Case Title: State v. Kizer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020AP000192-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 58 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP192-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Chrystul D. Kizer, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 398 Wis. 2d 697, 963 N.W.2d 136 
PDC No:2021 WI App 46 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 1, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
David P. Wilk    
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to all parts except ¶¶27-29 & n. 9-11, in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined, and an opinion with respect to ¶¶27-29 & n. 9-11, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion. ROGGENSACK, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and HAGEDORN, 
J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Timothy M. Barber, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There 
was an oral argument by Timothy M. Barber.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Katie R. York and Colleen Marion, assistant state public 
defenders. There was an oral argument by Katie R. York.  
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Caitlin Kendall Noonan, 
Rebecca Donaldson, Erika Jacobs Petty, and Legal Action of 
Wisconsin, Inc., Milwaukee and Lotus Legal Clinic, Inc., 
Brookfield, for Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc. and Lotus Legal 
Clinic, Inc.    
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Naikan Tsao, Lynn Hecht 
Schafran, Jennifer M., Becker, Sigrid McCawley, Lindsey Ruff, 
and Foley & Lardner LLP, Madison, Legal Momentum, New York City, 
and Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, New York City, for Legal 
Momentum, Wisconsin Coalition Against Sexual Assault, Harvard 
Law School Gender violence Program, Cornell Law School Gender 
Justice Clinic, Diverse & Resilient, Jewish Women International, 
Lovelace Consulting Services, Inc., National Alliance to End 
Sexual Violence, National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 
Rights4Girls, Sanctuary for Families, The Institute to Address 
Commercial Sexual Exploitation, and World Without Exploitation.   
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 58 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2020AP0192-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2018CF0643) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Chrystul D. Kizer, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to all parts except ¶¶27-29 & n. 9-11, in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined, and an opinion with respect to ¶¶27-29 & n. 9-11, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion. ROGGENSACK, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and HAGEDORN, 
J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   In Wisconsin, victims of 
human trafficking or child sex trafficking have "an affirmative 
defense for any offense committed as a direct result" of the 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
2 
 
trafficking.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m) (2019-20).1  Chrystul 
Kizer wants to rely on this defense when she is tried on charges 
of first-degree intentional homicide and several other felonies 
in connection with the death of the man she says trafficked her.    
We do not decide whether Kizer may rely on this defense at 
trial.  Instead, we decide two general questions regarding the 
interpretation of § 939.46(1m) and the scope of the defense.  
First, what does it mean for an offense to be "committed as a 
direct result of the violation" of the human-trafficking 
statutes?  And second, is § 939.46(1m) a complete defense to 
first-degree intentional homicide or does it merely mitigate a 
first-degree conviction to a second-degree one?   
¶2 
We hold that an offense is "committed as a direct 
result" of a violation of the human-trafficking statutes if 
there is a logical, causal connection between the offense and 
the trafficking such that the offense is not the result, in 
significant 
part, 
of 
other 
events, 
circumstances, 
or 
considerations apart from the trafficking violation.  We also 
hold that § 939.46(1m) is a complete defense to first-degree 
intentional homicide.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals' decision.   
I 
¶3 
This case is still in a pre-trial posture and we 
therefore 
state 
the 
facts 
as 
described 
in 
the 
criminal 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
3 
 
complaint.  In June 2018, Kizer traveled from Milwaukee to the 
Kenosha home of the man she says trafficked her.  Kizer 
allegedly admitted to detectives that after she arrived, she 
"had gotten upset and she was tired of [him] touching her," and 
shot him.  Kizer then started a fire at the house and drove away 
in his car.  She was subsequently charged with first-degree 
intentional homicide, operating a motor vehicle without the 
owner's consent, arson, possession of a firearm by a felon, and 
bail jumping.   
¶4 
At a pre-trial conference, Kizer's counsel suggested 
that her defense at trial would rest at least in part on 
§ 939.46(1m).  After the State argued that the defense was not 
available to Kizer, the circuit court2 ordered briefing and 
argument on that issue and the scope of the defense.  The 
circuit court determined that the defense "is available to 
[Kizer] so long as [she] is charged with one of the acts in 
§940.302(2) . . . and . . . the cause of the offenses listed in 
940.302(2) was the victimization, by others, of" Kizer.  That 
meant that Kizer could not rely on the defense, since she was 
                                                 
2 The Honorable David P. Wilk of the Kenosha County Circuit 
Court presiding. 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
4 
 
not charged with a violation of § 940.302(2), which prohibits 
human trafficking.3   
¶5 
The court of appeals granted Kizer's petition for 
leave to file an interlocutory appeal and reversed the circuit 
court's decision.  See generally State v. Kizer, 2021 WI App 46, 
398 Wis. 2d 697, 963 N.W.2d 136.  There, as here, Kizer and the 
State 
agreed 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 939.46(1m) was incorrect, since the defense applies to "any 
offense committed as a direct result of the violation of 
s. 940.302(2) or 948.051 without regard to whether anyone was 
prosecuted or convicted for the violation of s. 940.302(2) or 
948.051."  § 939.46(1m) (emphases added); see also Kizer, 398 
Wis. 2d 697, ¶4.  Before the court of appeals, however, the 
parties disagreed about what it means for an offense to be 
"committed as a direct result of the violation" of the human-
trafficking statutes, as well as whether § 939.46(1m) is a 
complete or mitigating defense to first-degree intentional 
homicide.  See Kizer, 398 Wis. 2d 697, ¶¶5, 7.  The court of 
appeals held that, when determining whether to instruct a jury 
on the defense, circuit courts should consider whether there is 
"'some evidence'" that "the victim's offense arises relatively 
                                                 
3 Although the circuit court analyzed § 939.46(1m) as if 
Kizer were a victim of human trafficking under § 940.302(2), 
Kizer maintains that she is a victim of child sex trafficking, 
which is prohibited by § 948.051.  Because we analyze the 
meaning of § 939.46(1m) in the abstract, and not whether it 
applies to Kizer's particular circumstances, we do not decide 
whether she is a victim of human trafficking, child sex 
trafficking, or both.      
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
5 
 
immediately from the trafficking violation of which the victim 
is 
a 
victim, 
is 
motivated 
primarily 
by 
the 
trafficking 
violation, is a logical and reasonably foreseeable consequence 
of that violation, and is not in significant part caused by 
events, 
circumstances 
or 
considerations 
other 
than 
that 
violation." Kizer, 398 Wis. 2d 697, ¶15 (quoting State v. 
Schmidt, 
2012 
WI 
App 
113, 
¶¶8-9, 
344 
Wis. 2d 336, 
824 
N.W.2d 839).  This list, the court of appeals emphasized, was 
non-exhaustive and simply intended to provide some guidance to 
circuit courts.  See id.  The court of appeals also concluded 
that 
§ 939.46(1m) 
is 
a 
complete 
defense 
to 
first-degree 
intentional homicide.  See id., ¶23.  We granted the State's 
petition for review.   
II 
¶6 
This case involves the interpretation of § 939.46(1m), 
which is a question of law that we review de novo.  See, e.g., 
State v. Matthews, 2021 WI 42, 
¶7, 397 Wis. 2d 1, 959 
N.W.2d 640. 
 
"[S]tatutory 
interpretation 
begins 
with 
the 
language of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  "The goal of statutory interpretation is to give 
the statutory text its 'full, proper, and intended effect.'"  
Matthews, 397 Wis. 2d 1, ¶9 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶44).  To that end, we "generally give words their common, 
everyday meaning, 'but we give legal terms of art their accepted 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
6 
 
legal meaning.'"  Id. (quoting Estate of Matteson v. Matteson, 
2008 WI 48, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 311, 749 N.W.2d 557).       
III 
¶7 
We begin with the full text of § 939.46(1m): 
A victim of a violation of s. 940.302(2) or 948.051 
has an affirmative defense for any offense committed 
as a direct result of the violation of s. 940.302(2) 
or 948.051 without regard to whether anyone was 
prosecuted or convicted for the violation of s. 
940.302(2) or 948.051.   
Sections 940.302(2) and 948.051 prohibit, respectively, human 
trafficking 
and 
child 
sex 
trafficking. 
 
Thus, 
under 
§ 939.46(1m), a victim of human trafficking or child sex 
trafficking has an affirmative defense "for any offense [the 
victim] committed as a direct result" of the trafficking 
offense, regardless of whether anyone is charged with or 
convicted of trafficking.   
¶8 
Section 939.46(1m) does not define what it means for 
an offense to be "committed as a direct result" of the 
trafficking offense.  Nor does the statute state expressly 
whether it is a complete defense to first-degree intentional 
homicide or if it is a mitigating defense——a defense that, if 
successful, reduces a first-degree intentional homicide to a 
second-degree one.  We address those two disputed issues in 
turn.   
¶9 
We do not decide, however, whether Kizer is entitled 
to a jury instruction on this defense at trial as to some or all 
of the charges against her.  Both parties acknowledge that 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
7 
 
regardless of how we interpret the defense in § 939.46(1m), it 
will be available to Kizer at trial only if she puts forth "some 
evidence" to support its application.  See State v. Johnson, 
2021 WI 61, ¶17, 397 Wis. 2d 633, 961 N.W.2d 18.  If she puts 
forth such evidence, the burden will be on the State to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply.  See 
Moes v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 756, 765-66, 284 N.W.2d 66 (1979).   
A 
¶10 We first analyze what it means for an offense to be 
"committed as a direct result of the violation" of the human-
trafficking statutes.  See § 939.46(1m).  The State's argument 
comes in two parts.  First, it offers several different 
definitions of "direct result," including "the consequence of an 
action 
without 
any 
intervening 
circumstances, 
or 
without 
compromising or mitigating elements," "the primary, proximate, 
immediate cause, marked by the absence of intervening agency," 
and "both actual and proximate cause and immediacy related to 
trafficking."  Based on those definitions, the State contends 
that § 939.46(1m) applies only to an offense that is caused by 
the underlying trafficking crime and not by "superseding or 
intervening causes."  The State then combines its definitions of 
"direct result" with the next phrase in § 939.46(1m)——"direct 
result of the violation" of the trafficking statutes, see id. 
(emphasis added)——to conclude that the defense applies only to 
offenses that are "part of or in furtherance of the underlying 
trafficking violation."  This conclusion is important because, 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
8 
 
in the State's view, the text of § 939.46(1m) does not create a 
defense that applies solely because an individual is a victim of 
human trafficking when she commits a crime.  Rather, the defense 
applies only to offenses committed by the trafficking victim 
that are "part and parcel of the trafficking enterprise."   
¶11 Kizer largely adopts the court of appeals' view that 
an offense is committed as a direct result of the violation of 
the human-trafficking statutes when it "arises relatively 
immediately from the trafficking violation of which the victim 
is 
a 
victim, 
is 
motivated 
primarily 
by 
the 
trafficking 
violation, is a logical and reasonably foreseeable consequence 
of that violation, and is not in significant part caused by 
events, 
circumstances 
or 
considerations 
other 
than 
that 
violation."  Kizer, 398 Wis. 2d 697, ¶15.  She suggests several 
reasons why this interpretation is more consistent than the 
State's with the text of § 939.46(1m).4  For one thing, she 
argues that the State conflates "proximate cause" with "direct 
result," despite the two being distinct and unrelated.  For 
                                                 
4 Kizer also argues that the State forfeited any objection 
to the court of appeals' interpretation of § 939.46(1m) by 
failing to raise that issue in its petition for review.  We 
acknowledge 
that 
the 
State 
took 
substantially 
different 
positions in its briefing than it did in the petition for 
review.  For example, the State asserted in its petition that 
§ 939.46(1m) could never apply to a charge of first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
but 
abandoned 
that 
position 
in 
its 
briefing, acknowledging that the defense could apply to such a 
charge, but "only in [the] rarest of cases."  Nevertheless, and 
even assuming the State forfeited these arguments, they raise 
important issues that we choose to address.  See State v. 
McKellips, 2016 WI 51, ¶47, 369 Wis. 2d 437, 881 N.W.2d 258. 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
9 
 
another, she asserts that the State takes too narrow a view of 
the necessary relationship between the trafficking crime and the 
offense for which the victim claims the defense.  Although 
§ 939.46(1m) spells out the necessary connection——the offense 
for which the victim claims the defense must be a direct result 
of the trafficking offense——Kizer argues that the statute does 
not require as close a connection as the State claims.   
¶12 Neither the words "direct result" nor the full phrase 
"committed as a direct result of the violation" of the human-
trafficking statutes are defined in § 939.46(1m).5  The lone 
other criminal statute that uses the phrase "direct result" also 
does not define it.  See Wis. Stat. § 949.06(1) (explaining how 
restitution awards should be computed for "economic losses 
incurred as a direct result of an injury").  As a result, we 
look to the common, ordinary meaning of the phrase.  See Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.   
                                                 
5 Although other states have adopted statutes using somewhat 
similar language, those statutes do not define "direct result" 
either.  See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-7-201.3(1) (2021) ("A 
person charged with prostitution . . . which offense as 
committed as a direct result of being a victim of human 
trafficking, may assert as an affirmative defense that he or she 
is a victim of human trafficking."); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 787(h) (2021-22) ("An individual charged with prostitution or 
loitering committed as a direct result of being a victim of 
human trafficking may assert as an affirmative defense that the 
individual is a victim of human trafficking."); Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 17-10-21(a)(1) (2021) ("A defendant convicted of an offense 
and sentenced as a direct result of the defendant being the 
victim of an offense of trafficking under Code Section 16-5-46 
may petition the court imposing the sentence to vacate such 
conviction.").    
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
10 
 
¶13 Defining "direct result" in the abstract is relatively 
straightforward as it is a common phrase with a familiar 
meaning.  "Result" means "to proceed or arise as a consequence, 
effect, or conclusion."6  Result, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2009); Kizer, 398 Wis. 2d 697, ¶8 (noting 
that the word "result" means "'to proceed, spring, or arise as a 
consequence, effect, or conclusion: come out or have an issue.'" 
(quoting Result, Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (1993))); 
see also State v. McKellips, 2016 WI 51, ¶32, 369 Wis. 2d 437, 
881 N.W.2d 258 (when a statute does not define terms we can rely 
on dictionary definitions).  But § 939.46(1m) does not apply to 
just any result.  As the court of appeals put it in this case, 
the legislature "tightened up ['result'] by preceding it with 
'direct.'"  Kizer, 398 Wis. 2d 697, ¶8.  "Direct" is also a 
common word, with a well-understood meaning:  "from the source 
without interruption or diversion" and "without an intervening 
agency 
or 
step." 
 
Direct, 
Merriam-Webster's 
Collegiate 
Dictionary, supra; see also Kizer, 398 Wis. 2d 697, ¶8 (quoting 
several relevant definitions of "direct" including "stemming 
immediately from a source" and "marked by absence of an 
intervening agency, instrumentality, or influence." (quoting 
Direct, Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, supra; Direct, 
                                                 
6 The parties cite a handful of similar definitions.  See 
Result, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/result ("[T]o proceed or arise as a consequence, 
effect, or conclusion."); Result, American Heritage Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1991) (defining "result" as "[t]he consequence of a 
particular action, operation, or course; [an] outcome.").     
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
11 
 
Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/direct)).7  A "direct result" is therefore 
a consequence, effect, or conclusion that stems immediately from 
its source.  
¶14 Ordinary usage confirms that definition and also 
reveals that a consequence can be the direct result of more than 
one prior action.  For instance, a car accident caused by a 
distracted 
driver 
is 
the 
direct 
result 
of 
the 
driver's 
inattention.  So too is an accident in which a distracted driver 
crashes into a car that ran a red light; but that accident is 
also a direct result of the other driver running the red light.  
Those two causes might be treated differently in apportioning 
tort liability, see, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1), but as a 
matter of ordinary language, the accident is a direct result of 
both.  Ordinary usage also helps define the scope of which 
consequences are the direct result of a prior action.  An 
ordinary person would never say that, in our car-accident 
example, the accident was a direct result of the driver having 
been born, even though that is a necessary precursor to the 
accident.  Rather, the ordinary meaning of "direct result" 
                                                 
7 As with "result," the parties cite several additional, 
mostly 
similar 
definitions 
of 
"direct." 
 
See 
Direct, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/direct ("[S]temming immediately from a source," 
"marked by absence of an intervening agency, instrumentality, or 
influence," and "characterized by close logical, causal, or 
consequential relationship."); Direct, Cambridge Dictionary, htt
ps://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/direct 
("[W]ithout 
anyone 
or 
anything 
else 
being 
involved 
or 
between.").    
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
12 
 
connotes a tighter logical and causal relationship between 
events than simply the word "result."   
¶15 Based on the above dictionary definitions of "direct" 
and "result," the ordinary usage of the phrase "direct result," 
and the language of § 939.46(1m), we conclude that an offense is 
"committed as a direct result of the violation" of the human-
trafficking statutes if there is a logical, causal connection 
between the offense and the trafficking such that the offense is 
not 
the 
result, 
in 
significant 
part, 
of 
other 
events, 
circumstances, or considerations apart from the trafficking 
violation.  Additionally, we emphasize that the offense need not 
be a foreseeable result of the trafficking violation and need 
not proceed "relatively immediately" from the trafficking 
violation.  Kizer, 398 Wis. 2d 697, ¶15.  In this respect, we 
disagree with the court of appeals' decision, which interpreted 
§ 939.46(1m) to apply when an offense "arises relatively 
immediately from" and is a "logical and reasonably foreseeable 
consequence" of the trafficking violation.8  See id.  We see no 
basis in the language of the statute for imposing such 
categorical rules, which would run counter to the ordinary 
meaning of the phrase "direct result" and the nature of the 
                                                 
8 The court of appeals also described an offense "committed 
as a direct result of the violation" of the trafficking statutes 
as 
one 
that 
is 
"motivated 
primarily 
by 
the 
trafficking 
violation."  See Kizer, 398 Wis. 2d 697, ¶15.  In our view, this 
notion——to the extent it is consistent with the language of 
§ 939.46(1m)——is already incorporated in our reading of the 
statute.   
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
13 
 
underlying trafficking crime.  Unlike many crimes, which occur 
at discrete points in time, human trafficking can trap victims 
in a cycle of seemingly inescapable abuse that can continue for 
months or even years.  See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Justice, 2019 
Law Enforcement Assessment of Sex Trafficking in Wisconsin 17-18 
(2019).  For that reason, even an offense that is unforeseeable 
or that does not occur immediately after a trafficking offense 
is committed can be a direct result of the trafficking offense, 
so long as there is still the necessary logical connection 
between the offense and the trafficking.   
¶16 Although the "direct result" language in § 939.46(1m) 
contains a causal component, we reject the State's arguments 
about proximate cause.  The legislature has already specified 
that a different kind of causal relationship is required 
here:  a direct result.  In doing so, the legislature did not 
use or otherwise incorporate technical terms like proximate 
cause, which has a particular meaning in a distinct doctrinal 
context.  See Fandrey ex rel. Connell v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 
2004 WI 62, ¶15, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345 (describing 
"'public policy factors,' formerly referred to as 'proximate 
cause,'" and their application in the negligence context).   
¶17 For similar reasons, we also reject the State's narrow 
view of causation more generally.  The State argues that the 
defense in § 939.46(1m) is unavailable whenever an "intervening 
cause[] or agency" is involved.  But an offense may be a direct 
result of a trafficking offense even if there are other causes 
at play, so long as the offense is not the result, in 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
14 
 
significant 
part, 
of 
other 
events, 
circumstances, 
or 
considerations apart from the trafficking violation.  This is in 
keeping with both the ordinary understanding of what a direct 
result is and how we have interpreted that phrase in other 
statutes.  For example, in Waller v. American Transmission Co., 
2013 WI 77, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 N.W.2d 764, we analyzed Wis. 
Stat. § 32.19(2)(e)1., which states that a person is displaced 
by a public project if they move "[a]s a direct result of a 
written notice" of the government's intent to acquire or its 
actual 
acquisition 
of 
the 
person's 
real 
property.  
§ 32.19(2)(e)1. (emphasis added).  We concluded that the "direct 
result" language required "a factual inquiry into the cause of 
the person's move," and concluded that property owners could 
move as a direct result of an offer to acquire property even if 
"they chose to move voluntarily and were not 'forced' to move."  
Waller, 
350 
Wis. 2d 242, 
¶¶114, 
116. 
 
Section 939.46(1m) 
likewise requires a factual inquiry into whether there is a 
logical, 
causal 
connection 
between 
the 
offense 
and 
the 
trafficking such that the offense is not the result, in 
significant 
part, 
of 
other 
events, 
circumstances, 
or 
considerations apart from the trafficking violation.  It does 
not require, however, that the victim's offense be the result of 
only the trafficking offense, or that the victim be forced to 
commit the offense (as the State puts it) as "part of or in 
furtherance of the underlying trafficking violation."   
¶18 This conclusion is also consistent with the only 
published decision from another state court interpreting similar 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
15 
 
statutory language.  See In re D.C., 60 Cal. App. 5th 915 (2021) 
(interpreting Cal. Penal Code § 236.23(a), which provides an 
affirmative 
defense 
to 
certain 
crimes 
if 
the 
defendant 
establishes that they were "coerced to commit the offense as a 
direct result of being a human trafficking victim at the time of 
the offense and had a reasonable fear of harm").  In that case, In 
re D.C., the defendant was a victim of human trafficking charged 
with carrying a concealed knife.  Id. at 918.  The defendant 
said that he carried the knife to protect himself against 
abduction by his trafficker——something that had happened before.  
Id. at 918-19.  The California Court of Appeal concluded that 
the defendant's conduct could fall within the affirmative 
defense because someone could be coerced to commit an offense as 
a direct result of being a trafficking victim even if they did 
not "act at the behest of the trafficker" and the trafficker was 
unaware "that the victim was planning or had committed a crime."  
Id. at 920.  The similar language in Wisconsin's statute 
supports a similar conclusion.  "[C]ommitted as a direct result 
of 
the 
violation" 
of 
the 
human-trafficking 
statutes 
in 
§ 939.46(1m) does not require that the trafficker be aware of 
the offense, or that it occur at the trafficker's behest in 
furtherance of the trafficking violation.  It simply requires 
that the offense occur as a direct result of the violation of 
the trafficking statutes.    
¶19 We agree with the State that the application of 
§ 939.46(1m) requires more than the fact that a crime was 
committed by a trafficking victim, but our interpretation 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
16 
 
already addresses that concern.  One necessary element of the 
defense is, of course, that the defendant be "[a] victim of a 
violation of" the human-trafficking statutes.  See § 939.46(1m).  
But § 939.46(1m) also requires that the offense be committed as 
a direct result of the violation of the trafficking statutes.  
And as we have interpreted that requirement, it is not enough to 
say simply that because the defendant is a victim of human 
trafficking, any offense they commit subsequently must be a 
direct result of the trafficking.  The offense must bear a 
logical, 
causal 
connection 
to 
the 
underlying 
trafficking 
offense; it must be a direct result of the trafficking.  
Moreover, the same threshold applies to § 939.46(1m) as to other 
affirmative defenses——the defendant must produce some evidence 
on which a reasonable jury could find that the defense applies.  
See Johnson, 397 Wis. 2d 633, ¶17.  Thus, our interpretation 
does not create the kind of blanket immunity for victims of 
human trafficking that the State fears.  
¶20 In conclusion, we hold that an offense is "committed 
as a direct result of the violation" of the human-trafficking 
statutes if there is a logical, causal connection between the 
offense and the trafficking such that the offense is not the 
result, in significant part, of other events, circumstances, or 
considerations apart from the trafficking violation.   
B 
¶21 The remaining issue is whether § 939.46(1m) creates a 
complete defense to a charge of first-degree intentional 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
17 
 
homicide or merely mitigates a conviction for first-degree 
intentional homicide to one for second-degree homicide.   
¶22 The State's argument that the defense is mitigating 
rests on its reading of two related statutes, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 939.45(1) and 940.01(2)(d).  Section 939.45 states that 
"[t]he fact that the actor's conduct is privileged, although 
otherwise criminal, is a defense to prosecution for any crime 
based on that conduct," including "[w]hen the actor's conduct 
occurs under circumstances of coercion . . . so as to be 
privileged under s. 939.46."  § 939.45(1).  Because § 939.46(1m) 
is part of § 939.46, the State concludes that it is one of the 
privileges referenced in § 939.45(1).  The State then points to 
§ 940.01(2), which lists the affirmative defenses that mitigate 
first-degree intentional homicide "to 2nd-degree intentional 
homicide."  Among those mitigating defenses are the privileges 
listed in § 939.45(1).  See § 940.01(2)(d) (stating that first-
degree intentional homicide is mitigated to second-degree 
homicide when the "[d]eath was caused in the exercise of a 
privilege under s. 939.45(1)").  Thus, the State concludes that 
the § 939.46(1m) defense must be mitigating because it appears 
in the coercion statute, § 939.46. 
¶23 Kizer, on the other hand, argues that § 939.46(1m) is 
a complete defense, in part because the history of the coercion 
statute does not support the State's conclusion.  She points out 
that §§ 939.45 and 939.46 were adopted at the same time in 1955 
and that at that time, § 939.46 contained only two subsections——
subsec. (1) codified the common law coercion defense, while 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
18 
 
subsec. (2) made clear that the same standard for coercion 
applied when "a married woman" claimed that "the alleged crime 
was committed by command of her husband."  See Ch. 696, § 1, 
Laws of 1955; see also Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1)-(2) (1955-56).  
Kizer explains that § 939.46(2) (1955-56) simply placed a 
limitation on coercion defenses; it was not a defense in its own 
right, as § 939.46(1m) is.  Thus, when it was adopted, the 
"circumstances of coercion" referred to in § 939.45(1) (1955-56) 
could 
have 
meant 
only 
the 
general 
coercion 
defense 
in 
§ 939.46(1) (1955-56).  And because § 939.46(1m) was not adopted 
until more than 50 years later, see 2007 Wis. Act 116, § 30, 
Kizer 
concludes 
that 
§ 
939.46(1m) 
is 
not 
one 
of 
the 
"circumstances of coercion" referenced in § 939.45(1).   
¶24 A weakness in Kizer's argument is that Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.001(5)(b) requires us to read statutory cross-references 
like those in § 939.45 as referring to all subsections currently 
in effect.  "When a decimal-numbered statute of this state," 
like § 939.45(1), "contains a reference to another decimal-
numbered statute of this state," like § 939.46, "the reference 
is to the current text of the statute referenced, and includes 
any change that has been inserted into . . . the referenced 
statute since the reference was first incorporated into the 
statute."  § 990.001(5)(b).  Thus, the fact that § 939.46(1m) 
did not exist when § 939.45(1) was enacted does not mean that 
§ 939.45(1) does not refer to § 939.46(1m) now.   
¶25 That said, the text of § 939.45(1) is not particularly 
clear, since it refers not to all of § 939.46 but to 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
19 
 
"circumstances of coercion . . . under s. 939.46."  Despite 
§ 939.46 being titled "coercion," not every subsection of the 
statute is a coercion defense.  Indeed, subsec. (2) is a 
limitation on coercion defenses, and subsec. (3) provides a non-
coercion affirmative defense for so-called "straw purchases" of 
firearms.  Not to mention that "titles . . . are not part of the 
statutes," § 990.001(6).  Thus, not all of the conduct addressed 
in § 939.46 is necessarily covered by § 939.45(1)'s reference to 
"circumstances of coercion . . . under § 939.46."  And that 
means that not all conduct in § 939.46 would mitigate a first-
degree intentional homicide charge to a second-degree one.  At 
least subsecs. (2) and (3) would not, and it is therefore 
unclear whether the same is true of subsec. (1m) as well.     
¶26 Kizer's stronger argument is that the absence of any 
explicit mitigation language in § 939.46(1m) means that the 
statute creates a complete defense to first-degree intentional 
homicide.  She points out that, unlike § 939.46(1m), many other 
statutory defenses expressly state that they mitigate a first-
degree intentional homicide to a second-degree intentional 
homicide.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 939.47 (necessity is a 
complete defense "except that if the prosecution is for first-
degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced 
to 2nd-degree intentional homicide"); § 939.44(2) ("Adequate 
provocation is an affirmative defense only to first-degree 
intentional homicide and mitigates that offense to 2nd-degree 
intentional homicide."); § 940.01(2)(a)-(c) (specifying that 
adequate provocation, imperfect self-defense, and prevention of 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
20 
 
a felony "mitigate the offense" of first-degree intentional 
homicide "to 2nd-degree intentional homicide").  The absence of 
similar language in § 939.46(1m) is notable because the only 
other statutory defense that could apply to a first-degree 
intentional homicide and that also contains no such mitigating 
language is perfect self defense, which is a complete defense to 
first-degree intentional homicide.  See § 939.48(1).  This 
context suggests that a defense is complete as to first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
unless 
the 
statute 
contains 
express 
language regarding mitigation.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 
(we interpret statutory language in context, "in relation to the 
language of surrounding or closely-related statutes.").  And 
that suggestion is particularly compelling here because the 
subsection immediately preceding § 939.46(1m) states expressly 
that a general coercion defense, if successful, reduces a 
"first-degree 
intentional 
homicide[] . . . to 
2nd-degree 
intentional homicide."  See § 939.46(1); see also Augsburger v. 
Homestead Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 133, ¶17, 359 Wis. 2d 385, 856 
N.W.2d 874.    
¶27 The 
State 
and 
Kizer's 
competing 
interpretations 
demonstrate that § 939.46(1m) is ambiguous.  It is "capable of 
being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in [at 
least] two . . . senses":  either as a complete defense to 
first-degree intentional homicide or as a defense that mitigates 
a first-degree intentional homicide to a second-degree one.  See 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47.  When an ambiguity exists in a 
criminal statute, we apply the rule of lenity to resolve the 
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
21 
 
ambiguity in the defendant's favor unless the legislative 
history clarifies the statute's meaning.9  See State v. Luedtke, 
2015 WI 42, ¶73, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592; State v. Cole, 
2003 WI 59, ¶67, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.  We do so "to 
avoid usurping the function of the legislature" and to ensure 
that statutes "provide the public with fair notice of prohibited 
conduct."10  See State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶66, 308 
Wis. 2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447.   
                                                 
9 We recognize that there is some variation across our cases 
and the federal courts as to when the rule of lenity applies.  
See, e.g., State v. Guarnero, 2015 WI 72, ¶27, 363 Wis. 2d 857, 
867 N.W.2d 400 (stating that the rule applies when there is a 
"'grievous ambiguity' or uncertainty" in a statute's meaning 
after "considering statutory language, context, structure and 
purpose" (quoting United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 173 
(2014))); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) 
("[W]e have always reserved lenity for those situations in which 
a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope 
even after resort to 'the language and structure, legislative 
history, and motivating policies' of the statute." (emphasis in 
original) (quoted source omitted)); see also Shon Hopwood, 
Restoring the Historical Rule of Lenity as a Canon, 95 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 918, 924-31 (2020) (reviewing the various historical and 
contemporary formulations of the rule of lenity).  In this case, 
though, none of those variations would alter our conclusion. 
10 We acknowledge that the use of legislative history to 
clarify an ambiguous criminal statute may be at odds with the 
fair-notice purpose of the rule of lenity.  Nevertheless, since 
at least the 1970s, our cases——with the exception of Guarnero, 
discussed previously——have applied the rule of lenity only after 
concluding that the legislative history did not clear up an 
ambiguity.  See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 77 Wis. 2d 15, 26-27, 
252 
N.W.2d 64 
(1977); 
see 
also 
State 
v. 
Setagord, 
211 
Wis. 2d 397, 415, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997).  And Guarnero did not 
overrule those cases.  See 363 Wis. 2d 857, ¶¶26-27.  In any 
case, revisiting these precedents is not necessary to resolve 
this case, since, as discussed below, the legislative history 
does not clarify the meaning of § 939.46(1m).   
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
22 
 
¶28 The legislative history of § 939.46(1m) does not 
answer whether the statute creates a complete or mitigating 
defense to first-degree intentional homicide.  Indeed, there is 
no legislative history at all on the mitigation question.  The 
drafting file for the Senate bill contains both a Legislative 
Reference Bureau memo and a "model state anti-trafficking 
criminal statute," but neither address whether § 939.46(1m) is a 
mitigating or complete defense.  In addition, the parties have 
not pointed us to any other extrinsic source that sheds light on 
the question, and we have not found any either.11 
¶29 Accordingly, we apply the rule of lenity, and conclude 
that § 939.46(1m) is a complete defense to a charge of first-
degree intentional homicide.  See Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶68.    
                                                 
11 The dissent fails to explain why common law coercion 
somehow helps resolve the issue.  For one thing, common law 
coercion was not a defense to homicide at all; it was neither a 
mitigating nor a complete defense.  See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, 
Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and 
Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1331, 1370 
(1989).  Given that, it is not clear why the common law's 
treatment of coercion should somehow mean that § 939.46(1m) must 
be a mitigating defense.  The only reason the general coercion 
defense in § 939.46(1) is mitigating is because the legislature 
broke with the common law rule.  See §§ 939.46(1), 939.45(1).  
Moreover, the legislature codified § 939.46(1m) separately from 
the 
general 
coercion 
defense 
in 
§ 939.46(1) 
and 
without 
referring to "coercion" at all and without specifying that it is 
a mitigating defense to first-degree intentional homicide.  
Indeed, as the dissent points out, the legislature specifically 
rejected proposed model legislation referring to "coercion" when 
it adopted the statute.  See dissent, ¶75.  For these reasons, 
common law coercion is irrelevant to our analysis.   
No. 
2020AP0192-CR   
 
23 
 
IV 
¶30 We hold that an offense is "committed as a direct 
result" of a violation of the human-trafficking statutes if 
there is a logical, causal connection between the offense and 
the trafficking such that the offense is not the result, in 
significant 
part, 
of 
other 
events, 
circumstances, 
or 
considerations apart from the trafficking violation.  We further 
hold that § 939.46(1m) is a complete defense to a charge of 
first-degree intentional homicide.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2020AP192-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶31 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  "[A]ny 
reasonable doubt about the application of a penal law must be 
resolved in favor of liberty."  Wooden v. United States, 595 
U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 1063, 1081 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
As Justice Patience Drake Roggensack's well-reasoned dissent 
demonstrates, reasonable minds may differ on whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.46(1m) provides a complete defense for trafficking victims 
charged 
with 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
or 
merely 
mitigates a conviction to second-degree intentional homicide.  
Ascertaining the meaning of the Wisconsin Statutes to resolve 
this issue requires deciphering a labyrinth of cross-referenced 
provisions, an undertaking the Wisconsin Supreme Court is 
typically well-equipped to perform.  In this case, however, that 
exercise 
produced 
analytical 
disagreement, 
generating 
two 
reasonable constructions of governing statutes.  I join the 
majority/lead opinion (in part)1 rather than the dissent because 
the rule of lenity demands judgment in the defendant's favor.  
Id. 
¶32 I depart from the dissenting opinion because making 
sense of the applicable statutes on the issue presented 
befuddles even supreme court justices.  When it comes to laws 
imposing criminal punishment, the text of the law must convey 
the consequences of criminal conduct "in terms an ordinary 
person can understand."  Id. at 1082.  If "uncertainty exists" 
because an ordinary person cannot unravel the web of complexity 
                                                 
1 I do not join the majority/lead opinion's discussion of 
the rule of lenity, paragraphs 27-29 and accompanying footnotes. 
No.  2020AP192-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
created by the legislature, "the law gives way to liberty."  Id.  
If supreme court justices are unable to definitively discern the 
meaning of statutes, how could an ordinary person?  "[A] fair 
system of laws requires precision in the definition of offenses 
and punishments.  The less the courts insist on precision, the 
less the legislatures will take the trouble to provide it."  
Antonin 
Scalia 
& 
Bryan 
A. 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law: 
The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 301 (2012). 
¶33 I depart from the majority/lead opinion because it 
elevates 
legislative 
history 
over 
a 
rule 
of 
statutory 
construction predating the founding.  The majority/lead opinion 
says, "[w]hen an ambiguity exists in a criminal statute, we 
apply the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity in the 
defendant's favor unless the legislative history clarifies the 
statute's meaning."  Majority/Lead op., ¶27 (citing State v. 
Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶73, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592; State 
v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶13, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700).  
Consulting legislative history before applying the rule of 
lenity is in error.  "For the freedom of our constitution will 
not permit, that in criminal cases a power should be lodged in 
any judge, to construe the law otherwise than according to the 
letter."  Introduction, William Blackstone, Commentaries *92.  
We do not "possess the authority to punish individuals under 
ambiguous laws in light of our own perceptions about some piece 
of legislative history or the statute's purpose."  Wooden, 142 
S. Ct. at 1085.  If "the traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation yield no clear answer, the judge's next step 
No.  2020AP192-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
isn't to legislative history . . . .  The next step is to 
lenity."  Id. at 1085-86; see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 
U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) ("There are, we recognize, contrary 
indications in the statute's legislative history.  But we do not 
resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is 
clear.  Moreover, were we to find § 5322(a)'s 'willfulness' 
requirement ambiguous as applied to § 5324, we would resolve any 
doubt in favor of the defendant."  (citations omitted)). 
¶34 The majority/lead opinion cites outdated cases in 
support of its consultation of legislative history.2  In State v. 
Luedtke, 362 Wis. 2d 1, ¶73, this court declined to apply the 
rule of lenity because it deemed the statute under consideration 
unambiguous.  In a single paragraph disposing of the issue, the 
court merely quoted State v. Cole for the proposition that the 
rule of lenity applies only if the statute is ambiguous and the 
court is "unable to clarify the intent of the legislature by 
resort to legislative history."  Luedtke, 362 Wis. 2d 1, ¶73 
(quoting Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶67).  Cole is a pre-Kalal case 
                                                 
2 The majority/lead opinion acknowledges "that the use of 
legislative history to clarify an ambiguous criminal statute may 
be at odds with the fair-notice purpose of the rule of lenity"; 
however, it declines to relieve this tension.  Majority/Lead 
op., ¶27 n.10.  "[I]t is this court's function to develop and 
clarify the law."  State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 
Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988); see also Cook v. Cook, 
208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (noting this court 
has been "designated by the constitution and the legislature as 
a law declaring court"  (quoting State ex rel. La Crosse Trib. 
v. Cir. Ct. for La Crosse Cnty., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 229–30, 340 
N.W.2d 460 (1983))).  In fulfilling that function, this court 
has a duty to independently research, analyze, and interpret the 
law on behalf of the nearly 6 million people of Wisconsin. 
No.  2020AP192-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
reflecting an approach to statutory construction focused on what 
the legislature "intended."  See Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶13 
("The principal objective of statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.").  
In Kalal, this court rejected that approach and joined the 
judicial 
mainstream 
in 
adopting 
a 
method 
of 
statutory 
interpretation focused on the meaning of the text.  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
¶35 In at least one post-Kalal case, the court analyzed 
the applicability of the rule of lenity without any mention of 
legislative history.  State v. Guarnero, 2015 WI 72, ¶27, 363 
Wis. 2d 857, 867 N.W.2d 400.  Although the majority/lead opinion 
acknowledges Guarnero, it effectively declares it an outlier.  
More accurately, Guarnero conformed this court's jurisprudence 
on lenity to the prevailing method of statutory interpretation, 
in which legislative history plays no part. 
¶36 "Regardless, stare decisis is a judicially-created 
policy and 'not an inexorable command;' for this reason, we will 
overturn precedent if it is objectively wrong."  Friends of 
Frame Park, U.A. v.  of Waukesha, 2022 WI __, __ Wis. 2d __, 
¶64, __ N.W.2d __ (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) 
(quoting Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 
108, ¶97, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257).  "Historically, the 
judiciary has prioritized declaring the law correctly over 
perpetuating errors in judgment in the name of stability in the 
law."  Id.  We should do so in this case. 
No.  2020AP192-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
¶37 "Changes or developments in the law have undermined 
the rationale behind" consulting legislative history to resolve 
statutory ambiguity before applying lenity.  See State v. 
Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶50, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 
(quoting Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare 
Health Servs. Ins. Corp., 2006 WI 91, ¶33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 
N.W.2d 216).  In Kalal, this court rejected intentionalism.  
"Kalal was a 'watershed decision in the modern history of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court' and is Wisconsin's 'most cited case of 
modern times.'"  Clean Wis., Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Nat. Res., 
2021 WI 71, ¶86, 398 Wis. 2d 386, 961 N.W.2d 346 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting 
Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 969, 969–70 (2017)).  
"'Kalal transformed statutory interpretation in Wisconsin' and 
'shift[ed] 
state 
courts 
from 
a 
vaguely 
intentionalist 
interpretive method' to a 'uniform method' focusing upon the 
plain meaning of the words actually enacted into law."  Id. 
(quoting 
Suhr, 
Interpreting 
Wisconsin 
Statutes, 
at 
970) 
(modification in the original). 
¶38 As Kalal recognized, "[i]t is the enacted law, not the 
unenacted intent, that is binding on the public."  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶44.  This is the same premise underlying the rule 
of lenity.  As the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged, 
"it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the 
text of the law before he murders[.]"  McBoyle v. United States, 
283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).  Nevertheless, a fair justice system 
requires "that a fair warning should be given to the world in 
No.  2020AP192-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
language that the common world will understand, of what the law 
intends to do if a certain line is passed."  Id.  While the 
notion that statutes "give adequate notice to the citizen is 
something of a fiction, . . . albeit one required in any system 
of law," this "necessary fiction descends to needless farce when 
the public is charged even with knowledge of Committee Reports."3  
United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 
The 
rule 
of 
law 
cannot 
countenance 
any 
"justification for extending the 'necessary fiction' that 
citizens know the law . . . to such extralegal materials."  Id. 
at 312 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Plainly, "defendants cannot be 
presumed to be on notice of information present only in the 
legislative record[.]"  Sarah Newland, Note, The Mercy of 
Scalia:  Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 197, 213 (1994).  Examining legislative 
history to resolve an ambiguity in a criminal statute is 
incompatible with Kalal and the purpose of the rule of lenity. 
                                                 
3 Often, many members of the legislature are not even 
familiar with a bill's historical materials: 
The notion that you can pluck statements from a couple 
of legislators or even from a committee report, which 
is usually written by some teenagers, and . . . very 
often not even read by the committee, much less read 
by the whole House, much less less read by the other 
House, . . . [and 
presume 
the 
statements] 
somehow 
[are] reflective of the intent of the whole Congress 
and of the President . . . it truly is the last 
surviving fiction in American law. 
Clean Wis., Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Nat. Res., 2021 WI 71, ¶90, 
398 Wis. 2d 386, 961 N.W.2d 346 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting) 
(quoting 
Hoover 
Inst., Uncommon 
Knowledge 
with 
Justice Antonin Scalia, YouTube, at 17:40 (Oct. 30, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DaoLMW5AF4Y). 
No.  2020AP192-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
¶39 Although legislative history may play a limited role 
in confirming a plain meaning statutory interpretation, "it is 
not consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a textually 
ambiguous penal statute against a criminal defendant on the 
basis of legislative history."  R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 307 (Scalia, 
J., concurring); see also Crandon v. United States, 494 
U.S. 152, 160 (1990) ("Because construction of a criminal 
statute must be guided by the need for fair warning, it is rare 
that legislative history or statutory policies will support a 
construction of a statute broader than that clearly warranted by 
the text.").  If the rule of lenity requires legislative clarity 
in defining crime and punishment, nothing in the legislative 
history may "cause[] the criminal law to be stricter than the 
text of the law displays."  R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 308.  While we 
presume the people's familiarity with the law,4 we do not expect 
citizens to consult legislative history in order to ensure their 
conduct conforms with the rules prescribed by the legislature. 
¶40 Applying the rule of lenity upon determining a 
criminal statute is ambiguous reflects a proper exercise of 
judicial restraint, reserving the amendment of unclear statutes 
for the legislature.  Newland, The Mercy of Scalia, at 203.  For 
courts to instead explore legislative history to divine what the 
                                                 
4 "[I]gnorance of the law is no excuse in any country.  If 
it were, the laws would lose their effect, because it can be 
always pretended."  From Thomas Jefferson to André Limozin, 22 
December 
1787, 
Founders 
Online, 
National 
Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-12-02-0460. 
[Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 12, 7 
August 1787 – 31 March 1788, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1955, pp. 450–51.] 
No.  2020AP192-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
legislator "intended" "risk[s] the possibility that judges 
rather than legislators will control the power to define crimes 
and 
their 
punishments." 
 
Wooden, 
142 
S. Ct. 
at 
1086.  
"[L]egislative history can never provide assurance against" 
courts defining the criminal law rather than the legislature.  
R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 309.  Limiting judicial review to declaring 
what the law says rather than what legislators may have 
intended, but did not write, is fundamental to the separation of 
powers.  "To determine that a case is within the intention of a 
statute, its language must authorise us to say so."  United 
States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96 (1820). 
¶41 Legislative history crept into judicial opinions only 
in the 20th century; until then, "[f]rom the beginnings of the 
republic, American law followed what is known as the 'no-
recourse doctrine'——that in the interpretation of a text, no 
recourse may be had to legislative history."  Scalia & Garner, 
Reading Law, at 369.  The defects and dangers of using 
legislative history as a tool for interpretation have been well 
documented.  See, e.g., id. at 369-90.  In contrast, the rule of 
lenity "antedates both state and federal constitutions," id. at 
297, 
and 
"became 
a 
widely 
recognized 
rule 
of 
statutory 
construction in the Republic's early years."  Wooden, 142 S. Ct. 
at 1082.  In 1820, Chief Justice John Marshall explained its 
origins:  "The rule that penal laws are to be construed 
strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself.  
It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of 
individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of 
No.  2020AP192-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial 
department.  It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to 
define a crime, and ordain its punishment."  Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 
at 95. 
¶42 The rule of lenity does not apply every time a court 
must unravel complex statutes; if it did, the court would adopt 
any plausible statutory interpretation favoring the defendant's 
case, in every case.  Although the United States Supreme Court 
has framed the threshold for its application differently in 
different cases, the rule of lenity should apply only if, after 
exhausting "all legitimate tools of interpretation . . . , 'a 
reasonable doubt persists.'"  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 
299 (quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) 
(per Marshall, J.)); see also Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1081.  In 
this case, notwithstanding earnest application of the canons of 
statutory 
construction, 
the 
members 
of 
this 
court 
reach 
different interpretations, producing reasonable doubt as to 
which reading is correct.  The issue of whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.46(1m) provides a complete defense for trafficking victims 
charged 
with 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
or 
merely 
mitigates a conviction to second-degree intentional homicide "is 
eminently debatable——and that is enough, under the rule of 
lenity, to require finding for" the defendant in this case.  
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 246 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
¶43 Because "the majority of statutes are clear in their 
prescriptions," the United States Supreme Court "often rejects 
No.  2020AP192-CR.rgb 
 
10 
 
the use of the rule of lenity based on statutory clarity."  
Newland, The Mercy of Scalia, at 211 n.67.  This is true 
regarding the Wisconsin statutes as well.  The rule of lenity 
may be rarely used,5 but reasonable doubt over the meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m) as applied in this case compels a 
resolution in the defendant's favor. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The rare application of the rule of lenity means our 
opportunities for review will come infrequently, yet another 
reason the court should ensure it declares the law correctly in 
this case. 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶44 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (dissenting).  In 
accord with the common law principle that coercion is not a 
complete defense to first-degree intentional homicide as well as 
the text and surrounding context of Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m), I 
conclude that § 939.46(1m)'s trafficking defense, which is 
grounded in coercion, is not a complete defense to first-degree 
intentional homicide.  Rather, it comes within § 939.46(1) and 
has the potential to mitigate the charge of first-degree 
intentional homicide to second-degree intentional homicide.  The 
majority/lead 
opinion 
errs 
because 
its 
interpretation 
of 
§ 939.46(1m) abrogates the common law by making coercion a 
complete defense to first-degree intentional homicide and 
ignoring 
the 
context 
in 
which 
the 
legislature 
placed 
§ 939.46(1m).  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
I.  BACKGROUND1 
¶45 Chrystul 
Kizer 
was 
charged 
with 
first-degree 
intentional homicide, operating a motor vehicle without the 
owner's consent, arson, possession of a firearm by a felon, and 
bail jumping.  These charges stemmed from Kizer's alleged murder 
of a man who allegedly had been sex trafficking her.  According 
to the criminal complaint, Kizer travelled from Milwaukee to 
Kenosha where she shot her trafficker.  Following the shooting, 
Kizer started a fire at the man's home and drove off in his car.   
¶46 At pre-trial, Kizer and her counsel sought to rely on 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.46(1m), 
which 
grants 
victims 
of 
human 
                                                 
1 The majority/lead opinion ably sets forth relevant facts; 
therefore, 
I 
provide 
only 
additional 
facts 
necessary 
to 
understand my opinion that follows.   
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
trafficking "an affirmative defense for any offense committed as 
a direct result" of the trafficking.  See § 939.46(1m).  After 
briefing and argument on this issue, the circuit court concluded 
that Kizer could not rely on the defense.  Kizer moved for 
interlocutory appeal, which motion the court of appeals granted.  
Following further argument and briefing, the court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court.  As part of its reversal, the court 
of appeals concluded that § 939.46(1m) is a complete defense to 
first-degree intentional homicide.  We granted the State's 
petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review  
¶47 "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. 
Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110.  Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the 
statute.  If the meaning of the words are plain and unambiguous, 
the court's inquiry ends and there is no need to consult 
extrinsic 
sources 
of 
interpretation, 
such 
as 
legislative 
history.  Id., ¶¶45, 46.  
¶48 In addition to the plain words of the text, "[c]ontext 
is important to meaning.  So, too, is the structure of the 
statute in which the operative language appears."  Id., ¶46. 
Therefore, rather than in isolation, "statutory language is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; . . . in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
statutes; . . . to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable 
results; 
. . . [and] read where possible to give reasonable effect to 
every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id.  "Statutes are 
closely related when they are in the same chapter, reference one 
another, or use similar terms."  State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 
104, ¶27, 378 Wis. 2d 504, 904 N.W.2d 773 (citing City of 
Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 2007 WI 93, ¶24, 302 Wis. 2d 
599, 734 N.W.2d 428). 
¶49 It is consistent with the plain-meaning rule "to 
consider the intrinsic context in which statutory language is 
used; 
a 
plain-meaning 
interpretation 
cannot 
contravene 
a 
textually or contextually manifest statutory purpose."  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49.  However, in "construing or interpreting a 
statute the court is not at liberty to disregard the plain, 
clear words of the statute."  Id., ¶46.  Nor are courts 
permitted to read words into the statute that the legislature 
did not insert.  Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, ¶42, 336 
Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316.   
B.  The Majority/lead Opinion 
¶50 The State's argument that Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m) 
mitigates first-degree intentional homicide to second degree, 
rather than providing a complete defense, focuses on following 
the links among statutory cross references.2  Following this 
chain, the State argues that the trafficking defense is limited 
by the provision of Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(d), which provides 
that the listed affirmative defenses mitigate a first-degree 
                                                 
2 See Section II.D. 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
intentional homicide charge to a second-degree charge.  The 
majority/lead ignores the effect of the common law and disagrees 
with the State's contention.  The majority/lead asserts that the 
absence of explicit mitigation language in § 939.46(1m) creates 
a complete defense to first-degree intentional homicide.3   
¶51 In arriving at this conclusion, the majority/lead 
compares Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m) with other statutory defenses 
that explicitly state that they mitigate the charge to second-
degree intentional homicide.4  Ultimately, the majority/lead 
opinion declares that this "suggests that a defense is complete 
as to first-degree intentional homicide unless the statute 
contains express language regarding mitigation."5 
¶52 Yet, 
in 
doing 
this, 
the 
majority/lead 
errs 
by 
implementing an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m) that 
is in derogation of the common law without the unambiguous and 
clearly expressed legislative purpose to do so.  Because no such 
purpose was expressed by the statute, § 939.46(1m) must be 
interpreted so as to comport with the common law.  See Strenke 
v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶28, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 N.W.2d 296 ("A 
statute must be interpreted in light of the common law and the 
scheme 
of 
jurisprudence 
existing 
at 
the 
time 
of 
its 
                                                 
3 Majority/lead op., ¶26.   
4 Id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 939.47 (necessity is a complete 
defense "except that if the prosecution is for first-degree 
intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-
degree intentional homicide")). 
5 Id. (citing State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110). 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
enactment.").  Therefore, I conclude that the trafficking 
defense is limited by the chain of statutory cross references 
which is in accord with the common law and, therefore, results 
in mitigation of a first-degree intentional homicide charge to a 
second-degree charge.   
C.  Abrogation of the Common Law 
¶53 It is helpful to review the effect of common law on 
statutory interpretation.  I begin by noting that it is 
axiomatic that a statute does not abrogate a rule of common law 
unless the abrogation is clearly expressed and leaves no doubt 
of 
the 
legislature's 
purpose. 
 
Fuchsgruber 
v. 
Custom 
Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, ¶25, 244 Wis. 2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 
833 (quoting Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 
56, 74, 307 N.W.2d 256, 266 (1981)).  A statute does not change 
the common law unless the legislative purpose to do so is 
clearly expressed in the language of the statute.  Maxey v. 
Redevelopment Auth. of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 399, 288 N.W.2d 
794 (1980).  To accomplish a change in the common law, "the 
language [of the statute] must be clear, unambiguous and 
peremptory."  Id. (quoting Wis. Bridge & Iron Co. v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 233 Wis. 467, 474, 290 N.W. 199 (1940)). 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
1.  Coercion Generally6  
¶54 Coercion occurs when a "threat by a person other than 
the actor's coconspirator[7] . . . causes the actor reasonably to 
believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing 
imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and 
which causes him or her so to act."  State v. Keeran, 2004 WI 
App 4, ¶5, 268 Wis. 2d 761, 674 N.W.2d 570 (quoting Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.46(1) (2001-02)).  This privilege to act provides a 
complete common law defense to any crime except first-degree 
intentional homicide.  Id.; see also People v. Anderson, 50 P.3d 
368, 370-75 (2002) (tracing history of coercion at common law).   
                                                 
6 Initially, an examination of the coercion defense, as well 
as its application to the specific crime of sex trafficking, 
will be helpful to our discussion.   
7 A conspiracy "commences with an agreement between 2 or 
more persons to direct their conduct toward the realization of a 
criminal objective and each member of the conspiracy must 
individually and consciously intend the realization of the 
particular criminal venture.  Additionally, each conspirator 
must have an individual stake in the conspiracy."  Bergeron v. 
State, 85 Wis. 2d 595, 613, 271 N.W.2d 386 (1978).  Regarding 
the intent required to be deemed a conspirator, courts have 
described the need for a "voluntary" association and intention 
to commit the particular criminal venture.  United States v. 
Wroblewski, 105 F.2d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 1939) (requiring 
evidence of "two or more persons, in voluntary cooperation," to 
prove a conspiracy).  Traffickers form emotional bonds with 
their victims and, through ever-present abuse and control, 
manipulate them to commit acts they would not otherwise choose 
to do.  As Legal Action of Wisconsin and LOTUS Legal Clinic 
explained in their brief to this court, "the line between 
'choice' and 'force' can [quickly] erode" in trafficking 
relationships.  Kizer says her association with her trafficker 
stems from such a relationship.   
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
¶55 Coercion and duress8 "are similar in substance" to 
self-defense.  United States v. Waller, 605 F. App'x 333, 336 
(5th Cir. 2015).  "Duress, like the related, and often 
overlapping, defenses of self-defense and necessity, is a form 
of the affirmative defense of justification."  United States v. 
Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 873 (5th Cir. 1998).  Often described 
as "lesser evil" defenses, both duress and self-defense "rest[] 
on the belief that a person facing harm is justified in 
performing an act, otherwise illegal, less injurious than the 
impending loss."  United States v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089, 1091 
(7th Cir. 1998); see also Model Penal Code § 3.02 (collecting 
these defenses under the rubric "justification" and "choice[s] 
of evil").  While differences exist based on the source of the 
threat, these differences are often in nomenclature rather than 
in the "nature of the justification."  Id. 
¶56 Coercion, as a defense, is "limited to the most severe 
form of inducement" and requires a finding "under the objective-
reasonable man test, with regard to the reasonableness of the 
actor's beliefs that he is threatened with immediate death or 
great bodily harm with no possible escape other than the 
commission of a criminal act."  State v. Amundson, 69 Wis. 2d 
554, 568, 230 N.W.2d 775 (1975).  Specifically, in trafficking 
cases, courts around the country have concluded that various 
realities that victims are forced to endure at the hands of the 
                                                 
8 Courts often use the terms "coercion" and "duress" 
interchangeably when speaking of circumstances in which a victim 
is justified in performing an otherwise illegal act based on a 
threat of harm from outside forces.  See supra note 9.  
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
traffickers 
demonstrate 
coercion. 
 
See 
United 
States 
v. 
McIntyre, 612 F. App'x 77, 79-80 (3d Cir. 2015) (describing that 
victim testimony that they had either been beaten or been 
present while others were beaten was sufficient to demonstrate 
coercion that was used to cause them to engage in commercial sex 
acts); United States v. Fields, No. 8:13-cr-198-T-30TGW, 2013 WL 
5278499, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2013) (concluding that 
trafficker's threat of forcing opiate withdrawal sickness if 
victim did not prostitute herself was a harm serious enough to 
demonstrate coercion). 
¶57 However, due to the circumstances of trafficking and 
the relationship between the trafficker and the victim, threats 
of bodily harm, sufficient to demonstrate coercion, do not 
always line up with the stereotypically immediate examples of 
coercion, such as committing a crime while being forced at 
gunpoint to do so.  As the Legal Action of Wisconsin and LOTUS 
Legal 
Clinic 
confirmed 
in 
their 
brief 
to 
this 
court, 
"trafficking involves manipulating a victim's vulnerabilities, 
such as cultural isolation, financial dependency, or a need for 
love and belonging."  Rather than stand-alone, explicit threats 
of violence, traffickers often form emotional bonds with their 
victims and, through ever-present abuse and control, manipulate 
them to commit acts they would not otherwise choose to do.   
¶58 In similar circumstances, courts around the country 
have allowed victims of abuse to present expert testimony on 
battering and its effects in support of a duress9 defense because 
                                                 
9 The Court chose to use the term "duress," instead of 
coercion, because that was the term used more prevalently in the 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
it may help juries "understand the objective reasonableness of a 
defendant's actions in the situation [he or she] faced, which 
included the history of violent and psychological abuse."  
United States v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744, 754 (7th Cir. 2021).   
¶59 The facts in Dingwall are very similar to the 
circumstances of abuse and manipulation that we often see in 
trafficking situations.  Marjory Dingwall was a victim stuck in 
a relationship with her abusive boyfriend, Aaron Stanley.  Id. 
at 748.  After Stanley began to use drugs, a pattern of behavior 
emerged:  "Stanley 
would 
beat 
Dingwall, 
then 
apologize 
profusely, and things would then return to 'normal' for a while 
until Stanley would fly into a rage again."  Id.  Stanley 
exhibited 
controlling 
behavior 
towards 
Dingwall, 
including 
stealing her EBT card, making it difficult to buy food.  Id.  
"Dingwall wanted to leave, but she felt that she had no other 
options."  Id. 
¶60 The abuse became worse when Stanley began using crack 
cocaine.  Id.  To get money for drugs, Stanley began robbing 
stores.  When he began to feel that he was "hot," he accused 
Dingwall of owing him money and pistol-whipped her when she was 
not able to come up with any.  Id.  Stanley then forced Dingwall 
                                                                                                                                                             
Seventh Circuit under similar circumstances.  See United States 
v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744, 746 n.1 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining 
that the Seventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 
"describe[d] 'coercion/duress' as when the defendant has proven 
that she committed the offense 'because [she was] coerced'; and 
'[t]o establish that [she] was coerced, [the] defendant must 
prove' fear of immediate death or serious injury if she did not 
commit the offense, and had no reasonable opportunity to refuse 
to commit the offense."  Seventh Circuit Pattern Crim. Jury 
Instr. § 6.08 (2020 ed.)). 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
to rob a convenience store, which she did.  Id.  Stanley did not 
hit her that night and was "nice" to her, which sent the message 
that "committing the crime as ordered was a way to avoid his 
abuse."  Id. 
¶61 This process repeated itself two more times until 
Dingwall was arrested and charged with three counts of robbery.  
Id. at 749.  However, she claimed that she committed the 
robberies under duress, in fear of violence at the hands of her 
boyfriend.  Id. at 745-46.  The district court denied Dingwall's 
claim and concluded that it was "not sufficient under existing 
circuit precedent, reasoning that even if Dingwall's evidence 
were credited, the duress requirements of imminence and of no 
legal alternatives could not be satisfied."  Id. at 750.  
¶62 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit joined numerous state 
courts, as well as the Sixth, Ninth, and District of Columbia 
Circuits in concluding that a victim of abuse may put forth a 
duress defense by producing expert testimony on battering and 
its effects.  Id. at 754.  In so doing, the Court rejected a 
"strict physical proximity test to establish a reasonable fear 
of imminent violence."  Id. at 757.  It reasoned that a jury 
could conclude that Stanley's pattern of abuse and manipulation 
demonstrated "an expectation of and level of control over 
Dingwall, even when physically separate" and that "Stanley's 
threats could have caused a reasonable person in Dingwall's 
situation to fear imminent violence."  Id. at 758.   
¶63 The Court also concluded that Stanley's continuous 
violence against Dingwall, contrasted with his being "nice" when 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
Dingwall did what he wanted, "showed a level of manipulation and 
a style of communication that could lead a reasonable person in 
her situation to have interpreted Stanley's demands and behavior 
as a threat of imminent violence unless she committed each 
robbery."  Id.  Likewise, the Court concluded that the repeated 
abuse and its psychological impact on Dingwall were factors that 
could be considered in determining whether she reasonably 
believed that she lacked an alternative to breaking the law.   
¶64 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district 
court and concluded that the evidence of battery and its effects 
was potentially relevant and sufficient to support a duress 
defense to the robbery charges.  Id. at 761.  In doing so, it 
recognized that victims of abuse and manipulation——like that 
experienced by trafficking victims——are able to utilize the 
traditional coercion/duress defense for most criminal defenses.   
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
2.  Coercion10 as a Defense to Murder under the Common Law 
¶65 "Stemming from antiquity, the [constant tradition] of 
Anglo-American common law is that duress never excuses murder, 
that the person threatened with his own demise 'ought rather to 
die himself, than escape by the murder of an innocent.'"  Joshua 
Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress:  Justifying the Excuse 
and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1331, 
1370 (1989) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, at *30).  In the seminal case, Regina v. Tyler, two 
men were on trial for the murder of a town constable.  Regina v. 
Tyler, [1837] 8 C.P. 616, 923.  The two men were followers of a 
revolutionary, a man named Thom.  Id.  Thom shot and stabbed the 
constable and, while the constable was still alive, ordered the 
                                                 
10 For purposes of the common law rule prohibiting the use 
of coercion as a complete defense to first-degree murder, courts 
historically have used the defenses of "coercion" and "duress" 
interchangeably.  See, e.g., Moes v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 756, 766, 
284 N.W.2d 66 (1979) (employing both terms and explaining that 
the obligation for the state to disprove an affirmative defense 
was not changed in 1955 when Wisconsin adopted the criminal 
code; Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 659 (Wyo. 2000) (citing 
Amin v. State, 811 P.2d 255, 260 (Wyo. 1991)) ("Coercion or 
duress has been recognized as a defense to criminal charges, 
other than a charge of taking the life of an innocent person.  
Coercion or duress must be present, imminent or impending, and 
of such a nature so as to induce a well-grounded fear of death 
or serious bodily harm if the otherwise criminal act is not 
done."); Frasher v. State, 260 A.2d 656, 661 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1970) (citing 1 Anderson Wharton's Criminal Law § 123, at 261) 
("[I]t is a defense as to all crimes except taking the life of 
an innocent person that the defendant acted under a compelling 
force of coercion or duress."); 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 107 
(2019) ("It is generally held that neither duress, coercion, nor 
compulsion are defenses to murder . . . ." (citations omitted)).  
Cf. People v. Heath, 255 Cal. Rptr. 120, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1989) (critiquing conflation of duress and necessity without 
comment on conflation between coercion and duress).   
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
13 
 
defendants to throw the constable into a ditch.  Id. at 923-24.  
Thom was later killed by the military and the defendants were 
arrested for their role in the constable's murder.  Id. at 924.  
¶66 At trial, the defendants argued that they complied 
with the order only "from a fear of personal violence to 
themselves at the hands of Thom."  Id. at 924.  Lord Denman, 
sitting in judgment for the Crown, concluded that this excuse 
must be "discard[ed,]" id. at 926, and these circumstances had 
"never been received by the law as an excuse for his crime, and 
the law is, that no man, from a fear of consequences to himself, 
has a right to make himself a party to committing mischief on 
mankind."  Id. at 925.   
¶67 Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that a 
man was not excused for murder, even when he was forced to do so 
at gunpoint.  Arp v. State, 12 So. 301, 302-03 (Ala. 1893).  In 
so concluding, the court traced the history of the common law's 
treatment of coercion as a defense to murder.  See id. at 302-
03.  The Court recognized that the authorities were conclusive 
that "at common law no man could excuse himself, under the plea 
of necessity or compulsion, for taking the life of an innocent 
person."  Id. at 303.  In keeping with the common law history, 
the Court upheld the conviction and reasoned that "the immediate 
necessity or compulsion under which he acted at the time [was] 
no excuse to him."  Id. at 304.   
¶68 Likewise, in recent history, the California Supreme 
Court has reaffirmed the prudence behind the common law's 
tradition by concluding that, "as in Blackstone's England, so 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
14 
 
today in California:  fear for one's own life does not justify 
killing an innocent person."  Anderson, 50 P.3d at 369.  In 
Anderson, the defendant, Anderson, and his accomplice, a man 
named Kiern, were convicted of murdering a camp counselor who 
had allegedly molested one of their children.  Id. at 370.  
According to Anderson, a large group of people, including 
himself and Kiern, had kidnapped the counselor, taken her out to 
a field, stripped her of her clothes, beat her, put duct tape 
over her mouth, and abandoned her.  Id.  Anderson and Kiern 
later saw the counselor going naked down the street.  Id.  The 
two grabbed her and forced her into the back of Kiern's car and 
drove away.  Id.   
¶69 Anderson testified that, after they had re-kidnapped 
the counselor and brought her back to the field, Kiern ordered 
him to get a nearby rock.  Id.  The defendant replied that Kiern 
was "out of [his] mind," to which Kiern responded, "Give me the 
rock or I'll beat the shit out of you."  Id.  Because of the 
physical disparities between himself and Kiern, the defendant 
testified to being scared that Kiern would "break [his] neck" if 
he did not comply.  Id.  Using the rock retrieved by Anderson, 
Kiern knocked the counselor unconscious and later the two killed 
her by dropping a small boulder on her head.  Id. 
¶70 At trial, Anderson, based primarily on his "testimony 
that Kiern threatened to 'beat the shit out of' him, [] 
contended on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury on duress as a defense to the murder charge."  
Id.  The California Supreme Court, in affirming the refusal to 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
15 
 
instruct the jury on defense, explained that the common law 
reasoning for the defense of duress for crimes is that "for 
reasons of social policy, it is better that the defendant, faced 
with a choice of evils, choose to do the lesser evil (violate 
the criminal law) in order to avoid the greater evil threatened 
by the other person."  Id. at 371 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, 
Criminal Law, § 5.3(b), at 467 (3d ed. 2000)).  However, this 
lesser of two evils rationale is "strained when a defendant is 
confronted with taking the life of an innocent third person in 
the face of a threat on his own life[.]"  Id. (quoting United 
States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 205 (9th Cir. 1991)).  "When 
the defendant commits murder under duress, the resulting harm——
i.e. the death of an innocent person——is at least as great as 
the 
threatened 
harm——i.e. 
the 
death 
of 
the 
defendant."  
Anderson, 50 P.3d at 371 (quoting LaFleur, 971 F.2d at 205).   
¶71 The Court concluded that the reasoning behind the rule 
that fear for one's own life does not justify killing an 
innocent person applies "as well to 19th-century California as 
to 
Blackstone's 
England." 
 
Anderson, 
50 
P.3d 
at 
374.  
Accordingly, 
it 
concluded 
that 
both 
the 
common 
law 
and 
California law prohibited duress from being a defense to murder.  
Id. 
¶72 In Wisconsin, the common law defense of coercion is 
codified in Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1) which provides: 
A 
threat 
by 
a 
person 
other 
than 
the 
actor's 
coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to 
believe that his or her act is the only means of 
preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the 
actor or another and which causes him or her so to act 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
16 
 
is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on 
that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-
degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime 
is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide. 
Section 939.46(1) explicitly confirms the common law rule that 
coercion is not a complete defense to first-degree intentional 
homicide.  In addition, the legislature has provided that a 
successful 
coercion 
defense 
may 
mitigate 
a 
first-degree 
intentional homicide to 2nd-degree.  Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(d).   
3.  Wisconsin Stat. § 939.46(1m) 
¶73 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.46(1m) follows the codification 
of the common law defense of coercion.  It provides, "A victim 
of a violation of s. 940.302(2) or 948.051 has an affirmative 
defense for any offense committed as a direct result of the 
violation of s. 940.302(2) or 948.051 without regard to whether 
anyone was prosecuted or convicted for the violation of 
s. 940.302(2) or 948.051."  § 939.46(1m).  The majority/lead 
asserts that it is "unclear" whether subsec. (1m) constitutes a 
coercion defense11 and determines that subsec. (1m) is ambiguous 
as to the question of whether it provides a complete defense to 
first-degree intentional homicide or merely mitigates it to a 
charge of second-degree.12  The majority/lead opinion further 
concludes that there are no extrinsic sources, including 
legislative history that can be used to resolve the ambiguity.13  
Accordingly, the majority/lead resorts to the rule of lenity to 
                                                 
11 Majority/lead op., ¶25. 
12 Id., ¶27.   
13 Id., ¶28.   
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
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conclude that subsec. (1m) provides the accused a complete 
defense to first-degree intentional homicide.14  I disagree and 
conclude that extrinsic factors direct us towards the conclusion 
that subsec. (1m) mitigates a charge of first-degree intentional 
homicide to a second-degree charge consistent with Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.46(1).   
¶74 The first question that must be answered is whether 
Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m) provides a coercion defense at all.  The 
majority/lead opinion asserts that "common law coercion is 
irrelevant to our analysis."15  As previously noted, subsec. (1m) 
is located under the section title, "Coercion."  And while the 
majority/lead is correct that "titles . . . are not part of the 
statutes[,]"16 they are "permissible indicators of meaning."  
State v. Lopez, 2019 WI 101, ¶41, 389 Wis. 2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 
125 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (quoting Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts, 221 (2012)).  Statutory titles may be used to 
resolve a doubt and confirm a statute's meaning.  Id., ¶¶26-29.  
Because we "presume that the legislature is aware of existing 
law when it passes a new statute[,]" we presume the placement of 
subsec. (1m) was not done accidentally or without prior thought.  
Prosser v. Leuck, 225 Wis. 2d 126, 150, 592 N.W.2d 178 (1999).  
"When the legislature adopts non-statutory language in titles, 
that language has meaning and reflects a decision of the 
                                                 
14 Id., ¶29. 
15 Id., ¶28 n.11.    
16 Id., ¶25 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6)). 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
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legislature."  Lopez, 389 Wis. 2d 156, ¶27.  See also  Scalia & 
Garner, supra, 327 (quoting James DeWitt Andrews, "Statutory 
Construction," in 14 American Law and Procedure 1, at 21-22 
(James Parker Hall & James DeWitt Andrews eds., rev. ed. 1948) 
("The title is adopted by the legislature.")). 
¶75 The availability of Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m) as a 
coercion defense is confirmed by the legislative history.  
Subsection (1m) was based, in part, on the model legislation 
compiled by the Polaris Project.17  A provision of the model 
legislation, included and referenced throughout the drafting 
materials, directed that legislatures to include the following 
section:   
VICTIM IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION 
In any prosecution of a person who is a victim of 
trafficking in persons, it shall be an affirmative 
                                                 
17 According to the document, 
The Model Elements of Comprehensive State Legislation 
to Combat Trafficking in Persons (Comprehensive Model 
Law) is divided into three sections:  1) Prosecution, 
2) Prevention 
of 
Trafficking, 
and 
3) Victim 
Protection.  Language in this model law draws from 
numerous 
sources, 
including:  A) the 
Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386; 
B) Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the 
Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-21; C) the Department of State's Model 
Anti-trafficking law, released March 12, 2003, D) the 
Department of Justice's Model State Anti-trafficking 
Criminal 
Statute, 
released 
July 
16, 
2004; 
and 
E) current 
proposed 
and 
previously 
enacted 
State 
Statutes related to combating human trafficking in 
various U.S. States.   
Drafting File, 2007 Act 116, Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wis.  
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
19 
 
defense that he or she was under duress [if defined 
under state law] and/or coerced [if defined under 
state law] into committing the offenses for which he 
or she is being subject to prosecution. 
This characterization of subsec. (1m) as a defense of coercion 
in the model legislation, coupled with the legislature's 
decision to place it within § 939.46 (titled "Coercion") is 
persuasive evidence that subsec. (1m) provides a coercion 
defense.   
¶76 Because coercion does not provide a complete defense 
to first-degree intentional homicide at common law and because 
Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m) is a coercion defense, the next question 
I must answer is whether subsec. (1m)'s language "clearly 
expresse[s]" and "leaves no doubt" of the legislature's purpose 
to abrogate the common law principle that coercion is not a 
complete 
defense 
to 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide.  
Fuchsgruber, 244 Wis. 2d 758, ¶25.  I conclude that § 939.46(1m) 
does not abrogate the common law. 
¶77 Initially, I note that the majority/lead opinion 
implicitly agrees that the language of Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m) 
does not expressly abrogate the common law by providing a 
complete defense to first-degree intentional homicide.  The 
majority/lead admits that it is "unclear" whether subsec. (1m) 
"would mitigate a first-degree intentional homicide charge to a 
second-degree one."18  This is hardly indicative that the 
language is a "clear, unambiguous and peremptory" abrogation.  
Maxey, 94 Wis. 2d at 399.   
                                                 
18 Majority/lead op., ¶25. 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
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¶78 Nelson v. Hansen, provides a helpful example of the 
type of language needed to abrogate the common law.  Nelson v. 
Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W.2d 251 (1960).  The common law 
rule addressed in Nelson was that an "owner was not liable for 
damages resulting from the vicious act of his dog unless he had 
prior knowledge of its vicious propensities . . . or the injury 
was attributable to some negligence [in the manner in which the 
owner kept his domestic animals]."  Id. at 113.  Furthermore, a 
domestic animal owner who neither (1) owned an animal that was 
known to be abnormally dangerous and (2) had reason to know was 
abnormally dangerous but which was likely to do harm unless 
controlled, "[was] liable for the harm done by such an animal 
only if he fail[ed] to exercise reasonable care to confine or 
otherwise control it, or the harm is of a sort which it is 
normal for animals of that class to do."  Id. at 113–14. 
¶79 In Nelson, we examined what effect Wis. Stat. ch. 174 
(1955-56) had on this common law rule.  See id. at 115.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 174.02 provided that:   
Owner's liability.  The owner or keeper of any dog 
which shall have injured or caused the injury of any 
person or property or killed, wounded or worried any 
horses, cattle, sheep or lambs shall be liable to the 
person so injured and the owner of such animals for 
all damages so done, without proving notice to the 
owner or keeper of such dog or knowledge by him that 
his dog was mischievous or disposed to kill, wound, or 
worry horses, cattle, sheep, or lambs. 
Id. at 113 n.1 (quoting § 174.02).  We concluded that the 
statute's language expressly provided that it was "dispens[ing] 
with the necessity of proving scienter in cases when the injury 
is done by a dog because of a mischievous trait or propensity."  
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
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Id. at 119.  Accordingly, because of the unambiguous overlap and 
clear applicability of the statute to an aspect of the common 
law rule on dog owner liability, we recognized that the section 
abrogated a portion of the common law.  Id.  We also concluded 
that because the elimination of scienter was in derogation of 
the common law, § 174.02 must be strictly construed.  Id. at 
119.   
¶80 Turning 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.46(1m), 
the 
clear 
expression of the legislature's desire to abrogate the common 
law is not present.  As the majority/lead concedes, common law 
coercion was not a defense to homicide.  The common law rule is 
clear:  coercion is not and has never been a complete defense to 
first-degree intentional homicide.   
¶81 The majority/lead opinion, by concluding that Wis. 
Stat. § 939.46(1m) provides a complete defense, ignores that 
subsec. (1m)'s text does not clearly express a complete defense 
to 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
majority/lead opinion is forced to rely on an absence of 
statutory text to make its conclusions.19  Accordingly, because 
the majority/lead's interpretation of subsec. (1m) provides a 
complete defense to first-degree intentional homicide, it 
abrogates 
the 
common 
law 
without 
the 
required 
level 
of 
legislative clarity and purpose; therefore, its interpretation 
of § 939.46(1m) is erroneous.  
D.  Statutory Interpretation 
                                                 
19 Id., ¶26. 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
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¶82 Finally, the last remaining question that I must 
answer is, "How should Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m) be interpreted if 
it cannot provide a complete defense?"  The State's argument, 
consisting of statutory cross-references, is grounded in the 
text and context of § 939.46(1m) and supports the common law 
rule that coercion is not a complete defense to first-degree 
intentional homicide.  Accordingly, I conclude that § 939.46(1m) 
has 
the 
potential 
to 
reduce 
the 
crime 
of 
first-degree 
intentional homicide to a charge of second-degree intentional 
homicide, as the statutory links I examine below show.   
¶83 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.01(1) is our first statute to 
consider.  It sets out the elements of first-degree intentional 
homicide. 
 
Section 
940.01(1) 
is 
linked 
to 
"Mitigating 
circumstances" in § 940.01(2).  
¶84 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 940.01(2), 
our 
second 
link, 
provides, "The following are affirmative defenses to prosecution 
under this section which mitigate the offense to 2nd-degree 
intentional homicide under s. 940.05."  Subsection 940.01(2) has 
various paragraphs, one of which is relevant to our discussion.   
¶85 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 940.01(2)(d), 
our 
third 
link, 
provides that first-degree intentional homicide is mitigated to 
second-degree homicide when, "Death was caused in the exercise 
of a privilege under s. 939.45(1)."  The question at this point 
in 
my 
examination 
of 
the 
context 
in 
which 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.46(1m) was placed is whether the trafficker's death was 
cause by Kizer's exercising a "privilege under s. 939.45(1)."  
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
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¶86 Accordingly, I move to the fourth link, Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.45, which provides, "The fact that the actor's conduct is 
privileged, although otherwise criminal, is a defense to 
prosecution for any crime based on that conduct.  The defense of 
privilege 
can 
be 
claimed 
under 
any 
of 
the 
following 
circumstances[.]" 
¶87 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.45(1) is the fifth link.  It 
provides, 
"(1) 
When 
the 
actor's 
conduct 
occurs 
under 
circumstances of coercion or necessity so as to be privileged 
under s. 939.46 or 939.47," the defendant can raise the defense 
of privilege "under [Wis. Stat.] § 939.46."  Here, Kizer claims 
a defense of privilege by raising § 939.46(1m), which as I 
explained above, and summarize below, involves coercion.  
¶88 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.46 is titled, "Coercion."  The 
majority/lead 
implies 
and 
I 
conclude 
that 
Kizer, 
as 
a 
commercially sex trafficked victim, was subjected to on-going 
coercion by her trafficker, whom she killed.  Therefore, she has 
alleged the required status of a coerced defendant to raise 
privilege under § 939.46 as a defense to prosecution for his 
homicide according to the directive of Wis. Stat. § 939.45(1). 
¶89 The sixth link in the legislature's statutory chain 
places us on Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m).  Section 939.46(1m) falls 
within Wis. Stat. § 939.45(1)'s general designation of § 939.46 
as a collective provision that does not limit § 939.46's use by 
subsection designation.  Therefore, § 939.45(1) includes the 
subsection at issue here, § 939.46(1m), to which coercion is a 
defense.   
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
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¶90 As I have explained in some detail earlier, at common 
law, coercion is not a complete defense to first-degree 
intentional homicide.  That continued when common law coercion 
was 
codified 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.46(1). 
 
In 
addition, 
§ 939.46(1) provided the potential to mitigate first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
to 
2nd-degree 
intentional 
homicide.  
Because the legislature did not clearly express an intent to 
abrogate 
the 
common 
law 
when 
it 
codified 
coercion 
in 
§ 939.46(1), but simply provided the potential to mitigate 
first-degree intentional homicide to 2nd-degree intentional 
homicide, employing § 939.46 as a collective provision at the 
directive of § 939.45(1) encompasses both §§ 939.46(1) and 
939.46(1m).    
¶91 "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶44.  In addition to the plain words of the text, "[c]ontext is 
important to meaning."  Id., ¶46.  Rather than in isolation, 
"statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is 
used; . . . in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes . . . ."  Id.  "Statutes are closely 
related when they are in the same chapter, reference one 
another, or use similar terms."  Reyes Fuerte, 378 Wis. 2d 504, 
¶27 (citing CC Midwest, Inc., 302 Wis. 2d 599, ¶24).  "[A] 
plain-meaning interpretation cannot contravene a textually or 
contextually manifest statutory purpose."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, ¶49.  Similarly, in "construing or interpreting a statute 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
25 
 
the court is not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words 
of the statute."  Id., ¶46.   
¶92 Apart from its derogation of the common law, the 
majority/lead's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m) also 
fails 
because 
it 
seeks 
to 
contravene 
a 
textually 
and 
contextually 
manifest 
interpretation. 
 
The 
majority/lead 
concludes that, based on the statute's context and comparisons 
to the language in other statutes, "a defense is complete as to 
first-degree intentional homicide unless the statute contains 
express language regarding mitigation."20  While comparisons to 
surrounding statutes are a permissible source of statutory 
context, they are not the only source.  "Statutes are closely 
related when they . . . reference one another[.]"  Section 
939.46(1m) is linked, through the cross-reference chain I 
describe above, to Wis. Stat. § 940.01 which lists affirmative 
defenses that mitigate a charge of first-degree intentional 
homicide to second-degree intentional homicide.   
¶93 Furthermore, 
the 
majority/lead's 
interpretation 
elevates the negative implication of Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m)'s 
text (the absence of explicit mitigation language) over its 
plain, objective meaning, as understood by the statutory cross-
references described above.  It is the text of the statute that 
controls——not the absence of text.21  By failing to read the 
                                                 
20 Id. (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46). 
21 See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 327 (2009) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that there is no authority for 
"a 
canon 
of 
interpretation 
that 
favors 
a 
'negative 
implication'. . . over clear and express statutory language."). 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
26 
 
statute reasonably, see Scalia & Garner, supra, 355, the 
majority/lead misses the forest for the trees and contravenes 
the textually and contextually manifest purpose of the statutory 
scheme enacted by the legislature.  Because both the text and 
context of § 939.46(1m) instruct me to do so, I conclude that 
§ 939.46(1m) has the potential to mitigate a charge of first-
degree intentional homicide to a charge of second-degree 
intentional homicide, rather than providing the perpetrator 
complete exoneration for the crime. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶94 In accord with the common law principle that coercion 
is not a complete defense to first-degree intentional homicide 
as well as the text and surrounding context of Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.46(1m), 
I 
conclude 
that 
§ 939.46(1m)'s 
trafficking 
defense, which is grounded in coercion, is not a complete 
defense to first-degree intentional homicide.  Rather, it comes 
within § 939.46(1) and has the potential to mitigate the charge 
of 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
to 
second-degree 
intentional homicide.  The majority/lead opinion errs because 
its interpretation of § 939.46(1m) abrogates the common law by 
making coercion a complete defense to first-degree intentional 
homicide and ignoring the context in which the legislature 
placed § 939.46(1m).  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
¶95 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice BRIAN HAGEDORN join this dissent. 
 
No.  2020AP192-CR.pdr 
 
 
 
1