Case Title: In re Kepfield video

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
Nos.  112,897 
          119,709 
 
In the Matter of SAM S. KEPFIELD, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed March 15, 2019. Probation revoked; one-year 
suspension reinstated; additional consecutive three-year suspension imposed, stayed after six months to 
begin three years' supervised probation. 
 
 
Matthew J. Vogelsberg, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton 
A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, and Penny R. Moylan, Deputy Disciplinary 
Administrator, were on the formal complaint for the petitioner.  
 
John J. Ambrosio, of Ambrosio & Ambrosio, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Sam S. 
Kepfield, respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
PER CURIAM:  This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Sam S. Kepfield, of Hutchinson, an 
attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1989. 
 
 
On April 3, 2015, the court suspended respondent's license to practice law for a 
period of one year for violating Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). 
Imposition of that discipline was suspended and respondent was placed on supervised 
probation for a period of three years. See In re Kepfield, 301 Kan. 662, 670, 346 P.3d 332 
(2015). 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
On March 14, 2018, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against respondent alleging new violations of the KRPC. On March 29, 2018, 
the respondent timely filed an answer to the formal complaint. In his answer, the 
respondent generally admitted to violations of KRPC. 
 
On April 11, 2018, the Disciplinary Administrator filed a motion with this court to 
revoke respondent's three-year supervised probation. Thereafter, the chairperson of the 
Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys entered an order consolidating the motion to 
revoke respondent's probation with the pending formal complaint. See Rule 211(g)(10) 
(2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 251). 
 
On May 8, 2018, the hearing panel called the consolidated matters. Respondent 
appeared in person and by counsel. Before the hearing began, respondent stipulated to 
certain facts and rule violations alleged against him in the formal complaint. Specifically, 
respondent stipulated his conduct violated KRPC 1.1 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 289) 
(competence); 1.3 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 292) (diligence); 1.4 (2018 S. Ct. R. 293) 
(communication); 1.15(a) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 328) (safekeeping property); 1.16(d) 
(2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 333) (terminating representation); and 8.4(c) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 
381) (misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). Because the 
respondent admitted to rule violations, the panel heard evidence on the merits of the 
formal complaint and motion to revoke probation as well as evidence in aggravation and 
mitigation at the same time. 
 
Although respondent stipulated to violating KRPC 1.1 and 1.4, after hearing 
additional evidence, the panel concluded respondent did not violate these rules. Further, 
the panel concluded respondent did not violate KRPC 3.1 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 343) 
(meritorious claims and contentions) and 3.3 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 344) (candor toward 
the tribunal). Accordingly, these four allegations were dismissed.  
3 
 
 
 
 
A majority of the hearing panel determined respondent violated KRPC 1.3 and 
1.16(d). The panel unanimously determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a); 
8.1(a) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 379) (false statement in connection with disciplinary matter); 
and 8.4(c). 
 
Because the hearing panel concluded the respondent violated certain Kansas Rules 
of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal complaint, the panel determined 
respondent violated certain terms and conditions of his current probation plan. See Rule 
211(g)(11) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 251). 
 
After the hearing, the panel made the following detailed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"8. 
On April 3, 2015, in case number 112,897, the Kansas Supreme Court 
placed the respondent on probation for having violated Rules 1.2 (scope of 
representation), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4(a) (communication), and 1.16(d) (terminating 
representation). In re Kepfield, 301 Kan. 662, [670,] 346 P.3d 332 (2015). 
 
 
"9. 
In placing the respondent on probation, the court stated: 
 
'In this case, we are persuaded that respondent's misconduct was 
largely a product of his depression, which is being successfully 
monitored and treated. We also note his effort to make full restitution of 
the fee paid by J.L., despite financial challenges, and his attendance at 
attorney support group and Twelve Step meetings. We therefore hold 
4 
 
 
 
that the discipline jointly recommended by the Deputy Disciplinary 
Administrator and respondent should be imposed. 
 
'CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
'IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Sam S. Kepfield be and is 
hereby disciplined by a one-year suspension from the practice of law, 
imposition of which is suspended immediately, and placement on three 
years' supervised probation, as outlined in his probation plan. See 
Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(2) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 306).' 
 
 
"10. 
The respondent's probation plan, adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court, 
provided: 
 
'OVERVIEW 
 
'Respondent is a fifty (50) year old criminal practitioner. His practice 
consists of appointed and retained criminal work. The Respondent has 
several clients whom he represents on Domestic matters. However, he is 
closing out those files and has decided to eliminate that portion of his 
practice. 
 
'Respondent has been sanctioned on two prior occasions, both were 
informal admonitions. 
 
'Respondent's major challenge, as with many sole practitioners, is that he 
does not have anyone to turn to for advice nor does he have support staff 
to handle the administrative portion of his practice. 
 
'PROPOSED SUPERVISOR 
 
'Sarah McKinnon of Hutchinson, Kansas has agreed to act as supervisor 
for the Respondent. Proposed supervising attorney is a practicing lawyer 
5 
 
 
 
handling similar types of cases as Respondent. She is the chief public 
defender of Reno County. Ms. McKinnon knows the Respondent and has 
worked on a number of cases with him over the years. 
 
'Further, Ms. McKinnon is Respondent's KLAP monitor. 
 
'PROPOSED PROBATION PLAN 
 
'1. 
The Respondent's practice will be supervised by Sarah 
McKinnon, a licensed attorney in good standing in Hutchinson, 
Kansas. 
 
'2. 
The Respondent shall allow Ms. McKinnon access to his files, 
calendar, operating account and trust account records. 
 
'3. 
Respondent shall comply with any requests made by the 
supervising attorney. 
 
'4. 
During the first year and a half of supervision, the Respondent 
shall meet with the supervising attorney once a week. Said 
meeting shall be face-to-face. 
 
'5. 
During the final six months of the probation period, the 
Respondent shall meet with Ms. McKinnon per her direction. 
 
'6. 
Ms. McKinnon shall prepare and submit a detailed monthly 
report to the Disciplinary Administrator regarding Respondent's 
status on probation. 
 
'7. 
Ms. McKinnon shall conduct an immediate and detailed audit of 
the Respondent's files. 
 
6 
 
 
 
'8. 
Six months after the completion of the first audit, Ms. McKinnon 
shall conduct a second audit of the Respondent's files. 
 
'9. 
At the completion of the supervised probation, Ms. McKinnon 
shall conduct a final audit. 
 
'10. 
After each audit, Ms. McKinnon shall prepare and submit a 
report regarding same to the Disciplinary Administrator's Office. 
 
'11. 
Should Ms. McKinnon discover any violations of the Kansas 
Rules of Professional Conduct, she shall include such 
information in her report to the Disciplinary Administrator's 
Office to facilitate investigation of the same. 
 
'12. 
Ms. McKinnon shall provide the Respondent with a copy of each 
report referenced above. 
 
'13. 
Respondent shall follow all recommendations of his supervisor 
and shall immediately correct all deficiencies noted in Ms. 
McKinnon's periodic reports and audit reports. 
 
'14. 
The supervisor shall determine whether Respondent's office 
procedures are appropriate and effective. The supervising 
attorney shall confirm that Respondent has an appropriate 
calendaring system, method of notifying clients for hearings and 
scheduled meetings, billing procedures, as well as appropriate 
methods for tracking client and opposing counsel contact, 
including documenting all phone messages and phone contacts. 
 
'15. 
At the weekly meetings, Respondent and supervisor shall review 
all new cases and discuss the course of action to be taken as to 
each. Further Respondent shall discuss all potential problems he 
has noted in each of his cases. 
7 
 
 
 
 
'16. 
Respondent and supervisor shall review the following week's 
schedule in order to assure that notices have been sent to all 
appropriate parties, that appropriate preparation has been carried 
out, and that all updates to the files have been completed. 
 
'17. 
Ms. McKinnon shall be acting as an officer and agent of the 
Court while supervising the Respondent in monitoring his legal 
practice. The supervisor shall be afforded all immunities by 
Supreme Court Rule 223 (2003 [sic] Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 306), 
during the course of this activity and pursuant to this Order. 
 
'18. 
Respondent shall follow the voluntary monitoring agreement 
entered into with KLAP on June 24, 2014. (attached) 
 
'19. 
The Respondent shall continue to cooperate with the 
Disciplinary Administrator's Office. If the Disciplinary 
Administrator requires any further information, the Respondent 
shall timely provide said information. 
 
'20. 
The Respondent shall not violate the provisions of his probation 
or the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. In the event the 
Respondent violates any of the terms of his probation or any of 
the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct during the 
probationary period, the Respondent shall immediately report 
such violations to his supervisor and the Disciplinary 
Administrator. 
 
'21. 
Respondent shall follow the dictates of Supreme Court Rule 
211(g). 
 
'22. 
Respondent shall pay the costs in an amount to be certified by 
the Disciplinary Administrator's Office.' 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
"11. 
On April 11, 2018, the disciplinary administrator filed a motion with the 
Kansas Supreme Court to revoke the respondent's probation. In support of the motion, the 
disciplinary administrator alleged: 
 
'1. 
On April 3, 2015, this court ordered that Respondent be 
disciplined by a one-year suspension from the practice of law. The court 
further ordered that the one-year suspension be suspended immediately, 
and the Respondent be placed on three years' supervised probation, as 
outlined in the Respondent's probation plan. 
 
'2. 
The Respondent's probation plan provided, in relevant part, that 
"Respondent shall not violate the provisions of his probation or the 
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct." 
 
'3. 
On December 7, 2017, the Kansas Board for Discipline of 
Attorney's Review Committee determined probable cause existed to find 
that Respondent had violated one or more provisions of the Kansas Rules 
of Professional Conduct (KRPC), and directed that a Formal Complaint 
be filed. 
 
'4. 
On March 14, 2018, a Formal Complaint, in Case Nos. DA 
12,657 and DA 12,710, was filed against Respondent, alleging violations 
of KRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 1.16, 3.1, 3.3, 8.1, and 8.4. 
 
'5. 
On March 29, 2018, the Respondent filed an answer to the 
Formal Complaint, admitting most of the facts pled within, and admitting 
to unspecified violations of the KRPC. 
 
'6. 
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 211(g)(9) provides that "upon 
receiving other credible evidence that the Respondent has violated one or 
more probation conditions, the Disciplinary Administrator may file a 
motion to revoke probation with the Supreme Court and the Chairman of 
9 
 
 
 
the Board for Discipline of Attorneys. The filing of such a motion shall 
automatically suspend the running of probation time and continue the 
supervision until the motion is resolved.' 
 
 
"12. 
On April 13, 2018, John D. Gatz, Chairman of the Kansas Board for 
Discipline of Attorneys, entered an order of consolidation under Rule 211(g)(10). The 
order provided: 
 
'On this 13th day of April, 2018, the Disciplinary Administrator's 
Amended Motion to Revoke Probation and consolidate the hearing on 
the Motion to Revoke Probation with the formal complaint filed in 
DA12,657 and DA12,710 comes before the Chairman of the Kansas 
Board for Discipline of Attorneys. 
 
'The Chair finds as follows: 
 
'1. 
After a Motion to Revoke Probation is filed, the Chairman of the 
Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys is required to "immediately 
appoint one Board Member of the Kansas Board for Discipline of 
Attorneys to conduct an expedited hearing, or consolidate with a pending 
matter to determine whether the Respondent has failed to comply with 
one or more probation conditions." Kansas Supreme Court Rule 
211(g)(10). 
 
'2. 
A hearing on the formal complaint filed In the Matter of Sam S. 
Kepfield, DA12,657 and DA12,710 is currently scheduled for May 8, 
2018. 
 
'3. 
The Motion of the Disciplinary Administrator to Revoke 
Probation and determine whether Respondent has failed to comply with 
one or more probation conditions should be and is hereby consolidated 
with the formal complaint filed in DA12,657 and DA12,710 now set for 
hearing on May 8, 2018. 
10 
 
 
 
 
'IT IS SO ORDERED.' 
 
 
"13. 
Because Mr. Gatz consolidated the allegation that the respondent 
violated the terms and conditions of his probation with the two pending disciplinary 
complaints, the hearing panel considers all three of these matters. 
 
"DA12657 
 
 
"14. 
In the written stipulation entered on May 8, 2018, the parties stipulated to 
the following facts: 
 
'5. 
On or about January 7, 2016, Respondent was appointed by 
Reno County District Court Judge Timothy Chambers, to represent 
[E.S.], in the appeal of District Court Case No. 2008-CR-492 (Appeal 
Case No. 114,55), wherein the district court summarily dismissed [E.S.]'s 
post-conviction motion. 
 
'6. 
Respondent filed an appellate brief on March 1, 2016. 
 
'7. 
On August 26, 2016, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court's dismissal of [E.S.]'s post-conviction motion. 
 
'8. 
On or about August 29, 2016, Respondent forwarded the Court 
of Appeals' decision to [E.S.] and informed him that a petition for Kansas 
Supreme Court review had to be filed within 30 days of the August 26, 
2016 Court of Appeals' decision. Respondent did not tell [E.S.]:  (1) that 
he would file the petition for [E.S.]; (2) that [E.S.] needed to let him 
know if [E.S.] wanted to petition for review; or (3) what would happen if 
[E.S.] did not let him know one way or another. 
 
'9.  
On September 19, 2016, [E.S.] sent a "Notice of Intent [to] 
Petition for Review" ("notice") to the Kansas Appellate Court Clerk's 
11 
 
 
 
office. The notice stated that [E.S.] wanted to pursue review. The notice 
also contained allegations critical to respondent and [E.S.]'s prior 
attorney. 
 
'10. 
Respondent received [E.S.]'s notice on September 23, 2016, 
three days before the deadline for filing a petition for review. 
 
'11. 
On September 23, 2016, Respondent sent [E.S.] a letter stating, 
"I take it that by filing a notice pro se, combined with your motion to 
have me removed as appellate counsel for your latest post-conviction 
motion, you do not wish me to file a petition for review. Therefore, I will 
not do so, and will consider my involvement in this matter at an end." 
 
'12. 
On September 26, 2016, the Kansas Appellate Court Clerk's 
office sent [E.S.] a letter informing him that his notice "could not be filed 
. . . because you are represented by counsel." 
 
'13. 
No petition for review was filed, and a mandate was 
subsequently issued on October 6, 2016. 
 
'14. 
On October 14, 2016, Kansas Appellate Court Clerk's office 
received an undated letter from [E.S.] stating that he no longer had a 
lawyer, due to his lawyer "quitting," and attached a copy of Respondent's 
September 23, 2016, letter. 
 
'15. 
On October 14, 2016, the Kansas Appellate Court Clerk's office 
wrote to [E.S.] and informed him that the office still considered him 
represented by Respondent and therefore, the office could not file his pro 
se pleading. The letter further informed [E.S.] that the Court of Appeals 
no longer had jurisdiction over the matter because it had been over 30 
days since the Court of Appeals issued its decision and the mandate was 
issued on October 6, 2016. 
 
12 
 
 
 
'16. 
That same day, Jennifer Bates, the Chief Deputy Clerk of the 
Kansas Court of Appeals, filed a complaint against Respondent. 
 
'17. 
On October 19, 2016, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator Kate 
Baird provided Respondent with a copy of the complaint and requested 
he provide a written response within 20 days. 
 
'18. 
On October 31, 2016, Respondent sent a responsive letter 
wherein he stated that prior to sending [E.S.] the September 23, 2016 
letter, he met with Sarah McKinnon, his probation supervisor. 
Respondent further alleged:  "She read [E.S.'s notice] and agreed that it 
appeared that Mr. [E.S.] wished to proceed pro se. She advised me to 
write him a letter, and inform Mr. [E.S.] that since he wished to proceed 
pro se, my involvement was apparently at an end." Respondent further 
alleged that McKinnon strongly suggested that he write such a letter. 
 
'19. 
McKinnon was subsequently contacted by the Disciplinary 
Administrator's Office. McKinnon confirmed that she met with 
Respondent, reviewed [E.S.]'s notice and discussed writing a responsive 
letter to [E.S.]'s. However, she emphasized that she was not aware at the 
time of her discussion with Respondent, that the deadline for filing the 
petition for review was just three days away. McKinnon stated that had 
she known of the deadline, she would not have approved of the letter; but 
would have instead informed Respondent that he needed to file the 
petition for review.' 
 
 
"15. 
In addition to the facts contained in the stipulation, it is also relevant that 
on August 16, 2016, E.S. filed a motion to remove the respondent as counsel of record. 
The Court of Appeals denied E.S.'s motion on August 26, 2016, the same day the court 
issued its opinion affirming E.S.'s convictions. 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
"16. 
On September 19, 2016, E.S. forwarded a pro se petition for review to 
the Clerk of the Appellate Courts. The pro se filing was not accepted pursuant to Rule 
5.01(d). That rule provides: 
 
'Motion by Represented Party. A party represented by counsel may file a 
motion on the party's own behalf only to remove counsel or to file a 
supplemental brief. A motion filed under this subsection must be served 
on the party's counsel and all other parties to the appeal. This subsection 
does not apply to a party appearing pro se.' 
 
Thus, under Rule 5.01(d), the only pro se filing that would be accepted by the Clerk of 
the Appellate Courts when a party is represented by counsel is a motion to remove 
counsel or a motion to file a supplemental brief. Because the respondent remained as 
attorney of record in E.S.'s appellate case, the Clerk of the Appellate courts could not 
accept E.S.'s pro se petition for review, forwarded on September 19, 2016. The 
respondent was not familiar with Rule 5.01(d). 
 
 
"17. 
In order to extract himself as attorney of record for E.S., the respondent 
was required to comply with Rule 1.09, which provides: 
 
'[b] . . . When withdrawal of an attorney who has appeared of record in 
an appellate proceeding will leave the client without counsel, the 
attorney may withdraw only when: 
 
(1) 
the attorney has served a motion for withdrawal 
on the client—and on all parties—that: 
 
(A) 
states the reasons for the withdrawal, unless 
doing so would violate an applicable standard of 
professional conduct; 
 
(B) 
provides evidence that the withdrawing attorney 
provided the client: 
14 
 
 
 
 
(i) 
an admonition that the client is personally 
responsible for complying with all orders of the 
court and time limitations established by the 
rules of procedure or by court order; and 
 
(ii) 
notice of the date of any pending hearing, 
conference, or deadline; and 
 
(C) 
provides the court with a current mailing address 
and telephone number for the client, if known; 
 
(2) 
the attorney has filed the motion with the clerk 
of the appellate courts under Rule 5.01; and 
 
(3) 
a justice or judge of the appellate courts issues 
an order approving the withdrawal.' 
 
The respondent did not file a motion to withdraw from his representation of E.S. 
Accordingly, the respondent remained as attorney of record for E.S. 
 
 
"18. 
At the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent explained that 
because the respondent's client made it clear that he did not wish to have the respondent 
continue to represent him, the respondent believed he should not file anything on behalf 
of his client. While the hearing panel is sympathetic to the respondent's position, a 
majority of the hearing panel concludes that the rules required that the respondent file a 
motion to withdraw from the representation and take action to protect E.S.'s interests. The 
respondent did not do so. 
 
 
"19. 
Based on the stipulation and the evidence presented at the hearing on the 
formal complaint, a majority of the hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the 
respondent violated Rules 1.3 (diligence) and 1.16 (termination of representation) in 
representing E.S. 
15 
 
 
 
 
"Rule 1.3 
 
 
"20. 
Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing their clients. See Rule 1.3. The respondent failed to diligently represent E.S. 
in one limited way. On August 16, 2016, by filing a motion to have the respondent 
removed as counsel of record, E.S. made it clear to the respondent that he no longer 
desired the respondent's representation. At that point, diligent representation required the 
respondent to file a motion to withdraw. Because E.S.'s motion was denied and because 
the respondent failed to file a motion to withdraw as counsel, the respondent remained as 
attorney of record for E.S. As such, the Clerk of the Appellate Courts could not accept 
E.S.'s pro se petition for review filed on September 19, 2016. See Rule 5.09(1)(d). 
Finally, the respondent's lack of diligence caused E.S. to lose his chance to have the 
Kansas Supreme Court review the Kansas Court of Appeals' decision. At the hearing on 
this matter, the respondent argued that there was little likelihood that E.S. would have 
received any relief from the petition for review. The respondent's misconduct is not 
diminished by the respondent's belief that the petition for review had little likelihood of 
success. What E.S. lost was his opportunity to present his case to the Kansas Supreme 
Court for review. Because the respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing his client, a majority of the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated Rule 1.3. 
 
"Rule 1.16 
 
 
"21. 
Rule 1.16 requires lawyers to take certain steps to protect clients after the 
representation has been terminated. First, when an attorney is discharged, the attorney 
must withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16(a)(3). Clearly, E.S. did not want 
the respondent to continue to represent him. After E.S. filed his August 16, 2016, motion 
to remove the respondent as counsel of record, the respondent should have filed a motion 
to withdraw from the representation. The respondent failed to do so. The respondent's 
failure to file a motion to withdraw from the representation precluded E.S.'s ability to file 
pleadings on his own behalf. Accordingly, a majority of the hearing panel concludes that 
the respondent violated Rule 1.16(a)(3). 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
"22. 
Additionally, Rule 1.16(d) provides: 
 
'Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the 
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other 
counsel, . . .' 
 
In this case, in order to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect E.S.'s 
interests, the respondent should have timely filed a motion to withdraw from the 
representation as required by Rule 1.09. Because the respondent failed to withdraw from 
the representation, the respondent should have taken other action to preserve E.S.'s 
interest in filing a petition for review. Because the respondent failed to take any action to 
preserve E.S.'s interests in filing a petition for review, a majority of the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent violated Rule 1.16(d). 
 
"DA12710 
 
 
"23. 
In the written stipulation entered on May 8, 2018, the parties stipulated to 
the following facts: 
 
'20. 
On August 29, 2014, [E.M.] was arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol and was served with a notice of suspension of his 
driver's license after refusing to submit to alcohol testing. 
 
'21. 
[E.M.] was charged, in Hutchinson Municipal Court, with 
Driving Under the Influence (DUI). 
 
'22. 
Consequently, [E.M.] retained Respondent to represent him in 
the administrative driver's license suspension hearing with the Kansas 
Department of Revenue (KDOR hearing), as well as the DUI municipal 
court case. 
 
17 
 
 
 
'23. 
[E.M.] and Respondent signed a retainer agreement on 
September 25, 2014. The agreement required [E.M.] to pay Respondent a 
$1,000 retainer, which encompassed $750 for the DUI case and $250 for 
the KDOR hearing. The Agreement further provided: 
 
"The initial retainer may be deposited in Attorney's 
operating account to pay for immediate expenses, such 
as filing fees, obtaining copies of complaints, 
videotapes, and other evidence, and any outside 
consultation Attorney believes necessary." 
 
'24. 
[E.M.'s] records indicate that on or about September 25, 2014, he 
paid Respondent $200.00; and on or about October 6, 2014, he paid 
Respondent $550.00. Thereafter, according to [E.M.'s] records, he made 
additional payments to Respondent, totaling $550.00 from July 2016, 
through November 2016. 
 
'25. 
Respondent did not provide [E.M.] a statement or accounting of 
fees and expenses until November 17, 2016. At that time, Respondent 
provided [E.M.] with a "Statement of Account," which documented he 
had billed 23.4 hours at an hourly rate of $150.00. The statement 
provided an incorrect total of $4,510, but documented that the client had 
paid $1,700. 
 
'26. 
The KDOR hearing was held on November 6, 2014. 
 
'27. 
On December 19, 2014, the KDOR hearing office issued a 
written order affirming [E.M.'s] driver's license suspension. The order 
indicates it was mailed to [E.M.] and Respondent. 
 
'28. 
Pursuant to relevant statutory authority, [E.M.] had until January 
8, 2015, in which to file a petition for review of the KDOR order. 
 
18 
 
 
 
'29. 
[E.M.] received a copy of the order prior to Christmas 2014. 
[E.M.] noted that a copy had been mailed to Respondent and assumed 
Respondent would contact him about what further action could be taken. 
 
'30. 
When he had not heard from Respondent by December 31, 2014, 
[E.M.] sent an email to Respondent, titled "Hearing," which read as 
follows: 
 
"Since the state disapproved my request, I guess we need 
to appeal to district court, have you had time to look at 
the video tape yet or have access to it. Please let me 
know, I feel we need to go after the officer if he was 
properly trained, after me talking to other officers, they 
said he should have been able to show me the record of 
the testing machine with no problem, they also said he 
didn't know what he was doing." 
 
Respondent did not reply to [E.M.'s] December 31, 2014, email. 
 
'31. 
[E.M.] and Respondent had a meeting in January 2015, in which 
[E.M.] provided Respondent with a copy of the KDOR order. 
 
'32. 
Respondent acknowledged that he received [E.M.'s] December 
31, 2014, email; but alleged that he did not realize it was referring to the 
KDOR order. In addition, Respondent alleged that he did not receive a 
copy of the order from KDOR. 
 
'33. 
[E.M.] left the January 2015 meeting believing Respondent 
would file the necessary appeal, or petition for judicial review, of the 
KDOR order. 
 
'34. 
On January 27, 2015, KDOR notified [E.M.] that his driving 
privileges had been suspended. 
19 
 
 
 
 
'35. 
Respondent filed an untimely petition for judicial review of the 
KDOR order on February 24, 2015. Respondent initially told the 
investigator that he did not file the petition for judicial review until 
February 24, 2015, because [E.M.] had not submitted the filing fee. 
However, Respondent's file revealed that [E.M.] paid the filing fee to 
Respondent on January 30, 2015. 
 
'36. 
Respondent alleged, in the petition for judicial review, that it was 
untimely filed because the Respondent did not receive a copy of the 
order from KDOR, and he only learned of its existence on January 15, 
2015. Respondent argued that KDOR's failure to provide him with a 
copy of the order excused the late filing. 
 
'37. 
KDOR filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the petition was filed 
out of time. Respondent did not file a written response to the motion to 
dismiss, which was heard on August 7, 2015. The respondent did not 
present any evidence at the hearing, even though [E.M.] was present at 
the hearing and available to testify. 
 
'38. 
On August 12, 2015, the district court granted the motion to 
dismiss, finding that [E.M.] had failed to satisfy his burden to show 
excusable neglect in filing the petition for judicial review out of time. 
 
'39. 
Respondent filed a motion to reconsider on August 21, 2015. 
The district court denied the motion on September 9, 2015, finding that 
[E.M.] did not offer or proffer any evidence at the hearing. 
 
'40. 
Respondent filed an initial notice of appeal on August 27, 2015, 
and an amended notice of appeal on September 15, 2015, following the 
order denying his motion to reconsider. 
 
20 
 
 
 
'41. 
Respondent failed to timely docket the appeal; consequently, on 
October 7, 2015, KDOR filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. 
Respondent did not respond to KDOR's motion; and the motion was 
thereafter granted on October 13, 2015, and the appeal was dismissed. 
 
'42. 
On December 31, 2015, the respondent filed a motion to 
reinstate the appeal. The motion was ultimately granted by the Court of 
Appeals on January 8, 2016. 
 
'43. 
Respondent's appellate brief alleged that the petition for judicial 
review should have been granted because Respondent did not receive a 
copy of the order from KDOR. Respondent did not address the fact that 
his client had received the KDOR order prior to the deadline for filing 
the petition for judicial review, or that he had received a copy of the 
KDOR order as of January 15, 2015, at the latest. 
 
'44. 
On November 4, 2016, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court's dismissal of the case. 
 
'45. 
On November 22, 2016, the Respondent filed a petition for 
review with the Kansas Supreme Court, which was denied on November 
9, 2017. 
 
'46. 
On November 23, 2016, [E.M.] sent a letter to KDOR, alleging 
that Respondent misrepresented facts contained within the pleadings 
filed with the courts. KDOR forwarded the complaint to this office. On 
December 8, 2016, [E.M.] filed a complaint with this office regarding 
Respondent's representation of him in the KDOR and criminal 
proceedings. The complaint was docketed for investigation. 
 
'47. 
During an August 10, 2017 interview, the investigator asked 
Respondent to account for the retainer paid by [E.M.] on September 
2014. Respondent informed the investigator that he believed he placed 
21 
 
 
 
the retainer in his trust account. Consequently, the investigator requested 
that the Respondent provide him with trust account records to document 
the deposit. 
 
'48. 
The investigator also requested Respondent to provide him with 
evidence to document what Respondent did with the filing fee paid by 
[E.M.] on January 30, 2015, as well as any evidence to establish that 
Respondent sent billing statements to [E.M.], other than the one provided 
on November 17, 2016. 
 
'49. 
On August 14, 2017, Respondent wrote to the investigator, 
alleging that he believed [E.M.] paid the filing fee in cash, that he placed 
the cash into a bank bag in his office, and later used it to pay the filing 
fee. The August 14, 2017, correspondence did not contain any trust 
account records. 
 
'50. 
That same day, the investigator sent Respondent an email to 
inquire about the trust account records and billing statements. The 
Respondent replied on August 15, 2017, stating that he could locate no 
other billing statements. The Respondent did not answer the 
investigator's inquiry regarding the trust account records. 
 
'51.  
Consequently, on August 17, 2017, Deputy Disciplinary 
Administrator Deborah Hughes requested Respondent to provide her 
with all trust account and operating account records from September 1, 
2014 to June 30, 2016. 
 
'52. 
On September 12, 2017, the Respondent replied, admitting that 
he hadn't had a trust account since 2011. The Respondent further alleged 
that he deposited his clients' money into a safe deposit box.' 
 
 
"24. 
In addition, the hearing panel finds that the respondent did not receive a 
copy of the written order affirming the suspension of E.M.'s driver's license from the 
22 
 
 
 
KDOR, despite the notation on the written order that KDOR sent the written order to the 
respondent. 
 
 
"25. 
During the hearing on the formal complaint, E.M. testified that on 
January 5, 2017, he met with the respondent and provided him with a copy of the written 
order affirming the suspension of E.M.'s driver's license. The respondent testified that he 
did not meet with E.M. until January 15, 2015. Based on all the evidence presented to the 
hearing panel, the hearing panel accepts the respondent's testimony that the meeting with 
E.M., where E.M. provided the respondent with a copy of the written order affirming the 
suspension of E.M.'s driver's license, occurred on January 15, 2015. 
 
 
"26. 
Based on the stipulation and the evidence presented at the hearing on the 
formal complaint, the hearing panel unanimously concludes that the respondent violated 
Rules 1.15 (safeguarding property), 8.1 (disciplinary matters), and 8.4 (professional 
misconduct) in representing E.M. 
 
"Rule 1.15 
 
 
"27. 
Lawyers must properly safeguard their clients' property. Rule 1.15(a) 
specifically provides that: 
 
'(a) 
A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in 
a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from 
the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account 
maintained in the state of Kansas. Other property shall be identified as 
such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account 
funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be 
preserved for a period of five years after termination of the 
representation.' 
 
In this case, the respondent deposited E.M.'s unearned fees and filing fees into an 
operating account with the respondent's own money. By commingling funds belonging to 
E.M. with funds belonging to the respondent and by failing to deposit E.M.'s unearned 
23 
 
 
 
fees and filing fees into an attorney trust account, the hearing panel unanimously 
concludes that the respondent violated Rule 1.15(a). 
 
"Rule 8.1 
 
 
"28. 
Rule 8.1 provides: 
 
'a lawyer . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: 
 
(a) 
knowingly make a false statement of material 
fact; or  
 
(b) 
fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a 
misapprehension known by the person to have 
arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond 
to a lawful demand for information from an 
admissions or disciplinary authority, except that 
this rule does not require disclosure of 
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.' 
 
In this case, during the disciplinary investigation, the respondent falsely told the attorney 
appointed to investigate the disciplinary complaint that he deposited the unearned fees 
paid by E.M. into his attorney trust account. The respondent knew that at the time he 
received the funds from E.M. he did not have an attorney trust account. Thus, the hearing 
panel concludes that the respondent knowingly made a false statement of material fact to 
the disciplinary investigator in connection with a disciplinary matter, in violation of 
KRPC 8.1(a). 
 
"Rule 8.4(c) 
 
 
"29. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' Rule 8.4(c). The respondent 
stipulated that during the disciplinary investigation, the respondent falsely told the 
24 
 
 
 
investigator that he believed he deposited the fees paid by E.M. into his attorney trust 
account. The respondent knew that he did not have a trust account at the time he received 
the fees from E.M. Accordingly, the hearing panel unanimously concludes that the 
respondent violated Rule 8.4(c). 
 
"Probation Violation 
 
 
"30. 
Because the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated the 
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct in DA12657 and DA12710, the hearing panel also 
concludes that the respondent violated the term numbered 20 of the probation plan 
adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court in case number 112,897. See Rule 211(g)(11). 
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
 
"31. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
 
"32. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his client to provide 
diligent representation. The respondent violated his duty to his client to properly deal 
with his client's fees. The respondent also violated his duty to his client to properly 
terminate the representation. Finally, the respondent violated his duty to the legal 
profession to properly cooperate during the disciplinary investigation. 
 
 
"33. 
Mental State. The respondent negligently and knowingly violated his 
duties. 
 
 
"34. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
potential injury to his clients. 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
"35. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 
imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, 
found the following aggravating factors present: 
 
a. 
Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent has been previously 
disciplined on three occasions. 
 
On December 8, 2010, the disciplinary administrator informally 
admonished the respondent for violating Rules 3.3 (candor to the 
tribunal), 8.2 (statements regarding judges) and 8.4 (professional 
misconduct). 
 
On April 3, 2015, the Kansas Supreme Court placed the respondent on 
probation for three years for violating Rules 1.2 (scope of 
representation), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication), and 1.16 
(terminating representation). 
 
On May 10, 2016, the disciplinary administrator informally admonished 
the respondent for violating Rule 1.1 (competence). 
 
b. 
Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent misled the attorney 
assigned to investigate the respondent's conduct by indicating that he believed he 
deposited E.M.'s unearned fees into the respondent's trust account knowing that 
at the time he received E.M.'s unearned fees, the respondent did not have a trust 
account. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent's 
misconduct included conduct that was motivated by dishonesty. 
 
c. 
Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations. 
The respondent violated 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communications); 1.15 (safekeeping 
property), 1.16 (terminating representation), 8.1 (disciplinary matters), and 8.4 
26 
 
 
 
(professional misconduct). Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent committed multiple offenses. 
 
d. 
Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding by Intentionally 
Failing to Comply with Rules or Orders of the Disciplinary Process. The 
respondent provided false information to the attorney appointed to investigate 
E.M.'s complaint when he told the investigating attorney that he believed he 
deposited E.M.'s unearned fees into the respondent's trust account. The 
respondent's false statement to the attorney appointed to investigate the 
disciplinary complaint amounts to bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
e. 
Vulnerability of Victim. E.S. and E.M. were vulnerable to the 
respondent's misconduct. 
 
f. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme 
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1989. At 
the time of the misconduct, the respondent has been practicing law for more than 
25 years. 
 
 
"36. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
a. 
Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have Contributed 
to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. As was pointed out in 
the earlier disciplinary case, the respondent suffers from depression and the 
respondent's depression appears to have contributed to his misconduct. 
 
b. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His 
Cooperation During the Hearing and His Full and Free Acknowledgment of the 
Transgressions. Other than providing false information to the disciplinary 
27 
 
 
 
investigator, the respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary process. The 
respondent entered into a stipulation and admitted violating multiple rules. 
 
c. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including 
Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and 
General Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active and productive 
member of the bar of Hutchinson, Kansas. The respondent enjoys a reputation for 
providing good representation to an underserved population. 
 
 
"37. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.42 
Suspension is generally appropriate when: 
 
(a) 
a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for 
a client and causes injury or potential injury to a 
client; or 
 
(b) 
a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and 
causes injury or potential injury to a client. 
 
'7.2 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a 
professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the 
public, or the legal system. 
 
'8.2 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer has been 
reprimanded for the same or similar misconduct and engages in 
further acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to 
a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.' 
 
28 
 
 
 
"Recommendation 
 
 
"38. 
The disciplinary administrator argued that disbarment is the appropriate 
discipline, relying on ABA Standard 8.1(a), which provides that '[d]isbarment is 
generally appropriate when a lawyer . . . knowingly violates the terms of a prior 
disciplinary order and . . . causes injury or potential injury to a client.' 
 
 
"39. 
The respondent recommended that he be allowed to continue to practice 
law, subject to the same plan of supervised probation approved by the Kansas Supreme 
Court in case number 112,897. 
 
 
"40. 
The hearing panel struggled with making a recommendation for 
discipline in this case. As argued by the disciplinary administrator, the respondent 
violated the terms of a prior disciplinary order when he violated the terms of probation. 
However, the misconduct which violated the terms of probation, standing alone, does not 
warrant disbarment. 
 
 
"41. 
Additionally, clearly, the respondent does good work for an underserved 
population in Reno County, Kansas. The results that he obtained for E.S. and E.M. were 
good results. However, the respondent's failure to timely establish a trust account and the 
respondent's false statement to the attorney investigating E.M.'s complaint coupled with 
the respondent's failure to withdraw from his representation of E.S. troubles the hearing 
panel. 
 
 
"42. 
Unfortunately, the hearing panel concludes that placing the respondent 
on probation has not served to be a sufficient deterrent to the respondent. Accordingly, 
the hearing panel concludes that a short suspension is appropriate in this case. 
 
 
"43. 
Based upon the stipulation, the findings of fact, the conclusions of law, 
and the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions listed above, the hearing panel 
unanimously recommends that the Kansas Supreme Court suspend the respondent's 
license to practice law for a period of three years. The hearing panel further recommends 
that after the respondent has served six months of the suspension, the Court place the 
29 
 
 
 
respondent back on probation subject to the terms and conditions included in the Court's 
opinion in case number 112,897, for an additional three years. Finally, in the event the 
Court adopts the hearing panel's recommendation, the hearing panel also recommends 
that at the time the opinion is released in this case the following terms be added to the 
respondent's plan of probation: 
 
'23. 
The respondent will maintain an attorney trust account. 
 
'24. 
The auditor employed by the disciplinary administrator 
will conduct an audit of the respondent's trust account to 
cover the time period from when the account was 
established through the date of the Court's opinion in this 
case. During the period of probation following the 
respondent's suspension, the auditor employed by the 
disciplinary administrator will conduct an annual audit of 
the respondent's trust account. Following each audit, the 
auditor will prepare a report which details (1) whether the 
respondent is properly utilizing the attorney trust account, 
(2) all irregularities with the respondent's trust account, 
and (3) what the respondent needs to do differently to 
properly utilize the attorney trust account and eliminate 
the irregularities. The auditor will provide a copy of the 
report to the respondent, to counsel for the respondent, to 
the respondent's practice supervisor, and the disciplinary 
administrator. If violations of Rule 1.15 are discovered in 
the audits, the disciplinary administrator may file another 
motion to revoke the respondent's probation.' 
 
 
"44. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
30 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 251). Clear 
and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth 
of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 
(2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
 
Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint to which he filed 
an answer. Respondent was also given adequate notice of the hearing before the panel 
and the hearing before this court. He filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final 
hearing report. With no exceptions before us, the panel's findings of fact are deemed 
admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c), (d) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 255). Furthermore, the 
evidence before the hearing panel establishes the charged misconduct in violation of 
KRPC 1.3 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 292) (diligence); 1.15(a) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 328) 
(safekeeping property); 1.16(d) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 333) (terminating representation); 
8.1(a) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 379) (false statement in connection with disciplinary matter); 
and 8.4(c) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 381) (misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation) by clear and convincing evidence and supports the panel conclusions 
of law. 
 
We adopt all of the panel's findings and conclusions except for the finding in ¶ 35c 
that respondent violated KRPC 1.4 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 293) (communication) as this 
allegation had been dismissed by the hearing panel. Accordingly, we find respondent 
31 
 
 
 
violated his existing probation plan by again violating the KRPC during his probationary 
period. See Rule 211(g). 
 
The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline for respondent's 
violations. At the hearing before this court, at which respondent appeared, the office of 
the Disciplinary Administrator recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law. The hearing panel recommended that respondent be suspended 
for three years from the practice of law, that after six months of that suspension, 
respondent be placed on a three-year probation subject to the terms and conditions of his 
previous probation plan with two additional terms and conditions. 
 
The panel's recommendation is advisory and does not prevent this court from 
imposing a greater or lesser punishment. In re Harrington, 296 Kan. 380, 387, 293 P.3d 
686 (2013) (citing Supreme Court Rule 212[f]). In determining the appropriate sanction, 
this court considers the facts and circumstances of the case as well as aggravating and 
mitigating factors. 296 Kan. at 387. 
 
 
After carefully balancing the aggravating factors with the mitigating factors, the 
court determines the motion to revoke respondent's probation should be granted and the 
original one-year suspension from the practice of law should be reinstated. After 
respondent serves this one-year suspension, the court accepts the panel's recommendation 
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years, that after six 
months of that suspension the respondent be placed on a three-year probation subject to 
the terms of his previous probation plan, plus the two new conditions recommended by 
the hearing panel. A minority of this court would impose the harsher sanction 
recommended by the Disciplinary Administrator of indefinite suspension from the 
practice of law. 
 
32 
 
 
 
In summary, respondent's total suspension from the practice of law is for 18 
months followed by a three-year supervised probation. During respondent's probationary 
period he must comply with the probation terms set forth in the hearing panel's final 
report, ¶ 43, including new terms 23 and 24. See Supreme Court Rule 211(g)(6). 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Sam S. Kepfield be and is hereby ordered to serve 
his original one-year suspension from the practice of law followed by a three-year 
suspension from the practice of law. After serving six months of this second suspension, 
respondent will be placed on probation under the stated terms for three years. This order 
becomes effective upon the filing of this decision. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 
 
ROSEN, J., not participating. 
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 112,897 
and 119,709 vice Justice Rosen under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by 
K.S.A. 20-2616.