Case Title: Anderson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 616, 2008

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TERRENCE ANDERSON, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 616, 2008 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0510000049 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 24, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
September 22, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 22nd day of September 2009, upon consideration of the briefs of 
the parties and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Terrence Anderson, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s opinion and order denying his motion for postconviction 
relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61and related motions.  We 
conclude that there is no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm for the 
reasons stated by the Superior Court in its decisions dated December 4, 
2008. 
 
(2) 
Following a jury trial in June 2006, Anderson was convicted of 
Assault in the First Degree as a lesser-included offense of Attempted 
 
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Murder, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony and 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited.  The Superior Court 
sentenced Anderson to fifteen years at Level V incarceration suspended after 
ten years mandatory for work release and probation.  On direct appeal, this 
Court affirmed.1 
 
(3) 
In May 2008, Anderson filed a motion for postconviction relief 
alleging that his former defense counsel was ineffective at trial and on direct 
appeal.  Anderson alleged that defense counsel was ineffective at trial when 
he failed to (i) obtain discovery, (ii) challenge Anderson’s in-court 
identification, (iii) object to the trial judge’s decision not to dismiss a juror, 
(iv) argue insufficient evidence, and (v) disclose a plea offer.  Anderson 
alleged that defense counsel was ineffective on direct appeal by failing to 
argue that the State had not turned over discovery, challenge the in-court 
identification, argue insufficient evidence, and argue that the juror was 
disqualified. 
 
(4) 
At the Superior Court’s direction, the State and Anderson’s 
former defense counsel each responded to the postconviction motion.  On 
August 12, 2008, defense counsel filed an affidavit denying the allegations 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.  On September 2, 2008, the State filed a 
                                          
 
1 Anderson v. State, 930 A.2d 898 (Del. 2007). 
 
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response arguing that the postconviction claims were without merit or were 
procedurally barred. 
 
(5) 
In a “motion to compel” filed on August 19, 2008, Anderson 
asked the Superior Court to compel defense counsel to provide him with 
discovery materials and a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript.  
According to Anderson, those documents were “essential” to his 
postconviction motion and to any appeal.  In a “motion for default” filed on 
September 15, 2008, Anderson asked the Superior Court to dismiss the 
State’s response to the postconviction motion as untimely filed.  Anderson 
argued that the State’s untimely response combined with defense counsel’s 
failure to provide him with the discovery materials and preliminary hearing 
transcript constituted a “complete miscarriage of justice.” 
 
(6) 
By order dated December 4, 2008, the Superior Court denied 
Anderson’s motions to compel and for default.  The Court concluded that the 
motion for default was “unfounded” to the extent it alleged that the State’s 
response was untimely filed.  The Court also concluded that Anderson had 
not identified any discovery materials that he had been denied.  Finally, after 
reviewing the preliminary hearing transcript and the postconviction claims, 
the Superior Court concluded, in the exercise of its discretion, that there was 
no basis upon which to provide the transcript to Anderson. 
 
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(7) 
By opinion also issued on December 4, 2008, the Superior 
Court denied the postconviction motion.  The Court concluded that 
Anderson’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were without 
merit, and that his claim of  insufficient evidence was procedurally barred as 
formerly adjudicated. 
 
(8) 
On appeal, Anderson argues the identical claims that he raised 
in his postconviction motion, motion to compel and motion for default, with 
one exception.  Anderson has not argued the claim that the State failed to 
disclose a plea offer.  As a result, that claim is deemed to be waived on 
appeal.2 
 
(9) 
When denying the postconviction motion, the Superior Court 
determined that Anderson’s claim of insufficient evidence was procedurally 
barred as formerly adjudicated on direct appeal.  We agree.3  Anderson has 
not demonstrated that reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the 
interest of justice.4 
 
(10) Having carefully considered Anderson’s allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in view of the Superior Court record as 
expanded with defense counsel’s affidavit, we conclude that those 
                                          
 
2 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997). 
3 Anderson v. State, 930 A.2d 898, 901-02 (Del. 2007).  
4 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
 
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allegations are without merit for the reasons stated in the Superior Court’s 
decision of December 4, 2008.  After ruling that Anderson’s underlying 
claims of improper in-court identification and juror disqualification were 
without merit, the Superior Court correctly reasoned that Anderson’s 
counsel was not ineffective for not raising those claims at trial or on direct 
appeal.  Similarly, absent Anderson’s identifying any discovery that he was 
denied and, more importantly, any demonstration that he was prejudiced 
thereby, we agree with the Superior Court that Anderson has not established 
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain or to provide him with 
discovery.5 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the 
Superior Court are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Justice 
                                          
 
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).