Case Title: CHRISTOPHER STEWARD V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2008-SC-000617-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTERJANUARY l, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED AMONGWITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . CHRISTOPHER STEWARD V ,;vuyrrmr (~vurf of 2008-SC-000617-MR ON APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE PATRICIA M . SUMME, JUDGE NO. 06-CR-00490-002 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART RENDERED : MARCH 18, 2010 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPELLANT Appellant, Christopher Steward, was found guilty by a Kenton Circuit Courtjury of wanton murder . Appellant was sentenced to forty (40) years imprisonment . He now appeals his conviction as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) . I. Background In the late evening of April 6, 2006, Appellant shot and killed Prince Warren in the stairwell landing outside of Diane Nicely's second floor apartment . While Appellant lived with his girlfriend, LaTonya Barwick, in the apartment located below Nicely, Warren, along with his companion Jonathon Jones, was a frequent guest at Nicely's . Charles Eapmon, later indicted with Appellant for Warren's murder,' spent significant time in both apartments using crack cocaine. Appellant testified to the sequence of events that led to Warren's fatal shooting, which he claimed was done in self-defense . On the day of the shooting, Appellant, an admitted crack cocaine dealer, testified he woke up late in the afternoon and Eapmon came over to purchase drugs. Sometime thereafter, Appellant heard Warren's voice outside the door and left his apartment to complain that Warren and Jones had again left the gate on his fence open which allowed his dogs to get out. With two handguns in his waistband, Appellant proceeded to follow Warren and Jones up the stairwell, saying "You punk m-----fu----- don't know how to close a gate . You all that dumb?" As he neared the landing at the top of the steps, Jones allegedly drew a handgun and pointed it at Appellant before Warren, too, drew his handgun. The two responded, "What you mean m-----fu-----? We know about you anyway, m-----fu------ We gonna do something to you anyway, m-----fu----- ." According to Appellant, Jones fired first, which Appellant dodged, and then Warren fired a shot which went over Appellant's head . Appellant then fired back, hitting Warren in the leg. As Appellant was getting up, he noticed Jones had fled . When Warren lifted his firearm and shot at Appellant again, Appellant fired at Warren at close range before quickly leaving in a Ford Explorer with Eapmon and Barwick . 1 Eapmon was also charged with assault in the first degree and with being a persistent felony offender . He pled guilty to an amended charge of facilitation to murder and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment . Eapmon largely corroborated Appellant's version of events leading up to the fatal confrontation in the stairwell. On the afternoon of the shooting, Eapmon went to Nicely's second-floor apartment where they discussed the prior evening's events and he learned that she was being evicted due to the party that police had responded to the previous night. When Eapmon later went downstairs to purchase crack cocaine from Appellant, he told Appellant that Warren and Jones were planning on retaliating against Appellant for calling the police. After Appellant went out of his apartment to confront Warren and Jones over the gate, Eapmon heard the three arguing. At this point, Barwick handed Eapmon a shotgun, indicating that Appellant needed help . When Eapmon went outside, he saw Jones standing in the doorway of Nicely's apartment above him pointing a gun at Appellant . He heard four or five shots but could not see who fired them from his vantage point. He acknowledged that he, Appellant, and Barwick left afterwards in a Ford Explorer . The accounts of three nearby eyewitnesses differed . Amy Ellis lived across the street from the building and she and her boyfriend, Russell Bowling, were sitting down to eat when they heard the gunshots . Ellis looked out and saw Appellant standing over and screaming at a man on the stairwell landing. As the man tried to crawl toward the apartment door, Appellant shot him . Shortly thereafter, both Bowling and Ellis saw Appellant go back into the apartment building, retrieve a black bag, and leave in a vehicle with a black female and a white male, later identified as Charles Eapmon . Thomas Gardner was remodeling a house adjacent to the building when he heard yelling. He looked out the window and saw a white male standing underneath the stairwell with a rifle . The man, presumably Eapmon, shot up the stairwell twice, went into the apartment, and came out with a bag that he placed in a Ford Explorer. Gardner then watched as Appellant walked upstairs and shot the victim at point-blank range with a handgun.2 The victim was later identified as Prince Warren. At the conclusion of trial, the jury rejected Appellant's self-protection defense and found him guilty of wanton murder . He was sentenced to forty years imprisonment . On appeal, Appellant raises five principal allegations of error in his underlying trial : 1) that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's violent character; 2) that the trial court erred in amending the indictment to include a charge ofwanton murder ; 3) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to self-protection ; 4) that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury a missing evidence instruction or in dismissing his case ; and 5) that the trial court erred in admitting uncertified court records containing hearsay. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Appellant's conviction, but reverse his sentence and remand the matter for a new sentencing phase . 2 The medical examiner testified that the fatal shot was fired within a quarter of an inch of the victim's head. II. Analysis A. Evidence of Victim's Violent Character Appellant first argues that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of Warren's violent character. In particular, he contends that it was reversible error for the court to exclude Eapmon's testimony regarding Warren's violent assault of a guest (known as "Kevin") at Nicely's apartment the night prior to the shooting. We conclude, however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence, as its decision was not "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles ." Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citation omitted) . At trial, Eapmon briefly explained his whereabouts the night prior to Warren's shooting . He testified that he was at Nicely's apartment with several partygoers and that Warren and Jones were selling drugs to various guests when, at some point, the two had an altercation with a guest named Kevin . During that conflict, Eapmon testified, Warren had a gun and Warren and Jones were passing a gun back and forth during the incident . Eapmon did not elaborate further. Appellant later asked Eapmon to describe the incident with Kevin in greater detail. The trial court, however, sustained the Commonwealth's objection to the testimony . Thereafter, on avowal, Eapmon explained that he watched as Jones confronted Kevin over his outstanding debt. When Kevin claimed that the money he was using to buy drugs was not his own, Jones became irate and began beating Kevin with a handgun. Eapmon explained that Warren took turns with Jones "pistol-whipping" Kevin . The two forced Kevin to sit on a couch where they placed a blanket over his head and continued to beat him. Finally, Jones and Warren placed Kevin a closet in an apparent effort to punish him. 3 The trial court properly excluded Eapmon's testimony, as it represented a specific instance of conduct. That KRE 404(a)(2) allowed Appellant to offer evidence of Warren's violent character is not at issue. Rather, he sought to do so in a manner outside the recognized means of proof: reputation or opinion testimony. Under the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, [g]enerally, a homicide defendant may introduce evidence of the victim's character for violence in support of a claim that he acted in self-defense or that the victim was the initial aggressor . KRE 404(a)(2); Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 477 S.W.2d 159, 161 (1972) ; Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook[,] § 2.15[4)[b], at 104 (4th ed. [12003) . However, such evidence may only be in the form of reputation or opinion, not specific acts of misconduct . KRE 405(a) ; Lawson, supra, § 2.20 [4J, at 116 ("By providing only for the use of reputation or opinion evidence in this situation, the rule plainly implies a prohibition on evidence of particular acts of conduct.") . Saylor v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 812, 815 (Ky. 2004) .4 3 Though less relevant, Eapmon described an additional incident . He stated that Jones became angry again when he discovered that his pack of drugs was missing. Jones and Warren strip-searched the guests for the missing drugs and told them that no one could leave until they were found . At some point thereafter, Nicely found the drugs in the same closet where Kevin was imprisoned and Eapmon was allowed to leave the apartment. 4 Appellant does not contend that Eapmon's testimony was admissible evidence of his state of mind, as there was no indication that Appellant was aware of the assault Eapmon witnessed . There is, indeed, an exception allowing a defendant to introduce specific instances of a victim's conduct in order "to prove that the defendant so feared the victim that he believed it was necessary to use physical Appellant, nevertheless, devotes much of his argument to the contention that Eapmon's testimony should have been admitted because "the jury had to make a finding that [Appellant] was not the initial aggressor" and thus "necessarily had to find that Warren and/or Jones were the initial aggressor as an element of the defense of self-protection ." In other words, Appellant asserts that the initial aggressor qualification, see KRS 503.060(3), within the jury's self-protection instruction somehow made Warren's violent character an element of his defense. While it is true that a defendant may offer specific instances of conduct "[i]n cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense," KRE 405(c), we do not believe that an otherwise proper initial aggressor qualification to a self-protection instruction transforms it into one of the very few issues in which character is an essential element. See Sherroan v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 7, 21-22 (Ky. 2004) (listing examples of such charges, claims, or defenses) . Rather, evidence of the victim's violent character is merely circumstantial evidence of whether the defendant was entitled to act in self-protection and whether he was the initial aggressor. force (or deadly physical force) in self-protection, `provided that the defendant knew of such acts, threats, or statements at the time ofthe encounter."' Saylor, 144 S.W.3d at 815-16 (emphasis added) (quoting Lawson, § 2.15[4][d] at 105-06 ; citing Commonwealth v . Higgs, 59 S.W.3d 886, 892 (Ky. 2001) ; Commonwealth v. Davis, 14 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Ky. 2000) ; Wilson v. Commonwealth, 880 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Ky . App. 1994)) . The evidence comes in, not as character evidence under KRE 404(a)(2), but as evidence of the defendant's state of mind at the time. Saylor, 144 S.W.3d at 816 . In a related argument, Appellant also asserts that Eapmon's testimony should have been admitted through the doctrine of "curative admissibility" because, he argues, the Commonwealth improperly introduced evidence of Warren's good character before Appellant placed it in issue under KRE 404(a)(2) . In particular, he complains that the testimony of Warren's mother was evidence of Warren's good character . In explaining how she missed her son, Warren's mother testified that his sixteen year-old brother wore a necklace of Warren's picture and that his five-year old brother prayed to Warren and said hello to him every morning. She also stated that Warren graduated from high school in 2003 where he played on the high school varsity basketball team . In the same vein, Appellant argues that it was error for the Commonwealth to introduce the fact that Warren was an organ donor . Prior to trial, Appellant moved the trial court to prohibit the Commonwealth from introducing evidence that Warren was an organ donor. The Commonwealth had no objection to the motion and it was granted. During the medical examiner's testimony, however, and while summarizing his autopsy procedures and findings, he briefly stated that "the body had also undergone an organ donor tissue recovery." The trial court immediately interrupted the testimony and the Commonwealth informed the medical examiner that he should limit his discussion to Warren's wounds . As to the testimony of Warren's mother, we do not believe that her statements overstepped the appropriate range of background testimony regarding the victim - and, indeed, Appellant chose not to object to the testimony at trial . This Court has flatly rejected similar arguments for similar reasons. See McQueen v. Commonwealth, 669 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Ky. 1984) ("[W]e find no error in bringing to the attention of the jury that the victim was a living person, more than just a nameless void left somewhere on the face of the community.") ; Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 542 (Ky. 1988) ("Our Court has recognized that a certain amount of background evidence regarding the victim is relevant to understanding the nature of the crime ; that victims are not mere `statistics . ') (overruled on other grounds by Hudson v. Commonwealth, 202 S.W.3d 17 (Ky. 2006)) ; see also Lawson, § 2.15[4][c], at 104-05 n.31 ("It should be noted, however, that the prosecution can introduce basic background information about a crime victim (a homicide victim for example) without running afoul of the prohibition against showing a victim's good character before the defendant has shown bad character."). As to the medical examiner's statements regarding the victim being an organ donor, we believe that the statements were inadvertent and their effect extremely minimal. Moreover, the trial court quickly interrupted any elaboration and the Commonwealth upheld its intent to not introduce the evidence. Appellant neither objected nor requested an admonition. As such, any error was, pursuant to RCr 9.24, clearly harmless and not so significant so as to warrant the admission of Eapmon's testimony detailing a specific instance of Warren's violent conduct. Cf . Sanborn, 754 S.W .2d at 548 ("The defense witness' brief and unresponsive comment did not open the door to the storm of evidence that followed .") . 8. Amending Indictment Appellant also argues it was error for the trial court to allow the Commonwealth to amend his indictment at the close of the evidence to reflect a charge of wanton murder . We reject this contention . Appellant was indicted by a Kenton County Grand jury for murder . On the first day of trial, the Commonwealth tendered its proposed jury instructions that included a wanton murder instruction . Later, at the close of all the evidence, the Commonwealth moved the trial court to amend Appellant's indictment so as to conform to the proof presented and include a wanton murder charge. Over Appellant's objection, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion and amended Appellant's indictment to reflect a theory of wanton murder in addition to intentional murder . RCr 6.16 states that a "court may permit an indictment, information, complaint or citation to be amended any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and ifsubstantial rights ofthe defendant are notprejudiced." (Emphasis added) . In arguing otherwise, Appellant fails to note that this Court has held that wanton murder and intentional murder "constitute the same crime of murder under KRS 507.020 ." Evans v. Commonwealth, 45 S .W.3d 445, 447 (Ky . 2001) (citing Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Ky. 1984)) ; see generally KRS 507 .020(1) .5 In addition, we do not believe that the amendment prejudiced Appellant in any way. Appellant had notice on the first day of trial that the Commonwealth would pursue both theories of murder and, indeed, the evidence presented allowed a reasonable juror to conclude that, if Appellant did not intend to kill Warren, he, nevertheless, wantonly caused his death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life . See KRS 507.020 Commentary (1974) ("Subsection (1) (b) following the lead of the Model Penal Code and other modern statutes, manifests a judgment that there is a type of homicide that should be treated as murder even though the actor had no conscious desire to cause the victim's death. The culpable mental state for this type of homicide is described in this section as wantonness manifesting extreme indifference to human life .') . C. Self-Protection Instruction Appellant also asserts three claims of error with respect to the trial court's self-protection instruction. We disagree with each . 5 For this reason, Appellant's reliance on Lucas v. O'Dea, 179 F.3d 412 (6th Cir . 1999) is misplaced . Therein, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[a] modification at trial that acts to broaden the charge contained in an indictment constitutes reversible error." Id . at 416 . Amending an indictment to include a theory of wanton murder to that of intentional murder pursuant to KRS 507.020 does not, contrary to Appellant's contentions, "broaden" the murder charge. l . Erroneous Self-Protection Instruction Appellant first argues that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury as to the proper definition of self-protection . In particular, he complains that the instruction given did not conform to the statutory language. KRS 503.050(1) states "[t]he use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by the other person ." The trial court's instructions replaced the phrase "the use or imminent use" with `then and there about to." This substitution, Appellant contends, erroneously narrowed the meaning of the statutory language . See Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 402, 96 S.W.2d 1041, 1043 (1936) ("[T]he failure of the court to strictly follow the language of the statute, defining the offense, in its instruction upon the trial of defendant for that particular statutory offense, is not a ground for reversal provided the instruction as given embraced and conveyed the meaning of the statute .") . Appellant's argument is unpreserved . Pursuant to RCr 9 .54(2), [n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless the party's position has been fairly and adequately presented to the trial judge by an offered instruction or by motion, or unless the party makes objection before the court instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which the party objects and the ground or grounds of the objection. Appellant did not specifically object to the Commonwealth's definition of self- protection ("then and there about to") so as to fairly and adequately present his position to the trial court . See Gibbs v. Commonwealth, 208 S .W .3d 848, 853- 54 (Ky . 2006) ("It is the duty of counsel . . . to object with specificity so that the trial judge will be advised on how to instruct .") (citing Commonwealth v. Duke, 750 S.W .2d 432 (Ky. 1988)) . While Appellant claims that his argument is preserved by objection, a review of the record shows that he only objected to the giving of a murder instruction and to part B of the self-protection instruction which did not concern the definitional aspect of self-protection that Appellant now contests .6 And while it is true that Appellant tendered an 6 Appellant tendered his own self-protection instruction, which was not accepted . His instruction read : Even though the Defendant . . . might otherwise be guilty . . . if at the time the Defendant killed Prince Warren, [Defendant] believed that Prince Warren was then and there about to use physicalforce upon him, or believed there was an impending danger that Prince Warren would use physicalforce upon him, [Defendant] was privileged to use such physical force upon Prince Warren as he believed to be necessary in order to protect himself against it, but including the right to use deadly physical force in so doing only if he believed it to be necessary in order to protect himself from death or serious physical injury at the hands of Prince Warren . (Emphasis added) . The self-protection instruction tendered by the Commonwealth read, in relevant part : If at the time an individual, including the Defendant, uses physical force upon another person he believes that person was then and there about to use physical force upon him, he is privileged to use such physical force against that person as he believe [sic] to be necessary in order to protect himself against it, including the right to use deadly physical force but only if. A . He believed deadly physical force to be necessary to protect himself from death or serious physical injury OR B . The person against who [sic] the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully 1 3 instruction, it, too, failed to "call to the trial court's attention . . . the alleged error," Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v . Smith, 142 S.W.3d 153, 163-64 n.20 (Ky. 2004) (citing Johnson v . Cormney, 596 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Ky . App . 1980) ; Miller v . Quaife, 391 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Ky. 1965)), because the difference in wording is not error at all: in Henson v. Commonwealth, 812 S .W.2d 718, 722 (Ky. 1991), this Court held that "[t]here is no significant difference in the use of the phrase `then and there about to' and the statutory language [in KRS 503.050(1)] . Both phrases connote an immediacy or close proximity in time during which the defendant was allowed under the circumstances to use physical force ." 2 . Unwarranted Initial Aggressor Instruction Appellant next argues that the evidence did not support an initial aggressor instruction, pursuant to KRS 503.060(3),7 which served to qualify the jury's self-protection instruction.$ We do not agree. and forcibly entered a dwelling; unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was engaged in an unlawful activity or was using the dwelling, to further an unlawful activity A person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and whose [sic] is attacked in a place where he had a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a felony involving the use of force . (Emphasis added) . At trial, Appellant objected to part B of the instruction and argued that it was not supported by the evidence . The trial court agreed and stated that it would use the Commonwealth's instruction as given, excepting part B. 7 The instruction, in pertinent part, read: If at the time an individual, including the Defendant, uses physical force upon another person he believes that person was then and there about to use physical force upon him, he is privileged to use such 14 It is well-established that "[a] trial court is required to instruct the jury on every theory of the case that is reasonably deducible from the evidence." Fredline v. Commonwealth, 241 S.W .3d 793, 797 (Ky . 2007) (citing Manning v . Commonwealth, 23 S .W.3d 610, 614 (Ky . 2000)); see also RCr 9 .54(l) . Indeed, "[i]n a criminal case, it is the duty of the court to prepare and give instructions on the whole law. This general rule requires instructions applicable to every state of case covered by the indictment and deducible from or supported to any extent by the testimony." Lee v. Commonwealth, 329 S.W .2d 57, 60 (Ky. 1959) (emphasis added) . This Court reviews "a trial court's rulings regarding instructions for an abuse of discretion ." Ratliff v . Commonwealth, 194 S .W.3d 258, 274 (Ky. 2006) (citing Johnson v . Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 563, 569-70 (Ky. 2004)) . physical force against that person as he believes to be necessary in order to protect himself against it . . . (p]rovided, however, that ifyou believefrom the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was the initial aggressor in the use ofthe physicalforce, the defense is not available to the Defendant . . . (Emphasis added) . s We note that this claim of error is preserved . Appellant's tendered self-protection instruction clearly did not include the provocation exception when compared with the Commonwealth's tendered version . See Sand Hill Energy, 142 S.W.3d at 163-4 n.16-17 ("Generally speaking, if a party's `offered instructions clearly present [the] party's position, no further action is required' to preserve for appellate review an allegation that the trial court erred by failing to give a requested instruction .") (citations omitted) ; RCr 9 .54(2) ("No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless the party's position has been fairly and adequately presented to the trial judge by an offered instruction .") ; but see Davis v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 574, 580-81 (Ky . 1998) (tendered instruction was improper) . 1 5 With respect to the initial aggressor qualification to the defense of self- protection, we have previously explained that KRS 503.060(3) provides that the use of physical force by a defendant on another person is not justified when the defendant was the initial aggressor, except that his use of physical force upon the other person under that circumstance is justified when, (a) his initial physical force was non-deadly and the force returned by the other is such that he believes himself to be in imminent danger of death or serious physical injury; or (b) he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so and the latter nevertheless continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force . Stepp v . Commonwealth, 608 S.W .2d 371, 373 (Ky. 1980) . The evidence at trial indicated that Appellant may have acted as the initial aggressor. Appellant testified that he was angry when he confronted Warren and Jones in the stairwell. Armed with two handguns in his waistband, Appellant pursued the two up the stairs, shouting "You punk m----- fu----- don't know how to close a gate . You all that dumb?" We, therefore, find no error in this regard . 3. Failure to Instruct for Multiple Aggressors Appellant's final argument with respect to the trial court's self-protection instruction is, he concedes, unpreserved and he requests review pursuant to RCr 10.26.9 Appellant relies on Hayes v. Commonwealth for the idea that he was entitled to a multiple aggressor instruction because Jones and Warren were acting in concert with one another against him. See 870 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky. 1993) ("It is the holding of this Court that the question of self-protection 9 Appellant's tendered instructions did not contain a multiple aggressor instruction. See supra note 3. 16 against multiple aggressors acting in concert, when supported by sufficient evidence, should be given to the jury .") ; see also Griffin v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky . 783, 265 S.W . 327, 330 (1924) ("It is thoroughly established that, where several are acting in concert in attacking another, he may base his defense for injuring any one of them upon reasonably apprehended danger from the others."). Thus, Appellant contends that his actions in killing Warren could have been justified as a valid act of self-protection in defending himself from Jones . Because, however, the trial court's instructions omitted any reference to Jones, Appellant argues that the jury was unable to consider this theory, which he claims amounts to manifest injustice. We do not agree . While it is, of course, true that "the defendant has a right to have every issue of fact raised by the evidence and material to his defense submitted to thejury on proper instructions," Haves, 870 S.W.2d at 788 (citations omitted), no evidence tended to show that Appellant's actions in shooting and killing Warren were in self-protection from Jones . By Appellant's own admission, he intentionally shot and killed Warren after Warren, then acting alone, fired an additional shot at him. Notably, Appellant stated that Jones had already fled the scene when he fired the fatal shot and there was no indication from his testimony that he was defending himself from Jones when he fired the shot that killed Warren . Cf . Griffin, 265 S.W . at 330 (defendant "may base his defense for injuring any one of them upon reasonably apprehended dangerfrom the others") (emphasis added) . There was simply no error. D . Missing Evidence Appellant's next claim of error is also unpreserved. He contends that the trial court erroneously failed to dismiss his case or to at least give the jury a missing evidence instruction due to the fact that the Commonwealth was unable to produce Jones' allegedly exculpatory pretrial statement . Though Appellant and his co-defendant suggested that they would likely tender a missing evidence instruction in an effort remedy the issue, neither did so pursuant to RCr 9.54(2) . In addition, Appellant did not move the trial court for a dismissal of the charges, nor did he specifically object to the trial court's instructions as required . Gibbs, 208 S.W .3d at 854 . While Appellant now claims that the evidence was destroyed, he articulated no such objection before the trial court and thus no ruling exists on the matter. See Commonwealth v. Pace, 82 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Ky. 2002) . He does not request palpable error review and we do not address it further. E . Admission of Court Documents Appellant's final argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth's witness to testify to the contents of uncertified court records during the penalty phase. We agree and conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony. Because the error cannot be deemed harmless, we reverse Appellant's sentence . During the trial's penalty phase, Christie Feldman, a probation and parole officer, testified to Appellant's prior criminal convictions on behalf of the Commonwealth . Appellant objected to the testimony and argued that the evidence was inadmissible because the Ohio court records she relied upon were not certified and were hearsay . When the Commonwealth stated that the records were the type that a parole officer would normally rely upon, Appellant further objected that Feldman was not a custodian of the records . The trial court overruled Appellant's objections and Feldman was allowed to testify to the records' contents . KRS 532.055(2)(a) provides that relevant evidence of a defendant's prior criminal convictions may be introduced by the Commonwealth during the sentencing phase of trial . Generally, prior convictions are often shown through court records themselves or testimony based on such records . We have encountered, however, at least two common obstacles to their admission. First, we have held that the court records from sister-states must be "certified, as required by KRS 422.040." Dillingham v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 377, 383-84 (Ky. 1999) ; see also Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 99 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2003) ("[Flora court of this Commonwealth to give full faith and credit to the judgment of another state, certification by that court is required.') (emphasis in original) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 899 S.W .2d 487, 489 (Ky. 1995)) . 10 Second, we have held that an otherwise certified court record to KRS 422.040 reads : The records andjudicial proceedings of any court of any state, attested by the clerk thereof in due form, with the seal of the court annexed if there be a seal, and certified by the judge, chiefjustice, or presiding magistrate of the court, shall have the same faith and credit given to them in this state as they would have at the place from which the records come . The 19 must also be exemplified or fall under the business record hearsay exception - i.e., it must be authenticated as admissible evidence. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 926 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Ky. 1996) . Thus, it was error for the trial court to admit Feldman's testimony as to the Ohio convictions . The Ohio court records that Feldman testified to were uncertified even though KRS 422.040 indicates that such records must be certified . Moreover, Feldman was the only witness to testify to their authenticity and she stated that she had not kept the records in the regular course of her business . See KRE 803(6) ("A . . . record . . . made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the . . . record . . . all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness .") . Because the records were in no way sealed, certified, attested, or exemplified, they were not self-authenticating. See KRE 902(l) (domestic public documents under seal), (4) (official records), and (11) (business records) . The evidence of Appellant's prior criminal convictions was, therefore, incompetent. However, the Commonwealth is correct to contend that this error alone should not warrant reversal of Appellant's sentence without a further analysis of its effect - i .e ., whether it was harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 . We cannot record and judicial proceedings of any court of the United States attested by the clerk thereof, with the seal of the court annexed if there be a seal, shall have the same faith and credit given to them in this state as they would have in the courts of the United States . 20 dismiss the fact that Appellant, during the trial's guilt phase, admitted to most of the convictions that Feldman's testimony later revealed . Thus, we must ask "whether the error itself had substantial influence" on Appellant's sentence. Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 688-89 (Ky. 2009) (quoting . Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S .750, 765 (1946)) ; cf . Dillingham, 995 S.W.2d at 383-84 (reviewing for palpable error) . Upon reviewing the record, we believe that Feldman's erroneous testimony brought before the jury additional and different convictions than those Appellant admitted . During the trial's guilt phase, Appellant admitted that he had been convicted for felony drug possession and for being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun." Though Feldman's testimony largely confirmed these admissions, she also indicated that Appellant had two prior weapons-related felonies and three prior drug-related felonies . Moreover, her testimony established that Appellant had convictions for resisting arrest and for falsification to mislead - crimes which suggest a peculiar animosity towards the justice system. Given also that the jury sentenced Appellant to twice the minimum penalty - forty years imprisonment - this Court cannot say with any fair assurance that the error did not have a significant effect on his sentence . We thus reverse Appellant's sentence and remand this matter for a new sentencing phase. i i He further admitted that he generally owned firearms, was a drug-dealer, and was under post-release control for past convictions . 21 Therefore, for the above stated reasons, we hereby affirm Appellant's conviction . However, Appellant's sentence is reversed and the case is remanded for a new sentencing phase of trial. All sitting. All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Thomas More Ransdell Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General Of Kentucky Christian Kenneth Ray Miller Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General Office of Criminal Appeals 1024 Capital Center Drive Suite 200 Frankfort, KY 40601 III. Conclusion