Case Title: In re Alexandria C.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016 ME 182

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 182 
Docket: 
Som-16-219 
Argued: 
October 27, 2016 
Decided: 
December 22, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE ALEXANDRIA C. 
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
[¶1]  The mother’s parental rights to Alexandria C. were terminated by a 
judgment of the District Court (Skowhegan, Benson, J.) on June 8, 2015, after 
police discovered that the mother had taken a series of shocking, graphic, and 
abusive photographs of her daughter, and the mother declined to participate 
in any way in reunifying with the child.1  We affirmed the judgment.  In re A.C., 
Mem-15-106 (Dec. 22, 2015).  The mother then filed a motion for relief from 
judgment, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel.  She now appeals the 
court’s denial of that motion.  Because the mother failed to meet her burden to 
prove that her trial counsel was ineffective, we affirm the judgment. We take 
                                         
1  On June 18, 2014, police executing a search warrant discovered numerous graphic pictures of 
then-six-year-old Alexandria on the mother’s computer.  The mother admitted to having taken the 
photographs, claiming it was for Alexandria’s “protection.”  It was necessary to take these 
photographs, she rationalized, to document Alexandria’s physical condition before she went to visit 
her father in case Alexandria suffered sexual abuse during the visit.  The mother subjected her 
daughter to between two and four photographic sessions. 
 
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this opportunity to clarify the emerging process for post-judgment review of 
judgments terminating parental rights.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The petition for termination in this case was unusual in that 
Alexandria’s father is well able to care for her, and she is safely placed with 
her father where she has made “progress . . . emotionally, mentally, physically, 
and academically in his care.”  Ordinarily, there would be no need to 
permanently terminate the mother’s rights to her child.  Unfortunately, the 
mother’s obsession, since at least May of 2008, “with the belief that the 
father . . . is a mortal danger to [Alexandria]” has resulted in her unwillingness 
or inability to allow Alexandria to be raised in peace by her father.  The 
termination court summarized an extensive history of litigation by the mother 
in which she alleged abuse by the father in three protection from abuse 
matters, the parents’ divorce, and in post-divorce motions.  The court further 
noted that there was never a finding of abuse in any of these matters. 
[¶3]  We affirmed the termination of the mother’s parental rights 
because, as the guardian ad litem recognized, the mother’s litigiousness would 
in all likelihood lead her immediately “back to court attempting to amend 
[any] parental rights and responsibilities order.”  Her litigious approach to the 
 
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ancillary family matter proceedings, along with her obstinate unwillingness to 
participate in any services designed to allow her to normalize her relationship 
with her daughter, necessitated the unusual action by the Department of 
Health and Human Services seeking to have her parental rights permanently 
terminated.  
[¶4]  The child protective proceeding originated when the police 
discovered the mother’s graphic photographs of Alexandria.  The court 
granted a preliminary child protection order on the same day.  When the 
mother contested the preliminary order two weeks later, the court (Fowle, J.) 
found that Alexandria was at immediate risk of serious harm and granted 
custody of Alexandria to her father.  After a hearing in which the court made a 
finding of jeopardy as to the mother, including an aggravating factor, the 
Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights.  
[¶5]  The court (Benson, J.) then held a hearing on the termination 
petition and considered the testimony of the mother and the Department 
caseworker, reports of a GAL, and orders that were entered in prior family 
and protection from abuse matters.  The court found that the mother “has not 
gained any appreciation for the gravity and the harm” caused by her 
“outrageous and disgusting conduct,” and that she remained a “considerable 
 
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and significant threat” to Alexandria.  Further finding that termination was in 
Alexandria’s best interest, the court entered a judgment terminating the 
mother’s parental rights.   
[¶6]  The mother appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence 
to support the court’s findings.  See In re A.C., Mem 15-106 (Dec. 22, 2015).  
We affirmed the court’s judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights on 
December 22, 2015.  Id.  While the mother’s appeal was pending, on 
October 29, 2015, we published an opinion in a different child protection 
proceeding in which we announced the procedural requirements and 
standards that apply to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in cases for 
termination of parental rights.  In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, 126 A.3d 718. 
[¶7]  Relying on the process announced in that case, on January 8, 2016, 
seventeen days after we affirmed the judgment terminating her parental 
rights, the mother filed a motion for relief from judgment.  See M.R. 
Civ. P. 60(b).  She argued that her trial counsel had rendered ineffective 
assistance.  She did not file the required sworn affidavit identifying the basis 
for her claim.  See In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶ 21, 126 A.3d 718. 
[¶8]  Despite the missing affidavit and the questions regarding timing, 
the court acted cautiously and allowed the mother to proceed promptly to 
 
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hearing to challenge her counsel’s representation.  The mother and her former 
attorney testified at the hearing.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the court 
recited the following factual findings from the bench, which are supported by 
record evidence.  During the termination proceeding, the mother was rigid 
and unwilling to consider any resolution that would allow contact between 
Alexandria and the father.  The mother threw “roadblocks” in the way of 
meeting with her attorney, would not provide releases for her attorney to 
meet with her medical providers, and declined to provide witnesses.  The 
mother’s trial counsel thoroughly discussed with her the option of a potential 
agreement that would have avoided termination of her parental rights, and 
fully advised her of the risk and consequences of having her rights terminated. 
[¶9]  In accordance with its findings, the court ultimately concluded that 
the mother had not met her burden to prove that her trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance, and it denied her motion for relief from judgment on 
April 29, 2016.  This appeal followed.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Procedure 
[¶10]  We begin by emphasizing the critical importance of swift 
resolution in child protection proceedings to promote stability and 
 
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permanence for children who are the subjects of these proceedings.  When the 
Department alleges that a child cannot safely be returned to her parents, the 
law requires prompt action to “[p]romote the early establishment of 
permanent plans for the care and custody of children who cannot be returned 
to their family.”  22 M.R.S. § 4003(4) (2015); see also In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, 
¶¶ 18-19, 126 A.3d 718.  To this end, we have imposed strict procedural 
requirements on a parent claiming the ineffective assistance of counsel in 
termination proceedings following the opportunity for a full trial on the 
merits of the Department’s petition for termination of parental rights.  In re 
M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 19-21, 126 A.3d 718.   
[¶11]  Thus, we have said that ineffectiveness claims in termination 
proceedings should generally be raised on direct appeal.  See id. ¶¶ 19-20.  We 
allow an exception, however, where “the record does not illuminate the basis 
for the challenged acts or omissions” of a parent’s attorney.  Id. ¶ 20.  This 
exception permits no delay.  In such cases, “the parent must promptly move 
for relief . . . pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) . . . no later than twenty-one days 
after the expiration of the period for appealing the underlying judgment.”  Id.  
This timeframe is necessary so that any appeal from the Rule 60(b)(6) 
ineffective assistance claim can be heard together with the direct appeal and 
 
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not unreasonably delay the achievement of a permanent out of home 
placement for the child, or the swift return to a meaningful reunification 
effort.  See id. ¶ 20 & n.4.   
[¶12]  Accordingly, when a parent presents a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel following a termination proceeding that is not included 
in the appeal itself, the claim must be made within the time frames established 
in In re M.P.  To be specific, any Rule 60(b)(6) motion alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel must be made within twenty-one days after the time for 
taking an appeal has expired.  Id. ¶ 20.  The trial court will dismiss and 
therefore not act on the merits of an untimely Rule 60(b)(6) motion alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and no appeal from the trial court’s dismissal 
of an untimely motion will lie.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2015). 
[¶13]  We stress these time requirements because we are acutely aware 
of the challenges presented in rapidly assessing the situation regarding 
representation, which must be weighed against the competing need for 
finality for the children involved.  It will be critically important for counsel to 
be attentive to these deadlines at the conclusion of termination proceedings.   
[¶14]  In the matter before us, because In re M.P. was certified months 
after the order terminating the mother’s parental rights was docketed, and 
 
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because the motion was filed within seventeen days after the decision 
affirming the order of termination against the mother, we accept the mother’s 
Rule 60(b)(6) motion as timely filed.  See In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶ 28, 126 
A.3d 718.  
[¶15]  In addition to the strict temporal limitations on Rule 60(b)(6) 
motions, “the parent making the claim must submit a signed and sworn 
affidavit stating, with specificity, the basis for the claim.”  Id. ¶ 21.  “Because of 
the counter-balancing interests of the State in ensuring stability and prompt 
finality for the child, if the parent fails to comply with this procedure, the 
parent’s motion . . . must be denied.”  Id.; see also In re Aliyah M., 2016 ME 106, 
¶ 9, 144 A.3d 50. 
 
[¶16]  When a parent pursues a claim of ineffective assistance by means 
of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the parent’s affidavit and any accompanying 
affidavits must explicitly address the two parts of the standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  See In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 21, 27, 126 A.3d 718.  
The affidavit must demonstrate that there was admissible, material, and 
noncumulative evidence that counsel was aware of and did not offer to the 
trial court, or that the parent’s counsel was deficient for some other very 
substantial reason.  See id.  The affidavit must also demonstrate that the 
 
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alleged deficiency resulted in prejudice—meaning that there was a reasonable 
probability that it could have made a difference to the outcome of the 
proceeding.  See id.; Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶ 19, 125 A.3d 1163.  
Although affidavits of other witnesses will be helpful in this context, we again 
stress that an affidavit from the parent, setting forth, among other things, the 
parent’s efforts to advise trial counsel of the availability of such witnesses or 
evidence, must be filed with the motion.   
[¶17]  Because here the mother filed no signed and sworn affidavit with 
her Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the court could simply have denied the mother’s 
motion for failure to adhere to the required procedure.  See In re M.P., 2015 
ME 138, ¶ 21, 126 A.3d 718.  In future cases, this requirement must be strictly 
enforced.  However, again, because of the unique procedural posture of this 
case, in an exercise of caution, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the 
mother’s motion, and we turn to the merits of the mother’s appeal on her 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
B. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
[¶18]  When a parent raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
in a child protection case, it is the parent’s burden to show that “(1) counsel’s 
performance was deficient, i.e., that there has been serious incompetency, 
 
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inefficiency, or inattention of counsel amounting to performance . . . below 
what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney”; and (2) the 
deficient performance prejudiced the parent’s interests at stake in the 
termination proceeding to the extent “that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result.”  Id. ¶ 27 (quotation marks omitted) (citation 
omitted). 
[¶19]  We review the factual findings underlying ineffectiveness claims 
for clear error.  See Roberts v. State, 2014 ME 125, ¶ 23, 103 A.3d 1031.  
Because the parent alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness had the burden of proof, 
on appeal the parent must demonstrate that a contrary finding is compelled 
by the evidence.  See Dickens v. Boddy, 2015 ME 81, ¶ 12, 119 A.3d 722; Heon 
v. State, 2007 ME 131, ¶ 8, 931 A.2d 1068.  The trial court’s ultimate denial of 
a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Town of Wiscasset 
v. Mason Station, LLC, 2015 ME 59, ¶ 6, 116 A.3d 458.   
[¶20]  In the matter before us, there was ample evidence to support the 
court’s finding that the mother’s attorney performed at and above the level 
that would be expected from an ordinary, fallible attorney.  The court found, 
with evidentiary support, that the attorney informed the mother of her 
options and the associated risks, and assisted her with tactical decisions.  
 
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Indeed, before us, the mother does not suggest that she proposed to counsel 
other evidence that counsel should have presented to the court.  At the 
hearing on the Rule 60(b)(6) motion, when asked what other evidence 
existed, the mother responded, “There was no additional evidence.”  Thus, the 
court was not compelled to find that the performance of the mother’s counsel 
was deficient. 
[¶21]  Even if counsel’s performance had been deficient, the court was 
not compelled to find that the mother’s case was prejudiced by her attorney’s 
performance.  The mother provided no additional evidence that would have 
created a reasonable probability of the termination hearing resulting in a 
different outcome, and she specifically testified that there was no such 
evidence.  The mother’s paranoid obsession that the father is a danger both to 
Alexandria and to herself caused the mother to do great harm to her 
daughter—harm that she still refuses to acknowledge.  The same paranoia 
caused the mother to refuse to consider any resolution that would have 
allowed contact between Alexandria and her father, even if it would have 
avoided the termination of her own parental rights. 
[¶22]  The mother’s intransigence would have eviscerated most 
attorneys’ abilities to provide successful representation.  Sadly, she 
 
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completely failed to assist her own attorney by providing witnesses and 
evidence.  In addition, the Department caseworker testified at the termination 
hearing that after the caseworker recommended reunification services, she 
was unable to contact the mother again except to arrange service of the 
termination petition.  The GAL’s report similarly indicated that the mother 
never responded to the GAL’s offers to meet with her.  Even in court at the 
termination hearing, the mother refused to answer questions about where she 
lived or to provide the names of her alleged service providers.  We are 
accordingly unpersuaded by the mother’s argument that the court was 
compelled to find that her lawyer provided ineffective assistance, and we 
discern no injustice in the court’s order denying her Rule 60(b)(6) motion and 
establishing permanency for Alexandria.  The court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the mother’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion.    
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶23]  In order to assure that a parent may be heard on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in a termination proceeding, and to promote 
swift action to provide permanency and stable families for children who have 
been tangled in the child protection system, we have announced a procedure 
 
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intended to balance the important interests at stake.  A post-termination claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel must be 
(1) 
included in any appeal from the order of termination; or 
(2) 
addressed through a Rule 60(b)(6) motion that must be 
a. filed no later than 21 days after the running of the time for an 
appeal, and 
b. accompanied by the parent’s signed and sworn affidavit setting 
forth the facts upon which an ineffective assistance of counsel 
determination could be made.   
 
[¶24]  In the matter before us, the court held a hearing, provided the 
mother with an opportunity to be heard on her Rule 60(b)(6) motion, and 
concluded that the mother had failed to meet her burden.  The court did not 
err in reaching that conclusion.   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Verne E. Paradie, Jr., Esq. (orally), Paradie, Sherman, Walker & 
Worden, Lewiston, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. 
Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee 
Department of Health and Human Services 
 
 
Skowhegan District Court docket number PC-2014-40 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY