Case Title: Cubin v. Cubin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cubin v. Cubin1984 WY 88685 P.2d 680Case Number: 83-209Decided: 08/14/1984FREDERICK W. CUBIN, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

R. ROCHELLE CUBIN, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
FREDERICK W. CUBIN, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

R. ROCHELLE CUBIN, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Ronald A. 
Kastanek, Casper, for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ. 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The issue which the 
court is called to resolve in this case is whether a divorced father who is 
seeking modification of child support should be permitted to make discovery 
according to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure of his former wife's income 
and financial circumstances. The district court, by order, effectively insulated 
the former wife from discovery either by means of written interrogatories or by 
the taking of her deposition. We conclude that the effect of the order by the 
district court was to foreclose the father from an opportunity to make 
meaningful pretrial discovery of relevant evidence. We reverse the order of the 
district court and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.

[¶2.]     The parties were 
divorced on March 26, 1975. Custody of their two children was awarded to the 
mother subject to reasonable rights of visitation by the father. The father was 
required to pay child support in the amount of $300 per month for each child for 
a period of five years, and after that he was to pay $400 per month for each 
child until that child reached the age of 21 or was married. This obligation was 
imposed pursuant to a stipulation of the parties.

[¶3.]     On September 23, 1982, 
the father filed a Petition for Modification, pursuant to which he sought to 
modify the child support provisions contained in the original Judgment and 
Decree. The father alleged that his financial circumstances and ability to earn 
had substantially and materially changed subsequent to the date of the divorce. 
In particular he averred that he had remarried and had become responsible for 
the support of his wife and two minor children; that the increase in cost of 
living had outstripped his earning capacity, and this coupled with the 
additional expense engendered by his remarriage and the failure of his financial 
condition to improve as anticipated, had placed a heavy financial burden on him; 
and that he had sustained a material and significant downward change in 
financial condition, warranting a reduction in the amount of child support he 
should be required to pay. The father requested that the 
court:

"1. Revise and alter the 
previous award of child support to a reduced figure that is appropriate given 
Plaintiff's and Defendant's financial circumstances."

[¶4.]     On October 20, 1982, 
the father's First Combined Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents by Defendant Frederick W. Cubin was served by mail upon the wife's 
attorney. From our examination of these interrogatories we conclude that the 
primary purpose was to discover evidence regarding changes in the financial 
circumstances of the wife and the needs of the children subsequent to the date 
of the divorce. However, on November 10, 1982, the wife filed her Objection of 
Plaintiff to First Combined Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents by Defendant Frederick W. Cubin, in which she asserted that the 
information requested would not lead to any meaningful discovery in connection 
with the litigation between the parties, and that requiring her to furnish the 
documents requested would be unduly burdensome and oppressive.1

[¶5.]     In the meantime the 
father served a Notice to Take Deposition upon the wife, noticing the taking of 
her deposition for December 3, 1982, in Denver, Colorado, where she resided. The wife 
responded with a Motion for Protective Order pursuant to Rule 26(c), W.R.C.P.,2 which was filed in the district 
court on November 23, 1982. The wife asserted in her motion that the scheduling 
of the deposition subjected her to an undue burden and expense and was 
oppressive, and that the taking of her deposition and production of documents 
requested in the notice would not lead to any meaningful discovery in the 
litigation between the parties. The hearing on this motion also was set for 
November 30, 1982, at which time it was combined with the hearing on her 
objection to the interrogatories. The hearing was held, but it was not recorded, 
and the record discloses nothing with respect to what 
occurred.

[¶6.]     On December 23, 1982, 
the court entered its Order which provided that the wife was not required to 
respond to the interrogatories and request for production of documents filed by 
the father, and that she was not required to respond to the notice for the 
taking of her deposition. The order is silent with regard to the district 
court's rationale in its issuance. Under the circumstances, however, it is a 
fair inference that the ground for denying discovery was based upon the 
contentions of the wife in her objections and motion for a protective 
order.

[¶7.]     Although the father 
sought to prosecute an immediate appeal from this order, his appeal was 
dismissed because interlocutory orders denying discovery are not final orders 
appealable under Rule 1.05, W.R.A.P. After remand of the case to the district 
court the hearing on the father's petition for modification was held on August 
1, 1983. A Judgment and Decree denying the father's petition for modification 
for the reason that "the defendant has failed to prove a substantial change in 
circumstances from the date of the Decree to the present time" was entered on 
September 1, 1983. This appeal has been perfected from that Judgment and 
Decree.

[¶8.]     The statement of the 
issues found in the father's brief on appeal is as 
follows:

"A.

"DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR 
IN ORDERING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THE INTERROGATORIES 
AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS BY THE DEFENDANT?

"B.

"DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR 
IN ORDERING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THE NOTICE FOR THE 
TAKING OF HER DEPOSITION?

"C.

"DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR 
IN ORDERING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE TO THE COURT WITH RESPECT TO 
A CHANGE IN HIS FINANCIAL AND MEDICAL CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A 
MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES BY REDUCING THE AMOUNT 
OF CHILD SUPPORT WHICH DEFENDANT IS CURRENTLY REQUIRED TO 
PAY?"

[¶9.]     The father did not 
present any cogent argument or authority with respect to the third issue in his 
brief or at oral argument. In accordance with our usual rule we will not discuss 
the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to justify a modification, instead 
treating that issue as waived. We have no brief or argument from the mother, who 
did not appear in this appeal.

[¶10.]  In a proceeding instituted for 
modification of child support provisions encompassed in a divorce decree the 
burden is upon the moving party to establish a substantial change in 
circumstances occurring subsequent to the entry of the original decree. Harrington v. Harrington, Wyo., 660 P.2d 356 (1983); Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 638 P.2d 156 (1981); Booker v. Booker, 
Wyo., 626 P.2d 561 (1981); and Rubeling v. Rubeling, Wyo., 
406 P.2d 283 (1965). Divorce decrees, like other judgments, are res judicata 
with respect to issues which were decided upon the evidence presented by the 
parties at the time of the original proceedings. Ayling v. Ayling, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1054 (1983); Salmeri v. Salmeri, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1244 (1976); and Heyl v. Heyl, Wyo., 518 P.2d 28 (1974). If the moving party is to 
prevail upon a petition for modification it is necessary that an opportunity be 
afforded to demonstrate how the circumstances of the parties have changed 
subsequent to the entry of the original decree.

[¶11.]  The courts in other jurisdictions have 
held that evidence of the financial circumstances of the parents is subject to 
discovery upon a petition to modify the support provisions established by a 
decree of divorce. State ex rel. Hoffman 
v. Campbell, Mo. App., 428 S.W.2d 904 (1968); Hughes v. Hughes, Mont., 
666 P.2d 739 (1983); and Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 416 A.2d 45 
(1980). The cases which are collected in Annotation 89 A.L.R.2d 7 (1963) lead to 
a conclusion that a substantial change in the financial condition and needs of 
either parent or the children may be sufficient grounds for modification of the 
provisions of a decree for child support payments. It is by virtue of evidence 
of such changes in financial condition or needs that the moving party meets the 
burden of proof which must be assumed. In this case the father was prevented 
from bringing evidence of a substantial change in conditions with regard to his 
ex-wife's financial status despite the rule that such a change could justify a 
modification in the provisions for child support. The ruling of the district 
court with respect to the discovery efforts inhibited the father from developing 
any evidence regarding the financial circumstances of the 
ex-wife.

[¶12.]  In Wyoming the pertinent statutory provisions 
provide as follows:

[¶13.]  Section 20-2-113(a), W.S. 
1977:

"In granting a divorce or 
annulment of a marriage, the court may make such disposition of the children as 
appears most expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the children. The 
court shall consider the relative competency of both parents and no award of 
custody shall be made solely on the basis of gender of the parent. On the petition of either of the parents, 
the court may revise the decree concerning the care, custody and maintenance of 
the children as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children 
requires." (Emphasis added.)

[¶14.]  Section 20-2-116, W.S. 
1977:

"After a decree for 
alimony or other allowance for a party or children and after a decree for the 
appointment of trustees to receive and hold any property for the use of a party 
or children, the court may from time to time, on the petition of either of the 
parties, revise and alter the decree respecting the amount of the alimony or 
allowance or the payment thereof and respecting the appropriation and payment of 
the principal and income of the property so held in trust and may make any 
decree respecting any of the matters which the court might have made in the 
original action."

[¶15.]  In accordance with the provisions of § 
20-2-113(a), W.S. 1977, the district court is vested with continuing 
jurisdiction with respect to the provisions of a prior divorce decree 
"concerning the care, custody and maintenance of the children as the 
circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children requires." One of 
the relevant subjects with respect to the exercise of that jurisdiction is the 
change in financial circumstances of both parents as compared to those in 
existence at the time of the original decree:

"When the modification 
sought involves the question of custody of the child, that child's welfare must 
be given paramount consideration. Laughton v. Laughton, supra [71 Wyo. 
506, 259 P.2d 1093, 43 A.L.R.2d 351 (1953)]. However, it is imprudent to contend 
that, when the question involves support payments, the matter should be decided 
without consideration of the paying parent's ability to pay, the recipient's 
spending habits, and all other surrounding circumstances. Redman v. Redman, Wyo., 
521 P.2d 584, 587 (1974). See also, § 20-2-113(a), W.S. 1977. This court in 
Redman agreed with the proposition that a child support order may not 
accurately reflect what children actually require but, rather, what the parent 
can reasonably be expected to pay. The circumstances of the parents are 
recognized by our controlling statute as well. Even in unbroken homes a child's 
monetary needs must be limited by the parents' income. Child support cannot be 
determined in a vacuum. If a child's wants and needs were to be the sole 
criterion, then child support may have to fall upon the state since few parents 
are able to raise their children without having to make do with what they 
have.

[¶16.]  "Appellant tries to point to Rubeling v. Rubeling, supra [Wyo, 406 P.2d 283 
(1965)], for the proposition that appellee's ability to pay should have been 
ruled irrelevant to the trial on whether to grant the modification in support 
payments. However, her reliance on Rubeling v. Rubeling, supra, is 
misplaced. That case involved a petition by the husband which sought to reduce 
the support payments. There the court, while considering whether a change in 
circumstances occurred, observed:

"`Unfortunately, we have 
no record of proceedings in connection with the court's first modification. 
Although counsel for the husband suggests that the divorced wife has an improved 
income situation, he admits the record fails to support his contention in that 
regard, because it does not reflect what her income situation was at the time of 
the last previous modification.

"`Likewise, it is not 
shown that the husband has less income. In fact, appellee suggests his income 
was nominally increased.' 406 P.2d  at 284-285.

"It is clear that the 
income of the parents can and should be taken into consideration in determining 
whether there has been a change in circumstances which warrants a modification 
of the divorce decree." Mentock v. 
Mentock, supra, 638 P.2d  at 158-159.

See also Harrington v. Harrington, supra; Kamp v. Kamp, Wyo., 640 P.2d 48 (1982); Salmeri v. Salmeri, supra; 
Weppner v. Weppner, 78 Wyo. 106, 319 P.2d 127 (1957); and Moore v. Moore, 33 Wyo. 230, 237 P. 235 
(1925).

[¶17.]  Rule 26(b)(1), W.R.C.P., governing 
discovery in civil cases, provides that:

"(1) In General. - 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it 
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim 
or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, 
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible 
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any 
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought 
will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence."

[¶18.]  When this court is required to review the 
propriety of orders denying discovery in civil cases, the standard that is 
invoked is abuse of discretion. Mauch v. 
Stanley Structures, Inc., Wyo., 641 P.2d 1247 (1982). See also Ulrich v. Ulrich, Wyo., 
366 P.2d 999 (1961). In Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980), we said that one definition of an abuse of discretion is that it is "an 
error of law committed by the court under the 
circumstances."

[¶19.]  Section 20-2-113(a), W.S. 1977, provides 
that the "circumstances of the parents" is to be considered in connection with a 
petition for modification of child support. In refusing to allow the father to 
discover relevant evidence according to the statute relating to any changes in 
the financial circumstances of his ex-wife since the entry of the divorce 
decree, the district court abused its discretion. At the same time the district 
court permitted the ex-wife to make discovery with respect to the financial 
affairs of the father, even though the father objected. The interests of justice 
require that both parties be afforded a similar opportunity to discover relevant 
evidence, and the discretion of the trial court should be exercised in a 
balanced manner.

[¶20.]  We have no way of knowing whether the 
discovery efforts of the father will or will not produce evidence which is 
helpful to him in support of his petition to modify child support. We are 
satisfied, however, that because such evidence is relevant to the issues before 
the court the father must be given the opportunity to obtain discovery of the 
financial circumstances of his ex-wife.

[¶21.]  The Judgment and Decree entered by the 
district court on September 1, 1983, is reversed; the Order that the ex-wife is 
not required to respond to interrogatories in the request for production of 
documents and relieving her from responding to the notice for the taking of her 
deposition is reversed; and the case is remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1 We note that these 
interrogatories did not comply with the provisions of Rule 18, Uniform Rules of 
the District Courts of the State of Wyoming, because their number exceeded 
thirty.

2 Rule 26(c), W.R.C.P., 
provides in part:

"(c) Protective orders. - Upon motion by a 
party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, 
the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating 
to a deposition to be taken within the state, the court in the district where 
the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to 
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 
burden or expense, including one (1) or more of the following: (1) that the 
discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms 
and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the 
discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by 
the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or 
that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that 
discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the 
court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the 
court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated 
way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information 
enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the 
court."

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
concurring.

[¶22.]  I agree with that said in the majority 
opinion but want to note that I do not consider additional financial 
requirements of a remarriage, in itself, sufficient to modify the divorce 
decree.