Case Title: State v. Tague

Citation: 372 So. 2d 555

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1979-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
372 So. 2d 555 (1978) STATE of Louisiana v. Charles TAGUE. No. 62584. Supreme Court of Louisiana. December 15, 1978. On Rehearing June 25, 1979. *556 A. J. Boudreaux, Kenner, Indigent Defender Board, for defendant-appellant. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara B. Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mamoulides, Dist. Atty., Clarence McManus, Abbott J. Reeves, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee. PER CURIAM. Charles E. Tague was charged by bill of information with armed robbery in violation of La.R.S. 14:64. After trial by jury, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to serve sixty-five years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. On appeal, defendant relies on one assignment of error for reversal of his conviction and sentence. We have reviewed the record and find no merit to defendant's assignment of error. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction and sentence. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. BLANCHE, Justice. In this rehearing, we again consider defendant's assignment of error that the arresting officer failed to inform him of each of his constitutional rights. State v. Hollingsworth, 337 So. 2d 461 (La.1976); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602,16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Defendant contends that the introduction of an inculpatory statement made by him after his arrest should not have been admitted into evidence, as the State had not overcome its heavy burden of proof establishing that Miranda rights were actually given and knowingly waived. *557 On original hearing we affirmed defendant's conviction, and for the following reasons we conclude that our decision on that original hearing was correct. In the hearing to determine whether the inculpatory statement would be admitted, the arresting officer was the only one to testify about when the accused allegedly made the inculpatory remark concerning the location of the cab. He stated that he read the defendant his Miranda rights after he apprehended him and before the alleged inculpatory statement was made. His testimony is as follows: We are not willing to hold that the defendant was not informed properly of his constitutional right to remain silent because the arresting officer could not remember what "Miranda rights" were in the absence of the white card on which such rights were printed. In view of the officer's inability to remember these rights independently without a card, we believe that any attempt by him to give such rights to an accused without reading therefrom would, indeed, have been suspicious as to adequacy of the advice. In short, his failure on the witness stand to remember what Miranda rights were is not proof they were not given by the officer in the manner stated. On the hearing as to admissibility of defendant's statement, defendant introduced no evidence to negate the arresting officer's testimony that defendant was informed of his rights. The reading of the Miranda rights from a card was adequate, and has even been held to be preferable to giving an accused a copy to read for himself. United States v. Choice, 392 F. Supp. 460 (E.D.Pa.1975); cf. United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1972). Neither is an arresting officer compelled to give an intelligence test to a person who has been advised of his rights to determine if he understands them; an illiterate, or a person with a below-normal I. Q., even a mental retardate, can make a valid waiver of his Miranda rights and is not precluded from making a knowing and voluntary confession. State v. Neal, 321 So. 2d 497, 499 (La.1975); State v. Washington, 321 So. 2d 763, 767 (La.1975), vacated in part (re. death sentence), 428 U.S. 906, 96 S. Ct. 3214, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1213 (1976); State v. Ross, 320 So. 2d 177, 179 (La.1975); State v. Nicholas, 319 So. 2d 361 and 365 (La.1975) (two *558 cases); State v. Edwards, 257 La. 707, 243 So. 2d 806 (1971). Absent a clear and readily apparent lack thereof, it can be presumed that a person has capacity to understand, and the burden is on the one claiming a lack of capacity to show that lack. LSA-C.C. arts. 25 and 1782; State v. Rankin, 357 So. 2d 803 (La.1978); State v. Glover, 343 So. 2d 118, 128 (La.1976). Even intoxication, when readily apparent, has been held to go only to the weight to be given an inculpatory statement. Rankin, supra. When there is nothing in the speech or manner of a person to call attention to a lack of capacity, we do not regard that an arresting officer has an obligation to take any special measures to be assured of that person's capacity before proceeding to question him. There is no showing whatsoever in this record as to any lack of capacity on the part of defendant. We find no merit to defendant's assignment of error; and accordingly, for the reasons assigned on original hearing and herein, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. AFFIRMED. DIXON and CALOGERO, JJ., dissent. DENNIS, J., dissents with reasons. DIXON, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. If the State couldn't prove what the defendant was told (his "Miranda" rights) the trial judge couldn't possibly have found that defendant was informed of his rights and knowingly waived them. DENNIS, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Contrary to the explicit requirements of the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the majority today creates a presumption that the defendant understood his constitutional rights and places the burden of proof upon the defendant, instead of the state, to demonstrate whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. In Miranda the Supreme Court painstakingly put the burden of proof upon the government to show that the specific warnings were given and that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. In doing so, the court specifically rejected the idea that a defendant could be presumed to know his constitutional rights without a warning because of his education, background, or because of other circumstantial evidence: The majority opinion today clearly violates the principles of Miranda and of Article 1, § 13 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.