Case Title: JOHANNA WOODARD V UNIVERSITY OF MICH MEDICAL CTR

Citation: 

Docket Number: 124995

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED July 12, 2005 
JOHANNA WOODARD, Individually and as
Next Friend of AUSTIN D. WOODARD,
a Minor, and STEVEN WOODARD 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
 
and Cross-Appellants 
 
 
v 
 
No. 124994 
JOSEPH R. CUSTER, M.D., 
Defendant-Appellant, 
 
and Cross-Appellee 
 
and 
MICHAEL K. LIPSCOMB, M.D.,
MICHELLE M. NYPAVER, M.D., and
MONA M. RISKALLA, M.D., 
Defendants. 
JOHANNA WOODARD, Individually and as
Next Friend of AUSTIN D. WOODARD,
a Minor, and STEVEN WOODARD, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees 
 
and Cross-Appellants, 
 
v 
No. 124995 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
Defendant-Appellant 
 
and Cross-Appellee. 
 
 
 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MARKMAN, J.  
The question presented to this Court is whether expert 
testimony is necessary in the circumstances of this case. 
We conclude that it is. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiffs’ fifteen-day-old son was admitted to the 
Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) at the University of 
Michigan Hospital, where he was treated for a respiratory 
problem. 
During his stay in the PICU, he was under the 
care of Dr. Joseph R. Custer, the Director of Pediatric 
Critical Care Medicine. 
When the infant was moved to the 
general hospital ward, physicians in that ward discovered 
that both of the infant’s legs were fractured. 
Plaintiffs 
sued Dr. Custer and the hospital, alleging that the 
fractures were the result of negligent medical procedures, 
namely, the improper placement of an arterial line in the 
femoral vein of the infant’s right leg and the improper 
placement of a venous catheter in the infant’s left leg. 
Defendant physician is board-certified in pediatrics 
and has certificates of special qualifications in pediatric 
critical care medicine and neonatal-perinatal medicine. 
Plaintiffs’ proposed expert witness, who signed plaintiffs’ 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
affidavit of merit, is board-certified in pediatrics, but 
does not have any certificates of special qualifications. 
Before discovery, the trial court denied defendants’ 
motion for summary disposition, concluding that plaintiffs’ 
attorney had a “reasonable belief” under MCL 600.2912d(1) 
that plaintiffs’ proposed expert witness was qualified 
under MCL 600.2169 to testify against the defendant 
physician, and, thus, that plaintiffs’ affidavit of merit 
was sufficient. 
After discovery, the trial court granted 
defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ expert witness on 
the basis that he was not actually qualified under MCL 
600.2169 to testify against the defendant physician. 
The 
trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim with prejudice, 
concluding that plaintiffs could not reach a jury without 
expert testimony. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling 
that plaintiffs’ proposed expert witness was not qualified 
under MCL 600.2169 to testify against the defendant 
physician (Judge Borrello dissented on this issue), but 
reversed the trial court’s dismissal on the basis that 
expert testimony was unnecessary under the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, i.e., an inference of negligence may be 
drawn from the fact that the infant was admitted to the 
PICU with healthy legs and discharged from the PICU with 
fractured legs (Judge Talbot dissented on this issue).
3 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 21, 2003 
(Docket Nos. 239868-239869). 
The case was remanded for 
trial. 
Defendants sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeals 
decision that res ipsa loquitur applies and that expert 
testimony was not necessary. 
Plaintiffs sought leave to 
cross-appeal the Court of Appeals decision that their 
proposed expert witness was not qualified under MCL 
600.2169 to testify against the defendant physician. 
We 
heard oral argument on whether to grant the applications or 
take other peremptory action permitted by MCR 7.302(G)(1). 
471 Mich 890. 
We have granted plaintiffs’ application for 
leave to appeal as cross-appellants.1  In this opinion, we 
address only defendants’ application for leave to appeal. 
1 That order states: 
On December 9, 2004, the Court heard oral 
argument on defendants’ application for leave to
appeal the October 21, 2003, judgment of the
Court 
of 
Appeals 
and 
plaintiffs’ 
cross­
application for leave to appeal. 
Plaintiffs’ 
cross-application for leave to appeal is again
considered and it is GRANTED. 
The parties are
directed to include among the issues to be 
briefed: (1) what are the appropriate definitions
of the terms “specialty” and “board certified” as
used in MCL 600.2169(1)(a); (2) whether either
“specialty” 
or 
“board 
certified” 
includes 
subspecialties 
or 
certificates 
of 
special
qualifications; (3) whether MCL 600.2169(1)(b)
requires an expert witness to practice or teach
the same subspecialty as the defendant; (4) 
whether MCL 600.2169 requires an expert witness
(continued…)
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews de novo decisions on summary 
disposition motions. 
Grossman v Brown, 470 Mich 593, 598; 
685 NW2d 198 (2004). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Plaintiffs argue that expert testimony is unnecessary 
in this case because of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
In 
a 
medical 
malpractice 
case, 
the 
plaintiff 
must 
establish: 
(1) the applicable standard of care, (2)
breach of that standard of care by the defendant,
(3) injury, and (4) proximate causation between
the alleged breach and the injury. 
[Locke v 
Pachtman, 446 Mich 216, 222; 521 NW2d 786 
(1994).] 
(…continued)
to match all specialties, subspecialties, and 
certificates of special qualifications that a 
defendant may possess, or whether the expert
witness need only match those that are relevant
to the alleged act of malpractice. 
See Tate v 
Detroit Receiving Hosp, 249 Mich App 212 (2002);
and (5) what are the relevant specialties,
subspecialties, 
and 
certificates 
of 
special
qualifications in this case. 
The 
American 
Osteopathic 
Association’s 
Bureau 
of 
Osteopathic 
Specialists, 
the 
Accreditation 
Council 
for 
Graduate 
Medical 
Education, and the Council of Medical Specialty
Societies are invited to file briefs amicus 
curiae. 
Other persons or groups interested in
the determination of the questions presented in
this case may move the Court for permission to
file briefs amicus curiae. 
[473 Mich ___
(2005).] 
5  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
See MCL 600.2912a. Generally, expert testimony is required 
in medical malpractice cases. Locke, supra at 230. 
This 
Court 
has 
long 
recognized 
the 
importance of expert testimony in establishing a
medical malpractice claim, and the need to 
educate the jury and the court regarding matters
not within their common purview. . . . 
While we 
have recognized exceptions to this requirement,
the benefit of expert testimony, particularly in
demonstrating the applicable standard of care,
cannot be overstated. [Id. at 223-224.] 
However, if a medical malpractice case satisfies the 
requirements of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, then 
such case may proceed to the jury without expert testimony. 
Id. at 230. 
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin term meaning, 
“[t]he thing speaks for itself.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 
(6th ed).2 
[R]es ipsa loquitur . . . entitles a 
plaintiff 
to 
a 
permissible 
inference 
of 
negligence from circumstantial evidence. 
The major purpose of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is to create at least an inference
of negligence when the plaintiff is unable to
prove the actual occurrence of a negligent
act. . . . 
In a proper res ipsa loquitur medical case,
a jury is permitted to infer negligence from a
result which they conclude would not have been 
reached unless someone was negligent. 
[Jones v 
2 “Res ipsa loquitur” is the “[r]ebuttable presumption
or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises
upon proof that the instrumentality causing injury was in
defendant’s exclusive control, and that the accident was 
one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of 
negligence.” Id. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Porretta, 428 Mich 132, 150, 155-156; 405 NW2d
863 (1987).] 
In order to avail themselves of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur, plaintiffs must meet the following conditions: 
“(1) the event must be of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of 
someone’s negligence; 
(2) it must be caused by an agency or 
instrumentality 
within the exclusive control of 
the defendant; 
(3) it must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the plaintiff”; and 
(4) “[e]vidence of the true explanation of
the event must be more readily accessible to the
defendant than to the plaintiff.” 
[Id. at 150­
151 (citations omitted).] 
With regard to the first condition, this Court has 
held that “the fact that the injury complained of does not 
ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence must either 
be supported by expert testimony or must be within the 
common understanding of the jury.” 
Locke, supra at 231. 
In this case, whether a leg may be fractured in the absence 
of negligence when placing an arterial line or a venous 
catheter in a newborn’s leg is not within the common 
understanding of the jury, and, thus, expert testimony is 
required. 
That is, plaintiffs needed to produce expert 
testimony to support their theory that the infant’s 
injuries were not the unfortunate complication of a 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
reasonably performed medical procedure. 
As this Court 
explained in Jones, supra at 154: 
[I]n a normal professional negligence case,
a bad result, of itself, is not evidence of
negligence sufficient to raise an issue for the
jury. . . . 
Something more is required, be it
the common knowledge that the injury does not
ordinarily occur without negligence or expert
testimony to that effect. 
In a case where there is no expert evidence
that “but for” negligence this result does not 
ordinarily occur, and in which the judge finds 
that such a determination could not be made by
the jury as a matter of common understanding, a
prima facie case has not been made, and a 
directed verdict is appropriate. 
Whether, “but for” negligence, the newborn’s legs 
would not have been fractured is not a determination that 
can 
be 
made 
by 
the 
jury 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
common 
understanding. As the trial court explained: 
Whether the fractures could have occurred in 
the 
absence 
of 
someone’s 
negligence 
is 
an 
allegation that must be supported by expert 
testimony; the procedures [the infant] underwent
are 
not 
within 
the 
common 
knowledge 
of 
a 
reasonably prudent jury. 
Furthermore, whether
fractures of the kinds suffered by [the infant]
are possible complications arising from the types
of procedures performed during [his] stay at the
Pediatric ICU is knowledge that is exclusively
within the expertise of the medical profession. 
And, as Judge Talbot in dissent in the Court of Appeals 
explained, “[a]ssuming that the fractures may have been 
caused by the placement of the lines in the infant’s legs, 
the risks associated with the placement of arterial lines 
or venous catheters in a newborn infant, and whether 
8  
 
 
 
     
                                                 
   
 
fractures ordinarily do not occur in the absence of 
negligence, are not within common knowledge of a reasonably 
prudent fact finder.” 
Slip op at 9. 
Because we do not 
know whether the injury complained of does not ordinarily 
occur in the absence of negligence, we cannot properly 
apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
Plaintiffs argue that, even if res ipsa loquitur does 
not apply, expert testimony is not required because the 
alleged negligence was within the common understanding of 
the jury. 
For the same reason that we conclude that res 
ipsa loquitur does not apply here—whether a leg may be 
fractured in the absence of negligence when placing an 
arterial line or a venous catheter in a newborn’s leg is 
not within the common understanding of the jury—we conclude 
that this latter exception to the requirement of expert 
testimony also does not apply.3 
3 Our dissenting colleagues criticize us for deciding
defendants’ application for leave to appeal separately from
plaintiffs’ 
cross-application 
for 
leave 
to 
appeal.
However, it is only logical to determine whether expert
testimony is required, the issue raised in defendants’
application for leave to appeal, before determining whether
plaintiffs’ proposed expert is qualified to testify, the 
issue raised in plaintiffs’ cross-application for leave to
appeal. 
If we were to determine that expert testimony was
not required, there would be no need to determine whether
plaintiffs’ expert is qualified to testify. 
Because we 
have determined in this opinion that expert testimony is 
required, we must next determine whether plaintiffs’
proposed expert is qualified to testify. 
Because of the 
complexities and the importance of the latter issue, we
(continued…)
9 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Expert testimony is required because whether a leg may 
be fractured in the absence of negligence when placing an 
arterial line or a venous catheter in a newborn’s leg is 
not within the common understanding of a jury. 
We have 
granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal as 
cross-appellants, and will determine whether plaintiffs’ 
expert is qualified, within the meaning of MCL 600.2169, to 
testify against the defendant physician. 
Accordingly, 
while we now hold that this case cannot proceed to a jury 
on a res ipsa loquitur theory, the entry of final judgment 
in this case must await our determination of the expert­
qualification issue.4 
Stephen J. Markman
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
(…continued)
have granted plaintiffs’ cross-application for leave to
appeal. 
However, because we have already reached a 
decision on the former issue, and because we believe that
the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine, we issue our opinion on this former
issue today. 
4 Justice Cavanagh concludes that “the trial court
abused its discretion in not granting plaintiffs’ motion 
for an extension of time to add a new expert witness.”
Post at 2. 
Because plaintiffs have not appealed the trial
court’s 
decision 
denying 
plaintiffs’ 
motion 
for 
an 
extension of time to add a new expert witness, we do not
address this issue. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
JOHANNA WOODARD, Individually and as
Next Friend of AUSTIN D. WOODARD,
a Minor, and STEVEN WOODARD, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees
 
and Cross-Appellants, 
v 
No. 124994 
JOSEPH R. CUSTER, M.D., 
Defendant-Appellant
 
and Cross-Appellee, 
and 
MICHAEL K. LIPSCOMB, M.D.,
MICHELLE M. NYPAVER, M.D., and
MONA M. RISKALLA, M.D., 
Defendants. 
______________________________________ 
JOHANNA WOODARD, Individually and as
Next Friend of AUSTIN D. WOODARD,
a Minor, and STEVEN WOODARD, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees
 
and Cross-Appellants, 
v 
No. 124995 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
Defendant-Appellant
 
and Cross-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that expert 
witness testimony is necessary in this case because I agree 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
that the medical procedures at issue are not within the 
common understanding of a jury. I also concur with Justice 
Weaver that defendant’s1 appeal and plaintiffs’ cross-appeal 
should not be bifurcated, but should be considered and 
decided together. 
Like Justice Weaver, I would have 
granted defendant’s application rather than peremptorily 
reversing the Court of Appeals. I write separately because 
I find that although expert testimony is required in this 
case, the trial court abused its discretion in not granting 
plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time to add a new 
expert witness. 
As noted by the Court of Appeals, some of the 
procedural aspects of this case are not definitively clear 
on the existing record, which may lead one to question 
which of the parties’ multiple motions were the impetus for 
the trial court’s ultimate dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims. 
After discovery, defendants University of Michigan Medical 
Center and Dr. Custer moved to strike plaintiffs’ expert 
witness as unqualified. 
They also moved for summary 
disposition 
under 
MCR 
2.116(C)(10) 
on 
other 
bases, 
including allegations that a claim for respondeat superior 
did not lie and that plaintiffs’ testimony did not support 
a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In 
1 The singular “defendant” refers to Joseph R. Custer,
M.D. 
2  
 
 
response to defendants’ claim that plaintiffs’ expert was 
not qualified, plaintiffs alleged that they did not need an 
expert witness at all because the matters to be decided 
were within the common understanding of a jury. 
At the hearing on these motions, the trial court 
granted defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ expert, 
but did not address whether expert testimony was required. 
Defendants then moved to enter an order of dismissal, 
presumably 
because 
they 
assumed 
that 
an 
expert 
was 
required. 
Plaintiffs objected to the order, requested a 
determination whether expert testimony was needed, and 
moved to “extend time” to add an expert witness. The trial 
court determined that expert testimony was necessary, 
denied the motion to add an expert, and, as a result, 
entered 
an 
order 
dismissing 
plaintiffs’ 
claims 
with 
prejudice. 
While plaintiffs’ appellate challenges to the trial 
court’s dismissal have focused primarily on plaintiffs’ 
claim 
that 
their 
expert 
was 
qualified 
or, 
in 
the 
alternative, that expert testimony was not required, the 
trial court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion to add an 
expert was inextricably intertwined with its decision to 
dismiss the case. In other words, the trial court’s denial 
of plaintiffs’ motion to add an expert and its grant of 
defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ expert were 
3  
 
equally dispositive of plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, by virtue 
of opposing defendants’ application for leave to appeal and 
mounting 
their 
own 
challenges 
to 
the 
trial 
court’s 
dismissal, plaintiffs are necessarily, albeit somewhat 
indirectly, challenging the trial court’s denial of their 
motion to add an expert. 
Contrary to the majority’s 
position, ante at 11 n 4, I believe that the ruling on the 
motion to add an expert is fairly encompassed in the issues 
this Court is addressing. 
Thus, having found that plaintiffs needed expert 
witness testimony, I would then find that the trial court 
abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion for an 
extension of time to add an expert witness and dismissing 
the case with prejudice. 
A trial court’s decision whether 
to allow a plaintiff to add an expert witness is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion, as is a trial court’s ruling on 
adjournment. 
See Klabunde v Stanley, 384 Mich 276, 281; 
181 NW2d 918 (1970); Tisbury v Armstrong, 194 Mich App 19, 
20; 486 NW2d 51 (1992). 
MCR 2.401(I)(2) states that if a 
party fails to list a witness by the time designated by the 
trial court, “[t]he court may order that any witness not 
listed in accordance with this rule will be prohibited from 
testifying at trial except upon good cause shown.” 
Thus, 
in considering a motion to amend a witness list, the trial 
court should determine whether the party seeking the 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
amendment 
demonstrated 
good 
cause. 
Similarly, 
considerations for a motion to adjourn or extend time 
include whether the requesting party has sought numerous 
past continuances, whether the party has exercised due 
diligence, and the “lack of any injustice to the movant.” 
Tisbury, supra at 20. 
Another important consideration, though, is our legal 
system’s preference for disposition of litigation on the 
merits. 
See Wood v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exch, 413 
Mich 573, 581; 321 NW2d 653 (1982).  Thus, if denying a 
motion to extend time to add an expert witness extinguishes 
a plaintiff’s cause of action, that factor should be given 
due weight. 
See Dean v Tucker, 182 Mich App 27, 32; 451 
NW2d 571 (1990). 
A trial court should recognize that it 
has other, less drastic, measures available to it by which 
to ameliorate any inconvenience caused to the opposing 
party. Id.  For example, the trial court could require the 
plaintiff to pay any deposition or other costs, including 
attorney fees, associated with the delay caused by the 
plaintiff’s failure to timely name the witness. 
In 
addition, the trial court should have carefully weighed the 
available options and expressed reasons why dismissal with 
prejudice was preferable over other alternatives. 
Id. at 
32-33. 
5  
 
                                                 
In this case, plaintiffs moved for an extension of 
time to add an expert witness directly after the trial 
court struck the expert witness that plaintiffs timely 
presented. 
The controversy surrounding plaintiffs’ named 
expert pertained to problematic language in MCL 600.2169, 
language that this Court had not then, and has not yet, 
fully construed. 
In fact, whether plaintiffs’ original 
expert witness was qualified to testify in this case is the 
subject of plaintiffs’ yet to be decided cross-appeal. 
A 
look at this Court’s order granting plaintiffs’ cross­
application for leave to appeal, 473 Mich ___ (2005), which 
contains a list of unanswered questions regarding what 
qualifications an expert witness in a medical malpractice 
case must have, is illustrative of the unsettled nature and 
complexity of MCL 600.2169. 
Clearly, then, there are apparent difficulties in 
interpreting exactly what qualifications are required of a 
medical malpractice expert witness. 
Where this Court has 
not agreed on the proper construction of the statute,2 and 
has expressly left for another day several of the precise 
questions at the core of the qualifications debate in this 
2 See, e.g., Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich 572; 683 NW2d
129 (2004), and Grossman v Brown, 470 Mich 593; 685 NW2d
198 (2004). 
6  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
case,3 a plaintiff who has made a good-faith effort to 
satisfy unconstrued statutory criteria should not be 
penalized for ostensibly failing to meet the criteria with 
the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice.4  Rather, 
I would hold that where the trial court determined that the 
requirements of MCL 600.2169 had not been met, it should 
also have found that plaintiffs demonstrated good cause to 
seek additional time to add a new expert. 
Further, the 
court should have found that disposition on the merits 
outweighed any prejudice a short delay might have caused 
defendants. And as noted, the trial court could still have 
maintained sufficient control over its docket by, for 
example, setting a deadline by which plaintiffs had to 
present their new expert and invoking other measures to 
mitigate any harm to defendants. 
On that basis alone, I would hold that the trial 
court, having found that plaintiffs’ expert did not meet 
the criteria contained in the statute, should have granted 
3 Halloran, supra at 577 n 5; Grossman, supra at 600 n 
7. 
4 I make no conclusions regarding whether plaintiffs’
expert was indeed qualified for trial purposes. 
Because a 
majority of this Court insists on deciding this portion of
the case today and the expert witness portion of the case
at a later date, I will assume for purposes of this opinion
that plaintiffs at least had a good-faith belief that their
expert 
complied 
with 
the 
statutory 
mandates. 
This 
admittedly awkward position is the direct result of the
majority’s refusal to address these interconnected issues
at the same time. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
plaintiffs additional time to procure another expert 
instead of dismissing plaintiffs’ claim with prejudice and 
permanently depriving plaintiffs of a cause of action. 
Because trial was still two months away, any delay would 
have been minimal and containable. 
Plaintiffs had sought 
no previous continuances, and their request was not the 
result of a lack of due diligence.5 
For these reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion 
granting peremptory reversal to defendant. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
5 To the extent defendant argues that plaintiffs were
on notice that defendant would challenge their expert’s
qualifications, I find the argument without merit. 
It is 
not unusual for a defendant in a medical malpractice suit
to launch a challenge of that type. 
And on defendants’ 
first challenge to the expert, which occurred directly
after plaintiffs filed their complaint and affidavit of
merit, the trial court found that the expert met the
threshold requirements for purposes of the affidavit of
merit. 
The mere fact that the trial court reserved for a 
later date the question whether the expert could offer
trial testimony does not, in my view, compel a finding that
plaintiffs should have automatically sought a replacement
expert at that juncture, as defendant implies. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
JOHANNA WOODARD, Individually and as
Next Friend of AUSTIN D. WOODARD,
a Minor, and STEVEN WOODARD, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees 
 
and Cross-Appellants, 
 
v 
No. 124994 
JOSEPH R. CUSTER, M.D., 
Defendant-Appellant 
 
and Cross-Appellee, 
 
and 
MICHAEL K. LIPSCOMB, M.D.,
MICHELLE M. NYPAVER, M.D., and
MONA M. RISKALLA, M.D., 
Defendants. 
JOHANNA WOODARD, Individually and as
Next Friend of AUSTIN D. WOODARD,
a Minor, and STEVEN WOODARD, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees 
 
and Cross-Appellants, 
 
v 
No. 124995 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
Defendant-Appellant 
 
and Cross-Appellee. 
 
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 
 
 
 
 
 
While 
I 
would 
likely 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
conclusion that expert testimony is necessary in the 
circumstances of this case, I dissent from the majority 
decision, 
because 
I 
would 
not 
decide 
defendants’ 
application for leave to appeal separately from plaintiffs’ 
cross-application for leave to appeal and without full 
briefing and argument. 
Plaintiffs’ cross-application was 
granted at 473 Mich ___ (2005). 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
2