Case Title: Lifestar Response of Maryland v. Vegosen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 031376

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
LIFESTAR RESPONSE OF MARYLAND, INC. 
 
 
 
          OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 031376 
            JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
           APRIL 23, 2004 
PEGGY VEGOSEN 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
Joanne F. Alper, Judge 
 
 
The issue in this appeal is whether Code § 8.01-288 cures a 
plaintiff’s failure to serve upon the defendant a notice of 
motion for judgment when the defendant was served with a copy of 
the amended motion for judgment and had actual notice of the 
lawsuit. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Peggy Vegosen (“Vegosen”) filed a motion for judgment 
against Lifestar Ambulance Service, Inc. alleging personal 
injuries sustained during her transport in an ambulance.  
Lifestar Ambulance Service, Inc., entered a special appearance 
claiming it was not the proper defendant.  With leave of court, 
Vegosen filed an amended motion for judgment against Lifestar 
Response of Maryland, Inc. (“Lifestar”).  Lifestar Ambulance 
Service, Inc. was dismissed as a defendant.  A private process 
server then served the amended motion for judgment on the 
registered agent for Lifestar.  According to the affidavit of 
 
 
service, a “Summons, Complaint, and Attachments”1 were included 
in the service of process. 
Lifestar did not make an appearance or file a responsive 
pleading.  Vegosen filed a motion for default judgment which it 
served upon Lifestar.  The trial court granted Vegosen’s motion 
for default judgment and, after an ore tenus hearing, awarded 
damages in the amount of $100,000.  Subsequently, Lifestar moved 
to vacate the default judgment pursuant to Code § 8.01-
428(A)(ii). 
In support of its motion Lifestar argued that it had not 
been served with a notice of motion for judgment as required by 
Rule 3:3 and therefore the trial court did not have jurisdiction 
over it to enter the default judgment.  Lifestar contended that 
the default judgment was thus void and should be set aside under 
Code § 8.01-428(A)(ii).  Vegosen responded that Lifestar had 
failed to prove no notice of motion for judgment had been served 
and that, even if that allegation was true, the saving provision 
                     
1 While the affidavit makes the recital quoted in the text 
that a "Summons" was served as part of the papers delivered to 
the defendant's registered agent, the record is clear in this 
case that no summons or notice of any kind was affixed to the 
motion for judgment delivered to defendant's registered agent.  
Hence we do not address in this opinion the issue whether a 
notice that is improperly titled is valid.  See Rule 3:3(c)  
("The notice to be given of the motion for judgment shall be 
substantially in this form")  (emphasis added). 
 
 
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of Code § 8.01-288 cured any defective service because Lifestar 
had actual notice of the proceedings. 
The trial court ruled by letter opinion 
that the mere absence of a Notice of Motion 
for Judgment does not automatically render a 
default judgment void where the defendant 
has been served with an Amended Motion for 
Judgment and has actual notice of the 
litigation.  While [Lifestar] is correct 
that Rule 3:3 of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court of Virginia provides that the Notice 
of Motion for Judgment is the process 
required to give notice to the defendant of 
a lawsuit, the saving provision of Va. Code 
Ann. § 8.01-288 cures a defect of service 
where process is shown to have actually 
“reached the person to whom it is directed 
within the time proscribed by law.” 
 
 
The trial court found that while Lifestar had been served 
with an amended motion for judgment, the required Rule 3:3(c) 
notice prepared by the clerk was not served or otherwise 
received by Lifestar.  The trial court also found Vegosen’s 
counsel had communicated by telephone to Lifestar’s registered 
agent on the date the amended motion of judgment was served that 
Lifestar had three weeks to file a responsive pleading.  
Concluding that Lifestar “had actual notice of the lawsuit and 
of the time for filing a responsive pleading,” the trial court 
ruled Code § 8.01-288 cured any defect in service of process 
because actual notice cures “any defect whatsoever.”  The trial 
court denied Lifestar’s motion to vacate the default judgment.  
We awarded Lifestar this appeal. 
 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
Under Rule 3:3(a), “[a]n action shall be commenced by 
filing in the clerk’s office a motion for judgment.”  Rule 
3:3(c) sets out the proper form of “[t]he notice to be given of 
the motion for judgment,” which is issued by the clerk and 
notifies the party being sued that unless a responsive pleading 
is filed in the clerk’s office within twenty-one days after 
service of the notice of motion for judgment, default judgment 
for the plaintiff may be entered.  Rule 3:3(c) then provides 
that “[t]he clerk shall issue the notice and attach it to a copy 
of the motion for judgment, and the combined papers shall 
constitute the notice of motion for judgment to be served as a 
single paper.”  Rule 3:3(c) (emphasis added). 
 
The plain language of Rule 3:3(c) mandates that the notice 
of motion for judgment to be served on the defendant has two 
constituent parts, both of which are required to constitute 
“process”: a copy of the motion for judgment and the notice 
issued by the clerk.  See Bendele v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 
395, 398, 512 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1999) (in equity, “process” is 
the “subpoena in chancery, which the clerk would have attached 
to a copy of the filing”).  Rule 3:3(c) then underscores that 
these two documents, “served as a single paper,” constitute 
“process” because “[n]o judgment shall be entered against a 
 
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defendant who was served with process more than one year after 
commencement of the action against him.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
The trial court held that failure to serve the defendant 
with the “notice” portion of the notice of motion for judgment 
does not void a default judgment when the defendant has been 
served with an amended motion for judgment and has actual notice 
of the suit.  We disagree.  Receiving a notice of motion for 
judgment is the sine qua non to having been served with process.  
Indeed, under the plain language of Rule 3:3(c), “process” is 
the notice of motion for judgment which must consist of “the 
combined papers . . . to be served as a single paper.”  Without 
either the notice prepared by the clerk or the copy of the 
motion for judgment, there is no notice of motion for judgment 
and no “process.”  It is the “process” which must reach the 
defendant to vest the court with jurisdiction.  Without service 
of the “process,” the court acquires no jurisdiction.  A 
plaintiff who fails to serve a notice of motion for judgment on 
the defendant has failed to serve process and cannot benefit 
from the entry of a default judgment because the trial court 
never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. 
Nonetheless, Vegosen argues that the saving provision of 
Code § 8.01-288 cures any defect of service so as to give the 
court jurisdiction.  Again, we disagree. 
 
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When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it 
will be construed according to its plain meaning.  Smith Mt. 
Lake Yacht Club, Inc. v. Ramaker, 261 Va. 240, 247, 542 S.E.2d 
392, 396 (2001); Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 370, 514 
S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999).  Code § 8.01-288 states, in pertinent 
part, that “process which has reached the person to whom it is 
directed within the time prescribed by law, if any, shall be 
sufficient although not served or accepted as provided in this 
chapter.”  (Emphasis added).  By its plain language the statute 
applies only when “process” has reached “the person to whom it 
is directed.”  Id.  “Process” under Code § 8.01-288 is the same 
“process” as defined under Rule 3:3(c).  In the case at bar, 
“process” never reached Lifestar because the papers served on it 
did not constitute a notice of motion for judgment under Rule 
3:3. 
Under its clear terms, Code § 8.01-288 is designed to cure 
defects in the manner in which “process” is served.  It cannot 
 
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cure defects in the “process” itself.2  Since Lifestar never 
received “process,” Code § 8.01-288 does not apply.  The trial 
court erred in concluding otherwise. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Vegosen’s failure to serve Lifestar with a notice of motion 
for judgment pursuant to Rule 3:3 meant Lifestar never received 
process and was not properly before the trial court.  Since the 
process was defective, as distinguished from the manner of 
service, the savings provision of Code § 8.01-288 does not 
apply.  Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over 
Lifestar, it erred in entering a default judgment.  Since the 
default judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction, the trial 
court also erred in failing to grant Lifestar’s motion to set 
that judgment aside under Code § 8.01-428(A)(ii).  We will 
therefore vacate the default judgment entered May 17, 2002, 
                     
 
2 Vegosen also argues that even if the trial court’s 
determination that the saving provision Code § 8.01-288 cured 
the defective service of process is in error, Lifestar’s 
subsequent receipt of notice of default judgment under Code 
§ 8.01-296(2)(b) cures any defect in service.  The trial court 
rejected this argument, as do we.  Nothing in Code § 8.01-
296(2)(b) purports to validate jurisdiction to a court for entry 
of default judgment when the court has not otherwise acquired 
jurisdiction over the defendant.  Further, Rule 3:17 states that 
“[a] defendant who fails to plead to a notice of motion for 
judgment within the required time is in default.” (Emphasis 
added).  Lifestar did not receive a notice of motion for 
judgment and therefore could not have been in default. 
 
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reverse the trial court’s final judgment order entered June 10, 
2002, and remand the case. 
Reversed, vacated and remanded.
 
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