Case Title: In Re Kraushaar

Citation: 258 Kan. 772

Docket Number: 74,367

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1995-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
258 Kan. 772 (1995)
In the Matter of STEVEN A. KRAUSHAAR, Respondent.
No. 74,367

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 8, 1995.
Stanton A. Hazlett, deputy disciplinary administrator, argued the cause, and Bruce E. Miller, disciplinary administrator, and Marty M. Snyder, deputy disciplinary administrator, were with him on the formal complaint for the petitioner.
John J. Ambrosio, of Topeka, argued the cause for the respondent, and Steven A. Kraushaar, respondent, argued the cause pro se.
ABBOTT, J.:
This original proceeding in discipline was filed by the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against Steven A. Kraushaar, respondent, a Marysville attorney who is the Marshall County Attorney, alleging multiple violations of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC).
The respondent stipulated to the controlling facts and specific violations as set forth in Counts II, III, and IV of the formal complaint. Count I was dismissed by the Disciplinary Administrator.
COUNT II
In early 1990, while county attorney of Marshall County and having a statutory duty to prosecute child in need of care cases, respondent contacted a Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) employee who was conducting an investigation of a mother for possible neglect of her two children. Respondent informed the SRS employee he represented the mother and appeared with the mother as her attorney at a meeting with the SRS employee representing the mother's interests in the child in need of care investigation.
Respondent stipulated that a conflict existed because he was county attorney and had a statutory duty to prosecute child in need of care cases and represented a client who was being investigated for possible neglect of her children by SRS, all in violation of *773 MRPC 1.7(a) (1994 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 313) (the conflict of interest rule).
COUNT III
Respondent also stipulated he violated MRPC 3.5(d) (1994 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 354), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in undignified or discourteous conduct degrading to a tribunal.
Respondent stipulated that he had engaged in the following conduct:
A. Appearing in court in blue jeans, a torn shirt, and filthy.
B. Announcing to participants in litigation outside of the courtroom that he hoped the matter before the court would be concluded soon because he wanted to get drunk.
C. Discussing his sexual needs during a conference in chambers with Judge Elizabeth Carleen and defense counsel present.
D. During a hearing, jumping over the railing that separates the courtroom from the area for the seating of spectators and witnesses.
E. Making the statement during a sentencing that he did not care what the court did in response to a question from the court about the respondent's recommendation for sentencing.
COUNT IV
The respondent, while county attorney, refused to file a child in need of care action at the request of the stepfather of a client who was terminally ill unless he was paid $1,000. The district court judge appointed a local attorney as special prosecutor (after the client's death), who handled the child in need of care action.
Respondent stipulated that his demand he be paid $1,000 before he would file a child in need of care case violated MRPC 8.4(g) (1994 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 379), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on his or her fitness to practice law, and further violated K.S.A. 19-705, which reads:
MITIGATION
The hearing panel found the following matters in mitigation:
a. Absence of prior disciplinary record.
b. Absence of dishonest or selfish motives.
c. Inexperience in the practice of law.
d. Remorse.
e. Acceptance of responsibility for his acts.
The hearing panel recommended that respondent be disciplined by public censure and that he appear in open court and personally apologize to Judge Elizabeth Carleen for his conduct. The office of the Disciplinary Administrator recommends that this court accept the recommendation.
All members of the court view respondent's conduct as being more egregious than conduct where published censure is imposed. A majority of the court concludes that respondent's violations are a severe breach of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, but the violations are not of the kind and character that would warrant suspension from practice or disbarment.
IT IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT that the imposition of discipline against Steven A. Kraushaar be and hereby is suspended, and he is placed on probation for 2 years from the date of this opinion.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent not violate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and that in addition to meeting his CLE requirements, he shall attend the 2-hour ethics program designed for county and district attorneys at both the 1996 spring meeting (to be held in Lawrence, Kansas) and 1996 fall meeting (to be held in Wichita, Kansas) of the Kansas County and District Attorneys Association. Respondent shall furnish the Disciplinary Administrator with proof of attendance.
*775 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent appear in open court and personally apologize to Judge Elizabeth Carleen for the conduct respondent stipulated to in Count III and furnish to the Disciplinary Administrator, at respondent's expense, a transcript of the apology.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event respondent fails to abide by the conditions set forth herein, a show cause order will issue to respondent and this court will take whatever disciplinary action it deems just and proper without further formal proceedings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order be published in the official Kansas reports and that respondent pay the costs of these proceedings.
SIX, J., dissenting:
I would impose the sanction of suspension from the practice of law for 1 year.
Steven A. Kraushaar worked 1 year in the Kansas City area after receiving his undergraduate degree before enrolling in law school. He graduated from law school in May 1985. Kraushaar entered private practice with a firm in Chanute, Kansas, where he remained for 6 months. Kraushaar learned of an opening in Marysville, Kansas, in the office of Kenneth Moses. He started practicing in Moses' office either in December of 1985 or January of 1986. He worked with Moses until Moses retired in 1989. At the time of the conduct described in Counts II and IV (1990), he knew of the option to contact the Attorney General's office or the county commissioners to ask for appointment of a special prosecutor. He had done that before but would "always get a lot of flack when [he hired] a special prosecutor because it's paid by the county funds, [and] the commissioners don't like it." He has been Marshall County Attorney since 1986.
I now turn to the allegations of the formal complaint admitted by Kraushaar.
COUNT II
The substance of Kraushaar's admissions under this count has been stated in the majority opinion.
*776 COUNT III
COUNT IV
As county attorney, Kraushaar was the chief law enforcement officer of Marshall County when he committed the actions he has admitted are disciplinary violations. His license to practice law qualified him for the office. The license and the office require a high standard of conduct in order to preserve the public trust in the profession and respect for our system of justice. In re Diehl, 243 Kan. 580, 582, 757 P.2d 732 (1988).
We have imposed suspensions for 1 year in two cases filed this date, In re Geeding, 258 Kan. 740, ___ P.2d ___ (1995), and In re Eastepp, 258 Kan. 766, ___ P.2d ___ (1995). See also In re *778 Gershater, 256 Kan. 512, 886 P.2d 343 (1994), and In re Carson, 252 Kan. 399, 845 P.2d 47 (1993), for two of our numerous 1-year suspension cases. We have also imposed a 1-year suspension in In re Wood, 247 Kan. 219, 221, 794 P.2d 660 (1990) (the panel's unanimous recommendation was public censure), and in In re King, 253 Kan. 444, 451, 855 P.2d 963 (1993) (one panel member recommended public censure).
I am unable upon review of Kraushaar's admissions under Count IV to impose any sanction less than suspension for 1 year. Kraushaar, as county attorney, told two persons (Perez and Boyda) on separate occasions that he would not file a child in need of care case unless he was paid $1,000. See K.S.A. 19-705.
Kraushaar admitted violating MRPC 8.4(g) (1994 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 379) (Count IV). His conduct adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law. In addition, he violated K.S.A. 19-705 (no fees are to be received by a county attorney, except as are allowed by law, for any prosecution or official business). A portion of the MRPC 8.4 commentary states:
The Count III admissions of discussing his sexual needs in chambers when appearing before District Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Carleen and also commenting to participants in litigation that he hoped the matter would be concluded soon because he wanted to get drunk compound Kraushaar's situation.
McFARLAND, C.J., and DAVIS, J., join the foregoing dissenting opinion.