Case Title: People v. Davis

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89704

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89704-Agenda 7-November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								ARLIE RAY DAVIS, Appellant.
Opinion filed February 22, 2002.
 
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant was convicted after a jury trial in Henry County of
multiple counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West
1994)), and of other crimes in connection with the killing of
Laurie Gwinn. After the jury found defendant eligible for the death
penalty, he waived his right to a jury for the second phase of the
sentencing hearing. The circuit court imposed the death penalty for
the murder. In addition, the circuit court imposed prison sentences
for some of the convictions and vacated others as lesser-included
offenses. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial and sentencing
hearing, which the circuit court denied.
	On direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions and the
prison terms, but vacated the sentence of death and remanded for
a new sentencing hearing only, there being no question that
defendant was eligible for the death penalty. People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317 (1998). The basis for vacating the death sentence was
the circuit court's apparent refusal to consider certain evidence in
mitigation. We held that although the sentencer may give little
weight to evidence properly offered in mitigation, it may not
entirely exclude such evidence from consideration. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d  at 346. Specifically, defendant offered evidence of his good
behavior while incarcerated pending and during trial. The circuit
court commented that it did not care "how great a prisoner he is,
the real test is ... what's going to happen upon release." We agreed
with defendant that this statement expressed the judge's
categorical belief that such evidence is never relevant to the capital
sentencing decision. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d  at 347. Consequently,
defendant was deprived "of the individualized consideration
required by the eighth and fourteenth amendments," and
resentencing was required. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d  at 347.
	On remand, defendant's request that the original sentencing
judge recuse himself was granted and a new judge was assigned.
Defendant again waived a jury and the circuit court again imposed
the death penalty. Because defendant was sentenced to death, his
appeal lies directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). As the facts
of his crimes are set out in detail in our earlier opinion (Davis, 185
Ill. 2d 317); we will summarize here only the testimony at the
second sentencing hearing.

THE SECOND SENTENCING HEARING
	The State presented the testimony of four women, all of them
admitted former prostitutes. Each woman told of being assaulted
between January 1993 and the summer of 1994 by a man who
picked her up in the Madison Square area in the north end of
Peoria. None of the women reported the attack at the time.
Between November 1994 and January 1995, however, each
woman gave a statement to the police describing the attack and
identifying defendant as her attacker. Laurie Gwinn was killed in
August 1995.
	Kari B. testified that on a summer afternoon in 1993, she
agreed to perform a sex act for money and entered a man's car. He
drove into the country and stopped near what she described as "an
abandoned farmhouse." She noticed that the door handle and the
window crank were torn out from the passenger side door. The
man turned to her and said "Bitch, I'm gonna kill you," and he put
his hands on her throat. She struggled and was able to climb
through the open car window. She fell to the ground, then got up
and ran to the road, with him chasing her. A passing driver gave
her a ride back into town. Kari admitted that she had been using
cocaine at the time of the attack and had been "up for a few days."
She also acknowledged a criminal record that included
prostitution, possession of a controlled substance, and robbery. At
the time she testified, she was on parole. She first told the story of
her attack to the police in January 1995, when she was being
interviewed after one of her arrests. When asked why she did not
report the attack when it occurred, she said she "was on cocaine
bad" and "just didn't want to get involved with the police." In
addition, she "didn't really think that they would listen" to her
because of her "background." Kari identified the defendant from
a photo array in January 1995. She also identified him in the
courtroom, stating that she had "no doubt whatsoever" that he was
the man who attacked her and that she could "never forget his
face."
	On cross-examination, Kari admitted that in 1993 she had
been addicted to crack cocaine. She stated that when she first
reported the attack to police, she told Peoria police officer Terry
Pyatt that the car's inside door handle was missing. However, she
also admitted telling Pyatt that she opened the car door and that
both she and her attacker fell out of the car. When asked if her
memory had improved in the five years since the incident, she
said, "I was on a lot of narcotics back [then]." Kari also
acknowledged that she told Pyatt she had been arrested later that
same night. However, when defense counsel produced a list of her
five arrests in the summer and fall of 1993, she could not pinpoint
the date of the attack.
	Denise T. testified that she had been employed as a roofer for
about a year and a half, but that she had previously worked as a
prostitute. In addition to arrests for prostitution, she had also been
convicted of obstruction of justice and three counts of retail theft.
About 10 p.m. one day in late April 1994, she agreed to pose for
nude photographs in exchange for money and entered a man's car.
She identified the car as defendant's, based on a photograph of his
car that was admitted into evidence. He drove to a remote wooded
area. She felt "dazed" and explained that she thought the man
struck her in the back of the head. When she came to, she was in
the back seat of the car with her hands handcuffed behind her. The
man was strangling her with an orange extension cord, which he
would loosen until she regained consciousness and then tighten
again. This went on for several hours, until morning, with
defendant repeatedly masturbating and ejaculating onto her chest.
The pressure from the cord being pulled tight around her neck
caused one of her eyes to "pop out" of its socket. She has a
permanent injury as a result. After she told the attacker that her
husband had seen her get into his car, he took her to a Peoria hotel,
took her up in an elevator, pushed her out, and fled. Denise did not
immediately seek medical attention for her injuries, because she
was afraid of going to jail. She explained that there were "a
couple" of outstanding warrants for her arrest and she did not want
the police to be contacted. When her condition did not improve
after a few days, she went to the emergency room for treatment.
She eventually spoke to the police in November 1994 and
identified defendant from a photo array. She admitted to using
drugs in April 1994, but testified that there was "no doubt" in her
mind that defendant was the man who attacked her.
	On cross-examination, Denise could not explain why she
initially told Pyatt that the attack occurred in January. She
acknowledged that she arrived at the April date only after her
hospital records showed a May 1, 1994, emergency room visit for
treatment of her eye injury. Defense counsel also questioned her
recollection of the time of day at which the attack occurred. Denise
insisted it had happened at night and that she had been picked up
"at the Mexican store on Perry." She denied telling Pyatt that she
had been picked up at 12:30 in the afternoon or telling Officer Rod
Huber that she had been picked up outside a bar called
Mulvaney's. Denise said she was not sure what defendant hit her
with and was not sure if she had told the police it was something
metal. She stated that she told Pyatt about defendant's
masturbating on her, but she could not recall if she told him about
car's missing door handle.
	The State also called a nurse from Methodist Hospital in
Peoria who verified Denise's eye injury and explained that it could
have been caused by excessive pressure on the blood vessels of the
neck.
	Michelle U. testified that a man picked her up in a blue car at
about 11 a.m. one day in the summer of 1994. She was a cocaine
user at the time, but had not used any drugs that morning. He
drove her to a secluded area at the end of a dead-end street. The
door handle and window crank were missing from the passenger
door. She performed the sex act they had agreed upon, but he
demanded more. She insisted that he pay her more money. He then
grabbed her throat, pushed her down on the seat, and completed
the act. He got out of the car, went around to the passenger side,
opened her door, and threw her out. He called her "bitch" and
"whore." Her pimp, who had followed them, arrived and took her
back to town. She did not report the attack because she was
"scared" and "embarrassed." She wanted to avoid contact with the
police and did not think she would be believed. Michelle's record
includes "a drug case" in addition to arrests for prostitution. She
told her story to the police in December 1994 and identified
defendant from a photo array. In court, she expressed certainty that
"[h]e's the one."
	On cross-examination, Michelle acknowledged that she
previously had been addicted to crack cocaine and had made her
initial identification of defendant while undergoing rehabilitation
at an inpatient treatment facility.
	Maria N. was a prostitute before she began working as a food
service worker in a nursing home. Her record includes charges of
prostitution, driving under the influence, possession of a controlled
substance, and obstruction of justice. She got into a car with a man
at 2 a.m. one day in January 1993 and he drove down a back road
to a wooded area behind a furniture warehouse. He told her to
remove her blouse while he got into the back seat to undress. Then
he reached from behind her, put a belt around her neck, and started
choking her. She passed out. When she came to, she was on the
floor of the back seat and it was daylight. She got her clothing
from the front seat, left the car, and walked to the road, where she
found a ride. She did not go to the police because she knew that
what she was doing "was wrong." She gave a statement to Pyatt in
January 1995 and identified the defendant from a photo array.
Maria admitted that she told Pyatt she woke up naked on the
ground rather than in the car, but insisted that her testimony was
accurate.
	On cross-examination, Maria described the car as a "brownish
colored station wagon with wood on the sides." She again
acknowledged telling Pyatt that she regained consciousness on the
ground, not in the car.
	The State called Officer Pyatt to testify regarding his
investigation of these attacks. He stated that he was present in
February 1995 when defendant's "older blue Dodge" was
searched. Among the items recovered from the car were an orange
extension cord and a set of handcuffs. In addition, the inside door
handle and the mechanism to roll the window up and down were
missing from the passenger-side door.
	Without objection by the defense, he also testified regarding
the statements made to him by the four women. His testimony
generally confirmed that they testified consistently with their
earlier statements as recorded in his notes. However, Maria N. did
tell him that she had been "dumped nude with her clothing."
	On cross-examination, Pyatt acknowledged that during his
first interview with Denise, she indicated that the attack had
occurred in late January 1994. When police investigation of
hospital records revealed her emergency room visit on May 1,
1994, the date was revised to late April 1994. There was no
mention in his written report and he did not recall Denise
mentioning that the door or window handles were missing from
the car. His report says that Denise claimed to have been picked up
at 12:30 in the afternoon, not at night. His report did not contain
any mention of the attacker's masturbating on her, but he stated
that he did recall Denise talking about this. Pyatt acknowledged
that defendant was charged with aggravated battery based on this
incident, but that the matter was dismissed with leave to refile.
Pyatt also stated that Kari described a "big green car" and that
neither the missing door handles nor the threat "Bitch, I'm gonna
kill you" were mentioned in his report.
	The State agreed to defense counsel's request to stipulate that
Huber, if called to testify, would say that Denise told him the
attack occurred after she was picked up outside Mulvaney's bar at
around 10 p.m.
	In addition to the testimony summarized above, the State also
presented the testimony of the victim's father, who read a short
statement; two Henry County deputies, who testified regarding
defendant's conduct while confined in the county jail awaiting
resentencing; several correctional officers, who testified to his
conduct while in state custody; and the records custodian from the
Department of Corrections, who testified regarding defendant's
disciplinary record. Because the circuit court gave little, if any,
weight to this information, we need not detail it here.
	Evidence in mitigation included the testimony of defendant's
uncle, the transcript of defendant's late mother's testimony at the
first sentencing hearing, and a written statement prepared by Dr.
George L. Savarese, a mitigation specialist. In addition,
defendant's driving abstract, which reveals one conviction for
driving under the influence and citations for speeding and driving
without a valid license, was admitted as evidence of defendant's
minimal prior criminal history.
	Because defendant argues that the circuit court failed to
properly consider a statutory mitigating factor, specifically the lack
of a significant history of criminal activity, we find it necessary to
quote at length from the circuit court's remarks upon sentencing.
The court first acknowledged its "duty to make a diligent inquiry
to find mitigating factors that are sufficient, individually or
collectively, to preclude the death penalty, if they indeed exist."
The court noted the aggravating factors that the State had proven
at the eligibility stage, in accordance with section 9-1(b) of the
Criminal Code of 1961: that defendant "actually and personally
struck and strangled Laurie Gwinn, intentionally committing
murder while in the course of committing three forcible felonies:
robbery, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated
kidnapping." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1994). In addition, the
court noted:
		"[T]he State has supplemented the record during the
course of this hearing by presenting the testimony of four
women who describe similar savage attacks *** by Arlie
Davis, similar to each other and similar to the factual
basis of this case.
			In this manner the State attempts to demonstrate that
the lack of a history of criminal convictions, a clean
record except for a driving under the influence charge and
... traffic charges, ... belies Arlie Ray Davis' true
character, a character the State contends is sinister,
violent, and perverse.
			Now I find that I must comment on the testimony of
[the four women]. Each is a cocaine addict, plunged deep
into a life of prostitution, theft, and prevarication. Each
has accumulated a deplorable criminal record. Each took
the witness stand and looking directly at the defendant
presented testimony in an emotional, blunt, and
convincing manner about incidents in their lives that are
likely to be indelibly fixed for a lifetime.
			Individually their credibility is certainly questionable,
suspect, and enigmatic. But, having assessed their
emotion, their grim determination, their manner while
testifying, and considering how their experiences coincide
in many respects with the facts and circumstances
surrounding the killing of Laurie Gwinn, the Court finds
these women believable and their testimony relevant.
			Additional significance is attached to the curious
manner in which they are corroborated by evidence in the
State's case-in-chief, namely handcuffs in the glove
compartment, an orange extension cord in the back seat,
manipulation of his victims to lonely, secluded places,
and a penchant for strangulation of his victims followed
by perverse sexual attacks.
			The Court has determined that collectively their
testimony reveals an intentional evil mindset of the
defendant and portrays a pattern of criminal behavior that
is appropriately considered in this Court's sentencing
decision. Let there be no mistake, however, this Court
will impose sentence for the murder of Laurie Gwinn, not
for charges that have not been filed.
			The testimony of these women is considered for the
narrow purpose of understanding Arlie Ray Davis'
character, the likelihood that he can be restored to useful
citizenship, and his potential for rehabilitation in or out of
prison."
	The court observed that Laurie Gwinn was unlike these four
earlier victims in that "Laurie Gwinn would be expected to
identify and prosecute her assailant. Arlie Davis knew she had no
fear of authorities." Thus, the court implied, defendant killed
Laurie Gwinn, but allowed the prostitutes he attacked to live,
because he thought he could count on them not to report the crime,
or perhaps not to be taken seriously if they had.
	The court then turned to its "quest to find one or more
mitigating factors which would preclude imposition of the death
penalty." Using the statute (720 ILCS 5/9-1(c) (West 1994)) as a
guide, the court considered each of the statutory factors
individually, finding only section 9-1(c)(1) applicable: "the
defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity."
With regard to this factor, the court commented:
		"While defendant has minor traffic violations including a
conviction for DUI, I find that the events which occurred
in Peoria in 1993 and 1994 establish a significant recent
history of prior criminal activity, thus this is not a
mitigating factor."
	In its "quest" to find mitigation, the court then considered the
13 statutory mitigating factors that are applicable to minimizing a
sentence of imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1 (West 1994).
None of these factors offered any support for mitigation.
	The Court also considered the evidence presented at the first
sentencing of defendant's model behavior while incarcerated prior
to and during trial and the evidence presented at this hearing of his
breaches of prison discipline. The court stated that it was "not
willing to disregard" the evidence of earlier good behavior "simply
because he misbehaved on seven occasions in the past three-and-a-half years."
	The testimony of defendant's uncle and mother revealed some
positive relationships with family members, but also a "dark side"
to defendant, the court found. The report of the mitigation expert
described defendant's "dysfunctional family" and a "wretched,
misdirected life."
	In the end, the court concluded that although there "are
glimmers of mitigation in the life of Arlie Davis," the court could
"not find that any factors in mitigation are sufficient to preclude
the imposition of the death penalty."

ANALYSIS
	Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by
considering the testimony of four prostitutes, none of whom was
"worthy of belief, as the stories they told were incredible and
motivated by self interest." In support of this assertion, he notes
that each of the four women was a convicted felon and an admitted
drug addict and that none of the women reported the alleged
assault at the time it occurred. Although defendant raised this issue
in a post-sentencing motion, the State responds that this argument
is waived for failure to make a contemporaneous objection. People
v. Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d 1, 27 (1995). We agree. Our case law
clearly requires that to avoid procedural default, the defendant
must make a contemporaneous objection and raise the issue in a
post-trial motion. In the alternative, the defendant must
demonstrate plain error or another exception to the rule of
procedural default. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 190
(1988). The defendant has not attempted to do so.
	In any event, even if defendant had argued plain error, he
could not have prevailed because there was no error. Defendant
admits that the testimony of the four women was relevant and
admissible. Therefore, his argument really goes to their credibility.
Defense counsel cross-examined each witness and pointed out any
discrepancies between her testimony and her earlier statements to
the police. Defense counsel also made a forceful argument in
closing that these witnesses' memories were unreliable because
they were impaired by drug use at or near the time of the attacks
and their frequent arrests might make them eager to shape their
testimony to fit the State's case. The circuit court considered their
testimony, their demeanor, and the arguments of counsel, and, in
the end, determined that the testimony was credible.
	We must defer to the sentencing judge in this matter. When
the defendant has waived a jury for the sentencing phase, assessing
the witnesses' credibility is exclusively within the province of the
circuit court as the trier of fact. People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409,
467 (1996). In the present case, the court was aware of several
reasons to regard the witnesses' testimony with skepticism. On the
other hand, their demeanor was apparently quite convincing. Some
details of their testimony were corroborated by physical evidence.
And their encounters with defendant were chillingly similar to the
manner in which he abducted and killed Laurie Gwinn. The trial
court was well within its discretion to credit the testimony of these
witnesses.
	Before we address defendant's second issue, we pause to
comment on the tenor of defendant's brief. Although we
appreciate that appellate counsel must zealously represent the
client, we find counsel has stepped very close to the line between
zealous advocacy and incivility toward the court and opposing
counsel. For example, counsel charges that the State, "lacking any
legitimate evidence in aggravation to present, elected to present
the testimony of criminals and drug addicts to sway the fact finder
toward a verdict of death" and, further, that the circuit court "was
beguiled" by this evidence. The brief asserts that the court's
comments reveal that the court did not find the witnesses "worthy
of belief individually, but because the prosecution managed to find
four prostitutes to testify, the testimony suddenly became
believable." In that same vein, counsel argues that "the fact that
the prosecution could find no witness who had allegedly been
attacked by Mr. Davis other than prostitutes, known to curry favor
with the police, is significant in its omission."
	Counsel's tone, which mocks the trial court and witnesses that
it found credible, does not assist this court in addressing the merits
of the issues, a duty which we take most seriously. The comments
of the circuit court reveal the court's understanding that the State
found no living witness, other than these four women, who had
been attacked by defendant because the very traits that made them
vulnerable to attack-their work as prostitutes, their drug use, and
their run-ins with the law-meant that they did not pose a threat to
defendant and, thus, he could allow them to survive. Laurie Gwinn
might have made a compelling witness, one whose credibility
would not have been in question, had she survived her encounter
with defendant.
	Defendant's second argument is that counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to the testimony of police officer Pyatt.
According to defendant, Pyatt's testimony was hearsay and
cumulative and merely bolstered the testimony of the four women
who accused him of assault. As a result, he argues, the testimony
would not have been allowed if counsel had made a timely
objection.
	Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated
under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064,
2068 (1984), which requires the defendant to demonstrate both
that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reviewing court assesses counsel's performance
using an objective standard of competence under prevailing
professional norms. To establish deficient performance, the
defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's
action or inaction was the result of sound trial strategy. People v.
Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999). As a result, counsel's strategic
choices that are made after investigation of the law and the facts
are virtually unassailable. People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401,
413 (2000).
	In the present case, the transcript makes it clear that counsel
did not object to Pyatt's testimony because counsel's strategy was
to impeach the credibility of the four earlier witnesses by showing
numerous discrepancies between their testimony at the sentencing
hearing and their earlier statements to the officer. Indeed, when the
State called only one of the two investigating officers to testify, the
defense requested that the State stipulate to the testimony of the
absent officer so that it, too, could be used to expose an
inconsistency in the testimony of one of the women. The strategy
was not unreasonable, even though it was ultimately unsuccessful.
Because defendant cannot meet the first prong of the Strickland
test, he cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
	Defendant's third argument is based on our opinion in his first
appeal, in which we concluded that the "dispositive inquiry" was
whether the sentencing judge refused, as a matter of law, to
consider certain mitigating evidence. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d  at 346. We
cited Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982), for the firmly established rule that "while a capital
sentencer 'may determine the weight to be given relevant
mitigating evidence,' the sentencer 'may not give it no weight by
excluding such evidence' from its consideration." Davis, 185 Ill. 2d  at 346, quoting Eddings, 455 U.S.  at 114-15, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 11,
102 S. Ct.  at 877. Defendant argues that the judge in his second
sentencing hearing committed precisely the same error that
resulted in the need for a second hearing-outright refusal to
consider relevant mitigating evidence. In particular, defendant
asserts that the circuit court refused to consider evidence that he
had "no significant history of prior criminal activity" (720 ILCS
5/9-1(c)(1) West 1994)), other than insignificant traffic offenses.
As a result, defendant seeks a third sentencing hearing. His
argument hinges on a single sentence from the trial court's lengthy
remarks upon sentencing:
		"While defendant has minor traffic violations including a
conviction for DUI, I find that the events which occurred
in Peoria in 1993 and 1994 establish a significant recent
history of prior criminal activity, thus this is not a
mitigating factor." (Emphasis added.)
	We reject defendant's argument that these few words
demonstrate that the resentencing judge committed the same error
as the original sentencing judge. The flaw in defendant's first
sentencing hearing was that "the judge expressed the categorical
belief" that evidence of defendant's positive adjustment to
incarceration was "never relevant to a capital sentencing decision.
The judge's comments thus demonstrate[d] that he did not
consider defendant's proffered mitigating evidence *** based
upon the judge's mistaken belief that such evidence is not
mitigating." Davis, 185 Ill. 2d  at 347. At the second sentencing
hearing, the judge did not categorically refuse to consider evidence
of defendant's lack of a significant criminal record.
	Defendant also raises several other arguments with respect to
this statutory mitigating factor. He argues that: (1) only a
significant history of prior criminal convictions, as opposed to
prior criminal activity, may be used to "negate" this factor, (2)
when evidence of lack of a history of criminal convictions is
presented, the court must make a specific finding that this
mitigating factor is present, even if it then considers evidence of
uncharged crimes as a nonstatutory aggravating factor, and (3) due
process requires any fact that increases the maximum penalty for
a crime must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, citing
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 455, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000).
	Defendant cites People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 144 (1981),
in which this court considered whether the statutory phrase " 'no
significant history of prior criminal activity' " is impermissibly
vague. We held that while this phrase "can, perhaps, be construed
or applied by courts so as to render it overly broad, there is no
reason to assume it will be. *** We believe the phrasing of section
9-1(c)(1) is not a constitutionally impermissible basis for calling
to the jury's attention the absence of significant criminal
convictions." (Emphasis added.) Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d  at 144-45. He
notes that we later decided a case in which evidence of a prior
juvenile proceeding that did not result in an adjudication of
delinquency and of a prior criminal charge that did not result in a
conviction were considered by the sentencing court, holding that:
		"Even if these two dispositions were improperly
considered by the trial judge, the error was harmless
because the defendant still had a significant history of
criminal activity; i.e., convictions for two burglaries,
misdemeanor theft, possession of a controlled substance,
and two for unlawful-use-of weapons charges." People v.
Stewart, 101 Ill. 2d 470, 494 (1984).
	Reading Lewis and Stewart together, defendant concludes that
only prior criminal convictions, or the lack thereof, may be
considered by the sentencer to determine whether the mitigating
factor is present and, further, any error resulting from
consideration of other criminal activity is harmless only if the
defendant also has a significant history of criminal convictions.
Thus, he concludes, it was error for the circuit court to find that
the mitigating factor did not exist based on evidence of criminal
activity that did not result in conviction and, further, the error
could not have been harmless because he had no other significant
criminal convictions on his record.
	The State responds that the trial court's single comment that
"this is not a mitigating factor" must be read in the context of the
court's lengthy remarks, and that the court did, in fact,
acknowledge that defendant did not have a significant history of
criminal convictions before concluding that this fact was
outweighed by the existence of a nonstatutory aggravating factor,
that is, substantial evidence of uncharged criminal activity.
	Defendant does not attempt to argue that the circuit court
erred by admitting and considering evidence of uncharged criminal
conduct. To do so would have been futile in any event. See People
v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 255 (1997) ("the sentencer may consider
in aggravation evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct,
including juvenile delinquency, 'although the misconduct may not
have resulted in prosecution or conviction' "), quoting People v.
Lego, 116 Ill. 2d 323, 346-47 (1987).
	Upon careful reading of the circuit court's comments, we note
that the court referred to the evidence of uncharged crimes as the
State's having "supplemented the record," a clear reference to the
court's understanding that this evidence was offered as a
nonstatutory aggravating factor, presented in the State's case in
chief to supplement the aggravating factors proven at the first
stage of sentencing.
	The court also stated that defendant's lack of criminal history,
as reflected by his record of convictions, was "belied" by the
evidence of his attacks on the four women. To "belie" a fact is to
demonstrate its falsity. See B. Garner, Dictionary of Modern Legal
Usage 102 (2d ed. 1995) ("belie = (1) to disguise, give a false idea
of; (2) to leave unfulfilled; or (3) to contradict or prove the falsity
of"). When a defendant offers evidence in mitigation, the State is
permitted to offer evidence to "belie" its factual basis. The State
did so, for example, in People v. Ramirez, 98 Ill. 2d 439, 467
(1983), by having its own psychiatric expert testify after the
defendant offered evidence that he committed the murder while
"under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance"
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(2) (West 1994)). We found that "[s]ince the
defendant himself raised the issue of his mental condition at the
time of the offense, it was not improper for the State to try to
disprove his assertion." Ramirez, 98 Ill. 2d  at 467.
	In People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 296 (1992), the defendant
presented mitigating evidence that his prior adjudications for
delinquency were for nonviolent crimes, for which he received
probation. While we did not "discount the significance" of this
mitigation evidence, we also found it significant that between the
murder of Gilbert Perez, for which he faced the death penalty, and
his arrest, defendant shot Louis Rosero five times, rendering him
a paraplegic. Flores, attempting to minimize the significance of
Rosero's testimony at the sentencing hearing, argued that "he was
never convicted of the Rosero shooting." Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 296.
We noted that "this evidence was admissible, for, certainly, prior
uncharged criminal conduct is relevant in a sentencing
determination. [Citation.] If believed, the jury may have
considered that defendant's mitigation evidence was insufficient
to overcome the aggravating factors." Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 296.
 	In the present case, defendant pointed to his lack of a criminal
record as evidence that he had "no significant history of prior
criminal activity" (720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(1) (West 1994)). He
introduced the record of his traffic offenses, including a DUI, as
evidence of that any prior law-breaking on his part was not
"significant." The State, anticipating that he would rely on this
particular mitigating factor, put on evidence of quite significant
criminal activity in the two years immediately preceding the
murder. The circuit court, considering all of the evidence,
commented: "In this manner the State attempts to demonstrate that
the lack of a history of criminal convictions, a clean record except
for a driving under the influence charge and *** traffic charges,
*** belies Arlie Ray Davis' true character, a character the State
contends is sinister, violent, and perverse."
	We conclude, based on the record of the circuit court's
comments, that the court did find that the statutory mitigating
factor was present, but that its significance was clearly
outweighed, or "belied," by the evidence of uncharged crimes
properly introduced by the State. This conclusion is supported by
the circuit court's statement that it was considering the other-crimes evidence "for the narrow purpose" of understanding
defendant's "character, the likelihood that he can be restored to
useful citizenship, and his potential for rehabilitation."
	Defendant acknowledges that it would have been entirely
appropriate for the circuit court to find that the statutory mitigating
factor was present, but that the evidence of nonstatutory
aggravating factors "reduced the impact of this factor." He argues,
however, that the court's remark that "this is not a mitigating
factor" demonstrates that it was not engaging in this kind of
balancing and, without citation to authority, he asserts that the
circuit court was required to make an express finding that the
factor was present before finding it outweighed by other factors.
The State responds that "[w]hile the court's language may not
have been as precise" as it could have been, this court has
previously permitted a sentencing court to weigh the lack of a
prior criminal record against evidence of prior uncharged criminal
activity. Both parties cite Smith, in which we found "no error
where the trial court first found the presence of the statutory
mitigating factor, and then 'tempered' that finding by noting
evidence of defendant's juvenile misconduct." Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 
at 255.
	We also find Stewart instructive. In that case, the defendant
argued that the trial judge failed to consider, or improperly
considered, certain factors in mitigation, including his lack of a
significant history of prior criminal activity. Stewart, 101 Ill. 2d  at
493-94. The judge made a remark quite similar to the disputed
comment in this case when he concluded that there was " 'nothing
to mitigate the offense committed here.' " Stewart, 101 Ill. 2d  at
494. As in the present case, the judge's remark was made in the
context of describing his consideration of all of the evidence
presented: " 'I have indulged in many hours of reflective
introspection seeking to find some factors in mitigation. *** I have
searched my conscience and my soul and I cannot find any basis
in law or in fact that would preclude the death penalty in this
case.' " Stewart, 101 Ill. 2d  at 494-95. We found that the record in
Stewart, despite the single comment relied on by the defendant,
did not demonstrate that the judge failed to consider factors in
mitigation. Stewart, 101 Ill. 2d  at 494-95. Similarly, in the present
case, the judge's remarks, taken as a whole, reflect careful
consideration of all of the statutory and nonstatutory factors
offered by the parties and the reluctant conclusion that the death
penalty was proper. Implicit in the single, isolated comment that
"this is not a mitigating factor" is the judge's conclusion that the
mitigating factor was not sufficient to outweigh the aggravating
factors.
	Defendant's final argument with regard to this mitigating
factor is that the trial court's reliance on allegations of criminal
conduct that were not proven at trial violates the constitutional
guarantee of due process as interpreted in Apprendi. This
argument is entirely without merit. Apprendi held that any fact that
increases the statutory maximum penalty for a crime, other than
the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at 2362-63. The Supreme Court in
Apprendi expressly excluded death penalty proceedings from its
reach. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 496, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 459, 120 S. Ct. 
at 2366.
	In the present case, when evidence of uncharged crimes was
offered during the second stage of sentencing, defendant had
already been proven eligible for the death penalty based on the
presence of three aggravating factors. Thus, the maximum
sentence he faced was death. No fact that was offered at the
second stage of sentencing could have had the effect of increasing
the maximum penalty. Apprendi concerns are, thus, not implicated
here.
	In the end, defendant's arguments with regard to this
mitigating factor are nothing more than an invitation to "assign
greater weight to the mitigation evidence than did the trial court."
People v. Turner, 156 Ill. 2d 354, 366 (1993). We will not engage
in such reweighing. "The trial court reviewed the evidence and
observed the witnesses. The court expressly cited the factors in
aggravation and mitigation which it considered in arriving at its
sentencing determination. Our review of that determination is
weighted with a heavy measure of deference." Turner, 156 Ill. 2d 
at 366.
	Defendant also argues that what he calls the "Illinois Death
Penalty Statute," actually sections (b) through (j) of the statute
defining first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) through (j) (West
1994)), is unconstitutional because it does not require the
sentencer to find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating
factors outweigh mitigating factors. He bases this argument on
Apprendi as well. Defendant acknowledges that the Court stated
that the rule it was announcing in Apprendi would not "render
invalid state capital sentencing schemes requiring judges, after a
jury verdict holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find
specific aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death."
Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 496, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 459, 120 S. Ct.  at
2366, citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 111 L. Ed. 2d 511,
110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990). Nevertheless, he argues that the Apprendi
rule should be applied to Illinois' death penalty sentencing scheme
because it differs from the scheme described by the Court in
Apprendi. He notes that "there is only one offense of murder in
Illinois; no distinction is made between capital and non-capital
murder." People v. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d 508, 524 (1980). Thus, he
argues, because he was found guilty of "murder," but not "capital
murder," any further findings of fact permitting imposition of a
sentence in excess of the 60-year statutory maximum for murder
(730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 1994)) must be proved by the
State beyond a reasonable doubt, including a finding that the
aggravating factors are not outweighed by mitigating factors.
	The State responds that defendant has waived this argument
by failing to raise it in his first appeal. However, Apprendi was
decided more than a year after his first appeal, while his
resentencing was pending, so this argument was not available to
him at that time. In addition, this proceeding is a direct appeal,
albeit a second one. The doctrine of waiver does not bar a
defendant from raising a constitutional issue on direct appeal, even
if he failed to raise it at trial. See People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 280 (2001).
	Defendant's argument hinges on the underlying proposition
that the statutory maximum sentence for murder is established in
every case by section 5-8-1(a)(1)(a) of the Code of Corrections.
730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 1994) (stating that the sentence
for first degree murder, absent a finding of fact regarding certain
aggravating factors, shall be a determinate term "not less than 20
years and not more than 60 years"). If this is so, then imposition
of an extended-term sentence (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2),
5-8-2(a)(1), (b) (West 1994)), or the death penalty (720 ILCS
5/9-1(b) through (j) (West 1994)), would always implicate the due
process concerns addressed in Apprendi. But what of the case in
which the defendant who, after being convicted of murder, is
found eligible for the death penalty? This question has already
been addressed by this court in People v. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68
(2001), and our holding in that case forecloses defendant's
argument.
	Eric Ford was convicted of first degree murder after a bench
trial. When the State sought the death penalty, he waived a jury for
both phases of the capital sentencing hearing. The trial court found
him eligible for the death penalty on two separate bases: the
murder was committed in the course of another felony and the
murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. Ford,
198 Ill. 2d  at 71. Following receipt of mitigating evidence, the trial
court declined to impose the death penalty, based on Ford's youth,
his lack of a significant history of criminal activity, his confession,
and his cooperation with the police. Nevertheless, because the
murder " 'was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty,' " the trial court imposed an
extended-term sentence of 100 years, rather than the 60-year
sentence that would have been proper absent the aggravating
factor. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 71. Ford argued that his 100-year
extended-term sentence was unconstitutional under Apprendi
because the maximum sentence for the offense of murder is a 60-year prison term. The State's position was that Apprendi does not
ever apply to sentencing under Illinois' first degree murder statute
because the maximum penalty authorized by that statute is death.
Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 71-72.
	The first degree murder statute permits the State to seek
imposition of the death penalty for any defendant found guilty
under the statute by proving that the defendant is at least 18 years
of age and that one or more of the listed aggravating factors is met.
720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1994). The State must meet this burden
by proving the existence of the aggravating factor or factors
beyond a reasonable doubt. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(f) (West 1994). Once
the State has met this burden, the maximum sentence facing the
particular defendant is death.
	As applied to Ford, because he had been found eligible for the
death penalty, a 100-year sentence, even though it was an
"extended-term" sentence, did not exceed the statutory maximum
he was facing-death. The trial court's finding that the murder
" 'was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty,' " although a finding of fact "did
nothing to increase the penalty" that he was facing. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 74.
	In the present case, the jury found the defendant guilty of
murder and of the three felonies that served as aggravating factors
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(a) (West 1994)). The jury also found,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was eligible for the death
penalty. "At this point, and based exclusively upon facts that were
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant faced a prescribed
statutory maximum sentence of death." Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 74.
Consideration of mitigating factors, or even consideration of
nonstatutory aggravating factors, at the second stage of sentencing
cannot increase the penalty for the crime beyond that maximum.
Indeed, mitigating factors can only reduce the likelihood that the
maximum penalty will be imposed. The remaining question at this
stage-whether sufficient mitigating factors exist to preclude
imposition of the death penalty-thus need not be submitted to the
jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
	We, therefore, conclude that the rule announced in Apprendi
is not applicable in the mitigation phase of a death penalty
sentencing hearing.
	Defendant raises another Apprendi-based claim-that his
indictment was flawed because it did not set forth all of the
elements of the crime. The omitted elements, according to
defendant, are that he was over the age of 18 at the time of the
commission of the crime, that he actually killed Laurie Gwinn,
that the killing occurred in the course of one or more of the
specified felonies, and that mitigating factors are not sufficient to
preclude the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, he contends
that he may not constitutionally be sentenced to death.
	Defendant's brief also states in its summary of the "Nature of
the Case" that "no issue is raised concerning the sufficiency of the
charging instruments." Perhaps this language is just boilerplate, or
perhaps it reflects counsel's recognition that the time for raising
any challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment is long past.
"When an indictment or information is attacked for the first time
on appeal, it is sufficient that the indictment or information
'apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with
sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading a
resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecution arising out of
the same conduct.' " People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 448
(1991), quoting People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23, 29 (1976). In
other words, the question on appeal is "whether the defect in the
information or indictment prejudiced the defendant in preparing
his defense." Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d  at 448.
	In the present case, defendant did not challenge the indictment
at trial or in his first direct appeal. Thus, unless he demonstrates
that he was prejudiced in preparing his defense, this issue is
waived. Defendant makes no claim of prejudice, however. Instead,
he packages his challenge to the indictment in Apprendi wrapping
and raises it as a constitutional claim that was not available to him
at the time of his first appeal.
	Defendant's attempt to create an Apprendi issue is unavailing
because the Supreme Court, in Apprendi, specifically excluded
capital sentencing schemes in which eligibility for the death
penalty must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt from
its scope:
		" ' Neither the cases cited, nor any other case, permits a
judge to determine the existence of a factor which makes
a crime a capital offense. What the cited cases hold is that,
once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the
elements of an offense which carries as its maximum
penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge
to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a
lesser one, ought to be imposed ... . The person who is
charged with actions that expose him to the death penalty
has an absolute entitlement to jury trial on all the elements
of the charge.' " Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 497, 147 L. Ed. 2d 
at 459, 120 S. Ct.  at 2366, quoting Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 257 n.2, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350, 
377 n.2, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1237 n.2 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.).
	Defendant argues that this dicta in Apprendi regarding capital
sentencing applies only to those states with criminal laws that
distinguish between the offenses of murder and capital murder.
Because Illinois' criminal code defines only one offense of first
degree murder, he argues that a charge of first degree murder does
not adequately inform the accused that he may face the death
penalty. He claims that Apprendi implicitly overturns our decision
in People v. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d 508 (1980).
	In Brownell, the defendant argued that a capital sentencing
hearing, conducted after his conviction for first degree murder,
violated double jeopardy principles. He characterized his trial as
having convicted him of the "lesser included offense of murder,"
and his sentencing hearing as having tried him again for the
offense of "capital murder." Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d  at 523. He also
made an eighth amendment argument that his indictment was
defective because the prosecutor could initiate a death penalty
hearing without having charged him with "aggravated murder."
Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d  at 526-27. We noted that "there is only one
offense of murder in Illinois; no distinction is made between
capital and non-capital murder." Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d  at 524.
Further, "[t]here is no offense of 'aggravated,' as opposed to
simple, murder, in Illinois. There is simply one murder statute,
which includes within it a provision for the imposition of the death
sentence." Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d  at 527. Thus, an indictment for
murder is sufficient if it sets out "with such specificity or
particularity that the accused is informed of the offense with which
he is charged and enabled to prepare his defense and, further, that
he is protected against being later prosecuted for the same crime."
Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d  at 524. In addition, when the indictment
contains allegations that the defendant murdered the victim in the
course of committing certain other felonies, such as aggravated
kidnapping or rape, the defendant is "fully apprised, from
indictment on, that he could potentially receive the death
sentence." Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d  at 525.
	We relied on Brownell in People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1 (1983),
in which the defendant argued that the indictment was insufficient
to support a death sentence because it failed to allege a statutory
aggravating factor. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d  at 28. After again noting that
there is only one offense of murder under Illinois law, and that the
defendant did not assert that the necessary elements of that crime
were insufficiently alleged in the indictment, we stated:
		"The aggravating factors are not necessary elements of the
offense, and are relevant only to a determination of the
appropriate punishment. Therefore, the real question
concerns defendant's knowledge that the death penalty
would be sought, and his ability to adequately prepare a
defense." (Emphases in original.) Davis, 95 Ill. 2d  at 29.
	As in Davis, this defendant "does not allege that he was
unaware of the aggravating factors upon which the State would
rely." Davis, 95 Ill. 2d  at 29. Indeed, in the present case, defendant
was also charged with three separate felonies, any one of which,
if proven, would have provided an aggravating factor to make him
eligible for the death penalty. "This is not, therefore, a situation in
which the indictment either failed to specify aggravating factors or
defendant received no pretrial notice." Davis, 95 Ill. 2d  at 29-30.
	We recognized in Wagener that "Apprendi contains isolated
statements which on their face might appear to support the
conclusion that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt each
and every fact which might have any real-world impact on the
length of time the defendant might spend in prison." Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d  at 286. Nothing in Apprendi, however, causes us to
reconsider our holdings in Brownell and its progeny. Aggravating
factors are not elements of the offense of murder. They are
sentencing factors. When the State is considering seeking the
death penalty, the defendant must be put on notice of this
possibility either by the inclusion of specific aggravating factors
in the indictment or some other form of pretrial notice, so that he
may adequately prepare his defense. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d  at 29-30. If
such notice is provided, the defendant can show no prejudice and
the indictment is a sufficient basis upon which to predicate the
death penalty. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d  at 30.
	Defendant's final arguments are that the Illinois death penalty
statute is unconstitutional because it places a burden of proof on
defendants to show that mitigating evidence outweighs
aggravating evidence; allows sentencers to weigh a vague
aggravating factor, namely, "any other reason" beyond the
statutory factors why a defendant should be sentenced to death
(see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c), (e) (West 1994)); and fails to sufficiently
minimize the risk of arbitrarily imposed death sentences. This
court has repeatedly addressed these claims; indeed, we did so in
defendant's first appeal (Davis, 185 Ill. 2d at 351-52) . He offered
no reason then, and offers no reason now, why we should
reconsider our prior decisions. Therefore, we again reject these
claims.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order
setting Tuesday, May 13, 2002, as the date on which the sentence
of death entered by the circuit court of Henry County shall be
carried out. Petitioner shall be executed in the manner provided by
law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 2000). The clerk of this court shall
send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of
Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to
the warden of the institution where petitioner is now confined.
Affirmed.
	When this matter was last before the court, I did not take issue
with the validity of Davis' convictions. People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 352 (1998) (Harrison, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). My view has now changed. During the pendency of
Davis' appeal, our court adopted a comprehensive set of new rules
governing the conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the
death penalty. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion
in People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 35 (September 27,
2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures contained in
those rules are indispensable for achieving an accurate
determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital
cases now coming before us. Because Davis was tried, convicted
and sentenced without the benefit of the new rules, his convictions
and death sentence should be vacated, and the cause should be
remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
	Even if Davis were not entitled to the benefit of the new rules,
his sentence of death could not stand. As I wrote when this matter
was last before us, and for the reasons set forth in my partial
concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179
(1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void and unenforceable
because it violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and
article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §2). Absent the new rules, there is no basis for altering that
conclusion. At a minimum, Davis' sentence of death should
therefore be vacated, and he should be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1994).
	For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey,
No. 87286, slip op. at 39 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084, slip op. at 35
(September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe this cause
should be remanded for a new trial conducted in compliance with
the new rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my dissents, 
the procedures in capital cases prior to this court's adoption of the
new rules were inherently unreliable and did not sufficiently
protect a defendant's constitutional rights. For this reason, I
believe that the new rules should be applied retroactively. See
People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997). Therefore,  I 
respectfully dissent.