Case Title: State v. Edwards

Citation: 13 Utah 2d 51, 368 P.2d 464

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1962-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
13 Utah 2d 51 (1962) 368 P.2d 464 STATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, v. JOHN EDWARDS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. No. 9525. Supreme Court of Utah. February 1, 1962. Wendell P. Ables, Salt Lake City, for appellant. Walter L. Budge, Atty. Gen., Ronald N. Boyce, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent. CALLISTER, Justice. Defendant was convicted of "profiting from the earnings of a fallen woman."[1] The information against him charged: In appealing from his conviction, the defendant, among other things, alleges that error was committed by the trial court in permitting the prosecutor to question him, upon cross-examination, concerning his wife's plea of guilty to a charge of prostitution and his incarceration for misdemeanor crimes. As an outgrowth of the circumstances leading to the charge against the defendant, his wife was charged with the crime of prostitution, presumably under an Ogden City ordinance. Upon cross-examination of the defendant by the prosecutor, the following took place: The State concedes that a plea of guilty by one of two persons charged with a crime arising from the same incident is not usually admissible as against the other to prove guilt.[2] However, it contends that the fact that defendant's wife pleaded guilty was relevant and admissible to impeach the defendant's veracity with respect to his wife's character. The defendant saw fit to put his wife's character in issue. Counsel for defendant, in his opening statement, said: The defendant, upon direct examination, testified: Ordinarily, the fact that a confederate or accomplice of the defendant pleaded guilty, or has been found guilty, is inadmissible on the issue of the guilt of the defendant who is separately tried. Such was the case in State v. Justesen,[3] and the court there properly held that it was error to admit evidence of the confederate's plea of guilty. In the instant case, the defendant having placed in issue his wife's character, the fact that she had pleaded guilty to the crime of prostitution tended to impeach the defendant's assertion that his wife was a woman of good character, and thus impeach his veracity.[4] Therefore, the questions propounded relating to the wife's plea of guilty were proper for this limited purpose. An instruction to the jury restricting its consideration of this evidence to this limited purpose certainly would have been in order. However, no such instruction was requested by the defendant.[5] Upon direct examination, the defendant testified: On cross examination the following occurred: Defendant contends that the foregoing cross-examination was improper and prejudicial error. The State seeks to justify it upon three grounds. First, that the defendant injected his own character into the proceedings as being a hard-working man and thus opened the door for rebuttal. Second, that the accused, by his testimony, attempted to show a steady pattern of employment which the State was entitled to disprove. And, third, that the cross-examination tended to show a motive for the crime. A defendant in a criminal case may not be questioned as to matters wholly remote from the question of guilt or innocence of the crime charged, so as to amount to a general assault upon his character.[6] The cross-examination, here complained of, relates to matters wholly remote and collateral. To hold that it was justified merely because the defendant had testified that "I have been working for her honestly" is untenable. Whether or not the defendant was in jail for what appears to be violations of city ordinances, and therefore not working at those times, on occasions some nine or 10 months previous to the alleged crime (February 17, 1961) is certainly collateral and remote to the issue of his guilt or innocence of "profiting from the earnings of a fallen woman." A defendant need not answer, and therefore the prosecutor should not ask, questions which have a tendency to degrade his character, unless such answers relate to the very fact in issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed.[7] The argument that the cross-examination was justified because the defendant's drinking habits and the interruption of his work because of his sojourns in jail provided a motive is without merit. The cross-examination could do nothing more than to degrade the defendant's character and prejudice the jury against him. Defendant's objection to this line of questioning should have been sustained. Failure to do so was prejudicial error.[8] Reversed and remanded for new trial. WADE, C.J., and HENRIOD, McDONOUGH and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. [1] 76-53-10, U.C.A. 1953. [2] State v. Justesen, 35 Utah 105, 99 P. 456; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, 12th Ed., Sec. 439; 48 A.L.R.2d 1016. [3] Supra, n. 2. [4] See: State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229. [5] State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497, 94 P. 987. It should also be noted that no objection was actually made to the question concerning the wife's plea of guilty. [6] 58 Am.Jur., p. 373. [7] 78-24-9, U.C.A. 1953. [8] State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412; State v. Herrera, 8 Utah 2d 188, 330 P.2d 1086.