Case Title: Bollig v. Bollig

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bollig v. Bollig1996 WY 87919 P.2d 136Case Number: 95-217Decided: 06/25/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
James Allen BOLLIG,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Gwen Ann 
BOLLIG,

 Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County, Dan

Larry R. Clapp 
of Clapp and Associates, P.C., Casper, for 
Appellant.

Richard G. 
Miller, Casper, for, Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Pursuant to a 
decree of divorce, Gwen Bollig was awarded custody and support for the parties' 
minor children. Following emancipation of the parties' daughter, Mrs. Bollig 
sought adjustment of the child support for the minor son. From the success of 
that effort, James Bollig appeals. The district court is generally affirmed, 
except for a limited remand for recalculation of Mr. Bollig's imputed 
earnings.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant, James 
Allen Bollig (father), states a single issue:

A.        Did the 
trial court abuse its discretion when it relied upon documents which were 
neither offered nor admitted into evidence at a child support modification 
hearing and modified Defendant/Appellant's child support 
obligation?

[¶3]      Appellee, Gwen 
Ann Bollig (mother), restates the issue:

Based upon the record as 
a whole, did the trial court abuse its discretion when it adjusted the child 
support[?]

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      The father and 
mother were divorced in 1990. The mother was awarded primary custody of the 
couple's two minor children and the father was ordered to pay monthly support in 
the amount of $319.00 per child, for a total obligation of $638.00 per month. 
When their daughter was emancipated, the mother petitioned for an adjustment, 
claiming a change of more than twenty percent in the amount of support due the 
minor son. The father generally admitted the mother's allegations, demurring 
only as to the mother's claim of arrearage. 

[¶5]      At the hearing on 
her petition for adjustment, the mother filed an affidavit detailing her 
financial circumstances. Simultaneously, she filed a "Plaintiff's Proposal for 
Entry of Order," calculating presumptive child support due under Wyo. Stat. § 
20-6-304 (1994) and employing the father's 1992 and 1993 federal income tax 
returns to determine his average gross income over those two years. The mother's 
proposal was not in the form of an affidavit nor were the father's 1992 and 1993 
tax returns admitted as evidence at the hearing.

[¶6]      The father 
sought, through testimony and exhibits, to show greatly reduced recent earnings 
occasioned by efforts to start his own business. Based upon those reduced 
earnings, he requested a reduction of support due his minor son from $319.00 per 
month to $150.00 per month.

[¶7]      Because the 
father voluntarily left highly remunerative employment to start his own 
business, the district court determined that the average of the father's 1992 
and 1993 federal income tax returns most accurately represented his true earning 
power. The mother's proposal was adopted, setting child support for the minor 
son at $638.00 per month.

[¶8]      The father filed 
a W.R.C.P. 59 motion to alter or amend the district court's order, suggesting a 
figure of $536.38 for support of his minor son. In support of his motion, the 
father submitted an affidavit admitting the validity of his 1992 and 1993 tax 
returns as submitted by the mother. He also averred that the 1992 tax return was 
artificially inflated by a lump sum payout of his retirement account. Asserting 
that his retirement account was property already divided by the divorce decree, 
the father calculated presumptive child support exclusive of the retirement 
account proceeds.

[¶9]      The father's 
W.R.C.P. 59 motion was denied and timely appeal was taken to this 
court.

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶10]   Appellate scrutiny of an order 
adjusting child support obligations is limited to determining whether the 
district court abused its discretion or violated a legal principle. Cranston v. 
Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 348 (Wyo. 1994). A court abuses its discretion if it 
acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. 
Smith v. Smith, 863 P.2d 624, 625 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819, 821 (Wyo. 1993)).

IV. 
DISCUSSION

[¶11]   The father scores the district 
court's order as predicated on tax returns which were neither authenticated nor 
admitted as evidence at the hearing. The factual accuracy of his allegation 
cannot gainsay his affidavit, submitted in support of his W.R.C.P. 59 motion, 
admitting the authenticity of the tax returns.

[¶12]   The father's affidavit verifies the 
tax returns but protests inflation of his 1992 gross income due to receipt of 
his share of the retirement account. That account represented property equitably 
divided between the parties pursuant to the divorce decree. His 1992 tax return, 
as submitted by the mother, and the decree of divorce both corroborate the 
father's affidavit.

[¶13]   The question thus presented is 
whether a court may reconsider one party's share of property already divided by 
the divorce decree as income for purposes of subsequent adjustment of the child 
support obligation.

[¶14]   We have held that "attorney fees, 
child support, property division and any other financial matters must all be 
considered together in making a just and equitable disposition of the 
family assets." Klatt v. Klatt, 654 P.2d 733, 738-39 (Wyo. 1982) (emphasis 
added). Here, such a just and equitable disposition was made in the divorce 
decree and was not timely appealed. Adjustment of support obligations cannot 
occur in defiance of the property division effectuated by the prior 
decree.

[¶15]   We hold that contemplation of 
previously divided assets a second time, as income for purposes of post-decree 
child support adjustment, is inequitable and violative of the rule announced in 
Klatt. See Kruschel v. Kruschel, 419 N.W.2d 119, 121-22 (Minn.App. 
1988).

[¶16]   The district court properly 
followed Wyo. Stat. § 20-6-302(b)(xi) (1994) in utilizing the father's average 
income from 1992 and 1993. The district court, however, incorrectly considered 
the father's receipt of previously divided marital property as income. The 
father's calculations, as contained in his W.R.C.P. 59 motion, demonstrate that 
$536.38 is the correct amount of monthly support which the father owes his minor 
son.

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶17]   The district court is generally 
affirmed with limited remand for entry of an order adjusting the father's 
monthly child support obligation.