Case Title: THOMAS L. WILSON and HELEN L. WILSON V. LUCERNE CANAL AND POWER COMPANY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
THOMAS L. WILSON and HELEN L. WILSON V. LUCERNE CANAL AND POWER COMPANY2007 WY 10150 P.3d 653Case Number: 05-292Decided: 01/18/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
THOMAS 
L. WILSON and HELEN L. WILSON,

 
 
Appellants

(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 

LUCERNE 
CANAL AND 
POWER COMPANY,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofGoshenCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Frank J. 
Jones of Wheatland, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Jerry M. 
Smith of Jerry M. Smith Law Office, Torrington, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After a bench 
trial, the district court ruled in favor of LucerneCanal and Power Company in a quiet title 
action that developed out of a festering easement dispute with Thomas L. Wilson 
and Helen L. Wilson.  We affirm in 
part and reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent 
herewith.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Are the Wilsons' claims barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata or by 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel?

 
 
           
2.   Are the Wilsons' claims barred by 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel?

 
 
           
3.   Did the district 
court err in refusing to quiet title to the property in the Wilsons as against Lucerne?

 
 
           
4.   Did the district 
court err in ordering the Wilsons to pay 
Lucerne's 
attorney's fees?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      It is difficult 
to understand this conflict without reference to a map.  Consequently, we have attached to this 
opinion a rough 
sketch of the area in question based upon plats that are in the record.  To avoid overcrowding the sketch, we 
will set out the legend here, with the relevance of the identified features 
becoming clear in later discussion:

 
 
A         
Western river channel

 
 
B         
Eastern river channel

 
 
C         
Formerly submerged "island"

 
 
D         
Diversion dam

 
 

E         
Headgate

 
 
F          
Authorized canal

 
 

G         
Road along 
authorized canal

 
 

H         
Road along 
eastern channel

 
 
I           
Meander line of river

 
 
J          
Existing fence identified by Wilsons

 
 
K         
Overflow return to river

 
 
[¶4]      In 1908, Edwin R. 
Hisey received the patent to certain lands on the east side of the North Platte 
River in Goshen County, 
Wyoming.1  At that time, and previously, the river 
along the west edge of the Hisey property was spread out from ¼ to ½ mile wide 
between two channels, with the land between the channels being at times 
partially or totally submerged.  The 
Wilsons bought 
the Hisey property in 1964.

 
 
[¶5]      Lucerne was incorporated as a non-profit irrigation 
company, operating in GoshenCounty.  In 1893, Lucerne obtained from the State of Wyoming a permit to divert water from the eastern channel 
of the North 
Platte River at a location in the 
southern part of what would become the Hisey property.  A diversion dam and main headgate were 
constructed there, and remain today as Lucerne's legal point of 
diversion.

 
 
[¶6]      At least as early 
as 1913, insufficient water flowed down the eastern channel to supply Lucerne's canal.  On March 15 of that year, Lucerne's board of 
directors met "for the purpose of deciding which was the best way to get water 
in the ditch."  The board's decision 
was "to open the channel running by Mr. Hisey's house."  Apparently, that effort was inadequate, 
because sometime thereafter Lucerne constructed a diversion dam across the 
river above the point where the two channels diverged, to force water down the 
eastern channel.

 
 
[¶7]      Since purchasing 
the Hisey property in 1964, the Wilsons have used the formerly submerged lands 
between the channelssometimes referred to as "the island"as pasture for their 
livestock.  When they bought the 
property, a fence was in place along the eastern edge of the western channel, 
indicating that the Hiseys had also utilized "the island."  In 1990, the Wilsons built a bridge 
across the eastern channel for better access to the pasture 
land.

 
 
[¶8]      A primary trial 
issue was whether water would flow naturally down the eastern channel if the 
upper diversion dam did not exist.  
When asked whether water would flow to Lucerne's headgate by natural flow without the dam, one of 
Lucerne's 
directors, Stanley Speckner, testified that "[i]t has to be diverted."  In further testimony, he twice repeated 
that, if the dam were removed, water would not flow down the eastern 
channel.  James E. Greer, a 
certified land surveyor, testified that he measured the elevations of the two 
channels and the diversion dam, and that, in his opinion, under normal flow, all 
of the water would flow down the western channel if the dam was not there.  After repeating his belief that normal 
flow water could not reach Lucerne's headgate without the dam, he did 
opine that "normal flow" is difficult to determine in that area because of heavy 
regulation upstream.  His final 
conclusion was that, "unless there is very high water that they didn't intend to 
let down there, probably it would all go down the main channel."  Mr. Wilson agreed under 
cross-examination that water does go into the channel in high water years.  No witness testified or suggested, 
however, that Lucerne could operate its headgate on the 
eastern channel without diverting water into that channel.

 
 
[¶9]      Over the years, 
conflict developed between Lucerne and the 
Wilsons concerning Lucerne's access to its facilities on the Wilsons' property.  In 1988, Lucerne filed a complaint in the district court 
alleging that, in order to maintain its "diversion dams, channels, headgates, 
canals, ditches, and other facilities," it required regular unimpeded access 
thereto.  Lucerne then claimed that, by prescription, it had gained 
legal access over four separate roads across the Wilsons' lands.  Finally, Lucerne claimed the right of access to and use of its 
facilities granted by the United States Government, to which the Wilsons' ownership was 
subject.

 
 
[¶10]   The gravamen of Lucerne's 1988 complaint was that the Wilsons were interfering with Lucerne's access over the four roads, and thereby 
interfering with Lucerne's duty to its members to maintain and 
operate its facilities and to supply water.  In addition to money damages, Lucerne sought an 
injunction to prevent continued interference.  The Wilsons' answer contained several affirmative 
defenses, including permissive use and failure to describe the four road 
easements being requested.  In a 
counterclaim, the Wilsons alleged repeated 
trespass and property damage by Lucerne.

 
 
[¶11]   After granting a temporary 
restraining order, and then a preliminary injunction, the district court delayed 
the trial and on January 10, 1989, ordered Lucerne to do the 
following:

 
 
3.    [Lucerne] shall cause a survey to be made of the property 
affected by this litigation, including any lands utilized by [Lucerne] for water 
transportation facilities.

 
 
4.    [Lucerne] shall cause an ownership plat to be made of all 
lands owned or occupied by [the Wilsons] which may be affected by this 
litigation . . . .

 
 
5.    [Lucerne] shall cause a 
survey to be made of the location of all existing roadways and the location of 
other rights-of-ways across [the Wilsons'] lands over which [Lucerne] has or 
desires to establish easements.

 
 
[¶12]   The record does not directly reveal 
what may have occurred factually or procedurally in the ensuing months, but on 
February 6, 1990, Lucerne filed another Motion 
for Temporary Restraining Order, alleging the same types of behavior by the 
Wilsons and the same types of resultant damage to 
Lucerne.  Specifically, however, the Motion 
referred only to interference with "use of the road described in Exhibit 1' 
attached hereto."  The road 
described in Exhibit 1 is the road that adjoins Lucerne's original ditch downstream from its 
headgate, labeled "G" on our sketch, plus the road that adjoins the eastern 
channel, labeled "H" on our sketch.  
The Wilsons quickly consented to entry of such an order, and on February 
15, 1990, a Preliminary Injunction was issued, enjoining the Wilsons from 
interfering with Lucerne's use of the described roadway "for the purpose of 
gaining access to the diversion dam, channel, canal and related facilities 
utilized by [Lucerne] for diverting and transporting water from the North Platte 
River across [the Wilsons'] lands[.]"

 
 
[¶13]   Trial of the underlying issues in 
the 1988-1990 controversy was averted when the parties entered into a Consent 
Decree and Judgment on May 4, 1990.  Because this Consent Decree and Judgment 
is the focal point of much of the current controversy, we will set forth its 
pertinent provisions in detail.  
Those include the following findings:

 
 
3.    That [the Wilsons] own or 
occupy lands upon which part of [Lucerne's] facilities are located, which 
property has been and must be crossed by Lucerne members, employees, agents and 
contractors in order to inspect, regulate, operate, maintain[,] repair and 
replace such facilities; and

 
 
4.    That Lucerne received from 
the United States Department of Interior, in 1894, and has continually since 
such time had an easement and right-of-way for its canal and associated 
facilities upon, over and across Lots 1 and 4 and a part of the unsurveyed lands 
in Section 21, Township 26 North, Range 64 West of the 6th P.M., Goshen County, 
Wyoming, pursuant to 43 U.S.C. §§ 946-949; and

 
 
5.    That Lucerne has 
continuously, for a period in excess of ten (10) years, had and maintained a 
diversion or check dam located in the unsurveyed portion of the North Platte 
River, adjacent to Lot 3, Section 16, Township 26 North, Range 64 West of the 
6th P.M., Goshen County, Wyoming, and has actually used a road or roads over, 
upon or across property owned or occupied by [the Wilsons] to gain access to its 
facilities including but not being limited to said dam and walkway, for purposes 
of inspection, regulation, operation, repair, replacement and maintenance of 
such facilities; and

 
 
6.    That Lucerne has obtained, by 
prescriptive use, over, upon and across [the Wilsons'] property, an easement and 
right-of-way for a road from its headgate located S60°46'34"W  1255.94' from 
the NE corner of Section 21, Township 26 North, Range 64 West of the 6th P.M. to 
its said diversion or check dam, the center line of the road being specifically 
designated and set forth on Plats, consisting of three (3) sheets, prepared by 
Eastern Wyoming Engineering Professionals, a copy of which is marked Exhibit 
"A", attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference, for the purpose 
of ingress and egress to its facilities for inspection, regulation, operation, 
maintenance, repair and replacement of its facilities; and

 
 
7.    That [the Wilsons] have 
agreed that Lucerne has and shall continue to have an easement and right-of-way, 
for a road, for so long as it maintains or operates any of its facilities, 
ditches, water transportation facilities, or other irrigation facilities on or 
adjacent to the lands now owned by [the Wilsons], of such a nature as to provide 
unobstructed ingress, egress and access for such vehicles, machinery and 
equipment, as is reasonably necessary for [Lucerne] to operate, maintain, 
inspect, repair, replace, remove, renovate and for all other reasonably 
necessary purposes, its irrigation system, facilities, equipment and 
appurtenances, over, upon and across the roadways, the centerline being shown on 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto, over and across property owned or occupied by [the 
Wilsons] from Lucerne's headgate up to and including Lucerne's diversion or 
check dam, walkway and bridge; and

 
 
8.    That [Lucerne] and [the Wilsons] each withdraw all other respective 
claims set forth in the pleadings filed herein.

 
 
[¶14]   Based upon those stipulated 
findings, the district court ordered, adjudged and decreed as 
follows:

 
 
1.    That [Lucerne] is the owner, by virtue of a grant from the United 
States Department of the Interior pursuant to the act of March 3, 1891, and its 
prescriptive use for the statutory period, of an easement and right-of-way for a 
road upon, over and across lands in GoshenCounty, State of Wyoming, described as 
follows:

 
 
Township 
26 North, Range 64 West of the 6th P.M., Goshen County, Wyoming

 
 
Section 
16:    Lots 3, 4, 5 and 8 
and certain unsurveyed lands in said Section 16 adjacent to the above described 
lots.

Section 
21:    Lots 1 and 4 and 
certain unsurveyed lands in said Section 21 adjacent to the above described 
lots.

 
 
for 
access, ingress and egress to all its canals, water transportation facilities, 
diversion dams, walkways and all appurtenant facilities; the center line of the 
easement being specifically described on the plats attached hereto, marked 
Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein.

 
 
2.    That [Lucerne] has and shall 
have an easement and right-of-way for its canal, headgate and appurtenant 
facilities, as set forth in 43 U.S.C. § 946 upon, over and across the following 
described real property, to-wit:

 
 

Township 
26 North, Range 64 West of the 6th P.M., Goshen County, Wyoming

 
 
Section 
21:    Lots 1 and 4 and 
unsurveyed lands occupied by [the Wilsons] 
adjacent to said Lot 4

 
 
3.    That [Lucerne] has and shall 
continue to have a non-exclusive easement and right-of-way, which shall run with 
the land, for a road, upon, over and across the following described real 
property, to-wit:

 
 

Township 
26 North, Range 64 West of the 6th P.M., Goshen County, Wyoming

 
 
Section 
16:    Lots 3, 4, 5 and 8 
and unsurveyed lands occupied by [the Wilsons] adjacent to said Lots 3, 4, 5 and 
8.

Section 
21:    Lot 1 and unsurveyed 
lands occupied by [the Wilsons] adjacent to said 
Lot 1;

 
 
the 
center line for such roadways is more specifically designated on the Plats 
attached hereto, marked Exhibit "A", and incorporated herein, for so long as it 
maintains or operates any of its facilities, ditches, canals, or other 
irrigation facilities on or adjacent to the lands now owned by [the Wilsons], of 
such a nature as to provide unobstructed ingress, egress and access for such 
vehicles, machinery and equipment as is reasonably necessary for [Lucerne] to 
operate, regulate, maintain, inspect, repair, replace, remove, renovate and for 
all other reasonably necessary purposes for its irrigation system, facilities, 
equipment and appurtenances.

 
 
4.    [Lucerne] has the right to 
maintain said road as is reasonably necessary to provide for such access and 
shall have unobstructed use of its easement.  [The Wilsons] shall  
not interfere with Lucerne's use of said Easements and 
rights-of-way.

 
 
5.    That all other claims of the 
parties hereto against each other which were included in the pleadings are 
hereby dismissed.

 
 
. . .

 
 
8.    That this Consent Decree and 
Judgment is in full, final and complete settlement and adjudication of the above 
entitled action.

 
 
[¶15]   A review of both the plat attached as 
Exhibit "1" to Lucerne's February 6, 1990 Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order, and the plat attached as Exhibit "A" to the Consent Decree and Judgment 
reveals that both identify what is, in effect, a single roadthe road that 
enters the Wilsons' property in the southeast corner of our sketch map, travels 
past the headgate, follows along the eastern bank of the eastern channel, and 
ends at the diversion dam.2  Clearly, the purpose and effect of the 
stipulated judgment was to provide road access for Lucerne along the full length of its 
facilities across the Wilsons' property.  Of further 
significance is the fact that the stipulated judgment specifically recognized 
the existing easement for Lucerne's headgate and the 
canal below it, but made no mention of any other easement for irrigation 
facilities.

 
 
[¶16]   Unfortunately, this settlement did not 
end the disputes between the parties.  The next litigated controversy, which began 
in 2002, grew out of a physical aspect of the just-described road.  The road, lying as 
it does along the east bank of the east channel, must cross the east channel to 
reach the upper diversion dam.  The natural crossing that is used lies near 
the diversion dam, and is part of the identified road easement.  In late 2001 or 
early 2002, the Wilsons constructed an 
earthen berm in the channel above the crossing, for the avowed purpose of 
preventing ice build-up and beaver dam activity during the winter.3  In May 2002, the berm was still there and it 
interfered with Lucerne's attempt to start 
the irrigation flow down the eastern channel.

 
 
[¶17]   Lucerne returned to the district court, where it obtained a 
permanent restraining order, enjoining the Wilsons from interfering with Lucerne's easements.  That restraining 
order was appealed to, and affirmed by, this Court in Wilson v. Lucerne Canal 
& Power Co., 
2003 WY 126, 77 P.3d 412 (Wyo. 
2003).  Because 
the district court hearing was not reported, we were left to assume that the 
evidence supported the trial court's findings.  Id., ¶ 3, at 416.  After considering 
numerous procedural and due process challenges to the order, we concluded that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the permanent 
injunction.  
Id., ¶ 21, at 419.  Because the 
permanent injunction now controls the rights of the parties in regard to the 
issues then presented, we will set out in detail the pertinent language 
therefrom:

 
 
            
This matter coming before the Court upon [Lucerne's] Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order and the Court being fully advised finds that [Lucerne] should 
have the use of that roadway over and across [the Wilsons'] property and the right to 
operate, regulate, maintain, inspect, repair, replace, remove or renovate its 
facilities including but not being limited to dams, channels, headgates and 
other water works which [Lucerne] uses in the supplying of water to it [sic] 
members and to use the hereinafter described property for the purpose of 
gaining access to the diversion dam, channel, canal and related facilities 
utilized by [Lucerne] for diverting and transporting water from the North Platte 
River across [the Wilsons'] property.

 
 
            
It is therefore ordered that [Lucerne], its agents, employees and 
contractors shall have the use of the following described property, to wit: 
[legal description], the use to be for the purpose of gaining access to the 
diversion dam, channel, canal and related facilities utilized by [Lucerne] for 
diverting and transporting water from the North Platte River across [the 
Wilsons'] lands, and [the Wilsons], their agents, employees and any other 
persons acting in their behalf be, and they are hereby permanently enjoined and 
restrained from interfering with [Lucerne], its agents, employees or contractors 
in the use of the lands of [the Wilsons] used as a roadway and for irrigation 
facilities henceforth and in perpetuity.

 
 

Id., ¶ 6, at 415.  (Emphasis added.)

 
 
[¶18]   Lucerne's May 2002 motion is not contained in this record, 
but both the nature of the controversy and the emphasized language of the 
permanent injunction indicate that the squabble had expanded beyond the question 
of Lucerne's right to use 
the road to the question of Lucerne's right to use the 
eastern channel, for which it held no easement.  The issue brewing was whether or not the 
eastern "channel" was no longer part of the river, but was simply an irrigation 
canal or ditch.

 
 
[¶19]   Probably to no-one's surprise, that 
issue was brought squarely before the district court on September 3, 2004, when 
the Wilsons filed the quiet title action that is 
now before this Court.  In substance, the Wilsons in their Complaint (1) claimed 
title to the Hisey lands and the area between those lands and the western river 
channel; (2) recognized Lucerne's headgate and canal easement; (3) recognized 
Lucerne's road easement; and 
(4) claimed damages for Lucerne's negligence and 
trespass in transporting excessive water down the eastern "channel" or 
"canal."

 
 
[¶20]   The Wilsons' Complaint was tried to the court on 
March 21, 2005.  
On September 16, 2005, the district court issued a final order, entitled 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which is the order from which the 
Wilsons now appeal.  Once again, because 
they set the stage for the current issues, we will set forth the pertinent 
findings and conclusions from that order:

 
 
. . .

 
 
3.     Wilsons claimed that Lucerne had no easement or authority 
to transport water through the channel on Wilsons' land in the 1988 case.  Their pre-trial 
memo in that case specifically claimed that Lucerne had no authority to direct water where its upper 
diversion is and that Lucerne had no authority 
to transport water through the channel where the river once flowed.

 
 
. . .

 
 
5.     [The 1988 case] was settled 
with a Consent Decree and Judgment.  In that Consent Decree the parties stipulated 
that Lucerne was the owner 
and operator of facilities to divert water from the North Platte River and to convey such 
irrigation water to the lands of its members.  All findings and conclusions of that 1990 
Consent Decree are incorporated herein.

 
 
6.     In 2002 Wilsons built a dam across the channel 
that Lucerne used to convey water.  Lucerne obtained a permanent 
injunction which enjoined Wilsons from interfering with Lucerne's "use of the lands of [the 
Wilsons] used as a roadway and for irrigation facilities,"

 
 
. . .

 
 
11.   In 1893, the North Platte River was between ¼ and 
½ mile wide where it passed through Sections 16 and 21, Township 26 North, Range 
64 West, and primarily had two (2) channels.  Lucerne's sole headgate originally was on the 
north channel.  
The land between the channels belonged to the U.S. and was never surveyed.  It was withdrawn 
from entry under homestead acts.  Although they now claim ownership of that 
land by accretion, the Wilsons failed to prove 
that accretion had occurred.

 
 
12.   Around 1913, when dams and reservoirs 
were built on the North 
Platte upstream from Lucerne's diversion and headgate, water did not reliably 
flow down the north channel of the North Platte River.  In response, Lucerne built an additional diversion structure where the 
two (2) channels separated, insuring that water went down the north channel to 
Lucerne's headgate.  When the river flow 
is high this additional diversion is not required for water to flow down the 
north channel of the North Platte.

 
 
13.   Lucerne has utilized water from the north channel of the 
North Platte River every 
year.  That 
channel is the only source of water for Lucerne.  The north channel is slightly higher than the 
south channel, and when the river is low the north channel is dry.

 
 
14.   During the irrigation season more water 
flows down the north channel than is diverted into Lucerne's canal, partially as a result 
of Lucerne's diversion.  The water not 
diverted into the canal continues down the north channel of the North Platte River.

 
 
15.   Wilsons now claim to own the lands through which the north 
channel of the North Platte 
River flows in Sections 16 and 21, Township 26 North, Range 64 
West.  In 2002 
Wilsons blocked the north 
channel, requiring Lucerne to hire an 
attorney to obtain injunctive relief.

 
 
16.   Lucerne spent $3,215.82 on attorney's fees to 
enforce the Consent Decree.  Wilson's blockage of the channel violated the 
Consent Decree.  
Lucerne did not establish other damage by a 
preponderance of the evidence.

 
 
17.   Lucerne's upper diversion, the river channels, and 
Lucerne's headgate are all in the same 
locations as they were in 1990 when the Consent Decree was entered.  The Wilsons complaint in [the present case] is 
about the same irrigation facilities and channel that were recognized in the 
1990 Consent Decree.

 
 
18.   Lucerne utilizes a river channel, and not a 
ditch or canal, to obtain water at its headgate.  The route of Lucerne's water up to its headgate is the north channel of 
the North Platte 
River.

 
 
19.   In July, 2003, a large rainstorm 
resulted in flooding on the North 
Platte River, including the north channel in Section 21, Township 26 
North, Range 64 West.  
The flooding damaged a bridge installed by Wilsons and left debris on property Wilsons claim.  Any damage to Wilsons was the result of an unusually heavy rain, and not 
caused by any act of Lucerne.

 
 
20.   In the 1990 Consent Decree, Wilsons acknowledged that Lucerne had facilities to divert and distribute 
water, and that such water flowed down the channel in question.  Wilsons are judicially estopped from 
now claiming that Lucerne 
has no right to diversion in the North 
Platte River and has no right to utilize the north channel of the 
River.

 
 
21.   Lucerne uses the same diversion and channel it 
always has, and such use was recognized by the 1990 Consent Decree.  Wilsons are precluded by collateral estoppel 
and res judicata from now challenging that use.

 
 
The Wilsons' claims were denied by the district court, and they 
were ordered to pay Lucerne's attorney's 
fees.  This 
appeal followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

Are the Wilsons' claims barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata or by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel?

 
 
[¶21]   The district court's final order 
contained the following conclusion:

 
 
21.   Lucerne uses the same diversion and channel it 
always has, and such use was recognized by the 1990 Consent Decree.  Wilsons are precluded by collateral estoppel 
and res judicata from now challenging that use.

 
 
[¶22]   We said the following about res judicata and 
collateral estoppel in Eklund v. PRI Envtl., Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶ 15, 25 P.3d 511, 517 (Wyo. 
2001):

 
 
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are related but 
distinct concepts.   Res judicata bars the 
relitigation of previously litigated claims or causes of action.  Slavens v. Board of 
CountyCommissioners, 
854 P.2d 683, 686 
(Wyo. 1993).  Four factors are examined to determine 
whether the doctrine of res judicata applies:  (1) identity in parties; (2) identity in 
subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the subject matter; 
and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference to both the 
subject matter and the issues between them.  Id.  Collateral 
estoppel bars relitigation of previously litigated issues and 
involves an analysis of four similar factors:  (1) whether the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication was identical with the issue presented in the present action; (2) 
whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether 
the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity 
with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom 
collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
issue in the prior proceeding.  Id.

 
 
[¶23]   The policy justifications for these 
doctrines will not be reiterated here in detail, and we will note only that 
their general purpose is to prevent piecemeal litigation, thereby preserving 
judicial resources.  
In re 
Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1264 (Wyo. 1991).  Two features of the 
doctrines are significant in light of the circumstances of the present 
case:  (1) 
claim preclusion bars not just issues that were actually litigated in the prior 
action, but issues that could have been raised in that action; and (2) consent 
decrees are the equivalent of litigated judgments for purposes of res judicata.  In re Big Horn River 
System, 2004 WY 21, ¶ 52, 85 P.3d 981, 996 (Wyo. 
2004), overruled in 
part on other grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1998); 
Wyodak Res. Dev. 
Corp. v. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue, 2002 WY 
181, ¶ 12, 60 P.3d 129, 135 (Wyo. 
2002); Amoco Prod. 
Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 
154, ¶ 12, 55 P.3d 1246, 1251 (Wyo. 
2002); Eklund v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 2004 WY 
24, ¶ 14, 86 P.3d 259, 263 (Wyo. 
2004).  
Application of the doctrines is a question of law that we review de novo.  In re Big 
HornRiver, 2004 WY 21, ¶ 19, 85 P.3d  
at 987.

 
 
[¶24]   We concur with the district court's 
limited application of res judicata and collateral estoppel in this case.  By "limited," we 
mean that our perception of the district court's conclusion is that the very 
nature of the Consent Decreea recognition of Lucerne's right of access between its headgate and the 
upper diversion damwas also a recognition of Lucerne's right to transport water between the 
two points.  
The latter follows the former by necessary implication.  In other words, it 
was a recognition of Lucerne's right to use the eastern 
channel.4

 
 
[¶25]   We cannot say, however, that the 1988 
litigation bars the Wilsons' current desire to have the courts quiet title in 
them to the unpatented riparian lands.  The 1988 litigation was fundamentally an 
access easement controversy.  It did not directly implicate ownership of 
the "island," and its issues readily could be resolved short of quieting title 
to that land.  
The road at issue traversed the patented lands owned by the Wilsons, not the unpatented and unsurveyed 
riparian lands that had "arisen" through natural redirection of the river.  We are mindful of 
the precept that res 
judicata may bar claims that could have been brought in prior 
litigation.  
But the purpose of the doctrine is to enhance judicial economy by 
limiting litigation, rather than to expand litigation by requiring litigants to 
conjure up every conceivable issue that might arise with the other party and add 
it to a complaint, whether presently contested or not.

 
 
            
An examination of the cases in which this court has considered the 
application of the doctrine of res judicata as that rule is precisely defined and its 
corollary collateral or judicial estoppel leads to the conclusion that the 
policy in Wyoming has been to apply 
those propositions rather narrowly.  Barrett v. Town of 
Guernsey, Wyo., 652 P.2d 395 (1982); Roush v. Roush, [589 P.2d 841 (Wyo. 1979)]; Bard Ranch Company v. 
Weber, [557 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1976)]; Willis v. Willis, 
48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670 (1935); and Cook v. Elmore, 27 
Wyo. 163, 192 P. 824 (1920).  While those 
concepts will be invoked when appropriate to avoid repetitious suits involving 
the same cause of action, and the relitigation of matters actually litigated and 
determined in the first proceeding, to the end that the concept of finality 
is  honored in 
litigation in the State of Wyoming, still they are not to be applied in a highly 
technical manner which would in a context such as this prevent litigants from 
presenting their claims against others for determination on their merits.

 
 

Robertson v. TWP, Inc., 656 P.2d 547, 553 (Wyo. 
1983).  The 
question of whether the Wilsons had gained 
ownership over the unpatented riparian lands was not so intertwined with the 
road access question as to require that it be litigated at the same time.  Furthermore, the 
"island" now exists as a parcel of no-longer-submerged land, and the question of 
its ownership needs to be resolved.

 
 
Are the Wilsons' claims barred 
by

the doctrine of judicial estoppel?

 
 
[¶26]   Wyoming recognizes the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel:

 
 
The principle, while denominated judicial estoppel, is 
sometimes referred to as a doctrine which estops a party to play fast and loose 
with the courts or to trifle with judicial proceedings.  It is an expression 
of the maxim that one cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath.  A party will just 
not be allowed to maintain inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings, as 
here.  31 
C.J.S. Estoppel § 117, pp. 624-625.

 
 
The role of judicial estoppel has been accepted in this 
state.  Hatten Realty Co. v. 
Baylies, 1930, 42 Wyo. 69, 89-93, 290 P. 561, 72 A.L.R. 
587.  It was 
there held that where a man is successful in a position taken in a previous 
court proceeding, that position rises to the position of conclusiveness.

 
 

Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 
1976).  See also Cross v. Berg 
Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 930 (Wyo. 2000); and In re Parental Rights 
to ARW, 716 P.2d 353, 355-56 
(Wyo. 1986), overruled on other 
grounds by Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 154 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 
[¶27]   The district court applied judicial 
estoppel in the following finding of fact, which also includes a conclusion of 
law:

 
 
20.   In the 1990 Consent Decree, Wilsons acknowledged that Lucerne had facilities to divert and distribute 
water, and that such water flowed down the channel in question.  Wilsons are judicially estopped from 
now claiming that Lucerne 
has no right to diversion in the North 
Platte River and has no right to utilize the north channel of the 
River.

 
 
[¶28]   We agree with the district court's 
application of judicial estoppel to the same extent that we agreed with its 
application of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  The Consent Decree 
that resolved the 1988 controversy necessarily assumed Lucerne's right to use the channel/canal to 
carry water from its diversion dam to its headgate.5  Therefore, the 
Wilsons are judicially estopped from taking a 
contrary position.6  On the other hand, the issues involved in the 
quiet title action that are now pending, in particular the question of reliction 
and the resultant ownership of formerly inundated lands, were neither addressed 
nor resolved in the earlier litigation, and judicial estoppel does not bar the 
present litigation of those issues.

 
 
Did the district court err in refusing to quiet title to 
the property in the Wilsons 
as against Lucerne?

 
 
[¶29]   In the case of a trial to the court, 
rather than to a jury, and where the trial court has made specific findings of 
fact and reached specific conclusions of law, we apply the following standard of 
review:

 
 
            
When a trial court has made express findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in a bench trial, we review the factual determinations under the clearly 
erroneous standard and the legal conclusions de novo.  State v. Campbell 
County School District, 2001 WY 
19, ¶ 41, 19 P.3d 518, ¶ 41 (Wyo. 
2001) (quoting 
Rennard v. Vollmar, 977 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Wyo. 1999)).  "A finding is 
clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed."  Campbell CountySchool District, 
¶ 41 (citing Hopper 
v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993)).  In the 
alternative:  
"[A] determination that a finding is against the great weight of the 
evidence means a finding will be set aside even if supported by substantial 
evidence."  
Id.

 
 

Davis v. Chadwick, 2002 WY 157, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 1267, 1270 (Wyo. 
2002).  See also Parkhurst v. 
Boykin, 2004 WY 90, ¶ 25, 94 P.3d 450, 461 (Wyo. 
2004); and Stansbury 
v. Heiduck, 961 P.2d 977, 978 
(Wyo. 1998).  A party seeking to quiet title based upon the 
doctrines of accretion or reliction has the burden of proving the same by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Madson v. TBT Ltd., 12 Neb.App. 773, 686 N.W.2d 85, 
94-95 (2004).

 
 
[¶30]   The Wilsons seek to quiet title to the lands 
underlying the old eastern channel of the river and the lands lying between that 
channel and the western channel.  The district court found and concluded that 
the eastern channel continues to be a river channelin other words, that it has 
not simply become an irrigation canaland that the Wilsons "failed to prove that accretion has 
occurred."  The 
doctrine of accretion, or more accurately, the related doctrine of reliction, is 
the central legal issue in this dispute.  The two terms have been defined as 
follows:

 
 
            
"Accretion" is the increase of riparian land by the gradual and 
imperceptible deposit, by water, of solid material, whether mud, sand, or 
sediment, called alluvion," so as to cause that to become dry land which was 
before covered by water.  It is a slow change in the river's boundaries 
that constitutes accretion.  Accretion occurs when the line between water 
and land bordering thereon is changed by the gradual deposit of alluvial soil 
upon the margin of the water.  The term "alluvion" is applied to the deposit 
itself, while accretion denotes the process, although the terms are sometimes 
used synonymously.

 
 
            
"Reliction" (or, as it is sometimes called, "dereliction") differs from 
"accretion" in that the term reliction is applied to land made by the withdrawal 
of the waters by which it was previously covered, from any cause, instead of the 
building up of the bottom by deposits displacing the waters.  Reliction connotes 
the uncovering of land by a permanent recession of a body of water, rather than 
a mere temporary or seasonal exposure of the land.

 
 
78 Am.Jur.2d Waters § 311 (2002) (internal footnotes omitted).  Reliction has also 
been defined as the "process by which a river or stream shifts its location, 
causing the recession of water from its bank."  Black's Law Dictionary 1317 (8th ed. 2004).  The facts presented 
in the record in this case clearly reveal that the Wilsons' claims are based upon the doctrine of 
reliction, rather than accretion.

 
 
[¶31]   We will preface this discussion with a 
recitation of certain basic principles:

 
 
           
1.   
Where a non-navigable river or stream is the boundary between two parcels 
of land, the boundary lies along the thread of the main channel.  Jourdan v. Abbott 
Constr. Co., 464 P.2d 311, 314 (Wyo. 1970); and 78 
Am.Jur.2d Waters 
§§289, 302 (2002).

 
 
           
2.   
Where lands are conveyed with a non-navigable watercourse as a boundary, 
there is a rebuttable presumption that the grantor intends the boundary to be 
the thread of the river or stream, rather than its meander line.  Jourdan, 464 P.2d  
at 314; Denison v. Hodge, 196 
Or.App. 248, 100 P.3d 1144, 1145 (2004), reh'g denied, 338 Or. 584, 114 P.3d 505 (2005); and 78 
Am.Jur.2d Waters 
§ 289.

 
 
The thread, or center, of a channel is the line which would 
give the landowners on either side access to the water, whatever its stage might 
be and particularly at its lowest flow.  The thread of the stream is that portion of a 
waterway which would be the last to dry up.  Where the thread of a stream is the boundary 
between estates and that stream has two channels, the thread of the main channel 
is the boundary between the estates.

 
 

Edlund v. 4-S, LLC, 13 Neb.App. 800, 702 N.W.2d 812, 820 (2005) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
           
3.   
Where the bed of a watercourse changes through accretion or reliction, 
the boundary of the riparian lands changes to follow the thread thereof, and the 
upland riparian owner then owns the newly formed lands.  Jourdan, 464 P.2d  
at 314; Krumwiede v. 
Rose, 177 Neb. 570, 129 N.W.2d 491, 
494 (1964); and 78 Am.Jur.2d Waters § 315.

 
 
           
4.   
Where the United States 
has owned the bed of a non-navigable watercourse, and has disposed of the 
riparian uplands, the question of whether it has retained or conveyed the bed of 
the stream is a question of intent.  78 Am.Jur.2d Waters § 309.

 
 
           
5.   
Riparian owners are entitled to possession and ownership of an island 
formerly under waters of the stream as far as the thread of the stream.  Monument Farms v. 
Daggett, 2 Neb.App. 988, 520 N.W.2d 556, 562 (1994).

 
 
           
6.   
"Generally, it is immaterial, with respect to the effects of accretion, 
reliction, or erosion, whether it results from natural or from artificial 
causes.  This 
rule has been applied in cases where the accretion, reliction, or erosion is 
indirectly induced by artificial conditions created by third persons."  78 Am.Jur.2d. Waters § 314 
(internal footnotes omitted).

 
 
           
7.   
The doctrines of accretion and reliction are based upon several public 
policy considerations:

 
 
            
The courts are not in complete accord as to the reasons for the general 
rule as to the acquisition of title to additions to land by accretion or 
reliction.  One 
reason given for this rule is that expressed by the maxim de minimis non curat 
lex.[7]  
In a considerable number of cases the rule has been predicated upon 
the principle of natural justice, that one who sustains the burden of losses and 
of repairs, imposed by the contiguity of waters, ought to receive whatever 
benefits they may bring by accretion.  The rule is also derived from the principle 
of public policy that it is in the interest of the community that all land 
should have an owner, and most convenient that imperceptible additions to the 
shore should follow the title to the shore itself.  Another reason for 
the rule is based upon the general policy of the law to promote the highest and 
best use of the land, the riparian owner being in the best position to develop 
and utilize that land.  Moreover, where waterways serve as the 
boundary between property owners and/or sovereigns, convenience and perhaps 
necessity mandate that the waterway should continue to serve as the 
boundary.  
Perhaps the most practical reason for the rule is the necessity or 
desirability of preserving the riparian right of access to the water.

 
 
78 Am.Jur.2d Waters § 316 (internal footnotes omitted).

 
 
[¶32]   The essential finding and conclusion of 
the district court was that the Wilsons failed to prove that the eastern 
channel no longer is a river channel, and failed to prove that reliction had 
occurred.  A 
review of the complete record convinces us that these findings and conclusions 
are clearly erroneous.  In particular, we note the following 
information contained in a report from the Bureau of Land Management's Chief, 
Branch of Land Resources, to the Wyoming District Manager on May 24, 1988, 
concerning the very land at issue:

 
 
Your February 17, 1988, memorandum requested determination 
of ownership of an unsurveyed island in the North Platte River, contiguous to the following land:

 
 
Sixth Principal Meridian, 
Wyoming

T. 26 N., R. 64 W.,

sec. 16, lots 3, 4, 5, 8,

sec. 21, lots 1, 4.

 
 
This island was apparently created as a result of Bureau of 
Reclamation reservoir projects and LucerneCanal 
construction.

 
 
We reviewed the surveyor's field notes from the 1891 
survey.  During 
the survey of the subdivisional lines of sections 16 and 21 in the spring of 
1891, the surveyor made references to large sand bars scattered through the 
river.  The 
land was described as level and sandy, covered with vegetation and grass.  Considering that 
the survey was done in the spring of the year, the North Platte River bottom may have 
been flooded or showed evidence of flooding.  However, the surveyor did not reference any 
islands in his official field notes.  If the subject island was upland at time of 
survey, it would or should have been surveyed; overflowed lands were not subject 
to survey.

 
 
Bureau of Reclamation reservoir projects have controlled 
seasonal fluctuations and flooding on the North Platte River.  However, these water-control projects do not 
affect the status of the 1891 survey nor the ownership of lands subsequently 
submerged or created.

 
 
The North Platte River in Wyoming is non-navigable.  Title to the bed of 
a non-navigable body of water did not pass to Wyoming upon its admission into the Union, but remained 
vested in the United States 
until transferred into private ownership with land adjoining the river.  Thus, conveyance of 
a parcel of land bordering a non-navigable river includes riparian rights to the 
thread of the river.  
The lands described in this memorandum were conveyed on June 11, 1908, by 
Patent No. 2213 (copy attached), and included any land between the surveyed 
meander line and thread of the river.

 
 
Our conclusion is that the island in question did not exist 
at the time of the 1891 survey.  It was overflowed and not subject to 
survey.  The 
island is owned to the thread of the river by respective riparian owners and 
subject to applicable laws governing accretion, reliction, and avulsion.  The United States 
does not possess any interest in the lands bordering the North Platte River in 
sections 16 and 21, T. 21 N., R. 64 W., 6th P.M., Wyoming.

 
 
[¶33]   As noted earlier herein, we know that 
Lucerne obtained the State's permission to divert water from the eastern channel 
in 1893; we know that the 1908 patent mentioned in the BLM letter refers to the 
purchase of the property by Edwin R. Hisey, the Wilsons' predecessor in 
interest; and we know that by 1913 insufficient water was flowing down the 
eastern channel to allow Lucerne to operate its irrigation headgate.  In addition, Thomas 
Wilson testified that the island was fenced to the western channel, and was 
being used by his predecessors in interest when he purchased the property in 
1964.  
Furthermore, the great weight of the evidence is that water would rarely, 
if ever, flow down the eastern channel in the absence of Lucerne's upstream diversion dam.  Taken together, 
these facts can lead to no conclusion other than that reliction has occurred and 
that title to the property should be quieted in the Wilsons.

 
 
[¶34]   That conclusion, however, does not 
answer the entire question, and should not be construed as contradictory to our 
earlier conclusions herein regarding estoppel and res judicata.  The stipulated 
resolution of the earlier proceedings included the presumption that Lucerne had the right to transport 
sufficient water down the eastern channel, now operated in fact as an irrigation 
canal, to operate its lower diversion and headgate at a fully functional level, 
including the right to release necessary overflow back into the North Platte River.  Consequently, the 
Wilsons' title to the property must be subject 
to that right.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶35]   We affirm the conclusion of the 
district court that the Wilsons are barred from relitigating the issue of Lucerne's right to transport water from its 
upper diversion dam to its lower headgate.  As to the issue of quiet title, however, we 
reverse and remand this matter to the district court for entry of an order 
quieting title to the property in the Wilsons, subject to the right of Lucerne 
to transport water from its diversion dam to its headgate, and beyond, as set 
forth above.  
If the precise location of such easement cannot be stipulated, the 
district court shall take additional evidence to identify the precise location 
thereof, including the survey originally ordered by the district court in its 
January 10, 1989 order.

 
 
[¶36]   These conclusions lead to the 
additional conclusion, regarding the fourth issue raised herein, that the 
district court erred in ordering the Wilsons to pay Lucerne's attorney's fees, and that portion of 
the judgment is also reversed.  The record does, however, support the 
district court's conclusion that Lucerne did not establish its damage claims by 
a preponderance of the evidence.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The testimony in this case is confusing and contradictory 
in regard to directions.  For instance, the right bank of the right 
channel shown on the plats is sometimes referred to as the east bank and 
sometimes referred to as the north bank.  Further, while the North Platte River 
generally runs through Goshen County from the northwest to the southeast, the 
plats show the two channels in question running almost due north/south.  We will refer to 
directions as if both channels do lie generally north/south, as the plats seem 
to indicate.

 
 

2The roads labeled "G" and "H" on the sketch.

 
 

3Mr. Wilson's testimony was interrupted and incomplete, but 
the suggestion was made that he routinely constructed such a berm in the 
wintertime.

 
 

4Beyond that, the evidence in the record is overwhelming 
that, even if the eastern channel is a canal rather than a river channel, 
Lucerne has obtained by prescription the right 
to use it.

 
 

5The sole purpose of the stipulated roadway was to allow 
Lucerne to reach the upper diversion dam, the sole purpose of which, in turn, 
was to furnish water to Lucerne through the eastern channel/canal.

 
 

6There may be an argument that the stipulation recognized 
only the fact of 
Lucerne's use of the eastern channel/canal, and 
not its right to do 
so.  Judicial 
estoppel bars only the changing of position in regard to facts; it does not 
apply to legal conclusions based upon facts.  Matter of Paternity of SDM, 882 P.2d 1217, 1224 
(Wyo. 1994).  The difference between the two is reflected 
in the two sentences just quoted from the district court's order.  That issue not 
having been addressed by the parties, however, we will not further consider 
it.

  

7"The law does not concern itself with trifles."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 464 (8th ed. 2004).