Case Title: Massachusetts v. Moore

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11582 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DWAYNE MOORE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 10, 2016. - June 16, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, 
Criminal, Jury and jurors, Investigation of jurors, 
Deliberation of jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 7, 2011. 
 
 
A postconviction emergency motion for judicial intervention 
to prohibit inquiry of the jury, filed on July 23, 2015, was 
heard by Jeffrey A. Locke, J., and questions of law were 
reported by him to the Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney (Edmond J. 
Zabin, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Chauncey B. Wood for the defendant. 
 
K. Neil Austin, Caroline S. Donovan, & David A.F. Lewis, 
for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  We consider here five questions reported by a 
Superior Court judge to the Appeals Court concerning the effect 
of an amendment to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 (c), as appearing in 
471 Mass. 1428 (2015) (rule 3.5 [c]), regarding an attorney's 
ability to communicate, postverdict, with jurors who deliberated 
on, or were discharged from, the attorney's client's case.  Rule 
3.5 (c) became effective on July 1, 2015. 
 
1.  Background.  From February 13 to March 22, 2012, the 
defendant was tried in the Superior Court in Suffolk County on 
charges of murder in the first degree (four counts), G. L. 
c. 265, § 1; home invasion, G. L. c. 265, § 18C; armed robbery, 
G. L. c. 265, § 17; armed assault with intent to murder, G. L. 
c. 265, § 18 (b); aggravated assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c); carrying a firearm 
without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and trafficking in 
cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b).  The jury were deadlocked on 
nine of the charges and found the defendant not guilty on the 
tenth (trafficking in cocaine).  The trial judge declared a 
mistrial.  On October 2, 2012, the defendant filed a motion for 
a change of venue on account of extensive media coverage, which 
was allowed in part.  The defendant was retried before a jury 
from Worcester County sitting in the Suffolk County Court House 
from October 16 to December 18, 2012.  In the middle of 
deliberations, an issue concerning a deliberating juror's 
3 
 
compliance with the judge's instruction not to consult extra-
trial research arose.  After individual inquiry of each 
deliberating juror, the judge dismissed one juror and, based on 
a finding that the remaining jurors were not affected by 
exposure to extraneous information, denied the defendant's 
motion for a mistrial.  The jury continued to deliberate.  One 
week later, the jury found the defendant guilty on the four 
indictments charging murder in the first degree as well as on 
those charging home invasion and armed robbery, and not guilty 
on the remaining three charges.1  The defendant filed a notice of 
appeal on January 2, 2013; the appeal has been docketed in this 
court but has not yet been briefed or argued. 
 
On July 14, 2015, two weeks after the effective date of 
rule 3.5 (c), one of the defendant's appellate attorneys sent a 
letter to the assistant district attorney representing the 
Commonwealth on appeal, informing her of defense counsel's 
intention to contact the deliberating jurors in the defendant's 
second trial pursuant to amended rule 3.5 (c), and attached a 
copy of the proposed letter that counsel intended to send to the 
jurors.  On July 21, 2015, the defendant's appellate counsel 
sent via first class mail the letters to the deliberating 
jurors.  Later that same day, the assistant district attorney 
                     
 
1 The defendant was found not guilty on the charges of armed 
assault with intent to murder, aggravated assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon, and carrying a firearm without a 
license. 
4 
 
sent an electronic mail (e-mail) message to the defendant's 
appellate counsel, notifying them that the Commonwealth would 
file a motion to prohibit juror communication, and further 
explained that "[i]t is the Commonwealth's position that post-
conviction inquiry of jurors remains prohibited as a matter of 
law." 
 
On July 23, 2015, the Commonwealth filed an emergency 
motion for judicial intervention to prohibit postconviction 
inquiry of the jury; the defendant's appellate counsel filed an 
opposition.  After hearing, the motion judge, who had been the 
trial judge in the defendant's second trial, agreed to report to 
the Appeals Court five questions concerning rule 3.5 (c), 
ordered that the defendant's appellate counsel not communicate 
further with the discharged jurors pending further order of the 
court, and further ordered that counsel retain sealed and unread 
any written or e-mail responses they might receive from jurors 
in response to the letter previously sent. 
 
The five reported questions are the following: 
 
"1. In revising Rule 3.5 of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Professional Conduct to permit attorney originated 
communications with discharged jurors, did the Supreme 
Judicial Court implicitly overrule the prohibition against 
attorney originated communications with jurors as set forth 
in Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 203-204 (1979)? 
 
 
"2. In generally adopting the American Bar 
Association's Model Rule 3.5 containing the language 
'prohibited by law,' did the Supreme Judicial Court intend 
Commonwealth v. Fidler to be continuing precedent? 
 
5 
 
 
"3. If the answer to question two is 'no,' then what 
types of contact with discharged jurors by an attorney, if 
any, are 'prohibited by law' under Rule 3.5(c)(1)? 
 
 
"4. If the answer to question one is 'yes,' and the 
answer to question two is 'no,' does revised Rule 3.5 
permit attorneys to communicate with jurors who were 
discharged prior to July 1, 2015? 
 
 
"5. If the answer to question four is 'yes,' in light 
of Commonwealth v. Fidler, are attorneys required to seek 
approval from the court prior to contacting jurors?" 
 
 
We transferred the judge's report from the Appeals Court to 
this court on our own motion. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Attorney disciplinary rules and the 
Fidler decision.  Effective October 2, 1972, this court adopted 
S.J.C. Rule 3:22, the Canons of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules 
Regulating the Practice of Law, as appearing in 359 Mass. 796 
(1971).  Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-108 (D) governed postverdict 
contact with jurors.  This rule permitted attorneys to initiate 
communication with jurors postverdict without permission of the 
court, providing that "the lawyer shall not ask questions of or 
make comments to a member of that jury that are calculated 
merely to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence his 
actions in future jury service."  S.J.C. Rule 3:22, DR 7-108 
(D), as appearing in 359 Mass. 826 (1971).  The text of DR 7-108 
(D) was essentially identical to the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility that previously had been adopted by the American 
Bar Association (ABA). 
6 
 
 
Seven years later, this court decided Commonwealth v. 
Fidler, 377 Mass. 192 (1979).  The defendant in Fidler was 
convicted of armed robbery after a jury trial in the Superior 
Court, and thereafter filed a motion for a new trial based on 
alleged juror misconduct.  See id. at 193-194.  In support of 
the motion, the defendant filed an affidavit of one of the 
deliberating jurors.  See id.  The affidavit averred that the 
jury considered in their deliberations matters the judge had 
instructed them to disregard, and also that extraneous 
information had been introduced into the jury deliberations in 
the form of statements by a juror about factual matters relating 
to the defendant that had not been presented in evidence at 
trial.  See id.  The trial judge denied the defendant's motion 
for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing.  In considering 
the defendant's appeal from this denial, this court affirmed the 
common-law rule, first discussed by this court in Woodward v. 
Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 460 (1871), but having earlier roots in 
England, that inquiry into jury deliberations is prohibited.2  In 
                     
 
2 As stated in Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 460 
(1871), this common-law principle is the following:  "The proper 
evidence of the decision of the jury is the verdict returned by 
them upon oath and affirmed in open court; it is essential to 
the freedom and independence of their deliberations that their 
discussions in the jury room should be kept secret and 
inviolable; and to admit the testimony of jurors to what took 
place there would create distrust, embarrassment and 
uncertainty."  See Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 196 
(1979) ("We still adhere to our rule [expressed in Woodward] 
which requires courts to protect jurors and their verdicts from 
7 
 
particular, we reiterated that it is impermissible to impeach a 
jury verdict with juror testimony concerning the contents of the 
jury's deliberations, and also impermissible to "permit evidence 
concerning the subjective mental processes of jurors, such as 
the reasons for their decisions." 3  Fidler, supra at 198.  After 
discussing these common-law precepts, we proceeded to define and 
adopt a separate rule that, going forward, would require all 
postverdict contact with and interviews of jurors by attorneys 
to occur under court supervision and direction, and to be 
permissible "only if the court finds some suggestion that there 
were extraneous matters in the jury's deliberations. . . .  
[C]ounsel, litigants, and those acting for them may not 
independently contact jurors after a verdict is rendered.  
Counsel may investigate unsolicited information only to see if 
it is a matter worth bringing to the judge's attention."  Id. at 
203-204. 
                                                                  
unwarranted intrusions and which emphasizes the importance of 
the finality of jury verdicts"). 
 
 
3 We made clear, however -- as had Woodward, 107 Mass. at 
466 -- that this common-law principle did not bar juror 
testimony to the effect that information extraneous to the trial 
had been introduced into the jury deliberations; the prohibition 
was against eliciting testimony or other evidence concerning the 
impact of such extraneous information on the jurors, 
individually or collectively:  "[O]ur rule does not create an 
absolute prohibition against juror testimony to impeach a 
verdict. . . .  [J]uror testimony is admissible to establish the 
existence of an improper influence on the jury, but is not 
admissible to show the role which the improper influence played 
in the jury's decisions."  Fidler, 377 Mass. at 196.  See id. at 
196-198. 
8 
 
 
Fidler did not involve directly any rules of professional 
conduct governing lawyers; the restrictions on attorneys' 
postverdict contact with and interviews of jurors that the court 
adopted there were independent of the disciplinary rules.  See 
Commonwealth v. Solis, 407 Mass. 398, 399, 402-403 (1990) 
(attorney obtained information from juror in manner that 
conflicted with Fidler restrictions but was consistent with 
S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon 7, DR 7-108 [D], 382 Mass. 792 [1982]).  
In light of the tension between Fidler and DR 7-108 (D), in 
1991, the court amended DR 7-108 (D) to codify the Fidler rule 
governing postverdict attorney contact and communications with 
jurors.  See S.J.C. Rule 3:07, DR 7-108 (D), as amended, 411 
Mass. 1317 (1991).4  And when in 1998 we amended the attorney 
disciplinary rules to conform generally to the ABA's Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct, we retained the Fidler-inspired 
limitations on postverdict contact of jurors by attorneys.  See 
                     
 
4 The revised version of S.J.C. Rule 3:07, DR 7-108 (D), 
appearing in 411 Mass. 1317 (1991), provided:  "After discharge 
of the jury from further consideration of a case with which the 
lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not initiate any 
communication with a member of the jury without leave of court 
granted for good cause shown.  If a juror initiates a 
communication with such a lawyer, directly or indirectly, the 
lawyer may respond provided that the lawyer shall not ask 
questions of or make comments to a member of that jury that are 
intended only to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence 
his or her actions in future jury service.  In no circumstances 
shall such a lawyer inquire of a juror concerning the jury's 
deliberation processes." 
9 
 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 (d), as appearing in 426 Mass. 1391 
(1997), effective January 1, 1998.5 
 
Thereafter, in light of changes in 2002, 2012, and 2013 to 
the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, this court asked 
its Standing Advisory Committee on the Rules of Professional 
Conduct (committee) to review the Massachusetts Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  The committee did so, and proposed 
numerous revisions to our attorney disciplinary rules, including 
a unanimous recommendation that we adopt the ABA's Model Rule 
3.5 in place of the existing version of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 
and the existing rule 3.5 (d), in particular.  After receiving 
public comments and hearing, we adopted the committee's 
recommendation.  The amended rule 3.5, appearing at 471 Mass. 
1428 (2015), and effective July 1, 2015, provides in relevant 
part: 
 
"A lawyer shall not: 
 
". . .  
"(c) communicate with a juror or prospective juror after 
discharge of the jury if: 
 
"(1) the communication is prohibited by law or court order; 
 
"(2) the juror has made known to the lawyer, either 
directly or through communications with the judge or 
otherwise, a desire not to communicate with the lawyer; or 
 
                     
 
5 The text of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 (d), appearing in 426 
Mass. 1391 (1997), was identical to the 1991 version of DR 7-
108 (D).  See note 4, supra. 
10 
 
"(3) the communication involves misrepresentation, 
coercion, duress or harassment . . . ."6 
 
 
b.  Effect of adoption of rule 3.5 (c) on prohibition 
against attorney-originated communications with jurors.  The 
first three reported questions concern what, if any, substantive 
changes resulted from this court's adoption of rule 3.5 (c).  
Because we find the three questions to be interconnected, we 
discuss them together.  The first question asks whether in 
adopting rule 3.5 (c),7 this court implicitly overruled the 
prohibition against attorney-originated communications with 
jurors set forth in Fidler.  The Commonwealth argues that 
Fidler's prohibition was not overruled by rule 3.5 (c), because 
a revised rule of professional conduct "do[es] not and cannot 
create, modify, or supersede" existing case law, here Fidler and 
                     
 
6 Comment 3 to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5, appearing in 471 Mass. 
1429 (2015) (rule 3.5), relates to rule 3.5 (c).  The comment 
states: 
 
 
"A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a 
juror or prospective juror after the jury has been 
discharged.  The lawyer may do so unless the communication 
is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the 
desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer.  For 
example, where a juror makes known to the judge a desire 
not to communicate with the lawyer, and the judge so 
informs the lawyer, the lawyer may not initiate contact 
with that juror, directly or indirectly.  The lawyer may 
not engage in improper conduct during the communication." 
 
 
7 The first reported question does not state expressly that 
its focus is specifically rule 3.5 (c), but the intended focus 
on this subsection of the rule is clear. 
 
11 
 
its progeny,8 until this court expressly overrules those 
decisions.  The Commonwealth consequently reasons that Fidler's 
rule prohibiting attorneys from communicating with jurors 
postverdict without judicial supervision remains part of the 
definition of "prohibited by law" in rule 3.5 (c) (1).  We 
disagree. 
 
Contrary to the Commonwealth's argument, we answer the 
first reported question in the affirmative:  by adopting rule 
3.5 (c), we effectively overruled our rule, first stated in 
Fidler, that prohibited attorney-initiated, postverdict contact 
of and communications with jurors free from court oversight.  In 
our view, the text of rule 3.5 (c) and the associated commentary 
by themselves make this point clearly even without any mention 
of Fidler by name, but by way of further explanation, we add 
that the Fidler rule was not a statement of common-law principle 
but rather a rule that we adopted pursuant to our authority and 
responsibility to supervise the practice of law by attorneys in 
the Commonwealth, independent of common law or statute.  See, 
e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. 795, 813 (1978) (court 
retains "the ultimate authority to control [attorneys'] conduct 
in the practice of law").  To the extent that the Fidler rule 
operated to define a manner of contact and communication with 
                     
 
8 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bresnahan, 462 Mass. 761, 769-
770 (2012); Commonwealth v. Solis, 407 Mass. 398, 403 (1990); 
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 395 Mass. 149, 153 (1985); Cassamasse v. 
J.G. Lamotte & Son, 391 Mass. 315, 317-319 (1984). 
12 
 
jurors postverdict that was "prohibited by law" before the 
adoption of rule 3.5 (c), the latter effectively superseded the 
Fidler rule and the prohibition against unsupervised, 
postverdict attorney communication that the Fidler rule had 
imposed. 
 
This is not to say, however, that rule 3.5 (c) implicitly 
overruled this court's opinion in Fidler in its entirety, a 
point that leads us to the second reported question.  We 
interpret this question to be asking whether, in adopting rule 
3.5 (c), this court intended Fidler "to be continuing precedent" 
in any respect.  Our answer is yes.  As we have noted, Fidler, 
in addition to establishing the rule of conduct relating to 
unsupervised postverdict contact with jurors by attorneys, 
discusses and reaffirms the court's continuing adherence to the 
common-law principle barring inquiry into the contents of jury 
deliberations and thought processes of jurors and the 
impeachment of jury verdicts based on information that might be 
gained from such inquiry.  See Fidler, 377 Mass. at 196-198.  
Our adoption of rule 3.5 (c) leaves the viability of this 
common-law principle undisturbed.  The secrecy of jury 
deliberations has served as a bedrock of our judicial system, 
and inquiry into the "jury's deliberative processes . . . would 
intrude improperly into the jury's function."  Solis, 407 Mass. 
at 403.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 
13 
 
858 (2011).  The common-law principle that "it is essential to 
the freedom and independence of [jury] deliberations that their 
discussions in the jury room should be kept secret and 
inviolable," Fidler, supra at 196, quoting Woodward, 107 Mass. 
at 460, was not, and arguably could not be, overruled by rule 
3.5 (c). 
 
That rule 3.5 (c) allows attorneys to initiate postverdict 
contact with jurors without prior court permission or oversight, 
however, does not mean, as the Commonwealth apparently fears, 
that the permitted inquiry is "unfettered and unrestricted."  
Rule 3.5 (c) explicitly limits the inquiry:  it bars 
communications prohibited by law, communications with jurors who 
have made known an unwillingness to communicate, and 
communications involving "misrepresentation, coercion, duress or 
harassment."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 (c) (1)-(3).  The third 
reported question seeks further clarification of the first of 
these proscriptions, asking "what types of contact with 
discharged jurors by an attorney, if any, are 'prohibited by 
law' under [r]ule 3.5(c)(1)?"  We answer that prohibited contact 
and communication include those that violate common-law 
principles, such as inquiries into the substance of jury 
deliberations, and communications that violate statutory law, 
other court rules, or specific court orders.  See, e.g., Adams 
v. Ford Motor Co., 653 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2011) (suggesting 
14 
 
that "prohibited by law" under ABA-derived rule 3.5 includes 
court orders and local rules of court); Williams v. Lawton, 288 
Kan. 768, 794-795 (2009) ("attorneys may discuss a trial with 
willing jurors after their discharge . . . unless contrary 
[court] orders have been given").9 
 
The Commonwealth contends that States that have adopted ABA 
Model Rule 3.5 (c) nonetheless restrict communication with 
jurors in a variety of ways; the thrust of the argument is that 
the adoption of rule 3.5 (c) does not have (or at least should 
not have) the practical effect of permitting attorneys 
independently to communicate with jurors.  It is true that a 
court may further tailor the limitations of attorney-initiated 
contact with jurors beyond those referenced in rule 3.5 (c).  
However, at this point in time, this rule has been in effect in 
the Commonwealth for somewhat less than two years, and without 
further experience with the rule in operation, we are not 
inclined to consider adopting limitations on the scope and 
                     
 
9 Although "prohibited by law" is not defined in the 
Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, a previous version 
of the American Bar Association's Model Rules provided that 
"[c]onduct 'prohibited by law' clearly includes violations of 
criminal law and presumably includes other acts that violate 
statutes, court rules, or other legal norms."  Annotated Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, at 232 (1984). 
 
15 
 
character of unsupervised postverdict attorney contact with 
jurors beyond those that rule 3.5 (c) sets out.10,11 
 
c.  Application of rule 3.5 (c) to jury trials completed 
before July 1, 2015.  The fourth reported question asks whether 
rule 3.5 (c) permits attorneys to communicate with jurors 
discharged prior to July 1, 2015, the effective date of the 
rule. 
 
"In general, changes in the common law brought about by 
judicial decisions are given retroactive effect."  Halley v. 
Birbiglia, 390 Mass. 540, 544 (1983).  Because rule 3.5 (c) 
effects a change in an ethical rule governing lawyer conduct 
rather than a substantive change in the common law, 
retroactivity principles applicable to the common law do not 
strictly apply here.  As a general matter, "[d]isciplinary rules 
operate prospectively, not retroactively."  Matter of the Estate 
                     
 
10 We do not question that, when appropriate, a judge in a 
particular case may restrict or even prohibit attorneys' 
unsupervised communication with jurors postverdict; such a court 
order is expressly contemplated by rule 3.5 (c) (1) (lawyer 
shall not communicate with juror after trial if "the 
communication is prohibited by law or court order" [emphasis 
added]). 
 
 
11 A number of the cases cited by the Commonwealth 
addressing practices in other States appear to reflect a fair 
degree of judicial willingness to permit postverdict contact 
with jurors.  See, e.g., Stewart v. Rice, 47 P.3d 316, 325 
(Colo. 2002) ("jurors are free to discuss any aspect of their 
service they care to"); State v. Thomas, 813 S.W.2d 395, 397 
(Tenn. 1991) (local rule that all interviews with jurors by 
lawyers are prohibited except with permission of court 
contravenes State Supreme Court rule; court permission not 
necessary to communicate with jurors postverdict). 
16 
 
of Southwick, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 740, 747 (2006).  Nevertheless, 
in contrast to a case such as Southwick, the issue here is not 
whether the propriety of an attorney's conduct should be judged 
by more restrictive ethical rules than those in operation when 
the attorney acted.  Rather, it is whether a less restrictive 
rule that effectively broadens a litigant's opportunity to 
explore the possibility that a jury verdict was marred by the 
intrusion of extraneous influences should apply to trials 
completed before the rule's effective date.  In this context, 
general retroactivity principles offer guidance.  To borrow from 
the retroactivity lexicon applicable to criminal cases, rule 3.5 
(c) is a "new rule" in the sense that the rule was not "dictated 
by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction 
became final."  Commonwealth v. Bray, 407 Mass. 296, 303 (1990), 
quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).  See 
Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 434 (2013), S.C., 473 
Mass. 832 (2016).  In the context of the criminal law, such new 
rules generally apply to cases that are pending, are on direct 
appeal, or for which the appeal period has not run.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 413 Mass. 193, 202 (1992), S.C., 422 
Mass. 72 (1996).  See also Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 
230, 257-258 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 
(2015).  Adopting this new rule approach to determine the scope 
of rule 3.5 (c)'s retroactivity offers a helpful way to balance 
17 
 
the competing interests at play here -- the interest of the 
defendant (and indeed every litigant) in being tried by an 
impartial jury, on the one hand, and society's recognized 
interests in the finality of jury verdicts and protecting jurors 
from harassment.  See Commonwealth v. Bresnahan, 462 Mass. 761, 
769 (2012), and cases cited.  Accordingly, we answer the fourth 
question by stating that rule 3.5 (c) applies to attorneys who 
represented a litigant in a jury trial in which the jurors were 
discharged before July 1, 2015, if the case was on appeal as of 
that date or the appeal period had not run.  These attorneys, 
therefore, are permitted to contact jurors in accordance with 
the terms of the amended rule. 
 
d.  Whether court approval is required prior to contacting 
jurors.  The fifth reported question builds on the fourth and 
asks whether, assuming at least some attorneys are permitted to 
communicate with jurors who were discharged prior to July 1, 
2015, those attorneys are required to seek approval from the 
court prior to initiating contact.  We answer the question no.  
As is the case with attorneys who, pursuant to rule 3.5 (c), 
seek to communicate, postverdict, with jurors discharged after 
July 1, 2015, attorneys who seek postverdict contact with jurors 
who were discharged before July 1, 2015, may do so without 
permission from the court.  However, and again as is true of 
attorneys seeking contact with jurors discharged after July 1, 
18 
 
2015, any proposed contact is subject to the notice requirements 
set forth in the following section of this opinion. 
 
e.  Guidelines for implementation of rule 3.5 (c).  To 
assist attorneys and judges in working with rule 3.5 (c), we 
offer some procedural guidelines.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 
469 Mass. 134, 147 (2014). 
 
 i.  Going forward, on request of any party, the trial 
judge shall instruct the jury regarding an attorney's right to 
contact and communicate with jurors after trial and a juror's 
right to decline to speak with an attorney postverdict.  A 
suggested instruction is included as an Appendix to this 
opinion. 
 
ii.  Although an attorney may initiate postverdict contact 
with jurors without prior court approval under rule 3.5 (c), the 
attorney must -- as the defendant's appellate attorneys did in 
the present case -- send prior notice of the attorney's intent 
to initiate such contact to counsel for the opposing party or 
parties (or directly to the opposing party or parties, if not 
represented by counsel) five business days before contacting any 
juror.  The notice is to include a description of the proposed 
manner of contact and the substance of any proposed inquiry to 
the jurors, and, where applicable, a copy of any letter or other 
form of written communication the attorney intends to send.  The 
preferred method of initiating contact with a juror is by 
19 
 
written letter, and the letter is to include a statement that 
the juror may decline any contact with the attorney or terminate 
contact once initiated.  If the attorney seeks to initiate 
contact through an oral conversation (whether in person, by 
telephone, or otherwise), the attorney is nonetheless required 
to provide opposing counsel or opposing parties with prior 
notice of the substance of the intended communication. 
 
The purpose of requiring prior notice is to permit opposing 
counsel (or an unrepresented opposing party) to seek relief from 
the court if the proposed communication appears to be beyond the 
scope of permissible inquiry or otherwise improper, or if there 
is a compelling reason, specific to that case, that 
communicating with the jurors would be inappropriate.12  See Hall 
v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 48 (2011) ("Trial courts have the 
inherent authority to review . . . letters and enclosures [to be 
sent by counsel to discharged jurors] and order counsel to make 
modifications accordingly").  In stating that an opposing 
counsel or party may seek relief from a court, we do not intend 
to suggest that we anticipate a general need to do so.  Our 
mention of the availability of judicial intervention and relief 
is not intended to serve as an invitation to counsel to seek it 
as a matter of course. 
                     
 
12 Of course, opposing counsel (or an unrepresented opposing 
party) may not contact jurors upon receipt of the notice without 
first providing notice to the other side. 
20 
 
 
iii.  If, after communicating with a juror, an attorney 
wishes to secure an affidavit from the juror concerning alleged 
extraneous influences on the jury deliberation process, the 
attorney may do so without seeking or obtaining prior court 
approval, but any such affidavit must focus on extraneous 
influences, and not the substance of the jury's deliberations or 
the individual or collective thought processes of the juror or 
the jury as a whole.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 606(b) (2016).13  See 
also Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 
(2001).  Nothing in rule 3.5 (c) changes the standards governing 
requests for and the conduct of postverdict evidentiary 
                     
 
13 Massachusetts Guide to Evidence § 606(b) (2016) provides: 
 
"(b) During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict or 
Indictment. 
 
"(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence.  During an 
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a 
juror may not testify about any statement made or incident 
that occurred during the jury's deliberations, the effect 
of anything on that juror's or another juror's vote, or any 
juror's mental processes concerning the verdict or 
indictment.  The court may not receive a juror's affidavit 
or evidence of a juror's statement on these matters. 
 
"(2) Exceptions.  A juror may testify about whether 
 
"(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to the jury's attention or 
 
"(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on 
any juror." 
 
21 
 
hearings.  See Fidler, 377 Mass. at 201.  See also Commonwealth 
v. Kincaid, 444 Mass. 381, 386 (2005).14 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We summarize here the answers to the 
reported questions. 
 
(1) The adoption of rule 3.5 (c) in effect overruled the 
rule established by Fidler, 377 Mass. at 203-204, requiring 
attorneys to seek leave of court before contacting jurors 
postverdict, and to do so only under court supervision and 
direction. 
 
(2) The common-law principles that limit postverdict 
inquiry of jurors to matters relating to extraneous influences 
and prohibit inquiry into the individual or collective thought 
processes of jurors, the reasons for their decision, or the 
substance of their deliberations, discussed in Fidler, 377 Mass. 
at 196-198, remain as continuing precedent.  As Fidler notes, 
however, inquiry is permissible to establish the existence of an 
                     
 
14 Finally, although the reported questions do not address 
specifically the postverdict letter sent by the defendant's 
appellate counsel to the jurors, the Commonwealth argues here 
that that the letter represents an inappropriate or improper 
fishing expedition.  The criticism appears overblown.  The 
dismissal of one deliberating juror due to failing to follow the 
judge's instructions concerning consideration of extra-trial 
information, the significant publicity surrounding the trial, 
and the particular circumstance of the shooting at Sandy Hook 
Elementary School in Connecticut occurring in the middle of 
deliberations all provide support for the questions posed by 
appellate counsel in their letter that, it appears, was focused 
on exploring the possibility of extraneous influences having 
been introduced into the jurors' deliberations, and not the 
jurors' deliberative processes. 
22 
 
improper influence, "but . . . not . . . to show the role which 
the improper influence played in the jury's decisions."  Id. at 
196. 
 
(3) The common-law limitations on postverdict juror inquiry 
discussed in Fidler, supra at 196-198, address a type of 
communication "prohibited by law" within the meaning of rule 3.5 
(c) (1); other communications "prohibited by law" include 
communications in violation of statutory law as well as specific 
court orders and court rules. 
 
(4) Rule 3.5 (c) generally applies to attorneys in their 
representation of litigants in trials on and after July 1, 2015, 
but an attorney representing a party in a case that was tried to 
a jury and concluded before that date may contact jurors on that 
case pursuant to rule 3.5 (c) if the case was pending on appeal 
as of July 1, 2015, or the appeal period had not run as of that 
date. 
 
(5) If an attorney is entitled to initiate contact with 
jurors who were discharged prior to July 1, 2015, because the 
case at issue is pending on appeal or the appeal period has not 
yet run, the attorney is treated the same as an attorney 
contacting jurors discharged after July 1, 2015; the attorney is 
not required to seek prior court approval, but is required to 
adhere to the notice requirements set out in this opinion. 
23 
 
 
The case is remanded to the Superior Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Appendix. 
Suggested Jury Instruction 
 
"Now that your service is concluded, the question may arise 
whether you may discuss this case with the lawyers who presented 
it to you.  Whether you discuss your jury service on this case 
with anyone is entirely up to you.  The attorneys may desire to 
talk with the members of the jury.  For your guidance, you are 
advised that it is entirely proper for you to talk with the 
attorneys, and you are at liberty to do so.  However, you are 
not required to do so and may decline to speak with an attorney.  
Whether you do so or not is entirely a matter of your own 
choice.  If you choose to talk with the attorneys, please do not 
discuss the substance or content of the jury's deliberations, 
including the reasons for the jury's verdict.  However, in the 
unlikely event that any juror during deliberations provided 
information about the case or any party to the case that was not 
in evidence, you may tell the attorneys what information was 
provided, but you may not discuss the effect this information 
had on jury deliberations.  If you prefer not to be contacted by 
an attorney after you are discharged, you may inform me or a 
court officer in person or in writing, and we will communicate 
this to the attorneys.  Further, if you decline to discuss the 
case, either today or in the future, and an attorney persists in 
discussing the case over your objection or becomes critical of 
your service as a juror, please report the incident to the 
court."