Case Title: SEWARD v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-125

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
SEWARD v. STATE2003 WY 11676 P.3d 805Case Number: 02-125Decided: 09/16/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

CHARLES 
M. SEWARD,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender; and Barbara A. Parnell, 
Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Julie Nye 
Tiedeken, Special Assistant Attorney General; and Sean W. Scoggin, Special 
Assistant Attorney General.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      In November 2001, 
a jury found Charles Michael Seward (appellant) guilty of one count of 
second-degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(v) 
(LexisNexis 2003) and one count of third-degree sexual assault in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003), both felonies, for sexually 
assaulting his three-year-old granddaughter.  The district court sentenced appellant 
to imprisonment for seven to ten years for second-degree sexual assault and ten 
to fifteen years for third-degree sexual assault.  It ordered that these sentences be 
served consecutively, but suspended the second sentence upon appellant's release 
from confinement on the first sentence and conditioned the suspended sentence 
upon appellant successfully completing supervised probation for up to ten 
years.  Appellant appeals from that 
judgment and sentence.  We 
reverse.

 

 

[¶2]      Appellant raises 
the following issues on appeal:

 

ISSUE 
I

 

Whether 
the admission of expert testimony which impermissibly vouched for the 
credibility of the child witness was reversible error per 
se?

 

ISSUE 
II

 

Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion by finding the child witness competent to 
testify, and by denying the defendant the opportunity to present pretrial 
testimony indicating the child's statements were tainted?  Whether the child's incompetency to 
testify violated the defendant's right to the opportunity for effective 
cross-examination under the confrontation clause of the Wyoming Constitution and 
the confrontation clause of the United States 
Constitution?

 

ISSUE 
III

 

Whether 
the district court abused its discretion when it excluded extrinsic evidence of 
a prior inconsistent statement of a witness?

 

The 
State phrases the issues in substantially the same manner.

 

 

[¶3]      On December 12, 
2000, the victim and her mother, Crystal Barbee (Barbee), resided with Barbee's 
fiancé in Fort Collins, Colorado.  
The fiancé testified that the victim, three years and ten months of age 
at the time, disclosed "out of the blue" that her "grandpa Michael" (appellant 
is the victim's paternal grandfather) let her rub lotion on his "lollypop," and 
that her grandpa also licked her "cookie."  
The fiancé understood the term "lollypop" to mean "penis" and the term 
"cookie" to mean "vagina" (Barbee confirmed this).  He telephoned Barbee at work and had the 
victim repeat what she had disclosed over the telephone.  Barbee testified that her fiancé called 
her at work that night, put the victim on the telephone, and the victim stated 
that she put lotion on her grandpa's "lollypop" and her grandpa licked her 
"cookie" and "she didn't like it."  
Barbee immediately drove the victim to the police department in 
Cheyenne.

 

[¶4]      The victim, 
nearly four years and ten months of age at the time of trial, testified at 
trial.  She recalled attending the 
Christmas parade in Cheyenne with her father, stepmother, and appellant,1 and that at some point, when her 
father, grandmother and other family members were at work, she put lotion that 
she had found in the bathroom of her grandpa's house in Cheyenne on her 
"grandpa's dick" or "lollypop" and her grandpa also removed her panties and 
"licked" her "cookie" on the bed.  
The victim identified the respective body parts she was referring to on 
anatomically correct male and female drawings, and also identified appellant as 
her "grandpa," who she had rubbed lotion on.  Witness testimony revealed that the 
victim often refers to appellant as "grandpa" and her maternal grandfather as 
"papa."

 

[¶5]      Detective Ray 
Bilkie (Bilkie) of the Cheyenne Police Department interviewed appellant on two 
occasions.  In the first interview, 
appellant essentially denied his involvement and provided information 
implicating the victim's maternal grandfather.  After a "forensic interviewer" 
interviewed the victim and the victim identified appellant from a photo array 
that included both grandfathers, Bilkie interviewed appellant a second 
time.  At this second interview, 
according to Bilkie, appellant stated that he was a "heavy drinker" at the time 
of the incident, that he did not recall drinking that day, but that if the 
victim "says I did it, then I must have.  
I just don't remember it" or "if [the victim] says this happened, 
[appellant] may have done this to her, but he just specifically doesn't 
remember."

 

[¶6]      Appellant also 
testified at trial.  According to 
appellant, age fifty-three at the time of trial, the victim asked if she could 
take a bath the day of the incident.  
Appellant ran her bath water.  
The victim emerged from the bath, appellant put a t-shirt on her, and the 
victim went to a bedroom and returned with a bottle of baby lotion.  According to appellant, the victim asked 
him to put lotion on her, and he put some on her arms and around her neck.  She reportedly then asked him to "put it 
on, on my cookie."  Appellant 
replied "No, I won't," and the victim responded "Well, my papa does," and 
appellant again replied "Grandpa's just don't do things like 
that."

 

[¶7]      When the victim's 
stepmother returned to the residence, appellant informed her that she needed to 
ask the victim what the victim had previously told appellant.  The victim was, according to appellant, 
reluctant at first because she said her "papa will go to jail."  The victim then told the stepmother what 
she had previously disclosed to appellant, and also later spoke with appellant's 
wife.  Appellant recalled stating to 
Bilkie that "Well, I guess if, if [the victim] says I did, I guess I must have 
done something," but that he said this "sarcastically" after repeatedly denying 
Bilkie's allegations, hoping the detective would "leave [him] alone."  He testified that he only drank one beer 
the entire weekend, and that was the evening following the victim's 
disclosure.  Cassette tapes of 
Bilkie's interviews with appellant were inadvertently destroyed prior to 
trial.

 

[¶8]      The victim's 
stepmother testified that when she returned to the residence that day, appellant 
told her that she needed to talk to the victim, and in the course of doing so, 
the victim stated that her "papa" puts "lotion on her cookie, and she puts 
lotion on his lol[l]ypop."  When the 
victim's father returned to the residence that day, he also spoke with the 
victim alone in a separate room, and she responded similarly and differentiated 
between appellant and her maternal grandfather.  Appellant's wife provided similar 
testimony regarding her own conversation with the victim that 
day.

 

[¶9]      According to the 
victim's father, Barbee asked him a "couple months" before the incident to 
relinquish his parental rights to the victim so that Barbee's fiancé could be 
the victim's father.  The father 
declined.

 

 

 

[¶10]   In his appellate brief, appellant 
argues that the testimony of Lynn Story Huylar (Huylar), a "forensic 
interviewer," impermissibly vouched for the victim's credibility.  At oral argument, appellant also 
generally contended that the district court erred by admitting into evidence 
Huylar's videotaped interviews with the victim as prior consistent statements 
pursuant to W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  
According to appellant, other authority2 provides good reasoning concerning 
whether, despite our precedent, a temporal requirement should be applied in 
admitting such evidence, and that admitting Huylar's testimony and her 
videotaped interviews with the victim essentially resulted in a "parade of 
witnesses."  However, appellant's 
oral argument did not precisely apply either the rule's requirements or the 
referenced authority to the particular circumstances and nuances of the instant 
case.

 

[¶11]   In response to the vouching issue, 
the State asserts that Huylar did not opine in her testimony that the victim was 
credible or truthful, but assisted the jury in "understanding the interview 
process," the "ability of a child of this age to communicate," and the 
"behavioral characteristics of sexual misconduct victims . . .."  According to the State, this testimony 
did not directly comment on the victim's truthfulness, "notwithstanding that 
information concerning the child's ability to communicate had the likely 
incidental effect of enhancing the child's credibility."

 

 

[¶12]   Appellant's trial counsel filed a 
pretrial motion to exclude the victim's statements to several witnesses, 
including Huylar, as hearsay.  At a 
motion hearing, the prosecutor argued that the victim's statements were 
admissible as prior consistent statements pursuant to W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), but 
appellant's trial counsel did not specifically object to any witness' testimony 
other than Huylar's.  At trial, 
appellant's counsel renewed his objection that the substance of Huylar's 
interviews with the victim were inadmissible and objected specifically to Huylar 
commenting beyond the substance of any such interviews.  Appellant's trial counsel apparently did 
not object at trial to either Barbee's testimony or that of her fiancé.  At oral argument, appellant's 
contentions similarly appeared to focus on Huylar's 
testimony.

 

[¶13]   The district court ruled that the 
victim's statements to Huylar were admissible pursuant to W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) to 
rebut "expressed and implied charges of improper influence, motivation," 
although according to the district court, it was "ambiguous [at that time] 
whether the alleged improper influence or motive antedated the prior consistent 
statement . . .."3  The district court found that Huylar 
could testify to the foundation for taking the victim's statements, in addition 
to her "approach and technique, and the reasons for it."

 

Rulings 
on the admissibility of evidence are committed to the sound discretion of the 
district court and are not subject to appellate second guessing absent an abuse 
of discretion.

 

Curl 
v. State, 
898 P.2d 369, 373 (Wyo. 1995).

 

We 
have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question 
of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, ¶ 
7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001).  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  
Id.  "In the absence 
of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's 
determination."  Id.  The burden is on the defendant to 
establish such abuse.  Trujillo 
[v. State], 2 P.3d [567] at 571 [(Wyo.2000)].

 

"If 
the trial court erred by admitting evidence, we then must ascertain whether the 
error affects any substantial rights of the accused, providing grounds for 
reversal, or whether it is harmless.  
The harmless error standard is set out in W.R.A.P. 
9.04:

 

Any 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded by the reviewing court.'

 

See 
also 
W.R.Cr.P. 52.  An error is harmful 
if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred.  To demonstrate harmful error, the 
defendant must show prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play.'  Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 321, 232 (Wyo.1990)."

 

Solis 
[v. State], 
981 P.2d [34] at 36 [(Wyo.1999)] (some citations omitted); see also Ryan v. 
State, 988 P.2d 46, 52-53 (Wyo.1999)."

 

Skinner 
v. State, 
2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766-67 (Wyo. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 994 (2002).4

 

            
Appellant's W.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(B) 
Arguments

 

[¶14]   We recognize that the State did not 
have an adequate opportunity to respond to the additional issues appellant 
raised at oral argument, but we choose briefly to comment on appellant's general 
arguments.  First, in our recent 
precedent, we have specifically decided not to follow the reasoning of the 
authority cited by appellant regarding the application of a temporal requirement 
in admitting prior consistent statements pursuant to W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).5  In Cook v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 58 
(Wyo. 2000), 
we stated the following:

 

We 
expressly stated in Makinen [v. State, 737 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 
1987)] that the rule was not limited to statements made before the advent of an 
allegedly improper motive, as Cook suggests here.  Id.  We recently affirmed that position in 
Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1024 (Wyo.1999).

 

            
Cook contends that our holding in Makinen has been superseded by 
the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 115 S. Ct. 696, 130 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1995).  In Tome, the Supreme Court held 
that F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), after which our rule is patterned, allows only those 
prior consistent statements made prior to the alleged fabrication or improper 
influence or motive.  Tome, 
513 U.S.  at 159-60, 115 S. Ct.  at 702, 130 L. Ed. 2d  at 583-84.  We acknowledge that federal court 
interpretations of federal rules are highly persuasive in our interpretations of 
analogous Wyoming rules.  Kimbley 
v. City of Green River, 642 P.2d 443, 445 n. 3 (Wyo.1982).  However, the decision in Tome was 
not based on a constitutional issue and is, therefore, not binding upon this 
court, which is the final authority on this state's court 
rules.

 

            
This court determined in Dike that post-motive consistent 
statements are admissible for the purpose of evaluating the credibility of the 
declarant who testifies at trial.  
We further held that the defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction 
to that effect, if he or she so requests.  
Id. at 1024.  

 

See 
also Lancaster v. State, 
2002 WY 45, ¶¶ 13-18, 43 P.3d 80, 87-89 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶15]   Second, we note that prior 
consistent statements, when admitted under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) to rehabilitate a 
witness whose credibility has been impeached in the particular manner described 
in the rule, may be prejudicial.  
See Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 27, 43 P.3d  at 92-93.  Prior consistent statements are governed 
by the general principles of relevancy found in W.R.E. 401, 402, and 403, and 
are not admissible without limitation.  
Further, repetitious testimony of prior consistent statements offered for 
rehabilitative purposes is not always admissible:

 

If 
the corrupting influence did in fact precede the statements, probative value is 
greatly diminished.

 

"* 
* *  Evidence which merely shows 
that the witness said the same thing on other occasions when his motive was the 
same does not have much probative force for the reason that repetition does not 
imply veracity.'"

 

Stephens 
v. State, 
774 P.2d 60, 72 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting 4 J. Weinstein & M. 
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 801(d)(1)(B)[01] at 803-150 to 151 
(1987)).

 

[¶16]   We continue to observe that prior 
consistent statements are relevant for consideration when their admission will 
provide a whole picture for the jury to determine whether there was any real 
inconsistency.  Generally, 
post-motive statements are not significantly probative, and admitting a 
statement that merely repeats in-court testimony can, depending on the 
circumstances, have minimal impact on a trial.  However, where there is a proper 
objection, the trial court should consider whether having numerous authority 
figures trained to recognize sexual abuse appear at trial is actually a trial 
strategy of preparing a multitude of self-serving, biased, inflammatory, video, 
audio, and written statements for trial; having the witness testify; and then 
introducing into evidence these consistent statements made prior to 
testifying.  See Baum v. 
State, 745 P.2d 877, 882 (Wyo. 1987) (Cardine, J. and Urbigkit, J., specially 
concurring).  Such a trial strategy 
could render the statements irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, particularly if 
the consequence of repeating the same testimony several times unduly emphasizes 
that testimony over all other testimony in the case.6

 

[¶17]   Given that the purpose of a 
"forensic interview" is, according to Huylar, an "assessment process" regarding 
whether, based upon the information the victim provides during such an 
interview, the victim's disclosure is indeed credible, and that it is evident 
from this case, and other recent cases, that expert forensic interviews are 
being conducted for introduction at trial pursuant to W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), the 
district court should, in deciding to admit such evidence in the face of a 
proper objection, carefully consider how these factors affect the legitimacy of 
the interviews as prior consistent statements, as well as their probative 
value.  We do not mean to question 
the legitimacy of statements introduced during expert testimony for some other 
proper purpose or according to another aspect of the hearsay 
rule.

 

            
Vouching 
Issue

 

[¶18]   Huylar, a "forensic interviewer," 
former supervisor of the Department of Family Services' Child Abuse 
Investigation Unit, and current project director at a child advocacy center, 
interviewed the victim on December 18, 2000, and again on February 5, 2001.7  According to Huylar, a "forensic 
interview" is

 

a 
way to obtain the information from a child that is in a nonleading manner, that 
is open, that still respects the integrity of the investigation and preserving 
evidence, and does  It's an assessment process.

 

It's 
assessing what the child is giving to you based upon certain criteria, and then 
assessing it based upon those criteria to whether or not the, the disclosure was 
credible or not.

 

The 
"protocol" for such an interview includes building a "rapport" with the victim 
and his or her family, a general "developmental" assessment of the victim, 
whether the victim understands the difference between the truth and a lie, 
establishing whether the victim is aware of why he or she is there (this helps 
in "assessing their statements from that point on"), and engaging the victim in 
"normal conversation" followed by "very specific" formal questioning regarding 
the incident at issue.  Huylar 
videotaped her interviews with the victim in the instant case, and both 
videotapes were played for the jury.8

 

[¶19]   On direct examination, the 
following colloquy occurred between the prosecutor and 
Huylar:

 

Q.  And whenever you, when you did these 
interviews with [the victim], did you undertake to evaluate the information that 
she was able to provide you?

 

A.  Yes, I did.

 

Q.  And what was the most critical as a 
forensic interview[er] for you to be evaluating?

 

A.  Probably the most critical for me when 
I'm evaluating the child's interview and disclosure is the contextual details 
that they can give me.  And when 
I'm, when I'm talking about "contextual," I'm talking about those unique details 
that a person only who has witnessed something could give 
me.

 

            
There are those details like:  
How did it feel?  How did it 
smell?

 

            
What did it look like?  Did, 
did somebody interrupt the process?

 

            
They're very specific details, and only a person that has witnessed them 
would be able to give those to me.  
. . .

 

. 
. .

 

Q.  And when you do these interviews, do you 
then prepare a report?

 

A.  I do.

 

Q.  And do you have a format for how you put 
that into report fashion and what you specifically note?

 

A.  I've, I do.  The, the tapes that I then record, I 
then take and I write a report verbatim off of, off of those 
tapes.

 

            
And in those I am then doing the assessment part of the interview.  I'm looking for elements of 
coaching.

 

            
I'm looking for elements of contextual details.  I'm looking for other elements that 
would support it either being a credible disclosure or a noncredible 
disclosure.     

 

Q.  Okay, and did you, in fact, make note of 
the, that assessment in your report on the interviews you did with [the 
victim]?

 

A.  I did.

 

. 
. .

 

Q.  Significant to you that each time she 
identified "Grandpa" she was clear who she was talking 
about?

 

A.  Yes, because it showed consistency.  She was very consistent, and at no time 
did she have confusion when she was asked specifically about who did 
what.

 

It 
was always that particular grandpa.

 

Q.  Okay.  Did you make note of each of the 
contextual details you indicated you earlier were evaluating throughout the 
interview process in your report?

 

A.  I did.  I did.

 

Q.  The ones that were of significance?  In the second interview, was there 
something of significance that you particularly found?

 

A.  Well, she had a few more contextual 
details.  She was able to now say 
whose lotion it was, and she named [her stepmother], who is a known person to 
her dad and lives in that home.

 

So 
that was significant. . . .

 

She 
talked about --  She could do 
sequentially what she did, what happened next.  And she talked about going and getting 
the lotion and then bringing the lotion back, and where she got it off the 
counter.

 

            
Those are really significant because, again, for a three- and a 
four-year-old, those are pretty heavy-duty details.  She'd have had to have some kind of 
experience to be able to describe that.

 

Q.  And you noted each of those in your 
assessment and in your report?

 

A.  I did.

 

Cross-examination 
by appellant's trial counsel addressed primarily claimed inconsistencies in the 
victim's answers to Huylar's questions.  
On redirect by the prosecutor, Huylar testified as 
follows:

 

Q.  . . . [Appellant's trial counsel] was 
essentially indicating that you described, that you asked questions to evaluate 
a child's ability to give contextual details.  And he says, "Well, you didn't get her 
to say she knew what it felt like or smelled like."

 

What 
contextual details did you obtain that you felt were 
significant?

 

A.  In the scheme of things you can't, you 
know, I, you can't say that you will have all of those elements in order for it 
to be credible.  So I look for a 
broad range of things that would be contextual, and I found quite a 
few.

 

            
In terms of that she was just wearing a top and he was wearing pants, and 
then the detail that she described there was that it popped out.  That was a real contextual detail she'd 
have been able to witness to have been able to describe 
that.

 

            
That the lotion smelled like shampoo; that she had to rub it on his 
lollypop, and that she was licked; and that Grandpa liked it but not with the 
poo-poo on it.  Those are contextual 
details that she gave that supported the conclusion.

 

In 
closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following:

 

[Y]ou 
have evidence that [the victim's] Statements are not only reliable; they are 
consistent; they are detailed, and with contextual detail; a description 
provided of her real-life experience, her real-life sexual abuse at the hand of 
this man, her grandpa . . .

 

. 
. .

 

. 
. . And it is what [the victim] reported that she consistently, clearly, and 
with her three-year-old detail said to Lynn Huylar in the taped 
interviews.

 

After 
listing several details from the victim's interviews with Huylar, the prosecutor 
continued:

 

All 
of these three- to four-year-old contextual details.  Remember, [the clinical psychologist] 
explained the significance.

 

The 
prosecutor argued the following during rebuttal argument:

 

[A]nd 
you, with your life experience, know how to evaluate the weight of the testimony 
given.  And you are allowed to 
believe your four-year-old [victim] because you know that when you hear a child 
in their contextual detailed setting explain to you what happened to them, that 
that's the best way to refute somebody's testimony.

 

And 
you know, based on everything that you've heard, that [the victim] has no motive 
to lie, and would have had absolutely no way to tell a consistent, detailed 
account of what her grandpa did to her unless she had a life experience to be 
describing.  . . 
.

 

. 
. .

 

. 
. .  Remember all of those 
contextual details, Ladies and Gentlemen.

 

Remember 
what [the victim] tells you, what she told you happened, what her grandpa 
did.  Her grandpa is 
guilty.

 

In 
Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 360 (Wyo. 1998), we 
said:

 

It 
is well established in Wyoming that an expert witness cannot vouch for the 
truthfulness or credibility of an alleged victim.  Lessard v. State, Wyo., 719 P.2d 227, 233 (1986).  In Lessard, 
we explained that the question of credibility is for the jury, who are 
themselves expert in that area.  
Consequently, the testimony of a psychologist or other expert on the 
issue of credibility does not assist them and therefore does not satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 702, W.R.E.[9]

 

One 
additional reason we "prohibit such testimony [is that] we do not need or want a 
parade of truth or falsehood' experts invading the jury's traditional function 
by offering expert opinions of credibility."  Wells v. State, 846 P.2d 589, 598 
(Wyo. 1992) (Cardine, J., specially concurring) 
(emphasis omitted).  However, 
testimony assisting the jury "in understanding some aspect of the testimony of 
another witness that does not comment directly on that witness' credibility or 
veracity is not invasive of the role of the jury."  Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 
618 (Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶20]   We conclude that Huylar's 
"truthfulness criteria" testimony and her assessment of the victim's credibility 
based on the content of the victim's interview responses directly vouched for 
the victim's credibility.  It is 
evident that the purpose of Huylar's testimony was twofold:  establish the foundation for admitting 
her videotaped "forensic interviews" with the victim and assess the credibility 
of the victim's disclosure based on the content of those interviews.  According to Huylar, the very purpose of 
a "forensic interview" is to assess whether the victim's disclosure was 
"credible or not"a forensic interviewer is looking for "elements that would 
support it either being a credible disclosure or a noncredible disclosure."  In evaluating the information the victim 
provided, the "most critical" factor, according to Huylar, is whether such 
information contains "contextual details," or "those unique details that a 
person only who has witnessed" them could provide.  Specifically, Huylar was asked to 
describe what "significant" contextual details the victim provided during the 
interviews.  Huylar did so and 
testified that she "found quite a few" contextual details that supported her 
"conclusion," a conclusion she based solely on the content of, indeed the extent 
of, the "contextual details" contained in the victim's responses.  As to the significance of these details, 
Huylar stated that "for a three- and a four-year-old, those are pretty 
heavy-duty details," the victim would "have had to have some kind of experience 
to be able to describe that," and that one particular "contextual detail" was a 
"real contextual detail [the victim would] have been able to witness to have 
been able to describe that."

 

[¶21]   Huylar's testimony in the instant 
case is nearly identical in nature and extent to the testimony we found 
impermissible in Zabel and quite similar to the objectionable testimony 
in Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶¶ 17-18, 74 P.3d 699, 708-09 (Wyo. 
2003), 
a case also involving Huylar's testimony.  
In Zabel, 765 P.2d  at 358, 
the victims were ten and thirteen years of age, and Zabel was charged with four 
counts of taking "immodest, immoral and indecent liberties with a minor."  A clinical psychologist who evaluated 
both victims, which evaluation included a "clinical interview," testified that 
in evaluating the "authenticity" of the victims' reporting,10 she looked for "emotionality 
linked to the reporting," "inconsistencies in the reporting," the "amount of 
anxiety around the reporting," "secondary gains" as a motive to fabricate, and 
antisocial tendencies.  Id. 
at 358-59.  The psychologist further 
addressed specifically whether she observed any of these characteristics in 
either of the victims, essentially testifying that she observed the 
"characteristics" of a "child telling the truth" in both victims, as opposed to 
those characteristics of a child who is fabricating.  Id. at 360.

 

[¶22]   We found that this testimony was 
directed "to whether the children were fabricating' and toward [the 
psychologist's] search for authenticity of the reporting,'" that it was 
"abundantly clear that she was discussing truthfulness criteria in connection 
with the victims' reports of the incidents of sexual abuse," and that she "led 
the jury through her truthfulness evaluation, including her conclusions."  Id. at 361-62.  We also distinguished such testimony 
from testimony that we previously had found to assist the jury in "understanding 
some peculiar aspect of the victim's behavior" (i.e. "that most rape victims ask 
their assailants not to tell anyone about the incident," that "victims often 
delay in reporting sexual abuse or assault," and that it was "typical behavior" 
for an adolescent victim not to immediately flee the scene and report the 
incident).  Id. at 
360-61.  We concluded that, 
considering the circumstances present in Zabel, and especially that "the 
case turned on the question of whether the jury believed the" victims or Zabel, 
the error amounted to plain error.  
Id. at 362-63.

 

[¶23]   In Wilde, 2003 WY 93, ¶ 19, 
74 P.3d  at 709, 
we found reversible error, "especially given the difficult credibility issues 
the jury had to assess in [the] case," due to vouching for the victim's 
credibility in part based on Huylar's testimony.  In that case, also involving the same 
prosecutor as the instant case, Huylar similarly testified regarding her 
"forensic examination" of two child witnesses, and "emphasized that a part of 
her interview process is to determine if the child knows what telling the truth 
is and whether the child is suggestible," and when

 

asked 
by the prosecutor if AM was able to provide a detailed account of the event at 
issue, Huylar answered that "kids who have been sexually abused will be able to 
provide those [details]."

 

Id., 
2003 WY 93, ¶ 18, 74 P.3d  at 709.  
Huylar continued that she "gave much weight to the details AM provided, 
because a child cannot make up that sort of detail."  Id., 2003 WY 93, ¶ 18, 74 P.3d  at 
709.  Wilde's trial counsel had 
"objected to virtually every erroneous question," and the district court 
sustained several of the objections and "did its level best to keep the 
prosecutor on track;" nevertheless, "despite several warnings, admonitions, and 
sustained objections, the prosecutor continued down the path of reversible 
error."  Id., 2003 WY 93, ¶ 
19, 74 P.3d  at 709.

 

[¶24]   The State contends that Huylar's 
testimony assisted the jury in assessing a child victim's ability to communicate 
"information consistent with the environment in which the alleged abuse took 
place" and in understanding Huylar's interview techniques.  The State also attempts to equate such 
testimony with that concerning "the behavioral characteristics of sexual 
misconduct victims . . .."  
According to the State, Huylar "did not opine whether what the child was 
testifying to was credible," but merely noted "in general, what features might 
signal authenticity in the story of an interviewee;" therefore, any bolstering 
of the victim's credibility was incidental.

 

[¶25]   We do not agree.  The State's contentions mischaracterize 
Huylar's testimony.  Huylar 
testified that the purpose of her forensic interviews with the victim was for 
Huylar to assess the credibility of the victim's disclosure regarding what 
occurred between the victim and appellant.  
The most critical component to that assessment was whether the victim's 
interview responses contained sufficient "contextual details" to render the 
disclosure credible.  The nature of 
this testimony is the very "search for authenticity of the reporting'" and 
"truthfulness criteria" testimony we identified in Zabel, 765 P.2d  at 
361-62.  Huylar's testimony as to 
the significance of the victim's ability to communicate "contextual details" 
during those interviews is nothing more than Huylar's expert opinion that the 
victim's disclosure was credible because Huylar, in her expert capacity, was 
able to discern sufficient "contextual details" based solely on the content of 
the victim's responses to Huylar's interview questions.  Huylar's testimony clearly exceeded even 
the purposes for which the district court had admitted it.

 

[¶26]   We add that the State has not, in 
the instant case, established to our satisfaction that testimony of this nature 
assisted the jury in addressing an issue beyond the jurors' "common experience," 
that such testimony amounted to "objective scientific or specialized knowledge" 
that assisted the jury in evaluating the victim's testimony or explaining some 
aspect of the victim's testimony, that such testimony was necessary to disabuse 
the jury of some widely held misconception about child sexual assault victims, 
or that such testimony was otherwise relevant to, or helpful in, explaining some 
factual issue or other contention in the case.  See, for example, Montoya v. 
State, 822 P.2d 363, 366-67 (Wyo. 1991) and Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 
979 (Wyo. 1988).  The district court had already 
determined that the victim was competent to testify, and the victim did testify 
at trial.  Nothing in either 
Huylar's testimony, or the portions of a clinical psychologist's testimony that 
also addressed "truthfulness criteria,"11 suggests that this kind of 
testimony would assist the jury in evaluating the victim's credibility any 
differently from how it would evaluate the credibility of another witness.  Expert testimony "concerning the 
victim's truthfulness would be of no assistance" to the jury.  Montoya, 822 P.2d  at 
365.  Counsel were capable of arguing, and at 
least in the instant case, the jury was capable of evaluating, whether the 
content of the victim's statements contained indicia of reliability in the 
absence of Huylar's expert testimony.

 

[¶27]   It is true that we have previously 
found that expert testimony

 

that 
discusses the behavior and characteristics of sexual assault victims and the 
range of responses to sexual assault encountered by experts is admissible.  Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 
(Wyo.1987).  Such testimony is 
relevant and helpful in explaining to the jury the typical behavior patterns of 
adolescent victims of sexual assault.  
Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo.1988).  It assists the jury in understanding 
some of the aspects of the behavior of victims and, so long as there is no 
comment on the credibility or truthfulness of the victims, it does not invade 
the province of the jury.  Zabel 
v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo.1988).

 

Rivera 
v. State, 
840 P.2d 933, 939 (Wyo. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Springfield v. 
State, 860 P.3d 435 (Wyo. 1993).  However, in Zabel, 765 P.2d  at 
360-61, 
we distinguished testimony nearly identical in nature and scope to the 
referenced testimony in the instant case from testimony we had previously found 
to assist the jury in "understanding some peculiar aspect of the victim's 
behavior."  The State has similarly 
failed to establish a sufficient nexus between that testimony and the general 
symptoms or typical behavior tendencies of child sexual assault victims or a 
proper diagnosis that the victim had been sexually assaulted.  See, for example, Chapman v. 
State, 2001 WY 25, ¶¶ 7-23, 18 P.3d 1164, 1169-74 (Wyo. 2001); 
Cook, 7 P.3d at 56-57; 
Humphrey v. State, 962 P.2d 866, 873 (Wyo. 1998); 
Curl, 898 P.2d at 373-74; 
Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 746 (Wyo. 1993), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 959 (1997); 
Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1022-23 (Wyo. 1993); 
and Rivera, 840 P.2d  at 938-39.  Rather, Huylar's testimony in the 
instant case sought to evaluate the credibility of the victim's disclosure based 
solely on the content of the victim's responses to Huylar's interview 
questions.  See Griswold v. 
State, 994 P.2d 920, 928 (Wyo. 1999) and Rigler v. State, 941 P.2d 734, 
740 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶28]   Perhaps equally troubling is the 
following exchange during the cross-examination of Bilkie, who had served as a 
law enforcement officer for twenty years and testified immediately after 
Huylar:

 

Q. 
[Appellant's counsel].  That's 
correct.  You had the statements of 
the [Seward] family indicating that [the victim] disclosed her other grandfather 
as touching her.

 

A.  Yes, I had allegations from the Seward 
family that [the maternal grandfather] had done this.

 

Q.  And there was no investigation done on 
that, basically; correct?

 

A.  Once I clarified and [the victim] 
positively identified Mr. Seward, there was no other, no other place to go with 
the investigation.  On [the maternal 
grandfather], there was no other evidence pointing towards 
him.

 

Q.  Well, let's assume that even if [the 
victim] was saying Mr. Seward was doing it, she is a young girl and we don't 
know whether or not those statements were valid, or at least in the time you did 
this do not know whether or not this occurred or not; 
correct?

 

A.  I based the credibility of [the victim] 
on the detail she gave in the interview.  
And based on experience, yes, I do believe that this happened to her. 

 

Q.  Okay, but she's a three-year-old 
girl.  

 

A.  Yes.

 

Q.  Okay, and you didn't know her from Adam 
before you did this interview; correct?

 

A.  No, but I'm experienced with children 
giving contextual detail.

 

The 
detective's responses certainly exceeded a circumstance where he merely "relied 
upon the statements in determining that sufficient probable cause existed to 
arrest" appellant.  See Ogden v. 
State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 29, 34 P.3d 271, 278 (Wyo. 2001); 
see also Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 859-60 (Wyo. 1998) (statement that officer "thought the 
informant was honest with him when they worked together" not opinion that 
witness was truthful but recommending that such inquiries "be avoided").  Not only did he express an opinion that 
the victim was credible solely due to the content of her statements, his opinion 
tied directly into Huylar's expert testimony regarding the amount of "contextual 
details" contained in the victim's statements.  See Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1339-41 (Wyo. 1992).

 

[¶29]   We conclude that the vouching 
errors that occurred in the instant case were harmful.  Credibility was the central issue in the 
casea close factual dispute existed regarding whether to believe the victim's 
testimony, or appellant's testimony, as to what occurred during the weekend of 
November 25, 2000.  The evidence of 
appellant's guilt certainly does not rise to the level of "overwhelming" nor was 
any physical evidence introduced to support the State's case.  Accordingly, because two witnesses 
essentially vouched directly for the victim's credibility based solely on the 
content of the victim's disclosure, and considering the prosecutor's utilization 
of that testimony during closing and rebuttal argument, we find that a 
reasonable possibility exists that the verdict might have been more favorable to 
the appellant if the error had never occurred.

 

 

[¶30]   We will briefly address this issue, 
but recognize that appellant could potentially raise the issue again on remand 
in the context of an entirely different record.  Appellant contends that the district 
court erred in finding that the victim was competent to testify at trial.  According to appellant, selected 
portions of the victim's testimony at the competency hearing indicate that the 
victim did not understand her obligation to testify truthfully, did not have the 
mental capacity to testify, and was easily distracted.  Appellant also argues that the district 
court's review of Huylar's videotaped interviews with the victim did not 
"sufficiently address the other possible instances of suggestion presented" by 
appellant's trial counsel, and that the victim's lack of competency prevented 
his trial counsel from effectively cross-examining the victim at 
trial.

 

The 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence provide that "[e]very person is competent to be a 
witness except as otherwise provided in these rules."  W.R.E. 601.  "A person is generally competent to 
testify if he can understand, receive, remember and narrate impressions and is 
sensible to the obligations of the oath taken before testifying."  English [v. State], 982 P.2d 
[137] at 139 [(Wyo.1999)] (citing Simmers [v. State], 943 P.2d [1189] at 
1199 [(Wyo.1997)]); Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo.1984).  "Intelligence, not age, is the guiding 
criteria in determining the competency of a witness."  Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 879 
(Wyo.1987).  "It is a 
well-established principle of law that competency of witnesses to testify is a 
question within the sound discretion of the trial court."  English, 982 P.2d  at 145.  "However, when children are called into 
the courtroom to testify, we have held that once the child's competency is 
called into question by either party, it is the duty of the court 
to make an independent examination of the child to determine competency, and 
that determination will not be disturbed unless shown to be clearly 
erroneous."  
Id.

 

We 
have directed the district courts to use a five-part test for determining the 
competency of child witnesses:

 

"(1) 
an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) 
the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to 
testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to 
retain an independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to 
express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to 
understand simple questions about it."

 

Id.; 
Larsen, 686 P.2d  at 585 (quoting State v. Allen, 70 Wash. 2d 690, 
424 P.2d 1021 (1967)).

 

            
In English, we decided that the existing state of the law 
adequately addresses pretrial taint concerns and a pretrial taint hearing is not 
necessary.  At the time of a child's 
competency hearing, a defendant can argue memory taint at that hearing to 
discredit the reliability of a child's testimony.  We held that if a defendant can 
establish a child's memory of events has been corrupted by improper interviews, 
it is possible the third Larsen factor, "a memory sufficient to retain an 
independent recollection of the occurrence," may not be satisfied.  English, 982 P.2d  at 
146.

 

            
Although we declined to adopt a separate pretrial "taint hearing" 
procedure, we did, however, endorse the use of the following factors as they 
relate to the question of independent recollection.  Id.

 

"The 
factors that should be considered in assessing the reliability of a complaint 
regarding sexual offenses are:  (1) 
the age of the victim; (2) circumstances of the questioning; (3) the victim's 
relationship with the interrogator; and (4) the type of questions asked.'  * * *  Undue suggestiveness can occur when an 
interviewer has a preconceived notion of what has happened to a child, the 
interviewer uses leading questions, the interviewer is a trusted authority 
figure, the person accused of wrongdoing is vilified during the interview, or 
the interviewer uses threats or rewards to pressure the 
child."

 

Id. 
(quoting State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 694 A.2d 196, 245-46 
(1997) (summarizing and quoting State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 642 A.2d 1372, 1377-1383 (1994)).

 

Billingsley 
v. State, 
2003 WY 61, ¶¶ 10-13, 69 P.3d 390, 395-96 (Wyo. 2003) (emphasis in 
original).

 

[¶31]   The district court held a 
competency hearing the first day of trial.12  At the hearing, the district court heard 
testimony from the victim, in addition to having previously reviewed the 
videotapes of Huylar's interviews with the victim.  The district court concluded that the 
victim "clearly" met the referenced competency criteria.  It found that the victim "clearly 
understood the difference between the truth and untruth," that she had the 
requisite mental capacity and there was "no indication to the contrary," that 
she had the ability to "retain an independent recollection" and the "capacity to 
express in words the memory of the occurrence, and the capacity to understand 
simple question[s] about it from both Prosecutor and Defense Counsel."  The district court also found that 
Huylar's videotaped interviews did not contain "improperly suggestive questions 
of or statements to" the victim.  
[Id. at 127]

 

[¶32]   We cannot say that, based on the 
record before it, the district court erred in finding the victim competent to 
testify at trial.  The district 
court applied the requisite factors to that record and made specific 
findings.  We

 

do 
not presume to place ourselves in the shoes of the trial court in these cases by 
reading a cold record.  The trial 
court sees the witness' facial expressions, hears inflections in her voice and 
watches her mannerisms during examination.  
These observations are a vital part of the ultimate ruling on 
competency.

 

In 
Interest of CB, 
749 P.2d 267, 271 (Wyo. 1988).  During her testimony as a whole, the 
victim was able to differentiate between the truth and a lie by way of specific 
examples and negative consequences associated with lying, even during 
questioning by appellant's trial counsel.  
She also was able to state her age, birth date, age at previous and next 
birthdays, name, family members, who she lived with, identified appellant, the 
state in which she lived, and counted accurately to twelve but inaccurately 
thereafter.  It is worth noting that 
at trial, the victim was able to articulate and testify regarding her version of 
what happened to her in addition to utilizing anatomically correct 
drawings.

 

[¶33]   Appellant claims that the district 
court somehow prevented appellant from adequately exploring "taint" issues at 
the competency hearing.  The record 
does not support this contention.  
At a motion hearing earlier in the case, appellant's trial counsel 
mentioned three areas in which the victim's disclosure might have been 
tainted:  evidence regarding a 
potential custody dispute between the victim's mother and father, evidence 
pointing to the victim's maternal grandfather as the perpetrator, and evidence 
of improper influence during the videotaped interviews Huylar conducted.  Yet, during the motion hearing, the 
district court specifically referred to Barbee's potential testimony in this 
respect, stated that it would "look into the issues" and "if necessary, counsel 
may inquire of Lynn Huylar and Officer Bilk[ie]," and indicated that it would 
hold a competency hearing at a later date.  
These witnesses could have provided information addressing the very three 
areas that appellant identified at the motion hearing (based on his trial 
testimony, Detective Bilkie would have been able to provide testimony regarding 
the maternal grandfather as the perpetrator).

 

[¶34]   The district court reviewed the 
videotaped interviews involving Huylar and the victim (appellant does not 
contest the district court's finding regarding these interviews) prior to the 
competency hearing, received the victim's testimony at the competency hearing, 
and made its findings based on the record before it.  Nothing in the record indicates that 
appellant's trial counsel ever attempted to call, or requested that the district 
court receive testimony from, any other witness at the competency hearing.  In fact, other than summarily objecting 
to the district court's competency ruling, appellant's trial counsel made no 
argument regarding these taint issues at the competency 
hearing.

 

[¶35]   The record similarly does not 
support appellant's argument as to whether the victim's competence interfered 
with his ability to cross-examine her.

 

 

[¶36]   Appellant asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion in excluding testimony offered to impeach the 
victim's mother with a prior inconsistent statement.  During the cross-examination of Barbee, 
appellant's trial counsel elicited the following 
testimony:

 

Q.  . . .  You moved out of your family's house 
because you had troubles with your father; is that 
correct?

 

A.  Yes.

 

Q.  And he's actually your stepfather; is 
that right?

 

A.  Yes.

 

. 
. .

 

Q.  Okay.  And you had explained to Matt [the 
victim's father] and the family that it was because of your father; is that 
correct?

 

A.  Yes.

 

Q.  And you also shared with Matt and his, 
his family that he had abused you; is that correct?

 

A.  Me and him had gotten into a fist fight 
once, and that's the only time he has abused me.

 

Q.  Okay.  Did you ever tell Mike Seward that you 
had been abused by him?

 

A.  No.

 

Q.  Did you ever tell him that you had been 
sexually abused by him?

 

A.  No.

 

Appellant's 
trial counsel called appellant's son, Mike Seward, as a witness, and the 
following transpired during direct examination:

 

Q.  Have you had conversations with [Barbee] 
concerning her past?

 

A.  Yes, I have.

 

Q.  Okay, and specifically with her 
grandfather, about her grandfather on her side?

 

A.  Well, her father on her side, 
yes.

 

Q.  Father.  Excuse me.  What transpired in those 
conversations?

 

The 
prosecutor objected as to relevance.  
Appellant's trial counsel responded that the witness' testimony would 
rebut Barbee's testimony.  The 
district court sustained the prosecutor's objection.  Appellant's trial counsel provided the 
district court an offer of proof regarding the witness' proposed testimony that 
he and Barbee were watching television, and "something came on the TV about [a] 
child molester, or it was something along those lines," and Barbee stated that 
"she couldn't stand her father either because he used to do the same thing to 
her."  The district court stated 
that the testimony was "collateral" to the issues in the case and "404(b) 
evidence called against a person who is not charged and isn't here . . 
.."

 

[¶37]   Should this issue arise on remand, 
we note that, while the district court retains its discretion regarding the 
admissibility of evidence, we have recently stated the following with respect to 
such testimony when offered for impeachment purposes:

 

Prior 
inconsistent statements are admissible under W.R.E. 613(b) to impeach by 
contradiction a witness' trial testimony.  
W.R.E. 613(b) provides:  
"Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not 
admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the 
same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him 
thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require."  This rule applies when two 
statementsone made at trial and one made previouslyare irreconcilably at 
odds.  In such an event, counsel is 
permitted to show the discrepancy by extrinsic evidence, if necessary.  United States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 558 (1st Cir.1999).  The purpose of this type of impeachment 
evidence is to show a witness to be generally capable of making errors in his 
testimony.  3A John Henry Wigmore, 
Evidence § 1017 (Chadbourn rev.1970).  
In doing so, counsel can resort to the witness' own prior statements in 
which that witness has given a contrary version.  Id.

 

Prior 
statements made by a witness are not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the 
trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statements.  W.R.E. 801(d)(1).  The use of a prior inconsistent 
statement is not inadmissible hearsay because it is not offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted.  Rather, it is 
used as a tool to compare both statements and conclude that the declarant has 
erred in making one or the other without determining which statement is 
erroneous.  3A John Henry Wigmore, 
Evidence § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).

 

Willis 
v. State, 
2002 WY 79, ¶¶ 18-19, 46 P.3d 890, 896 (Wyo. 2002).  However, the jury should ultimately 
consider such testimony in accordance with the limited purpose for which it is 
offered.  See, for example, 
Medrano v. State, 914 P.2d 804, 810 (Wyo. 1996) and Channel v. State, 592 P.2d 1145, 1149-50 (Wyo. 1979).

 

[¶38]   In evaluating whether the proffered 
testimony was indeed "collateral," the district court might consider whether 
such testimony was "relevant to some issue in the case other than 
credibility . . .."  Daniel v. 
State, 923 P.2d 728, 739 (Wyo. 1996) (emphasis in original).  Barbee's credibility certainly was at 
issue, and one of appellant's theories was that Barbee had a motive to influence 
the victim based on Barbee's desire that the victim's father relinquish his 
parental rights.  Appellant also 
advanced a theory that the victim's maternal grandfather was the 
perpetrator.  Appellant, and several 
witnesses from appellant's family, testified that the victim referred to her 
maternal grandfather perpetrating the acts alleged.  Bilkie also testified that he checked 
the maternal grandfather's history and found "one incident," and that Barbee 
denied that the maternal grandfather perpetrated any acts against her.  We make no comment as to whether the 
proffered testimony was probative of that, or some other issue in the case, but 
merely state that the district court should consider any such issues in deciding 
on remand whether the proposed brief testimony is collateral and would unduly 
confuse the issues at trial.

 

[¶39]   We reverse.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Barbee recalled that sometime after 
Thanksgiving in 2000, the victim visited the Sewards to attend the Christmas 
parade in Cheyenne.  Information 
from other witnesses placed the visit during the weekend of November 25, 
2000.

 

  2Appellant specifically referenced 
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 115 S. Ct. 696, 130 L. Ed. 2d 574 
(1995) in addition to other regional 
authority.

 

  3The trial testimony appears to 
indicate that an alleged motive to fabricate based on Barbee's desire that the 
victim's father relinquish his parental rights arose approximately two months 
prior to the victim's disclosure to Barbee's fiancé.  Appellant's trial counsel did not follow 
through at trial regarding any allegations that Huylar improperly questioned the 
victim.  If the prior consistent 
statement was made subsequent to when the improper influence arose, the 
statement may only be used for rehabilitative purposes.  Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 
751 (Wyo. 1993), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 959 (1997).  "Because of the limited purpose for 
which the statement may be offered, the party contesting admission of the 
statement is entitled to a limiting instruction to that effect."  Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 
15, 43 P.3d 80, 87-88 (Wyo. 2002).

 

The 
district court offered, if appellant requested, to give a limiting instruction 
"to the effect that the statement or statements are admitted for the limited 
purpose of evaluating the [victim's] credibility . . .."  Instruction No. 7 to the jury 
provided:

 

The 
video-taped interviews of [alleged victim's name] by Mrs. Huyl[a]r were admitted 
into evidence only to assist you to evaluate the credibility of the child's 
testimony as given at the trial.  It 
is not to be seen as direct evidence.

 

Appellant 
does not argue that this jury instruction was deficient.

 

  4We do not "apply the error per se 
standard in reviewing a claim that a witness improperly vouched for the 
credibility of another witness."  
Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 38, 46 P.3d 309, 319 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

  5W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) provides, in 
pertinent part:

 

(d)  Statements which are not 
hearsay.    A statement is not hearsay 
if:

(1)  Prior Statement by Witness.    
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . (B)  consistent with his testimony and is 
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication 
or improper influence or motive . . .[.]

 

  6Recent cases indicate that, as 
interpreted by this Court, W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) is susceptible to misuse.  Should such misuse continually pervade 
future cases, this Court may be required to revisit the temporal requirement 
issue.

 

  7Huylar testified that the Cheyenne 
Police Department requested the second interview in order to get "some more 
specific information relating to the disclosure, and to clarify some details 
that were got in the first interview," primarily the "detail of who exactly had 
touched her; who that person was."

 

  8It appears that the videotapes were 
played in their entirety.  We 
recently addressed that issue in Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶¶ 8-30, 43 P.3d  
at 86-93.

 

  9Both parties refer to Huylar's 
testimony  as "expert" testimony 
pursuant to W.R.E. 702, and appellant does not question Huylar's 
qualifications.  W.R.E. 702 
provides:

 

If 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise.

 

In 
addition, W.R.E. 704 states:

 

Testimony 
in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable 
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact.

 

  10The psychologist testified that 
children who are lying generally exhibit certain characteristics, as do children 
who are telling the truth.  
Zabel, 765 P.2d  at 360.

 

  11The clinical psychologist's 
testimony briefly, and generally, addressed similar "truthfulness criteria," at 
one point in response to a question posed by appellant's trial counsel, but also 
in response to the prosecutor's questions.  
Appellant's trial counsel did not object to this testimony at trial, but 
did object to the relevance of her testimony at a motion hearing when the 
prosecutor first disclosed that the psychologist would testify at trial.  It does not appear that a formal 
designation was filed regarding the psychologist's proposed testimony (or 
Huylar's for that matter), and at the motion hearing, the prosecutor generally 
described the nature of that testimony (that general description did not include 
truthfulness criteria), and the prosecutor informed appellant's counsel that he 
could contact the witness "and ask her any kind of questions he wants about what 
her expertise is or what she intends to provide testimony for me on."  We merely note that even general 
testimony of this nature raises the aforementioned 
concerns.

 

  12The manner in which the competency 
hearing began is rather concerning:

 

[Prosecutor]:  Okay.  Can you tell us your whole 
name?

 

[Victim]:  Uh-huh.

 

[Appellant's 
trial counsel]:  Your Honor, I guess 
before we proceed, I just want the Record to note that the Witness is sitting on 
the Prosecutor's lap, and I would ask that she not do 
that.

 

[Prosecutor]:  Can you sit on the Witness Chair for me, 
Baby?  Okay?