Case Title: In re J.S.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 395PA19

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 395PA19  
Filed 17 July 2020 
 
 
IN THE MATTER OF: J.S., C.S., D.R.S., D.S. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 11 July 
2019 by Judge Jeanie R. Houston in District Court, Wilkes County, and on writ of 
certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review an order entered on 
10 September 2018 by Judge William F. Brooks in District Court, Wilkes County. 
This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 June 2020 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Vannoy, Colvard, Triplett & Vannoy, P.L.L.C., by Daniel S. Johnson, for 
petitioner-appellee Wilkes County Department of Social Services. 
 
Robert C. Montgomery for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Peter Wood for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s orders terminating her 
parental rights to the minor children Donald, Jimmy, Charles, and Dora.1 By order 
                                            
1 We use pseudonyms chosen by respondent to protect the juveniles’ identities and for 
ease of reading. We note that the trial court also terminated the parental rights of the 
respective fathers of Donald, Jimmy, and Charles, none of whom are a party to this appeal. 
Dora’s father relinquished his parental rights prior to the institution of these proceedings.  
IN RE J.S., C.S., D.R.S., D.S. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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entered on 28 October 2019, this Court granted respondent’s petition for writ of 
certiorari to review the trial court’s 10 September 2018 permanency planning order 
which eliminated reunification with respondent from the children’s permanent plans 
and relieved petitioner Wilkes County Department of Social Services (DSS) from 
further efforts to reunify respondent with her children. We now affirm the trial court’s 
orders in their entirety. 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
On 9 May 2016, DSS obtained nonsecure custody of respondent’s children and 
filed juvenile petitions alleging that they were neglected based on the following: 
Several [Child Protective Services] reports have c[o]me into 
the Wilkes DSS office . . . with concerns of an injurious 
environment due to the living conditions [in] the home. The 
child[ren were] placed into a safety resource placement 
with the maternal grandmother . . . . Mother was given 10 
days to get the home cleaned. The home has not been 
cleaned up. There is animal feces in every room of the 
home, clothing is piled up in every room, medications are 
left out in children’s reach, food & garbage is piled up in 
every room. There is also a concern for improper 
supervision because the children continue to go back up to 
the mother’s home which places the children in an 
injurious environment to [their] welfare. 
 
 
Respondent entered into a DSS family services case plan on 31 May 2016 in 
which she agreed to (1) obtain a mental health assessment and comply with all 
treatment recommendations; (2) submit a written explanation of why her children 
were in DSS custody; (3) complete parenting classes, submit a written report of what 
she learned, and incorporate those lessons into her interactions with the children; 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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(4) obtain and maintain suitable employment; (5) sign a voluntary support agreement 
and pay child support; (6) obtain and maintain housing free from safety hazards and 
otherwise suitable for her children; (7) participate in DSS’s In-Home Aide Program 
and work to address issues identified by the aide; (8) maintain regular contact with 
her social worker; (9) submit to and pass random drug screens; (10) attend all 
scheduled visitations with her children; and (11) refrain from illegal activity.  
At a hearing on 7 June 2016, respondent stipulated to the allegations in the 
juvenile petitions filed by DSS and consented to an adjudication of neglect. The trial 
court entered its “Adjudication and Disposition Order” on 26 July 2016, adjudicating 
respondent’s children to be neglected and maintaining them in DSS custody. On 4 
April 2017, the trial court established a primary permanent plan of reunification for 
each child with a secondary plan of adoption for Dora and Jimmy and a secondary 
plan of custody with a court-approved caretaker for Donald and Charles. After 
successive hearings reviewing respondent’s progress toward reunification, the trial 
court entered a permanency planning order on 10 September 2018 that changed each 
child’s primary permanent plan to adoption with a secondary plan of custody with a 
court-approved caretaker.  
DSS filed petitions to terminate respondent’s parental rights to the children 
on 29 November 2018. The trial court held a hearing on the petitions for termination 
on 3 April 2019 and entered orders terminating respondent’s parental rights on 11 
July 2019. Respondent filed notices of appeal from the termination orders. This Court 
IN RE J.S., C.S., D.R.S., D.S. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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subsequently granted respondent’s petition for writ of certiorari to review the trial 
court’s 10 September 2018 permanency planning order that eliminated reunification 
from the children’s permanent plans. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(2), (a2) (2019) 
(prescribing preservation and notice requirements for appeal from an order 
eliminating reunification as a permanent plan); see also N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1) 
(allowing review by writ of certiorari “when the right to prosecute an appeal has been 
lost by failure to take timely action”). In her brief to this Court, however, respondent 
does not bring forward any issues related to this 10 September 2018 permanency 
planning order. See generally N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (“Issues not presented in a 
party’s brief . . . will be taken as abandoned.”). As a result, we have no basis for finding 
any error in the permanency planning order that was the subject of respondent’s 
petition for writ of certiorari.  
In her brief, respondent argues that the trial court erred in adjudicating the 
existence of grounds to terminate her parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a). 
She further contends that the trial court abused its discretion under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a) by concluding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests 
of Donald, Jimmy, and Charles. 
Adjudication 
“We review a district court’s adjudication [under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)] ‘to 
determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” In re N.P., 839 S.E.2d 801, 
IN RE J.S., C.S., D.R.S., D.S. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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802–03 (N.C. 2020) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 
253 (1984)); see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019). Unchallenged findings of fact “are 
deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 
372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 58 (2019). Moreover, we review only those findings 
needed to sustain the trial court’s adjudication. Id. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58–59.  
The issue of whether a trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of 
law is reviewed de novo. See State v. Nicholson, 371 N.C. 284, 288, 813 S.E.2d 840, 
843 (2018). However, an adjudication of any single ground for terminating a parent’s 
rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) will suffice to support a termination order. In re 
B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 380, 831 S.E.2d 305, 311 (2019); accord In re Moore, 306 N.C. 
394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 132 (1982). Therefore, if this Court upholds the trial court’s 
order in which it concludes that a particular ground for termination exists, then we 
need not review any remaining grounds. In re C.J., 373 N.C. 260, 263, 837 S.E.2d 
859, 861 (2020).  
In the present case, the trial court concluded that there were four statutory 
grounds for terminating respondent’s parental rights, including her failure to make 
reasonable progress under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Subsection 7B-1111(a)(2) 
authorizes termination of parental rights if “[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile 
in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without 
showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the 
IN RE J.S., C.S., D.R.S., D.S. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal 
of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2019).  
We agree with the Court of Appeals that an adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2) requires that a child be “ ‘left’ in foster care or placement outside the home 
pursuant to a court order” for more than a year at the time the petition to terminate 
parental rights is filed. In re A.C.F., 176 N.C. App. 520, 527, 626 S.E.2d 729, 
734 (2006). “This is in contrast to the nature and extent of the parent’s reasonable 
progress, which is evaluated for the duration leading up to the hearing on the motion 
or petition to terminate parental rights.” Id. at 528, 626 S.E.2d at 735.  
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that a finding that a parent acted 
“willfully” for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) “does not require a showing of 
fault by the parent.” In re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 439, 473 S.E.2d 393, 
398 (1996). “ ‘[A] respondent’s prolonged inability to improve her situation, despite 
some efforts in that direction, will support a finding of willfulness “regardless of her 
good intentions,” ’ and will support a finding of lack of progress . . . sufficient to 
warrant termination of parental rights under section 7B-1111(a)(2).” In re J.W., 
173 N.C. App. 450, 465–66, 619 S.E.2d 534, 545 (2005) (quoting In re B.S.D.S., 
163 N.C. App. 540, 546, 594 S.E.2d 89, 93 (2004)), aff’d per curiam, 360 N.C. 361, 
625 S.E.2d 780 (2006).  
“[P]arental compliance with a judicially adopted case plan is relevant in 
determining whether grounds for termination exist pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
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1111(a)(2).” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 384, 831 S.E.2d 305, 313 (2019). However, in 
order for a respondent’s noncompliance with her case plan to support the termination 
of her parental rights, there must be a “nexus between the components of the court-
approved case plan with which [the respondent] failed to comply and the ‘conditions 
which led to [the child’s] removal’ from the parental home.” Id. at 385, 831 S.E.2d at 
314 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)); see also In re Y.Y.E.T., 205 N.C. App. 120, 
131, 695 S.E.2d 517, 524 (explaining that a “case plan is not just a check list” and 
that “parents must demonstrate acknowledgement and understanding of why the 
juvenile entered DSS custody as well as changed behaviors”), disc. review denied, 364 
N.C. 434, 703 S.E.2d 150 (2010). 
We note that the trial court here entered a separate termination order for each 
of respondent’s children. The findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the 
trial court’s adjudications are essentially identical in each termination order. In order 
to facilitate our discussion of the salient matters in this case involving all four of the 
juveniles, we shall refer therefore to the findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
enumerated in the termination order entered by the trial court in the child Dora’s 
case.    
The trial court’s adjudicatory findings recount the reasons for the children’s 
removal from respondent’s home on 9 May 2016 and their subsequent adjudication 
by the trial court as neglected. Specifically, the findings of fact describe the filthy and 
hazardous conditions in respondent’s home, respondent’s failure to improve those 
IN RE J.S., C.S., D.R.S., D.S. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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conditions when given time to do so, and respondent’s violation of the DSS safety plan 
by retrieving the children from their placement with the maternal grandmother. The 
findings of fact also list the requirements of respondent’s family services case plan 
signed on 31 May 2016.   
The trial court made the following additional findings of fact regarding 
respondent’s conduct after DSS obtained nonsecure custody of her children: 
14. 
The Respondent-Mother completed the following 
items on her plan: she participated in parenting classes; 
she submitted a written statement concerning what she 
learned during parenting classes; she paid small amounts 
of child support; she contacted her social worker on a 
somewhat regular basis; she attended visitation with the 
minor child; she passed all drug screens; and, she refrained 
from illegal activity. 
 
15. 
The Respondent-Mother failed to obtain and 
maintain appropriate housing. The Respondent-Mother’s 
housing has been a consistent concern while the minor 
child has been in DSS custody. 
 
16. 
DSS offered services to the Respondent-Mother 
through its in-home aide program after she signed her case 
plan. This program was intended to assist the Respondent-
Mother in making improvements to the condition of her 
home and to make appropriate decisions on behalf of her 
children. 
 
17. 
On multiple occasions, the Respondent-Mother 
stated that she thought the in-home aide worker was there 
to clean her house for her. After numerous arguments with 
the in-home aide worker, DSS closed its in-home aide 
services at the Respondent-Mother’s request. 
 
18. 
Although the Respondent-Mother made small 
improvements 
to 
her 
home, 
DSS 
social 
workers 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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consistently found that it was unsanitary, cluttered, and 
unfit for children. The Respondent-Mother lives with a 
disabled relative, who would leave jars of urine in the 
home. The Respondent-Mother also had numerous pets 
that defecated in the home. 
 
19. 
The Respondent-Mother failed to obtain and 
maintain consistent employment. She has told DSS that 
her job is to manage the trailer park adjacent to her home. 
In late 2018 to early 2019, she worked briefly for a 
temporary service at Hobes’ Hams in North Wilkesboro. 
 
20. 
The Respondent-Mother was ordered to pay child 
support for the minor child and her siblings. The 
Respondent-Mother has made small payments and has 
consistently maintained a child support arrearage. 
 
. . . . 
 
22. 
During visits between the minor child, her siblings, 
and the Respondent-Mother, . . . . [t]he Respondent-Mother 
. . . consistently made inappropriate comments to the 
children regarding when they would be returning to her 
home. 
 
. . . . 
 
24. 
The Respondent-Mother struggled during visits 
with age appropriate interactions and conversations with 
the minor child. . . . 
 
25. 
The minor child has been in DSS custody since May 
2016. . . .  
 
26. 
The Respondent-Mother failed to make any 
reasonable progress in correcting the conditions which led 
to the removal of the minor child from her home. 
 
To the extent respondent does not except to these findings of fact, they are binding 
on appeal. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58. 
IN RE J.S., C.S., D.R.S., D.S. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Based on its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that each child had been 
residing in a “placement outside of the Respondent-Mother’s home for more than 
twelve (12) months and the Respondent-Mother willfully left the minor child in such 
placement without making any reasonable progress to correct the conditions which 
led to the removal of the minor child.” The determination that respondent acted 
“willfully” is a finding of fact rather than a conclusion of law. See, e.g., Pratt v. Bishop, 
257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962). However, the trial court’s placement 
of this finding in its conclusions of law is immaterial to our analysis. See State v. 
Icard, 363 N.C. 303, 308, 677 S.E.2d 822, 826 (2009). We are obliged to apply the 
appropriate standard of review to a finding of fact or conclusion of law, regardless of 
the label which it is given by the trial court. See Burns, 287 N.C. at 110, 214 S.E.2d 
at 61–62. 
 
Respondent challenges the trial court’s findings of fact that respondent “failed 
to make any reasonable progress in correcting the conditions which led to the removal 
of” her children and that she acted “willfully” in this regard. Respondent contends 
that the evidence showed that she “lacked ‘the ability to show reasonable progress’ ” 
as a result of the cognitive limitations and personality issues identified by Dr. Nancy 
F. Joyce in a “Psychological/Parental Fitness Assessment” performed on respondent 
in October and November of 2017.  
Respondent also characterizes the contested factual findings as “irreconcilably 
inconsistent” with the trial court’s additional finding that she lacked the “capability 
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to provide for the proper care of the minor child[ren] . . . as a result of her mental 
limitations as found by the examination psychologist Dr. Joyce,” as well as the trial 
court’s adjudication of grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights based on 
the children’s status as dependent juveniles under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). 
See N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9) (2019) (defining “[d]ependent juvenile”). According to 
respondent, she “could not simultaneously have lacked the capacity to parent the 
children” for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) “while also willfully failing to take 
steps to regain custody” for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).  
The record in this case shows that the children were removed from 
respondent’s home on 9 May 2016 as a result of its “filthy and unsafe condition” as 
well as respondent’s failure to abide by a DSS safety plan that placed the children 
with their maternal grandmother. Respondent consented to the trial court’s 
adjudication of the children as neglected juveniles based on the conditions in the 
home and respondent’s failure to remedy them. At the time of the termination hearing 
on 3 April 2019, respondent had met several conditions of her case plan—completing 
parenting classes, maintaining regular contact with DSS, attending visitations with 
the children, passing drug screens, and refraining from illegal activity—but had 
failed to make meaningful progress in improving the conditions of her home. Cf. In re 
A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 198, 835 S.E.2d 417, 423 (2019) (affirming adjudication under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) despite the respondent’s completion of some case plan 
IN RE J.S., C.S., D.R.S., D.S. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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requirements where she failed to resolve “the primary reason for the removal of her 
children—the presence of the father in the home”). 
Contrary to respondent’s assertion, we see no irreconcilable inconsistency 
between the trial court’s finding that respondent willfully failed to make reasonable 
progress in correcting the conditions that led to the children’s removal from her home 
on 9 May 2016 and the trial court’s determination that respondent is incapable of 
providing proper care and supervision for her four children under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(6).  
As the Court of Appeals has explained, 
the issue of whether or not the parent is in a position to 
actually regain custody of the children at the time of the 
termination hearing is not a relevant consideration under 
N.C.[G.S.] § 7B-1111(a)(2), since there is no requirement 
for the respondent-parent to regain custody to avoid 
termination under that ground. Instead, the court must 
only determine whether the respondent-parent had made 
“reasonable progress under the circumstances . . . in 
correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the 
juvenile.” N.C.[G.S.] § 7B-1111(a)(2). Accordingly, the 
conditions which led to removal are not required to be 
corrected completely to avoid termination. Only reasonable 
progress in correcting the conditions must be shown. 
 
In re L.C.R., 226 N.C. App. 249, 252, 739 S.E.2d 596, 598 (2013). The “reasonable 
progress” standard enunciated in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) therefore did not require 
respondent to completely remediate the conditions that led to the children’s removal 
or to render herself capable of being reunified with her children. In applying this 
standard, we conclude that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that 
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respondent acted willfully in failing to make reasonable progress toward correcting 
the conditions that led to the children’s removal from her home.  
In her written report,2 Dr. Joyce diagnosed respondent with a “Mild 
Intellectual Disability” and an “Unspecified Personality Disorder” and opined, inter 
alia, “that [respondent] lacks the cognitive skills necessary to manage a home as well 
as the children[-]rearing responsibilities for four children.” The trial court accurately 
summarized the results of respondent’s psychological assessment in its findings of 
fact. As respondent observes, the trial court expressly accepted Dr. Joyce’s conclusion 
that respondent “does not have the capability to provide for the proper care of the 
[four children] as a result of her mental limitations.”   
Notwithstanding respondent’s cognitive deficits, Dr. Joyce did not find that 
respondent lacked the ability to clean the home or to maintain it in a condition 
suitable for children in order to address the principal cause of the children’s removal 
from her home. As the trial court found, Dr. Joyce did report that respondent 
appeared to lack the capacity to manage a home while simultaneously rearing four 
children. However, even when respondent was relieved of her child-rearing 
responsibilities when DSS took the children into nonsecure custody on 9 May 2016, 
respondent still failed to materially improve the conditions in her home. 
                                            
2 Although Dr. Joyce was deceased by the time of the termination hearing, the trial 
court admitted her report into evidence. 
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The evidence and the uncontested findings of fact show that respondent 
refused to cooperate with the in-home aide who was provided by DSS to assist 
respondent in addressing the conditions in the home. For example, when asked why 
she had refused the in-home aide’s services, respondent testified as follows: 
I felt like that she was pushing me a little harder. I 
understand that she was—yes, I should have listened, but 
I just . . . . felt like I was being pushed too hard, and I felt 
like she was staying up in my business all the time wanting 
—I felt like she was my mother and trying to tell me what 
to do. 
  
Such evidence establishes that respondent was capable of complying with the 
important aspects of her case plan.  
In light of respondent’s refusal to work with the in-home aide provided by DSS 
and the fact that respondent was afforded almost three years to achieve a home 
environment suitable for her children, we conclude that the trial court did not err by 
finding that respondent failed to make reasonable progress pursuant to N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(2) under these conditions and by finding that her failure to do so was 
willful. See In re Bishop, 92 N.C. App. 662, 669, 375 S.E.2d 676, 681 (1989) 
(“[R]espondent has been afforded almost double the statutory . . . period in which to 
demonstrate her willingness to correct the conditions which led to the removal of her 
children. Her failure to do so supports a finding of willfulness regardless of her good 
intentions.”); see also In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App. 693, 699–700, 453 S.E.2d 220, 224–
25 (1995) (concluding that respondent’s “sporadic efforts to improve her situation” did 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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not preclude a finding of willfulness where she “had more than three and one-half 
times the statutory period of twelve months in which to take steps to improve her 
situation, yet she has failed to do so”). In light of the extended length of time that 
respondent was given to be successful in completing her case plan, the trial court’s 
findings of fact demonstrate that it duly considered respondent’s partial completion 
of her case plan as well as her limited cognitive abilities as diagnosed by Dr. Joyce. 
See In re Bishop, 92 N.C. App. at 669, 375 S.E.2d at 681 (upholding adjudication while 
acknowledging “respondent’s contentions that her inability to improve her situation 
stems from her mental disability, her poverty, and other personal problems”); see also 
In re I.G.C., 373 N.C. 201, 206, 835 S.E.2d 432, 435 (2019) (noting that the trial court 
“considered all of respondent-mother’s efforts up to the time of the termination 
hearing, weighed the evidence before it, and then made findings which showed that 
respondent-mother . . . had not made reasonable progress”). Consequently, 
respondent’s challenge to the trial court’s adjudication is overruled.   
  
Because we hold that the trial court properly adjudicated a ground for 
terminating respondent’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), we need 
not review respondent’s arguments regarding the three additional grounds for 
termination found by the trial court. See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 194, 835 S.E.2d at 
421; In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395, 831 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2019). 
Disposition 
Respondent also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that it is in the best 
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interests of Donald, Jimmy, and Charles to terminate her parental rights. 
Respondent does not contest the trial court’s determination with regard to Dora. 
 At the dispositional stage of a termination proceeding, the trial court must 
“determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). In doing so, the trial court must “consider the following 
criteria and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant”: 
(1)  
The age of the juvenile. 
(2)  
The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
(3) 
Whether the termination of parental rights will 
aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan 
for the juvenile. 
(4)  
The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
(5) 
The quality of the relationship between the 
juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, 
guardian, 
custodian, 
or 
other 
permanent 
placement. 
(6)  
Any relevant consideration. 
 
Id. Although the trial court must consider each of the factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a), written findings of fact are required only “if there is ‘conflicting evidence 
concerning’ the factor, such that it is ‘placed in issue by virtue of the evidence 
presented before the [trial] court[.]’ ” In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 199, 835 S.E.2d at 424 
(second alteration in original) (quoting In re H.D., 239 N.C. App. 318, 327, 768 S.E.2d 
860, 866 (2015)).  
The trial court’s dispositional findings are binding on appeal if supported by 
any competent evidence. In re K.N.K., 839 S.E.2d 735, 740 (N.C. 2020). The trial 
court’s determination of a child’s best interests under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) is 
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reviewed only for abuse of discretion. In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 6, 832 S.E.2d 698, 
700 (2019). “An abuse of discretion is a decision manifestly unsupported by reason or 
one so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re 
K.N.K., 839 S.E.2d at 740 (citation omitted). 
Respondent asserts that the trial court failed to comply with N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a) because it “did not consider [certain] statutorily mandated factors” in 
assessing each of her sons’ best interests. She specifically contends that “[t]he court 
did not address [each child’s] permanent plan, the bond with his placement, the 
probability of adoption[,] and whether or not termination would help accomplish the 
permanent plan.” See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2)–(3), (5). 
We find no merit in respondent’s argument. In the termination orders 
concerning Donald, Jimmy, and Charles, the trial court concluded that “[b]ased upon 
the factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110, it is in the best interest of the minor child 
for the [respondent’s] parental rights to be terminated.” (Emphasis added.) Since 
there was no conflicting evidence about the likelihood of each child’s adoption or the 
facilitation of each child’s permanent plan of adoption if respondent’s parental rights 
were terminated, the trial court was not required to make written findings under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2)–(3). See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 200, 835 S.E.2d at 424. 
Likewise, the absence of any conflicting evidence regarding Charles’s strong bond 
with his prospective adoptive parents obviated the need for written findings on this 
issue under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5). Finally, because no prospective permanent 
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placement had been identified for Donald and Jimmy, the factor in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a)(5) did not apply to those two children. Id. To the extent that respondent 
contends that the trial court violated the statutory mandate in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) 
as to its determination of the best interests of each juvenile, her argument is 
overruled.  
Respondent also challenges the merits of the trial court’s determination that 
terminating her parental rights was in each child’s best interests. According to 
respondent, “Charles, Jimmy, and Donald had zero adoptive possibilities” due to their 
“tremendous behavioral problems.” With no hope of adoption, she argues that the 
trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights amounts to a needless and 
“arbitrary” separation of a mother from her children. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-100(4) (2019) 
(articulating policy goal of “preventing the unnecessary or inappropriate separation 
of juveniles from their parents”). Respondent notes that she attended all of her 
scheduled visitations with her children. Moreover, she contends that “Donald and 
Jimmy wanted to return to live with their mother.” Given the strength of the family 
relationship, respondent submits that the trial court should have maintained the 
existing arrangement that she had with her sons, which “was working.” 
Respondent’s characterization of the circumstances is inconsistent with both 
the evidence from the termination hearing and the trial court’s uncontested findings 
of fact. At the time of the termination hearing, Donald was eleven years old, Jimmy 
was ten years old, and Charles was eight years old. Charles was in a potential 
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adoptive placement, while Donald and Jimmy were in therapeutic foster homes. 
When asked at the termination hearing about the likelihood of Charles’s adoption if 
respondent’s parental rights were terminated, the DSS adoption social worker 
testified that adoption “is 100 percent likely.”  
The DSS adoption social worker acknowledged that Donald and Jimmy “had 
some pretty significant behavioral problems” when the two children entered DSS 
custody, but described both juveniles’ marked improvement in therapeutic foster 
care. In responding to the query about Donald’s and Jimmy’s prospects for being 
“levelled down” from therapeutic foster care, the DSS adoption social worker said, “I 
think right now it’s just a matter of finding an appropriate possible adoptive home, 
because their behaviors are so much better. I think that they could easily be levelled 
down, but just again, need to be a home where they had plenty of the same structure 
that they needed . . . .”3 She expressed a preference for placing Donald and Jimmy 
together and confirmed that DSS planned to move them into an adoptive home “[o]nce 
a placement is found.” Based on this testimony offered by the DSS adoption social 
worker, respondent’s contention that Donald and Jimmy had only a “speculative and 
remote” chance for adoption is unsupported by the record.4  
                                            
3 The guardian ad litem noted Donald’s need for “a consistent home with structure, 
logical consequences, and either an only child or children who are of similar age” as well as 
Jimmy’s need for “a structured and emotionally supportive environment” to address “his 
attention seeking behaviors.”  
 
4 For this reason, we are unpersuaded by respondent’s invocation of the Court of 
Appeals’ decision reversing an order terminating parental rights in In re J.A.O., 166 N.C. 
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Respondent also mischaracterizes the evidence concerning the bond between 
her and her two sons. The trial court expressly found that none of respondent’s sons 
had a bond with respondent. Respondent does not except to the trial court’s findings 
of fact as to any of the children and is therefore bound by its determinations. In re 
A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 195, 835 S.E.2d at 421.  
In our assessment of the record, we discern some evidence of a bond between 
respondent and Jimmy and, to a lesser extent, between respondent and Donald. The 
guardian ad litem described Donald as having “more of [a] bond with the 
grandmother than [respondent]. His bond with [respondent] seems to be more 
towards what [she] can get or do for him.” Moreover, as respondent relates, Jimmy 
told the guardian ad litem that he “want[ed] to go back home and live with [his] mom 
                                            
App. 222, 601 S.E.2d 226 (2004). The sixteen-year-old boy in In re J.A.O. had cycled through 
nineteen different treatment centers due to his “verbally and physically aggressive and 
threatening” behavior, and he had been diagnosed with “bipolar disorder, attention deficit 
hyperactivity 
disorder, 
pervasive 
developmental 
disorder, 
borderline 
intellectual 
functioning, non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, and hypertension.” Id. at 223, 228, 
601 S.E.2d at 227, 230. Adoption was “highly unlikely,” and the guardian ad litem 
recommended against terminating the respondent-mother’s parental rights. Id. at 224, 226, 
601 S.E.2d at 228, 229. In light of the devotion shown to the child by his mother, and 
“balancing the minimal possibilities of adoptive placement against the stabilizing influence, 
and the sense of identity, that some continuing legal relationship with natural relatives may 
ultimately bring,” the Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in 
terminating the mother’s parental rights. Id. at 228, 601 S.E.2d at 230 (quoting In re A.B.E., 
564 A.2d 751, 757 (D.C. 1989)).  
Here, the DSS adoption social worker expressed optimism about Donald and Jimmy’s 
prospects for adoption. The guardian ad litem also recommended terminating respondent’s 
parental rights so that Donald and Jimmy could “have a permanent, safe home.” The holding 
of the Court of Appeals in In re J.A.O. is thus inapposite.  
 
 
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and uncle.” Donald also stated a desire “to go back home, with his mother or 
grandmother.” However, the DSS adoption social worker who supervised the majority 
of respondent’s visitations with the children testified that she “d[id not] see a bond” 
between respondent and any of the children. As the finder of fact, the trial court was 
entitled to credit this testimony of the DSS adoption social worker over any conflicting 
evidence. In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167–68 (2016). 
Additionally, in light of the trial court’s uncontested finding of fact that respondent 
was incapable of raising her children, the fact that Donald and Jimmy may have 
expressed a preference to return home is noteworthy but not determinative.   
Conclusion 
We affirm the adjudications in regard to all four children. Respondent has not 
challenged the trial court’s disposition regarding Dora and based on the evidence in 
the record and the trial court’s findings of fact, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by deciding to terminate respondent’s parental rights to Donald, Jimmy, 
and Charles. All three children had been in foster care for almost three years and had 
no realistic prospect of being reunified with respondent. Charles was in an adoptive 
placement, and DSS was hopeful of finding adoptive homes for Donald and Jimmy. 
Cf. In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 200, 835 S.E.2d at 424 (“[T]he absence of an adoptive 
placement for a juvenile at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to 
terminating parental rights.” (alteration in original) (quoting In re D.H., 232 N.C. 
App. 217, 223, 753 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2014))). Contrary to respondent’s assertion, 
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leaving her sons in their current foster placements with periodic visitation by 
respondent was not “working” as a “plan.” This arrangement was not only contrary 
to the permanent plan established by the trial court, it also served to deny to the 
juveniles the prospect of “a safe, permanent home within a reasonable amount of 
time” as contemplated by the Juvenile Code. N.C.G.S. § 7B-100(5). Accordingly, we 
affirm the termination orders.  
AFFIRMED.