Case Title: Gayson Mills v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-68

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-68
____________
GAYSON MILLS,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[June 20, 2002]
LEWIS, J.
This case is before us for review of Mills v. State, 773 So. 2d 650 (Fla.
1st DCA 2000).  The basis for our exercise of jurisdiction is apparent conflict with
Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1991).  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
Upon further analysis, as discussed infra, we conclude that the apparent conflict
arises in statutory construction, and that, when the proper construction is made, the
appearance of conflict is resolved.
ANALYSIS
The petitioner, Gayson J. Mills, was sentenced to six years in prison as a
1.  Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), provides, in pertinent part:
775.084.  Violent career criminals; habitual felony offenders and
habitual violent felony offenders; definitions; procedure;  enhanced
penalties or mandatory minimum prison terms.--
(1)  As used in this act:
(a)  "Habitual felony offender" means a defendant for whom the
court may impose an extended term of imprisonment, as provided in
paragraph (4)(a), if it finds that:
1.  The defendant has previously been convicted of any
combination of two or more felonies in this state or other qualified
offenses.
2.  The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was
committed:
a.  While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other
sentence, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision that is
imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified
offense; or
b.  Within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the defendant's
last prior felony or other qualified offense, or within 5 years of the
defendant's release from a prison sentence, probation, community
control, control release, conditional release, parole or court-ordered or
lawfully imposed supervision or other sentence that is imposed as a
result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense,
whichever is later.
3.  The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced, and
one of the two prior felony convictions, is not a violation of s. 893.13
relating to the purchase or the possession of a controlled substance.
4.  The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony or
other qualified offense that is necessary for the operation of this
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habitual felony offender for battery on a law enforcement officer.  The First District
Court of Appeal, in a split decision, affirmed Mill's sentence.  See Mills v. State,
773 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).  In rejecting Mill’s argument that his habitual
felony offender1 sentence violated double jeopardy, the majority declined to find
 paragraph.
5.  A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary
to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any
postconviction proceeding.
2.  Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), provides in relevant part: 
784.07.  Assault or battery of law enforcement officers,
firefighters, emergency medical care providers, public transit
employees or agents, or other specified officers; reclassification of
offenses; minimum sentences.--
. . . . 
(2)  Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing
an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer . . . while the
officer . . . is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties,
the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as
follows: 
. . . . 
(b)  In the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first
degree to a felony of the third degree.
(Emphasis supplied.)  
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controlling this Court's statement in Merritt v. State, 712 So. 2d 384, 385 (Fla.
1998), that the statute for battery on a law enforcement officer is an enhancement
statute, classifying such as “dicta.”  The dissent opined that Merritt precluded a
habitual felony offender sentence, because battery on a law enforcement officer was
already an enhancement, and double enhancement was barred by double jeopardy. 
This timely petition for review followed.
In Merritt, we held that section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995)2 (providing
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for reclassification of offenses and minimum sentences for assault or battery of law
enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical care providers, public transit
employees or agents, or other specified officers) did not apply to the offense of
attempted battery of a law enforcement officer.  See id. at 385 (“We agree that
section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1995), does not include the offenses of
attempted battery or attempted aggravated assault.  Thus, neither attempted battery
nor attempted aggravated assault can be reclassified based upon section
784.07(2).”).  In so doing, we explained:
Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995), is an enhancement
statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense. 
The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature enacted
section 784.07 in order to increase the penalties for the enumerated
crimes of assault, aggravated assault, battery, and aggravated battery
for offenders who commit these crimes upon law enforcement officers.
At the time the enhancement statute was enacted, the legislature had
created the four enumerated offenses in other statutory provisions. 
Id. (emphasis supplied).  We concluded in Merritt that section 784.07 contained “no
enhancement or reclassification of penalties for the offense of attempted commission
of the enumerated offenses; therefore, attempted assault and attempted battery as
well as attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer are
nonexistent offenses.”  Id. (emphasis supplied).
Mills appears to conflict with Merritt because of our statement in Merritt--
3.  In light of this Court’s particular choice of words in Merritt, it is further
understandable that Judge Browning, in “giving . . . deference to” the “plain
wording of the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in  Merritt” would be prompted to
bring to our attention the fact that the panel majority’s conclusion that section
784.07 was not “an enhancement statute in the sense it would not be subject to the
double jeopardy bar when combined with another enhancement statute,” Mills, 773
So. 2d at 652 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), appeared to
be contrary to this Court’s holding in Merritt.
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albeit in the context of determining that section 784.07 did not create the substantive
offenses of attempted assault, attempted battery, or attempted aggravated assault
and battery of a law enforcement officer--that section 784.07 “is an enhancement
statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense.”  712 So. 2d
at 385.  This statement was germane to resolution of the issue before us at that time,
and was, therefore (as Judge Browning observed in a separate opinion below),3 not
technically “dicta.”  However, as reflected in the language of the statute itself,
section 784.07 operates as a reclassification statute.  While the statute does not, in
and of itself, create new offenses separate from those to which it makes reference, it
does more than provide for minimum sentences applicable to those offenses; it also
reclassifies the enumerated offenses based upon the status of the victim.  Cf. Wright
v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024, 1030-31 (Fla. 1991) (observing that “[s]ection 784.07 of
the Florida Statutes (1985), which defines the substantive offense [of battery upon a
law enforcement officer], requires as an essential element of proof that the victim
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was in fact a law enforcement officer” (citing Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 93));
Grinage v. State, 641 So. 2d 1362, 1369 & n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (assuming,
without deciding, that section 784.07(3) creates a new substantive offense),
approved, 656 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1995); Carpentier v. State, 587 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1991) (analyzing the “offense described” in section 784.07(3), Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1988), in determining that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague).  Thus, although in Merritt we characterized the statute as an “enhancement
statute” to emphasize that it resulted in greater penalties for already-enumerated
offenses which qualified under the statute, rather than itself creating new offenses,
there is a qualitative difference between a statute which reclassifies enumerated
offenses committed against law enforcement officers and enhancement statutes such
as the habitual offender statute, “which cut across some or all criminal statutes.” 
State v. Brown, 476 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla. 1985) (holding that a penalty could not be
enhanced under section 775.087(1) for a crime in which the use of a deadly weapon
was an essential element, because that statute by its express terms did not apply to
such felonies).  As section 775.084 itself reflects, the Legislature has exempted
certain offenses from the ambit of the habitual felony offender statute, as
demonstrated by its partial exclusion of felonies committed pursuant to section
893.13, Florida Statutes (relating to the purchase or the possession of a controlled
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substance).  See § 775.084(1)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2001) (specifically exempting those
convicted of “purchase or possession of a controlled substance,” pursuant to section
893.13, Florida Statutes, from a habitual offender sentence); see also Wilson v.
State, 752 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (observing that section 812.014(2)(d),
Florida Statutes (1991)--which had previously provided that sentencing for felony
petit theft was required under section 775.082 (general criminal penalties), section
775.083 (criminal fines) or section 775.084 (habitual offenders)--was amended, and
the reference to section 775.084 (habitual offenders) was deleted).  We conclude
that the Legislature did not intend felony convictions pursuant to section 784.07 to
be so excluded.
Consistent with this legislative intent, offenses which are thus reclassified as
felonies pursuant to section 784.07 qualify as felony offenses for purposes of
habitual felony offender status, and such treatment does not offend double jeopardy. 
Here, there was a single underlying offense; the single offense was charged,
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Cf. King v. State, 763
So. 2d 546 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (observing that, although there “is a logical
argument to be made that battery on a law enforcement officer is a separate crime
from battery,” this Court’s statement in Merritt that section 784.07 is an
enhancement statute “should be adhered to by the lower courts,” but this did not
-8-
preclude the Fifth District’s holding that King could be sentenced pursuant to both
section 784.07 and section 775.084), review denied, 779 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2000).  
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Districts
have held that it is proper, and not proscribed by double jeopardy principles, to
sentence a defendant convicted of a crime pursuant to section 775.087 to an
enhanced sentence under a recidivist sentencing scheme for which (considering the
section 775.087 conviction) the defendant qualifies.  See Brown v. State, 789 So. 2d
366 (Fla. 2d DCA) (applying prison releasee reoffender statute), review denied, 796
So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2001); Mills v. State, 773 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
(applying habitual felony offender statute); Spann v. State, 772 So. 2d 38, 39-40
(Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (applying prison releasee reoffender statute); King v. State,
763 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (applying habitual felony offender statute); cf.
also Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655, 658 (Fla. 2000) (approving imposition of a
concurrent prisoner releasee reoffender sentence with longer habitual felony
offender sentence); Jackson v. State, 659 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (Fla.1995) (holding
that a defendant could receive a minimum mandatory sentence for possession of a
firearm to run concurrently with a habitual felony offender  sentence for offenses
occurring within a single criminal episode); Perez v. State, 772 So. 2d 577, 577
(Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“Also, we do not find that a double jeopardy violation
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occurred upon imposition of a habitual violent felony offender sentencing following
the reclassification, pursuant to section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1997), of
appellant's attempted robbery offense for use of a firearm.”).   The Court’s decision
in State v. Whitehead, 472 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1985), is instructive in this regard.  
In Whitehead, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder with a
firearm.  The issue addressed by this Court was whether it constituted an improper
double enhancement to apply both section 775.087(1) (providing that, when a
person commits a felony with a firearm, the sentence is to be reclassified one
category higher) and section 775.087(2) (providing, at that time, for a minimum
mandatory sentence of three years for the possession of a firearm during the
commission of the enumerated felonies in the statute).  In holding that the
application of both statutes was not an improper double enhancement, the Court
explained: 
Determination of punishment for crimes is a legislative matter.
Because the legislature has provided both these subsections, both are
to be followed. Absent an indication from the legislature that these
subsections are an either/or proposition, both subsections will be
followed.
472 So. 2d at 732; see also State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. 1989) (quoting
from Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983), in which the United States
Supreme Court stated that “the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent
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the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature
intended”).
As applied to this case, in the absence of a contrary legislative intent, the two
statutory provisions in question should be read in pari materia.  See generally State
v. Fuchs, 769 So. 2d 1006, 1009 (Fla. 2000) (observing that “statutes which relate
to the same or closely related subjects should be read in pari materia”).  “Although
the legislature may direct that statutes be read in pari materia, the absence of that
directive does not bar such a reading.”  Holmes County School Board v. Duffell,
651 So. 2d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 1995) (allowing injured school board employee to
maintain action against coworker as well as against school board by reading section
which allowed a public or private employee to sue a fellow employee when each
was operating in furtherance of the employer's business and when they were
assigned to unrelated tasks in pari materia with section which provided that the
exclusive remedy for damages inflicted by an employee of the state shall be an
action against the governmental entity even though neither statute contained
reference to the other); see generally American Bakeries Co. v. Haines City, 180 So.
524, 528 (Fla. 1938) (“Laws should be construed with reference to the constitution
and the purpose designed to be accomplished, and in connection with other laws in
pari materia, though they contain no reference to each other.”), cited with approval
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in Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 394 So. 2d 981, 988
(Fla.1981).  Here, the Legislature has made the offense of battery, which is
otherwise a misdemeanor, a third-degree felony when the victim is a law
enforcement officer.  See § 784.07(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).  In section
775.084, the Legislature has also authorized increased sentences for defendants who
qualify as habitual felony offenders.  Thus, the imposition on a qualifying defendant
of one sentence under the habitual felony offender statute for the crime of battery on
a law enforcement officer is proper, and not violative of double jeopardy.  Indeed, if
a conviction pursuant to section 784.07 were not treated as a qualifying offense
under section 775.084, this would, in effect, nullify the clear legislative expression
of intent to treat battery on a law enforcement officer as a felony.  
As the respondent correctly observes, our decision in State v. Crumley, 512
So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1987), does not compel a different result.  In Crumley, the issue
was “whether a defendant can be separately convicted and sentenced for the
offenses of aggravated battery and battery on a law enforcement officer when both
are predicated on a single underlying act.”  512 So. 2d at 184.  Crumley had been
found guilty of two separate counts of aggravated battery and battery on a law
enforcement officer based upon a single criminal act.  This Court determined that
the defendant could not be convicted of two separate crimes which addressed the
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same “evil” and were based upon a single offense.  Id. at 184.
Here, in contrast, there is only one punishment being imposed for a single
offense.  That offense is reclassified as a felony pursuant to section 784.07, and
therefore constitutes a qualified offense under section 775.084.  As reasoned by the
Fifth District in King:
[Section 775.084] was enacted to cause persons who are repeat
offenders to be treated differently from those who are not.  The statute
defines who should be sentenced as an habitual felony offender, an
habitual violent felony offender, or a violent career criminal and allows
the court to "impose an extended term of imprisonment."  Without
question this statute seems to use "enhancement" language but the
statute also can be interpreted as defining the status of the defendant
not at all unlike the felony petit theft defendant.  In  Gayman v. State,
616 So. 2d 17 (Fla.1993), [Note 1] our supreme court recognized that
one who is found guilty by a jury of petit theft, and is also found to
have been at least twice before convicted of petit theft, is guilty of a
felony and the punishment may be further enhanced by a habitual
felony offender statute where appropriate.  It is our determination to
analogize the felony petit theft statute, section 812.014(3)(c), with 
section 775.084 because a similar procedure is used in classifying and
sentencing the felony petit theft defendant as is used in classifying and
sentencing the repeat offender sentenced pursuant to  section 775.084. 
If a person steals $5.00 he is guilty of petit theft (misdemeanor) and if
it is proven that the person committed theft at least twice before, it is a
felony and then can even be habitualized says our supreme court.  It
logically follows that if a person commits a battery (misdemeanor) and
the victim is a law enforcement officer it is a felony and he gets a
greater sentence.  But if that defendant is a repeat offender, then he,
like the repeated thief, is a person to be treated differently on account
of his past behavior and is subject to receive different, more severe,
treatment.  We believe that it is the intent of the legislature to impose
the harsher treatment on this appellant and others like situated and that
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it does not work an unconstitutional double punishment to do so.
[Note1]  We note that the holding of Gayman has been
superseded by statute, see Wilson v. State, 752 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2000), but that does not preclude using Gayman as we do here.
763 So. 2d at 547-48.  As correctly observed in King, under these circumstances,
we conclude that double jeopardy concerns do not apply.  Cf. also Vucinich v.
State, 776 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (affirming appellant’s ten-year habitual
offender sentence, and rejecting his argument that “his conviction for felony driving
without a license, which resulted from the enhancement of the misdemeanor charge
of driving without a license to a third degree felony due to his prior suspensions,
was improperly further enhanced when the trial court declared him to be an habitual
offender,” thereby violating double jeopardy principles).  
Based upon the foregoing discussion, the apparent conflict between Mills and
Merritt is resolved.  Accordingly, we approve the First District's decision in Mills to
the extent consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.  
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., dissents.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
First District - Case No. 1D99-2159 
(Leon County)
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender,
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butteworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief,
Criminal Appeals, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Respondent