Case Title: AVIAT AIRCRAFT, INC., a Wyoming Corporation V. EDWARD SAURENMAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0143

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
AVIAT AIRCRAFT, INC., a Wyoming Corporation V. EDWARD SAURENMAN2009 WY 98Case Number: S-08-0143Decided: 08/14/2009NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
AVIAT 
AIRCRAFT, INC., a Wyoming 
Corporation,Appellant(Defendant),v.EDWARD 
SAURENMAN,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Lincoln County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

J. 
Kent Rutledge and James C. Kaste, of Lathrop & Rutledge, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Rutledge.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Marvin 
L. Tyler* and Ford T. Bussart, of Bussart, West & Tyler, P.C. Rock Springs, 
Wyoming; Peter Tolley of Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C., Grand Rapids, 
Michigan.  Argument by Mr. 
Tolley.

 
 
*Order 
Allowing Substitution of Counsel entered October 14, 2008.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Aviat 
Aircraft, Inc. (Aviat), seeks review of the district court's "Judgment in 
Accordance with Verdict."  We will 
explain the details below, but we briefly note here that Aviat actually appealed 
from a decision of the district court that was made independent of, but which 
was subsumed into, the above identified "Judgment."  We also note that Aviat filed a motion 
for new trial that stayed the time for filing the notice of appeal, and that 
Aviat did not file its notice of appeal until an appropriate time after the 
motion for new trial was denied.  We 
will affirm the district court.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Aviat raises this 
issue:

 
 
            
Did the district court err when it determined as a matter of law that 
after wrongfully converting an aircraft owned by Aviat Aircraft, Inc., Mr. 
Saurenman became an involuntary bailee and that such involuntary bailment was a 
defense to Aviat's claim for conversion?

 
 
Saurenman 
restates the issue thus:

 
 
            
Based upon uncontroverted material facts, did the district court err in 
finding that Saurenman was an involuntary or gratuitous bailee, thereby 
precluding Aviat's claimed property damages to its airplane from exposure to 
elements and deterioration over time?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      This case has a 
long procedural history.  Boiled 
down to its essence, there are two individuals and a corporation who figure in 
this story.  The corporation is 
Aviat, of course.  Saurenman worked 
for Aviat, which was a corporation wholly owned by Stuart Horn (Horn), who was 
its president and the person in control of its day-to-day operations.  Aviat builds aerobatic airplanes, other 
small aircraft such as those used by bush pilots in Alaska, as well as "kit" 
airplanes for the truly adventurous.  
Saurenman worked for Aviat as an "engineer" who designed, built, and flew 
many types of aircraft.  His work 
experience included working for other aircraft manufacturers, including some 
that produced personal and military aircraft (e.g., Learjet and Raytheon).  Saurenman met Horn in 1995-96, and Horn 
hired him to work for Aviat in 1997.  
That employment relationship lasted until early 2004, when Saurenman 
chose to treat Horn's abusive conduct toward him as a constructive discharge and 
left that employment.

 
 
[¶4]      Horn tried to 
impeach Saurenman's credibility by questioning him as to why one of the aircraft 
manufacturers Saurenman claimed to have worked for had no record of him ever 
being an employee.  Without missing 
much of a beat, Saurenman explained that he worked for a subcontractor which 
worked directly for that manufacturer on site.  Saurenman produced an internal phone 
book used by that aircraft manufacturer which showed his name and phone number 
for the time he claimed to have worked there.  Horn also tried to make much of the fact 
that Saurenman had very little formal education, apparently to attempt to show 
that he had deceived Horn about his qualifications to work for Aviat.  However, once again the record is devoid 
of any direct evidence that Saurenman purposely or maliciously ever tried to 
deceive Horn, or any one else, about the level of his academic 
achievements.  He was not a degreed 
engineer, indeed, he did not have a high school diploma, although he did have a 
GED.

 
 
[¶5]      Both of 
Saurenman's parents were aerobatic pilots and he grew up in that world.  He built his first aerobatic plane as a 
teenager and had worked in one way or another in the design, building, and 
flying of aircraft of various sorts for his entire work life.  Interestingly enough, the two principal 
designers of the bulk of the aircraft Aviat produced were both individuals who 
were not "college graduate" engineers, but rather experienced pilots intimately 
familiar with the design and building of the types of aircraft Aviat 
produced.

 
 
[¶6]      The litigation 
that leads us to this juncture was initiated by Saurenman with the filing of a 
multi-count complaint in the district court on May 13, 2004.  Saurenman asserted that he was 
approached by Horn (on behalf of Aviat) in 1997, and was hired to work for Aviat 
as an "advanced design engineer."  
Saurenman contended that he was either fired, or "constructively 
discharged," from Aviat in early 2004, when Horn became very angry after a 
meeting Aviat was hosting at its Afton headquarters with officials from the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  
Those meetings related to a new aircraft that Saurenman was designing 
known as the A-4000.  That aircraft 
was essentially a modified version of a two-seat plane Aviat had manufactured 
for years, which was being enlarged to carry four passengers.  Horn was frustrated at that time because 
he thought the progress of the project had been too slow, as well as because he 
"perceived" that Saurenman had been late for that meeting with the FAA that 
day.  Saurenman explained in his 
testimony that he had forewarned Horn that he would necessarily be delayed in 
arriving at the meeting and had told Horn he would have to take care of the 
first half-hour or so of the meeting  much of which was more social that 
substantive  i.e., coffee, introductions, etc.  According to Saurenman, after that 
meeting was over, Horn flew into a rage that included him seriously damaging one 
of the prototype A-4000 aircraft by repeatedly throwing heavy objects at it, 
screaming and hollering, and dangerously (to those persons present) accelerating 
his pickup truck out of the hangar in which the aircraft was being 
assembled.  Horn did not dispute 
that an event much like that described by Saurenman occurred, although he did 
describe it in terms more favorable to his point of view, just as, perhaps, 
Saurenman described it in terms more favorable to his point of 
view.

 
 
[¶7]      Immediately 
following this event, Saurenman left Afton, as he had planned to do before 
Horn's "tantrum" occurred, and returned to the State of New York, where he was 
doing his work for Aviat.  However, 
shortly after returning to New York, Saurenman informed Horn that he would no longer work for 
Aviat.  At that point in time, 
Saurenman had possession of two planes that were titled in Aviat's name, a 
Sukhoi plane and the Monocoupe.  At 
that time those planes were being housed in a hangar in New York that was leased 
by Aviat.  Horn e-mailed Saurenman 
and directed that he return both planes, as well as an extensive list of other 
Aviat property Horn claimed Saurenman had in his possession.  By the time this litigation came to 
trial, the only property still in dispute was the Sukhoi and the Monocoupe.  With respect to the Monocoupe, Saurenman 
had "revised" his position from one that he "owned" the Monocoupe, to one that 
he was entitled to an "interest" in the Monocoupe to the extent that he had 
owned the skeletal airframes and jigs (a sort of frame) that he had built before 
he went to work for Aviat, and which had been transported to Afton for 
completion of the plane.  
Eventually, Saurenman was determined not to have any interest of any sort 
in the Monocoupe.

 
 
[¶8]      The employment 
"contract" between Horn and Saurenman was in many ways quite informal and the closest it ever came to being 
formalized was a draft letter from Horn to Saurenman that contained marginal 
notations made by Saurenman, but which was never signed by Horn.  Saurenman claimed that they reached an 
agreement to that effect and Horn denied it.  The record fully supports a conclusion 
that that letter best summarized their contractual relations, which was also the 
jury's conclusion at the end of the trial.  
In order to fill in the gaps, it is necessary to look to the testimony of 
both Horn and Saurenman and their views on that "contract," which frequently 
were directly at odds with one another.  
It is of some considerable significance to the resolution of the very 
limited issue that we must address in this appeal that Saurenman lived with Mr. 
Horn and his family, in their home in Afton, during almost all the time that he 
worked in Afton for Aviat.  During 
that time they developed a very close personal relationship, as well as a fairly 
close working relationship.

 
 
[¶8]      In his complaint, 
Saurenman contended:

 
 
            
1.  Count I  Breach of Contract (All Defendants).  The claims detailed in this section of 
the nine-page complaint had to do with the terms and conditions of Saurenman's 
employment with Horn and Aviat.

 
 
            
2.  Count II  Breach of Contract (Defendant 
Aviat).  This claim had to do 
with Saurenman's ownership of the rights, title, and interest in the design, the 
data, and the rights to manufacture the type of aircraft known as the Pitts 
S1-11 (Superstinker).  On January 
18, 1996, Saurenman sold his rights to that aircraft to Aviat.  Sauernman contended that Aviat agreed to 
pay Sauernman $240,000.00 for the rights to that plane, but only paid 
$130,000.00 of that amount.1

 
 
            
3.  Count III  Conversion by Aviat of the plans for the 
Superstinker airplane.  This 
claim is closely interrelated with Count II, immediately above.  

 
 
            
4.  Count IV  Conversion of Sukhoi Aircraft (All 
Defendants).  This claim arose 
because Saurenman wanted to buy a Russian-made aerobatics plane known as a 
Sukhoi.  The Sukhoi was to be for 
his personal use and he was to own it, once he had paid for it.  Horn agreed to have Aviat use its credit 
to buy the plane, and then Saurenman was to make payments on it until he had 
paid off that "loan."  Saurenman did 
not pay off that loan, but other deals were struck between Saurenman and Horn in 
the intervening years which were intended to effect a forgiveness by Aviat of 
any part of that loan that was yet unpaid.  
We briefly note here that the jury agreed with Saurenman that he owned 
the Sukhoi aircraft (and that Aviat did not), although that was disputed by Horn 
and Aviat until the very end of this litigation.

 
 
            
5.  Count V  Conversion of Monocoupe Aircraft (All 
Defendants).  Saurenman owned 
the "Type Certificate" for the Monocoupe.  
The "Type Certificate" was registered with the Federal Aviation 
Administration and it included all the type data, drawings, and plans (there is 
no dispute about those facts).  The 
Monocoupe was a 1930's vintage plane and the data and plans were in a format 
well-known to that time period, but none of those plans had been "translated" 
via computer assisted design (CAD) into a modern format.  Saurenman had begun work on building two 
Monocoupe aircraft before he went to work for Aviat, and Aviat had potential 
buyers who were interested in acquiring such a plane.  Saurenman claimed that he owned or, as 
it was later re-described, had a financial interest or stake in, one of the 
Monocoupe aircraft.  He spent much 
of his initial time at Aviat working on those planes.  Saurenman claimed that Aviat registered 
the Monocoupe in the name of Aviat without his permission and without any 
colorable right.

 
 
6.  Count 
VI  Conversion Monocoupe Type Data (All Defendants).  Saurenman contended that Aviat retained 
much of his proprietary data relating to the Monocoupe after he was discharged 
by Horn.

 
 
7.  Count 
VII  Abuse of Process (Defendant Horn).  When Saurenman was fired in early 2004, 
he was working most of the time in New York State on a new project that Horn had 
put Saurenman in charge of.  Horn 
had rented office space in New York for Saurenman to use because Saurenman felt 
he was wasting too much time flying to and from New York, to Wyoming.  For the purpose of commuting to and from 
New York to Wyoming, Horn provided Saurenman the use of one of the Monocoupe 
prototypes.  In addition to the 
Monocoupe, Saurenman also had possession of the Sukhoi aircraft at his home in 
New York.  Saurenman claimed he had 
partly paid for that latter plane and, to the extent he had not paid for it, 
that it was a substitute for part of his compensation package which Horn had not 
paid to him.  After Saurenman left 
Aviat in early 2004, he kept both aircraft in his possession.  Horn went to police authorities, first 
the local county sheriff and then the FBI, accusing Saurenman of stealing the 
two planes.  Neither police agency 
opted to prosecute because Saurenman had obtained his possession of the aircraft 
legally and Horn admitted that.

 
 
[¶9]      In response to 
Saurenman's complaint, on June 18, 2004, Aviat and Horn filed a voluminous 
answer and counterclaim.  One of the 
first significant delays in this litigation came about when, on October 1, 2004, 
Horn and Aviat filed a "Notice of Removal" in the United States District Court 
for the District of Wyoming on the basis that an amendment to Saurenman's 
complaint gave rise to a copyright infringement claim.  Although some proceedings continued in 
the state district court in the meantime, in a November 10, 2004 order, the 
federal district court directed that all "records and proceedings" be filed with 
that court.  In a September 15, 2005 
order, the matter was remanded back to the state district court because Horn and 
Aviat failed to demonstrate proper removal jurisdiction, because all of 
Saurenman's claims were state law claims, and because what Horn and Aviat deemed 
to be a copyright claim was only a traditional state-law conversion claim.  That order also concluded that any 
further claims with regard to the asserted copyright claim would have to be 
vindicated in a separate civil action in federal court.

 
 
[¶10]   While this case was in the process 
of going to and from the federal district court, the state district court issued 
an October 14, 2004 order resolving a motion for preliminary injunction filed by 
Horn and Aviat.  That order covered 
a lot of ground, but for purposes of this appeal, it was important because it 
temporarily settled what was to be done with the Monocoupe 
aircraft:

 
 
            
4.  [Monocoupe].  
By October 4, 2004, Saurenman shall relinquish possession 
and control of a specific aircraft known as [Monocoupe] to a receiver 
agreed upon by the parties and paid for by [Aviat/Horn].  The receiver shall immediately hangar 
[that aircraft] at a hangar to be chosen by Aviat, which hangar may be located 
anywhere in the United States, so long as said hangar is not on property owned 
by Aviat.  The receiver's duties 
shall include, possessing [the aircraft], ensuring that it is secure, hangared 
in a hangar that is in good repair, and issuing periodic reports to the parties 
detailing the condition of the [aircraft].  
Aviat shall pay the cost of transporting, hangaring and insuring the 
[aircraft].  The parties shall not 
have access to [the aircraft] while it is in the possession of the 
receiver.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
The 
district court orally issued this order in July of 2004, but it was not reduced 
to writing and prepared for the district court's signature until October 
2004.

 
 
[¶11]   Over the course of the litigation, 
Saurenman and Horn stipulated to the dismissal of many of the claims and when 
the jury trial came to an end on April 23, 2007, the verdict the jury had to 
decide upon was fairly simple:

 
 
1.  Did 
Aviat Aircraft, Inc., and Edward Saurenman enter into a contract which required 
Aviat Aircraft, Inc., to pay Edward Saurenman a commission on the sale of all 
new products Edward Saurenman designed and on all products that were redesigned 
under Mr. Saurenman's direction?

            
NO ____                                                        
YES __X__

 
 
2.  If 
the answer to Question No. 1 is "YES," do you find that Mr. Saurenman performed 
the design work or directed the redesign work which entitled him to a 
compensation on any of the following products?

            
Husky A-1A               
NO __X__                 
YES _____

            
Husky A-1B               
NO __X__                 
YES _____

            
Pitts S-2C                  
NO ____                    
YES __X__

 
 
3.  If 
you have answered "YES" to Question No. 1 and "YES" to any of the products 
identified in Question No. 2, for what period of time do you find that Mr. 
Saurenman is entitled to receive [a] commission?

            
From  5/15/2003                   
To  
2/27/04

 
 
4.  What 
amount is Mr. Saurenman entitled to receive as commission?

 
 
            
Husky A-1A               
$ __0__

            
Husky A-1B               
$ __0__

            
Husky S-2C              
$  
6994.64

 
 
5.  Did 
Aviat Aircraft, Inc. and Edward Saurenman enter into a contract which required 
Aviat Aircraft, Inc. to pay Edward Saurenman an annual salary of $150,000.00 
beginning May 15, 2003?

            
NO _____                              
YES __X__

 
 
6.  If 
you answered "YES" to Question No. 5, what is the amount of salary that was not 
paid to Mr. Saurenman that should have been paid as a result of the raise in 
annual salary from May 15, 2003 to February 27, 2004?

 
 
                                                
$ 58,128.61

 
 
7.  Did 
Aviat Aircraft, Inc., and Edward Saurenman enter into a contract which required 
Aviat Aircraft, Inc., to pay Edward Saurenman a "sign-on-bonus" of 
$50,000.00?

 
 
                        
NO  _____                             
YES __X__  

 
 
8.  What 
amount, if any, does Edward Saurenman owe to Aviat Aircraft, Inc. for money 
Aviat Aircraft, Inc. paid to Edward Saurenman for prepaid commission, royalties 
or salary advances?

 
 
                                    
$ __0__

 
 
9.  Which 
party is the owner of the Sukhoi aircraft?

 
 
            
Aviat Aircraft _____ Mr. Saurenman 
__X__

 
 
[¶12]   As can readily be seen, to the 
extent the issues raised in the complaint and the counterclaim were not settled 
between the parties, the jury ruled almost completely in favor of 
Saurenman.  The jury's verdict was 
not the end of this case, however.  
Due to an oversight, there was still one issue that was undecided.  That issue was which party was 
responsible for the damage/deterioration the Monocoupe had suffered while 
sitting in Saurenman's hangar pending trial (2004-2007).  A little bit more background is necessary 
at this point in our discussion.  
After the jury rendered its verdict, it was pretty much accepted by all 
that Saurenman did not convert either of the aircraft to his own use, rather he 
came into possession of them lawfully.  
Not long after he was "constructively discharged" and returned to his 
work place in New York to collect his belongings/possessions, he moved to North 
Carolina.  At that residence he had 
a small landing strip and a hangar with three sides and a roof, but which was 
open to weather on the front.  He 
took both the Monocoupe and the Sukhoi with him to that 
location.

 
 
[¶13]   The only issue in this appeal is 
how the injunction issued by the district court on October 7, 2004, which we 
have set out in detail above, affected the responsibility of the parties to care 
for the Monocoupe.  The preliminary 
injunction represented the relief Horn and Aviat had strived to obtain from the 
very outset of this litigation.  
However, once the relief was granted, Horn and Aviat did not act on it, 
but rather the plane just sat in Saurenman's hangar for the next three years 
while the proceedings languished, first in federal district court, and then back 
in the state district court.  In 
their brief, Horn and Aviat assert that: "Neither party had requested that the 
aircraft be placed into the hands of a receiver, and the parties had no input as 
to the implications of the Order."  
However, the Preliminary Injunction itself demonstrates that the ruling 
favored Horn and Aviat's claim of ownership and neither Horn nor Aviat sought 
any relief from it or a modification of the injunction.  Because of Horn's and Aviat's inaction, 
Saurenman, on the other hand, was deprived of any "possessory rights" he might 
have had, as well as any right of access to the Monocoupe, even though it was 
located on his property.

 
 
[¶14]   After the jury reached its verdict 
on April 23, 2007, things remained in limbo until the district court issued a 
decision letter on October 29, 2007, because all parties and the district court 
itself, were unsure about the status of the Monocoupe and who bore the 
responsibility for the deterioration of the aircraft during the time between the 
district court's issuance of the October 4, 2004 Preliminary Injunction, and the 
issuance of the jury's verdict in this case.  It was Horn's and Aviat's expectation 
that the district court would rule both on Saurenman's contention that he was an 
"involuntary" or "gratuitous" bailee, as well as on the amount of damages that 
had occurred to the plane.2  The district court's decision letter 
provided: 

 
 
            
There has been confusion in the Court's mind regarding [Saurenman's] 
motions for summary judgment wherein [he] contends that his possession of the 
Monocoupe was [as] an involuntary bailee.  
I initially denied the motion because I had forgotten the details of the 
stipulation made by the parties regarding how the damage issue would be resolved 
and assumed that the parties had agreed to let the special master decide if 
[Saurenman] was an involuntary bailee, along with the damages, if any.  However, in a telephone conversation 
with [counsel], both agreed that it was contemplated that I would decide the 
involuntary bailment issue as a matter of law based on the uncontroverted 
facts.  I had my court reporter type 
the oral stipulation and agree that is what the parties intended.  A copy of the oral stipulation is 
appended hereto.  I appreciate 
counsels' patience and help in refreshing the Court's 
recollection.

 
 
            
[Horn and Aviat] claim[] its Monocoupe was damaged as a result of it 
being stored in an open hangar under [Saurenman's] control during the course of 
this litigation.  [Saurenman] 
contends that he held the aircraft as an involuntary bailee because [Horn and 
Aviat] did not get the plane as authorized by the Court in a preliminary order 
and 

[Saurenman] 
was merely holding it until [Horn and Aviat] got it.

 
 
            
The Court has taken judicial notice of the matters of record in this 
case, specifically its order on [Horn's and Aviat's] motion for preliminary 
injunction, [Saurenman's ] countermotion dated October 7, 2004, the affidavits 
accompanying the motions, the trial testimony of the witnesses, and the exhibits 
and the jury verdict.3

 
 
            
The uncontested material facts are these:

 
 
            
1.  By virtue of the jury verdict, [Horn and Aviat are] the 
owner[s] of the Monocoupe aircraft.4

 
 
            
2.  [Saurenman] came into possession of the aircraft 
lawfully.  He constructed it while 
he was an Aviat employee, with Aviat's consent.  As an Aviat employee, [Saurenman] used 
it as a mode of transportation and as a demonstration while promoting the 
aircraft for Aviat.  While at trial, 
the parties disagreed as to whether or not [Horn and Aviat] owned the aircraft, 
the jury resolved that question.4

 
 
            
3.  After [Saurenman] left [Horn's and Aviat's] employ, the 
parties disputed the ownership of the Monocoupe.   The claim of ownership to the 
Monocoupe and the Sukhoi was not readily apparent.  Both parties filed motions for 
preliminary injunction involving the Monocoupe.  A hearing on the motions was held in July 
of 2004 and a bench decision was made.  
However, the order reflecting the bench decision was not submitted by 
[Horn's and Aviat's] counsel for signature until October 7, 2004.  The order directed that [Saurenman] 
relinquish possession of the Monocoupe "to a receiver agreed upon by the parties 
and paid for by [Horn and Aviat]."  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
            
4.  [Horn and Aviat] chose to leave the Monocoupe at 
[Saurenman's] hangar in North Carolina because [they] did not want to spend the 
funds to move the aircraft to another location and pay the expenses and rent 
associated with the receiver.

 
 
            
5.  Neither [Horn and Aviat] nor [Saurenman] ever sought to 
modify the October 2004 order.

 
 
            
6.  The Monocoupe aircraft remained at [Saurenman's] hangar 
from October 4, 2004 until the trial.  
During this time, [Saurenman] took no action with respect to the 
Monocoupe other than to allow it to sit in the hangar, to wash it, and to allow 
the parties' expert witnesses to inspect it.

 
 
            
7.  There is no evidence of any willful abuse or willful 
destruction of the Monocoupe while in [Saurenman's] 
possession.

 
 
Discussion

 
 
            
As a result of the Court's order on the motions for preliminary 
injunction, [Saurenman] had no obligation to possess the aircraft.  [Horn and Aviat] prevailed on part of 
[their] motion to dispossess [Saurenman].  
[Horn and Aviat] had the right and obligation to have the aircraft 
removed to a hangar of [their choice] by paying the cost of moving the aircraft 
and of storing it in a new location.  
The fact that the aircraft remained in [Saurenman's] hangar following the 
Court's order on the motions for preliminary injunction is the result of [Horn's 
and Aviat's] choice  not [Saurenman's].

 
 
Duty

 
 
            
The existence of a duty is a matter of law to be determined by the 
Court.  E.g. John Q. Hammons Inc. v. Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wyo. 1998).  If 
there is no duty of care owed, then there is no course [read "cause"] of action. E.g. Davis v. Black Hills Trucking, Inc., 929 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo. 1996).

 
 
            
A bailee is one who holds possession of property of another, but not 
title.  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 141 
(6th Edition 1990).

 
 
            
"A constructive or involuntary bailment arises where the person having 
possession of a chattel holds it under such circumstances that the law imposes a 
burden on him the obligation of delivering it to another, where a person has 
lawfully acquired possession of personal property of another otherwise than by a 
mutual contract of bailment, or where a person has lawfully acquired the 
possession of personal property of another and holds it under circumstances 
whereby he should, on princip[les] of justice, keep it safely and restore it or 
deliver it to the owner."  E.g. Hoblyn v. Johnson, 55 P.3d 1219, 1229, 
2002 WY 152 citing 8 C.J.S. Bailments 
§ 15, at 237.

 
 
            
In this case, [Saurenman] held [Horn's and Aviat's] aircraft first as an 
employee of [them].  [Saurenman] 
also retained possession believing he owned the aircraft.  Pursuant to the Court's order dated 
October 7, 2004, [he] had the obligation of relinquishing possession to the 
receiver named by [Horn and Aviat] for storage pending conclusion of this 
litigation and determination of ownership.  
The law (i.e. the Court's order) imposed upon him the burden of 
delivering it to the receiver.  
[Saurenman] originally acquired possession of the aircraft lawfully, with 
the consent of Aviat, who was ultimately declared the owner.  However, following the Court's 
preliminary order, [he] had no choice but to hold the aircraft by keeping it in 
his hangar until the receiver obtained possession of it or until the jury 
determined the rightful ownership.  
There is no evidence that following the Court's order [Saurenman] would 
not have relinquished the aircraft to the receiver designated by [Horn and 
Aviat] if someone had come to recover [it].  The Court concluded that from the date 
of its preliminary order until possession of the aircraft was relinquished to 
[Horn and Aviat] in May of 2007 following the trial, [Saurenman] was an 
involuntary bailee.

 
 
The 
duty of an involuntary bailee is:

 
 
  An involuntary bailee, as long as his 
lack of volition continues, is not under the slightest duty to care for the 
subject of the bailment, and cannot be held, in respect to custody, for what 
would even be the grossest negligence in the case of voluntary bailment, but he 
may owe some measure of care if he has knowledge that the property has come into 
his possession.  In any event, the 
involuntary bailee must refrain from wanton, reckless or willful acts, which 
would injur[e] or destroy the property.  
8 C.J.S. Bailments, §48(a) at 280.

 
 
Damages 
are recoverable as a result of injury to or destruction of property caused by 
the willful or reckless acts of another.  
There is no evidence of damage to the aircraft as a result of wanton, 
reckless or willful acts of [Saurenman].  
Accordingly, [he], as a matter of law, has not breached any duty of care 
owed by an involuntary bailee to the owner of the aircraft.  [Horn's and Aviat's] counterclaim for 
damages to the Monocoupe is dismissed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶15]   Identifying the standard of review 
that should apply in this case is in itself problematic.  Most of the issues were decided by a 
jury after a jury trial, but the issue raised in this appeal was decided by the 
district court in what appears to have been a summary judgment order.  Horn and Aviat contend, however, that 
what finally happened here was really a trial to the court and that is the 
standard of review that should apply.  
As a practical matter, we agree that that is as close as we can get to an 
appropriate standard of review, given the highly unusual set of proceedings we 
are called upon to decipher.  Thus, 
we agree that:

 
 
We 
review a district court's decision following a bench trial according to the 
following standards:

 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.

 
 

Mullinnix 
LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 
2006 WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo. 2006) (citations omitted).  Further, with regard to the trial 
court's findings of fact,

 
 
[W]e 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it.  We do not substitute ourselves 
for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings 
unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of 
law.

 
 

Id. 
The district court's conclusions of law however are subject to our de novo 
standard of review.  Id.

 
 

Addison 
v. Dallarosa-Handrich, 
2007 WY 110, ¶ 8, 161 P.3d 1089, 1091 (Wyo.2007).

 
 

In 
re Estate of Thomas, 
2009 WY 10, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 1090, 1093-94 (Wyo. 2009).  Moreover, we may affirm the district 
court upon any valid basis appearing in the record.  Arnold v. Day, 2007 WY 86, ¶ 14, 
158 P.3d 694, 698 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
Law 
of Bailments (vs. Conversion)

 
 
[¶16]   Horn and Aviat persisted throughout 
the proceedings below, and in this appeal, in characterizing Saurenman's actions 
with respect to the Monocoupe as conversion or outright theft, and that that 
conversion had persisted for over three years despite the district court's 
preliminary injunction.  No fact 
finder found that Saurenman converted the Monocoupe, whether that term is used 
in its criminal sense or its civil law sense.  To the extent fact finding was done, the 
jury determined that Saurenman owned the Sukhoi aircraft that Horn and Aviat 
also accused Saurenman of converting.  
The district court found "from all the materials in the record" that 
Saurenman came into possession of the Monocoupe lawfully, and none of the 
district court's findings can be read to even suggest that Saurenman's "lawful 
possession" ever transformed from lawful possession to conversion by his refusal 
to return the plane "at once," when Horn and Aviat demanded that he do so in an 
e-mail.  Horn and Aviat also contend 
that Saurenman "vigorously resisted" their efforts to regain possession of the 
Monocoupe, but the record will support only that Saurenman so resisted for a few 
months in 2004, and beginning in July of 2004, he was unequivocally divested of 
any possessory rights with respect to it.  
In short, Horn and Aviat present only those facts of record which tend to 
support their view of the case and ignore almost entirely the evidence presented 
by Saurenman.  The governing 
standard of review requires that we credit the district court's findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous  and here we must also take into account that, not 
only did the district court believe Saurenman's testimony (and largely discount 
Horn's), but the jury's verdict which underlies the district court's appealable 
order also credited Saurenman's testimony and largely discredited that of 
Horn.

 
 
[¶17]   This case is not destined to make 
an enduring contribution to the law that pertains to bailments, whether the 
bailment under review is a purely contractual bailment or one of the more modern 
incarnations of bailment that relies on tort principles of negligence for its 
vitality, rather than on contract principles.  We recite below some of the law relating 
to that subject to the extent it pertains to this specific 
case.

 
 
[¶18]   Although "bailments" are 
traditionally discussed in terms of a "contract" or "promise," where there is no 
express contract, a variety of hybrid theories have stepped in to fill in some 
of the gaps left where there is no express contract.  Of course, here there was no express 
bailment contract.  One of those 
theories is described in 4 Williston on Contracts, Gratuitous undertakings, in general, 
§ 8:1 at 3-22 (4th ed.) (2008 and Supp. 
2009).  More detail about this 
subject is found in 19 Williston on Contracts, §§ 53:1 through 53:13 (2001 
and Supp. 2009).  With respect to a 
gratuitous bailment, a bailee "is liable for damage caused only by his or her 
gross negligence." Id., § 53:8; 
8 C.J.S Bailments § 79 (2005).  A gratuitous bailment assumes that the 
bailee has notice or knowledge that he has possession of the disputed goods, and 
that is the case here.  Where 
possession of goods is imposed upon a person without his permission, that person 
is known as an involuntary bailee, and he "is under a duty of reasonable care to 
protect the receptacle in the condition in which it is received."  19 Williston, supra, § 53:9.  There are other forms of bailment as 
well, but none that are more clearly applicable than the two described 
immediately above.  Id., §§ 53:10 through 
53:13.

 
 
[¶19]   Another matter that deserves 
mention is the creation of a "constructive bailment."  A constructive bailment arises where a 
party having come into possession of the personal property of another without 
that party being specifically entrusted with the property as a bailee.  See Walter H. Sekela, Constructive Bailment, 39 P.O.F.2d 501 
(1984 and Supp. 2008).  However, the 
district court properly dismissed this potential theory when it found that, 
although Saurenman lawfully came into possession of the Monocoupe, to the extent 
he had any right to possession, he was deprived of that right by the district 
court's preliminary injunction.  See 
generally, Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Liability of Bailee of Airplane for Damage 
Thereto, 44 A.L.R.3d 862, § 2 (1972 and Supp. 2009) (suggesting that 
Saurenman would have owed only a "slight" duty of care to Horn and Aviat in the 
instant circumstances).

 
 
[¶20]   In sum, to the extent the district 
court made finding of facts, we conclude that none of them was clearly 
erroneous.  Likewise, we conclude 
that the district court's application of the law to the facts (whether those 
that were undisputed or those about which there is some contention as to their 
"clearly erroneous" status) was correct, although perhaps for reasons that vary 
somewhat from those articulated in the district court's decision letter.  The terminology used by the parties and 
the district court may have been a bit too loose (and that might well be true of 
this opinion too); however, the result in this case is fully consistent with the 
law generally applicable to circumstances such as those that arose 
here.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   The district court's appealable 
order is affirmed in all respects.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Horn and Aviat obtained the rights to the Superstinker design in 1996, 
before Saurenman went to work for Aviat, while Saurenman worked for (and 
partially owned) Kansas Aero Design.  
It was this transaction that brought the two men together and which led 
to Saurenman going to work for Horn.

 
 

2The facts pertaining to the issue of the "damages/deterioration" of the 
Monocoupe were just one of the stumbling blocks that came up in this case  and 
both the parties and the district court were very upfront about conceding that 
the proceedings had been fraught with human error.  The problem began when Saurenman's 
damages witness testified out of order because of confusion about trial 
scheduling.  That testimony was 
received by the district court and it indicated that the damages, if any, to the 
Monocoupe were minimal.  When it was 
Horn's and Aviat's turn to present damages evidence, the district court ruled 
that their "expert" was not qualified to give an opinion about the damages.  That left no evidence at all as to 
damages to support Horn's/Aviat's theory.  
It was at this point in time that the district court agreed that it would 
decide if Saurenman had any responsibility at all for the 
"damages/deterioration" of the Monocoupe.  
Only if Saurenman was found to be so responsible was the issue of damages 
to be assigned to a special master for resolution.

 
 

3The entire record is not before this Court.  However, we discern from the briefs and 
the argument that the parties are in agreement that this Court has all of the 
record that is pertinent to the appeal before it.

 
 

4Actually, this portion of the decision is not accurate.  The question of the ownership of the 
Monocoupe was not presented to the jury.  
During the course of the litigation, Saurenman's position evolved from 
one of claiming ownership, to one of owning an interest in the aircraft, and 
finally conceding that he did not own the aircraft at all, but should be paid 
for component parts that he owned before he went to work for Aviat and which 
were incorporated into the plane.  
The district court changed the terms of the preliminary injunction in an 
order filed of record on January 31, 2007, giving Aviat the full right to 
possess the Monocoupe, although it had had the right to possess it through a 
receiver for over two years.  Our 
review of the record was unable to pinpoint when this particular order was 
decided by the district court, but it was not an item on the verdict form  on 
the other hand, no one now disputes the fact that Horn and Aviat were given the 
right to possession before an appealable order was entered in the form of the 
Judgment on Jury's Verdict.  Aviat 
actually went and exercised its right to possess the plane in May of 2007.  Horn and Aviat took several different 
positions with respect to that plane, claiming that it was too expensive to hire 
a receiver, claiming that Saurenman agreed to keep it and take care of it, and 
claiming that Saurenman's persistence in making a claim that he had an "economic 
interest" in the Monocoupe belied his claims that Horn and Aviat had had the 
right to its possession since October of 2004.