Case Title: State v. Dwight Glen Jones

Citation: 2010 WI 72

Docket Number: 2008AP002342-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 72 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP2342-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Dwight Glen Jones, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
Reported at: 321 Wis. 2d 477, 774 N.W.2d 476 
(Ct. App. 2009-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 12, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Elsa C. Lamelas   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Ellen Henak, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Eileen 
W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 72
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP2342-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2005CF2432) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent   
 
 
v. 
 
Dwight Glen Jones,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner   
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished opinion of the court of appeals affirming a judgment 
and order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County.  Dwight 
Glen Jones appeals from his judgment of conviction and an order 
denying his post-conviction motion seeking a new trial.  He 
seeks a new trial on the grounds that the circuit court erred 
when it denied his request to substitute counsel.  He contends 
that the denial was error because the circuit court should have 
given more weight to the timeliness of his request——made more 
than three months before trial——and should have balanced that 
with the conflict he had with trial counsel.  He claims that the 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
2 
 
dispute related partly to his severe hearing impairment.  He 
also argues that the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution give him the right to reject his appointed counsel 
and, because substitute counsel was available through the Office 
of the State Public Defender (SPD), to have a second attorney 
appointed.  His basis for the constitutional claim is that the 
United States Supreme Court and this court have both upheld, 
though 
on 
slightly 
different 
constitutional 
grounds,1 
a 
defendant's right to retained counsel of choice; he contends 
that such a right should be applied to indigent defendants to 
the extent possible and would require a court to grant his 
request for substitution of counsel.   
¶2 
The issues we address are first, whether Jones is 
entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the circuit court 
wrongly denied his request for substitution of counsel, and 
second, whether he is entitled to a new trial on the grounds 
that such a denial violates rights guaranteed by the Wisconsin 
                                                 
1 In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 
(2006), the United States Supreme Court discusses "the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel of choice[]  . . . [which] commands 
 . . . that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes 
to be best."  In Mulkovich v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 464, 474, 243 
N.W.2d 198, (1976), this court stated that denial of "the right 
to be represented by counsel of one's own choosing" is a denial 
of due process.  In both cases, the courts explicitly limited 
the right to defendants with retained rather than appointed 
counsel.  Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151, and Mulkovich, 73 
Wis. 2d at 475. 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
3 
 
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
¶3 
We agree with the court of appeals that the circuit 
court, in denying Jones' motion for a new trial, considered the 
relevant factors, including Jones' stated reasons for wanting 
new counsel and his ability to read written English and to 
speech read,2 and applied a proper standard of law as set forth 
in State v. Lomax.3  Because the circuit court did so and reached 
a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach, there was no 
erroneous exercise of discretion in denying his request for 
substitution of counsel, and therefore the order denying the 
post-conviction motion for a new trial was proper.4 
                                                 
2 An education professor who testified on Jones' behalf at 
the 
retrospective 
evidentiary hearing stated that "speech 
reading" and "lip reading" refer to the same process; however, 
"speech 
reading" 
is 
currently 
the 
term 
preferred 
by 
professionals 
because 
it 
recognizes 
that 
reading 
visual 
communication cues involves more than just looking at a 
speaker's lips.  
3 State v. Lomax, 146 Wis. 2d 356, 432 N.W.2d 89 (1988) 
(setting forth factors for a court's consideration when it is 
deciding whether to grant a defendant's request for substitution 
of counsel and holding that a retrospective hearing to ascertain 
whether a new trial is required is the appropriate remedy where 
it cannot be determined on the available record that the circuit 
court appropriately exercised its discretion in denying such a 
request). 
4 In order to avoid any confusion, we note that the 
Honorable Elsa C. Lamelas presided over pretrial and trial 
proceedings as well as a post-conviction motion seeking a new 
trial, which was denied without an evidentiary hearing.  The 
Honorable Dennis P. Moroney presided over the proceedings after 
remand from the court of appeals for an evidentiary hearing.   
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
4 
 
¶4 
We reject as well Jones' argument that indigent 
defendants with appointed counsel have a right, under the 
constitutions of Wisconsin and the United States, to reject 
appointed counsel in favor of substitute counsel.  Jones has not 
cited any case where a court has so held, and we are unaware of 
any.  Of course, nothing bars a defendant from requesting 
substitution of counsel, nothing bars the SPD from choosing to 
make substitute counsel available, and nothing bars a court from 
granting such a request.  The question is whether a court is 
required 
by 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution or by Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution to do so solely because a defendant requests it.  
This court and the United States Supreme Court have held that it 
is not.  As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals put it, the 
Sixth Amendment does not guarantee "a friendly and happy 
attorney-client relationship,"5 but rather effective assistance 
of counsel.  Even if Jones was dissatisfied with the number of 
letters and visits from his counsel, and took offense at 
counsel's assessment of the strength of the case, it is evident 
from the record that counsel visited Jones, wrote him letters, 
conveyed plea offers, reviewed discovery with him and discussed 
with him during trial matters such as the defendant's decision 
about whether to testify.  It is clear that the two communicated 
and that an adequate defense was presented.  There was therefore 
no violation of Jones' right to counsel under the Sixth 
                                                 
5 United States v. Mutuc, 349 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2003). 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
5 
 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and under the 
Wisconsin Constitution, and the circuit court properly denied 
Jones' motion for a new trial on that basis. 
¶5 
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals decision 
affirming the denial of Jones' motion for a new trial. 
I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
We begin by briefly setting forth the procedural 
history of this case.  A jury found Jones guilty of seven 
charges related to car thefts and break-ins.  Jones filed a 
post-conviction motion for a new trial, which the circuit court 
denied.  Jones appealed his judgment of conviction and the 
denial of the post-conviction motion.  The court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court's order denying the motion for a new 
trial and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Jones' 
contentions.  Following remand, the circuit court held a two-day 
evidentiary hearing and then denied the motion for a new trial.  
Jones again appealed the judgment of conviction and the denial 
of the post-conviction motion.  The court of appeals affirmed 
both.  Jones then petitioned this court for review, and we 
granted his petition. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
¶7 
In early spring of 2005, there was a rash of break-ins 
and car thefts in a parking structure on Milwaukee's east side.  
One of the stolen vehicles was later located on a Milwaukee 
street, and officers conducting surveillance saw Jones walk up 
to the car, start it, and drive off in it.  They followed him 
until he parked and got out of the car.  Police observed that 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
6 
 
the car's steering column was peeled, so that it could be 
started without a key.  Officers then approached Jones, who ran.  
They chased Jones for three blocks, found him under a porch, and 
arrested him.  A security guard who had witnessed one of the 
break-ins identified Jones as the person who took the vehicle.  
Security camera footage of two of the thefts showed a man whom 
the security guard identified as Jones stealing a radio from a 
car on one occasion and stealing a car on another.  Jones was 
charged in May 2005 with theft, criminal damage to property, 
obstruction, entry into a locked vehicle, operating after 
revocation, and operating a vehicle without the owner's consent.  
All counts were subject to the habitual criminality enhancer.   
¶8 
Jones was indigent, and the SPD appointed counsel to 
represent him.  As the court of appeals noted,  
According to Jones, he has no hearing in his right 
ear, and he has twenty-five percent hearing in his 
left ear.  He wears hearing aids that do not allow him 
to hear normally.  He knows sign language, he can read 
lips, and he can speak aloud in English. 
State v. Jones (Jones II), No. 2008AP2432-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶4 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2009).  Jones' hearing aids were 
broken on the day of his arrest and he did not have working 
hearing aids during the pendency of this case.  Counsel 
appointed to represent Jones did not know sign language.  It is 
not disputed that besides appearing at status hearings where 
Jones was not present, counsel met with Jones on May 10, 2005, 
before the preliminary hearing; on August 19, 2005; on October 
17, 2005; and on January 26, 2006.  Counsel also sent Jones 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
7 
 
detailed letters on the status of the case on August 16, August 
30, and October 13, 2005.  At the preliminary hearing,6 when the 
court was unable to procure an interpreter for Jones, the court 
gave Jones the choice of adjourning the hearing or proceeding 
with "real-time reporting," which allows the court reporter to 
transcribe the proceedings in such a way that the words appear 
on a screen as they are spoken.  Jones' counsel informed the 
court, 
I did discuss both options with him.  His desire is to 
proceed today.  He indicates to me that he has 
attended the School for the Deaf in Delavan and 
completed a high school degree  . . . in the MPS 
program for the deaf, so——and he has no problem 
reading as long as he doesn't have to go too fast. 
The preliminary hearing proceeded and Jones was bound over for 
trial.  The trial was adjourned once to October 17, 2005, and 
then again to February 6, 2006; the adjournments were necessary 
because the interpreters were unavailable, and Jones did not 
request either adjournment. 
¶9 
While the case was pending, the circuit court received 
two letters from Jones complaining about his appointed counsel. 
The letters to the court, dated October 17, 2005, and October 
30, 2005, asked that his appointed attorney be permitted to 
                                                 
6 The preliminary hearing was held before Milwaukee County 
Court Commissioner Barry C. Slagle. 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
8 
 
withdraw,7 giving the following reasons: the attorney was not 
acting in Jones' best interest, the attorney had not been 
truthful, the attorney had visited Jones only once during the 
six months he had been in custody, and some of Jones' letters to 
the attorney had not been answered.8 
¶10 After receiving a motion to withdraw from Jones' 
counsel on October 26, 2005, the circuit court, Judge Elsa C. 
Lamelas presiding, held a motion hearing.  Prior to the hearing, 
the 
record 
reflects 
that 
the 
court 
questioned 
how 
the 
interpreters, who were there to assist Jones by signing for him, 
would work in the hearing.9 The circuit court then commented that 
                                                 
7 Though Jones did not expressly state it in his letters to 
the court, he stated in a letter to counsel on September 26, 
2005, that he was going to "write to Judge Lamelas asking her 
for a new attorney."  There is no contention in this case, and 
no indication in the record, that Jones sought to proceed pro 
se. 
8 The October 17, 2005, letter from Jones said counsel had 
"never [responded] to any of them"; the October 30, 2005, letter 
from Jones said counsel had "only [responded] to me 2-time[s]."  
The record contains copies of letters from counsel to Jones 
dated August 16, August 30, and October 13, 2005; those letters 
detailed the plea offer, updated Jones on the trial date, and 
explained when counsel would come to meet with Jones.  The 
October 13, 2005, letter from counsel explains that the 
Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility (MSDF) staff had cancelled 
the visit scheduled for September 7 and that another visit had 
been scheduled for October 17.   
9 There were two interpreters: a hearing interpreter who 
interpreted the spoken word into literal signed English, and a 
deaf interpreter who then interpreted the signed English into 
American Sign Language (ASL) for Jones.  A publication of the 
National Consortium of Interpreter Education Centers explains 
the need in some circumstances for such a two-interpreter team:   
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
9 
 
Jones' counsel had told the court "that at least in close 
proximity he's communicated with the defendant without any 
interpreter whatsoever."  Jones asserted immediately, through 
signing, "I believe that we did struggle. I think I need an 
interpreter with my attorney."  From the circuit court's 
response, the court apparently took the comment to mean, given 
the context of the discussion, that Jones was referring to 
                                                                                                                                                             
A significant portion of the deaf population is best 
served by the provision of a deaf-hearing interpreting 
team 
accommodation . . . [T]he 
deaf-hearing 
interpreting 
team 
consists 
of 
one 
deaf 
court 
interpreter and one court interpreter who can hear who 
work together in the transfer of meaning between 
 . . . spoken 
English 
and 
American 
Sign 
Language 
("ASL") . . . . 
 . . . [M]any court interpreters who can hear and sign 
are not fluent in ASL. Courts assume that because a 
court interpreter can sign, the court interpreter can 
also interpret in a manner that is understandable to 
the 
deaf 
litigant. 
 
However, 
many 
certified 
interpreters who can hear are not fluent in ASL, have 
insufficient exposure to legal settings and will not 
have the knowledge or the linguistic skill required to 
satisfy 
the 
oath 
to 
interpret 
the 
proceedings 
accurately. The deaf interpreter ensures that the 
court interpreter is able to achieve the level of 
accuracy required in legal settings.   
Carla M. Mathers, Nat'l Consortium of Interpreter Educ. 
Ctrs., Deaf Interpreters in Court: An Accommodation That Is 
More Than Reasonable 6-7 (Mar, 2009).  According to the 
publication, interpreting teams are beneficial for deaf 
people with additional communication needs such as those 
for whom English is a second language.  Id. at 8-9.  The 
record in this case indicates the interpreting team chose 
to err on the side of caution, because it had not been 
possible to determine in advance of the motion hearing what 
type of interpreting services Jones needed. 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
10 
 
having an interpreter with him and his attorney at the defense 
table.  The court responded, "I'm not disputing that he may need 
an interpreter for court.  I'm wondering if this additional step 
of the deaf interpreter is necessary."  The hearing then 
proceeded with both interpreters, and Jones communicated with 
the court both directly and through the interpreter, with a 
combination of signing and speaking aloud.  He told the court at 
one point, "I am functioning well, understanding through using 
the interpreters; but I will probably speak using my own voice." 
¶11 At the hearing, Jones' counsel detailed his work on 
the case so far, including his appearance at the preliminary 
hearing on May 10, a meeting on August 19, 2005 that lasted 
between four and five hours, during which Jones and counsel had 
reviewed discovery "exhaustively," and a one-and-a-half hour 
meeting on October 17, 2005. Jones' counsel noted that he had 
filed the motion to withdraw and had requested a quick hearing 
"because Mr. Jones did not want to impair his February 6th trial 
date by switching attorneys if the court grants that request."   
¶12 When it was Jones' turn to speak, the circuit court 
asked him directly, "Why do you want another lawyer?"  He 
responded with the following reasons: counsel was not looking 
out for Jones' "best interests"; counsel had met with Jones only 
one time in seven months; counsel never wrote letters back in 
response; Jones had "too many disagreements" with counsel; Jones 
did not "feel comfortable with him" and did not trust him; the 
four-hour meeting counsel had mentioned was not "a good 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
11 
 
meeting"; and finally Jones suspected that counsel was "working 
with the D.A." 
¶13 The circuit court denied counsel's motion to withdraw 
on the grounds that the court "[had not] heard a reason to 
permit [counsel] to withdraw," and that there was no indication 
that Jones was being deprived of his Sixth Amendment rights. 
¶14 Jones discussed his dissatisfaction with counsel with 
the court yet again at the beginning of trial.  As the circuit 
court was reviewing the arrangements made for interpreters' 
services, the court asked counsel if he was "satisfied with this 
degree of interpretation."  The attorney said that he was.  The 
court then asked Jones if he was satisfied, and Jones answered 
that he was not.  The court asked why not.  Jones replied that 
he did not "feel comfortable" with counsel, because counsel was 
trying to "force" him to accept the plea.  After clarifying that 
the issue being addressed was the sufficiency of the sign 
language interpreters (with which Jones said he was satisfied), 
the court returned to the question of counsel.  The court said, 
"All right. Now you're not happy with your lawyer; is that what 
you started to tell me?"  Jones said, "Yes," and then added:  
I want to say more. . . . Your Honor, my lawyer is 
trying to force me to plead to something that I did 
not commit.  He's telling me that I'm not going to win 
my trial, even if I appeal it I won't win that either.  
And I don't feel that's right.  And, you know, I, I 
don't have no trust or confidence in him, you know. He 
supposed to be with me.  And he also have a video that 
me and him haven't saw yet.  And he has been my lawyer 
for ten months, and I still haven't seen the video 
with him because there are things I want to point out 
to him, but yet he haven't sit down and took time to 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
12 
 
show me the video.  . . . And I just don't feel 
comfortable with him representing me for my trial, and 
I told him that.  And I also told you that on November 
30, 2005.  And the same thing happened over, and over, 
and over.  And he don't believe nothing I tell him.  
And I have been showing him the fact of my innocence.  
It seemed like I get nothing out of him because he 
don't believe nothing I say, and I don't want to plead 
to something I didn't commit.  And that's all I want 
to say to the court. 
¶15 The circuit court addressed Jones' complaint by making 
arrangements for Jones and counsel to review the video in 
question together during the lunch break before the jury was 
selected.  (Jones had seen the video himself in a separate 
revocation proceeding in which he was represented by other 
counsel; counsel informed the court that he had also reviewed 
the videotape for several hours and had taken notes on it.)  
Jones also was, at that point, given a final opportunity to 
consider accepting the plea offer.  He reviewed the videotape 
with counsel and then, when the court reconvened in the 
afternoon, informed the court that he wished to go to trial.  
The trial proceeded, with Jones' theory of defense being 
mistaken identity and the prosecution's failure to prove its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt.  At the close of the State's 
case, outside the presence of the jury, the court asked what 
Jones' wishes were in regard to testifying.  Jones indicated on 
the record, when counsel asked if he wanted to discuss the 
matter before answering, "Yeah, I want to talk to you."  Before 
the matter was settled, another question arose concerning how 
the interpreters would participate in the testimony if Jones 
took the stand.  Again, Jones stated on the record, "I think I 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
13 
 
would like to discuss with my attorney before anything, then I 
will let them know."  The circuit court noted for the record, 
"And the record should reflect that Mr. Jones always answers the 
questions in spoken English rather than through American Sign."  
Jones elected not to testify. 
¶16 A jury returned verdicts of guilty on seven counts10; 
it returned a verdict of not guilty on one count of operating a 
motor vehicle without the owner's consent.  
¶17 Jones filed a post-conviction motion for a new trial 
on the grounds that the circuit court had wrongly denied his 
request to substitute counsel.  The circuit court, without a 
hearing, denied the post-conviction motion in an order, noting, 
"Had Jones asserted a legitimate reason for new counsel, 
anything other than what was essentially a bald request for a 
substitution, I would have balanced these concerns, as well as 
the State's interest in proceeding to trial on what was already 
an old case, against whatever reason Jones had advanced."  
                                                 
10 The jury found Jones guilty of one count of operating a 
motor vehicle without the owner's consent, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 943.23(2); one count of theft of property with a value 
of less than $2,500, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(a) & 
(3); one count of criminal damage to property with a value of 
less than $2,500, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.01(1); one count 
of entry into a locked vehicle, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.11; 
one count of operating after revocation, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(1)(b) & (2)(b); and two counts of obstructing or 
resisting an officer (count 6, obstructing an officer; and count 
8, obstructing an officer, false information), contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 946.412(1).  All counts included the  habitual criminal 
penalty enhancer pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62. 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
14 
 
¶18 Jones appealed the denial of his post-conviction 
motion to the court of appeals, claiming that "he was unable to 
effectively communicate with his trial lawyer because he, Jones, 
is severely hearing-impaired."  State v. Jones (Jones I), 2007 
WI App 248, ¶1, 306 Wis. 2d 340, 742 N.W.2d 341.  The court of 
appeals remanded for a retrospective evidentiary hearing in 
accordance with the procedure prescribed in Lomax.  The court of 
appeals asked the circuit court on remand to allow Jones "to 
prove, by expert testimony if necessary, his contention that he 
had an irresolvable breakdown in communications with his trial 
lawyer." Jones I, 306 Wis. 2d 340, ¶19.  The reasons given for 
the remand were 1) that contrary to the circuit court's 
assertion, Jones had asserted a need for an interpreter with his 
attorney; 2) that the circuit court had made unsupported 
assumptions that permitting substitution would require a delay 
and a new trial date, which would be costly and disruptive; 3) 
that the circuit court had assumed without first determining 
that it would not be possible to find a substitute lawyer who 
could be prepared in time for trial; and 4) that there was no 
basis for assuming that the State would be prejudiced by any 
delay, even if delay were necessary. 
¶19 The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable 
Dennis 
P. 
Moroney 
presiding, 
conducted 
the 
retrospective 
evidentiary hearing over the course of two days.  The court of 
appeals subsequently described the testimony at that hearing:  
Several witnesses testified at the hearing after 
remand.  Dr. Amy Otis-Wilbourn, a professor in the 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
15 
 
Department of Exceptional Education at the University 
of 
Wisconsin–Milwaukee, 
testified 
regarding 
her 
evaluation of Jones's ability to communicate using 
sign 
language, 
English, 
and 
speech 
reading.[2]  
Jones's trial counsel described communicating with 
Jones during attorney/client conferences without a 
sign language interpreter.  Jones's mother testified 
that she does not know sign language and that she 
communicates with Jones using spoken English. 
Jones also testified.  He asserted that he had 
difficulty understanding his trial counsel, and that 
he "couldn't 
trust [counsel] when [counsel] was 
talking . . . without 
an 
interpreter." 
 
Jones 
explained that none of his fifteen letters to trial 
counsel mentioned either an inability to understand 
his counsel or a need for an interpreter because his 
counsel promised to bring an interpreter to future 
meetings.  Jones also explained that his letters to 
the trial court requesting new counsel did not mention 
the need for an interpreter because the court knew 
that Jones was deaf and "would know that [Jones] would 
have 
problems 
with 
this 
lawyer 
without 
an 
interpreter." 
Jones II, ¶¶7-8. 
¶20 After that hearing, the circuit court denied the 
motion for a new trial, saying that "[the trial court] asked 
three times what his reasoning was [for seeking substitute 
counsel], all of which were insufficient to indicate . . . why 
[the attorney] should have to be removed."  The circuit court 
noted that the record was "devoid" of any indication that Jones' 
substitution request related to his deafness, and that the 
reasons given were "distrust, lack of coming to see him, lack of 
answering his questions, and then ultimately 'I think he's 
working with the D.A.'s office,'" referring to Jones' assertion 
that counsel was colluding with the prosecutor. 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
16 
 
¶21 Jones again appealed the denial of the motion to the 
court of appeals, arguing that the circuit court had erred in 
concluding 
that 
he 
and 
his 
counsel 
could 
communicate 
effectively.  Though it took issue with one statement in the 
circuit court's ruling,11 the court of appeals reviewed the 
record and found that it supported the circuit court's decision.  
Specifically, it found support in the record for the conclusions 
that Jones communicated effectively with his attorney without a 
sign language interpreter, that Jones' letters did not include 
"complaints about a language barrier or state that Jones could 
not understand his lawyer," and that Jones' acknowledgment that 
he 
had 
previously 
pled 
guilty 
"more 
than 
eight 
times" 
discredited the expert's testimony that Jones had not understood 
such terms as "plea" and "incarceration."  The court of appeals 
also rejected Jones' constitutional claim of a right to 
substitute counsel by noting that it was bound by precedent 
holding that indigent defendants are not entitled to counsel of 
choice. 
¶22 Jones petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted. 
                                                 
11 In its ruling following the retrospective hearing, the 
circuit court had stated that Jones had not expressed a need for 
a sign language interpreter with his attorney.  The court of 
appeals said Jones had done so at one point and cited his 
statement to the trial court, saying, "I think I need an 
interpreter with my attorney."  Jones II, ¶11.  
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
17 
 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶23 Whether trial counsel should be relieved and a new 
attorney appointed is a matter within the circuit court’s 
discretion.  State v. Lomax, 146 Wis. 2d 356, 359, 432 N.W.2d 89 
(1988).  Absent an erroneous exercise of discretion, the circuit 
court’s judgment "will not be disturbed."  Anderson v. Onsager, 
155 Wis. 2d 504, 513, 455 N.W.2d 855 (1990).  This court will 
sustain the circuit court’s decision if the court "examined the 
relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a 
demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach." Id. at 514.  This court 
independently reviews whether deprivation of a constitutional 
right has occurred. See State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶ 16, 315 
Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598; State v. Harenda Enterprises, 2008 
WI 16, ¶ 28, 307 Wis. 2d 604, 746 N.W.2d 25.   
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. 
¶24 We 
first 
consider 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it denied Jones' 
request for substitution of counsel, and whether the post-
conviction motion seeking a new trial should have been granted 
on that ground. 
¶25 We review the circuit court's exercise of discretion 
using the factors test set forth in Lomax for reviewing a denial 
of a request to substitute counsel. There, this court stated, 
"When all of the defendant's complaints about counsel are known 
to 
the 
judge, 
judicial 
discretion 
may 
be 
exercised 
in 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
18 
 
application of the factors  . . . [I]f the defendant's reasons 
are 
sufficient, 
it 
is 
better 
that 
new 
counsel 
be 
appointed . . . The trial judge presiding over the evidentiary 
hearing will be informed of the specific reasons for the 
defendant's dissatisfaction with his counsel, and the court will 
be able to evaluate those reasons . . . ." Id. at 362.  When 
reviewing the circuit court's decision, we stated in Lomax,   
A reviewing court must consider a number of factors 
including: (1) the adequacy of the court’s inquiry 
into the defendant’s complaint; (2) the timeliness of 
the motion; and (3) whether the alleged conflict 
between the defendant and the attorney was so great 
that 
it 
likely 
resulted 
in 
a 
total 
lack 
of 
communication that prevented an adequate defense and 
frustrated a fair presentation of the case.  
Id. at 359. 
¶26 The parties agree that Lomax controls our review; they 
disagree about the test that Lomax prescribes and how it applies 
to the facts of this case.  Jones contends that his lack of 
trust in counsel, and counsel's failure to respond to letters 
constituted difficulties in the attorney-client relationship 
that justify substitution of counsel under Lomax.  This is so, 
he contends, because Lomax prescribes a balancing test.  He 
cites the statement that "Timeliness must be balanced with the 
third consideration . . . ." Here, had the court correctly 
balanced the reasons given for wanting new counsel with the 
timeliness of the request, Jones contends, it would have been 
required to grant his request.  Instead, he argues, the circuit 
court incorrectly treated as dispositive the fact that there was 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
19 
 
not a likelihood of "a total lack of communication that 
prevented an adequate defense."  In other words, in his view the 
court erred in applying Lomax in a way other than a balancing 
analysis.   
¶27 The State argues that Jones failed to establish what 
he is required to establish under Lomax: that "the alleged 
conflict . . . was so great that it likely resulted in a total 
lack of communication."  Because the circuit court properly 
concluded that Jones had not met the test under Lomax, the State 
contends, it was irrelevant how far in advance of trial Jones 
made the request. In other words, the State points out, having 
been given no valid reasons for substitution, the court had 
nothing to balance. 
¶28 We recognize that claims by a hearing impaired 
defendant that he or she was unable to communicate with counsel 
can raise significant issues and concerns different from those 
encountered by defendants without hearing impairment.  However, 
we note here that Jones' legal argument does not turn on, or 
even significantly touch on, his hearing impairment; the 
argument——that 
the 
evidence 
of 
his 
frustration 
with 
the 
relationship is sufficient to justify permitting substitution, 
so long as there is no request to delay trial——would apply 
equally 
to 
a 
defendant 
with 
unimpaired 
hearing 
who 
was 
dissatisfied with the number of visits he had from counsel, and 
also unhappy with counsel's candid assessment of the strength of 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
20 
 
the defense case.12  It is also clear on this record that Jones' 
need for interpreters in the courtroom was recognized and was a 
priority 
from 
the 
initial 
proceedings 
on. 
 
The 
court 
commissioner presiding over the preliminary hearing expressed 
willingness, without being asked, to reschedule the preliminary 
hearing if Jones preferred to have interpreters present, rather 
than to use the real-time court reporting system that required 
him to read the screen to follow what was spoken in court.  The 
record also reflects the circuit court's attention to the 
scheduling and the active participation of the interpreters.  At 
one point, one of the three sign language interpreters sworn in 
and present in the courtroom requested, and was granted, 
permission from the court to leave, and the following exchange 
took place: 
[Interpreter]: [I]t is my professional opinion that 
Mr. Jones' communication needs are being met.  And so 
I in the best interest of the court am going to leave 
and save some time and money for the court. 
 . . .  
                                                 
12 Jones suggests in his brief that the attempts to 
communicate via letter were especially significant because 
telephone contact was not possible; the telephone at the 
Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility where Jones was in custody 
did not have a TTY, or telephone typewriter, a piece of 
telecommunications equipment often used by people who are deaf.  
Counsel did, however, send Jones at least three letters in reply 
that included detailed updates on the case and explained 
rescheduling of court dates and of visits; the record contains 
copies of counsel's letters to Jones dated August 18, August 30, 
and October 13, 2005. 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
21 
 
[Counsel]: So I trust this means that if Mr. Jones 
testifies, the two remaining interpreters will have no 
problem. 
The Court: I think that is what Ms. Burckhardt [the 
first interpreter] is telling us. And I see Ms. 
Kerkvliet [the second interpreter] nodding, and I am 
certain that Ms. Peplinski [the third interpreter] 
would speak up if she thought that the two of them 
could not meet Mr. Jones' needs.  
¶29 We therefore address the question Jones raises as to 
the nature of the test prescribed in Lomax.  As noted above, 
Lomax says that a reviewing court must "consider a number of 
factors" and it says that such factors include the three 
mentioned above: an adequate inquiry by the circuit court, the 
timeliness of the request, and whether the alleged attorney-
client conflict results in "a total lack of communication" that 
prevented the defendant from mounting an adequate defense.  
Lomax, 146 Wis. 2d at 359.  "The trial judge presiding over the 
evidentiary hearing will be informed of the specific reasons for 
the defendant's dissatisfaction with his counsel, and the court 
will be able to evaluate those reasons."  Id. at 362.   
¶30 We note that the cases on which the Lomax court relied 
when it set forth its test recite the test as a multi-factor 
test.  The test articulated in Lomax is a standard and widely 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
22 
 
used test13 for evaluating a court's denial of a substitution 
motion.  Our review of those cases shows that the test is 
routinely applied as a straightforward factors test without 
reference to "balancing" of particular factors.  The Lomax court 
gave no indication that it intended to alter the standard test 
it was adopting.  It appears evident that the statement in Lomax 
about balancing "timeliness" with the third factor, the total 
lack of communication, was not intended to create for Wisconsin 
a novel application of a well-established test.  Rather, it was 
meant to convey that some factors weigh more heavily than others 
in the analysis, depending on the circumstances, and that the 
definition of "timely" will also depend on the circumstances.  
For example, we stated with regard to timeliness, "[I]t is 
possible that the conflict between the defendant and counsel 
arose on the day of trial and therefore the request for change 
of counsel was timely."  Id. at 362.  In describing the test 
adopted in Lomax, this court was acknowledging the wide variety 
                                                 
13  See, e.g., United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 288 
(4th Cir. 1998) (stating in its analysis that the motion was 
timely, the district court's inquiry was adequate, and "[t]hus, 
the remaining question—whether the conflict . . . became so 
great that it resulted in a total lack of communication 
preventing an adequate defense——is determinative here"); United 
States 
v. 
Calderon, 
127 
F.3d 
1314, 
1343 
(11th 
Cir. 
1997)("[S]everal 
factors 
that 
should 
be 
considered 
by 
a 
reviewing court have been identified . . . ."); United States v. 
Zillges, 978 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]his court should 
consider several factors[.]");United States v. McClendon, 782 
F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1986) ("In applying the . . . rule, 
three factors are considered"); United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 
90, 92 (1st Cir. 1986) ("[T]he appellate court should consider 
several factors"). 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
23 
 
of 
circumstances 
in 
which 
a 
circuit 
court 
makes 
its 
determinations concerning substitution of counsel requests, and 
not prescribing a balancing test. 
¶31 Having established that the analysis is properly one 
of considering multiple factors, we turn to the application of 
the test in this case.  Our analysis begins with consideration 
of the first of the enumerated factors in Lomax, the adequacy of 
the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint.  The circuit 
court set a hearing, at which it asked Jones for his reasons for 
requesting substitute counsel, and directly asked counsel for a 
response to the reasons given by Jones.  When the issue arose 
again just prior to trial, the circuit court again gave Jones an 
opportunity to explain his reasons.  When the court heard that 
part of his complaint related to an inability to review together 
one piece of evidence, a videotape, the court resolved the 
problem.  Jones does not argue that the circuit court should 
have inquired further into his complaints, including his 
assertion that counsel was colluding with the prosecutor; that 
is, he does not contest the adequacy of the court's inquiry into 
the complaint.  It is clear to us that the inquiry was certainly 
adequate. 
¶32 The second factor we consider is the timeliness of 
Jones' motion.  Following remand from the court of appeals, when 
the circuit court, with Judge Dennis P. Moroney then presiding, 
held a retrospective hearing, it acknowledged that "there would 
have been probably plenty of time probably to get another 
attorney on board," without jeopardizing the trial date.  The 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
24 
 
court of appeals, when the matter was appealed again after the 
circuit court's retrospective hearing, did not reach the 
question of timeliness.  As Jones points out, trial was set for 
February, nearly four months after the October 2005 request for 
substitution.  The original trial date (rescheduled by the 
circuit court for other reasons, and not in response to Jones' 
request) had been in September, about four months after Jones' 
trial counsel was appointed. The State appears to concede that 
the motion was timely, and instead argues that other factors 
weigh more heavily.  Especially given that counsel specifically 
stated that Jones did not wish to adjourn the trial, Jones' 
request to substitute and Jones' counsel's motion to withdraw 
were timely.  Given the nature of the test set forth in Lomax, 
however, the timeliness factor is by itself not dispositive in 
regard to the analysis. 
¶33 The third of the factors identified in Lomax for the 
reviewing court's consideration is "whether the alleged conflict 
between the defendant and the attorney was so great that it 
likely resulted in a total lack of communication that prevented 
an adequate defense and frustrated a fair presentation of the 
case."  Id. at 359.  As noted above, when the circuit court 
questioned both Jones and counsel at the motion hearing and then 
questioned Jones again just prior to trial, the circuit court 
was able to determine that there was not "a total lack of 
communication" between Jones and counsel.  The circuit court, at 
the retrospective hearing upon remand, heard further testimony 
about the conflict.  It identified the "real crux of this whole 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
25 
 
case" 
as 
"whether 
or 
not[,] 
based 
upon 
the 
defendant's 
communication to and with [the attorney] and vice versa, whether 
or not they can collectively establish a sufficient rapport so 
as to have the constitutional rights of right to counsel under 
[the] Sixth Amendment be properly protected."  This is the Lomax 
"alleged conflict" factor stated in positive form.  The evidence 
concerning the communication between Jones and his trial counsel 
included the following: letters from counsel to Jones, testimony 
that Jones did not dispute that counsel met and reviewed 
discovery 
with 
him, 
the 
court's 
observation 
of 
Jones' 
communications with counsel, Jones' mother's testimony that she 
did not know sign language and never used it to communicate with 
her son, and the fact that the inmates who assisted Jones in 
writing his letters did not know sign language either.  Further, 
as noted above, Jones asserted to the court on the record his 
intention to discuss with counsel the decision about whether to 
testify and how the interpreters would facilitate that if he 
chose to do so; he was given time to discuss those issues with 
counsel prior to making the decision.   
¶34 Given that evidence, we agree with the court of 
appeals that in this case, "[t]he record amply supports the 
circuit court's conclusions that Jones and his trial counsel 
communicated effectively without a sign language interpreter." 
Jones II, ¶12.  Because the circuit court considered the 
relevant factors, applied a proper standard of law as set forth 
in Lomax, and reached a conclusion a reasonable judge could 
reach, there was no erroneous exercise of discretion in denying 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
26 
 
his request for substitution of counsel, and therefore the order 
denying the post-conviction motion for a new trial was proper. 
B. 
¶35 The second issue we consider is whether in denying 
Jones' substitution request, the circuit court violated Jones' 
alleged constitutional right to counsel of choice under the 
Wisconsin and United States constitutions.  Jones argues that, 
given the Wisconsin SPD's policy14 of appointing substitute 
counsel upon the first request to do so, a court cannot deny an 
indigent defendant's request to reject counsel and substitute 
counsel unless grounds exist, such as delay of trial or conflict 
of interest, that would justify denying substitution for a 
similarly situated defendant represented by retained counsel.  
In other words, Jones argues, the existence of PD § 2.04 puts 
defendants with retained and with appointed counsel on the same 
footing.  Further, Jones contends that cases that include 
statements regarding indigent defendants' right to counsel of 
choice have never squarely addressed the issue.  He also argues 
                                                 
14 Wis. Admin. Code PD § 2.04. Person's right to refuse 
specific attorney 
(1) A person may request that the attorney assigned to 
represent him or her be discharged and that another attorney be 
assigned, and the state public defender shall honor such 
request, provided: 
a. 
It is the only such request made by the person in that 
case; and 
b. 
Such change in counsel will not delay the disposition 
of the case or otherwise be contrary to the interests of 
justice. 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
27 
 
that there is a difference between holding that an indigent 
defendant does not have a right to choose counsel he cannot 
afford, and holding that an indigent defendant has no right to 
substitute for another available public defender.  Jones 
therefore argues that because the denial violated his right to 
reject his initially appointed counsel and substitute for 
available counsel under Wis. Admin. PD § 2.04, the denial was 
error and he is entitled to a new trial. 
¶36 The State argues that cases from the United States 
Supreme Court and this court unequivocally establish that Jones 
has no such right.  Rather, it asserts that as an indigent 
defendant, he has a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel, not to counsel of his choice.  The State argues that 
the administrative code provision governing the SPD is not 
relevant to the analysis, because such a code provision cannot 
be read to limit the authority of a circuit court to make 
determinations about substitution of counsel.  Further, the 
State points to the fact that the SPD itself does not 
consistently interpret the provision to require substitute 
appointed counsel for indigent defendants,15 and argues that the 
                                                 
15 Jones' 
brief 
acknowledges 
the 
differences 
in 
the 
interpretation of Wis. Admin. PD § 2.04 by the Trial Division 
and the Appellate Division of the State Public Defender.  He 
quotes Judicial Counsel Note, 2001, to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.30(4): 
[At the appellate level] [t]he state public defender 
will not appoint successor counsel where a defendant 
disagrees with the legal conclusions of appointed 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
28 
 
inconsistent application of the provision illustrates that an 
administrative code provision is a shaky foundation for a claim 
of a violation of a constitutional right.  The State directs our 
attention to a fact sheet given by the SPD to indigent 
defendants, which states, 
Can I fire my appointed attorney and get a different 
one? 
Under 
some 
circumstances, 
yes. . . . The 
Public 
Defender will appoint a second attorney after the 
court has given permission to the first attorney to 
withdraw from providing representation in the case.   
The State points out that in the ordinary case, substitution 
will likely cause some delay in the disposition of the case.  
Finally, the State notes that where the dispute is over the 
merits of the case, there is little reason to think that 
substituting counsel will solve anything.  Because there is no 
constitutional violation here, the State contends that the 
circuit court did not err in denying substitution of counsel. 
¶37 We find Jones' arguments unpersuasive.  First, we do 
not see the right to reject appointed counsel and proceed pro 
se,16 as the equivalent of a right to reject appointed counsel 
                                                                                                                                                             
counsel or when a defendant wants a second opinion as 
to the merits of an appeal.  
16 See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 
(1975) (holding that the trial court's appointment of a public 
defender despite defendant’s knowing and voluntary request to 
represent himself was unconstitutional, writing, "[T]he right to 
self-representation—to 
make 
one’s 
own 
defense 
personally—
is . . . necessarily implied by the structure of the [Sixth] 
Amendment."). 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
29 
 
and have new counsel appointed, and Jones has directed us to no 
case that has viewed it as such.   
¶38 Second, the cases in which courts have reversed 
convictions 
based 
on 
erroneous 
denials 
of 
motions 
for 
substitution 
of 
counsel 
involve 
defendants 
with 
retained 
counsel; those cases without exception explicitly state that the 
right to choice of counsel is by necessity limited to defendants 
with retained counsel.17  For example, in United States v. 
                                                 
17 Even if the case law were not clear and unwavering on 
this point, we would be skeptical of the parameters of the 
constitutional right that Jones advocates.  As the State argues, 
Jones' proposed constitutional right to substitute, based on 
Wis. Admin. Code PD § 2.04, is a right to substitute only once, 
and it is grounded on a provision that is not interpreted 
consistently 
even 
by 
the 
SPD's 
own 
trial 
and 
appellate 
divisions.  We also note that Wis. Stat. § 977.08 states:  
Appointment of counsel.(1) If the representative or 
the 
authority 
for 
indigency 
determinations . . . refers a case to or within the 
office of the state public defender . . . , the state 
public defender shall assign counsel according to 
subs. (3) and (4). If a defendant makes a request for 
change of attorney assignment, the change of attorney 
must be approved by the circuit court. 
(Emphasis added.)  Jones contends that the circuit court would 
still be required to approve change of counsel but could deny 
requests only on the same grounds it would do so for defendants 
with retained counsel. 
We again note that the information given by the SPD to an 
indigent defendant states that appointment of a second attorney 
is only "after the court has given permission to the first 
attorney to withdraw . . . ."  In any event, it appears that one 
of his primary reasons for conflict with appointed counsel was 
their differing views of the strength of his defense case, and 
counsel's prediction——correct, as it turned out——that Jones 
would be convicted and would not prevail on appeal.  
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
30 
 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that a district court's denial of admission pro hac 
vice based on a misinterpretation of a rule of conduct 
erroneously deprived the defendant in that case of his choice of 
counsel. Although the government had argued that a showing of 
prejudice was necessary to sustain a reversal based on a Sixth 
Amendment claim, the Court held that a choice-of-counsel claim 
does not require a showing of prejudice.  Instead, it concluded 
that the proper remedy was reversal of the conviction.  However, 
the Court made it clear that "the right to counsel of choice 
does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be 
appointed for them."  Id. at 151.   
¶39 Similarly, in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United 
States, 491 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1989), the Court stated, 
Whatever the full extent of the Sixth Amendment's 
protection of one's right to retain counsel of his 
choosing, that protection does not go beyond 'the 
individual's right to spend his own money to obtain 
the advice and assistance of . . . counsel.' 
Id. at 626.  In that case, the defendant, indicted under a 
federal statute that authorized forfeiture of assets obtained in 
violation of drug laws, had entered a plea agreement and agreed 
to forfeit the assets.  That forfeiture, in effect, prevented 
the defendant's retained counsel from collecting its attorney 
fees. 
 
Defense 
counsel 
then 
sued, 
challenging 
the 
constitutionality of the forfeiture statute on the grounds that 
such a forfeiture deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment 
right to select his preferred counsel.  The Court disagreed, 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
31 
 
holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees 
effective representation, not counsel that a defendant cannot 
afford.  Id.  It also held that forfeited assets were not 
rightly the defendant's in the first place.  Id.   
¶40 This court, likewise, has held that it was error for a 
circuit court to deny a defendant's request for substitution of 
retained counsel following the conviction for purposes of 
representing the defendant at sentencing.  However, while so 
holding, this court noted, 
This court has frequently said that, except in cases 
of indigency, a defendant may have whatever counsel he 
chooses to retain and may refuse to accept the 
services of counsel he does not want. . . . When there 
is no evidence that the proposed counsel is inadequate 
and when there is no evidence that a change of counsel 
is made for the purpose of delay, it is an abuse of 
discretion to refuse a request for retained counsel or 
for substitution of counsel. 
Mulkovich v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 464, 474, 243 N.W.2d 198 (1976). 
¶41 Jones contends that the cases from this court and the 
United State Supreme Court excepting indigent defendants from 
the right to counsel of choice are poorly reasoned and do not in 
fact mean that a defendant has no choice whatsoever in regard to 
counsel.  Absent any indication from the United States Supreme 
Court of the accuracy of that interpretation, we are not 
prepared to construe its case law in such a way.  To the 
contrary, we believe that these cases accurately represent the 
established law on this point and recognize the adequacy of the 
constitutional protections already in place as well as the 
realities of an overburdened criminal justice system.  Jones has 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
32 
 
not contended that the assistance he received from his counsel 
was ineffective.  We note that the jury acquitted him of one 
serious charge and infer from that fact and the remainder of the 
record that trial counsel was adequately prepared for trial.  
See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 12 (1983) (observing that the 
defense attorney's success in getting a hung jury on the 
accused's more serious charges necessarily reflected "favorably 
on [the attorney's] readiness for trial.").  However, as an 
indigent defendant, he is not entitled to be represented by 
counsel of his choice.   
¶42 We therefore find that the denial of the request for 
substitution did not violate Jones' constitutional rights under 
either the United States or Wisconsin constitutions, and the 
motion for a new trial on those grounds was correctly denied.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶43 The issues presented are first, whether Jones is 
entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the circuit court 
wrongly denied his request for substitution of counsel, and 
second, whether he is entitled to a new trial on the grounds 
that such a denial violates rights guaranteed by the Wisconsin 
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
¶44 We agree with the court of appeals that the circuit 
court, in denying Jones' motion for a new trial, considered the 
relevant factors, including Jones' stated reasons for wanting 
new counsel and his ability to read written English and to 
speech read, and applied a proper standard of law as set forth 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
33 
 
in Lomax.  Because the circuit court did so and reached a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach, there was no 
erroneous exercise of discretion in denying his request for 
substitution of counsel, and therefore the order denying the 
post-conviction motion for a new trial was proper. 
¶45 We reject as well Jones' argument that indigent 
defendants with appointed counsel have a right, under the 
constitutions of Wisconsin and the United States, to reject 
appointed counsel in favor of substitute counsel.  Jones has not 
cited any case where a court has so held, and we are unaware of 
any.  Of course, nothing bars a defendant from requesting 
substitution of counsel, nothing bars the SPD from choosing to 
make substitute counsel available, and nothing bars a court from 
granting such a request.  The question is whether a court is 
required 
by 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution or by Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution to do so solely because a defendant requests it.  
This court and the United States Supreme Court have held that it 
does not.  As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals put it, the 
Sixth Amendment does not guarantee "a friendly and happy 
attorney-client relationship,"18 but rather effective assistance 
of counsel.  Even if Jones was dissatisfied with the number of 
letters and visits from his counsel, and took offense at 
counsel's assessment of the strength of the case, it is evident 
from the record that counsel visited Jones, wrote him letters, 
                                                 
18 Mutuc, 349 F.3d at 934. 
No. 
2008AP2342-CR   
 
34 
 
conveyed plea offers, reviewed discovery with him and discussed 
with him during trial matters such as the defendant's decision 
about whether to testify.  It is clear that the two communicated 
and that an adequate defense was presented.  There was therefore 
no violation of Jones' right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and under the 
Wisconsin Constitution, and the circuit court properly denied 
Jones' motion for a new trial on that basis. 
¶46 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals decision 
affirming the denial of Jones' motion for a new trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP2342-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶47 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  In United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,1 by a 5-4 vote, the United States 
Supreme Court unearthed a heretofore unrecognized constitutional 
right to choice of counsel.  It is a qualified right, however.  
It is enjoyed only by defendants with sufficient money to hire 
an attorney.  
¶48 I write separately to alert parties and courts to this 
significant change in the law, in part because the violation of 
this right carries with it the stark consequence of automatic 
reversal of conviction.  I also write separately because I am 
troubled that the Court has recognized a new constitutional 
right 
that 
applies 
only 
to 
defendants 
of 
means. 
 
The 
asymmetrical assignment of constitutional rights based on wealth 
is difficult to reconcile with traditional concepts of equal 
justice under the law. 
¶49 Accordingly, although I agree with the majority that 
the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion 
and that Jones has not established a Sixth Amendment violation 
here, I respectfully concur.   
I 
¶50 United 
States 
v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez 
marks 
a 
major 
doctrinal change of direction in the Court's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel jurisprudence.  Previously in Wheat v. United 
States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988), the Court explained that the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of a fair trial was the basis for both 
                                                 
1 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
No.  2008AP2342-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
the right to effective counsel and the right to counsel of 
choice.2  In Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court breathed new life into the 
right to counsel of choice for those who can afford to retain an 
attorney by giving the right its own separate place within the 
Sixth Amendment.  No longer does the right to counsel of choice 
for defendants with means emanate from the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of a fair trial. 
¶51 The Gonzalez-Lopez Court explained that the Sixth 
Amendment is now to be interpreted as providing two separate and 
independent guarantees——the right to effective counsel to ensure 
a fair trial and the right to counsel of choice for defendants 
of means.  The right to effective counsel is enjoyed by all 
defendants, regardless of financial status.  If a defendant can 
demonstrate that either retained or appointed counsel was 
ineffective 
under 
the 
test 
set 
forth 
in 
Strickland 
v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), then the Sixth Amendment right 
to effective counsel has been violated and the defendant is 
entitled to a new trial.    
¶52 In describing the independent right to counsel of 
choice for those defendants who can afford to retain an 
attorney, the Court stated that this right commands not only 
"that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of 
fairness be provided——to wit, that the accused be defended by 
                                                 
2 ""[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one's 
preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the 
essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective 
advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that 
a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he 
prefers."  Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).   
No.  2008AP2342-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
the counsel he believes to be best."  548 U.S. at 146.  If a 
defendant is erroneously denied the right to representation by 
the attorney "he believes to be best," his constitutional rights 
have been violated.   
¶53 Erroneous denial of the new and independent right to 
counsel of choice is considered "structural error."  Id. at 148-
49.  This means that it matters not whether the defendant's 
second-choice counsel was in fact effective or whether the 
defendant's first-choice counsel would have performed any 
better.  Thus, "it is unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness 
or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth Amendment violation."  
Id. at 148.  Whenever the defendant's choice has been wrongfully 
denied, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.  Id. at 150. 
¶54 There is a lot on the line when a circuit court is 
asked to rule on a defendant's request for substitute counsel.  
Yet, Gonzalez-Lopez leaves unanswered many important questions, 
making the circuit court's exercise of discretion difficult.  
The consequence of an erroneous circuit court decision is stark.   
¶55 In some cases, a circuit court will appropriately deny 
a defendant's request.  The Gonzalez-Lopez Court explained that 
"the right to counsel of choice is circumscribed in several 
important respects," and nothing in the decision "casts any 
doubt or places any qualification upon [previous decisions] that 
limit the right to counsel of choice[.]"  Id. at 144, 151.  For 
instance, a defendant may not insist on representation by a 
person who is not a member of the bar or by an attorney who has 
a conflict of interest.  Id. at 151-52.   
No.  2008AP2342-CR.awb 
 
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¶56 Gonzalez-Lopez also appears to recognize "a trial 
court's wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of 
choice against the needs of fairness and against the demands of 
its calendar."  Id. at 152.  However, the decision provides 
little guidance on how courts should balance a defendant's 
constitutional right with the demands of its calendar.  It is 
unclear what magnitude of a scheduling inconvenience will 
counterbalance a defendant's constitutional right to counsel of 
choice.   
¶57 Additional unanswered questions relate to how the 
Gonzalez-Lopez opinion will be applied to defendants with 
appointed counsel3 who nevertheless pay for their representation.  
Since the mid-1990s, the legislature has required the state 
public defender to seek reimbursement for services provided to 
indigent clients.  Lola Velázquez-Aguilú, Not Poor Enough: Why 
Wisconsin's System for Providing Indigent Defense Is Failing, 
2006 
Wis. 
L. 
Rev. 
193, 
212 
(2006) 
(citing 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 977.06(1)(d); Wis. Admin. Code PD § 6.01).  One method of 
reimbursement allows the client to elect to pay a one-time 
                                                 
3 There are two categories of indigent defendants: those who 
are statutorily indigent and those who are constitutionally 
indigent.  Members of the former category are entitled to public 
defender representation based on legislative criteria.  Members 
of the latter category, although not meeting the public defender 
criteria, are nevertheless entitled to representation under 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  See State v. Dean, 
163 Wis. 2d 503, 512-13, 471 N.W.2d 310 (1991) (concluding that 
the creation of the public defender did not abrogate the circuit 
court's duty to appoint counsel where the public defender has 
declined to act but appointment of counsel is constitutionally 
required). 
No.  2008AP2342-CR.awb 
 
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reduced amount within sixty days of the appointment of counsel.  
Id. at 213 (citing Wis. Admin. Code PD §§ 6.01, 6.02).   
¶58 In counties all over this state, circuit courts 
appoint counsel for constitutionally indigent defendants who do 
not meet the public defender appointment guidelines.  Generally 
when circuit courts appoint such counsel, the defendant is 
required to reimburse the county on a payment schedule.   
¶59 How does the reimbursement affect, if at all, the 
Gonzalez-Lopez right to counsel of choice?  If it does not 
affect the initial choice, does it affect the right to continue 
an ongoing attorney-client relationship?4 
¶60 I fear that the Gonzalez-Lopez decision will occupy 
courts for years as they attempt to interpret and apply its 
newly contoured constitutional right.  Given the uncharted 
course, circuit courts should study the teachings of Gonzalez-
Lopez when deciding whether to grant a request for substitute 
counsel.  The stark consequence of automatic reversal of 
conviction demands a careful exercise of discretion.    
                                                 
4 One commentator advances that the repayment obligations 
"when 
considered 
in 
light 
of 
the 
constitutional 
values 
underlying the right to retain counsel of choice, militate in 
favor of recognizing a limited right of indigent criminal 
defendants to select which attorney is assigned to defend them."  
Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent 
Criminal 
Defendant: 
Do 
Reimbursement 
Statutes 
Support 
Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the Indigent?, 
64 Brook. L. Rev. 181, 183 (1998).  Another suggests that it may 
not affect the initial right to choose, but should affect the 
right to continue the existing attorney-client relationship.  
Janet C. Hoeffel, Toward A More Robust Right to Counsel of 
Choice, 44 San Diego L. Rev. 525, 549 (2007). 
No.  2008AP2342-CR.awb 
 
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II 
¶61 The Gonzalez-Lopez Court bluntly explained that "the 
right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who 
require counsel to be appointed for them."  548 U.S. at 151.  
Therefore, under Gonzalez-Lopez, some defendants enjoy two Sixth 
Amendment rights relating to the assistance of counsel, and 
other defendants who are indigent enjoy only one of these 
rights.  Because the right to counsel of choice does not apply 
to an entire class of defendants, Gonzalez-Lopez is difficult to 
reconcile with the American ideal of equal justice under law.  
¶62 It is particularly troubling for Wisconsin courts to 
be bound to a holding that places a credit check on the 
constitutional right to counsel of choice.  Wisconsin was at the 
forefront of recognizing the importance of guaranteeing all 
criminal defendants access to counsel——regardless of their 
wealth. 
¶63 In 1859, more than one hundred years before the United 
States Supreme Court made a similar pronouncement in Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
held that indigent defendants were entitled to counsel furnished 
at government expense.  In Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 
249, 251 (1859), Justice Cole emphasized that it would be a 
"mockery" of our "constitutional guaranties" to deny "paupers" 
the right to counsel enjoyed by others:   
[It would be] like mockery to secure to a pauper these 
solemn constitutional guaranties for a fair and full 
trial of the matters with which he was charged, and 
yet to say to him when on trial, that he must employ 
No.  2008AP2342-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
his 
own 
counsel 
who 
could 
alone 
render 
these 
guaranties of any real permanent value to him.   
Id. 
¶64 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a variety of rights "in 
all criminal proceedings" including the right to a public trial, 
the right of an unbiased jury, and the right "to have the 
assistance of counsel."  No one would seriously suggest that 
only defendants of means have a right to a public trial, or only 
those who have sufficient money have the right to an unbiased 
jury.  Yet, the Gonzalez-Lopez Court selected the right to 
assistance of counsel of choice and made it contingent upon 
financial status.     
¶65 In addition to recognizing a constitutional right for 
one class of defendants and not for another, the remedy adopted 
in Gonzalez-Lopez further widens the gulf between indigent 
defendants and those who can afford to retain an attorney.  To 
be entitled to a new trial, indigent defendants must demonstrate 
that their appointed counsel's performance was ineffective——a 
significant hurdle to overcome.  
¶66 This 
court 
has 
explained 
that 
an 
attorney's 
performance "need not be perfect, nor even very good, to be 
constitutionally adequate."  See, e.g., State v. Carter, 2010 WI 
40, ¶22, __ Wis. 2d __, 782 N.W.2d 695.  When evaluating 
effectiveness, the court applies "a heavy measure of deference 
to counsel's judgments."  Id., ¶23.  Even if the defendant 
successfully 
demonstrates 
that 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient, the defendant must also demonstrate a reasonable 
No.  2008AP2342-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
probability that the deficient performance had an adverse effect 
on the outcome of the proceeding.  Id., ¶37.   
¶67 By contrast, defendants who can afford to retain an 
attorney need not make such a showing if they were denied 
representation by their attorney of choice.  Rather, those 
defendants need to show only that the court should not have 
denied representation by counsel of choice, and a new trial is 
automatic.  
¶68 This case demonstrates the disparate treatment of rich 
and poor defendants.  Jones' attorney asked to withdraw from the 
case so that a new attorney could be appointed.  That motion was 
denied.  If Jones had the resources to retain an attorney, the 
circuit court's denial of the motion four months in advance of 
trial would likely be considered structural error, and a new 
trial would be granted.  However, because Jones was dependent 
upon the office of the state public defender for representation, 
he had no right to counsel of choice, and he has no recourse 
unless he can show that his appointed attorney's performance was 
ineffective.  
¶69 I cannot reconcile, under our system of equal justice, 
that a constitutional right viewed as so robust that its 
violation amounts to structural error can be contingent upon a 
credit check.  Nevertheless, this concurrence should not be 
viewed as advocating an unbridled extension of that right.  
Providing indigent defendants with unfettered choice of counsel 
would impose impossible administrative burdens on the office of 
the state public defender and on circuit courts.  I believe that 
No.  2008AP2342-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
the Court was correct in Wheat when it explained that "the 
essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an 
effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to 
ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the 
lawyer whom he prefers."  486 U.S. at 159.  
¶70 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
concur.   
¶71 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence.   
 
 
No.  2008AP2342-CR.awb 
 
 
 
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