Case Title: Einstein v. PSRB

Citation: 

Docket Number: S45530

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  March 23, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

HERBERT R. EINSTEIN,
Respondent on Review,
v.
PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD,
Petitioner on Review.
(PSRB 961429; CA A96647; SC S45530)

En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 4, 1999.
Katherine H. Waldo, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With her on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General.
Harris S. Matarazzo, Portland, argued the cause and filed
the brief for respondent on review.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The order
of the Psychiatric Security Review Board is affirmed.
Van Hoomissen, J., concurred and filed an opinion.
*On judicial review of an order of the Psychiatric Security
Review Board.  153 Or App 522, 958 P2d 843 (1998).
GILLETTE, J.
This is a proceeding for judicial review of an order of
the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB).  Applicant was
committed to the jurisdiction of PSRB for a period not to exceed
20 years after he was found guilty except for insanity of arson
in the first degree.  In the present proceeding, which was
brought several months after his commitment, applicant argued to
PSRB that he was entitled to be discharged from PSRB jurisdiction
because he no longer was affected by a mental disease or defect. 
PSRB concluded that applicant still suffered from the mental
disease or defect that led to his commitment; it therefore denied
his release.  Applicant sought judicial review in the Court of
Appeals, contending that the PSRB order was not supported by
substantial evidence.  The Court of Appeals reversed the order
and remanded the case for reconsideration, reasoning, inter alia,
that it was "equally * * * inferable" from the evidence in the
record that applicant no longer suffered from a mental disease. 
Einstein v. PSRB, 153 Or App 522, 525-26, 958 P2d 843 (1998).  We
allowed PSRB's petition for review and now reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
The arson that led to applicant's commitment to the
jurisdiction of PSRB occurred in September 1995.  Applicant was
fearful that there were persons in his residence who wished to
hurt him; he started a fire in the residence. 
Following his commitment to PSRB's jurisdiction,
applicant immediately was placed on "conditional release" status,
which meant that he was living in the community but was subject
to PSRB supervision.  See ORS 161.332 (defining "conditional
release").  Applicant brought the present proceeding in November
1996 and, in January 1997, just eight months after applicant was
found guilty except for insanity, a hearing was held to determine
whether he should be discharged.
ORS 161.336 governs the circumstances in which PSRB may
grant, modify, or terminate conditional release.  The statute
provides, in part:
"(1) If [PSRB] determines that the person presents
a substantial danger to others but can be adequately
controlled with supervision and treatment if
conditionally released and that necessary supervision
and treatment are available, [PSRB] may order the
person conditionally released, subject to those
supervisory orders of [PSRB] as are in the best
interests of justice, the protection of society and the
welfare of the person. * * *
"* * * * *
"(3) For purposes of this section, a person
affected by a mental disease or defect in a state of
remission is considered to have a mental disease or
defect requiring supervision when the disease may, with
reasonable medical probability, occasionally become
active and, when active, render the person a danger to
others.  The person may be continued on conditional
release by [PSRB] as provided in this section.
"* * * * *
"(7)(a) Any person conditionally released under
this section may apply to [PSRB] for discharge from or
modification of an order of conditional release on the
ground that the person is no longer affected by mental
disease or defect or, if still so affected, no longer
presents a substantial danger to others and no longer
requires supervision, medication, care or treatment. 
* * * The applicant, at the hearing pursuant to this
subsection, must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the applicant's fitness for discharge or
modification of the order of conditional release. 
Applications by the person for discharge or
modification of conditional release shall not be filed
more often than once every six months."
In this case, applicant seeks discharge under ORS
161.336(7)(a).  Thus, unlike the case in periodic review hearings
held under ORS 161.341(7)(b), (1) applicant bears the burden of
proof to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he
is entitled to discharge.
We take the following description of the PSRB hearing
from the opinion of the Court of Appeals:
"The hearing was held on January 13, 1997.  At the
hearing, Dr. Lee Squire, [applicant's] treating
psychologist and conditional release supervisor,
testified about [applicant's] current mental state. 
She stated that, in her opinion, [applicant] was not
suffering from a mental disease or defect at that time. 
She explained that she had seen [applicant] regularly
since his placement under the PSRB's jurisdiction and
had observed no evidence of mental disease or defect. 
In addition, she noted that [applicant] was not taking
any medication for a mental disease or defect.  The
state opposed discharge and relied on [applicant's]
past medical records1 in support of its opposition. 
Ultimately, the PSRB ruled that:
"'2. [Applicant] is affected by a mental disease
or defect as demonstrated by the underlying facts shown
by the evidence, including the information contained in
Exhibits 10, 9, 8, 7, and 3, as well as the judgment 
* * * in this case as noted in Exhibit 1.  Although
[applicant's] case manager, Lee Squire, Ph.D.,
testified at the hearing that, in her opinion,
[applicant] is not suffering from a mental disease or
defect, the Board was convinced by a preponderance of
the evidence based on the record and [applicant's]
psychiatric history that he does suffer from a mental
disease or defect.
"'3.  Although [applicant's] mental disease or
defect is now in a state of remission, it does require
supervision, because, with reasonable medical
probability, it occasionally will become active and
when active it will cause [applicant] to present a
substantial danger to others.'"
_____________________
     "1    The records consist of Exhibits 1 through
13.  One of the exhibits is a report dated February 6,
1996, diagnosing [applicant] as having a cannabis-induced psychotic disorder with delusions, cannabis
abuse by history, amphetamine abuse by history and
hallucinogen abuse by history.  It also diagnosed
[applicant] as having a 'personality disorder, with
antisocial features.'" 
Einstein, 153 Or App at 524-25.
On judicial review, the state relied on the exhibits
referred to by PSRB, all of which related to applicant's
condition before and at the time when he was found guilty except
for insanity, to support the PSRB order.  Relying on its own
precedent, (2) the Court of Appeals held that such documentation
could not serve as substantial evidence for PSRB's findings 
because it was "stale" and, therefore, was not relevant to
applicant's mental condition at the time of the PSRB hearing.  It
followed, the court reasoned, that "[t]he only evidence in the
record that purports to discuss [applicant's] current mental
state is the testimony of Dr. Squire[]."  Einstein, 153 Or App at
525.
The state had argued to the Court of Appeals that, even
under a reading of the record most favorable to applicant, the
best that could be said with respect to applicant's psychotic
disorder resulting from cannabis abuse was that it was in
remission, and a mental disease that is in remission still is a
mental disease.  The Court of Appeals rejected that argument:
"[T]he state submitted no evidence that, at the time of
the hearing, [applicant's] prior mental health disease
was in remission.  The only evidence submitted
established that a year earlier [applicant] had
suffered from a medical [sic] disease.  It is equally
as inferable from that evidence that [applicant] no
longer suffers from a mental disease as it is that the
disease continues but is in remission.  Once petitioner
offered evidence at the hearing that established that
he currently no longer suffers from the disease, the
state had the burden to overcome that evidence and to
show that petitioner still suffers from a mental
disease that is in remission.  See Martin v. PSRB, 312
Or 157, 166, 818 P2d 1264 (1991) (holding that, to
continue jurisdiction over [an applicant], it was
necessary to show that he had a mental disease or
defect, which was in remission at the time of the
hearing)."
Id. at 525-26 (emphasis added).  Because, in its view, the
medical records were not sufficient to demonstrate that applicant
currently had a mental disease, the Court of Appeals held that
PSRB's finding that applicant's disease was in remission was not
supported by substantial evidence.  See ORS 183.482(8)(c)
(authorizing reviewing court to set aside or remand an agency
order if the order "is not supported by substantial evidence in
the record").  The court reversed and remanded PSRB's order for
reconsideration.  Id. at 526.  We allowed PSRB's petition for
review.
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the
appropriate factual inquiry was applicant's mental condition at
the time of the hearing.  The question therefore is whether there
is substantial evidence in the present record from which a
reasonable person could find, either directly or by permissible
inference, that applicant continues to suffer from a mental
disease or defect that is in remission.  Judicial review for
substantial evidence to support a finding of fact is a statutory
undertaking under ORS 183.482(8).  "Substantial evidence exists
to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole,
would permit a reasonable person to make that finding."  ORS
183.482(8)(c).  
In the present case, the record includes exhibits
establishing that, as recently as eight months before the
hearing, applicant had suffered from an episodic psychotic
disorder that was triggered by cannabis abuse.  The record also
contains evidence on which PSRB relied that applicant has a long
history of mental illness, punctuated by periods of
hospitalization, but that his mental illness goes through periods
of remission.  The nature of applicant's disease and its recent
flare-up that led to the underlying criminal charges could, in
our view, lead a reasonable person to find that the absence of
symptoms just eight months later was, at best, evidence that the
condition was in remission.  In other words, the evidence
supported the inference that PSRB drew, viz., that applicant's
underlying psychotic condition persists. (3)  It follows that there
was substantial evidence for the finding of fact that PSRB made
and that the Court of Appeals' contrary ruling was error.
This court's decision in Martin, 312 Or at 157, on
which both the Court of Appeals and applicant relied, is not to
the contrary.  In that case, this court held that PSRB had
misunderstood the specific evidence on which it had relied in
finding that a committed person suffered from a mental disease or
defect and that, when correctly understood, that evidence did not
justify the finding.  Id. at 165-68.  However, the court was
careful to note that there could be other evidence in the record
-- evidence that, by definition, had to relate to the person's
condition at times up to a year or more preceding the hearing --
that might provide substantial evidence to support the same
finding.  The court therefore remanded the case to PSRB for
reconsideration.  Id. at 168.  That is, the court in Martin
suggested that evidence older than the evidence in the present
case could be relied on by PSRB to make decisions respecting the
status of a committed person's current mental health. (4)
Under ORS 183.482(8)(c), the sole issue before the
Court of Appeals was whether a reasonable person, based on the
evidence before PSRB, permissibly could draw the inference that
applicant presently suffers from a mental disease or defect.  If
a reasonable person could do so -- and, here, applicant's long
history of episodic manifestations of his psychotic condition,
the last coming less than a year earlier, would permit such an
inference -- then the Court of Appeals' inquiry should have been
at an end.  The Court of Appeals appears to have been preoccupied
with the fact that only Squire's testimony purported to describe
applicant's condition "right now," but, as we have explained,
this is not a case in which evidence of applicant's history is so
remote that a reasonable person could not, as a matter of law,
give that evidence substantial weight. 
Applicant also relies on this court's opinion in Drew
v. PSRB, 322 Or 491, 909 P2d 1211 (1996), but that case does not
aid him.  It stands for the proposition that a board such as PSRB
may not supplement the record based on its members' expertise, 
id. at 498-99, but this is not a case in which PSRB did so.  PSRB
made its findings based on its assessment of the weight that it
could give to the evidence that was in the record.  As already
noted, that assessment was a legally permissible one.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
order of the Psychiatric Security Review Board is affirmed. 
VAN HOOMISSEN, J., concurring.
In this proceeding for judicial review of an order of
the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB), I agree with the
analysis and holding of the majority.  I write separately to
record a few impressions that I have formed after more than a
decade of reviewing PSRB orders.
First, it is not unusual for a petitioner on
conditional release to request a full discharge from PSRB's
jurisdiction within a relatively short time after his or her
original commitment to PSRB.  The record on review in such cases,
however, frequently contains only the sketchiest evidence of the
criminal conduct that resulted in the petitioner being found
guilty except for insanity.  I should think that, if someone were
found to be guilty except for insanity a relatively short time
before a PSRB hearing, then the likelihood that that person no
longer would be affected by mental disease or defect, or, if so
affected, no longer would present a substantial danger to others
at the time of the hearing would be, at best, doubtful.  For that
reason, I should think that the state would want to present, and
that PSRB would want to consider, the record of the petitioner's
trial and evidence of the petitioner's entire psychiatric and
criminal history.  
ORS 161.346(3) provides in part:
"The board shall consider all evidence available to it
which is material, relevant and reliable regarding the
issues before the board.  Such evidence may include but
is not limited to the record of trial, the information
supplied by the attorney representing the state or by
any other interested party, including the person, and
information concerning the person's mental condition
and the entire psychiatric and criminal history of the
person.  All evidence of a type commonly relied upon by
reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their
serious affairs shall be admissible at hearings. * * *"
That kind of evidence has been missing in several of the PSRB
cases recently reviewed by this court.
Second, ORS 161.336(3) provides:
"For purposes of this section, a person affected
by a mental disease or defect in a state of remission
is considered to have a mental disease or defect
requiring supervision when the disease may, with
reasonable medical probability, occasionally become
active and, when active, render the person a danger to
others. The person may be continued on conditional
release by the board as provided in this section."
The fact that a person affected by a mental disease or defect in
a state of remission presently is not evidencing conduct
rendering him or her a danger to others might be the consequence
of that person's current supervision, treatment, and medication. 
PSRB must be alert to the reality that a petitioner's discharge
from PSRB's jurisdiction might result in the abrupt cessation of
those ameliorating influences.
Third, it cannot be overemphasized that the burden of
proof at an ORS 161.336(7) discharge hearing is on the
petitioner.  ORS 161.336(7)(a) provides in part:
"Any person conditionally released under this
section may apply to the board for discharge from or
modification of an order of conditional release on the
ground that the person is no longer affected by mental
disease or defect or, if still so affected, no longer
presents a substantial danger to others and no longer
requires supervision, medication, care or treatment.  
* * * The applicant, at the hearing pursuant to this
subsection, must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the applicant's fitness for discharge or
modification of the order of conditional release."
In this case, the Court of Appeals held that, once petitioner
offered evidence that he no longer suffered from the disease, the
state had the burden to overcome that evidence and to show that
petitioner still suffered from a mental illness.  That is
incorrect.  The burden of proof does not shift to the state.  The
state is not required to introduce affirmative evidence of the
petitioner's unfitness for discharge or modification of the order
of conditional release.  PSRB is entitled to find that
petitioner's evidence is unpersuasive.  If PSRB was not persuaded
that petitioner in this case had sustained his burden of proof,
then it was entitled to deny his application for discharge on
that ground alone, and, in this case, that probably is what it
should have done.  
I note finally, that, as in all proceedings for
judicial review of administrative decisions, this court's task is
facilitated by a cogent explanation of the reasons for PSRB's
decision. (5) 

1. Persons who, unlike applicant, are found not to be
eligible for conditional release are committed to the custody of
the Mental Health and Developmental Disability Services Division
for custody, care, and treatment.  ORS 161.341(1).  Such persons
are entitled to a hearing at least every two years to determine
whether the person continues to be one who should be
conditionally released or discharged.  ORS 161.341(7)(b). 
Persons who, like applicant, are granted conditional release are
entitled to a hearing every five years to determine if they
should be discharged from PSRB's jurisdiction.  ORS 161.352(3). 
In both kinds of proceedings, which are called "periodic review"
hearings, the state bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the committed person still
requires commitment or continued supervision on conditional
release. 

2. The precedent was Garcia v. PSRB, 117 Or App 172, 173,
843 P2d 465 (1992), in which the Court of Appeals held that
medical reports that had been prepared nine months to a year
before a PSRB hearing "did not purport to discuss petitioner's
mental condition at the time of the hearing."  This court was not
asked to review the Garcia decision.

3. If the condition persists, there is no separate issue
as to whether applicant would be a danger to others.

4. Applicant's arguments are based in large part on
Squire's testimony, but PSRB was not required to accept that
testimony without considering the rest of the record.  See
Martin, 312 Or at 167 ("PSRB does not count the witnesses; it
weighs the evidence").  And, in light of the other evidence in
the record, PSRB permissibly could have rejected Squire's
testimony.

5. ORS 183.470(2) provides:
"A final order shall be accompanied by findings of
fact and conclusions of law.  The findings of fact
shall consist of a concise statement of the underlying
facts supporting the findings as to each contested
issue of fact and as to each ultimate fact required to
support the agency's order."