Case Title: Arthur T. Donaldson v. Board of Commissioners of Rock-Koshkonong Lake District

Citation: 2004 WI 67

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 67 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-3396 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Arthur T. Donaldson,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Board of Commissioners of Rock-Koshkonong  
Lake District,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 26 
Reported at: 260 Wis. 2d 238, 659 N.W.2d 66 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 9, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 8, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock   
 
JUDGE: 
James Welker   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by David C. Moore and Nowlan & Mouat LLP, Janesville, and oral 
argument by David C. Moore. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by William P. 
O’Connor, Mary Beth Peranteau and Wheeler, Van Sickle & 
Anderson, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by William P. 
O’Connor. 
 
An amicus brief was filed by William J. Mulligan and Davis 
& Kuelthau, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of The Wisconsin 
Association of Lakes, Inc. 
 
 
2004 WI 67 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-3396   
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 405) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Arthur T. Donaldson,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of Commissioners of Rock-Koshkonong  
Lake District,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 9, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   Arthur T. Donaldson (Donaldson) 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals 
that reversed an order detaching Donaldson's two parcels of land 
from the Rock-Koshkonong Lake District (Lake District).1  The 
Lake 
District 
is 
a 
public 
inland 
lake 
protection 
and 
rehabilitation district (lake district) under Wis. Stat. ch. 33 
                                                 
1 Donaldson v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist., 
2003 WI App 26, ¶2, 260 Wis. 2d 238, 659 N.W.2d 66.   
No. 01-3396 
 
2 
 
(2001-02).2 
 
This 
review 
requires 
us 
to 
(1) 
interpret 
Wis. Stat. § 33.33(3), which authorizes a property owner to seek 
detachment of "territory" from a lake district; and (2) address 
the scope of a circuit court's authority to review a lake 
district board's rejection of a detachment petition. 
¶2 
Donaldson asks that we reinstate the decision of the 
circuit court, which detached his "territory" from the Lake 
District 
on 
grounds 
that 
the 
evidence 
presented 
at 
the 
detachment hearing did not support a finding that Donaldson's 
two parcels were benefited by continued inclusion in the 
District.  Conversely, the Board of Commissioners of the Rock-
Koshkonong Lake District (the Lake District Board) asks that we 
affirm the court of appeals decision that a lake district board 
may detach property only if it finds there has been a change in 
circumstances since the formation of the district.   
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 33.33(3) 
accords 
a 
statutory right to petition the lake district board for an 
individual determination of whether specific "territory" is 
"benefited" by continued inclusion in the lake district.3  This 
                                                 
2 All references are to the 2001-02 version of the Wisconsin 
Statutes unless otherwise indicated.  
3 In Wis. Stat. § 33.33(3) the legislature uses the word 
"territory" to describe the land a petitioner seeks to detach 
from the lake district.  This word is different from the word 
"property" in Wis. Stat. § 33.26, which is used to describe land 
included in a lake district at the time the district is created.  
In this opinion, we use the phrases "Donaldson's territory," 
"Donaldson's 
parcels," 
and 
"Donaldson's 
property" 
interchangeably.  But see n.17, infra. 
No. 01-3396 
 
3 
 
determination is separate and distinct from the legislative 
decision to create the district.  There is no inherent conflict 
between a county board's decision to create a district with 
certain property in it and a lake district board's decision to 
detach a parcel from the district, because the lake district 
board's decision must address present circumstances, taking into 
account the lake district's past, present, and future activities 
in relation to that property.  We therefore reject a rule that a 
petitioner must always demonstrate a change in circumstances 
before a lake district board is authorized to detach property. 
¶4 
We further conclude that a lake district board 
performs a legislative function when it considers whether to 
detach territory under § 33.33(3).  Accordingly, a lake district 
board's detachment decision is presumed correct, and judicial 
review is limited to inquiring (1) whether the lake district 
board kept within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on 
a correct theory of law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, 
oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will and not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that the board 
might reasonably make the determination in question.  When the 
board fails this review, the circuit court should remand the 
petition to the lake district board for action consistent with 
its decision. 
¶5 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand this case to the circuit court.   
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
No. 01-3396 
 
4 
 
¶6 
The facts and procedural history are not in dispute.  
On June 10, 1999, the Rock County Board of Supervisors created 
the 
Rock-Koshkonong 
Lake 
District, 
consisting 
of 
land 
surrounding Lake Koshkonong and a portion of the Rock River.  
The Lake District consists of more than 4,000 parcels of land 
located within five towns in three counties (Dane, Jefferson, 
and Rock).4  It describes itself as "the largest lake district in 
the State of Wisconsin."  See www.rkld.org (Rock-Koshkonong Lake 
District website) (last modified April 5, 2004).  When it 
created the Lake District, the Rock County Board found that 
"[t]he property included in the district will be benefited by 
the district's establishment."  This is a prerequisite finding 
required by statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 33.26(3).5   
                                                 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 33.37 for a county board's authority to 
create a lake district in more than one county. 
5 Section 33.26(3) states: 
The committee shall report to the county board 
within 3 months after the date of the hearing.  Within 
6 months after the date of the hearing, the board 
shall issue its order under this subsection.  If the 
board finds, after consideration of the committee's 
report and any other evidence submitted to the board, 
that the petition is signed by the requisite owners as 
provided in s. 33.25, that the proposed district is 
necessary, 
that 
the 
public 
health, 
comfort, 
convenience, necessity or public welfare will be 
promoted by the establishment of the district, that 
the property to be included in the district will be 
benefited by the establishment thereof, and that 
formation of the proposed district will not cause or 
contribute to long-range environmental pollution as 
defined in s. 299.01(4), the board, by order, shall 
declare its findings, shall establish the boundaries 
and shall declare the district organized and give it a 
No. 01-3396 
 
5 
 
¶7 
The Lake District includes two parcels of land owned 
by Donaldson.  One parcel is located about one mile north of the 
Rock River, the other about one-half mile south of the Rock 
River.  Donaldson's attorney filed a timely letter objecting to 
the formation of the lake district, as permitted by statute,6 but 
did not seek judicial review after the district was formed. 
¶8 
On January 4, 2001, Donaldson petitioned the Lake 
District Board for detachment of his two properties.7  On 
February 13, 2001, the Lake District Board held a public hearing 
to review his petition.  A transcript of the Board's evidentiary 
hearing was made part of the circuit court record. 
                                                                                                                                                             
corporate name by which it shall be known.  Thereupon 
the district shall be a body corporate with the powers 
of a municipal corporation for the purposes of 
carrying out this chapter.  If the board does not so 
find, the board, by order, shall declare its findings 
and deny the petition.  (Emphasis added.) 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 33.26(1) states in relevant part:  "Any 
person wishing to object to the organization of such district 
may, before the date set for the hearing, file objections to the 
formation of such district with the county clerk." 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 33.33(3) provides: 
Territory may be detached from the district 
following petition of the owner or motion of the 
commissioners.  Proposals for detachment shall be 
considered by the commissioners, and territory may be 
detached upon a finding that such territory is not 
benefited by continued inclusion in the district.  
Appeals of the commissioners' decision may be taken 
under s. 33.26(7). 
 
No. 01-3396 
 
6 
 
¶9 
At the hearing, Donaldson testified that his two 
parcels are not adjacent to any body of water, do not have 
access rights to Lake Koshkonong or the Rock River, and are not 
adjacent to any public access to those bodies of water.  On the 
contrary, his parcels consist of agricultural land adjacent to 
an interstate highway.  The only improvements on the land are 
three highway signs unrelated to Lake Koshkonong or the Rock 
River.  Donaldson also testified that he did not believe the 
value of his land was enhanced by its proximity to Lake 
Koshkonong.  He acknowledged that his property had not changed 
since the formation of the Lake District in 1999.   
¶10 The only other person to testify was Steve Hjort, a 
biologist who serves as a consultant to the Lake District.  He 
asserted 
that 
Donaldson's 
parcels 
are 
within 
the 
lower 
Koshkonong Creek sub-watershed, which is part of the Rock River 
watershed, meaning that surface water from his property drains 
into the Rock River.  When asked about the boundaries of the 
Rock River watershed, Hjort explained that the watershed extends 
well beyond the established boundary of the Lake District, and 
that all land in Wisconsin is in some watershed.  Hjort also 
stated that, based on the map he had in front of him, 
Donaldson's northern property was approximately one and one-half 
miles from the lake or river and two miles from the nearest 
public access site; the southern parcel was approximately one-
half mile from the lake or river and one mile from the nearest 
public access site.   
No. 01-3396 
 
7 
 
¶11 Although he did not testify, one of the Board 
commissioners, 
Jim 
Folk, 
took 
photographs 
of 
Donaldson's 
southern parcel to demonstrate that the parcel was within the 
sightline of the Rock River.  Folk's photos were admitted into 
evidence.  Donaldson had testified that Lake Koshkonong was not 
visible from either of his parcels.   
¶12 The Lake District Board continued the matter until its 
next meeting on March 13, 2001.  At that meeting Buck Sweeney, a 
member of the Lake District Board who had not been present at 
the previous hearing, moved to deny the petition for detachment 
for the following reasons: (1) both tracts were within the 
original boundary of the district; (2) the Rock County Board's 
Resolution included a finding that the property within the Lake 
District will be benefited by the creation of the Lake District; 
(3) there was no evidence that there was a change in 
circumstances inconsistent with the initial finding that these 
tracts benefit from their inclusion in the Lake District; (4)  
both tracts are within the Rock River watershed and sub-
watershed areas; (5)  both tracts are located in near proximity 
to Lake Koshkonong and the portion of the Rock River within the 
Lake District; (6) although neither parcel is riparian, both 
tracts are located close to public boat launches; (7) the 
southerly tract has a direct view of the Rock River; (8)  the 
value of both tracts will be enhanced if the water quality and 
recreational value of Lake Koshkonong and associated Rock River 
are improved and will be diminished if the lake or river were 
further degraded or if the Indianford Dam were removed; and (9) 
No. 01-3396 
 
8 
 
therefore, the parcels are benefited by continued inclusion in 
the Lake District.   
¶13 The Board voted unanimously in favor of Sweeney's 
motion to deny Donaldson's petition. 
¶14 Donaldson appealed to the Rock County Circuit Court, 
James E. Welker, Judge.  This appeal was taken pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 33.33(3) and 33.26(7).  The defendant Board moved 
to dismiss the action on grounds that § 33.26(7) requires that a 
verified petition be made within 30 days of a lake district 
board's decision on detachment, and Donaldson's complaint, 
though within the 30-day period, was not verified.  Shortly 
thereafter, Donaldson filed an amended complaint complying with 
the verification requirements. 
¶15 Both Donaldson and the Lake District Board moved for 
summary judgment, and the circuit court held a hearing on June 
13, 2001.  On November 7, 2001, the circuit court granted 
judgment 
in 
favor 
of 
Donaldson 
and 
detached 
Donaldson’s 
properties from the Lake District.   
¶16 The Lake District Board appealed, contending that the 
circuit court erred in rejecting its argument that detachment 
requires a change in circumstances.  The court of appeals 
agreed, reversing and remanding the matter for an order 
affirming the Lake District Board’s decision to deny the 
petition.  Donaldson v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Rock-Koshkonong Lake 
Dist., 2003 WI App 26, ¶22, 260 Wis. 2d 238, 659 N.W.2d 66. 
¶17 Because both parties treated Donaldson's action in 
circuit court as a request for certiorari review, the court of 
No. 01-3396 
 
9 
 
appeals employed the standard utilized in statutory certiorari 
cases.  Id., ¶10.  Accordingly, the court of appeals presumed 
that the Lake District Board's decision was correct and limited 
its inquiry to "whether: (1) the board kept within its 
jurisdiction; (2) the board proceeded on a correct theory of 
law; (3) the board's action was arbitrary, oppressive or 
unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; and 
(4) the evidence was such that the board might reasonably make 
the order or determination in question."  Id. (quoting Nielsen 
v. Waukesha County Bd. of Supervisors, 178 Wis. 2d 498, 511, 504 
N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1993)). 
¶18 In fact, the court of appeals focused exclusively on 
the second inquiry: whether the board proceeded on a correct 
theory of law.  Id.  It noted that the word "benefited" in § 
33.26(3), governing the creation of lake districts, and the word 
"benefited" in § 33.33(3), the detachment provision, carry the 
same meaning.  Id., ¶12.  The court of appeals reasoned that the 
Rock County Board had determined that Donaldson's property 
"benefited" by including it in the Lake District when it created 
the District, id., ¶20, and Donaldson did not seek judicial 
review of that decision.  In effect, then, the Lake District 
Board would be allowing Donaldson to circumvent the 30-day time 
period 
for 
appeal 
if 
it 
permitted 
detachment 
of 
his 
property without 
requiring 
him 
to 
show 
a 
change 
in 
circumstances.  Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the 
Lake District Board applied the correct theory of law when it 
denied 
Donaldson's 
petition 
for 
detachment, 
inasmuch 
as 
No. 01-3396 
 
10 
 
Donaldson himself conceded that no circumstances had changed 
since the creation of the district.  Id., ¶¶20-21.   
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
¶19 This case requires us to interpret and harmonize the 
provisions of Chapter 33.  Statutory interpretation is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  Tri-Tech Corp. v. 
Americomp 
Serv., 
2002 
WI 
88, 
¶19, 
254 
Wis. 2d 418, 
646 
N.W.2d 822.  The purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what a statute means so that it may be given the full, 
proper, and intended effect.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  We 
look first to the language of the statute.  N.E.M. v. Strigel, 
208 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 559 N.W.2d 256 (1997).  If the language is 
ambiguous, even after examining such intrinsic factors as scope 
and 
purpose, 
we 
may 
consult 
extrinsic 
sources, 
such 
as 
legislative history, in an effort to divine legislative intent.  
Kalal, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶42.  Differing interpretations of a 
statute do not necessarily create ambiguity, but equally 
sensible interpretations of a word or phrase indicate a 
statute's ability to support more than one meaning.  State ex 
rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 2d 112, 122, 561 
N.W.2d 729 (1997).  "In construing statutes that are seemingly 
in conflict, it is our duty to attempt to harmonize them, if it 
is possible, in a way which will give each full force and 
effect."  City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d 168, 184, 
532 N.W.2d 690 (1995).   
No. 01-3396 
 
11 
 
¶20 In this case, it is not clear whether the word 
"benefited" 
is 
intended 
to 
carry 
the 
same 
meaning 
in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 33.001, 33.26(1) and (3), and 33.33(3); see also 
§ 33.32.  It is also uncertain what kind of review is intended 
in §§ 33.26(7) and 33.33(3).  Consequently, we examine both 
intrinsic and extrinsic sources to help us construe the statute. 
B. Lake District Powers 
¶21 In 1974 the legislature created Chapter 33 of the 
statutes to afford additional protection to inland lakes.  Ch. 
301, Laws of 1973.  The legislature declared that environmental 
values, wildlife, public rights in navigable waters, and the 
public welfare are threatened by the deterioration of public 
lakes.  Wis. Stat. § 33.001.  It found that protection and 
rehabilitation of public inland lakes are in the best interest 
of the citizens as a whole and that the public welfare will be 
"benefited" thereby.  Id.  It noted that lakes form an important 
basis for the state's recreation industry and that increasing 
recreational use of public waters justifies state action to 
enhance and restore the potential of the state's inland lakes.  
Id.  Therefore, the legislature concluded, "it is necessary to 
embark upon a program of lake protection and rehabilitation, to 
authorize a conjunctive state and local program of lake 
protection and rehabilitation to fulfill the positive duty of 
the 
state 
as 
trustee 
of 
navigable 
waters, 
and 
protect 
environmental values."  Wis. Stat. § 33.001(2)(a). 
¶22 In 
addition, 
the 
legislature 
found 
that 
local 
"districts should be formed by persons directly affected by the 
No. 01-3396 
 
12 
 
deteriorated condition of inland waters and willing to assist 
financially, 
or 
through 
other 
means, 
in 
remedying 
lake 
problems."  Wis. Stat. § 33.001(2)(b).  These lake districts are 
a significant component of Chapter 33's manifold approach to 
addressing the legislature's inland lakes objectives.  They are 
corporate bodies with the powers of a municipal corporation, 
Wis. Stat. § 33.26(3), and 
each district may 
undertake "a 
program of lake protection and rehabilitation of a lake or parts 
thereof."  Wis. Stat. § 33.21.  The provisions governing the 
creation and activities of lake districts are designed to enable 
these 
special 
purpose 
districts 
to 
coexist 
among 
more 
traditional local governmental units.   
¶23 A 
lake 
district's 
powers 
are 
set 
out 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 33.22.  They include the power to sue and be sued, 
make contracts, purchase, lease or otherwise acquire property, 
disburse money, contract debt and do any other acts necessary to 
carry out a program of lake protection and rehabilitation.  
Wis. Stat. § 33.22(1).  The district may also create, operate 
and 
maintain 
a 
water 
safety 
patrol 
unit, 
enhance 
the 
recreational uses of the lake, including recreational boating 
facilities, 
and 
assume 
sanitary 
district 
powers.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 33.22(2m), 33.22(4m), and 33.22(3) and (4). 
¶24 To finance these operations, the lake district has 
power to impose taxes and special assessments.  First, the 
annual meeting may levy a uniform tax on all taxable property 
within the district.  This tax to fund operations may not exceed 
No. 01-3396 
 
13 
 
a rate of 2.5 mills ($2.50 per thousand) of equalized valuation.  
Wis. Stat. § 33.30(4)(a).8 
¶25 Second, because a lake district may borrow money, the 
district "shall levy an annual, irrepealable tax to pay the 
principal and interest" on its indebtedness.  "The district 
shall levy the tax without limitation as to rate or amount on 
all 
taxable 
property 
within 
the 
district."  
Wis. Stat. § 33.31(3). 
¶26 Third, the board of commissioners may impose special 
assessments "for the purpose of carrying out district protection 
and rehabilitation projects."  Wis. Stat. § 33.32(1).  After 
determining the entire cost of the work to be done, the lake 
district board must apportion a special assessment "on a 
reasonable 
basis." 
 
Id. 
 
"In 
apportioning 
the 
special 
assessment, the commissioners shall examine each parcel and 
determine the benefits to each parcel from the project, 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 33.30(4)(a) provides that the electors 
and property owners may, at the district's annual meeting, 
Vote by majority a tax upon all taxable property 
within the district.  That portion of the tax that is 
for the costs of operation for the coming year may not 
exceed a rate of 2.5 mills of equalized valuation as 
determined by the department of revenue and reported 
to the district board.  The tax shall be apportioned 
among the municipalities having property within the 
district on the basis of equalized full value, and a 
report shall  be delivered by the treasurer, by 
November 1, by certified statement to the clerk of 
each municipality having property within the district 
for collection. 
Wis. Stat. § 33.30(4)(a). 
No. 01-3396 
 
14 
 
considering such factors as size, proximity to the lake and 
present and potential use of the parcel, including applicable 
zoning regulations."  Wis. Stat. § 33.32(1)(b) (emphasis added).  
¶27 The potential scope of a lake district's operations, 
juxtaposed with the lake district's extensive taxing authority, 
may cause non-riparian property owners to be wary of large 
property tax bills and assessments.  Special assessments should 
be tailored to reflect actual benefit to individual properties, 
but taxes to cover a lake district's indebtedness will be taxed 
at the same uniform rate, irrespective of whether properties are 
choice riparian or marginal non-riparian parcels. 
¶28 At oral argument, the parties discussed the tensions 
that sometimes exist among owners of property within a lake 
district.  Some riparian property owners favor high water 
levels, in part to promote recreation that will benefit their 
property; some riparian property owners favor lower water 
levels, perhaps because they have less interest in boating; and 
some property owners prefer to return a lake to its natural 
condition by removing any existing dam.  When tensions exist 
within a lake district, factions may struggle to control the 
elected board to influence the policies and expenditures of the 
lake district.  Non-riparians may watch these struggles, almost 
as bystanders, understanding that when elephants fight, the 
grass gets trampled. 
¶29 In this case, there has been discussion about the Lake 
District's 
potential 
role 
in 
acquiring, 
operating, 
and 
maintaining the Indianford Dam, which is presently owned by Rock 
No. 01-3396 
 
15 
 
County. See David W. Marcouiller, et al., University of 
Wisconsin-Extension, Assessing Potential Economic and Ecological 
Impacts of Removing the Indianford Dam 15 (Dec. 8, 1999); James 
E. Welker, Circuit Judge, Memorandum Decision 1 (Nov. 7, 2001) 
("The impetus for the creation of the District was the potential 
for the removal of a small dam at Indianford."). 
¶30 With this in mind, Donaldson petitioned to have his 
two properties removed from the District.  He objected to the 
added layer of taxation that comes from being included in the 
Lake District, asserting that his properties are not benefited 
by the District because neither property is riparian or enjoys 
private access rights to the lake or river.  He therefore sees 
no point in subsidizing activities that he contends serve only 
to benefit the Lake District's riparian owners. 
¶31 A lake district board must consider a detachment 
petition and may detach property "upon a finding that such 
territory is not benefited by continued inclusion in the 
district."  Wis. Stat. § 33.33(3).  In this case, after a 
hearing, the Lake District Board turned down Donaldson's 
petition. 
¶32 Section 33.33(3) also provides for "appeals of the 
commissioners' decision," which may be taken under § 33.26(7).  
Section 33.26(7) provides: "Any person aggrieved by the action 
of the board may petition the circuit court for judicial review.  
A verified petition shall be presented to the court," specifying 
the 
grounds 
upon 
which 
the 
appeal 
is 
based.  
Wis. Stat. § 33.26(7).  Donaldson availed himself of this right.  
No. 01-3396 
 
16 
 
His ground for appealing was that the Lake District Board could 
not have reached the decision to deny his petition based on the 
evidence it received.  The circuit court agreed and ordered 
Donaldson's property detached.  As noted, the court of appeals 
reversed, reasoning that Chapter 33's statutory scheme required 
a change in circumstances, a position strongly espoused by the 
Lake District Board.  Donaldson, 260 Wis. 2d 238, ¶21.  Because 
Donaldson conceded that the overall circumstances had not 
changed since his property was included in the District, the 
"petition for detachment was properly denied on the basis that 
he failed to show a change in circumstance."  Id.   
C. History of Inland Lakes Legislation 
 
¶33 The 1974 legislation to promote the protection of 
public inland lakes grew out of a study conducted by the 
Legislative Council's Natural Resources Committee in 1972.  The 
drafting file for the Legislative Council's bill, 1973 Assembly 
Bill 766,9 makes clear that the drafters used existing law on 
town sanitary districts as the model for the creation of lake 
districts.  The bill went through seven drafts before it was 
introduced, however, and these drafts reveal an evolution in 
concerns about protections for property owners and they show how 
the lakes bill differed from the sanitary district law. 
 
¶34 To illustrate, the first draft of the lakes bill 
limited the land in the lake district to "frontage" land.  It 
defined "frontage" as "lands fronting on a lake, having a direct 
                                                 
9 1973 Assembly Bill 766 became Chapter 301, Laws of 1973. 
No. 01-3396 
 
17 
 
access to the lake via artificial watercourses or having rights 
of access 
running 
with 
the 
lands." 
 
LRB-170/1:4. 
 The 
explanation provided in the text of the draft stated: "The 
definition of 'frontage' is used in delimiting those lands in 
local lake renovation districts.  It includes those lands having 
direct private access to lakes; presumably, these lands will be 
specially benefited by any lake renovation project, and thus 
should directly bear part of the financial burden."  LRB-
170/1:4. 
 
¶35 In this first draft, only persons owning frontage 
could petition to establish a lake district.  LRB-170/1:6.  An 
explanatory note read: "Governmental jurisdictions are included 
as eligible petitioners, since frontage owned by them will both 
be 
assessed 
for 
and 
benefited 
by 
reclamation 
activities 
undertaken by the district."  In the bill's section on special 
assessments, the lake district commissioners were directed to 
"severally and separately consider each parcel of frontage 
therein and determine the benefits to each parcel and make 
assessments thereon."  Any owner of a parcel of frontage who 
"feels aggrieved" by the assessment was authorized to "appeal" 
to the circuit court.  "Such appeal shall be tried and 
determined in the same manner as cases originally commenced in 
said court." 
¶36 In the first draft, there was no provision for a 
landowner to seek review of the county board's decision to 
include a parcel of frontage property in the lake district and 
No. 01-3396 
 
18 
 
no provision for a landowner to seek detachment of frontage 
property from the district. 
¶37 By the third draft, the bill contained a provision 
permitting any person aggrieved by the county board's decision 
to create the lake district to petition the court for judicial 
review.  LRB-170/3-10.  The third draft still contained the 
delimiting language on "frontage."  
¶38 The fourth draft retained the limitation to "frontage" 
and added the following explanation:  
The "frontage" definition also includes lands having 
direct access via natural streams flowing into or out 
of a lake.  Determining whether any particular lands 
in this class should be included in a district because 
of direct benefit is a question of fact, and is 
reserved to the county board for determination . . . . 
LRB-170/4:7 (emphasis added). 
¶39 The fifth draft dropped both the definition of and 
limitation 
to 
"frontage" 
land 
but 
added 
a 
provision 
on 
detachment, linking it to the appeal provision for establishment 
of the district.  LRB 170/5:20.  The draft also eliminated the 
explanatory note affirming the county board's broad fact-finding 
authority in creating a lake district. 
¶40 When 
the 
bill 
was 
ultimately 
introduced, 
the 
explanatory note following the bill's section on "Merger, 
Annexation, Detachment" read: 
 
[The 
section] 
[p]rovides 
means 
of 
altering 
district boundaries.  Merger is done by common consent 
of the governing bodies and members of both districts.  
Annexation proposals are measured against the same 
standards used for establishing the district, and are 
similarly 
appealable. 
 
Detachment 
proposals 
are 
No. 01-3396 
 
19 
 
decided upon the basis of whether the territory 
proposed for detachment is benefited by continued 
inclusion in the district. 
LRB 170/7:29-30. 
¶41 Although the lakes bill received extensive attention 
prior to its introduction, it remained controversial.  Its 
legislative history after introduction includes 5 Substitute 
Amendments and 36 simple Amendments.  See Legislative Council, 
Digest of Council Bills in the 1973 Legislature 65 (May, 1975).  
We see nothing in the legislative history of the statute that 
dictates a requirement that a property owner prove a change in 
circumstances to qualify for detachment.  On the contrary, the 
detachment procedure assures that an aggrieved property owner 
will be able to secure an individual determination whether 
specific property is benefited. 
D. The Delegation of Legislative Authority  
 
¶42 The Lake District Board contends that the creation of 
a lake district is an exercise of legislative power by a county 
board, and a 
decision on 
detachment 
is 
an 
exercise of 
legislative power by a lake district board.  The Board 
emphasizes that an exercise of legislative power is subject to 
very limited judicial review.  At a minimum, the Board argues, a 
property owner seeking a review of a decision on detachment must 
show a change in circumstances since the lake district was 
formed. 
 
¶43 Because the statutes on town sanitary districts were 
used as a model for the lake district legislation, we believe 
No. 01-3396 
 
20 
 
that cases interpreting the sanitary district statutes are 
helpful in interpreting Chapter 33. 
¶44 In Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Fox River Heights Sanitary 
District, this court reviewed a challenge to the creation of a 
town sanitary district.  250 Wis. 145, 26 N.W.2d 661 (1947).  
The standards then in place for a town to create a sanitary 
district resemble the conditions necessary for a county board to 
create a lake district.10  Both require, among other things, that 
                                                 
10 Compare 
Wis. Stat. § 60.303(3) 
(1945) 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 33.26(3).  Former Wis. Stat. § 60.303(3) provided: 
Upon the hearing, if it shall appear to the town 
board after consideration of all objections, that the 
petition is signed by the requisite owners of real 
estate as provided in subsection (1) of section 
60.302, and that the proposed work is necessary, and 
that 
the 
public 
health, 
comfort, 
convenience, 
necessity or public welfare will be promoted by the 
establishment of such district, and the property to be 
included in the district will be benefited by the 
establishment thereof, the town board, by formal 
order, shall declare its findings and shall establish 
the 
boundaries 
and 
shall 
declare 
the 
district 
organized . . . . 
Current Wis. Stat. § 33.26(3) provides: 
If the board finds, after consideration of the 
committee's report and any other evidence submitted to 
the board, that the petition is signed by the 
requisite owners as provided in s. 33.25, that the 
proposed 
district 
is 
necessary, 
that 
the 
public 
health, comfort, convenience, necessity or public 
welfare will be promoted by the establishment of the 
district, that the property to be included in the 
district 
will 
be 
benefited by 
the establishment 
thereof, and that formation of the proposed district 
will 
not 
cause 
or 
contribute 
to 
long-range 
environmental pollution . . . , the board, by order, 
shall 
declare 
its findings, 
shall 
establish the 
No. 01-3396 
 
21 
 
the appropriate body find that "the property to be included in 
the district will be benefited by the establishment thereof."  
Wis. Stat. §§ 60.303(3) (1945), 33.26(3).11  The focus in Fort 
Howard was on the scope of a circuit court's power to review the 
town board's determination that Fort Howard's property benefited 
from the establishment of the town sanitary district.  The 
legislature had included a provision for an aggrieved party to 
bring an action in circuit court.  Wis. Stat. § 60.304 (1945).12  
When Fort Howard brought such an action, the circuit court tried 
the issue as if there had been no prior decision by the town 
board, and determined that Fort Howard's property did not 
benefit from being in the town sanitary district and excluded it 
from the district.  Fort Howard, 250 Wis. at 149. 
                                                                                                                                                             
boundaries 
and 
shall 
declare 
the 
district 
organized . . . . 
11 The 
contemporary 
counterpart 
to 
§ 60.303(3) 
(1945) 
requires a town board to find, among other things, that 
"[p]roperty to be included in the district will be benefited by 
the district."  Wis. Stat. § 60.71(6)(b).   
12 The current counterpart of this provision provides: 
Any person aggrieved by any act of the town board 
or the department of natural resources in establishing 
a town sanitary district may bring an action in the 
circuit court of the county in which his or her lands 
are located, to set aside the final determination of 
the town board or the department of natural resources, 
within 90 days after the final determination, as 
provided under s. 893.73(2).  If no action is taken 
within the 90-day period, the determination by the 
town board or the department of natural resources is 
final. 
Wis. Stat. § 60.73. 
No. 01-3396 
 
22 
 
¶45 On appeal, this court concluded that the power to 
establish a town sanitary district had been delegated to the 
town board by the legislature.  Id. at 149-50. Thus, the circuit 
court erred by reviewing de novo and under its own standards 
whether the property would "benefit."  Id. at 151.  We said that 
a court's powers of review were quite limited.  Id. at 150. 
¶46 The Fort Howard decision requires close analysis.  The 
statute in place at the time stated that "if it shall appear to 
the 
town 
board 
after 
consideration 
of 
all 
objections, 
that . . . the public health, comfort, convenience, necessity or 
public welfare will be promoted by the establishment of such 
district, and the property to be included in the district will 
be benefited by the establishment thereof," the board shall 
declare its findings, establish the boundaries, and declare the 
district organized.  Wis. Stat. § 60.303(3) (1945). 
¶47 The right of a property owner thereafter to appeal the 
board's 
decision 
to 
circuit 
court 
was 
limited.  
Wis. Stat. § 60.304 (1945).  The statute authorized an action 
"to set aside the action of the board" (emphasis added).  The 
statute went on: "Unless action is so taken [within the required 
time period], the determination by the town board shall be 
conclusive."  Id. 
¶48 As a general proposition, we noted that "the court may 
not exercise legislative power."  Fort Howard, 250 Wis. at 150.   
The question here is to what extent has the court 
power to review the action of a body exercising 
legislative power.  By sec. 60.301, Stats., the 
legislature delegated to the town board the power to 
No. 01-3396 
 
23 
 
establish a town sanitary district.  The power thus 
delegated to the town board being legislative in its 
character, cannot be exercised by a court. 
Id.   
¶49 The court then appeared to step back somewhat, saying 
that "unless otherwise provided by statute," the power of the 
court "is limited in the review of legislative orders to inquire 
as to:" 
(1) the validity of the statute under which the 
legislative body acts; (2) whether the legislative 
body proceeded in accordance with the provisions of 
law and within its jurisdiction; (3) whether the 
legislative body acted arbitrarily, capriciously or 
oppressively.  If the town board acted without 
evidence sufficient to support its findings it acted 
arbitrarily. 
Id. at 150 (emphasis added).   
¶50 Did the statute's reference to the town board's 
determination that "the property to be included in the district 
will 
be 
benefited 
by 
the 
establishment 
thereof," 
imply 
additional review powers for a court?  Not in that case, the 
court said.  The statute did not require the town board to keep 
a record of its proceedings.  Id.  "In the absence of such a 
record, it must be presumed that the town board acted upon 
sufficient evidence to sustain its findings as there is nothing 
in the record to indicate the contrary."  Id. at 150-51.  The 
court further explained that the town was not expected to focus 
on the benefit to individual properties: 
The statute does not provide that if any piece or 
parcel of land included within the boundaries of the 
proposed district shall not be benefited, the district 
shall not be organized.  If the town board finds that 
No. 01-3396 
 
24 
 
the property within the boundaries of the proposed 
district as a whole will be benefited then the 
district is to be organized. . . .  If all the 
property 
within 
the 
boundaries 
of 
the 
proposed 
district 
is 
in 
the 
watershed 
and 
the 
proposed 
improvement may serve it, then the property of the 
district as a whole is benefited and the town board if 
it makes the other necessary finding may organize the 
district.  The organization of a sanitary sewer 
district is in the interest of the public health.  
Such a district cannot be organized unless the town 
board finds from the evidence that the public health, 
comfort, convenience, necessity, and public welfare 
will be promoted thereby.  That is the benefit that is 
meant by the statute. 
Id. at 152. 
¶51 The 
Fort 
Howard 
case 
stands 
in 
part 
for 
the 
proposition 
that 
courts 
are 
prohibited 
from 
substituting 
judicial judgment as to good public policy for legislative 
judgment.  Id. at 150.  In the Fort Howard circumstances, 
"Fixing the limits of the proposed district is within the 
discretion of the town board, which discretion the court has no 
power to review.  The order must be set aside or affirmed in 
toto."  Id. at 151. 
¶52 As a general principle, whether a particular unit of 
government should be created involves the best interest of the 
community and is therefore a matter of "public policy and 
statecraft."  See, e.g., In re Incorporation of Village of North 
Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 616, 624, 67 N.W. 1033 (1896); see also Town 
of Pleasant Prairie, Kenosha County v. Department of Local 
Affairs and Development, 113 Wis. 2d 327, 343, 334 N.W.2d 893 
(1982); Town of Beloit v. City of Beloit, 37 Wis. 2d 637, 646-
47, 155 N.W.2d 633 (1968); Scharping v. Johnson, 32 Wis. 2d 383, 
No. 01-3396 
 
25 
 
388, 
145 
N.W.2d 691 
(1966) 
("The 
creation 
of 
municipal 
corporations 
is 
peculiarly 
within 
the 
province 
of 
the 
legislature.").  As we have stated in the parallel context of 
municipal annexation: 
What is "desirable," or "advisable" or "ought to be" 
is a question of policy, not a question of fact.  What 
is "necessary," or what is "in the best interest" is 
not a fact and its determination by the judiciary is 
an exercise of legislative power when each involves 
political considerations and reasons why there should 
or should not be an annexation.  This is the general 
and 
universal 
rule 
which 
sharply 
draws 
the 
differentiating line between legislative power and 
judicial power and by which the validity of the 
delegation of functions to the judiciary by the 
legislature is determined.  
City of Fond du Lac v. Miller, 42 Wis. 2d 323, 329, 166 
N.W.2d 225 (1969), (citing Town of Beloit, 37 Wis. 2d at 644). 
¶53 We are constrained to believe that the same principles 
apply when a court reviews the action of a county board in 
creating a lake district.  The dynamics of lake district 
creation are such that a county board is likely to look at the 
big picture, that is, whether the proposed lake district will 
serve the public interest as a whole and whether the properties 
No. 01-3396 
 
26 
 
to be included in the district will be benefited as a whole.13  
In these circumstances, judicial review is almost necessarily 
limited to whether the county board followed proper procedures 
in establishing the district and whether the board's action with 
respect to an individual property or group of properties was so 
arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable that it jumps out to the 
observer without additional evidence.14 
¶54 Of course, a property owner who does not wish a 
certain parcel to be included in a proposed lake district may be 
able to persuade the county board to consider that parcel 
individually and remove it from the district, or to consider the 
parcel individually and provide an explanation of why that 
parcel is benefited.  If the latter determination is made, it 
will be very hard to challenge on appeal, and hard to challenge 
in a subsequent detachment petition, absent a change in 
circumstances. 
                                                 
13 When a county board determines that the property within 
the district as a whole will be benefited by the formation of 
the 
district, 
its 
broad 
finding 
necessarily 
includes 
a 
determination 
that 
each 
parcel 
in 
the 
district 
will 
be 
benefited, and that finding is presumed to be correct.  But a 
presumption of correctness goes only so far in the absence of an 
individual determination.  In reality, a county board may do 
nothing more than rubberstamp a petition and parrot the words 
required by statute.  The record does not indicate whether the 
Rock County Board of Supervisors made any changes in the 
boundaries of the lake district proposed in the petition. 
14 Ross 
v. 
Honey 
Lake 
Protection 
and 
Rehabilitation 
District, 166 Wis. 2d 739, 746, 480 N.W.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1992), 
emphasizes that actions challenging a county board's creation of 
a lake district must be brought within the statutory 30-day time 
limit.  Wis. Stat. § 33.26(7). 
No. 01-3396 
 
27 
 
E. Tension Between Lake District Formation and Detachment 
Procedures 
¶55 We are concerned in this case with the Lake District 
Board's determination not to detach property, not the Rock 
County Board's decision to form the District.  Both parties 
admit to a certain tension in the statutes because each board, 
at different points in time, decides whether property is 
"benefited" from inclusion in the lake district.  Our task is to 
resolve the tension between language in Wis. Stat. § 33.26(3), 
governing the formation of lake districts, and language in 
§ 33.33(3), authorizing the detachment of territory from lake 
districts. 
¶56 We agree with the Lake District Board that the 
decision to detach territory from a lake district is, like the 
decision to form a lake district, an exercise in legislative 
power.15 
 
Consequently, 
judicial 
review 
is 
circumscribed.  
Nonetheless, there are important differences between judicial 
review of the creation decision by a county board and judicial 
review of the detachment determination by the lake district 
board. 
                                                 
15 The 
jurisprudence 
relating 
to 
school 
district 
reorganization, which includes detachment of property from one 
school district followed by reattachment to another district, is 
instructive.  In Joint School District No. 1 of the Town of 
Wabeno v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 790, 203 N.W.2d 1 (1973), we stated 
that "school district reorganization is a legislative policy-
making function, which the legislature has delegated to local 
boards and to the state superintendent of public instruction."  
Id. at 794 (collecting cases).   
No. 01-3396 
 
28 
 
¶57 First, the 1974 lake district legislation created a 
detachment mechanism that was not present in the town sanitary 
district law.16  There was a reason for doing so.  As we observed 
in ¶39 above, the detachment procedure appeared in the draft 
legislation at the same time the language limiting the property 
that could be included in the district was taken out.  The term 
"frontage" may have been viewed as too limiting, but its removal 
effectively erased all limits.  Thus, we believe it is a fair 
inference that the detachment procedure was designed as a 
necessary 
safeguard 
for 
property 
owners——to 
discourage 
overreaching by the proponents of a lake district and to assure 
that an aggrieved property owner would be able to secure an 
individual determination of whether a specific parcel is 
benefited. 
¶58 Second, the "benefited" language in § 33.26(3) is not 
the same as the "benefited" language in § 33.33(3).  A county 
board determines "that the property to be included in the 
district will be benefited by the establishment" of the 
district.  Wis. Stat. § 33.26(3) (emphasis added).  This finding 
                                                 
16 Sanitary districts did not have a removal provision until 
1987.  
In Haug 
v. Wallace 
Lake 
Sanitary 
District, 130 
Wis. 2d 347, 387 N.W.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1986), the court of 
appeals decided a case brought by several residents of a 
sanitary district who complained that they were being assessed 
for a sanitary sewer system from which they received no service.  
The residents contended that the town had authority to redefine 
the boundaries of the district without dissolving the district, 
permitting them to get out.  The court of appeals disagreed.  
Shortly 
thereafter, 
the 
legislature 
enacted 
the 
removal 
provision in Wis. Stat. § 60.785(1m).  Act 77, Laws of 1987. 
No. 01-3396 
 
29 
 
is both general and predictive.  In the absence of an 
individualized determination, a county board is making a rough 
approximation of benefit to all properties in the district as 
the county board looks to the future.  By contrast, a lake 
district board must decide whether "such territory is not 
benefited 
by 
continued 
inclusion 
in 
the 
district."  
Wis. Stat. § 33.33(3) (emphasis added).17  This determination 
requires an individualized evaluation of property under present 
circumstances.18  A lake district board may utilize hindsight and 
foresight as it makes its fact-based detachment determination on 
an individual parcel.  The commissioners are aware of both past 
and present activities of the lake district, and, as such, can 
intelligently ascertain whether a property initially included in 
                                                 
17 We also note that the legislature chose a different word 
to describe the large mass of real estate proposed for inclusion 
in the district and the individual parcels that are likely to 
come before a lake district board for detachment.  In the former 
instance, the legislature opted to use the term "property," but 
in the latter detachment provision the legislature chose the 
word "territory."  While neither of these words is used with 
precision in the statutes, the differing formulations for the 
same concept suggest that the legislature did not intend 
complete identity between the two proceedings.  If it had so 
intended, the legislature would have used the same language in 
both. 
 
18 A lake district board's individualized determination of 
whether a specific parcel is or is not benefited by continued 
inclusion in the lake district might be characterized as a 
quasi-judicial 
determination, 
rather 
than 
a 
legislative 
determination.  We decline to pursue this point, urging instead 
that the legislature establish additional standards for lake 
district boards. 
No. 01-3396 
 
30 
 
the district is currently benefited and will continue to benefit 
from the district.  The district board is uniquely situated to 
assess whether activities slated for future implementation will 
benefit a particular piece of property. 
¶59 By closely examining the two statutes, we conclude 
that it is not always necessary for the petitioner in a 
detachment proceeding to prove that there has been a change in 
circumstances. 
 
When 
there 
has 
been 
no 
individualized 
determination of benefit to property by the county board, there 
is a presumption that the board made a reasonable decision, but 
this presumption is not conclusive in a future detachment 
proceeding.  In other words, the county board's decision 
normally does not settle the issue of benefit to individual 
property.  As noted above in ¶40, the Legislative Council 
described the distinction between the test for annexation to a 
lake district and the test for detachment from a lake district: 
"Annexation proposals are measured against the same standards 
used 
for 
establishing 
the 
district, 
and 
are 
similarly 
appealable.  Detachment proposals are decided upon the basis of 
whether the territory proposed for detachment is benefited by 
continued inclusion in the district."  LRB 170/7:29-30 (emphasis 
added).  The framers of the legislation explicitly recognized a 
distinction 
between 
one 
determination 
and 
the 
other.  
Consequently, a lake district board's duty to render an 
individualized determination as to present benefit to a specific 
parcel cannot be satisfied by relying solely on the decision 
No. 01-3396 
 
31 
 
previously made by the county board, unless the county board 
made an individualized determination and nothing has changed. 
¶60 At oral argument, counsel for the Lake District 
asserted that the legislature has imposed no standards at all to 
guide a lake district as it exercises legislative power on the 
issue of detachment.  This is not correct.  The legislature's 
findings and declaration of intent are not irrelevant.  They 
include statements (1) that "the protection and rehabilitation 
of the public inland lakes of this state are in the best 
interest of the citizens of this state; [and] the public health 
and welfare will be benefited thereby," and (2) lake "districts 
should 
be 
formed 
by 
persons 
directly 
affected 
by 
the 
deteriorated 
condition 
of 
inland 
waters."  
Wis. Stat. § 33.001(1) and (2)(b) (emphasis added).  A lake 
district board ought to be able to articulate why property 
included in the lake district and subject to its added layer of 
taxation is more directly benefited by inclusion in the district 
than thousands of parcels in the vicinity that are not included 
in the district.19   
                                                 
19 We also note that the detachment decision may precede or 
coincide with a hearing contesting a special assessment.  A 
special assessment hearing explicitly requires commissioners to 
"examine each parcel and determine the benefits to each parcel 
from the project, considering such factors as size, proximity to 
the lake and present and potential use of the parcel, including 
applicable zoning regulations."  Wis. Stat. § 33.32(1)(b).  
Commissioners must be able to explain why property is benefited 
by inclusion in the lake district if they intend to impose 
special assessments on that property. 
No. 01-3396 
 
32 
 
¶61 In short, there are factors besides whether there has 
been a change in circumstances that a conscientious lake 
district board must take into account. 
¶62 In this case, the Rock-Koshkonong Lake District went 
beyond the statute, adopting procedures and criteria for the 
consideration of detachment petitions.  One of the reasons for 
adopting these criteria was to promote consistency.  Resolution 
99-03 (A-123).  The Lake District's procedure anticipates that a 
petitioner will provide a "statement explaining why the property 
should be removed from the District."  The petitioner may 
present testimony and evidence relevant to whether specific 
property is not benefited by continued inclusion in the 
District.  Id. at II(A).  The commissioners may question any 
witness, including the property owner, id. at II(B), and the 
Board may consider: 
A. 
The 
physical 
characteristics 
of 
the 
property. 
B. 
Its 
use 
(recreational, 
commercial, 
residential, etc.). 
C. 
Its relationship to the lake in terms of 
whether: 
 
1. 
It is riparian; 
2. 
It has private access rights to the 
lake; 
3. 
Its proximity to public access to the 
lake; 
4. 
It is within view of the lake; and 
5. 
It is within the watershed or ground 
water table of the lake. 
No. 01-3396 
 
33 
 
D. 
Whether the value of the property would be 
enhanced 
if 
the 
lake 
were 
to 
be 
in 
reasonably 
clean, 
attractive 
and 
usable 
condition; or whether the value of the 
property would be diminished if the lake 
were to be in a degraded condition. 
E. 
Whether detachment of the property will 
result in any "hole" or "island" in the 
boundaries of the District. 
F. 
Whether 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
property's inclusion in the District have 
changed. 
G. 
Any other factors relevant to whether the 
property is benefited by continued inclusion 
in the District. 
Id. at A-124, III Criteria.  Surely, the "relevant" factors the 
Board ought to address include the factors set out by the 
petitioner in making the case for detachment.   
¶63 Having established 
criteria 
to consider, a 
lake 
district board should not look solely to those criteria that 
support its position and disregard criteria that do not, because 
a lake district must avoid arbitrary and capricious action.  
"Arbitrary action is the result of an unconsidered, wilful and 
irrational choice of conduct and not the result of the 
'winnowing and sifting' process."  Olson v. Rothwell, 28 
Wis. 2d 233, 239, 137 N.W.2d 86 (1965).  Arbitrary action 
represents a board's will and not its judgment.  The fair and 
consistent 
application 
of 
reasonable 
rules 
will 
blunt 
a 
detachment petitioner's claims that a lake district board has 
been arbitrary. 
¶64 It should be noted that if property is detached, the 
detachment is not irrevocable.  If a lake district undertakes a 
No. 01-3396 
 
34 
 
project that will benefit property that has been detached, or if 
the property itself changes, the lake district board may 
initiate proceedings to re-attach the property to the district. 
¶65 Review of a detachment determination does not permit a 
court to substitute its judgment for the considered judgment of 
a legislative body.  However, the statute empowers the court to 
assure 
that 
the 
lake 
district 
board 
actually 
makes 
an 
individualized determination of whether a parcel is or "is not 
benefited 
by 
continued 
inclusion 
in 
the 
district," 
see 
§ 33.33(3), and permits a court to address a plainly erroneous 
exercise of discretion. 
¶66 In this opinion we do not attempt to set forth 
standards for determining whether property is or is not 
benefited by continued inclusion in a lake district.  This is 
legislative work.  Our objective is to encourage the development 
of reasonable standards by lake district boards and the 
legislature, and to assure adherence to standards when they 
exist, so as to promote fairness, consistency, and sound public 
policy. 
F. Review of Detachment Decisions 
¶67 Both the circuit court and the court of appeals 
assumed that this action was governed by the review principles 
of statutory certiorari, and they conducted their analyses 
accordingly. 
¶68 The legislature did not make clear what kind of 
hearing it intended for an appeal under § 33.26(7).  It imposed 
no requirement that a county board conduct an evidentiary 
No. 01-3396 
 
35 
 
hearing on objections to a lake district or make a record of its 
decision other than a resolution creating the lake district with 
certain required findings.  Likewise, it imposed no requirement 
for an evidentiary hearing when a lake district board considers 
a detachment petition.  Yet the legislature did not authorize a 
circuit court, on appeal, to take additional evidence in either 
situation.   
¶69 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 33.26(7) and 33.33(3) each afford 
an aggrieved party a right to appeal.  This implies that the 
decision to grant review is not discretionary with the court, 
and that suggests statutory certiorari.   
¶70 In Stacy v. Ashland County Department of Public 
Welfare, 39 Wis. 2d 595, 601, 159 N.W.2d 630 (1968), we examined 
the question of review by certiorari where no provision was made 
for a review of a decision by a board or commission.  We 
concluded that where there are no statutory provisions for 
judicial review, the action of a board or commission may be 
reviewed by way of certiorari.  Id.  The situation in Stacy is 
somewhat analogous to the situation here. 
¶71 Although § 33.26(7) does not mention "certiorari," it 
does use the words "petition" and "appeal."  In the absence of 
any additional grant of authority to the court, we believe the 
words of the statute imply that the court is largely confined to 
a previously existing record.  See Nielsen v. Waukesha County 
Bd. of Supervisors, 178 Wis. 2d 498, 521, 504 N.W.2d 621 (Ct. 
App. 1993).  This view is supported by comparing a § 33.26(7) 
hearing to a § 33.32(1)(f) hearing, which is utilized for a 
No. 01-3396 
 
36 
 
challenge to an assessment.20  The latter hearing appears to 
contemplate more than a review of existing evidence. 
¶72 In Lakeshore Development Corp. v. Plan Commission, 12 
Wis. 2d 560, 107 N.W.2d 590 (1961), the court explained that:  
The writ of certiorari at common law was limited 
in scope and . . . usually raised only questions of 
jurisdiction or excess power set forth as errors in 
the petition . . .  The return was taken as conclusive 
if responsive to the petition and could not be 
impeached by collateral affidavits. . . .  
The scope and purpose of the writ of certiorari 
has been enlarged by statute and it is now used as a 
method 
of 
appeal 
to 
determine 
not 
only 
the 
jurisdiction of a municipal board . . . but also to 
review the action of such a board as arbitrary, 
unreasonable, 
or 
discriminatory 
and 
sometimes 
to 
decide the merits of the action.   
Id. at 565.  
¶73 We do not perceive any authority for a court to decide 
de novo the merits of an action in detachment.  We see review 
based on inquiry as to (1) whether a lake district board kept 
within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on a correct 
theory of law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, 
or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; 
and (4) whether the evidence was such that the board might 
reasonably make the determination in question.   
G. Donaldson's Petition for Detachment 
                                                 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 33.32(1)(f) provides in part: "Such 
appeal shall be tried and determined in the same manner as cases 
originally commenced in said court." 
No. 01-3396 
 
37 
 
¶74 The statute on detachment requires a lake district 
board to make an individual determination whether specific 
property is or is not benefited by continued inclusion in the 
lake district.  The petitioner has the burden of persuading the 
board and creating a record.  A petitioner should (1) clearly 
state the grounds for detachment; (2) append documents, whenever 
possible, that tend to support these grounds; and (3) request 
the opportunity to testify and present evidence.  The district 
board must respond by setting out the rules and procedures it 
intends to follow, and eventually it must marshal arguments and 
evidence to support its decision. 
¶75 Under principles of certiorari review, the circuit 
court is limited to the facts contained in the record from the 
proceeding under review, unless a statute expands the scope of 
review.21  This principle is somewhat difficult to apply when a 
lake district board makes findings that go beyond the evidence 
adduced at the hearing, because the petitioner will not have had 
notice of the need to address this evidence. 
¶76 A court is not powerless in the face of an inadequate 
record.  If the record is inadequate because the petitioner 
failed to make a compelling case or failed to make a compelling 
offer of proof, the petitioner should lose.  If the record is 
inadequate because the lake district did not permit the 
petitioner to present evidence, the lake district board would 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10) (authorizing the court 
to take additional evidence in a review of a decision by a board 
of adjustment).   
No. 01-3396 
 
38 
 
violate the spirit if not the letter of the detachment statute 
and would subject itself to due process review. 
¶77 In this case, Arthur Donaldson testified, a consultant 
to the District testified, and one of the commissioners 
submitted photographs.  Consequently, the Rock-Koshkonong Lake 
District Board cannot be faulted for any failure to permit 
Donaldson to present evidence.  However, the Lake District Board 
did make findings that went beyond the evidence presented at the 
hearing. 
¶78 We now examine the record under the standards for 
statutory certiorari. 
¶79 The first component of certiorari that we review here 
is whether the District acted according to law.  "Law" refers 
not only to the applicable statutes but also to the guaranties 
of due process found in the state and federal constitutions.  
State ex rel. Wasilewski v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 14 Wis. 2d 243, 
263, 111 N.W.2d 198 (1961), (citing State ex rel. Ball v. 
McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 199, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959)). 
¶80 The court of appeals focused on the question whether 
the lake district board acted according to law and concluded 
that it did: "Donaldson's petition for detachment was properly 
denied on the basis that he failed to show a change in 
circumstance."  Donaldson, 260 Wis. 2d 238, ¶21.  Because we 
conclude that this is not a correct statement of law in a 
situation where the county board has not made and articulated an 
individual 
determination 
of 
benefit 
to 
the 
petitioner's 
property, we reverse the court of appeals. 
No. 01-3396 
 
39 
 
¶81 The Lake District Board also relied on this principle.  
The Board's first three reasons in support of its conclusion 
relate to its premise that the county board made a legislative 
decision to include property in the district because such 
property will be benefited by inclusion in the district.  Thus, 
according to the Board, the Lake District Board not only had no 
obligation to second-guess the county board about any of this 
property but also should not have second-guessed the county 
board about this property, in the absence of a change of 
circumstances.  We reject this premise as inconsistent with the 
statutory scheme.  Except in those rare instances in which a 
county board takes the time to address individual parcels and 
articulates the basis for a finding that these parcels will be 
benefited by inclusion in the district, the lake district board 
is expected to make its own determination whether each parcel is 
or is not benefited by continued inclusion in the district.  
Thus, the Board relied in substantial part on an incorrect 
theory of law. 
¶82 Looking to another legal issue, we note that in State 
ex rel. Riley v. Department of Health & Social Services, 151 
Wis. 2d 618, 445 N.W.2d 693 (Ct. App. 1989), the court of 
appeals stated: 
On certiorari review, we 
determine 
de 
novo 
whether 
the 
department . . . acted 
according 
to 
applicable law, whether the action was arbitrary or 
unreasonable, and whether the evidence supported the 
determination . . .  An important component of the 
analysis is whether the department followed its own 
No. 01-3396 
 
40 
 
rules, "for an agency is bound by the procedural 
regulations which it itself has promulgated." 
Id. at 623 (emphasis added). 
¶83 This analysis is inapposite in reviewing a pure 
exercise of legislative power.  "Courts are reluctant to inquire 
into whether the legislature has complied with legislatively 
prescribed formalities in enacting a statute.  This reluctance 
stems from separation of powers and comity concepts."  State ex 
rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 364-65, 338 
N.W.2d 684 (1983). 
[C]ourts generally consider that the legislature's 
adherence 
to 
the 
rules 
or 
statutes 
prescribing 
procedure is a matter entirely within legislative 
control and discretion, not subject to judicial review 
unless the legislative procedure is mandated by the 
constitution.  If the legislature fails to follow 
self-adopted procedural rules in enacting legislation, 
and such rules are not mandated by the constitution, 
courts will not intervene to declare the legislation 
invalid. 
Id. at 365.   
¶84 Although the Lake District Board adopted criteria to 
consider in reviewing a detachment petition, it did not make the 
consideration of these criteria mandatory.  Consequently, we do 
not see a due process violation in the Board's failure to 
discuss each of the relevant criteria.  Rather, we consider the 
Board's failure to discuss all the relevant criteria under a 
different component of certiorari review. 
¶85 The second component of certiorari review in this case 
is whether the Board's decision was arbitrary, oppressive, or 
unreasonable, representing its will and not its judgment. 
No. 01-3396 
 
41 
 
¶86 In Resolution 99-3, the Lake District Board listed 
seven 
criteria 
that 
it 
might 
"consider" 
in 
reviewing 
a 
detachment petition.  In reviewing Donaldson's petition, the 
Lake District Board enumerated eight "reasons" why it concluded 
that "the territory is benefited by continued inclusion in the 
District." 
¶87 Three of the "reasons" stated by the Board relate to 
one of the seven criteria; namely, "F. Whether circumstances 
surrounding the property's inclusion in the District have 
changed."  This was discussed in ¶¶59 and 81 above and found to 
be legally incorrect on the facts of this case. 
¶88 The Lake District Board did not discuss four of the 
seven criteria, namely "A. The physical characteristics of the 
property," "B. Its use (recreational, commercial, residential, 
etc.)," "E. Whether detachment of the property will result in 
any 'hole' or 'island' in the boundaries of the District," and 
"G. Any other factors relevant to whether the property is 
benefited by continued inclusion in the District."  Each of 
these criteria tends to support Donaldson's position.  His two 
parcels consist of agricultural land near an interstate highway.  
They are zoned agricultural.  They are used for agriculture, and 
Donaldson said he has no intention to change their use.  There 
are no improvements on the parcels except for highway signs, and 
no one lives on these parcels.  Detachment of the two parcels 
would not create any holes in the District.  The District did 
not discuss "other" relevant factors or rebut Donaldson's 
arguments directly. 
No. 01-3396 
 
42 
 
¶89 This leaves two of the seven criteria that the Board 
itself listed as factors for consideration.  The Board's third 
criterion, "C," reads as follows: 
 
C. 
[The land's] relationship to the lake in 
terms of whether: 
 
 
1. 
It is riparian; 
2. 
It has private access rights to the 
lake; 
3. 
Its proximity to public access to the 
lake; 
 
 
4. 
It is within view of the lake; and 
5. 
It 
is 
within 
the 
watershed 
or 
groundwater table of the lake. 
Criterion "C"——which specifically refers to "lake"——is the 
source of four of the Board's eight "reasons" for finding that 
Donaldson's parcels are benefited.   
¶90 The Board states that both tracts are in "near 
proximity" to Lake Koshkonong "and the portion of the Rock River 
within the District."  The "northerly tract" is located 
approximately one mile from the Rock River; the "southerly 
tract" is located approximately a half-mile from the Rock River.  
Significantly, the Board does not indicate the distances between 
the two parcels and Lake Koshkonong.  Instead, it shifts focus, 
citing distances to the Rock River because Donaldson's parcels 
are closer to the river than to the lake.  By doing so, the 
Board turns Donaldson's argument on its head, using the 
distances he cited to establish that he is not benefited as 
proof that his parcels are in "near proximity" to the river. 
No. 01-3396 
 
43 
 
¶91 In reviewing the Board's "near proximity" rationale, 
we cannot say that a legislative finding that property located 
one mile from a lake is "benefited" by its proximity, is an 
irrational finding.  Similarly, we would have difficulty 
dismissing out of hand a legislative determination that property 
located five miles from a lake or river is benefited by its 
proximity.  What is evident in this case, however, is that the 
Lake District has no consistent rationale about proximity.  The 
Lake District Board has not established a consistent standard 
for determining "near proximity," has switched from lake to 
river in its analysis, and has not explained how non-riparian 
agricultural land located a half-mile or a mile from the river 
is benefited by its proximity more directly than many similar 
parcels not included in the District and not subject to its 
added layer of taxation. 
¶92 In 1999 the University of Wisconsin Extension did a 
study on the potential impacts of removing the Indianford Dam.  
See David W. Marcouiller, et al., University of Wisconsin-
Extension, Assessing Potential Economic and Ecological Impacts 
of Removing the Indianford Dam (Dec. 8, 1999).  The study 
focused on the towns of Albion, Milton, Sumner, and Koshkonong.  
It did not study the town of Fulton in which Donaldson's 
properties are located, presumably because Fulton has no 
riparian property on Lake Koshkonong.  In the course of their 
analysis, the investigators indicated that they studied property 
within a half-mile of Lake Koshkonong.  "In general, there is a 
rough overlap between the identified parcels within 1/2 mile and 
No. 01-3396 
 
44 
 
[the] newly created lake district."  Marcouiller, supra, at 22.  
The investigators acknowledged that "the boundaries do not match 
exactly" with their half-mile calculation.  However, most 
property in the district appears to be within a half-mile of the 
lake. 
¶93 When property is a half-mile or more from the river, 
is not riparian, and has no private access to the lake or river, 
the benefit derived from "proximity" is not so self-evident that 
it requires no explanation in a detachment decision.  In this 
case, the Board failed to link proximity to benefit. 
¶94 The 
Board 
gave 
another 
"reason" 
for 
opposing 
detachment.  It stated: "Both tracts are within the Rock River 
watershed and within the sub-watershed areas that drain into 
portions of the Rock River and Lake Koshkonong within the 
boundaries of the District."  Judge Welker addressed this 
reason, saying: "There is a very great deal of land in Rock 
County [as well as Jefferson and Dane Counties] which is within 
the Rock River watershed or drains into the Rock River or Lake 
Koshkonong which is not included in the District."   
¶95 Under cross-examination, the Board's witness, Steve 
Hjort, acknowledged that all land in Wisconsin is within some 
watershed.  Consequently, the fact that property is located in a 
watershed or sub-watershed tells us very little about how that 
property affects a lake or river or how that property is 
benefited by inclusion in a lake district.  Again, the Lake 
District Board provides a fact without showing how that fact is 
No. 01-3396 
 
45 
 
relevant to benefit.  As Judge Welker put it, the fact or reason 
was not one of "any controlling probity."   
¶96 As another reason, the Lake District Board stated: 
"Although neither parcel is riparian, both parcels are located 
in close proximity to public boat launch facilities."  It 
explained that the northern parcel is located approximately 2.5 
miles from the DNR boat launch site on Ellendale Road and one 
mile from several private boat launching facilities.  The 
southern parcel is "located approximately 1 mile from the DNR 
boat launching site."  It did not explain that this DNR site is 
on the Rock River, not the lake.   
¶97 If 
Donaldson's 
parcels 
consisted 
of 
residential 
property, inhabited by boaters and potential boaters, the 
Board's reason might be relevant.  But Donaldson's parcels 
consist 
of 
agricultural 
land 
with 
no 
residents 
and 
no 
improvements.  There are no potential boaters on the property to 
take advantage of proximity, and no boats are stored there.  The 
District must acknowledge in emphasizing this reason that 
Donaldson's property is not riparian and has no private access 
rights to the lake or river.  As a result, Donaldson's property 
is not markedly different from property in Edgerton or Milton, 
or even Janesville, except that trailering a boat from one of 
his two agricultural parcels to a public launch site would take 
a few minutes less time than trailering a boat from residential 
property in one of these communities.  Moreover, there are 
properties closer to the DNR public launch site than Donaldson's 
properties that are not in the Lake District.   
No. 01-3396 
 
46 
 
¶98 As its final "C"-criterion reason, the Board states: 
"The southerly tract has a direct view of the Rock River."  This 
reason was supported at the hearing by a photograph taken from 
Knutson Road near Donaldson's southern parcel and is not 
disputed.  In reviewing this rationale, we note that it is 
undisputed in the record that neither parcel has a direct view 
of Lake Koshkonong, and there is no evidence that there is a 
direct view of the river from the northern parcel.  Hence, this 
reason for opposing detachment applies only to the southern 
parcel.  In citing this reason, the Lake District Board is 
contending that agricultural land located more than eight 
football fields away from the river is "benefited" by a direct 
view of the river.  This evidence is not compelling. 
¶99 We turn now to the Board's final reason for opposing 
detachment, a reason related to the Lake District Board's fourth 
criterion, "D."22  The Board states: "The value of both tracts 
will be enhanced if the water quality and recreational value of 
the Lake Koshkonong and associated reaches of the Rock River 
within the District are improved and will be diminished if the 
Indianford Dam were removed or if water quality and recreational 
value of the lake and associated reaches of the Rock River were 
further degraded."   
                                                 
22 Paragraph D. of the Lake District Board's Criteria reads 
as follows: "D. Whether the value of the property would be 
enhanced if the lake were to be in reasonably clean, attractive 
and usable condition; or whether the value of the property would 
be diminished if the lake were to be in a degraded condition." 
A-124. 
No. 01-3396 
 
47 
 
¶100 In reviewing this reason, we are reminded of the 
legislature's 
findings 
and 
declaration 
of 
intent.  
Wis. Stat. § 33.001(1).  In 1974 the legislature determined that 
"the protection and rehabilitation of the public inland lakes of 
this state are in the best interest of the citizens of this 
state" and "the public health and welfare will be benefited 
thereby."  Id.  In other words, in a broad legislative sense, 
residents of Milwaukee, La Crosse, Superior, Marinette, and all 
Wisconsin, are "benefited" by a clean, healthy Lake Koshkonong, 
as well as other inland lakes, because protected, rehabilitated 
public inland lakes "benefit" the public health and welfare.  
This does not mean, however, that residents of Milwaukee, La 
Crosse, Superior, and Marinette could reasonably be included in 
the Rock-Koshkonong Lake District because they are not "directly 
affected" 
by 
a 
"deteriorated 
condition" 
of 
this 
lake.  
§ 33.001(2)(b).  The same analysis must be applied in evaluating 
Donaldson's parcels.  Are the parcels "directly affected" by 
some condition of these waters? 
¶101 Is the "value" of Donaldson's two tracts enhanced by 
the quality of Lake Koshkonong and the Rock River?  The Board 
bases its reason on contingencies: the "value" of the parcels 
will be affected "if" the water quality and recreational value 
are improved, or "if" the Indianford Dam were removed, or "if" 
water quality and recreational value were degraded.  The Board 
does not reference what actions it has taken, is taking, or will 
take in this regard, nor has it explained how these actions have 
affected or will affect the value of non-riparian agricultural 
No. 01-3396 
 
48 
 
land.  The Board relies on the relationship between Donaldson's 
properties and the Rock River but does not explain how removal 
of the Indianford Dam would affect his properties or any 
properties linked to the Rock River.  In all likelihood, any 
increased land value would depend on the conversion of the land 
to 
residential 
use 
instead 
of 
agricultural 
use. 
 
This 
contingency is inconsistent with Donaldson's testimony.  Once 
again, the Lake District Board has failed to articulate the 
linkage between its reason and present benefit to the particular 
parcels of land. 
¶102 To sum up, the Lake District Board exercised its will 
and not its judgment.  It placed heavy emphasis on a requirement 
for a change in circumstances in a situation in which a change 
in circumstances was not required.  It failed to address or 
rebut the grounds given by the petitioner.  In so doing, it 
failed to discuss several criteria it had identified in its own 
rules.  Although the Board gave several reasons for its decision 
beyond the absence of a change in circumstances, it consistently 
failed to explain why these reasons were relevant in showing 
direct benefit to Donaldson's property and why Donaldson's 
property was more directly benefited than many other properties 
not included in the Lake District.  The Lake District Board 
consistently failed to discuss how its past, present, and future 
actions were benefiting Donaldson's parcels.  In short, the 
Board was arbitrary and unreasonable.  Were we to conclude that 
the Board's hollow, ritualistic enumeration of reasons was 
sufficient to sustain its refusal to detach the Donaldson 
No. 01-3396 
 
49 
 
properties, 
we 
would 
render 
the 
detachment 
procedure 
meaningless. 
¶103 There is one additional component for certiorari 
review that we should mention: whether the evidence was such 
that the Board might reasonably make the determination in 
question.  We conclude that the evidence——the reasoning——cited 
by the Lake District Board was not sufficient to sustain its 
decision.  As noted, the Board failed to link several of its 
reasons to a finding of benefit and failed to justify its 
disregard of the reasons proffered by Donaldson. 
H. 
Lake Districts and Certiorari Review 
 
¶104 This court is extremely sensitive to its obligation to 
afford substantial deference to any exercise of legislative 
power.  When a lake district performs its legislative functions, 
it is entitled to this deference, and courts should be reluctant 
to invalidate its legislative decisions.  Nonetheless, there 
must be a clear-eyed analysis of the predicament inherent in the 
exercise of legislative power by lake districts. 
 
¶105 As a general rule, all property in Wisconsin is 
situated within a city, village, town, or Indian reservation, 
and is either taxable or tax exempt.  All property within a lake 
district is also situated within a city, village, or town, and 
is subject to whatever taxes the pertinent municipality may 
impose.  When property is included within a lake district, it is 
subject to an additional level of taxation: that is, it is 
subject to a tax on top of the tax imposed by the county, the 
city, village, or town, the vocational-technical district, and 
No. 01-3396 
 
50 
 
the school district.  There must be some discernible reason why 
any property is required to pay an additional layer of taxes. 
 
¶106 In theory, a town sanitary district is also an 
additional layer of government.  However, cities and villages 
have clear statutory authority to handle sanitary issues while 
towns do not.  As a result, towns create sanitary districts so 
that certain functions can be performed that cannot be performed 
by the towns themselves.  In this sense, sanitary districts are 
not an additional layer of government. 
 
¶107 Lake districts are truly an additional layer of 
government, and they are created by people driven by a laudable 
but special interest.  Special interest petitioners devise the 
boundaries of a lake district to serve this interest and they 
submit their plan to a county board for approval.  The county 
board may carefully evaluate every parcel of property to 
determine whether it should be included in the district.  As a 
practical matter, this is not likely to happen.  Such a review 
would require a conscientious board to fine-tune the proposal 
submitted by the petitioners and collectively draw up its own 
plan.  This is especially unlikely to happen with respect to 
property located in a different county. 
 
¶108 Thus, because the legislature has failed to establish 
clear standards for what property may be included in a district, 
a lake district may be a gerrymandered creation that is 
ultimately turned over to the people who drew the lines.  
Property owners disgruntled by their inclusion in the district 
may not have means to influence the elected county board 
No. 01-3396 
 
51 
 
officials who approve the creation, or the ability to punish at 
the 
ballot 
box 
either 
the 
board 
or 
the 
lake 
district 
commissioners who administer their own creation.  In this 
regard, creation of a lake district has fewer checks than 
creation of a town sanitary district. 
 
¶109 If courts are unable to provide any meaningful 
protection to property owners, the creation and governance of 
lake districts will lend themselves to serious abuse.  The 
limitations of certiorari review do not provide much protection.  
Consequently, we urge the legislature to reexamine the statutes 
on 
lake 
districts 
to 
provide 
reasonable 
standards 
for 
legislative decisions, whether by a county board creating a 
district or by a lake district board in governing a district. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶110 For the reasons stated, we conclude that the Lake 
District Board failed to render a satisfactory determination of 
whether Arthur Donaldson's two parcels of territory are not 
benefited by continued inclusion in the Lake District.  The 
Board improperly relied on the premise that Donaldson was 
required to show a change in circumstances from the time the 
Lake District was formed, even though the Rock County Board had 
not made an individualized determination that his parcel would 
be benefited by inclusion in the district.  Although the Board 
stated additional reasons for denying Donaldson's petition for 
detachment, its determination was arbitrary and unreasonable, 
representing its will and not its judgment.  The court of 
appeals decision reversing the decision of the circuit court and 
No. 01-3396 
 
52 
 
upholding the Lake District Board is reversed, and this case is 
remanded to the circuit court for action consistent with this 
opinion.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
No.  01-3396.npc 
 
1 
 
¶111 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  Because the 
majority fails to accord the required deference to the decision 
of the Lake District Board, I respectfully dissent.  I disagree 
with the majority's conclusion that an owner of property located 
within a lake district is not required to show a change of 
circumstances in order to have that territory detached from the 
lake district.  I respectfully dissent because the majority's 
ruling institutes a duplicative process that undermines a county 
board's previous determination that each individual property in 
the Lake District "will be benefited by the establishment" of 
such district.  Wis. Stat. § 33.26(3).  The term "benefited" has 
the same meaning in § 33.26(3), the lake district creation 
statute, 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 33.33(3), 
the 
statute 
governing 
detachment.  In coming to an opposite conclusion, the majority 
both improperly interpreted § 33.33(3) and failed to avail 
itself of case precedent illustrating that the term "benefited," 
as it appears in both §§ 33.26(3) and 33.33(3), refers to each 
individual parcel within the lake district.   
¶112 The majority begins its discussion of the relationship 
between the word "benefited" in Wis. Stat. §§ 33.26(3) and 
33.33(3) by agreeing that the decision to detach is legislative.  
Majority op., ¶56.  The majority then states that because the 
term 
"frontage" 
was 
not 
included 
in 
the 
lake 
district 
legislation 
but 
was 
included 
in 
earlier 
drafts 
of 
that 
legislation, a fair inference can be drawn that the detachment 
procedure for lake districts was intended to be a safeguard 
ensuring that a property owner is provided an individual 
No.  01-3396.npc 
 
2 
 
decision regarding whether the owner's specific property is 
benefited by continued inclusion.  Id., ¶57.  The majority then 
concludes that the definition of benefit under § 33.26(3), which 
relates to whether property "will be benefited," is not the same 
as under § 33.33(3), which speaks to whether "territory is not 
benefited by continued inclusion in the district."  Id., ¶58. 
¶113 The majority needs to look no further than the 
statutes themselves to determine that "benefited" has the same 
meaning in both Wis. Stat. §§ 33.26(3) and 33.33(3).  Because 
both statutes are in Subchapter IV of Chapter 33, the proper 
rule of statutory construction dictates that "benefited" should 
be attributed the same meaning unless the statutory context 
calls for a different meaning.  Wilson v. Waukesha County, 157 
Wis. 2d 790, 796, 460 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1990)  (rejecting 
ascribing a different meaning to the word "malicious" that 
appeared multiple times in the same statute because the 
statutory structure did not call for different meanings).  Here, 
the context does not call for a different meaning of the term 
"benefited."   
¶114 In fact, the statutory context leads me to conclude 
that "benefited" must be defined the same way in both statutes 
in the same chapter.  Wisconsin Stat. § 33.33(3) states, in 
relevant part: "Proposals for detachment shall be considered by 
the commissioners, and territory may be detached upon a finding 
that such territory is not benefited by continued inclusion in 
the district."  (Emphasis added).  The language, "not benefited 
by continued inclusion," indicates that the individual property 
No.  01-3396.npc 
 
3 
 
that the owner is petitioning for detachment has already been 
determined by the county board to be benefited by inclusion in 
the lake district.  The effect of the majority’s decision is to 
allow members of a lake district to challenge a county board’s 
determination that the owner’s property was benefited by 
inclusion in the lake district by appealing to the Lake District 
Board without the need to show a change in circumstances.  As 
the court of appeals noted, Donaldson’s testimony during his 
hearing before the Lake District Board proves this point.   
[LAKE DISTRICT BOARD]: 
[H]as anything changed since 
Rock County passed the resolution forming the lake 
district . . . or did they make a mistake back then 
when they formed this lake district? 
MR. DONALDSON:  
I think they made a mistake back 
then because it was farm land when I bought it and 
I’ve owned if for a number of years and it’s still 
farm land, but I don’t intend to do anything else with 
it other than farm land. 
[LAKE DISTRICT BOARD]: 
So there haven’t been any 
changes in the conditions of the property since then? 
MR. DONALDSON:  
No. 
¶115 The court of appeals held, as did the Lake District 
Board, that without a showing of changed circumstances Donaldson 
is not entitled to detachment.23  I agree with them. 
¶116 I find additional support for this conclusion in 
Wis. Stat. § 33.26(7), which establishes a 30-day window for a 
person "aggrieved by the action of the board" to petition the 
                                                 
23 Rock-Koshkonong Lake District Resolution 99-03, Section 
III(F) states, in relevant part, that the Board may consider 
"[w]hether circumstances surrounding the property's inclusion in 
the District have changed." 
No.  01-3396.npc 
 
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circuit court for review of the county board's action in 
including a particular property within the lake district's 
boundaries. 
 
The 
majority's 
approach 
eviscerates 
the 
legislature's intent to limit the time period that a property 
owner has to challenge such a decision by a county board.  
Chapter 33 also undercuts the majority's concern that property 
owners will be compelled to remain in lake districts in 
perpetuity, unless they can challenge the county board's 
determination that their property is benefited by inclusion in 
the lake district by way of Wis. Stat. § 33.33(3) without any 
showing of changed circumstances.  Chapter 33 provides property 
owners with two reasonable options:  An owner can make a timely 
petition, initially, under § 33.26(7), challenging a county 
board's decision to include the owner's property in a lake 
district, and an owner can also, later, petition for detachment 
if the owner is able to demonstrate changed circumstances under 
§ 33.33(3).  If shown, such circumstances would allow a lake 
district board to order detachment.   
¶117 The majority acknowledges that application of Fort 
Howard Paper Co. v. Fox River Heights Sanitary District, 250 
Wis. 145, 26 N.W.2d 661 (1947), leads to the conclusion that 
this case is subject to certiorari review.  However, it fails to 
give deference to language in Fort Howard, as the court of 
appeals pointed out, illustrating that a finding that an entire 
district is "benefited" means that each individual property in 
the district has the potential to be benefited. 
No.  01-3396.npc 
 
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¶118 In Fort Howard, a property owner argued that its 
property should not be included in a sanitary district because 
its individual property was not benefited by inclusion.  Id. at 
152.  Fort Howard asserted that in order to be included in the 
district, its property had to be immediately benefited by such 
inclusion.  Id.  Focusing on benefit to the property of the 
district as a whole, this court disagreed, concluding that when 
such property as a whole is benefited then each individual 
property within the district is benefited by inclusion in the 
district.  Id.  The fact that the individual property did not 
realize immediate benefits did not preclude the formation of the 
district.  Id.  The Fort Howard court stated: 
If the town board finds that the property within the 
boundaries of the proposed district as a whole will be 
benefited then the district is to be organized.  For 
example, if some parcel of land was included in the 
proposed district which lay out of the watershed and 
could not be served by the proposed improvement, 
manifestly a property so situated could not be 
benefited.  If all the property within the boundaries 
of the proposed district is in the watershed and the 
proposed improvement may serve it, then the property 
of the district as a whole is benefited and the town 
board if it makes the other necessary finding may 
organize the district.  
Id.  (Emphasis added). 
¶119 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
properly 
interpreted 
this 
directive from Fort Howard and commented:  "Stated differently, 
a finding that a district as a whole is 'benefited' will stand 
unless some parcel in the district is not benefited by the 
inclusion."  Donaldson v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Rock-Koshkonong Lake 
Dist., 2003 WI App. 26, ¶15, 260 Wis. 2d 238, 659 N.W.2d 66.   
No.  01-3396.npc 
 
6 
 
¶120 Further affirmation for this interpretation of Fort 
Howard emerges from the court of appeals' statement that "[t]his 
reading of Fort Howard is further supported by the subsequent 
discussion of the particular facts in that case and the supreme 
court's conclusion:  'it appears from the undisputed evidence 
that the property of the plaintiff will be benefited.'"  Id.  
The court of appeals pointed out that "[i]f benefit to the 
individual parcel at issue in Fort Howard was irrelevant, the 
supreme court would not have explained why the parcel was 
benefited."  Id.  The court of appeals went on to conclude that 
the text of Subchapter IV in Chapter 33 did not suggest that the 
term "benefited" had a different meaning prior to the time when 
the lake district was formed than it had after it was formed.  
Id., ¶21.  Again, not requiring Donaldson to show a change in 
circumstances 
is 
contrary 
to 
the 
language 
and 
proper 
interpretation of the statutes at issue.   
¶121 As 
mentioned 
above, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
interpretation of the language "benefited" was correct.  In 
upholding the Lake District Board's decision to deny Donaldson's 
petition, the court found persuasive the Board's argument "that 
Donaldson's opportunity to challenge whether his property was 
properly included in the District is governed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 33.26, and because Donaldson failed to avail himself of that 
opportunity, he must now demonstrate a change in circumstances 
showing he is no longer 'benefited,' using the same definition 
of 'benefited' used by the county board when the Lake District 
was created."  Id., ¶12.  Unlike the majority, the court of 
No.  01-3396.npc 
 
7 
 
appeals did not fail to give weight to the Board's decision when 
determining that the property included in the Lake District 
would potentially benefit by such inclusion. 
¶122 The majority's decision ignores the legislative role 
of both the County Board and the Lake District Board.  The 
majority concedes that certiorari review of a detachment 
decision does not allow it to substitute its judgment for the 
Lake District Board's determination.  Majority op., ¶51.  Yet, 
by not recognizing that the County Board's original finding that 
each property benefited by inclusion in the Lake District, by 
failing to apply the rules of certiorari review, correctly, and 
by failing to accord to the Lake District Board's decision the 
presumption of correctness, the majority has wandered from the 
correct analytical path into a thicket of error.  While claiming 
to recognize the presumption, the majority only applies the 
presumption of correctness to the County Board's creation of the 
Lake District, see majority op., ¶53, n.13, even though the 
majority recognizes the decision of the Lake District Board on 
detachment to be a legislative one.  Majority op., ¶¶4 and 56. 
¶123 As the majority notes, "a court may not exercise 
legislative power."  Majority op., ¶48 (quoting Fort Howard, 250 
Wis. at 150).  Yet the majority seems to ignore this directive 
by according the Lake District Board's decision little or no 
deference.  The decision of the Board is a legislative 
determination.  See Joint Sch. Dist v. State Appeal Bd., 56 
Wis. 2d 790, 794 203 N.W.2d 1 (1973).  When reviewed on appeal, 
the Board's decision should be reviewed to determine whether it 
No.  01-3396.npc 
 
8 
 
exceeded its jurisdiction or acted arbitrarily or capriciously.  
Id. at 795.  A presumption of correctness must be afforded to a 
decision of a board such as the Lake District Board, if there is 
no violation of those factors. 
  
¶124 More specifically, I agree with the majority (see 
majority op., ¶4) that the only factors a court may properly 
consider on review are as follows:  (1) Whether the board kept 
within its jurisdiction; (2) whether the board acted according 
to law; (3) whether the board's action was arbitrary, oppressive 
or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; 
and (4) whether the evidence was such that it might reasonably 
make the order or determination in question.  State ex rel. 
Mitchell Aero v. Bd. of Review, 74 Wis. 2d 268, 281-82, 246 
N.W.2d 521 (1976)  (citing Dolphin v. Bd. of Review, 70 
Wis. 2d 403, 408, 234 N.W.2d 277 (1975)).  
¶125 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
properly 
recognized 
these 
principles of certiorari review.  Donaldson, 260 Wis. 2d 238, 
¶10.  The court focused its analysis on the second prong, since 
the circuit court found that the Board acted contrary to law.24  
The court reasoned that because the Lake District Board 
proceeded on the correct theory of law——a property owner who is 
part of a lake district must show a change in circumstances in 
order 
to 
successfully 
petition 
for 
detachment 
from 
that 
district——it did not have to address the remaining three 
factors.  Id.  I conclude that the Lake District Board was right 
                                                 
24 The circuit court, in its decision, determined that the 
decision of the Lake District Board was contrary to the statute 
and that no change of circumstances was required for detachment. 
No.  01-3396.npc 
 
9 
 
in its assessment and provided sufficient support for its 
decision not to grant detachment. 
¶126 The Board provided detailed reasons justifying its 
position that Donaldson's request for detachment should be 
denied.  The Board stated the following, in relevant part: 
First, both tracts were within the original 
boundary of the District approved by the Rock County 
Board of Supervisors Resolution 99-A-038.   
Second, the Rock County Resolution included a 
finding that the property included in the District 
will be benefited by the establishment of the Rock-
Koshkonong Lake District.   
Third, no evidence has been provided to the 
commission indicating that there has been any change 
in the property inconsistent with the Board of 
Supervisors' findings that these tracts benefit from 
inclusion in the District.   
Fourth, both tracts are within the Rock River 
watershed, and within the subwatershed areas that 
drain into the portions of the Rock River and Lake 
Koshkonong within the boundaries of the district.   
Fifth, both tracts are located in near proximity 
to Lake Koshkonong and the portion of the Rock River 
within the District.   . . .    
Sixth, although neither parcel is riparian both 
parcels are located in close proximity to public boat 
launch facilities.   . . .    
Seventh, the southernly tract has a direct view 
of the Rock River.   
Eighth, the value of both tracts will be enhanced 
if the water quality and recreational value of Lake 
Koshkonong and associated reaches of the Rock River 
within 
the 
District 
are 
improved 
and 
will 
be 
diminished if the Indianford dam were removed or if 
the water quality and recreational value of the lake 
and associated reaches of the Rock River were further 
degraded. 
No.  01-3396.npc 
 
10 
 
¶127 After 
detailing 
these 
considerations, 
the 
Lake 
District Board finally concluded that Donaldson's territory was 
benefited by its inclusion in the District.      Nevertheless, 
the majority concludes that the Board "exercised its will and 
not its judgment."  Majority op., ¶102.25 
                                                 
25 I strongly disagree with the majority's characterization 
of the Board's decision-making process.  The Board clearly 
exercised its judgment in applying the criteria set forth in 
Rock-Koshkonong Lake District Resolution 99-03, Section III.  
Section III states, in relevant part: 
In its consideration of whether the subject 
property is benefited by continued inclusion in the 
District, the Board may consider: 
 
A. The physical characteristics of the property. 
B. Its use (recreational, commercial, residential, 
etc.). 
C. Its relationship to the lake in terms of whether: 
1. It is riparian; 
2. It has private access rights to the 
lake; 
3. Its proximity to public access to the 
lake; 
4. It is within view of the lake; and 
5. It is within the watershed or ground 
water table of the lake. 
D. Whether the value of the property would be 
enhanced if the lake were to be reasonably clean, 
attractive and usable condition; or whether the 
value of the property would be diminished if the 
lake were to be in a degraded condition. 
No.  01-3396.npc 
 
11 
 
¶128 While the majority provides what the Lake District 
Board could have used as an alternative analysis, that analysis 
is no more reasonable than the one applied by the Board.  The 
Board need not look to every criteria it had established for a 
review of a petition for detachment.  The majority admits that 
those factors are guidelines——not mandatory.  The majority's 
inappropriate 
application 
of 
certiorari 
review 
is 
best 
exemplified by its own fact-finding that an increase in property 
value results from recreational use, not agricultural use.  The 
majority fails to take into account the potential that land 
included in the Lake District will experience increases in its 
property value, not only because of the activities on that 
property, but also as a result of the activities occurring on 
other properties included in the Lake District.   
                                                                                                                                                             
E. Whether detachment of the property will result in 
any "hole" or "island" in the boundaries of the 
District. 
F. Whether circumstances surrounding the property's 
inclusion in the District have changed. 
G. Any other factors relevant to whether the property 
is 
benefited 
by 
continued 
inclusion 
in 
the 
District. 
No.  01-3396.npc 
 
12 
 
¶129 For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶130 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley join this dissent.             
 
 
 
No.  01-3396.npc 
 
 
 
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