Case Title: Anderson v. Duncan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Anderson v. Duncan1998 WY 145968 P.2d 440Case Number: 98-153Decided: 12/07/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Gloria ANDERSON, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Kenneth DUNCAN and Patty Duncan, Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Platte County, Keith 
G. Kautz, J.

 

Fred W. Phifer, Wheatland, 
Wyoming, for the Appellant.

Rebecca A. Lewis and Scott 
W. Meier of Lewis & Hunt, LLC, Laramie Wyoming, for the 
Appellees.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Retired November 2, 1998

 

MACY, Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant Gloria Anderson appeals from the order 
in which the trial court granted Appellees Kenneth Duncan and Patty Duncan's 
motion for a judgment as a matter of law upon finding that a causal connection 
did not exist between Anderson's slip and fall and the condition of the Duncans' 
property.

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] Anderson presents two 
issues in her appeal:

 

          
1. Did the trial court err in granting Appellees' Motion for Judgment as 
a Matter of Law?

 

          
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to admit Appellant's x-ray 
exhibits?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶4] The Duncans owned a 
house in Wheatland. A sidewalk ran from the front entry of the house to the 
street, and two concrete stairs were located at the far end of the sidewalk, 
near the street. At one time, handrails were located on the sides of the stairs, 
but one handrail was removed before the Duncans acquired the property. A lamp on 
a post was located adjacent to the stairs. The cover on the lamp had been 
damaged in a storm, so the Duncans removed the cover to have it repaired. They 
also removed the light bulb from the lamp even though the lamp was still 
functional. Large trees with dense foliage were located on the Duncan property 
near the sidewalk, and apparently some 
crab apple trees were also located in the vicinity.

 

[¶5] The Duncans and Alvera 
Prewitt entered into an oral contract for Prewitt to purchase the Duncans' 
house, and the Duncans allowed Prewitt to move into the house before the sale 
closed. Anderson helped Prewitt move into the Duncans' house on August 15, 1996. 
During the course of the day, Anderson consumed one alcoholic drink plus part of 
a second alcoholic drink. She ate dinner that night with Prewitt and other 
members of Prewitt's family. When Anderson left the Duncans' house after dinner, 
it was dark outside. She walked down the sidewalk and fell, landing near the 
stairs at the far end of the sidewalk. Anderson broke her ankle when she 
fell.

 

[¶6] On January 29, 1997, 
Anderson filed a complaint in the district court, asserting that the Duncans 
were negligent because they did not maintain their property in a reasonably safe 
condition. Specifically, Anderson claimed that the Duncans: failed to keep the 
trees trimmed so that they did not block the light that might have illuminated 
the sidewalk and the stairs; failed to keep the lamp on the post operable; and 
failed to replace the handrail next to the stairs.

 

[¶7] The trial court held a 
jury trial on Anderson's negligence claim on March 11, 1998. After Anderson 
rested her case on the liability issue, the Duncans presented a motion for a 
judgment as a matter of law, claiming that Anderson failed to present evidence 
showing a causal connection existed between their allegedly negligent acts and 
her fall. The trial court granted their motion, and Anderson appealed to this 
Court.

 

                              
             DISCUSSION

 

[¶8] Anderson asserts that 
the trial court erred by granting a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the 
Duncans. Although her argument is somewhat difficult to understand, Anderson 
apparently contends that the evidence presented at the trial justified 
submitting the case to the jury. We do not agree with Anderson; the trial court 
properly granted a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the 
Duncans.

 

W.R.C.P. 50(a) provides:

 

          
              
(a) Judgment as a Matter of Law.

 

(1) 
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is 
no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that 
party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and 
may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with 
respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be 
maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that 
issue.

 

(2) 
Motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before 
submission of the case to the jury. Such a motion shall specify the judgment 
sought and the law and the facts on which the moving party is entitled to the 
judgment.

 

In reviewing a judgment as a 
matter of law, we evaluate the record without affording deference to the trial 
court's views. John Q. Hammons Inc. v. Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wyo. 1998); 
Hatch v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 930 P.2d 382, 395 (Wyo. 1997). A 
judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when reasonable jurors could reach 
but one conclusion as to the verdict. Hatch, 930 P.2d  at 395. We regard the 
nonmoving party's evidence as being true, and we give that party the benefit of 
all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Garaman, Inc. v. 
Williams, 912 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Wyo. 1996). Additionally, we do not weigh the 
evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. John Q. Hammons Inc., 954 P.2d  at 1356. A judgment as a matter of law deprives the opposing party of the 
opportunity to have the jury determine the facts, and the court should, 
therefore, use caution in granting such a judgment. Id.; Hatch, 930 P.2d  at 
395.

 

[¶9] The elements of a 
negligence claim are: (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the 
defendant breached that duty; (3) the defendant's breach of his duty was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries; and (4) the plaintiff was injured. 
Turcq v. Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 51 (Wyo. 1997); Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039, 
1043 (Wyo. 1995). A plaintiff has the burden of proving all four elements of his 
negligence claim. Vasquez By and Through Vasquez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 913 P.2d 441, 443 (Wyo. 1996).  The 
trial court determined that Anderson did not satisfy the causation element of 
her negligence claim against the Duncans.

 

[¶10] Legal causation is 
defined as conduct that "is a substantial factor in bringing about the 
plaintiff's injuries." Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186 
(Wyo. 1994). See also Turcq, 950 P.2d  at 51.

 

[I]f the conduct is "that cause which in natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by a sufficient intervening cause produces the 
injury, without which the result would not have occurred," it must be identified 
as a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.  If, however, it created only a condition 
or occasion for the harm to occur then it would be regarded as a remote, not a 
proximate, cause, and would not be a substantial factor in bringing about the 
harm.

 

Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 10, 200 P. 791, 793 
(1921)). See also Natural Gas Processing Co., 886 P.2d  at 
1186.

 

[¶11] At the trial, Anderson 
testified that she did not know what caused her to fall:

 

I 
was walking out the door down the sidewalk, and I found out I was on the ground. 
I don't remember how or what. It was really dark. There were little bitty [c]rab 
apples all over every[ ]where, the sidewalk, the grass, the street, but I can't 
tell you what happened. I don't know. It happened too 
fast.

 

She reiterated on 
cross-examination that she did not know why she fell:

 

          
Q There are two stairs, and you fell somewhere in that 
vicinity.

 

          
A (The witness nodded her head.)

 

          
Q And you don't know whether there was anything there that you fell on 
either, correct?

 

          
A (The witness shook her head.)

 

Q 
There has been mention that there were crab apples around, but [you] don't know 
that you fell on a crab apple.

 

          
A I have no idea how I went down, the truth. I don't 
know.

 

[¶12] Anderson does not 
direct us to additional evidence in the record that establishes the causation 
element of her negligence claim.  In 
ruling on the Duncans' motion for a judgment as a matter of law, the trial court 
stated:

 

Here is where we are. [Anderson] doesn't say that she 
couldn't see the steps. She doesn't say she needed a guardrail to hang on to. 
She didn't say she slipped on a crab apple.

 

The definition of cause, the one that you both agreed 
to, is an act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about a result. 
That's kind of the more modern definition of cause, and even using that, I don't 
see any evidence that the darkness - It would be guessing to say it was a 
substantial factor in why she tripped. It would be guessing to say that the 
handrail was a substantial factor in why she tripped. Actually, it would be 
guessing to say for sure where she tripped.

 

I 
am reluctant to do it, but I don't see any way that I could support a jury 
saying that the [Duncans] caused this, based on the evidence we have 
today.

 

          
. . . .

 

. 
. . [T]here is no evidence of a causal connection. . . . [I]t's all speculation 
for us to say that she wouldn't have tripped if that light had been on, that she 
wouldn't have tripped if the handrail had been there.

 

          
I am going to grant the motion.

 

[¶13] This Court has stated 
that negligence and causation are not presumed simply because an accident 
occurred. Vasquez By and Through Vasquez, 913 P.2d  at 443; see LeGrande v. 
Misner, 490 P.2d 1252, 1254-55 (Wyo. 1971). Liability for a negligence claim 
cannot be established by conjecture, speculation, or guess. Bluejacket v. 
Carney, 550 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo. 1976); Continental Motors Corporation v. Joly, 
483 P.2d 244, 252 (Wyo. 1971). In establishing that a defendant is liable for a 
plaintiffs injuries, the plaintiff must show the reason why he slipped and fell. 
Bluejacket, 550 P.2d  at 497; LeGrande, 490 P.2d  at 1254.

 

[¶14] Anderson quotes from 
Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 735 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1987), in making her 
claim that the trial court should have allowed the case to go to the jury. In 
Bettencourt, a worker fell while he was descending the ladder he had used to 
climb to the top of an oil storage tank. 735 P.2d  at 724. The district court 
granted a summary judgment in favor of the defendants in the case because the 
worker could not establish the cause of his fall. 735 P.2d  at 722. Bettencourt 
could not establish causation because no one witnessed his fall and he had 
traumatic amnesia as a result of his fall. 735 P.2d  at 724. We reversed the 
summary judgment, stating:

 

We 
hold that in this instance the circumstantial evidence presents a question for 
the jury and extends beyond conjecture, speculation or surmise. The 
circumstantial evidence here present and common knowledge provide a basis from 
which the causal sequence may be inferred. Reasonable minds could differ on the 
question, but they also could find that the design of the oil tank and the 
attached ladder; the absence of artificial lighting; the oil on top of the 
tanks; and the continued use of the tank with the ladder in the condition 
described by [a witness] or any or all of these did constitute a substantial 
factor in bringing about the injuries to Bettencourt. Under the circumstances, 
the summary judgment in favor of [the defendants] must be 
reversed.

 

735 P.2d  at 729. The 
Bettencourt case obviously involved a very unique factual situation, and we 
attribute the holding in that case to its unique facts.

 

[¶15] In this case, by 
contrast, Anderson did not have traumatic amnesia as a result of her fall. She 
simply did not know what caused her to fall. This case is more akin to 
Bluejacket and LeGrande. We will, accordingly, follow the rationale of those 
cases in our decision in the case at bar.

 

[¶16] We have examined all 
the evidence in this case in accordance with our standard for reviewing 
judgments as a matter of law. The record is completely devoid of evidence on 
what actually caused Anderson to fall. Although Anderson suggested that the lack 
of light and the crab apples were potential causes of her fall, she did not 
present concrete evidence to establish that either condition was a substantial 
factor in bringing about her fall. Faced with this dearth of evidence on the 
causation element of Anderson's negligence claim, the trial court properly resisted the 
temptation to speculate or guess about the cause of her fall. We conclude that 
the trial court's assessment of the state of the evidence was correct and that 
the trial court did not err by granting a judgment as a matter of law in favor 
of the Duncans.

 

[¶17] In her second issue, 
Anderson claims that the trial court erred when it refused to admit her x-ray 
exhibits into evidence at the trial. The x-rays purportedly showed Anderson's 
broken ankle and the results of her surgery. As we stated above, we have 
determined that the trial court properly granted a judgment as a matter of law 
because Anderson did not present evidence to establish the cause of her 
injuries. Anderson does not claim that the x-rays were relevant to the causation 
element of her negligence claim, and we cannot imagine how the x-rays could be 
used to prove causation. We do not, therefore, need to determine whether the 
x-rays were admissible evidence because they were not relevant to the causation 
issue and our decision that Anderson did not present evidence on the legal cause 
of her injury is dispositive.

 

[¶18] 
Affirmed.