Case Title: State v. Mulqueen

Citation: 188 N.W.2d 360

Docket Number: 

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1971-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
188 N.W.2d 360 (1971) STATE of Iowa, Respondent, v. John Daniel MULQUEEN, Appellant. No. 54616. Supreme Court of Iowa. June 17, 1971. John Daniel Mulqueen, pro se. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Richard N. Winders, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael S. McCauley, County Atty., for respondent. RAWLINGS, Justice. Trial court sustained respondent State's motion for summary disposition of movant's pro se petition for relief in the nature of coram nobis, dealt with as a statutory application for post conviction remedy. Movant appeals. We reverse. John Daniel Mulqueen was confined in the California State Prison at Folsom, Represa, California, when the instant petition was filed. He claims to be of subnormal intelligence and has a criminal record. Movant contends, in substance, he had suffered serious injuries as the result of an automobile accident, was arrested and hospitalized; April 14, 1958, an assistant county attorney visited him in the hospital; this official advised movant to the effect that if he waived counsel and pled guilty to breaking and entering, the State would *361 make no recommendations, otherwise an additional auto theft charge would be filed, and the county would no longer pay his hospital expenses; April 23rd a breaking and entering charge was filed against him. The same day movant appeared in District Court, Dubuque County; was cursorily offered benefit of counsel, which he orally waived; his guilty plea accepted; a sentence of not more than ten years in prison immediately entered. November 18, 1960, movant was released on parole from which final discharge was given February 8, 1962. On or about August 13, 1970, movant filed in the District Court, Dubuque County, an instrument captioned, "Petition for Relief in Nature of Courm [sic] Nobis (Motion to Annul, Vacate and Set Aside Judgment) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C., § 1651." Appended thereto was a "Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis", a "Motion for Appointment of Counsel", and an "Affidavit in Forma Pauperis". At no time in the course of any subsequent proceedings was an attorney appointed to represent movant. Trial court justifiably treated the aforesaid petition as an application for postconviction relief under the Second Session, Sixty-Third General Assembly, Chapter 1276 (The Code 1971, chapter 663A). By statutory enactment this may be cited as the "Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act." The Code 1971, Section 663 A. 11. By his application for postconviction relief movant asserts, as best we can determine, the April 1958, conviction contravened due process requirements in that trial court did not then meaningfully advise him regarding right to counsel, he did not knowingly waive benefit thereof, his guilty plea was of no legal force or effect, and judgment entered thereon was invalid. September 16, 1970, the State filed a "Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal" of the instant application, with supportive brief. Copies of these documents were mailed to movant about September 17th. There is no indication in the record before us as to when they were received. September 23, 1970, trial court peremptorily sustained the State's summary dismissal motion. A copy of that order was mailed to movant the next day. Again the record fails to disclose date of receipt thereof. On or about October 5, 1970, there was filed in the trial court a document bearing date September 28, 1970, identified as movant's "Reply Brief to State's Brief in Support of State's Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal". This apparently evoked no response by trial judge or the State. On appeal movant contends his application was erroneously dismissed in that counsel was not appointed to represent him as requested, he was denied an evidentiary hearing, never properly informed relative to time or method for consideration of the application for postconviction relief, and the court erred in holding the matter moot. I. Timely notice of appeal was filed by movant. See The Code 1971, Section 663 A. 9; rule 336, Ia.R.Civ.P. Sometime in January 1971, exact date unknown, petitioner mailed from the prison in California, what is designated "Exhibits and Record", received by the Clerk of this Court January 22, 1971. March 3, 1971, the State moved to dismiss this appeal because of failure on part of movant to file a printedrecord as required by rule 342, Ia.R.Civ.P. Had trial court appointed counsel for movant as requested, this problem would probably have been avoided. Under existing circumstances we shall treat the aforesaid "Exhibits and Record", though fragmentary, as the statutorily required record. See Blanchard v. Brewer, 429 F.2d 89, 90-92 (8 Cir.); Board of Directors v. Cherokee County, 260 Iowa 210, *362 215, 149 N.W.2d 304; Ford v. State, 258 Iowa 137, 141-143, 138 N.W.2d 116; Stolar v. Turner, 236 Iowa 628, 631, 19 N.W.2d 585; cf. Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 329-332, 89 S. Ct. 1715, 1717-1718, 23 L. Ed. 2d 340. II. Since the case at hand is one of first impression with us it is essential we inceptionally interpret Code chapter 663A as it relates to those procedural problems instantly presented. Legislative adoption of that Act was at least partially prompted by Case v. The State of Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337, 85 S. Ct. 1486, 1487, 14 L. Ed. 2d 422, where the court clearly held, absence of an effective state postconviction remedy may stand as a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In any event, prior to enactment of this legislation, postconviction relief in Iowa was confined to a judicially expanded concept of habeas corpus. See Ely v. Haugh, 172 N.W.2d 144, 146-148 (Iowa); Sewell v. Lainson, 244 Iowa 555, 567, 57 N.W.2d 556. See also The Code 1971, chapter 663; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465-466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023-1024, 82 L. Ed. 1461; 3 Drake L.Rev. 30, 34-35; 80 Harv. L.Rev. 422, 427-436. Compare with Farrant v. Bennett, 347 F.2d 390 (8 Cir.); Lockard v. Clark, Sheriff, 166 Iowa 556, 558-559, 147 N.W. 900. And such habeas proceedings stood as law actions, accordingly considered on appeal. Janvrin v. Haugh, 171 N.W.2d 275, 276 (Iowa); Hoskins v. Bennett, 256 Iowa 1370, 1377, 131 N.W.2d 510; see State v. Hellickson, 162 N.W.2d 390, 393-394 (Iowa). III. The question next to be resolved is the nature of proceedings under Code chapter 663A. There is no need to engage in any extended discussion of this subject. We are satisfied a statutory postconviction review proceeding, like habeas corpus, stands in this jurisdiction as an action at law, triable to the court. See Code § 663 A. 7; cf. Holland v. Swenson, 433 F.2d 909, 910 (8 Cir.); 32 F.R.D. 393, 396. See generally ABA Standards, Post-Conviction Remedies, Approved Draft, at 25 et seq. That in turn means, trial courts shall in each such action make findings of fact in writing with separately stated conclusions and appropriate judgment. Code § 663 A. 7; rule 179, Ia.R.Civ.P. See also United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219-220, 72 S. Ct. 263, 272-273, 96 L. Ed. 232; cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 310-314, 83 S. Ct. 745, 756-758, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770. The foregoing is instantly important because we have repeatedly held: This case will be accordingly considered on appeal. See Evans v. Rosenberger, 181 N.W.2d 152, 154-155 (Iowa); Janvrin v. *363 Haugh, 171 N.W.2d 275, 276 (Iowa); Hoskins v. Bennett, 256 Iowa 1370, 1377, 131 N.W.2d 510; 33 F.R.D. at 473, n. 56. IV. It has also been held, establishment of postconviction remedy legislation is constitutionally proper as a means by which convicted persons may collaterally attack a conviction or sentence in a forum other than that available in habeas actions. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219, 72 S. Ct. 263, 272, 96 L. Ed. 232; Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (The Handbook), comment at 271-272. For additional discussions relative to the historical background, purpose of postconviction review, and guideline forms, see 50 F.R.D. 153; 45 F.R.D. 199; 39 F.R.D. 281; 33 F.R.D. 452; 32 F.R.D. 391. V. An examination of Code chapter 663A, readily reveals it is, as to content, a legislative codification of the Second Revised Uniform Postconviction Act. See The Handbook at 271; ABA Standards, Post-Conviction Remedies, Approved Draft, at 102, et seq. This, at the threshold, is demonstrated by the fact that Code § 663 A. 11 specifically declares the Act may, as aforesaid, be cited as the "Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act." Also, Code § 663 A. 10, states: That clearly means we may look to commissioners' comments or notes, decisions of federal courts, and those of sister states for guidance in the interpretation of the instant Act. See The Code 1971, Section 5.4; Sherwood v. Nissen, 179 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa); Hubbard v. State, 163 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Iowa); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 362; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 319; cf. The Handbook at 269-270, comment at 275-276. VI. By reason of the result reached infra, we confine ourselves to procedural matters here involved. In that regard there are two problems which must be resolved, (1) movant's right to appointed counsel in this postconviction relief proceeding; (2) the method employed by trial court in summarily disposing of the instant application. Though to some degree interrelated they will be considered in that order. Code § 663 A. 5, provides: And § 663 A. 6 states in relevant part: It would appear, by this statutory provision, the legislature anticipated some Code chapter 663A applications might prove to be so inartistically drawn or fundamentally *364 deficent as to require amendment or complete substitution by an attorney. Cf. Code § 663 A. 3. On that point Professor David J. Meador said in 50 A.B.A.J. 928 at 930: "State judges must learn to read inartfully drawn petitions liberally in favor of the petitioner, for that is what the federal courts do * * *." Dealing with an applicant's right to hearing and appointment of an attorney in a postconviction review proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the court said in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 21, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 1080, 10 L.Ed.2d 148: 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was also involved in Milani v. United States, 319 F.2d 441 (7 Cir.), and the court stated at 443: See 33 F.R.D. 365, 384; cf. 50 Iowa L. Rev. 1246. Furthermore, ABA Standards, Post-Conviction Remedies, Approved Draft, § 4.4(a), says: In the case at bar movant's application challenges a prior conviction based upon an allegedly involuntary guilty plea and requests appointment of counsel, supported by his affidavit of indigency. Martin v. United States, 199 F.2d 279 (8 Cir.), likewise dealt with an application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the movant alleged, as in the case at bar, his conviction was a nullity, having been foundationed upon a guilty plea absent advice to the effect an attorney would be appointed to represent him if he so desired. On appeal the court, in holding movant was entitled to a hearing on his application for postconviction relief, aptly commented at 199 F.2d 282: *365 To like effect is this statement in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 22, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 1080-1081, 10 L.Ed.2d 148: Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313-318, 83 S. Ct. 745, 757-759, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770. Significant here are the authoritatively supported views expressed in Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 447-448 (9 Cir.): And at 450 is this statement: An examination of the instant application for postconviction relief discloses movant specifically contends, while he was hospitalized an assistant county attorney appeared, as aforesaid, and advised him to the effect he was charged with breaking and entering, whereupon movant asserted his innocence of theft and was told "should he protest the county would then file an additional charge of car theft." Under existing circumstances an attorney should have been appointed to represent movant. Such would have been beneficial to him, conducive to a just disposition of this case in the trial court, and most certainly helpful on this appeal. That is not to be construed, however, as meaning an attorney must always be appointed to represent an indigent, or hearing accorded on every application for postconviction review. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487-488, 89 S. Ct. 747, 750, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718; Cates v. Ciccone, 422 F.2d 926, 928 (8 Cir.); Stanley v. Wainwright, 406 F.2d 8, 10 (5 Cir.); Queor v. Lee, 382 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5 Cir.); State v. Tahash, 152 N.W.2d 301, 305-307 (Minn.); cf. 43 F.R.D. 343. Confining ourselves to the factual situation here presented we now hold trial court erred in failing to appoint an attorney to represent this indigent movant in the processing of his application for postconviction review. VII. Next to be considered is trial court's peremptory dismissal of the instant action. In that regard Code § 663 A. 6, to the extent here relevant, provides: It is thus evident provision is made for two methods of summary disposition. First, on the court's initiative in which event the applicant is foundationally entitled to notice of such intent and opportunity to respond thereto prior to final disposition. Second, on motion by either party. With regard to disposition by the court on its own motion, first above, this pertinent statement is found in Machibroda v. *367 United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493-495, 82 S. Ct. 510, 513-514, 7 L.Ed.2d 473: See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-313, 83 S. Ct. 745, 757, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770; cf. Sherwood v. Nissen, 179 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa). Turning now to summary disposition on motion by either party, second above, it is at once evidence the relevant language employed in Code § 663 A. 6 is comparable to that in rule 237(c), Ia.R.Civ.P., relative to summary judgments. See Northwestern Nat. Bank of Sioux City v. Steinbeck, 179 N.W.2d 471, 476-477 (Iowa). *368 Additionally, Code § 663 A. 7 makes all our rules and statutes in civil actions applicable to postconviction review proceedings. Also, as stated in ABA Standards, Post-Conviction Remedies, Approved Draft, § 4.5, Commentary at 68-69: And Bauer v. Stern Finance Company, 169 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa), discloses our rule 237 is based on rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. So it appears rule 237, Ia.R.Civ.P. is applicable to motions by either party for summary disposition of an application for postconviction relief. In light of the foregoing reference to Bass v. Iowa Public Service Company, 184 N.W.2d 691 (Iowa), is appropriate in that we there held, motions for summary judgment must be specifically set for hearing at a time not less than ten days from date of filing. It is thus apparent trial court proceeded erroneously in peremptorily sustaining respondent State's motion to dismiss movant's application. VIII. For reasons stated above this case must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. Reversed and remanded with instructions. All Justices concur, except REYNOLDSON, J., who takes no part.