Case Title: Tech Landing LLC v. JLH Ventures LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 46949

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2021-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 46949 
 
 
TECH LANDING, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
 
     Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
JLH VENTURES, LLC. an Idaho limited 
liability company, dba TRUE PAINTBALL, 
LLC, 
 
     Defendant-Respondent. 
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Boise, August 2020 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: March 23, 2021 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County. Jonathan Medema, District Judge. 
 
The district court’s order is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.  
 
Sasser & Jacobson, PLLC, Boise, for appellant. James Jacobson argued. 
 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, Boise, for respondents. Phillip Collaer argued. 
 
_____________________  
BRODY, Justice. 
 
This appeal involves the grant of summary judgment on a negligence claim stemming 
from a fire loss. In 2013, Tech Landing, LLC (“Tech Landing”) leased a building to JLH 
Ventures, LLC (“JLH”) to operate a paintball business. After the building burned down in 2017, 
Tech Landing sued JLH, alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and negligence. The breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing claims involved payment of rent after the building was destroyed and the failure to 
insure the building against fire loss. Those claims have been dismissed by stipulation of the 
parties and are not at issue here. With respect to its negligence claim, Tech Landing alleges that 
the fire was caused by the negligence of JLH. After ruling certain opinions of Tech Landing’s 
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expert witnesses were inadmissible, the district court granted summary judgment to JLH. We 
affirm the district court’s ruling on the admissibility of the expert opinions, but reverse its grant 
of summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact that must be decided by a 
jury.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In its complaint, Tech Landing alleged three different theories as to how JLH’s 
negligence caused the fire that destroyed its building: (1) “connecting too many pieces of 
equipment into power strips,” (2) “failure to clean and maintain the laundry room including the 
washer and dryer units,” and (3) “negligently leaving a base board heater running after hours.” 
Tech Landing appears to have abandoned the first and third theories at some point in the 
litigation and instead refined its second theory. Though not stated with precision in Tech 
Landing’s arguments below, the district court understood Tech Landing to assert the allegedly 
negligent actions that caused the fire were: (1) JLH’s failure to clean lint from the back of the 
dryer left running after hours on the night of the fire, or (2) JLH’s use of a piece of PVC pipe for 
a portion of the dryer’s exhaust ducting.  
JLH moved for summary judgment in November 2018, arguing that no evidence showed 
the fire was caused by its negligence. In support of the motion, JLH included a report from 
Dennis Zigrang, a fire investigator, concluding that neither a specific ignition source nor the 
exact origin of the fire could be identified, but that the fire could not have originated in the 
laundry room. JLH also included a report from Captain Boehm of the Boise Fire Department, 
concluding that the cause of the fire was undetermined and that it was possible, but unlikely, that 
the fire was caused by the clothes dryer. 
Tech Landing opposed the summary judgment motion and submitted its own expert 
reports and declarations. The report of Dean Hunt, a fire investigator, contradicted Zigrang’s 
report by concluding that the fire did originate in the laundry room. Further, Hunt concluded that 
while the specific ignition sequence was not identified, the probable cause of the fire was the 
dryer left running on the night of the fire. However, Hunt noted that review by an electrical 
engineer was necessary to conclusively determine the fire’s cause. The report of David Cutbirth, 
an electrical engineer, concluded that the fire was not caused by an electrical fault in the dryer, 
but rather by combustion within the dryer exhaust duct, at or near a piece of PVC pipe used for 
part of the ducting. Tech Landing did not file a subsequent report from Hunt incorporating the 
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findings of Cutbirth.  
At the hearing on the summary judgment motion, JLH objected to the admissibility of 
both Hunt’s and Cutbirth’s reports, arguing that neither witness was qualified to offer expert 
testimony and that both reports lacked sufficient factual foundation for their conclusions. The 
district court took both the summary judgment and admissibility matters under advisement. In 
February 2019, the district court entered an order on JLH’s evidentiary objections and motion for 
summary judgment. On the evidentiary matters, the district court ruled that the opinions of Hunt 
and Cutbirth on the cause of the fire were inadmissible. Specifically, the court found that Hunt’s 
opinion that the dryer was the probable cause of fire was not based on his expertise, but “a 
logical deduction any person [could] choose to draw or not draw on his or her own.” Therefore, 
it was inadmissible as an expert opinion. Similarly, the district court found Cutbirth’s opinion 
that the fire began in the exhaust duct was not based on any expertise, but merely “an inference 
[Tech Landing] would like the jury to draw from various facts.”  
In its summary judgment ruling, the district court found there was a genuine dispute 
whether the fire began in the laundry room. However, without admissible expert opinion to 
establish the dryer was the cause of the fire, the court ruled this dispute was not material. 
Therefore, it granted summary judgment in favor of JLH on the negligence claim. Tech Landing 
timely appeals. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews summary judgment rulings using the same standard that the district 
court used. Eldridge v. West, 166 Idaho 303, ___, 458 P.3d 172, 177 (2020). The movant has the 
burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Eagle Springs Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Rodina, 165 
Idaho 862, 867, 454 P.3d 504, 509 (2019). If the movant makes that showing, the district court 
must grant summary judgment. Eldridge, 166 Idaho at ___, 458 P.3d at 177. When determining 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the district court must liberally construe the facts 
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Eagle Springs, 165 Idaho at 
867–68, 454 P.3d at 509–10. Summary judgment should not be granted if reasonable people 
could reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence. Gomez v. Crookham Co., 166 
Idaho 249, ___, 457 P.3d 901, 905 (2020).  
A district court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse 
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of discretion. Green v. Green, 161 Idaho 675, 679, 389 P.3d 961, 965 (2017). When reviewing a 
lower court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, this Court considers whether the trial court: (1) 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 
163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). The admissibility of expert testimony is a 
threshold matter that is distinct from whether the testimony raises genuine issues of material fact 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Mattox v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 157 Idaho 468, 
473, 337 P.3d 627, 632 (2014).  
III. 
 ANALYSIS 
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that portions of Tech 
Landing’s experts’ testimony were inadmissible. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. A trial court 
has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of expert testimony under the rule. Weeks v. 
E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007). Generally, expert 
testimony is admissible “if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” I.R.E. 702. A 
corollary of this rule is that expert opinion is inadmissible if it “concerns conclusions or opinions 
that the average juror would be qualified to draw from the facts utilizing the juror’s common 
sense and normal experience.” Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 367, 128 P.3d 897, 904 (2005). 
While a court may not exclude testimony simply because it disagrees with an expert’s 
conclusions, 
it 
must 
distinguish 
between 
“the self-validating expert, 
who 
uses 
scientific terminology to present unsubstantiated personal beliefs,” and genuine experts 
employing methodologies recognized as valid within their respective fields. Coombs v. Curnow, 
148 Idaho 129, 140–41, 219 P.3d 453, 464–65 (2009).  
1. Admissibility of Hunt’s opinions 
 
Tech Landing’s expert, Dean Hunt, a fire investigator, examined the scene of the fire in 
October 2017. Based on his observations, Hunt eliminated several areas of the building as 
possible origins of the fire before focusing on the laundry room. In the laundry room, Hunt noted 
there were burned remnants of fabric in one of two clothes dryers, and that the pattern of fire 
damage on the dryer began at the rear bottom and moved toward the front. Hunt also interviewed 
Jeremy Haile, one of the owners of JLH. Relevant here, Haile told Hunt that a dryer had been left 
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running when the last employee left the building on the night of the fire; that the dryers had been 
purchased twelve years earlier; and, that the backs of the dryers had never been removed to clean 
out lint. Hunt’s report closed with the following analysis: 
This fire originated in the laundry room located in the northeast corner of the 
structure. This determination was based on the observed patterns of fire damage, 
witness statements, and a systematic evaluation of the remaining physical 
evidence and within a reasonable degree of fire science certainty. The probable 
cause of this fire is the dryer in the laundry room that had been left running prior 
to the fire. The cause of this fire is undetermined pending an evaluation by an 
electrical engineer. 
The district court characterized Hunt’s analysis as containing “two basic opinions”: (1) 
that the fire originated in the laundry room and (2) that the dryer was the probable cause. While 
the district court found Hunt’s opinion on the fire’s origin was admissible (i.e., that the fire 
started in the laundry room), it excluded his opinion about its probable cause (i.e., that the dryer 
caused the fire). The district court held Hunt’s opinion on origin was admissible because it was 
based on Hunt’s observation of the fire site and “interpreting burn patterns, and distinguishing 
damage caused by flame versus smoke versus heat are things beyond the experience of most 
jurors.” However, according to the district court, Hunt’s conclusion about the probable cause of 
the fire did not rely on any special skill or knowledge. Rather, the district court held Hunt’s 
opinion on causation invaded the province of the jury: 
[Hunt] is simply making a logical deduction any person can make (or choose not 
to make). He opines the dryer is likely to be the cause of fire because 1) it is in the 
room where the fire started, 2) it appears the fire started near the back of the 
dryer, 3) the dryer was on at the time the fire started, and 4) he was told the back 
of the dryer had never been removed to clean out any lint build up. 
Further supporting its holding, the district court observed that Hunt’s report stated his opinion on 
the fire’s origin was reached “within a reasonable degree of fire science certainty,” while it does 
not appear to make the same claim about the fire’s probable cause. Thus, the district court 
concluded the opinion was inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. 
Tech Landing makes four arguments that the district court abused its discretion to 
exclude Hunt’s opinion about the probable cause of the fire: (1) the district court inappropriately 
required Hunt to opine on a “specific ignition sequence” instead of a reasonably probable cause, 
(2) the court “failed to recognize the scientific methodology Hunt utilized in reaching both 
opinions,” (3) the court substituted its own judgment for that of Hunt, and (4) the court 
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unreasonably parsed the language of Hunt’s report to conclude his opinion was not reached 
through his expertise.  
As a preliminary matter, JLH contends that Tech Landing waived any argument the 
district court abused its discretion because Tech Landing failed to specify in its opening brief 
which prong of the abuse of discretion standard the district court did not meet. JLH’s argument is 
misplaced. While this Court declines to address conclusory arguments or arguments unsupported 
by authority, it does not impose a “formalistic requirement that the standard of review be recited 
and the party claiming error attack a particular prong of that standard of review.” State v. Jeske, 
164 Idaho 862, 869, 436 P.3d 683, 690 (2019); State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 575 n. 2, 388 
P.3d 583, 589 n.2 (2017). Here, Tech Landing identified the appropriate standard of review, 
made arguments relevant to the standard, and cited authority to support its arguments. Tech 
Landing’s abuse of discretion arguments have not been waived. 
Nonetheless, Tech Landing’s arguments are unavailing. First, its argument that the 
district court abused its discretion by requiring Hunt to opine as to the specific ignition sequence 
(instead of a probable cause) misses the mark. It is well established that an expert witness may 
express an opinion in terms of probability instead of certainty. See, e.g., 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert 
and Opinion Evidence § 54 (“While expert opinions must be based on facts which enable the 
expert to express a reasonably accurate conclusion, absolute certainty is not required.”); 
Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended (Apr. 27, 2010) (“Lack of 
certainty is not, for a qualified expert, the same thing as guesswork.”). However, the district 
court did not exclude the opinion because Hunt was insufficiently certain of his conclusion; it 
excluded Hunt’s opinion because it found no expertise was necessary to reach it.  
There are two general classes of matters in which expert testimony is helpful to a jury. In 
the first class, a juror can use common knowledge and experience to draw accurate conclusions 
from the relevant facts, but establishing the facts themselves requires special expertise. In the 
second class, special expertise is necessary both to establish facts and to draw accurate 
conclusions. See 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 37 (2020); cf. Ackerschott v. 
Mountain View Hosp., LLC, 166 Idaho 223, ___, 457 P.3d 875, 882–83 (2020) (recognizing that 
expert testimony is not necessary to establish proximate causation in some medical malpractice 
cases, but that expert testimony is required where causation involves “highly-technical medical 
questions”). Here, the matter of the fire’s origin clearly belongs to the second class: interpreting 
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patterns of heat, flame, and smoke damage to determine the progression of a fire through a 
building is not a matter of common knowledge or experience. However, the district court found 
the matter of the fire’s cause was within the first class because—based on the facts presented—it 
was “a logical deduction any person [could] choose to draw or not draw on his or her own.” 
While reasonable minds could disagree with the district court’s determination, we cannot 
conclude the district court abused its discretion in light of Hunt’s report. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that a party intending to rely on expert 
testimony at trial must disclose “a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the 
basis and reasons for the opinion.” I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added). It is certainly 
possible that Hunt based his opinion about the probable cause of the fire on special knowledge or 
skill as a fire investigator, but other than placing the origin of the fire near the dryer, nothing in 
his report discloses what this might have been. Notably, by including Jeremy Haile’s statements 
about not cleaning lint from the dryer, Hunt’s report implies that an accumulation of lint within 
the dryer may have caused the fire. But Hunt did not expressly state this, much less explain how 
he reached this conclusion using his special knowledge and skill as a fire investigator.  
Tech Landing’s second and third arguments are unavailing for a similar reason. Nothing 
in the district court’s order suggests that it misunderstood Hunt’s methodology or that it excluded 
Hunt’s opinion because it disagreed with the opinion. Rather, the district court concluded Hunt’s 
opinion was inadmissible because it was not based on Hunt’s expertise. As explained above, this 
was not an abuse of discretion in light of Hunt’s report. 
Finally, the district court did not inappropriately parse the language of Hunt’s report to 
find it significant that Hunt did not clearly assert his causation opinion was reached “within a 
reasonable degree of fire science certainty.” To the contrary, this is a reasonable reading of 
Hunt’s report and it illustrates how the report was inadequate to demonstrate that Hunt’s 
causation opinion was based on his expertise. Hunt acknowledged that the actual cause of the fire 
was undetermined pending evaluation by an electrical engineer, but he did not explain what such 
an evaluation would establish. Moreover, Hunt did not supplement or amend his report after the 
evaluation by an electrical engineer was complete. In the absence of this information, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion to rule Hunt’s causation opinion was inadmissible. 
2. Admissibility of Cutbirth’s opinions 
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In addition to Hunt’s report, Tech Landing provided a report by David Cutbirth. 
Cutbirth’s report indicated he is a professional electrical engineer, but because his curriculum 
vitae was not attached to his report, the district court had no further knowledge of his 
qualifications. As with Hunt’s expert report, the district court found portions of Cutbirth’s report 
admissible, while excluding other portions.  
Cutbirth’s report contained two primary opinions. First, Cutbirth concluded the fire had 
not been caused by an electrical fault in the dryer. Second, Cutbirth opined that the fire was 
“caused by combustion within the drier [sic] vent, at or near the PVC piping” that formed part of 
the dryer’s exhaust. To support his second opinion, Cutbirth noted the International Mechanical 
Code requires that exhaust ducts for dryers must be constructed of metal; that air moving through 
PVC is prone to create static, which may cause a buildup of lint; that clothes dryers may exhaust 
air as hot as 155 degrees Fahrenheit; and that the maximum operating temperature of PVC is 140 
degrees Fahrenheit. The district court held Cutbirth’s opinion that an electrical fault had not 
caused the fire was admissible because, as a professional electrical engineer, Cutbirth was 
qualified to offer this opinion. The court also found Cutbirth’s opinion that the PVC exhaust duct 
was prone to static buildup was admissible. However, the court held Cutbirth’s opinion that the 
fire was caused by combustion in the dryer vent was inadmissible speculation.  
Tech Landing argues the district court abused its discretion by sitting as its own expert to 
rebut and then exclude Cutbirth’s opinion that the fire began in the dryer vent. It cites Nield v. 
Pocatello Health Services, Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 811, 332 P.3d 714, 723 (2014), for the 
proposition that a trial court may not weigh the credibility of an expert’s opinion to determine 
admissibility, and points to five statements by the district court that it claims demonstrate 
impermissible weighing: 
(1) “The [c]ourt accepts Mr. Cuthbirth’s [sic] statement that air moving through a 
PVC pipe may build up a static electric charge on the surface of the pipe, 
although the [c]ourt’s understanding is that it is generally solid particulates in 
the air that cause such a build-up, not the gas molecules themselves.”  
 
(2) “Mr. Cuthbirth’s [sic] statement that PVC is prone to static buildup seems 
unlikely to be true in humid environments, but is certainly consistent with 
common experience in more arid environments, like Boise.”  
 
(3) “The [c]ourt suspects different materials have different fire points and 
different ignition temperatures. What is the minimum ignition energy for lint, 
if that is what Mr. Cuthbirth [sic] believes combusted? How much energy 
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does Mr. Cuthbirth [sic] think this static discharge had? Can a hunk of PVC 
pipe this size even store that much energy in the form of static electricity (i.e. 
what is the pipe’s capacitance?) If a static discharge occurs, is it always going 
to discharge all of its stored electrical energy or will the discharge be more 
localized because electrons do not move freely along the surface of an 
insulator? 
 
(4) “If a static charge built up on the pipe, what happened to cause a discharge? If 
the dryer was simply running and no one was around, what happened such 
that the electrical energy on the PVC pipe, which was building up because it 
had no place to go, suddenly had a place to go? What did it spark to? The 
aluminum dryer vent? If so, why wasn’t it sparking all the time and how did it 
build up enough electrical energy to bring a fuel above its fire point or ignition 
temperature when it finally did arc? If it did not spark to something normally 
in place, what changed so it suddenly had a place to arc to?” 
 
(5) “[Cutbirth’s] statements about the maximum operating temperature of PVC 
also do not appear to support his opinion. PVC is a vinyl. At higher 
temperatures it softens. The Court understands the maximum operating 
temperature to be related to PVC’s structural integrity; not its flammability. It 
starts to get soft above 140 degrees Fahrenheit; therefore, it is less capable of 
supporting loads at those temperatures. That doesn’t mean PVC melts at that 
temperature and it certainly doesn’t mean PVC will ignite at that temperature. 
It doesn’t mean PVC starts to give off flammable gas at that temperature. If 
Mr. Cuthbirth [sic] believes the lint was the fuel source, what does the 
maximum operating temperature of PVC have to do with how the lint 
combusted?” 
The first two of these statements do not support Tech Landing’s argument because they pertain 
to Cutbirth’s opinion that the PVC exhaust ducting could create static and accumulate lint—an 
opinion the district court found admissible. The remaining three statements, however, pertain to 
Cutbirth’s excluded opinion that the cause of the fire was combustion in the exhaust duct. As 
discussed in the next section addressing the appropriateness of summary judgment, the district 
court’s statements about its own understanding of relevant scientific principles give this Court 
pause, but the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Cutbirth’s opinion on the 
cause of the fire. 
Tech Landing is correct to assert that a trial court may not substitute its judgment for that 
of a qualified expert. However, “[i]n determining whether expert testimony is admissible, a court 
must evaluate the expert’s ability to explain pertinent scientific principles and to apply those 
principles to the formulation of his or her opinion.” Coombs, 148 Idaho at 140–41, 219 P.3d at 
464–65. In other words, the weight of an expert’s opinion is a question for the jury, but whether 
10 
 
a witness is an expert, or has employed a valid methodology to reach his or her conclusions, is a 
question that must first be answered by the trial court. Id.  
Here, Cutbirth explained how he formed his opinion that an electrical fault did not cause 
the fire employing the specialized knowledge of an electrical engineer: had the fire been caused 
by an electrical fault within the dryer, the circuit breaker feeding the dryer likely would have 
tripped; however, the circuit breaker was not tripped before power to the laundry room electrical 
panel was lost due to the fire; therefore, an electrical fault in the dryer likely did not cause the 
fire. However, Cutbirth’s report offers no similar analysis for his opinion that the fire began in 
the dryer vent. Cutbirth merely states that PVC ducting may create static electricity which 
attracts lint, that dryers exhaust hot air, and that PVC is not intended for high temperature 
applications such as a dryer vent. He does not explain how he used these facts to reach his 
conclusion, nor how his reasoning relates to his training as an electrical engineer. 
In the absence of analysis by Cutbirth, the final three statements highlighted by Tech 
Landing are better characterized as the district court identifying gaps in Cutbirth’s application of 
his expertise to observed facts, rather than the district court weighing its own scientific 
understanding against Cutbirth’s. For example, the district court does not contradict Cutbirth’s 
statement that PVC’s maximum operating temperature is 140 degrees Fahrenheit; it notes that 
Cutbirth does not explain how this fact is connected to his opinion that the fire caused 
combustion in the dryer vent. Likewise, the district court does not expressly challenge Cutbirth’s 
apparent conclusion that lint was the fuel source for the fire; it notes that Cutbirth does not 
explain why he believes that to be the case here.  
A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether an expert is qualified to offer his 
or her opinions. Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837, 153 P.3d at 1183. The district court noted gaps 
apparent in Cutbirth’s report that bring into question whether his opinion as to the cause of the 
fire was based on expert knowledge, or whether he was qualified to opine on the cause of the fire 
at all. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Cutbirth’s opinion on 
the cause of the fire. 
B. The district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of JLH 
 
Tech Landing contends the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to JLH 
because it determined there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tech Landing’s 
negligence caused the fire. To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish four 
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elements: “(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain 
standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s 
conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage.” Ackerschott, 166 Idaho at ___, 
457 P.3d at 882. Summary judgment is only appropriate where, drawing all reasonable 
inferences and construing all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Eagle Springs, 165 Idaho at 867, 454 P.3d at 509. Here, the district court found that there 
was a genuine dispute as to where the fire began in the building: JLH’s expert concluded the fire 
could not have started in the laundry room, while Hunt’s admissible opinion was that the fire 
must have started in the laundry room. Nevertheless, the district court granted summary 
judgment to JLH because it found Tech Landing failed to support the causation element of its 
negligence claim and, therefore, the dispute about the origin of the fire was not material.  
Tech Landing argues it set forth sufficient evidence of causation to survive summary 
judgment because it pointed to evidence that JLH negligently installed and maintained the dryer 
and its experts concluded the dryer was the cause of the fire. JLH argues summary judgment was 
properly granted because Hunt “stopped short of concluding the dryer was the cause of the fire” 
and Cutbirth’s opinion the fire started in the exhaust duct was inadmissible. Thus, JLH 
maintains, Tech Landing failed to demonstrate there was a material dispute as to JLH’s 
negligence. We disagree. Even without the excluded portions of Hunt’s and Cutbirth’s reports, 
Tech Landing put forth sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment. 
 As stated by the district court after making its evidentiary rulings: 
In the light most favorable to the Plaintiff the evidence in the record is that 
the fire started in the laundry room, the fire was not caused by an electrical fault, 
in the dryer or elsewhere, the dryer was on at the time, the back of the dryer had 
never been cleaned, there was a PVC pipe being used for part of the dryer exhaust 
tubing, air moving through a PVC pipe is capable of generating static electricity; 
static electricity is capable of attracting lint; some dryers are capable of 
exhausting air with temperatures as high as 155 degrees Fahrenheit; and the rags 
inside the dryer and the inside of the dryer appear damaged by flame and heat; 
whereas other appliances in the room appear to have been damaged only by heat 
from outside. 
We hold the above facts are sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that negligent 
installation or maintenance of the dryer by JLH caused the fire.  
12 
 
In finding that Tech Landing presented no evidence of causation, the district court 
appears to misapprehend the nature of proof permissible in a negligence case. After reciting the 
facts favorable to Tech Landing, the district court wrote: 
Assuming Defendant’s act of installing the PVC pipe and/or Defendant’s failure 
to clean the back of the dryer were negligent, no rational juror could conclude 
those acts were more likely to have caused the fire than anything else; 
spontaneous combustion of the rags in the dryer? A flammable substance spilled 
on the laundry room floor that went undetected? A flammable substance on the 
rags that went in the dryer? A burglar/arsonist? Plaintiff wants the jury to 
speculate about how this fire likely started without proffering any evidence about 
how it could have started. What was the ignition source? What was the first fuel 
to burn? Does Plaintiff want the jury to simply assume that an exhaust 
temperature of 155 degrees F is hot enough to cause lint to combust? Does 
Plaintiff want the jury to simply assume a static electric discharge from a short 
section of PVC pipe carries enough energy to ignite lint?  
But Tech Landing does not need to have direct evidence of how the fire started or to prove the 
precise conditions within the dryer exhaust vent on the night of the fire. “[C]ircumstantial 
evidence is competent to establish negligence and proximate cause.” Krinitt v. Idaho Dep’t of 
Fish & Game, 159 Idaho 125, 129, 357 P.3d 850, 854 (2015); accord Sheridan v. St. Luke’s 
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 783, 25 P.3d 88, 96 (2001); Henderson v. Cominco Am., Inc., 95 
Idaho 690, 696, 518 P.2d 873, 879 (1973); Splinter v. City of Nampa, 74 Idaho 1, 10, 256 P.2d 
215, 220 (1953). Thus, “the possibility, or even probability of another cause for damages than 
that alleged does not defeat recovery where plaintiff presents sufficient facts to justify a 
reasonable juror in concluding that the thing charged was the prime and moving cause.” Thomas 
Helicopters, Inc. v. San Tan Ranches, 102 Idaho 567, 571, 633 P.2d 1145, 1149 (1981); see also 
57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 443 (“Absolute certainty cannot be achieved in proving 
negligence circumstantially; but such proof may satisfy where the chain of circumstances leads 
to a conclusion which is more probable than any other hypothesis reflected by the evidence.”).  
Accordingly, Tech Landing’s burden to avoid summary judgment was not to disprove 
every possible non-negligent cause of the fire, but to point to evidence from which a rational 
juror could find negligence was the cause. As the district court observed in its evidentiary 
rulings, Tech Landing met this threshold from the facts and admissible opinion in Hunt’s report 
alone. The court ruled Hunt’s causation opinion was inadmissible precisely because it was a 
logical deduction any juror could make from the fact that the dryer had been left running 
unattended and its back had never been cleaned of lint. The summary judgment standard required 
13 
 
the district court to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Tech Landing, and because it did 
not do so, the grant of summary judgment in favor of JLH must be reversed. 
Finally, we observe that the only effect of excluding Cutbirth’s opinion on causation 
should have been to preclude consideration of the inadmissible opinion. In particular, Cutbirth’s 
failure to offer an admissible opinion on exactly how lint in the dryer vent might have caused a 
fire did not establish, as a matter of law, that an accumulation of lint in a clothes dryer or its 
exhaust vent cannot cause a fire. Thus, while identification of gaps in Cutbirth’s expert report 
was relevant to the district court’s admissibility ruling, reiteration of those gaps in the course of 
deciding the summary judgment motion gives the appearance the court weighed the evidence 
against Tech Landing. Further, the district court’s statements about its own understanding of 
scientific principles reinforce this appearance. To the extent the district court doubts the 
combustion of an accumulation of lint (either in the dryer vent or back of the dryer) caused the 
fire, this is not a matter for the district court to decide at the summary judgment stage or 
otherwise—it is a question for the jury to resolve at trial.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The district court’s decision on the admissibility of Hunt’s and Cutbirth’s expert opinions 
is affirmed. The district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of JLH is reversed 
and the case is remanded. Costs on appeal are awarded to Tech Landing.  
Chief Justice BEVAN and Justice BURDICK concur. 
 
STEGNER, J., dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the district court properly 
excluded expert testimony of both Hunt and Cutbirth. I would find that the district court abused 
its discretion in excluding portions of each expert’s proffered testimony because the testimony 
would have assisted the trier of fact as to the origin and possible causes of the fire. 
 
I begin with an analysis of the law as it relates to expert opinions. “To give expert 
testimony, a witness must first be qualified as an expert on the matter at hand.” State v. Pearce, 
146 Idaho 241, 245, 192 P.3d 1065, 1069 (2008). “Once the witness is qualified as an expert, the 
trial court must determine whether such expert opinion testimony will assist the trier of fact in 
understanding the evidence.” Id. at 246, 192 P.3d at 1070. In this case, the district court found 
14 
 
that both Hunt and Cutbirth were at least partially qualified to render opinions about the 
circumstances surrounding the fire but rejected their ultimate opinions regarding causation.  
“Shaky but admissible evidence is to be attacked by cross examination, contrary 
evidence, and attention to the burden of proof, not exclusion.” Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 
564 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended (Apr. 27, 2010). “The judge is ‘supposed to screen the jury from 
unreliable nonsense opinions, but not exclude opinions merely because they are 
impeachable.’ ” Pyramid Techs., Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 752 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Alaska Rent–A–Car, Inc., v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., 738 F.3d 960, 969 (2013)). 
“Simply put, ‘[t]he district court is not tasked with deciding whether the expert is right or wrong, 
just whether his testimony has substance such that it would be helpful to a jury.’ ” Id. “A district 
court should not make credibility determinations that are reserved for the jury.” Id. at 814. 
“[M]ost courts implicitly reject the notion that Rule 702 merely preserves the common 
law or precludes expert testimony regarding matters within common experience. These courts 
assume that, even where the jury can understand the evidence at some level, expert testimony 
satisfies the ‘help’ requirement if it advances the jury’s understanding to any degree.” 
Interpretation of the “Help” Requirement, 29 FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 6265.1 (2d ed.) 
(italics added). “In line with the notion that expert testimony helps if it advances the jury’s 
understanding to any degree, some courts conclude that expert testimony meets the requirements 
of Rule 702(a) even where the jury has some familiarity with the subject, but that familiarity is 
incomplete or inaccurate.” Factors Considered: Relevance, Need, and Infringement on Role of 
Judge or Jury, 29 FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 6265.2 (2d ed.).  
A detailed description of the testimony excluded by the district court is enlightening. 
Regarding Hunt’s testimony, the district court found Hunt was qualified to render both proffered 
opinions. The district court found that Hunt’s opinion that the “fire originated in the laundry 
room,” was admissible because it was based on his “observation of burn patterns and heat 
damage to the structure and various objects within it” (i.e., the dryer). Conversely, the district 
court found that even though Hunt was qualified his opinion that the “probable cause of the fire 
was the dryer” was not admissible.  
The district court apparently reached its conclusion because Hunt purportedly did not 
assert that this conclusion was “reached to the degree of certainty accepted within the field of fire 
science” as he did with his initial opinion. The district court also suggests that it was improper 
15 
 
for Hunt to rely on information provided to him during his investigation by the owner of the 
building. The district court does not explain why this is so. However, if the information relied on 
by Hunt is the type of information relied on by similar experts in his field, and there is no 
suggestion that this was not the type of information relied on by Hunt, he is allowed to rely on it. 
See Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140, 219 P.3d 453, 464 (2009); see also I.R.E. 703. 
Additionally, the district court states that Hunt’s opinion on the probable cause of the fire 
did “not appear to be based on any specialized knowledge that Mr. Hunt has.” The district court 
continued by concluding that Hunt was “simply making a logical deduction any person can make 
(or choose not to make).” Finally, the district court conceded that Hunt had “qualified his 
opinion in the way the [c]ourt would expect a professional in his field to do so.” 
I would conclude that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Hunt’s opinion. 
Although the district court is afforded deference in its determination of admissibility of expert 
opinions, that deference is not boundless. The district court split hairs by excluding Hunt’s 
second opinion that the probable cause of the fire was the dryer based primarily on the fact that 
Hunt did not specify that this opinion was rendered within the acceptable degree of fire science 
certainty. In actuality, Hunt’s two ultimate opinions were discussed on the same page of his 
report, along with his assertion that his opinions were based on the accepted degree of fire 
science certainty. The analysis section of Hunt’s report provided: 
This fire originated in the laundry room located in the northeast corner of the 
structure. This determination was based on the observed patterns of fire damage, 
witness statements, and a systematic evaluation of the remaining physical 
evidence and within a reasonable degree of fire science certainty. The probable 
cause of this fire is the dryer in the laundry room that had been left running prior 
to the fire. 
(Italics added). 
Further, the district court noted that Hunt had qualified his opinion appropriately as any 
expert would. Finally, the district court found that Hunt was merely making a logical deduction 
that any person could have made. This determination invades the province of the jury because 
the jury, as the fact finder, is the proper body to decide whether to give credence to Hunt’s 
opinion. The district court abused its discretion in determining that Hunt’s opinion would not 
assist the jury because the district court improperly made a credibility determination that should 
have been left to the jury. In addition, having made the determination that Hunt was merely 
making a logical deduction that any person could have made, the district court erred in ultimately 
16 
 
concluding summary judgment was warranted. If the opinion arises from a logical deduction any 
person could make, there obviously exists a question of fact for resolution by the jury. It is 
illogical to conclude that a logical deduction may be drawn by the jury and at the same time 
conclude that the jury should not be allowed to apply its logic to the question presented. 
With respect to Cutbirth’s testimony, the district court first attacked Cutbirth’s overall 
credibility, noting that a curriculum vitae had not been attached to his report and that Cutbirth 
inconsistently referred to himself as both a “principal electrical engineer” and a “professional 
electrical engineer.” (As an aside, it should be noted that JLH did not register an objection to the 
fact that Cutbirth’s affidavit did not contain a curriculum vitae. Had it done so, Tech Landing 
could have supplemented Cutbirth’s affidavit. However, because it did not know this would be a 
basis for the district court’s decision, it was unable to cure the problem identified solely by the 
district court.) Based on Cutbirth’s lack of testimony regarding his education or work experience, 
the district court found Cutbirth qualified to render only one opinion: that the “fire was not 
caused by an electrical fault, either within the dryer or elsewhere.” That opinion was admissible, 
according to the district court, because Cutbirth is a professional electrical engineer and the 
opinion was “based on information he received from others about the status of the circuit 
breakers within the structure.”  
Cutbirth proffered another opinion that the “fire was [likely] caused by combustion 
within the dryer vent.” The district court ultimately excluded this opinion for several reasons. 
First, the district court found that despite Cutbirth providing several reasons for his opinion, there 
was “not a sufficient basis to remove Mr. Cutbirth’s opinion from the realm of speculation.” 
Cutbirth stated that he reached his opinion that combustion in the dryer caused the fire based on 
Hunt’s opinion as to the origin of the fire, the installation of PVC pipe behind the dryer, that 
PVC pipe is prone to creating static electricity, that the maximum operating temperature of PVC 
is 140 degrees Fahrenheit, and that “dryer discharge temperatures” could reach up to 155 degrees 
Fahrenheit. 
In addition, the district court engaged in fact-finding regarding Cutbirth’s opinion: 
The Court will accept as common knowledge that Poly Vinyl Chloride (PVC) is 
an insulator. The Court accepts Mr. Cutbirth’s statement that air moving through a 
PVC pipe may build up a static electric charge on the surface of the pipe, although 
the Court’s understanding is that it is generally solid particulates in the air that 
cause such a build-up, not the gas molecules themselves. Mr. Cutbirth’s statement 
that PVC is prone to static buildup seems unlikely to be true in humid 
17 
 
environments, but is certainly consistent with common experience in more arid 
environments, like Boise. The Court will simply accept those statements as 
statements Mr. Cutbirth is qualified to make. They are facts any high school 
graduate ought to know. 
. . . 
 
[Cutbirth’s] statements about the maximum operating temperature of PVC also do 
not appear to support his opinion. PVC is a vinyl. At higher temperatures it 
softens. The Court understands the maximum operating temperature to be related 
to PVC’s structural integrity; not its flammability. It starts to get soft above 140 
degrees Fahrenheit; therefore, it is less capable of supporting loads at those 
temperatures. That doesn’t mean PVC melts at that temperature and it certainly 
doesn’t mean PVC will ignite at that temperature. It doesn’t mean PVC starts to 
give off flammable gas at that temperature. If Mr. Cutbirth believes the lint [in the 
dryer] was the fuel source, what does the maximum operating temperature of 
PVC have to do with how the lint combusted? 
 
The district court concluded its discussion of Cutbirth’s testimony by stating that the 
“opinion is simply an argument about an inference Plaintiff would like the jury to draw from 
various facts.” The district court then excluded that portion of Cutbirth’s opinion. 
I conclude the district court abused its discretion in excluding Cutbirth’s testimony. The 
district court engaged in fact finding and accepted as common knowledge facts a layperson is 
unlikely to know. The quoted portions of the district court’s analysis above demonstrate the fact 
finding that should have been left to the jury. The district court made several factual findings 
regarding the use of PVC pipe that an average juror likely would not understand. Cutbirth’s 
opinions which dealt with the safe temperature range for PVC pipe, the inappropriate use of PVC 
pipe in this particular application, and the difference between gas molecules and solid 
particulates causing static buildup inside the PVC pipe, are well beyond what jurors are likely to 
know based on their common sense and experience. Additionally, the district court injected itself 
and made credibility determinations by stating that an aspect of Cutbirth’s opinion was “unlikely 
to be true.” This determination is better left to the crucible of cross-examination and 
determination by the ultimate factfinder, the jury, rather than the district court. See Nield v. 
Pocatello Health Services, Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 811, 332 P.3d 714, 723 (2014); see also Pyramid 
Techs., Inc., 752 F.3d at 814.  
The district court essentially acted as its own expert in making these factual findings and 
credibility determinations. As the majority notes, “the district court’s statements about its own 
understanding of relevant scientific principles give this Court pause. . .” Despite that pause, the 
18 
 
majority ultimately concludes that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
Cutbirth’s second opinion regarding the cause of the fire. I disagree with this conclusion and 
would instead hold that the district court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the jury 
in making both factual and credibility determinations and assuming that complex scientific 
knowledge was something that “any high school graduate ought to know.”  
However “shaky” the testimony proffered by either Hunt or Cutbirth seemed to the 
district court, such testimony should “be attacked by cross examination, contrary evidence, and 
attention to the burden of proof, not exclusion.” Primiano, 598 F.3d at 564. 
For the reasons discussed, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding portions of Hunt’s and Cutbirth’s opinions. 
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment to JLH.  
Justice MOELLER concurs.