Case Title: Commonwealth v. Silva

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11096

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11096 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERT SILVA. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     February 6, 2015. - June 11, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Robbery.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Joint Enterprise.  
Search and Seizure, Warrant, Expectation of privacy, 
Clothing.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Privacy.  
Malice.  Intent.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion 
to suppress, Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor, 
Presumptions and burden of proof. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 23, 2007. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Paul E. 
Troy, J., and the cases were tried before Richard J. Chin, J. 
 
 
 
Chauncey B. Wood for the defendant. 
 
Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  The defendant, Robert Silva, stands convicted 
of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or 
2 
 
cruelty and felony-murder, and also of armed robbery.1  He 
appeals the convictions, arguing that (1) his motion to suppress 
evidence of his sneakers and evidence derived from blood found 
on his sneakers was improperly denied; (2) the trial judge erred 
in instructing the jury on the theory of joint venture liability 
where the Commonwealth's exclusive argument was that the 
defendant was guilty as a principal; (3) the judge also erred in 
denying the defendant's request for an instruction on 
involuntary manslaughter; and (4) the prosecutor improperly 
shifted the burden of proof in her closing argument.  Finally, 
the defendant argues that he is entitled to relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  We affirm the defendant's convictions. 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts that the 
jury could have found at trial.2  During the afternoon of June 9, 
2004, the defendant and Eric Pimental, both eighteen years old, 
were walking together on a path in the woods in Wareham.  They 
encountered Thomas Loftus, the victim, who was intoxicated,3 and 
                     
 
1 The convictions followed the defendant's second trial 
before a jury on these charges; the first trial ended in a 
mistrial when the jury could not agree on verdicts. 
 
 
2 Some of the evidence presented at the hearing on the 
defendant's motions to suppress, and the judge's findings of 
fact based on that evidence, are relevant to the defendant's 
appeal.  We summarize them later in connection with our 
discussion of the claims raised by the defendant. 
 
 
3 The victim's blood alcohol level was .278. 
3 
 
they agreed that they would "roll" him.4  After Pimental knocked 
the victim down to the ground, both Pimental and the defendant 
began to kick the victim, and the defendant jumped on the 
victim's chest.  The defendant later stated to David Belmore, a 
fellow inmate of the Plymouth County correctional facility 
(PCCF), "You should have seen [the victim's] eyes bug out when I 
jumped on his chest," and that he and Pimental knew the victim 
was dead when his eyes ceased to move.5  The two men moved the 
victim's body off the path, and the defendant and Pimental took 
the victim's backpack, his money, and other items the victim was 
carrying on his person.  The defendant ended up carrying 
Pimental's camouflage-colored backpack with the victim's black 
backpack inside of it; Pimental ended up with the victim's 
money.  Before leaving the woods, the defendant and Pimental 
encountered Kathy Browne, who was walking on the same path in 
the woods with her young son.  They spoke briefly together, and 
Browne noticed blood on Pimental's legs.  The defendant and 
                     
 
4 There was no evidence that either the defendant or Eric 
Pimental knew the victim; in talking to another inmate at the 
Plymouth County correctional facility (PCCF) some years later, 
the defendant described the victim as "the guy" he and Pimental 
encountered on the path. 
 
 
5 David Belmore testified as a witness on behalf of the 
Commonwealth at trial.  He had entered into a cooperation 
agreement with the Commonwealth on April 2, 2010, that was 
thoroughly explored by the defendant's counsel in his cross-
examination of the witness. 
4 
 
Pimental then departed from the woods, separated, and the 
defendant went downtown, where he drank whiskey. 
 
Some hours later, around 6:30 P.M., Thomas Joyce, the chief 
of police of Wareham, who was off duty, observed the defendant 
trying to open locked vehicles on a street in Onset, a section 
of Wareham.  Based on his observations and conversation with the 
defendant, Joyce decided to place the defendant in protective 
custody because of the level of the defendant's intoxication.6  
Joyce opened the camouflage-colored backpack the defendant was 
carrying to check for possible weapons, and noted that there was 
another backpack inside.7  The defendant and the backpacks were 
transported to the Wareham police station, and the police took 
custody of the backpacks.  Because the police determined that 
                     
 
6 The police had no knowledge of the victim's death at this 
time. 
 
 
7 See G. L. c. 111B, § 8, which provides in relevant part: 
 
 
"Any person who is incapacitated may be assisted by a 
police officer with or without his consent to his 
residence, to a facility or to a police station. . . . 
 
 
". . .  
 
 
"A police officer acting in accordance with the 
provisions of this section may use such force as is 
reasonably necessary to carry out his authorized 
responsibilities.  If the police officer reasonably 
believes that his safety or the safety of other persons 
present requires, he may search such person and his 
immediate surroundings, but only to the extent necessary to 
discover and seize any dangerous weapons which may on that 
occasion be used against the officer or other person 
present . . . ." 
5 
 
the defendant had at least one outstanding warrant, he was not 
released at the end of the protective custody period, but taken 
to the Wareham Division of the District Court Department 
(Wareham District Court) the following morning, June 10, 2004.  
Following his court appearance, the defendant remained in 
custody pursuant to the outstanding warrant, and was transported 
to the PCCF. 
During that same morning, June 10, 2004, the victim's body 
was found off the path in the woods where the defendant and 
Pimental had encountered Browne the previous afternoon.  In the 
early morning hours of the following day, June 11, based on 
information supplied by his then girl friend, Pimental was 
arrested and charged with the victim's murder.  Later that day, 
the defendant's sneakers were seized from the PCCF pursuant to a 
search warrant.  DNA testing performed on a sample taken from a 
bloodstain on one of the defendant's sneakers revealed that the 
sample matched the victim's blood; the likelihood that a random 
individual's DNA would match the sample was one in ninety-five 
quintillion.  The bloodstain on the defendant's other sneaker 
was not sufficient for DNA testing. 
The cause of the victim's death was blunt force trauma to 
the chest.  His sternum was broken, and his heart lacerated by 
the sternum bone.  His ribs on both sides of his chest were 
broken, and he would have been alive when that occurred.  His 
6 
 
left lung was torn.  The injuries to his chest, heart, and lung 
were consistent with being stomped.  The victim's jaw was 
fractured, and he also had suffered blunt force trauma to the 
head. 
2.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted on 
charges of murder and armed robbery in 2007.  He filed five 
motions to suppress evidence.8  The motions were heard and 
decided by a judge in the Superior Court (motion judge) in the 
summer of 2009, after an evidentiary hearing.  The motion judge 
allowed the motion to suppress statements (fourth motion to 
suppress), and allowed in part the first motion to suppress 
evidence of the search of the backpacks conducted by the police 
chief and an officer of the Wareham police department, 
respectively, on June 9, 2004.  The judge otherwise denied the 
first motion to suppress, and also denied the remaining motions 
(second, third, and fifth motions to suppress).9  After the 
                     
 
8 The five motions were:  (1) a motion to suppress evidence 
obtained from warrantless search of backpacks on June 9, 2004; 
(2) a motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrant search 
conducted at PCCF on June 11, 2004; (3) a motion to suppress 
evidence obtained from a warrant search conducted at the Wareham 
Division of the District Court Department on June 11, 2004; (4) 
a motion to suppress the defendant's statements made when 
arrested on September 29, 2006; and (5) a motion seeking relief 
pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
 
 
9 On appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of his 
motion to suppress evidence of his sneakers (second motion to 
suppress), but does not challenge the motion judge's rulings in 
any other respect. 
7 
 
defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury could 
not agree on verdicts, the defendant was retried in January of 
2011 before a judge other than the motion judge (trial judge).  
The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree on the theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and 
felony-murder, and also found him guilty of armed robbery.  He 
was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole on the murder 
conviction and a concurrent sentence of from four to five years 
on the armed robbery conviction.10  The defendant filed a motion 
for a new trial that he later withdrew. 
Discussion.  1.  Evidence of the defendant's sneakers.  On 
appeal, the defendant asserts error in the motion judge's denial 
of his second motion to suppress, which challenged the 
constitutionality of the search and seizure of the defendant's 
sneakers from the PCCF on June 11, 2004.  As indicated, the 
motion judge held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's 
suppression motions as a group in which evidence was presented 
pertaining to essentially all of the motions.  In considering 
the defendant's arguments here concerning the second motion, we 
                     
 
10 Eric Pimental was separately tried and convicted of 
murder in the first degree and armed robbery.  This court 
affirmed his convictions.  See Commonwealth v. Pimental, 454 
Mass. 475, 476, 485 (2009). 
8 
 
begin by summarizing the judge's pertinent findings and 
rulings.11 
The judge found that the defendant was taken into 
protective custody by the Wareham police chief on the evening of 
June 9, 2004, taken to the Wareham District Court the following 
morning, and then ordered held by a District Court judge on an 
outstanding warrant and transported to the PCCF.  After the 
victim's body was found on June 10, the medical examiner 
determined the same day that the death was a homicide, and had 
occurred about twenty-four hours earlier -- around 3:15 P.M. on 
the afternoon of June 9.  Police investigation into the homicide 
led them to believe that Pimental and the defendant were 
involved in the crime, and Pimental was interviewed by the 
police on June 11.12  Pimental ultimately told the police that 
both he and the defendant had fought with the victim and that 
the defendant had hit and kicked the victim, and also described 
the clothing the defendant had been wearing.  One of the State 
police officers interviewing Pimental, State police Trooper 
Robert Dateo, believed the defendant was still wearing the same 
clothes when he was transported to the PCCF the previous day, 
                     
 
11 The defendant does not appear to dispute the motion 
judge's factual findings. 
 
 
12 The motion judge did not make a finding as to when on 
June 11, 2004, Pimental was interviewed.  It appears to have 
been in the very early morning hours of that date.  See 
Pimental, 454 Mass. at 477 n.1. 
9 
 
June 10.  Based on the information supplied by Pimental, the 
trooper applied for a search warrant to obtain the defendant's 
clothes from the PCCF for forensic testing purposes.  The 
warrant issued at 6:15 A.M. on June 11.  Captain Scott Berna of 
the State police, who was present when the warrant issued, then 
telephoned the PCCF and informed Captain Scott Petersen of the 
Plymouth County sheriff's department that a warrant to search 
for and seize the defendant's property had been secured and 
police would be coming to the facility to execute it.  Petersen 
then notified the PCCF property department to get the 
defendant's property together, and correctional officers went to 
the unit where the defendant was housed and secured his 
sneakers.13 
At the PCCF, a detainee is issued prison clothing and his 
own clothing is put into a property bag and stored until it is 
either picked up by the detainee's family or mailed elsewhere at 
the detainee's expense.  The clothing must be removed from the 
PCCF within thirty days of the detainee's arrival.  A detainee, 
however, may be, and often is, permitted to keep his or her 
footwear, and specifically sneakers, because the prison-issue 
sneakers are not of good quality and would not fit as well.  But 
keeping the sneakers is a privilege, and they may be taken from 
                     
 
13 There was no evidence presented as to the precise 
location of the defendant's sneakers in the unit at the time 
they were seized. 
10 
 
a detainee at any time.14  When police seize a detainee's 
property from the PCCF pursuant to a search warrant, they 
generally do not give the detainee notice or provide him with a 
copy of the warrant unless it is a warrant to take a buccal 
swab.15 
In this case, after the search warrant issued, Berna drove 
to the PCCF to retrieve the defendant's property at some point 
during the morning of June 11, 2004.  He met a correction 
officer in the facility's lobby; the officer gave him the bag 
containing the defendant's clothes, including the defendant's 
sneakers, and Berna gave the officer a copy of the search 
                     
 
14 Introduced in evidence at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress was the PCCF "property seizure receipt" for the 
defendant's clothing.  The receipt, which is signed by the 
defendant, states that "[a]ll items except court clothes, 
glasses, hearing aids and approved prosthetic devices will be 
considered contraband."  The receipt then lists the items of 
clothing the defendant brought or was wearing, including a 
shirt, two shorts, and "1 sneakers."  The receipt has an 
asterisk typed on it on the line listing the sneakers.  Captain 
Scott Petersen of the Plymouth County sheriff's department 
testified the asterisk meant that the defendant was entitled to 
keep his sneakers, although doing so was a privilege, and the 
sneakers could be taken from him at any time. 
 
 
15 Petersen testified to this point.  He also stated more 
generally that when the inmate is present at the time property 
is seized, a copy of the warrant is given to the inmate, "[a]nd, 
say, the individual, in this particular case, was Mr. Silva, had 
the sneakers on his person and they were going to be executing 
the search warrant, we would provide him a copy as we take the 
sneakers away from him because he's physically there and 
physically present."  As indicated in the text, infra, there is 
no indication in the record that the defendant was given a copy 
of the search warrant when his sneakers were seized. 
11 
 
warrant at the same time.  The copy ultimately was received by 
the "legal department."  The defendant was not present when his 
property was turned over to the police, and was not provided a 
copy of the warrant at that time.  After receiving the bag 
containing the defendant's property, Berna took the bag to the 
State police barracks, where Dateo, in Berna's presence, opened 
it on June 14, 2004, and listed the contents on the search 
warrant return.  Dateo then filed the return with the court on 
June 17. 
Based on his findings, the motion judge ruled in relevant 
part that the defendant was required to establish that he had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in his clothing that also was 
objectively reasonable, and that given his status as an inmate 
at the jail, the defendant could not make the required showing.16  
On appeal, the defendant challenges the judge's conclusion.  He 
claims that the judge equated the status and rights of a 
pretrial detainee with those of a convicted prisoner, and in 
doing so failed to recognize that, as a pretrial detainee, the 
defendant had a privacy right with respect to his personal 
clothing that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable, 
                     
 
16 In his motion to suppress, the defendant raised a number 
of additional challenges to the search and seizure of his 
clothes and sneakers from the PCCF that the motion judge 
considered and rejected in his memorandum of decision.  The 
defendant does not challenge these particular rulings on appeal, 
and we do not discuss them except to say that we find no error 
in the rulings. 
12 
 
and that therefore was entitled to constitutional protection.  
Because the officers who performed the seizure did not have a 
warrant in hand at the time they seized the clothing and 
sneakers, the defendant's argument continues, the seizure was 
the equivalent of a warrantless seizure that violated the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
As the defendant acknowledges, he carries the burden of 
establishing that, in the circumstances presented, he retained a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his sneakers.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bly, 448 Mass. 473, 490 (2007) ("To succeed on 
appeal, [the defendant] must bear the threshold burden of 
showing that a warrantless search or seizure occurred. . . . 
This question is analyzed under the familiar two-part query 
whether [the defendant] had a subjective expectation of privacy 
in the items seized, and if so, whether that expectation was 
reasonable objectively"); Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 
290, 301 (1991) (same).  The defendant has not met this burden.  
Based on undisputed evidence before him, the motion judge found 
that as a matter of policy the PCCF deemed the personal clothing 
(including footwear) of individuals held in custody there, 
including pretrial detainees, to be contraband, and although the 
PCCF generally allowed inmates to keep their sneakers, the 
retention was a privilege that could be withdrawn at any time.  
13 
 
Moreover, the status of a prisoner's clothing as contraband was 
stated explicitly on the property seizure receipt used by the 
PCCF to make a record of the defendant's items of clothing being 
seized and stored; the defendant's signature on that receipt 
indicates that he was or reasonably should have been aware of 
the contraband status. 
As indicated, the defendant argues that as a pretrial 
detainee, his privacy interests are entitled to greater 
protection in the jail setting than those of a convicted 
defendant serving a sentence.  We agree that a pretrial detainee 
enjoys at least as many constitutional rights as a convicted 
prisoner and perhaps more.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
545 (1979).  See also United States v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20, 23-24 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854 (1986).  But, as decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court considering the Fourth 
Amendment reflect, the legitimate penological interests and 
needs of a jail also are entitled to great respect.  See Turner 
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Bell, supra at 545-546.  See 
also Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of 
Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 (2012) (considering 
constitutionality of strip searches of jailed detainees).  We 
have recognized the need to weigh legitimate penological 
concerns and interests under art. 14 as well.  See, e.g., Matter 
of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 454 Mass. 685, 689-693 (2009).  There, 
14 
 
the court considered and rejected a challenge under art. 14 to a 
sheriff's policy of recording the telephone calls of "inmates" 
(both pretrial detainees and inmates serving a sentence) and 
providing the recordings to the grand jury in response to 
subpoena.  In doing so, the court observed that "we [have] 
adopted the deferential standard of review for constitutional 
challenges to prison regulations and policies established by the 
United States Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, [supra]."  
Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, supra at 690 (citing and 
discussing Cacicio v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 422 Mass. 764, 
772-773 [1996]).  Here, the defendant does not challenge the 
validity of the PCCF's policy of treating inmates' clothing, 
including sneakers, as contraband.17  Rather, he argues that the 
sneakers were seized from his cell or from his person,18 and 
                     
 
17 Although the reason for the policy to treat clothing as 
contraband was not raised by the defendant in his motion to 
suppress and was not the subject of any testimony or other 
evidence introduced at the hearing on the defendant's 
suppression motions, we infer that the policy was one designed 
for reasons of security and perhaps other reasons as well, 
including sanitation and health.  See Kight v. State, 512 So. 2d 
922, 927 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988), and 
cases cited (warrantless seizure of defendant's clothing by jail 
authorities was permissible even though seizure was made in 
order to test for evidence of crime, where legitimate health or 
security purposes would have entitled jail authorities to effect 
seizure of inmates' clothing at any time). 
 
 
18 It is not relevant to our decision here, but the 
defendant's assumption that if his sneakers were not seized from 
his cell, they must have been seized from his person, has no 
evidentiary support in the record. 
15 
 
asserts that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy related 
to the sneakers that was entitled to protection under the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14, and that barred the seizure of the 
sneakers from either location. 
The defendant relies particularly on Cohen, 796 F.2d at 23-
24, in making his claim.  In Cohen, a correction officer 
conducted a search of the defendant's cell in the jail facility 
where he was being held pending trial.  The search was conducted 
at the direction of a prosecutor, and in conducting it, the 
officer focused on the defendant's papers in the cell.  Based on 
information the officer obtained from these papers, the 
prosecutor thereafter obtained a search warrant for them and 
used the papers as evidence against the defendant at trial.  Id. 
at 21.  The court concluded that because the initial, 
warrantless "contraband" search was "intended solely to bolster 
the prosecution's case against a pre-trial detainee awaiting his 
day in court," id. at 23, with no purpose related to 
institutional security, it violated the Fourth Amendment, 
tainted the validity of the search warrant subsequently 
obtained, and required suppression of the materials seized 
pursuant to the warrant.  See id. at 23-24.  Accord, e.g., McCoy 
v. State, 639 So. 2d 163, 164-167 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994) 
(warrantless search ordered by prosecutor solely to uncover 
incriminating evidence from defendant's cell; denial of motion 
16 
 
to suppress reversed because no legitimate prison objectives 
justified search); State v. Neely, 236 Neb. 527, 530, 540-541 
(1990) (warrantless search of defendant's property in locked 
jail inventory to look for evidence of crime; suppression order 
affirmed).  See State v. Henderson, 271 Ga. 264, 267-268 (1999), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1083 (2000) (agreeing with principle that 
warrantless search of pretrial detainee's cell solely at 
prosecutor's request would be improper; search warrant would be 
required).  In this case, it is true that the seizure of the 
defendant's sneakers and other clothes was at the behest of 
police who were conducting an investigation, and was not done 
for institutional security reasons related to the PCCF.  But 
here, in contrast to the Cohen case -- and similar to Henderson, 
supra at 268-269 -- the police had obtained a search warrant for 
the defendant's clothes, on the basis of an affidavit providing 
probable cause, before any examination or seizure of the 
sneakers occurred.19 
                     
 
19 Despite the existence of the search warrant, the 
defendant asserts that under Commonwealth v. Guaba, 417 Mass. 
746 (1994), the seizure of his sneakers was unreasonable by 
definition because although the search warrant had issued by the 
time the correction officers seized the sneakers, the officers 
did not have a copy of the warrant with them when they did so.  
See id. at 754 ("we hold art. 14 [of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights] implicitly requires law enforcement 
officials to possess a copy of the warrant when executing it, 
unless there are exigent circumstances which would permit a 
warrantless search").  We explain in the next paragraph of the 
text that at the time the sneakers were seized, the defendant 
17 
 
Moreover, in order to claim constitutional protection 
against the seizure of his sneakers, the defendant must show 
that he had an actual expectation of privacy in them that 
society would be prepared to recognize as objectively 
reasonable.  Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 454 Mass. at 688, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 68 (1987).  Even if 
we assume that the defendant had a subjective expectation of 
privacy related to his sneakers, it would not be one that is 
objectively reasonable; the circumstances previously discussed 
make this clear.20  As discussed, this court has long held that 
the monitoring and recording of detainees' and other inmates' 
telephone calls in a jail or house of correction, when the 
inmates have notice of the policy, does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment or art. 14.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rosa, 468 
Mass. 231, 242-244 (2014); Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 
                                                                  
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in them that 
was entitled to protection under art. 14.  Accordingly, we need 
not decide the defendant's Guaba claim or consider whether there 
are circumstances in which the "rule" of Guaba may not apply. 
 
 
20 In terms of circumstances, we focus on the following:  
the defendant was lawfully being held in custody at the PCCF on 
an outstanding warrant; the PCCF had a policy, unchallenged by 
the defendant, of treating the personal clothing belonging to 
all inmates, including pretrial detainees, as contraband, 
presumably as a security measure; and the defendant was or 
reasonably can be held to have been aware of the policy, having 
signed the "property seizure receipt" on the day of his arrival 
at the institution.  The personal papers of the defendant at 
issue in United States v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20, 21 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854 (1986), would not appear to be 
covered by the PCCF policy. 
18 
 
supra at 688-693; Cacicio, 422 Mass. at 770-773.  As we recently 
determined in relation to inmate mail deemed contraband by jail 
officials, see Commonwealth v. Jessup, 471 Mass. 121, 127-134 
(2015), we conclude here that as a pretrial detainee in a jail 
facility with a legitimate policy in place of treating detainee 
and inmate clothing as contraband -- a policy of which the 
defendant had notice -- the defendant had no constitutionally 
protectable privacy interest in his sneakers that prevented 
their seizure. 
2.  Joint venture.  The defendant argues that the trial 
judge committed constitutional error by instructing the jury on 
joint venture liability, over defense counsel's objection.  The 
argument is not that there was insufficient evidence of a joint 
venture between the defendant and Pimental, but rather that the 
instruction violated his constitutional right to due process 
because he had no notice that a joint venture theory would be 
advanced. 
The defendant's claim lacks merit.  As the Commonwealth 
points out, the opening statement of the prosecutor clearly 
reflected the Commonwealth's position that the defendant and 
Pimental acted together in committing the murder, as did the 
defendant's own statements about committing the crime that were 
19 
 
introduced through the testimony of one of the Commonwealth's 
central witnesses, David Belmore.21 
The defendant suggests a denial of due process here because 
the Commonwealth presented the defendant to the jury only as 
having participated directly in the killing and therefore as a 
"principal," whereas through the vehicle of the judge's joint 
venture instruction, the jury were permitted to convict him as 
an "accomplice" or "joint venturer," a theory of guilt that had 
never been presented during trial and in response to which he 
lacked an opportunity to prepare a defense.  The defendant's 
argument, however, appears to be premised on an incorrect view 
of joint venture principles.  To prove that a defendant 
committed a crime as part of a joint venture, the Commonwealth 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
"knowingly participated in the commission of the crime charged, 
alone or with others, with the intent required for that 
offense."  Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466 (2009).  
There is no requirement that the Commonwealth prove precisely 
what role the defendant played -- whether he acted as a 
principal or an accomplice (or joint venturer).  Rather, as 
Zanetti reflects, what matters is only that there be proof of 
                     
 
21 Nor could any claim be made that the Commonwealth's 
request for, and the judge's decision to give, a joint venture 
instruction was a surprise.  A joint venture instruction had 
been given during the defendant's first trial, and the same 
trial counsel represented the defendant in both trials. 
20 
 
(1) the defendant's knowing participation in some manner in the 
commission of the offense; and (2) the defendant's intent -- 
i.e., proof that the defendant had or shared in the intent 
necessary for the offense of which he is convicted.  See id. at 
466-468 & n.22.  The evidence presented by the Commonwealth in 
this trial indicated that both the defendant and Pimental 
actively participated in the killing of the victim, and also 
that the defendant did so with the intent necessary to commit 
murder.  There was no error in charging the jury on joint 
venture. 
3.  Involuntary manslaughter instruction.  The defendant 
claims reversible error in the trial judge's decision not to 
give an instruction on involuntary manslaughter.  We disagree.  
The trial evidence concerning the defendant's actions and role 
in the killing of the victim was presented by the Commonwealth's 
witness Belmore, who testified to conversations he had had with 
the defendant while they were both incarcerated in the same 
jail.  That evidence indicated that after Pimental knocked the 
victim down, he and Pimental together kicked the victim with 
Pimental kicking him in the head, and that the defendant jumped 
on the victim's chest, making the victim's eyes "bug out."  
According to the defendant, he and Pimental knew the victim was 
dead when "his eyes stopped moving."  The injuries sustained by 
the victim, which were consistent with someone jumping or 
21 
 
stomping on his chest, were multiple and severe:  a broken 
sternum, an injury that, according to the medical examiner, was 
consistent with a great deal of force being applied; a lacerated 
heart and torn lung; and broken ribs on both sides of his body, 
also involving significant force.  The victim's additional 
injuries included a broken jaw and blunt force trauma to the 
head such that his face was unrecognizable. 
The intent necessary to prove murder in the first degree on 
the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty includes (1) an intent 
to commit grievous bodily harm or (2) an intent to commit an act 
that, in the circumstances known to the defendant, created a 
plain and strong likelihood that death would follow (third prong 
malice).  Commonwealth v. Pimental, 454 Mass. 475, 480 (2009).  
The intent necessary to prove involuntary manslaughter is an 
intent to commit an act that "involves a high degree of 
likelihood that substantial harm will result to another."  
Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 427 Mass. 392, 396 (1998), S.C., 
431 Mass. 360 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 
292, 303 n.14 (1992).  The circumstances of the killing and 
injuries sustained by the victim are not consistent with 
anything other than intent to do grievous bodily harm or an 
22 
 
intent qualifying as third prong malice.  The trial judge did 
not err in declining to instruct on involuntary manslaughter.22 
4.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  In her closing 
argument, the prosecutor stated: 
"Now, the defense has suggested that Eric Pimental 
acted alone and that this defendant did nothing but stand 
by.  There is not a scintilla of evidence to support that 
proposition, ladies and gentlemen. . . .  [T]hree men 
walked into the woods and only two came out.  And those two 
men walked out of those woods together, and they were both 
carrying the property of [the victim].  [T]hey both had the 
blood of [the victim] on their shoes."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The defendant contends that the prosecutor's statement 
about "not a scintilla of evidence" improperly shifted the 
burden of proof to the defendant.  We disagree.  In context, the 
argument represented a response to defense counsel's closing 
argument in which he summarized the evidence of blood and other 
physical evidence linking Pimental directly to the crime, and 
the paucity of such evidence relating to the defendant, and then 
argued that the defendant had been present with Pimental when 
the latter killed the victim, but had not actively participated 
in the crime -- that his conduct in not interfering and stopping 
                     
 
22 In any event, the jury also convicted the defendant of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, with 
armed robbery as the predicate felony.  A defendant is not 
entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter in 
connection with the theory of felony-murder.  See Commonwealth 
v. Jessup, 471 Mass. 121, 135 (2015); Commonwealth v. Selby, 426 
Mass. 168, 172 (1997). 
23 
 
his companion was morally "troubling", but was not a crime.23  
The prosecutor was entitled to respond to the defense argument 
and also to comment on the strength of its case and weakness of 
the defense, "as long as argument is directed at the defendant's 
defense and not at the defendant's failure to testify."  
Commonwealth v. Garvin, 456 Mass. 778, 799 (2010).  Considering 
the challenged phrase in the context of the prosecutor’s entire 
argument, we find no error. 
5.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
thoroughly reviewed the evidence and record in this case, and 
find no basis on which to grant relief to the defendant pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
                     
23 Defense counsel argued: 
 
"I know for many people it's troubling that Mr. Silva 
would even be present, okay, and that it's morally 
troubling that he didn't intervene.  I understand that.  
But that is not a crime.  It's not right, but it's not a 
crime.  We're here to determine not whether he acted, 
necessarily, the way we would have wished he had acted that 
day, but we're here to determine whether he committed a 
crime."