Case Title: Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon

Citation: 2002-Ohio-2490

Docket Number: 20011631

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-2490.] 
 
CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. DIXON. 
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-2490.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Permanent disbarment — Fifteen distinct 
violations of the Disciplinary Rules during the administration of an 
estate — Failing to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation. 
(No. 2001-1631 — Submitted January 8, 2002 — Decided June 12, 2002.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 00-85. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J. 
{¶1} 
This cause is before the court upon the filing of a certified report 
by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“board”) 
recommending that we sanction the respondent, Debra J. Dixon of Cleveland, 
Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0060090, for acts violating numerous 
Disciplinary Rules and for initially failing to cooperate in the disciplinary 
investigation.  The board recommends that we indefinitely suspend Dixon from 
the practice of law in Ohio.  For the reasons that follow, we decline to follow the 
board’s recommendation and instead disbar Dixon. 
I 
{¶2} 
The parties entered into detailed factual stipulations that formed 
the basis for the panel report, which in turn formed the basis of the board’s 
certified report to this court.  These stipulations indicate that in September 1996, 
Dixon began to represent Bertha Heim, both individually and as the administrator 
of the estate of Heim’s deceased husband, Otto.  Dixon also represented Heim’s 
son for limited purposes.  During the course of her relationship with Heim, Dixon 
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obtained power of attorney, which Dixon used to sign probate documents and to 
transfer both probate and non-probate funds or assets. 
Neglect 
{¶3} Dixon admits that she lacked the experience to handle the probate 
matter.  Among other errors, she failed to identify accurately funds valued at 
$33,950.65; failed to file accurate accounts in a timely fashion, resulting in a 
citation against Heim; failed to deliver assets to beneficiaries in a timely fashion; 
and failed to provide full information in a timely fashion to both the court and her 
client.  Eventually, a probate court magistrate judge contacted the Cleveland Bar 
Association over concerns that Heim had expressed to him about Dixon’s 
usurping estate assets valued between $200,000 and $500,000 and about a 
potential conflict of interest arising from Dixon’s representing the estate, of which 
both Heim and her son were beneficiaries, while also representing Heim 
personally. 
{¶4} 
The parties stipulated that Dixon’s conduct violated DR 6-
101(A)(1) (a lawyer shall not handle a legal matter that she knows or should have 
known she is not competent to handle without associating herself with a lawyer 
who is competent to handle it), 6-101(A)(2) (a lawyer shall not handle a legal 
matter inadequately), 6-101(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not neglect an entrusted legal 
matter), 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), 7-101(A)(2) (a lawyer shall not fail to carry out a 
contract of legal employment with a client for professional services), and 7-
102(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose that which the law 
requires to be revealed). 
Failure to Account for Fiduciary Funds 
{¶5} 
In the course of the attorney-client relationship, Dixon had 
assumed nearly total control over all assets belonging to the estate and to Heim.  
January Term, 2002 
3 
The parties stipulated that Dixon’s mishandling of the assets violated DR 9-
102(B)(2) (failure to label all assets properly), 9-102(B)(3) (failure to render 
appropriate accounts to the client), and 9-102(B)(4) (failure to pay or deliver to 
the client promptly property that was in lawyer’s possession).1 
Improper Transfers of Fiduciary Funds 
{¶6} 
In the second month of her representation of Heim, Dixon opened a 
joint and survivorship checking account in both their names.  Although Dixon 
used this account to receive various fiduciary monies and to pay fiduciary bills, 
Dixon also withdrew $252,406.80 from that account for her own use.  Exhibits 
accompanying the stipulations show that Dixon had written several checks 
payable to “Cash.”  Another was payable to a university scholarship fund, while 
yet others were payable to relatives of Dixon.  Although Dixon periodically 
reimbursed the account, she twice deposited her own funds into the account and 
identified them as “loans,” even though Heim did not require such loans. 
{¶7} 
The parties stipulated that Dixon’s conduct violated DR 9-102(A) 
(commingling funds), 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct adversely 
reflecting on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), and 7-101(A)(3) (intentionally 
prejudicing or damaging her client in the course of their professional relationship). 
{¶8} During her second year of representing the estate and Heim, Dixon 
transferred $110,000 from Heim’s assets to Dixon’s brother and another 
individual.  The two men used the money to purchase real property.  Dixon 
prepared a promissory note and open-ended mortgage for the transaction that 
identified the lender as “Bertha Heim c/o her Attorney, Debra J. Dixon.”  The 
                                          
 
1.  The board report describes DR 9-102(B)(2) as prohibiting Dixon’s failure to render an 
appropriate account to Heim in a timely fashion, while describing DR 9-102(B)(3) as prohibiting 
Dixon’s failure to label all assets properly.  The board has switched the Disciplinary Rules.  Our 
independent evaluation of the case corrects this clerical error. 
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stipulations state that Dixon “admits she has no records evidencing disclosure of 
this loan to Bertha Heim.”  The parties stipulated that Dixon’s conduct violated 
DR 5-105 (representing conflicting interests). 
{¶9} 
Upon reaching a settlement with the estate’s conservator, who had 
filed a concealment of assets action, Dixon repaid that portion of the principal that 
she had not already redeposited, paid interest on the principal, and paid the 
conservator’s attorney’s fees. 
Charging an Excessive Fee 
{¶10} By two payments in February and June 1997, Dixon paid herself a 
total of $15,000 from non-probate funds.  Dixon recorded the payments as “funds 
management.”  Later, during the course of the conservator’s legal action against 
her, Dixon submitted a fee invoice in the amount of $18,205 plus additional 
expenses.  As part of the settlement agreement, Dixon waived payment of her 
fees.  The parties stipulated that Dixon attempted to charge an excessive fee in 
violation of DR 2-106(A). 
Failure to Cooperate with Disciplinary Investigation 
{¶11} The Cleveland Bar Association first notified Dixon in February 
1999 of a grievance against her.  Despite repeated requests by the bar association, 
Dixon failed to provide full information for months.  Finally, following the estate 
conservator’s filing of the civil action against Dixon, Dixon retained counsel who 
facilitated Dixon’s cooperation with the disciplinary investigation.  The parties 
stipulated that Dixon’s conduct constitutes misconduct under Gov.Bar R. 
V(6)(A)(1) in that she failed to cooperate as required by Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 
{¶12} The matter proceeded to a hearing before a board panel.  At the 
hearing, the bar association confirmed that it was withdrawing other alleged 
violations that were not resolved by stipulation, as well as an amended complaint 
that it had filed alleging additional violations.  After hearing mitigation testimony, 
January Term, 2002 
5 
the panel adopted the parties’ stipulations as its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and recommended an indefinite suspension.  The board then adopted the 
findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the panel. 
{¶13} Dixon now objects to a portion of the board’s findings and to a 
condition of the recommended sanction. 
II 
{¶14} With one exception, Dixon does not object to the factual findings 
and conclusions adopted by the board.  Nor does she suggest that the imposition 
of an indefinite suspension is unwarranted in light of her admitted violations of 
numerous Disciplinary Rules.  Rather, Dixon urges this court to find that mental 
illness contributed to her misconduct and to permit her to apply for reinstatement 
from indefinite suspension upon a determination by mental health professionals 
that she is fit to resume the practice of law rather than upon the expiration of 
Gov.Bar R. V(10)(B)(1)’s two-year waiting period.  We need not address Dixon’s 
argument regarding early reinstatement from an indefinite suspension, however, 
because the facts of this case warrant disbarment.2 
                                          
 
2. 
{¶a} 
As noted, the parties stipulated to the recommended sanction of an indefinite 
suspension, which both the panel and the board found appropriate.  At first blush, our departure 
from the board’s recommended sanction would therefore appear to necessitate a remand in this 
case pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(8)(D): 
 
{¶b} 
“After a hearing on objections, * * * the Supreme Court shall enter an order as it 
finds proper.  If the Court rejects the sanction contained in a certified report submitted pursuant to 
Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, the Court shall remand the matter to 
the board for a hearing.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
{¶c} 
No remand is required.  This court has previously explained that “stipulations to 
[an indefinite suspension or disbarment] are not within the scope of Section 11 [of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline].”  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Selnick (2001), 94 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 9, 759 N.E.2d 764 (“Gov.Bar R. V[11][A][3][c] * * * expressly exempts indefinite 
suspensions and disbarments from the ambit of [Section 11].”  Emphasis sic.).  Because the 
board’s certified report was not submitted pursuant to Section 11, Gov.Bar R. V(8)(D) is 
inapplicable. 
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{¶15} Because misappropriation of client funds is among Dixon’s acts of 
admitted misconduct, we must begin our consideration with the presumptive 
sanction of disbarment.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Wise (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 
169, 171, 707 N.E.2d 852.  See, also, Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Glatki (2000), 88 
Ohio St.3d 381, 384, 726 N.E.2d 993; Disciplinary Counsel v. Connaughton 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 644, 645, 665 N.E.2d 675.  “However, on some occasions 
because of mitigating circumstances, we have given weight to a board 
recommendation of a lesser sanction.”  Wise, 85 Ohio St.3d at 171, 707 N.E.2d 
852, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Kurtz (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 55, 693 N.E.2d 
1080.  In considering whether such sufficient mitigating circumstances exist, we 
are guided by Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 474, 477, 756 
N.E.2d 104. 
{¶16} Dixon posits that an indefinite suspension would be an appropriate 
lesser sanction because numerous Section 10 mitigating factors exist in this case: 
the absence of a prior disciplinary record; evidence of her otherwise good 
character and good works; the fact that the misconduct was limited to a single 
representation; her mental illness, which she labels as a “significant contributing 
factor” to her dishonesty and which she is making an effort to overcome; and the 
fact that she made “full restitution prior to any court ordered compulsion to do 
so.”  The panel and board found the presence of several of these mitigating 
factors, including restitution, no prior discipline, and positive character witnesses. 
{¶17} We agree that a lack of prior discipline and the fact that Dixon’s 
misconduct was limited to single representation constitute some mitigation.  See 
Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints 
and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.  
January Term, 2002 
7 
We also accord some weight to Dixon’s character references.  But for the 
following reasons, we find Dixon’s claim to each remaining mitigating factor less 
compelling. 
Mental Illness 
{¶18} Although Section 10(B)(2) of the Rules and Regulations 
Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline does not explicitly reference mental 
illness as a mitigating factor, Section 10(B) of that rule requires consideration of 
“all relevant factors” in determining an appropriate sanction for misconduct.  We 
have historically considered an attorney’s mental state in determining an 
appropriate sanction for misconduct.  Glatki, 88 Ohio St.3d at 384, 726 N.E.2d 
993. 
{¶19} Here, both the panel and the board explicitly rejected the existence 
of Dixon’s psychological issues as a mitigating factor.  The board specifically 
found that Dixon’s psychological problems were “peripherally related” to her 
misconduct and concluded that Dixon’s “mental state did not cause and does not 
justify her dishonest conduct.”  “While this court is not bound by the findings of 
fact of the board and panel, we give them some deference in light of the reality 
that the panel observed the witnesses firsthand.”  (Citation omitted.) Cleveland 
Bar Assn. v. Cleary (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 191, 198, 754 N.E.2d 235.  We have 
independently reviewed the testimony and written report of the clinical and 
forensic psychologist that Dixon presented on her behalf.  Both contain evidence 
of unfortunate circumstances in Dixon’s history that have resulted in mainly 
personality and interpersonal relationship difficulties.  Neither, however, contains 
a sufficiently compelling causal link between Dixon’s stated psychological issues 
and her misappropriation of over $250,000.  Accordingly, we decline to credit 
Dixon’s claim to mitigation in this regard. 
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8 
Restitution 
{¶20} We discount the mitigating value of Dixon’s having made “full 
restitution prior to any court ordered compulsion to do so.”  Though the board 
found Dixon’s restitution to constitute a mitigating factor, the board also found 
the circumstances behind the restitution to constitute an aggravating factor.  We 
agree.  While Dixon had indeed made restitution before a court ordered her to do 
so, she completed it well over a year after learning of the grievance—and only 
after the conservator of the estate of Otto Heim had initiated legal action to 
reclaim the misappropriated funds, after the conservator had issued a subpoena 
duces tecum requiring Dixon to produce records of the accounts, securities, and 
other assets held by the estate and Bertha Heim, and after Dixon had retained 
counsel and negotiated a settlement in which she paid the estate $151,960.50 in 
exchange for a release of all claims against her. 
{¶21} Despite the delay in making restitution, Dixon testified before the 
panel that she had promptly paid the $151,960.50 to the estate upon the 
conservator’s determination of the total amount of principal, interest, and 
conservator fees due, implying that she acted timely and in good faith.  Yet, given 
her firsthand knowledge of how much money she had misappropriated, Dixon 
could have, and should have, repaid the monies owed to the estate (except the 
conservator’s fee) even prior to completion of the conservator’s calculation.  
Dixon’s delayed payment therefore constitutes less than a “timely good faith effort 
to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct.”  Section 
10(B)(2)(c) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and 
Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.  
Although Dixon’s having made restitution provides some mitigation, the 
circumstances surrounding the repayment determine its weight. 
Remorse 
January Term, 2002 
9 
{¶22} In addition to those mitigating factors set forth above, the board 
also cited as mitigating Dixon’s expression of remorse for her conduct.  Dixon, 
however, does not assert remorse in her list of mitigating factors to this court.  We 
note nonetheless that Dixon testified before the board that “words cannot 
describe” her degree of remorse and that she feels “ashamed for having marred * * 
* one of the most honorable professions around.” 
{¶23} We also note that Dixon testified that she had “never meant, under 
any circumstances, to harm Mrs. Heim.  On the contrary, [Dixon’s] goals and * * 
* motivations for getting involved were to help her.”  Further, Dixon testified that 
she had never intended to deprive Bertha Heim of her money or property, and that 
she recognizes that the problem in making the loan to her brother was that “[a]s a 
practical matter and for ethics purposes [she] was representing both sides of a 
transaction.” 
{¶24} Dixon is correct in identifying issues related to representing both 
sides of a transaction—if we accept for the sake of argument that making a loan 
without Heim’s knowledge constitutes “representing” the client.  But Dixon fails 
to acknowledge the deeper nature and severity of her misconduct.  The panel 
found that “[n]o disclosure of this loan was made to Bertha Heim.”  The board in 
turn adopted this factual finding, and Dixon does not object to the finding here.  
By acknowledging only the conflict of representing both sides in the loan, Dixon 
has failed to identify the larger issue: the money was never hers to lend in the first 
place. 
{¶25} Similarly, Dixon’s expression of remorse is undercut by the 
confusion that Dixon exhibited as to whether she believes that she had indeed 
initially charged an excessive fee.  First, she testified that her $18,651 fee was not 
excessive for the labor and services that she rendered.  Dixon then testified that 
she had agreed to the stipulation because she realized that she “had botched from 
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top to bottom the Heim matter.  * * * [T]he reason that I agreed to that particular 
stipulation was I guess a fundamental belief that if you don’t provide services in a 
meaningful [manner], one that advances the cause of the client, it is excessive.  
Anything is excessive.”  Such contradictory testimony highlights Dixon’s inability 
to identify and appreciate the full scope of her errors. 
{¶26} Further, the bar association argues in its brief that “Dixon’s request 
to be considered for readmission in less than the two-year period proscribed [sic] 
by Gov.Bar R. V(10)(B) raises the serious question whether she truly appreciates 
the degree to which she violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, abused a 
client’s trust, and abused the public’s trust.”  In her objections to this court, Dixon 
continued to seek potential early reinstatement, even after both the panel and the 
board had rejected Dixon’s attempt on the basis that it would “not impose an 
adequate penalty for [her] intentional dishonesty.”  We agree that the bar 
association raises a legitimate concern that, coupled with our recognition of 
Dixon’s inability to perceive the extent and nature of her misconduct, supports our 
finding that Dixon has failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct 
in regard to the misappropriation and in attempting to charge an excessive fee.  
See Section 10(B)(1)(g) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline.  This aggravating factor offsets Dixon’s incomplete expression of 
remorse. 
III 
{¶27} Against the foregoing mitigating factors of varying persuasiveness, 
we weigh Dixon’s admitted misconduct comprising fifteen distinct violations of 
the Disciplinary Rules and a violation of her duty to cooperate in the 
investigation.  We find that the mitigating factors present in this case fail to 
warrant a lesser sanction than disbarment.  We have held that in most instances, 
January Term, 2002 
11 
“[t]he continuing public confidence in the judicial system and the bar requires that 
the strictest discipline be imposed in misappropriation cases.”  Cleveland Bar 
Assn. v. Belock (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 694 N.E.2d 897.  Misappropriation 
was but one form of Dixon’s misconduct.  As the board correctly explained, 
Dixon “has committed disciplinary rule violations involving incompetence, 
neglect, 
dishonesty 
and 
misrepresentation 
involving 
commingling 
and 
misappropriation of a client’s funds, an attempt to charge an excessive fee, and 
failure to cooperate initially in the disciplinary process until she was advised to do 
so by retained counsel.”  Dixon’s mitigating circumstances inadequately offset the 
more compelling interest of protecting the public. 
{¶28} This court hereby disbars Dixon from the practice of law.  Costs 
are taxed to Dixon. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent and would indefinitely suspend 
respondent. 
__________________ 
Brouse McDowell and Virginia Brown; Baughman & Associates and 
Eileen M. Joyce, for relator. 
Gold, Schwartz & Company, L.P.A., and Niki Z. Schwartz; Charles W. 
Kettlewell, for respondent. 
__________________