Case Title: Svensen v. Hester

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2023-0680, SC-2023-0762, SC-2023-0898, SC-2024-0096, SC-2024-0143, SC-2024-0206

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2024-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: May 17, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0680 
_________________________ 
 
John Svensen 
 
v.  
 
Jeff Hester 
 
 
 
Appeal from Lauderdale Circuit Court 
(CV-20-900339) 
 
MITCHELL, Justice. 
 
At the height of public concern over COVID-19, John Svensen wrote 
a check to Jeff Hester's company, CJH, Inc., d/b/a Ginesis Products 
SC-2023-0680 
 
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("Ginesis"), in exchange for several thousand bottles of hand sanitizer.  
That check bounced.  Ginesis sued Svensen and his company, 
Marketpointe, LLC, to recover the money that was allegedly owed.  After 
protracted litigation, Hester pressed charges against Svensen for the bad 
check, leading to Svensen's arrest.  Eventually, on the motion of the 
Lauderdale County District Attorney's Office, the Lauderdale Circuit 
Court dismissed the criminal complaint as barred by the statute of 
limitations, and Svensen, free from the specter of prosecution, sued 
Hester for malicious prosecution.  The circuit court entered summary 
judgment for Hester.  Svensen appealed.  We affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
In early 2020, Marketpointe contracted to purchase hand sanitizer 
from Ginesis.  In July 2020, as part of that transaction, Svensen, on 
behalf of Marketpointe, gave Hester, Ginesis's agent, a check for $23,400.  
That check bounced because Marketpointe's account had insufficient 
funds.  For that bad check, and other allegedly unpaid invoices, Ginesis 
sued Svensen and Marketpointe in the Lauderdale Circuit Court. 
 
Neither Svensen nor Marketpointe answered the complaint, and 
the circuit court entered a default judgment against them.  Soon after, 
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Svensen, appearing pro se, filed a motion to vacate the default judgment 
for improper service, which the circuit court granted.  The circuit court 
then set a bench trial for September 2021.  The trial date came and went, 
but Svensen did not appear.  As a result, the circuit court entered another 
default judgment against Svensen and Marketpointe.  After Svensen 
provided an excuse, the circuit court vacated the default judgment and 
reset the matter for a bench trial.   
 
In the meantime, Hester considered his options.  On the advice of 
his attorney, he took the bounced check to the Lauderdale County 
Sheriff's Department.  There, a lieutenant investigated the issue.  After 
discussion with employees of the Lauderdale County District Attorney's 
Office, the investigating lieutenant advised Hester to sign an affidavit on 
a criminal complaint against Svensen.  That affidavit stated, in full: 
"Before me, the undersigned Judge/Magistrate of the District 
Court of Lauderdale County, Alabama personally appeared 
JEFF HESTER who being by me, first duly sworn, does 
depose and say that he/she has probable cause for believing 
and does believe that JOHN SVENSEN who [sic] name is to 
the affiant otherwise unknown, than as stated, with intent to 
defraud, did make, utter, draw or deliver a check or draft upon 
a bank/credit union, to-wit: REGIONS BANK the amount of 
23,400.00 service fee of 30.00 totaling 23,430.00 payable to 
JEFF HESTER that said Defendant at the time of such JOHN 
SVENSEN union [sic] with which to pay the same upon its 
SC-2023-0680 
 
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due presentation, in said county within twelve months before 
making this affidavit, against the peace and dignity of the 
State of Alabama." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
In October 2021, after Hester had signed the affidavit, Svensen was 
arrested and charged with negotiating a worthless instrument.  See 
§ 13A-9-13.1, Ala. Code 1975.  As a result, the circuit court stayed the 
civil proceedings against Svensen.  Several months later, the State filed 
a motion to dismiss the criminal charge after realizing it was time-
barred.  See § 15-3-2, Ala. Code 1975. 
 
The circuit court in the civil case then lifted the stay.  At that point, 
Svensen, now represented by counsel, filed an amended answer and 
counterclaims, as well as a third-party complaint for malicious 
prosecution against Hester.  In the third-party complaint, Svensen 
alleged that Hester had caused Svensen's arrest without probable cause 
and with malice because, he said, Hester knew the statute of limitations 
had run.  He requested compensatory as well as punitive damages.  
Hester filed a motion for summary judgment on the malicious-
prosecution claim, which the circuit court granted.  After denying 
Svensen's postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate, the circuit 
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court, at Svensen's request, certified as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. 
Civ. P., the summary judgment on Svensen's malicious-prosecution 
claim.  Svensen then appealed. 
Standard of Review 
 
We review a summary judgment de novo. Nettles v. Pettway, 306 
So. 3d 873, 875 (Ala. 2020).  "[I]f the moving party establishes the absence 
of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving 
party to present substantial evidence" of a genuine issue of material fact.  
Lands v. Ward, 349 So. 3d 219, 222 (Ala. 2021).  This Court has said that 
"substantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-
minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably 
infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved."  West v. Founders Life 
Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). 
Analysis 
To prevail on a malicious-prosecution claim, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate "'1) that a prior judicial proceeding was instigated by the 
defendant 2) without probable cause and 3) with malice; 4) that that prior 
proceeding was terminated in the plaintiff's favor; and 5) that the 
plaintiff suffered damage[] as a result of that prior proceeding.'"  
SC-2023-0680 
 
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Dolgencorp, LLC v. Spence, 224 So. 3d 173, 183 (Ala. 2016) (quoting 
Whitlow v. Bruno's, Inc., 567 So. 2d 1235, 1237 (Ala. 1990)).  This appeal 
turns on the probable-cause element.  In particular, Svensen contends 
that Hester lacked probable cause to sign the affidavit that caused 
Svensen's arrest for negotiating a worthless instrument.  We disagree. 
Probable cause is a "'"reasonable ground for suspicion, supported 
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious 
man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense 
charged."'"  Eidson v. Olin Corp., 527 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Ala. 1988) 
(quoting Parisian Co. v. Williams, 203 Ala. 378, 383, 83 So. 122, 127 
(1919)).  In other words, a person acts with probable cause if he could 
have reasonably believed that the accused committed the charged crime.  
There is no genuine issue of material fact here; Hester had probable 
cause to believe that Svensen had committed the crime of negotiating a 
worthless negotiable instrument. 
It is a crime in Alabama to knowingly write someone a bad check.  
The elements of negotiating a worthless negotiable instrument are 
simple: the accused must have (1) "negotiate[d] or deliver[ed]" (2) "a 
negotiable instrument for a thing of value" (3) "with the intent, 
SC-2023-0680 
 
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knowledge, or expectation that the instrument would not be honored by 
the drawee."  § 13A-9-13.1(a).  It is undisputed that Svensen's actions 
met the first two elements: Svensen delivered Hester a worthless check 
in exchange for hand sanitizer, and a check is a quintessential 
"negotiable instrument."  See § 7-3-104(f), Ala. Code 1975.  As to the third 
element, a reasonable person would suspect that Svensen knew the bank 
would not honor the check.  After all, Svensen wrote a check for funds 
that did not exist and has made no attempt to rectify the situation, 
despite Ginesis's attempts to collect.  Indeed, Svensen does not even 
argue on appeal that he lacked knowledge that the check would be 
dishonored.  With all of these elements satisfied, it follows that Hester 
had probable cause to believe that Svensen had committed the offense.   
Svensen nonetheless argues that Hester lacked probable cause 
because, he says, Hester knew that the one-year statute of limitations for 
misdemeanor offenses had expired.  Svensen points out that the affidavit 
Hester signed stated that Svensen wrote the bad check "within twelve 
months before making this affidavit."  Because Hester signed the 
affidavit in October 2021 and Svensen wrote the bad check in July 2020, 
Svensen says that Hester must have known that Svensen's prosecution 
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was time-barred.  That knowledge, Svensen asserts, shows that Hester 
did not have a reasonable basis for believing that he had committed the 
charged crime.   
The problem with Svensen's theory is that expiration of the 
limitations period has nothing to do with whether the defendant actually 
committed the offense charged.  That is why the timeliness of an action 
does not bear on whether "'"a cautious man"'" would believe "'"that the 
person accused is guilty of the offense charged."'"  Eidson, 527 So. 2d at 
1285 (citation omitted). 
For that reason, courts across the country have expressly rejected 
arguments like the one Svensen makes here.  See, e.g., Sands v. 
McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that whether a 
prosecution is time-barred is not "a relevant consideration" when charges 
are filed); Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that probable cause exists whenever the elements of a crime are 
facially satisfied and that officers have no duty to "investigate and decide 
the potential viability of a defense, such as the statute of limitations," 
before charging or arresting someone).  In short, the validity of a statute-
of-limitations defense is "'appropriately evaluated by the district 
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attorney or by a court after a prosecution is begun.'"  Sands, 502 F.3d at 
269 (quoting Pickens, 59 F.3d at 1207-08).  Accordingly, requiring crime 
victims to determine whether a prosecution is time-barred before signing 
a complaint "is too heavy a burden."  Sands, 502 F.3d at 269.  That logic 
applies with full force here. 
Svensen argues that our opinion in Empiregas, Inc., of Elberta v. 
Feely, 524 So. 2d 626 (Ala. 1988), contradicts that rule.  But he misreads 
Empiregas.  In that case, the plaintiff brought a malicious-prosecution 
claim against a company that had sued him to recover an overdue balance 
after the limitations period had run.1  An agent who acted on behalf of 
the malicious-prosecution defendant "acknowledged that he knew the 
claim was barred" before initiating a judicial proceeding.  Id. at 628 
(emphasis added).  This Court held that, in those circumstances, evidence 
 
1The prior judicial proceeding in Empiregas was civil in nature.  
Alabama courts do not distinguish between the wrongful initiation of 
criminal and civil actions when considering a malicious-prosecution 
claim.  See 2 Angela K. Upchurch, Alabama Personal Injury & Torts § 
12:25 (2023) (stating that "the institution or continuation of an original 
civil or criminal proceeding against the plaintiff" is an element of 
malicious prosecution (emphasis added)); Mitchell v. Folmar & Assocs., 
LLP, 854 So. 2d 1115 (Ala. 2003) (affirming a jury award in a malicious-
prosecution case based on a civil fraud suit).   
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of the defendant's behavior was "proper for the jury's consideration."  Id.  
Thus, instead of replacing the traditional probable-cause rule, Empiregas 
recognized a limited exception if the defendant had actual knowledge 
that the prior proceeding it instigated was meritless. 
That exception is not applicable here.  Unlike in Empiregas, the 
record in this case does not indicate that Hester knew Svensen's 
prosecution was time-barred.  After an investigation into the check by a 
lieutenant in the Lauderdale County Sheriff's Department -- who knew 
all the relevant facts and determined that Marketplace's account had 
insufficient funds when Svensen wrote the bad check -- the lieutenant 
advised Hester to "sign the affidavit for a criminal complaint against 
Svensen."  Although Hester's affidavit incorrectly stated that Svensen 
wrote the check within the prior 12 months, that is not substantial 
evidence that Hester knew about and intentionally flouted the statute of 
limitations.  And Hester may have signed the affidavit -- which he did 
not write -- for an innocuous reason.  For example, Hester may have 
misread the inartfully drafted affidavit or he may have thought that some 
form of tolling applied.  Because Svensen has not provided any evidence 
that Hester had actual knowledge that the prosecution was time-barred, 
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the Empiregas exception is inapplicable.  Hester thus had probable cause 
to initiate criminal proceedings against Svensen. 
Conclusion 
 
Because there is no genuine dispute that Hester had probable cause 
to initiate criminal proceedings against Svensen, we affirm the circuit 
court's summary judgment in Hester's favor. 
AFFIRMED. 
 
Parker, C.J., concurs. 
 
Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.