Case Title: Thorsen v. Richmond Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

Citation: 

Docket Number: 150528

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, McClanahan, Powell, and Kelsey, JJ., and Russell and 
Millette, S.JJ. 
 
JAMES B. THORSEN, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 150528 
SENIOR JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
June 2, 2016 
RICHMOND SOCIETY FOR THE  
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO  
ANIMALS 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Paul M. Peatross, Judge Designate 
 
 
This appeal concerns whether an intended third-party beneficiary of a will contract, who 
failed to successfully take under the will instrument due to the drafting attorney’s error, may sue 
the attorney for malpractice. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
In 2003, Alice Louise Cralle Dumville, then a resident of Chesterfield County, met with 
James B. Thorsen, an attorney, at his office in Richmond, Virginia, in order to prepare her last 
will and testament.  At the end of the initial meeting, Thorsen understood that Dumville wanted 
him to prepare a will that would, upon her death, convey all of her property to her mother if her 
mother survived her, and, in the event her mother predeceased her, to the Richmond Society for 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“RSPCA”).  At the time, Dumville was forty-three and her 
mother was in her late seventies or early eighties.  Dumville lived with three cats, which she 
desired to go to the RSPCA upon her death. 
Thorsen prepared the will.  At no time in the preparation of the will did Thorsen provide 
any tax advice, such as attempting to minimize tax burdens on the estate.  On April 16, 2003, 
Thorsen wrote a letter to Dumville informing her of the completion of her will, and Dumville 
executed the will as drafted by Thorsen. 
 
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Dumville died on May 16, 2008, her mother having predeceased her.  Thorsen, in his 
capacity as co-executor of the estate, notified the RSPCA that it was the sole beneficiary of 
Dumville’s estate.  Thorsen was subsequently informed that, in the opinion of the title insurance 
company, the will left only the tangible estate, not real estate, to the RSPCA. 
Thorsen brought suit in a collateral proceeding to correct this “scrivener’s error” based on 
Dumville’s clear original intent.  The Circuit Court of Chesterfield County, however, found the 
language unambiguously limited the bequest to the RSPCA to tangible personal property, while 
the intangible estate passed intestate to Dumville’s heirs at law, Helen Boyle and Kathleen 
Davis.  Thorsen v. Boyle, Rec. No. CL09-718 (April 9, 2010) (unpublished). 
On April 14, 2011, the RSPCA brought suit against James B. Thorsen, Thorsen & Scher, 
LLP, and James B. Thorsen, P.C. (collectively, “Thorsen”) for breach of contract-professional 
negligence, as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Thorsen and Dumville.  Thorsen 
demurred, arguing, among other things, that:  (1) the RSPCA was not an intended third-party 
beneficiary of the contract and Thorsen undertook no obligation on its behalf, and so he could 
not be liable to the RSPCA; and (2) in the Commonwealth, an action by a third-party beneficiary 
arises under Code § 55-22 and requires a written agreement.  Additionally, Thorsen filed a plea 
in bar premised on the statute of limitations.  The circuit court overruled the demurrer and denied 
the plea in bar. 
At trial, the parties stipulated that Thorsen, as Dumville’s attorney, had a duty to 
incorporate her intent into her will accurately and that he did not accurately incorporate her 
intent as to the disposition of real property to the RSPCA.  The RSPCA received $72,015.60 
from the tangible estate, but the ultimate bequest, less expenses, would have totaled $675,425.50 
absent the error. 
 
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The circuit court admitted Thorsen’s testimony from the previous collateral proceedings 
regarding his understanding of Dumville’s intent.  After considering both this evidence and trial 
testimony, the court found for the RSPCA.  The final order incorporated the proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law offered by the RSPCA and found damages for the RSPCA in the 
amount of $603,409.90.  Thorsen now appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Requirement of a Written Contract 
Thorsen assigns error to the circuit court’s “ruling that Virginia Code § 55-22 applied to 
the oral contract between Alice Louise Cralle Dumville and James B. Thorsen.”  We agree with 
Thorsen that Code § 55-22 does not apply to the oral contract between Dumville and Thorsen.  
However, we do not agree that this is fatal to the RSPCA’s claim. 
This issue of statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law which we review de 
novo.  Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 
(2007).  “When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of 
that language.  Furthermore, we must give effect to the legislature’s intention as expressed by the 
language used unless a literal interpretation of the language would result in a manifest 
absurdity.”  Id.  (internal citations omitted). 
Code § 55-22 states: 
An immediate estate or interest in or the benefit of a condition respecting any 
estate may be taken by a person under an instrument, although he be not a party 
thereto; and if a covenant or promise be made for the benefit, in whole or in part, 
of a person with whom it is not made, or with whom it is made jointly with others, 
such person, whether named in the instrument or not, may maintain in his own 
name any action thereon which he might maintain in case it had been made with 
him only and the consideration had moved from him to the party making such 
covenant or promise. 
 
 
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Thorsen argues that the language of Code § 55-22 refers to the third-party beneficiary of an 
“instrument.”  An instrument is a “written legal document that defines rights, duties, 
entitlements, or liabilities, such as a statute, contract, will, promissory note, or share certificate.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary 918 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).  Thorsen therefore contends that, 
under the plain language of the statute, the oral nature of the contract in question is fatal to the 
RSPCA’s cause of action, and the RSPCA has no recourse. 
The parties do not dispute, nor can they in good faith, that the plain meaning of the term 
“instrument” as employed in this statute refers to a written document.  Because the benefit to the 
third-party referred to in the first phrase of the statute derives from an “instrument,” Code § 55-
22 must refer to a benefit from a written document.  This interpretation is bolstered by the second 
half of the statute:  although the term “covenant or promise” is not preceded by a modifier 
specifying “written,” it is nonetheless closely followed by reference to “the instrument” 
(emphasis added).  The definite article makes clear that the source of the benefit referred to in 
this statute must be a written agreement or other benefit that is memorialized in a written 
document. 
While we agree with Thorsen’s construction of the statute, we cannot agree that this 
statute abrogates the common law so as to prohibit the ability of third-party beneficiaries to sue 
upon oral contracts.  We have previously noted: 
At common law, 
  
the general rule was that, whether the contract was 
express or implied, by parol or under seal, or of 
record, the action must be brought in the name of the 
party in whom the legal interest was vested, and that 
this legal interest was vested in the person to whom 
the promise was made, and consequently that he or 
his privy was the only person who could sue in a 
court of law upon such contract. 
 
5 
 
Thacker v. Hubard, 122 Va. 379, 387, 94 S.E. 929, 931 (1918); accord, Cemetery 
Cons[ultants] v. Tidewater Fun. Dir., 219 Va. 1001, 1003, 254 S.E.2d 61, 62 
(1979).  However, “in contracts not under seal, it has been held, for two centuries 
or more, that any one for whose benefit the contract was made may sue upon it.”  
Thacker, 122 Va. at 387, 94 S.E. at 931 (emphasis in original). 
 
Ward v. Ernst & Young, 246 Va. 317, 329, 435 S.E.2d 628, 634 (1993).  Oral contracts are not 
under seal, and the Court has never held, in the centuries prior to Thacker or the century since, 
that the oral nature of a contract limits a third-party beneficiary’s ability to sue upon it. 
Code § 55-22 is silent as to oral contracts.  By its plain terms, it applies only to written 
contracts.  Its enactment therefore does not affect the ability of a third-party beneficiary to bring 
a common law action based on an oral contract made for his or her benefit, which remains intact. 
Additionally, “statutes are not to be considered as isolated fragments of law, but as a 
whole, or as parts of a great connected, homogenous system, or a single and complete statutory 
arrangement.”  Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 405, 100 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1957) (quoting 
50 Am. Jur. Statutes § 349).  Code § 11-2, entitled “When written evidence required to maintain 
action,” more commonly known as the Statute of Frauds, sets forth limitations on oral contracts 
under some circumstances.  A third-party beneficiary cannot sue upon an oral promise to answer 
for his or her debt, for example.  Code § 11-2(4).  However, there is no prohibition in Code § 11-
2 on the ability of third-party beneficiaries to sue upon oral contracts generally.  To so hold 
would be to judicially amend the Statute of Frauds, an action we decline to take. 
Neither the complaint in this case nor the final order invoke or rely on Code § 55-22.  
This issue is raised only on demurrer by Thorsen, who sought to apply Code § 55-22 due to his 
belief that it prohibited oral contracts and no common law cause of action existed. 
Because the RSPCA had the authority to proceed under common law as a third-party 
beneficiary of an oral contract, and the circuit court had the authority to enter judgment 
 
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accordingly, and nothing in the pleadings frustrates this authority, we therefore conclude that the 
demurrer was properly overruled and proceed to the next assignment of error. 
B. Standing 
Thorsen next assigns error to the circuit court’s holding that the RSPCA has standing to 
sue for breach of contract while not party to the attorney-client relationship.  Standing is a 
question of law which we review de novo.  Kelley v. Stamos, 285 Va. 68, 73, 737 S.E.2d 218, 
220 (2013). 
This assignment of error requires us to consider two legal components:  first, whether 
Virginia recognizes a cause of action for breach of contract against attorneys by third-party 
testamentary beneficiaries, and, if so, whether the RSPCA’s pleadings were sufficient to accord 
it standing as a third-party beneficiary of the attorney-client contract. 
1. The Cause of Action 
While, as a general rule, strangers to a contract acquire no rights under such contract, 
third-party beneficiary contracts represent a well-recognized exception in our law under which a 
nonparty can nevertheless enforce the contract under certain circumstances.  13 Williston on 
Contracts § 37:1, at 14-15 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1990 & 2013 rev.); see supra Part II.A.  
A primary rationale for supporting third-party beneficiary claims was that donee contracts, of 
which testamentary instruments are one example, otherwise could rarely be enforced, as the 
promisee could recover only nominal damages upon nonperformance:  “The party to the contract 
would have no action for its breach except nominal damages since he was not the one who 
suffered by the promisor’s default.  If the beneficiary could not sue there could be no adequate 
recovery even though the breach was established.”  Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291 of Int’l 
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 204 F.2d 495, 497 (3d Cir. 1953).  Thus, “through this travail . . . the 
 
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common law has given birth to a distinct, new principle of law which takes its own place in the 
family of legal principles, and gives not only to a donee beneficiary, but also to a creditor 
beneficiary, the right to enforce directly the promise from which he derives his interest.”  Id.  
(quoting 2 Williston on Contracts § 357 (rev. ed. 1936) (alteration omitted).  “[A]s stated in one 
leading decision: ‘The tendency of American authority is to sustain the gift in all such cases and 
to permit the donee-beneficiary to recover on the contract.’”  13 Williston on Contracts § 37:13, 
at 134 (Richard A. Lord, ed., 4th ed. 2013) (quoting Seaver v. Ransom, 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 
1918)). 
The Supreme Court of the United States held in National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 
U.S. 195, 205-07 (1880), that a bank could not recover as against an attorney for negligence in 
examining title to the property when the attorney’s clients and not the bank had retained the 
attorney to conduct the title search, due to lack of privity between the attorney and the bank: 
Beyond all doubt, the general rule is that the obligation of the attorney is to his 
client and not to a third party, and unless there is something in the circumstances 
of this case to take it out of that general rule, it seems clear that the proposition of 
the defendant must be sustained. 
. . . . 
Analogous cases . . . show to a demonstration that it is not every one who suffers 
a loss from the negligence of another that can maintain a suit on such grounds. 
On the contrary, the limit of the doctrine relating to actionable negligence, says 
Beasley, C. J., is, that the person occasioning the loss must owe a duty, arising 
from contract or otherwise, to the person sustaining such loss. 
 
Id. at 200, 202 (citation omitted).  While this rule remains throughout many aspects of the 
attorney-client relationship, courts in the majority of our sister states have recognized some form 
of cause of action against negligent drafters of estate instruments by frustrated beneficiaries, 
through contract or tort principles, or both.1  In Virginia, “an action for the negligence of an 
                     
1 See, e.g., Fickett v. Super. Ct., 558 P.2d 988, 990 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Lucas v. 
Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 & n.2 (Cal. 1961); Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 84 (Conn. 1981); 
 
8 
attorney in the performance of professional duties, while sounding in tort, is an action for breach 
of contract.”  Oleyar v. Kerr, 217 Va. 88, 90, 225 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1976).  In the 
Commonwealth, the cause of action alleged today therefore lies in contract, and the exception to 
the privity rule lies there as well. 
Indeed, this Court is among those which have previously addressed the privity 
requirement in terms of the attorney-client relationship in Copenhaver v. Rogers, 238 Va. 361, 
384 S.E.2d 593 (1989), in which grandchildren who were remaindermen under their 
grandparents’ testamentary trust were precluded from bringing a legal malpractice action.  The 
fatal aspect of the claim, however, was that they had asserted they were intended beneficiaries of 
the estate rather than intended beneficiaries of the contract.  Id. at 369, 371, 384 S.E.2d at 597-
98. 
“In order to proceed on the third-party beneficiary contract theory, the party claiming the 
benefit must show that the parties to a contract ‘clearly and definitely intended’ to confer a 
benefit upon him.”  Id. at 367, 384 S.E.2d at 596 (citing Allen v. Lindstrom, 237 Va. 489, 500, 
379 S.E.2d 450, 457 (1989)).  While a party may reap a benefit from an estate, such party may 
                                                                  
Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C. 1983); Passell v. Watts, 794 So.2d 651, 652-
53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 462 (Haw. 2001); Ogle v. Fuiten, 466 
N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ill. 1984); Walker v. Lawson, 526 N.E.2d 968, 968 (Ind. 1988); Schreiner v. 
Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987); Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So.2d 419, 425 (La. Ct. 
App. 1971); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 51 (Kan. 1990); Mieras v. DeBona, 550 N.W.2d 
202, 211 (Mich. 1996); Francis v. Piper, 597 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Donahue 
v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 629 (Mo. 1995); Simpson v. Calivas, 
650 A.2d 318, 322 (N.H. 1994); Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle, 55 P.3d 1054, 1062 (Okla. 2002); Hale v. 
Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or. 1987); Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983); 
Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 141 (S.C. 2014); Persche v. Jones, 387 N.W.2d 32, 35-36 
(S.D. 1986); Powers v. Hayes, 776 A.2d 374, 375 (Vt. 2001); Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 
331 N.W.2d 325, 328 (Wis. 1983); Stangland v. Brock, 747 P.2d 464, 467-68 (Wash. 1987).  
See also Riser v. Livsey, 227 S.E.2d 88, 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Hargett v. Holland, 447 S.E.2d 
784, 786 (N.C. 1994); Jaramillo v. Hood, 601 P.2d 66, 67 (N.M. 1979) (recognizing a cause of 
action but finding that the statute of limitations had run). 
 
9 
not proceed in Virginia against one who negligently drafted testamentary documents without 
showing that the party was a “clearly and definitely intended” beneficiary of the contract to draft 
the testamentary documents.  Id. at 368-69, 384 S.E.2d at 596-97.  By way of illustration, the 
Court in Copenhaver offered these polar hypotheticals: 
There is a critical difference between being the intended beneficiary of an 
estate and being the intended beneficiary of a contract between a lawyer and his 
client.  A set of examples will illustrate the point:  A client might direct his 
lawyer to put his estate in order and advise his lawyer that he really does not care 
what happens to his money except that he wants the government to get as little of 
it as possible.  Given those instructions, a lawyer might devise an estate plan with 
various features, including inter vivos trusts to certain relatives, specific 
bequests. . . [and] many people and institutions might be beneficiaries of the 
estate, but none could fairly be described as beneficiaries of the contract between 
the client and his attorney because the intent of that arrangement was to avoid 
taxes as much as possible.  By contrast, a client might direct his lawyer to put his 
estate in order and advise his lawyer that his one overriding intent is to ensure 
that each of his grandchildren receive one million dollars at his death and that 
unless the lawyer agrees to take all steps necessary to ensure that each grandchild 
receives the specified amount, the client will take his legal business elsewhere.  
In this second example, if the lawyer agrees to comply with these specific 
directives, one might fairly argue each grandchild is an intended beneficiary of 
the contract between the client and the lawyer. 
 
Id.  Because the Copenhavers “never alleged that their grandparents and Rogers entered a 
contract of which they were intended beneficiaries,” they had no claim.  Id. 
 
The above authority reflects this Court’s understanding, nearly three decades ago, that 
the specific agreement between a testator client and an attorney concerning the drafting of a will 
could establish an intended third-party beneficiary, while specifically acknowledging the 
difficulty in proving third-party beneficiary status under such circumstances.  Id. at 371, 384 
S.E.2d at 598. 
“The essence of a third-party beneficiary’s claim is that others have agreed between 
themselves to bestow a benefit upon the third party but one of the parties to the agreement fails 
to uphold his part of the bargain.”  Id. at 367, 384 S.E.2d at 596.  In short, there is an agreement 
 
10 
out of which arises an obligation to benefit a third party, the breach of which causes damages to 
that third party.  Accordingly, “where the intent to benefit the plaintiff is clear and the promisee 
(testator) is unable to enforce the contract,” our precedent recognizes a cause of action among 
the narrow class of third-party beneficiaries to enforce claims which would otherwise have no 
recourse for failed legacies resulting from attorney malpractice.  Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 
132, 140 (S.C. 2014) (quoting Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 747 (Pa. 1983)). 
Four years later, our holding in Ward v. Ernst & Young reinforced this understanding.  In 
Ward, in the context of accountants, this Court permitted the privity requirement to be satisfied 
by a showing that a nonparty is a third-party beneficiary of the contract:  the Court held that the 
circuit court had improperly granted a motion to strike plaintiff’s evidence at the close of 
plaintiff’s proof on the amended pleading, because the evidence, taken in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, “was fully sufficient to raise a jury question” on the claim that the 
contracting parties intended to benefit the plaintiff.  246 Va. at 332, 435 S.E.2d at 636.  See 
Bank of Am. v. Musselman, Bowling, Franklin & Co., 240 F.Supp. 2d 547, 553-54 (E.D. Va. 
2003) (“[P]rivity of contract is required where, as here, a non-party to a contract for . . . 
accounting services seeks damages for an economic loss resulting from the accountant’s 
allegedly negligent performance. . . .  [H]owever, the privity requirement may be satisfied 
through a showing by the non-party that he is a third-party beneficiary of the contract.” (citing 
Ward and other Virginia authority)).2   In Ward, the Court also declined to distinguish between 
attorneys and accountants as to privity requirements, because both are “licensed to invite the 
                     
 
2 While it has become commonplace for American courts to adopt the language that the 
third-party beneficiary relationship establishes privity, in that it implies the necessary obligation, 
it is more precise to state that the relationship dispenses with the need for strict privity.  13 
Williston on Contracts § 37:1, at 24 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1990 & 2013 rev.) (citing 
Anderson v. Rexroad, 266 P.2d 320 (Kan. 1954)). 
 
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public to rely on their professional competence, and they are regulated and disciplined in the 
performance of services to those who accept their invitation.”  246 Va. at 326, 435 S.E.2d at 
632. 
 
Thorsen argues that Johnson v. Hart, 279 Va. 617, 692 S.E.2d 239 (2010), overrules 
Copenhaver.  Yet Johnson applies specifically to an attempt to bring suit under Code § 8.01-13, 
pertaining to assigns and beneficial owners.  The appeal concerned whether a sole testamentary 
beneficiary could bring a legal malpractice action in her own name against the attorney for the 
estate for negligent services rendered.  Id. at 622, 692 S.E.2d at 240.  Because the attorney-client 
relationship existed between the attorney and the estate, id. at 621, 692 S.E.2d 241, Johnson 
never argued that she was an intended third-party beneficiary.  Johnson sought to bring suit as a 
beneficial owner under Code § 8.01-13, but the Court found that such action was barred by the 
rule prohibiting assignment of legal malpractice actions in the Commonwealth.  Id. at 626, 692 
S.E.2d at 244.  We thus find the holding in Johnson inapplicable to the question before this 
Court today. 
 
“[I]mposing an avenue for recourse in the beneficiary, where the client is deceased, is 
effectively enforcing the client’s intent, and the third party is in privity with the attorney.”  
Fabian, 765 S.E.2d at 140 (recognizing legal malpractice cause of action in estate planning 
derived on a third-party beneficiary theory, among other theories).  Indeed, many of our sister 
states recognize that contracts made for the benefit of a third-party testamentary beneficiary 
provide that party with a cause of action against an attorney for damages incurred due to breach 
of contract in the nature of professional negligence.  See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 
689 & n.2 (Cal. 1961); Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 84 (Conn. 1981); Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 
462 (Haw. 2001); McLane v. Russell, 546 N.E.2d 499, 501-502 (Ill. 1989); Walker v. Lawson, 
 
12 
526 N.E.2d 968, 968 (Ind. 1988); Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So.2d 419, 425 (La. Ct. App. 
1971); Simpson v. Calivas, 650 A.2d 318, 322 (N.H. 1994); Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle, 55 P.3d 
1054, 1062 (Okla. 2002); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or. 1987); Guy v. Liederbach, 
459 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983); Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 140 (S.C. 2014); Stangland v. 
Brock, 747 P.2d 464, 467-68 (Wash. 1987).  Because this cause of action requires that one of the 
primary purposes for the establishment of the attorney-client relationship is to benefit the 
nonclient,3 the scope of such claims is necessarily limited; as this Court has previously stated, “it 
will no doubt be difficult for a litigant, in a case of this kind, to meet the requirements of third-
party beneficiary claims.”  Copenhaver, 238 Va. at 371, 384 S.E.2d at 598.  Indeed, it has 
proved so difficult that this Court has not seen another such case in the nearly three decades 
from Copenhaver until this day. 
2. Allegations of Third-Party Beneficiary Status 
The only element in dispute regarding standing is the RSPCA’s status as a third-party 
beneficiary.  A nonparty must allege facts sufficient to conclude it was a “clearly and definitely 
intended beneficiary” of the contract; “[a]n incidental beneficiary has no standing to sue.”  Kelly 
Health Care, Inc., v. Prudential Ins. Co., 226 Va. 376, 380, 309 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1983) (citing 
Valley Landscape Co. v. Rolland, 218 Va. 257, 260, 237 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1977)).  We will 
accordingly limit the scope of our discussion to this element of the claim.  An incidental 
beneficiary is so far removed from the obligations assumed by the contracting parties that a court 
will not allow him to sue on that contract, whereas an intended beneficiary is such an integral 
part of the obligations assumed by the contracting parties that a court will permit him to sue on 
                     
 
3 Cf. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 51 (2000) (describing the 
circumstances giving rise to a duty of care when professional negligence lies in tort, yet 
analogous to the reasoning underlying a duty to third-party nonclient beneficiaries when 
professional negligence sounds in tort but arises from a contractual agreement). 
 
13 
that contract.  Radosevic v. Virginia Intermont College, 651 F.Supp. 1037, 1038 (W.D. Va. 
1987). 
In the complaint, the RSPCA alleges that, “In engaging Mr. Thorsen’s legal services . . . 
Ms. Dumville informed Mr. Thorsen . . . in the event that her mother predeceased her . . . to 
designate the RSPCA as the sole beneficiary of all of her property.”  The RSPCA alleges that 
“Mr. Thorsen was informed that Ms. Dumville sought to bestow a benefit on the RSPCA by 
leaving all of her property to this one recipient in the event her mother predeceased her”; that, 
“[w]hen agreeing to prepare [the will,]” and “as part of his Contract,” Thorsen specifically 
agreed to draft the will as instructed by Dumville for the sole benefit of the RSCPA in the event 
that her mother predeceased her; that it was clear to both Dumville and Thorsen that the RSPCA 
was “an intended beneficiary of the Contract;” and that Dumville was “assured by Mr. Thorsen 
that he had written the Will to meet her testamentary intent to leave all of her property to the 
RSPCA in the event that her mother predeceased her” before she executed the will. 
Here, the facts sufficiently allege that the contract was entered into for the benefit of 
Dumville’s mother and the RSPCA.  The RSPCA sufficiently alleges that Dumville “sought to 
confer a benefit” to the RSPCA upon her death; that she sought Thorsen’s professional expertise 
to accomplish this task; that Dumville and Thorsen contracted so that Dumville would confer a 
benefit, and that Thorsen accepted that obligation, thus creating the clear and definite intent to 
create a benefit to the RSPCA.  When, according to the allegations, Thorsen accepted the 
contract to prepare Dumville’s will as she specified, the RSPCA became not only the intended 
beneficiary of Dumville’s will but also the intended beneficiary of her contract of employment 
with Thorsen.  Copenhaver, 238 Va. at 368-69, 384 S.E.2d at 596-97.  In sum, despite the 
 
14 
practical difficulties in being able to prove such a case, the RSPCA alleges many of the elements 
set forth in the successful Copenhaver hypothetical. 
Accordingly, while we have suggested in the past that such a cause of action could exist 
under properly pled facts, today we affirmatively acknowledge the RSPCA’s pleading as 
sufficient to allege a cause of action for breach of contract-professional negligence on behalf of a 
third-party beneficiary of the contract between the testator and her attorney.  The RSPCA has 
standing to proceed. 
C. Contingent, Residuary Beneficiaries as Third Party Beneficiaries 
Thorsen next argues that a contingent, residuary beneficiary to a will cannot be a “clearly 
and definitely intended” third-party beneficiary as a matter of law.  We disagree. 
Thorsen seeks to remove factual matters properly within the province of the trial court, 
thus creating a per se rule against certain classes of testamentary beneficiaries.  The class of 
beneficiary in a will is one of many factors to be considered in weighing whether the nonparty 
was a “clearly and definitely intended beneficiary” to the contract. 
1. Residuary Beneficiaries 
First, we consider the residuary beneficiary, the beneficiary who takes after specific 
bequests.  It is patently obvious that this beneficiary can be a “clearly and definitely intended 
beneficiary” under the law. 
Consider the following example:  a widowed and remarried woman living in a nursing 
home with her husband retains an attorney to create a will for the benefit of her own biological 
son.  She leaves a specific bequest to her husband of her wedding ring and bequeaths the entire 
residue of her estate to her son.  Although the residuary taker, the son receives nearly the entirety 
 
15 
of the estate, and, although there may have been multiple purposes to the will, the son was a 
“clearly and definitely intended beneficiary” of the contract and not an incidental beneficiary. 
Depending on circumstances, a residuary beneficiary may take all of the estate, none of 
the estate, or anything in between.  Evidence may support a finding that the residuary beneficiary 
was clearly and definitely intended by the testator, or may support the conclusion that the 
residuary was an incidental beneficiary, such as if the testator instructed the attorney to select a 
charity for the residuary estate.  Whether the residuary beneficiary is a third-party beneficiary is 
a fact-intensive inquiry; the residuary beneficiary is not precluded from third-party beneficiary 
status as a matter of law.  See Teasdale v. Allen, 520 A.2d 295, 296 (D.C. 1987) (declining “to 
adopt any per se rule that standing may be granted only to those whose precise status as intended 
beneficiaries can be discerned from the four corners of the will itself”); Needham v. Hamilton, 
459 A.2d 1060, 1061 (D.C.1983) (upholding standing in a testamentary malpractice action in 
which the legatee was the residuary beneficiary); Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 746-47 (Pa. 
1983) (finding that a named residuary beneficiary was an intended beneficiary).  See also Lucas 
v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1961) (plaintiffs were would be takers of residual trust); 
Passell v. Watts, 794 So.2d 651, 652 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (plaintiffs were contingent, 
residual beneficiaries); Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle, 55 P.3d 1054, 1055-56 (Okla. 2002) (plaintiffs 
who were unintentionally omitted residual beneficiaries could bring a claim). 
2. Contingent Beneficiaries 
At the time a will is drafted, the testator cannot know or at least could not be certain 
whether any particular contingency will be removed such that a contingent beneficiary will in 
fact take.  Thorsen argues, therefore, that a contingent beneficiary by definition cannot be a 
“definitely intended beneficiary.” 
 
16 
Yet one of the most common scenarios in which parents enter into their first set of 
testamentary instruments shows this to be contrary to reason.  Consider the couple who retains an 
attorney to draft reciprocal wills at the birth of their child.  They will likely name each other as 
the primary beneficiaries, desiring that if something were to happen to only one of them, the 
other would benefit from the will.  The child is a contingent beneficiary, sometimes through a 
trust if a minor and in his or her own name as an adult.  An overriding purpose in entering into 
the contract with the attorney to draft such a will at this time is generally to account for the 
possibility that both parents might perish, perhaps in a common accident, and to provide for the 
child’s long-term care.  Although the surviving spouse remains the primary beneficiary of the 
will, and the child takes only as a contingent beneficiary, this does not alter the fact that the child 
is a “clearly and definitely intended beneficiary” of the contract to draft the will. 
Contrary to Thorsen’s claims, the viability of a third-party contract claim in this context 
does not depend on identifying, or being able to identify, the specific party being benefitted 
when the contract is made.  Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Conn, 272 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1926); see 
also 13 Williston on Contracts § 37:29, at 215 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1990 & 2013 rev.) 
(citing many sources).  Contingent beneficiaries exist to accommodate changing circumstance, 
particularly age, and to direct the progression of beneficiaries without the constant need to revisit 
the instrument as time and eventuality goes by.  Thus, the fact that beneficiaries do not take first 
does not mean that they are not “clearly and definitely intended beneficiar[ies]” under the 
contract, but rather that they were not intended as the first takers given the circumstances at the 
time the will was drafted; yet, the will might still have been drafted, perhaps even primarily as in 
the example above, for their benefit.  See, e.g., Ogle v. Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ill. 1984) 
(allowing a claim from niece and nephew contingent beneficiaries to go forward on a breach of 
 
17 
contract/third-party beneficiary theory); Passell v. Watts, 794 So.2d 651, 652 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001) (plaintiffs were contingent, residuary beneficiaries).  Whether a contingent beneficiary in a 
will is a third-party beneficiary of the contract to draft the will is a fact-intensive inquiry. 
3. Contingent, Residuary Beneficiaries 
As there is no justification for barring contingent or residuary beneficiaries as a matter of 
law from being considered third-party beneficiaries to the attorney-client contract, neither can 
there be justification for barring contingent, residuary beneficiaries as a matter of law.  See 
Passell, 794 So.2d 651, 652.  Determining whether such parties satisfy the requirements for an 
actionable claim is an inquiry properly left to the finder of fact. 
D. Plea in Bar 
The denial of a plea in bar as to the statute of limitations is a question of law that this 
Court reviews do novo.  Van Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457, 460, 699 S.E.2d 480, 281 (2010). 
In Virginia, actions for legal malpractice are actions for breach of contract and are thus 
governed by the limitations periods prescribed for contract claims.  Oleyar, 217 Va. at 90, 225 
S.E.2d at 399.  Code § 8.01-246 states that “actions founded upon a contract . . . shall be brought 
within the following number of years next after the cause of action shall have accrued: . . . 4.  In 
actions upon any unwritten contract, express or implied, within three years.”  (Emphasis added.) 
Code § 8.01-230 states that: 
In every action for which a limitation period is prescribed, the right of action 
shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run 
from the date the injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person or damage 
to property, when the breach of contract occurs in actions ex contractu and not 
when the resulting damage is discovered, except where the relief sought is solely 
equitable or where otherwise provided under Code § 8.01-233, subsection C of 
§ 8.01-245, §§ 8.01-249, 8.01-250 or other statute. 
 
(Emphases added.) 
 
 
18 
Thorsen maintains that, if he breached the contract, it was when he drafted the will, thus 
completing his legal services, on April 16, 2003 (citing MacLellan v. Throckmorton, 235 Va. 
341, 345, 367 S.E.2d 720, 722 (1988) (“[T]he breach of contract or duty occurs and the statute of 
limitations begins to run when the attorney’s services rendered in connection with that particular 
undertaking or transaction have terminated.”)).  In his view, the statute of limitations then 
expired three years later, on April 16, 2006.  We disagree. 
Statutes of limitation do not affect a cause of action; they bar a right of action. The two 
may accrue at the same time, but will not of necessity do so.  First Va. Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 
225 Va. 72, 81-82, 301 S.E.2d 8, 13-14 (1983).  A cause of action is the operative set of facts 
giving rise to a right of action.  Id.; Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 959, 275 
S.E.2d 900, 905 (1981).  “A right of action cannot arise until a cause of action exists because a 
right of action is a remedial right to presently enforce an existing cause of action.”  Van Dam, 
280 Va. at 460, 699 S.E.2d at 481 (citing Shipman v. Kruck, 267 Va. 495, 502, 593 S.E.2d 319, 
322 (2004)).  “Some injury or damage, however slight, is essential to a cause of action.”  Id. at 
463, 699 S.E.2d at 482. 
In the case of a testamentary beneficiary, no injury, however slight, can be sustained prior 
to the testator’s death, because “[a] testator may, during his lifetime, alter his will or other 
testamentary papers as he pleases and whenever he chooses.”  Van Dam, 280 Va. at 462, 699 
S.E.2d at 482. “While [the testator] lives, no beneficiary has anything more than a bare 
expectancy and no person has suffered any injury or damage as a result of his tentative 
dispositions.”  Id. (citing Schilling v. Schilling, 280 Va. 146, 149, 695 S.E.2d 181, 183 (2010)).  
Because of this mutability and bare expectancy, no testamentary beneficiary has a cause of 
action prior to the death of the testator. 
 
19 
In accordance with Code § 8.01-246, the three-year statute of limitations cannot begin to 
run as to the testamentary beneficiary until a cause of action accrues, after the death of the 
testator.  Thus Code § 8.01-246 can, under the proper circumstances in which no injury is 
sustained, provide one of the referenced statutory exceptions to the rule set forth in Code § 8.01-
230 that contractual rights of action accrue at breach.4 
Most courts have allowed both the promisee and the third-party beneficiary to sue to 
enforce the contract.  13 Williston on Contracts § 37:55, at 354 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 
1990 & 2013 rev.).  While both parties have an action against the promisor, there can only be 
one satisfaction, preventing double recovery.  Id. at 355.  This is particularly true of testamentary 
actions. 
We do not today overrule our previous holding in MacLellan, 235 Va. at 345, 367 S.E.2d 
at 722 (holding that the statute of limitations began to run on a divorce attorney’s services when 
that particular undertaking or transaction had terminated).  There, MacLellan received erroneous 
advice on his Property Settlement Agreement, which was entered by the court as part of his 
divorce decree, but suffered monetarily from that harm only years later when his income 
changed.  However, while some injury or damage, however slight, is required for a cause of 
action to accrue, “it is immaterial that all the damages resulting from the injury do not occur at 
the time of the injury.”  Van Dam, 280 Va. at 463, 699 S.E.2d at 482 (emphasis added).  
Although the plaintiff in Van Dam similarly suffered primary monetary damage at the time of 
her ex-husband’s death due to lost survivor benefits, the Court found some initial injury took 
place at the time the divorce decree was entered.  In each instance, the statute of limitations on 
                     
 
4 We note that the primary purpose of Code § 8.01-230 as to contracts is to avoid creating 
a so-called “discovery rule,” and this reading of the two statutes together in no way frustrates 
that purpose.  The requirement of the cause of action is merely that one sustains injury, not that it 
be known. 
 
20 
plaintiff’s right of action ran from the entry of the divorce decree, when the parties’ rights were 
fixed. 
The RSPCA’s position in this case can be distinguished.  It was unable to bring suit in the 
years following the execution of the will:  lacking a vested interest and possessing only a bare 
expectancy, it had no standing to sue.  Not even slight harm or damage accrued to the RSPCA 
until the testator’s death. 
American jurisdictions vary considerably in their approaches to statutes of limitations, 
some permitting the discovery rule to apply to contracts which Virginia’s Code § 8.01-230 
would prohibit.  Nonetheless: 
Courts which have addressed this issue seem to agree that the cause of action 
accrues as [sic] the testator’s death, not at the time of the drafting of, or signing 
of, the will.  This is the time when the attorney’s negligence becomes 
irremediable and the impact of the injury occurs, courts recognize; before a 
testator’s death, the potential beneficiaries possess no recognized legal interest in 
the estate. 
 
Joan Teshima, Annotation, Attorney’s Liability, To One Other Than Immediate Client, For 
Negligence in Connection with Legal Duties, 61 A.L.R. 4th 615, § 5 (1988 & 2015 rev.) (citing 
Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969), Shideler v. Dwyer, 417 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. 1981); Auric 
v. Continental Casualty Co., 331 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1983)). 
Because the RSPCA’s cause of action could not have accrued until the testator’s death, 
we must affirm the trial court’s denial of the plea in bar premised on the statute of limitations. 
E. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Thorsen additionally challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to render a verdict in 
favor of the RSPCA at trial.  Thorsen stipulated at trial that, as Dumville’s attorney and pursuant 
to their agreement, he “had a duty to incorporate Ms. Dumville’s intent into her Will in an 
accurate manner,” that the will he drafted “did not incorporate [her] intentions regarding the 
 
21 
disposition of her property,” that he is “ultimately responsible for the error in [the will],” and “as 
a result of this error, the RSPCA did not receive all of [her] property.”  Accordingly, the only 
element that Thorsen challenges the sufficiency of is whether the RSPCA was an intended third-
party beneficiary of the contract, such that Thorsen’s duty ran not only to Dumville but also to 
the RSPCA. 
On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial.  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. St. John, 259 
Va. 71, 76, 524 S.E.2d 649, 651 (2000); Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. Woodyard, 244 Va. 51, 57, 
419 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1992).  “A judgment should be reversed for insufficient evidence only if it 
is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”  Edmonds v. Edmonds, 290 Va. 10, 18, 772 
S.E.2d 898, 903 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To review the circuit court’s finding 
that the RSPCA was a third-party beneficiary of the contract, we review both the evidence as to 
Dumville’s intent and Thorsen’s intent at the time of the contract to consider whether the 
RSPCA was a “clearly and definitely intended” beneficiary. 
1. Dumville’s Intent 
First, we consider the question of whether the facts were sufficient for a factfinder to 
conclude that, for Dumville, an overriding purpose of the contract was to benefit the RSPCA.  
Thorsen’s answer to an interrogatory from the prior collateral proceeding stated:  “The decedent 
was clear in her instructions to Thorsen . . . that she wanted her entire estate to go to her mother 
and if her mother predeceased her, then her entire estate be to the Richmond SPCA.  These were 
her instructions and intentions at the time of the initial interview and the creation of her last will 
and testament and throughout the drafting period.”  The RSPCA introduced a letter from Thorsen 
to the title insurance company stating: 
 
22 
 [I]t was the clear intent of Alice and the intent in my drafting, to make a full and 
complete conveyance of Alice’s estate to her mother if she survived Alice, and if 
not, a full and complete bequeath/conveyance of all of Alice’s entire estate to the 
RSPCA.  Moreover, I had no idea Alice had any relative other than her mother, 
and did not become aware of Ms. Boyles [sic] until sometime after [Dumville’s 
mother] died. 
 
The parties stipulated that Dumville was forty-three and her mother was in her late seventies or 
early eighties when the will was drafted.  Thorsen testified that he was aware that Dumville had a 
relationship with the RSPCA, had an affinity for the organization, and wanted her cats to go to 
the RSPCA after her death.  Thorsen testified in the previous matter that these three cats “were 
her babies” and she “probably cared for her cats more than she did herself.”  Finally, although 
there is error in the drafting, the RSPCA is named specifically in the will instrument. 
Thorsen testified in the current proceeding that Dumville’s motivation for creating a will 
was in part to disinherit her husband while divorce proceedings were underway.  However, in the 
prior 2009 proceeding, he stated that “it would not have been a consideration,” and he “did not 
discuss with [Dumville] any issue of her husband’s rights of intestacy.” 
The circuit court found Thorsen’s answers in the 2009 proceeding credible.  The 
factfinder is entitled to consider the nature and content of the instrument as evidence and draw 
reasonable inferences arising therefrom.  Here, a single woman with an uncomplicated estate 
created a simple will devising her entire estate to the only relative with whom evidence suggests 
she had a close relationship, her elderly mother, or, if her mother predeceased her, a charity with 
which she had a preexisting relationship, upon her death.  It is a fair inference that the client 
entered into a contract to draft a will for the purpose of benefiting one of those parties upon her 
death.  Given the deference afforded to the factfinder, we find no error in the circuit court’s 
conclusion that the primary or overriding purpose of the contract was for the benefit of the will 
beneficiaries. 
 
23 
The evidence was also sufficient to support Dumville’s intent for the RSPCA specifically 
to benefit.  There was testimony as to her relationship with the RSPCA, supporting the RSPCA 
as a purposeful choice.  The ages of Dumville and her mother at the time the will was drafted 
make it not unlikely and, in fact, foreseeable that Dumville’s mother would predecease her and 
the RSPCA would take the entirety of Dumville’s estate.  Finally, in the case of a residuary 
charitable beneficiary, affirmatively being named in the instrument lends additional support to 
the testator’s clear and definite intention to benefit the charity in her contract with her attorney 
and his understanding of that obligation. 5  Taking these facts together, we find no error in the 
trial court’s finding of sufficient evidence to conclude that Dumville clearly and definitely 
intended the RSPCA to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract. 
2. Thorsen’s Intent 
Thorsen alleges that there was no evidence that Thorsen agreed to benefit the RSPCA in 
entering into the retention agreement to draft the will, and so the RSPCA cannot be a third-party 
beneficiary of the contract.  A third-party beneficiary rule “has no application unless the party 
sought to be held liable has assumed an obligation for the benefit of the third party.”  Valley 
Landscape Co., 218 Va. at 259-60, 237 S.E.2d at 122.  Thorsen argues that, in the Copenhaver 
hypothetical, this Court explicitly included a requirement that a lawyer comply with the testator’s 
specific directives at the outset of their retention.  238 Va. at 369, 384 S.E.2d at 597.  Thorsen 
desires the Court to distinguish between the obligation undertaken to make a will in a retention 
agreement and the obligation to benefit the parties in the will. 
                     
5 Here, it is equally important to note what we do not decide today: while naming may in 
some cases support intention, failure to name does not necessarily indicate lack of intention, such 
as in the case of an intentional bequest to the substantially defined but open class of “my 
children,” a term invoked in many wills to include after-born children. 
 
24 
We disagree that Copenhaver requires some specific language in the contract between a 
testator and her attorney that the lawyer must comply with her directives or there will be no 
contract, and we do not find this cause of action necessarily so limited.  The Copenhaver 
hypothetical indeed emphasizes that mutual understanding of the benefit to the third party is 
essential to the contract.  Id. at 369, 384 S.E.2d at 597 (e.g., “unless the lawyer agrees . . . the 
client will take his legal business elsewhere”; “if the lawyer agrees to comply with these specific 
directives”).  Yet, the agreement to comply with specific directives is implied when the client 
contracts with the attorney to perform a specific service which the attorney then undertakes to 
perform.  We cannot separate the obligations of the client’s intent from the agreement because, 
without the intent and the assent to take on those specific directives, there would be no retention 
agreement. 
For this reason, when a client can terminate a contract at any time, a client’s request six 
months into an attorney-client relationship to make a third party his or her beneficiary has the 
same weight as a request on the first day of the relationship:  refusal of the attorney to draft the 
will according to his or her wishes would likewise result in the termination of the attorney-client 
relationship.  Thus, we do not find it necessary to prove that this mutual assent was expressed 
prior to retention, but rather that, prior to the completion of the attorney’s services, the attorney 
became aware of the directives of the client and agreed to undertake the obligation. 
There may be many reasons for drafting a testamentary instrument which would not 
result in the creation of third-party beneficiaries to the attorney-client contract.  But the evidence 
in this case supports the trial court’s finding that Dumville went to Thorsen to draft a will for the 
purpose of benefiting her mother and the RSPCA.  The parties stipulated that, at the end of their 
initial meeting regarding preparation of the will, “Thorsen understood that Ms. Dumville wanted 
 
25 
him to prepare a Will which would accurately incorporate and effectuate Ms. Dumville’s 
decisions as to the distribution of her estate upon her death, i.e. that upon her death all of her 
property would be left to her mother if her mother survived her, and in the event her mother 
predeceased her, all of her property would be left to the RSPCA.”  Thorsen stated under oath 
that “There was no doubt in my mind what she wanted in terms of the will, no doubt what she 
expressed.”  In that meeting, which Thorsen testified was their only meeting regarding the will 
prior to his drafting, Thorsen agreed to draft a will according to those specifications.  We find no 
error below. 
Thus, taking these findings together as a whole, we find no error in the trial court’s 
holding that the RSPCA was a clearly and definitely identified third-party beneficiary of the 
contract. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, dissenting. 
 
 
Because the rule of strict privity in legal malpractice actions has not been abolished in 
Virginia, I would hold that the Richmond Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
(“RSPCA”) does not have standing to sue for breach of the legal services agreement between 
Alice Louise Cralle Dumville and James B. Thorsen.  The determination of whether to abolish 
the common law privity requirement is a policy decision that should be made by the General 
Assembly, not this Court.  Therefore, I dissent. 
 
“Virginia has adopted the strict privity doctrine in legal malpractice cases.”  Johnson v. 
Hart, 279 Va. 617, 624, 692 S.E.2d 239, 243 (2010).  In fact, “the common law has long 
 
26 
provided that [a legal malpractice action] requires the existence of an attorney-client relationship 
as a threshold requirement.”   Id. at 626, 692 S.E.2d at 244.  The requirement of privity is 
grounded in the “‘highly confidential and fiduciary relationship between an attorney and client’” 
and “‘safeguards the attorney-client relationship which is an indispensable component of our 
adversarial system of justice.’”  Id.  at 625, 692 S.E.2d at 243 (quoting MNC Credit Corp. v. 
Sickels, 255 Va. 314, 318-19, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333-34 (1998)).  We have held that this policy 
underlying the requirement of privity “precludes a testamentary beneficiary from maintaining, in 
her own name, a legal malpractice action against an attorney with whom an attorney-client 
relationship never existed.”  Id. at 625, 692 S.E.2d at 244.1 
 
“By statute in Virginia, it is provided that: ‘Every attorney at law shall be liable to his 
client for any damage sustained by him by the neglect of his duty as such attorney.’”  Glenn v. 
Haynes, 192 Va. 574, 580, 66 S.E.2d 509, 512 (1951) (emphasis added) (quoting former Code § 
54-46, predecessor to Code § 54.1-3906); see Code § 54.1-3906 (“Every attorney shall be liable 
to his client for any damage sustained by the client through the neglect of his duty as such 
attorney.” (emphasis added); Ripper v. Bain, 253 Va. 197, 202, 482 S.E.2d 832, 835 (1997) (“An 
attorney is liable to the client for damages caused by the attorney’s negligence.”) (citing Code § 
54.1-3906).  The General Assembly has dispensed with the requirement of privity to allow 
actions resulting from legal malpractice concerning an irrevocable trust where a legal services 
contract existed between the grantor of the trust and the attorney prior to the grantor’s death.  See 
                     
 
1 The majority concludes that the “holding” in Johnson is “inapplicable” because the 
testamentary beneficiary pursued her claim as a beneficial owner under Code § 8.01-13 and 
“never argued that she was an intended third-party beneficiary.”  Yet, the majority’s conclusion 
ignores the ratio decidendi for the Court’s holding in Johnson – the common law requirement of 
the existence of an attorney-client relationship to maintain a legal malpractice action and the 
underlying policy of such requirement, which also precludes assignment of legal malpractice 
claims. 
 
27 
Code § 64.2-520(B) (permitting action for damages to the grantor, the estate, or the trust, by the 
grantor’s personal representative or the trustee if such damages are incurred after the grantor’s 
death).2  The General Assembly has not abolished the common law requirement of privity for 
any other legal malpractice actions. 
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, this Court did not abandon the requirement of 
privity in legal malpractice actions in Copenhaver v. Rogers, 238 Va. 361, 384 S.E.2d 593 
(1989).  Although, in that case, the Court discussed cases from other jurisdictions that have 
permitted third-party beneficiary claims against attorneys and ultimately ruled that the claim of 
the beneficiaries in Copenhaver did not meet traditional rules governing third-party beneficiary 
claims, the Court did not address the issue of whether the common law requirement of privity in 
legal malpractice actions has been, or should be, abandoned in Virginia to accommodate third-
party beneficiary claims against attorneys.  This issue is squarely before the Court in this case 
and demands a careful and thorough discussion of the policies underlying the requirement of 
strict privity and the role this Court should play in determining whether this common law 
requirement should be abolished.3 
                     
 
2 The statute provides that “[a]n action for damages, including future tax liability, to the 
grantor, his estate or his trust, resulting from legal malpractice concerning an irrevocable 
trust shall accrue upon completion of the representation in which the malpractice occurred.”  
Code § 64.2-520(B) (emphasis added).  “An action for damages pursuant to this section in which 
a written contract for legal services existed between the grantor and the defendant shall be 
brought within five years after the cause of action accrues” and “[a]n action for damages 
pursuant to this section in which an unwritten contract for legal services existed between the 
grantor and the defendant shall be brought within three years after the cause of action accrues.”  
Id.    
 
3 Despite the majority’s implication otherwise, the Court in Ward v. Ernst & Young, 246 
Va. 317, 435 S.E.2d 628 (1993), made no comparison between accountants and attorneys in its 
analysis of the third-party beneficiary claim in that case.  In fact, the Court did not discuss the 
privity requirement in legal malpractice actions or even cite to Copenhaver in the context of its 
discussion of that claim. 
 
28 
 
The abolishment of the common law requirement of privity in legal malpractice actions 
presents competing public policy concerns.  While acknowledging the need to have attorney 
accountability in the area of estate planning, many state courts have refused to abandon the 
privity requirement in actions for legal malpractice in this context.  See, e.g., Robinson v. 
Benton, 842 So.2d 631, 637 (Ala. 2002) (“[W]e decline to change the rule of law in this state that 
bars an action for legal malpractice against a lawyer by a plaintiff for whom the lawyer has not 
undertaken a duty.”); Baker v. Wood, Ris & Hames, PC, 364 P.3d 872, 882 (Colo. 2016) 
(extending third-party beneficiary theory of contract liability to legal malpractice claims by 
intended beneficiaries of a will “is contrary to each of the settled policies underlying the strict 
privity rule to which Colorado courts have long adhered, and we perceive no justifiable policy 
reason for so extending attorney liability”); Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1275 (Md. Ct. App. 
1998) (“We decline the beneficiaries’ invitation to create a new rule in Maryland governing 
attorney liability to nonclients arising out of will drafting or estate planning.”);  Schneider v. 
Finmann, 933 N.E.2d 718, 721 (N.Y.  2010) (“[S]trict privity remains a bar against beneficiaries’ 
and other third-party individuals’ estate planning malpractice claims absent fraud or other 
circumstances.”); Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, 887 N.E.2d 1167, 1172 (Ohio 2008) (“While 
recognizing that public-policy reasons exist on both sides of the issue, we conclude that the 
bright-line rule of privity remains beneficial.  The rule provides for certainty in estate planning 
and preserves an attorney’s loyalty to the client.”); Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. 
1996) (“We therefore hold that an attorney retained by a testator or settlor to draft a will or trust 
owes no professional duty of care to persons named as beneficiaries under the will or trust.”). 
 
Chief among the policy reasons underlying the rule of privity is the preservation of the 
sanctity of the attorney-client relationship.  “Primarily, the [privity] rule is used to protect the 
 
29 
attorney’s duty of loyalty and the attorney’s effective advocacy for the client.”  Shoemaker, 887 
N.E.2d at 1171.  “The strict privity rule ensures that attorneys may represent their clients without 
the threat of suit from third parties who may compromise that representation.  Otherwise, an 
attorney’s preoccupation or concern with potential negligence claims by third parties might 
diminish the quality of legal services provided to the client if the attorney were to weigh the 
client’s interests against the possibility of third-party lawsuits.”  Id.; see also Baker, 364 P.3d at 
877 (“[L]imiting an attorney’s liability to his or her clients protects the attorney’s duty of loyalty 
to and effective advocacy for the client.”); Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 578-79 (preserving a bright-
line privity rule “will ensure that attorneys may in all cases zealously represent their clients 
without the threat of suit from third parties compromising that representation”).4 
The privity rule also serves to protect against the potential for conflicting duties owed to 
clients and third parties by the attorney.  “[E]xpanding attorney liability to non-clients could 
result in adversarial relationships between an attorney and third parties and thus give rise to 
conflicting duties on the part of the attorney.”  Baker, 364 P.3d at 877.  “Such conflicting duties 
and loyalties, in turn, could constrain the attorney’s ability to represent his or her client 
                     
 
4 Discussing the scenario in which an attorney may have delayed in ensuring a will was 
properly executed, the Supreme Court of Texas observed: 
 
In most cases where a defect renders a will or trust invalid, however, there are 
concomitant questions as to the true intentions of the testator.  Suppose, for 
example, that a properly drafted will is simply not executed at the time of the 
testator’s death.  The document may express the testator’s true intentions, lacking 
signatures solely because of the attorney’s negligent delay.  On the other hand, the 
testator may have postponed execution because of second thoughts regarding the 
distribution scheme.  In the latter situation, the attorney’s representation of the 
testator will likely be affected if he or she knows that the existence of an 
unexecuted will may create malpractice liability if the testator unexpectedly dies. 
 
The Court stated, “we are unable to craft a bright-line rule that allows a lawsuit to proceed where 
alleged malpractice causes a will or trust to fail in a manner that casts no real doubt on the 
testator’s intentions, while prohibiting actions in other situations.”  Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 578. 
 
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properly.”  Id.  Thus, “without the strict privity rule, the attorney could have conflicting duties 
and divided loyalties during the estate planning process.”  Shoemaker, 887 N.E.2d at 1171. 
 
The abandonment of privity in legal malpractice actions also raises justifiable concerns 
over uncertain and unlimited liability as well as the effect on the availability of legal services.  
As the Supreme Court of Colorado noted, “if an attorney’s duty of care were extended to third 
parties, then the attorney could be liable to an unforeseeable and unlimited number of people.”  
Baker, 364 P.3d at 878.  “The impact of an expansion of attorney liability to third parties would 
not be limited to the attorneys.  As other courts have recognized, an expansion of attorney 
liability to allow claims by non-clients could deter attorneys from undertaking certain legal 
matters, thus compromising the interests of potential clients by making it more difficult for them 
to obtain legal services.”  Id.; see also Schneider, 933 N.E.2d at 721 (“Relaxing privity to permit 
third parties to commence professional negligence actions against estate planning attorneys 
would produce undesirable results--uncertainty and limitless liability.”); Shoemaker, 887 N.E.2d 
at 1171 (observing that without the privity requirement “there would be unlimited potential 
liability for the lawyer”). 
 
In the context of estate planning services, the abandonment of the privity doctrine is 
particularly troublesome since, under the majority’s holding that the cause of action for legal 
malpractice accrues on the date of the client’s death, an attorney may be held liable for 
malpractice decades after the testamentary documents were drafted for the client.5  In general, 
when the alleged legal malpractice consists of a single, isolated act, the statute of limitations 
                     
 
5 In contrast, in the one instance in which the General Assembly has dispensed with the 
requirement of privity to permit a legal malpractice action by a nonclient, the General Assembly 
has provided that the action “shall accrue upon completion of the representation in which the 
malpractice occurred.”  Code § 64.2-520(B) (emphasis added) (permitting action for damages to 
the grantor, the estate, or the trust, by the grantor’s personal representative or the trustee if such 
damages are incurred after the grantor’s death). 
 
31 
begins to run when the act is performed.  Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512, 518, 352 S.E.2d 327, 
330 (1987); see Code § 8.01-230.  When a course of professional services takes place over a 
period of time, the statute of limitations begins to run when the attorney’s services related to that 
particular undertaking ended.  Id.  Yet, as this Court has observed, “[a] testator may, during his 
lifetime, alter his will or other testamentary papers as he pleases and whenever he chooses.”  Van 
Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457, 462, 699 S.E.2d 480, 482 (2010).  Thus, while the testator lives, “no 
beneficiary has anything more than a bare expectancy and no person has suffered any injury or 
damage as a result of his tentative dispositions.”  Id.  Following this logic, the majority 
concludes that since third-party beneficiaries of a legal services agreement to draft a will suffer 
no damage until the testator’s death, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until 
testator’s death.  Thus, attorneys in Virginia will now be subject to liability to nonclients for 
malpractice in connection with the preparation of testamentary documents for an indefinite, and 
potentially lengthy, period of time after the preparation of such documents. 
 
In my view, the decision of whether to abolish the privity requirement in legal 
malpractice actions and create a new cause of action against attorneys in favor of third-party 
beneficiaries should be left to the legislature.  Although the public’s interest in holding attorneys 
accountable in providing estate planning services is an important consideration, there are 
competing policy concerns raised by the extension of legal malpractice standing to nonclients.   
“The public policy of the Commonwealth is determined by the General Assembly [because] it is 
the responsibility of the legislature, and not the judiciary, . . . to strike the appropriate balance 
between competing interests.”  Uniwest Constr., Inc. v. Amtech Elevator Servs., 280 Va. 428, 
440, 699 S.E.2d 223, 229 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  When the 
 
32 
question of whether to recognize a new cause of action involves a multitude of competing 
interests, 
which courts are ill-equipped  to balance, . . . . [o]n the other hand, the 
legislative machinery is specially geared to the task.  A legislative change in 
the law is initiated by introduction of a bill which serves as public notice to 
all concerned.  The legislature serves as a forum for witnesses representing 
interests directly affected by the decision.  The issue is tried and tested in 
the crucible of public debate.  The decision reached by the chosen 
representatives of the people reflects the will of the body politic.  And when 
the decision is likely to disrupt the historic balance of competing values, its 
effective date can be postponed to give the public time to make necessary 
adjustments. 
 
Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, 219 Va. 287, 293, 247 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1978). 
The majority’s decision to recognize this new cause of action represents a radical 
departure from the existing law of legal malpractice in Virginia.  Under the majority opinion, the 
common law requirement of privity in legal malpractice actions is now abolished in Virginia.  
From this date forward, attorneys will owe a legal duty to nonclients by virtue of legal services 
agreements with their clients whenever a “lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the 
primary objectives of the representation that the lawyer’s services benefit the nonclient.”6  In the 
specific context of estate planning in which the cause of action will accrue upon the client’s 
death, attorneys will be subject to liability for malpractice for a period of time that could extend 
well beyond the date that the testamentary documents were drafted.  Such uncertain and 
unlimited liability will undoubtedly deter attorneys from offering estate planning services.  
Additionally, this expansion of liability will likely lead to higher malpractice insurance 
premiums and ultimately affect the ability of potential clients to obtain affordable estate planning 
                     
 
6 Although today’s opinion is rendered in the context of an action resulting from services 
provided in connection with a will, the majority’s discussion, as well as its citation to the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 51 (2000), signals the Court’s intention to 
abolish the requirement of privity in all legal malpractice actions. 
 
33 
services from attorneys who choose to continue to offer such services.  The common law 
requirement of privity in legal malpractice actions may “produce inequities,” but “it is the role of 
the General Assembly, not the courts, to change a rule of law that has been relied upon by the 
bench and bar for many years.”  Van Dam, 280 Va. at 462, 699 S.E.2d at 483. 
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the RSPCA lacked standing to sue Thorsen 
for legal malpractice and would, therefore, reverse the judgment of the circuit court overruling 
the demurrer.