Case Title: Thorpe v. Ted Bowling Constr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, JJ., 
and Russell and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
ALISSA M. THORPE, BENEFICIARY OF  
MATTHEW ALSON THORPE (DECEASED)1 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 110349 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
 
 
 
May 4, 2012 
TED BOWLING CONSTRUCTION, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
This is an appeal from an award of worker's compensation 
benefits.  It presents a question concerning the statutory rules 
governing the determination of an employee's "average weekly 
wage." 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
The essential facts are undisputed.  In 2006, Matthew Alson 
Thorpe was the owner of a self-storage facility and operated a 
side business called "Alson's Ornamental Iron" that installed 
residential porch railings.  Eric McMahon worked for Alson's 
Ornamental Iron. 
                     
 
1 Alyssa Thorpe did not file her claim with the Workers' 
Compensation Commission as personal representative of the 
deceased Matthew Alson Thorpe.  Rather, the parties entered into 
a stipulation that she was his wholly dependent wife at the time 
of his injury and was therefore a statutory beneficiary pursuant 
to Code §§ 65.2-515(A)(1) and 65.2-512(A)(1).  The Commission 
originally styled the case: "Matthew Alson Thorpe (Deceased) - 
Employee, Alissa M. Thorpe, Claimant."  Later, the caption was 
changed to its present form. 
 
2 
 
In May 2006, John Clary, one of Thorpe's storage customers, 
offered to employ Thorpe and McMahon to complete the metal roof 
and siding of an industrial building he was constructing for Ted 
Bowling Construction.  Clary offered Thorpe and McMahon $5000 to 
complete the job.  Clary wanted the job completed "as soon as 
possible."  He expected them to complete it in one week, but 
made it clear that he would pay $5000 only when the job was 
completed, no matter how long it took.  Clary memorialized his 
offer by writing "5000" with soapstone on the top of a shop 
table in the office in which the employment was being discussed.  
Because the iron railing business was "slow" at the time, Thorpe 
and McMahon agreed to do the work, even though they had never 
previously done work of that kind.  They agreed to divide the 
$5000 payment equally between themselves. 
 
Clary provided tools and materials and gave the men some 
instruction and supervision.  On May 26, 2006, their fourth day 
of work, while installing metal sheets on the roof of the 
building, Thorpe fell through a skylight to his death.  His 
widow, Alissa M. Thorpe (the claimant), filed with the Workers' 
Compensation Commission of Virginia (the Commission) a claim for 
worker's compensation benefits. 
 
A deputy commissioner heard the evidence in February 2009.  
Clary had "disappeared" and, because of Thorpe's death, the only 
witness to the terms and conditions of the employment, as well 
 
3 
as the facts of the fatal accident, was McMahon.2  Thorpe and 
McMahon had never before engaged in the kind of work they were 
doing for Clary.  Neither party adduced any evidence of the 
prevailing wage paid at that time and in that area for similar 
work.  Thus, the only evidence presented to the deputy 
commissioner concerning Thorpe's wages for work in the relevant 
trade was McMahon's testimony as to their single transaction 
with Clary, described above. 
 
After the hearing, the deputy commissioner, in a letter to 
counsel, wrote: 
 
I confess that though I have scoured the 
record to access all the information available to 
make a proper determination of the average weekly 
wage of Mr. Thorpe, pursuant to § 65.2-101, the 
evidence is limited.  For that reason, I invite 
your input as to whether there needs to be a 
reconvening of the hearing for that limited issue, 
or, if both parties are in agreement that no 
further evidence should come into the record, for 
your position statements on the determination of 
the average weekly wage. 
 
Counsel responded by a letter stating that they agreed that no 
further evidence was necessary and that they would state their 
positions in writing. 
                     
 
2 Clary did business as "JMC Welding."  The Commission 
determined that he was Thorpe's employer at the time of the 
accident.  Ted Bowling Construction, for whom Clary was 
constructing the building, was determined to be the statutory 
employer and Virginia Surety Company defended the claim as its 
compensation carrier. 
 
4 
 
After receiving counsels' written arguments, the deputy 
commissioner found that Thorpe was Clary's employee at the time 
of the accident and that Ted Bowling Construction was his 
statutory employer.  The deputy commissioner found that Alissa 
Thorpe was Thorpe's sole beneficiary and was entitled to 
benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act). 
 
Turning to the issue of Thorpe's average weekly wage at the 
time of the accident, the deputy commissioner held that the only 
evidence in the record was that Thorpe was employed to perform a 
specific job for a total compensation of $5000 (to be divided 
with McMahon) and was not employed for a specific period of 
time.  He was not an independent contractor because Clary had 
the power to control and supervise his work.  Neither was he a 
casual employee.  Because there was no evidence in the record of 
any other wages Thorpe, or any other person, had been paid for 
similar work, the deputy commissioner was left with no 
alternative but to compute Thorpe's average weekly wage on the 
basis of the single payment of $5000, from which Thorpe would be 
paid $2500, pursuant to his contract of employment with Clary.3  
The deputy commissioner determined that Thorpe would have 
                     
 
3 The evidence showed that Clary never paid anything to 
McMahon or to anyone on Thorpe's behalf.  The deputy 
commissioner ruled that to be immaterial because of Clary's 
promise of payment. 
 
5 
received from Clary $2500 during the entire calendar year 2006.  
Divided by 52 weeks, that resulted in an average weekly wage 
from Clary of $48.08.  In the absence of any other evidence, the 
deputy commissioner adopted that figure as the average weekly 
wage applicable to the claim.  That finding resulted in an award 
of $48.08 payable weekly for 500 weeks, plus burial, medical and 
transportation costs, and attorney's fees. 
 
The claimant appealed to the full Commission.  By a divided 
vote, the Commission agreed with the deputy commissioner, 
holding:  
There was no evidence within the record that the 
decedent had anticipated any further jobs from 
the employer.  The decedent had never worked for 
the employer and had never attempted this 
particular type of work prior to beginning this 
job.  The claimant may have had other 
employment; however, the record shows that this 
employment was dissimilar to the employment in 
which he was working at the time of his death 
and, thus, any earnings from that employment 
could not be used to calculate the average 
weekly wage. 
 
The claimant appealed to the Court of Appeals.  A unanimous 
three-judge panel affirmed the decision of the Commission by a 
published opinion, Thorpe v. Clary, 57 Va. App. 617, 629, 704 
S.E.2d 611, 616 (2011).  We awarded the claimant an appeal.  The 
claimant's sole assignment of error is to the Court of Appeals' 
ruling affirming the Commission's holding that $48.08 was 
Thorpe's average weekly wage applicable to the claim. 
 
6 
Analysis 
 
Awards of workers' compensation benefits under the Act are 
based upon the employee's average weekly wage.  Dinwiddie Cnty. 
Sch. Bd. v. Cole, 258 Va. 430, 432, 520 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1999).  
Code § 65.2-101(1) defines the term "[a]verage weekly wage" 
within the meaning of the Act and governs its application.  That 
section provides for a four-step analysis.  First, if the 
employee has been working "in the employment in which he was 
working at the time of the injury" for 52 weeks or more, then 
his average weekly wage is computed by dividing his earnings in 
that employment, during the 52 weeks immediately preceding his 
injury, by 52.  Second, the statute provides that if the 
employment was less than 52 weeks in duration prior to the 
injury, the employee's earnings during the time of his 
employment shall be divided by the number of weeks he earned 
wages, "provided that results fair and just to both parties will 
be thereby obtained."  Third, the statute provides:  
When, by reason of a shortness of time during 
which the employee has been in the employment of 
his employer or the casual nature or terms of 
his employment, it is impractical to compute the 
average weekly wages as above defined, regard 
shall be had to the average weekly amount which 
during the 52 weeks previous to the injury was 
being earned by a person of the same grade and 
character employed in the same class of 
employment in the same locality or community. 
 
Code § 65.2-101(1)(a).  Fourth, the statute provides: 
 
7 
When for exceptional reasons the foregoing would 
be unfair either to the employer or employee, 
such other method of computing average weekly 
wages may be resorted to as will most nearly 
approximate the amount which the injured 
employee would be earning were it not for the 
injury. 
 
Code § 65.2-101(b). 
 
The claimant argues on appeal that this case is governed by 
our decision in Uninsured Employer's Fund v. Thrush, 255 Va. 14, 
17, 496 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1998).  There, Thrush was hired for one 
day of work, painting power poles in a parking lot.  He was to 
work for seven hours at an agreed wage of $6 per hour.  While 
performing the work, Thrush fell from a scaffolding, came into 
contact with electric power lines, and died as a result of 
electrocution.  Although Thrush's usual occupation was as a 
pipe-layer, we agreed with the Commission's holding that his 
earnings from that employment could not be considered in 
computing his average weekly wage, observing that the 
"dissimilar employment rule" is "alive and well in workers' 
compensation law."  Id. at 21, 496 S.E.2d at 10.  We did, 
however, as the claimant points out, determine that Thrush had 
the expectancy of a payment of $42 for the seven hour day for 
which he was employed.  That figure, we held, was the only basis 
provided by the evidence for computing his average weekly wage, 
resulting in an award of $42 per week.  Id. at 22, 496 S.E.2d at 
61. 
 
8 
 
The present case differs from Thrush in a fundamental 
respect.  Thrush was employed for a fixed period of time, one 
day.  This meant that the wage he was to earn that one day 
represented the total amount he was to earn from that employment 
for the week he was employed.  No such time-based conclusion is 
possible in the present case.  Thorpe was not employed for any 
period of time.  Rather, he was hired to perform a job for a 
fixed price.  His compensation would have been the same whether 
he completed it in four days or 52 weeks.  Thus, our holding in 
Thrush is inapplicable here. 
 
The parties were offered an unusual opportunity to reopen 
the case before the deputy commissioner to supplement the very 
limited evidence in the record concerning the applicable average 
weekly wage.  Under the third step of the statutory analysis, 
evidence of the wages earned by similarly-situated workers would 
have been admissible to supplement this very sparse record, but 
neither party chose to offer such evidence.  As the Court of 
Appeals correctly held, the burden of proof is upon the claimant 
at every step of the decision-making process.  Thorpe, 57 Va. 
App. at 626, 704 S.E.2d at 15 (citing Thrush, 255 Va. at 20, 496 
S.E.2d at 60).  The claimant failed to carry the burden of 
proving that any basis existed for computing Thorpe's average 
weekly wage beyond the fact of his single transaction with 
Clary. 
 
9 
 
The claimant relies on the language of the statute in its 
specification of the second step in the analysis, providing that 
where the employment has lasted less than 52 weeks, his earnings 
during the time he was employed "shall" be divided by the number 
of weeks he earned wages.  Code § 65.2-101(1)(a).  This, the 
claimant contends, makes the second-step analysis mandatory, 
requiring the Commission to divide $2500 by one, resulting in an 
average weekly wage of $2500.  The claimant overlooks the 
qualifying proviso that completes the second-step analysis: 
"provided that results fair and just to both parties will be 
thereby obtained."  Id. 
 
Thorpe had never worked in the metal roofing and siding 
occupation before, and there was no evidence that he would ever 
do so in the future.  He had never worked for Clary before and 
there was no evidence that any future employment was 
contemplated by either of them.  Their engagement was for a 
single project.  Under those circumstances, it would manifestly 
not be "fair and just to both parties" to impose on the employer 
an award based on the assumption that the employee was hired for 
a continuing wage of $2500 per week. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.