Case Title: State ex rel. Jones v. Garfield Hts. Mun. Court

Citation: 1997-Ohio-256

Docket Number: 19961375

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Jones, Appellant, v. Garfield Heights Municipal Court, Appellee. 
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[Cite as State ex rel. Jones v. Garfield Hts. Mun. Court (1997),  Ohio St.3d    .] 
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Prohibition to prevent municipal court from proceeding in a pending petty-
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theft case -- Complaint dismissed, when. 
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(No. 96-1375 -- Submitted January 7, 1997 -- Decided February 19, 1997.) 
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Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 70611. 
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In May 1996, appellant, Moses E. Jones III, filed a complaint in prohibition 
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in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.  Jones sought to prevent appellee, 
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Garfield Heights Municipal Court, from proceeding in his pending petty-theft 
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case, Maple Hts. v. Jones, case No. 96-243.   
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According to his complaint, in December 1995, Jones was charged by the 
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city of Maple Heights with petty theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02, a misdemeanor 
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of the first degree.  Jones was accused of stealing property which had a value of 
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less than three hundred dollars.  More specifically, the criminal complaint was 
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based on the theft of 83.4 pounds of beef short loins, valued at approximately 
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$249.  But the police report filed in connection with the alleged theft stated that 
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71.5 pounds of pork loins valued at approximately $89 were also stolen.  The 
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police report therefore indicated that the value of the property allegedly stolen was 
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greater than $300.   
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Upon learning of the police report, Jones moved to transfer the case to the 
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Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court.  Jones contended that he should have 
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been charged with felony theft instead of misdemeanor petty theft and that the 
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municipal court thus lacked jurisdiction to try him.  The municipal court overruled 
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Jones’s motion and set the case for jury trial.   
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The court of appeals, after considering the foregoing allegations, sua sponte 
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dismissed Jones’s complaint for a writ of prohibition.   
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The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
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____________________ 
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Koblentz & Koblentz, Richard S. Koblentz and Craig J. Morice, for 
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appellant. 
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Michael G. Ciaravino, for appellee. 
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____________________ 
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Per Curiam.  In his propositions of law, Jones asserts that the court of 
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appeals erred in sua sponte dismissing his complaint for a writ of prohibition.  
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Although sua sponte dismissal of a complaint without notice is generally 
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inappropriate, it is warranted if the complaint is frivolous or the claimant 
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obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.  State ex rel. 
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Cossett v. State Governors Federalism Summit (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1416, 655 
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N.E.2d 737.  To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Jones had to establish (1) that 
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the municipal court is about to exercise judicial power, (2) that the exercise of 
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such power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that denial of the writ will cause injury 
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to Jones for which no other adequate legal remedy exists.  State ex rel. Barclays 
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Bank PLC v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 536, 
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540, 660 N.E.2d 458, 461.  Jones sufficiently alleged in his complaint that the 
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municipal court would continue to exercise jurisdiction in his criminal case absent 
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a writ of prohibition. 
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Regarding the remaining requirements for a writ of prohibition, absent a 
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patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter 
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jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court’s 
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jurisdiction possesses an adequate remedy by an appeal.  State ex rel. Fraternal 
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Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common 
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Pleas (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 287, 289, 667 N.E.2d 929, 931. 
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Jones contends that the municipal court patently and unambiguously lacks 
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jurisdiction to try his petty-theft case because he should have been charged with 
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theft, a felony of the fourth degree.  Under R.C. 1901.20(A), a municipal court has 
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jurisdiction “of the violation of any misdemeanor committed within the limits of 
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its territory.”  Based on Jones’s own allegations, he was charged with petty theft, a 
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misdemeanor of the first degree.  Therefore, the municipal court possessed 
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jurisdiction to proceed with Jones’s criminal trial. 
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Jones essentially claims that the city prosecutor undercharged him and that 
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he should have been charged with a felony instead of a misdemeanor.  But Jones’s 
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claim challenges the decision of the prosecutor in charging him, rather the 
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jurisdiction of the municipal court.  Cf. Mootispaw v. Eckstein (1996), 76 Ohio 
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St.3d 383, 385, 667 N.E.2d 1197, 1199  (“[T]he decision whether to prosecute is 
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discretionary and not normally subject to judicial review.”).  Unlike the defendant 
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in the case relied on by Jones to support his claim that the municipal court lacked 
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jurisdiction, State v. Nelson (1977), 51 Ohio App.2d 31, 5 O.O.3d 158, 365 N.E.2d 
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1268, Jones was not charged with a felony. 
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Based on the foregoing, the municipal court did not patently and 
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unambiguously lack jurisdiction over Jones’s petty-theft trial, and Jones had an 
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adequate legal remedy by an appeal to raise his “jurisdictional” claims.  Because 
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Jones obviously could not prevail on the facts alleged in his complaint, the court 
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of appeals committed no error in sua sponte dismissing Jones’s complaint.  
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Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
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Judgment affirmed. 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
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