Case Title: AUTO CLUB INS CO v TOYOTA MOTOR

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12666 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1974 -- AUTOMOBILE CLUB INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellant, TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U . S . A . , INC. , and TOYOTA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Honorable W. W . Lessley , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Bennett and Bennett, Bozeman, Montana Lyman Bennett, Jr. argued and Lyman Bennett, 111 argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondents: Berg, Angel, Andriolo and Morgan, Bozeman, Montana Charles F . Angel argued, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: June 13, 1974 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted defendants i n the d i s t r i c t court, Gallatin County. This cause arose out of an accident i n Gallatin County and i s the same accident involved i n Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, Mont . U.S.A., Inc., , 513 P.2d 268, 30 St.Rep. 808. In a motion f o r summary judgment plaintiffasked the t r i a l court t o take j u d i c i a l notice of a l l records, pleadings, f a c t s and the decision by t h i s Court i n Brandenburger and concluded t h a t the decision i n the t r i a l court and i n t h i s Court on appeal, were r e s judicata. Here, the complaint i s one whereby p l a i n t i f f Automobile Club Insurance Company, insurer of Tafford Oltz, driver of the Toyota, by way of indemnity seeks recovery from Toyota f o r the sum of $50,000 which i s the amount p l a i n t i f f paid on behalf of Oltz on the Brandenburger verdict and judgment against Oltz and Toyota, and f o r the recovery of monies incurred by p l a i n t i f f i n defending f o r Oltz the claim on which t h e judgment was based. Four separate claims predicating l i a b i l i t y a r e made: 1) S t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t ; 2) Alleged breach of express warranty; 3) Alleged breach of implied warranty of merchantability; and 4 ) Alleged breach of implied warranty of f i t n e s s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose. In Brandenburger. Oltz f i l e d a cross complaint against Toyota based on idemnity. The complaint i n the i n s t a n t cause i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same a s t h a t cross complaint except t h a t there were no allegations of negligence i n manufacture and design of the vehicle i n question here, whereas such allegations were contained i n the cross complaint f o r indemnity i n Brandenburger. A t the close of a l l testimony i n Brandenburger on behalf of Toyota, a motion was made t o dismiss the indemnity cross complaint on t h e grounds the evidence showed a s a matter of law t h a t Oltz was g u i l t y of a c t i v e negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident and rande en burger's death. That same premise was carried forward i n the answer f i l e d i n the i n s t a n t cause i n t h e t h i r d de- fense wherein it i s alleged: hat the i n j u r i e s and damages of which p l a i n t i f f complains, i f any, were contributed t o and proximately caused by the negligence of Tafford E. Oltz, ugon whose r i g h t of recovery the p l a i n t i f f depends. The t r i a l court i n i t i a l l y granted t h e motion and then l a t e r took it under advisement, but did not i n s t r u c t the jury on indemnity. Subsequently i n the settlement of instructions, counsel f o r Toyota agreed t h a t there would be no claim of waiver of the indemnity cross claim merely because it was not disposed of i n Brandenburger. Here it i s contended, however, t h a t t h e verdict of the jury and the decision of t h i s Court i n Brandenburger a r e r e s judicata a s t o c e r t a i n controlling factors. Therefore, i n properly applying the concept of r e s judicata t o t h i s case i t becomes necessary t o c l e a r l y ascertain j u s t what the Brandenburger decision determined. A s t o the jury verdict, it i s important t o note t h a t t h a t claim was submitted t o the jury insofar a s Oltz was concerned on a charge of gross negligence i n the operation of the vehicle. A s t o the Brandenburger claim against Toyota, it was based on alleged negligence and s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t . The jury i n returning a verdict i n favor of p l a i n t i f f against Oltz and Toyota i n e f f e c t found Oltz g u i l t y of gross negligence and Toyota e i t h e r g u i l t y of negligence i n manufacture and design o r t h a t the vehicle was de- f e c t i v e and i n an unreasonably unsafe condition. The e f f e c t of t h a t determination by the Brandenburger jury i s a determination of r e s judicata a s t o the above matters. Toyota argues t h a t the jury determination i n Brandenburger i s r e s judicata only a s t o the following propositions: 1) Oltz was g u i l t y of gross negligence which was the proximate and contributing cause of the accident and rand en burger's death. In other words, but f o r h i s gross negligence, the accident would not have happened and Brandenburger would not have been k i l l e d . 2) That Toyota was e i t h e r g u i l t y of negligence, o r t h a t the vehicle i n question was i n a defective o r unreasonably unsafe condi- t i o n , and t h a t such negligence or condition a l s o contributed a s a proximate cause of rande en burger's death. This Court's decision i n Brandenburger made no determination Toyota was s t r i c t l y l i a b l e t o p l a i n t i f f insurance company by way of indemnity f o r t h a t issue was not before the Court. The decision of t h i s Court was t h a t the doctrine of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t was applicable i n Montana; t h a t the instructions on t h a t issue were correct; t h a t there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o show t h a t the vehicle i n question was i n a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition; and, t h a t such dangerous condition contributed a s a proximate cause of rande en burger's death. W e w i l l not s e t f o r t h i n d e t a i l the f a c t s of Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, e t . a l . , M o n t . , 513 p.2dS68, 30 St.Rep. 808. Reference is made t o t h a t case f o r the f a c t situation. Here, three issues a r e presented. Did t h e t r i a l court e r r i n : 1) Determining t h a t no r i g h t of indemnity by p l a i n t i f f against defendants existed? 2) Denying p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r summary judgment? 3) Granting defendants' motion f o r summary judgment? A s t o issue No. 1, the verdict i n Brandenburger against Oltz and Toyota c l e a r l y determed they were j o i n t tortfeasors. Such a determination i s r e s judicata a s t o the p a r t i e s here involved i n the present indemnity l i t i g a t i o n . The general r u l e i s a j o i n t tortfeasor i s not e n t i t l e d t o e i t h e r contribution o r indemnity. A s noted by Judge Jameson i n Panasuk v. Seaton, 277 F.Supp. 979, 980: "The r u l e i s well s e t t l e d i n Montana t h a t , ' i f the concurrent negligence of two o r more persons causes an i n j u r y t o a t h i r d person, they a r e j o i n t l y and severally l i a b l e , and the injured person may sue them j o i n t l y o r severally, and recover against one o r a l l ' . [Citing cases] * * * the Montana court a l s o recognized 1 the general r u l e t h a t one of the several wrongdoers cannot recover against another wrongdoer although he may have been compelled t o pay a l l the damages f o r the wrong done. 1 11 The "conflicting views" regarding the r i g h t of contribution as between j o i n t t o r t f e a s o r s i s well summarized i n the Annotation, 60 ALR2d 1366. See also: 18 Am Jur 2d, Contribution 5 33; 41 Am Jur 2d,Indemnity 520. There a r e exceptions but, where each t o r t - feasor is chargeable with affirmative negligence, neither i s e n t i t l e d t o indemnity or contribution. 41 Am JUT 2d, Indemnity 521. Two recent opinions of t h i s Court involved the question of indemnity between j o i n t tortfeasors but a r e distinguishable. St. Paul F i r e and Marine Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 152 Mont. 396, 451 P.2d 98; Crosby v. Billings Deaconess Hospital, 149 Mont. 314, 426 P.2d 217. While indemnity was allowed i n Thompson it was on the b a s i s of imputed negligence o r responsibility under the doctrine of respondeat superior not on any independent a c t of negligence of the employer. In Crosby t h i s Court reversed a summary judgment of the t r i a l court but noted t h a t the h o s p i t a l ' s claim f o r indemnity would be defeated i f t h e evidence showed t h a t i t s (hospital's) responsibility t o p l a i n t i f f was t h a t of an active tortfeasor. See also: Great Northern Railway Company v. United States, 187 F.Supp. 690. A s t o any claim t h a t the indemnity sued f o r i n t h i s cause i s based upon warranty, we find t h a t 0 l t z ' s a c t i v e negligence which contributed a s a proximate cause t o the accident bars any r e c w e r y . In a case similar t o Brandenburger on the f a c t s , the Washington Court denied indemnity, Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Stromme, 4 Wash.App. 85, 479 P.2d 554, 556, and said: I I In conjunction with t h i s assignment of e r r o r , p l a i n t i f f contends the doctrine of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y imposes a s u f f i c i e n t degree of l i a b i l i t y on defendants f o r injury t o the user of i t s product t o e s t a b l i s h the primary-secondary relationship between t o r t feasors required t o invoke the exception t o the indemnity pro- h i b i t i o n rule. Assuming arguendo t h a t there might be s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y imposed upon defendants f o r i n j u r i e s suffered by the user of a defective product i n such a s i t u a t i o n , t h i s does not diminish t h e quantum, o r change the character, of l i a b i l i t y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o p l a i n t i f f ' s insured. " ~ a s h i n g t o n ' s recent adoption of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y a s a b a s i s f o r t o r t action against a manufacturer does not, of i t s e l f , r a i s e t h e t o r t f e a s o r ' s l i a b i l i t y there- under t o a higher plateau or degree than the u s e r ' s l i a b i l i t y which stems from the use of the product causing the injury; nor does it change our indemnity law pertaining t o j o i n t t o r t feasors. The f a c t s surrounding the incident giving r i s e t o the i n i t i a l cause of action and the d u t i e s breached by the t o r t feasors determine whether indemnity w i l l be permitted, not the theory upon which t h e i r l i a b i l i t y may be based. W e believe Rufener v. Scott, supra, contains one of the c l e a r e r statements of the law applicable t o t h i s issue wherein it s t a t e s 46 Wash.2d a t 243, 280 P.2d a t 255, quoting from 27 Am.Jur.Indemnity $18: I"* * dr one constructively l i a b l e f o r a t o r t i s gen- e r a l l y held e n t i t l e d t o indemnity from the a c t u a l wrongdoer, regardless of whether l i a b i l i t y is imposed on the person seeking indemnity by s t a t u t e o r by r u l e of * * * law, * * * . I ( I t a l i c s ours.) In other words, i f t h e t o r t i o u s conduct of t h e wrongdoer, regardless of the underlying theory of l i a b i l i t y , does nothing more than furnish a condition t o which a subsequent independent ' a c t ' of a co-wrongdoer occurs, the t o r t feasors a r e not i n p a r i d e l i c t o and in- demnity may be allowed. Conversely, i f each of the t o r t f e a s o r ' s a c t s although independent concur i n establishing the b a s i s f o r the a c t u a l l i a b i l i t y , t h e y a r e i n p a r i d e l i c t o and indemnity w i l l not be allowed. I I I n the i n s t a n t appeal p l a i n t i f f ' s cause was dismissed a t the close of i t s case. The t r i a l court found a s a matter of law t h a t Mrs. Blacklaw was l i a b l e t o Curtis f o r (1) operating an automobile with a defective brake system, (2) f a i l i n g t o sound her horn t o warn Curtis of her approach, and (3) f a i l i n g t o apply her emergency brake. I f only (1) had been t h e basis f o r the t r i a l c o u r t ' s decision we would be compelled t o reverse and remand the case f o r a f a c t u a l deter- mintation of other possible sources of Mrs. lackl law's l i a b i l i t y . The a c t u a l wrongdoer i n such a s i t u a t i o n could be the r e t a i l e r o r the manufacturer who placed the defective automobile i n her possession. [Citing case.] However, the presence of (2) and (3) e s t a b l i s h a c t u a l l i a b i l i t y i n addi- t i o n t o her constructive f a u l t . Thus, her t o r t i o u s conduct concurred with defendants' i n producing the injury and t h i s concurrence precludes indemnity. 11 W e hold the j u r y ' s finding i n Brandenburger t h a t Oltz was grossly negligent i s controlling and t h i s precludes appellant in- surance company from receiving indemnity. Having so found there can be no e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o grant summary judgment f o r appellant. Granting of summary judgment f o r respondent was proper. The judgment i s affirmed. W e Concur: - . s - - - - c - - - - - - - - - - - - c - L - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I ^ I ^ - chief J u s t i c e P ' / ..................................... Justices. M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell, specially concurring: I concur i n the r e s u l t . However, i n m y viey the r u l e of c o l l a t e r a l estoppel r a t h e r than r e s judicata is involved here. See Gessell v. Jones, 149 Mont. 418, 427 P.2d 295, f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n . J u s t i c e