Case Title: Beintema v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-147

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Beintema v. State1997 WY 58936 P.2d 1221Case Number: 96-147Decided: 04/23/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

PAUL BEINTEMA,

Appellant(Defendant), 

v. 

The 
STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District Court, Campbell County, 

The Honorable Dan R. Price II, 
Judge

For Appellant:

Todd Hambrick and Donald L. Fuller of 
Krampner & Fuller, L.L.C., Casper.

For Appellee:

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Bryan A. Skoric, Assistant Attorney General, for 
Appellee.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Paul 
Beintema appeals from his conviction for delivery of 
marihuana.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents the following issues for our review:

I. Was the 
Defendant denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution?

II. Were the 
prosecutor's statements during opening and questioning of the State's two 
witnesses regarding prior bad acts plain error requiring 
reversal?

FACTS

[¶4]      On December 23, 
1994, a Gillette police officer responded to a report involving a runaway. 
During his investigation, the police officer came into contact with a juvenile 
who possessed approximately fifty grams of marihuana. The juvenile had obtained 
the marihuana from Darrel Huskinson.

[¶5]      The police 
obtained a search warrant for the Huskinson home. During the search, the police 
recovered approximately two ounces of marihuana from the bedroom belonging to 
Darrel's parents, Brent and Tammy Huskinson. Mr. Huskinson told the police that 
he and his wife were heavy marihuana users and indicated that they purchased 
their marihuana from a Colorado man whose first name was Paul and whose last 
name began with the letter "B". He provided the police with a telephone number 
for "Paul B."

[¶6]      Further 
investigation revealed that Appellant was the man who had supplied the marihuana 
to the Huskinsons. Appellant was arrested and charged with one count of delivery 
of marihuana, a controlled substance, under WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (Supp. 
1996). Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, and a jury trial was held. 
The jury returned a guilty verdict. Appellant filed two motions for a new trial, 
claiming that sufficient evidence did not exist to convict him and that he had 
not received effective assistance from his trial counsel. The trial court denied 
Appellant's motions, and he appealed to this Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Other Bad 
Acts

[¶7]      Appellant 
contends that plain error occurred when evidence concerning his other bad acts 
was admitted at the trial and when the prosecutor commented on that evidence in 
his opening statement. Appellant also complains that, under Dean v. 
State, 865 P.2d 601 (Wyo. 1993), reversible errors occurred when the State 
did not give notice of its intention to introduce other bad acts evidence at the 
trial and the trial court did not hold a hearing to determine whether the 
evidence was admissible.

[¶8]      In his opening 
statement, the prosecutor stated that Mr. Huskinson would testify that he had 
discovered several years earlier that he could obtain marihuana from Appellant. 
The prosecutor stated that the evidence would show that Appellant delivered 
marihuana to Mr. Huskinson every two or three months over the next several 
years. Mr. Huskinson did, in fact, testify at the trial to those matters. 
Appellant's attorney did not object to the prosecutor's comments or to the trial 
testimony about Appellant's prior deliveries of marihuana to Mr. 
Huskinson.

[¶9]      We turn first to 
Appellant's contention that, under Dean, the State was required to 
provide notice of its intention to present other bad acts evidence and the trial 
court was required to conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence was 
admissible. In Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo. 1996), we stated 
that a defendant must object in order to trigger the State's obligation to 
establish the admissibility of the evidence. See also Gunderson v. State, 
925 P.2d 1300, 1303 (Wyo. 1996). Further, the trial court is not required to 
conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence is admissible when a proper 
objection to the evidence has not been made. 925 P.2d  at 1303. Therefore, since 
Appellant did not object, the State was not required to establish the 
admissibility of the evidence, and the trial court was not required to conduct a 
hearing.

[¶10]   We must now determine whether the 
trial court committed plain error by allowing the other bad acts evidence to be 
admitted at Appellant's trial. The admissibility of other bad acts evidence is 
governed by W.R.E. 404(b):

(b) Other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts. - Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident.

We do not apply the five-part test which we 
adopted in Dean and modified in Vigil to determine whether the 
other bad acts evidence in this case was admissible under W.R.E. 404(b) because 
that analysis is intended to be conducted at the trial level rather than at the 
appellate level. Spencer v. State, 925 P.2d 994, 997 (Wyo. 1996). 
Instead, we must determine whether the admission of the evidence amounted to 
plain error. Id.

A three-part test 
has been established for determining whether an error may achieve the status of 
plain error. First, the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged 
as error. Second, the party claiming that the error amounted to plain error must 
demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that 
party must prove that a substantial right has been denied him and as a result he 
has been materially prejudiced.

Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Wyo. 1981). See also 
Vigil, 926 P.2d  at 357.

[¶11]   Our decision concerning the second 
prong of the plain error analysis - whether a clear and unequivocal rule of law 
was violated - is determinative of this issue. When evidence "`forms part of the 
history of the event or serves to enhance the natural development of the 
facts,'" that evidence is admissible as long as its probative value outweighs 
its prejudicial effect. Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 49 (Wyo. 1986) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Evans, 343 Pa. Super. 118, 494 A.2d 383, 390 
(1985)). See also Vigil, 926 P.2d 351; McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 752 (Wyo. 1993). An obvious purpose for presenting the evidence of 
Appellant's other marihuana deliveries to Mr. Huskinson was to enhance the 
natural development of the facts in this case. The evidence of the continuing 
relationship between Mr. Huskinson and Appellant was relevant to help the jury 
understand the context of the charged delivery. Furthermore, the testimony about 
the prior deliveries was relevant in showing how Mr. Huskinson was able to 
identify Appellant as the man who had sold the marihuana to him. W.R.E. 404(b); 
see also Johnson v. State, 872 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶12]   While the evidence of the periodic 
drug transactions between Mr. Huskinson and Appellant was obviously prejudicial 
to Appellant, the probative value of the evidence justified its admission 
because it was a necessary part of the history of the charged crime. The other 
bad acts evidence was, therefore, admissible, and no violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law occurred when it was admitted at the trial or when the 
prosecutor commented on it during his opening statement.

B. Effective Assistance of 
Counsel

[¶13]   Appellant argues that his trial 
attorney did not provide him with effective assistance of counsel because (1) he 
failed to investigate Appellant's alibi and did not file a motion for a bill of 
particulars to determine the specific time when the offense was committed; (2) 
he failed to preserve the record from the preliminary hearing; (3) he failed to 
conduct adequate voir dire; (4) he allowed the State to discuss Appellant's 
prior bad acts without objecting; (5) he failed to move for a judgment of 
acquittal at the close of the State's case; and (6) he failed to present a 
defense which showed the mathematical impossibility that Appellant committed the 
crime charged.

[¶14]   The Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the 
Wyoming Constitution, guarantees a criminal defendant the right to have 
effective assistance of counsel. Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190, 198 (Wyo. 
1995); Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 819 (Wyo. 1996). This Court 
follows the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), in determining whether the assistance 
that a criminal defendant received from his counsel was ineffective. Dickeson 
v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 609 (Wyo. 1992).

"First, the 
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant 
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable."

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984). 
. ..

We examine the 
conduct of defense counsel in light of all the circumstances in determining 
whether the identified acts or omissions fall outside the ambit of 
professionally competent assistance, bearing in mind the function of counsel is 
to make the adversarial testing process work in every case. We do not evaluate 
the efforts of counsel from a perspective of hindsight but, rather, we endeavor 
to reconstruct the circumstances surrounding counsel's challenged conduct and 
evaluate the professional efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time. 
"We invoke a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable 
assistance making all decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional 
judgment." Gist [v. State], 737 P.2d [336,] 342 [(Wyo. 1987)] (citations 
omitted). The burden is upon the defendant to overcome this presumption that, in 
light of the circumstances, the challenged action or failure of the attorney 
might be considered sound trial strategy.

Id. (some citations omitted).

1. "DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 
INVESTIGATE [APPELLANT'S] ALIBI AND EVEN SPEAK TO [APPELLANT'S] ALIBI WITNESSES 
AND THEN FAILING TO MOVE FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS TO NARROW THE TIME FRAME OF 
THE OFFENSE IN QUESTION DENIED [APPELLANT] HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL."

[¶15]   With respect to an attorney's duty 
to investigate, we have stated:

"[S]trategic 
choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to 
the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 
investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary. . . .

"The reasonableness 
of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the 
defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, 
quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on 
information supplied by the defendant. . . . [W]hat investigation decisions are 
reasonable depends critically on such information."

Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-67). See also McCoy v. 
State, 886 P.2d 252, 255 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶16]   At the hearing on Appellant's 
motion for a new trial, Appellant's trial counsel was specifically questioned 
about why he did not pursue an alibi defense. The attorney explained that he did 
not pursue an alibi defense because the criminal information which charged 
Appellant simply stated that the crime had occurred "on or about September, 
1994." He stated that, even with Appellant's witness list, it was impossible for 
Appellant to account for his whereabouts during the entire month. Additionally, 
Appellant listed his wife as one of his alibi witnesses, and his counsel felt 
that it would be risky to have her testify. The attorney was afraid that the 
wife's testimony could open the door to questioning by the State about a 
Colorado case in which Appellant was accused of cultivating 
marihuana.

[¶17]   Given this testimony, we conclude 
that Appellant's attorney acted in a reasonable manner when he determined that 
he did not need to contact Appellant's alibi witnesses. The attorney's trial 
strategy was sound.

[¶18]   As a related matter, Appellant 
contends that his trial attorney should have filed a motion for a bill of 
particulars to pinpoint the time when the offense was committed. At the 
post-trial hearing, Appellant's attorney indicated that he did not file a bill 
of particulars because he believed that the lack of specificity in the State's 
charge worked to Appellant's advantage. Some evidence existed which indicated 
that there may have been a delivery in November in addition to the September 
delivery which was specified in the charging document. The attorney indicated 
that the lack of specificity in the charge played to Appellant's advantage 
because it highlighted the fact that the State could not pinpoint the precise 
date when the charged delivery occurred.

[¶19]   Appellant's attorney offered a 
valid explanation as to why he did not file a motion for a bill of particulars. 
The attorney's strategic decision was reasonable in light of the circumstances, 
and we will not second guess him on appeal. See Owen, 902 P.2d  at 
199.

2. "DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO PRESERVE 
A COMPLETE RECORD, NAMELY THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT, DENIED [APPELLANT] 
HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL."

[¶20]   The preliminary hearing was 
recorded on audio tapes. Unfortunately, the tapes were inaudible, and a 
transcript could not be produced. Appellant's trial counsel attempted to have 
the tapes professionally enhanced to improve their clarity but was not 
successful. Appellant claims that, if his attorney had taken appropriate 
measures to preserve the preliminary hearing testimony, the testimony could have 
been used to impeach Steve Rozier, a sergeant with the Gillette police 
department, because the officer's trial testimony was inconsistent with his 
preliminary hearing testimony. Appellant insists that the attorney should have 
requested that another preliminary hearing be held in order to preserve the 
record.

[¶21]   Appellant's exact argument is 
difficult to follow. He apparently contends that Officer Rozier could have been 
impeached because he did not discuss the November delivery at the preliminary 
hearing. Appellant asserts that the officer lied or recklessly disregarded the 
truth about the November delivery in a hearing in the Colorado case and that the 
judge in that case discovered the falsehood. He insists that, if the preliminary 
hearing transcript had been preserved, the attorney could have used it to 
impeach the officer without opening the door to further testimony about the 
Colorado case.

[¶22]   In reviewing the trial transcript, 
we discovered that Officer Rozier did testify at the trial about both the 
September and the November deliveries. Appellant's attorney acknowledged at the 
post-trial hearing that Officer Rozier did not discuss the November delivery at 
the preliminary hearing.

[¶23]   Officer Rozier's testimony was 
obviously more detailed at the trial than it was at the preliminary hearing. 
That does not mean, however, that his testimony was inconsistent. It is 
reasonable to assume that the testimony at the preliminary hearing focused on 
the September delivery since that was the delivery which was specifically 
included in the State's charge. Furthermore, Officer Rozier's testimony that a 
delivery occurred in November was consistent with the evidence that Appellant 
had delivered marihuana to Mr. Huskinson every two or three months over a period 
of several years.

[¶24]   Appellant has not explained to this 
Court exactly how the preliminary hearing testimony was inconsistent with the 
trial testimony or how the preliminary hearing testimony could have been used to 
impeach the officer without opening the door to questions about the Colorado 
case. Appellant has, therefore, failed to meet his burden of proving that his 
counsel performed ineffectively when he failed to preserve the preliminary 
hearing transcript.

[¶25]   Appellant also argues that his 
attorney's failure to procure a recording or transcript from the preliminary 
hearing prejudiced his right of appeal. Appellant did not attempt to settle the 
record pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03. He cannot, therefore, complain that his right 
of appeal was prejudiced when he did not make an effort to correct the 
problem.

3. "DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO CONDUCT 
AN ADEQUATE VOIR DIRE DENIED [APPELLANT] HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL."

[¶26]  
Through voir dire, a defendant may question the prospective jurors 
to determine whether they have biases or prejudices which would infringe on his 
right to have a fair trial. Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 352 (Wyo. 
1995). Voir dire is intended to allow parties to determine whether any 
juror may be challenged for cause. See Frias, 722 P.2d  at 139-40. Jurors 
may be dismissed for cause only upon a "`provable and legally cognizable basis 
of partiality.'" Schwenke v. State, 768 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Wyo. 1989) 
(quoting Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541, 549 n. 6 (Wyo.), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S. Ct. 577, 83 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984)). See 
also WYO. STAT. § 7-11-105(a) (1995). "Because voir dire questioning 
techniques are diverse, any alleged voir dire error must be egregious and 
obvious in order to fall below the line of competence." Arner v. State, 
872 P.2d 100, 105 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶27]   In this case, the trial judge asked 
the members of the jury panel to introduce themselves. After the jurors had 
finished introducing themselves, the State's attorney questioned the panel. When 
it was his turn to examine the jury panel, Appellant's attorney acknowledged 
that the prosecution had already covered many of the questions that he had 
planned to ask, but he went on to address several questions to the 
jurors.

[¶28]   Appellant points to one instance 
where he believes that a challenge for cause was warranted. In that instance, 
the prospective juror stated that he associated with police officers because he 
was studying police science and that he considered police officers to be "very 
loyal, trustworthy people." That juror went on to state, however, that he was 
not biased. Consequently, no basis existed for Appellant's attorney to challenge 
him for cause. Appellant's attorney did, however, use one of his peremptory 
challenges to disqualify the juror.

[¶29]   The remainder of the answers to the 
questions did not suggest that the prospective jurors were biased and did not 
trigger the need for further questioning. Although his attorney's questioning of 
the jurors on voir dire was not extensive, it, coupled with the 
introductions and the State's questions, was sufficient for the attorney to 
utilize his peremptory challenges. Appellant has, therefore, failed to 
demonstrate that his attorney's performance in conducting voir dire was 
deficient or that he was prejudiced by his attorney's method of conducting 
voir dire. See Arner, 872 P.2d  at 104-05.

4. "DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ALLOWING THE STATE 
TO BLATANTLY DISCUSS INADMISSIBLE PRIOR BAD ACTS OF [APPELLANT] WITHOUT ANY 
OBJECTION PRIOR TO TRIAL OR DURING THE TRIAL, OR MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL DENIED 
[A]PPELLANT OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL."

[¶30]   As we stated earlier in this 
opinion, the other bad acts evidence which was presented at the trial was 
admissible. Appellant's trial attorney did not, therefore, perform in a 
deficient manner by failing to object to its admission. 

[¶31]   As a related matter, Appellant 
argues that his attorney should have requested a limiting instruction after the 
evidence was admitted. Counsel may, as a matter of trial strategy, choose not to 
request a limiting instruction in order to avoid emphasizing the unfavorable 
evidence. Sybert v. State, 724 P.2d 463, 467 (Wyo. 1986). One of the 
defenses employed by Appellant's attorney in this case involved challenging the 
credibility of Mr. Huskinson. An instruction limiting the scope of the other bad 
acts evidence may have given the impression that Appellant was trying to hide 
something with regard to the alleged prior deliveries to Mr. Huskinson. Such an 
inference may have given additional credibility to Mr. Huskinson's testimony. 
That would have been harmful to Appellant's defense; consequently, his attorney 
was justified in not requesting a limiting instruction.

5. "DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE FOR 
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL AT THE END OF THE STATE'S CASE WAS A FAILURE TO PROVIDE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, GIVEN THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED."

[¶32]   Appellant claims that a motion for 
a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case was warranted because 
the State did not present evidence which corroborated Mr. Huskinson's 
testimony.

"A motion for 
judgment of acquittal is to be granted only when the evidence is such that a 
reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the 
essential elements of the crime. Or, stated another way, if there is substantial 
evidence to sustain a conviction of the crime, the motion should not be granted. 
This standard applies whether the supporting evidence is direct or 
circumstantial." (citations omitted) Leppek v. State, 636 P.2d 1117, 1119 (Wyo. 
1981).

Apodaca v. State, 796 P.2d 806, 807 (Wyo. 1990). See also DeVries 
v. State, 909 P.2d 977, 978 (Wyo. 1996).

[¶33]   Mr. Huskinson testified that 
Appellant had delivered one-quarter pound of marihuana to him in the Wal-Mart 
parking lot on or around September 1994. The parties stipulated before the trial 
that marihuana was recovered from Mr. Huskinson's home during the police search. 
Sufficient evidence, therefore, existed to establish all the elements of the 
charged crime, and the jury was left to determine whether the evidence was 
adequate to convict Appellant. A motion for a judgment of acquittal would not 
have been successful; therefore, Appellant's counsel did not perform in a 
deficient manner by failing to present such a motion to the trial 
court.

6. "DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO PRESENT 
THE DEFENSE WHICH PROBABLY WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL, THAT IS, 
THE MATHEMATICAL IMPOSSIBILITY THAT [APPELLANT] COMMITTED THE CRIME HE WAS 
CHARGED WITH, WAS HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TO [APPELLANT] AND WAS A FAILURE TO PROVIDE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL."

[¶34]   The theory of defense advocated by 
Appellant would have established that the amount of marihuana delivered by 
Appellant to Mr. Huskinson was not equal to the amount which had been consumed 
and sold by Mr. Huskinson and which had been seized in the police search. At the 
trial, Mr. Huskinson testified that he had received one-quarter pound (four 
ounces) of marihuana from Appellant in September 1994. The police seized 
approximately two ounces of marihuana from the Huskinson residence and another 
fifty grams (approximately two ounces) of marihuana from the juvenile. One of 
the police reports indicated that Mr. Huskinson had also sold some marihuana to 
a relative for $310. Appellant surmises that, for $310, Mr. Huskinson would have 
delivered approximately three ounces to the relative. Additionally, Appellant 
argues that, because the Huskinsons were heavy marihuana users, they undoubtedly 
consumed a significant portion of the marihuana allegedly delivered by Appellant 
in September 1994. Accordingly, Appellant maintains that a great deal more 
marihuana was accounted for by the police than Mr. Huskinson claims to have 
received from Appellant in the September delivery. He contends, therefore, that 
it was mathematically impossible for him to have committed the crime charged. 

[¶35]   Appellant's argument relies on a 
number of unproven assumptions. He speculates about the amounts of marihuana 
which were consumed and sold by the Huskinsons. Further, Appellant completely 
ignores the fact that there were continuous drug transactions between him and 
Mr. Huskinson and that, when Mr. Huskinson received the September delivery, he 
may have had some marihuana left from prior deliveries. Since Appellant's 
"mathematical impossibility" argument is little more than speculation, we cannot 
fault his attorney for failing to pursue such a defense. Appellant has not, 
therefore, satisfied his burden of showing that his attorney's performance was 
deficient or that he was prejudiced by the performance.

CONCLUSION

[¶36]   The evidence of Appellant's other 
bad acts was admissible, and Appellant received effective assistance of trial 
counsel. Appellant's conviction is, therefore,

[¶37]   
Affirmed.