Case Title: People v. Barney

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the filing of the opinion 
to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at 
anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the 
following slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, 
it cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following 
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official 
Reports advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
                   No. 81389--Agenda 5--January 1997. 
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. GEORGE BARNEY, 
                               Appellant. 
                      Opinion filed March 20, 1997. 
 
     JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court: 
     The issue in this case is whether a criminal defendant who has 
testified on his own behalf is entitled to a new trial because the 
prosecutor told the jury during closing argument that the defendant 
had an interest or bias in being found not guilty. Adhering to its 
recent decision in People v. Armstrong, 275 Ill. App. 3d 503 
(1995), the Fourth District of the Appellate Court held that such 
remarks did not constitute reversible error, reasoning that the 
State is entitled to comment on the bias or prejudice of the 
defendant, just as it may with any other witness. No. 4--94--0850 
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). 
     The appellate court's position has been followed by the First 
Division of the First District of the Appellate Court, which held 
that argument by the prosecutor "that asks the jury to consider a 
defendant's interest in the outcome of the case in evaluating his 
credibility is proper." People v. Falconer, 282 Ill. App. 3d 785, 
790 (1996). By contrast, the Third District of the Appellate Court 
(People v. Walton, 246 Ill. App. 3d 552, 555 (1993); People v. 
Crowder, 239 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1030-31 (1993); People v. Ellis, 
233 Ill. App. 3d 508, 511 (1992); People v. Watts, 225 Ill. App. 3d 
604, 606-07 (1992)) and the Second Division of the First District 
of the Appellate Court (People v. Cross, 272 Ill. App. 3d 354, 364 
(1995)) have taken the position that such comments constitute 
reversible error because they imply that a defendant is presumed to 
lie simply because of his status as a defendant and diminish his 
fundamental right to the presumption of innocence. We granted 
defendant's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315) to 
resolve this conflict among the districts, and for the reasons that 
follow, we affirm. 
     The facts pertinent to the case are straightforward. Defendant 
was searched by police following his arrest for driving without a 
license. During the course of the search, police found what turned 
out to be cocaine in one of defendant's coat pockets. Based on that 
discovery, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1992)) and unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 
ILCS 570/401(d) (West 1992)). 
     Defendant was given a jury trial on the charge of unlawful 
possession. At trial, defendant did not deny that there was cocaine 
in his coat pockets. His defense was that he should not be found 
guilty because the law requires that the possession be knowing (720 
ILCS 570/402 (West 1992)) and that element was not present here. 
According to defendant, the coat was not his--it belonged to his 
mother--and he had no idea that there were illegal drugs in the 
pockets at the time of his arrest. 
     Defendant presented various witnesses to substantiate that the 
coat was, in fact, his mother's and not his. The most significant 
testimony came from defendant himself, who told the jury that he 
owned no coat of his own, that he usually wears one of his 
brother's coats, that this coat was just lying around the house, 
that although the coat belonged to his mother she was no longer 
staying at the house, that he had worn the coat occasionally, that 
other people had worn the coat as well, and that he had not known 
that small plastic bags containing the cocaine were located in the 
pockets. 
     At the close of the evidence, an instructions conference was 
held during which the court indicated its intention to use Illinois 
Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.02 (3d ed. 1992), a 
standard instruction given to the jury in nearly every criminal 
case. The court used the version of the instruction applicable 
where, as here, a defendant has testified. The instruction 
provided: 
               "Only you are the judges of the believability of the 
          witnesses and of the weight to be given to the testimony 
          of each of them. In considering the testimony of any 
          witness, you may take into account his ability and 
          opportunity to observe, his memory, his manner while 
          testifying, any interest, bias or prejudice he may have, 
          and the reasonableness of his testimony considered in the 
          light of all the evidence in the case. 
               You should judge the testimony of the defendant in 
          the same manner as you judge the testimony of any other 
          witness." 
     In contemplation of this instruction, the prosecutor addressed 
the issue of defendant's bias during closing arguments. He stated: 
               "Obviously the defendant has an interest or bias 
          here, and that interest or bias here is that, you know, 
          he wants to be found not guilty." 
This remark drew an unsuccessful objection and motion for mistrial, 
and it is the basis for this appeal. 
     Defendant was ultimately found guilty and sentenced to 2« 
years' probation. Pursuant to an agreement with the prosecutor, he 
subsequently pleaded guilty to the companion charge of unlawful 
possession with intent to deliver and received the identical 
sentence, 2« years' probation, to be served concurrently. 
     Defendant has never attempted to withdraw his guilty plea for 
the offense of unlawful possession with intent to deliver, but he 
did file a post-trial motion with respect to his conviction on the 
unlawful possession charge. That motion contended, inter alia, that 
the prosecution should not have been permitted to make the argument 
that defendant was biased because he had an interest in being 
acquitted. 
     Defendant's post-trial motion was denied. The appellate court 
subsequently affirmed in an unpublished order under Supreme Court 
Rule 23, invoking its recent decision in People v. Armstrong, 275 
Ill. App. 3d 503 (1995), to hold that the prosecutor's remarks were 
not improper. This appeal followed. 
     In assailing the judgment of the appellate court, defendant 
contends that the prosecutor's remarks were improper and that he 
should be granted a new trial because the challenged remarks 
contravened his presumption of innocence. This argument was 
previously considered and rejected by the Fourth District in People 
v. Armstrong, 275 Ill. App. 3d 503 (1995), and by the First 
Division of the First District of the Appellate Court in People v. 
Falconer, 282 Ill. App. 3d 785, 790 (1996). Although a contrary 
position has been taken by judges in the Third District of the 
Appellate Court (see People v. Walton, 246 Ill. App. 3d 552, 555 
(1993); People v. Crowder, 239 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1030-31 (1993); 
People v. Ellis, 233 Ill. App. 3d 508, 511 (1992); People v. Watts, 
225 Ill. App. 3d 604, 606-07 (1992)) and the Second Division of the 
First District of the Appellate Court (see People v. Cross, 272 
Ill. App. 3d 354, 364 (1995)), we cannot agree with the reasoning 
in this second line of cases. 
     Where, as here, a prosecutor suggests to the members of the 
jury that a defendant's testimony is biased because he has an 
interest in the outcome of the case, the prosecutor is not telling 
them anything they do not know and are not already thinking. The 
notion that the possibility of conviction may color a defendant's 
testimony is so basic, so rooted in common experience and human 
nature, that it would be taken into account by the jurors whether 
the prosecutor mentioned it or not. When the prosecution makes the 
point during closing argument, it is merely stating the obvious. 
The complexion of the case is unchanged. 
     Defendant contends that a prosecutor's reference to an 
accused's interest in acquittal is nevertheless improper because of 
an overriding consideration, the presumption of innocence. We note, 
however, that assailing a defendant's testimony by pointing out his 
interest in being acquitted no more erodes the presumption of 
innocence than any other attempt by the State to prove its case and 
refute the evidence presented by the defense. The presumption of 
innocence remains. Arguing bias is merely one means for the State 
to try to rebut that presumption. 
     When the defendant contends that the State should not be 
allowed to argue that he is biased because he has an interest in 
avoiding conviction, what he is really suggesting is that his 
testimony should be cloaked with a presumption of veracity. No such 
presumption exists. As Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, 
Criminal, No. 1.02 (3d ed. 1992), recognizes, the testimony of a 
criminal defendant is entitled no greater deference than the 
testimony of any other witness. This court made that clear nearly 
40 years ago when it expressly held: 
               "When a defendant elects to testify in his own 
          behalf, his credibility is to be tested by the usual 
          rules applicable to other witnesses. In determining the 
          credibility of a witness, including a defendant, the jury 
          may take into consideration, among other things, the 
          probability or improbability of the truth of his 
          statements in the light of human experience. [Citations.] 
          The jury are not entitled to disregard the accused's 
          testimony merely because he is the defendant in the case, 
          but it may consider his interest in the result of the 
          trial in weighing his testimony." People v. Malmenato,  14 Ill. 2d 52 , 59 (1958). 
     These principles remain the law in Illinois, and they are 
dispositive of this appeal. Because the jury was entitled to 
consider the defendant's interest in the result of the trial in 
weighing his testimony, the prosecutor's statement that defendant 
had an interest or bias in being found not guilty was not 
reversible error. 
     For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court 
is affirmed. 
 
 Affirmed.