Case Title: Bilyeau v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-120051

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: GORDON R. BILYEAU, AN EMPLOYEE OF BABCOCK & WILCOX CONSTRUCTION v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2012 WY 141Case Number: S-120051Decided: 11/02/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 
2012 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER’S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:GORDON R. 
BILYEU, AN EMPLOYEE OF BABCOCK & WILCOX 
CONSTRUCTION,Appellant(Petitioner),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS’ SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,Appellee(Respondent).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Campbell County
The Honorable Dan R. 
Price II, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Andrew 
F. Sears of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, 
Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Wyoming Attorney General; John D. Rossetti, Deputy Attorney General; Michael J. 
Finn, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kelly Roseberry, Assistant Attorney 
General.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN*, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
KITE, C.J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a specially concurring 
opinion.
 
* Justice Golden retired effective 
September 30, 2012.
 
KITE, Chief 
Justice.
 
[¶1]  
Gordon R. Bilyeu was injured in an accident while driving his 
motorcycle to work.  He filed a claim for worker’s 
compensation benefits asserting that his injuries were covered because he 
sustained them while traveling to work and his employer reimbursed him for 
travel expenses.  The Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Division 
(the Division) denied his claim.  After a contested case 
hearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings (the OAH) also denied his 
claim.  Mr. Bilyeu sought review of 
the OAH ruling in district court, which affirmed the 
denial.  He now appeals to this court claiming 
the OAH’s decision is contrary to the evidence because it ignored 
evidence showing that his employer reimbursed him for travel 
expenses.  We affirm.     

ISSUE
 
[¶2]  
The issue for this Court’s determination is whether the OAH’s 
conclusion that Mr. Bilyeu failed to meet his burden of proving 
he was 
reimbursed for travel expenses within the meaning of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) (LexisNexis 2011) was contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence.  
 
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]  
Mr. Bilyeu worked as a boilermaker for Babcock & Wilcox 
Construction for thirty years.  In June of 2010, he was 
working at Dry Fork Station Power Plant (Dry Fork) near Gillette, 
Wyoming.  His home address was in Texas, but he was living at 
the time in Gillette in order to work at Dry Fork.  He was 
driving his motorcycle to work from his home in Gillette on June 28, 2010, when 
he was involved in an accident.  He sustained a broken ankle, 
broken ribs, a broken collar bone, a collapsed lung, and lacerations.
 
[¶4]  
Mr. Bilyeu filed a claim for worker’s compensation benefits 
asserting that his injuries were covered because he was “reimbursed for travel 
expenses” as provided in § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).  That section 
states:
 
§ 
27-14-102.  Definitions.
 
(a)          
 As used in this 
act:
. . . .
            
(xi) “Injury” means any harmful change in the human organism other than 
normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and 
death, arising out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about 
the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at 
work in places where the employer’s business requires an employee’s presence and 
which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the 
business.   “Injury” does not include:
            
. . . 
                        
(D) Any injury sustained during travel to or from 
employment unless the 
employee is reimbursed for travel expenses or is transported by a vehicle of 
the employer;
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  
 
[¶5]  
At the contested case hearing, Mr. Bilyeu presented evidence 
that he received per diem of $60 per day while working on the Dry Fork 
project.  Citing In re Van Matre, 
657 P.2d 1226 (Wyo. 1983), the OAH concluded 
Mr. Bilyeu did not meet his burden of proving that the $60 per diem 
was intended to reimburse him for his travel expenses.  
The OAH concluded the evidence showed instead that the per 
diem was tied to the number of hours Mr. Bilyeu worked, was intended 
as additional compensation negotiated by Mr. Bilyeu’s union and had 
no relationship to actual travel expenses.  On that basis, 
the OAH concluded the per diem did not constitute reimbursement for 
travel expenses and Mr. Bilyeu’s injuries were not 
covered.
 
[¶6]  
Mr. Bilyeu filed a petition for review of the OAH 
order in district court.  After hearing argument, the district 
court agreed that the evidence did not show the per diem was intended to 
reimburse Mr. Bilyeu for travel expenses and affirmed 
the OAH ruling.  Mr. Bilyeu appealed 
to this Court, claiming the ruling is contrary to the 
evidence.          

 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶7]  
The OAH concluded Mr. Bilyeu did not meet his 
burden of proving that he was reimbursed for his travel expenses.  
When an agency concludes a claimant failed to meet his burden of proof, 
our task is to decide whether there is substantial evidence to support the 
agency’s decision to reject the evidence offered by the burdened party by 
considering whether that conclusion was contrary to the overwhelming weight of 
the evidence in the record as a whole.  Davenport v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2012 WY 6, ¶ 12, 
 268 P.3d 1038, 1041-42 (Wyo. 2012).

DISCUSSION
 
[¶8]  
As reflected in paragraph 4 above, § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) provides that an 
injury sustained by an employee while traveling to or from work is not 
compensable under the Worker’s Compensation Act unless the employee is 
reimbursed for travel expenses or is transported by a vehicle of the 
employer.  We have said that this provision “constitutes a 
legislative determination that, while no compensable nexus with the employment 
is generally present when an employee is traveling between home and work, such a 
nexus is created where the employer has assumed the cost of that 
travel.”  Berg v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2005 WY 23, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d 867, 871 (Wyo. 
2005), quoting Archuleta v. Carbon County School District No. 1, 
787 P.2d 91, 92 (Wyo. 1990).  Thus, the question 
in this case was whether Mr. Bilyeu’s employer assumed the cost of 
travel between his home and work.  The OAH 
concluded Mr. Bilyeu did not meet his burden of proving that 
nexus.  We consider whether the OAH’s conclusion 
is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
 
[¶9] 
The union contract applicable to Mr. Bilyeu’s employment at Dry Fork 
stated in relevant part as follows:
 
ARTICLE 
16 – TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE
            
A per diem allowance shall apply on the Project, as outlined in Appendix 
A.  This per diem allowance does not include pay for travel 
time or mileage.
 
ARTICLE 
17 – GENERAL WORKING CONDITIONS
 
            
Section 17-1.  Employment begins and ends at the 
Project site.
 
* * * 
*
 
Appendix 
A
 
 . 
. . .
 
A-4      
Per Diem Allowance
A-4.1 
Per diem allowance will be based on mileage from the employee home address to 
the Dry Fork Station site.  
 
A-4.2 
Per diem allowance for the time period July 1, 2009, shall be paid as 
follows:
 
     
       0 to 20 miles - $10.00 
per day worked
            
Over 20 miles to 50 miles - $30.00 per day worked
            
Over 50 miles -- $60.00 per day worked.
 
A-4.3 
Holidays, rain, breakdowns, or any reason the employees are stopped by the 
Employer from working will be considered days worked and per diem 
paid.  Employees absent from work shall not be paid per diem 
for the day absent.
 
A-4.4 
An employee must work the scheduled work day before or the scheduled work day 
following a holiday that occurs Monday through Friday, to be entitled to per 
diem for the holiday, unless excused.
 
A-4.5 
 Employees who leave the job before the end of the shift 
except for reasons beyond their control, such as illness in family, court 
summons, bona fide illness, etc. shall be paid per diem for the time actually 
worked unless they get permission of designated Employer’s 
representative.  
 
A-4.6  
Per diem allowances shall be in effect at the start of construction and 
will be reviewed by the DFS-WCA Committee on an annual basis 
starting in 2008, with the annual review being completed by July 1 of the review 
year.  Any adjustments to the per diem allowance shall be 
incorporated as an Amendment per Article 21.

[¶10]  
Mr. Bilyeu testified that at the time of his injuries he was 
receiving per diem in the amount of $60 per day because his home address in 
Texas was more than 50 miles from Dry Fork.  He testified the 
$60 per day was for travel, meals and other expenses associated with getting to 
and from the work site.  To refute Mr. Bilyeu’s 
testimony, the Division called the project manager for Dry Fork who testified 
the per diem paid to employees on the project was an allowance for living 
expenses and did not include any pay for travel time or mileage.  
The project manager acknowledged, however, that per diem was based on 
mileage from the employee’s home address, which in Mr. Bilyeu’s case 
was an address in Texas.     
 
[¶11]  
From this evidence, it is not clear whether Mr. Bilyeu was 
“reimbursed for travel expenses” within the meaning of § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).  On the one hand, the contract states the 
per diem does not include pay for travel time or mileage; on the other hand, it 
states the per diem is based on mileage.   While 
Mr. Bilyeu understood the per diem was compensation for expenses he 
incurred in getting to and from work, the project manager said it was intended 
for living expenses and, although based on mileage, did not include pay for 
travel time or mileage.  The most that can be said of this 
evidence is that it did not overwhelmingly support the position of either 
Mr. Bilyeu or the Division. 
 
[¶12]  
To reiterate that said in paragraph 7 above and this Court’s precedent, 
our task is to determine whether the OAH’s decision to reject 
Mr. Bilyeu’s evidence was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence in the record as a whole.  Applying this standard, we 
cannot say that it was.  The evidence presented did not 
overwhelmingly support either party’s position; therefore, the OAH’s 
decision to reject Mr. Bilyeu’s evidence was not contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence.
 
[¶13]  
Asserting otherwise, Mr. Bilyeu contends the OAH 
completely ignored the contract language basing per diem on the number of miles 
between an employee’s home address and the worksite.  He 
argues that a daily subsistence pay based entirely upon a sliding mileage scale 
is, at least partially, compensation for travel.  Irrespective 
of the language attempting to make it otherwise, Mr. Bilyeu contends 
the contract language tying per diem to mileage shows it was partly compensation 
for travel and no other conclusion is reasonable.  
 
[¶14]  
By itself, the language in Appendix A of the contract basing per diem on 
mileage between an employee’s home address and the work site could be 
interpreted to mean the per diem was related to travel.  
However, when read together with Article 16, which expressly states per 
diem does not include pay for travel time or 
mileage, we cannot conclude the OAH’s ruling was contrary to 
the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence.             
 
[¶15]  
Mr. Bilyeu also asserts the OAH ignored In re 
Willey, 571 P.2d 248 (Wyo. 1977), in which this Court held the 
claimants were entitled to benefits under circumstances similar to those in the 
instant case.  There, one employee was killed and another was 
injured in a head-on collision as they were car-pooling from their residences to 
the jobsite.  Id. at 249.  The 
evidence showed that in addition to their normal wages, employees received $12 
per day pursuant to a union contract, which they used to defray expenses for 
traveling to and from work.  Id.  The 
$12 was based upon the distance between the job site and the local union hiring 
hall.  Id.  Employees received $12 if 
they reported to work, regardless of the distance they traveled.  
Id.   
 
[¶16]  
Finding that the employees received daily compensation separate from 
wages which they used for transportation to and from work, the district court 
awarded benefits.  The employer appealed, claiming the $12 was 
unrelated to actual travel expenses.  This Court rejected the 
employer’s contention and affirmed the award.  While noting 
that the record “is not as clear as it could be” concerning the $12 per day 
payment, the Court found the evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that 
“at least a portion of the payment was intended to defray travel 
expenses.”  Id. at 252.   

 
[¶17]  
In reaching this result, the Court pointed to evidence showing that 
Willey had been expressly told the $12 per day was for vehicle maintenance and 
gas.  Id.  Also, upper level 
employees testified the extra pay was due when the worksite was remote from the 
hiring hall and was based on the mileage chart contained in the union 
contract.  Additionally, the evidence showed that substantial 
travel was necessary to reach the work site regardless of where a particular 
employee lived.
 
[¶18]  
In Willey, the Court noted that it did not have the actual 
contract before it; it did not, therefore, have the benefit of contract language 
expressly addressing the additional pay.  In contrast, the 
evidence here included a contract expressly stating per diem did not include pay 
for travel time or mileage.  Additionally in Willey, 
evidence was presented showing the employees were expressly told the payment was 
for “upkeep of the car and for gas, anything your car needed” and the employees 
actually used the $12 per day to defray the expense of traveling from home to 
work.  Id. at 252.  In the present 
case, no evidence was presented showing that Mr. Bilyeu actually 
used the $60 payment for gas or vehicle maintenance or that anyone told him that 
was what the payment was for.  While he stated in his 
affidavit that “his employer agreed to pay $60 per day for travel, meals and other expenses” and that the amount 
identified as “subpay” on his pay stubs was to reimburse him for travel 
expense, he did not say from where or from whom he acquired that 
information.  Given these distinctions, we do not find 
Willey controlling in the present 
case.      
 
 
[¶19]  
Mr. Bilyeu also cites Lloyd v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 85, ¶ 16, 93 P.3d 1001, 1005 (Wyo. 2004) in which this Court reversed a denial of benefits to an 
employee who was injured in an accident as he was returning home in his own 
vehicle after delivering his employer’s truck to an agreed upon 
destination.  There, the evidence showed the employer 
authorized the trip with the express condition that after delivering the truck 
the employee would retrieve his vehicle for the return trip home.  
The evidence also showed the employer had a policy of reimbursing 
employees for using their personal vehicles for business travel either by paying 
mileage at $.21 per mile or reimbursing the actual cost of gasoline, and the 
employee understood he would be reimbursed in accordance with that 
policy.  We declined to countenance the employer’s 
after-the-fact effort to avoid reimbursement in contravention of its own policy 
and the conditions on which it authorized the trip.  

 
[¶20]  
Mr. Bilyeu’s reliance on Lloyd is 
misplaced.  There, the evidence clearly showed that it was 
only after the accident and the employee’s request for reimbursement that the 
employer decided to depart from established policy and the conditions on which 
the trip was authorized and deny benefits to which the employee was clearly 
entitled.  Here, the policy stating that per diem did not 
include pay for travel time or mileage was clearly in place prior to the 
accident.
 
[¶21] 
 The OAH’s conclusion that Mr. Bilyeu 
did not meet his burden of proving his employer reimbursed him for travel 
expenses was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. 

 
[¶22]   
Affirmed.       
 
VOIGT, 
Justice, specially 
concurring.
 
[¶23]   
I agree with the rationale and result of the majority 
opinion.  I write separately to make a seemingly minor point 
in regard to the standard of review.  The second sentence of ¶ 
7 of the majority opinion reads as follows:
 
When an agency 
concludes a claimant failed to meet his burden of proof, our task is to decide 
whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency’s decision to 
reject the evidence offered by the burdened party by considering whether 
that conclusion was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the 
record as a whole.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  I believe the highlighted portion of the sentence 
should be deleted.  It is not necessary for the agency to 
reject the burdened party’s evidence for the agency to rule against the burdened 
party.  The agency may accept every bit of the burdened 
party’s evidence, yet still decide that the evidence does not meet the burden of 
proof.