Case Title: People v. Ford

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90083

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90083-Agenda 35-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								ERIC FORD, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 18, 2001. - Modified upon denial of
rehearing December 3, 2001
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue presented is whether defendant's 100-year
extended-term sentence for the commission of first degree murder
is constitutional under the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). We hold that it is.

BACKGROUND
	The facts are not in dispute. On February 17, 1995, a tugboat
captain found Tommy Glass' body lying on the bank of the
Calumet Sag Channel. The body was lacerated, badly decomposed,
and missing several parts. Due to the condition of Glass' body,
which had been immersed in the channel for several weeks, the
original autopsy report listed the cause of death as
"indeterminate."
	On April 5, 1995, defendant confessed to participating in
Glass' murder. According to defendant's statement, on December
27, 1994, defendant and three fellow gang members grabbed Glass
off the street and dragged him into a nearby apartment to question
him concerning the murder of their friend James Chapman. When
Glass denied any involvement in Chapman's murder, all four men
repeatedly punched him in the face. Attempting to protect himself,
Glass curled up into a ball on the floor. One of defendant's cohorts
summoned a fifth member of defendant's gang, Altai Thornton,
who was passing on the street. Thornton entered the apartment and
began beating Glass' head and body with a paint can. According
to defendant, "It was kind of funny at that point." Thornton then
entered the kitchen, removed all four heated burners from the
stove, and seared Glass' face with each of the burners. Each
searing lasted "like thirty seconds," and defendant "could hear his
face sizzling." Defendant and Thornton then used duct tape to bind
Glass' ankles, knees, arms, and mouth. Once Glass was bound,
Thornton heated a metal rake on the stove and again seared Glass'
head.
	At this point, Thornton suggested tossing Glass into the
Calumet Sag Channel. Defendant objected, noting that Glass
"would float up to the top." Defendant was outvoted, however,
and the five men carried Glass to a nearby hill, where defendant
and Thornton rolled Glass' body to the water's edge. Glass was
still alive at this point, so, while defendant watched, Thornton held
Glass under the water for about 10 minutes. Finally, defendant
"saw [Thornton] push down one last time and come back to the
shore."
	Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of first
degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1998)). The State
sought imposition of the death penalty, and defendant waived a
jury for both phases of the capital sentencing hearing. The trial
court found defendant eligible for the death penalty both because
the murder was committed in the course of another felony (720
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1998)) and because the murder was
intentional and involved the infliction of torture (720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(14) (West 1998)). The trial court declined to impose the
death penalty, however, noting that defendant was young, had
confessed to the crime, had cooperated with the police, and lacked
a significant criminal record. The trial court instead imposed an
extended-term sentence of 100 years based upon its finding that
the murder "was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty." See 730 ILCS
5/5-5-3.2(b)(2), 5-8-2(a)(1) (West 1998).
	Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, and the
appellate court affirmed in an unpublished order. No. 1-99-0104
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Two months
later, defendant filed a petition for rehearing in which he argued
for the first time that his 100-year extended-term sentence was
unconstitutional under Apprendi. The appellate court denied the
petition "for want of jurisdiction." Defendant then filed a motion
for leave to file a late petition for leave to appeal, and this court
granted both the motion and the petition. 177 Ill. 2d Rs. 315(a),
(b).

ANALYSIS
	Defendant argues that his 100-year extended-term sentence is
unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). According to defendant, under section
5-8-1(a)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) (730
ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1) (West 1998)), the maximum sentence for first
degree murder in Illinois is 60 years. Although sections
5-5-3.2(b)(2) and 5-8-2(a)(1) of the Code (730 ILCS
5/5-5-3.2(b)(2), 5-8-2(a)(1) (West 1998)) authorize the
imposition of an extended-term sentence of between 60 and 100
years if the trial court finds that the murder "was accompanied by
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty," that finding need not be based upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Rather, that finding need only be based upon a
preponderance of the evidence. This, defendant insists, violates
Apprendi's mandate that "any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at
2362-63.(1) In response, the State argues that Apprendi does not
apply to Illinois' first degree murder statute because the maximum
penalty authorized by that statute is death.
	Before reaching the merits of defendant's argument, we note
that, although it was announced after the appellate court issued its
opinion in this case, the decision in Apprendi nevertheless applies
to this case. As this court consistently has held, judicial opinions
announcing new constitutional rules applicable to criminal cases
are retroactive to all cases-like this one-pending on direct review
at the time the new constitutional rule is declared. See People v.
Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d 117, 126 (2001); see also People v. Erickson,
117 Ill. 2d 271, 288 (1987), citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987).
	That said, we need not decide whether the maximum sentence
authorized by the Illinois first degree murder statute is 60 years, as
defendant contends, or death, as the State contends. This is
because, under the particular facts presented in this case,
defendant's 100-year extended-term sentence clearly complies
with the rule announced in Apprendi.
	In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court invalidated
New Jersey's hate crime statute, which allowed the sentencing
judge to increase the sentence for a particular offense beyond the
statutory maximum if the judge found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant, in committing the offense, acted with
a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals on
the basis of, inter alia, race. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 468-69, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 442, 120 S. Ct.  at 2351. In doing so, the Court held that,
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV), "[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at
2362-63.
	In this case, defendant was convicted of first degree murder,
and the State-as it is entitled to do-sought imposition of the death
penalty based upon that conviction. Defendant waived a jury for
both phases of the capital sentencing hearing, and the trial court
found, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was
eligible for the death penalty. At this point, and based exclusively
upon facts that were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant
faced a prescribed statutory maximum sentence of death. The
sentence actually imposed-100 years in prison-does not exceed
this maximum.
	That the aggravating factor used to impose defendant's 100-year sentence-i.e., that the murder "was accompanied by
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty"-was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt is immaterial.
Apprendi does not require that every fact related to sentencing be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. On the contrary, Apprendi
requires that only those facts that increase the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. As Apprendi explains:
			"We should be clear that nothing *** suggests that it is
impermissible for judges to exercise discretion-taking
into consideration various factors relating both to offense
and offender-in imposing a judgment within the range
prescribed by statute. We have often noted that judges in
this country have long exercised discretion of this nature
in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the
individual case." (Emphases in original.) Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 481, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 449, 120 S. Ct.  at 2358 .
Here, the maximum sentence facing defendant (i.e., death) was
established when the trial court found, by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the murder both was committed in the
course of another felony and involved the infliction of torture. The
trial court's subsequent finding that the murder "was accompanied
by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty" did nothing to increase the penalty that defendant was
facing. Rather, it simply guided the trial court in fashioning an
appropriate sentence that was both specifically authorized by
statute and below the prescribed statutory maximum. This is
precisely the type of judicial fact finding that Apprendi permits.
	We therefore hold that, as in this case, when a defendant is
found eligible for the death penalty by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the imposition of an extended-term prison sentence under
sections 5-5-3.2(b)(2) and 5-8-2(a)(1) of the Code complies with
the rule announced in Apprendi. Indeed, to hold otherwise would
be to construe the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
as authorizing the ordering of a man's death but prohibiting the
sentencing of that same man to a term of years in prison. Apprendi
does not compel such an absurdity.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed.
Affirmed. 
	I agree that the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), applies retroactively and that the matter before us
is subject to the principles decided in that case. Contrary to the
majority, however, I believe that Apprendi requires us to vacate
Ford's extended-term sentence.
	Apprendi holds that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490,
147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at 2362-63. Under this rule, the
prescribed maximum sentence is the maximum sentence a court
could impose based on the jury's verdict of guilty. It does not
include enhanced sentences which require findings in addition to
the determination of guilt. If an additional finding is required to
impose a more severe sentence than would be authorized based on
the guilty verdict alone, Apprendi holds that the finding must be
made by a jury based on facts proved by the State beyond a
reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455,
120 S. Ct.  at 2362-63.
	The prescribed statutory maximum for first degree murder, the
crime for which Ford was convicted, is 60 years' imprisonment.
730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 1998); see People v. Beachem,
317 Ill. App. 3d 693, 706-08 (2000); People v. Kaczmarek, 318 Ill.
App. 3d 340, 350 (2000). That is the highest punishment that can
be imposed based solely on the facts reflected in the jury's verdict
of guilty. Additional imprisonment is possible, but the 60-year
maximum cannot be exceeded without an additional finding that
the murder was accompanied by "exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty" (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b), 5-8-2(a), 5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West 1998)) or one of
various other enumerated statutory aggravating factors (730 ILCS
5/5-8-2(a), 5-5-3.2(b) (West 1998)). If a finding of
"exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty" is made, a defendant convicted of first degree murder is
subject to an extended term of not less than 60 years and not more
than 100 years (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(1), 5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West
1998)) or natural life (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b) (West 1998)).
	Under a plain reading of Apprendi, such a sentencing scheme
is valid only if the existence of the aggravating factor is made by
the jury, and the State has the burden of proving the aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt. The Illinois statutes, however,
expressly provide that the aggravating factor necessary to support
an enhanced sentence is to be made by the court, not a jury, and
the law contains no requirement that the aggravating factor be
proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. See 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b), 5-8-2(a) (West 1998).(2) Because of those
deficiencies, extended terms imposed under the statutes cannot, as
a general rule, pass constitutional muster under Apprendi. See
People v. Swift, 322 Ill. App. 3d 127, 130 (2001); People v. Lee,
319 Ill. App. 3d 289, 307-08 (2001); People v. Chanthaloth, 318
Ill. App. 3d 806, 816-18 (2001); People v. Kaczmarek, 318 Ill.
App. 3d 340, 353 (2000); People v. Lee, 318 Ill. App. 3d 417, 422
(2000); People v. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d 693, 708 (2000);
People v. Joyner, 317 Ill. App. 3d 93, 109-10 (2000).
	An exception to this rule applies where the State seeks the
death penalty, but the defendant waives a jury for capital
sentencing. If the circuit court finds the defendant eligible for
death, but instead of death, imposes an extended term based on the
same aggravating factor on which the finding of death eligibility
was predicated, no Apprendi violations occurs. See People v. Tye,
323 Ill. App. 3d 872 (2001). The reason is this: the defendant
cannot complain that he was denied the right to a jury because he
affirmatively waived a jury, and he cannot complain that the
standard of proof was too lax because under section 9-1(f) of the
Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(f) (West 1998)), the
death-eligibility factors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
even where the proceedings are before the court sitting without a
jury. Accordingly, the concerns underlying Apprendi are not
implicated. 
	This exception is inapplicable to the case before us because
the trial court did not rely on the same factor to support the 100-year extended term as it used to find Ford death eligible. Ford was
found death eligible because the murder was committed in the
course of another felony and because the murder was intentional
and involved the infliction of torture. While the trial court was
required to find those eligibility factors beyond a reasonable doubt,
it had no similar requirement under the law then in effect with
respect to the question of whether the offense was accompanied by
"exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty" (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West 1998)), which was the
aggravating factor invoked by the trial court to justify the 100-year
extended term under section 5-8-2(a)(1) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(1)
(West 1998)). Because the court was not required to find that
aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, the extended term
cannot stand under Apprendi. The extended-term portion of Ford's
sentence should therefore be vacated.
 



 



1.      1Defendant also suggests that, under Apprendi, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be charged in the indictment. However, the Court in
Apprendi specifically declined to address the indictment question,
noting that (1) Apprendi did not assert a constitutional claim based upon
the indictment's failure to charge the extended-term sentencing factors,
and (2) the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, upon which
Apprendi exclusively relied, has never been construed to make the fifth
amendment right to " 'presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury' "
applicable to the states. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 477 n.3, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at
447 n.3, 120 S. Ct.  at 2355 n.3.

2.      2Public Act 91-953, §10, which took effect February 23, 2001,
amended section 5-8-1(a)(1)(b) and section 5-8-2(a) to specify that the
aggravating factors necessary to support enhanced sentences must now
to be found by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.