Case Title: State v. Gadreault

Citation: 171 Vt. 534, 758 A.2d 781

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Gadreault (99-208); 171 Vt. 534; 758 A.2d 781 

[Filed 26-Jul-2000]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-208

                              MARCH TERM, 2000

State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	District Court of Vermont,
                                       }	Unit No. 3, Washington Circuit
Raymond R. Gadreault	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 126-2-98Wncr

Trial Judges:	Walter M. Morris,
          	Alan W. Cheever  

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant Raymond Gadreault appeals his conviction for cruelty to
  animals.  He argues that  (1) the court erred by ruling that the specific
  offenses of the cruelty to animals statute with which he  was charged do
  not include an intent element; (2) he was denied a speedy trial; (3) the
  search warrant  used to search his property was obtained through illegal
  means; (4) the court's sentence was  excessive, in violation of his Eighth
  Amendment rights; (5) his Sixth Amendment rights were  violated because he
  was not allowed to assist his attorney and because the State failed to call
  a  particular witness; and (6) the trial judge should have been recused. 
  We affirm.

       On December 3, 1997, a search of defendant's property revealed three
  frozen, dead pigs in an  unsheltered pen in six inches of liquid manure,
  and a calf tethered to a fence post that appeared weak  and to have
  difficulty standing. (FN1) On February 5, 1998, defendant was arraigned on
  four counts  of cruelty to animals in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 352
  (previously 13 V.S.A. § 352(a)).  Following a  two-day jury trial held in
  March, 1999, defendant was found guilty on three counts.  He was  sentenced
  to six months to one year on each count, consecutive, all suspended with
  probation, and  this appeal followed. 

       First, defendant claims that the court erroneously excluded the intent
  element from the crimes  with which he was charged.  The intent element, or
  mens rea, of a crime embodies one of the most  fundamental principles in
  criminal law: a person cannot be held criminally liable for 

 

  causing a bad result without a culpable mental state with respect to that
  result.  See State v.  Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 523, 573 A.2d 286, 290
  (1990).  

       The State charged defendant with violating the following two
  provisions of the cruelty to  animals statute:

    A person commits the crime of cruelty to animals if the person: 

         . . .   
         (3) ties, tethers, or restrains an animal, either a pet or
    livestock, in a manner  that is inhumane or is detrimental to its
    welfare.  Livestock and poultry husbandry  practices are exempted;
         (4) deprives an animal which a person owns, possesses or acts as
    an agent for,  of adequate food, water, shelter, rest or
    sanitation, or necessary medical attention, or  transports an
    animal in overcrowded vehicles.

  13 V.S.A. § 352(3), (4).  The State filed a motion in limine to preclude
  defendant from introducing  evidence supporting a diminished capacity
  defense, arguing that the relevant subsections of the  cruelty to animals
  statute do not require intent and thus are strict liability offenses. 
  After initially  denying the motion, the court granted it on
  reconsideration, reasoning that the purpose and plain  language of the
  statute supported the conclusion that intent was not an element of
  subsections (3) and  (4).  We agree.
	
       When statutory crimes are without a common-law antecedent, we resolve
  the question of  which mental element, if any, is required through
  statutory construction.  See State v. Dann, 167 Vt.  119, 132, 702 A.2d 105, 113 (1997).  Cruelty to animals was not an offense at common law.  See 
  Regaldo v. United States,