Case Title: State v. McCullough

Citation: 

Docket Number: S056910

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2009-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: December 10, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent
on Review,
v.
ROY LEE MCCULLOUGH, JR., 
aka Roy Lee McCullough, Sr.,
Petitioner
on Review.
(CC
060834514; CA A134505; SC S056910)
En Banc
On review from
the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and
submitted September 15, 2009.
Kenneth A.
Kreuscher, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief
for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief
Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
Patrick M.
Ebbett, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief
for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney
General, and Jerome Lidz, Solicitor General.
BALMER, J.
The decision of
the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal from
Multnomah County Circuit Court, Janice R. Wilson, Judge. 224 Or App 177, 197
P3d 1151 (2008).
BALMER, J.
This case involves the construction
of the statute that defines the crime of hindering prosecution.  That statute,
ORS 162.325(1), which we set out in full below, makes it illegal to engage in certain
acts intended "to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or
punishment of a person who has committed a crime punishable as a felony." 
The question is whether ORS 162.325(1) can be applied to a father (defendant) who
provided money and an airline ticket to his son (youth) so that youth could
flee to the Philippines.  Youth had been on probation after he had been found
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for committing third-degree
assault.  In anticipation of the possible revocation of youth's probation for
unacceptable behavior in his treatment program, defendant sought to assist
youth in fleeing the state to avoid assignment to a juvenile correctional
facility.  A jury subsequently convicted defendant of hindering prosecution.  Defendant
appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion.  State v.
McCullough, 224 Or App 177, 197 P3d 1151 (2008).  We allowed defendant's
petition for review and now conclude that ORS 162.325(1) applies when an
individual interferes with the apprehension of a juvenile who has been found
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for engaging in conduct
punishable as a felony.  
The facts are undisputed.  As previously
noted, defendant is youth's father.  Youth was found to be within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court for engaging in conduct constituting assault
in the third degree, ORS 163.165, a Class C felony.  He was given probation and
placed in a treatment program.  Later, youth violated his conditions of probation
when he was discharged from the treatment program for behavioral problems.  In
response, youth's juvenile probation officer scheduled a meeting with defendant
and youth to discuss the possibility of placing youth in a juvenile correctional
facility.  To avoid the possibility that his son might be sent to such a
facility, defendant formulated a plan to send him to the Philippines to live
with defendant's wife (youth's stepmother).  Accordingly, defendant made an
airline reservation for youth and assisted youth in obtaining an expedited
passport.  Defendant also gave youth traveling money and drove him to the
airport.  The probation officer, suspecting that defendant might assist youth
in fleeing the jurisdiction, had notified Port of Portland police.  The
probation officer also sought and obtained a felony arrest warrant for youth.  Police
later took defendant and youth into custody at the airport when youth attempted
to check in for his flight.
Defendant was charged with hindering
prosecution under ORS 162.325(1), and the case was tried to a jury.  At the
close of the state's evidence, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal,
arguing that ORS 162.325(1) does not proscribe assisting a juvenile offender in
attempting to evade juvenile court proceedings.  In the alternative, defendant
argued that ORS 162.325(1) applies only to efforts to hinder felony prosecutions
but does not apply to the hindrance of subsequent probation-violation
proceedings.  The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted
defendant of violating ORS 162.325(1).  As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion.  Defendant then filed a petition for review, which we allowed.
ORS 162.325(1) provides:  
"A person commits the crime of hindering prosecution
if, with intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or
punishment of a person who has committed a crime punishable as a felony, or
with the intent to assist a person who has committed a crime punishable as a
felony in profiting or benefiting from the commission of the crime, the person:
"(a) Harbors or conceals such person; or
"(b) Warns such person of impending
discovery or apprehension; or
"(c) Provides or aids in providing such
person with money, transportation, weapon, disguise or other means of avoiding
discovery or apprehension; or
"(d) Prevents or obstructs, by means of
force, intimidation or deception, anyone from performing an act which might aid
in the discovery or apprehension of such person; or
"(e) Suppresses by any act of concealment,
alteration or destruction physical evidence which might aid in the discovery or
apprehension of such person; or
"(f) Aids such person in securing or
protecting the proceeds of the crime."
It is undisputed that youth engaged in conduct described in
ORS 163.165(1)
as third-degree assault -- a felony -- and that, as a result of that conduct,
he was found to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  It also is
undisputed that defendant provided youth with money and transportation as part
of a plan to help youth flee the jurisdiction and avoid possible incarceration
in a juvenile correction facility as a penalty for his probation violation.  The
only question is a legal one, specifically, the meaning of the first paragraph
of ORS 162.325(1) and its application to the facts of this case.
It is helpful to review briefly the
historical background of the crime of hindering prosecution.  At common law, the
analogous crime was known as accessory after the fact.  Accessories after the
fact, like accessories before the fact, were punished according to the
liability of the principal.  4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England 39 (1769).  An accessory after the fact had to know of the
commission of the felony.  Id. at 37.  The accessory could be liable for
providing even minimal assistance to the felon.  See id. at 37-38
("[A]ny assistance whatever given to a felon, to hinder his being
apprehended, tried, or suffering punishment, makes the assistor an accessory."). 
Also, one could not be an accessory to a misdemeanor, only to a felony.  Id.
at 37.
Oregon's early criminal statutes largely
followed the common law, and the standard for liability was substantially the
same as at common law:  "All persons who, after the commission of any
felony, conceal or aid the offender, with knowledge that he has committed a
felony, and with intent that he may avoid or escape from arrest, trial,
conviction or punishment, are accessories."  General Laws of Oregon, Crim
Code, ch LIII, § 692, p 573-74 (Deady 1845-1864).  As was the case at common
law, one who assisted a person who had committed a misdemeanor could not be
punished as an accessory.  Id. at § 693, p 574.  However, an accessory
after the fact could be indicted, tried, and punished, whether or not the
principal was indicted or tried.  Id. at ch VIII, § 91, p 456-57.  Oregon
further departed from the common law by providing a specific range of penalties
rather than tying the accessory's punishment to the principal's punishment.  Id.
at ch LIII, § 694, p 574.  On the eve of the 1971 revision of Oregon's criminal
law, those principles had changed little.  See former ORS 161.230
(1969), repealed by Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 432 (defining accessory); former
ORS 161.240 (1969), repealed by Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 432 (describing
punishment); former ORS 161.250 (1969), repealed by Or Laws 1971,
ch 743, § 432 (accessory punishable even if principal not tried).(2)
ORS 162.325 was adopted as part of the
1971 revision of Oregon's criminal code and has not been amended since.  See
Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 207 (adopting statute).  The 1971 statute changed
the description of the crime of assisting a person who has committed a felony
from its previous focus on a principal/accessory relationship to the more
general concept of hindering the prosecution of another person.  The revision replaced
the requirement that assistance occur "after the commission of any felony"
with the requirement that the person assisted be one "who has committed a
crime punishable as a felony."  And it changed the requirement that the accessory
have actual knowledge of the felony, instead requiring proof of the aider's
"intent to hinder" certain aspects of the law enforcement process. 
Finally, the object of the aider's intent was changed from helping the offender
to "avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment" to
"hinder[ing] the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment"
of the offender.(3)
Having sketched some of the history
of the elements of the crime of hindering prosecution, we turn to defendant's
first argument -- that ORS 162.325(1) does not apply to acts undertaken to
hinder juvenile proceedings, but applies only to acts undertaken to hinder criminal
proceedings.  If the legislature had intended ORS 162.325(1) to apply to
juvenile proceedings, defendant asserts, it easily could have identified juvenile
proceedings by use of an alternative phrase or wording.  Defendant argues that,

"if the legislature had wanted to capture the hindrance
of non-criminal juvenile matters, it would have used the phrase 'official
proceeding' (as it did in other contextual statutes) or by writing [some
reference to] juvenile proceedings into the law (as it did in other
governmental administration offenses and as other states have done in their hindering
prosecution statutes)."  
In addition, defendant argues that youth was not a
"person who has committed a crime," ORS 162.325(1), because the law
did not authorize a "sentence" of imprisonment for youth's conduct, precisely
because he was a youth.  See ORS 419C.411 (juvenile adjudications
authorize dispositions rather than sentences).  Finally, defendant argues that
the terms that the legislature used in describing the required intent -- or, at
least the terms "prosecution," "conviction," and
"punishment" -- describe events that take place in criminal
proceedings but not juvenile proceedings.  Thus, he argues, the legislature demonstrated
its intent that the statute apply only to the hindrance of criminal
proceedings. 
We begin by examining the wording of
the hindering prosecution statute.  As noted, ORS 162.325(1) provides that
"[a] person commits the crime of hindering prosecution if, with intent to
hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of a person who
has committed a crime punishable as a felony," the person engages in
certain conduct.  That key sentence first announces the subject matter of the
provision, and then states that the actor must possess the intent to hinder
particular actions that represent governmental interests in criminal law
enforcement, namely, "the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or
punishment of a person."  
Next, ORS 162.325(1) refers to "a
person who has committed a crime punishable as a felony."  It appears that
with those words, the legislature intended to adopt the common-law principle
discussed above, which limits criminal liability to situations where the actor
assists someone who has committed a crime more serious than a misdemeanor.  Significantly,
the legislature did not use the past participle "punished," which would
have suggested a requirement that the person whom the actor is aiding engage in
conduct and subsequently be subjected to felony punishment for that conduct.  The
legislature's use of the term "punishable" instead makes it clear
that actual prosecution or conviction is not an element of the crime.  Indeed,
a separate statute provides, "It is no defense to a prosecution for
hindering prosecution * * * that the principal offender is not apprehended,
prosecuted, convicted or punished."  ORS 162.345.  Hindering prosecution
is unlawful if the crime is punishable -- i.e., capable of being punished
-- as a felony.  
Moreover, ORS 162.325(1) focuses not
on whether the person who committed the crime will be or has been
punished for a felony, but on whether the crime is "punishable as a
felony."  ORS 161.515(1), in turn, provides, "A crime is an offense
for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized."  (Emphasis added.)  ORS
161.505 defines the term "offense" as "conduct for which
a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine is provided by any law of
this state * * *," (emphasis added), and "conduct" means an act
(or omission) accompanied by a mental state.  ORS 161.085(4).  Accordingly, Oregon
statutes define the word "crime" as an act or omission and its
accompanying mental state, for which a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed. 
The legislature's focus on whether the "crime" is punishable as a
felony indicates that the relevant inquiry is whether the particular conduct
is "punishable as a felony," not whether the person who engaged in
that conduct is punishable as a felon.  That conclusion is buttressed by the
statutory definition of the term "felony."  Subject to certain
exceptions, "a crime is a felony if it is so designated in any statute
of this state or if a person convicted under a statute of this state may be
sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year."  ORS
161.525 (emphasis added).  In other words, if a person engages in conduct that
is classified, by statute, as a felony, that person commits "a crime
punishable as a felony," whether or not that person is actually punished
for committing a felony.
The general structure of the criminal
code and the juvenile code further support our conclusion that an individual
"has committed a crime punishable as a felony" when he or she engages
in criminal conduct even if that individual cannot be held criminally responsible. 
With rare exception, the criminal code does not distinguish between adults and
juveniles in defining crimes.(4) 
Instead, the criminal code prohibits specific conduct along with an
accompanying mental state, regardless of age.  See generally ORS
chapters 161-67 (defining most crimes in terms of conduct by "persons,"
rather than persons over 18 years of age).  When juveniles commit crimes,
however, the juvenile code provides for a different procedure for
addressing that activity and imposing consequences for it.(5)
Although juveniles, in certain
circumstances, cannot be held criminally responsible for their criminal
conduct, nothing in the juvenile code transforms the juvenile's conduct from
criminal to noncriminal.(6)
 Indeed, one means by which a juvenile comes within the jurisdiction of the
court is precisely because the juvenile "has committed an act that is a violation"
of state law.  ORS 419C.005(1).  Although ORS 419C.005(1) also grants
jurisdiction over juveniles who commit acts "that if done by an adult
would constitute a violation" of state law, that provision refers to the
few crimes described above where a juvenile cannot actually commit the crime
because age is incorporated as an element.  See ORS 163.165(1)(h) (one
method of committing assault in the third degree is when a person 18 years or
older intentionally or knowingly causes physical injury to someone 10 years or
younger); ORS 163.432 (online sexual corruption of a child requires that the
actor be 18 years or older); ORS 163.435 (contributing to the sexual
delinquency of a minor requires that the actor be 18 years or older).  Thus,
ORS 419C.005(1) expressly acknowledges that juveniles can commit not only acts
that "would constitute" violations of state criminal law if committed
by an adult; they also can commit acts that are violations of state criminal
law in and of themselves.  In other words, juveniles can engage in conduct
constituting a crime, even though they may not be held criminally responsible
in certain cases.  Similarly, other statutes in the juvenile code acknowledge
that, although they are subject to a different system of adjudication,
juveniles can commit crimes.  See ORS 419C.001(1) (one purpose of
juvenile justice system is to prevent "further criminal activity" by
youths).   
The function of the felony
requirement in ORS 162.325(1), as suggested earlier, is to remove hindrance of
the prosecution of lesser crimes (such as misdemeanors) from the scope of the
statute.  That function does not depend on whether any particular offender is
prosecuted, whether the offender is prosecuted for a felony, or what punishment
the offender receives.  Rather, the emphasis is on the conduct of the offender. 
As noted previously, it is not a defense that the principal offender has not
been apprehended, prosecuted, convicted, or punished.  ORS 162.345.  The
offender's conduct is still "punishable as a felony" even if it in
fact was not prosecuted or punished as one.  We conclude that the phrase "a
person who has committed a crime punishable as a felony" focuses on the offender's
conduct -- and, specifically, the seriousness of the conduct -- rather than on
whether a particular offender may be held liable for a criminal act.  It thus is
sufficient here that youth engaged in conduct punishable as a felony, namely
third-degree assault, for the state to satisfy the elements of ORS 162.325(1).
As noted, however, defendant's
principal argument is based on the legislature's use of the words "apprehension,
prosecution, conviction or punishment" in describing the requisite
intent.  Those terms, defendant argues, describe events in criminal proceedings,
not those that occur in juvenile proceedings, and youth was the subject of a
juvenile proceeding.  The use of those familiar terms of criminal procedure, he
contends, demonstrates a legislative intent that ORS 162.325(1) should apply
only to hindering criminal proceedings and not juvenile proceedings.  Defendant
explains that "youths in the delinquency system are neither 'prosecuted'
nor 'convicted.'  They instead are 'petitioned' to be in the 'jurisdiction' of
the juvenile court and 'adjudicated' as delinquent."  Defendant notes that
the juvenile code uses the term "prosecution" to describe what
happens after a youth's case is transferred to the adult criminal justice
system.  See ORS 419C.349(1) (juvenile court may transfer "a youth
to a circuit, justice or municipal court of competent jurisdiction for
prosecution as an adult" under specified circumstances); ORS 419C.352
(juvenile court may transfer "a youth under 15 years of age at the time
the act was committed to circuit court for prosecution as an adult" under
specified circumstances).  Further, he notes, the term "punishment"
does not describe what happens to juveniles, because they are placed on
probation when it is in their "best interest and welfare," ORS
419C.446(1), or they are detained in the custody of the Oregon Youth Authority "for
care, placement and supervision," ORS 419C.478. 
Even assuming that defendant's
argument regarding the terms "prosecution," "conviction,"
and "punishment," is correct, defendant fails to demonstrate why the
term "apprehension" would not include apprehension of a juvenile
offender who is seeking to avoid referral to a correctional facility and
instead would include the apprehension of only an adult criminal.  "Apprehension"
refers to "the taking by legal, esp. criminal, process:  ARREST."  Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary 106 (unabridged ed 2002).  Defendant concedes
that the term "apprehension," unlike the other terms discussed above,
could be understood in isolation to apply to juvenile offenders.  He argues, however,
that the placement of apprehension in a list of other terms that apply only to
adult criminal offenders suggests that the term apprehension should be construed
in light of the other terms.  ORS 162.325(1) applies only to certain acts
performed with the intent to hinder "apprehension, prosecution, conviction
or punishment" in a criminal case, according to defendant, but not to acts
performed with the intent to hinder a youth's apprehension and referral to a juvenile
correctional facility.
Defendant asks us to apply certain
maxims of statutory construction that, he argues, support his position -- in
pari materia (statutes on the same subject should be construed together);(7)
noscitur a sociis (meaning of unclear word may be clarified by other
words in context);(8)
and ejusdem generis (when legislature uses general term and also lists
specific examples, general term is interpreted using the other terms in the
list).(9) 
None of those maxims applies here, however.  In pari materia refers to
comparing statutes rather than a list of words in a particular statute; noscitur
a sociis refers to interpreting an unclear term according to its context,
but, as we explain below, the term "apprehension" is not ambiguous;
and ejusdem generis assists in giving content to a general phrase when
the statute also lists specific examples, which is not the issue confronting
us.
The central flaw in defendant's
argument with respect to the term "apprehension" is that the term is
not ambiguous:  it simply represents the idea of capture.  In the criminal-law
context, apprehension involves restraining an individual's liberty so that the
state can assert the authority of legal process over that individual.  In many
cases, that legal process leads to prosecution, conviction, or punishment, but
not always.  Some offenders are apprehended, but the state elects not to
prosecute them.  More importantly, some offenders cannot be subjected to
criminal liability, even if they have committed a crime punishable as a
felony.  For example, some offenders are mentally ill and for that reason are guilty
except for insanity.  See ORS 161.295 ("A person is guilty except
for insanity if, as a result of mental disease or defect at the time of
engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the
requirements of law.").  Other offenders are juveniles and therefore not
subject to prosecution in circuit court in the same manner as adults.  See
ORS 419C.005(1) (juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over most violations
of criminal laws committed by minors).  An evaluation of the lack of
culpability and the need for alternative treatment for certain offenders,
however, cannot be undertaken unless and until they are apprehended and
examined.  Thus, the legislature presumably would not want other persons
assisting offenders in evading the justice system, particularly if they have
engaged in conduct that is punishable as a felony.
As noted, defendant argues that the
final terms in the sequence should be used to apply a narrow meaning to the
initial term.  Defendant is incorrect because he is, in effect, inviting us to
look through the wrong end of the telescope.  He attempts to narrow the otherwise
natural meaning of the word "apprehension" by reference to the other
terms in the list.  Because of the nature of the criminal process, however,
each of the first two terms in the sequence "apprehension, prosecution, conviction
or punishment" casts a wider net than the terms that follow.  Suspects are
apprehended; after the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the
identification of juveniles and the mentally ill, fewer will be prosecuted;
after prosecution, even fewer will be convicted and punished.  (Regarding the
terms "conviction" and "punishment," in general, one may
assume that those who are convicted will be punished, but even then, exceptions
exist.)   Hence, the term "apprehension" is broader and more general
than the terms that follow it, because it encompasses both persons who are
subject to criminal sanction as well as persons who turn out to be, for
whatever reason, not subject to criminal prosecution, conviction, or punishment. 
We therefore reject defendant's argument that the word "apprehension"
should be understood in the narrow sense for which he argues.
We now turn to defendant' second
argument -- that, even if ORS 162.325(1) applies to the hindrance of juvenile
proceedings, it does not apply here because defendant hindered youth's
apprehension for a probation violation, rather than for his initial crime.  According
to defendant, ORS 162.325(1) criminalizes only "specified acts that hinder
the initial process of catching, trying, convicting, and sentencing a
criminal."  (Emphasis in original.)  His argument is that ORS 162.325(1) does
not apply to hindrance of apprehension for a probation violation, because a
probation violation and referral to a correctional facility occur later than
the temporal sequence of apprehension through punishment set out in the statute. 
In other words, he contends, youth's "punishment" concluded with the
imposition of probation, and when youth allegedly violated his probation, that probation
violation occurred after the span of events listed in ORS 162.325(1).  
The list of four stages set out in
ORS 162.325(1), however, does not indicate a temporal limitation imposing a
particular order of events.  Of course, the list reflects the ordinary sequence
of events in a criminal case.  Even though prosecution occurs before conviction,
which occurs before punishment, there is nothing in the statute indicating that
the legislature understood that apprehension can occur only before
prosecution.  An attempt to evade the justice system can take place at any time
in the process, and the state has an interest in securing the presence of the
offender for the purpose of carrying out criminal or juvenile proceedings.  Here,
youth already had been through some juvenile proceedings regarding his
third-degree assault, but it later was necessary to apprehend him.  He was about
to evade the further process of the juvenile court and circumvent possible
referral to a juvenile correctional facility by flying to the Philippines.  Indeed,
as noted, when youth sought to board the airplane to leave the jurisdiction
after violating his conditions of probation, a warrant was outstanding for his
arrest.  Youth's probation officer had anticipated that youth, with defendant's
assistance, might seek to avoid the legal process by fleeing and had obtained
an arrest warrant.  Defendant's act of assisting youth in fleeing when a
warrant had issued for his arrest hindered youth's apprehension in the same
manner as if he had hindered youth's initial apprehension.  We reject
defendant's argument that ORS 162.325(1) does not apply to hindering the apprehension
of an offender for a probation violation.
We conclude that ORS 162.325(1)
applies when an individual aids a juvenile in avoiding apprehension for a
probation violation, as long as the juvenile was on probation because he or she
engaged in conduct punishable as a felony.  The trial court correctly denied
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. ORS 163.165(1) provides, in part:
"A person commits the crime of assault in
the third degree if the person:
"(a) Recklessly causes serious physical
injury to another by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon[.]"
2. The
changes from early statehood were merely stylistic.  Compare General
Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, ch LIII, § 692, p 573-74 (Deady 1845-1864)
("All persons who, after the commission of any felony, conceal or aid the
offender, with knowledge that he has committed a felony, and with intent that
he may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, are
accessories."), with former ORS 161.230 (1969) ("All
persons are accessories who, after the commission of any felony, conceal or aid
the offender, with knowledge that he has committed a felony, and with intent
that he may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or
punishment.").
3. The
commentary to the 1971 criminal code revision characterizes the intent element
of what became ORS 162.325 in general terms as "intent to hinder law
enforcement."  Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed
Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report § 207, 205 (July 1970).
4. As noted, there are rare exceptions.  See ORS 163.165(1)(h) (one method
of committing assault in the third degree is when a person 18 years or older
intentionally or knowingly causes physical injury to someone 10 years or
younger); ORS 163.432 (online sexual corruption of a child requires that the
actor be 18 years or older); ORS 163.435 (contributing to the sexual
delinquency of a minor requires that the actor be 18 years or older).
5. In
some cases, age may also be a defense to criminal conduct.  See ORS
163.345 (age as a defense to certain crimes); ORS 161.290 (defense of lack of
criminal responsibility for crimes committed when an individual is under 12
years of age).
6. We
emphasize that juvenile adjudications themselves are not the equivalent of
criminal proceedings.  See State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Reynolds, 317 Or
560, 567-74, 857 P2d 560 (1993) (describing history and purpose of juvenile
system).  Nonetheless, the conduct of the juvenile remains criminal
regardless of the ultimate adjudication. 
7. Under
the canon that courts should read statutes in pari materia, "[s]tatutory
provisions on the same subject are construed together."  Griffin v.
Tri-Met, 318 Or 500, 524, 870 P2d 808 (1994). 
8. Noscitur
a sociis "is an old maxim which summarizes the rule both of language
and of law that the meaning of words may be indicated or controlled by those
with which they are associated."  Nunner v. Erickson, 151 Or 575,
609, 51 P2d 839 (1935).  The maxim is useful if a particular word is
ambiguous.  See Black's Law Dictionary 1084 (7th ed 1999)
("A canon of construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or
phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it.").
9. "When the legislature uses 'nonspecific or general phrases' as well as a
list of items, this court, under the principle of ejusdem generis,
construes the statute 'as referring only to other items of the same
kind.'"  Liberty v. State Dept. of Transportation, 342 Or 11, 20,
148 P3d 909 (2006) (citation omitted).