Case Title: Baker v. Fisher

Citation: 296 N.E.2d 882

Docket Number: 673S115

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
296 N.E.2d 882 (1973)
George P. BAKER et al., Appellants, Chicago, South Shore & South Bend Railroad Company, Defendant below,
v.
Herman FISHER, Appellee. George P. Baker et al., Appellants,
v.
Herman Fisher and Transport Motor Express, Inc., Appellees.
No. 673S115.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 12, 1973.
Harold Abrahamson, Kenneth D. Reed, Hammond, for appellants.
Vitold Reey, Gary, Herbert Fehner, Michigan City, for defendants.
Richard A. Mayer, Spangler, Jennings, Spangler & Dougherty, Gary, for appellees.
Paul Huebner, Hammond, for Herman Fisher.
HUNTER, Justice.
We have before us a Petition to Transfer which fails to meet the requirements for a petition to transfer established in A.P. 11(B). The grounds for transfer *883 are contained in A.P. 11(B)(2) which reads as follows:
This Court can still consider a Petition to Transfer which does not fall within the categories established in A.P. 11(B)(2). Troue v. Marker (1969), 253 Ind. 284, 252 N.E.2d 800. However, consideration of such a petition should be a rare occurrence, and should be done only where a special need has been demonstrated. The grounds for transfer are relatively inclusive and permit consideration of most any important question which might arise. Parties seeking transfer should make a concerted effort to frame their arguments in terms of these established categories. If a party finds it impossible to urge its point within these categories, he should so state, explaining why it is impossible to do so and why the Supreme Court should still consider his Petition to Transfer.
The petition in the case at bar is not addressed to any of the grounds contained in A.P. 11(B)(2). Petitioner must allege facts with ample particularity to bring his petition within one of the stipulated grounds for transfer. City of Hobart v. Baum (1957), 237 Ind. 316, 145 N.E.2d 573; Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Hoffman (1928), 200 Ind. 178, 162 N.E. 403; American Quarries Co. v. Lay (1906), 166 Ind. 234, 76 N.E. 517, In re Aurora Gaslight Coal & Coke Co. (1917), 186 Ind. 690, 115 N.E. 673. The petition before us merely states in general terms that the Court of Appeals erred in connection with that court's determination of the facts. Such a petition presents no issues to this Court and should therefore be dismissed.
Other difficulties have arisen in the construction of recent Petitions to Transfer. One such problem is the failure to meet the following language of A.P. 11(B)(1)(d):
Frequently "particularity" is sadly lacking with no reference being made to that portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion considered to be erroneous.
Another problem arises under A.P. 11(B)(2)(a), which is the ground for transfer that the Court of Appeals' opinion contravened a ruling precedent of the Supreme Court. The petitioner is required to indicate the ruling precedent contravened. Frequently a petitioner will merely cite a case without indicating any specific precedent contained in the cited case. Cases often stand for several propositions and the petition should state the exact proposition *884 of law relied upon. Additionally, petitioner should state in what way the decision of the Court of Appeals has contravened the ruling precedent.
The filing of a Petition to Transfer should not be considered simply a perfunctory procedure to follow after every adverse decision from the Court of Appeals. Transfer should only be sought because of a genuine belief that one of the grounds under A.P. 11(B)(2) has been met. As noted hereinbefore, none of the grounds for transfer was even mentioned in the Petition to Transfer before us, and we are of the opinion that said petition presents no reason for going beyond the scope of these grounds. The Petition to Transfer is therefore dismissed.
Petition to Transfer dismissed.
DeBRULER, GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.
ARTERBURN, C.J., not participating.