Case Title: TOMLIN v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
TOMLIN v. STATE2001 WY 12135 P.3d 1255Case Number: 00-175Decided: 12/10/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

 

CLIFFORD 
TOMLIN,                                     

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane E. 
Courselle, Director, and Casey Martin, Student Intern, of the Wyoming Defender 
Aid Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Martin.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, and Patrick A. 
McWilliams, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. 
McWilliams.

   

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

  

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
Appellant 
Clifford Tomlin appeals the denial of his motion for sentence reduction filed 
pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure.  He argues that the trial court erred 
when it determined that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the 
motion.  We find the district court 
did have jurisdiction and accordingly vacate the order denying Tomlin's motion 
for sentence reduction and remand to the district court for a full 
adjudication.

 

 

 

[¶2]           
Appellant 
presents one issue for review:

 

            
Did the trial court err when it concluded that it was without 
jurisdiction to consider Mr. Tomlin's potentially meritorious motion for 
sentence reduction, even though the motion was filed within one year after Mr. 
Tomlin's appeal was dismissed, and there were no other conceivable 
jurisdictional barriers to preclude the trial court from hearing defendant's 
motion?

 

Appellee 
rephrases the issue thus:

 

            
Did the district court have jurisdiction over Appellant's motion for 
sentence reduction, which was filed more than a year after revocation of 
Appellant's probation, but less than a year after Appellant voluntarily 
dismissed his appeal from the district court's order revoking his 
probation?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
In 1997 
Tomlin was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to five to seven years 
in the state penitentiary.  The 
sentence was suspended, and Tomlin was placed on probation for four years.  In 1998 Tomlin violated the terms of his 
probation, and his probation was revoked in December 1998.  Tomlin timely appealed the order 
revoking his probation.  In July 
1999 this Court granted a motion for voluntary dismissal filed by Tomlin and 
entered an order dismissing Tomlin's appeal.  

 

[¶4]           
Pursuant 
to W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), Tomlin filed two motions for reduction of sentence with the 
trial court prior to December 1999.  
The trial court denied both motions on their respective merits.  In February 2000 Tomlin filed a further 
W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) motion for sentence reduction.  The trial court denied the motion 
stating only that it was without jurisdiction to hear the 
matter.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶5]           
This 
Court reviews jurisdictional matters de novo.   Thomas v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 719 (Wyo. 1999) ("Jurisdictional issues present questions of law which we 
review de novo.").  

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶6]           
Motions 
for sentence reduction may be brought pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), which 
contains certain time requirements:

 

(b) 
Reduction.A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may 
reduce a sentence without motion, within one year after the sentence is imposed 
or probation is revoked, or within one year after receipt by the court of a 
mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or 
within one year after entry of any order or judgment of the Wyoming Supreme 
Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of 
conviction or probation revocation.  

 

If a 
motion to reduce a sentence is filed outside of the prescribed time limits, the 
district court is deprived of jurisdiction to hear the motion.  Reese v. State, 910 P.2d 1347, 1348 (Wyo. 1996).  

 

[¶7]           
The 
question in this case is the effect of this Court's order dismissing Tomlin's 
appeal in response to his motion for voluntary dismissal.  Tomlin argues that the order clearly 
falls within the language of W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) allowing motions for sentence 
reduction to be filed "within one year after entry of any order or judgment of 
the Wyoming Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, 
a judgment of conviction or probation revocation."  Tomlin argues that W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) makes 
no distinction between voluntary and involuntary dismissals and that an order 
dismissing an appeal, for any reason, constitutes an order "having the effect of 
upholding  probation revocation."  
Thus, since Tomlin's motion was filed within one year of the order of 
this Court dismissing his appeal, he concludes the motion was timely under 
W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), and the district court had jurisdiction.

 

[¶8]           
The 
State argues that the order only acknowledged a voluntary dismissal by 
Tomlin  and did not constitute a 
ruling on the merits of the controversy.  
As such, contends the State, the order cannot have the "effect of 
upholding" an order revoking probation.  
The State argues that an order revoking probation can only be "upheld" by 
an appellate court after the appeal has been perfected and the issues submitted 
to the appellate court for determination.  
According to the State, because an order dismissing an appeal upon a 
motion of the appellant for voluntary dismissal does not fall within the 
language of W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), it should be disregarded for purposes of the 
rule.  The State argues that, absent 
any appellate court order on the merits, any motion for sentence reduction must 
be filed within one year of the order revoking probation.  The State concludes that Tomlin's 
February 2000 motion was not filed within one year of his probation revocation, 
leaving the district court without jurisdiction to consider the 
motion.

 

[¶9]           
We 
cannot agree with the position espoused by the State.  The language of the rule is plain and 
unambiguous.  The rule simply 
requires an order from this Court that has the effect of upholding a probation 
revocation.  A dismissal of an 
appeal, on any grounds, certainly has the effect of upholding the order appealed 
from, in this case an order revoking probation.  This particular clause requires nothing 
more. 

 

[¶10]       
This 
interpretation is strengthened upon a reading of the rule as a whole.  A separate clause in W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) 
allows for an extension of time upon the issuance of a mandate of this Court, 
"issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal."  This clause covers appellate decisions 
on the merits of an appeal.  The 
clause at issue, the final clause, would become redundant if it only applied to 
appellate decisions on the merits.  
Obviously, the final clause must cover orders or judgments that do not 
necessarily result in the issuance of a mandate from this Court.  Thus, through the inclusion of these two 
separate clauses, the language of the rule clearly anticipates a large variety 
of orders and judgments originating from this Court, including an order 
dismissing an appeal upon a motion for voluntary dismissal.  

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶11]       
Because Tomlin's 
motion for reduction of sentence at issue was filed within one year of this 
Court's order dismissing his appeal of the order revoking his probation, the 
district court had jurisdiction to consider the motion.  We vacate the order denying Tomlin's 
motion for sentence reduction and remand to the district court for a full 
adjudication.1

FOOTNOTES

1We obviously make no determination as to 
the merits of any motion by Tomlin for sentence reduction.