Case Title: State v. Awkal

Citation: 1996-Ohio-395

Docket Number: 19951132

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Awkal, Appellant. 
1 
[Cite as State v. Awkal (1996) __ Ohio St.3d __.] 
2 
Criminal law -- Aggravated murder -- Death penalty upheld, when. 
3 
 
(No. 95-1132 -- Submitted March 6, 1996, -- Decided August 14, 1996.) 
4 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 66291. 
5 
 
On January 7, 1992, appellant, Abdul Hamin Awkal, shot and killed his 
6 
estranged wife, Latife Awkal, and his brother-in-law, Mahmoud Abdul-Aziz, at the 
7 
Family Conciliation Services Department of the Cuyahoga Domestic Relations 
8 
Court.  Appellant was captured in the courthouse basement not far from where the 
9 
shooting took place. 
10 
 
Awkal arrived in the United States from Lebanon about 1984, when he was 
11 
twenty-four.  He lived with family members in Detroit, Michigan, and worked as a 
12 
dishwasher and gas station attendant.  In 1985, Awkal suffered a mental breakdown 
13 
at the gas station after he believed he had been accused of theft by his employer.  He 
14 
became hysterical, cursing and breaking things, vomited and then collapsed.  He was 
15 
taken to Detroit Medical Center in a straitjacket.  Awkal was apparently released into 
16 
his brother’s custody later that same day, but disregarded instructions to follow up 
17 
with a psychiatrist. 
18 
 
2
 
Later, Awkal began working at a General Motors’ factory in Michigan.  He 
1 
was eventually transferred to the Chevrolet plant in Parma, Ohio.  He had difficulty 
2 
sleeping during this period, and was prescribed medication to help him sleep. 
3 
 
Awkal’s family arranged for him to meet his wife, Latife, after his arrival in 
4 
Cleveland.  This type of arranged marriage was common in his Islamic faith.  
5 
Awkal’s need for sleeping pills diminished after he met his wife.  Awkal and Latife 
6 
were married under Islamic law in March 1989 and under Ohio law in April 1989.  
7 
Later in 1989, Awkal went to Cleveland Metropolitan General Hospital complaining 
8 
of numbness down his side.  Although Awkal was again told to talk to a psychiatrist, 
9 
he never did so.  Awkal and Latife had a daughter, Zaynab, born in September 1990. 
10 
 
On their honeymoon, Latife told Awkal she did not love him, but that she 
11 
understood that love would follow.  He unsuccessfully attempted to improve their 
12 
relationship by opening a bank account for her, teaching her to drive, encouraging 
13 
her to attend school, and helping her parents with various household tasks. 
14 
 
Latife and her brothers felt that Awkal was not a good Muslim.  Awkal did not 
15 
spend sufficient time in daily prayer and he enjoyed music and celebrating Christian 
16 
holidays, such as Christmas.  Latife and her brothers did not listen to music, or 
17 
celebrate Christian holidays, and prayed five or six times a day.  Latife’s brother, 
18 
Mahmoud Abdul-Aziz, tried to teach Awkal the tenets of their family’s Islamic faith, 
19 
 
3
but Awkal viewed Mahmoud’s actions as interference with his freedom, and believed 
1 
that he was harassed and threatened by Mahmoud because of his religious beliefs. 
2 
 
Awkal’s marital life was dissolving.  Latife spent many nights away from 
3 
Awkal and eventually asked for an Islamic divorce.  According to Awkal, a Muslim 
4 
husband may divorce his wife merely by telling her “I divorce you, I divorce you, I 
5 
divorce you.”  Awkal granted her request on October 13, 1991, but then Latife 
6 
agreed to remarry him under Islamic law.  Latife felt that she had been shamed and 
7 
that her baby had been made illegitimate by the divorce. 
8 
 
On October 16, 1991, Latife found out that she had contracted a venereal 
9 
disease from Awkal.  The next day, Latife moved out of the marital home, moved in 
10 
with Mahmoud, and started divorce proceedings.  A divorce complaint and motions 
11 
for spousal support, child support, visitation and restraining orders were filed in 
12 
October 1991.  Latife talked of returning to Lebanon with the baby. 
13 
 
Awkal was hurt by his family problems and sought counseling, but declined 
14 
medication.  Awkal had counseling sessions four times in November 1991, because 
15 
he was depressed and suicidal.  These feelings were brought on by the divorce and 
16 
Awkal’s belief that Latife’s brothers and their religion had interfered with his life 
17 
and his marriage.  Awkal’s psychological records reflect that he was very angry with 
18 
Latife and her brothers because of the divorce. 
19 
 
4
 
On November 8, 1991, Awkal bought a nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol, 
1 
allegedly to defend himself from Latife’s brothers.  The evening of that same day and 
2 
the morning of the next, Awkal called Latife and her brother, Omar Abdul-Aziz, 
3 
threatening to kill her and her entire family if the divorce was not dismissed.  Latife 
4 
reported the call to her divorce attorney, who sent a letter to Awkal’s attorney 
5 
regarding the threats. 
6 
 
Awkal attended hearings in his divorce case on December 10, 17, and 19, 
7 
1991, without incident.  During this period, Awkal and Latife agreed to a child 
8 
visitation schedule and temporary child and spousal support.  At Latife’s insistence, 
9 
the visitation order prohibited Awkal from participating in any Christmas-related 
10 
activities with the baby during his visitation.  Awkal also agreed that the family 
11 
checking accounts, containing approximately $4,800, which had been frozen by the 
12 
domestic relations court, were to be equally divided between Latife and Awkal. 
13 
 
A meeting was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. on January 7, 1992, at the Family 
14 
Conciliation Services Department, Room 52, located in the basement of the old 
15 
Cleveland courthouse.  Latife came early to the meeting with her brother, Mahmoud, 
16 
and her baby.  They waited in the hall outside for Awkal to arrive. 
17 
 
Awkal arrived at the courthouse parking garage at 1:48 p.m. from Michigan, 
18 
where he had spent the weekend with relatives.  On his person were copies of the 
19 
 
5
baby’s medical records, which had been checked out from the treating HMO over a 
1 
month earlier, and numerous childcare supplies, including diapers, baby food, and 
2 
clothing.  Prior to the meeting, Awkal wrote a check to his brother for nearly the 
3 
entire contents of the frozen checking accounts, and changed his address at the post 
4 
office to his brother’s house in Michigan. 
5 
 
Awkal confronted Mahmoud and Latife in the hallway at approximately 2:00 
6 
p.m.  No harsh words or raised voices were heard from the hall before the shooting.  
7 
However, “panicky” voices were heard immediately before the three entered Room 
8 
52.  Awkal chased Latife and Mahmoud into the room, where he shot his wife and 
9 
her brother at close range.  Five shell casings were found inside the room; one shell 
10 
casing was found in the hall outside the room. 
11 
 
Awkal then picked up the baby from the bench outside the room and walked 
12 
quickly through the basement halls of the courthouse with her in his arms.  Several 
13 
armed deputies confronted Awkal in the hallway.  Awkal pointed his gun at his head 
14 
and then at his daughter’s head, threatening to kill her and then himself.  Awkal 
15 
vowed that nobody was going to take his baby. 
16 
 
When a deputy tried to grab Awkal’s gun, Awkal backed further down the hall 
17 
with the baby.  While proceeding down the hall, Awkal was confronted by another 
18 
 
6
deputy, who attempted to disarm Awkal.  Awkal evaded this attempt, but was shot in 
1 
the back while trying to escape. 
2 
 
When Awkal was taken into custody, his pistol was cocked, ready to fire, and 
3 
contained six live rounds (one in the chamber; five in the magazine).  Awkal also had 
4 
another magazine containing thirteen rounds of live ammunition in his coat pocket.  
5 
The bullets retrieved from Mahmoud’s body and from Room 52 were fired from 
6 
Awkal’s gun. 
7 
 
At the hospital the next day, Awkal, after being advised of his Miranda rights, 
8 
told police that he had confronted Mahmoud in the hallway and demanded that 
9 
Mahmoud “profess that Allah was the only God.”  When Mahmoud did not do so, 
10 
Awkal shot the victims.  Awkal stated that he thought that he had shot himself.    
11 
 
Awkal was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder with prior calculation 
12 
and design, including the multiple-murder death penalty specification.  He was also 
13 
indicted on two counts of felonious assault, including a firearm specification.  Awkal 
14 
pled “not guilty” and “not guilty by reason of insanity” to the charges against him.   
15 
 
While awaiting evaluation by a court-appointed psychiatrist to determine 
16 
whether he was sane and competent to stand trial, Awkal reportedly had 
17 
hallucinations involving his wife, who spoke to him and told him to join her.  Two 
18 
psychiatrists had examined Awkal at the county jail and found him to be depressed 
19 
 
7
and angry.  Awkal was prescribed anti-depressant and anti-anxiety drugs.  These 
1 
drugs did not stop him from having the hallucinations, and he was prescribed 
2 
different anti-psychotic and anti-depressant medications. 
3 
 
Awkal was found sane at the time of the murders in the preliminary sanity 
4 
report.  However, the severity of his depression rendered him incapable of aiding 
5 
with his defense, and the trial court found Awkal not competent to stand trial.  He 
6 
was ordered to the Dayton Mental Health Center, Forensic Unit, for treatment and 
7 
further evaluation.  During his stay in Dayton, Awkal continued to receive anti-
8 
psychotic medication, but at greater levels.  He was also placed on anti-depressant 
9 
and anti-anxiety medications.  On September 3, 1992, the trial court found Awkal 
10 
competent to stand trial, but returned him to Dayton for further treatment until the 
11 
trial started. 
12 
 
In October 1992, a jury was impaneled.  During the trial, defense counsel 
13 
complained to the court that Awkal’s condition had deteriorated and suggested that a 
14 
new competency evaluation be undertaken.  The trial court refused to have Awkal 
15 
reevaluated, but stated that it would watch Awkal closely to see that he was paying 
16 
attention to the trial and helping with his own defense.  After the state closed its case 
17 
in chief, the trial court dismissed one of the felonious assault charges. 
18 
 
8
 
Several witnesses testified on Awkal’s behalf during the guilt phase.  Dr. Paul 
1 
E. Hewitt, a psychologist, was called to give an opinion on the issue of prior 
2 
calculation and design.  However, when the court learned that Dr. Hewitt was not a 
3 
licensed psychologist in Ohio, his testimony was stricken from the record.  Dr. 
4 
Magdi S. Rizk, the psychiatrist who conducted Awkal’s pretrial sanity and 
5 
competency evaluations, testified that Awkal was sane at the time of the murders.  
6 
Finally, Dr. Eileen S. McGee, a psychiatrist awaiting board certification, testified 
7 
that Awkal was insane at the time of the shooting, that he did not know what he did 
8 
was wrong, and that Latife and Mahmoud had provoked the incident. 
9 
 
Awkal testified on his own behalf.  He stated that Mahmoud and Latife’s other 
10 
brothers were religious fanatics, and had harassed him and interfered in his life.  
11 
Awkal testified that he purchased the gun to protect himself from Latife’s brothers, 
12 
who had threatened him and, on one occasion, forced him to kneel down before 
13 
them, swearing allegiance to their religious sect.  He denied threatening Latife or her 
14 
brother. 
15 
 
Awkal stated that on the morning in question he met Latife in the hallway of 
16 
the courthouse, and asked her to come back to him.  She refused, and he went back to 
17 
his car to get his gun, intending to kill himself in front of Latife to make her regret 
18 
her decision to divorce him.  When Awkal returned he asked Latife if he could hug 
19 
 
9
his daughter one last time.  Latife agreed, but Mahmoud confronted Awkal, stating 
1 
that the baby was not Awkal’s, and that Awkal would never see her again.  Awkal 
2 
testified that Mahmoud’s face “turn[ed] into that of a monster” and that the walls 
3 
then collapsed.  The next thing Awkal knew, he awoke in the hospital. 
4 
 
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Dr. Edward Dutton, a forensic 
5 
psychiatrist, who testified that Awkal was malingering, that he understood what he 
6 
had done was wrong, and that he had acted out of anger. 
7 
 
The jury found Awkal guilty as charged on the aggravated murder charges, but 
8 
not guilty on the remaining felonious assault charge. 
9 
 
Several witnesses, including Drs. Paul Hewitt, Eileen McGee, and Salah Samy, 
10 
testified on Awkal’s behalf during the penalty phase.  Dr. Hewitt testified that 
11 
Awkal’s problems were part of a life-long anxiety problem, and believed that 
12 
Mahmoud’s threats and religious fanaticism were extremely strong provocation and 
13 
had facilitated the shooting.  Dr. Hewitt believed that Awkal’s reaction was 
14 
spontaneous and that he did not have the ability to conform his conduct to the 
15 
requirements of Ohio law when he committed the murders. 
16 
 
Dr. McGee testified that the religious interference of Mahmoud and his 
17 
brothers was a strong provoking force in the murders.  Dr. McGee also testified that 
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Awkal’s reaction was triggered by Mahmoud’s provocation, and that Awkal did not 
19 
 
10
have the ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law of Ohio when 
1 
the murders occurred. 
2 
 
Dr. Samy, Awkal’s treating psychiatrist in Dayton, testified that Awkal was 
3 
not malingering, and that he lost his judgment and control and awareness of what he 
4 
was doing just prior to the murders.  Dr. Samy testified that Awkal was not sane at 
5 
the time of the murders.  Dr. Samy also believed that Latife and Mahmoud facilitated 
6 
the incident. 
7 
 
Awkal gave an unsworn statement, in which he explained his childhood 
8 
situation, his religious problems with his brothers-in-law, and how these religious 
9 
problems caused his marital problems.  He also talked about how after Mahmoud’s 
10 
face became that of a monster, the walls collapsed down upon him.  The next thing 
11 
Awkal knew, he woke up in the hospital. 
12 
 
The prosecution rebutted this testimony with Dr. Edward Dutton, who 
13 
believed that Awkal was malingering.   
14 
 
The jury found Awkal guilty of the aggravated murder charges and 
15 
recommended death.  The trial court agreed and imposed the death penalty.  The 
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court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. 
17 
 
The cause is presently before this court on appeal as of right. 
18 
 
11
 
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, George J. 
1 
Sadd and Richard J. Bombik, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
2 
 
McGinty, Gibbons & Hilow Co., L.P.A., Henry J. Hilow and Kevin M. 
3 
Spellacy, for appellant. 
4 
_______________ 
5 
 
Pfeifer, J. 
Appellant raises fourteen propositions of law.  We have reviewed 
6 
each one and have determined that none justifies the reversal of appellant’s 
7 
convictions for aggravated murder or of the sentence of death. 
8 
I 
9 
Evidentiary Issues 
10 
A 
11 
Insufficient Evidence 
12 
 
In propositions Nos. I and II, Awkal argues that the evidence proving his guilt 
13 
is insufficient.  Awkal argues that the busy location and the fact that the shooting 
14 
took place in front of witnesses indicate that this was a “spur of the moment” 
15 
shooting or impulse murder.  This argument is without merit.  The length of time 
16 
pondering the crime does not determine whether an accused acted with prior 
17 
calculation and design. 
18 
 
12
 
“ ‘[P]rior calculation and design’ requires ‘a scheme designed to implement 
1 
the calculated decision to kill.’  In addition, ‘[n]either the degree of care nor the 
2 
length of time the offender takes to ponder the crime beforehand are critical factors 
3 
in themselves,’ but ‘momentary deliberation’ is insufficient.”  State v. D’Ambrosio 
4 
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 196, 616 N.E.2d 909, 918, quoting State v. Cotton 
5 
(1979), 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 11, 10 O.O.3d 4, 6, 381 N.E.2d 190, 193; Legislative 
6 
Service Commission Comment to R.C. 2903.01. 
7 
 
The record reflects that Awkal harbored anger against his wife and her family.  
8 
Awkal felt that Mahmoud interfered with his family and harassed Awkal.  Prior to 
9 
the shooting, Awkal threatened to kill his wife and her family, and bought a gun.  On 
10 
the day of the shooting, Awkal changed his address at the post office and issued a 
11 
check to his brother for almost the entire balance of the family checking accounts.  
12 
Before going the courthouse, Awkal stocked his car with baby care items, including 
13 
food and clothing.  He then confronted Latife, Mahmoud, and the baby in the hall 
14 
outside Room 52.  Awkal then followed Latife and Mahmoud into Room 52 where 
15 
the shooting occurred.  He shot each victim at least three times.  The sequencing of 
16 
the shots also implies that he intended to kill both victims.  Awkal also had a spare 
17 
magazine containing thirteen live rounds in his coat pocket on the day in question.  
18 
 
13
 
“‘The standard [for determining the sufficiency of the evidence] * * * is 
1 
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a 
2 
reasonable jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
3 
reasonable doubt.’”  State v. Davis (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 361, 365, 528 N.E.2d 925, 
4 
930, citing Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.  
5 
Accord State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of 
6 
the syllabus. 
7 
 
When the evidence is viewed in a manner most favorable to the prosecution, a 
8 
reasonable fact finder could find that Awkal acted with prior calculation and design 
9 
in killing Latife and Mahmoud.  These propositions are without merit. 
10 
B. 
11 
 
State of Mind / Hearsay Evidence 
12 
 
In proposition No. IV, Awkal incorrectly argues that the trial court erred in 
13 
permitting the prosecution to elicit hearsay testimony from Latife’s divorce attorney 
14 
regarding statements allegedly made to Latife by Awkal.  The prosecution called 
15 
Latife’s divorce attorney to testify regarding telephone threats made to Latife by 
16 
Awkal on November 8, 1991.  Counsel testified to what Latife told her, and that 
17 
counsel then sent Awkal’s divorce attorney a letter concerning the alleged threats.  
18 
 
14
Awkal argues this was hearsay within hearsay, and was inadmissible under Evid. R. 
1 
805. 
2 
 
The trial court admitted the evidence under Evid. R. 803(3), as a statement of 
3 
“then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition.”  In State v. 
4 
Apanovitch (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 514 N.E.2d 394, this court discussed the 
5 
admissibility of evidence reflecting a victim’s fearful state of mind.  However, the 
6 
court limited this type of testimony to that reflecting the state of mind of the victim, 
7 
but not the reasons underlying that state of mind.  Id. at 21-22, 514 N.E.2d at 398.  
8 
Further, the testimony must point forward in time rather than to the past.  Id. at 21-
9 
22, 514 N.E.2d at 398.  Portions of the testimony in question here exceed the scope 
10 
of the rule discussed in Apanovitch.   
11 
 
Latife’s divorce attorney arguably testified to Latife’s mental state on 
12 
November 8, 1991.  Yet, she did not testify that Latife was upset or in fear for her 
13 
life.  However, she did testify that Awkal threatened to kill Latife and her family.  
14 
Admitting this testimony was error under Apanovitch.  Id.  However, Latife’s 
15 
brother, Omar Abdul-Aziz, also testified that he received a call from Awkal on 
16 
November 9, 1991, threatening the family members if the divorce was not dismissed.  
17 
This testimony was proper.  Thus, divorce counsel’s testimony duplicated Omar’s 
18 
testimony and admission of the divorce counsel’s testimony was harmless beyond a 
19 
 
15
reasonable doubt.  State v. Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 485, 653 N.E.2d 
1 
304, 318. 
2 
 
Latife’s divorce counsel also drafted a letter to Awkal’s counsel concerning 
3 
Awkal’s threats.  This letter was admitted into evidence.  The content of the letter is 
4 
not limited to Latife’s state of mind.  Instead, it focuses upon the alleged threats or 
5 
“harassment” by Awkal.  [Id.]  Thus, admission of the letter was also error, as its 
6 
only purpose was to establish Awkal’s threats to Latife and her family.  However, 
7 
given the volume of evidence against Awkal, this error was harmless beyond a 
8 
reasonable doubt.  See id. 
9 
C 
10 
Psychological Expert 
11 
 
In proposition No. V, Awkal contends the court improperly excluded the 
12 
testimony of Dr. Hewitt because he was not a licensed psychologist in Ohio.  Awkal 
13 
contends that Dr. Hewitt possessed the requisite knowledge, skill, and experience in 
14 
his field to give an expert opinion, under Evid. R. 702, on the issue of prior 
15 
calculation and design.  This proposition is without merit. 
16 
 
Determinations of expert witness qualifications to testify are within the 
17 
discretion of the trial court.  State v. Bidinost (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 449, 453 644 
18 
 
16
N.E.2d 318, 322.  Thus, all questions concerning the admission or exclusion of this 
1 
type of evidence are considered on an abuse of discretion basis.  Id.   
2 
 
Appellant argues that the licensure question goes to the weight, not the 
3 
admissibility, of the evidence.  Appellant is correct.  Where expert testimony has 
4 
been admitted, the licensure issue goes to the weight of the evidence. Id. at 454, 644 
5 
N.E.2d at 323.  However, where, as here, the evidence has been excluded, the issue is 
6 
whether the court abused its discretion in doing so.  Id.  See State v. Grant (1993), 67 
7 
Ohio St.3d 465, 475, 620 N.E.2d 50, 64;  Alexander v. Mt. Carmel Med. Ctr. (1978), 
8 
56 Ohio St.2d 155, 157, 10 O.O.3d 332, 333, 383 N.E.2d 564, 565;  State v. Maupin 
9 
(1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 473, 479, 71 O.O.2d 485, 488, 330 N.E.2d 708, 713.   
10 
 
Dr. Hewitt had experience that may have been helpful to the jury.  However, 
11 
he was not individually licensed as a psychologist in Ohio.  Nor was he qualified as a 
12 
forensic psychologist.  As a non-physician, Dr. Hewitt was not competent to give an 
13 
opinion on the sanity issue.  Under those circumstances, the court determined that it 
14 
would not let him testify and give an expert opinion on the issue of prior calculation 
15 
and design.  The trial court had the discretion to exclude the testimony.  Doing so 
16 
was not an abuse of discretion.  Even if it were, identical testimony was presented by 
17 
defense expert Dr. McGee.  Thus, Dr. Hewitt’s testimony duplicated portions of Dr. 
18 
McGee’s testimony and excluding this testimony did not prejudice appellant. 
19 
 
17
D 
1 
Malingering 
2 
 
In proposition No. VII, Awkal argues that the trial court committed plain error 
3 
when it permitted Dr. Dutton to testify that Awkal was malingering.  Appellant 
4 
contends that this testimony was nothing more than an opinion that Awkal was lying 
5 
about his hallucinations and was intended to be evidence of Awkal’s allegedly poor 
6 
character.  This proposition is without merit. 
7 
 
Appellant presented an insanity defense, and supported that defense with 
8 
evidence of the hallucinations.  Thus, he placed his psychological status and 
9 
competency at issue.  Therefore, the prosecution was entitled to attack the existence 
10 
of the hallucinations when rebutting the evidence of his insanity defense.  See R.C. 
11 
2945.10(D); State v. Cooper (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 163, 173-174, 6 O.O.3d 377, 382-
12 
383, 370 N.E.2d 725, 732-733.  This proposition is without merit. 
13 
E 
14 
Photographs 
15 
 
In proposition No. VIII, Awkal contends that the autopsy photographs of the 
16 
victims were improperly admitted during both the guilt phase and the penalty phase 
17 
of his trial and that this admission requires reversal in this case.  This proposition is 
18 
without merit. 
19 
 
18
 
The prosecution introduced twelve autopsy photographs of the two victims 
1 
(six per victim).  Appellant objected only to State Ex. 7, a photograph of Mahmoud 
2 
with his eyes partially open.  Thus, with the exception of State Ex. 7, the other 
3 
photographs are reviewed on the basis of plain error. 
4 
 
Under Evid.R. 403 and 611(A), the admission of photographic evidence is left 
5 
to the discretion of the trial court.  State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 264, 
6 
15 OBR 379, 401, 473 N.E.2d 768, 791;  State v. Morales (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 
7 
257, 513 N.E.2d 267, 273.  Relevant, non-repetitive photographs, even if gruesome, 
8 
are admissible if the probative value of each photograph exceeds the prejudicial 
9 
impact to the accused.  Maurer, supra, paragraph seven of the syllabus; Morales, 
10 
supra, 32 Ohio St.3d at 257.  The photograph in question shows Mahmoud’s wounds 
11 
and is not overly prejudicial. 
12 
 
As to the remaining photographs, sheer numbers alone do not establish 
13 
prejudice or show that the photographs are cumulative or repetitious.  State v. DePew 
14 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 281, 528 N.E.2d 542, 550; State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio 
15 
St.3d 626, 636, 653 N.E.2d 675, 686. See State v. Lundgren, 73 Ohio St.3d at 486, 
16 
653 N.E.2d at 318.  Moreover, photographs may be admitted during the penalty 
17 
phase of the trial.  See State v. DePew, 38 Ohio st.3d at 282-283, 528 N.E.2d at 551-
18 
552. 
19 
 
19
 
Awkal suffered no prejudice from the admission of these pictures.  The victims 
1 
died from multiple gunshot wounds.  The autopsy photographs were introduced to 
2 
illustrate the coroner’s testimony and provide differing perspectives of the victims 
3 
and their numerous wounds.  Thus, several photographs of each victim were 
4 
necessary in order to show all of the entry and exit wounds.  The photographs in this 
5 
case are neither repetitive nor cumulative in number, and are non-prejudicial.  
6 
Although it is possible to argue that fewer photographs could have been used, the 
7 
trial court did not err in admitting these particular pictures. 
8 
II 
9 
Jury Instructions 
10 
 
Appellant argues, in proposition Nos. IX and X, that the trial court erred when 
11 
it instructed the jury during the guilt phase.  In proposition No. IX, Awkal contends 
12 
that the trial court committed plain error when it failed to instruct the jury that it need 
13 
not unanimously find that Awkal was not guilty of aggravated murder before it 
14 
considered the lesser offense of murder. 
15 
 
Awkal did not object to the proposed instructions at trial and has waived this 
16 
asserted error unless he would have been acquitted but for the error.  State v. Waddy 
17 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 437, 588 N.E.2d 819, 830.  The court instructed on the 
18 
applicable lesser included offenses, but failed to give any instruction regarding when 
19 
 
20
the jury should proceed from deliberating on the primary charge to deliberating on 
1 
the lesser included offense. 
2 
 
Failing to instruct on this issue was error.  The only instruction potentially 
3 
applicable to this issue was when the court stated that the jury had not “reached a 
4 
verdict” until all of the members of the jury agreed on the verdict.  This instruction 
5 
implies that jury unanimity is required on a not guilty verdict on the primary offense 
6 
before the jury could move on to consider the lesser included offense.  Thus, the trial 
7 
court may have improperly required a unanimous not guilty verdict before 
8 
considering the lesser included offenses.  However, given the evidence of appellant’s 
9 
guilt below, this error did not rise to the level of plain error. 
10 
 
In proposition No. X, Awkal attacks the trial court’s jury instruction on 
11 
“reasonable doubt.”  The trial court used the statutory definition of “reasonable 
12 
doubt” set forth in R.C. 2901.05(D).  We have upheld use of that statutory language.  
13 
See State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, 
14 
paragraph eight of the syllabus; State v. Frazier (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 330, 653 
15 
N.E.2d 1000, 1008.  This proposition is without merit. 
16 
 
In proposition Nos. XII and XIII, Awkal contends the trial court improperly 
17 
instructed the jury during the penalty phase.  In proposition No. XII, Awkal argues 
18 
that the court should have instructed the jury before the penalty phase began 
19 
 
21
regarding what its function was during that phase of the trial and what the mitigating 
1 
factors are, so that the jury would be informed what to expect when listening to the 
2 
evidence, and that failing to instruct the jury permitted it to consider non-statutory 
3 
aggravating circumstances.  This argument is without merit. 
4 
 
The trial court instructed the jury at the close of the evidence in the penalty 
5 
phase.  These instructions delineated the mitigating factors, the aggravating 
6 
circumstances, and what the jury’s function was.  The court also instructed the jury 
7 
that it was not limited to the statutory mitigating factors when weighing the 
8 
mitigating factors against the aggravating circumstances.  The record does not reflect 
9 
that the jury was permitted to use non-statutory aggravating circumstances in its 
10 
weighing process.  This proposition is without merit. 
11 
 
In proposition No. XIII, Awkal argues that the trial court committed plain 
12 
error when it instructed the jury that it could consider Awkal’s psychological 
13 
evidence mitigating only if Awkal established that he lacked substantial capacity to 
14 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
15 
requirements of law.  This proposition has merit. 
16 
 
Although the court instructed the jury that it was not limited to the statutory 
17 
mitigating factors when weighing the mitigating factors against the aggravating 
18 
circumstances, the court did not instruct the jury that it could use the psychological 
19 
 
22
evidence for any purpose other than establishing the statutory mitigating factor in 
1 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  Thus, the court failed to instruct the jury that even if the jury 
2 
determined that this mitigating factor was not established, it could view appellant’s 
3 
psychological evidence as mitigating under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  This was error.  See 
4 
State v. Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 9 564 N.E.2d 408, 416.  However, this error 
5 
can be cured by our independent assessment.  See State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 
6 
160, 170, 555 N.E.2d 293, 304;  State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 110, 
7 
559 N.E.2d 710, 716. 
8 
III 
9 
 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
10 
 
In proposition of law  No. VI, Awkal argues that the trial court committed 
11 
plain error when it permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine Dr. McGee on the issue 
12 
of Awkal’s sanity at the time of the trial.  Awkal also contends that the prosecutor’s 
13 
argument that Awkal would “walk out that door” if the jury found him not guilty by 
14 
reason of insanity was error. 
15 
 
Awkal objected to neither of these alleged errors at trial.  Therefore, he has, 
16 
with the exception of plain error, waived the issues.  Waddy, supra, 63 Ohio St.3d at 
17 
437, 588 N.E.2d at 830.   
18 
 
23
 
The admission of the evidence gained from the prosecution’s cross-
1 
examination of Dr. McGee. was not error.  However, even if it were error, given the 
2 
evidence against him, the error was harmless.  Lundgren, supra, 73 Ohio St.3d at 
3 
485. 
4 
 
It was error for the prosecutor to argue that Awkal would “walk out that door” 
5 
if the jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity.  First, this statement was an 
6 
incorrect statement of the law.  If Awkal were found not guilty by reason of insanity, 
7 
he would have been confined to a psychiatric facility until his sanity was restored.  
8 
This statement plainly sought to inflame the passions of the jury.  However, the 
9 
prosecutor’s arguments, as a whole, although impassioned, did not deprive Awkal of 
10 
a fair trial and did not constitute plain error.  Maurer, supra, 15 Ohio St.3d at 266 15 
11 
OBR at 402, 473 N.E.2d at 793.  Accordingly, this proposition is without merit. 
12 
IV 
13 
Lack of Remorse 
14 
 
In proposition No. XI, Awkal contends the trial court committed plain error 
15 
when it permitted the prosecutor to argue that Awkal demonstrated no remorse for 
16 
his actions. Awkal contends that these statements might have been based on Awkal’s 
17 
failure to show emotion during the trial, and that they impugned his right not to 
18 
testify against himself.  This proposition is without merit. 
19 
 
24
 
The prosecutor’s first comment does not discuss Awkal’s lack of remorse: 
1 
“And then you’ll find a common theme, ladies and gentlemen, of placing blame, 
2 
placing the blame for his predicament on his wife, Latife, and his brother-in-law 
3 
Mahmoud.  Blame them, blame his family, blame religion.  The guy goes up there 
4 
and he gives an unsworn statement, at any point does he accept responsibility for 
5 
what he did?  It’s not my fault, blame them.” 
6 
 
However, the prosecutor’s later comments do address the remorse issue: 
7 
 
“[D]id he ever accept responsibility for what he did?  Did he ever even 
8 
remotely at the time of the murder even indicate that he was sorry?  Is that asking too 
9 
much?  The man’s still angry.”  (Emphasis added.) 
10 
 
However, these comments were not error.  The prosecutor is addressing 
11 
Awkal’s statements at the time of the event, not his decision not to testify at trial.  
12 
The prosecutor was entitled to rebut the evidence of remorse presented by Awkal.  
13 
Further, appellant’s counsel did not object to this argument at trial.  A prosecutor’s 
14 
actions at trial do not create ground for error unless they deprive a defendant of a fair 
15 
trial.  Maurer, supra, 15 Ohio St.3d at 266, 15 OBR at 402, 473 N.E.2d at 793.  
16 
Awkal was not deprived of a fair trial by this statement.  This proposition is without 
17 
merit. 
18 
V 
19 
 
25
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
1 
 
Awkal contends, in his proposition of law No. III, that his trial counsel was 
2 
ineffective because it presented an insanity defense with three incompetent “expert 
3 
witnesses.”  Awkal’s argument is without merit.   
4 
 
To demonstrate that counsel was ineffective, Awkal must prove that counsel’s 
5 
performance was deficient and that this prejudiced him.  Strickland v. Washington 
6 
(1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 100 S.Ct 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 674, 693; State v. 
7 
Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
8 
 
Awkal was not deprived of a fair trial by his trial counsel.  Given the evidence 
9 
supporting his conviction, he was not prejudiced by what occurred at trial. 
10 
 
Counsel called Dr. Hewitt as an expert witness to testify during the guilt phase 
11 
on the issue of prior calculation and design.  While attempting to qualify Dr. Hewitt 
12 
to give an opinion on that issue, counsel established that Dr. Hewitt was not 
13 
competent to engage in forensic psychology.  During a discussion in chambers, the 
14 
court learned that Dr. Hewitt was not a licensed psychologist in Ohio and struck Dr. 
15 
Hewitt’s testimony.  Trial counsel knew of Dr. Hewitt’s lack of qualifications before 
16 
he called Dr. Hewitt to the stand.  Counsel made a tactical decision to try to get Dr. 
17 
Hewitt’s testimony into evidence.  He failed.  This was not a good tactical decision, 
18 
but it does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.   
19 
 
26
 
Counsel also called Dr. Rizk to testify during the guilt phase.  Dr. Rizk is 
1 
adequately qualified and has testified in numerous other similar circumstances.  
2 
However, Dr. Rizk testified that Awkal was sane at the time of the murders.  This 
3 
testimony obviously damaged Awkal’s affirmative defense that he was not sane 
4 
when he committed the murders.  Yet, portions of Dr. Rizk’s testimony assisted the 
5 
defense, including testimony about religion as a basis for Awkal’s marital problems, 
6 
his medication levels, and his hallucinations.   
7 
 
Counsel concluded Awkal’s affirmative defense by calling Dr. McGee, a 
8 
psychiatrist.  Dr. McGee was not yet board certified in psychiatry, had no experience 
9 
in forensic psychiatry, and had been practicing psychiatry for only one year.  Dr. 
10 
McGee testified that Awkal, as evidenced by his hallucinations involving his wife in 
11 
his cell in Dayton, had broken with reality at the time of the murders.  This break 
12 
with reality impaired his ability to know right from wrong at the time of the murders.  
13 
Although her opinion may have been diminished by her lack of certification and 
14 
inexperience, Dr. McGee supported Awkal’s affirmative defense.   
15 
 
Thus, of the three doctors called to testify for the defense, the testimony of one 
16 
was stricken from the record, one gave an opinion contradicting Awkal’s affirmative 
17 
defense but also gave other evidence that assisted that defense, and one testified that 
18 
Awkal was not mentally responsible for his acts.  However, Drs. McGee and Hewitt 
19 
 
27
were called to testify and did testify during the penalty phase of the trial, giving pro-
1 
defense opinions.  Dr. Samy also gave a pro-defense opinion in the penalty phase. 
2 
 
Awkal’s counsel obviously had some plan in mind.  Dr. Hewitt conceivably 
3 
could have been allowed to testify as an expert witness, and Dr. Rizk did make an 
4 
earlier finding that Awkal was incompetent to stand trial.  In hindsight it appears that 
5 
Awkal may have been better served to call only Dr. McGee during the guilt phase, 
6 
and call her and the other defense doctors during the penalty phase, if the trial would 
7 
reach that stage.  However, the end result of tactical trial decisions need not be 
8 
positive in order for counsel to be considered “effective.”  See State v. Lawson 
9 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 336, 341, 595 N.E.2d 902, 907.  We do not believe the record 
10 
establishes that Awkal’s attorneys were ineffective at trial. 
11 
VI 
12 
Eighth Amendment/Proportionality 
13 
 
In proposition  No. XIV(A)-(M), Awkal challenges the constitutionality of 
14 
Ohio’s death penalty statute.  These claims were previously rejected in State v. 
15 
Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 125, 31 OBR 273, 285-286, 509 N.E.2d 383, 396;  
16 
State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 38-39, 526 N.E.2d 274, 285;  State v. Mills 
17 
(1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 371-372, 582 N.E.2d 972, 985-986.  We will not revisit 
18 
them in this case. 
19 
 
28
VII 
1 
Independent Sentence Assessment 
2 
 
After independent assessment, we find that the evidence proves the 
3 
aggravating circumstances for which Awkal was convicted, namely multiple murder, 
4 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The record also establishes that the aggravating 
5 
circumstances outweigh the combined mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.   
6 
 
The nature and circumstances surrounding the offense are not mitigating.  
7 
Awkal acted in a cold, calculating fashion.  He threatened Latife and her family 
8 
before the murder.  He then prepared himself, his car, and his personal effects for the 
9 
events that would follow.  After this preparation, Awkal went to the basement of the 
10 
courthouse and calmly, repeatedly shot and killed his wife and her brother at close 
11 
range.  Then, in an attempt to escape these killings, he pointed his loaded gun at his 
12 
daughter’s head and threatened to kill her. 
13 
 
Awkal’s character, history and background are mitigating.  Awkal’s childhood 
14 
was poor.  He grew up in Beirut, Lebanon, and was forced to quit school in the 
15 
fourth grade to help his father’s business.  His father was physically abusive, on one 
16 
occasion beating Awkal to the point of unconsciousness.  Although poorly educated, 
17 
Awkal learned to speak English when he arrived in this country.  Further, he was 
18 
 
29
gainfully employed, holding two jobs, as a gas station attendant and automobile plant 
1 
employee.  He also tried to raise a family. 
2 
 
Awkal’s claim of remorse is relevant.  Awkal’s expert witnesses testified that 
3 
the victims “induced” and “facilitated” the offense within the meaning of R.C. 
4 
2929.04(B)(1).  Awkal gave an unsworn statement, in which he discussed his 
5 
religious differences with Latife and her brother as the source of his marital 
6 
problems.  He also accused Mahmoud and his brothers of threatening him and 
7 
interfering with his family.  Further, Awkal’s experts offered supporting testimony 
8 
that he acted “under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.”  R.C. 2929.04(B)(2). 
9 
 
Awkal presented evidence under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) that he suffers from 
10 
major depression, a mood disorder.  Awkal’s psychological experts believed that he 
11 
suffered from this disorder for some time before the murders.  These experts testified 
12 
that he did not know right from wrong or understand the criminality of his actions at 
13 
the time of the murders.  Thus, Awkal presented evidence that he lacked substantial 
14 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his acts or to conform his conduct to the 
15 
requirements of the law.  R.C. 2929.04(B)(3). 
16 
 
However, the prosecution rebutted this psychological evidence with the 
17 
testimony of Dr. Dutton.  Dr. Dutton testified that Awkal was malingering and that 
18 
he acted out of anger and knew the criminality of his actions.  We concur.  By his 
19 
 
30
actions and preparations that day, Awkal demonstrated that he knew what he was 
1 
doing and that what he was doing was wrong.  This is evidenced by his pre-shooting 
2 
preparations, including changing his address at the post office and preparing his car 
3 
with the baby’s medical records, baby food, and child care products, and his post-
4 
shooting actions, including trying to escape by using the baby as a shield and 
5 
threatening to kill her.  Although we find that appellant did not establish that he 
6 
lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his actions or to conform his 
7 
conduct to he requirements of the law, his history of mental problems and his current 
8 
mental condition are entitled to some weight as mitigation under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).   
9 
 
Awkal’s age, thirty-two at the time of the offenses, does not mitigate this 
10 
crime.  R.C. 2929.04(B)(4).  Awkal has no prior criminal history.  Thus, R.C. 
11 
2929.04(B)(5) is relevant in mitigation.  Awkal was the principal actor.  Hence, R.C. 
12 
2929.04(B)(6) is inapplicable. 
13 
 
The aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances in this 
14 
case.  The evidence shows that these murders were not the insane acts of a madman, 
15 
but were the methodical acts of an angry and vengeful man.  Awkal bought a gun and 
16 
then threatened his wife and her family before the murders.  He changed his address, 
17 
obtained a place to live in Michigan, wrote a check to his brother for nearly the entire 
18 
contents of the family’s bank accounts, and obtained his baby’s medical records as 
19 
 
31
preparation for the events that would follow.  After this preparation, Awkal loaded 
1 
his gun and, with an extra magazine, went into a public courthouse and calmly, 
2 
repeatedly shot and killed his wife and her brother at close range in front of several 
3 
witnesses.  Then, in an attempt to escape, he pointed his loaded gun at his daughter’s 
4 
head and threatened to kill her and himself.   
5 
 
Awkal prepared himself for murder and a getaway.  He appreciated that his 
6 
actions were wrong and attempted to use his daughter as a human shield when his 
7 
plans went awry.  Thus, the specified aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
8 
collective mitigation evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, the death 
9 
penalty is appropriate.  
10 
 
The death penalty in this case is not excessive when compared with the penalty 
11 
imposed in other multiple-murder cases involving a mental disease issue.  See, State 
12 
v. Seiber, 56 Ohio St.3d 4; 564 N.E.2d 408; State v. Garner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 
13 
49, 656 N.E.2d 623. 
14 
 
Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s convictions and his sentence of death. 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.  
16 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOULGAS, LAZARUS, RESNICK, F.E.SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., 
17 
concur. 
18 
 
32
 
CYNTHIA CECIL LAZARUS, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for 
1 
WRIGHT, J. 
2 
‘ 
3