Case Title: Farrell v. the Federal Land Bank of Wichita

Citation: 175 Kan. 786, 267 P.2d 497

Docket Number: 39,192

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1954-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
175 Kan. 786 (1954)
267 P.2d 497
GEORGE R. FARRELL, Appellant,
v.
THE FEDERAL LAND BANK OF WICHITA, a Corporation, Appellee.
No. 39,192

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 6, 1954.
Erle S. Francis, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Erle W. Francis, of Topeka, was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Edw. H. Jamison, of Wichita, argued the cause, and John W. Brookens, of Westmoreland, and Wm. G. Plested, Jr., of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, J.:
This is an action on a contract wherein the plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant Federal Land Bank to convey certain real estate therein described and pay damages for other land, also included in the description, which plaintiff alleges cannot be delivered in conformity with that agreement. The appeal is from a ruling sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the petition.
Upon commencement of the action by the filing of the petition the defendant moved to make that pleading more definite and certain by stating (1) on what date the plaintiff went into possession of the premises involved; (2) whether (a) the alleged shortage in acreage existed at the time of the execution of the contract, which was made a part of the petition, and (b) if such shortage occurred since the execution of that agreement, by stating how, in what manner or by what agency, event or cause such shortage occurred; and (3) more definitely the shortage in acreage relied upon for recovery of damages.
After the foregoing motion, over the plaintiff's resistance, had been sustained as to grounds 2(a) and 3 and overruled as to grounds *787 1 and 2(b), plaintiff filed an amended petition. In most respects the allegations of these two pleadings were identical. However, it may be stated, that italicization of the amendments made as a result of the ruling on the motion, will disclose everything appearing in, both pleadings. For that reason, and others to be presently disclosed, we shall quote at length from the amended petition which, in the interest of brevity, will be hereafter referred to as the petition. Omitting preliminary averments and formal allegations respecting identity and residence of the parties such pleading reads:
Most of the terms of the contract identified as Exhibit "A" and attached to the petition are set forth in the petition and need not be repeated. However, it should be stated that certain portions thereof, not referred to herein, have significance and should be mentioned. Briefly stated, and without minimizing terms of the agreement not mentioned, they are to the effect that "in consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions herein contained" the first party, "hereby contracts and agrees to sell to party of the second part all of its title to and interest in" the real estate identified in the petition; that purchaser was to pay the consideration agreed upon; that the abstract of title was to be accepted without being brought down to date; *789 that execution of the agreement by the purchaser should constitute acceptance of title to the real estate involved; that such purchaser after payment of $500 payable on March 1, 1942, should retain possession of the real estate so long as he faithfully continued to comply with the terms of the agreement; that it was the essence of the contract; that if any of the payments provided for therein were not paid when due, or in the event of a breach of any of its other terms and conditions, the seller might terminate the contract at his option, retaining all payments made by the purchaser as liquidated damages for the breach of the agreement and for his use and occupancy of the premises under its terms; and that all covenants and conditions contained in the contract should extend to and be binding upon the respective successors and assigns of the seller, as well as the respective heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of the purchaser.
Defendant demurred to the amended petition on grounds (1) it failed to state a cause of action; (2) that it showed on its face plaintiff was the equitable owner of the property involved at and prior to the date of the occurrence of the alleged shortage; and (3) that it contained no allegations defendant was unable or unwilling to convey legal title to the property described in the contract or that the alleged shortage in acreage or damage to the property was occasioned by any fault on the part of defendant. When this demurrer was sustained plaintiff, who had been granted leave to file an amended petition and declined to do so, perfected the instant appeal wherein under a single specification of error the propriety of that ruling is the only question involved.
Obviously sensing that it might strengthen his position the first contention raised by appellant is that the involved contract is unilateral in nature and must be construed as a contract to sell rather than one of purchase and sale. We think this question was determined adversely to appellant's contention in Marquez v. Cave, 134 Kan. 374, 5 P.2d 1081; Ditzen v. Given, 139 Kan. 506, 32 P.2d 448. Be that as it may, a review of the contract and its provisions, particularly those contained in the mutual covenants and reciprocal promises heretofore described, makes it clearly appear that agreement was bilateral in character and convinces us it must be construed as a contract for the purchase and sale of the real estate. The fact the involved agreement contains provisions for its forfeiture for nonpayment or a breach of its other terms and conditions does not warrant a contrary conclusion as appellant suggests. A *790 careful analysis of the opinion in Marquez v. Cave, supra, discloses that the contract there involved contained provisions of like import.
Turning to the petition, and without laboring the merits of the motion to make more definite and certain which we believe should have been sustained in view of decisions to be presently mentioned, it may be said that it discloses, even when liberally construed, that appellant entered into possession of the real estate, upon or shortly after execution of the contract, at a time when there was no shortage in the amount of land described therein and that the alleged shortage of acreage for which he now seeks recovery by way of damages was caused by conditions occurring subsequent to that date. Such pleading, when read in connection with the contract which it will be recalled was made a part thereof, also discloses that appellant's execution of the contract constituted acceptance of title to the real estate therein described. Under such circumstances, and without more, we have little difficulty in concluding, that in order to state a cause of action for recovery of damages for the claimed shortage in acreage appellant was required to plead facts disclosing such shortage was due to or caused by acts or conduct for which appellee would be legally responsible, and that having failed and declined to do so, the trial court's action in sustaining the demurrer to the petition was proper. But that is not all.
This court is committed to the rule that the purchaser under an unconditional contract for the sale of real property assumes the risk of a partial destruction or deterioration of the property from the date of the execution of the contract of purchase and sale, where the loss is not due to a fault of the seller and where the seller at the time of the loss is not in default and is able to convey a good title. See Bank v. Grisham, 105 Kan. 460, 185 Pac. 54, which holds:
For a more recent decision, dissimilar from the standpoint of facts and circumstances involved yet nevertheless recognizing and applying the same principle in a case where purchasers of real estate, under the terms of an unconditional contract, were seeking to rescind the agreement on the ground improvements located upon such property had been destroyed by a flood occurring subsequent *791 to the execution of the agreement, see Torluemke v. Abernathey, 174 Kan. 668, 258 P.2d 282.
In conclusion, although we are not disposed to labor them, it may be said for the benefit of those who are inclined to pursue the subject further that our own decisions will be found to be in line with the great weight of authority upon resort to the following legal treatises, digests and textbooks, see 66 C.J., Vendor and Purchaser, 702, 1052 §§ 262, 811; 81 C.J.S., Specific Performance, 445, § 18b; 55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, 817, 993 §§ 396, 600; 11 A.L.R.2d., Anno, 390; 22 A.L.R., Anno, 575, supplemented by 41 A.L.R., Anno, 1272; 46 A.L.R., Anno, 1126, and 101 A.L.R., Anno, 1241; 27 A.L.R.2d., Anno, 444; American Digest System, Vendor & Purchaser, § 203; Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed.) §§ 928, 940; 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed.) § 368; 4 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed.) §§ 1161, 1161a, 1406.
The judgment is affirmed.