Case Title: Blocker's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Yarborough

Citation: 277 So. 2d 9

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1973-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
277 So. 2d 9 (1973)
BLOCKER'S TRANSFER & STORAGE COMPANY et al., Petitioners,
v.
Jess YARBOROUGH et al., Respondents.
No. 42472.

Supreme Court of Florida.
April 4, 1973.
Rehearing Denied May 23, 1973.
*10 W.B. Dickenson, Jr., of Hill, Hill & Dickenson, Tampa, for petitioners.
Sol H. Proctor, of Proctor & Cain, Jacksonville, Prentice Pruitt, and L. Keith Pafford, Tallahassee, for respondents.
ADKINS, Justice.
We have for review by petition for writ of certiorari, an order of the Florida Public Service Commission which, on rehearing, reversed an earlier order of the Commission and granted a state-wide certificate to move household goods to J-W Moving and Storage, Inc.
Petitioners, Blocker's Transfer & Storage Company and fourteen other moving companies, protested the application, with four of the companies appearing to testify before the examiner. J-W Moving and Storage, Inc., a Largo-based agent for North American Van Lines, had held a certificate for moves in Pinellas and Pasco counties for over two years when it applied to extend its authority. For those persons seeking to leave the Pinellas-Pasco area, J-W had established an interlining arrangement with an exchange serviced by three North American agents with state-wide authority. All three are situated on the east coast of Florida and supported J-W's application so as to round out their state-wide coverage with a west coast affiliate.
The president of J-W testified that the interlining arrangement was unsatisfactory as he had lost some moves and had been forced to delay others because of the lack of availability of equipment from the exchange. An official of the exchange testified that he felt the Largo area was in need of another state-wide authority because some families chose to wait a day or two to deal with North American rather than dealing with another area firm. There was no evidence of any delay or other inconvenience of customers who dealt with the existing state-wide moving firms. An area realtor who testified for J-W as to the tremendous growth in the Largo area admitted that he had heard of no complaints about the moving service in the area.
Blocker's and the other protestants testified that they were able to handle all the moves in the area of a state-wide nature, and that the granting of another state-wide authority would cut into their operations and force them to raise rates. J-W's president testified that the granting of the application would not, in his opinion, injure other area moving companies as he would merely be moving with his own equipment those families which had been interlined in the past. However, no evidence was offered to support his claim.
Based on the evidence, in Order No. 9919, the Commission denied the application and found, in part:
In Order No. 10099, the order which Blocker's wants reviewed, the Commission reversed its position and granted the application, making the following conclusions:
Based upon these findings, the Commission held that public convenience and necessity required the granting of the application of J-W.
The role of this Court in reviewing orders of the Commission is to determine whether or not the order is illegal, or was reached without observing law or procedure, or violates organic or fundamental rights, or is merely arbitrary. Florida Motor Lines Corporation v. Douglass, 150 Fla. 1, 7 So. 2d 843 (1942). There is a great presumption of correctness attendant to the orders of the Commission (Florida East Coast Railway Company v. King, 158 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1963)), and the burden falls on the petitioner to prove the incorrectness of the order. Fogarty Bros. Transfer, Inc. v. Boyd, 109 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1959). It is not the duty of this Court to reevaluate the probative weight to be given to the evidence, but merely to determine whether or not the findings of fact reached by the Commission are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Ace Delivery Service, Inc. v. Boyd, 111 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1959).
The duty of the Commission in considering applications for certificates is set forth in Fla. Stat. § 323.03(3)(a), F.S.A., which provides:
Fla. Stat. § 323.03(3)(c), F.S.A., is also applicable as there are certificate holders with state-wide authority domiciled in the Largo area. It provides:
As we said in Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Mayo, 255 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1971),
Despite the finding by the Commission that the present interlining arrangement causes delays in service which adversely affect the shipping public, there was no finding that the companies presently holding state-wide authority "fail to provide service and facilities which may reasonably be required by the commission," as required by Fla. Stat. § 323.03(3)(c), F.S.A. The only evidence of delay or inconvenience involved customers of J-W. There was not even a scintilla of evidence that any members of the moving public had faced a delay or other inconvenience in dealing with those companies which presently hold state-wide certificates in the Largo area.
The fact that J-W is not able to provide competitive state-wide service on an area-wide authority cannot be equated with a showing that the existing holders of state-wide authority are failing to provide required services or facilities.
The grant of the certificate sought by J-W might benefit that company and the interlining exchange, but as this Court said in Central Truck Lines v. Railroad Commission, 118 Fla. 555, 160 So. 26 (1935),
While we have established that the word necessity does not mean an "absolute and indispensable necessity," but rather that which is "reasonably necessary to meet the public needs" (Greyhound Corp., S.E. Greyhound Lines Div. v. Carter, 124 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1960)), that does not mean that the requirement of showing a public need, required by statute, can be ignored. We are reluctant to overturn an order of the Commission as they are the finders of fact. We do not reverse solely because we would have reached a different result. Benton Bros. Film Exp. v. Florida Railroad & P.U. Com'n, 57 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1952). However, we will not affirm an order of the Commission if it is established that it departs from the essential requirements of law. Tamiami Trail Tours v. Carter, 80 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1955).
A finding of public necessity where there is no evidence to support a legally-required finding of inadequacy of existing services does not comport with the essential requirements of law, and where an essential finding is based solely on unreliable evidence or no evidence at all, the order should be held insufficient. Florida Rate Conf. v. Florida Railroad & P.U. Com'n, 108 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1959).
Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is issued, Order No. 10099 of the Florida Public Service Commission is quashed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, Acting C.J., and BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
ERVIN and DREW (Retired), JJ., dissent.