Case Title: Scott v. Jenkins

Citation: 345 Md. 21

Docket Number: 29/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No.  29
  September Term, 1996
___________________________________
ROBERT SCOTT
v.
TERRY NAPOLEON JENKINS
___________________________________
Bell,  C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
  
Wilner
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Karwacki, J.
___________________________________
      Filed:  March 14, 1997       
         
      The Jenkins Amended Complaint also named Prince George's County and Police
1
Officer, C. Richardson, as defendants.  These codefendants of Jenkins were dismissed
by the trial court prior to trial for reasons unrelated to the issues presented in
this appeal.
This appeal concerns the pleading requirements for a claim of
punitive damages.  We are asked whether a complaint seeking
monetary damages for a tort must make a specific claim for punitive
damages and whether that complaint must set forth facts that, if
proven true, would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages.  The
answer to both questions is yes.  Consequently, for the reasons
explained below, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of
Special Appeals.
I.
During the investigation of an assault and battery unrelated
to the case sub judice, Prince George's County Police Officer,
Corporal Robert Scott, Petitioner, assisted in the detention of a
juvenile suspect.  Scott was informed by Terry N. Jenkins,
Respondent, that someone other than the detainee was responsible
for the crime.  For reasons disputed by the parties, Jenkins and
Scott engaged in a scuffle, resulting in Jenkins' arrest for
battering Corporal Scott.  Jenkins testified at the trial below
that the State nolle prossed his battery charge.
Shortly thereafter, Jenkins filed a Complaint and a demand for
a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. 
Jenkins subsequently filed an Amended Complaint charging Scott, and
others,  individually and in their official capacities, with counts
1
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of assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, slander, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Jenkins' Amended
Complaint demanded judgments for each count:
"1.
For damages in the amount of $500,000.00.
 2.
For costs plus interest.
 3.
For such other and further relief as the
court may deem just and proper."
Jenkins' Amended Complaint neither made a specific claim for
punitive damages, nor did it allege that Scott acted with actual
malice. 
Following the close of all evidence at trial, Jenkins
requested the submission of a punitive damages instruction to the
jury.  Scott objected, pointing out that Jenkins failed to plead
punitive damages in his original and Amended Complaints and that no
mention of punitive damages was made during trial until the
discussion of jury instructions with the trial judge.  The court
overruled Scott's objection, noting that Jenkins' claim of $500,000
damages, given the nature of the case, should have forewarned Scott
that punitive damages were being sought.  Scott also objected to
the form of the punitive damages instruction.
The jury returned a verdict in Jenkins' favor on the false
arrest and battery counts, awarding him $150.00 compensatory
damages, and $1,000.00 punitive damages.  The verdict sheet did not
-3-
       The verdict sheet recreated in its entirety appeared as follows:
2
"In the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland
TERRY NAPOLEON JENKINS
*
Plaintiff
*
v.
*
CAL90-23661
Corporal Robert Scott
*
Defendant
*
Verdict Sheet
1. 
Was defendant Corporal Robert Scott guilty of battery [i.e., did
defendant Scott intentionally and unlawfully touch Terry Napoleon Jenkins in a
harmful or offensive manner]?
Yes   T  
No      
2.
Was defendant Corporal Robert Scott guilty of false arrest [i.e., did
defendant Scott detain Terry Napoleon Jenkins for purpose of prosecution for
misdemeanor battery without probable cause]?
Yes   T  
No      
   Note:
If your answer is "No" to Questions 1 and 2, STOP and go no further.
If your answer is "Yes" to Question 1 or 2 or both, answer Question 3.
3.
What damages do you award plaintiff Jenkins?
a.  Compensatory:
$   150.00
b.  Punitive:
$ 1,000.00"
indicate upon which of the two counts submitted to the jury the
punitive award was predicated.2
Scott appealed the judgment based on that verdict to the Court
of Special Appeals, claiming that the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury on punitive damages when Jenkins failed to
specifically claim or plead such damages in his Amended Complaint.
Noting that Jenkins' complaint averred that Scott had "placed his
finger in Jenkins's nostril, that Scott was verbally abusive to
-4-
Jenkins, that Scott beat Jenkins, and that Jenkins acted with due
care at all times and did nothing to provoke such abusive
behavior[,]"  Scott v. Jenkins, 107 Md. App. 440, 443, 668 A.2d
958, 960 (1995), the intermediate appellate court concluded that
"Scott was notified adequately of Jenkins' intent to seek punitive
damages at trial."  Scott, 107 Md. App. at 445, 668 A.2d at 960.
We granted Scott's petition for certiorari to consider the adequacy
of Jenkins' "claim" for punitive damages.
II.
Of the necessities for the prosecution of a successful
lawsuit, none is more important than the pleading.  It is the
first, and sometime the last, opportunity a plaintiff has to make
his or her case.  Although Maryland abandoned the formalities of
common law pleading long ago, it is still a fair comment to say
that pleading plays four distinct roles in our system of
jurisprudence.  It (1) provides notice to the parties as to the
nature of the claim or defense; (2) states the facts upon which the
claim or defense allegedly exists; (3) defines the boundaries of
litigation; and (4) provides for the speedy resolution of frivolous
claims and defenses.  JOHN A. LYNCH, JR. & RICHARD W. BOURNE, MODERN
MARYLAND CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.1 (1993).  Of these four, notice is
paramount.  American Express Co. v. State, 132 Md. 72, 74, 103 A.
96, 96 (1918); Peace v. Watkins, 68 Md. 534, 538, 13 A. 376, 377
(1888); see also Early v. Early, 338 Md. 639, 658, 659 A.2d 1334,
-5-
1343 (1995)("The Court has no authority, discretionary or
otherwise, to rule upon a question not raised by the pleadings, and
of which the parties therefore had neither notice nor an
opportunity to be heard.").
To that end, Maryland Rule 2-303(b) requires that each claim
in a pleading
"be simple, concise, and direct.  No technical
forms of pleadings are required.  A pleading
shall contain only such statements of fact as
may be necessary to show the pleader's
entitlement to relief or ground of defense . .
. ." 
  
III.
In the context of a negligence action, we have previously held
that a sufficient pleading must "allege, with certainty and
definiteness, facts and circumstances sufficient to set forth (a)
a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (b) a breach of that
duty and (c) injury proximately resulting from that breach."  Read
Drug and Chemical Co. v. Colwill Constr. Co., 250 Md. 407, 412, 243
A.2d 548, 553 (1967)(emphasis in original).  Our holding in Read
Drug flowed from the natural import of the language of former Md.
Rule 301 b, now Rule 2-303(b), that a "pleading shall contain only
such statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleader's
entitlement to relief[.]"  Md. Rule 2-303(b).
In that regard, any claim for relief based upon an alleged
tort, intentional or non-intentional, must allege facts, if proven
true, sufficient to support each and every element of the asserted
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claim.  In a civil battery action, for example, a well-pleaded
complaint must allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant
engaged in an "unpermitted application of trauma . . . upon any
part of the" plaintiff, proximately causing his or her injuries.
Sabra v. Darling, 72 Md. App. 487, 491, 531 A.2d 696, 698
(1987)(quoting RICHARD J. GILBERT AND PAUL T. GILBERT, MARYLAND TORT LAW
HANDBOOK § 3.1 (1986)) aff'd, 320 Md. 45, 575 A.2d 1240 (1990).
Likewise, in a claim for false arrest, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant deprived him or her of his or her liberty
without consent and without legal justification.  Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 654, 261 A.2d 731, 738
(1970); Mahan v. Adam, 144 Md. 355, 365, 124 A. 901, 905 (1924).
As we shall explain, however, facts sufficient to support an
intentional or non-intentional tort claim do not necessarily
entitle a plaintiff to a punitive damages award.
IV.
We have lately, and at great length, discussed the necessary
prerequisites to a punitive damages award.  Lest there be any
remaining doubt, in order to recover punitive damages in any tort
action in the State of Maryland, facts sufficient to show actual
malice must be pleaded and proven by clear and convincing evidence,
and a specific demand for the recovery of punitive damages must be
made before an award of such damages may be had.
-7-
      "Implied malice," as we use it here, means non-intentional conduct so
3
reckless or wanton as to be "grossly negligent."  This is to be distinguished from
conduct motivated by ill will, fraud, intent to injure, or other mens rea exhibiting
an evil motive or purpose, or stated otherwise, "actual malice."  See Montgomery
Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 728 n.5, 664 A.2d 916, 930 n.5 (1995).
Prior to 1972, this Court held fast to a standard requiring
"actual malice" before recovery of punitive damages in negligence
actions.  See Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 133-34, 36 A.2d 699,
700-01 (1944).  With the decision in Smith v. Gray Concrete and
Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 271 (1972), our predecessors
departed from this rule, holding that in automobile negligence
cases, implied malice,  while falling short "of wilful or
3
intentional 
injury, 
contemplates 
conduct 
which 
is 
of 
an
extraordinary or outrageous character" and will support a punitive
damages award.  Smith, 267 Md. at 168, 297 A.2d at 732.  That
standard was applied as recently as Nast v. Lockett, 312 Md. 343,
539 A.2d 1113 (1988).
Shortly after the Smith decision, an explosion of punitive
damages litigation ensued, fueled in part by two opinions which, in
effect, severed punitive damage awards from their historical
rationales of punishment and deterrence.  Schaefer v. Miller, 322
Md. 297, 322, 587 A.2d 491, 503-04 (1991)(Eldridge, J.,
concurring).  Relying primarily upon Knickerbocker Co. v. Gardiner
Co., 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1908), the Court in H & R Block, Inc.
v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975), while acknowledging
that H & R Block exhibited a reckless disregard for the rights of
-8-
      In Wedeman, the plaintiff was fraudulently induced into the purchase of a
4
damaged car sold as first quality.  In concluding that the tort did not arise out
of the contractual relationship, we pointed out that "it [was] the tortious conduct
which induce[d] the innocent party to enter into the contractual relationship."
Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 529-30, 366 A.2d 7, 11 (1976).
others by employing inexperienced and unqualified employees,
nevertheless concluded that punitive damages were recoverable in a
tort action arising out of a contractual relationship only upon a
showing of "actual malice."   Although the Court conceded that
punitive damages were potentially recoverable in tort actions
arising out of contractual relationships when the contract was
broken for the "sole purpose of wrongfully injuring the plaintiff,"
punitive damages based on any other motive would obliterate the
distinction between tortious conduct and simple breach of contract.
275 Md. at 44, 338 A.2d at 53 (emphasis in original).
One year later, in Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524,
366 A.2d 7 (1976), the Court stepped away from Testerman and held
that when tortious conduct preceded a contractual relationship,
implied, rather than actual, malice could support a punitive
damages award.   "Conduct of an extraordinary nature characterized
4
by a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of others" became
sufficient to support such an award.  278 Md. at 532, 366 A.2d at
12.
In a concurring opinion in Schaefer, supra, a medical
malpractice action which upheld the reversal of a punitive damages
award, 322 Md. 297, 587 A.2d 491 (1991), Judges Eldridge, Cole, and
-9-
Chasanow called upon this Court to abandon the distinction between
torts arising out of a contractual relationship versus those that
do not, otherwise known as the Testerman-Wedeman Rule, and to
return to the actual malice standard announced in Davis, supra. 
In its reasoning, the concurrence pointed out that the Testerman-
Wedeman Rule was (1) unsupported by Maryland authority, Schaefer,
322 Md. at 316-18, 587 A.2d at 501-02; (2) inconsistently applied
by the Court, 322 Md. at 318-21, 587 A.2d at 502-03; and (3)
unrelated to the purposes of punitive damages.  322 Md. at 321-22,
587 A.2d 503-04.
Within the year, this Court adopted the rationale of the
Schaefer concurrence. In Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420,
601 A.2d 633 (1992), we rejected both the Testerman-Wedeman Rule,
and the implied malice standard announced in Smith v. Gray Concrete
and Pipe Co., supra.  We held that "in a non-intentional tort
action, the trier of fact may not award punitive damages unless the
plaintiff has established that the defendant's conduct was
characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud,
i.e., `actual malice.'"  Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652
(citing Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. at 133, 36 A.2d at 701).
The reasons for the return to the pre-Smith rule were far less
opaque than the inconsistent cases that the departure from it had
spawned.  Noting that the "the purpose of punitive damages related
entirely to the nature of the defendant's conduct," we concluded
-10-
      See American College of Trial Lawyers, Committee Report on Punitive Damages,
5
at 6 and n.23 (1989) ("law of various jurisdictions are evolving to require some
conscious indifference to the rights of others before punitive damages are
warranted); see also Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 162, 726 P.2d 565, 578
that "the availability of punitive damages ought to depend upon the
heinous nature of the defendant's conduct," and not upon whether
the tortious conduct occurred within the context of a contractual
relationship.  Zenobia, 325 Md. at 454, 601 A.2d at 650 (citing
Schaefer v. Miller, 322 Md. at 321-22, 587 A.2d at 503)(citations
omitted).  Moreover, the prophetic warning in Smith v. Gray
Concrete, supra, that the "implied malice" or as there used, "gross
negligence," standard "may be so flexible that it can become
virtually unlimited in its application," 267 Md. A.2d 66, 297 A.2d
at 731, proved true.  "Despite [that] Court's [attempts to limit]
the implied malice standard to torts involving the operation of
motor vehicles, the standard [was] freely applied to other non-
intentional torts."  Zenobia, 325 Md. at 457, 601 A.2d at 651
(citations omitted).
Perhaps the most compelling reason for casting aside the
implied malice standard was its elusive nature.  Although the
purported basis for assessing punitive damages is to punish and
deter particularly reprehensible conduct motivated by a conscious
and evil motive, the various formulations of "implied malice"
reached conduct that was perhaps reprehensible, but otherwise free
of the ill-will appropriately targeted by a punitive damages
award.   325 Md. at 458-59, 601 A.2d at 651-52.  Not only did this
5
-11-
(1986)(availability of punitive damages restricted to those cases in which
defendant's conduct was guided by evil motives).
inconsistency expose individuals and companies alike to an ever
changing legal landscape which more often concealed, rather than
revealed, the conduct subject to a punitive damages award, it also
"undermine[d] the deterrent effect of [such] awards."  Id., 601
A.2d at 652 (citing 2 L. SCHLUETER AND K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES,
Appendix B, at 418-19 (2d ed. 1989)(suggesting that under the
"implied malice" standard, potential defendants may either refrain
from socially beneficial behavior out of fear, or engage in conduct
harmful to society).  See also Owens-Corning v. Garrett, 343 Md.
500, 538, 682 A.2d 1143, 1161 (1996); ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340
Md. 334 at 361-62, 667 A.2d 116, 129 (1995).
In addition to requiring that punitive damages claimants prove
"actual malice," Zenobia also burdened tort plaintiffs with
"establish[ing] by clear and convincing evidence the basis for an
award of [such] damages."  325 Md. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657.
Following the lead of at least twenty-three other states, we
concluded that such a burden was appropriate, given the "penal
nature" of punitive damages and "their potential for debilitating
harm."  Id. at 467-49, 601 A.2d at 656-57.  In short, although the
underlying tort may be proven by a mere preponderance, the evidence
supporting the punitive damages claim must be subjected to the more
stringent "clear and convincing" standard.
-12-
Although the debate underlying Zenobia concerned the proper
standard for a punitive damages award in non-intentional tort
cases, with respect to the tort of false imprisonment, the Court
said over fifty years ago in Heinze v. Murphy that
"[a]n officer who acts in good faith in making
an arrest is absolved from punitive or
exemplary damages, even though he is liable
for compensatory damages.  However, such
damages may be allowed against an officer
under circumstances upon which bad faith or
malice may be attributed to him in making the
arrest."
180 Md. 423, 430, 24 A.2d 917, 920 (1942).  The Court went on to
say that "where damages beyond compensation, to punish the party
guilty of a wrongful act, are asked, the evidence must show wanton
or malicious motive, and it must be actual and not constructive or
implied." 180 Md. at 434, 24 A.2d at 922-23 (emphasis added).
Since Zenobia, we have made it abundantly clear that "with respect
to both intentional and non-intentional torts, . . . an award of
punitive damages must be based upon actual malice, in the sense of
conscious and deliberate wrongdoing, evil or wrongful motive,
intent to injure, ill will, or fraud."  Montgomery Ward v. Wilson,
339 Md. 701, 733, 664 A.2d 916, 932 (1995)(citing Ellerin v.
Fairfax Savings, 337 Md. 216, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995); Alexander v.
Evander, 336 Md. 635, 652, 650 A.2d 260, 269 (1994); Komornik v.
Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 725, 629 A.2d 721, 723 (1993); Adams v.
Coates, 331 Md. 1, 13, 626 A.2d 36, 42 (1993)).  
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V.
As we indicated earlier, the present controversy is prompted
by what Scott perceives to be Jenkins' failure to plead adequately
his claim for punitive damages, thereby depriving Scott of fair
opportunity to respond to the claim.  Although the precise issue
now raised has never been addressed by this Court, we have offered
ample guidance in the past.
a.
Amicus for Petitioner Scott points out that in Smith v. Gray
Concrete and Pipe Co., supra, we imposed a strict pleading
requirement in punitive or exemplary damages cases.  We there said
that
"No bald or conclusory allegations of `wanton
or reckless disregard for human life' or
language of similar import, shall withstand
attack on grounds of insufficiency.  It
follows from what we have said that far
greater specificity will be required [when
pleading punitive damages] than that reflected
by the `Appendix of Forms' accompanying the
Maryland Rules." 
Smith, 267 Md. at 168, 297 A.2d at 732; see also Nast v. Lockett,
312 Md. 343, 370, 539 A.2d 1113, 1127 (1988), overruled on other
grounds by Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 460, 601 A.2d
633, 652 (1992).  Professors Lynch and Bourne of the University of
Baltimore have echoed this sentiment, stating that "[a] plaintiff
seeking to recover punitive damages must allege in detail in his
complaint the facts that indicate the entertainment by the
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defendant of [an evil motive or intent]."  MODERN MARYLAND CIVIL
PROCEDURE, supra § 6.5(b)(2)(emphasis added).  Cf. Summit Loans, Inc.
v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43, 288 A.2d 114 (1972)(systematic threatening
and vile telephone calls to a debtor sufficient to support a
punitive damages award).  Our decisions subsequent to Smith and
Nast in no way suggest a departure from that strict pleading
requirement.
In upholding Jenkins' punitive damages award, the Court of
Special Appeals drew an analogy to consequential damages, being
those damages that "the law would impute . . . as the natural,
necessary, and logical consequence of the acts of the defendant.
[S]uch damages need not be specifically requested in the complaint;
instead they may be recovered under a claim for damages generally."
107 Md. App. at 444, 668 A.2d at 958 (citing Nicholson v.
Blanchette, 239 Md. 168, 180-81, 210 A.2d 732, 738-39 (1965);
Weiller v. Weiss, 124 Md. 461, 466-67, 92 A. 1028, 1029 (1915)).
The intermediate appellate court's analogy is flawed for at least
two reasons.
First, as alluded to above, because a higher standard of proof
precedes a recovery of punitive damages, it follows that a more
detailed factual allegation is necessary to put the other party on
notice that such damages are being sought.  To suggest otherwise,
would allow plaintiffs to hide their hand until the last possible
moment and leave defendants unprepared to face a claim for punitive
-15-
damages.  Our rules of pleading are designed to prevent surprise,
not encourage it.
A claim that "may" support a punitive damages award, does not
necessarily apprise the defendant of the true nature of the claim
against him.  This is especially so, when, as in the instant case,
the pleading fails to expressly demand a judgment for "punitive
damages."  See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168,
175, 122 A.2d 457, 461 (1955)(actual malice necessary to support
punitive damages in a false imprisonment claim, but malice is not
an element of the tort).  A punitive damages award based upon an
insufficiently 
pleaded 
complaint 
may 
render 
the 
judgment
constitutionally infirm.  See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Nationwide
Constr. Corp., 244 Md. 401, 410-411, 224 A.2d 285, 290
(1966)("Where a judgment was outside the cause of action stated in
the complaint and the defendant was not given a fair opportunity to
defend against the claim on which the judgment was based, the
judgment is invalid and subject to collateral attack.").
Second, punitive damages do not necessarily flow from a
tortious act.  Rather than representing a specific monetary loss by
the 
plaintiff, 
punitive 
damages 
embody 
a 
public 
policy
determination that a particular defendant engaged in heinous and
malicious conduct sufficient to warrant the equivalent of a "civil
penalty."  See Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, 337 Md. at 242 n.13, 652
A.2d at 1130, n.13.  It has no necessary relation to the loss
-16-
suffered by the plaintiff, but rather depicts the degree of the
defendant's culpability and his ability to pay.  Ellerin, 337 Md.
at 242, 652 A.2d at 1129 (citing Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 141-
42, 442 A.2d 966, 973 (1982).  Moreover, unlike consequential
damages, "the trier of fact has the discretion to deny punitive
damages even when the record would otherwise support their award."
Adams v. Coats, 331 Md. 1, 15, 626 A.2d 36, 43 (1993).  These
considerations demand a high degree of specificity from a plaintiff
seeking punitive damages.
b.
In addition to the factual allegations required by Md. Rule 2-
303, Md. Rule 2-305 commands that 
"a pleading that sets forth a claim for relief
. . . shall contain a clear statement of the
facts necessary to constitute a cause of
action and a demand for judgment for relief
sought.  Relief in the alternative or of
several different types may be demanded."
(Emphasis added).
In assessing this Rule, authors Niemeyer and Schuett have observed
that
"If the pleading seeks one type of relief only
but has several counts or legal theories to
support it, one demand for judgment at the end
of the pleading is sufficient.  On the other
hand, if the pleader seeks different types of
relief based upon the nature of the legal
theory alleged to support it, the claim for
relief is included at the conclusion of each
count of the pleading."
-17-
PAUL V. NIEMEYER & LINDA M. SCHUETT, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 169 (2d ed.
1992, 1995 Supp.).  We agree with that assessment.  Because, as
indicated supra, punitive damages serve different ends than do
general damage awards, and are therefore properly classified as
different in nature, a specific claim for their recovery must be
made.  See Falcinelli v. Cardascia, 339 Md. 414, 423, 663 A.2d
1256, 1260 (1995)("Of course, the recovery, if any, by the
plaintiff cannot exceed in nature or amount either the damage
proved or the sum claimed in the ad damnum [clause].")(quoting
Scher v. Altomare, 278 Md. 440, 442, 365 A.2d 41, 42 (1976)).
Although our sister state Virginia takes a similar view,
compare Harrell v. Woodson, 233 Va. 117, 122, 353 S.E.2d 770, 773
(1987)("punitive damages may only be recovered where the plaintiff
has made an express claim for them in the prayer for relief . . .
sufficient to put the defendant on notice that an award of punitive
damages is sought apart from and in addition to, the compensatory
damages claimed"), we acknowledge that other jurisdictions do not
require a specific claim for punitive damages prior to their award.
See Kabajak v. VanBrugge, 59 Ill. App. 2d 344, 348, 207 N.E.2d 344,
350 (1972); Berkovits v. Hanley, 338 N.Y.S.2d 330, 344, 40 A.D.2d
921, 921 (1972); Cays v. McDaniel, 204 Or. 449, 457-58, 283 P.2d
658, 662 (1955); Tucker v. Reynolds, 268 S.C. 330, 335, 233 S.E.2d
402, 404 (1977); see also 25 C.J.S. Damages § 133 (and cases cited
therein).  Be that as it may, those jurisdictions do not share the
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generally restrictive view Maryland takes towards punitive damages,
militating toward a higher standard of pleading when such damages
are sought.  The rule we announce today is consistent with that
view.
In sum, in order to properly plead a claim for punitive
damages, a plaintiff must make a specific demand for that relief in
addition to a claim for damages generally, as well as allege, in
detail, facts that, if proven true, would support the conclusion
that the act complained of was done with "actual malice."  Nothing
less will suffice.
Viewed in light of the principles articulated above, the trial
court erred by submitting Jenkins' punitive damages instruction to
the jury.  Even assuming that his Amended Complaint specifically
and sufficiently alleged facts that would have supported the
conclusion that Scott acted with the requisite "actual malice" to
support a punitive damages award, Jenkins failed to make a specific
claim for such damages.  His prayer for damages and general relief
were simply insufficient to inform Scott of the extraordinary
nature of the additional relief sought against him.
VI.
Scott also assails the trial court's punitive damages
instruction.  Given our conclusion that Jenkins' complaint failed
adequately to seek exemplary damages, and that therefore his claim
-19-
for such damages should not have been submitted to the jury, any
issue concerning the adequacy of that instruction has been rendered
moot.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REVERSE THAT PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE
GEORGE'S COUNTY WHICH CONSTITUTED
PUNITIVE DAMAGES.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT. 
Bell, C.J. joins in the result only.