Case Title: State v. Holsinger

Citation: 124 Ariz. 18, 601 P.2d 1054

Docket Number: 3440-2

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1979-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
124 Ariz. 18 (1979) 601 P.2d 1054 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jeannie L. HOLSINGER, Appellant. No. 3440-2. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. October 11, 1979. *19 John A. LaSota, Jr., Former Atty. Gen., Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III, and Crane McClennan, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Thinnes & Rawles by Thomas A. Thinnes, Thomas V. Rawles, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Chief Justice. Defendant Jeannie Louise Holsinger was adjudged guilty, after a jury trial, of first degree murder, A.R.S. §§ 13-451, 452, 453, 454, 138, 139 and 140; conspiracy to commit murder, A.R.S. § 13-331; burglary in the first degree, A.R.S. §§ 13-301, 302, 138, 139 and 140; and conspiracy in the second degree to commit burglary, A.R.S. §§ 13-301, 302 and 331.[*] She was sentenced to the following prison terms: 25 years to life for murder; 14 to 15 years each for the crimes of conspiracy to commit murder and first degree burglary; and 3 to 4 years for second degree conspiracy to commit burglary, the sentences to run concurrently. We have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4031. *20 Although defendant raises five questions on appeal, we find it necessary to discuss only the following three: This case has previously been before this court. In the case of State v. Holsinger, 115 Ariz. 271, 564 P.2d 1238 (1977) we reversed the convictions of the defendant because of the failure of the prosecutor to provide certain information to the defense. The matter was remanded for retrial. The evidence presented to the jury in this case showed that the defendant, Jeannie Holsinger, and her husband, "Buster" Holsinger, conspired to murder Dr. Harry Schornick. The doctor, a close friend of the defendant's mother had, from time to time, held large certificates of deposit with her as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. At the time of the attempt on his life, he held one such certificate in the sum of $24,700. The State argued that the defendant would ultimately inherit the money after Dr. Schornick's death. The Holsingers allegedly enlisted Gary Cagnina to murder Dr. Schornick. Prior to the event, the Holsingers had discussions with Cagnina concerning the killing and the taking of certain items in the house. On 1 June 1975, Gary Cagnina and Wade Arnold went to Dr. Schornick's residence. Although the testimony was disputed as to who performed which acts, it is undisputed that the telephone lines were cut, the house was entered through the back door, Dr. Schornick was shot and wounded, and Dr. Schornick's housekeeper Theresa Bortz was shot and killed. Payment was made by the Holsingers to Cagnina in the amount of $750. Later, Cagnina received the defendant's car and more money. At trial, Cagnina testified that this latter payment was not for the killing but for drugs. The State argued that it was for the killing. From the defendant's convictions and judgments of guilt she appeals. I. DEFENDANT'S "LONG CRIMINAL RECORD" Defendant initially contends that the prosecutor's question concerning defendant's "long criminal record" constitutes reversible error. We agree. While questioning the State's key witness Gary Cagnina as to whether he, the prosecutor, was "out to get" the defendant, the prosecutor asked the following questions: Defense counsel immediately objected. The trial court sustained the objection, ordered the question stricken from the record, and instructed the jury to disregard it. Defendant contends that in spite of these remedial measures, the prosecutor's comments, which had no basis in fact, were so prejudicial as to require reversal. We believe that the matter must be reversed for two reasons. First, assuming that the defendant did, in fact, have a long *21 criminal record, the question was both improper and highly prejudicial. Testimony regarding prior offenses may come into evidence only in certain circumstances. Rule 404(b), Arizona Rules of Evidence, 17A A.R.S. See State v. Henderson, 116 Ariz. 310, 569 P.2d 252 (App. 1977); State v. Moore, 108 Ariz. 215, 495 P.2d 445 (1972). In the instant case, no such circumstances were present: the prosecutor's question was not relevant under Rule 404(b); nor was it offered under Rule 404(a)(1) to impeach the defendant's character: The implication in the prosecutor's question was clear and prejudicial and could not be erased from the minds of the jury. Asking the question was reversible error. There is, however, a second reason why the matter should be reversed. The prosecutor's question clearly implied that the defendant had a long criminal record when, in fact, she did not. This was improper conduct on the part of the prosecution. The American Bar Association's suggested standards for prosecutors states: The Commentary to 5.7(d) states: The vice of such type of questioning is apparent. By asking questions that have no basis in fact, the questioner can leave in the minds of the jurors all kinds of damaging and prejudicial but false or inadmissible facts, facts which can't be adequately rebutted by witness's testimony or instructions by the court. In the instant case, some if not all of the jurors, even though the judge instructed them to disregard the question, could still hold the opinion that the defendant had a long criminal record and therefore was probably guilty even if the facts admissible at trial might not have proven her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This court has stated, in an analogous though not identical fact situation: The question was prejudicial and the prosecutor's conduct improper. The judgment must be reversed and the matter again remanded for a new trial. II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE Defendant next contends that certain questions asked by the prosecutor on cross examination improperly infringed upon the attorney-client privilege and thereby prejudiced her in the eyes of the jury. Defendant's allegations of prejudicial error in regard to the attorney-client privilege stem from the following series of questions asked by the prosecutor: The attorney-client privilege, A.R.S. § 13-4062(2), belongs to the client and concerns communications between the attorney and the client. The reason for the privilege is not to protect the client, but to encourage free exchange of information between the attorney and the client and to promote the administration of justice. State v. Alexander, 108 Ariz. 556, 503 P.2d 777 (1972). Neither the client nor the attorney can be compelled to disclose these communications against the client's wishes. IES v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 559, 283 P.2d 700 (1955); Fluty v. State, 224 Ind. 652, 71 N.E.2d 565 (1947); Ex parte Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N.E.2d 388 (1943). Neither does the defendant in a criminal case waive the attorney-client privilege when she takes the stand to testify in her own behalf: In the instant case, it is clear that the effect if not the intent of the question was to force the defendant either to waive the attorney-client privilege or to invoke the privilege before the jury. She was thus on the horns of a dilemma she could waive the privilege which might have resulted in testimony damaging to her, or she could invoke the privilege and lead the jury to believe she had something to hide. In either case, the effect of the questioning was prejudicial to her. Vilardi, supra, was a civil case. The rationale is even more applicable in a criminal case where the defendant is being cross-examined by the State. III. MARITAL PRIVILEGE Defendant also claims that the prosecutor tried to force her to exercise the marital privilege in front of the jury. Buster Holsinger, defendant's husband, was incarcerated on death row at the Arizona State Prison. See State v. Holsinger, 115 Ariz. 89, 563 P.2d 888 (1977). During cross examination concerning the visit of Gary Cagnina and Wade Arnold after the killing, the defendant was asked the following: Defense counsel objected to the question. During a discussion the prosecutor stated: The trial court ruled that the question was improper and precluded further inquiry into the availability of Buster Holsinger as a witness for the defendant. A defendant's marital privilege is violated when a prosecutor comments on the defense's failure to call defendant's spouse as a witness: The trial court was correct in precluding further inquiry. We assume this error will not be repeated on retrial. The judgments of guilt are reversed and this case is remanded for a new trial. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and HOLOHAN, J., concur. [*] Title 13 citations in this opinion are to the Arizona Criminal Code as it existed prior to its extensive revision effective 1 October 1978.