Case Title: Noe v. Edmonds School Dist.

Citation: 515 P.2d 977, 83 Wash. 2d 97

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1973-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
83 Wn.2d 97 (1973) 515 P.2d 977 BILLIE NOE, Appellant, v. EDMONDS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 15, Respondent. No. 42726. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. November 15, 1973. LeSourd, Patten, Fleming & Hartung, by Leon C. Misterek and C. Dean Little, for appellant. Michelson, Rutter & Gallagher, by John E. Rutter, Jr., for respondent. STAFFORD, J. Appellant, Billie Noe, is a teacher employed by respondent, Edmonds School District No. 15. Her original contract of employment for the 1969-70 school year set forth an annual salary and provided that she would *98 perform "such duties as are prescribed by the laws of the State of Washington and by the policies, rules and regulations of the District ..." On May 28, 1970, her contract was renewed for the 1970-71 school year under the same terms, with a salary increment. On May 7, 1971, the superintendent of respondent school district and appellant's building principal had a private conference with appellant. In a letter bearing the same date, the superintendent and principal informed appellant that she was being placed on probation because, as the letter asserted, she had slapped one student across the face as a disciplinary measure in the 1969-70 school year and treated another similarly on April 30, 1971. The letter contended she had admitted the second incident at the conference. If the asserted incidents did occur, they would have been in violation of the district's rules on discipline. While the rules required teachers to maintain order and discipline, they authorized corporal punishment only when necessary for the preservation thereof. However, if administered by a teacher, corporal punishment was to be imposed in the presence of the principal and was not to be administered on or about a student's head. As indicated in the letter, appellant's probation period was to commence May 10, 1971, and to continue for one full year. During that year her salary would be reduced by 7 percent. Both the probation and the sanction of a salary reduction were imposed by the superintendent pursuant to a policy adopted by the board of respondent school district on September 8, 1970. The policy reads in part as follows: (Italics ours.) Billie Noe appealed to the Snohomish County Superior Court contending: (1) Respondent's probation policy violates RCW 28 A. 58.450 which requires that any decision adversely affecting a teacher's contract status must be made by the school district's board of directors following a prescribed notice and hearing. It was urged that the board's policy, authorizing the superintendent to take summary procedures regarding probation, failed to comply with RCW 28 A. 58.450. (2) Although RCW 28 A. 67.065 authorizes district boards to place teachers on probation, it does not authorize monetary sanction. (3) Based on the foregoing, appellant asserted her right to reinstatement, and to her full salary as provided by RCW 28 A. 58.450. She also requested reasonable attorney's fees and costs as provided by RCW 28 A. 58.490. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court held there was no genuine issue of material fact and awarded respondent's motion for summary judgment. Billie Noe appeals. Respondent contends that it properly enacted the challenged policy which authorized the superintendent of schools to summarily impose on teachers both probation and a monetary sanction of reduced salary. In support thereof it cites RCW 28 A. 58.110 which reads in part: and RCW 28 A. 58.100 which provides: (Italics in both quotations ours.) The foregoing statutes do not, however, provide the authority claimed by respondent. Although RCW 28 A. 58.110 grants boards of directors (hereinafter referred to as boards) the power to enact by-laws for government of the schools, the power is not unrestricted. The statute specifically provides that such by-laws shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this title (i.e., Title 28A). In the same vein, while RCW 28 A. 58.100 provides that boards may, for sufficient cause discharge certified employees and "fix, alter, allow and order paid their salaries," the authority is preceded by the admonition that boards possess such power "unless otherwise specially provided by law." Thus, neither statute provides an unfettered grant of power. The restrictions contained in each require us to turn to other provisions of title 28A to determine whether and to what extent a board's power is circumscribed. Two statutes contained in title 28A are particularly applicable. First, RCW 28 A. 58.450 sets forth the procedure which must be followed by a board of directors before a teacher can be "discharged or otherwise adversely affected in his contract status." In brief form, the essence of the procedure is as follows: Second, RCW 28 A. 67.065 pertaining to a board's power to place teachers on probation provides in part: (Italics ours.) *102 Respondent acknowledges that the policy, which authorizes the district superintendent to summarily place a teacher on probation and to impose a monetary sanction or penalty by means of a salary reduction, is not consistent with the provisions of RCW 28 A. 58.450 or RCW 28 A. 67.065. It asserts, however, that it was unnecessary to adhere to either statute because the board's policy, and the procedure employed thereunder, was a lawful delegation of mere ministerial or administrative duties. It is urged that the board's policy so circumscribed the superintendent's power that he was concerned only with the quantum of predetermined probation and monetary sanction. This, it is said, is to be differentiated from a board's discretionary acts that are nondelegable. We disagree. Even if we accept the questioned summary probation/salary sanction policy at face value, more has been delegated to the district's superintendent than mere ministerial or administrative acts. The superintendent is required to make the following decisions. By the terms of the questioned probation/salary sanction policy neither probation nor the 7 percent monetary sanction is mandated. The acts and decisions required of the superintendent, in imposing probation and/or the monetary sanction, are primarily discretionary rather than ministerial or administrative in nature. *103 [1, 2] School districts are municipal or quasi-municipal corporations. American Fed'n of Teachers Local 1485 v. Yakima School Dist. 7, 74 Wn.2d 865, 447 P.2d 593 (1968); Seattle High School Ch. 200 v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 424, 293 P. 994, 72 A.L.R. 1215 (1930). They are created by the legislature and can exercise only such powers as the legislature has granted in express words, or those necessary or fairly implied in, or incident to, powers expressly granted or those essential to the declared objects and purposes of such district. Seattle High School Ch. 200 v. Sharples, supra. Where a statute, which is the source of a municipal or quasi-municipal corporation's power, confers specific functions to particular officers or boards, such functions may not be delegated to others (Roehl v. PUD 1, 43 Wn.2d 214, 240, 261 P.2d 92 (1953)) unless the statute expressly authorizes such delegation to some other officer or body. Othello v. Harder, 46 Wn.2d 747, 752, 284 P.2d 1099 (1955). School districts are no exception to the rule. [3] Under title 28A the legislature has given school boards exclusive power to discharge, place on probation or otherwise adversely affect a teacher in his or her contract status.[1] For reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, discretionary duties specifically imposed upon the board by statute cannot lawfully be delegated to the superintendent either by direct board action or, as respondent seems to suggest, by negotiations with a professional organization under the guise of RCW 28 A. 72.030. Without question, RCW 28 A. 72.030 is broad in scope. Nevertheless, it does not, either directly or by implication, authorize a board to divest itself of powers and duties placed within its exclusive control by statute. While a delegation of power and duties can take place if authorized by legislature, there is no such grant here. [4] Turning next to the validity of the probation/monetary *104 sanction itself, we hold that the policy adopted by the board is invalid. Both RCW 28 A. 58.450 and RCW 28 A. 67.065 specifically circumscribe the power of boards (1) to take action that will adversely affect a teacher in his or her contract status and (2) to place teachers on probation. Neither statute grants boards power to use the type of summary procedure adopted by respondent. Neither authorizes boards to impose monetary penalties as an adjunct of the probation contemplated in RCW 28 A. 67.065. Further, neither RCW 28 A. 58.100 nor RCW 28 A. 58.110, as limited by RCW 28 A. 58.450 and RCW 28 A. 67.065, authorizes a school board to use disciplinary measures or procedures other than those provided in RCW 28 A. 58.450 and RCW 28 A. 67.065 for the purpose of discharge, probation, or for otherwise adversely affecting a teacher in his or her contract status. The board exceeded the power granted it by the legislature. Further, since the board itself lacked statutory power to follow a policy of summary procedure it could not delegate such power to the superintendent. The board's policy denied appellant notice and an opportunity to request a hearing before the imposition of probation and before her contract status was adversely affected. The policy violated RCW 28 A. 58.450 and RCW 28 A. 67.065. Since there was no original board hearing, it is impossible to have a hearing de novo as required by RCW 28 A. 58.480. Because of the lack of notice and opportunity for hearing, RCW 28 A. 58.450 directs that the appellant shall not be otherwise adversely affected in her contract status for the duration of the period May 10, 1971 to May 10, 1972. Foster v. Carson School Dist. 301, 63 Wn.2d 29, 385 P.2d 367 (1963). The trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for entry of a summary judgment in favor of appellant reflecting a return of the 7 percent salary reduction imposed from May 10, 1971 to May 10, 1972. Further, appellant is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee for the preparation *105 and prosecution of the appeal in superior court. RCW 28 A. 58.490,.500. The reasonable attorney's fee and taxable costs shall be set by the superior court. RCW 28 A. 58.490. HALE, C.J., and FINLEY, ROSELLINI, HUNTER, HAMILTON, WRIGHT, UTTER, and BRACHTENBACH, JJ., concur. Petition for rehearing denied January 8, 1974. [1] See Foster v. Carson School Dist. 301, 63 Wn.2d 29, 385 P.2d 367 (1963); Daly v. Shelton School Dist. 309, 3 Wn. App. 348, 475 P.2d 897 (1970); Lande v. South Kitsap School Dist. 402, 2 Wn. App. 468, 469 P.2d 982 (1970).