Case Title: Ada Co Prosecuting Atty v. 2007 Legendary Motorcycle

Citation: 

Docket Number: 39359

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2013-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
Docket No. 39359 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY, 
 
       Plaintiff-Respondent-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
2007 LEGENDARY MOTORCYCLE, VIN 
4B7H8469X35007098; APPROXIMATELY 
THIRTEEN (13) GRAMS 
METHAMPHETAMINE; ONE(1) 
MOTOROLA VGA CELL PHONE; ONE (1) 
BLACK VEST; and ONE (1) BLACK 
JACKET, 
 
       Defendants-Appellants-Respondents. 
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Boise, February 2013 Term 
 
2013 Opinion No. 33 
 
Filed: March 26, 2013 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 
County.  Hon. Kathryn A. Sticklen, District Judge.  
District court decision on civil forfeiture, affirmed.   
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, Boise, for appellant. 
Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., Boise, for respondents.  
__________________________________ 
 
 
BURDICK, Chief Justice 
This case arises from an Ada County district court’s review on appeal of a magistrate 
court’s decision regarding the civil forfeiture of a motorcycle and other items that belong to 
Christopher Rubey (Rubey).  On April 22, 2009, Rubey was arrested and charged with 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.  Subsequently, the Ada County 
Prosecutor’s Office (State) brought this action under I.C. § 37-2744 for civil forfeiture of the 
motorcycle and related items used in the alleged crime.  The magistrate court granted summary 
judgment to the State, and the district court reversed and remanded that decision.  The State now 
appeals to this Court, arguing that the district court erred in its decision and that the legislative 
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intent behind I.C. § 37-2744(a)(4) supports civil forfeiture for either the transportation or 
trafficking of drugs.  We affirm the decision of the district court.          
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On April 22, 2009, Boise Police observed Christopher Rubey leave his home driving a 
2007 Legend Motorcycle (Motorcycle) and observed a blue Chevy truck follow the Motorcycle.  
Police then observed the Motorcycle engage in what they described as driving maneuvers 
intended to evade police surveillance.  The police eventually stopped the Chevy truck and placed 
the driver—the primary subject of the surveillance and for whom a federal warrant was 
outstanding—under arrest.  Rubey then rode the Motorcycle to the scene and made contact with 
the police.  During a consensual search, a police pat down revealed thirteen grams of 
methamphetamine inside Rubey’s coat jacket.  Rubey was arrested and charged with possession 
of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.   
On May 20, 2009, the County filed its Complaint In Rem For Forfeiture Under Idaho 
Code § 37-2744 (Forfeiture Complaint) in magistrate court.  The Forfeiture Complaint alleged 
that a Motorcycle, methamphetamine, cell phone, black vest, and black jacket were lawfully 
seized and subject to forfeiture.  In response, Rubey asserted an affirmative defense that the 
Motorcycle was not used in any manner described in I.C. § 37-2744 and is not properly subject 
to forfeiture.  The parties agreed to stay the forfeiture case pending the resolution of the criminal 
case, and Rubey eventually pled guilty to the lesser charge of possession of methamphetamine in 
violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c).   On January 4, 2010, the State filed a motion for summary 
judgment and an accompanying memorandum.   
The magistrate court held a motion hearing on February 1, 2010, and on February 25, 
2010, issued an order granting the State’s motion for summary judgment.  In granting summary 
judgment, the magistrate court found that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that 
the Motorcycle is forfeited to the State because it is a conveyance used to transport controlled 
substances in violation of I.C. § 37-2744.  The magistrate court issued a final judgment, and 
Rubey appealed to the district court.   
After receiving briefs from both parties, the district court heard oral argument on the 
appeal on November 4, 2010.  In an October 13, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order, the 
district court reversed the magistrate court’s order.  In its decision, the district court concluded 
that I.C. § 37-2744(a)(4) was not ambiguous and that the language “for the purpose of 
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distribution or receipt” of a controlled substance applied to the actions described in the statute.  
The State timely filed a notice of appeal with this Court on November 8, 2011.   
II. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in reversing the Magistrate Court’s decision that Idaho 
Code § 37-2744(a)(4) allows conveyances to be forfeited when used to transport 
controlled substances. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When the district court renders an opinion in its intermediate appellate capacity, the 
Supreme Court “directly reviews the district court’s opinion.” Hausladen v. Knoche, 149 Idaho 
449, 452, 235 P.3d 399, 402, (2010). “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over 
which this Court exercises free review.” Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist., 142 Idaho 804, 
807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006).  “The interpretation of a statute ‘must begin with the literal 
words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the 
statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe 
it, but simply follows the law as written.’” Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 
889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 
721 (2003)). “A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction.” Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 
P.3d 671, 674 (2004).  
IV. ANALYSIS 
In the sole issue on appeal, the State argues that the district court erred in reversing the 
magistrate court’s decision that Idaho Code § 37-2744(a)(4) allows conveyances to be forfeited 
when used to transport controlled substances.  First, the State argues that I.C. § 37-2744(a)(4) is 
ambiguous and an interpretation of the statute requires an analysis of legislative history to 
determine legislative intent.  Second, the State argues that previous decisions from this Court 
have supported civil forfeiture of conveyances that are used to transport methamphetamine.  In 
response, Rubey argues that the statute is not ambiguous, the legislative history is not relevant, 
and federal case law is not applicable to an interpretation of I.C. § 37-2744(a)(4). 
Idaho Code section 37-2744(a)(4) states in pertinent part: 
(a) The following are subject to forfeiture: 
. . .  
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(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, 
delivery, receipt, possession or concealment, for the purpose of distribution or 
receipt of [controlled substances]. 
The statute was interpreted differently by the magistrate and district courts.  In its order, the 
magistrate court found that: 
After due consideration and in applying the plain language of the statute and 
looking to federal law as for guidance, this Court concluded that as a matter of 
law the Plaintiff is required to prove that the vehicle was used or intended to be 
used to transport or to facilitate any of the listed actions with regard to a 
controlled substance.  
Going further, the magistrate court addressed the applicability of the statute’s qualifying clause: 
This Court applies the plain language of the statute and will not require the 
Plaintiff, in a civil forfeiture case, prove the criminal elements of distribution of 
methamphetamine or receipt of methamphetamine. 
Requiring the State to prove distribution or receipt of methamphetamine in 
the civil forfeiture case is not in this Court’s opinion, what the Idaho Legislature 
intended, nor is such a conclusion consistent with federal precedent which this 
Court found instructive. 
In contrast, the district court held that “[t]he interpretation adopted by the magistrate 
reads ‘for the purpose of delivery or receipt’ out of the statute completely,” and that “it must be 
assumed that the legislature meant something by those words.” On the issue of elements that 
must be proven, the district court held that the State would “have to prove the purpose of 
delivery or receipt by a preponderance of the evidence.”  
 
On appeal, the State argues that the first clause of the statute, which ends with the phrase, 
“to transport,” would not be modified by the, “for the purpose of distribution or receipt” 
language.  Rubey argues that the district court interpreted the statute correctly, and that the “for 
the purposes of distribution or receipt” language modifies the entire subsection.   
As a starting point, differing opinions from two courts would not necessarily make the 
statute ambiguous. 
[A]mbiguity is not established merely because different possible interpretations 
are presented to a court. If this were the case then all statutes that are the subject 
of litigation could be considered ambiguous. . . . [A] statute is not ambiguous 
merely because an astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of it. 
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Matter of Permit No. 36-7200 in Name of Idaho Dept. of Parks & Recreation, 121 Idaho 819, 
823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992) (abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l 
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011)). 
To analyze the meaning of the statute “we must look to the grammatical construction of 
the statute as the legislature intended the statute to be construed according to generally accepted 
principles of English grammar.” State v. Collinsworth, 96 Idaho 910, 914, 539 P.2d 263, 267 
(1975).  Generally, “[u]nder the rule of the last antecedent clause, a referential or qualifying 
clause refers solely to the last antecedent, absent a showing of contrary intent.” BHC 
Intermountain Hosp., Inc. v. Ada Cnty., 150 Idaho 93, 96, 244 P.3d 237, 240 (2010). However, 
“[w]hen punctuation discloses a proper legislative intent or conveys a clear meaning the courts 
should give weight to it as evidence.” 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47:15 (5th ed. 
1992). “Evidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only 
to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that it is separated from the 
antecedents by a comma.” Id., § 47.32. 
 
Here, the qualifying clause “for the purpose of distribution or receipt” is separated from 
its immediate antecedent, “concealment,” by a comma.  This separation is intended to apply the 
qualifying clause to all antecedents.1  In addition, the coordinating conjunction “or” that follows 
the clause “to transport” syntactically equates that clause with “in any manner to facilitate the 
transportation, delivery, receipt, possession or concealment.”2  This conclusion is bolstered by 
the absence of any distinct modifier for “to transport” that would imply the rule of reddendo 
singular singulis, translated as referring each to each.  See 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction 
§ 47:26 (5th ed. 1992). (“Where a sentence contains several antecedents and several consequents 
they are to be read distributively.”).     
The district court correctly found that the statute is not ambiguous.  Given the plain 
meaning of the words and the tenets of grammar it would be unreasonable to apply the qualifying 
clause “for the purpose of distribution or receipt” to every antecedent after “to facilitate” while 
                                                 
1 By contrast, there is no comma between the phrase “to facilitate” and the enumerations “the transportation, 
delivery, receipt, possession or concealment.”  Here, the last antecedent rule would necessarily require the reader to 
ascribe those enumerated acts to the last antecedent “facilitate” and not to the preceding phrase “to transport.”  
2 See Tenielle Fordyce-Ruff, Creating Separation and Emphasis in Your Writing Part I: Joining Independent 
Clauses, The Advocate, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 45 (2011) (Used in this context, the comma “distributes the emphasis 
between the ideas equally, creating very little separation between them.  Neither the first nor the second clause is 
emphasized.  Instead, the comma lets the reader know that the idea before and the idea after the comma are equally 
important.”).   
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not applying it to the clause “to transport.” What we are left with, in this context, can be 
extracted from the statute as bolded: 
(a) The following are subject to forfeiture: 
. . .  
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, 
delivery, receipt, possession or concealment, for the purpose of distribution or 
receipt of [controlled substances]. 
I.C. § 37-2744(a)(4) (emphasis added).  Put another way, the qualifying phrase “for the purpose 
of distribution or receipt” in I.C. § 27-2744(a)(4) modifies the antecedents “to transport, or in 
any manner to facilitate the transportation, delivery, receipt, possession or concealment.”    
Since there is only one reasonable interpretation, the statute is unambiguous and there is 
no need to address legislative history or other extrinsic evidence. “We have consistently held that 
where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should 
not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.” 
Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506 (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 
Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). 
In its decision, the district court properly concluded that the statute is unambiguous and 
that the qualifying phrase “for the purpose of distribution or receipt” applied to the action 
described in the statute.  Therefore, we affirm the decision of the district court.   
V. CONCLUSION 
We find that the district court did not err when it reversed the decision of the magistrate 
court. 
 
Justices EISMANN, J. JONES, and W. JONES, and Justice Pro Tem KIDWELL 
CONCUR.