Case Title: State v. Schultz

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP001977-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 24 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1977-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Alexander M. Schultz, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 385 Wis. 2d 494,922 N.W.2d 866 
PDC No:2019 WI App 3 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 4, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Lincoln    
 
JUDGE: 
Robert R. Russell   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, and KELLY, JJ., 
joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY, and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Frederick A. Bechtold, Taylor Falls, Minnesota. There was 
an oral argument by Frederick A. Bechtold.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by Scott 
E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief was 
Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by 
Scott E. Rosenow.  
2020 WI 24 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP1977-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CF68) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Alexander M. Schultz, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
Mar 4, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, and KELLY, JJ., joined. 
HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
   
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   The State charged Alexander 
M. Schultz with repeated sexual assault of a child for engaging in 
sexual intercourse with the fifteen-year-old victim, M.T.,1 in 
"late summer to early fall of 2012."  A jury acquitted him of this 
charge.  Shortly thereafter, paternity test results revealed 
Schultz to be the father of M.T.'s child.  The State then charged 
Schultz with sexual assault of a child under 16 years of age 
                                                 
1 For privacy purposes, we do not refer to the victim in this 
case by name.  See Wis. Stat. § 809.86 (2017-18). 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
2 
 
occurring "on or about October 19, 2012," the date M.T.'s 
obstetrician determined the child was conceived.  We review whether 
the State exposed Schultz to multiple prosecutions for the same 
offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United 
States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  Schultz asks us to consider 
whether a court may ascertain the scope of jeopardy in the first 
prosecution based upon trial testimony, as well as to determine 
who bears the burden resulting from any ambiguity in the timeframe 
of a charging document——the defendant or the State.2 
¶2 
We hold that a court may examine the entire record of 
the first proceeding, including the evidence admitted at trial, 
when determining the scope of jeopardy in a prior criminal 
prosecution.  Because the complaint incorporated the police 
report, which documents a certain end date for the intercourse, 
and the evidence presented at Schultz's first trial did not 
encompass the same timeframe of the offense charged in his second 
prosecution, we conclude that Schultz was not twice in jeopardy 
for the same criminal offense.  Specifically, the State's second 
prosecution of Schultz for sexual assault of a child under 16 "on 
or about October 19, 2012," did not include the same timeframe as 
its first prosecution for repeated sexual assault of a child in 
the "late summer to early fall of 2012."  We affirm the court of 
appeals. 
                                                 
2 We interpret Schultz's use of the word "burden" in the 
petition for review to ask which party should have the 
responsibility to overcome an ambiguous timeframe in a charging 
document.  Due to our determination on the first question, we need 
not address the second. 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Schultz's First Prosecution 
¶3 
In December 2012, Merrill Police Officer Matthew Waid 
interviewed then-fifteen-year-old M.T. after learning she was 
pregnant.  Waid learned that M.T. had sexual intercourse with a 
male named "Dominic" in early to mid-October.  M.T. also informed 
Waid that she had sexual intercourse with Schultz "approximately 
one month before she had sexual intercourse with Dominic."  M.T. 
confirmed that "she had her period between the time she had sexual 
intercourse with Alex" and when she had intercourse with Dominic 
in early to mid-October.  When questioned by Waid, Schultz denied 
having a sexual relationship with M.T. 
¶4 
In January 2013, Officer Waid conducted two follow-up 
interviews with M.T. about her sexual relationship with Schultz.  
In the first, M.T. claimed she and Schultz had sexual intercourse 
more than five times, beginning in the middle of 2012 and lasting 
for a few months.  Schultz was either 19 or 20 years old when the 
intercourse began.  In the second, M.T. showed Waid Facebook 
messages between her and Schultz on September 3, 2012.  In these 
messages, Schultz was angry and dismissive of M.T. because he 
believed that she was telling other people things that "can put me 
in prison."  Based upon these messages, the interviews with M.T., 
and interviews with multiple witnesses who suggested knowledge of 
a sexual relationship between Schultz and M.T., Waid recommended 
charges against Schultz. 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
In April 2013, the State filed charges against Schultz 
in Lincoln County Circuit Court3 for repeated sexual assault of a 
child, a Class C felony.4  The complaint listed the timeframe for 
the assaults as "late summer to early fall of 2012."  Because 
Schultz was a repeat criminal offender with three prior 
convictions, the State also charged him with a penalty enhancer 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(c)(2017-18).5  The complaint 
"incorporated by reference" the entirety of Officer Waid's police 
report and attached his report to the complaint.  The subsequent 
Information also listed "late summer to early fall of 2012" as the 
timeframe for the crime.  During a pre-trial hearing, the parties 
agreed M.T.'s pregnancy was not pertinent to Schultz's trial 
because Dominic was presumed to be the child's father.6 
                                                 
3 The Honorable Jay R. Tlusty presided. 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1)(e).  For the jury to convict 
under § 948.025(1)(e), it must find the defendant engaged in three 
separate sexual assaults, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) 
or (2), during the charged timeframe. 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
6 Before trial, Schultz's counsel moved to introduce evidence 
of M.T.'s pregnancy as well as her claim that Dominic was the 
father, because he assumed M.T.'s pregnancy "was going to be part 
of this case" and "part of the context of the case."  In response 
to that motion, the State moved for a continuance in order to 
prepare its response.  Both M.T. and her mother supported the 
State's request for a continuance and expressed a desire to wait 
for the paternity test results.  The State regarded the results as 
irrelevant, anticipating they would confirm Dominic to be the 
father.  While Schultz indicated he wanted to see the test results, 
he also wanted to proceed with the trial and withdrew his motion.  
Both parties agreed to proceed with the trial as scheduled.  The 
paternity test results were not available until after the first 
trial and therefore do not inform the determination of the scope 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
5 
 
¶6 
Schultz's trial took place on January 21-22, 2014.  
During his opening statement, the prosecutor indicated the sexual 
relationship between Schultz and M.T. began in the "late summer of 
2012."  Consistent with the prosecutor's timeframe, M.T. testified 
she had sexual intercourse with Schultz starting around July or 
between July and August, and that she and Schultz broke up around 
the beginning of September 2012.  On direct examination, M.T. 
confirmed she had sexual intercourse with Schultz in the month or 
so leading up to the beginning of October 2012.  On cross-
examination, she relayed the same information she initially told 
Officer 
Waid: 
 
she 
had 
sexual 
intercourse 
with 
Schultz 
approximately one month before she had intercourse with Dominic, 
the latter of which took place in early to mid-October.  Later in 
her testimony, M.T. claimed she told a friend about her sexual 
relationship with Schultz, and that this conversation occurred 
"closer to October," after she had stopped seeing Schultz. 
¶7 
During his testimony, Officer Waid confirmed that in the 
course of his initial investigation, M.T. told him she had sexual 
intercourse with Schultz in the month or so prior to early October 
2012.  He also read Facebook messages between M.T. and Schultz 
from September 3, 2012.  These messages confirmed M.T.'s testimony 
regarding the relationship with Schultz ending by early September.  
In the messages, Schultz stated "[U]r dead to me now" and "[I] was 
gonna try to get back with you[.]"  While not explicitly mentioning 
a sexual relationship, Schultz accused M.T. of breaking a promise 
                                                 
of jeopardy in the first trial. 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
6 
 
to him and telling people things that could send him to prison.  
M.T. responded that she "didnt tell anyone." 
¶8 
No evidence at trial indicated M.T. and Schultz had 
sexual intercourse in October 2012.  One of Schultz's own 
witnesses, A.O., testified that she and Schultz were in a romantic 
relationship between September 2012 and the spring of 2013. 
¶9 
While instructing the jury, the circuit court reiterated 
that the timeframe alleged for the assaults was "late summer to 
early fall of 2012."  In closing argument, the State argued the 
intercourse between Schultz and M.T. ended in September.  In 
summarizing M.T.'s testimony regarding sexual intercourse with 
Schultz, the State specifically mentioned that M.T. indicated 
intercourse occurred in the month before October 2012; the assaults 
started in July and ended in September 2012; and the assaults 
happened 
during 
"September, 
August, 
and 
July." 
 
After 
deliberations, the jury acquitted Schultz of "repeated acts of 
sexual assault of a child as charged in the information," which 
had charged Schultz with this crime during the timeframe of "late 
summer to early fall of 2012."7  
                                                 
7 The dissent claims the court's recitation of the evidence 
"is not a fair picture."  Dissent, ¶80.  It is the dissent that 
relies on a slanted summary of the proceedings, ignoring 
dispositive facts in the record.  In presenting its gloss on this 
case, the dissent disregards any portions of the record that 
counter its analysis, including:   
 the 
police 
report 
summarizing 
Officer 
Waid's 
investigation, which was attached to and incorporated 
in the initial indictment; 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
7 
 
B.  Schultz's Second Prosecution 
¶10 Five days after Schultz's acquittal, Officer Waid 
learned from Lincoln County Victim Services that M.T. had received 
her paternity test results.  These results indicated a 99.99998 
percent certainty that Schultz, not Dominic, was the father of 
M.T.'s baby.  Although incarcerated at the time, Schultz 
participated in a phone interview with Waid about the statements 
                                                 
 M.T.'s statements to Officer Waid regarding the 
timeline of the sexual activity with Schultz and 
Dominic; 
 the Facebook messages exchanged between M.T. and 
Schultz, shedding light on the nature and timeframe of 
their relationship; 
 the withdrawal of Schultz's request for an adjournment 
pending receipt of the paternity test results, based 
on the State's representation that M.T.'s pregnancy 
would not be mentioned at trial, and never was;  
 Schultz's pretrial admission, in a motion to dismiss 
the first charge for selective prosecution, that "the 
complainant had sexual intercourse with at least one 
other adult during the time period involved" and "the 
other adult has admitted to sexual intercourse and has 
been determined to be the father of the complainant's 
child[]"; and 
 the State's acknowledgment that "Dominic [] [has been] 
imputed the father of the victim's child, that's been 
in the reports for months as well." 
 
The dissent can conclude the record is "unclear when the 
alleged sexual activity . . . stopped" only because it closes its 
eyes to this evidence.  The dissent mistakenly asserts that the 
State went to trial knowing Schultz could be the father of M.T.'s 
child.  Dissent, ¶80.  In fact, M.T. told law enforcement that 
"she had her period between the time she had sexual intercourse 
with Alex" and when she had intercourse with Dominic in early to 
mid-October, rendering it unreasonable to suggest the State knew 
Schultz could be the father.  Finally, the dissent points to 
nothing in the record to support its assertion that "late summer 
to early fall 2012" included "on or about October 19, 2012." 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
8 
 
from his previous trial and his relationship with M.T.  Schultz 
continued to deny having sexual intercourse with M.T. at any point 
during 2012.  After receiving authorization from M.T. and her 
mother, Waid contacted M.T.'s obstetrician to obtain information 
regarding the date of conception.  M.T.'s obstetrician informed 
Waid that the conception date for the baby was October 19, 2012. 
¶11 In March 2014, the State filed charges against Schultz 
in Lincoln County Circuit Court.8  Count 3 charged Schultz with 
sexual assault of a child under 16 years of age, a Class C felony, 
"on or about October 19, 2012."9  The State again charged Schultz 
with a penalty enhancer for being a repeat criminal offender, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(c).  The complaint incorporated 
Officer Waid's police report detailing his investigation, which 
was attached to the complaint. 
¶12 Schultz moved to dismiss Count 3, arguing it violated 
his constitutional protections against double jeopardy.  Because 
"fall" started on September 22, 2012, and October 19, 2012 fell 
within the first thirty days after the September equinox, Schultz 
argued the date alleged for his second sexual assault charge——"on 
or about October 19, 2012"——fell within the timeframe alleged for 
his first charge, which included "early fall."  The circuit court 
denied Schultz's motion because it found no evidence of any assault 
                                                 
8 The Honorable Robert R. Russell presided.  
9 See Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  The complaint included two 
other counts:  Count 1 charged Schultz with perjury in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 946.31(1)(a); Count 2 charged Schultz with 
obstructing an officer in violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1). 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
9 
 
in October in the first prosecution for repeated sexual assault of 
a child.  The circuit court found, based on the testimony adduced 
in the first trial, that "late summer to early fall of 2012" meant 
July, August, and September 2012, but not October 19, 2012. 
¶13 Schultz thereafter pled guilty to Counts 1 and 3——
perjury and sexual assault of a child under 16 years of age, 
respectively.  The circuit court sentenced Schultz to two years of 
initial confinement plus two years of extended supervision for 
perjury, and five years of initial confinement plus five years of 
extended supervision for the sexual assault against M.T, both 
sentences to run concurrently. 
¶14 Schultz moved for postconviction relief, again raising 
the double jeopardy argument he set forth in his motion to dismiss.  
Having concluded the defendant presented no new evidence for his 
argument, the circuit court denied the motion.  Schultz appealed. 
¶15 The court of appeals rejected Schultz's assertion that 
his second prosecution violated the constitutional proscription of 
double jeopardy and affirmed the circuit court.  See State v. 
Schultz, 2019 WI App 3, ¶3, 385 Wis. 2d 494, 922 N.W.2d 866.  The 
court of appeals held that the test to determine the scope of 
jeopardy in the face of an ambiguous charging document is how a 
reasonable person would understand the charging language, based on 
the evidence introduced at trial and the entire record of the 
proceeding.  Id., ¶30.  The court of appeals agreed with the 
circuit court's analysis of the evidence presented at Schultz's 
first trial:  the sexual assaults were alleged to have occurred 
only in July, August, and September 2012, but not October.  Id., 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
10 
 
¶¶33–34.  Schultz filed a petition for review, which this court 
granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 Whether a defendant's convictions violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, are questions of law appellate 
courts review de novo.  State v. Steinhardt, 2017 WI 62, ¶11, 375 
Wis. 2d 712, 896 N.W.2d 700 (citation omitted); see also State v. 
Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 492, 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992) (citation 
omitted). 
¶17 As part of our analysis, we interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.29.  Statutory interpretation is a "question[] of law that 
this court reviews de novo while benefitting from the analyses of 
the court of appeals and circuit court."  State v. Ziegler, 2012 
WI 73, ¶37, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238 (citation omitted). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Double Jeopardy Overview  
¶18 The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part:  "nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb[.]"  U.S. Const. amend. V.  The 
Wisconsin Constitution likewise provides protection against double 
jeopardy, stating "no person for the same offense may be put twice 
in jeopardy of punishment[.]"  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  We 
view the United States and Wisconsin Double Jeopardy Clauses as 
"identical in scope and purpose."  State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, 
¶18, 
263 
Wis. 2d 145, 
666 
N.W.2d 1 
(citation 
omitted).  
Accordingly, United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
11 
 
the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause are "controlling 
interpretations" of both the federal Constitution and the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Id. (citations omitted). 
¶19 In order to apply the original meaning of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, we interpret this provision "through the 
historical ascertainment of the meaning that it would have conveyed 
to a fully informed observer at the time when the text first took 
effect."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 435 (2012).  Unlike other 
constitutional protections, the right to be free from double 
jeopardy does not have identifiable roots in a specific legal 
system or a particular point in time.  Whereas the writ of habeas 
corpus traces its origin to English common law,10 and the Eighth 
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment derives directly 
from the English Bill of Rights,11 the protection against double 
jeopardy enshrined in the Constitution represents the amalgamation 
of legal principles applied throughout documented history.  See 
David S. Rudstein, A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee 
against Double Jeopardy, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 193, 196-202 
(2005) (stating "[t]he precise origins of the guarantee against 
                                                 
10 See State ex rel. Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 225 
Wis. 2d 446, 450, 593 N.W.2d 48 (1999) (stating that habeas relief 
comes from the common law). 
11 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991) (Scalia, 
J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (noting in discussion of the "cruel 
and unusual punishment" provision of the Eighth Amendment, 
"[t]here is no doubt that the [English] Declaration of Rights is 
the antecedent of our constitutional text."). 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
12 
 
double jeopardy are unclear[,]" before discussing the legal 
systems upholding the doctrine).  The guarantee against double 
jeopardy existed in the English common law, as evidenced by William 
Blackstone's characterization of it as a "universal maxim of the 
common law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy 
of his life, more than once, for the same offence."  4 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 335 (1790).  Even 
before Blackstone's recognition of the right as a "universal 
maxim," the English common law included the protection through the 
pleas of "autrefoits acquit (a former acquittal), autrefoits 
convict (a former conviction), and pardon."  Rudstein, 14 Wm. & 
Mary Bill Rts. J. at 204 (footnote omitted). 
¶20 Precursors to the principle against subjecting people to 
punishment multiple times for the same wrongful act predate the 
common law and are found in ancient civilizations.  See, e.g., 
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., 
dissenting) ("Fear and abhorrence of governmental power to try 
people twice for the same conduct is one of the oldest ideas found 
in western civilization.  Its roots run deep into Greek and Roman 
times."  (footnote omitted)); see also David S. Rudstein, Double 
Jeopardy:  A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution 2–
11 (2004) (tracing double jeopardy principles from the Ancient 
Greeks in 355 B.C.E. through Roman and canon law to the English 
common law, and ultimately the Fifth Amendment).  In the lengthy 
history underlying this principle, one idea has remained constant:  
a subsequent prosecution must be for the "same offense" in order 
to violate the right to be free from double jeopardy.  Rudstein, 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
13 
 
Double Jeopardy at 2–15 ("same issue," "same offense," "same 
charge" in Ancient Greece; "same offense," or "one offense" in 
Roman law; "same thing," "same matter," or "same crime" in canon 
law; "same offense," "same crime," or "same identical crime" in 
the English common law; "one and the same crime, offence, or 
trespasse" in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, "same crime or offence" 
in the first state constitution with double jeopardy protection; 
"same offence" in the Fifth Amendment; "same offense" in the 
Wisconsin Constitution).  In accord with the original meaning of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, in Wisconsin, "'[t]he same offense' is 
the sine qua non of double jeopardy."  Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 
¶33 (citations omitted). 
¶21 The Supreme Court identified three constitutional 
protections provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause:  (1) "against 
a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal[,]" (2) 
"against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction[,]" and (3) "against multiple punishments for the same 
offense."  North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), 
overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 
(1989).  This case involves the first of these protections. 
¶22 Over 40 years ago, we held that two prosecutions are for 
the "same offense," and therefore violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, when the offenses in both prosecutions are "identical in 
the law and in fact."  State v. Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d 754, 758, 
242 N.W.2d 206 (1976) (citation omitted).  Offenses are not 
identical in law if each requires proof of an element that the 
other does not.  See Blockburger v. United States, 284  U.S. 299, 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
14 
 
304 (1932) (citation omitted).  Offenses are not identical in fact 
when "a conviction for each offense requires proof of an additional 
fact that conviction for the other offenses does not."  State v. 
Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 414, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998) (citing 
Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 493-94 n.8; Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d at 758).  
Offenses are also not identical in fact if they are different in 
nature or separated in time.  State v. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d 739, 
749, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998) (citation omitted); see also State v. 
Stevens, 123 Wis. 2d 303, 323, 367 N.W.2d 788 (1985) (holding 
offenses were not the same in fact because they were separated by 
a significant period in time). 
B.  The Dispute 
¶23 The parties agree that the offenses in Schultz's first 
and second prosecutions, repeated sexual assault of a child and 
sexual assault of a child under 16, are identical in law.  The 
parties disagree as to whether the offenses are identical in fact.  
Schultz argues that both offenses are identical in fact because 
the timeframe for the offenses charged in the first prosecution, 
"late summer to early fall of 2012" encompasses the date for the 
offense charged in the second prosecution, "on or about October 
19, 2012."  Schultz contends the charging language is unambiguous 
and the proper inquiry considers how a reasonable person would 
construe the indictment at the time jeopardy attaches, without 
considering later evidence introduced at the previous trial.12  
                                                 
12 For a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn.  
See Wis. Stat. § 972.07(2).  Under Schultz's proposed test, the 
circuit court would determine how a reasonable person would 
construe "late summer to early fall of 2012" at the time the jury 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
15 
 
Schultz also asserts that even if the charging document is 
ambiguous, the State bears the burden of the ambiguity as the 
drafter of the document.  In contrast, the State argues that when 
faced with ambiguous language in a charging document, courts must 
examine the entire record of the proceeding to clarify the scope 
of jeopardy. 
C.  Determining the Scope of Jeopardy  
¶24 Whether courts may consider the record to determine the 
scope of jeopardy is a question of first impression in Wisconsin.  
In his reply brief, Schultz argued that the record's relevance is 
limited to considering only "how a reasonable person would have 
understood the scope of jeopardy 'at the time jeopardy attached in 
the first case.'"  (quoting United States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271, 
282 (2d Cir. 2006)).13  At oral argument, Schultz again conceded 
                                                 
was sworn.  
13 The dissent suggests the point at which jeopardy attaches 
delimits the scope of jeopardy.  Dissent, ¶87.  This is 
fundamentally wrong.  The time at which jeopardy attaches does not 
lock in the scope of jeopardy.  Jeopardy attaches when the jury is 
sworn in order to prevent the State from conducting a full trial 
but then dismissing the charges before judgment only to refile the 
charges and retry the defendant until it is confident the jury 
will convict.  The attachment of jeopardy when the jury is sworn 
protects the "valued right" of the defendant "to have his trial 
completed by a particular tribunal."  Arizona v. Washington, 434 
U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (quoted sources omitted); State v. Seefeldt, 
2003 WI 47, ¶16, 261 Wis. 2d 383, 661 N.W.2d 822 (quoted sources 
omitted).  The rationale for this rule is well-established:   
The protection against double jeopardy limits the 
ability of the State to request that a trial be 
terminated and restarted.  This protection is important 
because the unrestricted ability of the State to 
terminate and restart a trial increases the financial 
and emotional burden on the defendant, extends the 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
16 
 
that the record is relevant, but only to understand the minds of 
the parties at the time jeopardy attaches:  
The court:  But counsel, isn't that . . . why 
we look at the rest of the record, to try to figure 
out what does "early fall" mean? 
Schultz's counsel:  When . . . we look at the 
record, we're not looking at the record to 
determine whether evidence was submitted to show 
that there was sex in the month of October, what 
we're looking at is evidence of what was the common 
understanding of the parties as to what the 
timeframe was. 
The court:  [Y]ou mentioned that we should 
apply the test described in Olmeda,[14]. . . it 
says, a court must further determine that such a 
conclusion would be reached by an objective 
arbiter.  That 
determination 
will 
require 
examination 
of 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
the 
                                                 
period during which the defendant is stigmatized by an 
unresolved accusation of wrongdoing and may increase the 
risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted.  
Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶17 (citation omitted).  The United 
States Supreme Court similarly expressed the reasoning underlying 
this rule:   
[A] second prosecution may be grossly unfair.  It 
increases the financial and emotional burden on the 
accused, prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized 
by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and may even 
enhance the risk that an innocent defendant may be 
convicted.  The danger of such unfairness to the 
defendant exists whenever a trial is aborted before it 
is completed.  Consequently, as a general rule, the 
prosecutor is entitled to one, and only one, opportunity 
to require an accused to stand trial. 
Washington, 434 U.S. at 503-05 (internal footnotes omitted).  
The point at which jeopardy attaches has nothing to say about the 
actual scope of jeopardy. 
14 United States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir. 2006). 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
17 
 
indictments in the two prosecutions, as well as the 
entire record of the proceedings.  
Schultz's 
counsel:  And 
I 
agree 
with 
that. . . . I do acknowledge that the entire record 
is relevant but only relevant to the understanding 
at the time of jeopardy . . . . 
¶25 As 
Schultz 
conceded, 
the 
entire 
record 
of 
the 
proceedings may be relevant in determining the scope of jeopardy.  
Contrary to Schultz's argument, however, no binding authority 
limits courts to using the record only to determine the subjective 
understanding of the parties in the first criminal proceeding at 
the time jeopardy attaches.  Instead, substantial authority 
indicates courts may review the entire record of the first 
proceeding to determine the scope of jeopardy. 
¶26 In Van Meter, we decided there was no double jeopardy 
violation when, after a jury trial, the trial court convicted Van 
Meter of knowingly fleeing a police officer in Wood County, after 
he was previously convicted of knowingly fleeing a police officer 
in Portage County, with both charges arising from the same high 
speed chase across county lines, in violation of the same statute.  
Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d at 755–59.  The defendant argued the Double 
Jeopardy Clause barred the second prosecution.  Id. at 757.  
Acknowledging the "identity of legal elements" based on both 
prosecutions charging violations of the same statute, this court 
concluded that the requisite "identity in fact[] cannot be shown" 
because "eluding Wood county officers in Wood county" is not the 
same offense as "eluding Portage county officers in Portage 
county."  Id. at 757-58.  We held a double jeopardy violation 
exists when "facts alleged under either of the indictments would, 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
18 
 
if proved under the other, warrant a conviction under the 
latter[.]"  Id. (quoting State v. George, 69 Wis. 2d 92, 98, 230 
N.W.2d 253 (1975)).  Applying that test, which was originally 
adopted in Anderson v. State, 221 Wis. 78, 87, 256 N.W. 210 (1936), 
this court determined "that defendant has not been put twice in 
jeopardy for the same offense because proof of facts for conviction 
for the Wood county offense would not have sustained conviction 
for the Portage county offense[.]"  Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d at 759.  
We explicitly "emphasize[d] the importance of having all of the 
facts in the record" to determine whether one fact alleged under 
an indictment would warrant a conviction under the latter.  Id. at 
758.  Nonetheless, because the defendant did not order any trial 
transcripts for the appeal, this court's review was "limited to 
whether the pleadings, decision, findings and conclusions sustain 
the judgment."  Id. at 756, 758 (citations omitted).  Accordingly, 
we assumed the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict in 
the Wood County conviction and we relied on the facts from the 
Portage County Circuit Court's decision affirming Van Meter's 
Portage County conviction.  Id. at 758–59.  Van Meter establishes 
the relevance of the record in determining whether a double 
jeopardy violation occurred. 
¶27 All of the federal circuit courts of appeal that have 
addressed this issue have also examined the record, including 
evidentiary facts, in determining the scope of jeopardy.  For 
example, in United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1999), 
abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Henrickson, 135 S. Ct. 
2466 (2015), an indictment charged a corrections officer three 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
19 
 
times for violating the Eighth Amendment by causing "unnecessary 
and wanton pain" to an inmate.  Walsh, 194 F.3d at 40–41.  The 
three counts alleged conduct occurring between January 4, 1991 and 
March 8, 1991 (Count 1); between May 26, 1992 and December 1, 1992 
(Count 2); and between May 26, 1992 and July 22, 1992 (Count 3).  
Id.  Walsh challenged the timeframes for exposing him to double 
jeopardy, because each count alleged the same conduct and the 
timeframes overlapped.  Id. at 41.  The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected his argument that the charges violated the 
prohibition of double jeopardy because the "evidence presented at 
trial" conclusively demonstrated Counts 2 and 3 were not the same 
and the conduct alleged in Count 3 occurred after June 5, 1992.  
Id. at 46.  Even though the indictment charged an offense occurring 
between May 26th and July 22nd and it therefore appeared that the 
State was charging Walsh for the same criminal act during the same 
timeframe, the evidence admitted at trial established a break in 
time between the conduct charged in each count.  Id. 
¶28 In United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118 (3d Cir. 1985), 
multiple defendants were charged with and convicted of conspiracy 
to possess with intent to distribute more than 1,000 pounds of 
marijuana, among other offenses, based upon attempted drug 
transactions in Pennsylvania, Texas, and Florida.  Id. at 1120.  
The appellate court acknowledged a variance between the indictment 
and the evidence produced at trial, with the jury finding a 
conspiracy and attempt to purchase marijuana in Pennsylvania only.  
Id. at 1123.  On appeal, Castro contended this variance would 
expose him to prosecution in Texas for the same crime.  Id.  The 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
20 
 
appellate court disagreed, noting that "[t]he scope of the double 
jeopardy bar is determined by the conviction and the entire record 
supporting the conviction."  Id.  (citation omitted).  The 
appellate court concluded "[t]he record shows clearly that the 
jury found that Castro conspired to possess the Bristol[, 
Pennsylvania] marijuana, and that the evidence supporting his 
conviction could not be sufficient to warrant a conviction based 
upon . . . transactions outside Pennsylvania."  Id. at 1124. 
¶29 While the Castro court framed the analysis in terms of 
the "record supporting the conviction," courts also examine the 
record in cases involving an acquittal, like Schultz's, in order 
to determine the scope of jeopardy.  For example, in United States 
v. Crumpler, 636 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ind. 1986), the defendant was 
charged with multiple drug offenses in Florida, of which he was 
acquitted.  Id. at 397-98.  He was subsequently charged with 
multiple drug offenses in Indiana, in response to which he filed 
a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.  Id. at 398.  The 
Crumpler court resolved the motion "based solely on the record 
before it which includes all pleadings, affidavits, and the 
evidence adduced during that evidentiary hearing[]" on the motion 
to dismiss.  Id. at 399.  Regardless of whether the first 
prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction, "[a] 
defendant claiming that he has been subjected to double jeopardy 
bears the burden of establishing that both prosecutions are for 
the same offense . . . .  The defendant must show that 'the 
evidence required to support a conviction on one indictment would 
have been sufficient to warrant a conviction on the other' 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
21 
 
indictment."  Id. at 403 (citing United States v. Roman, 728 F.2d 
846 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 681 (7th 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Buonomo, 441 F.2d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 
1971)).  In Crumpler, the defendant argued that all of his drug 
smuggling activities were part of one scheme, so the court examined 
the timeframes alleged in each indictment as part of its double 
jeopardy analysis.  Id. at 399, 404-05.  In doing so, that court 
considered both "the face of the indictments" as well as "the 
evidence presented during the hearing" and found nothing in the 
record to establish any "overlap in the time periods charged in 
the indictment here and the one in Tampa."  Id. at 405. 
¶30 The other circuits are in accord with Walsh and Castro.  
See United States v. Stefanidakis, 678 F.3d 96, 100-01 (1st Cir. 
2012) (in reviewing a double jeopardy challenge, courts must see 
if the record "contains facts sufficient to supply a rational basis 
for a finding that [the prosecutions] were predicated on different 
conduct."  (citations omitted)); United States v. Bonilla, 579 
F.3d 1233, 1241-44 (11th Cir. 2009) (court reviews the record to 
determine whether convictions violated double jeopardy); United 
States v. Hamilton, 992 F.2d 1126, 1130 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[F]or 
purposes of barring a future prosecution, it is the judgment and 
not the indictment alone which acts as a bar, and the entire record 
may be considered in evaluating a subsequent claim of double 
jeopardy."  (citation omitted)); United States v. Vasquez-
Rodriquez, 978 F.2d 867, 870-72 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding the two 
prosecutions were not for the same offense after reviewing the 
evidence admitted at trial after noting that "acts as described in 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
22 
 
the indictment will be examined as well as the acts admitted into 
evidence at the trials or hearings."  (citations omitted)); United 
States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 84, 86-87 (3d Cir. 1992) 
("[E]xamin[ing] the record to determine if [separate counts were] 
impermissibly multiplicitous[]" under the Double Jeopardy Clause); 
United States v. Am. Waste Fibers Co., 809 F.2d 1044, 1047 (4th 
Cir. 1987) ("When a Double Jeopardy bar is claimed, the court must 
examine not just the indictment from the prior proceeding but the 
entire record."  (citation omitted)); Roman, 728 F.2d 846, 853–54 
(7th Cir. 1984) ("It is the record as a whole, therefore, which 
provides the subsequent protection from double jeopardy, rather 
than just the indictment[.]"); United States v. Levine, 457 F.2d 
1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 1972) ("The entire record of the proceedings 
may be referred to in the event of a subsequent similar 
prosecution.  In the case at bar the record contains adequate 
detail to protect against double jeopardy."  (internal citation 
omitted)).  See also 1 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 125 (4th ed. 2019) ("If a defendant claims prior 
jeopardy in defense to a pending charge, the court is free to 
review the entire record of the first proceeding, not just the 
pleading."  (footnote omitted)). 
¶31 In addition to precedent from the federal courts, 
historical sources support examining the defendant's actual 
exposure to jeopardy in a prior prosecution.  "The guarantee 
against double jeopardy became firmly entrenched in the [English] 
common law in the form of the  pleas of autrefois acquit (a former 
acquittal), autrefoits convict (a former conviction), and pardon."  
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
23 
 
Rudstein, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. at 204 (footnote omitted).  
If the defendant had already been acquitted, convicted, or pardoned 
of the offense, he could advance the appropriate plea, backed by 
the facts underlying the first case.  The availability of these 
common law pleas in defense of a second prosecution confirms the 
historical basis for examining the record of the first prosecution 
to determine the scope of jeopardy.  Each of these pleas focused 
on the actual result of the initial prosecution.  A founding era 
dictionary reinforces the meaning of "jeopardy" as the actual 
danger to which a person is exposed, as opposed to the danger a 
person fears, defining "jeopardy" as "[h]azard; danger; peril."  1 
Thomas Sheridan, A General Dictionary of the English Language 
(1780).  Near the time the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted, 
Webster's Dictionary similarly defined "jeopardy" as "[e]xposure 
to death, loss or injury; hazard; danger; peril."  Jeopardy, 
Webster's Dictionary (1st ed. 1828); see also John Boag, Popular 
and Complete English Dictionary 749 (1848) (defining "jeopardy" 
with verbatim language).  Similarly, the current edition of Black's 
Law Dictionary defines "jeopardy" as the exposure a defendant 
actually "faces at trial."  Jeopardy, Black's Law Dictionary (11th 
ed. 2019) ("The risk of conviction and punishment that a criminal 
defendant faces at trial."  (emphasis added)).  None of these 
definitions bases jeopardy on the criminal defendant's fears, 
beliefs, or perceptions regarding his exposure in the first 
prosecution, as Schultz proposes. 
¶32 In light of the common law interpretations of jeopardy, 
as well as its historical meaning, we apply Van Meter's holding 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
24 
 
and join the federal circuit courts of appeal in examining the 
entire record, including evidentiary facts adduced at trial, in 
ascertaining whether a defendant's double jeopardy rights have 
been violated by a second prosecution.  Regardless of whether the 
first prosecution results in an acquittal or a conviction, it is 
the record in its entirety that reveals the scope of jeopardy and 
protects a defendant against a subsequent prosecution for the same 
crime.  See Roman, 728 F.2d at 854 ("It is the record as a whole, 
therefore, which provides the subsequent protection from double 
jeopardy, rather than just the indictment[.]"); Wright, supra ¶30 
("If a defendant claims prior jeopardy in defense to a pending 
charge, the court is free to review the entire record of the first 
proceeding, not just the pleading."  (footnote omitted)). 
D.  The Record of Schultz's Case 
¶33 In this case, we apply the test originally adopted in 
Anderson v. State and reaffirmed in George and Van Meter, and 
examine the entire record of Schultz's first prosecution for 
repeated sexual assault of a child to determine whether the "facts 
alleged under either of the indictments would, if proved under the 
other, warrant a conviction under the latter."15  Van Meter, 72 
                                                 
15 The dissent cites the test from State v. Anderson, 219 
Wis. 2d 739, 749, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998) but fails to apply it 
correctly.  In conclusory fashion, the dissent simply declares 
that "evidence of an act of sexual assault on or around October 19 
would have supported a conviction for repeated sexual assault 
occurring in the 'late summer to early fall[,]'" but never explains 
why.  See dissent, ¶74.  The dissent merely repeats its conclusory 
assertions regarding the charging language, without analysis.  See 
dissent, ¶¶86, 90 ("evidence of an October 19 sexual assault would 
support a conviction" during "a timeframe including 'early 
fall.'").  Tellingly, the dissent ignores a critical portion of 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
25 
 
Wis. 2d at 758; George, 69 Wis. 2d at 98; Anderson, 221 Wis. at 87 
(quoted source omitted).  Specifically, we determine whether the 
initial charge for repeated sexual assault of a child during the 
timeframe of "late summer to early fall of 2012" includes the date 
charged in the second prosecution for sexual assault of a child 
"on or about October 19, 2012." 
1.  An Unambiguous Complaint 
¶34 We begin our analysis with the complaint charging 
Schultz in the initial prosecution.  The complaint's language of 
"early fall," viewed alone, does not answer the question because 
"early fall"——standing alone——could be ambiguous.16  However, the 
complaint in this case expressly incorporates by reference the 
attached police report of Officer Waid, which contains some detail 
elucidating the meaning of "early fall."  The police report plainly 
establishes the timeframe in which Schultz was subject to jeopardy 
for repeated sexual assault of a child.  The report identifies 
                                                 
the charging document in the first prosecution——the attached and 
incorporated-by-reference police report——which defines the time 
period for the alleged assaults, thereby lending temporal 
specificity to what could otherwise be an ambiguous charge. 
16 We reject Schultz's argument that fall and early fall have 
definitive meanings based on the earth's position in relation to 
the sun.  Dictionaries and people define the seasons differently.  
See, e.g., Fall, Oxford Dictionary (6th ed. 2007) (defining fall 
as "the time of year when leaves fall from trees; autumn" and using 
the following example:  "In early fall, towards the end of August, 
they gathered berries."  (emphasis added)); Autumn, Oxford 
Dictionary (6th ed. 2007) ("The third season of the year, between 
summer and winter:  in the northern hemisphere freq[uently] 
regarded as comprising September, October, and November," before 
moving to the astronomical definition Schultz advances). 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
26 
 
Dominic——not Schultz——as the person who had intercourse with M.T. 
in "early to mid-October."  Waid's report described M.T. as having 
intercourse with Schultz "approximately one month before she had 
sexual intercourse with Dominic."  One month before early to mid-
October is early to mid-September.  The report details M.T. having 
had no "sexual intercourse with anyone between Dominic and 
[December 4, 2012]."  The police report attached to the complaint 
also recounted another interview during which M.T. said she had 
sexual intercourse with Schultz "over five times," starting in 
"the middle of the year of 2012" and lasting for "a couple of 
months."  When asked at oral argument what statements in the police 
report indicated intercourse with Schultz during the month of 
October, Schultz's counsel was unable to identify any.  Counsel 
responded, "Well, I don't have a specific quote, but . . . she 
claims there are multiple incidents of sexual abuse." 
¶35 Nothing in the police report mentions or even suggests 
sexual intercourse between Schultz and M.T. during October.  The 
attached police report unambiguously identifies the latest date of 
intercourse for which Schultz was charged in the first prosecution.  
If, as the report indicates, M.T.'s sexual intercourse with Schultz 
occurred one month before her sexual intercourse with Dominic in 
early to mid-October, and she had no sexual intercourse between 
her intercourse with Dominic and December 4, 2012, then the State's 
charging language of "early fall" means the intercourse for which 
Schultz was charged concluded in early to mid-September, well 
before October 19, 2012.  Coupled with the fact that the police 
report indicates M.T. had her period in between the sexual activity 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
27 
 
with Schultz in mid-September and the sexual activity with Dominic 
in early to mid-October, the police report attached to the 
complaint repudiates any suggestion that "early fall" in the first 
prosecution encompassed October 19. 
¶36 Contrary to Schultz's assertion, none of the "five 
times" of sexual intercourse charged in the first prosecution 
occurred in October.  The police report included Facebook messages 
between M.T. and Schultz on September 3, 2012 indicating the 
relationship 
was 
over 
on 
that 
date, 
offering 
additional 
confirmation that the first prosecution encompassed sexual 
assaults by Schultz that ended in September.  The police report, 
incorporated by reference into the complaint, clearly identifies 
Schultz's scope of jeopardy in the first prosecution at the time 
jeopardy attached. 
2.  The Record At Trial  
¶37 Even though the incorporated and attached police report 
renders the complaint unambiguous, we also review the record of 
the first trial to see if anything suggests "early fall" extended 
past mid-September to include October 19, 2012.  We do so in order 
to safeguard the defendant's constitutional right against double 
jeopardy.  The facts alleged under the second complaint——a sexual 
assault "on or about October 19"——would not, if proven, support a 
conviction in the first prosecution.  The complaint in the first 
prosecution alleged repeated sexual assaults during "late summer 
to early fall[,]" which the attached and incorporated police report 
clarified to have concluded in early to mid-September.  Limiting 
our review to the complaint, however, would not protect the 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
28 
 
defendant against double jeopardy if the State introduced evidence 
of a sexual assault occurring "on or about October 19" after 
jeopardy attached.  In order to ascertain whether the defendant 
was exposed to double jeopardy in the second prosecution, we 
examine the entire record of proceedings in the first case to see 
if any evidence of a sexual assault occurring "on or about October 
19" was introduced.17 
¶38 The trial transcripts reveal no evidence extending the 
end date identified in the police report.  M.T testified at 
Schultz's first trial that they began having intercourse in July 
or August and broke up in the beginning of September 2012.  She 
also testified to having a conversation with a friend "closer to 
October," after she stopped seeing Schultz, during which she 
disclosed to her friend the previous intercourse with Schultz.  A 
                                                 
17 While the dissent repeatedly insists "the defendant's 
protection against double jeopardy must be firmly and rigidly 
guarded"——a principle this court heartily endorses——the dissent 
nevertheless restricts its double jeopardy analysis to "the 
charging period allegation[,]" ignoring the charging document as 
a whole, as well as the record.  Dissent, ¶76.  Although this 
opinion explains at great length that the defendant's double 
jeopardy rights cannot be fully protected without examining the 
record of trial proceedings, the dissent does not explain why it 
would circumscribe the defendant's constitutional rights by ending 
its analysis with a review of the "the charging period allegation" 
alone.  Contradicting its own analysis, the dissent seems to 
recognize the import of reviewing the record when it hypothesizes 
about the consequences "if the results of the pregnancy test 
showing an estimated conception date of October 19 had been 
presented at the first trial[.]"  Dissent, ¶83.  Unremarkably, if 
the results of the pregnancy test had been presented at the trial, 
double jeopardy would foreclose the second prosecution, regardless 
of the charging language in the first complaint, hence the need to 
review not only the complaint but also the entire record in order 
to determine the scope of jeopardy. 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
29 
 
witness for Schultz, A.O., testified that she and Schultz began a 
romantic relationship in September 2012, lasting until the spring 
of 2013.  The State's closing argument stipulated that the 
intercourse between M.T. and Schultz ended in September 2012.  In 
its rebuttal, the State identified the time period for the sexual 
assaults as "September, August, and July."  The transcript of 
Schultz's first trial contains only 21 mentions of "October."  
Eight of those refer to intercourse with Dominic in early to mid-
October.  Of the remaining 13, seven refer to M.T. having 
intercourse in the month or so before "October 2012."  Of the 
remaining six, four referenced procedural matters regarding 
motions or Schultz's prior convictions.  One of the remaining two 
referred to the timing of a conversation M.T. had with a friend 
about the sexual relationship with Schultz after they had already 
broken up. 
¶39 The lone remaining reference to the month of October 
came from Schultz's counsel during his opening statement, who 
mentioned a "bombshell that occurred sometime in October of 2012."  
Counsel indicated the "bombshell" was friends alerting Schultz 
that M.T. told others she and Schultz were in a sexual 
relationship.  Immediately after, counsel said Schultz and M.T. 
exchanged Facebook messages in which she denied making the 
statements and "his contact with her ended shortly thereafter."  
However, as the trial evidence and police report show, the Facebook 
conversation occurred on September 3, 2012, not in October.  
Schultz's counsel offered no evidence suggesting a second 
conversation occurred in the month of October. 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
30 
 
¶40 Based upon our review of the complaint and its attached 
police report, as well as the trial transcripts, the scope of 
jeopardy of Schultz's first prosecution for "late summer to early 
fall of 2012," ended sometime in September.  We need not determine 
the exact date because the conduct charged in the second 
prosecution was "on or about October 19, 2012."  It is sufficient 
to conclude the record does not support jeopardy attaching to 
Schultz for any conduct during the month of October.  Because the 
scope of jeopardy in the first prosecution did not include the 
date of the assault charged in the second prosecution, the two 
prosecutions were separate in time and therefore not identical in 
fact.  See Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 749 (holding offenses are not 
identical in fact if they are separated in time). 
E.  Schultz's Arguments 
¶41 Schultz primarily relies on three cases to support a 
double jeopardy violation based on the State's second prosecution.  
For the reasons discussed below, none of them help his case. 
¶42 First, Schultz encourages us to apply the test set forth 
in George for a continuing crime.  In George, we analyzed a 
complaint alleging 29 counts of sports betting, with most counts 
alleging continuing conduct over the span of a definite time 
period, such as from September 15, 1971 to January 15, 1972.  
George, 69 Wis. 2d at 95-96.  In that case, we concluded that if 
one prosecution charges a continuing crime, "a conviction or 
acquittal for a crime based on a portion of that period will bar 
a prosecution covering the whole period."  Id. at 98 (quoting 1 
Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure 351 (1957)) 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
31 
 
(emphasis added).  We affirm this principle.  In George, an 
acquittal for conduct on December 24, 1971, would bar the State 
from charging the defendant again for sports betting occurring on 
January 1, 1972, because it was within the time period originally 
described in the complaint.  However, the holding in George 
supplies no support for Schultz's double jeopardy argument because 
Schultz's case requires us to compare the period of time charged 
in each prosecution.  Because the record confirms the assaults 
charged in the first prosecution were alleged to have occurred 
before the assault charged in the second prosecution, George 
provides no support for Schultz's double jeopardy argument. 
¶43 Schultz 
next 
contends 
that 
the 
double 
jeopardy 
principles espoused by our court of appeals in State v. Fawcett 
resolve this case in his favor.  In Fawcett, the State charged the 
defendant with two counts of first-degree sexual assault.  State 
v. Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 247, 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1988).  
The complaint alleged the sexual assaults of a child occurred in 
the "six months preceding December [] 1985."  Id.  The defendant 
challenged this time period as a violation of his Fifth Amendment 
right against double jeopardy.  Id. at 247.  The court of appeals 
applied our sufficiency-of-the-charge test set forth in Holesome 
v. State, using the second prong of the Holesome test, which asks 
whether conviction or acquittal of the complained-of-charge is a 
bar to another prosecution for the same offense.  Fawcett, 145 
Wis. 2d at 251 (quoting Holesome v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 95, 102, 161 
N.W.2d 283 (1968)).  In analyzing whether the six–month time period 
in the Fawcett complaint implicated double jeopardy concerns under 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
32 
 
the Holesome test, the court of appeals concluded that double 
jeopardy was not "a realistic threat in this case."  Id. at 255.  
Noting that the defendant's "double jeopardy protection can also 
be addressed in any future prosecution growing out of this 
incident[,]" the court of appeals explained that "[i]f the state 
is to enjoy a more flexible due process analysis in a child 
victim/witness case, it should also endure a rigid double jeopardy 
analysis if a later prosecution based upon the same transaction 
during the same time frame is charged."  Id.   (emphasis added). 
¶44 We agree with the court of appeals' statement in Fawcett 
but it does not support Schultz's double jeopardy argument.  
Fawcett expressly limited its "rigid double jeopardy analysis" to 
later prosecutions "based upon the same transaction during the 
same time frame[.]"18  Id.  (emphasis added).  In this case, 
                                                 
18 The dissent dodges the dispositive question in this case:  
were the offenses charged in each prosecution separated in time?  
The dissent offers no answer.  Instead, the dissent merely assumes 
"early fall" encompasses October 19.  See dissent, ¶¶83-86.  The 
dissent would impose "a blanket bar on subsequent prosecutions 
involving the same victim and the same timeframe."  Dissent, ¶72.  
So would we.  But as explained at length in this opinion, the two 
prosecutions against Schultz involved different timeframes.  The 
police report attached to the complaint makes this clear.  The 
dissent claims we "construe[] the ambiguous timeframe narrowly" 
misstating our analysis as "implicitly conclud[ing] that 'early 
fall' is ambiguous."  Dissent, ¶75, 85.  Read in its entirety, the 
charging document is not ambiguous and our construction of it is 
reasonable, not narrow.  A "rigid double jeopardy analysis" does 
not mean the court must pretend the police report was not part of 
the complaint, as the dissent apparently does.  See dissent, ¶86 
("October 19 is not clearly separate and apart from a charging 
period that runs through 'early fall.'").  A charging document 
should not be read narrowly or expansively, but reasonably and 
fully.  Without authority, the dissent espouses a heretofore 
unheard of "important principle" that "the tie goes to the runner—
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
33 
 
Schultz's prosecutions involved criminal conduct separated in 
time.  Accordingly, applying Fawcett's "rigid double jeopardy 
analysis" does not affect our conclusion that Schultz's second 
prosecution, for sexual assault of a child under 16, was beyond 
the end date for the repeated sexual assaults of a child charged 
in the first prosecution.  Because the sexual assaults charged in 
each prosecution were separated in time, Schultz was not twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense. 
¶45 Finally, Schultz proposes that this court adopt the test 
pronounced by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States 
v. Olmeda.  In Olmeda, the defendant moved to dismiss an indictment 
from June 2002, charging him with unlawful possession of ammunition 
in Manhattan.  Olmeda, 461 F.3d at 275.  Olmeda had previously 
pled guilty to an earlier indictment charging him with ammunition 
possession in June 2002 "within the Eastern District of North 
Carolina and elsewhere."  Id.  Olmeda argued the conduct alleged 
in the North Carolina indictment, specifically the use of the word 
"elsewhere," subsumed the conduct alleged in the later Manhattan 
indictment, which therefore violated constitutional protections 
against double jeopardy.  See id. at 277–78.  The State charged 
Olmeda under the same statute for both offenses, leaving the 
determination of whether the offenses were identical in fact the 
central issue in the double jeopardy analysis.  Id. at 279, 282. 
¶46 To decide whether successive prosecutions were the same 
in fact, Olmeda crafted the following test:  courts must decide 
                                                 
—in this case, the defendant."  Dissent, ¶76.  Even if this 
principle were valid, there is no "tie" in this case. 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
34 
 
whether "a reasonable person familiar with the totality of the 
facts and circumstances would construe the initial indictment, at 
the time jeopardy attached in the first case, to cover the offense 
that is charged in the subsequent prosecution."  Id. at 282.  The 
Olmeda court went on to say that the determination "will require 
examination of the plain language of the indictments in the two 
prosecutions, as well as 'the entire record of the proceedings.'"  
Id.  (quoting 1 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 125 (3d ed. 1999)).  Finally, Olmeda established a burden-
shifting test particularized for conspiracy.  Id.  Under this test, 
the defendant must first make a "non-frivolous" and "colorable 
objective showing" that the two indictments charge only one 
conspiracy.  Id.  If the defendant does so, the burden shifts to 
the prosecution to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
existence of separate conspiracies and no double jeopardy 
violation.  Id.  Applying this burden-shifting analysis, the Olmeda 
court held the government failed to meet its burden.  Id. at 289. 
¶47 We decline to adopt Olmeda's "reasonable person" test.19  
As a preliminary matter, we are not bound by Olmeda, which was 
                                                 
19 At oral argument, the relevance of Olmeda's footnote 15 was 
in dispute.  Footnote 15, in relevant part, states:   
[W]here 
the 
government 
constructively 
narrows 
an 
indictment after jeopardy attaches only to refile the 
dropped charge at a later date, a variation of the 
problem of increased exposure arises implicating due 
process if not double jeopardy concerns. 
Olmeda, 461 F.3d 287 n.15. 
This footnote is irrelevant to Schultz's case.  The dissent 
misrepresents this court's "approach" as "endors[ing] the idea 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
35 
 
decided by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  On federal 
constitutional issues, only United States Supreme Court decisions 
bind the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  See Thompson v. Vill. of Hales 
Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 306-07, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983).  Supreme 
Court decisions on the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause are 
also "controlling interpretations" of our own.  Davison, 263 
Wis. 2d 145, ¶18.  In contrast, decisions by the federal courts of 
                                                 
that the scope of jeopardy is limited to and reduced by the 
evidence presented."  Dissent, ¶87.  Not so.  As explained at 
length in this opinion, review of the record is necessary in order 
to protect the defendant from double jeopardy.  As already made 
clear, if the first trial produced evidence of a sexual assault 
occurring "on or about October 19," then regardless of the mid-
September end date for the assaults alleged in the first 
prosecution, double jeopardy would preclude the State from 
subsequently prosecuting Schultz for a sexual assault occurring 
"on or about October 19."  In the first case, the State did not 
narrow its prosecution of Schultz after jeopardy attached only to 
refile a dropped charge at a later date.  There was no constructive 
amendment by the State for the purpose of pursuing a second 
prosecution for conduct within the timeframe of the first 
prosecution.  The government never dropped a charge or sought to 
narrow the timeframe of the first indictment.  Instead, the State 
merely learned of similar criminal activity occurring after the 
activity charged in the first proceeding ended, and charged Schultz 
for that later conduct, which was outside the timeframe of the 
first prosecution. 
If the complaint charged sexual assaults occurring July 1, 
2012 through November 1, 2012, but no evidence of assaults beyond 
September was introduced at trial, double jeopardy would preclude 
the State from later filing a complaint against Schultz for 
assaults alleged to have occurred in October.  Under that scenario, 
the State would indeed be attempting to "constructively narrow[] 
[the] indictment[.]"  That is not what happened in this case.  
Misleadingly, 
the 
dissent 
clouds 
the 
distinction 
between 
"constructively narrow[ing] an indictment" for the purpose of 
refiling a "dropped charge" with determining what the original 
scope of jeopardy was in the first place. 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
36 
 
appeal have only persuasive value to this court.  See Thompson, 
115 Wis. 2d at 307. 
¶48 Secondly, Olmeda did not identify any legal authority 
for its "reasonable person" test.  The pertinent section of the 
opinion reads:  
To determine whether two offenses charged in successive 
prosecutions are the same in fact, a court must ascertain 
whether a reasonable person familiar with the totality 
of the facts and circumstances would construe the 
initial indictment, at the time jeopardy attached in the 
first case, to cover the offense that is charged in the 
subsequent prosecution.  Thus, where a defendant pleads 
guilty . . . .  
Olmeda, 461 F.3d at 282.  Olmeda cites no cases from the United 
States Supreme Court incorporating the "reasonable person" test 
into the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and we 
have discovered none. 
¶49 Finally, we reject Olmeda's test because the "reasonable 
person" standard is typically applied in common law areas such as 
contract and tort.  See John Gardner, The Many Faces of the 
Reasonable Person, 131 L.Q. Rev. 563, 563 (2015) (referring to the 
reasonable person standard as the "common law's helpmate" and "most 
closely associated with the law of torts").  The double jeopardy 
clauses of the Fifth Amendment and Article 1, Section 8 do not 
include the word "reasonable" and it is a seminal canon of textual 
interpretation that we do not insert words into statutes or 
constitutional text.  "Nothing is to be added to what the text 
states or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro omisso habendus 
est)."  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, supra ¶19, at 93 (2012).  
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
37 
 
See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 
106 Yale L.J. 1807 (1997) (advocating a plain meaning approach to 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, under which "'[s]ame offense' means 
just that[,]" and employing the Due Process Clause as a backdrop).  
Absent direction from the text itself or the Supreme Court, we 
decline to read a "reasonable person" standard into the Fifth 
Amendment's protections against double jeopardy.  Likewise, we 
will not read words into Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Cf. State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶56, 389 
Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 ("A state court does not have the power 
to write into its state constitution additional protection that is 
not supported by its text or historical meaning."). 
¶50 Applied in this case, the Olmeda test could yield 
different results depending upon the geographic location of the 
"reasonable person" who determines what "early fall" means.  The 
"reasonable person" in Hurley, Wisconsin might perceive "early 
fall" to commence in late September, coinciding with changes in 
the color of leaves on trees and dropping temperatures.  In 
contrast, the "reasonable person" in Madison may associate "early 
fall" with the opening game of the University of Wisconsin Badgers 
football team.  The constitutional protections against double 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
38 
 
jeopardy cannot be conditioned upon geographic location——or any 
other variables influencing the judge's perspective.20 
F.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.29 
¶51 Schultz also contends the court of appeals erred in 
relying on Wis. Stat. § 971.29 as a basis for reviewing the entire 
record.  He argues doing so is improper when it prejudices the 
defendant.  We agree with the court of appeals.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 971.29(2) expressly allows post-verdict amendments to the 
pleading to conform to the proof presented at trial, with no 
consideration of prejudice to the defendant: 
At the trial, the court may allow amendment of the 
complaint, indictment or information to conform to the 
proof where such amendment is not prejudicial to the 
defendant.  After verdict the pleading shall be deemed 
amended to conform to the proof if no objection to the 
relevance of the evidence was timely raised upon the 
trial. 
(Emphasis added.)  
¶52 Only "at the trial" must the circuit court consider 
prejudice to the defendant of allowing an amendment to the 
pleading.  "After verdict the pleading shall be deemed amended to 
                                                 
20 Although the dissent never cites Olmeda as the source, it 
essentially adopts its "reasonable person" test.  The dissent says 
"the scope of jeopardy" is "as broad as the charging language may 
be fairly read."  Dissent, ¶72.  The dissent does not explain what 
"fairly read" means (or by whose measure we define it).  The 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy cannot depend 
upon such a vague standard.  This court instead follows the rule 
overwhelmingly applied by other jurisdictions and reflected in the 
common law dating back centuries, under which courts define the 
scope of jeopardy by the entire record in the case, rather than 
how a particular judge may "fairly read" a single document filed 
in the matter. 
 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
39 
 
conform to the proof" unless at trial, the defendant timely 
objected to the relevance of the evidence.  The portion of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.29(2) addressing such post-verdict amendments of the 
pleading contains no prejudice qualifier.  We do not read words 
into the statute that the legislature did not write.  "Under the 
omitted-case canon of statutory interpretation, '[n]othing is to 
be added to what the text states or reasonably implies (casus 
omissus pro omisso habendus est).  That is, a matter not covered 
is to be treated as not covered.'"  Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann, 
2019 WI 58, ¶18, 387 Wis. 2d 50, 928 N.W.2d 480 (quoting Scalia & 
Garner, Reading Law, supra ¶19, at 93).  "One of the maxims of 
statutory construction is that courts should not add words to a 
statute to give it a certain meaning."  Fond Du Lac Cty. v. Town 
of Rosendale, 149 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(citation omitted); see also State v. Wiedmeyer, 2016 WI App 46, 
¶13, 370 Wis. 2d 187, 881 N.W.2d 805 ("It is not up to the courts 
to rewrite the plain words of statutes[.]").  Based on the same 
principle, we reject any contention that the statute implicitly 
excludes the amendment of dates or times in a charging document.  
See State v. Duda, 60 Wis. 2d 431, 440, 210 N.W.2d 763 (1973) 
(construing Wis. Stat. § 971.29, "[w]e are of the opinion that the 
sentence regarding amendment after verdict was intended to deal 
with technical variances in the complaint such as names and dates."  
(emphasis added)). 
G.  Admonition  
¶53 Our opinion should not be read to approve attempts by 
the State to use imprecise charging language in an effort to skirt 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
40 
 
the protections against double jeopardy.  As the court of appeals 
correctly noted, defendants faced with uncertain language in a 
charging document should raise the issue to the circuit court 
through an appropriate motion.  See Wis. Stat. § 971.31 (pretrial 
motions including defects in the indictment); State v. Miller, 
2002 WI App 197, ¶¶8–9, 257 Wis. 2d 124, 650 N.W.2d 850 (motion to 
dismiss based on vague or overbroad charging period and motion 
requesting a more definite and certain statement); Fawcett, 145 
Wis. 2d at 250–51 (due process challenges to the sufficiency of an 
indictment).   
¶54 Further, we reaffirm a principle already established in 
cases involving child sexual assaults:  the law does not require 
definitive dates in charging documents in such cases.  See State 
v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶¶33–34, 361 Wis. 2d 529, 861 N.W.2d 174.  
This is because children are often incapable of remembering 
traumatic incidents by the day, week, or month, but instead might 
correlate them to other events in their lives, such as holidays, 
birthdays, or school semesters.  See id. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶55 We hold that when the State charges a defendant in a 
subsequent prosecution for conduct the defendant contends overlaps 
the first prosecution's timeframe, courts may examine the entire 
record of the first proceeding to determine the actual scope of 
jeopardy in the first proceeding.  The test to determine whether 
the earlier timeframe included the second is not what a reasonable 
person would think the earlier timeframe includes.  Instead, the 
reviewing court ascertains the parameters of the offense for which 
No. 
2017AP1977-CR   
 
41 
 
the defendant was actually in jeopardy during the first proceeding 
by reviewing all of the evidence, testimony, and arguments of the 
parties. 
¶56 The State's prosecution of Schultz for sexual assault of 
a child under 16, "on or about October 19, 2012," did not violate 
the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment or Article 
I, Section 8.  This second prosecution for sexual assault was not 
identical in fact to the first prosecution for repeated sexual 
assault of a child in "late summer to early fall of 2012."  A 
court's determination of the scope of jeopardy in a prior criminal 
prosecution is based upon the entire record of the first 
proceeding, including the evidence introduced at trial.  It is the 
entire record of the first proceeding that reveals the details of 
the offense for which the defendant was actually in jeopardy during 
the first prosecution.  The record of Schultz's first criminal 
prosecution——including the indictments, the police report, and 
trial testimony——establish a scope of jeopardy that excludes any 
conduct occurring in the month of October.  The two cases against 
Schultz did not involve the "same offence" under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.  We affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
¶57 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (dissenting).  Alexander Schultz 
was charged with repeated sexual assault, a criminal offense that 
encompasses any and all sexual assaults committed within a 
specified period of time.  Based on the vague witness statements 
as well as a still-outstanding paternity test, the State chose a 
broad and imprecise charging period:  "late summer to early fall."  
While it could have waited until it had all the evidence——most 
notably, the results of the paternity test——the State went forward 
anyway, and the jury acquitted.  When the paternity test later 
showed Schultz was the father, the State tried again, this time 
charging Schultz for committing sexual assault "on or about October 
19." 
¶58 Our state and federal constitutions protect against two 
prosecutions for the same offense.  When asking whether a second 
charge is based on the same facts, the test is whether the facts 
alleged under the second complaint would, if proved, support a 
conviction under the first complaint.  See Anderson v. State, 221 
Wis. 78, 87, 265 N.W. 210 (1936). 
¶59 Applying this test, evidence of sexual assault on 
October 19 would have supported a conviction for repeated sexual 
assault during "late summer to early fall."  Because those charges 
are for the same offense, the subsequent prosecution violated 
Schultz's constitutional protection against double jeopardy and 
should have been dismissed.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
I 
¶60 Both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions 
protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal.1  The constitutional protection against double jeopardy 
features both front-end and back-end safeguards; that is, our 
double jeopardy cases examine whether the protection is secure 
both at the time an original complaint is filed and when a 
subsequent prosecution is brought. 
¶61 On the front end, a defendant charged with a crime is 
entitled to be informed of "the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him."  Holesome v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 95, 102, 161 
N.W.2d 283 (1968) (citing U.S. Const. amends. V, VI; Wis. Const. 
art. I, §§ 7, 8(1)).  When a defendant claims these rights have 
been violated, the court reviews the allegations in the charging 
document to determine "whether it states an offense to which he is 
able to plead and prepare a defense and whether conviction or 
acquittal is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense."  
Id. 
¶62 In child sexual assault cases, these due process 
protections——though still required——are viewed through a "more 
flexible" lens.  State v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶34, 361 Wis. 2d 529, 
861 N.W.2d 174 (quoting State v. Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 254, 
426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1988)).  This is so because of the unique 
nature of these offenses.  In particular, the "vagaries of a 
                                                 
1 "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."  U.S. Const. 
amend. V.  "[N]o person for the same offense may be put twice in 
jeopardy of punishment . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8(1). 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
3 
 
child's memory"——i.e., the difficulty for child victims to testify 
regarding specific dates and details——should not allow offenders 
to escape punishment.  See id., ¶¶33-34 (quoting Fawcett, 145 
Wis. 2d at 254).  Therefore, the complaint need not set forth 
precise allegations regarding the date any alleged crimes were 
committed. 
¶63 Given all this, complaints alleging child sexual assault 
generally pass constitutional muster despite featuring more 
expansive and imprecise charging periods than other criminal 
offenses.  For example, in Hurley, we concluded that a complaint 
charging the defendant with repeated sexual assault of the same 
child "on and between" 2000 and 2005 was constitutionally 
sufficient.  Id., ¶¶10, 53; see also State v. Kempainen, 2015 
WI 32, ¶¶1, 4, 361 Wis. 2d 450, 862 N.W.2d 587 (holding sufficient 
notice provided with charging periods of "on or about August 1, 
1997 to December 1, 1997," and "on or about March 1, 2001 to June 
15, 2001"). 
¶64 But it is also true that this charging flexibility 
necessitates a counterbalancing assurance——that is, because the 
prosecution is held to a less-exacting standard for charging period 
precision, the defendant's protection against double jeopardy must 
be firmly and rigidly guarded. 
¶65 In 
Fawcett, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
reviewed 
the 
sufficiency of two sexual assault charges alleged to have occurred 
"during the six months preceding December A.D. 1985."  145 
Wis. 2d at 247.  In conducting its double jeopardy analysis, the 
court explained:   
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
4 
 
[W]e do not conclude that double jeopardy is a realistic 
threat in this case.  In its brief, the state concedes 
that Fawcett may not again be charged with any sexual 
assault growing out of this incident.  Courts may tailor 
double jeopardy protection to reflect the time period 
charged in an earlier prosecution.  Therefore, Fawcett's 
double jeopardy protection can also be addressed in any 
future prosecution growing out of this incident.  If the 
state is to enjoy a more flexible due process analysis 
in a child victim/witness case, it should also endure a 
rigid double jeopardy analysis if a later prosecution 
based upon the same transaction during the same time 
frame is charged. 
Id. at 255 (emphasis added) (citing State v. St. Clair, 418 
A.2d 184, 189 (Me. 1980)).  In other words, as long as the State 
enjoys front-end pleading flexibility, defendants are deserving of 
equally extensive back-end protection against any threat of double 
jeopardy that could arise from such flexibility. 
¶66 Other jurisdictions have recognized the same dynamic in 
cases involving broad and vague charging language, and provide 
guidance for what a "rigid double jeopardy analysis" looks like. 
¶67 In State v. Martinez, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
affirmed the need for pleading flexibility in child sexual assault 
cases:  "It is preferable to allow the State to conduct one 
vigorous prosecution to protect a child rather than to bar any 
prosecution at all because of a child's natural mnemonic 
shortcomings."2  550 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Neb. 1996).  To compensate 
for that, however, the State must face a "blanket bar" against any 
                                                 
2 The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision 
that itself cited Fawcett for the premise that "courts may tailor 
double jeopardy protection to reflect the time period involved in 
the charge in the earlier prosecution."  State v. Martinez, 541 
N.W.2d 406, 414–15 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Fawcett, 
145 Wis. 2d 244, 255, 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
5 
 
further prosecutions arising from the broad timeframe alleged in 
the earlier prosecution:   
The State may allege a timeframe for its allegations of 
sexual assault of a child in its first prosecution; as 
a quid pro quo to ensure that this liberty is not abused, 
the State must survive double jeopardy scrutiny if it 
attempts a second prosecution based upon the same 
transaction during the same timeframe.  Unless the 
offense charged in the second prosecution is clearly 
separate and apart from the offense charged in the first 
prosecution, the timeframe alleged in the first 
prosecution acts as a "blanket bar" for subsequent 
prosecutions.  This is the only viable means of balancing 
the profound tension between the constitutional rights 
of one accused of child molestation against the State's 
interest in protecting those victims who need the most 
protection. 
Id. at 658 (emphasis added).  Again, the blanket bar extends to 
all subsequent offenses unless they are "clearly separate and 
apart" from the timeframe charged in the first offense. 
¶68 Similarly, the Maine Supreme Court decision cited in 
Fawcett explained, "[w]hen an offense charged consists of a series 
of acts extending over a period of time, a conviction or acquittal 
for a crime based on a portion of that period will bar a prosecution 
covering the whole period."  St. Clair, 418 A.2d at 189 (quoted 
source omitted).  This meant that an indictment broadly alleging 
the commission of embezzlement "during and between the months of 
November, 1973, and December, 1975," would bar a prosecution across 
that whole period even though the evidence presented at trial was 
limited to a transaction occurring on November 1, 1973.  Id. at 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
6 
 
188-90.  These cases are not unique.  This concept is a common, 
well-understood theme in sister courts around the country.3 
¶69 Our repeated sexual assault statute also embodies the 
notion of a blanket bar unless the second charge is clearly 
separate and apart from the first.  It expressly prohibits the 
State from charging a defendant with repeated acts of sexual 
assault (under Wis. Stat. § 948.025) and sexual assault of the 
same child (under Wis. Stat. § 948.02) "unless the other violation 
occurred outside the time period" used for the repeated acts 
charge.  § 948.025(3) (2017-18) (emphasis added).4 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., State v. D.B.S., 700 P.2d 630, 633, 635 (Mont. 
1985) (explaining, in reference to charging period of "January 1, 
1983 to October 28, 1983," that less charging period specificity 
required in cases involving sexual abuse of a child but also that 
double jeopardy concerns are alleviated because "[t]he State is 
barred by [the state constitution] from retrying the defendant for 
the offense to this particular victim during the time in 
question"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Olson, 951 
P.2d 571, 577 (Mont. 1997); State v. Lakin, 517 A.2d 846, 847 (N.H. 
1986) (explaining that the broad timeframe alleged in a sexual 
assault does not implicate fear of the possibility of double 
jeopardy because "[c]ourts may tailor double jeopardy protection 
to reflect the scope of the time period charged in an earlier 
prosecution"); State v. Altgilbers, 786 P.2d 680, 695 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1989) ("Because of the scope of the indictment in this case, 
the state would not be permitted in the future to charge defendant 
with any sexual offenses involving his two children during the 
time encompassed by the counts in the indictment."); State v. 
Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1030, 1033–34 (Utah 1991) (explaining, in 
reference to charging period of "on or between January, 1985, and 
September 4, 1987," that although less charging period specificity 
is required when young children are involved, "[o]nce a prosecutor 
chooses to prosecute on such vague allegations, a necessary quid 
pro quo under our constitutional notice provision is that to 
protect the defendant from double jeopardy, the prosecutor should 
be precluded from bringing further charges that fall within the 
general description of the charging allegations"). 
4 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 
version. 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
7 
 
¶70 The 
same 
front-end 
flexibility 
authorizing 
broad 
charging periods in child sexual assault cases also supports vague 
or imprecise charging periods.  See, e.g., People v. LaPage, 53 
A.D.3d 693, 694–95 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (finding child sex offense 
charging period of "late summer or early fall of 2006" provided 
constitutionally sufficient notice).  It appears that cases 
stemming from vague charging language are rare.  Even so, the same 
complementary principles should apply.  When imprecise allegations 
are considered for double jeopardy purposes, any imprecision must 
be read at its broadest to ensure that the subsequent offense is 
clearly separate and apart.  This guarantees that the State's 
pleading flexibility is not acting as both a sword and a shield 
against the defendant. 
¶71 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court applied this principle 
in a case where a defendant challenged a sexual assault indictment 
on double jeopardy grounds because the indictment charged him with 
a "sexual act," a general statutory term that was elsewhere 
statutorily defined as any of several different forms of behavior.  
State v. Hebert, 448 A.2d 322, 326 (Me. 1982).  The court rejected 
the defendant's front-end double jeopardy claim based on the 
indictment.  The vague charge, the court explained, means the scope 
of jeopardy in any subsequent prosecution is commensurately vast, 
encompassing anything fairly included within the charging 
document:   
Because that statutory language may mean, under [the 
statutory definition], several different forms of 
behavior, that allegation in this indictment is 
ambiguous.  It is clear, however, that when a defendant 
is placed in jeopardy under a valid indictment, he or 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
8 
 
she may not thereafter be placed in jeopardy for any 
offense of which he properly could have been convicted 
under that indictment.  The scope of jeopardy created by 
an indictment is therefore as broad as that indictment 
may be fairly read.  The ambit of the constitutional bar 
to subsequent prosecution is co-extensive with the scope 
of jeopardy created in the prior prosecution.  Thus, if 
the allegations in one prosecution describe an offense 
which is shown to be within the scope of the charging 
allegations of a prior prosecution, then the defendant 
may successfully raise a defense of former jeopardy to 
the subsequent proceedings. 
Id. at 326 (second and third emphases added) (citations omitted). 
¶72 Putting this all together, a "rigid double jeopardy 
analysis" necessarily depends on the specific charging language of 
a given case.  This case-specific approach recognizes that the 
State has more pleading flexibility in child sexual assault cases 
because of the unique nature of such offenses.  Where that relaxed 
standard leads to expansive and imprecise allegations, the State 
must be held responsible for any flexibility it exercises when 
those same allegations are considered from a double jeopardy 
perspective.  This means a broad charging period must be paired 
with a blanket bar on subsequent prosecutions involving the same 
victim and the same timeframe.  And vague allegations should 
likewise be coupled with a scope of jeopardy as broad as the 
charging language may be fairly read. 
 
II 
¶73 This common-sense approach matches the test we set forth 
84 years ago in Anderson.  Where the issue is whether the charges 
are identical in fact, double jeopardy is violated if the facts 
alleged under the second complaint would, if proved, support a 
conviction under the first complaint.  See Anderson, 221 Wis. at 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
9 
 
87; see also State v. George, 69 Wis. 2d 92, 98, 230 N.W.2d 253 
(1975) (applying Anderson); State v. Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d 754, 
758, 242 N.W.2d 206 (1976) (same).  The logic of this test is 
apparent.  If allegations of a subsequent prosecution describe an 
offense that falls within the scope of jeopardy in an earlier 
prosecution, the defendant is twice subject to conviction and 
punishment for the same conduct.  This the constitution does not 
allow. 
¶74 Applying this test, the proper question is whether 
evidence of an act of sexual assault on or around October 19 would 
have supported a conviction for repeated sexual assault occurring 
in the "late summer to early fall."  Reading "early fall" as broad 
as it may be fairly read, with the whole record in view, the answer 
is yes. 
¶75 The majority comes out the other way, its logic 
proceeding in three steps.  First, although it doesn't explicitly 
say so, it implicitly concludes that "early fall" is ambiguous.  
Then, it determines that this ambiguity should be resolved by 
looking to the entire record to determine what "early fall" meant 
in the context of the original prosecution.  Finally, it concludes 
that the police report attached to the complaint and evidence 
presented at trial show "early fall" meant, in effect, mid-
September.5 
                                                 
5 The majority says it is not concluding the charging language 
is ambiguous.  Majority op., ¶44 n.18.  We can quibble over the 
descriptor for what the majority is doing, but there would be no 
need to explore the record to define an end date not chosen by the 
State if the complaint was clear on its face. 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
10 
 
¶76 I agree with the majority that the whole record may be 
consulted to determine the scope of jeopardy defined by ambiguous 
charging language.6  But the important principle the majority loses 
sight of is that the tie goes to the runner——in this case, the 
defendant.  This is so because any imprecision in the phrase "early 
fall" is a product of the pleading flexibility that allows vague 
charging language like this in the first place.  Looking to the 
record of the original proceeding shows that it was unclear when 
the alleged sexual activity between M.T. and Schultz stopped.  This 
in turn led the State to allege a broad and imprecise end point 
for the repeated sexual assault charge consistent with the very 
lack of precision reflected in the evidence it had.  Although the 
majority finds a date certain (mid-September) in the police report 
and testimony, that's not the charging period allegation.  The 
                                                 
6 As the majority aptly points out, examining the record is 
appropriate and necessary to determine the scope of jeopardy in 
certain circumstances.  For instance, the entire record has been 
used to define the parameters of an underlying offense like a 
conspiracy that "seldom will be clear" from the charging document 
alone.  See, e.g., United States v. Crumpler, 636 F. Supp. 396, 
403 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (quoting United States v. Castro, 629 
F.2d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1980)).  Or it may assist when the evidence 
at trial presents a variance from the language in the charging 
document.  See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 992 F.2d 1126, 
1129-30 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the whole record would 
protect against double jeopardy where a variance existed between 
charging language and the evidence produced at trial); United 
States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1123 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing 
a defendant's broader double jeopardy protection when the evidence 
supporting his conviction was considerably narrower than the 
language in the indictment). 
The parties in this case do not disagree on whether the record 
may be consulted; they simply part ways over how such information 
can be used. 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
11 
 
State instead chose an undefined seasonal end point ("early fall"), 
one that matched the temporally imprecise information that was 
shared by witnesses throughout the underlying investigation.  The 
State's strategic decision to select a vague end point for the 
charging period should not be newly defined by this court to be a 
narrower date certain. 
¶77 The investigation into sexual assault against fifteen-
year-old M.T. began in December 2012 precisely because she was 
pregnant.  The investigating officer turned his attention to 
twenty-year-old Alexander Schultz after M.T. stated in interviews 
that the two of them had sex multiple times.  Schultz denied a 
sexual relationship with M.T.  He stuck with that story even after 
the investigating officer informed him that M.T. was pregnant and 
"may believe that [he] is the father of the child." 
¶78 Schultz was eventually charged with committing at least 
three acts of sexual assault against M.T. in the "late summer to 
early fall of 2012."  As part of his defense against that charge, 
Schultz moved the court to order a paternity test.  On the morning 
of trial, the results of that test were still an open question.  
M.T. wanted the trial to be continued until the father's identity 
was known.  Her mother supported that plan. 
¶79 Schultz previously had also hoped to postpone the trial 
in anticipation of the paternity test results.  However, after 
M.T. and her mother made their desires known, Schultz reversed 
course and asked to proceed with trial that day.  The court agreed, 
and a jury found Schultz not guilty.  Four days later, the 
paternity test results came in, revealing that Schultz was the 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
12 
 
father of M.T.'s child, with an apparent conception date of October 
19, 2012. 
¶80 As an initial matter, the conception-inducing sexual 
assault is what commenced the investigation that led to Schultz's 
original prosecution in the first place.  The majority's assertion 
that everyone agreed the pregnancy was not pertinent at trial is 
not a fair picture.  Majority op., ¶5.  While the State seemingly 
entered trial presuming that Schultz was not the father, it was 
certainly not certain about that.  Instead, the State went to trial 
with the evidence it had, knowing all the while that Schultz could 
be the father. 
¶81 Moreover——and this is important——if the evidence was 
clear that no sexual activity occurred after mid-September, the 
State could have charged Schultz accordingly.  As the majority 
tells it, the police report itself definitively excludes any 
conduct occurring in the month of October.  Majority op., ¶34.  
Yet, instead of so charging, the State chose to use the vaguer and 
less precise language, "early fall."  Why?  Because that is the 
imprecise 
language 
witnesses 
used 
throughout 
the 
initial 
investigation,7 and undoubtedly the State hoped to capture the full 
array of evidence that could have emerged at trial to support a 
conviction. 
                                                 
7 For instance, M.T.'s neighbor informed the investigating 
officer that she had seen Schultz at M.T.'s residence numerous 
times "around the summer to early fall area" of 2012.  Another 
friend of M.T.'s told the officer she was aware of sexual 
interactions between M.T. and Schultz that had "occurred during 
the late summer, early fall area of 2012." 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
13 
 
¶82 By casting a wider net, the State was empowered to 
present evidence of any and all acts occurring during the entire 
charging period that supported its charge of repeated sexual 
assault.  But it must also live with the reality that any new 
evidence of sexual assault during that time period would be 
unavailable for a second prosecution.  Again, case after case after 
case explains that charging flexibility on the front end equals 
exacting double jeopardy protection on the back end. 
¶83 Returning to our long-established test, charges are 
factually identical if facts alleged under the second complaint 
would, if proved, support a conviction under the first complaint.  
See Anderson, 221 Wis. at 87.  Applying this test, the benchmark 
that proves the point is this:  if the results of the paternity 
test showing an estimated conception date of October 19 had been 
presented at the first trial, that evidence would have supported 
a conviction for repeated sexual assault during the charging period 
without any need for the State to amend its complaint.  The same 
would be true if M.T. testified that she and Schultz had sex 
through the middle of October——that is, testimony that merely days 
later would be proven true by way of the paternity test results. 
¶84 The majority dismisses this as a hypothetical, and then 
says that if evidence of an October 19 sexual assault was 
introduced at the first trial, Schultz's second prosecution would 
be barred under double jeopardy.  Majority op., ¶37 n.17.  This is 
true, but misses the point being made in this dissent.  If the 
majority is correct that the ambiguous phrase "early fall" meant 
nothing beyond mid-September, then an effort by the State to 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
14 
 
introduce evidence of an October 19 sexual assault would have 
required amending the complaint.  Why?  Because that date, the 
majority concludes, was outside the original charging period. 
¶85 The key difference between the majority and my own view 
is that the majority draws on the record to establish a date 
certain that the State did not delineate for what was actually a 
deliberately vague and imprecise charging period.  The majority 
construes the ambiguous timeframe narrowly, whereas I believe a 
proper protection of Schultz's constitutional right to be free 
from double jeopardy requires us to construe such ambiguity against 
the State.  This is the "rigid double jeopardy analysis" that the 
State must endure.  Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 255.  While this seems 
deferential to the defendant, that is precisely the point. 
¶86 Reading the charging language as broad as it may be 
fairly read, evidence of an October 19 sexual assault would support 
a conviction during a timeframe including "early fall."  As Schultz 
points out, October 19 is, from an astronomical perspective, early 
fall; it occurs in the first full month of the astronomical season 
of fall.  While this is not conclusive, it is a fair reading of 
how early fall can be understood.  October 19 is not clearly 
separate and apart from a charging period that runs through "early 
fall."8 
                                                 
8 The majority responds that a "charging document should not 
be read narrowly or expansively, but reasonably and fully."  
Majority op., ¶44 n.18.  As explained above, however, a reasonable 
and full reading of vague and imprecise charging language requires 
ensuring that the defendant is given the benefit of the State's 
imprecision.  While the majority may describe what it is doing as 
reasonably reading the charging language, it is in fact identifying 
a narrower date certain the State never chose. 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
15 
 
¶87 Problematically, the majority's approach in this case 
seems to endorse the idea that the scope of jeopardy is limited to 
and reduced by the evidence presented.  But jeopardy is "[t]he 
risk of conviction and punishment that a criminal defendant faces 
at trial."  See Jeopardy, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) 
(emphasis added).  Here, that jeopardy attached when the jury was 
sworn.  State v. Moeck, 2005 WI 57, ¶34, 280 Wis. 2d 277, 695 
N.W.2d 783.  Schultz was therefore at risk of conviction and 
punishment based not solely on the evidence presented at trial, 
but on the evidence that could have been presented under the charge 
as brought.  On the other hand, if the scope of jeopardy is now 
defined simply by "the evidence, testimony, and arguments of the 
parties," nothing stops that definition from shrinking until it 
resembles only the evidence presented.  Majority op., ¶55.  That 
is not consistent with the protections provided by our state and 
federal constitutions.9 
¶88 The Second Circuit emphasized the danger of constructive 
amendments of this kind in United States v. Olmeda, warning that 
double jeopardy is threatened when broad or imprecise charging 
language is implicitly narrowed after the fact based on the lack 
of certain evidence:   
The law recognizes constructive amendment 
of an 
indictment to broaden a defendant's criminal exposure as 
a "serious error."  In general, a constructive amendment 
                                                 
9 Moreover, it makes little sense for our courts to determine 
whether the allegations in a charging document are sufficient to 
protect against a subsequent prosecution on the front end if the 
ensuing proceedings will effectively redefine those allegations 
based on the evidence presented.  Holesome v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 95, 
102, 161 N.W.2d 283 (1968). 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
16 
 
narrowing the scope of an indictment is not troublesome 
because it does not similarly increase a defendant's 
criminal 
exposure. 
 
But 
where 
the 
government 
constructively narrows an indictment after jeopardy 
attaches only to refile the dropped charge at a later 
date, a variation on the problem of increased exposure 
arises implicating due process if not double jeopardy 
concerns. 
461 F.3d 271, 287 n.15 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 
¶89 The majority suggests that fear of this threat is 
misplaced because the State never sought to narrow or amend its 
first charge against Schultz.  Majority op., ¶47 n.19.  No formal 
amendment occurred; this is true, but it's not the danger Olmeda 
flags.  Olmeda's warning is aimed at exactly what the majority 
does here——not formal amendment, but constructively narrowing a 
charge based on evidence presented after jeopardy attaches. 
¶90 In short, because evidence of a sexual assault on or 
about October 19 would have supported a conviction in his first 
trial without the need to amend the charging period in the 
complaint, the State's second prosecution violated Schultz's 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.  The State 
chose to charge Schultz for repeated sexual assault over a time 
period with a vague and ambiguous end point.  It is inconsistent 
with a vigorous protection against double jeopardy to construe 
that ambiguity to conform to the more limited evidence presented, 
rather than to construe it broadly to encompass the very 
evidentiary indeterminacies that caused the State to pick an 
indeterminate timeframe in the first place.  Reading the charging 
language as broad as it may be fairly read, evidence of an October 
19 sexual assault would support a conviction over a timeframe 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
17 
 
including "early fall."  Accordingly, Schultz's conviction should 
be vacated and the charge dismissed. 
¶91 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent. 
 
No.  2017AP1977-CR.bh 
 
 
 
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