Case Title: Warfield Raymond Wike v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC00-2141

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No.  SC00-2141
____________
WARFIELD RAYMOND WIKE,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[January 24, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Warfield Raymond Wike appeals an order of the circuit court denying a
motion for postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing.  We have jurisdiction. 
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial
court's order denying Wike postconviction relief.
Wike, who was thirty-two years old at the time of the offenses, was
convicted of first-degree murder, two counts of kidnaping, sexual battery, and
-2-
attempted murder.  See Wike v. State, 596 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1992).  The facts of
the crime are detailed in this Court's opinion on direct appeal.
The facts reflect that at approximately 6:30 a.m. on
September 22, 1988, a couple found eight-year-old Sayeh Rivazfar
alongside a rural road in Santa Rosa County.  Sayeh was waving one
hand and held the other to her throat.  The couple noticed that Sayeh's
throat was cut and immediately drove her to a store to call for help.
During the drive, Sayeh told the couple that a man named "Ray" had
taken her and her sister from their home and to the woods where he
cut her throat and killed her six-year-old sister, Sarah.  Later at the
hospital, it was determined that Sayeh suffered a cut throat and two
lacerations to her vagina which were consistent with forced
penetration.
A search for Sarah Rivazfar began shortly after Sayeh was
found.  Sarah's body was found in the woods about seventy-five feet
from the dirt road where Sayeh was picked up.  Footprints were also
found at the scene.  Sarah's hands were tied behind her back and her
throat had been cut.  Crime scene technicians recovered several items
of evidence from three separate locations near the area where the body
was found.  These included pieces of shirt material, tire tracks, and
blood stains.
On the information investigators gathered from Sayeh and her
mother, they determined that Wike was a suspect.  Officers
immediately went to the Wike residence.  From neighbors they learned
that an elderly couple, a thirty-year-old man, and a child lived in the
house.  They also learned that the elderly man was confined to a
wheelchair.  Parked in front of the house was an older model green
Dodge automobile, with a dent on the side, which fit the description
given by Sayeh and her mother as being Wike's car.  A computer
check revealed that the car was registered to a Raymond Wike.
Although no one answered when an officer rang the front doorbell,
another officer heard movement inside.  The officers had the
dispatcher call the house.  A man named Ray answered. He was asked
to come outside with his hands on his head.  When he did, the officers
arrested him on the spot.  Then the officers conducted a sweep of the
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house to determine if there were other occupants.  After the sweep, the
officers obtained a search warrant and searched the house and the car
and seized several items of evidence from each.  The automobile was
also seized.
. . . .
At trial, Patricia Rivazfar, the girls' mother, testified that she and
her children had known Ray Wike for a little over a year. Evidence
seized from Wike and his vehicle established that: Wike, being a type
"A" secretor, could have contributed to the semen stains found on
various items in the car; (2) semen stains from a type "A" secretor
were found on the torn pink bathing suit found in the car; (3) a child's
sock found on the car had type "O" bloodstains, matching Sayeh's
type; (4) the car seat material had type "O" bloodstains, as did the
underpants that Sayeh wore; and (5) other bloodstains matching
Sarah's type "O" were found on the pine needles obtained from the
scene where Sarah's body was located and also on clothing material,
tennis shoes, and a blue blanket seized from the carport.  Further DNA
testing of the blue blanket identified the type "O" blood found as
positively coming from Sayeh.  Additionally, a hair expert testified
that, from a piece of torn material found at the scene, she found two
head hairs that were consistent with Wike's hair.  She also testified that
two pubic hairs consistent with Wike's were found, and that other
head hairs were found consistent with the hair of Sarah and Sayeh. An
examination of the clothing from Sarah revealed a pubic hair consistent
with Wike's, and a head hair consistent with Wike's was found on
both Sarah's and Sayeh's underpants.
Fingerprint evidence was presented that established two palm
prints matching Sayeh's were found on the trunk of Wike's car.  One
of these prints was made in blood or a substance of a high protein
content.  Two palm prints matching Wike's were located on the edge
of the trunk, and these prints were also made in a substance of high
protein content.  An expert in tire track comparisons testified that
plaster casts and photographs of the tire tracks found at the scene
matched the tires from Wike's car.
Sayeh testified that she and Sarah went to bed on September 22
around 8 p.m.  She explained that they both wore their clothes to bed
since they were sometimes late for the bus in the morning. She stated
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that she woke up in a car parked in front of her house and that she
recognized the man's voice as her mother's friend Ray.  Since she was
not fully awake, she went back to sleep.  Furthermore, she stated that
the man put Sarah in the back seat of the car and, when she asked for
her mother, Ray told her that her mother was coming.  Sayeh
remembered traveling on a paved road, which then turned into a dirt
road.  The child stated that, when they stopped, Wike raped her on the
trunk of the car.  Afterwards, they then got back into the car and
proceeded to a different location, where they stopped again and
walked in the woods.  At that point, Ray pulled a knife with finger
grips on it and told Sayeh to say a prayer and then cut her throat with
the knife.  She explained that Sarah was screaming and then Ray cut
her throat and left.
Wike testified in his own defense and denied involvement in any
of the crimes committed against the girls.  Wike explained that
somebody else could have used the car because he had been drinking
and smoking marijuana that night.  The jury found Wike guilty of all
charges.
Id. at 1021-22.
After the penalty phase hearing, the jury recommended imposition of the
death penalty by a vote of nine-to-three and the trial court imposed the death
penalty.  See id. at 1023.  On appeal, this Court affirmed Wike's convictions, but
remanded the case for a new penalty phase proceeding before a new jury,
concluding that the trial court erred by denying Wike's motion to continue the
penalty phase.  See id. at 1025.  
On remand, the jury unanimously recommended the death penalty, which the
trial court subsequently imposed.  See Wike v. State, 648 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla.
-5-
1994).  This Court on appeal, however, reversed Wike's sentence and remanded
the cause for resentencing because the trial court erroneously denied Wike his
vested procedural right to conclude the closing arguments before the jury.  See id.
at 684.  
In Wike's third sentencing proceeding, the jury again unanimously
recommended that Wike be sentenced to death.  See Wike v. State, 698 So. 2d
817, 819 (Fla. 1997).  The Court explained:
In following that recommendation, the trial judge found four
aggravating circumstances: prior violent felonies (1974 robbery, and
contemporaneous attempted murder, kidnaping, and sexual battery of
Sayeh); committed to avoid arrest; heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC);
and cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). Additionally, the judge
gave little or no weight to the statutory mitigating circumstance of age
(Wike was 32 at the time of the murder). He also considered a number
of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. 
[Note 1.]
[Note 1.] The nonstatutory mitigating circumstances considered by the
trial judge are as follows: Troubled childhood (little weight), mental
and emotional disturbance due to father's death and troubled life (little
weight), history of alcohol and drug abuse (some weight), under the
influence of drugs and alcohol at time of crime (little weight because
not corroborated by witnesses who observed Wike just after the
crime), gainfully employed (little weight), serving life for sexual battery
of Sayeh and able to serve life for this crime (some weight), has
behaved well in prison and not likely to be dangerous in the future
(little or no weight), and Wike has maintained his innocence (little or
no weight).
1.  The fifteen claims were:  (1) violation of the right to speedy trial; (2) denial
of Wike's right to be present at all stages of the trial; (3) unconstitutional arrest; (4)
erroneous admission into evidence of the fruit of the unconstitutional arrest; (5)
illegal search of Wike's parents' home; (6) insufficiency of the evidence to support
conviction; (7)  ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to achieve suppression of
evidence; (8) ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to investigate witnesses and
present alibi evidence; (9) ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to move for change
of venue; (10) ineffectiveness of counsel for failure to ensure Wike's presence at all
critical stages of trial; (11) ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to ensure Wike's
presence at sidebar conferences; (12) ineffectiveness of trial counsel in failing to
obtain a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community; (13) ineffectiveness
of counsel at the first resentencing for allowing the state to have the final closing
argument; (14) ineffectiveness of counsel at all three penalty phases; and (15) a
Brady claim of state suppression of exculpatory evidence.
2.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
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Id. at 819.  This Court affirmed, see id. at 823, and the United States Supreme
Court denied review.  See Wike v. Florida, 522 U.S. 1058 (1998).
Wike thereafter filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising fifteen
claims.1  After a Huff2 hearing, the trial court determined that the following six
claims required an evidentiary hearing:  (7) ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to
achieve suppression of evidence; (8) ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to
investigate witnesses and present alibi evidence; (9) ineffectiveness of counsel in
failing to move for change of venue; (10) ineffectiveness of counsel for failure to
ensure Wike's presence at all critical stages of trial; (11) ineffectiveness of counsel
for failing to ensure Wike's presence at sidebar conferences; and (14)
3.  Wike's appellate brief does not raise the issue of ineffective assistance for
failing to move for change of venue during resentencing, and appellate counsel
clarified at oral argument that his claim on this issue is in fact limited to trial
counsel's ineffectiveness during the guilt phase.  
4.  The trial court found that of the 75 individuals in the venire, 42 indicated
that they had at least some knowledge of the case.  Only 6 individuals, who were
excused for cause, indicated that they would have difficulty acting impartially
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ineffectiveness of counsel at the third penalty phase.  After the trial court conducted
a hearing on these issues, the parties entered written post-hearing arguments.  The
trial court thereafter entered an order denying all of Wike's claims.  Wike now
appeals the trial court's denial of postconviction relief, raising five issues for this
Court's review.  
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for
Failing to File a Change of Venue Motion
Wike first contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
change of venue motion to have the trial moved out of Santa Rosa County.3  In its
order denying Wike relief on this issue, the trial court determined that trial counsel
was not ineffective for failing to bring a change of venue motion against Wike's
wishes.  In addition, the trial court found that Wike had failed to establish that
grounds for a venue change existed because both the State and defense counsel
engaged in extensive voir dire before the trial, and the parties conducted individual
voir dire of each prospective juror.4  The trial court found that Wike had failed to
because they had already formed opinions concerning Wike.  Of the 15 individuals
impaneled as jurors or alternates, only 8 indicated having at least some prior
knowledge of the case and were questioned individually as to this issue.  Each juror
indicated that he or she had not formed any fixed opinions as to Wike's guilt, and
therefore, could sit as an impartial juror. 
-8-
demonstrate that he had substantial difficulty seating a jury in Santa Rosa County. 
Further, the trial court determined that the media exhibits that Wike introduced at
the evidentiary hearing did not demonstrate inflammatory media coverage.  
To establish a claim that defense counsel was ineffective, a defendant must
prove two elements: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Rutherford v. State,
727 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1998).  In establishing deficiency, "the defendant must show
that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"
based on "prevailing professional norms."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  In
establishing prejudice: 
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The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Here, the trial court determined that trial counsel's performance was not
deficient.  Defense counsel discussed the venue issue with Wike, received affidavits
from fifty individuals, and prepared for filing a motion for change of venue. 
Counsel's decision not to file the motion for change of venue was premised upon
Wike's opposition to a change of venue.  Competent, substantial evidence supports
the trial court's findings of fact, and, under all of these circumstances, we agree that
trial counsel's performance was not deficient.
Likewise, we agree with the trial court's determination as to the prejudice
prong.  The trial court determined that Wike failed to establish that grounds for a
venue change existed, or that there was substantial difficulty in seating a fair or
impartial jury.  When applying the prejudice prong to a claim that defense counsel
was ineffective for failing to move for a change of venue, the defendant must, at a
minimum, "bring forth evidence demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability
that the trial court would have, or at least should have, granted a motion for change
of venue if [defense] counsel had presented such a motion to the court."  Meeks v.
5.  As an initial matter, we reject the State's argument that Wike did not
preserve this issue for appeal.  Wike raised this issue in his 3.850 motion and he
presented testimony on it at the evidentiary hearing.  Accordingly, this issue has
been adequately preserved for appellate review.
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Moore, 216 F.3d 951, 961 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Provenzano v. Dugger, 561
So. 2d 541, 545 (Fla. 1990) (concluding that counsel was not ineffective for failing
to renew the motion for change of venue because it was a tactical decision and
because "it is most unlikely that a change of venue would have been granted
because there were no undue difficulties in selecting an impartial jury").  We agree
with the trial court's determination as to both prongs, and therefore, reject Wike's
claim on this issue. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for
Failing to Develop and Present a Viable Alibi Defense5
Wike next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to develop
and present a viable alibi defense.  Wike contends that he has always maintained his
innocence, and he claims that he specifically advised his counsel, before the original
trial, that he had an alibi for the night of September 21, 1988, and the early morning
hours of September 22, 1988.  In particular, he alleges that he went to the Silver
Eagle Lounge in Pensacola until about 1:30 a.m.  While there, he made several
phone calls and finally contacted Angie Cooper (then Angie Faulk), whom he had
been dating.  Wike then drove his car to the Scenic Hills Lounge, and Cooper
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picked him up from there and took him to her residence.  Wike stayed there until
5:45 a.m., when Cooper took him back to the Scenic Hills Lounge, where he got
his car and then drove back to his parents' house.  In addition, Wike contends that
there were other witnesses who could have testified that he was somewhere other
than the crime scene at the time of the abduction.  In particular, Wike alleged that he
had been seen by Glenda Hilliard at Fred's Bar as late as 11:50 p.m. and, after that,
by Tammy Osborn at the Silver Eagle Lounge at 1:15 a.m.  Furthermore, Wike
contends that Angela Jones could place him at the Cove Tavern until 11 p.m., and
Carolyn Neal told Mr. Martin, the investigator, that Wike arrived at the RaceTrac at
midnight. 
In response, the State contends that there is no one who could testify to
Wike's whereabouts after 1:15-1:30 a.m., and many of those who Wike claims
should have been called as witnesses would have had unfavorable things to say
about Wike.  Accordingly, the State argues that Wike has not demonstrated any
deficient attorney performance in the investigation and presentation of evidence at
the guilt phase of his trial.  In addition, the State contends that Wike has not
demonstrated any prejudice because he cannot point to any evidence that trial
counsel should have discovered or presented that could possibly have made any
difference in the result of the guilt phase of the trial.
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At the evidentiary hearing, Cooper testified that "there was no doubt in [her]
mind" that Wike was not with her on the night of the crimes, and stated:  "[H]e was
not at my house."  She also testified that she had not seen Wike for two to three
weeks before the crimes.  Defense counsel testified at the hearing that "in
discussing the matter with Mr. Wike and reviewing the trial strategy that we had we
concluded it was more important to have rebuttal argument than to present the issue
regarding what I classify as pre-alibi witnesses." 
In its order denying postconviction relief, the trial court reviewed the hearing
testimony and concluded:
The record does not support the claim that counsel failed to
investigate the use of alibi witnesses.  With the exception of Ms. Faulk
[Cooper], the Defendant failed to provide the name of a witness who
could provide an alibi for the Defendant during the relevant time frame. 
As to Ms. Faulk [Cooper], when she was located, she positively
denied she was with the Defendant during the period of time the
crimes were committed.  The decision not to call the "pre-alibi
witnesses" to testify at trial was a tactical decision to gain the
advantage of rebuttal in closing arguments and cannot be said to have
prejudiced the Defendant or to have deprived him of a fair trial.  See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
Competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings.  Indeed,
Cooper clearly did not support Wike's alibi defense, nor has Wike demonstrated
that any of the other witnesses could have provided an alibi for the relevant time
frame either.  Accordingly, Wike has failed to demonstrate that counsel's
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performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent the alleged deficient
performance.  See Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So. 2d 466, 470 (Fla. 1997).  We
thus reject Wike's claim on this issue.  
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failing to Ensure
That Wike Was Present at All Critical Stages of Trial
Wike's next argument is that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
ensure that Wike was present at all critical stages of trial.  Specifically, Wike claims
that he did not attend his arraignment, three docket calls, part of jury selection, and
part of the trial. 
This Court has held that a defendant has a "constitutional right to be present
at the stages of his trial where fundamental fairness might be thwarted by his
absence."  Francis v. State, 413 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 1982); see also
Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 351 (Fla. 2001) ("Criminal defendants have a
due process right to be physically present in all critical stages of trial.").  Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a defendant
shall be present at first appearance; any pretrial conferences, unless he waives his
presence in writing; during the examination, challenging, impaneling, and swearing
of the jury; and at all proceedings before the court when the jury is present.  
6.  In support of that proposition, the trial court cited Wright v. State, 688
So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1996), in which this Court stated, "[T]he general qualification
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At the evidentiary hearing on Wike's motion, defense counsel testified as
follows:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:   My normal practice was to have clients
present at each docket day so they would
know what was happening and why, and be
present when things were happening.  And
without a specific recollection I would
presume that happened in this case.
. . . .
[Q]:
In fact, sir, as a defense attorney in this
particular area what would you have done if
the defendant was not present and something
like this was going on?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:   I certainly would have objected and refused
to participate without him being present.
In its postconviction order, the trial court determined that the record reflects
that Wike was present for arraignment.  As for Wike's alleged absence during
docket calls, the trial court determined that counsel was not ineffective for failing to
secure Wike's presence at these docket calls, nor did Wike show that he had
suffered any prejudice as a result of his absence.  With regard to the first day of
jury selection, the trial court determined that the general qualification of the jurors is
not considered a critical phase of the trial at which the defendant's presence is
required.6  
process is not 'a critical stage of the proceedings requiring the defendant's
presence.'" 
-15-
With regard to the in-chambers preliminary conference that was held
immediately after the general qualification of the jury and before jury selection, the
trial court determined that Wike was absent, but that he was not prejudiced by his
absence because no matters were discussed that required his input and no adverse
rulings were made against him (defense counsel raised an in-court identification
issue and a request to sequester the jury, and the trial court reserved ruling on both
requests).  Further, the trial court found that Wike was present before jury selection
began during the individual voir dire.  With regard to the second day of jury
selection, the court found that Wike was present at the opening of jury selection.  
Finally, with regard to Wike's claim that he was not present during the first
two days of trial, the trial court found that the record neither affirmatively indicates
Wike's presence, nor does it indicate his absence.  Accordingly, the trial court
relied upon trial counsel's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, along with the
numerous references to Wike's presence throughout the trial, to find that counsel
ensured Wike's presence during the first two days of trial.
Competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings that Wike
was present at arraignment, at jury selection on June 13, 1989, and at the first two
7.  Because the Strickland standard requires establishment of both the
deficiency and the prejudice prongs, when a defendant fails to make a showing as
to one of the prongs, it is not necessary to delve into whether the defendant has
made a showing as to the other prong.  466 U.S. at 697 ("[T]here is no reason for a
court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both components of
the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one."); see also
Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d 506, 518 n.19 (Fla. 1999) (no need to address
prejudice prong where defendant failed to establish deficient performance element);
Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912, 914 (Fla. 1989).
-16-
days of trial.  Accordingly, Wike has failed to demonstrate a preliminary basis for
relief on this aspect of his claim.  As to the stages where Wike was absent or where
the record is not conclusive as to whether Wike was present or not, we agree with
the trial court's conclusions that Wike was not prejudiced by any absence, and
therefore, we reject Wike's claim on this basis.7  Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court's denial of this claim. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failing
to Ensure That Wike Was Present
at Sidebar Conferences During the Third Penalty Phase 
Wike next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure
that he was present at sidebar conferences during the third penalty phase.  In his
post-hearing motion, Wike outlined seven bench conferences that occurred during
the voir dire proceedings at which he was not present:
1.  Wike's counsel requests that the court allow him to inform the
venire that Wike has already been convicted of sexual battery and
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sentenced to 25 years in state prison.  The court permitted counsel to
do so.
2.  Wike's counsel renewed his motion to sequester the jury, which the
court denied.
3.  A prospective juror advised the court that, for religious reasons, he
cannot sit in judgment of another.  Wike's counsel and the State
stipulated (and the court agreed) to excuse this juror for cause.
4.  A prospective juror advises the court that, due to past experiences
with the state attorney's office, he could not be impartial.  Wike's
counsel and the State stipulated (and the court agreed) to excuse this
juror for cause.
5.  A prospective juror advises the court that she was previously
molested and therefore, that she could not be impartial.  Wike's
counsel and the State stipulated (and the court agreed) to excuse this
juror for cause.
6.  A prospective juror advises the court that this venire person could
not be impartial.  Wike's counsel and the State stipulated (and the
court agreed) to excuse this juror for cause.
7.  A prospective juror advises the court that on the day of the
offense, she worked and was present at the hospital where the
surviving victim was taken, and she believed this could affect her
ability to be impartial.  Wike's counsel and the State stipulated (and the
court agreed) to excuse this juror for cause.
The State contends that Wike has failed to demonstrate any prejudice as to
any of these absences because he has neither suggested that he personally would
have taken a different position than that taken by counsel at these sidebars, nor has
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he shown in what way the position taken by counsel at these sidebars was
incorrect, strategically unwise, or otherwise subject to attack. 
In Coney v. State, 653 So. 2d 1009, 1013 (Fla. 1995), this Court ruled that
under our then-current rules of procedure, the defendant had a right to be present at
the bench when pretrial juror challenges were exercised.  Violation of that right,
however, is subject to a harmless error analysis.  See id.  Although Coney has since
been superseded by statute, see Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 685 So. 2d 1253, 1254 n. 2 (Fla.1996), it still applies to cases in which
jury selection took place after April 27, 1995, and before January 1, 1997.  See
Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 353 n.6.  Because Wike's third penalty phase began on
August 14, 1995, Coney is applicable to this case.  
In its order denying relief, the trial court determined that with regard to the
bench conference concerning Wike's prior conviction, Wike had failed to
demonstrate how his absence affected the outcome of the trial because no matters
were discussed that required Wike's input and no adverse rulings were made
against him.  As for the bench conference regarding jury sequestration, the court
determined that legal issues were discussed and that Wike's presence would not
have assisted counsel, and therefore, Wike did not suffer any prejudice.  Finally,
with regard to the bench conferences where jurors were excused for cause, the trial
-19-
court determined that under Coney, Wike did have a right to be physically present
at the immediate site where juror challenges were exercised.  However, the court
explained that this right was subject to a harmless error analysis, and that Wike's
absence constituted harmless error and that he has suffered no prejudice.
Although under Coney Wike had a right to be present at the site where the
juror challenges were exercised, the substantive claims relating to Wike's absence
should have been raised either at trial or on direct appeal.  Accordingly, only the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims relating to Wike's absence were properly
raised in his 3.850 motion.  We agree with the trial court that Wike has not
demonstrated prejudice under Strickland, and therefore, we affirm the trial court's
denial of relief as to this claim. 
Cumulative Error
Wike's final claim is that the cumulative effect of his alleged errors require
that he receive a new trial.  However, because no errors have occurred, this claim
also is without merit.  See Rose v. State, 774 So. 2d 629, 635 n.10 (Fla. 2000); see
also Downs v. State, 740 So.2d 506, 509 (Fla. 1999) (concluding that where
allegations of individual error do not warrant relief, a cumulative error argument
based thereon is without merit).
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For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court and reject all of Wike's
claims on appeal.  We commend the trial court, whose diligence in providing a well-
documented and well-analyzed order greatly assisted this Court in this case. 
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Santa Rosa County,
Paul A. Rasmussen, Judge - Case No. 88-547-CF
Baya Harrison, III, Monticello, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Curtis M. French, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee