Case Title: State ex rel. Valley Interior Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2008-Ohio-2703

Docket Number: 20071196

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Valley Interior Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 118 Ohio St.3d 418, 2008-
Ohio-2703.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. VALLEY INTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC., APPELLANT, v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Valley Interior Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 
 118 Ohio St.3d 418, 2008-Ohio-2703.] 
Temporary total disability compensation — Failure to notify employee of 
consequences of absence — Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2007-1196 — Submitted April 24, 2008 — Decided June 12, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 06AP-649, 2007-Ohio-2523. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee John F. Wood was fired by appellant, Valley Interior 
Systems, Inc. (“Valley Interior”).  Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio found 
that the termination did not foreclose temporary total disability compensation, and 
the Court of Appeals for Franklin County agreed.  Valley Interior now challenges 
that decision. 
{¶ 2} Wood worked as a drywall finisher for Valley Interior.  In 
September 2004, he fell ten feet onto a concrete floor and fractured his right 
elbow.  Wood had surgery on his elbow on March 4, 2005, and his surgeon 
eventually released him to work with restrictions.  Wood missed approximately 
six weeks of work before returning in a light-duty capacity.  Once he returned, he 
continued to miss work sporadically.  For example, between April 21, 2005, and 
May 11, 2005, Wood apparently missed work seven times for various reasons. 
{¶ 3} On May 11, 2005, Valley Interior sent a certified letter to Wood.  
The letter stated that Valley Interior had a position available consistent with 
Wood’s physical restrictions.  The letter closed by stating: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 4} “We expect you to be at work on Friday, May 13, 2005.  Failure to 
appear at work will be construed as a voluntary abandonment of employment.” 
{¶ 5} It is undisputed that this letter was not delivered to Wood until the 
afternoon of Saturday, May 14, 2005.  When he contacted his employer on 
Monday, May 16, Wood explained that he had not received the letter until May 
14.  Valley Interior told him that he was terminated nevertheless for excessive 
absenteeism. 
{¶ 6} In October 2005, Wood saw Dr. Patricia Southworth because of 
continuing problems with his elbow and arm.  The next month, he filed a motion 
with the commission for temporary total disability compensation.  Valley Interior 
objected, claiming that Wood’s firing constituted a voluntary abandonment on his 
part of his former position of employment that barred the requested compensation.  
State ex rel. Watts v. Schottenstein Stores Corp. (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 118, 623 
N.E.2d 1202. 
{¶ 7} The commission disagreed.  A district hearing officer ruled that the 
firing did not satisfy the requirements of State ex rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. 
Indus. Comm. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 401, 650 N.E.2d 469, and could not be 
considered a voluntary abandonment of Wood’s former position of employment.  
A staff hearing officer affirmed but on a different basis.  He found that Wood’s 
failure to timely receive Valley Interior’s letter rendered Louisiana-Pacific 
inapplicable. 
{¶ 8} The Court of Appeals for Franklin County denied Valley Interior’s 
request for a writ of mandamus.  Valley Interior now appeals to this court as of 
right. 
{¶ 9} An employee’s voluntary abandonment of an employment position 
can preclude temporary total disability compensation.  Watts.  A firing can be 
considered to be a voluntary departure from the former position of employment. 
Id.  This derives from the principle that an individual “may be presumed to tacitly 
January Term, 2008 
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accept the consequences of his voluntary acts.”  State ex rel Ashcraft v. Indus. 
Comm. (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 42, 44, 517 N.E.2d 533.  Thus, while an employer 
may formalize the separation, the claimant is deemed to have initiated it when he 
or she chose to engage in the misconduct that precipitated the termination. 
{¶ 10} This principle, however, requires that the consequence is one of 
which the claimant was, or should have been, aware.  State ex rel. Liposchak v. 
Indus. Comm. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 194, 196, 652 N.E.2d 753.  Wood did not 
learn until May 14 that the consequence of his absence the previous day was 
immediate termination.  A staff hearing officer thus concluded that Wood could 
not have tacitly assented to his firing when he missed work on May 13 because he 
did not know that employment termination was the consequence of absence.  This 
determination was not an abuse of discretion. 
{¶ 11} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
___________________ 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur and Christopher C. Russell, for appellant. 
Ward, Kaps, Bainbridge, Maurer & Melvin, L.L.C., and Matthew A. 
Weller, for appellee John Wood. 
Nancy Hardin Rogers, Attorney General, and Sandra E. Pinkerton, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
______________________