Case Title: City of Orlando v. County of Orange

Citation: 276 So. 2d 41

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1973-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
276 So. 2d 41 (1973)
CITY OF ORLANDO, Petitioner,
v.
COUNTY OF ORANGE, Respondent.
No. 42737.

Supreme Court of Florida.
April 11, 1973.
*42 Egerton K. van den Berg of Van Den Berg, Gay, Burke & Dyer, Orlando, for petitioner.
John H. Ward of Ward & Ward, Orlando, for respondent.
Ralph A. Marsicano, Tampa, Burton M. Michaels, Tallahassee, and Paul S. Buchman, Plant City, for The Florida League of Cities, as amicus curiae.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District. That Court has certified that its decision, reported at 264 So. 2d 844, is one passing upon questions of great public interest, giving this Court jurisdiction under Article V, § 3, of the Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A.
The facts as reported by the District Court are as follows:
The District Court held that the portion of the complaint alleging that the county levied ad valorem taxes for road and bridge purposes but failed to share the same with the municipality stated a cause of action on behalf of the municipality and, on the basis of these facts, has certified to this Court the following three questions:
Question 1. Contrary to the view expressed by the District Court,[3] the answer to the first question is "yes". It is our opinion that Section 336.59, F.S. 1969, F.S.A., constitutes a direction by the Legislature to county commissioners to make an ad valorem assessment on real property in the county to be used for road and bridge purposes.[4] The Legislature has not determined what percentage of funds used for this purpose must be from this source, but it is clear that the road and bridge fund cannot be funded entirely from revenue other than the mandated ad valorem taxation. City of Waldo v. Alachua *44 County.[5] The Legislature has not set any minimum millage for this purpose.[6]
Question 2. As the District Court correctly noted,[7] the answer to the second question is "yes". It is our opinion that Orange County is obligated to share with the City of Orlando the ad valorem taxes levied for road and bridge purposes regardless of the budgetary fund into which the resulting revenues were placed by Orange County. The clear Legislative intent in Section 336.59[8] requires that the assessment be made and that an appropriate fund be established. Counties are not permitted to juggle accounting and budgetary procedures to defeat this provision of law. A city is entitled to one-half of the ad valorem taxes collected by a county within the municipal boundaries for road and bridge purposes, even though the county may place a portion of said funds within other designated areas of the county budget.
Question 3. Contrary to the view expressed by the District Court,[9] the answer to the third question is "no". It is our opinion that Section 336.59 clearly expresses the Legislative intent that one-half of the ad valorem taxes collected within a municipality and subsequently used for road and bridge purposes by the county should be returned to the city for repairing and maintaining the roads and streets in said city.
In Nelson v. City of Fort Lauderdale,[10] this Court said:
To allow a county to do indirectly what it could not directly do would frustrate the clear purpose of the statute.
Accordingly, the questions certified are answered as follows: Questions 1 and 2 are answered in the affirmative, and Question 3 is answered in the negative. The Decision of the District Court of Appeal is quashed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
ROBERTS, Acting C.J., McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., and MASON, Circuit Judge, concur.
[1]  264 So. 2d  at 845-846.
[2]  Id. at 849.
[3]  Id. at 846-848.
[4]  Section 336.59(1), F.S. 1969, F.S.A., provides in part: "The Commissioners shall levy a tax not to exceed ten mills on a dollar on all property in their county each year for road and bridge purposes." (Emphasis supplied.) According to its normal usage, the word "shall" in a statute has a mandatory connotation. Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1962).
[5]  249 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1971).
[6]  See note 8, infra.
[7]  264 So. 2d  at 848.
[8]  Section 336.59, F.S. 1969, F.S.A., provides, in part: "(1)... . Such tax, when collected, shall be paid over to the county depository and kept in a separate fund, which fund shall not be expended for any other purpose than for work on the public roads and bridges in the county, and for the payment of the salaries of employees engaged in road and bridge work, and in providing the necessary tools, materials, implements and equipment and for the necessary work on such roads and bridges." (Emphasis supplied.) "(2) One-half the amount realized from such special tax on the property in incorporated cities and towns, shall be turned over to such cities and towns, to be used in repairing and maintaining the roads and streets thereof, as may be provided by the ordinances of such cities and towns." (Emphasis supplied.) The Legislature's use of the word "shall" in these passages naturally has the same mandatory connotation.
[9]  264 So. 2d  at 848-849.
[10]  54 So. 2d 207, 208 (Fla. 1951).