Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Rees

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49ag/05

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG
NO. 49
SEPTEMBER TERM, 2005
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
NATALIE H. REES
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
 Filed: December 20, 2006
1Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides:
“(a)  Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon approval 
of the Commission.  Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel
shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals.” 
2Rule 16-752 (a) provides:
“(a)  Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any
circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the
record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation
with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing
of motions, and hearing.”  
3Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides:
“(c)  Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file or dictate
into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings
as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law. If
dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless
the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later
than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy
of the statement to each party.” 
The respondent, Natalie H. Rees, was charged by the petitioner, the Attorney
Grievance Commission of Maryland, in a Petition For Disciplinary Action, filed by Bar
Counsel, acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 with violating a number of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, as adopted by Maryland Rule 16-812, and Maryland Code (2004 Repl.
Vol., 2006 Cum. Supp.), § 10-306 of the Business and Occupations Article.  Following a
hearing, the Hon. Robert N. Dugan, of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, to whom the
Court referred the matter, see Rule 16-752 (a), 2 to make findings of fact and draw
conclusions of law, see Rule 16-757 (c),3 concluded that violation of only two of them, Rules
4Subsection (a) of Rule 1.15, Safekeeping Property, provides:
“A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in the
lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the
lawyer’s own property.   Funds shall be kept in a separate account
maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules.   Other
property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded.  
Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept
by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after
termination of the representation.”
5Rule 8.1, Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters, provides, as relevant:
“An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
*     *     *     *
“(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the
matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for
information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.”  
6Maryland Code (2004 Repl. Vol., 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 10-306 of the Business and
Occupations Article provides:
“A lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for
which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.”
7The hearing court rejected the allegations, made pursuant to Rule 1.4, that the
respondent failed to communicate with her clients and those made pursuant to Rule 1.5,
that she charged an unreasonable fee, as well as the related allegation, pursuant to Rule
8.4 (c), that she fabricated her billing statements and did not actually perform the services
for which she billed.   It branded these allegations as “frivolous,” reflecting “a typical
unhappy client second guessing his former lawyer,” and chided, “Bar Counsel should
have used better judgment.”   Bar Counsel’s allegations with regard to Rules 1.15 (b) and
1.16 (d), pertaining to a lawyer’s obligation upon terminating representation, fared no
2
1.15 (a)4 and 8.1,5 and of § 10-306,6  had been proven.7 
better.   The hearing court was apparently persuaded by the respondent’s testimony “that
it was her practice to send all her clients billing statements every two months,” as it found
the testimony of the clients to the contrary to “lack credibility.”
There were other Rule violations charged in the Petition: Rules 1.1, Competence,
1.2, Scope of Representation, 1.3, Diligence, 8.4 (b) and (d).   The hearing court did not
address them and the petitioner has not excepted to that omission.   Consequently, we
assume that those charged Rule violations were not presented for resolution. 
3
Noting that the allegations “involve two disgruntled former clients,” who had retained
the respondent to assist them, as partners, to adopt a child, the hearing court found that the
respondent did not respond to Bar Counsel’s request for information in answer to those
allegations in a timely manner.   The request from Bar Counsel was sent to the respondent
by regular mail on September 21, 2004 and delivered to her by certified mail on October 21,
2004.   Aware of the respondent’s personal problems, generally relating to the care of a
bipolar child, the hearing court nonetheless was “satisfied by clear and convincing evidence
that Respondent’s delay in responding to the allegations was not excusable,” and, thus, that
the respondent violated Rule 8.1 (b).
With respect to the Rule 1.15 and § 10-306 violations, the hearing court found that
they were supported by the respondent’s billing records.   They established that four days
after depositing in her escrow account the $ 4,000.00 retainer received from her clients, the
respondent withdrew $ 3,000.00.   At that time, most of the fee remained unearned and, in
fact, counting all of the work recorded as having been done on the case over a 19 day period,
8The hearing court inadvertently switched the two arrangements, the respondent
switched from “retainer” to “engagement.”  On this subject, it stated:
“After twenty-four years in practice, Rees began using an engagement
agreement rather than a retainer agreement for new clients.   Existing clients
who had funds in escrow were advised of the change and were given the
options of: 1) switching the remaining portion of the retainer, if any, to a
non-refundable engagement fee; or 2) receiving a refund of the balance of
their retainer and retaining new counsel.”
4
including the previous month, after the deposit, as of April 7, 2003, the hearing court found,
the respondent had earned only $ 860.00 of the fee.   Also as of that date, the escrow balance
was $ 1,307.39, considerably less than the $ 3,140.00 it was required to be, or would have
been, had the withdrawal not occurred.     The hearing court further found:
“Even taking into account the potential for some unrecorded services rendered
and the fact that at the time the Respondent was honestly mistaken that the
appropriate billing rate was two hundred fifty ($250.00) per hour, a shortage
of funds existed on that date.   Although the Respondent was not certain that
the four thousand dollar ($4,000) deposit on April 3 rd, 2003 was from [the
respondent’s clients], that is the logical inference to be drawn from the
evidence.
“...  Aside from approximately three hundred dollars ($300.00), the only
money held in escrow related to Respondent’s representation in this case. 
Four days after the escrow deposit, Rees should not have been confused as to
whether three thousand dollars ($3000.00) had already been earned when those
funds were improperly withdrawn.”
It rejected the respondent’s explanation based on her change from a retainer fee arrangement
to an engagement fee arrangement,8 finding that “[u]nder all the circumstances, this
explanation cannot stand careful scrutiny.”
9“Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person.   Except as stated in this
Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall
promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or
third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall
promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.”
10Rule 1.16 (d) provides:
“(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable
notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering
papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance
payment of fee that has not been earned.   The lawyer may retain papers relating to
the client to the extent permitted by other law.”
5
The respondent did not file any exceptions to the hearing court’s findings of fact or
conclusions of law.   In fact, at argument, she expressly acknowledged her misconduct and
made clear that she was not challenging that aspect of the case.    The petitioner, on the other
hand, has taken exceptions to the hearing court’s failure to find violations of Rules 1.15 (b)9
and 1.16 (d).10   The basis for these exceptions is essentially that the respondent
acknowledged in testimony that she failed to send copies of her billing statement to her
clients in response to their July letter and that, according to her own testimony, she was made
aware at the peer review hearing of an error in billing her clients and conceded that she owes
them a refund of $257.00.   The petitioner makes the point that the refund, although
conceded, has not yet been made.   
The hearing court expressly determined that the respondent’s clients were not credible
11The respondent did not read this “observation” as a finding that she owed the
clients the amount mentioned.   It was her view, which she offered at argument, that she
had earned all of the fees billed, and more.   She asserted, it is the nature of the family law
practice that many more hours are spent working on a client’s case than is billed and
argued that is what occurred in this case.    
6
when they testified that they had not received billings from the respondent.  On the other
hand, immediately after making that finding, it observed:
It certainly would have been a better practice for the Respondent to have re-
submitted the aforesaid billings to her clients as well as to have refunded two
hundred fifty-seven ($257.00) that is due to them.”[11]
Thus, its findings appear to reflect that it found that a refund, in the amount contended by the
petitioner, was in fact due to the respondent’s clients.   Accordingly, we sustain the
petitioner’s exceptions.
This brings us to the sanction that is appropriate in this case.   As to that, the petitioner
recommends that the respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.   That
sanction is, it says, “appropriate for the misconduct in this case,” and “will serve the purpose
of protecting the public by requiring the Respondent, before she is permitted to practice law
again, to demonstrate in a reinstatement petition that the personal issues described in this
proceeding have been addressed sufficiently to enable her to render adequate legal service
and to conduct her practice in compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.” 
Acknowledging her misconduct and expressing her embarrassment as a result, the respondent
12We note that while that may be the rule, there are exceptions.   See Attorney
Griev. Comm'n v. Protokowicz, 329 Md. 252, 263, 619 A.2d 100, 105 (1993), which this
Court, in Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Franz, 355 Md. 752, 762, 736 A.2d 339, 344 
(1999), cited as an example of conduct so egregious that, although an aberration,
warranted the imposition of a significant sanction.
7
asks the Court to impose no sanction.   The misconduct, she maintains, is an isolated
instance, which is not likely to be repeated.12
The purpose of attorney discipline is well settled - to protect the public, not to punish
the erring attorney.  Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Parker, 389 Md. 142, 155, 884 A.2d 104, 112
(2005); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Culver, 381 Md. 241, 283-84, 849 A.2d 423, 448-49
(2004).  That purpose is achieved, the public is protected, when the sanctions are
commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they
were committed.   Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Stein, 373 Md. 531, 533, 819 A.2d 372,
375 (2003).   While  the circumstances of each case-the nature and effect of the violations -
are critical, and ordinarily decisive, factors in determining the severity of the sanction to be
imposed, Parker, 389 Md. at 155, 884 A. 2d at 112, there are other important factors we have
identified, including “the lawyer’s state of mind which underlies the misconduct, actual or
potential injury flowing from the misconduct, the duty of this Court to preserve the integrity
8
of the profession, the risk to the public in allowing the Respondent to continue in practice,
and any mitigating or aggravating factors,” Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Monfried, 368 Md.
373, 396, 794 A. 2d 92, 105 (2002), the attorney's remorse for the misconduct, Attorney
Griev. Comm'n v. Wyatt, 323 Md. 36, 38, 591 A.2d 467, 468 (1991), the likelihood of
repetition of the misconduct,  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Freedman, 285 Md. 298, 300,
402 A.2d 75, 76 (1979), and the attorney's prior grievance history.  Maryland State Bar Ass'n
v. Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 362, 347 A.2d 556, 561 (1975).
The misconduct that the respondent has been found to have engaged in is quite
serious.   We are satisfied, however, that it is misconduct that is isolated and is not likely to
be repeated.  The respondent has readily admitted the misconduct, acknowledged its
seriousness and expressed her embarrassment and, thereby, her resolve not to repeat it.   She
has no negative grievance history.   The one prior matter was resolved in her favor.  We
believe that, under these circumstances, a thirty day suspension, commencing thirty days
from the date of the filing of this opinion,  will protect the public interest and, therefore, is
the appropriate sanction in this case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK
9
OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF 
THE 
ATTORNE Y  
G R IEVANCE
COMMISSION AGAINST NATALIE H. REES.