Case Title: People v. Henriquez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S089311

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2017-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 12/7/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S089311 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
CHRISTOPHER HENRIQUEZ, 
) 
 
 
) 
Contra Costa County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 961902-4 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Defendant Christopher Henriquez killed his pregnant wife and their two-
year-old daughter.  He stipulated at trial that he killed the victims with malice 
aforethought, but asserted that the murders were not premeditated and were 
instead the unplanned result of a fit of rage.  A jury convicted defendant of two 
counts of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder, found true a 
multiple-murder special circumstance, and returned a verdict of death.  This 
appeal is automatic.  (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On October 10, 1996, the Grand Jury of Contra Costa County indicted 
defendant Christopher Henriquez for the first degree murder of his wife, Carmen 
Henriquez (with an enhancement for personal use of a deadly or dangerous 
weapon), the first degree murder of his daughter, Zuri Henriquez (with an 
enhancement for personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon), and the second 
degree murder of the fetus Carmen was carrying.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 
2 
189, 12022, subd. (b)(1).)  The indictment alleged as a special circumstance that 
defendant committed multiple murders.  (Id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)  As later 
amended, the indictment also alleged that defendant had suffered a prior strike for 
a serious felony in New York.  (Id., §§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) 
A jury convicted defendant of all charges, found true the alleged 
enhancements and special circumstance, and returned a verdict of death. 
II.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case 
Defendant admitted that he killed his pregnant wife and daughter, but 
denied that he acted with premeditation.  Defendant stipulated “1. that he killed 
each of the alleged victims.  2. that each and all of the killings were unlawful.  
3. that each and all of the killings were done with malice aforethought.  4. that 
each and all of the killings were done willfully.”  Defendant also stipulated that he 
had been convicted of second degree robbery in New York on April 27, 1994, 
served a term of 18 months, and was released on parole on July 28, 1995.  
Defendant was on parole at the time the murders were committed in August 1996.  
In July 1996, Carmen and Zuri spent some time at the home of Carmen’s 
father, Harold Jones.  Jones learned that defendant intended to rob banks and 
called him on the telephone “to relay to him the consequences of — and the 
effects of robbing banks and the effects it would have on his family and himself.”  
Defendant became “very defensive and boisterous” and said Jones “was 
intervening in his business.”  The conversation “deteriorated” and ended quickly.  
The next day, Jones’s wife, Mona Lisa Jones, called defendant “trying to patch 
things up” and defendant repeated that “[t]his is my business.” 
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In mid-July, defendant spoke to Carmen’s best friend, Angelique Foster, 
and said that Carmen “was going crazy telling people that he was . . . going to rob 
banks . . . .”  Defendant was “irritated and angry.”  Defendant’s younger brother, 
Francisco Henriquez, testified that in the late spring of 1996, defendant had said 
that he wanted to kill Carmen “because she doesn’t listen.”  About a month before 
the murders, defendant repeated that if Carmen did not stop talking he would kill 
her.  
Defendant’s mother, Deborah Henriquez, testified that defendant told her in 
July that his neighbor, Gregory Morton, had come to their house with a gun and 
told defendant that he “should teach his wife not to talk so much.”  Morton 
declared that he was not going back to prison, and he did not “like the idea of 
[Carmen] talking about his business.”  Carmen took Zuri and fled to her mother’s 
house. 
On July 26, 1996, defendant and Morton robbed a bank in San Francisco 
and obtained $9,054.  On July 31, 1996, defendant and Morton robbed another 
bank in San Francisco and obtained $179,397.  Deborah testified that in July 1996, 
defendant came into some money.  Defendant said he had gotten a boxing contract 
and his manager had given him an advance payment.  Defendant told his mother 
that Carmen did not believe the money came from a boxing contract and instead 
believed defendant had gotten the money by committing robberies. 
Carmen’s cousin, Trenice White, testified that Carmen and Zuri stayed with 
her for three days in July 1996.  Carmen seemed abnormal and withdrawn and said 
that defendant “was into heavy stuff,” but did not elaborate. 
In August 1996, defendant, Carmen, and Zuri went to Disneyland for 
several days, accompanied by defendant’s mother, sister, and younger brother.  
Defendant paid for the trip.  They returned home on Sunday, August 11, 1996.  At 
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the airport, defendant told his mother that he was thinking about going to New 
York. 
Carmen’s sister-in-law, Heidi Jones, testified that she spoke to Carmen on 
the telephone on Monday, August 12, 1996, the day she was killed.  Carmen said, 
“Heidi, things are very bad right now.”  Heidi heard defendant yelling in the 
background.  Carmen said she had to go and the conversation ended. 
On August 12, 1996, the day after they returned from Disneyland, Deborah 
spoke to defendant on the telephone at about 5:30 p.m.  He sounded troubled.  
Deborah invited him to come to her house.  When he arrived, he appeared 
intoxicated and was incoherent.  He looked sick and “a bit dazed.”  He threw up, 
began mumbling, “She just doesn’t listen,” and cried out for Zuri.  Defendant’s 
brother, Francisco, said defendant was different than Francisco had ever seen him.  
Defendant would not talk to Francisco.  Francisco speculated at trial that “at this 
point [defendant] realized what he had done.”  Defendant would sporadically 
begin to cry and ask where Zuri was, calling for “Zuzu.” 
The next morning, Deborah went to work and spoke to defendant on the 
telephone.  She told him she had called Carmen but had not reached her.  
Defendant said, “Well, she’s not going to return your call.”  When Deborah asked 
why, defendant said:  “Carmen is dead.  I killed Carmen.”  Deborah asked where 
Zuri was, and defendant replied that he had killed her as well. 
Deborah returned home and asked defendant what had happened.  
Defendant said he and Carmen had argued when they returned from the airport.  
The next day, he awoke and heard Carmen talking to someone on the telephone.  
Defendant said, “She just, you know, didn’t listen.  She just didn’t know how not 
to stop talking about things.”  Defendant became angry “because she was talking 
about their business, and it really shouldn’t have been talked about.”  The next 
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thing defendant knew, he was choking Carmen.  Zuri woke up.  Defendant 
claimed that while he was hitting Carmen with a hammer, “Zuri got in the way.” 
Deborah told defendant to go to the police, but defendant said he could not 
do that because he was on parole.  He said that “he would never be in a cage 
again.”  After defendant “finished talking about, you know, how bad he felt and 
everything and the fact that he missed Zuri and he wanted his little girl, he just laid 
back and he — and then he sat up from the pavement and he says and, ‘Oh, by the 
way,’ . . . ‘I robbed a bank.’ ”  Defendant said he could not believe he had killed 
his wife and daughter, but stated he killed Carmen because she “wouldn’t stop 
blabbing her mouth.”  He had told Carmen he was planning to rob a bank and she 
was upset.  The morning of the murders, he became enraged when “Carmen 
continued blabbing about his business to her friends.”  Deborah reported the 
crimes to the police after defendant left.  She told the police she thought defendant 
might have gone to New York. 
Police officers entered defendant’s apartment shortly after 2:00 p.m. on 
Tuesday, August 13, 1996, and found Carmen’s body “covered or wrapped in a 
bed covering.”  She was lying facedown on a bed in a pool of blood.  Her wrists 
and ankles were bound, and there was a plastic bag near her mouth.  Zuri’s body 
was in a large box nearby, also wrapped in a blanket. 
An autopsy of Zuri revealed skull fractures caused by at least two blows, 
possibly from a hammer that was found at the scene.  Bruises on Zuri’s neck were 
consistent with strangulation.  There were multiple lacerations and abrasions on 
Zuri’s face, some of which could have been inflicted with the clawed end of the 
hammer. 
Carmen’s hands were tied behind her back with a telephone cord.  Her feet 
were bound together with shoelaces.  She had been manually strangled.  Her face 
was swollen and bruised, consistent with her having been kicked.  She had 
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defensive wounds on her arms and two large bruises on her scalp.  Carmen was 
“obviously pregnant” and was carrying an eight-month-old fetus. 
Defendant was arrested when he disembarked from an airplane at La 
Guardia Airport in New York.  He was carrying nearly $50,000 in cash.  
Defendant waived his Miranda rights and admitted that he had killed Carmen and 
Zuri.  At the police station, defendant signed a five-page confession in which he 
admitted having robbed a bank on July 31, 1996, and telling his “wife at length 
about the robbery.”  He then took his family to Disneyland.  Defendant stated that 
after they returned, on August 12, 1996, he started arguing with his wife.  He 
continued:  “She left the house to cash a check.  After my wife left, I suffocated 
my daughter Zuri, who had been playing.  I brought her over to her bed and put 
the pillow over her face until she was not breathing anymore.  I covered Zuri with 
a sheet completely, and left her there. . . .  [W]hen my wife returned, I took the 
money from her and just started beating her.  She is seven months pregnant.  I put 
a plastic bag over her face and kept it there until she was dead.  I dragged her body 
into my daughter’s room.  I left the body of my wife on the floor and covered her 
with a quilt. . . .  After I killed my daughter and wife, I went to my mother’s house 
. . . .” 
The next day, police again interviewed defendant, and he admitted having 
robbed another bank “about two to four weeks prior to the July 31st robbery.”  He 
identified Gregory Morton as his accomplice in the robberies.  Defendant also 
admitted having killed his daughter “by striking her multiple times in the face and 
head with a hammer.”  An audiotape of defendant’s statement was played for the 
jury. 
On August 5, 1998, while defendant was awaiting trial, defendant and four 
other inmates attempted to escape custody by prying open a cell window.  The 
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prosecution argued the escape attempt showed defendant’s consciousness of his 
guilt.   
2.  Defense Case 
Defendant did not testify.  Defendant called as a witness Dr. Donald 
Dutton, a psychologist and expert in domestic violence, who testified that most 
spousal homicides are preceded by a history of domestic violence and separations 
and reconciliations.  One of the characteristics of such homicides is “overkill,” 
which “refers both to sort of clumsiness, and also refers to a number of strikes or 
blows that are more than sufficient to kill a person.  It seems to be driven largely 
by an explosion of rage from the perpetrator.”  Dr. Dutton explained that “the 
majority of spousal homicide is really rage-generated.  And the rage, in most 
cases, seems to have to do with the either real or perceived abandonment of the 
perpetrator by the victim.  That is, she’s leaving. . . .  [T]hese men have some ego 
deficits that makes that kind of separation absolutely intolerable.  So they go into a 
volcanic rage state.”  Just before a homicide, he testified, these men generally 
“have spotty recollection of what’s happening . . . .  It could range from complete 
amnesia to what I would call spotty recollection. . . .  Many are in such high 
arousal stages at that point that they’re virtually in an altered state . . . .”  After a 
homicide, “what most typifie[s] the posthomicidal state [is] complete confusion.  
And these men [are] stunned by what they had done.  They [are] literally just kind 
of walking around [and] not thinking clearly at all.” 
In a study of 90 spousal homicides, Dr. Dutton found that “78 of these 
things seemed to be spontaneous acts that occurred on the spot.”  If a weapon was 
used in one of the homicides in the study, “typically it was something that was 
found in the house.”  If no weapon was used, “it basically meant the woman, in 
most cases, was strangled.  Killed with a man’s [bare] hands.”  Dr. Dutton 
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testified, “Bearing on the issue of overkill, here we get the number of blows or 
stabs.  There was a range of 5 to 25, talking about knife stab wounds.”  There was 
evidence of “estrangement” in “two-thirds of these cases.  They were either 
arguing about the woman leaving, or she had just left.” 
The defense introduced evidence showing that on July 27, 1996, Carmen 
saw a psychiatrist at a nearby hospital.  Upon discharge, she was given the 
telephone number of a battered women’s shelter. 
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case 
Carmen’s father, Harold Jones, described his relationship with Carmen and 
Zuri and the impact of their deaths on him.  Carmen’s best friend, Angelique 
Foster, and Carmen’s sister-in-law, Heidi Jones, also described their relationships 
with Carmen and Zuri and the impact of their deaths on them.  Carmen’s older 
brother, Valen Jones, described Carmen’s childhood and recounted his 
relationships with Carmen and Zuri and the impact of their deaths on him. 
Bank employees described the details of defendant’s robberies.  A teller 
and the assistant manager at the bank defendant robbed on July 26, 1996, testified, 
as did a teller and the branch manager of the bank defendant robbed on July 31, 
1996.  The branch manager of the bank defendant robbed on July 31 testified that 
she suffered posttraumatic stress after the incident and would no longer work “in a 
branch type environment.”  An FBI agent testified that on August 16, 1996, 
defendant confessed to both bank robberies and described in detail how he and his 
accomplice, Gregory Morton, committed them. 
Frank Pecoraro testified that defendant robbed him in New York City on 
January 9, 1994, around 4:00 a.m.  He was walking down the sidewalk near his 
apartment when defendant approached him and asked a question.  Before he could 
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answer, defendant punched him in the face, knocking him down a flight of stairs.  
Defendant jumped on top of him and punched him numerous times.  Defendant 
stole Pecoraro’s wallet and fled when a neighbor intervened. 
Lutgarda Lugo testified that between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. on January 2, 
1994, she was driving across the Macombs Dam Bridge in New York City, near 
Yankee Stadium, when she saw two people drop something off the bridge.  She 
screamed and said to her companions, “Let’s see if we can find a policeman 
nearby.”  They found New York Police Officer John Reilly at about 1:50 a.m. and 
led him to where a 46-year-old Black man later identified as Jerome Bryant was 
lying.  Officer Reilly called for an ambulance.  Bryant was pronounced dead at the 
hospital after hours of unsuccessful efforts to resuscitate him.  An autopsy 
revealed that Bryant was alive when he was thrown from the bridge and died from 
multiple blunt force injuries to the head and torso.  Photographs of the crime scene 
were shown to the jury. 
On August 14, 1996, after being arrested in New York, defendant confessed 
to his participation in the attempted robbery and murder of Bryant.  Defendant said 
that he, his brother Timothy, and a friend saw the victim leaving a bank and 
followed him to a bridge near Yankee Stadium, planning to rob him.  Defendant 
said, “My brother and a friend threw this guy from the bridge down to me on the 
street below.  The guy was dead and had nothing on him, so . . . we all left him 
there.” 
2.  Defense Case 
Defense investigator Sandra Coke testified that she compiled defendant’s 
family history.  Psychologist Dr. Dutton, who had testified at the guilt phase, 
reviewed police reports and other documents relating to the murders and 
concluded that defendant was “almost a sort of textbook example of the men” he 
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had studied who had killed their wives.  Dr. Dutton testified that defendant “grew 
up in an abusive home where he was shamed and where he had no secure 
attachment,” which “led to the anger and rage that he felt in intimate relationships 
. . . .”  Defendant’s mother was “cold and rejecting” and failed to provide a “safe 
haven.”  Defendant’s father was “emotionally unstable, ha[d] a heroin addiction, 
[was] physically violent, [got] into fights in the street, and [took] out a lot of 
physical violence both on his wife and his three oldest boys.”  Dr. Dutton 
described defendant’s crimes as an “[u]nexpected episode of violent, impulsive, 
acting out behavior, which [was] not well thought out, for no obvious purpose or 
personal advantage.” 
Defendant’s mother, Deborah Henriquez, described her life raising six 
children as a single mother.  She described defendant as “a good son” and “a nice 
brother to his siblings.” 
Dr. Leonti Thompson, a psychiatrist, met with defendant several times at 
the county jail starting on October 4, 1996.  He reported that defendant “was able 
to converse quite rationally.  He had a fairly good recollection of his past history.  
He had a recollection of the offense and his mental status during that time.  The 
most noticeable feature that I saw of his mental reaction was his continued 
expressions of remorse.  His disbelief that he had done what he had done.” 
Dr. Jonathan Mueller, a psychiatrist, reviewed police reports regarding the 
murders, defendant’s life history, psychiatric reports about defendant, and other 
documents, including Carmen’s diary.  Dr. Mueller found “a clear and strong 
history of psychiatric disorders, mental illness on both the mother and the father’s 
side of the family.  There was also a very strong history of violence that ran in the 
family . . . .”  Dr. Mueller concluded that defendant has a psychiatric disorder that 
“resembles an Intermittent Explosive Disorder, because there are discre[te] 
episodes of violence, and the violence seems to be out of proportion to the 
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provocation. . . .”  Defendant “had the nickname of Rage, apparently, or Silent 
Rage . . . .”  But “he most closely fits into the Borderline Personality Disorder, the 
hallmarks of which are intense fear of abandonment with frantic efforts to avoid 
that, and extreme reaction to perceived abandonment or rejection or criticism.  
Secondly, great difficulty controlling anger; and thirdly, emotional swings and 
oscillations, so his affect is up and down . . . .” 
Defendant’s younger brother, Edwin Henriquez, testified that he “looked up 
to” defendant, who “was a kind brother” and “a role model.” 
Renee and Charles Dunn testified that they attended the same church in 
New York as defendant’s family and met defendant when he was 15 years old.  
Renee said that defendant “was an excellent example of a teenager.  Very 
mannerly, very good home training, very devoted to his faith . . . .”  Charles added 
that defendant had “an exemplary reputation” in the church.  Viola Goldenberg 
also was a member of defendant’s church in New York.  When defendant was a 
teenager, he ran errands for Goldenberg, including picking up her paychecks.  She 
described defendant’s behavior as “exemplary.” 
Kenneth Henley, too, attended the same church as defendant and tutored 
him in Bible studies.  Henley said:  “Christopher was a very loving young man.  I 
was impressed with him after I first met him because of his sincerity.  He was 
respectful to older people . . . his biggest vice was wanting to stay out and play 
basketball too late.  That was it.” 
Modesto Henriquez, testified that his brother Edward, defendant’s father, 
abused drugs and alcohol.  He was not able to control his temper and “would beat 
a person down in the street for saying the wrong thing.”  Edward “wasn’t a nice 
person.”  He “was very . . . verbally abusive, short tempered, loud . . . .” 
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III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Pretrial 
1.  Deprivation of the Right to a Jury Drawn from a Fair Cross-Section 
of the Community 
Defendant contends he was denied his federal and state constitutional rights 
to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community because African-
Americans were underrepresented in the master jury list and jury venire.  
Defendant fails to establish a constitutional violation. 
a.  Background 
On November 20, 1998, defendant filed a motion to quash the jury master 
list and jury venire.  He alleged that he was “of African-American descent” and 
that a “conservative estimate of the African-American jury-eligible population in 
Contra Costa County totals 8.1% of the general jury-eligible population” while a 
survey of 42 jury panels conducted in 1996 and 1997 showed that “the number of 
African-Americans who appeared for jury duty represented only 4.8% — a 
comparative disparity of 40%, and an absolute disparity of 3.3% . . . .”1  
Defendant argued that this disparity is “systematic” because “the source lists used 
                                              
1  
“ ‘Absolute disparity’ is the difference between the underrepresented 
group’s percentage in the jury-eligible population and the group’s percentage in 
the actual jury venire.  [Citation.]  Thus, if Blacks are 3.2 percent of the eligible 
population, but only 2.1 percent of the actual venire, the absolute disparity is 3.2 
percent minus 2.1 percent, or 1.1 percent[age points].  ‘Comparative disparity’ 
measures the percentage by which the number of group members in the actual 
venire falls short of the number of group members one would expect from the 
overall ‘eligible population’ figures.  Thus, if 32 of every 1,000 members of the 
presumptively eligible population are Black, but only 21 of every 1,000 persons 
who actually make up the venire are Black, the comparative disparity is the 
percentage by which 21 falls short of 32, or approximately 34.4 percent.”  (People 
v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 564-565, fn. 6.) 
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to prepare the juror list from which venires are drawn do not fairly represent the 
African-American jury eligible population . . . [,] the criteria for merging the two 
source lists, and for purging duplicate names . . . , and the failure to adequately 
follow-up [with] potential jurors summoned who do not respond, results in a list of 
qualified jurors which is underrepresentative of the African-American jury-eligible 
population in the county.”  Defendant also contended that the disparity was the 
result of “an historical pattern of residential and employment segregation of the 
county’s African-American population in the East and West ends of the county,” 
from which there is limited public transportation to the Martinez courthouse where 
felony trials are held.  
In his opposition, the Contra Costa County Jury Commissioner 
acknowledged that appellate courts have noted that African-Americans are 
underrepresented in Contra Costa County venires, but denied that the 
underrepresentation was the result of the jury selection process.  The jury 
commissioner described that process as follows:  “The names of prospective jurors 
are obtained by merging a list of registered Contra Costa County voters with a 
DMV list of licensed drivers and identification cardholders who are age 18 or 
older and who are county residents.  The lists are obtained, merged and purged of 
duplicates twice annually. . . .  [¶]  Jurors who are summoned and fail to appear 
are sent a follow up notice by the jury services office.” 
On February 10, 1999, this case and seven other cases challenging the jury 
selection process in Contra Costa County were ordered to be assigned “to an 
outside judge.”2  The Judicial Council selected Judge Thomas Reardon of the 
                                              
2  
In addition to the present matter, the hearing concerned People v. Lawrence 
Stringer, No. 982011-9; People v. Kermith Harbison, No. 990285-9; People v. 
Vincent  Bailey, No. 990301-4; People v. Brian Williams, No. 971571-5; People v. 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
14 
Alameda County Superior Court to hear the motion to quash.  An evidentiary 
hearing began on May 17, 1999.  
The parties stipulated that the court would consider the reporter’s transcript 
and exhibits received in evidence in People v. Aldridge Currie (Super. Ct. Contra 
Costa County, 1998, No. 962407-3).  The trial court in that case denied the 
defendant’s motion to quash the master jury list and jury venire, and the Court of 
Appeal affirmed.  (People v. Currie (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 225, 228.)  The 
defendant presented “statistical evidence that the number of African-Americans in 
Contra Costa County totaled 8.4 percent of the county’s adult population, but that 
only approximately 4.6 percent of the persons who appeared for jury duty in 
response to summons were African-Americans.”  (Id. at p. 233.)  Both the trial 
court and the Court of Appeal adopted the results of a study performed by 
Dr. Robert Ross at Currie’s behest that “revealed that less than 5 percent (4.6 to 
4.8 percent) of the jurors called in a sample period were African-Americans.”  (Id. 
at p. 233, fn. 2.)  The Court of Appeal, however, also accepted “the Attorney 
General’s additional argument that [the court] must use the roughly 8 percent (8.1 
percent) figure for the percentage of African-American adults in the county’s 
population, rather than an 8.4 percent figure, which included all persons regardless 
of age.”  (Ibid.) 
The Court of Appeal in Currie acknowledged that underrepresentation of 
African-Americans in Contra Costa jury venires “is a long-standing problem, 
dating back at least 20 years.”  (People v. Currie, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 235.)  
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
Carl Cotright, No. 990211-5; People v. Antonio Warren, No. 990566-2; and 
People v. Lamonta Ramey, No. 981648-9. 
15 
But the court held that Currie had failed to make a prima facie showing “that the 
disparity was caused by the ‘systematic exclusion’ of African-American jurors.”  
(Ibid.)  To the contrary, the court held that “the procedures employed by the 
county to summon and select persons for jury service are, according to the 
undisputed evidence, entirely race-neutral.”  (Id. at p. 236.)  Currie upheld the trial 
court’s finding that the disparity in representation was attributable to the 
“disproportionately high rate of failure to appear by those summoned for jury 
service from the county’s Bay Judicial District, which is located in the City of 
Richmond” (ibid.), and in which approximately 75 percent of the African-
American population in Contra Costa County resided (id. at p. 234).  The court 
concluded:  “ ‘Statistical underrepresentation of minority groups resulting from 
race-neutral . . . practices does not amount to “systematic exclusion” necessary to 
support a representative cross-section claim.  [Citations.]’  [Citation.]”  (Id. at 
p. 236.)  
In evaluating defendant’s claim in this case, the trial court considered 
additional testimonial evidence.  The Jury Commissioner, represented by county 
counsel, called as a witness Assistant Jury Commissioner Sherry Dorfman.  She 
testified that in 1999, she began administering a questionnaire to all prospective 
jurors appearing countywide that collected information including the jurors’ 
residential zip code, gender, “ethnicity with respect to Hispanic origin,” and racial 
self-identification.  The questionnaire also asked if the jurors were licensed drivers 
or identification card holders and registered voters.  The 1990 census showed that 
the percentage of African-Americans in the population of Contra Costa County 
was 8.4 percent.  Dorfman’s expert opinion was that, at the time of the hearing, 
there was a “relatively small underrepresentation of African-Americans in the jury 
venire as compared to the County population.”  In particular, Dorfman testified 
that “[t]he absolute difference between the percentage of African-Americans 
16 
appearing in the jury venire [and the percentage of African-Americans in Contra 
Costa County] is 1.1 percent[age points].”  She further testified that the absolute 
disparity for African-American citizens who are over the age of 18 years is 2.71 
percentage points. 
The defense called as a witness Dr. Peter Sperlich, who testified as an 
expert in statistical analysis.  Dr. Sperlich questioned Dorfman’s 1999 study 
because it included subjects called for jury service during only a two and a half-
month period.  Dr. Sperlich calculated an “absolute disparity of 2.71 percentage 
points [and] a comparative disparity of 27.24 percent,” which he termed “a very 
substantial underrepresentation.”  The trial court noted:  “The Jury 
Commissioner’s year-end reports show that the residents of the Bay District, 
Richmond, at least in 1998, . . . 43 percent of those who got a jury summons in 
that judicial district didn’t show up, or failed to appear, which is the highest of the 
four judicial districts.  The Delta district, which is Pittsburg, was 30 percent, 
approximately.  Mt. Diablo 20 percent, and Walnut Creek 15 percent.”  
After considering both the Currie record and the additional evidence 
introduced at the hearings in these consolidated cases, the trial court denied 
defendant’s motion to quash the jury venire.  The court found “that the adult 
population of African Americans in this county rests probably somewhere in the 
low eight percent.”  The court relied on “the Ross study” because the subjects in 
the Ross study “self-identified” their race, as did the subjects in the census.  The 
court gave less weight to Dorfman’s questionnaire because it permitted individuals 
to “check more than one box,” which is different from “the census data I have 
available to compare it against, which requires that folks check only one box.”  
Finding the Ross survey to be “the best survey,” the trial court found that the adult 
population of African-Americans in Contra Costa County was 8.4 percent while 
the percentage of African-Americans in the jury pool was 4.8 percent.  This 
17 
absolute disparity of 3.6 percentage points produced a comparative disparity 
“somewhere around 43 percent,” which the court found “is statistically significant, 
whether . . . I do a comparative disparity or an absolute disparity . . . .”3 
The trial court ruled, however, that defendant had not carried his burden to 
show that this underrepresentation was the result of systematic exclusion and thus 
“constitutionally impermissible.”  The court found that the evidence did not 
support defendant’s argument that the disparity was caused by the distance 
between the district in which the majority of African-Americans in Contra Costa 
County live and the district in which felony trials were held.  The trial court noted 
that the Jury Commissioner’s office “ha[d] taken steps to improve the system,” 
such as adopting a “one day one trial” system of jury duty and using “proportional 
summoning.”  Although the court questioned whether the office was “doing 
everything [it] could do” to address the underrepresentation of African-Americans 
in the jury pool, the court ultimately concluded that defendant had not carried his 
burden to demonstrate that the underrepresentation was likely caused by any 
feature of the jury selection system. 
b.  Discussion 
A criminal defendant has a “right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, to a petit jury selected from a fair cross section of the community.”  
(Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 359 (Duren); see People v. Howard 
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1159.)  “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the 
fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged 
                                              
3  
Counsel later pointed out that “Dr. Ross found that the African American 
representation in the survey was 4.6” percent and the court agreed.  Using the 4.6 
percent figure results in an absolute disparity of 3.8 percentage points and a 
comparative disparity of 45 percent. 
18 
to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the 
representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair 
and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and 
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the 
jury-selection process.”  (Duren, at p. 364.)  If a defendant establishes a prima 
facie violation, the burden then shifts to the state to show “attainment of a fair 
cross section to be incompatible with a significant state interest.”  (Id. at p. 368.) 
The parties do not dispute that African-Americans are a “distinctive” group 
for purposes of Duren’s first prong.  (See People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 
526.)  As for the second prong, the parties dispute whether defendant has carried 
his burden of demonstrating that the proportion of African-Americans in the jury 
pool is not “fair and reasonable” relative to their numbers in the community.  The 
evidence before the trial court showed there was a 3.8 percentage point absolute 
disparity and a 45 percent comparative disparity.  The Attorney General argues 
that courts have previously held that “numbers much higher than those . . . were 
insufficient to show disparity.”  In People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1156, 
for example, this court concluded that “a range of absolute disparity between 2.7 
and 4.3 percent[age points] and of comparative disparity between 23.5 and 37.4 
percent” is not constitutionally significant.  (See also People v. Cunningham 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 652 [an absolute disparity of 7.2 percentage points and a 
relative disparity of 30 percent “are not constitutionally significant”].)  But the 
trial court here found a comparative disparity of roughly 43 percent, which 
exceeds the range we have found insufficient in prior cases.  Our cases do not 
definitively identify the point at which such a disparity becomes constitutionally 
significant.  And as we have repeatedly noted, “the [United States] Supreme Court 
has not yet spoken definitively on either the means by which disparity may be 
measured or the constitutional limit of permissible disparity.”  (People v. Bell, 
19 
supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 527-528, fns. omitted; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 
Cal.4th 833, 856-857.)  The high court has since affirmed that none of its cases 
“specifies the method or test courts must use to measure the representation of 
distinctive groups in jury pools,” while noting that both “[a]bsolute disparity and 
comparative disparity measurements . . . can be misleading when, as here, 
‘members of the distinctive group comp[ose] [only] a small percentage of those 
eligible for jury service.’  ”  (Berghuis v. Smith (2010) 559 U.S. 314, 329.)   
As in our prior cases, we need not resolve these issues here.  The trial court 
found there was “a pattern of underrepresentation” that was “statistically 
significant,” but questioned whether it was “of such a degree that it rises to a 
constitutional level.”  The trial court ultimately concluded that defendant’s fair 
cross-section claim failed because he did not satisfy the third prong of the Duren 
test.  We agree with the trial court’s conclusion.  Even if defendant has carried his 
burden of showing that African-Americans are underrepresented in Contra Costa 
County juries, he has not carried his burden of showing that this 
underrepresentation is the product of systematic exclusion. 
Defendant’s primary argument is that the long-standing history of 
underrepresentation of African-Americans in Contra Costa County jury pools, 
combined with the county’s “failure to take steps to remedy this problem,” itself 
demonstrates systematic exclusion.  But as defendant acknowledges, our cases 
have held that “[a] defendant does not discharge the burden of demonstrating that 
the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion merely by offering 
statistical evidence of a disparity.  A defendant must show, in addition, that the 
disparity is the result of an improper feature of the jury selection process.”  
(People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 857.)  “Where, as here, a 
county’s jury selection criteria are neutral with respect to the distinctive group, the 
defendant must identify some aspect of the manner in which those criteria are 
20 
applied that is not only the probable cause of the disparity but also constitutionally 
impermissible.  [Citation.]  . . . Speculation as to the source of the disparity is 
insufficient to show systematic exclusion [citation], as is evidence the disparity is 
unlikely to be a product of chance [citation] or has endured for some time 
[citation].”  (Id. at p. 858.) 
Defendant relies for his argument on language in Duren stating that the 
defendant in that case had established systematic exclusion by demonstrating that 
women were underrepresented in jury pools “not just occasionally, but in every 
weekly venire for a period of nearly a year.”  (Duren, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 366.)  
This, the court said, “manifestly indicates that the cause of the underrepresentation 
was systematic — that is, inherent in the particular jury-selection process 
utilized.”  (Ibid.)  But as the remainder of the discussion makes clear, the 
defendant in Duren had identified a jury selection practice at the root of the 
persistent disparity:  a county’s administration of a state-law exemption permitting 
women to opt out of jury service.  (Id. at p. 367.)  The court did not hold that 
statistics demonstrating that a particular group is consistently underrepresented in 
the jury pool, standing alone, suffice to demonstrate that the group has been 
systematically excluded. 
Defendant does point to certain features of the Contra Costa County jury 
selection system that, in his view, are responsible for the underrepresentation of 
African-Americans in the jury pool.  First, he points to the county’s use of 
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and voter registration lists.  Defendant 
contends that “since it is well known that minorities register to vote at lower rates 
than Whites and that poorer people are less likely to own automobiles,” the county 
should also have used “other sources, for example utility company lists.”  This 
court has previously rejected a similar argument.  (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 398, 428.)  As we explained in Ochoa, “[t]he challenged state action must 
21 
be the probable cause of the disparity.”  (Ibid.)  Here, defendant has made no 
showing that the county’s use of the DMV and voter registration lists was the 
probable cause of the disparity he challenges, nor has he shown that any other 
available list would have produced a jury venire that was more representative of 
the population. 
Defendant next contends that African-Americans were systematically 
excluded because all felony trials are held in the Martinez courthouse, which “is 
located far from the centers of the African-American population,” and because the 
county fails to provide reasonable public transportation.  The evidence does not 
substantiate defendant’s argument.  The trial court noted that the failure-to-appear 
rate for residents of the Bay District—in which approximately 75 percent of the 
African-American population of Contra Costa County resided—was about the 
same whether they were summoned to appear in the Martinez courthouse or the 
Richmond courthouse, which is located in the Bay District:  “The Jury 
Commissioner’s year-end reports show that the residents of the Bay District . . . 43 
percent of those who got a jury summons in that judicial district didn’t show up” 
in the Martinez courthouse, whereas the failure to appear rate for Bay residents 
summoned to the Richmond courthouse was 42.5 percent.  As the trial court later 
added:  “The statistics would tell us it’s not geography and transportation. . . .  
[T]he failure-to-appear rate is . . . roughly the same for Bay residents, when they 
are summoned to come to Martinez as when they are summoned to come to 
Richmond.” 
Finally, defendant points to the county’s failure to follow up when a 
potential juror does not respond to an initial summons.  But defendant has not 
shown that the county’s failure to engage in more aggressive follow-up is a cause 
of underrepresentation of African-Americans in the jury pool in Contra Costa 
County.  In rejecting a similar claim, the Court of Appeal in People v. Currie, 
22 
supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at page 237, footnote 5, wrote:  “[T]here is no merit in 
appellant’s suggestion that the county was required to conduct more extensive 
follow-up of African-American jurors who do not appear, in order to coerce their 
attendance.  The county currently takes reasonable steps to follow up and urge 
attendance for all jurors.  A more coercive and harassing approach, which singles 
out African-American jurors, would seemingly raise serious questions of fairness 
and discrimination.”  Like the Court of Appeal, we cannot conclude that the 
county’s failure to conduct more aggressive follow-up is an improper feature of 
the jury selection process that resulted in the systematic exclusion of African-
American jurors. 
B.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Motion to Exclude Evidence of an Uncharged Murder  
The trial court ruled that if Dr. Dutton testified that defendant’s murders of 
his pregnant wife and daughter were consistent with a “rage killing,” rather than 
premeditated murder, then the prosecution would be permitted to impeach 
Dr. Dutton with evidence that defendant had participated in an uncharged 
attempted robbery and felony murder in 1994, as well as committing other crimes 
involving violence.  As a result, Dr. Dutton testified in general terms about “rage 
killings” of wives by their husbands, but did not offer his opinion that defendant’s 
homicides were consistent with such a rage killing.  Defendant argues that the trial 
court’s ruling was incorrect as a matter of state evidentiary law, deprived him of a 
fair trial by precluding him from presenting critical evidence in his own defense, 
and violated his “Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process 
rights to present a defense and to a fair trial, his Sixth Amendment right to 
effective counsel and an impartial jury and his Eighth Amendment right to a fair, 
23 
reliable sentencing determination, and the state constitutional analogs to the 
federal Constitution.”  Defendant’s arguments lack merit.  
a.  Background 
Before trial, the prosecutor stated that if a penalty phase was conducted, he 
would introduce evidence that defendant admitted planning and participating in 
the attempted robbery and murder of Jerome Bryant in New York City in 1994.  
The prosecutor stated, however, that he did not intend to introduce this evidence at 
the guilt phase in the case-in-chief, but might use it on rebuttal or on cross-
examination.  At the court’s urging, the prosecutor promised not to refer to this 
evidence during the guilt phase without first warning the court and defendant. 
Later, defendant filed a pretrial motion “to exclude from the ‘guilt’ phase of 
the jury trial evidence of any other crimes attributed to him but not charged in this 
case.”  The court ruled that the prosecution could not introduce evidence of 
Jerome Bryant’s murder in the prosecution’s case-in-chief and ordered that the 
prosecution “make no reference to the Bryant murder either on cross-examination 
or rebuttal without first approaching the Bench . . . .” 
On December 7, 1999, the day before the prosecution rested its case-in-
chief, defendant filed a motion requesting an ex parte, in camera hearing to present 
an offer of proof regarding the testimony of Dr. Dutton.  The motion stated:  
“Whether the defense will call Dr. Donald Dutton as a witness at trial will depend 
on this court’s ruling as to admissibility of the Bryant incident in any cross-
examination of Dr. Dutton . . . .”  The motion recounted that after defendant was 
arrested, he told a New York City police officer that in 1994, in New York, he, his 
brother, and a friend attempted to rob a man who had just left a bank.  Defendant 
told the officer that his brother and a friend threw the victim off a bridge and 
defendant searched the body after the victim landed. 
24 
Defendant made an offer of proof stating that “Dr. Donald Dutton is an 
expert on the subject of domestic violence, the personality of male batterers, and 
the etiology and causes of wife assault and femicide.”  The offer of proof stated 
that Dr. Dutton had reviewed “certain materials, including statements of the 
defendant, pertinent police reports, and other material regarding the background 
and development of the defendant” and had a “professional expert opinion 
regarding the mental condition of Mr. Henriquez on August 12th, 1996, and how 
that mental condition affected conduct on that date.”  Defendant stated that 
Dr. Dutton’s opinion would “assist the jury in reaching their own conclusion about 
the mental state of the defendant regarding the issue of premeditation and 
deliberation.” 
Dr. Dutton was called as a witness outside the presence of the jury.  He 
testified that his study of “spousal homicides” revealed “that they’re characterized 
typically by a history of domestic violence that culminates, leads up to, precedes 
the homicide. . . .  That the homicide is frequently almost sort of an inexplicably 
violent act, frequently referred to as ‘overkill.’  That is, there’s so much rage that’s 
released in an act of spousal homicide, because so much rage builds up on an 
intimate bond, that the amount of violence that occurs is frequently more than 
would be required to kill a person.”  “[T]he men who sort of express this huge 
explosion of rage are in a somewhat . . . ‘disassociated state.’  They’re confused 
after the fact. . . .  And I think this is indicative of the fact that when they’re in this 
rageful state they’re in — what might be considered almost an altered state of 
consciousness . . . .”  
Based on materials describing the crime scene, Dr. Dutton opined:  “[I]t 
appeared to be what I would call a very disorganized crime scene.  It . . . didn’t 
show much planning.  For example, the weapons were weapons that were largely 
every-day household items that appeared to have been grabbed on the spot.  There 
25 
was a considerable amount of violence that was committed, what I would consider 
to be overkill. . . .  [T]his was a homicide that had the earmarks of what I would 
call an ‘estrangement homicide’ or an ‘abandonment homicide’ that seemed to be 
precipitated by intimate issues, and had the characteristics of intimate rage 
associated with it.” 
Dr. Dutton stated that defendant’s “relationship with his wife was highly 
conflictual, where there were periods of physical abuse, certainly a lot of verbal 
abuse that occurred during the relationship.  There were a number of separations 
where his wife left, sometimes taking the baby with her.  And then a return to 
reconcile with Mr. Henriquez.”  Dr. Dutton opined, “So two of the kind of 
hallmark characteristics of what I would call a spousal estrangement homicide 
appeared to be evident in the evidence that I reviewed.”  Dr. Dutton also read 
Carmen’s diary and notes written by Carmen found in a kitchen drawer that 
“looked . . . like an escape plan.”  Dr. Dutton opined, “She had a battered women’s 
shelter number on there, and a number of statements that she appeared to have 
written to herself. . . .  So it looked to me like two things were going on here:  
There had been a history of abuse, and it looked as though she was planning to 
exit the relationship.”  In Dr. Dutton’s view, the fact that a wife has left or is 
planning to leave “makes it about 600 percent more likely” that a spousal 
homicide will occur. 
Dr. Dutton testified that he knew about defendant’s participation in the 
attempted robbery and murder of Jerome Bryant in New York in 1994.  Although 
it was not “completely irrelevant,” Dr. Dutton stated that the attempted robbery 
and murder of Bryant did not affect his opinion about the “causes of the conduct 
of Mr. Henriquez on August 12th, 1996.”  Dr. Dutton testified:  “I would simply 
see the characteristics of the homicide that occurred where Carmen Henriquez was 
the victim, the facts surrounding those homicides, as really fitting a particular 
26 
pattern.  And things that occurred on the outside would be marginally related to 
that set of facts.”  Nor would the fact that defendant later discussed killing a guard 
in order to escape from jail cause Dr. Dutton to alter his opinion:  “I still see the 
pattern . . . as a spousal homicide with all the particular and specific earmarks of a 
spousal homicide.”  Dr. Dutton acknowledged that “an act of intimate rage is not 
necessarily inconsistent with something that’s planned.” 
Dr. Dutton also considered it relevant that defendant’s older brother, 
Michael, was “incarcerated for spousal homicide.”  Dr. Dutton testified that this 
fact played a role in the formulation of his opinion because “it was part of sort of 
the entire examination of family background and things that had occurred during 
[defendant’s] upbringing, and I suppose the fact that they were raised in a family 
that I would say was kind of a breeding ground for violence.” 
On cross-examination, Dr. Dutton explained the difference between “the 
impulsive batterer” and “the instrumental batterer.”  The impulsive batterer is 
“reactive” and “their violence is predominantly within the relationship.”  The 
impulsive batterer is unable “to modulate . . . the emotions that stem from 
physiological arousal.”  The instrumental batterer is “lacking in conscience . . . 
[and] uses violence . . . both within the relationship and outside the relationship 
. . . to achieve some instrumental goal.”  
In distinguishing between impulsive and instrumental batterers, Dr. Dutton 
agreed that he would “want to see whether the violence centered predominantly 
within the relationship or outside the relationship” and whether “there’s a history 
of any other antisocial behavior.”  Dr. Dutton explained:  “If I ran across a person 
that . . . exhibited a lot of antisocial characteristics, as Mr. Henriquez did, one of 
the things I’d want to know right off the top was something about their emotional 
makeup.  And if I saw that there was a kind of a consistent emotional makeup in 
the commission of antisocial acts, outside the relationship and within the 
27 
relationship—that is, that they were kind of a cold, affectively flat person, who 
could use violence really without being upset by the use of the violence, with a 
person that was totally lacking in empathy—I might come to one conclusion . . . .  
If, on the other hand, I notice that the use of violence outside the relationship 
seemed to have one sort of motivational pattern behind it, but the within-
relationship behavior was characterized by extreme volatility, emotion that was 
leading to, as I said before, break ups and reconciliations, if I saw a 
disproportionate rage response that indicated an inability to modulate arousal, 
where the emotional reactions were quite extreme within the relationship, then I 
would come to the conclusion, as I did in this case, that the motivation and pattern 
of the violence within the relationship was differentially motivated than the 
violence outside the relationship.” 
The court held that if Dr. Dutton testified that defendant murdered his wife 
as an impulsive act of rage rather than an act of “goal-oriented violence,” the 
People could introduce evidence of defendant’s participation in the Bryant killing, 
evidence of violence or threats of violence in connection with the bank robberies, 
and evidence of defendant’s willingness to kill a guard in order to effectuate 
escape.  The trial court explained:  “[A]ll of these were instances of goal-oriented 
violence.  Each of these have value, in and of themselves, and a synergism in 
connection with each other, in terms of their value, for allowing a jury to evaluate 
the opinion of the expert in this case.”  The court noted that defendant did not 
dispute that he unlawfully killed the victims with malice aforethought.  Rather, it 
noted, “The only issue in this case is:  Is it an impulsive act of domestic rage or 
intimate rage, or was it the product of some deliberation and premeditation?”  The 
court concluded that evidence of the Bryant murder would be “extremely 
probative on a vital if indeed not key issue, and may be the only issue in this case, 
and . . . it’s not substantially outweighed by the prejudicial value that it has.” 
28 
In light of the court’s ruling, defense counsel stated he would have 
Dr. Dutton “testify to general principles that are at play in situations involving 
spousal homicide . . . without reference to this particular defendant” and without 
expressing an opinion that “this particular defendant acted impulsively in light of 
all the evidence he had examined here.”  Counsel, however, expressed the “great 
concern of the defense . . . because we have retreated to something far from what 
we think we are entitled,” and which “would be far more powerful and far more 
helpful to the defense.” 
b.  Discussion 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that evidence of the 
attempted robbery and murder of Bryant would be admissible to impeach 
Dr. Dutton if he testified that defendant’s subsequent killing of his pregnant wife 
and daughter was the unplanned product of “intimate rage” rather than 
premeditated murder, because the Bryant murder was irrelevant to Dr. Dutton’s 
expert opinion and the prejudicial impact of the evidence far outweighed its 
probative value. 
We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Doolin 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 437.)  Evidence Code section 721, subdivision (a), 
provides that “a witness testifying as an expert may be cross-examined to the same 
extent as any other witness and, in addition, may be fully cross-examined as to 
(1) his or her qualifications, (2) the subject to which his or her expert testimony 
relates, and (3) the matter upon which his or her opinion is based and the reasons 
for his or her opinion.”  “ ‘A party “may cross-examine an expert witness more 
extensively and searchingly than a lay witness, and the prosecution [is] entitled to 
attempt to discredit the expert’s opinion.  [Citation.]  . . .” ’  [Citations.]  . . . 
‘ “ ‘Once an expert offers his opinion, . . . he exposes himself to the kind of 
29 
inquiry which ordinarily would have no place in the cross-examination of a factual 
witness.  The expert invites investigation into the extent of his knowledge, the 
reasons for his opinion including facts and other matters upon which it is 
based [citation], and which he took into consideration; and he may be “subjected 
to the most rigid cross-examination” concerning his qualifications, and his opinion 
and its sources [citation].’  (Italics added.)” ’ ”  (People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 
Cal.4th 587, 647.) 
Defendant argues that evidence of the Bryant homicide was irrelevant 
because Dr. Dutton was aware of it and it had no effect on his expert opinion.  But 
the credibility of an expert witness may be challenged based on the sources of 
information the expert relied on to form his or her opinion.  (People v. Rodriguez, 
supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 646-647 [“Under state law, an expert such as a psychiatrist 
may rely on various sources of information, including hearsay, in forming an 
opinion, and a party may question that expert about that information to test the 
expert’s credibility.”].)  The prosecution was entitled to explore Dr. Dutton’s 
knowledge of the Bryant homicide in an attempt to discredit the expert’s opinion.  
(Id. at p. 647 [“the prosecutor was entitled to explore with [the expert] occasions 
in which he had reason to believe defendant had lied, to attempt to discredit his 
reliance on defendant’s other statements, and to attempt to discredit [the expert]’s 
opinion . . . .”]; People v. Nye (1969) 71 Cal.2d 356, 375 [proper for prosecutor to 
ask defense expert witness whether he would change his opinion “ ‘if certain 
additional facts were known to him’ ”].)  It was for the jury to determine whether 
the circumstances of the Bryant homicide were relevant and affected the 
credibility of Dr. Dutton’s testimony. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that evidence of the 
Bryant murder could be admitted to impeach Dr. Dutton if he testified that the 
charged murders were an unplanned product of “intimate rage” and, thus, were not 
30 
premeditated.  Dr. Dutton had testified that among the factors he considered in 
determining whether the charged murders resulted from an impulsive act of rage 
or were planned acts to achieve a goal were whether defendant’s prior violent acts 
“centered predominantly within the relationship or outside the relationship,” and 
whether “there’s a history of any other antisocial behavior.”  Dr. Dutton stated that 
he would consider whether defendant’s prior violent acts showed that defendant 
“could use violence really without being upset by the use of the violence” and was 
“a person that was totally lacking in empathy.”  Evidence that defendant had 
participated in the murder of Jerome Bryant for the purpose of robbing him would 
have been highly relevant to impeach Dr. Dutton’s testimony. 
We agree with the trial court that this conclusion finds support in our 
decision in People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, which addressed an 
analogous issue.  Hendricks was charged with robbing and murdering James 
Parmer and Charleston Haynes.  The prosecution introduced evidence that 
Hendricks was a male prostitute.  He had a paid sexual encounter with Parmer’s 
roommate and, a few days later, broke into the apartment and shot Parmer six 
times at point-blank range.  Hendricks later had a paid sexual encounter with 
Haynes and then shot him five times at point-blank range. 
After the prosecution rested its case-in-chief, Hendricks made an offer of 
proof that psychologist Linda Carson would testify in support of the defense’s 
theory that the murders were not premeditated because in committing the murders, 
“defendant acted out of ‘homosexual rage,’ ” which was described as an 
“irresistible impulse springing from fear that he was in fact homosexual.”  (People 
v. Hendricks, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 642, 641.)  The trial court ruled that if 
Dr. Carson so testified, the prosecution would be permitted to impeach her with 
evidence that near the time of the charged murders, Hendricks also murdered two 
31 
other gay men in Los Angeles and a woman in Oakland.  The defense rested 
without presenting any evidence.  (Ibid.) 
Hendricks held that the trial court did not err:  “Other-crimes evidence may 
be used to impeach the testimony of an expert witness.  [Citations.]  Because an 
expert witness may be cross-examined more extensively and searchingly than a 
lay witness, the court has broad discretion to admit such evidence for 
impeachment.  [Citations.]  [¶]  No abuse of discretion appears here.  Because 
Dr. Carson’s ‘opinion . . . was at odds with the evidence introduced by the 
prosecution,’ the prosecutor was entitled to ‘attempt to discredit’ it.”  (People v. 
Hendricks, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 642.)  The same is true here:  The prosecution 
was entitled to discredit Dr. Dutton’s opinion with evidence of defendant’s goal-
oriented violence.   
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling that the probative value 
of the proffered evidence would have outweighed its prejudicial effect.  
“ ‘ “Prejudice” as contemplated by [Evidence Code] section 352 is not so 
sweeping as to include any evidence the opponent finds inconvenient.  Evidence is 
not prejudicial, as that term is used in a section 352 context, merely because it 
undermines the opponent’s position or shores up that of the proponent. . . .  “ ‘The 
“prejudice” referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which 
uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual 
and which has very little effect on the issues.  In applying section 352, 
“prejudicial” is not synonymous with “damaging.” ’  [Citation.]”  [Citation.]  [¶] 
The prejudice that section 352 “ ‘is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or 
damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative 
evidence.’  [Citations.]  ‘Rather, the statute uses the word in its etymological sense 
of “prejudging” a person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors.  [Citation.]’  
[Citation.]”  [Citation.]  In other words, evidence should be excluded as unduly 
32 
prejudicial when it is of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the 
jury, motivating them to use the information, not to logically evaluate the point 
upon which it is relevant, but to reward or punish one side because of the jurors’ 
emotional reaction.  In such a circumstance, the evidence is unduly prejudicial 
because of the substantial likelihood the jury will use it for an illegitimate 
purpose.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 438-439.)  
In most cases, the danger of inflaming the emotions of the jury by admitting 
evidence of an uncharged murder is that the jury will conclude that the defendant 
committed the charged murder because he has a propensity to kill.  But in this 
case, defendant had stipulated that he murdered the victims; the question was 
whether he planned the murders.  Here, evidence that defendant had previously 
been involved in the Bryant homicide would have been highly relevant to the 
jury’s consideration of Dr. Dutton’s testimony that defendant killed his victims as 
an impulsive act of rage rather than an act of “goal-oriented violence.”  The 
probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the risk that 
the jury would consider the evidence for a different, illegitimate purpose. 
Finally, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court’s ruling violated his 
federal constitutional rights:  “The ‘routine application of state evidentiary law 
does not implicate [a] defendant’s constitutional rights.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1014.) 
2.  Attempt to Escape from Jail 
Defendant argues that he was denied due process and his right under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments “to a reliable adjudication at all stages of a 
death penalty case” because the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution 
could admit evidence at the guilt phase of the trial that defendant had attempted to 
escape from jail. 
33 
In response to defendant’s pretrial motion “to exclude from the ‘guilt’ 
phase of the jury trial evidence of any other crimes attributed to him but not 
charged in this case,” the prosecution argued that defendant’s participation in an 
attempted jail escape was admissible to show consciousness of guilt.  The trial 
court agreed.  During trial, the parties stipulated “that on August 5th, 1998, five 
inmates, including Christopher Henriquez, using part of a cell bunk attempted to 
pry open a cell window to escape from the custody of the Main Detention Facility 
of Contra Costa County where they were housed awaiting trial.” 
Defendant argues that because there was no dispute that he murdered the 
victims, and the only contested issue at the guilt phase of the trial was whether the 
murders were premeditated and deliberate, consciousness of guilt was irrelevant.  
Therefore, defendant argues, there was no reason to admit the escape evidence.  
Defendant cites People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 32, which held that 
while evidence that the defendant tried to “ ‘cover up’ ” a murder “may possibly 
bear on defendant’s state of mind after the killing, it is irrelevant to ascertaining 
defendant’s state of mind immediately prior to, or during, the killing.”   
As defendant acknowledges, we rejected a similar claim in People v. Moon 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, in which the defendant was charged with premeditated 
murder and admitted killing the victims.  We said:  “Although defendant’s theory 
of the case was that he was guilty of only second degree murder, he pleaded not 
guilty to the charges, thereby putting in issue ‘all of the elements of the offenses.’  
[Citation.]  Even if he conceded at trial his guilt of some form of criminal 
homicide, ‘the prosecution is still entitled to prove its case and especially to prove 
a fact so central to the basic question of guilt as intent.’  [Citation.]  We have 
previously rejected the notion that the flight instruction is improper when an 
accused concedes the issue of identity and merely contests his mental state at the 
time of the crime.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 28.) 
34 
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 
because the prejudicial effect of this evidence substantially outweighed its 
probative value.  As we held in People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1126, 
where an attempted escape “involve[s] no overt violence,” “the risk of undue 
prejudice [is] slight.”  (Accord, People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 963.) 
3.  Admission of the Victim’s Statement 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that three 
weeks before her death, defendant’s wife, Carmen, told her cousin that defendant 
“was into ‘heavy stuff.’ ”  Defendant asserts that this error violated his rights to 
due process and to confront and cross-examine witnesses, as well as his “right to a 
reliable determination of guilt and penalty as guaranteed by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and analogous 
provisions of the California Constitution.”  We find no error. 
a.  Background 
During trial, defendant filed a motion in limine asking the court to “rule on 
the admissibility of any statements attributed to Carmen Henriquez, the 
defendant’s wife and one of the victims in this case, that the prosecutor intends to 
introduce.”  Just before the testimony of Carmen’s cousin, Trenice White, the 
prosecutor represented that White would testify that on July 19, 1996, Carmen 
came to stay at her apartment for a few days.  White would testify that Carmen 
“seemed upset, said Christopher was into heavy stuff but didn’t elaborate further 
. . . .” 
The trial court ruled that Carmen’s out-of-court statement that defendant 
was “into heavy stuff” was admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of showing her 
state of mind that she believed her husband was involved in “heavy stuff,” 
specifically bank robberies.  The evidence also was admissible as a spontaneous 
35 
statement because it was made under the stress or excitement of Carmen realizing 
that her husband was involved in bank robberies.  The trial court then clarified its 
ruling:  “If [the statement] were offered for the truth of the matter asserted that 
[defendant] was into heavy stuff, I believe there is enough here to indicate it’s a 
spontaneous statement, falls within the exception of the hearsay rule.  However, 
my princip[al] ruling is that it is based on the fact that in my view it is not hearsay, 
it is being offered to establish that Carmen had knowledge of the bank robberies 
and was talking about them in this form of defendant being into heavy stuff to 
third parties.  And . . . when considered for those purposes, it’s not even hearsay.  
It’s . . . state of mind of Carmen and communication of that state of mind to a third 
party, which [in] my view are relevant to the overall motive contentions of the 
People in this case.” 
Later, the court revisited the issue and explained:  “The nonhearsay purpose 
really has nothing to do with Carmen’s state of mind.  It has to do with the fact of 
the communication made by Carmen to a third party, and how that might 
corroborate the People’s motive.”  The court again undertook to clarify its ruling, 
terming its earlier reliance on Carmen’s state of mind “unfortunate”:  “It’s not 
really so much state of mind . . . it’s evidence of a communication made by 
Carmen to a friend.  And to that extent, it corroborates . . . that defendant had 
complained . . . about Carmen talking to her friends.”  The evidence that Carmen 
had spoken to her cousin about the bank robberies “tends to corroborate that 
defendant was concerned about that. . . .  It’s really not state of mind; it’s simply 
evidence of a communication.” 
The prosecutor called White as a witness. Her testimony was brief.  She 
stated she was Carmen Henriquez’s first cousin.  On July 19, 1996, Carmen and 
her daughter, Zuri, arrived at White’s apartment and stayed for three days.  
36 
Carmen seemed “abnormal,” “withdrawn,” and “stressed.”  Carmen told White 
that defendant “was into heavy stuff” but did not elaborate. 
b.  Discussion 
“ ‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was made other than 
by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of 
the matter stated.”  (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).)  “Except as provided by law, 
hearsay evidence is inadmissible.”  (Id., subd. (b).)  “We review claims regarding 
a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.”  
(People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266.) 
Here, White’s testimony that Carmen told her that defendant “was into 
heavy stuff” was admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of showing that Carmen 
had told someone that defendant was planning a bank robbery.  Carmen’s 
statement to her cousin that defendant was “into heavy stuff” was not offered to 
prove defendant actually was “into heavy stuff” or planning bank robberies, but to 
corroborate other evidence showing that defendant was upset that Carmen was 
talking about “his business,” which provided a motive for the murder.  The 
statement was admissible for this purpose.  (See People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 
Cal.4th 686, 697.) 
In Mendoza, the defendant killed his stepdaughter after his wife told him 
that his stepdaughter had accused him of molesting her.  This court upheld the 
admission of the stepdaughter’s accusations, explaining that the prosecutor had not 
offered the accusations “to prove defendant actually molested her, but rather to 
prove defendant was aware of the accusations and to explain defendant’s motive 
for killing” his stepdaughter.  (People v. Mendoza, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 697.)  
Thus, we explained, the statements were not hearsay and “were properly admitted 
to explain defendant’s state of mind, motive, and conduct.”  (Ibid.; see also People 
37 
v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 427-428 [gang leader’s statement at gang 
meeting that “ ‘We’re not killing enough people or our rivals’ ” admissible for the 
nonhearsay purpose of showing the defendant’s mental state when he shot and 
killed a police officer later that day].)   
Defendant argues that Mendoza is distinguishable because there is no 
evidence in the present case that defendant was aware of Carmen’s statement.  But 
there was circumstantial evidence that defendant was aware of Carmen’s 
statement, because he later complained to Carmen’s best friend, Angelique Foster, 
that Carmen “was going crazy telling people that he was . . . going to rob banks 
. . . .”  The lack of direct evidence that defendant was aware of Carmen’s 
statement affects its weight, but not its admissibility.   
4.  Jury Instructions on Consciousness of Guilt 
Defendant argues the trial court violated his “Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to due process, a fair trial, a jury trial, equal protection, and 
reliable jury determinations on guilt, the special circumstance and penalty, as well 
as their state constitutional analogs” by giving the jury instructions regarding 
consciousness of guilt based on CALJIC Nos. 2.03, 2.04, and 2.52.  First, the court 
instructed the jury they could consider “as a circumstance tending to prove a 
consciousness of guilt” that “before this trial, [the] defendant made a willfully 
false or deliberately misleading statement concerning any of the crime[s] for 
which [he] is now being tried” (see CALJIC No. 2.03) and “that defendant 
[attempted to] escape from jail after being charged with the crimes in this case” 
(see CALJIC No. 2.04).  The court also instructed the jury that “[t]he flight of a 
person immediately after the commission of a crime . . . is a fact which, if proved, 
may be considered by you in the light of all other proved facts in deciding whether 
a defendant is guilty or not guilty” (see CALJIC No. 2.52).  The trial court added 
38 
to each pattern instruction:  “[I]t is for you to determine whether such conduct in 
fact shows [consciousness of] guilt, and, if so, guilt of what crime or degree of 
crime.” 
Defendant argues the challenged instructions were unnecessary because the 
trial court had instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC Nos. 2.00 and 2.01, “that it 
may draw inferences from the circumstantial evidence.”  He further contends the 
challenged instructions were “impermissibly argumentative” in that they invited 
the jury to draw inferences favorable to the prosecution, and that the instructions 
improperly “permitted the jury to use the consciousness-of-guilt evidence to infer 
not only that [defendant] committed the murders, but that he had done so with 
premeditation and deliberation.”  
The Attorney General argues defendant forfeited this issue by failing to 
object at trial.  Penal Code section 1259 provides that an appellate court may 
“review any instruction given . . . , even though no objection was made thereto in 
the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.”  
We have held that a claim that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury 
pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.52 affects the defendant’s substantial rights.  (People v. 
Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1074, fn. 7.) 
We have previously considered and rejected the argument that CALJIC No. 
2.03 unnecessarily duplicates the circumstantial evidence instructions.  (People v. 
Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 50.)  We explained in Page “that ‘[t]he cautionary 
nature of [CALJIC No. 2.03] benefits the defense, admonishing the jury to 
circumspection regarding evidence that might otherwise be considered decisively 
inculpatory.  [Citations.]’  [Citation.]”  (Page, at p. 50.)  Noting that the jury in 
that case might have erroneously concluded that evidence that the defendant had 
lied about his whereabouts was sufficient to show he committed the crime, this 
court concluded that “CALJIC No. 2.03 specifically addresses this risk by 
39 
acknowledging the inference that may be drawn from a defendant’s willfully false 
or misleading statement, but precluding a finding of guilt based solely upon a 
willfully false or misleading statement.  Thus, CALJIC No. 2.03 is not merely 
duplicative of CALJIC No. 2.00 and CALJIC No. 2.01, which address more 
general principles of evidence.”  (Page, at p. 50, fn. omitted.)  The same rationale 
applies to CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.52, which similarly address the inferences that 
may be drawn from evidence of evasive behavior following the charged offense.  
(See People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 304 [CALJIC No. 2.03 does not 
violate due process]; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 179-180 [CALJIC 
No. 2.52 does not violate due process].) 
Further, defendant acknowledges that this court has “found California’s 
consciousness-of-guilt instructions not to be argumentative” (see, e.g., People v. 
Page, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 50-51; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 
713, and cases cited therein) and not to “permit irrational inferences concerning 
the defendant’s mental state” (see Page, at pp. 51-52; Nakahara, at p. 713; People 
v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 348, and cases cited therein).  Our cases have 
explained that these instructions are not argumentative because they “properly 
‘ “pinpoint[] the theory of the defense” ’ ” rather than “ ‘improperly impl[y] 
certain conclusions from specified evidence . . . .’ ”  (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 1164, 1223.)  The cases have also explained that “[n]o reasonable juror 
would conclude that CALJIC No. 2.03’s guidance concerning an inference that 
may be drawn from a defendant’s dishonest statements made after the commission 
of a crime establishes what the defendant was thinking at the time of the 
commission of the crime.”  (Page, at p. 51.)  Defendant urges this court to 
reconsider these cases but provides no persuasive reason for doing so. 
The instructions in this case regarding consciousness of guilt may be 
distinguishable from those in the cases discussed above because the trial judge 
40 
augmented each of the challenged instructions, telling the jury it is “for you to 
determine whether such conduct in fact shows consciousness of guilt, and, if so, 
guilt of what crime or degree of crime.”  (Italics added.)  But defendant does not 
argue that the additional language makes any difference to the analysis.  In any 
event, even if we were to assume that the instructions were erroneous, any error 
would be harmless.  The evidence admitted to show consciousness of guilt was 
irrelevant to determining the degree of the crime and the augmented instruction 
made clear it was for the jury to determine whether the evidence showed the 
degree of the crime.  It is likely the jury realized that this evidence had no effect 
on whether the murders were premeditated and, even if the jury did consider this 
evidence when determining the degree of the crime, the effect would be 
exceedingly weak and thus nonprejudicial. 
5.  Jury Instruction on Motive 
Defendant contends the trial court’s instruction based on CALJIC No. 2.51 
permitted the jury to determine guilt based upon motive alone and improperly 
shifted the burden of proof to defendant to establish his innocence, depriving him 
of his federal constitutional rights to a “fair jury trial, due process, and a reliable 
verdict in a capital case under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and their state constitutional analogs.”  Defendant acknowledges that we have 
previously considered and rejected his claims. 
The instruction stated:  “Motive is not an element of the crime charged and 
need not be shown.  However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a 
circumstance in this case.  Presence of motive may tend to establish the defendant 
is guilty.  Absence of motive may tend to show the defendant in not guilty.”  We 
repeatedly have rejected defendant’s argument “that this instruction allowed the 
jury to determine guilt based on the presence of an alleged motive only and 
41 
thereby lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof.”  (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 513, 553; see People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 889 [CALJIC No. 
2.51 does not violate due process].) 
6.  Separate Guilt and Penalty Juries and Sequestered Voir Dire 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying his requests for a separate 
penalty phase jury, for “sequestered, individualized ‘death qualification’ ” voir 
dire, and “to permit limited voir dire prior to the penalty phase.”  These errors, 
defendant contends, deprived him of his federal constitutional rights “to voir dire, 
an impartial jury, a fair trial, due process and reliable guilt, special circumstance 
and penalty determinations under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and their state constitutional 
analogs.” 
Before trial, defendant correctly anticipated that evidence that he had 
participated in the attempted robbery and murder of Jerome Bryant would not be 
admitted at the guilt phase of the trial but would be admitted at the penalty phase.  
Defendant asserts this was “a primary reason” he asked that a new jury be selected 
if a penalty phase was necessary or that dual juries be empaneled.  He further 
asked that only the penalty phase jury be “death qualified,” and that “any death 
qualification be conducted on an individual, sequestered basis.”  His goal was to 
ensure that “jurors who would be deciding the appropriate penalty after hearing 
about an additional murder could be asked about its impact without tainting jurors 
at the guilt phase of the case.”  The trial court denied these requests, observing that 
Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (c), “expresses a clear legislative intent that 
at least where good cause does not require otherwise, that both the guilt and the 
penalty phase of a capital trial will be tried by the same jury.”  The court noted 
that having a single jury is a more efficient use of judicial resources and the jury 
42 
that determined the defendant’s guilt is “in a better position to determine what the 
appropriate punishment should be.” 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Penal Code section 190.4, 
subdivision (c), provides that unless the trial court has discharged the jury that 
determined the defendant’s guilt, the same jury that “convicted the defendant of a 
crime for which he may be subject to the death penalty . . . shall consider . . . the 
penalty to be applied . . . .”  “In People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551 . . . , we 
recognized that Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (c), ‘expresses a clear 
legislative intent that both the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial be tried by 
the same jury.’  [Citation.]  There, we held that the ‘mere desire’ of defense 
counsel ‘to voir dire in one way for the guilt phase and a different way for the 
penalty phase’ ‘does not constitute “good cause” for deviating from the clear 
legislative mandate . . . .’ ”  (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 268; see 
also People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 325.)  Here, as in our prior cases, 
defendant’s wish to conduct voir dire differently at the penalty phase does not 
provide sufficient cause to deviate from the procedure set out in Penal Code 
section 190.4.  (See also People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 600 [unitary 
jury does not violate the federal Constitution].) 
The trial court also denied defendant’s request to voir dire prospective 
jurors individually regarding their views on the death penalty, noting that “most of 
this information is being elicited by form of a written questionnaire, which they 
will be answering at home,” and promising that “it will be made clear to the jurors 
that if they want to ask any question outside the presence of the other jurors, 
they’re entirely welcome to that.  I’ll honor their request. . . .  [I]f they feel they 
can speak more freely about any subject matter by simply meeting with us . . . 
outside the presence of the jury, I will honor that request.” 
43 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion.  As defendant acknowledges, 
Proposition 115, which took effect on June 6, 1990, amended Code of Civil 
Procedure former section 223 to read as follows:  “In a criminal case, the court 
shall conduct the examination of prospective jurors.  However, the court may 
permit the parties, upon a showing of good cause, to supplement the examination 
by such further inquiry as it deems proper . . . .  Voir dire of any prospective jurors 
shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal 
cases, including death penalty cases.”4  This portion of Proposition 115 “abrogated 
the former rule requiring individual, sequestered voir dire in capital cases . . . .”  
(People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 604.)  “[T]here is no federal 
constitutional requirement that a trial court conduct individualized, sequestered 
voir dire in a capital case.  [Citations.]  Nor [does] the trial court’s denial of the 
motion for individual, sequestered voir dire violate any of defendant’s rights under 
the state Constitution or other state law.”  (Id. at p. 606; see also People v. Jackson 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 357-358.) 
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s request to 
permit “limited voir dire prior to the penalty phase.”  Defendant argues that 
“because the jury was never asked about the impact of an unrelated murder . . . the 
trial court should have found good cause for permitting such questions after the 
guilt phase.”  The trial court noted that similar requests for additional voir dire 
following the guilt phase of a capital trial were denied in People v. Taylor (1990) 
52 Cal.3d 719, 737-738 and People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 27-28.  More 
recently, this court upheld the denial of a similar request in People v. Hart (1999) 
20 Cal.4th 546.  This court said:  “The subject of the jurors’ attitudes had been 
                                              
4  
The statute was further amended after the trial in the present case.  (See 
Stats. 2000, ch. 192, § 1, p. 2216.)  
44 
examined thoroughly during the voir dire examination conducted at the outset of 
the guilt phase of the trial.  There was nothing unusual about the prosecution’s 
properly noticed intention to introduce evidence, at the penalty phase, of an 
additional, unadjudicated murder.  [Citation.]  To permit a convicted capital 
defendant to delay commencement of the penalty phase proceedings on such a 
speculative basis would contravene the purpose of [Penal Code] section 190.4, 
subdivision (c).  The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request to re-
voir dire the jury.”  (Id. at pp. 640-641.)  The same is true in this case. 
7.  Victim Impact Evidence 
Defendant contends that admitting victim impact evidence of three 
members of Carmen’s family and Carmen’s best friend, and the prosecutor’s call 
for vengeance based upon this testimony, “unduly inflamed the jury and resulted 
in a fundamentally unfair trial and unreliable sentencing determination in violation 
of appellant’s Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and their state 
constitutional analogs.” 
Carmen’s father, Harold Jones, her sister-in-law, Heidi Jones, her older 
brother, Valen Jones, and her best friend, Angelique Foster, described their 
relationships with Carmen and Zuri and the impact of their deaths on them.  Valen 
Jones also described Carmen’s childhood.  Defendant argues the trial court erred 
by admitting victim impact testimony by “non-family members, evidence beyond 
the defendant’s knowledge at the time of the crime, cumulative testimony by 
several witnesses, and evidence as to how family members learned about the 
crime,” but recognizes this court has considered and rejected these arguments and 
“raises them here for purposes of preservation.”  
Our cases have held that, “[u]nless it invites a purely irrational response, 
evidence of the effect of a capital murder on the loved ones of the victim and the 
45 
community is relevant and admissible under [Penal Code] section 190.3, factor (a), 
as a circumstance of the crime.  [Citation.]  The federal Constitution bars victim 
impact evidence only if it is so unduly prejudicial as to render the trial 
fundamentally unfair.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 574.)  
“Victim impact evidence . . . is not limited to family members, but may include 
the effects on the victim’s friends . . . .”  (Id. at p. 578.)  “We have approved 
victim impact testimony from multiple witnesses who were not present at the 
murder scene and who described circumstances and victim characteristics 
unknown to the defendant.”  (People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1183.)  
Victim impact testimony of six witnesses was found not to be excessive in People 
v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 139, 140.  Testimony that many members of the 
victim’s family cried when they learned she had been murdered “ ‘concerned the 
kinds of loss that loved ones commonly express in capital cases.’ ”  (People v. 
Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 646.)  The trial court did not err in admitting the 
victim impact evidence introduced in this case. 
8.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by calling for 
vengeance on behalf of the victims’ family near the end of her argument to the 
jury at the penalty phase.  The prosecutor said:  “One other thing I want to talk 
about is vengeance. . . .  It has a legitimate role in our society. . . .  [T]his man’s 
life should be taken in retribution, and yes, I mean retribution, in punishment for 
the lives he took. . . .  Yes, there is a lot of vengeance involved.  We are saying 
that he did something so terrible, so heinous, that he has forfeited his right to live.”  
The prosecutor later returned to this theme:  “We are not allowing the Jones family 
. . . to take personal vengeance on a defendant . . . .  In return, they, the victims’ 
family, are entitled to vengeance, plain and simple, from the state because they are 
46 
not allowed to get it themselves.”  Defendant objected on the ground that “[i]t 
suggests that there are views of victims’ family.  There is no evidence of any 
views of the victims’ family.”  The court sustained the objection “[i]n so far as it 
does suggest that,” and directed the prosecutor to “[c]omport yourself 
accordingly.”  On appeal, defendant contends the argument was an improper 
appeal to vengeance. 
In our recent decision in People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 483, we 
considered a challenge to a prosecutor’s argument on the ground that it improperly 
appealed to vengeance.  In Sánchez, the prosecutor “argued to the jury that the 
defense attorneys would ask for mercy for their clients, but that the prosecution 
asked instead for justice.  She noted that crime victims are not permitted 
themselves to seek vengeance for the crimes—that was what the criminal justice 
system is for.  She went on to argue, ‘we owe the victims in this case vengeance as 
part of our system of justice and as sanctioned by the laws of our state, and that 
you swore to uphold as jurors in this case in determining the penalty.’ ”  (Ibid.)  
We held the argument was proper:  “ ‘[P]rosecutorial references to community 
vengeance, while potentially inflammatory, are not misconduct if they are brief 
and isolated, and do not form the principal basis for advocating the death penalty.’  
(People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1178 . . . .)  ‘We noted 
in Zambrano that it is not error to argue “that the death penalty, where imposed in 
deserving cases, is a valid form of community retribution or vengeance—i.e., 
punishment—exacted by the state, under controlled circumstances, and on behalf 
of all its members, in lieu of the right of personal retaliation.”  ([Zambrano], at 
p. 1178.)’ ”  (People v. Sánchez, supra, at p. 484.)  We concluded that “[a]rguing 
that ‘we owe the victims in this case vengeance as part of our system of justice’ 
did not violate this rule.”  (Ibid.) 
47 
Much as in People v. Sánchez, the prosecutor’s references to vengeance in 
this case were brief and isolated and they did not form the principal basis for 
urging the death penalty.  Toward the end of an argument that occupies nearly 70 
pages of the reporter’s transcript, the prosecutor briefly referred to community 
vengeance:  She argued that “vengeance is appropriate” and “has a legitimate role 
in our society,” adding that defendant’s “life should be taken in retribution, . . . in 
punishment for the lives he took.”  Defendant did not object to these references to 
community vengeance and no misconduct appears.   
The prosecutor later returned to the subject of vengeance, however, arguing 
that “the victims’ family are entitled to vengeance . . . from the state because they 
are not allowed to get it themselves.”  Defendant objected and the trial court 
sustained the objection.  The prosecutor did not mention vengeance again. 
Defendant argues that these references were impermissible because they 
“explicitly and emphatically called for vengeance on behalf of the victims’ 
family.”  We have previously held that a prosecutor may not argue that the 
victim’s family asks for the death penalty.  (See People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
581, 622.)  But defendant was not prejudiced by any improper argument because 
the trial court sustained defendant’s objection, warned the prosecutor to avoid 
making an impermissible argument that “there are views of [the] victims’ family,” 
and instructed the prosecutor to “[c]omport [her]self accordingly.”  No reversible 
error appears. 
9.  Photographs of the Victims 
Defendant argues that the trial court violated “state statutory law, and [his] 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as his rights 
guaranteed by article I, sections 7, 15, 17, and 24 of the California Constitution, to 
48 
a fair trial and a reliable capital sentencing proceeding” by admitting into evidence 
at the penalty phase photographs of the dead bodies of Carmen and Zuri. 
The trial court had excluded these photographs during the guilt phase 
because defendant had indicated he would stipulate that he willfully and 
unlawfully killed the victims with malice aforethought.  Absent the stipulation, the 
court would have admitted the photographs at the guilt phase because “they’re 
highly probative of issues of unlawfulness of the killing, of intent to kill, and of 
malice aforethought. . . .  And the[ir] prejudicial value, such as it is, would not 
substantially outweigh their probative value.”  The court was careful to point out 
that this did not mean the photographs would not be admitted into evidence at the 
penalty phase:  “I hope you all understand, I’m not talking about penalty.  If we 
get to the penalty phase in this case, my view is completely different.  The People 
have a right to show the circumstances of the crime.” 
At the penalty phase, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to admit one 
photograph of Carmen and one of Zuri, finding that any prejudicial value was 
outweighed by the probative value to show “the gruesome physical consequences 
of the murders here in question.”  The court later clarified the photographs of the 
victims as “they appeared after their death tell in ways that words could never do, 
the gruesome consequences of the unlawful acts that were perpetrated by the 
defendant, and are something that are properly to be considered by the jury in 
determining what the appropriate penalty is.” 
Defendant acknowledges that we held in People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 313, 353-354:  “ ‘The admission of allegedly gruesome photographs is 
basically a question of relevance over which the trial court has broad discretion.’  
[Citations.]  The further decision whether to nevertheless exclude relevant 
photographs as unduly prejudicial is similarly committed to the trial court’s 
discretion:  ‘A trial court’s decision to admit photographs under Evidence Code 
49 
section 352 will be upheld on appeal unless the prejudicial effect of such 
photographs clearly outweighs their probative value.’  [Citations.]  Notably, 
however, the discretion to exclude photographs under Evidence Code section 352 
is much narrower at the penalty phase than at the guilt phase.  This is so because 
the prosecution has the right to establish the circumstances of the crime, including 
its gruesome consequences ([Pen. Code,] § 190.3, factor (a)), and because the risk 
of an improper guilt finding based on visceral reactions is no longer present.” 
Our conclusion in Bonilla that the photographs of the murder victim in that 
case were admissible applies equally here:  “ ‘ “ ‘ “[M]urder is seldom pretty, and 
pictures, testimony and physical evidence in such a case are always 
unpleasant.” ’ ” ’  [Citation.]  Likewise here.  But as unpleasant as these 
photographs are, they demonstrate the real-life consequences of [the defendant]’s 
actions.  The prosecution was entitled to have the jury consider those 
consequences.  The trial court’s exercise of discretion to admit them was neither 
statutory nor constitutional error.”  (People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 354.)  
We therefore reject defendant’s argument. 
10.  Evidence that Defendant Would Kill a Guard to Escape 
On rebuttal at the penalty phase, the prosecutor introduced testimony of a 
former jail guard who had monitored a conversation in which defendant told a 
fellow inmate that he would kill a guard in order to escape.  Defendant argues that 
admitting this testimony “rendered [his] trial fundamentally unfair and resulted in 
an unreliable, arbitrary, and non-individualized sentencing determination in 
violation of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and their 
state constitutional analogs.”  Former Deputy Sheriff Tom Lawrence testified that 
on August 23, 1998, while defendant was in jail awaiting trial, defendant had a 
conversation with fellow inmate Joshua Puckett in a recreation area that former 
50 
Deputy Lawrence was monitoring using an internal public address system.  
Puckett described an earlier escape he had attempted, which led them to discuss 
the layout of the jail facility and the best way of escaping.  Defendant said that 
during the night watch there was only one deputy on duty, rather than two, and it 
would be easy for him to kill the deputy and escape unnoticed.  Puckett disagreed, 
but defendant “was insistent that it was worth the risk to try to kill the deputy, if it 
would lead to his escape.” 
Dr. Leonti Thompson, a psychiatrist, testified that defendant expressed 
remorse for his crimes.  Evidence that defendant was willing to kill again to 
escape was relevant to rebut evidence that he felt remorse for his crimes.  (People 
v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 356 [evidence of lack of remorse is admissible at 
the penalty phase].) 
11.  Jury Instructions Concerning Mercy 
Defendant claims the trial court deprived him of “his rights to a fair and 
reliable penalty determination, as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the applicable 
sections of the California Constitution” by refusing to instruct the jury that it could 
consider mercy in determining the appropriate penalty. 
The trial court refused to give the following instruction that defendant 
requested:  “A mitigating circumstance or factor does not constitute a legal 
justification or excuse that lessens factual guilt for the offense in question.  A 
mitigating circumstance or factor is something about Christopher Henriquez or 
about the offenses, which in fairness, sympathy, compassion or mercy, may be 
considered in extenuating or reducing the defendant’s degree of moral culpability 
or which justifies a sentence of less than death.” 
51 
The trial court instructed the jury to disregard those instructions given 
during the guilt phase “which prohibit you from considering pity or sympathy for 
the defendant.”  The court instructed the jury it “shall take into consideration, 
among other things, pity and sympathy for defendant, insofar as you find that it is 
warranted by the evidence.”  The court also told the jurors they could “take a 
lenient or tolerant view of the defendant and/or his conduct.” 
Defendant acknowledges that “[t]his Court has never found the failure of a 
trial court to instruct a jury regarding mercy to be error.”  We stated in People v. 
Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1067:  “Defendant contends that there is a crucial 
difference between pity, sympathy, and mercy, inasmuch as the first two are 
sentiments whereas the third implies action.  We do not agree, however, that 
instructions to consider various factors, including sympathy for the defendant, 
could leave a jury with any ambiguity as to its power and duty also to act on such 
considerations.”  (See also People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 943 [“A jury 
told it may sympathetically consider all mitigating evidence need not also be 
expressly instructed that it may exercise ‘mercy.’ ”].) 
Indeed, we held in People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 393, that the trial 
court did not err in refusing to instruct that jury that it could “ ‘exercise mercy on 
behalf of the defendant’ ”:  “We have cautioned that ‘ “the jury must ‘ignore 
emotional responses that are not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence 
introduced during the penalty phase.’  [Citation.]  The jury may not act on whim 
or unbridled discretion.” ’  [Citation.]  ‘The unadorned use of the word “mercy” 
implies an arbitrary or capricious exercise of power rather than reasoned discretion 
based on particular facts and circumstances.’ ” 
In People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 706-707, we upheld a trial 
court’s refusal to give an almost identical instruction, holding the requested 
instruction was “duplicative of the CALJIC instructions given.”  We added:  “The 
52 
words ‘sympathy’ and ‘compassion’ are functional synonyms.  [Citation.]  
Defendant fails to articulate a meaningful distinction between them.  As for mercy, 
we repeatedly have cautioned against using that word in the penalty phase 
instructions, explaining, ‘[t]he unadorned use of the word “mercy” implies an 
arbitrary or capricious exercise of power rather than reasoned discretion based on 
particular facts and circumstances.’ ”  (Id. at p. 707.) 
We observed in Boyce that “the court did not foreclose defense counsel 
from urging the jury to show sympathy and mercy to defendant.”  (People v. 
Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 707.)  Defendant asserts that the same is not true 
here, pointing to the following comments made by the court to counsel during a 
discussion of proposed jury instructions:  “[I]f the People were to argue, or you 
were to argue to the jury, ‘Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, even if you do the 
weighing that’s called upon by the statute, even if you find that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, I am asking you to be 
merciful.  Give him life anyhow.  Be merciful,’ that’s what mercy means, to 
disregard.  To accord to someone some sort of a punishment other than the one 
that he or she is entitled to under the law.  And if you’re using the word in that 
sense, I would stop that argument.  That’s erroneous.” 
The trial court did not impermissibly restrict defense counsel’s argument.  
The court was not ruling on an objection to an argument proffered by defense 
counsel but was simply using a hypothetical defense argument as an example to 
illustrate the point he was making.  Further, the court correctly concluded that it 
would be improper for defense counsel to argue that the jury could disregard 
whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances and 
“accord to someone some sort of a punishment other than the one that he or she is 
entitled to under the law.”  As defendant acknowledges, we held in People v. 
Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 802, that “the trial court did not err in directing the 
53 
parties to refer to sympathy, pity, or compassion instead of mercy in argument.”  
This ruling “merely guided the language [counsel] was to use in requesting 
leniency, replacing the word ‘mercy’ with a synonym that did not connote an 
emotional response to the mitigating evidence instead of a reasoned moral 
response.”  (Ibid.) 
12.  Nature of the Jury’s Sentencing Determination 
Defendant argues that comments made to prospective jurors by the trial 
court during voir dire, coupled with a jury instruction based on CALJIC No. 8.88 
and limits placed on defense counsel’s closing argument at the penalty phase, 
“violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the jury was left with 
guidance that was vague and directionless.” 
During voir dire, the court instructed:  “If you find that the defendant is 
guilty of first-degree or premeditated murder and find the alleged circumstances in 
this case to be true, then you will consider whether the penalty in this case should 
be death or life without possibility of parole.  But . . . the law in California does 
not provide for a[n] automatic imposition of the death sentence or life without 
possibility of parole in any circumstance. . . .  If it comes to that, you must find 
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.  And 
for you to impose life without possibility of parole you must find that the 
mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating factors or circumstances.”  
Defendant objected. 
Before penalty phase deliberations, the court instructed the jury pursuant to 
the then-current version of CALJIC No. 8.88 that:  “[Y]ou shall now consider and 
take into account and weigh and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed.  The weighing 
of aggravating or mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical 
54 
counting of the factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary 
assignment of weights to any of them.  You are free to assign whatever moral or 
sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you 
are permitted to consider.  In weighing the various circumstances, you determine, 
under the relevant evidence, which penalty is justified and appropriate by 
considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the 
mitigating circumstances.  To return a judgment of death, each of you must be 
persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison 
with the mitigating circumstances, that it warrants death instead of life without 
possibility of parole.” 
Whether or not the trial court’s comments during voir dire perfectly 
described the jury’s task in determining the appropriate penalty, it is clear that the 
jury was not misled in light of the complete and accurate instructions given just 
prior to deliberations at the penalty phase.  We have held that “CALJIC 
No. 8.88 adequately guides selection of the appropriate punishment.”  (People v. 
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 640.) 
Returning to his earlier argument that the trial court improperly precluded 
defense counsel from arguing that the jury could show defendant mercy, defendant 
argues that the trial court erred in precluding defense counsel from arguing that 
each juror could “vote for life even if he or she found that aggravation outweighed 
mitigation.”  The argument fails for reasons already stated.  As previously noted, 
the trial court was correct to conclude that it would be improper for defense 
counsel to argue that the jurors could disregard whether the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances and thereby “accord to 
someone some sort of a punishment other than the one that he or she is entitled to 
under the law.” 
55 
13.  Challenges to the Death Penalty Statutes 
In order to preserve these issues, defendant briefly raises a number of 
challenges to the California death penalty statutes that he acknowledges this court 
previously has considered and rejected.  We briefly respond to each of these 
challenges below. 
The death penalty is not unconstitutional for failing to meaningfully narrow 
the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty.  (People v. Simon, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at p. 149.) 
“[Penal Code] [s]ection 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider 
the circumstances of a defendant’s crime in determining whether to impose the 
death penalty, does not license the jury to impose death in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Simon, 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 149.) 
The death penalty is not unconstitutional “ ‘for failing to require proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, outweigh the mitigating 
factors, and render death the appropriate punishment.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 149.)  Nor is the jury required to find unanimously 
and beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating 
factors.  (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 618-619 (Jones).)  This conclusion 
is not altered by the decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 
(Apprendi), Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, and Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 
U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. 616] (Hurst).  (Jones, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 619.)   
The federal Constitution does not require that a burden of proof be placed 
on the prosecution at the penalty phase.  (People v. Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 
p. 372.)  Nor did the trial court err by failing to tell the jury that there was no 
burden of proof.  (Id. at p. 373.)  “Unlike the guilt determination, ‘the sentencing 
56 
function is inherently moral and normative, not factual’ [citation] and, hence, not 
susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification.”  (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 43, 79.) 
The federal Constitution does not require that the jury agree unanimously 
on which aggravating factors apply.  (People v. Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 
p. 372.)  This does not violate a capital defendant’s right to equal protection of the 
laws.  “[C]apital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and therefore 
may be treated differently without violating constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection of the laws or due process of law [citation] . . . .”  (People v. Manriquez 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 590.) 
The federal Constitution does not require that the jury agree unanimously 
on whether defendant committed unadjudicated criminal activity.  (People v. 
Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 150; People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 
Cal.4th 335, 452.) 
The phrase “ ‘so substantial’ ” in CALJIC No. 8.88 is not unconstitutionally 
vague and “the instruction is not unconstitutional for not stating that the central 
determination is whether the death penalty is ‘appropriate.’ ”  (People v. Lewis 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 533.) 
The trial court is not required by the federal Constitution to instruct the jury 
that it must return a sentence of life without parole if it determines that the factors 
in mitigation outweigh the aggravating factors.  (People v. Jackson, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at p. 373.) 
The trial court is not required to instruct the jury that it need not agree 
unanimously on whether mitigating factors apply.  (People v. Breaux, supra, 1 
Cal.4th at p. 314.) 
As we have repeatedly held, “ ‘ “[t]he trial court’s failure to [instruct] the 
jury that there is a presumption of life does not violate a defendant’s constitutional 
57 
rights to due process, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, to a reliable 
determination of his sentence, and to equal protection of the law under the Fifth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.” ’  [Citations.]”  
(People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 293-294.) 
Nothing in Hurst, supra, 577 U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. 616] causes us to 
reconsider our holding in People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pages 589-590, 
footnote 14, that “once the defendant has been convicted of first degree murder 
and one or more special circumstances has been found true beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” imposing the death penalty does not constitute an increased sentence 
within the meaning of Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466. 
The penalty phase jury is not required by the federal Constitution to make 
written findings.  (People v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 149.)  This conclusion is 
not altered by the high court’s decision in Hurst, supra, 577 U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. 
616].  (Jones, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 618-619.) 
The federal Constitution does not require intercase proportionality review.  
(People v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 149.) 
“California does not deny capital defendants equal protection of the law by 
providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants that are not 
afforded to capital defendants.”  (People v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 150.) 
“International norms and treaties do not render the death penalty 
unconstitutional as applied in this state.”  (People v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 
p. 150.) 
14.  Restitution Fine 
 
At the time of defendant’s trial, Penal Code former section 1202.4, enacted 
in 1995, (section 1202.4) required the court to impose a restitution fine of not less 
58 
than $200 and not more than $10,000 if the defendant was convicted of a felony.5  
The trial court in this case imposed a restitution fine of $6,000.  Defendant argues 
that under Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, it was impermissible for the trial court 
to impose any amount above the statutory minimum, and the restitution fine 
should therefore be reduced to $200. 
 
Apprendi held:  “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .  ‘[I]t is 
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts 
that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is 
                                              
5  
At the time of trial, former section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(3), provided:  
“The court, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the law, 
shall order the defendant to pay . . .  [¶]  (A)  A restitution fine in accordance with 
subdivision (b).”   
 
Subdivision (b) of former section 1202.4 stated:  “In every case where a 
person is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional 
restitution fine.  The restitution fine shall be set at the discretion of the court and 
commensurate with the seriousness of the offense, but shall not be less than two 
hundred dollars ($200), and not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) if the 
person is convicted of a felony. . . .  In setting a felony restitution fine in excess of 
two hundred dollars ($200), the court may determine the amount of the fine as the 
product of two hundred dollars ($200) multiplied by the number of years of 
imprisonment the defendant is ordered to serve, multiplied by the number of 
felony counts of which the defendant is convicted.” 
 
Subdivision (c) of the former statute added, “if the court finds that there are 
compelling and extraordinary reasons, the court may waive imposition of the 
fine.”  And subdivision (d) of former section 1202.4 provided:  “In setting the 
amount of the fine pursuant to subdivision (b) in excess of the two hundred dollar 
($200) . . . minimum, the court shall consider any relevant factors including, but 
not limited to, the defendant’s ability to pay, the seriousness and gravity of the 
offense and the circumstances of its commission, any economic gain derived by 
the defendant as a result of the crime, the extent to which any other person 
suffered any losses as a result of the crime, and the number of victims involved in 
the crime.” 
59 
exposed.’ ”  (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.)  This rule applies to the 
imposition of fines in criminal cases.  (Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 
567 U.S. 343, 346.) 
 
Here, however, the trial court did not find any fact that increased the 
prescribed range of penalties to which defendant was exposed.  It instead imposed 
a fine within the prescribed statutory range.  Its ruling therefore raises no concerns 
under Apprendi.  (See People v. Kramis (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 346, 349-350 
[upholding a $10,000 restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4 against a 
similar Apprendi challenge].)  Nor does the high court’s subsequent decision in 
Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. ___ [133 S.Ct. 2151] cast any doubt on 
the trial court’s ruling.  Overruling Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545, 
Alleyne held that Apprendi applies to judicial factfinding that increases the 
mandatory minimum sentence for a crime.  (Alleyne, at p. 2155.)  The trial court in 
this case found no facts that increased the mandatory minimum penalty for 
defendant’s crime, so Alleyne does not affect the analysis.   
15.  Cumulative Error 
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of errors at the guilt and 
penalty phases requires reversal.  “Defendant has demonstrated few errors, and we 
have found each error or possible error to be harmless when considered separately.  
Considering them together, we likewise conclude that their cumulative effect does 
not warrant reversal of the judgment.”  (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 
567-568.) 
 
 
60 
IV.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of death is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
LEVY, J.*
                                              
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Henriquez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S089311 
Date Filed: December 7, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Contra Costa 
Judge: Peter Spinetta 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Lynne S. Coffin and Scott Kauffman, under appointments by the Supreme Court; and Oscar Bobrow, 
Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Nanette Winaker, Margo J. Yu, 
Glenn R. Pruden, Sarah J. Farhat and Roni Dina Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Scott Kauffman 
California Appellate Project 
101 Second Street, Suite 600 
San Francisco, CA  94150-0760 
(415) 495-0500 
 
Oscar Bobrow 
Deputy State Public Defender 
355 Tuolumne Street, Suite 2200 
Vallejo, CA  94590 
(707) 553-5241 
 
Roni Dina Pomerantz 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5866