Case Title: People ex rel. Devine

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90931

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90931-Agenda 8-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. RICHARD
A. DEVINE, State's Attorney of Cook County, Petitioner, v.
HON. JOSEPH M. MACELLAIO, Judge of the Circuit Court of
								Cook County, et al., Respondents.
Opinion filed March 21, 2002.
	 
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	This is an original action for issuance of a writ of mandamus
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(a)) brought by Richard Devine, the
State's Attorney of Cook County, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
381 (188 Ill. 2d R. 381). In this proceeding, Devine asks our court
to compel the Honorable Joseph M. Macellaio, judge of the circuit
court of Cook County, to vacate the 30-year sentence he imposed
on defendant, Darnell Brown, for aggravated criminal sexual
assault and to sentence Brown to natural life imprisonment
pursuant to section 12-14(d)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720
ILCS 5/12-14(d)(2) (West 2000)). For the reasons that follow, the
writ is awarded subject to conditions.
	Following a bench trial at which judge Macellaio presided,
Brown was found guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault,
criminal sexual assault, armed robbery, home invasion, aggravated
unlawful restraint and unlawful restraint. By statute, the maximum
term of imprisonment for the type of aggravated criminal sexual
assault for which Brown was convicted is normally 30 years. See
720 ILCS 5/12-14(d)(1) (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3)
(West 2000). Section 12-14(d)(2) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS
5/12-14(d)(2) (West 2000)) provides, however, that where a
defendant is convicted of a second or subsequent offence of
aggravated criminal sexual assault, the defendant "shall be
sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment." Section
5-8-1(a)(2.5) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(2.5) (West 2000)) reiterates this requirement.
	There is no dispute that Brown had previously been convicted
of aggravated criminal sexual assault in an unrelated case. Under
the terms of the foregoing statutes, he should therefore have been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of natural life on his
conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault in this case.
Although the State argued for imposition of such a sentence, the
circuit court rejected the State's argument. Instead it imposed a 30-year term of imprisonment on the aggravated criminal sexual
assault conviction. It also imposed 30-year terms on the
convictions for armed robbery and home invasion; a term of 15
years on the criminal sexual assault conviction; and terms of 4
years each on the convictions for aggravated unlawful restraint and
unlawful restraint. Each of the sentences was to be served
concurrently.
	Brown appealed the circuit court's judgment, and his appeal
is presently pending in the appellate court. As Brown's appeal
proceeds, the State has initiated this original mandamus action to
compel the circuit court to follow the requirements of section
12-14(d)(2) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/12-14(d)(2) (West
2000)) and to sentence Brown to natural life imprisonment rather
than 30 years on his conviction for aggravated criminal sexual
assault.
	Brown does not dispute that a sentence of natural life would
be mandated under the circumstances present in this case if his
appeal proved unsuccessful. Nor does he contest that mandamus
is an appropriate mechanism for compelling the circuit court to
comply with the statute's mandatory sentencing provisions. His
contention is simply that our court should defer ruling on the
State's mandamus request until his appeal has been heard and
decided by the appellate court.
	Brown's position is not without merit. Should he prevail on
the merits of his appeal and succeed in having his convictions
reversed, there would be no second conviction for aggravated
criminal sexual assault and therefore no basis for imposing a
mandatory life sentence under section 12-14(d)(2) of the Criminal
Code (720 ILCS 5/12-14(d)(2) (West 2000)) and section
5-8-1(a)(2.5) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(2.5) (West 2000)). Any order entered by this court
requiring imposition of such a mandatory sentence would be
rendered meaningless, and any action taken by the circuit court in
furtherance of our order would have to be set aside.
	 Although there is precedent for Brown's position (see People
ex rel. Carey v. Scotillo, 84 Ill. 2d 170, 176-77 (1981)), our court
has adopted a different approach where, as here, the court is aware
of the pendency of the underlying appeal when the writ of
mandamus is sought by the State. In such circumstances, we have
held that the better course of action is to follow Morrow v. Dixon
108 Ill. 2d 223 (1985), where we retained jurisdiction and awarded
the writ conditionally. People ex rel. Daley v. Strayhorn, 119 Ill. 2d 331, 337 (1988). That is the approach we shall therefore take
here.
	For the foregoing reasons, we retain jurisdiction of this matter
pending the outcome of Brown's appeal in the appellate court and
award the writ conditionally. If the appellate court affirms
Brown's conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault, the
writ shall issue directing the circuit court to vacate the 30-year
term of imprisonment it imposed for aggravated criminal sexual
assault and sentence Brown to natural life imprisonment as
mandated by section 12-14(d)(2) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS
5/12-14(d)(2) (West 2000)) and section 5-8-1(a)(2.5) of the
Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(2.5) (West
2000)). If Brown's conviction for aggravated criminal sexual
assault is reversed, the clerk of this court shall enter an order
dismissing the State's action for mandamus as moot.
Writ conditionally awarded;
jurisdiction retained.