Case Title: People v. Blue

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84046

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Opinion filed January 27, 2000.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
This matter comes before the court on the direct appeal of the jury 
conviction of defendant, Murray Blue, of one count of first degree murder (720 
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1992)); three counts of attempted first degree murder 
(720 ILCS 5/8-4, 9-1 (West 1992)); two counts of aggravated battery with a 
firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 1992)); and two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 
1992)). Defendant elected to have the same jury deliberate his subsequent 
capital sentencing hearing. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 1992). The jury determined 
that defendant was eligible for the death penalty, and that there were no 
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. 
720 ILCS 5/9-1(b), (d) (West 1998). The trial court entered judgment on the 
verdict and sentenced defendant to death.
Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence directly to this court. 134 
Ill. 2d R. 603. On appeal, defendant contends that errors occurring at the guilt 
and sentencing phases of his trial entitle defendant to a new trial or, in the 
alternative, to a new sentencing hearing.
This court holds that cumulative errors occurring at trial deprived defendant 
of his due process right to a fair trial. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, §1; Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. I, §2. We reverse the trial court's judgment on defendant's 
convictions, vacate the sentence entered on the judgment, and remand for a new 
trial.
BACKGROUND
The trial of defendant Murray Blue encompassed multiple crimes. The State 
alleged that, on the afternoon of March 8, 1995, defendant was involved in two 
separate shooting incidents. Testimony of several witnesses and physical 
evidence admitted at the guilt phase of defendant's trial revealed the following 
course of events.
A. The Victor Young Shooting
Victor Young testified that, from 1990 until 1991 or 1992, he sold cocaine 
and heroin for defendant at the corner of Maypole and Kildare streets in 
Chicago. Defendant controlled drug sales at Maypole and Kildare. At the 
beginning of each day, defendant would give Young two guns to carry with him. 
Defendant would collect the guns at the end of the day. At the time, both Young 
and defendant were members of the Gangster Disciples street gang. Young 
identified other individuals that sold drugs for defendant as Clyde Cowley and 
Jimmy Parker.
Young stopped selling drugs for defendant when Young joined the Conservative 
Vice Lords, a rival street gang. In March 1995, Young was selling drugs for the 
Conservative Vice Lords at the corner of Karlov and Maypole streets.
On March 8, 1995, at approximately 2:30 p.m., Young and his friends Jermaine 
White and Lawrence Walker were walking on Maypole Street, between Kildare and 
Keeler. As they passed 4245 W. Maypole Street, defendant yelled at Young from 
the first-floor window of an apartment building. Defendant accused Young of 
talking to the police about defendant. Young denied it and told defendant that 
defendant was not going to harm Young. Young turned to walk away and defendant 
called after him. When Young turned back toward defendant, he saw that defendant 
was holding a "TEC-9" semiautomatic gun. Young started to run away from the 
apartment building and defendant began shooting at him. Young estimated that 
defendant fired 12 to 20 shots. Young was hit in the hip or buttocks and fell to 
the ground.
Lawrence Walker, who was standing next to Young at the time the shooting 
began, testified that he heard defendant fire at least 15 shots. Walker 
continued to run from the scene when the shooting started.
From the ground, Young looked behind him and saw defendant run out of the 
apartment building, accompanied by Clyde Cowley and Jimmy Parker. Parker was 
also holding a weapon and, at defendant's direction, shot at Young as well. 
Young then heard defendant say, "Let's get out of here. It's getting too 
hot."
Young saw defendant, Cowley and Parker run through a vacant lot. A few 
minutes later, Young observed a black Lincoln Continental automobile drive north 
on Kildare street at 40 miles per hour. Young could not see inside the car, but 
he knew that the car belonged to defendant.
B. The Shooting of Daniel Doffyn, Milan Bubalo, Murray Blue and 
Clyde Cowley
On the same day that the shooting of Young took place, March 8, 1995, Geneva 
Walker was living in an apartment in a building located at 754 N. Lorel Avenue 
in Chicago. The apartment building also contains the address of 750 N. Lorel, 
and is located approximately 17 blocks from the 4200 block of West Maypole. At 
3:15 p.m., Walker heard the sound of glass breaking. Looking outside her window, 
she saw a man sitting on the window ledge of another first-floor apartment. She 
observed the man removing broken glass and dropping it on the ground. She called 
911 and reported what she saw.
The 15th District station of the Chicago police department is directly across 
the street from 750 N. Lorel. Several police officers responded to the call of a 
burglary in progress at the apartment building. Officer Elois Jackson testified 
that she was in the warrant office at the 15th District station when she heard 
the report over her police radio of a burglary in progress. Jackson told the 
dispatcher she could respond to the call and walked across the street to 750 N. 
Lorel.
As she approached the building, Jackson saw Officers Milan Bubalo and Daniel 
Doffyn walking to the front of the building. Jackson entered a gangway at the 
south side of the building, leading toward its rear. As she reached the far end 
of the gangway, she was approached by two black males. One carried a TEC-9 gun, 
with his hands extended in front of him. The other male appeared to be unarmed. 
Jackson keyed in her radio that she had an emergency, pointed her gun at the 
men, and yelled at them to get on the ground.
The man with no gun, later identified as Parker, raised his hands in the air, 
but did not immediately go to the ground. The other male turned and started to 
run away. Eventually, Parker followed Jackson's command to get to the ground. As 
he did so, Jackson heard the sound of gunfire. Jackson remained behind the wall 
of the gangway, with her gun trained on Parker, until other officers 
arrived.
Officers Milan Bubalo and Daniel Doffyn were in the parking lot of the 15th 
District station when they learned of the suspected burglary at 750 N. Lorel. 
Doffyn and Bubalo went across the street together to investigate the reported 
burglary. The officers saw broken glass on the ground from a window next to the 
entrance to 750 N. Lorel. Bubalo testified that, followed by Doffyn, he went 
inside the building. Bubalo knocked on the front door of the apartment with the 
broken window. Bubalo could hear the sound of several feet running to the back 
of the apartment and the sound of breaking glass.
Doffyn ran down the steps from the first-floor landing and out the building. 
Bubalo followed Doffyn as Doffyn ran from the front of the building to the rear, 
through a gangway at the north side of the building. When Bubalo entered the 
gangway, Doffyn was already rounding the far corner of the gangway, into the 
back yard of the building. According to Bubalo, Doffyn never drew his service 
weapon at any time.
When Bubalo reached the backyard of the building, he saw Doffyn struggling 
with a black male. Doffyn had the individual, whom Bubalo identified in court as 
Clyde Cowley, in a "bear hug" and Cowley was trying to break free. Almost 
immediately, Bubalo heard the sound of several gunshots fired in quick 
succession. Both Doffyn and Cowley fell to the ground, with Doffyn lying face 
down on top of Cowley.
Bubalo's testimony continued as follows: just as Doffyn and Cowley dropped, 
Bubalo felt himself get shot in his left hip. As he fell to the ground from his 
own wound, Bubalo saw defendant running toward him, from "around the corner." 
Defendant was firing a gun at Bubalo and Bubalo returned fire. The officer fired 
until he fell on two knees and one hand. Bubalo fired a total of five shots; one 
struck defendant in the back of the head as defendant ran past Bubalo. This shot 
caused defendant to fall face forward to the ground, slightly behind Bubalo.
After defendant fell, Bubalo radioed for help, disarmed defendant, and 
crawled to the aid of Doffyn and Cowley. As Bubalo was attempting to reach 
Doffyn, Officer Robert Podkowa ran past Bubalo to help Doffyn.
After telling Podkowa what happened, Bubalo lay back on the ground. The wound 
in his hip prevented him from walking. Bubalo underwent surgery the next day for 
a total replacement of his left hip.
Several officers arrived on the scene immediately after the shooting. Officer 
Podkowa testified that he ran to the rear of the building from the police 
station after hearing the sound of gunfire. He found Bubalo on one knee, and saw 
three other bodies on the ground. After learning what had happened from Bubalo, 
Podkowa went directly to Doffyn because Doffyn appeared to be the "worst hit." 
There was a lot of blood near where Doffyn lay.
Doffyn was lying on top of Cowley. Podkowa pulled Cowley out from beneath 
Doffyn. Because Cowley was moving, he searched Cowley to make sure Cowley had 
nothing in his hands. Podkowa found a loaded, .38-caliber revolver in Cowley's 
right pants' pocket.
A Chicago police department detective searched defendant inside the ambulance 
that took defendant from 750 N. Lorel to the hospital. The detective found a 
nine-millimeter pistol in defendant's right front pants' pocket and a box of 
nine-millimeter bullets in his other pocket.
From the crime scene, police recovered a TEC-9 gun, a Taurus model revolver 
and spent cartridges. They also found a black Lincoln automobile parked "a 
couple of doors" south of 750 N. Lorel.
Police officers searched the first-floor apartment with the broken front 
window. They discovered that the window of the rear door to the apartment had 
also been broken. In the living room, officers found several bags of marijuana 
on a table, and a jacket with .38-caliber bullets in its pocket. In the bedroom, 
police found plastic bags containing rock cocaine and folded tin packets 
containing heroin. Also in the bedroom were $5,385 in cash, a scale and a razor 
blade. An open box of nine-millimeter cartridges lay on the bed.
Chicago fire department ambulance commander Steven Schulz stated at trial 
that he arrived at 750 N. Lorel at approximately 3:30 p.m. on March 8. At the 
rear of the building, he found four persons on the ground, including Doffyn. 
Doffyn was in critical condition, with a bullet wound to the head. Schulz saw "a 
quantity of blood ... and brain matter" in the snow. Schulz was unable to secure 
an airway in the unconscious Doffyn, because the officer's jaw was clenched and 
Schulz could not get a laryngoscope between his teeth. Schulz established an IV 
and used an ambu-bag to try to hyperventilate Doffyn with oxygen.
Additionally, Schulz cut the straps of Doffyn's shirts and bullet proof vest. 
Schulz saw a gunshot wound to Doffyn's upper right chest near the clavicle. 
Schulz found out later that the bullet to the chest had traversed one of 
Doffyn's major blood vessels. He also learned later that evening that Doffyn had 
died.
Reviewing a report prepared by other paramedics, Schulz averred that Cowley 
had been shot in the back.
The chief medical examiner of Cook County, Edmund Donoghue, performed an 
autopsy on Doffyn on March 9, 1995. Donoghue found evidence of a bullet wound to 
the right side of Doffyn's head, a few inches above his right ear. As he opened 
Doffyn's skull, Donoghue found that the bullet wound coursed through the right 
parietal and frontal lobes of Doffyn's brain. Donoghue recovered a bullet and 
lead fragments from the right frontal lobe of the brain.
Donoghue further described an injury to Doffyn's right upper chest. He said 
the gunshot wound was "very large," involving the first rib, the space between 
the first and second ribs, the second rib, the right upper, middle and lower 
lobes of the lung, the anterior surface of the liver, the abdominal wall and the 
left thigh. Donoghue recovered another bullet from Doffyn's left thigh.
Doffyn died of multiple gunshot wounds. Either of the wounds described could 
have killed Doffyn, according to Donoghue.
The State called Richard Chenow, formerly of the firearms section of the 
Chicago police department, to render expert forensic evidence. Chenow opined, 
inter alia, that the bullet recovered from Doffyn's thigh was fired 
from the TEC-9 pistol recovered from defendant. The bullet taken from Doffyn's 
head was so mutilated that it contained insufficient individual characteristics 
to indicate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the bullet had been also fired from 
the TEC-9. However, Chenow did say that the bullet came from the same class of 
weapons as a TEC-9.
Chenow stated that the bullet removed from Young also came from the TEC-9 
gun, "to the exclusion of all other firearms." As to the bullet removed from 
Bubalo's body, Chenow could not positively identify it as fired by the TEC-9; 
however, he could not rule out the TEC-9 as the source of the bullet.
The State called Etoya Nelson as a witness. She is the mother of two of 
defendant's children. Nelson testified that she and defendant lived together for 
a period of time, ending in February 1995. Nelson spoke by telephone to 
defendant on March 4 and March 5, 1995. Defendant refused to tell her where he 
was; defendant said he was on the run from the police. Defendant called Nelson 
again on March 7 and came to see her.
On the witness stand, Nelson denied the substance of a statement she 
allegedly made to an assistant State's Attorney on March 9, 1995. Nelson denied 
reporting that defendant told her, two days previously, that "people were 
running over him, they had taken everything he had." However, Nelson admitted 
having signed the statement taken by the prosecutor on March 9.
Defendant presented the testimony of two witnesses in defendant's case in 
chief. Officer James Lukas of the office of professional standards of the 
Chicago police department participated in the departmental investigation that 
followed the shooting of Bubalo and Doffyn on March 8, 1995. Lukas testified 
that a recording of 911 telephone calls indicated a message was broadcast to all 
police at "15.28:38 hours" that "all had been captured and [sic] 
offender had been caught." Lukas stated that a second broadcast, approximately 
one minute later, indicated that two officers and two others were shot, and an 
evidence technician was requested.
The stipulated testimony of Hernando Torres, M.D., established that on March 
8, 1995, defendant received a bullet wound to the left side of his head.
Additionally, the theory of defendant's case evolved during the course of the 
trial. During opening statements to the jury, counsel for defendant posited that 
Doffyn was not killed by bullets fired by defendant, but rather by gunfire from 
Bubalo's weapon. Defendant's attorney also implied that members of the Chicago 
police department discussed the shooting of Doffyn and Bubalo in an attempt to 
reach a consensus as to what had occurred. By the time defense counsel delivered 
the closing argument at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, defendant 
retreated from this theory significantly, and instead argued generally that the 
State had failed to meet its burden of proof.
C. Defendant's Sentencing Hearing
The same jury that deliberated the guilt/innocence phase of defendant's trial 
also heard the capital sentencing phase. Regarding defendant's eligibility for 
the death penalty (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1998)), the parties stipulated that 
all of the evidence and signed verdict forms admitted at the guilt/innocence 
phase could be admitted for the purpose of determining defendant's death 
eligibility.
Evidence adduced at the aggravation/mitigation phase (720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 
1998)) demonstrated the extent and nature of defendant's criminal history. The 
State introduced the testimony of Antron Person, whom defendant had employed to 
sell drugs. Person stated that in 1995, defendant earned $30,000 a week selling 
drugs.
Person further averred that, in February 1995, Louis Moret told Person that 
defendant had pulled a gun on Moret and told Moret to "get away before defendant 
could hurt him." Defendant put a gun to Moret's head and told him to leave the 
corner of Kildare and Maypole. Also in February 1995, defendant had complained 
to Person that police took "stuff" from defendant, and that "the last thing he 
[was] going to do is kill a police [sic] before he let them kill 
him."
A variety of law enforcement officials testified to defendant's arrests and 
convictions in the years preceding March 8, 1995. In October 1991, the Chicago 
police arrested defendant for unlawful use of weapons after defendant attempted 
to pull a gun from his waistband during a protective, pat-down search by a 
police officer. The charge was later dismissed.
In September 1994, defendant was arrested and charged with unlawful 
possession of alcohol, marijuana and weapons. Pursuant to this arrest, defendant 
pleaded guilty to three counts of unlawful use of weapons.
Authorities recovered two unregistered semiautomatic weapons from defendant's 
residence in July 1992. During the search of his apartment, defendant told the 
officers where the guns were and that they were registered. The guns were not 
registered. Officers also found $1,740 in cash in the bedroom of the apartment. 
Defendant told the police that he was unemployed and could not account for the 
cash. Defendant was charged with mob action and failure to register handguns. 
The mob action charge was subsequently dismissed.
Defendant was arrested in December 1994 on charges of unlawful possession of 
weapons and controlled substances. As a result of the arrest, police recovered a 
loaded, .38-caliber handgun, $1,250 in cash, heroin, and 150 bags of rock 
cocaine.
A joint project by the Chicago police department and the United States Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), conducted in July 1993, investigated how 
handguns were coming into the City of Chicago. According to ATF agent John 
Taylor, the ATF and Chicago police learned that a man named Barry Jones was a 
"straw purchaser" of guns for defendant. Taylor testified that Jones was forced 
to purchase guns for defendant to repay a $1,500 debt Jones owed to defendant. 
Defendant had also ordered gang members to beat up Jones because of his failure 
to repay the debt, Taylor said.
Taylor stated that when defendant wanted Jones to make a purchase, defendant 
would pick up Jones in defendant's car and drive to a gun shop. Defendant would 
give Jones money and a list of guns that defendant wanted Jones to buy. Once 
purchased, Jones would turn the guns over to defendant. Jones allegedly 
purchased 28 guns for defendant.
The State introduced additional evidence concerning defendant's purported 
involvement in a shooting that occurred shortly before March 8, 1995. Terrence 
Hall testified that on February 26, 1995, he was working as the manager of an 
Amoco filling station at Washington and Pulaski. At approximately 10 p.m., Hall 
saw a gray customized van pull into the station and begin to refuel. A car 
pulled into the other side of the station. The driver of the car, later 
identified as Louis Moret, approached the driver of the van and spoke to him. 
Then Moret walked to a line at the cashier station. Two men emerged from the van 
and approached Moret. One of the men from the van, subsequently identified as 
defendant, seemed very angry and pulled a gun from his pocket. Moret began to 
run and defendant fired several shots at Moret, killing him. Hall stated that 
defendant followed Moret as Moret tried to run from defendant. Both defendant 
and the second person from the van then walked to the van and drove away.
Detective Gerhardstein of the Chicago police department investigated Moret's 
murder. He counted 14 bullet wounds on Moret's body, including one wound in the 
middle of Moret's forehead, and wounds to Moret's neck, chest and back. 
Gerhardstein said that witnesses at the station identified the shooter as 
defendant. Gerhardstein obtained an arrest warrant for defendant on March 4, 
1995; he arrested defendant for Moret's murder on March 8, 1995.
In mitigation, defendant introduced the testimony of acquaintances, family 
members and medical experts. Jacqueline Wheeler, a teacher at the Austin 
Community Academy High School between 1979 and 1992, testified that she selected 
defendant to participate in the "principal scholars program." The program is 
designed for minority students who show academic promise.
Defendant's grade point average in high school was 2.6, which was considered 
"the cream of the crop" at that Austin Community Academy. To her knowledge, 
defendant had no disciplinary problems while in high school.
Family members averred that defendant visited his children on a regular basis 
and participated in their upbringing. Testimony from the mother of two of 
defendant's children, and defendant's eight-year-old daughter indicated that 
defendant's children would miss him if he were put to death. Defendant has five 
children by four different women.
Defendant's brothers, Robert Lee Blue and Curtis Blue, testified that 
defendant came from a family of 13 children. It was a single-parent family. 
Robert and Curtis described defendant as a very good student in high school and 
a very good employee, when defendant was working at Church's Chicken.
Defendant's brothers professed not to know about defendant's alleged history 
as a drug dealer. In addition, Robert admitted that he did not know what 
defendant was doing for employment in 1995, because Robert was away at school. 
He did not know why guns and drugs were found in an apartment where defendant 
was living in 1995. Defendant encouraged Robert not to get involved with drugs 
or gangs.
Both Robert and Curtis knew defendant was accused of killing Doffyn, but 
neither had spoken to defendant about the murder of Louis Moret.
Curtis testified that, as a result of the bullet wound to the head that 
defendant received on March 8, 1995, defendant is not as "agile" as he used to 
be and defendant has dizzy spells. Sometimes he passes out as a result of the 
wound.
Defendant's maternal aunt, Gertrude Collier, also testified. According to 
Collier, when defendant was growing up, he was a lovable and respectable young 
man. He won trophies and praise from teachers. She loves him very much and if he 
was taken out of her life, it would "destroy her very much."
Defendant's mother, Carrie Blue, testified that defendant was the 
eleventh-born of her 13 children. She said that defendant was a "nice son" and 
that she never had any problems with him. He was an "A" student as a child. She 
described an incident in which defendant suffered a severe football injury in 
high school that caused defendant to lose a kidney. Even though this accident 
necessitated a prolonged absence from school, defendant maintained good grades, 
his mother said.
Carrie Blue testified that defendant loves his children and does things for 
them and with them. He supports his children.
She pleaded with the jury not to take her son away from her.
Defendant's mother admitted that, before she moved out of an apartment she 
occupied at 4306 W. Maypole Street in 1991, she was aware that drugs were being 
sold at the corner of Maypole and Kildare. After she was shown several guns on 
cross-examination, she asserted that she did not know how the guns got into her 
home on Maypole Street or how defendant had obtained them. None of her children 
would allow her to see them with guns because they know that she would not 
approve. She never saw cocaine or heroin in her son's home.
Carrie Blue did not know if defendant had been fired from Church's Chicken. 
She said that in 1994 and 1995, defendant was working for her. She has never 
asked defendant about any murder.
Chaplain Marcus Baird is the chaplain at the Cook County jail. He testified 
to defendant's participation in various prayer services and Bible studies. Baird 
said defendant was one of the "disciples in counseling." He has seen defendant 
develop a desire to help others and to get more involved in the Bible studies 
program at the jail. Baird agreed that by participating in religious programs, 
defendant could call Baird as a witness to testify that defendant was active in 
those programs.
Baird said that he has talked to defendant about this case and that defendant 
sometimes struggles to remember things. When he talks to defendant, defendant 
sometimes understands the questions that Baird asks and is sometimes able to 
speak about Jesus and God. Defendant has told Baird that he shot a police 
officer, although he cannot remember the shooting. Defendant has not mentioned 
shooting another officer or the shooting of Louis Moret.
Jamillah Simms, the mother of defendant's son, and defendant's friend Robert 
McMillan also testified on defendant's behalf. Their testimony was substantially 
similar to the mitigation testimony of other family members and 
acquaintances.
A board-certified neurologist, Gero Kragh, M.D., testified for the defense. 
In Kragh's opinion, defendant has static encephalopathy and subclinical 
polysensory neuropathy, etiology to be defined. A review of a CT scan taken of 
defendant on March 9, 1995, showed that defendant had bone and bullet fragments 
in his brain and neck. Physical findings in defendant suggest significant and 
profound diffused difficulties involving the brain, including the left temporal 
lobe, left cerebellar hemisphere, brain stem, eighth cranial nerve and other 
ancillary problems in the neck.
Kragh concluded that defendant does not have a normal brain. Defendant has 
permanent brain damage, although not all of his current difficulties can be 
attributed to the bullet fired by Bubalo. Defendant's school records suggest 
that he suffered from an attention deficit disorder and hyperactivity. Kragh 
believed that defendant's disinhibition or potential for explosiveness also 
predates the gunshot wound to the head. The same applies to other problems 
exhibited by defendant, including difficulty in organizing his thoughts in a 
coherent fashion and "difficulty with the conversation in the brain between the 
left and right halves at various times."
Kragh attributed other difficulties to damage caused by the bullet wound. He 
said defendant could not use complete sentences to describe the shooting at 750 
N. Lorel. The best defendant could recall was the agitation, confusion, and 
explosiveness of the moment. He had no recall of events 30 minutes before the 
shooting and events one month after the shooting. He also said defendant has 
difficulty with immediate recall, getting his thoughts together, balance, 
clumsiness, "the staggers" and "things like that."
Further, defendant exhibits abnormal reflexes, which indicate a problem with 
his left frontal lobe. Due to this physical defect, defendant will behave 
unpredictably when stressed or will predictably not behave in a manner that is 
conducive for his survival or the survival of others. Even under the most quiet 
circumstances, defendant is not, and never will be, normal. While he has made 
remarkable progress since he was shot in the head, it is doubtful that the 
progress will continue.
The defense also called Michael Gelbort, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist with 
a specialty in neurophsychology. Gelbort found cognitive dysfunction in 
defendant correlating to defendant's brain damage. Some of the difficulties 
resulting from the damage to the left hemisphere of defendant's brain are: 
difficulties in learning new information; intellectual scores in the borderline 
mentally deficient range; changes in sense of touch; change in motor 
functioning. Gelbort opined that defendant's neurocognitive deficits are 
permanent and irreversible. Gelbort recommended that defendant be placed in a 
structured, controlled environment where he would have to make few choices and 
where he could avoid stress.
In rebuttal, and over defendant's objection, the State introduced the victim 
impact statements of Doffyn's parents and daughter. Doffyn's mother read all 
three statements into the record.
The court allowed the State to present the testimony of Mathew Markos, M.D., 
in rebuttal, again over the objection of defendant. Markos is a forensic 
psychiatrist. Markos examined defendant in late 1996 and early 1997 in order to 
determine defendant's fitness to stand trial and defendant's mental state on 
March 8, 1995.
Markos concluded that, while defendant does have some brain impairment, 
defendant did not suffer from any impairment significant enough to render 
defendant unfit to stand trial. Markos found defendant to be calm, cooperative, 
and alert. Defendant responded to Markos' questions in a relevant, coherent and 
rational manner. Markos found no indication of anxiety, agitation or abnormal 
behavior. He found no evidence of abnormal thought processes, delusional 
thinking, or abnormal perceptions.
Defendant has a memory deficit, which includes an absence of memory of the 
events surrounding his arrest on March 8, 1995. Aside from this "isolated 
cognitive deficit," defendant appears to have no other cognitive deficits. 
Defendant is intact cognitively and mentally, except for the memory deficit.
Defendant scored 84 on an IQ test. Someone with this score is in the 
"borderline to normal" range of intelligence. If he scored an 85, defendant 
would fall in the "normal" range.
Defendant has shown good mental and physical improvement since the injury, 
Markos testified. Markos did not detect any malingering in defendant.
ANALYSIS
Before this court, defendant alleges that he is entitled to either a new 
trial and sentencing hearing, or a new sentencing hearing, alone. In particular, 
defendant maintains that the conduct of the State's prosecutors throughout the 
entire proceedings below was so improper and abusive that defendant was denied a 
fair trial. Next, defendant asserts that, during the guilt phase of the trial, 
the trial court committed the following errors: refusing to ask potential jurors 
if they would automatically sentence defendant to death for killing a police 
officer; permitting the State to display a life-size mannequin clothed with 
Doffyn's uniform and allowing the exhibit to go to the jury room during the 
jury's deliberations; allowing the State to argue that the Doffyn family and the 
police "needed to hear" from the jury; and sustaining hearsay objections by the 
State during defense counsel's examination of a witness, where the State had 
elicited hearsay from the same witness on direct examination.
Defendant further contends that, during the sentencing phase of his trial, 
the trial court erred in the following respects: denying defendant's request 
that a member of the public defender's office assist defendant's counsel; 
permitting Dr. Markos to testify regarding the extent of brain damage suffered 
by defendant when he was shot by Bubalo; allowing the State to display a 
five-foot-square poster illustrating various aspects of defendant's criminal 
history; and admitting victim impact testimony that contained improper content 
and exceeded the permissible amount of such testimony allowed by statute. 
Lastly, defendant urges the court to find the death penalty statute 
unconstitutional.
Following a thorough review of the record and controlling case law, we hold 
that some of the arguments raised by defendant constitute error and, 
cumulatively, deprived defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. We 
find that a combination of errors occurring at trial may have coerced the jury 
into returning a verdict more likely grounded in sympathy than on a 
dispassionate evaluation of the facts. In light of this possibility, the 
constitutionality of defendant's trial is in doubt and we must reverse and 
remand for a new trial.
A. Doffyn's Uniform
Defendant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the 
bloodied and brain-splattered uniform of Daniel Doffyn into evidence and 
permitting the uniform to be taken into the jury room during deliberations. At 
trial, defendant moved the trial court to bar introduction of Doffyn's partial 
uniform into evidence. The uniform, consisting of Doffyn's shirts, police jacket 
and bullet-proof vest, contained bloodstains and stains from Doffyn's brain 
matter. Also, the clothing was torn as a result of medical treatment rendered to 
Doffyn. Defendant argued that autopsy reports, photographs taken of Doffyn at 
the morgue, and the testimony of the medical examiner adequately supplied any 
facts the State intended to prove by display of the uniform. Defendant asserted 
that viewing the uniform would have no probative value, and it could only 
"excite" the jury's emotions concerning the shooting of a police officer.
In response, the State urged that the uniform showed that defendant knew 
Doffyn was a police officer when defendant fired his weapon at him and that the 
officers, Doffyn and Bubalo, were wounded in the line of duty. The clothing 
display would also corroborate the medical examiner's testimony concerning the 
placement and nature of Doffyn's injuries, according to the State. The trial 
court denied defendant's motion, finding the uniform "relevant."
The State displayed the uniform on a headless, torso mannequin during the 
State's case in chief. The State introduced the uniform during Bubalo's 
testimony, but had the mannequin in the court room, in view of the jury, during 
the examination of another State witness. Defendant objected to the premature 
display of the uniform and to the fact that the State placed the clothes on a 
life-size mannequin. The trial court ordered the mannequin removed to the 
court's chambers until it was ready to be introduced.
After the completion of Bubalo's testimony, the mannequin remained in the 
courtroom. Counsel for defendant again objected, complaining that the mannequin 
had been present during the testimony of several witnesses. The court again 
ordered it removed from the courtroom.
Defendant renewed his objection to the exhibit when the State moved to admit 
the exhibit into evidence, and when the State proposed sending the exhibit to 
the jury room during deliberations. The trial court overruled defendant's 
objections and, prior to jury deliberations, ordered that the jurors be supplied 
with rubber gloves in case the jurors wanted to handle the uniform.
The fundamental principles governing the admission of physical evidence are 
well established:
Further, if a defendant in a murder trial pleads not guilty, the State must 
prove every element of the crime charged and every fact relevant to the charges, 
irrespective of whether defendant offers to stipulate to any of those facts. 
People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 319 (1990); People v. 
Dukett, 56 Ill. 2d 432, 447 (1974).
While the State and defendant rely on case law regarding photographic 
evidence to further their respective arguments, a line of cases already exists 
concerning the admission of articles of clothing worn by a victim. The common 
principles guiding these decisions echo the holding in Jenko, namely, 
that clothes will be admissible provided they tend to prove facts material to 
the issues to be proved in the case, and the probative value of the evidence is 
not outweighed by potential prejudice. People v. Dukett, 56 Ill. 2d 432, 447-48 (1974); see also People v. Pittman, 55 Ill. 2d 39, 
60 (1973); People v. Jurczak, 147 Ill. App. 3d 206, 215 (2d Dist. 
1986); People v. Parisie, 5 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1039 (4th Dist.1972). 
The admission of the articles rests within the trial court's discretion. See 
Dukett, 56 Ill. 2d at 447-48; People v. Pittman, 55 Ill. 2d  at 
60.
Illinois courts have found bloodstained police uniforms both inadmissable and 
admissible. In People v. Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d 133 (1992), the 
trial court admitted two police officers' "bullet-marked and bloodstained 
uniforms" into evidence and allowed the uniforms to go the jury room during 
deliberations. On appeal, defendants maintained that the uniforms were 
irrelevant to contested issues at trial, and that, as police uniforms, they were 
"symbols charged with emotion." Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 143-44. 
The State responded that the bullet holes in the uniforms were relevant to the 
question of defendants' intent to kill the officers and to show that the 
defendants meant to inflict great bodily harm.
The Burrell court noted that tangible objects admitted into evidence 
that are probative of any material issue may be taken into the jury room during 
jury deliberations. Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 144. Whenever physical 
evidence is allowed into the jury room, the proximity of the exhibit to the jury 
and the potential that the exhibit may be in the jury's possession for an 
extended period of time give the proponent of the exhibit a distinct advantage 
over the opposing party. Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 144. For this 
reason, the court will closely scrutinize the exhibit to ensure that its 
prejudicial value does not outweigh its value as evidence. Burrell, 228 
Ill. App. 3d at 144.
The appellate court ruled that, while the uniforms were probative of 
defendants' criminal intent, the prejudicial effect of the uniforms outweighed 
their probative value. "The jury saw the shirt, bullet holes, and blood during 
the trial. [One of the victims] even put his fingers through the bullet holes 
during his testimony." Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 144. Thus the court 
determined that the trial court erred in allowing the uniforms into evidence, 
although the error was subsequently determined to be harmless error. 
Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 144.
In contrast to Burrell, the appellate court in People v. 
Stewart, 122 Ill. App. 3d 546, 549 (1984), found no error in the admission 
of a policeman's uniform. In Stewart, the trial court admitted the 
officer's "bloody clothing" into evidence. The State successfully argued that 
the uniform was proof of aggravated battery, the crime charged against 
defendant. Stewart, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 549. The appellate court 
affirmed because the evidence was relevant to the crime charged. 
Stewart, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 549.
Neither appellate decision controls the outcome of this case. Anderson v. 
Board of Education of School District No. 91, 390 Ill. 412, 420 (1945). 
However, we find the reasoning of the Burrell court persuasive in the 
context of the instant appeal. Like the uniform in Burrell, the verbal 
descriptions and photos of Doffyn's uniform in the record indicate that the 
uniform displayed to the jury was "bullet-marked and bloodstained." 
Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 143-44. The uniform also bore the tears 
from where paramedics and other medical personnel attempted to save Doffyn's 
life.
There was no question left in the jury's mind, moreover, as to the nature of 
the stains on the front and collar of the shirt and on the jacket. During his 
direct examination, Bubalo identified the uniform on the mannequin as Doffyn's 
police uniform, and then answered the following question:
The reasons offered by the State to the trial court for admission of the 
uniform included corroboration of anticipated medical testimony regarding the 
path of the bullets that injured Doffyn, as well as reinforcement of allegations 
that Cowley and defendant knew that they were firing their guns at uniformed 
officers, acting in the line of duty. On appeal, the State argues that the 
uniform shows defendant intended to kill Doffyn by purposefully firing at 
Doffyn's head and above his bullet proof vest.
Not all of these reasons withstand close scrutiny. According to the 
indictments returned in this case, the fact that the victims were police 
officers was relevant to the charge that defendant attempted to murder Bubalo 
(but see 720 ILCS 5/8-4, 9-1(a) (West 1992)), but none of the first degree 
murder charges for the death of Doffyn were dependant on the victim's profession 
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1992)). Further, as defendant argues before this 
court, if the State wanted to illustrate the defendant's intent to shoot at 
Doffyn's head, it makes no sense to employ a model on which the head is absent. 
Additionally, there was ample testimony, from paramedic Schulz and Dr. Donoghue, 
to describe the placement and appearance of Doffyn's wounds. Through Donoghue, 
moreover, the State introduced and admitted 16 autopsy photographs documenting 
Doffyn's injuries. Therefore, although we agree that the uniform could 
corroborate the medical testimony describing the placement or nature of one of 
the fatal wounds on Doffyn's body, the evidentiary value of the uniformed 
mannequin-over and above the other proof introduced by the State-was 
minimal.
Having found the uniform at least nominally probative of a material fact, we 
now determine whether the potential prejudice of the uniform outweighed its 
probative value. We conclude that it did. While we are aware that pictures 
graphically displaying wounds and autopsy procedures have been previously 
allowed into evidence (see, e.g., People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 40-41 (1996); People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 246 (1993); 
Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d at 320), the physical evidence here was not 
photos of a gruesome scene, but the actual remnants of the scene itself, 
spattered with the actual blood and brains of the victim.
We are further aware that bloodied garments of victims have been admitted 
into evidence, as the cases cited above demonstrate. In this case, however, we 
perceive a coalescence of facts that tip the evidentiary scale from items that 
are merely useful to those that are aimed directly at the sympathies, or 
outrage, of the jury. These are not just bloody clothes, but the clothes of a 
police officer, which, as the defendants noted in Burrell, 228 Ill. 
App. 3d at 144, are uniquely "charged with emotion." Critically, too, the jury 
knew that the stains on the uniform were not only from the officer's blood-a 
concept disturbing in and of itself-but also from the officer's brains. The 
latter fact presumably intensified the already inflammatory nature of the 
garments.
Additionally, the jury was allowed an extended period of exposure to the 
life-size mannequin that wore the uniform. They saw the mannequin in the 
courtroom during the testimony of several witnesses, and then were allowed an 
even closer exposure to the exhibit during their deliberations. By furnishing 
the jurors with gloves, moreover, the trial court appeared to encourage the jury 
to engage in a tactile interaction with the uniform.
The nature and presentation of the uniform rendered the exhibit so disturbing 
that its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value. Its admission into 
evidence was error.
B. The State's Rebuttal Closing Argument
Defendant contends next that the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing the State, in rebuttal closing argument, to make inappropriate 
references to police and to Doffyn's family. Rather than arguing the evidence 
and inferences to be drawn therefrom, defendant maintains, the State appealed 
directly to the jurors' passions and prejudices by urging the jury to use its 
verdict to send a message to Doffyn's family and to the police. Defendant 
maintains that the error inherent in the State's improper argument deprived 
defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.
The State's response is twofold. First, the State asserts that defendant 
waived this argument by neglecting to contemporaneously object to the statements 
and to raise the alleged error in defendant's post-trial motion. See People 
v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Second, the State avers that the 
argument fell squarely within the broad latitude allowed prosecutors in making 
arguments, and to trial judges in scrutinizing their admissibility. People 
v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 244 (1999).
The State correctly observes that defendant failed to properly preserve this 
argument for our review. Defendant contemporaneously objected to the State's 
references to police officers, but failed to raise the issue in his post-trial 
motion. As to the argument concerning Doffyn's family, defendant neither 
objected at trial nor included the alleged error in his motion for a new trial. 
Generally, in the absence of both a timely objection at trial, and repetition of 
that objection in a post-trial motion, any alleged error is deemed waived. 
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 190. Under the unique circumstances of this case, 
however, we decline to apply the waiver doctrine so that we may address the 
merits of defendant's arguments and protect defendant's interest in receiving a 
fair trial. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 127 (1998) (waiver 
doctrine is a limitation on the parties, not the court); see also People v. 
Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 528 (1998) (Freeman, C.J. specially concurring, 
joined by McMorrow, J.).
Courts allow prosecutors great latitude in making closing arguments. 
People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d 163, 175 (1987). In closing, the State 
may comment on the evidence and all inferences reasonably yielded by the 
evidence. People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 184 (1992). However, 
argument that serves no purpose but to inflame the jury constitutes error. 
People v. Tiller, 94 Ill. 2d 303, 321 (1982); People v. 
Threadgill, 166 Ill. App. 3d 643, 651 (1988). Closing arguments must be 
viewed in their entirety and the allegedly erroneous argument must be viewed 
contextually. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d  at 176. "The regulation of the 
substance and style of the closing argument is within the trial court's 
discretion, and the trial court's determination of the propriety of the remarks 
will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion." People v. 
Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 295 (1995); accord Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d  
at 175; Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 185.
In its rebuttal argument, the State argued:
The State defends these appeals to the jury on behalf of the Doffyn family 
and the police as supplications to fearlessly administer justice. Generally, 
arguments urging a fearless administration of justice or commenting unfavorably 
on the evils of crime do not constitute error. People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265, 277-78 (1986). However, even a cursory examination of the State's 
argument in this case suggests more than a general exhortation to the jury to 
protect society. Accordingly, we examine separately the remarks made concerning 
the victim's family and the police in order to determine the existence, if any, 
of error.
1. The Doffyn Family
In People v. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d 359 (1964), this court ruled that 
a defendant's guilt may be proved only by "legal and competent" facts, 
"uninfluenced by bias or prejudice raised by irrelevant evidence." 
Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d  at 371. Proof that the victim of a crime is 
survived by a family is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of a criminal 
defendant. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d  at 371. It can only serve to prejudice 
a defendant in the eyes of the jury. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d  at 371. 
Therefore, the court continued, evidence or argument dwelling on the victim's 
family, or relating defendant's punishment to the existence of a family, is 
"inflammatory and improper" and constitutes reversible error. Bernette, 
30 Ill. 2d  at 371.
In People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265 (1986), the State made several 
references to and elicited testimony concerning the victim's family. The 
victim's spouse testified that she had three children, 10 years of age and 
younger, and that two of the children were fathered by decedent. She also 
identified family photographs of the decedent with her and the children. At 
closing argument, the State referred to decedent's family, saying, 
" 'Little did [decedent] know that when he said good-bye to his wife, that 
would be the last time he saw her alive.' " Hope, 116 Ill. 2d  at 
277.
The Hope court found that the evidence and argument about the 
victim's family bore no relation to defendant's innocence or guilt. 
Hope, 116 Ill. 2d  at 278. The sole motivation behind these statements 
was a desire to prejudice the jurors against the defendant, and to inflame their 
emotions. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d  at 278. In reversing and remanding for a 
new trial, the court held that " 'be he a sinner or a saint, 
[defendant] has the right to expect that his fate will be fixed with reference 
only to the circumstances of the crime with which he is charged.' " 
Hope, 116 Ill. 2d  at 278, quoting People v. 
Gregory, 22 Ill. 2d 601, 606 (1961). See also People v. 
Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 322 (1990) (argument that defendant's acts 
deprived victim of her "rights" held to be improper); People v. 
Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 294, 322-23 (1983) (the State's urging to the jury to 
" 'tell the [victim's family] what you decided' " was "improper, 
inexcusable and unprofessional"); People v. Jordan, 38 Ill. 2d 83, 
90-92 (1967) (error for prosecutor to elicit testimony concerning victim's 
children and to argue that victim was as beloved as any celebrity in the 
country); People v. Gregory, 22 Ill. 2d 601, 605-06 (1961) (argument 
concerning decedent's wife and small children partially deprived defendant of a 
fair trial).
In the present appeal, the State's argument that Doffyn's father, mother and 
child needed to "hear" from the jury was patently immaterial to the defendant's 
guilt or innocence. Combined with the State's reminder of the pain endured by 
the parents in the loss of their only child, the remarks concerning the 
decedent's family amounted to an unequivocal, and erroneous, appeal to the 
jury's emotions.
Additionally, the inflammatory impact of the State's argument cannot be fully 
understood without also knowing the evidence that preceded it. Kliner, 
185 Ill. 2d  at 157; People v. Leger, 149 Ill. 2d 355, 392-93 (1992); 
People v. Baptist, 76 Ill. 2d 19, 29 (1979); People v. Tate, 
45 Ill. 2d 540, 545 (1970); see People v. Parks, 168 Ill. App. 3d 978, 
982-83 (1988). The State opened its case in chief with testimony from decedent's 
father, Roger Doffyn. Mr. Doffyn's testimony covers nine pages of transcript. 
Among other things, he testified as to his age (71), and that he had been 
married to decedent's mother for 51 years. Mr. Doffyn related that he and his 
wife occupied one floor of a two-flat, while his son and his granddaughter lived 
together on another floor of the same building. According to Mr. Doffyn, his son 
and granddaughter shared the same birthday.
Mr. Doffyn described the last time he saw his son alive, March 8, 1995. He 
identified a photograph of his son and described the events of the evening of 
March 8, after he learned that his son had been shot.
Some of the testimony admitted through Mr. Doffyn served the proper purpose 
of identifying the victim as Daniel Doffyn, and proving that he was alive, and 
subsequently died, on the date of defendant's crime. People v. Easley, 
148 Ill. 2d 281, 335 (1992). Further, we agree that incidental evidence of a 
victim's family is not only permissible, but in most trials, unavoidable, since 
"[c]ommon sense tells us that murder victims do not live in a vacuum and that, 
in most cases, they leave behind family members." People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 415 (1983).
Nonetheless, some of the evidence admitted through Mr. Doffyn, such as the 
age of his granddaughter, the number of years he has been married to decedent's 
mother, and the living arrangements of the Doffyn family, was not probative of 
defendant's guilt or innocence. This evidence served only one purpose, namely, 
to highlight the poignancy of the Doffyn family's loss and to suggest to the 
jury that the family's pain could be alleviated by a guilty verdict. Moreover, 
the knowledge of these facts surely heightened the impact of the State's 
emotional closing argument on the jury.
We reject the State's contention that jury instructions in the present matter 
cured any error introduced by the State's argument. The instructions cited by 
the State were standard instructions that argument of counsel are not evidence. 
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.03 (3d ed. 1992). 
Instructing the jury that arguments are not evidence will not, in every 
instance, cure the defect caused by introduction of such evidence. Whether the 
remarks and/or evidence constitute error depends, in each case, on the nature 
and extent of the statements and whether they are probative of defendant's 
guilt. See People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 142 (1990); Hope, 
116 Ill. 2d  at 276.
In the case at bar, we find that the generic instructions tendered by the 
State were not likely to undo the damage to defendant's case inflicted by the 
State's pointed remarks. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion by permitting the State to argue that its verdict should be a vehicle 
to vindicate the Doffyn family. Cf. People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 481-82 (1993) (any error resulting from "general" and "fleeting" 
remarks concerning the victim's family, and reference to the defendant as a 
"predator" cured by standard instructions concerning arguments of counsel); 
People v. Chavez, 265 Ill. App. 3d 451, 461-62 (1994).
2. The Police
Similarly, we determine that the trial court abused its discretion in failing 
to sustain defendant's objections to the State's argument concerning the police. 
The State's exhortation that the jury send a message to all police that the jury 
supported them, from the "superintendent to the newest rookie," was little more 
than a transparent play to the jury's sympathy and loyalty to law enforcement. 
Nothing in the portions of the State's argument quoted above tended to make the 
fact of defendant's guilt more or less true.
The same reasons that made introduction of the remarks concerning the Doffyn 
family inappropriate should have compelled the trial court to bar the State's 
direction that the jurors use their verdict to reassure the police. Admission of 
these remarks constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Cf. 
People v. Clark, 52 Ill. 2d 374, 390 (1972); People v. 
Montgomery, 254 Ill. App. 3d 782, 795 (1993); People v. Rivera, 
235 Ill. App. 3d 536, 540-41 (1992); People v. Williams, 228 Ill. App. 
3d 981, 1002 (1992); People v. Threadgill, 166 Ill. App. 3d 643, 648-51 
(1988); People v. Plair, 51 Ill. App. 3d 75, 81 (1977); but see 
People v. Chavez, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 461; People v. Lovelace, 
251 Ill. App. 3d 607, 623-24 (1993); People v. Jenkins, 190 Ill. App. 
3d 115, 136 (1989).
Our own review of the record leads us to believe that the State compounded 
the error of its rebuttal argument by introducing, in the State's case in chief, 
testimony from Commander Joseph Delopez of the Chicago police department. 
Delopez testified that, in November 1994, he was the commander of the training 
division of the department. He was present for the "star ceremony" when Doffyn 
took his police officer's oath of office.
Over defendant's objection, the court permitted Delopez to read aloud the 
oath of office sworn by Doffyn. The oath states:
Delopez was also permitted to testify that Doffyn's police badge was retired 
and is now displayed in the "honored star case" at Chicago police department 
headquarters.
At the time Delopez testified, the State argued that his testimony was 
relevant to show that Doffyn was killed in the line of duty. Defendant did not 
dispute this fact at trial. Moreover, the fact Doffyn was killed in the line of 
duty was relevant only at the eligibility phase of defendant's subsequent 
capital sentencing hearing (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(1) (West 1992)). The fact that 
Doffyn was a police officer was, at the guilt phase of the trial, irrelevant to 
the central issue of defendant's guilt or innocence. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 
1992).
In sum, the trial court allowed the State to argue two emotion-laden themes 
to the jury, neither of which were probative of defendant's guilt for the 
several crimes charged against him. The nakedly prejudicial nature of the 
arguments was intensified by parallel evidence which, perhaps by design, 
reinforced the tragedy of the loss suffered in this case by the police force and 
by the family of Daniel Doffyn. Consequently, we hold that the trial court 
abused its discretion by permitting the jury to hear these arguments.
C. "Testifying" by Prosecutors
Defendant enumerates several instances of alleged misconduct at trial by 
attorneys for the State. Defendant contends that the State's improper 
examination and treatment of certain witnesses and abusive conduct toward 
defense counsel deprived defendant of a fair trial.
This court finds that counsel for the State engaged in improper conduct at 
trial. Additionally, the most egregious behavior contributed to the continuum of 
error that deprived defendant of a fair trial.
In the State's case in chief, the State called Etoya Nelson to establish, 
inter alia, defendant's purported hostility toward police and the fact 
that, in the days immediately preceding March 8, 1995, defendant believed that 
the police were pursuing him. Before trial, Assistant State's Attorneys McKay 
and O'Connor interviewed Nelson after a warrant had issued for her arrest. McKay 
and O'Connor were also the prosecutors that tried the State's case against 
defendant.
The trial transcripts demonstrate that the exchanges at trial between Nelson 
and the prosecuting attorneys were palpably hostile. Further, the State's 
counsel repeatedly interjected testimony of their own through thinly veiled 
"objections." The following colloquy illustrates the State's misconduct during 
cross-examination of Nelson by defendant's attorney:
During redirect examination, Assistant State's Attorney McKay questioned 
Nelson concerning their encounter before trial:
Lastly, on recross examination, Nelson elaborated on her allegation that she 
had been detained in a "cage" at the police station:
Before this court, the State has conceded the error of the prosecutors' 
"testifying" objections. An objection is intended only to state the fact of the 
objection and the evidentiary basis therefore. See Eizerman v. Behn, 9 
Ill. App. 2d 263, 287 (1956). The objections quoted above constituted an 
improper attempt by the prosecutors to introduce contrary evidence through 
themselves while Nelson was still on the witness stand. See also People 
v. Wielgos, 220 Ill. App. 3d 812, 818 (1991) (State should not editorialize 
when stating an objection).
Moreover, the State's objections violated the "advocate-witness rule," which 
bars attorneys from assuming a dual role as advocate and witness in the same 
proceedings. See 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 3.3(a)(10); 3.7, United States v. 
Johnston, 690 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1982). The rule is particularly 
pertinent to prosecutors in criminal cases because of the sensitive role they 
assume as the government's representative in the court room. In 
Johnston, 690 F.2d 638, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals repeated 
four considerations that animate the witness-advocate rule: (1) as an advocate 
for the government, the prosecutor's objectivity as a witness could never be 
assured; (2) the prosecutor's credibility is automatically (and unfairly) 
enhanced by the prestige and authority of the prosecutor's office; (3) the dual 
role of witness and advocate assumed by a prosecutor might confuse the jury; and 
(4) the rule reinforces the adage that the appearance of propriety is as vital 
to the operation of our judicial system as actual propriety. Johnston, 
690 F.2d  at 643.
In the instant case, the prosecutors' "objections" to Nelson's testimony 
exceeded the accepted evidentiary bases for entering objections. Instead, they 
offered the jury a simultaneous rebuttal to Nelson's account of an event where 
both McKay and O'Connor were present. Since the objections were made by 
prosecutors, moreover, the State gained an unfair advantage: it is probable that 
the jury endowed the remarks made by government representatives with greater 
credibility than is normally accredited to witnesses. See Johnston, 690 F.2d  at 643. The advantage gained by the State in this case was reinforced by 
the fact the trial court sustained some of the State's objections, so that, in 
the eyes of the jury, the trial judge might have appeared to endorse those 
objections. Accordingly, counsel should have refrained from attempting to rebut 
Nelson's testimony with their own "testimony." Further, the trial court erred 
whenever it failed to overrule the editorial comments offered by McKay and 
O'Connor.
D. Cumulative Error
In response to each assertion of error by defendant, the State urges that, 
regardless of whether error occurred, the evidence against defendant at the 
guilt and sentencing phases was so overwhelming that the absence of these errors 
would have made no difference in the outcome of the trial. This court may invoke 
the harmless error doctrine to dispose of claims of error that have a de 
minimus impact on the outcome of the case. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 
157; People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 38 (1996).
Yet prejudice to a defendant's case is not the sole concern that drives our 
analysis of defendant's appeal: "A criminal defendant, whether guilty or 
innocent, is entitled to a fair, orderly, and impartial trial" conducted 
according to law. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 214 (1998). This due 
process right is guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. 
Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 214; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, §1; Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, §2; see also Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 480.
Additionally, when a defendant's right to a fair trial has been denied, this 
court must take corrective action so that we may preserve the integrity of the 
judicial process. People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 577 (1980). To 
determine whether defendant's right to a fair trial has been compromised, we 
employ the same test that this court uses whenever it applies the second prong 
of the plain error test. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). We ask whether a substantial 
right has been affected to such a degree that we cannot confidently state that 
defendant's trial was fundamentally fair. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); People v. 
Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995); People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 522-23 (1998) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring).
As explained in People v. Green, 74 Ill. 2d 444, 455 (1979) (Ryan, 
J., specially concurring), when an error arises at trial that is of such gravity 
that it threatens the very integrity of the judicial process, the court must act 
to correct the error, so that the fairness and the reputation of the process may 
be preserved and protected. Critically, the court will act on plain error 
regardless of the strength of the evidence of defendant's guilt. 
Green, 74 Ill. 2d  at 455 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).
Justice Ryan noted in Green:
In this appeal, we hold that a new trial is necessary in order to preserve 
the trustworthiness and reputation of the judicial process. We do not disagree 
that the evidence proving defendant's guilt is overwhelming. Nonetheless, 
regardless of the weight of the evidence, as guardians of constitutional rights 
and the integrity of the criminal justice system, we must order a new trial 
when, as here, we conclude that defendant did not receive a fair trial.
Each of the errors detailed above, in and of themselves, cast doubt upon the 
reliability of the judicial process. Cumulatively, we find that the errors 
created a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice to defendant's case. People 
v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 376 (1992); People v. Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 83 (1984); People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill. 2d 322, 341 (1982). 
The argument by State's counsel concerning the Doffyn family and the police 
encouraged the jury to return a verdict grounded in emotion, and not a rational 
deliberation of the facts. Therefore, by allowing the State to suggest improper 
considerations to the jury, the trial court errantly allowed the jury to 
consider "evidence" not relevant to defendant's alleged crimes.
Combined with the introduction of the dead officer's bloodied uniform, 
moreover, the errors assumed a synergistic effect. In particular, if we view 
together the manner and duration of the uniform's display, the appeal to the 
jurors to demonstrate their gratitude to the police force, the introduction of 
Doffyn's oath of office and testimony that his star occupies an honored place at 
police headquarters, we discern an intent by the State to place the jury's 
responsibility as citizens on trial, as much as the State placed defendant on 
trial. See People v. Carter, 297 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1034-35 (1998).
The State's overbearing conduct in pursuit of defendant's convictions was 
further demonstrated by the assistant State's Attorneys' behavior at trial. The 
tendency of the prosecutors to interject editorializing objections unfairly 
negated evidence that may have been favorable to defendant. The fact the 
objections were made-and sometimes sustained-by government representatives 
suggested that, because knowledgeable authorities found the testimony in 
question incredible, then the jury should reach the same conclusion.
Under these circumstances, defendant did not receive a fair trial. 
Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 214; Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d  at 371. In sum, 
the trial court allowed the guilty verdict to rest on considerations other than 
the evidence alone. Accordingly, we reverse defendant's convictions and sentence 
and remand for a new trial.
In light of our decision to reverse the judgment entered by the trial court, 
we need not decide the remainder of the alleged errors identified by defendant. 
However, we will address one remaining issue which the court finds troubling and 
which the court directs the parties and the trial court to remedy in the event 
of a retrial.
E. Conduct of Counsel
The record in the present matter yields evidence of improper conduct by both 
counsel for the State and for defendant. In addition to the impermissible 
objections made at trial by the State's counsel, we have found the behavior of 
the attorneys in this case so wanting in professionalism that we believe it 
necessary to address the most egregious examples of that conduct here.
An assistant State's Attorney engaged in improper conduct in his examination 
of Dr. Gelbort during the aggravation/mitigation phase. The source of the 
State's animosity toward Gelbort was the State's unsuccessful, pretrial attempts 
to obtain a copy of Gelbort's report of his examination of defendant. Defendant 
argues that the State's cross-examination of Gelbort was "very prejudicial" 
because the State insinuated that defendant's attorneys hid the report from the 
State. Our review of the record reveals that even after Gelbort informed the 
prosecutor that he had turned his report over to the court, the State's attorney 
questioned Gelbort's veracity concerning the State's attempts to meet with him. 
The tone and manner of the examination amounted to harassment, which was 
improper in and of itself. It was doubly improper, however, because if the State 
had difficulty obtaining discovery concerning anticipated expert testimony, the 
State's remedy rested with the trial court or defendant's attorneys, and not 
with the witness himself.
The remaining complaints against the attorneys for the State include shouting 
at a defense witness in open court, throwing photographic exhibits onto a table 
in front of defense counsel, and calling one of defendant's attorneys an 
"asshole" in the judge's chambers. We agree that these incidents were improper. 
Attorneys should, at all times, maintain a sense of decorum and professionalism. 
Infantile behavior and foul language are signs of disrespect for the court and 
the justice system, as much as a lack of respect for each other. People v. 
Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 413-14 (1985).
In fairness to the State, however, we note that counsel for defendant engaged 
in improper behavior as well. According to the State, defense counsel referred 
to one of the prosecuting attorneys as a "jerk." One of defendant's attorneys 
was argumentative with the court, had to be admonished not to make "speaking" 
objections of her own, and was twice reminded not to leave the courtroom while 
the trial was in session. Too, in the many instances of unnecessary bickering 
between the attorneys during trial, counsel for defense and the State displayed 
equal degrees of immaturity and unprofessionalism.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. We 
remand the cause for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.