Case Title: Melchert v. Pro Electric Contractors

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2013AP002882

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 30 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP2882 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Dr. Randall Melchert, Happy Hobby, Inc. and The 
Warren V. Jones and Joyce M. Jones Revocable 
Living Trust, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Pro Electric Contractors and Secura Insurance, A 
Mutual Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 363 Wis. 2d 654, 862 N.W.2d 902 
(Ct. App. 2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 7, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 9, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
James R. Kieffer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, R. G., J. joined by KELLY, J. dissents 
(opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellants-petitioners, there was a brief 
by Rudolph J. Kuss, and Stevens & Kuss, S.C., Brookfield, and 
oral argument by Rudolph J. Kuss. 
 
For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief by Amy M. 
Freiman, Rick E. Hills and Hills Legal Group, LTD, Waukesha, and 
oral argument by Amy M. Freiman. 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 30
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP2882 
(L.C. No. 
2013CV535) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Dr. Randall Melchert, Happy Hobby, Inc. and The 
Warren V. Jones and Joyce M. Jones Revocable 
Living Trust, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Pro Electric Contractors and Secura Insurance, 
A Mutual Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 7, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review an unpublished 
decision of the court of appeals that affirmed the Waukesha 
County circuit court's1 grant of summary judgment in favor of Pro 
Electric Contractors ("Pro Electric"), after Pro Electric was 
sued for negligence in connection with its work as a contractor 
on a government construction project.  Melchert v. Pro Electric 
Contractors, No. 2013AP2882, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Mar. 11, 2015). 
                                                 
1 The Honorable James R. Kieffer presiding. 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Dr. Randall Melchert, Happy Hobby, Inc., and The 
Warren V. Jones and Joyce M. Jones Revocable Living Trust 
("Petitioners") brought suit after Pro Electric severed a sewer 
lateral2 during an excavation, because the broken lateral caused 
flooding damage to property that Petitioners owned and occupied.  
Pro Electric moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity as a 
governmental contractor pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).3  
While Pro Electric admitted to severing the sewer lateral, it 
argued that the damage occurred because of construction design 
decisions made by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation 
("DOT"), and that Pro Electric was merely implementing DOT's 
decisions.  Following a hearing, the circuit court granted the 
motion and dismissed the case.  The court of appeals affirmed. 
                                                 
2 A "sewer lateral" is an underground pipe that connects a 
property to the sewer system.  See Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(2m)(b) 
(2011-12) (requiring local government units to "mark the 
locations within the public right-of-way of all laterals 
connected to the sewer or water facilities . . . .").  All 
subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-
12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) provides:   
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company organized under ch. 213, political corporation, 
governmental subdivision or any agency thereof for the 
intentional torts of its officers, officials, agents or 
employees nor may any suit be brought against such 
corporation, subdivision or agency or volunteer fire 
company or against its officers, officials, agents or 
employees for acts done in the exercise of legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
3 
 
¶3 
This case requires us to address the extent to which 
governmental immunity protects a private contractor implementing 
a construction design chosen by a governmental entity.  We hold 
that Pro Electric is immune from liability for severing the 
sewer lateral because it acted in accordance with reasonably 
precise design specifications adopted by a governmental entity 
in the exercise of its legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, 
or quasi-judicial functions. 
¶4 
This case also requires us to interpret and apply 
certain provisions of the Digger's Hotline statute, codified at 
Wis. Stat. § 182.0175.  Petitioners allege that Pro Electric 
caused their damages not only by severing the sewer lateral, but 
also by backfilling the excavation without inspecting the sewer 
lateral for damage and allowing repairs to be made, as required 
by  § 182.0175(2)(am)6.-6m.4  Pro Electric is not immune from 
liability as to this second allegation, because DOT did not 
provide Pro Electric with reasonably precise specifications for 
inspecting sewer laterals for damage before backfilling pursuant 
to § 182.0175(2)(am)6.-6m.  Ultimately, however, we affirm the 
                                                 
4 Among other duties, Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(2)(am) requires 
an excavator to "do all of the following":   
6. 
Before 
backfilling, 
inspect 
all 
transmission 
facilities exposed during excavation to ascertain if 
the transmission facilities have been or may have been 
struck, damaged, dislocated or disrupted. 
6m. Refrain from backfilling an excavation until an 
inspection is conducted and any necessary repairs have 
been made by the owner of the transmission facility. 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
4 
 
circuit court's grant of summary judgment on the factual record 
before us.  We do so because the undisputed material facts do 
not support a reasonable inference that Pro Electric failed to 
comply with its duties under § 182.0175(2)(am). 
¶5 
We 
begin 
with 
a 
brief 
factual 
background 
and 
description of the procedural history, and we next set forth the 
applicable principles of governmental contractor immunity.  We 
apply these principles respectively to the two aspects of Pro 
Electric's conduct that allegedly caused Petitioners' damages:  
(1) Pro Electric's conduct in severing the sewer lateral, and 
(2) Pro Electric's conduct in backfilling the excavation without 
inspecting the sewer lateral for damage and allowing repairs to 
be made, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(2)(am).  Finally, we 
perform the necessary analysis to determine whether Pro Electric 
is entitled to summary judgment. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
We have set forth the facts that appear in the record 
and which the parties do not dispute.  On July 25, 2011, DOT 
approved a plan for the improvement of a five-mile stretch of 
State Highway 190, also known as Capitol Drive, in Brookfield 
("Project Plan").  The Project Plan spanned over 1,000 pages and 
contained 
specifications 
and 
detailed 
diagrams 
for 
the 
installation of new asphalt pavement, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, 
and traffic signals.  Additionally, the DOT Highway Work 
Proposal for the project included over 100 pages of "Special 
Provisions" covering the various aspects of the project, 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
5 
 
including a section on requirements regarding underground 
utilities.5 
¶7 
Following the bidding process, DOT awarded the project 
to Payne & Dolan as the general contractor.  On January 5, 2012, 
Payne & Dolan entered into a subcontractor agreement6 with Pro 
Electric to perform work on certain parts of the project, 
including the installation of traffic signals.  For some of the 
traffic signals, the Project Plan directed Pro Electric to 
install new concrete bases to support the traffic signal poles. 
¶8 
This case concerns only the installation of the 
concrete base identified in the Project Plan as "SB2," located 
at the northeast corner of Capitol Drive and 128th Street and 
                                                 
5 Article 6 of the Special Provisions in the Highway Work 
Proposal 
was 
entitled 
"Utilities," 
and 
among 
its 
other 
provisions it directed contractors to "[c]oordinate construction 
activities with a call to Diggers Hotline or a direct call to 
the utilities that have facilities in the area as required per 
statutes.  Use caution to ensure the integrity of underground 
facilities and maintain code clearances from overhead facilities 
at all times." 
6 Although Pro Electric was a subcontractor, we use the term 
"contractor" throughout our opinion because "immunity extends to 
a subcontractor even though it has a contract with a general 
contractor rather than with a governmental authority."  Bronfeld 
v. Pember Cos., 2010 WI App 150, ¶20 n.3, 330 Wis. 2d 123, 792 
N.W.2d 222.  The "reasoning for adopting the defense for 
contractors also applies to subcontractors," because "it is just 
as unfair for a subcontractor to be subjected to suit for 
carrying out a governmental directive as it is for the party 
directly contracting with the government."  Jankee v. Clark 
Cty., 222 Wis. 2d 151, 165-66, 585 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1998), 
rev'd on other grounds, 2000 WI 64, 235 Wis. 2d 700, 612 
N.W.2d 297. 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
6 
 
identified by specific coordinates in the Project Plan.7  The 
Project Plan directed Pro Electric to install a "Type 10" 
concrete base to support the traffic signal pole for SB2 and to 
use a circular auger to drill the hole in the ground for the 
base.  The Project Plan specified that a Type 10 base required a 
hole that was 14 feet deep and 30 inches wide. 
¶9 
At least three days before Pro Electric started the 
excavation for SB2, Pro Electric contacted Digger's Hotline.  
The statute requires an excavator to contact Digger's Hotline at 
least three days before beginning any excavation.8  Wis. Stat. 
§ 182.0175(2)(am)1.  Under the statute, Digger's Hotline is then 
responsible for contacting the owners of transmission facilities9 
in the area, and the owners are responsible for ensuring that 
                                                 
7 The Project Plan provided for SB2 to be located at Station 
499+66.8 and at Location 86.8 LT.  These coordinates were 
measured in feet and identified the location to within a tenth 
of a foot. 
8 As defined in Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(1)(b), "excavation" 
means "any operation in which earth, rock or other material in 
or on the ground is moved, removed or otherwise displaced by 
means 
of 
any 
tools, 
equipment 
or 
explosives 
and 
includes . . . augering . . . ."  An "excavator" is "a person 
who engages in excavation."  § 182.0175(1)(bm). 
9 As defined in Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(1)(c), "transmission 
facilities" includes "all lines, pipelines, wires, cables, 
ducts, wirelines and associated facilities, whether underground 
or 
aboveground, . . . utility 
facilities, 
government-owned 
facilities, 
facilities 
transporting 
hazardous 
materials, 
communications 
and 
data 
facilities, 
drainage 
and 
water 
facilities and sewer systems." 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
7 
 
such facilities are marked.  § 182.0175(1)(d)6., (2m)(a)2.10  Pro 
Electric instructs its employees to inspect the area visually 
for these markings before beginning excavation. 
¶10 Pro Electric's employees augered the hole for SB2 on 
August 22, 2012.  Pro Electric used a circular auger attached to 
a truck at the end of a boom.  Two of Pro Electric's employees 
performed the work:  one was assigned to operate the auger from 
the truck and the other to monitor the auger and periodically 
clean it with a shovel.  As Craig Clements, president of Pro 
Electric, stated in his affidavit, drilling a hole with a 
circular auger "creates a situation where the technician 
operating the auger has no ability to see into the hole which is 
being augered." 
¶11 DOT retained an engineering firm, HNTB, to ensure Pro 
Electric's compliance with the Project Plan, and an HNTB 
engineer, Julie Keller, was onsite to supervise the augering 
work.  The DOT Project Plan warned that "there may be other 
utility installations within the project which are not shown" on 
the diagram, but in anticipation of a contractor encountering 
                                                 
10 Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(1m) requires owners of transmission 
facilities to be members of the Digger's Hotline organization 
and requires Digger's Hotline to "[a]ccept notices of intended 
excavation activity" and "[p]romptly transmit notice information 
to 
affected-member 
transmission 
facilities 
owners."  
§ 182.0175(1m)(a), (d)3., (d)6.  Subsection (2m) makes it the 
owner's duty to "[r]espond to an excavation notice within 3 
working days by marking the location of transmission facilities 
and, if applicable, laterals as provided under par. (b) in the 
area described in the excavation notice."  § 182.0175(2m)(a)2. 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
8 
 
such unexpected utility installations, it further provided that 
"the engineer may adjust the locations of items under this 
contract to avoid conflict with existing utility facilities."  
Keller neither instructed nor authorized Pro Electric to change 
the location of SB2.11  Nothing in the record suggests that 
either Pro Electric or Keller was aware, or had any reason to be 
aware, of any utility facilities in the way of the excavation 
for SB2.  Pro Electric proceeded to complete the Type 10 
concrete base in accordance with the specifications set forth  
in the DOT Project Plan. 
¶12 At some point after the project was completed, sewage 
backed up into an adjoining commercial property.  The property 
was owned by The Warren V. Jones and Joyce M. Jones Revocable 
Living Trust and occupied by Dr. Randall Melchert and Happy 
Hobby, Inc., as tenants.  It was subsequently discovered that 
the sewer backup occurred because an underground sewer lateral 
serving Petitioners' property ran directly through the location 
of SB2, such that Pro Electric had severed that lateral while 
constructing SB2.  Nothing in the record suggests that either 
Pro Electric or HNTB was aware at the time of construction that 
Pro Electric had severed anything.  The sewer lateral had been 
                                                 
11 Clements testified that, during an earlier augering 
excavation on the same DOT project, Pro Electric's employees 
noticed pieces of green PVC material coming up with the dirt. 
Keller determined that it was a damaged sewer lateral, and she 
instructed Pro Electric to move the excavation to a different 
location in order to allow a sewer contractor to make repairs. 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
9 
 
made of clay, and the surrounding soil was also clay, thus 
making it unlikely that indicia of the damage would have been 
apparent among the material the auger was bringing up.12  
Clements stated in his affidavit that "[n]o employee of Pro 
Electric ever reported to me, HNTB, or the general contractor 
that any sewer lateral was struck during the installation of 
SB2.  All Pro Electric employees were instructed that any such 
incident would need to be reported immediately." 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶13 On March 1, 2013, Petitioners sued Pro Electric in the 
Waukesha County circuit court.  Their complaint alleged that Pro 
Electric 
negligently 
severed 
the 
sewer 
lateral 
and 
then 
completed the project without repairing it.  The complaint 
further alleged that, by doing so, Pro Electric thereby caused 
flooding and water damage to Petitioners' property, along with 
monetary losses, inconvenience, and other damages.  In its 
answer, 
Pro 
Electric 
asserted 
immunity 
from 
suit 
as 
a 
                                                 
12 Clements explained that the similarity of the materials 
is significant because of how augering works.  An auger, he 
testified, 
grinds and pulverizes the ground and slowly starts 
bringing dirt to the surface.  If the sewer line would 
have been PVC we would have immediately saw that there 
was something there.  As an auger augers it's pushing 
everything up, and it will push everything into any 
voids in the hole, so as you look in a hole you will 
not see a pipe or anything because it gets packed with 
dirt.  They had no way of knowing.  If it would have 
been a newer one, yes, we would have known right away. 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
10 
 
governmental contractor.  The court held a summary judgment 
hearing on Pro Electric's motion on November 18, 2013. 
¶14 In an oral ruling following the hearing, the circuit 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Pro Electric, ruling 
that it was immune from liability.  The court concluded that, 
"under any reasonable view of the evidence, DOT design choices 
regarding the location and the depth of the traffic light caused 
this accident here.  Those relevant design choices were made by 
the government."  The court did not consider whether the 
Digger's 
Hotline 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 182.0175, 
imposed 
additional duties on Pro Electric, because the court determined 
that the statute did not apply.  Therefore, the circuit court 
granted 
summary 
judgment 
to 
Pro 
Electric 
and 
dismissed 
Petitioners' case. 
¶15 The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Pro 
Electric was immune from liability for any damages that resulted 
from severing the sewer lateral.  The court of appeals 
determined that the "project design decision [of] where and how 
to install the traffic light, as implemented by Pro Electric, is 
entitled to immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 'because it 
was 
made 
through 
the 
exercise 
of 
a 
legislative, 
quasi-
legislative, 
judicial, 
or 
quasi-judicial 
function 
of 
the 
governmental entity.'"  Melchert, unpublished slip op., ¶11 
(quoting Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., 2013 WI 79, 
¶34, 350 Wis. 2d 509, 835 N.W.2d 226).  The court also examined 
Petitioners' allegation that Pro Electric was negligent in 
"backfilling the hole without repairing the severed sewer 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
11 
 
lateral," concluding that the record "does not support a causal 
connection 
between 
[Petitioners'] 
specific 
allegations 
of 
negligence . . . and the alleged injury."  Id., ¶¶12-13. 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 We review a grant of summary judgment independently, 
using the same methodology as the circuit court.  Oneida Cty. 
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, ¶8, 299 
Wis. 2d 637, 728 N.W.2d 652.  "The judgment sought shall be 
rendered 
if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
¶17 "We review questions of statutory interpretation and 
application independently, but benefiting from the discussions 
of the circuit court and the court of appeals."  State v. 
Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶10, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769. 
"[D]etermining 
whether 
governmental 
immunity 
exists 
for 
particular conduct requires the application of legal standards 
to the facts found, which is also a question of law for our 
independent review."  Showers, 350 Wis. 2d 509, ¶21. 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
A.  General Principles of Governmental Contractor Immunity 
¶18 Our discussion begins with the longstanding principle 
that a governmental entity is immune from liability for acts 
done "in the exercise of its legislative or judicial or quasi-
legislative or quasi-judicial functions."  Holytz v. City of 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
12 
 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 40, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).  The 
legislature 
has 
codified 
this 
principle 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4).  Showers, 350 Wis. 2d 509, ¶24 (citing Coffey v. 
City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 532, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976)).  
As we have recognized, immunity under § 893.80(4) "is available 
to a governmental entity only for those governmental decisions 
that are made as an exercise of 'legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions.'" 
 
Showers, 
350 
Wis. 2d 509, ¶35.13  "Legislative and quasi-legislative functions 
generally refer to those policy choices made in an official 
capacity, e.g., when a governmental entity chooses one project 
design over another."  Id., ¶26 (citing Estate of Lyons v. CNA 
Ins., 207 Wis. 2d 446, 453, 558 N.W.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
¶19 It is also well established that a governmental 
entity's immunity may extend to private contractors acting as 
agents of the governmental entity.  Lyons, 207 Wis. 2d at 457-
58.  A contractor asserting governmental immunity must prove two 
elements.  First, the contractor must show that it was an 
"agent" of the governmental entity under "the Lyons test, i.e., 
whether the governmental entity approved reasonably precise 
                                                 
13 As we emphasized in Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson 
Bros., 2013 WI 79, 350 Wis. 2d 509, 835 N.W.2d 226, "[a]lthough 
some of our cases have equated § 893.80(4)'s 'legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial' standard with the 
term 'discretionary,' and although our decision is not intended 
in any way to alter that standard," the statute is best 
interpreted 
"by 
applying 
the 
legislature's 
chosen 
plain 
language, rather than a judicial distillation thereof."  Id., 
¶35 (citations omitted). 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
13 
 
specifications that the governmental contractor adhered to when 
engaging in the conduct that caused the injury."  Showers, 350 
Wis. 2d 509, ¶37.14 
¶20 Second, 
"in 
addition 
to 
satisfying 
the 
Lyons 
test . . . a contractor asserting immunity must be able to 
demonstrate that the conduct for which immunity is sought was 
the implementing of a governmental entity's decision made during 
the exercise of the entity's legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial, or quasi-judicial functions."  Id., ¶45.  This is so 
because the contractor's immunity "is dependent upon the 
immunity of the governmental act or decision that the agent was 
implementing when it caused an injury."  Id., ¶35.  If that act 
or decision was made during the exercise of the governmental 
entity's legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-
judicial functions, the governmental entity's immunity may 
extend to an agent implementing that act or decision.  Id., ¶34. 
¶21 For a private entity such as Pro Electric that is 
contracting with a governmental entity, this is where immunity 
ends.  A contractor is not immune from liability if the 
governmental entity did not direct the injury-causing conduct 
                                                 
14 The decision in Estate of Lyons v. CNA Insurance, 207 
Wis. 2d 446, 558 N.W.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1996), also considered a 
contractor's independent "duty to the public [not to] withhold 
information about dangers that the government might not know 
about."  Id. at 457 (citing Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 
U.S. 500, 512-13 (1988)).  However, Showers clarified that this 
part of Lyons "does not bear on whether statutory agency is 
present."  Showers, 350 Wis. 2d 509, ¶37 n.15. 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
14 
 
with reasonable precision in the exercise of its legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.  As we 
explained in Showers, the DOT contractor in that case was not 
immune from allegations of negligent construction work, in part 
because the contractor had not demonstrated that the allegedly 
negligent acts "were the implementation of a governmental 
entity's exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, 
or quasi-judicial functions."  Id., ¶54.  The overarching 
principle is that a "governmental contractor [is] entitled to 
the same level of immunity as would be accorded to the 
governmental entity had it been sued directly . . . ."  Id., ¶31 
(citing Lyons, 207 Wis. 2d at 454). 
B.  The Legislative or Quasi-Legislative Nature of Construction 
Design Decisions 
¶22 Decisions regarding the design and placement of 
individual 
elements 
incorporated 
into 
larger 
government 
construction projects have been held to be legislative or quasi-
legislative decisions.  For example, in Allstate Insurance v. 
Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of County of Milwaukee, 80 
Wis. 2d 10, 258 N.W.2d 148 (1977), a driver was injured in an 
accident with a truck which was servicing a manhole located in 
the middle of the street.  The plaintiffs claimed that the 
relevant governmental entity was negligent for placing the 
manhole in that particular location, id. at 14, but the court 
held that governmental immunity applied.  "[T]he decisions of 
the [governmental entity] in planning and designing the system 
in question, including the placement of the manhole, were 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
15 
 
legislative acts performed in response to its authority to plan 
and construct sewer systems . . . ."  Id. at 15-16 (footnote 
omitted).  Similarly, "decisions concerning the adoption of a 
waterworks system, the selection of the specific type of pipe, 
the placement of the pipe in the ground, and the continued 
existence of such pipe" are entitled to immunity.  Milwaukee 
Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, ¶60, 277 
Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658.  It is, indeed, well settled that 
"acts of designing, planning, and implementing are legislative 
or quasi-legislative acts subject to immunity under [Wis. Stat.] 
§ 893.80(4)."  Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 
2013 WI 78, ¶41 n.21, 350 Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160. 
C.  Pro Electric's Immunity 
¶23 We now apply the foregoing principles to the two 
aspects 
of 
Pro 
Electric's 
conduct 
that 
allegedly 
caused 
Petitioners' damages:  (1) Pro Electric's conduct in severing 
the sewer lateral, and (2) Pro Electric's conduct in backfilling 
the excavation without inspecting the sewer lateral for damage 
and allowing repairs to be made, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 182.0175(2)(am).  We address each allegation in turn. 
1.  Pro Electric is Immune From Liability For Severing the Sewer 
Lateral 
¶24 Pro Electric is immune from liability for severing the 
sewer lateral, because the DOT Project Plan provided reasonably 
precise specifications for Pro Electric's augering, Pro Electric 
severed the sewer lateral by adhering to those specifications, 
and DOT adopted the specifications in the exercise of its 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
16 
 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial, 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions. 
¶25 Petitioners 
conceded 
at 
oral 
argument 
that 
the 
specifications in DOT's Project Plan for Pro Electric's augering 
were reasonably precise and that Pro Electric complied with 
those specifications exactly.  While we are not bound by the 
concessions of the parties, see State v. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, ¶42 
n.11, 360 Wis. 2d 576, 851 N.W.2d 434, we agree that a factual 
basis exists for Petitioners' concessions. 
¶26 As for reasonable specificity, DOT directed the exact 
location for the augering using measured coordinates and 
specified the dimensions of the augering by directing that SB2 
was to be constructed with a Type 10 base.  A Type 10 base 
required a hole with particular dimensions:  30 inches in 
diameter and 14 feet deep, with between 2 and 4 inches of 
concrete exposed above ground.  These dimensions gave Pro 
Electric discretion of no more than two inches as to the depth 
of the hole.  DOT also specified the method of excavation:  
"Bases shall be excavated by use of a circular auger."  Clements 
testified 
that 
this 
was 
a 
precise 
instruction, 
because 
variations among types of augers concern only the size, type of 
teeth, or the kind of truck on which the auger is mounted; 
otherwise, "[a]n auger's an auger."  Given these facts and the 
fact that Petitioners do not contest this point, we have no 
difficulty concluding that DOT's specifications for the augering 
were reasonably precise. 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
17 
 
¶27 Petitioners have also conceded that, when Pro Electric 
augered the hole for the concrete base for SB2, Pro Electric 
followed DOT's reasonably precise specifications as to the 
location and dimensions of the hole and the method of augering.  
Although Keller, the DOT-retained engineer, had authority to 
change the location of SB2, Pro Electric did not.  As the 
circuit court concluded, Pro Electric "did what they were told 
to do by the DOT.  In my opinion, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact as it relates to that."  We agree, and we 
therefore conclude that Pro Electric complied with DOT's 
reasonably precise specifications as to the specific augering 
activities that severed the sewer lateral. 
¶28 Finally, DOT adopted the specifications for Pro 
Electric's augering in the exercise of its legislative or quasi-
legislative functions.  The project at issue was governed by the 
DOT Project Plan, which was prepared at DOT's direction and 
approved by DOT prior to the start of the project.  By providing 
the final approval to the entire Project Plan, DOT thereby made 
all the relevant decisions about which traffic signals to 
replace, where to put them, and even the precise size of 
concrete bases to use. 
¶29 In Allstate, we concluded that "the decisions of the 
[governmental entity] in planning and designing the system in 
question, 
including 
the 
placement 
of 
the 
manhole, 
were 
legislative acts performed in response to its authority to plan 
and construct sewer systems . . . ."  Allstate, 80 Wis. 2d at 
15-16 (footnote omitted).  Similarly, in choosing to approve the 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
18 
 
Project Plan in this case, DOT was exercising its legislatively 
delegated authority to "direct, undertake and expend state and 
federal aid for planning, promotion and protection activities in 
the areas of highways, motor vehicles, [and] traffic law 
enforcement . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 85.02(1).  The placement of a 
traffic signal in a highway project is akin to the placement of 
a manhole in a sewer system, and "[i]t is not for the court to 
be judge or jury to 'second guess' [governmental entities] in 
these 
determinations 
nor 
to 
find 
they 
are 
liable 
for 
negligence."  Allstate, 80 Wis. 2d at 16.15 
¶30 In light of the foregoing, we agree with the circuit 
court and court of appeals and hold that Pro Electric severed 
the sewer lateral as an agent implementing a legislative or 
quasi-legislative DOT design decision.  DOT——not Pro Electric——
made the decision to auger that particular hole in that 
particular place, and all of the evidence suggests that Pro 
                                                 
15 Petitioners argue that "DOT's directive was not the 
injury-causing act; the injury-causing act was Pro Electric's 
negligent severing of the sewer lateral through its performance 
of construction work."  However, Petitioners have failed to 
demonstrate a meaningful distinction between the two in this 
case.  Petitioners concede that the DOT designs directed Pro 
Electric to excavate using a circular auger to a precise depth 
in a precise location, and neither side disputes the fact that 
this is the conduct that severed the sewer lateral.   In this 
situation, immunity depends not on the character of the 
contractor's acts but "upon the immunity of the governmental act 
or decision that the agent was implementing when it caused an 
injury."  Showers, 350 Wis. 2d 509, ¶35 (emphasis added).  
Therefore, our focus is properly on DOT's decision to adopt the 
specifications that caused Pro Electric to sever the sewer 
lateral. 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
19 
 
Electric severed the sewer lateral not because of the manner in 
which Pro Electric chose to do the augering, but simply because 
the Project Plan directed Pro Electric as to exactly where and 
how to auger. 
2.  Pro Electric Is Not Immune From Liability For Backfilling 
the Excavation Without Inspecting the Sewer Lateral 
¶31 Petitioners' second allegation is that Pro Electric 
negligently backfilled its excavation without inspecting the 
sewer lateral for damage and allowing repairs to be made, 
despite having a statutory duty to do so.  Petitioners argue 
that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(2)(am), Pro Electric had 
an "independent statutory duty to inspect its excavation, to 
ascertain if the sewer lateral had been or may have been severed 
or damaged, and to refrain from backfilling its excavation until 
an inspection was conducted and all necessary repairs were 
completed." 
¶32 Petitioners make two arguments as to why Pro Electric 
may not enjoy immunity from liability for this allegation.  
First, Petitioners argue that Pro Electric was not acting as 
DOT's agent in regard to its compliance with Wis. Stat. 
§ 182.0175(2)(am) and instead was "solely responsible for the 
means and methods of inspecting its excavation, ascertaining if 
there was any damage, and refraining from backfilling until all 
necessary repairs were completed."  Second, Petitioners argue 
that the duties imposed by § 182.0175(2)(am) do not implicate 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial, 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions under our case law. 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
20 
 
¶33 Pro Electric does not rebut these arguments.  The DOT 
Highway Work Proposal assigned responsibility to Pro Electric to 
"[c]oordinate construction activities with a call to Digger's 
Hotline or a direct call to the utilities that have facilities 
in the area as required per statutes" and to "[u]se caution to 
ensure the integrity of underground facilities."  The Project 
Plan did not provide reasonably precise specifications for how 
to fulfill these responsibilities, and there would have been 
ample room for Pro Electric's discretion if, for instance, it 
had discovered a damaged sewer lateral during excavation.  A 
"contractor may not possess such control over the alleged 
injury-causing action and still be considered an agent for 
purposes of governmental contractor immunity under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4)."  Showers, 350 Wis. 2d 509, ¶51. 
¶34 Therefore, Pro Electric was not acting as DOT’s agent 
in this regard, and immunity would not shield Pro Electric from 
liability.  Given this conclusion, there is no need to proceed 
to the next step in the analysis and determine whether the 
duties 
imposed 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 182.0175(2)(am) 
implicate 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial, 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions.  We therefore do not decide that question. 
¶35 For these reasons, Pro Electric does not enjoy 
governmental immunity for a failure to inspect the excavation to 
look for the severed sewer lateral and to refrain from 
backfilling until repairs were made.  But our discussion does 
not end here.  Rather, we must now apply the traditional summary 
judgment standards to the facts of the case. 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
21 
 
D.  Summary Judgment 
¶36 Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  "[A]ny doubts as to the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact are resolved against the moving party.  
However, evidentiary facts set forth in the affidavits or other 
proof are taken as true by a court if not contradicted by 
opposing affidavits or other proof."  L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 
Wis. 2d 674, 684, 563 N.W.2d 434 (1997) (citations omitted). 
¶37 In order for Petitioners to have a viable common-law 
negligence claim against Pro Electric for backfilling the 
excavation without inspecting the sewer lateral for damage and 
allowing repairs to be made, Petitioners must  
plead facts, which if proved true, would establish the 
following four elements:  (1) the existence of a duty 
of care on the part of the defendant, (2) a breach of 
that duty of care, (3) a causal connection between the 
defendant's breach of the duty of care and the 
plaintiff's injury, and (4) actual loss or damage 
resulting from the [breach]. 
Brandenburg v. Briarwood Forestry Servs., LLC, 2014 WI 37, ¶6, 
354 Wis. 2d 413, 847 N.W.2d 395 (quoting Hoida, Inc. v. M&I 
Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶23, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17). 
1.  Pro Electric's Duties under Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(2)(am) 
¶38 As to the element of duty, generally "every person is 
subject to a duty to exercise ordinary care in all of his or her 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
22 
 
activities."  Id., ¶7 (quoting Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters 
Ins., 2009 WI 71, ¶3, 318 Wis. 2d 622, 768 N.W.2d 568).  In this 
case, we asked the parties to brief the relevance of the 
Digger's 
Hotline 
statute, 
in 
particular 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 182.0175(2), including a discussion of whether the facts in 
the record demonstrate compliance with the statute.  Although 
the parties disagree as to whether Pro Electric complied with 
§ 182.0175(2)(am), 
neither 
has 
disputed 
the 
notion 
that 
demonstrating noncompliance with § 182.0175(2)(am) is essential 
to Petitioners' claim that Pro Electric was negligent in 
backfilling the excavation without inspecting the sewer lateral 
for damage and allowing repairs to be made.  Pro Electric 
conceded 
at 
oral 
argument 
that 
noncompliance 
with 
§ 182.0175(2)(am) 
would 
support 
a 
negligence 
claim, 
and 
Petitioners have not presented any argument as to how the duty 
of ordinary care in regard to the specifically alleged negligent 
conduct 
would 
differ 
from 
the 
duties 
imposed 
by 
§ 182.0175(2)(am).16  Therefore, we assume for purposes of 
                                                 
16 Petitioners allege in their Second Amended Complaint that 
"it was obvious to [Pro Electric's] workers at the time that 
they were drilling through a sewer lateral," and that Pro 
Electric was therefore negligent when it "proceeded with the 
installation of the light pole without warning any of the 
occupants of the building that the sewer lateral was severed nor 
did they take remedial action to repair or reroute the sewer 
lateral around the pole."  In their briefs before this court, 
Petitioners characterize these allegations solely in terms of 
the duties imposed by Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(2)(am), arguing that 
Pro Electric had an "independent statutory duty to inspect its 
excavation, to ascertain if the sewer lateral had been or may 
have been severed or damaged, and to refrain from backfilling 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
23 
 
deciding this case that Pro Electric's duty of care under the 
circumstances here is coextensive with the requirements of 
§ 182.0175(2)(am). 
¶39 Subsection (2)(am) is titled "Excavation notice" and 
begins by providing that an excavator shall "[p]rovide advance 
notice [to Digger's Hotline] not less than 3 working days before 
the 
start 
of 
nonemergency 
excavation." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 182.0175(2)(am)1.  Subsection (2)(am) also requires that, 
while excavating, the excavator must maintain minimum clearances 
around any "marking for an unexposed transmission facility that 
is marked under sub. (2m)," though it may reduce that clearance 
"[w]hen the underground transmission facility becomes exposed or 
if 
the 
transmission 
facility 
is 
already 
exposed."  
§ 182.0175(2)(am)3.  Additionally, after the excavation is 
complete, the excavator must, "[b]efore backfilling, inspect all 
transmission facilities exposed during excavation to ascertain 
if the transmission facilities have been or may have been 
struck, damaged, dislocated or disrupted," and shall "[r]efrain 
from backfilling an excavation until an inspection is conducted 
and any necessary repairs have been made by the owner of the 
transmission facility."  § 182.0175(2)(am)6.-6m. 
2.  There Is No Issue of Material Fact As To Whether Pro 
Electric Complied With Its Duties Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 182.0175(2)(am) 
                                                                                                                                                             
its excavation until an inspection was conducted and all 
necessary repairs were completed" (emphasis added). 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
24 
 
¶40 The undisputed facts in the record establish that Pro 
Electric 
complied 
with 
its 
duties 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 182.0175(2)(am).  There is no dispute that Pro Electric 
contacted Digger's Hotline at least three days before beginning 
excavation.  Nor is there any evidence to indicate the presence 
of any markings indicating that the sewer lateral was in the way 
of the excavation.  The statutes clearly impose the duty to mark 
buried transmission facilities——including sewer laterals——on 
their owners, not on an excavator.  § 182.0175(2m)(a)(2).  
Nothing in the record permits a reasonable inference that the 
presence of the sewer lateral was anything other than a surprise 
to all involved. 
¶41 Further, there are no facts from which it could be 
inferred that the sewer lateral was a "transmission facilit[y] 
exposed during excavation," triggering Pro Electric's duty to 
inspect it for damage and refrain from backfilling until repairs 
could be made.  Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(2)(am)6.-6m.  Clements 
explained in his deposition that augering generally pulverizes 
and grinds the material together, making it highly unlikely that 
pieces of a clay pipe would be identifiable in clay soil.  He 
testified that when Pro Electric hit a different sewer lateral 
on a previous excavation, Pro Electric noticed it because pieces 
of green PVC material were visible amid the soil that was coming 
up.  But here, both the buried sewer lateral and the surrounding 
soil consisted of clay-colored material.  Furthermore, the hole 
was relatively narrow, being 14 feet deep while only 30 inches 
wide.  Augering in this situation, Clements stated, generally 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
25 
 
"creates a situation where the technician operating the auger 
has no ability to see into the hole which is being augered."  
The lateral here could not have been open to view, because of 
the way that an auger typically "will push everything into any 
voids in the hole, so as you look in a hole you will not see a 
pipe or anything because [the hole] gets packed with dirt."  
Clements further stated that, although Keller was supervising 
Pro Electric's work and one of Pro Electric's employees was 
assigned to monitor the auger and periodically clean it with a 
shovel, no one reported seeing any indication that they had hit 
a sewer lateral. 
¶42 Petitioners do not dispute these facts except to argue 
that, because Clements was not present at the job site, his 
deposition cannot "conclusively establish[] that Pro Electric 
inspected its excavation, ascertained if the sewer lateral had 
been or may have been severed or damaged, and refrained from 
backfilling its excavation . . . as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 182.0175(2)(am)."  However, the statute does not require Pro 
Electric 
to 
inspect 
its 
excavation; 
rather, 
it 
requires 
inspection 
of 
transmission 
facilities 
exposed 
during 
the 
excavation.  Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(2)(am)6.-6m.  The only 
evidence Petitioners produced in this regard was a photograph 
taken after the fact, which depicted wider excavations done 
later to repair the sewer lateral and in no way represented that 
the sewer lateral would have been exposed to Pro Electric at the 
time of augering.  A party opposing summary judgment "must show, 
by affidavit or other proof, the existence of disputed material 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
26 
 
facts or undisputed material facts from which reasonable 
alternative inferences may be drawn that are sufficient to 
entitle the opposing party to a trial."  Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 
683.  Petitioners have not met this burden, because the 
undisputed material facts they have presented do not support a 
reasonable 
inference 
that 
Pro 
Electric 
violated 
§ 182.0175(2)(am). 
¶43  Therefore, we hold that Petitioner has not identified 
any material fact supporting a reasonable inference that Pro 
Electric failed to comply with its duties under Wis. Stat. 
§ 182.0175(2)(am).  Pro Electric did what it was required to do 
under the statute, and based on the record before us, 
Petitioners' attempts to suggest that the sewer lateral was 
exposed to Pro Electric during the excavation amount to mere 
speculation.  Pro Electric is therefore entitled to summary 
judgment. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶44 We hold that Pro Electric is immune from liability for 
Petitioners' allegations that it was negligent in severing the 
sewer lateral, and we hold that Pro Electric is entitled to 
summary 
judgment 
on 
Petitioners' 
allegation 
that 
it 
was 
negligent in backfilling the excavation without inspecting the 
sewer lateral for damage and allowing repairs to be made 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(2)(am). 
¶45 Pro Electric is immune from liability for severing the 
sewer lateral, because it acted in accordance with reasonably 
precise design specifications adopted by a governmental entity 
No. 
2013AP2882   
 
27 
 
in the exercise of its legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, 
or quasi-judicial functions.  At the same time, Pro Electric is 
not immune from liability for backfilling without inspecting the 
sewer lateral pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(2)(am), because 
DOT did not provide Pro Electric with precise specifications for 
inspecting damaged utilities before backfilling pursuant to 
§ 182.0175(2)(am), so Pro Electric was not DOT's agent with 
regard to these duties.  Ultimately, however we affirm the 
circuit court's grant of summary judgment on the factual record 
before us.  We do so because the undisputed material facts do 
not support a reasonable inference that Pro Electric failed to 
comply with its duties in § 182.0175(2)(am).  For these reasons, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No.  2013AP2882.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶46 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
that the decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed.  I 
would affirm the decision, however, by dismissing the petition 
for review as having been improvidently granted.   
¶47 The court should dismiss the petition as improvidently 
granted because, as the majority opinion explains at length, the 
two issues the parties raised were decided by the court of 
appeals consistently with Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson 
Bros., Inc., 2013 WI 79, 350 Wis. 2d 509, 835 N.W.2d 226, and 
Estate of Lyons v. CNA Insurance Companies, 207 Wis. 2d 446, 558 
N.W.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1996).1  The majority opinion should not be 
read as deviating from Showers and Lyons or changing our 
governmental contractor immunity law in any way.    
¶48 A third issue was directed to the parties in the 
court's order granting the petition for review.  The parties 
were directed to address whether the Diggers Hotline statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(2), creates a ministerial duty, and to 
discuss the relevance of the statute to the case, whether the 
facts in the record demonstrate compliance with the statute, and 
if so, how.  Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and Annette K. Ziegler 
concurred in this order, expressing their concern that this 
                                                 
1 The parties raised two issues for this court to address:  
Was Pro Electric Contractors acting as a governmental 
agent as that term is used in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4)? 
Was the alleged injurious conduct caused by the 
implementation of a government decision for which 
immunity is available under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4)? 
No.  2013AP2882.ssa 
 
2 
 
third issue "could place this court in the role of fact-finder."  
Their concern proved prescient.       
¶49 With regard to this third issue, the majority opinion 
recites and applies well-established principles of summary 
judgment law, and then declares that no issue of material fact 
exists regarding whether Pro Electric complied with its duties 
under Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(2).   
¶50 My final comment on dismissal regards issues that 
members of the court have raised previously in government 
immunity cases, but that are not raised or answered by the 
parties or the court in the instant case:  Should the court 
revisit the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80?  Revisit 
Wisconsin case law defining legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial, and quasi-judicial functions?  And revisit Holytz v. 
City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962)?2  These 
issues are not before the court and should not be decided in the 
instant case.  We should not bypass the adversary process.3  
                                                 
2 See Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewage Dist., 2013 WI 
78, ¶¶131-138, 350 Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., dissenting); Nicholas J. Bullard, Comment, Pushing the 
Reset Button on Wisconsin's Governmental Immunity Doctrine, 2014 
Wis. L. Rev. 801.    
3 "As various members of this court have said, we should not 
'reach out and decide issues' that were not presented to the 
court by the parties."  Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., v. 
Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶335, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 
(Roggensack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Town of Beloit v. Cty. of Rock, 2003 WI 8, ¶72, 259 
Wis. 2d 37, 657 N.W.2d 344 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting)).  See 
also State v. Thompson, 2012 WI 90, ¶¶9, 57, 342 Wis. 2d 674, 
680, 695, 818 N.W.2d 904 (declaring that the court should not 
decide issues that are not briefed). 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP2882.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶51 Because the majority opinion does not in any way 
develop the law of the state, which is the function of this 
court,4 
the 
petition 
for 
review 
should 
be 
dismissed 
as 
improvidently granted. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The United States Supreme Court has often explained the 
fundamental importance of the adversarial presentation of 
issues.  See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988); Polk 
Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 
U.S. 1, 13 (1979). 
4 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r); State v. Moeck, 2005 WI 
57, ¶94, 280 Wis. 2d 277, 314, 695 N.W.2d 783, 802 (Prosser, J., 
dissenting) ("The [Wisconsin] supreme court is a law-defining, 
law-developing court.") (citing Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 
189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997)).   
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶52 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  When this 
court abrogated the common law doctrine of sweeping governmental 
immunity in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 
N.W.2d 618 (1962), it lamented that "[t]he rules surrounding 
municipal tort immunity have resulted in . . . highly artificial 
judicial distinctions."  Id. at 32.  More than a half century 
later, "artificial judicial distinctions" once again pervade our 
governmental immunity cases, and the majority overlooks an 
opportunity 
to 
fix 
this 
creeping 
error. 
 
Although 
the 
legislature grants immunity to certain governmental entities and 
their agents only "for acts done in the exercise of legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions," Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4) (2015-16),1 the majority opinion leaves in 
place a judicial distortion of this statutory language that 
instead ties immunity to a "discretionary" versus "ministerial 
duty" test invented by the judiciary.  The court supplants the 
legislature's 
textually 
limited 
immunity 
in 
favor 
of 
an 
expansive interpretation of a doctrine long ago abolished but 
nevertheless repeatedly resurrected by this court's problematic 
case law.  Because the majority opinion perpetuates a non-
textual interpretation of § 893.80(4), I respectfully dissent.  
Further, because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
whether Pro Electric inspected the hole before filling it, I 
would reverse the court of appeals' decision and remand for 
further proceedings. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
2 
 
I 
¶53 The Holytz court unsparingly criticized governmental 
immunity, explaining that the doctrine's "origin seems to be 
found in the ancient and fallacious notion that the king can do 
no wrong."  17 Wis. 2d at 33 (internal quotation mark omitted) 
(quoting Britten v. City of Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 382, 386, 51 
N.W.2d 30 (1952)). For decades before Holytz, multiple courts 
and scholars foreshadowed the Holytz court's critique.  Almost a 
century ago, Justice Wanamaker of the Ohio Supreme Court 
observed that governmental immunity "has been shot to death on 
so many different battlefields that it would seem utter folly 
now to resurrect it."  Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 126 N.E. 72, 
77 (Ohio 1919) (Wanamaker, J., concurring).  More than 70 years 
ago, the New Mexico Supreme Court exclaimed: 
It is almost incredible that in this modern age of 
comparative 
sociological 
enlightenment, 
and 
in 
a 
republic, the medieval absolutism supposed to be 
implicit in the maxim, "the King can do no wrong", 
should exempt the various branches of the government 
from liability for their torts, and that the entire 
burden of damage resulting from the wrongful acts of 
the government should be imposed upon the single 
individual 
who 
suffers 
the 
injury, 
rather 
than 
distributed among the entire community constituting 
the government, where it could be borne without 
hardship upon any individual, and where it justly 
belongs. 
Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 1943-NMSC-012, ¶11, 136 P.2d 480 
(internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Annotation, 75 A.L.R. 
1196 (1931)).  Later, the Florida Supreme Court determined:  
"[T]he time has arrived to declare this doctrine [anachronistic] 
not only to our system of justice but to our traditional 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
3 
 
concepts of democratic government."  Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa 
Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957).  Joining other courts in 
retracting an antiquated common law doctrine, this court 
unequivocally held, "[H]enceforward, so far as governmental 
responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule is liability——
the exception is immunity."  Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d  at 39. 
¶54 Mindful of its role under Wisconsin's constitutional 
structure, this court acknowledged that, "[i]f the legislature 
deems it better public policy, it is, of course, free to 
reinstate immunity."  Id. at 40.  This court also explained the 
scope of its abrogation:  "Our decision does not broaden the 
government's obligation so as to make it responsible for all 
harms to others; it is only as to those harms which are torts 
that governmental bodies are to be liable by reason of this 
decision."  Id. at 39-40 (emphasis added).  Specifically, this 
court added that its decision should not "be interpreted as 
imposing liability on a governmental body in the exercise of its 
legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial 
functions."  Id. at 40 (citing Hargrove, 96 So. 2d at 133). 
¶55 A year later, the legislature responded by enacting an 
exception to liability echoing the language in Holytz, granting 
immunity only "for acts done in the exercise of legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions."  Laws 
of 1963, ch. 198, § 331.43(3).  As amended, the current 
statutory language remains substantially similar: 
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
4 
 
officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) (emphasis added). 
¶56 Over 
time, 
however, 
this 
court's 
decisions 
in 
governmental immunity cases have enlarged the limited exception 
to liability first articulated in Holytz and, importantly, later 
adopted by the legislature.  Recently, the court described the 
current state of Wisconsin law: 
The court has interpreted the words "legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions" in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) to be synonymous 
with 
the 
word 
"discretionary." 
 
If 
an 
act 
is 
discretionary, then governmental immunity provided by 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) applies.  There is no immunity, 
however, 
for 
liability 
associated 
with 
"the 
performance of ministerial duties imposed by law." 
Legue v. City of Racine, 2014 WI 92, ¶42, 357 Wis. 2d 250, 849 
N.W.2d 837 (footnote omitted) (first citing Lister v. Bd. of 
Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976); then 
quoting Brown v. Acuity, 2013 WI 60, ¶42, 348 Wis. 2d 603, 833 
N.W.2d 96).2  The majority does not disturb that interpretation, 
explaining that, although Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) "is best 
                                                 
2 For in-depth discussion of the governmental immunity 
doctrine's evolution since Holytz, see generally Legue v. City 
of Racine, 2014 WI 92, ¶¶35-43, 357 Wis. 2d 250, 849 N.W.2d 837; 
Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2013 WI 78, 350 
Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160 (Gableman, J., concurring); Umansky 
v. ABC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 82, 319 Wis. 2d 622, 769 N.W.2d 1 
(Prosser, J., concurring); Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of 
Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶¶60-99, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693 
(Prosser, J., dissenting). 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
5 
 
interpreted 
'by 
applying 
the 
legislature's 
chosen 
plain 
language, rather than a judicial distillation thereof,'" the 
court's "decision is not intended in any way to alter [the 
'discretionary'] standard."  Majority op., ¶19 n.13 (internal 
quotation mark omitted) (quoting Showers Appraisals, LLC v. 
Musson Bros., 2013 WI 79, ¶35, 350 Wis. 2d 509, 835 N.W.2d 226). 
¶57 Criticism of this court's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) is well-documented in recent cases and need not be 
repeated at length.  See, e.g., Legue, 357 Wis. 2d 250, ¶43 
("The court's explication and application of the doctrine of 
governmental immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) has come 
under increasing criticism by members of the court."); Bostco 
LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2013 WI 78, ¶103, 350 
Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160 (Gableman, J., concurring) ("[T]his 
court continues to apply a series of doctrines that have no 
connection 
to 
the 
text 
of 
the 
municipal 
immunity 
statute . . . or our decision to abrogate all governmental 
immunity in Holytz . . . ."); Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 
82, ¶78, 319 Wis. 2d 622, 769 N.W.2d 1 (Prosser, J., concurring) 
("So far as government responsibility for torts is concerned, 
immunity has become the rule and liability has become the rare 
exception.  Justice has been confined to a crawl space too 
narrow for most tort victims to fit."); Scott v. Savers Prop. & 
Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, ¶79, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715 
(Prosser, J., dissenting) ("In effect, this methodology has made 
the rule become immunity——the exception, liability."). 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
6 
 
¶58 Justice Gableman's concurrence in 
Bostco LLC v. 
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, 2013 WI 78, 350 
Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160, stands out among the critiques 
because it offers an alternative interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4).  The Bostco concurrence advocates "adopt[ing] the 
'planning-operational 
distinction' 
to 
determine 
whether 
governmental 
action 
is 
'legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial, or quasi-judicial.'"  350 Wis. 2d 554, ¶103.  That 
approach "grants immunity only to upper-level legislative, 
judicial, executive and administrative policy and planning 
decisions rather than to any decision that might be made."  Id. 
(emphasis added) (quoting 18 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of 
Municipal 
Corporations 
§ 53:16, 
at 
236 
(3d 
ed. 
2013) 
[hereinafter 
McQuillin]). 
 
Compared 
to 
the 
prevailing 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) as granting immunity to 
"discretionary" acts, the planning-operational distinction comes 
closer to narrowing the field of what this court deems 
"legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions."3  Using the planning-operational distinction as a 
definition of the statutory phrase, however, suffers from the 
same shortcoming that afflicts the court's current approach:  it 
replaces the legislature's chosen language with a judicially 
manufactured standard. 
                                                 
3 For 
further 
discussion 
of 
the 
planning-operational 
distinction in the context of Wisconsin law, see also Nicholas 
J. Bullard, Comment, Pushing the Reset Button on Wisconsin's 
Governmental Immunity Doctrine, 2014 Wis. L. Rev. 801, 824-28. 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
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¶59 Rather than layering the court's favored standard over 
the statutory text——or simply asserting that a particular action 
is "legislative or quasi-legislative," as the majority does 
here——the appropriate interpretive tool is to critically assess 
the 
original 
meaning 
of 
"legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions."4  The specific language 
chosen by the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) parallels 
the exception to liability crafted by this court's Holytz 
opinion, which cited Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 
(Fla. 1957), when introducing into Wisconsin law an exception 
for acts pursuant to "legislative or judicial or quasi-
legislative or quasi judicial functions."  Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 
40.  In Hargrove, the Florida Supreme Court also stopped short 
of absolutely abrogating common law immunity: 
We think it advisable to protect our conclusion 
against any interpretation that would impose liability 
on the municipality in the exercise of legislative or 
judicial, 
or 
quasi-legislative 
or 
quasi-judicial, 
functions as illustrated in such cases as Elrod v. 
City of Daytona Beach, 180 So. 378; and Akin v. City 
of Miami, Fla.1953, 65 So.2d 54. 
Hargrove, 96 So. 2d at 133 (citations omitted). 
¶60 Careful review of the two cases cited in Hargrove 
clarifies that the Florida Supreme Court sought to preserve 
immunity for a narrowly tailored set of governmental functions 
bearing a particular legislative or judicial character.  In 
Elrod v. City of Daytona Beach, 180 So. 378 (Fla. 1938), the 
                                                 
4 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 
WI 58, ¶¶44-52, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110, outlines the 
principles of statutory interpretation. 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
8 
 
Florida Supreme Court upheld a city's immunity in a suit by a 
traveling salesman who sought damages resulting from his arrest 
for violating an allegedly unconstitutional ordinance.  Id. at 
378-79.  The court explained that "the action of the city in 
adopting the ordinance in question was . . . a legislative 
act . . . .  For errors of judgment in the exercise of such 
powers the cities are not liable . . . ."  Id. at 379 (quoting 
Trescott v. City of Waterloo, 26 F. 592, 594 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 
1885), which cited Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria, 28 
U.S. (3 Pet.) 398 (1830)).   
¶61 Likewise, in Akin v. City of Miami, 65 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 
1953), the Florida Supreme Court upheld a city's immunity in a 
suit seeking damages resulting from its denial of a building 
permit, 
explaining 
that, 
"inasmuch 
as 
the 
granting 
or 
withholding of a building permit by a municipality was the 
exercise of a purely governmental function, the city could not 
be held liable in a tort action for damages for the wrongful 
refusal to issue such a permit."  Id. at 55.  Immunity for 
enactment of an ordinance, as in Elrod, implicates actions with 
uniquely legislative character, while immunity for a decision to 
deny a permit after applying law to facts, as in Akin, 
implicates action of a more judicial nature. 
¶62 The legislative and judicial actions immunized in 
Elrod and Akin align well with the ordinary meaning of the words 
found in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  A "function" refers to an 
"[a]ctivity that is appropriate to a particular business or 
profession."  Function, Black's Law Dictionary 787 (10th ed. 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
9 
 
2014) [hereinafter Black's]; see also The American Heritage 
Dictionary 
of 
the 
English 
Language 
710 
(5th 
ed. 
2011) 
[hereinafter American Heritage] (defining "function" as "[t]he 
action or purpose for which a person or thing is suited or 
employed"). 
 
"Legislative" 
means 
"[o]f, 
relating 
to, 
or 
involving lawmaking or the power to enact laws; concerned with 
making 
laws." 
 
Legislative, 
Black's, 
supra, 
at 
1039.  
"Judicial," in turn, means "[o]f, relating to, or involving a 
judgment."  Judicial, id. at 974.  The prefix "quasi" means 
"[s]eemingly but not actually; in some sense or degree; 
resembling; nearly."  Quasi, id. at 1439.5 
¶63 Taken together, these definitions suggest that the 
phrase 
"legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-
judicial functions" grants immunity to the entities listed in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) only for actions pertaining to making or 
enacting laws, actions involving an exercise of judgment in an 
adjudicative sense, or actions otherwise resembling lawmaking or 
adjudication.  Essentially, the statutory text contemplates 
immunity for the enumerated entities and their agents within the 
limited sphere of authority by which government makes and 
adjudicates 
law. 
 
Toward 
that 
end, 
this 
court 
properly 
recognizes that "[t]he purpose of [governmental] immunity is to 
ensure that courts refuse to pass judgment on policy decisions 
                                                 
5 See also Quasi-legislative, Black's Law Dictionary 1440 
(10th ed. 2014) ("(Of an act, function, etc.) not purely 
legislative 
in 
nature . . . ."); 
Quasi-judicial, 
id. 
("Of, 
relating to, or involving an executive or administrative 
official's adjudicative acts."). 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
10 
 
in the province of coordinate branches of government, if such a 
policy decision, consciously balancing risks and advantages, 
took place."  Legue, 357 Wis. 2d 250, ¶40 (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Scarpaci v. Milwaukee Cty., 96 Wis. 2d 663, 
687, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980)).6  Returning to an interpretation 
tethered to the text of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) would safeguard 
the separation of powers among the branches of government 
without shifting to innocent victims the burden of losses caused 
by government actors and agents. 
¶64 The planning-operational distinction, suggested by 
Justice Gableman in Bostco, seeks to restore some limitations on 
immunity, 
inching 
closer 
to 
the 
actual 
text 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4): "[A] decision to adopt (or not adopt) a certain 
policy would be shielded by immunity, but the implementation of 
the policy would be subject to traditional tort standards."  
Bostco, 350 Wis. 2d 554, ¶112 (Gableman, J., concurring).  
Although the discretionary-ministerial distinction purportedly 
arose out of similar "concerns over courts interfering with 
other branches of government," 18 McQuillin, supra, § 53:4, at 
168-69, it inevitably regressed from protecting political 
decisions to immunizing the destruction of private property. 
                                                 
6 One commentator similarly described immunity's purpose:  
"[P]ublic 
policy 
justifies 
applying 
immunity 
where 
the 
challenged government action is of a policymaking character——
involving social, economic, or political judgments——and where 
the government action is best monitored through the political 
process rather than through tort actions."  Linda M. Annoye, 
Comment, Revising Wisconsin's Government Immunity Doctrine, 88 
Marq. L. Rev. 971, 981 (2005). 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
11 
 
Because both tests substitute, by judicial fiat, a grossly 
circumscribed limit on government immunity undetectable in the 
language 
actually 
chosen 
by 
the 
legislature, 
neither 
is 
compatible with the comparatively narrow governmental immunity 
actually found in the text of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).7 
¶65 Restoring an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
properly grounded in that section's text would bring coherence 
and predictability to our governmental immunity jurisprudence.  
If a municipality acts in a formal capacity pursuant to its 
powers derived from the State, it might reasonably be immune 
from liability caused by, for example, an ordinance declared 
unconstitutional or a decision to deny a permit.  Critically, 
immunity would no longer attach to negligent actions by a 
                                                 
7 The "guided balancing test" proposed by Andrea Dudding, 
Comment, Reining in Municipalities: How to Tame the Municipal 
Immunity Monster in Wisconsin, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 1741, would 
similarly depart inappropriately from the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4).  Engineering a balancing test risks replacing 
predictable rules of law with the will or whim of the court: 
[A]t the point where an appellate judge says that the 
remaining issue must be decided on the basis of the 
totality of the circumstances, or by a balancing of 
all the factors involved, he begins to resemble a 
finder of fact more than a determiner of law.  To 
reach such a stage is, in a way, a regrettable 
concession of defeat——an acknowledgment that we have 
passed the point where "law," properly speaking, has 
any 
further 
application. . . .  [E]quality 
of 
treatment is difficult to demonstrate and, in a multi-
tiered 
judicial 
system, 
impossible 
to 
achieve; 
predictability is destroyed; judicial arbitrariness is 
facilitated . . . .  
Antonin Scalia, Essay, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1175-82 (1989). 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
12 
 
government actor (or agent) disconnected from the government's 
truly 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial, 
or 
quasi-
judicial functions.  Characterizing the installation of a 
traffic light pole as a legislative or quasi-legislative act is 
the latest absurdity generated by the misapplication of the 
governmental immunity doctrine.8  See Scott, 262 Wis. 2d 127, ¶82 
                                                 
8 Because it conflates legislative and quasi-legislative 
decision-making with execution of a construction project plan, 
the majority mistakenly concludes that Pro Electric can be 
immune from liability for severing the sewer lateral.  Majority 
op., ¶¶28-30.  The majority reaches this conclusion based on 
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of 
Milwaukee County, 80 Wis. 2d 10, 258 N.W.2d 148 (1977), which 
concluded that the Commission was immune from liability for 
placement of a manhole:  "Where, when and how to build sewer 
systems 
are 
legislative 
determinations 
imposed 
upon 
a 
governmental body.  It is not for the court to be judge or jury 
to 'second guess' them in these determinations nor to find they 
are liable for negligence."  Id. at 15-16 (footnote omitted).  
The Allstate court's immunity analysis properly asked whether 
governmental conduct was legislative or quasi-legislative in 
nature.  At the time, the court still seemed to recognize the 
distinction between immunity for policy determinations pursuant 
to lawmaking authority and liability for implementation of those 
decisions.  Compare Dusek v. Pierce Cty., 42 Wis. 2d 498, 506, 
167 N.W.2d 246 (1969) ("[W]hether or not to place a stop sign, a 
warning sign, or a yield sign at the approach to a county trunk 
highway is a legislative decision that must be undertaken by the 
county board and not by the courts."), with Chart v. Dvorak, 57 
Wis. 2d 92, 100-01, 203 N.W.2d 673 (1973) ("[O]nce appellants 
made the legislative or quasi-legislative decision to place the 
highway warning sign, they had a duty to place it and maintain 
it without negligence." (emphasis added)). 
Even if immunity's tendrils reached all the way to DOT's 
planning decisions here, immunity would not extend to negligent 
implementation of DOT's plan.  The majority grants Pro Electric 
immunity because the majority concludes there is no evidence Pro 
Electric deviated from DOT's plan.  See majority op., ¶30.  A 
lack of proof of negligence may absolve Pro Electric of 
liability, but whether Pro Electric acted negligently presents a 
different question than whether Pro Electric was immune from 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
13 
 
(Prosser, J., dissenting) ("In determining today that a school 
counselor is immune from liability for advising a student that 
[a course was] an acceptable NCAA-approved course when the 
counselor had access to a . . . document listing [the course] as 
[not acceptable], this court has . . . [reached a] result [that] 
is profoundly wrong and unjust.").  This court should not 
persist with an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) that 
artificially prohibits redress for wrongs committed by the 
government.  The government can do wrong, and when it does, it 
should 
be 
held 
accountable 
to 
those 
damaged 
by 
its 
transgressions. 
II 
¶66 The majority opinion appropriately applies the two-
part framework for analyzing government contractor immunity, 
determining first whether the contractor was an agent and second 
whether the action was one for which immunity is available  
Majority op., ¶¶19-20 (citing Showers, 350 Wis. 2d 509).  Using 
this framework, I agree with the majority's determination that 
"Pro Electric does not enjoy governmental immunity for a failure 
to inspect the excavation to look for the severed sewer lateral 
and to refrain from backfilling until repairs were made."  
Majority op., ¶35.  A contractor's alleged negligent failure to 
inspect an excavation before backfilling clearly bears no 
                                                                                                                                                             
liability.  Here, the manner in which Pro Electric augured the 
hole and severed the sewer lateral bears no resemblance to 
lawmaking or adjudication; consequently, Pro Electric cannot be 
immune from liability for any negligence in performing these 
services. 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
14 
 
resemblance to lawmaking or adjudication and therefore does not 
constitute a "legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial function[]" for immunity purposes under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4). 
¶67 I disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion 
that 
Petitioners 
have 
"not 
identified 
any 
material 
fact 
supporting a reasonable inference that Pro Electric failed to 
comply with its duties under Wis. Stat. § 182.0175(2)(am)."  
Majority op., ¶43.  A court may grant a motion for summary 
judgment 
"if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  "'Any 
reasonable doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact must be resolved against the moving party' for 
summary judgment."  Schmidt v. N. States Power Co., 2007 WI 136, 
¶24, 305 Wis. 2d 538, 742 N.W.2d 294 (quoting Heck & Paetow 
Claim Serv., Inc. v. Heck, 93 Wis. 2d 349, 356, 286 N.W.2d 831 
(1980)). 
¶68 Wisconsin Stat. § 182.0175(2)(am) establishes several 
duties for excavators, two of which are relevant here:9 
(am)  Excavation notice.  An excavator shall do all 
of the following: 
. . . . 
                                                 
9 "Excavator" 
is 
a 
defined 
term 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 182.0175(1)(bm). 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
15 
 
6.  Before backfilling, inspect all transmission 
facilities exposed during excavation to ascertain if 
the transmission facilities have been or may have been 
struck, damaged, dislocated or disrupted. 
6m.  Refrain from backfilling an excavation until an 
inspection is conducted and any necessary repairs have 
been made by the owner of the transmission facility. 
"Transmission facilities" is a defined term in the statute and 
includes all underground pipes, as well as "drainage and water 
facilities and sewer systems."  § 182.0175(1)(c). 
¶69 The majority identifies a subtle aspect of Wis. Stat. 
§ 182.0175(2)(am)6:  "[T]he statute does not require Pro 
Electric 
to 
inspect 
its 
excavation; 
rather, 
it 
requires 
inspection 
of 
transmission 
facilities 
exposed 
during 
the 
excavation."  Majority op., ¶42.  Recognizing that subdivision 6 
creates a duty to inspect exposed transmission facilities rather 
than a duty to inspect the excavation itself properly focuses 
interpretation of the subdivision on the word "exposed."  To 
"expose" something is "to make [it] visible."  American 
Heritage, 
supra, 
at 
625; 
see 
also 
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International Dictionary 802 (1986) [hereinafter Webster's] 
(defining "expose" as "lay open to view: lay bare: make known: 
set forth").  Here, Pro Electric did not see or know about the 
severed clay sewer lateral because it blended in with the 
surrounding soil, and after-the-fact pictures of the trenched 
lateral do not establish that it was exposed during excavation. 
¶70 But our analysis does not end there.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 182.0175(2)(am)6m 
also 
imposes 
a 
duty 
to 
refrain 
from 
backfilling "until an inspection is conducted."  One reasonable 
reading of the statute might be to assume the inspection 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
16 
 
mentioned in subdivision 6m is the same "inspect[ion of] all 
transmission facilities exposed during excavation" required by 
subdivision 6. 
 
The 
scope-of-subparts 
canon 
of 
statutory 
construction, however, counsels against reading such independent 
subdivisions together in that manner.  See Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 156-60 (2012) ("Material within an 
indented 
subpart 
relates 
only 
to 
that 
subpart; 
material 
contained in unindented text relates to all the following or 
preceding indented subparts.").  Subdivision 6m is not a subpart 
of subdivision 6 and speaks in much broader terms.  To "inspect" 
something is "to view closely and critically (as in order to 
ascertain 
quality 
or 
state, 
detect 
errors, 
or 
otherwise 
appraise)" or to "examine with care."  Webster's, supra, 1170; 
see also American Heritage, supra, at 908 ("To examine carefully 
and critically, especially for flaws.").  A duty to inspect 
suggests excavators must conduct a careful, critical examination 
of the excavation overall to determine whether it created any 
problems, not limited to exposed transmission facilities, which 
in this case were obliterated and therefore incapable of 
exposure. 
¶71 Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to 
Petitioners, I conclude Pro Electric has not demonstrated it is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The record establishes 
that people were "looking at" the hole while auguring was 
ongoing, that lighting would not have revealed the severed 
lateral during auguring, and that dirt pushed into the sewer 
lateral would have made it difficult to identify.  Those facts 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
17 
 
do not demonstrate that Pro Electric conducted an inspection of 
the completed excavation; accordingly, whether an inspection 
occurred before backfilling presents a genuine issue of material 
fact. 
III 
¶72 When abrogating common law doctrine in Holytz, this 
court showed appropriate attention to its constitutional role by 
recognizing the legislature's ultimate authority to decide the 
scope of immunity as a matter of policy.  The legislature 
responded by enacting a statute that now allows immunity only 
"for 
acts 
done 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
legislative, 
quasi-
legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions." 
 
By 
continuing 
to 
immunize 
acts 
bearing 
no 
resemblance 
to 
legislative or judicial functions, this court once again 
abandons the plain language of the governmental immunity statute 
in favor of an archaic judicial doctrine rooted in shielding the 
government from answering for its tortious wrongs against the 
people.  Because this artificial judicial invention strays from 
the legislature's formulation, and because Pro Electric has not 
met the standard for summary judgment, I would reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals; therefore, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶73 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY 
joins this dissent. 
No.  2013AP2882.rgb 
 
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