Case Title: JEREMY GEORGE MERTA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-227

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
JEREMY GEORGE MERTA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 137165 P.3d 456Case Number: 06-227Decided: 08/24/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
JEREMY 
GEORGE MERTA,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Jeremy 
George Merta, Pro 
se

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Timothy J. Forwood, 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Jeremy 
George Merta (Merta), challenges orders of the district court that denied his 
motions to modify his sentence and/or to correct an illegal sentence.  W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) ("The court may correct 
an illegal sentence at any time.").  
Merta asserts that his sentence is "illegal" because he was not given 
proper credit for all time served in jail prior to the imposition of 
sentence.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Merta states this 
issue:

 
 
The 
trial court failed to grant this defendant all pre-sentence credit for time 
served in the county jail, and failed to award this defendant pre-sentence 
credit for time waiting in county jail for transfer to Wyoming DOC [Department 
of Corrections], that the Wyoming DOC did not credit this defendant with the 
correct amount of time off his minimum and maximum sentences, and did not credit 
this defendant the time waiting in county jail to be transferred to the Wyoming 
DOC.

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issue as:

 
 
The 
trial court denied [Merta's] motion to correct illegal sentence, finding he was 
properly credited for his time served.  
Was that denial an abuse of the district court's 
discretion?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      In support of his 
assertions, Merta apparently relies almost entirely on his memory, rather than 
pertinent documentation.  We have, 
at best, a skimpy record upon which to base our review.  The record reflects that Merta's 
sentence was first imposed on February 16, 2001, for the felony of possession 
with intent to deliver a controlled substance (methamphetamine).  Sentence was imposed prior to the 
completion of a pre-sentence report as provided for in W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(1).  He was sentenced to a term of three to 
six years with credit for 26 days "previously served off his minimum and maximum 
sentence."  That document also 
indicates that Merta served 89 days on Counts 2 and 3 (misdemeanor interference 
with a police officer and reckless endangering).  It is unclear from the record exactly 
what happened to Merta after he was sentenced, but he was recommended for 
admission into the Boot Camp Program.  
The post-sentence report was filed in the district court on April 17, 
2001.  Merta did not appeal from 
this judgment and sentence, and as a result no transcript of the proceedings was 
prepared for an appeal.

 
 
[¶4]      Merta appears to 
have successfully completed Boot Camp on July 16, 2001.  Shortly thereafter, Merta filed a motion 
for a reduction of sentence.  The 
district court suspended the balance of Merta's jail term and placed him on six 
years of probation.  That order was 
entered on July 25, 2001.  No 
mention is made of credit for pre-sentence confinement in that order.  No appeal was taken from that order, and 
no transcript of the proceedings was prepared.

 
 
[¶5]      On October 18, 
2004, the prosecuting attorney filed a petition to revoke Merta's probation 
based upon Merta being cited for two charges of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol and one charge of driving while under suspension.  A transcript of the initial hearing was 
prepared and appears in the record.  
That transcript does not shed any light on the issues raised in this 
appeal.  On February 28, 2005, after 
a dispositional hearing on that matter, the district court revoked Merta's 
probation, suspended imposition of sentence and again placed him on six years of 
supervised probation.  In that 
order, the district court gave Merta 193 days of credit against his minimum and 
maximum sentences.  This included 
the time he spent in Boot Camp, as well as the 26 days credited in the district 
court's February 16, 2001 order.  
Merta did not appeal that order either, and no transcript of the 
dispositional hearing was prepared.

 
 
[¶6]      On August 29, 
2005, the prosecutor again petitioned the district court to revoke Merta's 
probation, this time for consuming alcohol and methamphetamine on several 
occasions, thus violating the terms of his probation.  By order entered on December 29, 2005, 
the district court revoked Merta's probation, imposed the original sentence of 
three to six years of imprisonment, and credited Merta for 250 days of time 
served off his minimum and maximum sentences.  The 250 days included the 193 noted 
immediately above, as well as 57 days of jail time served immediately prior to 
the imposition of the instant sentence.  
The record does include a transcript of the hearing associated with this 
disposition and, therein, the district court states that Merta "will be given 
credit for 250 days of presentence confinement against both the minimum and the 
maximum terms of imprisonment."  
Merta did not appeal from this order either.

 
 
[¶7]      On March 16, 
2006, Merta filed a motion for amendment/modification of sentence.  A hearing was held on this motion on May 
18, 2006.  In this proceeding, as 
well as all of the other the proceedings outlined above, Merta was represented 
by counsel.  At this hearing, 
Merta's counsel recited that Merta had been properly credited for 250 days of 
presentence incarceration and he had served 210 days in prison at that point (a 
total of 460 days of confinement).  
Merta did not express a concern that he had not been given enough credit 
for pre-sentence confinement at the hearing.  In response to this motion, on June 5, 
2006, the district court reduced Merta's prison term from three to six years, 
down to two and one-half years to six years.  Merta did not appeal this 
order.

 
 
[¶8]      On June 14, 2006, 
Merta filed a pro se motion for 
amended judgment and sentence, and on July 17, 2006, he filed a motion to 
correct an illegal sentence.  In 
these papers, Merta complained for the first time that he was entitled to 
additional credit for time served.  
Merta did not differentiate between time served pre-sentence for the 
instant crime and time served post-sentence, or time spent in jail for reasons 
other than the original crime.  
Merta also includes a claim that the Wyoming Department of Corrections 
has erred in its computation of his time served.  By orders entered on August 30, 2006, 
the district court denied Merta's motions.  
On September 19, 2006, Merta filed a notice of appeal, seeking review of 
those orders.  From the record 
extant, it would appear at this juncture that Merta has completed serving all of 
the time he was required to serve under his reduced two and one-half to six year 
sentence, and the issues raised may, in some senses, be of academic interest 
only.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      In Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491, 498-99 
(Wyo. 1990) 
(some citations and some footnotes omitted) we held (after stating what the 
rules were for sentences that were imposed before the date of that 
decision):

 
 
            
Credit will be automatically granted for presentence incarceration time 
on all sentences.  We will presume 
that in imposing the stated sentence, the trial court, in its exercise of 
discretion, considered presentence confinement. Consequently, without regard for 
what is or is not stated in the sentence, credit for presentence confinement 
will be applied to reduce the length of remaining incarceration under the 
sentence.  As long as the maximum 
and minimum terms remain within statutory limits, discretion of the trial court 
continues to establish the periods which obviously include recognition of 
presentence confinement. 

 
 
            
We adopt the goal of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice for "the purpose * * * to end * * * technical distinctions by granting a 
comprehensive credit that treats all periods of confinement attributable to the 
underlying criminal transaction as equivalent, no matter what label is attached 
to such incarceration.  To this end, 
[we would] require[ ] the credit to be offset against both the minimum and 
maximum terms imposed, * * *."  III 
ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice 18.310 (2d ed. 1980). (FN10)

 
 
            
This resolution provides certainty of result, clarity of rules, and 
preservation of equal protection of constitutional interests. 

 
 
(FN10.) 
In result, we would follow generally the standard developed by III ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice, supra, at 
18.307-08:

 
 
Standard 
18-4.7.  Credit for pretrial 
confinement

 
 
(a)  Credit 
against the maximum term and any minimum term should be given to a defendant for 
all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison 
sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is 
based.  This should specifically 
include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending 
sentence, pending the resolution of an appeal, and prior to arrival at the 
institution to which the defendant has been committed.

 
 
(b)  Credit 
against the maximum term and any minimum term should be given to a defendant for 
all time spent in custody under a prior sentence if the defendant is later 
reprosecuted and resentenced for the same offense or for another offense based 
on the same conduct.  In the case of 
such a reprosecution, this should include credit in accordance with paragraph 
(a) for all time spent in custody as a result of both the original charge and 
any subsequent charge for the same offense or for another offense based on the 
same conduct.

 
 
(c)  If 
a defendant is serving multiple sentences, and if one of the sentences is set 
aside as the result of direct or collateral attack, credit against the maximum 
term and any minimum term of the remaining sentences should be given for all 
time served since the commission of the offenses on which the sentences were 
based.

 
 
(d)  If 
the defendant is arrested on one charge and later prosecuted on another charge 
growing out of conduct which occurred prior to arrest, credit against the 
maximum term and any minimum term of any sentence resulting from such 
prosecution should be given for all time spent in custody under the former 
charge which has not been credited against another 
sentence.

 
 
(e)  To 
avoid ambiguities, the award of credit for pretrial incarceration should be 
automatic and mechanical, and affirmative action by the sentencing court should 
be unnecessary.  A procedure 
consistent with this principle is specified in standard 
18-6.8.

(f)  The 
policies of sentencing authorities and those of other agencies empowered to 
determine the date of actual release should be carefully coordinated in the area 
of sentencing credit to achieve consistency of application and the abolition of 
any distinction between pretrial and posttrial confinement.  In particular, where the agency 
administering early release employs guidelines to determine the presumptive date 
of such release, credit for pretrial confinement should also be given against 
such presumptive term.  To the 
extent that full integration of policies respecting sentencing credit is not 
achieved, the sentencing court should make corresponding adjustments in the 
sentence it imposes to ensure that the defendant who is confined before trial 
receives full credit therefor.

 
 
(g)  These 
standards do not address the question of whether credit should be given against 
the maximum term for good conduct within the correctional institution or for 
compliance with institutional rules.

 
 
Standard 
18-6.8 provides:

 
 
Procedure 
for awarding credit

 
 
The 
credit required by standard 18-4.7 should be awarded in the following 
manner:

 
 
(a)  The 
parties should communicate to the court at the time of sentencing the facts upon 
which credit for time served prior to sentencing will be 
based;

 
 
(b)  The 
court should inform the defendant at the time of sentencing of the defendant's 
status on the issue of credit for time previously served;

 
 
(c)  The 
court should assure that the record accurately reflects the facts upon which 
credit for time served prior to sentencing will be computed, but, to avoid 
possible ambiguities, the court should not itself award such credit or otherwise 
reduce the sentence for time served;

 
 
(d)  The 
custodian should communicate to the prison authorities at the time the defendant 
is delivered for commitment the amount of time spent in custody since the 
imposition of sentence;

 
 
(e)  The 
credit to be awarded against the sentence should be computed by the prison 
authorities as soon as practicable and automatically 
awarded;

 
 
(f)  The 
prison authorities should inform the defendant of his or her status as soon as 
practicable; and

 
 
(g)  The 
defendant should be afforded an avenue of postconviction review for the prompt 
disposition of questions which may arise as to the amount of credit which should 
have been awarded.

 
 

Id. at 
18.491-92.

 
 
[¶10]   We have continued to recognize that 
a sentence that does not include proper credit for presentence incarceration is 
illegal.  Manes v. State, 2007 WY 6, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d 179, 181 (citing Gomez v. State, 
2004 WY 15, ¶ 18, 85 P.3d 417, 421 (Wyo. 2004) and Smith v. State, 988 P.2d 39, 40 
(Wyo. 
1999)).  In Smith we held:

 
 
A 
sentence which does not include proper credit for presentence incarceration is 
illegal.  Smith v. State, 932 P.2d 1281, 1282 
(Wyo.1997).  A criminal defendant is 
entitled to credit against his sentence for the time he was incarcerated prior 
to sentencing, provided that the confinement was due to his inability and 
failure to post bond on the offense for which he was awaiting disposition.  Meek v. State, 956 P.2d 357, 358 
(Wyo.1998); Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491, 498 (Wyo.1990).  The purpose of 
this rule is to provide equal protection to defendants who are unable to post 
bond because of their indigence.  Renfro, 785 P.2d  at 497-98.  A defendant is not, however, entitled to 
credit for the time that he spent in custody when his confinement would have 
continued despite his ability to post bond.  Meek, 956 P.2d at 358;  Renfro, 785 P.2d  at 498.  In accordance with this principle, a 
defendant is not entitled to credit against his sentence for the time he spent 
in custody while awaiting probation revocation proceedings because that 
confinement was not attributable to his financial inability to post bond.  Milladge v. State, 900 P.2d 1156, 
1160-61 (Wyo.1995).

 
 
            
Our review of the record reveals that Smith was incarcerated for five 
different periods of time.  The 
district court credited two of those periods against his sentence:  the twenty days that he spent in custody 
between August 18, 1995, and September 7, 1995; and the 156 days that he spent 
at Community Alternatives.  The 
other three periods of confinement-October 21, 1995, through January 5, 1996; 
October 28, 1997, through January 12, 1998; and July 6, 1998, through August 14, 
1998-involved proceedings to revoke Smith's bond or his probation.  Those periods of confinement would have 
persisted regardless of Smith's financial ability to post bond.  He was not, therefore, entitled to 
credit against his sentences for those periods of 
incarceration.

 
 
[¶11]   Despite the optimism this Court 
expressed in Renfro, that these sorts 
of problems might be put behind us, appeals associated with proper credit for 
time served have not abated.  The 
record on appeal is not entirely clear in this case, but that is principally 
because Merta did not appeal from any of the district court's appealable orders, 
except the most recent ones.  Merta 
does not document his claims of "time served" with supporting evidence, cogent 
argument, or pertinent authority.  
However, to the extent the record is clear, he received credit for time 
in excess of that which is required by our long-standing rules.  Merta appears to assert that the Wyoming 
Department of Corrections has erred in keeping his records.  To the extent there may be any truth in 
that, it is a matter which must be taken up administratively through the 
Department of Corrections and would be subject to this Court's review only to 
the extent such an issue reached this Court via W.R.A.P. 
12.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶12]   The orders of the district court 
denying Merta's motions to modify his sentence and/or to correct an illegal 
sentence are affirmed.