Case Title: Scott v. Scott

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 90-123


Eleanor (Brown) Scott                        Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      Windham Superior Court

Albert W. Scott                              October Term, 1990


Ellen H. Maloney, J.

William M. McCarty, Jr., and Cynthia Burns (On the Brief) of McCarty Law
  Offices, Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellee

Thomas W. Costello, Brattleboro, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
          Specially Assigned


     ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant appeals from the order of the Windham Superior
Court granting plaintiff a divorce on the grounds that she had lived
separate and apart from defendant for six consecutive months and that the
resumption of marital relations was not reasonably probable.  He also
appeals the distribution of the marital assets and the award of maintenance
to the plaintiff.  We reverse.
                                    I.
     Defendant first contends that the trial court's finding that "plaintiff
and defendant have lived separately and apart from each other in excess of
six consecutive months" was not supported by the evidence.  In response to
defendant's similar argument at trial, the court stated in its opinion that
"the parties have not had marital relations for fifteen years and that this
emotional interrelationship terminated well over six months ago."
     The background facts material to this issue disclose that the parties
were married on May 27, 1967, and had resided together in the same home
until September 20, 1989, when, pursuant to a temporary order, the court
awarded possession of the marital residence to plaintiff.  Plaintiff then
moved for an expedited hearing on the merits because she had been diagnosed
as being terminally ill with cancer.  This motion was granted, and the
hearing was held on February 8, 1990.  Plaintiff had initially filed for
divorce by alleging an anticipatory separation, meaning that by the time of
the final hearing the six-month living apart period required by 15 V.S.A. {
551(7) would have occurred.  At the hearing on the motion to expedite,
plaintiff represented that she could establish grounds for divorce under {
551(7) notwithstanding that the parties had resided in the same dwelling for
a portion of the required six months.  She amended her complaint to reflect
this representation, and the matter proceeded to final hearing before six
months had elapsed from the date defendant moved from the house.
     Defendant first argues that the statute in the context of grounds for a
final divorce requires that the parties not have lived under the same roof
for the requisite period.  While we have not addressed this specific
question, we have determined that for purposes of temporary orders in
divorce matters, "separation of the parties" as used in 15 V.S.A. { 594a
does not mean that one of the parties must have vacated the house.  Rather,
"[c]ontinued residence in the same dwelling is but one factor to be con-
sidered with others in determining the nature of the relationship between
the parties."  Buxton v. Buxton, 148 Vt. 22, 25,