Case Title: Prazma v. Kaehne

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Prazma v. Kaehne1989 WY 38768 P.2d 586Case Number: 87-228Decided: 02/09/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
ED PRAZMA 
AND MARY PRAZMA, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

 
 
v.

 
 
RAYMOND 
KAEHNE AND HELEN KAEHNE, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, CrookCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

 
 
John M. 
Daly of Daly, Anderson & Taylor, P.C., Gillette, for appellants 
(plaintiffs).

 
 
John F. 
Araas of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellees 
(defendants).

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS and URBIGKIT, JJ., 
and GUTHRIE and BROWN, JJ., Retired.

 
 

GUTHRIE, Retired 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
the grant of a motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs' case 
(appellants here). We affirm the trial court's decision.

 
 

[¶2.]     This action involves a 
suit filed by appellants in which they sought an injunction against appellees to 
confirm their right to use a road and to restrain appellees from blocking or 
interfering with the use of the road by appellants and their visitors. 
Additionally, appellants asserted a claim for damages for alleged tortious 
interference with a reasonable contractual expectancy for the sale of their 
ranch.

 
 

[¶3.]     The road which is the 
focus of this appeal is located in CrookCounty. It was originally established by 
agreement between relatives of the parties to this appeal. In 1928, John Prazma, 
father of appellant Ed Prazma, and grandfather of Helen Kaehne, purchased the 
ranch now owned by the appellants from James Nemic. John Prazma encountered 
access problems with James Nemic, Jr., whose ranch lay to the south. 
Consequently, in 1930 Prazma resorted to statutory procedures which permitted 
the county commissioners to establish a road. This road, which crossed land 
owned by James Nemic, led in a southerly direction from Prazma's ranch to what 
was then described as the Custer 
Battlefield Highway (Highway 16), at a point 
approximately five miles west of Moorcroft. The existence of Prazma's road is 
admitted by the pleadings and the evidence, although the southern part has not 
been used since 1932.

 
 

[¶4.]     In 1932, J.B. Prazma, 
who was Helen Kaehne's father, bought the James Nemic, Jr., land, which lay to 
the south of his father's ranch. Because part of the road as established by the 
county commissioner proceedings was blocked by snow at times, and because it 
went through a hay meadow, the Prazmas established a "new" road which ran up to 
a quarter of a mile west of the original road. This road, which was called 
"John's Road," was regularly used by all the parties without objection or 
dispute. This road extended from John's ranch to the highway. The road on to 
J.B.'s ranch remained in its original course. Although there was some bickering 
and disputes with other users of the road, these problems were not based on the 
use of the road, but were directed at the manner of use, i.e., excess speed or 
leaving the right-of-way.

 
 

[¶5.]     It was not until August 
1986 that appellees closed the road between the highway and their place to all 
users. A barricade was erected announcing the closure of this road with an arrow 
pointing east containing the words "Prazma Road," this being an apparent 
reference to the road established by the earlier proceedings before the County 
Commissioners.

 
 

[¶6.]     Thus the battle was 
joined and this litigation ensued.

 
 

[¶7.]     There was no written 
agreement or understanding when the use of the former road was abandoned and 
"John's Road" established, nor was there any testimony of any verbal 
understanding by the parties when this change was made. The closure of the road 
was prompted, among other things, by the claimed refusal of appellants to pay a 
proper share for the maintenance of the section of the road which was used by 
both parties for access to their ranches. No question is raised in connection 
with the other portion of the road.

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellants outline the 
issues in the appeal as follows:

 
 
1. Is there 
an easement by grant?

 
 
2. Is there 
an easement by estoppel?

 
 
3. Is there 
a prescriptive easement?

 
 
4. Is there 
interference with contractual advantage?

 
 

[¶9.]     Appellees assert that 
it is improper for the court to consider whether there is an easement by grant 
or estoppel because these issues were never asserted or presented in the lower 
court and that it would not be proper to now consider them for the first time in 
this appeal.

 
 
EASEMENT BY 
GRANT

 
 

[¶10.]  We need not consider on appeal questions 
not properly raised in the trial court. Ricci v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 721 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wyo. 1986). Insofar as the claim of an 
easement by grant is concerned, there is no citation of authority of any 
character in appellants' brief. They argue that the exact location of the 
original road was left to the determination of the landowners. However, there is 
no support for that in the record, nor are we cognizant of any proceedings for 
the establishment of such a road by county commissioners which would allow such 
procedure.

 
 

[¶11.]  This argument does not reach the dignity 
of proper citation of authority or cogent argument. It has been settled that we 
will not consider such issues in absence of citation or cogent argument. Zanetti 
v. Zanetti, 689 P.2d 1116 (Wyo. 1984).

 
 
EASEMENT BY 
ESTOPPEL

 
 

[¶12.]  Nor can the claim that an easement was 
established by estoppel be properly considered. We find no mention of estoppel 
in the complaint, nor were any facts pleaded upon which an estoppel theory could 
be based. The appellants' pretrial submission sets out only a claim for a 
prescriptive easement and does not mention estoppel. In addition to the general 
rule that we need not consider questions not properly raised in the trial court, 
estoppel is an affirmative defense which must have been pleaded. In response to 
the motion for directed verdict, we find no mention of estoppel nor any claim 
thereof. The case of Fuss v. Franks, 610 P.2d 17, 21 (Wyo. 1980) is decisive in 
this respect. The court there said:

 
 
     We held in Ranger 
Insurance Company v. Cates, 
Wyo., 501 P.2d 1255, 1259 (1972), 
that estoppel must be pleaded (Rule 8(c), W.R.C.P.) with precision and 
certainty, provided, however, that the defense may be relied upon even though 
not pleaded in so many words where the allegations amount to an 
estoppel.

 
 
     There was no pleading 
of estoppel, nor were there allegations amounting to estoppel in this case. We 
will, therefore, not consider the point.

 
 
See also, 
Waters v. Brand, 497 P.2d 875, 877 (Wyo. 1972); 
Badley v. Birchby, 487 P.2d 798, 799 (Wyo. 1971).

 
 
PRESCRIPTIVE 
USE

 
 

[¶13.]  The question of whether appellants have 
an easement giving them the right to use the portion of the road known as John's 
Road, that portion of the road which was moved from its established location to 
a course approximately a quarter of a mile west, must rest in our determination 
whether an easement by prescriptive use can be 
established.

 
 

[¶14.]  Because there was the grant of a directed 
verdict at the close of plaintiffs' case, we must examine the record and make 
our disposal under the rule applying to such situations as set forth in Erickson 
v. Magill, 713 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 1986). Such motions are seldom granted. The 
trial court cannot consider the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of 
evidence. Motions for directed verdict should only be granted when no other 
conclusion could be reached. These rules have been so often discussed no good 
purpose would be served by their reiteration in different 
words.

 
 

[¶15.]  To establish and acquire a prescriptive 
easement requires proof of four necessary elements: (1) adverse use; (2) claim 
of right under color of title or claim of right; (3) to be of such use as to put 
the owner of the subservient estate on notice of the claim; and (4) that the 
adverse use must be continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years. 
Koontz v. Town of Superior, 746 P.2d 1264, 1268 
(Wyo. 1987); Gregory v. Sanders, 635 P.2d 795 
(Wyo. 
1981).

 
 

[¶16.]  The facts and evidence show, without 
dispute, that the road, in its inception, was in no manner adverse. The way was 
established by mutual agreement and concurrence of the parties when it was moved 
from its original location and became the road both of them used for access to 
their respective ranches. This was clearly a mutual arrangement for a permissive 
use. Appellants make no claim that it was otherwise.

 
 

[¶17.]  Appellants here have a heavy oar. Claims 
of prescriptive easements are not favored. Gregory, 635 P.2d at 800-01; Gray v. 
Fitzhugh, 576 P.2d 88 (Wyo. 1978). Additionally, one claiming such an 
easement has the burden of proof, Caribou Four Corners, Inc. v. Chapple-Hawkes, 
Inc., 643 P.2d 468 (Wyo. 1982), and such use is presumed permissive, absent 
evidence of hostile entry. Under these facts, the use of this road must be 
regarded as permissive. Appellants base their claim of adversity on the behavior 
of Kaehnes in confrontations with invitees or others seeking to use the road to 
get to the Prazma ranch. There is no evidence of Kaehnes ever forbidding the 
appellants to use the road; they permitted its use until the sign and barricade 
were placed upon the road sometime late in August or September, 1986. This is 
less than the requisite period of limitations.

 
 

[¶18.]  There is no evidence of any facts or 
actions of appellants which would put the owners of the subservient estate on 
notice that appellants' use was anything but permissive as 
before.

 
 

[¶19.]  It was necessary for appellants to show 
just how their actions would give notice to appellees of the adverse use and 
adverse nature of their claim. Shumway v. Tom Sanford, Inc., 637 P.2d 666, 670 
(Wyo. 1981). 
This rule should have particular application when the original use is clearly 
permissive. Because there is no proof of an adverse use, appellants' claim of a 
prescriptive easement must fall.

 
 
CONTRACTUAL 
INTERFERENCE

 
 

[¶20.]  This claim is based upon an asserted 
intentional interference with appellants' contractual expectancies looking 
towards the sale of the Ed Prazma ranch to Harold Birch or Charles Birdie. Birch 
and his wife were interested in leasing land with an option to purchase. He 
later learned that the owner was interested only in the sale of the lands and 
not a lease. He testified that he made no offer because the price was too high 
and he did not like the neighbors, being an apparent reference to the 
confrontations between Lester Kaehne, not a party to the suit, as well as the 
appellees.

 
 

[¶21.]  In light of our determination that 
appellants have no prescriptive easement, appellees' statements to real estate 
sales persons or prospective purchasers that Prazmas had no such easement is not 
actionable. Birch not only did not make an offer, he deemed the price too high. 
His desire was to lease a ranch with an option to purchase. Ed Prazma did not 
want that. This, on its face, negates any intention to make an offer. 

 
 

[¶22.]  It is also to be observed that, whether 
solicited or volunteered, truthful statements are not actionable for tortious 
interference with a contract or prospective contractual relationship. Allen v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 280 (Wyo. 1985).

 
 

[¶23.]  Insofar as the claimed prospective 
contractual relationship with Charles A. Birdie is concerned, there is a 
complete lack of evidence which would sustain any claim. Birdie never saw, nor 
was he able to go upon, the Ed Prazma place. This was in no manner due to 
actions of appellees. When Pettigrew, the realtor, drove Birdie out to the ranch 
of appellants, they encountered a locked gate at the entrance to the Prazma 
place. This gate was locked by the Prazmas, not the appellees. When Birdie was 
asked if he had intended to make an offer on the Prazma place, he responded in 
an equivocal manner:

 
 
Had I been 
able to see the property, if it was the property that we wanted, yes. Yes, sir; 
I would have made an offer.

 
 

[¶24.]  This clearly demonstrates that never at 
any time had Birdie formed any intent to make an offer.

 
 

[¶25.]  This factual situation causes this writer 
to wonder just what could be the possible measure of damages. A possible offer, 
in an unmentioned amount, contingent upon an examination of the premises, raises 
the question of just what would be a proper measure of damages. It would be 
speculative in its most favorable light. Complete speculation by a finder of 
fact has been often condemned, Wheeler v. Woods, 723 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Wyo. 1986), and damages 
are a necessary element in the proof of a claim for interference with 
contractual relationships.

 
 

[¶26.]  In Wheeler, 723 P.2d  at 1229, citing W. 
Prosser & W. Keaton, The Law of Torts § 130 at 1006 (5th ed. 1984) with 
approval, the general rule recognized by the court in cases of this character is 
that there must be some real possibility of benefit to sustain recovery; 
recovery has been denied when there is "`no sufficient degree of certainty that 
the plaintiff ever would have received the anticipated benefits.'" This 
rationale is repeated by Martin v. Wing, 667 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Wyo. 1983) which held 
that there must be a "reasonable probability of resulting in a 
contract."

 
 

[¶27.]  A claim based upon such a possibility of 
Birdie making any offer which might be accepted is completely speculative. The 
evidence does not present a reasonable possibility of a contract being made. He 
made no further attempt to see the property after this incident. Appellants do 
not point out just what prospective contractual relationship Kaehne interfered 
with insofar as Birdie was concerned. Birdie's possible offer was based upon 
seeing the place. The locked gate prevented that. No suggestion is made that 
Kaehne locked the gate. Cited authority appears unnecessary to demonstrate the 
speculative nature of such a claimed prospective contractual 
relationship.

 
 

[¶28.]  There was no evidence that there was a 
reasonable expectancy of a contract with either the Birches or Birdies; because 
there is no evidence on which a proper award of damages might be based, the 
action of the trial court on this claim was proper.

 
 

[¶29.]  AFFIRMED.