Case Title: Harrell v. Scheidt

Citation: 243 N.C. 735, 92 S.E.2d 182

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1956-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
92 S.E.2d 182 (1956)
243 N.C. 735
Jasper Hymrick HARRELL
v.
Edward SCHEIDT, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
No. 235.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
April 11, 1956.
*183 William B. Rodman, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Giles, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant-appellant.
Talmadge L. Narron, Narron & Narron, Wilson, for plaintiff-appellee.
PARKER, Justice.
G.S. § 20-138 provides that "it shall be unlawful and punishable, as provided in § 20-179, for any person * * * who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, to drive any vehicle upon the highways within the State."
G.S. § 20-179 provides that for the first offense of violating the provisions of G.S. § 20-138 the punishment shall be a fine of not less than $100 or imprisonment for not less than 30 days, or both, in the discretion of the court; for the second violation of the same offense the punishment shall be a fine of not less than $200 or imprisonment for not less than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court; and for a third or subsequent conviction of the same offense the punishment shall be a fine of not less *184 than $500 or by both fine and imprisonment in the court's discretion.
The relevant part of G.S. § 20-24(a) reads: "Whenever any person is convicted of any offense for which this article", Article 2, Uniform Driver's License Act, "makes mandatory the revocation of the operator's or chauffeur's license of such person by the Department, the court in which such conviction is had shall require the surrender to it of all operators' and chauffeurs' licenses then held by the person so convicted and the court shall thereupon forward the same, together with a record of such conviction, to the Department." The Department referred to is the Department of Motor Vehicles.
G.S. § 20-17 is captioned "Mandatory revocation of license by Department", and reads: "The Department shall forthwith revoke the license of any operator or chauffeur upon receiving a record of such operator's or chauffeur's conviction for any of the following offenses when such conviction has become final: * * * 2. Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug."
G.S. § 20-19 is captioned "Period of suspension or revocation", and the pertinent part thereof reads: "(d) When a license is revoked because of a second conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug, the period of revocation shall be three years."
The facts we have stated are those found by Judge Bone. As to the facts of the case there seems to have been no dispute, for neither party has excepted to his findings.
The defendant's only assignment of error is to the judgment. That brings here for review two questions: one, do the facts found support the judgment, and two, does any fatal error of law appear upon the face of the record? Bailey v. Bailey, 243 N.C. 412, 90 S.E.2d 696; Bond v. Bond, 235 N.C. 754, 71 S.E.2d 53.
We have presented for determination the sole question, whether the revocation of the operator's license of the plaintiff for three years, is, under the mandatory provisions of G.S. § 20-17, subd. 2, and G.S. § 20-19(d), a part of the punishment for the crime charged in the warrant issued by the Mayor's Court for the Town of Farmville.
The enactment of the North Carolina Uniform Driver's License Act, G.S., Ch. 20, Article 2, was designed under the police power of the State to safeguard the use of our highways from those who are not qualified to operate motor vehicles, from those guilty of certain violations of our statutes regulating the use of motor vehicles, e. g. manslaughter resulting from the criminally negligent operation of an automobile, drunken driving, etc., to exercise some measure of control over such operators, and generally to make uniform, so far as practicable, the granting or withholding of this privilege to operate a motor vehicle in furtherance of the safety of the users of the State's highways.
In Commonwealth v. Ellett, 174 Va. 403, 4 S.E.2d 762, 767, the Court said: "The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways is a common right, but the exercise of that right may be regulated or controlled in the interest of public safety under the police power of the State. The operation of a motor vehicle on such highways is not a natural right. It is a conditional privilege, which may be suspended or revoked under the police power. The license or permit to so operate is not a contract or property right in a constitutional sense."
In State v. McDaniels, 219 N.C. 763, 14 S.E.2d 793, 794, it is said: "The Legislature has full authority to prescribe the conditions upon which it" (a driver's license) "will be issued and to designate the court or agency through which and the conditions upon which it will be revoked."
G.S. Ch. 20, Art. 2, Uniform Driver's License Act, vests exclusively in the State Department of Motor Vehicles the issuance, suspension and revocation of licenses to operate motor vehicles. Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 31, 84 S.E.2d 259; State v. Warren, 230 N.C. 299, 52 S.E.2d 879. Therefore, the courts have no authority to issue, *185 suspend or revoke a driver's license to operate a motor vehicle. State v. McDaniels, supra; State v. Cooper, 224 N.C. 100, 29 S.E.2d 18; State v. Warren, supra; State v. Cole, 241 N.C. 576, 86 S.E.2d 203.
"A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege in the nature of a right of which the licensee may not be deprived save in the manner and upon the conditions prescribed by statute." In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584, 589, 46 S.E.2d 696, 699. In this case the Court also said: "No right accrues to a licensee who petitions for review of the order of the department when it acts under the terms of G.S. § 20-17, for then its action is mandatory. The court is granted authority to review only suspensions and revocations by the department in the exercise of its discretionary power. G.S. § 20-25."
Under our decisions the revocation of a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a part of, nor within the limits of punishment to be fixed by the court, wherein the offender is tried. When the conviction has become final, the revocation of a driver's license by the Department of Motor Vehicles is a measure flowing from the police power of the State designed to protect users of the State's highways. G.S. § 20-179, which provides the punishment for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, appears under Art. 3, Part 12Penaltiesof G.S. Ch. 20, Motor Vehicles, and G.S. § 20-17Mandatory Revocation of License by Departmentand G.S. § 20-19Period of Suspension or Revocationappear under Art. 2Uniform Driver's License Actof the same chapter of G.S.
In Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393, 395, it was held that the revocation of an automobile driver's license following a conviction on a charge of leaving the scene of an accident in violation of the State statute, was not part of the penalty for the criminal offense. In holding that a pardon did not restore or revive the revoked license the Court said:
See also Prawdzik v. City of Grand Rapids, 313 Mich. 376, 21 N.W.2d 168, 165 A.L.R. 1165, where is quoted the same part of the opinion in Prichard v. Battle, supra, that we have quoted; see, also, Parker v. State Highway Department, 224 S.C. 263, 78 S.E.2d 382.
Commonwealth v. Ellett, supra, is directly in point. On 21 September 1935, Ellett was convicted in the Police Court of the City of Richmond of operating a motor vehicle upon the highways of the State while intoxicated. He was fined $100 and costs. Upon receiving a report of this conviction the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles entered an order, pursuant to the Virginia Code 1936, section 4722, revoking for one year the operator's license of Ellett. On 8 May 1936, within a year of the former conviction, and in the same court, Ellett was again convicted of a similar offense, committed after 21 September 1935. The conviction carried a penalty of one month in jail and a fine of $100 and costs. Although the penalty imposed was applicable to either a first or second offense, no reference was made to the prior conviction in the second warrant, or in the judgment of conviction thereon. Upon receiving a report of the conviction of 8 May 1936, the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles entered another order revoking Ellett's operator's license for a period of three years from the date of the last conviction, 8 May 1936. On 17 December 1938, less than three years after the last conviction, Ellett applied to the Director in writing for a new operator's license. The Director denied the application on 20 December 1938, on the sole ground that two convictions of driving under the influence of intoxicants automatically revoked the offender's license for three years from the *187 date of the last conviction, regardless of whether or not the offender had been charged with a second offense upon his trial for the latter offense. In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond the Director's decision was reversed. To that judgment the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia awarded a writ of error. Ellett contended, as the plaintiff here contends, that his last conviction was a conviction for a first offense since the warrant did not allege the last offense to be a second offense, and conviction thereof deprived him merely of the right to secure a permit to operate a motor vehicle for a period of one year from the date of conviction. The two judgments of conviction of Ellett and of the plaintiff are final, and are now matters of record. Within the limits prescribed by law, the trial court fixed the measure of punishment in Ellett's two cases and in plaitiff's two cases. The penalty of Ellett and of the plaintiff of being deprived of the right to operate a motor vehicle is not a part of, nor within the limits of the punishment to be fixed by a court. The Virginia Court said: "We are not dealing with the degree of gravity of the accused's guilt upon either conviction, but with the effect of the two separate and distinct convictions upon his rights as a citizen." Farther on in the opinion the Court said:
To make a person subject to the infliction of the heavier punishment to be imposed by the court for a second offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, pursuant to G.S. § 20-179, it is necessary that a prior conviction be alleged in the indictment or warrant for the second offense. State v. Cole, supra. The object of the allegation is to put the accused on notice that proof of his prior conviction will be introduced, not for proving the offense subsequent in point of time, but for the purpose of imposing a heavier punishment by the court, if the later or following offense is proved. Such a rule permits the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and allows evidence to go before the jury showing the gravity of a repeated offense. Keeney v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 678, 684, 137 S.E. 478. This rule, of course, can be effective only when the prosecuting attorney for the State has knowledge of the prior conviction.
That rule of law has no application to the instant case for G.S. § 20-138 and G.S. § 20-179 nowhere provide that the court as a part of the punishment can revoke an operator's license to operate a motor vehicle. The provisions of G.S. § 20-17, Mandatory revocation of license by Department, become effective only after judgments of conviction have become final. Equally mandatory is the provision of G.S. § 20-19(d): "When a license is revoked because of a second conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug, the period of revocation shall be three years." (Italics added.) These statutes, § G.S. 20-17 and G.S. § 20-19(d) emphasize the effect of a conviction, and the result following the imposition of punishment fixed by the court in the judgment on the conviction. No action or order of the court is required to put the revocation of license into effect. It is not dependent on evidence to convict. The record of a conviction, which has become final, suffices to invoke the ministerial duty of performing the mandatory requirements of the statutes by the Department.
A plea of guilty is "equivalent to a conviction." State v. Brinkley, 193 N.C. 747, 138 S.E. 138, 139. In State v. Robinson, 224 N.C. 412, 30 S.E.2d 320, 321, this Court, quoting 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, par. 272, p. 952, said: "`A plea of guilty, accepted and entered by the court, is a conviction or the equivalent of a conviction of the highest order.'"
The case of Cedergren v. Clarke, 99 N.H. 421, 112 A.2d 882, 883, is distinguishable. The New Hampshire statute differs from ours. As the New Hampshire Supreme Court said in its opinion: "The provisions both for the heavier penalties and for ineligibility for a license for three years are contained in the same sentence of the statute."
It is said in Annotation 10 A.L.R.2d at page 842: "Statutes not requiring or not providing for notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of a license to operate a motor vehicle have been generally sustained as against various constitutional objections."
The facts found do not support the conclusions of law and the judgment. For the foregoing reasons the judgment complained will be reversed, and all the facts being before this Court, a final judgment will be entered in the court below dismissing plaintiff's action with the costs to be taxed against him.
Reversed and remanded for final judgment.
DEVIN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.