Case Title: Petrus v. The Nature Conservancy

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Phillip PETRUS, et al. v. The NATURE
CONSERVANCY and the Arkansas Natural Heritage
Commission

97-156                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 11, 1997


1.   Civil procedure -- final decree required for order to be
     appealable -- contents of order. -- Under Rule 2(a) 1 and 2 of
     the Rules of Appellate Procedure--Civil, an appeal may be
     taken from a final decree entered by the chancery court and an
     order which in effect determines the action and prevents a
     judgment from which an appeal might be taken from, or
     discontinues the action; for an order to be appealable, it
     must dismiss the parties from the court, discharge them from
     the action, or conclude their rights to the subject matter in
     controversy; the order must be of such a nature as not only to
     decide the rights of the parties but also to put the court's
     directive into execution, ending the litigation or a separable
     part of it.  

2.   Civil procedure -- final appealable order -- requirements for
     decree in boundary line dispute. -- A chancery court's decree
     must describe the boundary line between disputing land owners
     with sufficient specificity that it may be identified solely
     by reference to the decree.

3.   Adverse possession -- party actually possessing property under
     color of title deemed to have possession of entire area
     described in document constituting color of title -- parties
     here had no such intent. -- One who enters adversely under
     color of title and actually possesses any part of the tract is
     deemed to have possession of the entire area described in the
     document constituting color of title; here, neither the
     chancellor nor the respective parties intended for this
     settled rule of property to apply, since appellee claimed only
     the disputed right-of-way minus those portions the appellants
     continued to farm and use.  

4.   Civil procedure -- chancery court's "final order" in adverse
     possession case not sufficiently specific -- property could
     not be identified solely by reference to order. -- The
     chancellor's decree captioned "Final Order," which purported
     to dismiss appellants' claims and found that appellee had
     prevailed on its adverse possession claim, did not identify
     the boundary lines of the properties in dispute; nowhere in
     the chancellor's decree was the property awarded to appellee
     identified along with the portions excepted and reserved to
     the appellants; while the chancellor and the parties
     apparently intended to resolve the boundary lines via a future
     survey, the permanent record in a boundary-line decision
     should describe the line with sufficient specificity that it
     may be identified solely by reference to the order; the
     chancery decree should have fixed and described the boundary
     lines.  

5.   Appeal & error -- appeal premature -- decree not final -- case
     dismissed without prejudice. -- The supreme court ruled that
     the chancellor was required to modify his decree to fix and
     define the boundary lines, including those establishing
     appellants' encroachments; because the appeal was premature
     and the decree lacked finality, the case was dismissed without
     prejudice. 


     Appeal from Prairie  Chancery Court; Jim Hannah, Chancellor;
appeal dismissed.
     Green, Henry & Green, by:  David G. Henry, for appellants.
     Marian M. McMullan, P.A., for appellees.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     This case is a sequel to Nature Conservancy v. Kolb, 313 Ark.
110, 853 S.W.2d 864 (1993).  In Kolb, this court determined that
the Nature Conservancy and Arkansas Natural Heritage Commission's
predecessors-in-title had obtained a 100-foot-wide easement, not a
fee simple interest, in a strip of land across the north half of a
section of land in Lonoke County, so long as that land was used for
railroad purposes.  Kolb and others who owned property adjoining
the disputed easement filed suit to quiet title, alleging that,
when the right-of-way was no longer used for railroad purposes, all
interest in the right-of-way reverted to them.  The Kolb court
upheld the trial court's ruling, adopting Kolb's and the adjoining
landowners' contention.  
     The Kolb decision was relied on by Phillip and J. D. Petrus
and six other Prairie County landowners (collectively Petruses)
when filing this quiet title suit against appellees, Nature
Conservancy and Arkansas Natural Heritage Commission (ANHC).  The
Petruses claimed that, in 1985, when the appellees' predecessors-
in-title abandoned their railroad right-of-way easement located in
Prairie County, the disputed easement automatically reverted to
them as adjoining property owners.  However, Nature Conservancy and
ANHC counterclaimed, stating that, even if the Petruses' reliance
on Kolb was correct, they had acquired title by adverse possession
to the strip of land after it was abandoned in 1985.
     After trial on the parties' respective issues, the trial court
dismissed the Petruses' reversionary interest claim, and ruled the
Nature Conservancy and ANHC had sustained their burden of proof,
showing they had acquired title by adverse possession to the
abandoned easement except for those portions of the old railroad
right-of-way being used by the Petruses for farming, drainage,
roadways, and wells under, across, and on the right-of-way.  During
trial, Nature Conservancy and ANHC stipulated that they did not
intend to lay claim to those portions of the right-of-way the
Petruses had continued to use after the easement had been abandoned
for railroad purposes.  In addition, they agreed to underwrite the
expenses of conducting a survey to identify and legally describe
those portions of the right-of-way the adjoining appellant
landowners continued to use.  
     The Petruses filed their appeal in the court of appeals,
arguing only that Nature Conservancy and ANHC's proof was
insufficient to show adverse possession, but the court of appeals
certified the appeal to us, raising the question as to whether the
trial court's decree was a final appealable order.  The court of
appeals suggests that, since the trial court purportedly quieted
title in Nature Conservancy and ANHC, the court's decree should
have specifically set out the legal description of the property, or
portion thereof, to which each party and landowner had title.  The
court of appeals is right.
     Under Rule 2(a) 1 and 2 of the Appellate Procedure -- Civil,
an appeal may be taken from a final decree entered by the chancery
court and an order which in effect determines the action and
prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken from, or
discontinues the action.  We have interpreted this portion of Rule
2 to mean that, for an order to be appealable, it must dismiss the
parties from the court, discharge them from the action, or conclude
their rights to the subject matter in controversy.  Doe v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 323 Ark. 237, 914 S.W.2d 312 (1996).  The order must
be of such a nature as to not only decide the rights of the
parties, but also put the court's directive into execution, ending
the litigation or a separable part of it.  Id.
     In a long line of cases, this court has held that a chancery
court's decree must describe the boundary line between disputing
land owners with sufficient specificity that it may be identified
solely by reference to the decree.  Riddick v. Streett, 313 Ark.
706,