Case Title: STATE v SPURLOCK v DONEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12338 & 12339 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1972 STATE OF M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - J A M E S C O N L E Y SPURLOCK, Defendant and Appellant, -vs - L E O N A R D DONEY , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Robert J. Campbell argued, Missoula, Montana. For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana. Jonathan B . Smith, argued, Assistant Attornery General, Helena, Montana. R. D. Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, argued, Missoula, Montana. Submitted: November 30, 1972 Decided: FEB 2 0 1973 X r . J u s t i c e Gene S , Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal i s taken from a judgment i n the d i s t r i c t court of Missoula County entered on a jury verdict convicting Jarnes Conley Spurlock of four counts of robbery and Leonard Edwin Doney of three counts of robbery. Spurlock was sentenced t o f i f t y years and Doney t o twenty-five years i n the Montana s t a t e prison. The s t a t e employed the provisions of section 95-1506, R.C.M, 1947, a s t o both defendants i.n seeking increased punishment based on p r i o r convictions. The appeal was brought t o t h i s Court on a t r a n s c r i p t of the proceedings taken p r i o r t o t r i a l and no t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t was furnished. The sole issue raised i s whether the denial of defendantsr p r e t r i a l motion f o r a continuance was an abuse of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s discretion and a v i o l a t i o n of the r i g h t s guaranteed t o defendants under the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Montana. The record indicates t h a t on January 28, 1972, an Tnformation was f i l e d in the d i s t r i c t court charging each de- fendant with four counts of robbery upon four Missoula f i l l i n g s t a t i o n s committed on January 18, 1972. D. R. Matthews, Esq., !4issoula Public Defender, was appointed by the court a s counsel and he represented both defendants i n a l l stages of p r e t r i a l proceedings. Both defendants entered pleas of not g u i l t y and t r i a l was set f o r May 4, 1972. Bail was fixed i n the amount L J ~ $15,000 ( l a t e r reduced t o $12,500) f o r defendant Spurlock dnd in the amount of $12,500 f o r defendant Doney. Neither de- fendant was able t o post b a i l . Defendant Doney requested a psychiatric examination and w a s admitted t o the s t a t e hospital a t Warm Springs on February 2 , 1972, remaining there about t h i r t y days. A n examination was performed and a report submitted t o the court. O n March 13, 1972, defendant Spurlock f i l e d an a f f i d a v i t of disqualification of t r i a l judge Hon. Emmet Glore, which was granted. The cause was transferred t o the court of Eon. E. Gardner Brownlee. On April 5 , 1972, defendant Spurlock submitted motions f o r a psychiatric examination by a l o c a l psychiatrist and f o r separate counsel, Both motions were denied. Subsequent t e s t i - mony by Spurlock's wife indicated t h a t he had been t o Warm Springs f o r treatment and/or examination on some previous occasion and t h a t he did not wish t o return there, O n April 6, 1972, defendant Doney petitioned the court pro s e f o r a w r i t of habeas corpus based on v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t s a t a preliminary examination f o r probable cause. Judge Jack L. Green, s i t t i n g f o r Judge E. Gardner Brownlee, heard the p e t i t i o n on April 6, 1972, with p e t i t i o n e r present i n court and represented by public defender D,R. Matthews, h i s attorney, After argument the w r i t was denied. O n May 3, 1972, one day preceding the t r i a l date, the defendants through t h e i r appointed counsel, D. R. Matthews, entered four motions requesting: 1. Withdraw1 of court appointed counsel. 2. Separate t r i a l s , 3 , Separate counsel. 4. A continuance. The requested continuance was f o r the claimed purpose of allowing t h e i r counsel time t o prepare t h e i r defense, and t o obtain a psychiatric evaluation f o r defendant Spurlock. The court denied a l l four motions. However, p r i o r t o t r i a l on May 4, 1972, the motion f o r withdrawal of counsel was granted and Robert J, Campbell, Esq. was entered a s counsel, I n granting t h i s motion, the court s p e c i f i c a l l y questioned both defendants a f t e r making them aware t h a t t h e i r other motions (in- cluding t h e motion f o r a continuance) would not be be granted, a s t o whether they would s t i l l prefer t o have Robert J . Campbell substituted a s counsel replacing D, R, Matthews. Both defendants s t a t e d they so preferred. The court then suggested t h a t Matthews remain t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the defense and requested both defendants' permission before M r . Matthews was permitted t o leave. Both defendants gave t h a t permission. A t the time the court was considering the request f o r substitution of counsel, M r . Matthews stated: "They have told m e absolutely nothing. They w i l l not confide i n me, there has been no communication a t a l l . " In t h e i r appeal b r i e f , defendants s t a t e d "Prior t o t r i a l t h e Defendants remained i n the Missoula County j a i l and sought private counsel a s best they could." The record does not support t h i s statement. It does not disclose t h a t defendants o r anyone acting i n t h e i r behalf, contacted o r were refused by any attorney p r i o r t o t h e i r contacting M r . Campbell, who did take t h e i r case. It does not disclose t h a t defendants were refused permission t o contact any attorney while they were i n j a i l , It does disclose t h a t M r , Campbell was contacted f o r the f i r s t time by Mrs. Spur- lock a t 4:15 p.m. on May 3, 1972, over three months a f t e r the arraignment of defendants and on the afternoon before the t r i a l date. Section 95-1708, subsections (c) and (d), R.C.M. 1947, provide : "(c) A l l motions f o r a continuance a r e addressed t o the discretj-on of the t r i a l court and s h a l l be considered i n the l i g h t of the diligence shown on the part of the movant. "(d) This section s h a l l be construed t o the end t h a t criminal cases a r e t r i e d with due diligence consonant wit11 the r i g h t s of the defendant and the s t a t e t o a speedy t r i a l . " (Emphasis supplied). ~ e f e n d a n t s ' r e f u s a l t o communicate with t h e l r appointed counsel and t h e i r eleventh hour dismissal of M r . Matthews and h i r i n g of M r . Campbell a f t e r a three month period during which defendants were f u l l y aware of the date s e t f o r t r i . a l , was not a,n exercise of due diligence. The i n s t a n t case i s readily distinguishable from State v. Blakeslee, 131 Mont, 47, 306 P.2d 1103, relied upon by de- fendants t o support t h e i r Sixth Amendment (lack of r i g h t t o counsel.) and Fourteenth Amendment (lack of due process) conten- tions. In Blakeslee, the court appointed counsel three days before the trial---but a f t e r Blakeslee's privately retained counsel withdrew. Here, defendants voluntarily dismissed ap- pointed counsel and retained private counsel a f t e r being made f u l l y aware t h a t no continuance would be granted, I n contrast t o Blakeslee and other cases r e l i e d on i n t h i s appeal by de- fendants, t h i s was a voluntary action d i r e c t l y i n the control of the accused. The United States Constitution and t h e Montana Consti- tution e s t a b l i s h c e r t a i n r i g h t s , under law, f o r persons accused of a criminal offense. One of these i s the r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e representation by l e g a l counsel, W e find the d i s t r i c t court accorded these defendants t h a t r i g h t , The court appointed competent counsel t o represent defendants and allowed them and t h e i r counsel three months t o prepare t h e i r case, Numerous federal decisions hold with unanimity t h a t : "Although the attorney-client relationship i s ordinarily a private matter, a defendant does not have the unbridled rLght t o discharge counsel on the eve of t r i a l * fi *. "In order t o work a delay by a l a s t minute dis- charge of counsel there must e x i s t exceptional circumstances." United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182, 209, c e r t . den, 393 U,S, 840, 89 S.Ct. 118, 21 L ed 2d Ill. See also: Kates v. Nelson, 435 F,2d 1085 (9th C i r , 1970) ; Harper v. United States, 143 F,2d 795 (8th C i r , 1944). For c o l l a t e r a l t e x t references see annotations following section 95-1708, R,C.M. 1947; 66 ALR2d 298, 304, 54(a). I n State v. Forsness, Mont . , 495 P,2d 176, 29 St.Rep. 232, 236, a case analogous t o the i n s t a n t case on the issue of the constitutional r i g h t of an accused t o counsel, t h i s Court s t a t e d : " W e agree with counsel f o r defendant t h a t the r i g h t t o be represented by counsel i n a criminal proceeding i s a fundamental r i g h t e s s e n t i a l t o criminal justice. [Citing cases] However, we do not agree with defendant s contention t h a t he can dismiss h i s counsel j u s t before going t o t r i a l , a f t e r counsel had adeauatelv r e ~ r e s e n t e d him f o r several months, and tden ona app;?al a l l e g e h i s basic constitutional r i g h t s have been violated. Several recent federal cases have covered t h i s argument f u l l y . [Citing cases 1. " (Emphasis supplied) Where there i s an alleged abuse of discretion by the t r i a l court i n denying a motion f o r a continuance, the burden of proof on appeal i s upon the claimant t o make a c l e a r showing of such abuse, S t a t e v. Howard, 30 Mont. 518, 77 P. 50; S t a t e v. Collins, 88 Mont, 514, 294 P. 957; S t a t e v. Olsen, 152 Mont. 1, 445 P,2d 926. Here, defendants have not sustained t h a t burden. / / Chief J u s t i c e /' ~ s s b c i a t e Justices. I