Case Title: Barber v. LaFromboise

Citation: 180 Vt. 150, 2006 VT 77, 908 A.2d 436

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Barber v. LaFromboise (2005-006); 180 Vt. 150; 908 A.2d 436

2006 VT 77

[Filed 04-Aug-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 77

                                No. 2005-006


  Edwin J. Barber                                Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Orleans Superior Court


  Lucy LaFromboise                               February Term, 2006


  Alan W. Cook, J.

  Deborah T. Bucknam and Jennifer Bucknam Black of Deborah Bucknam
    Associates,  St. Johnsbury, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

  Robin Ober Cooley of Pierson Wadhams Quinn Yates & Coffrin, Burlington, for 
    Defendant-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

       ¶  1.  REIBER, C.J.   Plaintiff in this personal injury case appeals
  from a judgment, based on a jury verdict, in favor of defendant.  Plaintiff
  asserts, among other claims, that the trial court committed prejudicial
  error in refusing to instruct that defendant had the burden to prove the
  essential elements of her affirmative defense of comparative negligence. 
  We agree, and therefore reverse the judgment and remand for further
  proceedings. 
   
       ¶  2.  The record evidence may be summarized as follows.  In the
  early evening hours of November 5, 1999, plaintiff Edward J. Barber was
  proceeding south on Route 105 in the Town of Derby when he struck a vehicle
  driven by defendant Lucy LaFromboise which was attempting to turn left onto
  Route 105 from Route 5.  Plaintiff testified that he approached the
  intersection at a speed of about thirty to thirty-five miles per hour (the
  speed limit was thirty-five miles per hour), but slowed to about fifteen
  miles per hour because the vehicle immediately in front of him was also
  slowing and signaling to turn right.  Plaintiff recalled that he closed to
  within ten feet of the vehicle as it turned right, and then proceeded
  straight ahead when he saw defendant's vehicle turning left directly across
  his path.  Plaintiff braked but could not avoid colliding with defendant.  
  Plaintiff testified that he had no intention of turning right, and denied
  having his right-turn signal activated. 

       ¶  3.     Defendant testified that she was traveling east on Route 5
  when she came to a stop at a stop sign where the road intersects with Route
  105.   She recalled activating her left-turn signal while she observed the
  traffic traveling south on Route 105.  Defendant stated that she saw
  several cars, including plaintiff's, with their right-turn signals on,
  assumed that plaintiff intended to turn right, and therefore proceeded into
  the intersection to turn left, where she was immediately struck by
  plaintiff's vehicle.    

       ¶  4.  Defendant further recalled that, after the accident, plaintiff
  approached her vehicle in an agitated state and began to swear at her. 
  Defendant stated that she smelled alcohol on plaintiff's breath and decided
  to stay in her car.   A police officer responding to the scene recalled
  speaking with both drivers.  The officer's accident report indicated that
  defendant claimed to have seen plaintiff signaling a right turn, while
  plaintiff denied that his signal was on.  While conversing with plaintiff,
  the officer smelled alcohol and noted that plaintiff's eyes were bloodshot,
  his stance was unsteady, he avoided the officer, and he refused to answer
  questions about the times of his first and last drinks.  Plaintiff
  acknowledged having had two drinks earlier in the day, which he described
  as scotch and sodas.  The officer arrested plaintiff and processed him for
  driving under the influence. (FN1)
                                                      
       ¶  5.  Although the officer's report contained no indication of any
  injuries to the parties, plaintiff later claimed that the impact from the
  collision had exacerbated a gastrointestinal condition and hiatal hernia
  that had been surgically repaired two years earlier.  Plaintiff filed a
  personal injury action against defendant in September 2002.  Defendant
  raised the affirmative defense of comparative negligence.  At the
  conclusion of a three-day trial in October 2004, the trial court denied
  plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of
  defendant's negligence and plaintiff's comparative negligence.  The jury
  then returned a special verdict, finding that both parties had been
  negligent, but attributed seventy-two percent of the fault to plaintiff and
  twenty-eight percent to defendant, so that plaintiff recovered nothing. 
  The court denied plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
  verdict or new trial.  This appeal followed.  


                                     I.


       ¶  6.  On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in
  refusing to direct a verdict in his favor on comparative negligence, and in
  failing to instruct on the essential principles of that doctrine.  As
  explained more fully below, we conclude that the court did not err in
  submitting the issue of plaintiff's negligence to the jury, but did err in
  refusing to instruct as to defendant's burden of proof.   
   
       ¶  7.  Under our comparative negligence statute, a plaintiff in a
  negligence action may recover damages if his or her own causal negligence
  is not greater than that of the defendant.  12 V.S.A. § 1036.  Allocation
  of the respective percentages of causal negligence attributable to the
  plaintiff and defendant is generally a fact question for the jury, and
  plaintiff's recovery is automatically reduced according to the proportional
  amount of  his or her causal negligence.  Id.; Gilman v. Towmotor Corp.,
  160 Vt. 116, 121,