Case Title: STATE, EX REL. v. Schroeder

Citation: 199 Kan. 403, 430 P.2d 304

Docket Number: 44,772

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1967-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
199 Kan. 403 (1967)
430 P.2d 304
THE STATE OF KANSAS, ex rel., ROBERT C. LONDERHOLM, Attorney General of Kansas, Plaintiff,
v.
FLOYD SCHROEDER, a/k/a HENRY FLOYD SCHROEDER, Defendant.
No. 44,772

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 12, 1967.
Robert Martin, special assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, attorney general, J. Richard Foth, assistant attorney general, and Melvin M. Gradert, special assistant attorney general, were with him on the brief for the plaintiff.
Eugene G. Coombs and Harry E. Robbins, Jr., both of Wichita, argued the cause and were on the brief for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARMAN, C.:
This is a quo warranto action to oust the defendant Floyd Schroeder from the office of county commissioner of Sedgwick county, third district. It was instituted pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1205, et seq., which provide for the forfeiture of a public official's office for willful misconduct in office, willful neglect to perform any duty imposed by law, or violation of any penal statute involving moral turpitude.
The petition, as amended, alleged six separate claims for relief as grounds for removal: (1) Conflict of interest sales of material to Sedgwick county under the name K & L Service & Supply Company; (2) conspiracy with certain vendors to defraud the county in connection with sales of merchandise; (3) false statement in reelection campaign; (4) fraudulent inventory concealing shortages of county property; (5) refusal to testify at an inquisition; and (6) conflict of interest sales of material to the county under the name L & S Equipment Company, together with short delivery of merchandise *404 and excessive prices charged. The defendant filed an answer denying the factual allegations of misconduct, whereupon this court appointed Honorable Perry Owsley, a qualified attorney and a former district judge of this state, as its commissioner to hear evidence, make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and report to the court.
After evidence had been heard by the commissioner but prior to the filing of his report, plaintiff moved to reopen the proceeding and present evidence in support of a seventh claim for relief based upon its allegation defendant had requested and accepted gratuities from certain vendors doing business with Sedgwick county and, during his second term, had testified falsely as to his connection with these vendors. This court referred the motion to the commissioner for disposition. The commissioner declined to reopen the case in view of his findings, conclusions and recommendation made with respect to two of the other grounds for relief.
The commissioner's findings (omitting transcript and exhibit citations) and conclusions so far as necessary for decision here are as follows:
"Facts Pertaining to the Sixth Claim for Relief
"Facts Pertaining to the First Claim for Relief
"Facts Pertaining to the Second Claim for Relief
"Facts Pertaining to the Third Claim for Relief
"Facts Pertaining to the Fourth Claim for Relief
"Facts Pertaining to the Fifth Claim for Relief
"COMMISSIONER'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
..............
..............
After the filing of this report and upon plaintiff's motion this court entered an order pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1207 suspending defendant from office pending final determination of the action.
The contentions of the parties now are as follows: Plaintiff urges the commissioner correctly determined questions of fact and law as to the first and sixth claims for relief and that he properly recommended ouster as to them; plaintiff contends the commissioner should have made findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending *410 defendant's ouster on the fifth claim for relief based on defendant's action in claiming his privilege against self-incrimination at the April 15, 1966, inquisition; if ouster be not sustained as recommended on the first and sixth claims for relief, then plaintiff urges its motion to reopen the case to file a seventh claim for relief and present evidence thereon should be granted. Plaintiff does not contest the commissioner's findings and conclusions with respect to the second, third and fourth claims for relief.
Defendant objects to the adverse findings of fact and conclusions of law and asks they be disapproved and that judgment be entered in his favor.
Defendant is charged with misconduct in office and willful neglect of duty in the office of county commissioner. We examine some of the duties and responsibilities of that office, briefly summarized, as follows:
The powers of a county as a body politic and corporate are exercised by its board of county commissioners (K.S.A. 19-103).
County commissioners are empowered to establish regulations and orders as to the use of county property; to examine and settle all accounts for receipts and expenses of the county and to allow and pay all accounts chargeable against the county; to represent the county and to have the care of its property and the management of its business and concerns in all cases where no other provision is made by law (K.S.A. 19-212).
No account is to be allowed by the board of county commissioners unless it separately states each item and is certified as being just, correct, due and unpaid. The board may, in its judgment, disallow a certified claim and demand further evidence in support of the claim (K.S.A. 19-221).
The board of county commissioners has exclusive control of all expenditures of the county (K.S.A. 19-229).
K.S.A. 19-242 makes it unlawful for the board of county commissioners to allow or pay any sum on an account, claim or demand against the county greater "than the amount actually due thereon, dollar for dollar, according to the legal or ordinary compensation or price for ... materials furnished."
K.S.A. 19-243 provides that a violation of 19-242 by any county commissioner is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars and by removal from office.
*411 K.S.A. 21-1608, our so-called conflict of interest statute, provides that all county and state officers are "prohibited from taking any contract, or performing or doing or having performed or done for their own profit, any work in and about the office holden by them, or in or about any work over which they have in whole or in part supervision, direction, or control, and from furnishing any materials used in any such work, and from furnishing for the use of any institution, public work, county ... any ... materials for building, or other thing required by such institution, public work, county, township, or other interest so in the keeping, in whole or in part, of such person."
K.S.A. 21-1609 provides that violation of 21-1608 by a county officer is a misdemeanor.
K.S.A. 19-232 provides that all fees, costs or other allowances obtained from or allowed against the county when not authorized by law, and if not refunded upon demand, may be recovered in a civil action brought in any court of competent jurisdiction, and the court is required to add a 100% penalty in rendering judgment in favor of the county. The authority to commence and prosecute such actions rests exclusively with the board of county commissioners (Kerby v. Clay County, 71 Kan. 683, 81 Pac. 503).
K.S.A. 19-233 provides that any county commissioner "who shall willfully violate any provision of law, or fail to perform any duty required of him by law, shall be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor."
K.S.A. 10-802, insofar as applicable, provides no warrant shall be issued or authorized by any board of county commissioners except on an itemized statement certified by the claimant to be true, correct, due and unpaid, and that any claimant willfully making a false claim is guilty of larceny.
Both factual and legal questions are presented in determining whether the defendant should be ousted from office. As to the former, in State, ex. rel., v. Buchanan, 142 Kan. 515, 51 P.2d 5, this court stated:
Defendant urges this court to disapprove the findings of fact made by the commissioner with respect to the first and sixth claims *412 for relief, as being unsupported by the evidence. We treat them chronologically as did the commissioner, dealing with the latter claim first wherein defendant was charged with improper sales of material to Sedgwick county under the name of L & S Equipment Company soon after taking office.
First, with respect to the conflict of interest sales generally and without attempting to repeat the commissioner's carefully prepared findings, it was undisputed that defendant while he was a county commissioner made certain sales to the county of utility generators and others items totaling $3,381.42 as revealed by documentary and other evidence. Defendant had taken office as county commissioner on January 9, 1961. Although there was some negotiation prior to this time leading up to the questioned transactions, as evidenced by invoices on behalf of defendant, and in some instances by purchase requisitions dated prior to January 9, 1961, in every instance the purchase order claim voucher was signed and certified by the vendor after January 9, 1961, was dated and signed on behalf of the county thereafter, and paid for by county warrant thereafter. It should be noted the vouchers for payment were signed and certified to by defendant's seventeen-year-old nephew on behalf of the L & S Equipment Company, owned solely by defendant.
Defendants' principal contention here is that the sales were actually completed prior to the time he took office and that "it merely took a while for the paper work to catch up." The contention is incorrect. A purchase requisition is simply a request by the interested department that certain material be supplied. It does not constitute a contract. There was no contract binding upon the county shown here until the purchase order claim vouchers were completed (K.S.A. 10-802; 19-103, 19-212; 19-221; 19-222; 19-229; 19-242; 19-307). Moreover, duties of county commissioners do not end with mere completion of the paper work essential to a contract. When material is delivered the commissioners are charged with supervisory responsibility of determining whether the contractor has satisfied the contract terms and, if problems arise, of settling them satisfactorily to the county's best interest.
Nondelivery of certain merchandise paid for by the county during this period was also found by the commissioner (finding 8). This consisted of three utility generators sold to the county fire department to be installed on its vehicles. Evidence on this was conflicting. The defendant testified he personally delivered four generators to the fire department maintenance shop. On behalf of plaintiff *413 the mechanic in charge of that shop, as well as the captain in charge, testified only one generator was delivered there.
As to excessive prices charged for the generators, the distributor testified that according to the manufacturer's schedule of recommended price, known to defendant, the appropriate price to Sedgwick county for the ten generators sold would have been $199.50 each instead of $269.55, such latter figure being twenty dollars more than the suggested retail price (finding 9).
The evidence as to the first claim for relief was likewise conflicting. In addition to the details recited in the commissioner's report (findings 17-21) the record reveals that the defendant's seventeen-year-old nephew ostensibly operating the K & L Service and Supply Company during the period from June to December, 1961, maintained no business records of any kind for this company and filed no income tax return reflecting any income on behalf of its activities. Also to be noted is the fact that when in December, 1961, the defendant sold his Wichita Fire Equipment Company to Lewis Bros. Hardware Company (vendors with whom defendant was charged with misconduct in the second and fourth claims for relief), at the same time defendant's nephew and his K & L Company, for some unexplained reason, went out of business. The circumstances reveal more than just an elaborate coincidence  rather they reveal a wholly fabricated arrangement whereby defendant, after becoming county commissioner, continued to do business with the county under a sham company, the true nature of which he concealed.
Defendant presents no cogent or persuasive reasons to support his argument the commissioner's findings should be disapproved. We think the findings are well substantiated by credible evidence and we are satisfied with their correctness.
Defendant's chief defense is that which has become known as the present term rule, i.e., a public officer may not be removed from office for misconduct occurring during a previous term of the office. The rule was applied by this court in State, ex rel., v. Henschel, 103 Kan. 511, 175 Pac. 393. There the accused was a police chief whose alleged misconduct was attempting to prevent a constable from arresting the chief's chauffeur, a special police officer, on a misdemeanor charge.
It is true the alleged misconduct of which defendant has been found guilty occurred during his term which expired January 11, 1965, and the ouster action is directed toward his second successive term in office.
*414 The present term rule is not followed in all jurisdictions; about as many reject as support it (see annotations at 17 A.L.R. 279 and 138 A.L.R. 753, together with A.L.R. Blue Book Service). Statutory provisions aside, the principal rationale of the rule is that reelection or reappointment of the officer amounts to condonation of his prior misconduct. Condonation of an offense implies knowledge of the offense, and, if the officer's misconduct in the prior term was concealed or not known to the electorate or the appointing official at the time of reelection or reappointment, several courts have refused to apply the rule (see annotations, supra).
We would have difficulty supposing any electorate would knowingly reelect as guardian of the public funds one guilty of the deceitful dealings revealed here. Be that as it may, we are not confronted with deciding whether the present term rule should be applied here because of condonation by the electorate. The defendant throughout has stoutly denied any acts of wrongdoing, more specifically, in his reelection campaign he is shown to have categorically denied the factual basis upon which any wrong must rest (finding 27). The wrongdoing has been concealed from public view and there is nothing before us which may fairly be interpreted as condonation by the electorate.
The present term rule applied in Henschel, and referred to by way of dictum elsewhere, was considered most recently in State, ex rel., v. Harvey, 148 Kan. 166, 80 P.2d 1095. This was an action to oust a district court clerk from her third consecutive two year term of office for shortages in her accounts occurring during her second term. In defense, cases applying the present term rule were cited. This court looked somewhat askance at that rule, saying:
This court thereupon pointed out there was a continuing duty on the part of the clerk to restore the money taken and this duty extended into the current term of office, and failure to discharge the duty constituted misconduct. The court noted also other instances of misconduct with respect to record-keeping, summarizing as follows:
The findings here indict defendant on four separate charges: *415 Conflict of interest sales through the L & S Equipment Company; nondelivery of merchandise paid for by the county; excessive prices charged the county; and conflict of interest sales through the dummy proprietorship.
Insofar as nondelivery of merchandise and excessive prices are concerned, we think, under the reasoning applied in Harvey, there remains a continuing duty on the part of the defendant to make restitution to the county for the wrongful depletion of its funds, this duty extends into the present term, and neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct.
The same reasoning might be applied respecting the conflict of interest sales, particularly where there was concealment of the true facts, on the basis the sales in subversion of the law gave rise to continuing obligations on the part of the officer. Beyond that, however, we think there is a public interest in the fitness for public office of one engaging in such calculated trafficking, even though the transactions occurred in a term immediately prior to the present term of the officer.
The statute (K.S.A. 21-1608) denouncing such transactions has been part of our law since 1867. Its roots go back to the ancient injunction that no man can serve two masters. Official action is to be guided only by consideration of the public welfare. Violation of the statute is criminal (K.S.A. 21-1609). In 1889, in Weston v. Lane, 40 Kan. 479, 20 Pac. 260, this court held its violation to be ipso facto a disqualification to hold the office of clerk of a public school board.
Today our concern for honest and faithful public service is probably no where more evident than in the area of conflict of interest; no acts are more universally deemed inimical to the public welfare.
Vested as county commissioners are with the general control and supervision of the business affairs of the county, we can scarcely imagine a more serious disqualification for the particular office than conflict of interest transactions especially where, as here, the transactions are not of an illusive gray nature but are clearcut and direct. Nothing could be more intimately related to the duties of the office or affect those duties more directly. Such acts are moral delinquencies striking at the very heart of faithful performance required of the office and, whenever committed, they stamp the actor unworthy of the office.
The object of removal of a public officer for official misconduct *416 is not to punish the offending incumbent, but to protect and preserve the office, and to free the public of an unfit officer (see State, ex rel., v. Showalter, 189 Kan. 562, 370 P.2d 408).
We hold then that direct conflict of interest transactions by a county commissioner in his first term of office under the circumstances here shown are grounds for ouster from his second successive term of that office.
Finally, defendant argues the amounts involved are too trifling to invoke the drastic penalty of ouster. We need not labor the matter. The transactions amounted to approximately $4,800.00. This is not insubstantial nor is it de minimus from any standpoint. We believe ouster is warranted on the record of willful misconduct and neglect of duty. We approve and confirm the commissioner's findings and conclusions as to plaintiff's first and sixth claims for relief and we sustain the recommendation for defendant's ouster based thereon. In view of this conclusion we need not consider other matters urged by plaintiff as additional grounds for ouster.
The judgment of this court is that defendant be ousted from the office of county commissioner of Sedgwick county, Kansas, third district.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.