Case Title: Baker v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC13-2331, SC14-873

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-2331 
____________ 
 
CORNELIUS O. BAKER, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-873 
____________ 
 
CORNELIUS O. BAKER,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[March 23, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Cornelius Baker, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an order of the 
circuit court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We 
 
 
- 2 - 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated 
below, we reverse the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief as to Baker’s 
claim relating to the constitutionality of his penalty phase, vacate Baker’s death 
sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase.  We deny, however, Baker’s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Baker was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death for the January 2007 
robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Elizabeth Uptagrafft.  This Court summarized 
the case in greater detail on direct appeal.  The relevant facts here are as follows: 
 
 
At the time of the offenses, Baker was living in Daytona Beach, 
Florida, with his girlfriend, Patricia Roosa.  Baker had recently been 
released from jail, where he had been incarcerated for several months 
for selling drugs.  Baker and Roosa decided that they wanted to move 
to New York.  To get extra money for their move, they decided to rob 
a house using a pistol that Baker had recently stolen.  On the morning 
of January 7, 2007, they walked around a Daytona Beach 
neighborhood until they found a house they could rob.  Baker later 
told police that he and Roosa selected the Uptagrafft residence 
because it looked nice and they thought there might be money inside.  
Baker and Roosa walked to the front door.  Baker told Roosa to ring 
the doorbell and that he would do the rest. 
 
 
 
Inside the house, Elizabeth Uptagrafft and her mother, Charlene 
Burns, had just finished eating breakfast.  The only occupants of the 
house at the time were Elizabeth, Burns, and Elizabeth’s adult son 
Joel Uptagrafft.  Burns later stated that she thought they finished 
eating at approximately 8:30 or 9:00 a.m., and that Joel was still 
asleep at that time.  After breakfast, Burns went to her bedroom to 
take a nap, while Elizabeth sat down on the couch in the living room 
to read.  The doorbell rang a few moments later.  When Elizabeth 
 
 
- 3 - 
opened it, Baker came through the door and immediately hit her with 
his gun.  The gun discharged and the bullet grazed Elizabeth’s head. 
 
 
 
At trial, Burns testified that she heard a noise that sounded like 
someone kicking in the door, followed by a gunshot.  Burns stated that 
after she entered the hallway outside her room that was connected to 
the living room, she was attacked by Baker, who beat, choked and 
kicked her.  Burns said that Baker then told her to sit on the couch 
next to Elizabeth.  When Burns saw Elizabeth’s head wound, she 
yelled for her grandson, Joel.  Joel came out of his room and was 
attacked by Baker, who beat Joel with the gun. 
 
 
 
Burns estimated that the family was held at gunpoint for 
between two-and-a-half and three hours while Baker and Roosa 
searched the house for valuables.  Burns stated that there was no 
money in the house, but said that Baker and Roosa found some 
jewelry and placed it in a bag.  Elizabeth eventually offered Baker her 
ATM card and PIN code if they would leave.  Baker did not believe 
that the PIN was real and told Elizabeth that she would have to come 
with them.  According to Burns, Baker then said that if Elizabeth did 
not come with him, he would kill all three members of the family.  
Because Elizabeth was covered in blood from her head wound, Baker 
told her that she would have to change clothes before they left.  Baker 
also told her to find a hat to cover the wound.  Baker collected 
Elizabeth’s cell phone and all other phones in the house.  Before she 
left the house, Elizabeth whispered to her mother to call the police 
once Baker and Roosa were gone.  Baker then placed Elizabeth, the 
phones, and the stolen jewelry into Elizabeth’s car, and he and Roosa 
drove away from the house.  Joel then walked to a neighbor’s house 
and called the police. 
 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
 
. . . Baker decided to drive to a rural area of Flagler County 
known as the Mondex.  Baker told police that it was his intention to 
drop Elizabeth off in a remote area where it would take her some time 
to find a phone that she could use to call the police.  When they 
arrived at a spot that Baker thought was sufficiently isolated, Baker 
told Elizabeth to get out of the car, which she did.  He also told her 
that she was going to live.  According to Baker’s statement to police, 
 
 
- 4 - 
he then drove approximately fifteen feet before stopping the car and 
getting out.  Baker said that Roosa told him, “Don’t do it.  Don’t do 
it.”  Baker told the officers, “I felt like I done came this far.”  Baker 
said that Elizabeth started to run and that he ran after her.  She ran into 
some nearby bushes, then tripped and fell.  Baker fired two shots at 
her.  He then went back to the car and drove away. 
 
 
 
Baker v. State, 71 So. 3d 802, 808-09 (Fla. 2011).  Baker was indicted on charges 
of first-degree murder, home invasion robbery with a firearm, kidnapping, 
conspiracy, burglary of a structure or conveyance, and aggravated fleeing and 
eluding a law enforcement officer.  Id. at 811.  The jury found Baker guilty of one 
count each of first-degree murder, home invasion robbery, kidnapping, and 
aggravated fleeing and eluding a law enforcement officer.  Id.   
 
At the penalty phase, Baker’s attorney, Matthew Phillips, presented 
testimony from psychologist Dr. Harry Krop, Baker’s mother and two sisters, and 
Baker himself.  At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury returned a 
recommendation in favor of death by a vote of nine to three.  Id. at 812.  The trial 
court sentenced Baker to death, making the following findings as to the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances: 
 
 
[T]he court found that the following aggravating factors had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the crime was committed 
while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt 
to commit, the crime of home invasion robbery or kidnapping; (2) the 
capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain (great weight); (3) 
the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great 
weight); and (4) the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated 
and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification (great weight). 
 
 
- 5 - 
 
 
As statutory mitigation, the court found: (1) the crime was 
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance (some weight); and (2) the age of the 
defendant (twenty years old) at the time of the crime (some weight).  
As nonstatutory mitigation, the court found: (1) the defendant suffers 
from brain damage, low intellectual functioning, drug abuse and that 
those factors are compounded by each other (some weight); (2) the 
defendant was born into an abusive household and was neglected as a 
child (some weight); (3) the defendant is remorseful (little weight); (4) 
the defendant was well behaved and displayed appropriate demeanor 
during all court proceedings (little weight); and (5) the defendant’s 
confession and cooperation with police (some weight). 
 
 
 
Id. at 813 (footnotes omitted).  In addition to its death sentence, the trial court 
sentenced Baker to life imprisonment for the charge of home invasion with a 
firearm, life imprisonment for the charge of kidnapping, and fifteen years’ 
imprisonment for the charge of aggravated fleeing and eluding a law enforcement 
officer.  Id.  
 
On direct appeal, Baker raised seven claims.1  This Court affirmed Baker’s 
convictions and sentences.  Id. at 825.  The United States Supreme Court denied 
                                          
 
 
1.  Baker asserted that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress the recording of his post-arrest interrogation; (2) the trial court erred in 
refusing to allow Baker to read a letter of apology during the penalty phase; (3) the 
trial court erred in admitting portions of two victim impact statements; (4) the trial 
court erred in finding that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP); 
(5) the trial court erred in finding that the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC); (6) death is a disproportionate punishment; and (7) 
Florida’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002).  Baker, 71 So. 3d 802 at 814-24.  
 
 
- 6 - 
certiorari.  Baker v. Florida, 565 U.S. 1237 (2012).  Baker filed an initial 
postconviction motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, 
raising six claims.2  On September 16, 2013, the trial court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing on Baker’s ineffective assistance claim.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, Baker called trial counsel to testify regarding his twenty years of 
experience as a public defender, his recollection of Baker’s examination during the 
penalty phase, and Baker’s letter of remorse.  Phillips was the only witness called 
to testify at the hearing.  On October 14, 2013, the trial court denied all relief.  
 
Baker has appealed the denial of his postconviction motion to this Court.  He 
has also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court.  
RULE 3.851 MOTION ON APPEAL 
 
Baker has raised the following six issues in this appeal: (1) trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of the trial by 
                                          
 
 
2.  Baker asserted that: (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failing to proffer Baker’s letter of apology; (2) the Rule Regulating the 
Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4), which prohibits party attorneys from interviewing jurors 
after the conclusion of the case, violated Baker’s right to equal protection; (3) the 
trial court’s instructions to the jury during the penalty phase diminished the jury’s 
sense of responsibility in determining the proper sentence and trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to litigate this issue; (4) Florida’s sentencing statute is 
unconstitutional based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Ring, 
536 U.S. 584; (5) Florida’s capital sentencing statutes and rules unconstitutionally 
fail to prevent the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty and 
Florida’s use of lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; and (6) 
cumulative error.  
 
 
- 7 - 
failing to proffer Baker’s letter of apology; (2) the trial court erred in denying 
Baker’s claim that Florida’s rule prohibiting defense counsel from interviewing 
jurors is unconstitutional under the federal and state constitutions; (3) section 
921.141 is facially vague and overbroad, the trial court’s instruction to the jury that 
its role was advisory was unconstitutional, and trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance for failing to litigate these claims; (4) Florida’s death sentence statute is 
unconstitutional as applied; (5) Florida’s capital sentencing statute does not 
prevent the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty, Florida’s 
method of execution is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment, and trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate these claims; and (6) cumulative error.   
Penalty Phase Issues 
 
First, Baker claims that because the capital sentencing scheme utilizes 
aggravating factors to operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a 
greater offense, they must be found by a unanimous jury under Ring, 536 U.S. 584.  
During the pendency of Baker’s case, the United States Supreme Court found 
Florida’s death penalty scheme unconstitutional in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 
(2016).  We have interpreted Hurst v. Florida, an extension of Ring, to require a 
jury to unanimously find each aggravating factor, that the aggravating factors are 
sufficient to warrant death, and that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigation.  See Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 57, 66 (Fla. 2016).  We have also 
 
 
- 8 - 
determined that most defendants sentenced to death after the Ring decision should 
receive the benefit of Hurst.  See Mosley v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S629, S624 
(Fla. Dec. 22, 2016).  Baker, whose sentence was final in 2011, is one such 
defendant.   
 
Because Hurst applies to Baker, we must consider whether it is clear beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have unanimously found all the facts 
necessary for imposition of death and unanimously recommended death, such that 
any Hurst error is harmless.  See Mosley, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at S641.  In this case, 
the jury’s recommendations of death were not unanimous, and the jury made no 
findings concerning the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The jury 
recommended death for the murder of Elizabeth Uptagrafft by a vote of nine to 
three.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that the error in Baker’s penalty phase was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, Baker is entitled to a new 
penalty phase.3  
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Baker raises two claims in his petition for habeas corpus filed with this 
Court.  He contends that (1) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to supplement the record on appeal; and (2) appellate counsel rendered 
                                          
 
 
3.  Because we find that Baker is entitled to a new penalty phase, we do not 
address the other penalty phase issues raised.   
 
 
- 9 - 
ineffective assistance by failing to supplement the record on appeal with the full 
April 24, 2002 ACT Corporation Evaluation Report.  As explained below, Baker is 
not entitled to habeas relief on either claim.  
Record on Appeal 
 
For his first habeas corpus claim, Baker argues appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to supplement the record on appeal.  Claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately presented in a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  
Consistent with the standard set forth by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984), to grant habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel this Court 
must determine: 
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result. 
 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 
1069; Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).  In raising such a claim, 
“[t]he defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act 
upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”  Freeman, 
761 So. 2d at 1069; see Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 1981).  Claims 
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may not be used to camouflage issues 
 
 
- 10 - 
that should have been presented on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion.  
Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000).  “If a legal issue ‘would in 
all probability have been found to be without merit’ had counsel raised the issue on 
direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not 
render appellate counsel’s performance ineffective.”  Id. (quoting Williamson v. 
Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)).  
 
Baker claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to supplement 
the record on appeal with an exhibit that contained the medical records that defense 
psychologist, Dr. Harry Krop, relied on during his testimony during Baker’s 
penalty phase.4  Baker takes issue with the trial court’s finding that he was not 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the crime 
was committed.  As part of the court’s reasoning, it stated that Dr. Krop believed 
                                          
 
 
4.  Both parties agree that an exhibit was admitted into evidence, omitted 
from the record on appeal, and contained the following documents:  
 
Psychological Evaluation by J. Jeff Oatley, Ph.D., dated April 6, 1994; ACT 
Corporation Psychiatric Evaluation by Sharon Winters, M.D., dated April 22, 
1994; Psychological Evaluation by James D. Upson, Ph.D., dated June 24, 1994; 
ACT Corporation Psychiatric Evaluation by Ann Mian, M.D., dated April 30, 
1998; Psychological Report by Peter Larkin, M.A., N.C.S.P., dated April 14, 2000; 
two reports of Harry Krop, Ph.D., dated July 6, 2007 and September 7, 2007; PET 
scan dated February 8, 2008, and an MRI dated September 10, 2007; composite 
records from Shands Hospital from Baker’s 1992 eye surgery; composite of Flagler 
County school health records from Baker; composite of Flagler County school 
system assessment reports for Baker; and composite of Flagler County school 
“other” reports for Baker. 
 
 
- 11 - 
that Baker “suffers from significant brain damage,” yet noted “no other of the 
numerous reports even suggested the possibility of brain damage.”  Baker argues 
that this Court was unable to review the trial court’s determination of Baker’s 
sentence adequately without these records, which further prevented this Court from 
performing a competent proportionality review.  The State argues that the absence 
of the exhibit from the record on appeal did not undermine confidence in the result 
reached in Baker’s direct appeal in light of the extensive testimony of defense 
witnesses that established all of the relevant facts and findings contained within the 
exhibit.   
 
During the penalty phase, defense counsel presented the testimony of Dr. 
Krop.  Dr. Krop’s testimony provided this Court with extensive detail about 
Baker’s difficult childhood as well as all of the medical, psychological, and 
educational issues that were documented in the exhibit.  Dr. Krop explained in 
detail the dynamics of Baker’s difficult childhood as well as his medical and 
developmental challenges.  Dr. Krop also described the findings contained in the 
psychological evaluation conducted by J. Jeff Oatley, Ph.D., on April 6, 1994, and 
the ACT Corporation Psychiatric Evaluation conducted by Sharon Winters, M.D., 
on April 22, 1994.   
 
Dr. Krop then summarized and explained the relevant portions of the 
psychological evaluation by James D. Upson, Ph.D., dated June 24, 1994, and the 
 
 
- 12 - 
ACT Corporation Psychiatric Evaluation by Ann Mian, M.D., dated April 30, 
1998.  Dr. Krop’s testimony then addressed the psychological report by Peter 
Larkin, M.A., N.C.S.P., dated April 14, 2000.  Next, Dr. Krop summarized the 
findings contained in his two reports dated July 6, 2007, and September 7, 2007.  
After explaining the fundamentals of MRI and PET scans, Dr. Krop then explained 
the results of Baker’s PET scan dated February 8, 2008, and Baker’s MRI dated 
September 10, 2007.  Finally, Dr. Krop’s testimony on direct examination 
concluded with his overall opinion and diagnoses regarding Baker’s mental state.  
 
Dr. Krop’s testimony regarding the medical records established that Baker 
had an inability to concentrate, borderline intelligence, and learning disabilities.  
Baker also exhibited poor behavior in school, was not learning, and had a serious 
impairment of social and school functioning.  Regarding his own opinion and 
diagnoses, Dr. Krop testified that Baker had attention deficit disorder and a 
cognitive disorder due to a frontal lobe brain impairment.  None of the other 
medical records or evaluations found that Baker suffered from brain damage.  
 
The State’s cross-examination of Dr. Krop was brief.  The State questioned 
Dr. Krop about his experience serving primarily as an expert witness for the 
defense.  The State then challenged Dr. Krop’s opinion that Baker suffered from 
brain damage, but receded from the line of questioning once Dr. Krop explained 
that he based his opinion on his own neuropsychological testing and the findings of 
 
 
- 13 - 
Baker’s PET scan.  The State challenged Dr. Krop’s findings of brain damage and 
borderline intelligence but left the bulk of Dr. Krop’s testimony unrefuted.  Dr. 
Krop’s conclusions and testimony concerning the contents of the documents within 
the Exhibit were unimpeached and did not need documentary support or 
augmentation.  
 
This Court has routinely affirmed death sentences despite there being an 
incomplete record on appeal.  Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 163 (Fla. 2002) 
(“Darling has failed to demonstrate what specific prejudice, if any, has been 
incurred because of the missing transcripts.  The missing portion of the transcript 
has not been shown to be necessary for a complete review of this appeal.”); 
Armstrong v. State, 862 So. 2d 705, 721 (Fla. 2003) (“Armstrong has failed to link 
a meritorious appellate issue to the allegedly missing record and thus cannot 
establish that he was prejudiced by its absence.”).  Baker fails to show how he was 
prejudiced by the omissions in the record, or how consideration of new information 
contained within the exhibit would change the result of Baker’s direct appeal or 
otherwise undermine confidence therein.  The trial court’s finding that only Dr. 
Krop believed Baker suffered from brain damage was correct.  Contrary to Baker’s 
claim, neither the PET scan nor any other defense exhibit submitted into evidence 
tendered the conclusion that Baker suffered from brain damage.  
 
 
- 14 - 
 
Furthermore, counsel is not ineffective for failing to present duplicative or 
cumulative evidence of a single mitigating factor.  See Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 
366, 378 (Fla. 2007) (citing Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1106 (Fla. 2002)); 
see also Sweet v. State, 810 So. 2d 854, 863-64 (Fla. 2002).  Dr. Krop’s extensive 
testimony5 regarding Baker’s medical reports established all of the relevant facts 
and findings contained within the exhibit.  Dr. Krop’s testimony concerning the 
relevant facts and findings contained in the exhibit was a part of the record on 
appeal and the State never impeached any defense witness testimony concerning 
the exhibit’s content.  The exhibit adds no substantial mitigating evidence to the 
record. 
 
Baker’s appellate counsel did not commit serious error by failing to 
supplement the record to include the missing exhibit in light of its cumulative 
nature and relatively minor import.  Even if appellate counsel should have 
supplemented the record, Baker has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by 
the omission of an exhibit from the record on appeal.  For these reasons, we deny 
Baker relief as to this claim.  
 
                                          
 
 
5.  Dr. Krop’s direct examination testimony exceeded fifty pages of trial 
transcript.  The State’s cross-examination comprised less than seven pages of trial 
transcript. 
 
 
- 15 - 
ACT Corporation Evaluation Report 
 
As the second claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Baker argues 
that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to supplement 
the record on appeal with the full April 24, 2002, ACT Corporation Evaluation 
Report.  Again, in order to determine whether Baker is entitled to habeas relief, this 
Court must determine (1) “whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as 
to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling outside the range of 
professionally acceptable performance,” and (2) “whether the deficiency in 
performance compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine 
confidence in the correctness of the result.”  Cox v. State, 966 So. 2d 337, 365 
(Fla. 2007) (quoting Pope, 496 So. 2d at 800).  “The defendant has the burden of 
alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”  Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 
520 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069).  “Appellate counsel is not 
ineffective for failing to raise issues not preserved for appeal.”  Medina v. Dugger, 
586 So. 2d 317, 318 (Fla. 1991).   
 
Baker argues that an April 24, 2002, history and assessment of Baker 
prepared by a social worker for the ACT Corporation was discussed during witness 
testimony but never submitted into evidence.  Baker takes exception with the trial 
court’s reference to information contained in the report in its Sentencing Order.  
 
 
- 16 - 
Since Baker did not object to the Sentencing Order on this basis, he is procedurally 
barred from seeking relief for this trial court error.  Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 
3d 535, 563 (Fla. 2010) (“Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may not be 
used to camouflage issues that should have been presented on direct appeal or in a 
postconviction motion.”) (citations omitted).  
 
Baker also fails to establish how he was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s 
failure to supplement the record on appeal with this report.  Baker argues that the 
prognosis that he was at a low to moderate risk of suicide shows proof that Baker 
suffered from extreme emotional disturbances.  This argument is meritless.  While 
the report was made because Baker was allegedly seen tying a sheet around his 
neck, Baker denied that he ever did so and specifically claimed that the report was 
false.  Moreover, the report indicates that Baker denied any depression, reported 
that he had a couple of class friends, attended church, denied feeling suicidal, 
appeared to the evaluator to have normal intelligence and a strong street sense, and 
liked listening to music.  Finally, the relevant portion of the report that the trial 
court cited in its Sentencing Order that Baker had a “strong street sense” was a part 
of Dr. Krop’s testimony.   
 
This report did little to support Baker’s claim of extreme emotional distress 
and actually contradicted Baker’s claim of borderline intelligence.  For this reason, 
appellate counsel cannot be found to have committed serious error by failing to 
 
 
- 17 - 
supplement the record on appeal to include the report.  Further, Baker has failed to 
demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the omission of this report from the record 
on appeal.  Consequently, we deny relief as to this claim.  
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Baker’s 
claim related to the constitutionality of Florida’s death penalty scheme, and we 
deny habeas relief.  Accordingly, we vacate Baker’s death sentence as 
unconstitutional under Hurst and remand to the trial court for a new penalty phase.  
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision except its vacating of the death 
sentence pursuant to Hurst. 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
Two Cases:  
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Flagler County,  
Joseph David Walsh, Judge - Case No. 182007CF000033XXXXXX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
 
 
- 18 - 
James V. Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, and 
Ann Marie Mirialakis and Ali A. Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional 
Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Vivian Singleton, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent