Case Title: Love v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 71S03-1612-CR-641

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2017-05-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
Jeffrey E. Kimmell 
South Bend, Indiana  
  
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE  
 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.  
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Ellen H. Meilaender 
Deputy Attorney General  
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
  
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
No. 71S03-1612-CR-00641 
ROYCE LOVE, 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
v. 
THE STATE OF INDIANA, 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court, No. 71D03-1308-FD-000653 
The Honorable Jerome Frese, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 71A03-1511-CR-02009 
May 11, 2017  
David, Justice. 
This is a sufficiency case that turns, in part, on video evidence.   At issue is the appropriate 
standard of review for this video evidence; more specifically, when does reviewing video evidence 
become impermissible reweighing? This Court has previously addressed video evidence in 
Robinson v. State, where we observed that: “[w]hile technology marches on, the appellate standard 
of review remains constant.” 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014).  Today, however, we write to 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
May 11 2017, 11:35 am
 
 
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supplement our standard of review for video evidence to add a narrow failsafe.  We hold that 
Indiana appellate courts reviewing the sufficiency of evidence must apply the same deferential 
standard of review to video evidence as to other evidence, unless the video evidence indisputably 
contradicts the trial court’s findings.  A video indisputably contradicts the trial court’s findings 
when no reasonable person can view the video and come to a different conclusion. 
 
 The case before us does not present such a set of circumstances.  That is, the video at issue 
does not indisputably contradict the trial court’s findings.  As such, we affirm the trial court.   
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
In August 2013, the South Bend police observed a white van driven by Defendant, Royce 
Love, drive through a red light. Police began following Love and saw him disregard a stop sign. 
They then initiated a traffic stop, but Love did not stop.  Instead, he drove on, and other officers 
joined the chase. Police attempted to use their cars to create a roadblock, but Love hit one of the 
police cars and kept going. Eventually, Love was stopped in an alley with the use of a spike or 
stop sticks which were used by police to deflate Love’s tires.  
 
Love exited his vehicle. He was ordered to the ground.  He then raised his hands and got 
down on all fours. He eventually lay face down on the ground. Officers used tasers and a police 
dog to effect Love’s arrest.  
 
Love was charged with three counts: 1) resisting law enforcement (based on his fleeing in 
his vehicle) as a class D felony1; 2) battery to a law enforcement animal as a class A misdemeanor; 
and 3) resisting law enforcement (based on forcibly resisting after the vehicle was stopped) as a 
class A misdemeanor. 2   
 
                                                 
1 On appeal, Love does not challenge this count.  
2 The State also charged Love with Count IV, operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a class A 
misdemeanor, but this charge was dismissed prior to trial.  
 
 
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During a jury trial, several police officers testified that Love did not comply with the 
officers’ commands after he exited his vehicle. Police testified that because Love was 
uncooperative, police deployed a taser, twice, but that Love pulled the taser probes out, 
necessitating deployment of a police dog.  Police testified that the dog bit Love’s right forearm.  
Love then struck and squeezed the police dog, causing the dog to yelp.  Police also observed a bite 
ring on the dog’s head after they struck Love a number of times to secure the dog’s release.  
 
The State also introduced a DVD recording of the police pursuit of Love’s van, as taken 
from one of the officer’s cars. This video was admitted without objection and played for the jury.  
 
Love’s version of the events is very different.  He testified that an officer approached his 
vehicle and told him to “get the F out of the car” and that he got out of his vehicle, put his hands 
up and laid face down on the ground.  (Appellant’s Appendix at 234.)  He further testified that he 
put his hands up to be cuffed, but the officers tased him, kicked him and deployed the dog who bit 
him.  He maintains that he only tried to protect himself from the dog, that he basically hugged the 
dog and that he wasn’t trying to hurt it.   
 
 
Love also introduced a DVD recording from an officer’s in-car camera. It showed the scene 
in the alley where Love was eventually stopped and arrested by police.  It was admitted without 
objection and played for the jury.  
 
The jury found Love guilty as charged.  He was ultimately sentenced to consecutive one-
year sentences with all of the time suspended to supervised probation. He appealed.  
 
In a split 2-1 published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed Love’s convictions.  Love 
v. State, 61 N.E.3d 290, 292 (Ind. Ct. App.), transfer granted, opinion vacated, 64 N.E.3d 1207 
(Ind. 2016).  Relying on a Texas appellate court opinion it found instructive, Carmouche v. State, 
10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), the majority found that when faced with video evidence 
to review, an appellate court may not reweigh the evidence and must instead “give almost total 
deference to the trial court’s factual determinations unless the video recording indisputably 
contradicts the trial court’s findings.”  Love, 64 N.E.3d at 298 (citing State v. Houghton, 384 
 
 
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S.W.3d 441, 446 (Tex. App. 2012) (emphasis added)).   Here, the majority found that the video 
unambiguously showed Love cooperated with police almost immediately.   
 
Judge Pyle dissented.  He would have affirmed the trial court. He believes that his 
colleagues impermissibly reweighed the evidence.  He interpreted the video differently and argued 
that Love walked to the rear of the vehicle before complying and that he did not remain still. He 
also stated that the camera does not show everything and thus, the testimony of the witnesses is 
the only evidence of what happened during the ensuing altercation between Love and police.  
 
 
The State filed a petition to transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals 
decision. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
 
Standard of Review 
 
For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and 
reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.  Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007).  
We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.  Id.   We will affirm the 
conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id. 
Discussion 
 
 
 
This is a sufficiency case.   We must decide whether the evidence the State presented at 
trial is sufficient to sustain Love’s convictions for battery of a law enforcement animal and 
resisting law enforcement.  As for battery of a law enforcement animal, at the time of the offense, 
Ind. Code § 35–46–3–11(a) provided that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally. . . strikes, 
torments, injures, or otherwise mistreats a law enforcement animal . . . commits a class A 
misdemeanor.” (Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 158–2013, § 563 (eff. July 1, 2014); and 
Pub L. No. 168–2014, § 86 (eff. July 1, 2014)). As for resisting law enforcement, at the time of 
the offense, Ind. Code § 35–44.1–3–1(a)(1) provided that a defendant commits resisting law 
enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor when he “knowingly or intentionally. . .forcibly resists, 
obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the 
officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer's duties [.]” (Subsequently amended by 
 
 
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Pub. L. No. 158–2013, § 509 (eff. July 1, 2014); Pub. L. No. 168–2014, § 80 (eff. July 1, 2014); 
and Pub. L. No. 198–2016, § 673 (eff. July 1, 2016)).  
 
An officer is not lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties when he uses 
unconstitutionally excessive force.  Shoultz v. State, 735 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 
Claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force in the course of an arrest of a free 
citizen are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and its 
“reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The “reasonableness” 
inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one; the question is whether the officers' actions 
are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without 
regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Id. at 396. 
 
The State offered evidence by way of testimony from the police officers that Love 
knowingly struck or mistreated a police animal and that he knowingly and forcibly resisted a police 
officer while that officer was engaged in his duties as a law enforcement officer.   Specifically, 
five officers testified during trial.  They testified that when Love exited his van, he ignored police 
orders to stop walking away and lie on the ground.  They further testified that because of Love’s 
failure to cooperate, they tased him twice.  Finally, they testified that after Love pulled the taser 
probes out, they deployed the police dog that bit Love’s forearm and that Love responded by 
striking the dog, squeezing it, biting its head and causing it to yelp.   
 
For his part, Love testified that he cooperated with police.  He testified that police ordered 
him to get out of the car and he did so, putting his hands up and lying face down on the ground.  
He argues that the police used excessive force and that he was only trying to protect himself from 
the dog.  Thus, he argues his actions were lawful efforts to protect himself from serious injury and 
therefore, cannot form the basis for his convictions.  
 
Resolution of this issue turns, in part, on interpretation of the video evidence in this case 
because Love argues that, contrary to police testimony, the video shows he cooperated with police.  
This Court recently addressed video evidence and the standard of review in Robinson v. State, 5 
N.E.3d 362 (Ind. 2014). In Robinson, the parties also disputed the significance of the video 
 
 
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evidence, and we observed that: “[w]hile technology marches on, the appellate standard of review 
remains constant.”  Robinson, 5 N.E.3d at 365. We added:   
 
[w]e do not believe, however, as some of our colleagues in other 
jurisdictions do, that the very act of reviewing video evidence 
constitutes impermissible appellate reweighing. State v. Rascon, 
No. 30,561, 2011 WL 704472 at *2 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2011) 
cert. denied, 2011–NMCERT–003, 150 N.M. 619, 264 P.3d 520 
(2011) (table) (declining even to review a video of a traffic stop in a 
reasonable suspicion case on the ground that doing so would amount 
to reweighing the evidence). Rather, we consider video evidence 
admitted in the trial court to be a necessary part of the record on 
appeal, just like any other type of evidence. 
 
* * * 
 
And just like any other type of evidence, video is subject to 
conflicting interpretations. In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S. 
Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007), Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority of the Court, described a videotape as showing “a 
Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort, placing 
police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious 
injury.” Id. at 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769. Based largely on his impression 
of that video, he concluded police were justified in using deadly 
force to end the pursuit. Id. at 386, 127 S. Ct. 1769. Justice Stevens, 
dissenting, described the very same video as “hardly the stuff of 
Hollywood” and opined it did not show “any incidents that could 
even be remotely characterized as ‘close calls.’” Id. at 392, 127 S. 
Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
Robinson 5 N.E.3d at 366.   Scott highlights the split among courts regarding the standard of 
review that should apply to video evidence on appeal, with some courts, like ours, applying a 
deferential standard of review and some applying a de novo standard. For instance, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted a de novo standard for video evidence: 
 
we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact unless not 
warranted by the evidence and the judge's ultimate findings, while 
open for review, are afforded substantial deference. . .  [H]owever, 
[when] the judge's findings are based almost exclusively on the 
videotape of [defendant’s] confession, and we are in the same 
position as the [trial] judge in viewing the videotape. 
 
Com. v. Novo, 812 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (Mass. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
 
 
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This Court has declined to adopt a de novo standard for video evidence. Instead, we give 
the trial court’s decision great deference.  However, this does not mean we do not review or 
consider video evidence. In Robinson, we noted that our appellate courts are permitted to review 
the video evidence, just like any other evidence. Robinson 5 N.E.3d at 366.  The question Robinson 
did not squarely address is when does review of video evidence become impermissible reweighing.  
For there may be times when reasonable minds could disagree about interpretation of the video 
evidence or times when the video is unclear or does not capture the entire event.  However, there 
may be other times when objective video evidence is complete and indisputably contradicts the 
other evidence in the case.  For example, there could be a situation where the issue is whether a 
defendant consented to a search.  The police testify that defendant consented to the search; 
however, on the video of the events, defendant indisputably says “no” when police ask if they may 
search his vehicle.   In such an instance, it would not be appropriate to ignore the video evidence 
and only look to the evidence supporting the verdict citing the deferential standard of review.   
As the Supreme Court of Florida recently and aptly stated: 
We respect the authority and expertise of law enforcement officers, 
and thus rely on an officer's memory when necessary. But we would 
be remiss if we failed to acknowledge that at times, an officer's 
human recollection and report may be contrary to that which 
actually happened as evinced in the real time video. This is the 
reality of human imperfection; we cannot expect officers to retain 
information as if he or she were a computer. Therefore, a judge who 
has the benefit of reviewing objective and neutral video evidence 
along with officer testimony cannot be expected to ignore that video 
evidence simply because it totally contradicts the officer's 
recollection. Such a standard would produce an absurd result.  
Wiggins v. Florida Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 209 So. 3d 1165, 1172 (Fla. 2017). 
 
 
We agree.  Accordingly, we think it is appropriate that there be a narrow failsafe built into 
our standard of review for video evidence.  To that end, we agree with our Court of Appeals that 
the opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2000), is instructive. Carmouche involved whether defendant consented to a search.  
Finding the police testimony that Carmouche gave his consent was contradicted by video evidence, 
the court noted that “as a general rule, the appellate courts, including this Court, should give almost 
 
 
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total deference to a trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports 
especially when the trial court's findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.” 
Id. at 332.  But it added: “[i]n the unique circumstances of this case, however, we decline to give 
‘almost total deference’ to the trial court's implicit findings,” noting that “the nature of the evidence 
presented in the videotape does not pivot ‘on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor’” and that, 
“[r]ather, the videotape presents indisputable visual evidence contradicting essential portions of 
[the officer’s] testimony.” Id. It ruled that “[i]n these narrow circumstances, we cannot blind 
ourselves to the videotape evidence simply because [police] testimony may, by itself, be read to 
support the Court of Appeals' holding.” Id. Accordingly, it vacated a judgment of the Court of 
Appeals of Texas that Carmouche consented to the search. Id. at 333. 
 
This rule has since been stated as courts “give almost total deference to the trial court's 
factual determinations unless the video recording indisputably contradicts the trial court's 
findings.” State v. Houghton, 384 S.W.3d 441, 446 (Tex. App. 2012).  We find this to be a 
workable approach that allows for appropriate deference to the trial court unless and until there is 
a reason such deference is not appropriate. We recognize these situations may be rare.  But in those 
instances, where the video evidence indisputably contradicts the trial court’s findings, relying on 
such evidence and reversing the trial court’s findings do not constitute reweighing.  To be clear, 
in order that the video evidence indisputably contradict the trial court’s findings, it must be such 
that no reasonable person could view the video and conclude otherwise.  When determining 
whether the video evidence is undisputable, a court should assess the video quality including 
whether the video is grainy or otherwise obscured, the lighting, the angle, the audio and whether 
the video is a complete depiction of the events at issue, among other things.  In cases where the 
video evidence is somehow not clear or complete or is subject to different interpretations, we defer 
to the trial court’s interpretation.  
 
  
Turning to the facts of the present case, Love claims that, here, the video evidence 
(Defendant’s Exhibit A) indisputably contradicts the testimony of five police officers and shows 
him cooperating with police immediately.  However, the video at issue is dark and it is hard to see 
much.   At some point, we do see Love get down on the ground, but we do not see what happens 
before he does, nor do we see much of what happens afterwards.  It is the moments leading up to 
 
 
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Love’s getting on the ground and what ensued afterwards with tasers and the police dog that are 
critical to determining what happened in this case.  While Love claims the video indisputably 
shows he cooperated immediately, this is simply not the case. The video does not capture his exit 
from his vehicle.  It also does not show what happens with the taser or police dog.  We only have 
Love’s testimony and the officers’ testimony in that regard.  This is not a case where the video 
indisputably contradicts the testimony of police nor where no reasonable person could look at the 
video and think anything other than Love cooperated immediately.  Instead, we have the 
conflicting testimony of Love and the officers and a video that does not serve to irrefutably 
contradict police testimony.   As such, we defer to the trial court’s factual determinations regarding 
weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 
We hold that for video evidence, the same deference is given to the trial court as with other 
evidence, unless the video evidence at issue indisputably contradicts the trial court’s findings.  A 
video indisputably contradicts the trial court’s findings when no reasonable person can view the 
video and come to a different conclusion.  
 
Because the video evidence at issue does not indisputably show Love’s compliance with 
police, and there is other evidence that sufficiently established the elements of the crimes, we 
affirm Love’s convictions for battery of a law enforcement animal and resisting law enforcement 
as class A misdemeanors.   
 
Rush, C.J., Rucker, Massa and Slaughter, J.J., concur.