Case Title: Regan v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-12-0074

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
KYLE F. REGAN v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. JOSEPH B. PARSONS v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.2012 WY 161Case Number: S-12-0074; S-12-0075Decided: 12/20/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2012 
 
KYLE 
F. REGAN,Appellant(Petitioner),v.STATE OF WYOMING, 
ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORATION,Appellee(Respondent).JOSEPH B. 
PARSONS,Appellant(Petitioner),v.STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORATION,Appellee(Respondent).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County
The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellants:
R. 
Michael Vang of Fleener & Vang LLC, 
Laramie, WY.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; 
Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Michael T. 
Kahler, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN*, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
 
*Justice Golden 
retired effective September 30, 2012.
 
HILL, Justice.
 
[¶1]      
This opinion encompasses two separate appeals from two separate 
appellants, but both appeals challenge the implied consent advisement as 
affected by the same Laramie ordinance.  While the appeals 
have not been consolidated, we join them for the purposes of opinion.
 
[¶2]      
Kyle Regan and Joseph Parsons, in separate incidents, were both arrested 
for driving while under the influence (DWUI).  
Following their arrests, each appellant consented to chemical 
testing.  Regan’s test showed that he had a 0.26 percent blood 
alcohol concentration, and Parsons’ test showed that he had a 0.16 percent blood 
alcohol concentration.  Based on the test results, each 
appellant had his driver’s license administratively suspended.  
Each appellant likewise challenged the administrative suspension, 
claiming that his consent to chemical testing was invalid because he had been 
threatened with jail time under a local Laramie ordinance if he did not consent 
to the testing.  In each case, the Office of Administrative 
Hearings (OAH) issued an order upholding the suspension, and each 
appellant appeals that order.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]      
Regan and Parsons both present the same issues on appeal:
 
            
I.          
This matter should be stayed pending resolution of pending declaratory 
judgment action involving enforcement of Laramie Municipal Ordinance 
1592.
            
II.         [Were 
Appellants] read proper implied consent advisements after being arrested for 
a DWUI under Laramie Enrolled Ordinance 1592?
            
III.        Does the 
creation of minimum mandatory jail time for an alleged refusal to submit to a 
chemical test under Laramie’s new DWUI constitute a “critical stage” 
for purposes of application of the Wyoming right to an attorney and distinguish 
the case from Mogard v. City of Laramie, 2001 WY 88, 
¶¶ 26-31, 32 P.3d 313, 324-25 (Wyo. 2001)?
            
IV.       Are Laramie's new 
drinking and driving laws in conflict with State law and therefore 
preempted?
 
FACTS
 
Kyle 
Regan
 
[¶4]      
On April 17, 2011, at 2:23 a.m., Officer Christopher Cleven 
was on patrol in Laramie, Wyoming, when he observed a vehicle being driven 
erratically.  Officer Cleven followed the vehicle 
for several blocks and then initiated a traffic stop.  He made 
contact with the driver, Kyle Regan, and noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming 
from the vehicle.  Officer Cleven also observed 
that Regan’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy and that Regan had difficulty 
retrieving his driver’s license and proof of insurance.
 
[¶5]      
Officer Cleven asked Regan to exit the vehicle and then 
directed him through standardized field sobriety tests.  Regan 
performed poorly on the tests and showed a lack of balance.  
Officer Cleven asked Regan if he felt that he had had too 
much to drink to be driving, and Regan responded, “Yes I have and I’m (sic) 
genuinely do not know what I was thinking.”  
Officer Cleven then arrested Regan for DWUI and 
transported him to the Albany County Detention Center.
 
[¶6]      
At the detention center, Officer Cleven read Regan the 
Wyoming Implied Consent Advisement, which informed Regan that failure to submit 
to chemical testing would result in a six-month driver’s license suspension for 
a first offense and an eighteen-month suspension for subsequent refusals or 
offenses.  Regan refused to submit to chemical 
testing.  Officer Cleven described the subsequent 
events as follows:
 
* * *  
I then read him the Chemical Test Refusal Warning Form1 at which time he asked if he could 
think about it and after approximately ten minutes he advised me that he would 
provide a breath sample and I gave him the Wyoming Implied Consent Advisement in 
which he did sign this agreeing to a breath sample, however it should be noted 
that he originally signed the refuse to submit to any chemical test and he then 
scratched this out and signed the line above it stating that he would 
agree.
 
[¶7]      
After obtaining Regan’s consent to the chemical testing, 
Officer Cleven administered the test.  The 
chemical breath test showed that Regan had a 0.26 percent blood alcohol 
concentration, and based on those results, Officer Cleven issued 
Regan a citation for DWUI, confiscated his driver's license, and issued 
him a Notice of Suspension and Temporary Wyoming Driver’s License.  
On April 26, 2011, the Wyoming Department of Transportation 
(WYDOT) notified Regan that due to his chemical testing 
results, WYDOT was suspending his driver’s license for a period of 
ninety days, beginning on May 17, 2011.
 
Joseph 
Parsons
 
[¶8]      
On the evening of May 19, 2011, Officer Jay Peyton was on patrol in 
Laramie, Wyoming, when he observed a pickup truck traveling north on 9th Street 
in excess of the posted speed limit.  Officer Peyton turned 
around and followed the truck to make a traffic stop.  While 
following the truck, Officer Peyton observed the truck “swerving badly” in its 
lane and at one point nearly hit a parked vehicle.  Officer 
Peyton initiated a traffic stop and made contact with the truck’s driver, Joseph 
Parsons.  He noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from the 
truck and also observed that Parsons’ eyes were bloodshot and glossy and his 
eyelids were droopy.  In responding to Officer Peyton's 
initial questions, Parsons slurred his words, had difficulty forming complete 
sentences and had difficulty retrieving his driver’s license.
 
[¶9]      
Officer Peyton asked Parsons to exit the vehicle and then directed him 
through standardized field sobriety tests.  Parsons failed the 
sobriety tests and based on that failure and “the totality of the 
circumstances,” Officer Peyton then arrested Parsons for DWUI and 
transported him to the Albany County Detention Center.
 
[¶10]   
Officer Peyton described his advisements to Parsons and the subsequent 
events as follows:
 
I transported Parsons 
to the Albany County Detention Center (ACDC) for booking.  
Once at the ACDC I read Parsons the Wyoming Implied Consent 
Advisement and requested that he agree to a chemical breath test.  
Parsons agreed to the chemical breath test.  I checked 
Parsons' mouth for any foreign objects and found nothing.  I 
waited the required 15 minute observation period and started the 
test.  Just before the first breath sample was to be taken 
Parsons asked for a drink of water.  I explained to Parsons 
that he was not allowed to have anything in his mouth for at least 15 minutes 
prior to the chemical breath test and the test had already been 
started.  Parsons stated that he wanted to speak with his 
lawyer.  I explained to Parsons that he did not have the right 
to speak with his lawyer prior to taking the breath test in order to decide 
whether or not to take the test.  Parsons stated that he had 
changed his mind and that he was refusing to take the chemical breath 
test.  I read Parsons the Refusal of a Chemical Test 
Advisement.2  Parsons changed 
his mind again and stated that he would take the chemical breath 
test.  Parsons registered at a .169% BAC according 
to the Intoximeter.  Parsons was transferred over to 
the custody of the deputies at ACDC.
 
[¶11]   
Based on Parsons’ chemical testing results, Officer Peyton cited Parsons 
for DWUI and issued him a Notice of Suspension and Temporary Wyoming 
Driver’s License.  On May 23, 2011, the Wyoming Department of 
Transportation (WYDOT) notified Parsons that due to his chemical testing 
results, WYDOT was suspending his driver’s license for a period of 
ninety days, beginning on June 19, 2011.
 
OAH Ruling
 
[¶12]   
Regan and Parsons each requested a hearing to contest WYDOT’s 
administrative suspension of his driver’s license, and the OAH held 
separate evidentiary hearings for each appellant.  Before the 
OAH, neither Regan nor Parsons contested the lawfulness of law 
enforcement's initial contact or the probable cause for their 
arrests.  They instead challenged the implied consent 
advisement they were given, contending that the advisement was improper because 
it went beyond the advisement prescribed by statute and included a warning of 
the consequences under Laramie’s implied consent ordinances.  
They also challenged the validity of the Laramie ordinances, arguing that 
the ordinances conflicted with state law, were vague and overbroad, and 
infringed on the constitutional right to an attorney.
 
[¶13]   
The OAH issued orders upholding the administrative 
suspensions of Regan’s and Parson's driver’s licenses.  The 
orders were separate but virtually identical.  
The OAH rulings explained:
 
            
The suspension of driving privileges is civil in nature and is controlled 
by Wyoming law.  In order for a person to make a choice to 
take or refuse a chemical test, the person must be informed of the consequences 
of taking or refusing the chemical test as provided for under the Wyoming 
implied consent law.  The evidence in this matter 
clearly established [the officer] arrested Regan[/Parsons] for DWUI, read 
Regan[/Parsons] the implied consent advisement required under Wyoming law 
and Regan[/Parsons] eventually agreed to submit to a chemical test.  
As such, the proposed suspension action should be upheld.  
The issues and argument raised by Regan’s/[Parson's] counsel have no 
merit in this civil proceeding.  The arguments may have some 
bearing in the underlying criminal action in the Laramie Municipal Court but 
that issue is not one this Office has authority upon which to rule.  
Additionally, it should be noted Regan[/Parsons] was specifically 
notified if he submitted to a chemical test and if the result indicated he was 
under the influence of alcohol, he may be subject to criminal 
penalties.  Regan[/Parsons] was put on notice his decision to 
take a chemical test could result in criminal penalties.  
Regan/[Parsons] was given the proper advisement and the proposed 
suspension action should be upheld.  (Emphasis in 
original.)
 
[¶14]   
Regan and Parsons each filed a petition for judicial review, and the 
district court issued separate orders affirming their suspensions.  
In so ruling, the district court upheld the OAH determination 
that each appellant was read the proper implied consent advisement.  
The court also affirmed that the OAH was without jurisdiction 
to consider the challenges to the validity of Laramie's implied consent 
ordinances, and it concluded that because the OAH did not have such 
jurisdiction, the district court likewise lacked jurisdiction to address those 
issues.  The district court also denied each appellant's 
request to stay his appeal pending resolution of a separate declaratory judgment 
action challenging the validity of Laramie’s ordinances.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶15]   
We review administrative decisions in accordance with the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides:
 
(c)  To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:
(i)  Compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(ii)  Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:
(A)  Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;
(B)  Contrary 
to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C)  In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;
(D)  Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or
(E)  Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011).
 
[¶16]   
Neither Regan nor Parsons raises an issue of fact or evidentiary weight 
in this appeal, and the appeal thus presents only questions of law.  
“'We review an agency’s conclusions of law de novo, and will 
affirm only if the agency’s conclusions are in accordance with the 
law.’”  Kenyon 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety and Compensation Div., 2011 WY 
14, ¶ 13, 247 P.3d 845, 849 (Wyo.2011) (quoting Moss v. 
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety and Compensation Div., 2010 WY 
66, ¶ 11, 232 P.3d 1, 4 (Wyo.2010)).  In an appeal from a district 
court’s appellate review of an administrative decision, we review the case as if 
it came directly from the hearing examiner, affording no deference to the 
district court’s decision.  Deloge v. 
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety and Compensation Div., 2011 WY 154, 
¶ 5, 264 P.3d 28, 30 (Wyo. 2011); In re 
Kaczmarek, 2009 WY 110, ¶ 7, 215 P.3d 277, 280 (Wyo. 
2009).
 
DISCUSSION
 
A.        
Implied Consent Advisement
 
[¶17]   
Wyoming law provides that every driver on 
Wyoming roads is deemed to have consented to chemical testing upon an arrest for 
DWUI.  Escarcega v. Wyo. Dep’t of 
Transp., 2007 WY 38, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 264, 268 (Wyo. 2007) 
(citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102).  The law in effect when 
Regan and Parsons were arrested for DWUI required that upon a 
lawful DWUI arrest, the arrested person must be advised 
that:
 
   (A)  His 
failure to submit to all required tests requested by the peace officer shall 
result in the suspension of his Wyoming driver’s license or his privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle for a period of six (6) months for a first offense or 
eighteen (18) months for a second or subsequent offense and he may be required 
to drive only vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock device as provided 
by W.S. 31-6-107;
   (B)  If 
a test is taken and the results indicate the person is under the influence of 
alcohol or a controlled substance, he may be subject to criminal penalties, his 
Wyoming driver’s license or his privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall be 
suspended for ninety (90) days and he may be required to drive only vehicles 
equipped with an ignition interlock device;
   (C)  After 
 submitting to all chemical tests  requested 
by the peace officer at a place and in a manner prescribed by and at the expense 
of the agency employing the peace officer, the arrested person may go to the 
nearest hospital or clinic and secure any additional tests at his own 
expense[.]  
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(a)(i)-(ii) (LexisNexis 2009).
 
[¶18]   
The appellants do not contest that they were read the statutorily 
required implied consent advisements in their entirety.  Their 
objection is instead that the advisements went beyond the statutory advisements 
and improperly included a warning that, under the Laramie ordinances, a refusal 
to submit to chemical testing may result in additional penalties including up to 
seven days in jail.  The appellants thus argue that their 
chemical test results may not be used to support their administrative 
suspensions because their submission to the testing was coerced and they were 
not allowed to speak with an attorney.
 
[¶19]   
We reject the appellants' arguments.  First, with 
respect to their administrative suspensions, it is impossible for the appellants 
to articulate prejudice from allegedly being coerced into the 
testing.  This Court has observed as follows concerning the 
purpose to be served by the implied consent advisement:
 
The 
Legislature has mandated specific warnings to all drivers that there are 
consequences to their non-commercial driver's licenses for refusing to submit to 
chemical testing subsequent to an arrest for DWUI. The prospect of those 
consequences encourages drivers to submit to chemical testing, and serves to aid 
the state in achieving the legitimate goals of removing drunk drivers from the 
road and imposing proper penalties on offenders. Mackey 
v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 2621, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1979).
 
Escarcega, 
¶ 19, 153 P.3d  at 270.
 
[¶20]   
In other words, the implied consent advisement is itself a coercive 
device.  It encourages a driver to submit to chemical testing 
by imposing a greater administrative penalty for refusing the chemical testing, 
a minimum six-month suspension, than it imposes for a test result that confirms 
the driver was under the influence of alcohol, a ninety-day 
suspension.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(a)(ii).  
Thus, if the appellants had refused the testing, as they have indicated 
they would have done had they not been threatened with jail time for their 
refusals, their administrative suspensions would have been a minimum of three 
months longer than the administrative suspensions that were imposed on 
them.  Thus, at least with respect to the appellants' 
administrative suspensions, the alleged coercion did not expose them to an 
enhanced penalty, and in fact was to their benefit rather than 
their detriment.3  
 
[¶21]   
We further reject the appellants' arguments because they ignore the 
distinction between an administrative proceeding and a criminal 
prosecution.  See Glasrud v. City 
of Laramie, 934 P.2d 1242, 1246 (Wyo. 1997) (“Driver’s license 
suspensions are civil proceedings, separate and distinct from DWUI 
prosecutions.”).  Because the OAH review of the 
driver's license suspensions was an administrative proceeding, its scope was 
statutorily prescribed and limited:
 
(b)  The 
scope of a hearing for the purposes of this act shall cover the issues of 
whether a peace officer had probable cause to believe the arrested person had 
been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public 
street or highway in this state in violation of W.S. 31-5-233(b) or 
any other law prohibiting driving under the influence as defined 
by W.S. 31-5-233(a)(v), whether the person was placed under arrest, 
whether he refused to submit to a test upon request of the peace officer or if 
he submitted to a test whether the test results indicated that the person had an 
alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or more, 
and whether, except for the persons described in this act who are 
incapable of refusing, he had been given the advisements required 
by W.S. 31-6-102(a)(ii).
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-103(b) (LexisNexis 2009) (Emphasis added.).
 
[¶22]   
The OAH ruled that Regan and Parsons were each given the 
advisements required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(a)(ii), and the appellants do 
not contest that they were given those advisements.  
The OAH therefore ruled in accordance with the 
law and evidence in finding that the statutorily required implied consent 
advisements were given.  To the extent that Regan and 
Parsons wish to extend their challenge to the constitutionality or validity of 
the Laramie municipal ordinances, we agree with the OAH and the 
district court that such a challenge was beyond the scope of the OAH 
proceeding and must be brought in a separate declaratory judgment action or in 
the criminal proceeding on the DWUI citation.  
See Sandoval v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep’t of Transp., 2012 
WY 160, ¶ 15, ___ P.3d. ___ (Wyo. 2012) (“Wyoming law does not 
require peace officers to give further advisements depending upon municipal 
ordinances and does not authorize the OAH to consider municipal 
ordinances when determining whether to rescind or sustain a driver’s license 
suspension.”); Williams v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety and 
Compensation Div., 2009 WY 57, ¶ 18, 205 P.3d 1024, 1032 
(Wyo. 2009) (“The law is clear that administrative 
agencies have no authority to determine the constitutionality of a statute and 
that neither the district court nor this Court has jurisdiction on appeal of 
agency action to consider the issue.”).
 
[¶23]   
Having concluded that the OAH was without jurisdiction to 
rule on the challenges to the Laramie implied consent ordinances, we must 
likewise conclude that this Court is without jurisdiction to consider and rule 
on those issues.  Escarcega, ¶ 22, 
153 P.3d  at 270 (neither district court 
nor this Court has authority in an administrative agency appeal to address law’s 
constitutionality or validity).
 
B.        
Regan/Parsons Requests to Stay Appeal
 
[¶24]   
The appellants requested that this Court stay consideration of this 
appeal until resolution of a separately pending declaratory judgment action 
challenging the constitutionality and validity of the Laramie implied consent 
ordinances.  We agree with the district court that there is no 
basis for such a stay.  As discussed above, the issue of the 
validity of the Laramie ordinances is outside the scope of the administrative 
suspension.  The question before the OAH was a 
narrow one, and the OAH resolved that question in accordance with 
the applicable law and the OAH’s authority.  The 
appellants' challenges to the Laramie ordinances may affect their criminal 
conviction for the DWUI citations, but it will have no affect on the 
outcome of this appeal.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶25]   
The OAH ruled in accordance with law in determining that 
Regan and Parsons were given the statutorily required implied consent 
advisements, and it properly declined to rule on their remaining contentions as 
beyond the scope of the administrative proceeding and outside the jurisdiction 
of the OAH.  We thus affirm.
 
FOOTNOTES
  1The record contains no document entitled “Chemical Test 
Refusal Warning Form.”  It is our understanding, given the 
context of this appeal, and given that the warning form was read after Regan’s 
initial refusal, that the form warned of the penalties associated with Laramie’s 
implied consent ordinances.  The municipal ordinances make it 
a crime to refuse the chemical testing and provide penalties that include up to 
seven days in jail for a first offense and up to thirty days in jail for 
subsequent offenses.
  2The record contains no document entitled “Refusal of a 
Chemical Test Advisement.”  As with the advisement that Regan 
was given, it is our understanding, given the context of this appeal, and given 
that the warning form was read after Parsons’ initial refusal, that the form 
warned of the penalties associated with Laramie’s implied consent 
ordinances.
3The appellants' criminal prosecutions 
for DWUI are not before the Court, and we therefore do not address 
the coercion issue as it relates to those 
prosecutions.