Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Francisco Ramon Rodriguez

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC03-909

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-909 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
FRANCISCO RAMON RODRIGUEZ, 
Respondent. 
 
[May 3, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Francisco Ramon 
Rodriguez be found guilty of professional misconduct and that he receive a public 
reprimand and serve a four-year period of probation.  The referee also recommends 
denying The Florida Bar’s request that Rodriguez be ordered to forfeit prohibited 
fees to the Clients’ Security Fund.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const. 
For the reasons explained herein, we disapprove the referee’s 
recommendation that Rodriguez receive a public reprimand and serve probation.  
Instead, we impose a two-year suspension.  Further, we order Rodriguez to 
disgorge his portion of the prohibited fee to the Clients’ Security Fund, including 
the taxes and interest on that fee.1   
BACKGROUND 
Rodriguez was a shareholder in the law firm of Friedman, Rodriguez, 
Ferraro, and St. Louis.  The firm was hired to represent twenty clients who sought 
to sue DuPont Corporation for damages allegedly resulting from use of the DuPont 
product Benlate, a fungicide that was suspected of causing severe crop damage and 
was recalled from the market in March 1991.  The partners in the firm were Paul 
D. Friedman, Diane D. Ferraro, Roland R. St. Louis, and Francisco R. Rodriguez.  
The Florida Bar brought separate disciplinary actions against the four named 
partners of the firm alleging that they committed misconduct by engaging in a 
secret “engagement agreement” with the DuPont Corporation, solely for their own 
financial benefit, while they were representing the clients in the Benlate cases 
against DuPont.  Based on the partners’ separate acts of misconduct, they received 
different sanctions.  
Ferraro received a public reprimand and made restitution of $425,000 to the 
clients.  Fla. Bar v. Ferraro, 839 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2003) (table citation).  The 
                                          
 
1.  The referee did not make a clear finding as to the specific amount that he 
considered for disgorgement.  There are some references in the referee’s report to 
$1,440,000, and at other points the report states that the amount “was in excess of 
$1,600,000.”  We remand this issue to the referee to determine the appropriate 
amount for disgorgement. 
 
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sanction was based on the referee’s finding that Ferraro had “absolutely nothing to 
do with the settlement negotiations with DuPont” and did not even know about the 
engagement agreement until well after her former partners received the prohibited 
funds.  Also, Ferraro agreed to testify against her former partners.  Due to these 
facts, the referee ultimately recommended a public reprimand, after finding that a 
suspension or disbarment was not appropriate.  
Friedman did not know about the engagement agreement until after it had 
been executed.  Thus, he had a comparatively smaller role in the firm’s misconduct 
than St. Louis and Rodriguez.  Also, Friedman cooperated with the Bar and he paid 
restitution before his disciplinary case was reviewed by this Court.  However, 
Friedman partook in the financial benefits of the unethical engagement agreement, 
exposed the Benlate clients to potential harm by engaging in the conflict of 
interest, and acquiesced in the firm lying to the clients.  He did not take any 
measures to inform clients or repudiate the engagement agreement.  In fact, as 
Secretary-Treasurer of the firm, Friedman received the prohibited funds from 
DuPont.  Therefore, Friedman’s misconduct merited a ninety-day suspension and 
payment of restitution in the amount of $910,000.  Fla. Bar v. Friedman, 940 So. 
2d 428 (Fla. 2006) (table citation).   
 
St. Louis and Rodriguez were the firm’s principal actors in developing and 
executing the secret engagement agreement.  As will be discussed herein, 
 
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Rodriguez’s misconduct is less egregious than St. Louis’s misconduct.  St. Louis 
negotiated the engagement agreement for the firm, placed his financial interests 
above those of his clients with regard to DuPont, and lied to Judge Wilson and the 
Bar regarding the secret engagement agreement.  This Court disbarred St. Louis.  
Fla. Bar v. St. Louis, No. SC04-49 (Fla. May 3, 2007).   
FACTS 
 
With regard to Rodriguez, a referee made the following findings and 
recommendations. 
The Firm, DuPont, and the Engagement Agreement.  In 1996, the firm 
represented twenty different plaintiffs in property damages claims against DuPont 
arising from the use of Benlate.  St. Louis, who was the lawyer who brought in the 
clients for the firm, had primary responsibility for communicating with the clients.  
Rodriguez’s primary role in the Benlate cases was to act as first chair if any of the 
cases went to trial and to handle significant hearings. 
The firm discovered that in the case for one of its clients, Davis Tree Farm, 
DuPont had concealed its testing of Benlate in Costa Rica.  The test plants 
exhibited significant damage and DuPont ordered the plants to be destroyed.  The 
firm subsequently filed a motion to strike DuPont’s pleadings in the Davis Tree 
Farm case.  The trial court judge orally ruled that she would enter an order striking 
DuPont’s pleadings and entered a judgment in favor of Davis Tree Farm. 
 
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After the judge made this oral ruling, DuPont approached the firm to try to 
settle the Davis Tree Farm case, as well as the other Benlate cases the firm was 
handling.  DuPont’s attorney negotiated with Rodriguez and St. Louis.  At this 
point, Rodriguez learned that DuPont was requesting as a condition of settlement a 
restriction on the firm’s right to practice.  DuPont’s counsel stated that settlement 
of the firm’s cases would include resolving the Davis Tree Farm case before the 
trial judge issued her written order, as well as requiring the firm not to use the fees 
earned to fund future litigation against DuPont.  The firm engaged in research to 
determine whether it was ethical for the firm to engage in such an agreement.  The 
firm’s researcher informed Rodriguez that the law was unclear, but it appeared that 
DuPont’s objective could be achieved by engaging the firm after the firm finished 
representing the twenty Benlate clients. 
DuPont eventually made offers of settlement to nineteen of the Benlate 
plaintiffs, but not to Davis Tree Farm.  The firm was prepared to recommend that 
the clients accept the offers because the firm believed the offers exceeded what the 
clients could have reasonably expected to recover if their respective cases had gone 
to trial.  While Rodriguez initially rejected DuPont’s request for the firm not to 
bring future Benlate cases against the corporation, St. Louis told DuPont that in 
order to have a restriction on the firm’s right to practice, DuPont would have to 
 
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pay the firm.  DuPont made settlement of the nineteen Benlate plaintiffs’ claims 
contingent on the settlement of the Davis Tree Farm case. 
On August 7, 1996, the trial judge’s written order striking DuPont’s 
pleadings arrived in the mail.  Settlement negotiations continued and when 
DuPont’s offer reached $30,000,000, the spokeswoman for Davis Tree Farm 
agreed to accept the offer.  Although Rodriguez believed settlement negotiations 
were complete, DuPont then made the settlement of the nineteen Benlate clients 
contingent on the firm agreeing to sign an “engagement agreement” that would 
preclude the firm from bringing future cases against DuPont.  Again, Rodriguez 
declined to enter into such an agreement until the firm’s representation of the 
clients was complete.  The firm resisted DuPont’s condition until the appointed 
mediator made it clear that DuPont would retract the offer unless the firm signed 
such an engagement agreement.  The mediator, who had substantial experience in 
mass tort cases and had been appointed as the Special Master to handle discovery 
disputes in Benlate-related litigation in Dade County, advised Rodriguez that in 
these situations, parties would sometimes make an engagement agreement. 
After much discussion about the settlement amounts that the firm was going 
to recommend that the clients accept from DuPont, the firm and DuPont negotiated 
the restrictions on the right to practice.  DuPont agreed to pay the firm $6,445,000 
in exchange for the firm’s agreement not to pursue future claims against DuPont 
 
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and for the firm to possibly perform future work for DuPont on an hourly basis.  
Thus, the $59,000,000 offered to the Benlate plaintiffs and the $6,445,000 offered 
to the firm through the engagement agreement constituted separate funds.  
Rodriguez did not participate in drafting the engagement agreement.  However, he 
did not object to the agreement, he agreed with its terms, and he testified that he 
“negotiated very hard for the $6,445,000.”  Further, language in the engagement 
agreement stated that it was contingent upon the effectiveness of the settlement 
agreement with the Benlate clients. 
The referee found that, at this point, Rodriguez became an agent of DuPont, 
and his allegiance to both DuPont and his Benlate clients created a conflict of 
interest.  Further, the referee found that the firm placed its interest above that of the 
Benlate clients because (1) the firm avoided the risks and expenses of protracted 
litigation and possible appeals; (2) the firm received fees from these cases, some of 
which had fatal flaws; (3) the firm received significant amounts of attorney’s fees 
from the settlements; (4) the firm accepted a guaranteed $6,445,000 in exchange 
for not pursuing future cases against DuPont; and (5) the firm could return to the 
“very successful full time practice” of working on an hourly basis with DuPont as 
an added client. 
The referee found that the attorneys of the firm knew or should have known 
that negotiations for settlements were not concluded until the clients had accepted 
 
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DuPont’s offers and, if the offers were rejected, they would have to resume 
negotiations.  Yet, DuPont’s agreement with the firm was conditioned on the 
consummation of the settlement agreement between DuPont and the firm’s clients.  
The referee found that the statement in the engagement agreement that the firm had 
“completed the negotiations” indicated that the firm had a desire, if not an intent, 
not to have any further discussions with DuPont on behalf of its clients. 
On August 8, 1996, the parties appeared before the trial judge and 
announced that a settlement for the Benlate clients had been reached and requested 
that the judge vacate and seal the order striking DuPont’s pleadings.  The parties 
did not inform the judge about the engagement agreement.  Also, because all but 
two of the Benlate clients had the right to accept or reject the settlement, DuPont 
insisted that the clients only be told the amount that they were being offered to 
settle their respective cases.  DuPont further insisted that the clients keep the 
amount they received confidential.  To enforce these conditions, ten percent of the 
settlement amounts were to be held in escrow for two years and, should any breach 
of confidentiality occur, approximately $6,000,000 of the clients’ settlement 
monies would be lost.  Rodriguez never told the clients about the engagement 
agreement.  He claimed that because DuPont had insisted on confidentiality, he 
believed a breach of that confidentiality would result in the clients losing ten 
percent of the settlement.  However, because the settlement agreement between the 
 
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clients and DuPont was separate from the engagement agreement between the firm 
and DuPont, the referee found that the confidentiality provisions of the settlement 
agreement were between the clients and DuPont, and did not bind the firm.  Thus, 
disclosure of the engagement agreement to the clients would not have jeopardized 
the escrow funds. 
The referee found that by not disclosing the agreement, Rodriguez was 
protecting the firm’s interest in $6,445,000, “his own interest in $1,440,000,” and 
DuPont’s economic interests in “not having disclosed to the world that it had done 
some very bad things to its clientele and got caught doing them.”  Because there 
was ongoing Benlate litigation occurring around the nation, the latter information 
potentially could have caused DuPont serious harm. 
Rodriguez testified that the money he would receive from the agreements 
never entered his mind.  However, the referee found this to be unlikely because (1) 
Rodriguez admitted that he found the amounts offered to the clients to be 
“staggering”; (2) Rodriguez testified that the Benlate clients were clients with “no 
hope” and would obtain no money had their cases gone to trial; and (3) Rodriguez 
“received in excess of $4,700,000 from the settlements.”   
Aftermath of the Settlement and Engagement Agreements.  After the terms 
of the settlement and engagement agreements were agreed upon, St. Louis traveled 
around the state to meet with clients and convince them to accept DuPont’s 
 
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settlement agreement.  St. Louis told the clients that if they did not accept the 
settlement offer, the firm would no longer represent them.  On August 12, 1996, 
the firm received $6,445,000.  Thereafter, on August 16, 1996, the firm received 
$59,000,000 from DuPont.  When one client refused to settle, Rodriguez filed a 
motion to withdraw representation and a charging lien.  At the hearing on this 
motion, Rodriguez did not tell the judge about the engagement agreement.  Rather, 
he claimed that he wished to withdraw because the client wanted to eliminate 
Rodriguez’s fee.  Eventually, the client accepted DuPont’s offer and Rodriguez 
resumed the attorney-client relationship with the client.  Rodriguez did withdraw 
from representing Fred Haupt, another client who refused to settle.  Haupt 
eventually settled with DuPont through his own means.   
The referee found that no clients, other than Davis Tree Farm, were made 
aware of the engagement agreement.  Thus, the clients believed that Rodriguez was 
representing only their interests.  Further, the referee found that the firm also kept 
$393,933.21 of the clients’ money.  The authorization to settle contained a 
provision by which the firm kept the interest earned on the clients’ settlement 
funds.  The referee found that this provision was not in the best interest of the 
clients. 
1997 Bar Investigation.  In 1997, based on the complaint of one of the 
Benlate plaintiffs, the Bar conducted an investigation into allegations that the firm 
 
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did not explain to its clients the $59,000,000 original settlement agreement, and 
that a possible conflict of interest had occurred between the various Benlate clients.  
The individual who filed the complaint, Robert L. Beasley, alleged that the firm 
was coercing clients into accepting DuPont’s offers, the clients were being held 
hostage by the firm, and the firm was keeping the interest earned from the clients’ 
settlement funds.  Rodriguez contacted attorney Robert Batsel to represent him 
during this initial Bar investigation, which included a meeting with Bar 
representatives.  Rodriguez and Batsel subsequently testified that the Bar did not 
ask any questions that called for them to disclose the engagement agreement to the 
Bar.  Rodriguez and Batsel believed the meeting concerned whether there was an 
improper aggregate settlement with the Benlate clients.  Eventually, this earlier 
disciplinary proceeding resulted in a consent judgment in 1998. 
The Instant Complaint.  The Bar filed the instant complaint in 2003.  Before 
the referee in these proceedings, Batsel testified that during the 1997 meeting the 
Bar representatives never posed a question that required Rodriguez to disclose the 
engagement agreement.  Batsel testified that if the Bar had asked questions 
regarding the engagement agreement during that 1997 investigation, Batsel would 
have counseled Rodriguez to disclose the agreement.  The instant referee found 
Batsel’s testimony credible.  Further, the referee found that Rodriguez and Batsel 
did not conspire to deceive the Bar.  The referee did find, however, that Rodriguez 
 
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should have disclosed the engagement agreement on his own accord during the 
1997 investigation.  
Findings as to Guilt.  Based on these facts, the referee recommended that 
Rodriguez be found guilty of violating Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.4(a) 
(informing client of status of representation), 4-1.4(b) (duty to explain matters to 
client), 4-1.5(a) (prohibited fees), 4-1.7(a) (representing a client whose interests are 
adverse to another client), 4-1.7(b) (duty to avoid limitation on independent 
professional judgment), 4-1.8(a) (business transaction with or acquiring interest 
adverse to client), 4-1.9(a) (conflict of interest as to former clients), 4-1.16(a)(1) 
(declining or terminating representation), 4-5.1(c) (responsibilities of a partner for 
rules violations), 4-5.6(b) (restriction on lawyer’s right to practice), and 4-8.4(a) 
(lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct).  
In making these recommendations, the referee specifically rejected the following 
defenses raised by Rodriguez:  (1) he was only following the advice of counsel; (2) 
he believed he was acting in his clients’ best interests; (3) client confidentiality 
prevented him from disclosing the engagement agreement to the Benlate clients 
and the Bar; (4) the Bar is at fault in this matter; and (5) DuPont is responsible for 
these acts of misconduct. 
Disciplinary Recommendations.  In aggravation, the referee found the sole 
factor of multiple offenses.  In mitigation, the referee found (1) Rodriguez’s lack of 
 
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a disciplinary history; (2) his remorse; (3) his inexperience in handling settlements 
of multiple-plaintiff mass tort cases; (4) his interim rehabilitation; (5) the length of 
time during which Rodriguez has had to deal with various proceedings and 
negative publicity arising out of the DuPont settlement; (6) the emotional, 
financial, and physical stress Rodriguez has suffered for over eight years as a result 
of his misconduct; (7) the excellent results Rodriguez obtained for the Benlate 
clients;2 and (8) Rodriguez’s character and outstanding reputation in the 
community. 
As to discipline, the referee recommended that Rodriguez (1) serve a four-
year probationary period, during which he would perform 1000 hours of pro bono 
legal services; (2) receive a public reprimand; and (3) pay the Bar’s costs.  The 
referee stated that the recommended discipline is a constructive sanction that will 
                                          
 
2.  In contrast to the referee’s finding, this Court has repeatedly refused to 
find a mitigating factor based on a respondent’s assertion that he engaged in 
misconduct in order to produce benefits for his client or a third party.  See Fla. Bar 
v. Kelner, 670 So. 2d 62, 63 (Fla. 1996) (explaining that although an attorney has a 
duty to zealously represent his clients, this duty does not require that he violate a 
court order and produce a mistrial); Fla. Bar v. Rendina, 583 So. 2d 314, 316 (Fla. 
1991) (disbarring attorney for attempting to bribe an official to obtain a lesser 
criminal sentence for his client); Fla. Bar v. Rambo, 530 So. 2d 926 (Fla.1988) 
(sanctioning attorney for bribing county official to receive favorable rezoning of a 
client’s property); Fla. Bar v. Snow, 436 So. 2d 48, 49 (Fla. 1983) (suspending 
attorney who, in attempting to effect a favorable settlement in a civil case for his 
clients, obtained evidence by false representations); Fla. Bar v. Riccardi, 264 So. 
2d 5 (Fla. 1972) (disbarring attorney for bribing tax agent to influence the 
determination of tax liability of a third party).  Thus, we disapprove the referee’s 
finding of this factor in mitigation.  
  
 
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help the less fortunate in the community and that “[s]uspending [Rodriguez] from 
the practice of law will not accomplish any worthy objective.” 
Before the referee, the Bar requested that Rodriguez be ordered to forfeit 
$1,600,000 from his prohibited fee to the Clients’ Security Fund of The Florida 
Bar.  The referee concluded that the Bar was seeking forfeiture of the funds more 
as a fine than as restitution for money taken from the Benlate clients.  The referee 
stated that there is no authority in a Bar disciplinary proceeding to require payment 
that is not for restitution or payment of costs.  Further, the referee found that 
payment of such an amount by Rodriguez would be punitive in nature. 
On Review.  Rodriguez petitioned this Court for review of the referee’s 
report, alleging that the Bar’s claims in the instant case are an impermissible 
collateral attack on the 1998 consent judgment entered into by Rodriguez and the 
Bar.  The Bar filed a cross-petition, challenging the referee’s recommended 
discipline and the referee’s recommendation that Rodriguez not be required to 
forfeit money to the Clients’ Security Fund. 
ANALYSIS 
First, Rodriguez asserts that The Florida Bar’s claims in the instant case are 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata and, in turn, the referee’s findings of certain 
rule violations should not be approved.  He bases this claim on the 1998 consent 
judgment that he negotiated with the Bar.  Rodriguez claims that the consent 
 
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judgment resolved all disciplinary matters relating to the firm’s twenty Benlate 
clients, and that it therefore prevents the Bar from bringing this case.  Based on this 
premise, Rodriguez argues that the instant referee erred in denying Rodriguez’s 
motion for summary judgment.  Further, Rodriguez notes that the grievance that 
generated the first disciplinary proceeding raised the issue of the firm keeping the 
interest on the settlement monies that were to go to the clients.  Therefore, 
Rodriguez concludes that the Bar could have alleged a violation of rule 4-1.8(a) at 
that time, so the referee’s instant recommendation of a violation of the rule on that 
same basis is barred by res judicata. 
Rodriguez’s claim that the Bar was precluded from bringing a second 
complaint, based on the firm’s secret engagement agreement with DuPont, is 
without merit.  The doctrine of res judicata applies when all four of the following 
conditions are present:  (1) identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause 
of action; (3) identity of persons and parties to the action; and (4) “identity of 
quality in persons for or against whom claim is made.”  McGregor v. Provident 
Trust Co. of Philadelphia, 162 So. 323, 328 (Fla. 1935); see also Palm AFC 
Holdings, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 807 So. 2d 703, 704 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).  
Thus, the causes of action must be closely related for the doctrine of res judicata to 
apply.  See Hay v. Salisbury, 109 So. 617, 621 (Fla. 1926).   
 
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While both the previous and current disciplinary proceedings stem from 
Rodriguez’s representation of the Benlate clients in a lawsuit against DuPont, the 
previous case focused on how the firm dealt with its clients and whether the firm 
improperly negotiated an aggregate settlement for the clients.  In contrast, the 
current case is based on the engagement agreement that the firm arranged with 
DuPont.  Where “the second action between the same parties is upon a different 
claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as 
to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which 
the finding or verdict was rendered.”  Gray v. Gray, 107 So. 261, 262 (Fla. 1926) 
(quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876)).  Thus, the current 
case is not barred by res judicata as it is based on a different cause of action, i.e., 
Rodriguez’s relationship with DuPont.3  See Fla. Bar v. Gentry, 447 So. 2d 1342 
(Fla. 1984) (holding that there was no identity of facts for res judicata to bar the 
proceedings where the subsequent Bar allegations were based on separate, 
additional, and continuing misconduct).  Further, Rodriguez did not disclose or 
produce the secret engagement agreement in the course of the Bar’s 1997-98 
                                          
 
3.  Rodriguez argues that the language of the 1998 consent judgment 
precludes the subsequent disciplinary action against him.  The consent judgment 
states that it “concludes any Bar investigation into all of the firm’s twenty (20) 
Benlate clients.”  A plain reading of this language demonstrates that the consent 
judgment addressed matters regarding the firm’s dealings with its Benlate clients 
and the settlement for those clients.  The language does not refer to the firm’s 
secret engagement agreement with DuPont. 
 
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investigation.  As this engagement agreement never came to light and the Bar did 
not suspect its existence, Rodriguez cannot be rewarded in this case for previously 
hiding this matter from the Bar and this Court.  See Fla. Bar v. Spears, 786 So. 2d 
516, 520 (Fla. 2001) (finding that the exclusion of the present disciplinary matter 
from a prior judgment was solely attributable to Spears’ failure to bring the matter 
to the Bar’s attention). 
Based on the doctrine of res judicata, however, we disapprove the referee’s 
finding that Rodriguez violated rule 4-1.8(a) when the firm retained the interest 
earned on the clients’ escrow funds.  In its Answer Brief and Initial Brief on Cross 
Appeal in the instant case, the Bar admits that one of the main issues in the earlier 
proceedings was that Rodriguez “and his partners . . . [were] keeping interest 
earned on the clients’ settlement proceeds.”  Thus, the Bar was aware of this issue, 
but failed to fully pursue it in the earlier case regarding the firm’s dealings with its 
Benlate clients.  Further, this rule violation is based on the firm’s settlement 
agreement with the Benlate clients, rather than its engagement agreement with 
DuPont.  Accordingly, based on res judicata, we disapprove the referee’s finding of 
this rule violation. 
Second, the Bar argues that the referee’s recommended disciplinary 
sanctions are not supported by caselaw or the standards for imposing lawyer 
sanctions.  In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope of 
 
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review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because it is 
the Court’s ultimate responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar 
v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
(“The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate . . . the discipline 
of persons admitted [to the practice of law].”).  Generally speaking, this Court will 
not second-guess the referee’s recommended discipline as long as it has a 
reasonable basis in existing caselaw and the Florida Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  In 
the instant case, we agree with the Bar that the referee’s recommendations are not 
supported.   
A two-year suspension, rather than a public reprimand, is the appropriate 
sanction under these circumstances.  Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions 4.32 states that “[s]uspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows of a 
conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that 
conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.”  Rodriguez violated this 
standard and exposed the Benlate clients to potential harm.  He was a knowing 
party to the engagement agreement, he did not disclose the conflict of interest to 
his clients, and his interests were clearly divided.  He protected his interest in the 
engagement agreement by engaging in actions that were contrary to the interests of 
his own clients.  A suspension is appropriate in conflict of interest situations 
 
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which, as here, rise above mere negligence.  See e.g., Fla. Bar v. Dunagan, 731 So. 
2d 1237 (Fla. 1999) (upholding ninety-one-day suspension where, without wife’s 
consent, lawyer represented husband in dissolution proceeding although the lawyer 
had previously represented both husband and wife in a business matter).   
Additionally, standard 7.2 provides for suspension “when a lawyer 
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional 
and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”  
Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 7.2.  Rodriguez’s conflict of interest with respect 
to the Benlate clients caused the clients harm.  Further, he potentially harmed the 
public by forming an agreement with DuPont not to pursue future lawsuits against 
DuPont.  Also, he potentially harmed the legal system by not disclosing the 
engagement agreement to the Bar during the previous disciplinary proceedings.   
Rodriguez’s misconduct does not rise to the same level of egregiousness as 
that of his former partner St. Louis.  See Fla. Bar v. St. Louis, No. SC04-49 (Fla. 
May 3, 2007) (disbarring St. Louis).  St. Louis engaged in additional acts of 
misconduct, such as drafting the engagement agreement, signing the engagement 
agreement on behalf of the firm, deliberately lying to a circuit court judge, making 
dishonest written statements to Bar representatives, and specifically refusing to 
advise certain clients in response to their inquiries.  Nevertheless, Rodriguez still 
engaged in extremely serious misdeeds.  He was scheduled to serve as first chair if 
 
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any of the Benlate cases went to trial and he was responsible for the significant 
hearings.  Yet to satisfy his own greed, he engaged in actions that directly 
conflicted with the interests of his clients.  He became an agent for DuPont while 
still representing his Benlate clients against DuPont.  In fact, due to the funds that 
were held in escrow to prevent any breach of confidentiality, the firm represented 
the Benlate plaintiffs as a fiduciary (the escrow agent) for two years after signing 
the engagement agreement.  Thus, Rodriguez was representing adverse interests 
because he was on retainer to DuPont during that two-year period.   
Davis Tree Farm was the only client aware of the engagement agreement.  
The other nineteen clients believed that Rodriguez was representing only their 
interests.  However, Rodriguez’s interests were clearly divided.  When one client 
refused to settle, Rodriguez filed a motion to withdraw and filed a charging lien.  
Rodriguez alleged that he wished to withdraw because the client wanted to 
eliminate Rodriguez’s fee.  Rodriguez did not disclose the engagement agreement 
to the judge.  Further, Rodriguez withdrew from representing another client who 
refused to settle.   
When Rodriguez entered into the engagement agreement, he violated rule 4-
5.6(b)(restriction on the right to practice).  The rule was adopted by this Court in 
1986.  See Fla. Bar re Rules Regulating Fla. Bar, 494 So. 2d 977, 1069 (Fla. 1986).  
The rule was firmly established by the time Rodriguez entered into the engagement 
 
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agreement ten years later in 1996.  Further, the rule is clear and unambiguous in its 
language:   
Restrictions on right to practice  
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making . . . 
 (b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to 
practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private 
parties. 
 
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-5.6(b)(1986).  Attorneys who engage in such 
engagement agreements receive severe sanctions, even when the misconduct 
is far less egregious than that in the instant case.  See In re Brandt, 10 P.3d 
906 (Or. 2000) (imposing thirteen- and twelve-month suspensions on two 
lawyers, one with a prior disciplinary record and the other without, for 
entering into a side agreement with the adversary to act as legal counsel); In 
re Hager, 812 A.2d 904 (D.C. 2002) (suspending for one year a lawyer who, 
while representing fifty clients against a manufacturer, secured a side 
agreement with the manufacturer involving restricting his right to practice, 
dropping the pending case, and maintaining confidentiality).  In light of the 
severe sanctions imposed on attorneys who have engaged in side agreements 
and Rodriguez’s serious misconduct, we conclude that a two-year 
suspension is the appropriate sanction. 
In addition, we conclude that the referee’s recommendation of a four-year 
period of probation is inconsistent with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(c).  
 
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The rule permits probation for periods up to three years “or for an indefinite period 
determined by conditions stated in the order.”  The referee’s recommendation 
exceeds three years and is not based on “conditions stated in the order.”  Thus, the 
referee’s recommendation of a four-year period of probation is impermissible 
under the rule.  Further, in light of the two-year suspension, we disapprove the 
referee’s recommendation of probation and the accompanying terms and 
conditions.   
Third, the Bar asserts the referee’s recommendation that Rodriguez not be 
required to forfeit the funds acquired through a prohibited fee (the engagement 
agreement) is erroneous pursuant to rule 3-5.1(h).  We agree.  As we discussed in 
the companion case of Florida Bar v. St. Louis, No. SC04-49 (Fla. May 3, 2007), 
the proceeds from the engagement agreement are a prohibited fee that are 
addressed by rule 3-5.1(h).  The rule provides, in pertinent part: 
Forfeiture of Fees.  An order of the Supreme Court of Florida or a 
report of minor misconduct adjudicating a respondent guilty of 
entering into, charging, or collecting a fee prohibited by the Rules 
Regulating The Florida Bar may order the respondent to forfeit the fee 
or any part thereof.  . . . [A] fee otherwise prohibited by the Rules 
Regulating The Florida Bar may be ordered forfeited to The Florida 
Bar Clients’ Security Fund and disbursed in accordance with its rules 
and regulations. 
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(h) (emphasis added).  This Court approved rule 3-
5.1(h) in 1990.  See Fla. Bar Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar--
Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 472 (Fla. 1990).  Thus, the clear language of 
 
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the rule had been in effect for several years when Rodriguez entered into the 
engagement agreement in 1996. 
 
Pursuant to rule 3-5.1(h), it is appropriate for Rodriguez to disgorge the 
prohibited fee to the Clients’ Security Fund.  Further, permitting Rodriguez to 
retain his ill-gotten gains would fail to provide a deterrent and could actually 
encourage misconduct by greedy lawyers.  See In re Hager, 812 A.2d 904 (D.C. 
2002); In re Hager, 878 A.2d 1246 (D.C. 2005). 
 
Based on the clear language in rule 3-5.1(h) and caselaw, we disapprove the 
referee’s recommendation that Rodriguez be permitted to retain the prohibited fee.  
Instead, we require Rodriguez to disgorge the prohibited fee into the Clients’ 
Security Fund.  We direct that the total amount for disgorgement include the 
amount Rodriguez paid in taxes, as he can seek a refund of those taxes from the 
Internal Revenue Service.  Further, we require Rodriguez to disgorge interest on 
the full amount of the prohibited fee.  Interest shall be calculated as starting on 
August 12, 1996, the date the firm received the $6,445,000. 
The referee stated that the amount he considered when examining the issue 
of disgorgement “was in excess of $1,600,000,” yet the referee also stated that 
Rodriguez was protecting “his own interest in $1,440,000.”  Clearly, the referee 
did not make a finding as to a precise amount.  Further, before this Court, the Bar 
has presented the amounts of $1,600,000 and $935,040.  Thus, as this Court has 
 
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not been presented with an ultimate specific amount, which includes taxes and 
interest, we remand this matter to the referee solely to determine the total amount 
for disgorgement.  We direct the referee to consider Florida Bar v. St. Louis, No. 
SC04-49 (Fla. May 3, 2007), in making this determination. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, Francisco Ramon Rodriguez is suspended from the practice of 
law in Florida for two years.  The suspension will be effective thirty days from the 
filing of this opinion so that Rodriguez can close out his practice and protect the 
interests of existing clients.  If Rodriguez notifies this Court in writing that he is no 
longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this 
Court will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.  Rodriguez 
shall accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed until he is 
reinstated. 
 
Further, as the referee did not find a specific amount for disgorgement that 
includes taxes and interest, this Court hereby remands that issue to the referee as 
the finder of fact to determine the total amount for disgorgement.   
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Francisco Ramon 
Rodriguez in the amount of $45,258.88, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
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LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, Kenneth L. Marvin, Director of Lawyer 
Regulation, James A.G. Davey, Jr. and Donald M. Spangler, Bar Counsels, The 
Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Michael Nachwalter and Lauren C. Ravkind of Kenny Nachwalter, P.A., Miami, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
 
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