Case Title: JOHN GRONSKI v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOHN GRONSKI v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 70700 P.2d 777Case Number: 84-247Decided: 06/06/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN GRONSKI, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, App. Counsel, Wyoming Public 
Defender Program, Cheyenne, and Steve Politi, 
Defender Aid Program, Laramie, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Robert Nicholas, Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a probation revocation. Appellant words the issue on appeal as 
follows:

"Whether the district 
court erred in considering illegally seized evidence in determining whether or 
not Appellant had, in fact, violated the terms of his probation, and in revoking 
Appellant's probation."

The evidence in 
question was held to be inadmissible for the purpose of prosecuting appellant 
for possession and delivery of a controlled substance, but admissible for the 
purpose of revoking his probation.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     On May 21, 1984, three 
law enforcement officers were conducting a consent search of an apartment in 
connection with the execution of a valid arrest warrant. While the search was 
being conducted, appellant drove up to the apartment building and approached the 
apartment carrying a large paper bag. None of the officers recognized him at 
that time. After appellant entered the apartment and greeted its renter, the 
officers identified themselves as police officers; appellant became tense, 
clenched his fists, and urinated in his trousers. One of the officers took the 
paper bag out of appellant's hands and looked inside it, finding what he 
believed to be marijuana. Another officer then went to appellant's car, noticed 
more suspected marijuana inside, and seized it.

[¶4.]     Appellant was charged 
on June 13, 1984, with possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver. 
On June 25, 1984, defense counsel filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained 
by Illegal Search and Arrest and Motion to Dismiss. Both motions were based on a 
lack of probable cause to arrest appellant or to search him, or to stop and 
frisk him.

[¶5.]     The district court 
granted this motion, saying, in part, in its Decision 
Letter:

"In the case at hand, the 
officers did not have reason to believe that the defendant was armed and 
dangerous. They made no preliminary inquiry as to what he was doing at the 
apartment or as to what was in the bag. The officers did not recognize the 
defendant. He was not doing anything illegal, suspicious, unusual, or dangerous. 
There was no reason to think that he was armed."1

[¶6.]     On August 20, 1984, the 
charges against appellant were dismissed. However, in an unrelated and prior 
incident, appellant had pled guilty to two counts of possession and delivery of 
a controlled substance, for which he was sentenced to a term of not less than 
one year nor more than three years for one count, and not less than one year nor 
more than two years for the other count, with the sentences to run concurrently. 
The two sentences were suspended and appellant was placed on supervised 
probation for a period of two years with the conditions that appellant pay a 
$2,000 fine, be under the direction of the State Department of Probation and 
Parole and obey that department's rules and regulations, and that appellant 
"obey the law and lead a worthy life." The district attorney's office petitioned 
the district court to revoke this probation on the basis of the May 21, 1984, 
incident.

[¶7.]     Appellant resisted the 
petition for revocation of probation because the evidence in support thereof had 
been ruled inadmissible in the case in chief. The district court reasoned 
otherwise and on August 31, 1984, granted the petition because of "the 
Defendant's failure to obey the terms of his said 
probation."

[¶8.]     The imposition as well 
as the revocation of probation lies within the sound discretion of the district 
court, and we will not reverse the actions of the district court unless that 
discretion is abused. State v. Reisch, Wyo., 491 P.2d 1254 (1971); Minchew v. State, 
Wyo., 685 P.2d 30 (1984). Probation can be revoked on the basis of conduct which is not 
criminal. Ketcham v. State, 
Wyo., 618 P.2d 1356 (1980). The evidence utilized by the district court in making the decision 
to revoke probation need not establish the violation of the conditions of 
probation beyond a reasonable doubt, and the usual rules of evidence need not be 
applied. Minchew v. State, supra. 
Revocation because of a violation of law is not precluded merely because the 
probationer is acquitted in a criminal proceeding predicated on such violation. 
Ketcham v. State, supra. In short, 
all that is required is a conscientious judgment by the court, after hearing the 
facts, that a violation of the probation has occurred.

"A probationer or parolee 
is not entitled to the `full panoply of rights' that attend a criminal 
prosecution. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 
2600, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972); United 
States v. Strada, 8 Cir. 1974, 503 F.2d 1081." 
Ketcham v. State, supra, 618 P.2d  at 
1359.

 

[¶9.]     We noted in Minchew v. State that a probation 
revocation hearing is not a trial on a new criminal charge, but merely an 
extension of the sentencing procedure resulting from the original 
conviction.

"`* * * We emphasize 
there is no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation to a 
criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be 
flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other 
material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.' Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-489, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2604, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972) re paroles with Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973) extending the same to probationers." Id., 685 P.2d  at 31-32.

[¶10.]  The great majority of courts which have 
ruled on this question have held that evidence obtained by illegal search and 
seizure is admissible in a probation revocation hearing even though it would be 
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. See Annotation, Admissibility, in State 
Probation Revocation Proceedings, of Evidence Obtained through Illegal Search 
and Seizure, 77 A.L.R.3d 636, 641 (1977).

[¶11.]  In doing so, they have considered the 
purposes behind the exclusionary rule to determine whether those purposes would 
be served by extending that rule to probation revocation proceedings. One of the 
recognized purposes behind the rule is to "deter future unlawful police 
conduct." United 
States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 53, 30 
A.L.R.Fed. 817 (9th Cir. 1975). If some deterrence can be expected from 
application of the rule to probation revocation hearings, it must be weighed 
against the potential injury to the function of such proceedings. United States v. Winsett, 
supra.

[¶12.]  The Alaska Supreme Court, in analyzing 
this issue, said:

"`* * * Although we 
recognize, of course, that such evidence would not be admissible in a court of 
law, we believe that an agency whose delicate duty is to decide when a convicted 
offender can be safely allowed to return to and remain in society is in a 
different posture than the court which decides his original guilt. To blind the 
authority to relevant facts in this special context is to incur a risk of danger 
to the public which, at least as of this date, outweighs the competing 
considerations of a problematical gain in deterrence.'" State v. Sears, Alaska, 553 P.2d 907, 913 n. 13 (1976), quoting from 
In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734, 740, 
cert. denied 400 U.S. 851, 91 S. Ct. 71, 27 L. Ed. 2d 88 
(1970).

"* * * Clearly, it would 
be destructive of the purpose of probation to hold that the sentencing court is 
forbidden to consider relevant facts concerning Sears' possession of marijuana 
in determining whether Sears should be allowed to continue on probationary 
status. If Sears' rehabilitation is to be furthered and society protected from 
antisocial conduct, then it is crucial to rational decision-making that this 
significant information not be denied the very court which initially imposed 
probation. Here the needs of the probation system clearly outweigh the possible 
deterrence of unlawful methods of law enforcement." State v. Sears, supra, 553 P.2d  at 
913.

[¶13.]  A second rationale for the exclusionary 
rule

"* * * is the imperative 
of judicial integrity which requires that the courts not be made `party to 
lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting 
unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.'" (Footnotes 
omitted.) State v. Sears, supra, 553 P.2d  at 912.

Examination of 
that rationale in the present context also leads us to a balancing test. We 
agree with the conclusion reached by the Alaska court that:

"* * * [I]n the special 
context of a probation violation proceeding, it is our belief, on the balance, 
that the facts of this case present no such threat to the imperative of judicial 
integrity as to outweigh the clear need of the sentencing court to know whether 
the probationer is conducting his life in a manner which warrants continuation 
of his present probationary status, or whether because of antisocial conduct the 
goal of rehabilitation is not being furthered and thus, either a change in the 
conditions of probation, or incarceration, is necessary in order to protect 
society." State v. Sears, supra, 553 P.2d  at 914.

[¶14.]  In Patterson v. State, Wyo., 691 P.2d 253, 
259 (1984), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 2048, 85 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1985), we 
said, paraphrazing from United States v. 
Leon, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), reh. denied ___ 
U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 52, 82 L. Ed. 2d 942 (1985), that:

"* * * [T]he exclusionary 
rule was not a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment but is instead a 
judicially created remedy designed to protect Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect; that in gauging its deterrent effect, the 
exclusion question `must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits;' that 
the exclusionary rule exacts `substantial social costs;' that the truth-finding 
functions of judges and juries are impeded by the exclusionary rule and some 
guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences due to plea bargains; 
that indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule may generate disrespect 
for the administration of justice; and that the rule should be applied only 
where its remedial objectives are best served. Id. 104 S. Ct.  at 3412, 
3413."

[¶15.]  In summary, we recognize that a probation 
revocation proceeding is qualitatively different from a criminal trial, both in 
purpose and procedure. Also, the goal of deterrence is not likely to be 
furthered by the suggested expansion of the exclusionary rule, particularly in 
cases where law enforcement personnel are unaware that the object of their 
search and seizure is a probationer. Accordingly, the evidence was properly 
admitted in this case.

[¶16.]  Affirmed.

1 We are not asked in this 
appeal to comment on the trial court's ruling that urinating in one's trousers 
after being informed that police officers are present in the room is not 
"unusual" or "suspicious."