Case Title: ALLAN PEDEN V CITY OF DETROIT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 119408

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JUNE 11, 2004 
ALLAN PEDEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 119408 
CITY OF DETROIT, DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MARKMAN, J.  
We granted leave to appeal to consider two issues: (1) 
whether defendant, the city of Detroit, Detroit Police 
Department, properly characterized the essential functions 
or duties of a police officer position under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq., and the 
Michigan 
Persons 
with 
Disabilities 
Civil 
Rights 
Act 
(PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq.; and (2) whether plaintiff, 
who suffers from a permanent heart condition, has presented 
prima facie evidence that he is able to perform the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
essential functions of this position. 
Regarding the first 
issue, the circuit court granted summary disposition in 
favor of defendant and the Court of Appeals subsequently 
reversed that judgment. 
Because there is no genuine 
question 
of 
material 
fact 
that 
defendant 
properly 
characterized the essential functions of the police officer 
position, we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and we 
reinstate the circuit court's grant of summary disposition 
in favor of defendant. 
Likewise, regarding the second 
issue, the circuit court granted summary disposition in 
favor of defendant and the Court of Appeals reversed that 
judgment. Because there is also no genuine question of 
material fact that plaintiff cannot perform the essential 
functions of the police officer position, we reverse the 
Court of Appeals judgment on this issue as well. 
We 
reinstate the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition 
in favor of defendant. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 1986, plaintiff, Allan Peden, a police officer in 
Detroit’s 13th Precinct, suffered a heart attack while 
performing clerical tasks consistent with his “A Clerk” 
position. 
Plaintiff was diagnosed with heart disease and 
underwent successful heart surgery. 
Plaintiff’s physician 
released him to work on indefinite restricted duty. 
For 
2  
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
about ten years, plaintiff continued working on restricted 
duty status, first remaining in the “A clerk” position and 
eventually winning a “bidded” position with the police 
department’s Crime Analysis Unit (CAU). 
In 1995, the Detroit Police Department compiled a list 
of “24 Essential Job Functions of a Law Enforcement 
Officer” (the essential functions list or EFL). 
This list 
was based on model standards developed by the Michigan Law 
Enforcement Officers Training Council, a council created by 
statute to develop educational, mental, and physical 
standards for all commissioned law enforcement officers in 
the state of Michigan. 
See MCL 28.601 et seq. 
The 
department’s list includes such tasks as pursuing suspects 
in foot chases, engaging in vehicle pursuits, effecting 
forcible 
arrests, 
overcoming 
violent 
resistance, 
and 
qualifying with a firearm.1 
In 
1996, 
the 
department 
placed 
plaintiff 
on 
involuntary, nonduty, disability retirement. 
The CAU 
physician, Dr. Hill, signed the application for early 
1 Although the EFL was compiled in 1995, the record in
this case indicates that, at least since 1975, the 
department has maintained a written job description for
police officer positions providing that the duties of 
officers include patrolling an assigned post, enforcing 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
retirement on behalf of the department. 
Dr. Hill reviewed 
plaintiff's medical records, including records made by 
plaintiff's physicians and the department’s physicians over 
the 
course 
of 
several 
years 
of 
routine 
medical 
examinations, and determined, on the basis of those 
records, that plaintiff was unable to perform the EFL tasks 
and was therefore eligible for disability retirement.2 
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging that 
the department violated the ADA and the PWDCRA when it 
placed him on involuntary disability retirement. Defendant 
argues 
that 
plaintiff 
cannot 
perform 
the 
essential 
functions of his former CAU police officer position and, 
therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to proceed on his ADA 
and PWDCRA discrimination claim. 
Plaintiff contends that 
the EFL tasks are not essential to his former CAU position 
because that position is essentially clerical in nature. 
Alternatively, plaintiff argues that he can perform the EFL 
laws, apprehending violators of the law, transporting sick
and injured people to hospitals, and serving warrants. 
2 For instance, Dr. Hill’s summary of plaintiff’s 
medical history includes comments made periodically by 
plaintiff’s 
doctor 
that 
plaintiff 
should 
remain 
on 
restricted duty and other statements made by plaintiff’s
doctor and other department physicians during various 
examinations, such as “coronary artery disease,” “[h]e is
working without problems,” and “advised to check with his 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
tasks. 
The circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s case on 
summary 
disposition 
pursuant 
to 
MCR 
2.116(C)(10), 
concluding, as a matter of law, that the department is 
entitled to define the essential functions of a police 
officer position and that plaintiff failed to present prima 
facie 
evidence 
demonstrating 
that 
he 
is 
capable 
of 
performing those functions. 
The 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
reversed, 
holding 
that 
a 
determination regarding what constitutes the essential 
functions of a position and whether a plaintiff is capable 
of performing those essential functions must be made with a 
case-by-case examination of the particular circumstances 
involved.3  The Court of Appeals held that while defendant 
had presented some evidence showing that the EFL tasks are 
essential to a police officer position, plaintiff presented 
evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether those functions are, in practice, essential to 
plaintiff’s specific position with the CAU and whether 
plaintiff can perform the essential functions of his 
doctor because the diastolic pressure is above normal 
limits.” 
3 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 23, 2001
(Docket No. 214491). 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
position despite his disability. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This 
case 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation that is an issue of law reviewed de novo. G 
C Timmis & Co v Guardian Alarm Co, 468 Mich 416, 419; 662 
NW2d 710 (2003). 
The grant or denial of summary 
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) is likewise 
reviewed de novo. 
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 
597 NW2d 817 (1999). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Overview of the ADA 
The ADA was enacted by Congress in part “to provide a 
clear 
and 
comprehensive 
national 
mandate 
for 
the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.” 
42 USC 12101(b)(1).4
 42 USC 12112(a), 
4 Plaintiff’s federal ADA claim is properly before this
Court because state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction
over such claims. 
In Gulf Offshore Co v Mobil Oil Corp,
453 US 473, 478; 101 S Ct 2870; 69 L Ed 2d 784 (1981), the
United States Supreme Court stated:
In considering the propriety of state-court
jurisdiction over any particular federal claim,
the Court begins with the presumption that state
courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction. Congress,
however, may confine jurisdiction to the federal
courts either explicitly or implicitly. 
Thus,
the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be
rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by
unmistakable 
implication 
from 
legislative 
6  
 
 
 
                                                 
prohibiting employment discrimination, states that “no 
covered entity[5] shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the disability of 
such individual in regard to job application procedures, 
the 
hiring, 
advancement, 
or 
discharge 
of 
employees, 
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment.” 
A plaintiff alleging a violation of the ADA carries 
the burden of proving a prima facie case. 
Doe v Univ of 
Maryland Medical Sys Corp, 50 F3d 1261, 1264-1265 (CA 4, 
1995). 
To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must first 
show that he is a “qualified individual with a disability” 
entitled to the ADA’s protections. 
42 USC 12112(a). 
A 
“disability” is defined under § 12102(2) as “(A) a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a 
history, or by a clear incompatibility between
state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.
[Citations omitted.]
Moreover, 42 USC 12202 provides that “[a] State shall
not 
be 
immune 
under 
the 
eleventh 
amendment 
to 
the 
Constitution of the United States from an action in [a]
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a
violation of this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) 
5 A “covered entity” includes any employer who has
fifteen or more employees each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year. Section 12111(2),(5). 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as 
having such an impairment.” A “qualified individual with a 
disability” is defined as “an individual with a disability 
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform 
the essential functions of the employment position that 
such individual holds or desires. . . .” Section 12111(8). 
It is important to recognize that the ADA does not 
protect against discrimination based on any disabilities, 
but only against discrimination based on those disabilities 
(or perceived disabilities) that substantially limit at 
least one major life activity of the disabled individual, 
but that, with or without reasonable accommodation, do not 
prevent 
the 
disabled 
individual 
from 
performing 
the 
essential functions of the position held or sought. 
After 
the 
plaintiff 
presents 
sufficient 
evidence 
demonstrating that he is a “qualified individual with a 
disability,” his next burden lies in proving that his 
employer “discriminated” against him. 
The ADA broadly 
defines the term “discriminate” to prohibit employers from 
undertaking a variety of measures that adversely affect 
qualified individuals with disabilities. See § 12112(b).6 
6 
Generally, 
an 
employer 
may 
not 
purposefully
discriminate 
through 
direct 
action, 
by 
the 
use 
of 
standards, criteria, or methods of administrations, or 
8  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Plaintiff 
in 
this 
case 
has 
alleged 
purposeful 
discrimination. 
In 
claims 
under 
the 
ADA 
alleging 
purposeful discrimination, once the plaintiff has presented 
a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to 
rebut plaintiff's evidence. 
Raytheon Co v Hernandez, 540 
US ___, ___; 124 S Ct 513, 520; 157 L Ed 2d 357 (2003). 
B. Overview of the PWDCRA 
In Chmielewski v Xermac, Inc, 457 Mich 593, 601; 580 
NW2d 817 (1998), quoting Allen v Southeastern Michigan 
Trans Auth, 132 Mich App 533, 537-538; 394 NW2d 204 (1984), 
we stated that the Handicappers' Civil Rights Act (amended 
in 1998 and renamed the “Persons With Disabilities Civil 
Rights Act”) “‘prohibits discrimination against individuals 
through the denial of reasonable accommodations against a
qualified individual with a disability because of that
individual’s disability. 
An employer also may not utilize
qualification standards, tests, or other criteria that are
not job-related in a manner that has the effect of 
screening out qualified individuals with disabilities from
the workplace. Section 12112(b). 
Pursuant to § 12112(b), the United States Supreme
Court has explained that “[b]oth disparate-treatment and
disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the ADA.” 
Raytheon Co v Hernandez, 540 ___, ___; 124 S Ct 513, 519;
157 L Ed 2d 357 (2003). Liability in a disparate-treatment
case “‘depends on whether the protected trait . . . 
actually motivated the employer’s decision.’ . . . By
contrast, 
disparate-impact 
claims 
‘involve 
employment
practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business 
9  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
because of their handicapped status. The purpose of the act 
is to mandate ‘the employment of the handicapped to the 
fullest 
extent 
reasonably 
possible.’” 
Under 
MCL 
37.1202(1)(a)-(e), 
which 
prohibit 
employment 
discrimination, an “employer”7 shall refrain from taking any 
of a number of adverse employment actions against an 
individual “because of a disability . . . that is unrelated 
[or not directly related] to the individual’s ability to 
perform the duties or a particular job or position.” 
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving a violation 
of the PWDCRA. 
“To prove a discrimination claim under the 
[PWDCRA], the plaintiff must show (1) that he is [disabled] 
as defined in the act, (2) that the [disability] is 
unrelated to his ability to perform his job duties, and (3) 
that he has been discriminated against in one of the ways 
delineated in the statute.” Chmielewski, supra at 602. 
A “disability,” for purposes of article 2, MCL 
37.1201-37.1214, is defined in MCL 37.1103(d) as: (i) “[a] 
determinable physical or mental characteristic of an 
necessity.’” Id. (citations omitted). 
7 An “employer” is defined in MCL 37.1201(b) as “a
person who has 1 or more employees or a person who as
contractor or subcontractor is furnishing material or 
performing work for the state or a governmental entity or 
10  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
individual . . . if the characteristic: (A) . . . 
substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities 
of that individual and is unrelated to the individual's 
ability to perform the duties of a particular job or 
position . . . ”; (ii) “[a] history of [such a] 
determinable physical or mental characteristic . . . ”; or 
(iii) “[b]eing regarded as having [such a] determinable 
physical or mental characteristic . . . .” 
“‘Unrelated to 
the 
individual’s 
ability’ 
means, 
with 
or 
without 
accommodation, an individual’s disability does not prevent 
the individual from . . . performing the duties of a 
particular job or position.” MCL 37.1103(l)(i). 
Thus, like the ADA, the PWDCRA generally protects only 
against 
discrimination 
based 
on 
physical 
or 
mental 
disabilities that substantially limit a major life activity 
of the disabled individual, but that, with or without 
accommodation, do not prevent the disabled individual from 
performing the duties of a particular job. 
See Sanchez v 
Lagoudakis (After Remand), 458 Mich 704, 715; 581 NW2d 257 
(1998). 
Once the plaintiff has proved that he is a “qualified 
person with a disability” protected by the PWDCRA, he must 
agency of the state and includes an agent of such a 
11  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
next demonstrate that he has been discriminated against in 
one of the ways set forth in MCL 37.1202. 
Like the ADA, 
the PWDCRA prohibits employers from taking any of a variety 
of measures that adversely affect protected individuals.8 
If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination, the burden then shifts to the 
defendant to rebut such evidence. 
Kerns v Dura Mechanical 
Components, Inc (On Remand), 242 Mich App 1, 12; 618 NW2d 
56 (2000). 
See also Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 
463-466; 628 NW2d 515 (2001). 
C. Essential Functions of a Detroit Police Officer 
The dispute in this case primarily concerns whether 
the EFL tasks are essential to plaintiff’s former police 
officer position.9
 If so, plaintiff must show that he is 
person.” 
8 
Generally, 
an 
employer 
shall 
not 
purposefully
discriminate, through direct action or by failing to 
provide necessary accommodation, against a person because
of a disability that is unrelated to that person’s ability
to do the duties of a job; an employer shall not limit, 
segregate, or classify employees in a manner that adversely
affects a person because of a disability that is unrelated
to that person’s ability to do the duties of a job; an
employer shall not take direct adverse action against an
individual on the basis of examinations that are not 
directly related to the requirements of the job. 
MCL 
37.1202. 
9 Plaintiff cites Rourk v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 458 Mich 
25; 580 NW2d 397 (1998), for the proposition that in
determining the essential functions of his former position, 
12  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
able, with or without accommodation, to perform these 
functions; otherwise, he may not proceed on a claim under 
either the ADA or the PWDCRA. 
If plaintiff shows that he 
is able to perform the essential functions of the position, 
he 
may 
proceed 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
department 
discriminated against him in one of the ways set forth in 
the acts. 
i. The ADA 
Regarding 
what 
the 
“essential 
functions” 
of 
an 
we must consider the functions of the CAU position that he
held 
before 
being 
forcibly 
retired 
rather 
than 
the 
functions of a patrol officer position. 
Rourk is an 
accommodation case in which this Court addressed whether an 
employer must transfer a disabled person to a new position
that the person could perform. In holding that no transfer
was required, we stated that “an individual is handicapped
even if some accommodation is necessary to allow that
individual to perform the duties of a particular job or
position,” but that “the existence of a [disability is]
determined with reference to the job actually held or
applied for . . . .” 
Id. at 31, 33. 
In other words, we
held that the mere fact that a disabled person can perform
“some” job is not relevant; rather, he must be able to
perform the job he held or sought at the time the alleged
PWDCRA violation occurred, and any accommodation must be 
directed toward enabling the plaintiff to perform the 
duties of that job. 
As such, Rourk is not directly
relevant 
because 
plaintiff 
here 
is 
not 
making 
an 
accommodation argument and is not seeking transfer to a new
position. Rather, plaintiff is arguing that he can perform
the essential functions of the CAU position. As we explain
in our analysis, 
the EFL tasks are essential functions of 
all sworn police officer positions, including those, such
as in the CAU, that are typically less demanding than
patrol officer positions. 
13  
 
 
   
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
employment position are, Congress specifically provided 
under the ADA that “consideration shall be given to the 
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are 
essential, and if an employer has prepared a written 
description before advertising or interviewing applicants 
for the job, this description shall be considered evidence 
of the essential functions of the job.” 42 USC 12111(8).10 
The Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC) 
regulations provide that the term “essential functions 
means the fundamental job duties of the employment position 
the individual with a disability holds or desires. 
The 
term ‘essential functions’ does not include the marginal 
functions of the position.” 
29 CFR 1630.2(n)(1). 
A 
function may be essential if, inter alia: 
(i) [t]he reason the position exists is to
perform that function; (ii) [there is a] limited
number of employees available among whom the 
performance 
of 
that 
job 
function 
can 
be 
distributed; and/or (iii) [t]he function [is]
highly specialized so that the incumbent in the
position is hired for his or her expertise or
ability to perform the particular function. 
[29
CFR 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii).] 
10 This statutory provision, in our judgment, reflects 
a congressional affirmation of the general right of 
employers to determine what the essential functions of any
particular employment position are. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
The EEOC regulations further provide: 
Evidence of whether a particular function is 
essential includes, but is not limited to: 
(i) The employer's judgment as to which 
functions 
are 
essential; 
(ii) 
Written 
job
descriptions 
prepared 
before 
advertising 
or 
interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The
amount of time spent on the job performing the
function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring
the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) 
The work experience of past incumbents in the
job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of
incumbents 
in 
similar 
jobs. 
[29 
CFR 
1630.2(n)(3).][11] 
11 As noted, in § 12111(8) of the ADA, the Congress has
specifically provided that “consideration shall be given to
an employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are
essential . . . .” 
The statute is silent, however,
regarding what constitutes “consideration” in accordance
with § 12111(8). In Yellow Transp Inc v Michigan, 537 US 
36, 45; 123 S Ct 371; 154 L Ed 2d 377 (2002), the United
States Supreme Court held that “[i]f a statute is ...
‘silent or ambiguous with respect to [a] specific issue,’
[courts] must sustain the agency's interpretation if it is
‘based on a permissible construction of the statute.’”
Regarding this issue, the EEOC has concluded that, to
afford the employer’s judgment adequate “consideration,” it
is sufficient to include the “employer’s judgment” in its §
1630.2(n)(3) listing of factors to consider in determining
whether a job function is essential. 
While we accept that
this construction of “consideration” is not altogether
unreasonable, and is therefore “permissible,” we do not
necessarily think that it is the best or the most 
reasonable construction of the law. 
In our 
estimation, §
1630.2(n)(3)—by seemingly providing that the employer's
judgment is to be accorded the same weight as any other
factors—risks 
diluting 
any 
real 
significance 
of 
the 
Congress’s specific, and exclusive, statutory directive 
that consideration is to be given to the employer’s
judgment. 
Nonetheless, in accordance with Yellow Transp,
we accord deference to the EEOC regulations and apply them 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
Because the plaintiff bears the overall burden of 
demonstrating under the ADA that he is a “qualified 
individual with a disability,” the burden of proving that a 
challenged function is not “essential” lies with the 
plaintiff. See Laurin v Providence Hosp, 150 F3d 52 (CA 1, 
1998). 
Further, a contrary position would be at odds with 
§ 12111(8), which requires that “consideration shall be 
given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a 
job are essential . . . .” We find compelling the court’s 
analysis of this issue in Hamlin v Charter Twp of Flint, 
942 F Supp 1129, 1138 (ED Mich, 1996), in which Judge Rosen 
stated succinctly: 
Pretty clearly, placing the burden on the
employer to show a certain job function is 
essential would place courts and jurors in the
position 
of 
second-guessing 
an 
employer's
business judgment as to what the essential 
functions of a job are, without even requiring
the plaintiff challenging the function to first
come forward with evidence that the function is 
not essential.[12] 
to the extent they are relevant to our analysis of the ADA. 
12 The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan, unlike this Court, is bound by
decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. Thus, although the district court in Hamlin 
believed that the burden to prove that a disputed function
is not essential belonged with the plaintiff, it was 
nonetheless required, in accordance with contrary Sixth
Circuit precedent, to place this burden on the defendant.
Id., citing Monette v Electronic Data Sys Corp, 90 F3d 1173 
(CA 6, 1996). Despite the dissent’s contrary statement, we 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
In analyzing whether the EFL tasks are “essential” to 
plaintiff’s former position, the EEOC regulations suggest 
that courts must undertake a factual analysis of the 
relevant factors. 
The dominant consideration in this 
factual analysis is that plaintiff was a police officer. A 
police officer is a member of a profession charged with 
carrying out what arguably constitute primary functions of 
government, protecting the citizenry from criminals and 
preserving "domestic tranquility." 
A police officer 
performs functions that are indispensable to our free and 
ordered society. 
In Michigan, a police officer is 
“responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and 
the enforcement of the general criminal laws of this 
state.” MCL 28.602(k)(i). A police officer is a member of 
a highly regulated profession, subject to a broad range of 
municipal and state rules and policies, not to mention the 
constraints of the federal and state constitutions. 
Each 
of these regulations is designed to ensure that a police 
officer performs the functions of his position within the 
boundaries of public policy. 
When the police officer acts 
outside these boundaries, adverse consequences may be 
do not “disregard” the conclusion reached by the Sixth
Circuit in Monette. 
We simply find the trial court’s
reasoning in Hamlin to be more persuasive. 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
considerable, including the failure to detect and apprehend 
criminals, the erosion of the freedoms of citizens, 
transgressions 
of 
the 
Constitution, 
and 
a 
general 
undermining of the well-being of society. 
As a police 
officer, plaintiff was entrusted with the full measure of 
the responsibilities of his position. 
The statutory law in Michigan further defines the role 
of a police officer, and provides guidance regarding the 
essential functions that enable a police officer to perform 
his duties. 
MCL 92.2, for example, provides that a city 
council, such as that of the city of Detroit 
may make and establish rules for the regulation
and government of the police, prescribing and
defining the powers and duties of policemen and
nightwatchmen, and shall prescribe and enforce
such police regulations as will most effectually
preserve the peace and good order of the city,
preserve the inhabitants from personal violence,
and protect public and private property from 
destruction 
by 
fire 
and 
from 
unlawful 
depredation. . . . 
Pursuant to these powers, the city of Detroit has 
given the department the authority to promulgate rules that 
will enable the department and its officers to effectively 
maintain the peace in the city. 
In response, the 
18  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
department promulgated the EFL.13
 Because the EFL was 
formulated in accordance with MCL 92.2 and with the purpose 
of 
satisfying 
the 
statutory 
obligations 
imposed 
on 
defendant and its police officers, the defendant’s claim 
that the functions included in that list are “essential” to 
police officer positions is, in this Court’s opinion, 
highly persuasive.14 
Further, it is the “duty of all sheriffs, deputy 
sheriffs, constables, policemen and public officers, to 
arrest and prosecute all persons of whose violation of the 
[Michigan Penal Code] they may have knowledge or reasonable 
notice, and for each neglect of such duty, the officer so 
offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.” 
MCL 
750.52 (emphasis added). 
MCL 479.13 provides that “every 
peace officer shall arrest, on sight or upon warrant, any 
13 While defendant may not promulgate rules that 
themselves violate federal law, the only issue in this case
is whether the EFL tasks constitute essential functions of 
the position. 
There is no allegation that the EFL tasks
are otherwise violative of federal law. 
14 Although the ADA is a federal statute, relevant
state statues may be consulted because the ADA does not
specifically define what the essential functions of any
position are; it provides only that a plaintiff must be
able to perform those functions and that the employer’s
judgment 
about 
those 
functions 
must 
be 
taken 
into 
consideration. State statutes are relevant where, as here, 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
person found violating or having violated, any provision of 
[the Motor Carrier Act] . . . .” 
See also MCL 765.26 and 
MCL 764.1b. 
Thus, the ability to effect arrests is not 
only a duty arising from the police officer's general 
obligation to maintain the peace, but it is a duty 
specifically imposed on police officers. An officer who 
neglects to attempt to make an arrest where necessary has 
committed a criminal offense. 
It is apparent that the EFL is a compilation of 
functions that the department expects an officer will be 
able to perform so that he may adequately “preserve the 
peace and good order of the city, preserve the inhabitants 
from personal violence, and protect public and private 
property from destruction by fire and from unlawful 
depredation,” 
MCL 
92.2, 
and 
thereby 
satisfy 
his 
professional and legal duties. 
As noted above, EEOC regulation 29 CFR 1630.2(n)(2)(i) 
provides that an alleged job function may be essential if 
“the reason the position exists is to perform the function 
. . . .” 
Accordingly, there is no question that the 
reason cities such as Detroit hire police officers and fund 
their positions is so that the officers will perform those 
they provide evidence supporting the employer’s judgment 
20  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
functions necessary to adequately maintain the peace and 
enforce the laws of the community.15
 MCL 92.2 grants 
municipalities the authority to prescribe and enforce 
police regulations that will most effectively serve these 
ends, and the department promulgated the EFL pursuant to 
this authority. 
Thus, the police officer positions exist 
specifically for the purpose of performing the very tasks 
identified in the EFL. 
Further, 
EEOC 
regulation 
29 
CFR 
1630.2(n)(2)(ii) 
provides that a function may be essential if there are a 
"limited number of employees available among whom the 
performance of that job function can be distributed . . . 
.” 
In fact, there is a highly limited number of police 
officers available among whom the performance of the EFL 
tasks 
can 
be 
distributed. 
Because 
of 
budgetary 
constraints, there is a limited number of officers that the 
department employs to effectively police and patrol the 
entire city of Detroit, a city of nearly one million people 
that serves as the center of a metropolitan area of more 
regarding which functions are essential to the job.
15 In support of this, MCL 92.1, which grants cities
the power to maintain a police force, provides: “The 
council of any city may provide, by ordinance, for a police
force . . . as they may think necessary for the good
government of the city and for the protection of the
persons and property of the inhabitants . . . .” 
21  
 
 
  
 
  
 
                                                 
than 
four 
million 
people 
and 
that 
functions 
as 
an 
international 
gateway 
into 
the 
United 
States.16 
Additionally, EEOC regulation 29 CFR 1630.2(n)(2)(iii) 
provides that a function may be essential if it is “highly 
specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired 
for his or her expertise or ability to perform the 
particular function.” 
In fact, because of the nature of 
the obligations under which police officers labor, the 
police 
officer 
position 
involves 
highly 
specialized 
responsibilities 
such 
that 
new 
officers 
are 
hired 
specifically for their ability to perform the EFL tasks.17 
Only a small portion of the overall population would be 
physically and otherwise equipped to carry out such 
responsibilities. 
Thus, the EEOC regulations at 29 CFR 
1630.2(n)(2) lead to the conclusion that the EFL tasks 
constitute 
essential 
functions 
of 
a 
police 
officer 
position. 
16 
US 
Census 
2000, 
available 
on-line 
at 
 (accessed May 26, 2004). 
17 Pursuant to state law, a police officer candidate
must demonstrate the ability to perform tasks similar to
those on the department’s EFL by passing an approved
physical agility examination before he may be employed as a
commissioned officer in this state. 
See 203 PA 1965, MCL
28.601 et seq.; 1979 AC, R 28.4102(h). 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
As further noted above, EEOC regulation 29 CFR 
1630.2(n)(3) provides a nonexhaustive list of factors that 
may be considered in determining a position’s essential 
functions. 
The first factor is “[t]he employer’s judgment 
. . . .” Section 1630.2(n)(3)(i). This factor has already 
been discussed and clearly does not weigh in favor of 
plaintiff’s argument. 
The second factor, “[w]ritten job 
descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing 
applicants for the job,” § 1630.2(n)(3)(ii), is not 
relevant in this case because neither side has presented 
evidence relating to any job description prepared before 
plaintiff was hired. 
However, because the written job 
description currently used by the department includes the 
EFL tasks, and because, at least since 1975, the department 
has maintained a written job description that includes many 
tasks similar to those on the EFL, this factor too does not 
appear to weigh in plaintiff's favor. 
Another EEOC factor 
is “[t]he consequences of not requiring the incumbent to 
perform the function . . . .” 
Section 1630.2(n)(3)(iv). 
If defendant, rather than plaintiff, is correct in its 
assessment of the necessary functions of the police officer 
position, 
then 
the 
consequences 
of 
siding 
with 
the 
plaintiff would potentially exact a considerable cost on 
the ability of defendant to carry out its responsibilities. 
23  
 
 
 
 
As earlier noted, the duties of the police officer position 
are essential to carrying out what is arguably the primary 
function of government, protecting the citizenry from 
criminals and preserving "domestic tranquility.” 
Thus, 
this factor likewise does not weigh in plaintiff’s favor. 
Another EEOC factor refers to the “terms of a collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
[CBA] 
. 
. 
. 
.” 
Section 
1630.2(n)(3)(v). 
Plaintiff notes that there is nothing in 
the CBA that prevents the department from employing 
individuals with disabilities or making accommodations for 
these individuals. 
Although that may be the case, there 
has been no evidence presented to this Court that a 
decision by the department to refrain from doing so 
violates the CBA. Thus, this factor also does not weigh in 
favor of the plaintiff. 
This leaves three remaining factors from the EEOC 
nonexhaustive list to consider, all of which are relied on 
by plaintiff in support of his case. 
These are “[t]he 
amount of time spent on the job performing the function,” 
“[t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job,” and 
“[t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar 
jobs.” 
Section 1630.2(n)(3)(iii), (vi), (vii). 
These 
three factors implicate similar considerations. 
Plaintiff 
claims that in his CAU position, he was never called upon 
24  
 
 
 
 
to perform the EFL tasks and that other employees in 
similar positions were likewise not required to perform 
these tasks. Thus, plaintiff argues that the EFL tasks are 
not “essential functions” of his and similar positions. 
Were this Court to agree with this analysis, we would 
effectively be eviscerating the CAU and other similar 
positions of their “police officer” significance. 
We 
decline to do this because the fact remains that these 
positions are advertised as police officer positions, hired 
as police officer positions, supervised as police officer 
positions, governed by laws 
pertaining to police officer 
positions, and subject to the terms and benefits of police 
officer positions. 
Further, such positions are supported 
by public funds appropriated for the employment of police 
officers and they must be filled by applicants who satisfy 
the standards for police officers. 
Moreover, to ensure 
satisfaction of its critical public obligations, the 
department has determined that all Detroit police officers, 
including those who need not regularly engage in patrol 
functions, must be constantly capable of performing those 
functions during times of riots or crises, or special 
circumstances, such as the recent electrical blackout or, 
more predictably, during large special event gatherings, 
such as the Detroit Thanksgiving Day parade, the Fourth of 
25  
 
 
       
                                                 
 
July fireworks, or major sporting events such as the 
upcoming Super Bowl. 
While it may be true that plaintiff, 
as well as other individual officers, have been rarely 
called on to perform EFL tasks, this does not obviate the 
fact that these tasks remain essential to the police 
officer position.18 
18 In Holbrook v Alpharetta, 112 F3d 1522, 1528 (CA 11,
1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit stated: 
[F]or quite some time . . . the City of
Alpharetta was able to accommodate Holbrook with
respect to those essential functions he concedes
he cannot perform without assistance. It is 
equally apparent, however, that the City of 
Alpharetta's 
previous 
accommodation 
may 
have 
exceeded that which the law requires. . . . [I]t
seems likely that the City retained a productive
and highly competent employee based partly on its
willingness to make such accommodations. However,
we cannot say that the City's decision to cease
making those accommodations that pertained to the
essential 
functions 
of 
Holbrook's 
job 
was 
violative of the ADA. 
Likewise, the fact that the department may have thus
far “accommodated” plaintiff by not requiring him to 
actively perform patrol functions and by allowing him to
remain on light duty does not by itself suggest that the
EFL tasks are rendered unessential to plaintiff’s police 
officer position or that the department cannot place
plaintiff on disability retirement if he is unable to
perform those functions. 
A contrary conclusion would, in
fact, inhibit a police department from ever granting any
officer a light duty assignment for fear of permanently
redefining that officer’s essential functions and thereby
undermining the flexibility of the department regarding
future employment action. 
26  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Accordingly, under the relevant EEOC standards, there 
is no genuine question of material fact presented in the 
record before us that the EFL tasks are essential to 
plaintiff’s former police officer position.19  Therefore, we 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and reinstate 
the circuit court's grant of summary disposition on this 
issue in favor of defendant. Unless plaintiff can, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, perform the EFL tasks, 
his claim under the ADA must be dismissed.20 
19 In Laurin, supra at 58-59, the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit noted:
[Plaintiff] vainly string-cites cases which
acknowledge that the . . . “essential function”
inquiry [under EEOC regulation § 1630.2(n)(3)]
tends to be fact-intensive, such that it is 
relatively rare that a trial court may enter
summary judgment. 
Nevertheless, since an ADA
plaintiff ultimately must shoulder the burden of
establishing that she was able to perform all
"essential functions" of her position, at summary
judgment 
[plaintiff]—and 
not 
the 
[defendant­
employer]—bore the burden of adducing competent
evidence from which a rational factfinder could 
have found in her favor . . . . 
[Citations
omitted.]
20 The dissent argues that, to constitute a basis for 
dismissal, 
the 
alleged 
essential 
function 
must 
be 
"uniformly applied in practice to all [officers].” Post at 
7. 
The dissent asserts that the evidence shows that the 
EFL tasks here are not "uniformly applied in practice to
all [officers]." 
Id. (emphasis added), 
However, if the
dissent’s 
reasoning 
is 
carried 
to 
its 
inevitable 
conclusion, it would exclude from the essential functions
of the police officer virtually all EFL tasks since few of
these, 
as 
the 
dissent 
itself 
recognizes, 
id., 
are 
27  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
ii. The PWDCRA 
The Court of Appeals noted in its opinion that “[t]he 
ADA’s ‘qualified’ language and the PWDCRA’s ‘disability’ 
language require essentially the same analysis . . . [and] 
the result under either statute is the same.”21
 We agree 
that both statutes require essentially the same analysis, 
and in the predominant number of cases, the result under 
either statute may well be the same. 
However, because the 
acts are not identical, and because federal laws and 
regulations are not binding authority on a Michigan court 
“uniformly applied" to "all" officers, including, for 
example, "all" intake or desk officers. 
As a result, the
dissent would effectively ensure that there is almost no
EFL task that would constitute a truly essential function
of a police officer position, including that of the “beat
cop” who is daily patrolling the streets and on the 
frontline in protecting the public from criminal offenders.
The proper question is not whether a particular task is
“uniformly applied” to "all" positions, but only whether it
constitutes an essential function of the position at issue.
Moreover, the question is not, as the dissent posits, post
at 8, whether other officers who arguably cannot perform
one or more of the EFL tasks should be placed on disability
retirement, but rather whether it was appropriate to place
plaintiff on disability retirement because he cannot 
perform the essential functions of his police officer 
position. The practical consequences of the dissent's test
would be to accord little respect for the judgment of
police departments in determining the qualifications of
their officers, and undue regard for the judgment of courts
in making this determination. 
These consequences would be
hastened by the dissent's apportionment of the burden of
proof upon the police department. See n 12. 
21  Slip op at 3 n 4. 
28  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
interpreting a Michigan statute, we caution against simply 
assuming that the PWDCRA analysis will invariably parallel 
that of the ADA.22 
Unlike the ADA, the PWDCRA does not provide specific 
guidance regarding what the duties of a particular job are. 
Thus, the task falls upon the judiciary to determine how to 
resolve relevant disputes in the absence of a more specific 
legislative directive. In doing this, we take into account 
a number of considerations. 
First, we take cognizance of 
the obvious fact that there is statutory silence on this 
matter in the PWDCRA and that something more than silence 
is required, in our judgment, to warrant redefining the 
role of the employer in determining the scope of job 
positions within its purview. 
That is, there is no 
indication anywhere in the PWDCRA that the employer's 
customary responsibilities in this regard were to be 
22 In cases filed under both the ADA and the PWDCRA 
against employers subject to both acts, if an employer is
found to have violated the ADA, rarely will it make any
practical difference whether the employer has also violated
the PWDCRA. 
However, the PWDCRA covers a broader range of
employers than the ADA (while the PWDCRA covers any
employer who has one or more employees, the ADA only covers
employers who have fifteen or more employees). Thus, small
business 
employers 
are 
most 
likely 
to 
be 
affected 
exclusively by the PWDCRA. 
Thus, it is important that
courts refrain from glossing over relevant differences 
29  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
altered by the act, and we decline to read any such 
indication from the act's silence. 
Therefore, in the 
absence of any contrary indication, we believe that the 
customary responsibilities of the employer in defining the 
scope of job positions are unaffected by the act and that 
the judgment of the employer in terms of such scope is 
entitled to substantial deference by the courts under the 
PWDCRA. 
Second, we take into consideration that the PWDCRA is 
an antidiscrimination statute. 
It is not a statute 
designed to regulate, or to set governmental standards for, 
particular employment positions. 
Nor is it a statute 
designed to enable judges to second-guess, or to improve 
upon, the business judgments of employers. 
Rather, the 
PWDCRA's purpose is to ensure that “[t]he opportunity to 
obtain employment . . . without discrimination because of a 
disability” is established as a protected civil right. MCL 
37.1102(1). 
In order to avoid transforming the PWDCRA 
from an antidiscrimination statute into something that is 
unwarrantedly broader, we believe that the judgment of the 
employer regarding the duties of a given job position is 
entitled to substantial deference. 
between these two acts and conflating them in a manner 
30  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Third, our analysis regarding what constitute the 
"duties of a particular job" is premised on an assumption 
that the employer is the single most interested person in 
the world in the success of his business. 
Therefore, as a 
general matter, it can reasonably be expected that the 
functions or duties that the employer specifies for a given 
position will be those reasonably well-designed to effect 
the success of such business. 
It is contrary to the 
economic interests of a reasonable employer to define a job 
position 
in 
a 
manner 
that 
is 
either 
inadequate 
or 
irrelevant. 
While the employer's own judgment about the 
duties of a job position will not always be dispositive, it 
is nonetheless always entitled to substantial deference. 
Finally, in Chmielewski we stated that 
in interpreting provisions of the HCRA [the
former PWDCRA], analogous federal precedents are
persuasive, although not necessarily binding. . . 
. 
* * * 
Because the HCRA definition [of disability]
mirrors that of the ADA, we examine federal law
for guidance. 
[Chmielewski, supra at 601-604 
(citations omitted).] 
Accordingly, because the PWDCRA and the ADA are similar in 
purpose, and generally require similar proofs, we examine 
the ADA for guidance. 
The ADA specifically provides that 
unwarranted by their language. 
31  
 
 
 
the employer’s judgment regarding what functions of a job 
are essential shall be given consideration. 
This is the 
only such provision in the ADA. 
As earlier noted, see n 
10, it is our judgment that this provision reflects a 
general congressional affirmation of the right of employers 
to determine what the essential functions of any particular 
employment position are. 
While we do not accept as 
dispositive in interpreting the PWDCRA the EEOC regulations 
pertaining to the ADA, see n 11, we do believe that the 
explicit emphasis set forth in the ADA itself suggests the 
extent of the deference due the employer's own judgment in 
determining the duties of a job under the PWDCRA. 
Thus, we hold that, in disputes regarding what the 
duties of a particular job are, the employer’s judgment is 
entitled to substantial deference. 
Consistent with the 
plaintiff’s burden of proving discrimination under the 
PWDCRA, the plaintiff bears the burden of presenting 
sufficient evidence to overcome this deference. Unless the 
plaintiff can satisfy this burden, it is to be presumed 
that the employer’s judgment concerning the duties of a 
particular job is reasonable. 
In such circumstances, the 
plaintiff 
must 
prove 
that 
he 
can, 
with 
or 
without 
accommodation, perform those duties. 
32  
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, the department’s judgment that the EFL 
tasks are duties of plaintiff’s former police officer 
position is entitled to considerable deference. 
Plaintiff 
here has not sustained his burden of demonstrating that the 
department’s judgment in this regard is not reasonable. 
Thus, we hold that the EFL tasks are “job duties” of a city 
of Detroit police officer position under the PWDCRA. 
Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals reversal of the 
circuit court’s grant of summary disposition for defendant 
on this issue. 
Unless plaintiff can, with or without 
accommodation, perform these functions, his claim under the 
PWDCRA must be dismissed. 
D. Ability to Perform Essential Functions 
Defendant moved for summary disposition of plaintiff’s 
entire case, arguing that plaintiff is unable to perform 
the EFL tasks and, therefore, is not entitled to proceed on 
his ADA and PWDCRA claims. To overcome defendant’s motion, 
plaintiff bears the burden of raising a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding whether he can perform the EFL 
tasks. 
Unless plaintiff can satisfy this burden, summary 
disposition in defendant’s favor is warranted. 
In 
our 
judgment, 
the 
evidence 
supports 
summary 
disposition. 
After plaintiff suffered a heart attack and 
was diagnosed with heart disease, his physician released 
33  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
him to work on restricted duty only. 
Accordingly, 
plaintiff spent the majority of his career as a desk 
clerk.23
 The record indicates that for approximately ten 
years, there was never a question that plaintiff’s heart 
condition prevented him from performing the full range of 
duties normally required of police officers. 
This is 
precisely 
why 
plaintiff’s 
physician 
placed 
him 
on 
restricted duty and why he remained in a nonpatrol, desk­
clerk position for ten years. 
Plaintiff’s own counsel 
admitted to the trial court that plaintiff, because of his 
heart condition, cannot perform regular patrol functions. 
In 
attempting 
to 
withstand 
defendant’s 
motion, 
plaintiff argues that the department failed to undertake an 
individualized assessment of his condition before placing 
him on disability retirement in 1995, and, therefore, that 
a genuine question of material fact necessarily remains 
regarding whether he can perform the EFL tasks. 
However, 
in light of the circumstances of plaintiff’s employment 
history and the nature of his medical condition, we believe 
23 Consistent with the decision of the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Holbrook, see n 18, the fact that the 
department allowed plaintiff for a period of years to
continue working, even though he could not perform the
essential functions of his position, does not preclude it 
34  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
that the department was not required to perform an 
individualized assessment of plaintiff’s condition beyond 
those 
assessments 
that 
were 
routinely 
carried 
out. 
Department physicians examined plaintiff and consulted the 
medical records prepared by plaintiff’s own physicians. 
Plaintiff’s 
medical 
records 
indicated, 
as 
would 
be 
expected, that plaintiff’s heart condition continued to 
persist. 
Under such circumstances, it would be pointless 
to require the department, before placing plaintiff on 
disability retirement, to have him undertake agility tests 
in order to determine whether he could perform the EFL 
tasks. 
Such tests would essentially require plaintiff to 
perform those very tasks that, because of his heart 
condition, his medical records indicated he was to refrain 
from performing. 
When the department stated in 1995 that 
plaintiff was unable to perform the essential functions of 
a police officer position, it was relying on evidence that 
already had been conclusively established by plaintiff’s 
own medical records and accepted as the truth by all 
parties. 
Plaintiff has presented evidence that he chased down a 
purse-snatcher on foot approximately fifteen years ago. 
from subsequently changing its mind, perhaps on the basis 
35  
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
This evidence perhaps demonstrates that plaintiff is not 
incapable of performing on a sporadic basis individual EFL 
tasks. 
However, in light of the substantial contrary 
evidence reflected in plaintiff’s medical records and by 
ten years of employment history, that evidence does not 
create a genuine question of material fact regarding 
whether plaintiff is capable of performing the essential 
functions of a police officer. 
Accordingly, in light of the evidence in support of 
summary disposition, the evidence presented by plaintiff 
does not raise a genuine question of material fact. 
Because the record establishes that plaintiff is unable to 
perform the EFL tasks, he may not proceed on his ADA and 
PWDCRA claims. 
We therefore reverse the decision of the 
Court of Appeals and reinstate the circuit court’s grant of 
summary disposition in favor of defendant. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, plaintiff has raised no genuine issue 
of material fact regarding whether the EFL tasks are 
“essential 
functions” 
of 
his 
former 
police 
officer 
position. 
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court 
of Appeals on this question, and we reinstate the circuit 
of budgetary or other considerations. 
36  
 
 
  
 
court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant. 
We further hold that plaintiff has not raised a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he is able 
to perform the essential functions of a police officer 
position. 
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court 
of Appeals on this question as well. We reinstate the 
circuit court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of 
defendant. 
Stephen J. Markman
Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
37  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ALLAN PEDEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 119408 
CITY OF DETROIT, DETROIT
POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
While I agree with much of the majority's analysis, I 
cannot join in its decision to uphold the trial court's 
summary dismissal of this case. 
Instead, I would affirm 
the decision of the Court of Appeals, reverse the trial 
court’s ruling, and remand the matter for trial. 
The issue is not whether defendant has the right to 
require all its officers to meet what it determines are 
essential functions of police work within the department. 
It is whether plaintiff presented a factual question about 
whether the requirements that defendant has designated as 
essential for its police officers are actually imposed on 
all officers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appropriate standard of review for this case is 
recited in Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 
817 (1999): 
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the
factual 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
complaint. 
In 
evaluating a motion for summary disposition
brought under this subsection, a trial court
considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and other evidence submitted by the
parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.
Where the proffered evidence fails to establish
a genuine issue regarding any material fact,
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10), (G)(4). Quinto 
v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358; 547 NW2d 314
(1996). 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EEOC INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES 
The majority describes the statutory framework of the 
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et 
seq., and the Michigan Persons With Disabilities Civil 
Rights Act, MCL 37.1101 et seq. 
It disregards the 
Interpretive Guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 
These guidelines are 
valuable in clarifying that the "essential functions" of a 
police officer must be essential in reality, not just on 
paper: 
The 
inquiry 
into 
whether 
a 
particular
function 
is 
essential 
initially 
focuses 
on 
whether the employer actually requires employees
in the position to perform the functions that the
employer asserts are essential. For example, an
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
employer may state that typing is an essential 
function of a position. If, in fact, the employer
has 
never 
required 
any 
employee 
in 
that 
particular 
position 
to 
type, 
this 
will 
be 
evidence that typing is not actually an essential
function of the position. 
* * * 
It is important to note that the inquiry
into essential functions is not intended to 
second guess an employer's business judgment with
regard 
to 
production 
standards, 
whether 
qualitative 
or 
quantitative, 
nor 
to 
require
employers to lower such standards. (See § 1630.10
Qualification 
Standards, 
Tests 
and 
Other 
Selection Criteria). If an employer requires its
typists to be able to accurately type 75 words
per minute, it will not be called upon to explain
why an inaccurate work product, or a typing speed
of 65 words per minute, would not be adequate.
Similarly, if a hotel requires its service 
workers to thoroughly clean 16 rooms per day, it
will not have to explain why it requires thorough
cleaning, or why it chose a 16 room rather than a
10 room requirement. However, if an employer does
require accurate 75 word per minute typing or the
thorough cleaning of 16 rooms, it will have to 
show that it actually imposes such requirements
on its employees in fact, and not simply on 
paper. [29 CFR Pt 1630, App 1630.2(n) (emphasis
added).] 
The EEOC Interpretive Guidelines render the question 
of what comprises the essential functions of a job a 
factual matter. 
In addition, the language cited suggests 
that it is the employer who must show that the purported 
"essential functions" of a job are imposed uniformly. 
THE APPROPRIATE BURDEN OF PROOF 
With respect to which party bears the burden of 
proving the essential nature of the disputed "essential 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
functions," the majority finds persuasive the analysis of a 
federal district court. 
It disregards rulings by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that 
the burden is on the employer. 
See Monette v Electronic 
Data Sys Corp, 90 F3d 1173, 1179-1180, 1184-1185 (CA 6, 
1996), and Hamlin v Charter Twp of Flint, 165 F3d 426, 429­
431 (CA 6, 1999). 
I find the Sixth Circuit analysis more 
soundly grounded in the EEOC's Interpretive Guidelines and 
more compelling. 
A CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS IS REQUIRED 
In formulating its opinion, the majority considers the 
job requirements for a department’s police officers in 
general terms. 
The consideration should be focused, 
instead, case by case, on the essential functions of an 
officer 
in 
the 
plaintiff's 
position. 
Other 
courts 
reviewing ADA claims against law enforcement agencies have 
taken the latter approach. 
For example, in Champ v Baltimore Co,1 the plaintiff 
did not prevail because the defendant showed that he could 
not perform essential duties that actually were required of 
all officers. 
Plaintiff had lost the complete use of one 
arm 
and 
could 
not 
drive 
a 
vehicle 
under 
emergency 
conditions or effectuate a forcible arrest. 
He was not 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
proficient with a firearm. 
The department provided 
evidence that all officers were subject to reassignment at 
any 
time 
and 
that 
nonpatrol 
officers 
actually 
were 
reassigned to patrol in emergencies. 
 
Similarly, in Shoemaker v Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Comm,2 the court considered the small size of the police 
department and the actual duties of its officers in 
determining that all officers were required to perform 
patrol work. Plaintiff could not do that work. 
In Dorris v Kentwood,3 a Michigan federal district 
court refused to grant summary disposition in favor of the 
defendant police department. 
There, the officer offered 
evidence that his position as an in-school instructor did 
not require the strenuous physical exertion demanded of a 
patrol officer. 
In each of the cases, the department was 
obligated to come forward with evidence that in practice 
all of its officers were required to perform the activities 
that it demanded of the plaintiff. 
The proper factual analysis is set forth at 29 CFR pt 
1630.2(n). 
The trial court in this case failed to engage 
1 884 F Supp 991 (1995).  
2 160 Pa Cmwlth 216; 634 A2d 772 (1993).  
3 1994 US Dist LEXIS 15640; 1994 WL 762219, 4 Am 
Disabilities Cas (BNA) 741 (WD Mich, 1994). 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in that analysis. 
Rather, it decided that public policy 
considerations required that defendant be insulated from 
judicial review of the "essential functions" that it had 
established for its officers. 
It ignored that plaintiff 
has raised a question of fact regarding whether those 
functions were uniformly applied to all officers. 
THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS MAY NOT HAVE 
BEEN UNIFORMLY APPLIED IN PRACTICE 
In 
this 
case, 
for 
ten 
years 
after 
plaintiff's 
physician placed him on restrictive duty status, he worked 
for defendant, a large, urban police department that was 
divided 
into 
many 
subdivisions. 
Eventually, 
he 
successfully bid for both A-clerk and Crime Analysis Unit 
(CAU) positions. He won these positions without regard to 
his medical condition. Neither required the physical 
capabilities of a patrol officer. After plaintiff had 
served three years in the CAU, defendant forced him into 
involuntary disability retirement. 
Defendant asserts that plaintiff was unable to perform 
the essential functions of his job. 
As evidence of its 
definition of essential functions, defendant relies on a 
Michigan Law Enforcement Officer Training Commission list 
that it had adopted. 
See ante, p 3. 
However, plaintiff 
provided 
testimony 
that 
full-duty 
officers 
were 
not 
routinely evaluated to determine whether they could perform
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
all the tasks on the list. 
Further evidence demonstrated 
that defendant continued to employ others, including a 
wheelchair-bound officer, who also could not perform all 
the tasks on the essential functions list. 
There is precedent for adopting plaintiff’s position 
that, 
to 
establish 
grounds 
for 
dismissal, 
essential 
functions must be uniformly applied in practice to all. 
The court in the case of Simon v St Louis Co, Mo,4 faced a 
situation 
similar 
to 
the 
instant 
one. 
After 
the 
plaintiff’s dismissal, other disabled officers remained at 
work as commissioned police officers. 
The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit remanded the case 
to the district court with the following order: 
On remand, the district court should 
consider whether the requirements for police
officers of St. Louis County, as testified to
at 
trial 
by 
Colonel 
Kleinknecht, 
are 
reasonable, 
legitimate, 
and 
necessary
requirements for all positions within the 
department. The district court should determine
whether the ability to make a forceful arrest
and the ability to perform all of the duties of
all of the positions within the department are
in fact uniformly required of all officers. If
not uniformly required, they should not be
considered 
actual 
requirements 
for 
all 
positions. [Id. at 321.] 
In Simon, the plaintiff police officer presented 
evidence that the defendant police department’s physical 
4 656 F2d 316, 320 (CA 8, 1981). 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
requirements for officers were not actually applied to all 
officers. 
This case is similar to Simon in that Officer 
Peden presented evidence that the department’s essential 
functions were not, in fact, required of all but were 
selectively required. 
Contrary to the majority's characterization, I do not 
imply that every officer must spend the same percentage of 
time on every task on the essential functions list. 
Rather, if all the tasks are applicable to all the 
officers, as the police department asserts, then all tasks 
must actually be considered when assessing the ability of 
any officer. 
If one officer is subject to forced 
disability 
retirement 
because 
he 
cannot 
perform 
an 
essential function, then all officers who cannot perform 
that function should be forced to retire. 
The difficulty that plaintiff raises here is that, 
although the department asserts that all officers must 
satisfy all tasks on the list, that assertion may not be 
true in practice. In accordance with the EEOC Interpretive 
Guidelines, we should not defer to an essential function if 
it is essential only on paper. 
Given that plaintiff has 
offered evidence that officers who cannot perform the 
essential functions are still employed by the department, 
summary disposition should not have been granted. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
I agree with the majority that the courts should give 
deference to the descriptions given by police departments 
of the essential functions of their officers’ jobs. 
However, I do not believe that the deference should be 
absolute. 
To constitute a basis for dismissal, the essential 
functions must be uniformly applied to all police officers. 
The burden is on the department, if challenged, to make 
this showing. 
In this case, plaintiff raises the issue 
whether defendant viewed the tasks on its essential 
functions list as applicable to all positions within the 
police department and uniformly required them. 
Consequently, summary dismissal of plaintiff’s claim 
was not appropriate. While it is unknown whether plaintiff 
would prevail at trial, he has provided enough evidence to 
escape summary disposition. I would affirm the decision of 
the Court of Appeals and remand the case for trial. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
9