Case Title: Oregon v. Moore

Citation: 

Docket Number: S063946

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 15	
March 9, 2017	
205
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Adverse Party,
v.
MARK LYLE MOORE,
aka Mark Lyle Moore, Sr.,
Defendant-Relator.
(CC 14CR12536, SC S063946)
En Banc
Original proceeding in mandamus.*
Argued and submitted October 13, 2016.
Laura Graser, Portland, argued the cause and filed the 
brief for defendant-relator.
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for plaintiff-adverse 
party. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
BALDWIN, J.
Peremptory writ of mandamus to issue.
______________
	
*  On petition for a writ of mandamus from an order of Multnomah County 
Circuit Court, Christopher J. Marshall, Judge.
206	
State v. Moore
Case Summary: Defendant’s arson-related murder trial was well underway 
when, following testimony from eight of the state’s witnesses, the prosecutor 
abruptly announced his discovery of a new witness — an insurance investiga-
tor — who, according to the prosecutor, was willing to testify that, based on his 
insurance-related examination of the crime scene, the fire that had killed the 
victim was the result of arson. Although defendant objected to that evidence, he 
was unambiguous in his desire to avoid a mistrial and finish the proceedings 
against him with the jury his lawyer selected. After ruling that testimony from 
the state’s newly-discovered expert would, indeed, be allowed, the trial court went 
on to declare a mistrial on its own motion. Among other things, the trial court 
found that the state had met its burden of establishing that the new evidence 
to be admitted was, under the circumstances, so prejudicial to defendant that 
a “manifest necessity” existed to retry defendant before a new jury. Defendant 
subsequently moved to dismiss the new indictment that followed, citing, in part, 
his former jeopardy rights under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. 
That motion was denied, however, and defendant’s petition for mandamus relief 
to the Oregon Supreme Court followed shortly thereafter. Held: A peremptory 
writ of mandamus shall issue. The Court concluded that the applicable “manifest 
necessity” standard has not been met in this case. First, the prosecutor commit-
ted a serious mistake by proceeding to trial before discovering one of his key 
witnesses. It was that mistake, in fact, that created the prejudice that the trial 
court sought to mitigate by ordering a mistrial. Second, it is significant that the 
state had already presented eight witnesses prior to the mistrial. That testimony 
would potentially present the state with an unfair advantage at a new trial since 
the state could further prepare many of its witnesses based on their prior trial 
participation. As a result, the trial court’s sua sponte mistrial order and denial of 
defendant’s subsequent motion to dismiss (1) violated defendant’s right to be free 
from a second prosecution for the same offense under the Oregon Constitution 
and (2) constituted fundamental legal error.
Peremptory writ of mandamus to issue.
Cite as 361 Or 205 (2017)	
207
	
BALDWIN, J.
	
In this original proceeding, relator (defendant), who 
is a defendant in the underlying criminal case, seeks a writ 
of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the indict-
ment against him with prejudice, based on former or dou-
ble jeopardy under state and federal law. After a jury was 
impaneled and several witnesses for the state had testified, 
the trial court declared a mistrial. When the state sought a 
retrial, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on jeop-
ardy grounds, and the trial court denied his motion. The 
issue before us now is whether, under Article I, section 12, of 
the Oregon Constitution, there was “manifest necessity” for 
the trial court’s mistrial order. For the reasons that follow, 
we conclude that the state has not met its burden of demon-
strating that the trial court’s mistrial was consistent with 
the “manifest necessity” standard. We therefore direct the 
issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the 
trial court to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
	
This petition arises out of criminal charges involv-
ing defendant, codefendant Golden, and a third defendant, 
Richardson. All three men allegedly played a role in the 
arson-related death of the victim. Defendant and codefen-
dant Golden presently face retrial, after the trial court 
declared a mistrial over defendant’s objection and dismissed 
the charges against both men without prejudice. The state 
sought to proceed with a retrial against both defendants 
on multiple counts of murder and first-degree arson. Prior 
to the first trial, Richardson, the third defendant, pleaded 
guilty to a single count of third-degree assault as part of an 
agreement to cooperate with police authorities and testify 
against the codefendants.
	
In February 2011, Richardson was living—with the 
owner’s consent—in a small detached garage located next to 
a house. Unbeknownst to the owner, however, Richardson 
had allowed the victim, Purcell, to stay in the garage as 
well. One night, a fire broke out in the garage with the vic-
tim inside. Firefighters arrived, removed Purcell from the 
burning structure, and put the fire out. Purcell, however, 
died of smoke inhalation some time later.
208	
State v. Moore
	
In the fire investigation that followed, state fire 
authorities found blood on the floor of the garage, along with 
numerous syringes, discoveries that subsequently prompted 
the intervention of Portland homicide investigators. An 
autopsy revealed that Purcell had died of asphyxia from 
inhaling smoke and carbon monoxide, but the state investi-
gators who examined the fire scene were not able to find any 
arson-related indicators. One investigator and his acceler-
ant-sniffing K-9 partner searched in vain for evidence that 
an accelerant had been used to start the fire. Instead, what 
the investigator found was a structure that he concluded 
was a “firetrap,” a space littered with combustible materials, 
multiple plugged-in extension cords, and several locations 
where a fire could have started accidentally.
	
Shortly after the fire, Richardson recounted the 
events of that evening to investigators and stated that the 
fire had apparently been an accident. Two months later, 
however, Richardson—who had been jailed on charges not 
specified on this record—confessed to police that he had 
entered the garage and beaten up the victim on the night of 
the fire. According to Richardson’s new account, defendant 
and codefendant Golden arrived at the garage and started 
the fire after Richardson had left the area. Defendant and 
Golden were subsequently indicted on murder and arson 
charges; Richardson was released from jail and charged 
with third-degree assault.
	
According to defendant, at the beginning of trial, 
he was confident about his trial strategy. In opening state-
ments, defendant’s trial counsel had asked the jury to care-
fully consider the “pros and cons” of the evidence that would 
come before it in determining whether the fire that had 
killed the victim was arson or an accident. The “pros” were 
the state fire investigators who had examined the burned-
out garage in the wake of the victim’s death. Counsel indi-
cated that they would uniformly testify that the cause of 
the fire was undetermined, that there was no physical evi-
dence linking defendant to the victim’s death, and that there 
would be no expert testimony indicating that the fire was the 
result of arson. The “cons,” in contrast, constituted many of 
the prosecutor’s other witnesses—incarcerated individuals 
who, burdened with lengthy criminal histories and pending 
Cite as 361 Or 205 (2017)	
209
criminal charges, were highly motivated to provide favor-
able testimony for the state in exchange for certain consid-
erations regarding their sentences and the charges against 
them.
	
The state called its first eight witnesses, among 
them, the firefighting personnel who had been at the crime 
scene, and local a resident, Thomas. At one point, Thomas 
testified that she had seen defendant and codefendant 
Golden leaving the garage shortly before it caught fire, but 
made other statements that conflicted with that testimony. 
Ultimately, Thomas acknowledged that, at the time of the 
fire, she had been awake on crystal methamphetamine 
for approximately 24 hours and that the drug affected her 
memory.
	
At the end of the first day of trial, the prosecutor 
stated that he was “still trying to track down information 
on the arson—the fire investigation from the insurance com-
pany.” On the next day of trial, the prosecutor stated that he 
had discovered a new witness and new evidence that he now 
wished to present as part of the state’s case-in-chief:
	
“[A]s you recall, last week, Thursday, the state apprised 
the Court and defense counsel that it had become aware 
that there is potentially information from the insurance 
company that an investigator, a fire investigator, did a 
complete investigation and made a determination as to the 
source and cause of the fire, and that’s all we knew at that 
time.”
According to the prosecutor, he was still awaiting the 
recently subpoenaed insurance file but had, in the interim, 
spoken with insurance investigator Gunsolly and procured 
the investigator’s notes. The handwritten notes, which the 
prosecutor gave to the trial court and opposing counsel, 
contained the names of different fire and police officials 
involved with the post-fire investigation, along with the 
names of various potential witnesses. The prosecutor stated 
that, during his conversation with the insurance investiga-
tor, the investigator
“had ruled out that this was a fire that was caused by elec-
trical purposes and that he believe that a handheld, open 
source flame was used to light some materials in the garage 
210	
State v. Moore
to start the fire. In essence, my interpretation of that is he 
believed that somebody intentionally started the fire, that 
it was not accidental.”
	
Both defendants moved to exclude the prosecutor’s 
new evidence, arguing that to do otherwise would not only 
be fundamentally unfair, but would also “encourage the 
state to remain willfully blind to something that was in dis-
covery.” Defendant nevertheless rejected the possibility of a 
mistrial, arguing that, “we do not want a mistrial” because 
“the defense is always prejudiced when they have to retry 
the case.” The trial court, however, denied the motion to 
exclude, ruling that the new evidence would be admitted.1
	
Codefendant Golden’s counsel, opining that he 
was obligated to do so, responded by moving for a mistrial. 
Defendant did not join in that motion; his counsel stated, 
“We don’t want a mistrial. We like this jury; we like how 
we’re doing.” Counsel later reiterated, “[W]e are not joining 
[codefendant’s] motion; we are not seeking a mistrial. That 
is done in consultation with our client.” The trial court then 
granted codefendant Golden’s motion for a mistrial, on its 
own motion declared a mistrial as to defendant, and dis-
missed the jury. Shortly thereafter, the state reindicted both 
defendants.
	
Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the 
indictment against him citing his former jeopardy and dou-
ble jeopardy rights under ORS 131.525(1),2 Article I, section 
12, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. After briefing and oral 
argument, the trial court declined to dismiss the indict-
ment. It ruled:
“We will find that the state has met its burden of proof to 
show that there was manifest necessity in declaring the 
	
1  The parties have not argued the correctness of that ruling in this proceed-
ing, and we express no opinion on that issue.
	
2  ORS 131.525(1) is, in part, a codification of the test of “manifest necessity” 
set forth in United States v. Perez, 22 US 579, 6 L Ed 165, 9 Wheat 579 (1824). 
See State v. Cole, 286 Or 411, 417-18, 595 P2d 466 (1979) (so stating). However, 
the parties did not develop a statutory argument under ORS 131.525(1) in either 
the trial court or in this court. Further, the trial court did not base any rul-
ing on ORS 131.525(1). Thus, we limit our analysis to the parties’ constitutional 
arguments.
Cite as 361 Or 205 (2017)	
211
mistrial that the ends of public justice could not be served 
by a continuation of the proceedings.”
The trial court later made a number of findings and conclu-
sions, among them that (1) the state had met is burden of 
proof to demonstrate that there was manifest necessity to 
declare a mistrial; (2) the state had not violated any pre-
trial discovery rules with its mid-trial request to have the 
insurance investigator testify; (3) there had been no reason 
to believe that the prosecutor used the superior resources 
of the state to harass or achieve a tactical advantage over 
defendant; (4) the insurance investigator’s anticipated tes-
timony and report would be extremely probative of the core 
issue in the case and would not be substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence; and (5) this case was like the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Wade v. Hunter, 336 
US 684, 689, 69 S CT 834, 93 L Ed 974 (1949), in which 
the Court opined that “a defendant’s valued right to have 
his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some 
instances be subordinated to the public’s interest in fair tri-
als designed to end in just judgments.”
	
The trial court scheduled a new trial date for both 
defendants. After the trial court denied defendant’s motion 
to dismiss the indictment against him, defendant petitioned 
this court for a writ of mandamus.
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
	
The parties agree that the question for this court’s 
determination is whether the trial court’s mistrial ruling over 
defendant’s objection met the constitutional standard of “man-
ifest necessity.” Defendant argues that he was entitled to com-
plete his trial with the jury selected and that the state has 
not met its burden of demonstrating that the mistrial decision 
was consistent with the standard of “manifest necessity.”
	
The state, for its part, acknowledges that “the ulti-
mate question whether defendant was entitled to dismissal 
on jeopardy grounds is a legal one.” However, the state first 
argues that the trial court—by ordering a mistrial—was 
simply exercising its discretion to address the prejudice to 
defendant resulting from the court’s ruling admitting the 
212	
State v. Moore
new evidence. Second, the state argues that defendant’s 
objection to a mistrial was equivocal because defendant had 
suggested to the trial court that defendant would not be able 
to proceed with trial even if the court allowed a continuance.
ANALYSIS
	
“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may 
serve only to enforce a known, clear legal right.” Longo v. 
Premo, 355 Or 525, 531, 326 P3d 1152 (2014). Although a 
writ of mandamus “shall not be issued in any case where 
there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordi-
nary course of the law,” ORS 34.110, defendant neverthe-
less contends that a writ should issue here because the right 
to appeal after a conviction would not vindicate his consti-
tutional right to be free from a second prosecution for the 
same offense. Subject to defendant sustaining his constitu-
tional claim, defendant is correct that mandamus relief is 
available to avoid a reprosecution. See State ex rel Turner v. 
Frankel, 322 Or 363, 376, 908 P2d 293 (1995) (so holding). 
Thus, the issue for our determination is whether defendant 
had a clear, legal right to dismissal of the state’s indictment 
after the trial court had ordered a mistrial and discharged 
the original jury in this case.3
	
Defendant’s 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
the 
indictment 
against 
him was based on former jeopardy under Article I, section 
12, of the Oregon Constitution and double jeopardy under 
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.4 
Both provisions “provide, in somewhat different terms, that 
	
3  As noted, the state contends that the trial court properly exercised discre-
tion in ordering a mistrial over defendant’s objection. However, mandamus relief 
may be appropriate when “the trial court’s decision amounts to ‘fundamental 
legal error’ or is ‘outside the permissible range of discretionary choices’ 
” avail-
able. Lindell v. Kalugin, 353 Or 338, 347, 297 P3d 1266 (2013) (quoting State ex rel 
Keisling v. Norblad, 317 Or 615, 623, 860 P2d 241 (1993)). As we will explain, the 
trial court’s decision below amounted to fundamental legal error.
	
4  Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution provides:
“No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offence [sic] * 
* 
*.”
	
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
“No person shall * 
* 
* be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb[.]”
Neither party argues that those provisions have different meanings as applied 
here.
Cite as 361 Or 205 (2017)	
213
a defendant in a criminal case has a right not to be put 
in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” State v. Cole, 286 
Or 411, 419, 595 P2d 466 (1979). This court’s practice has 
been to resolve such claims first under state law while giv-
ing proper weight to relevant United States Supreme Court 
opinions that we find persuasive. See, e.g., id. at 417-18 
(applying state statute to jeopardy claim before analyzing 
under Supreme Court cases); see also Sterling v. Cupp, 290 
Or 611, 614, 625 P2d 123 (1981) (“proper sequence is to ana-
lyze the state’s law, before reaching a federal constitutional 
claim). We have, in some instances, concluded that the state 
and federal provisions afford varying degrees of protection 
to a criminal defendant. See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 
276-77, 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (acknowledging that Oregon 
law concerning retrial after prosecutor-induced mistrial not 
identical to federal law); State v. Rathburn, 287 Or 421, 431, 
600 P2d 392 (1979) (Article I, section 12, barred reprosecu-
tion of defendant as result of bailiff’s prejudicial remarks 
to jury); State v. Brown, 262 Or 442, 497 P2d 1191 (1972) 
(holding that Article I, section 12, requires consolidation of 
all charges known to prosecutor).
	
Thus, we analyze defendant’s Article I, section 12, 
claim first and, in doing so, give proper weight to relevant 
United States Supreme Court opinions that we find persua-
sive. The general purpose and meaning of the federal dou-
ble jeopardy bar has been cogently summarized by Justice 
Hugo Black:
	
“The constitutional prohibition against ‘double jeopardy’ 
was designed to protect an individual from being subjected 
to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than 
once for an alleged offense[.]
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
	
“The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at 
least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that 
the State with all its resources and power should not be 
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual 
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embar-
rassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live 
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as 
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he 
may be found guilty.”
214	
State v. Moore
Green v. United States, 355 US 184, 187-88, 78 S Ct 221, 
2 L Ed 2d 199 (1957). This court has embraced a similar 
view regarding Article I, section 12, by holding that “a bar 
against prosecution must be derived from the constitutional 
objective to protect defendant against ‘the harassment, 
embarrassment and risk of successive prosecutions for the 
same offense’ and that ‘[i]t is not a sanction to be applied for 
the punishment of prosecutorial or judicial error.’ 
” Kennedy, 
295 Or at 273 (footnote omitted).
	
The dimensions of the guarantee against double 
jeopardy and the many issues that may arise when the state 
seeks to reprosecute a defendant are varied and complex. 
See, generally Wayne R. LaFave et al, 6 Criminal Procedure 
§ 25 (4th ed 2015). Where, as here, a trial court declares a 
mistrial over a defendant’s objection, that decision is exam-
ined against the standard of “manifest necessity.” United 
States v. Perez, 22 US 579, 6 L Ed 165, 9 Wheat 579 (1824); 
Arizona v. Washington, 434 US 497, 98 S Ct 824, 54 L Ed 717 
(1978); see also Cole, 286 Or at 419 (applying standard).
	
In Cole, this court held that the state had “sus-
tained its burden to show that there was such a ‘manifest 
necessity’ as to justify the dismissal of the jury and avoid 
the bar of double jeopardy,” when the trial judge in that case 
had become so ill that he was hospitalized. Id. at 424. In so 
holding, the court distinguished between two distinct kinds 
of necessity: (1) “physical necessity”, and (2) the “necessity 
of doing justice” based on the duty of the court to “guard the 
administration of justice.” Id. at 423. The court characterized 
the circumstance of the judge’s illness as a “physical neces-
sity” and noted that “there is nothing in the record to show 
that either the defendant or his attorney would have agreed 
to the continuation of the trial before any other judge.” Id. 
at 425. Justice Linde, specially concurring, emphasized that 
the trial judge “became incapacitated after the jury was 
selected and sworn but before any testimony was taken.” Id. 
at 426. His view was that, “[i]n a case in which witnesses 
have been examined and cross-examined, including perhaps 
the defendant himself,” a mistrial “might be much more 
prejudicial” and, “when the defendant is prepared to con-
tinue with a new judge[, the state’s burden] might arguably 
be greater.” Id.
Cite as 361 Or 205 (2017)	
215
	
As noted, the United States Supreme Court first 
established the “manifest necessity” standard in Perez, an 
1824 case where the Court held that the failure of a jury 
to agree on a verdict did not bar the state from retrying 
the defendant. At that point, the standard was undeveloped, 
requiring only the exercise of “standard discretion” consis-
tent with the “ends of the public justice,” a power, the Court 
nevertheless added, that “ought to be used with the greatest 
caution, under urgent circumstances[.]” Perez, 22 US at 580. 
In Arizona v. Washington, the Court explained:
	
“The words ‘manifest necessity’ appropriately char-
acterize the magnitude of the prosecutor’s burden. * 
* 
* 
[But] it is manifest that the key word ‘necessity’ cannot be 
interpreted literally; instead, contrary to the teaching of 
Webster, we assume that there are degrees of necessity and 
we require a ‘high degree’ before concluding that the mis-
trial is appropriate.”
434 US at 505-06. The Supreme Court has, moreover, often 
observed that the validity of each “manifest necessity” rul-
ing depends on the unique circumstances that each case 
presents.5 Such a standard, the Court has stated, “abjures 
the application of any mechanical formula by which to judge 
the propriety of declaring a mistrial in the varying and 
often unique situations arising during the course of a crim-
inal trial.”6 Illinois v. Somerville, 410 US 458, 462, 93 S Ct 
1066, 35 L Ed 2d 425 (1973).
	
5  Arizona, 434 US at 505; Illinois v. Somerville, 410 US 458, 462, 93 S Ct 
1066, 35 L Ed 2d 425 (1973), United States v. Jorn, 400 US 470, 480, 91 S Ct 547, 
27 L Ed 2d 543 (1971).
	
6  Professor LaFave’s commentary about the many factors that may be rele-
vant in assessing whether a mistrial order is justified by “manifest necessity” is 
instructive:
“A substantial number of factors enter into the assessment of ‘manifest neces-
sity’ on a fairly regular basis. They are (1) the source of the difficulty that led 
to the mistrial—i.e., whether the difficulty was the product of the actions of 
the prosecutor, defense counsel, or trial judge, or were events over which the 
participants lacked control; (2) whether the difficulty could have been inten-
tionally created or manipulated for the purpose of giving the prosecution an 
opportunity to strengthen its case; (3) whether the possible prejudice or other 
legal complications created by the difficulty could be ‘cured’ by some alter-
native action that would preserve the fairness of the trial; (4) whether the 
record indicates that the trial judge considered such alternatives; (5) whether 
any conviction resulting from the trial would inevitably be subject to rever-
sal on appeal; (6) whether the trial judge acted during the ‘heat of the trial 
216	
State v. Moore
	
In addition to the authorities noted above, we also 
consider two United States Supreme Court cases that we 
find particularly relevant to our inquiry here: Downum v. 
United States, 372 US 734, 83 S Ct 1033, 10 L Ed 2d 100 
(1963), and United States v. Jorn, 400 US 470, 480, 91 S Ct 
547, 27 L Ed 2d 543 (1971).
	
In Downum, a trial court granted the state’s request 
to discharge an impaneled jury after the state had allowed 
the jury to be selected and sworn even though one of its key 
witnesses was absent and had not been found. 372 US at 
735. The trial court cited precedent, including Wade, for the 
proposition that “[a]t times the valued right of a defendant 
to have his trial completed by the particular tribunal sum-
moned to sit in judgment on him may be subordinated to 
the public interest—when there is an imperious necessity 
to do so,” but concluded that the circumstances presented 
did not pose such a necessity. Id. at 736. The Court observed 
that to not bar the subsequent prosecution of the defendant 
would allow the trial court to “exercise what would be an 
unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary judicial discretion.” Id. 
at 738. Downum is similar to this case, in that the state did 
not identify a key witness until after the trial was under-
way, and the trial court ordered a mistrial over defendant’s 
objection.
	
In Jorn, a plurality opinion, the trial court, sua 
sponte, discharged an impaneled jury to allow state wit-
nesses to consult with their own attorneys because the trial 
court was unsure whether the witnesses had been ade-
quately advised of their right against self-incrimination. 
According to the plurality, it was “apparent from the record 
confrontation’; (7) whether the trial judge’s determination rests on an eval-
uation of the demeanor of the participants, the ‘atmosphere’ of the trial, or 
any other factors that similarly are not amendable to strict appellate review; 
(8) whether the trial judge granted the mistrial solely for the purpose of pro-
tecting the defendant against possible prejudice; (9) whether the evidence 
presented by the prosecution prior to the mistrial suggested a weakness in 
the prosecution’s case (e.g., a witness had failed to testify as anticipated); 
(10) whether the jurors had heard enough of the case to formulate some ten-
tative opinions; (11) whether the case had proceeded so far as to give the 
prosecution a substantial preview of the defense’s tactics and evidence; and 
(12) whether the composition of the jury was unusual.”
LaFave, 6 Criminal Procedure § 25.2(c) at 799-800.
Cite as 361 Or 205 (2017)	
217
that no consideration was given to the possibility of a trial 
continuance.” Jorn, 400 US at 487. Concluding that the trial 
court’s decision did not meet the “manifest necessity” stan-
dard, the plurality affirmed dismissal of the information on 
the ground of double jeopardy and barred a retrial of the 
defendant.
	
Although Jorn did not involve prosecutorial error, 
the Court nevertheless cited its holding in Downum and dis-
cussed the significance of the lack of preparedness by the 
government for trial in double-jeopardy cases. The plurality 
also emphasized the importance of a defendant being able to 
complete a trial with a jury that the defendant believed to be 
favorably disposed to his or her position:
“The trial judge must recognize that lack of preparedness 
by the Government to continue the trial directly implicates 
policies underpinning both the double jeopardy provision 
and the speedy trial guarantee. Cf. Downum v. United 
States, 372 US 734 (1963). Alternatively, the judge must 
bear in mind the potential risks of abuse by the defendant 
of society’s unwillingness to unnecessarily subject him to 
repeated prosecutions. Yet, in the final analysis, the judge 
must always temper the decision whether or not to abort 
the trial by considering the importance to the defendant 
of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confronta-
tion with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might 
believe to be favorably disposed to his fate.”
Jorn, 400 US at 486.
	
In reaching its decision, the plurality rejected as 
unsubstantiated by the record the government’s argument 
that the trial court had ordered a mistrial solely for the 
defendant’s benefit. Id. at 483. The plurality also cited prior 
case law recognizing that the Double Jeopardy Clause does 
not always guarantee a single trial for a given offense, as 
in cases where reprosecution is necessary after a criminal 
defendant’s conviction has been reversed on appeal. Id. at 
484. However, the plurality differentiated between that 
circumstance and reprosecution after a mistrial by a trial 
court sua sponte:
“For the crucial difference between reprosecution after 
appeal by the defendant and reprosecution after a sua 
218	
State v. Moore
sponte judicial mistrial declaration is that, in the first sit-
uation, the defendant has not been deprived of his option 
to go to the first jury and, perhaps, end the dispute then 
and there with an acquittal. On the other hand, where the 
judge, acting without the defendant’s consent, aborts the 
proceeding, the defendant has been deprived of his ‘valued 
right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.’
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
“Thus, where circumstances develop not attributable to 
prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the 
defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove 
any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant’s motion 
is necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error. In the 
absence of such a motion, the Perez doctrine of manifest 
necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to fore-
close the defendant’s option until a scrupulous exercise of 
judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of 
public justice would not be served by a continuation of the 
proceedings.”
Id. at 484-86 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
	
We find the reasoning of Jorn and Downum persua-
sive, and, therefore, we will give those cases proper weight 
in addressing the Article  I, section 12, issue presented 
here. See Cole, 286 Or at 424 (applying “flexible standard of 
Arizona” and concluding that state “[not] required to show 
that no other judge is available to continue the trial” when 
mistrial ordered because trial judge ill in hospital).
	
With the above authority in mind, we now deter-
mine whether the state has met its burden of demonstrating 
that the trial court’s mistrial order is consistent with the 
standard of “manifest necessity.” The trial court concluded 
that the circumstances of this case justified a mistrial under 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wade, a posi-
tion also adopted by the state on review. We disagree.
	
Wade involved a military court martial in wartime 
Germany of a United States soldier accused of rape. After 
the court martial had commenced, the commander of the 
Third Army concluded that the tactical situation of his com-
mand and its distance from the trial site prevented the trial 
from being completed within a reasonable timeframe. The 
Cite as 361 Or 205 (2017)	
219
charges against the defendant were withdrawn and later 
reinstated for trial at a location more convenient for the wit-
nesses. The Court concluded that there was “manifest neces-
sity” for the reprosecution under the circumstances. Wade, 
336 US 684. Later, in Downum, the Court stated that “the 
tactical problems of an army in the field were held [in Wade] 
to justify the withdrawal of a court-martial proceeding and 
the commencement of another one on a later day.” Downum, 
372 US at 736. We think that Wade—a case decided based 
on tactical problems posed in a war zone—is inapposite to 
this case where the state proceeded to trial without a key 
witness and the trial court, after declining to exclude the 
testimony of that witness, ordered a mistrial sua sponte over 
defendant’s objection.7
	
As previously explained, whether a trial court rul-
ing is consistent with the federal “manifest necessity” stan-
dard depends on the unique circumstances presented in 
that case. Washington, 434 US at 505; Somerville, 410 US at 
462 (“manifest necessity” standard “abjures the application 
of any mechanical formula by which to judge the propriety 
of declaring a mistrial in the varying and often unique sit-
uations arising during the course of a criminal trial”); Jorn, 
400 US at 480. Similarly, we think that whether the “man-
ifest necessity” standard is met under Article I, section 12, 
likewise depends on the circumstances of each individual 
case. After considering the unique circumstances here, two 
factors lead us to conclude that the trial court’s mistrial 
order did not meet the “manifest necessity” standard.
	
First, the state mistakenly proceeded to trial in this 
case before identifying a key witness, Gunsolly, an insur-
ance investigator who—according to the prosecutor—would 
testify that the fire that caused the victim’s death was not 
accidental. The prospect of such testimony—raised well into 
the state’s case-in-chief—went to the core of the case and 
necessarily affected the parties’ theories and strategies. The 
record shows that that serious mistake created the issue of 
	
7  Wade might be most accurately characterized as a case where the test of 
“manifest necessity” was met based on the physical necessity of a retrial in a 
war zone. See Cole, 286 Or at 423 (distinguishing “physical necessity” from the 
“necessity of doing justice” based on the duty of the court to “guard the adminis-
tration of justice”).
220	
State v. Moore
prejudice that the trial court sought to address by allowing 
codefendant Golden’s motion for a mistrial and sua sponte 
ordering a mistrial as to defendant. The record also shows 
that the state was solely responsible for that mistake. That 
factor weighs heavily in favor of defendant’s constitutional 
argument. See Downum, 372 US at 734 (failure to bar sub-
sequent prosecution of defendant when state allowed jury to 
be selected and sworn even though one of its key witnesses 
was absent would allow trial court to exercise “unlimited, 
uncertain, and arbitrary judicial discretion”).
	
Second, it is significant that the state examined—
and defense counsel cross-examined—eight witnesses for 
the state prior to the mistrial. That fact presents a signif-
icant potential for prejudice to defendant and an unfair 
advantage to the state. If the state is permitted to repros-
ecute defendant, it would then have an unfair opportunity 
to further prepare its witnesses based on their previous 
examination and cross-examination during the first trial. 
See Cole, 286 Or at 426 (Linde, J., concurring) (where “wit-
nesses have been examined and cross-examined, including 
perhaps the defendant himself, the mistrial might be much 
more prejudicial,” and the state’s burden is arguably greater 
when defendant prepared to continue with new judge).
	
In this case, the record is clear that defendant 
wished to complete his trial with the jury selected, not-
withstanding the prospect of new evidence or his codefen-
dant’s motion for a mistrial. Defendant’s counsel stated to 
the court: “We don’t want a mistrial. We like this jury; we 
like how we’re doing.” Defendant also personally stated to 
the court that he wanted to continue with the trial. The 
fact that defendant and his counsel believed that the jury 
was favorably disposed to his case and objected to a mis-
trial is an important consideration here. See Jorn, 400 US 
at 486 (judge “must always temper the decision whether or 
not to abort the trial by considering the importance to the 
defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his con-
frontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he 
might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate”).
	
Thus, we hold, as a matter of law, that the trial court’s 
mistrial order violated defendant’s right to be free from a 
Cite as 361 Or 205 (2017)	
221
second prosecution for the same offense under Article I, sec-
tion 12.8 Under the circumstances presented, the sua sponte 
mistrial ordered by the trial court over defendant’s objection 
was outside the constitutional bounds of discretion and con-
stituted legal error. We do not reach our holding today as a 
sanction for prosecutorial error, but rather to protect defen-
dant against the harassment, embarrassment, and risk of 
successive prosecutions as guaranteed by Article I, section 
12. See Kennedy, 295 Or at 272-73 (expressing constitutional 
objective of Article I, section 12).
	
We reject the state’s first argument that the trial 
court’s mistrial order was necessary to eliminate the poten-
tial prejudice to defendant attributable to the court admit-
ting new evidence after prosecutorial error. We also reject 
the state’s second argument that defendant’s objection to a 
mistrial was equivocal because defendant suggested to the 
court that defendant would not be able to proceed with the 
trial even if the court allowed a continuance. The record 
does not support the state’s argument. The record shows 
that defendant did not request a continuance or bring up 
the subject of a continuance when the court discussed with 
counsel the prejudicial effect on both defendants of admit-
ting the new evidence. The state first raised the possibility 
of a continuance to address the problem. Defendant unequiv-
ocally took the position that the new evidence should not 
be admitted because the prejudice to defendant could not 
be effectively addressed by a continuance. Defendant stated 
that the nature of the new evidence was such—at that point 
in the trial—that “a continuance will not be the cure” in 
support of his argument to exclude the evidence. Defendant 
did not, however, state that he would not be able to proceed 
with the trial even if the court admitted the evidence. In 
addition, after a lengthy discussion about whether the prej-
udice to defendant could be effectively addressed, defendant 
told the court: “And just so we’re clear, the last—we do not 
want a mistrial.” The only reasonable inference that could 
be drawn from that statement is that, even if the trial court 
admitted the challenged evidence, defendant nevertheless 
wanted to proceed with the trial. In sum, the record shows 
	
8  As a result, we do not find it necessary to address defendant’s federal con-
stitutional claim.
222	
State v. Moore
that defendant clearly took the position that (1) the new evi-
dence should not be admitted because—if admitted—the 
resulting prejudice to defendant could not be effectively 
cured; and (2) defendant objected to a mistrial. Defendant 
was entitled to make both arguments, and he did so.
CONCLUSION
	
We conclude that the trial court’s sua sponte mis-
trial order violated defendant’s right to be free from a sec-
ond prosecution for the same offense under Article I, section 
12, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court’s mistrial 
order and the court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dis-
miss the indictment with prejudice constituted fundamental 
legal error. This court, therefore, will provide the manda-
mus relief requested by defendant to enforce a clear legal 
right. Frankel, 322 Or at 376 (mandamus relief available to 
avoid reprosecution when defendant’s Article I, section 12, 
rights violated). We direct the issuance of a peremptory writ 
of mandamus requiring the trial court to dismiss the indict-
ment with prejudice.
	
Peremptory writ of mandamus to issue.