Case Title: Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski

Citation: 1999-Ohio-285

Docket Number: 19962190

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski, 85 Ohio St.3d 524, 1999-Ohio-285.] 
 
 
 
 
 
CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLEE, v. TRZEBUCKOWSKI, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 524.] 
Appellate procedure — Determining whether a judgment entry is a final 
appealable order when the clerk of court does not journalize the entry until 
after the thirty-day period has run as set forth in Sup.R. 7 — Municipal 
corporations — Ordinances — Prosecutor’s discriminatory enforcement of 
Cleveland Codified Ordinance 688.13 against privately owned, for-profit 
billiard rooms and not against city-owned, public recreation centers violates 
right to equal protection as guaranteed by the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions. 
(No. 96-2190 — Submitted January 12, 1999 — Decided June 2, 1999.) 
APPEAL  from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 69478. 
 
On March 12, 1995, a Cleveland police officer issued five complaints 
against defendant-appellant, Stanley Trzebuckowski, for allowing a juvenile in a 
billiard room, a violation of Cleveland Codified Ordinance 688.13.  According to 
the printout of the docket that this court received from the Cuyahoga County Court 
of Appeals, these complaints were received and filed with the Cleveland Municipal 
Court Clerk’s Office on March 14, 1995.  On June 7, 1995, defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss the charges on the grounds that the ordinance was 
unconstitutional.  On June 22, 1995, the court completed a judgment entry form, 
stating that it was granting defendant’s motion to dismiss.  This judgment entry 
form was stamped “Judgment Entry Received for Journalization Sep 12 1995.” 
 
On July 26, 1995, the municipal court submitted its finding of fact and 
conclusion of law, supporting its decision to grant the motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that the ordinance was unconstitutional (the date below the judge’s 
signature, in a handwriting different from that of the judge’s signature, is June 23, 
 
 
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1995).  The finding of fact and conclusion of law also is stamped “Judgment Entry 
Received for Journalization Sep 12 1995.” 
 
On August 28, 1995, appellee, city of Cleveland, filed a notice of appeal in 
the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals.  On November 3, 1995, defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that the city did not timely file its notice of 
appeal and therefore that the court of appeals had no subject-matter jurisdiction.  
The court of appeals’ decision, released on August 15, 1996 and journalized on 
September 9, 1996,1 apparently denied, without so stating, defendant’s motion to 
dismiss.  The court of appeals held the ordinance constitutional on the merits of the 
city’s arguments, thus apparently assuming its own jurisdiction.  The court of 
appeals accordingly reversed the decision of the trial court and entered judgment 
for the city. 
 
On September 9, 1996, the court of appeals directly addressed defendant’s 
jurisdictional arguments in a journal entry denying his August 26, 1996 application 
for reconsideration.  The court of appeals held that the date of journalization of the 
trial court’s judgment entry started the “appeal clock” running, and thus the city’s 
notice of appeal was prematurely, but timely, filed pursuant to App.R. 4(C). 
 
This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
George A. Pace, Jr., Cleveland Chief Prosecutor, and Jay A. Cole, Assistant 
City Prosecutor, for appellee. 
 
Kenneth A. Bossin and Robert J. Willis, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  Before we reach the merits of this case, we must 
address the issue of whether a judgment entry is a final appealable order when the 
 
 
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clerk of court does not journalize the entry until after the thirty-day period has run 
as set forth in Sup.R. 7. 
I 
 
The Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio apply to “all courts of 
appeal, courts of common pleas, municipal courts, and county courts” in Ohio.  
Sup.R. 1(A).  Sup.R. 7(A) states: 
 
“The judgment entry specified in Civil Rule 58 and in Criminal Rule 32 
shall be filed and journalized within thirty days of the verdict, decree, or decision.  
If the entry is not prepared and presented by counsel, it shall be prepared and filed 
by the court.” 
 
In the case sub judice, the municipal court’s judgment entry, which granted 
defendant’s motion to dismiss and purported to terminate the case at the trial level, 
was prepared on June 22, 1995.  The entry was not journalized by the clerk until 
September 12, 1995, a full eighty-two days later.  The city filed its notice of appeal 
on August 28, 1995, sixty-seven days after the entry was prepared, and fifteen days 
before the entry was journalized. 
 
App.R. 4(A) requires that a party file the notice of appeal “within thirty days 
of the later of entry of the judgment or order appealed or, in a civil case, service of 
the notice of judgment and its entry if service is not made on the party within the 
three day period in Rule 58(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  In State ex rel. Hughes v. Celeste (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 429, 430, 619 
N.E.2d 412, 414, we set forth the test for a final appealable order: 
 
“Under R.C. 2505.02, an order is final and appealable if it satisfies each of 
these three criteria:  (1) it affects a substantial right; (2) it in effect determines the 
action; and (3) it prevents a judgment.  Bellaire City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Paxton 
(1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 65, 13 O.O.3d 58, 391 N.E.2d 1021. 
 
 
4
 
“A ‘substantial right’ is a legal right enforced and protected by law.  Noble 
v. Colwell (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 94, 540 N.E.2d 1381, 1383.  * * * ”  In the 
case sub judice, the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss in a criminal 
case affects a legal right enforced and protected by law:  it granted defendant his 
freedom from multiple criminal charges.  And an entry granting a motion to 
dismiss also determines the action, thus fulfilling the second criterion. 
 
Thus, this case presents the issue of whether the third criterion, that of 
preventing a judgment, was met.  We begin our analysis by noting that a 
conclusion or statement of judgment must be journalized formally to become a 
final appealable order.  Civ.R. 58(A) and Crim.R. 32(C); State ex rel. Hansen v. 
Reed (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 597, 600, 589 N.E.2d 1324, 1327.  See, also, State ex 
rel Hanley v. Roberts (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 1, 17 OBR 1, 476 N.E.2d 1019; State 
ex rel. White v. Junkin (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 686 N.E.2d 267. 
 
In Hansen and White, cited above, this court held that because the entries 
determining the convictions and the sentences of the criminal defendants were not 
journalized, they were not final appealable orders, and thus the trial courts properly 
vacated their own orders and set the cases for trial.  Likewise, in the case sub 
judice, until the trial court’s entry determining the final verdict on a criminal 
complaint is officially journalized, the entry cannot prevent further judgment, since 
the trial court can always vacate its own judgment and set the case for trial.  Thus, 
it is not a final appealable order. 
 
However, in State ex rel. Grove v. Nadel (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 325, 327, 
691 N.E.2d 275, 277, we held that either party to an action may file a writ of 
mandamus or a writ of procedendo in an appellate court to compel the trial court to 
journalize its judgment if the court fails to do so within the thirty-day period 
mandated by Sup.R. 7.  The judgment would then become a final appealable order 
on the date of journalization, no matter how delayed.  In the case sub judice, the 
 
 
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judgment likewise became final on September 12, 1995, the date of eventual 
journalization. 
 
Because the city’s notice of appeal was filed prior to the journalization of the 
court’s judgment, the notice was premature.  When a notice of appeal is filed after 
a judgment is announced, but before the judgment is entered, that notice is treated 
as filed immediately after the judgment is entered.  App.R. 4(C).  Thus, in the case 
sub judice, the city’s notice of appeal is considered filed and effective on 
September 12, 1995, the date the court’s judgment was filed and became final.  
Accordingly, the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the case.  App.R. 4(A). 
 
From the record in the case sub judice, it is difficult to ascertain exactly who 
is at fault for the violation of Sup.R. 7.  Because all documents entered in the trial 
court’s file of the case were stamped with the same date for journalization and that 
date follows shortly after the date on which the city filed its notice of appeal, we 
can assume that everything was officially journalized on that late date in the case 
only after being triggered by the filing of a notice of appeal.  This is a blatant 
violation of Sup.R. 7, extremely poor court practice, and inexcusable on the part of 
the trial court. 
 
As we state above, the Appellate Rules and the procedures of mandamus and 
procedendo work to alleviate the detrimental results upon the parties of an 
untimely filed judgment, but it is incumbent upon the part of the judiciary to 
comply with the mandate of Sup.R. 7.  Without official journalization within thirty 
days, nothing that the trial court did in the case was final and all orders could 
potentially be reversed at any time.  See, e.g., White, 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 686 
N.E.2d 267; Hansen, 63 Ohio St.3d 597, 589 N.E.2d 1324.  Parties to the action 
cannot depend on the court’s statements and are prohibited from appealing.  The 
Cleveland Municipal Court must see to it that all entries of the court are 
journalized in an expeditious manner. 
 
 
6
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals on the jurisdictional issue 
is affirmed. 
II 
 
Having decided that the judgment of the trial court, despite the delay in 
journalization, is final and appealable, we now address the merits of this case, 
which raise the issue of whether the Cleveland codified ordinance prohibiting 
minors from remaining in “billiard rooms” violates the Constitution because it (1) 
is overbroad, and (2) violates defendant’s right to equal protection. 
A 
Overbreadth 
 
Defendant first asserts that the ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad and 
therefore violates the rights of minors to assemble freely as protected by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 
Cleveland Codified Ordinance 688.13 states: 
 
“No owner, operator, agent or keeper of a billiard room shall permit any 
person who has not reached the age specified in Section 688.12 [fourteen years of 
age] to remain in a billiard room for any purpose.  However, a minor under the age 
specified in Section 688.12, when accompanied by either parent or his legal 
guardian, may be permitted to play both billiards and pool, or be in and remain in 
such parlor or public place.  * * * ” 
 
Cleveland Codified Ordinance 688.01 defines “billiard room” as “any public 
place wherein the game of billiards is permitted to be played.” 
 
Initially we note that in order to challenge a statute, the challenger must 
overcome a strong presumption of constitutionality.  State v. Brooks (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 148, 155, 661 N.E.2d 1030, 1037, citing State v. Warner (1990), 55 
Ohio St.3d 31, 43, 564 N.E.2d 18, 30-31.  The specific doctrine of overbreadth 
relates only to First Amendment issues.  Id., citing New York v. Ferber (1982), 458 
 
 
7
U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113.  Under the Ohio Constitution, free 
speech guarantees are no broader than those guaranteed by the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco (1994), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 221, 222-223, 626 N.E.2d 59, 61.  The First Amendment is the proper basis 
for interpretation of Section 11, Article I, Ohio Constitution, the provision that 
establishes those free speech guarantees in Ohio.  Id., citing State ex rel. Rear 
Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist. Court of Appeals (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 354, 362-
363, 588 N.E.2d 116, 123; Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. (1978), 
54 Ohio St.2d 286, 288, 8 O.O.3d 265, 266, 376 N.E.2d 582, 583; State v. Kassay 
(1932), 126 Ohio St. 177, 187, 184 N.E. 521, 525. 
 
A statute or ordinance may be overbroad “if in its reach it prohibits 
constitutionally protected conduct.”  Grayned v. Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 
114, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 231; Akron v. Rowland (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 374, 386-387, 618 N.E.2d 138, 148.  See, also, Boos v. Barry (1988), 485 
U.S. 312, 329-330, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 1168, 99 L.Ed.2d 333, 350.  In the case sub 
judice, defendant asserts that the ordinance at issue unconstitutionally restricts 
minors’ freedom to associate with friends in a billiard hall.  The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized two types of “freedom of association.”  Dallas v. 
Stanglin (1989), 490 U.S. 19, 23-24, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 1594, 104 L.Ed.2d 18, 25. 
 
The first type of freedom of association includes the “ ‘choice[ ] to enter into 
and maintain certain intimate human relationships.’ ”  Id., quoting Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees (1984), 468 U.S. 609, 617-618, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3249, 82 
L.Ed.2d 462, 470.  These types of associations are the sorts of traditional personal 
bonds that have “ ‘played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation 
by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.’ ”  FW/PBS, Inc. v. 
Dallas (1990), 493 U.S. 215, 237, 110 S.Ct. 596, 611, 107 L.Ed.2d 603, 626, 
quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-619, 104 S.Ct. at 3250, 82 L.Ed.2d at 472.  As 
 
 
8
such, these relationships receive “protection as a fundamental element of personal 
liberty.”  Roberts at 618, 104 S.Ct. at 3249, 82 L.Ed.2d at 471.  In the case sub 
judice, defendant does not assert that the ordinance prohibits the creation and 
cultivation of such intimate relationships, only that it prohibits the development of 
the relationships in a billiard hall.  As such, it is not an assertion of personal 
liberty. 
 
The second type of freedom of association is the right to associate for the 
purpose of engaging in expressive activity as protected by the First Amendment.  
Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24, 109 S.Ct. at 1595, 104 L.Ed.2d at 25.  Defendant does not 
assert that minors gather at billiard halls as “members of any organized 
association” or to “ ‘take positions on public questions,’ ” activities clearly 
protected by the First Amendment.  Id. at 24-25, 109 S.Ct. at 1595, 104 L.Ed.2d at 
25, quoting Bd. of Directors of Rotary Internatl. v. Rotary Club of Duarte (1987), 
481 U.S. 537, 548, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 1947, 95 L.Ed.2d 474, 486.  The Stanglin court 
stated, “[i]t is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a 
person undertakes — for example, walking down the street or meeting one’s 
friends at a shopping mall — but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity 
within the protection of the First Amendment.”  Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25, 109 S.Ct. 
at 1595, 104 L.Ed.2d at 25-26.  Likewise, meeting one’s friends at a billiard hall 
“qualifies neither as a form of ‘intimate association’ nor as a form of ‘expressive 
association’ * * *.”  Id. at 25, 109 S.Ct. at 1595, 104 L.Ed.2d at 26. 
 
Because Cleveland Codified Ordinance 688.13 does not prohibit conduct 
protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or by Section 
11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, the ordinance does not trigger the 
overbreadth doctrine.  Thus, the judgment of the court of appeals as to the 
overbreadth issue is affirmed. 
B 
 
 
9
Equal Protection 
 
Defendant next asserts that Cleveland Codified Ordinance 688.13 
unconstitutionally violates his right to equal protection because the city enforces 
the ordinance against privately owned, for-profit billiard halls and not against the 
city-owned recreation centers in which a billiard table is located.  The city does not 
contest this factual assertion, and, ever since its response to appellant’s motion to 
dismiss in the trial court, the city has readily conceded and justified its policy. 
 
In 1962, the United States Supreme Court articulated the standard for 
selective prosecution under the Equal Protection Clause to the United States 
Constitution:  a selection “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as 
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”2  Oyler v. Boles (1962), 368 U.S. 
448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 506, 7 L.Ed.2d 446, 453, citing Oregon v. Hicks (1958), 
213 Ore. 619, 325 P.2d 794, and referencing Snowden v. Hughes (1944), 321 U.S. 
1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497; Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 
1064, 30 L.Ed. 220.  In Oyler, the defendant, a recidivist, had been prosecuted as a 
“habitual criminal” while a majority of the recidivists in that state were not 
prosecuted as “habitual criminals.”  The United States Supreme Court held that 
because the defendant could articulate no reason for the prosecution of a small 
percentage of recidivists as habitual criminals other than the prosecutor’s lack of 
knowledge of the prior offenses of the other offenders, there was no violation of 
defendant’s equal protection rights. 
 
This court adopted the Oyler standard in State v. Wolery (1976), 46 Ohio 
St.2d 316, 325-326, 75 O.O.2d 366, 372, 348 N.E.2d 351, 358, in which it held 
that the prosecution had not been unconstitutionally discriminatory because the 
defendant articulated no classification defining the difference between those not 
prosecuted and himself. 
 
 
10
 
Over the years, this court has referred to the standard as “intentional and 
purposeful discrimination.”  State v. Freeman (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 55, 58, 20 
OBR 355, 357, 485 N.E.2d 1043, 1045.  In State v. Flynt (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 
132, 134, 17 O.O.3d 81, 82, 407 N.E.2d 15, 17, this court further refined the 
standard and articulated a two-part test: 
 
“ ‘To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a 
defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1) that, 
while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against because 
of conduct of the type forming the basis of the charge against him, he has been 
singled out for prosecution, and (2) that the government’s discriminatory selection 
of him for prosecution has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such 
impermissible considerations as race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise 
of constitutional rights.’ ”  (Quoting United States v. Berrios [C.A.2, 1974], 501 
F.2d 1207, 1211.)  See, also, State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 203, 702 
N.E.2d 866, 888; State v. Lawson (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 336, 346, 595 N.E.2d 902, 
910; Freeman, 20 Ohio St.3d at 58, 20 OBR at 357, 485 N.E.2d at 1045. 
 
As in Flynt, the defendants in Getsy, Lawson, and Freeman did not articulate 
a specific classification on which the prosecutors were allegedly selectively 
prosecuting.  In Getsy, the defendant argued that because some of his codefendants 
were offered plea bargains in exchange for noncapital charges and he was not 
offered such a choice, the prosecutors had violated his right to equal protection.  In 
Lawson, the defendant alleged that because two of his co-conspirators were not 
prosecuted, his right to equal protection had been violated.  In both of these cases, 
this court held that the defendants had established neither (1) that others similarly 
situated had not generally been proceeded against, or (2) that prosecutorial 
decisions regarding which of multiple co-conspirators to offer plea bargains and 
which to prosecute were based upon any impermissible consideration.  Getsy, 84 
 
 
11
Ohio St.3d at 203-204, 702 N.E.2d at 888-889; Lawson, 64 Ohio St.3d at 346, 595 
N.E.2d at 910. 
 
In Freeman, the defendant alleged that there was another individual who 
committed the same acts and against whom the prosecutors did not file charges.  
This court held that “[a] mere showing that another person similarly situated was 
not prosecuted is not enough; a defendant must demonstrate actual discrimination 
due to invidious motives or bad faith.”  Freeman, 20 Ohio St.3d at 58, 20 OBR at 
357, 485 N.E.2d at 1046.  The defendants’ arguments in those cases were not 
enough to overcome the strong presumption that the prosecutors’ choices were not 
discriminatory.  State v. Keene (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 653, 693 N.E.2d 246, 
255. 
 
In contrast to those cases, defendant in the case at bar is able to articulate a 
classification upon which the prosecutors are basing their decisions as to whom to 
prosecute:  profit versus nonprofit billiard rooms.  Not only does the city concede 
that this distinction is its prosecutorial policy, but also it openly asserts the merits 
of this policy in its brief before this court.  The city therefore has conceded the 
intentional discrimination, and since it did not present evidence to the contrary, 
defendant has met his burden of showing that others situated similarly to him have 
not generally been proceeded against because of the same or similar conduct.  See, 
generally, id.  Accordingly, defendant has met the first prong of the 
Oyler/Wolery/Flynt test. 
 
Over the years, this court, when considering the second prong of the 
selective prosecution test, has concentrated on the phrase “based upon such 
impermissible considerations as race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise 
of constitutional rights.”  In the case sub judice, in which the defendant has alleged 
a specific policy that deliberately classifies potential defendants, we are required to 
use the broader test articulated in Wolery and State ex rel. Nagle v. Olin (1980), 64 
 
 
12
Ohio St.2d 341, 18 O.O.3d 503, 415 N.E.2d 279:  “[The] selection is ‘deliberately 
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Wolery at 325-326, 75 O.O.2d at 372, 348 
N.E.2d at 358, quoting Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456, 82 S.Ct. at 506, 7 L.Ed.2d at 453.3  
See, also, 2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) 185-203, Section 13.4; 
Annotation, What Constitutes Such Discriminatory Prosecution or Enforcement of 
Laws as to Provide Valid Defense in State Criminal Proceedings (1979; 
Supp.1998), 95 A.L.R.3d 280; Annotation, What Constitutes Such Discriminatory 
Prosecution or Enforcement of Laws as to Provide Valid Defense in Federal 
Criminal Proceedings (1979; Supp.1998), 45 A.L.R.Fed. 732. 
 
The city justifies its discriminatory policy as protective of minors and 
therefore rational.  However, its assertions are based upon assumptions not based 
on facts and conclusory opinions of what the atmosphere in for-profit billiard 
rooms is supposedly like.  The city asserts that its recreation centers “provide 
minors with a safe and wholesome environment in which they can spend their 
time,” while the for-profit billiard rooms are less likely to provide adequate 
security and will tend to be oriented towards the interests of adults, not minors.  
The city concludes that “[w]hile this does not indicate that the atmosphere in for-
profit billiard rooms will necessarily be inappropriate for minors, it would be more 
appropriate for minors who wish to play pool to do so in a [r]ecreation [c]enter.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
We state again that defendant has a heavy burden to overcome the strong 
presumption of regularity in prosecutorial discretion.  Keene at 653, 693 N.E.2d at 
255.  See, also, Getsy, Lawson, Freeman, Flynt.  However, the city’s paternalistic 
view of the differences between privately owned, for-profit billiard rooms and city-
owned, not-for-profit recreation centers, is clearly irrelevant to law enforcement 
purposes and therefore is not a reasonable basis for systematic discriminatory 
 
 
13
enforcement and is an arbitrary classification.  See, e.g.,  United States v. Robinson 
(W.D.Mo.1969), 311 F.Supp. 1063 1065-1066 (Enforcement of federal laws 
regulating wiretapping against private investigators and not against government 
agents violated equal protection.); LaFave & Israel at 193, Section 13.4.  See, also, 
generally, People v. Acme Markets, Inc. (1975), 37 N.Y.2d 326, 331, 372 N.Y.S.2d 
590, 594, 334 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Prosecutor’s policy of enforcing Sunday closing 
[“blue”] laws only upon individual complaint is “perhaps unenforceable in an 
even-handed and fair manner” and therefore violates the guarantee of equal 
protection.). 
 
We contrast this rather tenuous justification that the city makes to support its 
distinction between privately owned and publicly owned billiard rooms with our 
analysis of the distinction the ordinance makes between those over fourteen years 
of age and those under fourteen.  As we reasoned above, an adult-oriented facility 
is likely to have alcohol and other “corrupting influences.”  Not all facilities in 
which a billiard room is located are such adult-oriented facilities.  Defendant 
represents and the city does not contest that his billiard room does not serve 
alcohol and is otherwise oriented towards teenagers.  The assumptions the city 
makes about all privately owned billiard rooms thus appear based more on the 
distinction between adult-oriented facilities versus teenager-oriented facilities as 
opposed to profit facilities versus nonprofit facilities.  Therefore the ordinance on 
its face passes equal-protection scrutiny but does not under selective-enforcement 
analysis.  See, generally, LaFave & Israel at 195-197, Section 13.4. 
 
We therefore hold that the prosecutor’s discriminatory enforcement of 
Cleveland Codified Ordinance 688.13 against privately owned, for-profit billiard 
rooms and not against the city-owned, public recreation centers violates 
defendant’s equal protection as guaranteed by the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions.4  The judgment of the court of appeals on the equal-protection issue 
 
 
14
is reversed, and we reinstate the judgment of the trial court granting defendant’s 
motion to dismiss for the reasons stated herein. 
Judgment reversed in part, 
affirmed in part 
and cause dismissed. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., concur in part and dissent in part. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
The Eighth Appellate District delays journalization of its entries in order to 
allow the parties to have time to file a motion for reconsideration before having to 
file a notice of appeal in the Supreme Court.  Rule 27 of the Local Rules of the 
Eighth Appellate Judicial District (Cuyahoga County) states: 
 
“The initial release of a journal entry and opinion is an announcement of 
decision issued pursuant to App.R. 22(B) and 26(A).  Within ten days after the date 
of an announcement of decision, any party to the appeal may file an application for 
reconsideration.  App.R. 22(D) and 26(A).  Pursuant to App.R.  22(E), this court 
will file the journal entry and opinion with the clerk of this court for journalization 
on the tenth day after the announcement of decision if a timely application for 
reconsideration is not filed.  See also App.R. 14(A).  If a timely application for 
reconsideration is filed, journalization will be deferred until this court disposes of 
the application for reconsideration.  Pursuant to App.R. 22(E), a journal entry and 
opinion constitutes the entry of the judgment upon journalization.  The time for 
filing a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio runs from the date of the 
entry of judgment in this court.  S.Ct.Prac.R. II, Section 2(A).” 
2. 
Because application of this analysis necessarily involves judicial review of 
law enforcement and prosecutorial discretion, the analysis is different from that of 
traditional equal-protection analysis, which is used for classifications established 
 
 
15
by statute.  LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) 192-193, Section 13.4; 
Annotation, What Constitutes Such Discriminatory Prosecution or Enforcement of 
Laws as to Provide Valid Defense in State Criminal Proceedings (1979; 
Supp.1998), 95 A.L.R.3d 280; Gifford, Equal Protection and the Prosecutor’s 
Charging Decision:  Enforcing an Ideal (1981), 49 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 659, 679-680.  
See, also, People v. Acme Markets, Inc. (1975), 37 N.Y.2d 326, 372 N.Y.S.2d 590, 
334 N.E.2d 555.  Cf. McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 
6 L.Ed.2d 393, and Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley (1961), 
366 U.S. 582, 81 S.Ct. 1135, 6 L.Ed.2d 551, in which the Supreme Court held 
“Sunday blue laws” did not violate the Equal Protection Clause under the 
traditional statutory rational-basis review (In Two Guys the court recognized the 
potential separate issue of selective enforcement [but held it moot in that specific 
case].), and Oyler v. Boles (1962), 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 506, 7 L.Ed.2d 
446, 453, in which the Supreme Court established the test of selective prosecution 
as being deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or 
other arbitrary classification. 
 
Defendant does not assert a facial equal-protection challenge to Cleveland 
Codified Ordinance 688.13; such challenge would necessarily be based on the only 
classification established by the legislation:  minors under fourteen years of age. 
 
Age does not determine a suspect or a quasi-suspect class.  See Gregory v. 
Ashcroft (1991), 501 U.S. 452, 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2406, 115 L.Ed.2d 410, 430; 
Qutb v. Strauss (C.A. 5, 1993), 11 F.3d 488, 492.  And, as stated above, there is no 
fundamental right to assemble in a pool hall; therefore, the appropriate level of 
scrutiny is rational-basis review.  See Gregory at 470, 111 S.Ct. at 2406, 115 
L.Ed.2d at 430; Roseman v. Firemen & Policemen’s Death Benefit Fund (1993), 
66 Ohio St.3d 443, 613 N.E.2d 574.  When we consider the purposes underlying 
the age distinction as asserted by the city, we believe that the distinction survives 
 
 
16
this “most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”  Dallas v. Stanglin (1989), 490 U.S. 19, 26, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 1596, 104 
L.Ed.2d 18, 26.  As the United States Supreme Court stated in Stanglin, when 
reviewing a statute prohibiting minors in “dance halls”: 
 
“The city could reasonably conclude * * * that teenagers might be 
susceptible to corrupting influences if permitted, unaccompanied by their parents, 
to frequent a dance hall with older persons.  * * * The city could properly conclude 
that limiting dance-hall contacts between juveniles and adults would make less 
likely illicit or undesirable juvenile involvement with alcohol, illegal drugs, and 
promiscuous sex.”  (Citations omitted.)  Id. at 27, 109 S.Ct. at 1596, 104 L.Ed.2d 
at 27. 
 
Likewise, the city in the case sub judice could also conclude that billiard 
rooms in general promote “corrupting influences” that are inappropriate for 
children.  This rationale is strengthened because the city ordinance includes an 
exception for minors who are accompanied by a parent or legal guardian, thus 
ensuring that the minors are protected from any bad influences in the billiard room.  
Thus we conclude that Cleveland Codified Ordinance 688.13, on its face, does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
3. 
The Nagle court articulated the test for selective prosecution as being “based 
upon * * * race, religion, exercise of constitutional rights or other impermissible 
consideration.”  (Emphasis added.)  Nagle v. Olin (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 341, 347, 
18 O.O.3d 503, 506, 415 N.E.2d 279, 284. 
4. 
Since adopting the standard for selective enforcement as set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court in Oyler, the Ohio courts have developed an 
independent selective-enforcement doctrine that is adequately supported by state 
grounds.  See Michigan v. Long (1983), 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 
1201. 
 
 
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__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I agree with 
Sections I and II(A) of the majority opinion.  I dissent from the conclusion that the 
city’s method of enforcement violates equal protection.  On this issue, I agree with 
the analysis of the court of appeals.  I would find that, under the rational-basis test, 
Trzebuckowski has failed to demonstrate that the city’s method of enforcing this 
ordinance bears no rational relation to the legitimate governmental interest in 
promoting the welfare of minors. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.