Case Title: J.S. and M.S. v. R.T.H.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-98-97

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). HANDLER, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issue in this case is whether a wife who suspects or should suspect her husband of actual or prospective sexual abuse of their neighbors' children has any duty of care to prevent such abuse and, if there is such a duty, whether breach of that duty constitutes a proximate cause of the harm that results from sexual abuse. In 1988, defendants R.T.H. and R.G.H., husband and wife ( John and Mary ), moved into a house in Vineland, N.J., and became next-door neighbors of plaintiffs, J.S. and M.S. and their two daughters, C.S. and M.S., aged 12 and 15. The two families quickly became friendly and spent a lot of time together. John and Mary owned horses and a barn, and, at John's encouragement, the minor girls visited daily to ride horseback and to help care for the horses. Additionally, John would take the older of the two girls horseback riding on various trails in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Usually, John was the only adult in the company of the two girls; Mary never joined the trio. Over a period of approximately one year, from 1991 until his arrest in November 1992, John sexually assaulted the girls. Although Mary admitted that she knew or should have known of her husband's proclivities/propensities, she never confronted John about the time he was spending alone with either or both of the girls. Following his arrest, John pled guilty to endangering the welfare of minors and was sentenced to eighteen months in state prison. The girls' parents subsequently filed a civil complaint against John alleging intentional, reckless, and/or negligent acts of sexual assault against each of the two girls. Later, they amended the complaint to include Mary as defendant, alleging that she was negligent in that she knew and/or should have known of her husband's proclivities/propensities and that as a result of her negligence the two girls suffered physical and emotional injury. In her answer to the amended complaint, Mary asserted that she owed no duty to the girls, that any alleged negligence on her part was not the proximate cause of any injuries or damages sustained by the girls, and that any damages were the result of actions by a third party over whom she exercised no control. Mary then filed a motion for summary judgment contending that there was no legal basis for finding her negligent. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint against Mary. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the order granting Mary's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court granted John and Mary's petition for certification. HELD: When a spouse has actual knowledge or special reason to know of the likelihood of his or her spouse engaging in sexually abusive behavior against a particular person or persons, a spouse has a duty of care to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the harm, and breach of such a duty constitutes a proximate cause of the resultant injury, the sexual abuse of the victim. 1. Foreseeability of the risk of harm is the foundational element in the determination of whether a duty exists. It is based on a defendant's knowledge of the risk of injury, which knowledge may be constructive if the defendant is in a position to discover the risk of harm. (pp. 6-7) 2. The imposition of a duty requires an evaluation and a balancing of the conflicting interests of the respective parties, which necessarily includes an examination of the relationships between and among the parties and an assessment of the defendant's responsibility for conditions creating the risk of harm. (pp. 7-8) 3. The determination of the existence of a duty is a question of fairness and public policy. In fixing the limits of liability as a matter of public policy, courts must draw on notions of fairness, common sense, and morality in the context of contemporary circumstances and considerations. (p. 8) 4. The scope of a duty is determined under the totality of the circumstances and must be reasonable under those circumstances, taking into consideration the risk of harm involved and the practicality of preventing it. (pp. 8-9) 5. Although conduct involving sexual abuse is often secretive, clandestine, and furtive, a number of factors are relevant when determining whether or not it is foreseeable to a wife that her husband would sexually abuse a child. (pp. 9-11) 6. There is empirical support for the conclusion that sexual abuse of a child, while extremely difficult to detect or anticipate, is a risk that can be foreseen by a spouse. (pp. 11-12) 7. Particularized foreseeability in this kind of case will conform the standard of foreseeability to the empirical evidence and common experience that indicate a wife may often have actual knowledge or special reason to know that her husband is abusing or is likely to abuse an identifiable victim and will accommodate the concerns over the inherent difficulties in predicting such furtive behavior, while ensuring that the wife is not subject to a broad duty that may expose her to liability to every child whom her husband may threaten and harm. (pp. 12-13) 8. There can be no doubt about the strong policy of this State to protect children from sexual abuse and to require reporting of suspected child abuse. (pp. 13-16) 9. Although the Court must take into consideration defendants' interests in a stable marital relationship and in marital privacy, the societal interest in enhancing marital relationships cannot outweigh the societal interest in protecting children from sexual abuse. (pp. 16-18) 10. In providing sweeping statutory protections designed to protect children and to curb child abuse, the Legislature did not intend to foreclose civil remedies. Rather, civil remedies will complement statutory protections and further the legislative efforts to enhance the protection of children. (pp 19-20) 11. Although the child-abuse reporting statute provides a standard of care in that it requires anyone who has reasonable cause to believe that a child is being sexually abused to report the abuse to DYFS, it does not purport to incorporate or codify any common-law standard and, therefore, a violation of that statute may constitute only evidence of negligence. (pp. 21-22) 12. Considerations of fairness implicate the scope as well as the existence of a duty. Fairness concerns in these circumstances can be accommodated by a flexible duty of care that requires a spouse, when there is particularized foreseeability of harm of sexual abuse to a child, to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the harm. (pp. 23-24) 13. There is little question that the physical and emotional injuries allegedly suffered by the girls are hardly an extraordinary result of John's acts of molestation and that their victimization is not an extraordinary consequence of Mary's own negligence. Mary's negligence therefore could be found to be proximate cause of the girls' injuries. (pp. 25-27) 14. On renewal of the motion for summary judgment, the trial court may consider whether a reasonable jury could find that, under the totality of the circumstances based on the standards set forth in this opinion, Mary knew or should have known of the abuse and could have taken reasonable actions to have prevented such abuse. Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE HANDLER's opinion. J.S. and M.S., his wife, as Natural Parents and Guardians Ad Litem of C.S., A Minor, and M.S., A Minor, and M.S., individually, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. R.T.H., Defendant, and R.G.H., his wife, jointly and severally Defendant-Appellant. Argued February 3, 1998 -- Decided July 29, 1998 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 301 N.J. Super. 150 (1997). Patricia M. Forsyth argued the cause for appellant (Waters, McPherson, McNeill, attorneys; Kenneth D. McPherson, Jr., of counsel; Ms. Forsyth and Brian D. Lieberman, on the briefs). Marian I. Kelly argued the cause for respondents (Hoffman, DiMuzio and Hoffman, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by HANDLER, J. It is a disorderly persons offense to fail to report an act of child abuse reasonably believed to have been committed. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.14. See F.A. v. W.J.F., 280 N.J. Super. 570, 576 (App. Div. 1995) (noting that any person "who knowingly fails to report an act of child abuse 'having reasonable cause to believe an act of child abuse has been committed, is a disorderly person'") (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.14). Another statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1a(1), declares that a person who stands in loco parentis to a child and knowingly permits or acquiesces in sexual abuse of the child by another person in the household is also guilty of sexual abuse. Further evidence of the State's continuing concern for children at risk from abuse is N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.75, which establishes the New Jersey Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect.See footnote 3 "Megan's Law," N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, provides yet more evidence of the State's intolerance of sexual abuse of children. In affirming the constitutionality of the community notification and registration requirements of Megan's Law for convicted sex offenders, this Court recognized the enormous public interest in protecting society from the threat of potential molestation, rape, or murder of women and children. See Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 13. While the interest in protecting children from sexual abuse is great, this Court must also take into consideration defendants' interests in a stable marital relationship and in marital privacy. See State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406, 414 (1994). That interest traditionally found expression in the common-law doctrine of interspousal immunity wherein one spouse could not sue or be sued by another, see generally Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 396 (1954); 1 Blackstone Commentaries 442; Prosser, Torts 122 at 860-64 (4th ed. 1971), and the testimonial disqualification wherein one spouse was not permitted to testify for or against the other, see generally Szemple, supra, 135 N.J. at 414; 1 Coke, A Commentarie upon Littleton 6b (9th ed. 1832); 8 Wigmore on Evidence 2227 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Both courts and scholars, however, increasingly questioned whether the doctrine of marital immunity actually succeeded in promoting the marital tranquility and privacy it was designed to serve. See, e.g., Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535 (1978) (abrogating interspousal immunity; also observing that it is hard to "monitor marital morality" and stating: "The threat to domestic harmony posed by a legal action between spouses is an imponderable; the cohesiveness of a marriage may be jeopardized as much by barring a cause of action as by allowing it."). The testimonial disqualification has also been criticized. See 8 Wigmore, supra, 2228 at 221 (terming the spousal testimonial privilege "the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in practice"); 63 American Bar Ass'n Reports 594-95 (1938) (calling for the abolition of the spousal testimonial privilege); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52, 100 S. Ct. 906, 913, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186, 196 (1980) (holding that the rule permitting an accused to bar all adverse spousal testimony cannot stand because the "ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege have long since disappeared"; and observing that "[w]hen one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding--whatever the motivation--their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve"). Moreover, the societal interest in enhancing marital relationships cannot outweigh the societal interest in protecting children from sexual abuse. The child-abuse reporting statute itself has mandated that balance -- it applies to every citizen, including a spouse. Supra at __ (slip op. at 14). As the Appellate Division here described, "the Legislature's adoption of that statute [i.e., "Megan's Law"] is an expression of New Jersey's strong public policy favoring protection of children over the privacy of an offending adult." 301 N.J. Super. at 157. Thus, "[t]he protective privilege ends where the public peril begins." Tarasoff, supra, 551 P.2d at 347; cf. State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 112 (1997) (refusing to extend a parent's right to counsel or right to Miranda warnings under the state and federal constitutions to Title Nine investigations by DYFS workers because that "would shift the primary focus of Title Nine from the right of children to be protected from abuse and neglect to the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Those rights are not in equipoise."). The Appellate Division here also overruled the holding contained in Rozycki v. Peley, 199 N.J. Super. 571, 579 (Law Div. 1984) to the extent that it "places a higher priority upon preserving the defendants' marital relationship than upon protecting children from abuse." 301 N.J. Super. at 157. Thus, while the marital relationship is a genuine concern in this case, it is by no means dispositive. Considerations of fairness and public policy also govern whether the imposition of a duty is warranted. Carvalho, supra, 143 N.J. at 573. Public policy considerations based in large measure on the comparative interests of the parties support overwhelmingly the recognition of a duty of care in these circumstances. This Court has recognized that the sexual abuse of children not only traumatizes the victims, but also exacts a heavy toll on society: Recent research indicates that a number of psychosocial problems -- including chronic depression and anxiety, isolation and poor social adjustment, substance abuse, suicidal behavior, and involvement in physically or sexually abusive relationships as either aggressor or victim -- are more common among adults molested as children than among those with no such childhood experiences. Victims of sexual abuse can suffer an impaired ability to critically evaluate the motives and behavior of others, making them more vulnerable to revictimization. An especially disturbing finding about child sexual abuse is its strong intergenerational pattern; in particular, due to the psychological impact of their own abuse, sexually abused boys have been found to be more likely than non-abused boys to turn into offenders against the next generation of children, and sexually abused girls are more likely to become mothers of children who are abused. And studies show that adult male aggressive behavior, particularly sexual aggression, is associated with the trauma of childhood sexual abuse. Thus, apart from the substantial personal trauma caused to the victims of such crimes, sexual crimes against children exact heavy social costs as well. [Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 16 (internal quotation and citation omitted.] In defining the appropriate standard of care, we are enjoined again to consider the comprehensive legislative treatment of the issue of sexual abuse of children. While the efforts of the Legislature to combat sexual abuse of children are considerable, evidence and experience indicate that they may not be sufficient to stem the tide. This is because ninety-five to ninety-eight percent of child sexual abuse "is hidden behind closed doors" and occurs "in the home or within the circle of immediate friends and family." Hearing Before the Senate Institutions, Health and Welfare Committee on Child Abuse and Sexual Abuse of Children in Day and Residential Children's Facilities 39 (Oct. 3, 1984) (statement of Betty Wilson, President of the Center for Non-Profit Corporations). Moreover, "80" of substantiated perpetrators of child sexual abuse have no prior criminal records," id. at 11 (statement of George Albanese, Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Human Services), and thus would fall outside of current registration and community notification requirements. Thus, we can confidently conclude that civil remedies will complement statutory protections and further the legislative efforts to enhance the protection of children. It is obvious that the Legislature, in providing sweeping statutory protections designed to protect children and to curb child abuse, did not intend to foreclose civil remedies. We note that [w]hen a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action. Not only may a violation of a statute "generate a civil remedy even where no such remedy is included in the act," but the "violation of some statutes may even be negligence." Parks v. Pep Boys, 282 N.J. Super. 1, 14-15 (App. Div. 1995). When a statute specifically incorporates a standard of care, "a jury finding of a statutory violation constitutes a finding of negligence." Eaton v. Eaton, 119 N.J. 628, 642-43 (1990); see also Jones v. Bennett, 306 N.J. Super. 476, 484 (App. Div. 1998) (noting that normally "violation of a motor vehicle statute is evidence of negligence," but where "a motor vehicle statute codifies the common law standard, the violation of the statute is not evidence of negligence, it is negligence") (internal quotation and citation omitted). When a statute, however, merely proscribes conduct and adopts a standard without intending specifically to incorporate the non-statutory or common-law standard, violation of that statute may constitute only evidence of negligence. See Smith v. Young, 300 N.J. Super. 82, 95 (App. Div. 1997) (noting "venerable rule of law that permits an injured plaintiff to use violation of a legislatively established standard as evidence of negligence for the consideration of the jury, as long as the plaintiff was one of a class for whose benefit the statute was enacted") (internal quotations and citations omitted). In this case, there is no doubt that the minor children were members of the class that N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10 was meant to protect and that they suffered precisely the type of harm from which the statute was intended to protect them. Further, there is no doubt that a wife can be a person who is subject to the obligation imposed by the statute. See Hill, supra, 232 N.J. Super. at 356. If Mary herself had discovered the sexual abuse of the children, or even had "reasonable cause to believe" that they had been sexually abused, she would have been lawfully compelled to report that occurrence. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10. Further, the child-abuse reporting statute provides a standard of care in that it requires anyone who has "reasonable cause to believe" that a child is being sexually abused to report the abuse to DYFS. This statutory standard, however, does not purport to incorporate or codify any common-law standard. Moreover, the statute does not expressly attempt to resolve for purposes of civil liability the comparative interests of the parties, and the Court must heed not only the public policy of protecting children, but also that of promoting stability in marriage. Accordingly, we do not conclude that the Legislature intended that the child-abuse reporting statute constitute an independent basis for civil liability or that its violation constitute negligence per se. Nevertheless, because the protections provided, the evils addressed, and the obligations imposed by the reporting statute parallel those that would be relevant in recognizing the existence of a duty as a basis for a civil remedy, we determine that a violation of the statute may constitute evidence of negligence in circumstances such as those presented in this case. Considerations of fairness implicate the scope as well as the existence of a duty. In defining the duty to be imposed, the court must weigh the ability and opportunity of the defendant to exercise reasonable care. See, e.g., Kuzmicz, supra, 147 N.J. at 515; Carvalho, supra, 143 N.J. at 573. Defendant contends that the imposition of a duty to prevent her husband from engaging in sexual abuse of another person would be unfair. She argues that sexual offenses are extremely difficult to combat and that she did not necessarily have the power, the ability, or the opportunity to control her husband and should not be expected or required to police his conduct continuously. However, fairness concerns in these circumstances can be accommodated by a flexible duty of care that requires a spouse, when there is particularized foreseeability of harm of sexual abuse to a child, to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the harm. See Franklin, supra, 930 S.W.2d at 928-29 (holding that "a duty exists to not place a child in a situation in which the risk of sexual abuse is heightened and in which the risk is foreseeable" and that therefore a wife who "knew or should have known of her husband's proclivities, [] should have taken steps to ensure that [the grandchild] would not be placed in harm's way or to otherwise ensure that her husband would not be in a position to act on his temptations"); Phillips v. Deihm, 541 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that victim of sexual abuse had cause of action against pedophile's wife who was allegedly aware of, but failed to prevent, the abuse that occurred in the marital home and pickup truck); Pamela L., supra, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (finding that children who suffered sexual abuse stated valid cause of action against pedophile's wife, where the complaint alleged that the wife knew her husband had molested children in the past, she encouraged and invited the children to be alone with her husband in the family pool when she was at work, and she unreasonably exposed the children to harm); Chaney, supra, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 76 (noting that "public policy requires that where a child is sexually assaulted in the defendant wife's home by her husband, the wife's duty of reasonable care to the injured child depends on whether the husband's behavior was reasonably foreseeable"); see also T.A. v. Allen, supra, 669 A.2d at 364-65 (Olszewski, J., dissenting) (arguing that where step-grandmother knew or had reason to know of her husband's pedophilia, she had a duty to warn the children of the danger posed by their grandfather); id. at 372 (Ford Elliott, J., dissenting) (arguing that wife in those circumstances had duty to protect the children from a known child abuser, not simply to warn them of the danger); cf. Arvinitis v. Hios, 307 N.J. Super. 577 (App. Div. 1998) (citing Appellate Division decision in this case and holding that layperson, a wife, owes duty of reasonable care under the circumstances to her nephew who was injured while assisting her in convincing her husband, whom she knew to have violent tendencies, to take his medication); Tarasoff, supra, 551 P.2d at 340 (imposing duty of reasonable care when defendant knew that a third person posed a risk of harm to the victim). NO. A-98 J.S. and M.S., etc., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. R.T.H., Defendant, and R.G.H., etc., Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED