Case Title: State v. Nathaniel A. Lindell

Citation: 2001 WI 108

Docket Number: 1999AP002704-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 108 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-2704-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Nathaniel A. Lindell,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 180 
Reported at:  238 Wis. 2d 422, 617 N.W.2d 500 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 11, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 30, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse 
 
JUDGE: 
John J. Perlich 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Timothy J. Gaskell and Hanson & Gaskel, Westby, and 
oral argument by Timothy J. Gaskell. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Diane M. Welsh, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Rhonda L. 
Lanford and Habush, Habush, Davis & Rottier, S.C., Madison, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
2001 WI 108 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No.  99-2704-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Nathaniel A. Lindell,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.  This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals affirming a judgment of the 
circuit court for La Crosse County, John J. Perlich, Judge.1  The 
defendant, Nathaniel A. Lindell, was convicted in a jury trial 
of first-degree intentional homicide, arson, and burglary. 
¶2 
After his conviction, Lindell moved the circuit court 
to vacate the judgment and grant him a new trial on grounds that 
(1) the circuit court failed to strike a prospective juror for 
cause, forcing him to use one of his peremptory strikes to 
remove the juror 
from the 
venire, 
and (2) 
he received 
                     
1 State v. Lindell, 2000 WI App 180, 238 Wis. 2d 422, 617 
N.W.2d 500. 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
2 
ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed 
to present certain impeachment evidence. 
¶3 
The circuit court denied the defendant's motion and 
Lindell appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed.  The court of 
appeals applied the analysis on juror bias recently developed in 
this court and ruled that the challenged juror was neither 
objectively nor subjectively biased.  The court of appeals also 
ruled that the defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  We granted the defendant's 
petition for review. 
¶4 
In this case, we have considered three issues and 
reach the following conclusions: First, under the juror bias 
standards promulgated by this court, juror D.F. was objectively 
biased as a matter of law and should have been removed for 
cause.  The circuit court erred when it failed to remove juror 
D.F. for cause. 
¶5 
Second, under the facts of this case, the circuit 
court's error did not affect the substantial rights of the 
defendant.  Lindell used the first of seven peremptory strikes 
to remove the prospective juror who should have been struck for 
cause, and the juror did not participate in the trial.  Because 
our decision to affirm Lindell's conviction is at odds with 
State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997), which 
would have required an automatic reversal in any situation where 
the defendant used a peremptory strike to remove a prospective 
juror who should have been excused for cause, we overrule Ramos 
and announce a new standard to protect defendants. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
3 
¶6 
Third, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
defendant 
was 
not 
prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance of trial 
counsel. 
¶7 
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
I. UNDERLYING FACTS 
 
 
¶8 
Donald Harmacek, a La Crosse resident in his mid-60s, 
was killed in his home on November 25, 1996.  Nathaniel Lindell, 
the defendant in this case, was convicted by a jury of first-
degree 
intentional 
homicide 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.01(1) (1997-98)2 for causing Harmacek's death.  Lindell was 
also 
convicted 
of 
burglary 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.10(1)(a) and (2)(d), and arson in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.02(1)(a), for burglarizing and torching Harmacek's home as 
part of the incident that caused Harmacek's death.  Lindell was 
convicted of all these charges as a party to the crime, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 939.05(1). 
¶9 
In the early morning hours of November 25, 1996, three 
men went to Harmacek's home with the intention of committing a 
burglary.  The three men were Nathaniel Lindell, 21, his brother 
Joshua Lindell, 19, and Marcus Mitchell, 26.  The men traveled 
in Joshua Lindell's car with Mitchell as the driver.  The 
                     
2 All statutory references are to the 1997-98 volumes unless 
noted otherwise.  
No. 99-2704  
 
 
4 
Lindells wore dark clothing and all three men carried two-way 
radios.  
¶10 Nathaniel Lindell had burglarized Harmacek's home in 
the past; Harmacek kept a large coin collection in his house.  
¶11 When the men arrived at a point near Harmacek's 
residence, Mitchell remained with the vehicle.  The Lindells 
entered the residence by duct-taping a basement window and 
breaking it with a miniature Louisville Slugger bat.  While they 
were in the basement, the Lindells found a small amount of 
money, and then Joshua Lindell picked up a wrench at Nathaniel 
Lindell's direction. 
¶12 The men proceeded upstairs to the main level of the 
home where they observed Harmacek apparently sleeping on the 
floor.  When Harmacek moved, Joshua Lindell, who was walking 
ahead of his brother, "freaked and knocked him on the head with 
the wrench."  After this blow, Joshua Lindell asked his brother 
what they should do.  Nathaniel Lindell responded by hitting 
Harmacek with a small hammer, causing significant injury and 
gruesome results.  According to testimony by an expert in 
bloodstain-pattern analysis, Harmacek received at least three 
blows to the head.  Joshua Lindell testified that "blood 
squirted up" when his brother hit the victim.  Later Nathaniel 
Lindell took Harmacek's wallet from a nearby table and the men 
took $90 from it.  Both Lindells proceeded to search the house 
for valuables.  
¶13 The Lindells found alcohol in the house and they 
spread it about the main level and the basement.  Nathaniel 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
5 
Lindell then lit fires in the house.  The two men crawled back 
out the window through which they entered and returned to 
Mitchell who was at the waiting car.  Harmacek died as a result 
of the trauma to his head and the fire. 
¶14 Joshua 
Lindell 
pleaded 
guilty 
to 
first-degree 
intentional homicide as a party to the crime.  He did so in 
exchange for (1) the State recommending that the judge give him 
parole eligibility after 25 years imprisonment, and  (2) the 
State dismissing the arson and burglary charges against him.  
Joshua Lindell testified in his brother's trial.  Mitchell, 
meanwhile, was granted complete immunity in exchange for his 
testimony in the trial of Nathaniel Lindell.  
 
II. LITIGATION FACTS 
 
 
¶15 Nathaniel Lindell was charged with homicide and other 
crimes on March 5, 1997.  The circuit court conducted numerous 
motion hearings in the case throughout the latter half of 1997 
and January 1998.  
¶16 Harmacek's murder received significant news media 
attention in the La Crosse area.  In fact, months before trial, 
the parties and the circuit court were concerned with issues 
relating to media publicity and the future venire, particularly 
when Joshua Lindell pleaded guilty, and the parties had a 
dispute over the extent of media coverage about the case and 
Joshua Lindell's guilty plea.  Nathaniel Lindell moved the 
circuit court to issue a protective order to prevent discussion 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
6 
of the case with members of the news media, but the circuit 
court denied the motion.  
¶17 In addition, when a mental examination was done to 
assess Nathaniel Lindell's competency, the media requested 
access to the report and it became the subject of two motions by 
the defendant.  In both instances, the circuit court declined to 
keep the report under seal.  
¶18 Nathaniel Lindell also moved the circuit court to 
allow individual voir dire of prospective jurors and to mail 
prospective jurors a lengthy questionnaire before they arrived 
for jury service.  Both of these motions related to the 
defendant's concerns over pretrial publicity.  The circuit court 
allowed individual voir dire, but it apparently did not approve 
any of the questionnaires that the defendant proffered to the 
court. 
¶19 The motions noted above were made in the last half of 
1997.  In January 1998, just weeks before trial, the defendant 
moved the circuit court for change of venue "because an 
impartial trial [could] not be had in La Crosse County."  
Counsel for Lindell argued that a fair trial could not take 
place in the county "because of the nature and the amount, the 
overwhelming amount, of pretrial publicity."  The circuit court 
denied this motion.  
¶20 On the morning of January 26, 1998, jury selection 
began in the State's case against Nathaniel Lindell.  District 
Attorney Scott Horne represented the State and Assistant State 
Public Defenders Christine Clair and Keith Belzer represented 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
7 
the defendant.  The circuit court noted that it would begin with 
a venire of 50 prospective jurors but that initially only 28 
would be brought into the courtroom.  
¶21 The clerk called the first 28 prospective jurors.  
Prospective juror D.F. was not among these 28.  She became, 
however, the 30th prospective juror called when the circuit 
court excused several of the first 28 candidates for lack of 
availability and called in 4 additional prospective jurors.  
¶22 The circuit court asked whether anyone in the venire 
had heard of the facts of the case.  So many people raised their 
hand in response to this inquiry that the circuit court decided 
to ask who had not heard about the case.  The court then asked 
the venire whether anyone had decided about the guilt or 
innocence of those accused in the case.  The circuit court 
excused one juror who had already made a decision as to the 
guilt of those accused.  The court also engaged in colloquies 
with a number of other prospective jurors who indicated they 
might have an opinion about the guilt or innocence of Nathaniel 
Lindell, but the court did not excuse any more prospective 
jurors once the court made a determination that each person 
could be impartial.  D.F. did not indicate that she had already 
made up her mind about the guilt or innocence of the accused.  
¶23 The circuit court then allowed the parties to read 
their witness lists to the venire to examine the extent of any 
relationships between the venire and witnesses, attorneys, and 
the defendant.  When the State read the name of Shirley Otto, a 
long-time companion of Harmacek, D.F. indicated that she knew 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
8 
Otto.  The following exchange then occurred between the circuit 
judge and D.F.: 
 
The Court: Miss [F.], how do you know Shirley? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: I've known Shirley and Donny 
for about twenty years.  Our place of business, Donny 
was our Pabst distributor. 
 
The Court: Okay.  Was the relationship such that you 
would have difficulty -- 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: No. 
 
The Court: Okay. 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Close friends, just friends, 
you know, over the years. 
 
The Court: Okay.  Can you judge the credibility of her 
the same way you judge the credibility of any other 
witnesses? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Yeah. 
The State proceeded to read the names of more of its potential 
witnesses aloud.  After further questioning of the venire by the 
attorneys, the circuit court asked: "The alleged victim in this 
case is Mr. Donald Harmacek.  Is anyone acquainted with, related 
to by blood or marriage, or had any business dealings with Mr. 
Harmacek?"  The transcript of the voir dire does not indicate 
that D.F. or any prospective juror raised a hand in response to 
this question.  
¶24 The circuit court then moved on to questioning the 
venire about their criminal histories, among other things.  The 
court dismissed one juror for cause because she was being 
prosecuted by the district attorney's office.  
No. 99-2704  
 
 
9 
¶25 The jury selection began at about 9:20 a.m. and at 
around 10:45 a.m. the circuit court gave the venire a break.  
Out of the presence of the jury, the first words on the record 
went as follows: 
 
Ms. Clair: I'm going to ask that Miss [F.], who knows 
both Mr. Harmacek and Miss Otto, be struck for cause. 
 It's not that she just knows him casually, this was a 
business acquaintance.  And because she knows both of 
them -- she said that she didn't think it would bother 
her.  I just, you know, somebody that got murdered, 
and you know that person's girlfriend, you're going to 
have an emotional, feeling about that, and I think 
it's very difficult. 
 
 
And if I ask more specific questions about it, 
and then she gets struck, it's like I'm trying not to 
-- I don't want somebody that knows him. 
 
The Court: She has assured us she can fairly and 
impartially judge this case.  As long as she makes 
that assurance, I don't think I can strike her for 
cause.  You can ask her some questions and we'll play 
it by ear, but I won't strike her at this time. 
 
Ms. Clair: If after I ask her some questions -- I 
don't want to ask you directly when I'm asking, 
because I don't want it -- 
 
The Court: You can ask then, or I will strike her on 
my own if, in fact, I find that that's necessary. 
The parties and the court recessed at this point.  
 
¶26 When the voir dire continued after the recess, the 
circuit court dismissed a number of prospective jurors for 
cause: two people because they had strong feelings about the 
general credibility of witnesses who testify pursuant to an 
immunity agreement; one man because he had strong feelings about 
the incident in the case, which occurred in his neighborhood; 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
10
one woman because she felt she could not be fair to the 
defendant because she treated crime victims in her work as a 
nurse. 
 
¶27 Counsel for the defendant, Clair, questioned jurors 
after the State had asked many questions.  When Clair came to 
prospective juror D.F., the following exchange occurred: 
 
Ms. Clair: Okay.  Now, you had stated before that you 
knew Mr. Harmacek and you know Miss Otto. 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Um-hum. 
 
Ms. Clair: Was that from working at [a local store] or 
previous employment? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: The previous.  My parents 
used to own and operate [a La Crosse bar/restaurant], 
and Donny was our distributor. 
 
Ms. Clair: Okay.  How much contact did you have with 
either him or Miss Otto? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: None really with Shirley 
other than knowing her.  Donny, you know, when he made 
our deliveries three times a week. 
 
Ms. Clair: Other than when he would make deliveries, 
did you ever socialize with him or did your family? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: My parents knew him real 
well. 
 
Ms. Clair: Your parents did? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Yeah. 
 
Ms. Clair: Did you and your family talk of -- about 
what had happened after, after his death? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Yes. 
 
Ms. Clair: And how was that? 
 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
11
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Hard.  We knew Donny for 
quite a few years. 
 
Ms. Clair: Was it very difficult on your parents? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Yeah.  I had the loss of my 
dad the year before this happened to Donny, so prior 
to that.  It was hard, yes. 
 
Ms. Clair: Okay.  Knowing that you had known him, and 
that your parents knew him even more so, and that he 
was the victim on the charges in this case, how does 
that make you feel right now sitting on this jury? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Okay.  I think I could -- I 
think I could go along with it and make my, you know, 
decision. 
 
Ms. Clair: Do you think that you could listen to the 
evidence and look at the case without being -- having 
an emotional reaction because of your relationship and 
your family's relationship with him? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Yes, because I worked part-
time for my parents other than working at [a local 
store].  So I wasn't [sic] on a daily basis.  I mean 
he'd come in for breakfast every morning, but I wasn't 
there every day.  I worked like -- I went to school 
and worked afternoons, so I would meet him like when 
he would bring the deliveries that afternoon.  But as 
far as an everyday basis, no, I didn't deal with Donny 
every day. 
 
Ms. Clair: So do you think that if you were chosen to 
be on the jury, you would be able to listen to all the 
evidence and make a fair determination? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Yes, I think I could. 
 
Ms. Clair: Okay.  Thank you.  I really appreciate 
that. 
Counsel for the defendant went on to ask many questions of the 
venire and counsel for the State followed up with additional 
questions. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
12
¶28 Individual voir dire of the prospective jurors then 
began in the nearby jury room.  When D.F. entered the jury room 
for individual voir dire, defense counsel Belzer questioned her: 
 
Mr. Belzer: Obviously you have told us previously that 
you knew something about this case before getting here 
today? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Um-hum. 
 
Mr. Belzer: Had you also seen information in the 
newspaper or television? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Just other than what we've 
been reading in the paper and the TV has had prior to, 
you know, when this happened. 
 
Mr. Belzer: Do you receive the daily newspaper? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Um-hum. 
 
Mr. Belzer: You have read all the articles about the 
case? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Um-hum.  Well, I can't say 
all of them.  When I get time to read the paper, I do, 
yeah. 
 
Mr. Belzer: What do you recall hearing about Mr. 
Lindell, about Nathan Lindell? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Well, just what had happened 
that night.  I mean Donny, Donny lived like about six 
blocks from us -- 
 
Mr. Belzer: Um-hum. 
 
Prospective 
Juror 
[D.F.]: 
-- 
in 
the 
neighborhood. . . . So other than what had happened 
that evening, other than what I've read in the paper, 
that's, you know. 
 
Mr. Belzer: Okay.  Do you remember specific things 
from the paper about Nathan? 
 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
13
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: No.  Huh-uh. 
 
Mr. Belzer: Okay. 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: Not pinpoint anything, you 
know. 
 
Mr. Belzer: You have discussed this case based on 
media reports with your family I assume? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: My mom.  I live with my mom 
since I lost my dad, yes. 
 
Mr. Belzer: Sure. 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: So we've talked about it, 
yeah.  We've known Donny.  He was our beer driver for 
47 years my parents were in business, so -- 
 
Mr. Belzer: When you discussed it with your mom, did 
either of you offer an opinion about whether you 
thought --  
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: No. 
 
Mr. Belzer: -- anybody was guilty in the case? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: No, huh-uh. 
 
Mr. Belzer: Okay.  Have you discussed the case with 
Ms. Otto at all? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: No.  We run [sic] into her a 
couple weeks ago on the elevator, and that's the first 
we'd seen her since this happened other than the 
funeral home that night. 
 
Mr. Belzer: Earlier when you were answering questions, 
clearly you were very emotional, and it seemed like 
you were about to start crying.  Are you sure you feel 
okay about sitting on this jury? 
 
Prospective Juror [D.F.]: I feel very confident.  Like 
I say, I knew him, but as far as personal, I think my 
parents knew him more personal than I did. 
 
Mr. Belzer: Okay.  Thank you. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
14
¶29 After the attorneys had questioned all the prospective 
jurors individually, the circuit court judge asked the parties 
if they were "[r]eady for strikes."  Belzer immediately renewed 
Lindell's request that D.F. be removed from the venire for 
cause.  He noted that during the initial questioning of D.F. 
earlier in the day, D.F. had to stop talking because she was 
going to cry.  He also stressed D.F.'s familiarity with 
Harmacek, a man D.F. repeatedly referred to as "Donny."  The 
circuit court judge replied that he did not notice D.F. "looking 
like she was ready to cry," that D.F.'s relationship with 
Harmacek was minimal, and that D.F. had "repeatedly" maintained 
she could be impartial.  Thus, the circuit court denied the 
defendant's request to strike D.F. for cause.  
¶30 The defendant struck D.F. from the panel with his 
first peremptory challenge and therefore D.F. did not sit on the 
jury.  At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of 
homicide, arson, and burglary.  The circuit court judge 
sentenced Nathaniel Lindell to prison on all three sentences, 
most important of which was the sentence on the first-degree 
intentional homicide conviction: life in prison with parole 
eligibility after 50 years.  
 
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR JUROR AND VENIRE BIAS 
 
 
¶31 Cases concerning juror bias present difficult legal 
questions for this court.  This is another such case. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
15
¶32 In 1997, this court decided State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 
2d 12.  The main issue in Ramos was identical to the principal 
issue here: What is the appropriate remedy when a defendant uses 
one of his or her peremptory challenges to remove a prospective 
juror who should have been struck for cause?  In Ramos, we 
"[held] that the use of a peremptory challenge to correct a 
trial court error is adequate grounds for reversal because it 
arbitrarily deprives the defendant of a statutorily granted 
right," even though the defendant is found guilty by a fair and 
impartial jury.  211 Wis. 2d at 24-25. 
¶33 Since Ramos, we have confronted a number of cases 
relating to juror bias.  State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 579 
N.W.2d 654 (1998); State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 588 N.W.2d 
1 (1999); State v. Broomfield, 223 Wis. 2d 465, 589 N.W.2d 225 
(1999); State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 596 N.W.2d 770 
(1999); State v. Kiernan, 227 Wis. 2d 736, 596 N.W.2d 760 
(1999); State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 596 N.W.2d 749 
(1999); State v. Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d 838, 596 N.W.2d 736 
(1999).  In several of these cases, the principal issue involved 
the alleged bias of prospective jurors who never served.  In 
these cases, the principal issue was not whether a defendant 
received a fair and impartial jury but whether the circuit court 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
16
committed reversible error in jury selection by making an 
allegedly incorrect ruling on "cause."3 
¶34 In analyzing these cases, we have recognized three 
types of bias in examining whether a prospective juror or juror 
is impartial.  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 716. 
¶35 The first type of bias is "statutory bias."  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 805.08(1) provides that a person meeting certain 
statutory criteria shall not be allowed to serve as a juror in a 
case regardless of his or her ability to be impartial.  Id. at 
717.  This rule applies to a prospective juror who is "related 
by blood or marriage to any party or to any attorney appearing 
in the case, or has any financial interest in the case."  Wis. 
Stat. § 805.08(1).4  When a party alleges this type of bias, a 
                     
3 It is important to note that the events at voir dire in 
this case, in January 1998, occurred after State v. Ramos, 211 
Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997), but before a number of other 
cases in which this court attempted to clarify this area of the 
law.  State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999); 
State v. Kiernan, 227 Wis. 2d 736, 596 N.W.2d 760 (1999); State 
v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999); State v. 
Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d 838, 596 N.W.2d 736 (1999); State v. 
Broomfield, 223 Wis. 2d 465, 589 N.W.2d 225 (1999); State v. 
Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999); State v. Ferron, 
219 Wis. 2d 481, 579 N.W.2d 654 (1998) (opinion released June 
1998). 
4 The legislature added the word "adoption" to the 1999-2000 
version of this statute, resulting in the statute reading: "by 
blood, marriage or adoption."  1999 Wis. Act 162. 
The statute also addresses a prospective juror who "has 
expressed or formed any opinion, or is aware of any bias or 
prejudice in the case."  Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1).  However, this 
court has said that these prospective jurors should be analyzed 
under the "subjective bias" standard described below.  Faucher, 
227 Wis. 2d at 717. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
17
question of law is presented and we review the decision by the 
circuit court de novo.  See Kiernan, 227 Wis. 2d at 744.  
Prospective juror D.F. did not fit within any of the categories 
constituting statutory bias. 
¶36 The second type of bias is "subjective bias."  This 
type of bias "is revealed through the words and the demeanor of 
the prospective juror" and "refers to the prospective juror's 
state of mind."  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 717.  "Discerning 
whether a juror exhibits this type of bias depends upon that 
juror's verbal responses to questions at voir dire, as well as 
that juror's demeanor in giving those responses."  Kiernan, 227 
Wis. 2d at 745.  We recognize that the circuit court sits in the 
best position to judge this type of bias.  Id.  Thus, we will 
uphold the circuit court's factual finding that a prospective 
juror is or is not subjectively biased unless it is clearly 
erroneous.  Id. 
¶37 Subjective bias is not the primary type of bias at 
issue in this case; D.F. steadfastly maintained that she would 
be impartial and the circuit court believed her. 
¶38 The third type of bias is "objective bias."  This is 
the type of bias central to this case.5  The category of 
"objective bias" recognizes that in some cases bias can be 
detected "from the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
                     
5 Because 
we 
find 
that 
prospective 
juror 
D.F. 
was 
objectively biased, we need not consider whether she was 
subjectively biased. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
18
prospective juror's answers" even though he or she pledges 
impartiality.  Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 283.  Specifically: 
 
[T]he focus of the inquiry into "objective bias" is 
not upon the individual prospective juror's state of 
mind, but rather upon whether the reasonable person in 
the individual prospective juror's position could be 
impartial. 
 
When 
assessing 
whether 
a 
juror 
is 
objectively biased, a circuit court must consider the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the voir dire and 
the facts involved in the case.  However, the emphasis 
of this assessment remains on the reasonable person in 
light of those facts and circumstances. . . . [W]hen a 
prospective juror is challenged on voir dire because 
there 
was 
some 
evidence 
demonstrating 
that 
the 
prospective juror had formed an opinion or prior 
knowledge, . . . whether the juror should be removed 
for cause turns on whether a reasonable person in the 
prospective juror's position could set aside the 
opinion or prior knowledge. 
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718-19.  The standard of review in 
objective bias cases is somewhat more intricate than for the 
other two types of bias. 
¶39 Whether a juror is objectively biased is a mixed 
question of fact and law.  Id. at 720.  The circuit court's 
factual findings will be upheld unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Id.  Whether those facts fulfill the legal standard 
of objective bias is a question of law.  Id.  In addition, as we 
further explained in Faucher: 
 
This court does not ordinarily defer to the circuit 
court's determination of a question of law.  However, 
a circuit court's conclusion on objective bias is 
intertwined with factual findings supporting that 
conclusion. Therefore, it is appropriate that this 
court give weight to the circuit court's conclusion on 
that question. 
 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
19
The circuit court is particularly well-positioned 
to make a determination of objective bias, and it has 
special competence in this area.  It is intimately 
familiar with the voir dire proceeding, and is best 
situated to reflect upon the prospective juror's 
subjective state of mind which is relevant as well to 
the determination of objective bias.  We therefore 
give 
weight 
to 
the 
court's 
conclusion 
that 
a 
prospective juror is or is not objectively biased.  We 
will reverse its conclusion only if as a matter of law 
a reasonable judge could not have reached such a 
conclusion. 
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 720-21 (citations and parenthetical 
information omitted).  This case requires that we employ this 
latter standard of review in evaluating the circuit court's 
decision not to strike D.F. from the jury. 
¶40 We note in passing that this court has been very 
hesitant to find that a category of persons is per se biased.  
State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, 479, 457 N.W.2d 484 (1990), 
cited with approval in Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d at 851. 
 
IV. OBJECTIVE BIAS 
 
¶41 Applying 
the 
standards 
above, 
we 
conclude 
that 
prospective juror D.F. was objectively biased and should have 
been 
struck 
for 
cause. 
 
The 
totality 
of 
circumstances 
demonstrates that a reasonable person in D.F.'s position could 
not have remained fair and impartial. 
¶42 Prospective juror D.F.'s familiarity with the victim 
plays a major role in our finding of objective bias, though it 
is not the only factor.  See Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 735; State 
v. Zurfluh, 134 Wis. 2d 436, 438, 397 N.W.2d 154 (Ct. App. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
20
1986).  D.F. knew the victim for a long period of time——about 20 
years——and her parents knew the victim for an even longer period 
of time——47 years.  There was particularly strong indicia of 
objective bias when the juror said that she was "[c]lose 
friends, just friends, you know, over the years" with the 
victim.  Her use of the name "Donny" for the victim further 
evinces a close personal relationship with the victim. 
¶43 We also find it significant that the victim, Donald 
Harmacek, had a long-standing business relationship with D.F. 
and her parents.  D.F. stated that she worked at her parents' 
establishment, which evidently was a bar/restaurant.  Although 
D.F.'s parents no longer owned and operated the bar/restaurant 
(her father had recently died), it cannot be overlooked that 
D.F. said that the victim was the distributor for "our place of 
business."  Coupled with the fact that D.F. said she was "close 
friends" with the victim, this strong business relationship 
weighs heavily in our determination that D.F. was objectively 
biased. 
¶44 D.F. also stated that she had last seen witness 
Shirley Otto, Harmacek's long-time companion, a few weeks 
earlier but had not otherwise seen her since Harmacek's death, 
except at "the funeral home that night."  We take this reference 
to mean that D.F. and her mother attended Harmacek's visitation 
or funeral.  D.F.'s presence at the funeral home is powerful 
evidence that D.F. and her family were close to the victim. 
¶45 It is also relevant that D.F. discussed the death of 
Harmacek with her mother.  She moved in with her mother after 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
21
her father's death, the year before Harmacek was murdered.  She 
indicated that Harmacek's death was "hard" on her mother.  Such 
an environment might lead to sympathy for the victim because 
D.F. indicated that her parents were closer to Harmacek than she 
was. 
¶46 The nature of the crimes also plays a role in our 
decision.  Harmacek was brutally murdered and his house was 
torched; we should not expect a person in D.F.'s situation to be 
indifferent in judging the guilt or innocence of a person 
charged with committing those acts. 
¶47 During the individual voir dire of D.F., defense 
counsel mentioned that D.F. had appeared to start crying during 
the earlier general voir dire.  D.F. did not deny counsel's 
statement but instead replied: "I feel very confident.  Like I 
say, I knew him, but as far as personal, I think my parents knew 
him more personal than I did."  After the individual voir dire, 
defense counsel argued to the court that he noticed D.F. 
starting to cry earlier that day.  The circuit court judge said 
that he did not notice such a reaction.  We find it significant 
that D.F. did not deny crying nor respond to counsel's 
observation in any direct way.  According to our reading of the 
voir dire record, D.F. was normally quite assertive in her 
responses, frequently interrupting counsel.  The circuit court 
should have explored through questioning whether counsel's 
observations of D.F. were correct. 
¶48 It is not always enough that a prospective juror 
assures counsel or the court that he or she will be impartial.  
No. 99-2704  
 
 
22
Circuit courts are often in a better position to judge whether a 
prospective juror is biased, or potentially biased, than is the 
prospective juror.  For example, the circuit court will almost 
always have a better appreciation for the evidence that is going 
to be presented in the trial than the prospective juror.  As the 
defendant points out, the relationship of D.F. to the victim——as 
opposed to a witness——meant that D.F. would confront a great 
deal of evidence concerning Harmacek's death.  This evidence was 
likely to include testimony from a forensic expert, photos of 
the crime scene, and autopsy photos of the victim.  The circuit 
court was in a better position than D.F. to judge the likely 
effect of this evidence on her because of her relationship to 
the victim. 
¶49 We take this opportunity to restate that "we caution 
and encourage the circuit courts to strike prospective jurors 
for cause when the circuit courts 'reasonably suspect' that 
juror bias exists."  Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 495-96.  This is a 
decades-old standard, Kanzenbach v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 
273 Wis. 621, 627, 79 N.W.2d 249 (1956), that encourages circuit 
courts "to err on the side of striking prospective jurors who 
appear to be biased, even if the appellate court would not 
reverse their determinations of impartiality.  Such action will 
avoid the appearance of bias, and may save judicial time and 
resources in the long run."  Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 503 
(emphasis added).  As Justice William A. Bablitch said in 
dissent in State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 486: "It is the 
appearance of partiality that gives great pause.  Jurors must 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
23
not only be fair and impartial; they must also not have a 
relationship to either side which leaves doubt about their 
impartiality."6 
¶50 Prospective juror D.F. was objectively biased and 
should have been struck for cause.  The facts show that a 
reasonable person in D.F.'s position could not have remained 
fair and impartial. 
 
V. REMEDY 
 
¶51 Now that we have determined that D.F. should have been 
struck for cause, we consider the proper remedy for this error. 
 This court's decision in State v. Ramos would require that we 
reverse Lindell's conviction and remand his case for a new 
trial.  Yet, there is no serious argument that the defendant did 
not commit the offenses of which he was convicted, or that he 
did not receive a fair trial by an impartial jury.  Hence, 
                     
6 We also find it noteworthy that the circuit court 
apparently had many extra prospective jurors available on the 
day of jury selection.  The circuit court judge commented to the 
prospective jurors in court that he released a number of 
prospective jurors once the parties had chosen a jury.  While it 
is not at all part of our assessment of whether D.F. was 
objectively biased, we note this fact only to stress that the 
circuit court should have felt no pressure to keep D.F. on the 
panel.  The circuit court's unreasonable assessment of objective 
bias in this case is particularly troublesome in light of the 
heightened scrutiny already on the venire.  The pretrial motions 
relating to publicity and media attention, as well as the 
venire's general familiarity with the case, should have put the 
circuit 
court 
on 
guard 
to 
dismiss 
D.F., 
as 
there 
was 
overwhelming evidence of objective bias. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
24
reversal of Lindell's conviction is counterintuitive and would 
certainly lead to a costly and time-consuming new trial. 
¶52 The harsh reality of this option forces us to 
reexamine whether the result dictated by the Ramos decision 
makes sense for our system of justice on an ongoing basis.  We 
conclude that it does not.  Consequently, the Ramos decision is 
overruled. 
¶53 We base our decision to overrule Ramos on several 
factors.  First, the Ramos decision neglected to fully describe 
and analyze long-standing Wisconsin law on peremptory challenges 
and harmless error.  Second, the court read too much into the 
Supreme Court's decision in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 
(1988), and did not anticipate the decision in United States v. 
Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000).  Third, the court has 
recognized some disturbing systemic problems that came out of 
the Ramos decision.  Finally, the court has taken significant 
steps to address the issue of juror bias. 
 
A. State v. Ramos 
 
¶54 The rule in Ramos is that: "[T]he use of a peremptory 
challenge to correct a trial court error is adequate grounds for 
reversal because it arbitrarily deprives the defendant of a 
statutorily granted right."  211 Wis. 2d at 14.  We revisit the 
case to understand how the court made this ruling. 
¶55 Edward Ramos was convicted of first-degree intentional 
homicide in the death of his girlfriend's two-year-old son.  Id. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
25
at 15.  There was an extensive voir dire of prospective jurors 
before his trial.  Because of the nature of the case, one 
prospective juror expressed doubt whether she could be fair.  
When she was pressed on the subject, she said: "Just knowing 
that the child was suffocated, I guess I couldn't be fair."  The 
defense attorney followed up: "So you could not be fair to this 
man?"  The prospective juror replied: "No."  Id. 
¶56 In chambers, Ramos's counsel moved to strike the juror 
for cause.  The circuit court refused to strike the juror for 
cause.  When the judge and the prosecutor said they did not 
recall the prospective juror saying that she could not be fair, 
defense 
counsel 
asked 
that 
the 
reporter 
read 
back 
the 
prospective juror's responses.  Three times counsel asked that 
the prospective juror's responses be read back and three times 
he was denied, and the court refused to strike the juror for 
cause.  As a result, Ramos exercised the first of his seven 
peremptory challenges to remove the prospective juror and she 
did not sit at the trial.  Id. at 14-15. 
¶57 When the case came to this court after Ramos's 
conviction, we noted that the circuit court's action violated 
Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1) in two respects:  (1) a prospective juror 
who is not indifferent in a case "shall be excused," but this 
prospective juror was not; and (2) any party objecting for cause 
to a prospective juror may introduce evidence in support of the 
objection, but three times Ramos was denied that right.  This 
court concluded that the failure to excuse the suspect juror was 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
26
an erroneous exercise of discretion by the circuit court.  Id. 
at 16. 
¶58 This court structured its analysis of constitutional 
questions to conform to our understanding of Ross, 487 U.S. 81. 
 It acknowledged that a defendant's right to a full complement 
of peremptory strikes was not grounded in the Sixth Amendment 
but rather in state law.  Citing Ross, we stated that peremptory 
challenges are "creatures of state law" and that it is "'for the 
state to determine the number of peremptory challenges allowed 
and to define their purpose and the manner of their exercise.'" 
 Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 18 (quoting Ross, 487 U.S. at 89).  Thus, 
"'the 'right' to peremptory challenges is 'denied or impaired' 
only if the defendant does not receive that which state law 
provides.'"  Id. at 18-19 (quoting Ross, 487 U.S. at 89).  In 
short, we concluded that our task was to configure the 
peremptory rights of a criminal defendant in Wisconsin on the 
basis of Wisconsin law. 
¶59 The court then concluded that Wisconsin gives a 
criminal defendant a mandatory right to a specific number of 
peremptory challenges.  It does not, we said, require the 
defendant to use peremptory challenges against a prospective 
juror who should have been removed for cause.  Ramos, 211 
Wis. 2d at 19 (citing State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 671, 482 
N.W.2d 99 (1992)).  The court recognized the importance that has 
been accorded to peremptory challenges over our history and 
formulated the rule of automatic reversal.  Id. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
27
¶60 Two members of the court, Justice N. Patrick Crooks 
and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, strongly disagreed with the 
court's decision.  Justice Crooks wrote: 
 
I dissent because I conclude that the circuit 
court did not deprive Edward Ramos of his right to the 
effective exercise of a peremptory challenge under 
Wisconsin law.  Instead, I conclude that by using a 
peremptory challenge to strike a juror who should have 
been excused for cause, Ramos effectively exercised 
this challenge for the purpose it is intended——to 
impanel an impartial jury.  Further, I conclude that 
Ramos is not entitled to automatic reversal of his 
conviction because it is well established that, in 
cases like this, the defendant is not entitled to a 
new trial unless a biased juror actually sat on the 
jury.  Consequently, I conclude that Ramos' challenge 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution must fail because he was not deprived of 
any right to which he was entitled under Wisconsin 
law. 
Id. at 30-31 (Crooks, J., dissenting). 
¶61 Justice Crooks argued that it was not improper for a 
defendant to use a peremptory strike to cure a circuit court 
error. 
 
The majority essentially concludes that, under 
Wisconsin law, if a defendant uses a peremptory 
challenge to strike a "for cause" juror, the defendant 
is thereby deprived of the effective exercise of that 
challenge because he or she did not use it to strike a 
juror for "no cause," i.e., based on a hunch or 
intuition. 
Id. at 33 (Crooks, J., dissenting).  He cited four Wisconsin 
cases including Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis. 560, 47 N.W. 629 
(1891), which reached conclusions contrary to the majority 
opinion. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
28
¶62 Justice Bradley reiterated her concern with the Ramos 
decision the following year in State v. Ferron: 
 
As 
the 
dissent 
in 
Ramos 
succinctly 
noted, 
statutory peremptory challenges exist not to allow 
defendants to randomly shuffle a jury pool in their 
favor, but rather to ensure the impaneling of an 
impartial jury as a component of our constitutional 
guarantee of a fair trial.  When a defendant exercises 
a peremptory challenge to strike a juror who should 
have been excused by the court for cause, the 
defendant also acts to ensure that an unbiased trier 
of fact considers the case. 
 
. . . . 
 
Although Ramos is a recent decision of this 
court, its rationale is no more correct today than it 
was one year ago when it was decided.  While I agree 
that the doctrine of stare decisis deserves great 
weight in our jurisprudence, it seems incongruous to 
refuse to reconsider the decision solely on stare 
decisis grounds when . . . Ramos itself disregarded a 
line of precedent spanning over a century in reaching 
its conclusion. 
Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 514-15 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 
¶63 For this court, time and events have put the Ramos 
decision in a new light.  We have reexamined our premises, and 
conclude that Ramos should be overruled. 
 
B. State Law on Peremptory Challenges and Harmless Error 
 
 
¶64 The Ramos decision did not fully describe and analyze 
long-standing 
Wisconsin 
law 
on 
peremptory 
challenges 
and 
harmless error.  As a result, it presented a distorted view of 
Wisconsin law. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
29
¶65 The Wisconsin Statutes have long given peremptory 
challenges to criminal defendants.  For instance, Wis. Stat. Ch. 
148, §§ 3, 5 (1849) provided: 
 
 
Sec. 3.  Every person indicted for any offence, 
shall, when the jury is impannelled for his trial, be 
entitled to the same challenges that are allowed by 
law to defendants in civil causes. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
Sec. 5.  Any person who is put on trial for an 
offence punishable with death, shall be allowed to 
challenge peremptorily twenty-four of the persons 
returned as jurors and no more. 
See also Wis. Stat. Ch. 191, § 4689 (1889); Wis. Stat. Ch. 191, 
§ 4690 (1889); Wis. Stat. § 357.03 (1925); Wis. Stat. § 957.03 
(1955); Wis. Stat. § 957.03 (1967); Wis. Stat. § 972.03 (1999-
2000). 
 
¶66 At the same time, from statehood until 1976, there was 
always a specific statute protecting the verdict from challenges 
for irregularity in impaneling jurors, except in certain 
situations.  For instance, Wis. Stat. Ch. 97, § 29 (1849) 
provided: 
 
 
Sec. 29.  No irregularity in any writ of venire 
facias, or in the drawing, summoning, returning or 
empanelling of petit jurors, shall be sufficient to 
set aside a verdict, unless the party making the 
objection was injured by the irregularity, or unless 
the objection was made before the returning of the 
verdict. 
See also Wis. Stat. Ch. 118, § 30 (1858); Wis. Stat. Ch. 128, 
§ 2881 (1898); Wis. Stat. § 270.52 (1925); Wis. Stat. § 270.52 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
30
(1973); Judicial Council Committee Note, 1974, Wisconsin Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 715 (1976). 
 
¶67 The two exceptions listed in these statutes were (1) 
when the party making the objection was injured by the 
irregularity, or (2) when the objection was made before the 
returning of the verdict. 
 
¶68 The second exception in these statutes, that objection 
must 
be 
made 
before the 
returning 
of the 
verdict, was 
consistently interpreted in light of another statute that dates 
from the early years of the state's history.  Wisconsin's 
general harmless error statute has been in effect since Chapter 
120, Laws of 1856 set out to establish "an uniform course of 
proceeding, in all cases (emphasis added)."  Section 84 of the 
Chapter provided: 
 
 
Sec. 84.  The court shall, in every stage of an 
action, disregard any error or defect in the pleadings 
or proceedings, which shall not affect the substantial 
rights of the adverse party; and no judgment shall be 
reversed or affected by reason of such error or 
defect. 
This statute has appeared in substantially the same form since 
1856.  See Wis. Stat. Ch. 125, § 40 (1858); Wis. Stat. Ch. 127, 
§ 2829 (1878); Wis. Stat. Ch. 127, § 2829 (1898); Wis. Stat. 
§ 269.43 (1925); Wis. Stat. § 269.43 (1973); Wisconsin Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 714 (1976); Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.18(2) (1999-2000).7 
                     
7 The 1849 version of the Wisconsin Statutes contains a 
harmless error statute, though it is in quite different form 
than the 1856 version and the statutes that followed.  See Wis. 
Stat. Ch. 100, § 7 (1849). 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
31
 
¶69 This 
general 
prohibition 
against 
reversal 
of 
a 
judgment for error or defect in proceedings unless the error 
affects 
substantial 
rights 
now 
appears 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.18(2), our "harmless error" statute.  This statute applies 
to criminal cases.  State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 547, 370 
N.W.2d 222 (1985).  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18 is especially 
pertinent to this case because it is "substantially equivalent 
to ss. 269.43 and 270.52," the general harmless error statute 
and the specific "irregularities in venires" statute that were 
replaced when this court issued the order creating § 805.18.  
See Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, Wisconsin Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 714 (1976). 
 
¶70 The Ramos majority neglected to discuss this statute 
that specifically mentions errors in the selection of a jury: 
 
No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of selection or misdirection of the jury, or 
the improper admission of evidence, or for error as to 
any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the 
opinion of the court to which the application is made, 
after 
an 
examination 
of 
the 
entire 
action 
or 
proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained 
of has affected the substantial rights of the party 
seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to 
secure a new trial. 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) (emphasis added).  Moreover, when the 
court brushed aside two "19th century" cases cited in the Ramos 
dissent, Pool v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 94 Wis. 447, 453, 
69 N.W. 65 (1896), and Bergman v. Hendrickson, 106 Wis. 434, 82 
N.W. 304 (1900), it was brushing aside cases that made explicit 
or implicit references to the harmless error statutes. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
32
 
¶71 The best discussion of the point appears in Pool: 
 
[T]here is also presented the question whether the 
court erred in overruling a challenge of a juror for 
cause, and, if so, whether that is reversible error, 
in view of the fact that the objectionable juror did 
not sit upon trial of the case.  On this point, People 
v. Casey, 96 N. Y. 115, is confidently relied upon. 
That is to the effect that if, by the erroneous 
ruling, the party is obliged to exhaust all his 
peremptory challenges, the error is harmful. The 
record here does not show such a case.  It shows that 
all the peremptory challenges were exhausted, but not 
that the last challenge was used in striking from the 
panel the objectionable juror, or that the ruling was 
the cause which compelled such exhaustion of the 
challenges.  The true rule, we hold, is laid down in 
Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, to the effect that it is 
not prejudicial error to overrule a challenge for 
cause, unless it is shown that an objectionable juror 
was forced upon the party, and sat upon the case after 
such party had exhausted his peremptory challenges.  
This court substantially adopted that view in Grace v. 
Dempsey, 75 Wis. 313, where it is said in the opinion 
by Mr. Justice Cassoday, discussing a similar subject, 
"The statute expressly precludes this court from 
reversing any judgment for any error not affecting the 
substantial right of the appellant.  R.S. sec. 2829." 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that by 
such ruling the defendant was in any way prejudiced. 
94 Wis. at 453 (emphasis added).8  The statute of which Pool 
spoke was the general harmless error statute.  Wis. Stat. Ch. 
127, § 2829 (1889). 
 
¶72 In Grace v. Dempsey, the court said: 
 
                     
8 This court held similarly in Kohler v. West Side Railroad 
Co., 99 Wis. 33, 36-37, 74 N.W. 568 (1898) ("[I]t is not 
prejudicial error to overrule a challenge for cause unless it is 
shown that an objectionable juror was forced upon the party, and 
sat upon the case, after such party had exhausted his [or her] 
peremptory challenges."). 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
33
[T]he trial court must necessarily exercise a very 
large discretion in the impaneling of a jury; and the 
exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed 
except in case of its abuse or the violation of some 
rule of law.  Santry v. State, 67 Wis. 67; Sutton v. 
Fox, 55 Wis. 531; Olson v. Solveson, 71 Wis. 663; 
Thomp. & M. Juries, §§ 258, 270, 271.  The statute 
expressly precludes this court from reversing any 
judgment for any error not affecting the substantial 
right of the appellant.  Sec. 2829, R. S. There is 
nothing in the record to indicate that by such ruling 
the defendants were in any way prejudiced. 
75 Wis. 313, 321, 43 N.W. 1127 (1889) (emphasis added).  As 
noted, Grace specifically cited the general harmless error 
statute. 
 
¶73 In Bergman v. Hendrickson, the court said: 
 
An error assigned to a refusal to discharge a juror on 
challenge for cause cannot serve for reversal, since 
no prejudice resulted to appellants.  The juror was 
removed on peremptory challenge, and no objection was 
made to the jury as finally impaneled.  Emery v. 
State, 101 Wis. 627; Cornell v. State, 104 Wis. 527. 
Bergman v. Hendrickson, 106 Wis. 434, 438-39, 82 N.W. 304 
(1900).  This decision is consistent with harmless error 
analysis. 
¶74 Both the Ramos majority and dissent discussed Carthaus 
v. State, 78 Wis. 560, 47 N.W. 629 (1891), in which two 
defendants used their "eighth and last peremptory challenge" to 
strike a prospective juror who allegedly should have been struck 
for cause.  But the majority dismissed the case, saying: 
"Without any analysis, this court in the Carthaus case quipped: 
'A fair and impartial jury was impaneled, and what more could 
the defendants ask for?'"  Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 34.  By 
contrast, the dissent discussed the case at length, referring to 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
34
passages in the 1890 briefs, arguments of counsel, and quotes 
from the opinion. 
¶75 In Carthaus, the court began its opinion as follows: 
"So many exceptions are relied on for a reversal of the judgment 
in this case that each exception can only be noticed in the 
briefest manner, in order to avoid extending this opinion to an 
inordinate length."  78 Wis. at 562.  This passage helps to 
explain 
the 
court's 
relatively 
brief 
discussion 
of 
the 
peremptory challenge issue.  Among the many claims were four 
challenges to jurors or potential jurors.  At one point in the 
opinion the court said: 
 
Another 
error 
assigned 
is 
that 
the 
court 
permitted A. J. Lumsden to stand as a juror, after it 
appeared from his examination on the voir dire that he 
had been previously called as a juror at the former 
trial of the cause, and had been excused by the court. 
 It appears from the record that Lumsden had been 
summoned as a juror on the first trial, but did not 
sit in the cause, being excused by the court.  On this 
trial 
he 
was 
peremptorily 
challenged 
by 
the 
defendants, and set aside.  We think he was qualified 
to try the cause, but as he did not there can be no 
objection to the conviction on that ground. 
Id. at 566. 
 
¶76 Later in the opinion the court took up another 
challenge, saying: 
 
As 
to 
the 
objection 
to 
the 
juror 
Wayland 
Chaplain, 
we 
think 
it 
has no 
merit. 
 
He was 
peremptorily challenged by the defendants, and set 
aside.  It is said the defendants should not have been 
put to their peremptory challenges as to this juror 
and Lumsden, because in so doing they exhausted their 
peremptory challenges; but it does not appear that 
they were prejudiced in any way by that fact.  A fair 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
35
and impartial jury was impaneled, and what more could 
the defendants ask for? 
Id. at 568. 
¶77 Several points may be taken from the Carthaus case.  
First, the court made two rulings on peremptory strikes after 
the defendants challenged prospective jurors for cause.  The 
court's reference to "prejudice" is completely consistent with 
the two relevant harmless error statutes in effect at that time. 
 Second, the Carthaus decision came only 13 months after Grace 
v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. at 320-21, a case which had extensive 
discussion of the issues and cited three Wisconsin cases; Wis. 
Stat. Ch. 127, § 2829 (1889); and a treatise on juries.  Third, 
the court's pithy summary of the law represented the tenor of 
Wisconsin law until the Ramos case.  For example, in Schoeffler 
v. State, 3 Wis. 717, [*823], 729, [*836] (1854), the court 
heard a challenge to a prospective juror named Morley, who in 
the end did not serve on the defendant's jury.  The court said: 
 
Whether the juror Morley was challenged peremptorily 
by the prosecution or by the defendants, does not 
appear.  If he was thus challenged by the prosecution, 
the defendants were not injured.  If challenged by the 
defendants, that fact should appear upon the record. 
 
 . . . The name of not one of the jurors sworn 
and examined, as set forth in the bill of exceptions, 
was retained upon the list of jurors ultimately 
impaneled to try the issue.  Upon the completion of 
the panel of jurors who tried the issue, it seems that 
the 
defendants 
had 
exhausted 
but 
thirty-seven 
peremptory 
challenges. 
In 
consequence 
of 
the 
overruling of the challenges "for cause," of the 
defendants, not one of the objectionable jurors were 
retained, and we cannot perceive how the defendants 
could have been injured, even admitting the position 
of their counsel to be correct. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
36
Schoeffler, 3 Wis. at 729 [*836] (emphasis added). 
¶78 In State v. Mendoza, this court unanimously issued an 
opinion in which the court applied Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) to a 
jury selection case.  227 Wis. 2d at 864. 
¶79 Mendoza was not the first time that we applied a 
harmless error analysis in a jury selection case in recent 
years. 
For 
example, 
this 
court 
explicitly 
addressed 
the 
applicability of harmless error statutes in State v. Coble, 100 
Wis. 2d 179, 209-11, 301 N.W.2d 221 (1981).9 
¶80 In Coble we examined Milwaukee County's process of 
compiling juror lists.   We applied a harmless error analysis, 
noting that previously Wis. Stat. § 270.52 (1973) regulated 
"when a verdict or judgment shall be set aside or a new trial 
granted on an objection to certain stages of the jury selection 
process."  Coble, 100 Wis. 2d at 209.  The court noted that Wis. 
Stat. § 805.18(2) replaced the prior statute on January 1, 1976, 
and § 805.18(2), "according to the Judicial Council Committee's 
Note, 1974, is substantially equivalent to sec. 270.52, Stats." 
 Id.  Coble also said: 
 
This court, in assessing jury challenges in prior 
cases, has stated that irregularities in the process 
are immaterial unless it appears probable that there 
                     
9 See also State v. Chosa, 108 Wis. 2d 392, 402, 321 N.W.2d 
280 (1982) (declaring that erroneous exclusion of class of 
jurors required a new trial because the defendant's substantial 
rights were affected under Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2)); State v. 
Lehman, 108 Wis. 2d 291, 314, 321 N.W.2d 212 (1982) (applying 
one-time 
harmless 
error 
analysis 
when 
court 
determined 
substitution of an alternate juror during jury deliberations was 
error). 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
37
has been prejudice.  "The rule in this state is that 
irregularities in the selection of jurymen are to be 
disregarded unless it appears probable that the person 
seeking to take advantage thereof has been prejudiced 
thereby.  Ullman v. State (1905), 124 Wis. 602, 609, 
103 N.W. 6."  Petition of Salen, 231 Wis. 489, 491, 
286 N.W. 5 (1939).  Accord Pamanet v. State, 49 Wis. 
2d 501, 509, 182 N.W.2d 459 (1971).  In other cases 
this court has indicated that it will review a 
challenge to the selection of the "jury array" that is 
to the preparation of the jury list to determine if 
there was a violation "in any material respect" or 
whether there was "substantial compliance" with the 
jury selection statute.  State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 
527, 540, 129 N.W.2d 155 (1964), cert. denied 380 U.S. 
918 (1965); State v. Bond, 41 Wis. 2d 219, 227, 163 
N.W.2d 601 (1969). 
Id. at 211.  We recognize that these cases relate to the 
composition of the venire but conclude that the application of 
harmless error analysis is instructive and relevant.  In Coble, 
this court analyzed what was then a relatively new harmless 
error law (Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2)) and said: "The legislature 
intended the doctrine of harmless error to apply to jury 
selection."  100 Wis. 2d at 201-11. 
¶81 In one of the last major jury cases before Ramos, 
State v. Traylor, the court of appeals said: 
 
There is no constitutional right to peremptory 
challenges; there is only a constitutional right to an 
impartial jury.  Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85, 88 
(1988).  Any claim that a jury is not impartial must 
focus not on the jurors who were removed by peremptory 
challenges but on the jury that actually sat in the 
case.  See id. at 85-86.  Where there is no showing 
that any of the actual jurors were biased, it would be 
speculative for a court to conclude that the jury 
would have been fairer if counsel had been allowed to 
preserve peremptory challenges on other, unspecified 
members of the jury venire.  Moreover, there would be 
no 
stopping 
point 
if 
the 
deprivation 
of 
such 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
38
speculative 
benefit, 
standing 
by 
itself, 
could 
establish prejudice. 
170 Wis. 2d 393, 400, 489 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1992).  The court 
referred to "harmless error" and then said: 
 
[T]he 
state 
argues 
that 
even 
if 
counsel 
was 
ineffective, this performance did not prejudice the 
defendant. . . . The reason for this is that, under 
old and never overruled Wisconsin law, Traylor cannot 
prove prejudice unless he can show that the exhaustion 
of peremptory challenges left him with a jury that 
included an objectionable or incompetent member.  Pool 
v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 94 Wis. 447, 453, 69 
N.W. 65, 67 (1896).  Wisconsin's longstanding rule is 
that where a fair and impartial jury is impaneled, 
there is no basis for concluding that a defendant was 
wrongly required to use peremptory challenges.  See 
Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis. 560, 568, 47 N.W. 629, 631 
(1891). 
Id. 
 
¶82 Considering Traylor's clear and trenchant summary of 
the law, including its explicit reference to "harmless error" 
and "prejudice" to the defendant, this court should have 
confronted Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) and the state's long history 
of statutes and cases linking the impaneling of jurors to 
harmless error, when we decided Ramos.  We did not do so.10  
Consequently, this court could not reasonably conclude that the 
legislature had mandated the result we reached.  The legislature 
had mandated exactly the opposite result. 
                     
10 The issue of whether Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) applies to 
jury selection cases was not briefed by either the defendant or 
the State in Ramos.  Consequently, the court was not able to 
fully consider the current § 805.18(2) and the 150-year history 
of 
harmless 
error's 
relationship 
to 
peremptory 
challenge 
statutes in this state.  In addition, neither the State nor any 
defendant has raised the harmless error statute in any brief to 
this court in any of the juror bias cases since Ramos.  
No. 99-2704  
 
 
39
 
C. United States v. Martinez-Salazar 
 
¶83 Looking backward, we can see that the Ramos decision 
read too much into the Supreme Court's decision in Ross v. 
Oklahoma and did not anticipate the decision in Martinez-
Salazar. 
¶84 The Ross court was closely divided.11  The case 
involved a homicide defendant subject to the death penalty.  The 
trial judge erred in declining to excuse a juror who should have 
been excused for cause.  The defendant was required to use one 
of his nine peremptory strikes to cure the error, as provided by 
Oklahoma law.  The Supreme Court did not reverse the conviction, 
rejecting the argument that the use of a peremptory challenge to 
correct an error was a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
an impartial jury.  The Court said: "So long as the jury that 
sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a 
peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the 
Sixth Amendment was violated."  Ross, 487 U.S. at 88. 
¶85 The Court also rejected the argument that the use of 
the peremptory to correct the judge's error violated "his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by arbitrarily 
                     
11 Ross was decided by a five-person majority of the Court. 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion and Justice 
Marshall wrote a dissent in which three others joined.  Justice 
Marshall's dissent began: "A man's life is at stake.  We should 
not be playing games."  Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 91 (1988) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
40
depriving him of the full complement of nine peremptory 
challenges allowed under Oklahoma law."  Id. at 89.  But the 
Court then backpedaled from its holding by stressing that 
Oklahoma law required a defendant to use a peremptory to 
eliminate the prospective juror "in order to preserve the claim 
that the ruling deprived him of a fair trial."  Id.  "Even then, 
the error is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts 
all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced 
upon him."  Id. 
¶86 The Court stated that because peremptory challenges 
are 
creatures 
of 
statute 
and 
are 
not 
required 
by 
the 
Constitution, "it is for the State to determine the number of 
peremptory challenges allowed and to define their purpose and 
the manner of their exercise."  Id.  Only if the defendant does 
not receive "that which state law provides" is there a viable 
due process claim.  Id.  In a footnote, the Court said: 
 
We need not decide the broader question whether, in 
the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the "right" to 
exercise 
peremptory 
challenges 
[requiring 
the 
defendant to use peremptories curatively], "a denial 
or 
impairment" 
of 
the 
exercise 
of 
peremptory 
challenges occurs if the defendant uses one or more 
challenges to remove jurors who should have been 
excused for cause.  See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
202, 219, 85 S. Ct. 824, 835, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1965); 
cf. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 8 S. Ct. 21, 22, 
31 L. Ed. 80 (1887); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 
380, 382, 40 S. Ct. 176, 177, 64 L. Ed. 317 (1920), 
denying rehearing to 251 U.S. 15, 40 S. Ct. 50, 64 L. 
Ed. 103 (1919). 
Id. at 91 n.4. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
41
 
¶87 These statements opened the door to argument that 
impairment of state-created rights to peremptory challenges 
violated due process.  The Court's footnote used the phrase "a 
denial or impairment" after it had quoted a sentence in Swain v. 
Alabama: "The denial or impairment of the right is reversible 
error without a showing of prejudice."  380 U.S. at 219.  The 
Ramos opinion also quoted this sentence, 211 Wis. 2d at 18, and 
that undoubtedly contributed to our failure to engage in 
harmless error analysis.  Ramos relied heavily upon Ross and its 
quotation of Swain; the Ramos radix is the automatic reversal 
rule implied by Ross/Swain. 
¶88 In Martinez-Salazar, the Supreme Court confronted, in 
a federal case, the very situation contemplated in footnote 4 of 
the Ross decision: "the erroneous refusal of a trial judge to 
dismiss a potential juror for cause, followed by the defendant's 
exercise of a peremptory challenge to remove that juror."  528 
U.S. at 307.  That puts the case on a par with this case and 
Ramos.  The Court stated its view on peremptory challenges 
directly: "A hard choice is not the same as no choice.  
Martinez-Salazar, together with his codefendant, received and 
exercised 11 peremptory challenges (10 for the petit jury, one 
in selecting an alternate juror).  That is all he is entitled to 
under the Rule."  Id. at 315. 
¶89 The Court thereafter stated: 
 
In choosing to remove [the prospective juror] 
rather than taking his chances on appeal, Martinez-
Salazar did not lose a peremptory challenge.  Rather, 
he used the challenge in line with a principal reason 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
42
for peremptories: to help secure the constitutional 
guarantee of trial by an impartial jury.  See, e.g., 
J.E.B. [v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137 
n.8], 
114 
S. 
Ct. 
1419 
[(1994)], 
 
(purpose 
of 
peremptory challenges "'is to permit litigants to 
assist the government in the selection of an impartial 
trier 
of 
fact'") 
(quoting Edmonson v. 
Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 114 
L. Ed. 2d 660 (1991)); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 
42, 57, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 120 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1992) 
(peremptory challenges are "one state-created means to 
the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair 
trial");  Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505, 
69 S. Ct. 201, 93 L. Ed. 187 (1948) ("the right [to 
peremptory challenges] is given in aid of the party's 
interest to secure a fair and impartial jury"). 
Id. at 315-16.12 
¶90 The Court summarized its decision: "We answer today 
the question left open in Ross and hold that a defendant's 
exercise 
of 
peremptory 
challenges . . . is 
not 
denied 
or 
impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory 
challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for 
cause."  Id. at 317. 
¶91 The Martinez-Salazar opinion applies only to federal 
cases.  It is not binding upon state courts.  However, the 
Court's opinion settles the critical question whether the 
required use of a peremptory challenge to correct a trial court 
                     
12 Although there were two short concurring opinions in 
Martinez-Salazar, all nine members of the Court expressed the 
notion that one of the reasons for peremptory challenges is to 
correct errors in failing to strike for cause.  United States v. 
Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2000); id. at 318 
(Souter, J., concurring) ("Martinez-Salazar simply made a choice 
to use his peremptory challenge curatively."); id. (Scalia, J., 
concurring) ("The fact that he voluntarily chose to expend [a 
peremptory challenge] upon a venireman who should have been 
stricken for cause makes no difference."). 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
43
error is "a denial or impairment" of an important right.  It is 
not "a denial or impairment" of a due process right unless a 
full 
complement 
of 
unencumbered 
peremptory 
challenges 
is 
required by state law. 
¶92 The sentence in Swain v. Alabama may make good sense 
in the appropriate circumstances; that is, if "a trial court 
repeatedly and deliberately misapplied the law in order to force 
petitioner to use his peremptory challenges to correct these 
errors," Ross, 487 U.S. at 91 n.5, or if there were a 
"substantial impairment" of the right to exercise peremptory 
challenges.  Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 317 n.4.  Swain in 
fact cited several 19th century cases that involved errors in 
jury selection, Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892) 
(defendant not present during challenge process); Harrison v. 
United States, 163 U.S. 140 (1896) (defendant denied the number 
of peremptories to which he was entitled); Gulf, Colorado & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Shane, 157 U.S. 348 (1895) (defendant forced 
to exercise peremptories without having the entire pool from 
which to strike).  Whether such errors would now require an 
automatic reversal under the federal or state constitutions——in 
light of the dramatic changes in harmless error review in this 
century13——is a question we need not answer in this case.  See 
Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 317 n.4.  This case does not 
involve the type of error present in those early cases. 
                     
13 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 27.6(b)-(c) (2d 
ed. 1999). 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
44
¶93 As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Martinez-Salazar, at least one other state court has changed its 
"Ramos" rule of automatic reversal, and other courts have 
discussed doing so.  Shortly after the release of Martinez-
Salazar, the Supreme Court of North Dakota abandoned its 
automatic reversal rule.  Compare State v. Entzi, 615 N.W.2d 
145, 149 (N.D. 2000) (adopting Martinez-Salazar approach and 
finding that curative use of a peremptory is not a violation of 
a statutory right) with City of Dickinson v. Lindstrom, 575 
N.W.2d 440, 444 (N.D. 1998) (citing Swain for the rule that 
denial of a peremptory compels an automatic reversal).  In 
addition, the Supreme Court of South Dakota recently decided a 
case in which it did not find a challenged juror was biased, but 
said: 
 
[W]ere we to find the trial court erred in 
failing to remove a potential juror for cause, we 
would still reject Moeller's argument that the failure 
to remove the challenged jurors forced him to exhaust 
his peremptory challenges.  The United States Supreme 
Court recently held that if a defendant elects to cure 
the erroneous refusal of a trial judge to dismiss a 
potential juror for cause by exercising a peremptory 
challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on 
which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of 
any 
right 
under 
the 
Federal 
Rules 
of 
Criminal 
Procedure or the Constitution. 
State v. 
Moeller, 
616 N.W.2d 
424, 
441 n.8 
(S.D. 
2000) 
(commenting on Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304).14 
                     
14 We also note that there is no clear majority rule when a 
peremptory challenge is used by a defendant on a prospective 
juror who should have been struck for cause. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
45
¶94 Justice James E. Keller of the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky recently criticized his state's rule in Stopher v. 
Commonwealth, 2001 WL 431274, at *21, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Ky. 2001) 
(Keller, J., dissenting) ("I am struck by the incongruity of 
                                                                  
For a sampling of states that require a showing of 
prejudice, i.e., a showing that a biased juror actually served 
on the jury, see Minch v. State, 934 P.2d 764, 769-70 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1997); Bangs v. State, 998 S.W.2d 738, 744-45 (Ark. 
1999); State v. Pelletier, 552 A.2d 805, 810 (Conn. 1989); State 
v. Ramos, 808 P.2d 1313, 1315 (Idaho 1991); Dye v. State, 717 
N.E.2d 5, 18 n.13 (Ind. 1999); State v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 
743, 747 (Iowa 1993); State v. Anderson, 603 N.W.2d 354, 356 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Stufflebean, 329 N.W.2d 
314, 317 (Minn. 1983)); Johnson v. State, 754 So. 2d 576, 578 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Storey, 40 S.W.3d 898, 904-05 
(Mo. 2001); State v. Entzi, 615 N.W.2d 145, 149 (N.D. 2000); 
Myers v. State, 17 P.3d 1021, 1027-28 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000); 
and State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399-400 (Utah 1994). 
For a sampling of states that have an automatic reversal 
rule, i.e., do not require that a biased juror served on the 
jury to set aside a verdict, see Uptain v. State, 534 So. 2d 
686, 687-88 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988); People v. Cunningham, 2001 
WL 694040, *16, ___ P.3d ___ (Cal. 2001); People v. Lefebre, 5 
P.3d 295, 307-08 (Colo. 2000); Cummings v. State, 715 So. 2d 
944, 948 (Fla. 1998) (citing Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553, 556 
(Fla. 1985)); State v. Kauhi, 948 P.2d 1036, 1041 (Haw. 1997); 
Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 568 N.E.2d 1148, 1150 (Mass. 1991); 
Commonwealth v. Ingber, 531 A.2d 1101, 1105 (Pa. 1987); State v. 
Short, 511 S.E.2d 358, 360-61 (S.C. 1999); Johnson v. State, 43 
S.W.3d 1, 5-7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); David v. Commonwealth, 493 
S.E.2d 379, 381 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Breeden v. 
Commonwealth, 227 S.E.2d 734, 736-37 (Va. 1976)); and State v. 
Fire, 998 P.2d 362, 364 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), review granted by 
State v. Fire, 11 P.3d 826 (2000).  A number of these states 
impose procedural requirements before the grant of an automatic 
reversal on appeal, such as requiring the defendant to use all 
peremptory challenges, ask the trial court for additional 
peremptory challenges, or object to the composition of the jury 
before trial.  See, e.g., Cunningham, 2001 WL 694040 at *16; 
Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 307-08, Cummings, 715 So. 2d at 948; Johnson, 
43 S.W.3d at 5-7. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
46
these two conclusions——Stopher was tried by a fair and impartial 
jury, and I must vote to reverse.  Accordingly, I believe this 
is an appropriate time to express my opinion that this Court 
should reconsider existing precedent decreeing that automatic 
reversible error exists whenever a trial court error implicates 
a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges."); see also 
State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 117 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) 
("In light of our conclusion that the trial court did not err, 
we need not resolve the discrepancy between [State v. Huerta, 
855 P.2d 776, 777 (1993) (automatic reversal rule)] and 
Martinez-Salazar."); Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2001) (Hervey, J., dissenting) (citing Martinez-
Salazar and arguing that a defendant is not deprived of any 
statutory right when he or she uses a peremptory curatively). 
 
D. Systemic Problems with Ramos 
 
¶95 In the period since our Ramos decision, we have come 
to recognize some of the systemic problems our decision has 
created. 
¶96 There is seldom a litmus test for bias in voir dire.  
Challenges for statutory bias are relatively easy to decide and 
should not prove a difficulty for the circuit court; but all 
other challenges for cause involve an element of discretion. 
¶97 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg summed up the dilemma in 
Martinez-Salazar.  Twice she quoted Judge Pamela Ann Rymer of 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals who wrote that "'trial 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
47
courts, state and federal, rule on cause challenges by the 
minute.'"  528 U.S. at 310 (quoting United States v. Martinez-
Salazar, 146 F.3d 653, 659 (1998) (Rymer, J., dissenting)).  
Justice Ginsburg then added: 
 
Challenges for cause and rulings upon them, as Judge 
Rymer observed, see supra, at 778-779, are fast paced, 
made on the spot and under pressure.  Counsel as well 
as court, in that setting, must be prepared to decide, 
often between shades of gray, "by the minute." 146 
F.3d, at 661. 
Id. at 316 (quoting Martinez-Salazar, 146 F.3d at 661). 
 
¶98 The multitude of fact-intensive challenges involving 
shades of gray are bound to produce some trial court error.  
This error is not likely to be deterred by the sanction of a new 
trial because there is no intent by the circuit court to commit 
error.  We recognize that circuit judges must deal with a 
diverse group of prospective jurors, some of whom are eager to 
serve even when they should not, others of whom will offer any 
excuse to escape from their civic duty. 
 
¶99 One of our cases immediately after Ramos illustrates 
the difficulty.  In State v. Ferron, the circuit court denied 
Ferron's request to excuse a prospective juror for cause after 
the juror said he "would certainly try" and "probably" could set 
aside his opinion that a criminally accused defendant who was 
truly innocent would take the stand and testify on his own 
behalf.  This court determined that the prospective juror should 
have been excused because the juror was not "a reasonable person 
who was sincerely willing to put aside his opinion or bias."  
219 Wis. 2d at 489. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
48
¶100 Ferron had used a peremptory challenge to remove the 
prospective juror before trial——so that he received a fair trial 
by an impartial jury——but our court ruled that Ferron was 
deprived of his statutorily-defined right to due process of law 
when he was compelled to use one of his peremptory challenges, 
as provided by Wis. Stat. § 972.03.  Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 485-
86.  This decision was grounded entirely on Ramos and the court 
declined the State's invitation to overrule the case. 
¶101 Justice Janine Geske, who had been part of the Ramos 
majority, wrote a strong dissent.  She said in part: 
 
I write separately to express my deep concern that the 
majority 
has 
substantially 
and 
inappropriately 
restricted the circuit court's discretion during the 
voir dire process.  In almost every serious felony 
case, honest prospective jurors express concerns about 
the heinous factual allegations, the presumption of 
innocence, a prior record, other acts testimony, a 
defendant's option not to testify, evaluating a police 
officer's testimony in the same manner as other 
witnesses, or the victimization of a child, elderly or 
disabled person.  We encourage trial judges to explore 
those fears, biases, and natural reactions with the 
members of the prospective jury panel.  Few people can 
honestly tell the court that they are bothered by some 
of these factors in the case and then absolutely, 
without equivocation, reassure the judge that they are 
certain they can disregard their concerns.  Most 
honest people can only commit that they will do their 
best to be fair.  The trial judge must then, based 
upon his or her own assessment of that person's 
sincerity and ability to be fair, decide whether that 
person is qualified to sit on that particular case. 
 
 
 . . . [T]he majority concludes that Mr. Metzler, 
whom none of us on this court ever heard or observed, 
maintained a manifest bias and could not be a fair 
juror.  Exchanges like the one between Judge Naze and 
juror Metzler occur in Wisconsin courtrooms every day. 
Trial judges, in both civil and criminal cases, 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
49
routinely make the type of assessment that Judge Naze 
did here. 
Id. at 507 (Geske, J., dissenting). 
 
¶102 Justice Bradley added her own dissent: 
 
While I agree with the test adopted by the 
majority, I disagree with the court's application of 
that test here.  In reversing the circuit court, the 
majority claims that the record does not indicate that 
the challenged juror in this case, Metzler, was 
sincerely willing to put aside his potential bias 
against a defendant that does not testify.  However, 
this is not a case where the record indicates that a 
potential juror refused to put aside a procedural 
bias.  This is also not a case where the circuit court 
ignored counsel's concern about a potential juror.  
Rather, this is a case where, based on extensive 
questioning, 
legal 
instruction, 
and 
first-hand 
assessment of Metzler's comments, the circuit court 
determined that the juror was willing to put aside his 
bias. 
Id. at 509 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
¶103 The reality of Ramos is that whenever two members of 
the court of appeals or four members of the supreme court make a 
different call on bias than the circuit court, the automatic 
result is a new trial.  This is the rule notwithstanding the 
absence of any deficiency in the first trial. 
¶104 This puts the defendant in a "win-win" situation, as 
Justice Crooks explained in his Ramos dissent.  211 Wis. 2d at 
39 (Crooks, J., dissenting).  If the circuit court erroneously 
fails to exclude a prospective juror who should be struck for 
cause, the defendant may take his or her chances and refuse to 
exercise a peremptory challenge, wait until the jury renders its 
verdict, appeal if he or she does not like the result, and then 
receive a new trial.  Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660.  On the other 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
50
hand, the defendant may exercise a peremptory challenge and 
strike the prospective juror, then claim after a trial that 
produces a bad result that his or her due process was violated. 
 The latter rule applies even though the defendant's peremptory 
strike comes so quickly that the prosecutor has no chance to use 
a strike to correct the error.  This sort of gamesmanship does 
not instill confidence in our system of justice. 
¶105 An even more troublesome problem comes out of the 
Ramos decision.  This court encourages circuit courts to 
liberally grant requested strikes for cause to avoid the 
appearance of bias.  Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d at 861; Ferron, 219 
Wis. 2d at 495-96; Kanzenbach, 273 Wis. at 627.  This immensely 
important policy objective conflicts with an appellate court's 
traditional role in trying to uphold jury verdicts and in 
deferring to circuit court determinations whenever it reasonably 
can.  There is a natural tendency in appellate courts to limit 
the scope of objective bias so as not to reverse the circuit 
court, for we may not reverse the circuit court on objective 
bias without ruling that the circuit judge reached a conclusion 
that no reasonable judge could reach. 
¶106 Surely, this tension is reflected in the court of 
appeals decision in this case.  State v. Lindell, 2000 WI App 
180, ¶19, 238 Wis. 2d 422, 617 N.W.2d 500.  This court is torn 
between a liberal definition of juror bias and a costly and 
largely senseless new trial. 
¶107 Another disturbing element of the Ramos decision is 
that it requires a new trial in cases where the trial was nearly 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
51
perfect and the verdict is unquestionably sound.  Yet, we 
examine 
error 
in 
other 
situations——both 
statutory15 
and 
constitutional16——for harmful effect.  Many of these situations 
                     
15 E.g, State v. Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 109, 325 N.W.2d 
687 (1982) (ruling judge's failure to recuse himself contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 757.19 constituted harmless error); Rosado v. 
State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 285-86, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975) (holding 
that judge's impermissible consideration of information prior to 
conviction under Wis. Stat. § 972.15(1) was harmless error); 
State v. Garcia, 2000 WI App 81, ¶1, 234 Wis. 2d 304, 610 N.W.2d 
180 (finding harmless error in circuit court's failure to 
personally address a defendant entering a guilty plea, as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) (1993-1994)); State v. 
Harris, 229 Wis. 2d 832, 839-40, 601 N.W.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1999) 
("Deprivation of . . . the right of the defendant to be present 
and the right to have counsel present at jury selection 
[contrary to Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(c)] is subject to a 
'harmless error' analysis."); Oliver v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 
179 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 505 N.W.2d 452 (Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that 
circuit court's manipulation of the jury pool in order to obtain 
a more diverse array violated Wis. Stat. § 756.096(2), but was 
harmless error). 
16 Professor LaFave notes the multitude of constitutional 
violations that are subject to harmless error analysis: 
[I]mproper comment on the defendant's failure to 
testify; admission of evidence obtained in violation 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment; 
admission 
of 
evidence 
obtained in violation of an accused's right to 
counsel; 
admission 
at 
trial 
of 
an 
out-of-court 
statement of a non-testifying codefendant in violation 
of 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment's 
Confrontation 
Clause; 
admission of evidence at the sentencing stage of a 
capital case in violation of the right to counsel; 
erroneous use during trial of defendant's silence 
following 
Miranda 
warnings; 
a 
restriction 
on 
a 
defendant's right to cross-examine in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause; denial of the 
right to present exculpatory evidence, denial of the 
right to be present during a trial proceeding; denial 
of an indigent's right to appointed counsel at a 
preliminary hearing; a jury instruction containing an 
unconstitutional 
rebuttable 
presumption; 
a 
jury 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
52
involve error with more potential for harm than the present 
circumstance. 
¶108 Ramos has placed one "right" on a pedestal above 
others, and it is not worthy to be there.  We conclude that the 
case produces some systemic problems that require correction. 
 
E. Vindicating the Substantial Rights of the Defendant 
 
¶109 This court has been very clear about the circuit 
court's role in jury selection.  The appearance of bias should 
be avoided.  Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 478 (citing Peters v. Kiff, 
407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972)).  Circuit courts are advised to err on 
the side of striking jurors who appear to be biased, even if the 
appellate court would not reverse their determinations of 
impartiality.  Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d at 864; Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 
at 503.  "Such action will avoid the appearance of bias, and may 
save judicial time and resources in the long run."  Ferron, 219 
Wis. 2d at 503. 
¶110 To assist the bench and bar in analyzing juror bias, 
this court initiated a major effort two years ago to clarify the 
law.  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700; Kiernan, 227 Wis. 2d 736; 
                                                                  
instruction containing an unconstitutional conclusive 
presumption; 
an 
unconstitutionally 
overbroad 
jury 
instruction in a capital case; the submission of an 
invalid aggravating factor to the jury in a capital 
sentencing proceeding, and even a misdescription of an 
element of the offense. 
 
5 LaFave, supra, § 27.6(d), at 948-49 (footnotes omitted). 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
53
Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758; Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d 838.  These 
cases followed on the heels of two other decisions, Ferron, 219 
Wis. 2d 481, and Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, in which the court 
itself 
struggled 
with 
confusing 
concepts 
and 
awkward 
terminology.  It is our avowed hope that these new cases will 
provide a proper analytical framework for making and resolving 
challenges for cause. 
¶111 In this new environment, we are able to abandon Ramos 
and return to analyses of juror bias claims under Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.18(2).17  Under this statute, we first determine whether 
the circuit court erred, using the appropriate standard of 
review for each type of bias claim.  Then, if we determine that 
a circuit court's decision is clearly erroneous (in the case of 
subjective bias), or an error of law (with respect to other 
alleged claims), we evaluate whether the error has affected the 
substantial rights of the party.  This analysis is conducted in 
fact situations in which a defendant has not claimed a violation 
of his or her Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. 
¶112 In Martinez-Salazar, 
the 
Court made 
the pointed 
observation that "we do not decide in this case what the 
appropriate 
remedy 
for 
a 
substantial 
impairment 
[of 
the 
statutory right to peremptory strikes] would be."  528 U.S. at 
317 n.4.  This language provides guidance for future challenges. 
                     
17 State v. Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d 838, 596 N.W.2d 736 (1999), 
utilized a harmless error analysis. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
54
¶113 The substantial rights of a party are not affected or 
impaired 
when 
a 
defendant 
chooses 
to 
exercise 
a 
single 
peremptory strike to correct a circuit court error.  We are not 
called upon here to evaluate other situations.  However, we note 
that in Pool, 94 Wis. at 453, this court commented on a New York 
case, People v. Casey, 96 N.Y. 115 (1884), saying that "if by 
the erroneous ruling [of the court], the party is obliged to 
exhaust all his peremptory challenges, the error is harmful." 
¶114 In her Ramos concurrence, Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson 
wrote 
that 
the 
Ramos 
majority 
concluded 
that 
automatic "reversal is the only feasible way to vindicate a 
party's right to peremptory challenges when the right is 
impinged by the court's erroneous denial of a challenge for 
cause."  211 Wis. 2d at 26 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).  "The 
harmless error analysis . . . would fail to serve the purposes 
of the statutes." 
¶115 Responding to these arguments in reverse order, we 
believe 
that 
giving 
a 
defendant 
unfettered 
exercise 
of 
peremptory challenges is not the sole purpose of the peremptory 
statutes.  From the perspective of the defendant, there is 
always going to be some overlap between prospective jurors whom 
a defendant believes should be removed for cause and prospective 
jurors whom the defendant would simply prefer not to have on the 
jury.  A defendant is not entitled to a favorable ruling on 
every challenge for cause, because some challenges lack merit.  
"A defendant is entitled to a jury which will insure him [or 
her] a fair and impartial trial, but not to an unlimited choice 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
55
in an attempt to secure a jury which will acquit him [or her]." 
 Pollack v. State, 215 Wis. 200, 207-08, 253 N.W. 560 (1934), 
overruled in part by State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 
2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965).  Until Ramos, Wisconsin law had 
never required an automatic reversal when a defendant used a 
single peremptory challenge to cure a trial court error.  
Traylor, 170 Wis. 2d at 400. 
¶116 In the absence of Ramos, there will be another dynamic 
at work vindicating a party's right to peremptory challenges.  
This dynamic is alluded to in Martinez-Salazar.  Justice 
Ginsburg noted that "the immediate choice Martinez-Salazar 
confronted——to stand on his objection to the erroneous denial of 
the challenge for cause or to use a peremptory challenge to 
effect an instantaneous cure of the error——comports with the 
reality of the jury selection process."  528 U.S. at 316.  
"After objecting to the . . . denial of his for-cause challenge, 
Martinez-Salazar had the option of letting [the objectionable 
juror] sit on the petit jury and, upon conviction, pursuing a 
Sixth Amendment challenge on appeal."  Id. at 315.  Justice 
Antonin Scalia took strong exception to these comments.  "I 
would not find it easy to overturn a conviction where, to take 
an extreme example, a defendant had plenty of peremptories left 
but chose instead to allow to be placed upon the jury a person 
to whom he had registered an objection for cause, and whose 
presence be believed would nullify any conviction."  Id. at 318-
19 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
56
¶117 The precise situation that Justice Ginsburg posed and 
Justice Scalia fears is already the law in Wisconsin.  In Gesch, 
167 Wis. 2d at 671, this court rejected the State's argument 
that the failure to exercise a peremptory challenge to a juror 
who was challenged for cause but not excused results in a waiver 
of the defendant's right to raise the issue of whether the juror 
should have been struck for cause.  The court declined to 
require that a defendant use a peremptory challenge to correct 
the error of the trial court.  The Gesch decision contributed to 
the "win-win" situation for defendants that Justice Crooks 
described and criticized in his Ramos dissent. 
¶118 Nothing in this opinion changes the fundamental law 
that an accused is entitled to be tried by an impartial jury.  
Our decision requires a defendant to make a conscious choice 
between exercising a peremptory challenge or waiting for a Sixth 
Amendment challenge after conviction.  However, the State must 
now be more alert and sensitive to a defendant's challenge for 
cause.  Anticipating the defendant's possible strategy, the 
State has three courses of action: (1) It can join the defendant 
in urging the court to remove a juror for cause; (2) it can 
exercise one of its own limited peremptory strikes to remove a 
juror who should have been struck for cause; or (3) it can do 
nothing and risk a new trial if an appellate court finds that a 
biased juror sat on the jury.  We think the defendant's right to 
peremptory 
challenges will 
be effectively 
vindicated 
when 
prosecutors have an interest in seeing that jurors biased 
against the defendant never sit. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
57
¶119 When the Ramos case was argued, the State conceded 
that situations might arise in which a defendant receives a fair 
and impartial jury but reversal is nevertheless appropriate.  
For example, reversal might be appropriate when a circuit court 
judge repeatedly and deliberately misapplies the law to force a 
defendant to use peremptory challenges or when the court makes 
errors that force a defendant to use most or all of his or her 
peremptory strikes.  The State made the same concession in oral 
argument in this case. 
¶120 We conclude that the Ramos case should be overruled 
because our good intentions did not produce good results.  The 
time has come to acknowledge error and move forward. 
 
VI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
 
¶121 The defendant also claims that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  He claims that counsel should have 
impeached Robert Hanson, who was a witness for the prosecution. 
¶122 Hanson testified that while he was incarcerated in the 
La Crosse County jail Nathaniel Lindell told him about the 
burglary, homicide, and arson.  He testified at Lindell's trial 
in exchange for the district attorney dismissing a charge of 
operating a vehicle without the owner's consent. 
¶123 Nathaniel Lindell contends that Hanson told another 
inmate that it would be beneficial to tell the State that 
Nathaniel Lindell had confessed to the crimes at issue in this 
case.  Lindell argues that Hanson should have been impeached 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
58
with testimony from Richard Moeck, the inmate whom Hanson 
approached.  Lindell points out that Hanson's was the only 
testimony containing inculpatory statements by Lindell, besides 
the inculpatory testimony of Joshua Lindell and Mitchell. 
¶124 Defense 
counsel 
tried 
to 
impeach 
Hanson 
with 
information from Moeck while Hanson was on the witness stand 
before the jury.  This information was learned by the defense 
during the course of trial.  The State objected and argued that 
the defendant failed to give notice of "other acts" evidence.18  
The circuit court sustained the objection but told defense 
counsel she could revisit the issue at a later time if she so 
desired.  Defense counsel did not pursue a motion on this 
matter. 
¶125 The United States Supreme Court articulated a two-part 
test 
for 
determining whether counsel's 
actions 
constitute 
ineffective assistance.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984).  A defendant must show "(1) that his counsel's 
representation was deficient and (2) that this deficiency 
prejudiced him so that there is a 'probability sufficient to 
undermine 
the 
confidence 
in 
the 
outcome' 
of 
the 
case."  
Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 768 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694).  In order to successfully claim ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test.  
                     
18 Like the court of appeals, we do not analyze the circuit 
court's ruling on this matter because it is unnecessary to 
decide the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
59
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Wisconsin employs the Strickland 
test to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 768; State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 
633, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985). 
¶126 To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, the 
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.  
There is a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."  
Strickland, 466 U.S at 689. 
¶127 If the defendant can show deficient performance, he or 
she must also meet the second prong of the Strickland test by 
proving 
that 
this 
deficient 
performance 
prejudiced 
the 
defendant.  Id. at 687.  This entails showing "that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial."  Id. 
¶128 When a reviewing court examines a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, it is permissible to reverse the order of 
the two tests or avoid the deficient performance analysis 
altogether if the defendant has failed to show prejudice.  State 
v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 222, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986) (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).  "The object of an ineffectiveness 
claim is not to grade counsel's performance.  If it is easier to 
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 
sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
¶129 We agree with the court of appeals and conclude that 
Nathaniel Lindell was not prejudiced by defense counsel's 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
60
performance.  As this is not an exercise in grading counsel's 
performance, we examine only the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland test. 
¶130 We agree with the court of appeals in its three 
reasons for finding that the defendant was not prejudiced by 
Hanson.  First, the circuit court found that defense counsel had 
made a strategic decision not to pursue the admission of this 
impeachment evidence against Hanson because the element of 
surprise had been eliminated.  Second, Hanson's credibility was 
of limited value, as he had an extensive record.  Third, the 
evidence of Nathaniel Lindell's guilt was overwhelming: 
 
For 
example, 
Todd 
Gass 
testified 
that 
he 
was 
approached by Lindell about participating with him in 
the burglary and using walkie-talkies before the 
burglary occurred.  Charles Schaub testified that 
Lindell purchased three communication radios from his 
store shortly before the burglary.  Josh Lindell (the 
defendant's brother) and Marcus Mitchell testified 
that Mitchell agreed to serve as the look-out for the 
burglary while both Nathaniel and Josh Lindell went 
inside the Harmacek residence.  Harmacek collected 
coins, 
and 
Lindell's 
roommate, 
Casey 
Castona, 
testified that after the date of the burglary Lindell 
had some rare coins that he was trying to sell. 
Lindell, 238 Wis. 2d 422, ¶22.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
Nathaniel Lindell was not prejudiced. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
¶131 We conclude that the automatic reversal rule of Ramos 
is not the appropriate rule.  Accordingly, the Ramos decision is 
overruled.  The defendant in this case received that which he is 
No. 99-2704  
 
 
61
entitled to under state law when he used a peremptory challenge 
to remove a prospective juror who should have been struck for 
cause.  Finally, we conclude the defendant has not shown that he 
was prejudiced by any alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
99-2704-CR.awb 
 
1 
¶132 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring).  
 
The circuit court is particularly well-positioned to 
make a determination of objective bias, and it has 
special competence in this area.  It is intimately 
familiar with the voir dire proceeding, and is best 
situated to reflect upon the prospective juror's 
subjective state of mind which is relevant as well to 
the determination of objective bias. 
State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 720, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999).   
¶133 I write separately because the majority opinion erases 
the deference that a reviewing court owes to a circuit court's 
objective bias determination expressed in the above quote.  Like 
the court of appeals, I believe that the circuit court engaged 
in a thoughtful inquiry and reached a reasonable conclusion in 
determining that D.F. was not objectively biased.   
¶134 Applying the correct standard and giving the circuit 
court's determination the weight it properly deserves, I 
conclude that a reasonable circuit court judge could conclude 
that D.F. was not objectively biased.  Because I conclude that 
there was no error in failing to strike D.F. for cause, I need 
not reach the question of the Ramos remedy.  However, because 
the majority has seen fit to overrule recent precedent without 
sufficient justification, I address this aspect of the majority 
opinion as well.   
I 
¶135 The preliminary question that the court must answer in 
this case is whether the circuit court erred in failing to 
strike D.F. for cause.  The majority answers this question by 
stating that "[t]he totality of circumstances demonstrates that 
99-2704-CR.awb 
 
2 
a reasonable person in D.F.'s position could not have remained 
fair and impartial."  Majority op. at ¶41.  While the juror's 
potential for fairness and impartiality must be measured against 
that of a reasonable person, the majority fails to engage in the 
inquiry that is ultimately controlling.   
¶136 When 
reviewing 
a 
circuit 
court's 
objective 
bias 
determination, precedent requires that we ask whether the 
circuit court's conclusion is one that no reasonable judge could 
reach.  In State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718-21, after 
explaining that the objective bias of a juror is to be 
determined under a reasonable person standard, we also concluded 
that weight must be afforded to the circuit court's objective 
bias determination.  That weight derives from the circuit 
court's first-hand observation of the voir dire proceedings and 
its ability to reflect on the juror's subjective state of mind. 
 Id. at 720.  The weight attributed to the circuit court's 
determination tilts the scales in favor of affirmance to such a 
degree that we will not reverse the circuit court unless it 
reaches a conclusion that no reasonable judge could reach: 
 
We therefore give weight to the court's conclusion 
that a prospective juror is or is not objectively 
biased. We will reverse its conclusion only if as a 
matter of law a reasonable judge could not have 
reached such a conclusion. 
Id. at 721; State v. Kiernan, 227 Wis. 2d 736, 745, 596 N.W.2d 
760 (1999).  
¶137 The standard announced in Faucher, and reiterated in 
Kiernan, is quite different from the standard applied by today's 
99-2704-CR.awb 
 
3 
majority.  Under the correct standard, we do not simply ask 
whether a reasonable person in the juror's shoes could remain 
impartial.  Rather, we must ask whether no reasonable circuit 
court asking that question could have concluded that the juror 
was not objectively biased.  The question is not whether we 
would have struck the juror for cause.   
¶138 Applying the correct standard to the instant case, and 
giving the circuit court's determination the weight properly 
afforded to it, I conclude that the circuit court's decision 
that D.F. was not objectively biased must stand.  The majority 
provides a litany of "bad facts" to support its independent 
conclusion that D.F. was objectively biased.  However, it 
minimizes many of the considerations relied upon by the circuit 
court in making its determination that D.F. was not biased——a 
determination that is entitled to deference.   
¶139 In making its initial ruling declining to strike D.F. 
for cause, the circuit court explained that it relied on D.F.'s 
repeated assertions that she was impartial and could fairly 
evaluate 
the 
evidence 
of 
the 
defendant's 
guilt. 
 
After 
witnessing and participating in both the general voir dire of 
the jury panel and the individual voir dire of D.F., the circuit 
court explained: 
 
[T]he fact of the matter is, [D.F.] has repeatedly 
assured you that her relationship with the deceased 
was minimal, that she can fairly and impartially try 
this case and that she can  . . . be a good and fair 
juror.   
99-2704-CR.awb 
 
4 
D.F. assured the court that she had not drawn any conclusions 
regarding the defendant's guilt and had not had any discussions 
regarding who was responsible for the crime.  Ultimately, D.F. 
explained that she was "very confident" in her ability to sit on 
the jury. 
¶140 The goal of the jury selection process is to have a 
fair and impartial jury.  In assessing the bias of jurors, an 
appellate court is left with only a written transcript to 
review, several months, often several years, after the actual 
jury selection.  This reality limits our ability to fully assess 
the fairness and impartiality of an individual juror whom we 
have neither heard nor observed.  The written transcript that we 
review is usually limited only to the spoken word.  Yet a juror 
cannot speak fairness or talk impartiality.  Fairness and 
impartiality are communicated. 
¶141 The essence of the weight afforded to the circuit 
court's determination are the unknown factors that do not 
survive transcription: tone of voice, demeanor, body language, 
and other intangibles.  While we are not privy to these 
elements, there is more to the exchange between counsel, the 
circuit court, and D.F. than the majority relates in its 
opinion.  Ultimately, there is more underlying the circuit 
court's determination that D.F. could be impartial and fair than 
the cold text of D.F.'s words.  
¶142 These elements of the circuit court's decision were 
further explained by the circuit court when it denied Lindell's 
post-conviction motion seeking a new a trial based upon the 
99-2704-CR.awb 
 
5 
failure to strike D.F. for cause.  I believe that these excerpts 
reveal the deliberation of a reasonable circuit court concluding 
that it need not strike D.F. for cause: 
 
As to the issue of [D.F.], let's not talk about the 
questions that were asked of [D.F.] in a vacuum 
here. . . .  
 
 
. . . . 
 
. . . [T]o 
take 
this 
whole 
questioning 
and 
understand it, you have to take it in the context in 
which it occurred. . . .  
 
 
. . . . 
 
. . .  [L]et's talk about what I saw and what I 
didn't see. . . .   
 
 
. . . . 
 
. . . I can emphatically say that there was 
absolutely nothing that was blocking my view of any of 
the jurors, including counsel, the podium, where they 
stood, how they stood, etc.  I saw at a very close 
distance, maybe twenty feet, each and every juror that 
was asked questions and the testimony that they gave. 
 And I saw [D.F.]. 
 
 
 . . . [I]n 25 years that I've been practicing 
law, and in the 14 years I've been on the bench, I've 
seen a lot of jurors, I've seen a lot of jurors asked 
a lot of questions.  I've seen jurors who it's pretty 
clear are not giving truthful answers.  
 
 
. . . . 
 
  
It was clear from the very beginning that this 
was going to be an emotional case.  We're talking 
about a very heinous crime and the death of a —— death 
of a human being.  This is not a disorderly conduct 
case, never was.  
 
 
It was clear from the way all of the jurors 
reacted to the questioning that they took it as 
99-2704-CR.awb 
 
6 
serious as everybody else did, [D.F.] included.  I 
would not describe her as emotional.  I would describe 
her as very honest, very sincere.  I would describe 
her demeanor as somebody who is trying very, very hard 
to search her heart and her soul to answer as honestly 
and truthfullly as she could.  Was she having some 
difficulty with that?  Yes.  Did she have to think 
about it?  Yes.  Were there pauses in her answers?  
Yes. 
 
 
But in 14 years on the bench I don't think I've 
ever been more impressed with a juror who was trying 
to be as honest, sincere, and thorough as she possibly 
could.  She was trying as hard as she possibly could 
to follow the instructions of the Court, to answer the 
questions as honestly and thoroughly as she could, and 
I think she did.   
 
 
Now, what did she say?  That she knew Miss Otto. 
 She knew Mr. Harmacek but only through a business 
relationship.  That she didn't have hardly any contact 
with Miss Otto.  The only contact she had was with Mr. 
Harmacek when he delivered the beer to her parents' 
tavern.  That she did not deal with him every day.  
That she never expressed an opinion, and that she had 
no opinions about the guilt or innocence of Mr. 
Lindell.  That she never had any discussions with Miss 
Otto about the case.  And when she was asked -- oh, 
that her parents had never offered any opinion about 
the guilt or innocence of Mr. Lindell.   
 
 
So what you have is someone who had never 
socialized with either Miss Otto or Mr. Harmacek, 
never expressed an opinion of the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant, never discussed the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant with anyone else, that the 
only relationship she had with the two people was a 
business relationship, and who repeatedly time after 
time indicated that she could fairly and impartially 
decide this case, and that was an assertion that I 
believe and believe to this day.   
 
 
And when she said, quote, "I think I can," the 
inflection on her voice was very emphatic, and I 
believe it was absolutely unequivocal. . . .  
I 
believe she was pretty emphatic that she could fairly 
and impartially try the case.   
99-2704-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
 
. . . . 
 
. . . I do not believe that this [juror] was 
evasive in any way.  I think she was honest, fair in 
her answers.  It's clear from her demeanor that she 
searched her soul and answered fairly and that she 
could fairly and impartially decide this case. . . . 
 
. . . Could 
a 
reasonable 
person 
under 
these 
circumstances be impartial?  When you look at the 
cases that talk about juror imparitality, virtually 
all of them involve knowledge of a witness.  They all 
involve somebody judging the credibility of a witness. 
 
Miss Otto was a witness, although her testiony 
was extremely minor.  If there was any feelings about 
Mr. Harmacek by [D.F.], unfortunately, Mr. Harmacek 
wasn't a witness here.  This juror was not going to be 
asked to discuss the credibility of Mr. Harmacek, was 
he telling the truth or not?  She was not going to be 
asked  . . . anything about him at all.   
 
If this had been a case where there was a 
burglary, and Mr. Harmacek was testifying as a 
witness, as a victim, perhaps she would have been 
excused.  But that wasn't the case here.  
 
Is it reasonable for a person who has a relative 
who knows a victim to be able to put that aside and 
judge a case fairly and impartially when the victim's 
credibility, the victim's actions, are not in any way, 
shape, or form being judged or examined?  Can we say 
that just because [D.F.] had a business relationship 
with the victim that she would want to convict 
somebody, anybody, even an innocent man?  Because 
that's what the claim of bias boils down to, that 
somehow she would try to convict an innocent man based 
only on, on her minimal relationship with the victim.  
 
 
I 
believe 
a 
reasonable 
person 
under 
these 
circumstances could fairly judge, impartially judge 
the case.  I do not believe there was objective bias. 
 There 
is 
a 
big 
difference 
between 
answers 
to 
questions that would result in a juror being struck 
for cause and answers to questions that would cause 
somebody to exercise a peremptory strike.  And based 
99-2704-CR.awb 
 
8 
on her answers, perhaps counsel wished to strike her 
and obviously did.  But I do not believe . . . the 
evidence here justified my striking that juror. 
¶143 If this thoughtful explanation is not that of a 
reasonable circuit court, I do not know what is.  Would I have 
struck D.F. for cause?  Maybe.  But that is not the controlling 
inquiry.  The controlling inquiry is whether a circuit court, 
exercising reasonable judgment, could decline to strike D.F.   
The circuit court in this case not only rested its bias 
determination upon relevant facts and considerations, but it 
carefully explained its decision.  I cannot conclude that the 
circuit court's determination was unreasonable.  
¶144 Rather than give weight to the circuit court's 
determination, the majority eliminates the element of deference 
to be applied in an objective bias analysis.  It parses D.F.'s 
words and draws its own conclusion that a reasonable juror in 
D.F.'s position could not remain fair and impartial.19  The 
majority's approach is a departure from precedent, and it is a 
departure that I ultimately find to be determinative of the 
outcome of this case.   
II 
                     
19 Not only does the majority fail to give due weight to the 
circuit court's legal conclusions, but it also ignores the 
circuit court's factual observations and replaces them with its 
own.  The circuit court explained that it did not recall D.F. 
"crying or even looking like she was ready to cry."  Yet, the 
majority, relying on tenuous inferences, disregards this and 
imputes to D.F. an emotional state not founded in the record.  
By doing so, the majority negates the very reason we give 
deference to the circuit court.  The circuit court is in the 
best position to determine whether there were tears or even a 
hint of sadness on the part of D.F. 
99-2704-CR.awb 
 
9 
¶145 I now briefly address the majority's decision to 
overrule State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997). 
 I happen to be among those who believe Ramos was wrongly 
decided.  I joined the dissent in Ramos.  See id. at 30 (Crooks, 
J., dissenting).  I later continued to dissent in State v. 
Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 508, 579 N.W.2d 654 (1998) (Bradley, 
J., dissenting).  However, despite my disagreement, because of 
the many and consistent affirmations of Ramos by this court I 
eventually had to acknowledge it as valid precedent.  See, e.g., 
Kiernan, 227 Wis. 2d at 751-52 (Bradley, J., concurring).   
¶146 Until today, Ramos remained valid precedent.  Out of 
respect for the law and this court as an institution, I believe 
that 
the 
majority 
should 
continue 
to 
acknowledge 
it 
as 
precedent.  Instead, with nothing changed but the bodies on this 
court, the majority overrules a case that, to my recollection, 
has been reaffirmed more than any other case in the last four 
years.   
¶147 The court's decision in State v. Ramos was grounded in 
Wisconsin statutory law.  See, e.g., 211 Wis. 2d at 19 
("Wisconsin Statutes do not suggest that a defendant should be 
required to use a peremptory challenge against a juror who 
should have been removed for cause").  It was, after all, only 
Ramos's "statutory rights" that were deemed violated.  Id. at 
24-25.  While the majority points to the decision in United 
States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000), and other 
factors in its decision to overrule Ramos, it points to no 
99-2704-CR.awb 
 
10
statutory change or anything indicating a shift in legislative 
intent to justify its reversal.  
¶148 Our job, in statutory interpretation is to discern the 
intent of the legislature when it enacted the statute.  Now four 
years later, a new majority apparently has a new interpretation 
of what the legislature meant when it enacted the statute.  
There has been no change in the relevant statutes, no change in 
the constitution, and no change in the underlying principles.  
Nonetheless, 
the 
majority 
substitutes 
its 
will 
over 
its 
obligation to stare decisis. 
 
 
 
No. 99-2704-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶149 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
The court today overrules State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 
N.W.2d 328 (1997).  I disagree with the court's overruling for 
three reasons: 
 
(1) Today's majority opinion violates the rule of stare 
decisis, which requires a court to "stand by things 
decided."  In other words, once this court has officially 
considered and settled a principle of law, this court must 
remain faithful to its precedent unless there are good 
reasons to overrule precedent.  No such reasons exist to 
overrule Ramos.  The Ramos court considered the authority 
and the rationale advanced by today's majority opinion and 
rejected them. 
(2) Today's majority opinion violates a basic rule of 
statutory 
interpretation: 
Once 
this 
court 
has 
authoritatively construed a statute, the court maintains 
this construction unless and until the legislature either 
amends or repeals the statute.  Ramos is based on this 
court's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 972.03 (1995-96) 
governing peremptory strikes.  The legislature has not 
changed this statute since the Ramos case, and the court 
should not change its interpretation of the statutes 
without new information.  
(3) Today's overruling of Ramos leaves defendants with no 
satisfactory remedy for a circuit court's error in failing 
to strike a juror for cause. 
No. 99-2704-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
I 
 
¶150 The simplest, easiest reason to dissent in the present 
case is to rely on the doctrine of stare decisis.20 
¶151 And stare decisis is an especially good reason in the 
present case because nothing new has been brought to the court's 
attention since Ramos that would justify a departure from 
precedent in Ramos. 
¶152 Today's majority opinion focuses on the harmless error 
statute and nineteenth-century case law.  The dissent in Ramos 
urged a harmless error analysis, and the Ramos court declined 
the invitation.  Likewise, the Ramos dissent focused on 
nineteenth-century 
cases 
such 
as 
Pool,21 
Bergman,22 
and 
Carthaus,23 which the Ramos court found unpersuasive.   
                     
20 See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 441-42 
(1994) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) ("Fidelity to precedent, the 
doctrine of stare decisis 'stand by things decided,' is 
fundamental to 'a society governed by the rule of law.'  Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 
(1983).  When legal standards 'are open to revision in every 
case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, 
with arbitrary and unpredictable results.'  Appeal of Concerned 
Corporators of Portsmouth Savings Bank, 129 N.H. 183, 227, 525 
A.2d 671 (1987) (Souter, J., dissenting, quoting Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 786-87 (1986), White, J. dissenting)."). 
21 Pool v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 94 Wis. 447, 69 
N.W. 65 (1896). 
22 Bergman v. Hendrickson, 106 Wis. 434, 82 N.W. 304 (1900). 
23 Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis. 560, 47 N.W. 629 (1891). 
No. 99-2704-CR.ssa 
 
3 
¶153 Today's majority opinion has not added any new 
material for the court's consideration to justify overturning a 
1997 decision of this court.  To overturn a decision requires 
more than the majority opinion musters. 
 
II 
 
¶154 The second reason to dissent in the present case is 
that Ramos is a statutory interpretation case,24 and the 
legislature has not changed the relevant statutes since Ramos.  
The general rule of statutory interpretation is that once this 
court has authoritatively construed a statute, the court 
maintains this construction "unless and until the legislature 
either amends or repeals the statute."25 
¶155 Today's majority opinion ignores this basic rule of 
statutory interpretation when it concludes that the legislature 
                     
24 A defendant's right to peremptory challenges is a 
creature of state law.  State law, not federal law, determines 
the number of peremptory challenges, their purpose, and the 
manner of their exercise.  The right to peremptory challenges is 
"'denied or impaired' only if the defendant does not receive 
that which state law provides."  State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 
19, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997) (citing and quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988)).   
25 See State v. Anthony D.B., 2000 WI 94, ¶20, 237 Wis. 2d 
1, 614 N.W.2d 435 ("Having authoritatively construed a statute, 
well-established principles of judicial decision-making require 
that the chosen construction be maintained unless and until the 
legislature either amends or repeals the statute.") (citing and 
quoting Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 470, 290 N.W.2d 510 
(1980)). 
No. 99-2704-CR.ssa 
 
4 
could not have intended the authoritative construction that the 
Ramos court gave the peremptory challenge statute.26  If the 
legislature does not overturn an interpretation of the statute, 
we assume the legislature agrees with our interpretation.27  The 
legislature has not overturned our construction of the statutes 
in Ramos.  Legislative silence on this question is far more 
revealing than today's revisiting of nineteenth-century case law 
and the harmless error rule. 
¶156 The Ramos decision rests on an interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 972.03 (1995-96), which provides that "the defendant is 
entitled to 6 peremptory challenges . . . .  Each side shall be 
allowed one additional peremptory challenge if additional jurors 
are to be impaneled under s. 972.04(1)."28   
¶157 Today's majority opinion ignores these jury statutes 
directly at issue in the present case and in Ramos and instead 
turns the reader's attention to the harmless error rule.  
                     
26 See majority op. at ¶82. 
27 See also State v. Olson, 175 Wis. 2d 628, 498 N.W.2d 661 
(1993) ("Legislative silence with regard to new court-made 
decisions 
indicates 
legislative 
acquiescence 
in 
those 
decisions.") (citing In Interest of R.W.S., 162 Wis. 2d 862, 
880, 471 N.W.2d 16 (1991); State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 
566, 455 N.W.2d 143 (1990)). 
28 The Ramos court expressly embraced the statutory claim.  
Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 21.  The Ramos court concluded that under 
the Wisconsin statutes the defendant was entitled to a set 
number of peremptory challenges.  It further concluded that 
defendant Ramos was deprived of the statutory right to exercise 
a full complement of his peremptory challenges when he used a 
challenge to remove a juror whom the circuit court should have 
excused for cause. 
No. 99-2704-CR.ssa 
 
5 
¶158 Justice Donald Steinmetz, writing for the court in 
Ramos, focused on the defendant's substantive right to a full 
complement of peremptory challenges guaranteed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.03.  The Ramos decision refused to apply the harmless 
error rule as a matter of statutory interpretation.  Justice 
Steinmetz's concluding words in the Ramos opinion are as 
follows:  
 
Although it is a shame to have a new trial in this 
tragic first-degree murder case when a fair and 
impartial jury made the final decision, the error by 
the trial court requires that the defendant receive a 
new trial.  We hold that the use of a peremptory 
challenge to correct a trial court error is adequate 
grounds for reversal because it arbitrarily deprives 
the defendant of a statutorily granted right.29   
 
¶159 I joined Ramos, but that fact is irrelevant for 
purposes of this discussion.  What is relevant is whether I have 
learned anything new to justify reconsideration of our statutory 
interpretation in Ramos.  The answer to that question is no. 
¶160 The majority opinion criticizes the Ramos court for 
reading too much into Ross v. Oklahoma30 and not anticipating the 
holding of United States v. Martinez-Salazar.31  But in Ross, the 
U.S. Supreme Court endorsed our Ramos interpretation of the 
                     
29 Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 24-25 (emphasis added). 
30 487 U.S. 81 (1988). 
31 528 U.S. 304 (2000); see majority op. at ¶¶53, 83. 
No. 99-2704-CR.ssa 
 
6 
Wisconsin statutes.32  Moreover, there was no need for this court 
to anticipate Martinez-Salazar: that decision is based purely on 
an interpretation of the federal rules of criminal procedure and 
has no bearing on how state courts interpret their peremptory 
challenge statutes.33  
 
III 
 
¶161 The third reason to dissent in the present case is 
that the Ramos automatic reversal rule maintains a level playing 
field for both the State and the defendant.  As a result of 
Ramos, each party is guaranteed a full complement of peremptory 
strikes, and the parties are not forced to take over the circuit 
court's role of removing jurors for cause.   
¶162 With Ramos overruled, few if any practical remedies 
are available to a defendant, other than to "lose" a peremptory 
challenge when the circuit court errs in allowing a biased juror 
to sit.  Three alternative courses of action have been 
suggested, none of which provides a firm foundation for ensuring 
both a defendant's right to an unbiased jury and a defendant's 
                     
32 See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 89 ("Because peremptory 
challenges are a creature of statute and are not required by the 
[federal] Constitution, it is for the State to determine the 
number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define their 
purpose and the manner of their exercise.  As such, the 'right' 
to peremptory challenges is 'denied or impaired' only if the 
defendant does not receive that which state law provides."). 
33 See majority op. at ¶91. 
No. 99-2704-CR.ssa 
 
7 
right to a statutorily guaranteed complement of peremptory 
challenges. 
¶163 First, a defendant could allow a juror who should have 
been removed by the circuit court for cause to serve and then 
claim an unfair trial.  In State v. Gesch,34 this court held that 
a defendant does not waive the right to challenge a conviction 
on the ground of an unfair trial if the defendant does not use a 
peremptory challenge to remove a juror whom the circuit court 
should have removed for cause.  Although today's majority 
opinion relies on our holding in Gesch, some readers might, in 
the light of today's Ramos reversal, view Gesch as perched on a 
banana peel. 
¶164 In his concurring opinion in Martinez-Salazar, Justice 
Antonin Scalia explains the practical problems a court faces in 
abiding by the Gesch rule.  Justice Scalia wrote:  
 
The 
difficult 
question, 
however, 
is . . . whether 
normal principles of waiver . . . disable a defendant 
from objecting on appeal to the seating of a juror he 
was entirely able to prevent.  I would not find it 
easy to overturn a conviction where, to take an 
extreme 
example, 
a 
defendant 
had 
plenty 
of 
peremptories left but chose instead to allow to be 
placed upon the jury a person to whom he had 
registered an objection for cause, and whose presence 
he believed would nullify any conviction.35 
 
                     
34 State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992). 
35 United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 318-19 
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
No. 99-2704-CR.ssa 
 
8 
¶165 Counsel for the defendant in the present case suggests 
that as a practical matter defense counsel would be reluctant to 
rely on Gesch: 
 
Certainly Gesch is still the law in Wisconsin.  
However, it is hard to imagine sitting next to a 
client at defense table during voir dire and informing 
him that you cannot use a peremptory on a certain 
juror who just minutes earlier you were seeking to 
remove for cause in hopes that Gesch would not be 
overturned on waiver grounds. 
¶166 A Gesch-based approach seems to raise legal and 
practical problems, limiting its usefulness in most cases.36 
¶167 Second, a defendant could try to show that the circuit 
court deliberately misapplied the law and the circuit court's 
purpose in misapplying the law was to force the defendant to use 
a peremptory challenge to correct the court's error.37  I view it 
as highly unlikely that a Wisconsin circuit court judge would 
act in this manner. 
¶168 Third, a defendant who has used a peremptory challenge 
to cure an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause and who has 
exhausted his statutory peremptory challenges could request a 
"make-up" peremptory challenge or could raise an objection to a 
sitting juror who would have been struck if the defendant had 
any remaining statutory challenges.  The circuit court's denial 
of his request or objection would raise an issue not presented 
                     
36 See majority op. at ¶¶116-18. 
37 See Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 316 (2000). 
No. 99-2704-CR.ssa 
 
9 
in this case.38  As the State points out, the defendant in the 
present case did not request additional peremptory challenges or 
object to any juror who sat.  Of course the defendant did not.  
There was no need to do so.  The defendant in the present case 
was relying on, and was justified in relying on, our Ramos rule 
of automatic reversal.  The majority concludes, however, that 
the defendant cannot get the benefit of his reliance on the 
Ramos case.  
 
IV 
 
¶169 In summary, I am sorry to see Ramos overturned.  Sorry 
not because Ramos was, in my opinion, a correct decision, but 
more importantly because overturning Ramos undermines confidence 
in the reliability of our decisions.  
                     
38 See also Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 317-18 (2000) 
(Souter, J., concurring).  Justice Souter wrote: 
I concur in the opinion of the Court.  I write only to 
suggest that this case does not present the issue 
whether it is reversible error to refuse to afford a 
defendant a peremptory challenge beyond the maximum 
otherwise allowed, when he has used a peremptory 
challenge to cure an erroneous denial of a challenge 
for cause and when he shows that he would otherwise 
use his full complement of peremptory challenges for 
the noncurative purposes that are the focus of the 
peremptory right.  Martinez-Salazar did not show that, 
if 
he 
had 
not 
used 
his 
peremptory 
challenge 
curatively, he would have used it peremptorily against 
another juror.  He did not ask for a make-up 
peremptory or object to any juror who sat.  Martinez-
Salazar simply made a choice to use his peremptory 
challenge curatively. 
No. 99-2704-CR.ssa 
 
10
¶170 For the reasons stated, I dissent. 
¶171 I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH joins this opinion. 
 
 
No. 99-2704-CR.ssa 
 
1