Case Title: Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 509 v. Dep’t Mental Health

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11544

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11544 
 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 509  vs.  
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 7, 2014. - August 15, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ.1 
 
Privatization Act.  Commissioner of Mental Health.  Auditor. 
Declaratory Relief.  Practice, Civil, Declaratory 
proceeding, Standing, Parties, Failure to join party. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
February 15, 2012.  
 
 
The case was heard by Merita A. Hopkins, J., on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Alfred Gordon O'Connell for the plaintiff. 
 
Jo Ann Shotwell Kaplan, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
Donald J. Siegel & James A.W. Shaw, for Massachusetts AFL-
CIO, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Gerald A. McDonough, for the Auditor of the Commonwealth, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
                                                     
 
 
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The plaintiff, Service Employees International 
Union, Local 509 (union), appeals from an order of a Superior 
Court judge dismissing its complaint for declaratory judgment 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, §§ 1, 2, and 5. In that complaint, 
the union alleged that the Department of Mental Health (DMH) 
violated the Massachusetts privatization statute, G. L. c. 7, 
§§ 52-55 (Pacheco Law), by entering into contracts with private 
entities to obtain services substantially similar to those 
performed by members of the union, but failing to comply with 
relevant statutory obligations.  DMH filed an answer as well as 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).  After a hearing, the judge 
granted DMH's motion, which she treated as a motion to dismiss 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Mass. R. Civ. P. 
12 (b) (1), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).  The judge determined that the 
union lacked both direct and associational standing to seek 
declaratory relief and, additionally, that the union's failure 
to join necessary parties constituted a separate jurisdictional 
bar requiring dismissal.  The judge did not err in declining to 
consider the union's complaint on the basis of its failure to 
name all necessary parties.  However, because we conclude that 
the union has direct standing to seek a declaratory judgment 
under G. L. c. 231A that would invalidate the contracts at 
3 
 
 
issue, we remand the case to the Superior Court for the limited 
purpose of allowing the union to seek leave to amend its 
complaint by adding all necessary parties.  An order of 
dismissal shall enter if the union does not take such action 
within thirty days of the issuance of the rescript in this case.   
 
1.  Background.  The following facts are taken from the 
union's complaint.  For over a decade, DMH, which provides 
mental health services to clients throughout the Commonwealth, 
has employed case managers who are members of the union. Case 
managers are responsible for conducting initial need 
assessments, developing individualized service plans, and 
maintaining ongoing client contact and advocacy.  In late 2008 
or early 2009, DMH entered into contracts with private entities 
to initiate a new program, Community Based Flexible Supports 
(CBFS).  CBFS services, which were intended to facilitate more 
personalized client assistance, overlapped in certain respects 
with services previously provided by DMH case managers.2   
                                                     
 
     2 The Department of Mental Health (DMH) has described 
Community Based Flexible Supports (CBFS) services as including 
"interventions and supports that manage psychiatric symptoms in 
the community, restore or maintain daily living skills, promote 
wellness and the management of medical conditions and assist 
clients to restore or maintain and use their strengths and 
skills to undertake employment. . . . CBFS contractors are 
responsible for:  client screenings and enrollment; assessments 
and integrated treatment planning; quality and utilization 
management; data collection and reporting; service documentation 
and discharge planning."     
 
4 
 
 
 
DMH concluded that the contracts into which it sought to 
enter did not constitute "privatization contracts" within the 
meaning of G. L. c. 7, § 53,3 and that it was therefore not 
subject to the terms of the Pacheco Law.  For this reason, 
throughout the contracting process, DMH did not comply with any 
of the requirements enumerated in G. L. c. 7, §§ 52-55, 
discussed in more detail below, nor did it notify the union or 
the Auditor of the Commonwealth that it had entered into such 
contracts.  During fiscal year 2009, approximately one hundred 
case managers, all members of the union, were laid off.  The 
union alleges that these layoffs resulted from implementation of 
DMH's CBFS contracts because the services provided by private 
                                                     
 
 
3  General Laws c. 7, § 53, defines a "privatization 
contract" as "an agreement or combination or series of 
agreements by which a non-governmental person or entity agrees 
with an agency to provide services, valued at $500,000 . . . 
which are substantially similar to and in lieu of, services 
theretofore provided, in whole or in part, by regular employees 
of an agency."  The statute further provides that the value of 
applicable contracts will increase as of January 1 each year in 
order to reflect the consumer price index.  Id.  As of January 
1, 2014, only contracts valued at $543,442 or more were subject 
to the requirements of the Pacheco Law, G. L. c. 7, §§ 52-55.  
See http://www.mass.gov/auditor/information-and-resources/for-
public-agencies/the-commonwealths-privatization-law-.html (last 
viewed Aug. 12, 2014).  While the record does not reflect the 
value of the contracts at issue in the present case, DMH has 
maintained that the Pacheco Law was inapplicable only because 
CBFS services, in its view, were distinct from those offered by 
case managers, not because the contract price was below the 
established minimum amount. 
  
5 
 
 
entities were substantially similar to those previously offered 
by the case managers.4 
   
In early 2009, the union notified the Auditor, who is 
endowed by G. L. c. 7, § 55, with a "broad grant of power" to 
review all privatization contracts for compliance with the 
Pacheco Law, Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Auditor of the 
Commonwealth, 430 Mass. 783, 791 (2000) (MBTA), that DMH had 
declined to follow the terms of the Pacheco Law despite having 
contracted with private entities in order to implement the CBFS 
program.  On September 15, 2010, after soliciting information 
from DMH about the contracts at issue, the general counsel for 
the Auditor issued a memorandum to both parties in which he 
concluded that the contracts in question constituted 
privatization contracts under the Pacheco Law and that, 
accordingly, DMH had erred in declining to comply with the 
Pacheco Law's requirements.5  Counsel forwarded this memorandum 
to the office of the Attorney General "to take whatever 
                                                     
 
     4 In its complaint, Service Employees International Union, 
Local 509 (union) alleged that case managers lost their jobs as 
a direct result of DMH's contractual activities.  We take no 
view as to whether the layoffs in fact resulted from the 
contracts into which DMH entered, or, indeed, whether those 
contracts constituted "privatization contracts" within the 
meaning of G. L. c. 7, § 53.  
  
     5 The memorandum states that "the facts in general and the 
statistics in particular indicate that at least a portion of 
public services was moved from state employees to private 
contractors without following the provisions set forth in G. L. 
c. 7, section 52-57."   
6 
 
 
steps . . . are appropriate."  The Attorney General took no 
action as a result of the Auditor's findings.  Following the 
issuance of the Auditor's report, DMH has not taken steps to 
comply with the terms of the Pacheco Law in connection with its 
implementation of the CBFS program, and has not reinstated the 
case managers who lost their jobs.  
 
On February 15, 2012, the union filed a complaint in the 
Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment pursuant to G. L. 
c. 231A, §§ 1, 2, and 5.  The complaint alleged that DMH had 
violated the Pacheco Law by entering into contracts with private 
entities without adhering to the requirements set forth in G. L. 
c. 7, §§ 52-55, and requested a declaration that the contracts 
at issue are invalid, as well as equitable relief including 
monetary damages and reinstatement of the case managers who were 
laid off.  In its answer, DMH averred that there was no 
violation because the provisions of the Pacheco Law were not 
applicable to the CBFS contracts.  
 
After a hearing, the judge allowed DMH's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, which consisted only of the union's 
complaint and DMH's answer.  She determined that the union 
lacked both direct and associational standing to pursue its 
claim, concluding that, where an agency "believes that the law 
is not applicable in a particular situation," it owes no duty to 
an employee organization or its members.  The judge also 
7 
 
 
concluded that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because 
the union had failed to join necessary parties to the action 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 8, and Mass. R. Civ. P. 19, 365 
Mass. 765 (1974).  We granted the union's petition for direct 
appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  We are asked to determine whether the 
union has standing to seek declaratory relief where DMH did not 
comply with the provisions of the Pacheco Law, given its 
unilateral determination that the law was inapplicable to its 
proposed contracts with outside vendors.  According to the 
union, DMH breached its statutory duties when it opted not to 
follow the procedures set forth in the Pacheco Law, thereby 
preventing the union from protecting the interests and 
employment rights of its membership.  This inability to fulfill 
its core mission, the union argues, constituted a legally 
cognizable injury sufficient to confer direct standing for the 
purposes of G. L. c. 231A.   
 
DMH maintains that the Pacheco Law provides no benefits to 
the union itself, as distinct from its members, and that the 
union's rights under the Pacheco Law exist solely to assist 
State employees.  Therefore, DMH contends, it owes no duty to 
the union under the Pacheco Law, and the union has no standing 
to seek declaratory relief.  In a related vein, DMH argues that 
the union has suffered no legally cognizable injury that could 
8 
 
 
serve as a predicate for direct standing.  Because, on this 
view, any statutory obligations DMH might owe the union inure 
only to the benefit of DMH employees, any injuries occasioned by 
a violation of those obligations would harm only the union's 
members and not the union itself.  In any event, such injuries 
would lie outside the Pacheco Law's zone of interest.  
 
As an initial matter and before turning to the merits of 
this dispute, it seems plain that the Pacheco Law as written 
does not contemplate the situation presented here.  The Pacheco 
Law establishes "[p]rocedures that agencies must follow when 
beginning the bidding process for and entering into a 
privatization contract."  MBTA, supra at 786.  While G. L. c. 7, 
§ 53, defines which contracts are subject to those enumerated 
procedures, the Pacheco Law provides no means by which to 
resolve questions as to whether a particular proposed contract 
with a private entity constitutes a "privatization contract" 
within the meaning of G. L. c. 7, § 53.  Otherwise put, there is 
no statutory provision addressing the procedures to follow when 
an agency makes a unilateral decision that it need not comply 
with the requirements of the Pacheco Law.      
 
Nor did our previous analysis of the Pacheco Law anticipate 
such a situation.  See MBTA, supra.  In that case, a public 
agency sought to privatize certain services and presented its 
proposed contract to the Auditor.  The Auditor objected, 
9 
 
 
concluding that the agency had not sufficiently complied with 
the terms of the Pacheco Law and that its contracts therefore 
were invalid.  Id. at 784-785.  The agency sought review 
pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, based on asserted errors in the 
Auditor's determination.  MBTA, supra at 790.  Importantly, 
neither party disputed the applicability of the Pacheco Law.  
The agency submitted a draft contract as contemplated by G. L. 
c. 7, § 54, and the Auditor reviewed that draft in accordance 
with G. L. c. 7, § 55.  MBTA, supra at 784-785.  In our review, 
we asked only whether the Auditor had erred in executing his 
statutory duties.6  Id. at 791.  Here, on the other hand, we must 
determine the proper means by which parties may resolve the 
preliminary question, not expressly contemplated by the 
Legislature, whether the Pacheco Law applies to certain 
contracts such that an agency must satisfy its requirements. 
 
With these considerations in mind, we first address whether 
the union has standing to contest DMH's determination that its 
proposed contracts fell outside the ambit of the Pacheco Law by 
                                                     
 
     6 Although G. L. c. 7, §§ 52-55, does not explicitly provide 
for the judicial review of a determination made by the Auditor, 
in Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Auditor of the 
Commonwealth, 430 Mass. 783, 791 (2000) (MBTA), we considered 
whether the Auditor "substantially erred in a way that 
materially affected the rights of the parties."  See G. L. 
c. 249, § 4; Carney v. Springfield, 403 Mass. 604, 605 (1988), 
citing Murray v. Second Dist. Court of E. Middlesex, 389 Mass. 
508, 511 (1983).  Here, however, we are not asked to assess the 
substantive merits of a decision made by the Auditor, and need 
not further consider the scope of such review.  
10 
 
 
seeking declaratory relief.  We then turn to the union's alleged 
failure to join all necessary parties to its complaint.  
 
a.  Standing.  The declaratory judgment statute, G. L. 
c. 231A, "may be used in the superior court to enjoin and to 
obtain a declaration of the legality of the administrative 
practices and procedures of any municipal, county, or state 
agency . . . ."  G. L. c. 231A, § 2.  A party has standing 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231A where the defendant has "violated some 
duty owed to the plaintiff[s]," Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. 
Affairs, 432 Mass. 132, 135 (2000) (Enos), quoting Penal Insts. 
Comm'r for Suffolk County v. Commissioner of Correction, 382 
Mass. 527, 532 (1981), and where the plaintiffs "can allege an 
injury within the area of concern of the statute or regulatory 
scheme."  Enos, supra, quoting Massachusetts Ass'n of Indep. 
Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 
290, 293 (1977).7  In assessing whether a party may seek 
declaratory relief, we have considered the text and purpose of 
the relevant statute and the nature of the administrative scheme 
it sets forth, the availability of other remedies for the 
plaintiffs, and any adverse consequences that might follow 
should standing be recognized.  Enos, supra at 135-136.  
                                                     
 
     7 General Laws c. 231A does not provide an independent basis 
for standing.  See Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, 432 
Mass. 132, 135 (2000), citing Pratt v. Boston, 396 Mass. 37, 42-
43 (1985).  
11 
 
 
 
The notion of standing is an "elastic concept[]" whose 
meaning depends on the particular parties at issue, id. at 135, 
and "standing requirements should be liberally construed" in 
declaratory judgment proceedings, Home Bldrs. Ass'n of Cape Cod, 
Inc. v. Cape Cod Comm'n, 441 Mass. 724, 733 (2004).  We take as 
true all facts alleged in the union's complaint.  See Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (when considering motion to 
dismiss for lack of standing, reviewing court must accept as 
true all material allegations in complaint); Iannacchino v. Ford 
Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008); Barbara F. v. Bristol Div. 
of the Juvenile Court Dept., 432 Mass. 1024, 1025 (2000) (court 
construed all allegations as true in determining whether 
plaintiff had standing).   
 
i.  Text and purpose of the Pacheco Law and its 
administrative scheme.  General Laws c. 7, §§ 52-55, was enacted 
in 1993, over the veto of Governor William Weld, based on the 
Legislature's findings that "using private contractors to 
provide public services formerly provided by state employees 
does not always promote the public interest."  G. L. c. 7, § 52.  
See MBTA, supra at 787, quoting Senate Committee on Ways and 
Means, Fiscal Year 1994 Budget Recommendations 2-21 (June 1993) 
(noting that "some privatization has indeed come at the 
citizens' expense").  Accordingly, "[t]o ensure that citizens of 
the commonwealth receive high quality public services at low 
12 
 
 
cost, with due regard for the taxpayers of the commonwealth and 
the needs of public and private workers," the Pacheco Law 
permits State agencies to enter into privatization contracts 
only after satisfying certain prerequisites.  See MBTA, supra at 
785, quoting G. L. c. 7, § 52.  
 
General Laws c. 7, § 54, sets forth the procedures an 
agency is obliged to follow when it seeks to enter into a 
"privatization contract" as defined in G. L. c. 7, § 53.  The 
agency must, among other things, (1) prepare a written statement 
of the services to be performed by private entities; (2) prepare 
a written estimate of the cost of those services as performed by 
State employees in the most cost-efficient manner; (3) allow 
"any relevant employee organization" the opportunity to propose 
amendments to collective bargaining agreements to lower the 
estimated cost of State employees performing the services; and 
(4) consult with any such organization and provide information 
designed to assist State employees in proposing a bid to keep 
the services in house.  G. L. c. 7, § 54.8  These requirements 
                                                     
 
     8 General Laws c. 7, § 54, provides, in relevant part:   
 
 
"No agency shall make any privatization contract and 
no contract shall be valid unless the agency . . . first 
complies with each of the following requirements: -- (1) 
The agency shall prepare a specific written statement of 
the services proposed to be the subject of the 
privatization contract, including the specific quantity and 
standard of quality of the subject services. . . . (4) The 
agency shall prepare a comprehensive written estimate of 
13 
 
 
ensure that privatization contracts are permissible only if a 
State agency can demonstrate cost savings that do not result 
from lowered employment standards.  "[N]o [privatization] 
contract shall be valid" unless and until the agency submits a 
written certification that it has complied with the above 
requirements and all others enumerated by the statute.  Id.   
 
In order to enforce these requirements, the Auditor may 
adopt regulations and prescribe forms that an agency must use 
when formulating its proposal.  G. L. c. 7, § 55 (c).  The 
Auditor may object to any proposed privatization contract within 
thirty days of receiving the agency's certificate of compliance.  
G. L. c. 7, § 55 (a).  Such an objection is final and binding on 
the agency.  Id.   
 
ii.  Duty and injury.  DMH contends that the provisions of 
the Pacheco Law serve only State employees and not the unions to 
which they belong, and that, accordingly, it owes no duty to the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the costs of regular agency employees' providing the 
subject services in the most cost-efficient manner. . . .  
For the purpose of this estimate, any employee organization 
may . . . propose amendments to any relevant collective 
bargaining agreement to which it is a party. . . . (5) 
After consulting any relevant employee organization, the 
agency shall provide adequate resources for the purpose of 
encouraging and assisting present agency employees to 
organize and submit a bid to provide the subject 
services. . . . (7) The head of the agency and the 
commissioner of administration shall each certify in 
writing to the state auditor, that:  (i) he has complied 
with all provisions of this section and of all other 
applicable laws . . . ."  
 
14 
 
 
union.  This argument finds little support in the statutory 
language.  The Pacheco Law confers two specific, substantive 
rights on employee organizations that benefit those 
organizations in and of themselves.  First, G. L. c. 7, 
§ 54 (4), provides that "any employee organization may . . . 
propose amendments to any relevant collective bargaining 
agreement to which it is a party" in order to reduce the 
estimated cost of allowing the services in question to continue 
to be provided by State employees.  Second, G. L. c. 7, 
§ 54 (5), requires that the agency shall consult with "any 
relevant employee organization" before providing resources that 
will encourage agency employees to prepare a bid for the 
services in question.  No privatization contract "shall be 
valid" if a public agency fails to comply with these substantive 
requirements, G. L. c. 7, § 54, which recognize and promote the 
essential role unions play in "assist[ing their] members to 
improve their wages, hours, and conditions of employment."  
G. L. c. 150E, § 1.   
 
Under the plain language of the Pacheco Law, then, a public 
agency owes certain duties to a collective bargaining 
organization.  When such an agency seeks to privatize duties 
previously performed by State employees, it is incumbent upon 
that agency to allow the union to amend its collective 
bargaining agreement and benefit from a consultation about 
15 
 
 
materials relevant to the preparation of a competitive bid.  An 
agency that does not afford a union these opportunities is not 
in compliance with the Pacheco Law and cannot be said to have 
fulfilled its obligations.  Here, accepting all facts alleged in 
the union's complaint, DMH declined to submit its proposed 
contracts to the Auditor for review even though the contracts 
constituted "privatization contracts" within the meaning of 
G. L. c. 7, § 53.  In thus preventing the union from advocating 
on behalf of its members in the manner specifically permitted by 
the Pacheco Law, DMH committed a breach of the duty it owes the 
union pursuant to that statute.       
 
The union has alleged in its complaint a "reasonably 
definite" injury stemming from this breach, Professional Fire 
Fighters of Mass. v. Commonwealth, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 66, 75 
(2008), that is neither "speculative, remote, [nor] indirect,"  
Ginther v. Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 323 (1998).  
Because DMH did not follow the procedural steps set forth in 
G. L. c. 7, § 54, the union had no opportunity, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 7, § 54 (4), to amend the terms of its collective 
bargaining agreements with a public agency in an effort to lower 
the costs of providing the relevant services by union members.  
Nor was it able to consult with DMH pursuant to G. L. c. 7, 
§ 54 (5), to assist in compiling information for use by agency 
employees.  As a result of DMH's unilateral determination that 
16 
 
 
the Pacheco Law did not apply to its proposed contracts, 
therefore, the union was precluded from exercising its explicit 
statutory rights and from intervening, in service of its 
membership, when confronted with the prospect of privatization.    
 
These consequences are not "inchoate and 
nonparticularized," Ten Persons of the Commonwealth v. Fellsway 
Dev. LLC, 460 Mass. 366, 381 (2011) (citation omitted); they 
bear directly on the union's core mission of protecting the 
long-term interests of all of its members.  See G. L. c. 150E, 
§ 5 ("The exclusive representative . . . shall be responsible 
for representing the interests of all . . . employees without 
discrimination").  In essence, the union's complaint alleges 
that, because of DMH's failure to submit its contracts to the 
Auditor and to comply with the terms of the Pacheco Law, one 
hundred case managers lost their jobs; the union could neither 
exercise its statutory rights to bargain on their behalf nor 
continue to represent those managers once they were no longer 
State employees.  Taken as true, these deprivations constitute 
cognizable injury for purposes of the declaratory judgment 
statute.  
 
What is more, such injuries fall within the zone of 
interest of the Pacheco Law.  See Massachusetts Ass'n of Indep. 
Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., supra at 
294 (injury must be "within the parameters of the statutory 
17 
 
 
concern").  The Pacheco Law was enacted "with due regard 
for . . . the needs of public and private workers,"  G. L. c. 7, 
§ 52,9 and, accordingly, allows the union to amend collective 
bargaining agreements and consult with a public agency about the 
resources necessary to prepare competitive bids.  The 
administrative scheme set forth by the Pacheco Law, therefore, 
fairly can be seen as promoting the role of employee 
organizations in representing the interests of State employees.  
When the union was foreclosed from assisting its members in the 
ways enumerated by the Legislature, the resulting injury fell 
squarely within the statute's area of concern.  See 
Massachusetts Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Ins., supra at 295-296.  
 
In contending that it owes no duty to the union and that 
the union has suffered no cognizable injury to itself, DMH 
misapprehends the nature of employee organizations as defined in 
G. L. c. 150E.  A union is the exclusive representative of all 
employee members, see G. L. c. 150E, § 4, and it "shall have the 
                                                     
 
 
9 Indeed, Governor Weld understood the Pacheco Law, as first 
proposed by the Legislature, to be a "State Employee 
Preservation Act."  Governor William F. Weld, Testimony before 
the Joint Committee on State Administration, in Executive Office 
for Administration and Finance, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
Privatization in Massachusetts:  Getting Results 49 (Draft Nov. 
1, 1993).  See Rosse v. Commissioner of Revenue, 430 Mass. 431, 
438 n.6 (1999), quoting Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 
384 Mass. 409, 421 (1981) (This court "may turn to unofficial 
sources in order to gain a 'contemporary understanding of the 
underlying purposes' of the legislation").   
18 
 
 
right to act for and negotiate agreements covering all employees 
in the unit."  G. L. c. 150E, § 5.  It is not the case, 
moreover, that the interests of a union are always coextensive 
with those of its members.  See Anderson v. Commonwealth 
Employment Relations Bd., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 908, 911 (2009) 
(union "did act reasonably in negotiating the [collective 
bargaining agreement] for all its members" even where it did not 
cater to each individual member's demands).  A union may take 
action in service of the long-term interests of its members, 
even where certain employees disagree or are displeased with the 
immediate result.  See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 
338 (1953) ("The complete satisfaction of all who are 
represented [by a union] is hardly to be expected").     
 
The Pacheco Law preserves this distinction between a union 
and its membership.  For instance, only a union may, pursuant to 
the Pacheco Law, amend collective bargaining agreements in order 
to lower the costs of having its members perform the services at 
issue.  An individual employee has no statutory authority to 
take such action.10  See Miller v. Board of Regents of Higher 
Educ., 405 Mass. 475, 480 (1989); DiLuzio v. United Elec., Radio 
                                                     
 
     10 This is in keeping with the requirements of G. L. 
c. 150E, § 6, pursuant to which public employers may negotiate 
in good faith only with a union.  They are prohibited from 
dealing directly with individual employee members.  See G. L. 
c. 150E, § 6; Service Employees Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, Local 509 
v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 431 Mass. 710, 714-715 (2000).   
19 
 
 
& Mach. Workers of Am., Local 274, 386 Mass. 314, 314 (1982), 
S.C., 391 Mass. 211 (1984) (labor unions are legal entities for 
purposes of suing or being sued).  Furthermore, the Pacheco Law 
distinguishes between rights that belong to a union and rights 
that belong to a union's members.  As discussed, under the 
Pacheco Law, the union is empowered to consult with an agency 
prior to the agency's dissemination of information relevant to 
competitive bids.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 7, § 54 (5), however, 
the individual members are the parties actually permitted to 
submit such bids.   
 
These provisions reflect the Legislature's understanding 
that a union may have rights and interests separate from those 
of the employees it represents.  Although DMH's asserted failure 
to notify the union of its intent to contract may also have run 
counter to the interests of the case managers, who were State 
employees, such conduct caused independent harm to the union 
itself, which was barred thereby not only from exercising its 
statutory privileges, but also from engaging in actions 
indispensable to its essential function.  See Massachusetts 
Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Ins., supra at 296 (plaintiffs had standing where opposite 
ruling would have had "the potential of lessening the role and 
vitality of such persons" within administrative scheme).   
20 
 
 
 
While the injuries a union suffers also may affect the 
well-being and rights of its members, rather than being a bar to 
union standing, such concurrent injury simply reflects the very 
nature of the relationship between a collective bargaining 
association and the employees it represents.  A union may have 
standing in its own right even where its members suffer injury, 
so long as the union, too, is injured in its capacity as an 
organization.  See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 
442 U.S. 289, 299 n.11 (1979), overruled on other grounds by 442 
U.S. 936 (1979) (union had direct standing to seek declaratory 
judgment invalidating provision of farm labor statute that 
inhibited members' constitutional right to freedom of 
association).  Contrast Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts 
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 375 Mass. 160, 177-178 (1978) 
(union lacked standing pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 1, where 
"union as a union did not sustain any direct injury as a result 
of the company's alleged [sex-based] discriminatory practices," 
which only affected rights of its pregnant members).   
 
iii.  Availability of other remedies and possible adverse 
consequences.  To deny standing in these circumstances would 
leave the union no recourse whenever an agency decides that the 
requirements of the Pacheco Law are inapplicable and, therefore, 
that it need not comply with those requirements.  See Villages 
Dev. Co. v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 
21 
 
 
410 Mass. 100, 107 (1991) (plaintiff had standing to seek 
declaratory relief where no other remedy available).  Contrast 
Enos, supra at 141-143 (plaintiffs who had an alternative 
statutory remedy lacked standing to file claim under G. L. 
c. 231A).  Issuance of a writ of mandamus would be inappropriate 
against DMH, the Auditor, or the Attorney General, where none of 
those parties has failed "to perform a clear cut duty" pursuant 
to the statute.11  See Montefusco v. Commonwealth, 452 Mass. 
1015, 1015 (2008), quoting Simmons v. Clerk-Magistrate of the 
Boston Div. of the Housing Court Dep't, 448 Mass. 57, 59-60 
(2006).  Where a State agency seeks to enter into contracts that 
constitute "privatization contracts" under G. L. c. 7, § 54, 
that agency, as discussed above, owes certain specific duties to 
a union pursuant to the Pacheco Law.  Here, however, the parties 
dispute whether the law applies to the proposed contracts in 
question and thus whether DMH, in fact, owed any duties at all 
to the union.  Indeed, the union sought declaratory judgment in 
order to resolve precisely this question.  Accordingly, absent a 
                                                     
 
     11 Moreover, the extraordinary remedy of mandamus is 
appropriate only to prevent a failure of justice in instances 
where no other relief is available and "nothing else would 
work."  Doe v. District Attorney for the Plymouth Dist., 29 
Mass. App. Ct. 671, 674 (1991).  The Coach & Six Restaurant, 
Inc. v. Public Works Comm'n, 363 Mass. 643, 644 (1973).  See 
Trust Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 48 Mass. App. Ct. 617, 
622 (2000) (where petitioner had filed petition for declaratory 
judgment, mandamus was inappropriate given petitioner's "more 
general request for relief").   
22 
 
 
binding declaration that DMH's efforts at privatization did, 
indeed, fall within the terms of the Pacheco Law, DMH would 
maintain it has no "clear cut" obligations to the union that 
might render mandamus an apt mechanism for relief.     
 
It would be equally unsuitable for the union to seek 
mandamus against the Auditor, who neither shirked his statutory 
obligation or otherwise violated the terms of the Pacheco Law.  
As noted, the Legislature did not establish any means by which 
the Auditor may contest an agency's assertion that the Pacheco 
Law is inapplicable.  Here, the Auditor nevertheless issued a 
memorandum advising DMH that its proposed contracts were subject 
to the terms of the Pacheco Law, but subsequently, DMH has taken 
no steps towards compliance.  There is therefore no other action 
on the part of the Auditor that the union properly could request 
in a petition for a writ of mandamus.  Finally, as for the 
Attorney General, the Pacheco Law provides only that she may 
file an action pursuant to G. L. c. 7, § 54 (2), in order to 
enforce the minimum wage to be paid to those employed under a 
privatization contract.  It makes no express provision for her 
to intervene when an agency, as here, declines at the outset to 
submit its contracts to the Auditor.    
 
Nor does the Pacheco Law contain a private right of action 
that might provide some other avenue for relief.  Although DMH 
points to this absence as evidence that permitting an employee 
23 
 
 
organization to seek declaratory relief against a public agency 
would contravene the intention of the Legislature, we draw the 
opposite conclusion.  A plaintiff may seek the equitable remedy 
of declaratory relief, Grady v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 
Mass. App. Ct. 126, 137 n.9 (2013), even if the relevant statute 
does not provide a private right of action.  See, e.g., Ten 
Persons of the Commonwealth v. Fellsway Dev. LLC, 460 Mass. 366, 
380 (2011), quoting Enos, supra at 134-135 ("to invoke the 
court's general equity jurisdiction under c. 231A, '[t]he 
dispositive question is whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated 
that they have standing to maintain their action . . .'").  Cf. 
Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court, 
448 Mass. 15, 24, 38 (2006) (plaintiff employees could seek 
declaratory relief against trial court for exposure to asbestos 
despite absence of private right of action in applicable 
environmental statutes).   
 
To be sure, a party may not seek declaratory relief to 
effect an "end run" around the absence of a private right of 
action where the Legislature intended to foreclose certain 
remedies.  See Boston Med. Ctr. Corp. v. Secretary of the 
Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 463 Mass. 447, 471 
(2012), citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985) 
(plaintiff medical provider could not seek declaratory judgment 
as to reasonableness of rate determinations absent private right 
24 
 
 
of action).  But that rationale has little weight where the 
absence of declaratory relief would prevent the Pacheco Law from 
being administered properly and thus contravene the 
Legislature's intent.  Here, the union suffered a cognizable 
injury but cannot directly enforce the terms of the statute or 
otherwise vindicate its rights.  No other party is entitled to 
challenge the alleged violation.  In such specific 
circumstances, declaratory judgment is an appropriate vehicle 
for relief to ensure that agencies may not evade the 
requirements of the Pacheco Law with impunity.   
 
In short, it cannot be that there is no recourse where an 
agency, believing the Pacheco Law is inapplicable in a 
particular situation, simply opts not to comply with its terms.  
The Pacheco Law could not function as the Legislature intended 
if an agency could decide, unilaterally and without input from 
the Auditor or the union, that its proposed contracts did not 
fall within the provisions of  G. L. c. 7, § 53.  Indeed, a 
public agency would have little incentive to adhere to the 
Pacheco Law's requirements were its decision to evade those 
requirements immune from any review.  DMH's belief that the 
Pacheco Law does not apply to its proposed contracts cannot be 
understood to inoculate it against efforts to demonstrate 
otherwise.  Such an approach would render the statute toothless, 
25 
 
 
confounding the Legislature's efforts to ensure that 
privatization does not occur at the expense of public welfare.    
 
Allowing the union to contest an agency's otherwise 
unreviewable pronouncement that it need not comply with the 
Pacheco Law will not, as DMH contends, transform the declaratory 
judgment statute into a "roving entitlement for allegedly 
aggrieved plaintiffs."  Enos, supra at 141 (no standing where 
public agency did not owe plaintiff property owners duty under 
Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act).  To confer standing 
on an employee organization in this circumstance does no more 
than allow it to challenge the view of a public agency that its 
proposed contracts do not fall within the terms of the Pacheco 
Law.12  Indeed, such challenges are critical to the functioning 
                                                     
 
     12 Our decision that declaratory judgment is an appropriate 
remedy here should be understood as limited to the circumstances 
presented, where an agency takes the position that the Pacheco 
Law does not apply to certain contracts with private entities 
and accordingly does not comply with relevant statutory 
obligations including notification of the Auditor as to such 
contracts.  See G. L. c. 7, §§ 52-55.  In contrast, an action in 
the nature of certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, is the 
proper vehicle for relief when challenging a decision made by 
the Auditor.  See MBTA, supra at 790-791. 
    
 
Further, the Pacheco Law, consistent with its purpose, 
provides a streamlined and time-sensitive process for agencies 
seeking to enter into privatization contracts.  Such contracts 
affect the interests of many parties and the concomitant need 
for expedition in settling questions as to their validity is 
evident.  Given this, and notwithstanding the three-year statute 
of limitations for declaratory judgment actions, a union failing 
to take prompt action against the agency in these circumstances 
26 
 
 
of the statute, and also may provide clarity to parties in 
related situations concerning whether they properly are subject 
to the requirements of the Law.     
 
We express no opinion as to the merits of the Auditor's 
determination that the CBFS contracts at issue constitute 
"privatization contracts" such that the Pacheco Law does, in 
fact, apply.  See note 4, supra.  Contrast MBTA, supra at 791-
792.  We conclude only that there must be a way to resolve any 
disputes over the parameters of the Pacheco Law in the first 
instance, and that the union's complaint alleged a cognizable 
injury sufficient to support standing.  Because the union is the 
party best situated to challenge an agency's decision not to 
submit proposed contracts to the Auditor, because seeking a 
declaratory judgment is the only viable mechanism by which it 
may do so, and because the Legislature could not have intended 
that the Pacheco Law effectively be unenforceable, the union has 
direct standing to pursue declaratory relief under G. L. 
c. 231A.13  
                                                                                                                                                                           
runs the serious risk of exposure to the affirmative defense of 
laches.   
 
     13 The union also alleges that it has associational 
standing, on behalf of its members, to file a petition for 
declaratory relief.  Given our conclusion that direct standing 
does lie, we do not reach this claim.   
 
27 
 
 
 
b.  Joinder of necessary parties.  We turn to the union's 
asserted failure to join necessary parties pursuant to G. L. 
c. 231A, § 8, and Mass. R. Civ. P. 19, which, DMH maintains, 
independently should bar consideration of the union's complaint.   
The declaratory judgment statute provides that "all persons 
shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would 
be affected by the declaration."  G. L. c. 231A, § 8.  Rule 19, 
although not limited to the context of declaratory relief, is to 
similar effect.14  The failure to name necessary parties may be 
jurisdictional in a declaratory judgment action, thereby 
precluding the court's consideration of the issue.  See, e.g., 
Villages Dev. Co. v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envtl. 
Affairs, 410 Mass. 100, 105-106 (1991).   
 
In its complaint, the union did not name as defendants the 
private vendors with whom DMH entered into contracts under the 
CBFS program.  These vendors, however, are plainly necessary 
parties.  As beneficiaries of the disputed contracts, the 
                                                     
 
     14 Rule 19 (a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 365 Mass. 765 (1974), provides that a  
 
"person who is subject to service of process shall be 
joined in the action if . . . (2) he claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) 
as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons 
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring 
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by 
reason of his claimed interest."   
 
28 
 
 
vendors have an interest in the resolution of the union's claim, 
and, like DMH, a right to contest whether the contracts are 
subject to the terms of the Pacheco Law.  Unless and until the 
vendors are joined as parties, therefore, "any declaration of 
rights would be merely academic as to persons not parties to the 
proceedings."  J.R. Nolan & B.R. Henry, Civil Practice § 48.11, 
at 411 (3d ed. 2004) ("fundamental purpose" of declaratory 
judgment "cannot be effectuated" where necessary parties are 
missing from suit).  Accordingly, the judge did not err in 
concluding that the union's failure to name all necessary 
parties rendered its complaint legally insufficient, and that 
she therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain that complaint.   
 
3.  Conclusion.  While there was no error in the judge's 
decision to dismiss the complaint on the ground of the failure 
to name all necessary parties, in light of our conclusion as to 
direct standing, the judgment of dismissal is vacated and set 
aside, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for the 
limited purpose of allowing the union to file a motion seeking 
leave to amend the complaint to add all necessary parties.  If 
the union does not file such a motion within thirty days of the 
issuance of the rescript in this case, an order shall enter 
dismissing the complaint.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.