Case Title: Commonwealth v. Mattier

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11924, SJC-11960

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-11924 
SJC-11960 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BRANDEN E. MATTIER 
(and five companion cases1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 7, 2016. - May 13, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Larceny.  False Impersonation & Identity Fraud.  Fraud.  
Conspiracy.  Attempt.  Search and Seizure, Arrest.  
Evidence, Identity, Fraud, Conspiracy.  Jury and Jurors.  
Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Jury and jurors, 
Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 29, 2013. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Kenneth 
W. Salinger, J., and the cases were tried before Jeffrey A. 
Locke, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted applications for direct 
appellate review. 
 
 
 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for Branden E. Mattier. 
                     
 
1 Two against Branden E. Mattier and three against Domunique 
D. Grice. 
2 
 
 
William S. Smith for Domunique D. Grice. 
 
Randall E. Ravitz, Assistant Attorney General (Gina M. 
Masotta, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  The defendants, Branden E. Mattier and his half-
brother Domunique D. Grice, were convicted by a jury on 
indictments charging one count each of conspiracy to commit 
larceny, G. L. c. 274, § 7, and attempted larceny, G. L. c. 274, 
§ 6.  Mattier also was convicted on an indictment charging one 
count of identity fraud, G. L. c. 266, § 37E.  The charges 
stemmed from an attempt by the defendants to defraud The One 
Fund Boston (One Fund) of approximately $2 million by claiming 
that a long-deceased aunt had been injured in the 2013 bombing 
at the finish line of the Boston Marathon.2  The judge imposed on 
each defendant a State prison sentence of from three years to 
three years and one day on the conspiracy count and three years' 
probation on the attempted larceny count, to run from and after 
the committed sentence.  Mattier was sentenced to an additional 
concurrent probationary term for his conviction of identity 
                     
 
2 The One Fund Boston (One Fund) was established as a 
charitable organization to collect and distribute funds to 
assist the victims of the April, 2013, Boston Marathon bombing. 
 
3 
 
fraud.  The defendants appealed, and we granted their 
applications for direct appellate review.3 
 
Although the appeals were not formally consolidated, we 
have treated them as such, given the substantial congruence of 
the issues raised by the defendants.4  Mattier contends that his 
conviction of identity fraud fails as a matter of law because 
the charged conduct is insufficient to meet the elements of the 
statute.  Both defendants claim that the judge erred in (1) 
denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of 
Mattier's warrantless arrest for the identity fraud and 
attempted larceny charges; (2) denying the motions for required 
findings of not guilty on all charges; and (3) denying the 
motion to strike for cause jurors who donated to One Fund.  
Grice also challenges statements made by the prosecutor in 
closing argument. 
 
We agree, for the reasons explained below, that Mattier's 
identity fraud conviction fails as a matter of law.  Our ruling 
on the validity of the identity fraud conviction, however, does 
not compel the reversal of the conspiracy and attempted larceny 
                     
 
3 Both defendants requested a stay of execution of their 
sentences, which were denied.  Mattier filed a motion to stay, 
and the single justice denied relief.  He appealed to the full 
bench of the Supreme Judicial Court, and we affirmed in 
Commonwealth v. Mattier, 474 Mass. 227 (2016). 
 
 
4 The Commonwealth filed a single brief to address both 
appeals. 
4 
 
convictions, because they are based on sufficient legally 
obtained evidence.  The claimed errors regarding the seating of 
jurors and the prosecutor's closing argument similarly are 
unavailing. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving certain details for our discussion of the specific 
issues raised.  After two bombs exploded near the finish line of 
the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013, One Fund was established.  
See note 1, supra.  In early May, 2013, the administrator of One 
Fund held two community meetings to discuss distribution.  
Mattier and Grice attended one of the meetings, and Mattier 
registered on One Fund's Web site the following day.  On May 15, 
2013, One Fund disseminated the claims protocol to those persons 
registered on One Fund's Web site.  The levels of payment were 
based on severity of injury, with the largest amount going to 
those victims who suffered double amputation.  The protocol 
required that a claimant submit a "hospital statement" 
confirming the dates of hospital treatment and the nature of the 
injury.  All claims were due by June 15, 2013. 
 
One Fund received a claim form from Mattier on June 12, 
2013, stating that Mattier's aunt had been injured in the 
bombing and had required double amputation as a result of her 
injuries.  Mattier requested that the claim disbursement check 
be made payable to him at his Boston address.  On June 7, he 
5 
 
signed the claim form as representative for his aunt, and his 
signature was notarized.  Attached to the claim form was a 
signed letter purporting to be from Dr. Peter A. Burke, chief of 
trauma services at Boston Medical Center.  The letter, dated May 
2, 2013, stated that both of the aunt's legs had been amputated 
as a result of injuries from the marathon bombings.5 
 
One Fund administrators suspected that Mattier's claim form 
might be fraudulent and conducted an internal investigation.  
After learning that the aunt died in 2000, they rejected the 
claim.  One Fund administrators alerted the Attorney General's 
office of the false claim. 
 
As part of the Attorney General's investigation into the 
matter, the police created a "sting" operation using an 
overnight courier to deliver a letter to Mattier's residence on 
July 1, 2013, which stated that the claim had been approved and 
a check would be arriving July 2, 2013.  On July 1, police 
officers observed Mattier sign for and accept the letter outside 
his residence while holding his cellular telephone.  
Subsequently, the police officers obtained a search warrant for 
Mattier's residence and for Mattier himself at that location. 
                     
 
5 On May 29, 2013, Mattier sent One Fund an electronic mail 
message in which he explained that his aunt had had one leg 
amputated and may need to have the other leg amputated. 
6 
 
 
On July 2, 2013, police conducted a controlled delivery of 
a fake check to Mattier.  State police Trooper John Banik drove 
to Mattier's residence dressed as a Federal Express delivery 
driver in a white van bearing a Federal Express logo.  Mattier 
was standing just outside his apartment building when Trooper 
Banik arrived.  The two walked toward each other and met on the 
sidewalk in front of Mattier's apartment building.  Trooper 
Banik asked Mattier to produce his driver's license and, after 
explaining that he was delivering a claim check, asked whether 
Mattier was injured in the bombings.  Mattier responded that his 
aunt had been injured.  The trooper copied Mattier's driver's 
license number onto his paperwork and handed Mattier the 
envelope.  Other police officers in the area then surrounded 
Mattier and arrested him for identity fraud and attempted 
larceny. 
 
During booking, Mattier's cellular telephone was placed 
into his property inventory.  After being given the Miranda 
warnings, Mattier waived his rights and spoke with Trooper 
Banik.  He admitted to submitting the claim on behalf of his 
long-deceased aunt and explained how he created the doctor's 
letter using forms obtained from the Internet.  Trooper Banik 
obtained Mattier's cellular telephone from inventory, placed it 
in his office, and obtained a search warrant authorizing the 
search of the telephone. 
7 
 
 
The search produced hundreds of cellular telephone text 
messages between Mattier and Grice.  The brothers corresponded 
about One Fund on the day of the community meeting they had 
attended, expressed their joy at receiving news that their claim 
had been approved, and ruminated about the type of Mercedes Benz 
vehicle that each would buy using the funds awarded on their 
claim.  In one of the text messages, sent before Mattier created 
the forged letter regarding their dead aunt's claimed injuries, 
Grice wrote to Mattier:  "Subject: Auntie, Nevie Shelton ss# 
Hospitalized from 4-15-13 til 5-3-13 18 days. Yes to double 
amputation and permanent brain damage." 
 
Discussion.  1.  Identity fraud.6  General Laws c. 266, 
§ 37E (b), criminalizing identity fraud, provides: 
 
"Whoever, with intent to defraud, poses as another 
person without the express authorization of that person and 
uses such person's personal identifying information to 
obtain or to attempt to obtain money, credit, goods, 
services, anything of value, any identification card or 
other evidence of such person's identity, or to harass 
another shall be guilty of identity fraud and shall be 
punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment 
in a house of correction for not more than two and one-half 
years, or by both such fine and imprisonment." 
 
                     
 
6 Although Grice was acquitted of this charge, he joins in 
the argument that the identity fraud conviction fails as a 
matter of law.  The applicability of the statute to Mattier's 
conduct underlies Grice's argument that evidence presented 
against him at trial was obtained pursuant to the warrantless 
arrest of Mattier, which was based on charges of identity fraud 
and attempted larceny. 
8 
 
The essential elements of the crime are that a defendant "(1) 
posed as another person; (2) did so without that person's 
express authorization; (3) used the other person's identifying 
information[7] to obtain, or attempt to obtain, something of 
value; and (4) did so with the intent to defraud."  Commonwealth 
v. Giavazzi, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 374, 376 (2004).  The essence of 
the Commonwealth's case was that Mattier downloaded a template 
of a letter from the Boston Medical Center onto his computer, 
composed a letter on the template, copied Dr. Burke's signature 
onto that letter, and then submitted the letter to One Fund 
together with his claim form. 
 
The defendants challenge this conviction on the ground that 
the particular conduct at issue here was insufficient to 
establish the first and third elements of the crime.  They argue 
that Mattier did not "pose" as Dr. Burke within the meaning of 
the statute and that even if he did, he did not obtain or 
attempt to obtain money from One Fund while posing as Dr. Burke.  
                     
 
7 General Laws c. 266, § 37E (a), defines "[p]ersonal 
identifying information" as: 
 
"any name or number that may be used, alone or in 
conjunction with any other information, to assume the 
identity of an individual, including any name, address, 
telephone number, driver's license number, social security 
number, place of employment, employee identification 
number, mother's maiden name, demand deposit account 
number, savings account number, credit card number or 
computer password identification." 
9 
 
In rebuttal, the Commonwealth argues that the evidence, taken in 
the light most favorable to it, Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 
Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), was sufficient to prove that Mattier 
"pose[d]" as Dr. Burke because the language of the letter 
implicitly asserted that he, as drafter, was Dr. Burke and that 
the statute does not require proof that the posing occurred at 
the same time as the attempt to obtain funds.  The trial judge, 
in denying the defendants' motions for a required finding of not 
guilty on the identity fraud charges, focused on the "pos[ing]" 
element and accepted that Mattier did not "directly" pose as Dr. 
Burke.  He noted that the "statute is stretched in this case" 
because the defendants "did not represent themselves to be Dr. 
Burke at all.  They used Dr. Burke's identity to validate their 
intended fraud."  He then concluded that the jury should decide 
whether Mattier "indirectly posed as [Dr. Burke] by inserting 
that dummied up letter." 
 
The issue before us is whether, on the facts of this case,8 
Mattier's conduct is encompassed within the reach of the 
                     
 
8 This case differs factually from the typical identity 
fraud scenario.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Catalano, 74 Mass. 
App. Ct. 580, 581 (2009) (unauthorized use of another's name to 
open gas and electric accounts violated identity fraud statute).  
In Commonwealth v. Clark, 446 Mass. 620, 625 (2006), we reviewed 
the legislative purpose in enacting the identity fraud statute 
and explained: 
 
 
10 
 
statute.  When the meaning of a statute is at issue, "[w]e begin 
with the canon of statutory construction that the primary source 
of insight into the intent of the Legislature is the language of 
the statute."  International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 
841, 853 (1983).  Where "the statutory language '[could] 
plausibly be found to be ambiguous,' the rule of lenity requires 
the defendant[s] be given 'the benefit of the ambiguity.'"  
Commonwealth v. Constantino, 443 Mass. 521, 525 (2005), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Carrion, 413 Mass. 44, 45-46 (2000). 
 
We agree with the defendant's argument that he did not 
"pose" as another person in the manner contemplated by the 
statute.  General Laws c. 266, § 37E (a), defines "[p]ose" to 
mean "falsely represent[ing] oneself, directly or indirectly, as 
another person or persons."  Where G. L. c. 266, § 37E, does not 
define the phrase "falsely represent," we interpret the term in 
accordance with "approved usage of the language" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Hinds, 437 Mass. 54, 63 (2002), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1205 (2003).  In that regard, other cases 
                                                                  
 
"The primary, but not sole, focus of [G. L. c. 266,] 
§ 37E is (a) to criminalize the unauthorized use of someone 
else's personal identifying information to obtain 
fraudulently anything of value while posing as such other 
person, and (b) to criminalize the possession of such 
personal identifying information without authorization and 
with intent to pose as such other person to obtain 
fraudulently anything of value.  It also criminalizes the 
misappropriation of such information to harass another." 
11 
 
interpreting allegations of false representations require the 
existence of another party on the receiving end of the 
representation.  See Commonwealth v. McCauliff, 461 Mass. 635, 
638-639 (2012) (larceny by false pretenses); McEvoy Travel Bur., 
Inc. v. Norton Co., 408 Mass. 704, 712 (1990) (fraud); Schleifer 
v. Worcester N. Sav. Inst., 306 Mass. 226, 228 (1940) (deceit).  
Accordingly, we interpret the phrase "falsely represent" in 
G. L. c. 266, § 37E, to require the Commonwealth to prove that a 
defendant "pose[d]" as Dr. Burke in his dealings with a third 
party, One Fund. 
 
Here, the operative act for the purposes of the identity 
fraud charge was the submission of a forged letter, purportedly 
written by Dr. Burke, to One Fund.  Although Mattier 
misrepresented the authenticity of the letter to One Fund in 
claiming that the letter was from Dr. Burke, nothing in the 
evidence establishes that he ever falsely represented himself to 
be Dr. Burke.9  Mattier submitted the claim form to One Fund 
under his own name; he did not falsely represent to One Fund 
                     
 
9 The language of the statute that allows an "indirect" 
misrepresentation does not alter our conclusion.  G. L. c. 266, 
§ 37E (a).  A false representation may be made directly, e.g., 
face to face contact; or it may be made indirectly, e.g., 
through an electronic program where a person enters the credit 
card number of another attempting to act as the owner of that 
card.  A false representation that solely relates to the 
authenticity of a document instead of one's identity, however, 
is insufficient to support a conviction of identity fraud. 
12 
 
that he was Dr. Burke at the time that he submitted the letter.10  
Thus, Mattier's deception does not fall within the scope of the 
identity fraud statute; his criminal deception was properly 
charged as attempted larceny.11,12 
 
2.  Motion to suppress.  The defendants next argue that the 
judge erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained as a result of Mattier's warrantless arrest for 
                     
 
10 A forged letter could provide the basis for an identity 
fraud conviction under different circumstances.  If Mattier had 
presented himself to a third party as Dr. Peter Burke when 
signing the letter or assumed another's identity in order to 
obtain the Boston Medical Center letterhead, then his conduct 
could have satisfied the requirement that he assume another's 
identity.  Those situations did not occur here. 
 
 
11 Moreover, even assuming that G. L. c. 266, § 37E, 
applied, Mattier's conviction cannot stand where the jury were 
required to speculate on the meaning of an essential element of 
identity fraud.  "Statutory interpretation is a pure question of 
law," Commonwealth v. Cintolo, 415 Mass. 358, 359 (1993), and 
all reasonable interpretations of an ambiguous statute are 
resolved in favor of the defendants under the rule of lenity, 
Constantino, 443 Mass. at 525.  The jury must be instructed on 
the legal meaning of a criminal statute in order to determine 
whether a violation occurred.  Commonwealth v. Niziolek, 380 
Mass. 513, 527 (1980).  Here, the jury were not instructed on 
the meaning of "indirectly" posing.  Although the judge 
instructed the jury in accordance with the model instructions, 
more was required under the facts of this case, where, as the 
judge acknowledged, the meaning of indirectly posing was central 
to determining whether the defendants could be found guilty of 
the offense. 
 
 
12 Because we conclude that Mattier's conduct was 
insufficient to satisfy the first element of identity fraud, we 
need not analyze whether the posing and use of personal 
identifying information must occur simultaneously. 
13 
 
identity fraud and attempted larceny.13  They argue that the 
arrest was unlawful because the police lacked probable cause to 
make an arrest for identity fraud where the alleged conduct was 
insufficient as a matter of law to prove a violation of the 
identity fraud statute,14 and the warrantless arrest for 
attempted larceny, a misdemeanor, cannot be justified in the 
absence of an applicable statute or a breach of peace.15  They 
posit that the evidence -- text messages retrieved from the 
cellular telephone seized from Mattier's person after the arrest 
and statements by Mattier during postarrest interrogation -- is 
the fruit of the unlawful arrest and that it should not have 
been admitted at trial. 
                     
 
13 Grice adopted Mattier's argument on the claim of error in 
the denial of the motion to suppress evidence obtained from the 
cellular telephone. 
 
 
14 The identity fraud statute directly authorizes a police 
officer to "arrest without warrant any person [the officer] has 
probable cause to believe has committed the offense of identity 
fraud as defined in this section."  G. L. c. 266, § 37E (e). 
 
 
15 In the absence of a statute, police may arrest an 
individual without a warrant for a misdemeanor if the 
individual's actions "(1) [constitute] a breach of the peace, 
(2) [are] committed in the presence or view of the officer, 
. . . and (3) [are] still continuing at the time of the arrest 
or are only interrupted so that the offense and the arrest form 
parts of one transaction."  Commonwealth v. Jewett, 471 Mass. 
624, 630 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Howe, 405 Mass. 332, 
334 (1989). 
14 
 
 
Mattier filed a motion to suppress before trial asserting 
these claims,16 which the judge denied after an evidentiary 
hearing.  "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error 'but conduct an independent review of [his] ultimate 
findings and conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth v. Craan, 469 
Mass. 24, 26 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 
642, 646 (2004).  The motion judge rejected Mattier's claim that 
forgery alone could not subject him to the identity fraud 
statute and concluded that police had probable cause to arrest 
for identity fraud.  Further, the judge concluded that seizure 
of Mattier's cellular telephone was lawfully authorized by the 
search warrant. 
 
We agree with the judge that the seizure of Mattier's 
cellular telephone was lawful because the search of Mattier and 
the seizure of his cellular telephone was expressly authorized 
in the search warrant, the defendants appropriately do not 
challenge that the search warrant contained sufficient probable 
cause to believe that Mattier committed attempted larceny, and 
police could lawfully seize Mattier for the duration of the 
search.  Relying on Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 428 Mass. 871 
                     
 
16 Mattier also claimed that his statements should be 
suppressed because his Miranda waiver was not voluntary.  
Mattier does not renew this argument on appeal. 
15 
 
(1999), Mattier argues that the seizure of his cellular 
telephone was unlawful because Mattier's presence on the 
sidewalk in front of his apartment when he was approached by 
police placed him outside the scope of the search warrant.  In 
McCarthy, supra at 873, 876, we concluded that the search of a 
vehicle was unlawful where, although a search warrant authorized 
the search of a particular residence, the vehicle was outside 
the residence's curtilage when it was searched, and the vehicle 
was not specifically authorized by the warrant.17 
 
Mattier's reliance on the McCarthy case is unavailing, 
however, because the search of Mattier's person was lawful for a 
different reason.  Specifically, the police were authorized to 
detain Mattier during the search of his apartment and the 
discovery of his cellular telephone was inevitable under that 
authority.  Commonwealth v. Catanzaro, 441 Mass. 46, 52 (2004).  
"[A] warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause 
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the 
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."  
Id., quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981). 
                     
 
17 We also noted, however, that the police only sought 
"authority to search the apartment" and "this problem could have 
been avoided altogether had the police included the vehicle in 
the application for the search warrant."  Commonwealth v. 
McCarthy, 428 Mass. 871, 872 & n.3 (1999). 
16 
 
 
This "limited authority" expands to occupants found outside 
the premises and its curtilage in certain circumstances.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Charros, 443 Mass. 752, 760-761, cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 870 (2005).  The United States Supreme Court, in 
Summers, supra at 702-703, identified three law enforcement 
interests that justify expanding this authority:  (1) 
"preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is 
found"; (2) "minimizing the risk of harm to the officers"; and 
(3) "the orderly completion of the search [that] may be 
facilitated if the occupants of the premises are present."  We 
have included the middle of an "alley or driveway" common to an 
occupant's apartment complex as within this authority where the 
occupant was first observed on the front steps of her apartment.  
Catanzaro, 441 Mass. at 48-49, 52-53 & n.12.  Conversely, we 
have excluded from this authority seizure of occupants at a 
location one mile away from the premises to be searched, because 
it did not serve the first two of these law enforcement 
interests and the third -- orderly execution of the warrant -- 
could have been served by executing the warrant when police knew 
the occupants would be home.  See Charros, 443 Mass. 762, 764.  
Moreover, the warrant generally authorized "any persons present" 
but did not specifically name the persons who were seized.  Id. 
at 760 n.5. 
17 
 
 
In this case, police were authorized to search and detain 
Mattier under the authority of the warrant because the facts 
known to police demonstrated that he was an occupant of the 
apartment to be searched, his location when the police 
approached had a "meaningful relation" to the apartment, and his 
detainment served the law enforcement interests identified in 
Summers.  See Charros, 443 Mass. at 764; Catanzaro, 441 Mass. at 
51-52.  Mattier's driver's license address was that of the 
apartment authorized for search, Mattier was standing in front 
of that building when Trooper Banik first observed him, he 
produced his driver's license to Trooper Banik, and he was 
seized within "fifteen to twenty yards" of that building.  
Moreover, seizure of Mattier served law enforcement interests 
because he was aware of the warrant, was standing on the 
sidewalk in front of his home, and could have conceivably 
attempted to flee, harmed the police officers, or disrupted the 
search.  See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-703. 
 
Although police arrested Mattier instead of detaining and 
searching him, evidence from the cellular telephone was 
admissible because the telephone inevitably would have been 
discovered.  Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 16 (2002).  
"Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, if the Commonwealth 
can demonstrate by a preponderance standard that discovery of 
the evidence by lawful means was certain as a practical matter, 
18 
 
the evidence may be admissible as long as the officers did not 
act in bad faith to accelerate the discovery of evidence, and 
the particular constitutional violation is not so severe as to 
require suppression."  Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 424 Mass. 802, 
810 (1997), citing Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 117-
118 (1989).  This is a "demanding test."  Balicki, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 Mass. 539, 548 (1990). 
 
Here, it is certain as a practical matter that the cellular 
telephone inevitably would have been discovered had the police 
seized Mattier for the duration of the search instead of 
arresting him because the police were looking for mobile 
devices, had seen Mattier carrying his cellular telephone the 
prior day, and were specifically authorized to search Mattier's 
person.  See O'Connor, 406 Mass. at 118.  Moreover, the police 
did not act in bad faith to accelerate the discovery of 
evidence.  Before they arrested Mattier, police had obtained a 
search warrant, which contained sufficient probable cause to 
believe that Mattier committed the offense of attempted larceny.  
Therefore, even assuming that the arrest was unlawful, the 
police had authority at that time to seize Mattier's cellular 
19 
 
telephone.  Accordingly, there was no error in admitting 
evidence obtained from the cellular telephone at trial.18 
 
Mattier also argues that his postarrest statements must be 
suppressed.  We need not consider the merits of this argument 
because admission of the statements was not prejudicial in light 
of other overwhelming evidence, including the cellular telephone 
text messages exchanged by the defendants, the claim form, the 
forged letter, and statements Grice made to a Red Cross 
representative (discussed infra).  This evidence was sufficient 
to support the attempted larceny and conspiracy convictions. 
 
3.  Conspiracy and attempted larceny.  Grice argues that 
the judge erred in denying his motion for a required finding of 
not guilty on the conspiracy to commit larceny and attempted 
larceny charges. 19  Grice concedes knowledge of the plan and 
interest in deriving reward from the proceeds, but claims that 
the evidence falls short of proving his intent that the crime be 
committed.  Relying on Commonwealth v. Smith, 342 Mass. 180, 
(1961), Grice argues that his convictions must be vacated 
because the evidence "tends equally to sustain either of two 
                     
 
18 Because of our disposition, we do not address the 
Commonwealth's argument regarding alleged procedural 
deficiencies in Grice's claim. 
 
 
19 Mattier adopted Grice's arguments on this issue as 
contained in Grice's brief pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 16 (j), 
365 Mass. 860 (1974). 
20 
 
inconsistent propositions, neither of them can be said to have 
been established by legitimate proof."  Id. at 183, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Carter, 306 Mass. 141, 147 (1940). 
 
Because Grice's convictions were based on his role as a 
joint venturer, "the Commonwealth was required to prove to the 
jury that 'the defendant knowingly participated in the 
commission of the crime charged, alone or with others, with the 
intent required for that offense.'"  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 
471 Mass. 430, 434 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 
Mass. 449, 468 (2009).  "'The defendant's intent may be inferred 
from his knowledge of the circumstances and participation in the 
crime,' . . . and any inferences drawn 'need only be reasonable 
and possible, and need not be necessary or inescapable'" 
(citations omitted).  Tavares, supra. 
 
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, Latimore, 378 Mass. at 676-677, we conclude that 
there was sufficient evidence to show that Grice knowingly 
participated in the crimes of attempted larceny and conspiracy 
to commit attempted larceny, and he intended that they be 
completed.  The Commonwealth presented evidence that Grice 
attended meetings regarding One Fund, attended an event honoring 
the victims, communicated with claims representatives, and 
communicated with Mattier about the crimes through text message.  
After protocols for distribution of funds based on severity of 
21 
 
injury were released, Grice wrote to Mattier referencing their 
dead aunt, "Yes to double amputation and permanent brain 
damage."  Subsequently, Mattier sent Grice a message asking if 
they should attend a ceremony being held to honor the victims, 
Grice responded, "Yessir.  Gotta get dis money," and the two 
attended the event.  There, Grice gave a Red Cross 
representative his contact information to obtain information 
about additional claim resources after the brothers, with Grice 
doing most of the talking, told the representative "that their 
aunt had had a leg amputated, and that she was going to need the 
other leg amputated as well."  The Commonwealth is not required 
to disprove every alternative theory "if the record viewed in 
its entirety supports 'a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.'"  Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 401 (2003), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 533-534 (1989). 
 
In light of the even more persuasive evidence against 
Mattier, we reject his claim as well. 
 
4.  Juror bias.  Grice and Mattier argue that their rights 
under the Federal and State Constitutions were violated by the 
trial judge's denial of the motion to excuse for cause jurors 
whom they claim were biased by their donations to One Fund 
22 
 
(donating jurors).20  During voir dire, the judge asked each 
juror, "Have you or a member of your family raised any money for 
or contributed to or filed a claim with or received funds from 
the Boston One Fund?"  Over objections, the judge denied Grice 
and Mattier's motions to strike two donating jurors for cause.  
The judge explained that the mere act of donating was not 
sufficient for a juror to be excused for cause so long as the 
jurors credibly stated that they could be objective.21 
 
The judge excused four donating jurors for cause where the 
jurors did not explicitly say that they could be indifferent.  
In one instance, the judge found a juror to be indifferent 
notwithstanding the fact that he and his firm had donated to One 
Fund.  After being alerted by Mattier's counsel that the juror's 
firm had donated $1 million to the fund, the judge noted that he 
was going to "err on the side of caution," and he excused this 
juror for cause.  Two donating jurors sat on the deliberating 
jury.22 
                     
 
20 Mattier adopted this argument as set forth in Grice's 
brief pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 16 (j). 
 
 
21 The judge stated that, "there are thousands of 
Massachusetts citizens who have contributed to the Boston One 
Fund.  I'm not sure that that standing alone disqualifies all of 
them from jury service in this case." 
 
 
22 The defendants exercised five of their ten combined 
peremptory challenges against jurors who had donated.  The 
defendants did not exercise peremptory challenges against the 
 
23 
 
 
"Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the 
Massachusetts Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, applied to the States through the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantee the right 
of a criminal defendant to a trial by an impartial jury."  
Commonwealth v. Andrade, 468 Mass. 543, 547 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 494 (2010).  "The 
presence of even one juror who is not impartial violates a 
defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury."  McCowen, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Vann Long, 419 Mass. 798, 802 
(1995).  "The defendant has the burden of showing that the juror 
was not impartial and must do so by a preponderance of the 
evidence."  Commonwealth v. Amirault, 399 Mass. 617, 626 (1987). 
 
"On a claim of structural error alleging that a jury were 
not impartial because a particular juror was biased, the 
defendant must show actual or implied juror bias."  Commonwealth 
v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 163 (2010).  In deciding whether a 
juror is actually biased, "it is sufficient for the judge to 
'determine whether jurors [can] set aside their own opinions, 
[properly] weigh the evidence . . . and follow the instructions 
of the judge.'"  Andrade, 468 Mass. at 547-548, quoting 
                                                                  
two donating jurors who sat on the deliberating jury even though 
both defendants had challenges remaining when those jurors were 
selected. 
24 
 
Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 688-689 (2011).  We review 
for "clear abuse of discretion or a showing that the judge's 
findings were clearly erroneous."  Commonwealth v. Torres, 437 
Mass. 460, 469 (2002), quoting Amirault, 399 Mass. at 626.  This 
is because such a determination "is essentially one of 
credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor."  McCowen, 
458 Mass. at 493, quoting Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 425 Mass. 
349, 352-353 (1997). 
 
After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the 
judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the jurors 
were not actually biased.  The jurors either responded with a 
direct "No" when asked whether the contribution would affect his 
or her ability to be objective or were further questioned until 
the judge was satisfied that each juror could be objective. 
 
The more difficult question is whether donations to One 
Fund created an implied bias in donating jurors.  Grice argues 
that donating jurors had an implied bias because of the close 
connection between the jurors' donations to One Fund and the 
allegations that the defendants attempted to steal from that 
same fund.  Moreover, Grice asserts that the trial judge, during 
25 
 
sentencing, confirmed why the jurors should have been removed 
when he stated that the defendants had "victimized all donors."23 
 
For the defendant to prevail on a claim of implied bias, we 
"must be satisfied that it is more probable than not that the 
juror was biased against the litigant."  Amirault, 399 Mass. at 
630, quoting State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 730 (1985).  We 
have recognized certain extreme circumstances where implied bias 
could be found:  (1) where "it is disclosed that 'the juror is 
an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is 
a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the 
criminal transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow 
involved in the criminal transaction'"; (2) in "a case where the 
trials of codefendants are severed and an individual observes 
the first trial and sits as a juror in the second trial"; and 
(3) where "a juror who has been the victim of a similar crime 
and has consciously concealed that fact from the parties or the 
court."  Amirault, 399 Mass. at 628 n.5, quoting Smith v. 
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
 
In addition to the examples cited in Amirault, other 
jurisdictions have recognized certain circumstances where a 
                     
 
23 After the defendants' statements of apology during 
sentencing, the judge responded that it was "absolutely 
shocking" that neither recognized "the broader community of 
victims in this case," which he said included donors and those 
actually injured. 
26 
 
juror's personal stake or substantial interest in the outcome of 
the case can demonstrate implied bias.  "[E]ven a tiny financial 
interest in the case" has required a juror to be excused for 
cause.  United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1168 (2001).  Accordingly, courts 
have presumed bias in stockholders of for-profit corporations 
that are parties in a lawsuit.  Getter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
66 F.3d 1119, 1122 (10th Cir. 1995).  Conversely, courts have 
not found an implied bias in members of a for-profit retail club 
because the club "membership is still worth the same after a 
judgment adverse to [the club]."  Guerra v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 943 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). 
 
In this case, it is clear that the jurors did not have a 
financial interest in the outcome of the case.  A charitable 
contribution does not constitute a financial interest because a 
donation does not grant any ownership interest in a charitable 
fund.  See United States v. Arena, 918 F. Supp. 561, 578 
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting assertion that wife's donation to 
victim, a charitable organization, caused bias in judge).  
Additionally, the outcome of the case would not affect the 
viability of One Fund.  Indeed, the case had no financial effect 
on One Fund because the defendants failed to obtain any money 
from the charity.  Notwithstanding the judge's comments during 
sentencing, One Fund donors were not victims of the defendants' 
27 
 
crimes, nor did they have any financial interest in the 
charitable organization by way of their contributions. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the jurors' connection to the 
charitable fund targeted by the defendants is too attenuated to 
cause their disqualification as a matter of law.  See Searle v. 
Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, 203 Mass. 493, 498 (1909) 
(rejecting contention that all jurors of Roman Catholic faith 
should be disqualified from jury in property dispute lawsuit 
against defendant Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield where no 
jurors were taxpayers of town or members of local parish).  The 
notion of implied bias has been used sparingly.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied sub nom. Rivera v. United States, 523 U.S. 1065 (1998) 
("situations in which a trial judge must find implied bias are 
strictly limited and must be truly 'exceptional'").  The judge's 
decision to excuse one juror whose firm donated $1 million does 
not require us to find otherwise.  Although only "extreme" 
situations require a finding of implied bias, a judge has 
discretion to remove a juror out an abundance of caution where 
there is a possible inference of bias but no actual or implied 
bias.  See id. at 47.  The defendants have not met their burden 
to show actual or implied bias on the part of any juror. 
 
5.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  Last, Grice argues that 
he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's description, during his 
28 
 
closing argument, of the law regarding coconspirators' 
statements.  We recognize, as an exception to the hearsay rule, 
that a statement made by a coconspirator or joint venturer may 
be admitted for its truth against the other coconspirators or 
joint venturers.  Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E) (2016).  See 
Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 319-320 (2007).  The 
exception applies only if the existence of the conspiracy or 
joint venture is shown by evidence independent of the statement.  
Id.  Grice does not reference any particular statement made by 
the prosecutor, but we note the following passage where the 
prosecutor stated, "you can use [certain described text messages 
sent by Mattier and Grice] to show that these two defendants 
conspired to steal 2.2 million dollars from the One Fund." 
 
"In determining whether an error in closing argument 
requires reversal, we consider whether defense counsel made a 
timely objection; whether the judge's instructions mitigated the 
error; whether the error was central to the issues at trial or 
concerned only collateral matters; whether the jury would be 
able to sort out any excessive claims or hyperbole; and whether 
the Commonwealth's case was so strong that the error would cause 
no prejudice."  Commonwealth v. Scesny, 472 Mass. 185, 203 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 470 Mass. 320, 335 
(2014).  Although Grice did object to the prosecutor's 
29 
 
statements at the end of closing, the remaining factors do not 
support reversal. 
 
The judge instructed the jury on the proper rule of law 
several times, both before and after closing arguments.  The 
judge elaborated on the instructions at Grice's request.  The 
prosecutor correctly described the rule of law in his closing 
argument following the challenged statement.  Moreover, the 
Commonwealth had a strong case against Grice using only Grice's 
own statements and his attendance at events. 
 
6.  Conclusion.  We affirm the convictions of attempted 
larceny and conspiracy against Grice and Mattier.  Because we 
conclude that the evidence was insufficient to convict Mattier 
of identity fraud, we vacate that conviction and order entry of 
a judgment of not guilty.  We do not remand to the Superior 
Court for resentencing, where Mattier's sentence is unlikely to 
be affected by our decision.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                     
 
24 The judge issued concurrent sentences of probation on 
Mattier's identity fraud conviction and his attempted larceny 
conviction.  Except for the concurrent sentence on the identity 
fraud conviction, Mattier and Grice received the same sentences.  
Grice's sentence demonstrates that the judge did not enhance any 
other portion of Mattier's sentence based on the identity fraud 
conviction.