Case Title: Estate of Stewart v. Caldwell

Citation: 271 So. 2d 754

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1972-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
271 So. 2d 754 (1972)
In re ESTATE OF Ruth Y. STEWART, Deceased, Petitioner,
v.
Manley P. CALDWELL, As Administrator C.T.A. of the Estate of Ruth Y. Stewart, Respondent.
No. 40839.

Supreme Court of Florida.
October 18, 1972.
Rehearing Denied February 7, 1973.
*755 Joseph D. Farish, Jr., of Farish & Farish, West Palm Beach, and Ryan, Taylor, Booker & Law, North Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Fletcher G. Rush, and W. Scott Gabrielson of Rush, Marshall, Bergstrom & Robison, Orlando, Manley P. Caldwell, Jr., of Caldwell, Pacetti, Barrow & Salisbury, Palm Beach, Irwin L. Langbein, and John A. Gentry, III, of Moyle, Gentry, Jones & Flanigan, West Palm Beach, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported at 242 So. 2d 781. The decision sought to be reviewed conflicts with King v. Palm Beach Bank & Trust Co.,[1] giving this Court jurisdiction under § 4, Article V, of the Florida Constitution F.S.A.
Petitioner, Thomas Young, brought suit in the County Judge's Court, Palm Beach County, for construction and revocation of probate of a portion of the Last Will and Testament of his sister, Ruth Y. Stewart. The fifth paragraph of the Will, the portion in question, provides as follows:
The testatrix died March 1, 1968, and her will was admitted to probate on March 20, 1968. Thereafter, Young petitioned for construction and revocation of a portion of the Will, renouncing any disposition and bequest made to him under the Will and seeking to have the Fifth paragraph revoked and declared invalid. On December 19, 1968, William A. Shea, holder of the power of appointment designated in the Fifth paragraph of the Will, filed a revocable designation of those relatives and corporations which were to take the principal of the Trust at its termination.
The Probate Judge entered an order holding paragraph Fifth (e) null and void as violating the rule against perpetuities and further holding that the power of appointment given to Shea could not be exercised until the death of the brother of the testatrix. The trial court found it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the power of appointment was impossible of performance because of ill-defined, vague and ambiguous classes of recipients described therein.
On appeal the District Court correctly held that the power of appointment did not violate the rule against perpetuities.[2] However, the District Court erred in holding that the purported exercise of the power of appointment by Shea prior to the death of the testatrix' brother was valid. This holding creates conflict with the rule of King v. Palm Beach Bank & Trust Co., supra, wherein it was held:[3]
The power of appointment given Shea under the Will is a naked power not coupled with an interest, in that he neither has nor acquires, any estate in the interest *757 to be disposed of.[4] The power is also classified, as the Court below correctly held, as a special power of appointment, in that it is a power to appoint among members of a class or classes specified in the Will.[5] Unlike a general power, a special power of appointment cannot be exercised in favor of the donee or his estate.[6] The trial court was also correct in holding as follows:
The recognized practical use of powers of appointment in testamentary dispositions is to provide flexibility in an estate so as to allow for change of conditions which may occur after the death of the owner of the property. Premature exercise of a power of appointment violates the purpose and intent of the donor.
Despite the need for flexibility, however, there are limitations on the degree of ambiguity and lack of specificity that can be upheld in a special power of appointment.[7] Paragraph Fifth (e) of the Will in the instant case exceeds those limitations. The power to appoint to "such of my relatives as may then be surviving", standing alone, might be subject to interpretation and enforcement on behalf of such a class. The cumulative effect, however, of the whole named and ill-defined classes renders the entire provision invalid.
Our decision essentially affirms the holding of the trial court, except that portion relating to the rule against perpetuities. Since there has been no determination below on the disposition of the residual interest covered by the invalid power of appointment, the cause must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings establishing the rightful heirs of the testatrix.
Accordingly, the decision sought to be reviewed is quashed in part and affirmed *758 in part and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
ROBERTS, C.J., and ERVIN, J., dissent.
[1]  92 Fla. 414, 109 So. 580 (1926).
[2]  In re Estate of Stewart, 242 So. 2d 781, 784 (Fla.App.4th 1971): "As long as Shea makes a valid designation the interest can and must vest within the time prescribed by the rule. The court cannot void a power where the vesting must happen, if at all, within the rule. `If at all' are the life-giving words to an interest, where the only possible way it can vest falls within the rule and the only alternative is that it can never vest. In this event it would vest by intestacy. The power granted herein does not violate the rule against perpetuities."
[3]  92 Fla. 414, 416, 109 So. 580, 581 (1926).
[4]  25 Fla.Jur. Powers § 3: "A power simply collateral and without interest, or a naked power, exists when authority is given to a mere stranger to dispose of an interest that he neither has nor acquires in any estate whatsoever. But when the power is given to a person who derives under the instrument creating the power, or otherwise, a present or future interest in the property, the subject on which the power is to act, it is then a power coupled with an interest. A distinguishing feature of a naked power not coupled with an interest is that every prerequisite to the exercise of such power must be strictly observed."
[5]  Phipps v. Palm Beach Trust Co., 142 Fla. 782, 196 So. 299 (1940).
[6]  Sims & Smith, Future Interest § 876 (2nd Ed. 1956).
[7]  62 Am.Jur.2d Powers § 7: "To create a valid power, either beneficial or in trust, it is indispensable that the object or objects to be benefited by its execution shall be specified in or be clearly ascertainable from the instrument by which the power is atempted to be created. For the creation of a valid power in trust, it is essential that its execution be beneficial to some person or class of persons other than the grantee of the power who can compel the due execution of the trust, which person or class of persons must be designated in or be clearly ascertainable from the instrument by which the power is created."