Case Title: Hermes Consol., Inc. v. People

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-89

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hermes Consol., Inc. v. People1993 WY 53849 P.2d 1302Case Number: 92-89Decided: 04/06/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
HERMES CONSOLIDATED, 
INC., 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

PEOPLE of the State of 
Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Stanley K. 
Hathaway, Rick A. Thompson, and Rebecca L. Hellbaum of Hathaway, Speight, Kunz, 
Trautwein & Barrett, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and William J. Flynn, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and URBIGKIT, J. 
Ret.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      After a bench 
trial, the district court entered an order which required Hermes Consolidated 
Inc. (Hermes) to implement hazardous waste remediation procedures at their 
refinery. Hermes appeals claiming that the State Department of Environmental 
Quality (DEQ) is pre-empted by an EPA federal consent decree entered pursuant to 
the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). We agree and 
reverse.

[¶2]      Appellant raises 
these issues:

1. Is the State of 
Wyoming pre-empted from regulating the defendant's refinery in a manner that is 
inconsistent and in conflict with regulations and a remediation plan imposed by 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency resulting from an action in 
the United States District Court of Wyoming?

2. Did the district court 
have statutory authority to order a remediation plan? Since the evidence did not 
demonstrate irreparable harm and there was no finding of irreparable harm by the 
court to support issuance of an injunction under the court's equitable powers, 
did the district court err in ordering a remediation plan characterized as 
injunctive relief?

3. Did the district court 
err in attempting to settle this case as a mediator, in admitting settlement 
documents into evidence during the trial and ordering settlement negotiations 
after the trial?

FACTS

[¶3]      Hermes 
Consolidated, Inc., a Delaware corporation, purchased the oil refinery at 
Newcastle, Wyoming in 1977. The refinery had been built more than forty years 
earlier and operated by various owners during that period of time. Hermes 
continues to operate the refinery under the trade name Wyoming Refining Company 
(WRC).

[¶4]      When Hermes 
purchased the refinery, it was aware of its potential pre-existing environmental 
problems. In 1979, the State of Wyoming initiated environmental enforcement 
litigation against Hermes because WRC was in violation of a National Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit that they had been issued pursuant 
to the Clean Water Act. In August of 1979, the State and Hermes reached an 
agreement for resolution of the problems at the refinery and a consent decree 
was entered.

[¶5]      In 1983 the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) started enforcement 
proceedings against Hermes for violations of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA). That action proceeded through the administrative process, 
an Administrative Law Judge and eventually the EPA Administrator. Hermes was 
dissatisfied with the result of the administrative process and initiated a suit 
in federal court against the EPA. EPA counterclaimed for additional violations 
of RCRA and the Clean Water Act and requested a full site investigation and 
assessment. Meanwhile, in 1985, Hermes and the State modified the NPDES consent 
decree.

[¶6]      In April of 1988, 
before the trial was to begin in federal court, Hermes and the EPA settled the 
case by agreement upon a proposed consent decree. Pursuant to federal law, the 
consent decree was published in the Federal Register, and all interested parties 
were invited to submit comments. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1991). In addition, 
Hermes and the EPA met with State of Wyoming representatives, encouraged them to 
participate in the federal litigation, and made efforts to include the State of 
Wyoming's views in the consent decree.

[¶7]      On June 1, 1988, 
the federal consent decree was filed and entered in the United States District 
Court. The consent decree required comprehensive 
remediation.

[¶8]      On January 6, 
1989, just seven months after Hermes had settled the dispute with EPA, the 
Attorney General of Wyoming commenced a state enforcement action by filing a 
second suit against Hermes in state district court. The State alleged that 
structures at the refinery as well as the standard operations of the refinery 
had caused the discharge of pollution in violation of state law. The State asked 
for a penalty of $10,000.00 per day and that further violations be 
enjoined.

[¶9]      Hermes contended 
that jurisdiction over the regulation of hazardous waste rested exclusively with 
the federal government under RCRA provisions. Hermes alleged that the State's 
actions violated the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, United 
States Constitution Article VI, clause 2. Hermes also argued that, since the 
State had failed to adopt standards and obtain certification of its own 
hazardous waste program, it was pre-empted and lacked jurisdiction. Hermes moved 
for summary judgment which, on September 27, 1989, was denied by the district 
court.

[¶10]   Thereafter, following an eight-day 
bench trial, the district court issued its opinion letter on September 3, 1991, 
which asked both sides to submit remediation plans. The district court then, on 
October 23, 1991, entered findings of fact and an interim order. After a series 
of additional hearings, letters, and responses, the district court entered an 
amended final order which outlined the State's remediation plan that Hermes was 
to undertake at the refinery. The district court certified its order as a final 
order. Hermes now appeals to this court asserting, among other objections, that 
the remediation required by the State directly conflicts with the remediation 
ordered by the EPA in the federal consent decree.

THE FEDERAL RESOURCE 
CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT

[¶11]   The Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act was enacted in 1976. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., 3 Environmental 
Law: Pesticides and Toxic Substances, § 7.1 at 510 (1988) (hereinafter Rodgers, 
Environmental Law). Substantial amendments were added in 1984 through the 
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments Act. Rodgers, Environmental Law, § 7.1 at 
511. Two of the expressly stated purposes of RCRA are to: 1) assure that 
hazardous waste management practices are conducted in a manner which protects 
human health and the environment; and 2) require that hazardous waste be 
properly managed in the first instance thereby reducing the need for corrective 
action at a future date. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1988).

[¶12]   In order to execute the national 
policy of safe hazardous waste management, RCRA contains a cooperative 
federalism scheme. Under that scheme, a state may adopt regulations which at 
least guarantee the federal minimum in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) 
(1988), which provides:

Any State which seeks to 
administer and enforce a hazardous waste program * * * may develop and, after 
notice and opportunity for public hearing, submit to the Administrator an 
application * * * for authorization of such program.

[¶13]   If the EPA approves the state's 
proposed regulations, the state, rather than the EPA, is then authorized to 
regulate hazardous waste. State actions taken under the authorized program have 
the same force and effect as actions taken by the EPA as provided by 42 U.S.C. § 
6926(d) (1988): 

Any action taken by a 
State under a hazardous waste program authorized under this section shall have 
the same force and effect as action taken by the Administrator under this 
subchapter.

See also 40 
C.F.R. § 271.3(b) (1992). If a state has not adopted regulations which have been 
submitted and approved, it is not an authorized state; EPA then administers the 
RCRA program. Alex S. Karlin, "Hazardous Waste Management," 3 Environmental Law 
Practice Guide: State and Federal Law, § 29.01[6][b] (Michael B. Gerard, general 
ed. 1992). See also 40 C.F.R. § 271.3(b)(1) (the requirements and prohibitions 
in § 271.1(j) [regulations implementing the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments 
of 1984] supersede any less stringent provision of a state 
program).

[¶14]   States that establish a federally 
approved comprehensive hazardous waste management program can receive several 
benefits including: federal grants in aid, access to federal technical 
expertise, control over enforcement, and elimination of secondary regulation by 
the federal government. People v. Roth, 129 Misc.2d 381, 492 N.Y.S.2d 971, 974 
(Co.Ct. 1985) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6902, 6926; 40 C.F.R. § 271.1 et seq.). 
Approval of a state program does not totally divest the federal government of 
future control over the state's program nor does it give the state "unbridled" 
discretion in enforcement. Roth, 492 N.Y.S.2d  at 974. In addition, because of 
the increased RCRA requirements through later amendments, states that have 
authorization may only have authorization to administer portions of the RCRA 
program. John C. Chambers, Jr. & Peter L. Gray, EPA and State Roles in RCRA 
and CERCLA, 4 Natural Resources & Environment 7, 8 (Summer 1989). 
Overlapping federal and state regulation can occur to a limited extent when 
there is partial authorization. A limited amount of overlapping authority can 
also occur when a state is in the process of obtaining EPA authorization. 
Although dual and overlapping regulation can occur, Congress designed the 
cooperative federalism scheme within RCRA so that one agency would ultimately be 
regulating hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(7) (1988).

FEDERAL 
PRE-EMPTION

[¶15]   Hermes argues that the DEQ's 
actions are pre-empted by RCRA. In order to properly examine the ability of the 
state to regulate hazardous waste under RCRA, we utilize the United States 
Supreme Court's test for pre-emption.

As we recently observed 
in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & 
Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 75 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1983), state 
law can be preempted in either of two general ways. If Congress evidences an 
intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is 
pre-empted. If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the 
matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually 
conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both 
state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.

Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S. Ct. 615, 621, 78 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1984) 
(citations omitted and emphasis added). Therefore, we examine whether Congress 
intended to totally or partially occupy the entire field of hazardous waste 
regulation. If there was not total occupation of hazardous waste regulation, 
then states are pre-empted only to the extent there is actual conflict with 
federal mandates which make it impossible to comply with the federal 
mandate.

[¶16]   Congress envisioned state and 
federal cooperation when it enacted RCRA. In the objectives section of RCRA, the 
law provides:

The objectives of this 
chapter are to promote the protection of health and the environment and to 
conserve valuable material and energy resources by -

* * * * * 
*

(7) establishing a viable 
Federal-State partnership to carry out the purposes of this chapter and insuring 
that the Administrator will, in carrying out the provisions of subchapter III of 
this chapter, give a high priority to assisting and cooperating with States in 
obtaining full authorization of State programs under subchapter III of this 
chapter [.]

42 U.S.C. § 
6902(a) (1988). Since the objectives of RCRA expressly mention federal and state 
cooperation, Congress made explicit its intention not to exclusively occupy the 
entire field of hazardous waste regulation. We conclude that Congress did not 
intend to occupy the entire field of hazardous waste regulation. See also People 
v. Teledyne, Inc., 233 Ill. App.3d 495, 174 Ill. Dec. 688, 691, 599 N.E.2d 472, 
475 (1992); Chemclene Corp. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Environmental Resources, 
91 Pa. Cmwlth. 316, 497 A.2d 268, 273 (1985).

[¶17]   Since Congress did not intend to 
occupy the entire field, pre-emption will occur if the state law conflicts with 
the federal law and complying with both would be impossible. In other words, 
state law will be pre-empted to the extent the remedies sought by the state 
conflict with the remedies ordered by the federal 
government.

[¶18]   While analyzing a pre-emption 
question under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the terms 
of the consent decree caused the pre-emption, not the provisions of the CERCLA 
statute, since CERCLA expressly provides for federal-state cooperation. United 
States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1455 (6th Cir. 1991). 
Therefore, we examine the terms of the federal consent decree and compare them 
with the state remediation plan.

[¶19]   A review of the federal consent 
decree and the state order will demonstrate the conflicts between the programs 
and the confusion over what Hermes must do to comply with each. We must 
ascertain whether Hermes, if it fully complies with the federal decree, will 
violate the state ordered remediation plan. If it fully complies with the state 
plan, will it violate the federal mandates? Although it is difficult to contrast 
all of the state provisions with the federal decree since the state provisions 
are often vague, we point to those sections where there is a clear conflict in 
the direction and implementation of the plans. The following are examples of the 
confusion and conflict.

OVERALL APPROACHES TO THE 
SITE

[¶20]   The federal consent decree states 
that the decree is designed to address the release of hazardous waste and 
prevent discharges from the site. The federal decree is also very specific in 
defining hazardous constituent concentrations that are prohibited and in 
defining "Background Level Concentrations" - the concentrations to which the 
water should be returned. The federal approach is a containment approach. In 
contrast, the state plan mandates steps which are not aimed at containment of 
existing contaminates, but are aimed at removing all contaminates from the site. 
The state plan does not contain standards which define the condition to which 
the site should be returned, but leaves that open to later 
decision.

LEADED TANK BOTTOM AREA 
AND BLOW-DOWN PIT

[¶21]   Under the federal decree, Hermes is 
required to excavate the blow-down pit and then backfill and cover it. Hermes is 
required to address the leaded tank bottom area by capping it and notifying via 
property records, for perpetuity, that the area contains hazardous waste and has 
been capped and closed.

[¶22]   The state plan addresses the same 
blow-down pit and leaded tank bottom area. The state plan calls for study and 
remediation or modification of those two facilities. The state plan conflicts 
with the federal decree since Hermes cannot both cap the facilities and perform 
additional study and some other unspecified remediation, such as excavation. The 
state plan does contain a purported savings clause which provides that Hermes is 
not required to disturb previous work required by the federal consent decree. 
However, the additional study provisions and the broad remediation requirements 
relating to those two specific facilities represent an assertion of state 
jurisdiction over facilities that have been investigated, remediated and ordered 
closed by the EPA. The continued requirements of the state are in conflict with 
the EPA requirements.

GROUNDWATER 
RECOVERY

[¶23]   The federal consent decree requires 
Hermes to intercept and treat contaminated groundwater. The decree specifically 
notes that areas of contamination are still an open issue and leaves room for 
future additional solutions. The federal decree requires nine recovery wells and 
groundwater recovery equipment. The federal decree also requires a piezometer 
construction program and monitoring wells. The federal decree specifies detailed 
well drilling and sampling requirements. It also specifies intervals of field 
parameter monitoring, starting with daily monitoring and moving to semi-weekly 
monitoring. The federal decree requires that stream gauging records in Little 
Oil Creek and Cambria Creek be reported as part of the physical parameter 
monitoring. The federal decree requires that the recovery system be operated so 
that the corrective measures standards are achieved at each point and requires 
Hermes to maintain compliance.

[¶24]   The state plan requires groundwater 
contamination investigation. The state plan requires additional monitoring wells 
and an additional piezometer. The plan states that after the additional wells 
are drilled and the samples are analyzed, Hermes must submit a plan for 
additional recovery wells or other clean up methods if the samples reveal 
"unacceptably contaminated" groundwater. The state plan does not specify what 
amounts of hazardous constituents will constitute acceptable groundwater. In 
fact, under the state plan, the district court did not determine the goal to be 
achieved by any recovery well system in terms of achieving cleanliness of the 
groundwater.

[¶25]   The state district court stated 
that the additional recovery wells will be placed beyond the influence of the 
EPA system. The order provides that the court will conduct additional hearings 
on the specific location of the wells. This makes the order difficult for this 
court to review for actual conflict. However, this attempted savings clause does 
not save the state plan. The state is still requiring a different solution 
rather than stricter standards. As Hermes points out in its brief, it may be 
impossible to drill wells which would be beyond the influence of the EPA 
recovery system since the groundwater flows toward the EPA recovery wells. 
Therefore, additional wells might either be ineffective because groundwater 
would not flow toward them or they would interfere with the groundwater flowing 
toward the EPA recovery wells.

[¶26]   In addition to more study and more 
wells, the state plan requires Hermes to remove, treat and/or dispose of all 
wastes and contaminated soils which are identified during the state mandated 
soil and waste sampling plan. Thus, the state's plan is directed at contaminated 
soil removal. In contrast the federal plan is geared toward containment of the 
site. The state's plan is in direct conflict with the federal 
decree.

PENALTIES AND CONTINUING 
OVERSIGHT

[¶27]   The federal district court assessed 
Hermes a $25,000.00 penalty for its violations and set out additional stipulated 
payments if Hermes fails to comply with the federal decree. The decree provides 
the United States District Court with continuing jurisdiction for the purpose of 
ensuring compliance.

[¶28]   The state district court imposed a 
$20,000.00 penalty on Hermes. The state district court order also retains 
jurisdiction over the site. The State's broad assertion of jurisdiction is 
pre-empted by the actions taken by the EPA pursuant to RCRA. The State is not 
overseeing specific additional standards and regulations, rather it is 
attempting to oversee the entire site contemporaneously with the United States 
District Court. 

[¶29]   We conclude that the remedies 
sought by the State through the DEQ do conflict with the remedies imposed by the 
EPA in the federal consent decree, and complying with both is impossible. 
Therefore, the provisions of the state plan are pre-empted by the federal 
decree.

[¶30]   The State argues that there is no 
actual conflict between the remedies. It argues that the federal consent decree 
did not cover the surface impoundments or the flare pit, and therefore the State 
should be able to pursue regulation of those areas. The problem with the State's 
argument is that it ignores the underlying goal of the federal consent decree. 
The underlying goal of the EPA corrective measures is to minimize or eliminate 
groundwater and soil contamination including any off-site contamination. 
Therefore, although the consent decree may not specifically mention each pond at 
the refinery, it does contain a total regulatory federal scheme that leaves no 
room for the State to regulate.

FURTHER STUDY PROVISIONS 
IN THE STATE PLAN

[¶31]   Although other facilities such as 
the flare pit are addressed in the state plan, it is impossible to evaluate 
whether there is a conflict with the federal consent decree since specific 
remediation is not required in the state plan. Rather the state plan is to 
further study those facilities and then propose remediation. Because the 
assertion of state authority is so broad and because of its undefined final 
parameters, the further study and future remediation section also conflicts with 
the federal decree. The same can be said for the sampling of waste water 
treatment ponds requirement and the artisan well plans. The EPA has addressed 
the entire site to prevent deleterious health effects and to contain the 
contamination. Additional undefined state requirements only conflict with EPA's 
assertion of jurisdiction over the site.

[¶32]   Since the state plan provides for 
study but does not specify remedies, we examine testimony in the record 
concerning the general purposes behind each plan. The record reveals the 
following testimony.

[¶33]   Bryan Gooch Redd, lead counsel for 
the Department of Justice, explained the design of the EPA recovery system as 
follows:

The [consent decree 
remediation system] was designed primarily by the Department of Justice 
consultants with review by the company. The integral part of it is a system of 
nine wells that are drilled strategically throughout the facility. And those 
wells are designed to intercept ground water, basically it could create an 
enormous cone of depression that pulls the ground water towards the wells and 
pumps the ground water[.] * * * [T]he consent decree also required the 
installation of five monitoring wells that are also set up on the downgradient 
side of the recovery-well system. And those monitoring wells are designed to 
read the ground water, if you will, after it has been subjected to the recovery 
system and determine the limits that are set forth in the consent decree are met 
or not. * * * The purpose of the recovery system, at least as I envisioned it 
and as I believe it's reflected in the consent decree, is basically a 
containment system to prohibit the off-site migration of the 
contaminates.

[¶34]   According to Redd's testimony, even 
if some areas are not specifically enumerated in the federal consent decree, the 
federal plan is intended to solve the entire contamination problem at the 
refinery site. The State cross-examined Mr. Redd as 
follows:

Q. You wouldn't maintain 
that just because there is a health description in the consent decree, that 
means that the entire refinery site is addressed?

A. Our experts reached 
the conclusions that this recovery system would intercept contamination from the 
facility.

Mr. Redd stated 
further on redirect examination:

It was our intent that, 
yes, we - that the intent of the system, as incorporated in the consent decree, 
would be that it would intercept ground water, including whatever was in 
it. 

[¶35]   The DEQ's conflicting view of 
necessary remediation was explained by Carol Wagner Pfarr of the DEQ as 
follows:

Q. Could it be that the 
recovery system EPA designed is working, but it needs more 
time?

A. I don't believe it 
will address dissolved constituent.

Q. How soon do you think 
all of the hydrocarbons from under the refinery can be, or can they ever be 
taken out?

A. I think total 
excavation I said would be - would take them all out. I mean, total excavation 
would do it.

Q. Of course, that means 
closing the refinery, doesn't it?

A. Common sense says 
that, yes.

[¶36]   In sum, the state plan, although 
undefined in many respects is directed at removing all contaminants including 
requiring excavation if needed. In contrast, the federal plan calls for 
containment of the site and implementation of the groundwater recovery 
system.

[¶37]   The Sixth Circuit's finding is 
relevant here:

[M]ore stringent state 
environmental laws must be incorporated by EPA into federal consent decrees if 
relevant and applicable, but thereafter the state may not seek other remedies 
that are at odds with the terms of the decree.

Akzo Coatings, 
949 F.2d  at 1457. Here the State's remediation plan is at odds with the federal 
decree. The federal decree seeks containment and remediation while the state 
plan seeks excavation of contaminated soils and removal instead of containment. 
The contrasting positions of the state and federal agencies is similar to those 
found in People v. Teledyne, Inc., 233 Ill. App.3d 495, 174 Ill.Dec. 688, 599 N.E.2d 472 (1992). Teledyne involved two hazardous waste disposal sites. 
Teledyne, 174 Ill.Dec. at 689, 599 N.E.2d  at 473. After it was discovered that 
contaminants were migrating, reports were made to the EPA. Teledyne, 174 
Ill.Dec. at 690, 599 N.E.2d  at 474. The EPA and the site owner, US Ecology, a 
subsidiary of Teledyne, agreed to a consent order which required study of the 
best solution. Id. After study was completed, the EPA issued a final order which 
required contaminant source control and groundwater remediation. Id. The EPA 
found that soil and waste removal would be "dangerous, unnecessary, and 
impractical." Id. Contemporaneously with the activity of the EPA, the State of 
Illinois filed a complaint alleging violation of state statutes and seeking an 
injunction that would require US Ecology to exhume the wastes. 
Id.

[¶38]   US Ecology filed a motion for 
summary judgment in the state court action. Id. 174 Ill.Dec. at 691, 599 N.E.2d  
at 475. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of US Ecology finding 
an actual conflict between the remedies sought by the state and the remedial 
requirement imposed by the EPA. Id. The district court judge stated "You can't 
keep this material buried and dig it up at the same time." Id. 174 Ill.Dec. at 
691, 599 N.E.2d  at 475. The district court judge also noted that the only 
evidence in the case was the evidence developed by the EPA, and the State was 
asking the court to review the same studies the EPA had reviewed and reach the 
opposite result. The Third District Appellate Court of Illinois upheld the trial 
court's dismissal of the state's action. Id. 174 Ill.Dec. at 689, 599 N.E.2d  at 
473.

[¶39]   The court of appeals in Teledyne 
followed the rationale of Brown v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 767 F.2d 1234 (7th 
Cir. 1985). Id. 174 Ill.Dec. at 692, 599 N.E.2d  at 476. In Brown, adjacent 
property owners were seeking an injunction under state law for removal of 
nonradioactive toxic wastes. Brown, 767 F.2d  at 1237. The applicable federal law 
in Brown gave the Nuclear Regulatory Commission exclusive authority to regulate 
radiation hazards. Brown, 767 F.2d  at 1241. In holding that federal law, the 
Atomic Energy Act, preempted the state injunction, the Seventh Circuit 
reasoned:

"Such state law remedies 
* * * interfere with the NRC's [Nuclear Regulatory Commission's] ability to 
choose the method of disposal that, in light of radiation, nonradiation, and 
economic considerations, is most appropriate. We therefore hold that plaintiffs' 
request for an injunction ordering the Kerr-McGee wastes moved elsewhere is 
preempted because, if granted, the injunction would stand `as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives' of federal regulation of 
radiation hazardous."

Teledyne, 174 
Ill.Dec. at 692, 599 N.E.2d  at 476 (quoting Brown, 767 F.2d at 1242). The court 
in Teledyne also relied on United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409 (6th Cir. 1991). In Akzo, the EPA entered a consent decree, under 
CERCLA, which utilized a soil flushing remedy at the site. The State of Michigan 
intervened in the federal proceeding and sought removal and incineration of the 
contaminated soil. Akzo, 949 F.2d  at 1422. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that Michigan's request for removal and incineration of the soil was 
properly dismissed because Michigan failed to show that the EPA remedy would not 
achieve the state standards. Teledyne, 174 Ill.Dec. at 692, 599 N.E.2d  at 476 
(citing Akzo Coatings, 949 F.2d 1409).

[¶40]   The authority relied on by the 
court in Teledyne is applicable here as is the Teledyne court's reasoning. We 
hold that the state law injunction and remediation plan requiring soil removal, 
additional study, and overlapping jurisdiction for future remedies would be "`an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives' of federal 
law embodied in RCRA and implemented by the [EPA] in that it would severely 
restrict the remedial options available to the federal agency." Teledyne, 174 
Ill.Dec. at 693, 599 N.E.2d  at 477. See also ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743 
(8th Cir. 1986).

[¶41]   The State of Wyoming argues that it 
is imposing stricter standards, and its remediation plan is not pre-empted 
because of the savings clause in § 3009 of RCRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988). 
Section 3009 of RCRA provides:

Retention of State 
authority

* * * Nothing in this 
chapter shall be construed to prohibit any State or political subdivision 
thereof from imposing any requirements, including those for site selection, 
which are more stringent than those imposed by such regulations [issued under 
this subchapter].

42 U.S.C. § 6929 
(1988).

[¶42]   There are two problems with the 
State's reliance on this subsection of RCRA. First, although § 3009 allows 
states to adopt more stringent regulations, it does not authorize them to defeat 
safe federal solutions. We agree that "where the savings clause provision of 
section 3009 has been considered, it has been construed to authorize local 
adoption of more stringent environmental standards than the [EPA] but not to 
allow local governments to directly subvert RCRA and [EPA] decisions by outright 
bans on activities federal authorities considered safe." Teledyne, 174 Ill.Dec. 
at 693, 599 N.E.2d  at 477 (citing ENSCO, 807 F.2d 743); see also City of 
Jacksonville v. Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology, 308 Ark. 543, 824 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1992); Ogden Environmental Serv. v. City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436 (S.D.Cal. 1988); Daniel P. Selmi & Kenneth A. Manaster, State 
Environmental Law, § 5.04[4] at 5-21 (1989) (discussing ENSCO). Here, EPA 
considers a containment approach safe. DEQ actions, which are aimed ultimately 
at excavation, subvert the federal EPA consent decree.

[¶43]   The State's argument in this case 
is similar to the argument made by the State of Illinois in Teledyne. "Here 
plaintiffs do not claim that the environmental standards which the [EPA] is 
requiring US Ecology to attain are less stringent than Illinois standards. 
Instead, plaintiffs dispute the effectiveness of the remedies chosen by the 
[EPA] to protect human health[.]" Teledyne, 599 N.E.2d  at 477. We construe, as 
did the Teledyne court, the savings clause provision in section 3009 as allowing 
"more stringent requirements, i.e. environmental standards [more 
stringent than] federal regulation." Id. But "[t]he savings clause does not 
allow local governments to demand different remedies than those ordered 
by the [EPA] where there is no challenge to the environmental standards to be 
attained." Teledyne, 599 N.E.2d  at 477. The State of Wyoming does not claim that 
the standards the EPA is requiring Hermes to meet are not as strict as state 
standards. Here the State does not specify what stricter standards are not being 
met, instead the DEQ disputes the remedies chosen by the 
EPA.

[¶44]   The other difficulty with the 
State's assertion of the RCRA savings clause is that the savings clause applies 
only to authorized states. Wyoming is not an authorized state. Nearly all states 
have been at least partially authorized by the EPA. One tally reports that as of 
February 1988, forty-four states "had been authorized and were administering all 
or part of the RCRA program. EPA administers the program exclusively in the 
remaining states." John C. Chambers, Jr. & Peter L. Gray, EPA and State 
Roles in RCRA and CERCLA, 4 Natural Resources and Environment, 7, 8 (Summer 
1989). A review of another source indicates that the number of authorized states 
may be even higher. Deborah Hitchcock Jessup, Guide to: State Environmental 
Programs, passim (2d ed. 1990).

[¶45]   The State of Wyoming has failed to 
adopt state standards, submit them for approval and obtain authorization to 
regulate hazardous waste as is required by RCRA. As one author noted "Wyoming 
has not been granted primacy to enforce a hazardous waste regulatory program 
comparable to that under the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act." 
Deborah Hitchcock Jessup, Guide to: State Environmental Programs, at 632 (2d ed. 
1990) (emphasis added). See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 272.2550 through 272.2599 (1992). 
See also Professor Mark Squillace & Edward W. Harris, Wyoming, in 6 
Environmental Law Practice Guide § 93.10 (Michael B. Gerrard ed. 1992). 
Therefore, the State is unable to argue that it is requiring compliance with 
stricter standards. Since Wyoming is not an authorized state, the savings clause 
provision does not apply to it. Since we decide that the State was pre-empted 
because of actual conflict in the state remediation plan and the federal 
remediation plan, we need not address the full impact of the State's failure to 
become an authorized RCRA enforcement state. Our consideration is limited to the 
action the State has taken in this particular case. Given the State's status as 
an unauthorized state and its failure to point to stricter standards, we are 
unable to accept the State's argument that § 3009 of RCRA permits their 
enforcement action.

[¶46]   We also feel compelled to comment 
briefly on the State's failure to participate in the federal process which was 
attempting to resolve the problems at the refinery. The State of Wyoming made no 
attempt to intervene in the federal litigation. In 1983, the EPA commenced 
proceedings against Hermes. Hearings were held, and there was a finding against 
the refinery. Hermes appealed to the United States District Court for the 
District of Wyoming. Extensive discovery and work in the federal court continued 
for five years until the parties entered into a consent decree in 1988. The 
State of Wyoming was notified at all stages of the pending federal litigation, 
and the State's input and participation were requested.

[¶47]   Pursuant to law, all interested 
parties were given 30 days notice during which they could comment on the consent 
decree. The consent decree was, pursuant to regulation, published in the Federal 
Register for public comment. Neither the court nor any party received any 
comments. The Department of Justice communicated with the State and made it 
aware of the federal litigation on several occasions. In addition to several 
meetings and phone calls, attorneys from the Department of Justice utilized the 
State's files about the facility to gather information.

[¶48]   The State of Wyoming, at all times, 
declined to become involved, did not cooperate with Hermes and the EPA, and did 
not give their input or suggestions. Then, seven months after the federal 
consent decree was entered, the State filed the present suit against Hermes, and 
now, for approximately five years, has been litigating the very same things that 
were involved in the federal action over again. 

[¶49]   This is a classic case of a citizen 
being whipsawed by a competing state agency. Hermes and EPA litigated the 
refinery hazardous waste problems in federal court for five years (1983-1988). 
The case was settled by entry of a consent decree. Seven months later, the State 
sued Hermes in state court. Now, in 1993, Hermes will have been in court for ten 
years litigating over hazardous waste at this small refinery at Newcastle, 
Wyoming. In essence, Hermes is a pawn in a contest in which the state refuses to 
accept and cooperate in federal enforcement, and Hermes is the loser after ten 
years in court with attendant costs and expenses of 
litigation.

[¶50]   The State's failure to act is 
troubling not only because of its effect on Hermes and the national policy of 
RCRA, but also because the legislature has expressly mandated that the director 
of the DEQ cooperate in federal actions. Section W.S. 35-11-109 
provides:

(a) [T]he director of the 
department shall:

* * * * * 
*

(ii) Advise, consult and 
cooperate with other agencies of the state, the federal government, other 
states, interstate agencies, and other persons in furtherance of the purposes of 
this act[.]

and 
also

(viii) The director shall 
cooperate and participate in the negotiation and execution of consent orders, 
permit issuance, site investigations and remedial measures by and between  been delegated the authority to 
administer and enforce federal legislation[.] [emphasis 
added]

[¶51]   There was serious failure on the 
part of the State of Wyoming to function as the legislature intended in the 
entry of the federal consent decree.

[¶52]   The record can be searched in vain 
to ascertain a logical reason why the State would expend time, money and effort 
on this litigation after sitting out the federal litigation and refusing to 
become involved for five years.

[¶53]   The State explained its failure to 
act during the trial:

THE COURT: Why didn't you 
intervene in Federal Court? Are you afraid of Federal 
Court?

[STATE'S COUNSEL]: I 
guess it's the same reason that EPA doesn't come into state court. We want to 
enforce our state laws in front of our state court judges.

THE COURT: Is that a 
policy [that] has been made by the Attorney General, as far as you 
know?

[STATE'S COUNSEL]: As far 
as I know.

This policy is 
not acceptable under RCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(7) (1988). The result of this 
policy is that a business is subject to dual regulation. This flies directly in 
the face of the RCRA cooperative federalism design whereby a single agency, 
either state or federal, administers the RCRA program. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) & 
(d) (1988). RCRA does not contemplate that state and federal agencies will 
regulate simultaneously and thereby create a dual burden on the regulated 
industry. In order to ensure uniform national regulation of hazardous waste, 
RCRA emphasizes cooperation. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (1988).

[¶54]   We also stress that we do not 
undertake this decision because of a policy consideration which would favor 
business over the health of the citizens of this state. That judgment is not 
ours to make. We recognize that hazardous waste is a dangerous threat to humans 
and to the environment. However, we are bound by the law in this case which 
holds that pre-emption occurs when the state decree conflicts with the federal 
consent decree under RCRA, and in this case there is the additional 
consideration that the State has failed to become an authorized regulatory body 
under RCRA.

[¶55]   Because we reverse the district 
court's order, we need not address appellant's other claims of 
error.

CONCLUSION

[¶56]   Because the remediation sought by 
the State conflicts with the remediation ordered by the United States District 
Court's consent decree, we hold that the State is pre-empted from asserting 
regulatory authority over the refinery.

[¶57]   For the reasons stated herein, we 
reverse and vacate the judgment and order entered by the district 
court.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.

[¶58]   The majority opinion reverses the 
judgment of the trial court upon a finding of federal preemption in this 
instance. I agree with the result and rationale of the majority in this regard. 
Because the ground for reversal is federal preemption, it is not necessary to 
address other issues in the majority opinion.

[¶59]   In their briefs and arguments, the 
parties debated whether the State can seek injunctive relief pursuant to the 
provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-901 (1988). That statute 
provides:

(a) Any person who 
violates, or any director, officer or agent of a corporate permittee who 
willfully and knowingly authorizes, orders or carries out the violation of any 
provision of this act, or any rule, regulation, standard or permit adopted 
hereunder or who violates any determination or order of the council pursuant to 
this act or any rule, regulation, standard, permit, license or variance is 
liable to either a penalty of not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) 
for each day during which violation continues, or, for multiple violations by 
surface coal mining operations, a penalty of not to exceed five thousand dollars 
($5,000.00) for each violation for each day during which the violation 
continues, which may be recovered in a civil action, and the person may be 
enjoined from continuing the violation as hereinafter 
provided.

(b) Except for surface 
coal mining operations, damages are to be assessed by the court. For surface 
coal mining operations, all notices for abatement and cessation orders shall be 
reported to the director. The director shall:

(i) Issue a notice of 
assessment, if a cessation order was issued;

(ii) Make a determination 
on whether a notice of assessment will be issued, if a notice for abatement was 
issued.

(c) Upon issuance of a 
notice of abatement or cessation order, the director shall inform the operator 
of the proposed amount of the penalty within thirty (30) days. The amount shall 
be determined in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the 
council. The person charged with the penalty shall have fifteen (15) days to 
request a conference with the director for informal disposition of any dispute 
over either the amount of the penalty or the occurrence of the 
violation.

(d) If a conference is 
held and after the director has determined that a violation did occur and the 
amount of the penalty which is warranted, the person charged with the penalty 
shall, within fifteen (15) days, either:

(i)                 
Pay 
the proposed penalty in full; or

(ii)               
Petition the council for 
review of either the amount of the penalty or the fact of the violation, 
submitting a bond equal to the proposed amount of the penalty at the time of 
filing the petition. The bond shall be conditioned for the satisfaction of the 
penalty in full, or as modified by the council, if the director's determination 
as to the occurrence of the violation and the assessment of a penalty are 
affirmed. The petition is effective when the bond is approved by the council. If 
the bond is not approved, the person charged with the penalty has ten (10) days 
to forward the proposed amount to the council for placement in an escrow account 
in order to make the petition effective.

(e) If a conference is 
not requested, the person charged with the penalty has thirty (30) days to take 
the action described in subsection (c) of this section.

(f) After a petition is 
effective, the council shall hold a hearing, which shall be conducted as a 
contested case proceeding, as required by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act [§§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115]. The council shall 
either:

(i) Determine the 
occurrence of the violation and the amount of penalty which is warranted for the 
purpose of ordering that the penalty be paid; or (ii) Determine that no 
violation occurred, or that the amount of penalty should be reduced. If such a 
determination is made either through administrative or judicial review, the 
director shall within thirty (30) days remit the appropriate amount to the 
person, if any deposit has been made, with interest at the rate of six percent 
(6%), or at the prevailing department of the treasury rate, whichever is 
greater. Failure to file an effective petition shall result in a waiver of all 
legal rights to contest the violation or the amount of the 
penalty.

(g) Any person aggrieved 
or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of the council pursuant to 
this section is entitled to judicial review in accordance with the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act.

(h) Any person who 
violates this act, or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, and thereby 
causes the death of fish, aquatic life or game or bird life is, in addition to 
other penalties provided by this act, liable to pay to the state, an additional 
sum for the reasonable value of the fish, aquatic life, game or bird life 
destroyed. Any monies so recovered shall be placed in the general fund of 
Wyoming, state treasurer's office.

(j) Any person who 
willfully and knowingly violates, or any director, officer or agent of a 
corporate permittee who willfully and knowingly authorizes, orders or carries 
out the violation of any provision of this act or any rule, regulation, 
standard, permit, license, or variance or limitations adopted hereunder or who 
willfully violates any determination or order of the council or court issued 
pursuant to this act or any rule, regulation, standard, permit or limitation 
issued under this act shall be fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars 
($25,000.00) per day of violation, or imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, 
or both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a first conviction 
of such person under this act, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than 
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) per day of violation or by imprisonment of 
not more than two (2) years, or both.

(k) Any person who 
knowingly makes any false statement, representation or certification in any 
application, record, report, plan or other document filed or required to be 
maintained under this act or who falsifies, tampers with, or knowingly renders 
inaccurate any monitoring device or method required to be maintained under this 
act, shall upon conviction, be fined not more than ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00) or imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, or 
both.

(m) Any person who shall, 
except as permitted by law, willfully resist, prevent, impede, or interfere with 
the director, any administrator, or any of their agents in the performance of 
duties in the regulation of surface coal mining operations shall be punished by 
a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) or by imprisonment for 
not more than one (1) year in county jail, or both.

(n) Any operator of a 
surface coal mining operation who fails to correct a violation within the period 
permitted for its correction, or after a final order or decision issues 
requiring correction when either the department or a court has relieved the 
operator from the abatement requirements of the notice or order, shall be 
assessed a civil penalty of not less than seven hundred and fifty dollars 
($750.00) for each day during which the failure or violation 
continues.

(o) Except as 
provided in subsection (p) of this section, nothing in this act shall be 
construed to abridge, limit, impair, create, enlarge or otherwise affect 
substantively or procedurally the right of any person to damages or other relief 
on account of injury to persons or property and to maintain any action or other 
appropriate proceeding therefor.

(p) Any person who is 
injured in his person or property through the violation by any operator of any 
rule, regulation, order or permit issued pursuant to this act as it provides for 
the regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation in accordance with the 
requirements of P.L. 95-87 [30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.] may bring an action for 
damages (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) only in the 
judicial district in which the surface coal mining operation complained of is 
located.

(q) All actions pursuant 
to this article shall be brought in the county in which the violation occurred 
or in Laramie county by the attorney general in the name of the people of 
Wyoming. All actions pursuant to this article for the enforcement of any program 
to administer the provisions of W.S. 35-11-301(a)(iii) and (v) pursuant to the 
authority delegated under W.S. 35-11-304 may also be brought by the county 
attorney in the county in which the violation occurred. (Emphasis 
added.)

The State relies 
upon the emphasized language of Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-901(a) to justify seeking 
injunctive relief under the statute.

[¶60]   In my opinion, Hermes Consolidated, 
Inc., correctly points out that nothing contained in the statute following 
subdivision (a) serves to justify the claim for injunctive relief pursuant to 
this statute. I would hold that the avenue to injunctive relief is found by 
pursuing the procedure to arrive at a cease and desist order set forth in Wyo. 
Stat. § 35-11-701. I believe that this is a logical extension of the rationale 
found in People v. Fremont Energy Corp., 651 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1982), which is 
limited to a suit to recover penalties. If there is no compliance with the cease 
and desist order, the State appropriately could seek judicial enforcement by an 
action for an injunction. I would also reverse the decision of the trial court 
as to the injunctive relief for the reason that Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-901 does not 
authorize the injunctive relief sought and obtained by the 
State.