Case Title: Butler v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 012826

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  ALL THE JUSTICES 
WILLIE WALTER BUTLER, JR. 
v.  Record No. 012826  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    November 1, 2002 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we decide whether a defendant was 
entitled to a continuance of his trial when the jury panel 
had to be reconstituted and the defendant’s attorney did 
not receive the new jury panel list forty-eight hours prior 
to trial in accordance with the provisions of Code § 8.01-
353.  Because we conclude that the requirements of that 
statute are directory rather than mandatory and that the 
defendant suffered no specific prejudice, we will affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the 
circuit court’s refusal to grant the defendant’s motion for 
a continuance. 
I. FACTS AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS 
The appellant, Willie Walter Butler, Jr., was indicted 
for first-degree murder and forcible sodomy.  Immediately 
following opening statements at his trial, a juror suddenly 
became ill.  The circuit court subsequently recessed the 
trial until the next morning.  The juror appeared the 
following day but advised the court that she was still ill 
and could not continue to sit on the case as a juror.  At 
that point, Butler moved for a mistrial.  The court granted 
Butler’s motion and indicated that it would continue the 
trial to the next day. 
The Commonwealth, however, opposed a continuance 
because it had three out-of-state witnesses who needed to 
leave that day.  The Commonwealth wanted to proceed with 
the trial and informed the court that a new jury panel was 
available in an adjacent courtroom because another trial 
had been canceled.  Butler’s counsel then advised the court 
that the defense could not be ready to proceed that day 
because he needed time to “regroup and get ready for a new 
jury.”  Defense counsel also stated that he had not seen 
the new jury panel list.  Consequently, Butler moved for a 
continuance in order to prepare for voir dire of another 
jury panel, to consult with his client about the new 
potential jurors, and to investigate any conflicts of 
interest regarding those jurors.  Butler objected to using 
any of the jurors who were already seated and had heard 
opening statements.  He insisted that he was entitled to a 
“brand new jury,” and the court agreed. 
 
After another recess, the court announced that a new 
panel of jurors was available and that a list of those 
jurors was being prepared so that counsel could review it.  
 
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The court indicated that, after counsel had done so, it 
intended to attempt to seat a jury from that panel and 
proceed with the trial that day.  Butler objected, arguing 
that Code § 8.01-353 requires that a copy of the jury panel 
be made available to counsel at least forty-eight hours 
before trial.  Continuing, Butler’s counsel asserted that 
the defense needed time to prepare for the new jury and 
that it was prejudicial to the defendant to be required to 
go forward just to accommodate the Commonwealth’s 
witnesses. 
 
The Commonwealth again opposed Butler’s request for a 
continuance, arguing that Code § 8.01-353 should not be 
strictly construed against the Commonwealth and that the 
proper remedy would be for defense counsel to review the 
new jury list with Butler and then proceed with the trial 
that day.  Relying on Code § 8.01-355, the court denied 
Butler’s motion for a continuance but recessed in order for 
Butler’s counsel to review the new jury panel list.  After 
counsel had done so and before voir dire of the new 
prospective jurors, the court asked Butler’s counsel if 
there was “anything else that’s not cumulative that [he 
would] like to say before we proceed.”  Counsel responded, 
“No, your Honor.”  Without further objection by Butler, a 
jury was then selected and seated from the new panel.  
 
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After hearing the evidence, the jury found Butler guilty of 
both charges. 
Butler appealed his convictions to the Court of 
Appeals.  Relying on this Court’s decision in Norfolk 
Southern Ry. Co. v. Bowles, 261 Va. 21, 539 S.E.2d 727 
(2001), the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court 
did not err “in reconstituting the original jury panel and 
proceeding with trial.”  Butler v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
0185-01-1 (Dec. 11, 2001).  The court noted that 
“unanticipated circumstances arose that necessitated 
reconstitution of the original jury panel and, pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-355, an alternate panel was summoned for the 
trial.”  Id.  The Court of Appeals thus affirmed Butler’s 
convictions, and he now appeals from that judgment.1
II. ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Butler asserts that the “Court of Appeals 
erred in affirming the trial court’s decision forcing 
Butler to go to trial where a copy of the jury panel to be 
used for trial had not been made available to defense 
counsel at least [forty-eight] hours before the trial, 
contrary to the requirements of . . . Code § 8.01-353.”  
                     
1 A summary of the evidence supporting Butler's 
convictions is not necessary to the issue presented on 
appeal. 
 
 
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Butler claims that the provisions of Code § 8.01-353 
“mandate” that a copy of the jury panel be provided to 
counsel forty-eight hours prior to trial.  We do not agree. 
The pertinent portion of Code § 8.01-353 reads as 
follows: 
Upon request, the clerk or sheriff or other 
officer responsible for notifying jurors to 
appear in court for the trial of a case shall 
make available to all counsel of record in that 
case, a copy of the jury panel to be used for the 
trial of the case at least forty-eight hours 
before the trial.[2] 
 
 
This same statute was at issue in Bowles, 261 Va. 
at 27, 539 S.E.2d at 730.  In that case, inclement 
weather forced all potential jurors to be placed into 
a combined pool.  Id.  That pool was used first for 
selecting a jury for a criminal case with the 
remaining jurors being made available for the Bowles 
trial.  Id.  Ultimately, the jury chosen from the pool 
to hear the Bowles case contained six persons who were 
not on the jury panel list previously furnished to 
Norfolk Southern’s counsel.  Id.
After examining the statutory procedures for 
empanelling a jury and recognizing the importance of 
                     
2 It is not clear from the record whether Butler’s 
counsel requested a copy of the new jury panel list from 
the clerk or sheriff, but he made his request known to the 
circuit court. 
 
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complying with those procedures designed to insure the 
presence of a fair and impartial jury, we, nonetheless, 
held that the statutory scheme set forth in Code § 8.01-353 
does not “contemplate that a full and accurate jury panel 
list will always be available for counsel forty-eight hours 
before the trial of the case.”  Id. at 28, 539 S.E.2d at 
731.  As an example, we pointed out that Code §§ 8.01-353 
and –355 “allow the trial judge to delay the appearance of 
previously-summoned members of a jury panel and to call 
persons on the term list to serve for a particular trial, 
even though those persons were not on the jury panel list.”  
Id.  We recognized that these provisions take into account 
the fact that “unanticipated circumstances requiring 
alternate means of securing a jury panel will arise.”  When 
such circumstances occur, “the members of the actual jury 
panel necessarily will vary from those persons listed on a 
jury panel list provided forty-eight hours before trial.”  
Id.
 
Butler argues that the present case is distinguishable 
from Bowles primarily for three reasons.  First, Bowles was 
a civil case, as opposed to a criminal case.  Next, it 
involved the substitution of only some of the members of 
the original jury panel rather than the reconstitution of 
the entire jury panel as happened here.  Butler 
 
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acknowledges that Code § 8.01-353 contemplates that trial 
counsel may be expected to cope with the addition of a few 
panel members not included on the original list but that 
Code § 8.01-353 does not allow for the “wholesale wavier of 
the requirement for a jury list [forty-eight] hours in 
advance of trial.”  Finally, in Bowles, Norfolk Southern 
asserted that failure to comply with the statute was a per 
se error that did not require a showing of prejudice, 
whereas Butler claims that he did suffer prejudice.  We are 
not persuaded by Butler’s arguments. 
 
In Bowles, we did not decide the question whether the 
pertinent provisions of Code § 8.01-353 are mandatory in 
nature or merely directory.  We answer that question today 
because Butler complains about the fact that the entire 
jury panel was reconstituted in this case.  To do so, we 
need look no further than the language utilized in that 
statutory provision. 
 
Although Code § 8.01-353 states that a copy of the 
jury panel “shall” be made available to counsel upon 
request, we have repeatedly held “that the use of ‘shall,’ 
in a statute requiring action by a public official, is 
directory and not mandatory unless the statute manifests a 
contrary intent.”  Jamborsky v. Baskins, 247 Va. 506, 511, 
442 S.E.2d 636, 638 (1994); accord Tran v. Board of Zoning 
 
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Appeals of Fairfax County, 260 Va. 654, 657-58, 536 S.E.2d 
913, 915 (2000); Commonwealth v. Wilks, 260 Va. 194, 199-
200, 530 S.E.2d 665, 667 (2000); Commonwealth v. Rafferty, 
241 Va. 319, 324, 402 S.E.2d 17, 20 (1991).  As far back as 
1888, when this Court addressed a statute that used the 
term “shall,” we stated that “[a] statute directing the 
mode of proceeding by public officers is to be deemed 
directory, and a precise compliance is not to be deemed 
essential to the validity of the proceedings, unless so 
declared by statute.”  Nelms v. Vaughan, 84 Va. 696, 699, 5 
S.E. 704, 706 (1888). 
 
Code § 8.01-353 contains no prohibitory or limiting 
language that prevents a trial from proceeding when 
circumstances necessitate that part or all of a jury panel 
be reconstituted and counsel, consequently, has not 
received a list of the new jury panel forty-eight hours 
prior to trial.  Nor is there any language that renders the 
result of a trial in that situation invalid.  Absent such 
language, we hold that the provisions of Code § 8.01-353 at 
issue in this case are directory rather than mandatory.  
Thus, a failure to comply with those provisions is not a 
per se basis for reversing a trial court’s judgment in 
either a civil or a criminal case. 
 
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This conclusion does not mean that, in every instance 
when a jury panel has to be reconstituted, a trial court 
can require a party to proceed to trial without the benefit 
of a continuance in order for counsel to receive the new 
panel list in accordance with the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-353.  As we recognized in Bowles, “[t]he right to a 
jury trial is one of the cornerstones of our legal system,” 
and the process of securing a fair and impartial jury 
includes “the ability of the parties to investigate 
potential jurors for information which may disqualify a 
juror for cause or otherwise impact the jury selection 
process.”  261 Va. at 28, 529 S.E.2d at 731.  Thus, 
adherence to the provisions of Code § 8.01-353 is required 
to the extent necessary to insure due process.  When 
dealing with a statute whose terms are directory, “[a]ny 
determination whether a [party] has suffered prejudice 
constituting a denial of due process must be made on a 
case-by-case basis.”  Jamborsky, 247 Va. at 511, 442 S.E.2d 
at 639; accord Tran, 260 Va. at 658, 536 S.E.2d at 916; 
Wilks, 260 Va. at 201, 530 S.E.2d at 668. 
Despite Butler’s argument to the contrary, he has not 
demonstrated that he suffered any specific prejudice that 
constituted a denial of due process as a result of the 
circuit court’s refusal to grant his motion for a 
 
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continuance when the jury panel had to be reconstituted in 
this case.  Butler does not dispute the necessity of 
discharging the juror who became ill nor did he do so at 
trial.  In fact, Butler is the party who moved for a 
mistrial.  When the court inquired of the parties whether 
they believed the remaining jurors could continue to sit on 
the case, meaning that only one new juror would be needed, 
Butler insisted on having a “brand new jury.”  As soon as 
the new panel list was prepared, the court gave counsel 
time to review that list.  After doing so, Butler’s counsel 
voiced no specific need for additional time in which to 
investigate any particular juror on the new list.  In fact, 
when asked by the court at that time if he had anything 
that was not cumulative to say before proceeding, Butler’s 
counsel answered, “No, your Honor.” 
Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing to grant Butler’s motion for a 
continuance when the jury panel had to be reconstituted.  
The Commonwealth had out-of-state witnesses who needed to 
leave that day, the trial had already been postponed one 
day because the juror became ill, and Butler, after 
reviewing the list of the new jury panel, did not identify 
any specific prejudice that would result from proceeding 
with the trial.  “A trial court’s ruling on a motion for a 
 
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continuance will be reversed on appeal only if it is 
plainly erroneous and upon a showing of abuse of discretion 
and resulting prejudice to the movant.”  Mills v. Mills, 
232 Va. 94, 96, 348 S.E.2d 250, 252 (1986) (citing Autry v. 
Bryan, 224 Va. 451, 454, 297 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1982)).  
“Abuse of discretion and prejudice to the complaining party 
are essential to reversal.”  Ferguson v. Colonial Pipeline 
Co., 206 Va. 719, 722, 146 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1966). 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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