Case Title: DIANA CALIMLIM DAVIS, f/k/a DIANA CALIMLIM GILL V. MATTHEW A. GILL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
DIANA CALIMLIM DAVIS, f/k/a DIANA CALIMLIM GILL V. MATTHEW A. GILL2007 WY 17150 P.3d 1181Case Number: 06-88Decided: 01/30/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
DIANA 
CALIMLIM DAVIS, f/k/a DIANA CALIMLIM 
GILL,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
MATTHEW 
A. GILL,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Lisa M. 
Barrett of Buchhammer & Kehl, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Matthew 
Gill, pro se.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Diana Davis 
("Mother") appeals an order of the district court finding that it had no 
jurisdiction to modify a custody decree entered by the superior court of 
Guam on October 28, 2004.  Mother argues that Wyoming has become the "home state" under the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and that the children's substantial contacts in 
Wyoming make 
jurisdiction here appropriate.  
Matthew Gill ("Father") did not file an appellate brief.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Whether the 
district court had jurisdiction to modify a Guam court's child custody, support, and visitation 
decree?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mother and Father 
obtained a divorce in Guam.  On October 28, 2004, the superior court 
of Guam awarded the parties joint custody of 
their two minor children, with physical custody alternating annually between 
Mother and Father.

 
 
[¶4]      During her first 
year with the children, Mother and the children were relocated to Wyoming because Mother is 
a member of the United States Air Force.  
Father is remarried and still resides in Guam.  On May 
17, 2005, after the children had resided in Wyoming with Mother for six months, Mother filed a motion 
to modify the Guam decree in Wyoming district court.  Mother claimed that there was a material 
change in circumstances and asked the district court to award her primary 
physical custody of the children with liberal visitation rights for Father.  The district court determined that 
Wyoming did not have jurisdiction to modify a 
custody decree from Guam and, therefore, 
dismissed Mother's motion.  Mother 
now appeals the district court's order.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      Whether a court 
has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.  Steele v. Neeman, 6 P.3d 649, 653 (Wyo. 
2000).  We "presume the district 
court's findings of fact are correct and will not set them aside unless the 
findings are inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous or 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence."  In re Guardianship of MEO, 2006 WY 87, ¶ 
17, 138 P.3d 1145, 1150 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      We have said that 
"[t]he Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A, 
constitutes federal preemption of custody matters. . . .  Consequently, a jurisdictional analysis 
necessarily begins with its provisions."  
Ritter v. Ritter, 989 P.2d 109, 111 (Wyo. 1999).  The PKPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West 
2006), states, in pertinent part, as follows:

 
 
(a)    The appropriate authorities 
of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except 
as provided in subsections (f), (g), and (h) of this section, any custody 
determination or visitation determination made consistently with the provisions 
of this section by a court of another State.

 
 
(b)    As used in this section, the 
term  

 
 
        . . . 

 
 
        
(8)    "State" means 
a State of the United States, 
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States . 
. .

 
 
(f)     A court of a State may 
modify a determination of the custody of the same child made by a court of 
another State, if  

 
 
        
(1)    it has 
jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and 

 
 
        
(2)    the court of 
the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such 
jurisdiction to modify such determination.

 
 
[¶7]      Based on the 
plain language of the PKPA, it is clear that (1) both Wyoming and Guam are 
"states" within the meaning of the act; (2) before modifying another state's 
custody determination under the PKPA, the modifying state must have subject 
matter jurisdiction; and (3) the original decree state must either decline or be 
divested of jurisdiction.  
Therefore, under the PKPA, the first question we must answer is whether 
Wyoming 
statutes conferred subject matter jurisdiction to the district court in the 
instant case.  In answering this 
question, we will also address whether Guam has retained jurisdiction over the 
matter and, ultimately, Wyoming's jurisdiction 
to modify the decree under the PKPA and Wyoming statutes.  

 
 
[¶8]      While Wyoming has 
enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), see Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-5-201 et seq. (LexisNexis 2005), the effective 
date of that act fell after Mother filed her modification motion in the instant 
case.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-502 
(LexisNexis 2005) currently states that a "motion or other request for relief 
made in a child custody proceeding or to enforce a child custody determination 
which was commenced before the effective date of this act is governed by the law 
in effect at the time the motion or other request was made."  Therefore, because the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-5-101 et seq. (LexisNexis 2003), was in effect 
at the time Mother filed her motion in the district court, the provisions of 
that act control the outcome in the instant case.

 
 
[¶9]      The general 
jurisdictional statute for making a child custody determination under Wyoming's UCCJA was Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-104 (LexisNexis 
2003); however, when modifying a custody decree made by a court of another 
state,1 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-115 (LexisNexis 
2003) provides:

 
 
(a)    If a court of another state 
has made a custody decree a court of this state shall not modify that decree 
unless it appears that the court which rendered the decree does not now have 
jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with 
this act or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree, and the 
court of this state has jurisdiction.[2]

 
 
Because 
there is no indication in the instant case that Guam has declined to assume 
jurisdiction, the district court did not have the authority to modify the Guam 
decree under § 20-5-115 unless (1) the district court had jurisdiction under the 
UCCJA, and (2) Guam no longer had jurisdiction under the act.  

 
 
[¶10]   Wyoming's jurisdictional statute for making 
child custody determinations in the first instance stated, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
(a)    A court of this state 
competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child 
custody determination by initial decree or modification decree 
if:

        
(i)      
This state is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of 
the proceeding[3] . . .;  [or]

        
(ii)     It is 
in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction 
because the child and his parents, or the child and at least one (1) contestant, 
have a significant connection with the state and there is available in this 
state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, 
protection, training and personal relationships[.]

(b)    . . . [P]hysical presence in 
this state of the child or of the child and one (1) of the contestants is not 
alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a child 
custody determination.

(c)    Physical presence of the 
child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his 
custody.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-5-104.  The benchmarks for 
jurisdiction in the first instance under the preceding statute are, therefore, 
either that the state is the child's home state, meaning the child has resided 
there for the previous six months, or it is in the best interest of the child 
that the state assume jurisdiction because of significant connections and 
substantial evidence in the state concerning the child's well-being.  When § 20-5-104 is read in conjunction 
with § 20-5-115, Wyoming can only modify a child custody decree of another 
jurisdiction if (1) the district court has home state or best interest 
jurisdiction, and (2) Guam is no 
longer able to exercise the same jurisdiction.

 
 
[¶11]   Having set forth the preceding 
statutory framework, we will analyze the district court's reasoning and order 
and Mother's appellate arguments.  
We note at the outset that neither Mother's appellate brief, nor the 
district court's order, discussed the applicability of § 20-5-115, which section 
controls the outcome of the instant case.

 
 
[¶12]   In its "Order as to Jurisdiction," 
the district court determined that Mother and Father had joint custody of the 
children, with physical custody alternating annually.  The district court further held that the 
children had lived in Wyoming since November 2004, and had educational and 
health care contacts in this state; however, the district court also found that 
the children had significant contacts in Guamincluding Fatherand had lived 
most of their lives in that jurisdiction.

 
 
[¶13]   Mother contends that the district 
court could make a custody determination because she lived with her children in 
Wyoming for the six months preceding the 
modification petition and Wyoming, therefore, became the children's home 
state.  She further argues that the 
district court erred in determining that it did not have jurisdiction because of 
the children's more significant contacts with Guam than Wyoming.4  Mother also does not deny that Father 
still resides in Guam and that the children were born there and lived in 
Guam until they relocated with Mother in 
2004.

 
 
[¶14]   Although the district court's order 
did not discuss § 20-5-115, we may affirm such order on any grounds supported by 
the record.  Fraternal Order of Eagles Sheridan Aerie No. 
186 v. State ex rel. Forwood, 2006 WY 4, ¶ 38, 126 P.3d 847, 861-62 (Wyo. 
2006).  The district court concluded 
that Wyoming did not have jurisdiction to make 
a child custody determination in this case, but that Guam did have such jurisdiction.  As discussed above, in order for 
Wyoming to modify the Guam custody decree under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-115, Wyoming must first 
be able to exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJA, and Guam must no longer have jurisdiction.  The district court's order that 
Guam currently has jurisdiction over child 
custody matters between Mother and Father relates directly to the second prong 
of the modification test.  
Therefore, if there is no error in the district court's determination 
that Guam has jurisdiction, the question of whether Wyoming has concurrent jurisdiction is moot because a 
Wyoming court cannot modify a Guam decree while 
Guam retains 
jurisdiction.

 
 
[¶15]   Having reviewed the record, and 
even if we were to consider Mother's statement of the evidence and proceedings, 
we are unable to conclude that Guam no longer has jurisdiction to modify its 
child custody decree.  We have 
previously recognized that the PKPA changed the UCCJA to create a decree state 
preference in modification matters.  
Steele, 6 P.3d  at 654; Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 43-45 
(Wyo. 
1992).  While the decree state 
preference is not absolute, we agree with the district court that the children 
have sufficient contacts with Guam to allow 
continuing jurisdiction in its courts, absent relinquishment of jurisdiction by 
those courts.  Among the children's 
contacts with Guam are: (1) they were born in and lived in Guam until they left 
with their mother to live in Wyoming; (2) Father still resides in Guam; (3) many 
of the children's paternal relatives reside in Guam; and (4) the children were 
supposed to return to Guam to reside with Father for one year, absent 
modification.  We further note that 
the Guam court evidenced its intent to retain 
jurisdiction over its decree by issuing an order to show cause on September 7, 
2005, nearly four months after Mother 
filed her motion to modify the original decree.

 
 
[¶16]   Faced with the children's 
continuing contacts with Guam as well as the UCCJA and PKPA preference for 
continuing jurisdiction in the original decree state, it is clear that the 
district court in the instant case did not err when it found that it did not 
have jurisdiction to modify the Guam custody 
decree.

 
 
[¶17]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Like the 
PKPA, Wyoming's UCCJA statutes define "state" 
to include territories and possessions of the United States, which definition includes 
Guam.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-5-103(a)(x) (LexisNexis 2003).

 
 

2We note 
that this language is nearly identical to the PKPA, § 1738A(f), quoted 
above.

 
 

3"Home 
state" was defined as "the state in which the child immediately preceding the 
time involved has lived with his parents, a parent or person acting as a parent, 
for at least six (6) consecutive months . . . ."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-5-103(a)(v).

 
 

4Because 
there is no transcript of the district court proceedings, Mother's argument 
relies partially on facts contained in a statement of evidence and proceedings 
appended to her appellate brief and also included at the end of the record 
transmitted from the district court.  
W.R.A.P. 3.03 (Supp. 2006) states:

 
 
If no 
report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a 
transcript is unavailable, appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means including appellant's 
recollection.  The statement shall 
be filed and served on appellee within 35 days of the filing of the notice of 
appeal.  Appellee may file and serve 
objections or propose amendments within 15 days after service.  The trial court shall, within 10 days, 
enter its order settling and approving the statement of evidence, which shall be 
included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on 
appeal.

 
 
It 
appears that the statement was served on Husband; however, there is no 
indication that the district court settled or approved the contents of the 
statement before it was placed in the record on appeal.  When we do not have a properly 
authenticated record before us, we must accept the district court's findings of 
fact as true and accordingly restrict our review to non-factual issues.  Seherr-Thoss v. Seherr-Thoss, 2006 WY 
111, ¶ 6, 141 P.3d 705, 710 (Wyo. 2006).  
Problems arise when no objections are filed by the appellee and the 
statement is included in the record, but there is no indication from the 
district court that it has settled or approved the statement before it is 
transmitted to this Court on appeal.  
As we will discuss more fully herein, however, even with the facts 
alleged by Mother in the statement of evidence and proceedings, the district 
court properly found that Guam retained 
jurisdiction, which issue is dispositive in this 
appeal.