Case Title: Kirkwood v. Kelly

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kirkwood v. Kelly1990 WY 75794 P.2d 891Case Number: 89-237Decided: 07/17/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
WILLIAM C. KIRKWOOD AND 
VIOLA J. KIRKWOOD, 

APPELLANTS 
(PLAINTIFFS),

v.

GUS I. KELLY, McNAMARA 
REALTY AND WILLIAM E. McNAMARA, 

APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

Patrick M. 
Hunter, Casper, for appellants.

Phillip T. 
Willoughby, Casper, for appellees McNamara Realty and William E. 
McNamara.

Jerry A. Yaap, 
Casper, for appellee Gus I. Kelly.

Before 
THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., and GUTHRIE and RAPER, JJ., 
Retired.

RAPER, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      Appellants sued 
appellees charging that Kelly (appellee), agent for McNamara (appellee), 
negligently failed to advise appellants that Roussalis intended to purchase 
their home at a foreclosure sale. Appellants also claimed that Roussalis would 
have purchased their home for $600,000 or more and the current value has dropped 
to $400,000, leaving them damaged in the sum of $200,000. The complaint was 
later amended to charge that, had Kelly properly performed his fiduciary duty as 
a real estate salesman to the Kirkwoods (appellants), they would have sold their 
property to Roussalis for about $300,000 and claimed damages in that amount. The 
trial court found in favor of appellees on the latter's motion for summary 
judgment and appellants' action was dismissed. The appellants set out the issues 
as:

A. Whether the findings 
and conclusions of the trial court are correct?

B. Whether the trial 
court's finding that there was no causal connection between the alleged breach 
of duty and the alleged damages is reversible error?

[¶2]      Appellees 
state:

1. Did the trial court 
err finding no causal connection between the alleged breach of duty by appellee 
Gus Kelly and the alleged damages claimed by appellants, and, therefore erred 
finding no issue of material fact existed and as a matter of law appellees were 
entitled to an order dismissing the appellants' cause of action.

[¶3]      We will affirm 
the trial judge.

[¶4]      The record 
discloses the facts to be substantially as narrated by appellees in their brief 
and we set them out as a matter of convenience in basically the same language, 
changed as required to fit the format of this opinion. This matter was 
previously before this court in a suit by Roussalis against the same appellees 
wherein Roussalis obtained a judgment affirmed in Kelly v. Roussalis, 776 P.2d 1016 (Wyo. 1989). We see the facts there related to be compatible with the facts 
here.

[¶5]      Appellants 
executed a listing with Caldwell Banker, Luker Realty on August 12, 1986, for 
the sale of their home at 5600 South Poplar Street, Casper, Wyoming. On November 
22, 1986, appellee Kelly, a salesman for McNamara Realty, under multi-listing 
arrangement, showed the property to Roussalis. The property was listed for 
$695,000. Following the viewing of the home, Roussalis told Kelly he would not 
pay more than $300,000 for the home. Roussalis never made an offer to purchase 
appellants' home.

[¶6]      On December 3, 
1986, Roussalis saw an advertisement in the Casper Star-Tribune which was a 
mortgage foreclosure notice of property owned by appellants in Garden Creek 
Acres. (It was later learned appellants owned two properties in Garden Creek 
Acres.) Roussalis telephoned appellee Kelly and asked if this was the same 
property he had previously viewed. Kelly ultimately, but incorrectly, told 
Roussalis it was the same property.

[¶7]      Roussalis then 
persuaded appellee Kelly, after some resistance by Kelly, to attend the 
foreclosure sale and bid the property in for $150,000 on behalf of Roussalis. 
Later it was determined that the property purchased by Roussalis for $150,000 at 
the foreclosure sale was the wrong property, not the property previously 
viewed.

[¶8]      Appellants now 
sue appellees for breach of fiduciary duty and conspiracy to deprive appellants 
of their interest in their home. The present matter came before the district 
court upon a motion for summary judgment, and the court found that there was no 
genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact and that all defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Specifically the trial court 
found:

Assuming, for the 
purposes of argument, that the defendant Kelly breached his duty as alleged in 
the amended complaint, there is no evidence to indicate any causal connection 
between the alleged breach and the alleged damages. Any relationship between the 
breach and damages is based upon speculation only.

The trial court, 
in its decision denying appellants' motion for reconsideration, stated: "Among 
other things, the motion for reconsideration overlooks the fact that Dr. 
Rousallis [sic] never did make an offer on the property." We have no 
disagreement with the observations of the trial judge in granting appellees 
summary judgment. Roussalis did not present a written offer to appellants for 
purchase of the property. At best appellants can only claim that Roussalis, in 
an off-hand remark, indicated that he would not pay more than $300,000 for the 
property. Roussalis did not direct Kelly to prepare an offer to appellants. 
Appellants have not and cannot present evidence to show they lost a sale due to 
Kelly. Appellants continue to live in the house at the present time.

[¶9]      Appellants admit 
in their response to an interrogatory by McNamara:

List the minimum selling 
price Plaintiffs would have accepted for purchase of the house during the times 
it was listed with Luker. Referencing paragraph 20 of the Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
provide all evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, that Plaintiffs will 
rely on to prove at trial that Roussalis would have paid in excess of 
$600,000.00 for the property.

     Answer: $625,000.00 
was listed as the minimum selling price on the exclusive right to sell 
agreement. Plaintiffs may or may not have taken a lower offer depending upon the 
circumstances and details of said offer. At the present time the Plaintiffs have 
not determined what testimony and documents they will utilize at trial. When 
such determination is made the same will be provided.

Roussalis made 
arrangements to borrow $250,000 which he could use to bid at the bankruptcy 
foreclosure sale.

[¶10]   After the trial court entered its 
order dismissing appellants' cause of action on summary judgment, appellants 
filed a motion for reconsideration and an affidavit by the appellant, William 
Kirkwood. The thrust of the motion for reconsideration and Kirkwood's affidavit 
is that appellants, after the case had been dismissed by the trial court, would 
accept $300,000 for the property, a significant reduction in price to say the 
least.

Describe all 
circumstances, produce for inspection all documentary evidence, and summarize 
all testimonial evidence that Plaintiffs rely on for their claim of punitive 
damages.

     Answer: Plaintiffs 
have not determined what evidence and testimonial evidence that will be 
presented at trial that will support their claims for punitive damages. The same 
will be provided as the same becomes available.

At no time, 
including materials submitted in opposition of summary judgment, did appellants 
elaborate on what evidence they had to support their claim for punitive 
damages.

[¶11]   W.R.C.P. 56(c) sets out the rule 
for granting a summary judgment:

     The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

[¶12]   There are no genuine issues of fact 
disclosed by the file, as indicated in the foregoing statement of facts. The 
moving appellees are thus safely over the first hurdle of the dual test. Any of 
the "material" facts contended by appellants would not be based on 
anything but conjecture and speculation as observed by the trial judge and to 
which we agree, and thus are inadmissible. 

[¶13]   There are statutory reasons why 
appellants could not recover as a matter of law. If the appellants have any idea 
that the Roussalis remark that he would not pay over $300,000 was an offer that 
appellees should have reduced to writing by Kelly assumes that Kelly must not 
exercise judgment with respect to interest of a prospective buyer. It is obvious 
that he did not treat it as worthy of much attention. He did not read it as 
worthy of such a step, nor do we, particularly in the face of an asking price of 
$695,000 as any indication that appellants would consider less than the listed 
price (recall minimum of $625,000). The appellants seem to think that the 
$300,000 off-hand comment was an offer. It certainly does not fall within the 
Wyoming statute of frauds. W.S. 1-23-105(a)(v).1 It is inconceivable that by 
conjecture the allegedly tortious conduct by Kelly can be converted into an 
agreement not covered by the ancient statute of frauds so bred into our 
jurisprudence. We do not rely on this in our decision but only note its 
arguability in passing.2

[¶14]   We can also note an argument with 
respect to Hagar v. Mobley, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1981) that a real estate salesman 
or broker must be meticulously honest because of the public stature of his 
license. This lacks the clear-cut features of the rule we eventually adopt so we 
avoid deciding the case on that basis.

[¶15]   We do not consider Roussalis as a 
ripe enough prospect for Kelly to suggest that he make an offer. Appellants' 
come lately statements that they would have accepted $300,000 are afterthoughts 
and not convincing.

[¶16]   We conclude that the only viable 
and clear-cut rule, followed by the district court, controlling this case is 
that found in DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 651 (Wyo. 1986), ruling that: 
"Where the causal connection between defendant's acts and plaintiff's damage is 
almost entirely subject to conjecture and speculation, summary judgment may be 
proper." We are inclined to believe that appellants' guessing approached the 
preposterous. An age-old observation of some wise sage that "you cannot make a 
silk purse out of a sow's ear," certainly applies here.

[¶17]   This case is an ideal one to 
dispose of by summary judgment. It avoids a further waste of judicial resources 
and unnecessary expense to litigants in an already too expensive system of 
justice.

[¶18]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. 1-23-105(a)(v) 
reads in pertinent part:

(a) 
In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or 
some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith:

* * 
* * * *

(v) 
Every agreement or contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, 
for more than one (1) year[.]

2 Counsel for appellees 
cites us to W.S. 33-28-111(a)(xiii) setting out various grounds for censure of 
brokers and salesmen that perhaps result in suspension or revocation of 
license:

"Failing to submit all 
offers in writing to a seller, if received prior to written acceptance of any 
offer." We cannot see that this indicates a requirement that anything less need 
not be transmitted to the seller. We agree that only written offers have any 
value and are good practice but this does not clearly state that oral offers, 
even if made, need not be transmitted. Rule 9(a) of the Real Estate Commission 
Regulations only sets out requirements of written offers. These contained in 
appellees' casual remarks cannot be found there necessary details nor do they 
appear anywhere else.