Case Title: Kanoy v. Hinshaw

Citation: 160 S.E.2d 296, 273 N.C. 418

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1968-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
160 S.E.2d 296 (1968) 273 N.C. 418 Frances D. KANOY v. Emory Ray HINSHAW and Security Mills of Greensboro, Inc. Connie Reid KANOY, by his Next Friend, Francis V. Kanoy, v. Emory Ray HINSHAW and Security Mills of Greensboro, Inc. No. 450. Supreme Court of North Carolina. April 10, 1968. *300 W. H. Steed, Thomasville, and Walser, Brinkley, Walser & McGirt, Lexington, for plaintiffs. Sapp & Sapp and Rollins & Rollins, Greensboro, for defendants. BRANCH, Justice. Plaintiffs assign as error the trial court's action in consolidating the two cases for trial. This assignment of error is based on an exception duly taken. Fleming v. Holleman, 190 N.C. 449, 130 S.E. 171. Appellants rely on the language contained in the case of Dixon v. Brockwell, 227 N.C. 567, 42 S.E.2d 680, where Winborne, J., (later C. J.) stated: The trial court possesses the power to order consolidation of actions for trial when the actions involve the same parties and the same subject matter, if no prejudice or harmful complications will result therefrom. This power is vested in the trial judge so as to avoid multiplicity of suits, unnecessary costs, delays, and to afford protection from oppression and abuse. To sustain an exception to the court's discretionary consolidation of the actions, injury or prejudice to the appealing party arising from such consolidation must be shown. Peeples v. Seaboard Air Line R. R., 228 N.C. 590, 46 S.E.2d 649. In the case of Davis v. Jessup, 257 N.C. 215, 125 S.E.2d 440, Denny, C. J., speaking for the Court, stated: It should be noted that the Davis v. Jessup case differs from the instant case in that the issue of contributory negligence was submitted as to both plaintiffs and there was no counterclaim against either of the plaintiffs. Robinson v. Standard Transportation Co., 214 N.C. 489, 199 S.E. 725, is a case in which the driver of an automobile and *301 four of his guest passengers brought separate actions against the same defendants, in which each plaintiff sought recovery for personal injuries, and one plaintiff, in addition, sought recovery for property damage. The original record shows that an issue of contributory negligence was submitted as to one plaintiff only. The Court, holding that there was no error in the consolidation of these cases for trial, stated: In analyzing Robinson v. Standard Transportation Co., supra, we conclude that the court reasoned that "the defenses were the same" in the sense that no confusion would result in the trial from the consolidation since defendants relied on the same negligent acts of the plaintiff driver as their defense in their plea of contributory negligence and in their contention that the sole negligence of the same driver barred recovery by the other plaintiffs. An examination of the case law of other jurisdictions indicates a strong trend towards approval of consolidation in actions for injuries whenever possible, on the premise that, generally, the applicable rules of law are not complicated and may be explained to the modern jury so that it may understand and apply the legal rules to the factual situation. See 68 A.L.R.2d 1372, for an exhaustive note on Consolidation Actions for Injuries. In this connection we observe it is the rule in this jurisdiction that when cases are consolidated for trial, although it becomes necessary to make only one record, the cases remain separate suits and retain their distinctiveness throughout the trial and appellate proceedings. Pack v. Newman, 232 N.C. 397, 61 S.E.2d 90; Horton v. Perry, 229 N.C. 319, 49 S.E.2d 734. Here, the court submitted separate issues as to both cases and the written issues were in the possession of the jury during its deliberations. Any contention that confusion resulted from consolidation of the actions because of the submission of the defense of contributory negligence and the inclusion of a counterclaim against the plaintiff driver is further dispelled by the fact that the jury considered only the first and fourth issues in the Frances D. Kanoy case and only the first issue in Connie Reid Kanoy case. The actions grew out of the same accident, the same evidence was related by the same witnesses (except as to damages), both defendants relied on the same acts of negligence of the plaintiff Frances D. Kanoy to sustain their defense of contributory negligence and their defense that the sole negligence of Frances D. Kanoy caused the injuries received by the passenger Connie Reid Kanoy. Plaintiffs brought forward no assignment of error as to the admission or exclusion of evidence or as to any other specific ruling of the court which they contended was caused by consolidation of the actions for trial. The record in the instant case does not reveal apparent prejudice to either plaintiff which justifies interference with the court's discretionary order of consolidation. *302 We do wish to stress, however, that in considering consolidation of actions for trial, the trial court should carefully weigh the possibilities of confusion, misunderstanding or prejudice to the parties which might arise from such consolidation. Plaintiffs assign as error comments of the trial judge made in the presence of the jury as being prejudicial in expressing an opinion as to the evidence. The court, in explanation of his ruling on the admissibility of evidence, stated in the presence of the jury: On three or four other occasions he made statements of like import. Proximate cause is that cause which produces the result in continuous sequence and without which it would not have occurred, and one from which any man of ordinary prudence could have foreseen that such a result was probable under all of the facts then existing. Jenkins v. Leftwich Electric Co., 254 N.C. 553, 119 S.E.2d 767. It is well recognized in this jurisdiction that a litigant has a right by law to have his cause tried before an impartial judge without any expressions from the trial judge which would intimate an opinion by him as to weight, importance or effect of the evidence. Upchurch v. Hudson Funeral Home, 263 N.C. 560, 140 S.E.2d 17. However, this prohibition applies only to an expression of opinion related to facts which are pertinent to the issues to be decided by the jury, and it is incumbent upon the appellant to show that the expression of opinion was prejudicial to him. McDonald v. MacArthur Bros. Co., 154 N.C. 11, 69 S.E. 684. See also Upchurch v. Hudson Funeral Home, supra. The lengthy comments by the trial judge were unnecessary. However, there was no evidence that the manner in which the truck body was attached to the chassis caused the collision. The statements made by the court were obviously true and did not express an opinion as to facts pertinent to the issues being considered by the jury so as to be prejudicial to plaintiffs. This assignment of error is overruled. Plaintiffs contend that there was error in the time when and manner in which the trial judge submitted the case to the jury. In this connection the record shows the following: When the jury returned, the court then gave further instructions on the issues and the order in which the jury should answer them. In re Will of Hall, 252 N.C. 70, 113 S.E.2d 1, contains the following pertinent statements: Without indicating any opinion as to the weight of the evidence or what the verdict should be, the trial judge courteously and considerately reminded the jury of its duty and of the result if it failed to reach a unanimous verdict. The record fails to show that the verdict was coerced or that the jury was intimidated by the actions or words of the trial judge. Further, upon reading the charge as a whole, it appears that the trial judge so explained the law applicable to the facts of the case that we are unable to find any reasonable ground to believe that the jury was misled or misinformed. Phillips v. North Carolina R. R., 257 N.C. 239, 125 S.E.2d 603. *304 Plaintiff appellants have failed to carry the burden of showing sufficient prejudicial error to warrant a new trial. Defendant Security Mills of Greensboro, Inc., assigns as error the failure of the trial court to apply the law, as set out in G.S. § 20-154 and G.S. § 20-141, to the facts on this case. These statutes, in pertinent part, provide: G.S. § 20-158 not only requires the driver on a servient highway to stop, but such driver is further required to exercise due care to see that he may enter or cross the dominant highway or street in safety before entering thereon. Jordan v. Blackwelder, 250 N.C. 189, 108 S.E.2d 429. The court's interpretation of G.S. § 20-158 incorporates the requirements contained in G.S. § 20-154, that the motorist must see "that such movement can be made in safety," and under the factual situation here presented, an instruction as to G.S. § 20-154 is unnecessary. Here the court charged as to G.S. § 20-158 and applied the law contained therein to the facts of instant case. Further, the theory of defendant's counterclaim is so clearly based on provisions of G.S. § 20-158 that prejudicial error is not shown by failure to charge on G.S. § 20-141 in relation to the fourth issue. Defendant Security Mills of Greensboro, Inc., has failed to show prejudicial error on its appeal. As to appeal of plaintiffs: No Error. As to appeal of defendant Security Mills of Greensboro, Inc.: No Error. BOBBITT, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). In my opinion, the order of consolidation did not prejudice plaintiff Frances D. Kanoy. In her case, I agree the verdict and judgment should stand. In my opinion, the minor plaintiff, Connie Reid Kanoy, was prejudiced by the order of consolidation, particularly so in view of the fact the court did not give positive instructions to the effect the negligence issue in his case should be answered, "Yes," if the jury found that the collision and his injuries were caused by the joint and concurrent negligence of Frances D. Kanoy and of defendants. In Connie Reid Kanoy's case, my vote is for a new trial. SHARP and HUSKINS, JJ, join in this opinion.