Case Title: State ex rel. Highlander v. Rudduck

Citation: 2004-Ohio-4952

Docket Number: 20041189

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Highlander v. Rudduck, 103 Ohio St.3d 370, 2004-Ohio-4952.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. HIGHLANDER v. RUDDUCK, JUDGE, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Highlander v. Rudduck, 103 Ohio St.3d 370, 2004-Ohio-
4952.] 
Public records — Mandamus sought to compel release of documents in divorce 
action after appeal from order to unseal the record was filed — Appeals 
process does not preclude writ — Writ granted. 
(No. 2004-1189 ─ Submitted August 26, 2004 ─ Decided September 23, 2004.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} By assignment, respondent Judge John W. Rudduck presided over 
Bubp v. Bubp, case No. 2001-0460-DRB, a divorce case filed in the Adams 
County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division.  On January 3, 
2003, Judge Rudduck sealed the entire record of the Bubp divorce case, including 
pleadings, filings, and transcripts.  Judge Rudduck sealed the record upon an 
agreed judgment entry after being “informed that sealing of such records has 
traditionally been permitted in the Adams County Court.”  Relator, Sharon 
Highlander, counters that the sealing of divorce records was an unwritten and 
informal court policy “at best.” 
{¶ 2} In May 2004, Highlander, through counsel, requested that 
respondents, Judge Rudduck and Adams County Clerk of Courts Gary Gardner, 
provide her with access to “[a]ll pleadings, filings, transcripts and record of 
proceedings in the case of Bubp v. Bubp, Case No. 2001-0460-DRB, in the 
Adams County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division.”   In her 
request, Highlander stated that she understood “that certain information will likely 
need to be redacted, e.g., social security numbers.” 
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{¶ 3} Two days later, Judge Rudduck filed an entry offering the parties 
in the divorce case an opportunity to file objections to Highlander’s public-
records request.  On May 28, 2004, the plaintiff in the divorce case, Danny R. 
Bubp (“Bubp”), filed objections.  He claimed that the sealing of divorce records 
had been the practice of the Adams County court for over 50 years.  Bubp’s ex-
wife did not object to Highlander’s request. 
{¶ 4} On June 4, 2004, Judge Rudduck vacated his January 3, 2003 order 
by filing an entry unsealing the Bubp divorce records.  Judge Rudduck concluded 
that Bubp had presented no legal basis to keep the record sealed and that the 
Public Records Act controlled.  To allow time for Bubp to appeal from the entry, 
Judge Rudduck delayed the unsealing until June 21, 2004. 
{¶ 5} On June 18, 2004, Bubp appealed from Judge Rudduck’s entry to 
the Court of Appeals for Adams County.  On the same date, Bubp moved the 
common pleas court to stay the entry to unseal the records in his divorce case.  On 
June 21, 2004, because of Bubp’s appeal, Judge Rudduck stayed his June 4, 2004 
order directing Gardner to unseal the divorce records.  Judge Rudduck ordered 
Gardner “to keep all records filed in this case sealed, and not make them available 
for public review and inspection, until further Order of the Court.” 
{¶ 6} On July 22, 2004, Highlander filed this action for a writ of 
mandamus to compel respondents to make the Bubp divorce records immediately 
available for inspection and copying pursuant to R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public 
Records Act.  Highlander also requests an award of attorney fees.  On August 16, 
2004, respondents moved to dismiss, and on August 20, 2004, Highlander filed a 
memorandum in opposition to respondents’ motion for dismissal and a request for 
immediate issuance of a peremptory writ. 
{¶ 7} This cause is now before us for our S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) 
determination. 
Standard of Review 
January Term, 2004 
3 
{¶ 8} Under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5), we must now determine whether 
dismissal, an alternative writ, or a peremptory writ is appropriate.  State ex rel. 
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 301, 2004-Ohio-2894, 
809 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 9.  Dismissal is required when it appears beyond doubt, after 
presuming the truth of all material factual allegations of the complaint and making 
all reasonable inferences in Highlander’s favor, that she is not entitled to the 
requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  State ex rel. Satow v. Gausse-
Milliken, 98 Ohio St.3d 479, 2003-Ohio-2074, 786 N.E.2d 1289, ¶ 11.  If, 
however, after so construing Highlander’s complaint, it appears that her 
mandamus claim may have merit, an alternative writ should be granted and a 
schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs should be issued.  Tatman v. 
Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 102 Ohio St.3d 425, 2004-Ohio-3701, 811 N.E.2d 
1130, ¶ 13.  Finally, if the pertinent facts are uncontroverted and it appears 
beyond doubt that Highlander is entitled to the requested writ, we will issue a 
peremptory writ of mandamus.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio 
St.3d 106, 2003-Ohio-2506, 789 N.E.2d 203, ¶ 30. 
Application of Standard of Review to Mandamus Claim 
{¶ 9} Respondents “agree with all of the material facts set out by 
[Highlander] in her petition for writ of mandamus.”  For the following reasons, 
based on these uncontroverted facts, Highlander has established her right to the 
requested peremptory writ of mandamus. 
{¶ 10} Respondents do not contend that the requested divorce records 
either do not constitute records or are exempt from disclosure under R.C. 149.43.  
“[A]ny record used by a court to render a decision is a record subject to R.C. 
149.43.”  State ex rel. WBNS TV, Inc. v. Dues, 101 Ohio St.3d 406, 2004-Ohio-
1497, 805 N.E.2d 1116, ¶ 27. 
{¶ 11} Although properly sealed court records are excepted from 
disclosure and releasing sealed records is a fourth-degree misdemeanor pursuant 
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to R.C. 2953.55(B), the records here were not sealed under R.C. 2953.52 or other 
applicable statutory authority.  Cf. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler, 
101 Ohio St.3d 382, 2004-Ohio-1581, 805 N.E.2d 1094, ¶ 6.  No contrary local 
rule of the Adams County Common Pleas Court can prevail over R.C. 149.43.  
State ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers v. Gosser (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 
33-34, 20 OBR 279, 485 N.E.2d 706; Herman v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 
Cuyahoga App. Nos. 81143 and 81272, 2002-Ohio-7251, 2002 WL 31875969. 
{¶ 12} Moreover, Judge Rudduck held that Highlander was entitled to 
access to the Bubp divorce records in his June 4, 2004 entry unsealing those 
records. 
{¶ 13} Respondents instead assert that because the court of appeals, not 
they, now has custody and control of these records, the judge and clerk are not the 
proper respondents for Highlander’s mandamus claim.  Respondents’ assertion 
lacks merit. 
{¶ 14} R.C. 149.43(C) authorizes mandamus actions against persons 
responsible for public records.  “The law does not require that the action be 
brought against the person ultimately responsible for the records, but requires suit 
against a person responsible for them.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Cincinnati 
Post v. Schweikert (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 170, 174, 527 N.E.2d 1230.  Gardner is 
the clerk of both the common pleas court and the court of appeals.  See R.C. 
2501.16(A) (“The clerk of the court of common pleas [acts] as the clerk of the 
court of appeals for the county * * *”). 
{¶ 15} Gardner is a “person responsible” for the requested records.  R.C. 
149.43(B)(1).  “When statutes impose a duty on a particular official to oversee 
records, that official is the ‘person responsible’ ” under the Public Records Act.  
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 20 OBR 279, 485 N.E.2d 706, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  As the clerk of both courts, Gardner is required by 
statute to maintain the courts’ records, including the divorce records requested by 
January Term, 2004 
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Highlander here.  See R.C. 2303.09 (“The clerk of the court of common pleas 
shall file together and carefully preserve in his office all papers delivered to him 
for that purpose in every action or proceeding”); R.C. 2501.16(A) (“The clerk of 
the court of common pleas, acting as the clerk of the court of appeals for the 
county * * * shall maintain the files and records of the court”). 
{¶ 16} Judge Rudduck is also a “person responsible” for the requested 
records because he controlled the public’s right to access these records.  The sole 
reason that Gardner has not released the records to Highlander is that Judge 
Rudduck stayed his June 4, 2004 order directing Gardner to unseal the requested 
divorce records. 
{¶ 17} Furthermore, Gardner had custody and Judge Rudduck had control 
over the requested records when Highlander requested them.  See State ex rel. 
Consumer News Serv., Inc. v. Worthington City Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 58, 
2002-Ohio-5311, 776 N.E.2d 82, ¶ 40 (school superintendent is a proper 
respondent in a public-records mandamus action because he had custody and 
control over the requested records when relator requested them). 
{¶ 18} In addition, despite respondents’ claims that we should defer to the 
court of appeals, Bubp’s pending appeal from Judge Rudduck’s order unsealing 
the divorce records does not preclude Highlander’s claim for a writ of mandamus.  
We have consistently held that mandamus is the appropriate remedy to seek 
compliance with the Public Records Act under R.C. 149.43.  State ex rel. Beacon 
Journal Publishing Co. v. Bond, 98 Ohio St.3d 146, 2002-Ohio-7117, 781 N.E.2d 
180, ¶ 50.  The mere fact that the relator in a public-records mandamus case is 
also a party or may be joined as a party in a pending action does not preclude the 
mandamus claim.  See State ex rel. Findlay Publishing Co. v. Schroeder (1996), 
76 Ohio St.3d 580, 581-582, 669 N.E.2d 835 (pending declaratory judgment 
action against relator on same subject did not preclude mandamus claim to 
compel county coroner to permit public inspection and copying of records); State 
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ex rel. Dist. 1199, Health Care & Social Serv. Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO, v. 
Lawrence Cty. Gen. Hosp. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 351, 354, 699 N.E.2d 1281 
(pending declaratory judgment action brought by respondent to resolve issue of 
whether it was a “public office” subject to public records disclosure requirements 
did not preclude mandamus claims based on R.C. 149.43). 
{¶ 19} Adopting respondents’ argument would accord a status to judicial 
records different from the status of nonjudicial records.  The plain language of 
R.C. 149.43(C), however, makes no such distinction, and we will not imply one.  
That statute permits a person allegedly aggrieved by the failure of any public 
office to afford access to a public record to “commence a mandamus action to 
obtain a judgment that orders the public office or the person responsible for the 
public record to comply” with the Public Records Act.  Consequently, a person 
aggrieved by the failure of a court to provide access to its public records is not 
relegated to the appellate process to seek relief. 
{¶ 20} Therefore, Highlander has established her entitlement to the 
requested writ of mandamus. 
Attorney Fees 
{¶ 21} Highlander also requests an award of attorney fees.  In determining 
a relator’s right to attorney fees under R.C. 149.43(C), “ ‘courts consider the 
reasonableness of the government’s failure to comply with the public records 
request and the degree to which the public will benefit from release of the records 
in question.’ ”  State ex rel. WBNS TV, Inc. v. Dues, 101 Ohio St.3d 406, 2004-
Ohio-1497, 805 N.E.2d 1116, ¶ 47, quoting State ex rel. Wadd v. Cleveland 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 50, 54, 689 N.E.2d 25. 
{¶ 22} Highlander has established a sufficient public benefit.  She alleges 
that Bubp is “presently a candidate for a high profile public office, specifically, 
state representative.”  Respondents have conceded the truth of the material facts 
in Highlander’s petition.  The requested records may be relevant to the 
January Term, 2004 
7 
electorate’s consideration of Bubp’s candidacy for public office.  Cf. Consumer 
News, 97 Ohio St.3d 58, 2002-Ohio-5311, 776 N.E.2d 82, ¶ 53 (“The public has 
an unquestioned interest in the qualifications of potential applicants for positions 
of authority in public employment”). 
{¶ 23} Nevertheless, respondents could have reasonably determined that 
sealing the records while affording Bubp the opportunity to appeal from the 
decision to unseal them was appropriate.  Although this determination was 
ultimately meritless, we do not find that respondents lacked any reasonableness in 
doing so. 
{¶ 24} Therefore, we deny Highlander’s request for attorney fees. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 25} Based on the foregoing, it appears beyond doubt based upon the 
uncontroverted material facts that Highlander is entitled to the requested 
peremptory writ of mandamus.  We note, however, that in accordance with 
Highlander’s request, Judge Rudduck should promptly make any appropriate 
redactions, e.g., Social Security numbers, before releasing the records.  
Consequently, because there is no reason to delay granting the writ, we grant a 
peremptory writ of mandamus.  We deny Highlander’s request for attorney fees. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs with the denial of attorney fees but 
would deny the writ. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 26} I agree with the majority opinion except that I would award 
attorney fees to relator as the prevailing party under R.C. 149.43(C).  See State ex 
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rel. Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. v. Petro (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 
261, 268, 685 N.E.2d 1223 (Resnick, J., concurring); State ex rel. Pennington v. 
Gundler (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 171, 175-178, 661 N.E.2d 1049 (F.E. Sweeney, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
____________________ 
 
Law Firm of Curt C. Hartman and Curt C. Hartman, for relator. 
 
David Kelley, Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark R. Weaver, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents. 
____________________