Case Title: Smith v. Dexter Oil Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 408-a-2d-1014-0

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 1979-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wayne A. SMITH v. DEXTER OIL COMPANY[1] et al. Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. December 14, 1979. *1015 C. W. & H. M. Hayes by Robert Scott Lingley, Dover-Foxcroft (orally), for plaintiff. Rudman, Winchell, Carter & Buckley by William S. Wilson, Jr. (orally), Michael P. Friedman, Bangor, for defendants. Before McKUSICK, C. J., and WERNICK, GODFREY, NICHOLS and GLASSMAN, JJ. McKUSICK, Chief Justice. Plaintiff-employee Wayne A. Smith sustained a work-related injury on February 8, 1977, and was receiving compensation for total disability pursuant to an approved agreement dated May 9, 1977. On October 11, 1977, defendant-employer Dexter Oil Company brought before the Workers' Compensation Commission a petition for review of incapacity. See 39 M.R.S.A. § 100 (1978). On March 21, 1979, after receiving evidence from both sides, the commissioner issued a decree suspending compensation, in which he concluded: We are not convinced at this time that the effects of the injury sustained by Mr. Smith on February 8, 1977 prevent him from engaging in gainful employment and believe that whatever disabling effects the accident may have produced are not now substantial causative factors producing disability. Employee Smith now appeals a pro forma decree of the Superior Court affirming the commission. The commissioner's decree is ambiguous in two significant respects. First, his use of the phrase "[w]e are not convinced" suggests that the commissioner placed the burden of proof upon the employee; that would be erroneous as a matter of law in a petition for review of incapacity filed by the employer. Dufault v. Midland-Ross of Canada, Ltd., Me., 380 A.2d 200 (1977); Dailey v. Pinecap, Inc., Me., 321 A.2d 492 (1974). Second, his use of the word "substantial" to modify the phrase "causative factors" raises the possibility that the commissioner applied an erroneous legal standard in resolving the question of causation raised by the petition. By his use of the phrase "substantial causative factors" the commissioner may merely have meant "real" or "actual" causative factors. If so, he violated no rule of law. On the other hand, he may have used it in the sense of "important" or "predominant" causative factors. If so, he applied an incorrect principle of causation. Our cases have never required a showing of a substantial in the sense of "important" or "predominant" causative relationship between a work-related injury and a worker's subsequent inability to work. For example, compensation may be awarded where a work-related injury aggravates to any degree a preexisting physical ailment or condition so as to produce disability. Bernier v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., Me., 250 A.2d 820 (1969). See 1 Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation § 12.20, at 3-331 (1978) ("the relative contribution of the accident . . . is not weighed"). Likewise, in order to suspend compensation in cases of continuing incapacity, there must be competent evidence from which the commissioner could conclude that the work-related injury has ceased to be "a contributing factor to [the employee's] incapacity." Soucy v. Fraser Paper, Ltd., Me., 267 A.2d 919 , 922 (1970) (emphasis added).[2] In the circumstances of *1016 this case, any requirement of a "substantial" (i. e., a "predominant" or "important") causative relationship would lessen impermissibly the burden that the employer must bear on the issue of causation. Because we cannot determine from the record before us whether the commissioner's decision was free from errors of law, we remand for clarification of the decree.[3] On remand, the commissioner should resolve both points of ambiguity by making appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The entry will be: Appeal sustained. Judgment of the Superior Court vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for substitution of Dexter Oil Company as the party employer and for remand to the Workers' Compensation Commission with directions (i) to make further findings of fact and conclusions of law on the basis of the present record, and (ii) to substitute Dexter Oil Company as the party employer. Further ordered that the employer pay to the employee an allowance for counsel fees in the amount of $550, together with his reasonable out-of-pocket expenses for this appeal. POMEROY and ARCHIBALD, JJ., did not sit.