Case Title: In re Cabrera

Citation: 

Docket Number: S197283

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 10/29/12 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
In re ELVIN CABRERA, 
) 
 
 
) 
S197283 
 
on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
  
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
Ct.App. 5 F059511 
 
Prison regulations promulgated by the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) set forth the procedures and substantive 
requirements for validating an inmate as a member or associate of a prison gang.  
Because gangs “present a serious threat to the safety and security of California 
prisons” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3023, subd. (b)), validation of an inmate as a 
gang member or associate can result in the inmate‟s placement in a security 
housing unit (SHU).   
The current dispute arose when the CDCR validated petitioner Elvin 
Cabrera as a gang associate—i.e., “an inmate . . . who is involved periodically or 
regularly with members or associates of a gang.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3378, 
subd. (c)(4) (hereafter section 3378)).  Under section 3378, validation of an inmate 
as an “associate” requires at least three “independent source items of 
documentation indicative of association” with persons who have been classified as 
gang members or associates.  (Ibid.)  At least one of the source items must be a 
“direct link” to a current or former gang member or associate.  (Ibid.)     
The question presented for our review, which involves the meaning of this 
prison regulation, is very narrow.  In essence, the CDCR contends that the Court 
 
 
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of Appeal erred by independently interpreting the scope of the regulation‟s 
requirement of a “direct link” between the inmate and a gang member or associate 
with respect to one category of source items—a category called “Association” 
(§ 3378, subd. (c)(8)(G))—instead of deferring to the CDCR‟s interpretation of its 
own regulation.1  For the reasons that follow, we agree the Court of Appeal failed 
to accord due deference to the CDCR‟s interpretation of its own regulations, and 
therefore reverse the judgment awarding habeas corpus relief and remand the 
matter to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings.    
BACKGROUND 
In 2003, Cabrera was convicted of robbery, burglary, receiving stolen 
property, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  He was sentenced to prison for 62 
years to life.  He is incarcerated at the California Correctional Institution at 
Tehachapi.       
On May 13, 2008, Cabrera was officially identified—or “validated,” in the 
words of the CDCR regulation (§ 3378, subd. (c)(4))—as an associate of the 
Mexican Mafia prison gang.  The validation was based on the discovery in his 
prison cell of several photocopied drawings containing symbols distinctive to the 
gang.  Two of the drawings were signed by validated affiliates2 of the Mexican 
Mafia.   
                                              
1  
Section 3378 uses the term “association” in two different contexts:  first in 
subdivision (c)(4) to explain that “identification” as an “associate” requires at least 
three independent source items of documentation “indicative of association,” and 
later in subdivision (c)(8)(G) as the label (“Association”) for one category of 
source items.  In this opinion, we address the term‟s meaning only in the latter 
context.   
2  
Like the parties, we use the term “affiliate” to refer collectively to gang 
members and associates.   
 
 
3 
Cabrera challenged his validation through the CDCR administrative appeal 
process, but his appeal was denied.  Cabrera then filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in Kern County Superior Court.  The superior court denied the petition, 
finding that his validation as a gang associate was supported by three source items 
of gang validation with two direct links to gang affiliates.    
Cabrera filed an original petition in the Court of Appeal, which issued an 
order to show cause and then granted relief in a published opinion.  The Court of 
Appeal‟s decision to grant relief rested on a disagreement with the CDCR over the 
interpretation of the CDCR‟s own regulation.  In the view of the Court of Appeal, 
the regulation providing that at least one source item indicative of association with 
validated gang affiliates be a “direct link” to a current or former validated gang 
affiliate (§ 3378, subd. (c)(4)) required in these circumstances a “reciprocal (i.e., 
mutual or two-way) interaction between the two individuals forming the 
relationship.”  Having found insufficient evidence of such a reciprocal 
relationship, the Court of Appeal granted the writ and ordered the CDCR to 
expunge Cabrera‟s validation as an associate of the Mexican Mafia gang and to 
cease housing Cabrera in the SHU to the extent the assignment had been based on 
the gang validation.  In light of its disposition, the Court of Appeal found it 
unnecessary to consider Cabrera‟s other challenges to the validation order.     
We granted review to resolve a question of law concerning the deference 
owed to the CDCR in interpreting its own regulations governing the identification 
of inmates as prison-gang affiliates.  
DISCUSSION 
It is a “ „black letter‟ proposition” that there are two categories of 
administrative rules—quasi-legislative rules and interpretive rules—and that the 
distinction between them derives from their different legal foundations and 
ultimately from the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers.  (Yamaha 
 
 
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Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 10 (Yamaha).)  
Quasi-legislative rules are those that the agency promulgates as part of the 
lawmaking power the Legislature has delegated to it, and are subject to “very 
limited” review.  (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1012.)  “ „The 
courts exercise limited review of legislative acts by administrative bodies out of 
deference to the separation of powers between the Legislature and the judiciary, to 
the legislative delegation of administrative authority to the agency, and to the 
presumed expertise of the agency within its scope of authority.‟ ”  (San Francisco 
Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
653, 667.)  Rules that interpret a statute, on the other hand, receive less judicial 
deference.  (Sara M., supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1012.) 
The Legislature has “provided no specific guidance regarding how 
prisoners should be classified” (In re Jenkins (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1167, 1173), but 
has instead delegated lawmaking power to the CDCR to “prescribe and amend 
rules and regulations for the administration of the prisons.”  (Pen. Code, § 5058; 
see also id., § 5068.)  “By enacting these statutes, „[t]he Legislature has given the 
[secretary] broad authority for the discipline and classification of persons confined 
in state prisons.  [Citations.]  This authority includes the mandate to promulgate 
regulations governing administration, classification, and discipline.‟”  (In re 
Jenkins, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1173.) 
Section 3378 (the regulation at issue here) is a quasi-legislative rule 
promulgated by the CDCR to identify and manage inmates with a prison-gang 
affiliation.  Because the CDCR, like any agency granted this sort of substantive 
lawmaking power, is “truly „making law,‟ [its] quasi-legislative rules have the 
dignity of statutes.  When a court assesses the validity of such rules, the scope of 
its review is narrow.  If satisfied that the rule in question lay within the lawmaking 
authority delegated by the Legislature, and that it is reasonably necessary to 
 
 
5 
implement the purpose of the statute, judicial review is at an end.”  (Yamaha, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.)  “The substitution of the judgment of a court for 
that of the administrator in quasi-legislative matters would effectuate neither the 
legislative mandate nor sound social policy.”  (Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 
824, 835.)   
No party disputes that section 3378 is within the scope of the authority 
conferred by the Legislature on the CDCR.  Rather, the question here is how to 
interpret one of the provisions in section 3378 governing validation of an associate 
of a prison gang.  The Court of Appeal and the CDCR have differing views as to 
the interpretation of this provision of section 3378.  But resolution of their dispute 
must acknowledge one simple observation:  “we defer to an agency‟s 
interpretation of its own regulations, particularly when the interpretation 
implicates areas of the agency‟s expertise.”  (Environmental Protection 
Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 459, 505.)       
The text of section 3378, subdivision (c)(4) provides:  “An associate is an 
inmate/parolee or any person who is involved periodically or regularly with 
members or associates of a gang.  This identification requires at least three (3) 
independent source items of documentation indicative of association with 
validated gang members or associates.  Validation of an inmate/parolee or any 
person as an associate of a prison gang shall require at least one (1) source item be 
a direct link to a current or former validated member or associate of the gang, or to 
an inmate/parolee or any person who is validated by the department within six (6) 
months of the established or estimated date of activity identified in the evidence 
considered.”  Section 3378 lists 13 different categories of source items indicative 
of association with validated gang affiliates, including an inmate‟s admission of 
involvement with the gang, tattoos and symbols distinctive to the gang, written 
 
 
6 
material or communications evidencing gang activity, the inmate‟s association 
with validated gang affiliates, and offenses reflecting gang affiliation.  (§ 3378, 
subd. (c)(8).) 
In this case, the source items underlying the CDCR‟s validation of Cabrera 
as a gang associate consisted of several photocopied drawings containing symbols 
assertedly distinctive to the Mexican Mafia.  Two drawings depict armed women 
(one with a spear, one with a revolver) and contain a “Matlactomei” symbol (the 
Mayan symbol for 13), which consists of two vertical lines and a vertical column 
of three dots.  The number 13 refers to “M,” the 13th letter in the alphabet, and is 
used as a designation for the Mexican Mafia gang.  (See People v. Gonzalez 
(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1544.)  One of these drawings is signed by a 
validated associate of the Mexican Mafia.  Another drawing depicts a female 
Mesoamerican warrior armed with a sword and shield as well as a bow and quiver 
of arrows.  An “eternal war shield,” which demonstrates loyalty to the Mexican 
Mafia, is on her chest.  A fourth drawing, which features Mesoamerican and 
imprisonment themes, is signed by a validated member of the Mexican Mafia.   
The prison‟s institutional classification committee concluded that the drawings 
depicting the gang symbols qualified as source items under the “Tattoos and 
symbols” category of the regulation (§ 3378, subd. (c)(8)(B))3 and that the signed 
drawings qualified as source items under the “Association” category (id., subd. 
                                              
3  
“Tattoos and symbols.  Body markings, hand signs, distinctive clothing, 
graffiti, etc., which have been identified by gang investigators as being used by 
and distinctive to specific gangs.  Staff shall describe the tattoo or symbol and 
articulate why it is believed that the tattoo or symbol is used by and distinctive of 
gang association or membership.  Staff shall document and disclose this 
information to the inmate/parolee in a written form that would not jeopardize the 
safety of any person or the security of the institution.”  (§ 3378, subd. (c)(8)(B).) 
 
 
7 
(c)(8)(G)).4  The committee further found that Cabrera‟s possession of two 
drawings signed by validated Mexican Mafia affiliates directly linked him to those 
gang affiliates.     
The Court of Appeal accepted the CDCR‟s definition of “direct link” 
(§ 3378, subd. (c)(4)) as encompassing a connection that is “ „without interruption 
or diversion‟ and „without any intervening agency or step.‟ ”  The Court of Appeal 
also accepted the CDCR‟s definition of “association with validated gang affiliates” 
(§ 3378, subd. (c)(8)) to mean “a „loose relationship as a partner, . . . colleague, 
friend, companion, or ally‟ with a validated gang affiliate.”  This connection could 
be established, according to the Court of Appeal, by “information related to the 
inmate‟s loose relationship with a gang affiliate.”   
But the Court of Appeal departed from the CDCR‟s construction of the 
regulation when the court purported to “combine the definitions and reach a 
conclusion as to what is meant by „direct link‟ when the source item used is the 
inmate‟s „association with validated gang affiliates‟ ”:  “The relationship, whether 
characterized as one of partners, colleagues, friends, companions, or allies, must 
involve reciprocal (i.e., mutual or two-way) interaction between the two 
individuals forming the relationship.  In other words, the requisite relationship 
cannot be created solely by one party‟s action; there must be some assent or 
mutuality from the other party.”  The Court of Appeal then relied on the lack of 
evidence of “a mutual relationship, even a loose one,” to conclude that the CDCR 
                                              
4  
“Association.  Information related to the inmate/parolee‟s association with 
validated gang affiliates.  Information including addresses, names, identities and 
reasons why such information is indicative of association with a prison gang or 
disruptive group.  Staff shall document and disclose this information to the 
inmate/parolee in a written form that would not jeopardize the safety of any person 
or the security of the institution.”  (§ 3378, subd. (c)(8)(G).) 
 
 
8 
had failed to establish a direct link between Cabrera and any validated gang 
affiliate and, on that basis, granted relief.      
In announcing its interpretation of the CDCR regulation, the Court of 
Appeal acknowledged that the CDCR had construed the regulation to have a 
broader scope.  In the CDCR‟s view, the regulation‟s requirement of a direct link 
does not require evidence of a reciprocal or two-way interaction between the 
inmate and the validated gang affiliate in these circumstances.  Yet, in rejecting 
the CDCR‟s interpretation, the Court of Appeal offered neither deference to the 
agency‟s view nor acknowledgement of the agency‟s expertise in prison 
management.  This was error.   
“As a general matter, courts will be deferential to government agency 
interpretations of their own regulations, particularly when the interpretation 
involves matters within the agency‟s expertise and does not plainly conflict with a 
statutory mandate.”  (Environmental Protection Information Center v. California 
Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 490.)  The question of 
how best to identify gang affiliates in the prison setting “is a judgment call, and we 
will not disturb the agency‟s determination without a demonstration that it is 
clearly unreasonable.”  (Ibid.) 
The Court of Appeal never contended that the CDCR‟s interpretation of 
section 3378 was clearly unreasonable.  It instead chided the CDCR for appearing 
to rely “on an overly broad interpretation of our opinion in In re Furnace [(2010) 
185 Cal.App.4th 649],” which, the Court of Appeal contended, did not address 
“whether mutuality or reciprocity was inherent in the concept of „association.‟ ”  
Because that issue had not been decided in Furnace, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that “the Furnace decision does not prevent us from interpreting 
„association‟ to mean a mutual relationship” when a direct link is sought to be 
established through the source item category of “association.”       
 
 
9 
The issue before the Court of Appeal, though, was not whether a prior 
judicial decision had compelled the CDCR‟s interpretation of the regulation, but 
(rather) whether the construction offered by the CDCR, the agency that had 
promulgated the regulation and was charged with enforcing it, was clearly 
unreasonable.   
Cabrera, by contrast, does argue that the CDCR‟s proffered interpretation is 
clearly unreasonable.  He relies on In re Andrade (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 807, but 
the case is clearly distinguishable.  In that case, the Court of Appeal relied on the 
“plain language” of the regulation to determine that the interpretation proffered by 
the Board of Prison Terms (now the Board of Parole Hearings) was “clearly 
erroneous.”  (Andrade, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 815, 817.)  The regulation at 
issue directed the Board to consider “whether „[t]he prisoner has made realistic 
plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon 
release.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 815, quoting Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (d)(8).)  
The Board had required the prisoner (Andrade) to prepare California parole plans, 
even though Andrade conceded he had entered the country illegally, planned to 
return to his native country, and there was a “great probability” he would be 
expeditiously deported once released.  (Andrade, at p. 816.)  After consulting 
dictionary definitions of “realistic,” the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
contingency of Andrade‟s remaining in the United States could not reasonably be 
deemed realistic, given that he could not remain here legally and no employer 
could legally employ him.  (Id. at pp. 816-817.)  In short, the Court of Appeal 
found it could not be realistic to “require the prisoner to plan for the contingency 
that the government might fail to do its job of deporting him. . . .  It is self-evident 
that the government may not require as a condition of parole that someone arrange 
to violate the law.”  (Id. at p. 817.)   
 
 
10 
Here, by contrast, nothing in the plain language of section 3378 requires 
proof the inmate formed a reciprocal or mutual relationship with a validated gang 
affiliate in order to establish a direct link, via the source item category of 
association, with that gang affiliate.  The Court of Appeal appears to suggest that 
such a requirement would nonetheless be necessary as a matter of policy, for 
“[o]therwise, a validated gang affiliate could create such a relationship with an 
inmate unilaterally, without any assent or mutuality on the part of the inmate.”   
But the CDCR has not claimed the requisite connection could be formed by 
unilateral conduct by the validated gang affiliate.  Rather, as the Court of Appeal 
acknowledges in the very next sentence of its opinion, the connection 
contemplated by the CDCR is “unilateral action by an inmate.”      
Moreover, the CDCR‟s policy of relying on unilateral inmate conduct to 
satisfy the direct link to a validated gang affiliate is not clearly unreasonable.  
Gangs “present a serious threat to the safety and security of California prisons.”  
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3023, subd. (b).)  “ „Prison gangs are criminal 
organizations that must communicate with their affiliates to conduct gang 
business, ensure group solidarity, and recruit and train new affiliates.  Indeed, one 
of the primary duties of a gang affiliate is to establish a line of communication 
between himself and other gang affiliates.‟ ”  (In re Furnace, supra, 185 
Cal.App.4th at p. 660.)  Even though prison officials “restrict correspondence 
between inmates, and are especially restrictive of the correspondence of validated 
gang affiliates housed in a security housing unit” (ibid.), the declaration of Everett 
W. Fischer, an expert in the Mexican Mafia prison gang, explained that gang 
affiliates attempt to evade detection by using coded and hidden messages in 
drawings and photos.  Moreover, a gang affiliate may collect or keep a copy of 
such artwork to demonstrate his association with that validated gang member or 
associate.  “As a result,” the expert declared, “something seemingly innocuous as 
 
 
11 
a drawing can promote gang activity among inmates, which undermines the order 
and security of the institution.”  A requirement that prison officials demonstrate 
reciprocal interaction to establish a direct link between the inmate and a validated 
gang affiliate thus could seriously impair efforts to detect and prevent gang 
activity in prisons.    
Because the Court of Appeal‟s grant of habeas relief rested on the 
erroneous assumption that a direct link in this context required proof Cabrera had 
a mutual relationship with a validated gang affiliate, we reverse the judgment.  
Whether the evidence is sufficient, under the regulation as properly construed, to 
uphold the validation of Cabrera as a gang associate, and whether the validation 
and placement in the SHU otherwise violates any of Cabrera‟s rights, is for the 
Court of Appeal to decide on remand in the first instance. 
 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Cabrera 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 198 Cal.App.4th 1548 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S197283 
Date Filed: October 29, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Elvin Cabrera, in pro. per.; Michael Satris, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Melanie K. 
Dorian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner Elvin Cabrera. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Donald E. DeNicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, Julie L. Garland and Jennifer A. 
Neill, Assistant Attorneys General, Anya M. Binsacca, Amy Daniel, Jessica N. Blonien and Henry J. Valle, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent Warden Kim Holland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael Satris 
Post Office Box 337 
Bolinas, CA  94924 
(415) 868-9209 
 
Amy Daniel 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 322-6105