Case Title: Blue Star Supper Club, Inc. v. City of Wichita

Citation: 208 Kan. 731, 495 P.2d 524

Docket Number: 46,172

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1972-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
208 Kan. 731 (1972)
495 P.2d 524
BLUE STAR SUPPER CLUB, INC., Appellant,
v.
CITY OF WICHITA, KANSAS, A Municipal Corporation, Appellee.
No. 46,172

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed February 10, 1972.
Jacob S. Graybill, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Robert R. Arnold, also of Wichita, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
Arthur G. Johnson, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FONTRON, J.:
The plaintiff, Blue Star Supper Club, Inc., is a nonprofit Kansas corporation with its place of business at 4545 South Hydraulic in Wichita. The club holds a class A private club license issued under the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 41-2601, et seq., commonly known as the Private Club Act (sometimes referred to herein as the act).
On August 19, 1969, the city of Wichita adopted Ordinance No. 30-747 requiring that the premises of any club licensed under the act be closed to members and to the public between the hours of 3 a.m. and 9 a.m. on any day other than Sunday and from 3 a.m. to 12 noon on Sundays. The present action is brought by the club for a declaratory judgment declaring the ordinance void and for an injunction precluding the city from enforcing the ordinance. Judgment was entered in the city's favor and the Blue Star Supper Club has appealed.
The club presents three points: (1) The ordinance conflicts with K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 41-2614 and hence is void under K.S.A. 41-208 *732 and K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 41-2631. (2) The ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious and therefore void. (3) The ordinance is not a valid exercise of the city's police power. The latter two points present basically the same issue and will be considered together.
Point number one is two pronged. First, is the ordinance void as being in conflict with 41-2614? This statute provides that no licensed club shall allow the serving, mixing or consumption of alcoholic liquor on its premises between 3 a.m. to 9 a.m. on weekdays and from 3 a.m. to noon on Sundays. K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 41-2631 provides no city shall enact an ordinance in conflict with the provisions of the Private Club Act and any ordinance conflicting with that act shall be void.
A similar situation was disclosed in Leavenworth Club Owners Assn. v. Atchison, 208 Kan. 318, 492 P.2d 183. In that case the city of Leavenworth adopted an ordinance prohibiting licensed clubs from allowing the serving, mixing or consumption of alcoholic liquor between 1:30 a.m. and 9 a.m. on weekdays and from 1:30 a.m. to 12 noon on Sundays. The plaintiffs contended in that case that the Leavenworth ordinance conflicted with K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 41-2614. We rejected that contention and held that 41-2614 gave the plaintiffs in that case no vested right to serve or permit the mixing or consumption of alcoholic drinks until the hour of 3 a.m.; that the limitation contained in the ordinance merely added to or enlarged the limitation imposed by the statute and hence was not contradictory or conflicting in a legal sense. In this connection see, also, Clemons v. Wilson, 151 Kan. 250, 98 P.2d 423.
We believe the rationale underlying the decisions in Clemons and Leavenworth is clearly applicable here. The Wichita ordinance does not conflict with K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 41-2614. While the statute relates to the hours during which alcoholic liquor may be served, mixed or consumed on licensed club premises, the ordinance simply imposes closing hours. Those hours do not interfere with the time limitations of the statute. Although the hours set by ordinance for closing coincide with the hours during which the serving, mixing or consumption of alcoholic liquor is prohibited by statute, this coincidence does not imply that the statute and ordinance are at cross purposes, or that the ordinance contravenes the provisions of the statute. There is no disharmony between the two enactments; they may coexist with amity.
*733 But the plaintiff contends that the ordinance is void as contravening the pre-emptive provisions of K.S.A. 41-208. This statute was enacted in 1949 as part of the Kansas Liquor Control Act and reads as follows:
In our opinion the pre-emptive provisions of the foregoing statute are not as broad or as inconclusive as the plaintiff suggests. By its own terms, the statute applies only to the act of which it is a part  the Liquor Control Act of 1949 (L. 1949, ch. 242). The passage of the Liquor Control Act closely followed approval by Kansas voters of a proposal to amend Article 15, Section 10, of the Kansas Constitution which at that time prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. As amended, Article 15, section 10, now empowers the legislature to prohibit intoxicating liquors in certain areas, to regulate, license and tax the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors and to regulate the possession and transportation of the same.
It occurs to us that what the legislature intended by including the pre-emptive provisions of 41-208 as part of the Liquor Control Act was to give the state exclusive power to control and regulate the traffic in alcoholic liquor and the manufacture of beer. To such end it was provided that the power to regulate and control the "manufacture, distribution, sale, possession, transportation and traffic in alcoholic liquor and the manufacture of beer regardless of its alcoholic content" should be vested exclusively in the state. This pre-emptive clause contains no reference whatever to the consumption of alcoholic liquor, nor were any restrictions placed upon consumption in the entire Liquor Control Act, with one exception. That exception *734 is found in section 82 of that act, K.S.A. 41-719, where it was made unlawful for any person to drink or consume alcoholic liquor upon the public streets, alleys, roads or highways, or in beer parlors, taverns, pool halls or places to which the general public had access. (Subsequent amendments make it possible for certain public property, in limited cases, to be exempted from the restrictions of this statute. See K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 41-719.)
It was not until the year 1965, some sixteen years after the Liquor Control Act was adopted, that the legislature again turned its attention to the consumption of alcoholic beverages and enacted the Private Club Act (L. 1965, ch. 316). This act deals with places where alcoholic liquor may be served and consumed. In section 1 of the act (now K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 41-2601 [b] [1]) a club is defined as "an organization licensed hereunder to which the club members shall be permitted to resort for the purpose of consuming alcoholic liquor." Section 2 of the act, now K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 41-2602, specifically relates to consumption. This statute reads:
A third section of the Private Club Act, now appearing as K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 41-2603, declares that consumption of alcoholic liquor at any place other than those provided in the act shall be deemed to be consumption in a place to which the general public has access.
The foregoing provisions of the Private Club Act clearly indicate to us that its purpose is to regulate and control the consumption of alcoholic liquor, not the liquor traffic. In our opinion the act does *735 not encroach upon those areas which the legislature intended to pre-empt for exclusive state action.
In concluding that the regulation and control of the consumption of alcoholic liquor is not an area exclusively reserved by the state we believe it is significant that when the legislature adopted K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 41-2631 as a component part of the Private Club Act, and forbade therein the enactment of any ordinance conflicting with the act, it did not include a pre-emptive provision. We cannot view the omission as unintentional. The legislature was perfectly aware of the method by which it could have vested exclusive control and regulation of liquor consumption in the state had it so intended, as is evidenced by its inclusion of the pre-emptive provision contained in K.S.A. 41-208.
We turn to the other issue. Is the Wichita ordinance void as being an unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious exercise of the police power?
The regulation of an occupation, trade or business is widely held to be a legitimate exercise of the police power, where the unrestricted pursuit of the same might adversely affect the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. This principle presupposes that the regulation is reasonable, is not arbitrary, and that it bears a logical connection with the objectives to be accomplished. (56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, §§ 471, 472, pp. 520-523.) The general subject was explored by this court in Grigsby v. Mitchum, 191 Kan. 293, 380 P.2d 363, where a challenge was directed to an ordinance enacted by the governing body of Kansas City, Kansas requiring a license for the operation of pinball machines in that city. In the course of its opinion the court said:
In the Grigsby case the court reached the conclusion that the ordinance was valid and that its enactment was within the legislative power of the city.
Rules relating to the regulation of hours of business are found stated in 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, Etc., § 474, p. 526:
It may be argued that the Blue Star Supper Club is not a business within the usually accepted meaning of that term, and it must be conceded there are points of difference. We believe, however, there is sufficient analogy between the two for purposes of comparison. Especially would there seem to be points of similarity between a licensed private club and an ordinary restaurant where the former dispenses both food and drink, as is true in the case before us.
The plaintiff complains that the city ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, in that it does not apply to commercial twenty-four hour restaurants or truck stops. We do not view the classification made by the ordinance as being unreasonably discriminatory. Premises on which alcoholic liquor is available for consumption as late as 3 a.m. can well be said, in our estimation, to occupy a different status than do those where more innocuous beverages alone are available for those who thirst. The ordinary commercial twenty-four hour dining stop does not provide its patrons with facilities for having a snifter with their late meals. Although the record before us reveals no infractions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 41-2614, so far as after-hours consumption of liquor is *737 concerned, the potential for violation appears obvious. At the very least we feel safe in saying there is greater opportunity for one, so inclined, to slake his post 3 a.m. thirst at a private club than at a common commercial all-night eatery.
The question of reasonable classification came before this court in Tuloss v. City of Sedan, 31 Kan. 165, 1 Pac. 285, and we believe it was properly answered in that case. The city had adopted an ordinance providing for the levy and collection of a license tax on merchants. Under the ordinance an annual license fee of eighty dollars, payable quarterly, was levied on druggists having a permit from the probate judge for the sale of intoxicating liquors, and a fee of only five dollars on druggists who did not have such a permit.
The plaintiff paid into the city treasury the sum of twenty dollars (a quarterly payment) and obtained a license as a druggist having a permit to sell intoxicating liquors. He then commenced an action to recover fifteen dollars of that amount as being an illegal exaction. The question presented was whether the ordinance was valid, and this court provided an affirmative answer. The court's discussion on the point is found on page 168:
In the light of what has been said we conclude that Wichita Ordinance No. 30-747 is valid and we therefore affirm the judgment of the court below.