Case Title: Eric M. Schmitz v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee

Citation: 2003 WI 21

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 21 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2139 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Eric M. Schmitz,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Firstar Bank Milwaukee,  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Putnam Mutual Funds Corporation, Putnam 
Investments, Northern Trust Company, Fortis 
Investors, Inc., and Putnam Fiduciary Trust 
Company,  
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 123 
Reported at:  254 Wis. 2d 732, 647 N.W.2d 379 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 25, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 16, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Walter J. Swietlik   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BABLITCH and WILCOX, J.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Joseph G. Doherty and Doherty Law Offices, S.C., West Bend, and 
oral argument by Joseph G. Doherty. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Gary P. 
Lantzy and Kohner, Mann & Kailas, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Gary P. Lantzy. 
 
 
2003 WI 21 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 01-2139   
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 209) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Eric M. Schmitz,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Firstar Bank Milwaukee,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Putnam Mutual Funds Corporation, Putnam  
Investments, Northern Trust Company,  
Fortis Investors, Inc., and Putnam  
Fiduciary Trust Company,  
 
          Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 25, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Schmitz 
v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, 2002 WI App 123, 254 Wis. 2d 732, 647 
N.W.2d 379, affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court for 
Ozaukee County, Walter J. Swietlik, Judge.  The circuit court 
granted summary judgment to one of the defendants, Firstar Bank 
No. 
01-2139 
 
2 
 
Milwaukee, dismissing Eric M. Schmitz's claims against Firstar 
Bank.1  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit 
court.  We reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
Eric M. Schmitz, the plaintiff-payee, sued Firstar 
Bank Milwaukee for negligence and conversion for depositing two 
checks (in the amounts of $58,599.19 and $6,173.21), issued by 
Putnam Investments and payable to his order, into the account of 
Georgetown Financial Corporation.  The first check, in the 
larger amount, did not have the plaintiff-payee's endorsement.  
The second check, in the smaller amount, had an endorsement 
bearing the plaintiff-payee's name that the plaintiff-payee 
alleges is a forged signature.  Each check had "for deposit 
only" and Georgetown Financial stamped on the back.  The 
plaintiff-payee claimed monetary damages equal to the face value 
of the two Putnam checks.  
¶3 
The plaintiff-payee moved for partial summary judgment 
against Firstar Bank with respect to the larger check.  The 
plaintiff-payee argued that because Georgetown Financial did not 
have authority to endorse the check, Firstar Bank was liable as 
a matter of law for making payment on this check, which was 
presented 
by 
Georgetown 
Financial 
without 
his 
actual 
or 
purported signature.   
¶4 
Firstar Bank then moved for summary judgment as to 
both checks, contending that two limited powers of attorney 
                                                 
1 The plaintiff-payee's complaint names other entities as 
defendants, but only Firstar Bank is involved in the present 
review. 
No. 
01-2139 
 
3 
 
executed 
by the plaintiff-payee gave 
Georgetown 
Financial 
authority to endorse and receive payment on the two Putnam 
checks at issue in this case.  
¶5 
The circuit court granted Firstar Bank's motion for 
summary judgment.  The circuit court held that the two limited 
powers of attorney authorized Georgetown Financial to endorse 
and deposit the two checks, thereby rendering unnecessary any 
consideration of the reasonableness of Firstar Bank's conduct.  
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court 
granting summary judgment to Firstar Bank.  
¶6 
We review a circuit court order granting summary 
judgment by applying the same methodology as that used by the 
circuit court.2  Summary judgment will be entered when a court is 
satisfied 
that 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show that no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.3  Thus, an appellate court will 
reverse a summary judgment if the record reveals that material 
facts are in dispute or if the circuit court misapplied the law.4 
¶7 
The ultimate issue in this case is whether Firstar 
Bank is liable to the plaintiff-payee for conversion for 
depositing the two checks, one without the plaintiff-payee's 
                                                 
2 Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 
(1980). 
3 Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (1999-2000). 
4 Jankee v. Clark County, 2000 WI 64, ¶48, 235 Wis. 2d 700, 
612 N.W.2d 297. 
No. 
01-2139 
 
4 
 
endorsement and one with a forged endorsement of the plaintiff-
payee, into Georgetown Financial's account.  The only issue 
properly before this court, however, is whether the two limited 
powers of attorney authorize Georgetown Financial to endorse the 
two Putnam checks on behalf of the plaintiff-payee.   
¶8 
We hold that the limited powers of attorney in the 
present case did not authorize Georgetown Financial to endorse 
the two Putnam checks made payable to the order of the 
plaintiff-payee.  Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision 
affirming summary judgment in favor of Firstar Bank is reversed.  
The cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings on whether Firstar Bank is liable for the value of 
either or both checks in light of our conclusion that Georgetown 
Financial did not have the authority to endorse the checks on 
behalf of the plaintiff-payee.   
I 
¶9 
The following facts are derived from the complaint and 
other documents in the record. Georgetown Financial was a 
Wisconsin company that provided investment, insurance, and 
financial services.  James O'Hearn was the sole owner and chief 
executive officer of Georgetown Financial and the plaintiff-
payee was one of his clients. 
¶10 In 1992, the plaintiff-payee executed two "Limited 
Power of Attorney" forms with Georgetown Financial.  Both forms 
contained typewritten, boilerplate text and included a blank 
space for the client to insert his or her name, a blank space 
for the client to identify a "company name," a series of blank 
No. 
01-2139 
 
5 
 
lines in which the client could list "policy names and numbers," 
and lines for the client's signature, the date, and a witness's 
signature.   
¶11 The first limited power of attorney was signed by the 
plaintiff-payee on July 10, 1992.5  The typewritten boilerplate 
text provided Georgetown Financial with the authority to 
"accomplish the surrender" of certain life insurance policies 
"identified below" and "negotiations of their cash values."  It 
further provided that "Power of Attorney also applies to stocks, 
bonds and other securities."6  "American Funds" was written in by 
                                                 
5 The limited power of attorney was also signed by Katreena 
Schmitz, who is apparently the wife of the plaintiff-payee. 
6 The full text of the July 1992 limited power of attorney 
is as follows: 
I, Eric M. Schmitz, as owner of the life insurance 
policies 
identified 
below, 
do 
hereby 
designate 
Georgetown Financial Corporation as my attorney to act 
in my name, place and stead to do everything that is 
required, as fully as if done by me personally, to 
register and obtain acknowledgement of the Assignment 
of Life Insurance Policy form(s), and accomplish the 
surrender of the life insurance polic(ies) identified 
below and negotiation of their cash values, and 
including any other requested information.  Answers to 
questions may be provided by telephone or fax [number 
omitted here].  Power of Attorney also applies to 
stocks, bonds and other securities. 
Company Name 
 
 
Policy Name and Number 
_______________________  
_______________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
 
No. 
01-2139 
 
6 
 
hand under "company name" and four different account names and 
numbers were similarly written in by hand on the lines under 
"policy name and number."  Three of the accounts have been 
identified as securities accounts; the fourth was an insurance 
policy. 
¶12 The second limited power of attorney was signed in 
August 1992.  The typewritten text of the form was identical to 
the first, except that the last line was expanded to read, 
"Power of Attorney also applies to stocks, bonds, CD's, 
annuities, savings accounts, and other securities."  "The 
American Funds" was typed in on the line under "company name," 
and only the number "57263159," identifying one document, was 
typed in under "policy name and number."  This number was 
identical to a number written next to one of the securities 
accounts on the July limited power of attorney.  None of the 
accounts listed on either of the powers of attorney was 
identified as a Putnam Investment account. 
¶13 In July 1994, O'Hearn's securities license was revoked 
by the State of Wisconsin.  The plaintiff-payee was not aware 
that O'Hearn had lost his license, and the plaintiff-payee 
continued as a client of Georgetown Financial.   
¶14 In May 1995, Georgetown Financial opened an investment 
account for the plaintiff-payee with Putnam Investments.  The 
account application was for an individual account and the 
plaintiff-payee was identified as the owner of the account.  The 
mailing address listed on the application was "Eric M. Schmitz 
c/o Georgetown Financial Corp., 10134 N. Port Washington Rd., 
No. 
01-2139 
 
7 
 
Mequon, WI, 53092."  The application also stated that the 
registered investment advisor for the account was "C Lynn 
O'Hearn" of the investment firm "Ogilvie & Taylor."  Telephone 
redemptions 
were 
authorized 
allowing 
Putnam 
to 
act 
upon 
instructions received from the plaintiff-payee or "any person 
claiming to act as [his] representative" who could provide 
specific information. 
¶15 Mutual funds were sold from the Putnam account by 
telephone redemption in July 1996 and March 1998.  On each 
occasion, Putnam issued a check and mailed it to the plaintiff-
payee, in care of Georgetown Financial, as designated in the 
account application.  The first check, dated July 12, 1996, was 
in the amount of $58,599.19.  It was issued as follows: 
Pay to the order of: 
 
Eric M. Schmitz 
c/o Georgetown Financial 
10134 North Port Washington Road 
Mequon, Wisconsin 53092 
The second check, dated March 5, 1998, was in the amount of 
$6,173.21.  It was issued in an identical manner.   
¶16 O'Hearn presented both checks to Firstar Bank for 
deposit into a Georgetown Financial account.  The larger check, 
presented on July 19, 1996, did not include an endorsement by or 
on behalf of the plaintiff-payee.  The smaller check included an 
endorsement bearing the name of the plaintiff-payee that was 
alleged in the complaint to be a forged signature.  Both checks 
were stamped with a Georgetown Financial deposit stamp and 
marked "for deposit only."  
No. 
01-2139 
 
8 
 
¶17 Firstar Bank deposited the face value of both checks 
into a Georgetown Financial account.  At the time, Firstar Bank 
was unaware of the existence of either of the limited powers of 
attorney and admits that it did not rely on the limited powers 
of attorney when it deposited the two Putnam checks into the 
Georgetown Financial account.   
¶18 The plaintiff-payee never received the funds deposited 
into the Georgetown Financial account.  O'Hearn has been 
convicted of criminal fraud, and Georgetown Financial has ceased 
to operate. 
II 
¶19 The question presented by this case is whether 
Georgetown Financial had authority to endorse and deposit the 
two Putnam checks to its own account.  The answer to this 
question turns on an interpretation of the two limited powers of 
attorney.   
¶20 According to the plaintiff-payee, the circuit court 
and court of appeals misconstrued the language of the two 
limited powers of attorney when they failed to read the last 
sentence relating to investments narrowly, limited by the 
particular grant of authority regarding insurance policies in 
the first sentence.  Moreover, asserts the plaintiff-payee, even 
if the powers of attorney did grant Georgetown Financial 
authority to endorse the two Putnam checks, the limited powers 
of attorney ceased to operate as a matter of law when O'Hearn, 
the chief executive officer of Georgetown Financial, lost his 
No. 
01-2139 
 
9 
 
securities license and began to act against the plaintiff-
payee's interest.   
¶21 Firstar Bank responds that the circuit court and court 
of appeals properly construed the limited powers of attorney.  
It argues that the final sentence of the limited powers of 
attorney, providing that power of attorney "also applies" to 
securities and other investments, expressly granted Georgetown 
Financial broad authority to act on the plaintiff-payee's behalf 
with respect to the plaintiff-payee's financial affairs and 
included the power to do everything necessary to buy and sell 
any security or investment as fully as if done by the plaintiff-
payee himself.  Firstar Bank asserts that Georgetown Financial 
was thus authorized to endorse the two Putnam checks at issue in 
this case on behalf of the plaintiff-payee. 
¶22 Agency agreements are generally subject to the same 
rules 
of 
interpretation 
as 
other 
contracts.7 
 
Like 
the 
interpretation of a contract, the interpretation of a power of 
attorney ordinarily presents a question of law that this court 
determines independently of the circuit court and court of 
appeals but with the benefit of their analyses.8   
¶23 Both the circuit court and the court of appeals 
construed the limited powers of attorney at issue in the present 
                                                 
7 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 32, at 114 (1958).  See, 
e.g., Estate of Smith v. United States, 979 F.Supp. 279, 282 (D. 
Vt. 1997); Burlington No. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Burlington Res. 
Oil & Gas Co., 590 N.W.2d 433, 437, 439 (N.D. 1999). 
8 RTE Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 74 Wis. 2d 614, 621, 247 
N.W.2d 171 (1976).  
No. 
01-2139 
 
10 
 
case to grant authority to Georgetown Financial to endorse the 
two Putnam checks.  According to the court of appeals, the 
limited powers of attorney authorized Georgetown Financial to 
liquidate specific life insurance policies, but the final 
sentence in each power of attorney granted power of attorney 
over 
the 
plaintiff-payee's 
other 
investments 
and accounts 
without any limitations on scope.  
¶24 We conclude that the expansive interpretation given 
the limited powers of attorney by the circuit court and court of 
appeals is not supported by the language of the documents.  
Rather, the language and structure of the limited powers of 
attorney supports a narrow construction of the authority granted 
to Georgetown Financial.  A narrow construction would not 
include the authority to endorse and deposit the two Putnam 
checks. 
¶25 With the exception of the single final sentence in 
each power of attorney applying Georgetown Financial's power of 
attorney to a variety of types of financial accounts or 
investments in addition to insurance policies, every other 
aspect of each limited power of attorney is narrowly crafted.  
The documents are styled "limited" powers of attorney.  The 
identical first sentence of each power of attorney——the line 
providing the greatest detail——authorizes Georgetown Financial 
to act in regard to life insurance policies "identified below."  
The printed text of both powers of attorney is followed by space 
for inserting the company name and the policy name and number.   
No. 
01-2139 
 
11 
 
¶26 Thus, in order to read the final sentence of the 
limited powers of attorney broadly enough to encompass any other 
investments and accounts of the plaintiff-payee, the final 
sentence has to be wrestled free from its context.  Indeed, that 
is precisely what the circuit court and court of appeals did.  
The court of appeals explained:  "[T]he limited powers of 
attorney in this case went on to separately grant Georgetown 
Financial the power of attorney with respect to 'stocks, bonds, 
CD's, annuities, savings accounts, and other securities.'  This 
additional grant of authority was not limited in scope."9 
¶27 The more natural reading of the two limited powers of 
attorney is to keep the final sentence within the narrow 
confines of the rest of the document.10  That is, in context, the 
final sentence serves to modify the first sentence, explaining 
simply that the listed items "identified below" may also include 
securities and other financial accounts in addition to insurance 
policies.  Only the insurance policies and investments listed in 
the limited powers of attorney are therefore covered by the 
document.   
¶28 Our reading of the limited powers of attorney is 
supported by several factors.  First, the very title of the 
                                                 
9 Schmitz v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, 2002 WI App 123, ¶16, 
254 Wis. 2d 732, 647 N.W.2d 379 (emphasis added). 
10 See, e.g., Fort Dearborn Life Ins. Co. v. Holcomb, 736 
N.E.2d 578, 589 (Ill. App. 2000) ("No matter how the power is 
characterized, a 'catchall' provision will not operate to expand 
powers 
expressly 
limited 
in 
other 
portions 
of 
the 
same 
instrument."). 
No. 
01-2139 
 
12 
 
documents, "Limited Power of Attorney," points to a narrow 
reading of the powers granted.  Second, the general rule of 
interpretation is that powers of attorney are to be strictly 
construed and interpreted to grant only those powers that are 
clearly delineated or specified.11  The limited powers of 
attorney in the present case do not explicitly authorize 
Georgetown Financial to endorse checks payable to the plaintiff-
payee arising from a Putnam investment account.   
¶29 Third, the limited power of attorney form requires 
that the life insurance policies to be included within the grant 
of authority be listed in the document.  The requirement that 
the insurance policies be listed extends to requiring that the 
other investments included in the final sentence be listed. 
Indeed the plaintiff-payee listed not only life insurance 
policies but specific securities.  Requiring a listing of 
insurance policies and investments indicates that Georgetown 
Financial has authority only over assets listed on the powers of 
attorney.  It simply does not make sense to say that a document 
that requires a list of individual policy names and numbers and 
then applies the power of attorney to other investments grants 
                                                 
11 Praefke v. Am. Enter. Life Ins. Co., 2002 WI App 235, ¶9, 
257 Wis. 2d 637, 655 N.W.2d 456; First Nat'l Bank of Omro v. 
Winnebago County Agr. & Horticultural Ass'n, 141 Wis. 476, 480, 
124 N.W.2d 656 (1910); see also Texas Soil Recycling, Inc. v. 
Intercargo Ins. Co., 273 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying 
Texas law); O'Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (applying Alabama law). 
No. 
01-2139 
 
13 
 
broad authority over all investment accounts, whether listed or 
not.   
¶30 In short, the clear implication is that both of these 
limited powers of attorney grant Georgetown Financial authority 
over only those insurance policies and other investments 
(stocks, bonds, CDs, annuities, savings accounts, and other 
securities) specifically listed on the limited powers of 
attorney.  Since neither limited power of attorney in the record 
lists a Putnam account, it is equally clear that Georgetown 
Financial did not have the authority to endorse either of the 
checks at issue in this case on behalf of the plaintiff-payee.12 
III 
¶31 Having determined that Georgetown Financial did not 
have the authority to endorse the two Putnam checks, the 
                                                 
12 Firstar 
Bank 
suggested 
at 
oral 
argument 
that 
an 
additional power of attorney was likely signed giving Georgetown 
Financial authority over the Putnam accounts, even though it was 
not discovered and is not in the record.  Firstar Bank asserted 
that discovery was complicated in this case because of the 
federal government's investigation of O'Hearn on criminal fraud 
charges.  Firstar Bank pointed to the Putnam account application 
as evidence that the plaintiff-payee had an ongoing relationship 
with Georgetown Financial and argued that the plaintiff-payee 
would have given Georgetown Financial authority, in the same 
manner as he previously did with the discovered powers of 
attorney, over the Putnam account. 
Firstar Bank's suggestion does nothing to bolster its 
position in this case.  First, to imply that another power of 
attorney might exist specifically listing the Putnam account 
supports the plaintiff-payee's claim that the limited powers of 
attorney currently in the record only extend to those accounts 
explicitly identified on the power of attorney.  Second, a 
motion for summary judgment will not be granted on the basis of 
pure conjecture. 
No. 
01-2139 
 
14 
 
remaining issue in this case is whether Firstar Bank is liable 
to the plaintiff-payee for the value of the two Putnam checks it 
deposited into a Georgetown Financial account, one without the 
plaintiff-payee's endorsement and the other with a forged 
endorsement of the plaintiff-payee.  We do not reach a decision 
on Firstar Bank's liability here, however, as the parties have 
not adequately briefed and argued the issues.   
¶32 The 
plaintiff-payee's 
underlying 
claims 
against 
Firstar Bank in the present action are for conversion and 
negligence.  Conversion is committed when a person takes the 
property of another, without the consent of the owner, in such a 
way that it seriously interferes with the right of the owner to 
control the property.13 
¶33 The plaintiff-payee's brief in this court asserted 
that Firstar Bank was never a holder or owner of the larger 
Putnam check but merely a transferee, and as a transferee, it 
has no greater rights to the check than Georgetown Financial.14  
Firstar Bank did not brief the conversion issue in this court.  
Firstar Bank addressed only the issue of whether the limited 
powers of attorney authorized Georgetown Financial to endorse 
the Putnam checks.   
¶34 Firstar Bank did argue before the circuit court, 
however, in its response in opposition to the plaintiff's motion 
                                                 
13 Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Nowatzski, 90 Wis. 2d 344, 353, 280 
N.W.2d 118 (1979).  
14 See Wis. Stat. §§ 403.201, 403.202, 403.301 (1993-94). 
No. 
01-2139 
 
15 
 
for summary judgment, that if the plaintiff-payee prevailed on 
his argument that Georgetown Financial did not have the 
authority under the limited powers of attorney to endorse the 
checks in the present case, the question whether Firstar acted 
in good faith or in accordance with reasonable commercial 
standards under Wis. Stat. § 403.419(3) (1993-94) was a question 
of 
fact 
that 
would 
need 
to 
be 
tried.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 403.419(3) 
(1993-94) 
provides 
that 
a 
depositary bank will not be liable for conversion of a 
negotiable instrument if it has acted "in good faith and in 
accordance with the reasonable commercial standards" applicable 
to the respective business, here banking.15 
                                                 
15 The plaintiff-payee's amended complaint asserted a claim 
for conversion under Wis. Stat. § 403.420 (1996-97).  Firstar 
Bank responded in its memorandum response in opposition to the 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment before the circuit court 
that the plaintiff-payee's claim for conversion with regard to 
the larger check is actually governed by Wis. Stat. § 403.419(3) 
(1993-94).  Section 403.419(3) stated the law on conversion of 
negotiable instruments applicable in Wisconsin in July 1996.  
Effective August 1, 1996, Wisconsin adopted revised Article III 
of the Uniform Commercial Code and the law on conversion of 
negotiable instruments was renumbered § 403.420.  Thus, it 
appears that the first, larger check would be governed by 
§ 403.419(3) (1993-94) while the second, smaller check is 
governed by § 403.420 (1996-97). 
Wisconsin Stat. § 403.419(3) (1993-94) reads:  
(3) Subject to the provisions of chs. 401 to 411 
concerning restrictive endorsements a representative, 
including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in 
good faith and in accordance with the reasonable 
commercial standards applicable to the business of 
such representative dealt with an instrument or its 
proceeds on behalf of one who was not the true owner 
is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true 
No. 
01-2139 
 
16 
 
¶35 While it appears clear that accepting a check when the 
payee's endorsement is missing is not in accordance with the 
reasonable 
commercial 
standards 
of 
banking 
and 
that 
the 
acceptance by a depositary bank of such a check for deposit is 
commercially unreasonable as a matter of law,16 there is far less 
case law addressing who constitutes the payee when a check is 
made out to an individual in the care of an investment company.17  
Accordingly, we remand the issue of liability on the larger 
Putnam check to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
¶36 A determination of liability on the smaller Putnam 
check is similarly inappropriate for summary judgment given the 
posture of the case.  In short, neither party briefed or argued 
whether it was appropriate to grant summary judgment on this 
claim if Georgetown was determined not to have authority to 
endorse and deposit the Putnam checks. 
¶37 The plaintiff-payee has not moved for summary judgment 
on the $6,173.21 check (with the forged signature), asserting 
that a trial is required because liability depends on whether 
                                                                                                                                                             
owner beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in 
his or her hands. 
16 See, e.g., Mid-Atl. Tennis Courts, Inc. v. Citizens Bank 
& Trust Co. of Maryland, 658 F. Supp. 140, 142-43 (D. Md. 1987); 
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Am. State Bank, 385 N.W.2d 460, 463 (N.D. 
1986); see also 6A Ronald A. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code 
§ 3-419:72, at 95 (1998); William D. Hawkland & Lary Lawrence, 4 
Uniform Commercial Code Series § 3-419:5, at Art. 3-912-16 
(1999). 
17 But see Geraldo v. First Dominican Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
2002 WL 31002770, ¶41 (Ohio App. 2002) (unpublished opinion). 
No. 
01-2139 
 
17 
 
Firstar Bank was negligent, a question of fact.  Firstar Bank 
moved for summary judgment on the claim regarding the smaller 
check but argued only that Georgetown Financial had authority 
under the powers of attorney to endorse and deposit the check.  
Firstar Bank offers no defense to support the conclusion that it 
was not liable for making payment on the smaller check once it 
has been determined that Georgetown Financial did not have 
authority to endorse the Putnam checks.  "To make a prima facie 
case for summary judgment, a moving defendant must show a 
defense which would defeat the plaintiff-payee.  If the 
defendant does not make out a prima facie case for summary 
judgment we need go no further."18 
¶38 We therefore remand the issue of Firstar Bank's 
liability on the smaller check to the circuit court as well.   
IV 
¶39 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the language 
of the limited powers of attorney, properly construed, did not 
grant Georgetown Financial the authority to endorse the two 
checks at issue in this case.  The circuit court's decision 
granting summary judgment to Firstar Bank is therefore reversed.  
The cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
                                                 
18 Kraemer Bros. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 566-
67, 278 N.W.2d 857 (1979). 
No. 
01-2139 
 
18 
 
¶40 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH and JON P. WILCOX, JJ., did not 
participate. 
 
 
No. 
01-2139 
 
 
 
1