Case Title: Smith v. Anderson

Citation: 144 N.W.2d 530

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1966-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
144 N.W.2d 530 (1966) Margaret M. SMITH, individually and as the Administratrix of the Estate of Wesley Smith, also known as Calvin Wesley Smith, deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jennie ANDERSON, the City of Williston, North Dakota, a municipal corporation, and all other persons unknown claiming any estate in, or lien or encumbrance upon the real property described in the complaint, Defendants and Respondents. No. 8317. Supreme Court of North Dakota. August 5, 1966. *531 Michael R. McIntee, Williston, for appellant. Davidson & Whisenand, Williston, for respondent Jennie Anderson. ERICKSTAD, Judge. This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Margaret M. Smith, from a judgment entered on the order of the District Court of Williams County quieting title in the defendant Jennie Anderson to the north 10 feet of the west 462/3 feet of Lot Eighteen of Block Three of the Original Townsite of Williston. Trial de novo is demanded. By quitclaim deed filed April 13, 1907, the City of Williston acquired title to the north 10 feet of Lot Eighteen of Block Three of the Original Townsite of Williston. According to the abstract of title the property was "dedicated and sold said City of Williston for use as a public alleyway." The facts are in dispute, but we believe that it may be reasonably concluded that the said strip of land was used as a public alleyway for some time thereafter, the exact number of years being unknown. On April 23, 1946, the plaintiff and her husband Wesley Smith, together with Jennie Anderson, Carl T. Anderson, and Phyllis S. Polk, executed an instrument entitled "Petition to Vacate Part of a Certain Public Alley." The pertinent part of the petition reads as follows: It is important to note at this point that the petition described the property to be vacated as the north ten feet of Lot Seventeen, whereas to cover the property which is the subject of this action, it should have described it as the north ten feet of Lot Eighteen. Mrs. Smith contends that the petition was defective because it was not verified as required by § 40-3905 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943, then in effect, which read as follows: She also alleges that she did not realize that she was signing a petition for the vacation of any property, and that had she known that this was the effect of the petition she would not have signed it. A copy of the plat attached to the petition describing the property to be vacated follows: The notice of the filing of the petition executed by the city auditor did not describe the lot through which the alley extended. It merely described the area to be vacated as follows: The affidavit of publication of the resolution adopted by the City of Williston vacating the alley disclosed that the published resolution contained the following language: Thus the affidavit of publication of the resolution indicates that the City vacated a part of Lot Seventeen, and it was not until after the document was indexed in the office of the register of deeds of Williams County that the part of the resolution which referred to the reversion of the vacated land was changed from Lot Seventeen to Lot Eighteen. It is clear, therefore, that the entire proceedings related to and drew the attention of the public to a part of Lot Seventeen rather than to a part of Lot Eighteen. Section 40-3907 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943, then in effect, provided for a hearing on a petition to vacate. It read as follows: Section 40-3908 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 required that the resolution be published as in the case of ordinances. That section read as follows: Section 40-3910 of said code granted aggrieved persons the right of appeal within twenty days after the publication of the resolution. It read as follows: These sections of the Code were designed to protect the public. The petition and its attached plat referring to Lot Seventeen, the vague reference to an alley extending east and west from First Avenue West to the alley running north and south through Block Three contained in the notice of the filing of petition as it was published, and the reference in the affidavit of publication of the resolution to the fact that the vacated land reverted to the owners of Lot Seventeen did not properly alert the public to the fact that a part of Lot Eighteen was affected. The proceedings, therefore, cannot be said to have legally affected the rights of the public in the north 10 feet of Lot Eighteen. *534 It is contended by Mrs. Anderson that, although the proceedings to vacate the alley were defective, they, with the recording of the altered transcript of the resolution, were sufficient to constitute color of title, and that therefore she is entitled to the property, having adversely possessed it under color of title and paid the taxes on it for ten years. The trial court, in quieting the title to the property in Mrs. Anderson, was apparently in accord with this view. The question that comes to mind at the outset is whether a municipality can be divested of title to its public streets and alleys by adverse possession. Our view is that it cannot. See City of Jamestown v. Miemietz, 95 N.W.2d 897 (N.D.1959); and Dacotah Hotel Company v. City of Grand Forks, 111 N.W.2d 513 (N.D.1961). It has been said that the weight of authority supports the conclusion that title to public streets and alleys cannot be acquired by prescription. The writers of American Jurisprudence call this view a widely accepted general rule: Although it is acknowledged by both texts referred to that there is authority to the contrary, we are convinced that the rule stated by the weight of authority is the correct one. We find no merit in Mrs. Anderson's contention that this case should be distinguished from City of Jamestown v. Miemietz and Dacotah Hotel Company v. City of Grand Forks, supra, because the instant case concerns interpretation of § 47-0603, N.D.R.C. of 1943, which provides for the acquisition of title through adverse possession under color of title and payment of taxes for ten years, whereas the other cases concerned interpretation of § 28-0104, N.D.R.C. of 1943, providing for acquisition of title merely through twenty years of adverse possession. These statutes read as follows: We do not believe that the difference in the language of the two statutes is sufficient, if we are to be consistent, to permit us to hold that under the first statute a municipality can be divested of title to its public streets and alleys by adverse possession, while under the latter statute it may not. As the Supreme Court of the United States said in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed. 884, statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect. This rule we very recently quoted with approval in City of Minot v. General Drivers & Helpers U. No. 74, 142 N.W.2d 612 (N.D.1966). It is contended by Mrs. Anderson that should it be determined that she has not acquired title through adverse possession, nevertheless the plaintiff is estopped from denying the validity of the vacation proceedings, having participated in them and having accepted the benefits of them. In this connection it should be noted that the north ten feet of the middle 462/3 feet of Lot Eighteen of Block Three is presently occupied by the plaintiff's building. It is argued that a person who, with knowledge of the facts assents to judicial proceedings without objection, is generally bound by such proceedings as against one who has been misled to his injury by such conduct, especially when the party against whom estoppel is claimed has accepted the benefits or enjoyed rights under the proceedings. In support thereof Mrs. Anderson refers us to 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 115 (1964), a part of which reads as follows: She asserts that the holding of this court in First State Bank of Strasburg v. Schmaltz, 61 N.D. 150, 237 N.W. 644, is applicable in this case. The pertinent part of that decision reads as follows: As applicable as this rule might be to the assertion of the plaintiff's individual rights if all elements of estoppel were proved, we question that it could apply to defeat the rights of the public for whom she also brings the action. It should be noted that her amended complaint asserts that she is a resident, elector, and taxpayer of the City of Williston and that she brings the action for herself and for all others similarly situated. *536 It is no defense that the City in its answer claimed no estate, title, or interest in the contested premises. See Le Pire v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 111 N.W.2d 355 (N.D.1961), in which we said: Mrs. Anderson further argues that an action to quiet title may not be defeated by showing that the claimant's interest, otherwise sufficient to support the action, is subject to possible superior rights in third persons who are not parties to the suit, but it is enough if the interest asserted by the claimant in possession of the land is superior to that of those who are defending against his claim. In support thereof she refers the court to 44 Am.Jur. Quieting Title § 50, at 39 (1942). The footnote to that section cites United States v. State of Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 55 S. Ct. 610, 79 L. Ed. 1267. Our court, in a quiet title action, in citing the said Supreme Court decision, said: We believe that it is very important to note that the possibly superior rights in third parties which the United States Supreme Court said could not be raised as a defense were rights of persons not parties to the suit. In the instant case the City of Williston is a party to the suit, although it denied any interest in the premises, and the plaintiff brought the action not only for herself but for all others similarly situated, she having described herself in the complaint as an elector and taxpayer of the City of Williston. Under these circumstances we believe that the rights of the public are in issue, and, thus, that title to the north 10 feet of the west 462/3 feet of Lot Eighteen in Block Three can be quieted in no one other than the City of Williston for use as described in the deed whereby the City acquired its interest therein. The judgment of the trial court is therefore reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to the trial court to order judgment in conformity with this opinion. TEIGEN, C. J., and STRUTZ, KNUDSON and MURRAY, JJ., concur.