Case Title: Virginian-Pilot v. Dow Jones & Company

Citation: 

Docket Number: 091661

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Millette, and Mims, JJ., and 
Carrico and Russell, S.JJ. 
 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT MEDIA COMPANIES, LLC 
 
 
 
            OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 091661  
  SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
                                    September 16, 2010 
DOW JONES & COMPANY, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge 
 
 
This appeal presents two questions:  (1) whether a 
circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction to determine 
whether a newspaper meets the requirements of Code § 8.01-
324(A) for the publication of legal notices and to enter an ex 
parte order ruling on that subject, and (2) whether another 
newspaper has standing to intervene to assert the court’s lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
No material facts are in dispute and the appeal presents 
pure questions of law.  Dow Jones & Company, Inc. (Dow) is the 
publisher of a newspaper, the Wall Street Journal (the WSJ).  
Virginian-Pilot Media Companies, LLC, is the publisher of a 
newspaper, the Virginian-Pilot (collectively, the Pilot). 
 
On May 7, 2009, Dow filed in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Virginia Beach a “Petition for Authority to Publish 
Legal Notices and Other Legal Business Pursuant to Va. Code 
§ 8.01-324(A).”  The petition was ex parte and gave no notice 
to any others who might have an interest.  It recited that the 
WSJ met each of the five requirements of Code § 8.01-324(A):  
(1) it had a bona-fide list of paying subscribers, (2) it had 
been published and circulated at least once per week for 24 
consecutive weeks without interruption for the dissemination 
of news of a general legal character, (3) it had a general 
circulation in the area in which the notice is required to be 
published, (4) it was printed in English, and (5) it has a 
second-class mailing permit from the U.S. Postal Service. 
The petition asked for entry of an order granting the WSJ 
authority to publish legal notices and other legal business in 
the City of Virginia Beach.  Dow attached as exhibits to the 
petition copies of ex parte orders of a similar nature that it 
had secured in six other circuit courts in Virginia. 
 
On May 14, 2009, the circuit court entered an ex parte 
order authorizing the WSJ to publish “ordinances, resolutions, 
notices and advertisements required by law in the City of 
Virginia Beach.”  On June 4, 2009, the Pilot filed a “Motion 
to Intervene and to Set Aside Order.”  The court heard 
arguments of counsel for Dow and the Pilot and ruled that (1) 
it had subject matter jurisdiction and (2) the Pilot lacked 
standing to challenge the court’s jurisdiction because it 
could not show that it had any right germane to the proceeding 
or that it would suffer a cognizable legal injury arising out 
 
2
of the court’s order.  The court denied the motion to 
intervene and we awarded the Pilot an appeal. 
Analysis 
 
Code § 8.01-324 provides, in pertinent part: 
Newspapers which may be used for legal notices and 
publications. – A.  Whenever any ordinance, 
resolution, notice, or advertisement is required by 
law to be published in a newspaper, such newspaper, 
in addition to any qualifications otherwise required 
by law, shall: 
 
1.  Have a bona fide list of paying 
subscribers; 
 
2.  Have been published and circulated at least 
once a week for twenty-four consecutive weeks 
without interruption for the dissemination of news 
of a general or legal character; 
 
3.  Have a general circulation in the area in 
which the notice is required to be published; 
 
4.  Be printed in the English language; and 
 
5.  Have a second-class mailing permit issued 
by the United States Postal Service. 
 
B.  However, a newspaper which does not have a 
second-class mailing permit may petition the circuit 
court for the jurisdiction in which the newspaper is 
located for authority to publish ordinances, 
resolutions, notices or advertisements. 
 
 
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to 
adjudicate a class of cases or controversies.  Article III, 
Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia provides, in 
pertinent part:  ”The legislative, executive, and judicial 
departments shall be separate and distinct, so that none shall 
exercise the powers properly belonging to the others . . . .”  
Because of that basic constitutional principle, subject matter  
jurisdiction exists in the courts only when it has been 
 
3
granted by a constitution or statute.  In re: Commonwealth of 
Virginia, 278 Va. 1, 11, 677 S.E.2d 236, 240 (2009).  The lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and such 
jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court by the litigants.  
The lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any 
time.  Id. 
A judgment or order entered by a court that lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter is a nullity.  Morrison v. 
Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 169-70, 387 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1990);  
Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 765, 772, 43 S.E.2d 890, 
893 (1947); Barnes v. American Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 
705, 130 S.E. 902, 906 (1925). 
Dow argues that Code § 8.01-324(A) should be construed to 
confer upon the circuit courts authority to decide whether a 
newspaper meets that section’s requirements because circuit 
courts have broad jurisdiction over civil cases, courts are 
authorized by many statutes to order the publication of legal 
notices, and the courts must necessarily apply Code § 8.01- 
324(A) in order to determine what newspapers are appropriate 
for the publication of such notices.  Dow contends that, for 
those reasons, a circuit court’s authority to entertain a 
petition such as Dow’s arises by necessary implication. 
The short answer to Dow’s contention is that if the 
General Assembly had so intended, it knew how to include such 
 
4
a provision.  Code § 8.01-324(B), the first sentence of which 
is quoted above, expressly confers upon the circuit courts 
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a petition from a 
newspaper that lacks a second-class mailing permit for 
authority to publish legal notices.  Subsection (A) of that 
statute, with which we are here concerned, applies only to 
newspapers which, like the WSJ, “have a second-class mailing 
permit issued by the United States Postal Service.”  
Subsection (A) conspicuously lacks any such grant of 
jurisdiction to the circuit courts.  The General Assembly 
highlighted the distinction between the two subsections by 
separating them with the word “However.”  
Dow’s reading of Code § 8.01-324(A) requires us to add 
language to the statute that the General Assembly declined to 
employ.  We have consistently refused to engage in that 
enterprise.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Md., 269 Va. 303, 313, 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005) ("[c]ourts 
cannot 'add language to [a] statute the General Assembly has 
not seen fit to include'") (quoting Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 
266 Va. 593, 599, 587 S.E.2d 561, 564-65 (2003)).  The maxim 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies when mention of 
a specific item in a statute implies that omitted items were 
not intended to be included.  Turner v. Wexler, 244 Va. 124, 
127, 418 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1992).  “The question here is not 
 
5
what the legislature intended to enact, but what is the 
meaning of that which it did enact.  We must determine the 
legislative intent by what the statute says and not by what we 
think it should have said.”  Id. (quoting Carter v. Nelms, 204 
Va. 338, 346, 131 S.E.2d 401, 406-07 (1963)). 
We construe Code § 8.01-324(A) to lack any grant of 
subject matter jurisdiction to the circuit courts, in contrast 
to the express grant of jurisdiction made by the subsection 
that follows it.  Section 8.01-324(A) is not, as Dow contends, 
rendered meaningless or superfluous by that construction.  The 
purpose of Code § 8.01-324(A) is to set standards for the 
guidance of those charged with the responsibility of 
publishing legal notices in order to achieve the highest 
likelihood that fair notice will be given to parties in 
interest.  That subsection also provides a useful rule of 
decision in any litigation that may subsequently arise, in 
which the sufficiency of notice by publication is at issue. 
Dow contended, in response to the Pilot’s motion to 
intervene, that the Pilot lacked standing to challenge the 
circuit court’s jurisdiction or to intervene in the case.  The 
circuit court agreed with Dow’s position, holding that the 
Pilot “has not shown that it has or will suffer a cognizable 
legal injury arising out of the Order or that it has a right 
germane to this proceeding [and therefore the Pilot] lacks 
 
6
standing to challenge this Court’s jurisdiction . . . .”  Dow 
argues that the Pilot’s injury would only consist of a 
possible increase in competition, which would fall far short 
of an “immediate, pecuniary, and substantial interest in the 
litigation, [but would rather be] a remote or indirect 
interest,” citing Harbor Cruises, Inc. v. Corporation Comm., 
219 Va. 675, 676, 250 S.E.2d 347, 348 (1979) and its progeny. 
It is unnecessary to discuss the question of standing in 
the present case because a court’s orders, entered in a case 
over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction, “are 
absolute nullities, and may be impeached directly or 
collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, or in any 
manner; and may be declared void by every court in which they 
are called in question.”  Barnes, 144 Va. at 705, 130 S.E. at 
906.  “The lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised 
at any time during the proceeding, even by this Court sua 
sponte.”  Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 371, 514 S.E.2d 
153, 156 (1999).  “The point may be raised at any time, in any 
manner, before any court, or by the court itself.”  Humphreys, 
186 Va. at 772, 43 S.E.2d at 893.  The point may even be 
raised for the first time on appeal by the appellate court sua 
sponte.  Morrison, 239 Va. at 170, 387 S.E.2d at 756. 
We do not depart in any manner from our decisions on the 
subject of standing, but hold only that they are not relevant 
 
7
to the inquiry whether an order was entered by a court that 
lacked jurisdiction of the order’s subject matter. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we hold that the circuit court 
had no subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order in 
question here and that the order is, therefore, null and void.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court 
and vacate the order. 
Reversed and vacated. 
 
JUSTICE LEMONS, with whom JUSTICE KINSER joins, dissenting. 
 
 
For many years, this Court has held as one of its first 
principles that a party must have standing to bring a case to 
the Court for resolution.  That is, until today.  The majority 
states that “[i]t is unnecessary to discuss the question of 
standing in the present case because a court’s orders, entered 
in a case over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction, 
‘are absolute nullities, and may be impeached directly or 
collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, or in any 
manner; and may be declared void by every court in which they 
are called in question.’ ”  (Citing Barnes v. American 
Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705, 130 S.E. 902, 906 (1925)).  
I believe that the standing issue is dispositive and 
absolutely necessary to our consideration of this appeal.  
 
8
Additionally, by deciding the case, the majority actually does 
decide the standing question, albeit incorrectly.  The Pilot’s 
lack of standing is apparent and should operate to deny this 
Court the ability to hear its claim.  Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
After the circuit court entered an ex parte order 
authorizing the WSJ to publish legal notices, the Pilot filed 
a “Motion to Intervene and to Set Aside Order.” The circuit 
court denied the Pilot’s motion to intervene, finding that the 
Pilot lacked standing to challenge the court’s jurisdiction 
because “[i]t has not shown that it has or will suffer a 
cognizable legal injury arising out of the Order or that it 
has a right germane to this proceeding.” 
 
Standing is a dispositive issue on appeal; if a party 
lacks standing, this Court will not consider the merits of the 
case.  See Kuznicki v. Mason, 273 Va. 166, 176, 639 S.E.2d 
308, 312-13 (2007).  A stranger to an action may not intervene 
and assert a claim unless that claim is “germane to the 
subject matter of the proceeding.”  Rule 3:14.  “In order for 
a stranger to become a party by intervention, he must ‘assert 
some right involved in the suit.’ ”  Layton v. Seawall 
Enters., Inc., 231 Va. 402, 406, 344 S.E.2d 896, 899 (1986) 
(quoting William M. Lile, Lile’s Equity Pleading & Practice 91 
(3d ed. 1952)).  Rule 3:14 is a specific Rule enacted by this 
 
9
Court to govern the right of strangers to intervene.1  “[T]he 
Rule’s history includes a strong adherence to limiting 
intervention to those parties who are legitimately plaintiffs 
or defendants . . . because the nature of their claim includes 
some right that is involved in the litigation.”  Hudson v. 
Jarrett, 269 Va. 24, 34, 606 S.E.2d 827, 832 (2005).   
In Hudson, we held that the trial court erred in allowing 
a stevedoring company and its workers’ compensation insurance 
carrier to intervene in a personal injury action because their 
claim did not present a right involved in that proceeding; 
therefore, they “fail[ed] to meet these conditions [of the 
Rule].”  Id.  Similarly, in Eads v. Clark, we denied an 
attorney’s motion to intervene in an action to collect 
attorney’s fees from a former client, finding that he was 
merely a bystander to the action and that his claim for fees 
was not germane to the underlying proceeding.  272 Va. 192, 
196, 630 S.E.2d 502, 504 (2006). 
The same conclusion must be reached with respect to the 
Pilot’s claim here.  The Pilot argues that it is entitled to 
                     
1 Former Rule 3:19 was a law rule with language identical 
to former equity Rule 2:15. Former Rule 3:19 was repealed 
effective January 1, 2006, when Rule 3:1 became effective, 
providing that "[t]here shall be one form of civil case, known 
as a civil action." The provisions of former Rule 3:19 are now 
contained in present Rule 3:14.  See Eads v. Clark, 272 Va. 
192, 196 n.3, 630 S.E.2d 502, 504 n.3 (2006) (discussing Rule 
3:14 and its predecessor, former Rule 3:19). 
 
10
intervene “as a newspaper of general circulation,” “as a 
corporate citizen,” and under “due process, fairness, and 
comity.”  However, as a stranger to the action, the Pilot may 
not intervene unless it “assert[s] some right involved in the 
suit.”  Eads, 272 Va. at 196, 630 S.E.2d at 504.  Clearly, it 
is not enough that the Pilot may be adversely affected by 
WSJ’s competition.  A competitor’s business interests are not 
sufficient to establish a cognizable legal interest in a 
pending lawsuit.  The Pilot is unable to assert a cognizable 
legal right or claim germane to the subject matter of this 
proceeding.  Therefore, in accordance with our previous 
decisions, the circuit court correctly denied the Pilot’s 
motion to intervene for lack of standing. 
However, the majority disregards the issue of standing 
altogether, stating that because the circuit court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction, its Order is void ab initio.  
Quoting Barnes, the majority suggests that these orders “are 
absolute nullities, and may be impeached directly or 
collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, or in any 
manner; and may be declared void by every court in which they 
are called in question.”  144 Va. at 705, 130 S.E. at 906. 
While it is true that a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction may be raised at any time, either by a party or 
by a properly reviewing court sua sponte, it is a misreading 
 
11
of Barnes to conclude that a stranger to the action may 
challenge an order as void ab initio.  The right to attack the 
validity of a judgment is limited either to the parties 
themselves, the court, or to “those strangers who, if the 
judgment were given full credit and effect, would be 
prejudiced in regard to some pre-existing right.”  Evans v. 
Asphalt Roads & Mat’ls Co., 194 Va. 165, 174, 72 S.E.2d 321, 
326 (1952) (quoting 1 Abraham C. Freeman, A Treatise on the 
Law of Judgments § 319, at 636 (5th ed. 1925)).  The Pilot is 
neither a party to the original action, nor did it have the 
requisite standing to intervene.  Consequently, the Pilot has 
no standing to challenge the validity of the circuit court’s 
Order. 
 
The majority cites several cases to support the 
conclusion that any stranger may challenge a lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction; however, in each case, the parties were 
already properly before the court.  No case cited by the 
majority involved a challenge by a stranger not properly 
before the court. 
 
In Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 514 S.E.2d 153 
(1999), we considered whether the trial court had subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider the Attorney General’s 
petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the state 
comptroller to make monthly allowance payments to legislators. 
 
12
Two clerks to the Virginia House of Delegates and Senate of 
Virginia, whom the Attorney General sought to add as parties, 
challenged the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.   Id. at 
368, 514 S.E.2d at 155.  We held that the statute in question 
did not provide the court with the authority to hear the 
Attorney General’s petition.  Id. at 371, 514 S.E.2d at 156.  
We decided the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction in a 
context where it was clear that the party challenging 
jurisdiction had standing to do so.   
 
The majority also cites Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 
173, 387 S.E.2d 753, 758 (1990), where the defendant physician 
argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
to hear the plaintiff’s claim of malpractice.  We affirmed the 
trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  Just as in Early, 
the doctor challenging subject matter jurisdiction had 
standing and was properly before the court. 
 
Likewise, in Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 765, 771-
72, 43 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1947), we considered whether the trial 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict Humphreys 
of two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  
The issue of jurisdiction was raised by the Commonwealth, 
which had standing to raise it.  Id. 
Finally, Barnes involved a petition for attachment 
brought against O.O. and Laura Barnes, husband and wife, by 
 
13
American Fertilizer Company, a creditor of the husband.  144 
Va. at 696-97, 130 S.E. at 903.  The validity of American 
Fertilizer’s attachment depended on two prior divorce decrees 
to which the company was not a party.  Id. at 697-98, 130 S.E. 
at 904.  American Fertilizer argued that the divorce court 
exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction when it issued the 
decrees.  Id. at 705, 130 S.E. at 906.  While American 
Fertilizer was not a party to the divorce proceedings, as a 
creditor of the husband under loan agreements predating the 
divorce, it clearly had a pre-existing right that was 
adversely affected by the property settlement provisions of 
the divorce decrees granting the wife sole ownership of the 
husband's real property that would otherwise have been 
available under contractual and statutory creditor's rights to 
satisfy the husband’s debt.  Id. at 699-700, 130 S.E.2d 904. 
In explaining how the divorce court's jurisdiction was 
open for consideration in the subsequent attachment litigation 
initiated by American Fertilizer, this Court in Barnes used 
the language cited by the majority here, id. at 705, 130 
S.E.2d at 906, but the Court never suggested that the company 
lacked standing, nor did it find that the company was a 
stranger having no pre-existing right that was adversely 
affected by the decrees it argued were void.  Viewed in that 
light, the Court’s recitation that orders issued without 
 
14
subject matter jurisdiction are void ab initio and are 
potentially subject to attack by third persons did not 
expressly or impliedly hold that persons without standing can 
challenge prior orders collaterally, and did not abrogate the 
traditional limitation of such challenges to persons with pre-
existing rights adversely affected by the prior decree being 
attacked.  No case cited in Barnes involved a challenge by a 
person without such standing,2 and any broader implication of 
the language in Barnes is dicta. 
Moreover, in every opinion by this Court citing the 
aforementioned passage in Barnes, the party seeking to set 
aside an order as void ab initio had standing to present the 
issue to the court. 
Most recently, in Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402, 
649 S.E.2d 672, 678 (2007), the petitioner argued that the 
circuit court’s order dismissing his personal injury claim was 
void ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  We 
                     
2 See Shelton v. Sydnor, 126 Va. 625, 634, 102 S.E. 83, 87 
(1920) (dismissing petitioner’s direct attack on the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the lower court); Seamster v. 
Blackstock, 83 Va. 232, 235, 2 S.E. 36, 38 (1887) (judgment 
affecting land title in prior proceeding found without 
jurisdiction on claim of heirs who had been parties to the 
prior county court action); Wade v. Hancock, 76 Va. 620, 626 
(1882) (trial court order held beyond statutory jurisdiction 
on direct appeal by parties who participated in the case 
below); Neale v. Utz, 75 Va. 480, 488 (1881) (refusing to 
vacate the lien of a creditor’s judgment because the lower 
court had valid jurisdiction). 
 
15
agreed, finding that the “mode of procedure” utilized by the 
circuit court was unlawful, rendering the dismissal order 
void.  Id.  The case did not involve a challenge by a person 
without standing. 
The case of Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 364-65, 634 
S.E.2d 754, 760 (2006), involved a claim by the defendant 
doctor that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the 
patient-plaintiff’s nonsuit order.  We held that the 
plaintiff’s failure to provide notice to the defendant of a 
second nonsuit order did not deprive the trial court of 
jurisdiction to enter it.  Id. at 367, 634 S.E.2d at 761.  
Therefore, the trial court was incorrect in holding that order 
void ab initio.  Id.  The case did not involve a challenge by 
a person without standing.  
 
In Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51-53, 541 S.E.2d 549, 
551-52 (2001), we clarified the difference between orders 
which are void ab initio and those which are merely voidable.  
We held that the trial court’s nonsuit order was voidable and 
had to be challenged by the defendant within the 21 days that 
the trial court still had jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 1:1.  
Id.  The case did not involve a challenge by a person without 
standing. 
 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Smith, 230 Va. 354, 356, 
337 S.E.2d 278, 279 (1985), the defendant challenged this 
 
16
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, contending that the 
Commonwealth had no right to appeal the Court of Appeals' 
decision allowing the defendant's release on bond.  We held 
that our jurisdiction was valid because the Commonwealth was 
allowed to appeal a judgment of the Court of Appeals admitting 
a convicted defendant to bail. Id. at 360, 337 S.E.2d at 281.  
The case did not involve a challenge by a person without 
standing. 
 
The case of Watkins v. Watkins, 220 Va. 1051, 1054, 265 
S.E.2d 750, 752 (1980), involved a divorce proceeding where 
the husband argued that the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to enjoin him from disposing of certain shares of 
stock.  We agreed and held that the portion of the final 
decree enjoining the husband was void.  Id. at 1055, 265 
S.E.2d 753.  Again, the case did not involve a challenge by a 
person who did not have standing. 
 
In Leonard v. Boswell, 197 Va. 713, 719, 90 S.E.2d 872, 
876 (1956), we held that the trial court had subject matter 
jurisdiction in a partition suit and therefore had authority 
to appoint commissioners to act on behalf of the parties.  The 
case did not involve a challenge by a person who did not have 
standing.  
 
In Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Chalkley, 184 Va. 553, 558, 35 
S.E.2d 827, 829 (1945), a defendant company argued that the 
 
17
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
plaintiff’s claim.  We held that the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to determine the controversy because the statute 
clothed the Industrial Commission of Virginia with exclusive 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 569, 35 S.E.2d at 834.  The case did not 
involve a challenge by a person who did not have standing. 
Finally, in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Board of 
Supervisors, 160 Va. 11, 27, 168 S.E. 617, 620 (1933), the 
plaintiffs sued the surety for liability on bonds issued by 
the county treasurer.  The circuit court held that the surety 
was relieved from liability.  Id. at 26, 168 S.E. at 620.  We 
reversed and held that the circuit court’s order was “void and 
ineffective” because circuit court was without power or 
jurisdiction to enter the order.  Id. at 47, 168 S.E. at 627. 
Again, the case did not involve a challenge by a person who 
did not have standing. 
This Court has cited Barnes eight times regarding 
standing, and on each occasion the party asserting a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction was properly before the court. No 
case involved a stranger’s challenge to subject matter 
jurisdiction similar to the Pilot’s claim before us here. 
 
Additionally, in Evans, we held that a person without 
standing could not challenge a divorce decree because he had 
no interest in the proceeding when judgment was entered.  194 
 
18
Va. 165, 177, 72 S.E.2d 321, 328 (1952).  Evans involved a 
workers compensation action brought after an employee was 
killed in an accident arising out of his employment.  Id. at 
167, 72 S.E.2d 322.  A child from the employee’s first 
marriage and the child’s mother argued that the employee’s 
divorce was “void for lack of jurisdiction.”  Id. at 169, 72 
S.E.2d at 323.  The lower court agreed, finding that only that 
child was entitled to compensation.  Id.  The employee’s 
second wife appealed, and we held that the decree was not 
susceptible to attack by the child or his mother.  Id. at 177-
78, 72 S.E.2d at 328.  “It seems clear that none of the 
appellees had any extant right that was prejudiced in the 
proceedings,” and therefore “have not shown that they . . . 
would be permitted to make a collateral attack on the decree.”  
Id. 
 
In George v. King, 208 Va. 136, 137, 156 S.E.2d 615, 616 
(1967), a husband argued that his wife’s decree of divorce 
from her former husband was “void for want of jurisdiction.”  
The husband sought an order declaring his subsequent 
“marriage” to the plaintiff to be a nullity.  Id.  On appeal, 
we held that the husband had no standing to attack the wife’s 
divorce decree because he “had no pre-existing interest to be 
adversely affected by the divorce decree.”  Id. at 139, 156 
S.E.2d at 617.  We held that in order for the husband to be 
 
19
able to attack the former decree, “it must appear that he had 
a legally protected interest which was adversely affected by 
the decree.”  Id. at 138, 156 S.E.2d at 616-17 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
Legal treatises on the issue are in accord with Evans and 
George.  As one author explains, “[a]s a general rule, a 
judgment will not be vacated or set aside at the motion of a 
third person, not a party to the action.”  1 Henry C. Black, A 
Treatise on the Law of Judgments § 317, at 481 (2d ed. 1902).  
However, such strangers may, in limited circumstances, 
challenge the judgment if they show “a real and substantial 
interest” in voiding the judgment.  Id. § 260, at 391.  
[I]n the case of strangers to the litigation, it 
is not every one who may impeach the judgment in 
a collateral proceeding.  The law does not permit 
wanton or unnecessary attacks upon its judgments, 
and they will stand as valid against any third 
person who fails to show that he has a real and 
substantial interest in avoiding the judgment, 
and one which the law is bound to protect.  As 
the cases express it, the rule against collateral 
attacks upon judgments does not apply to such 
third persons or strangers to the record as would 
be prejudiced in regard to some pre-existing 
right if the judgment were given full effect. 
Id.  That rule is echoed in a similarly authoritative work, 
which states, “To permit third persons to become interested 
after judgment, and to overturn adjudications to which the 
original parties made no objection, would encourage 
litigation, and disturb the repose beneficial to society.”  
 
20
1 Freeman, Law of Judgments § 258, at 521.  A stranger will be 
allowed to impeach a judgment only if giving the judgment full 
credit and effect would prejudice that person or entity “in 
regard to some pre-existing right.”  Id. at § 319, at 636. 
 
Therefore, the circumstances in which a stranger may 
challenge a void judgment are much narrower than the majority 
would hold.  Such attack is not available to any person, but 
only those who can show they would be prejudiced in regard to 
some pre-existing right if the judgment were given full 
effect. 
The effect of the majority holding in this case is truly 
far reaching.  Pursuant to the majority holding, a person in 
Roanoke learning by newspaper account of a judgment rendered 
by the Circuit Court of the County of Fairfax could intervene 
in the appeal of the matter to the Supreme Court of Virginia 
for the sole purpose of asserting lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, even though that person had no interest 
whatsoever in the merits of the case.  This has never been the 
law in Virginia. 
The concurring opinion recites the difficulty that is 
faced in this case.  The old adage “hard cases make bad law” 
comes to mind.  Often the phrase “judicial restraint” is used 
without proper definition.  The phrase embraces both 
substantive and procedural content.  This dissent is not the 
 
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place for an extended discussion of the concept. However, the 
concept includes the well-established principle that the 
proper role of courts is to reject involvement in cases where 
it is clear that a party has no standing to bring the cause to 
the court.  We often chastise counsel and lower courts for 
violating established rules.  It is unwise for us to 
demonstrate a lack of the restraint we have often held as 
appropriate to our role. Unfortunately, the majority and the 
concurring opinions have done so in this case. 
Whether consideration of this case involves “plucking it 
from thin air” may be rhetorically interesting, but it surely 
involves an illegitimate exercise of appellate review.  The 
Pilot has no standing and we should not violate our rules to 
reach the underlying question in this case. 
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and the 
judgment of this Court. 
 
 
JUSTICE MIMS, with whom SENIOR JUSTICE CARRICO joins, 
concurring. 
 
This case presents a procedural Gordian knot:  the 
appellant has no standing, the appellee has no standing, the 
circuit court had no authority, and its order is void.  In my 
view, the facts and prior proceedings compel the result 
reached by the majority opinion, in which I concur. 
 
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The circuit court exceeded its statutory and 
constitutional authority.  Va. Const. art. VI, § 1.  Code 
§ 8.01-324(A) authorizes neither entry of the order dated May 
14, 2009 nor Dow’s underlying ex parte petition.  Thus, the 
putative order must be a nullity. 
The dissenting opinion would leave this glaring error by 
the circuit court uncorrected because the Pilot has no 
standing to challenge it, either in this Court or below.  
While the dissenting opinion capably recites the requirements 
our precedents establish for intervention in lawful, 
adversarial proceedings, none of those precedents address the 
double dilemma posed by this case.  Dow sought to proceed ex 
parte, therefore there was no adversary to contest its factual 
allegations or legal arguments, and, dispositively, the action 
Dow brought had no lawful foundation.∗ 
 
                     
∗ The General Assembly permits parties to proceed ex parte 
and courts to hear such proceedings in certain cases.  E.g., 
Code § 8.01-217 (providing ex parte proceedings to change a 
person’s name).  Obviously, such lawful ex parte proceedings 
are not implicated in this case.  But the fact that Dow sought 
to proceed ex parte, without any adversary, amplifies the 
difficulty of imagining any entity that properly could 
challenge the order in this case under the standard the 
dissenting opinion would impose.  If the Pilot lacks the 
required standing, what hypothetical party could possess it?  
Fortunately, this question is irrelevant since no party – 
including Dow – has standing in an action that has no lawful 
foundation. 
 
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We often have said that “in an appellate proceeding this 
court sits to review and to correct errors of lower courts.”  
E.g., Rountree v. Rountree, 200 Va. 57, 63, 104 S.E.2d 42, 47 
(1958); Bissell v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 397, 400, 100 S.E.2d 
1, 3 (1957).  While that role does not empower us to scan the 
horizon for error or to ignore statutes, our prior decisions, 
or our Rules, it long has been established that putative 
orders such as the one entered by the circuit court in this 
case “may be declared void by every court in which they are 
called in question,” Barnes v. American Fertilizer Co., 144 
Va. 692, 705, 130 S.E. 902, 906 (1925), “even by this Court 
sua sponte.”  Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 371, 514 
S.E.2d 153, 156 (1999). 
We did not reach out and pluck this case from thin air.  
The error was made known to us through a petition for appeal.  
Whether this petitioner was the proper one to assign the 
error, we cannot look the other way once it is manifest.  In a 
case such as this, where no party had a right to proceed, no 
court had authority to act, and no valid order could be 
entered, our inaction would make this Court accomplice to a 
lower court’s exercise of jurisdiction contrary to the 
constraints constitutionally placed on the judicial branch by 
the legislative. 
 
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I do not believe the result in this case will invite 
outside parties to challenge orders in subsequent cases 
unadvisedly.  As stated, our action today arises from peculiar 
circumstances:  an ex parte proceeding brought by a party who 
had no statutory right of action before a court that had no 
jurisdiction to hear it.  Thankfully that is not a common 
occurrence in the Commonwealth. 
 
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