Case Title: NYBERG v. STATE OF WYOMING MILITARY DEPT.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-117

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
NYBERG v. STATE OF WYOMING MILITARY DEPT.2003 WY 4365 P.3d 1241Case Number: 02-117Decided: 03/31/2003
October Term, A.D. 2002

ROGER 
C. NYBERG,

Appellant(Plaintiff) ,

 
 

v.

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING MILITARY DEPARTMENT;

MAJOR 
GENERAL ED BOENISCH, Individually

and 
in his Official Capacity as Adjutant General,

State 
of Wyoming,

Appellees(Defendants) .

 
 

The Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 
    

Representing 
Appellant:

C.M. 
Aron of Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie,WY.  
Argument by Mr. 
Aron.

 
   

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; and 
John D. Rossetti, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Rossetti.

 
   

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

 LEHMAN, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Roger Nyberg (Nyberg) appeals the district court's dismissal 
of his complaint in which he sought damages and reinstatement as a Wyoming Air 
National Guard (WANG) technician based on, among other things, wrongful 
termination and deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The district court 
dismissed both these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  We affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Nyberg presents two 
issues for review:

 

1.  Whether a National Guard order based on federal 
authority, and on the recommendations of a federal administrative board under 
federal regulations, is a state agency action subject to judicial review by a 
Wyoming District Court.

2.  Whether the federal 
Feres doctrine, by which the federal government is immune from tort claims 
by soldiers, grants civil rights claims immunity to conduct of the Wyoming 
Adjutant General where:

(a)  the federal military determines the conduct to 
be in dereliction of military duty; and

(b)  the Adjutant General claims the conduct to be 
state agency action.

 

The State of Wyoming, Military Department (State) and Ed 
Boenisch as Adjutant General (Boenisch) phrase the issues as follows:

 

1.  Did the District Court correctly determine that 
it lacked jurisdiction over Nyberg's wrongful termination claim for the reason 
that Nyberg failed to seek judicial review of final agency action under the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the Wyo­ming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure?

2.  Was the dismissal of Nyberg's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claim against the State and Boenisch proper pursuant to the Feres doctrine?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Nyberg was a Lieutenant 
Colonel in WANG.  
In order to maintain his state officer appointment, Nyberg was required 
to maintain his federal recognition as a military officer.  Nyberg was also 
employed as a National Guard technician in the Wyoming Guard.  A condi­tion of 
his technician employment was that he remain a member of WANG.  On October 14, 1997, 
the Wing Commander, Colonel Robert D. Rodekohr, recommended to Boenisch that 
Nyberg be separated from WANG on the basis of misconduct.

 

[¶4]      On October 14, 1997, 
Nyberg received a letter of Notification of Recommendation for Separation or 
Discharge.  The 
letter informed him that it was being recommended that he be separated from WANG 
and as a reserve officer in the United States Air Force in accordance with AFI 
36-3209, Chapter 2, Section C.  A discharge board was convened and hearings 
were held.  
Nyberg was present at the hearing and utilized both military and civilian 
counsel.  Nyberg 
was allowed to introduce evidence, call witnesses, and cross examine the 
witnesses against him.

 

[¶5]      The discharge board 
deciding the issue consisted of three officers, superior in rank to Nyberg, from 
outside the command.  
The board concluded that misconduct occurred and recommended that Nyberg 
be discharged from both WANG and as a reserve officer in the United States Air 
Force.  The 
record of the board's proceedings was forwarded to Major Paula Zaleski for legal 
review and recommendations.  Zaleski completed a detailed legal review and 
issued a report to Boenisch.  This report recommended acceptance of the 
board's findings.  
Boenisch decided to separate Nyberg from WANG.  Boenisch then 
forwarded the record to the Secre­tary of the Air Force for a determination 
of whether Nyberg would be separated as a reserve officer in the United States 
Air Force.  
Nyberg's federal recognition was never withdrawn; but, because he was no 
longer a member of WANG, Nyberg's military technician employ­ment was 
terminated.  

 

[¶6]      On September 13, 2000, 
Nyberg filed an action against the State and Boenisch for money damages, a 
permanent injunction, and reinstatement.  In his complaint, Nyberg alleged that as a 
National Guard technician he could only legally be terminated by proper 
application of federal procedures, in this case Air Force Instruction (AFI) 
36-3209, or if he was discharged from WANG in compliance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 19-2-301(b) (Michie 1997).1  This statute requires that the discharge be 
either for cause on the recommendation of an efficiency board or upon conviction 
by court martial for violation of military law.  Nyberg alleged that these procedures were not 
followed because a state efficiency board was never convened, a court martial 
never took place, and AFI 36-3209 was not followed.  Instead, he contends 
the discharge board deciding the issue was a Withdrawal of Federal Recognition 
Board, which only allowed the Adjutant General to recommend withdrawal of 
Nyberg's federal recognition, not discharge Nyberg from WANG.

 

[¶7]      The State and Boenisch 
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdic­tion and 
failure to state a claim pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  On January 14, 2002, 
the district court dismissed the wrongful termination claim for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  
The district court found that the defendants were an agency within the 
scope of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and that the order separating 
Nyberg from WANG was a final agency action.  Because Nyberg failed to file a petition for 
review of the final administrative action, the district court found that 
judicial review was time barred.  On March 20, 2002, the court further dismissed 
the civil rights claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Feres doctrine ruling that the claims were 
nonjusticiable.  
These orders are the subject of this appeal.

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      The ultimate question 
for our review is whether the district court has subject matter jurisdiction 
over Nyberg's wrongful termination claim and his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.  The district court 
found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims.  A court has 
jurisdiction when it has the "power to hear and determine a matter in 
controversy."  Garnett v. Brock, 2 P.3d 558, 561 (Wyo. 
2000) (citing In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1146 (Wyo. 
1993)).  We 
review jurisdictional questions de novo pursuant to our power and duty to 
address jurisdictional defects.  Id. (citing Pawlowski v. Pawlowski, 925 P.2d 240, 242 (Wyo. 
1996)).

 

DISCUSSION

 

Wrongful Termination
 

[¶9]      Although not presented 
by either party, our determination of this issue requires a brief review of the 
body of case law involving the military and military personnel.  A fairly well 
established principle from this body of law is claims brought by military 
personnel for injuries arising from or in the course of activity incident to 
military service are nonjusticia­ble.  Texas Adjutant 
General's Dep't v. Amos, 54 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex.App. 2001) (citing United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683-84, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 97 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1987); Chappell v. 
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 76 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1983); Feres v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 135, 146, 71 S. Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed 152 (1950); Holdiness v. Stroud, 
808 F.2d 417, 423 (5th Cir. 1987); Crawford v. Texas Army Nat'l Guard, 794 F.2d 1034, 1035 
(5th Cir. 1986); Newth v. 
Adjutant General's Dep't, 883 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tex. App. 1994)).  We are called on to 
decide whether the reach and purpose of this well established principle is 
applicable to the case before us.

 

[¶10]   The current climate of nonjusticiability for suits brought by 
military personnel can be traced back in large part to the case of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S. Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed 152 (1950).  
 In Feres, the 
Supreme Court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is subject to an exception.  This exception, 
known now as the Feres doctrine, generally stands for 
the proposition that the federal gov­ernment cannot be sued by members of 
the armed services for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of 
activity incident to service."  Feres, 340 U.S.  at 
146, 71 S. Ct.  at 159.

 

[¶11]   In a later decision, the United States 
Supreme Court explained that the Feres doctrine is 
based on concern for the "peculiar and special relationship" between the soldier 
to his superiors, the effect such suits have on discipline, and the extreme 
results that might follow if suits under the FTCA were allowed for orders given 
or acts committed in the course of mili­tary duty.  Amos, 54 S.W.3d  at 77 (citing United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112, 75 S. Ct. 141, 99 L. Ed. 139 (1954)).  In a subsequent decision, the United States 
Supreme Court articulated three factors supporting the Feres doctrine: 1) state law should not affect the 
gov­ernment's liability to military members because the relationship between 
the parties is distinctly federal; 2) no fault compensation schemes exist to 
compensate military members; and 3) the negative effect judicial review would 
have on military discipline.  Stencel Aero Eng'g 
Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672-73, 97 S. Ct. 2054, 2058-59, 52 L. Ed. 2d 665 (1977).

 

[¶12]   Although Feres is often thought of only in connection with claims 
under the FTCA, the United States Supreme Court expanded the doctrine in Chappell v. Wallace, holding that 
military personnel may not seek to remedy alleged constitutional violations 
committed by their superior officers by pursuing a Bivens2 type action for damages.  Amos, 54 S.W.3d  at 77 (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.  at 305, 103 S.Ct. at 2362).  In the course of its holding, the Court 
explained that the Feres doctrine is founded, at 
least in part, on the notion that the military relies on a unique "hierarchical 
structure of discipline and obedience to command" not found in civilian 
settings.  Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.  at 300, 103 S. Ct.  at 
2366.  The Court 
concluded that if service members were permitted to expose their superior 
officers to personal liability, "[t]he special nature of military lifethe need 
for unhesitating and deci­sive action by military officers and equally 
disciplined responses by enlisted personnelwould be undermined."  Chappell, 462 U.S.  at 304, 103 S. Ct.  at 2367.  In discussing its 
holding, the Court noted that it was not adopting a per se rule that military 
personnel could never seek redress in civilian courts for all wrongs suffered in 
the course of military service.  Chappell, 462 U.S. 
at 304, 103 S. Ct.  at 2368.  The Court did however dictate that "[c]ivilian courts must, 
at the very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court 
to tamper with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel 
and their supe­rior officers; that relationship is at the heart of the 
necessarily unique structure of the Military Establishment."  Amos, 54 S.W.3d  at 77-78 (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S.  at 300, 103 S. Ct. 2366; Newth, 883 S.W.2d at 357).  

 

[¶13]   After Chappell, courts broadly applied the Feres 
doctrine.  For 
instance, courts have applied the Feres doctrine to 
FTCA claims, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Bivens claims.  Watson v. Arkansas 
Nat'l Guard, 886 F.2d 1004, 1005-08 (8th Cir. 1989).  Court decisions in 
this area seemed to be "guided by an increasing sense of awe for things 
mili­tary."  
Persons v. United States, 925 F.2d 292, 295 
(9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 
481 U.S. 681, 691, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2069, 95 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1987)).  "[P]ractically any 
suit that implicates the military judgments and decisions' . . . runs the risk 
of colliding with Feres."  Id.  One court has concluded, "the permissible range of lawsuits 
by present or former servicemen against their superior officers is, at the very 
least, narrowly circum­scribed."  Crawford v. Texas Army 
Nat'l Guard, 794 F.2d  at 1035.  

 

[¶14]   In 1987, the United States Supreme Court 
again revisited Feres in United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 
97 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1987), in response to confusion about when exactly the Feres doctrine as analyzed in Chappell applied.  The Court held that the Chappell approach applies to all activities performed 
"incident to service."  

 

A test for liability 
that depends on the extent to which par­ticular suits would call into 
question military discipline and decisionmaking would itself require judicial 
inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters.  Whether a case 
implicates those concerns would often be problematic, rais­ing the prospect 
of compelled depositions and trial testimony by military officers concerning the 
details of their military commands.  Even putting aside the risk of erroneous 
judicial conclusions (which would becloud military decisionmak­ing), the 
mere process of arriving at correct conclusions would disrupt the military 
regime.  The 
"incident to service" test, by contrast, provides a line that is relatively 
clear and that can be discerned with less extensive inquiry into mili­tary 
matters.

 

Stanley, 483 U.S.  at 682-83, 107 S. Ct.  at 3063.  In sum, as a general 
rule the Feres doctrine is applicable "whenever a 
legal action would require a civilian court to examine decisions regarding 
management, discipline, supervision, and control of members of the armed forces 
of the United States.'" Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting McGowan v. 
Scoggins, 890 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1989)).  

 

[¶15]   Even though all three factors supporting 
Feres as articulated in Stencel are not present in state actions, the 
third and possibly most important factor weighs heavily in favor of the 
nonjusticiability of these claims. See Stencel, 431 U.S.  at 672-73, 97 S. Ct.  at 2058-59.  Judi­cial review of National Guard 
personnel decisions certainly creates the potential for a nega­tive effect 
on military discipline.  We therefore hold that state courts cannot 
entertain suits by Guard personnel arising out of Guard employment except in two 
narrow circumstances.3  We have several reasons for doing so.   

 

[¶16]   First, decisions regarding the discharge of members of the military 
are precisely the type of military decisions civilian courts should refrain from 
reviewing.  Amos, 54 S.W.3d  at 78.  The "special relationships that define 
military life have supported the military estab­lishment's broad power to 
deal with its own personnel'" instead of involving civilian courts in such 
decisions.  Chappell, 462 U.S.  at 305, 103 S. Ct.  at 2368.  The climate of 
discipline and unquestioned obedience present in the military requires that 
people familiar with military needs, not civilian courts, determine military 
personnel issues.  

 

[¶17]   Allowing soldiers to sue superior 
officers and the military department would be impru­dent.  Such action would 
"require commanding officers to stand prepared to convince a civilian court of 
the wisdom of a wide range of military and disciplinary decisions such as 
whether to overlook a particular incident or episode and whether to discharge a 
serviceman."  Amos, 54 S.W.3d  at 79 (citing United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58, 105 S. Ct. 3039, 3043, 87 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1985)).  Suits by Guard personnel regarding Guard 
employment would destroy the legitimacy and authority of command.  Surely the 
legislature did not intend the disruption that would occur upon judicial review 
of discretionary military personnel deci­sions.  We are, as noted by 
the Court in Chappell, ill-equipped to evaluate the 
impact of such court actions on military discipline and must therefore defer to 
the military on such matters. See Chappell, 462 U.S.  at 305, 103 S. Ct.  at 2368.  We, like many other 
civilian courts, are particularly unqualified to assess the correctness of 
military personnel actions.

 

[¶18]   Second, we 
consider that the test for application of the Feres 
doctrine is whether the harm occurred incident to service.  We have no trouble 
concluding that the injuries Nyberg claims resulted incident to military 
service.  The 
United States Supreme Court noted in United States v. 
Shearer, 473 U.S.  at 58-59, 105 S. Ct.  at 3043, that the decision to 
discharge a serviceman is essentially a professional decision and that the 
attempt to hale military offi­cials into court to account for their decision 
must fail.   

 

[¶19]   Third, we 
consider the role the National Guard plays in the nation's defense force and the 
degree to which the National Guard is regulated by the federal government.  The National Guard 
has been described as an organization with both state and federal 
characteristics.  
Courts have explained that the National Guard does not fit completely 
within the scope of either state or national concerns.  Bowen v. Oistead, 125 F.3d 800, 802 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Knutson v. Wisconsin Air Nat'l Guard, 995 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1993); New Jersey Air Nat'l Guard 
v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 677 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1982)).   Instead, the National Guard is a hybrid 
organization serving the state in which it is located as well as the federal 
government in times of need.  Knutson, at 
767.  At the 
state level, the National Guard is a state agency, under state authority and 
control.  At the 
same time, federal law provides for a large part of the activity, makeup, and 
function of the Guard.  
New Jersey Air Nat'l Guard, at 279.  
Describing the relationship between the state and federal authority 
governing the National Guard, the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated the 
following:

 

The Defense Department, 
the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force, and the National Guard Bureau 
prescribe regulations and issue orders to organize, discipline, and govern the 
Guard.  32 U.S.C 
§ 110.  States 
that fail to comply with federal regulations risk forfeiture of federal funds 
allocated to organize, equip, and arm state Guards.  Id. §§ 101, 107, 108, 501; Knudson, 995 F.2d  at 767.

 

Charles v. Rice, 28 F.3d 1312, 1315-1316 (1st Cir. 1994).  Our own statutes 
require that beyond state law, the laws, regulations, and customs covering the 
United States Army and Air Force govern the National Guard.  Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
19-9-101(a) (LexisNexis 2001).

 

[¶20]   Command of the 
National Guard at the state level is vested in the governor of each state, and 
his appointee, the Adjutant General.  Charles, 28 F.3d  at 
1315; 32 U.S.C. § 314.  
The Adjutant General is a state officer appointed by the governor but he 
is also an agent of the United States in his capacity as an administrator for 
federal technicians.  
Williams v. Colorado Air Nat'l Guard, 821 P.2d 922, 924 (Colo.App. 1991) (citing Costner v. Oklahoma 
Army Nat'l Guard, 833 F.2d 905 (10th 
Cir. 1987)).  
Therefore, while the Wyoming National Guard appears to fit the definition 
of a state agency found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2001), 
it is not a pure state agency because of its required compliance with federal 
military regulation.  
The Adjutant General also serves in a dual role, as he is both a state 
appointee and an administrator of federal programs.  

 

[¶21]  Because the National 
Guard is governed in part by the federal military, we find federal decisions to 
be relevant in determining the proper scope of judicial inquiry into claims by 
Guard members.  
Federal courts have applied the Feres doctrine 
to the National Guard.  
"It is beyond question that the Feres 
doctrine generally applies to claims brought by National Guard members."  Stauber v. Cline, 837 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586, 588 (1st Cir. 1993); Uhl v. Swanstrom, 79 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 1996); Lovell v. Heng, 890 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1989); Estate of Himsel v. State, 36 P.3d 35, 45 n.13 (Alaska 2001) (Matthews, Chief Justice, dissenting, collecting 
cases).  Several 
state courts have applied the Feres doctrine as 
well.  Estate of Himsel, 36 P.3d  at 40 and n.21 (citing Mangan v. Cline, 411 N.W.2d 9, 11-12 (Minn.App. 1987); 
Zaccaro v. Parker, 645 N.Y.S.2d 985, 990-91 (Sup.Ct. 
1996), Wade v. Gill, 889 S.W.2d 208, 209-10, 214-15 
(Tenn. 1994); Newth v. Adjutant General's Dep't, 883 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tex.App. 1994)).  Three states have declined to adopt Feres including Montana, Washington, and Alaska.  Estate of Himsel, 36 P.3d  at 40 (citing Trankel v. State, Dep't of Military Affairs, 938 P.2d 614, 621 (Mont. 1997); Emsley v. Army Nat'l 
Guard, 722 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wash. 
1986); but see the dissent in Himsel, 36 P.3d  at 45 n.14 asserting that these courts 
reject the doctrine of intra-military immunity but nonetheless make clear that 
claims by Guard personnel arising out of their Guard employment against the 
state are not permitted for other reasons). 

 

[¶22]   We follow the 
vast majority of federal courts and those state courts that apply this body of 
law to suits involving the National Guard.  The same policies that support the 
non­justiciability of claims in the United States Armed Forces arena support 
the nonjusticiability of claims in the National Guard arena.  Judicial review 
would undermine the military in the perform­ance of its duties.  In fact, Nyberg 
recognizes in his brief that actions taken by the National Guard are generally 
not subject to judicial review.  He states "[i]f judicial review could be 
sought for a unilateral personnel decision by the State of Wyoming Military 
Department, this Court would be inundated with petitions for review of each such 
action.  Every 
demotion, every denied promotion and every disciplinary action by a National 
Guard officer could be subject to judicial review."  

 

[¶23]   Having recognized the general rule and 
its applicability to suits involving the National Guard, we now must recognize 
that exceptions to the Feres doctrine exist.  The Eighth Circuit 
recognizes two such exceptions.  First, facial challenges to the 
constitutionality of a military regulation or statute are not barred. Second, 
limited judicial review of final agency action is permitted if the official has 
acted beyond the scope of his statutory and regulatory authority.  Watson v. Arkansas Nat'l Guard, 886 F.2d 1004, 1010-11 (8th Cir. 1989).   The United States Supreme Court has 
entertained many suits involving facial constitutional chal­lenges to 
military regulations and statutes.  Watson, 886 F.2d  at 
1010 (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1986) (free exercise challenge to the 
application of an Air Force regulation restricting the wearing of headgear); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 69 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1981) (Fifth Amendment challenge to all-male draft 
registration); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 100 S. Ct. 594, 62 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1980) (First Amendment challenge to regulations concerning 
the circulation of petitions on Air Force bases); Parker 
v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1974) (vagueness and overbreadth challenges to criminal 
provisions of the military code); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1973) (Fifth Amendment challenge to statutes claimed to 
discriminate against women in military bene­fits)).  As these cases 
demonstrate, on a federal level, a military member is able to challenge the 
constitutionality of a particular statute or regulation related to the military 
regardless of the Feres doctrine.  We hold the same to 
be true on the state level.  National Guard members are able to challenge 
the constitutionality of particular state statutes or regulations.

 

[¶24]   An explanation of the second exception 
can be seen by examining Texas court deci­sions.  Courts in Texas have 
adopted Feres and have held that state law claims would undermine military decision making as 
surely as the federal claims held to be nonjusticiable.  
See Newth v. Adjutant General's Dep't, 883 S.W.2d  at 357.  However, Texas also recognizes the second exception in which civilian courts may 
review military decisions.  Amos, 54 S.W.3d  at 
78.  
This narrow exception is recognized "to prevent executive 
officers of gov­ernment from causing injury by administrative actions taken 
by them in excess of their authority."  Id. (quoting Cole v. Texas Army Nat'l Guard, 909 S.W.2d 535, 538 
(Tex.App. 1995)).  

 

[¶25]   In Cole, a 
National Guard member brought suit against the Texas Army National Guard and the 
Adjutant General claiming that his discharge was illegal because the Adjutant 
General had failed to convene an efficiency board before his dismissal.  Cole, 909 S.W.2d  at 536-37.  The Texas government 
code, similar to our statute, allowed the officer to hold his position until he 
reached the age of sixty-four or until among other things he was discharged by a 
court martial or efficiency board.  Id.  When discharging 
Cole, the Adjutant General had failed to convene either a court martial or an 
efficiency board and had made the discharging decision unilaterally without a 
hearing.  The 
court held that Cole could bring suit because it was the court's responsibility 
to make sure the Adjutant General did not exceed his power.

 

[¶26]   In making its decision the court 
stated:

 

"What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and 
whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions."  Sterling, 287 U.S. 
at 401, 53 S. Ct.  at 196 (emphasis added).  Thus, there can be no question of the district 
court's power to inquire whether a military officer's administrative order 
exceeds his or her authority.  See, e.g., State v. 
Sparks, 27 Tex. 627 (1864). 

The courts do not interfere with most military decisions and 
actions, however, because they are ordinarily taken within the limits of 
military power and discretion.  The courts do not wish to hamper military 
efficiency and they ordinarily have no familiarity with applicable "military 
law," that is to say the law applicable to military justice, the law of war, 
martial law, and military government.   See Alfred 
Avins, State Court Review of National Guard Courts 
Martial and Military Board Proceed­ings, 41 Cornell L.Q. 457, 470-71 
(1956).   

 

Cole, 909 S.W.2d  at 538 n.3.  

 

[¶27]   This court has held in a similar 
manner.  In State ex rel. Pearson v. Hansen, 401 P.2d 954 (Wyo. 1965), 
this court had the opportunity to consider a discharging decision within the 
National Guard.  
In Hansen, the newly elected governor removed 
Pearson as the Adjutant General without convening an efficiency board or a court 
martial contrary to the statute at the time.4  Pearson claimed that 
the governor had wrongly relieved him of his duties because he had not held a 
court-martial or an efficiency board.  Id. at 955-56.  We stated:  "It is our duty to 
take the statutory law as we find it and to see to it that the powers conferred 
upon public officials are not abused."  Id. at 957.  Because the governor 
had not complied with the requirements of the statute, this court held that the 
governor exceeded his powers and rein­stated the adjutant general to his 
position.  Id. at 960.

  

[¶28]   We therefore agree with the 
well-reasoned discussion of the Texas courts and recog­nize this second 
narrow exception to the principle of judicial deference for military 
decisions.  The 
district court has the power to construe the relevant statutes and determine if 
the Adju­tant General exceeded his powers.  "[W]here a [statutory] power is granted, and 
the method of its exercise prescribed, the prescribed method excludes all 
others, and must be followed."  Cole, 909 S.W.2d  at 
539 (quoting, Foster v. City of Waco, 255 S.W. 1104, 
1105 (Tex. 1923)).

 

[¶29]   In looking at the face of Nyberg's 
complaint, it appears the portion of his claim that asserts that his discharge 
was not in compliance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 19-2-301(b) may have fit within 
this narrow exception.  
As we noted, however, in ¶19, the National Guard is a hybrid organization 
and to the extent the National Guard is a state entity it is an agency.  As such, when 
contesting the exercise of the Adjutant General's authority, one must do so 
within the confines of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.  

 

[¶30]   This requires compliance with W.R.A.P. 
12.04, i.e., a petition for a writ of review of a final agency action must be 
filed within 30 days.  
Nyberg failed to comply with this rule.  He waited two years to contest the discharge 
decision.  Even 
though Nyberg has a colorable argument that his complaint fit the exception, he 
is time barred from asserting such an argu­ment.  The portion of 
Nyberg's argument regarding AFI 36-3209 does not fit within either exception and 
is barred by the Feres doctrine.  If Boenisch violated 
federal military rules, it is the military that must provide an avenue of relief 
not a civilian court.  
We therefore hold that the district court did indeed lack the subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear Nyberg's claim.  

 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim

 

[¶31]   Nyberg asserted claims against both the 
Wyoming Military Department and Boenisch under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation 
of his civil rights.  
At this time it is worth noting that Nyberg makes no constitutional 
attack on any statute or regulation.  Rather, he challenges the constitutionality of 
a discrete personnel action, i.e., whether he was denied due process when being 
discharged.  
Therefore, he does not fall within either of the exceptions previously 
noted.  

 

[¶32]   As with the first issue, we find federal 
decisions interpreting this issue helpful.  Many federal courts have extended the ban on 
Bivens actions set forth by Chappell to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions against state 
National Guard officials.  Watson v. Arkansas 
Nat'l Guard, 886 F.2d  at 1007 (citing  Brown v. United 
States, 739 F.2d 362, 367 (8th Cir. 1984); Martelon v. Temple, 
747 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 
(10th Cir. 1984); Holdiness, 808 F.2d  at 423; Jorden v. Nat'l Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 107-108 (3d Cir. 1986); Crawford v. Texas Army Nat'l Guard, 
794 F.2d at 1036).

 

[¶33]   In Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586, 591 (1st Cir. 1993), the First Circuit stated "there is no principled 
basis for according state actors sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a different degree 
of immunity than would be accorded federal actors sued for an identical 
abridgement of rights under Bivens."  
We agree and can think of no basis for such a decision either.  The difference in 
the claims is due solely to the identity of the defendant.  Martelon v. Temple, 747 F.2d  at 1350-51.  In this case the defendants are state officers 
so relief must be sought under § 1983, whereas with Bivens claims the defendants are federal officers. Id.  All the policies and rea­sons for the Feres doctrine discussed in the first section of this 
opinion apply to this issue as well.  To the extent Feres protects federal military personnel from Bivens claims, it should also shield state military 
officers from constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Bowen, 125 F.3d  at 803, n.2.    

 

[¶34]   Lastly we would note that a purpose of 
the Feres doctrine is to provide for the proper 
relationship between the courts, Congress, and the military.  It is a judicial 
doctrine deferring the resolution of matters "incident to service" to the 
military.  Bowen, 125 F.3d  at 805 (citing Stauber, 837 F.2d at 399).  Our interference and 
meddling in internal National Guard matters would undermine the respect and 
loyalty each military member must have for their com­manding officer as 
surely as a federal court meddling in the matters of Army would.

 

[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army.  The responsibility 
for setting up channels through which  . . . griev­ances can be considered and 
fairly settled rests upon the Con­gress and upon the President of the United 
States and his subor­dinates.  The military constitutes a specialized 
community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian.  Orderly government 
requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate 
Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial 
matters.

 

Chappell, 462 U.S.  at 301, 103 S. Ct. 2366 (citing Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94, 73 S. Ct. 534, 97 L. Ed. 842 (1953)).   

 

[¶35]   Entertaining a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim 
would surely require a civilian court to inter­fere in legitimate military 
matters.  We 
therefore hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Nyberg's 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Feres doctrine.  

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶36]   For the above stated reasons we affirm 
the district court's order of dismissal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 19-2-301(b) (Michie 1997) reads:

(b)  All officers appointed in the national guard 
of Wyoming except the adjutant general shall hold their appointments until they 
have reached sixty four (64) years of age unless retired prior to that time by 
reason of resignation, disability, withdrawal of federal recognition, transfer 
to armed forces reserves or for cause to be determined by a court-martial or 
efficiency board legally convened for that purpose.

This statute has subsequently been amended and 
renumbered.  The 
comparable statute now reads:

(b)  All officers appointed in the national guard 
of Wyoming except the adjutant general shall hold their appointments until they 
have reached sixty-four (64) years of age unless retired prior to that time by 
reason of resignation, disability, withdrawal of federal recognition, transfer 
to armed forces reserves or for cause to be determined by a courts-martial or 
administrative board legally convened for that purpose.

Wyo. Stat. Ann § 19-9-301(b) (Lexis Nexis 2001).

2In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that victims of constitutional 
violations may sue in federal court the federal official committing the 
violations despite the absence of explicit statutory authorization for such a 
suit.

3This case does not present the issue of how Feres would apply with respect to tort claims under the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, which is much different than the FTCA.  We, therefore, do 
not decide such an issue today, but do adopt the doctrine as it relates to suits 
by Guard personnel arising out of Guard employment. 

4At that time the exception of the adjutant general from the 
requirements of the statute was not provided as it is now.  Hansen, 401 P.2d  at 957 (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. §  9-19 (1957)).