Case Title: Habeck v. Sampson

Citation: 202 N.W.2d 868

Docket Number: 

State: south-dakota

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1972-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
202 N.W.2d 868 (1972) Gayle HABECK and Gloria Habeck, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Harold SAMPSON and Edith Sampson, Defendants and Appellants. No. 11040. Supreme Court of South Dakota. December 14, 1972. Willy, Pruitt, Matthews & Jorgensen, Gene E. Pruitt, Sioux Falls, for defendants and appellants. Danforth, Danforth & Johnson, G. J. Danforth, Jr., Sioux Falls, for plaintiffs and respondents. WOLLMAN, Judge. This is an appeal from a judgment ordering defendants to convey certain property to plaintiffs. On August 17, 1968 plaintiffs entered into a written Uniform Purchase Agreement prepared by a real estate broker acting on behalf of defendants whereby they agreed to buy Lot 3, Block 3 of Sampson's subdivision of Fauske's addition to Corson, Minnehaha County, South Dakota from defendants, Defendants accepted the terms of the agreement by signing the instrument. *869 On October 9, 1968 the sale of the property legally described in the agreement was completed by delivery to plaintiffs by defendants of a warranty deed and abstract to said property. Defendants did not furnish plaintiffs any additional document in the nature of a written option, nor, as far as we can tell from the limited record before us, was any written option ever requested by plaintiffs. On August 12 or 13, 1970, plaintiffs tendered payment of $500 to defendants and demanded a deed to Lots 3 and 4 of Block 4 of Sampson's subdivision of Fauske's addition to Corson, Minnehaha County, South Dakota. Defendants refused to accept the tender and did not convey the lots to plaintiffs, whereupon this action for specific performance followed. Defendants' answer raised, among other things, the defense of the statute of frauds and contained a denial that defendants had received any notice from plaintiffs with regard to exercising any alleged option. The evidence at the trial, in addition to the introduction of exhibits, consisted of the testimony of defendant Harold Sampson, who was called as an adverse witness by plaintiffs, the testimony of defendant Edith Sampson that she had signed the purchase agreement, and the testimony of the real estate broker who had prepared the purchase agreement. Plaintiffs did not testify. The testimony of defendant Harold Sampson revealed that he owned a total of five lots lying across the street west of the property that defendants had conveyed to plaintiffs pursuant to the terms of the purchase agreement. We consider it unnecessary at this time to comment on the legal sufficiency of the description in the purchase agreement or on the effect of negotiations of the parties both prior to and subsequent to the execution of the agreement because of the manner in which the trial court disposed of the case. Near the end of Mr. Sampson's adverse examination by plaintiffs' attorney, the following exchange occurred: After Mr. Cotton (the real estate agent) had testified, plaintiffs again moved for judgment. In resisting the motion, defendants' attorney outlined the several defenses on which defendants expected to rely. Following further statements by both attorneys, the court stated in substance that under the purchase agreement plaintiffs had an option to buy the two lots directly across the street from the property which they had purchased from defendants and that, We think that the court erred in denying defendants permission to proceed with their case. We think that defendants should have been given the opportunity to establish whatever defenses were available to them by calling their own witnesses. In view of our holding it is unnecessary for us to consider other alleged errors raised by the assignments of error. The case is reversed and remanded to circuit court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. All the Judges concur.