Case Title: Coleman v. Portage County Eng'r

Citation: 2012-Ohio-3881

Docket Number: 2011-0199

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Coleman v. Portage Cty. Engineer, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3881.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-3881 
COLEMAN ET AL., APPELLEES, v. PORTAGE COUNTY ENGINEER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Coleman v. Portage Cty. Engineer,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3881.] 
Political-subdivision immunity—R.C. Chapter 2744—Upgrading sewers involves 
construction and design and is therefore a governmental, not a 
proprietary, function—Judgment reversed. 
(No. 2011-0199—Submitted May 22, 2012—Decided August 29, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, No. 2010-P-00016,  
191 Ohio App.3d 32, 2010-Ohio-6255. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we address whether “upgrading” a storm-sewer 
system is a governmental or proprietary function of a political subdivision within 
the meaning of R.C. 2744.01 and whether failure to “upgrade” subjects that 
political subdivision to liability under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2).  For the reasons that 
follow, we hold that because upgrading involves construction and design, such 
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upgrading is a governmental, not a proprietary, function.  Therefore, we reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals that holds otherwise. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Appellees, Barbara Coleman and Robert Coleman, own real 
property in Rootstown, Ohio.  They sued appellant, the Portage County Engineer, 
complaining that their property was flooded in 1982, 1989, 2003, 2005, and 2009, 
and the water caused damage to their real and personal property.1  The Colemans 
averred, “on information and belief,” that  
 
the flooding is a result of the defendant collecting drainage water 
from drainage ditches along State Route 44 in Rootstown, and 
discharging same through a piping system that runs across the 
adjacent Rootstown Public School System.  The piping system is 
unable to accommodate all the drainage water, and accordingly the 
water overflows from the culverts in front of and behind the 
plaintiff’s [sic] residence. 
 
They further alleged that their property will continue to be flooded,  
 
due to the fact that the defendant has neglected or failed to 
construct a drainage plan or water drainage system to properly 
discharge the water and prevent it from collecting on the plaintiff’s 
[sic] property and causing significant damages.  The defendant also 
has failed to maintain the piping system that runs through the 
                                                          
 
1 Because this case was resolved in the trial court on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true all 
material allegations in appellees’ complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in their favor.  
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Mitchell v. Lawson 
Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988).  
 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
adjacent Rootstown Public School property to the storm sewer next 
to the Property. 
 
Whether Portage County has improperly maintained the storm sewers or failed to 
appropriately upgrade them has not been investigated.  At oral argument, the 
parties agreed that the cause of the storm-sewer backup is unclear. 
{¶ 3} The first count of the Colemans’ complaint alleges that Portage 
County “breached the duty of due care owed to the plaintiffs in designing, 
constructing and maintaining the water piping system that collects and discharges 
water on the plaintiff’s property.”  The Colemans also asserted that “[d]efendant 
has been notified on numerous occasions that they [sic] created a nuisance 
causing flooding upon plaintiff’s [sic] property, and defendant has refused, 
continues to refuse, and has been unwilling to abate the nuisance and resolve the 
repetitive flooding on the plaintiff’s [sic] property.” 
{¶ 4} The second count pleaded that “the defendants [sic] be directed to 
make modifications to the water piping system that is necessary to protect the 
plaintiff [sic] from further flooding” and that “the court enjoin defendant, and 
require the defendant to install adequate pipes and culverts, in order to prevent 
future and continued damage from flooding to plaintiffs’ property by defendant.” 
{¶ 5} The Portage County Engineer moved to dismiss the complaint, 
arguing that the Colemans had “failed to show that the [county engineer] is not 
immune from their claims” and “have failed to show that they have pled sufficient 
facts to show negligent maintenance of the pipeline.”  The county engineer 
asserted that even assuming that the drainage system was improperly designed, 
constructed, or installed, he is entitled to immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744, 
which addresses political-subdivision liability for torts.  The trial court agreed, 
holding, “The Portage County Engineer is immune from litigation based upon 
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claims for negligent planning, design, and construction of the water pipleines 
referred to the in the Plaintiffs’ pleadings.” 
{¶ 6} On the Colemans’ appeal from that order, the Eleventh District 
Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.  In affirming in part, the 
court wrote, “[The Colemans] argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their 
claim in Count I alleging negligent design, planning, and construction of the 
pipeline based on political-subdivision immunity because, they suggest, this claim 
alleged the negligent performance of a proprietary function, which is an exception 
to political subdivision immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(B)(2).  However, [the 
Colemans] fail to cite any authority for the proposition that the design, planning, 
or construction of a sewer system is a proprietary function, in violation of App. R. 
16(A)(7).  Moreover, [the Colemans] present no argument that the same 
constitutes a propriety function, in violation of the same appellate rule.  For this 
reason alone, [the Colemans’] argument is not well taken.”   Coleman v. Portage 
Cty. Engineer, 191 Ohio App.3d 32, 2010-Ohio-6255, 944 N.E.2d 756, ¶ 18 (11th 
Dist.). 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals also relied on its own precedent, Moore v. 
Streetsboro, 11th Dist. No. 2008-P-0017, 2009-Ohio-6511, ¶ 42, in holding that 
the county engineer cannot be held liable in tort in this case.  Applying R.C. 
2744.01(C)(2)(l), which immunizes certain government functions, including the 
decision whether to upgrade inadequate sewers, from tort liability, the court held 
that upgrading storm sewers is a governmental function.  Coleman at ¶ 20.  
Therefore, the Portage County engineer “is immune from liability for [his] alleged 
failure to design and construct an adequate storm-sewer system.”  Id. 
{¶ 8} Nevertheless, the court of appeals agreed with the Colemans that 
their claim was not barred by political-subdivision immunity to the extent that the 
county had negligently maintained the sewer system.  Id. at ¶ 32.  For this 
holding, the court relied on Moore and R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(d), which includes as 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
a political subdivision’s proprietary function the “maintenance, destruction, 
operation, and upkeep of a sewer system.” 
{¶ 9} We accepted the Portage County Engineer’s discretionary appeal. 
Coleman v. Portage Cty. Engineer, 128 Ohio St.3d 1458, 2011-Ohio-1829, 945 
N.E.2d 522, which asserts a single proposition of law:  “A political subdivision's 
failure to upgrade the capacity of an inadequate sewer system is not a proprietary 
function within the meaning of R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(d) so as to subject a political 
subdivision to liability under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2). The upgrade of sewer system 
capacity is an immune governmental function under R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(I).  (R.C. 
2744.01(G)(2)(d) and R.C.2744.01(C)(2)(I) interpreted and applied) .”  We agree 
that upgrading a sewer system is construction and design, not upkeep, and 
accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
Ohio’s Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act 
{¶ 10} R.C. Chapter 2744, Ohio’s Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, 
has been in place for more than 25 years and confers broad immunity on the 
state’s political subdivisions.  R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) states:  
 
Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a political 
subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, 
death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or 
omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the 
political subdivision in connection with a governmental or 
proprietary function. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
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{¶ 11} But the legislature has imposed exceptions to this general rule.  
Relevant here is the exception in R.C. 2744.02(B)(2), which declares  that as a 
rule, 
 
political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person 
or property caused by the negligent performance of acts by their 
employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political 
subdivisions. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 12} R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(l) identifies as a governmental function “the 
provision or nonprovision, planning or design, construction, or reconstruction of a 
public improvement, including, but not limited to, a sewer system,” making these 
responsibilities immune from political-subdivision liability.  By contrast, R.C. 
2744.01(G)(1)(d) identifies “the maintenance, destruction, operation, and upkeep 
of a sewer system” as a proprietary function for which civil liability may attach. 
{¶ 13} We often have interpreted and explained the purpose of this 
statutory scheme:   
 
“[T]he protections afforded to political subdivisions and 
employees of political subdivisions by this act are urgently needed 
in order to ensure the continued orderly operation of local 
governments and the continued ability of local governments to 
provide public peace, health, and safety services to their residents.” 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 176, Section 8, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1733.  
We noted in Hubbell [v. Xenia], 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-
4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, that “ ‘[t]he manifest statutory purpose of 
R.C. Chapter 2744 is the preservation of the fiscal integrity of 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
political subdivisions.’ ” Id. at ¶ 23, quoting Wilson v. Stark Cty. 
Dept. of Human Servs., 70 Ohio St.3d 450, 453, 639 N.E.2d 105 
(1994). 
 
Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 
522, ¶ 38. 
{¶ 14} We also held: 
 
“ ‘[D]etermination of whether a political subdivision is immune 
from liability is usually pivotal to the ultimate outcome of a 
lawsuit. Early resolution of the issue of whether a political 
subdivision is immune from liability pursuant to R.C. Chapter 
2744 is beneficial to both of the parties. If the appellate court holds 
that the political subdivision is immune, the litigation can come to 
an early end, with the same outcome that otherwise would have 
been reached only after trial, resulting in a savings to all parties of 
costs and attorney fees. Alternatively, if the appellate court holds 
that immunity does not apply, that early finding will encourage the 
political subdivision to settle promptly with the victim rather than 
pursue a lengthy trial and appeals. Under either scenario, both the 
plaintiff and the political subdivision may save the time, effort, and 
expense of a trial and appeal, which could take years.’ ”  
(Emphasis sic.)  [Hubbell] at ¶ 25, quoting Burger v. Cleveland 
Hts. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 188, 199-200, 718 N.E.2d 912 
(Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting). 
 
Summerville, ¶ 39. 
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{¶ 15} Our legislature has generally shielded political subdivisions from 
tort liability.  Greene Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming, 89 Ohio St.3d 551, 556-
557, 733 N.E.2d 1141 (2000); R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).  But that immunity is not 
absolute, and one exception to immunity is the political subdivision’s 
“maintenance, destruction, operation, and upkeep of a sewer system,” which is 
identified as proprietary functions.  R.C.2744.01(G)(2)(d).  R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) 
provides that political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or property loss 
caused by the subdivision’s employees’ “negligent performance with respect to 
proprietary functions.” 
{¶ 16} With the statutory framework in mind, we turn to the specific issue 
before us. 
Governmental Function or Proprietary Function? 
{¶ 17} “ ‘Functions which can be categorized as either governmental or 
proprietary * * * are clearly intended for use as a guide in determining whether, in 
a particular case, the activity attributed to a subdivision falls with the ambit of the 
statute.’ ”  Spitzer v. Mid Continent Constr. Co., Inc., 8th Dist. No. 89177, 2007-
Ohio-6067, ¶ 18, quoting Franks v. Sandusky Bd. of Trustees,  6th Dist. No. S-91-
18, 1992 WL 66561, *3 (Mar. 31, 1992).   
{¶ 18} The question is whether failure to keep a storm-sewer system 
functional is a “design, construction, or reconstruction * * * [of] a sewer system” 
and therefore a governmental function that is immunized from tort lawsuits under 
R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(l), or sewer “maintenance, * * * operation, and upkeep” 
under R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(d), a proprietary function for which political-
subdivision tort liability is allowed. 
{¶ 19} Our courts of appeals have developed a body of law holding that 
subdivisions are immune from claims that flow from the design and construction 
of a sewer system.  Spitzer, 2007-Ohio-6067, ¶ 20 (“Ohio courts have found that 
municipalities are immune from suit when flooding to private property was a 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
result of an improperly designed sewer that was inadequate to handle increased 
storm runoff”).  See also Ferguson v. Breeding, 4th Dist. No. 99 CA 22, 2000 WL 
1234262, *6 (Aug. 25, 2000). Reviewing the Colemans’ claims for relief, the 
court of appeals held, “It is clear that the city is immune from its failure to design 
and construct an adequate sewer system.”  Coleman, 191 Ohio App.3d 32, 2010-
Ohio-6255, 944 N.E.2d 756, ¶ 19, quoting Moore, 2009-Ohio-6511, ¶ 45. 
{¶ 20} To the extent that the court of appeals in this case held that the 
county enjoyed immunity for the claims arising from the Colemans’ assertions 
that the county was negligent in the design, planning, and construction, we affirm.  
But we disagree with the appellate court’s reasoning in holding that the 
Colemans’ claims of failure to upgrade the sewer system were not barred. 
{¶ 21} In so holding, the court of appeals rejected the county’s assertion 
that a “negligent-maintenance claim necessarily refers to a failure to install a 
larger pipeline system,” which is a governmental function.  Coleman, 191 Ohio 
App.3d 32, 2010-Ohio-6255, 944 N.E.2d 756, ¶ 44.  It held:   
 
If, indeed, the city is responsible for that pipeline, then “the failure 
to upgrade sewers that are inadequate to service upstream property 
owners despite sufficient notice of the inadequacy can be best be 
described as a failure to maintain or upkeep the sewer.”  H. Hafner 
& Sons Inc. v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Sewer Dist. (1997), 118 
Ohio App.3d 792, 797 [694 N.E.2d 111]; see, also, Hendrick v. 
Columbus (Mar. 30, 1993), 10th Dist. Nos. 92AP-1030 and 92AP-
1031 [1993 WL 104713].  “If proven, this failure would constitute 
the breach of a duty arising out of a proprietary function and would 
expose the city to liability under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2).” * * * Id. 
 
Coleman, ¶ 44-45, quoting Moore, 2009-Ohio-6511, ¶ 59. 
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{¶ 22} We disagree. 
{¶ 23} Initially, we observe that the General Assembly did not use the 
term “upgrade” in writing Chapter 2744.  Courts must abstain from inserting 
words into a statute that were not placed there by the General Assembly.  State ex 
rel. Carna v. Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 131 Ohio St.3d 478, 
2012-Ohio-1484, 967 N.E.2d 193, ¶ 18, citing State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 220, 631 N.E.2d 150 (1994).  It is 
not proper for courts to read “upgrade” into the statute. 
{¶ 24} Moreover, the failure to upgrade is different from the failure to 
maintain or upkeep.  To upgrade means “[t]o exchange a possession for one of 
greater value or quality; trade up.”  American Heritage Unabridged Dictionary 
1890 (4th Ed.2000).  “Upkeep,” however, means “[m]aintenance in proper 
operation, condition, and repair.”  Id.  Our courts of appeals have recognized this 
distinction. 
{¶ 25} For example, in Murray v. Chillicothe, a landscaper sued the city 
after his foot fell through a storm-sewer grate located in a public street.  The 
landscaper claimed that the grate had been poorly maintained.  164 Ohio App.3d 
294, 2005-Ohio-5864, 842 N.E.2d 95, ¶ 1, 3.  He brought a negligence claim 
against the city, but the trial court granted summary judgment in the city’s favor, 
holding that the city was immune from liability.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 26} The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding: 
 
Murray argues that his injury occurred because of the city's 
failure to maintain the storm-sewer grate. The city disagrees, 
arguing that the injury stems from the design of the storm-sewer 
grate. It contends that Murray's injury occurred because of the 
width of the grate's openings, which is “simply a matter of the 
design of the grate.” 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
Webster's Dictionary defines “maintenance” as the “act of 
maintaining or state of being maintained.”  Webster's New College 
Dictionary (1999) 660.  It defines “maintain” as “To preserve or 
keep in a given existing condition, as of efficiency or good repair.” 
Id.  The deposition testimony presented indicates that the accident 
in this case occurred because the openings in the storm sewer grate 
were too wide. There is no evidence that the four-inch openings 
existed because the grate was in a state of disrepair. Rather, the 
evidence indicates that the grate was designed with four-inch 
openings. Because Murray's injury did not result from the catch-
basin grate's being in a state of disrepair, we cannot say that this 
case involves the maintenance of a storm-sewer system. In most 
instances, the government's duty to maintain a structure does not 
include the duty to upgrade it to current construction standards.  
See Treese v. Delaware (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 536, 543 [642 
N.E.2d 1147], stating in the context of highways that maintenance 
involves only the preservation of existing facilities, and not the 
initiation of substantial improvements (but leaving unanswered the 
issue of whether maintenance may include upgrading where a 
nuisance condition has arisen). See, also, Thomas v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Bd. of Commrs., Sept. 30, 1993, Cuyahoga County Court of 
Appeals Case No. 62949, 1993 WL 389781, stating that the board 
had no duty to upgrade a highway median barrier as technology 
developed. 
 
Id. at ¶16-17. 
{¶ 27} The Fourth District recognized that injury resulting from an 
antiquated storm-sewer design has different legal significance from injury 
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resulting from improper storm-sewer maintenance.  The design, pursuant to R.C. 
2744.01(B)(2)(l), is a governmental function, and under R.C. 2477.02, no liability 
can attach to the political subdivision for obsolete design.  Id. at ¶ 18.  Put another 
way, “a private sewer system with a design flaw does not convert that design flaw 
into a maintenance responsibility.”  Id. 
{¶ 28} The analysis in Murray is consistent with that in Zimmerman v. 
Summit Cty., 9th Dist. No. 17610, 1997 WL 22588 (Jan 15, 1997).  There, 
homeowners sued the county alleging that the county had dumped sewage into a 
creek that ran through their property.  Id. at *1.  The county admitted that during 
severe rain storms, it pumped rain water and sewage from its sewer system into 
the creek to prevent sewage backups into basements.  Id. at *2.  It contended that 
“periodic pumping was necessary because the sewer system, as it was designed 
and constructed over twenty years before, could not handle all the rain water and 
sewage that currently pass through it” and noted that it had a permit from the 
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency to pump the sewage into the stream.  Id. 
{¶ 29} The trial court rejected the county’s claim of immunity, but the 
court of appeals reversed.  It held: 
 
Plaintiffs' claimed injuries and losses * * * were not caused by [the 
county’s] maintenance and operation of its sewer system. Unlike 
other cases in which Ohio courts have recognized that actions 
taken with respect to sewer systems were proprietary in nature, 
plaintiffs' claimed injuries and losses did not arise from [the 
county’s] failure to repair damage to the system, to inspect it, to 
remove obstructions, or to remedy general deterioration. See Doud 
v. Cincinnati (1949), 152 Ohio St. 132 [, 87 N.E.2d 243] (city 
allegedly failed to detect deterioration of sewer system) and Nice v. 
Marysville (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 109 [, 611 N.E.2d 468] (city 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
failed to detect and repair damage to sewer system). Instead, they 
resulted from [the county’s] original design and construction of the 
sewer system. As evidenced by [the county’s environmental 
services director’s] affidavit, [the county’s] decision to pump 
sewage and rain water into the stream was a response to the sewer 
system's inability as designed and constructed to handle the 
volume of materials that currently pass through it. This was not a 
problem that [the county] could remedy through routine 
maintenance. It would require extensive redesigning and 
reconstructing of the system to meet current demands. 
 
Id. at *3. 
{¶ 30} We find that the better-reasoned approach, and the one consistent 
with the immunity statute’s wording and the General Assembly’s intent, is that of 
the Fourth and Ninth District Courts of Appeals in Murray and Zimmerman.  As 
the Second District recently explained, “A complaint is properly characterized as 
a maintenance, operation, or upkeep issue when ‘remedying the sewer problem 
would involve little discretion but, instead, would be a matter of routine 
maintenance, inspection, repair, removal of obstructions, or general repair of 
deterioration.’ Essman [v. Portsmouth, 4th Dist. No. 09CA3325, 2010-Ohio-
4837] at ¶ 32.  But the complaint presents a design or construction issue if 
‘remedying a problem would require a [political subdivision] to, in essence, 
redesign or reconstruct the sewer system.’  Essman at ¶ 32–33.”  (Brackets sic.)  
Guenther v. Springfield Twp. Trustees, 2d Dist. No. 2010-CA-114, 2012-Ohio-
203, ¶ 18.  We agree. 
{¶ 31} Although creative, the Colemans’ attempt to characterize their 
claims as ones based on maintenance fails.  For purposes of R.C. Chapter 2744, a 
claim based on a failure to upgrade is a claim based on a failure of design and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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construction, for which political subdivisions enjoy immunity, and not a claim 
based on a failure to properly maintain, for which political-subdivision liability 
may be extant. 
{¶ 32} In so holding, we are not unmindful that damages suffered by 
homeowners like the Colemans can be devastating to property and possessions, as 
well as physical and mental health.  But the same is true for many other claims for 
which immunity attaches. 
{¶ 33} And we recognize that property owners have little control over the 
quality of storm and sewer systems to which their homes are attached.  But absent 
amendment to R.C. Chapter 2744 or other legislative action, relief does not lie in 
suits against political subdivisions based on a failure to upgrade the sewer system. 
Judgment reversed. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE 
BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
__________________ 
UAW-GM Legal Services Plan and Darrell D. Maddock, for appellees. 
Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., John T. McLandrich, and Frank H. 
Scialdone; and Victor Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Leigh 
S. Prugh, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., and Stephen W. Funk, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, L.L.P., Mark Landes, and Scyld D. 
Anderson, urging reversal for amicus curiae the County Commissioners 
Association of Ohio, the County Engineers Association of Ohio, the County 
Sanitary Engineers Association, the County Risk Sharing Authority, Metropolitan 
Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati, the Ohio Municipal League, the Ohio 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
Township Association, the Coalition of Large Urban Townships, and the 
Association of Ohio Metropolitan Wastewater Agencies. 
_______________________