Case Title: Ronald Dougan v. Donnie Ford and Leroy Brownlee

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Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. 04-623 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION RONALD DOUGAN Appellant v. DONNIE FORD AND LEROY BROWNLEE Appellees Opinion Delivered September 29, 2005 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DALLAS COUNTY, CV 2003-55-6, HON. DAVID FREDRIC GUTHRIE, JUDGE AFFIRMED PER CURIAM Ronald Dougan filed a complaint in Dallas County Circuit Court against Donnie Ford, the sheriff of Dallas County. Dougan was incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction, and he alleged Sheriff Ford had caused the Post Prison Transfer Board to add a condition to the board's decision to permit parole for Dougan, that Dougan not return to Dallas County. Dougan's complaint asserts that the condition violates the prohibition against banishment in the Arkansas Constitution and prays for relief by causing Ford to recall his request and have the no return condition removed from Dougan's parole. Dougan later moved to expand the record and filed a motion to amend his complaint, indicating in the motion that he wished to add the Post Prison Transfer Board as a party, and adding Leroy Brownlee as chairman. In response to a motion under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6), the circuit court dismissed the complaint by an order entered April 19, 2004, holding that mandamus was not available and that it had no authority to compel a state agency to perform a discretionary act, therefore Dougan had failed to state a cause of action. Dougan brings this appeal of that order. We agree that a circuit court does not have authority to grant the relief requested, and accordingly affirm the dismissal. In reviewing a court's decision on a motion to dismiss, we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Rhuland v. Fahr, 356 Ark. 382, 155 S.W.3d 2 (2004). In testing the sufficiency of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the complaint, and all pleadings are to be liberally construed. Id. Appellant Dougan's claim was a request for mandamus. The only relief sought was to cause the restrictive condition to be removed from appellant's parole. In review of a denial of a writ of mandamus, the standard is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Republican Party of Garland County v. Johnson, ___ Ark. ___, ___S.W.3d ___ (2004). Appellant cites to Reeves v. State, 339 Ark. 304, 5 S.W.3d 41 (1999), where we found a violation of Ark. Const. Art. 2, § 21 in a condition of probation that effectively banished the appellant in Reeves from the state for seven years. Reeves dealt with modification of an illegal condition of probation, something that is, as we discussed in Reeves, akin to modification of an illegal sentence and therefore within the court's jurisdiction. Here, the condition that appellant now asserts is an unconstitutional banishment is a condition of parole, not probation. It was not within the trial court's jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandamus to compel the Post Prison Transfer Board to modify the conditions attached to appellant's parole. The purpose of a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right or to enforce the performance of a duty, and it is issued only to compel an officer or judge to take some action. Arkansas Democrat-Gazette v. Zimmerman, 341 Ark. 771, 20 S.W.3d 301 (2000). A petitioner must show a clear and certain right to the relief sought and the absence of any other adequate remedy when requesting a writ of mandamus. Id. The writ will not lie to control or review matters of discretion. Id. The procedures for parole are set out in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-1302 (Supp. 2003), and they clearly provide for discretion on the part of the Post Prison Transfer Board in setting conditions for parole. See also, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-1208 (Supp. 2003); Jobe v. Urquhart, 102 Ark. 470, 143 S.W. 121 (1912). Moreover, there is no constitutional right or entitlement to parole. Michalek v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 301, 730 S.W.2d 210 (1987). See also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-1210 (Supp. 2003 ). If the conditions are too onerous, appellant could decline to accept the conditions set, and elect to serve out his sentence instead. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the writ, and accordingly we affirm. Affirmed.