Case Title: State v. Keller

Citation: 315 Or. 273, 844 P.2d 195

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1993-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
844 P.2d 195 (1993)
315 Or. 273
STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review,
v.
Arthur Dudley KELLER, Petitioner on Review.
CC C89-10-35670; CA A65541; SC S39111.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted November 3, 1992.
Decided January 22, 1993.
*196 Peter Gartlan, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the petition was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender, Salem.
Michael C. Livingston, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review.
Before CARSON, C.J., and PETERSON, VAN HOOMISSEN, FADELEY, UNIS and GRABER, JJ.
GRABER, Justice.
Defendant was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree, ORS 163.427,[1] involving a five-year-old child. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in permitting a medical doctor to testify, on direct examination during the state's case-in-chief, that the child had not been "coached" or "led" when she made the allegations against defendant and in denying defendant's motion to strike that testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction without opinion. State v. Keller, 110 Or. App. 635, 823 P.2d 457 (1992). We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case to the circuit court for a new trial.
Defendant's wife provided licensed day care to children in the home that she and defendant occupied. Late one afternoon in August 1989, defendant's wife asked defendant, who had just returned home from his place of employment, to watch three children while she ran an errand with two other children. Defendant and two of the children, including the alleged victim in this case, were on the lower level of the split-level house. About five minutes after defendant's wife left the house, the mother of one of the children arrived to pick up her child, the alleged victim. While waiting for defendant's wife to return with her other child, the child's mother conversed with defendant.
That night, the child told her mother that, during the time defendant and the children were alone together, defendant had touched her genital area. The mother immediately reported the allegation to the Multnomah County sheriff's office. The next day she took the child to the family's pediatrician to be examined. The doctor found no physical evidence of sexual abuse.
The mother then took the child to the Child Abuse Response and Evaluation Services unit (C.A.R.E.S.) at Emanuel Hospital in Portland. A trained interviewer at C.A.R.E.S. conducted a videotaped interview with the child and prepared a written report of the interview. Dr. Bays, a medical doctor, watched part of the interview from behind a one-way mirror and later viewed the videotape of the entire interview.
Defendant was arrested and charged with sexual abuse in the first degree. During trial, the state called Dr. Bays as a witness for the prosecution.[2] After stating her educational and professional qualifications,[3] Dr. Bays testified in part as follows:
"* * * * *
"[WITNESS]: Yes.
"* * * * *
"* * * * *
"[WITNESS]: Yes.
"* * * * *
"[WITNESS]: Yes.
"* * * * *
At that point in Dr. Bay's testimony, defense counsel objected "on foundation grounds." The trial court asked counsel to be "more specific as to the foundation." Defense counsel replied:
"Yes, Your Honor. Dr. Bays has shown expertise in areas where she has published medical exams of children who have alleged child abuse and also substance abuse, and children who are considered to be abused or involved in substance abuse, and also techniques for *198 interviewing children who are allegedly sexually abused.
The court overruled the objection, and the testimony continued:
The prosecutor asked Dr. Bays about the pediatrician's report, then returned to the subject of the interview:
In reply, the witness described to the court the types of behavioral evidence on which she normally relied to determine whether a child had been coached: a "rote" style of recitation by a child, a child's ability to supply "peripheral" details of the alleged incident, a child's tendency to correct the interviewer about the facts, and various emotional responses by a child. She then stated that, during the interview of the child in this case, the child was "obviously telling you about what happened to her body" and was "remembering what happened."
Defense counsel made this objection:
The trial court excused the jury and heard argument by the parties on the admissibility of the witness's testimony on the subject of whether the child had been coached. The prosecutor spoke first:
After a discussion between the court and the prosecutor on the facts and holdings of the cited cases, the court elicited argument from defense counsel, who replied:
"While the particular instance in this case may not fit the technical definition of syndrome, it is certainly in the vein of *199 Milbradt and in the vein of the typical reactions that the court in Milbradt was discussing.
The prosecutor responded in part:
Defense counsel responded in part:
The court again briefly reviewed the witness' qualifications and the process that she undertook with regard to the alleged victim in this case. The court then stated:
After a brief discussion by the court on the applicability of State v. Brown, supra, to various types of scientific evidence, defense counsel stated:
"* * * * *
Shortly thereafter, the court adjourned for the weekend.
When the proceedings resumed the following week, the prosecutor informed the court that he did not intend to question Dr. Bays any further on the issue in contention. *200 Defense counsel responded by requesting "a ruling on my objection to a line of questioning having to do with whether or not the victim in this case was coaxed [sic] or prepared in any way. * * * [A]nd * * * I request a jury instruction in this regard of that testimony." The following exchange took place:
Dr. Bays concluded her testimony; she made no further statements about whether the child had been coached. Later that day, defense counsel renewed his objection to the admission of Dr. Bays' testimony in "areas beyond [her] expertise" for which "there was not a proper foundation" and to the fact that "she testified as to the credibility of [the child]." The court again overruled the objections.
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Bays to testify about the child's credibility and in refusing to strike that testimony. We turn first to the issue whether defendant preserved that claim of error. See ORAP 5.45(2) (generally, matter assigned as error will not be considered on appeal unless preserved in the lower court).
In order for a ruling on evidence to be considered as an assignment of error on appeal, a timely objection to, or motion to strike, the evidence must appear on the record. OEC 103(1)(a).[5] An objection is "timely" if it is made as soon as its applicability to the offered evidence is known to the opponent of the evidence. Blanton v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 289 Or. 617, 623, 616 P.2d 477 (1980). An objection need not necessarily be made to the first *201 question in a series of foundation questions, because in that situation the court often will have no basis properly to assess the admissibility of the evidence. See I Wigmore, Evidence 801, § 18 (1983) (stating that principle).
Here, defendant first objected when Dr. Bays was asked to give her "diagnosis as to whether [the child] was sexually abused." In order for him to preserve the issue that he seeks to raise here, it was not necessary for him to object earlier while Dr. Bays was being questioned more generally about the "types of things" on which she relied "in reaching [her] diagnosis of the child." Defendant's objection was timely.
An objection to offered evidence also must state the specific ground of the objection. OEC 103(1)(a). This court stated in State v. Hitz, 307 Or. 183, 766 P.2d 373 (1988), that, in making an objection to evidence, raising the issue at trial ordinarily is essential; identifying a source for a claimed position is less so; and making a particular argument is even less so. 307 Or. at 188, 766 P.2d 373.
In his initial objection to the question put to Dr. Bays, defendant raised the issue of the admissibility of the testimony. Although he did not identify any source for his argument, he argued that the testimony was inadmissible because a sufficient foundation had not been laid to establish Dr. Bays' expertise in the area of whether a child has been "coached or prepared." In renewing his objection, defendant again raised the issue of admissibility; at that time he cited sources and made additional arguments in support of his position, in particular the argument that the objected-to portion of Dr. Bays' testimony was an impermissible comment on the child's credibility. Defendant sufficiently stated the grounds of his objections.
Finally, defendant properly made a motion to strike the testimony. See Hryciuk v. Robinson, 213 Or. 542, 569, 326 P.2d 424 (1958) (where a question asked a witness is unobjectionable, but the answer produces improper testimony, an objection to the question will not extend to the answer; a motion to strike must be made).
We conclude that defendant preserved the claimed error for appellate review. We turn next to the merits of defendant's claim.
This court repeatedly has held that, "in Oregon, a witness, expert or otherwise, may not give an opinion on whether he believes a witness is telling the truth. We reject testimony from a witness about the credibility of another witness." State v. Middleton, supra, 294 Or. at 438, 657 P.2d 1215. See Powers v. Officer Cheeley, 307 Or. 585, 596, 771 P.2d 622 (1989) (witness may not testify that, if certain testimony were given by another witness, it would be "fabrication"); State v. Isom, 306 Or. 587, 591-92, 761 P.2d 524 (1988) (witness may not testify that another witness was lying). Furthermore, this rule applies whether the witness is testifying about the credibility of the other witness in relation to the latter's testimony at trial or is testifying about the credibility of the other witness in relation to statements made by the latter on some other occasion or for some reason unrelated to the current litigation. See State v. Milbradt, supra, 305 Or. at 625-30, 756 P.2d 620 (error to allow psychotherapist to testify that prior interview with complaining witnesses revealed no "evidence of deception"; psychotherapist may not give an opinion on whether a witness is "credible").
Dr. Bays testified on direct examination during the state's case-in-chief that "[t]here was no evidence of leading or coaching or fantasizing" during the child's interview at C.A.R.E.S. and that, in that interview, the child was "obviously telling you about what happened to her body." Each of those statements amounts to testimony that the child was credible.
Neither is the situation here like that found in State v. Odoms, 313 Or. 76, 829 P.2d 690 (1992). In that case, the defendant argued that the out-of-court statements of a non-witness made to a witness at trial about the credibility of the defendant were inadmissible under the rule established in State v. Middleton, supra. *202 This court disagreed, concluding that that rule precluded only testimony by one trial witness about the credibility of another trial witness. State v. Odoms, supra, 313 Or. at 81-82, 829 P.2d 690.
Here, by contrast, a trial witness, Dr. Bays, testified about the credibility of another trial witness, the child. Once again, we repeat that a witness may not testify about the credibility of another witness. The trial court erred in admitting that testimony and in denying defendant's motion to strike it.
Finally, we turn to the question whether the trial court's erroneous admission of the evidence requires reversal. Under Oregon law,
See also State v. Phillips, 314 Or. 460, 471-73, 840 P.2d 666 (1992) (applying that rule); State v. Williams, 313 Or. 19, 56, 828 P.2d 1006 (1992) (explaining same); State v. Walton, 311 Or. 223, 230-31, 809 P.2d 81 (1991) (describing constitutional basis for Oregon doctrine and contrasting rule under federal constitution).
Dr. Bays was one of four witnesses who appeared for the state. The state's other witnesses were the child, the child's mother, and a Multnomah County deputy sheriff who was assigned to investigate the report of sexual abuse. The child testified to the incident of sexual abuse. The child's mother testified about her own observations at the day care center on the day of the incident, about the circumstances of the child's report to her of the incident, and about her actions in response to that report. The deputy's testimony consisted of a brief account of her interview with defendant at the sheriff's office.[6]
Of the state's witnesses, Dr. Bays was the last to testify. She is a medical doctor with extensive professional experience in the area of child sexual abuse, and she testified in an authoritative and detailed manner about that subject. Her comment on the child's credibility was part of that testimony and presumably was persuasive to the trier of fact. Considered in the context of the record as a whole, the issue of the child's credibility was critical to the outcome of this case. For those reasons, we cannot say with certainty that there is "little likelihood" that Dr. Bays' testimony about the child's credibility affected the jury's verdict in this case. Accordingly, we conclude that the admission of that testimony prejudiced defendant and requires reversal.
The state argues that the admission of the disputed testimony in this case, if error, does not require reversal, because defendant "invited" the admission of Dr. Bays' testimony. The state contends that "defendant's theory of the case and his initial objection to [Dr. Bays' testimony] introduced into the case the specific question whether the victim's complaint of abuse was the product of coaching" and that the state was "entitled to rebut defendant's theory of the case." On this record, we disagree.
Neither party mentioned the subject of coaching during opening statements to the jury. Before presenting the state's first witness and outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel argued to the court that he "would object to the fact that the alleged victim in the case would be present *203 [during her mother's testimony], and therefore, would be coached or further prepared for her own testimony."[7] The first mention of "coaching" in the presence of the jury occurred during the state's direct examination of Dr. Bays, who raised the subject as part of her description of the child's interview. Defense counsel then referred to the subject in his objections to that testimony.
Defendant did not "solicit" the subject of coaching during examination of a witness or otherwise "introduce" it in evidence. Cf. Hall v. Banta, 283 Or. 387, 390, 583 P.2d 1139 (1978) (after subject was "solicited" by one party on cross-examination, other party could develop that subject); Kentner v. Gulf Ins. Co., 298 Or. 69, 73, 689 P.2d 955 (1984) (party cannot introduce evidence in trial court and then claim on appeal that the same evidence is inadmissible). Neither did defendant later offer that same evidence himself for another reason. Cf. State v. Brown, 299 Or. 143, 152-53, 699 P.2d 1122 (1985) (party who makes later mention of subject for an independent reason cannot claim error in respect to original offer of such evidence). Defendant did not "invite" the admission of the disputed testimony in this case.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.[8]
[1]  ORS 163.427 provides in part:

"(1) A person commits the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree when that person:
"(a) Subjects another person to sexual contact and:
"(A) The victim is less than 14 years of age[.]
"* * * * *
"(2) Sexual abuse in the first degree is a Class B felony."
[2]  The child also testified at trial during the state's case-in-chief.
[3]  Dr. Bays stated that she was a board-certified pediatrician, that she had worked several years at Kaiser Hospital in San Diego, that she had spent five and one-half years in private practice in Los Angeles, that she had worked at Emanuel Hospital since 1984, and that she was currently medical director of the Child Abuse Response and Evaluation Services program there, among other duties. She testified that she was the author of several scholarly publications relating to her specialty, "child abuse and neglect, and also drug affected infants."
[4]  In fact, as quoted above, defendant did object, but the objection was overruled.
[5]  OEC 103(1)(a) provides in part:

"Evidential error is not presumed to be prejudicial. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and:
"(a) In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection * * *[.]"
[6]  Defendant testified on his own behalf. The defense also called defendant's wife, two character witnesses, and a deputy sheriff who testified briefly about the child's mother's initial report of the incident.
[7]  As it happened, the child testified first; the court permitted her parents to remain in court during her testimony.
[8]  Defendant's second assignment of error concerns a condition of probation imposed on him by the trial court. Because of our disposition of the case, we need not reach that assignment.