Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Dailey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1ag/19

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Jonathan Christian Dailey, Misc. Docket 
AG No. 1, September Term 2019.  Opinion by Raker, J. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) 
 
ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT – DISCIPLINE – DISBARMENT – Respondent 
Jonathan Christian Dailey violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
1.6(a) and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) and the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
19-308.4(a), (c), and (d) when he solicited, received, and mismanaged financial 
transactions from a client shortly after the client received her settlement.  Respondent took 
advantage of his client’s lack of legal sophistication and trust in him as an attorney to 
induce her into giving him money as “investments,” misappropriated it, and provided her 
repeatedly with misleading and false information about it.  Disbarment is the appropriate 
sanction for respondent’s misconduct. 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No. 464961 
Argued: December 9, 2019 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 1 
 
September Term, 2019 
______________________________________ 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISION OF 
MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
JONATHAN CHRISTIAN DAILEY 
______________________________________ 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
 
McDonald, 
 
Watts, 
 
Hotten, 
 
Getty, 
 
Booth, 
Raker, Irma S. 
        (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Raker, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
Filed:  March 18, 2020 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2020-03-18 12:02-04:00
 
 
 
The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed in this 
Court a Petition for Disciplinary Action against Jonathan Christian Dailey, respondent, 
alleging violations of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 
and the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”).1  The 
Commission charged respondent with violating MLRPC 1.6(a) (Confidentiality of 
Information), 1.15(a) and (d) (Safekeeping of Property),2 5.4(a) (Professional 
Independence of a Lawyer), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct).  The Commission also 
charged respondent with violating MARPC 19-308.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary 
Matters) and 19-308.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct).  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-727, we 
referred the matter to Judge Margaret M. Schweitzer in the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County to make findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law.  Judge Schweitzer held 
an evidentiary hearing and concluded that respondent violated MLRPC 1.6(a) and 8.4(a), 
(c), and (d) for his conduct occurring before July 1, 2016 and MARPC 19-308.4(a), (c), 
and (d) for his conduct occurring after July 1, 2016.3 
                                              
1 The Commission charged respondent under both MLRPC, which were in effect 
prior to July 1, 2016, and MARPC, which became effective July 1, 2016, because 
respondent’s acts of misconduct occurred before and after July 1, 2016.  Effective July 1, 
2016, MLRPC were renamed MARPC.  Rules Order (June 6, 2016). 
 
2 The Commission withdrew its MLRPC 1.15(a) charge following the hearing.  The 
MLRPC 1.15(d) charge remained, but Judge Schweitzer did not discuss or state her 
conclusion of law on this charge.  The Commission did not except to Judge Schweitzer’s 
lack of legal conclusion on this charge. 
 
3 Judge Schweitzer’s summary of her conclusions of law referenced “MARPC 19-
308.4(a)–(d).”  It appears, however, that she did not mean to include MARPC 19-308.4(b), 
which applies to “a criminal act that reflects adversely on the (footnote continued . . .) 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
I. 
 
Before the commencement of the July 30, 2019 hearing, Judge Schweitzer heard 
Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Discipline or Remedial Action as a Matter of 
Law and denied it pursuant to Md. Rule 19-725(c).4  At the end of the hearing, the 
Commission withdrew the MLRPC 1.15(a) charge,5 and Judge Schweitzer made the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
 
                                              
attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as an attorney in other respects” (emphasis 
added).  The Commission’s only ground for charging respondent with MARPC 19-
308.4(b) was for testifying falsely under oath and thus committing an act of perjury on June 
20, 2018, and Judge Schweitzer found that respondent did not testify falsely under oath.  
Furthermore, in Petitioner’s Recommendation for Sanction, the Commission excluded 
MARPC 19-308.4(b) when summarizing Judge Schweitzer’s conclusions of law. 
 
4 Md. Rule 19-725(c) provides that in proceedings on a petition for disciplinary or 
remedial action, “[m]otions to dismiss the proceeding are not permitted.” 
 
5 MLRPC 1.15(a) provides as follows: 
 
“(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that 
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation 
separate from the lawyer’s own property.  Funds shall be kept 
in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 
400 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and 
maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter.  Other 
property shall be identified specifically as such and 
appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and 
distribution shall be created and maintained.  Complete records 
of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by the 
lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years 
after the date the record was created.” 
 
 
3 
 
 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
“The Respondent, Jonathan Christian Dailey, was 
admitted to the Maryland Bar on December 12, 1995. 
*** 
Representation of Sherry Gaither 
 
“Since 2009, the Respondent has operated the Law 
Office of Jonathan C. Dailey, a sole proprietorship.[]  The 
Respondent’s practice is focused primarily on representing 
plaintiffs in medical malpractice and personal injury matters. . 
. .  
“Sherry Renee Gaither has spent most of her career 
working in the security services industry.  Ms. Gaither has also, 
at times, been employed as a driver for Uber Technologies, Inc.  
The highest level of education completed by Ms. Gaither is 
12th grade. 
 
“On April 11, 2011, Ms. Gaither retained the 
Respondent to represent her in an employment discrimination 
case in the United States District Court in the District of 
Maryland, Sherry Gaither v. Paragon Systems, Inc, Case No. 
8:12-CV-00086-RWT.  Around May 5, 2012, the parties 
reached a settlement for $17,000 with Paragon Systems, and 
 
4 
 
 
Ms. Gaither received $10,108.70 as her portion of the 
settlement funds. 
The Respondent Solicits Ms. Gaither to ‘Invest’ her 
Settlement Proceeds 
 
“As of May 2012, the Respondent was representing . . . 
Terry Hedgepeth[] in a medical malpractice lawsuit filed in the 
Superior Court of the District of Columbia in 2005.  (Terry 
Hedgepeth v. WWC, et al.).  The Respondent was representing 
Mr. Hedgepeth on a contingency fee basis and, as such would 
get a percentage of the proceeds. 
 
“In May 2012, within days after Ms. Gaither received 
her settlement funds from the Respondent, the Respondent 
approached Ms. Gaither with what he described to her as an 
opportunity to invest in his upcoming case.  The Respondent 
advised Ms. Gaither that if she invested funds with his law 
firm, those funds would be used to finance the litigation of one 
of his firm’s pending case[s].  The Respondent told Ms. 
Gaither that whatever amount she invested would be 
‘guaranteed’ and that he could possibly ‘double [her] 
money[.]’  The Respondent described the transaction to Ms. 
Gaither as ‘a real money-maker[.]’ 
 
5 
 
 
 
“On May 15, 2012, only ten days after the Paragon 
settlement, the Respondent sent Ms. Gaither an email attaching 
a document entitled ‘Letter Agreement.’  The Letter 
Agreement required Ms. Gaither to pay an ‘Investment 
Amount’ of $27,000 to the Respondent and stated that the 
funds would be used by the Respondent ‘for the purpose of 
advancing the litigation against Whitman Walker Clinic 
(“WWC”) in the case of Terry Hedgepeth v. WWC, et al.’  The 
Letter Agreement also included a section titled ‘Obligation of 
Entrepreneur’ which stated: 
‘In consideration of the investment in the 
[Hedgepeth] Case, Entrepreneur shall pay to 
Investor the full return sum of $27,000, by or 
before the end of the fiscal year 2012, if the Case 
settles or resolves by trial by jury for less than 
$500,000.  The return sum of $27,000 is 
guaranteed and is not conditioned upon the 
outcome of the Case.  In the event that the Case 
settles or resolves by trial by jury for more than 
$500,000, Investor shall be paid a return of 100% 
of the investment, or a total amount of $54,000, 
by or before the end of fiscal year 2012.  
Entrepreneur shall advise the Investor of the 
status of the Case every month and will make 
payment as set forth herein within 20 days of 
receipt of payment resulting from a settlement or 
verdict of the Case.  It is the intention of the 
Entrepreneur to double the investment of the 
Investor, but only the principal investment of 
$27,000 is guaranteed.’ 
 
 
6 
 
 
“The Court does not find that the agreement dated May 15, 
2012 was intended to be an agreement to share attorney’s fees 
with Ms. Gaither, a non-attorney.  First, it should be noted that 
in the agreement, the $27,000 was to be repaid regardless of 
whether there were any fees collected by the Respondent.  
Despite the language in the agreement, the Court concludes 
based upon the actions and words of the Respondent that he 
never intended to share fees.  Unfortunately, for the 
Respondent, the Court is also of the opinion that the 
Respondent was not intending to abide by the agreement and 
its assurances, and that the guarantees were empty promises by 
him.  The Court finds that the agreement was not an agreement 
to share fees but rather a vehicle containing alluring provisions 
to entice Ms. Gaither into turning over funds to the 
Respondent.  This is supported by the fact that the Hedgepeth 
case settled in August 2012, just a few months after the 
agreement, for $400,000, of which Respondent received 
personally $140,000.  When the Respondent received his fees, 
the Respondent did not: 1) return in full the guaranteed $27,000 
by or before the end of the fiscal year 2012; 2) advise Ms. 
Gaither of the state of the case every month, as Ms. Gaither 
 
7 
 
 
testified she got no information other than it was a financial 
loss to his firm; or 3) make payment within twenty days of the 
receipt of payment resulting from the settlement or verdict of 
the case. 
 
“In his May 15, 2012 email to Ms. Gaither, the 
Respondent stated the following, ‘[Mr. Hedgepeth] will not 
accept a settlement less than $1 Million[.]’.  Respondent later 
testified that he meant to say that his own goal was to settle for 
that price, rather than stating Mr. Hedgepeth’s expectations.  
Respondent’s proposition contradicts the plain language of his 
statements to Ms. Gaither.  The Court finds that the 
Respondent intended to express Mr. Hedgepeth’s expectations 
for the case, and that Respondent made the statement to Ms. 
Gaither to induce her to ‘invest’ her funds. 
 
“In the May 15, 2012 email, the Respondent also made 
the following knowing and intentional misrepresentation to 
Ms. Gaither: 
‘Please keep this Agreement, our emails and 
conversations confidential as instructed by [Mr. 
Hedgepeth].  He has authorized me to reveal 
details of his case to you for the purposes of this 
investment in his case.’ 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
“The Petitioner contends, and the Court finds, that the 
Respondent failed to obtain Mr. Hedgepeth’s informed consent 
before disclosing confidential information to Ms. Gaither, 
specifically the amount Mr. Hedgepeth was willing to accept 
in settlement.  The Court notes that the Respondent offered 
testimony regarding his communications with Mr. Hedgepeth 
that conflict with his representations to Ms. Gaither.  During a 
statement under oath given on June 20, 2018, the Respondent 
testified that he never explicitly explained to Mr. Hedgepeth 
that he had entered into any loan arrangement with Ms. 
Gaither.  At the hearing, when asked whether he had received 
authorization from Mr. Hedgepeth to share confidential 
information with Ms. Gaither, the Respondent testified, ‘I 
assured [Mr. Hedgepeth] that I was not going to share attorney-
client privileged information with her.  I simply said it was a 
loan against attorney’s fees that would have no effect on his 
case[.]’  Based on the Respondent’s testimony during the 
statement under oath and the hearing, the Court finds that the 
Respondent failed to obtain Mr. Hedgepeth’s informed consent 
before disclosing the amount Mr. Hedgepeth was willing to 
accept in settlement to Ms. Gaither. 
 
9 
 
 
 
“In a separate email to Ms. Gaither, also sent on May 
15, 2012, the Respondent instructed Ms. Gaither to wire the 
funds to his firm’s operating account maintained at the 
Community Banks of Colorado.[6]  Pursuant to the 
Respondent’s instruction, on May 16, 2012, Ms. Gaither wired 
$5,000 to the Respondent’s operating account, and on May 22, 
2012, she wired an additional $22,000 to the account. 
The Respondent Uses Ms. Gaither’s Funds for his 
Personal Benefit 
 
“In the May 15, 2012 email, the Respondent made the 
following statement to Ms. Gaither: 
‘I have to prepare now for trial and your 
investment will go toward that preparation.  I am 
sending funds to our infectious disease specialist 
and our psychiatrist as soon as investment funds 
are received.’ 
 
“The Court finds this statement, too, to be a knowing 
and intentional misrepresentation Respondent made to Ms. 
Gaither.  The Court received as evidence the Respondent’s 
operating account records from NBH Bank[7] for the period 
                                              
6 The Respondent has never been admitted to the Colorado Bar nor has he ever 
practiced law in Colorado. 
 
7 Community Banks of Colorado is a subsidiary of NBH Bank. 
 
 
10 
 
 
May 2012 through January 2016.  A review of the records 
demonstrates that, prior to Ms. Gaither’s May 16, 2012 wire 
transfer, the Respondent’s operating account had a balance of 
$55.41.  During the period of May 15 through June 18, 2012, 
the only deposits made into the account were Ms. Gaither’s two 
wire transfers totaling $27,000.  The records demonstrate, and 
Respondent confirms, that between May 15 and June 18, 2012, 
the Respondent disbursed $26,200 of Ms. Gaither’s funds from 
his operating account to pay for a variety of personal expenses 
unrelated to the Hedgepeth case.  Examples of his personal 
expenditures include: Revel Casino, Apparel Lacy Couture, 
Classic Beer and Wine and Netflix.com.  The only transaction 
related to the Hedgepeth case was a check dated June 11, 2012, 
in the amount of $800 made payable to Dr. Donald Vogel, an 
expert witness.  By June 18, 2012, the Respondent had 
disbursed the entirety of Ms. Gaither’s funds and his operating 
account had a negative balance of -$1,056.20. 
“The Court finds that the Respondent knowingly and 
intentionally misrepresented to Ms. Gaither that her 
‘investment’ would be used to fund the litigation of the 
Hedgepeth case.  The fact that the Respondent spent almost the 
 
11 
 
 
entirety of Ms. Gaither’s funds on personal expenses in 
approximately four weeks makes it clear that the Respondent 
never had any intention of using Ms. Gaither’s funds to pay for 
litigation costs in the Hedgepeth case.  The Respondent’s 
‘investment opportunity’ was a deception created by the 
Respondent for the purpose of obtaining funds from Ms. 
Gaither under false pretenses and then using those funds as an 
interest free personal loan.  During her testimony, Ms. Gaither 
made it clear that she would never have given the Respondent 
any funds if she had known they would be used for his own 
personal expenses. 
The Hedgepeth Settlement 
 
“In August 2012, the Hedgepeth case settled for 
$400,000.  The settlement funds were deposited in the 
Respondent’s firm’s attorney trust account.[8]  The Respondent 
testified at the hearing that his firm received approximately 
$160,000 in attorney’s fees as a part of the settlement, and that 
his firm retained $140,000 and paid another firm 
approximately $20,000 in fees.  The Respondent failed to 
                                              
8 The Respondent could not provide the specific date the funds were deposited in 
the account. 
 
 
12 
 
 
inform Ms. Gaither within 20 days, as per the agreement, that 
the Hedgepeth case had settled, the amount of the settlement, 
or the fact that his firm collected a large sum in attorney’s fees.  
The Respondent failed to deliver any portion of the Hedgepeth 
settlement funds to Ms. Gaither and instead, intentionally 
misrepresented to her that the case ‘didn’t do well’ and was a 
‘huge loss.’  When questioned at the hearing why Ms. Gaither 
wasn’t considered as one of the firm’s creditors and considered 
as part of costs, Respondent replied, ‘In retrospect, I should 
have made a better decision.’ 
The Cover-Up 
“In September 2012, the Respondent sent an email to 
Ms. Gaither stating the following: 
‘Sherry, 
 
If you are interested, I am offering the same deal 
on my ‘severed pinky’ case that I offered on my 
HIV misdiagnosis case.  You are currently owed 
$20,000[9] by the end of the year (or sooner). 
 
I would offer a ‘100%’ return on an investment 
of the $20,000—or $40,000, with a guarantee of 
a return of the initial $20,000 when the case 
                                              
9 Throughout the correspondence between Ms. Gaither and the Respondent they 
both state that the investment amount is $20,000; however, the Respondent’s operating 
account records clearly show that Ms. Gaither gave the Respondent $27,000.  Neither Ms. 
Gaither nor the Respondent could provide an explanation for this discrepancy. 
 
 
13 
 
 
settles.  We filed suit and the case is no [sic] on-
going.  We expect a trial date next year. 
 
Because it is a permanent injury and our client is 
50, we expect a jury award between $400,000–
$1M.  I would offer the deal of a double return if 
the case settles/resolves by trial jury verdict of 
$350,000 or higher. 
 
Let me know!’ 
 
“Ms. Gaither expressed interest in participating in the 
‘investment.’  In December 2012, the Respondent sent Ms. 
Gaither another email and stated: 
‘Sherry—I have two major HIV misdiagnosis 
cases that I recently signed based upon the 
publicity I gained in the last case.  I am going to 
include these cases to your ‘pinky case’ to ensure 
that no matter what case settles, you will see the 
return from one of them (hence, giving you 
further assurance of your return, spread out to 
three cases, not just the pinky case, to secure 
your investment). 
 
I have appreciated the faith you have placed in 
me and want to make sure you feel confident and 
comfortable with the fact that you will see a 
return.’ 
 
“The Respondent told Ms. Gaither that her funds would 
be ‘transferred’ to the three new cases.  On January 1, 2013, 
the Respondent and Ms. Gaither entered into a second 
agreement.  The terms of the January 1, 2013 Letter Agreement 
were identical to the May 15, 2012 Letter Agreement except 
 
14 
 
 
that Ms. Gaither’s funds were to be used to advance the 
litigation of Robert Dyer v. REL, Case No. 2012-CA-007315, 
in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia,[10] as well as 
two medical malpractice cases for Bobby Russell and Robert 
Blount that had yet to be filed.  The Respondent was 
representing the clients in all three of these cases on a 
contingency fee basis.  The Respondent told Ms. Gaither that 
her funds would be used, ‘[f]or the case, for the witnesses, for 
the filing, for the different litigations, whatever was necessary 
as far as to build the case.’  Like the first agreement, the 
January 1, 2013 agreement included a section titled ‘Obligation 
of Entrepreneur’ which states: 
‘In consideration of the investment in the [Dyer] 
Case, Entrepreneur shall pay to Investor the full 
return sum of $20,000 if the Case settles or 
resolves by trial by jury for less than $250,000.  
The return sum of $20,000 is guaranteed and is 
not conditioned upon the outcome of the Case.  
In the event that the Case settles or resolves by 
trial by jury for more than $400,000, Investor 
shall be paid a return of 100% of the investment, 
or a total amount of $40,000.  Entrepreneur shall 
advise the Investor of the status of the Case (to 
include the two HIV cases) every month and will 
make payment as set forth herein within 20 days 
of receipt of payment resulting from a settlement 
                                              
10 In their correspondence, the Respondent and Ms. Gaither refer to the Dyer case 
as the ‘pinky’ case. 
  
 
15 
 
 
or verdict of the Case.  It is the intention of the 
Entrepreneur to double the investment of the 
Investor, but only the principal investment of 
$20,000 is guaranteed.’  
 
“The Court finds that, for the same reasons discussed in 
regard to the May 15, 2012 Letter Agreement, the 
Respondent’s January 1, 2013 Letter Agreement was not an 
agreement to share attorney’s fees with Ms. Gaither, a non-
attorney. 
“For the period 2013 through 2017, the Respondent 
knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to Ms. Gaither 
that her funds were being used to finance the litigation of the 
three cases.  When Ms. Gaither requested status updates on the 
cases, the Respondent would tell her they were either still in 
litigation or that they settled but ‘didn’t do well.’  The Court 
finds that the Respondent made the misrepresentations to avoid 
repaying Ms. Gaither, and to deceive her into believing that he 
was still in possession of her funds and that he was using them 
for the purpose stated in their agreement. 
Ms. Gaither Requests Refunds 
 
“Beginning in or about 2013, Ms. Gaither began to 
experience significant financial difficulties.  On April 27, 
2015, Ms. Gaither, believing the Respondent was still in 
 
16 
 
 
possession of her funds, sent an email to the Respondent in 
which she urgently requested that the Respondent return 
$5,000 of her funds explaining that she was experiencing 
financial hardship.  At trial, Ms. Gaither testified that she was 
unemployed, was getting assistance from her brother, and was 
going through financial difficulties.  She stated that she had 
‘claimed’ bankruptcy and was going through depression.  On 
the next day, April 28, 201[5], Ms. Gaither sent another email 
in which she requested that the Respondent return the entirety 
of her funds as soon as possible.  On May 12, 2015, the 
Respondent provided Ms. Gaither with $5,000. 
 
“On August 14, 2015, in response to Ms. Gaither’s 
request for a status update for the Dyer case, the Respondent 
wrote: 
‘Sherry, 
 
I need to assign other cases to your return as the 
‘pinky’ case had to be settled for peanuts because 
my client could not pay trial costs.  The $5,000 
sent earlier is a third of our attorney’s fee of 
$15,000 in that case—disappointing. 
 
BUT—I am going to assign the cases of Sean 
Taylor (assault and battery against a well-known 
restaurant/bar), Matthew Sateri (breach of 
contract against Enterprise for not paying life 
insurance when he was killed in a car accident 
with 
his 
rental) 
and 
Maurice 
Parker 
 
17 
 
 
(discrimination case pending in DC federal court 
right now).  These cases WILL settle. 
 
As promised, I will get you the total principal 
back and a profit, through one case or another—
I won’t let you down, Sherry.’ 
 
 
“The Court does not find . . . these statements to be 
admissions of sharing attorney’s fees, but rather statements by 
the Respondent to assure Ms. Gaither that the Respondent was 
above board, dealing fairly with her regarding her 
investment.[11] 
 
“On March 3, 2016, at the request of Ms. Gaither, the 
Respondent provided her with an additional $5,000.  On 
September 3 and 12, 2016, Ms. Gaither sent the Respondent 
emails requesting that he return $10,000 to her by the end of 
the month.  The Respondent replied to Ms. Gaither’s emails 
and stated, ‘I will work on getting something to you, but this is 
a particularly tight time for my law practice.’  Notably, in the 
Respondent’s testimony at the hearing, the Respondent 
acknowledged that nowhere in his agreements with Ms. 
Gaither did he condition returning her funds on the financial 
                                              
11 The fee sharing was pursuant to the second Letter Agreement but did not comport 
with the terms of the Agreement.  According to the Agreement, Ms. Gaither should have 
received the entirety of the Dyer attorney’s fees, purportedly $15,000. 
 
 
18 
 
 
circumstances of his law firm.  As previously noted, the 
Respondent admitted, however, that he viewed Ms. Gaither as 
a creditor that should have been considered as a part of the 
Respondent’s costs.  As of the date of the hearing in this 
disciplinary matter, the Respondent has failed to return any 
additional funds to Ms. Gaither. 
*** 
Bar Counsel’s Investigation 
 
“On November 15, 2017, Ms. Gaither filed a complaint 
with Bar Counsel.  During Bar Counsel’s investigation, the 
Respondent gave a statement under oath on June 20, 2018. 
*** 
 
“The Court finds that the Respondent did not knowingly 
and intentionally testify falsely in this deposition with Bar 
Counsel on June 20, 2018.  The Court finds that the May 15, 
2012 Letter Agreement, expressly stating that in the event that 
the Hedgepeth case settles or resolves by trial for more than 
$500,000, the Respondent would repay Ms. Gaither $54,000, 
was not an agreement to share fees, but rather part of a 
concerted effort on the part of the Respondent to encourage 
Ms. Gaither to give Respondent her money.  The Court does 
 
19 
 
 
not find, given the history of events in this case, that 
Respondent if he received a $500,000 settlement instead of the 
$400,000 that he did receive[] that the Respondent would have 
doubled Ms. Gaither’s money and returned to her $54,000.  
The Court is confident in this prediction since after receiving 
[the] $400,000 settlement, he failed to pay any of the 
‘guaranteed’ $27,000. 
 
“The Court finds that the agreement is not what the 
Respondent purported it to be, a ‘guaranteed investment,’ but 
rather a personal ‘loan’ to the Respondent with ever-changing 
repayment and return provisions determined solely by the 
Respondent.  The Court makes the same assessment of the 
August 14, 2015 email.  The Court finds that the delivery of 
the $5,000 to Ms. Gaither, was not part of a fee but rather a 
token payment to support the illusion that he was abiding by 
the agreement and was a fair dealing partner in this venture.   
*** 
The Court views the emails and agreements as continuing 
empty promises solely intent on getting and retaining Ms. 
Gaither’s investment.  Therefore, the Court does not find that 
 
20 
 
 
he made knowingly and intentional misrepresentations in his 
statement under oath regarding monies paid to Ms. Gaither. 
 
 
“Finally, 
Petitioner 
alleges 
that, 
during 
the 
Respondent’s deposition, in response to a question regarding 
the Respondent’s use of Ms. Gaither’s funds, the Respondent 
knowingly and intentionally testified falsely . . . .  The full 
reading of the transcript shows that when questioned about the 
expenditure after the deposit of Ms. Gaither’s monies, the 
Respondent admitted that while some expenditures were 
personal in nature, and some were possibly business but could 
be personal, only one check for $800, for an expert witness, 
was an expenditure to benefit a specific case.  The statement 
by Respondent was, at best, an attempt to explain what he used 
the monies for, and the Court does not find it was a false 
statement viewed in the entirety of the deposition. 
Mitigating Factors 
 
“The Respondent did not present any evidence in 
mitigation. 
Aggravating Factors 
“The Court of Appeals has recognized the following 
aggravating factors: 
 
21 
 
 
‘(1) Prior disciplinary offenses; 
(2) A dishonest or selfish motive; 
(3) A pattern of misconduct; 
(4) Multiple offenses; 
(5) Bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary 
proceeding by intentionally failing to comply 
with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; 
(6) Submission of false evidence, false 
statements, or other deceptive practices during 
the disciplinary process; 
(7) Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature 
of conduct; 
(8) Vulnerability of victim; 
(9) Substantial experience in the practice of law; 
and 
(10) Whether he or she displayed indifference to 
making restitution.’ 
 
“See Att’y Griev. Comm’n v. Sperling, 434 Md. 658, 
676–77, 76 A.3d 1172, 1183 (2013) (citing Standard 9.22 of 
the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions).  The Petitioner has alleged the existence of the 
following aggravating factors: (2) a dishonest or selfish 
motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple offenses; (7) 
refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct; (9) 
substantial experience in the practice of law; and (10) 
indifference to making restitution.  This Court agrees. 
*** 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO EACH CHARGE 
 
22 
 
 
 
“For the reasons stated below, this Court finds, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that the Respondent violated the 
following Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
and the Maryland Attorney’s Rules of Professional Conduct:[] 
MLRPC Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information 
 
 
 
“Rule 1.6 provides, in part, 
‘(a) a lawyer shall not reveal information related 
to the representation of a client unless the client 
gives informed consent, the disclosure is 
impliedly 
authorized 
to 
carry 
out 
the 
representation, or the disclosure is permitted by 
section (b) of this Rule.’ 
 
“The Court finds that the Respondent violated Rule 1.6 
when he disclosed to Ms. Gaither, in his May 15, 2012 email, 
that Mr. Hedgepeth would not settle his case for less than one 
million dollars.  Despite the Responden[t]’s insistence that he 
intended to express his own goals in his statements to Ms. 
Gaither regarding the Hedgepeth settlement, the Court cannot 
and will not ignore the plain and obvious meaning of ‘[Mr. 
Hedgepeth] will not accept a settlement less than $1 Million.’  
The Court similarly rejects Respondent’s argument that 
disclosing a client’s expectations for settlement does not 
constitute a violation of Rule 1.6 simply because lawyers do so 
regularly; the Court will not speculate on what attorneys do in 
 
23 
 
 
their day-to-day practice, but it will not accept the argument 
that regularity voids culpability.  The Respondent failed to 
obtain Mr. Hedgepeth’s informed consent before making the 
disclosure, despite his assurances to Ms. Gaither that he had 
done so.  Therefore, the Court concludes that the Respondent 
has violated Rule 1.6. 
MLRPC 5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer 
 
“Rule 5.4 provides, in part: 
‘(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal 
fees with a nonlawyer, except that: 
 
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with 
the lawyer’s firm, partner, or 
associate may provide for the 
payment 
of 
money, 
over 
a 
reasonable period of time after the 
lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s 
estate or to one or more specified 
persons; 
(2) a lawyer who purchases the 
practice of a lawyer who is 
deceased or disabled or who has 
disappeared may, pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 1.17, pay the 
purchase price to the estate or 
representative of the lawyer; 
(3) a lawyer who undertakes to 
complete unfinished legal business 
of a deceased, retired, disabled, or 
suspended lawyer may pay to that 
lawyer or that lawyer’s estate the 
portion of the total compensation 
which 
fairly 
represents 
the 
 
24 
 
 
services rendered by the former 
lawyer; 
(4) a lawyer or law firm may 
include nonlawyer employees in a 
compensation or retirement plan, 
even though the plan is based in 
whole or in part on a profit-sharing 
arrangement; and 
(5) a lawyer may share court-
awarded legal fees with a nonprofit 
organization 
that 
employed, 
retained 
or 
recommended 
employment of the lawyer in the 
matter.’ 
 
“The Court does not find that the Respondent violated 
Rule 5.4(a) when he paid Ms. Gaither $5,000.  The Court is not 
convinced that the monies were in fact, fees attributable to the 
Dyer case.  The Court believes that the agreements and emails 
were constructed and sent to lure Ms. Gaither into entering into 
an agreement with the Respondent’s firm and the Respondent 
never intended to abide by the time constraints or the 
guaranteed return on the investment.  As such the Court cannot 
find that it was an agreement to share fees.  Therefore, the 
Court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that the 
Respondent violated Rule 5.4(a). 
MARPC Rule 8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary 
Matters 
“Rule 8.1 provides, in part: 
 
25 
 
 
‘An applicant for admission or reinstatement to 
the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar 
admission application or in connection with a 
disciplinary matter, shall not: 
 
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material 
fact.’ 
 
“The Court does not find that the Respondent violated 
Rule 8.1(a).  On June 20, 2018, during his statement under oath 
to Bar Counsel, the Respondent made several statements 
regarding his agreement with Ms. Gaither.  As previously 
discussed, the Court does not find the statement to be knowing 
and intentional misrepresentations made under oath.  Rather, 
the Court finds that since there was never any intent of the 
Respondent to comply with the initial agreement, his statement 
to Bar Counsel that he never intended to share fees with Ms. 
Gaither is not a knowing and intentional misrepresentation.  
Despite the language in the agreement, Respondent never 
intended and did not act in compliance with the contract or 
even the spirit of the contract.  The Court, therefore, finds that 
there was not an agreement to share fees in the Hedgepeth and 
Dyer cases and as a result his statements to Bar Counsel were 
not knowing and intentional misrepresentations. 
 
26 
 
 
 
“The Respondent further testified under oath that he 
used Ms. Gaither’s funds for ‘anything the firm needed to keep 
things moving forward.’  Petitioner asserts that this directly 
contradicts the Respondent’s testimony at the July 30, 2019 
hearing, at which he readily confessed he spent most of the 
funds on personal expenses.  A full reading of the transcript 
puts these statements in context and the Court is not convinced 
that the Respondent made false statements to Bar Counsel.  The 
Respondent admitted that he used the funds for personal 
expenditures and the statements were an explanation for why 
he used the funds in the manner that he did.  Therefore, the 
Court finds that this statement to Bar Counsel was [not] a 
knowing and intentional misrepresentation. 
MLRPC/MARPC Rule 8.4. Misconduct. 
“Rule 8.4 provides, in part: 
‘It is professional misconduct for a lawyer/attorney to: 
 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland 
Lawyers’/Attorneys’ Rules of Professional 
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to 
do so, or do so through the acts of another[;]  
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely 
on 
the 
lawyer’s/attorney’s 
honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as an attorney in other 
respects; 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 
 
27 
 
 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice[.]’ 
 
“The Court finds that the Respondent violated the 
sections of Rule 8.4 as charged.  Having violated other Rules 
of Professional Conduct, the Respondent violated Rule 8.4(a).  
See Att’y Griev. Comm’n v. Foltz, 411 Md. 359 (2009) (finding 
that where any attorney violated several other Rules of 
Professional Conduct, he necessarily violated Rule 8.4(a)). 
“. . . Additionally, the Respondent’s extensive use of 
deception and deceit in regard to his dealings with Ms. Gaither 
also constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4(c).  In Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Coppock, the Court of Appeals held that 
Rule 8.4(c) applies not only to the practice of law, ‘but extends 
to actions by an attorney in business or personal affairs that 
reflect on the individual’s character and fitness to practice law. 
. . . ”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Coppock, 432 Md. 629, 
644 (2013).  As the attorney who represented Ms. Gaither in 
her employment discrimination case, the Respondent knew 
that Ms. Gaither had received a considerable sum of money as 
a result of the settlement and, taking advantage of their 
disparate levels of legal sophistication, proceeded to design a 
scheme to take those funds from her.  The Court is persuaded 
 
28 
 
 
by the ruling of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia, which held in Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Battistelli 
that “[i]f a lawyer converts [others’] monies to his or her own 
use without authorization, the attorney is subject to a 
disciplinary charge.  Such conduct obviously reflects a 
dishonest and deceitful nature which violates the general 
precept that an attorney should avoid dishonesty or deceitful 
conduct.”  Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Battistelli, 206 W.Va. 
197, 203 (1999) (quoting Committee on Legal Ethics of West 
Virginia State Bar v. Hess, 186 W.Va. 514, 517 (1991)). 
 
“Here, the Respondent used Ms. Gaither’s funds for 
personal use and then lied to her about it repeatedly, stating 
that he would be applying her already-spent funds to upcoming 
cases.  The intentional and calculated dishonesty necessary to 
carry out the Respondent’s scheme is precisely the violative 
conduct the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
addressed in Hess, and unmistakably exposes the Respondent 
to liability. 
*** 
 
“It should be noted that, although not argued by 
Petitioner, there is an open question of whether an attorney-
 
29 
 
 
client [relationship] was still in existence at the time of the 
agreement between Ms. Gaither and the Respondent.  Some 
courts have found when loans between attorneys and client[s] 
occur close in time to the legal services, especially when 
settlements are reached, that a continuation of the attorney-
client [relationship] is found.  (Hunniecutt v. State Bar of 
California, 44 Cal.3d 362, 748 P.2d 1161 (1988) (finding that 
it [is] reasonable to examine the relationship between the 
parties to determine whether the attorney-client relationship 
still existed); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Battistelli, 206 W.Va. 
197, 205 (1999) (finding that elements of trust, rapport, and 
gratitude were present to compel the conclusions that the 
attorney-client relationship had not terminated when the loan 
was procured.).  The Supreme Court of Minnesota has 
explained it as follows, ‘[s]ince the duty of fidelity and good 
faith arising out of the confidential relation of attorney and 
client is founded not on the professional relation per se, but on 
the influence which the relation creates, such duty does not 
always cease immediately upon the termination of the 
relationship but continues as long as the influence therefrom 
 
30 
 
 
exists.’  Colstad v. Levine, 243 Minn. 279, 67 N.W.2d 648, 
654–55 (1954). 
 
“Since testimony and argument did not address this 
issue sufficiently for the Court to consider, the Court will not 
make that finding.  However, the Court is not constrained in 
considering such a fact in rendering its decision involving an 
attorney, who had recently terminated an attorney-client 
relationship through the settlement of a case.  The Court 
concludes . . . as a matter of law that an attorney who uses 
information about a client’s recent settlement for a 
considerable amount of money who then solicits that same 
client for a loan brings the legal profession into disrepute in 
violation of Rule 8.4(d).  This is especially true considering the 
following additional facts: that the client and the attorney had 
no previous relationship prior to their engagement; the client 
was not legally sophisticated in any respect; and the amount of 
time between the termination of the client-attorney relationship 
was short, days in this case. 
 
“The Court further concludes that the Respondent’s 
conduct, taken as a whole, most certainly brings the legal 
profession into disrepute in violation of Rule 8.4(d).  As stated 
 
31 
 
 
throughout this opinion thus far, the Respondent used his status 
as an attorney to persuade a former client to provide him with 
funds under false pretenses.  After the May 5, 2012 settlement, 
the Respondent wasted no time in approaching Ms. Gaither, 
and had an investment agreement drafted and ready for Ms. 
Gaither’s signature ten days later, on May 15, 2012.  The 
Respondent took advantage of Ms. Gaither’s trust in him which 
was gained while he acted in the capacity of her attorney to 
induce her to give him $27,000 under the guise of a legitimate 
financial investment.  The Respondent then misappropriated 
Ms. Gaither’s funds for his own personal use and made 
knowing and intentional misrepresentations to her regarding 
the use of her funds and the settlement of the Hedgepeth case.” 
(Footnotes in original). 
 
II. 
Judge Schweitzer found that respondent violated MLRPC 1.6(a) and MLRPC 
8.4/MARPC 19-308.4(a), (c), and (d).  Respondent excepts to Judge Schweitzer’s findings 
of fact and conclusions of law.12  Respondent rejects Judge Schweitzer’s findings of facts, 
                                              
12 Respondent notes that his “[e]xception is filed out of time with the consent of the 
Petitioner.” 
 
 
32 
 
 
presents before this Court the same arguments that he presented before her, and seeks 
essentially a de novo review of her findings.  As to Judge Schweitzer’s conclusions of law, 
respondent excepts generally that the case at bar does not implicate MLRPC/MARPC and 
falls outside the mandate of the Commission because he and Ms. Gaither engaged each 
other as private citizens after their attorney-client relationship ended.  Respondent argues 
as follows: 
“The [Commission] has taken what amounts to a business 
transaction between two individuals and attempted to construe 
it as [a] violation of an attorney’s fiduciary duties to a client.  
This is simply untrue. 
 
The Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct are 
rules that should be interpreted and applied to the purposes of 
legal representation and of the law itself.” 
 
In respondent’s view, the matter between him and Ms. Gaither should be adjudicated 
instead as a common law contract dispute before the District Court. 
 
As to Judge Schweitzer’s findings of fact related to MLRPC 1.6(a), respondent 
argues that there is “no proof whatsoever” that he revealed confidential client information 
about Mr. Hedgepeth to Ms. Gaither.  Respondent points out that the Commission could 
have but did not call Mr. Hedgepeth—“a critical witness in the Court’s analysis,” in 
respondent’s view—to testify.  Respondent acknowledges that in his agreements with Ms. 
Gaither, “pending cases in litigation were referred to [in order to] support the vitality of the 
practice,” but argues that his conduct did not violate MLRPC 1.6(a) because such conduct 
 
33 
 
 
“occurs every day by lawyers across the country with loan companies who provide a client 
loan or attorney loan.”13 
As to Judge Schweitzer’s findings of fact related to MLRPC 8.4/MARPC 19-
308.4(a), (c), and (d), respondent argues that there is “absolutely no evidence of deceit, 
dishonesty or fraud” on his part.  As to her conclusion of law, respondent argues that “[t]his 
is a case of unfortunate results that caused financial hardship to two private citizens” and 
that “[b]ad luck and unfortunate case results do not equate to a violation of the rules of 
ethics.” 
 
III. 
This Court has “original and complete jurisdiction” in attorney grievance matters 
and “conducts an independent review of the record.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Ambe, 
466 Md. 270, 286, 218 A.3d 757, 765–66 (2019).  We accept the hearing judge’s findings 
of fact unless we conclude that they are clearly erroneous.  Id. at 286, 218 A.3d at 766.  If 
the hearing judge’s factual findings are based on “competent material evidence,” they are 
not clearly erroneous, and we will not disturb them.  Id.  On the other hand, we review the 
hearing judge’s conclusions of law de novo.  Id. 
                                              
13 At oral argument before this Court, respondent stated repeatedly that it is a 
“common practice in personal injury law” for attorneys to “tell [loan companies] the facts 
of the case, with the client’s permission.”  He stated, “I did it with many other clients as 
well, with their permission.” 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
Although the Commission did not charge respondent with violating MLRPC 
1.8/MARPC 19-301.8 (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients; Specific Rules), whether Ms. 
Gaither continued to be respondent’s client at the time of their financial transactions, 
thereby triggering other applicable rules of professional conduct, is an important issue in 
this matter.  This issue is central to respondent’s defense of his conduct. 
MARPC 19-301.8 governs business transactions between an attorney and a client 
and provides in pertinent part as follows: 
“(a) An attorney shall not enter into a business transaction with 
a client unless: 
 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the 
attorney acquires the interest are fair and 
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed 
and transmitted in writing in a manner that can 
be reasonably understood by the client; 
(2) the client is advised in writing of the 
desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable 
opportunity to seek independent legal advice on 
the transaction; and 
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing 
signed by the client, to the essential terms of the 
transaction and the attorney’s role in the 
transaction, including whether the attorney is 
representing the client in the transaction.”14 
 
                                              
14 “When necessary, the attorney should discuss both the material risks of the 
proposed transaction, including any risk presented by the attorney’s involvement, and the 
existence of reasonably available alternatives and should explain why independent legal 
advice is desirable.”  Md. Rule 19-301.8, cmt. 2; see also In re Gold, 668 N.Y.S.2d 605 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that the attorney violated the New York equivalent of 
MARPC 19-301.8 by borrowing $57,000 from a former client and representing both 
borrower and lender in the transaction). 
 
 
35 
 
 
These safeguards are “intended to prevent ‘overreaching’ when a lawyer engages in a 
financial transaction with a client, given a lawyer’s skill and training and the relationship 
of trust with a client.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Shapiro, 441 Md. 367, 388, 108 A.3d 
394, 406 (2015); see Md. Rule 19-301.8, cmt. 1; see also People v. Culter, 277 P.3d 954, 
959 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2011) (holding that “[b]y neglecting to provide the safeguards that 
would alert the [clients] to [attorney’s] own self-interest, . . . Respondent acted without the 
vigilant dedication to his clients’ interests to which they were entitled”). 
Judge Schweitzer discussed this issue in her conclusions of law, but because the 
Commission had not charged a violation of MLRPC 1.8/MARPC 19-301.8, she 
characterized respondent’s relevant conduct as a violation of MLRPC 8.4(d) instead, 
explaining as follows: 
“The Court concludes . . . as a matter of law that an attorney 
who uses information about a client’s recent settlement for a 
considerable amount of money who then solicits that same 
client for a loan brings the legal profession into disrepute in 
violation of Rule 8.4(d).  This is especially true considering the 
following additional facts: that the client and the attorney had 
no previous relationship prior to their engagement; the client 
was not legally sophisticated in any respect; and the amount of 
time between the termination of the client-attorney relationship 
was short, days in this case.   
 
The Court further concludes that the Respondent’s conduct, 
taken as a whole, most certainly brings the legal profession 
into disrepute in violation of Rule 8.4(d).” 
 
(Emphasis added). 
We reject respondent’s argument that Ms. Gaither was no longer his client when he 
entered into financial transactions with her and that MLRPC/MARPC are not applicable to 
 
36 
 
 
the case at bar.  Whether the transaction is classified as a “loan” or an “investment,” Ms. 
Gaither continued to be a client of respondent.  Our conclusion is informed by attorney 
discipline cases in our sister jurisdictions, where bar counsels have brought the charge of 
violating the equivalent of MLRPC 1.8/MARPC 19-301.8 against attorneys who solicited 
and received personal loans from “former” clients.  In such cases, courts have held that 
attorney-client relationships persisted (1) if the transactions are “the result of overreaching 
or manipulation of the former relationship,” In re Ricco, 426 N.Y.S.2d 887, 888 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1980), or, stated differently, (2) “if the circumstances are such that the former client 
reasonably expects the lawyer to exercise professional judgment therein for the protection 
of the [former] client,” In re Ioannou, 89 A.D.3d 245, 250 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (internal 
quotation omitted) (alteration in original); see also In re Imming, 545 N.E.2d 715, 721 (Ill. 
1989) (regarding loans from “former” clients for an attorney’s non-legal business, holding 
that they “occurred so close in time to the respondent’s legal services to each client as to 
cause the client to believe that the respondent’s business relations were a continuation of 
the attorney-client relationship”) (emphasis added); La. St. Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 498 
So.2d 727, 728 (La. 1986) (“A lawyer may not enter into a business transaction with a 
client if they have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise 
his professional judgment on that matter for the protection of the client[.]”) (emphasis 
added); Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Battistelli, 523 S.E.2d 257, 263 (W. Va. 1999) (noting 
that the “former” client “still considered the Respondent his attorney and felt obligated to 
 
37 
 
 
give the Respondent the requested loan since the Respondent had assisted him in obtaining 
a favorable result” in his case). 
To determine if a financial transaction resulted from an overreaching or 
manipulation of the attorney-client relationship, courts have considered factors such as (a) 
the proximity in time between the last attorney-client interaction and the first conversation 
about the financial transaction at issue, (b) the location of the conversation (e.g., in the 
attorney’s office, “amidst the trappings of their attorney-client relationship”), (c) the 
attorney’s knowledge of the client’s possession of lendable money (in particular, a 
settlement received from the attorney’s representation), (d) the client’s willingness to make 
the transaction largely because of the attorney-client relationship (e.g., in the case of a 
former client “who said he had never before lent anyone more than $20”), (e) the client’s 
desire to help the attorney out of gratitude for the attorney’s representation, and (f) the 
client’s trust in the attorney (e.g., as demonstrated by the client’s not seeking independent 
legal advice about the transaction).  In re Ioannou, 89 A.D.3d at 249.  This is a “highly 
fact-specific inquiry.”  Id. at 250. 
 
In Hunniecutt v. State Bar, 748 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Cal. 1988), the Supreme Court of 
California held specifically that there is an attorney-client relationship as a matter of law 
where a client receives settlement proceeds and is then solicited by the attorney to invest 
“the fruits of the attorney’s representation” in the attorney’s (other, non-legal) business.  
The court explained as follows: 
“A client who receives the proceeds of a judgment or 
settlement will often place great trust in the investment advice 
 
38 
 
 
of the attorney who represented him in the matter.  This is 
especially likely when the client is unsophisticated and a large 
amount of money is involved.  This trust arises directly from 
the attorney-client relationship, and abuse of this trust is 
precisely the type of overreaching that rule 5–101[15] is 
designed to prevent.  Accordingly, when an attorney enters into 
a transaction with a former client regarding a fund which 
resulted from the attorney’s representation, it is reasonable to 
examine the relationship between the parties for indications of 
special trust resulting therefrom.  We conclude that if there is 
evidence that the client placed his trust in the attorney because 
of the representation, an attorney-client relationship exists for 
the purposes of rule 5-101 even if the representation has 
otherwise ended.” 
 
Id. at 1166–67; see also In re Imming, 545 N.E.2d at 721 (regarding loans from “former” 
clients for an attorney’s non-legal business, noting as significant that some of the clients 
had “directly invested the proceeds of the legal work respondent performed for them”); 
Williams, 498 So.2d at 728 (stating that “an unsophisticated client who is asked for a loan 
by her attorney out of her settlement proceeds is justified in believing the lawyer is acting 
as her attorney and guardian of her interests”).  This construction does not “dramatically 
extend the definition of an ‘attorney-client relationship’ beyond its common 
understanding.”  Hunniecutt, 748 P.2d at 1167.  The Supreme Court of Minnesota has 
explained as follows: 
“Since the duty of fidelity and good faith arising out of the 
confidential relation of attorney and client is founded, not on 
the professional relation per se, but on the influence which the 
relation creates, such duty does not always cease immediately 
upon the termination of the relation but continues as long as 
the influence therefrom exists.” 
                                              
15 The California equivalent of MLRPC 1.8/MARPC 19-301.8. 
 
 
39 
 
 
   
Colstad v. Levine, 67 N.W.2d 648, 654–55 (Minn. 1954). 
 
In the case at bar, the attorney-client relationship between respondent and Ms. 
Gaither continued through their financial transactions.  Relevant factors we consider 
include the fact that respondent broached the topic of an “investment” just days after Ms. 
Gaither received her portion of the settlement fund and Ms. Gaither’s lack of legal 
sophistication.  We overrule respondent’s exception. 
Regardless of whether Ms. Gaither is a current or former client of respondent, we 
hold that respondent violated MLRPC 1.6(a) and MLRPC 8.4/MARPC 19-308.4(a), (c), 
and (d).  First, as to the charge of violating MLRPC 1.6(a), whether there was an attorney-
client relationship between respondent and Ms. Gaither has no bearing on whether 
respondent violated his duty of confidentiality to his client Mr. Hedgepeth by disclosing 
Mr. Hedgepeth’s settlement expectation to Ms. Gaither without his informed consent.  
Second, as to the charge of violating MLRPC 8.4/MARPC 19-308.4(a), (c), and (d), we 
have held that this rule applies broadly to attorneys’ conduct inside and outside their 
practice of law.  We have held specifically that MLRPC 8.4(c)/MARPC 19-308.4(c) 
“extends to actions by an attorney in business or personal affairs that reflect on the 
individual’s character and fitness to practice law.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Coppock, 
432 Md. 629, 644, 69 A.3d 1092, 1100 (2013) (emphasis added). 
We hold that respondent violated MLRPC 1.6(a).  Respondent, although denying 
that there is any proof of his violation, fails to address Judge Schweitzer’s factual finding 
regarding respondent’s May 15, 2012 email to Ms. Gaither, in which respondent wrote, 
 
40 
 
 
“[Mr. Hedgepeth] will not accept a settlement less than $1 Million[.]”  Judge Schweitzer 
found, based on respondent’s testimony during his statement under oath and at the hearing, 
that respondent failed to obtain Mr. Hedgepeth’s informed consent before disclosing to Ms. 
Gaither the amount that Mr. Hedgepeth was willing to accept in settlement.  This finding 
of fact is based on “competent material evidence” despite lack of testimony from Mr. 
Hedgepeth, and it is not clearly erroneous. 
Respondent claims that sharing information about pending cases with third-party 
litigation funders for client or attorney loans is commonplace and argues that this negates 
any wrongdoing.  We agree with Judge Schweitzer in rejecting, without “speculat[ing] on 
what attorneys do in their day-to-day practice,” that “regularity voids culpability.”  
Attorneys must uphold their duty of confidentiality to their clients and secure the client’s 
informed consent before disclosing any confidential client information to third-party 
litigation funders.  See, e.g., Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Advisory Op. 2003-
15 (2003); Md. St. Bar Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 2000-45 (2000) (in discussing ethical 
implications of loans by private entity to personal injury plaintiffs, stating that “[a]ll 
courses of action must have the client’s consent”).  Respondent’s disclosure as to the 
amount Mr. Hedgepeth was willing to settle for was a confidential matter. 
We hold that respondent violated MLRPC 8.4/MARPC 19-308.4(a), (c), and (d).  
Judge Schweitzer found extensive deception and deceit by respondent in his dealings with 
Ms. Gaither throughout their financial transactions.  For example, Judge Schweitzer found 
that respondent used Ms. Gaither’s funds for personal use and then lied repeatedly to Ms. 
 
41 
 
 
Gaither about it, stating that he would apply her previously spent funds to upcoming cases.  
We overrule respondent’s exception of simply denying Judge Schweitzer’s findings, as 
they are not clearly erroneous. 
Respondent argues that his conduct was the result of “[b]ad luck and unfortunate 
case results . . . between two private citizens.”  We overrule this exception to Judge 
Schweitzer’s conclusion of law.  First, this is not a case of “two private citizens” because, 
as noted above, there was an ongoing attorney-client relationship between respondent and 
Ms. Gaither.  Second, respondent violated MLRPC 8.4/MARPC 19-308.4 regardless of 
Ms. Gaither’s status as a former or current client because the rule extends to an attorney’s 
dishonest personal dealings outside his practice of law.  See Coppock, 432 Md. at 644, 69 
A.3d at 1100.  Finally, respondent’s characterization of the events and conduct in question 
as “[b]ad luck and unfortunate case events” goes directly against Judge Schweitzer’s 
findings of fact, which respondent has not shown to be clearly erroneous.  Judge Schweitzer 
found that respondent, from the beginning, before any alleged misfortune took place, 
“never had any intention of using Ms. Gaither’s funds to pay for litigation costs.”  She 
found that respondent’s “investment opportunity” was a deception created to obtain funds 
from Ms. Gaither under false pretenses and to use those funds as an interest-free personal 
loan.  These findings are based upon the evidence before Judge Schweitzer and are not 
clearly erroneous.  Based on these factual findings, respondent violated MLRPC 
8.4/MARPC 19-308.4(a), (c), and (d). 
 
 
42 
 
 
IV. 
We now turn to the appropriate sanction to be imposed.  Bar Counsel recommends 
disbarment for the “central issue in this case” of respondent’s “use of deception and deceit 
to obtain funds from a former client,” drawing similarities between the case at bar and Att’y 
Grievance Comm’n v. Agbaje, 438 Md. 695, 735–36, 93 A.3d 262, 285 (2014), in which 
we disbarred an attorney for providing false and misleading information to his current 
client with whom he entered into a (non-legal) business transaction.  The Commission 
argues that “[l]ike the attorney in Agbaje, the Respondent took advantage of Ms. Gaither’s 
lack of experience, and her trust in him as an attorney, to induce her to giving him $27,000 
. . . and then provided Ms. Gaither with misleading and false information.”  On the other 
hand, respondent, in his filed exception, recommends a private reprimand for “poor 
judgement with a prior client” as the appropriate sanction.16 
The purpose of sanctioning an attorney is to protect the public rather than to punish 
the errant attorney.  See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Phillips, 451 Md. 653, 677, 155 A.3d 
476, 490 (2017).  Furthermore, it serves as deterrence against similar misconduct.  Id.  The 
severity of the sanction depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case, 
including consideration of any mitigating or aggravating factors.  See Att’y Grievance 
Comm’n v. Angst, 369 Md. 404, 416–18, 800 A.2d 747, 755 (2002). 
                                              
16 At oral argument before this Court, respondent did not recommend a particular 
sanction and deferred to the discretion of the Court.  Respondent also stated that this was 
his first and only loan dealing with a former client. 
 
 
43 
 
 
Our cases make clear that “[d]isbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for 
intentional dishonest conduct.”  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 
418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001).  In Angst, 369 Md. at 420, 800 A.2d at 757, we “iterated 
the unparalleled importance of honesty in the practice of law,” explaining as follows: 
“Unlike matters relating to competency, diligence and the like, 
intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most 
important matters of basic character to such a degree as to 
make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond 
excuse.  Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an 
attorney’s character.” 
 
(Internal quotation and citations omitted). 
Respondent presented no mitigating factors.  Judge Schweitzer noted several 
aggravating factors: a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple 
offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct, substantial experience in 
the practice of law, and indifference to making restitution.17  We conclude that disbarment 
is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct. 
 
IT 
IS 
SO 
ORDERED.  
RESPONDENT SHALL PAY 
ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY 
THE 
CLERK 
OF 
THIS 
COURT, INCLUDING COSTS 
                                              
17 At oral argument before this Court, respondent made repeated representations as 
to restitution.  He stated, “I will make her whole at any given moment, pursuant to promises 
of the contract, if she sues me in general District Court of Maryland or gets a . . . confessed 
judgment . . . unless we can just reach a settlement.”  Respondent explained that he had not 
repaid Ms. Gaither in full as of now “only because [he] can’t be in touch with her at all 
while this [proceeding] is pending.” 
 
 
44 
 
 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND 
RULE 19-709, FOR WHICH 
SUM 
JUDGMENT 
IS 
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
AGAINST 
JONATHAN 
CHRISTIAN 
DAILEY.