Case Title: City of Philadelphia Office of Housing and Community Development v. AFSME Local 1971 (Dissenting Opinion)

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Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[J-132-2003] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT CITY OF PHILADELPHIA OFFICE OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, Appellee v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, LOCAL UNION NO. 1971 Appellant : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 29 EAP 2003 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered on 1/15/2003 at No. 380 CD 2002, reversing the Order entered on 1/11/2002 in the Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, of Philadelphia County, at No. 2005 Nov. Term 2001 ARGUED: December 4, 2003 DISSENTING OPINION MR. JUSTICE NIGRO DECIDED: June 21, 2005 Unlike the majority, I would reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court as I believe that the arbitrator's award in this case must be affirmed under the deferential essence test that is traditionally applied in the labor arbitration setting. See State System of High Education (Cheyney Univ. v. State College Univ. Prof. Ass'n (PSEA-NEA), 743 A.2d 405, 413 (Pa. 1999). Indeed, like Justice Saylor, I see no evidence in the record that the arbitrator's intent in fashioning the remedy at issue was punitive. To the contrary, it appears clear that the arbitrator was merely attempting to make the union whole for injuries it found the union to have suffered as a result of the City's violation of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. As such, while I might agree in principle that the award was excessive, I nevertheless conclude that it was "rationally derived from" the collective bargaining agreement and must therefore be upheld. Id. at 413. J-41-2002 - 2 I further note that I do not agree with Justice Saylor that the facts of this case warrant application of the modified essence test, which this Court has stated requires moderation of "the usual degree of deference to be accorded an arbitrator's award . . . in a situation in which the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement led to the governmental employer relinquishing essential control over the public enterprise, i.e., those powers essential to its ability to discharge its functions." Greene County v. District 2, United Mine Workers of America, 852 A.2d 299, 308 (Pa. 2004). It is important to note that this Court has typically only applied this modified test in situations in which an arbitrator has reinstated an employee whom the public employer has discharged in furtherance of its core public functions. See, e.g., Greene County, supra (modified test applies when arbitrator reinstates employee whom Children and Youth Services has discharged for poor record- keeping practices); City of Easton v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 756 A.2d 1107 (Pa. 2000) (modified test applies when arbitrator reinstates employee whom City has fired for committing theft); Office of the Attorney General v. Council 13, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 844 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 2004) (modified test does not apply when arbitrator reinstates employee whom the Office of the Attorney General discharged for off-duty misconduct). Moreover, I would not apply it here, where the arbitrator did not reinstate a discharged employee and it simply cannot be said that the City's actions in entering into three competitively-bid inspection contracts with non-Union firms was in proper furtherance of its core public functions.