Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIAM EMERY LEBLANC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 217281

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 12, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee,  
v  
No. 118774  
WILLIAM EMERY LeBLANC,  
Defendant-Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
A circuit court jury convicted the defendant of third­
degree criminal sexual conduct, but the Court of Appeals  
reversed on the ground that the defendant had been denied  
effective assistance of trial counsel.  Because the circuit  
court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and its  
conclusions of law are correct, we agree with the circuit  
court that the defendant's trial attorneys were not  
ineffective.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit  
court.  
I  
In early 1998, the defendant was charged with one count  
of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for having sexual  
intercourse with his wife’s daughter-
--his stepdaughter.  MCL  
750.520d(1)(a).  The stepdaughter says that a number of sexual  
assaults occurred, culminating on a Sunday afternoon in May  
1997, 
when 
sexual 
relations occurred in the defendant’s truck,  
as they parked on a rural road.  
The defendant has consistently denied the charge. 
He  
maintains that the criminal allegation is the complainant’s  
revenge for parental discipline of an unruly teenager. 
At  
trial, he supplemented that defense with alibi testimony,  
seeking to demonstrate that he was working on the Sunday  
afternoons when this assault might have occurred.  
This matter was tried before a Leelanau Circuit Court  
jury in the late summer of 1998. 
The jurors believed the  
complainant, and thus found the defendant guilty as charged.  
In October 1998, the court sentenced the defendant to term of  
six to fifteen years in prison. Two months later, the court  
denied the defendant’s motion for new trial.  
After the defendant appealed, the Court of Appeals  
granted his motion to remand,1 so that he could file another  
1 Unpublished order, entered September 13, 1999 (Docket 
No. 217281).  
2  
 
 
 
motion for new trial.  On remand, the circuit court conducted  
a Ginther2 hearing to determine whether the defendant had been  
denied effective assistance by the two attorneys who  
represented him at trial.  After taking testimony from several  
witnesses, the circuit court denied the motion.  
Following the remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the  
defendant’s conviction, agreeing with his contention that he  
had been denied effective assistance.3  
The prosecuting attorney has applied for leave to  
appeal.4  
II  
In People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 155-156; 560 NW2d 600  
(1997), we explained the principles of law that govern an  
inquiry whether there has been a denial of effective  
assistance:  
The benchmark case describing the standard for 
claims of actual ineffective assistance of counsel  
in Michigan is People v Pickens, [446 Mich 298, 
318; 521 NW2d 797 (1994)], which held that the 
right to counsel under the Michigan Constitution 
does not justify a more restrictive standard than 
that applied under the United States Constitution 
and adopted the Supreme Court's test in Strickland  
[v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 
2d 674 (1984)].  That test requires the greatest 
level of factual inquiry into the actual conduct of 
the defense and its effect on the outcome of the  
2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443-444; 212 NW2d 922  
(1973).  
3 
 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 20, 
2001 (Docket No. 217281).  
4 The defendant has also applied, seeking leave to appeal 
as cross-appellant. We deny the defendant’s application.  
3  
 
trial.  It places the burden on the defendant to 
show, with regard to counsel's performance,  
“that counsel made errors so serious that  
counsel was not functioning as the  
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment . . . [and] that the 
deficient 
performance 
prejudiced 
the  
defense.
 This requires showing that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to  
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable. Unless a  
defendant makes both showings, it cannot 
be said that the conviction or death  
sentence resulted from a breakdown in the  
adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable. [Id. at 687.]”  
In applying this test, "a court must indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance . . . ."  Id. at 689. [C]ases decided  
under the Strickland/Pickens test require the  
defendant to "overcome the presumption that, under 
the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be 
considered sound trial strategy.'"  Strickland at  
689.  
Accord, People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694  
(2000).  
III  
In conducting an appellate review of the manner in which  
these principles were applied by the circuit court and the  
Court of Appeals, we begin by locating the proper standard for  
such review.  Whether a person has been denied effective  
assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and  
constitutional law.  A judge first must find the facts, and  
then must decide whether those facts constitute a violation of  
the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance  
of counsel.  
4  
 
  
As we have explained in other contexts, a trial court’s  
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. MCR 2.613(C),  
6.001(D); cf. MCR 7.211(A)(3)(a). See, generally, Grievance  
Administrator v Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 247, n 12; 612 NW2d 120  
(2000); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d  
407 (2000); McDougal v McDougal, 451 Mich 80, 87; 545 NW2d 357  
(1996); Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 151-152; 485 NW2d 893  
(1992); Mazur v Blendea, 409 Mich 858; 294 NW2d 827 (1980).  
Questions of constitutional law are reviewed by this  
Court de novo. Tolksdorf v Griffith, 464 Mich 1, 5; 626 NW2d  
163 (2001); People v Dunbar, 463 Mich 606, 615; 625 NW2d 1  
(2001); Blank v Dep’t of Corrections, 462 Mich 103, 112; 611  
NW2d 530 (2000).  
IV  
In the present case, the Court of Appeals concluded that  
a review of the record had persuaded it that “trial counsel’s  
performance undermines confidence in the reliability of the  
result. Mitchell, supra.” That conclusion rested on three  
principal bases-
--failure to introduce testimony from a  
defense expert, failure to conduct a proper voir dire of  
prospective jurors, and failure to object to rebuttal  
testimony.  However, we conclude that in each instance the  
circuit court, not the Court of Appeals, correctly resolved  
the issue whether the defendant was denied effective  
assistance.  
5  
 
A  
Expert Testimony  
The prosecution relied in part on the testimony of an  
expert in treating teenage sexual abuse victims.5  The expert  
testified that young victims often delay reporting the crime  
because of embarrassment, concern for the family, and other  
reasons.  The import of her testimony was that the behavior of  
the complainant in this case was consistent with the behavior  
often exhibited by such victims.  
Defense 
counsel 
had subpoenaed an expert who was prepared  
to offer countering testimony. However, defense counsel did  
not call her to testify at trial.6  
At trial, the prosecution expert properly refrained from  
offering an opinion regarding the defendant’s guilt.7  
However, the Court of Appeals found her testimony to have been  
quite 
significant, 
and 
criticized 
defense 
counsels' 
failure 
to  
call the defense expert.  Saying that the record belied the  
claim that the decision not to call her was strategic, the  
Court 
characterized 
defense 
counsels' 
preparation 
as  
“inadequate,” 
and 
concluded, 
“our 
confidence 
in 
the  
5 The defendant disputes her expertise.  
6 
 It appears that both the prosecution expert and the 
would-be defense expert had counseled the complainant in this 
matter. However, defense counsel apparently did not seek to 
review the records of the defense expert.  
7 People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691, 727-729, 734, 744; 456  
NW2d 391 (1990); People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349, 369; 537 
NW2d 857 (1995).  
6  
 
reliability of the result has been undermined, Mitchell,  
supra, and a new trial based on ineffective assistance is  
warranted.”  
The contrary conclusion of the circuit court was  
explained in the opinion it issued after the remand  
proceedings.  The circuit court noted several minor matters  
regarding which the would-be defense expert could have  
challenged the prosecution expert, but concluded that these  
were fairly inconsequential.  The principal issue, obviously,  
was whether the defense attorneys had committed a serious  
mistake in deciding to forgo the testimony of the expert whom  
they had subpoenaed.  Concerning this question, the circuit  
court stated:  
When [one of the defense attorneys] testified 
[at the remand hearing], he stated that his  
approach in examining [the prosecution expert] was 
to attack her credibility by showing that she was 
part of the police team and that she had a 
relationship 
counseling 
and 
treating 
the  
complainant.  Thus she would not be objective in 
the juries’ eyes. He went on to testify that he did 
not call [the defense expert] because in his 
experience a battle of the experts in cases of this 
type tends to favor of [sic] the prosecution. 
Merely calling a defense expert on these issues 
tells the jury that such experts are important and 
are to be believed and actually tends to increase 
in the [jurors’] eyes the importance of these 
expert witnesses in [defense counsel’s] view. So he 
decided not to call [an expert].  
As a tactical decision, even in retrospect, 
this Court cannot say that [defense counsel’s] plan 
about expert witnesses was wrong. During trial on 
August 
26, 
1998, 
under 
cross-examination 
by 
[defense counsel], the victim was asked what [the 
prosecution expert] had told her about the behavior 
of sexual abuse victims, implying she had been 
coached by [the expert].  He went on to bring out  
7  
 
 
by questioning the victim that [the expert] was 
involved with the prosecution team in planning how 
the trial was conducted. 
The defense team’s  
approach to [the prosecution expert] was to show 
that she was not objective and that therefore her 
testimony to the jury could not be believed. This  
is a legitimate and reasonable tactical decision by 
an attorney as to how to handle the other side’s 
expert witness.  
This is a sound reading of the events that unfolded at  
trial-
--certainly there is no clear error in the circuit  
court’s findings of fact. One can posit theories under which  
the defense might have been advanced by using the expert  
testimony of the woman whom the attorneys had subpoenaed.  
However, as explained in Mitchell, the inquiry is not whether  
a defendant’s case might conceivably have been advanced by  
alternate means.  
As noted above, our task on appeal is to examine de novo  
the constitutional issue whether, on facts properly found by  
the circuit court, the defendant was denied effective  
assistance.  In the phrasing of Mitchell, we determine whether  
“counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not  
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the  
Sixth 
Amendment” 
and 
that 
“the 
deficient 
performance  
prejudiced the defense,” i.e., “counsel's errors were so  
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial  
whose result is reliable.” Id. at 156, quoting Strickland,  
466 US 687. 
On the present record, the decisions made by  
defense counsel concerning use of an expert witness were well  
8  
within the bounds of sound professional representation,8 and  
did not come close to depriving the defendant of a fair trial.  
Again, the central issue in this case is a mixed question  
of fact and law. We have found the circuit court’s findings  
of fact not to be clearly erroneous, and we conclude, on those  
facts, that the decisions regarding use of an expert witness  
did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.  
B  
Voir Dire  
The defendant is a Native American, who was employed as  
a police officer. During voir dire, defense counsel did not  
ask the prospective jurors whether any of them harbored  
prejudice against Native Americans or police officers.  
The circuit court observed that “[u]nnecessary voir dire  
about racial matters might have the effect of making race an  
issue when it was not,” and concluded that, “[i]n this case,  
defense 
counsels’ 
conscious decision not to inquire about race  
during voir dire was sound trial strategy.” These conclusions  
were supported with a detailed discussion of the testimony  
presented by the defendant at the Ginther hearing.  
Here, too, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the  
conclusion reached by the circuit court. Acknowledging that  
8 As indicated, the Court of Appeals implied that defense 
counsel did not really make a reasoned decision, but  
contrarily that poor preparation led to the failure to call 
the defense expert.  It is evident that the circuit court  
credited the testimony of the defense attorneys at the remand 
hearing, and we see no error in that determination.  
9  
 
“[t]he mere fact that a complainant and the victim are of  
different races does not make race a bona fide issue,” the  
Court nonetheless held that “inquiry into any potential bias  
or prejudice against defendant was crucial where a conviction  
was based, in large part, on the credibility of the  
witnesses.”
 Thus, “[w]hile defendant was unable to  
demonstrate that race was a bona fide issue in the case, we  
conclude that the failure to inquire into bias or prejudice  
based on occupation and race undermines the reliability of the  
verdict.”  The Court added that, “[b]ecause the jury’s verdict  
was contingent on the credibility of defendant and the victim,  
any bias or prejudice by the jury could have served as the  
basis of the verdict.”  
Again, we have been shown no clear error in the circuit  
court’s findings of fact. 
In addition, our de novo  
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles 
to 
those 
facts 
yields  
the same result as that reached by the circuit court.  
As the circuit court noted, the defendant failed to  
produce evidence that failure to conduct voir dire on the  
topic of race, even if a serious mistake, led to any prejudice  
against the defense.  At the Ginther hearing, a defense expert  
on juries offered the opinion that the populace of northern  
Michigan is prejudiced against Native Americans, although she  
presented no corroborative studies. Her "investigation" was  
limited to conversations with two attorneys (one who had  
appeared for  the defendant in connection with postconviction  
10  
 
 
proceedings in the present case, and one who had represented  
the defendant’s tribe in treaty-related matters) and a  
personal friend.  The court aptly observed, “As a study of  
juror prejudice in northern Michigan, this hardly suffices to  
support her opinion.”  
The expert talked about survey findings in Minnesota,  
which evidently showed a degree of opposition in the non- 
Indian community to the treaty-based rights of Indians to  
engage in certain hunting, fishing, and gaming activities not  
open to the general populace.  In this regard, the circuit  
court stated:  
From her testimony, the court deduced that the 
[Minnesota survey] questions related to the jurors’ 
opinions of special rights that were secured to 
tribes pursuant to treaty, court decision, and 
otherwise respecting hunting, fishing and casino 
gambling.  This case, however, had no aspect of 
controversy over hunting, fishing rights, casino 
gambling, or any other issue related to the rights 
of tribes and their members.  The fact that a  
substantial number of Minnesota jurors, according 
to [the expert’s] testimony, disapprove or have 
reservations about the special rights of tribes and 
their members to hunt and fish under historic  
treaties as interpreted by the federal courts or 
about the special rights of tribes to conduct  
gambling operations does not equate with personal 
prejudice against Indians. To conclude that those  
answers make the jurors racially prejudiced would 
be as foolish as concluding that former Michigan 
Supreme Court Justice and now [United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit] Judge James Ryan 
is racist because he dissented in a recent case in  
which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
commercial fishing boats operated by tribal members 
had the right to use municipal marinas in Leelanau 
County.
 See [Grand Traverse Band v Dep’t of  
Natural Resources], 141 F3d 635 (CA 6, 1998). That  
a juror might express reservations about the  
propriety of the rights in question would not 
indicate that juror is racially prejudiced and  
11  
 
 
would be of little relevance unless the case grew 
out of a situation involving those treaty rights.  
Next, the court discussed testimony concerning some  
specific incidents of racial bias against Native Americans in  
northern Michigan.  Here the court said that “it would be  
ignoring the obvious to suggest that there is no prejudice  
against Native Americans in northern Michigan or in any part  
of Michigan for that matter.” However, the court went on to  
say that, “[e]ven if this court could take judicial notice of  
that fact, it would also have to take judicial notice of the  
apparent widespread support in the public for Native  
Americans.”  
The court also discussed testimony concerning (a) the  
close attention paid by the jury to the complainant’s  
testimony, (b) the reaction of some jurors to a smudging  
ceremony at the courthouse,9 and (c) a question at the  
preliminary examination concerning whether anyone in the  
audience resided in Peshawbestown.10  As the court noted, each  
of these had a ready and benign explanation.  
In its opinion of reversal, the Court of Appeals wrote:  
[E]ven when requested, an inquiry into racial 
prejudice is constitutionally required only where 
race is a bona fide issue in this matter.  Ristaino  
9 Smudging is a Native American custom, in which herbs 
are burned to create a cleansing smoke, for the purification 
of 
persons, 
places, 
or 
objects. 
See, 
generally, 
http://www.bmcc.org/Bimaadzwin/Traditions/smudging.htm.  
10 Many members of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indians reside in the Leelanau County community of 
Peshawbestown.  
12  
 
v Ross, 424 US 589, 594; 96 S Ct 1017; 47 L Ed 2d 
258 (1976).  
Nothing in the record before us suggests that race was a  
bona fide issue in the present case, as the Court of Appeals  
itself acknowledged.  While the defendant and the complainant  
were of different racial backgrounds, that circumstance by  
itself is not sufficient to conclude that race is a bona fide  
issue in a case, requiring, as a constitutional matter,  
particular inquiry at voir dire. Both sides tried this case  
as a fact-specific dispute involving events that did or did  
not occur within a particular family. Simply put, this case  
was not about race.  
The circuit court’s findings of fact are not clearly  
erroneous, and we agree with its conclusions of law. On the  
record of this case, the defense lawyers did not withhold  
effective assistance of counsel when they did not inquire  
during voir dire about bias against Native Americans.  
There is also an issue about failure to inquire about  
prejudice against police officers, but the circuit court  
properly noted that the record contains no evidence of bias  
against police officers in Leelanau County or among the  
persons hearing this particular case.  Again, the record does  
not support the conclusion that the failure to inquire during  
voir dire constituted ineffective assistance.  
C  
Rebuttal Testimony  
A third ground on which the Court of Appeals found  
13  
  
ineffective 
assistance 
was 
defense 
counsels’ 
failure 
to 
object  
to certain rebuttal evidence.  
The issue arose in this manner:  In support of his alibi,  
the defendant testified that he was working on the dates when  
the assault might have occurred.  In the course of this  
direct-examination testimony, he referred to the department  
logs, which documented his daily activities as an officer.  On  
cross-examination, he was asked whether he had ever falsified  
his daily logs.  He denied doing so. 
On rebuttal, the  
prosecutor 
called 
a 
department 
sergeant 
who 
testified, 
without  
objection, that the defendant falsified his log one day in  
July 1996 by recording a ninety-minute lunch break as though  
it had lasted only sixty minutes.  
The Court of Appeals held, in effect, that counsel was  
obliged to object to this testimony:  
MRE 608(b) provides that specific instances of 
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking 
credibility, other than conviction of a crime, may 
not be proved by extrinsic evidence.  See also  
Lagalo v Allied Corp (On Remand), 233 Mich App 514,  
518; 592 NW2d 786 (1999). 
Once defendant denied  
falsification of any daily log, the prosecutor was 
“stuck” with that answer.  Wischmeyer v Schanz, 449 
Mich 
469, 
477-478; 
536 
NW2d 
760 
(1995). 
Furthermore, there was no dispute, based on the 
victim’s work schedule, that any alleged sexual 
abuse would have occurred after, not during, 
defendant’s work shift. Therefore, our confidence 
in the reliability of the verdict in light of 
defense counsel’s failure to object to this  
specific instance of conduct, coupled with other 
errors in the trial, require reversal.  
The Court of Appeals also found error in failing to  
object to other portions of the rebuttal testimony, including  
14  
 
 
 
 
matters that the Court characterized as “inconsequential” and  
not proper impeachment.  
In 
its 
opinion 
on remand, the circuit court characterized  
the disputed rebuttal testimony as harmless, saying that  
“[t]he only possible exception might be the [sergeant’s]  
testimony . . . .”  It analyzed that portion of the record in  
this manner:  
When the defendant testified at [trial], he 
relied on the logs he maintained of his working 
time as a police officer for the Grand Traverse 
Band.  He relied on those time logs to show that he 
could not have picked the victim up at her place of 
employment at [a restaurant] in Leland on the 
likely day in question.  The accuracy of his 
employment time log was key to corroborating his 
statement that he did not and could not have driven  
the victim home from work, and stopped to commit 
the offense, on that day. 
He specifically 
testified that he never falsified his time logs.  
It was in rebuttal to that testimony that the 
prosecution offered [the sergeant] to testify that 
in fact on a prior occasion he had caught the 
defendant falsifying his time logs.  By relying 
upon his time logs to corroborate his statement 
that he could not have committed the crime on the  
day in question and by specifically testifying that 
these time logs he never altered, the defendant 
opened the door to this rebuttal evidence and it 
was admissible.  
In finding that the rebuttal testimony was improperly  
admitted, and that counsel therefore was ineffective for  
failing to object, the Court of Appeals relied, as noted  
above, on MRE 608(b):  
Specific instances of the conduct of a  
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting  
the witness' credibility, other than conviction of 
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence.  They may, however, in the  
discretion 
of 
the 
court, 
if 
probative 
of  
15  
truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on 
cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the 
witness' 
character 
for 
truthfulness 
or  
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness  
as to which character the witness being cross­
examined has testified. [Emphasis supplied.]  
As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, it has long  
been the law of this state that a cross-examining attorney  
must accept the answer given by a witness regarding a  
collateral matter. People v Hillhouse, 80 Mich 580, 585; 45  
NW 484 (1890); Hamilton v People, 46 Mich 186, 188; 9 NW 247  
(1881).  However, the law in this realm has nuances, including  
the rule, noted in People v Vasher, 449 Mich 494, 504; 537  
NW2d 168 (1995), that impeachment can be proper on matters  
“closely bearing on defendant's guilt or innocence.”  
The 
present 
issue is whether defense counsels’ failure to  
object 
constituted 
ineffective 
assistance. 
 
Our 
examination 
of  
the record persuades us that there was no ineffective  
assistance in this regard. 
First, as the circuit court  
observed, the existence of the logs was an element of the  
defendant’s 
own 
testimony on direct examination.  Further, the  
gist of his testimony was that these were essential police  
records, accurately maintained.  In light of the alibi  
defense, it is far from clear that the defendant’s inaccurate  
entry on another occasion was entirely a “collateral matter.”  
Further, we must weigh the strategic decisions made by  
16  
the experienced attorneys11 who represented the defendant. If  
counsel had objected to the prosecution's question about  
alteration of the logs, the counter-productive effect might  
have been to communicate to the jury that the defense was  
seeking to hide significant inaccuracies in the logs  
maintained by the defendant. 
By allowing the rebuttal  
evidence (of a single occasion when the defendant stretched  
his lunch thirty minutes), counsel let the jury learn that the  
problem was slight.  Counsel went on, during closing argument,  
to use this testimony to the defendant’s advantage, noting  
that the sergeant was “keeping an eye” on the defendant’s  
record keeping.  This is the sort of professional judgment and  
careful advocacy, all done in the heat of trial, that we will  
not second-guess at this distance.  
Again, this subissue reveals no clearly erroneous  
findings of fact by the circuit court.  Our de novo review of  
the constitutional question leads, for the reasons stated  
above, to the conclusion that the defendant was not denied the  
effective assistance of trial counsel.  
D  
Cumulative Error  
The Court of Appeals closed its opinion with this:  
The cumulative effect of a number of errors  
may amount to error requiring reversal.  People v  
11 The defendant retained two attorneys, each of whom had 
twenty-five years of experience.  Each had worked both as a  
prosecutor and a defense attorney, and had tried hundreds of 
felonies.  
17  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 659-660; 601 NW2d 409 
(1999).  After a thorough review of the record on 
appeal, we conclude that the cumulative effect of 
counsel’s errors undermines the confidence in the  
reliability of the verdict and a new trial is  
warranted. Id.; Mitchell, supra.  
It is true that the cumulative effect of several errors  
can constitute sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal where  
the prejudice of any one error would not.12  However, for the  
reasons stated above, this is not a case involving multiple  
errors by counsel.  
Rather, this is a case in which two experienced attorneys  
provided a vigorous and effective defense for the accused.  
After examining the full record of this case, we are mindful  
of what we said in Mitchell:  
In the real world, defending criminal cases is 
not for the faint of heart.  Lawyers must fulfill  
ethical 
obligations 
to 
the 
court, 
zealously 
advocate 
the 
client's 
best 
interests 
(which  
12 People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 292, n 64; 531 NW2d 659 
(1995), clarifies the meaning of the phrase “cumulative  
error.”  
In making this determination, only actual 
errors are aggregated to determine their cumulative 
effect. United States v Rivera, 900 F2d 1462, 1471 
(CA 10, 1990) (en banc) ("Impact alone, not  
traceable to error, cannot form the basis for 
reversal").  
That is, individual claims of error either have merit or 
they do not.  A ruling or action that is almost wrong does not 
become an error on the ground that, in the same case, other 
rulings or actions were almost wrong, too.  Thus, “cumulative 
error,” properly understood, actually refers to cumulative 
unfair prejudice, and is properly considered in connection 
with issues of harmless error. Only the unfair prejudice of 
several actual errors can be aggregated to satisfy the 
standards set forth in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 
597 NW2d 130 (1999).  
18  
 
 
 
 
 
includes establishing that they, and not the  
client, are in charge of making the professional 
decisions), 
and 
protect 
themselves 
against 
grievances and claims of malpractice.  Lawyers will 
inevitably make errors in the process, but, because 
both cases and attorneys come in an infinite 
variety of configurations, those errors can only 
rarely be defined "with sufficient precision to 
inform defense attorneys correctly just what  
conduct to avoid."  Strickland at 693.  Thus, the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees a range of reasonably 
competent advice and a reliable result.  It does  
not guarantee infallible counsel.  [454 Mich 170­
171.]  
V  
For these reasons, we conclude that the defendant was not  
denied effective assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, we  
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the  
judgment of the circuit court. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
19  
 
 
________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee,  
No. 118774  
WILLIAM EMERY LeBLANC,  
Defendant-Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
Although I might disagree with the Court of Appeals  
conclusion, as other members of this Court do, that is not a  
reason to issue a per curiam reversal. The Court of Appeals  
applied the correct legal standard for ineffective assistance  
claims to the facts and had a plausible basis in the record  
for its conclusion that trial counsel was ineffective. I do  
not think the unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals is  
clearly erroneous and would deny leave.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.