Case Title: Bell Carr, Jr., et al. v. International Refining & Manufacturing Company d/b/a IRMCO, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070770

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: January 16, 2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1070770
_________________________
Bell Carr, Jr., et al.
v.
International Refining & Manufacturing Company d/b/a IRMCO,
et al.
Appeal from Fayette Circuit Court
(CV-03-142)
On Application for Rehearing
LYONS, Justice.
This Court's opinion of November 14, 2008, is withdrawn,
and the following is substituted therefor.
1070770
2
The appellants in this action ("the former employees")
are several hundred former employees of Arvin Industries d/b/a
Arvin-Meritor, Inc.  ("Arvin").  The former employees sued
Arvin and several of their co-employees, alleging that they
had suffered injuries as a result of exposure to toxic
chemicals while employed by Arvin.  Through an amended
complaint, the former employees added 64 other named
defendants 
("the 
new 
defendants"), 
who 
they 
alleged
manufactured or sold Arvin the chemicals and equipment that
injured the former employees.  The former employees appeal
from the Fayette Circuit Court's dismissal of their claims
against the new defendants.  We reverse and remand.
This is the second time this case has come before this
Court.  See Ex parte International Refining & Mfg. Co., 972
So. 
2d 
784 
(Ala. 
2007)("International 
Refining"). 
In
International Refining, we described the facts and procedural
background as follows:
"On November 13, 2003, Bell Carr, Jr., and
approximately 320 other former employees at a
manufacturing plant operated by Arvin Industries
d/b/a Arvin-Meritor, Inc. (hereinafter 'the [former
employees]'), sued Arvin-Meritor and six individual
defendants, also former employees at the plant,
where automotive mufflers were manufactured. The
complaint alleged that up until the closing of the
1070770
3
plant in May 2002, the [former employees] suffered
harm 
from 
'exposure 
to 
toxic 
and 
dangerous
chemicals' that were flushed from the manufacturing
machines and eventually circulated into a large pit,
which the [former employees] were responsible for
draining and cleaning. In addition to these seven
defendants, the original complaint fictitiously
named 40 other defendants in the caption and in the
body of the complaint.
"On May 6, 2005, approximately three years after
their last exposure to the chemicals, the [former
employees] filed their first amended complaint,
seeking to add 64 new named defendants, including
the petitioners, in place of the fictitiously named
defendants (hereinafter 'the new defendants'), 113
new plaintiffs, as well as additional fictitiously
named defendants. The [first] amended complaint
reasserted the five claims asserted in the original
complaint, but only against the seven original
defendants. The first amended complaint also alleged
claims of negligence, wantonness, liability under
the 
Alabama 
Extended 
Manufacturer's 
Liability
Doctrine, civil conspiracy, and the tort of outrage,
but only against the new defendants."
972 So. 2d at 787.  
Regarding wantonness, the former employees alleged in
count 6 of the first amended complaint that the new defendants
had "wantonly engineered, designed, developed, configured,
manufactured, 
assembled, 
distributed, 
and/or 
sold 
the
chemicals" and other products that the former employees were
exposed to through their work at Arvin.  The former employees
also alleged in count 13 that 5 of the new defendants had
1070770
4
"wantonly engineered, designed, ... manufactured, ... sold,
inspected or consulted regarding the design, engineering,
manufacturing, 
production, 
distribution 
and/or 
warnings
associated with" the equipment used in Arvin's manufacturing
process.
"On June 14, 2005, the new defendants removed
the case to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act ('CAFA'), 28 U.S.C. § 1453. The
district court remanded the five original claims
against the seven original defendants to the Fayette
Circuit Court because they did not fall within the
CAFA. The district court also determined that the
claims in the amended complaint against the new
defendants did not relate back under Alabama law and
did not constitute what it referred to as an
'interstate 
case 
of 
national 
importance.'
Accordingly, the new claims asserted and the parties
added in the amended complaint fell within the
exception to federal jurisdiction under CAFA in 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I), and the district
court also remanded the remaining claims to the
Fayette Circuit Court.
"Upon remand, the new defendants filed motions
to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for a summary
judgment, on the ground that the claims asserted
against them in the amended complaint did not relate
back to the date of the filing of the original
complaint and are thus barred by the two-year
statute of limitations. See § 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code
1975. The trial court conducted a hearing and denied
the 
motions. 
 
The 
new 
defendants 
sought 
a
certification to file a permissive appeal under Rule
5, Ala. R. App. P., but the trial court denied the
request for the certification. The [new defendants]
then filed [a] petition for a writ of mandamus."
1070770
5
International Refining, 972 So. 2d at 787-88 (footnote
omitted).
This Court granted the new defendants' petition and
issued the writ of mandamus.  We concluded in International
Refining that the claims the former employees stated against
the new defendants in the first amended complaint did not
relate back to the claims they stated against the fictitiously
named defendants identified in their original complaint.  972
So. 2d at 791.  Because the first amended complaint was filed
in May 2005, three years after the former employees' last
possible exposure to the allegedly toxic chemicals, any new
claims stated in that complaint, which were subject to a two-
year statutory limitations period, see § 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code
1975, were time-barred and due to be dismissed. 972 So. 2d at
791.
We noted in International Refining that the former
employees argued "that some of their claims nonetheless
survive, because, they say, those claims fall within a six-
year statute of limitations."  972 So. 2d at 791.  See § 6-2-
34, Ala. Code 1975.  However, we declined to reach the
question whether a six-year statute of limitations applied to
1070770
6
any of the former employees' claims against the new
defendants, stating:
"That issue ... is not before us; our mandamus
review extends to reviewing the denial of motions
for a dismissal or for a summary judgment that
asserted a statute-of-limitations defense only as to
fictitious-party practice.  See [Ex parte] Stover,
663 So. 2d [948,] 951-52 [(Ala. 1995)].  The extent
to which the amended complaint, filed within six
years of the events made the basis of the action but
not within two years thereof, states claims not
barred by the two-year statute of limitations is a
question not before us."  
972 So. 2d at 791.  Therefore, we "reverse[d] the trial
court's order denying the motions to dismiss, or for a summary
judgment, and we remand[ed] the case for further proceedings,
including a determination of the extent to which any claims
are timely, without the availability of the relation-back
doctrine."  972 So. 2d at 791.
On remand, the new defendants filed motions to dismiss
or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment, on the ground
that all the claims asserted against them were subject to the
two-year limitations period stated in § 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code
1975, and were due to be dismissed pursuant to this court's
decision in International Refining.  The former employees
responded, arguing that their wantonness claims involved
1070770
7
trespass to the person and, under McKenzie v. Killian, 887 So.
2d 861 (Ala. 2004), were subject to the six-year limitations
period stated in § 6-2-34(1), Ala. Code 1975.  The former
employees conceded that their other claims against the new
defendants were subject to the two-year limitations period
and, without the availability of the relation-back doctrine,
were due to be dismissed.
On August 16, 2007, the former employees amended their
complaint a second time.  The second amended complaint stated
that it was "intended to clarify the allegations contained in
the Complaint and the First Amended Complaint in the wake of
[International Refining]."  It also stated that "no new
plaintiffs or defendants [were] added by way of [the]
amendment" and that "all claims stated [therein arose] out of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrences set forth in the
First Amended Complaint [and] no new causes of action [were]
stated by way of [the] amendment."  The second amended
complaint asserted only a workers' compensation claim against
Arvin, a wantonness claim against the new defendants, and a
separate wantonness claim against five of the new defendants
1070770
It is unclear from the record on appeal whether the
1
former employees' claims against their co-employees have been
resolved.
8
who the former employees alleged had provided the equipment
Arvin used in its manufacturing process.1
The wantonness claim asserted against the new defendants
in the second amended complaint stated, in relevant part: 
"[The 
new 
defendants] 
acted 
willfully 
and/or
wantonly, and committed trespass to the persons of
the former employees, in that the said defendants
consciously acted or omitted to act, and in that
they willfully and wantonly engineered, designed,
developed, 
configured, 
manufactured, 
assembled,
distributed and/or sold [the chemicals and other
products] that resulted in physical impact to the
persons of the former employees and injured the
former employees, and in that the defendants acted
or omitted a duty, while knowing of the existing
conditions and being conscious that, from doing or
omitting to do an act, injury would likely or
probably result to the former employees, in reckless
or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
the former employees."
The wantonness claim asserted against the five new defendants
who the former employees alleged had provided equipment to
Arvin stated similar allegations.
The new defendants moved to strike the second amended
complaint.  However, the trial court did not rule on the
motion to strike.  Instead, the trial court concluded in its
eventual ruling on the new defendants' motions to dismiss
1070770
9
that, because the second amended complaint purported to state
no new cause of action and to arise out of the same conduct
and occurrences stated in the first amended complaint, the
claims stated in the second amended complaint were subject to
the same analysis as those in the first amended complaint.
The new defendants argued that the wantonness claims in the
first and second amended complaints were subject to a two-year
limitations period because, they said, the claims were based
on a products-liability theory.  The new defendants relied on
Malsch v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 916 So. 2d 600, 601
(Ala. 2005); Boyce v. Cassese, 941 So. 2d 932, 945-46 (Ala.
2006); Gilmore v. M & B Realty Co., 895 So. 2d 200, 207-09
(Ala. 2004); and Smith v. Medtronic, Inc., 607 So. 2d 156, 159
(Ala. 1992).  Based on this authority, on February 4, 2008,
the trial court entered an order dismissing all the former
employees' claims against the new defendants.  The former
employees' claims against Arvin remained pending; however, the
trial court certified its February 4, 2008, order as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  The former employees
filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.
1070770
10
The standard of review of an order granting a motion to
dismiss was set out in Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299
(Ala. 1993):
"On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a
presumption of correctness. ... The appropriate
standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R.
Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the
complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's
favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any
set of circumstances that would entitle [the
pleader] 
to 
relief. 
... 
In 
making 
this
determination, this Court does not consider whether
the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only
whether [the plaintiff] may possibly prevail. ... We
note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only
when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of the claim that
would entitle the plaintiff to relief."
The 
former 
employees 
argue 
on 
appeal 
that 
their
wantonness claims against the new defendants are based in
trespass to the person and are subject to the six-year
limitations period stated in § 6-2-34(1), Ala. Code 1975.
Section 6-2-34(1) provides, in relevant part, that actions
"for any trespass to person or liberty, such as false
imprisonment or assault and battery" must be commenced within
six years.  The former employees argue, therefore, that the
trial court erred in dismissing their wantonness claims.  The
1070770
11
former employees rely, as they did before the trial court, on
McKenzie v. Killian, 887 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 2004).  
The new defendants argue in response that the former
employees' wantonness claims are based on a products-liability
theory and are therefore subject to the two-year limitations
period found in § 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code 1975.  That section
provides:  "All actions for any injury to the person or rights
of another not arising from contract and not specifically
enumerated in this section must be brought within two years."
The new defendants base their argument on Malsch v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc., 916 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 2005); Boyce v.
Cassese, 941 So. 2d 932 (Ala. 2006); Gilmore v. M & B Realty
Co., 895 So. 2d 200 (Ala. 2004); and Smith v. Medtronic, Inc.,
607 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1992).
In McKenzie v. Killian, the plaintiff asserted a
wantonness claim against a motorist whose vehicle collided
with hers.  In response to the defendant's summary-judgment
motion 
on 
statute-of-limitations 
grounds, 
the 
plaintiff 
argued
that her wantonness claim was grounded in trespass and was
thus subject to the six-year limitations period of § 6-2-
34(1).  The trial court entered a summary judgment for the
1070770
12
defendant.  Relying on Lowery v. Densmore, 739 So. 2d 1115,
1116 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998), for the proposition that "trespass
is an intentional or wanton direct application of force by a
defendant," the trial court concluded that the plaintiff had
not presented substantial evidence to support a finding of
willful or wanton application of force by the defendant.  
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that her wantonness claim
was an action in trespass, not trespass on the case; that
intent should be irrelevant to determining whether the action
was subject to the six-year statute of limitations; and that
she had presented substantial evidence showing "direct force."
To determine whether the wantonness claim was subject to the
six-year limitations period of § 6-2-34(1), this Court stated:
"[I]t is not possible to explain our rejection of Lowery v.
Densmore, [739 So. 2d 1115 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998),] stated as
controlling by the trial court in its order finding the
evidence insufficient, without first addressing the standard
by which the statute of limitations is applied to allegations
of negligence and wantonness."  887 So. 2d at 866.  We then
analyzed Alabama caselaw regarding the distinction between
trespass and trespass on the case and adopted the reasoning of
1070770
13
Justice Jones's dissenting opinion in Strozier v. Marchich,
380 So. 2d 804, 806 (Ala. 1980):
"'Whatever vestige of the outmoded
direct/indirect 
distinction 
between
trespass and trespass on the case still
exists in Alabama, I would now abandon and
adopt instead the more modern tort concept
of measuring the cause of action in terms
of the degree of culpability of the alleged
wrongful conduct.  Wanton conduct, as that
term is traditionally used and understood
in 
the 
jurisprudence 
of 
our 
State,
signifies the intentional doing  of, or
failing to do, an act, or discharge a duty,
with the likelihood of injury to the person
or property of another as a reasonably
foreseeable consequence.  Such conduct,
resulting in injury, is actionable in
trespass and governed by the six-year
statute of limitations, in my opinion.'"
McKenzie, 887 So. 2d at 870 (quoting Strozier, 380 So. 2d at
806 (Jones, J., dissenting)(emphasis added)).  We then stated:
"We embrace this reasoning today. ... [W]anton conduct is the
equivalent in law to intentional conduct.  Such an allegation
of intent renders the six-year statutory period of limitations
applicable."  Id.
This Court thus abandoned any determination of whether
the six-year statute of limitations applies based on the
presence of direct force to cause the injury in a claim
alleging wantonness.  In so holding, "[w]e overrule[d] Sasser
1070770
14
[v. Dixon, 290 Ala. 17, 273 So. 2d 182 (1973),] and its
progeny to the extent that those cases prefer the theory of
causality over intent as the mechanism for distinguishing
between actions for trespass and trespass on the case."
McKenzie, 887 So. 2d at 870.  Based on our adoption of an
intent-based analysis to determine whether the six-year
statute of limitations applies to a wantonness claim, this
Court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment because the
plaintiff in McKenzie had not presented substantial evidence
of the defendant's intent necessary to support a claim of
wantonness.
In this case, the former employees alleged that the new
defendants engaged in wanton conduct in manufacturing and
selling toxic chemical products and the equipment Arvin used
in its manufacturing process.  That wanton conduct, the former
employees alleged, proximately resulted in their physical
injuries.  We stated in McKenzie: "[W]anton conduct is the
equivalent in law to intentional conduct.  Such an allegation
of intent renders the six-year statutory period of limitations
applicable."  887 So. 2d at 870.  We also adopted Justice
Jones's conclusion that wanton conduct, "'resulting in injury,
1070770
15
is actionable in trespass and governed by the six-year statute
of limitations.'"  Id. (quoting Strozier, 380 So. 2d at 806
(Jones, J., dissenting)(emphasis added)).  Based on the
analysis adopted in McKenzie, because the former employees
have alleged wanton conduct by the new defendants, which
resulted in injury to them, their wantonness claims are
subject to the six-year limitations period of § 6-2-34(1).
The new defendants argue that our decision in McKenzie to
adopt an intent-based analysis is dicta.  However, our opinion
necessarily addressed the arguments the plaintiff in McKenzie
raised on appeal.  Furthermore, we expressly stated that the
determination 
regarding 
an 
intent-based 
analysis 
was 
necessary
because of the trial court's reliance upon Lowery v. Densmore,
supra, which had used a direct-force analysis.  Accordingly,
our discussion of the caselaw regarding intent versus direct
force and our ultimate adoption of an intent-based analysis
was necessary to our opinion in McKenzie.  Furthermore, we
cannot reasonably characterize our decision to overrule Sasser
v. Dixon, 290 Ala. 17, 273 So. 2d 182 (1973), and the line of
cases following it as dicta.  
1070770
16
The new defendants next argue that, even if the McKenzie
analysis is not dicta, the analysis should not apply in
products-liability cases.  First, they argue that Smith v.
Medtronic, Inc., supra, established a rule that all wantonness
claims in products-liability cases are subject to the two-year
limitations period of § 6-2-38(l).  This Court's opinion in
Medtronic stated: "An action alleging negligence, wantonness,
or liability under the [Alabama Extended Manufacturer's
Liability Doctrine] must be brought within two years after the
cause of action accrued.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-38(l)."
607 So. 2d at 159. However, the determinative question in
Medtronic involved when the claims of the former employees in
Medtronic accrued.  Nothing in our opinion suggests that the
former employees in Medtronic ever argued that a longer
statute of limitations applied.  Therefore, we cannot say that
this Court's statement in Medtronic, without argument or
analysis regarding the application of a longer limitations
period, established a separate rule for products-liability
cases independent of the rule subsequently announced in
McKenzie.  In any event, to the extent Medtronic can be read
as announcing a rule of law as to the statute of limitations
1070770
"'An opinion given in Court ..., if not necessary to the
2
judgment given of record, but that it might have been as well
given, if no such, or a contrary opinion had been broached, is
no judicial opinion, no more than a gratis dictum.'" Planters'
& Merchants' Bank v. Walker, 7 Ala. 926, 944 (1845).
17
in products-liability cases, for all that appears that holding
was based on the now discredited preference for causality over
intent. 
The new defendants also rely on gratis dictum  in Malsch
2
v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 916 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 2005);
Boyce v. Cassese, 941 So. 2d 932 (Ala. 2006); and Gilmore v.
M & B Realty Co., 895 So. 2d 200 (Ala. 2004), to support their
argument that, even after McKenzie, a separate rule for
products-liability actions exists.  In Malsch, an action
arising out of a helicopter crash, this Court stated, without
analysis, that both Mississippi and Alabama had "unambiguous
two-year statutes of limitations for the action," which
included a claim of wantonness.  916 So. 2d at 601.  However,
Malsch involved a forum non conveniens determination, and this
Court did not analyze the statutes of limitation applicable to
the claims of the former employees in Malsch beyond the above-
quoted statement. No party in Malsch argued that a longer
1070770
18
statute of limitations should apply.  Absent a more detailed
analysis and a direct challenge to the rule announced in
McKenzie, Malsch cannot reasonably be read as either deciding
the issue of the application of McKenzie in a products-
liability case or creating an exception to McKenzie.
In Boyce, an action arising from a dispute regarding the
use of the plaintiffs' real property by a golf club, this
Court stated: "Like fraud claims, negligence and wantonness
claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.  See
§ 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code 1975."  941 So. 2d at 945.  As in
Malsch, it does not appear that the plaintiffs in Boyce ever
argued that the analysis in McKenzie or a longer statute of
limitations was applicable to their claims.  Indeed, our
opinion does not show that the plaintiffs in Boyce suffered
any injury as would render their clams subject to the analysis
announced in McKenzie.  Furthermore, because Boyce did not
involve products-liability claims, our opinion in that case
does not support the argument that this Court has established
a rule requiring a shorter limitations period in products-
liability actions.
1070770
19
Finally, in Gilmore, a case in which the plaintiffs
alleged that a realtor had sold them the wrong house, we noted
that the plaintiffs "concede[d] that § 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code
1975, prescribes a two-year statute of limitations for their
negligence and wantonness claims, measured upon the date of
injury."  895 So. 2d at 207.  Our statement regarding the
plaintiffs' concession in Gilmore does not indicate a decision
by this Court to limit McKenzie.  As in Boyce, there is no
indication in Gilmore that the issue was ever raised, and we
cannot say that this statement of the plaintiffs' concession
regarding the statute of limitations in an action involving
real property supports the argument by the new defendants that
the application of McKenzie should be limited in products-
liability actions.
Accordingly, the cases the new defendants cite do not
show that this Court has created an exception to McKenzie for
products-liability actions, and we have found no authority
providing a basis for such an exception.  The former employees
in this case have alleged that the new defendants engaged in
wanton conduct that resulted in injury to them.  Accordingly,
under the analysis announced in McKenzie, supra, the six-year
1070770
20
limitations period of § 6-2-34(1) applies.   We find no
rational basis upon which to distinguish McKenzie so as to
render its holding inapplicable.  The former employees can
prove a set of circumstances that would entitle them to
relief, see Nance, 622 So. 2d at 299; therefore, the trial
court erred in dismissing the former employees' wantonness
claims.  We reverse its decision as to those claims and remand
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
APPLICATION OVERRULED; OPINION OF NOVEMBER 14, 2008,
WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall and Parker, JJ., concur.
See, Stuart, Smith, and Bolin, JJ., concur in overruling
the application for rehearing and concur in the result as to
the opinion.  
Murdock, J., dissents.
1070770
21
SEE, Justice (concurring in overruling the application for
rehearing and concurring in the result as to the opinion).
I concur in overruling the application for a rehearing.
I concur in the result reached by the main opinion for the
following reasons.  
I concurred in McKenzie v. Killian, 887 So. 2d 861 (Ala.
2004), the controlling precedent in this case.  Nonetheless,
its application in this case is troubling.  I concur in the
result reached by the main opinion because (1) McKenzie is the
current applicable law, (2) I do not believe that McKenzie can
be distinguished from this case, and (3) this Court has not
been asked to overrule McKenzie. 
This Court concluded in McKenzie that "wanton conduct is
the equivalent in law to intentional conduct" and that the
"allegation of intent renders the six-year statutory period of
limitations applicable." 887 So. 2d at 870.  In so doing, as
the main opinion notes, the Court "abandoned any determination
of whether the six-year statute of limitations applies based
on the presence of direct force to cause the injury in a claim
alleging wantonness." ___ So. 2d at ___. 
In the present case, the new defendants first argue that
McKenzie 
is 
distinguishable because this case, unlike
1070770
22
McKenzie, which involved a simple automobile accident, is a
toxic-substance-exposure case.  Castrol Industrial North
America's brief at 35.  If, however, this Court were to
determine the applicable statute of limitations here on the
basis of the alleged harm, namely, an injury arising out of a
motor-vehicle wreck versus a toxic tort, we would be
abandoning our conclusion in McKenzie that it is the
"allegation of intent [that] renders the six-year statutory
period of limitations applicable."  See McKenzie, 887 So. 2d
at 870 ("We overrule Sasser [v. Dixon, 290 Ala. 17, 273 So. 2d
182 (1973),] and its progeny to the extent that those cases
prefer the theory of causality over intent as the mechanism
for distinguishing between actions for trespass and for
trespass on the case.").  Such a conclusion would, in effect,
overrule McKenzie, a task that we have not been asked to
undertake.
The new defendants also argue that "[t]he relevant
discussion in McKenzie is dicta that does not control this
case."  Joint brief of appellees at 14.  In support of this
argument, the new defendants quote the following language from
McKenzie:
1070770
23
"[T]he record supports the affirmance [of the
summary judgment entered against McKenzie] on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to support
McKenzie's 
wantonness 
claim, 
notwithstanding
Killian's failure to assert that ground in his
summary-judgment motion, because McKenzie failed to
challenge below the trial court's reliance upon that
ground."
887 So. 2d at 866.  The new defendants point to this language
for the proposition that this Court decided McKenzie on the
basis that McKenzie's wantonness claim was not supported by
sufficient evidence; therefore, the new defendants conclude,
our decision in McKenzie was not based on the statute-of-
limitations discussion. Joint brief of appellees at 14.
McKenzie, however, offers no support for such a reading. 
Rebecca McKenzie, the plaintiff in McKenzie, sued George
Killian III, among others, alleging negligence and willful
and/or wanton conduct. 887 So. 2d at 863.  Killian moved for
a summary judgment, arguing that McKenzie's claims were barred
by the two-year statute of limitations.  McKenzie "responded
by arguing that her wantonness claims were grounded in an
action for trespass and were therefore governed by the six-
year statute of limitations set forth in § 6-2-34(a), Ala.
Code 1975." 887 So. 2d at 863.  After noting that "'trespass
is an intentional or wanton direct application of force by
1070770
24
defendant or under his or her authority,'" the trial court
concluded that McKenzie's claim was time-barred because
"'there [was] no evidence to establish a willful or wanton
application of force.'" McKenzie, 887 So. 2d at 863.  Implicit
in the trial court's ruling is the conclusion that McKenzie's
claim was, in fact, an action for trespass on the case, and
not one for trespass.
On appeal, this Court addressed as a threshold matter
whether McKenzie's claim was time-barred and determined that
the correct "mechanism for distinguishing between actions for
trespass and for trespass on the case" is not the causality --
that is, whether there was a direct or an indirect application
of force -- but the intent giving rise to the act or harm.
The Court then concluded that "wanton conduct is the
equivalent in law to intentional conduct.  Such an allegation
of intent renders the six-year statutory period of limitations
applicable." 887 So. 2d at 870.  From this conclusion, the
Court held that McKenzie's wantonness claim was not time-
barred.  Having addressed the threshold question of which
limitations period was applicable to McKenzie's wantonness
claim, this Court then addressed whether McKenzie had met her
1070770
Black's Law Dictionary 409 (8th. ed. 2004) defines obiter
3
dictum as: "A judicial comment made while delivering a
judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision
in the case ...."  It is true that in McKenzie, as in many
other cases addressed by this and other appellate courts, it
turned out that one of the two issues addressed by this Court
could have been avoided by addressing the other issue first.
In fact, in McKenzie, a priori, either of the two issues –-
the statute-of-limitations issue or the sufficiency-of-the-
evidence issue –- could have been dispositive, depending on
the outcome of the analysis of the respective issues.
However, in light of the trial court's order in McKenzie, this
Court chose to analyze first the statute-of-limitations issue
and then, only after the analysis of that issue turned out not
to be dispositive, to address the sufficiency of the evidence
of wantonness.  The issue with which this Court begins its
analysis is a matter that lies within the discretion of this
Court.  The proper question is not whether with perfect
25
burden of establishing that claim.  This Court held that
although the trial court had applied the wrong statute-of-
limitations provision, the summary judgment nevertheless was
appropriate because McKenzie's wantonness claim was not
supported by substantial evidence. 887 So. 2d at 871.  As the
main 
opinion 
notes, 
our discussion whether McKenzie's
wantonness claim was time-barred was necessary to properly
address the trial court's judgment and thus is not dicta, as
the new defendants assert. See Ex parte Williams, 838 So. 2d
1028, 1031 (Ala. 2002) ("[O]biter dictum is, by definition,
not essential to the judgment of the court which states the
dictum ....").3
1070770
hindsight this Court could have reached the same result by
another route; rather, the proper question is whether, having
chosen the route we chose, the analysis was reasonably related
to arriving at the result.
Compare Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 679 So.
4
2d 651, 653 (Ala. 1996) ("False imprisonment consists of the
unlawful detention of the person of another for any length of
time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty." (citing
§ 6-5-170, Ala. Code 1975)), and Harper v. Winston County, 892
So. 2d 346, 353 (Ala. 2004) ("The plaintiff in an action
alleging assault and battery must prove '(1) that the
defendant touched the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant
intended to touch the plaintiff; and (3) that the touching was
conducted in a harmful or offensive manner.'"(quoting Ex parte
Atmore Cmty. Hosp., 719 So. 2d 1190, 1193 (Ala. 1998))) with
Jordan v. Calloway, [Ms. 1070354, Sept. 19, 2008] ___ So. 2d
___, ___ (Ala. 2008) ("Wantonness is '"the conscious doing of
some act or the omission of some duty, while knowing of the
existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or
26
Were we asked to review our decision in McKenzie to
address whether all wantonness claims are subject to a six-
year statute of limitations, I would expect a developed
analysis that addresses the applicable statute of limitations
in light of our statutory scheme.  Section 6-2-34, Ala. Code
1975, provides that "[a]ctions for any trespass to person or
liberty, such as false imprisonment or assault and battery"
must be commenced within six years.  I question whether all
wanton conduct is, by definition, an action for trespass
analogous to false imprisonment or assault and battery, both
of which require intent to commit the wrongful act.   If § 6-
4
1070770
omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably
result."'" (quoting Barker v. Towns, 747 So. 2d 907, 907 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1999), quoting in turn Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush,
723 So. 2d 1250, 1256 (Ala. 1998))).  See also Berness v.
Regency Square Assocs., Ltd., 514 So. 2d 1346, 1349-50 (Ala.
1987) ("'"Wantonness has been defined as the conscious doing
of some act or the omission of some duty [while] under
knowledge of existing conditions and while conscious that,
from the doing of such act or the omission of such duty,
injury will likely or probably result, and before a party can
be said to be guilty of wanton conduct it must be shown that
with reckless indifference to the consequences he consciously
and intentionally did some wrongful act or omitted some known
duty which produced the result. Griffin Lumber Co. v. Harper,
247 Ala. 616, 25 So. 2d 505 [(1946)]; Taylor v. Thompson, 271
Ala. 18, 122 So. 2d 277 [(1960)]; Johnson v. Sexton, [277 Ala.
627, 173 So. 2d 790] [(1965)]."'" (quoting Roberts v. Brown,
384 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Ala. 1980), quoting in turn Lewis v.
Zell, 279 Ala. 33, 36, 181 So. 2d 101, 104 (1965))).
Although it may be suggested that the new defendants
5
engaged in the intentional act of engineering, designing,
developing, 
configuring, 
manufacturing, 
assembling,
distributing, and/or selling the chemicals or equipment used
at the muffler-assembly plant, there does not appear to be any
allegation of an intent to do harm.  It is for this reason
that I am concerned with a six-year statute of limitations in
this case.  However, I understand that under a wantonness
standard, the former employees will have to prove not only
that the new defendants intended to engineer, design, develop,
configure, manufacture, assemble, distribute, and/or sell the
chemicals or equipment used at the muffler-assembly plant, but
27
2-34, Ala. Code 1975, does not encompass all wanton conduct,
and if, as it appears, a statute-of-limitations provision for
wanton conduct is not addressed elsewhere in the statutory
scheme, then by default a wantonness claim would be subject to
the two-year statute-of-limitations provision.   See § 6-2-
5
1070770
also that the new defendants performed those tasks "with
reckless indifference to the consequences" that proximately
caused the former employees' injuries.  
This does not require that wanton conduct be considered
6
more closely akin to negligence than to an intentional tort;
this Court has repeatedly held that wantonness is neither an
intentional tort nor some form of "super-negligence."  See
Phillips ex rel. Phillips v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 988
So. 2d 464, 467 (Ala. 2008) ("'"Wantonness is not merely a
higher degree of culpability than negligence. Negligence and
wantonness, plainly and simply, are qualitatively different
tort concepts of actionable culpability."'" (quoting Ex parte
Anderson, 682 So. 2d 467, 469 (Ala. 1996), quoting in turn
Lynn Strickland Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Aero-Lane Fabricators,
Inc., 510 So. 2d 142 (Ala. 1987))).  
28
38(l), Ala. Code 1975 ("All actions for any injury to the
person or rights of another not arising from contract and not
specifically enumerated in this section must be brought within
two years.").6
Although I am troubled by the application of McKenzie in
this case, I do not believe that McKenzie is distinguishable
or that the statute-of-limitations analysis therein is dicta;
therefore, because we have not been asked to overrule
McKenzie, I concur in the result of the main opinion.
1070770
29
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I agree with the new defendants that the pronouncement in
McKenzie v. Killian, 887 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 2004), that the six-
year limitations period of § 6-2-34(1) applies to wantonness
claims, does not bind this Court in the present case.  As
Justice See notes in his special writing, ___ So. 2d at ____,
dictum is, by definition, "'not essential to the judgment of
the court which states the dictum'" (quoting Ex parte
Williams, 838 So. 2d 1028, 1031 (Ala. 2002)).  McKenzie was a
case that, as this Court decided, did not even involve
wantonness on the part of the defendant.  This Court held
that, "[b]ased on the facts before us, we cannot conclude that
Killian consciously did some act or omitted some duty, while
knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that,
from doing or omitting to do an act, injury would likely or
probably result."  887 So. 2d at 871 . We therefore were able
to, and did, "affirm the trial court's summary judgment in
favor of Killian based on the facts before us on authority of
[Alfa Mutual Insurance Co. v.] Roush[, 723 So. 2d 1250, 1256
(Ala. 1998)]."  887 So. 2d at 871 (defining "wantonness" as
above quoted from McKenzie)(emphasis added).  I therefore
1070770
30
agree with the position of the new defendants that, because
McKenzie was a case in which the evidence did not present a
wantonness claim, it was not essential in that case to decide
the correct limitations period for a wantonness claim.
Although the legal conclusion announced in McKenzie as to the
statute of limitations certainly may be taken as persuasive
authority, I would not consider it to have the same
authoritative weight, at least not on this Court, as it would
if the result in McKenzie had actually depended on the outcome
of that issue.  See generally, e.g., Stark v. Watson, 359 P.2d
191, 196 (Okla. 1961) ("'Obiter dictum is an expression of
opinion by the court or judge on a collateral question not
directly 
involved, 
or 
mere 
argument 
or 
illustration
originating with him, while judicial dictum is an expression
of opinion on a question directly involved, argued by counsel,
and deliberately passed on by the court, though not necessary
to a decision.  While neither is binding as a decision,
judicial dictum is entitled to much greater weight than the
other, and should not be lightly disregarded.'" (quoting
Crescent Ring Co. v. Travelers' Indem. Co., 102 N.J.L. 85, 132
A. 106, 107 (1926))).
1070770
31
Even aside from the foregoing, however, I have no qualm
with this Court's taking up in the present case the issue of
the proper understanding of §§ 6-2-34(1) and 6-2-38(l).  I
agree with the main opinion that the new defendants argue in
their briefs to this Court that any application of a six-year
statute of limitations to wantonness claims should not be
extended 
to 
toxic-substance 
or 
other 
products-liability 
cases.
I can agree with the main opinion, at least for purposes of
this case, that any difference between wantonness claims
generally and products-liability cases does not provide a
sufficiently principled basis for not applying the six-year
limitations period to this case, if it is to be applied  to
claims of wantonness generally.  I do not agree, however, that
the arguments of the new defendants and the cases they cite
are not sufficient to raise the issue whether the six-year
statute of limitations applies to wantonness claims generally.
The brief filed by new defendant Castrol Industrial North
America, Inc. ("Castrol"), begins with extensive statutory-
construction arguments, including an argument that § 6-2-34(1)
should be limited to injuries of the nature of assault and
battery 
and 
false 
imprisonment 
specifically 
enumerated
1070770
32
therein.  Castrol brief at 22.  In addition, before moving to
a more specific discussion of toxic-tort cases, the Castrol
brief contains the following general observation and citations
to cases that are not toxic-tort cases: 
"The Court's own recent decisions demonstrate
that 
claims 
of 
wantonness 
are 
subject 
to 
§
6-2-38(l). '[I]n at least two cases postdating
McKenzie v. Killian, the Alabama Supreme Court has
applied a two-year statute of limitations to
wantonness claims.'  Ratcliff v. Heavy Machines,
Inc., [No. 06-0861-WS-M] (S.D. Ala. July 17, 2007)
[not reported in F. Supp. 2d] (citing Boyce v.
Cassese, 941 So. 2d 932, 946 (Ala. 2006); Gilmore v.
M & B Realty Co., L.L.C., 895 So. 2d 200, 207-08
(Ala. 2004)); see also Malsch v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, 
Inc., 
916 
So. 
2d 
600, 
601 
(Ala.
2005)(wantonness 
claim 
subject 
to 
'unambiguous
statute of limitations')."
Castrol brief at 35. 
Similarly, before moving to a more specific argument that
this Court should not apply the six-year limitations period to
"products-liability" cases, the "Joint Brief of the Appellees"
refers to, and cites some of, "decades" of Alabama cases, most
not involving toxic-tort or other products-liability issues,
which have consistently "placed wantonness claims under the
two-year bar of Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l)":
"This Court has confirmed the application of the
two-year bar to claims of wantonness in three cases
post-dating McKenzie: Boyce v. Cassese, 941 So. 2d
1070770
33
932, 945-46 (Ala. 2006); Malsch v. Bell Helicopter
Textron Inc., 916 So. 2d 600, 601 (Ala 2005); and
Gilmore v. M & B Realty Co., 895 So. 2d 200, 207-09
(Ala. 2004).  The Southern Federal District of
Alabama 
rejected 
an 
argument 
similar 
to 
the
Plaintiffs' in Ratcliff v. Heavy Machines Inc., [No.
06-0861-WS-M, July 17, 2007] (S.D. Ala.) [not
reported in F. Supp. 2d].  This was in accord with
decades of Alabama law that placed wantonness claims
under the two-year bar of Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l).3
                                  
" Some such cases from the 16 years preceding
3
McKenzie include: Spain v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 872 So. 2d 101, 125 (Ala. 2003) ('An
action alleging ... wantonness ... must be brought
within 
two 
years 
after 
the 
cause 
of 
action
accrued.'); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Nicholas, 843
So. 2d 133, 135-36 (Ala. 2002) (holding that
wantonness claim was barred under § 6-2-38(l)); R.R.
Sanders v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., 817 So. 2d
683, 686 (Ala. 2001) (wantonness governed by
two-year statute); Cunningham v. Langston, Frazer,
Sweet & Freese, P.A., 727 So. 2d 800, 805 (Ala.
1999) ('[A]n action alleging ... wantonness must be
brought within two years of [its] accrual ....');
Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Smith, 719 So. 2d 797,
802-03 (Ala. 1998) (wantonness governed by two-year
statute); Booker v. United Amer. Ins. Co., 700 So.
2d 
1333, 
[1340] 
(Ala. 
1997) 
('Because 
the
[plaintiffs] 
filed their complaint [in August
1993——] 
over 
two 
years 
after 
their 
claims
accrued——their negligence and wantonness claims are
time-barred.'); Rumford v. Valley Pest Control,
Inc., 629 So. 2d 623, 627 (Ala. 1993) (wantonness
claim 'governed by the two-year statute' at §
6-2-38(l)); Henson v. Celtic Life Ins. Co., 621 So.
2d 1268, 1274 (Ala. 1993) ('The statutory period of
limitations for ... wantonness actions, found at ...
§ 6-2-38, is two years ....'); Smith v. Medtronic,
Inc., 607 So. 2d 156, 159 (Ala. 1992) ('An action
1070770
34
alleging ... wantonness ... must be brought within
two years after the cause of action accrued.')."
Joint brief of appellees at 15-16.  Later in their joint
brief, the new defendants discuss these post-McKenzie cases in
more detail and provide a substantial argument, not limited to
toxic-tort or other products-liability cases, that "these
cases still reflect this Court's continued understanding that
wantonness claims attract the two-year time bar of § 6-2-
38(l)."  Joint brief of appellees at 33. 
Similarly, before turning to the narrower question of
whether products-liability cases in particular should be
governed by a two-year statute of limitations, Spartan
Chemical Company, Inc., argues more generally as follows:
"First and foremost, the plain language of Ala.
Code §§ 6-2-34(1) and 6-2-38(l)(1975) warrants
dismissal of the Bell Carr Plaintiffs' allegations
of 'wanton' conduct.  Section 6-2-38(l) clearly
requires that '[a]ll actions for any injury to the
person or rights of another, not arising from
contract and not specifically enumerated in this
section must be brought within two years.'  The
Plaintiffs allegations do not arise out of contract
and do not implicate another enumerated action
within that statutory section. Thus, a plain reading
of that statute requires application of the two-year
limitation period to the Plaintiffs' claims.  This
conclusion is supported by years of settled Alabama
law."
1070770
35
Spartan Chemical brief at 13.  The brief then continues with
discussions of IMED Corp. v. Systems Engineering Associates
Corp., 602 So. 2d 344 (Ala. 1992), to urge "a plain language"
interpretation of §§ 6-2-34(1) and 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code 1975,
and of Winner v. Marion County Commission, 415 So. 2d 1061
(Ala. 1982), to argue that the examples of "assault and
battery" and "false imprisonment" in § 6-2-34(1) provide
meaning to the more general term, "trespass," in the statute.
Spartan Chemical brief at 13-16.  
In short, the new defendants briefs (1) argue the
application of principles of statutory construction to the
relevant statutes and (2) cite this Court to numerous cases
decided both before and after McKenzie that are not limited to
toxic-tort or other products-liability claims and argue that
these cases stand for the proposition that a two-year
limitations period now prescribed by § 6-2-38(l) should apply
to wantonness claims.  Implicitly, and of necessity, they
argue that McKenzie was incorrectly decided in this regard.
Moreover, in "response," both the initial brief and the reply
brief of the plaintiffs fully argue the merits of the very
issues joined by the new defendants.  Indeed, if anything, the
1070770
36
plaintiffs' briefs on appeal parse the reasoning and
analytically discuss the relative merits of the McKenzie
decision and the conflicting pre- and post-McKenzie decisions
issued by this Court more thoroughly than do the new
defendants.  
In the context of these arguments, it clearly is within
the authority, indeed it is the responsibility, of this Court
to decide this issue and to properly declare the state of the
law in Alabama on this issue.  If, in the course of doing so,
we determine that the two-year statute of limitations is
applicable, and that McKenzie was incorrectly decided on this
issue, then it falls to us to so hold.  Our doing so would not
require us to overrule a long line of well-established
precedents; to the contrary, it would require us to overrule
only a single case that stands as an exception to a long line
of cases that were decided both before and after McKenzie, and
upon which the new defendants expressly rely.  See, e.g., Ex
parte Howell Eng'g & Surveying, Inc., 981 So. 2d 413, 423
(Ala. 2006) ("Because we hold that the line of cases
culminating in Southeast Cancer[ Network, P.C. v. DCH
Healthcare Authority, Inc., 869 So. 2d 452 (Ala. 2003),] is
1070770
I would also note that my position does not require us
7
to reach out to consider and overrule a case for purposes of
reversing a lower court's decision and, in so doing, to
undertake a task that an appellant has not asked us to
undertake.  Rather, we would be responding to the arguments
made by the appellees regarding the proper interpretation of
§ 6-2-34(1) and § 6-2-38(l), and in the course of doing so we
would affirm the judgment of the trial court.   See generally
General Motors Corp. v. Stokes Chevrolet, Inc., 885 So. 2d
119, 124 (Ala. 2003)("This Court may affirm a trial court's
judgment on 'any valid legal ground presented by the record
....'" (quoting Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of
Alabama Health Servs. Found., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala.
2003))).  See also, e.g., Ex parte Wiginton,,743 So. 2d 1071,
1072-73 (Ala. 1999) ("The appellate courts will sustain the
decision of the trial court if it is right for any reason,
even one not presented by a party or considered or cited by
the trial judge, Morrison v. Franklin, 655 So. 2d 964 (Ala.
1995), even though the appellate courts will not reverse the
trial court on an issue or contention not presented to the
trial court for its consideration in making its ruling, Smith
v. Equifax Services, Inc., 537 So. 2d 463 (Ala. 1988).").
37
the better reasoned, to the extent that Dyson[ Conveyor
Maintenance, Inc. v. Young & Vann Supply Co., 529 So. 2d 212
(Ala. 1988)], Defco[, Inc. v. Decatur Cylinder, Inc., 595 So.
2d 1329 (Ala. 1992)], and Sevier[ Insurance Agency, Inc. v.
Willis Corroon Corp. of Birmingham, 711 So. 2d 995 (Ala.
1998),] conflict with this opinion, they are hereby overruled.
We acknowledge that HES did not ground its petition for a writ
of certiorari on Rule 39(a)(1)(E), Ala. R. App. P., by seeking
to have overruled the controlling precedent relied upon by the
Court of Civil Appeals.").7
1070770
38
I turn then to a consideration of the substantive issue
presented.   I begin by noting that I have no quarrel with the
conclusion reached in McKenzie that the issue presented turns
on "the degree of culpability of the alleged wrongful
conduct."  McKenzie, 887 So. 2d at 870 (quoting Justice
Jones's dissenting opinion in Strozier v. Marchich, 380 So. 2d
804, 809 (1980)).  As Strozier documents, courts as a general
rule have moved from a causality-based distinction between
actions labeled as trespass and trespass on the case to a
culpability-based 
distinction, 
i.e., 
between 
intentional 
torts
and those based in negligence.  
In discussing the transition from a jurisprudence that
categorized causes of action based on the causal sequence of
events to one that categorizes based on the culpability of the
tortfeasor, one well known authority makes no mention of
recklessness or wantonness, instead dividing actions merely
between 
those 
involving 
intentional conduct and those
involving negligence.  See W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton
on the Law of Torts at 29-31 (5th ed. 1984).  Further, the
discussion in Prosser explains that causes of action for
trespass, assault and battery, and false imprisonment--in
1070770
"At common law, trespass to the person was described as
8
trespass vi et armis, 'by force and arms.'" Lovell v. Acrea,
500 So. 2d 1082, 1083 (Ala. 1986).  Such "trespass to the
person" is exactly what is addressed in § 6-2-34(1) and in its
precursors dating back to the enactment in 1852 of § 2477,
Ala. Code.  Although an earlier case, decided in 1827, stated
trespass will lie when the injury is "direct and immediate,
whether it proceed from design or negligence," Rhodes v.
Roberts, 1 Stew. 145, 145 (Ala. 1827), not long after (and
according to Justice Jones in Strozier, "perhaps on account
of") the legislature's 1852 enactment of a six-year statute of
limitations for actions alleging "trespass," this Court held
that it was the intentional procurement of a harm to the
plaintiff that made for a "trespass," even if the harm does
39
other words, causes of action of the very type addressed in §
6-2-34(1)--involve intentional conduct by the tortfeasor:
"Terms such as battery, assault and false imprisonment, which
were varieties of trespass, came to be associated with intent,
and negligence emerged as a separate tort. ...  There is still
some occasional confusion, and some talk of a negligent
'assault and battery,' but in general these terms are
restricted to cases of intent."  Id. at 30 (footnote omitted).
"'The intention to do harm, or an unlawful intent, is of the
very essence of an assault, and without it there can be
none.'"  Id. at 30 n. 17 (quoting Raefeldt v. Koenig, 152 Wis.
459, 462, 140 N.W. 56, 57 (1912)).  See also id. at 31 n. 18
(explaining that "assault and battery, false imprisonment, and
trespass to land" were "derived from trespass").8
1070770
not result from the direct application of force by the
defendant: 
"[A] count which charges that Pleas [the
defendant's 
slave] 
willfully 
burned 
the
dwelling-house of plaintiff, and that said slave was
instigated and persuaded thereto by the defendant,
is, in form, a count in trespass, and charges the
defendant with the commission of a felony.
"On the other hand, some of the counts, in both
the original and amended complaints, charge on the
defendant's intestate no actual or intentional
procuration of the arson, but seek to base his
liability on his negligently permitting Pleas, his
slave, and of known bad character, to run at large,
contrary to law. These counts, if they have any
legal validity, are in case, and should not have
been joined with a count in trespass."
Bell's Adm'r v. Troy, 35 Ala. 184, 202 (1859).  Several years
later, in Pruitt v. Ellington, 59 Ala. 454, 457 (1877), the
Court cited Bell's Adm'r v. Troy and similarly held: 
"The distinction between an action on the case,
and an action of trespass, is in effect, though not
in terms preserved by the Code.  For a tort
committed 
with 
force 
and 
intentionally, 
the
immediate consequence of which is injury, trespass
is the appropriate remedy.  If the injury proceeds
from mere negligence, or is not the immediate
consequence of the tort, case is the appropriate
remedy."  
(Emphasis added.)
Despite the consistency of the Bell and Pruitt cases in
focusing upon the intent of the actor, and thus making a good
start at establishing not only internal consistency within
Alabama cases, but also consistency with the transition then
underway in English and American jurisprudence generally from
40
1070770
a causality analysis to an intent-based analysis, see
discussion supra of Prosser, cases decided in Alabama after
Pruitt often resorted to an inconsistent and confusing mixture
of references to both causality factors and intent.  See
discussion in McKenzie, 887 So. 2d at 867-70.
41
Our own cases likewise hold that the types of claims
described in § 6-2-34(1) involve intentional harm to the
plaintiff.  See, e.g., Harper v. Winston County, 892 So. 2d
346, 353 (Ala. 2004) (explaining that the unconsented touching
in an assault and battery must have been done intentionally);
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 679 So. 2d 651 ( Ala.
1996) 
(false-imprisonment 
case). 
 
In 
contrast, 
"'"[w]antoness"
has been defined by this Court as the conscious doing of some
act or the omission of some duty, while knowing of the
existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or
omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably
result.'"  Bozeman v. Central Bank of the South, 646 So. 2d
601, 603 (Ala. 1994)(quoting Stone v. Smithland Nat'l Ins.
Corp., 589 So. 2d 1289, 1292 (Ala. 1991)).  "To prove
wantonness, it is not essential to prove that the defendant
entertained a specific design or intent to injure the
1070770
In reaching its conclusion that wantonness ought to be
9
treated for statute-of-limitations purposes the same as
intentional conduct, the McKenzie Court quoted Justice Jones's
reasoning in Strozier v. Marchich that "'[o]ne who knowingly
sets into motion, by intentionally doing (or failing to do) an
act, a sequence of events resulting in reasonably foreseeable
injury to another, whether the resulting injury is immediate
or consequential, in my opinion, has committed a trespass
within 
the 
contemplation 
of 
the 
six-year 
statute 
of
limitations.'"  McKenzie, 887 So. 2d at 870 (quoting Strozier,
380 So. 2d at 809 (Jones, J., dissenting)).  The intent merely
to act in a certain way, often referred to in the law as
"willful" conduct, and the specific intent to harm are two
different things, however, and that difference denotes the
line between nonintentional torts and intentional torts.  As
worded, the quoted statement from Strozier is a reference to
the former.
42
plaintiff." Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So. 2d 1250, 1256
(Ala. 1998).  
9
It is true that this Court has stated that "[w]antonness
is not merely a higher degree of culpability than negligence"
and that negligence and culpability "are qualitatively
different tort concepts."  Lynn Strickland Sales & Serv., Inc.
v. Aero-Lane Fabricators, Inc., 510 So. 2d 142, 145 (Ala.
1987).  Accepting this proposition as true for present
purposes, I would submit that if the difference between
negligence and recklessness is a qualitative one rather than
one of degree, then the difference between reckless conduct
and intentional conduct is even more of a qualitative
1070770
Prosser states that the terms "willful," "wanton," and
10
"reckless" 
"have been grouped together as an aggravated form of
negligence, differing in quality rather than in
degree from ordinary lack of care. ...  They apply
to conduct which is still, at essence, negligent,
rather than actually intended to do harm, but which
is so far from a proper state of mind that it is
treated in many respects as if it were so intended.
Thus it is held to justify an award of punitive
damages, and may justify a broader duty, and more
extended liability for consequences, and it will
avoid 
the 
defense 
of 
ordinary 
contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff." 
Prosser at 212-14 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis added).
43
difference, and certainly one that is more definitive
conceptually.
 
10
But to show that claims alleging recklessness or
wantonness are more akin in either quality or degree to claims
alleging negligence than they are to claims based on a
tortfeasor's actual, specific intent to harm would be to show
more than is necessary.  As Justice See notes in his special
writing, questioning the conclusion reached in McKenzie that
claims of reckless and wanton conduct ought to be treated the
same as claims for intentional torts for purposes of the
statute of limitations "does not require that wanton conduct
be considered more closely akin to negligence than to an
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44
intentional tort; this Court has repeatedly held that
wantonness is neither an intentional tort nor some form of
'super-negligence.'" ___ So. 2d at ___ n. __ (See, J.,
concurring in the result) (emphasis added).  All that is
required is to be able to conclude that reckless or wanton
conduct is not intentional conduct.
I am clear to the conclusion that recklessness and
wantonness are fundamentally, and definitively, different
concepts than intent and that claims alleging reckless or
wanton conduct are fundamentally, and definitively, different
types of claims from those alleging intentional harm to the
plaintiff.   I therefore cannot place claims for such conduct
within the governance of § 6-2-34(1), which I interpret as
imposing a six-year statute of limitations on the intentional
torts described therein, i.e., "trespass to person or liberty,
such 
as 
false 
imprisonment 
or 
assault 
and 
battery."
Concomitantly, I must conclude that claims alleging reckless
and wanton conduct, just like those alleging negligence and,
for that matter, any number of nonintentional torts, fall
within the governance of the general provision in § 6-2-38(l)
for a two-year limitations period for "[a]ll actions for any
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45
injury to the person or rights of another not arising from
contract and not specifically enumerated in this section."
As previously noted, a long line of decisions reaching
back many years, including some that postdate McKenzie, has
consistently affirmed the proposition that wantonness claims
are governed by the relatively shorter statute of limitations
now embodied in § 6-2-38(l).  I believe this Court should once
again affirm that proposition. 
I therefore respectfully dissent.