Case Title: Maine Senate v. Secretary of State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 52

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 52 
Docket: 
Ken-18-130 
Argued: 
April 12, 2018 
Decided: 
April 17, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
MAINE SENATE 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE et al. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
[¶1]  The Superior Court (Kennebec County, Murphy, J.) has reported 
seven questions to us pursuant to M.R. App. P. 24(a), addressing the Secretary 
of State’s planned implementation of ranked-choice voting in Maine’s primary 
elections scheduled for June 12, 2018.1  The first three questions are 
substantive, and the remaining questions address the justiciability of those first 
three questions.  This opinion focuses only on the June 2018 primary election; 
it does not address any other potential application of ranked-choice voting in 
Maine. 
                                               
 
1  The Committee for Ranked-Choice Voting, along with prospective congressional, legislative, and 
gubernatorial candidates Lucas St. Clair, Mark Eves, Diane Russell, Betsy Sweet, and Ben Chipman, 
intervened in the matter in the Superior Court.  See M.R. Civ. P. 24. 
 
2 
[¶2]  We accept the Report, answer Question 3 on its merits, conclude 
that the other questions raise nonjusticiable issues, and remand the matter to 
the Superior Court for entry of a final judgment.  In summary:  
(1) 
We assume, without deciding, that the Maine Senate, a single body of 
the bicameral Maine Legislature, has standing to seek a declaration 
regarding the legal status of ranked-choice voting in the June 2018 
primary elections and to challenge in court the operational planning 
of the Secretary of State, who is a constitutional officer; 
 
(2) 
We answer Reported Question 3 and determine that ranked-choice 
voting is the current statutory law of Maine for the primary elections 
to be held on June 12, 2018; 
 
(3) 
We determine that  Reported Questions 1 and 2, which ask the Court 
to act in contravention to the constitutional provision respecting the 
separation of powers of the three independent Branches of 
government, are not justiciable; and 
 
(4) 
We determine that the remaining questions are moot.  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶3]  The history of ranked-choice voting in Maine to date could provide 
the substance of an entire civics course on the creation of statutory law in the 
State of Maine.  We provide the highlights here. 
[¶4]  In 2016, the people of Maine enacted citizen-initiated legislation to 
implement ranked-choice voting for general and primary elections occurring 
on or after January 1, 2018, for the offices of United States Senator and 
Representative, State Senator and Representative, and Governor.2  L.D. 1557, 
§§ 1-6 (referred to the voters, 127th Legis. 2016) (effective Jan. 7, 2017) 
(codified at 21-A M.R.S. §§ 1(27-C), 1(35-A), 601(2)(J), 722(1), 723-A (2017)); 
see Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18.  The Ranked-Choice Voting Act3 created by the 
citizens’ initiative did not, however, amend 21-A M.R.S. § 723(1) (2017),4 which 
                                               
 
2  The Ranked-Choice Voting Act, which we refer to as the RCVA, defined an “[o]ffice elected by 
ranked-choice voting” as any office for “United States Senator, United States Representative to 
Congress, Governor, State Senator and State Representative, and . . . any nomination[] by primary 
election to such offices.”  L.D. 1557, § 1 (effective Jan. 7. 2017) (codified at 21-A M.R.S. § 1(27-C) 
(2017)).   
 
3  The Ranked-Choice Voting Act was officially titled, “An Act To Establish Ranked-choice Voting.”  
L.D. 1557. 
 
4  At the time the RCVA was enacted by citizen vote, 21-A M.R.S. § 723 (2015) was in effect.  On 
June 22, 2017, the Legislature amended section 723.  P.L. 2017, ch. 248, §§ 1-9 (effective Nov. 1, 2017) 
(codified at 21-A M.R.S. §§ 144, 145, 311(1), 723(1)(A), (2), 753-B(5) (2017)); 30-A M.R.S. 
§§ 757(2)(A), 2528(4)(C) (2017)).  These amendments, enacted prior to the major revision made by 
“An Act To Implement Ranked-choice Voting in 2021,” P.L. 2017, ch. 316, §§ 1-14 (effective Feb. 5, 
2018), made no substantive changes to the voting method, but modified section 723 and several 
other provisions as to voter enrollment requirements.  P.L. 2017, ch. 248, §§ 1-9.  These intervening 
amendments do not affect the current dispute.  We therefore cite to the 2017 version of section 723. 
 
4 
states that “[i]n a primary election, the person who receives a plurality of the 
votes cast for nomination to any office, as long as there is at least one vote cast 
for that office, is nominated for that office.”  Thus, section 723(1) continued to 
provide that the winner of a primary election would be determined by a 
plurality of the votes, even while section 1(27-C) named primary elections as 
among those elections to be conducted using ranked-choice voting. 
[¶5]  On May 23, 2017, at the request of the Maine Senate pursuant to 
Me. Const. art. VI, § 3, we, as individual Justices of the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court, issued a unanimous Advisory Opinion stating that specific aspects of the 
RCVA conflict with three portions of the Maine Constitution—Me. Const. art. IV, 
pt. 1, § 5; Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 4; and Me. Const. art. V, pt. 1, § 3.  Opinion of 
the Justices, 2017 ME 100, ¶¶ 1, 7, 9, 57, 64-68, 72, 162 A.3d 188.  Those sections 
address the election of the Governor and members of the Maine Legislature, 
both Senators and Representatives.5  Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 5; Me. Const. 
art. IV, pt. 2, § 4; Me. Const. art. V, pt. 1, § 3.  
                                               
 
5  In the Senate’s request for an Advisory Opinion regarding the constitutionality of the 
ranked-choice voting statute, we were not asked to address primary elections, which are governed 
entirely by statute and find no source in the Maine Constitution itself.  See Opinion of the Justices, 
2017 ME 100, ¶ 3, 162 A.3d 188; see also 21-A M.R.S. §§ 331-40 (2017); In re Primary Election Ballot 
Disputes 2004, 2004 ME 99, ¶ 3, 857 A.2d 494. 
 
Although the Advisory Opinion did not generate binding precedent, we unanimously opined 
that the method of ranked-choice voting is inconsistent with election by a “plurality” as that word is 
used in the Maine Constitution.  Opinion of the Justices, 2017 ME 100, ¶¶ 9, 64-69, 162 A.3d 188. 
 
5 
 
[¶6]  In the months that followed, a number of legislative efforts were 
commenced regarding ranked-choice voting.  See L.D. 1256 (128th Legis. 
2017); L.D. 1624 (128th Legis. 2017); L.D. 1625 (128th Legis. 2017).  
Ultimately, the Legislature enacted “An Act To Implement Ranked-choice 
Voting in 2021,” which we refer to as the Implementation Act.  P.L. 2017, 
ch. 316, §§ 1-14 (effective Feb. 5, 2018); see Comm. Amend. B to L.D. 1646, 
No. H-568 (128th Legis. 2017).  The Implementation Act, P.L. 2017, ch. 316, 
§§ 1-14, had two essential components:  
• It delayed all aspects of the implementation of ranked-choice voting until 
December 1, 2021, and 
 
• It provided for an automatic repeal of all ranked-choice voting provisions 
on December 1, 2021, if, by that date, the Maine Constitution had not been 
amended to allow ranked-choice voting for the offices of Maine Senator, 
Maine Representative, and Governor.  
 
 
[¶7]  Three days before the effective date of the Implementation Act, a 
people’s veto of portions of the Implementation Act was initiated by the 
submission of signatures later certified by the Secretary of State.  See Me. Const. 
art. IV, pt. 3, §§ 17, 20; 21-A M.R.S. §§ 901-906 (2017).  Pursuant to Me. Const. 
art. IV, pt. 3, § 17(3), the Secretary of State announced that the statewide vote 
on whether to veto the challenged portions of the Implementation Act would 
 
6 
take place on June 12, 2018, the same day as the primary elections for the 
United States House and Senate, Governor, and State House and Senate. 
[¶8]  As a result of the initiation of the people’s veto, certified by the 
Secretary of State, the effect of those challenged portions of the Implementation 
Act was “suspended” as of February 2, 2018, pending the vote on June 12, 2018.  
Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 17(2).  Critical to the matter before us, the delay of the 
implementation of ranked-choice voting until 2021 was suspended.  As a result, 
the RCVA, along with certain portions of the Implementation Act, became 
immediately effective, thus effectuating ranked-choice voting for the June 2018 
primary elections.  See Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 17(2). 
[¶9]  With the challenged portions of the Implementation Act suspended, 
the provisions of law that are pertinent to the primary elections are: 
• The preexisting and unamended portions of the elections statutes,  
• The provisions put in place by the citizens’ enactment of the RCVA in 
2016, and  
 
• Those portions of the Implementation Act that are not suspended by the 
people’s veto.6 
                                               
 
6  The Implementation Act repealed the definition of “[o]ffices elected by ranked-choice voting” 
and replaced it with a new version of 21-A M.R.S. § 1(27-C) defining “[e]lections determined by 
ranked-choice voting” as follows: 
 
27-C. Elections determined by ranked-choice voting. “Elections determined 
by ranked-choice voting” means: 
 
 
7 
[¶10]  On February 16, 2018, the Committee for Ranked-Choice Voting 
and congressional and gubernatorial candidates Lucas St. Clair, Jim Boyle,7 
Mark Dion, Mark Eves, Sean Faircloth, Diane Russell, Betsy Sweet, and Ben 
Chipman (collectively, the Committee) filed a complaint in the Superior Court 
against the Secretary of State seeking a declaratory judgment that the Secretary 
of State is required to implement ranked-choice voting in the primary elections.  
Comm. for Ranked-Choice Voting v. Sec’y of State, AUGSC-CV-2018-24, at 9 n.4 
(Me. Super. Ct., Kennebec Cty., Apr. 3, 2018).  We understand that the Secretary 
of State initially announced that his office would implement ranked-choice 
voting for the primary elections, with the initial result that the suit was not 
aggressively pursued.   
[¶11]  On March 29, 2018, the Secretary of State indicated that there was 
a conflict between 21-A M.R.S § 1(27-C)—directing the use of ranked-choice 
                                               
 
A. Primary elections for the offices of United States Senator, United States 
Representative to Congress, Governor, State Senator and State Representative; 
[and] 
 
B. General and special elections for the offices of United States Senator and 
United States Representative to Congress. 
 
P.L. 2017, ch. 316, § 1.  Because it is not challenged by the people’s veto, the version of section 1(27-C) 
currently in place is that adopted by the Implementation Act.  Both versions of section 1(27-C) (that 
enacted by the RCVA and that enacted by the Implementation Act) provide for ranked-choice voting 
in the primary elections, however.   
 
7  Jim Boyle and Sean Faircloth have since withdrawn from the gubernatorial race. 
 
8 
voting in primary elections—and 21-A M.R.S § 723—providing for plurality 
winners in primary elections.  Immediately after the Secretary of State raised 
this issue, the Committee pressed its suit, requesting a temporary restraining 
order “requiring the Secretary of State to continue the implementation of 
ranked-choice voting for the June 12, 2018 primary election.”8  Comm. for 
Ranked-Choice Voting, AUGSC-CV-2018-24, at 9.  The Senate did not move to 
intervene in the litigation commenced by the Committee. 
[¶12]  The court (Murphy, J.), recognizing the urgency of the matter, 
conducted a hearing on the afternoon of March 29, 2018, and entered a 
thorough order dated April 3, 2018, to which the parties agreed, addressing and 
resolving the statutory conflict and requiring the Secretary of State to “continue 
implementation of the system of ranked-choice voting for the June 12, 2018 
primary election in accordance with 21-A M.R.S. § 1(27-C) and 21-A M.R.S. 
§ 723-A.”9  Comm. for Ranked-Choice Voting, AUGSC-CV-2018-24, at 13-14.  No 
                                               
 
8  Meanwhile, the Secretary of State posted draft rules detailing the procedures for the 
administration of elections using ranked-choice voting.  Department of the Secretary of State, 
Proposed Rules Governing the Administration of Elections Determined by Ranked-Choice Voting 
(Mar. 28, 2018), http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/upcoming/pdf/250rcv.pdf; see P.L. 2017, 
ch. 316, § 10 (effective Feb. 5, 2018) (to be codified at 21-A M.R.S. § 723-A(5-A)). 
 
9  In particular, the court concluded that the Committee had met its burden to establish a likelihood 
of success on the merits of its claim that the intent of the citizens in enacting the ranked-choice voting 
statute was to apply ranked-choice voting to the primary elections, notwithstanding other 
preexisting statutory language to the contrary.  Comm. for Ranked-Choice Voting v. Sec’y of State, 
AUGSC-CV-2018-24, at 11-13 (Me. Super. Ct., Kennebec Cty., Apr. 3, 2018); see Ingraham v. Univ. of 
Me. at Orono, 441 A.2d 691, 693 (Me. 1982) (setting out the criteria for obtaining injunctive relief). 
 
9 
appeal from that order has been taken, and the parties to that proceeding have 
indicated that no appeal will be pursued. 
[¶13]  On the same day that the Superior Court declared that 
ranked-choice voting would be applicable to the primary elections, the Maine 
Senate filed a five-count complaint against the Secretary of State seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief to halt the implementation of ranked-choice 
voting in the primary elections.  The parties agreed to a stipulated record, and, 
by order dated April 11, 2018, the Superior Court reported to us, pursuant to 
M.R. App. P. 24(a), the following questions. 
1.  Has the Senate proven, on the Stipulated Record appended 
hereto, that the Secretary of State’s commitment or 
expenditure of funds for the purpose of implementing 
ranked-choice voting in the June 12, 2018 primary election 
constitutes a violation of the Legislature’s appropriation 
authority or the Separation of Powers clause in the Maine 
Constitution, Article III, § 2, where the appropriation for the 
Secretary of State in the biennial budget law (P.L. 2017, c. 284) 
does not contain language explicitly referencing ranked-choice 
voting and the enactment of P.L. 2017, c. 316 was partially 
suspended by a People’s Veto Petition?  
 
2.  Has the Senate proven, on the Stipulated Record appended 
hereto, that the current statutory framework, including 
without limitation 21-A M.R.S. § 723-A, does not provide 
sufficient authority for the Secretary of State to arrange for the 
retrieval and transport of ballots cast by voters at the June 12, 
2018 primary election from municipalities to a central location 
in order to determine the winners of the election by 
ranked-choice voting? 
 
10 
 
3.  Has the Senate proven, on the Stipulated Record appended 
hereto, that the current statutory framework, including 
without limitation 21-A M.R.S §§ 1(27-C), 1(35-A), 339, 695, 
722(1), 723(1), some of which are suspended by the filing of 
the People’s Veto Petition pursuant to the Constitution of 
Maine, art. IV, pt. 3, § 17, prohibits determining the winners of 
the June 12, 2018 primary election by ranked-choice voting? 
 
4.   Has the Senate shown that it has standing to bring any and all of 
the legal claims set forth in its Complaint? 
 
5.  Has the Senate shown that any or all of the legal claims set forth 
in the Senate’s Complaint are justiciable under the political 
question doctrine? 
 
6.  Has the Senate shown that any or all of the legal claims set forth 
in its complaint are ripe for adjudication? 
 
7.  Has the Senate identified a cause of action for any of the legal 
claims set forth in its Complaint? 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
Reported Questions  
[¶14]  We begin by addressing the vehicle by which this matter reaches 
us—a Report pursuant to M.R. App. P. 24(a).10  Because there has been no trial 
                                               
 
10  Maine Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) provides, 
 
(a) Report by Agreement of Important or Doubtful Questions.  When the 
trial court is of the opinion that a question of law presented to it is of sufficient 
importance or doubt to justify a report to the Law Court for determination, it may so 
report when: 
 
(1) all parties appearing agree to the report;  
 
 
11 
court adjudication of facts or other matters ordinarily resolved by the trial 
court, we do not automatically accept such a report.  Conservatorship of Emma, 
2017 ME 1, ¶ 7, 153 A.3d 102.  “When the trial court reports questions for 
review, we independently determine whether acceptance of the report is 
consistent with our basic function as an appellate court or would improperly 
place us in the role of an advisory board” due to the lack of a final trial court 
judgment to review.  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  Although we emphasize 
that the acceptance of a reported question is the exception, not the rule, see id., 
in these unusual circumstances, we do accept the Report pursuant to 
Rule 24(a).   
B. 
Question 3 
[¶15]  We address Question 3 first.  The Senate asks whether the 
contradiction between the application of ranked-choice voting to the primary 
elections delineated in 21-A M.R.S. § 1(27-C) and the plurality provision for 
                                               
 
(2) there is agreement as to all facts material to the appeal; and 
 
(3) the decision thereon would, in at least one alternative, finally dispose of the 
action. 
 
12 
primary elections described in 21-A M.R.S. § 723(1) prevents the Secretary of 
State from implementing ranked-choice voting in the June 12, 2018, primary. 
 
[¶16]  The Senate’s argument on Question 3 addresses the very issue 
decided by the Superior Court in Committee for Ranked-Choice Voting v. 
Secretary of State, AUGSC-CV-2018-24 (Me. Super. Ct., Kennebec Cty., Apr. 3, 
2018).  Had the parties in this case been able to fully address the issue of the 
Senate’s decision not to seek intervention in Committee for Ranked-Choice 
Voting, it is possible that we would have determined that the Senate was 
precluded from advancing the same argument now.  See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 
553 U.S. 880, 893-95 (2008) (identifying six circumstances in which the 
assertion of collateral estoppel is permitted against a nonparty under the 
federal common law).  We have never addressed the issue of nonparty 
preclusion in these circumstances, however, and we do not take this occasion 
to opine on it now.  Accordingly, we address the merits of Question 3.   
[¶17]  For decades, Maine’s election laws have explicitly provided that 
the winner of a primary election is determined by a plurality of the votes.  See 
21-A M.R.S. §723(1); P.L. 1985, ch. 161, § 6 (effective Sept. 19, 1985).11  
                                               
 
11  Public Law 1985, ch. 161, repealed the prior title 21 M.R.S.A, generally governing election 
practices, and replaced title 21 with title 21-A, which has since governed election laws.  P.L. 1985, 
ch. 161, §§ 5-6 (effective Sept. 19, 1985). 
 
13 
Section 723(1) provides, in pertinent part, “[i]n a primary election, the person 
who receives a plurality of the votes cast for nomination . . . is nominated for 
that office.” 21-A M.R.S. § 723(1).  When the RCVA was enacted by the citizens’ 
initiative in 2016, it addressed the application of ranked-choice voting to the 
primary elections through the enactment of 21-A M.R.S. § 1(27-C), which 
declared that an office elected by ranked-choice voting “includes any 
nominations by primary election to such offices.”  L.D. 1557, § 1.  The RCVA, 
however, contained no reference to or amendment of section 723(1), thus 
creating a direct conflict in the applicable statutory provisions.   
[¶18]  When the RCVA was addressed by the Legislature in 2017, the 
reference in section 723(1) to plurality voting for primary elections was left in 
place until December 1, 2021.  P.L. 2017, ch. 316, § 6.  At the same time, the 
format of 21-A M.R.S. § 1(27-C) was amended so that, upon a later effective date, 
primary elections would proceed as follows:  
27-C. Elections determined by ranked-choice voting. 
“Elections determined by ranked-choice voting” means: 
 
A.  Primary elections for the offices of United States Senator, 
United States Representative to Congress, Governor, State 
Senator and State Representative.     
 
P.L. 2017, ch. 316, § 1.  
 
 
14 
[¶19]  As a result of the people’s veto, the changes to section 723(1) that  
deferred rank-choice voting in primary elections for several years were 
suspended, thus removing any temporal impediment to the original plurality 
language of section 723(1).  See Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 17(2).  Separately, the 
requirement of ranked-choice voting in the primary elections established by 
21-A M.R.S. § 1(27-C) became immediately effective and would apply to the 
June 2018 primary elections.  Because determining the winner of an election 
through plurality voting is inconsistent with determining the winner through a 
ranked-choice voting process, see Opinion of the Justices, 2017 ME 100, 
¶¶ 64-69, 162 A.3d 188,12 the two statutes are in conflict.  
[¶20]  The legal issue presented by the conflict presents an age-old 
question—which of two conflicting provisions applies?  See, e.g. Knight v. 
Aroostook River R.R. Co., 67 Me. 291, 293 (1877).13  When a more recent 
                                               
 
12  We acknowledge that an Opinion of the Justices is advisory only, and it does not provide binding 
precedent.  Me. Const. art. VI, § 3; Opinion of the Justices, 2017 ME 100, ¶ 9, 162 A.3d 188.  Through 
this opinion, we adopt the referenced reasoning in full without reciting the analysis verbatim.  
Opinion of the Justices, 2017 ME 100, ¶¶ 64-69, 162 A.3d 188 (advising that “the Ranked-Choice 
Voting Act is in direct contradiction to the plurality requirements of the Maine Constitution”). 
  
13  Quoting a Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Kelliher, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 480, 481 (1866), 
with approval, we said in Knight v. Aroostook River Railroad Co., 67 Me. 291, 293 (1877),  
 
[W]henever a statute is passed which embraces all the provisions of previous statutes 
on the same subject, the new statute operates as a repeal of all antecedent 
enactments. This well settled rule of interpretation is founded on the reasonable 
inference that the legislature cannot be supposed to have intended that there should 
be two distinct enactments embracing the same subject matter in force at the same 
 
15 
amendment to a Maine statute directly conflicts with an older provision, we 
must, as always, determine the intent of the Legislature, and the question 
becomes whether the older provision has been repealed “by implication.”  Blair 
v. State Tax Assessor, 485 A.2d 957, 959 (Me. 1984).  We apply this method of 
statutory construction  
when a later enactment encompasses the entire subject matter of 
an earlier act, or when a later statute is inconsistent with or 
repugnant to an earlier statute.  When a later statute does not cover 
the earlier act in its entirety, but is inconsistent with only some of 
its provisions, a repeal by implication occurs to the extent of the 
conflict.  
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
[¶21]  In the matter before us, there is both a direct conflict in the 
statutorily provided method of voting in Maine primary elections and a clarity 
of purpose regarding the most recent enactment.14  See Lewiston Firefighters 
Assoc. v. City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154, 159-160 (Me. 1976); see also Opinion of 
the Justices, 311 A.2d 103, 108 (Me. 1973). 
                                               
 
time, and that the new statute, being the most recent expression of the legislative will, 
must be deemed a substitute for previous enactments, and the only one which is to 
be regarded as having the force of law. 
 
14  Although we would not apply concepts of implicit repeal in doubtful cases, see Lewiston 
Firefighters Assoc. v. City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154, 159 (Me. 1976), there is no doubt about the direct 
conflict in this case.  
 
16 
[¶22]  The consistent and explicit purpose of the citizens’ initiative and 
the people’s veto has been to transition Maine elections to a system of 
ranked-choice voting.  The wisdom of ranked-choice voting is not before us.  
Our role is to determine and effectuate the intent of the legislation unless it 
conflicts with the Maine Constitution or the United States Constitution.  Neither 
Constitution is implicated by the questions presented here, but the statutory 
conflict is clear.  Despite the existing reference to plurality voting in the primary 
elections in section 723(1), both the RCVA as first enacted by the people in 2016 
and the amendments to ranked-choice primary voting enacted by the 
Legislature in the Implementation Act in 2017 and immediately effectuated 
through the people’s veto expressly provide for primary elections to be 
governed by ranked-choice voting.  L.D. 1557, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 316, § 1. 
[¶23]  It is evident that the ranked-choice primary provision of the RCVA, 
21-A M.R.S. § 1(27-C), enacted by the people through the initiative process and 
amended only in format by the Legislature in the Implementation Act, is 
“repugnant” in substance to the plurality provision in 21-A M.R.S. § 723(1).  
Lewiston Firefighters Assoc., 354 A.2d at 160.  Thus, as we have held, “the new 
statute, being the most recent expression of the legislative will, must be deemed 
 
17 
a substitute for previous enactments.” Knight, 67 Me. at 293 (quoted with 
approval in Lewiston Firefighters Assoc., 354 A.2d at 160). 
[¶24]  Accordingly, we conclude that the “plurality” provision of 
21-A M.R.S. § 723(1) has been implicitly repealed by the most recent provision 
of law addressing the ranked-choice voting method to be employed in the June 
primary elections, 21-A M.R.S. § 1(27-C).15  Pursuant to 21-A M.R.S § 1(27-C), 
ranked-choice voting must be applied to the primary elections on June 12, 
2018.    
C. 
Question 1 
[¶25]  Through Question 1, the Senate seeks a declaration that the 
Secretary of State lacks constitutional authority to commit and expend public 
monies for the implementation of ranked-choice voting in the absence of an 
explicitly targeted appropriation by the Legislature.  Assuming without 
deciding that the Senate has standing to assert such a claim, we conclude that 
Question 1 is not justiciable.   
[¶26]  We have long recognized a host of considerations according to 
which we will decline to exercise jurisdiction; we refer to this as the “universal 
rule” of justiciability.  Opinion of the Justices, 2017 ME 100, ¶ 15, 162 A.3d 188 
                                               
 
15  This determination is consistent with the decision of the Superior Court in Committee for 
Ranked-Choice Voting, AUGSC-CV-2018-24, at 11-13. 
 
18 
(quotation marks omitted).  Justiciability regards “the fitness of the issues for 
judicial decision.”  New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 448 A.2d 
272, 302 (Me. 1982) (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶27]  In the context of the matter at bar, the requirement of justiciability 
demands that our authority to decide a matter is limited by that most basic 
tenet 
of 
our 
governmental 
structure—the 
constitutionally-mandated 
separation of powers.  See Me. Const. art. III, § 2; Bouchard v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 
2015 ME 50, ¶ 10, 115 A.3d 92.  The Maine Constitution requires both that 
“[t]he powers of this government shall be divided into 3 distinct [Branches], the 
legislative, executive and judicial” and that “[n]o person or persons, belonging 
to one of these [Branches], shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging 
to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted.”  Me. Const. art. III, §§ 1-2; see Opinion of the Justices, 2017 ME 100, 
¶ 13, 162 A.3d 188.    
[¶28]  Like the federal courts, “our constitutional structure does not 
require that the Judicial Branch shrink from a confrontation with the other two 
coequal branches.”  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  Nevertheless, 
there are some matters in which we will exercise judicial restraint by refusing 
 
19 
to adjudicate matters where the adjudication “would involve an encroachment 
upon the executive or legislative powers.”  Wright v. Dep’t of Def. & Veterans 
Servs., 623 A.2d 1283, 1285 (Me. 1993) (quotation marks omitted); see Turner 
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (“[S]eparation of powers concerns counsel a 
policy of judicial restraint.”), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488.   
[¶29]  Regarding Question 1, the Senate argues that the general allocation 
of funding to the Secretary of State cannot be utilized by the Secretary of State 
absent an explicitly-descriptive allocation of appropriated funds to particular 
actions related to voting and elections.  The Senate has provided neither a 
constitutional basis for this argument nor a statutory foundation for its claim 
to restrict the authority of the Secretary of State.   
[¶30]  Without pointing to a live, current constitutional violation, the 
Senate asks the Court to involve itself in the Secretary of State’s expenditure of 
already-appropriated funds.  The separation of powers doctrine precludes us 
from entertaining this request by the Senate for the Court to assume any role in 
supervising the legislatively delegated tasks of the Secretary of State.  See 
generally, 21-A M.R.S. §§ 21, 601–609 (2017).  As the United States Supreme 
Court has announced, courts will not involve themselves in the “amorphous 
 
20 
general supervision of the operations of government.”  Raines, 521 U.S. at 829.  
Question 1 is not justiciable.   
D. 
Question 2 
[¶31]  Regarding Question 2, the Senate challenges the Secretary of 
State’s authority, in the absence of additional explicit legislative action, to 
arrange for the security, possession, and transportation of ballots in a ranked-
choice voting election.  As with Question 1, we are not persuaded by the 
suggestion that the logistics of implementing ranked-choice voting create a 
constitutional crisis sufficient for us to ignore the separation of powers 
problems inherent in these circumstances.  Question 2 regards the epitome of 
governmental action in which the courts lack authority to meddle pursuant to 
the separation of powers doctrine.  Question 2 is not justiciable.   
E.  
Questions 4 through 7 
[¶32]  The remaining questions have been resolved by our answers to 
Questions 1, 2, and 3 and are therefore moot.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
[¶33]  We have accepted the Report of Questions from the Superior Court 
pursuant to M.R. App. P. 24(a).  As to Question 3, we conclude that 
 
21 
ranked-choice voting is the law of Maine with regard to the primary elections 
on June 12, 2018, notwithstanding any contradiction by 21-A M.R.S. § 723(1).    
 
[¶34]  We have also determined that the courts of Maine will not 
adjudicate either of the remaining substantive questions presented by the 
Report—Questions 1 and 2.  These questions ask us to address the internal 
funding and administrative decisions of the Office of the Secretary of State and 
seek the Court’s intervention into the prospective logistical arrangements for 
securing, possessing, and transporting the ballots during the primary elections 
to be held on June 12, 2018.  We conclude that these questions, which reflect 
Counts 1 through 4 of the Senate’s complaint, cannot be adjudicated because 
they are quintessentially nonjusticiable. 
 
[¶35]  Finally, the need to answer Questions 4, 5, 6, and 7, which address 
justiciability, is obviated by our answers to Questions 1, 2, and 3.  The issues 
raised in those four questions are moot.  Thus, the matters raised by the 
Senate’s complaint, distilled to the seven questions presented here, are fully 
resolved by our answers. 
 
 
 
22 
The entry is: 
Report accepted.  Remanded to the Superior 
Court for entry of judgment on Count 5 
(Question 3) declaring that ranked-choice voting 
shall be employed in the June 12, 2018, primary 
election, and dismissing as nonjusticiable Counts 
1, 2, 3, and 4 (Questions 1 and 2). 
 
Mandate to issue forthwith. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Timothy C. Woodcock, Esq. (orally), Ryan P. Dumais, Esq., and Kady S. Huff, 
Esq., Eaton Peabody, Bangor, for the Maine State Senate 
 
Phyllis Gardiner, Esq. (orally), and Thomas A. Knowlton, Esq., Office of the 
Attorney General, Augusta, for the Secretary of State 
 
James G. Monteleone, Esq. (orally), and Michael R. Bosse, Esq., Bernstein Shur, 
Portland, for the Committee for Ranked-Choice Voting, Lucas St. Clair, Mark 
Eves, Diane Russell, Betsy Sweet, and Ben Chipman 
 
Timothy R. Shannon, Esq., Rachel M. Wertheimer, Esq., Jonathan Dunitz, Esq., 
Marie M. Mueller, Esq., and Samuel Baldwin, Esq., Verrill Dana, LLP, Portland, 
for amicus The League of Women Voters of Maine  
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CV-2018-51 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY