Case Title: Armstead v. State

Citation: 342 Md. 38

Docket Number: 133/93

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michael Devon Armstead v. State of Maryland, No. 133, 1993 Term.
EVIDENCE--Under Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum.
Supp.) § 10-915 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,
trial courts shall admit DNA evidence without a preliminary Frye-
Reed or "inverse Frye-Reed" hearing on the theoretical basis of DNA
testing or the restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP)
process of DNA analysis.   
EVIDENCE--Under Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum.
Supp.) § 10-915 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,
statistical probability evidence regarding the odds of a random DNA
match shall be admitted whenever DNA evidence is offered to prove
identity.  Experts may use either the "product rule" or "ceiling
principle" methodology of calculating the odds of a random match.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--The general theory of DNA testing, the process
of restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) DNA testing, and
the methods of calculating population genetics statistics are
sufficiently reliable to satisfy due process.  Case-specific
defects in the DNA testing process may render certain DNA evidence
so unreliable that its admission in a particular case would violate
due process.  Therefore, the opponent of DNA evidence must have the
opportunity to challenge case-specific defects in the DNA testing
procedure.
EVIDENCE--Under Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum.
Supp.) § 10-915 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,
individualized errors in the application of the DNA analysis
procedures ordinarily go to the weight of the evidence rather than
its admissibility.  Trial judges may exercise discretion to exclude
DNA evidence, however, if such errors were made in the course of
testing that the evidence would not be helpful to the factfinder.
Trial judges may not exclude DNA evidence under the probative
value/prejudicial effect balancing test in Maryland Rule 403.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 133
September Term, 1993
___________________________________
MICHAEL DEVON ARMSTEAD
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
___________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
Bell, J. dissents.
___________________________________
     Unless otherwise specified, all statutory cites herein are
1
to Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.) § 10-
915 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
 
        Filed:  March 20, 1996     
        
In this case we consider the statutory and constitutional
limitations on the admissibility of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
evidence.  Specifically, we must determine the effect of Maryland
Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.) § 10-915 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article  on the admissibility of
1
both the basic evidence of a DNA "match" and the descriptive
statistics that are typically offered in support of a match.  We
shall hold that the statute renders both components of DNA evidence
admissible.  We shall also hold that the admission of DNA evidence
in this case did not violate the Petitioner's due process rights.
I.
On January 29, 1991, the victim, a Howard County woman, was at
home alone when an assailant broke into the home, demanded her
money and valuables, and then raped her and forced her to perform
fellatio.  The State presented evidence that pointed to the
Petitioner, Michael Devon Armstead, as the perpetrator of these
offenses.  First, following the attack, the victim provided the
police with a description matching Armstead.  The victim also
selected Armstead's photograph from a photo array and identified
him in court as the perpetrator.  A neighbor who observed someone
-2-
     In the trial at issue in this appeal, Armstead was tried on
2
twelve of the twenty-five charges.  Ten of the remaining charges
were severed, two were dismissed, and one was not prosecuted.  
fleeing from the scene also identified Armstead as the perpetrator.
In addition, when Armstead was arrested on the evening of the
incident, he was wearing a leather jacket matching the victim's
description of the jacket worn by her attacker.  The police also 
found a pair of pantyhose and a roll of duct tape in shrubbery near
Armstead, which were both items that the perpetrator had used in
the attack.  
Physical evidence from the rape also linked Armstead to the
crime.  Semen was collected from the victim and analyzed using
standard blood group testing.  The blood group analysis indicated
that Petitioner was within the 4.7% of the population that could
have been the source of the semen.  Finally, DNA analysis was
performed using the restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP)
testing method, revealing a "match" between the defendant's blood
and the semen sample taken from the victim.  
Armstead was indicted in the Circuit Court for Howard County
on twenty-five counts,  including charges of first and second
2
degree rape, first and second degree sexual offense, perverted
practices, assault, battery, burglary, robbery, and theft.
Prior to trial, Armstead filed a motion in limine to exclude
the DNA evidence on both statutory and constitutional grounds.  His
statutory argument was that § 10-915 permits what he described as
-3-
an "inverse Frye-Reed hearing."  He argued that, although the
Legislature may have found RFLP testing reliable when it enacted
§ 10-915, this does not imply that the General Assembly intended
the statute to preclude all future inquiry into the technique's
reliability.  In light of recent scientific developments,
Petitioner argued, the State should have been required to prove
current general acceptance as a prerequisite to admission of the
DNA evidence.  
Petitioner also asserted several constitutional arguments.
First, he contended that § 10-915 was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad because it did not provide any standards for DNA testing.
Second, he argued that the use of DNA evidence violated his right
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
because "an individual [must] not suffer punitive action as a
result of an inaccurate scientific procedure."  Higgs v. Wilson,
616 F. Supp. 226, 230 (W.D. Ky. 1985), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 793 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, and remanded in part on other grounds sub nom
Higgs v. Bland, 888 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1991).  Third, Armstead
argued that the statute denied him his right to confrontation under
both the federal and state constitutions.  Finally, he argued that
the statute violated separation of powers because the Legislature
had invaded the province of the judiciary by enacting an
-4-
     For purposes of the DNA hearing, this case was consolidated
3
with the unrelated case of defendant John Daniel Kelly.
evidentiary rule.
The trial court rejected Petitioner's statutory argument on
the grounds that the statute precluded the trial court from holding
a hearing on the reliability of DNA evidence.  The court held a
five-day 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
however, 
to 
address 
his
constitutional challenges.   At the hearing, much of Petitioner's
3
argument focused on his due process claim.  He specifically
challenged the method used to calculate the odds of a random or
coincidental match between his DNA and the DNA taken from the
victim.  Petitioner contended that the DNA evidence should be
excluded because this probability calculation was based on a
purportedly outmoded method known as the "product rule" rather than
the newer "ceiling principle" method, rendering the data so
unreliable as to deny him due process.     
The trial court denied the motion in limine, ruling that the
evidence was admissible by statute, that the statutory conditions
for admissibility had been satisfied, and that Petitioner's
constitutional arguments lacked merit.  First, the court rejected
Armstead's "void for vagueness" argument, holding that the
vagueness doctrine did not apply to an evidentiary statute such as
§ 10-915.  Second, the court rejected the Petitioner's due process
argument because, after hearing extensive expert testimony, the
court concluded that the testing procedures used by the
-5-
laboratories in this case did not render the results so unreliable
as to violate Armstead's due process rights.  Third, the court
rejected Armstead's confrontation argument, finding that Armstead
exercised his right to cross-examine the State's witnesses at the
hearing, and that he would be afforded another opportunity to do so
at trial.  Finally, the court rejected the separation of powers
argument, concluding that the Legislature possesses the authority
to change the rules of evidence.  The court therefore held that the
DNA evidence would be admissible at trial.
Armstead was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for
Howard County.  At trial, the State called several expert witnesses
who presented both the product rule and ceiling principle
calculations to the jury, explaining the rationale for each method.
The witnesses explained that the product rule calculation yielded
odds of a random match between Armstead's DNA and the DNA recovered
from the victim of one in 480 million, while the ceiling principle
calculation yielded odds of a random match of one in 800,000.  The
jury was also informed of the laboratory error rates.  Petitioner
did not call any expert witnesses at trial to challenge the State's
DNA evidence; he did, however, cross-examine the State's experts
and elicited testimony regarding the controversy over the proper
method of calculating match probabilities.  
On December 9, 1992, the jury convicted Armstead of first
degree rape, first degree sexual offense, perverted practices,
assault, burglary, and attempted robbery.  He was sentenced to two
-6-
consecutive life terms plus twenty years.  He noted a timely appeal
to the Court of Special Appeals. 
Armstead raised five issues before the Court of Special
Appeals, but only one related to the admission of DNA evidence.  He
argued the trial court should not have admitted the DNA for two
reasons.  First, he claimed the trial court erred by not conducting
a preliminary hearing, his proposed "inverse Frye-Reed hearing," to
determine whether the evidence was reliable.  Second, he argued the
use of outmoded methods of analysis rendered the DNA evidence so
unreliable as to violate due process.  
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions in an
unreported opinion.  The intermediate appellate court held that the
trial court did not err in refusing to conduct a preliminary
hearing on the RFLP technique, stating that while "[t]he
reliability of the RFLP testing procedure is always open to attack
. . . the DNA profile's admissibility is incontestable."  The Court
of Special Appeals also held that the trial court did not err in
refusing to exclude the DNA profile based on the statistical
methods used because the evidence was admissible by statute.
Finally, the intermediate appellate court held that Armstead's due
process rights were not violated.  We granted certiorari to
consider the important questions presented.
II.
-7-
     Reed adopted the "general acceptance" standard originally
4
set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923), overruled by Daubert v. Merrell Dow,    U.S.   , 113 S.
Ct. 2786, 2794, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 480 (1993); hereinafter, we
shall refer to this as the Frye-Reed standard.
 
Petitioner raises five issues before this Court.  At the
outset, we note that the Petitioner does not question the
reliability of the general principles underlying DNA profiling.  
Petitioner first argues that, despite the enactment of § 10-915,
trial judges retain discretion to exclude DNA evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect; he therefore contends that the trial court erred by
refusing to engage in such balancing.  Second, Petitioner asserts
that § 10-915 does not preclude the possibility of a preliminary
hearing to challenge the reliability of DNA evidence, and that such
an "inverse Frye-Reed hearing" should be held if new evidence comes
to light that calls the reliability of a previously accepted
scientific technique into question.  Third, Armstead argues that
population genetics statistics must meet the "general acceptance"
standard articulated in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 389, 391 A.2d
364, 372 (1978),  and that § 10-915 only established the
4
admissibility of "raw" evidence of a DNA match.  He concludes that
if the Frye-Reed test had been applied to the statistical
techniques used in this case, the product rule methodology would
not have met the requisite "general acceptance" standard.  Fourth,
Armstead argues that because the laboratory error rate greatly
-8-
exceeded the probability of error due to random DNA matching, the
statistics on the odds of random matching were meaningless.  He
reasons that the DNA evidence was therefore incapable of "proving
identity" as required by the statute.  § 10-915(b). 
Finally, in addition to these statutory arguments, Petitioner
asserts a constitutional challenge.  He argues the statistical
evidence on the possibility of a random DNA match was so
unreliable, due to the laboratory error rate, the allegedly
improper probability calculations, and the use of improper
laboratory procedures, that his due process rights were violated.
The State contends that § 10-915 eliminated the need for trial
courts to engage in Frye-Reed analysis, and eliminated the
discretion of trial courts to engage in a case-by-case balancing of
probative value against prejudicial effect.  The State also argues
that the statute contemplated the admission of both the basic
evidence of a DNA match and the supporting statistical evidence
because the statistics provide necessary contextual information,
and because the statute explicitly refers to "allele frequency"
data.  § 10-915(b)(2)(v).  Finally, the State argues that
Armstead's due process arguments lack merit.  The State contends
that Petitioner's challenges to the statistical methodology, the
laboratory procedures, and the laboratory error rate go to the
weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. 
We will address some of the Petitioner's issues together,
-9-
      For a more detailed discussion of the mechanics and
5
history of DNA testing in forensics, see generally H. Lee et al.,
(continued...)
consolidating the arguments to three questions:
1. How does § 10-915 impact the "gatekeeping" function of
the trial court in screening DNA evidence?
(a) May the trial court conduct an "inverse
Frye-Reed hearing" if the opponent of DNA
evidence challenges its reliability?
(b) May the trial court engage in a weighing
exercise to determine if the probative value
of DNA evidence is substantially outweighed by
the prejudicial effect? 
2. 
Does 
§ 
10-915 
encompass 
population 
genetics
statistics, in addition to the "raw" evidence of a DNA
match?
3. Did the application of the product rule calculation,
the rate of laboratory error, or the specific laboratory
procedures used in this case render the resulting data so
unreliable as to violate the Petitioner's due process
rights?
 
We address each of these issues in turn below.
III.
In order to understand the legal issues presented, some
scientific explanation on DNA testing is helpful.  This information
has already been presented in several Maryland cases, see, e.g.,
Keirsey v. State, 106 Md. App. 551, 665 A.2d 700 (1995); Cobey v.
State, 80 Md. App. 31, 559 A.2d 391 (1989), cert. denied, 317 Md.
542, 565 A.2d 670 (1989), as well as cases from many other
jurisdictions.   For that reason, the description that follows is
5
-10-
     (...continued)
5
DNA Typing in Forensic Science,15 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY
269 (1994); COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992)
(Prepublication Manuscript) [hereinafter NRC REPORT]; OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USE OF DNA TESTS (1990).
See also  United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 169-73 (N.D. Ohio
1991), aff'd sub nom United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th
Cir. 1993);  State v. Vandebogart, 139 N.H. 145, 652 A.2d 671,
675-77 (1994); Com. v. Curnin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 445-48 (Mass.
1991) (Appendix); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988-95
(Bronx County Ct. 1989).
abbreviated.
A. History of the Forensic Use of DNA Profile Evidence
DNA profiling has been used for forensic purposes for nearly
a decade.  It was first used in a criminal case in the United
Kingdom in 1985, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC
USES OF DNA TESTING 8 (1990), and was subsequently adopted by the FBI
in 1988.  NRC REPORT at S-1 to S-2. Maryland's first appellate case
addressing DNA profiling evidence was Cobey v. State, 80 Md. App.
31, 559 A.2d 391 (1989), cert. denied, 317 Md. 542, 565 A.2d 670
(1989).  By 1990, DNA profiling had been used in over ten thousand
cases in the United States.  H. Lee et al., DNA Typing in Forensic
Science, 15 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 269, 270 (1994); see also
R. Chakraborty & K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic
Work, 254 SCIENCE 1735, 1735 (1991).  Since the technique was first
introduced, the overwhelming majority of state courts that have
-11-
     Nearly all courts that have considered the admissibility of
6
DNA evidence have found the general technique of DNA profiling
reliable.  See Developments in the Law: Confronting the New
Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1558
(1994).  Some courts, however, have rejected DNA evidence because
the population genetics component was held to be unreliable, see,
e.g., Com. v. Lanigan, 413 Mass. 154, 596 N.E.2d 311, 314 (1992)
(product rule method of calculating odds of a random DNA match
not generally accepted, and evidence of a DNA match inadmissible
without supporting statistics) (Lanigan I), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 419 Mass. 15, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (1994) (ceiling
principle method of calculating odds of a random DNA match now
generally accepted and, therefore, DNA evidence admissible)
(Lanigan II); State v. Vandebogart, 136 N.H. 365, 616 A.2d 483,
494 (1992) (product rule method of calculating odds of a random
DNA match not generally accepted, and evidence of a DNA match
inadmissible without supporting statistics), modified on reh'g,
139 N.H. 145, 652 A.2d 671 (1994) (ceiling principle method of
calculating odds of a random DNA match now generally accepted
and, therefore, DNA evidence admissible if supporting statistics
offered that were calculated using ceiling principle), or because
of errors in applying the profiling methods in a particular case.
People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Bronx County Ct. 1989). 
     Even before it was used in forensics, DNA profiling had
7
been used for a number of years for therapeutic purposes such as
the diagnosis of hereditary medical diseases.  Although there are
significant distinctions between use of DNA analysis for forensic
purposes versus therapeutic purposes, the longer experience with
therapeutic DNA analysis has provided an opportunity to develop
and refine the technique to its current level of consistency and
reliability.  See NRC REPORT, supra, at 2-2.
considered DNA evidence have found it admissible.   See
6
Developments in the Law: Confronting the New Challenges of
Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1558 (1995).7
-12-
B. The Science of DNA
 Deoxyribonucleic acid or DNA is the genetic material that
provides the instructions for all human characteristics, from eye
color to height to blood type.  P. HARTMAN & S. SUSSKIND, GENE ACTION 2
(1965).  Many types of cellular material carry DNA, including some
types of blood cells, semen, and hair follicles.  R. Lewontin & D.
Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing, 254 SCIENCE 1745,
1746 (1991).  DNA is a "double helix" molecule, similar to a spiral
staircase or a twisted rope ladder.  Lee et al., supra, at 270.
Each strand or "side" of the ladder is composed of four types of
building blocks known as nucleotides, which can be connected in any
order to form a DNA chain.  Id. at 270-71.  It is the sequence of
the nucleotides that conveys the information, in effect "spelling
out" the genetic instructions.  G. BEADLE & M. BEADLE, THE LANGUAGE OF
LIFE 193-94 (1966).  
A strand of DNA contains an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 genes,
each of which directs the construction of a specific protein.
HARTMAN & SUSSKIND, supra, at 37.  In addition to this "meaningful"
DNA, the chain also includes "spacer" or "junk" DNA between the
genes.  The total amount of DNA composing all of an individual's
genetic information includes over three billion individual
nucleotides, and a typical gene for an individual characteristic
may be made up of tens of thousands of nucleotides.  Lee et al.,
-13-
supra, at 270.
While each individual's total DNA profile is unique, large
segments of DNA are common to everyone.  Out of the three billion
nucleotides making up a complete DNA strand, there will likely be
about three million differences in the DNA sequence between two
randomly selected individuals.  NRC REPORT, supra, at S-7.  Many of
these differences will be found in the "spacer" DNA areas,
particularly in the number of times a spacer sequence is repeated.
These highly variable areas in the DNA strand are known as VNTR's,
for "variable number of tandem repeats."  Typically, a VNTR will
contain between twenty and one hundred repeats of the same
nucleotide sequence.  See Lee et al., supra, at 272 (Fig. 4);
Lewontin & Hartl, supra, at 1745-46.
In criminal investigations, DNA profiling is typically used to
compare a suspect's DNA with a sample of DNA taken from the crime
scene.  DNA profiling does not compare every nucleotide of the
suspect's DNA with every nucleotide of the sample DNA, but rather
compares the two at selected sites that are likely to vary from
person to person.  It is possible, however, that sections of DNA
taken from different people will match.  To avoid this type of
"random matching" error, comparisons are made at multiple sites or
loci along the DNA chain.  Typically, laboratories analyze four or
five loci in conducting DNA comparisons, reducing the probability
of random matches across all loci to a low level.  See L. Roberts,
-14-
     The only situation where two people should be found to have
8
identical DNA is in the case of identical twins, NRC REPORT,
supra, at S-2, although siblings or other close relatives will
also have substantial similarities in their DNA.  See B. Bockel
et al., Likelihoods of Multilocus DNA Fingerprints in Extended
Families, 51 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 554, 559 (1992).
     Although most cases to date have involved the RFLP method
9
of DNA analysis, a newer method known as polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) has also been developed.  NRC REPORT, supra, at 1-
8.  This method is particularly useful in analyzing DNA where
there is a very small evidence sample to be tested, because it
utilizes the same method by which cells replicate DNA to
"amplify" the quantity of DNA.  Id.  Alex Jeffreys, a pioneering
DNA researcher, has proposed a digital technique for applying PCR
that would eliminate some of the frequently challenged aspects of
RFLP testing.  Id. at 1-10. The PCR method, however, is subject
to other types of technical error.  Id. at 2-14 to 2-24.
Courts have already begun to evaluate the PCR method, and
some have already held that the technique is generally accepted
as reliable.  See, e.g., State v. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d 570, 888
P.2d 1105, 1117 (1995); People v. Lee 212 Mich. App. 228, 537
N.W.2d 233 (1995). 
Fight Erupts Over DNA Fingerprinting, 254 SCIENCE 1721, 1721-22
(1991).8
C. The Method of DNA Analysis
 
The basic process of DNA analysis is the same whether it is
used for diagnostic or forensic purposes.  The most widely used
technique at present is restriction fragment length polymorphism
(RFLP) analysis.   RFLP analysis involves three basic steps.
9
First, a whole DNA strand is cut into smaller pieces using
restriction enzymes, which are essentially chemical "scissors" 
-15-
designed to cut the DNA chain wherever a particular sequence of
nucleotides is found.  J. McKenna et al., Reference Guide on
Forensic DNA Evidence, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 282 (1994).  The result is a mass of DNA fragments
of varying sizes.  Id.  The second step is to separate these
fragments according to their size.  Lee et al., supra, at 271-73.
This is accomplished by passing a current through a gel medium
containing the DNA.  The fragments are negatively charged, so they
will migrate toward a positive electrode.  Their progress toward
the electrode will vary depending on their size, and thus the
fragments will spread out across the gel.  Id. (Fig. 5).  Using a
process known as Southern Blotting, these fragments are transferred
from the gel to paper and washed with a radioactive material that
attaches itself to the DNA fragments.  Id. at 273.  When the paper
is placed against a sheet of film, the radioactive material exposes
areas of the film, producing a discernible pattern of dark bands.
This "picture" is known as an autoradiograph.  Each band on the
autoradiograph represents a fragment of DNA.  McKenna et al.,
supra, at 283.  Finally, these banding patterns can be used for
identification by comparing the banding pattern in the suspect's
DNA with the pattern derived from DNA extracted from crime scene
evidence.  Id. at 283-84.
IV. Admissibility of DNA Match Evidence
-16-
A. General Principles of Statutory Construction
 In Maryland, novel scientific evidence may become admissible
in one of several ways.  First, the evidence may be admitted by
statute, if a relevant statute exists.  See 5 L. McLain, MARYLAND
EVIDENCE § 401.4(b), at 277-78 (1987).  Second, the proponent can
prove that the evidence meets the Reed standard of "general
acceptance" in the relevant scientific community.  Reed v. State,
283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978) (quoting Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).  This can be
accomplished through expert testimony, judicial notice, or a
combination of the two.  Goldstein v. State, 339 Md. 563, 567, 664
A.2d 375, 376-77 (1995).  In the present case, the first method
applies because the Legislature, by enacting § 10-915, declared DNA
profiling evidence reliable and admissible.  
Section 10-915 provides, in pertinent part,
(a) Definitions--
* * * * * *
(2) "Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)" means the
molecules in all cellular forms that contain
genetic information in a patterned chemical
structure of each individual.
(3) "DNA profile" means an analysis that
utilizes the restriction fragment length
polymorphism analysis of DNA resulting in the
identification of an individual's patterned
chemical structure of genetic information.
(b) Purposes. -- In any criminal proceeding, the evidence
of a DNA profile is admissible to prove or disprove the
identity of any person . . . .
The only condition the statute imposes on admission of DNA evidence
-17-
     Sections 10-915 b(1) and b(2) of the statute provide that
10
DNA profile evidence is admissible if the proponent:
(1) Notifies in writing the other party or
parties by mail at least 45 days before any
criminal proceeding; and 
(2) Provides, if requested in writing, the
other party or parties at least 30 days
before any criminal proceeding with:
(i) Duplicates of the actual
autoradiographs generated;
(ii) The laboratory protocols and
procedures;
(iii) The identification of each
probe utilized;
(iv) A statement describing the
methodology of measuring fragment
size and match criteria; and
(v) A statement setting forth the
allele frequency and genotype data
for the appropriate data base
utilized. 
relates to a discovery requirement, viz, information the proponent
of the DNA evidence must provide to the opponent on request.  
§§ 10-915(b)(1)-(b)(2).   
10
The question we must consider is how to interpret the effect
of § 10-915 on the traditional gatekeeping role of the trial court
in determining the admissibility of DNA evidence.  Petitioner
raises two related questions in this regard, which we will analyze
together.  First, although Petitioner concedes that § 10-915
eliminates the need for a Frye-Reed hearing as a prerequisite to
admission of DNA evidence, he contends that the Legislature merely
intended to create a rebuttable presumption of admissibility.  This
interpretation, he argues, would allow the possibility for an
-18-
opponent to challenge DNA evidence via an "inverse Frye-Reed"
proceeding, in which the opponent would bear the burden of showing
the DNA evidence to be unreliable.  Second, Armstead contends that
despite enactment of § 10-915, the trial court retains its
discretion to balance the probative value of DNA evidence against
its prejudicial effect. 
Both of these issues are essentially matters of statutory
interpretation.  When construing a statute, our governing principle
must be the Legislature's intent because, as we have consistently
stated, the cardinal rule in statutory construction is to
effectuate the Legislature's broad goal or purpose.  Gargliano v.
State, 334 Md. 428, 435, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994).  The primary
source of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself.
 Rose v. Fox Pool, 335 Md. 351, 359, 643 A.2d 906, 910 (1994).  In
reading the language, we apply common sense to avoid illogical or
unreasonable constructions, Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647
A.2d 106, 112 (1994), and we ascribe to words their common
meanings, unless the Legislature intended otherwise.  See Mustafa
v. State, 332 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991).  
If the language alone does not provide sufficient information
on the Legislature's intent, then courts will look to other sources
to discern the Legislature's purpose.  Gargliano, 334 Md. at 436,
639 A.2d at 678.  Alternatively, if the language itself is clear
and unambiguous and comports with the apparent purpose of the
-19-
statute, there may be no need to consider other sources of
information to glean the Legislature's purpose.  Jones v. State,
336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994).  Because the
meanings of even common words may be context-dependent, however, we
often proceed to consider other "external manifestations of
legislative intent," Tidewater v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md.
338, 347, 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995), such as the amendment history
of the statute, its relationship to prior and subsequent law, and
its structure.  Shah v. Howard County,  337 Md. 248, 255-57, 653
A.2d 425, 428-29 (1995); Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md.
505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987).
B. Interpretation of § 10-915
1. Effect of the Statute on the Possibility of "Inverse Frye-Reed
Hearings"
Applying the canons of statutory construction outlined above,
we conclude that the notion of an "inverse Frye-Reed hearing" is
inapposite when evidence is deemed admissible by statute.  When the
General Assembly has enacted legislation rendering evidence
admissible, "the only way to contest the validity of the underlying
principles involved would be to argue that the statutes violate
one's right to due process of the law."  L. McLain, MARYLAND EVIDENCE
§ 401.4(c), at 278 (1987 & 1994 Cum. Supp.).  See also J. Murphy,
MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 1406(C), at 733 (2d ed. 1993 & 1995 Cum.
-20-
     By comparison, Virginia's statute governing the
11
admissibility of DNA evidence provides that "DNA . . . testing
shall be deemed to be a reliable scientific technique and the
evidence of a DNA profile comparison may be admitted to prove or
disprove the identity of any person."  Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-270.5
(Michie 1995) (emphasis added).  The conditional language of the
Virginia statute has been interpreted to permit trial judges to
continue to exercise their discretion to weigh the probative
value of the DNA evidence against its prejudicial effect. 
Satcher v. Com., 244 Va. 220, 421 S.E.2d 821, 835 (1992), cert.
denied,   U.S.   , 113 S. Ct. 1319 (1993). See infra Section
IV.B.2.
Supp.).
In reaching this conclusion, as we have indicated, our
touchstone is the intent of the Legislature in enacting § 10-915.
It is significant that the plain language of the statute explicitly
states that DNA evidence "is admissible to prove . . . identity,"
§ 10-915(b) (emphasis added), rather than using conditional
language such as "may be admissible."   The General Assembly's
11
choice of language alone, therefore, strongly suggests that the
Legislature intended DNA profile evidence to be admitted without
reevaluation of the technique's general reliability.
We next consider whether this reading of the language
corresponds to the apparent purpose of the statute.  The
legislative history clearly demonstrates that the primary reason
the General Assembly enacted § 10-915 was to render DNA evidence
admissible without Frye-Reed analysis in each case.  When the DNA
legislation was initially proposed, the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee's Report explicitly stated that "[t]he intent of the bill
-21-
     Maryland is one of twelve states to enact legislation
12
establishing the admissibility of DNA evidence in criminal cases.
In addition to Maryland, the states that have enacted such
legislation are: Alaska, 1995 Alaska Sess. Laws 7, §2 (codified
at Alaska Stat. § 12.45.035 (1995)); Connecticut (Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 54-86k (1995)), Delaware (Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3515
(Michie Supp. 1994)), Indiana (Ind. Code Ann. § 35-37-4-13 (Burns
1994)), Louisiana (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:441.1 (West Supp.
1995)), Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 634.25-634.26 (West Supp.
1995)), North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code § 31-13-02 (Michie Supp.
1995)), Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 56.020 (Michie 1986 &
Supp. 1993)), Tennessee (Tenn. Code Ann. §24-7-117 (Michie Supp.
1995)), Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 972.11 (West Supp. 1994)),
and Virginia (Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-270.5 (Michie 1995)). 
 Four of the other eleven states--Alaska, Minnesota, Nevada,
and Tennessee--have enacted statutes that explicitly state that
probability estimates are also admissible. These provisions,
however, take different forms.  Tennessee's statute expressly
states that "statistical population frequency evidence . . . is
(continued...)
is to eliminate the necessity of holding a 'Frye-Reed' hearing to
prove that the technique has gained general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community."  Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee, Report on House Bill No. 711, at 2 (1989).  Before § 10-
915 was enacted, DNA profile evidence was admissible only if the
technique satisfied the Frye-Reed "general acceptance" test.  Reed,
283 Md. at 389, 391 A.2d at 372.  See also Wheeler v. State, 88 Md.
App. 512, 524, 596 A.2d 78, 84 (1991); Cobey, 80 Md. App. at 38,
559 A.2d at 392.  At that time, the issue was likely to be
relitigated in each case.  When the General Assembly enacted § 10-
915 in 1989, it clearly intended to streamline this process.  See
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Report on House Bill No.
711, at 2 (1989).  
12
-22-
     (...continued)
12
admissible in evidence to demonstrate the fraction of the
population that would have the same combination of genetic
markers as was found in a specific biological specimen."  Tenn.
Code Ann. § 24-7-117(c) (Michie Supp. 1995).  Nevada's statute
provides more generally that "[t]he opinion of any expert
concerning results of blood tests may be weighted in accordance
with evidence, if available, of the statistical probability of
the alleged blood relationship."  Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 56.020
(Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993).  Alaska's statute defines "DNA
profile" to include "statistical population frequency comparisons
of the patterned chemical structures." 1995 Alaska Sess. Laws 7,
§2 (codified at Alaska Stat. § 12.45.013(b)(2)(B) (1995)). 
Minnesota is unique because although its statute explicitly
provides for the admission of statistics in support of DNA
evidence, its courts have not uniformly admitted the statistics. 
The Minnesota statute provides that: "statistical population
frequency evidence . . . is admissible to demonstrate the
fraction of the population that would have the same combination
of genetic markers as was found in a specific biologic specimen."
Minn. St. Ann. § 634.26 (West Supp. 1995).  In Minnesota, a line
of cases culminating with State v. Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544 (Minn.
1987) had imposed limitations on the use of statistics because of
the potentially "exaggerated impact on the trier of fact." Id. at
548.  The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d
615 (Minn. 1991), questioned the legislature's authority to
create an exception to the Kim doctrine for DNA evidence. Id. at
620.  Relying on Nielsen, an intermediate appellate court again
questioned the legislature's authority to render the statistics
admissible in State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 41 n.2 (Minn. App.
1993), aff'd as modified, 505 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 1993).  More
recently, in State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1994), the
Minnesota Supreme Court modified its position to permit expert
witnesses to provide statistical evidence in DNA cases, but only
under the ceiling principle approach proposed in the NRC report.
Id. at 167.
The 1991 amendment of the DNA statute also illustrates the
Legislature's confidence in the reliability of DNA evidence,
because the amendment narrowed the potential arguments against
admitting DNA evidence from general attacks on the methodology to
-23-
     While the bill as originally proposed would have given
13
parties the right to depose any witness testifying about the DNA
evidence, this provision was eliminated prior to enactment. 1991
Maryland Laws ch. 631.
specific attacks on the procedures used in the case at issue.  The
primary effect of the amendment was to expand the background
information a proponent of DNA evidence would be required to give
to the opponent.  Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Report on
House Bill No. 1150, at 2 (1991).  Initially, the duty to disclose
background information on DNA testing offered in evidence only
applied to the State, but the bill expanded this duty to apply to
both the State and the defendant.  Id.  The proponent of DNA
evidence now must provide copies of the autoradiographs, laboratory
protocols, and additional information relating to the laboratory's
statistical methods.  § 10-915(b)(2)(i)-(v).  The amendment also
extended the notice requirement when DNA evidence is to be used
from 15 days before trial to 45 days before trial.  Senate Judicial
Proceedings Committee, Report on House Bill No. 1150, at 2 (1991).
In addition, courts are no longer required to ensure the presence
of anyone in the chain of custody on demand.   Moreover, the
13
proponent of DNA evidence is no longer required to submit all
reports generated about the DNA analysis, nor all the laboratory's
notes and photographs.  Id.  By providing the opponent with
detailed, case-specific information on the DNA analysis and giving
the opponent more time to evaluate the information before trial,
-24-
     One of the amendments made to the DNA legislation after it
14
was proposed and before its passage was to delete the words
"unique" and "uniquely" throughout the bill whenever they were
used to refer to an individual's DNA pattern.  1989 Maryland Laws
ch. 430, § 1, at 2893 (1989) (codified as amended at § 10-915). 
This alteration demonstrates that the Legislature was aware of
the possibility that an individual's DNA pattern was not unique,
and thus recognized the potential for random matching. 
Nevertheless, the Legislature unequivocally deemed DNA profiling
reliable. 
the amendments also indicate the Legislature's intent to establish
the general reliability and admissibility of the evidence,
permitting the opponent to attack the weight of the evidence
through cross-examination.  House Bill No. 1150; 1991 Maryland Laws
ch. 631, at 3447-49 (1991) (codified as amended at § 10-915).  
Finally, as further evidence of the Legislature's intent, we
turn to the preamble to the statute, which states that: 
[M]eans 
of 
identifying 
that 
unique 
DNA
structure have been  refined far beyond any
previous means of human tissue analysis, to a
level of scientific accuracy that approaches
an infinitesimal margin of error[.]
1989 Maryland Laws ch. 430, Preamble, at 2893 (1989) (emphasis
added).  This statement plainly illustrates the Legislature's view
that DNA evidence was sufficiently reliable to warrant elimination
of the Frye-Reed hearings.   
14
We conclude that interpreting the statute to permit either
traditional Frye-Reed hearings or the "inverse Frye-Reed hearings"
proposed by the Petitioner would be contrary to the Legislature's
intent.  As stated in the Fiscal Note to House Bill 711, under the
-25-
     The NRC Report estimated that states would spend millions
15
of dollars on forensic DNA evidence, including expenditures to
provide experts to testify for the State, to fund testing and
experts for indigent defendants, and to maintain and upgrade DNA
databases storing the profiles of convicted felons. NRC REPORT,
supra, at 6-18 to 6-19.
bill, "an extensive hearing process would not occur and, therefore,
court proceeding costs would decrease." Division of Fiscal
Research, Maryland General Assembly, Fiscal Note (Revised) on House
Bill No. 711, at 1 (May 19, 1989).  This statement is significant
because it demonstrates that the Legislature intended to eliminate
any extensive hearings, not merely to change the nature of the
hearings by shifting the burden from the State to the defendant.
The Legislature enacted § 10-915 to save time and money.  Merely
shifting the burden to defendants to prove DNA evidence unreliable,
rather than requiring the State to prove it reliable, would not
effectuate this purpose.  Valuable resources and great time
expenditures would still be required because both types of hearings
are resource-intensive procedures which require costly and time-
consuming expert testimony.   This the Legislature sought to
15
eliminate.  We therefore conclude that the statute eliminates not
only traditional Frye-Reed hearings, but also "inverse Frye-Reed
hearings."
-26-
2. The Effect of § 10-915 on the Discretion of the Trial Court to
Weigh Probative Value Against Prejudicial Effect
Petitioner's second argument, that the trial court retains
discretion to balance the probative value of DNA evidence against
its prejudicial effect is also without merit.  As one court
observed in United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991),
aff'd sub nom United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993),
the Frye test was designed to serve the same purpose as the trial
judge's discretionary balancing of probative value against
prejudice:
The Frye doctrine developed . . . out of the
same concerns that led to the adoption of Rule
403 
[providing 
the 
authority 
to 
weigh
probative value against prejudicial effect]:
namely, the concern that lay jurors might be
misled 
by 
testimony 
that 
was 
unfairly
prejudicial, confusing, or misleading.  
Id. at 212 (citing United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.
1977)).  By enacting § 10-915 and thereby eliminating Frye-Reed
hearings, the General Assembly legislatively determined that the
probative value of DNA outweighs any prejudicial effect.  The
Legislature, in doing so, implicitly rejected Petitioner's general
arguments that DNA evidence is inherently prejudicial, the argument
that the "aura of mystic infallibility" associated with DNA
overshadows all other evidence, or the argument that highly
technical evidence is "overwhelming" to juries.  Except for
constitutional challenges, therefore, generalized attacks on DNA
-27-
testing are now precluded. 
Petitioner also argues that use of the language "is
admissible" in § 10-915 rather than mandatory language such as
"shall be admitted" indicates that the Legislature intended to
permit judges to continue to exercise discretion to exclude DNA
evidence in some situations.  We have considered the Legislature's
choice of language above, see supra Section IV.A, and we conclude
that the words "is admissible" have eliminated the discretion of
the trial court to weigh probative value against prejudicial
effect.
Although we find that § 10-915 has eliminated some of the
trial court's gatekeeping responsibilities with regard to DNA
evidence, we emphasize that trial courts still exercise an
important function in determining whether DNA evidence is logically
relevant to the case at hand.  As we noted in Reed, there is an
important distinction between the trial judge's discretion to
evaluate relevancy as opposed to reliability:
The 
question 
of 
the 
reliability 
of 
a
scientific technique or process is unlike the
question, for example, of the helpfulness of
particular expert testimony to the trier of
facts in a specific case.  The answer to the
question about the reliability of a scientific
technique or process does not vary according
to the circumstances of each case.  It is
therefore inappropriate to view the threshold
question of reliability as a matter within
each trial judge's individual discretion.
Reed, 283 Md. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368.  See also Haines v.
-28-
     Paternity testing cases also serve to clarify the proper
16
role of the trial court in determining relevance.  For example,
in Haines v. Shanholtz, 57 Md. App. 92, 468 A.2d 1365 (1984),
cert. denied, 300 Md. 90, 475 A.2d 1201 (1984), as here, the
Legislature enacted a statute governing admissibility of
scientific evidence.  Md. Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum.
Supp.) § 5-1029(e)(ii) of the Family Law Article.  In Haines,
however, the evidence at issue was blood testing.  The statute
provided that "test results may be received in evidence in cases
where . . . the probability of the alleged father's paternity is
at least 97.3 percent." Id. at 96, 468 A.2d at 1366-67.  Under
this statute, the Court of Special Appeals held that:
[T]he trial court should not have engaged in
a determination of scientific acceptance of
genetic testing for establishing paternity .
. . The legislative intent is clear--genetic
testing is valid, subject to cross-
examination of those responsible for
performing and evaluating the tests.  The
trial judge has the discretion of admitting
testimony that may have a bearing on the
weight of the testimony offered . . . but
not, by reason of the statute, as to the
admissibility vel non of genetic testing to
establish paternity.
Id. at 97-98, 468 A.2d at 1367 (emphasis in original).  See also
Kammer v. Young, 73 Md. App. 565, 535 A.2d 936 (1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 919 (1988). 
Shanholtz, 57 Md. App. 92, 98, 468 A.2d 1365, 1369 (1984), cert.
denied, 300 Md. 90, 475 A.2d 1201 (1984).  
16
While ordinarily DNA evidence will be admissible, the trial
judge retains the discretion to exclude DNA evidence if errors in
the laboratory procedures render it so unreliable that it would not
be helpful to the trier of fact.  See Jackson v. State, 92 Md. App.
304, 323, 608 A.2d 782, 791 (1992), cert. denied, 328 Md. 238, 614
A.2d 84 (1992).  We recognize that courts in other jurisdictions
-29-
     The court in Castro articulated a three-part test for
17
admissibility of DNA evidence:
Prong I. Is there a theory, which is
generally accepted in the scientific
community, which supports the conclusion that
DNA forensic testing can produce reliable
results?
Prong II. Are there techniques or experiments
that currently exist that are capable of
producing reliable results in DNA
identification and which are generally
accepted in the scientific community?
Prong III. Did the testing laboratory perform
the accepted scientific techniques in
analyzing the forensic samples in this
particular case?
545 N.Y.S.2d at 987.  
(continued...)
have adopted differing views regarding whether challenges to the
laboratory procedures used in a specific case go to the
admissibility of DNA evidence or merely to its weight.  Compare
United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied,   U.S.   , 114 S. Ct. 734 (1993), with United States
v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 800 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,  
U.S.   , 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992). See also United States v. Two
Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated and dismissed as moot,
925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991).  Some courts, following the line of
cases beginning with the trial court decision in People v. Castro,
545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Bronx County Ct. 1989), require adherence to
accepted DNA protocols as a predicate for admissibility,   see,
17
-30-
     (...continued)
17
     This approach is supported by the NRC Report, which stated
18
that:
The validity of [the] assumption . . . that
the analytical work done for a particular
trial comports with proper procedure . . .
can be resolved only case by case and is
always open to question, even if the general
reliability of DNA typing is fully accepted
in the scientific community.  The DNA
evidence should not be admissible if the
(continued...)
e.g., State v. Houser, 241 Neb. 525, 490 N.W.2d 168, 181 (1992);
Ex Parte Perry, 586 So.2d 242, 250 (Ala. 1991),  while others have
concluded that case-specific errors in the laboratory procedures
should ordinarily be evaluated by the factfinder in determining the
weight of the evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. Chischilly, 30
F.3d 1144, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,   U.S.   , 115 S.
Ct. 946 (1995); United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 561 (6th Cir.
1993); People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 633 N.E.2d 451, 458 (1994);
Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 893 (Colo. 1993); State v.
Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 846 P.2d 502, 507 (1993); People v.
Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990, 992 (Westchester County Ct. 1992).  We
believe the better approach is generally to treat individualized
errors in application of the DNA technique as matters of weight,
but to permit trial judges discretion to exclude DNA evidence if
such errors were made in the course of testing that the evidence
would not be helpful to the factfinder.  
18
-31-
     (...continued)
18
proper procedures were not followed. 
Moreover, even if a court finds DNA evidence
admissible because proper procedures were
followed, the probative force of the evidence
will depend on the quality of the laboratory
work.
NRC REPORT, supra, at 6-4.
In determining whether an alleged error in DNA testing
constitutes the type of error that warrants exclusion of DNA
evidence, trial courts must distinguish mere measurement error,
which is inherent in any scientific procedure, from deviations
from accepted testing procedures.  For example, contamination or
degradation of the DNA sample constitutes the type of error that
warrants exclusion.
In order to resolve the issues presented in this case, we must
first distinguish Petitioner's general challenges to DNA testing
from his particularized challenges to the procedures used in his
case because, as we have indicated, his general challenges to the
DNA testing methodology have been precluded by statute, while his
specific challenges remain within the trial court's discretion.  We
conclude that two of Petitioner's contentions---his challenge
regarding the use of the product rule and his challenge regarding
the rate of laboratory error as compared to the odds of random
matching---are general challenges, and as such, they are precluded.
A constitutional challenge to the statute or its application
stands on a different footing from other generalized challenges to
DNA evidence.  The trial court always retains the authority to
consider constitutional challenges to the statute or its
-32-
     The Petitioner also raised another challenge, i.e., that
19
the differences in the results obtained by the FBI testing
laboratory and Cellmark Diagnostics rendered the test results in
his case so unreliable that they lacked probative value.  The
specific difference was that the FBI autoradiograph showed a
double band at one locus, while Cellmark's autoradiograph only
showed one band at that locus.  The presence of two bands at one
locus generally indicates that a person is heterozygous, which
means they have two different alleles or forms of a particular
gene.  G. BEADLE & M. BEADLE, THE LANGUAGE OF LIFE 54-66 (1966).  For
example, if a person has one gene for blue eyes and another gene
for brown eyes, he or she is heterozygous for the eye color gene.
By comparison, the presence of only one band may indicate that a
person is homozygous, or that they have two copies of the same
allele for a particular gene. Id.  Absent a rare genetic
mutation, the same person can not be both homozygous and
heterozygous for a given gene, since this is determined at
conception, when each parent contributes one allele of each gene.
Id. at 65. 
As the experts explained in the pre-trial hearing, however,
this discrepancy can be accounted for by differences in the
testing conditions used by the two laboratories.  The FBI expert,
Dr. Dwight Adams, and the Cellmark expert, Dr. Charlotte Word,
attributed the difference to the likelihood that low-molecular
weight bands may run off the bottom of the gel, causing only one
band to appear at a locus where two bands would normally be
found.  Dr. Word noted that Cellmark's procedures typically
yielded larger fragments, while the FBI's system typically
yielded smaller fragments.  As a result, the Cellmark method
would be more likely to show very large bands, which would often
be lost using the FBI methods, while the FBI system would be more
likely to show very small bands.
Although Armstead frames this argument as one that is
specific to the DNA evidence in his case, we believe it is really
(continued...)
application.  We review the decision of Petitioner's due process
claim in Section VI, infra.
Petitioner attempts to raise one objection to the DNA testing
methods as applied in his specific case:  the presence of "shadow
banding" in the autoradiographs.   Shadow bands are "extra" bands
19
-33-
     (...continued)
19
a general attack on the inherent variability of DNA analysis. 
All DNA testing will vary slightly depending on the type of
probe, the restriction enzyme, the gel, the amount of time the
experiment "runs," etc.  General attacks on these procedures are
precluded under § 10-915. 
 
that appear in one autoradiograph but not another, even though both
are believed to be derived from the same source.  Shadow bands may
either indicate that the two DNA samples do not match, or they may
be due laboratory error, such as excessive cutting action by the
restriction enzymes, a phenomenon known as "star activity."  NRC
REPORT, supra, at 2-9 to 2-10.  
Although Petitioner raised the issue of shadow banding before
the trial court as part of his due process challenge, however, he
did not argue that the trial court retained its discretion under
the statute to exclude the DNA evidence due to the shadow banding.
Therefore we shall not reach the issue in this appeal.  Md. Rule 8-
131(a).   
To summarize, we hold that § 10-915 precludes generalized
challenges to the admissibility of DNA evidence, except for
constitutional 
challenges. 
 
It 
therefore 
eliminates 
both
traditional 
Frye-Reed 
or 
"inverse Frye-Reed" 
hearings 
and
individualized balancing of probative value against prejudicial
effect.  The statute does, however, permit case-specific challenges
-34-
to the manner in which a particular test was conducted.  Although
these particularized challenges ordinarily will go to the weight
of the evidence rather than its admissibility, the trial judge
retains discretion to exclude evidence if it is so unreliable that
it would not be helpful to the factfinder.  See, e.g., Reed, 283
Md. at 389, 391 A.2d at 372 ("Testimony based on a technique which
is found to have gained 'general acceptance . . .' may be admitted
into evidence, but only if a trial judge also determines in the
exercise of his discretion, as he must in all other instances of
expert testimony, that the proposed testimony will be helpful to
the jury, that the expert is properly qualified, etc.").
Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in declining to conduct an "inverse Frye-Reed hearing"
and in refusing to balance the probative value of DNA evidence
against its prejudicial effect. 
-35-
V. Admissibility of Population Genetics Statistics
The next issue we must consider is whether population genetics
statistics are admissible under § 10-915.  Again, to resolve the
legal issue, it is helpful to have a basic understanding of the
science of population genetics.   
A. The Scientific Debate Regarding the Use of 
Population Genetics Statistics
For each genetic characteristic, there may be two or more
variations or forms of the controlling gene, which are called
alleles.  NRC REPORT, supra, at 1-3.  Each parent contributes one
copy of each gene, so every individual has two copies or alleles of
each gene.  Id.  For two-allele genes, i.e., genes with only a
"form A" and a "form B," an individual may end up with one of three
possible combinations: AA, AB, or BB.  Each combination of alleles
is known as a genotype.  Id. at 1-5 (Fig. 1-3).  RFLP analysis
examines a number of different alleles from a single strand of DNA.
Id.
The first step in statistically analyzing the results of RFLP
testing is to determine the frequency of occurrence of each allele
tested in the general population.  Id. at 3-2.  In the case of a
two-allele gene, form A may occur in 30% of the population, while
form B occurs in 70% of the population.  Therefore, the fact that
an individual has form A of the allele is not, in itself, very
informative because there is a 30% chance that form A would be
-36-
      In reality, two alleles would be identified at each locus
20
tested.  For example, at locus one, a person could be found to
have one of three "genotypes" or combinations of alleles: A1/A1;
A1/B1, or B1/B1.  NRC REPORT, supra, at 1-5 (Fig. 1-3).  For
simplicity, however, our hypothetical probability calculations
use only one allele at each locus.  
found in a random member of the population.
Let us assume, however, that three different loci are tested.
The alleles for each locus are A1 and B1, A2 and B2, and A3 and B3,
respectively.  Further assume that the allele frequencies for the
general population are 10% for all the "A" alleles, and 90% for all
the "B" alleles.  If the suspect's DNA is found to include alleles
A1, A2, and A3, the probability of a random match with this profile
can be calculated by multiplying the probability of a random
individual having allele A1 times the probability of having A2
times the probability of having A3, or 10% times 10% times 10%,
which equals 0.1%.   See R. Lempert, The Suspect Population and DNA
20
Identification, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 1-2 n.3 (1993).  By increasing
the number of loci tested, this probability of random matching can
be reduced further, so that if five alleles were tested, the
probability of a random match would be only 0.001%, or one in one
hundred thousand.  See supra note 20.  In actual practice, the
probability of random matching is reduced even further by choosing
highly variable areas of the DNA with dozens of different alleles,
so that individual allele frequencies will be very low.
Chakraborty & Kidd, supra, at 1735, 1736.
-37-
     A third question has been raised somewhat less often than
21
the two discussed above regarding DNA evidence.  This issue
relates to the mechanics of how the visual pattern produced by
RFLP analysis is translated into allele assignments.  As
described above, the variable areas of DNA tested in DNA
profiling, VNTR's, may contain between 20 and 100 repeats of the
same nucleotide sequence.  One profile may have a 29-repeat
segment, while another may have a 35-repeat segment.  DNA
profiling, however, is not sufficiently precise to identify small
differences in the number of repeats; therefore, a process known
as "binning" is used to sort the differing lengths of DNA
fragments into categories.  Each category is interpreted to
represent a different allele, although in reality, each may
contain several alleles: for example, one "bin" may include 26-
repeat, 27-repeat, and 28-repeat segments because their lengths
are not sufficiently different to distinguish them.  See, e.g.,
L. Mueller, Population Genetics of Hypervariable Human DNA, in
FORENSIC DNA TECHNOLOGY 56 (1992).  Several conservative assumptions
have been incorporated in the binning process, however, which
have resolved most theoretical objections, although concerns
about binning have not completely disappeared.
 There are at least two significant potential problems in
calculating the probability of a random DNA match as outlined
above.  The first question is how to combine the probability of
random matching for each allele to come up with an overall
probability of random matching across all alleles.  The second
question is how to select the proper reference group to be used to
calculate the general allele frequency in the population.  The
essence of this query is whether the general population may be
used, or whether there is enough difference in allele frequency
across racial and ethnic population subgroups to require more
specific subpopulation frequencies to be used.   We note that
21
although there was significant debate across the country in both
the scientific and legal communities concerning these issues,
-38-
compare Lewontin & Hartl, supra, with Chakraborty & Kidd, supra,
this controversy has largely been resolved by recent scientific
studies.  See, e.g., B. Budowle et al., The Assessment of Frequency
Estimates of Hae III-Generated VNTR Profiles in Various Reference
Databases, J. FORENSIC SCI. 319, 349 (1994); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VNTR
POPULATION DATA: A WORLDWIDE STUDY (1993); B. Devlin & N. Risch, A Note
on Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium of VNTR Data by Using the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's Fixed-Bin Method, 51 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS
549 (1992); B. Devlin & N. Risch, Ethnic Differentiation at VNTR
Loci, with Special Reference to Forensic Applications, 51 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 534, 545-47 (1992).
Most of the controversy over use of DNA evidence has focused
on the first question, i.e., how to combine the probabilities of
random matching across all alleles.  The hypothetical allele
frequency calculations described above rely on a probability
principle known as the "product rule."  Stated generally, the
product rule means that the probability of two events occurring
together is equal to the probability that event one will occur
multiplied by the probability that event two will occur.  R. FREUND
& W. WILSON, STATISTICAL METHODS 62 (1993).  The classic illustration is
coin tossing; the probability of finding "heads" on two successive
coin tosses is equal to the probability of heads on the first toss,
50%, times the probability of heads on the second toss, 50%,
equalling 25%.  R. JOHNSON, ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 143 (4th ed. 1984).
-39-
The product rule is valid if the individual events are
independent, i.e., if the outcome of the first event does not
impact the outcome of the second event.  FREUND & WILSON, supra, at
62.  In the coin toss example, this means that the outcome of the
first coin toss does not affect the outcome of the second coin
toss, which is a valid assumption.  Id.  By comparison, assume we
wish to calculate the probability of having both a checking account
and a loan from a particular bank.  This is an example of non-
independent or linked events.  JOHNSON, supra, at 144.  We can not
calculate the probability of having both a loan and a checking
account at the same bank by multiplying together the individual
probabilities under the product rule because a person is more
likely to obtain a loan from the bank where he maintains a checking
account.  Id.  To illustrate nonindependence as it applies to human
characteristics (although not genetic characteristics), assume we
wish to determine the probability a man will have both a beard and
a moustache.  Also assume that the probability of having a beard is
1/20, and the probability of having a moustache is 1/10.  It would
be incorrect to infer that the probability of having both a beard
and a moustache, applying the product rule, is 1/200, because it is
likely that these are non-independent events; men who have beards
are probably more likely than others to also have moustaches.  See
People v. Collins, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 503 & n.15, 438 P.2d 33, 39
-40-
     For a thorough discussion of independent and non-
22
independent events, see D. STIRZAKER, ELEMENTARY PROBABILITY 22-30
(1994).  Stirzaker provides a useful genetic example at pages 29-
30. Id.
     The terms "linkage equilibrium" and "gametic phase
23
balance" are related to the concept of Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium, although they are not interchangeable.  All
reference a theoretical state of random mating across racial and
ethnic lines.  Lewontin & Hartl, supra, at 1746-47.
& n.15 (1968).22
The legal and scientific debate regarding DNA evidence mainly
revolved around whether or not the product rule could be applied to
genetic testing.  L. Roberts, Fight Erupts Over DNA Fingerprinting,
254 SCIENCE 1721, 1723 (1991); see also J. McKenna et al., Reference
Guide on Forensic DNA Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
300 (1994).  In the past, population geneticists and other
scientists disagreed over whether the probability of possessing one
allele was really independent from the probability of possessing
another allele, and over the importance of any such differences.
Compare Chakraborty & K. Kidd, supra, with  Lewontin & Hartl,
supra.  Theoretically, truly independent distribution of individual
alleles in the population requires completely random mating across
racial and ethnic divisions, under a genetic principle known as
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium.   Lewontin & Hartl, supra, at 1746-47;
23
Chakraborty & Kidd, supra, at 1736.  Since it is generally
acknowledged that the population has not reached such a state of
equilibrium at present, some scientists hypothesized that there
-41-
     The ceiling principle "assumes the worst" about the amount
24
of variation in allele frequencies across subpopulations.  Under
the product rule, the odds of a random match at one allele are
determined by comparison with the frequency of occurrence of that
allele in the population.  Therefore, if a particular allele that
shows up in the suspect's sample occurs in 1% of the population,
there is a 1% chance of a random match.  
Suppose, instead, that the allele in question occurs in a
low percentage of Caucasians, but in a much higher percentage of
(continued...)
might be significant substructuring in the population which could
cause considerable variation in the allele frequency across
subpopulations.  Lewontin & Hartl, supra, at 1747; L. Mueller,
Population Genetics of Hypervariable Human DNA, in FORENSIC DNA
TECHNOLOGY 60 (1992).  There was, however, no empirical data to
support this theory.  Chakraborty & Kidd, supra, at 1737-38.
In 1992, the National Research Council issued a report on
forensic DNA testing to attempt to resolve this dispute.  NRC
REPORT, supra.  Although the report recommended using a conservative
modification of the product rule known as the ceiling principle, it
did not ultimately reject the product rule.  Id. at S-11.  Instead,
it merely suggested that until data could be collected to confirm
or refute the existence of significant population substructuring
effects, the interim approach should be to incorporate several
conservative assumptions into the product rule calculation.  Id. at
S-11 to S-12.  The effect of these conservative assumptions is to
maximize the likelihood of random matches, thus decreasing the
power of the DNA results to some extent.   
24
-42-
     (...continued)
24
Hispanics.  The ceiling principle proponents at one point
suggested that, in case such variability existed (although data
did not then exist to confirm or refute this), we should assume a
much higher maximum frequency than is likely, so that the
possibility of error due to a random match is minimized.  NRC
REPORT, supra, at 3-10 to 3-12.  The NRC report recommended using
an "interim" population allele frequency of 10%, to be replaced
by a figure of 5% once preliminary data was collected. Id. at 3-
21.  These rates were considerably higher than the likely maximum
allele frequency for any subgroup, based even on then-existing
data.  See, e.g.,  B. Devlin et al., Statistical Evaluation of
DNA Fingerprinting:  A Critique of the NRC's Report, 259 SCIENCE
748, 749 (1993). 
Other than incorporating these maximum allele frequencies,
the product rule would still be applied as discussed above.  See,
e.g., NRC REPORT, supra, at S-11 to S-12. 
     Emphasizing the convergence of scientific opinion
25
regarding population genetics statistics, Lander and Budowle note
in their article that:
As co-authors, we can address these questions
in an even-handed manner.  B.B. [Bruce
Budowle] was one of the principal architects
of the FBI's DNA typing programme, whereas
E.S.L. [Eric S. Lander] was an early and
vigorous critic of the lack of scientific
(continued...)
 While the NRC report did not definitively resolve the issue,
however, the debate over the product rule essentially ended in
1993, with the announcement in the scientific journal NATURE that
the "DNA fingerprinting wars are over."  E. Lander & B. Budowle,
DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest, 371 NATURE 735, 735 (1994).
Eric Lander, formerly a vociferous opponent of use of the product
rule, was one of the authors heralding this shift in scientific
opinion.   Id.  While a small number of scientists still advocate
25
-43-
     (...continued)
25
standards and served on the NRC committee. 
In a world of soundbites, we are often pegged
as, respectively, a "proponent" and an
"opponent" of DNA typing.  Such labels
greatly oversimplify matters, but it is fair
to say that we represent the range of
scientific debate. 
Lander & Budowle, supra, at 735.
     While Hartl and Lewontin continue to advocate conservative
26
treatment of DNA evidence, their attack on population genetics
statistics has shifted; Lewontin, for example, recently asserted
that "juries are no more capable of understanding probability
statements than they are of interpreting any other piece of
highly technical information."  R. Lewontin, Letter, NATURE 398
(1994); see also D. Hartl, Letter, 372 NATURE 398-99 (1994).  This
position has been subject to considerable criticism by other
scientists.  For example, in a recent response to Lewontin's
comment, the author stated "[t]he continued existence of a Flat
Earth Society and the increasing popularity of Creationism
demonstrate that it is never possible to convince every
individual of the validity of a scientific theory," and noted how
"a tiny, vocal minority with access to media outlets can attempt
to sway public opinion against generally accepted medical and
scientific opinions."  C. Strom, Letter, 373 NATURE 98-99 (1995).
very conservative treatment of DNA analysis until more data is
collected, see, e.g., More on DNA Typing Dispute, 373 NATURE 98-99
(1995), the empirical data collected thus far has indicated that
the population substructuring that currently exists does not result
in forensically significant variation in allele frequencies across
population subgroups.   See Lander & Budowle, supra, at 736; see
26
also B. Devlin & N. Risch, A Note on Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium of
VNTR Data by Using the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Fixed-Bin
Method, 51 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 549 (1992); B. Budowle et al., The
Assessment of Frequency Estimates of Hae III-Generated VNTR
-44-
Profiles in Various Reference Databases, 39 J. FORENSIC SCI.319
(1994).  Ultimately, the studies have generally concluded that use
of the ceiling principle is unnecessary:
[T]he data do not support the need for
alternate procedures, such as the ceiling
principle approach (NRC Report 1992), for
deriving for deriving statistical estimates of
DNA profile frequencies.
Estimates of the likelihood of occurrence
of a DNA profile using each of the major
population group databases (e.g.,  Caucasian
and 
Black) 
provide 
a 
greater 
range 
of
frequencies 
than 
would 
estimates 
from
subgroups of a major population category.
Comparisons across major population groups
provide reasonable, reliable, and meaningful
estimates of DNA profile frequencies without
forensically significant consequences.
VNTR POPULATION DATA STUDY, supra, at 6 (emphasis added). Similarly,
another study concluded that:
Subdivision, either by ethnic group or by
U.S. 
geographic 
region, 
within 
a 
major
population group does not substantially affect
forensic estimates of the likelihood of
occurrence of a DNA profile. . . .  Estimated
frequencies among regional groups and several
subgroups of a major population category are
similar. . . . The most appropriate approach,
therefore, is to estimate the likelihood of
occurrence of a particular DNA profile in each
major group. . . . [B]ased on empirical data,
there is no demonstrable need for employing
alternative approaches, such as the ceiling
principle, to derive statistical estimates.
VNTR frequency data from major population
groups provide valid estimates of DNA profile
frequencies without significant consequences
for forensic inferences.
Budowle et al., supra, at 349 (emphasis added).  In recent cases,
-45-
      The dissent apparently dismisses the importance of the
27
FBI study in dispelling the controversy regarding the product
rule versus the ceiling principle. See dissenting op. at 22-23 &
n.7.  Contrary to the dissent's view, however, courts that have
addressed the admissibility of population genetics subsequent to
the FBI's VNTR study have recognized that current scientific data
does not support the need to apply either the ceiling principle
or the modified ceiling principle.  See, e.g., Smith, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 613-14; Marlow, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32-33. 
courts considering the admissibility of DNA evidence have cited the
growing list of scientific publications refuting the Hartl and
Lewontin theory and supporting the continuing validity of the
product rule.  See, e.g., People v. Smith, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 608,
613-15 & n.15 (Ct. App. 1996); People v. Marlow, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d
5, 32-33 (Ct. App. 1995), cert. granted, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 4583 (July
20, 1995) (No. G013492); People v. Soto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 855-
56 (Ct. App. 1994), cert. granted, 890 P.2d 1115 (Cal. 1995).27
  
In addition to the controversy between the product rule and
the ceiling principle, however, scientists have also pointed to
problems in the selection of a reference database.  Lewontin &
Hartl, supra, at 1746.  See also Com. v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 565
N.E.2d 440, 444 & n.11 (1991).  In the hypothetical calculation
described above, see supra pages 31-32, we assumed that form A of
the gene occurred in 30% of the population, while form B of the
gene occurred in 70% of the population.  In reality, however, it is
difficult to determine the population frequency of a given allele.
First, the relevant population must be defined.  Lewontin & Hartl,
supra, at 1746.  If allele frequencies vary substantially across
-46-
     This approach, however, also presents problems, because
28
[t]o use the specific ethnic background of
the suspect (which may be impossible to
define) would presuppose that he or she be
the true perpetrator.  However, if the true
perpetrator were known a priori, there would
be no need for statistical estimates. 
Furthermore, if a particular subgroup was
chosen as the reference database, for the
majority of cases this would insinuate that a
member of one subgroup is a more likely
source of the crime scene evidence.  
Budowle et al., supra, at 320.  The authors therefore conclude
that "[s]ince the ethnicity of those people who are potential
perpetrators rarely, if ever, is known, statistical estimates
must be based on some sort of general population database."  Id.
ethnic and racial population subgroups, then it may be necessary to
base the population frequency on a subgroup corresponding to the
suspect's ethnic or racial category.  Id. at 1747-49.  If the
suspect is Hispanic, therefore, the most conservative way to
proceed is to use a Hispanic population group to determine the
allele frequency.   Even within the Hispanic category, however,
28
there is substantial potential for variation in allele frequencies,
i.e., from Hispanics who are mainly of Indian descent versus
Hispanics mainly of European descent.  Id. at 1749 ("Because of the
extreme 
heterogeneity 
among 
'Hispanics' 
and 
among 
'native
Americans,' it is doubtful whether any reference population could
be defined that would be reliable in a forensic context.").  See
also Lempert, supra, at 2.
Further complicating the issue, even assuming one can
-47-
     In the present case, population genetics statistics were
29
calculated using a Caucasian database, a Hispanic database, and
an African American database.  The odds of one in 800,000 and one
in 480 million referred to in this appeal were calculated using
the African American database.  The database consisted of
approximately 250 persons from the Detroit metropolitan area.
determine the proper population database to draw from, the allele
frequency must still be determined.  This requires obtaining sample
DNA profiles from some significant number of people, ranging from
several hundred to several thousand.  Scientists disagree over the
appropriate minimum number of profiles that should be used to make
a database meaningful.  See Devlin et al., supra, at 749; see also
People v. Soto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 852 n.15 (Ct. App. 1994),
cert. granted, 890 P.2d 1115 (Cal. 1995).  Moreover, the more
refined the subgroup analysis becomes, the smaller the subset of
the total database that can be used, exacerbating the database size
problem.  As a result, if a database of several thousand profiles
is limited, for statistical analysis purposes, to only those
profiles belonging to Indian-descended Hispanics, this may reduce
the reference database to only a few dozen profiles.29
 Resolution of the product rule versus ceiling principle
debate has, however, also ameliorated the database selection
problem.  Since the majority of scientists now believe that the
effects of population substructuring are relatively insignificant,
it has become unnecessary to develop data for very small population
subgroups.  See generally VNTR POPULATION DATA STUDY, supra; E. Lander
-48-
      Lempert argues that while population substructuring is no
30
longer a significant concern in most cases, there are still
caveats regarding the use of DNA evidence.  R. Lempert, The
Suspect Population and DNA Identification, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 1
(1993).  For example, he suggests that the odds of random matches
between the suspect DNA and DNA taken from the crime scene will
be underestimated where the suspect population includes one or
more of the suspect's close relatives.  Id. at 6.  The problem is
greatest in small, isolated populations with atypically
constrained mating, e.g., in the Pennsylvania Amish community,
certain Native American tribes, etc.  Id. at 2-3.
This argument arose in United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d
56 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated and dismissed as moot, 925 F.2d 1126
(8th Cir. 1991) (en banc).  The defendant in Two Bulls was a
Native American, and the relevant suspect population included a
large number of people with the same tribal background as the
defendant.  See Lempert, supra, at 5, n.9.
& B. Budowle, supra; Chakraborty et al., supra; Budowle et al.,
supra.  See also Lempert, supra, at 3.30
B. The Effect of Section 10-915 on Admission
of Population Genetics Statistics
Although § 10-915 does not explicitly discuss the use of
population genetics statistics, there are several indications in
the statute that the Legislature also intended the supporting
statistics to be routinely admitted along with the DNA match
evidence.  While the scientific dispute discussed above might at
one point have required exclusion of population genetics under the
Frye-Reed standard, the statute renders Frye-Reed analysis
unnecessary.   
First addressing the language of the statute, the General
-49-
Assembly amended the DNA statute in 1991 to specifically include a
provision referring to population genetics.  1991 Maryland Laws ch.
631, at 3447-49 (1991) (codified as amended at § 10-915); see also
House Bill No. 1150.  As amended, the statute now requires that the
proponent of DNA evidence provide, upon the opponent's request, "a
statement setting forth the allele frequency and genotype data for
the appropriate data base utilized." § 10-915(b)(2)(v).  See also
supra note 10.  This language clearly indicates that the
Legislature was aware that population genetics were used in support
of DNA evidence, and moreover, that the Legislature expected such
information to be presented at trial and used in cross-examination.
This amendment preceded Armstead's trial, and Armstead received all
the discovery information required under the amended statute.
 
 In addition, the preamble language discussed above referring
to an "infinitesimal margin of error," also demonstrates that the
Legislature knew that statistical calculations were routinely
applied to gauge the accuracy of DNA profile evidence.  See supra
Section IV.B.1.  Furthermore, the fact that the Legislature deleted
the words "unique" and "uniquely" from House Bill 711 before
enacting the DNA statute reflects an awareness that not all
segments of DNA are unique and, therefore, that there is some
possibility of random matching.  Even before the statute was
amended, therefore, the Legislature clearly recognized that the
odds of random matching would be at issue whenever DNA evidence was
-50-
presented.
Moreover, the statutory language stating that DNA profile
evidence is admissible "to prove or disprove . . . identity," § 10-
915(b), also indicates that the Legislature viewed population
genetics statistics as a necessary component of DNA evidence.  As
stated in the NRC Report, "[t]o say that two patterns match,
without providing any scientifically valid estimate (or, at least,
an upper bound) of the frequency with which such matches might
occur by chance, is meaningless."  NRC REPORT, supra, at 3-1.
Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized this problem,
observing that:  "Without the probability assessment, the jury does
not know [whether the matching] patterns are as common as pictures
with two eyes, or as unique as the Mona Lisa."  United States v.
Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 181 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff'd sub nom United
States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993).  See also  Nelson v.
State, 628 A.2d 69, 75 (Del. 1993); State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash.2d
879, 846 P.2d 502, 516 (1993); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d
629, 640 (D.C. 1992); Com. v. Lanigan, 413 Mass. 154, 596 N.E.2d
311, 314 (1992) (Lanigan I), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 419
Mass. 15, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (1994) (Lanigan II); State v.
Vandebogart, 136 N.H. 365, 616 A.2d 483, 494 (1992), modified on
reh'g, 139 N.H. 145, 652 A.2d 671 (1994); People v. Marlow, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 5, 29 & n.42 (Ct. App. 1995), cert. granted, 1995 Cal.
LEXIS 4583 (July 20, 1995) (No. G013492); People v. Soto, 35 Cal.
-51-
     Among the courts that have found statistical evidence
31
inadmissible, there have been at least three different approaches
to the use of DNA "match" testimony:  
(1) Disallow use of the DNA match as well,
because it is meaningless without contextual
(continued...)
Rptr. 2d 846, 855 (Ct. App. 1994), cert. granted, 890 P.2d 1115
(Cal. 1995);  State v. Watson, 257 Ill. App. 3d 915, 629 N.E.2d
634, 644 (App. Ct. 1994), cert. denied, 642 N.E.2d 1299 (Ill.
1994).
If random DNA matching is possible, then a "match" between two
DNA profiles is not meaningful without contextual statistics
regarding the odds that the match was coincidental.  United States
v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 181 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff'd sub nom United
States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993); Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d
at 314, Cauthron, 846 P.2d at 516.  The General Assembly recognized
the possibility of random matching, as indicated by the 1991
amendment and the preamble to the statute; therefore, in rendering
DNA evidence admissible, we conclude that the Legislature intended
to render the necessary contextual statistics admissible, not just
the "raw" evidence of a DNA match.  This interpretation is in
accord with common sense because to interpret the statute otherwise
would provide juries with DNA evidence that they could not evaluate
in a logical manner.  
We recognize that some courts have allowed use of DNA match
evidence without supporting statistics.   See, e.g., Com. v. Crews,
31
-52-
     (...continued)
31
statistics;
(2) "Uncouple" the match evidence from the
statistical evidence, permitting testimony as
to the match; or
(3) Permit testimony regarding the match, and
allow expert testimony regarding the
frequency of occurrence of each allele in the
general population, but disallow testimony
giving an overall probability of match (thus,
avoiding the product rule issue, because the
probabilities are not combined). 
See State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152, 1190 (1993),
cert. denied,   U.S.   , 114 S. Ct. 1578 (1994).
     To the extent that Jackson v. State, 92 Md. App. 304, 608
32
A.2d 782 (1992), cert. denied, 328 Md. 238, 614 A.2d 84 (1992),
is inconsistent with this holding, it is hereby disapproved.  In
Jackson, the defendant argued that expert testimony that his DNA
matched DNA from the crime scene should not have been admitted
because no population genetics statistics were provided to put
the "match" testimony in context, asserting that "without proper
evidence regarding the probability of a match, evidence that a
match was declared has no relevance.  Without probability
calculations the fact that there was a match does not tend to
make it more or less likely that [a]ppellant was the assailant." 
92 Md. App. at 324, 608 A.2d at 791.  While the court found that
this argument had been waived, it noted that: "In any event, we
have explained that DNA testing has been legislatively determined
to be reliable and is generally admissible in Maryland.  The
expert witness testified that she used standard procedures and
standard equipment in conducting the testing and comparisons. 
There was simply no need for the State to offer additional
evidence, such as probability calculations, to establish that the
testing procedures employed were reliable."  Id. at 324, 608 A.2d
at 792.
640 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1994).  We believe, however, that the better
approach is to treat the match and the statistics as inseparable
components of DNA evidence.   Cf. Keirsey v. State, 106 Md. App.
32
-53-
     In Keirsey, the Court of Special Appeals held that the
33
Frye-Reed test was inapplicable to the methods of calculating
population genetics statistics, stating that "the Frye-Reed test
. . . is applicable only when an essential component of the
expert's opinion is a scientific test result 'controlled by
inexorable, physical laws.'"  106 Md. App. at 575, 665 A.2d at
712 (quoting State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 98, 517 A.2d 741, 745
(1986)).  We believe this description of the scope of the Frye-
Reed test is too limited, excluding some mathematical techniques
that should be subjected to reliability analysis. 
The Frye-Reed test often will not apply to statistical
calculations because the choice between alternative statistical
techniques, although subjective, is often merely a choice between
equally valid methods of describing the same underlying
scientific data.  Statistics are inherently flexible, and thus
there are usually multiple correct statistics that can be used to
describe the same set of data.  Statisticians routinely make
choices in presenting data; for example, they may choose to
present either the mean, the median, or the mode to describe the
"center" of a data set.  This type of format choice is not
subject to Frye-Reed analysis.
There are, however, instances, as in this case, where the
proper choice of statistical techniques is dependent on an
underlying scientific phenomenon or principle.  For example,
suppose that a new species of flower is discovered.  When it is
discovered, a white-flowered variety and a red-flowered variety
are observed.  It would be incorrect to calculate the probability
of a new plant having white flowers based on a normal
distribution, because this would depend on whether flower colors
varied along a continuum from white to pink to red, or whether
there were only discrete possibilities for the flower color,
i.e., white or red.  See R. FREUND & W. WILSON, STATISTICAL METHODS 65-
66, 70-76.  Under this scenario, the correct choice of
probability calculations would depend on the underlying genetics
of the plant.
We believe the choice between population genetics
approaches--i.e., the product rule versus the ceiling principle--
is similarly dependent on an underlying scientific hypothesis,
because if the scientific data showed significant variation in
allele frequencies across subpopulations, this would imply that
use of the product rule was incorrect.  Other courts have also
(continued...)
551, 575, 665 A.2d 700, 712 (1995).33
-54-
     (...continued)
33
adopted this view.  For example, in People v. Soto, 35 Cal.Rptr.
2d 856 (Ct. App. 1994), cert. granted, 890 P.2d 1115 (Cal. 1995),
a California court determined that the Frye standard applied to
the population genetics formulae used to analyze DNA evidence. 
Id. at 858.  Because the scientific data has shown the variation
in allele frequencies to be insignificant, however, the Soto
court ultimately concluded that both the product rule and the
ceiling principle passed the "general acceptance" test.  Id.  See
also E. IMMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
§ 6.6(D), at 228-29 (1982).  
Although we therefore disagree with the Court of Special
Appeals' circumscribed view of the Frye-Reed test, we need not
carry our analysis as far as in Soto, because the Maryland
General Assembly has determined that statistical evidence of the
odds of a random DNA match is admissible.
  
Thus, we conclude that § 10-915 encompasses both the evidence
of a DNA match and the supporting statistics.  Although § 10-915
does not specify which statistical methodology should be used,
i.e., the product rule or the ceiling principle, the Legislature
need not reach this level of specificity in order for the
statistical information to be admitted.  For example, as originally
enacted, the statute did not specify which type of DNA analysis was
admissible; the Legislature only added the requirement that the
evidence be collected using the RFLP method when the statute was
amended in 1991.  1991 Maryland Laws ch. 631, at 3448 (codified as
amended at § 10-915(b)).  This lack of specificity can not be read
to mean that DNA analysis was inadmissible until the Legislature
committed to one specific method.
Moreover, if the Legislature specified the precise method to
-55-
     Taken to the extreme, this approach would require the
34
Legislature to specify not only the type of statistical formula
to be applied, but also the type of probe to be used, the number
of loci to be tested, the minimum database size, and a multitude
of other details which impact on the accuracy and reliability of
the results.
     While the court in Bible acknowledged the evolutionary
35
nature of scientific development, observing that "neither logic
(continued...)
be used for each critical step in DNA analysis, it would stultify
scientific development.   In Haines v. Shanholtz, 57 Md. App. 92,
34
468 A.2d 1365 (1984), cert. denied, 300 Md. 90, 475 A.2d 1201
(1984), the Court of Special Appeals discussed this point in
describing why the Legislature chose not to codify the specific
calculations to be used in determining the probability of
paternity:
The legislation . . . carefully refrained from
adopting any specific tests to establish the
percentages necessary to include or exclude
putative fathers.  It is reasonable to assume
that the General Assembly recognized that new
technology may become available and, by not
addressing any specific combination of tests,
laboratories will be allowed to utilize the
most 
effective 
tests 
without 
further
legislative change.
Id. at 96, 468 A.2d at 1367.  To codify every step in a
technological process such as DNA profiling would be to freeze the
process in time, precluding the introduction of better procedures
and potentially more accurate evidence without a subsequent change
in the law.  Cf. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152, 1189
n.33 (1993), cert. denied,   U.S.   , 114 S. Ct. 1578 (1994).35
-56-
     (...continued)
35
nor authority supports confining ourselves to a snapshot, rather
than viewing the motion picture, of technological advancement,"
it used this principle to support a different conclusion than the
one we reach here.  858 P.2d at 1189 n.33.  The Bible court
concluded that on appeal, review of the trial court's Frye-Reed
analysis should not be limited to the level of acceptance of DNA
testing at the time of trial, but rather should also consider
subsequent scientific developments.  Id.  The Bible court,
however, was not determining the scope of admissibility under a
statute, but rather considered the admissibility of DNA evidence
in a jurisdiction without legislation governing admissibility.    
Petitioner is simply wrong when he argues that the Court is
obliged to reconsider the reliability of the product rule in light
of the NRC Report and other recent scientific developments.  While
due process considerations require courts to intervene if
scientific opinion shifts so dramatically that previously accepted
methods 
are 
considered 
unreliable, 
§ 
10-915 
shifts 
the
responsibility to the Legislature to respond to incremental
advances in technology that do not effect sufficient change to
implicate due process.  Although Petitioner argues, as discussed in
Section VI, infra, that there has been a significant shift in
scientific opinion, such that the product rule has become outmoded,
we disagree.  Neither the NRC report nor the ensuing scientific
publications support such a conclusion.  See NRC REPORT, supra, at
S-11 to S-12; B. Budowle & E. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute
Laid to Rest, 371 NATURE 735, 737-38 (1994).  On the contrary, both
methods have been proven viable in light of the most recent
scientific evidence.  See VNTR POPULATION DATA STUDY, supra, at 6;
-57-
Budowle et al., supra, at 349.  Section 10-915 does not specify a
particular statistical method; therefore, it was appropriate for
the trial court to permit the results of both calculations to be
presented in court.  Cf. Soto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858-59
(affirming the trial court's decision to admit both the product
rule and ceiling principle calculations under the Kelly-Frye
standard).
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the statistical evidence regarding the probability of a
random DNA match calculated using the product rule because the
statute contemplates the use of probability evidence to place the
"raw" result of a DNA match in context.  Furthermore, the
Legislature need not specify the particular statistical method to
be used.  Because the statute does not specify a method, either the
product rule or the ceiling principle may be applied and presented
in evidence.  
VI. Due Process Considerations
Petitioner next contends that the DNA evidence is so
unreliable that its use violates his due process rights.  He bases
his contention that the DNA evidence was unreliable on both
generalized problems with DNA testing and specific problems with
the conduct of the testing in his case.  His generalized attack
focuses on the use of the product rule rather than the ceiling
-58-
     The FBI will declare a match between two fragments of DNA
36
if the size of one fragment is within 2.5% of the size of
another.  To illustrate, if fragment A is 10,000 nucleotides
long, while fragment B is 10,250 nucleotides long, they will
still be declared a "match."  Cellmark uses a match window that
varies with the size of the DNA fragment. 
principle, which he contends renders the statistical component of
the DNA evidence unreliable.  He also argues that because the
laboratory error rate, 0.7%, greatly exceeds the odds of random
matching under either the product rule or the ceiling principle,
both methods of calculating the odds are unreliable.  
In addition, he attacks several specific defects in the
conduct of the testing in his case.  The first technical defect he
discusses is the use of excessively large "match windows" in
comparing his DNA with the DNA taken from the victim.  Match
windows must be used due to measurement error that is inherent in
the DNA technique.  Even if an identical piece of DNA was measured
several times, the measurement would likely differ to a small
degree.  Therefore, match windows are used to account for this
margin of error.   If match windows are too large, two fragments
36
may be declared a match when they actually differ.  Petitioner
argues that this problem rendered his test results unreliable.
Petitioner also argues that error in the testing yielded bands in
one test that did not appear in another test, a phenomenon the
laboratories attributed to "star activity," or essentially
excessive activity of the restriction enzymes used to cut the DNA.
Third, he argues that the statistics on odds of a random match
-59-
failed to account for the higher degree of genetic similarity
between Petitioner and his siblings. 
     We begin our analysis with the proposition that "a part of the
due process guarantee is that an individual not suffer punitive
action as a result of an inaccurate scientific procedure." Higgs v.
Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226, 230 (W.D. Ky. 1985), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 793 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, and remanded in part on other grounds sub nom
Higgs v. Bland, 888 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1991).  Scientific test
results, however, need not be infallible to meet the standard for
due process.  Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352-53, 110
S. Ct. 668, 674, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708, 720 (1990).  As the Supreme
Court has stated, the due process standard only bars admission of
evidence that is "so extremely unfair that its admission violates
'fundamental conceptions of justice.'"  Id. at 353 (quoting United
States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752
(1977) (citations omitted)).  The Supreme Court has construed this
test narrowly, id. at 352, as have the Maryland courts.  Crawford
v. State, 285 Md. 431, 404 A.2d 244 (1979).  For evidence to
violate this standard because of its unreliability, the acts
complained of must "be of such quality as necessarily prevent a
fair trial." Id. at 452, 404 A.2d at 255 (quoting Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166 (1941)).
"Fundamental fairness" is an inherently malleable concept and,
-60-
thus, does not lend itself to formulation of a bright-line rule.
The issue of "fundamental fairness" must instead be assessed on the
facts of each case.  While there is neither a blanket test for
fundamental fairness nor well-defined factors to guide trial
courts, the Supreme Court has provided some broad considerations to
weigh in assessing "fundamental fairness."  For example, in Dowling
v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S. Ct. 668, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708
(1990), the Petitioner was tried for an armed bank robbery in which
the perpetrator had been wearing a ski mask and carrying a small
pistol.  A witness, Veronica Henry, testified that two weeks after
the incident, the Petitioner had attempted to rob her, while
wearing a ski mask and carrying a small pistol.  Id. at 344-45.
Although Dowling had been acquitted of the robbery of Henry, the
Court held that Henry's testimony was not so "fundamentally unfair"
that it violated Dowling's due process rights.  Id. at 353.  In
rejecting Petitioner's due process challenge, the Court emphasized
the jury's ability to weigh the evidence, and the Petitioner's
opportunity to challenge the testimony.  Id.
Maryland courts have also considered the question of when
evidence should be deemed so unreliable that it violates due
process.  The Court of Special Appeals has considered the issue,
for example, in the context of paternity testing in Kammer v.
Young, 73 Md. App. 565, 576-77, 535 A.2d 936, 941-42 (1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 919 (1988).  In Kammer, the court considered a due
-61-
process challenge to the reliability of calculations of the
probability of the defendant's paternity.  By statute, paternity
testing must exclude 97.3% of possible biological fathers to be
admitted.  Md. Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.) § 5-
1029(e)(1)(ii) of the Family Law Article.  The defendant in Kammer
argued that the conditional probability formula that was used to
calculate the probability of his paternity was so unreliable that
his due process rights were violated.  Id. at 574, 535 A.2d at 940-
41.  The intermediate appellate court held, however, that his
rights were not violated, explaining that:
Appellant was free to, and in fact did, put on
non-genetic evidence which not only disputed
generally his paternity but, in effect, was an
attack upon the use of the . . . [conditional]
probability figure.  This allowed him an
opportunity 
to 
counterbalance 
appellee's
introduction of the blood test results and the
prior probability on which they were based and
served to protect his due process rights.
Id. at 577, 535 A.2d at 942.  Cf. Wilson v. State, 70 Md. App. 527,
534, 521 A.2d 1257, 1262 (1987).  
This Court has not previously considered the due process
implications of the reliability of scientific evidence.  In other
contexts, however, we have considered whether evidence was
sufficiently reliable to satisfy due process.  For example, in
Department v. Bo Peep, 317 Md. 573, 565 A.2d 1015 (1989), cert.
denied, 494  U.S. 1067 (1989), the Department of Human Resources
held a hearing regarding revocation of Bo Peep Nursery's license
-62-
based on allegations of child abuse.  In the hearing, the agency's
case against the nursery was based entirely on hearsay evidence.
We held, however, that the exclusive use of hearsay, in the context
of an administrative hearing, did not violate the nursery's due
process rights.  Id. at 598-602, 565 A.2d at 1027-29.  In so
holding, we pointed to Bo Peep's opportunity to cross-examine adult
witnesses who spoke with the children.  Id. at 601, 565 A.2d at
1028-29.  We also contrasted this situation with cases where due
process was violated because the defendant was completely unaware
of the evidence his opponent intended to present, and thus had "no
opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal."  Id. at 598-99, 565
A.2d at 1027 (quoting Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 129, 314
A.2d 113, 115 (1974)).
From these cases, we distill the principle that the essence of
the due process "fundamental fairness" inquiry is whether there was
a balanced, fully explored presentation of the evidence.  This
balance in turn depends on the jury's ability to weigh the
evidence, and the defendant's opportunity to challenge the
evidence.  See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 353.
Applying these principles to the present case, we first
consider the Petitioner's generalized challenges to the DNA
evidence, i.e., the use of the product rule and the magnitude of
the laboratory error rate compared to the odds of random matching.
As we noted above, the most recent scientific data confirms that
-63-
     The laboratory error rate of 0.7% for Cellmark was based
37
on two errors identified in proficiency tests conducted in 1988. 
Since that time, the laboratory protocol has been revised to
address these problems.
both the product rule and ceiling principle methods are viable, and
therefore both are sufficiently reliable to satisfy due process.
See supra Section V; see also VNTR POPULATION DATA STUDY, supra;
Budowle et al., supra.  We therefore conclude that because the jury
was presented with both the product rule and ceiling principle
calculations, with full explanations of both methods, it had the
opportunity to weigh the contested evidence.  In addition, although
the Petitioner did not call independent experts at trial, we
conclude that he had ample opportunity to challenge the product
rule calculations.  
We next turn to Petitioner's argument that the magnitude of
the laboratory error as compared to the odds of random DNA matching
renders the odds of random matching meaningless.  Essentially,
Petitioner argues that the DNA testing procedure is inaccurate due
to lab error in 0.7% of cases.   This means that in seven cases out
37
of one thousand, an erroneous match may be found.  Given this, he
argues, it is improper to say that there is only one chance in
800,000 that the DNA match was "random" because there is at least
a 0.7% chance of erroneous matching due to laboratory error.  As we
indicated above, however, the jury was fully informed of the
laboratory error rate and the Petitioner had a full opportunity to
-64-
address this on cross-examination.  Therefore, there was no due
process violation.
Finally, considering the Petitioner's specific challenges to
the DNA testing procedures used in his case, we first observe that
although Petitioner characterizes his objection to the use of
"match windows" as a case-specific challenge, it is really a
general challenge to DNA testing.  The use of match windows is an
inherent component of the process of DNA testing.  Regarding
Petitioner's other case-specific challenges, we conclude that these
issues were fully presented to the jury at trial, and the jury was
able to factor them into its assessment of the DNA evidence.  The
alleged technical defects related to the DNA testing were fully
explained to the jury by the experts.  We can not say that the data
was so unreliable on its face that petitioner's due process rights
were violated.  Under the circumstances presented herein, we find
that these technical issues go to the weight of the DNA evidence,
not its admissibility.
Petitioner had the opportunity to challenge the DNA evidence
and to raise both components of potential error on cross-
examination, and he did so.  In discovery, the State provided all
the background information the proponent of DNA evidence is
required to provide under § 10-915 (b)(1) & (b)(2), facilitating
thorough cross-examination.  Cf. Jackson v. State, 92 Md. App. 304,
322-23, 608 A.2d 782, 791 (1992) (petitioner raised a due process
-65-
objection at trial, but dropped his constitutional arguments on
appeal), cert. denied, 328 Md. 238, 614 A.2d 84 (1992).  Therefore,
his due process rights were not violated by presenting this
thoroughly explored evidence to the jury.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY THE PETITIONER.               
Dissenting Opinion follows next page:
-1-
       Frye v. United States, 293 F.1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923) and
1
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).  Frye
established the general acceptance test for the admissibility of
new scientific evidence.  Id. at 1014.    This Court adopted the
Frye Test in Reed.  See 283 Md. at 389, 391 A.2d at 372.  In
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. ___, ___,
113 S.Ct. 2786, 2793, 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 479 (1993), the Supreme
Court addressed the viability of the Frye test as a rule of
evidence, concluding that, in the federal courts, it was
superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in
particular Rule 702, which provides:  
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge skill,
experience, training or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
The Court construed the rule as rendering all relevant expert
evidence admissible if it will assist the trier of fact.  Id. at
___, 113 S.Ct. at 2795, 125 L.Ed.2d at 480.  The Court explained:
 
Nothing in the text of Rule [702] establishes
"general acceptance" as an absolute
prerequisite to admissibility....[T]he court
ordinarily should consider the known or
potential rate of error..., and the existence
and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique's operation. 
Id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2794, 2797, 125 L.Ed.2d at 480, 483.
(citations omitted).
The holding in Daubert indicates that there is an
(continued...)
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, J.:
I agree with the majority that the petitioner is not
entitled to a Frye-Reed hearing  or an "inverse Frye-Reed"
1
-2-
     (...continued)
1
appreciable difference between general acceptance, as determined
by the Frye-Reed standard, and admissibility under the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
      The petitioner concedes that the scientific principles
2
underlying DNA profile analysis are generally reliable.  He
argues, however, that he should have been permitted to conduct
what he terms an "inverse Frye-Reed" hearing to address new
developments in, and new assessments of, the statistical
probability methodology in use when Maryland Code (1974, 1989
Repl. Vol. 1992 Cum. Supp.) § 10-915 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article was enacted.  Developments in the laboratory
testing procedures, he avers, indicate that the probabilities
obtained by the product rule method are not reliable and, indeed,
that the methodology itself is no longer generally accepted in
the relevant scientific community, if it ever was.  This, he
concludes, renders the results in this case unreliable.  
      Maryland Code (1984, 1995 Repl. Vol.) § 10-915 of the
3
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides, in its
entirety:
(a)  Definitions--
(1)  In this section the following words have the 
meanings indicated.
(2)  "Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)" means the molecules 
in an all cellular forms that contain genetic 
information in a patterned chemical structure of each 
individual.
(3)  "DNA profile" means an analysis that utilizes the 
restriction fragment length polymorphism analysis of 
DNA resulting in the identification of an individual's 
patterned chemical structure of genetic information.
(b)  Purposes.-- In any criminal proceeding, the evidence of
(continued...)
hearing.  Assuming the latter to mean an attack on the general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community of the scientific
technique underlying DNA profiling,   Maryland Code (1974, 1989
2
Repl. Vol., 1992 Cum. Supp.) § 10-915 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article,  was enacted precisely "to eliminate the
3
-3-
     (...continued)
3
DNA profile is admissible to prove or disprove the identity 
of any person, if the party seeking to introduce the 
evidence of DNA profile:
(1)  Notifies in writing the other party or parties by 
mail at least 45 days before any criminal proceeding; 
and
(2)  Provides, if requested in writing, the other party
or parties at least 30 days before any criminal 
proceeding with:
(i)    Duplicates of the actual autoradiographs 
generated;
(ii)   The laboratory protocols and procedures;
(iii)  The identification of each probe utilized;
(iv)   A statement describing the methodology of 
measuring a fragment size and match criteria; and 
(v)    A statement setting forth the allele 
frequency and genotype data for the appropriate 
data base utilized.
necessity of holding a preliminary Frye-Reed hearing to prove
that the [DNA profiling] technique has gained general acceptance
in the relevant scientific community."  Floor Report of the
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on HB 711, at 2 (1989).  It
is clear, therefore, that § 10-915 makes DNA profile analysis
evidence admissible, generally.  
I do not, however, accept the majority's conclusion, see
Armstead v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (1996)
[slip op. at 25], that it also divests the trial judge of all
discretion, except on the grounds of relevance and for "error,"
to consider, and decide whether proffered DNA profile evidence is
admissible in a particular case.  I believe that the petitioner
is entitled to an evidentiary determination of the accuracy and,
hence, reliability, of the laboratory procedures employed to
-4-
profile him by DNA and of the results obtained, and to their
exclusion, § 10-915 notwithstanding, if either is found lacking.
See People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 999 (Sup. 1989) ("DNA
forensic identification techniques and experiments are generally
accepted in the scientific community and can produce reliable
results.  Hence, the Frye standard of admissibility is satisfied. 
[Even so, a] pre-trial hearing should be conducted to determine
if the testing laboratory substantially performed the
scientifically accepted tests and techniques, yielding
sufficiently reliable results to be admissible as a question of
fact for the jury.").  Moreover, I am satisfied, as the
petitioner contends, that § 10-915 does not divest trial courts
of their discretion, under Maryland Rule 5-403, to exclude DNA
profile evidence if its probative value is outweighed by its
prejudicial impact.
I.
A.
The Frye-Reed hearing's purpose is to address, as a
preliminary matter, the reliability of new scientific techniques.
Reed, 283 Md. at 388, 391 A.2d at 371.  It was never designed to
determine whether proper testing procedures were employed in a
particular case, or whether the results obtained were reliable. 
Those issues were left to the trial judge's determination, to be
made in light of the evidence, including expert testimony,
adduced at trial.  Id. at 389, 391 A.2d at 372 ("Testimony based
-5-
on a technique which is found to have gained `general acceptance
in the scientific community' may be admitted into evidence, but
only if a trial judge also determines, in the exercise of his
discretion, as he must in all other instances of expert
testimony, that the proposed testimony will be helpful to the
jury, that the expert is properly qualified, etc....").
Thus, even following a Frye-Reed hearing, in which the
general acceptance of a scientific technique has been determined,
the trial court still must monitor and pass upon the
admissibility of the evidence offered with respect to that new
technique.  An evidentiary determination still must be made with
regard to the relevance of the testimony, the qualifications of
any expert witnesses, the adequacy of the foundation laid and
whether the results were obtained from accurate and reliable
procedures and protocol.  Section 10-915 does nothing more than
to "eliminate the need to conduct the Frye-Reed hearing,"
relating to the general acceptance of the technique; it does not
obviate the need for the trial court to review the protocol and
laboratory procedures associated with the new technique and
determine whether the results were compiled from the actual
procedures performed.  The trial court must be satisfied that the
generally accepted principles underlying the technique were
accurately and appropriately applied and, thus, be convinced of
the reliability of the results in that case.  In other words, the
-6-
trial court still must exercise discretion to determine the
admissibility, in the specific case, of the DNA profile analysis
results. State v. Houser, 490 N.W.2d 168, 181 (Neb. 1992) ("[T]he
trial court, in determining admissibility of DNA evidence, must
first be satisfied, and find, as to the general acceptance of
relevant DNA theories in the scientific community and must be
satisfied as to the acceptance and validity of the methodology of
testing DNA used.  The trial court then determines if specific
procedures were properly followed in the case before the
court.").  See also United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61
(8th Cir. 1990); Ex Parte Perry, 586 So.2d 242, 250 (Ala. 1991).
  The majority concedes that § 10-915 "does ... permit case
specific challenges to the manner in which a particular test was
conducted."   See Armstead, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip
op. at 31].  It holds, however, that ordinarily the finding of an
error or deviation from established protocol will affect the
weight, not the admissibility of the evidence.  Id.  This holding
flies in the face of the Daubert ruling in which the Supreme
Court opined, "[U]nder the [Federal] Rules [of Evidence], the
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."  Id. 509
S.Ct. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2795, 125 L.Ed.2d at 480 (emphasis
added). 
The majority speaks of a distinction between "mere
-7-
measurement errors" and errors resulting from "deviations from
accepted testing procedures." Armstead, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d
at ___ [slip op. at 28 n.18].  Both types of error are procedural
in nature and affect the relevancy and the reliability of the
results obtained.  Therefore, as the COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN
FORENSIC SCIENCE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT (1992) [hereinafter
NRC Report] notes, and the majority concedes, Id. at ___, ___
A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 28 n.18],
The validity of [the] assumption ... that the
analytical work done for a particular trial
comports with proper procedures can be
resolved only case by case and is always open
to question even if the scientific
reliability of DNA typing is fully
accepted....  The DNA evidence should not be
admissible if the proper procedures were not
followed.  Moreover, even if a court finds
DNA evidence admissible because proper
procedures were followed, the probative force
of this evidence will depend on the quality
of the laboratory work.  
NRC Report at 6-4.  See also Houser, 490 N.W.2d at 181 (citing
Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56; Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429 (Ark.
1991); Perry, 586 So.2d 242; Smith v. Deppish, 807 P.2d 144
(1991)).  I do not assume, as the majority apparently does, see
Armstead, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 28 n.18],
that the defects the petitioner alleges in this case constitute
"mere measurement errors" or relate to the general reliability of
DNA profiling as a scientific technique, rather than to the
quality of the laboratory work and the accuracy of the procedures
followed. In any event, one of the purposes of an evidentiary
-8-
hearing to determine admissibility is to explore that issue.
The petitioner cites two defects in the testing procedures
employed in his case, which, he avers, indicate that the
laboratory testing did not follow the required procedures.  He
also argues that these defects render the DNA profile evidence so
unreliable that its admission violates his right not to "suffer
punitive action as a result of an inaccurate scientific
procedure."  Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F.Supp. 226, 230 (D.C. Ky 1985)
(citing United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977)). 
First, the petitioner points to the fact that the match windows
used to compare his DNA sample with the DNA sample obtained from
the crime scene were excessively large.  Although the use of
match windows is inherent to DNA profiling, the Petitioner's
challenge relates to the size, and not the use, of the match
windows.  The fact that they are excessively large, he asserts,
as the majority also acknowledges, see Armstead, ___ Md. at ___,
___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 53], may result in two fragments
being declared a match "when they actually differ." 
The differences between the FBI autoradiographs and
Cellmark's autoradiographs was offered, by petitioner, as another
indication that the DNA evidence was inadmissible.  The FBI
autoradiographs showed a double band at one locus, while
Cellmark's showed only one band at the same locus.  A single band
-9-
      Homozygous means a person has two copies of the same
4
allele for a particular gene.  G. BEADLE & M. BEADLE, THE LANGUAGE OF
LIFE 54-66 (1966).
      Heterozygous means a person has two different alleles or
5
forms of a particular gene. Id.
indicates that the DNA belongs to a homozygous   person, whereas
4
a double band indicates that the person is heterozygous.   
5
Absent a rare genetic mutation, the same person cannot be both
homozygous and heterozygous for a given gene. Id.  There was no
testimony at the hearing, nor at trial, indicating that the
petitioner possessed such a rare genetic mutation.  The presence
of shadow bands may be the result of laboratory error and,
indeed, may indicate that the two samples do not match. NRC REPORT
at 2-9 to 2-10.  
The petitioner sought the opportunity to establish the
former defect.  As to the latter, the petitioner contends that
the inconsistent results by the FBI and Cellmark indicate that
both are so unreliable as to lack probative force and, hence, are
inadmissible.
The majority dismisses the petitioner's second point as
unpreserved, see Md. Rule 8-131(a), reasoning: "although
petitioner raised the issue of shadow banding before the trial
court as part of his due process challenge...he did not argue
that the trial court retained its discretion under the statute to
exclude the DNA evidence due to the shadow banding," Armstead,
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op at 30-31], and
-10-
characterized the petitioner's argument regarding the
inconsistency between the FBI and Cellmark results, as a general
attack on the reliability of DNA profile analysis evidence, thus
justifying its ultimate conclusion that § 10-915 does not allow
it.  Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 28 n.19].  
The majority addressed the match window challenge on the
merits.  It rejected it as not offensive to due process.   The
majority also determined that, if there were defects in the
application of the DNA profiling technique, that would affect
only the weight, not the admissibility of the evidence. Id. at
___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 28]. 
The petitioner's "shadow banding" argument is fully
preserved for appellate review.  It was the petitioner's position
in the court below that he was entitled to a hearing at which he
could explore the specific reliability and, hence, admissibility,
of the DNA profiling tests performed by the State's expert
witnesses.  To be sure, the petitioner characterized his
entitlement to such a hearing as a matter of due process, but, as
I read the record, he did not rely on that vehicle exclusively. 
Indeed, the petitioner emphasized his due process rights only
after the trial court indicated that it believed that § 10-915
precluded an evidentiary challenge, except as a matter of due
process.  Thus, not only was the petitioner entitled to have his
"shadow banding" argument reviewed on the merits, but he was also
entitled to a similar review, with respect to any other matter
-11-
which the majority addressed only as a matter of due process. 
The majority provides no justification for declaring that
the petitioner's challenge to the reliability of the DNA profile
testing done by the FBI and Cellmark is a general challenge to
the reliability of DNA profile analysis evidence instead of a
specific challenge to the accuracy of laboratory techniques used. 
In my opinion, it is the latter.  So, too, are the petitioner's
other challenges.
All of the petitioner's challenges relate to the specific
laboratory procedures that were used in conducting the DNA
profile analysis.  The petitioner does not complain that the
principles underlying DNA profile analysis, as a scientific
method, have not gained general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community, rather, he argues that the testing
procedures the FBI and Cellmark followed to "match" his DNA  with
the evidentiary DNA sample, were inaccurately performed and, so,
produced unreliable results, and that the results reached by each
laboratory were so inconsistent as to render both of them
unreliable.  
Nor do I agree with the majority's contention that
individualized errors in the application of the DNA profile
analysis technique should be treated "as matters of weight" and
not as bearing on the admissibility of the proffered evidence. 
Adoption of this position inappropriately places on the jury,
rather than the court, the responsibility of determining the
-12-
reliability of the testing procedures and the results.  See
Satcher v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d 821, 835 (Va. 1992).  
In Satcher the Virginia Supreme Court considered a statute
almost identical to § 10-915.  It held that the trial court
properly exercised discretion when it conducted an in camera
hearing to determine the reliability of the DNA profile evidence
offered in that case and thus balanced its probative value and
prejudicial effect.  Id. at 835.  Characterizing the statute as
"a rule of evidence, and [noting that] judges are well versed in
administering rules of evidence without explicit guidance from
the legislature," id.,  the court opined:
[W]ide discretion must be vested in the trial
court to determine, when unfamiliar
scientific evidence is offered, whether the
evidence is so inherently unreliable that a
lay jury must be shielded from it, or whether
it is of such character that the jury may
safely be left to determine the credibility
for itself.
Id.  Thus, the petitioner is correct, when he argues that in
determining whether to admit the results of DNA profiling
techniques, the trial court should have considered, and decided,
whether the laboratory procedures were conducted properly and
whether there were testing errors affecting the relevance and
reliability of the results produced.
B. 
The majority recognizes that the petitioner is entitled to
due process.  It characterizes the due process to which he is
-13-
entitled as merely a "balanced, fully explored presentation of
the evidence...,[which] in turn depends on the jury's ability to
weigh the evidence and the defendant's opportunity to challenge
the evidence."  Armstead, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip
op. at 57].  It is enough, the majority posits, that the
petitioner has the right to raise, and present to the jury at
trial, his concerns about defects in the laboratory testing
procedures utilized.   That will enable the jury to determine, as
it must, the weight to be given to those defects, it concludes. 
Id. 
The right to call and cross examine witnesses is not, as the
majority would have it, an exhaustive list of procedural due
process entitlements.  Phillips v. Venker, 316 Md. 212, 218, 557
A.2d 1338, 1341 (1989)("``due process' unlike some legal rules,
is not a technical conception with fixed content unrelated to
time, place, and circumstances'... (citation omitted), [r]ather
it is `flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.'")(quoting  Morrisey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972))).  In
addition to calling and cross-examining witnesses, other
procedural safeguards may include the right to a pre-trial
hearing and the right to judicial review.  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 261 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1017, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 295
(1970)("`Under all the circumstances, we hold that due process
requires an adequate hearing...and the fact that there is a later
-14-
      Procedural due process in the administrative context may
6
be satisfied by affording less than would be required in a
criminal context, see Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md.
540, 557-58, 625 A.2d 914, 922 (1993), and "administrative
agencies are not generally bound by the technical common-law
rules of evidence...." Montgomery County v. National Capital
Realty Corp., 267 Md. 364, 297 A.2d 675, 681 (1972).  Md Dep't of
Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. 573, 565 A.2d
1015 (1989), an administrative law case, upon which the majority
heavily relies to determine the due process implications of the
reliability of scientific evidence, Armstead, ___ Md. at ___, ___
A.2d at ___, [slip op. at 56], is not analogous.
constitutionally fair proceeding does not alter the result.'")
(quoting  Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.Supp. 893, 901 (1968))). Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 25 L.Ed.2d
113, 119 (1971)("The formality and procedural requisites for the
hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests
involved....").6
 
In the case sub judice, in my opinion, the petitioner was
entitled not only to cross examine the State's witnesses, to
produce his own witnesses, i.e. to present a balanced version of
the facts from his perspective, but he also had the right to a
pre-trial evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of
the State's proffered evidence.  
The rules of procedure govern the admissibility of evidence
and provide protection against due process infringements.  See
Venker, 316 Md. at 222, 557 A.2d at 1343 (1989); State v. Rusk,
289 Md. 230, 240, 424 A.2d 720, 725 (1981); Tichnell v. State,
290 Md. 43, 57, 427 A.2d 991, 998 (1981)(referencing "the
protective purposes of the rules of evidence in criminal
-15-
trials.").  One such rule is Rule 5-702, which provides:
Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if the court
determines that the testimony will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue.  In making that
determination, the court shall determine (1)
whether the witness is qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, (2) the appropriateness of the
expert testimony on the particular subject,
and (3) whether a sufficient factual basis
exists to support the expert testimony. 
(Emphasis added).
Section 10-915, speaks to a threshold or preliminary matter,
the acceptance in the relevant scientific community of DNA
profile analysis evidence.  Having determined that matter in
favor of the proponent of the evidence, such evidence generally
is admissible.  DNA profile evidence is not exempt from other
admissibility prerequisites, prescribed by applicable rules of
evidence, however, including relevance and such other
considerations as may be prompted by specific challenges to its
admissibility and  reliability in the case in which it is
offered.  Reed, 283 Md. at 389, 391 A.2d at 372; Daubert, 509
U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2798, 125 L.Ed.2d at 484. 
Underlying Rule 5-702 is the premise that evidence that will
be of assistance to the fact finder is relevant and, thus, is
admissible.  Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 43, 542 A.2d 1258,
1263 (1988)("The critical determination is whether the jury will
be aided by the opinion." (citation omitted));  State v.
-16-
Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 101, 517 A.2d 741, 747 (1986) (citing
Consolidated Mechanical Contractors Inc. v. Ball, 263 Md. 328,
338, 283 A.2d 154, 159 (1971); Reed, 283 Md. at 389, 391 A.2d at
372.).  In this case, the general acceptance of the DNA profile
analysis technique notwithstanding, DNA profile analysis evidence
is admissible only if it was obtained from accurately followed
laboratory testing procedures.   This is true because, if the
proper procedures were not followed, the relevance of that
evidence cannot be assured.  And that lack of foundation, i.e.
relevance, affects the admissibility of the evidence, since no
sufficient factual basis will have been shown to support the
expert opinion, as Rule 5-702 requires.  
Whether accurate procedures were followed in conducting DNA
profile analysis is critical to the factual basis for the
expert's opinion.  Indeed, if the tests, on which the expert
relies, were not accurately performed, it may not be assumed that
the results obtained were accurate.  Unless the facts, upon which
the expert renders an opinion, i.e., the comparison of the
defendant's DNA to the evidentiary DNA, are reliable, the
expert's opinion simply cannot be admitted.  
Rule 5-702 addresses an issue different from that considered
by this Court in Reed.  It is not directly concerned with the
theory underlying a particular scientific technique or procedure,
it relates only to the reliability and probativeness of specific
evidence offered in a particular case.   The Committee note to
-17-
Rule 5-702 makes this clear:  it states that the rule is not
intended to overrule Frye-Reed principles; rather, the required
scientific foundation for the admission of novel scientific
techniques or principles is left to development by case law.  
Rule 5-702 is, thus, in a real sense, a codification of the
precautionary recognition in Reed, that testimony based on a
scientific technique is admissible only when found to be
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community and the
court has determined it to be otherwise admissible.  Reed, 283
Md. at 389, 391 A.2d at 372.
The majority makes no mention of Rule 5-702 in its analysis. 
Instead, it interprets § 10-915 as broadly prohibiting a trial
judge's exercise of discretion to exclude DNA evidence, even when
individualized errors have been committed in the course of
gathering and compiling that evidence.   Thus, the majority,
presumes that "§ 10-915 has eliminated some of the trial court's
gatekeeping responsibilities with regard to DNA evidence...."
Armstead, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d ___ [slip op at 25].
 Because Rule 5-702 permits a trial court to exclude expert
testimony for which it has determined no adequate foundation has
been provided, it most assuredly imposes on the court a
gatekeeping responsibility.  I read the majority opinion as
stripping the trial court of that responsibility when the
proffered evidence offered is DNA evidence.  To the extent that
-18-
this is the majority's intention, it renders per-se admissible
virtually any evidence an expert may proffer as DNA profile
analysis.  By so doing, the majority fails to recognize the
difference between the preliminary determination of the general
acceptance of DNA profile analysis evidence to prove identity,
which is § 10-915's sole function, and its admissibility in a
specific case.  
To illustrate the important distinction between the
threshold issue - general acceptance in the scientific community
of proffered evidence - and the narrower, more specific issue of
the admissibility, as reliable, of particular evidence in a
particular case, it is only necessary to consider what happens
when a particular exception to the hearsay rule, e.g., excited
utterances, see, Rule 5-803(b)(2), is raised as the basis for the
admission of a proffered statement. Clearly, a statement offered
as an excited utterance is admissible, but only if its proponent
is able to lay the proper foundation, i.e., prove that it is what
it is characterized as being. See Md. Rule 5-803(b)(2).  So, too,
in this case.  The State proffered DNA profile analysis evidence,
which, it says, tends to prove the identity of the perpetrator of
the crime on trial.  Section 10-915 requires the admission of
that evidence, except when the court determines that it is
irrelevant to the issues in the case, as the majority
specifically recognizes, or finds that accurate testing
procedures were not followed, see NRC Report at 6-4; or pursuant
-19-
to Rule 5-702, the court concludes that the necessary factual
predicate for the expert's opinion has not been shown.
This Court in Reed, supra, recognized the distinction
between the threshold issue of the reliability of a scientific
technique and the determination a trial judge is required to make
pursuant to Rule 5-702 - whether particular facts will assist the
jury in resolving a particular case:
The question of the reliability of a
scientific technique or process is unlike the
question, for example, of the helpfulness of
particular expert testimony to the trier of
facts in a specific case.  The answer to the
question about the reliability of a
scientific technique or process does not vary
according to the circumstances of each case. 
It is therefore inappropriate to view this
threshold question of reliability as a matter
within each trial judge's individual
discretion.
Reed, 283 Md. at 381, 391 A.2d at 367 (emphasis added).  The use
of the phrase "threshold question of reliability" indicates that
this determination is preliminary in nature and is not
dispositive 
with respect to whether particular evidence is
admissible.  The reliability of the specific laboratory
procedures used and the results obtained, albeit bearing on and
related to the threshold issue, is, as we have seen, firmly
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
To be sure, the legislature can, as it has done, via § 10-
915, pre-determine that a scientific technique is generally
accepted in the relevant scientific community, thus, avoiding the
-20-
need for judicial decision on a case-by-case basis.   It cannot
pre-determine, however, that the tests performed pursuant to that
technique, or the results obtained, are reliable and, thus,
admissible in a particular case.  As we observed in Reed, such a
determination will depend on a case by case assessment. Id.  See
also Jackson v. State, 92 Md.App. 304, 323, 608 A.2d 782, 791
(1992); Polk v. State, 48 Md.App. 382, 391-92, 427 A.2d 1041,
1047 (1981).  DNA profile analysis evidence simply is not per se
admissible; its admissibility, in a particular case to prove
identity, is case and fact specific.  Proof that the DNA analysis
offered in a particular trial is reliable is a prerequisite to
its admissibility.
C.
The Petitioner, relying on Rule 5-403, also contends that,
as a matter of statutory construction, § 10-915 notwithstanding,
the trial court was required to balance the probative value of
the evidence against its prejudicial effect before admitting the
DNA profile.  
Unlike Rule 5-702, which pertains only to expert evidence,
Rule 5-403 has a broader reach.  It provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative
-21-
evidence.  
It is applicable to all evidence determined to be relevant.  By
its terms, the court is required to balance the probative value
of such evidence against its prejudicial effect.  In other words,
the admissibility of even relevant evidence depends upon that
evidence being more probative than prejudicial. Holman v. Kelly
Catering Inc., 334 Md. 480, 495, 639 A.2d 701, 708 (1994) citing,
Hunt v. State, 312 Md. 494, 504, 540 A.2d 1125, 1130 (1988);
Daubert, 509 U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2797-98, 125 L.Ed.2d at
484 ("[A] judge assessing a proffer of expert scientific
testimony under Rule 702 should also be mindful of other
applicable rules.... Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant
evidence `if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury....'").  Unless § 10-915 provides otherwise,
DNA profile evidence must meet this test.  
The majority asserts, "By enacting Section 10-915 and
thereby eliminating the need for the Frye-Reed hearings, the
General Assembly legislatively determined that the probative
value of DNA outweighs any prejudicial effect." Armstead, ___ Md.
at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 24].  It concludes that §
10-915 has "eliminated the discretion of the trial court to weigh
probative value against prejudicial impact." Id. at ___, ___ A.2d
at ___ [slip op. at 25].  There is nothing, however, in § 10-915
or in its legislative history to support this assertion. 
-22-
The probative value/prejudicial effect balance is dependent
upon the particular facts and circumstances of a given case.  See
Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 717, 668 A.2d 8, 14 (1995).  It
cannot be pre-determined or pre-ordained even by Legislative
enactment, without infringing due process.  This is so because
determining the probative value of DNA profile evidence entails a
fact specific review of the accuracy of the laboratory testing
procedures used and the reliability of the results produced.  The
shadow banding, the size of the match windows, and the different
statistical conclusions drawn by the FBI, as compared to those
reached by Cellmark, despite the fact that they were purportedly
using the same methodologies, bear on the probative value of the
proffered evidence.  All implicate and are relevant to whether
the testing procedures were accurately and reliably performed,
which, in turn, bears on the accuracy and reliability of the
results produced.  Another relevant factor in the evaluation of
the probative value and prejudicial impact of the proffered DNA
evidence is Cellmark's laboratory error rate. 
That there is an inherent prejudice in the use of scientific
evidence must also be considered.  Given its esoteric and usually
complex nature, there always is the danger that an expert
presenting scientific proof will "assume a posture of mystic
infallibility in the eyes of a jury."  Reed, 283 Md. at 386, 391
A.2d at 370 (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744
(D.C. Cir. 1974)).  This danger is increased when the "proof"
-23-
consists of statistical analysis, "based on the scientific
principle that every human being has unique characteristics...
having an aura of infallibility," Commonwealth v. Curnin, 565
N.E.2d 440, 441 (Mass. 1991), which produces a result expressed
in terms of infinitesimal probabilities.  Id.   See also Houser,
490 N.W. 2d at 183-84.  The complexity of DNA evidence, the
unfamiliarity that most lay jurors have with respect to the
subject and the likelihood that it will be perceived by such
jurors as conclusive on the ultimate issue of identity has caused
one court to observe:
We cannot reasonably ask the average juror to
decide such arcane questions as whether
genetic substructuring and linkage
disequilibrium preclude use of the Hardy-
Weinberg equation and the product rule, when
we ourselves have struggled to grasp these
concepts.  The result would be unpredictable. 
The juror would simply skip to the bottom
line - the only aspect of the process that is
readily understood - and look at the ultimate
expression of match probability, without
competently accessing the reliability of the
process by which the laboratory got to the
bottom line.
People v. Barney, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 731, 742 (Cal.App. 1992).  Other
courts have expressed the fear "that the testimony unduly
encourages the trier of fact, in its determination of whether the
State has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, to focus solely
upon a numerical conclusion and to disregard the weight of other
evidence," Perry, 586 So.2d at 254, thus, equating the
probability of a random match, which is the focus of DNA profile
-24-
analysis, with the probability of guilt.  State v. Boyd, 331
N.W.2d 480, 483 (Minn. 1983).  The court, in Boyd, considering
the admissibility of a statistical probability calculation, for
the purposes of demonstrating the likelihood of a random match in
the paternity context, cautioned,
Testimony expressing opinions or conclusions
in terms of statistical probabilities can
make the uncertain seem all but proven, and
suggest, by qualification, satisfaction of
the requirement that guilt be established
"beyond a reasonable doubt." 
(quoting State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. 1978)). See
also Lewontin & Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA
Typing, 254 Science 1745, 1749 (1991), in which the following
observations were made:
None of the statistical methods] take into
account the probability of a false match
through laboratory artifact or error.  The
rate of false positives defines a practical
lower bound on the probability of a match,
and probability estimates based on population
data that are smaller than the false-positive
rate should be disregarded.  Hence,
probability estimates like 1 in 738,
000,000,000,000, however they are calculated,
are terribly misleading because the rate of
laboratory error is not taken into account.
Id.   (Emphasis added).
Another issue affecting the potential prejudice of DNA
profile analysis evidence involves the debate which began in
1992, when the NRC Report proposed the use of the ceiling
principle in lieu of the product rule.  See NRC Report at S-11-
-25-
      "In a recent article from Nature magazine, Bruce Budowle
7
of the FBI and Eric Lander of MIT declared that there was no
longer any controversy over population genetics issues.  In
response, 26 geneticists and statisticians sent a letter to
Nature disagreeing with Lander and Budowle.  Nature refused to
publish it, in part because of the large number of authors." 
"Challenging the Admissibility of DNA Testing", 83 Illinois Bar
Journal at 176 n.29. The portion of the letter most relevant to
our discussion reads,
 
Two of the most significant areas of controversy are
the effect of population structure on match
probabilities (including the broad question of applying
appropriate population genetic and statistical
principles to forensic DNA analysis), and the essential
role of laboratory error in the proper presentation of
evidence.  These issues are not, as Lander and Budowle
assert, "purely academic."  Rather, we who have
expertise in population genetics and statistics,
believe that these issues affect the very validity and
reliability of the methods assessed from the witness
stand....We would all like to end the DNA "wars", but
this will not come about by two soldiers declaring an
armistice while the bullets continue to fly.  The new
NRC committee, created largely at the request of the
FBI, has an opportunity to clarify or reaffirm the many
important recommendations of the first NRC committee. 
(continued...)
S-14. See also, Lander, E.S. & Budowle, B.,"DNA Fingerprinting
Dispute Laid to Rest," 371 Nature 735 (1994), in which two
debatants, one a proponent of the ceiling principle and the other
a proponent of the product rule, while conceding that their
conclusion represented merely their "unanimous opinion", declared
that the DNA fingerprinting controversy was over.  But see Allan
Sincox, Marijane Hemza - Placek, "Challenging the Admissibility
of DNA Testing," 83 Illinois Bar Journal, 170 April 1995,
indicating that the Lander- Budowle reconciliation has by no
means eliminated or resolved the issue.   Thus, controversy
7
-26-
     (...continued)
7
This committee can also address--one hopes with more
specificity--those areas of DNA typing that remain
controversial.
      In 1992, one year after House Bill 1150 was adopted by the
8
General Assembly, the National Research Council Report, which the
majority cites extensively throughout its opinion, made the
following observations regarding statistical probability
analysis, in general and the product rule method, in particular:
What is the probability that such a match
would have occurred between the suspect and a
person drawn at random from the same
population as the suspect?  Answering that
question requires calculation of the
frequency in the population of each of the
gene variants (alleles) that have been found,
and the calculation requires a data bank
where one can find the frequency of each
allele in the population.  On the basis of
some assumptions, so-called Hardy-Weinberg
rations can be calculated....Interpreting a
DNA typing analysis requires a valid
scientific method for estimating the
probability that a random person by chance
matches the forensic sample at the sites of
DNA variation examined....A standard way to
estimate frequency is to count occurrences in
a random sample of the appropriate population
and then use classical statistical formulas
to place upper and lower confidence limits on
the estimate....Such estimates produced by
(continued...)
remains as to whether the results obtained by use of the product
rule are generally accepted, see State v. Bible, 858 P.2d at
1152, 1188-89 (Ariz. 1993); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 514
(Wash. 1993); Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d at 744; United States v.
Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 640 (D.C.App. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311, 315-16 (Mass. 1992); State v.
Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494 (N.H. 1992), or reliable.8
-27-
     (...continued)
8
straightforward counting have the virtue that
they do not depend on theoretical
assumptions, but simply on the samples having
been randomly drawn from the appropriate
population....In contrast, population
frequencies often quoted for DNA typing
analyses are based not on actual counting,
but on theoretical models based on the
principles of population genetics.  Each
matching allele is assumed to provide
statistically independent evidence, and the
frequencies of the individual alleles are
multiplied together to calculate a frequency
of the complete DNA pattern.  Although a
databank might contain only 500 people,
multiplying the frequencies of enough
separate events might result in an estimated
frequency of their all occurring in a given
person of 1 in a billion.  Of course, the
scientific validity of the multiplication
rule [product rule] depends on whether the
events (i.e., the matches at each allele) are
actually statistically independent....[T]here
is not a sufficient body of empirical data on
which to base a claim that such frequency
calculations are reliable or valid....The
multiplication rule has been routinely
applied to blood-group frequencies in the
forensic setting.  However, that situation is
substantially different...and does not appear
to lead to the risk of extrapolating beyond
the available data for conventional markers. 
But highly polymorphic DNA markers exceed the
informative power of protein markers and so
multiplication of their estimated frequencies
leads to estimates that are far less than the
reciprocal of the size of the databanks,
i.e., 1/N, N being the number of entries in
the databank....The key question underlying
the use of the multiplication rule--i.e.,
whether actual populations have significant
substructure for the loci used for forensic
typing--has provoked considerable debate
among population geneticists.
(continued...)
-28-
     (...continued)
8
Id. at 2-9- 2-11.  (Emphasis added).
 
II.  
The petitioner argues, I think correctly, that statistical
probability evidence is not rendered admissible by § 10-915,
which only addresses the admissibility of the "raw" evidence of a
DNA match.  Accordingly, since the trial court should have, but
did not, conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the
reliability and admissibility of the statistical probability
evidence, I would reverse on this basis also.  
Section 10-915 does not endorse or validate any specific
methodology, i.e., the product rule or the ceiling principle, by
which the probabilities of a random match are to be computed. 
Consequently, the petitioner is also correct - before the results
of calculations based on any such methodology may be admitted
into evidence, the methodology must meet the Frye-Reed standard
of general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. 
Determining the applicability and scope of § 10-915 is a
matter of statutory construction, the object of which is to
discern and effectuate the Legislature's intent.   Baltimore v.
Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 93, 656 A.2d 757, 760 (1995).  The source of
legislative intent ordinarily is the language of the statute
itself. Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145, 626 A.2d 946, 950
(1993).  "In the interest of completeness,..., we may look at the
-29-
purpose of the statute and compare the result obtained by use of
its plain language with that which results when the purpose for
the statute is taken into account,"  id. at 146, 626 A.2d at 950;
"however, the statute must be interpreted reasonably, avoiding an
interpretation that is illogical or incompatible with common
sense."  D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177,
1179 (1990); Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319, 498 A.2d 1195,
1196 (1985); Erwin & Shafer, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 304 Md.
302, 315, 498 A.2d 1188, 1194 (1985). 
Section 10-915(b) expressly provides that DNA profile
evidence is admissible "to prove or disprove the identity of any
person."  In addition, however, the statute provides that, before
such evidence is admissible several discovery and notice
requirements must be met.  "The party seeking to introduce the
evidence of DNA profile" is required to provide written notice of
that intention at least 45 days before any criminal proceedings. 
§ 10-915(b)(1).  Under § 10-915(b)(2)(v), the proponent of DNA
profile evidence must submit to the other side "[a] statement
setting forth the allele frequency and genotype data for the
appropriate data base utilized."  This requirement is triggered
by a written request from the opponent of the evidence.   The
majority maintains that this single reference to a statement of
allele frequency and genotype data evidences the Legislature's
intention that statistical probability evidence be admissible as
DNA profile analysis evidence.
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It is well settled that simply because evidence is
discoverable does not mean that it is admissible.   Patrick v.
State, 329 Md. 24, 30, 36, 617 A.2d 215, 218, 221 (1992). 
Indeed, the test for discoverability is quite different from the
test for admissibility.  See Md. Rule 2-402(a) which, as
relevant, provides: 
It is not
ground for
objection that
the information
sought is
already known
to or otherwise
obtainable by
the party
seeking
discovery or to
the claim or
defense of any
other party. 
It is not
ground for
objection that
the information
sought appears
reasonably
calculated to
lead to the
discovery of
admissible
evidence.  
It seems obvious that the disclosure requirement was included in
§ 10-915 in order to ensure that the party against whom the
proffered DNA evidence is produced has access to information
helpful, or necessary, to challenge the accuracy of the
laboratory testing procedures used and the reliability of the
results produced. See generally Sommers v. Wilson Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 270 Md. 8, 174 A.2d 776 (1973).  Had the General Assembly
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intended another purpose - that the statement of allele frequency
and genotype data be admissible as DNA profile evidence - it
could have and, I submit, would have clearly so provided.  The
Legislature certainly knows how to do so. 
Section 10-
915(2)(b)(v) does not prescribe the method to be utilized in
determining the statistical probability of a "match" between the
evidentiary DNA and that of the defendant.  This is further
evidence that the statement of allele frequency and genotype data
is not intended routinely to be admitted along with other DNA
"match" evidence.   It can not be assumed, as the majority seems
to do, that the Legislature intended that any and all statistical
methodologies purporting to determine the probability of a random
match be per se  admissible.   
  That a DNA profile analysis, using the restriction
fragment length polymorphism process, results in a "match" does
not necessarily mean that the evidentiary DNA and the defendant's
DNA sample came from the same person.  It may mean only that two
persons, including the one from whom the sample was taken, have
the same allele at the locus probed by a particular restriction
enzyme.  The likelihood of that occurrence can be estimated
statistically by computing the probability that someone chosen at
random will have the same allele at the same locus as the person
whose sample DNA is being tested. NRC Report at 2-10.  This is
done by estimating the frequency with which the subject allele
occurs in the general population.  Id.
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With this in mind, the majority argues that statistical
probability evidence is necessary to the jury's understanding of
the DNA profile evidence. To interpret § 10-915 otherwise, it
maintains, "would provide juries with DNA evidence that they
could not evaluate in a logical manner."  Armstead, ___ Md. at
___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 47].  To be sure, that
conclusion has been reached by some courts that have considered
the matter. See e.g.  Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d at 314.  Other cases
have reached the opposite result. See e.g. Com. v. Crews, 640
A.2d 395, 403 (PA 1994); State v. Kim 398 N.W.2d 544, 548-49
(Minn. 1987).  See also Houser, 290 N.E.2d at 183; Curnin, 565
N.E.2d at 442-45; Boyd, 331 N.W.2d at 482-83; Perry. 586 So.2d at
254.  
In Crews, the court admitted "raw" DNA evidence, but
excluded statistical probability estimates, reasoning, "The
factual evidence of the physical testing of the DNA samples and
the matching alleles even without statistical conclusions, tended
to make appellant's presence more likely than it would have been
without the evidence, and was therefore relevant."  Id. at 402. 
In Kim, the court also admitted "raw" DNA evidence, but excluded
proffered statistical evidence on the grounds that if the expert
were permitted to express an opinion as to the source of the DNA
sample at issue, "a jury will naturally convert [the statistical
probability estimate] into an inclusion percentage."   Id. at
548.   I find these cases more persuasive.  I also find it
significant that § 10-915 does not establish a threshold
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      Section 5-1029 provides: 
9
(e) Laboratory report as evidence.-- 
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3) of this
subsection, the laboratory report of the blood or genetic test
shall be received in evidence if: 
(i) definite exclusion is established; or 
(ii) the testing is sufficiently extensive to exclude 
97.3% of alleged fathers who are not biological
fathers, 
and the statistical probability of the alleged
father's 
paternity is at least 97.3%
statistical probability level, below which such evidence is
inadmissible.  Including such a provision in a statute, in
addition to evidencing an intention that probability evidence be
admissible, would also establish criteria for measuring the
reliability of that evidence.  See § 5-1029 of the Md. Family Law
Code Ann. (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol.).   Its absence, in my opinion,
9
greatly undermines the majority's assertion that random match
statistics are necessary to understanding DNA profile evidence.
In any event, the statute is anything but crystal clear; it
is at the very least ambiguous on the question of its breadth. 
In such cases, it is well settled that the rule of lenity applies
and that the statute must be construed in the light most
favorable to the defendant.  
Even if the majority were correct, that the statistical
probability analysis is a necessary part of the DNA profile
analysis evidence, and I do not concede that it is, the
admissibility of that evidence remains subject to the
requirements of Md. Rules 5-702 and 5-403.  In regard to the
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former, there are several issues which must be considered: (1)
whether the product rule is a statistical methodology that is
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community; (2)
whether the reference data base which it utilizes is an
"appropriate data base," as § 10-915(b)(2)(v) requires; and (3)
whether it fulfills its purported purpose of accurately
determining the probability of a random match.  In answering the
last question, the Cellmark .07% laboratory error rate must be
considered.    
Balancing the probative value of the product rule principle
against its prejudicial effect, involves the issue of its
reliability, i.e., whether the data base utilized is an
appropriate one and whether the relevant laboratory error rate is
included in the calculation.   Furthermore, the extent to which
the jury may be misled, or confused, to the prejudice of the
defendant, by being informed of three different, yet unrelated,
statistics concerning the odds of a random match must also be
considered, as must the jury's inclination to use the product
rule calculations to determine the likelihood of the defendant's
guilt or innocence.  Boyd, 331 N.W.2d at 483 (court explained
that the potential prejudice against which the probative value of
DNA profile evidence must be weighed, derives from the "real
danger that the jury will use the evidence as a measure of the
probability of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and that the
evidence will thereby undermine the presumption of innocence,
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erode the values served by the reasonable doubt standard, and
dehumanize our system of justice." (citations omitted)).
I respectfully dissent.  In my opinion, the petitioner is
entitled to a hearing to consider the admissibility of the DNA
profile evidence, followed by a new trial.