Case Title: Jones, Aubrey v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 090265

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
AUBREY DWIGHT JONES, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 090265 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
     JANUARY 15, 2010 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
Aubrey Dwight Jones appeals from a judgment of the Court of 
Appeals affirming his convictions in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Hampton for burglary while armed with a deadly weapon, 
conspiracy to commit burglary, and wearing body armor while 
committing a crime, violations of Code §§ 18.2-91, 18.2-22 and –
91, and 18.2-287.2, respectively.  Jones v. Commonwealth, Record 
No. 1201-08-1 (Feb. 3, 2009).  He claims that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that he committed these crimes.  For the 
reasons stated below, we conclude that there is sufficient 
evidence in this record to support the convictions and therefore 
will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Applying principles of appellate review, we recite the 
facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, 
the Commonwealth.  Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 
S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005).  In the early evening of April 9, 2007, 
Catherine Callahan and Jermaine Outlaw were at Outlaw’s 
apartment when they began arguing.  At one point, Outlaw called 
Callahan a “bitch.”  Callahan became upset and left the 
apartment saying that she “was going to do something about it.”  
Callahan called Jones telling him she was upset with Outlaw’s 
“slander.”  Following that conversation, Jones and Callahan met 
and picked up a third person, Sheldon Parker.  The trio returned 
to Outlaw’s apartment at Callahan’s direction to “discuss it” 
with Outlaw. 
When they arrived at Outlaw’s apartment around 2:00 A.M. on 
April 10, 2007, Callahan went to the door and was let in by 
Jeremy Blackburn, another resident of the apartment.  Callahan 
told Blackburn that she had some friends she was bringing into 
the apartment and that “if anything was going to happen tonight, 
[Blackburn was] not to worry about it.”  Callahan returned to 
the hallway outside the apartment and re-entered the apartment 
with Jones and Parker.  Jones was wearing a gun on his waist and 
Parker had an asp∗ in his hand.  Callahan showed the two men 
Outlaw’s bedroom and she went into the bathroom.  Jones and 
Parker began knocking on Outlaw’s bedroom door, asking Outlaw to 
come out and talk.  Outlaw did not respond and Jones tried to 
open the door but it was locked.  He then kicked in the door.  
Outlaw was not in the bedroom but the window was open.  Parker 
and Jones left the apartment to look for Outlaw.  Jones returned  
                     
∗An “asp” or “asp baton” is an extendable bludgeoning weapon 
capable of inflicting blunt force trauma.  See Gray v. Rhoads, 
268 Va. 81, 84-85, 597 S.E.2d 93, 95 (2004). 
 
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a short time later saying that the police were outside.  Jones 
then told Timothy Ellyson, another resident of the apartment, to 
tell the police that they “were just chilling in the house 
watching television.” 
When the police arrived at the apartment they recovered a 9 
millimeter semi-automatic handgun with rounds in the clip and a 
bulletproof vest from Jones.  They also recovered a pair of 
brass knuckles and a pair of black gloves.  An asp was found 
near the car Jones had driven that night.  Jones told the police 
officers that he was at Outlaw’s apartment to “seek an apology” 
and that he carried a gun and wore body armor because of his job 
as a security officer. 
DISCUSSION 
1.  Statutory Burglary 
 
We begin with Jones’ claim that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction for statutory burglary in 
violation of Code § 18.2-91.  Code § 18.2-91 defines statutory 
burglary as a violation of Code §§ 18.2-89 or 18.2-90 with the 
intent to commit assault and battery.  Code § 18.2-90 provides 
that a person armed with a deadly weapon commits a Class 2 
felony if he enters a dwelling in the nighttime without 
breaking. 
To sustain the statutory burglary conviction the 
Commonwealth was required to prove that at the time Jones 
 
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entered the apartment he intended to commit an assault and 
battery.  See Vincent v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 648, 652, 668 
S.E.2d 137, 140 (2008).  Intent can be inferred from the facts 
and circumstances of a case and shown by the acts of the 
defendant.  Id. at 652-53, 668 S.E.2d at 140. 
The evidence in this case established that Jones went to 
Outlaw’s apartment at Callahan’s request because she was upset 
with Outlaw.  When Jones entered the apartment he was wearing 
body armor and was armed with a firearm.  His companion was 
carrying an asp.  Upon entering the apartment Jones immediately 
went to confront Outlaw, banged on his bedroom door, and 
ultimately kicked in the door when Outlaw did not respond.  The 
two men then rushed out of the apartment in pursuit of Outlaw 
who apparently had escaped through his bedroom window.  These 
facts support a finding that Jones intended to assault Outlaw at 
the time Jones entered the apartment. 
We reject Jones’ argument that his statements to police 
that he went to the apartment only to get an apology from Outlaw 
and that he always wore body armor and carried a gun because of 
his job demonstrate that he did not have the intent to assault 
at the time he entered the apartment.  Furthermore, the fact 
finder was entitled to discount these self-serving statements or 
view them as an effort to conceal his guilt.  Shackleford v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 196, 209, 547 S.E.2d 899, 907 (2001). 
 
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Jones also argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish statutory burglary because he entered the apartment 
with the consent of one of its occupants.  Jones relies 
primarily on Davis v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 521, 523, 110 S.E. 
356, 357 (1922), in which this Court reversed a conviction of 
burglary because the defendant had been given a key to the 
premises and had the owner’s permission to enter at any time.  
The Court stated that “a breaking, either actual or 
constructive, to support a conviction of burglary, must have 
resulted in an entrance contrary to the will of the occupier of 
the house.”  Id.  Jones argues that here an occupant of the 
apartment let Callahan into the apartment and voiced no 
objection when Jones entered the apartment.  Therefore, Jones 
concludes his entry into the dwelling place was not against the 
will of the occupant and will not support a conviction for 
statutory burglary. 
We disagree with Jones’ argument that Davis has any 
application to this case.  The Davis opinion makes it clear that 
“breaking,” a required element of the crime charged under the 
law governing at that time, was central to that decision.  See 
132 Va. at 523, 110 S.E. at 357.  However, “breaking” is not an 
element of the crime in the instant case because the entry 
occurred at night.  Code § 18.2-90; Finney v. Commonwealth, 277 
Va. 83, 88, 671 S.E.2d 169, 172 (2009).  Furthermore, in Davis 
 
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this Court stated that a person authorized to enter a dwelling 
may nevertheless be guilty of burglary if that person “actually 
enters for the purpose of carrying out a previously formed 
design to commit a felony.”  Davis, 132 Va. at 524, 110 S.E. at 
357.  Thus, permission or authorization to enter may be negated 
by the invitee's or guest's intent for purposes of establishing 
burglary or statutory burglary.  In the present case, any 
permission to enter the apartment given to Jones does not 
preclude a conviction for statutory burglary because that 
permission would have been negated by his intent to commit 
assault and battery, an intent fully supported by the record in 
this case as discussed above.  
2.  Conspiracy 
Jones also claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction for conspiracy.  As discussed above, the 
record supports the finding that Jones entered Outlaw’s 
apartment during the evening with the intent of committing 
assault and battery.  To sustain a conviction for conspiracy in 
this case, the Commonwealth was required to show that there was 
an agreement between Jones and Callahan before they entered the 
apartment to commit the felony. 
Code § 18.2-22, conspiracy to commit a felony, is violated 
when two or more persons agree to commit a felony offense, 
regardless of whether any act in furtherance of the underlying 
 
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crime has been performed.  Gray v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 675, 
680, 537 S.E.2d 862, 865 (2000).  Proof of an explicit agreement 
is not required and the requisite agreement may be established 
by circumstantial evidence.  Id.  Because of the nature of the 
offense, an agreement often may only be established by 
circumstantial and indirect evidence including the overt actions 
of the parties.  Floyd v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 580-81, 249 
S.E.2d 171, 174 (1978).  
The record in this case shows that Callahan intended to 
exact revenge on Outlaw for statements made during their 
argument and contacted Jones and Parker for assistance in that 
endeavor.  Neither Jones nor Parker was a party to the argument 
between Callahan and Outlaw but both agreed to go with Callahan 
to Outlaw’s apartment.  Jones told the police officer he went to 
Outlaw’s apartment at Callahan’s direction.  Jones carried a 
firearm to the apartment and Parker had an asp.  Callahan, on 
entering the apartment, told an occupant that if something 
happened that evening, he was “not to worry about it” because 
“it didn’t have anything to do with [him].”  Once at the 
apartment Jones acted at Callahan’s direction by waiting in the 
hallway outside the apartment until Callahan brought him inside 
and then going to Outlaw’s bedroom door at Callahan’s direction. 
This evidence supports a conclusion that Parker and Jones 
agreed to accompany Callahan to Outlaw’s apartment to commit a 
 
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felony.  There clearly was an agreement to go to Outlaw’s 
apartment for purposes stemming from Callahan’s argument with 
Outlaw.  A pre-designed plan was shown when Parker and Jones 
waited outside the apartment until called inside by Callahan, 
when Callahan pointed out Outlaw’s bedroom to Parker and Jones, 
and when Callahan retreated to the bathroom, leaving Jones and 
Parker to confront Outlaw.  Callahan’s warning that “if 
anything” was going to happen further indicates that the group’s 
visit was to exact more than an apology.  Accordingly, we reject 
Jones’ claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction for conspiracy to commit a felony. 
3.  Body Armor 
In his last assignment of error, Jones claims that his 
conviction for wearing body armor during the commission of a 
crime should be reversed because the evidence was insufficient 
to prove that he committed a “crime of violence” while wearing 
the bulletproof vest or that the vest was “body armor designed 
to diminish the effect of the impact of a bullet or projectile” 
as required by Code § 18.2-287.2. 
We reject both claims.  First, a “crime of violence” for 
purposes of Code § 18.2-287.2 includes burglary.  See Code 
§ 18.2-288(2).  There is no dispute that Jones was wearing a 
bulletproof vest when he committed statutory burglary. 
Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals held, Jones did not object 
 
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to the testimony of the police officers at trial that 
characterized the vest worn by Jones as a “bullet proof vest” 
and “body armor.”  The finder of fact was entitled to rely on 
this uncontested and uncontradicted testimony in determining 
whether Jones violated Code § 18.2-287.2.  
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals.  
Affirmed. 
 
 
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