Case Title: Trombley v.Southwestern VT Medical Center

Citation: 169 Vt. 386, 738 A.2d 103

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Trombley v. Southwestern VT Medical Ctr. (97-320); 169 Vt. 386; 738 A.2d 103

[Filed 16-Jul-1999]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
  40 as well as  formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
  Readers are requested to notify  the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
  Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont  05609-0801 of any errors in
  order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to  press.

                                 No. 97-320

Judy Trombley	                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.		                                  Bennington Superior Court

                                                  November Term, 1998
Southwestern Vermont Medical Center

Richard W. Norton, J.

       Herbert G. Ogden, Jr., and Alicia L. Aiken of Liccardi Crawford &
  Ogden, P.C., Rutland,     for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Karen McAndrew and Jeffrey J. Nolan of Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C.,
  Burlington, for   Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       MORSE, J.  Defendant Southwestern Vermont Medical Center (SVMC)
  appeals a jury  verdict awarding plaintiff Judy Trombley damages for
  wrongful termination.  SVMC claims the  trial court erred by: (1) failing
  to grant its motion for judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff  was
  an at-will employee; (2) admitting in evidence an out-dated employee
  handbook; (3)  instructing the jury that, if it found that plaintiff was
  entitled to disciplinary procedures, plaintiff  could be terminated only
  for cause; (4) placing the burden of proof on defendant to show just  cause
  for discharge; (5) excluding supervisory reports of complaints by patients
  who had failed  to waive confidentiality to allow plaintiff to inspect
  their medical records;  (6) admitting hearsay  testimony; (7) instructing
  the jury it could award front pay; and (8) failing to reduce the award  of
  back pay.  We affirm. Plaintiff, a Licensed Professional Nurse (LPN), began
  her employment with SVMC 

 

  in 1958.  After four years of employment, she left SVMC, but returned to
  work there in 1967.  Twenty-five years later, in 1992, she was terminated.

       In 1981, SVMC distributed to employees a revised employee handbook,
  which, under  "Resignations and Dismissals," stated:

     Recommendation for dismissal of an employee is the responsibility 
     of the Department Head.  An employee may receive a reprimand 
     for inefficiency, improper conduct or violation of hospital policies. 
     Such a reprimand will be written in duplicate by the Department 
     Head, signed by a member of the hospital administration, 
     countersigned by the employee and placed in the employee's 
     personnel folder.

     The third reprimand as outlined above will result in automatic 
     dismissal.

       In 1989, Carole Heaney became plaintiff's supervisor.  From 1989 until
  plaintiff's  termination, various supervisory personnel received complaints
  about plaintiff by patients and  nursing staff.  Heaney discussed the
  complaints with plaintiff and noted each complaint on a  "Performance
  Record" form.  The complaints included allegations by patients or their
  relatives  of callous and insensitive treatment.  Several co-workers also
  complained that she was  uncooperative with nursing staff.  Between 1989
  and 1991, Heaney gave plaintiff warnings, both  verbal and written, and
  supervisor counseling.  None of the "Performance Record" reports  indicate
  that plaintiff reviewed the statements made in them.  In 1991, plaintiff
  was suspended for  three days for refusing to "accept[ ] assignments as
  delegated by charge nurse."  

       On January 1, 1992, four months before plaintiff's termination, SVMC
  again revised the  employee handbook.  The "Introduction" included the
  following disclaimer:

     Nothing in the handbook should be interpreted to represent a 
     contract of employment.  You and the Medical Center may 
     terminate the employment relationship at any time.  Employees 
     should be aware that the policies and benefits summarized in this 
     booklet are not permanent conditions of employment.  

     Please read this handbook carefully and keep it handy for future 
     reference.  You have a responsibility to be familiar with the 
     contents.

 

  The section entitled "When You Leave," described the discharge procedure as
  follows:

     A formal progressive disciplinary procedure has been developed to 
     ensure that employees are treated in a consistent and reasonable 
     manner.  Toward this end, the Medical Center will, where 
     reasonable, provide employees with an opportunity to correct 
     inadequate or inappropriate work behavior.  In most cases 
     progressive disciplinary procedure will include verbal counseling, 
     written counseling, suspension and finally, if corrective action has 
     not been taken, discharge.

       In February 1992, Heaney filled out a performance record in response
  to a complaint  about plaintiff from a patient's daughter.  According to
  the report, "her mother did not get the  care that she needed from
  [plaintiff]."  The report indicated that Heaney approached plaintiff with 
  the complaint.  Plaintiff contended that when she offered to bathe the
  patient, the patient refused.  As a result of the complaint, the patient
  was assigned to a different care provider.(FN1)  On  March 9, Heaney filled
  out another performance report following a complaint by the daughter of 
  another patient asking that plaintiff be reassigned because she had fed her
  mother too quickly.  The performance record indicates that plaintiff denied
  she had fed the patient too quickly and said  that Mrs. Whiton, the
  patient, had never relayed this to her.  Plaintiff contended that: "Mrs. 
  Whiton's daughter was probably angry because [I] suggested that they limit
  visitors."  On March  28, Heaney made another "Performance Record," noting
  in the "description outlining employee's  behavior" section:  "Mrs. B.
  McKee commented on Judy's mumbling under her breath while in  her room and
  described how bad Judy's day was going."  In the "noting expected change in 
  behavior" section, Heaney stated: "Will review [plaintiff's] record -
  incidents of complaints are  too frequent.  Will discuss with Julia and
  Suzie.  Recommend dismissal.  Third reprimand."  The  report was signed by
  Heaney. 

       On April 6, Heaney prepared a "Counseling Report Form" alleging that
  plaintiff lacked  "caring" behavior towards patients as evidenced by
  complaints from patients or their families and 

 

  recommended plaintiff be terminated from employment with SVMC.   The report
  stated:

      The employee was advised of the following policy;

      According to the personnel policies of Southwestern Vermont 
      Medical Center, an official reprimand may be issued to employees 
      for inefficiency, improper conduct or violation of hospital policies. 
      The third reprimand results in automatic dismissal from your job.

  There was a place for "employee comments" and a signature line for the
  employee.  Both were  left blank.  A statement below the signature line
  noted that the employee's signature indicated only  that the employee had
  an opportunity to read the statements, not that the employee necessarily 
  agreed with them.  Plaintiff was subsequently fired.  She was fifty-eight
  years old.

       Plaintiff filed suit in August 1994 against SVMC and Heaney.  Her
  complaint against  Heaney was dismissed before trial.  In her complaint
  against SVMC, plaintiff claimed that she was  (1) discriminated against in
  violation of 21 V.S.A. § 495(a)(1) because of a seizure disorder, (2)  a
  victim of age discrimination in violation of 21 V.S.A. § 495(a)(1) and (3)
  terminated in breach  of her employment contract with SVMC.  

       During discovery, a dispute developed over the production of the
  medical records of  patients who had complained about plaintiff.  In
  response to plaintiff's request for those records,  SVMC sought a
  protective order, arguing that the patient records were confidential.  In
  April  1996, the court directed SVMC to either obtain waivers from patients
  of any applicable privilege  or refrain from introducing at trial any
  evidence of complaints by patients who did not waive the  confidentiality
  of their medical records. 

       In September, SVMC filed a motion in limine requesting the court to
  admit evidence at  trial of personnel records that contained complaints by
  those patients from whom they had been  unable to obtain waivers.  One
  month later, SVMC requested that the court inspect the medical  records of
  patients in camera to determine whether they contained any relevant
  information.  The  court denied both motions.  

       At trial, SVMC introduced testimony and documents in plaintiff's
  personnel file about 

 

  complaints made by both nursing staff and patients.  Plaintiff attacked the
  credibility of the  complaints with testimony highlighting inconsistencies
  and inaccuracies with the alleged  complaints.  Furthermore, plaintiff
  introduced testimony by several co-workers describing her  capabilities
  both with patients and staff members.   

       At the close of the evidence, the court submitted the claims for
  disability discrimination  and breach of contract to the jury.  The jury
  returned a plaintiff's verdict, awarding her $60,000  in past wages (back
  pay) and $65,000 in future lost wages (front pay).  Although the jury 
  determined plaintiff was handicapped, it did not find that SVMC had
  discriminated against her on  that basis.  Instead, the jury based
  liability on breach of her employment contract because she was  dismissed
  without cause and she was not terminated in the "manner and means" of
  SVMC's  discharge procedure.

       SVMC moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the
  alternative, for a new  trial or remittitur.  The court denied the motion.

                                     I.

       SVMC first contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant its
  motion for judgment  as a matter of law because plaintiff was an at-will
  employee.  SVMC claims that the 1992  handbook was in effect at the time of
  plaintiff's discharge and thus controlled the discharge. 

       An employment contract may be "at-will," terminable at any time, by
  either party, for any  reason or for no reason at all.  See Sherman v.
  Rutland Hosp., Inc., 146 Vt. 204, 207,