Case Title: In Re: Lead Paint Litigation

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-73-05

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). The defendant manufacturers (defendants) moved to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court granted defendants motion, finding that the plaintiff public entities (plaintiffs) overstepped their powers and were not authorized to maintain suit, regardless of any particular theories asserted. In regard to plaintiffs public nuisance argument, the trial court rejected it because: 1) the damages sought would be barred by the municipal cost recovery doctrine; 2) defendants acts were governed exclusively by products liability theories; and 3) the Legislature, in enacting the Lead Paint Act (LPA), intended to act comprehensively, with the result that other remedies, including the common law remedy of public nuisance, were not available to plaintiffs. The trial court also rejected the complaints based on a proximate cause analysis, reasoning that defendants lack of control of the premises where the nuisance could be found was fatal to any recovery of damages. The Appellate Division reversed only the trial court s dismissal of the public nuisance claim, affirming all of the trial court s other conclusions. The panel found that allowing plaintiffs public nuisance claim to go forward would not subvert any legislative goals reasoning that, absent any express legislative limitation, courts must assume that the LPA was not intended to bar any inconsistent common-law remedy. The panel also found no separation of powers violation, referring to the goals of the complaints as complementary to the remedies authorized by the LPA. The Appellate Division also rejected the trial court s municipal cost recovery analysis, questioning the continued viability of that theory and its application to public nuisance claims. In addition, the panel held that a public nuisance claim is permissible even if the only allegation is that defendants failed to advise of the risks associated with an ordinary consumer product lawfully made and sold decades before. The panel concluded that the plaintiffs were not impermissibly suing on behalf of third parties but had suffered their own, unique damage. The Appellate Division also rejected the defendants argument that plaintiffs claims were barred by the Product Liability Act (PLA), finding instead that their claims were precluded from the scope of the PLA because of that statute s exception for environmental tort actions. Finally, the panel concluded that plaintiffs claims were not barred by the remoteness doctrine, plaintiffs identifying a sufficient link between defendants conduct and the alleged damages. The Supreme Court granted certification to address issues relating to the tort of public nuisance. HELD: Plaintiffs cannot state a cognizable claim consistent with the well-recognized parameters of the common-law tort of public nuisance. To find otherwise would be directly contrary to legislative pronouncements governing both lead paint abatement programs and products liability claims. 1. Lead, a naturally occurring metal, has been linked to serious health risks, especially in young children. There are many forms of lead contamination, including that caused by lead paint most often ingested through chipping, peeling, or dust resulting from deteriorating conditions of older homes. As of 2000, the Centers for Disease Control considered childhood lead exposure, which can cause learning disabilities, retardation, hyperactivity, or even death, a major environmental problem. (Pp. 10-14) 2. Congress passed and continued to amend legislation to fund grants to investigate, address, and remediate continued lead paint contamination in residential units throughout the country. In New Jersey, through the LPA and other statutes, the Legislature has separated the statutory scheme for the abatement of lead paint in buildings from the programs devoted to the health care aspects of lead exposure and lead poisoning. There are many and varied funding sources for addressing the health concerns arising from lead exposure. In contrast, under the LPA, responsibility for the costs of abatement rests largely on the property owner, with the statute specifically empowering local boards of health to sue owners to recover abatement costs. It is within this statutory framework that the parties arguments must be evaluated. (Pp. 14-22) 3. The Legislature s use of the term public nuisance in the LPA is in keeping with the term s historic meaning and intent. Thus, if the Court were to agree that there is a basis sounding in public nuisance for plaintiffs claims, it would be creating a remedy entirely at odds with the pronouncements of the Legislature. Essential to the concept of public nuisance is the interference with the interests of the community at large. An example of such a public nuisance is a pond breeding malarial mosquitoes or the storage of explosives. The tort has been historically linked to the use of land by the one creating the nuisance. The modern concepts of the term are found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, but the definitional language continues to adhere to the traditional notion that the tort of public nuisance fundamentally involves the vindication of a right common to the public. (Pp. 22-30) 4. In the area of public nuisance, there is a distinction between suits for money damages and proceedings for the injunctive remedy of abatement. A private plaintiff can sue for money damages caused by a public nuisance only if the private plaintiff has suffered harm of a kind that is different from that suffered by other members of the public (a special injury). Conversely, a public entity only has the right to abate. There is no right either historically or through the Restatement (Second) for a public entity to seek to collect money damages, in general. (Pp. 30-34) 5. The Legislature s use of the term public nuisance can only have been intended in its strict historical sense. By attaching a criminal penalty, by ordering an abatement through a public entity, and by maintaining a focus on the owner of premises as the actor responsible for the public nuisance itself, the Legislature s approach remained tethered to the historical bases that have defined public nuisance throughout the years. Nor is there any basis to conclude that the Legislature, in using the term public nuisance in the LPA and in creating a remedial scheme consistent with the historical understanding of the term in both criminal and tort antecedents, had nonetheless expected that its use of that term would be the springboard for the expansive reading suggested by plaintiffs. (Pp. 34-38) 6. There is no basis for recognizing a public nuisance cause of action in plaintiffs complaints. The Legislature, consistent with traditional public nuisance concepts, recognized that the appropriate target of the abatement and enforcement scheme must be the premises owner whose conduct has, effectively, created the nuisance. Plaintiffs view that defendants product is a public nuisance would improperly stretch the theory to the point of creating strict liability to be imposed on the manufacturers of ordinary consumer products which, although legal when sold, and although sold no more than twenty-five years ago, have become dangerous through deterioration and poor maintenance by the purchasers. (Pp. 38-42) 7. In applying these above referenced principles to plaintiffs complaints, the inevitable conclusion is that the complaints do not state a claim in public nuisance. First, the complaints seek damages rather than abatement and, as such, fall outside the scope of remedies available to a public entity plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiffs may only proceed in the manner of private plaintiffs. Assuming that is permissible, they must identify a special injury to which an award of money damages may attach. Plaintiffs have not and cannot do that because all of the injuries they have identified are general to the public at large. Rather, plaintiffs claims are cognizable only as products liability claims. The language of the Products Liability Act encompasses both the products at issue and the harms suffered. Nor are the claims raised excluded from the scope of the PLA, which excludes claims seeking coverage for exposure to toxic chemicals or substances. Lead paint exposure is not within the environmental tort exclusion. Although there may be room, under other circumstances, for an expanded definition of public nuisance, there is no basis in this record to conclude that plaintiffs have stated such a claim. (Pp. 42-51) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for entry of a judgment in favor of defendants. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI, dissenting, in which JUSTICE LONG joins, is of the view that the Court has a duty to reconcile outdated formulations of common law with the complexities of contemporary society and, as such, he would not allow those responsible for polluting this State s residential environment to avoid liability simply because past applications of the public nuisance doctrine do not mirror the circumstances of this case. Justice Zazzali finds the public nuisance doctrine an appropriate and efficient means for vindicating the public s right to be free from the harmful effects of lead paint. The majority s holding unfairly places the cost of abatement on taxpayers and private property owners, while sheltering those responsible for creating the problem. The common law doctrine of public nuisance is an appropriate means of shifting the costs of abatement to those who unfairly profited at the expense of the general public. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE HOENS opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE LONG joins. JUSTICE ALBIN did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 73 September Term 2005 IN RE: LEAD PAINT LITIGATION Argued November 28, 2006 Decided June 15, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Ezra D. Rosenberg argued the cause for appellants, American Cyanamid Co.; Atlantic Richfield Company; Cytec Industries, Inc.; E.I. duPont de Nemours and Company, ConAgra Grocery Products Company; Millenium Inorganic Chemicals Inc.; NL Industries, Inc. and Sherwin-Williams Co. (Dechert, attorneys for Atlantic Richfield Company; Coughlin Duffy, attorneys for American Cyanamid Co. and Cytec Industries, Inc.; Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Perretti, attorneys for E.I. duPont de Nemours and Company; Lowenstein Sandler, attorneys for ConAgra Grocery Products Company; Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, attorneys for Millenium Inorganic Chemicals Inc.; McCarter & English, attorneys for NL Industries, Inc. and Herrick, Feinstein, attorneys for Sherwin-Williams Co.; Mr. Rosenberg, Joyce Chen Shueh, Timothy I. Duffy, David W. Field, Anne M. Patterson, Lauren E. Handler, Steven P. Benenson, Andrew T. Berry and Ronald J. Levine, on the briefs). Fidelma Fitzpatrick, a member of the Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New York and District of Columbia bars and Michael Gordon argued the cause for respondents, City of Bayonne; City of Camden; Borough of Collingswood; Cumberland County; City of East Orange; County of Essex; City of Gloucester; Gloucester County; Borough of Highland Park; Township of Hillside; Township of Irvington; City of Jersey City; City of Linden; City of Newark; Borough of North Plainfield; City of Orange; City of Passaic; Town of Phillipsburg; City of Plainfield; Borough of Roselle; Borough of Roselle Park; City of Union City; County of Union; Township of Union; Town of West New York and Township of West Orange (Gordon & Gordon, attorneys for City of Newark and Township of West Orange; Morris G. Smith and Florio, Perrucci, Steinhardt & Fader, attorneys for City of Camden; Florio, Perrucci, Steinhardt & Fader, attorneys for Borough of North Plainfield; City of Gloucester; Town of Phillipsburg; Borough of Collingswood and County of Gloucester; Florio, Perrucci, Steinhardt & Fader and Hobbie, Corrigan, Bertucio & Tashjy, attorneys for City of Plainfield; Jon L. Gelman, Michael P. Burakoff and Scarinci & Hollenbeck, attorneys for City of Bayonne; City of Jersey City; City of Passaic; City of Union City and Town of West New York; Mr. Gelman, Mr. Burakoff, James J. Plaia and Marvin T. Braker, attorneys for City of Orange; Basile & Testa, attorneys for County of Cumberland; Mr. Gelman, Mr. Burakoff and Bross, Cummings & Pereira, attorneys for Township of Irvington and County of Essex; Bross, Cummings & Pereira, attorneys for City of East Orange; Mr. Gelman, Mr. Burakoff and Mr. Plaia, attorneys for City of Linden; Township of Hillside; Borough of Roselle; Borough of Roselle Park; County of Union and Borough of Highland Park; Ms. Fitzpatrick, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Smith, Mr. Burakoff, Mr. Gelman, Mr. Plaia, Mr. Braker, Michael J. Perrucci, Glenn A. Clouser, Norman M. Hobbie, Jacqueline DeCarlo, Michael L. Testa, Michael Bross, Sheldon Bross and Steven L Schepps, on the brief). Ronald K. Chen, Public Advocate of New Jersey, argued the cause for amicus curiae Public Advocate. Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Department of Health and Senior Services (Stuart Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Rachana R. Munshi and Melissa H. Raksa, Deputy Attorneys General, on the brief). Steven J. Picco submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Chemistry Council of New Jersey (Reed Smith, attorneys). Kenneth J. Wilbur submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae Johnson & Johnson, New Jersey Business & Industry Association, New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce and Commerce and Industry Association of New Jersey (Drinker Biddle & Reath, attorneys). David G. Evans submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation. Stacy Alison Fols submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. (Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, attorneys). JUSTICE HOENS delivered the opinion of the Court. In these consolidated complaints, twenty-six municipalities and counties seek to recover, from manufacturers and distributors of lead paints, the costs of detecting and removing lead paint from homes and buildings, of providing medical care to residents affected with lead poisoning, and of developing programs to educate residents about the dangers of lead paint. Although the complaints initially sought recovery through a wide variety of legal theories, we are called upon to consider only whether these plaintiffs have stated a cognizable claim based on the common law tort of public nuisance. Because we conclude that plaintiffs cannot state a claim consistent with the well-recognized parameters of that tort, and because we further conclude that to find otherwise would be directly contrary to legislative pronouncements governing both lead paint abatement programs and products liability claims, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand for dismissal of the complaints. I. This litigation began on December 14, 2001, when the City of Newark and its mayor filed a complaint asserting claims sounding in fraud, public nuisance, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and indemnification. Named as defendants were a large number of companies that had manufactured lead pigments or lead paints, or that were the corporate successors to the manufacturers of those products. See footnote 1 Shortly thereafter, twenty-five other plaintiffs See footnote 2 filed complaints similar to the one filed by the City of Newark. By order dated February 11, 2002, this Court designated all pending and future litigation involving damages or other relief arising out of the manufacture, sale, distribution and/or use of lead-based paint as a mass tort. See R. 4:38A. Pursuant to that order, all of the complaints were transferred to a single vicinage and assigned to one judge for management. [Childhood Lead Poisoning in New Jersey: Annual Report 4 (2005) [hereinafter Annual Report].] This bill is designed to set up a comprehensive program both at the State and local level to eliminate the causes of lead poisoning in New Jersey, to treat the incidents thereof, and to enable both State and local government units to take advantage of Federal funding for such programs. [Statement to Senate Bill No. 998, at 3 (Dec. 10, 1970).] [Id. at 12 (codified at N.J.S.A. 24:14A-12) (repealed and replaced in 1985).] (2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public right is unreasonable include the following: (a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience, or (b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation, or (c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right. [Restatement (Second) of Torts 821B (1979).] [Ibid.] (2) In order to maintain a proceeding to enjoin to abate a public nuisance, one must (a) have the right to recover damages, as indicated in Subsection (1), or (b) have authority as a public official or public agency to represent the state or a political subdivision in the matter, or (c) have standing to sue as a representative of the general public, as a citizen in a citizen s action or as a member of a class in a class action. [Id. at 821C.] [S. 2805, 3 (introduced on Nov. 17, 1986).] [Statement to Senate Bill No. 2805, at 7-8 (Nov. 17, 1986).] [Statement to Senate Bill No. 2805, at 1 (June 22, 1987).] JUSTCES LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE HOENS opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI filed a separate, dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE LONG joins. JUSTICE ALBIN did not participate. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI, dissenting. This Court has a duty to reconcile outdated formulations of the common law with the complexities of contemporary society. See Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 21-22 (1950). The common law must stand ready to adapt as appropriate, to shape, redress, and remedy so as to answer measure for measure the particular evil it pursues. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), rev d on other grounds, 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, I would not allow those responsible for polluting this State s residential environment to avoid liability simply because past applications of the public nuisance doctrine do not mirror the circumstances of this appeal. Because I find that the public nuisance doctrine is an appropriate and efficient means for vindicating the public s right to be free from the harmful effects of lead paint, I respectfully dissent. [Office of Lead-Based Paint Abatement and Poisoning Prevention, 61 Fed. Reg. 29170-71 (June 7, 1996) (citations omitted).] Children need not ingest lead paint directly to be at risk. Because lead does not dissipate, biodegrade, or decay, all lead paint not properly extracted remains in the State s environment, and children are not safe from exposure simply because their residence has been decontaminated. Comment, Karla A. Francken, Lead Based Paint Poisoning Liability: Wisconsin Realtors, Residential Property Sellers, and Landlords Beware, 77 Marq. L. Rev. 550, 559 (1994). Paint chips and particles pollute dust and soil, which children subsequently inhale or ingest. See Thomas F. Zimmerman, The Regulation of Lead-Based Paint in Air Force Housing, 44 A.F. L. Rev. 169, 172 (1998). The usual wear and tear associated with the use of walls, windows, and doors introduces the toxin into our environment. Ibid. The federal Department of Housing and Urban Development, therefore, has identified lead poisoning as the most common environmental disease of young children, eclipsing all other environmental health hazards found in the residential environment. Office of Lead-Based Paint Abatement and Poisoning Prevention, supra, 61 Fed. Reg. at 29170 (emphasis added) (internal citation and quotation omitted). That contamination harms thousands of New Jersey s children. The most recent survey of blood-lead levels in New Jersey revealed that 3.12% of children tested were suffering from lead poisoning. See footnote 12 New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, Childhood Lead Poisoning in New Jersey, Annual Report Fiscal Year 2003 11 (2004) [hereinafter Childhood Lead Poisoning]. As amicus Public Advocate of New Jersey observes, if that percentage is extrapolated across the relevant population, there are approximately 18,176 New Jersey children suffering from elevated blood levels. Compare Judy Peet, The Danger Lurking Within, Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 4, 2001, at 21 (reporting number of poisoned children at 30,000). Children from underprivileged communities are most at risk because of the prevalence of older, dilapidated buildings within their communities. American Civil Liberties Union, Preventing Childhood Lead Poisoning in New Jersey: Advocate and State Government Working Together to Increase the Lead Screening of Children 2 (2005). Statistically, low-income children are eight times more likely to be poisoned than children from other income brackets, and an estimated sixty percent of all poisoned children are on Medicaid. Ibid. Adding to the crisis are the logistical difficulties associated with abating lead paint contamination. Residential homes are widely recognized as the principal source of poisonous lead. See, e.g., New Jersey Department of Health and Family Services, Lead Poisoning Elimination Plan 6 (2005). Prior to 1950, residential lead paint contained extremely high levels of lead pigment. Childhood Lead Poisoning, supra, at 50 (noting that some paints manufactured before 1950 contained fifty percent lead pigment). However, in 1978, the federal government banned the use of lead paint in residential homes. Ban of Lead-Containing Paint, 16 C.F.R. 1303.1. Nevertheless, in 2003, the Legislature noted that because of the age of New Jersey s housing stock, our State is among the states with the most serious risk of exposure from previous residential use of lead-based paint. N.J.S.A. 52:27D-437.2(d) (estimating that there are two million homes in New Jersey built before 1978, one million of which were built before 1950). Most significant, however, is the staggering cost of decontamination. In 2001, the chairman of the State s Inter-Agency Task Force for Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention estimated that it would cost New Jersey $50 billion to abate lead paint contamination. Peet, supra, at 21. The cost to private property owners is also prohibitive, with the decontamination of a single apartment costing as much as $12,000. Ibid. In sum, New Jersey s residential environment is infected with a deadly toxin that affects our most vulnerable and cherished citizens: our children. [Ante at __ (slip op. at 40).] However, that perspective sidesteps the harsh reality of the lead paint crisis. Decades ago, lead paint was applied to buildings throughout this State. As the harmful effects of lead paint became public, those who could afford its removal or proper maintenance did so. The dangerous lead paint that remains in our physical environment exists primarily in underprivileged, residential communities where home owners and municipalities cannot afford the exorbitant costs of decontamination. See American Civil Liberties Union, supra, at 2. Those citizens and communities should not be portrayed as the cause of a public health crisis; they are the victims. More important, defendants should not be shielded from liability by recasting the reality of the lead paint problem. If plaintiffs allegations are proven true, defendants should bear the burden of remediation. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-73 SEPTEMBER TERM 2005 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court IN RE: LEAD PAINT LITIGATION DECIDED June 15, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Hoens CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Chief Justice Zazzali