Case Title: Ricker v. Ricker, Administratrix

Citation: 201 Or. 416, 270 P.2d 150

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1954-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Affirmed May 12, 1954.
Petition for rehearing denied June 17, 1954.
*417 Charles R. Cater, of La Grande, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
Patrick J. Gallagher argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Gallagher & Gallagher, of Ontario.
*418 Before LATOURETTE, Chief Justice, and WARNER, ROSSMAN, TOOZE and PERRY, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
TOOZE, J.
This is an action for money loaned, brought by plaintiff F.E. Ricker against Mabel Ricker, executrix of the estate of G.H. Ricker, deceased, as defendant. The trial court sustained defendant's general demurrer to the amended complaint; and plaintiff having failed to plead further, judgment was entered dismissing the action. Plaintiff appeals.
By his amended complaint, plaintiff, after alleging the appointment of defendant as executrix of the estate of G.H. Ricker, deceased, stated his cause of action as follows:
Defendant demurred to this amended complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
It is defendant's position, and the trial court held, that on its face the amended complaint conclusively established that the alleged claim against the estate of G.H. Ricker was barred by the statute of limitations: ORS 12.080.
That statute provides that "an action upon a contract or liability, express or implied" shall be commenced within six years after the cause of action shall have accrued.
The sole contention made by plaintiff on this appeal is that the objection that the complaint shows on its face that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations must be made by special demurrer based upon that particular ground, and that it cannot be made by general demurrer. He states his proposition as follows:
In support of this contention, plaintiff cites ORS 16.260 and ORS 16.330; also, Eastman v. Crary, 131 Or 694, 699, 284 P 280.
*421 Oregon Revised Statutes 16.260 provides:
Oregon Revised Statutes 16.270 provides:
Oregon Revised Statutes 16.330 provides:
In Eastman v. Crary, supra, we said:
1. The amended complaint shows on its face that the money was loaned to G.H. Ricker, now deceased, on *422 December 8, 1919. At the time the loan was made by plaintiff as alleged, no time was fixed for the repayment thereof. In such circumstances, it was repayable on demand. 58 CJS 878, Money Lent, § 3a.
2. It is well settled that the statute of limitations begins to run at the time when a complete cause of action accrues or arises, unless it is otherwise provided by statute. In 54 CJS 45, Limitations of Actions, § 130, the following rule is stated:
3. It follows, therefore, that the statute of limitation commenced to run against plaintiff on December 8, 1919, the date it is claimed the loan was made. The original complaint in this case was filed on August 12, 1953, or approximately 34 years after the statute began to run.
4. However, plaintiff contends that the running of the statute of limitation was tolled by an oral agreement that was made between himself and the borrower, G.H. Ricker, on October 19, 1924. The statute had been running against plaintiff for approximately 5 years at that time. The agreement alleged to have been made on October 19, 1924, was a new contract between the parties. This contract was not evidenced by any writing which was signed by G.H. Ricker. For that reason, the evidence of such oral agreement was insufficient to toll the running of the statute.
Section 1-222, OCLA (ORS 12.230) provides:
According to the allegations of the amended complaint, the last payment by the borrower upon the loan, either as principal or interest, was made October 19, 1924, or approximately 29 years prior to the time action was commenced. Hence, it appears from the complaint itself that at the time plaintiff commenced his action, the statute of limitation had been running for approximately 29 years without interruption.
5, 6. Moreover, the alleged agreement of October 19, 1924, that G.H. Ricker would repay the loan when he "got on his feet", even had it been in writing, would not have tolled the running of the statute indefinitely. Under such an agreement, the money would have been repayable after a reasonable time. In 58 CJS 878, Money Lent, § 3a, this rule is stated as follows:
Also see Samuels v. Larrimore, 11 Cal App 337, 104 P 1001, 1002.
It could hardly be contended that 29 years was a reasonable time, either as a question of fact or of law.
7. In the light of the statutes of this state, and the decisions of this court construing them, it is settled that ordinarily when it appears on the face of the complaint that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitation, the objection must be raised by a *424 demurrer based upon that particular ground, and, if not so raised, the objection is waived.
However, it must be kept in mind that this action is based upon a claim presented against the estate of G.H. Ricker, deceased. Although the complaint is not very definite as to the form and contents of the claim presented to the defendant-executrix, we gather from its allegations that the claim was in substantially the same terms as those presented by the complaint. Therefore, upon the face of the claim as presented to the executrix it clearly appeared that the debt had been barred by the statute of limitation.
Oregon Revised Statutes 116.555 provides:
8. This statute is mandatory. Under its plain terms, the defendant was expressly prohibited from allowing plaintiff's claim. It is such a claim as cannot be enforced against the estate of decedent. The defendant could not waive the statutory ban.
9. The statute in question is a special statute dealing with a particular subject; whereas, ORS 16.260 and 16.330 are statutes of general application. Under well-recognized rules of statutory construction, the provisions of ORS 116.555 would be controlling. State ex rel. Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or 163, 269 P2d 491; State v. Preston, 103 Or 631, 637, 206 P 304, 306, 23 ALR 414; 82 CJS 834, Statutes, § 367b.
10. It appearing upon the face of the amended complaint that the alleged cause of action was based upon a claim against the estate that was not a valid and *425 enforceable demand, it follows that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and was subject to demurrer on that ground.
The trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action.
The judgment is affirmed.