Case Title: County of Grant v. Vogt

Citation: 2014 WI 76

Docket Number: 2012AP001812

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 76 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1812   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
County of Grant, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Daniel A. Vogt, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
346 Wis. 2d 551,830 N.W.2d 723 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 18, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 9, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Grant 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert VanDeHey 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, ROGGENSACK, GABLEMAN, JJJ., concur. 
(Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there was a  brief 
by Anthony J. Pozorski Sr., assistant district attorney, and 
Grant County, and oral argument by Anthony J. Pozorski Sr. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Jeffery 
J. Scott, and Block, Scott & Heenan, LLC, Platteville, and oral 
argument by Jeffery J. Scott.  
 
 
 
 2014 WI 76
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP1812   
(L.C. No. 
2012TR459 & 2012TR460) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
County of Grant, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel A. Vogt, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 18, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 reversing a 
decision of the Grant County Circuit Court, which found the 
defendant guilty of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. 
¶2 
The case affords this court an opportunity to develop 
the law on "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment.  The issue 
presented is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a 
law enforcement officer "seized" the defendant, Daniel Vogt 
                                                 
1 Cnty. of Grant v. Vogt, No. 2012AP1812, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013). 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
2 
 
(Vogt), when he knocked on the driver's window of Vogt's vehicle 
and asked Vogt to roll down the window.  When Vogt complied, the 
officer immediately smelled alcohol in the vehicle and noticed 
Vogt's slurred speech, leading to an investigation and Vogt's 
ultimate arrest.  In these circumstances, did the officer 
"seize" Vogt before the officer had probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion to believe that Vogt committed an offense? 
¶3 
Although we acknowledge that this is a close case, we 
conclude that a law enforcement officer's knock on a car window 
does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to 
give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person 
is not free to leave.  The objective of law enforcement is to 
protect and serve the community.  Accordingly, an officer's 
interactions with people are not automatically adversarial.  A 
court's "seizure" inquiry into one of these interactions must 
examine the totality of the circumstances, seeking to identify 
the line between an officer's reasonable attempt to have a 
consensual conversation and a more consequential attempt to 
detain an individual.  The facts in this case do not show a 
level of intimidation or exercise of authority sufficient to 
implicate the Fourth Amendment until after Vogt rolled down his 
window and exposed the grounds for a seizure.  Consequently, we 
reverse. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
In the early morning of December 25, 2011, Deputy 
Matthew Small (Deputy Small) of the Grant County Sheriff's 
Department was on patrol duty in the Village of Cassville.  The 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
3 
 
village is located on the Mississippi River, southwest of 
Lancaster, the Grant County seat.  In 2010 Cassville had a 
population of 947.  Around 1 a.m., Deputy Small observed a 
vehicle on Prime Street turn west and pull into the parking lot 
next to a closed park and boat landing on the Mississippi.  He 
did not observe any traffic violations but thought the driver's 
conduct was suspicious. 
¶5 
Riverside Park closed at 11 p.m., but the adjacent 
parking lot remained open.  Deputy Small said, however, that 
because of the time of year (Christmas), and because the park 
was closed and there were no boats at the landing, he thought it 
was odd for someone to be there.2 
¶6 
His curiosity piqued, Deputy Small pulled into the 
parking lot and parked his marked squad car behind Vogt's 
vehicle a little off to the driver's side.  The squad car's 
headlights were on, but its red and blue emergency lights were 
not.  Vogt's car was running and had its lights on as well.  
Deputy Small said at the suppression hearing that he was not 
                                                 
2 The circuit court opined that it was reasonable for Deputy 
Small to ask Vogt what he was doing.  During the hearing on 
Vogt's motion to suppress, the court commented, "I mean on one 
hand, what the officer did seems perfectly reasonable.  You 
know, 2:00 in the morning, nobody's going to be launching a boat 
on Christmas Day."  At trial, the court reiterated the 
reasonableness of Deputy Small's conduct when it noted that 
"there is really not anything unreasonable with approaching a 
vehicle at bar time and finding out why they're parked 
at . . . a boat landing that apparently was not closed, but the 
park next to it was closed." 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
4 
 
blocking the car and that the driver could have left, although 
Daniel Vogt later disagreed. 
¶7 
Deputy Small got out of his squad car and walked up to 
Vogt's window.  He was in full uniform and had a pistol in his 
side holster.  There were two people in the vehicle: Vogt in the 
driver's seat and Kimberly Russell (Russell) in the passenger's 
seat.  Deputy Small testified at the trial that he rapped on the 
window but could not recall if the knock was hard or soft.3  He 
also said that he motioned for Vogt to roll down the window and 
that if Vogt had ignored him and driven away, Deputy Small would 
have let him go because he "had nothing to stop him for." 
¶8 
When Vogt rolled down the window, Deputy Small asked 
him what he was doing, and Vogt said that he was trying to 
figure out his radio.  Deputy Small said that Vogt's speech was 
slurred and that he could smell intoxicants coming from inside 
the vehicle.  Deputy Small asked Vogt for his driver's license 
and went back to his squad car.  He turned on the red and blue 
emergency lights and moved the squad car back and a little to 
the left so that he could videotape the interaction.  Deputy 
Small asked Vogt to step out of the vehicle for a field sobriety 
test, during which Vogt showed signs of intoxication.  Deputy 
Small then placed Vogt under arrest and transported him to the 
Grant County Jail in Lancaster where Vogt submitted to an 
evidentiary chemical test of his breath.  The test indicated 
                                                 
3 Previously, at a suppression hearing, Deputy Small said he 
could not remember whether the window was up or down but said 
that he "may have knocked on the window." 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
5 
 
that Vogt had a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) of .19——
more 
than 
twice 
the 
legal 
limit. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 340.01(46m)(a) (2011-12).4 
¶9 
Vogt was cited for operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI) and PAC contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a).5  Because this was his first violation 
of § 346.63(1)(a), it was a civil violation.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am).  Vogt filed a plea of not guilty on January 5, 
2012.  On February 29, 2012, he moved to suppress all evidence 
obtained during his allegedly unlawful detention and arrest on 
grounds that Deputy Small did not have reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a traffic stop.  The Grant County Circuit Court, Robert 
P. VanDeHey, Judge, held a motion hearing on March 30, 2012, 
during which Deputy Small was the only witness to testify. 
¶10 The circuit court denied the motion to suppress in a 
written order on April 23, 2012.  Judge VanDeHey relied on the 
seizure analysis articulated in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 554 (1980), and determined that Deputy Small's conduct 
did not constitute a seizure.  The circuit court noted: 
Deputy Small did not draw his gun.  His emergency 
lights were not in operation.  There is no showing 
that he raised his voice.  There is some evidence that 
he impeded the operation of the defendant's automobile 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
5 Although 
the 
PAC 
citation 
lists 
only 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a) as the violated statute, the statute that 
specifically 
prohibits 
driving 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration is Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b). 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
6 
 
in that he initially parked somewhat to the side and 
behind the vehicle and then had to re-position his 
vehicle to conduct field sobriety tests.  There is no 
evidence that Deputy Small "commanded" Mr. Vogt to 
roll down his window by tapping on the window and 
motioning that he roll down his window. 
Although the circuit court believed it was a close case, the 
court denied the motion to suppress. 
¶11 A trial to the court took place on July 5, 2012.  
Vogt's passenger, Russell, testified that Deputy Small's rap on 
the window was "hard" and that he said, "Give me your driver's 
license."  According to Russell, Deputy Small's voice "was 
forceful," and he did not say "please" or "thank you."  Russell 
also described the parking lot.  To the right of the vehicle 
were a lit pop machine and the park.  As Deputy Small said, the 
squad car was behind Vogt's vehicle, a little closer to the 
driver's side.  The Mississippi River was in front of Vogt's 
vehicle.  Wisconsin Power & Light Company was on the left,6 and 
Deputy Small was standing on the left side of Vogt's vehicle.  
Russell thought that Vogt could not have ignored Deputy Small 
and could not have left because there was nowhere for him to go. 
¶12 Vogt testified that Deputy Small "rapped on the window 
very loud" with his knuckles and told Vogt to open the window 
without saying "please" or "would you."  Vogt said that Deputy 
Small's voice was commanding and that he did not think he had 
any alternative to rolling down the window.  Vogt said that he 
                                                 
6 Vogt admitted on cross-examination that Wisconsin Power & 
Light Company was far enough away that it would not have 
prevented him from turning left. 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
7 
 
could not have pulled forward and turned around, could not have 
turned left without hitting Deputy Small, could not have turned 
right without hitting the pop machine, and could not have backed 
up because of the squad car.  On cross-examination, Vogt 
admitted that the boat landing was roughly 40 yards wide and 
that the Mississippi River could have been 50 feet in front of 
him.  In the past, ice had washed up onto the parking lot, but 
Vogt did not know how far it had washed up on December 25, 2011, 
if at all.  Vogt agreed that he had had too much to drink and 
should not have been driving. 
¶13 At the end of the trial, Vogt renewed his motion to 
suppress.  In making its decision, the circuit court noted that 
there was a question as to whether Deputy Small verbally 
commanded Vogt to roll down the window.  The court said: 
There is additional evidence today that was not 
brought forth at the motion hearing, particularly that 
the officer rapped loudly on the window and supposedly 
commanded Mr. Vogt to roll down the window.  That's 
different than the officer's testimony who indicated 
that he just wanted to see what was going on.  He was 
suspicious.  Had Mr. Vogt decided to drive away, he 
would have let him. 
The officer also testified that he did not block 
the vehicle in, that the vehicle could have gotten 
around him.  So there are a few factual distinctions 
as far as the testimony.  It's not a very bright line, 
and I don't know how a driver knows the difference 
between a command and a suggestion, particularly when 
we're talking about a physical movement, the knocking 
on the window. 
To the extent that Mr. Vogt and Ms. Russell's 
testimony differs from the officer's, the resolution 
probably is somewhere in between, that the officer 
wasn't as aggressive as the occupants of the vehicle 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
8 
 
thought, and maybe he wasn't quite as subtle as he 
thought he was being.  But the basic facts are that 
there was [a] vehicle running at night at bar time.  
The officer knocked on the window, rapped on the 
window.  There is a dispute as to whether there was 
actually a verbal command after that.  I don't know 
that that's the case.  Given that the vehicle was 
running and the time of night and the officer's 
initial testimony that he probably just knocked on the 
window, that that seems to be the——well, at least the 
consistent testimony. 
Vogt's attorney interrupted to remind the court that at the 
motion 
hearing, 
Deputy 
Small 
could 
not 
remember 
how 
he 
approached Vogt.  The court responded: 
Yeah, and it was quoted in the decision, but I——his 
testimony today was that it——if Mr. Vogt drove away, 
he wasn't going to stop him.  He had no reason to do 
it, which would indicate that he wasn't commanding him 
to do anything, is that he was simply trying to make 
contact. 
¶14 The circuit court found Vogt guilty of the OWI 
violation and dismissed the PAC count.  The court ordered a 
forfeiture of $899, revoked Vogt's license for seven months, 
ordered alcohol assessment and a driver safety plan, and entered 
an order for a mandatory ignition interlock for one year.  All 
penalties 
were 
stayed 
pending 
appeal. 
 
The 
judgment 
of 
conviction was filed on August 3, 2012, and Vogt filed a notice 
of appeal on August 13, 2012. 
¶15 In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court.  Cnty. of Grant v. Vogt, No. 
2012AP1812, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013).  
The court of appeals determined that "when a uniformed officer 
approaches a vehicle at night and directs the driver to roll 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
9 
 
down his or her window, a reasonable driver would not feel free 
to ignore the officer."  Id., ¶13.  The court of appeals assumed 
that Deputy Small "directed Vogt to roll down his window, rather 
than asking him if he would do so."  Id.  Based on this 
assumption, the court of appeals concluded that a reasonable 
driver would not have felt free to leave, and therefore, Deputy 
Small seized Vogt without reasonable suspicion.  Id., ¶¶13-14. 
¶16 The County of Grant petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted on October 15, 2013. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 Whether someone has been seized presents a two-part 
standard of review.  State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶17, 255 
Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834.  This court will uphold the circuit 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but 
the application of constitutional principles to those facts 
presents a question of law subject to de novo review.  Id.  The 
same standard of review applies to a motion to suppress.  See 
State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, ¶19, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶18 Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, "The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ."  U.S. 
Const. amend. IV.7  The Wisconsin Constitution contains the same 
                                                 
7 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads in full: 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
10 
 
language,8 and "[w]e have historically interpreted the Wisconsin 
Constitution's protections in this area identically to the 
protections under the Fourth Amendment as defined by the United 
States Supreme Court."9  State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶14, 327 
Wis. 2d 252, 
786 
N.W.2d 97 
(footnote 
omitted) 
(citation 
omitted). 
¶19 The law on searches and the law on seizures present 
separate lines of analysis.  With respect to the latter, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
8 The Wisconsin Constitution reads:  
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized.   
Wis. Const. art. I, § 11. 
9 While this court generally interprets the Wisconsin 
Constitution to give the same protections as the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, we have determined 
that the Wisconsin Constitution offers more protection than the 
Fourth Amendment under the good faith exception, which does not 
apply in this case.  See State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶60, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  Because we interpret the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
to 
be 
coterminous 
with 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution in this area, the analysis in this opinion applies 
to both constitutions. 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
11 
 
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution are not implicated until a government agent 
"seizes" a person.  State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶23, 294 
Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729.  The reason is that not all personal 
interactions 
between 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
and 
people 
constitute a seizure.  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552; Young, 294 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶18 ("[N]ot all police-citizen contacts constitute a 
seizure . . . ."). 
¶20 A seizure occurs "[o]nly when the officer, by means of 
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained 
the liberty of a citizen."  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552 (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).  As Justice Stewart 
stated in Mendenhall, "a person has been 'seized' within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave."  Id. at 554 
(footnote omitted). 
¶21 When Mendenhall was written, Justice Stewart's lead 
opinion was joined by only Justice Rehnquist.  Justice Powell 
authored a concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Blackmun, in which he observed that "I do not 
necessarily disagree with" Justice Stewart's standard, but "the 
question whether the respondent . . . reasonably could have 
thought she was free to 'walk away' when asked by two Government 
agents for her driver's license and ticket is extremely close."  
Id. at 560 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
12 
 
¶22 The Court's tentative acceptance of Justice Stewart's 
standard has since been bolstered and confirmed.  INS v. 
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215-17 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 497, 502-04 (1983) (plurality opinion); see also Kaupp v. 
Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629-30 (2003); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 
429, 434-35 (1991); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627-
28 (1991); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988); 
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 228 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (citations omitted) ("A majority of the 
Court has since adopted [the Mendenhall] formula as the 
appropriate standard for determining when inquiries made by the 
police 
cross 
the 
boundary 
separating 
merely 
consensual 
encounters from forcible stops to investigate a suspected 
crime."). 
¶23 After articulating the test for determining when a 
seizure takes place, Justice Stewart went on to list some 
examples of circumstances that might suggest a seizure: "the 
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a 
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of 
the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating 
that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled."  
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (citations omitted); see Kaupp, 538 
U.S. at 630.  Justice Stewart stated that without similar 
evidence that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he 
or she was not free to leave, an interaction with law 
enforcement is not a seizure as a matter of law.  Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. at 555 (stating that "inoffensive contact between a 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
13 
 
member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, 
amount to a seizure of that person"). 
¶24 The 
Supreme 
Court 
provided 
further 
guidance 
in 
Delgado, when it stated that "police questioning, by itself, is 
unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation.  While most 
citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people 
do so, and do so without being told they are free not to 
respond, 
hardly 
eliminates 
the 
consensual 
nature 
of 
the 
response."  Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (citing Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-34 (1973)).  The Court then 
adopted the Mendenhall standard and stated that there is no 
seizure "[u]nless the circumstances of the encounter are so 
intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would 
have believed he was not free to leave."  Id. 
¶25 The 
rule 
that 
a 
seizure 
occurs 
only 
when 
law 
enforcement restrains a person's liberty by show of authority 
advances the goals of the Fourth Amendment: 
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to 
eliminate all contact between the police and the 
citizenry, but "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive 
interference by enforcement officials with the privacy 
and personal security of individuals."  United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 [(1976)].  As 
long as the person to whom questions are put remains 
free to disregard the questions and walk away, there 
has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or 
privacy as would under the Constitution require some 
particularized and objective justification. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553-54.  To facilitate these goals, the 
test is objective and "calls for consistent application from one 
police encounter to the next, regardless of the particular 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
14 
 
individual's 
response 
to 
the 
actions 
of 
the 
police."  
Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574. 
¶26 To sum up, there are countless interactions or 
encounters among police and members of the community.  Not all 
encounters are seizures, and these non-seizure encounters are 
not governed by the Fourth Amendment.  Other interactions or 
encounters are seizures and are subject to Fourth Amendment 
criteria.  Fourth Amendment jurisprudence focuses on the line 
between 
seizures 
and 
mere 
encounters 
as 
well 
as 
the 
reasonableness of the police/citizen interactions that do 
constitute seizures. 
¶27 There are two kinds of permissible seizures.  Young, 
294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20.  A Terry stop is an investigatory stop for 
which a law enforcement officer must have reasonable suspicion 
"in light of his experience that criminal activity may be 
afoot."10  Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; see Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20; 
State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 57, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996).  An 
                                                 
10 The standards for a Terry stop are codified in the 
Wisconsin Statutes: 
After having identified himself or herself as a 
law enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may 
stop a person in a public place for a reasonable 
period of time when the officer reasonably suspects 
that such person is committing, is about to commit or 
has committed a crime, and may demand the name and 
address of the person and an explanation of the 
person’s conduct. 
 Such detention and temporary 
questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where 
the person was stopped. 
Wis. Stat. § 968.24. 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
15 
 
officer has reasonable suspicion when he "possesses specific and 
articulable facts which would warrant a reasonable belief that 
criminal activity was afoot."  Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 55 
(citing State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294, 198 N.W.2d 377 
(1972)). 
¶28 The second kind of permissible seizure is an arrest, 
which normally involves "a trip to the station house and 
prosecution for crime."  Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶22 (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 16).  To make an arrest, a law enforcement 
officer must have probable cause to believe that the person 
arrested has committed a crime.  Id.  That is, the officer must 
"have sufficient knowledge at the time of the arrest to 'lead a 
reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant probably 
committed or was committing a crime.'"  Id. (quoting State v. 
Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 212, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999)). 
¶29 In the present case, neither type of permissible 
seizure came into play until Vogt opened the window and Deputy 
Small detected signs of intoxication.  Deputy Small may have had 
a savvy hunch that the driver of the Vogt vehicle had been 
drinking.  But a savvy hunch is not equivalent to the reasonable 
suspicion that would have justified a Terry-type temporary 
detention.  Because Deputy Small did not have reasonable 
suspicion to believe Vogt was operating while intoxicated until 
after Vogt opened his window, we must determine whether Vogt was 
seized before his window was rolled down. 
A. Wisconsin Seizure Law 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
16 
 
¶30 This court has adopted the Mendenhall test for 
determining whether a seizure took place, and it is the proper 
test for this case.  Id., ¶37 ("Mendenhall is the appropriate 
test for situations where the question is whether a person 
submitted to a police show of authority because, under all the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would not have felt free to leave.").  The test is objective and 
considers whether an innocent reasonable person, rather than the 
specific 
defendant, 
would 
feel 
free 
to 
leave 
under 
the 
circumstances.  See Williams, 255 Wis. 2d 1, ¶23. 
¶31 The seizure test is necessarily objective,11 but it is 
complicated by the tendency of people to defer to a symbol of 
authority no matter how it is manifested.  A badge might imbue 
an officer's request with intimidation in the mind of some 
persons, but the law must be more discerning.  In most cases it 
is important for courts conducting a Fourth Amendment seizure 
analysis 
to 
distinguish 
between 
a 
person's 
individual 
predisposition, which might lead the person to consent to an 
                                                 
11 The test must be objective because "any test intended to 
determine what street encounters are not seizures must be 
expressed in terms that can be understood and applied by the 
officer.  Asking him to determine whether the suspect feels free 
to leave, however 'would require a prescience neither the police 
nor anyone else possesses.'"  4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 9.4(a), at 568 (5th ed. 2012) (quoting United States 
v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969)). 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
17 
 
officer's inquiry, and an officer's objective conduct.12  To 
their credit, citizens and others may feel tethered by social 
norms to an officer's request and may consent in order to avoid 
the taboo of disrespecting an officer of the law.  However, a 
person's consent is no less valid simply because an individual 
is particularly susceptible to social or ethical pressures.13  
Were it otherwise, officers would be hesitant to approach anyone 
for fear that the individual would feel "seized" and that any 
question asked, however innocuous, would lead to a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.  Thus, when determining whether an 
individual was seized, we must replace the individual with the 
                                                 
12 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 228 (1984) (Brennan, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that the 
seizure 
analysis 
"properly 
looks 
not 
to 
the 
subjective 
impressions of the person questioned but rather to the objective 
characteristics of the encounter which may suggest whether or 
not a reasonable person would believe that he remained free 
during the course of the questioning to disregard the questions 
and walk away") (citing 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2, 
at 52 (1978)). 
13 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(a), at 581 
(5th 
ed. 
2012) 
(footnote 
omitted) 
(suggesting 
that 
law 
enforcement "should be allowed 'to seek cooperation, even where 
this may involve inconvenience or embarrassment for the citizen, 
and even though many citizens will defer to this authority of 
the police because they believe——in some vague way——that they 
should.'") (quoting Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 258 
(1975)). 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
18 
 
paradigmatic reasonable person and focus on the officer's 
conduct under the totality of the circumstances.14 
¶32 Although we have established the proper standards for 
seizure cases, this court has not yet considered whether a 
person is necessarily seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when a law enforcement officer knocks on the window of 
the person's vehicle.  However, we have expressed reluctance to 
determine that pulling up behind a car and "present[ing] indicia 
of police authority" automatically constitutes a seizure.  
Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶65, 69 ("[N]ot every display of police 
authority rises to a 'show of authority' that constitutes a 
seizure.").  In Young, the officer stopped his squad car in the 
middle of the street behind the defendant's car, which was 
parked on the side of the street.  Id., ¶10.  The officer shined 
his spotlight on the defendant's vehicle and turned on his 
emergency flashers, but he did not activate his red and blue 
emergency lights.  Id.  This court was reluctant to label the 
officer's conduct a "seizure," in part because he did not stop 
                                                 
14 To some extent, the "reasonable person" here is a legal 
fiction.  That defendants often consent to searches of areas 
that reveal incriminating evidence demonstrates that people 
often do not feel free to decline an officer's request, even 
absent a manifest show of authority.  However, the reasonable 
person standard is necessary if the inquiry is to remain 
objective.  The value of objective standards in this area cannot 
be gainsaid because the alternative is to equate the innocuous 
to the arbitrary and substantially limit the role of law 
enforcement in the community. 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
19 
 
the defendant's car (it was parked already),15 and the officer 
did not use his red and blue emergency lights.  Id., ¶¶66, 68-
69.  We did not have to decide in Young whether the officer's 
conduct was a seizure, but the case demonstrates that not all 
manifestations of authority will result in a seizure. 
B. Decisions from Other Jurisdictions 
¶33 Several 
jurisdictions 
outside 
Wisconsin 
have 
determined that knocking on a vehicle's window does not 
necessarily constitute a seizure.16  We discuss some of these 
factually similar cases below. 
                                                 
15 In contrast, we determined that an impermissible seizure 
occurred 
when 
officers 
stopped 
a 
moving 
vehicle 
without 
reasonable suspicion by blocking its path with an unmarked squad 
car.  State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 247, 258-59, 263, 557 
N.W.2d 245 (1996). 
16 See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 394 F.3d 1070 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (no seizure when officer got out of his squad car, 
shined a flashlight on his uniform and kept a hand on his gun as 
he approached the defendant and knocked on the defendant's 
vehicle window three separate times until defendant opened the 
window); Ex parte Betterton, 527 So. 2d 747, 748-50 (Ala. 1988) 
(determining that it was not a seizure when an officer 
approached a parked car and knocked on the driver's window); 
State v. Cerrillo, 93 P.3d 960 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (officer 
knocking on vehicle window to wake up sleeping occupants and 
requesting driver's license was not a seizure); Custer v. State, 
135 P.3d 620, 625-26 (Wyo. 2006) (no seizure when officer 
knocked on vehicle window twice to get defendant's attention).  
But see State v. Patterson, 868 A.2d 188, 192-93 (Me. 2005) 
(concluding that officer's knock on a car window and an order to 
roll down the window constituted a seizure, although a mere 
request might have led to a different result); Williams v. State 
Dep't of Safety, 854 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) 
(determining that an officer's knock on a car window violated 
the Fourth Amendment because there was no reasonable suspicion). 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
20 
 
¶34 In State v. Randle, 276 P.3d 732 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2012), an officer saw the defendant's "vehicle alone in a 
parking lot with its front-end abutting a grassy knoll."  Id. at 
733.  The officer parked about two car lengths behind the 
defendant, left the headlights of his squad car on, and knocked 
on the defendant's window.  Id.  The defendant opened the door, 
and the officer noticed two open beer cans in the cup holder.  
Id.  The officer smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath and 
decided to conduct a field sobriety test, which the defendant 
failed.  Id. at 734.  In considering the defendant's motion to 
suppress the evidence of intoxication, the circuit court 
determined that even though he could not pull forward, the 
defendant could have backed up and driven away and was not 
seized.  Id. at 737.  The court of appeals agreed, stating: 
After 
this 
review 
of 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances surrounding the encounter between Randle 
and the officer, we conclude that, when the officer 
parked behind Randle's vehicle, left the patrol car's 
headlights on, approached Randle's vehicle and knocked 
on 
the 
window, 
such 
conduct 
would 
not 
have 
communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was 
not at liberty to ignore the officer's presence and go 
about his or her business. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Both 
cited 
cases 
that 
have 
determined 
that 
the 
circumstances surrounding an officer's knock on a vehicle window 
constituted 
a 
seizure 
are 
readily 
distinguishable. 
 
In 
Patterson, the court determined that the officer commanded the 
driver to roll down the window instead of merely making a 
request.  Patterson, 868 A.2d at 192-93.  The court in Williams 
did not conduct a seizure analysis and instead ended the inquiry 
when it determined that the officers did not have a reasonable 
suspicion to knock on the vehicle window.  Williams, 854 S.W.2d 
at 105-07.  Therefore, neither case provides persuasive guidance 
for this court. 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
21 
 
Id. at 738. 
¶35 In State v. Steffes, 791 N.W.2d 633 (N.D. 2010), an 
officer responded to a tip that a man who appeared intoxicated 
was entering a vehicle in the parking lot of a bar.  Id. at 634.  
The officer arrived and parked far enough from Steffes' vehicle 
so that Steffes could leave the parking spot if he wanted.  Id.  
Steffes was sitting in the driver's seat holding a cell phone, 
and the radio was playing loudly.  Id. at 635.  The officer 
"tapped on the driver's side window and with his finger motioned 
downward indicating he wanted Steffes to lower the window."  Id.  
Steffes looked at the officer but did not respond, so the 
officer knocked again.  Id.  At that point, Steffes opened the 
door slightly and began to talk with the officer.  Id. 
¶36 While the two were talking, another officer arrived.  
Id.  When the first officer asked Steffes for his driver's 
license, Steffes said that he did not have it with him and gave 
a fake name and birthdate.  Id.  Steffes was charged with 
providing false information to a law enforcement officer and 
moved to suppress on grounds that he was unlawfully seized.  Id.  
The district court denied the motion and entered judgment on 
Steffes' conditional guilty plea.  Id.  On appeal, Steffes 
argued that the officer's second knock, oral request, and hand 
gesture constituted a seizure.  Id. at 636.  The Supreme Court 
of North Dakota noted that the officer did not turn on the red 
and blue emergency lights, did not block Steffes' car, and did 
not display authority.  Id.  Therefore, Steffes was not seized.  
Id. at 637. 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
22 
 
¶37 In State v. Bryant, 161 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. App. 2005), 
around 2:00 a.m., an officer noticed the defendant's car turn 
into a shopping center in which the businesses were closed.  Id. 
at 760, 762.  The officer pulled into the parking lot, got out 
of his patrol car, and knocked on the defendant's window.  Id.  
When the defendant opened his car door, the officer smelled 
alcohol 
and 
arrested 
the 
defendant 
for 
driving 
while 
intoxicated.  Id.  The circuit court suppressed the evidence of 
intoxication because the defendant did not violate any traffic 
laws, and the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to 
approach the defendant's car and knock on the window.  Id. at 
761.  The court of appeals reversed, determining that the 
officer "was not required to have reasonable suspicion that [the 
defendant] was engaged in criminal activity to approach [the 
defendant's] car and knock on his window."  Id. at 762.  Thus, 
the interaction "did not become an investigative detention until 
after [the defendant] opened his car door."  Id. 
¶38 These cases demonstrate that when an officer parks 
near a person's vehicle, gets out, and knocks on the person's 
window, the officer has not necessarily displayed sufficient 
authority to cause a reasonable person to feel that he or she 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
23 
 
was not free to leave.17  While a person is not automatically 
seized by a knock on the window, or even a supplementary 
request, the seizure inquiry looks at the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether the officer has effected a 
detention.  Thus, we turn to the facts of the case before us to 
determine whether Vogt was unlawfully seized. 
C. The Interaction Between Vogt and Deputy Small 
¶39 Vogt's argument focuses mainly on Deputy Small's 
conduct before Vogt opened the window.  Once the window was open 
and Deputy Small smelled intoxicants and detected Vogt's slurred 
speech, Deputy Small had reasonable suspicion that Vogt was 
operating his vehicle while intoxicated.  Before that point, the 
parties agree that Deputy Small did not have reasonable 
suspicion to stop Vogt.  Thus, the question for this court is 
whether Deputy Small seized Vogt at any time before Vogt rolled 
down his window.  We conclude that he did not. 
¶40 Vogt suggests that the seizure occurred when Deputy 
Small knocked on the window and "commanded" Vogt to roll down 
the window.  Vogt admits that Deputy Small did not seize him by 
                                                 
17 See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(a), at 
574-77 (5th ed. 2012) (footnotes omitted) ("[I]f an officer 
merely walks up to a person standing or sitting in a public 
place (or, indeed, who is seated in a vehicle located in a 
public place) and puts a question to him, this alone does not 
constitute a seizure.").  In addition, "The officer may tap on 
the window and perhaps even open the door if the occupant is 
asleep.  A request that the suspect open the door or roll down 
the window would seem equally permissible, but the same would 
not be true of an order that he do so."  Id., § 9.4(a), at 594-
95 (footnotes omitted). 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
24 
 
following him into the parking lot.  He admits that Deputy Small 
did not seize him by getting out of his squad car and would not 
have seized him by walking around Vogt's car and looking through 
the windows.  However, Vogt takes issue with the location of 
Deputy Small's car and his conduct at Vogt's window.  In 
claiming that a seizure took place, Vogt highlights several 
alleged facts: (1) Deputy Small parked right behind Vogt's 
vehicle; (2) "the location of Mr. Vogt's vehicle in the parking 
lot was not conducive to simply driving away"; (3) Deputy Small 
commanded Vogt to roll down the window; and (4) Deputy Small 
rapped loudly on the window. 
¶41 Even taken together, these facts do not demonstrate 
that Vogt was seized.  Although Deputy Small parked directly 
behind Vogt and allegedly there were obstacles on three sides of 
Vogt's vehicle, these facts do not demonstrate that Vogt was 
seized because he still could have driven away.  The circuit 
court did not explicitly find that Vogt had room to leave the 
parking lot, but "if a circuit court fails to make a finding 
that exists in the record, an appellate court can assume that 
the circuit court determined the fact in a manner that supports 
the circuit court's ultimate decision."  State v. Martwick, 2000 
WI 5, ¶31, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552 (citing Sohns v. 
Jensen, 11 Wis. 2d 449, 453, 105 N.W.2d 818 (1960)).  The 
appellate court is entrusted to make that assumption "only when 
evidence exists in the record to support the 'assumed fact.'"  
Id., ¶74 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  The record supports 
the assumption that Vogt had room to leave. 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
25 
 
¶42 Although Deputy Small pulled up behind Vogt's vehicle, 
there was testimony at trial that Vogt might have had 50 feet in 
front of him in which he could have pulled forward and turned 
around.  In addition, the video from the camera in Deputy 
Small's squad car shows ample room for the car to move forward.  
There was some discussion about ice washing up onto the lot in 
the past; however, there is no ice visible on the video and no 
evidence that there actually was ice on December 25, 2011.  
Thus, we assume that because the circuit court determined that a 
reasonable person in Vogt's circumstances would have felt free 
to leave, there was an avenue by which Vogt could have actually 
left.  Like the defendant in Randle who was not seized simply 
because the grassy knoll limited his exit options, Randle, 276 
P.3d at 733, 738, Vogt was not seized simply because there was 
only one way out of the parking lot. 
¶43 Vogt's assertion that he was seized because of Deputy 
Small's "command" to roll down the window also is unpersuasive.  
The circuit court found in its decision on the motion to 
suppress that "[t]here is no evidence that Deputy Small 
'commanded' Mr. Vogt to roll down his window by tapping on the 
window and motioning that he roll down his window."  At trial, 
the court found that Deputy Small's testimony "would indicate 
that he wasn't commanding [Vogt] to do anything, . . . that he 
was simply trying to make contact."  Even though the circuit 
court noted that Deputy Small maybe "wasn't quite as subtle as 
he thought he was being," the court still determined that Deputy 
Small's conduct was not so intimidating as to constitute a 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
26 
 
seizure.  Thus, Vogt's arguments that he was seized due to a 
"command" from Deputy Small are unavailing.18 
¶44 Vogt also emphasizes the loudness of the knock in 
arguing that he was seized.  Although the seizure analysis 
considers the totality of the circumstances, the volume of the 
knock generally will not play a significant roll in the 
analysis.  We live in a time of distraction where earbuds 
connected to smartphones or other music devices are commonplace.  
Vehicles may be outfitted with sophisticated stereo systems.  It 
might be necessary for an officer to motion or to knock in order 
to attract the attention of a person with whom he would like to 
speak if the person is willing.  To prescribe the types of 
permissible attention-getting gestures or the allowable volume 
of a knock would be an unrealistic venture.  A knock might sound 
loud to an unsuspecting vehicle occupant, but that alone does 
not mean the occupant has been seized. 
¶45 Vogt also implies that the fact that he was in a 
vehicle affects the analysis because if he had left, he might 
have been charged with obstruction.  Vogt's argument implicitly 
                                                 
18 The court of appeals decided to assume that Deputy Small 
"commanded" Vogt to roll down the window.  Cnty. of Grant v. 
Vogt, No. 2012AP1812, unpublished slip op., ¶13 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Mar. 14, 2013).  After noting that there was a discrepancy 
between Deputy Small's and Vogt's testimony, the court of 
appeals said that "those distinctions are not determinative in 
this case because without clarification, we must assume that the 
officer directed Vogt to roll down his window, rather than 
asking him if he would do so."  Id.  Because the circuit court 
made findings that Deputy Small did not command Vogt and 
determined Vogt was not seized, the court of appeals' assumption 
was not correct. 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
27 
 
suggests that Wis. Stat. § 346.04,19 which prohibits a driver 
from ignoring a signal from a traffic officer, limited Vogt's 
ability to drive away.  At oral argument, the County of Grant 
pointed out that Wis. Stat. § 346.04 is inapplicable because it 
applies only to highways.  We agree. 
¶46 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.02(1) is clear: "This chapter 
applies exclusively upon highways except as otherwise expressly 
provided in this chapter."  The term, "highways," does not 
include public parking lots.  65 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 45 (1976) 
(OAG 45-47).  A 1957 legislative committee note to Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.04 provides: 
(1) No person shall fail or refuse to comply 
with any lawful order, signal or direction of a 
traffic officer. 
(2) No operator of a vehicle shall disobey the 
instructions of any official traffic sign or signal 
unless otherwise directed by a traffic officer. 
(2t) No operator of a vehicle, after having 
received a visible or audible signal to stop his or 
her vehicle from a traffic officer or marked police 
vehicle, shall knowingly resist the traffic officer by 
failing to stop his or her vehicle as promptly as 
safety reasonably permits. 
(3) No operator of a vehicle, after having 
received a visual or audible signal from a traffic 
officer, or marked police vehicle, shall knowingly 
flee or attempt to elude any traffic officer by 
willful or wanton disregard of such signal so as to 
interfere with or endanger the operation of the police 
vehicle, or the traffic officer or other vehicles or 
pedestrians, nor shall the operator increase the speed 
of the operator's vehicle or extinguish the lights of 
the vehicle in an attempt to elude or flee. 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
28 
 
§ 346.61 is "highly persuasive evidence of legislative intent 
that public parking lots are not highways for the purpose of 
enforcement of ch. 346, Stats., generally."  Id. at 46. 
¶47 The exceptions alluded to in the phrase "except as 
otherwise expressly provided in this chapter" are the exceptions 
found in Wis. Stat. § 346.61, namely, §§ 346.62 to 346.64 
(reckless driving and drunken driving).  These exceptions apply 
beyond the limitation of "highways" and thus may be applied in 
public parking lots.  However, these exceptions do not include 
Wis. Stat. § 346.04, which applies "exclusively upon highways."  
Thus, Vogt could have driven out of the parking lot without 
violating § 346.04. 
¶48 If Deputy Small had pursued Vogt and ordered him to 
stop once he left the parking lot, Vogt could have pulled over 
to comply.  But stopping a moving vehicle is indisputably a 
seizure, State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 557 N.W.2d 245 
(1996), and requires Fourth Amendment analysis. 
¶49 In any event, Vogt cannot speculate about what might 
have happened if he had tried to leave.  See Delgado, 466 U.S. 
at 220-21 (stating that defendants "may only litigate what 
happened to them").  In short, § 346.04 does not support Vogt's 
argument.  We need not decide whether § 346.04 would affect the 
seizure analysis if Deputy Small had encountered Vogt on a 
highway.  However, § 346.04 does not apply to the facts as we 
know them. 
¶50 To support his arguments, Vogt cites an unpublished 
court of appeals decision involving an interaction between a 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
29 
 
person in a vehicle and two police officers.  See City of 
Kenosha v. Tower, No. 2009AP1957, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. Oct. 6, 2010).  In Tower, two bike patrol officers 
approached the defendant's van, which was stopped with the 
engine running on the side of the street where there was a "no 
parking" sign.  Id., ¶2.  Immediately after making contact with 
the defendant, the officers ordered her to "put the vehicle in 
'park.'"  Id.  The officers noticed signs of intoxication, and 
eventually, because the defendant refused to provide a breath 
sample, her license was revoked.  Id., ¶¶2-4.  On appeal, the 
city appeared to acknowledge that a seizure occurred and focused 
on whether there was reasonable suspicion.  Id., ¶¶7, 11 
("Because the City argues this was a valid Terry stop, on appeal 
we need only address whether the facts known to the officers, 
considered together as a totality of the circumstances, provided 
them the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify stopping 
Tower.").  Thus, Tower does not support Vogt's argument because 
the question in that case was whether there was reasonable 
suspicion, not whether the defendant was seized. 
¶51 Ultimately, what Deputy Small did in this case is what 
any traffic officer might have done: investigate an unusual 
situation.  As the circuit court noted, "what the officer did 
seems perfectly reasonable."  Deputy Small was acting as a 
conscientious officer.  He saw what he thought was suspicious 
behavior and decided to take a closer look.  Even though Vogt's 
conduct may not have been sufficiently suspect to raise 
reasonable suspicion that a crime was afoot, it was reasonable 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
30 
 
for Deputy Small to try to learn more about the situation by 
engaging Vogt in a consensual conversation.20 
¶52 The Fourth Amendment's prerequisites for a seizure are 
intended to safeguard the privacy of all persons; thus, a mere 
hunch is not enough to condone a seizure.  See Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 27.  Yet, while the law applicable to the facts of this case 
does not condone a seizure, it does not forestall an officer's 
reasonable 
attempt 
at 
further 
inquiry. 
 
In 
similar 
circumstances, a person has the choice to refuse an officer's 
attempt to converse and thereby retain his privacy, or respond 
by talking to the officer and aiding the officer in his duty to 
protect the public.  A dutiful officer does not make a mistake 
by presenting a person with that choice.  Only when the officer 
forecloses the choice by the way in which he exercises his 
authority——absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause——does 
he violate the Fourth Amendment. 
¶53 Although it may have been Vogt's social instinct to 
open his window in response to Deputy Small's knock, a 
reasonable person in Vogt's situation would have felt free to 
leave.  As several jurisdictions have recognized, a law 
enforcement officer's knock on a vehicle window does not 
automatically constitute a seizure.  The circumstances attendant 
to the knock in the present case are not so intimidating as to 
                                                 
20 See Barry, 394 F.3d at 1075 (citation omitted) (stating 
that the officer "probably would have been remiss had he ignored 
the vehicle parked in an alley behind closed stores at 11:18 
p.m."). 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
31 
 
transform the knock into a seizure.  None of the examples 
outlined by Justice Stewart as demonstrating a seizure are 
present in this case.  See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55.  Vogt 
was not subject to the threatening presence of multiple 
officers.  Deputy Small did not brandish any weapon.  There is 
no evidence that Deputy Small touched Vogt, and as discussed 
above, Deputy Small did not speak in a way that would suggest 
Vogt was compelled to roll down the window.  While the facts of 
Justice Stewart's examples need not be present for there to be a 
seizure, the facts in this case are not sufficient to 
demonstrate that a reasonable person would not feel free to 
leave.  Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, Vogt 
was not seized. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶54 Although we acknowledge that this is a close case, we 
conclude that a law enforcement officer's knock on a car window 
does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to 
give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person 
is not free to leave.  The objective of law enforcement is to 
protect and serve the community.  Accordingly, an officer's 
interactions with people are not automatically adversarial.  A 
court's "seizure" inquiry into one of these interactions must 
examine the totality of the circumstances, seeking to identify 
the line between an officer's reasonable attempt to have a 
consensual conversation and a more consequential attempt to 
detain an individual.  The facts in this case do not show a 
level of intimidation or exercise of authority sufficient to 
No. 
  2012AP1812 
32 
 
implicate the Fourth Amendment until after Vogt rolled down his 
window and exposed the grounds for a seizure.  Consequently, we 
reverse. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2012AP1812.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶55 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion, but concur and go further to conclude that 
even if a seizure were to have occurred, the officer was acting 
as a community caretaker at the time of the seizure. 
¶56 "Officers may exercise two types of functions: law 
enforcement functions and community caretaker functions."  State 
v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶18, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 
(citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)).  Officers 
acting 
in 
their 
community 
caretaker 
capacity 
"may 
be 
constitutionally permitted to perform warrantless searches and 
seizures."  Id., ¶14 (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 448; State v. 
Ziedonis, 
2005 
WI 
App 
249, 
¶14, 
287 
Wis. 2d 831, 
707 
N.W.2d 565).  The exception exists, in part, because "'[a]n 
officer less willing to discharge community caretaking functions 
implicates seriously undesirable consequences for society at 
large.'"  Id., ¶33 (quoting State v. Horngren, 2000 WI App 177, 
¶18, 238 Wis. 2d 347, 617 N.W.2d 508). 
¶57 An officer is engaged in a "bona fide community 
caretaker function" only if that officer has "an objectively 
reasonable basis" to conclude "that a motorist may have been in 
need of assistance" at the time of the stop.  State v. Kramer, 
2009 WI 14, ¶¶36-37, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598.  Further, 
the exception to the warrant requirement is satisfied only if 
"the officer's exercise of a bona fide community caretaker 
function was reasonable."  Id., ¶40 (citing State v. Kelsey 
C.R., 2001 WI 54, ¶35, 243 Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777).  This 
No.  2012AP1812.akz 
 
2 
 
requires courts to "balanc[e] a public interest or need that is 
furthered by the officer's conduct against the degree of and 
nature of the restriction upon the liberty interest of the 
citizen."  Id.  In balancing these interests, courts consider 
the following factors: 
(1) the degree of the public interest and the exigency 
of the situation; (2) the attendant circumstances 
surrounding the seizure, including time, location, the 
degree of overt authority and force displayed; (3) 
whether an automobile is involved; and (4) the 
availability, 
feasibility 
and 
effectiveness 
of 
alternatives 
to 
the 
type 
of 
intrusion 
actually 
accomplished. 
Id., ¶41. 
¶58 With respect to the first factor, "the public has a 
substantial interest in ensuring that police assist motorists 
who may be stranded . . . ."  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶42.  
Police assistance to motorists is "'not only authorized, but 
constitute[s] an important duty of law enforcement officers.'"  
Id. (quoting State v. Goebel, 103 Wis. 2d 203, 208, 307 
N.W.2d 915 (1981)).  Thus, the first factor weighs in favor of 
the reasonableness of Officer Small's exercise of the community 
caretaker function. 
¶59 With respect to the second factor, Officer Small was 
checking on the occupants of a vehicle parked at the top of a 
boat ramp in a closed park at approximately 1:00 on Christmas 
No.  2012AP1812.akz 
 
3 
 
morning.1  The presence of the vehicle in a closed park, at that 
hour, and at that time of the year, was unusual at a minimum.  
Under the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively 
reasonable for Officer Small to conclude that the occupants of 
the vehicle might be in need of assistance.2  Further, as the 
majority opinion properly notes, Officer Small used a minimum of 
overt authority and force in contacting the driver of the 
vehicle.  Majority op., ¶¶40-44.  The second factor thus weighs 
in favor of the reasonableness of Officer Small's conduct. 
¶60 The third factor also militates in favor of finding 
that Officer Small acted reasonably, as the case at issue 
involves an automobile.  See Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶44.  As 
this court has stated, "a citizen has a lesser expectation of 
privacy in an automobile," and so the privacy interest at issue 
weighs less heavily against the officer.  Ziedonis, 287 
Wis. 2d 831, ¶31. 
¶61 Finally, in considering the fourth factor, Officer 
Small had no other reasonable alternatives for discharging his 
                                                 
1 As a practical matter, Vogt's presence in the parking lot 
after the park had closed was quite possibly illegal.  Vogt 
concedes that the park was closed, and that a posted sign 
indicated that it was illegal to enter the park after closing.  
Grant County Ordinances § 200-2 gives a broad definition of 
"park" that would seem to encompass the parking lot. 
2 While Officer Small testified that he thought the vehicle 
was "suspicious," we have held that when "'an objectively 
reasonable basis for the community caretaker function is shown, 
that determination is not negated by the officer's subjective 
law enforcement concerns.'"  State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶31 
n.11, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (quoting State v. Kramer, 
2009 WI 14, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598). 
No.  2012AP1812.akz 
 
4 
 
community caretaker function.  See Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶45. 
Officer Small had to contact the driver of the vehicle in order 
to determine whether he was in need of assistance.  As 
discussed, the manner of that contact was reasonable.  The 
fourth factor thus weighs in Officer Small's favor as well.  
Thus, I conclude that Officer Small's conduct in the case at 
issue was a reasonable exercise of his community caretaker 
function. 
¶62 Indeed, not only was Officer Small's checking on the 
occupants of the vehicle objectively reasonable, we also expect 
our officers to react to such situations in this way and not sit 
idly by with the hope that the occupants will be safe. 
¶63 The facts in the case at issue are essentially 
identical to those in Kramer.  Officer Small did not act in an 
overbearing or excessively intrusive manner.  His behavior was 
constitutionally permissible.  Officer Small simply walked up to 
the driver's side window of the vehicle to initiate contact with 
the driver.  Under the circumstances presented, his action was 
"the only reasonable approach that [the officer] could take in 
performing this community caretaker function."  Kramer, 315 
Wis. 2d 414, ¶44.  As a result, I conclude that Officer Small's 
conduct was justified under the community caretaker exception. 
¶64 For the foregoing reasons, I concur. 
¶65 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
No.  2012AP1812.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶66 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I would 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals holding that the 
officer's conduct in the instant case constituted a seizure of 
the defendant within the meaning of the federal and state 
constitutions. 
¶67 No one disputes that the legal standard to be applied 
to determine whether a seizure occurred in the instant case is 
as follows:  "[A] seizure occurs if 'in view of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave.'"1  
¶68 The dispute is about the application of the legal 
standard to the totality of the circumstances of the instant 
case.2   
                                                 
1 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (quoting 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). 
See also majority op., ¶30; State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, 
¶23, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834. 
2 The totality of the circumstances is important.  A small 
variation in the circumstances often determines the outcome.  
See Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search & Seizure:  A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment § 9.4(a), at 594-95 (5th ed. 2013): 
[T]he mere approach and questioning of [persons seated 
in parked vehicles] does not constitute a seizure.  
The result is not otherwise when the officer utilizes 
some generally accepted means of gaining the attention 
of 
the 
vehicle 
occupant 
or 
encouraging 
him 
to 
eliminate any barrier to conversation.  The officer 
may tap on the window and perhaps even open the door 
if the occupant is asleep. A request that the suspect 
open the door or roll down the window would seem 
equally permissible, but the same would not be true of 
No.  2012AP1812.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶69 Here are the circumstances: It was late at night; the 
parking lot was empty; Deputy Small was in full uniform with his 
pistol fully visible; the deputy parked his squad car with 
headlights on right behind the defendant's vehicle; the location 
of the defendant's vehicle in the parking lot was not conducive 
to simply driving away; Deputy Small rapped loudly on the 
window; Deputy Small signaled the defendant to roll down the 
window. 
¶70 Courts across the country have divided when confronted 
with facts substantially similar to the ones in the instant 
case.3  Why?  Because courts engage in a fiction in determining 
whether the mythical reasonable person in the position of the 
defendant would have believed that he or she was not free to 
leave.4   
¶71 Studies demonstrate that the reasonable person "free 
to leave" standard applied in judicial decisions does not 
generally reflect what real, everyday people think and how they 
                                                                                                                                                             
an order that he do so (footnotes omitted, emphasis 
added).  
3 See several cases described in majority op., ¶¶33-38. 
4 See majority op., ¶31 n.14. 
No.  2012AP1812.ssa 
 
3 
 
act when approached by law enforcement officers.5  In short, the 
world of legal decisions does not reflect the real world.  As 
Professor LaFave has written, the United States Supreme Court 
finds "a perceived freedom [to leave] in circumstances when only 
the most thick-skinned of suspects would think such a choice was 
open to them."6     
¶72 When I look to the totality of the circumstances in 
the instant case, I conclude that, under the circumstances, a 
reasonable person would not have felt free to leave.  A 
reasonable person would have had three options:  (1) to drive 
away; (2) to stay put with the window closed; or (3) to comply 
with the officer's directions.   
¶73 No reasonable person I can imagine would feel free to 
drive away under the circumstances of the present case when the 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., David K. Kessler, Free To Leave: An Empirical 
Look at the Fourth Amendment's Seizure Standard, 99 J. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 51 (2009) (concluding that the average person does 
not feel free to leave simple interactions with police officers, 
based on empirical evidence from studying two scenarios in which 
the United States Supreme Court has held that a reasonable 
person would feel free to leave, on public sidewalks and on 
busses); Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for 
Clarity in Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 437, 439-42 (1988) (describing the 
"free to leave" test as artificial, resulting in outcomes "which 
bear little relationship to the individual's actual freedom to 
walk away"); Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout:  Bus Sweeps and 
the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153 (2002) 
(criticizing broadly the Court's post-Mendenhall jurisprudence 
as ignorant of human behavior with respect to authority figures, 
creating a set of non-seizures that nonetheless relied upon the 
coercive force of law enforcement). 
6 Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous 
Prey:  Whence Fourth Amendment "Seizures"?, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
729, 739-40. 
No.  2012AP1812.ssa 
 
4 
 
officer knocked on the car window and instructed the person to 
roll down the car window.  A reasonable person would be 
concerned that driving away could be viewed as violating some 
law that governs obstructing an officer, disobeying an officer, 
or fleeing.       
¶74 No reasonable person I can imagine would feel free to 
simply stay put with the car window closed for substantially the 
same reasons that no reasonable person would have just driven 
off.    
¶75 As the court of appeals wrote, "when a uniformed 
officer approaches a vehicle at night and directs the driver to 
roll down his or her window, a reasonable driver would not feel 
free to ignore the officer."  County of Grant v. Vogt, No. 
2012AP1812, unpublished slip op. ¶13 (Wis. Ct. App. March 14, 
2013).   
¶76 Before I conclude, I address the community caretaker 
function that the concurrence addresses. 
¶77 Exceptions to the warrant requirement are to be 
carefully delineated.  "The State bears the burden of proving 
that the officer's conduct fell within the scope of a reasonable 
community caretaker function."  State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 
¶17, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598 (citation omitted).  The 
State in the instant case never met or attempted to meet this 
burden.   
¶78 The concurring opinion concludes, "Under the totality 
of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for Officer 
Small to conclude that the occupants of the vehicle might be in 
No.  2012AP1812.ssa 
 
5 
 
need of assistance."  Concurrence, ¶59.  But neither the 
officer's testimony nor the State's arguments demonstrate that 
the officer ever came to that conclusion or that that conclusion 
is objectively reasonable on the basis of this record.  Overall, 
the concurring opinion relies on a wholly speculative premise. 
¶79 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶80 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2012AP1812.ssa 
 
 
 
1