Case Title: Boyce v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 090881

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan,∗ Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, 
Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ. 
 
DARRELL EUGENE BOYCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 090881 
 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  April 15, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY 
J. Warren Stephens, Judge Designate 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred by refusing to strike the testimony of a mental health 
expert who relied upon a criminal charge for taking indecent 
liberties with children that was dismissed by nolle prosequi 
as a factor in forming the opinion that the appellant met the 
criteria for a sexually violent predator. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The Commonwealth filed a petition under the Sexually 
Violent Predators Act (SVPA), Code § 37.2-900 et seq., seeking 
to have Darrell Eugene Boyce, who had previously been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense, committed as a 
sexually violent predator.  A sexually violent predator is 
defined, in pertinent part, as any person who (1) has been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense, and (2) because of a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder, finds it difficult 
                                                 
∗ Justice Keenan participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to her retirement from the Court on March 
12, 2010. 
to control his or her predatory behavior, which makes him or 
her likely to engage in sexually violent acts.  Code § 37.2-
900. 
During a jury trial, the Commonwealth presented expert 
testimony from Dr. Glenn R. Miller, Jr., a clinical 
psychologist, who was accepted as a psychological expert in 
the diagnosis, risk assessment, and treatment of sex 
offenders.  Dr. Miller testified that during his career, he 
had performed around 1,000 evaluations of sex offenders, 
including 275 evaluations under the SVPA.  In evaluating 
Boyce, Dr. Miller reviewed records, interviewed Boyce, and 
performed various risk assessments.  Based upon this 
information, Dr. Miller opined that Boyce suffered from both a 
mental abnormality, pedophilia, and personality disorder, not 
otherwise specified, with antisocial traits. 
According to Dr. Miller, pedophilia is a deviant sexual 
interest in children.  Dr. Miller opined that Boyce’s 
personality disorder causes him to violate society’s rules and 
customs, and to continue such behavior even after being caught 
and punished for it.  Dr. Miller concluded that Boyce’s 
pedophilia and personality disorder made it difficult for him 
to control his predatory behavior and that Boyce had a high 
risk to re-offend.  It was Dr. Miller’s opinion that Boyce met 
the criteria for a sexually violent predator under the SVPA.  
 
2
 
During his testimony, Dr. Miller stated that in 
formulating his opinion he considered a 1979 charge against 
Boyce for taking indecent liberties with children that had 
been dismissed upon the Commonwealth’s motion for nolle 
prosequi.  The dismissed charge was one of two indecent 
liberties charges brought against Boyce, with different 
victims, heard in the same circuit court on June 13, 1979.  
One of these charges resulted in a finding of guilt pursuant 
to a plea agreement while the other charge was dismissed upon 
the Commonwealth’s motion for nolle prosequi.  
Dr. Miller stated that it was accepted practice within 
his field to consider both convictions and charges for sex 
offenses.  Although Dr. Miller considered the dismissed 1979 
charge as a factor in his opinion, he testified that his 
opinion “is not based on any single incident [but rather] on 
the totality of all the information.” 
 
Regarding the dismissed charge, Dr. Miller stated that 
[f]rom an actuarial standpoint, it doesn’t 
matter whether [Boyce] did it.  The reality is that 
individuals [who] are charged with more sexual 
assaults have a higher risk of being re-convicted 
[sic] of a new sex offense.  It doesn’t matter 
whether he did it.  The reality is that research 
indicates that those charged have a higher risk of 
re-convicting [sic] in the future. 
 
 
At the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Boyce made a 
motion to strike, arguing that Dr. Miller’s testimony was 
 
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improper because he relied on the 1979 charge for taking 
indecent liberties with children that was dismissed by nolle 
prosequi in rendering his opinion.  Boyce contended that this 
Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Garrett, 276 Va. 590, 667 
S.E.2d 739 (2008), requires that Dr. Miller’s testimony be 
stricken.  The circuit court denied Boyce’s motion to strike.  
Boyce renewed his motion to strike at the conclusion of all of 
the evidence, and the circuit court denied the motion. 
The jury found that Boyce met the definition of a 
sexually violent predator.  The circuit court committed Boyce 
to the custody of the Department of Mental Health, Mental 
Retardation and Substance Abuse Services.  Boyce appeals. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Boyce argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to 
strike Dr. Miller’s testimony.  Boyce asserts that the circuit 
court should have granted his motion to strike Dr. Miller’s 
testimony because Dr. Miller, in forming his expert opinion, 
relied, in part, on a 1979 charge against Boyce for taking 
indecent liberties with children that had been dismissed upon 
the Commonwealth’s motion for nolle prosequi. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth argues that Garrett does 
not support Boyce’s argument that Dr. Miller’s testimony 
should have been excluded.  In support of this argument, the 
Commonwealth notes that Dr. Miller considered the dismissed 
 
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1979 charge as one factor among many in reaching his 
conclusion, and that Dr. Miller did not assume that Boyce had 
committed the offense charged.  The Commonwealth also contends 
that experts may consider unadjudicated charges in forming 
their opinions in sexually violent predator cases. 
 
On appeal, we generally review evidentiary rulings under 
an abuse of discretion standard.  Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 
83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986).  “However, ‘[a] trial 
court has no discretion to admit clearly inadmissible evidence 
because admissibility of evidence depends not upon the 
discretion of the court but upon sound legal principles.’ ”  
Commonwealth v. Wynn, 277 Va. 92, 97, 671 S.E.2d 137, 139 
(2009) (quoting Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Puryear, 250 Va. 
559, 563, 463 S.E.2d 442, 444 (1995)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
At the outset, we must clarify that the evidentiary 
ruling in question is not the admission of the dismissed 1979 
charge.  Although Boyce objected to the introduction of the 
dismissed indictment at trial, he failed to assign error to 
the circuit court’s overruling of his objection.  The issue, 
then, is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in 
failing to strike Dr. Miller’s entire testimony because he 
considered a dismissed charge as a factor in forming his 
 
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opinion that Boyce met the criteria for being a sexually 
violent predator. 
In Garrett, the expert, as the foundation of her 
diagnosis of Marvin D. Garrett’s mental condition as 
“Paraphilia, Not Otherwise Specified . . . Sexual Abuse of 
Child,” relied upon three juvenile petitions charging Garrett 
with having carnal knowledge of a minor that had been 
dismissed by nolle prosequi to draw the inference that Garrett 
had, in fact, committed those offenses.  276 Va. at 594-95, 
667 S.E.2d at 741-42.  We held that in the absence of 
additional evidence, the dismissal by nolle prosequi of the 
three charges, standing alone, was legally insufficient for 
the expert to infer that Garrett had actually committed the 
charged offenses in rendering her opinion.  Id. at 607, 667 
S.E.2d at 749.  Thus, we held that the expert’s testimony was 
properly excluded because the only factual basis upon which 
the expert could have reached her diagnosis of “Paraphilia, 
Not Otherwise Specified . . . Sexual Abuse of Child” was from 
her reliance on the unsupported belief that Garrett committed 
the offenses charged, because Garrett’s criminal record did 
not include any other charges of sexual abuse of a child, and 
the only adult offense of a sexual nature was a rape 
conviction with an adult victim.  Id. 
 
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This case can be distinguished from the ruling in 
Garrett.  First, Dr. Miller’s opinion that Boyce suffered from 
pedophilia was not based solely upon the 1979 offense of 
taking indecent liberties with children that was dismissed by 
nolle prosequi.  Rather, Dr. Miller’s opinion that Boyce 
suffered from a deviant sexual interest in children was based 
upon a number of factors, including:  (1) Boyce’s 1979 
conviction of indecent liberties with a seven-year-old child; 
(2) Boyce’s 1980 conviction for indecent liberties with a 
seven-year-old child; and (3) Boyce’s 1994 convictions for 
sodomy and indecent exposure with a nine-year-old child.  In 
fact, Boyce related details of the 1980 and 1994 convictions 
to Dr. Miller that fully supported the diagnosis of 
pedophilia.  
Second, Dr. Miller did not assume that Boyce was guilty 
of the dismissed indecent liberties charge as the basis for 
his opinion that Boyce suffered from a personality disorder, 
not otherwise specified, with antisocial traits.  According to 
Dr. Miller, the essence of a personality disorder is that a 
person does not benefit from being caught, punished, and 
offered opportunities at rehabilitation.  Dr. Miller based his 
opinion of Boyce’s personality disorder upon the “totality of 
all the information” and upon his conclusion that Boyce had 
not benefited from multiple arrests, punishments, probation, 
 
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or revocations of probation as opportunities to change his 
behavior.  According to Dr. Miller, Boyce had violated rules 
of society over a significant period of time, despite the fact 
that he knew he should not do so. 
In Garrett, we acknowledged that mental health 
professionals often rely upon judicial records of charged 
conduct that may not have resulted in a final determination of 
guilt, yet nevertheless may be indicative of antisocial 
behavior.  Id. at 607, 667 S.E.2d at 749.  We take this 
opportunity to reaffirm that position. 
Dr. Miller testified that his opinion was based on the 
“totality of all the information,” and that the mere fact that 
Boyce was charged with the dismissed 1979 sexual offense was a 
factor in his analysis of whether Boyce was a sexually violent 
predator.  According to Dr. Miller, from an actuarial 
standpoint, it did not matter whether Boyce committed the 
charged offense.  Dr. Miller’s opinion that individuals who 
have been charged with more sexual assaults have a higher 
risk, actuarially, of being reconvicted of a new sex offense 
was an appropriate factor to be considered in determining 
whether Boyce suffered from a personality disorder that, in 
conjunction with his pedophilia, made it difficult for him to 
control his predatory behavior, which made him more likely to 
engage in sexually violent acts.  Dr. Miller’s consideration 
 
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of the totality of the evidence in rendering his expert 
opinion included a review of Boyce’s criminal history, 
convictions as well as dismissed charges for sexual offenses, 
an interview with Boyce, and various risk assessments and 
amply supported his opinion that Boyce met the criteria for a 
sexually violent predator. 
 
This case is also distinguishable from our recent 
decision in Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 490, 689 S.E.2d 
748 (2010).  In Lawrence, the expert testified that her 
diagnosis that Lawrence had an antisocial personality disorder 
was partially based upon unadjudicated allegations of his 
sexual misconduct that were contained in police reports.  Id. 
at 490, 689 S.E.2d at 749.  We relied on Garrett in holding 
that the “expert testimony did not have an adequate factual 
foundation to the extent it was dependent upon assuming the 
truth of the hearsay allegations concerning Lawrence’s past 
sexual misconduct.”  Id. at 499, 689 S.E.2d at 753.   
This case is distinguishable from Lawrence because, as we 
stated above, Dr. Miller did not base his opinion on the 
inference that Boyce committed the offense dismissed by nolle 
prosequi.  Dr. Miller’s opinions that Boyce suffered from 
pedophilia and from a personality disorder, as well as his 
opinion that Boyce was a sexually violent predator, were amply 
supported by prior convictions for sexual offenses against 
 
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children and by evidence presented at trial.  Therefore, 
unlike the expert opinion at issue in Lawrence, Dr. Miller’s 
opinions were not “speculative and unreliable as a matter of 
law,” and were properly admitted into evidence.  Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Dr. Miller’s opinions were based upon a 
sufficient foundation and upon the totality of all of the 
information in the case, we hold that the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Dr. Miller’s 
testimony. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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