Case Title: Arakaki v. SCD-Olanani Corporation. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 03/01/2006 [pdf].

Citation: 110 Haw. 1

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LISRARY

‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION ***

—_
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

=-= 000

WALTER Y, ARAKAKI, GENERAL CONTRACTOR, INC.,
a Hawai'i corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee,

 

and 3

STEPHEN H. SWIFT, Defendant-Appellee.

 

aad

 

O48 HY €2 a3 9002

GE CAPITAL HAWAII, INC., @ Hawai'i corporatil},
Defendant/Thizd-Party Appellee,

STANFORD S. CARR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Hawai'i corporation,
‘Third-Party Defendant /Appellant,

and
JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10,

DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10, DOE ENTITIES 1-10, and
‘DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-10, Defendants.

nn
No. 24789

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(civ. No. 99-2261)

FEBRUARY 23, 2006
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
OPINION OF URE VINSON,

The defendants-appellants SCD-Olanani Corporation
(hereinafter, “SCD") and Stanford S. Carr appeal from the October
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4, 2001 judgment of the circuit court for the first circuit, the
Honorable Karen Blondin presiding, in favor of the plaintiff-
appellee Walter Y. Arakaki, General Contractor, Inc.
(hereinafter, “Arakaki") and against SCD and Carr. The third~
party defendant /appellant Stanford S. Carr Development
Corporation (hereinafter, “Carr Dev. Corp.) appeals from the
circuit court’s December 5, 2001 order denying the October 12,
2001 motion for reconsideration filed by Carr Dev. Corp., SCD,
and Carr (hereinafter, collectively, “the Appellants”).

On appeal, the Appellants contend that the circuit
court erred in failing to: (1) “consider evidence of [the
defendant-appellee Stephen H.] Swift’s fraudulent concealment of
his wilful and illegal dumping of asbestos and other waste
material on [a certain mortgaged property in Kane‘ohe
(hereinafter, “)the property{”)] prior to, during, and after the
sale of the property to [the Appellants) in denying [the]
Appellants’ motion for reconsideration”; and (2) “find that a
mutual mistake as to the value and condition of the [p]roperty
existed at the time that Arakaki settled [its] claims with [the
Appellants], justifying rescission of the(ir] settlement
agreement.” (Emphases omitted.)

For the reasons discussed infra in part £.3, we hold
that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment and
accordingly vacate the circuit court’s October 4, 2001 order and

remand for further proceedings.
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I. BACKGROUND

on dune &, 1999, Arakaki filed its complaint in the
circuit court (Civ. No. 99-2261) against, inter alia, ScD, Carr,
and the defendant/third-party plaintiff/appellee GE Capital
Hawaii, Inc. (hereinafter, “GECH”), praying for foreclosure of
the property. Swift had apparently assigned to Arakaki a
mortgage securing @ promissory note under which the Appellants
were the obligors.

In November 2000, the Honorable Kevin Chang conducted a
settlement conference. On December 21, 2000, SCD and Arakaki
settled Arakaki’s claim, but the Appellants allegedly failed to
make payments in accordance with the settlement agreement. On
July 19, 2001, Arakaki moved, pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil
Procedure (HRCP) Rule 56(a), for summary judgment against SCD and
Carr and attached affidavits and a purported copy of the
settlement agreement. In its motion, Arakaki argued in relevant
part:

There can be no factual dispute that... the

Anstalinent payment due on June 30, 2001 is overdue and

Suing. “There can be no factual dispute concerning the terms

GF the Settiement Agreement oF that the sun of $300,000.00

Gs overdue and owing.

Ne paynent has been received to satisty the

payment of $200,000.00 which was due on June 30, 2001. The

Befault of (SCO and Cars] is without factual dispute and

therefore (Arakaki) is entitled to summary judgment for the

belance of $400,000.00. . -
on August 7, 2001, SCD and Carr filed a “statement of no position

 

regarding [Arakaki]’s motion . . . and statement of non
appearance by counsel.” (Emphases omitted.) On August 15, 2001,
the circuit court conducted a hearing at which, of the parties,

only Arakaki appeared.
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‘The eireuit court's October 4, 2001 order granted
Arakaki's motion for summary judgment in relevant part, denying
only attorney’s fees and costs. The circuit court directed that
the order “be entered as 2 final judgment pursuant to [HRCP] Rule
54(b).” On the same day, the circuit court entered final
judgment in favor of Arakaki and against ScD-Olanani Corporation
and Carr,

on October 12, 2001, the Appellants moved, pursuant to
HRCP Rules $9(e) and 60(b),! for reconsideration of the circuit
court's October 4, 2001 order. The Appellants proffered certain
environmental findings as newly discovered evidence, to wit,
Clayton Group Services, Inc.’s September 4, 2001 report on its
environnental survey of the property, and Geolabs, Inc.’s July
23, 2001 report concerning Geolabs, Inc.’s “supplemental
geotechnical engineering exploration . . . to obtain an overview
of the surface and subsurface conditions at the [property]
and to confirm the subsurface conditions encountered in the 1995
geotechnical engineering exploration.” Geolabs, inc. concluded

that

5 Rep Rule $8 (2) permits “notion(s] to alter or amend . .
judgment." ACP Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part:

on motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
Sucgnent| or) Graer'. for the following reasons: (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in tine to move for a new trial under (NRCP) mule
59(b)? (3) fraud. . - » misrepresentation, or other misconduct of
an adverse party? (4) ‘the Judgnent is void; .\. . of (6) any other
Featon justifying relief from the operation Of the judgment

RCP Role $9(b) provides, in turn, that “(a) motion for 3 new trial shall be
filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.”
 

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there Ss @ distinct chenge in the nature and character of
the Fill materials at the [Property] between the 1955 field
Exploration and the current fiela exploration. The fill
Suteriais’” .'s contained 'a significant amount of
Ueleterious saterials that will neea to be. . . replaced
Sith'nell compacted aaterials in order to construct the
Proposes residential dwellings on the [property]

In support of its motion for reconsideration, the Appellants
argued in relevant part that Clayton Group Services, Inc.'s study

concludes that Swift knowingly end intentionslly dumped and
Eovered up asbestos and cther iilegal material on the
Tpitsperty pricr to selling che [p]#operty to ScD. This is
ifer these’ cine that anyone (besides Swift) knew oF could
have known about such illegel dumping. As such, the study
Be"newly discovered evidence that waa not available prior te
the {august 18,2001] hearing oo Arakaki"s. (July 19," 2001)
notion s+. Arakaki stands in Swift's shoes, and’ took the
[plroperty Subject to the ene Liabilities end clains as
suze

‘Swift fraudulently and intentionally misrepresented
the (piroperty £0 ScD in order to induce the sale...

 

 

Seitt had a duty to disclose any and all material
tacts regarding the Ipltoperty except for those contained in
ihe title report. However, [Be] breached this duty when ne
failed to disclose his illegal landfill activity
[fvolving asbestos containing debris. This asbestos debris
Places a clouden title. ss

111 jswiges knew enat he was in violation of
Gieposad laws and chose not to inform (the Appellants] of
his illegal activity. [The Appellants) had no way of
Enewing sbout this. However, even if (the Appellants] knew
Grthoutd have known that there was illegal dumping...
this ooes not negate Swift’s obligation to convey title that
Nas tree and clear of... anything that would materially
Mffect the velue of the [piroperty

1 Lime appellants] believed that the (p}roperty
was clear Gf anything which would materially affect [its]
Value ©, and hed no reason to ehink that the (plroperty
[they] purchased from [their] friend ang business associate
far aot ina condition to be developed for its intended u

 

 

 

 

1. (the Appellants’) experience «6 in. real
estate development does not absolve Swift from liability for
S condition ne knew involved unreasonable risk and strong
Iikelineod of affecting the value of the [plroperty,

‘while the principle of caveat emptor dictates that the
buyer will smune the Fisk if he does not inspect or exenine
Sethe tine of possession, there are exceptions...

 
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foithermere, [the Appellants] ha[ve) not waived
[their} right. to Fescing the [ejontract on the basis of
Eraud when [they] only found out about the asbestos problem
on Septenber 13, 200),

(Citation omitted.) At the Novenber 6, 2001 hearing on the
Appellants’ motion for reconsideration, Carr and Carr Dev. Corp.
further argued:

[the} settiement agreement 12 a contract which can be

cancelled in equity upon a determination there's been &
‘mutual mistake.

 

 

 

oN Binare’s no question that there was at least
mutual mistake. ss
‘the second point . . . 4e that we're talking about
fraud here? and every (b] ack letter Lax, everything that’s
been cited... has a fraud exception to it
(ithey"te pointed te the settlenont agreement
and saidi)”... . Care pust Rave known or should have known

thet there was 3 Fraud committed; "and despite the same,
entered into that settenent agrecnent. Simply not true,

(ijnere there is 2 fraud, there must be an
expressed inouing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the
fraud:

 

 

«If Your Honor looks at that settlement
agreement, there's no discussion of any type of
dumping, ss no sention of @ fravd{-)

LILA survey was done by (Corr) with his due
diligence, At the time the property wae conveyed te him in
$995) 1996, it aid not show admitted illegal landfitl or
illegal dumping.

vw (Tibe only tine {sic} that put [Carr] on
notice|)'was the September 4th, 2001 survey... showing
Silega! eonping occurred.

tv (Garr) wouldh't have entered into this
settlenent agreement had he known there was illegal dumping
on the property.

At the conclusion of the hearing and pursuant to its
December 5, 2001 order, the circuit court denied the Appellants’
motion for reconsideration. On January 2, 2002, the Appellants
filed a timely notice of appeal.
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IT, STANDARD OF REVIEW
Grant Of Summary Judonent

ie review the clrosit court's grant of summary
judgment de nove.

(slunmary judgment i# appropriate if the pleadings,
Gepeeit ones Snauere. to interrogatories, and
Gcniseions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
Sidiriat act and thet the moving party is entitled to
Jodguent es a matter of law, A fact ie material if
proof of that fact would have the effect of
Establishing oF refuting one of the essential elenents
SFgRause ef action or defense asserted by th
fareiea. The evidence mist be viewed in the light
Rost favorable to the aon-moving party. In other
words, we must view sil of the evidence and the
Thterences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to'the party opposing the motion

 

 

 

nv. C: unt noluly, 98 Hawai'i 233, 244-45, 47
P.3d 348, 359-60 (2002) (brackets in original) (quoting Hawaii
cmty, Fed. Credit Union v. Keka, 94 Hawai'i 213, 221, 11 P.3d 1,

9 (2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Tit. DISCUSSION
A. The Appellants’ arauments
on appeal, the Appellants argue? that “the circuit
court erred when it failed to consider evidence of Swift’s
fraudulent concealment of his wilful and illegal dumping of

asbestos and other waste material on the property prior to,

 

2 the Appellants’ concise statement of the points of error is
useless as a teadsep. Therein, the Appellants merely argue that the circuit
Gourt erred in ti] granting an’ zelevent part Arakeki’'s July 19, 2001 motion,
(2) entering its October 4, 2001 order, and (3) denying the Appellants’ notion
for feconesderation. inasmuch as any error(s) underlying an eppealeble ruling
Ste usually net self-evident, & concise statenent of points should not merely
Eecite the documents appealed from, lite a notice of appeal, But also
Eereshadon the erief’s specific argunent(s)- See Hawaii Rules of Appellate
Procedure Rule 28(b) (4) and (71~
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during, and after the sale of the property to [the Appellants} in

 

denying [the] Appellants’ motion for reconsideration

owift . . . failed to disclose his S1lega) landfill activity
fon the'site involving asbestos containing debris.

(The Appellants) did not know of the hazardous
material being dumped on the Property until September of
2001... . Hed [eney) been privy to. ~~ any illegal
Gunping and’ cover-up of... hazardous material on the
Property, [they] woul not have gone through with the

Ov; agreed to settle «

 

 

Even if (the Appellants] knew or should have
known that there «aa iiiegal dumping of hazardous material
be the Property, this does not negate Swift's obligation te
Sisclose sil naterial information affecting the
marketapility, condition, and value of the Property.

 

[11 ven though carr ds a developer, the doctrine of
caveat enptor does not apply . .. where there is active
Concealment of @ harmful, hazardous substance of which the
Seller 12 aware.

 

 

(Emphases omitted.) Moreover, the Appellants contend, “Swift's
fraud is imputed to Arakaki by . . . assignment of the [second
mortgage]. . . . Ag much as Arakaki would simply like to be paid
because he was the assignee of the promissory note, he becane
subject to the liabilities and defenses thereunder when he
accepted the assignment.”

Though the Appellants do not articulate exactly what
relief they seek in this court -- whether avoidance of the
contract or a remand for reconsideration on the basis of newly
discovered evidence -- they conclude that “a mutual mistake as to
the value and condition of the property existed at the time
Arakeki settled (its) claims against [the Appellants], justifying

rescission of the settlement agreement”:

Neither [the Appellants] nor Arakaki had any knowledge of
Swift's illegal dumping. (ALl) were unaware that asbestos
containing materiel wos present on she Property + tebe
Appellants) agreed to settle... on the material
Qesunpeion that the Property wes ready Zor development.

PIMP ithe Appellante] first found out about swift’s silegel

 
 

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actions . , . in September 2001. This is new evidence that
Sule nol have been raised during the settlenent
fegetintions between the parties in tiovenber 2000 [nor] at
the hearing on Arakaki's motion for summary judgment

ithe Apretiante] condocted [their] due diligence of the
Property and relied upon Swift's good faith as a fellow
businesenan and friend that the value and condition of the
Property maz suited for residential development.

 

(Emphasis and citation omitted.)
8. Arakaki's Arauments

In its answering brief, Arakaki counters’ that, “(als
the non-moving part [ies], [SCD and Carr] ha[d] the burden of
showing . . . that 2 genuine issue of {material] fact existled],”
and that “[Sco’s and Carr]’s statement of no position coupled
with their non-appearance at the hearing constitute (d] @ waiver
of objections to the granting of . . . summary judgment.”
(Citing Cordeiro v, Burns, 7 Haw. App. 463, 776 P.2d 411 (1989).

Arakaki contends that the underlying contract between

 

the parties merged into the settlement and that, “*[als @ general
rule, a properly executed settlenent precludes future litigation
for its parties.’” (Quoting Amantiad v. Odum, 90 Hawai'i 182,
161, 977 F.2d 160, 169 (1999).) Arakaki further notes that the
language of the settlement shows the parties’ agreement to bar
any further clains in the present matter: “(AJbsent bad faith or
fraud in the settlement agreement neither party . . . may rescind
the agreenent. None of the alleged newly discovered evidence
constitutes bad faith or fraud related to the Settlement

Agreement and hence there can be no rescission of the Settlement

>In addition to the responses presented infra, Arakaki argues thet
“the [circuit] court did not exr in denying the aotion for continuance of
trisl.* (Emphases omitted.) Inasmch as this point is unresponsive to the

 

Appellants’ opening brief, we do not address its

8

 
#44 POR PUBLICATION ***
Agreement.” (Citing Miller v, Manuel, 9 Haw. App. 56, 628 P.2d
286 (1999).)

In addition, Arakaki asserts that the Appellants’
motion for reconsideration did not meet the standard for newly
discovered evidence warranting reconsideration:

From 1995 through the present [SCO and Carr] ouned the
property, had control ever the property and knew oF should

Rave known that Swift was continuing te access and work on
the property.

‘The daposition of Sift . . . put (SCD and Care} on
notice more than § months before the settlenent conference
Gnd 17 months before - - . Arakaki's motion for summary

 

 

Judgment that the property was used ae e landfill. Th

Gectabe report simply confirmed the landfill as dic the

Conniesioner’s report

[SCo'and Carr) did not exercise due diligence in
discovering the notices of violation and Landfilis. The

Notices were public records from 1995-1996.

(Capitalization altered.)

Finally, Arakaki argues that SCD and Carr failed to
preserve any error(s) for appeal, inasmuch as their motion for
reconsideration concerned only “alleged fraud in the underlying
sale,” not the settlement agreement. (Citing Pele Def, Fund vy.
Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 837 P.2d 1247 (1992).) In any case, Arakaki

states, any mistake of fact about environmental conditions on the

 

property “[waJe not basic or material to the settlement agreenent
because the settlement agreenent makes no mention or
consideration of the development value(} or condition of the
property.”
c. revit C 4 In G: z
Wie disagree with Arakaki’s assertion that the
Appellants waived their objections to the circuit court's grant

of summary judgment by filing a statement of no position and

10
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failing to appear at the August 15, 2001 hearing. Absent @ local
rule to the contrary, a party need not affirmatively oppose @
motion for summary judgment that fails to show prima facie (1)
that the undisputed facts foreclose “genuine issue((s)] as to any
material fact((s))] and [(2)] that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." A non-novant’s failure to

oppose the facts averred by the movant may constitute admission

of those facts, Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 263, 268 (7th Cir.
1995); ev 2 , 745 B.2d 972, 974 (Me.

2000), but those facts must nonetheless establish that the movant
is entitled to relief. See Adickes v. S. Hs Kress § Co, 398
U.S. 144, 187 (1970); Buaker v, Folev, 274 F.3d 677, 680-81 (24
Cir. 2001) (*{E]ven when a nonmoving party chooses the perilous
path of failing to submit a response . . . , the [trial] court
may not grant the motion (for summary judgment] without first
examining the moving party’s submission to determine sf it has
met its burden of demonstrating that no material issue of fact
remains for trial.”); Peter y. Lincoln Tech, Inst., 255 F. Supp.
2d 417, 426 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Andrews v, Tex. Park & Wildlife
Rept, 196 F. Supp. 2d 424, 426 (E.D. Tex. 2001); San Juan Star
Co. v. Casiano Communications, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 110, 112
(D.P.R, 2001); Greater Ariz. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Tang, 400 P.2¢
121, 123 (Ariz. 1965) (“IE the papers of the moving party fail to
show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the
opposing party need not file an opposing affidavit.”); Ex.
Dors: Co. za Ci , 413 8.W.24 167, 170 (Mo.
1967) (The failure of [the] plaintiff to . . . present any proof

u
 

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in respect to the motion . . . forces us to accept . . . that
there is no factual issue concerning the terms of the contracts
attached to the motion . . . . However, this . . . does not
necessarily require (summary judgment] where, as here, the
“moving party may not have shown by ‘unassailable proof’ that as
a matter of law it was entitled thereto.'"); Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1190 & n.17
(3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2005) (citing Harriman v. Liberian Mar
Comp., 204 F. Supp. 205, 206 (D. Mass, 1962) ("It is elementary
that in either State or Federal practice a motion is not
automatically allowed by the mere filing of an ‘assent,’ or a
notation of ‘no opposition’ thereto, and it is a matter of daily
experience that Courts frequently deny motions which have been

; cfs Perez v. Tonberlin, 340 2.26 962, 985 (Ariz.
1959) ("The supporting affidavits . . . by [the defendants] . .

assented to.”)

 

were clearly strong enough to cast grave doubts upon the
assertions found in [the] plaintiff's . . . complaint, It was
therefore necessary for [the plaintiff] to controvert this

opposing evidence in order to preclude (summary judgment in the

defendants’ favor].

 

Moreover, the relevant local rules do not compel this
court or the circuit court to construe the Appellants’ silence as
waiver.‘ Cf. Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 652, 653 & a1 (9th
cir, 1994) (affirming summary judgment against plaintiff where

‘tm Hawaii's circute courte, “(failure to appear at the nearing
nay be deened waiver of cbjections to the granting of the motion,” Rule of
The Circuit Courts 7c) (emphasie added), But ite October 4, 2001 order do
hot indicate that the cifeuit court granted summary judgnent "by default’
Because of SCO's and/or Care's failure to appear.

 

 

12
484 POR PUBLICATION **#
local rule provided that “if the opposing party does not serve
and file the required answering memoranda . . . such
noncompliance may be deemed a consent to the . . . granting of
the motion and the court may dispose of the motion summarily,”
and trial court had “warned [the plaintiff] that failure to
respond . . . ‘shall constitute a consent on the part of [the
plaintiff) to the granting of the defendants’ motion’); Elvan,
58 F.3d at 286 n.2 (in dicta) ("[PJertinent local rules may more
explicitly define the consequences of a non-movant’s failure to
respond... .”). ven assuming, axauendo, that Arakaki’s
"his July 19, 2001 motion pursuant to HRC

 

affidavits “supporte
Rule $6(e) (concerning summary judgment)* such that SCD and Carr,
by failing to oppose them, acquiesced in their presumptive truth,
the burden remained upon Arakaki to show that it was “entitled to
judgment as a matter of law,” see generally french v. Hawaii
Pizza Hut, 105 Hawas' 462, 470, $9 P.3d 1046, 1054 (2004)

 

+ RCE Rule 56 provides in relevant pert:

la)... A party seeking to recover upon a claim... nay
nove with or without supporting affidavite for a sunnery judgrent
Sethe perty’s fever open all ox any part thereof,

ici “.'. . me udgaent sought shail be rendered forthwith
kf the pleadings, depositions, snsvers to interrogatories, and
Admissions on file, together with the affidavite, if any, show
Ghne there is no genuine seve as to any material fact and thet
the moving party is entitied to 8 judgment as a matter of law

_ . hen a motion for summary judgment is made and
worted a Seovidh rule, an adverse party may not ©
the were allegations or Genisis of the adverse perty’s
reading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as
Etherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
Showing that there se a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse
flety does not so respond, summary Sudgnent, if spsropriate, =
EeTentered againet the edverse party.

 

 

 

   

po
Bh

  

 

 

(amphe

 

2)

 

13
‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION ¥#*
(“*only when the moving party satisfies its initial burden of
production does the burden shift to the non-moving party to
respond to the motion for sunmary judgment and demonstrate
specific facts . . . that present a genuine issue worthy of
trial.'”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting GECC Fin. Corp.
daffarian, 79 Hawai'i 516, 521, 904 P.2d 530, $35 (App. 1995)).

Notwithstanding Arekaki’s citation of Cordeiro, the
foregoing analysis is consonant with that opinion. In Cordeiro,
the defendant State of Hawai'i had moved for summary judgment,
proffering to the circuit court the deposition testimony of
another defendant whose negligence, the State alleged, had been
the sole legal cause of the death that resulted from the
underlying traffic accident. 7 Haw. App. at 465, 467, 776 P.2d
at 414-15, ‘The non-movant plaintiff did not oppose the motion
except to challenge the credibility of the deponent, cleiming
that his testimony “[wa]s ‘self-serving’ and conflict(ed) with
statements he made to the police on the date of the accident.
(the plaintiff] therefore urge[d] that the credibility issue
should have precluded summary judgment in this case.” 7 Haw.
App. at 469-70, 776 P.2d at 416. The Intermediate Court of
Appeals disagreed, reasoning that

‘a party opposing the motion for summary judgment must be

able te point £0 some facts which refute the proof of the

event in some material portion and “nct merely recite the

Tecantation, ‘credibility,’ and have @ trial on the hope

that's Jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.”

‘The nensneving party must come forward with cone evidentiary

utters te support ite position. By failing to present any

Specific evidence of discrepancies or contradiction among

[the deponent’s] statements, [the nonmoving party) has

failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact
7 Haw. App. at 470, 776 P.2d at 416-17 (quoting Costa v. Able

 

u
ne POR PUBLICATION ###
Distribs.. Inc., 3 Haw. App. 486, 489, 683 P.2d 101, 104 (1982).
Nevertheless, the ICA did not grant summary judgment in the
State's favor “by default.” Rather, it evaluated the sufficiency
of the State's evidence, concluding that “there is no discrepancy
or conflict between [the deponent’s] testimony and the statement
he gave to the police at the time of the accident." 7 Haw. App.
at 471, 176 P.2d at 417.

In the present matter, Arakaki’s motion for summary
judgment and its affidavits did not present any evidence to rule
out “genuine issue(s) of] material fact” as to the Appellants’

possible default on the promissory note -- is@a, the subject of

 

civ. No. 99-2261 ~
production to the Appellants. At most, Arakaki’s motion tended

to show that the Appellants breached their settlement agreement

let alone enough to shift the burden of

with Arakaki, but the evidence “supporting” the motion is
inapposite to the claims set forth in the underlying suit. The
settlenent agreement does not purport to supplant the mortgage,
the promissory note it secured, or Arakaki's suit.

In sum, because the undisputed facts presented by
Arakaki’s motion are insufficient to obviate trial of the factual
issues raised in the complaint, the circuit court erred in

granting summary judgment .*

+ insofar as Arekeki's goal was the Appellants’ compliance with the
seteienent agreements ie could have filed @ motion in the circuit court to
eer eeeTenene cre separate action for breach of contract. See David
Foner at al,, Motion Practice § 20.06(A) (ith ed. Supp. 2005) ("Three
coated they Menton Eeassise ° [alm onendnent or supplenentation of the
Riesdings to allege the settlement agreenent as an executory accordl, ) a
creased’ action for breach ef the settlement agreenent(, and a) motion to
SGebieeSstesiement. The third remeay is the most common and is usually the
ost costeffective.").

 

as
‘84 FOR PUBLICATION **

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we vacate the circuit court's October 4,
2001 order and remand with instructions to (1) deny Arakaki's
July 19, 2001 motion for summary judgment and (2) conduct further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

on the briefs: Ire

Lyle S. Hosoda, .
for the cefendants~appellants Bere Relon man
SCD-Olanani Corporation and
Stanford s. Cart, and
the third-party defendant/ Rucese Ch raeuyane
appellant Stanford S. Carr
Development corporation

Stephen W.H.A. Lee, a \
for the piaintiff-appellee
Waiver Y. Arakaki, Yoo, Bedi th

General Contractor, Inc

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