Case Title: STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY V. SAMUEL J. TILDEN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY V. SAMUEL J. TILDEN2005 WY 53110 P.3d 865Case Number:  04-147Decided: 04/27/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                            

 
 
STEWART 
TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY,

a 
Texas 
corporation,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
SAMUEL 
J. TILDEN, a Wyoming resident,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Petition 
for Writ of Review 

Original 
Proceeding

 
 
 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Andrea 
L. Richard, P.C., of Jackson, Wyoming, and John A. Coppede of Rothgerber Johnson & 
Lyons LLP, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Jessica 
Rutzick, Jackson, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J., 
Retired

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Stewart 
Title Guaranty Company (Stewart Title) issued a policy of title insurance to 
Samuel Tilden.  When a defect in the 
insured title appeared and the parties could not resolve the issue otherwise, 
the parties entered into arbitration as required by the contract of 
insurance.  The dispute was 
eventually resolved.  During the 
course of the arbitration proceedings the arbitrator made a specific finding 
that Stewart Title failed to cure the defect in a reasonably diligent manner but 
Tilden suffered no actual damages.  
Tilden requested attorney's fees but the arbitrator determined that he 
had no authority to grant attorney's fees as part of the arbitration.  Tilden brought this current action for 
the sole purpose of recovering attorney's fees pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
26-15-124(c) (LexisNexis 2003).1  Stewart Title argues that § 26-15-124(c) 
does not create a private cause of action for attorney's fees and thus the 
district court should dismiss the action.  
Finding that an action for the recovery of attorney's fees pursuant to § 
26-15-124(c) has been properly brought under these specific circumstances, we 
affirm the grant of summary judgment.  

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]           
Stewart 
Title presents the following issues:

 
 
I.  What is the plain and ordinary meaning 
of "judgment" as used in Wyo. Stat. § 26-15-124(c)?

 
 
II.  Was Appellee entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on his claim for attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. § 26-15-124(c) 
without a judgment determining that Stewart Title refused, unreasonably or 
without cause, to pay the full amount of a covered loss[?]

 
 
III.  Can Appellee maintain a stand-alone 
claim for attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. § 26-15-124(c) without a judgment 
determining that Stewart Title refused, unreasonably or without cause, to pay 
the full amount of a loss covered by the insurance 
policy[?]

 
 
IV.  Did the district court err in ruling 
that Stewart Title was collaterally estopped from litigating the reasonableness 
of its claim denial where the arbitrator's decision on that issue did not result 
in a judgment on the merits, the decision was contrary to law, Stewart Title did 
not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the present issue(s) in the 
arbitration, and where the issue decided by the arbitrator was not identical to 
the issue before the district court?

 
 
Tilden 
generally agrees with this presentation of the issues.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
This is 
the second time the underlying facts have given rise to an appeal before this 
Court.  See Stewart Title Guar. 
Co. v. Tilden, 2003 WY 31, 64 P.3d 739 (Wyo. 2003)  (Stewart Title I).  The underlying facts are the same.  Tilden purchased a policy of title 
insurance from Stewart Title.  
Tilden discovered a title defect and presented a claim to Stewart Title, 
which Stewart Title initially denied.  
The issue went to arbitration as required under the contract of 
insurance.  Two years later the 
arbitrator determined that the policy of insurance did cover Tilden's claim, 
Stewart Title had failed to cure the defect in a reasonably diligent manner, but 
that Tilden had suffered no actual damages.  On the question of the reasonableness of 
Stewart Title's actions, the arbitrator, in his Final Award, expressly held that 
"Stewart Title did not cure the title defect in a reasonably diligent manner" 
and that the "delay [in taking action to cure the title] was unreasonable." The 
arbitrator denied Tilden's request for attorney's fees in the arbitration, 
concluding that he had no authority under the contract or the terms of 
arbitration to award attorney's fees.  

 
 

[¶4]           
Tilden, 
still seeking attorney's fees, filed an action in district court for the 
confirmation of the arbitration award pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-113 
(LexisNexis 2003).2  It is that action that gave rise to 
Stewart Title I.  The 
Steward Title I court held that the district court could not confirm the 
arbitration award.  "Stewart's 
satisfaction of the award effectively rendered the issue moot, and the district 
court should have dismissed the confirmation motion unless it determined that 
live issues remained to be litigated."  
Stewart Title I, ¶9.  
Tilden argued that the issue of attorney's fees remained to be 
litigated.  In response, the 
Stewart Title I court stated "we cannot see that a judgment on the award 
is necessary to receive a further additional judgment permitted by law."  Id. at ¶10.  The court remanded the case with 
directions to dismiss the underlying action.

 
 

[¶5]           
Tilden 
next filed the instant action.  
Tilden's complaint traced the underlying course of events and the 
different proceedings to date.  The 
only claim for relief presented by Tilden in his complaint was the award of 
attorney's fees pursuant to § 26-15-124(c).  Tilden filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment on the issue of the unreasonableness of the denial of his claim 
and the delay in curing the title defect by Stewart Title.  Tilden argued that the finding of 
unreasonableness by the arbitrator constituted res judicata or collateral 
estoppel against Stewart Title and therefore the finding was binding and 
precluded Stewart Title from relitigating the issue.  The district court granted the motion 
for partial summary judgment and directed Tilden to "submit an application for 
attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. §26-15-124(c)."  Stewart Title 
appealed.

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶6]           
Although 
not raised by either party in their respective briefs, we must first determine 
whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.  The motion was one for partial summary 
judgment.  The order granting that 
motion is a nonappealable interlocutory order.  This Court would only have jurisdiction 
to hear an appeal of the order if the district court certified the order as an 
appealable judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b).3  Hayes v. Nielson, 568 P.2d 905, 
906 (Wyo. 1977) ("No appeal will lie from an order granting a partial summary 
judgment because such an order is not a final order under Rule 54(b), 
W.R.C.P."); see also Ambariantz v. Cunningham, 460 P.2d 216, 217 (Wyo. 
1969).  The instant order contains 
no express certification that there is no just reason for delay or an express 
direction for the entry of such a judgment.   Barker Bros., Inc. v. 
Barker-Taylor, 823 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Wyo. 1992).  The order, therefore, is not 
appealable.  

 
 

[¶7]           
One 
option available to this Court, however, is to convert the appeal into a writ of 
review.4  See generally In re General 
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River System, 803 P.2d 61, 68 (Wyo. 1990) ("There is no inhibition in our court rules, the state 
constitution, or any legislative mandate that precludes this court from, on its 
own motion, considering a notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari 
and proceeding with review on that basis.")  As this Court has previously 
explained:

 
 
[Appellant] 
should have filed a petition for writ of review in this Court; instead, she 
filed a notice of appeal.  Upon 
initial consideration of that notice of appeal the Court had two options: (1) 
dismiss the appeal, explaining that a petition for writ of review was the proper 
vehicle for bringing the district court's order before this Court; or, (2) treat 
the notice of appeal as a petition for writ of review.  In this particular case, the Court opted 
to treat the notice of appeal as a petition for writ of review.  We caution practitioners that in many, 
if not most instances, this Court will dismiss appeals filed under these 
circumstances.

 
 

Kittles 
v. Rocky Mountain Recovery, Inc., 1 P.3d 1220, 1222 (Wyo. 2000).  With 
that caution still in mind, this Court will, albeit with reluctance, convert 
this appeal into a writ of review.  
We do so only because Stewart Title presents only questions of law 
relating to jurisdiction and Tilden's ability to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted.  Since these issues 
are fundamental to the action, an immediate review by this Court is in the best 
interest of judicial economy.  We 
will continue our review as if the issues were properly before us on a writ of 
review.

 
 

[¶8]           
The 
first issue that must be resolved is whether § 26-15-124(c) creates a private 
right of action.  If it does not, 
then the complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  The issue, however, is not as complex as 
it might first appear and already has been decided.  In Herrig v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487, 494-95 (Wyo. 1992), the court determined that § 
26-15-124(c) does create a private right of action.  At issue was whether third parties could 
bring an independent claim for attorney's fees pursuant to § 26-15-124(c).  Thus, the Herrig court was 
directly presented with the issue of whether § 26-15-124(c) creates a private 
right of action.  That court 
determined that § 26-15-124(c) did create a private right of action, although, 
under the particular circumstances of that case, the third parties could not 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the statute.  Specifically, in discussing the statute, 
the Herrig court stated:

 
 
The 
plain language of subsections (a) and (b) imposes a statutory duty on insurers 
to accept and pay, or reject, claims for insurance benefits within forty-five 
days of receiving adequate proof of a loss.  In the event that the insurer rejected a 
claim or failed to timely act upon a claim, subsection (c) contemplates that the 
insured or his beneficiary would bring a contractual action against its insurer 
for claimed benefits.  Subsection 
(c) provides that a court may, in addition to entering a judgment for the 
insured or its beneficiaries on the contractual action, award attorney's fees 
and interest if it is determined that the insurer's refusal to accept and pay 
the claim within forty-five days of receiving proof of the loss was unreasonable 
or without cause.  An underlying 
action for contractual benefits, however, is not a jurisdictional 
prerequisite.  An insured or his 
beneficiary may maintain an independent action to recover attorney's fees and 
interest for an unreasonable refusal to pay within forty-five days despite the 
insurer's ultimate payment of the claim prior to trial.  Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society, 614 F.2d 720 (10th Cir.1980).

 
 

Herrig, 
at 
494-95.

 
 

[¶9]           
Stewart 
Title fails to mention Herrig in its opening brief and even in its reply 
brief does not dispute that Herrig establishes that an independent action 
for attorney's fees can be maintained pursuant to § 26-15-124(c).  Stewart Title only argues that the 
circumstances of the instant action do not support a claim under the 
statute.  Given no argument that 
Herrig should be overruled, we will not discuss the issue further.  As previously determined by the 
Herrig court, § 26-15-124(c) does create a private right of action.  The district court has 
jurisdiction.

 
 

[¶10]      
The 
remaining issues raised by Stewart Title concern whether the facts and 
circumstances of this case support a claim under § 26-15-124(c).  Most, if not all, of the issues raised 
by Stewart Title require this Court to construe the language of § 
26-15-124(c).  A brief review of the 
rules of statutory construction reminds us that:

 
 
Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law which we review de novo.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
State, 918 P.2d 980, 983 (Wyo.1996).  
We first decide whether the statute is clear or ambiguous.  This Court makes that determination as a 
matter of law.  Id. A "statute is 
unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as 
to its meaning with consistency and predictability."  Allied-Signal, Inc. v. WyomingState Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo.1991).  A "statute is 
ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations."  Id. at 
219-20.

 
 
If we 
determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain 
language of the statute.  We begin 
by making an "inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 
employed according to their arrangement and connection.'"  Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. 
Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo.1993) (quoting 
Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)).  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all 
parts of the statute in pari materia.  State Dep't of Revenue and Taxation 
v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo.1994).  If we determine that the statute is 
ambiguous, we resort to general principles of statutory construction to 
determine the legislature's intent.  
State v. Bannon Energy Corp., 999 P.2d 1306, 1309 (Wyo.2000).  

 
 

Cabot 
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Followill, 2004 
WY 80, ¶¶6-7, 93 P.3d 238, ¶¶6-7 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

[¶11]      
The 
primary contention raised by Stewart Title is that an action pursuant to § 
26-15-124(c) can only be brought after a court judgment has been entered 
determining that an insurance company has unreasonably or without cause failed 
to pay a covered loss.  Stewart 
Title breaks this argument down into several components.  Initially, Stewart Title focuses on the 
word "judgment." It claims that a complete court judgment is a condition 
precedent to filing a complaint pursuant to § 26-15-124(c).  In this case there is only an 
arbitration award, and an arbitration award, especially an unconfirmed 
arbitration award, is not a judgment.  
Stewart Title continues by arguing that, with no prior court judgment 
entered against Stewart Title, an action under § 26-15-124(c) cannot be 
maintained.  

 
 

[¶12]      
This 
contention fails for two reasons: first, it ignores the prior holding of the 
court in Herrig that "[a]n underlying action for contractual benefits . . 
. is not a jurisdictional prerequisite.  
An insured or his beneficiary may maintain an independent action to 
recover attorney's fees and interest," 844 P.2d  at 495, and second, it is not 
supported by the plain language of the statute.  While we agree with Stewart Title that 
the plain meaning of the word "judgment" does not include an arbitration award, 
it does not advance Stewart Title's position.  The critical aspect of the term 
"judgment" under the present circumstances is the temporal aspect of the term 
"judgment" as used in the statute.  
Stewart Title argues a "judgment" must come first, as a condition 
precedent.  We find no support in 
the language of the statue for this contention.  

 
 

[¶13]      
We begin 
with a reminder that this Court is charged with giving effect to every word, 
clause and sentence used by the legislature.  Section 26-15-124(c) is comprised of one 
sentence.  We look then, to give 
effect to every clause and every word within that sentence.  The current focus is on the word 
"judgment" as used in the statute:

 
 
In any 
actions or proceedings commenced against any insurance company on any insurance 
policy or certificate of any type or kind of insurance, or in any case where an 
insurer is obligated by a liability insurance policy to defend any suit or claim 
or pay any judgment on behalf of a named insured, if it is determined that the 
company refuses to pay the full amount of a loss covered by the policy and that 
the refusal is unreasonable or without cause, any court in which 
judgment is rendered for a claimant may also award a 
reasonable sum as an attorney's fee and interest at ten percent (10%) per 
year.

 
 
§ 
26-15-124(c) (emphasis added).  We 
have agreed that "judgment" means a judicially imposed judgment.  The problem with the construction 
Stewart Title advances, that a judgment is a condition precedent to bringing an 
action pursuant to § 26-15-124(c), is that it eliminates the phrase "any actions 
or proceedings."  

 
 

[¶14]      
The 
statute specifically allows for a finding regarding unreasonableness or without 
cause to be made in any "actions or proceedings."  The two words are listed in the 
disjunctive and each must be given its distinct meaning.  The word "action" in its usual legal 
sense means "a civil or criminal judicial proceeding."  Black's Law Dictionary 31 (8th ed. 2004).  The term "proceeding" is broader.  A "proceeding" includes "any procedural 
means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency."  Id. at 1241.  Therefore, by the terms of the statute 
(as already determined in Herrig) a court action is not required as a 
condition precedent to the award of attorney's fees pursuant to the 
statute.  Rather, a determination 
regarding reasonableness can come from any prior action or 
proceeding.

 
 

[¶15]      
This 
construction is far more consistent with the language of the statute.  The "judgment" referred to in the 
statute is a judicial judgment entered at any time, either as part of an initial 
court "action," or after any "actions" or "proceedings" have been 
completed.  The "judgment" after a 
proceeding has been completed could be a judgment in an action brought 
independently under § 26-15-124(c), as has occurred in this case.  In short, a judgment is not a condition 
precedent to the bringing of an independent claim under § 26-15-124(c).  

 
 

[¶16]      
Another 
component of the statute that Stewart Title argues is not met under the 
circumstances is the required finding that "the company refuses to pay the full 
amount of a loss covered by the policy."  
Stewart Title argues that the statute does not apply because Stewart 
Title cured the defect in title, it never refused to "pay" the full amount of a 
covered "loss."  In fact, Stewart 
Title argues, the arbitrator determined that Tilden suffered no actual damages 
so there is no loss.  Thus, Stewart 
Title reasons, Tilden cannot meet the requirements of the 
statute.

 
 

[¶17]      
This 
reading of the statute, while literally correct, is too narrow.  We acknowledge that "[a] basic tenet of 
statutory construction is that omission of words from a statute is considered to 
be an intentional act by the legislature, and this court will not read words 
into a statute when the legislature has chosen not to include them," Merrill 
v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶29, 86 P.3d 270, ¶29 (Wyo. 2004), but such a reading 
would limit the previous language of the statute that a claim under the statute 
may be based upon "any action or proceeding" brought "against any insurance 
company on any insurance policy or certificate of any type or kind of 
insurance."  As further guidance, 
the title of the section refers to acceptance or rejection of a claim 
generally.  The language in general 
would seem to encompass the claim handling practices on all insurance policies 
and all insurance claims, yet the one phrase emphasized by Stewart Title seems 
to limit the scope of the statute to only those policies and circumstances where 
an insured has suffered a covered loss for which a monetary payment was 
due.  Since not all types of 
insurance coverage are limited to the payment of a loss (as the present case 
aptly illustrates), when reading the statute as a whole, an ambiguity is 
created.  

 
 

[¶18]      
There 
are various issues the Court may review when construing an ambiguous 
statute.  "When the language is not 
clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief the statute was 
intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public 
policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other prior and contemporaneous 
facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted rules of construction to 
ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and consistent."  State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. 
Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983).  The ultimate goal is to determine the 
intent of the legislature.  "If the 
statute is ambiguous, which means that its meaning is uncertain and it is 
susceptible to more than one interpretation, we may construe it.  Our primary goal is to determine 
legislative intent.  Statutes are to 
be given a reasonable interpretation with reference to their purpose."  Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶26, 
64 P.3d 104, ¶26 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 

[¶19]      
In this 
instance, legislative intent is clear.  
The majority of the language in the statute reveals that the legislature 
did not intend to limit the type of insurance or claim falling within the ambit 
of the statute.  As the court stated 
in Herrig:

The 
purpose of this statute, as it relates to claims for insurance benefits, is to 
encourage the prompt settlement of justifiable claims by providing redress for 
an insurer's wrongful refusal to pay.  
Id. at 723.   The statute complements and 
enforces the duty of good faith and fair dealing that an insurer owes to its 
insured.  

 
 

Herrig, 844 P.2d  at 495.  We do not believe the 
legislature intended for the conduct of an insurance company that constitutes an 
unreasonable delay in claim settlement to be removed from the ambit of the 
statute simply because the insurance company can settle the claim by means other 
than payment of an amount for a monetary loss suffered by the insured.  To use the present example, the fact 
that a title company can cure a title defect and thereby prevent its insured 
from sustaining actual damages does not excuse the company from liability under 
the statute for its unreasonable claim settlement practices prior to curing the 
title defect.  Hence, it is 
appropriate under these circumstances to interpret the phrase "the company 
refuses to pay the full amount of a loss covered by the policy" broadly to mean 
"the company refuses to fulfill its contractual obligations with regard to 
settling a loss covered by the policy."  

 
 

[¶20]      
In sum, 
the construction of § 26-15-124(c) as determined by this Court is that § 
26-15-124(c) creates a private right of action.  Under the present circumstances, the 
claim brought under the statute requires the following elements be proven: 1) an 
action or proceeding was commenced (which could include the present action); 2) 
against the insurance company; 3) on any insurance policy or any type or kind of 
insurance; 4) that in that action or proceeding it was determined that the 
company refused to pay the full amount of loss covered by the policy or 
otherwise fulfill its obligations to the insured under the policy; 5) and that a 
determination was made in that action or proceeding that the refusal was 
unreasonable or without cause.5  A court that renders a judgment finding 
these elements have been satisfied may award a reasonable sum as an attorney's 
fee and interest at 10% per year as damages.  Any other reading would render various 
words or clauses of the statute meaningless.  

 
 

[¶21]      
This 
construction also settles the issue of the use of collateral estoppel by the 
district court.  By the language of 
the statute, collateral estoppel plays no role in a proceeding pursuant to § 
26-15-124(c) under these circumstances.6  An element of the claim is that a 
finding of unreasonableness was made in a prior proceeding or action (if not, 
then in the current action).  Here, 
a finding of unreasonableness was made in a prior proceeding, the 
arbitration.  That is the element of 
the claim that needs to be proven.  
Stewart Title does not argue that such a finding was not made in the 
arbitration proceeding.  

 
 

[¶22]      
The 
prior finding, in this case the finding of the arbitrator, is not subject to 
challenge in an action brought pursuant to § 26-15-124(c).  If Stewart Title had a problem with any 
finding of the arbitrator, it had adequate recourse.  Stewart Title could have requested 
judicial review of the arbitration award pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-36 114 
or 115 (LexisNexis 2003).  Stewart 
Title instead allowed the findings by the arbitrator to stand uncontested.  The prior finding by the arbitrator was 
properly allowed in the instant action.  
It is the finding itself that is an element of the claim.  It is not necessary or applicable to 
apply collateral estoppel to the finding before the finding can be accepted.7

 
 

[¶23]      
Stewart 
Title finally complains that a finding of unreasonableness or without cause must 
be made in the statutory proceeding to ensure it has a proper chance to litigate 
the issue.  Stewart Title presents 
this argument by asserting that the elements of collateral estoppel have not 
been met.  Stewart Title claims that 
the findings of the arbitrator, that "Stewart Title did not cure the title 
defect in a reasonably diligent manner," and that the "delay [in taking action 
to cure the title] was unreasonable," are not tantamount to the finding 
necessary for a claim to succeed under § 26-15-124(c).  Stewart Title argues that the arbitrator 
never made a finding that it unreasonably refused to pay the full amount of a 
covered loss.  Stewart Title also 
argues that the decision on reasonableness only related to actual damages under 
the contract, not to statutory attorney's fees, thus it is a different 
issue.  

 
 

[¶24]      
As our 
discussion above indicates, however, the statute is not to be so narrowly 
construed.  The statute provides for 
the award of attorney's fees as damages if a finding of unreasonableness or 
without cause was made in any action or proceeding.  There is no restriction as to the claim 
under which such a finding is made.  
Thus, if the finding came in a prior action or proceeding, that action or 
proceeding could involve a claim either in tort or contract.  The finding of the arbitrator was made 
under the language of the contract, and thus qualifies as the necessary finding 
to satisfy the requirements of the statute.  

 
 

[¶25]      
Essentially, 
yet again Stewart Title is attempting to read out of the statute the acceptance 
of the trial court of prior decisions made in "any action or proceeding" and 
instead require the district court to always make the reasonableness 
determination independently.  This 
suggestion goes against the clear language of the statute.  The finding of the arbitrator fits the 
statutory requirement of a finding that Stewart Title unreasonably refused to 
fulfill its contractual obligations with regards to settling a loss covered by 
the policy.  The fact that the 
finding had collateral consequences beyond the arbitration does not make the 
finding inappropriate for the purposes of  
§ 26-15-124(c).

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶26]      
The 
construction of the language of § 26-15-124(c) provides the foundation for the 
answers to all issues presented by Stewart Title.  Section  26-15-124(c) creates a private right of 
action.  Under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, in order to prevail on a claim under § 26-15-124(c), 
Tilden must plead and prove that the arbitrator determined, as part of an 
arbitration proceeding brought under the policy of title insurance issued by 
Stewart Title, that Stewart Title unreasonably, or without cause, refused to 
cure a covered title defect upon a claim presented by Tilden.  The final award of the arbitrator, as 
well as other documents, was entered into evidence in support of Tilden's motion 
for partial summary judgment, effectively supporting all these elements.  Stewart Title does not argue that the 
grant of summary judgment is not factually supported.

 
 

[¶27]      
There is 
no genuine issue of any material fact.  
While we do not necessarily agree with the legal reasoning of the 
district court, we agree with the ultimate outcome.  Summary judgment on the issue of the 
unreasonableness of the delay by Stewart Title in curing the defect in title 
presented by Tilden is affirmed.  
The issue of the proper amount of damages remains to be determined.  This case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[¶28]      
FOOTNOTES

1Section 
26-15-124(c) states:

            
(c) In any actions or proceedings commenced against any insurance company 
on any insurance policy or certificate of any type or kind of insurance, or in 
any case where an insurer is obligated by a liability insurance policy to defend 
any suit or claim or pay any judgment on behalf of a named insured, if it is 
determined that the company refuses to pay the full amount of a loss covered by 
the policy and that the refusal is unreasonable or without cause, any court in 
which judgment is rendered for a claimant may also award a reasonable sum as an 
attorney's fee and interest at ten percent (10%) per year.

2Section 
1-36-113, entitled "Confirmation of award by court," 
states:

            
Upon application of a party the court shall confirm the award unless 
within the time limits allowed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying the 
award.

3W.R.C.P. 
54(b) states:

(b) 
Judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties. -- When more 
than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more 
but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination 
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the 
entry of judgment.  In the absence 
of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, 
however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights 
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as 
to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is 
subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties.

4This 
action should have been brought as a writ of review pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
13.02:

            
A writ of review may be granted by the reviewing court to review an 
interlocutory order of a trial court in a civil or criminal action, or from an 
interlocutory order of an administrative agency, which is not otherwise 
appealable under these rules, but which involves a controlling question of law 
as to which there are substantial bases for difference of opinion and in which 
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance resolution of the 
litigation.

5We 
present only these elements since this is not a "case where an insurer is 
obligated by a liability insurance policy to defend any suit or claim or pay any 
judgment on behalf of a named insured."

 
 

6Stewart 
Title complains that a construction of the statute preventing the issue of 
reasonableness from being litigated within the action brought pursuant to § 
26-15-124(c) will allow insured's to bring a claim against an insurance company 
pursuant to § 26-15-124(c) even if there was a positive determination of 
reasonableness in a prior proceeding or action.  Although this is not the circumstance 
directly before the Court, we note that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and 
res judicata remain available to defeat a claim under the appropriate 
circumstances.

 
 

7Technically, 
the reasoning of the district court applying collateral estoppel was incorrect, 
but this Court can affirm a decision on any grounds appearing in the 
record.  Hutchins v. Payless Auto 
Sales, Inc., 2004 WY 22, ¶12, 85 P.3d 1010, ¶12 (Wyo. 2004) ("Furthermore, 
even if we do not agree with the district court's reasoning, we will affirm the 
district court's summary judgment decision if there is any legal basis in the 
record to support it.").