Case Title: Price v. Taylor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 950802

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, 
and Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
JOYCE C. PRICE, EXECUTRIX, ETC.  
 
v.  Record No. 950802 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                       January 12, 1996 
KYLE R. TAYLOR, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
 
John E. Clarkson, Judge 
 
 
This appeal arises out of a contract for the sale of land 
between Kyle R. Taylor and Fay L. Mirman, the buyers, and Joyce 
C. Price, executrix of the Wallace V. Lankford Estate, the 
seller.  Taylor and Mirman filed a motion for judgment seeking 
damages for Price's alleged failure to perform the contract for 
sale dated April 2, 1993.  Price filed a response asserting 
that the contract was invalid because it was procured by fraud, 
because it was subject to a condition precedent, and because it 
lacked consideration.  Following a two-day hearing, the trial 
court entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding the buyers 
$35,000 in damages. 
 
On appeal, Price assigns error to the trial court's 
rulings (1) holding that, as a matter of law, the contract on 
its face recited sufficient consideration; (2) excluding jury 
instructions on fraud in the procurement of a contract; (3) 
admitting certain expert testimony; and (4) prohibiting parol 
evidence that the contract was subject to a condition 
precedent.  For the reasons set out below, we will reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new 
trial. 
 
I. 
 
 
 
 
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Price first assigns error to the trial court's ruling that 
the contract recited consideration on its face.
1  The relevant 
portion of the contract states: 
 
WITNESSETH:  That for and in consideration of the sum 
of N/A Dollars ($N/A) by N/A in hand, paid receipt of 
which is hereby acknowledged, the Buyer agrees to buy 
and the Seller agrees to sell for the sum of Twenty 
thousand Dollars xx/100 Dollars ($20,000), all that 
certain piece, parcel or lot of land . . . . 
The italicized portions were handwritten insertions made by 
Taylor in blanks on a prepared form.  Price argues that the 
language "in consideration of the sum of N/A Dollars" clearly 
and unambiguously states that the contract required a payment 
in cash as a form of consideration and that no such cash was 
tendered by the buyers or received by the seller.  Thus, Price 
concludes, the contract did not recite consideration on its 
face.  We disagree. 
 
First, the terms of the contract do not require that 
consideration be paid in cash to create the agreement.  More 
                     
     
1Price's assignment of error also stated that the trial 
court held that the contract was "valid and enforceable."  
However, the trial court's order does not contain that 
determination.  The record further reflects that the trial 
court refused to grant a motion for summary judgment filed by 
Price on the validity and enforceability of the contract 
because evidence on that issue was "anticipatory evidence as to 
one of the issues of the case," and therefore, the motion was 
"premature."  The validity and enforceability of the contract 
remained a subject for trial. 
 
 
 
 
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importantly, it is well established that mutual promises in a 
contract constitute valuable consideration.  Adams, Payne & 
Gleaves, Inc. v. Indiana Wood Preserving Co., 155 Va. 18, 29, 
154 S.E. 558, 562 (1930); Bernstein v. Bord, 146 Va. 670, 677, 
132 S.E. 698, 699-700 (1926); see also Brewer v. First Nat'l 
Bank of Danville, 202 Va. 807, 815, 120 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1961). 
 The contract recites that "the Buyer agrees to buy and the 
Seller agrees to sell for the sum of Twenty thousand Dollars." 
 This language reflects the mutual exchange of promises and 
alone is sufficient to constitute consideration for the 
contract.  Accordingly, the trial court's ruling on this issue 
was not erroneous. 
 
II. 
 
Price submitted five jury instructions which addressed her 
contention that the contract was obtained by fraud.  Price 
asserts that there was sufficient evidence to support 
instructions on this issue and that the trial court erred in 
refusing to give them. 
 
A litigant is entitled to jury instructions supporting his 
theory of the case if sufficient evidence is introduced to 
support that theory.  Bowers v. May, 233 Va. 411, 413-14, 357 
S.E.2d 29, 30 (1987).  While a litigant must carry his burden 
to show fraud in the procurement of the contract by clear and 
convincing evidence, the trial court must give the jury 
instruction on fraud unless the evidence is "clearly 
 
 
 
 
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insufficient to support the theory."  Provident Life & Accident 
Ins. Co. v. Walker, 190 Va. 1016, 1028, 59 S.E.2d 126, 131 
(1950).
2
 
Price testified that she signed a contract on January 9, 
1993, agreeing to sell the property to Taylor and Troy M. 
Evenson.  She then testified that sometime in late February or 
early March, Evenson approached her and asked her to sign three 
blank contracts because coffee had been spilled on the January 
contract.  Price stated that she did not sign a contract dated 
April 2, 1993, and that her signature on that contract was 
forged.  Finally, Price testified that she never negotiated 
with Mirman for the sale of the property. 
 
Applying the principles set out above, we conclude that 
the evidence produced by Price to show fraud was sufficient to 
support jury instructions on the issue.  Therefore, we hold 
that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on 
Price's theory of fraud in the procurement of the contract.
3
 
III. 
 
Over Price's objection, Taylor and Mirman introduced 
testimony of three attorneys as rebuttal witnesses.  Each of 
                     
     
2Taylor and Mirman did not move to strike Price's evidence 
on fraud as insufficient as a matter of law. 
     
3Price also complained of the submission of an instruction 
to the jury stating that the mutual exchange of promises 
constituted legal consideration for a contract.  Because the 
issue of the contract validity and enforceability remained a 
jury issue, see supra note 1, submission of an instruction on 
this issue was not reversible error. 
 
 
 
 
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these attorneys testified that the contract was valid on its 
face because it recited legally adequate consideration.  Price 
assigns error to the admission of this evidence, claiming that 
the testimony was improper because the attorneys' statements 
were conclusions of law prohibited by Code § 8.01-401.3(B).  We 
agree.  This testimony that a contract was valid on its face is 
not evidence regarding the existence of an offer, acceptance, 
or consideration, but purports to state the legal consequences 
of those factual predicates.  Thus, the testimony of these 
three witnesses was improper because it constituted conclusions 
of law in violation of Code § 8.01-401.3. 
 
IV. 
 
Our conclusions regarding instructing the jury on 
fraudulent procurement and admission of the attorneys' 
testimony require reversal of the judgment of the trial court 
and remand of the case.  We note that one of the issues at 
trial, the admissibility of parol evidence to show a condition 
precedent, may arise again on remand. 
 
The general rule in Virginia is that parol evidence of 
prior stipulations or oral agreements is inadmissable to vary, 
contradict, or explain the terms of a complete, unambiguous, 
unconditional written contract.  Shevel's, Inc. v. Southeastern 
Assocs., 228 Va. 175, 182, 320 S.E.2d 339, 343 (1984).  When a 
claim is made under an unambiguous written instrument, however, 
 a signatory to the instrument may introduce parol evidence to 
 
 
 
 
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establish a defense based on such doctrines as partial 
integration, collateral contract, fraudulent procurement, 
mutual mistake, or condition precedent.  Id. at 182-83; 320 
S.E.2d at 343-44; J.E. Robert Co. v. J. Robert Co., 231 Va. 
338, 343, 343 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1986); Walker & LaBerge Co. v. 
First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 206 Va. 683, 688, 146 S.E.2d 239, 
244 (1966); Meadows v. McClaugherty, 167 Va. 41, 45, 187 S.E. 
475, 477 (1936); Whitaker & Fowle v. Lane, 128 Va. 317, 345-46, 
104 S.E. 252, 262 (1920). 
 
Not all evidence alleged to establish a condition 
precedent is admissible, however.  As we stated in Walker & 
LaBerge, the alleged "condition precedent must be neither 
inconsistent with the instrument itself, nor of such a 
character that its performance would render the instrument 
wholly ineffective or nugatory."  206 Va. at 690, 146 S.E.2d at 
244.  Thus, in litigation involving the enforcement of an 
agreement by a general contractor to waive its mechanic's lien, 
evidence of an alleged condition precedent that the agreement 
was effective only if the contractor had been paid in full was 
inadmissible because a contractor has no mechanic's lien if he 
has been fully paid; therefore, the condition of payment made 
the agreement to waive the lien a legal impossibility, a 
nullity.  Id. at 692, 146 S.E.2d at 246.  Payment under these 
circumstances would negate any ability or need to waive the 
lien because there would be no lien. 
 
 
 
 
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On the other hand, in Whitaker & Fowle v. Lane, parol 
evidence was properly admitted to show an alleged condition 
precedent requiring certain action by a third party before a 
contract for the sale of a residence was enforceable.  The 
buyer, a bank, was allowed to introduce parol evidence that the 
purchase contract was conditioned on the amendment of a banking 
charter and subscription of bank stock which would allow the 
bank to move its headquarters.  Whitaker & Fowle, 128 Va. at 
346, 146 S.E.2d at 263.  The terms of this alleged condition 
precedent were not inconsistent with the terms of the purchase 
contract, did not vary the terms of that contract, and the 
performance of the condition precedent did not render the 
contract "wholly ineffective or nugatory."  These general 
principles would be applicable if, on remand, Price seeks to 
offer parol evidence of a condition precedent to the April 3, 
1993 contract. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial 
in accordance with this opinion. 
 
Reversed and remanded.