Case Title: AKG Real Estate, LLC v. Patrick J. Kosterman

Citation: 2006 WI 106

Docket Number: 2004AP000188

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 106 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP188 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
AKG Real Estate, LLC, a limited liability  
company,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
     v. 
Patrick J. Kosterman and Susan A.  
Kosterman,  
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 232 
Reported at:  277 Wis. 2d 509, 691 N.W.2d 711 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 14, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 15, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Charles H. Constantine 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-respondents-cross-appellants-petitioners 
there were briefs by Daniel Kelly, J. Bushnell Nielsen and 
Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument 
by Daniel Kelly. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent there was a 
brief by Robert E. Hankel and Hankel, Bjelajac, Kallenbach, 
Lehner & Koenen, L.L.C., Racine, and oral argument by Robert E. 
Hankel. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by M. Elizabeth Winters, 
Daniel W. Hildebrand, and DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C., Madison, 
on behalf of the Village of Merrimac. 
2006 WI 106
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP188   
(L.C. No. 
2002CV1887) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
AKG Real Estate, LLC, a limited liability 
company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Patrick J. Kosterman and Susan A. Kosterman, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 14, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case presents the question 
whether an express easement may be relocated or terminated 
without the consent of the dominant estate.  In a published 
decision,1 the court of appeals held that a servient estate could 
unilaterally terminate an express right-of-way easement once the 
servient estate provided an alternate route of ingress and 
                                                 
1 AKG Real Estate, LLC v. Kosterman, 2004 WI App 232, 277 
Wis. 2d 509, 691 N.W.2d 711.  
No. 2004AP188  
2 
 
egress to the dominant estate.  We reverse the court of appeals 
because we conclude that the owner of a servient estate cannot 
unilaterally relocate or terminate an express easement. 
I 
¶2 
We begin this case about easements by reviewing 
several key terms.  An easement (or servitude) is an interest 
that encumbers the land of another.  McCormick v. Schubring, 
2003 WI 149, ¶8, 267 Wis. 2d 141, 672 N.W.2d 63 (citing Ludke v. 
Egan, 87 Wis. 2d 221, 227, 274 N.W.2d 641 (1979)).  It is a 
liberty, privilege, or advantage in lands, without profit, and 
existing distinct from the ownership of the land.  Id.; Schwab 
v. Timmons, 224 Wis. 2d 27, 35-36, 589 N.W.2d 1 (1999); Stoesser 
v. Shore Drive P'ship, 172 Wis. 2d 660, 667, 494 N.W.2d 204 
(1993). 
¶3 
An easement creates two distinct property interests——
the dominant estate, which enjoys the privileges as to other 
land granted by an easement, and the servient estate, which 
permits 
the 
exercise 
of 
those 
privileges. 
 
Schwab, 
224 
Wis. 2d at 36. 
¶4 
In the spring of 2000, Patrick and Susan Kosterman 
(the Kostermans) purchased a house on a four-acre lot from 
Edward and Audrey Chvilicek (the Chviliceks).  The Kostermans' 
property (the Dominant Estate) lacked access to a public road 
except by means of three recorded, physically overlapping 
easements across part of an 80-acre parcel of land (the Servient 
Estate), which partially surrounded their property. 
No. 2004AP188  
3 
 
¶5 
Nearly 50 years ago the Dominant Estate and the 
Servient Estate were under common ownership.  Some time prior to 
1960, Louis and Angeline Chvilicek bought approximately 84 acres 
of vacant land along Highway 31 in Racine County.  In August of 
1960 Louis and Angeline deeded the four-acre Dominant Estate to 
their son and daughter-in-law, the Chviliceks, and granted the 
Dominant Estate a 30-foot-wide easement over the 80-acre 
Servient Estate, because the Dominant Estate lacked access to a 
public road.   
¶6 
In 1961 Louis and Angeline granted the Chviliceks a 
second right-of-way easement along the same course as the 1960 
easement.  This second easement was 66 feet wide.  By increasing 
the width of the easement, Louis and Angeline made it possible 
for the easement to be converted into a public road.   
¶7 
When Louis Chvilicek died, Angeline conveyed to the 
Chviliceks, as tenants-in-common, a 50 percent interest in the 
Servient Estate.  Angeline conveyed the other 50 percent 
interest in the property to her daughter and son-in-law, Joyce 
and Vincent White.  When Joyce and Vincent died, their interest 
in the Servient Estate transferred into the Vincent J. White 
Trust (the Trust). 
¶8 
In 1997 AKG Real Estate, LLC (AKG) offered to purchase 
the Servient Estate from the Chviliceks and the Trust, with the 
intention of developing a subdivision.  AKG purchased the entire 
Servient Estate from the Chviliceks and the Trust in January 
1998 by warranty deed and trustee's deed.  The 1998 deeds 
No. 2004AP188  
4 
 
expressly recognized a 30-foot-wide private road easement on the 
same location as the 1960 and 1961 easements: 
Reserving therefrom a private road easement for the 
benefit 
of 
Edward 
T. 
Chvilicek 
and 
Audrey 
M. 
Chvilicek, husband and wife, their heirs and assigns, 
or subsequent owners . . . until such time as public 
road access is made available for said real estate 
upon the following described easement of right of 
way . . . . 
In addition, the two deeds reserved to the grantors (including 
the Chviliceks) all "recorded and/or existing easements and 
right of way reservations[.]"   
¶9 
While AKG was planning to develop the land, the 
Chviliceks sold the Dominant Estate to the Kostermans in 2000.  
Initially, AKG's development plan depicted two public roads 
connecting with Highway 31 from the planned subdivision.  The 
first was along the path of the Kostermans' easements and the 
second, to the north, was at what is presently Cobblestone 
Drive.2  After meeting with Racine County officials, however, AKG 
realized that the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) 
was unlikely to approve a public road along the Kostermans' 
easements because Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 233.06 (Jan., 2004)3 
                                                 
2 On the initial subdivision plats, Cobblestone Drive was 
labeled Louis Drive.  We will refer to the road as Cobblestone 
Drive. 
3 Wisconsin Admin. Code § Trans 233.06(2) provides: 
The 
department 
shall 
determine 
a 
minimum 
allowable distance between connections with the state 
trunk highway or connecting highway, between any 2 
highways within the land division and between a 
highway within the land division and any existing or 
No. 2004AP188  
5 
 
requires a minimum distance of 1000 feet between roads that 
connect to state highways.  If a public road affording access to 
Highway 31 were constructed over the Kostermans' easements, the 
road would have been within 600 feet of Valley Road to the 
south, and within 300 feet of Cobblestone Drive to the north.   
¶10 After determining DOT would not consent to a public 
road located along the Kostermans' easements, AKG altered its 
subdivision plans and proposed to give the Kostermans access to 
Highway 
31 
via 
a 
cul-de-sac, 
which 
would 
connect 
with 
Cobblestone Drive, which in turn would connect with Highway 31.  
Under this plan, AKG would develop about seven lots over the 
Kostermans' easements and the Kostermans would be required to 
reconfigure their driveway so that it connected with AKG's 
proposed cul-de-sac.  Before AKG could get the necessary 
governmental approval for its subdivision plat, however, the 
Kostermans needed to release their easement rights to AKG, or 
agree to move the location of the easements.  To date, the 
Kostermans have refused to modify their right-of-way easements 
to accommodate AKG's development plans. 
¶11 The Kostermans objected to relocating the easements 
for several reasons in addition to requiring them to reconfigure 
their 
driveway. 
 
AKG's 
development 
plan 
would 
put 
the 
Kostermans' house in an odd position relative to the cul-de-sac 
                                                                                                                                                             
planned highway.  To the extent practicable, the 
department shall require a distance of at least 1,000 
feet between connections with a state trunk highway or 
connecting highway.  
No. 2004AP188  
6 
 
and the neighboring houses, require them to change their street 
address, and replace their direct access to Highway 31 with a 
circuitous route.  Consequently, AKG again modified its plans to 
develop 
the 
subdivision. 
 
The 
modified 
plan 
calls 
for 
development to occur in two phases, the second of which awaits 
the denouement of this litigation. 
¶12 In response to 
the 
Kostermans' unwillingness to 
relocate or terminate their easements, AKG sought a declaratory 
judgment that the easements terminated once AKG provided 
alternate public road access to the Dominant Estate.  The 
Kostermans counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the 
1960 and 1961 easements would remain in effect even if AKG 
provided an alternate means of ingress and egress to the 
Dominant Estate.  The Kostermans moved for summary judgment.  On 
summary judgment, the Racine County Circuit Court, Charles H. 
Constantine, Judge, ruled that the 1998 easement would terminate 
once AKG provided public road access, regardless of the 
location, but the 1961 easement of 66 feet would remain in 
effect even after AKG provided the Dominant Estate with 
alternate public road access.  Both parties appealed. 
¶13 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
holding that the 1998 easement terminated once AKG provided 
public road access, but it reversed the circuit court's holding 
that 
the 
1961 
easement 
would 
continue. 
 
Kosterman, 
277 
Wis. 2d 509, ¶55.  First, the court of appeals concluded the 
1998 easement was unambiguous and that it terminated once AKG 
afforded the Dominant Estate public road access regardless of 
No. 2004AP188  
7 
 
the location.  Kosterman, 277 Wis. 2d 509, ¶¶37-39.  Second, the 
court of appeals held that both the 1961 and the 1998 easements 
should be modified under the doctrine of changed conditions to 
avoid a "grossly inefficient allocation of resources."  Id., 
¶¶40, 53.  Central to the court of appeals conclusion was its 
assessment that "the miniscule benefits the Kostermans derive 
impose aggregate costs far in excess of the sum total of 
benefits to all concerned parties."  Id., ¶52.  Accordingly, the 
court of appeals modified the easement created by the 1960 deed 
as well as the 1961 easement so that both easements would 
terminate once the Dominant Estate received alternate public 
road access.  Id., ¶53.  The Kostermans petitioned for review. 
II 
¶14 This case comes to us on summary judgment.  We review 
a 
circuit 
court's 
grant 
or 
denial 
of 
summary 
judgment 
independently of the circuit court or court of appeals, applying 
the same methodology as the circuit court.  O'Neill v. Reemer, 
2003 WI 13, ¶8, 259 Wis. 2d 544, 657 N.W.2d 403.  Summary 
judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  Resolution of this case 
requires interpretation of the documents creating the 1961 and 
1998 easements.  Here, both the circuit court and the court of 
appeals decided the 1961 and 1998 easements were unambiguous.  
See Kosterman, 277 Wis. 2d 509, ¶¶36, 43.  Whether a deed or 
other instrument is ambiguous is a question of law we review 
independently.  See Gojmerac v. Mahn, 2002 WI App 22, ¶24, 250 
No. 2004AP188  
8 
 
Wis. 2d 1, 640 N.W.2d 178 (Ct. App. 2001).  If the language of a 
deed is unambiguous, its construction is also a question of law.  
Rikkers v. Ryan, 76 Wis. 2d 185, 188, 251 N.W.2d 25 (1977). 
III 
 
¶15 Two easements are at issue in this case: (1) the 30-
foot easement reserved in 1998; and (2) the 66-foot easement 
created 
in 
1961. 
 
Both 
easements 
are 
express 
easements 
(easements by written grant or reservation).4  As the court of 
appeals recognized, if the 1961 easement remains in effect, it 
is unnecessary to consider under what conditions the 1998 
easement terminates.  Because we conclude that the 1961 easement 
is unambiguous and that it survived the 1998 deeds, we begin and 
end with the terms of the 1961 easement. 
 
¶16 The 1961 conveyance to the Chviliceks created an 
express easement of right of way.  The instrument states Louis 
and Angeline Chvilicek "[d]o give, grant and convey unto [Edward 
and Audrey Chvilicek], and to their heirs and assigns forever, 
an ease of rt of way for purposes of ingress and egress upon the 
fol desc real est," after which follows a metes and bounds 
description of the easement.5 
                                                 
4 In 
addition 
to express 
easements, common 
types of 
easements 
include 
prescriptive 
easements, 
easements 
by 
necessity, and easements by implication.  See Jesse S. Ishikawa, 
Wisconsin Law of Easements § 2.1 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the 
ways in which easements are created).  
5 A metes and bounds description defines a parcel by 
describing the courses and directions of its boundaries, and is 
most often used when a parcel has an irregular shape.  1 
Property Assessment Manual for Wisconsin Assessors, ch. 5, at 5-
8 (2005). 
No. 2004AP188  
9 
 
 
¶17 In attacking the continued vitality of the 1961 
easement, AKG makes two distinct arguments.  First, AKG argues 
that changed circumstances frustrate the purpose of the 1961 
easement, requiring that the court modify the easement so that 
it will terminate once AKG provides the Kostermans with 
alternate access to a public road.  Second, AKG argues that when 
it purchased the Servient Estate in 1998, the 1998 deeds 
released the 1960 and 1961 easements.  We address each argument. 
A. 
Should the 1961 Easement Be Terminated under the Doctrine 
of Changed Conditions? 
 
¶18 AKG urges the court to adopt the changed conditions 
doctrine set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Servitudes § 7.10 (2000).  Section 7.10 of the Restatement 
states: 
(1) When a change has taken place since the 
creation of a servitude that makes it impossible as a 
practical matter to accomplish the purpose for which 
the servitude was created, a court may modify the 
servitude to permit the purpose to be accomplished.  
If modification is not practicable, or would not be 
effective, 
a 
court 
may 
terminate 
the 
servitude.  
Compensation for resulting harm to the beneficiaries 
may be awarded as a condition of modifying or 
terminating the servitude. 
(2) If the purpose of a servitude can be 
accomplished, but because of changed conditions the 
servient estate is no longer suitable for uses 
permitted by the servitude, a court may modify the 
servitude 
to 
permit 
other uses 
under 
conditions 
designed to preserve the benefits of the original 
servitude. 
¶19 Subsection (1) reflects the common law rule that an 
easement for a particular purpose terminates when it becomes 
No. 2004AP188  
10 
 
impossible to use the easement for the purpose intended in the 
granting 
instrument. 
 
Restatement 
(Third) 
of 
Property: 
Servitudes § 7.10, at 399 (Reporter's Note) (noting that 
traditionally 
courts terminate 
easements when the purpose 
becomes impossible to accomplish rather than by resort to the 
changed conditions doctrine); 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and 
Licenses § 96 (2004) ("An easement granted for a particular 
purpose normally terminates as soon as such purpose . . . is 
rendered impossible of accomplishment."). 
¶20 In contrast, prior to the Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes, the rule set forth in subsection (2) was 
traditionally not used to terminate easements.  Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Servitudes § 7.10 cmt. a; Susan F. French, 
Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient 
Strands, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261, 1269, 1301 (1982) (noting 
there is nothing comparable to the changed conditions doctrine 
of equitable covenants in easement law);6 see also Cortese v. 
United States, 782 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1986) (implying that 
covenants, but not easements, are subject to the doctrine of 
changed conditions).  Subsection (2) permits an easement to be 
terminated——where changed conditions exist——because the easement 
has become unreasonably burdensome upon the servient estate, 
obsolete, or economically wasteful.  See French, supra at 1316. 
                                                 
6 Professor French was the Reporter for the Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Servitudes. 
No. 2004AP188  
11 
 
¶21 AKG appears to argue that the 1961 easement should be 
terminated or modified under both standards, impossibility of 
purpose and changed circumstances, suggesting that the latter 
leads to the former.  We conclude that the easements should not 
be modified or terminated under Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Servitudes § 7.10(1) or (2). 
1. 
Should the 1961 Easement Be Terminated Because It Is 
Impossible to Fulfill Its Purpose? 
¶22 AKG contends that the purpose of the 1961 easement was 
to provide ingress and egress until public road access was 
provided but that subsequent developments have rendered the 
easement useless for this purpose because DOT regulations make 
it impossible to construct a public road along the course of the 
easement.  AKG emphasizes two changed conditions.  First, in 
1995 the Chviliceks deeded a portion of the 66-foot-wide 
easement to the State of Wisconsin and agreed that a public road 
could not be placed where the 1961 easement intersected with 
Highway 31.  Second, as of 1999 the DOT assumed increased 
oversight of compliance with Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 233.06.  
According to AKG, these two facts make it impossible for the 
easement to become a public road, defeating the purpose of the 
easement.  Therefore, given the Kostermans' refusal to bargain 
over relocating the easements, AKG contends it is appropriate 
for a court to modify the easements. 
 
¶23 We 
disagree 
with 
AKG's 
characterization 
of 
the 
easements.  The first step in analyzing impossibility of purpose 
is to determine the purpose of the easement.  Jon W. Bruce & 
No. 2004AP188  
12 
 
James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land 
§ 10:8, at 10-15 (2001).  Contrary to AKG's assertion, the 
primary purpose of the 1961 easement is not to become a public 
road.  Rather, the primary purpose of this easement is to 
provide ingress and egress to the Dominant Estate over a 
specifically described course.  The plain text of the 1961 
instrument creates "an ease[ment of right of way] for purposes 
of ingress and egress . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  That valid 
purpose has not been extinguished, frustrated, or otherwise 
rendered impossible to fulfill. 
¶24 The court of appeals erred by concluding that the 
purpose of the easement was to authorize a public road.  True, 
the 1961 easement made it possible to convert the private road 
into a public road.  But, the 1961 easement did not change the 
overriding purpose of the easement from providing ingress and 
egress to providing a public road. 
¶25 Next, AKG appears to shift ground, arguing that the 
1961 easement should be terminated once its purpose——to provide 
ingress and egress to the Dominant Estate——can be accomplished 
by an alternative course; that is, once the easement becomes 
unnecessary it should terminate.  AKG's position, however, is 
contrary to longstanding Wisconsin easement law, which holds 
that an express easement does not terminate even when the 
necessity or purpose of the easement ceases.  Niedfeldt v. 
Evans, 272 Wis. 362, 364, 75 N.W.2d 307 (1956). 
¶26 In Niedfeldt the defendant owned a prescriptive right 
of way across the plaintiff's land.  Id. at 363.  Once public 
No. 2004AP188  
13 
 
road access was provided to the defendant's property, the 
plaintiff constructed a fence across the easement and brought 
suit 
for 
trespass 
against 
the 
defendant, 
claiming 
the 
prescriptive easement terminated once alternate public road 
access became available.  Id. at 364.  The court rejected the 
plaintiff's contention that a prescriptive easement terminates 
when the necessity for the easement ceases.  Id. at 365. 
¶27 Central to Niedfeldt were the distinctions among 
easements of necessity, easements for a particular purpose, 
prescriptive easements, and express easements.  See id. at 364-
65.  The circumstances under which an easement can be modified 
or terminated depend upon the type of easement.  "Thus, if an 
easement is granted for a particular purpose only, the right 
continues while the dominant tenement is used for that purpose, 
but ceases when the specified use ceases."  Id. at 364 (quoting 
17 Am. Jur., Easements § 137, at 1023).  "Moreover, a way of 
necessity is a temporary right in the sense that it continues 
only so long as the necessity exists."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶28 In contrast, neither a prescriptive easement nor an 
express easement can be modified or terminated solely because 
the necessity for the easement ceases.  Id. at 365.  Thus, 
"[t]he rule that the right ceases with necessity has no 
application 
to 
ways 
acquired 
by 
express 
grant 
or 
by 
prescription; a right to a way so created cannot be defeated by 
showing that the owners have another convenient and accessible 
way of going to and from their premises."  Id. (quoting 28 
C.J.S. Easements § 54, at 718) (emphasis added); Millen v. 
No. 2004AP188  
14 
 
Thomas, 201 Wis. 2d 675, 679, 550 N.W.2d 134 (Ct. App. 1996).  
Thus, even if AKG did provide alternate public road access to 
the Kostermans, the 1961 easement would remain in force, because 
an express easement continues regardless of whether the dominant 
estate needs the easement. 
 
¶29 The Niedfeldt court acknowledged the rule that an 
easement can terminate with the cessation of the particular 
purpose for which the easement is granted, Niedfeldt, 262 
Wis. 2d at 364, but that is not the case here.  In the 40-plus 
years since the easement was granted, the owners of the Dominant 
Estate have used the easement for ingress and egress.  No 
circumstances have changed to frustrate this purpose or render 
it impossible.  The Kostermans continue to use the driveway 
created by the 1960 and 1961 easements, and they are not 
required to give up this use even if a reasonable alternative 
becomes available.  Another rule, that the right ceases with the 
necessity, has no application when the right was created not by 
"necessity" but by express grant.  Id. at 365.  As the court put 
it, "any offer to prove that the defendant [now] had another 
road to his farm would not defeat his easement and hence was 
immaterial."  Id. 
2. 
Should the Court Modify the Easement Because Changed 
Conditions Make It Unduly Burdensome upon the Servient Estate?  
 
¶30 AKG also requests that, regardless the language of the 
1961 
instrument, 
the 
court 
adopt 
Restatement 
(Third) 
of 
Property: Servitudes § 7.10(2), and thereby modify the easement 
because it inhibits the free and unrestricted use of property 
No. 2004AP188  
15 
 
and unreasonably burdens its property.  Alternatively, but in a 
closely related argument, AKG urges the court to modify the 1961 
easement pursuant to Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes 
§ 4.8(3).7 
 
¶31 We decline to apply either Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes §§ 7.10(2) or 4.8(3) to the facts of this 
case.   Even at the risk of sanctioning unneighborly and 
economically unproductive behavior, this court must safeguard 
                                                 
7 Section 4.8(3) states: 
 
Except where the location and dimensions are 
determined 
by 
the 
instrument 
or 
circumstances 
surrounding 
creation 
of 
a 
servitude, 
they 
are 
determined as follows: 
. . . .  
(3) Unless expressly denied by the terms of an 
easement, as defined in § 1.2, the owner of the 
servient estate is entitled to make reasonable changes 
in the location or dimensions of an easement, at the 
servient owner's expense, to permit normal use or 
development of the servient estate, but only if the 
changes do not 
(a) significantly lessen the utility of the 
easement, 
(b) increase the burdens on the owner of the 
easement in its use and enjoyment, or 
(c) frustrate the purpose for which the easement 
was created. 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, § 4.8(3).  Compared 
to Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, § 7.10(2), 
§ 4.8(3) arguably represents an even more radical departure from 
the majority rule because it allows a court to modify an 
easement without concluding that conditions have changed. 
No. 2004AP188  
16 
 
property rights.  See Schwab, 224 Wis. 2d at 41; Jacque v. 
Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 631, 563 N.W.2d 154 
(1997); Guse v. Flohr, 195 Wis. 139, 147, 217 N.W. 730 (1928).  
Thus, in Schwab we refused to impose a right-of-way easement of 
necessity across land adjoining the petitioners even though 
doing so effectively rendered the petitioners' land useless 
because the cost of providing alternative vehicular access was 
prohibitive.  Schwab, 224 Wis. 2d at 39-41.  In Jacque we upheld 
a $100,000 punitive-damages verdict despite nominal damages of 
$1 in order to protect property rights, where the defendant 
intentionally trespassed across the plaintiff's land to avoid 
the high cost of the alternative route.  Jacque, 209 Wis. 2d at 
631.  Similarly, in Guse we concluded that the dominant estate 
could not unilaterally modify a right-of-way easement even 
though doing so would have been economically beneficial to both 
the dominant estate and the servient estate.  Guse, 195 Wis. at 
147 ("[T]he refusal of the plaintiff to permit the removal of 
the 
fence 
to 
a 
point 
one 
rod 
farther 
south . . . is 
unneighborly, spiteful, and unreasonable.  However that may be, 
the legal rights of the plaintiff remain the same. . . .  There 
can be no balancing of equities in this case.").  Nothing in the 
host of cases AKG cites convinces us that we should sacrifice 
property rights in this case in favor of economic efficiency.  
As such, the court of appeals erred in placing overriding 
significance 
upon 
the 
need 
to 
prevent 
economic 
waste.  
Kosterman, 277 Wis. 2d 509, ¶1. 
No. 2004AP188  
17 
 
 
¶32 In support of its position, AKG relies upon M.P.M. 
Builders, LLC v. Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 2004), which 
concluded that four other jurisdictions had adopted or approved 
of Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.8(3), while 
only two jurisdictions had expressly rejected it.  Examination 
of Dwyer and the cases cited therein demonstrates that only in  
Dwyer did 
a 
court relocate 
an express easement with a 
specifically defined location. 
¶33 The cases Dwyer cites as adopting Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Servitudes § 4.8(3) evince a reluctance to relocate 
easements with a specifically agreed upon location.  See 
Burkhart v. Lillehaug, 664 N.W.2d 41, 44 (S.D. 2003) (noting the 
course of the right-of-way easement was not "surveyed, platted 
with specificity, or otherwise clearly established"); Roaring 
Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1236 (Colo. 
2001) ("under the Restatement, a burdened estate owner may 
unilaterally move an easement (unless it is specified in deeds 
or otherwise to have a location certain), subject both to a 
reasonableness 
test 
and 
to 
the 
constraints 
delimited 
in 
[§ 4.8(3)].") (emphasis added); Lewis v. Young, 705 N.E.2d 649, 
658, 662 (N.Y. 1998) (noting that if the parties intended the 
location of the easement to be fixed and not subject to 
unilateral relocation they should have described it by metes and 
bounds rather than as a driveway "running in a generally 
southwesterly direction"); Goodwin v. Johnson, 591 S.E.2d 34, 37 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (relocating an easement of necessity while 
No. 2004AP188  
18 
 
suggesting that express easements require mutual consent to be 
relocated). 
¶34 Dwyer, therefore, appears to stand alone.8  We decline 
to follow Dwyer because it would mean altering the longstanding 
default rule in Wisconsin that a servient estate cannot 
unilaterally 
relocate 
or 
terminate 
an 
express 
easement.  
Notably, even under the Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Servitudes § 4.8(3), parties can still prevent unilateral 
relocation by incorporating mutual consent requirements in their 
agreement.  See Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 
4.8(3) & cmt. a (noting the section merely supplies terms when 
omitted by the parties); see also Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d at 1058.  
The ability to contract around unilateral modification, as 
authorized by § 4.8(3), makes less convincing the argument that 
the interest in increased development of property should 
overcome the durability of easement rights.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that parties need not include a provision in an express 
easement to prevent unilateral modification or relocation.  
Absent any mention of modification or relocation in the 
instrument creating an easement, the rule is that the owner of 
the servient estate cannot unilaterally modify an express 
easement.  See Lehner v. Kozlowski, 245 Wis. 262, 266, 13 
N.W.2d 910 (1944); Guse, 195 Wis. at 147-48. 
                                                 
8 The Supreme Court of Vermont recently considered the Dwyer 
case and declined to follow it.  Sweezey v. Neel, 2006 VT 38, __ 
A.2d __, 2006 WL1195462.  
No. 2004AP188  
19 
 
¶35 We agree with the Kostermans and the courts that have 
rejected 
the 
Restatement 
(Third) 
of 
Property: 
Servitudes 
§§ 4.8(3) and 7.10(2) in favor of preventing the owners of 
servient estates from unilaterally relocating or terminating 
express easements.  See e.g., Herrin v. Pettengill, 538 S.E.2d 
735, 736 (Ga. 2000); MacMeekin v. Low Income Hous. Inst., Inc., 
45 P.3d 570, 579 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002); see also Davis v. Bruk, 
411 A.2d 660, 665 (Me. 1980).  These courts have rejected the 
position advanced by the Restatement as a threat to the 
certainty of property rights and real estate transactions, as a 
catalyst for increased litigation, and as a means for purchasers 
of servient estates to reap a windfall at the expense of owners 
of dominant estates.  We agree that these reasons for rejecting 
the Restatement's position are more compelling than the economic 
inefficiencies that might result from bilateral monopolies and 
holdout easement owners.9 
                                                 
9 As Professor Epstein states: 
Ownership is meant to be a bulwark against the 
collective preferences of others; it allows one, rich 
or poor, to stand alone against the world no matter 
how insistent or intense its collective preferences.  
To say that ordinary ownership presents a holdout 
problem is not to identify a defect in the system; it 
is to identify one of its essential strengths.  If a 
holdout is adamant, no private party can force him to 
sell the land in question at any price.  The state may 
intervene under its eminent domain powers, but only 
when it acts for 'public use,' and not for the narrow 
interests of B (or those whom he wishes to serve). 
Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of 
Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1353, 1366-67 (1982). 
No. 2004AP188  
20 
 
 
¶36 Thus, although a handful of courts have adopted 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.8(3), these 
jurisdictions remain distinctly in the minority.  Jon W. Bruce & 
James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land 
§ 7:16 at 7-31 to 7-33 (2001); see Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes, Introductory Note to ch. 4, at 496 (noting 
§ 4.8(3) departs from the "common-law rule to adopt the civil-
law rule on relocation of easements."); id., Introductory Note 
to ch. 7, at 336 (noting § 7.10 "provides for an expanded use of 
modification to permit more flexibility in adapting servitude 
arrangements to retain their utility over time."). 
¶37 Moreover, the position articulated in Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Servitudes §§ 4.8(3) and 7.10(2) is 
inconsistent with longstanding precedent that Wisconsin courts 
do not balance the equities of adverse property owners when 
determining whether to grant or modify an easement.  See Schwab, 
224 Wis. 2d at 41-43; Guse, 195 Wis. 2d at 147.  We decline to 
abandon this precedent. 
¶38 Finally, 
vigorous 
academic 
debate 
persists 
over 
whether wise public policy warrants the extension of the changed 
No. 2004AP188  
21 
 
conditions doctrine to easements.10  On one hand, proponents of 
the Restatement position argue that judicial intervention is 
necessary to rectify the problem of holdouts, who could 
otherwise single-handedly impede economic development.  See 
e.g., Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1177, 1233 (1982); Susan F. French, Toward a 
Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 1261, 1265, 1300 (1982); Note, Balancing the 
Equities: Is Missouri Adopting a Progressive Rule for Relocation 
of Easements?, 61 Mo. L. Rev. 1039, 1057-61 (1996).  Conversely, 
opponents 
of 
the 
Restatement 
position 
contend 
that 
the 
uncertainty caused by judicial modification of easements does 
more to hamper economic development than does current law 
because the Restatement discourages investment by rendering 
property rights uncertain.  See e.g., Richard A. Epstein, 
Covenants and Constitutions, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 906, 914 (1987); 
Carol M. Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments 
                                                 
10 In addition to the discussion of the changed conditions 
doctrine provided in the Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Servitudes (2000), see generally the symposium on servitudes 
presented in 55 Southern California Law Review 1177-1447.  See 
also John V. Orth, Relocating Easements: A Response to Professor 
French, 38 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 643 (2004); Susan F. 
French, Relocating Easements: Restatement (Third), Servitudes 
§ 4.8(3), 38 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1 (2004); Note, The Right 
of 
Owners 
of 
Servient 
Estates 
to 
Relocate 
Easements 
Unilaterally, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1693 (1996); Note, Balancing the 
Equities: Is Missouri Adopting a Progressive Rule for Relocation 
of Easements?, 61 Mo. L. Rev. 1039 (1996); Glen O. Robinson, 
Explaining 
Contingent 
Rights: 
The 
Puzzle 
of 
"Obsolete" 
Covenants, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 546 (1991). 
No. 2004AP188  
22 
 
on Professors French and Reichman, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1403, 
1412-13 (1982); Note, The Right of Owners of Servient Estates to 
Relocate Easements Unilaterally, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1693, 1694-97 
(1996). 
¶39 Given the lack of consensus and lack of evidence that 
the changed-conditions doctrine produces superior economic and 
legal consequences, we reject the Restatement's departure from 
the general rule that express easements cannot be unilaterally 
modified.  We are not persuaded that the policy arguments are 
sufficiently compelling to justify overturning more than a 
century of precedent and upsetting the settled expectations of 
thousands of easement holders. 
B. 
Did the 1998 Deeds Extinguish the 1961 Easement? 
 
¶40 Alternatively, 
AKG 
contends 
the 
1998 
deeds 
extinguished the 1960 and 1961 easements.  AKG's argument 
depends upon evidence extrinsic to the 1998 deeds, including the 
offer and counteroffer that preceded the completed transaction 
between the Chviliceks, the Trust, and AKG, the deposition 
testimony of Edward Chvilicek, the deposition testimony of 
members of AKG, and the 2000 deed in which the Kostermans 
purchased the Dominant Estate from the Chviliceks. 
 
¶41 There are two major flaws with AKG's argument.  The 
first is that before extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent 
can be 
considered, 
the 
1998 deeds 
between 
AKG and the 
Chviliceks, and between AKG and the Trust must be ambiguous with 
respect to the 1960 and 1961 easements.  See Rikkers, 76 
Wis. 2d at 188 ("where a deed is susceptible to only one 
No. 2004AP188  
23 
 
interpretation, extrinsic evidence may not be referred to in 
order to show the intent of the parties").  We find it telling 
that 
AKG 
points to no 
such ambiguity.  
Moreover, 
upon 
inspection, the 1998 deeds demonstrate no ambiguity with respect 
to the preexisting easements.  The 1998 deeds contain three 
references to right-of-way easements: (1) Both the warranty deed 
and the trustee deed conveyed the fee title to AKG except for 
"recorded 
and/or 
existing 
easements 
and 
right 
of 
way 
reservations . . . ."  (2) In an exhibit to the 1998 deeds, the 
Chviliceks and the Trust reserved the 30-foot-wide public road 
easement, which overlapped the 1960 and 1961 easements.11  (3) In 
the same exhibit, the Chviliceks and the Trust reserved another 
right-of-way easement for ingress and egress via Cobblestone 
Drive.   
¶42 Nothing in the language of the easements created by 
the 1998 deeds suggests that the 1960 and 1961 easements are 
being released.  Nothing in the language of the easements 
created by the 1998 deeds makes reference to any preexisting 
easements.  Moreover, the 1998 deeds explicitly except from the 
                                                 
11 Specifically, the deeds provide: "Reserving therefrom a 
private road easement . . . until such time as public road 
access is made available for said real estate upon the following 
described easement of right of way . . . ."  Although the 
circuit court and court of appeals concluded this 1998 easement 
would terminate once the Dominant Estate received public road 
access, 
regardless 
of 
the 
location, 
we 
question 
this 
interpretation.  If anything, use of the phrase "upon the 
following described easement" appears to suggest otherwise.  
Because the 1961 easement survives the 1998 deeds, however, we 
need not resolve this question. 
No. 2004AP188  
24 
 
title conveyed to AKG all recorded easements.  Since the 1960 
and 
1961 
easements 
are 
recorded, 
the 
only 
reasonable 
interpretation of the 1998 deed is that the property AKG 
purchased was encumbered by the 1960 and 1961 easements, along 
with all other recorded easements. 
¶43 If there is any doubt that the 1960 and 1961 easements 
survived, AKG's commitment for title insurance confirms that the 
property was encumbered by these earlier easements.  Both 
easements are clearly listed as exceptions to the title 
conveyed.  Absent ambiguity, we decline to consider the 
negotiations leading up to the 1998 deeds or the deposition 
testimony AKG offered for purposes of establishing intent.  To 
do otherwise would jeopardize the certainty and authoritative 
status of recorded titles and land records.  Cf. Kordecki v. 
Rizzo, 106 Wis. 2d 713, 718-19, 317 N.W.2d 479 (1982). 
 
¶44 The second flaw in AKG's position is that even if the 
1998 deeds were silent with respect to the 1960 and 1961 
easements, silence does not terminate an express easement.  See 
Union Falls Power Co. v. Marinette County, 238 Wis. 134, 141, 
298 N.W. 598 (1941).  The long-established rule is that an 
express easement "passes by a subsequent conveyance of the 
dominant estate without express mention in the conveyance."  
Id.; Barkhausen v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 142 
Wis. 292, 298, 124 N.W. 649 (1910); Gojmerac, 250 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶25; Krepel v. Darnell, 165 Wis. 2d 235, 245, 477 N.W.2d 333 
(Ct. App. 1991).  Conversely, a servient estate remains burdened 
by a recorded express easement even when the easement is not 
No. 2004AP188  
25 
 
expressly mentioned in the conveyance, since the purchaser has 
constructive notice of the easement.  Jon W. Bruce & James W. 
Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 10:32, at 
10-77 (2001).  Thus, when AKG acquired title to the Servient 
Estate, the 1960 and 1961 easements burdened the property.  
Likewise, when the Kostermans acquired the Dominant Estate, the 
chain of title confirmed that the 1960 and 1961 easements 
remained appurtenant to the property.  Accordingly, we reject 
AKG's argument that the 1998 deeds extinguished the 1960 and 
1961 easements. 
 
¶45 Although AKG couches its attack upon the easements 
burdening its land in terms of changed conditions, frustration 
of 
purpose, 
and 
subsequent 
easements 
extinguishing 
prior 
easements, we think AKG is really asking this court to relieve 
it of the duties placed upon every other buyer of real property.  
A buyer of real property is expected to determine the rights to 
the land he is about to purchase by consulting (1) the records 
in the office of the register of deeds; (2) other public records 
to discover rights which usually are not recorded in the office 
of the register of deeds, such as judgments and liens; and (3) 
the land itself.  Kordecki, 106 Wis. 2d at 719 n.5.  The 
testimony of all AKG members deposed reveals a failure to 
inspect 
the 
chain 
of 
title 
to 
determine 
whether 
their 
development plans were consistent with the rights conveyed by 
the title to the Servient Estate.  While not necessary to our 
holding, 
evidence 
of 
this 
omission 
by 
AKG 
bolsters 
our 
conclusion that the court of appeals should not have modified 
No. 2004AP188  
26 
 
the 1961 easement to relieve AKG of the burden upon the Servient 
Estate. 
IV 
 
¶46 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.  The 
1961 easement will remain in effect even if AKG provides the 
Kostermans an alternative means of access to a public road, 
because the owner of a servient estate cannot unilaterally 
modify or terminate an express easement. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶47 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2004AP188.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶48 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority opinion that AKG Real Estate cannot get court 
approval to relocate or terminate the express easement without 
the consent of the Kostermans, the owners of the dominant 
estate.   
¶49 The majority opinion, ¶1, however, states its holding 
and applicable rule of law too broadly.  The majority opinion 
declares its holding that "the owner of a servient estate cannot 
unilaterally relocate or 
terminate 
an 
express 
agreement," 
period.1  Not true!  The majority opinion, ¶28, also overstates 
the applicable rule as "even if AKG did provide alternate public 
road access to the [dominant estate], the 1961 easement would 
remain 
in 
force, 
because 
an 
express 
easement 
continues 
regardless of whether the dominant estate needs the easement." 
(emphasis added). 
¶50 Paragraph 
29 
in 
the 
majority 
opinion 
correctly 
explains that an express easement can terminate with the 
cessation of the particular purpose for which the easement was 
granted.  Niedfeldt v. Evans, 272 Wis. 362, 364, 75 N.W.2d 307 
(1956), clearly states this rule of law.     
¶51 The court need not and should not decide whether to 
adopt Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, § 4.8(3) or 
§ 7.10(2).  Neither provision applies in the instant case.  
                                                 
1 When the majority opinion speaks of "unilateral" action it 
means that the servient estate cannot get court approval of an 
act the servient estate wishes to take contrary to the wishes of 
the dominant estate. 
No.  2004AP188.ssa 
 
2 
 
Under § 4.8(3) the owner cannot make reasonable changes in the 
location of an easement if the change increases the burdens on 
the owner of the easement in its use and enjoyment.2  Here the 
servient 
owner proposes 
extinguishing, 
not 
modifying, the 
easement.  In any event, the owners of the dominant estate would 
be burdened. 
¶52 Under § 7.10(2) of the Restatement a court may modify 
the servitude (easement) to permit other uses because of 
"changed conditions."  "Changed conditions" is a stringent 
standard, including the concept that the servitude no longer 
serves its intended purpose.3  Comment a. to § 7.10 explains that 
the doctrine is used sparingly: 
Because servitudes create property interests that are 
generally 
valuable, 
courts 
apply 
the 
changed-
conditions doctrine with caution. Of the many changed-
conditions 
cases 
that 
have 
produced 
appellate 
decisions, few result in modification or termination 
of a servitude.  The test is stringent: relief is 
granted only if the purpose of the servitude can no 
longer 
be 
accomplished. 
 
When 
servitudes 
are 
terminated under this rule, it is ordinarily clear 
that the continuance of the servitude would serve no 
useful purpose and would create unnecessary harm to 
the owner of the servient estate.4 
                                                 
2 1 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.8(3) 
(1998) is quoted at n.7 of the majority opinion. 
3 See 2 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 7.10 
illus. 4 (1998). 
4 2 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 7.10 cmt. 
a. (1998) 
No.  2004AP188.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶53 Indeed, 
the 
owners 
of 
the 
dominant 
estate 
are 
persuasive in arguing that there were no changed conditions.5 
¶54 Section 7.10(2) of the 1998 Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes is not as broad as the description of 
modifications of servitudes is in Professor French's 1982 law 
review article, entitled Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: 
Reweaving the Ancient Strands, in 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261 (often 
discussing injunctive relief), upon which the majority opinion 
relies.6   
¶55 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.  I join 
the concurring opinion of Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY.        
 
 
                                                 
5 The Kostermans point out that the "changed condition" upon 
which the 
court of appeals 
relied 
was a 
Department of 
Transportation regulation that arguably prohibits AKG from 
building a public road on the easement path.  Yet this 
regulation was, according to the Kostermans, adopted five years 
before the 1961 easement. 
6 Majority op., ¶20. 
No.  2004AP188.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶56 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
write 
separately because I think some basics have been lost in the 
shuffle. 
¶57 The 1961 easement is the pivotal easement in this 
case.  That easement is an express easement granted "for 
purposes of ingress and egress."   It still can be, and is, used 
for these purposes.  Therefore, this case does not involve the 
concepts of impossibility or cessation of purpose. 
¶58 Whether the Kostermans' use of the 1961 easement for 
its expressly-granted purpose remains "necessary" is irrelevant.  
See Niedfeldt v. Evans, 272 Wis. 362, 365, 75 N.W.2d 307 (1956) 
("The rule that the right ceases with necessity has no 
application to ways acquired by express grant . . . ; a right to 
a way so created cannot be defeated by showing that the owners 
have another convenient and accessible way of going to and from 
their premises." (quoting 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 54, p. 718)); 
accord Millen v. Thomas, 201 Wis. 2d 675, 679, 550 N.W.2d 134 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
¶59 In addition, this case does not involve consent,1 
abandonment,2 unity of ownership,3 or any other precept of 
Wisconsin's common law that could operate to extinguish or 
                                                 
1 Guse v. Flohr, 195 Wis. 139, 147, 217 N.W. 730, 733 
(1928). 
2 Pollnow v. DNR, 88 Wis. 2d 350, 362, 276 N.W.2d 738 
(1979). 
3 Millen v. Thomas, 201 Wis. 2d 675, 679, 550 N.W.2d 134 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
No.  2004AP188.awb 
 
2 
 
relocate an express easement.  Thus, unless this court were to 
modify current Wisconsin law, the 1961 easement must continue 
under the facts of this case. 
¶60 In a future case, when impossibility is an issue, this 
court may well consider whether an express easement could be 
terminated when the purpose becomes impossible to accomplish.  
Impossibility is a high standard when properly defined.  Such a 
standard, nevertheless, would address the argument that a 
servient estate should not be bound in perpetuity when the 
purpose of the easement is impossible to achieve.  The 
impossibility 
standard 
may 
provide 
an 
appropriate balance 
between the respective rights and interests of the dominant and 
servient estates. 
¶61 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur. 
¶62 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence.  
 
 
 
No.  2004AP188.awb 
 
 
 
1