'specify
the points he would raise were his right to appeal
reinstated,' Rodriquez, 395 U.S. at 330[, 23 L. Ed. 2d  at
344, 89 S. Ct.  at 1717], will not foreclose the possibility
that he can satisfy the prejudice requirement where there
are other substantial reasons to believe that he would have
appealed. *** We *** conclude here that it is unfair to
require an indigent, perhaps pro se defendant to
demonstrate that his hypothetical appeal might have had
merit before any advocate has ever reviewed the record in
his case in search of potentially meritorious grounds for
appeal." (Emphasis in original.) Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 
at 486, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 1001, 120 S. Ct.  at 1039-40.
	Flores-Ortega thus establishes that a pro se defendant, even
if he pled guilty, cannot be required to demonstrate how his appeal
would have been successful in order to establish that he was
prejudiced by his attorney's failure to pursue a requested appeal.
The appellate court's conclusion to the contrary in the case at bar
is therefore in error.
	The State maintains, however, that Flores-Ortega is
distinguishable from the instant case under the deficient
performance prong of Strickland. As the State points out, the
deficient performance alleged in Flores-Ortega involved the
failure to file a notice of appeal, a ministerial act. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 477, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 995, 120 S. Ct.  at 1035.
In contrast, the deficiency alleged in this case, i.e., the failure to
file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, is not a ministerial act
because grounds for withdrawing the plea must be alleged in the
motion. See 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d) ("The motion shall be in writing
and shall state the grounds therefor"). In the State's view, because
the filing of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not considered
a ministerial act, "counsel's failure to file such a motion, without
any rational basis to do so from the client, cannot be labeled
unreasonable." Thus, according to the State, defendant's petition
must be dismissed as frivolous because it does not allege any
grounds for withdrawing the guilty plea.
	The State's argument is unpersuasive because it contradicts
the principles of Rodriquez and Flores-Ortega. Defendant in the
case at bar alleges that he repeatedly asked his attorney to file an
appeal but that she had "taken it or decided for herself not to file"
one. For purposes of deciding whether defendant's petition is
frivolous, we must take these allegations as true. People v.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380 (1998), quoting People v. Jennings,
411 Ill. 21, 26 (1952). There is nothing of record which indicates
that defendant's counsel reviewed the plea proceedings for error
or consulted with defendant regarding grounds for an appeal
before deciding not to file the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
Cf. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 278 n.10, 145 L. Ed. 2d 756,
775 n.10, 120 S. Ct. 746, 760 n.10 (2000) ("[I]n all cases, [an
indigent defendant has] the right to have an attorney, zealous for
the indigent's interests, evaluate his case and attempt to discern
nonfrivolous arguments" before deciding not to pursue an appeal).
Under these circumstances, as Rodriquez and Flores-Ortega hold,
it is unreasonable to place a burden on the pro se defendant to
demonstrate the merits of his hypothetical appeal. It is irrelevant
whether one characterizes this burden as a requirement to allege
deficient performance or prejudice because the principle remains
the same: the pro se defendant cannot be expected " 'to specify the
grounds for [his] appeal and show that they have some merit.' "
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 486, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 1001, 120 S. Ct. 
at 1040, quoting Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 30, 143 L. Ed. 2d 18, 25-26, 119 S. Ct. 961, 966 (1999) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.).
	Indeed, adopting the State's position, which would place a
burden upon the pro se defendant to recognize both legal and
factual errors in the plea process in order to survive summary
dismissal on post-conviction, would inevitably result in certain
defendants being improperly denied any meaningful review of plea
proceedings, despite the constitutional right to a direct appeal (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. VI, §6). For example, assume that a defendant
pleads guilty and is sentenced after being improperly admonished
or after some other legal error occurs. The defendant asks his
attorney to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea and appeal but
counsel, for whatever reason, fails to do so. No motion to
withdraw the plea is filed, no record is made that counsel reviewed
the proceedings for error, and no appeal is taken. The defendant
subsequently files a pro se post-conviction petition alleging that he
asked his counsel to file a motion to withdraw the plea and appeal,
but that his counsel ignored the request. Based upon the State's
reasoning, the post-conviction circuit court must dismiss the
petition as frivolous and patently without merit because no
grounds for filing the Rule 604(d) motion are set forth. Thus, even
though the circuit court has no assurance that an attorney has ever
reviewed the plea proceedings for error, and even though, despite
the defendant's request, no appellate review of any kind has
occurred, the defendant's petition is given no further
consideration. This result is unacceptable.
	The State makes an additional argument that involves a
comparison of post-conviction proceedings and Rule 604(d). The
State maintains that placing a burden on pro se defendants at the
initial stage of post-conviction to specify grounds for withdrawing
their guilty pleas puts these defendants in no more difficult a
position than a defendant who, after pleading guilty, is without
counsel and who therefore must file a pro se motion to withdraw
his guilty plea under Rule 604(d). Thus, according to the State, the
burden it seeks to place on defendant in this case is a reasonable
one. We disagree.
	Rule 604(d) states that upon receipt of a pro se motion to
withdraw a guilty plea
		"[t]he trial court shall then determine whether the
defendant is represented by counsel, and if the defendant
is indigent and desires counsel, the trial court shall
appoint counsel. *** The defendant's attorney shall file
with the trial court a certificate stating that the attorney
has consulted with the defendant either by mail or in
person to ascertain his contentions of error in the sentence
or the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial
court file and report of proceedings of the plea of guilty,
and has made any amendments to the motion necessary
for adequate presentation of any defects in those
proceedings." 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).
	Rule 604(d) adequately addresses the concerns relating to
attorney representation that arise when a defendant files a pro se
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Once a pro se defendant
notifies the circuit court that he wishes to withdraw his guilty plea
and appeal, the protections offered by Rule 604(d), i.e., the
appointment of counsel and the attorney certificate, are
automatically triggered. See, e.g., People v. Griffin, 305 Ill. App.
3d 326, 330 (1999) ("After a defendant demonstrates his desire to
appeal, the trial judge is obligated to inquire whether the defendant
seeks counsel"). Significantly, as our appellate court has
explained, there is no provision in Rule 604(d) for dismissing a
pro se motion to withdraw a guilty plea as frivolous. This is so
because "[i]t would be contrary to the purpose of the rule to draw
a conclusion about the legal basis of the defendant's motion before
he has had an opportunity to consult with an attorney to insure that
there is legally 'adequate presentation of any defects' (107 Ill. 2d
R. 604(d)) in his guilty plea proceedings. Because of the 'strict
waiver requirements of Rule 604(d), fundamental fairness requires
that a defendant be afforded a full opportunity to explain his
allegations and that he have assistance of counsel in preparing the
motion.' " People v. Velasco, 197 Ill. App. 3d 589, 591-92 (1990),
quoting People v. Ledbetter, 174 Ill. App. 3d 234, 237-38 (1988);
see also People v. Pegues, 277 Ill. App. 3d 884, 888 (1996);
People v. Barnes, 263 Ill. App. 3d 736, 738-39 (1994); People v.
Adams, 74 Ill. App. 3d 727, 731 (1979); People v. Moore, 45 Ill.
App. 3d 570, 572 (1976).
	Contrary to the State's assertions, a defendant proceeding pro
se under Rule 604(d) faces a significantly lesser burden than that
which the State seeks to place on defendant in the case at bar. A
pro se defendant under Rule 604(d) does not have to make an
"adequate presentation of any defects" (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) in
his guilty plea proceedings or face summary dismissal because
there is no provision in Rule 604(d) that provides for summary
dismissal of a pro se motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
Accordingly, the State's attempt to equate the burden it would
place on defendant in this case to the one faced by pro se
defendants under Rule 604(d) is unavailing.



III
	Because there is nothing of record to establish that
defendant's trial counsel ever reviewed the plea proceedings for
error before deciding not to pursue an appeal, and because it is
contrary to the holdings of Flores-Ortega and Rodriquez under
these circumstances to require defendant, who is proceeding pro
se, to provide grounds for withdrawing his guilty plea and his
appeal, we hold that the circuit court erred in dismissing
defendant's petition at the first stage of the post-conviction
proceedings. Whether, in the circumstances of this case, defense
counsel's decision not to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel requires the
appointment of an attorney who will be able to consult with
defendant regarding his claim and explore in more detail the
factual and legal ramifications of defendant's claim. At this
juncture, it would be inappropriate to conclude that defendant's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is so completely lacking
in substance that it is frivolous or patently without merit.
	Our holding is limited to the specific issue before us, i.e.,
whether the circuit court erred in dismissing defendant's petition
at the first stage of the post-conviction proceedings. We do not
hold that defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. To merit
an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he told his trial counsel to
file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to do so, defendant will have
to make a substantial showing to that effect. See Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 381. Such a showing will necessarily entail some explanation
of the grounds that could have been presented in the motion to
withdraw the plea. Since defendant will be at the second stage of
the post-conviction proceedings and will be represented by an
attorney, rather than proceeding pro se, this will not present an
unreasonable burden.



CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the appellate
court and the circuit court are reversed. The cause is remanded to
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
	Appellate court judgment reversed;
	circuit court judgment reversed;
	cause remanded.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD, specially concurring:
	I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in
summarily dismissing the defendant's post-conviction petition. I
write separately to discuss the confusion surrounding so-called
first-stage dismissals under section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act.
Understandably, there is great reluctance to accept dismissal of a
petition filed by an indigent defendant without the benefit of
counsel. This reluctance, and the vague language contained in
section 122-2.1, have led to the use of the terms "gist" and "low
threshold" in an effort to define the first-stage pleading standard.
I write separately to discuss the problems inadvertently created by
these terms.
	In 1983, the General Assembly amended the Act to include
section 122-2.1, which directed the trial court to conduct a
threshold evaluation of post-conviction petitions and to dismiss
those which were "frivolous" or "patently without merit." Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 122-2.1(a). The Act currently provides: "If
the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment and the court
determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it
shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings
of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision."
725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998).
	The General Assembly, however, never defined "frivolous"
or "patently without merit." Instead, our appellate court provided
the initial gloss on these terms. In People v. Baugh, 132 Ill. App.
3d 713 (1985), the defendant, whose pro se post-conviction
petition was summarily dismissed, argued that section 122-2.1
violated due process because it denied counsel to indigent
defendants. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court
approved federal legislation requiring indigent habeas corpus
petitioners to prepare petitions without the benefit of counsel.
Baugh, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 717; see Rodriguez v. United States,
395 U.S. 327, 330, 23 L. Ed. 2d 340, 344, 89 S. Ct. 1715, 1717
(1969); see also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718, 722, 89 S. Ct. 747, 750 (1969) ("It has not been held that
there is any general obligation of the courts, state or federal, to
appoint counsel for prisoners who indicate, without more, that they
wish to seek post-conviction relief"). The court then observed:
		"While it is obvious that counsel should be better able to
more artfully draft a petition than an indigent petitioner
unschooled in legal drafting, it is certainly not clear that
an indigent petitioner could not present the gist of his
claim so that the trial court could make an initial
determination as to whether *** the claim is frivolous. An
indigent petitioner is not deprived of post-conviction
relief. We do not find a denial of due process by the
operation of section 122-2.1." Baugh, 132 Ill. App. 3d at
717.
See also People v. Dredge, 148 Ill. App. 3d 911, 913 (1986) ("a
petition for post-conviction relief need only contain a simple
statement which presents the gist of a claim for relief which is
meritorious when considered in view of the record").
	Three years later, in People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64 (1988),
this court rejected a similar due process argument, noting that an
indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel after the trial
court determines that the claims are not frivolous or patently
without merit. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d  at 74. We held that, "Under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the [defendant] must set forth the
specific manner in which his rights were violated. [Citation.] The
[defendant] does not have to construct legal arguments or cite to
legal authority. Once the [defendant] sets out allegations
demonstrating a meritorious constitutional claim, he is entitled to
have counsel represent him ***." Porter, 122 Ill. 2d  at 74. We
then quoted Baugh with approval, recognizing that an indigent
defendant may be able to present the "gist" of a constitutional
claim. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d  at 74.
	In the wake of our opinion in Porter, however, our appellate
court continued to grapple with the sufficiency of pleadings
required to survive the first stage of a post-conviction proceeding,
and with the meaning of "gist." Compare People v. Sanders, 209
Ill. App. 3d 366 (1991) (holding that in the first stage of the
proceedings a petitioner must set forth facts which show the denial
of a constitutional right), with People v. Von Perbandt, 221 Ill.
App. 3d 951 (1991) (holding that limited detail is required to
survive the first stage of the proceedings). In People v. Lemons,
242 Ill. App. 3d 941, 946 (1993), the appellate court attempted to
clarify the meaning of "gist":
		"A 'gist of a meritorious claim' is not a bare allegation of
a deprivation of a constitutional right. Although a pro se
defendant seeking post-conviction relief would not be
expected to construct legal arguments, cite legal authority,
or draft her petition as artfully as would counsel, the pro
se defendant must still plead sufficient facts from which
the trial court could find a valid claim of deprivation of a
constitutional right." (Emphasis in original.)
	Thereafter, other appellate panels relied upon Lemons for the
standard in determining whether to dismiss a petition during the
first stage of the proceedings. See, e.g., People v. Prier, 245 Ill.
App. 3d 1037, 1040 (1993) (" '[a]lthough a pro se [litigant] ***
would not be expected to construct legal arguments, cite legal
authority, or draft her petition as artfully as would counsel, the pro
se defendant must still plead sufficient facts from which the trial
court could find a valid claim' " (emphasis in original)), quoting
Lemons, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 946.
	In People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996), we had a
chance to clarify Porter and the first-stage pleading standard. An
extended quotation from Gaultney is necessary to show what we
said, and what we did not say:
			"Pursuant to the Act, a post-conviction proceeding that
does not involve the death penalty has three distinct
stages. In the first stage, the defendant files a petition and
the circuit court determines whether it is frivolous or
patently without merit. At this stage, the Act does not
permit any further pleadings from the defendant or any
motions or responsive pleadings from the State. Instead,
the circuit court considers the petition independently,
without any input from either side. To survive dismissal
at this stage, a petition need only present the gist of a
constitutional claim. People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 74
(1988). This is a low threshold and a defendant need only
present a limited amount of detail in the petition. At this
stage, a defendant need not make legal arguments or cite
to legal authority. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d  at 74. The Act
provides that the petition must be supported by 'affidavits,
records, or other evidence supporting its allegations' or
the petition 'shall state why the same are not attached.'
725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 1992). If the circuit court does
not dismiss the petition pursuant to section 122-2.1, it is
then docketed for further consideration." Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d  at 418.
	In the first instance, I note that the facts in Gaultney presented
a peculiar hybrid of the first and second stages; the trial court had
dismissed the petition as frivolous, but only after the State had
filed a motion to dismiss. At issue in Gaultney was whether the
State's motion to dismiss tainted the trial court's first-stage review
of the petition. We did not directly address the level of pleadings
required to survive the first stage.
	More importantly, Gaultney did not redefine the first-stage
pleading requirement-it did not mention any dispute regarding the
pleading threshold for first-stage dismissals; it did not correct,
modify, or clarify this threshold; and it did not set a new standard.
Gaultney simply followed the course we set in Porter. I believe
that Gaultney is consistent with Lemons. Although Gaultney does
not directly refer to the "sufficient facts" pleading requirement
stated in Lemons, it does state that a petition must be supported by
some degree of factual evidence. Both opinions discuss the
necessity to present factual evidence in order to state the "gist" of
a constitutional claim. The consistent tenor of post-Gaultney
appellate court cases supports this reading. See People v. Truly,
318 Ill. App. 3d 217, 222 (2000); People v. Patton, 315 Ill. App.
3d 968, 972 (2000) (citing Lemons); People v. Donley, 314 Ill.
App. 3d 671, 673-74 (2000) (quoting Lemons); People v. Hill, 308
Ill. App. 3d 691, 698-99 (1999) (citing Gaultney, Porter, and
Lemons); People v. Douglas, 296 Ill. App. 3d 192, 197 (1998)
(quoting Lemons); People v. Davison, 292 Ill. App. 3d 981, 985
(1997) (citing Gaultney and Lemons); People v. McClain, 292 Ill.
App. 3d 185, 190 (1997) (reconciling Gaultney and Lemons),
overruled on other grounds, People v. Woods, 193 Ill. 2d 483
(2000); People v. Anderson, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1031 (1997)
(citing Gaultney and Lemons).
	The present case illustrates the confusion that exists
surrounding the meaning of the term "gist." In this court's original
opinion, before we granted the defendant's petition for rehearing,
the majority concluded that in order to allege ineffective assistance
of counsel on the basis that an attorney failed to preserve appeal
rights, a defendant must show the "grounds he or she would have
had to withdraw his or her plea of guilty had the proper motion"
been filed by counsel. The opinion provided, "[w]e refuse to create
a rule which would require defense counsel to invent grounds for
withdrawal of a defendant's guilty plea when defendant fails to
provide counsel with an articulable basis for doing so and he offers
none in his post-conviction petition." The allegations contained in
the petition-the defendant's order, "File an appeal," and the
attorney's response, "On what grounds"-did not state the "gist" of
a constitutional claim.
	The current opinion, which I join, reaches the opposite
conclusion from the same set of facts. We now hold that the
allegation of a mere request to file an appeal, and an attorney's
failure to perfect that appeal, is sufficient to state the "gist" of a
constitutional claim. I agree with this conclusion because the facts,
as alleged in the defendant's petition, show the real possibility of
a valid constitutional claim in two ways. First, the exchange
between the defendant and his attorney, in which the attorney
asked the defendant "On what grounds" he sought to appeal, leads
me to believe that further conversation occurred. Once the attorney
asked, "On what grounds," it is reasonable to conclude that the
defendant provided a response. This entire exchange warranted
further inquiry by the trial court. Second, if the defendant did not
respond to counsel's inquiry, and counsel failed to do or say more,
her lack of a response warranted further inquiry. The defendant's
attorney was required to advise the defendant: an attorney may not
relieve herself of the obligation to represent a defendant by forcing
the defendant to provide a legal theory or basis for the claim.
	Notwithstanding my agreement with the majority's
conclusion, I find that this case shows the inherent problems
caused by the vague language contained in section 122-2.1.
Certainly, judicial economy is not accomplished in cases such as
this, where "gist" is interpreted in two different ways. We should
be vigilant to avoid catchwords like "gist" which shortcut reliance
on the relevant statutory language, though I note that we have
previously employed the term "gist" to include the elements of a
crime. See People v. Steenbergen, 31 Ill. 2d 615, 619 (1964) ("In
a prosecution for robbery, the gist of the action is that the accused
forcibly took property that was in the care, custody, or control of
another person").
	Instead, we should rely first on the language used within the
Act. Section 122-2.1(a)(2) addresses petitions which are
"frivolous" or "patently without merit." "Frivolous" means "of
little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 913 (1993); Black's
Law Dictionary 677 (7th ed. 1999); accord Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, 498, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400
(1967) (legal points "arguable on their merits" are not frivolous).
"Patently" means "clearly, obviously, plainly." Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 1654 (1993); Black's Law
Dictionary 1147 (7th ed. 1999). "Merit" means "legal significance,
standing, or importance." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1414 (1993); Black's Law Dictionary 1003 (7th ed.
1999). Consequently, the trial court should dismiss petitions
having no basis in law or fact or petitions which clearly,
obviously, and plainly lack legal significance.
	In my view, this standard does not require the defendant to set
forth the claim "in its entirety" (slip op. at 4), but it does require
the defendant to plead sufficient factual allegations to support a
valid claim of deprivation of a constitutional right. See Gaultney,
174 Ill. 2d  at 418 ("The Act provides that the petition must be
supported by 'affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations' "), quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 1992); Porter,
122 Ill. 2d  at 74 ("Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the
petitioner must set forth the specific manner in which his rights
were violated"); see also People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380
(1998) ("at the dismissal stage of a post-conviction proceeding,
whether under section 122-2.1 or under section 122-5, the circuit
court is concerned merely with determining whether the petition's
allegations sufficiently demonstrate a constitutional infirmity
which would necessitate relief under the Act"); cf. People v. Scott,
194 Ill. 2d 268, 279 (2000) (the Act establishes an original and
independent remedy by a civil proceeding); People ex rel. Fahner
v. Carriage Way West, Inc., 88 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (1981) ("Illinois is
a fact-pleading State. *** The complaint is deficient when it fails
to allege the facts necessary for the plaintiff to recover"); accord
Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 344 (1997) ("A plaintiff must
allege facts sufficient to bring his or her claim within the scope of
the cause of action asserted"); Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 408 (1996). This standard allows the trial court to exercise
its screening function to dispose of frivolous petitions which raise
claims that have no constitutional basis or present constitutional
claims clearly rejected by controlling case law.
	A consistent theme runs through the legislative debates:
section 122-2.1 was enacted to allow trial judges to evaluate and
dismiss frivolous petitions without incurring the expense of
copying transcripts and appointing counsel. That is, the purpose of
section 122-2.1 was not to prevent the filing of post-conviction
petitions, but, according to Senator Sangmeister:
		"[A]t least let a judge look at it ***. *** [T]hat's what we
have judges for, let them look at the petition and if it has
merit, fine ***. But at least let the judge look at it and
those [petitions] that are obviously frivolous, let them
throw them out.
* * *
			*** The question that has to be addressed *** is
whether or not the petition has any merit. Once the judge
looks at it and says, I don't think this has any merit and
tosses it out, that's the end of it." 83d Ill. Gen. Assem.,
Senate Proceedings, May 19, 1983, at 171-72 (statements
of Senator Sangmeister).
Accord 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 28, 1983,
at 218 (statements of Senator Sangmeister).
	The Illinois House debates are substantially similar.
Representative Johnson, sponsor of the bill which eventually
became section 122-2.1(a), stated:
		"This simply says that on those post-conviction matters
after the trial, after the appeal, after everything else, that
*** the petition alleging new matter has to be matter that
is substantive and not frivolous or obviously without
merit. ***
* * *
			*** All this says, under current law, you have to
appoint a new lawyer, you have to order a transcript of the
proceedings over and over and over again without limit
and without any regard to the merits of the petition ... with
regard to the merits of the post-conviction petition. All
this says is that when those post-conviction petitions are
filed after the trial and after the appeal, that the court has
to make a threshold determination that they are not
frivolous or obviously without merit." 83d Ill. Gen.
Assem., House Proceedings, June 21, 1983, at 92, 95-96
(statements of Representative Johnson).
Accord 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, November, 1,
1983, at 9-10 (statements of Representative Johnson) ("All this
does is to provide that the court can dismiss the petition where it
determines that the petition is frivolous or patently without merit.
*** It still allows petitions with merit to be granted, attorneys to
be appointed and the appropriate expenses incurred, but it says if
your petition is without merit and frivolous, then the state ought
not to log the expense for that"); see 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, November 1, 1983, at 7 (statements of
Representative Cullerton) ("What we're saying here is that
frivolous post-conviction petitions can *** be dismissed easier
than they can be now").
	Representative Hawkinson stated:
		"This is an excellent piece of legislation. It will not create
a new bureaucracy in any sense. What happens too often
under the present law is a frivolous post-conviction
petition will be filed, and when I say frivolous, and what
this Bill addresses is a petition will be filed by some
jailhouse lawyer that will state one ground. It will state,
for example, that I deserve to have my conviction thrown
out because I was improperly represented by the public
defender. Anyone that looks at the record in the case can
easily see that the person was not even represented by a
public defender, but was represented by a private attorney.
This is the type of thing that the Bill addresses, where a
quick look at the record in the case will show that the
petition is absolutely untrue. There [is] no need to go to
the expense of appointing a court appointed lawyer, of
bringing the individual back from the penitentiary. It only
addresses that type of petition." 83d Ill. Gen. Assem.,
House Proceedings, June 21, 1983, at 89 (statements of
Representative Hawkinson).
	Representative McCracken added:
		"It's important to note that this is patterned after a federal
law and is consistent with that practice, 28 U.S.C., 1915.
Now, that practice has resulted in curing a backlog
problem, which was endemic to the federal post-conviction process. It's important to note *** that this
does not decide the merits of the controversy. All it does
is require a threshold finding by the court that there is not
a frivolous claim on its face. All it determines is that the
claim is or is not frivolous on its face, therefore, it is
analogous to a dismissal of pleadings. *** And the
question will be, 'Are the pleadings on their face
frivolous? Do they state a claim on their face?' This is
crucially important to a ... to avoid the appointment of
private counsel or the public defender to a claim which
can be fairly and expeditiously and without undue
violation of defendant rights decided by the court in the
first instance. You must remember the federal precedent
is the leading precedent on the question of post-conviction. We merely bring our law into line with them."
83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 21, 1983,
at 93-94 (statements of Representative McCracken).
See 28 U.S.C. §1915(d) (1994) ("Proceedings in forma pauperis")
("The court may request an attorney to represent any such person
unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the
allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is
frivolous or malicious"); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327,
104 L. Ed. 2d 338, 348, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833 (1989) ("[Section
1915(d)] accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim
based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the
unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual
allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless"); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340, 349-50, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733-34 (1992)
(factual frivolousness). These comments demonstrate that the
General Assembly intended section 122-2.1 to serve as a modest
barrier to meritless petitions. Lowering the defendant's pleading
burden too far contradicts the legislature's intent.
	Today's opinion raises an additional concern. In order to
provide clarity to the Act, this court has divided the Act into a
progression of "stages." Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d  at 418. In order to
prevail in the second stage of the proceedings, a defendant must
make a "substantial showing of a violation of constitutional
rights." 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 1998). The underlying purpose
of the entire Act, however, is to provide relief from a "substantial
denial" of rights under the United States or Illinois Constitutions.
725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1998).
	In the current opinion, the majority states:
		"At the outset of its opinion, the appellate court correctly
indicated that the issue presented in this case is whether
defendant's petition is frivolous or patently without merit.
[Citation.] At the conclusion of its opinion, however, the
appellate court stated: 'We affirm the trial court's
dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition. Under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, defendant has the
burden of showing a substantial violation of his
constitutional rights occurred in the proceedings that
resulted in his conviction. Defendant's petition failed to
state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel ***.
[Citation.]'
			These latter statements are inappropriate, given the
procedural posture of this case. The relevant question in
the case at bar is not whether defendant's petition makes
a substantial showing of a constitutional violation; that is
a second stage inquiry." (Emphases added.) Slip op. at 6.
	The majority criticizes the appellate court's incidental use of
the word "substantial," but misapprehends the appellate court's
opinion. The appellate court, in referring to a "substantial
violation" simply sought to focus attention on the central purpose
of the Act-to provide a procedural mechanism through which a
defendant can assert "that in the proceedings which resulted in his
or her conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her rights
under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of
Illinois or both." 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1998); see Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d  at 378-79. The appellate court did not, as the majority
charges, wrongfully impose a higher "substantial showing"
burden. At the outset, the appellate court recognized that the
defendant need only "assert the gist of a constitutional claim." 305
Ill. App. 3d at 855. The appellate court's statement was not
inappropriate, but rather "general terminology that is common in
post-conviction proceedings." Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d  at 422.
	The conclusions reached in our own cases show that
reasonable persons have difficulty determining whether the
defendant's allegations have met the murky frivolousness
standard. These cases depend more on fact variances and less on
cognizable legal standards, and the legal standards we have
formulated inadvertently aggravate this confusion. In light of the
continuing struggle of Illinois courts to bring clarity and certainty
to the Act's pleading requirements for first-stage petitions, I
believe that the trial bench and bar should approach first-stage
proceedings with caution.
	Where doubt exists regarding dismissal at the first stage, the
trial court should not hesitate to allow the claim to proceed to the
second stage, where counsel may amend the petition and craft a
more proper pleading for the court's review. If the petition is
dismissed at the second stage of the proceedings, a reviewing court
is presented with more adequately pleaded facts. Conversely, if the
defendant is granted an evidentiary hearing, the defendant will
obtain that which by law is his right. At present, this solution
serves both the ends of justice and judicial economy.
	I believe the trial court correctly dismissed defendant's pro se
post-conviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit
because the petition failed to allege grounds for the withdrawal of
defendant's guilty plea.
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1
et seq. (West 1998)) limits a defendant to constitutional challenges
of the proceedings that resulted in his conviction. A post-conviction proceeding is a collateral attack on a prior conviction
and sentence and "is not a substitute for, or an addendum to, direct
appeal." People v. Kokoraleis, 159 Ill. 2d 325, 328 (1994). In such
a proceeding, the defendant bears the burden of establishing a
substantial deprivation of his constitutional rights. People v.
Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 389 (1995). As noted by the majority, under
the Act, a post-conviction proceeding not involving the death
penalty is divided into three stages. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). At the first stage, the trial court examines the
defendant's post-conviction petition and shall dismiss the petition
if it is frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)
(West 1998). At this stage, the petition need only present the "gist"
of a constitutional claim. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d  at 418. If the
petition survives first-stage dismissal, it will advance to the second
stage, where the court must determine whether the defendant has
made a substantial showing of a violation of his constitutional
rights. At this stage, the trial court shall appoint counsel, if
necessary, to represent an indigent defendant. 725 ILCS 5/122-4
(West 1998). If the post-conviction petition advances to the third
stage, the trial court will conduct an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS
5/122-6 (West 1998); Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d  at 418.
	In his pro se post-conviction petition, defendant alleged that
his trial counsel "had taken it or decided for herself not to file an
appeal, in spite of [his] numerous requests to [do so]." The trial
court determined that this allegation was one of ineffective
assistance of counsel. On appeal to this court, defendant contends
that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because
counsel failed to perfect his right to appeal by filing a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that (1) his counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697-98, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).
	The determinative fact in this case is defendant's choice to
plead guilty. Entering a guilty plea is a " 'grave and solemn act.' "
People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 326 (1996), quoting Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1468 (1970). It is not a " 'temporary and meaningless
formality reversible at the defendant's whim.' " Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 
at 326, quoting United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). In Illinois, a defendant who pleads guilty is not entitled
to a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence. To challenge
his guilty plea, the defendant must first file with the trial court a
motion to withdraw his plea and vacate the judgment against him.
This motion "shall be in writing and shall state the grounds
therefor." 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). If the defendant's motion to
withdraw his plea is allowed, the plea of guilty, sentence, and
judgment will be vacated and a trial date will be set. 188 Ill. 2d Rs.
605(b)(3), 604(d). In this instance, there is no appeal. If, on the
other hand, the motion is denied, only that decision can be
considered on review. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d  at 329. Further, a
voluntary guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional errors or
irregularities. People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 491 (1993);
People v. Horton, 143 Ill. 2d 11, 22 (1991); People v. Del Vecchio,
105 Ill. 2d 414, 433 (1985); see also 5 W. LaFave, J. Israel & N.
King, Criminal Procedure §21.6 (2d ed. 1999).
	Unlike the defendant who is convicted pursuant to a guilty
plea, the defendant who chooses to go to trial and is convicted has
an automatic right to an appeal.(1) The defendant who chooses to be
tried maintains his innocence. As the appellate court noted, "[f]or
a defendant convicted after trial, who has always professed
innocence, the right to appeal insures due process and provides an
important safety net to those who may have been wrongly
convicted." 305 Ill. App. 3d 853, 858. The defendant who appeals
from a conviction following a trial may raise any issue on appeal
as long as that issue has been properly preserved. See People v.
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988) (both a trial objection and a
written post-trial motion raising the issue are required to preserve
alleged errors).
	Thus, when a defendant, convicted after trial, asks his attorney
to file a notice of appeal and the attorney fails to do so, that
defendant's right to appeal has been violated. This is what
occurred in Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 23 L. Ed. 2d 340, 89 S. Ct. 1715 (1969). There, the Supreme Court rejected the
notion that the defendant's post-conviction petition, in which he
alleged "that his retained counsel had fraudulently deprived him
of his right to appeal," needed to specify the points he would raise
on appeal. Rodriquez, 395 U.S.  at 329, 23 L. Ed. 2d  at 343, 89 S. Ct.  at 1716. The Court noted that"[t]hose whose right to appeal
has been frustrated should be treated exactly like any other
appellants; they should not be given an additional hurdle to clear
just because their rights were violated at some earlier stage in the
proceedings." Rodriquez, 395 U.S.  at 330, 23 L. Ed. 2d  at 344, 89 S. Ct.  at 1717.
	Similarly, in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 145 L. Ed. 2d 985, 120 S. Ct. 1029 (2000), the defendant was denied his right
to appeal by counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal. The
defendant entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a California rule that
permitted him both to deny committing a crime and to admit the
evidence was sufficient to convict him. The trial judge advised the
defendant of his right to file an appeal within 60 days. Counsel
failed to file a notice of appeal within the requisite period and the
defendant's subsequent pro se notice was rejected as untimely.
Then, the defendant filed a petition for federal habeas corpus
relief pursuant to section 2254 of the United States Code (28
U.S.C. §2254 (1994)), alleging constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel based on his counsel's failure to file a notice
of appeal after she promised to do so. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at
474, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 993, 120 S. Ct.  at 1033. The majority
concludes that in Flores-Ortega, "the Supreme Court rejected the
proposition that Rodriquez is limited to those cases where a
defendant's conviction is obtained following a trial." Slip op. at 9.
I disagree with this conclusion.
	The Flores-Ortega decision was premised on the performance
prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel. The question
presented in the case was whether counsel is deficient for failing
to file a notice of appeal when the defendant has not clearly
conveyed his wishes one way or the other. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 477, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 995, 120 S. Ct.  at 1035. The majority
correctly notes that "the question at 'the heart of the case' was
'[u]nder what circumstances does counsel have an obligation to
consult with the defendant about an appeal?' " Slip op. at 10,
quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 478, L. Ed. 2d at 996, 120 S. Ct.  at 1035. The Court, however, also discussed the prejudice
prong of Strickland. The Court held that assuming the defendant's
counsel was deficient under the first prong, that deficiency
completely deprived the defendant of appellate proceedings he
wanted and "to which he had a right." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at
483, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 999, 120 S. Ct.  at 1038. This denial required
a presumption of prejudice under the second prong. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 483, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 999, 120 S. Ct.  at 1038.
The Court noted that the prejudice standard "breaks no new
ground, for it mirrors the prejudice inquiry applied in ***
Rodriquez v. United States." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.  at 485, 145 L. Ed. 2d  at 1000, 120 S. Ct.  at 1039. This prejudice standard is
inapplicable to the case at bar because a defendant who pleads
guilty in Illinois is not entitled to an appeal.
 	The defendant in Flores-Ortega entered a plea of guilty
pursuant to California law. In California, a defendant convicted
following a plea of guilty "shall, within 60 days after the judgment
is rendered, file as an intended notice of appeal the statement
required by section 1237.5 of the Penal Code; but the appeal shall
not be operative unless the trial court executes and files the
certificate of probable cause required by that section." Cal. Rules
of Court, R. 31(d) (2001). Section 1237.5 of the California Penal
Code provides:
			"No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a
judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty *** except
where both of the following are met:
				(a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a
written statement, executed under oath or penalty of
perjury showing reasonable constitutional,
jurisdictional or other grounds going to the legality of
the proceedings.
				(b) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate
of probable cause for such appeal with the county
clerk." Cal. Penal Code §1237.5 (West 2000).
	California law, unlike the law of this state, does not require a
defendant to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Although a
defendant in California must comply with section 1237.5's written
statement and certificate of probable cause requirements, the
defendant maintains his right to appeal. Further, he maintains the
right to assert on appeal any "reasonable constitutional,
jurisdictional or other grounds going to the legality of the
proceedings." Cal. Penal Code §1237.5(a) (West 2000).
	In contrast, the Illinois defendant is not entitled to directly
appeal his conviction and sentence following a plea of guilty. As
previously noted, Rule 604(d) requires him to first file a motion
with the trial court to withdraw his plea. If the defendant is
allowed to withdraw his plea, the plea, sentence, and judgment
will be vacated and the defendant will proceed to trial. If the
motion is denied, the defendant may then appeal only the denial of
that motion. Therefore, in Illinois, even when a defendant who has
been convicted pursuant to a guilty plea requests his attorney to
file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the attorney's failure to
do so is not a per se violation of the defendant's right to appeal.
	This court's decision in People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93 (1988),
is instructive on the issue presented in this case. In Wilk, the
defendants pled guilty to various charges and defense counsel filed
notices of appeal. Defense counsel, however, failed to file motions
to withdraw defendants' guilty pleas pursuant to Rule 604(d). We
held that Rule 604(d) serves as a condition precedent for an appeal
from a defendant's guilty plea. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d  at 105. The
defendants, however, were not without a remedy. The remedy
could be found in the Act:
		"[I]n a post-conviction petition, the defendant pro se
needs only to allege a violation of his sixth amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel, due to the
attorney's failure to preserve appeal rights, and allege
whatever grounds he or she would have had to withdraw
his or her plea of guilty had a proper motion to withdraw
been filed by defendant's counsel prior to the filing of a
notice of appeal. At the hearing on the post-conviction
petition, the two-pronged test laid down in Strickland v.
Washington will apply to determine if in fact the
defendant has been deprived of effective assistance of
counsel." (Emphasis added.) Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d  at 107-08.
	A defendant who pleads guilty in this state voluntarily places
himself in a different position from a defendant who is convicted
after trial. The defendant who pleads guilty has given up his right
to appeal unless he has grounds to withdraw his plea. When a
judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty, the defendant is put on
notice that, to challenge the judgment, he must provide grounds
for the withdrawal of his plea. 188 Ill. 2d R. 605(b). If the
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea is granted and the
defendant is subsequently convicted after trial, he may then appeal
that conviction. Consequently, the defendant who pleads guilty
must state grounds for the withdrawal of his plea at the first stage
of post-conviction if he alleges that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel by counsel's failure to perfect an appeal. He
must state more than just that his attorney did not file an appeal.
Here, defendant has not alleged enough.
	The majority's conclusion essentially eliminates the first stage
of post-conviction when a defendant alleges he was denied an
appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel; whether the
defendant pleaded guilty or was convicted after trial. The petition,
according to the majority, need only allege that the defendant
requested counsel to file an appeal and that counsel failed to do so.
These petitions will automatically proceed to the second stage of
post-conviction where the trial court will appoint counsel.
	The majority's holding places defendants convicted after
pleading guilty and defendants convicted after trial on equal
footing in post-conviction proceedings where it is alleged that
counsel deprived a defendant of appellate proceedings. I cannot
agree with this result. Defendant failed to state a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to allege
grounds for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent.
 



 



1.      1Appeals, however, must be perfected by filing a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the entry of the final
judgment appealed from. In cases in which a death sentence is imposed,
an appeal is automatically perfected without any action by the defendant
or his counsel. 188 Ill. 2d R. 606(b).