Case Title: Allhusen v. State By and Through Wyoming Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-36

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Allhusen v. State By and Through Wyoming Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd.1995 WY 98898 P.2d 878Case Number: 94-36Decided: 06/23/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

David 
ALLHUSEN, M.S.S.W., an individual; Casper Psychological Services, a Wyoming 
professional corporation; George Conner, an individual; Jennifer Korb, an 
individual; and similarly situated John Does and Jane Does 1 through 100,

Appellants,

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, acting By and Through the 
WYOMING MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS LICENSING BOARD, 

Appellee.

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

Michael Rosenthal of 
Hathaway, Speight, Kunz & Trautwein, Cheyenne, and Charles S. Chapin of 
Crowell & Chapin, P.C., Casper, for 
appellants.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen.; 
Mary B. Guthrie, Deputy Atty. Gen.; Ron Arnold, and William G. Hibbler, Sr. 
Asst. Attys. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      At issue in this 
case is the state constitutionality of the licensure provisions,1 the prerequisites to licensure,2 and the licensure exemptions3 set forth in the Mental Health 
Professions Practice Act (MHPPA).4 The issue arises primarily under 
the equal protection and uniform operation of the laws requirements found in the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming. It occurs in the context of the licensure 
of mental health professionals and disparate treatment of unlicensed counselors 
employed by private, for-profit institutions and unlicensed counselors employed 
in public institutions, public and private educational institutions, including 
students, interns or trainees pursuing a course of study in the regulated 
professions in an accredited institution, and miscellaneous others. Reliance is 
placed by the parties upon various other state constitutional provisions. We 
hold the statutory provisions violate the constitutional mandate for equal 
protection of the laws, and the numerous other claims are subsumed by the equal 
protection analysis. While it did certify to this court the constitutional 
questions, the trial court articulated its conclusion that the provisions at 
issue are unconstitutional and issued a Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction inhibiting the enforcement of the provisions. We agree 
with the conclusion of the trial court, although on more limited grounds, and in 
response to the Order Certifying Questions to the Supreme Court, we hold the 
statutory scheme is unconstitutional.

[¶2]      Pursuant to 
WYO.R.APP.P. 11, the trial court certified to this court the following 
questions:

1.         Do 
the licensure provisions (W.S. § 33-38-110), prerequisites to licensure (W.S. § 
33-38-106), and licensure exemptions (W.S. § 33-38-103) of the Mental Health 
Professions Practice Act:

(a) 
Violate Article 1, Section 2 of the Wyoming Constitution by denying Plaintiffs' 
equal protection of the law?

(b) 
Violate Article 1, Section 6 of the Wyoming Constitution by denying Plaintiffs 
due process of law?

(c) 
Violate Article 1, Section 7 of the Wyoming Constitution by imposing arbitrary 
power over the lives and property of the Plaintiffs without 
cause?

(d) 
Violate Article 1, Section 34 of the Wyoming Constitution by lacking uniform 
operation?

(e) 
Violate Article 3, Section 27 of the Wyoming Constitution by amounting to 
special legislation granting special or exclusive privileges and immunities 
where a general law could be enacted?

(f) 
Violate Article 1, Section 35 of the Wyoming Constitution by violating the 
rights and obligations of contracts ex post facto?

(g) 
Amount to prohibited "fencing" legislation?

(h) 
Deny Plaintiffs' fundamental property rights, liberties and 
privileges?

(i) 
Create unconstitutional classifications by exempting from regulation a class of 
similarly-situated individuals who provide the same services to the public as 
the Plaintiffs who are restricted from doing so under the provisions of the 
MHPPA?

2.         Is 
the MHPPA so vague as to deny uniform enforcement without legislation on the 
part of the Administrative Board?

3.         Will 
enforcement of the MHPPA adversely affect the health and welfare of Wyoming 
citizens in need of emotional and mental assistance?

The preceding questions 
encompass all of the issues in the case, and no additional issues are suggested 
by any party.

[¶3]      We are not 
advised of the reason for pursuing this case under WYO.R.APP.P. 115 rather than WYO. STAT. § 1-13-101 
(1988).6 We understand WYO.R.APP.P. 11 to be 
broader in its application than WYO. STAT. § 1-13-101 and, in view of its 
specific nature, the statutory procedure should be invoked for the reservation 
of constitutional questions. We will consider the questions certified in this 
case, however, because the statutory provisions were substantially 
met.

[¶4]      In such an 
instance, we rely entirely upon the factual determinations made in the trial 
court. As set forth in the Order Certifying Questions to the Supreme Court, they 
are:

In 1987, the Wyoming Legislature enacted the 
"Professional Counselors, Marriage and Family Therapists, Social Workers and 
Chemical Dependency Specialists Act." (Laws 1987, Ch. 239, § 1, codified as W.S. 
§ 33-38-101, et seq.) Under this Act, a licensure procedure was available, but 
not required, for mental health professionals practicing in the state of 
Wyoming.

In 1993, the Legislature passed several amendments to 
the Act, including changing its name to the "Mental Health Professions Practice 
Act" (MHPPA). The 1993 amendments (Laws 1993, Ch. 181, §§ 2 and 3) for the first 
time made licensure mandatory for mental health professionals practicing in the 
state of Wyoming (W.S. § 33-38-110(a)(i)). However, the 1993 amendments also 
exempted from the licensure requirements a large group of persons providing 
counseling activities and services to the public, including people employed by 
any federal or state agency or any political subdivision thereof, or public or 
private educational institutions, students, interns or trainees pursuing a 
course of study in the regulated professions in an accredited institution of 
higher education or training institution, clergymen, or persons providing 
volunteer or professional services for public and private non-profit 
organizations or charities (W.S. § 33-38-103(a)(i)-(vi)). Additionally, the 1993 
amendments enlarged the number of hours of supervised clinical experience and 
supervision required of applicants for licensure before they could qualify to 
take the licensure examination (W.S. § 33-38-106(b)).

The licensure requirement of the MHPPA set out in 
W.S. § 33-38-110(a)(i), prohibits unlicensed counselors from having direct 
patient contact, even if that contact is under the direct supervision of a 
counselor already holding a valid Wyoming license. Persons violating the Act are 
subject to criminal prosecution which can lead to felony convictions and 
imprisonment for not more than two years and a fine of not more than $2,000 for 
each violation (W.S. § 33-38-110(e)).

As of the July 1, 1993, effective date of the MHPPA, 
Plaintiffs7 Allhusen, Conner and Korb were all 
employed as counselors and had all previously received Masters Degrees in 
various counseling fields. Plaintiffs Allhusen and Korb had not yet achieved the 
number of hours of clinical experience necessary to qualify to sit for the 
licensure examination. Plaintiff Conner had amassed the requisite number of 
hours of clinical experience, but the Mental Health Professionals Licensing 
Board informed Plaintiff Conner that, despite receiving a Masters Degree in 
Psychology, he would need to receive additional hours of education before being 
allowed to sit for the licensure examination.

Plaintiff Casper Psychological Services, P.C., 
employed Plaintiffs Conner and Korb to provide counseling services to the public 
directly and through a contract with Crestview [Crest View] Hospital and 
Counseling Center of Casper, Wyoming. Under the terms of this contractual 
relationship, Casper Psychological provided counseling services to eight to ten 
patients at Crestview Hospital on an average daily basis.

Plaintiff Allhusen was employed directly by Crestview 
Hospital and Counseling Center and, before the controversy which gave rise to 
this litigation arose, provided counseling services as a social worker at 
Crestview under the supervision of a Licensed Professional Social Worker as well 
as licensed psychiatrists and medical doctors.

Section 33-38-105 of the MHPPA requires the Board to 
"adopt rules not inconsistent with this Act or the laws of this state that are 
reasonable and necessary to administer this Act." As of the July 1, 1993, 
effective date of the Act, the Board had not adopted any rules or regulations by 
which to administer the Act. The Board adopted "Emergency Rules and Regulations" 
on October 18, 1993, after this action was filed, and without the benefit of 
public comment or a public hearing.

After the July 1, 1993, effective date, several 
inquiries were directed to the Mental Health Professions Licensing Board and its 
attorney by the administrators and counsel for Crestview Hospital and Counseling 
Center concerning the status under the MHPPA of persons like Plaintiffs Allhusen 
and Korb, new graduates having less than 3,000 post-graduate clinical hours of 
experience and, thus, not eligible under the Act to sit for the licensure 
examination. The Board, through its Administrative Officer, informed Crestview 
that these persons would not be eligible or qualified for supervised practice in 
non-exempt, private, for-profit counseling institutions such as Crestview. 
Crestview was informed by the Board's Administrative Officer that "new graduates 
will need to seek employment in exempted areas (meaning not-for-profit, 
government or educational institutions) in order to build the necessary hours 
required" to qualify to take the licensure examination.

Crestview was further informed by the Board that it 
would not allow any non-licensed counselors or new Masters-level graduates to 
practice professional counseling in for-profit institutions. On September 16, 
1993, Crestview was informed by the Licensing Board's attorney that non-licensed 
mental health professionals, including those who had completed Masters Degrees 
and were working towards licensure, could not offer professional counseling 
services in private, for-profit institutions until they were actually licensed. 
The Board's attorney indicated that such individuals could practice in public or 
non-profit organizations under the supervision of licensed individuals to 
acquire the requisite number of hours of practical counseling experience to 
qualify to take the licensure examination, but not at a private, for-profit 
mental health facility, such as Crestview Hospital and Counseling 
Center.

[¶5]      The MHPPA, WYO. 
STAT. § 33-38-101 to -112 (Supp. 1994), after defining board, counseling 
procedures, licensed professional counselors, and various styles of practice 
(WYO. STAT. § 33-38-102), initially provides for exemptions. The exemptions 
provision is the crux of this action, and it provides as 
follows:

(a)       Nothing in this 
act shall be construed to apply to the activities and services 
of:

(i) 
        
Qualified members of other legally recognized professions, such as 
physicians, psychologists or registered nurses, from performing services 
consistent with the laws of this state, their training and the code of ethics of 
their professions, provided they do not represent themselves to be practicing 
the professions licensed under this act and do not represent themselves to be 
counselors, clinical social workers, marriage and family therapists or addiction 
therapists;

(ii)        Persons who 
use an official title and are employed by any federal or state agency or any 
political subdivision, or public or private educational institution, provided 
those persons are performing professionally- related activities within the scope 
of their employment;

(iii)       A student, intern 
or trainee pursuing a course of study in these professions in an accredited 
institution of higher education or training institution, if these activities are 
performed under supervision and constitute a part of the supervised course of 
study, provided that such a person be designated a "counselor intern", "social 
work intern", or "marriage and family intern";

(iv)       Nonresidents who 
render services in this state for not more than thirty (30) days during any 
calendar year, provided that the persons are duly authorized to perform the 
activities and services under the laws of the state or county of the person's 
residency;

(v) 
       A 
rabbi, priest, minister or clergyman of any religious denomination or sect 
provided the activities and services are within the scope of the performance of 
regular or specialized ministerial duties;

(vi)       Persons offering 
volunteer or professional services for public and private nonprofit 
organizations or charities provided that these persons are approved by the 
organizations or agencies for whom the services are 
rendered.

WYO. STAT. § 33-38-103 
(Supp. 1994).

[¶6]      The MHPPA then 
provides for the creation of the board (WYO. STAT. § 33-38-104); the powers and 
duties of the board, including its rules, meetings, and fees (WYO. STAT. § 
33-38-105); and requirements for licensure (WYO. STAT. § 33-38-106). In addition 
to requirements relating to age, character, education, and examination, the 
licensure provision also provides, in pertinent part:

Before admission to the licensure examination 
applicants shall demonstrate that they have completed three thousand (3,000) 
hours of supervised clinical experience including a minimum of one hundred (100) 
hours of face-to-face individual clinical supervision from a supervisor meeting 
qualifications established by the board.

WYO. STAT. § 33-38-106(b) 
(Supp. 1994).

The statute then provides 
for reciprocity (WYO. STAT. § 33-38-108) and confidentiality of information 
communicated by a client (WYO. STAT. § 33-38-109).

[¶7]      In WYO. STAT. § 
33-38-110, the legislature articulates prohibited acts, causes for revocation or 
suspension of a license, how proceedings brought with respect to licenses shall 
be conducted, and provides for misdemeanor and felony penalties. The prohibited 
acts include:

(a) No person shall:

(i) 
Engage in the practice of professional counseling, clinical social work, 
marriage and family therapy or addictions therapy unless licensed to so practice 
under this act or to represent himself to the public as being licensed as a 
professional counselor, a clinical social worker, a marriage and family 
therapist or as an addiction therapist without having first complied with this 
act * * *.

WYO. STAT. § 33-38-110(a) 
(Supp. 1994).

WYO. STAT. § 33-38-111 
articulates the requirements for professional disclosure, and WYO. STAT. § 
33-38-112 requires limitation of practice.

[¶8]      Equal protection 
"mandates that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike, both in 
the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed." Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 425 (Wyo. 1984) (quoting State v. Freitas, 61 Haw. 262, 602 P.2d 914, 
922 (1979)). In this regard, we have held the Wyoming Constitution offers more 
robust protection against legal discrimination than the federal constitution. 
Wilson v. State ex rel. Office of Hearing Examiner, 841 P.2d 90 (Wyo. 1992); 
Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1992); Washakie 
County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980); Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo. 1978).

[¶9]      In this case, we 
attach import to the following provisions of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming:

WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 2 Equality of 
all.

In their inherent right to life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness, all members of the human race are 
equal.

WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 34 Uniform operation of general 
law.

All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform 
operation.

WYO. CONST. art. 3 § 27 Special and local laws 
prohibited.

The legislature shall not pass local or special laws 
in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: For * * * granting to 
any corporation, association or individual * * * any special or exclusive 
privilege, immunity or franchise whatsoever * * *. In all other cases where a 
general law can be made applicable no special law shall be 
enacted.

Equal protection is a 
feature of Article 1, Section 34 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming by 
virtue of the words "uniform operation." Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1; 
Nehring. The same effect has been afforded to the prohibition against special 
and local laws. We have said:

The prohibition against special legislation does not 
mean that a statute must affect everyone in the same way. It only means that the 
classification contained in the statute must be reasonable, and that the statute 
must operate alike upon all persons or property in like or the same 
circumstances and conditions. Nation v. Giant Drug Company, Wyo., 396 P.2d 431, 
434; and State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169, 105 P. 299, 300.

Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. 
Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1356 (Wyo. 1978).

[¶10]   In a number of instances, this 
court has rejected special legislation which does not operate uniformly and 
legislation which infringes upon guarantees of equal protection. Johnson, 838 P.2d 158 (finding statute providing for loss of driver's license based on age 
was unconstitutional special legislation lacking rational differentiation and 
violating the guarantees of equal protection); State ex rel. Wyoming Ass'n of 
Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors v. Sullivan, 798 P.2d 826 (Wyo. 1990) 
(finding Professional Review Panel Act violated the equal protection guarantees 
of the Wyoming Constitution); Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988) (finding 
Medical Review Panel Act was unconstitutional because it violated the equal 
protection clause of the Wyoming Constitution); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 
611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980) (finding statute of repose immunizing a class of 
defendants from certain kinds of liability unconstitutional because it violated 
constitutional provisions requiring all laws of general nature to have uniform 
operation and prohibiting special laws where general laws can be made 
applicable); Nation v. Giant Drug Co., 396 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1964) (finding 
ordinance prohibiting businesses which sold personal property from being open 
for business on Sunday, but excluding certain stores which sold specified items, 
was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, and oppressive); Bell 
v. Gray, 377 P.2d 924 (Wyo. 1963) (finding unconstitutional the statute which 
exempted a class of persons from taking a written insurance agent examination, 
but required other agents who sold the same types of insurance to sit for the 
exam); Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 
1962) (finding Wyoming Fair Trade Act unconstitutional as being beyond the 
police power of the state); Pirie v. Kamps, 68 Wyo. 83, 229 P.2d 927 (1951) 
(finding statute requiring publication of legal notices in newspapers having a 
specified minimum page size was a special law in contravention of the 
Constitution). See May v. City of Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300 (1942) 
(finding statutory provision attempting to create a class within a class 
violated the constitutional provision that the legislature shall provide by 
general laws for the organization and classification of municipal 
corporations).

[¶11]   Licensure acts such as the MHPPA 
"are passed for the express purpose of affording the public protection * * *." 
Mapes v. Foster, 38 Wyo. 244, 266 P. 109, 116 (1928). The legislature can, in 
the exercise of the police power, regulate and require licensure of 
professionals as it sees fit but any law in furtherance of the police power 
"must be reasonable and not arbitrary." State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767, 771 (1938).

[¶12]   The standard of equal protection 
found in the Wyoming Constitution does not require that all people be treated 
with exact equality in taxing and licensing. We have said in this regard, in 
Nehring, 582 P.2d at 77:

While there is no prohibition against a reasonable 
classification of persons and things for the purpose of legislation, the 
classification must be reasonable in its discrimination in the light of the 
objects sought to be accomplished and must not be arbitrary * * 
*.

[¶13]   We have invoked two levels of 
scrutiny in analyzing classifications in the context of equal protection. In 
Kautza v. City of Cody, 812 P.2d 143, 147 (Wyo. 1991), we 
said:

When a "suspect class" or a "fundamental right" is 
involved in the classification, we apply a strict scrutiny test which requires a 
showing that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state 
interest. Washakie Co. School District No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 
(Wyo. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980); 
Clements [v. Fashing], 457 U.S. [957] at 963, 102 S.Ct. [2836] at 2843 [73 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1982)].

The other level of scrutiny 
incorporates a rational relationship test and is appropriate when an ordinary 
interest is involved. Hays v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 
768 P.2d 11 (Wyo. 1989). There is no contention here any of the plaintiffs is a 
member of a suspect class nor is there any argument a fundamental right has been 
abridged. The rational relationship test is the appropriate one to 
invoke.

[¶14]   Under this less stringent level of 
scrutiny, the burden of persuasion is assigned to the challengers to demonstrate 
application of the MHPPA is unconstitutional. For example, the plaintiffs are 
charged with showing the invalidity of the provision which forbids unlicensed 
counselors employed by private, for-profit institutions from having direct 
patient contact even if that contact occurs under the direct supervision of a 
licensed counselor, while at the same time exempting public and educational 
unlicensed counselors from the prohibition. They must demonstrate the 
classification is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

[¶15]   In Johnson, 838 P.2d  at 166-67, we 
invoked a test new to Wyoming for analyzing state constitution equal protection 
claims. The four aspects of the test inquire as to (1) what class is harmed by 
the legislation and has that group been subjected to a tradition of disfavor by 
our laws; (2) what is the public purpose to be served by the law; (3) what is 
the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies disparate 
treatment; and (4) how are the characteristics used to distinguish people for 
disparate treatment relevant to the purpose the challenged law purportedly 
intends to serve. The Johnson test is applicable to the consideration of the 
issues in this case.

[¶16]   The plaintiffs do not contend the 
State is without power to license and regulate members of mental health 
professions. They argue the MHPPA creates an unreasonable classification and the 
licensing provisions manifest an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the 
police power, without any compelling state interest or rational basis. These 
parties point to Bell as precedent for holding a law unconstitutional as special 
legislation, lacking uniformity of operation and violating the tenets of equal 
protection. In Bell, this court held, applying the reasonable basis analysis, 
the statute was unreasonable because all persons in the exempted class, persons 
who sold insurance in connection with motor vehicle sales transactions, were 
permitted to sell the same types and varieties of insurance as those agents 
included in the regulated class. The plaintiffs here contend the exemption of 
public unlicensed counselors has exactly the same effect. They raise as the 
critical question among those certified whether the classification created by 
the exemption provision of the MHPPA has a reasonable basis. They assert it does 
not and, instead, constitutes arbitrary and invidious 
discrimination.

[¶17]   The first question we pose is 
whether the legislation harms the class of unlicensed counselors who are 
employed by private, for-profit institutions, and whether those persons have 
been subjected to a tradition of disfavor. The plaintiffs point out the MHPPA 
requires counselors employed by private, for-profit institutions to be licensed. 
They argue the MHPPA prohibits unlicensed counselors working in private, 
for-profit institutions from having any patient contact even if they are 
supervised by a licensed counselor. The unlicensed counselors claim they are 
harmed because effectively they have been prohibited from acquiring the 
requisite hours to qualify to sit for the licensure examination and, ultimately, 
they are prohibited from becoming licensed as they are required to do by the 
MHPPA. We perceive disadvantage that leads to harm. In order for unlicensed 
counselors, employed by private, for-profit institutions to become licensed 
under the law, they will have to leave employment in the private sector, procure 
a job in an exempt public or educational institution, and be supervised by a 
licensed counselor for the requisite number of hours. Nothing in the record, 
other than conjecture, demonstrates the licensed counselors supervising the 
exempted class are more competent, more ethical, and more qualified to supervise 
unlicensed counselors. There is a clear disparity of treatment of unlicensed 
counselors. It may not even be possible for all those seeking licensure to 
obtain employment in public or educational institutions.

[¶18]   We hold the MHPPA subjects the 
class to harm, but this category of unlicensed counselors has not been subjected 
to a tradition of disfavor by our laws. Under the 1987 statute preceding the 
MHPPA of 1993, licensing was a voluntary act, and private and public unlicensed 
counselors were treated exactly alike. Since this class has not been subjected 
to a tradition of disfavor in our law, it seems unlikely that the classification 
is a product of stereotypical thinking, a danger warned against in Johnson, 838 P.2d  at 166.

[¶19]   The next concern under the test is 
the purpose of a mandatory licensing requirement of private practice counselors 
while exempting public practice counselors. As is usually true in Wyoming, there 
is no legislative history. The drafter of the legislation, a member of the 
Wyoming Mental Health Professions Licensing Board (Board), stated the changes in 
the law will serve the purpose of protecting the public health, safety, and 
welfare. The drafter advanced four reasons for providing for exemption of public 
unlicensed counselors, but requiring licensure of those in the private 
sector.

[¶20]   The first reason was that, since 
the Board first came into existence, approximately half of the issued licenses 
have been held by private counselors and the other half by public counselors. 
Yet, the drafter testified the Board had received and dealt with nineteen 
verified complaints against private licensees and only one against a public 
licensee. He said, "[f]or that reason, it is evident that there is a greater 
need for regulation in the private sector where profit is a goal. Without 
licensure requirements, there would be no way to attempt to insure the safety of 
the public." His second reason, which is related, asserts public practice is 
under a de facto regulatory system because of the tiers of management. He claims 
this insures services are provided in the most effectual manner and in the best 
interest of the public. The rational basis asserted for the different treatment 
is that profit is not a goal.

[¶21]   The third reason relates to the 
phasing-in of the mandatory licensing of practitioners in public practice. The 
contention by the Board is that, because of the shortage of licensed counselors, 
rural areas of Wyoming could be left without any mental health care services, 
which would not be in the best interest of the public. The fourth reason 
advanced is that the act is "piecemeal" reform of the mental health profession 
in Wyoming. The Board took the position that it started with regulation in the 
sector which appeared to be most in need of it.

[¶22]   The legislature has a legitimate 
and substantial interest in prescribing reasonable qualifications for 
occupations requiring special knowledge or skill and affecting the public 
health, safety, and welfare. That interest of the State can be found in the 
purposes of providing safety to the public, who are potentially vulnerable to 
abuse, retaining the availability of services in rural areas, and providing for 
phase-in legislation with respect to licensure. The second concern under the 
Johnson test is satisfied.

[¶23]   The third prong of the test demands 
inquiry into what characteristics of the private, for-profit counselors justify 
the disparate treatment. The plaintiffs contend no real difference exists 
between unlicensed counselors who are exempted by the statute and unlicensed 
counselors who are not exempted by the statute. They argue counselors with the 
same training, experience, and education are treated differently by the statute 
based solely upon the public or private character of their employers. The 
response of the Board is that a profit motive causes a greater need for 
regulation of licensed private, for-profit counselors. In the absence of the 
licensure requirements, the Board contends also there is no other means of 
insuring the safety of the public. The record does not support the contentions 
of the Board with respect to either response. There is no demonstration on the 
record no other means exists for insuring safety for the public in the absence 
of mandatory license requirement for private, for-profit counselors, and no 
demonstration the profit motive demands greater regulation. The process for 
insuring safety for the public is currently provided under de facto regulation 
and the current structure of supervision in both classes of unlicensed 
counselors. In either instance, licensed counselors supervise unlicensed 
counselors. Furthermore, the statutory and administrative process for accepting 
and resolving complaints is available.

[¶24]   The record is also deficient with 
respect to the concern about the complaints against private, for-profit licensed 
counselors. The nature of those complaints, the merits of those complaints, the 
resolution of those complaints, and the number of private counselors against 
whom complaints were lodged cannot be established by this record. Conceptually, 
they could address anything from billing practices to personality conflicts. 
There could be multiple complaints against a single counselor. In presenting 
this contention, the Board does not explain its conclusion that the fact 
nineteen complaints were filed was related to the desire of the licensed 
counselors for profit. Nothing in this record demonstrates the licensure 
requirements would change the complaints received by the Board. Other means, 
such as disciplinary actions or continuing education, including training in 
ethical conduct, may address these problems more directly.

[¶25]   Were we to accept the Board's 
contention that licensure is useful in assuring public health, safety, and 
welfare, the exemption of a large number of unlicensed counselors from the 
requirement does not seem useful in reaching the Board's objective. Permitting 
untrained volunteers to provide counseling services so long as they work for 
non-profit or charitable organizations, while at the same time forbidding 
counselors who are educated, have experience, and are in the process of 
receiving training to provide counseling to patients, does not appear to promote 
public safety. The potential is exactly the opposite.

[¶26]   With respect to policy options, we 
said in Hoem, 756 P.2d at 783:

While it is true that "[t]he social wisdom of the 
legislature's policy choices is, of course, irrelevant to the question of 
constitutionality of the Act," it also is true that "[c]omplete disregard for 
other potential policy options is, however, of at least tangential relevance 
when considering whether a legislative * * * goal is a legitimate one." Waggoner 
v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1104 n. 3 (N.D.Tex. 1986).

The failure to consider 
other policy options is relevant to the legislative goal in this 
case.

[¶27]   The trial court concluded the 
provisions of the MHPPA create a no-win situation for unlicensed counselors in 
the private sector. Licensure is mandatory for them, but they are foreclosed 
from the licensing process. On the other hand, unlicensed counselors for whom 
licensing is not required have access to the licensure process. A more clear 
denial of equal protection would be difficult to find.

[¶28]   The last question of the Johnson 
test addresses how the characteristics used to distinguish those who are 
conducting private, for-profit institutions are relevant to the purpose of 
assuring public health, safety, and welfare.

[A]ny claim that the restriction of the law bears a 
reasonable relation to a public interest must rest not on conjecture but must be 
supported by something of substance, Nation v. Giant Drug Company, Wyo. 1964, 
396 P.2d 431. See also, Heather v. Delta Drilling Co., Wyo. 1975, 533 P.2d 1211, 
reh. den.

Nehring, 582 P.2d  at 77.

In this instance, the claim 
of the Board that the restriction bears a reasonable relation to the public 
interest is based on conjecture.

[¶29]   The Board argues the tiers of 
management in public entities seek to insure the most effective services are 
provided in the best interest of the public. The record reveals the plaintiffs 
are directly supervised by other licensed counselors and work in conjunction 
with physicians, psychiatrists, Ph.D. psychologists, and licensed social 
workers. There is no evidence to demonstrate any relation to the best interest 
of the public in forbidding unlicensed counselors from being supervised by 
licensed counselors in private institutions or to justify a conclusion that the 
supervision is inadequate.

[¶30]   The application of the test 
articulated in Johnson leads to the conclusion that the rights of the plaintiffs 
to equal protection have been transgressed. None of the evidence demonstrates 
that supervision by public, licensed counselors results in the qualification of 
counselors who are more competent or more ethical and, thus, more likely to 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public. The differentiation of 
the public employer or the charitable employer from the private, for-profit 
employer cannot be justified as a proper classification and, thus, is not a 
legitimate exercise in police power. We hold this classification is not founded 
on a reasonable basis, is arbitrary, and constitutes unwarranted discrimination. 
It is a violation of equal protection and must be set 
aside.

[¶31]   The plaintiffs also claim their 
right to due process has been infringed. They contend they have been deprived of 
a property right to employment which was granted to them by the 1987 
"Professional Counselors, Marriage and Family Therapists, Social Workers and 
Chemical Dependency Specialists Act." They invoke Article 1, Section 6, of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming, which provides:

Due 
process of law.

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.

In considering this claim, 
the trial court also relied upon Article 1, Section 7, of the Constitution of 
the State of Wyoming, which provides:

No 
absolute, arbitrary power. 

Absolute, arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and 
property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest 
majority.

[¶32]   These provisions do protect the 
rights of citizens to due process as well as other personal liberties, but the 
facts in this case do not justify invoking them. In their brief, the plaintiffs 
assert, and in its conclusions of law the trial court found, those property 
rights to employment were violated by the passage of the MHPPA. The record does 
not contain a copy of any affected employment contract, and no evidence was 
presented that any employment was for a specified duration. In the absence of 
evidence, we treat the employment of the plaintiffs as at-will 
employment.

[¶33]   In Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber 
of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 217 (Wyo. 1994), we said:

Wyoming continues to accept the common-law employment 
at will rule which states that either party may terminate a contract of 
employment, which is for an indefinite duration, at any time, for any reason or 
for no reason at all. Lankford v. True Ranches, Inc., 822 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 
1991); Chasson v. Community Action of Laramie County, Inc., 768 P.2d 572, 575 n. 
1 (Wyo. 1989); Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 685 P.2d 25, 27 (Wyo. 
1984).

See also Drake v. Cheyenne 
Newspapers, Inc., 891 P.2d 80, 81 (Wyo. 1995).

So far as we can tell, Crest 
View Hospital and Casper Psychological, or any of the employees could have 
terminated this employment at any time. Neither the employer nor the employee 
would have been able to pursue an action for breach of the employment contract. 
It follows that the right of the individuals to employment could not be violated 
when either party could terminate the employment contract at will. No 
interference with a property right is present in this instance which would 
justify reliance upon the due process clause. In addition, nothing suggests the 
legislative process was not correctly followed, and nothing in the record 
discloses any inhibition of the rights of the parties to be involved in the 
legislative process.

[¶34]   The trial court also certified a 
question with respect to the violation of a contract ex post facto. That concern 
invokes Article 1, Section 35, of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, 
which provides:

Ex post 
facto laws; impairing obligation of contracts.

No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the 
obligation of contracts, shall ever be made.

With respect to an ex post 
facto law, Casper Psychological states it had a contract with Crest View to 
provide counseling services prior to the effective date of the MHPPA. Casper 
Psychological contends it was forced to discontinue the provision of services by 
unlicensed counselors to Crest View which caused substantial economic injury as 
well as injury to its reputation. It argues the MHPPA clearly impaired the 
contract between it and Crest View.

[¶35]   The trial court accepted Casper 
Psychological's argument and found the MHPPA impaired the rights and obligations 
of the contract. Again, we are frustrated by the state of the record. There is 
no copy of the contract, and all the evidence relating to it is hearsay. We 
refuse to consider the ex post facto claim where the record is deficient in this 
regard, and our decision would have to be based upon hearsay testimony. 
Constitutional questions require clarity in the record.

[¶36]   The parties separately enumerate 
issues of "fencing" legislation, fundamental property rights, liberties and 
privileges, and the creation of an unconstitutional classification, but we 
believe these claims are all subsumed by the major claim of equal protection. 
They require no further discussion in light of our conclusion that the statute 
does violate the equal protection provisions of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming. We do not perceive the MHPPA as "vague," but conclude it impermissibly 
creates a classification and, for that reason, it exceeds the proper exercise of 
the police power. We agree with the finding of the trial court that patients 
with serious emotional afflictions may be deprived of needed and perhaps 
lifesaving services if the MHPPA is enforced as the legislature apparently 
intended.

[¶37]   The Board presents two final 
contentions. It relies upon Colorado Soc'y of Community and Institutional 
Psychologists, Inc. v. Lamm, 741 P.2d 707 (Colo. 1987), as controlling. In that 
case, the court found the amendments at issue did provide classifications which 
bore a rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest of 
regulating the practice of psychology to protect public health, welfare, and 
safety. The Colorado court also found no constitutionally protected property 
right existed to practice psychology under the repealed exemptions to the 
licensing act. We distinguish that case on two bases. First, the amendments did 
result in requiring unlicensed, previously-exempted psychologists to become 
licensed, but they did not foreclose those psychologists from licensure under 
their existing employment situation. All unlicensed psychologists were required 
to have the same qualifications through the same process. Second, in that case, 
the equal protection analysis was accomplished under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, which does not offer the same robust 
protection as Wyoming's equal protection provisions. Lamm is different on its 
facts and the law invoked.

[¶38]   The Board also argues that Allhusen 
and Korb were not treated differently because regulations were promulgated and 
adopted in October 1993 to allow them to obtain supervised clinical experience 
by private licensed counselors. While WYO. STAT. § 33-38-105 does require the 
Board to "adopt rules not inconsistent with this act or the laws of this state 
that are reasonable and necessary to administer this act," we conclude the 
regulations are not consistent with the act and cannot avoid the constitutional 
shortfall.

[¶39]   The effect of our declaration of 
unconstitutionality should be the same as that declared in Copp v. Redmond, 858 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Wyo. 1993) (citations omitted), where we 
said:

Generally, when an amendment to an original act is 
declared unconstitutional, the unconstitutional amendment has no effect, and the 
law as it existed before the amendment is controlling.

It, therefore, is our 
intention, in declaring WYO. STAT. §§ 33-38-110, -106, -103 (Supp. 1994) 
unconstitutional and of no effect, to reinstate the provisions as they existed 
prior to the 1993 amendments.

[¶40]   In summary, we hold the mandatory 
licensure provisions under WYO. STAT. § 33-38-110 (Supp. 1994), the 
prerequisites to licensure found in WYO. STAT. § 33-38-106 (Supp. 1994), and the 
licensure exemptions set forth in WYO. STAT. § 33-38-103 (Supp. 1994) violate 
guarantees of equal protection under WYO. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2 and 34 and WYO. 
CONST. art. 3, § 27. There is no rational relationship between the purpose for 
these amendments and affording disparate treatment of unlicensed counselors 
employed by private, for-profit institutions. These provisions must be stricken 
as contrary to guarantees of equal protection, the guarantee of uniform 
operation of laws, and as special legislation. The unconstitutional provisions 
are of no effect, and the law in the form it existed prior to the amendments is 
controlling.

FOOTNOTES

1 WYO. STAT. § 33-38-110 (Supp. 
1994).

2 WYO. STAT. § 33-38-106 (Supp. 
1994).

3 WYO. STAT. § 33-38-103 (Supp. 
1994).

4 WYO. STAT. §§ 33-38-101 to -112 (Supp. 
1994).

5 Certification of Questions of 
Law.

6 Chapter 13, Reservation of Question to 
Supreme Court. Constitutional questions, generally.

7 For convenience, the individual and 
corporate plaintiffs will be referred to as plaintiffs in the course of our 
opinion unless specificity is required.