Case Title: Ex parte Darryl Dewayne Turner. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CRIMINAL (In re: State of Alabama vs. Darryl Dewayne Turner)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1061477

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 6/27/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1061477
_________________________
Ex parte Darryl Dewayne Turner
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  State of Alabama
v.
Darryl Dewayne Turner)
(Limestone Circuit Court, CC-99-318.60; 
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-06-1033)
SEE, Justice.
Darryl Dewayne Turner ("Turner") petitions this Court for
the writ of mandamus directing the Court of Criminal Appeals
1061477
Section 13A-5-40(a), Ala. Code 1975, reads, in pertinent
1
part:
"(a) The following are capital offenses:
"....
"(2) Murder by the defendant during a
robbery in the first degree or an attempt
thereof committed by the defendant.
"(3) Murder by the defendant during a
rape in the first or second degree or an
attempt thereof committed by the defendant;
or murder by defendant during sodomy in the
first or second degree or an attempt
thereof committed by the defendant."
2
to vacate its June 29, 2007, order in which it instructed
Judge James W. Woodruff, Jr., to set aside his order granting
discovery of certain institutional files and prosecution
records.  We conclude that Turner has not demonstrated a clear
legal right to the relief sought; therefore, we deny the
petition.
Facts and Procedural History
In 1999 Turner was convicted under §§ 13A-5-40(a)(2) and
(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975,  of the capital murder of Barbara
1
Wilson and was sentenced to death.  In October 2006, Turner
petitioned the Limestone Circuit Court for postconviction
relief under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., alleging ineffective
1061477
3
assistance of counsel at both the guilt phase and the penalty
phase of his capital-murder trial.  
Turner 
moved 
the 
trial 
court 
for 
discovery 
of
institutional files and prosecution records that he alleges
are "necessary to a fair Rule 32 evidentiary hearing."
Petition at Exhibit C, p. 1, and Exhibit D, p. 1.  After a
hearing on the discovery requests, the trial court granted
Turner's motions as to (1) records related to the employment,
training, discipline, and promotions or demotions of Detective
Heath Emerson and Officer Lee Kennemer, who testified at his
capital-murder trial; (2) records maintained by the Limestone
County jail, where Turner was incarcerated pending his
capital-murder trial; (3) records maintained by the Alabama
Department of Human Resources related to Turner; and (4)
records maintained by the Alabama Department of Human
Resources related to Turner's mother, father, grandmother, and
anyone else who had claimed Turner as a dependant. Petition at
Exhibit G, pp. 1-2.  The trial court also ordered the State
"to produce the entire Prosecution file kept and maintained in
connection with the investigation and trial of Darryl Turner."
Petition at Exhibit G, p. 2.  The trial court denied Turner's
1061477
4
motion as to the records of the Alabama Department of Forensic
Sciences, as well as the institutional records related to the
administration of death by lethal injection. Petition at
Exhibit G, p. 2.
Following the issuance of the discovery order, the State
petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for the writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its discovery
order, except insofar as it related to the files of the
Department of Human Resources on Turner himself.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals, concluding that Turner had failed to meet
his burden to show good cause for the requested discovery,
granted the State's petition and issued the writ. State v.
Turner, 976 So. 2d 508 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (hereinafter
"Turner").  Turner now petitions this Court for the writ of
mandamus directing the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its
writ.
Issues
Turner presents three grounds on which, he argues, he is
entitled to the writ of mandamus from this Court.  First,
Turner argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in
issuing its writ of mandamus because, he says, the State had
1061477
5
adequate remedies other than petitioning for the writ of
mandamus.  Second, he argues that in reviewing the State's
petition for mandamus relief, the Court of Criminal Appeals
addressed the merits of his claim, instead of limiting its
analysis to whether the claims are facially meritorious.
Third, Turner argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred
in concluding that he had not demonstrated good cause for the
requested discovery.
Standard of Review
"'A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,
and it "will be issued only when there is: 1) a
clear legal right in the petitioner to the order
sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the
lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court."'"
Ex parte Monsanto Co., 862 So. 2d 595, 604 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala. 2000),
quoting in turn Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.
2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993)).
Rule 21(e)(1), Ala. R. App. P., provides:
"A decision of a court of appeals on an original
petition for writ of mandamus ... may be reviewed de
novo in the supreme court ....  If an original
petition has been granted by the court of appeals,
review may be had by filing in the supreme court a
petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition or
1061477
6
other extraordinary writ directed to the court of
appeals, together with a copy of the proceedings in
the court of appeals, including the order granting
the writ."
Turner is seeking review of the writ of mandamus issued by the
Court of Criminal Appeals directing the trial court to vacate
its discovery order, and he has otherwise complied with the
requirements of Rule 21(e).  Therefore, mandamus is an
appropriate remedy, and we review de novo the merits of
Turner's petition.
Analysis
I.
Turner first argues that the State is not entitled to
mandamus relief because it had other adequate remedies.
Specifically, Turner argues that the State could have moved
the trial court for reconsideration of the discovery order and
could have raised its concerns on appeal.  The State argues in
response that "both this Court and the Court of Criminal
Appeals have repeatedly held that mandamus is the proper
mechanism to contest discovery orders in Rule 32 proceedings
and criminal cases."  State's brief at 10.  We agree with the
State.
1061477
7
In Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d 847 (Ala. 2000), the
petitioner, Land, sought postconviction relief from the trial
court under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel and moved the trial court to allow
discovery of various prosecution files and institutional
records.  The trial court granted the motion as to some of
Land's discovery requests but denied it as to others.  Land
petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for mandamus relief
related to the discovery requests the trial court had denied.
The Court of Criminal Appeals denied that petition, and Land
sought the writ of mandamus from this Court under Rule 21(e),
Ala. R. App. P.  In addressing Land's petition, we set forth
the elements required for mandamus relief and stated:
"This Court has held that a petition for the writ of
mandamus is the proper means for seeking appellate
review of a trial court's discovery order.  As noted
above, Land has complied with Rule 21, Ala. R. App.
P., and the State has refused to produce the
materials he sought.  Therefore, the only issues to
be resolved are (1) whether the State has an
imperative duty to give Land access to the materials
requested and (2) whether Land has shown a clear
legal right to the discovery order he seeks."
775 So. 2d at 850 (citations omitted). See also State v.
Isbell, [Ms. 1061115, Nov. 30, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala.
2007) ("'This Court has held that a petition for the writ of
1061477
8
mandamus is the proper means for seeking appellate review of
a trial court's discovery order.'" (quoting Ex parte Land, 775
So. 2d at 850)).  We then addressed the merits of Land's
petition, ultimately concluding that Land had demonstrated a
clear legal right to mandamus relief.
In Ex parte Perkins, 941 So. 2d 242 (Ala. 2006), we
reaffirmed our holding in Ex parte Land that "'[a] petition
for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate vehicle for
challenging a trial court's ruling on a discovery motion.'"
941 So. 2d at 245 (quoting Ex parte Steiner, 730 So. 2d 599,
600 (Ala. 1998)).  Perkins, like Land, sought mandamus review
of a discovery order related to a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.,
petition for postconviction relief in which he alleged, among
other things, ineffective assistance of counsel.  Perkins had
moved the trial court to allow discovery of certain records
"in the possession of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles
... [and] various Alabama law-enforcement agencies." 941 So.
2d at 244.  The trial court denied Perkins's motion, and the
Court of Criminal Appeals denied his petition for the writ of
mandamus.  Perkins then petitioned this Court for the writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to grant the discovery
1061477
9
motions.  Under the standard recited above, we addressed the
merits of Perkins's petition, ultimately denying the petition
on the ground that Perkins had not demonstrated a clear legal
right to the requested discovery.
In this case, Turner, like Perkins and Land, moved the
trial court for discovery related to an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim raised in his Rule 32, Ala. R.
Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief.  The trial court
granted Turner's motions for discovery, and the State
petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for the writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to vacate that order.
Under our decisions in Ex parte Perkins and Ex parte Land,
mandamus was the proper avenue for appellate review of those
orders.  Therefore, we agree with the Court of Criminal
Appeals that "this case [was] correctly before [that] Court by
way of this extraordinary petition."  Turner, 976 So. 2d at
510.
II.
Turner argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals, in
issuing the writ of mandamus, "improperly rewrote the
postconviction discovery standard set forth by this Court in
1061477
Rule 39(a)(1)(D), Ala. R. App. P., provides that a
2
petitioner can obtain certiorari review of decisions of the
Court of Criminal Appeals that are "in conflict with prior
decisions of ... the Supreme Court of Alabama."  Turner
appears to argue here that the standard applied by the Court
of Criminal Appeals conflicts with the standard set forth by
this Court in Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d at 853.
10
[Ex parte] Land ... by evaluating the substantive merits of
Mr. Turner's underlying claims." Petition at 11.  In Ex parte
Land, we stated: 
"[W]e must determine whether Land presented the
trial court with good cause for ordering the
requested discovery.  To do that, we must examine
Land's basis for the relief requested in his
postconviction petition and determine whether his
claims are facially meritorious.  Only after making
that examination and determination can we determine
whether Land has shown good cause."
775 So. 2d at 853.  Turner argues that instead of limiting
itself to determining whether his claims were meritorious on
their face, the Court of Criminal Appeals examined and, in
some cases, adjudicated his claims based on the underlying
merits.
The State contends that although this argument may be an
appropriate argument for certiorari review,  it is not a
2
ground on which the Court can award mandamus relief.  We
agree.  Rule 21(e), Ala. R. App. P., provides that "[a]
decision of a court of appeals on an original petition for
1061477
11
[the] writ of mandamus ... may be reviewed de novo in the
supreme court."  The State argued before the Court of Criminal
Appeals that it had a clear legal right to the writ of
mandamus because, it argued, Turner had failed to demonstrate
good cause for the requested discovery.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals agreed with the State and issued the writ.  Under Rule
21(e), Ala. R. App. P., we review the court of appeals'
decision 
de 
novo; 
therefore, 
we 
make 
an 
independent
determination 
whether 
Turner's 
claims 
are 
facially 
meritorious
and whether he has demonstrated good cause for the discovery.
See Ex parte Land, supra.  What standard the Court of Criminal
Appeals applied in making its decision is irrelevant to that
determination.  Thus, we agree with the State that Turner's
argument that the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the wrong
standard in evaluating the State's petition for the writ of
mandamus is not a ground on which we would grant mandamus
relief, and we deny his petition on this ground. 
III.
Turner finally argues that he is entitled to mandamus
relief because he did, in fact, demonstrate good cause for the
requested discovery.  In Ex parte Perkins we stated:
1061477
12
"'"[G]ood cause" is the appropriate standard by
which to judge postconviction discovery motions ....
"'... 
[I]n 
order 
to 
obtain 
discovery, 
a
petitioner must allege facts that, if proved, would
entitle him to relief. ... Furthermore, a petitioner
seeking postconviction discovery also must meet the
requirements of Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.,
which states:
"'"The [Rule 32] petition must contain
a clear and specific statement of the
grounds upon which relief is sought,
including full disclosure of the factual
basis of those grounds.  A bare allegation
that a constitutional right has been
violated and mere conclusions of law shall
not be sufficient to warrant any further
proceedings."'"
941 So. 2d at 245 (quoting Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d at 852-
53).  The threshold issue in a good-cause inquiry is whether
the Rule 32 petitioner has presented claims that are facially
meritorious –- that is, whether the petitioner has argued
facts that, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief.
See Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d at 852 ("'[A]n evidentiary
hearing must be held on a [petition for postconviction relief]
which is meritorious on its face, i.e., one which contains
matters and allegations (such as ineffective assistance of
counsel) which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to
relief.'" (quoting Ex parte Boatwright, 471 So. 2d 1257, 1258
1061477
13
(Ala. 1985))).  "Only after making that examination and
determination can we determine whether [the petitioner] has
shown good cause."  Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d at 853.
The basis of Turner's Rule 32 petition was that his
counsel rendered ineffective assistance during both the guilt
phase and the penalty phase of his trial.  "[T]o establish a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must
prove (1) that counsel did not provide reasonably effective
assistance and (2) that counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced the petitioner." Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d at 850
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
"[T]he standard for showing prejudice [is] stated in
Strickland, in which the Supreme Court held: '[To show
prejudice, the] defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result would have been different.  A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.'" Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d at 850 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
A. Records Related to Detective Emerson and Officer Kennemer
1061477
14
Turner first argues that he has demonstrated good cause
for the discovery of documents related to "the Employment,
Training, Discipline, and Promotions or Demotions of Detective
Heath Emerson and Officer Lee Kennemer." Petition at 18.  He
argues that those records are necessary to prove his claim
that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to impeach Det. Emerson and to adequately cross-examine Det.
Emerson and Officer Kennemer. 
Turner argued in his Rule 32 petition that his trial
counsel failed to impeach Det. Emerson's testimony regarding
inconsistent accounts of the crime given by Tavares McCurley,
the cousin of Turner's codefendant, and Det. Emerson's
knowledge of other suspects in the case.  Turner argued that
this failure cost "trial counsel ... an opportunity to
challenge not only the testimony of this particular witness,
but also the very conduct of the police department's
investigation." Petition at Exhibit A, p. 57.  Turner also
argued that trial counsel had failed to cross-examine Det.
Emerson and Officer Kennemer regarding their suspicions
concerning the involvement of Trent Rainey in the crime and
that "[i]f trial counsel had pursued this line of questioning,
1061477
15
they could have exposed the Athens Police Department's
premature focus on Mr. Turner as the primary suspect" and cast
"significant doubt ... on the extent to which Mr. Turner was
culpable for the charged crimes." Petition at Exhibit A, p.
59.  Finally, Turner argued that trial counsel failed to
cross-examine Det. Emerson and Officer Kennemer regarding the
inconsistencies in statements concerning the crime made by
McCurley and Christopher Harris, a codefendant, and argued
that trial counsel, therefore, "missed not only an opportunity
to cast doubt on the shoddy police work that went into
investigating the Wilson death, but also a chance to discredit
the story implicating Mr. Turner as the primary suspect."
Petition at Exhibit A, p. 61. 
Although Turner does allege some harm from trial
counsel's allegedly deficient assistance, we cannot say that
these allegations, if proven, would demonstrate that "'there
is 
a 
reasonable 
probability 
that, 
but 
for 
counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result would have been different.'"
Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d at 850 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 694).  Therefore, we cannot say that Turner has
demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the alleged failures.
1061477
16
Turner alleges that trial counsel's failure to impeach Det.
Emerson cost him an opportunity to cast doubt on the police
investigation into Wilson's murder, but Turner does not allege
that this was the only such opportunity or that there is a
reasonable probability that but for the loss of this
particular opportunity the outcome of his case would have been
different. 
Similarly, Turner alleges that trial counsel's failure to
cross-examine Det. Emerson and Officer Kennemer on specific
issues cost him an opportunity to cast doubt on his
culpability and to discredit the story implicating him as the
primary suspect, but he fails to present facts or to argue
that this was the only such opportunity or that trial
counsel's failure at this juncture probably affected the
outcome of the trial.  Thus, we conclude that Turner has not
demonstrated 
that, 
"'but 
for 
counsel's 
[allegedly]
unprofessional errors, the result would have been different'"
and, therefore, that he has not met his burden to allege facts
that, if proved, would entitle him to relief. See Ex parte
Land, supra.
1061477
17
It further appears that even if we were to find Turner's
claims to be facially meritorious, he has not demonstrated
good cause for the requested discovery.  Turner argues that
"discovery 
related 
to 
the 
prior 
behavior 
of
Detective Emerson and Officer Kennemer is essential
to proving Mr. Turner's claims that trial counsel
were ineffective for failing to impeach false
testimony.  Likewise, records related to training
and protocols would have been highly material to
challenging the illegal arrest or impeaching the
testimony of crucial State witnesses."
Petition at 20-21.  However, it is unclear how Det. Emerson's
training and employment history would have helped Turner
establish his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that
trial counsel failed to use the police record of Det.
Emerson's interview with McCurley concerning the crime to
impeach Det. Emerson's testimony.  Similarly, it is unclear
how the requested records would relate to Turner's allegation
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-
examine Det. Emerson and Officer Kennemer as to their
suspicions of other suspects or the inconsistent testimony of
certain witnesses.  Instead, Turner's request appears to be
the type of "fishing expedition" warned against in Ex parte
Land: "[W]e caution that postconviction discovery does not
provide a petitioner with a right to 'fish' through official
1061477
18
files and that it 'is not a device for investigating possible
claims, but a means of vindicating actual claims.'" 775 So. 2d
at 852 (quoting People v. Gonzales, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1260, 800
P.2d 1159, 1206, 275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 776 (1990)).  Therefore,
even if we were to find facially meritorious Turner's claim
that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to impeach Det. Emerson with certain documents and failing to
cross-examine Det. Emerson and Officer Kennemer as to certain
issues, we would conclude that Turner has not demonstrated
good cause for the requested discovery.  
We deny Turner's petition for the writ of mandamus as to
this issue.
B. Limestone County Jail Records
Turner argues that he has demonstrated good cause for
discovery of the Limestone County jail records.  In order to
determine whether Turner has demonstrated good cause for the
discovery of the jail records, we must first examine whether
this discovery relates to a facially meritorious claim. See Ex
parte Land, supra.  Turner argues in his mandamus petition
before this Court that the requested records are related to
his claim that "trial counsel were ineffective for failing to
1061477
19
present certain mitigating evidence, specifically including
evidence related to a lack of disciplinary infractions while
Mr. Turner was incarcerated." Petition at 23.  In his Rule 32
petition, Turner generally alleged that he was "denied
[effective] assistance [of counsel] by [counsel's] failure to
adequately present a large quantity of available mitigation
evidence," Petition at Exhibit A, p. 85, and that "[h]ad trial
counsel 
conducted 
a 
reasonably 
adequate 
investigation,
developed a reasonable mitigation strategy, and presented the
wealth of available mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable
probability that Mr. Turner would not have been sentenced to
death." Petition at Exhibit A, p. 106.  With regard to his
behavior while incarcerated, Turner specifically alleged that
"[c]ounsel failed to present testimony from Sergeant James
Pugh that Mr. Turner committed no disciplinary infractions
while incarcerated ... pending trial." Petition at Exhibit A,
p. 105.  As noted previously, in order to demonstrate good
cause for the discovery sought, Turner must first establish
that his claims are meritorious on their face. See Ex parte
Land, supra.  We hold that as to this claim Turner has met
this burden.
1061477
20
In Ex parte Land, the petitioner argued that his trial
counsel was ineffective for, among other things, failing to
present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of trial,
including "evidence that he adjusts well to incarceration."
775 So. 2d at 853.  The State argued, among other things, that
Land's claims were not facially meritorious.  We disagreed,
stating:
"Land's claims, if proved to be true, would entitle
him to relief.  The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit has held that trial
counsel's failure to investigate the possibility of
mitigating 
evidence 
is, 
per 
se, 
deficient
performance. ... Furthermore, trial counsel may be
found ineffective for failing to present evidence of
adjustment to incarceration .... See Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.
2d 1 (1986) (holding that a capital defendant must
be permitted at the penalty phase of his trial to
introduce evidence of adjustment and good behavior
while incarcerated)."
775 So. 2d at 853-54.  Under our decision in Ex parte Land,
and in light of Turner's argument that if trial counsel had
presented the mitigating evidence, including the evidence
shown by the records of the Limestone County jail relating to
his incarceration there, he would likely not have been
sentenced to death, Turner's claim that trial counsel failed
1061477
21
to present mitigating evidence regarding his behavior while
incarcerated is facially meritorious.  
We now address whether Turner has otherwise demonstrated
good cause for discovery of the Limestone County jail records.
See Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d at 853 ("[W]e must examine
Land's basis for the relief requested in his postconviction
petition and determine whether his claims are facially
meritorious.  Only after making that examination and
determination can we determine whether Land has shown good
cause.").  The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that "some
of the information which Turner sought was, in part,
cumulative to other evidence that had been presented" and that
"'[t]his information was clearly available through other less
intrusive means; therefore, [the petitioner] can show no good
cause for disclosing information related to this claim.'"
Turner, 976 So. 2d at 517 (quoting Jackson v. State, 910 So.
2d 797, 808 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)).  Turner argues that he
has demonstrated good cause for discovery of the Limestone
County jail records because, he says, the information in those
records (1) was not cumulative of other evidence admitted at
1061477
22
trial, (2) was not available through other sources, and (3)
was of greater evidentiary value than testimony.
We agree with Turner that the requested records are not
cumulative.  Before concluding that the evidence would be
cumulative "in part," the Court of Criminal Appeals listed the
following evidence: 
"The record shows that the sentencing hearing
before the jury was waived after Turner became
disruptive when the jury returned a verdict finding
him guilty of capital murder.  During the sentencing
hearing before the circuit court the defendant told
the court that he had become a Christian while he
was incarcerated.  The probation officer's report
also states that Turner is a born-again Christian.
Turner's mother and his grandfather testified that
they were shocked by Turner's involvement in the
murder because, they said, such conduct was totally
uncharacteristic for Turner."
Turner, 976 So. 2d at 508.  Although this evidence may fall
into the category of mitigating evidence, it does not appear
that this evidence would speak to whether Turner had had
disciplinary infractions while incarcerated.  Therefore, we
agree with Turner that the requested discovery is not
cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial.  Cf. Ex parte
Perkins, 941 So. 2d at 249 ("Apparently, Perkins's trial
counsel did perform an investigation and did present evidence
sufficient to convince the trial court of the existence of
1061477
23
mitigating factors substantially similar to that Perkins now
seeks to prove in his postconviction petition.  Therefore, we
conclude that the documentary evidence in the form of law-
enforcement records Perkins now seeks would simply be
cumulative of the evidence his counsel presented during the
sentence phase of his trial."). 
Turner next argues that the information in the Limestone
County jail records is not available by other means because
"[i]t is not plausible to suggest that Mr. Turner or Sergeant
Pugh could personally know all of the information contained in
the 
Limestone 
County 
Jail's 
intake, 
assessment, 
institutional,
personal, disciplinary, medical, psychological, psychiatric,
mental health, and any other records generated or maintained
by the Limestone County Jail relating to Mr. Turner." Petition
at 24.  However, Turner's Rule 32 petition does not allege
that trial counsel failed to present any or all of this
information.  Instead, the only claim in Turner's Rule 32
petition related to the Limestone County jail records is that
"[c]ounsel failed to present testimony from Sergeant James
Pugh that Mr. Turner committed no disciplinary infractions
while incarcerated at the [Limestone] County Jail pending
1061477
Ex parte Perkins, 920 So. 2d 599, 606 (Ala. Crim. App.
3
2005) (denying Perkins's request for certain records  related
to his family's poverty during his childhood because "[w]hen
evidence is available through less intrusive means, a
petitioner fails to establish good cause for requested
discovery" (citing Jackson v. State, 910 So. 2d 797 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2005)); Jackson, 910 So. 2d at 808 ("Certainly,
Jackson could inform his Rule 32 counsel of the identities of
the individuals who visited him while he was incarcerated.
This information was clearly available through other less
intrusive means; therefore, Jackson can show no good cause for
disclosing information related to the claim.").
24
trial." Petition at Exhibit A, p. 105.  The information
necessary to vindicate this claim is well within Sgt. James
Pugh's knowledge and would be available through his testimony.
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a
petitioner fails to show good cause for discovery when the
information sought is available by less intrusive means,  we
3
have not had occasion to address this particular statement.
However, in adopting the good-cause standard in Ex parte Land,
we recognized that discovery in postconviction proceedings is
limited, stating:
"We 
emphasize 
that 
this 
holding 
–- 
that
postconviction discovery motions are to be judged by
a good-cause standard –- does not automatically
allow discovery under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., and
that it does not expand the discovery procedures
within Rule 32.4. ... By adopting this standard, we
are only recognizing that the trial court, upon a
petitioner's showing of good cause, may exercise its
inherent 
authority 
to 
order 
discovery 
in 
a
1061477
25
proceeding for postconviction relief.  In addition,
we caution that postconviction discovery does not
provide a petitioner with a right to 'fish' through
official files and that it 'is not a device for
investigating possible claims, but a means of
vindicating actual claims.'"
775 So. 2d at 852 (quoting People v. Gonzales, 51 Cal. 3d at
1260, 800 P.2d at 1206, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 776).  In that case,
we cited other jurisdictions that had adopted a "similar 'good
cause' or 'good reason' standard for the postconviction
discovery process." 775 So. 2d at 852.  The courts in those
cases also emphasized the limited nature of discovery in
postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 656 So.
2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 1994) ("In most cases any grounds for
post-conviction relief will appear on the face of the record.
On a motion which sets forth good reason, however, the court
may allow limited discovery into matters which are relevant
and material, and where the discovery is permitted the court
may place limitations on the sources and scope."); People ex
rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d 175, 182-84, 526 N.E.2d
131, 134-35, 121 Ill. Dec. 937, 940-41 (1988) ("[T]he range of
issues in a post-conviction proceeding is relatively narrow,
and discovery requirements are correspondingly limited. ... In
deciding whether to permit the taking of a discovery
1061477
26
deposition, the circuit judge should consider, among other
relevant circumstances, the issues presented in the post-
conviction petition, the scope of the discovery sought, the
length of time between the conviction and the post-conviction
proceeding, the burden that the deposition would impose on the
opposing party and on the witness, and the availability of the
desired evidence through other sources."); State v. Marshall,
148 N.J. 89, 270, 690 A.2d 1, 92 (1997) ("[C]onsistent with
our 
prior 
discovery 
jurisprudence, 
any 
[postconviction-relief]
discovery order should be appropriately narrow and limited.
... '[T]here is no postconviction right to "fish" through
official files for belated grounds of attack on the judgment,
or to confirm mere speculation or hope that a basis for
collateral relief may exist.'" (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 51
Cal. 3d at 1259, 800 P.2d at 1205, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 775)
(citation omitted)).
The rule set forth by the Court of Criminal Appeals in
Jackson v. State, 910 So. 2d 797 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) –-
that a petitioner cannot show good cause for discovery if the
information sought is available through other less intrusive
means –- is consistent with and furthers our policy that
1061477
27
discovery in the Rule 32 setting is limited to discovery for
which the petitioner has demonstrated good cause. See Ex parte
Land, supra.  Turner argues: 
"As the trial court recognized at the discovery
hearing: '[Sgt. James Pugh] is not going to probably
remember eleven years ago what went on between him
and an inmate, when he's dealing with hundreds. ...
[T]he best evidence of any kind of disciplinary
infraction is probably beyond the scope of James
Pugh, probably beyond the scope of his current
memory and it's fair to get those records at the
Limestone County jail."
Petition at 24-25.  However, Turner has not argued or
presented any evidence to indicate that Sgt. Pugh, in fact,
does not remember him or that Sgt. Pugh cannot testify as to
Turner's lack of disciplinary infractions while incarcerated
at the Limestone County jail.  As the State noted at the
disciplinary hearing, "[b]efore [Turner] can establish good
cause [for the Limestone County jail records], [he would] have
to show that [Sgt.] James Pugh doesn't remember this inmate.
The burden is on [him] to establish good cause." Petition at
Exhibit E, p. 27; see also Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d at 852
("[A] trial court, upon a petitioner's showing of good cause,
may exercise its inherent authority to order discovery in a
proceeding for postconviction relief.").  Therefore, we agree
1061477
28
with the Court of Criminal Appeals and with the State that
Turner has not demonstrated good cause for the Limestone
County jail records, because he has not demonstrated that Sgt.
Pugh's testimony would be an insufficient alternative source
for the information necessary to vindicate the claim related
to those records.
Turner argues that even if the records are available
through other sources, he has nonetheless demonstrated good
cause for the requested discovery because "State records carry
greater evidentiary value than Sergeant Pugh's memory given
that State records do not have the credibility issues that go
along with one individual's memory from more than ten years
ago." Petition at 24.  We rejected a similar argument in Ex
parte Perkins, in which the petitioner argued that trial
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by relying on
recollections 
of 
Perkins's family members rather than
presenting evidence of his dysfunctional upbringing through
documents and records.  We noted that the cases cited by
Perkins in support of his position "did not draw a distinction
between expert mitigating testimony based on interviews with
the defendant and his family members, on the one hand, and
1061477
29
objective documentary evidence, on the other." 941 So. 2d at
249.  We "decline[d] to extend [those] cases ... to hold that
Perkins's trial counsel were ineffective for failing to
present the documentary evidence in question" and held,
instead, that "Perkins ha[d] failed to show good cause for the
discovery he [sought], and he ha[d] not met his burden for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus." 941 So. 2d at 251.
Because Turner failed to demonstrate that the information
that could be revealed by the discovery of the Limestone
County jail records cannot be obtained from another less
intrusive source, we conclude that he has not demonstrated
good cause for that discovery and, thus, has failed to
demonstrate a clear legal right to the writ of mandamus.  We,
therefore, deny his petition as to those records.
C. Records of the Alabama Department of Human Resources
Finally, Turner argues that he is entitled to the writ of
mandamus because, he says, he has demonstrated good cause for
discovery of the records kept by the Alabama Department of
Human Resources related to several of his family members.
Turner argues that this information was related to his claim
that trial counsel were ineffective because they failed to
1061477
30
investigate and present mitigating evidence, in general, and
mitigating evidence related to his background, in particular.
See petition at 27.  As discussed in the previous section,
Turner has presented a facially meritorious claim as to trial
counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence. See Ex parte
Land, supra.  We therefore look to whether he has demonstrated
good cause for the requested discovery of the Alabama
Department of Human Resources.
Turner argued that trial counsel were ineffective for
failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence
concerning his background, including his family's poverty.
Turner moved the trial court for discovery of the records of
the Alabama Department of Human Resources because "[a]t times
during his childhood, Mr. Turner's family depended upon food
stamps or subsidies provided to them by the government.
Evidence of the family's reliance on government assistance is
likely contained in the records maintained by the Alabama
Department of Human Resources.  This type of evidence is
undoubtedly mitigating." Petition at Exhibit C, pp. 7-8.  
The State argued, and the Court of Criminal Appeals
agreed, that Turner does not need the records of the
1061477
31
Department of Human Resources to prove this claim because the
information is available through myriad other sources without
a court order, including the testimony of family members, tax
returns, subsidy applications, or documents presented to the
family upon receipt of food stamps or other subsidies. State's
brief at 29; Turner, 976 So. 2d at 517-18.  We agree, and, for
the same reasons set forth in our discussion of Turner's
request for the Limestone County jail records, we conclude
that Turner has not demonstrated good cause for the requested
discovery. See Jackson, supra.  We further conclude that
Turner has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the
relief sought; therefore, we deny Turner's petition on this
ground.
Conclusion
Because Turner has not demonstrated a clear legal right
to the issuance of the writ of mandamus directing the Court of
Criminal Appeals to vacate its order directing the trial court
to set aside its discovery orders, we deny his petition.
PETITION DENIED.
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and
Murdock, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.