Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP OF ROBERT LEE McNEEL; PAULA KAY McNEEL V. ROBERT LEE McNEEL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP OF ROBERT LEE McNEEL;  PAULA KAY McNEEL V. ROBERT LEE McNEEL2005 WY 36109 P.3d 510Case Number: 04-132Decided: 03/31/2005
  

            

 
 
October 
Term, A.D. 2004

 

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

AND 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF:

ROBERT 
LEE McNEEL, a person in need

of 
protection

 
 
PAULA 
KAY McNEEL,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent/Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
ROBERT 
LEE McNEEL,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner/Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSubletteCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Keith 
Goody, Alpine, Wyoming; Kent Alderman of 
Parsons Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake 
City, Utah.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Jack 
Vreeland, Evanston, Wyoming; V. Anthony Vehar, Evanston, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J., 
Retired.

 
 
 
 

            
STEBNER, 
District Judge, Retired.

 
 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the district 
court's order denying the motions for an independent medical examination and a 
competency hearing regarding Appellee, Robert Lee McNeel (Mr. McNeel), filed by 
Appellant, Paula Kay McNeel (Ms. McNeel), in an action wherein Mr. McNeel sought 
the voluntary appointment of a guardian and conservator on his own behalf.  Upon our review, we 
affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Ms. McNeel phrases the 
issues on appeal as:

 
 
1.   Whether the trial court erred in 
holding that Wyoming law does not require findings of 
competency prior to appointment of a guardian and 
conservator.

 

 
 

 
 

 
 
1.   Does [Ms. McNeel] have standing in 
[a] voluntary guardianship/conservatorship proceeding to appeal the District 
Court's order denying [Ms. McNeel's] motions for an independent medical 
examination and a competency hearing for [Mr. McNeel]?

 
 
2.   Is the District Court's order 
denying [Ms. McNeel's] motions for independent medical examination and for 
competency hearing an appealable order per W.R.A.P. 1.05?

 
 
3.   Is [Ms. McNeel's] defacto appeal of 
the District Court's order appointing guardian and conservator upon the 
voluntary application of [Mr. McNeel] timely?

 
 
4.   Is [Ms. McNeel] estopped by law of 
the case or res 
judicata from appealing 
the District Court's appointment of the guardian/conservator upon voluntary 
petition?

5.   Has [Ms. McNeel] waived any right 
she had to appeal the District Court's appointment of the 
guardian/conservator?

 
 
6.   Does Wyoming law require 
findings of [Mr. McNeel's] competency prior to appointment of a 
guardian/conservator upon voluntary petition of [Mr. 
McNeel]?

 
 
7.   Should [Ms. McNeel's] second (II) 
and third (III) arguments be stricken?

 
 
8.   Should the Court order sanctions in 
regard to [Ms. McNeel's] appeal?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On February 25, 2003, Mr. 
McNeel filed for divorce from Ms. McNeel.1  In response, Ms. McNeel filed a motion 
for an independent medical examination and a motion to stay proceedings in the 
Divorce Action contending that Mr. McNeel was incapacitated and delusional.  Because the Divorce Action was stayed 
for a period of approximately six months, as a result of an agreement entered 
into between the McNeels, the district court did not rule on Ms. McNeel's 
motions. 

 
 
[¶4]      On March 3, 2003, Ms. 
McNeel filed a petition for the involuntary appointment of a temporary guardian 
and conservator on behalf of Mr. McNeel, in a separate action.2  Mr. McNeel filed his answer to this 
petition and demanded a jury trial.  
On March 27, 2003, the district court continued the hearing on Ms. 
McNeel's petition and no further action occurred with respect to 
Guardian/Conservator Action 1. 

 
 
[¶5]      However, on August 6, 
2003, the McNeels participated in a court ordered mediation in the Divorce 
Action.  At the mediation, the 
McNeels agreed to their divorce and to the appointment of a guardian and 
conservator to help effectuate a property division in the Divorce Action. 

 
 
[¶6]      Subsequently, on August 
14, 2003, Mr. McNeel filed a voluntary petition for appointment of a guardian 
and conservator requesting that Steven D. Olmstead be appointed as his guardian 
and conservator in a separate and distinct action.3  Four days later, Ms. McNeel filed a 
pleading in Guardian/Conservator Action 2 indicating that she did not object to 
Mr. Olmstead being appointed as Mr. McNeel's guardian and conservator, but did 
object to Mr. McNeel's voluntary petition, based on her belief that Mr. McNeel 
did not have the capacity to file the petition.  Nevertheless, approximately five days 
thereafter, Ms. McNeel filed a motion for the appointment of Mr. Olmstead as 
guardian and conservator for Mr. McNeel in Guardian/Conservator Action 2.  This motion indicated that the parties 
and their attorneys had met with Mr. Olmstead, that the parties had agreed Mr. 
Olmstead should be appointed guardian and conservator for Mr. McNeel, and that 
Mr. Olmstead had agreed to serve in such capacity.  On September 3, 2003, the district court 
appointed Mr. Olmstead as guardian and conservator for Mr. McNeel in 
Guardian/Conservator Action 2.  
However, the district court's order did not make any specific finding of 
competency concerning Mr. McNeel, because the district court ruled that such a 
determination was not necessary with respect to a voluntary petition. 

 
 
[¶7]      On October 21, 2003, Mr. 
Olmstead filed his resignation as guardian and conservator for Mr. McNeel in 
Guardian/Conservator Action 2.  The 
district court, however, requested that Mr. Olmstead continue in that capacity 
at a status conference held on November 19, 2003.4

 
 
[¶8]      More than three months 
later, on January 23, 2004, Ms. McNeel filed a petition for appointment of a 
professional guardian and conservator for Mr. McNeel in Guardian/Conservator 
Action 2.  This petition was 
subsequently withdrawn by Ms. McNeel.  
However, on March 1, 2004, Ms. McNeel filed a motion requesting an 
independent medical examination for Mr. McNeel in Guardian/Conservator Action 
2.  On March 8, 2004, Ms. McNeel 
also filed a motion asking that a competency hearing be held concerning Mr. 
McNeel in Guardian/Conservator Action 2.  
On April 19, 2004, the district court denied these motions after hearing, 
ruling that the question of Mr. McNeel's competency was moot in light of the 
parties' previous mediation agreement in the Divorce 
Action.

 
 
[¶9]      On May 11, 2004, Ms. 
McNeel filed a Notice of Appeal challenging the April 19, 2004 order of the 
district court entered in Guardian/Conservator Action 2.  This notice was signed only by her 
out-of-state attorney, who had not been admitted to practice in Wyoming.  On May 19, 2004, Ms. McNeel filed an 
Amended Notice of Appeal.

 
 
[¶10]   The district court 
allowed Mr. McNeel, through his appointed guardian and conservator, to proceed 
with the Divorce Action.  The 
district court granted Mr. McNeel a divorce from Ms. McNeel on June 30, 
2004.  Ms. McNeel did not appeal the 
decree entered in the Divorce Action.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

            

[¶11]   Statutory construction 
involves a question of law and as such, the review of this Court is de novo.  Amoco Production Co. v. Department of 
Revenue, State of Wyo., 2004 WY 89, ¶34, 94 P.3d 430, ¶34 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
            
. . . . Our rules of statutory construction are well known and we will 
not repeat them at length.  See Pagel v. Franscell, 2002 WY 169, ¶9, 
57 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Wyo.2002) (quoting 
Wyoming Community College Com'n v. Casper Community College Dist., 2001 WY 
86, ¶¶16-18, 31 P.3d 1242, 1249 (Wyo.2001)).  We will, however, note a few 
particularly pertinent rules of construction.  Our primary concern is legislative 
intent, which intent must be ascertained from the words of the statute.  Id. 
Construction is unnecessary where statutory language is unambiguous.  Id. 
The intent of an unambiguous statute is determined from the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words used.  In re Wilson, 2003 WY 105, ¶6, 75 P.3d 669, 672 (Wyo.2003) (quoting 
Wyoming Dept. of Transp. v. Haglund, 982 P.2d 699, 701 (Wyo.1999)).  " When the 
words are clear and unambiguous, a court risks an impermissible substitution of 
its own views, or those of others, for the intent of the legislature if any 
effort is made to interpret or construe statutes on any basis other than the 
language invoked by the legislature.' "  
Pagel, 2002 WY 169, ¶9, 57 P.3d  at 1230 (quoting Wyoming Community College Com'n, 2001 WY 
86, ¶16, 31 P.3d at 1249).  " A 
statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons 
are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability.' " Pagel, 2002 WY 169, ¶9, 57 P.3d  at 1230 
(quoting Wyoming Community College Com'n, 2001 WY 
86, ¶17, 31 P.3d at 1249).

 
 
            
In addition to these general rules of construction, we also note more 
specifically that courts are not free to ignore any word the legislature has 
used.  Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶28, 64 P.3d 104, 113 (Wyo.2003).  And finally, " 
it is a universal rule that courts will not enlarge, stretch, expand or extend 
a statute to matters not falling within its express provisions.' " Knowles v. Corkill, 2002 WY 119, ¶19, 51 P.3d 859, 865 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Lo Sasso v. Braun, 386 P.2d 630, 632 
(Wyo.1963)).

 
 
In re Walsh, 2004 WY 96, ¶¶3  
4, 96 P.3d 1, ¶¶3  4 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Procedural 
Issues.

 
 
[¶12]   Initially, Mr. McNeel 
mounts numerous procedural arguments.  
He asserts that Ms. McNeel lacks standing to bring the appeal because 1) 
her appeal is not timely; 2) the district court's order, denying the motions for 
an independent medical examination and a competency hearing, is a non-appealable 
order; and 3) Wyoming's voluntary appointment of 
guardian/conservator procedure is non-adversarial.  Upon our review, we do not 
agree.

 
 
[¶13]   The district court's 
order, denying Ms. McNeel's motions for an independent medical examination and a 
competency hearing, was entered on April 19, 2004.  Ms. McNeel filed a Notice of Appeal in 
Guardian/Conservator Action 2, on May 11, 2004.  This Notice of Appeal, however, was 
signed only by counsel from outside of Wyoming.  
Said counsel was not licensed to practice law in Wyoming.  Ms. McNeel filed an Amended Notice of 
Appeal, signed by Wyoming counsel, on May 19, 2004. 

 
 
[¶14]   W.R.A.P. 2.01(a) provides 
that an appeal from a trial court to an appellate court shall be taken by filing 
the notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days from the 
entry of the appealable order.  
Therefore, we conclude that the Amended Notice of Appeal filed by Ms. 
McNeel was timely.  Furthermore, we 
are not persuaded by Mr. McNeel's argument that, in reality, Ms. McNeel is 
appealing the order appointing a guardian and conservator for Mr. McNeel, 
entered on September 3, 2003, in Guardian/Conservator Action 2.  Both Notices of Appeal, filed by Ms. 
McNeel, explicitly specify her appeal pertains to the district court's order 
denying motions for an independent medical examination and a competency 
hearing.

 
 
[¶15]   In addition, Mr. McNeel 
contends the district court's order, denying Ms. McNeel's motions, is not an 
appealable order.  W.R.A.P. 1.05(a), 
(b) and (c) defines an appealable order, in applicable part, as an order 
affecting a substantial right in an action or in a special proceeding, or upon 
summary application in an action after judgment.  Mr. McNeel argues that Ms. McNeel cannot 
be said to have any substantial rights in Guardian/Conservator Action 2, because 
a voluntary request for appointment of a guardian and conservator under 
Wyoming law is 
a non-adversarial process and Ms. McNeel's motions do not constitute summary 
applications after judgment.  In a 
related assertion, Mr. McNeel argues that Ms. McNeel lacks standing in 
Guardian/Conservator Action 2, because Wyoming's statutory scheme for requesting the 
voluntary appointment of a guardian and conservator does not allow for 
third-party objectors.

 
 
[¶16]   This Court has previously 
discussed the issue of standing.  In 
Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. v. Board of County 
Com'rs for Natrona County, 2004 WY 84, ¶8, 94 P.3d 412, ¶8 (Wyo. 
2004)(citing Jolley v. State Loan and 
Investment Board, 2002 WY 7, ¶6, 38 P.3d 1073, ¶6 (Wyo.2002), quoting from 
Roe v. Board of County Commissioners, 
Campbell County, 997 P.2d 1021, 1022 - 23 (Wyo. 2000)), this Court 
recognized:

 

The doctrine 
of standing is a jurisprudential rule of jurisdictional magnitude.  At its most elementary level, the 
standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from 
considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in 
vigorously advocating.  Accordingly, 
the doctrine of standing focuses upon whether a litigant is properly situated to 
assert an issue for judicial or quasi-judicial determination.  A litigant is said to have standing when 
he has a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." This personal stake 
requirement has been described in Wyoming as a "tangible interest" at 
stake.  The tangible interest 
requirement guarantees that a litigant is sufficiently interested in a case to 
present a justiciable controversy.

 
 
In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Public Service 
Com'n, 2003 WY 22, ¶12, 63 P.3d 887, ¶12 (Wyo. 2003)(quoting State ex rel. Bayou Liquors, Inc. v. City of 
Casper, 906 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wyo.1995), we 
elaborated:

 
 
The concept 
of "standing to sue" refers to a right to relief that goes to the existence of a 
personal claim for relief.  Matter of Various Water Rights in Lake DeSmet Reservoir, 623 P.2d 764, 767 
(Wyo.1981).

 
 
... The 
tangible interest requirement guarantees that a litigant is sufficiently 
interested in a case to present a justiciable controversy.   Laramie Rivers [Co. v. Wheatland Irr. Dist.], 708 P.2d 
[20,] at 27 [Wyo. 1985] (quoting Int'l Ass'n Fire Fighters v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 702 P.2d 1294, 1297-98 (Wyo.1985)).

 
 
Schulthess v. 
Carollo, 
832 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Wyo.1992).

 
 
We went 
further in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Wyoming 
Public Service Com'n, at ¶13, to state: 

 
 
In Foster's, Inc. v. City of Laramie, 718 P.2d 868, 872-73 (Wyo.1986) (quoting from Matter of Various Water Rights in Lake 
DeSmet Reservoir, 623 P.2d 764 (Wyo.1981)), we clarified that a potential 
litigant must show injury or potential injury:

 
 
"Standing 
to sue' is a right to relief and goes to the existence of a personal claim for 
relief.  It includes a legal 
disability, such as insanity or infancy, but it is more.  It involves a sufficient stake in an 
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that 
controversy.  It is closely related 
to the doctrine of mootness.  It 
requires sufficient personal interest in the outcome of litigation by way of 
injury or potential injury to warrant consideration by the court." 623 P.2d  at 
767.

 
 
To establish 
the requisite injury, a petitioner must allege a perceptible, rather than a 
speculative, harm resulting from the agency action:

 
 
"[A] party 
is not considered aggrieved' when there is only a remote possibility of 
injury."

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
"[P]leadings must be something more than an ingenious academic exercise 
in the conceivable.  A plaintiff 
must allege that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly harmed by the 
challenged agency action, not that he can imagine circumstances in which he 
could be affected by the agency's action....' United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 93 S. Ct. 2405, 2416, 37 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1973)."  (Citation 
omitted.)  623 P.2d  at 
769.

 
 
[¶17]   Under the facts in this 
case, we are convinced Ms. McNeel is sufficiently affected to guarantee this 
Court is faced with the determination of an actual justiciable controversy.  While Mr. McNeel tries to minimize Ms. 
McNeel's involvement, she is properly situated with sufficient pecuniary, 
personal, and tangible interests at stake given the pending Divorce Action.  Ms. McNeel had also previously indicated 
her concern that Mr. McNeel was mentally incapacitated and delusional.5  Such involvement assures Ms. McNeel is 
properly motivated to vigorously advocate her position.  Likewise, Ms. McNeel has also shown 
potential injury or harm is readily perceptible, resulting from the action taken 
by the district court, rather than merely speculative as argued by Mr. 
McNeel.  Moreover, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
3-2-105 (LexisNexis 2003) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-3-106 (LexisNexis 2003) 
provide the procedures to be utilized with respect to a voluntary application 
for the appointment of a guardian/conservator.  These statutes can only be characterized 
as setting forth "special proceedings" as defined under W.R.A.P. 1.05(b).  

 
 
[¶18]   In addition, both Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-105(b) and 3-3-106(b) require that a voluntary petition shall 
state whether notice of a petition for involuntary guardianship/conservatorship, 
under Wyoming's involuntary appointment statutes, has been served upon a 
ward.  Similarly, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
3-1-107 mandates that if an involuntary petition is filed before hearing on a 
voluntary petition, the court must combine the hearings.  Therefore, Wyoming's statutory 
scheme for the voluntary appointment of a guardian/conservator contemplates that 
third-parties may participate in that process by taking appropriate action.     

   

Voluntary 
Petition Issues.

 
 
[¶19]   Ms. McNeel argues that 
the district court erred in determining Wyoming law does not require findings of 
competency prior to the appointment of a guardian and conservator.  Essentially, she argues that no matter 
how well intentioned a person may be, that person cannot enter into agreements 
if that person is incapacitated.  
Accordingly, a voluntary petition for appointment of a 
guardian/conservator presupposes that the ward has capacity to consent to the 
appointment.   In support of 
this argument, Ms. McNeel relies upon our holding in Thoeming v. District 
Court, 379 P.2d 543 (Wyo. 1963).  Ms. McNeel also contends the district 
court erred in holding that Mr. McNeel's competency was mooted by the parties' 
agreement at mediation.  In essence, 
she again argues that Mr. McNeel did not have the capacity to enter into that 
agreement.  

 
 
[¶20]   In response, Mr. McNeel 
contends that the district court correctly held that Wyoming law does not 
require findings of competency prior to the appointment of a 
guardian/conservator, upon a voluntary petition.  He asserts that both Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
3-2-105 and 3-3-106 simply require the appointment of a guardian/conservator 
when the court finds that such would be in the best interest of the 
petitioner.  Mr. McNeel further 
distinguishes our holding in Thoeming as merely interpreting Wyo. Stat. § 
3  2 (Michie 1957) and not the new voluntary procedures enacted by the 
legislature in 1985 through Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-105 and 3-2-106.  Finally, Mr. McNeel argues the ruling 
made by the district court that "the question of whether Mr. McNeel was 
competent is moot due to the parties' agreement at mediation" does not 
constitute appealable error because the district court correctly ruled 
competency is not an issue in a voluntary petition proceeding.  

 
 
[¶21]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
3-2-105(a) (LexisNexis 2003) squarely sets forth (emphasis 
added):

 
 
(a) A 
guardian may be appointed by the court upon the petition of the proposed ward, 
including a minor who has reached the age of fourteen (14) years, if 
the court determines that the appointment is in the best interest of the 
petitioner.

 
 
Further, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-3-106(a) (LexisNexis 2003) clearly provides (emphasis 
added):

 
 
(a) The 
court may appoint a conservator upon the petition by the proposed ward 
if:

 
 
(i) The 
petitioner has reached the age of fourteen (14) years;  and

 
 
(ii) The 
court determines that the appointment of a conservator is in the best interest 
of the petitioner.

 
 
Therefore, 
the plain wording used within these statutes leaves little doubt the legislature 
intended that a court may appoint a guardian/conservator for a ward through the 
defined voluntary process, upon the sole determination that such appointment is 
in the best interest of the ward.  
Nevertheless, as noted above, Ms. McNeel argues it is inherent a guardian 
may not be appointed until a court holds a competency hearing.  In support of this proposition, Ms. 
McNeel cites the case of Thoeming v. District Court, 379 P.2d 543, 544 
(Wyo. 1963), 
wherein this Court stated:

 
 
The basic 
question in the matter before us is the jurisdiction of the district court to 
enter the order for the guardianship of the person and estate of Thoeming.  Although several matters pertaining 
thereto are argued, the case turns upon the authority of the district court to 
proceed under the provision of § 3-2, W.S.1957, with the appointment of a 
guardian for an adult person who had not been legally adjudged an incompetent or 
insane person under the provisions contained in §§ 25-1 to 25-13, W.S.1957, 
relating to insane persons.  It is 
conceded by the respondents that there was no hearing regarding incompetency by 
a lunacy commission or jury and that there was no direct finding concerning the 
matter.  It is the contention of 
respondents that the guardianship proceeding in district court was not adversary 
in nature, was taken solely for the protection of Thoeming who was not insane 
but incompetent, and that guardianship statutes must of necessity be summary in 
nature and have flexibility.  Such 
position is entirely without merit.  
It is elementary that proceedings for adjudication of insanity or mental 
incompetency are required to be in strict compliance with statutory 
requirements.  Hultquist v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 995;  State ex rel. Leonidas v. Larson, 109 
Mont. 70, 92 P.2d 774.  In the absence of such 
compliance a judgment declaring a person to be of unsound mind is void.  McFarland v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 128, 
60 S.W.2d 360; Ex parte McLaughlin, 
Mo.App., 105 S.W.2d 1020;  In re Ellern, 23 Wash. 2d 219, 160 P.2d 639; 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 14.  
One court in this area has well expressed the rule in saying, "If there 
is any class of cases which should be conducted with the utmost care to observe 
all of the requirements of the statute, it is the cases conducted for the 
purpose of determining the sanity of a citizen.  * * *" (In re Wells' Estate, 133 Or. 155, 289 P. 511, 512.)  The statute under which 
the district court acted, § 3-2, W.S.1957, reads:

 
 
"The 
district court of each county, or the judge thereof, when it appears necessary, 
may appoint guardians for the persons and estates, or either of them, of minors, 
incompetents or insane persons, who have no legally appointed guardian * * 
*."

 
 
In its 
genesis (Laws 1890-1891, ch. 70, art. 21, § 1), the statute dealt only with 
minors.  The revision contained in 
S.L. of Wyoming, 1931, ch. 73, § 145, added "incompetents or insane persons" to 
the category, but provided no means for adjudicating them to be such.  Accordingly, we look to Title 25 of 
W.S.1957 for procedure.  In that 
connection we observe that one of the definitions of an insane person under § 
25-2, W.S.1957, is "a person of unsound mind and incapable of managing his own 
affairs."  The procedure for 
determining that a person is insane or mentally incompetent is definite and 
clear.  It requires a finding either 
by a lunacy commission or by a jury and that only after various steps have been 
taken.  Any attempt to adjudicate a 
person as an "incompetent" without compliance with the statutes contained in 
this chapter would be a deprivation of due process.  Since there had been no adjudication of 
Thoeming's incompetence on July 13, 1962, the district court was without 
jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for him and such purported order is 
void.

            

Ms. McNeel 
argues that an independent medical examination and a competency hearing are 
mandatory procedures that a court cannot ignore.  Since the district court failed to 
comply with these requirements, Ms. McNeel asserts the district court did not 
have the jurisdiction to appoint Mr. Olmstead as guardian/conservator for Mr. 
McNeel.

 
 
[¶22]   A simple reading of the 
quoted language in Thoeming makes it 
evident our holding in that case is applicable only towards an interpretation of 
the statutory guidelines that were in place at that time, or at most, cases 
wherein a similar involuntary process is involved.  Furthermore, the voluntary petition 
scheme, which is currently in place, was first enacted in 1985 without any 
statutory predecessors.  Prior to 
1985, Wyoming 
only authorized the appointment of guardians/conservators for "minors, 
incompetents or insane persons."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 3  2 (1957).   
Accordingly, this Court did not even impliedly address the current 
voluntary petition statutes through its opinion in Thoeming.  

 
 
[¶23]   This conclusion is also 
supported by review of Wyoming's current overall statutory makeup 
regarding the appointment of guardians/conservators. As indicated above, a court 
may appoint a guardian/conservator for a ward under the voluntary appointment 
process if the court finds that such would be in the best interest of the 
ward.   Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
3-2-105(a) and 3-3-106(a) (LexisNexis 2003).  However, as noted previously, a 
voluntary petition must designate if notice of a petition for involuntary 
guardianship/conservatorship has been served upon a ward under Wyoming's involuntary 
appointment statutes.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
3-2-105(b) and 3-3-106(b) (LexisNexis 2003).  Likewise, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-107 
(LexisNexis 2003) mandates that if an involuntary petition has been filed prior 
to the time of hearing, on a voluntary petition, the court shall combine the 
hearings.  

 
 
[¶24]   Therefore, if a third 
party has any inclination that the competency of a proposed ward is of concern 
upon the filing of a voluntary appointment petition, that third party need only 
file an involuntary petition pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-101 and 3-3-101 
(LexisNexis 2003) prior to hearing on the voluntary petition.  In making such an application, the 
competency of the proposed ward is placed directly at issue as both statutes 
require enumeration of the status of the proposed ward as "a minor, an 
incompetent person or a mentally incompetent person and the reason for the 
petition."  Likewise, it is 
mandatory for a court to state its findings, including the reasons why the ward 
is in need of a guardian/conservator. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-104(b)(i) and 
3-3-104(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).

 
 
[¶25]   Finally, we believe that 
common sense supports our determination that differing requisites must be shown 
in an involuntary, as opposed to a voluntary, petition for appointment of a 
guardian/conservator.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 3-1-101(a)(ix) and (xii) (LexisNexis 2003) together define an 
"incompetent person" as an individual who is unable unassisted to properly 
manage and take of himself or his property as a result of infirmities of 
advanced age, physical disability, disease, the use of alcohol or controlled 
substances, mental illness, mental deficiency, or mental retardation.   In a voluntary situation, a 
proposed ward may be competent but desire assistance of a guardian/conservator 
in a particular realm of his life dealing with finances, real or personal 
property, health issues, or the like.  
Hence, it is probable that the legislature intended to allow the district 
court to appoint a guardian/conservator for a ward who voluntarily requests 
assistance, upon the limited showing that such appointment would be in the 
ward's best interest.   
Thereby, a proposed ward may make voluntary application for assistance, 
without the uncomfortable and daunting proposition of having to admit he is 
incompetent.

 
 
[¶26]   We, therefore, hold 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-105(a) and 3-3-106(a) that when an 
involuntary petition for appointment of a guardian/conservator is not filed 
prior to hearing on the voluntary petition, a court may appoint a 
guardian/conservator for a ward solely upon a finding that such appointment 
would be in the best interest of the ward.

 
 
[¶27]   Additionally, Ms. McNeel 
infers the district court was required to determine the competency of Mr. McNeel 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-107 (LexisNexis 2003) because 1) she had 
previously filed an involuntary petition for the appointment of a 
guardian/conservator for Mr. McNeel in Guardian/Conservator Action 1, and/or 2) 
she had directly requested the same through numerous motions filed in 
Guardian/Conservator Action 2.  
Under the circumstances in this case, we do not 
agree.

 
 
[¶28]   Ms. McNeel filed a 
petition for the appointment of a temporary guardian and conservator on behalf 
of Mr. McNeel in Guardian/Conservator Action 1.  The district court continued the hearing 
on Ms. McNeel's petition and no further action occurred with respect to 
Guardian/Conservator Action 1.  
Therefore, Ms. McNeel effectively abandoned such effort.  

 
 
[¶29]   Later, Ms. McNeel did not 
object to Mr. Olmstead being appointed as Mr. McNeel's guardian and conservator, 
but did object to Mr. McNeel's voluntary petition based on her belief that Mr. 
McNeel did not have the capacity to file the petition in Guardian/Conservator 
Action 2.  Nevertheless, Ms. McNeel 
in her motion for a guardian and conservator subsequently indicated that 1) the 
parties and their attorneys had met with Mr. Olmstead, 2) that the parties had 
agreed that Mr. Olmstead should be appointed guardian and conservator for Mr. 
McNeel, and 3) that Mr. Olmstead had agreed to serve in such capacity.  Thus, the pending objection to Mr. 
McNeel's voluntary petition was withdrawn by Ms. McNeel.  Ms. McNeel further agreed to the 
appointment of Mr. Olmstead.

 
 
[¶30]   On September 3, 2003, the 
district court appointed Mr. Olmstead as guardian and conservator for Mr. McNeel 
in Guardian/Conservator Action 2.  
Nearly three months later, Ms. McNeel filed a petition for appointment of 
a professional guardian and conservator for Mr. McNeel.  This petition was subsequently withdrawn 
by Ms. McNeel.

 
 
[¶31]   Ms. McNeel again filed a 
motion on March 1, 2004, requesting an independent medical examination for Mr. 
McNeel.  A second motion was filed a 
week later, by Ms. McNeel, requesting a competency hearing.  Both motions were filed months after the 
district court had already appointed a guardian and conservator for Mr. 
McNeel.

 
 
[¶32]   Ms. McNeel did not comply 
with the explicit parameters set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-107.  An involuntary petition was not filed, 
or openly pending, prior to entry of the district court's order on Mr. McNeel's 
voluntary petition.  Additionally, 
Ms. McNeel's last two motions requesting an independent medical examination and 
a competency hearing were well overdue.  
The district court was, therefore, under no requirement to make a 
competency ruling, as required under the involuntary appointment process 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-107.   

 
 
[¶33]   In conclusion, we need 
not address those remaining issues brought forth by the parties in this appeal 
surrounding the voluntary petition of Mr. McNeel in Guardian/Conservator Action 
2.  Such issues are rendered moot by 
our dispositive holding detailed above.  

             
           

Divorce 
Action Issue.

 
 
[¶34]   Ms. McNeel further 
asserts the district court erred in allowing Mr. Olmstead to proceed on Mr. 
McNeel's behalf in the Divorce Action.  
As noted above, the district court ultimately granted Mr. McNeel a 
divorce from Ms. McNeel.  Ms. McNeel 
now contends the divorce decree should be set aside, although she did not appeal 
the entry of the decree in the Divorce Action.  Rather, on May 11 and May 19, 2004, Ms. 
McNeel filed notices of appeal solely challenging the April 19, 2004 order of 
the district court denying her motions for an independent medical examination 
and a competency hearing in Guardian/Conservator Action 2.  Moreover, we are not persuaded by Ms. 
McNeel's argument that the Divorce Action is inextricably intertwined with 
Guardian/Conservator Action 2. 

 
 
[¶35]   Those issues directly 
raised concerning the district court's order, that was particularly appealed 
from, are the only matters that are before this Court for disposition on 
appeal.  Accordingly, the divorce 
granted to Mr. McNeel by the district court in the Divorce Action is not now 
properly before this Court for determination and will not be 
addressed.

 
 
Sanctions on 
Appeal.

 
 
[¶36]   Mr. McNeel summarily 
requests that this Court award him sanctions against Ms. McNeel under W.R.A.P. 
10.05, because there was no reasonable cause for this appeal.  This Court has previously held that we 
are generally reluctant to impose sanctions, but will make such an award in 
those rare circumstances where an appellate brief lacks cogent argument, is 
devoid of pertinent authority to support the claims of error, and/or fails to 
make adequate references to the record.   Ahearn v. Hollon, 2003 WY 125, ¶29, 53 P.3d 87, ¶29 (Wyo. 2002)(citing Gray v. 
Stratton Real Estate, 2001 WY 125, ¶11, 36 P.3d 1127, ¶11 (Wyo.2001)).  This appeal is not so lacking in merit 
as to qualify for sanctions. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶37]   As indicated above, we 
find no error in the proceedings.  
We, therefore, affirm the action taken by the district court denying Ms. 
McNeel's motions for an independent medical examination and a competency 
hearing.   We further refuse to 
award sanctions on appeal against Ms. McNeel pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
10.05.

 

FOOTNOTES

1We will 
refer to this litigation as the "Divorce Action."

2We will 
refer to this action as "Guardian/Conservator Action 1."

3We will 
refer to this matter as "Guardian/Conservator Action 2."  Guardian/Conservator Action 2 is the 
proceeding involved in this appeal.

4On March 11, 
2004, Mr. Olmstead formally withdrew his resignation as the appointed guardian 
and conservator for Mr. McNeel in Guardian/Conservator Action 
2.

5After Mr. 
McNeel filed his complaint in the Divorce Action, Ms. McNeel filed a motion for 
an independent medical examination and a motion to stay proceedings in the 
Divorce Action contending that Mr. McNeel was incapacitated and delusional.  On March 3, 2003, Ms. McNeel filed a 
petition for the appointment of a temporary guardian and conservator on behalf 
of Mr. McNeel in Guardian/Conservator Action 1.  In Guardian/Conservator Action 2, Ms. 
McNeel filed many petitions and motions dealing with the appointment of a 
guardian and conservator on behalf of Mr. McNeel.