Case Title: WILLIAM J. COMEAU, a/k/a WILLIAM COMEAU V. CAROL NASH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of KENNETH T. MCGRATH

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0075

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILLIAM J. COMEAU, a/k/a WILLIAM COMEAU V. CAROL NASH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of KENNETH T. MCGRATH2010 WY 71Case Number: S-09-0075Decided: 06/01/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
WILLIAM 
J. COMEAU, a/k/a WILLIAM 
COMEAU,Appellant(Defendant),v.CAROL NASH, as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of KENNETH T. 
MCGRATH,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sharon 
M. Rose of Lavery & Rose, P.C., Evanston, WY.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

V. 
Anthony Vehar of Vehar Law Firm, Evanston, WY.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
William J. Comeau (Comeau), challenges the district court's factual findings and 
legal conclusions to the effect that Comeau breached a fiduciary duty he owed to 
Kenneth T. McGrath (McGrath, or Mac).  
McGrath is deceased and Comeau is one of his heirs.  During McGrath's lifetime, Comeau 
obtained control of McGrath's health care decisions and his financial assets via 
powers of attorney.  Upon McGrath's 
death, Comeau essentially had possession of all of McGrath's assets via 
pay-on-death directives, accounts in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, 
and other means.  Comeau maintained 
that that result was in accordance with McGrath's intentions, which he clearly 
expressed during the final months of his life.  McGrath lived with Comeau and his wife 
(who was a nurse) in their home, or was in nursing home care near Comeau's home, 
during the last seven months of his life.  
In addition to challenging the district court's findings that Comeau 
breached fiduciary duties owed to McGrath, Comeau challenges the district 
court's findings that McGrath was susceptible to undue influence and that Comeau 
exercised actual control and undue influence over McGrath.  Appellee, Carol Nash (Nash) is the 
personal representative of McGrath's estate and she is also one of McGrath's 
heirs.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Comeau raises 
these issues:

 
 

1.    
Was 
the district court's finding that Kenneth T. McGrath was susceptible to undue 
influence clearly erroneous in light of the testimony of numerous witnesses that 
McGrath was competent.

 
 

2.    
Was 
the district court's finding that [Comeau] exercised actual control and undue 
influence over McGrath clearly erroneous in light of the evidence that McGrath 
himself directed [Comeau's] transactions.

 
 

3.    
Whether 
the district court's finding that [Comeau] breached a fiduciary duty was clearly 
erroneous.

 
 
Nash's 
statement of the issues tracks those raised by Comeau.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The principal 
parties to this litigation are Comeau and Nash.  They were once married to each 
other.  Nash is McGrath's 
granddaughter.  Comeau was once, in 
essence, McGrath's grandson-in-law and not a blood relative to him.  Comeau characterized himself as 
McGrath's "great-grandson's dador granddad."  Mr. McGrath spent his working career as 
a banker.

 
 
[¶4]      Comeau met Mac in 
1972, when he came to the Evanston/Layton, Utah, area to meet his new 
great-grandson, the child of Nash and Comeau.  Nash and Comeau divorced long before the 
events that are pertinent to this appeal.  
Nonetheless, Comeau remained very close with McGrath and McGrath 
continued to treat Comeau as if he were one of his grandchildren.  Indeed, their friendship deepened after 
Comeau was divorced from Nash.

 
 
[¶5]      McGrath's family 
(including Comeau) thought McGrath lived on a modest pension.  For the most part, McGrath went to the 
Veterans Administration medical facilities in Salt Lake for his medical 
care.  In fact, McGrath owned his 
home, had over $300,000.00 in checking and savings accounts, and owned a 
valuable piece of real estate in Florida.  
Comeau learned of McGrath's considerable wealth after McGrath's health 
began to fail and after McGrath had moved in with Comeau and his wife (who was a 
nurse experienced in caring for the elderly).  By the time of McGrath's death, Comeau 
had come into possession of almost all of McGrath's assets, except for the land 
in Florida.  Comeau's possession of 
the bulk of McGrath's estate did not reflect the testamentary intentions evinced 
by his Last Will and Testament.

 
 
[¶6]      There is no 
dispute between the parties as to the steady deterioration of McGrath's 
health.  That process began in early 
2005 and became increasingly evident because he had difficulty walking during an 
annual trip he and Comeau took to Las Vegas in October of 2005, at a time when 
Mac was nearing his 88th birthday.  McGrath did not want to talk to Nash 
about his "slowing down."  However, 
Comeau got McGrath to agree to see Comeau's family physician, Joel G. Porter, 
M.D., a family physician in Layton, Utah.  
McGrath was examined by Dr. Porter on February 6, 2006.  This was the first time Dr. Porter had 
met Mac.  Nash was aware of what 
Comeau was doing with respect to McGrath's health and the health care 
provider(s) involved.  Nash was 
comfortable with Comeau and his wife taking care of Mac because Comeau's wife 
was a registered nurse and had been a director of nursing at a nursing home for 
many years.

 
 
[¶7]      Dr. Porter had an 
independent recollection of seeing Mac on February 6th, and Porter 
made lengthy notes about his examination.  
Dr. Porter diagnosed Mac as "possibly" suffering from "early dementia," 
but he also noted that observation over time is required to diagnose that 
condition.  Dr. Porter's report 
indicated that Comeau and his wife were McGrath's grandchildren, but he did not 
recall if Comeau told him that, or if Mac told him that, or if he just assumed 
it.

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. McGrath 
experienced a fall at home in Layton, Utah, on March 6, 2006.  Comeau and his wife found him on the 
floor of his home in a semi-conscious and somewhat incoherent condition.  He was unable to get up off the floor 
without assistance.  McGrath was 
taken to the hospital emergency room by Comeau after the fall.  The hospital records indicate that 
Comeau identified himself there as a "friend" of McGrath.  McGrath was treated at the emergency 
room and released.  After that 
incident, McGrath agreed that he should move to Evanston with the Comeaus, and 
none of McGrath's "blood" relatives appear to have had any objections to 
that.

 
 
[¶9]      Comeau took Mac 
to see Dr. Porter for a second time on March 13, 2006, shortly after the 
fall.  The upshot of the follow-up 
visit with Dr. Porter was that McGrath was suffering from dehydration (at the 
time of the fall), and had probably suffered a stroke.  He was having more difficulty getting 
around (a lightweight wheelchair was ordered).  Dr. Porter continued Mac on a prescribed 
medication to treat hypertension (that was prescribed during the hospital 
visit), and added a second anti-hypertensive medication.  Dr. Porter also provided a letter to 
Comeau, at Comeau's request, to the effect that McGrath "is still able to manage 
his own funds and financial affairs."

 
 
[¶10]   After the incident described 
immediately above, McGrath moved to Evanston to live with the Comeaus.  That McGrath moved to Evanston, and that 
he did so voluntarily, and that it was his wish to be there, is not disputed by 
any evidence in the record.  The day 
following that move, McGrath told the Comeaus that he no longer wanted to have 
to deal with bill paying and managing his various bank accounts.  He also expressed his trust of Comeau, 
in part on the basis that he was the only one who had never tried to borrow 
money from him.

 
 
[¶11]   On March 9, 2006, McGrath gave Mr. 
and Mrs. Comeau a general power of attorney.  It was a form downloaded from the 
Internet and McGrath filled in the blanks.  
His handwriting is legible (especially his signature), although it does 
evince the weakness that McGrath was described as experiencing at that 
time.  That document was witnessed 
by a neighbor who attested that McGrath was "lucid," that she had no "concerns 
about his competency at all," and that McGrath "appeared to be well aware of 
what he was doing" in signing the documents.

.

[¶12]   After McGrath's second appointment 
with Dr. Porter on March 13th, he used the 
light wheelchair if they were going out of the house.  He did not use the wheelchair at 
home.  After the second appointment 
with Dr. Porter, the Comeaus began taking Mac to see Dr. Segarra in 
Evanston.  This change was made 
because McGrath was going to be living in Evanston, and the Comeaus considered 
it best that he have a physician in Evanston rather than having to transport Mr. 
McGrath to Layton, Utah, for medical care.

 
 
[¶13]   On March 23, 2006, McGrath executed 
a power of attorney for his medical and healthcare decisions, designating Mr. 
and Mrs. Comeau as his agent(s) and attorney(s)-in-fact.  This power of attorney was never 
exercised.  On April 5, 2006, Dr. 
Segarra determined that McGrath was incapable of making his own determinations 
and signing his own authorizations and forms.  On May 10, 2006, the district court 
appointed Comeau as McGrath's Guardian.  
Mr. McGrath died on October 16, 2006.  The report Comeau submitted to the 
district court as Guardian is included in the record on 
appeal.

 
 
[¶14]   When it came time to probate 
McGrath's will, most of McGrath's assets were in Comeau's possession.  On April 6, 2007, Nash filed a complaint 
seeking to recover those assets from Comeau and in favor of McGrath's estate and 
the heirs named in McGrath's will.  
Comeau is one of those heirs.

 
 
[¶15]   The assets at issue are 
these:

 
 

1.  Key 
Bank Certificate of Deposit                             
$100,000.00

 
 
Comeau 
obtained McGrath's consent to add him as the "pay on death (POD)" beneficiary of 
this certificate of deposit on March 13, 2006.  This was accomplished after the bank 
refused Comeau's initial attempt, made on March 10, 2006, to use the power of 
attorney he held to add his name as "joint" owner of the CD.  Employees of the bank testified that 
they were ready to call police because of the disruption Comeau caused on his 
first visit.  When Comeau returned 
with McGrath in his company, McGrath initially refused to change the CD because 
it would have meant a partial loss of accumulated interest.  The bank employees further testified 
that Comeau coaxed McGrath by saying he needed to make the change because the 
money might be needed for McGrath's care.  
McGrath decided to make the POD change because that did not entail a loss 
of interest.

 
 

2.  American 
First Credit Union                             
$141,069.35

 
 
Comeau 
obtained these funds using the general power of attorney given him by 
McGrath.

 
 

3.  Zion's 
Bank                                                         
$77,383.87

 
 
Comeau 
obtained these funds using the power of attorney, although a bank officer called 
McGrath and talked to him on the phone to verify Comeau's authority,  and in order to obtain McGrath's approval 
of the change of the account to a joint account with 
Comeau.

 
 

4.  McGrath's 
home                                                 
$159,131.80

 
 
Comeau 
sold McGrath's house using the power of attorney.

 
 
            
5.  McGrath's car                                                      
$8,500.00

 
 
Comeau 
used the power of attorney to change the title of this 
car.

 
 
            
6.  Miscellaneous                                                     
$1,529.00

 
 
Comeau 
wrote a check to pay for his car insurance ($429.00) using McGrath's checking 
account, and he deposited a refund check ($1,100.00) owed to McGrath into his 
own account.

 
 
            
7.  In addition, Comeau may have had possession of some of 
McGrath's personal property at the time the judgment was entered in this 
case.  In addition to the monetary 
judgment imposed by the district court, it was ordered that Comeau surrender the 
personal property to Nash.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶16]   We review a district court's 
decision following a bench trial according to the following 
standards:

 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.  

 
 
Further[more], 
with regard to the trial court's findings of fact, 

 
 
[W]e 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it.  We do not substitute ourselves 
for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings 
unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of 
law.

 
 
The 
district court's conclusions of law however are subject to our de novo standard 
of review.

 
 

Grommet 
v. Newman, 
2009 WY 150, ¶ 38, 220 P.3d 795, 807 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Dickson v. Thomas (In re Estate of 
Thomas), 2009 WY 10, ¶ 6, 
199 P.3d 1090, 1093-94 (Wyo. 2009)); Lasen v. Anderson, 2008 WY 80, 
¶ 15, 187 P.3d 857, 860 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶17]   In addition we have 
held:

 
 
            
This Court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the 
record, but we do not reweigh the evidence.  Forshee, et ux. v. Delaney, et ux., 2005 
WY 103, ¶ 6, 118 P.3d 445, 448 (Wyo.  
2005).  Due regard is given 
to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses.  We accept the prevailing 
party's evidence as true and give to that evidence every favorable inference 
which may fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.  Harber v. Jensen, 2004 WY 104, ¶ 7, 
97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Life 
Care Centers of America, Inc. v. Dexter, 2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, 
389 (Wyo. 2003)).  Findings may not 
be set aside because we would have reached a different result.  Harber, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d  at 60 (citing 
Double Eagle Petroleum & Mining Corp. 
v. Questar Exploration & Production Co., 2003 WY 139, ¶ 6, 78 P.3d 679, 681 (Wyo. 2003)).  A finding 
will only be set aside if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court 
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.  Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 2006 
WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
 

Street 
v. Street, 
2009 WY 85, ¶ 9, 211 P.3d 495, 498-99 (Wyo. 2009) (citing Snelling v. Roman, 2007 WY 49, 
¶¶ 7-8, 154 P.3d 341, 345 (Wyo. 2007)).

 
 
[¶18]   Unlike the Street case above (wherein the issue was 
not directly raised), Nash contended below that Comeau exercised undue influence 
over McGrath and for that reason we must apply the law pertinent to such a 
claim.  In order to prevail on a 
claim of undue influence, the following must be proven: 1) opportunity to 
control; 2) a condition permitting subversion; and 3) activity on the part of 
the person charged.  We have also 
held that courts should zealously scrutinize deed transactions between people in 
confidential relationships.  If the 
party challenging the validity of a deed transaction on the basis of undue 
influence establishes a confidential relationship, the party who received the 
property has the burden to establish that the transaction was fair and conducted 
in good faith.  Estate of Short, 785 P.2d 1167, 1170 
(Wyo. 1990).

 
 
[¶19]   With the facts of this case 
particularly in mind, this summary of the applicable law from 25 Am.Jur. 2d Duress and Undue Influence § 39 (2004) 
is especially in point:

 
 
            
The relationship of the parties is a factor to be taken into 
consideration in determining the existence of undue influence.  The absence of a fiduciary relationship 
is not an absolute bar to an undue influence claim if it can be shown that 
alleged undue influence has a different basis, such as fraud or coercion.  However, under certain circumstances, a 
presumption of undue influence arises from proof of a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship.

            
To support a finding of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, the 
evidence must show that the parties are not on equal terms, or, in other words, 
that on the one side there is an overmastering influence, or on the other, there 
is weakness, dependence, or trust that is justifiably reposed.  Any relation of confidence that gives 
one person domination over the other falls within the category of fiduciary 
relations.

            
Factors that may be considered in determining the existence of a 
confidential relationship include 

·         
the 
victim's advanced age, physical or mental debility or weakness, or dependence on 
the dominant party.

·         
whether 
the individuals maintain a close relationship.

·         
whether 
there is a power of attorney between individuals.

The 
Restatement [Contracts 2d § 177] describes a confidential relationship as either 
one person under the domination of another or one who is justified, by virtue of 
his relation with another, in assuming the other will not act inconsistently 
with his or her welfare.

 
 
District 
Court's Findings and Conclusions

 
 
[¶20]   The facts as they are stated above 
are not seriously contested by either party.  We will summarize the district court 
findings that we deem not to be clearly erroneous.  We will also add a few observations of 
our own which are implicit, if not explicit, in the district court's 
findings.  McGrath was an 
experienced banker and, thus, not a neophyte when it came to financial dealings 
such as those that are the subject of this litigation.  McGrath had a close relationship with 
all of his extended family members who are named in his will as heirs.  McGrath had a closer relationship with 
Comeau and his wife than he did with his "blood" relatives, indeed one witness 
testified that McGrath thought of Comeau as a "son" and would trust him with 
anything.  Comeau was treated on an 
equal basis as the "blood" relatives in McGrath's will.

 
 
[¶21]   McGrath kept the nature and amount 
of his assets to himself and so none of his relatives/heirs were aware of the 
significant assets that made up McGrath's estate.  McGrath's health began to deteriorate in 
2005.  Comeau found out about 
McGrath's wealth once he moved in with the Comeaus in March 2006.  McGrath lived with the Comeaus in their 
home for a time and was dependent upon them during that time.  After suffering a debilitating stroke, 
McGrath was moved to a nursing home in the late spring of 2006, where the 
Comeaus continued to monitor his day-to-day care.  He died there on October 16, 
2006.

 
 
[¶22]   Within one month of McGrath's 
death, Comeau had completed the transfer of all of McGrath's bank accounts into 
his own accounts.  McGrath may or 
may not have made promises to Comeau about giving the bulk of his assets to 
Comeau, but the only evidence in the record to support such claims by Comeau are 
his own self-serving testimony and the fact that McGrath gave him a general 
power of attorney that, theoretically, could support Comeau's claims to the bulk 
of McGrath's estate.  In any event, 
Comeau used the power of attorney, as well as his persuasion, to obtain 
"possession" of virtually all of McGrath's assets, including his home and his 
car.

 
 
[¶23]   Based upon these facts and 
circumstances, the district court found that McGrath was in a condition that 
permitted subversion and that a confidential relationship existed between 
McGrath and Comeau.  Because McGrath 
lived with and was dependent upon the Comeaus, the district court found that 
they had the opportunity to "control" McGrath.  The Comeaus were well aware of McGrath's 
steadily deteriorating physical and mental abilities, and this circumstance 
created an opportunity "permitting subversion" by the Comeaus.  Based upon these facts and 
circumstances, the district court found that Comeau exercised undue influence 
over McGrath and that all of Comeau's actions after March 6, 2006, were 
"presumed to be the result of this undue influence."  Comeau offered no credible evidence that 
McGrath made, or intended to make, a gift to Comeau of all of his assets.  The district court further 
opined:

 
 
39.  The 
facts in this case lead the Court to conclude that Mac trusted Bill and Patty 
[Comeau] to care for him, to look after him and his property, to dispose of the 
property as needed and then to see to it that it was distributed according to 
his will.  The use of a power of 
attorney, the appointment of Bill as guardian, and the informal accounting that 
Bill gave to Mac after the sale of the house are consistent with a 
less-than-complete transfer of assets at the outset.  The failure to execute any formal 
writing such as a statement of gift or a revocation of his will indicates a lack 
of intent to make a gift of the residuary estate to Bill.

40.  The 
facts paint a picture of Bill recognizing that the other members of Mac's family 
were unaware of the extent of Mac's estate and he had complete access to it and 
could take the assets and no one would know.  Mac was failing rapidly as early as 
April of 2006 and Bill and Patty directed that there be no measures to 
resuscitate or prolong his life.  
When Mac was in a state of advanced dementia Bill began transferring 
money to his own accounts and continued the transfers until soon after Mac's 
death nothing was left.  Bill 
resisted accounting for Mac's assets in the guardianship, which is inconsistent 
with the actions of someone who has nothing to hide.  In short, the evidence indicates a 
deliberate plan to take advantage of trust placed by an aged and failing man to 
get all of his assets.

 
 
[¶24]   The district court then correctly 
applied the applicable law to determine that the exercise of undue influence 
need be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.  Matter of Waters' Estate, 629 P.3d 470, 
473 (Wyo. 1981).  Furthermore, the 
district court held that Nash's evidence proved:  (1) An opportunity to control; (2) a 
condition permitting subversion; (3) activity on the part of Comeau; and (4) a 
benefit to Comeau.  Lasen, ¶ 18, 187 P.3d  at 861.  To the extent that Comeau contended that 
McGrath had made a gift of his assets to him, the district court concluded that 
Comeau failed to bear his burden of proof.  
See Parkhurst v. Boykin, 2004 
WY 90, ¶ 17, 94 P.3d 450, 458 (Wyo. 2004).  As McGrath's guardian, as well as the 
person holding a general power of attorney for the purpose of managing his 
financial affairs, Comeau was a fiduciary and owed McGrath a duty to act with 
the utmost good faith.  Snearly v. Hockett, 352 P.2d 230, 233 
(Wyo. 1960).  Comeau violated that 
duty.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶25]   The district court's finding that 
McGrath was susceptible to undue influence was not clearly erroneous.  The district court's finding that Comeau 
exercised actual control and undue influence over McGrath was not clearly 
erroneous.  The district court's 
conclusion that Comeau breached a fiduciary duty was not clearly erroneous.  The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed in all respects.