Case Title: Matter of Injury to Lea

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-10-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Injury to Lea1985 WY 173707 P.2d 754Case Number: 84-171Decided: 10/23/1985IN THE MATTER OF INJURY TO THOMAS B. LEA. THOMAS B. LEA, APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE), 

v. 

D & S CASING SERVICE, INC., APPELLEE (EMPLOYER).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF INJURY 
TO THOMAS B. LEA. THOMAS B. LEA, APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE), 

v. 

D & S CASING SERVICE, 
INC., APPELLEE (EMPLOYER).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

 
 
Willis Geer, 
Gillette, for 
appellant.

Paul J. Drew, 
Gillette, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Lea seeks 
review of the district court's refusal to award him further worker's 
compensation benefits. Appellant and his employer, appellee D & S Casing 
Service, Inc., entered into a stipulation settling the amount of worker's 
compensation benefits the employer would pay for appellant's injury. When 
appellant's award ran out, he petitioned the district court to reopen his case, 
seeking additional benefits under § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement). The district court denied appellant's petition and appellant seeks 
review of that decision stating the issue thusly:

"Appellant believes that 
the primary issue in this appeal is whether an injured employee should be 
prevented from reopening his worker's compensation file for payment of 
additional necessary medical benefits solely for the reason that he previously 
had entered into a stipulation with his employer limiting the amount of medical 
benefits to be paid and stipulating that the employee would not seek further 
benefits as a result of his injury."

[¶2.]     Appellee states the 
issues as follows:

"I. Is the remedy of 
reopening his worker's compensation case for additional benefits a remedy that 
is available to the appellant employee?

"II. Is the appellant 
employee bound by the order of award entered by the district court pursuant to 
stipulation of the parties."

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     The facts show that 
appellant was injured on January 24, 1981, while in the employ of appellee D 
& S Casing Service, Inc., resulting in the loss of appellant's left thumb. A 
pollicization was performed on appellant to move his index finger in place of 
the thumb.

[¶5.]     Appellee/employer 
objected in part to appellant's application for worker's compensation award. 
Both parties subsequently entered into a "Stipulation for Permanent Disability 
Benefits" and the court specifically approved the agreement and 
ordered:

"1. The employee shall 
receive an award for permanent partial disability for the loss of a thumb in an 
amount equal to two-thirds (2/3) of the State's average weekly wage for the 
twelve (12) months preceding the quarter in which the injury occurred multiplied 
by forty-four (44) weeks.

"2. No further temporary 
total disability benefits shall be paid in this matter.

"3. The employee shall 
hereinafter be entitled to actual medical and travel expenses not to exceed 
$2,000.00.

"4. The claim for medical 
treatment in the amount of $4,892.70, heretofore objected to by the employer, is 
hereby approved and shall be paid."

When such 
amounts were apparently depleted, appellant continued to submit claims in excess 
of the stipulated $2,000 amount. After a hearing on the matter, the district 
court entered its "Final Order of Award" on November 17, 1982, 
finding:

"1. The Stipulation and 
Order for permanent disability benefits entered herein on July 28, 1981 limited 
the employee's medical benefits thereafter to Two Thousand and no/100 
($2,000.00) Dollars.

"2. After July 28, 1981 
claims for medical benefits were submitted in this case in excess of Two 
Thousand and no/100 ($2,000.00) Dollars.

"3. The employee has 
remaining unpaid pursuant to the above mentioned stipulation three (3) monthly 
payments for permanent partial disability which payments should all be released 
to him.

"4. The employee's 
attorney fees for representation in this matter including the hearing upon which 
this order is based should be paid, but no attorney fees shall be allowed to the 
employee for an attorney's services in an attempt to settle or compromise any 
medical claim remaining unpaid in this matter.

"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED 
as follows:

"1. The sum of Two 
Thousand and no/100 ($2,000.00) Dollars shall be paid for medical expenses by a 
check in that amount made payable to RoseMedicalCenter and Thomas 
Lea.

"2. The employee shall be 
paid the remaining three (3) months' payments of the award of permanent partial 
disability theretofore awarded.

"3. Attorney fees for the 
employee's attorney Thomas Padget shall be paid subject to approval of this 
court for services rendered through the date of the hearing of this matter, but 
no attorney fees shall be payable with respect to any services rendered in 
attempting to settle or compromise any outstanding medical claims remaining 
unpaid in this matter."

[¶6.]     Appellant did not 
appeal this "Final Order of Award," but filed a petition to reopen the case 
several months later on May 2, 1984. This petition was denied, resulting in the 
present appeal. 

[¶7.]     Appellant claims he 
should be entitled to reopen his case contending the stipulation and order he 
entered into with appellee stipulating to damages was contrary to Art. 10, § 4 
of the Wyoming 
Constitution1 as well as § 27-1-105, W.S. 1977 
(June 1983 Replacement)2 and § 27-12-103(b), W.S. 1977 (June 
1983 Replacement).3 Suffice it to say, it is clear from 
the express language of such provisions that they are not applicable to the 
stipulation and order in this case. This was not an agreement "waiving any right 
to recover damages for causing the death or injury of any employee" prohibited 
by Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, nor was it an agreement which was 
required by appellant's employer as a condition of employment releasing the 
employer from liability for personal injuries caused by the employer's 
negligence prohibited by § 27-1-105.

[¶8.]     As further authority 
for appellant's proposition that the stipulation and order was void, he cites Horvath v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal 
Company, 58 Wyo. 211, 131 P.2d 315 (1942). In that case, the injured 
employee and the employer entered into an oral agreement whereby the employee 
agreed to "`forego and abandon his right to Workmen's Compensation allowances 
arising from the injuries received by him while employed by the Company,'" in 
exchange for the employer's promise to provide the employee with light work the 
rest of his life. Id., 131 P.2d  at 316. This court held the 
contract invalid in view of the constitutional and statutory provisions of the 
worker's compensation law prohibiting contracts which relieve an employer from 
any liability created by the act.

[¶9.]     We find the facts and 
circumstances in this case readily distinguishable from the Harvath case. In the 
present case, the stipulation and order did not operate to relieve the employer 
from liability under the act; rather, the employer accepted liability for 
appellant's worker's compensation claims and the parties agreed to an amount 
thereby settling a dispute pending before the court.

[¶10.]  One authority has 
stated:

"The general rule * * * 
is that, in the absence of any provision to the contrary, claims for 
compensation for injuries, payable under workmen's compensation statutes, may be 
compromised and settled as in other cases. * * *" 82 Am.Jur.2d, Workmen's 
Compensation § 459, pp. 223-224 (1976).

 

See also, Brigham Young University v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 74 Utah 349, 279 P. 889, 65 A.L.R. 152 (1929), wherein 
the court held an agreement between the employer and employee settling the 
controversy for less than the amount of worker's compensation awarded valid and 
stated:

"* * * The right of 
parties sui juris to settle their own controversy and avoid litigation is a 
valuable and absolute right, and may be exercised by them under all 
circumstances, unless the state, under a proper exercise of police power, has 
circumscribed, restricted, or prohibited it. * * *" Id., 279 P.  at 
893.

[¶11.]  If appellant was successful in his 
attempt to reopen the case, he would then seek the award of additional benefits 
under § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), which 
provides:

"Where an award of 
compensation has been made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any 
benefits under this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804], an application may be 
made to the clerk of district court by any party within four (4) years from the 
date of the last award, or at any time during which monthly payments under an 
award are being made, for additional benefits of any type or nature or for a 
modification of the amount of the award on the ground of increase or decrease of 
incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud."

However, it does 
not appear that appellant is seeking such additional benefits based on any of 
the criteria prescribed by the statute. He states in his 
brief:

"* * * Appellant is 
asking for additional benefits as allowed under the terms of this statute but is 
not asking for any modification of the amount of the award previously granted on 
the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity or upon the grounds of mistake 
or fraud. Appellant is not challenging or asking for modification of his prior 
permanent partial disability rating or for modification of the prior rulings in 
this case concerning payment of prior medical billings for treatment rendered. 
Appellant is only asking for additional benefits for medical treatment 
recommended by his physician and believes that he is entitled to be allowed to 
reopen his case for such benefits under the terms of the above 
statute."

[¶12.]  We have held that an employee seeking 
award of additional benefits bears the burden of proving that additional 
benefits are justified. Prentice Clark 
House v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1162 (1985); and Matter of Abas, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153 
(1985). We find appellant has not articulated a sound basis for the award of 
additional benefits under § 27-12-606.

[¶13.]  More significantly, however, is the fact 
that appellant may be without standing to challenge the validity of the 
stipulation entered into in the present case because he failed to appeal the 
district court's "Final Order of Award" entered on November 17, 1982. In that 
order, set forth above, the court ruled that the stipulation and order limited 
the benefits payable to appellant and that the provisions of such order be 
enforced. It also seems clear that the court intended the order to be the final 
determination of the parties' rights in this case.

[¶14.]  We think appellant should have perfected 
his appeal when the court made its final order adjudicating the issues he now 
raises. Rule 1.05, Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. Section 
27-12-607, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), states:

"Every award within the 
meaning of this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] is a judicial determination 
of the rights of the employer, the employee and the disposition of money within 
the various accounts provided under this act as to all matters involved. * * 
*"

[¶15.]  We have previously ruled that an award of 
worker's compensation benefits is a judicial determination of the parties' 
rights and, therefore, subject to the concept of finality. Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction Company, 
Wyo., 668 P.2d 649 (1983).

[¶16.]  Appellant has failed to show that the 
agreement was invalid or that the trial court committed any error in its 
disposition of this case.

[¶17.]  Affirmed.

1 Article 10, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution reads:

"No law shall be enacted 
limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death 
of any person. Any contract or agreement with any employee waiving any right to 
recover damages for causing the death or injury of any employee shall be void. 
As to all extra hazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for 
the accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid 
compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each 
person injured in such employment or to the dependent families of such as die as 
the result of such injuries, except in case of injuries due solely to the 
culpable negligence of the injured employee. Such fund or funds shall be 
accumulated, paid into the state treasury and maintained in such manner as may 
be provided by law. The right of each employee to compensation from such fund 
shall be in lieu of and, shall take the place of any and all rights of action 
against any employer contributing as required by law to such fund in favor of 
any person or persons by reason of any such injuries or 
death."

2 Section 27-1-105, W.S. 
1977 (June 1983 Replacement), reads:

"It shall be unlawful for 
any person, company or corporation to require of its servants or employees, as a 
condition of their employment or otherwise, any contract or agreement whereby 
such person, company or corporation shall be released or discharged from 
liability or responsibility on account of personal injuries received by such 
servants or employees while in service of such person, company or corporation, 
by reason of the negligence of such person, company or corporation, or the 
agents or employees thereof, and such contracts shall be absolutely null and 
void."

3 Section 27-12-103(b), 
W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), reads:

"No contract, rule, 
regulation or device shall operate to relieve an employer from any liability 
created by this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] except as otherwise 
provided by this act."

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶18.]  The cornerstone of the majority's 
resolution of this appeal is the conclusion that the district court's final 
order prohibiting additional worker's compensation benefits is not subject to 
attack in this proceeding to reopen appellant's original award. In my opinion, 
however, the court's order is void for lack of jurisdiction under our worker's 
compensation law, and appellant should be afforded the opportunity to establish 
his right to additional benefits.

[¶19.]  Section 27-12-606 of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act, §§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804, W.S. 1977, provides that an 
injured employee may be entitled to additional benefits after the entry of an 
award of compensation in his favor:

"Where an award of 
compensation has been made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any 
benefits under this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804], an application may be 
made to the clerk of district court by any party within four (4) years from the 
date of the last award, or at any time during which monthly payments under an 
award are being made, for additional benefits of any type or nature or for a 
modification of the amount of the award on the ground of increase or decrease of 
incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud."

An employer 
cannot be relieved of his liability under this section by any means not 
contemplated by the Act. Section 27-12-103(b) W.S. 1977, 
provides:

"No contract, rule, 
regulation or device shall operate to relieve an employer from any liability 
created by this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] except as otherwise 
provided by this act."

We have 
interpreted this language as prohibiting enforcement of a contract which 
purported to waive an injured employee's right to reopen his award in exchange 
for a promise of employment for life. Horvath v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 58 
Wyo. 211, 131 P.2d 315 (1942). We observed in that case:

"* * * [T]he legislature 
seems to have not added any language allowing compromise of liability on the 
part of the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act, evidently deeming it 
unwise to open the door to an agreed or contractual reduction of the employer's 
liability through the latter's power over employees." 131 P.2d  at 
322.

[¶20.]  The policy against contractual 
limitations on an injured employee's right to compensation appears in Art. 10, § 
4 of the Wyoming Constitution, which reads in part:

"* * * Any contract or 
agreement with any employee waiving any right to recover damages for causing the 
death or injury of any employee shall be void."

Section 
27-1-105, W.S. 1977, repeats and augments this constitutional 
provision:

"It shall be unlawful for 
any person, company or corporation to require of its servants or employes, as a 
condition of their employment or otherwise, any contract or agreement whereby 
such person, company or corporation shall be released or discharged from 
liability or responsibility on account of personal injuries received by such 
servants or employes while in service of such person, company or corporation, by 
reason of the negligence of such person, company or corporation, or the agents 
or employes thereof, and such contracts shall be absolutely null and 
void."

[¶21.]  The final order at issue in the instant 
case violates the express proscriptions as well as the fundamental policies of 
the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. The order abrogates 
appellant's right to seek future medical benefits pursuant to § 27-12-606. The 
court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to enter this judgment under § 
27-12-103(b) which prohibits any device that relieves an employer from liability 
under the Act. Furthermore, the basis for the judgment - the agreement between 
the parties to limit additional benefits - was null and void under Art. 10, § 4 
of the Wyoming 
Constitution and § 27-1-105.

[¶22.]  A judgment entered by a court without 
jurisdiction is void and unenforceable. Matter of Estate of Blaney, Wyo., 607 P.2d 354 (1980); Emery v. Emery, 
Wyo., 404 P.2d 745 (1965). A void judgment has no effect on the parties and is not res 
judicata. Matter of Blaney, supra, 
607 P.2d  at 357. We said in Emery v. 
Emery, supra, 404 P.2d at 749:

"A void judgment is not 
binding. It confers no rights and equitable relief is proper to prevent harm 
resulting from the fact that the judgment appears or purports to be valid. 
A.L.I. Restatement, Judgments, § 117, p. 565 (1942)."

[¶23.]  Accordingly, the final order of the 
district court prohibiting appellant from seeking additional worker's 
compensation benefits was entered without jurisdiction and is void and of no 
effect. I would have remanded this case to the district court to permit a 
factual determination of appellant's entitlement to additional benefits based on 
an increase in incapacity under § 27-12-606, as that statute has been 
interpreted by this court in House v. 
State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1162 (1985), 
and Matter of Abas, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153 (1985). I cannot agree with the majority that appellant has not presented a 
sound factual basis for the award of additional benefits, since the parties have 
never litigated that question and, in fact, have stipulated that appellant 
requires additional surgery as a result of his original 
injury.