Case Title: Plasse v. Reid

Citation: 

Docket Number: 50208

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2023-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 50208 
 
VICTORIA ELIZABETH PLASSE, 
 
     Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL LOREN REID, 
 
     Respondent-Appellant. 
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Boise, February 2023 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: May 2, 2023 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, Teton 
County. Jason D. Walker, Magistrate Judge.  
  
The judgment of the magistrate court is affirmed. 
 
Michael Loren Reid, appellant pro se. Michael Loren Reid argued. 
 
Smith Woolf Anderson & Wilkinson, Idaho Falls, for respondent, Victoria Elizabeth 
Plasse. Dennis P. Wilkinson argued.  
 
_____________________ 
 
STEGNER, Justice. 
Michael Loren Reid appeals from the magistrate court’s decision modifying the custody 
and visitation schedule involving his minor child whose custody he shares with his ex-wife, 
Victoria Elizabeth Plasse. This permissive and expedited appeal of the magistrate court’s decision 
was brought pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 12.1 and 12.2. Both parties filed motions seeking 
to modify the prior judgment, arguing that there had been a material, substantial, and permanent 
change in circumstances requiring a modification of the child custody and visitation schedule.  
The magistrate court conducted a bench trial and determined that there had been material, 
substantial, and permanent changes in circumstances requiring modification of the custody and 
visitation schedule. The magistrate court analyzed each of the factors listed in Idaho Code section 
32-717 to determine how the schedule should be altered. The magistrate court then determined 
that both parents would continue to share joint legal and physical custody of their minor child but 
amended the visitation schedule to minimize interactions between the parents, which had been a 
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source of contention between Reid and Plasse. Reid appealed the modified judgment. For the 
reasons discussed below, we affirm the decision of the magistrate court.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Michael Loren Reid appeals from the magistrate court’s decision modifying the custody 
and visitation schedule for him and Victoria Elizabeth Plasse. This case revolves around Reid’s 
claimed frustrations and unsubstantiated allegations of bias against the magistrate judge who has 
presided over the couple’s divorce since inception of this litigation. Though this appeal is limited 
to review of an amended judgment, a procedural history of the prior proceedings is included to 
provide context for the proceedings in general and Reid’s arguments in particular.   
Plasse filed for divorce from Reid in 2019. The couple shares one minor child who will be 
referred to by his initials, L.R. At the beginning of the proceedings, Reid requested the appointment 
of a parenting time evaluator to assess whether he should be entitled to primary legal and physical 
custody of L.R. After the parenting time evaluator submitted her findings to the magistrate court, 
Reid, who was apparently dissatisfied with the parenting time evaluation, filed several objections 
to it. Despite filing his objection, Reid failed to request that the magistrate court strike the 
evaluation.  
The magistrate court then presided over a five-day bench trial regarding the divorce and 
custody proceedings, during which Reid stipulated to the admission of the parenting time 
evaluation. The magistrate court considered the parenting time evaluation in its decision, though 
it did not adopt the recommendations of the evaluator in their entirety. Two days after the 
magistrate court rendered its decision, Reid appealed the judgment to the district court, arguing 
that the magistrate court had improperly considered the parenting time evaluation.1  
The district court determined that because Reid had not objected to the parenting time 
evaluation before the magistrate court, the issue had not been properly preserved for appeal. Reid 
appealed this decision, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court. 
Plasse v. Reid, No. 49472, 2022 WL 17334203, at *3 (Nov. 30, 2022). While Reid’s appeal of the 
first judgment was pending, he filed several motions and petitions with the magistrate court, all 
attempting to modify the first judgment. Plasse filed her own motion to modify as well as a motion 
                                                 
1 The magistrate court issued an amended judgment and decree one day after it issued its initial judgment and decree 
which implemented minor changes from the original judgment. For purposes of this opinion, this 2020 amended 
judgment and decree will be referred to as the first judgment and the 2022 amended judgment at issue in this appeal 
will be referred to as the amended judgment.  
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for contempt. Id. at *2. The magistrate court scheduled a trial to address the pending motions that 
are the subject of the present appeal. During the second trial, the parties resolved all issues except 
a determination of “whether there has been a material and substantial change in circumstances and 
whether a modification of the current custody and visitation schedule is in the best interests of the 
Minor Child.”  
In response to the allegations of both parties regarding a material, substantial, and 
permanent change in circumstances, the magistrate court “ordered a Brief Focused Assessment . . . 
to provide consultation regarding what are the wishes of the child regarding custody, including the 
context and basis for those wishes; whether or not the child is fearful of one of the parties . . .; and 
the identification of any resist-refuse dynamics that may appear within the parent-child 
relationship.” Upon Reid’s recommendation, the magistrate court appointed Robert DeWall, 
Licensed Clinical Professional Counselor, to complete the Brief Focused Assessment (“the BFA”). 
DeWall completed the BFA and submitted his report to the magistrate court for its consideration.   
Over Reid’s post-trial objections, the magistrate court found that it could properly consider 
the BFA because “[t]he parties did not object to the BFA before or during trial. However, Mr. Reid 
called and cross-examined Mr. DeWall at length during the trial.” Reid argued for the first time in 
his closing argument that the magistrate court could not consider DeWall’s conclusions in the BFA 
because his methods did not follow the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts Model 
Standards (“the AFCC Model Standards”) for BFAs. The magistrate court denied Reid’s post-trial 
objection to the BFA as untimely. Additionally, the magistrate court found that the Idaho Rules of 
Family Law Procedure governed the proceedings, and the Rules did not mandate use of the AFCC 
Model Standards in the preparation of the BFA.  
The magistrate court next determined that there had been “a material, substantial[,] and 
permanent change in circumstances indicating to the court’s satisfaction that modification [of the 
custody order] would be in the best interest of the Minor Child.” The magistrate court determined 
that the relationship between Plasse and Reid had deteriorated throughout the litigation and was 
“likely to remain permanently strained to the detriment of the Minor Child.” The magistrate court 
reviewed the modifications proposed by both parents and discussed the proposals and evidence 
presented at trial in the context of the factors listed in Idaho Code section 32-717.  
The magistrate court spent a significant amount of time explaining “[t]he interaction and 
interrelationship of the Minor Child with his parents” factor set out in section 32-717(1)(c), as that 
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appeared to be the most contentious issue. In so doing, the magistrate court analyzed Exhibit 318, 
a video recorded by Reid during a custody exchange, and the BFA prepared by DeWall, which 
Reid also contests on appeal. Exhibit 318 shows Plasse getting in her car with L.R., the back door 
opening, L.R. getting out of the car, briefly running away, then coming back to the car with Plasse. 
In its decision, the magistrate court did not find that L.R.’s behavior as shown in Exhibit 
318 supported Reid’s contention that the child was “afraid of his mother or that he would rather 
spend time with his father[.]” Instead, the magistrate court concluded that, in Exhibit 318, “the 
child is not upset or resistive, but actually seems at ease as if it were a game.”  
After reviewing the BFA, the magistrate court stated that it “ha[d] concerns that the Minor 
Child [was] influenced directly by Mr. Reid and that the Minor Child’s verbatim statements [were] 
inconsistent with the level of comfort exhibited with both parents and observed by Mr. DeWall.” 
As a result, the magistrate court explained that DeWall “found these statements [Reid’s assertions 
regarding Plasse] unconvincing and inconsistent with his observations of the Minor Child with 
each parent.” Commenting on Exhibit 318 and the BFA, the magistrate court stated that, given the 
high amount of conflict between the parents, it was in L.R.’s best interest for the court to modify 
the custody schedule to minimize interactions between Plasse and Reid.  
The previous custody arrangement required Plasse and Reid to interact on various school 
nights. For example, L.R. would go home from school with one parent and spend the evening with 
him or her. At the end of the evening, that parent would meet the other in a parking lot to drop off 
L.R. so he could spend the night with the other parent. This schedule resulted in several contentious 
interactions between Plasse and Reid. The magistrate court considered these interactions when 
devising the modified custody arrangement. The magistrate court explained in its decision that the 
parents would no longer attempt to share custody of L.R. on weeknights. Instead, they would rely 
on the school schedule to swap custody of L.R., so they would not have to interact with one another 
more than was necessary. Now, on certain weekends for example, Reid has custody of L.R. “from 
the time school lets out on Thursday afternoon until school resumes on Friday morning[,]” which 
eliminates the contentious evening pickups. This change also resulted in Reid having more time 
with L.R. than he did prior to the entry of the amended judgment.  
The magistrate court entered an amended judgment. Reid then filed a motion to reconsider. 
During the hearing for Reid’s motion to reconsider, Reid argued that Exhibit 318 also now included 
security camera footage from a custody exchange occurring in a grocery store parking lot that 
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“describes all the behavior that the [c]ourt said it didn’t see in the first video.” The magistrate court 
declined to review this security footage because it had not been admitted in the trial as part of 
Exhibit 318. The magistrate court explained that it would not consider the security camera footage 
because “[t]he video of the [security camera] was not made a part of the record[,]” and Exhibit 318 
had only included the video that Reid had recorded. We agree. In this opinion, “Exhibit 318” will 
refer only to the video personally recorded by Reid, since that was the only video admitted into 
evidence and considered by the magistrate court during the second trial.  
The magistrate court denied Reid’s motion to reconsider. In denying Reid’s motion, the 
magistrate court took the time to explain its role to Reid as the finder of facts. Arguing the 
magistrate court was biased against him, Reid then filed a “Motion for New 
Trial/Disqualification,” which the magistrate court also denied. After the magistrate court granted 
Reid’s motion for permissive appeal, Reid filed his appeal with this Court.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Permissive appeals of custody issues before this Court are governed by Idaho Appellate 
Rule 12.1. Permissive appeals involving custody are expedited and do not involve intermediate 
appeals so as to serve the best interest of the child and minimize the number of appeals in an effort 
to decrease cost and time from the beginning of a child custody appeal to its completion. As a 
result, this Court directly reviews the decision of the magistrate court in permissive appeals. The 
magistrate court’s decision will be upheld unless the magistrate court abused its discretion. Weaver 
v. Weaver, 170 Idaho 72, 74–75, 507 P.3d 1102, 1104–05 (2021). 
A trial court does not abuse its discretion as long as the court [1] recognizes the 
issue as one of discretion, [2] acts within the outer limits of its discretion . . . [3] 
[acts] consistently with the legal standards applicable to the available choices, and 
[4] reaches its decision through an exercise of reason. When the trial 
court’s decisions affect children, the best interests of the child [are] the primary 
consideration. A magistrate court’s decision will be affirmed if supported by 
substantial and competent evidence, even where conflicting evidence has been 
presented.  
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Decisions to admit 
evidence are also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1187 (2009). “When an appellate court reviews the magistrate judge’s findings of fact, the 
appellate court ‘will not set aside the findings on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous such that 
they are not based upon substantial and competent evidence.’ ” Searle v. Searle, 162 Idaho 839, 
843, 405 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. 
Reid’s briefing submitted to this Court is adequate (if only barely) to satisfy the 
minimum requirements of Idaho Appellate Rule 35, and, as a result, his appeal 
may proceed on its merits.  
Plasse initially argues that Reid’s submissions to this Court do not comply with Idaho 
Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) which requires that issues must be “supported by cogent argument and 
authority[] in the opening brief.” Specifically, Plasse notes that allegations of bias and error on the 
part of the magistrate court are unsupported by argument or authority. Plasse also contends Reid 
has not specifically argued that the magistrate court abused its discretion in rendering the decision 
it did. Plasse argues that Reid’s entire appeal should be rejected solely on this basis. Reid does not 
provide any argument in response. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35 requires an appellant’s brief to “contain the contentions of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.” I.A.R. 35(a)(6).  
Most of Reid’s briefing expresses frustration regarding the magistrate court’s consideration 
of certain evidence (and his arguments explaining how he thought the evidence should have been 
interpreted), rather than an assignment of specific legal error to the magistrate court’s decision. 
However, he does note at least two specific errors made by the magistrate court in its decision and 
explains why he contends that the decision is clearly erroneous. He provides citations to the 
portions of the magistrate court’s decision with which he disagrees and provides the same as it 
relates to the transcript. Additionally, Reid tries to argue the necessary standard of review and lists 
cases in his brief in an apparent attempt to support his position. As a result, we conclude Reid has 
minimally passed the threshold set by Idaho Appellate Rule 35 and so we will proceed with a 
discussion of the merits. 
 
 
B. 
Preservation Issues 
Reid makes several arguments in his briefing that are not properly before this Court. This 
Court’s review is limited to questions that have been properly preserved for appeal. See, e.g., State 
v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 222, 443 P.3d 231, 236 (2019). Reid’s objections to the first trial and 
first judgment have previously been decided by the Idaho Court of Appeals. Because Reid did not 
file a petition for review, a remittitur has been issued and those arguments are no longer subject to 
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challenge and are not properly before this Court. We will not address any issues pertaining to the 
first trial. 
Additionally, Reid has not properly preserved his right to appeal DeWall’s purported 
failure to use the AFCC Model Standards in the BFA because he failed to present an objection at 
the trial before the magistrate court. Because that issue has not been preserved for appeal, we have 
no need to address it further.  
C. 
Remaining Assertions of Error within the Magistrate Court’s Decision 
The remainder of Reid’s appeal argues that the magistrate court abused its discretion and 
made findings that are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Reid argues that the 
magistrate court abused its discretion in its review of Exhibit 318 during the trial, its refusal to 
consider security camera footage which Reid sought to add to Exhibit 318 after the trial, its reliance 
on Reid’s representations to the magistrate court, and its failure to admit the full reports created 
by the Idaho Department of Health Welfare. In addition, Reid points to several of the magistrate 
court’s findings that he believes to be clearly erroneous. Given the different standards of review, 
each argument is addressed in turn. 
1. 
The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the custody and 
visitation schedule.  
Reid argues that the magistrate court erred in four ways when it modified the custody and 
visitation schedule—(1) improperly considering Exhibit 318; (2) declining to expand the scope of 
Exhibit 318 to include security camera footage that was not admitted during the trial; 
(3) incorrectly assessing Reid’s character in its consideration of the factors listed in Idaho Code 
section 32-717(1); and (4) inappropriately refusing to admit the entire reports generated by the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare related to the couple’s contentious custody battle. 
Because these issues ultimately turn on their impact on the resulting modification of the custody 
and visitation schedule, we will review them under an abuse of discretion standard.  
a. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of the original 
Exhibit 318. 
In support of his motion for modification of the first judgment, Reid submitted Exhibit 318 
as evidence that Plasse reacts emotionally at custody exchanges and that her “relationship with 
their son has deteriorated significantly since the entry of the decree.” The magistrate court 
determined that custody exchanges between Plasse and Reid were areas of significant conflict and 
that those exchanges appear to be “where the majority of the Minor Child’s behavioral outbursts 
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have occurred.” The magistrate court found that, as seen in Exhibit 318, L.R. was “not upset or 
resistive, but actually seem[ed] to be at ease as if it were a game.”  
 The magistrate court concluded that Exhibit 318 supported the allegation that Plasse was 
frustrated at the exchanges, but it did not support Reid’s contention that the child was fearful of 
his mother or that Plasse’s and L.R.’s relationship had deteriorated. The magistrate court further 
concluded that “the emotions displayed by the Minor Child and Mr. Reid are incongruent with the 
circumstances as framed by Mr. Reid’s testimony.” The magistrate court went on to state: “While 
the court has significant concerns that the incident was contrived or encouraged, there is no 
conclusive evidence on this issue. However, the court will cautiously consider the evidence for the 
purposes it clearly supports.”  
 
Reid argues on appeal that the magistrate court’s evaluation of Exhibit 318 amounts to 
improper “expert testimony.” Reid contends that the magistrate court found facts that were not 
included in the video and ignored Reid’s testimony concerning his interpretation of the exchange. 
Because he was the only witness who testified about Exhibit 318, Reid contends that the magistrate 
court must “consider the video only upon the basis of what was testified to by Mr. Reid[.]”  
Plasse argues that the magistrate court correctly reviewed Exhibit 318 and drew reasonable 
conclusions from it. Plasse also contends that Reid’s argument regarding the exhibit should be 
rejected because he “provides no citation to law or reference to any specific factual error 
committed by the Magistrate[.]” Instead, Plasse maintains that the magistrate court properly 
understood its role as the fact finder and correctly applied the rules and law governing its review. 
Ultimately, Plasse characterizes the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding 
Exhibit 318 as well within his “sound discretion[.]”  
We hold that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in the way it analyzed Exhibit 
318. Its findings of fact regarding the video are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
As an initial observation, Reid appears to misunderstand the role of the magistrate court as the trier 
of fact. A judge in analyzing and characterizing evidence is not an “expert witness”; rather, he is 
a neutral and detached magistrate interpreting and explaining what transpired. At oral argument, 
Reid continued to argue that the magistrate court’s findings of fact regarding Exhibit 318 were 
testimonial in nature, rather than a description of what the magistrate court concluded after 
reviewing the evidence.  
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“At the trial court level[,] the trier of fact . . . is the arbiter of conflicting evidence. It is the 
province of . . . the trier of fact to weigh the conflicting evidence and testimony[.]” Abbott v. 
Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 547, 808 P.2d 1289, 1292 (1991). The role of the 
magistrate court as the trier of fact is to review the evidence before it and determine the appropriate 
“credibility and weight” to give it. Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 
Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990). In contrast, the role of the appellate court is limited 
to a determination of “whether there is evidence in the record that a reasonable trier of fact could 
accept and rely upon in making the factual finding that is challenged on appeal.” Reed v. Reed, 
157 Idaho 705, 710, 339 P.3d 1109, 1114 (2014) (internal citation omitted).  
 
Here, we cannot conclude that the magistrate court erred in its review of Exhibit 318. 
Contrary to Reid’s assertion, the magistrate court is not required to blindly adopt Reid’s self-
serving testimony regarding the video. Instead, the magistrate court is empowered to draw its own 
conclusions regarding the evidence, so long as those conclusions are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. We are persuaded the magistrate court did so when it reviewed the video for 
itself. The magistrate court painstakingly analyzed Exhibit 318 nearly frame by frame to describe 
the behaviors of the parties and explain the reasons underlying that behavior. See, e.g., 
I.R.C.P. 52(a); Searle, 162 Idaho at 844–45, 405 P.3d at 1185–86 (reversing the decision of the 
magistrate court where it failed to “thoroughly analyze or apply the facts of this case to any 
statutory factor[]”). Additionally, the magistrate court did not ignore Reid’s testimony, as argued 
by Reid on appeal, because it considered its own interpretation of the video vis-à-vis Reid’s 
testimony on the matter. (“The problem is that the emotions displayed by the Minor Child and Mr. 
Reid are incongruent with the circumstances as framed by Mr. Reid’s testimony.”). As explained 
above, it is the province of the trial court to consider and weigh the evidence before it. The 
magistrate court properly determined the appropriate weight to be given to Reid’s testimony and 
Exhibit 318 before issuing its findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
When child custody is the issue, the best interest of the child is the primary consideration. 
Searle, 162 Idaho at 843, 405 P.3d at 1184. Idaho Code section 32-717 lists multiple factors for a 
court to consider in determining the best interest of the child for purposes of awarding child 
custody. The magistrate court drew its conclusions regarding Exhibit 318 under the factor 
“interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or parents,” as stated in Idaho 
Code section 32-717. 
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The magistrate court did not err in determining that it was in the best interest of L.R. to 
modify the custody schedule. The magistrate court explained in its decision that it had reviewed 
Exhibit 318 extensively and found that the type of parental behaviors exhibited in it were “likely 
to reduce the child’s sense of security and even cause emotional distance between parent and 
child.” The magistrate court also determined that Exhibit 318 did not support Reid’s assertion that 
the child was fearful of his mother. Reid has failed to point this Court to any evidence in the record 
that contradicts the magistrate court’s findings or suggests that its interpretation of Exhibit 318 
was anything other than reasonable. As a result, we hold that the magistrate court did not abuse its 
discretion in analyzing and interpreting Exhibit 318 extensively under the framework of Idaho 
Code section 32-717.  
b. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the security 
camera footage.  
Exhibit 318 came up again at the hearing regarding Reid’s motion to reconsider. Reid 
sought to augment Exhibit 318 with additional video between the time it had been admitted at trial 
and at the motion to reconsider. At the later proceeding, Reid attempted to offer footage from a 
grocery store security camera that purportedly refuted the magistrate court’s earlier findings 
regarding the original Exhibit 318. The magistrate court refused to consider this footage because 
it had not been admitted at the modification trial, and it was not “newly discovered evidence[,]” as 
is necessary to be admitted at a reconsideration hearing.  
Reid argues that the security camera footage offers further support for his arguments of 
how the magistrate court should have interpreted Exhibit 318. This Court has previously 
articulated that “when considering a motion for reconsideration ‘the trial court should take into 
account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the order[.]’ ” 
Ciccarello v. Davies, 166 Idaho 153, 162, 456 P.3d 519, 528 (2019) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Under Reid’s interpretation, the security camera footage “bear[s] on the 
correctness of the order” because it would aid the magistrate court in its review of Exhibit 318. Id. 
Accordingly, under the Ciccarello standard, the magistrate court should have reviewed the security 
camera footage.  
However, Reid’s argument fails to account for the other consideration—that the facts must 
be “new[.]” Id. The magistrate court found that the security camera footage “was available at the 
time of trial,” so it correctly excluded the footage from consideration. Reid fails to challenge this 
finding on appeal. The magistrate court explained in detail that its role was limited to evaluating 
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the evidence admitted at trial and it cannot consider additional evidence during a hearing on a 
motion to reconsider when it “was [] available at the time of trial or would [] have been available 
at the time of trial, given reasonable efforts of the parties.” We cannot find that the magistrate court 
abused its discretion when it refused to consider evidence that could have been made available for 
trial. (We also do not endorse Reid’s modifying an exhibit that was admitted at trial and adding 
substantive video to an already admitted exhibit.)  
c. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in relying upon Reid’s 
representations to the court when he was representing himself.  
Next, Reid argues that, because he was representing himself pro se, the magistrate court 
was only allowed to consider his under oath testimony, as opposed to his representations and 
demeanor when representing himself. In essence, Reid asks this Court to reverse the magistrate 
court because it did not draw a distinction between Reid the party and Reid the party’s 
representative.  
It is unclear from Reid’s briefing where in the record the magistrate court purportedly erred 
in relying on Reid’s comments as the representative of himself. This Court will not scour the record 
for error, so we need not address this argument further. I.A.R. 35(a)(6); Michalk v. Michalk, 148 
Idaho 224, 230, 220 P.3d 580, 586 (2009) (declining to review arguments made without citations 
to the record). At the same time, Reid has provided no authority for the proposition that there are 
distinctions that must be drawn between him as the witness and him as the advocate. We are also 
unaware of some impunity or latitude that would be afforded to a self-represented litigant which 
would allow him to engage in inappropriate behavior when acting as his own counsel. Instead, 
licensed attorneys, pro se advocates, and parties are all responsible for their actions in court. See, 
e.g., Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 47, 253 P.3d 716, 721 (2011) (quoting Haeberle v. Tex. Int’l 
Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1984)) (“By voluntarily assuming the special status of trial 
participants and officers of the court, parties and their attorneys subject themselves to greater 
restraints on their communications than might constitutionally be applied to the general public.”). 
The very premise of Reid’s argument is flawed. We are unaware of any dispensation afforded to 
lawyers that they may act intemperately or aggressively in the practice of law. Attorneys are 
officers of the court and must maintain that demeanor throughout a court proceeding. Indeed, this 
heightened obligation requires candor to the court, a requirement that is over and above that owed 
by a litigant. I.R.P.C. 3.3. 
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d. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the full reports 
created by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare.  
Next, Reid argues that the magistrate court erred when it refused to admit all the reports 
prepared by the Children and Family Services division of the Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare (“CFS”). It appears from the record that Reid had “apparently reported [Plasse] to [CFS], 
claiming [she] was abusive to [their] son.” The magistrate court admitted only the portions of the 
reports that contained the findings and conclusions of CFS, rather than the full reports which 
included the allegations of the reporting parties. The magistrate court reasoned that the redactions 
throughout the entirety of the reports made it too difficult to understand what was being reported. 
Reid argues that the Rules of Family Law Procedure render the admission of the entire CFS reports 
mandatory. 
Despite these arguments, Reid failed to identify which CFS reports he contends the 
magistrate court erred in failing to admit and how the redacted reports would have added to the 
resolution of this dispute. This Court does not presume error on appeal; “the burden of showing it 
is on the party alleging it.” S Bar Ranch v. Elmore County, 170 Idaho 282, 309, 510 P.3d 635, 662 
(2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As we have repeatedly held, this Court is 
not obliged to “scour the record for error” and we will not do so here. Id.  
The Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure permit proceedings that do not strictly comply 
with the Idaho Rules of Evidence and provide that  
all relevant evidence is admissible, provided, however, that the court must exclude 
evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence, lack of reliability, or failure to adequately and 
timely disclose evidence. 
I.R.F.L.P. 102(b)(2).  
The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the CFS reports in 
their entirety. All throughout the trials between these parties, the magistrate court was diligent in 
explaining the procedural rules to Reid, who struggled to understand the intricacies of the Idaho 
Rules of Family Law Procedure. For example, Reid attempted to submit evidence at various stages 
of trial in contravention of the rules, including in some cases irrelevant evidence. The magistrate 
court dedicated a significant amount of time explaining to Reid its role as the trier of fact. The 
magistrate court also attempted to maintain the focus throughout the trials by ensuring that all 
proffered evidence was relevant and helpful to the resolution of the dispute. However, Reid appears 
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to have misunderstood the role of the magistrate court because he does not explain why the 
redacted CFS reports were necessary for the magistrate court to consider. Here, the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare closed the cases after conducting safety assessments with Plasse 
and attempting to conduct an assessment with Reid. After investigating the claims, the Department 
concluded that the claims of abuse were “unsubstantiated.” As a result, the magistrate court did 
not abuse its discretion in determining that portions of these reports were irrelevant.  
2. 
With few exceptions, the magistrate court’s factual findings are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence.  
Reid alleges that there are two factual findings made by the magistrate court that are not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence which should result in the magistrate’s decision 
being overturned on appeal. Reid also argues that the magistrate court was biased because it 
purportedly considered evidence differently when offered by Plasse than when offered by Reid.  
Reid’s arguments refer to magistrate court’s factual determinations. As a result, we review them 
under the clearly erroneous standard. Searle, 162 Idaho at 843, 405 P.3d at 1184.   
Plasse concedes that there are two factual findings made by the magistrate court that are 
unsupported by the record. First, there is no support in the record for the magistrate court’s 
conclusion that Reid is not close with his parents. Second, there is no support in the record for the 
magistrate court’s finding that “[Reid] often refers to [L.R.] as his legacy.” Because Plasse 
acknowledges the magistrate court’s findings are not supported by the record, we conclude that 
these two points are clearly erroneous.  
Nevertheless, this Court has previously held that where a party “has failed to show that his 
substantial rights were affected[,]” then the error will be deemed harmless. Reed v. Reed, 160 Idaho 
772, 775–76, 379 P.3d 1042, 1045–46 (2016); see also I.R.F.L.P. 806. Here, though Reid has 
correctly pointed out that the magistrate court’s findings on these points are clearly erroneous, he 
has failed to demonstrate how his substantial rights have been affected by these erroneous findings. 
Without any indication of how Reid’s substantial rights have been affected by the magistrate 
court’s unsupported findings, we hold that they amount only to harmless error.  
Reid makes several additional arguments that boil down to assertions of bias challenging 
the magistrate court’s interpretation of the evidence presented to it. Many of these arguments 
appear to be ad homonym attacks against the magistrate court, which need not be considered by 
this Court. See Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (“Where an 
appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and to support his position with 
14 
sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court.”) 
(internal citation omitted). Additionally, as described above, Reid’s assignments of error appear to 
be his misunderstanding regarding the role of the magistrate court as the trier of fact, rather than 
evidence of bias. Further, Reid fails to demonstrate how these purported errors affect his 
substantial rights as required by Reed. See 160 Idaho at 775–76, 379 P.3d at 1045–46.   
Apart from the two erroneous findings noted above, the magistrate court’s findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are supported by substantial and competent evidence and, therefore, are 
not clearly erroneous. 
D. 
Plasse is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.  
Plasse argues that she is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Code section 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Plasse argues that Reid’s arguments 
are unsupported by both legal authority and factual support, and he failed to identify any 
substantive way in which the magistrate court had erred. Plasse contends that Reid has not 
presented a single triable issue, rendering his conduct frivolous and entitling her to attorney fees 
on appeal.  
We agree that Plasse is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. First, Plasse is the 
prevailing party on every issue because Reid’s arguments were unsuccessful for the reasons 
explained above. Next, it is clear from the record that Reid appealed the magistrate court’s 
amended judgment and decree “frivolously[.]” I.C. § 12-121. This Court has previously held that 
where the nonprevailing party “continued to rely on the same arguments used in front of the [] 
court, without providing any additional persuasive law or bringing into doubt the existing law on 
which the [] court based its decision[,]” an award of attorney fees under section 12-121 is 
warranted. Thornton v. Pandrea, 161 Idaho 301, 320, 385 P.3d 856, 876 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  
A constant theme in this divorce, dating back to its origin in 2019, is the idea that Reid is 
abusing Idaho’s judicial system by using it as an arena to host his disputes with Plasse. It was 
suggested before the magistrate court that Reid had taken “Plasse to court for sport[.]” Such a 
statement represents a trivialization of our role as neutral arbiters. Courts exist as forums for parties 
to use to resolve legitimate disputes; they do not exist as boxing rings in which individuals may 
spar over their personal vendettas. Proceedings before a tribunal are not a game. They are not sport. 
15 
The matters before magistrate courts and this Court alike have serious repercussions for the parties 
involved, and proceedings before them should be treated with the solemnity to which they are due. 
We heard and understood Reid’s frustrations with the outcome of these proceedings before 
the magistrate court, and, certainly, a fundamental tenet of our judicial system is the right to appeal 
adverse rulings. However, we rejected his arguments because they were unsubstantiated or if 
substantiated, immaterial in the scheme of things. The lack of support for Reid’s arguments 
appears to be rooted in his misunderstanding of the legal process. Throughout this litigation, Reid 
has attempted to have different courts reconsider evidence until they side with him. However, the 
appeals process exists to correct errors made below, not to give parties a second attempt to have 
their arguments considered by an additional trier of fact. We are an error correcting court, not a 
finder of facts. 
Reid argues that the magistrate court’s rejection of evidence amounts to bias against him, 
but this is a misunderstanding of the responsibility of the magistrate court. As we explained in our 
analysis of Exhibit 318, a trier of fact is not bound to interpret evidence in the same way as its 
proponent would like. The role of the magistrate court as the trier of fact is to consider the evidence 
before it and make a determination of its credibility. An adverse ruling, on its own, is insufficient 
evidence of bias. Instead, the magistrate court’s findings (with two noted minor exceptions) appear 
to be supported by the record. Reid is clearly frustrated with the magistrate court’s decision and it 
appears that this appeal is another attempt to relitigate certain issues determined by the magistrate 
court, rather than correct any substantive legal or factual errors. As a result of this frivolous appeal, 
we award Plasse attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Given our procedural rules and case law requiring arguments to be made with specificity, 
we are unable to review several of Reid’s arguments, including purported error by the Idaho Court 
of Appeals and issues that have not been preserved. However, of the arguments that we may 
review, we affirm the magistrate court’s decisions. First, we affirm the modification of the custody 
and visitation schedule because we cannot conclude that the magistrate court abused its discretion 
in its decision to modify the original schedule. Next, we affirm the magistrate court’s rejection of 
Reid’s argument regarding the BFA, which was not properly preserved for appeal. We further 
affirm most of the magistrate court’s findings of fact, which are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, except for the two noted. However, we affirm the ultimate decision because 
16 
the error was harmless. The vast majority of findings of fact are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Finally, we conclude that Plasse is entitled to an award of attorney fees and 
costs because Reid’s appeal to this Court was frivolous. 
Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY, MOELLER, and ZAHN CONCUR.