Case Title: State v. Steven J. Burgess

Citation: 2003 WI 71

Docket Number: 2000AP003074

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 71 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3074 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Steven J. Burgess: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Steven J. Burgess,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 264 
Reported at:  258 Wis. 2d 548, 654 N.W.2d 81 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 30, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Vilas   
 
JUDGE: 
James B. Mohr   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Steven P. Weiss, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Sandra L. Nowack, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 71 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3074   
(L.C. No. 
98-CI-1) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Steven J.  
Burgess: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Steven J. Burgess,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Steven Burgess (Burgess), an 
enrolled member of the Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians, petitions this court for review of a court of 
appeals' decision that committed Burgess as a sexually violent 
person under chapter 980 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  State v. 
Burgess, 2002 WI App 264, 258 Wis. 2d 548, 654 N.W.2d 81.  We 
review three issues relating to Burgess's commitment under 
chapter 980: (1) whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to 
conduct chapter 980 proceedings since Burgess is an enrolled 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
2 
 
tribal member and committed the underlying sexual offense on an 
Indian reservation; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence 
for the jury to find that Burgess is a "sexually violent person" 
as defined in Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) (2001-02)1; and (3) whether 
Burgess's right to equal protection was violated because chapter 
980 proceedings do not have the same confidentiality as 
proceedings under chapter 51 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  
¶2 
We conclude that the circuit court had jurisdiction to 
conduct chapter 980 proceedings to commit Burgess since the 
conduct at the heart of chapter 980, both past and potential 
future 
conduct, 
is 
prohibited 
and 
not 
merely 
regulated; 
therefore, the State of Wisconsin (State) has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Public Law 83-280 (PL-280).  We also conclude that 
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Burgess 
is a "sexually violent person" for purposes of civil commitment 
under chapter 980.  Finally, we conclude that Burgess was not 
denied equal protection of the law because there is a rational 
basis for the legislature to treat the confidentiality of 
chapter 980 proceedings differently than chapter 51 proceedings.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.      
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  Burgess is an 
enrolled member of the Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians (Lac du Flambeau Tribe).  On February 24, 1995, 
                                                 
1 All references are to the 2001-02 version of the Wisconsin 
Statutes unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
3 
 
Burgess was convicted of attempted second-degree sexual assault 
of 
a 
child, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.32(1) 
and 
948.02(2) (1993-94) in the Circuit Court for Vilas County, Judge 
James B. Mohr, presiding.  Burgess committed the sexual assault 
on the Lac du Flambeau Reservation, where he resided.  Upon his 
conviction, Burgess was incarcerated at the Oshkosh Correctional 
Institution.  Burgess was scheduled for release on November 17, 
1998.  That same day, the State filed a petition pursuant to 
chapter 980 seeking to commit Burgess as a sexually violent 
person.  On November 19, 1998, a probable cause hearing was held 
by the circuit court.  Based on the testimony presented at the 
hearing, the circuit court found probable cause that Burgess is 
a 
"sexually 
violent 
person" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7)(1993-94), and Burgess was transferred to 
the Mendota Mental Health Institute.  As provided under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(2) (1993-94), Burgess requested a jury trial 
for the chapter 980 proceedings.    
¶4 
Burgess filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the 
petition 
on 
the 
grounds 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
lacked 
jurisdiction because he is an enrolled tribal member and 
committed the sexually violent offense on the Lac du Flambeau 
Reservation.  In response, the circuit court contacted the Lac 
du Flambeau tribal court, which declined jurisdiction because 
the Lac du Flambeau Tribe had not yet passed an ordinance to 
address the commitment of sexually violent persons, such as 
Burgess.  Thus, Judge Mohr stated that he "accept[ed] the letter 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
4 
 
from the tribe that is indicating that they are not in a 
position . . . to hear this case at this time."  Burgess also 
made a motion to have the chapter 980 proceedings closed to the 
public.  The circuit court denied Burgess's motion, concluding 
that it did not have authority to close the proceedings and that 
public safety concerns countenanced against doing so.   
¶5 
In August 2000, a jury trial was held to determine 
whether Burgess is a sexually violent person.  Both the State 
and Burgess presented expert witnesses who testified as to their 
clinical evaluations of Burgess.  The jury found Burgess to be a 
sexually violent person, and the circuit court ordered Burgess 
committed to the Department of Health and Family Services.  
Burgess filed post-judgment motions for a new trial and/or 
relief from judgment, or alternatively, for a dispositional 
hearing for immediate supervised release and/or a right to 
petition for release after six months.  The circuit court denied 
the motions, and Burgess appealed.   
¶6 
Burgess raised several issues at the court of appeals, 
including the following: (1) whether the circuit court had 
jurisdiction to conduct the commitment proceedings because he is 
an enrolled member of the Lac du Flambeau Tribe and committed 
the 
underlying 
criminal 
offense 
on 
the 
Lac 
du 
Flambeau 
Reservation; (2) whether his commitment violated due process 
because there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's 
finding that he is a sexually violent person; and (3) whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
should 
have 
granted 
him 
the 
same 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
5 
 
confidentiality as afforded under chapter 51 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes.  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and order 
of the circuit court, concluding that the State has jurisdiction 
over chapter 980 proceedings involving tribal members who commit 
sexually violent offenses on Indian reservations by virtue of 
PL-280.  The court of appeals also concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Burgess is a 
sexually violent person.  Finally, the court of appeals 
concluded that the State has a compelling interest to conduct 
open hearings for chapter 980 proceedings; therefore, Burgess's 
right to equal protection was not violated. 
¶7 
Burgess petitioned this court for review of these 
three issues, which was granted on January 14, 2003.       
II.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
¶8 
Whether a circuit court has jurisdiction to commit an 
enrolled tribal member, who has committed a sexually violent 
offense on an Indian reservation, as a sexually violent person 
under chapter 980, presents a question of law that this court 
reviews de novo.  
¶9 
The review of whether there was sufficient evidence to 
prove that an individual is a sexually violent person, who is 
subject to commitment, is based on the criminal standard of 
review.  State v. Kienitz, 227 Wis. 2d 423, 434, 597 N.W.2d 712 
(1999).  We may not reverse a commitment on the basis of 
insufficient 
evidence 
unless 
"the 
evidence, 
viewed 
most 
favorably to the state and the conviction, is so insufficient in 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
6 
 
probative value and force that it can be said as a matter of law 
that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt." 
 
State 
v. 
Poellinger, 
153 
Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990); see also Kienitz, 227 
Wis. 2d at 434.  Therefore, 
[i]f any possibility exists that the trier of 
fact could have drawn the appropriate inferences from 
the evidence adduced at trial to find [that the 
defendant is a sexually violent person], an appellate 
court may not overturn a verdict even if it believes 
the trier of fact should not have found [the defendant 
to be a sexually violent person] based on the evidence 
before it.    
Kienitz, 
227 
Wis. 2d at 
434-35 
(quoting 
Poellinger, 
153 
Wis. 2d at 507).  "'It is only when the evidence that the trier 
of fact has relied upon is inherently or patently incredible 
that [an] appellate court will substitute its judgment for that 
of the fact finder . . . .'"  State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 
420, 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999) (quoting Gauthier v. State, 28 
Wis. 2d 412, 416, 137 N.W.2d 101 (1965)).  It is up to the jury, 
as the trier of fact, to determine the weight and credibility of 
the evidence and testimony presented, and to resolve any 
conflicts in the evidence.  Id. at 435 (citing State v. Gomez, 
179 Wis. 2d 400, 404, 507 N.W.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1993)).   
 
¶10 The issue of whether chapter 980 proceedings violate 
equal 
protection 
because 
they 
do 
not 
have 
the 
same 
confidentiality as proceedings under chapter 51 presents a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo.  Nankin v. 
Vill. of Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, ¶10, 245 Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d. 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
7 
 
141.  In reviewing a challenge to the constitutionality of a 
statute, 
"[w]e 
presume 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
constitutional . . . .  Any doubt must be resolved in favor of 
the constitutionality of the statute."  Id. (citing Aicher v. 
Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶18, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 
613 N.W.2d 849).  "'Equal protection does not require that all 
persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a 
distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which 
the classification is made.'"  State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 
321, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995) (citing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 
107, 111 (1966)).  In cases where a statutory classification 
does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental interest, the 
classification will be upheld if there is any rational basis to 
support it.  Milwaukee Brewers v. DHSS, 130 Wis. 2d 79, 98, 387 
N.W.2d 254 (1986).  Thus, "[t]he basic test is not whether some 
inequality results from the classification but whether there 
exists a rational basis to justify the inequality of the 
classification."  Id. at 99.  
 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. PUBLIC LAW 280 AND COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS 
UNDER CHAPTER 980 
 
¶11 We begin by analyzing whether the circuit court had 
jurisdiction to commit Burgess, an enrolled tribal member, as a 
sexually violent person under chapter 980, where the underlying 
criminal 
offense 
was 
committed 
on 
the 
Lac 
du 
Flambeau 
Reservation.  To determine whether the State has jurisdiction 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
8 
 
over a tribal member, like Burgess, for purposes of chapter 980 
commitment proceedings, we look to the analytical framework 
developed by the United States Supreme Court.  County of Vilas 
v. Chapman, 122 Wis. 2d 211, 214, 361 N.W.2d 699 (1985); State 
v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 431-32, 338 N.W.2d 474 (1983). 
 
¶12 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, "'[s]tate laws 
generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian 
reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that 
State laws shall apply.'"  McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 
411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973) (citation omitted); see also 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).  In 
1953, Congress enacted PL-280, which expressly granted certain 
states, including Wisconsin, jurisdiction over criminal offenses 
and certain civil causes of action arising in "Indian country."2  
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1993).  The grant of 
                                                 
2 "Indian country" is defined as  
(a) 
all 
land 
within 
the 
limits 
of 
any 
Indian 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United 
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through 
the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities 
within the borders of the United States whether within 
the 
original 
or 
subsequently 
acquired 
territory 
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a 
state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian 
titles to which have not been extinguished, including 
rights-of-way running through the same. 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000). 
This definition of "Indian country" applies in the context of 
both criminal and civil jurisdiction.  DeCoteau v. Dist. County 
Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n. 2 (1975).  
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
9 
 
criminal jurisdiction under PL-280 broadly covers criminal 
offenses committed by or against Indians within Indian country.  
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000).  However, we must also examine the 
civil jurisdiction granted by PL-280 since chapter 980 involves 
involuntary civil commitments.  Unlike the criminal jurisdiction 
covered by PL-280, the grant of civil jurisdiction is more 
limited. 
28 U.S.C. 
§ 1360 
(1993). 
 
The 
grant 
of 
civil 
jurisdiction under PL-280 has been interpreted as applying to 
private civil litigation involving reservation Indians in state 
court, but not general state civil regulatory authority.  
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 
208-09 (1987); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 385 (1976).  
The civil jurisdiction granted under PL-280 provides:   
(a) Each of the States listed in the following 
table shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of 
action between Indians or to which Indians are parties 
which arise in the areas of Indian country listed 
opposite the name of the State to the same extent that 
such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of 
action, and those civil laws of such State that are of 
general application to private persons or private 
property shall have the same force and effect within 
such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the 
State: 
 . . . . 
Wisconsin . . . . All Indian country within the State 
 . . . . 
(c) Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or 
hereafter adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or 
community in the exercise of any authority which it 
may possess shall, if not inconsistent with any 
applicable civil law of the State, be given full force 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
10 
 
and effect in the determination of civil causes of 
action pursuant to this section.  
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1993).  Since Wisconsin is a mandatory PL-280 
state, all Indian country in Wisconsin is subject to PL-280, 
except for the Menominee Tribe, which is specifically exempt.3 
 
¶13 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he primary 
concern of Congress in enacting Pub. L. 280 . . . was with the 
problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the 
absence of adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement."  
Bryan, 426 U.S. at 379.  "The Act plainly was not intended to 
effect total assimilation . . . ."  Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208.  
Consequently, PL-280 does not grant "general civil regulatory 
power over Indian reservations [because it] would result in the 
destruction of tribal institutions and values."  Id.   
Accordingly, when a State seeks to enforce a law 
within an Indian reservation under the authority of 
Pub. L. 280, it must be determined whether the law is 
criminal in nature, and thus fully applicable to the 
reservation under § 2, or civil in nature, and 
applicable only as it may be relevant to private civil 
litigation in state court.  
Id.   
¶14 In Cabazon, the U.S. Supreme Court approved of the 
Ninth 
Circuit's 
characterization 
of 
the 
distinction 
as 
"criminal/prohibitory" and "civil/regulatory."  Id. at 209 
(citing Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians 
v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982)).   
                                                 
3 The federal government terminated federal recognition of 
the Menominee Tribe in 1954; however, the Tribe was subsequently 
restored in 1973 and is not subject to PL-280.  See State v. 
Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 421-27, 338 N.W.2d 474 (1983).    
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
11 
 
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to 
prohibit certain conduct, it falls within Pub. L. 
280's grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state 
law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to 
regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory 
and Pub. L. 280 does not authorize its enforcement on 
an Indian reservation.  The shorthand test is whether 
the conduct at issue violates the State's public 
policy. 
Id.  However, the Court explicitly recognized that some state 
statutes are "not so easily categorized" and that "[i]t is not a 
bright-line rule . . . ."  Id. at 208, 210.  In Cabazon, the 
Court concluded that since California did not prohibit all forms 
of gambling, but rather permitted certain gambling activities, 
the California gambling statute at issue was a regulation rather 
than a prohibition.  Consequently, the Court held that the 
statute could not be enforced by the State within the Cabazon 
and Morogno Reservations.  Id. at 210-12.   
 
¶15 In employing the analysis set forth in Cabazon, the 
Ninth Circuit stated that "[t]he inquiry prescribed in Cabazon 
is . . . one of the statute's intent and not simply its label."  
Quechan Indian Tribe v. McMullen, 984 F.2d 304, 307 (1993).  
"'[I]n an inquiry such as this we must examine more than the 
label itself to determine the intent of the State and the nature 
of the statute . . . .'"  Id. (quoting Confederated Tribes v. 
Washington, 938 F.2d 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1991)).  In Quechan, the 
Ninth 
Circuit 
held 
that 
a 
California 
fireworks 
law 
was 
criminal/prohibitory 
instead 
of 
civil/regulatory, 
and 
was 
therefore enforceable on the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation.  Id. 
at 308.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the fireworks law was 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
12 
 
prohibitory rather than regulatory even though the law was 
codified as a civil enactment and was referred to by the 
California Attorney General as "regulatory."  Id. at 307.  
Despite being a civil enactment, the court in Quechan reasoned 
that  
[t]he possession of fireworks is not the same 
situation encountered in other regulatory schemes such 
as hunting or fishing . . . .  The purpose of such 
statutes is to regulate the described conduct and to 
generate revenues.  In contrast, the purpose of the 
fireworks laws is not to generate income, but rather 
to prohibit their general use and possession in a 
legitimate effort to promote the safety and health of 
all citizens.      
Id.   
 
¶16 This case is of the kind alluded to in Cabazon and 
Quechan: it is not easily categorized.  Chapter 980 commitments 
for sexually violent persons do not squarely fall under one 
category 
within 
the 
criminal/prohibitory——civil/regulatory 
dichotomy.  Therefore, in accordance with the U.S. Supreme 
Court's analysis in Cabazon, we examine the "nature and intent 
of the state law at issue" and "whether the conduct at issue 
violates the State's public policy."  Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209-
10.   
¶17 This court has held that the involuntary commitment of 
an individual, who is found to be a "sexually violent person" 
under chapter 980, is "civil" rather than "criminal" based on 
the purposes of the chapter to provide treatment and to protect 
the public.  State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 267, 541 
N.W.2d 105 
(1995). 
 
However, 
notwithstanding 
the 
"civil" 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
13 
 
commitment allowed under chapter 980, only individuals who have 
been convicted of certain crimes——"sexually violent offenses," 
may be committed pursuant to chapter 980.  In addition, the 
primary purpose of chapter 980 is to protect the public from 
future acts of sexual violence.   
 
¶18 Chapter 980 permits the involuntary commitment of 
"only the most dangerous of sexual offenders——those whose mental 
condition predisposes them to reoffend."  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 
307.  The "principal purposes of ch. 980 are the protection of 
the public and the treatment of convicted sex offenders who are 
at a high risk to reoffend in order to reduce the likelihood 
that 
they 
will engage 
in 
such conduct in 
the future."  
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 271. 
 
¶19 The conduct addressed by chapter 980 commitments, both 
past as well as potential future conduct, is contrary to 
Wisconsin's public policy.  The commission of sexually violent 
offenses is not permitted conduct that is regulated by the 
State; rather, it is prohibited conduct that is "inimical to the 
health and safety of its citizens . . . ."  State ex rel. Lykins 
v. Steinhorst, 197 Wis. 2d 875, 887, 541 N.W.2d 234 (1995).  The 
"civil" proceedings under chapter 980 are enveloped on both 
sides by criminal conduct: (1) only persons who have committed 
sexually violent offenses are eligible for commitment under 
chapter 980 and (2) chapter 980 commitments are intended to 
protect the public by preventing future acts of sexual violence.  
Thus, the conduct at the heart of chapter 980——both past and 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
14 
 
potential future conduct——is prohibited and not merely regulated 
by the State.  Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court had 
jurisdiction to conduct chapter 980 proceedings for the civil 
commitment of Burgess pursuant to PL-280.      
 
¶20 In addition, even if chapter 980 is strictly construed 
as a "civil" law in its entirety, it is civil/adjudicatory 
rather than civil/regulatory, and therefore falls within PL-
280's grant of civil jurisdiction to the State.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has stated that the civil jurisdiction granted 
under PL-280 was "primarily intended to redress the lack of 
adequate Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes 
between reservation Indians, and between Indians and other 
private citizens, by permitting the courts of the States to 
decide such disputes . . . ."  Bryan, 426 U.S. at 383.  The 
Bryan court noted a law review article, which claimed that the 
civil jurisdiction affected by PL-280 includes areas such as 
"'contract, tort, marriage, divorce, insanity, descent, etc., 
but would not include laws . . . such as the power to tax, grant 
franchises, etc.'"  Id. at 384 n. 10 (quoting Daniel H. Israel & 
Thomas L. Smithson, "Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and 
Economic Development," 49 N.D. L. Rev. 267, 296 (1973)).  Thus, 
"'Congress intended "civil laws" to mean those laws which have 
to do with private rights and status.'"  Id. (quoting Israel & 
Smithson, 49 N.D. L. Rev. at 296).      
 
¶21 In this case, the adjudication of Burgess's mental 
health is a status determination, which is more similar to 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
15 
 
adjudications 
like 
those 
involving 
insanity, 
rather 
than 
regulations such as the power to tax.  Furthermore, the tribal 
court in this case declined to accept jurisdiction because the 
Lac du Flambeau Tribe had not yet passed an ordinance regarding 
the 
commitment 
of 
sexually 
violent 
persons. 
 
Thus, 
the 
appropriateness of State jurisdiction is bolstered since one of 
the stated purposes of PL-280 was to "redress the lack of 
adequate Indian forums . . . ."  Id. at 383.   
 
B.  SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
 
¶22 We next address Burgess's claim that his commitment 
violated due process because the State failed to prove that 
there is a substantial probability that he will reoffend due to 
his mental disorders, contrary to this court's decision in State 
v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784.  In 
support 
of 
his 
position, 
Burgess 
argues 
that 
actuarial 
instruments, which were used for his evaluations, were not 
relevant for determining whether he will reoffend due to a 
mental disorder.  In general, the actuarial instruments that 
were 
used 
provided 
a 
score 
regarding 
Burgess's 
risk 
of 
reoffending based on certain factors such as his age, prior sex 
offenses, and characteristics of the victim.  In response, the 
State contends that the evidence presented at trial, aside from 
the actuarial data, clearly established that there is a 
substantial probability that Burgess will reoffend due to his 
mental disorders and that he has serious difficulty controlling 
his behavior.  Upon reviewing the record and the testimony 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
16 
 
offered at trial, we agree with the State that there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Burgess is a 
sexually violent person, even without considering the actuarial 
data that Burgess complains of.    
 
¶23 In order to commit an individual under chapter 980, a 
jury must find that the individual is a "sexually violent 
person."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).  A "sexually violent person" 
is defined as  
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense, 
has 
been 
adjudicated 
delinquent 
for 
a 
sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty 
of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense 
by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect or 
illness, and who is dangerous because he or she 
suffers 
from 
a 
mental 
disorder 
that 
makes 
it 
substantially probable that the person will engage in 
acts of sexual violence.   
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) (emphasis added).   
¶24 In Laxton, this court concluded that the defendant in 
that case had a mental disorder, which created a "substantial 
probability 
that 
he 
[would] 
engage 
in 
acts 
of 
sexual 
violence.  . . .  This nexus between the mental disorder and the 
level of dangerousness distinguishes [the defendant] as a 
dangerous sexual offender who has serious difficulty controlling 
his behavior, from the dangerous but typical recidivist."  
Laxton, 254 Wis. 2d 185, ¶27.    
 
¶25 Burgess challenges his commitment based on the use of 
actuarial instruments in his chapter 980 commitment proceeding 
because they did not take into account his mental health.  
Consequently, 
Burgess 
contends 
that 
the 
instruments 
are 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
17 
 
irrelevant for chapter 980 proceedings because there must be a 
nexus between an offender's mental disorder and the probability 
of committing sexually violent acts in the future.  Although 
actuarial instruments were utilized by expert witnesses for both 
the State and Burgess, there was sufficient evidence, aside from 
the actuarial data, for the jury to reasonably find that there 
is a substantial probability that Burgess will reoffend due to 
his mental disorders.  Accordingly, the use of actuarial data in 
Burgess's chapter 980 proceedings does not affect our decision.      
¶26 One of the State's expert witnesses, psychologist 
Linda Nauth, conducted a psychological examination of Burgess.  
Ms. Nauth utilized and reviewed various sources of information 
about Burgess, including his social services file, his clinical 
services file, his sex offender program reports, and data from 
actuarial instruments (e.g. Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex 
Offender Recidivism or RRASOR).  She also consulted with other 
professionals involved with Burgess's care and treatment, and 
conducted a two-hour clinical interview with Burgess.  Based on 
this variety of information, Nauth reached the following 
conclusion and recommendation: 
This clinician came to the opinion to a reasonable 
degree of psychological certainty that Mr. Burgess 
suffers from pedophilia which is an acquired or 
congenital 
condition 
affecting 
his 
emotional 
or 
volitional capacity which predisposes him to commit 
sexually violent acts as defined by Chapter 980.  In 
addition, his diagnosis of alcohol dependence and 
anti-social 
personality 
disorder 
are 
acquired 
or 
congenital conditions which combined with pedophilia 
also affects his emotional or volitional capacity 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
18 
 
which predisposes him to commit sexually violent acts 
as defined by Chapter 980.   
It is also my opinion that each of these mental 
disorders, separately and together as exhibited by Mr. 
Burgess, create a substantial probability that he will 
engage of acts of sexual violence.  Finally, the 
preponderance of risk factors which apply to Mr. 
Burgess, are indicative that he is at a substantial 
risk to commit another sexual offense.  
 
¶27 Another of the State's expert witnesses, Dr. Sheila 
Fields, also evaluated Burgess based on several sources of 
information, including files on Burgess from the Department of 
Corrections and the Mendota Mental Health Institute, data from 
actuarial instruments, discussions with other professionals 
involved with Burgess's care and treatment, and a three-hour 
interview with Burgess.  Based on her evaluation, Dr. Fields 
reached the following conclusion and recommendation:  
It is my professional opinion, to a reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty, that Mr. Burgess 
manifests six diagnosed disorders: Pedophilia, Alcohol 
Abuse, Cocaine Abuse, Cannabis Abuse, Amphetamine 
Abuse, and Antisocial Personality Disorder.  The 
diagnoses of Pedophilia and Antisocial Personality 
Disorder constitute mental disorders as defined by 
Chapter 980, and are acquired or congenital conditions 
affecting 
Mr. 
Burgess' 
emotional 
or 
volitional 
capacity predisposing him to commit sexually violent 
acts, as defined by Chapter 980. 
 . . . . 
 
It is my professional opinion, then, to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that Mr. 
Burgess' 
mental 
disorders 
create 
a 
substantial 
probability that he will commit a sexually violent act 
as defined by Chapter 980, and that he is therefore a 
proper subject for commitment as a sexually violent 
individual.   
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
19 
 
 
¶28 The evaluations conducted by Dr. Fields and Ms. Nauth 
included a variety of sources of information about Burgess; the 
actuarial data was only one of many indicators regarding 
Burgess's likelihood to reoffend.  Furthermore, the testimony of 
both Dr. Fields and Ms. Nauth at trial supported their 
respective 
conclusions 
and 
recommendations 
from 
their 
evaluations of Burgess.  Dr. Fields testified that Burgess's 
pedophilia 
and 
psychopathy 
suggested 
a 
higher 
risk 
of 
recidivism, and that Burgess seems to have "a very difficult 
problem with impulse control . . . ."  Even Burgess's expert 
witness, Dr. Charles Lodl, concluded in his evaluation of 
Burgess that "it is my opinion that Mr. Burgess does present 
with [sic] a mental disorder which predisposes him to acts of 
sexual violence."  However, Dr. Lodl believed that Burgess's 
risk for reoffending was "moderate" as opposed to "substantial."  
 
¶29 Nevertheless, Burgess claims that the expert testimony 
presented at trial, specifically that of Dr. Fields, established 
that he is able to control his behavior.  Consequently, Burgess 
contends that the State did not prove that he cannot control his 
behavior due to his mental disorders as required for commitment 
under chapter 980.  Burgess points to testimony of Dr. Fields, 
where she agreed that Burgess might be able to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law and that there was not 
"anything 
in 
the 
record 
indicating 
he 
doesn't 
know 
the 
difference between right and wrong."  However, there is a 
critical difference between potentially being able to conform 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
20 
 
one's conduct to the requirements of law (i.e. knowing right 
from wrong) and actually doing so.  Even though Dr. Fields 
thought that Burgess might know right from wrong and might be 
able to abide by the law, she ultimately concluded that Burgess 
would 
not 
in 
fact 
conform 
his 
behavior 
to 
the 
law.  
Specifically, 
Dr. 
Fields 
concluded 
that 
"Burgess' 
mental 
disorders create a substantial probability that he will commit a 
sexually violent act" in the future.   
 
¶30 In sum, based on the in-depth and multi-faceted 
evaluations performed by the State's expert witnesses and the 
testimony presented at trial, we conclude that there was 
sufficient evidence, aside from the actuarial data, for the jury 
to reasonably find that Burgess is a "sexually violent person" 
under chapter 980.   
C. 
EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
AND 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
OF 
CHAPTER 
980 
PROCEEDINGS   
 
¶31 Burgess 
also 
raises 
an 
equal 
protection 
issue.4  
Burgess contends that equal protection requires that individuals 
who are subject to chapter 980 proceedings should have the same 
rights to privacy and confidentiality as individuals subject to 
chapter 51 proceedings.  See, e.g.,  Wis. Stat. §§ 51.20(5), 
                                                 
4 Equal protection is guaranteed under Article I, Section 1 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides: "All people are 
born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent 
rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."  
 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
21 
 
51.20(12) 
(right 
to 
request 
closed 
hearings); 
Wis. Stat. §§ 51.30, 51.61.(1)(n) (closed court and treatment 
records); § 51.61(1)(o) (right not to be filmed or taped).   
 
¶32 We have held that "[p]ersons committed under chapters 
51 and 980 are similarly situated for purposes of equal 
protection."  Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 413 (citing Post, 197 
Wis. 2d at 318-19).  In order to attack a statute on equal 
protection grounds, a party must demonstrate that the "state 
unconstitutionally treats members of similarly situated classes 
differently."  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 318.  However, "[e]qual 
protection is not violated where there exist reasonable and 
practical grounds for the classifications created by the 
legislature."  Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 413 (citing State v. 
Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 849, 894, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998)).  Thus, 
"[w]hether a legislative distinction between otherwise similarly 
situated persons violates equal protection depends upon whether 
there is a reasonable basis to support it."  State v. Dennis H., 
2002 WI 104, ¶31, 255 Wis. 2d 359, 647 N.W.2d 851 (citing State 
ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 733, 416 
N.W.2d 883 (1987)).  "Where the classification does not involve 
a suspect class [or a fundamental interest], equal protection is 
denied only if the legislature has made an irrational or 
arbitrary classification."  Jones, 141 Wis. 2d at 733.   
 
¶33 Although persons committed under chapter 980 are 
similarly situated to those committed under chapter 51, there is 
a rational basis for the legislature's distinction with respect 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
22 
 
to the confidentiality of proceedings under the two chapters.  
In 
Post, 
we 
noted 
that 
"[d]ifferences 
in 
difficulty 
of 
diagnosis, 
degree 
of 
dangerousness, 
and 
intrusiveness 
of 
treatment [have been] found by the [U.S.] Supreme Court to be 
sufficient justifications for differential treatment . . . ."  
Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 322.  In evaluating and comparing the 
legislative schemes of chapters 51 and 980, we have held that:  
The legislature has determined that, as a class, 
persons predisposed to sexual violence are more likely 
to pose a higher level of danger to the community than 
do other classes of mentally ill or mentally disabled 
persons. This heightened level of dangerousness and 
the unique treatment needs of sexually violent persons 
justify distinct legislative approaches to further the 
compelling governmental purpose of protection of the 
public.     
Id. at 322-23.  Accordingly, we conclude that Burgess's right to 
equal protection was not violated due to differences in 
confidentiality between chapter 980 proceedings and proceedings 
under chapter 51.   
¶34 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court had 
jurisdiction to conduct proceedings under chapter 980 for the 
involuntary civil commitment of Burgess because the conduct at 
the heart of chapter 980, both past and potential future 
conduct, is prohibited and not merely regulated; therefore, the 
State has jurisdiction under PL-280.  We also conclude that 
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Burgess 
is a "sexually violent person" for purposes of commitment under 
chapter 980.  Finally, we conclude that Burgess was not denied 
equal protection of the law because there is a rational basis 
No. 00-3074 
 
   
 
23 
 
for the legislature to treat the confidentiality of chapter 980 
proceedings differently than chapter 51 proceedings.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
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