Case Title: In Re Williams'will

Citation: 376 P.2d 3, 71 N.M. 39

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1962-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
376 P.2d 3 (1962) 71 N.M. 39 In the Matter of the Last WILL and Testament of Leon E. WILLIAMS, Deceased. Marietta Sinton GRAY, David W. Sinton, James H. Sinton and E.A. Bennett, Appellees, v. The ESTATE of Leon E. WILLIAMS and the Trustees of Dartmouth College, Residuary Legatee, Appellants. No. 7026. Supreme Court of New Mexico. November 2, 1962. *4 John B. Wright, Raton, Love & Cole, Colorado Springs, Colo., for appellant Estate of Leon E. Williams. Henry E. Blattman, Las Vegas, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, William C. Briggs, Albuquerque, McLane, Carleton, Graf, Greene, & Brown, Manchester, N.H., for appellant Trustees of Dartmouth College, Residuary Legatee. Kellahin & Fox, Santa Fe, Murray, Baker & Wendelken, Colorado Springs, Colo., for appellees. CASWELL S. NEAL, District Judge. This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court of Mora County, sitting in probate, in the matter of the last will and testament of Leon E. Williams. The will was admitted to probate in the probate court of Mora County and John F. Meck and James H. Sinton were appointed co-executors. The case was transferred by appeal to the district court (§ 16-4-18, N.M.S.A. 1953). John F. Meck resigned as executor and was replaced by William C. Bates. The only clause in the will concerning the present appeal is paragraph SIXTH, which reads as follows: The co-executors filed their final report and application for determination of heirship. Paragraph XI of the report recited the bequests contained in paragraph SIXTH of the will and, as to certain of these bequests, reported as follows: Thereafter, David W. Sinton filed his objection to the final account setting forth the bequest to him of $50,000.00; admitting that subsequent to the date of the will decedent made a gift to him of securities of the value of no more than $2,850.00, and prayed for an order of the court requiring the executors to pay to him, after giving credit for the $2,850.00 received by him personally, the balance of $47,150.00, plus interest thereon from May 24, 1960, at 6 per cent. James H. Sinton, individually and not as executor of the estate, filed his objection in *6 substantially the same form, acknowledging that subsequent to the date of the will decedent made a gift of securities of the value of not more than $6,000.00, and praying for an order directing the payment to him personally of $44,000.00 of the $50,000.00 bequest, plus interest. E.A. Bennett filed a similar objection, acknowledging that subsequent to the date of the will decedent made a gift to him of securities worth not more than $5,700.00 and seeking an order requiring the executors to pay to him personally an additional $44,300.00, plus interest. However, in his requested findings of fact, he admitted these securities were worth $6,000.00 and the court so found. Marietta Sinton Gray filed her objection to the final account and report, acknowledging that subsequent to the date of the will the testator made a gift to her of securities worth not more than $5,700.00 and seeking an order requiring the executors to pay her personally an additional $44,300.00, plus interest. Distribution of the remainder of the estate was made without objections from any of the other devisees under the will with the provision, nevertheless, that not less than $175,000.00 be retained by the co-executors to insure the payment of the sums sought by the objectors which might be allowed; and a final decree was entered approving the final account and report otherwise and determining heirship, but retaining jurisdiction to determine the issues raised by the objectors. A hearing was held by the court and the residuary legatee, the Trustees of Dartmouth College, and the co-executors introduced witnesses who testified to conversations with the deceased regarding the bequests advancements and regarding the gifts to his nephews and nieces, including the objectors. The residuary legatee also introduced 29 documents as exhibits, consisting of letters to and from the decedent concerning his gifts to the nephews and nieces and their families; letters to his former classmates explaining his inter vivos and testamentary program, and an accounting schedule showing gifts or advances made after the execution of the will and prior to the testator's death, and notes and comments of the testator on copies of the will in his own handwriting, all of which will be hereinafter referred to. The court allowed the admission of the testimony over objections, subject, nevertheless, to its being later stricken should the court so rule. The estate and residuary legatee rested its case and the objectors, after being given an opportunity to proceed with their testimony, rested their cases without offering any testimony, written or oral. The testimony introduced therefore stands uncontradicted. Requested findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by the respective parties and after a hearing before the court upon the requested findings and conclusions the court reversed its earlier ruling, sustaining objections to the admission of the oral testimony, exhibits, letters, comments on the will and accounting schedule showing gifts and, in effect, struck all of the testimony entered in the case as inadmissible. Thereafter, the court filed its decision, consisting of the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and at the same time entered an order denying all findings and conclusions not included in the decision of the court to which the executors and residuary legatee filed their objections and exceptions. The findings and conclusions made by the court material hereto are as follows: *8 Based on the decision of the court a judgment was entered in favor of the objectors in the following amounts: plus interest at six per cent from May 24, 1960. An appeal from this judgment was taken timely. A review of the facts of the case and of the testimony offered which was stricken indicates the following undisputed facts: Leon E. Williams executed his will on April 10, 1958. He had no children and his nearest relatives at the time of the execution of the will, as well as at the time of his death, May 26, 1958, were his wife, Marjorie M. Williams, two sisters, Lorraine W. Bennett and Lucile W. McGee, and four nephews and three nieces, among which group the four objectors are included. Basically the will provided for a bequest of $400,000.00 to his wife, plus a life estate for his wife in certain real estate and a distribution of personal property to his wife; the bequests of $50,000.00 to each of his sisters, nieces and nephews in paragraph SIXTH above quoted; a bequest of $100,000.00 to Colorado College and the distribution of the residue of his estate to the Trustees of Dartmouth College. The deceased was a man of substantial property. The appraised value of his estate approximated three and one-half million dollars. He was not an attorney but was a public accountant, in fact, one of the foremost public accountants in the country, thoroughly versed in the filed of federal taxation and thoroughly familiar with the provisions of the statutes of the United States and the rules and regulations adopted thereunder governing income and estate taxes. The will was written by him personally. After the execution of the will and before his death the decedent made gifts to the objectors, as follows: or a total of $20,550.00. In addition to these gifts, during the same period, he made gifts in various amounts to the spouses and children of the objectors with the result that between the execution of the will, on April 10, 1958, and the death of Mr. Williams, on May 26, 1958, he made the following gifts to the objectors and their families: Turning now to the testimony and facts shown by the parol testimony and written exhibits later stricken. By stipulation all written exhibits introduced were received without objection as to authentication. The testator, on the day of the execution of the will, April 10, 1958, told his attorney that it was his intent to make the gifts to the nephews and nieces and omit these bequests from a subsequent revision of the will, and this without paying any gift taxes; that he expected to have his gifts completed in 30 to 60 days and would make a new will with the bequests to his nephews and nieces left out. He wrote out on a slip of paper showing his attorney how he was going to do this and thus avoid taxation. At this time the will had not been executed. Later, on the same day, the testator and his attorney, Mr. Wright, were present at a directors meeting *9 in a Raton bank. At that time Mr. Williams took out of his coat several instruments and told the directors that this was his last will and testament and asked them to witness his signature to the will, and passed copies of the will around the table. On April 19, some nine days after the execution of the will, he again told Mr. Wright that the bequests in paragraph SIXTH would be taken care of shortly, at which time he would make a new will and all of the bequests in paragraph SIXTH would be out since he was going to take care of them. He advised his attorney that he had his schedules of gifts arranged in such a way that not only would they not pay an inheritance tax on the remainder but he would avoid any gift tax out of his estate. On May 9, 10, and 11, 1958, he reviewed in detail the provisions of his will with John H. Meck, the treasurer and vice president of Dartmouth College, and discussed the provisions of the will with him, paragraph by paragraph. At that time he read a part of a letter to Mr. Meck, which is in evidence, addressed to Eugene Bissell, who was a member of the 1915 class of Dartmouth College and a roommate of the testator during the four years they were undergraduates at the college. This letter, written by the testator, states, in part: He further advised Mr. Meck that he was making final gifts to each of his nieces and nephews and that while he would leave the $50,000.00 bequests to his sisters in subsequent wills, he would eliminate the bequests to the nephews and nieces. A few days before the will was executed the decedent wrote letters to each of his nieces and nephews in which he outlined a plan by which he could make the total gift of $50,000.00 to the particular nephew or niece and the members of his family, including children, indicating just when the gifts could be made in order to give the full $50,000.00 to each family as quickly as possible but without incurring any gift tax. To these letters the objectors replied, expressing their appreciation of the plan, giving the names of their children and discussing the manner in which the gifts should be sent and indicating how they might be used. Estate's Exhibit 6-A dated April 9, 1958, was written by the decedent to James H. Sinton and his wife, Bobbie. Material parts of this letter are: To this letter Mr. James H. Sinton replied (Estate's Exhibit 6-B): To E.A. Bennett and his wife, Helen, the testator on April 9, 1958, wrote a letter, the material parts of which are as follows (Estate's Exhibit 7-A): On April 12, E.A. Bennett and his wife replied as follows (Estate's Exhibit 7-C): To David W. Sinton and his wife, Eleanor, the testator on April 7, 1958, wrote the following letter (Estate's Exhibit 8-A): *14 To this letter Mr. David W. Sinton replied on April 14, 1958 (Estate's Exhibit 8-B), as follows: The testator replied to Mr. David W. Sinton's letter as follows (Estate's Exhibit 8-C) On May 16, 1958, Mr. David W. Sinton responded to this letter as follows (Estate's Exhibit 8-D): On April 9, the testator wrote to Marietta Sinton Gray and her husband, John, as follows (Estate's Exhibit 9-A): "You will note I started this letter sometime ago but we were hit with another heavy snowstorm (22 inches) then we had guests and then I had to go to Roswell and that is the way time goes. "The way the above plan would work out for your family would be somewhat as follows: On May 6, 1958, testator wrote to Marietta Sinton Gray as follows (Estate's Exhibit 9-B): To which Mrs. Gray responded on May 9, as follows: On May 16, Debby Crouch, a daughter of Marietta Sinton Gray, wrote the testator as follows (Estate's Exhibit 9-C): Similar letters were written to the other nephews and nieces involved who have not protested the testator's actions. These appear as Estate's Exhibits Nos. 10, 11-A, 11-B, 11-C, 11-E, 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, 12-D and 12-E. These were introduced for the purpose of showing the intent of the testator to adeem the $50,000.00 gifts by making payments of $50,000.00 to each family unit; it is undisputed under the evidence that in the seven family units consisting of nephews and nieces and their spouses and children, there are 34 individuals and the undisputed testimony shows that by the means of dividing the $350,000.00 provided in the will for the seven nephews and nieces the testator intended to divide among them, 34 individuals consisting of seven family groups at $50,000.00 per family group. It appears that on April 21, 1958, the decedent wrote his classmate, G. Kellogg Rose, a letter in which he enclosed a copy of the will, stating that the will with the notes attached would be self-explanatory. The letter contained the following information in the handwriting of the deceased relative to paragraph SIXTH. The slip attached reads as follows: It is noted that the word "also" written on the slip was stricken by the testator. On April 22, 1958, the testator wrote to his classmate and former roommate, Eugene Bissell. The letter, in testator's own handwriting, states in part: Estate's Exhibit No. 13 reflects payments actually made between the date of the will on April 10, 1958, and his death on May 26, 1958, and the receipts of these payments were admitted by counsel for the objectors. As hereinabove stated in the final account and report, the executors tendered to the four objectors and their families the difference between the total gifts to the objectors and their families the sum of $50,000.00, and in each case, as to the objectors, this was refused and the objectors filed their objections seeking payment of the difference between the amount received by the objector personally and $50,000.00, plus interest. Three of the nephews and nieces declined to join with the objectors; namely, Robert L. McGee, Virginia Bennett Lawton and Betty Bennett Kemp. Requested findings of fact of the executors and residuary legatee, clearly delineating this position, were submitted and were refused by the court. It is the opinion of the court that the position of the appellants is supported by undisputed evidence if the parol and extrinsic evidence stricken by the court was admissible. Appellants rely for a reversal of the Court's judgment upon two points, namely: and under POINT III take the position that the court should, by its mandate, direct the lower court to enter judgment in favor of the executors and residuary legatee. Turning to the point of whether extrinsic evidence is competent to show an intent to adeem. It cannot be denied that extrinsic evidence of the testator's intention to adeem is admissible, if not too remote and if not otherwise incompetent. In Page on Wills (Lifetime Ed.) Vol. 4, § 1539, the rule is thus announced: Numerous cases supporting this eminent author are cited in the notes and in supplemental editions from year to year. Many of these cases are cited in appellants' brief. Indeed, this rule of law is not seriously controverted in objectors' brief. The element of the alleged remoteness of the testimony is raised. All of the transactions involved in this matter, and which are in evidence, took place between April 7, 1958, three days before the testator executed his will on April 10, and the date of the death of decedent, on May 26, 1958. It is true that evidence which is otherwise competent may relate to facts too remote in point of time or matters too far removed from the scene of the transaction to be admissible. The admissibility of such evidence is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the trial court. It is inconceivable to this court that all of these matters, occurring within the short space of less than 50 days, make them too remote from the point of time to be inadmissible. It is true, as contended by appellees, that a declared intention to make a will does not operate as a revocation of an existing one. Appellees confuse the issue here involved. We are not here concerned with construction of the will of Leon E. Williams. The entire controversy before the court arises out of the gifts made by the testator after he made his will, on April 10, and before his death, on May 26, 1958. This controversy is here because the executors of the will took credit for gifts made to the legatees, their spouses and children after the execution of the will on the basis that the testator intended them to be credited on the several bequests. To this the objectors took exception and the litigation followed. Had deceased died before any gifts had ever been made, there would be no litigation and the objectors would have received their respective $50,000.00. All of the evidence in the case which was stricken was designed to prove the intent of the testator at the time the gifts were made and received and the law controlling here is the law of ademption by satisfaction. It is admitted in appellees' brief that the authority of the Annotations at 94 A.L.R. 26 at page 192 permits extrinsic evidence to be admitted upon the question of ademption or to rebut a presumption of ademption. The authorities treating the use of extrinsic evidence in construing a will such as those reviewed in 94 A.L.R. 26 are not in point here. We are not involved in a construction of the will. All of the gifts involved here are gifts made after the will had been executed and the only question involved is whether or not the $107,187.50 given to the spouses and children of the objectors constituted, in part, an ademption by satisfaction of the bequests in the will. This question is one of first impression in New Mexico. In Brown v. Heller, 1924, 30 N.M. 1, 227 P. 594, the doctrine of ademption was recognized by this court. However, the case dealt with ademption of a specific legacy by extinction rather than the question of ademption of a general legacy by satisfaction and the case has no application here. Again, in the case of Sylvanus v. Pruett, 1932, 36 N.M. 112, 9 P.2d 142, the court discussed the doctrine of advancements and this doctrine is not here *20 involved. Advancements should be confined to cases where the testator by will specifically directs that certain gifts already made by him be counted as advancement in equalizing the distribution of his estate. There are numerous circumstances under which the law of ademption, originally a term of the Roman law, and now recognized by the common law, is applicable. Ademption by satisfaction is the reduction or payment of a general legacy by actions of the testator subsequent to the will, by paying money or transferring property to the legatee or for the benefit of the legatee with the intent that the benefit conferred shall be applied on or substituted for the legacy. In Page on Wills (Lifetime Ed.) Vol. 4, § 1533, ademption by satisfaction is defined as follows: Turning now to the question of whether the evidence showing Williams' intention at the time of making the respective gifts should have been stricken. We think not. Whether or not the gifts constituted an ademption of the legacy depends upon the donor's intention at the time the gifts were made. The intention of the testator at the time the gifts were made is the controlling factor in ademption. The law is thus summarized in an annotation upon the subject in 26 A.L.R.2d 9, 18 (1952), wherein it is stated: It is unnecessary to review the many cases cited sustaining the foregoing proposition and the cases in general which we have reviewed proceed upon assumption of the correctness of the above quotation. In Page on Wills (Lifetime Ed.) Vol. 4, § 1536, it is stated: This author further states, § 1537: It is also immaterial that the payment be made to some third person, as in this case, the spouses and children of the nieces and nephews. Page on Wills (Lifetime Ed.) Vol. 4, § 1548, states: In each case the objectors here have admitted the satisfaction by gifts to them personally by pro tanto ademption but deny the same as to gifts made to his or her spouse and children. Many cases support the theory quoted from Page, supra. See Anno. 26 A.L.R.2d at 109. In Grogan v. Ashe, 156 N.C. 286, 72 S.E. 372, the court held that a gift to the testator's niece's husband adeemed the niece's legacy. In re Smith's Estate, 210 Iowa 563, 231 N.W. 468, a transfer to a bank was held to adeem the legacy to the testator's son. In Mast's Appeal, 40 Pa. 24; In re Barne's Estate, 177 Iowa 122, 158 N.W. 754, and in Stichtenoth v. Toph, 10 Ohio Dec.Reprint 690, transfers to the testators' sons-in-law were held to have adeemed legacies to their daughters. Duff v. Duff's Executors, 146 Ky. 201, 142 S.W. 242, a transfer to the testator's grandson was held to have been an advancement to the testator's son. See, Note, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1050. Further citations of authorities upon this point will operate only to incumber this opinion. The appellees seem to take the position that because in cases where the testator stands in loco parentis, a gift of amount equal to or greater than the legacy will be presumed to be an ademption of the legacy and a gift of less amount will be presumed to be a pro tanto ademption if the testator's plan of distribution will thus be carried into effect. Section 1541, Page on Wills (Lifetime Ed.) Vol. 4, asserts that no such presumption exists in regard to nieces and nephews, their spouses and children. This is undoubtedly true. However, in this case the appellants do not rest their cases upon any presumption relating to the nieces and nephews or their families. If such a presumption even existed it could be overcome by proof because the presumption of ademption where a gift is made by one in loco parentis to the beneficiary is purely prima facie; and is also subject to being rebutted by showing that the testator intended such gift as a separate and additional gratuity and not as satisfaction of the legacy. Vol. 4, Page on Wills (Lifetime Ed.), Sec. 1540, page 402. In the Annotation at 94 A.L.R. 190, the annotator states: Numerous cases are cited supporting this authority. On page 192 of the same annotation, the annotator states: In this case the extrinsic evidence which was introduced was introduced for the purpose of showing the entire scheme or plan of the testator in making his gifts and his intention appears clear and plain and no presumption of ademption is a factor in this case. It follows from the foregoing that the court erred in striking all of the evidence tending to show the intention of the testator in this case. This court has repeatedly held that a trial court may not ignore or disregard the unimpeached and uncontradicted evidence before it. Medler v. Henry, 44 N.M. 275, 101 P.2d 398; Morris v. Cartwright, 57 N.M. 328, 258 P.2d 719; Greenfield v. Bruskas, 41 N.M. 346, 68 P.2d 921. From the foregoing it appears that the court erred in making its conclusion No. 2, in striking the extrinsic evidence and the parol testimony of Mr. Wright, the testator's attorney, and of Mr. Meck. It further appears that the court erred in making its conclusion No. 3, that the evidence does not show an intent by the *22 decedent to adeem or decrease the legacies to children and spouses of the respective objectors. Upon this question the undisputed evidence conclusively shows that the testator had his will prepared but not executed on the morning of the 10th day of April, when he talked to his attorney, Mr. Wright. The will was written by the testator himself. It is extensive and indicates a great deal of thought in connection with the disposition of his estate. The testator was an especially smart business man and an expert accountant, fully familiar with all the laws and regulations relating to federal gift and inheritance taxes. Undoubtedly, on April 7, when he wrote his plan of distribution of his estate to his nephew, David W. Sinton, and on April 9, the day before he actually executed his will when he wrote the letters quoted above to James H. Sinton and his wife, E.A. Bennett and his wife and Marietta Sinton Gray and her husband, he had a plan by which he intended to give $350,000.00 of his estate to his seven nieces and nephews as a family unit, having in mind that this could be done for some thirty-four individuals consisting of the total number of nieces and nephews and their spouses and children. He explained the method by which he would make gifts of $50,000.00 to each family unit. He even set forth, in the case of each family of each objector, the plan which he would pursue in making the $50,000.00 gifts. The objectors, by their replies, fully set forth not only their understanding of the testator's plan, but also that they understood that the gifts made to the spouses and children were to be applied to adeem the $50,000.00 bequests and that the $50,000.00 would be paid to each family as a family unit. It is not necessary that the testator should have used the word "adeem." The testator's intention is further clearly set out in a letter of April 21, to his classmate, Rose, in which he mailed a copy of the will with a slip attached in which he said: The fact that the testator struck from the above the word "also" clearly shows his intention that the gifts were to be made to the nieces and nephews, their spouses and children to the extent of a total of $350,000.00, or $50,000.00 to each of the seven family units consisting of the families of the nieces and nephews. We have hereinabove quoted the contents of the letter in the testator's handwriting to his former roommate, Eugene Bissell, which clearly shows the testator's intent to make the gifts without a gift tax. It states in part: Turning now to point II, namely: From what we have heretofore said in this opinion, it is clear that the testimony introduced upon the part of the appellants and which was stricken by the court was admissible and should have been received and that the uncontradicted evidence discloses that the gifts to the spouses and children of the nieces and nephews show *23 an intent upon the part of the testator to adeem the legacies in the will by all payments made to the nieces and nephews, their spouses and children. From the foregoing it appears that the court erred in making its findings of fact numbered 10, 11 and 12 and its conclusions of law numbered 2 to 6, and erred in refusing to make the appellant's requested findings of fact numbered 6 through 20 and appellant's conclusions of law numbered 1 through 4. Requested conclusion of law numbered 3 of the appellants reads as follows: The elements of equitable estoppel are well defined in New Mexico and are fully set forth in the case of Westerman v. City of Carlsbad, 55 N.M. 550, 237 P.2d 356, wherein the court states: Each of the objectors knew the intention of the testator by letters received by them from the testator. They were invited to make any objections to the testator's plan which they wished to make. They made no objections. On the other hand, each of them wrote the testator, giving the names of their children to whom the gifts should be made, expressing thanks and delight at the testator's entire plan, realized and understood that he intended each family unit to have $50,000.00 and that he intended to make these payments to the nieces and nephews, their spouses and children, in such a manner as to avoid a gift tax on the bequests and to eliminate the amounts so paid from his estate from an inheritance tax standpoint. They accepted the payments which he made without objection, and certainly nothing upon their part in the lifetime of Leon E. Williams indicated any intention of any kind, upon their part, that they were not in full agreement and in accord and consented to his plan for the payment of the bequests. After the death of Leon E. Williams each of the objectors here have changed their positions. Suppose in his lifetime they had declined the gifts when they were made. This would have given testator an opportunity to change his will. On the other hand, by giving the names of their children to the testator and expressing delight at the gifts for the education of their children and expressing the manner in which they desired the gifts to be given, they undoubtedly led the testator to believe that they were in full and complete agreement with his plan. The element of reliance upon their failure to object is amply shown by the fact that Leon E. Williams made gifts of $107,187.50 to the families of the objectors other than the nieces and nephews after receipt of their letters expressing gratitude for his benevolence. *24 Objectors have no right in equity to have accepted the gifts with full appreciation of what they were intended to do in the donor's lifetime, under donor's plan, and retracted their positions after his death. Passing now to the question of whether or not the court should direct judgment in this case, it appears from the record that at the close of the case counsel for the objectors moved to strike the testimony introduced at the time counsel for the estate rested its case. The court thereupon requested the protestants (objectors) to proceed at that time and without introducing any evidence in the case to contradict the undisputed evidence hereinabove set forth, the protestants rested their case. In the light of our decisions the court is of the opinion that it should direct the judgment in this case. First National Bank of Clayton v. Harlan, 30 N.M. 356, 234 P. 305. We there stated: In the recent case of O'Rourke v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 68 N.M. 409, 362 P.2d 790, we said there: It is therefore ordered that the cause be reversed and remanded to the lower court with directions to set aside the judgment herein appealed from and enter a judgment in favor of James H. Sinton in the sum of $30,112.50; in favor of David W. Sinton in the sum of $11,000.00; to E.A. Bennett in the sum of $17,150.00, and to Marietta Sinton Gray in the sum of $14,000.00. These amounts having been tendered to the objectors and refused by them, no interest will be added to the judgment. The cost, including the cost of this appeal, will be taxed against the objectors and appellees. COMPTON, C.J., and MOISE and CHAVEZ, JJ., concur.