Case Title: Lashay v. Dept. of S.R.S.

Citation: 160 Vt. 60, 625 A.2d 224

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
LASHAY_V_DEPT_OF_SRS.92-118; 160 Vt. 60; 625 A.2d 224


[Opinion Filed 15-Jan-1993]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 24-Feb-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 92-118


 David Lashay                                 Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Windham Superior Court

 Department of Social and
 Rehabilitation Services; William
 Young, Commissioner of Social                November Term, 1992
 and Rehabilitation Services;
 P. Lawrence Belove and Ricky Lee
 Rice


 Richard W. Norton, J.

 William M. McCarty and Bruce Hesselbach of McCarty Law Offices, Brattleboro,
    for plaintiff-appellant

 John A. Serafino of Ryan Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, for defendants-
    appellees



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Johnson, JJ. and Bryan, Supr. J.,
           Specially Assigned



      GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff David Lashay appeals from a summary judgment
 order entered in favor of defendants Social and Rehabilitation Services
 (SRS); William Young, Commissioner of SRS; and P. Lawrence Belove, a former
 SRS employee.  Plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that
 defendants are immune from plaintiff's suit, which alleges that he was
 sexually abused by his foster father after SRS received warnings concerning
 the placement.  We affirm the decision with regard to defendant Young but
 reverse with regard to defendants Belove and SRS.
      In reviewing a decision to grant summary judgment, we regard all
 allegations made in opposition to the motion as true if supported by affida-
 vits or other evidentiary material.  Messier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
 154 Vt. 406, 409, 578 A.2d 98, 99-100 (1990).  As a result, we summarize the
 facts as advanced by plaintiff.
      On February 1, 1985, plaintiff was in the custody of the Commissioner
 of SRS (FN1) who placed him in the foster home of defendants Ricky Lee Rice and
 Donna Rice.  The Rices had submitted an application to SRS for a foster home
 license that was pending at the time of placement.  Plaintiff was fourteen
 years old.
      On about February 11, 1985, upon learning that plaintiff had been
 placed with the Rices, William Wait, plaintiff's former foster parent,
 telephoned SRS employees repeatedly to warn them that plaintiff should be
 removed from the Rices' home immediately.  Mr. Wait knew that defendant Rice
 had asked another foster child in Mr. Wait's care to engage in sexual
 activity with him.  Mr. Wait spoke with defendant Belove, the case worker
 supervisor, among others at SRS.  Plaintiff was not removed from the Rice
 household, nor did SRS investigate the allegations.
      During the latter part of February and March 1985, defendant Rice
 sexually abused plaintiff on three occasions.  Plaintiff was removed from
 the Rice household on April 19, 1985, after SRS received complaints about
 the abuse via plaintiff's natural mother.
      Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants Rice, Young, Belove and
 SRS in May 1989, alleging three counts of assault; negligent placement,
 supervision and investigation; breach of statutory duties; and deprivation
 of liberty under Chapter I, Article 1 of the Vermont Constitution. (FN2)
 On June 28, 1991, defendants Young, Belove and SRS moved for summary judgment 
 on the ground that each was immune from suit for the actions alleged. (FN3) 
 The superior court granted the motion, holding that (1) defendants Young and
 Belove are shielded from suit under the doctrine of official immunity, and
 (2) SRS is shielded from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
 Plaintiff appeals this decision.
      We first address a procedural issue raised by defendants.  They claim
 this Court has no jurisdiction to consider this appeal until a final
 judgment is entered regarding the claims against defendant Rice.  Defendants
 maintain that the Court cannot consider an appeal in the absence of a final
 order unless the collateral order exception to the finality rule applies.
 See V.R.A.P. 5.1.  We do not address defendants' argument because the trial
 court has entered final judgment regarding defendants Young, Belove and SRS.
      Under V.R.A.P. 4, when the notice of appeal is filed prior to entry of
 final judgment but after a decision has been announced, the notice is
 treated as filed on the day that final judgment is entered.  In this case,
 the decision was announced on January 28, 1992, in the court's summary
 judgment order.  Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on February 26, 1992,
 and the court entered final judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 54(b) on September
 23, 1992.  Consequently, we treat the notice of appeal as though filed on
 September 23.  See V.R.A.P. 4.
                                     I.
      We next consider the issues of immunity.  The first issue is whether
 defendants Young and Belove are entitled to immunity from suit based on the
 facts alleged.  Under some circumstances, official immunity shields state
 officials and employees from lawsuits based on their activities.  Levinsky
 v. Diamond, 151 Vt. 178, 183, 559 A.2d 1073, 1077 (1989), overruled on other
 grounds, Muzzy v. State, 155 Vt. 279, 583 A.2d 82 (1990).  We have recog-
 nized two degrees of official immunity: absolute immunity and qualified
 immunity.  Id. at 184-85, 559 A.2d  at 1078.  Absolute immunity applies to
 judges, legislators and the state's highest executive officers when they
 are acting within their respective authorities.  Id. at 185, 559 A.2d  at
 1078.  Because defendant Young is the highest executive officer at SRS, he
 is entitled to absolute immunity, if he was acting within the scope of his
 authority.  See Curran v. Marcille, 152 Vt. 247, 249, 565 A.2d 1362, 1363
 (1989) (Commissioners of Department of Motor Vehicles and Department of
 Corrections entitled to absolute immunity); Levinsky, 151 Vt. at 185, 559 A.2d  at 1079 (Commissioner of Department of Social Welfare entitled to
 absolute immunity).
      The scope of authority of the Commissioner of SRS is defined, in part,
 by 3 V.S.A. { 3052, which provides:
 Mandatory duties
           (a)  The commissioner shall determine the policies of
         the department, and may exercise the powers and shall
         perform the duties required for its effective
         administration.
           (b)  In addition to the other duties imposed by law,
         the commissioner shall:
            (1) Administer the laws assigned to the department.
            (2) Coordinate and integrate the work of the divi-
         sions.
            (3) Supervise and control all staff functions.
      Plaintiff alleges that defendant Young (1) violated the Foster Home
 Regulations by placing and maintaining plaintiff in an unlicensed home and
 (2) failed to train and supervise employees adequately regarding the
 reporting and investigating of allegations of child abuse.  All of these
 actions fall within the scope the Commissioner's authority to "[a]dminister
 the laws assigned to the department" and to "[s]upervise and control all
 staff functions",  3 V.S.A. { 3052; therefore, defendant Young is entitled
 to absolute immunity.
      Unlike defendant Young, defendant Belove is not among the state's
 highest executive officers.  Qualified immunity, however, protects lower-
 level officers, employees and agents "(1) acting during their employment and
 acting, or reasonably believing they are acting, within the scope of their
 authority; (2) acting in good faith; and (3) performing discretionary, as
 opposed to ministerial acts."  Levinsky, 151 Vt. at 185, 559 A.2d  at 1078.
 Plaintiff concedes that the alleged conduct of defendant Belove was in the
 course of his employment.  He disputes, however, whether defendant Belove
 met the other two elements.
      "Good faith exists where an official's acts did not violate clearly
 established rights of which the official reasonably should have known."
 Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621, 630, 587 A.2d 975, 980 (1991).  In Murray, we
 held that the defendant SRS case worker was immune from suit for conducting
 an allegedly inadequate and one-sided investigation following a report of
 child sexual abuse.  Id. at 632, 587 A.2d  at 981.  The plaintiff in that
 case argued that the investigation had not been carried out in good faith,
 and that, therefore, the defendant was not entitled to immunity.  There,
 however, the defendant had complied with 33 V.S.A. { 4915 by conducting an
 investigation immediately after receiving the report, and the investigation
 was in conformance with statutory guidelines and the SRS Policy Manual.  Id.
 at 631-32, 587 A.2d  at 981.  We concluded that because the defendant's
 investigation was in compliance with statutory requirements, the case worker
 should not reasonably have known that she was obligated to investigate
 further.  Therefore, we held that her investigation was undertaken in good
 faith.  Id. at 632, 587 A.2d  at 981.
      Under the third element, a discretionary duty is one requiring judgment
 in performance.  Libercent v. Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76, 81,