Case Title: Oregon v. Walker

Citation: 

Docket Number: S060828

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2014-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
4	
August 21, 2014	
No. 56
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
STEVEN BRADLEY WALKER,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 091089; CA A142712; SC S060828)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 7, 2013.
Erica Herb, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public 
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner 
on review. With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief 
Defender.
Pamela Johnstone Walsh, Assistant Attorney General, 
Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With 
her on the brief were Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and 
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General.
LINDER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of 
the circuit court are affirmed.
______________
	
*  Appeal from Clatsop County Circuit Court, Philip L. Nelson, Judge. 252 Or 
App 1, 285 P3d 751 (2012).
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
5
Under the Oregon Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 
(ORICO), it is unlawful to participate in an “enterprise” through a pattern of 
committing certain specified criminal offenses. Defendant was charged with 
theft and racketeering. The racketeering count was based on the charged theft 
offense and two uncharged theft offenses allegedly committed in another county. 
At trial, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the racketeering charge, 
arguing that there was insufficient evidence that he had participated in an 
“enterprise” within the meaning of ORICO. The trial court denied the motion, the 
jury found defendant guilty on both counts, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Held: As used in ORICO, an “enterprise” is any type of organization or entity that 
carries out some purposeful venture, undertaking, or activity. The entity need 
not have a formal structure but may consist of a loosely organized or informal 
association of individuals in fact that functions with a common purpose and has 
sufficient longevity to permit the entity to pursue that purpose. In this case, the 
state presented evidence of three occasions on which defendant and an associate, 
acting in a coordinated manner, carried out thefts of the same specific items from 
the same grocery stores. That evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find 
that defendant participated in an “enterprise” through a pattern of racketeering 
activity within the meaning of ORICO.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court 
are affirmed.
6	
State v. Walker
	
LINDER, J.
	
The issue in this case is what constitutes an 
“enterprise” within the meaning of the Oregon Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (ORICO), ORS 
166.715 - 166.735. Defendant was charged in Clatsop County 
with one count of racketeering, ORS 166.720(3), and one 
count of theft in the first degree, ORS 164.055.1 The racke-
teering count, which required proof that defendant partici-
pated in an “enterprise” through a pattern of racketeering, 
was based on the charged theft offense and two uncharged 
offenses of theft in the second degree allegedly committed 
in another county. A jury found defendant guilty of both the 
racketeering and the first degree theft offenses. Defendant 
appealed his conviction for racketeering, arguing that there 
was insufficient evidence that he had participated in an 
enterprise and that the trial court therefore had erred in 
denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the that 
count. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
conviction. State v. Walker, 252 Or App 1, 285 P3d 751 (2012). 
We granted review to determine the correct interpretation of 
ORS 166.720(3). For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
I.  BACKGROUND
A.  Facts
	
The facts, as recounted by the witnesses at the 
trial, were not significantly disputed. In several significant 
respects, however, the parties did dispute what inferences 
could be drawn from the facts. Below, consistently with the 
familiar standard that we use in reviewing a denial of a 
motion for judgment of acquittal, we describe the facts in 
the light most favorable to the state. State v. Cervantes, 319 
Or 121, 125, 873 P2d 316 (1994) (identifying applicable stan-
dard of review). More particularly, however, we draw all rea-
sonable inferences in the state’s favor as well. Id. (on denial 
of motion for judgment of acquittal, court gives state the 
benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
evidence).
	
On March 26, 2009, defendant and another person, 
Williams, traveled together—probably from the Portland 
	
1  The relevant statutory provisions are set out in the discussion, below. 
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
7
area—to Seaside. Once in Seaside, they went to the local 
Safeway store. Each selected a grocery cart, and each then 
began to shop independently. Price, a loss prevention offi-
cer, noticed them as they entered and began following them. 
Price worked in plain clothes and typically walked around 
the store to detect and monitor shoplifting activity. He par-
ticularly looked for the selection of “high-dollar, high-theft 
items,” which in the grocery store business include dispos-
able diapers, infant formula, meat, seafood, and beer.
	
Because defendant and Williams went separate 
directions in the store, Price watched defendant while 
another security officer followed Williams. Price saw defen-
dant go to the seafood section and select nine large bags of 
frozen shrimp. Defendant then proceeded to another aisle, 
where he pulled Safeway plastic bags from his pocket—the 
kind used to bag groceries at the register—and put the bags 
of shrimp into them. At one point, defendant noticed Price 
watching him, so Price moved to a position where he would 
be less visible to defendant. Meanwhile, Williams had gone 
through the store and had placed several boxes of Huggies 
diapers, Tide laundry detergent, beer, and several bags of 
frozen shrimp into his cart, as well.
	
Defendant then took his cart out of the store with-
out paying. Price followed defendant into the parking lot and 
saw defendant put the shopping bags filled with shrimp into 
the backseat of a car. Price yelled out to defendant, identify-
ing himself as a security officer, and defendant fled on foot. 
By then, Williams had approached the store exit with his 
own cart. He likewise had not paid for the items in his cart. 
Williams abandoned his cart full of merchandise and also 
left the scene.
	
The Safeway security officers called the Seaside 
police, who arrived as the security officers were recovering 
merchandise from the backseat of the car and putting it into 
grocery carts. Defendant had thrown the bags of shrimp 
atop disposable diapers, Tide laundry detergent, cold beer, 
more frozen shrimp, and beef jerky that were already in 
the backseat. The recovered merchandise filled two and a 
half grocery carts. The merchandise was returned to the 
8	
State v. Walker
store, where it was run through a register to determine its 
total value, which was $804.11. The police then impounded 
the car. Shortly after that, the police located and arrested 
Williams, who was the registered owner of the vehicle. After 
Williams consented to a search of the car, the police opened 
the trunk and found more boxes of Huggies diapers, cases 
of beer, and bags of shrimp. The beer was still cold; the 
shrimp was still frozen. Those items, too, were returned to 
the Safeway store and run through the cash register. They 
were valued at $329.06.2
	
At some point while the police were impounding the 
car and interviewing Williams, defendant called 9-1-1 to 
inquire about Williams’s whereabouts. Defendant claimed 
that he was calling from Portland, but the call was traced 
back to a hotel in Seaside, where police officers apprehended 
him soon afterwards. During the ensuing police interview, 
defendant admitted that he and Williams had traveled 
together to Seaside for the day. Defendant admitted, how-
ever, to taking “only eight bags of frozen shrimp,” which 
he told the interviewing officer that he had intended to 
“consume * 
* 
* on the beach.” He denied knowing whether 
Williams had taken anything from the Seaside Safeway. 
When the police told defendant that the items returned to 
the Safeway from the car totaled, in combination, more than 
$1,000, defendant insisted that the total could not be more 
$750, stating that “he wasn’t stupid” and more than $750 
“would be a felony.” Defendant did, however, admit to police 
	
2  At trial, the parties disputed whether the jury should infer that the mer-
chandise found in the trunk of Williams’s car had been taken from the Seaside 
Safeway store on March 26, 2009; we describe the facts based on the inference 
that favors the state. The dispute on that point was a significant one. The state 
had alleged that the items taken on that date from the Seaside Safeway were 
worth more than $1,000; the items found in the trunk were necessary to arrive 
at that value. At trial, defendant argued to the jury that the items could have 
been taken from other stores and the state had not adequately established they 
were taken from that Safeway store on that date; thus, defendant urged the jury 
to acquit on the Theft I charge. The state argued the converse inference. The jury 
was instructed that, to find defendant guilty of Theft I, it had to find that the 
aggregate value of the items taken from the Seaside Safeway on March 26, 2009, 
exceeded $1,000. Subsequently, on the verdict form returned by the jury, the jury 
specifically so found. The Court of Appeals erroneously viewed the merchandise 
in the trunk as possible evidence of a separate fourth theft from an undeter-
mined grocery store, rather than as a part of the March 26 theft from the Seaside 
Safeway. Walker, 252 Or App at 12 n 5. That error, however, played no part in the 
court’s analysis.
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
9
that he and Williams had “been involved in these types of 
thefts in the Portland area” during “the last two months.”
	
At trial, the state established two such prior thefts, 
which it presented for purposes of establishing a pattern 
of criminal activity as relevant to the racketeering charge. 
Those thefts were described by Glen Moule, an “organized 
retail crime investigator for Safeway stores in Oregon and 
southwest Washington.” Moule investigates thefts com-
mitted by “professional theft groups,” ones that “primarily 
* 
* 
* steal large amounts of high dollar merchandise from 
Safeway stores for the purposes of resale.” Safeway stores 
that experience such thefts provide Moule with reports and 
video surveillance recordings of the activity for his investi-
gation and analysis.
	
At some point before the trial of this case, and 
as part of his investigative responsibilities, Moule had 
reviewed video and still photos that showed defendant and 
Williams twice stealing similar items from a Safeway store 
in Sandy, Oregon, on dates several weeks before the Seaside 
theft. The first of those thefts occurred February 8, 2009. 
On that date, defendant and Williams entered the Sandy 
Safeway store, and each selected an empty shopping cart. 
Defendant went to the back aisle to the display of frozen 
seafood and put six bags of frozen shrimp into his cart. 
As defendant finished doing that, Walker moved into the 
same area and also took bags of shrimp from the display. 
Defendant then moved to other aisles, where he put several 
boxes of Huggies diapers into his cart and four cases of beer 
onto the cart’s lower shelf. Defendant then walked to yet 
another area of the store, took plastic bags from his pocket, 
and put the bags of frozen shrimp in them. Williams, who 
entered several of the same areas after defendant, likewise 
loaded his cart with boxes of Huggies diapers, Tide deter-
gent, and beer. Defendant exited the doors near the Safeway 
deli without paying for the items; soon afterwards, Williams 
exited through the same doors, likewise without paying for 
the items. Based on the time notation on the video, the two 
were in the store for a total of about six minutes.
	
A second video recording showed defendant and 
Williams commit a substantially identical theft from the 
10	
State v. Walker
same Safeway store in Sandy about two weeks later, on 
February 23, 2009. Again, each entered the store, each 
selected an empty cart, and each moved through the store 
filling his individual cart with Huggies diapers, Tide laun-
dry detergent, and cases of beer. Each then left the store 
through the door near the deli section without paying for the 
items.
B.  Procedural Posture
	
As noted, defendant was charged with first-degree 
theft, based on the Seaside Safeway theft, and with racke-
teering, based on that theft and the two previous thefts at 
the Sandy Safeway. Also as noted, defendant moved for a 
judgment of acquittal on the racketeering charge, arguing 
that the evidence was insufficient to prove that, in commit-
ting the predicate thefts, he had participated in an “enter-
prise” within the meaning of ORS 166.720(3).
	
Both the trial court and the parties considered State 
v. Cheek, 100 Or App 501, 786 P2d 1305, rev den, 310 Or 121 
(1990), to be controlling on the scope and meaning of the 
term “enterprise”. In that case, the court held that an enter-
prise could be established by “proof of an on-going organiza-
tion, however loose, that is distinct from the commission of 
separate criminal acts by an individual.” Cheek, 100 Or App 
at 505. Relying on Cheek, defendant argued in this case that 
the state’s evidence established, at most, that defendant and 
Williams “committed multiple crimes together.” Defendant 
emphasized that the state’s evidence showed only that the 
two entered the stores at about the same time; once inside, 
they did not interact or communicate. Moreover, no evidence 
showed that the items stolen were later sold or disposed of 
in any kind of systematic manner.
	
The state argued in response that defendant and 
Williams were “basically in the business of going out and 
stealing items together”; that they had a particular modus 
operandi in that they were stealing the same types of items 
every time and even stealing from the same store chain 
every time; and that they had been engaging in that con-
duct for at least two months. The state conceded that there 
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
11
was no direct evidence that the items were being resold, 
but urged that a jury could infer that they were. The state 
summed up, arguing that this was not “just average Joes 
going out and committing a few crimes together”; defendant 
and Williams “knew how to work the system,” had a “spe-
cific deal * 
* 
* between the two of them” to do that, and went 
out and committed multiple thefts from multiple Safeways 
in pursuit of that objective.
	
The trial court began its ruling on the motion by 
noting that, at the outset of the trial, the court had “qualms” 
about the case and did not think that defendant’s conduct 
amounted to racketeering. But by the conclusion of the 
state’s evidence, the court saw the evidence as establishing 
“more than what average Joes do in the commission of two 
or more crimes.” This case involved, in the trial court’s view, 
two people who were targeting Safeway stores and taking 
merchandise for at least a couple of months on a regular 
basis, as evidenced by the circumstances of the proven thefts, 
along with defendant’s own admission that he and Williams 
were committing other similar thefts in the Portland area 
during the two months preceding the Seaside Safeway theft. 
The trial court denied the motion for judgment of acquit-
tal, reasoning that, under the “broad reading” given to the 
term “enterprise” in Cheek, the state’s evidence “gets there.” 
The case was submitted to the jury, which found defendant 
guilty of racketeering.
	
Defendant appealed, again arguing that the evi-
dence was insufficient to show the existence of an enterprise 
as required for the charge of racketeering. On appeal, the 
parties essentially renewed the arguments that they had 
made to the trial court. Both parties relied significantly on 
the meaning of “enterprise” articulated in Cheek. Both par-
ties also relied on federal cases interpreting and applying 
the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act, 18 USC §§ 1961-1968 (RICO), on which Oregon’s statute 
(as we later discuss) was modeled. See David B. Frohnmayer, 
Donald C. Arnold and H. Robert Hamilton, “RICO: Oregon’s 
Message to Organized Crime,” 18 Will L Rev 1 n 2 (1982).
	
As noted, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. The majority first explained that it did not aim to 
12	
State v. Walker
revisit the meaning of the term “enterprise” that the court 
previously had announced in Cheek—viz., for the purposes 
of ORICO, an entity must “partake of ‘an ongoing organiza-
tion, however loose, that is distinct from the commission of 
separate criminal acts’ by the defendant.” Walker, 252 Or 
App at 9-10 (quoting Cheek, 100 Or App at 505). Rather, the 
majority considered only whether the evidence in this case 
was sufficient to permit a jury to infer the existence of an 
enterprise as so defined. Id. at 10. The majority highlighted 
four “concerns” that were relevant to that inquiry: First, by 
referring to an “organization, however loose,” the Cheek for-
mulation is “very broad”; second, the “transcendent consider-
ation” is ORICO’s focus on “criminal activity that originates 
from a sense of organization”; third, there is often a symbi-
otic relationship between proof of an “enterprise” and proof 
of a “pattern of racketeering activity”; and fourth, although 
proof of one does not necessarily establish the other, it may 
do so in some cases. Id. at 10-12.
	
Turning to this case, the majority concluded that 
there was sufficient evidence of an organization, including 
the facts that defendant and Williams entered the stores 
together, stole the same items, and traveled together to 
the third theft; that is, in carrying out the three identified 
thefts, they followed a “choreographed course of action” in 
“coordinated concert.” Id. at 12-13. The majority further 
concluded that, based on those same circumstances and the 
fact that they occurred over a two-month period, there also 
was sufficient evidence that the organization had the requi-
site “ongoing” continuity. Id. at 13. The majority expressly 
rejected defendant’s argument that there was no evidence 
of an entity that was separate and distinct from defendant 
and Williams themselves; the majority reasoned that, even 
though defendant and Williams were the sole participants 
in the “informal partnership” enterprise, a collective is qual-
itatively distinct from its individual members. Id. For all of 
those reasons, the majority concluded that defendant’s and 
Williams’s “informal partnership” constituted an “enter-
prise” within the meaning of ORICO. Id.
	
Judge Edmonds dissented. He acknowledged that 
an informal partnership for the purpose of committing 
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
13
multiple crimes could fall within ORICO’s definition of an 
enterprise. In his view, however, although defendant acted 
in concert with Williams, using the same modus operandi 
on three occasions, those activities were “ad hoc or episodic” 
in nature; accordingly, in the dissent’s view, the evidence 
did not permit an inference that the activities were attribut-
able to an organization that was “distinct from the commis-
sion of the predicate crimes.” Id. at 14-15 (Edmonds, S. J., 
dissenting).
	
We allowed defendant’s petition for review. On 
review, tacitly recognizing that this court is not bound by 
the Court of Appeals’ holding in Cheek, the parties expand 
on the positions that they took in the trial court and the 
Court of Appeals. Both defendant and the state look to the 
statutory text, context, and legislative history to argue their 
respective positions about the meaning of the term “enter-
prise.” Both parties also look to federal cases for guidance. 
Ultimately, defendant and the state agree that an enter-
prise need not have a particular formal or legal structure, 
but rather can be comprised of individuals associated in 
fact, whose association is characterized by an ascertainable 
structure, some common purpose, and longevity sufficient 
for pursuit of the enterprise’s purpose. Where they differ is 
on whether the enterprise must have continuity independent 
of its individual members and on what degree of formality 
is required for the enterprise’s structure. We describe and 
analyze the parties’ arguments at greater length in the 
course of our analysis below.
II.  ANALYSIS
	
The interpretative issue for us is: What did the leg-
islature intend the term “enterprise,” as used in ORICO, 
to encompass? We resolve that issue through our usual 
method of statutory interpretation. We begin with the text 
and context of the statute, which are the best indications of 
the legislature’s intent. If appropriate, we also consider the 
statute’s legislative history. Finally, if the statute’s meaning 
remains unclear, we may resort to general maxims of stat-
utory construction. See State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-73, 
206 P3d 1042 (2009) (explaining methodology).
14	
State v. Walker
A.  Text and Context
	
ORS 166.720(3) provides:
	
“It is unlawful for any person employed by, or associated 
with, any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or 
indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.”
The legislature did not define enterprise, but, in ORS 
166.715(2), it did give an illustrative list of what the term 
includes:
	
“ 
‘Enterprise’ includes any individual, sole proprietor-
ship, partnership, corporation, business trust or other profit 
or nonprofit legal entity, and includes any union, associa-
tion or group of individuals associated in fact although not 
a legal entity, and both illicit and licit enterprises and gov-
ernmental and non-governmental entities.”3
	
Because the term “enterprise” is not otherwise 
defined, we also consider its ordinary meaning. See gener-
ally State v. Kurtz, 350 Or 65, 72, 249 P3d 1271 (2011) (fact 
that statute listed types of persons “include[d]” within “cat-
egorical term” at issue indicated that term “can embrace 
persons beyond those that the statute expressly lists”; court 
therefore considered ordinary meaning of term). In 1981, 
when ORICO was enacted, the ordinary meaning of the 
term “enterprise” was
“1 a : a plan or design for a venture or undertaking  b : VENTURE, UNDERTAKING, PROJECT; 
esp : an undertaking that is difficult, complicated or has 
a strong element of risk * 
* 
* c : a unit of economic orga-
nization or activity (as a factory, a farm, a mine); esp : a 
business organization : FIRM, COMPANY * 
* 
* d : any sys-
tematic purposeful activity or type of activity  * 
* 
*.”
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 757 (unabridged ed 
1976).4
	
3  The quoted text of ORS 166.715(2) is identical to that originally passed by 
the 1981 Legislative Assembly.
	
4  Defendant notes that Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed 1990) defines “enter-
prise” as a “business venture or undertaking” and states that, under the fed-
eral racketeering statute, an enterprise “must be an ongoing organization, and 
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
15
	
From the statutory text and the dictionary defi-
nition of enterprise, defendant argues that “the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the term enterprise demonstrates that 
it applies to organizations that engage in planned, system-
atic, and purposeful activity.” And because the title of the act 
contains the term “organization,” defendant argues, quot-
ing Webster’s, that enterprise contextually refers to “some-
thing organized * 
* 
* a group of people that has a more or 
less constant membership, a body of officers, a purpose, and 
usu[ally] a set of regulations.” Webster’s at 1590. Defendant 
acknowledges that, in setting out a list of the entities that are 
“included[d]” within the term “enterprise”, ORS 166.715(2) 
refers not only to legally cognizable entities such as part-
nerships and corporations, but also to groups of individuals 
“associated in fact.” He nevertheless argues that, under the 
principle of noscitur a sociis,5 individuals “associated in fact” 
must have the same characteristics as entities such as part-
nerships or corporations—viz., a formal organization with 
an ascertainable structure, a continuing existence indepen-
dent of individual members, and engagement in purposeful 
and systematic activity.
	
We agree with the state, however, that neither the 
statutory text or the ordinary meaning of the term “enter-
prise” requires the formality of structure or separate struc-
tural existence that defendant urges. Under ORS 166.715(2), 
an enterprise must be some kind of entity that can either 
employ or be associated with a person. Also, an enterprise 
must be something that an individual can conduct or par-
ticipate in through a pattern of racketeering activity.6 That 
an entity separate from the pattern of activity in which it engages.” The edition 
of Black’s that was extant when the Oregon legislature enacted ORICO, how-
ever, defined the term “enterprise” as a “venture or undertaking[,] especially 
one involving financial commitment[,]” and did not include any reference to the 
federal racketeering statute. Black’s Law Dictionary 476 (5th ed 1979).
	
5  Noscitur a sociis “is an old maxim which summarizes the rule both of lan-
guage and of law that the meaning of words may be indicated or controlled by 
those with which they are associated.” Nunner v. Erickson, 151 Or 575, 609, 51 
P2d 839 (1935) (quoting 2 Williston on Contracts § 618, 1999 (1st ed 1920)). 
	
6  ORS 166.715(4) defines “pattern of racketeering activity”:
	
“ 
‘Pattern of racketeering activity’ means engaging in at least two inci-
dents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, 
accomplices, victims or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated 
by distinguishing characteristics, including a nexus to the same enterprise, 
16	
State v. Walker
does not tell us a lot, but it does tell us that an enterprise 
has some kind of recognizable or ascertainable existence. 
Beyond that, the statute does not convey that the enterprise 
must exist separately from its associates, as opposed to 
existing as a result of the association itself. And, although 
an enterprise capable of employing a person ordinarily 
might have organizational formality of some kind, that is 
not invariably so. Moreover, no such formality is implied by 
the idea that an enterprise be capable of “associating” with 
a person.
	
The list of illustrative forms of enterprises in ORS 
166.715(2) reinforces the conclusion that an enterprise need 
not be an entity or unit of any particular form or struc-
ture. The breadth of what qualifies as an enterprise is sug-
gested, first, by the fact that the term expressly includes 
“any” form of the listed entities, thus conveying that the 
meaning of enterprise is both unrestricted and compre-
hensive.7 The illustrative examples that follow convey the 
same thing. Enterprise includes: single individuals as well 
as associations of individuals; legal associations as well as 
associations-in-fact; individual legal formations (sole propri-
etorships) as well as group legal formations (partnerships, 
corporations, unions); for-profit as well as nonprofit associa-
tions; licit as well as illicit enterprises; and governmental as 
well as non-governmental entities.
	
The inclusion of “associations in fact” in the list in 
particular undermines defendant’s argument that an enter-
prise must have a more formal structure and an existence 
apart from the individuals who comprise the enterprise 
itself. So, too, does the fact that an enterprise can be an 
individual. The legislature’s choice to include those exam-
ples, along with others that have a more formal organization 
or an existence separate from their membership, was a way 
to broaden the meaning of enterprise, not narrow it.
and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred 
after November 1, 1981, and that the last of such incidents occurred within 
five years after an incident of racketeering activity.” 
	
7  See Dickinson v. Leer, 255 Or 274, 276-77, 465 P2d 885 (1970) (“any,” as used 
in statute related to service of summons, is unrestricted and comprehensive); 
Reed v. Reed, 215 Or 91, 96, 332 P2d 1049 (1958) (“any” used in statutory phrase 
conveys comprehensive meaning). 
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
17
	
Our examination of the text of the ORICO statutes, 
together with the ordinary meaning of the term “enterprise”, 
thus takes us to an expansive understanding of what an 
enterprise can be for purposes of a charge of racketeering. 
It can be any type of organization or entity, even a loosely 
formed or organized one, formed to carry out some purpose-
ful venture, undertaking, or activity. It can be formal and 
have an independent legal existence. But it need not be. It 
can be informal as well, and it can derive its existence from 
the purposeful association itself. See also ORS 166.735(2) 
(provisions of ORICO “shall be liberally construed to effec-
tuate its remedial purposes”). The statute requires no more, 
at least not as a matter of plain text and context.
B.  Legislative History
	
As noted, defendant further relies on the legislative 
history of ORICO to argue that the legislature intended a 
narrower concept. If, in fact, the legislative history reveals 
that the legislature had a narrower understanding of the 
term in mind, and if that narrower meaning is consistent 
with the text, even if not compelled by it, the legislative his-
tory would be a basis on which we appropriately may con-
strue the text more narrowly. See Gaines, 346 Or at 172-73 
(when text of statute is capable of only one meaning, legisla-
tive history cannot support different interpretation; legisla-
tive history, however, can resolve ambiguity or demonstrate 
that superficially plain text is not so clear).
	
Our review of that history reveals that the bill’s 
sponsors were concerned primarily with the presence and 
possible future expansion in Oregon of large-scale, orga-
nized crime consortiums engaged in prostitution, drug traf-
ficking, and the like. See, e.g., Testimony, Senate Committee 
on Justice, Joint Subcommittee on Organized Crime, SB 
531, Apr 23, 1981, Ex A (statement of Oregon Attorney 
General Dave Frohnmayer). One witness—a member of law 
enforcement—also mentioned “frauds that cause businesses 
to go bankrupt and the elderly to lose their life savings” 
and “groups specializing in violence and theft.” Testimony, 
Senate Committee on Justice, SB 531, May 18, 1981, Ex 
B (statement of Multnomah County Sheriff’s Deputy Neil 
Crannell). Nevertheless, in response to a question from a 
18	
State v. Walker
legislator about whether the statute might apply to shoplift-
ing, that same witness acknowledged that it could, noting 
that some shoplifting “groups” take high-value items and 
“fence” them according to specific methods. Tape Recording, 
Senate Committee on Justice, SB 531, May 18, 1981, Tape 
186, Side A (statement of Multnomah County Sheriff’s 
Deputy Neil Crannell).
	
The key feature of the legislation was that it focused 
on the patterned character of crimes, rather than, as the law 
traditionally had done, on crimes committed as a single act 
on a single day by a single person acting alone. As Professor 
Blakey,8 who presented the bill along with then Attorney 
General Frohnmayer, explained of federal RICO:
“Traditionally we have thought of crimes as a single inci-
dent on a single day and a single person engaged in it. For 
most crimes, street crimes, that is the whole story[.] [B]ut 
for organized crime the important things are the things 
that are not included in the current code. That is the rela-
tionship between this crime this day and this crime[ 
] the 
next day. That is, this crime is part of a pattern. Almost as 
important as its being part of a pattern is that there is an 
organization involved. The statute calls it an enterprise. 
* 
* 
* What RICO does is look to the organized character of 
the crime and makes that an element of the offense and it 
looks to the patterned character of the criminal behavior 
and makes than an element of the [offense][.] [It] imposes 
on the government [the burden] of proving those elements 
and once those elements are proven it then warrants the 
treatment of that crime in a different fashion.”
Minutes, Senate Committee on Justice, Joint Subcommittee 
on Organized Crime, SB 531, Apr 23, 1981, 6 (statement 
of Professor Blakey). In short, while large-scale organized 
crime was the target, nothing in the federal RICO statute 
made large- versus small-scale an element. Rather, the stat-
ute turned on the multiplicity of crimes and the “organized 
character” of those crimes, which together suggested that 
some form of organization was behind their commission. In 
	
8  Blakey, a professor at Notre Dame Law School, was more than just an inter-
ested academic. He had drafted the federal RICO act, was a nationally recog-
nized expert on RICO, and had helped draft parallel state legislation in Arizona 
and Florida. Minutes, Senate Committee on Justice, Joint Subcommittee on 
Organized Crime, SB 531, Apr 23, 1981, 1. 
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
19
light of Blakey’s testimony about the purpose and design of 
the federal RICO statute, the legislators enacting the paral-
lel provisions of ORICO would have understood the purpose 
and design of our statute to be similar.
	
Opponents of the bill also testified. One of them 
maintained that organized crime was not then a major 
problem in Oregon and that, to the extent it may become a 
problem, the portions of the bill establishing civil penalties 
such as forfeiture and injunctive relief, to be administered 
by the office of the Attorney General, were the most appro-
priate remedies. That witness opposed creating new crim-
inal penalties for the commission of multiple crimes—par-
ticularly “low level” crimes—arguing that such patterns of 
criminal activity were most appropriately addressed by use 
of existing criminal-conspiracy and habitual-criminal stat-
utes. Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Justice, SB 531, 
May 18, 1981, Tape 185, Side A (statement of Metropolitan 
Public Defender Jim Henning). A legislator, Senator Wyers, 
asked the witness if he had any suggestions to make it clear 
that the bill was not intended to “take two misdemeanors or 
Class C felonies * 
* 
* and make them into a Class A felony.” 
The witness responded that, although he did not believe it 
was the legislature’s intent to apply the new statute to “a 
group of 20-year-olds who go out and shoplift a couple of 
times,” it would be difficult to draft the bill to avoid that 
result. Id. Senator Wyers agreed that that result was “there 
in the language”; he understood that, although the Attorney 
General did not anticipate using the statute in that way, it 
would be within the discretion of Oregon’s 36 district attor-
neys whether to do so. Id. Another witness from the crimi-
nal defense bar also testified that there was no current need 
for such a statute in Oregon and urged that, even assuming 
there was a need, it could be adequately addressed in the 
federal courts under the federal RICO statute, as well as 
by existing Oregon criminal statutes. Id. (statement of John 
Henry Hingson III).
	
In a legislative hearing the next day, Senator 
Wyers reemphasized the breadth of the proposed statute. 
He explained to his fellow legislators that a “group of three 
or four amateurs * 
* 
* committing a series of burglaries or 
20	
State v. Walker
shoplifts could fit under this act” and that he would consider 
it a “real mess” if the act were used against “low-level crimi-
nals”; he noted that the Attorney General did not intend for 
it to be used that way, but that Oregon’s district attorneys 
nevertheless had discretion to do so. Tape Recording, Senate 
Subcommittee on Justice, SB 531, May 19, 1981, Tape 192, 
Side A (statement of Senator Wyers). In the floor debate pre-
ceding passage of the bill in the Senate, Senator Wyers gave 
examples of the kinds of conduct that the bill was intended 
to apply to, including contract killings by a motorcycle gang 
or a major organized crime entity; groups of a dozen or more 
persons involved in crimes yielding a “large sum of cash, hid-
den”; and such white-collar crimes as pharmacies submit-
ting fraudulent billings to state agencies. Tape Recording, 
Senate Floor Debate, SB 531, May 28, 1981, Tape 95, Side 
A (statement of Senator Wyers). Senator Wyers emphasized 
the benefits of the civil penalties provided in the bill and 
noted that the Attorney General had agreed to consult with 
district attorneys about the proper application of the new 
criminal provisions. Id. at Tape 96, Side A.
	
The legislative history provides two insights that 
are helpful to us in interpreting the meaning of the term 
“enterprise”. First, nothing in that legislative history sug-
gests that the legislature intended that term to be narrower 
than its ordinary meaning, so that it required a particular 
form of purposeful entity or association of individuals in fact. 
To the contrary, much of the discussion during the hearing 
focused on organized criminal activity—e.g., coordinated 
frauds and even shoplifting—as the essential evil to which 
the statute was directed. Second, and relatedly, opponents 
and some legislators expressed concern that the proposed 
ORICO statute would not be limited to the larger-scale 
organized criminal activities that were the legislature’s 
motivating concern. In that regard, the legislative history 
is particularly telling. It reveals that the legislature drafted 
the statute aware both that it was not tailored to those larg-
er-scale activities and that its terms did not preclude its 
use to reach “low level” crimes or smaller-scale coordinated 
activities that could also be addressed by criminal-conspir-
acy and habitual-criminal statutes. No drafting solution 
to that problem was identified. The only solution embraced 
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
21
was to rely on prosecutors to exercise their charging discre-
tion to serve the legislature’s underlying objectives; no legal 
limit on the statute’s reach or the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion was made a part of the law.
	
The legislative history thus reveals a mismatch—or 
at least, a potential mismatch—in the text that the legisla-
ture chose for the statute and the policy that the legislature 
ostensibly sought to effectuate. This court has confronted 
variations on that general problem in other cases. In South 
Beach Marina, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 301 Or 524, 724 P2d 788 
(1986), for example, the issue was whether the term “water-
craft” included pleasure craft as well as commercial vessels. 
In the absence of any legislative history at all relating to 
the 1949 enactment of the relevant statute, this court gave 
the term its ordinary—and expansive—meaning: It applied 
to all watercraft, including pleasure craft. In doing so, this 
court explained:
“Statutes ordinarily are drafted in order to address some 
known or identifiable problem, but the chosen solution may 
not always be narrowly confined to the precise problem. 
The legislature may and often does choose broader lan-
guage that applies to a wider range of circumstances than 
the precise problem that triggered legislative attention. 
For instance, lawmakers may believe that defining a nar-
rower class for coverage under a statute would cause more 
problems in interpretation and administration and would 
be less efficient than to use broad, residual language that 
avoids such problems. When the express terms of a statute 
indicate such broader coverage, it is not necessary to show 
that this was its conscious purpose. In the absence of an 
affirmative showing that the narrower meaning actually 
was intended by the drafters, we shall take the legislature 
at its word * 
* 
*.”
Id. at 531 (footnote omitted).
	
We took the same approach in Burke v. DLCD, 352 
Or 428, 290 P3d 790 (2012). In that case, we had stronger 
clues about the legislature’s policy objectives because the leg-
islature had made findings indicating that only certain per-
sons were targets of the relevant statute. Because those find-
ings were not reflected in the operative provisions of the law, 
however, this court gave the statute a broad interpretation 
22	
State v. Walker
consistent with its text. See also Hamilton v. Paynter, 342 
Or 48, 55, 149 P3d 131 (2006) (text of statute demonstrated 
that, “even if the legislature had a particular problem in 
mind, it chose to use a broader solution”); Clackamas County 
v. 102 Marijuana Plants, 323 Or 680, 688-89, 920 P2d 149 
(1996) (where legislative findings pertaining to the legisla-
ture’s particular reasons for enacting relevant statute were 
not referred to in operative section of statute, court gave 
effect to broad language in latter).
	
The interpretive problem presented here is similar. 
Although, as discussed above, the legislative history sug-
gests that ORICO was enacted with the objective of curb-
ing larger-scale, more sophisticated or structured criminal 
activities than those at issue here, textually the statute is not 
so limited. Moreover, members of the legislature expressly 
acknowledged the breadth of the statute and the role of pros-
ecutorial discretion in applying it. Particularly where the 
legislative history demonstrates that the legislature was 
aware of the expansive nature of an enactment’s text, yet 
chose not to narrow it, we are constrained to interpret the 
statute in a way that is consistent with that text, which is, 
in the end, the best indication of the legislature’s intent. See 
Gaines, 346 Or at 171 (text and context of legislative enact-
ments remain primary in interpreting their meaning).
	
This case proves the wisdom of that constraint. 
When the legislature enacted ORICO, it did so as much in 
anticipation of future problems of organized criminal activ-
ity in the state as to address current ones. The latitude 
that the legislature left in the statute was deliberate, and 
the legislature opted to rely on prosecutorial discretion as 
the means to tailor the statute more precisely to the prob-
lems that would be of greatest concern to law enforcement 
efforts. For us to interpret the statute more restrictively 
than it was consciously drafted would require us to draw 
a line that the legislature itself declined to draw. We might 
succeed in furthering the legislature’s objectives better than 
the legislature itself chose to do; we also might not. Either 
way, our role is not to draft or revise the laws, or to refine 
the policy reflected in the law. Our role is to interpret stat-
utes consistently with the words that the legislature used 
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
23
and the meaning that the legislature understood those 
words to have, if that meaning is consistent with the words 
themselves.
	
Here, the legislative history confirms what the 
plain text and context convey—that the term “enterprise,” 
consistently with its plain meaning, is an expansive one. 
It includes casual and informal associations of individuals 
in fact, as well as organizations with formal structures. An 
association or entity can be an enterprise within the mean-
ing of ORS 166.715(2) regardless of whether the association 
or entity has an existence separate from, and independent 
of, its membership or its activities. The key is whether the 
association or entity is engaged in ongoing, coordinated 
criminal activity.
C.  Federal RICO Cases
	
Oregon’s ORICO statute, as earlier noted, was mod-
eled on the federal RICO statute.9 Although federal case 
law predating the enactment of ORICO therefore can pro-
vide useful context for interpreting our statute,10 no federal 
	
9  The federal RICO statute making racketeering a crime is directed at enter-
prises affecting interstate commerce, but is otherwise written in terms that 
closely parallel ORICO. See 18 USC § 1962(c) (1976) (unlawful “for any person 
employed by or associated with an enterprise” affecting interstate commerce “to 
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity”). The federal RICO statute 
identifying what an enterprise includes is less expressly encompassing than 
ORICO; for example, it does not expressly include licit and illicit entities, profit 
and nonprofit entities, or governmental and non-governmental entities. See 18 
USC § 1961(4) (1976) (enterprise “includes any individual, partnership, corpo-
ration, association or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity”). The definition of enterprise in 
ORICO, while modeled on federal RICO, was “modified somewhat” to clarify the 
expansive scope of the term and thereby to avoid interpretative issues that were 
arising in federal courts. See Frohnmayer, Arnold, and Hamilton, 18 Willamette 
L Rev at 6-7 (comparing federal and Oregon definitions of enterprise). Oregon’s 
definition is not, however, inconsistent with federal RICO. Federal courts gener-
ally have given the federal definition of enterprise an expansive interpretation 
consistent with the clarifications that Oregon expressly incorporated. See, e.g., 
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 US 479, 499-500, 105 S Ct 3275, 87 L Ed 
2d 346 (1985) (enterprise includes illegitimate as well as legitimate businesses); 
National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 US 249, 257, 114 S Ct 798, 
127 L Ed 2d 99 (1994) (enterprise need not have an economic motivation); U.S. v. 
Freeman, 6 F3d 586, 596-97 (9th Cir 1993) (governmental entity may constitute 
federal RICO enterprise).
	
10  See State v. Cooper, 319 Or 162, 168, 874 P2d 822 (1994) (when legisla-
ture models Oregon statute after statute from another jurisdiction, legislature 
24	
State v. Walker
cases—and no United States Supreme Court cases in partic-
ular—had interpreted the meaning of the term “enterprise” 
when the legislature drafted, debated, and enacted ORICO. 
Cases that came later, however, still may be consulted for 
their persuasive value. Because interpretative issues have 
arisen under the parallel provisions of federal RICO with 
far greater frequency, and in a wider array of factual cir-
cumstances, than under ORICO, we consider it worthwhile 
in this case to look to federally controlling Supreme Court 
decisions bearing on the meaning of enterprise.
	
The first case in which the Supreme Court consid-
ered the meaning of enterprise for purposes of federal RICO 
was United States v. Turkette, 452 US 576, 101 S Ct 2524, 
69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981).11 The specific issue before the Court 
in Turkette was whether the term “enterprise” as used in 
the federal statute encompassed illegal or illegitimate enter-
prises as well as legitimate ones. The defendant in Turkette 
had been charged with participating in a wholly criminal 
enterprise described in the indictment as a “group of indi-
viduals associated in fact for the purpose of” illegal activi-
ties, including drug trafficking, mail fraud, and bribery. 452 
US at 578-79. In resolving whether both illegal and legal 
entities were subsumed within the term enterprise, the 
Court also explained the way in which the “enterprise” and 
“pattern of racketeering activity” elements are interrelated, 
but separate:
“In order to secure a conviction under RICO, the Government 
must prove both the existence of an ‘enterprise’ and the 
connected ‘pattern of racketeering activity.’ The enterprise 
is presumed to have intended same meaning as that given to other statute by 
highest court of that jurisdiction).
	
11  Turkette was decided on June 17, 1981. ORICO was approved by the 
Governor on August 21, 1981, and went into effect on November 1, 1981. The 
first hearing on the bill took place in April 1981 before the House and Senate 
Joint Subcommittee on Organized Crime; other Senate hearings occurred in 
May, followed by a hearing in July before the House Judiciary Committee. The 
various hearings included frequent mention of the federal RICO statute and its 
application; in one instance, a witness informed legislators that federal appellate 
courts were in disagreement about the proper meaning of the term “enterprise” 
as used in that statute. Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Justice, SB 531, 
May 18, 1981, Tape 185, Side A (statement of John Henry Hingson III). Thus, as 
discussed in note 9, both before and after Turkette was decided, the legislature 
generally was aware of developments relating to the federal RICO statute and 
drafted ORICO accordingly.
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
25
is an entity, for present purposes associated together for a 
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The 
pattern of racketeering activity is, on the other hand, a 
series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. The former 
is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or 
informal, and by evidence that the various associates func-
tion as a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence 
of the requisite number of acts of racketeering committed 
by the participants in the enterprise. While the proof used 
to establish th[o]se separate elements may in particular 
cases coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish 
the other. The ‘enterprise’ is not the ‘pattern of racketeer-
ing activity’; it is an entity separate and apart from the 
pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an 
enterprise at all times remains a separate element which 
must be proved by the Government.”
Turkette, 452 US at 583 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
	
Turkette made several observations that fit our stat-
ute as well. First, the state must prove both the existence of 
an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity. Those 
are separate elements, and both must be established. Thus, 
proving a pattern of racketeering activity does not establish, 
at least not necessarily, the existence of an enterprise. But 
that does not mean that proof of the two cannot “coalesce.” 
They can, especially when the organization is a group of 
individuals informally or loosely associated-in-fact, so that 
proof of the enterprise does not depend on the existence of 
a particular organizational form or structure, or on certain 
formalities of structure. For such an informal association, 
whose animating purpose and reason for existence may be 
to commit the crimes that form the pattern of racketeering 
activity, proof of the association-in-fact is particularly likely 
to coalesce with proof of the pattern of racketeering.
	
More recent, and more on point with the issue before 
us in this case, is Boyle v. United States, 556 US 938, 1209 
S Ct 2237, 173 L Ed 2d 1265 (2009). There, the Supreme 
Court took up the question of what form or structure an 
alleged association-in-fact entity must have to qualify as an 
enterprise for purposes of federal RICO. The Court held that 
an “association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three 
structural features: a purpose, relationships among those 
26	
State v. Walker
associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to 
permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” 
Boyle, 556 US at 946. The Court found the purpose require-
ment to be implicit in the common meaning of enterprise as a 
“venture,” “undertaking,” or “project.” Id. (quoting Webster’s 
Third New Int’l Dictionary 757 (1976)). As for longevity, that 
feature was inherent in the requirement of participation in 
a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. The Court found no 
basis in the text of the federal RICO statute, however, for 
the structural requirements that the defendant in that case 
proposed, such as a “core membership that functioned as a 
continuing unit, and an ascertainable structural hierarchy 
distinct from the charged predicate acts.” Id. at 943, 948. 
Rather, the Court affirmed its reasoning in Turkette that 
an “association-in-fact enterprise” was “simply a continu-
ing unit that functions with a common purpose,” in which, 
for example, decisions might be made on an ad hoc basis 
or carried out in a sporadic manner. Id. at 948. The Court 
described the language of the federal statute as “clear but 
expansive.” Id. at 950.12 It also reiterated its observation in 
Turkette that “proof of a pattern of racketeering activity may 
be sufficient in a particular case to permit a jury to infer 
the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise.” Id. at 951. 
The Court therefore found no error in trial court instruc-
tions informing the jury that, to prove the element of the 
existence of an “enterprise,” the government was required 
to prove that there was an “ongoing organization with some 
sort of framework, formal or informal, for carrying out its 
	
12  As reflected in Supreme Court decisions, the legislative history of federal 
RICO has presented the Court with the same potential problem that the legis-
lative history of ORICO presents us -- that is, a seeming mismatch between the 
problem that Congress identified and the breadth of the statute that it enacted 
to address that problem. As the Court observed in H.J. Inc v. Northwestern Bell 
Telephone Co., 492 US 229, 245, 109 S Ct 2893, 106 L Ed 2d 195 (1988): “To be 
sure, Congress focused on, and the examples used in the debates and reports 
to illustrate the Act’s operation concern, the predations of mobsters. Organized 
crime was without a doubt Congress’ major target[.]” Nevertheless, “for cogent 
reasons,” Congress “chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although 
it had organized crime as its focus, was not limited in application to organized 
crime.” Id. at 248. Consistently with its recognition that Congress “knew what 
it was doing when it adopted commodious language capable of extending beyond 
organized crime,” id. at 246, the Court has broadly interpreted enterprise and 
other terms in the statute consistently with Congress’s “self-consciously expan-
sive language and overall approach.” Id. at 249 (quoting Sedima, 473 US at 498).
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
27
objectives,” that “the various members and associates of the 
association function[ed] as a continuing unit to achieve a 
common purpose,” that an enterprise could consist of “an 
association of individuals, without structural hierarchy, 
form[ed] solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern 
of racketeering acts,” and that “the existence of an associ-
ation-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by what it 
does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.” Id. 
at 942, 951 (brackets in original).
	
Again, as we have noted, the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretations of the federal RICO statute are not binding on 
this court in interpreting ORICO. But the Court’s analysis 
of the text and context of the federal law on which ORICO 
was modeled parallels our analysis of the text and context 
of ORICO, and we find the Court’s reasoning and conclu-
sions on the meaning of the term “enterprise” persuasive. 
As we already have concluded from our examination of text, 
context, and legislative history, an enterprise for purpose 
of ORICO can be any type of organization or entity, even 
an informal or loosely organized one, that undertakes some 
purposeful venture, undertaking, or activity through a pat-
tern of criminal activity. The Supreme Court’s view that an 
enterprise must have a purpose accords with our conclusion. 
As we have further concluded from ORICO’s text and con-
text, an enterprise can be informal or loosely organized in 
its structure and can derive its existence from the purpose-
ful association itself. That is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion that an association-in-fact enterprise 
must have relationships among those associated with the 
enterprise, but it need not have a formal structure of any 
kind; rather, it is enough that it simply be a continuing 
unit of some kind that functions with a common purpose. 
The Supreme Court’s third structural feature of an associ-
ation-in-fact enterprise—that the association has longevity 
sufficient to permit the associates to pursue the enterprise’s 
purpose—also fits with our interpretation, and we embrace 
it as well. Finally, consistently with those features, we agree 
with the Supreme Court that an association-in-fact enter-
prise may consist of an association of individuals, formed 
“solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of racke-
teering acts,” and the existence of an association-in-fact will 
28	
State v. Walker
often be “more readily proven by what it does, rather than 
by abstract analysis of its structure.” Boyle, 556 US at 942.
III.  APPLICATION TO THIS CASE
	
The remaining question is whether the facts of 
this case were sufficient to prove that defendant partici-
pated with Williams in an “enterprise” through a pattern 
of racketeering activity, as ORS 166.720(3) requires. This 
case provides an apt example of the extent to which proof 
of an association-in-fact enterprise and proof of a “pattern” 
of racketeering activity—a pattern of engaging in conduct 
constituting one or more of the listed crimes—may coalesce.
	
The state presented evidence of three specific occa-
sions, during a two-month period of time, when defendant 
and Williams worked together to commit theft. The thefts 
that they committed had distinctive earmarks. Each of the 
three thefts were highly coordinated and, a jury could infer, 
planned in advance. For each of the three thefts, defendant 
and Williams entered the same Safeway grocery stores, in 
the same two geographically distant towns (Seaside and 
Sandy), on the same dates, and at the same times. Although 
the record is silent about how the two traveled to the Sandy 
Safeway store, it establishes that defendant and Williams 
traveled together to the Seaside Safeway. For each of the 
three thefts, defendant and Williams shopped separately, 
but they moved about the store in concert. Methodically and 
in combination, they stole the same distinctive and seem-
ingly incongruous items—in all three instances, they took 
multiple boxes of disposable diapers, multiple containers of 
Tide laundry detergent, and multiple cases of beer; in two 
of the three thefts, they took several large bags of frozen 
shrimp as well. The planning and organizing behind each 
crime was apparent from the consistent pattern of the thefts. 
The thefts were not spontaneous crimes of opportunity, as 
might occur for teens who, sporadically but repeatedly, steal 
random items because they see them in the store and, hav-
ing seen them, want them (e.g., a trendy pair of shoes; a 
fashionable leather jacket; a status-enhancing watch). The 
circumstances suggest nothing impulsive or extemporane-
ous about defendant’s and Williams’s concerted conduct.
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
29
	
The nature of the merchandise taken, as well, per-
mitted the jury to infer the planned and purposeful nature 
of the association between defendant and Williams. Expert 
testimony established that what defendant and Williams 
took were “high value” and “high theft” items often taken 
by professional groups of thieves for purposes of resale. 
Although the state presented no direct proof that defendant 
and Williams were fencing the items or otherwise using 
them in trade, the nature and volume of the merchandise 
readily permitted that inference. Indeed, it is difficult to 
envision how defendant and Williams personally could use 
or consume, from the Seaside theft alone, over $1,000 worth 
of Huggies diapers, Tide detergent, bags of frozen shrimp, 
and beer.13
	
Moreover, from their collective and common expe-
rience, jurors could recognize that stealing over $1,000 of 
merchandise on a single trip to the grocery store is unusual, 
at best; when the main items stolen are diapers, laundry 
detergent, frozen shrimp, and beer, the jury could infer the 
existence of an organized theft operation of some kind, not 
just an shoplifting incident by a ordinary (if dishonest) con-
sumer. Add to that the fact that defendant and Williams 
committed at least two other similar thefts within six weeks 
of the Seaside theft—ones that involved, again, large vol-
umes of Huggies diapers, Tide detergent, beer, and (and in 
one of the two additional thefts) frozen shrimp—and the 
jury could readily infer that defendant and Williams were 
associated for purposes of committing thefts of items that 
they could readily sell or otherwise trade for value. As con-
trasted with defendant’s argument to the jury that this was 
a case of the state inappropriately targeting two individuals 
who did nothing more sophisticated than commit multiple 
crimes together, the prosecutor argued:
“* 
* 
* This is a racketeering case. These two individuals are 
professionals; they know what items they need to get. They 
know how to do it, and they’re hitting the same stores. I 
	
13  Perhaps the jury could have inferred some charitable purpose on defen-
dant’s and Williams’s part. But even if defendant and Williams were engaged in 
a coordinated series of thefts “from the rich” so that they could “give to the poor,” 
that purpose still would fit with what qualifies as an enterprise under the stat-
ute. See ORS 166.715(2) (enterprise includes nonprofit entities).
30	
State v. Walker
would argue to you that nobody needs that much shrimp 
or that many baby diapers or that much beer or that much 
laundry detergent.
	
“Using your common sense you know what they’re going 
to do with those items. I would submit to [you], they’re sell-
ing them.”
Both the prosecutor’s and defendant’s characterization of 
the evidence, and what inferences the jury should draw, 
were fair arguments on this record, and it was for the jury 
to decide which characterization to accept.
	
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals major-
ity that the evidence gave rise to a question of fact, to be 
resolved by a jury, as to whether defendant and Williams 
were participants in an association-in-fact enterprise. As 
the majority observed, whether conduct “originates from 
some continuing organizational dynamic” or instead “was 
merely ad hoc or episodic” will often depend on what infer-
ence the jury draws from the “multiplicity, similarity, and 
temporal proximity of criminal acts by recurring combina-
tions or permutations of actors.” Walker, 252 Or App at 11. 
In the majority’s view, the jury in this case was entitled to 
infer that the three thefts, “far from being random, sporadic, 
or isolated,” originated from an “overarching, coordinated 
organizational dynamic and design.” Id. at 12-13. For the 
dissent, the evidence in this case reduced to proving nothing 
more than “episodic activities on multiple occasions.” Id. at 
14 (Edmonds, S. J., dissenting). What was missing from the 
evidence, the dissent believed, was “some fact from which 
it could be inferred that defendant and [Williams] were 
involved in an ongoing criminal business venture of which 
their thefts were a part—for example, acting together in an 
organized manner to steal particular merchandise, which, 
in turn, they could then sell to an available buyer.” Id. at 15 
(Edmonds, S. J., dissenting).
	
With respect, however, we disagree with the dis-
sent. The relationship between defendant and Williams may 
have been at the “loosely organized” end of the “associated- 
in-fact” spectrum. But no formal organization or structure 
was required. From the multiplicity and distinctive simi-
larity of the thefts that defendant and Williams committed, 
Cite as 356 Or 4 (2014)	
31
the jury could find that the criminal conduct in which they 
engaged was based on a plan or design, that it was purpose-
ful and systematic, and that defendant and Williams had an 
organized relationship of some longevity, even if it was solely 
for the purpose of carrying out the racketeering activity. In 
short, this is a case in which the evidence that permitted the 
jury to find that defendant engaged in a “pattern of rack-
eteering activity” coalesced to also permit the jury to find 
that defendant was part of an association-in-fact entity with 
sufficient purpose, relationship between the participants, 
and longevity to qualify as an enterprise under ORICO. No 
formal structure or existence separate from the association’s 
membership was required.
	
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence from 
which the jury could find that defendant was associated 
with an “enterprise” for the purpose of ORS 166.720(3). The 
trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a 
judgment of acquittal on the racketeering charge.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judg-
ment of the circuit court are affirmed.