Case Title: State v. Bellman

Citation: 1999-Ohio-95

Docket Number: 19980651

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BELLMAN, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Bellman (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 208.] 
Criminal procedure — Classification as a sexual predator — Defendant may waive 
R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) requirement that a sexual predator hearing precede 
sentencing — Defendant cannot be required to register as a sexual predator 
under R.C. 2950.04, when. 
1. 
A defendant may waive the R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) requirement that a sexual 
predator hearing precede sentencing. 
2. 
Where a defendant was both sentenced for a sexually oriented offense and 
released prior to July 1, 1997, and was not previously required to register 
under R.C. Chapter 2950, that defendant cannot be required to register under 
R.C. 2950.04. 
(No. 98-651 — Submitted April 20, 1999 — Decided August 25, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-970169. 
 
Robert Bellman, Jr. was found guilty of offenses qualifying him for review 
as a sexual predator.  At his February 1997 sentencing, the parties and the trial 
court agreed to delay Bellman’s sexual predator hearing until the following month.  
When the sexual predator hearing was held, as agreed, the trial court adjudicated 
Bellman a sexual predator and notified him of his future, ongoing duty to register 
with the county sheriff.  Thereafter, Bellman was released from jail prior to the 
July 1, 1997 effective date of R.C. 2950.04. 
 
Bellman appealed the sexual predator adjudication arguing, inter alia, that 
he was not required to register as a sexual predator because he did not fit within 
any of the statutory classes of persons required to do so.  The First District Court of 
Appeals agreed.  The court also sua sponte determined that the trial court lost 
authority to adjudicate Bellman a sexual predator because it failed to hold the 
sexual predator hearing prior to sentencing.  The court of appeals vacated the order 
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of the trial court adjudicating Bellman a sexual predator and requiring him to 
register with the sheriff. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. 
Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Sirkin, Pinales, Mezibov & Schwartz, Martin S. Pinales and John Feldmeier, 
for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  We decide here that the statutory requirement regarding the timing 
of the sexual predator hearing is not jurisdictional and a defendant may waive it.  
We also decide that a defendant who was sentenced for a sexually oriented offense, 
released prior to July 1, 1997, and not previously required to register under R.C. 
Chapter 2950, cannot be required to register as a sexual predator under R.C. 
2950.04. 
I.  Sexual Predator Hearing 
 
R.C. 2950.09(B)(1), part of Ohio’s sexual predator law, provides:  “The 
judge shall conduct the [sexual predator] hearing prior to sentencing and, if the 
sexually oriented offense is a felony, may conduct it as part of the sentencing 
hearing * * *.”  R.C. 2950.09(B)(1). 
 
On the day of Bellman’s sentencing, the parties were unprepared to proceed 
with the sexual predator hearing.  The trial judge noted the requirement to hold the 
sexual predator hearing prior to sentencing, but suggested delaying the hearing in 
order that the parties might prepare for it.  Bellman’s counsel agreed to this 
extension, stating: “I want the record to be perfectly clear I am waiving any defect 
for the hearing to occur then.” 
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The court conducted the sexual predator hearing at the later date, as agreed, 
and adjudicated Bellman a sexual predator.  Bellman appealed.  The court of 
appeals reversed the adjudication, finding, sua sponte, that under the terms of the 
statute, the trial court had no authority (jurisdiction) to adjudicate Bellman a sexual 
predator after the sentencing hearing was concluded.  We differ with the court of 
appeals on this point. 
 
“As a general rule, a statute providing a time for the performance of an 
official duty will be construed as directory so far as time for performance is 
concerned, especially where the statute fixes the time simply for convenience or 
orderly procedure.”  State ex rel. Jones v. Farrar (1946), 146 Ohio St. 467, 32 
O.O. 542, 66 N.E.2d 531, at paragraph three of the syllabus.  This is so “unless the 
object or purpose of a statutory provision requiring some act to be performed 
within a specified period of time is discernible from the language employed.”  Id. 
 
Generally, then, it is only where a statutory time requirement evinces an 
object or purpose to limit a court’s authority that the requirement will be 
considered jurisdictional.  For example, R.C. 2941.401 involving speedy trial 
rights for untried indictments provides that if the action is not brought within the 
required time, “no court any longer has jurisdiction thereof, the indictment * * * is 
void, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the action with prejudice.” 
 
By contrast, the language of R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) “does not establish that its 
time periods are for anything other than convenience and orderly procedure,” see 
State ex rel. Harrell v. Streetsboro Bd. of Edn. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 55, 63, 544 
N.E.2d 924, 932, and it “does not include any expression of intent to restrict the 
jurisdiction of the court for untimeliness.”  See In re Davis (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 
520, 522, 705 N.E.2d 1219, 1222; see, also, State ex rel. Smith v. Barnell (1924), 
109 Ohio St. 246, 255, 142 N.E. 611, 613.  The provision, then, is not 
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jurisdictional, and a defendant may waive the requirement in R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) 
that the sexual predator hearing precede sentencing. 
 
In this case, Bellman’s counsel explicitly waived the time requirement when 
he agreed to the postponement.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals on this issue and reinstate the trial court’s adjudication of Bellman as a 
sexual predator. 
II.  Duty to Register 
 
The sexual predator law also includes a provision regarding registration 
requirements for sexually oriented offenders.  R.C. 2950.04.  Effective July 1, 
1997, this statute provided: 
 
“(A) Each offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to * * * a sexually 
oriented offense and who is described in division (A)(1), (2), or (3) of this section 
shall register * * *: 
 
“(1) Regardless of when the sexually oriented offense was committed, if the 
offender is sentenced for the sexually oriented offense to a prison term * * * and if, 
on or after [July 1, 1997], the offender is released in any manner from the prison 
term * * *. 
 
“(2)  Regardless of when the sexually oriented offense was committed, if the 
offender is sentenced for a sexually oriented offense on or after [July 1, 1997],  and 
if division (A)(1) of this section does not apply * * *. 
 
“(3)  If the sexually oriented offense was committed prior to [July 1, 1997], 
if neither division (A)(1) nor division (A)(2) of this section applies, and if, 
immediately prior to [July 1, 1997], the offender was a habitual sex offender who 
was required to register under Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code.” 
 
The court of appeals found Bellman had no duty to register as a sexual 
predator because he fit into none of the above categories.  He does not fit section 
(A)(1) because he was released prior to July 1, 1997.  He evades (A)(2) because he 
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was sentenced prior to July 1, 1997.  And, he evades (A)(3) because he was never 
adjudicated a habitual sex offender and was not required to register under R.C. 
Chapter 2950. 
 
“ ‘Where the words of a statute are plain, explicit, and unequivocal, a court 
is not warranted in departing from their obvious meaning, although from 
considerations arising outside of the language of the statute, it may be convinced 
that the legislature intended to enact something different from what it did in fact 
enact.’ ”  Hough v. Dayton Mfg. Co. (1902), 66 Ohio St. 427, 437, 64 N.E. 521, 
524, quoting D.T. Woodbury & Co. v. Berry (1869), 18 Ohio St. 456, paragraph 
one of the syllabus.  There is a gap in the R.C. 2950.04 coverage, and Bellman’s 
situation fits into it.  While we might believe the gap created by the statute was a 
legislative oversight, “we cannot take the will for the deed.  It is our legitimate 
function to interpret legislation, but not to supply its omissions.”  Hough at 438, 64 
N.E. at 524.  Therefore, where a defendant was both sentenced for a sexually 
oriented offense and released prior to July 1, 1997, and was not previously required 
to register under R.C. Chapter 2950, that defendant cannot be required to register 
under R.C. 2950.04. 
 
We conclude, then, that although Bellman is properly adjudicated a sexual 
predator under the new law, he has no duty to register because he does not fit 
within the plain language of R.C. 2950.04 describing categories of compulsory 
registrants.  We thus affirm the judgment of the court of appeals vacating the order 
requiring Bellman to register pursuant to this statute. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in 
part and reversed in part. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
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MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents.