Case Title: Berman v. Kroger

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2009-12-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: December 24, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STEVEN
C. BERMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN KROGER,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC
S057817)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot
title filed September 23, 2009; considered and under advisement on December 2,
2009.
Thomas K. Doyle, Bennett,
Hartman, Morris & Kaplan, LLP, Portland, filed the petition and the reply
memorandum for petitioner.
Paul
L. Smith, Assistant Attorney-in-Charge, Salem, filed the answering memorandum
for respondent.  With him on the answering memorandum were John R. Kroger,
Attorney General, and Jerome Lidz, Solicitor General.
WALTERS,
J.
The
ballot title is referred to the Attorney General for modification.
WALTERS, J.
This ballot title review proceeding
brought under ORS 250.085(2) concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot
title for Initiative Petition 55 (2010).  The proposed measure provides:
"Section 1.  Throughout most of Oregon's
History, the state was responsible for incarcerating felony criminals, and each
county was responsible for incarcerating misdemeanor criminals.  County jails
were for misdemeanants, and state prisons were for felons.  In recent years,
the state has forced counties to incarcerate many convicted felons, imposing
significant costs on the counties.  In order to correct this abuse of state
power, the People hereby enact this statute as the Oregon Sentencing
Responsibility Act.
"Section 2.  The state shall fully
reimburse each county, on a timely basis, for the county's actual costs of
presentencing incarcerations of any person convicted of a felony.
"Section 3.  After sentencing for a felony
conviction, the term of incarceration must be served in facilities provided or
funded by the Oregon Department of Corrections.  The department may rent jail
space from any county, as needed, to hold persons convicted of felonies.  The
department and the county shall negotiate the rent under this section in an
amount sufficient to reimburse the county for the actual costs of
incarceration.
"Section 4.  This Act applies to jail or
prison time served by felons on or after July 1, 2011."
The Attorney General certified the
following ballot title for Initiative Petition 55 (2010):
"Requires all felony incarceration time
to be served in state facility or state-funded facility
"Result of 'Yes' Vote:  'Yes' vote
requires all felony incarceration time be served in state facility or facility
funded by state; state must reimburse counties for pre-sentencing felony
incarceration.
"Result of 'No' Vote:  'No' vote
retains current law:  county custody for felons pre-sentencing and for
incarceration of less than one year; longer incarcerations served in
state-funded facilities.
"Summary:  Under current law, people
who are incarcerated while awaiting sentencing on criminal convictions remain
in county jail until sentencing is complete.  If a person is sentenced to more
than one year incarceration, he or she is generally transferred to a state
correctional facility; any incarceration of one year or less is generally
served in a county jail whether the result of a felony or a misdemeanor
conviction.  Measure requires state to reimburse counties for costs associated
with incarcerating people convicted of felonies but not yet sentenced. 
Requires post-sentencing incarcerations for felony convictions be served in
facilities funded by Oregon Department of Corrections (DOC).  Permits DOC to
rent jail space for counties, as needed.  Measure does not provide revenue
source for additional expenditures.  Other provisions."
Petitioner is an elector who timely
submitted written comments to the Secretary of State concerning the content of
the draft ballot title.  Petitioner challenges both the caption and the
"yes" vote result statement.  He contends that the primary subject
matter of the measure and the major effect of the measure if it is approved is
the state's increased responsibility for the costs of felony incarceration.  That
new funding obligation, petitioner argues, must be identified clearly and
directly, both in the caption and in the "yes" vote result statement. 
Further, petitioner contends that to explain that obligation adequately, the caption
and "yes" vote result statement must indicate that measure approval
would reduce state funds available for other services.
The Attorney General responds that
the subject matter of the proposed measure is "felony
incarceration."  As to the funding requirement, the Attorney General
argues that "[a]ny resulting effect on the state budget is not, strictly
speaking, part of the subject matter."  In the Attorney General's view,
the caption is correct and the "yes" vote result statement is
adequate.
The caption must "reasonably identif[y]
the subject matter of the state measure."  ORS 250.035(2)(a).  The
"yes" vote result statement must "describe[] the result if the
state measure is approved."  ORS 250.035(2)(b).  For the reasons that follow,
we agree with petitioner's primary contention that the caption and the "yes"
vote result statement must state more directly the subject of the measure and
the result if the measure is approved, viz., an increase in the state's
fiscal responsibility for felony incarceration.  However, we disagree with
petitioner's additional contention that the Attorney General must state the
effect of that obligation on other state services.  
We have not been able to determine,
either from information provided by the parties or from our own independent
review of the statutes, the precise manner in which the state and Oregon's 36
counties presently share costs associated with incarcerating accused and
convicted felons.  However, we can state with clarity how those costs would be
dealt with under the proposed measure.
The proposed measure changes current
law.  It consists of four short sections.  Section 1 states the purpose of the
measure.  It recites that, "[i]n recent years, the state has forced
counties to incarcerate many convicted felons, imposing significant costs on
the counties."  (Emphasis added.)  The stated purpose of the measure
is to "correct this abuse."  Sections 2 and 3, the operative
provisions of the measure, are consistent with that stated purpose.  Those
sections impose on the state fiscal responsibility for the pre- and post-sentence
costs of incarcerating persons convicted of felonies.  Those sections mandate
that the state bear the cost of felony incarceration, regardless where the inmate
actually is housed.
Thus, the focus of the proposed
measure is not on where those who are convicted of felonies must serve their
time, but rather on the transfer of fiscal responsibility from counties to the
state and the imposition on the state of responsibility for the costs of felony
incarceration.  The Attorney General of course is correct that the general
subject matter of the measure is "felony incarceration" and that the
proposed measure accomplishes the shift in fiscal responsibility by referring
to the place where convicted felons must serve their sentences.  However, the "subject
matter" of the proposed measure lies between that general description of
its nature and the means chosen to accomplish its purpose.  To state correctly the
subject matter of the measure, the caption must point citizens not to the place
of felony incarceration, but to its cost, and, more particularly, to the entity
that must accept the fiscal responsibility for that cost if the measure is
approved.  Moreover, the caption must advise citizens that the measure
increases, or adds to, the state's existing fiscal obligations.
The "yes" vote result
statement similarly misdirects the voters' attention to the place of
incarceration, rather than to the increase in the state's obligation to pay the
cost of incarceration.  The result of a "yes" vote is to require that
the state assume the cost of incarcerating persons convicted of felonies and
not merely share those costs with the counties.
The Attorney General argues that this
is not a case, like Novick v. Myers, 333 Or 12, 17, 35 P3d 1017 (2001),
in which the effect that the proposed measure would have on the state budget is
so clear that it should be included in the "yes" vote result
statement.  The Attorney General contends that this case is more like Caruthers v. Myers, 343 Or 162, 169, 166 P3d 514 (2007), in which this court
concluded that the "yes" vote result statement need not include an
express statement of the impact of the proposed measure on the state General Fund. 
We disagree.  In those cases, the issue was not whether a ballot title must
disclose the existence of a new or increased funding obligation, but whether a
ballot title must identify the effect of a measure on the state General Fund.  Those
cases do not affect our conclusion that petitioner's primary argument is well
taken.
On the other hand, the cases cited by
the Attorney General do address petitioner's secondary argument, viz., that
the caption or "yes" vote result statement must include the phrase
"reduces state funds available for other services" or otherwise
convey that concept.  In this case, the proposed measure and its effect on the
state General Fund are closer to the measure and effect at issue in Caruthers
than to the measure and effect at issue in Novick.  Unlike the measure
in Novick, this measure does not divert a specified percentage of the
state General Fund from one purpose to another without replacing the lost
funds.  Although it is obvious that the increased obligation that this measure
imposes will reduce the funds available to meet other state obligations, the
significance of that impact on the state General Fund is not so clear as to
oblige the Attorney General to explain it in the caption or "yes"
vote result statement.
The ballot title is referred to the
Attorney General for modification.