Case Title: State v. Tims

Citation: 

Docket Number: 109472

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2015-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 109,472 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DANIEL W. TIMS, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
A person accused of a misdemeanor has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the 
sentence to be imposed upon conviction includes a term of imprisonment, even if the jail 
time is suspended or conditioned upon a term of probation. The right to counsel arises at 
the stage of the proceedings where guilt is adjudicated, eligibility for imprisonment is 
established, and the prison sentence determined. 
 
2. 
An uncounseled misdemeanor conviction obtained in violation of a defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel (i.e., an uncounseled conviction that resulted in a 
prison sentence, even if the sentence was suspended or conditioned upon a term of 
probation) may not be collaterally used for sentence enhancement in a subsequent 
criminal proceeding. Conversely, an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction that resulted 
in no prison sentence being imposed may be used to enhance punishment for a 
subsequent conviction without violating the Sixth Amendment.  
 
 
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3. 
Though a driving under the influence (DUI) diversion is considered a prior 
conviction pursuant to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1567(j), the diversion does not have an 
underlying sentence attached to it and, thus, is distinguishable from a misdemeanor 
conviction resulting in a suspended jail sentence. An uncounseled DUI diversion is more 
analogous to an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction that did not result in any jail 
sentence. Consequently, an uncounseled DUI diversion can properly be used to enhance 
punishment for a subsequent DUI conviction without violating a defendant's 
constitutional right to counsel.  
 
4. 
Based on the language of K.S.A. 12-4414(c), a defendant has a statutory right to 
be represented by counsel at a DUI diversion conference with a city attorney.   
 
5. 
 
The certification language suggested by this court in State v. Hughes, 290 Kan. 
159, 224 P.3d 1149 (2010), and In re Habeas Corpus Application of Gilchrist, 238 Kan. 
202, 708 P.2d 977 (1985), to ensure that a municipal court judge properly advises a 
defendant of his or her constitutional right to counsel is not required for a diversion 
agreement to be valid because the constitutional right to counsel does not attach during 
diversion proceedings.  
 
6. 
Any waiver of the statutory right to be represented by counsel during a diversion 
conference must be knowing and voluntary. The language of the diversion agreement 
controls appellate review of the soundness of the waiver.  
 
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7. 
Diversion agreements are to be interpreted in accordance with contract principles. 
An appellate court exercises unlimited review over the interpretation and legal effect of 
written instruments. The primary rule for interpreting written contracts is to ascertain the 
parties' intent. If the terms of the contract are clear, the intent of the parties is to be 
determined from the language of the contract without applying rules of construction. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 49 Kan. App. 2d 845, 317 P.3d 115 (2014). 
Appeal from Jackson District Court; MICHEAL A. IRELAND, judge. Opinion filed August 14, 2015. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing and remanding to the district court is affirmed in part and 
vacated in part. Appeal sustained on question reserved.   
 
Timothy Liesmann, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney 
general, was on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Kevin P. Shepherd, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  Daniel W. Tims appeals the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. 
Tims, 49 Kan. App. 2d 845, 317 P.3d 115 (2014), reversing the district court's decision 
holding that Tims' 2002 uncounseled driving under the influence (DUI) diversion could 
not be counted as a prior DUI conviction for purposes of determining his sentence for his 
current DUI conviction. The Court of Appeals found that Tims' Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel did not attach during the 2002 diversion proceedings. The court also concluded 
that though Tims had a statutory right to counsel during the diversion proceedings, the 
diversion agreement that Tims signed showed that he had validly waived this statutory 
right. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals determined that Tims' 2002 DUI diversion could 
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be properly counted as a prior conviction and, thus, remanded Tims' case with directions 
that his current DUI conviction be classified and sentenced as a felony third DUI.  
 
We granted Tims' petition for review to determine whether, absent a valid waiver 
of the right to counsel, an uncounseled DUI diversion can be considered as a prior 
conviction for classification and sentencing purposes in a subsequent DUI proceeding 
without violating a defendant's constitutional or statutory right to counsel.  
 
FACTS 
 
Tims does not contest the accuracy of the Court of Appeals' recitation of the facts 
in its opinion. That portion of the opinion is quoted below: 
 
"The Jackson County District Court found Tims guilty of driving under the 
influence of alcohol in June 2012. This was not Tims' first DUI. In 2002, Tims executed a 
DUI diversion agreement in the Topeka Municipal Court. There is no evidence in the 
record regarding whether Tims successfully completed the diversion; however, Tims 
makes no claim that he served jail time in connection with his Topeka offense; Tims' 
presentence investigation report lists it as a diversion and not a conviction; and since it is 
the subject of this appeal, we presume the diversion was never revoked and no sentence 
was imposed. Tims was convicted of another DUI in 2004. 
"Based upon the 2002 DUI diversion and the 2004 DUI conviction, in 2012 the 
State charged Tims with felony DUI under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1567(a)(5) and 
(b)(1)(D). Curiously, Tims waived his preliminary hearing then subsequently filed a 
Motion to Strike Diversion from Consideration of Defendant's Criminal History and 
Discharge from Felony Charges. After the State responded only to the merits of the 
motion and not its procedural propriety, the district court heard arguments and granted 
Tims' motion. The State then filed a motion to reconsider, resulting in a brief hearing and 
denial by the district court. Thereafter, the parties agreed to a bench trial upon stipulated 
facts. The State reserved the right to appeal the district court's sentencing decision based 
on the court's exclusion of Tims' 2002 DUI diversion from his criminal history. 
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"The district court found Tims guilty, treated his conviction as a second 
misdemeanor DUI conviction, and sentenced him to probation. The State timely 
appeal[ed] based on an illegal sentence and on a question reserved." Tims, 49 Kan. App. 
2d at 847.  
 
The Court of Appeals, relying on State v. Key, 298 Kan. 315, 322-23, 312 P.3d 
355 (2013) ("A defendant who intends to challenge the validity of a prior misdemeanor 
DUI as a classifying factor for a DUI felony charge under K.S.A. 8-1567 should 
challenge the prior misdemeanor at preliminary hearing . . ."), found that because Tims 
waived his right to a preliminary hearing, he waived his right to challenge the 
classification of the current DUI as a nonperson felony. Additionally, the panel, relying 
on State v. Bell, 268 Kan. 764, 768, 1 P.3d 325 (2000) (once probable cause existed to 
bind defendant over on charge, judge had no authority to amend charge), and State v. 
Leslie, 237 Kan. 318, 319, 699 P.2d 510 (1985) (magistrate judge had no authority to 
amend felony charge to misdemeanor at the conclusion of preliminary hearing), 
concluded that once Tims waived his right to a preliminary hearing, the district court did 
not have the authority to reclassify the DUI charge as a misdemeanor. The panel also 
determined that because the State was challenging the legality of Tims' sentence based on 
the assertion that he should have received a sentence for a felony third DUI instead of a 
misdemeanor second DUI, the State's appeal was properly before it under K.S.A. 22-
3504. Tims, 49 Kan. App. 2d at 848-50. Tims did not challenge these conclusions in his 
petition for review and, thus, they are waived. See State v. Holman, 295 Kan. 116, 125, 
284 P.3d 251 (2012) (An issue not briefed by the appellant is deemed waived and 
abandoned.).    
 
Regarding the merits of the State's argument, the panel found that the district court 
erred in not considering Tims' 2002 DUI diversion as a prior conviction for sentence 
enhancement purposes. Based on precedent from the United States Supreme Court and 
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this court, the panel concluded that Tims' Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not 
attach during the 2002 diversion proceedings and, thus, his diversion could be properly 
considered for sentencing purposes without violating his constitutional rights. The panel, 
however, found that based on K.S.A. 12-4416(a), Tims had a statutory right to counsel 
during the diversion conference with the city prosecutor. But based on the language 
within the diversion agreement that Tims signed, the panel concluded that Tims validly 
waived his statutory right to counsel. The panel specifically rejected Tims' argument that 
in order for his waiver to have been valid, there had to be a written certification from a 
municipal court judge stating that the judge fully advised Tims of his right to counsel and 
that Tims knowingly and voluntarily waived that right in front of the judge. The panel 
reasoned that because a diversion agreement is a contract solely between a prosecutor and 
a defendant, there was no need for a judge's certification on the diversion agreement. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court and remanded the 
case for resentencing as a felony conviction for a third DUI. Tims, 49 Kan. App. 2d at 
852-58. 
 
 
Tims' failure to seek review of these procedural and jurisdictional conclusions on 
petition for review constitutes a waiver of the issues under State v. Holman, 295 Kan. 
116, 125, 284 P.3d 251 (2012). Yet, as noted by the Court of Appeals, appellate courts 
have a duty to question appellate jurisdiction sua sponte. Ryser v. State, 295 Kan. 452, 
456, 284 P.3d 337 (2012). Our review of the proceedings in this case reveals a tangled 
web of procedural and jurisdictional issues which have not been adequately briefed or 
addressed by either party or fully considered by the panel below. As the State originally 
appealed the use of the prior uncounseled DUI diversion on alternate jurisdictional 
grounds, we elect to consider this appeal as a question reserved of statewide importance 
under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3602(b)(3), rather than an appeal from an illegal sentence 
under K.S.A. 22-3504, cognizant that our review will have no effect on Tims' sentence. 
See State v. Berreth, 294 Kan. 98, 123, 273 P.3d 752 (2012) ("an appellate court's answer 
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to a State's question reserved has no effect on the criminal defendant in the underlying 
case"). 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN DUI DIVERSION PROCEEDINGS 
 
In his petition for review, Tims argues that the Court of Appeals erred in 
determining that he did not have Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel 
when he entered into the 2002 DUI diversion agreement with the Topeka city prosecutor. 
As noted above, this conclusion led the Court of Appeals to hold that the diversion could 
be counted as a prior conviction for purposes of enhancing Tims' sentence for his current 
felony third DUI conviction without violating his constitutional rights.   
 
Whether Tims had a constitutional right to counsel during the 2002 diversion 
proceedings raises a question of law subject to unlimited review. See State v. Jones, 290 
Kan. 373, 376, 228 P.3d 394 (2010) (stating that the extent of the right to counsel is a 
question of law over which this court exercises unlimited review).     
 
Based on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Alabama v. Shelton, 535 
U.S. 654, 658, 122 S. Ct. 1764, 152 L. Ed. 2d 888 (2002), this court in State v. 
Youngblood, 288 Kan. 659, Syl. ¶ 2, 206 P.3d 518 (2009), held:   
 
"A person accused of a misdemeanor has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel if 
the sentence to be imposed upon conviction includes a term of imprisonment, even if the 
jail time is suspended or conditioned upon a term of probation. The right to counsel arises 
at the stage of the proceedings where guilt is adjudicated, eligibility for imprisonment is 
established, and the prison sentence determined." 
 
Further, we held in Youngblood that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction 
obtained in violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel (i.e., an 
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uncounseled conviction that resulted in a prison sentence, even if the sentence was 
suspended or conditioned upon a term of probation) "may not be collaterally used for 
sentence enhancement in a subsequent criminal proceeding." 288 Kan. 659, Syl. ¶ 3. 
Conversely, an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction that resulted in no prison sentence 
being imposed may be used to enhance punishment for a subsequent conviction without 
violating the Sixth Amendment. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748-49, 114 S. 
Ct. 1921, 128 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1994); Youngblood, 288 Kan. at 667 ("[W]hile a 
constitutionally obtained uncounseled misdemeanor conviction can be used to enhance a 
subsequent sentence, an unconstitutionally obtained uncounseled misdemeanor 
conviction cannot be used for that collateral purpose.").  
 
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1567, the statute governing Tims' present DUI offense, is a 
recidivist statute providing for an enhanced severity in charge and sentence if the 
offender has previous DUI convictions. The statute states that a third conviction for DUI 
is a nonperson felony "if the person has a prior conviction which occurred within the 
preceding 10 years, not including any period of incarceration." K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-
1567(b)(1)(D). Subsection (j) of the DUI statute states that a DUI diversion agreement 
entered in lieu of further criminal proceedings is considered a prior DUI conviction for 
purposes of determining the classification and sentence of a current DUI conviction. 
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1567(j).   
 
Based on the above, determining whether an uncounseled DUI diversion can be 
constitutionally used to enhance punishment for a subsequent DUI conviction depends on 
whether the diversion should be considered the same as an uncounseled misdemeanor 
conviction that resulted in a term of imprisonment—suspended or otherwise. If the two 
are the same, then, unless the defendant properly waived his constitutional right to 
counsel, the diversion cannot be used to enhance punishment for a subsequent DUI 
conviction. See Youngblood, 288 Kan. 659, Syl. ¶ 3. If, however, an uncounseled 
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diversion is more similar to an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction that resulted in no 
prison sentence being imposed, then the diversion can be constitutionally used to enhance 
punishment for a subsequent DUI conviction. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748-49; 
Youngblood, 288 Kan. at 667.       
 
According to Tims' diversion agreement, he committed the underlying DUI on 
July 24, 2002. Then and now, a city attorney has the discretion to offer a first time DUI 
offender a diversion in lieu of further criminal proceedings. Under a diversion agreement, 
an offender must waive certain constitutional and statutory rights and agree to abide by 
certain conditions; a diversion agreement, however, may not be conditioned on the 
defendant entering a plea to the offense charged. If defendant abides by all the terms of 
the agreement, the city attorney will dismiss the charge with prejudice. K.S.A. 12-
4414(a); K.S.A. 12-4415; K.S.A. 12-4416. Thus, satisfying a diversion agreement is a 
means to avoid a formal judgment of criminal guilt. Petty v. City of El Dorado, 270 Kan. 
847, 852, 19 P.3d 167 (2001); see K.S.A. 12-4413(c) and (d). If the defendant fails to 
fulfill the terms of the diversion agreement (as determined at a hearing before the 
municipal court), then the diversion agreement is revoked and criminal proceedings are 
resumed. K.S.A. 12-4418. Specific to diversion agreements on DUI charges, the  
 
"agreement shall include a stipulation, agreed to by the defendant and the city attorney, of 
the facts upon which the charge is based and a provision that if the defendant fails to 
fulfill the terms of the specific diversion agreement and the criminal proceedings on the 
complaint are resumed, the proceedings, including any proceedings on appeal, shall be 
conducted on the record of the stipulation of facts relating to the complaint." K.S.A. 12-
4416(b). 
 
Tims argues that his DUI diversion is essentially the same as a suspended sentence 
for an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction as contemplated in Shelton and Youngblood.  
He maintains that the diversion agreement could have resulted in his imprisonment had 
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the agreement been revoked and had he been sentenced to a jail term as a first-time DUI 
offender. We are unconvinced. Tims' argument ignores a crucial distinction between a 
diversion agreement and a suspended sentence or probation:  at the time a defendant 
enters into a diversion agreement, no formal adjudication of guilt is entered, eligibility for 
imprisonment is not established, and no prison sentence is imposed. See Youngblood, 288 
Kan. 659, Syl. ¶ 2 ("The right to counsel arises at the stage of the proceedings where guilt 
is adjudicated, eligibility for imprisonment is established, and the prison sentence 
determined."). Though a diversion is considered a prior conviction pursuant to K.S.A. 
2011 Supp. 8-1567(j), the diversion does not have an underlying sentence attached to it 
and, thus, is distinguishable from a misdemeanor conviction resulting in a suspended jail 
sentence. An uncounseled diversion is more analogous to an uncounseled misdemeanor 
conviction that did not result in any jail sentence. As noted above, such a conviction is 
valid under the Sixth Amendment and can be used to enhance a sentence in a subsequent 
criminal proceeding.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that Tims may have been vulnerable to imprisonment had 
his diversion been revoked and had he been convicted of the underlying DUI offense, see 
K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(d) (sentence for first-time DUI offender is "not less than 48 
consecutive hours nor more than six months' imprisonment, or in the court's discretion 
100 hours of public service" [Emphasis added.]), his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
never attached during the diversion proceedings because the proceedings did not result in 
an actual or suspended term of imprisonment being imposed. Consequently, the 2002 
diversion can be considered as a prior conviction without violating Tims' constitutional 
rights. 
 
 
 
 
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STATUTORY RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN DUI DIVERSION PROCEEDINGS 
 
As just noted, the Court of Appeals concluded that though Tims' constitutional 
right to counsel did not attach during the 2002 diversion proceedings, he did have a 
statutory right to counsel during the proceedings. The applicable statute, K.S.A. 12-
4414(c), states in pertinent part:  "[T]he defendant shall be present and shall have the 
right to be represented by counsel at the diversion conference with the city attorney." 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
In construing this statutory language, the Court of Appeals in Paletta v. City of 
Topeka, 20 Kan. App. 2d 859, 866, 893 P.2d 280, rev. denied 258 Kan. 895 (1995), 
stated:  "There is no statutory requirement in this state mandating that a defendant have 
counsel to enter into a misdemeanor diversion agreement." The panel in Paletta further 
opined:  "This statutory provision does not mandate that counsel be provided for a 
defendant nor void any diversion agreement entered into without counsel." 20 Kan. App. 
2d at 866.  
 
In commenting about the Paletta's interpretation of K.S.A. 12-4414(c), the panel 
here stated: 
 
"We mostly agree with the Paletta panel's conclusions as to the nature of this 
statutory right. First, we agree that a defendant is not required to have counsel in order to 
enter into a valid diversion agreement as that right may be knowingly and voluntarily 
waived. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-2909(a); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-4416(a). Second, we agree 
that this statutory right to counsel does not mandate that counsel be provided because any 
Kansas statute requiring counsel and requiring the appointment of counsel in case of the 
defendant's indigence specifically says so. See, e.g., K.S.A. 12-4405 (some municipal 
cases); K.S.A. 22-2805(b) (material witness in custody); K.S.A. 22-3104(1) (counsel for 
inquisition witness); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3428a(2) (annual hearing for committed 
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mentally ill person); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3716(b) (probation revocation hearing); 
K.S.A. 22-4503(a) and (b) (felony cases); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2205 (parents in CINC 
case); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 59-29a06(b) (sexual predator commitment proceeding); K.S.A. 
59-3063 (proposed ward); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-129c(d)(10) (health official ordered 
isolation or quarantine); see also Supreme Court Rule 183(i) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
278) (right to counsel in K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding where motion presents substantial 
question of law or triable issue of fact). Third, we express no view as to whether an 
uncounseled diversion is void in the absence of a valid waiver but would certainly agree 
that a diversion agreement is not void where there has been a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of counsel." Tims, 49 Kan. App. 2d at 855-56. 
 
The panel then proceeded to determine whether Tims had validly waived his 
statutory right to counsel when he entered into the diversion agreement. After reviewing 
this court's decisions in State v. Hughes, 290 Kan. 159, 224 P.3d 1149 (2010), and In re 
Habeas Corpus Application of Gilchrist, 238 Kan. 202, 708 P.2d 977 (1985), the panel 
concluded that the language within the diversion agreement established that Tims 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his statutory right to counsel. The panel then held that 
the 2002 diversion could be counted as a prior DUI conviction for sentencing purposes 
without running afoul of Tims' statutory right to counsel. Tims, 49 Kan. App. 2d at 856-
58. 
 
Tims argues that Hughes and Gilchrist mandate that before a defendant can validly 
waive his or her right to counsel and enter into a diversion agreement, a judge must have 
fully advised the defendant of his or her right to counsel. Furthermore, Tims argues that 
the two cases require language within the diversion agreement certifying that the judge 
fully advised the defendant of his or her right to counsel and that the defendant, after 
receiving this information, knowingly and voluntarily waived that right in front of the 
judge.     
 
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Both Hughes and Gilchrist involved uncounseled municipal court convictions that 
resulted in jail sentences being imposed. Thus, the issue in both cases was whether those 
convictions were constitutionally valid, i.e., whether the defendants had properly waived 
their Sixth Amendment right to counsel prior to being convicted and sentenced to jail. 
Hughes, 290 Kan. at 160, 162-64, Gilchrist, 238 Kan. at 203, 206-07. As already 
determined, Tims' Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not implicated by the 2002 
diversion proceedings. Consequently, the certification language and procedure suggested 
by Hughes and Gilchrist to ensure that a municipal court judge properly advises a 
defendant of his or her right to counsel is not a requirement for a valid diversion 
agreement. As the panel in this case noted, any waiver of the statutory right to counsel 
"must simply be done knowingly and voluntarily." Tims, 49 Kan. App. 2d at 857. Thus, 
the language of the diversion agreement controls appellate review of the soundness of the 
waiver.     
 
This court has held that diversion agreements are to be interpreted in accordance 
with contract principles. State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 245-46, 120 P.3d 319 
(2005). An appellate court exercises unlimited review over the interpretation and legal 
effect of written instruments. Prairie Land Elec. Co-op v. Kansas Elec. Power Coop, 299 
Kan. 360, 366, 323 P.3d 1270 (2014). "The primary rule for interpreting written contracts 
is to ascertain the parties' intent. If the terms of the contract are clear, the intent of the 
parties is to be determined from the language of the contract without applying rules of 
construction." Anderson v. Dillard's, Inc., 283 Kan. 432, 436, 153 P.3d 550 (2007).  
 
The text of the diversion agreement states in pertinent part: 
 
"This agreement is voluntarily entered into by the above-named defendant and 
the Office of the City Attorney of Topeka, Kansas, in lieu of further prosecution on the 
above charge(s). 
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"The defendant understands he/she has the following rights in this case:  The 
right to a speedy arraignment; the right to a trial to the Court . . . the right to be 
represented at all stages of this case by a lawyer of his/her own choosing or; if without 
funds with which to hire a lawyer and found by the Court to be indigent, by a court-
appointed lawyer. Knowing these rights, the defendant by signing this agreement, 
knowingly and voluntarily gives up these rights, including the right to a lawyer if not 
represented by one in this case." (Emphasis added.)   
 
The diversion agreement notes that Tims was acting pro se when he entered into 
the agreement. There is no signature on the line dedicated to "Attorney for Defendant." 
The diversion agreement was signed by Tims and by the attorney for the City of Topeka. 
 
As noted by the panel in this case, Tims raises no argument on appeal challenging 
the content of the diversion agreement or the capacity of either party to enter into the 
agreement. He merely argues that his waiver of the right to counsel within the diversion 
agreement was invalid under Hughes and Gilchrist. However, as we just distinguished, 
those cases are inapplicable to determining whether a defendant's waiver of the statutory 
right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. Here, the language of the diversion 
agreement—which Tims signed—specifically states that after being informed of the 
stated rights, including his right to counsel, Tims "knowingly and voluntarily gives up 
these rights, including the right to a lawyer if not represented by one in this case." Thus, 
based on the clear and unambiguous language of the diversion agreement, it appears that 
Tims knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be represented by an attorney during 
the diversion conference. 
 
Based on the above, we conclude that counting Tims' 2002 diversion as a prior 
DUI conviction for purposes of classifying and sentencing him for his current DUI 
conviction does not violate his constitutional or statutory right to counsel. Thus, we 
affirm the Court of Appeals' decision reversing the district court. However, our 
15 
 
 
 
consideration of this issue on question reserved compels us to vacate the order of the 
Court of Appeals remanding the case for resentencing as a felony DUI.