Case Title: Hickey v. Burnett

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-10-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hickey v. Burnett1985 WY 164707 P.2d 741Case Number: 84-282Decided: 10/15/1985BIRDIE HICKEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS GUARDIAN AND NEXT FRIEND OF DEREK HICKEY, TED HICKEY, AND TRAVIS HICKEY, MINORS; AND TED HICKEY AND CONNIE HICKEY, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

WARREN BURNETT; AND BURNETT & AHDERS, ASSOCIATED, A TEXAS ASSOCIATION, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
BIRDIE HICKEY, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS GUARDIAN AND NEXT FRIEND OF DEREK HICKEY, TED HICKEY, AND 
TRAVIS HICKEY, MINORS; AND TED HICKEY AND CONNIE HICKEY, APPELLANTS 
(PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

WARREN BURNETT; AND 
BURNETT & AHDERS, ASSOCIATED, A TEXAS ASSOCIATION, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 
Donald J. 
Sullivan, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Harley J. 
McKinney, Rock Springs, and Anthony A. Johnson of Rector, Retherford, Mullen 
& Johnson, Colorado Springs, Colo., for appellees; oral argument by 
Johnson.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This action, commenced 
July 31, 1981, against a Texas lawyer and his professional association, 
alleged that they were guilty of legal malpractice in their representation of 
appellants in a lawsuit which had been dismissed three months earlier by the 
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming. In addition to the 
claim of negligence, a second claim was made that the wrongful acts of appellees 
resulted in damage to appellants from the intentional or reckless infliction of 
severe emotional distress. The present appeal is taken from entry of summary 
judgment against the appellants-plaintiffs who contend that the district court 
erred in incorrectly deciding questions of culpable negligence which were not 
susceptible to determination at the summary judgment stage and also that the 
district court's decision was based upon materials not properly before the 
court.

[¶2.]     We reverse the district 
court for the reason that appellees failed to properly support their motion for 
summary judgment below as required by our prior decisions and Rule 56, 
W.R.C.P.

[¶3.]     In their brief 
appellants phrase the issues:

"1. Did the trial court 
err in treating the question of culpable negligence as amenable to summary 
judgment?

"2. Did the trial court 
err in granting summary judgment upon the circumstances of this 
case?

"3. Did the trial court 
err in granting summary judgment where the motion was supported by no admissible 
evidence?"

[¶4.]     Appellees counter with 
the following articulation:

"1. Whether the trial 
court erred in granting Defendant/Appellees' Motion for Summary 
Judgment.

"(a) Do the undisputed 
facts demonstrate absence of cause of action for any culpable negligence of any 
co-employees of Appellants' decedent?

"(b) Do the undisputed 
facts demonstrate `culpable negligence' on the part of Appellants' 
decedent?"

[¶5.]     Our resolution of the 
question: whether the motion for summary judgment was supported by material 
facts properly before the court, is dispositive of this appeal; and we will not 
address the other contentions of the parties.

[¶6.]     Appellants are the 
surviving spouse, minor children, and parents of Lonnie L. Hickey who was 
electrocuted on May 23, 1978, when he grasped an energized electrical cable 
while employed as a mine foreman in Sweetwater County, Wyoming. In September 1979, appellants 
employed appellees as their legal representative to pursue a wrongful death 
action on their behalf. In May of 1980, a complaint, alleging that the death of 
Lonnie L. Hickey was caused by the defective design and manufacture of the 
electrical cable, was filed by appellees on behalf of the appellants in 
Wyoming state 
district court. This action was subsequently removed to the United States 
District Court for the District of Wyoming for further proceedings. This federal 
court products liability action was terminated by entry of summary judgment on 
May 1, 1981, in favor of the named defendants, no evidence having been produced 
that defendants had either manufactured or sold the allegedly defective cable. 
No appeal was taken from the federal court's summary judgment.1

[¶7.]     On July 31, 1981, 
appellants' complaint in the instant proceedings was filed. As noted by the 
district court in its decision letter, appellants' contentions of negligence 
against the appellees focused upon alleged errors and omissions in the 
preparation of the federal court products liability case and the failure to 
pursue a claim based upon culpable negligence against the co-employees of 
appellants' decedent under the applicable Wyoming law, see, § 27-12-103, W.S. 
1977, and Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 
622 P.2d 1349 (1981). During discovery appellees took the depositions of the 
appellant, Birdie Hickey, and the Wyoming attorney originally employed by them 
in the federal court action. In addition, written interrogatories were served 
upon appellants which were not answered until the court entered an order 
compelling discovery or in the alternative providing for dismissal of the case. 
Following a pretrial conference, held on June 21, 1983, the court entered a 
pretrial order which adopted by reference the parties' joint statement and 
ordered that the parties submit written briefs on questions of law involved in 
the case. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment together with a 
supporting brief on June 7, 1984.

[¶8.]     Appellants responded 
with a memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment with an attached 
affidavit by an experienced Wyoming attorney. In their memorandum 
appellants pointed out that appellees failed to file any supporting materials 
with the motion for summary judgment. Appellees, in their reply brief, argued 
that the motion for summary judgment incorporated the exhibits endorsed by them 
on the joint statement including the contents of the federal court file and the 
depositions taken in these earlier proceedings. The depositions taken by 
appellees in the instant case were not attached nor filed with the summary 
judgment motion.

[¶9.]     A written decision 
letter granting the motion for summary judgment was issued by the district court 
on July 27, 1984. In reaching his decision, the district judge relied 
exclusively upon the contents of the record in the previous federal court 
litigation to establish the lack of a genuine issue of material fact as required 
for the issuance of summary judgment by Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P.2 Unfortunately, the contents of that 
record were not filed with the court below nor are they part of the record 
presently before this court.3

[¶10.]  In reviewing cases in which summary 
judgment has been granted our task is identical to that of the district court. 
Roth v. First Security Bank of Rock Springs, Wyoming, 
Wyo., 684 P.2d 93 (1984); Schepps v. Howe, Wyo., 665 P.2d 504 (1983); Hyatt v. Big Horn School 
District No. 4, Wyo., 636 P.2d 525 (1981). As explained in Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil Co. 
(Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147, 150 
(1981):

"When a motion for 
summary judgment is before the supreme court, we have exactly the same duty as 
the district judge; and, if there is a complete record before us, we have 
exactly the same material as did he. We must follow the same standards. The 
propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness 
of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
This court looks at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the 
facts contained in affidavits, depositions and other proper material appearing 
in the record."

[¶11.]  The problem in this case is that the 
materials relied upon by the district court in issuing summary judgment were not 
properly before the court but were provided by appellees' counsel outside of the 
record without the knowledge of appellants.4 In Larsen v. Roberts, Wyo., 676 P.2d 1046, 1048 
(1984), this court condemned the practice of late filing of affidavits in 
support of a motion for summary judgment noting:

"The Rules of Civil 
Procedure provide an orderly process for the determination of controversies. 
They are intended to provide notice to a party of the other's contentions, a 
fair opportunity to discover and develop the entire case and meet those 
contentions, and to avoid surprise - all to the end that a just result is more 
probable. To condone a practice which permits parties to simply ignore the rules 
will defeat their purpose. Thus, where the moving party, as in this case, has 
failed to comply, there is not often a reasonable justification for the failure. 
He is in control of the situation. He can file his motion for summary judgment 
at any time he chooses. Ordinarily he should not file it nor set it for hearing 
until it is ready to be heard. When he undertakes to do otherwise, and the 
decision is against him or the hearing must be vacated, he has only himself to 
blame."

In this case the 
documents and materials relied upon were not filed late. They simply were not 
filed at all.

[¶12.]  It has long been the position of this 
court that the party moving for summary judgment has

"a definite burden to 
clearly demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact, * * * and unless 
this is clearly demonstrated no such judgment should be granted * * *." 
(Citations omitted.) Kover v. Hufsmith, Wyo., 
496 P.2d 908, 910 (1972). See also, Western Surety Co. v. Town of 
Evansville, Wyo., 675 P.2d 258 (1984); Fugate v. Mayor and City Council of Buffalo, 
Wyo., 348 P.2d 76, 97 A.L.R.2d 243 (1959).

Appellees in the 
present case utterly failed to meet this burden upon the record before the trial 
court.

[¶13.]  The only materials other than the 
pleadings properly before the court at the time of its consideration of the 
motion for summary judgment were the affidavit submitted in opposition to the 
motion by appellants, the facts contained in the parties' joint statement, and 
the answers to appellees' interrogatories. Viewing these materials in the light 
most favorable to appellants, as we must, Western Surety Co. v. Town of 
Evansville, supra, we find substantial questions of material fact exist 
which preclude the granting of summary judgment. In particular, those materials 
establish only that appellees agreed to represent appellants in the wrongful 
death action; that such an action was filed based upon a theory of products 
liability; that the federal court action was dismissed upon the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment for the reason that there was no evidence linking 
those defendants to the allegedly defective cable; that appellees failed to 
conduct any discovery in that action; and that appellee, Warren Burnett, filed a 
stipulation to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice without informing appellants 
and sought to withdraw from the case. Based upon this record, it is apparent 
that the material facts properly before the court do not establish that 
appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

THE 
DISSENT

The dissent states that 
because "the federal case file was designated in the Joint Pretrial Statement as 
an exhibit that `will be produced,' * * * appellants * * * made a representation 
that such `will be done,' * * * [and]

* * * * * 
*

"* * * inasmuch as both 
parties intended such evidence to be presented in the trial, * * 
*"

it was proper 
for the trial judge to enter summary judgment based upon such evidence although 
it was not filed in support of the motion nor contained in the court file. We 
have not before heard of this procedure in summary judgment proceedings. Perhaps 
it was the common law. Whatever it was, it is not presently the law for Rule 
56(e), W.R.C.P., provides in part:

"Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits 
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." (Emphasis 
added.)

The Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted to promote an orderly and efficient means 
for the handling and disposing of litigation. Compliance with these rules of 
procedure in summary judgment matters is mandatory. Larsen v. Roberts, Wyo., 676 P.2d 1046 
(1984). Appellees here, ex parte, forwarded materials to the court for its 
consideration but did not file them. This method of supporting a motion for 
summary judgment does not satisfy mandatory requirements nor is it within the 
spirit and intent of the rules. It must be condemned. It will not support entry 
of summary judgment.

[¶14.]  The dissent suggests remand to supplement 
the record on appeal. The material relied upon by the trial court was never 
filed and never became a part of the district court records. The record cannot 
be supplemented with material that is not contained in the record below. We, 
therefore, see no alternative but to reverse the summary judgment and remand for 
further proceedings. The parties can still refile their motion for summary 
judgment, but this time they hopefully will comply with the requirements of the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure for such motions, and appellants will have a 
fair opportunity to traverse what is filed and may be able to show an issue of 
fact which must be determined upon trial.

[¶15.]  The summary judgment entered by the 
district court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

1 Present counsel for 
appellants had filed an appearance in the federal court action on their behalf 
at the time summary judgment was entered.

2 Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P., 
provides in pertinent part:

"The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party 
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages."

3 At the time of oral 
argument it was indicated that the federal court file was provided directly to 
the district judge by counsel for the appellees.

4 The district court did 
not rely upon judicial notice to apprise itself of the contents of the federal 
court record. Cf., St. Louis Baptist 
Temple, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 605 F.2d 1169 (10th 
Cir. 1979).

ROONEY, Justice, 
dissenting.

PREAMBLE

[¶16.]  The result reached by the majority 
opinion is founded on the alleged failure to make the file of the United States 
District Court a part of the record in the trial court and the failure to 
include such file in the record before us. The majority opinion notes that the 
district judge,

"relied exclusively upon 
the contents of the record in the previous federal court litigation to establish 
the lack of a genuine issue of material fact as required for the issuance of 
summary judgment by Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P. Unfortunately, the contents of that 
record were not filed with the court below nor are they part of the record 
presently before this court." (Footnotes omitted and emphasis in 
original.)

[¶17.]  The record before us contains briefs of 
both parties as presented to the district court in connection with pretrial 
matters and with the summary judgment, and it contains the opinion letter of the 
judge, all of which refer to the material in the file on the federal case as a 
basis for argument and for holding. The briefs of the parties on this appeal do 
likewise. One of the trial court's bases for the summary judgment was undisputed 
facts which establish culpable negligence on the part of Lonnie L. Hickey, for 
whose death appellants base their claim. The trial court quoted from 
Restatement, Torts 2d, § 503(3):

"A plaintiff whose 
conduct is in reckless disregard of his own safety is barred from recovery 
against a defendant whose reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety is a 
legal cause of the plaintiff's harm."

The court 
concluded that appellees':

"* * * decision not to 
proceed with a culpable negligence action was an `honest exercise of 
professional judgment', based on an informed decision and may not be the subject 
of a legal malpractice action. * * *"

The summary 
judgment issued accordingly.

RECORD IN DISTRICT 
COURT

[¶18.]  Although not filed with the clerk of 
court, the record of the federal case was before the trial court in connection 
with the motion for a summary judgment. Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P., includes 
"pleadings" among that which is to be considered in determining the propriety of 
a summary judgment. In his Pretrial Order, the district judge stated 
that:

"1. This pretrial order 
includes the Joint Statement, supersedes the pleadings, and shall govern the 
course of the trial of this cause, * * * and is hereby modified in the following 
particulars: See Schedule A attached hereto and by this reference made a part 
hereof."

Schedule A 
recites in part: "Each witness and exhibit named or listed * * * in the Joint 
Statements will be produced at the 
trial * * *" (emphasis added). In Attachment A to the Joint Pretrial Statement, 
signed by the attorney for appellants and the attorney for appellees, appellants 
list as a witness:

"A representative of the 
Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming will 
testify, if necessary, to the identity and contents of the official federal 
court file, or a copy thereof, including the deposition transcripts taken and 
filed therein, all relating to the underlying litigation initiated by Defendant 
Burnett."

[¶19.]  Both appellants and appellees list the 
file on the federal case as an exhibit. Appellants describe it as, "Federal 
court file (duplicate) including deposition transcripts." Appellees describe it 
as, "Federal Court file."

[¶20.]  Inasmuch as the Pretrial Order considered 
that contained in the Joint Pretrial Statement as superseding the pleadings, and 
inasmuch as the federal case file was designated in the Joint Pretrial Statement 
as an exhibit that "will be produced" at trial, and inasmuch as appellants, 
themselves, made a representation that such "will be done," the trial judge 
properly considered the federal case file in deciding the motion for a summary 
judgment.

RECORD IN THIS 
COURT

[¶21.]  The federal case file is not included in 
the record on appeal to this court. Any party desiring it to be considered by us 
had the obligation to designate it for inclusion in the record on appeal. As the 
majority opinion states, there is not sufficient information in the record on 
appeal to confirm the trial court's reference to facts which establish without 
contradiction that:

"* * * It is obvious that 
the immediate cause of Mr. Hickey's death was handling an energized cable in 
violation of company rule. He was the foreman and also in charge of safety. If 
anyone should have known the safety rules and the damages of the operation he 
should have. He chose to ignore the very rules he was obligated to see were 
obeyed. If anyone was culpably negligent, it was he. * * 
*"

CONCLUSION

[¶22.]  Inasmuch as the record before us does not 
include all that which was before the trial court, and inasmuch as both parties 
intended such evidence to be presented in the trial, and inasmuch as a reversal 
of this case will only result in another motion for summary judgment with such 
evidence being attached for consideration resulting in another appeal, I would 
remand for the specific purpose of supplementing the record on appeal with the 
federal case file.