Case Title: Morgan v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC20-641

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2022-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-641 
____________ 
 
DARRYL LEN MORGAN, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
November 3, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 
We have for review Morgan v. State, 293 So. 3d 1081 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2020), in which the Second District Court of Appeal held that 
an order granting a rule 3.800(a)1 motion and determining that a 
sentence was illegal was not a final order but remained subject to 
reconsideration until a final order imposing a corrected sentence 
was entered.  We accepted jurisdiction based on the Second 
District’s certification of conflict.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  
Based on the nature of proceedings to correct an illegal sentence 
 
 
1.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a). 
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under rule 3.800(a), we agree with the conclusion reached by the 
Second District. 
I 
 
In 1979, Darryl Len Morgan was convicted—based on a nolo 
contendere plea—of second-degree murder for an offense committed 
when he was a juvenile.  He was sentenced to life in prison with the 
possibility of parole after twenty-five years.  Morgan, 293 So. 3d at 
1082.  In September 2016, Morgan filed a rule 3.800(a) motion 
claiming that this sentence was an illegal sentence.  Id.  His claim 
relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460 (2012), and this Court’s interpretation of Miller in 
Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016).  Miller held “that 
mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the 
time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 
‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ”  567 U.S. at 465.  In Atwell, 
this Court held that the imposition on a juvenile of a sentence of life 
with the possibility of parole under “Florida’s existing parole 
system” was “virtually indistinguishable from a sentence of life 
without parole” and was “therefore unconstitutional.”  197 So. 3d at 
1041.  Based on this case law, in January 2017, the trial court 
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entered an order granting Morgan’s motion, ruling that the life-
with-the-possibility-of-parole sentence was an illegal sentence.  
Morgan, 293 So. 3d at 1082.  This order did not purport to vacate 
the sentence, but simply ordered that steps be taken to conduct a 
resentencing hearing. 
That resentencing hearing was—at the repeated request of 
Morgan—delayed for an extended period until it was finally set to 
take place on August 17, 2018.  Id.  But the landscape of Florida 
law changed dramatically before the resentencing could occur.  On 
July 12, 2018, State v. Michel issued, receding from Atwell and 
holding “that juvenile offenders’ sentences of life with the possibility 
of parole after 25 years do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution as delineated by the United States 
Supreme Court.”  State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3, 4 (Fla. 2018).  Citing 
Michel, the State filed a motion for reconsideration of the order 
granting Morgan’s rule 3.800(a) motion.  Ultimately, the State’s 
motion was granted, the prior order granting the rule 3.800(a) 
motion was vacated, and Morgan’s motion was denied.  Morgan 
then appealed to the Second District. 
 
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II 
In the Second District, Morgan contended that the order 
entered in January 2017 determining his sentence to be an illegal 
sentence was final and that the lower court was accordingly without 
jurisdiction to reconsider that order.  Morgan, 293 So. 3d at 1082.  
Relying on its earlier decisions interpreting rule 3.800(a) in State v. 
Rudolf, 821 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), and Stewart v. State, 
647 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), the Second District rejected 
Morgan 
’s argument.  293 So. 3d at 1083-84.  The court also cited 
the decisions of the Third District Court of Appeal in State v. 
Huerta, 38 So. 3d 883, 884-85 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), and the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal in State v. Delvalle, 745 So. 2d 541, 542 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1999), both of which held—like Rudolf and Stewart—
that rule 3.800(a) proceedings are not final until a resentencing 
order is entered because prior to that point judicial labor is still 
required.  293 So. 3d at 1084. 
The Second District certified conflict with the decisions of the 
First District Court of Appeal in Jordan v. State, 81 So. 3d 595 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2012), and Simmons v. State, 274 So. 3d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2019), the Fourth District in Jones v. State, 279 So. 3d 172 (Fla. 
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4th DCA 2019), and the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Magill v. 
State, 287 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019), together with their 
progeny.  293 So. 3d at 1086.  Although all of these conflict cases 
addressed the same question concerning finality in rule 3.800(a) 
proceedings that is presented by the case now on review, they each 
relied on precedent from this Court interpreting the application of 
rule 3.850.  Jordan relied on State v. White, 470 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 
1985), which recognized the right of the state to appeal an order 
vacating a death sentence in proceedings under rule 3.850.  Jordan, 
81 So. 3d at 596.  Simmons, Jones, and Magill all relied on Taylor v. 
State, 140 So. 3d 526, 528 (Fla. 2014), which in interpreting rule 
3.850 held that “an order disposing of a postconviction motion 
which partially denies and partially grants relief is a final order for 
purposes of appeal, even if the relief granted requires subsequent 
action in the underlying case, such as resentencing.”  See Magill, 
287 So. 3d at 1262-63; Jones, 279 So. 3d at 173-74; Simmons, 274 
So. 3d at 471-72. 
The Second District concluded that because it “addressed rule 
3.850 collateral attacks . . . rather than only illegal sentences under 
rule 3.800(a),” Taylor was not controlling.  Morgan, 293 So. 3d at 
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1085.  The Second District pointed out that Taylor’s analysis relied 
on the provision of rule 3.850(f)(8)(C), which states that the “order 
issued after the evidentiary hearing shall resolve all the claims 
raised in the motion and shall be considered the final order for 
purposes of appeal,” to support its conclusion that a resentencing 
proceeding after the granting of 3.850 relief was a new and separate 
proceeding.  293 So. 3d at 1083 (quoting Taylor, 140 So. 3d at 529).  
In distinguishing Taylor—as well as White—the court stated: 
“Unlike rule 3.850, rule 3.800 does not state that an order resolving 
‘all the claims raised in the motion’ shall be a final order.”  Id.  The 
court also observed that unlike rule 3.850 proceedings, which 
create a “new, separate proceeding” from the underlying criminal 
case, a rule 3.800 motion is “filed in continuation of the original 
criminal proceeding.”  Id. (quoting Rudolf, 821 So. 2d at 386). 
In support of its conclusion accepting the State’s argument 
that reconsideration of the order granting Morgan’s motion was 
proper, the Second District also relied on the provisions of Florida 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c), which authorizes the State to 
appeal orders “granting relief under Florida Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 3.801, 3.850, 3.851, or 3.853”—notably omitting any 
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reference to rule 3.800.  Morgan, 293 So. 3d at 1084 (quoting Fla. 
R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(J)). 
After the Second District decided Morgan, the en banc First 
District in Rogers v. State, 296 So. 3d 500, 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), 
held that orders granting relief under rule 3.800(a) are “not final or 
appealable until resentencing has occurred”—thus aligning itself 
with Morgan (as well as the Third District) and receding from 
Jordan, Simmons and their progeny.  But the law of the Fourth and 
Fifth Districts has remained in conflict with Morgan. 
III 
 
In his challenge to the Second District’s decision, Morgan 
argues that the trial court order granting his rule 3.800(a) motion 
was a final order (even if not appealable) and was therefore not 
subject to reconsideration.  In support of this argument, he relies 
primarily on our decision in Taylor, and contends that on the issue 
of finality there is no relevant difference between rule 3.850 and 
rule 3.800(a).  Morgan emphasizes Taylor’s statement that 
“postconviction proceedings and resentencing proceedings are 
separate, legally discrete proceedings.”  140 So. 3d at 529.  He 
further reasons that judicial labor is complete once a court enters 
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an order granting a motion under either rule 3.850 or rule 3.800(a), 
and that under either rule a resentencing proceeding is a distinct 
proceeding.  Recognizing that rule 9.140(c)(1)(J) supports the 
conclusion that an order granting a rule 3.800(a) motion is not 
appealable by the State, Morgan nonetheless asserts that such 
orders are final.  Morgan cites as supplemental authority State v. 
Jackson, 306 So. 3d 936, 945 (Fla. 2020), in which we held that an 
order vacating a death sentence in a successive rule 3.851 
proceeding was final and the sentence could not be “retroactively 
reinstated” based on a change in the governing law that occurred 
prior to resentencing.2 
The State contends that the order granting Morgan’s rule 
3.800(a) motion was nonfinal and therefore was—as the Second 
District ruled—subject to reconsideration.  The State responds to 
Morgan’s reliance on Taylor by arguing that because rule 3.800(a) is 
“entirely different” from rule 3.850, Taylor’s application of rule 
3.850 is not controlling here.  In distinguishing Taylor, the State—
 
 
2.  Morgan also makes a meritless argument based on Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.192, which we reject without further 
comment. 
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like the Morgan court—points to Taylor’s reliance on the rule of 
finality in rule 3.850(f)(8)(C), and the State emphasizes the absence 
of an analog in rule 3.800.  Further explaining the relevant 
differences between rule 3.800(a) and rule 3.850, the State argues 
that rule 3.800(a) authorizes the court to correct an illegal 
sentence—rather than to vacate such a sentence—and that the 
“process of correction” is not complete until the corrected sentence 
has been entered.  The State also contends that rule 3.800(a) is not 
properly described as a “postconviction rule,” and thus does not fall 
within the sweep on Taylor’s teaching concerning the distinction 
between postconviction proceedings and resentencing proceedings. 
IV 
As the arguments of the parties suggest, the resolution of the 
issue presented here turns on the scope of our holding in Taylor.  
We reject the expansive reading of Taylor’s interpretation of rule 
3.850 urged by Morgan and conclude that Taylor does not apply to 
proceedings under rule 3.800(a).  We agree with the State’s 
argument that in rule 3.800(a) proceedings the process of sentence 
correction is not complete until an order is entered imposing a 
corrected sentence.  Until that point, there is no final order.  
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Judicial labor in the cause remains to be done, and an order 
granting a rule 3.800(a) motion is subject to reconsideration.  In 
this respect, the structure of rule 3.800(a) is fundamentally 
different from rule 3.850, under which resentencing proceedings are 
separate and distinct from the prior proceedings that result in an 
order vacating a sentence. 
Taylor dealt with a question involving the finality of an order 
addressing claims raised in a rule 3.850 motion.  We framed the 
specific question on review as “whether an order disposing of a 
postconviction motion which partially denies and partially grants 
relief is a final order for purposes of appeal, when the relief granted 
requires subsequent action in the underlying case, such as 
resentencing.”  140 So. 3d at 527.  And we held that such an order 
was indeed a final order.  Id.  In doing so, we rejected the view of 
the Fifth District that such an order “was not a final appealable 
order because the resentencing required further judicial labor in the 
underlying case.”  Id. at 528.  Instead, we agreed with the reasoning 
of the Second District in Cooper v. State, 667 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1996): “An order denying in part and granting in part 
relief . . . marks the end of the judicial labor which is to be 
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expended on the motion, and the order is final for appellate 
purposes.”  140 So. 3d at 528. 
In Taylor, we relied on the then recently adopted provision of 
rule 3.850(f)(8)(C), which states that an “order issued after the 
evidentiary hearing shall resolve all the claims raised in the motion 
and shall be considered the final order for purposes of appeal.”  Id. 
at 529 (quoting In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc. & Fla. 
Rules of App. Proc., 132 So. 3d 734, 750 (Fla. 2013)).  We rejected 
the State’s argument that allowing an appeal before an ordered 
resentencing would “encourage piecemeal litigation.”  Id.  We 
concluded that “because resentencing is an entirely new, 
independent proceeding, an appeal from the underlying 
postconviction proceeding does not foster piecemeal litigation or 
waste judicial resources.”  Id.  
But proceedings under rule 3.800(a) are not equivalent to 
proceedings under rule 3.850.  Although both types of proceedings 
can result in relief from final criminal sentences, the two different 
rules are structured differently and therefore operate differently.  
Admittedly, rule 3.800 proceedings are commonly referred to as 
postconviction proceedings, but rule 3.800 is located in the portion 
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of the rules—part XIV (Sentence)—governing the imposition of 
sentences by sentencing judges, while rule 3.850 is in the part of 
the rules—part XVII (Postconviction Relief)—relating to 
postconviction proceedings.  Rule 3.850 characterizes motions to 
obtain relief from sentences as “motion[s] to vacate a sentence.”  
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b).  There is no analogous provision in rule 
3.800.  Sentences are corrected under rule 3.800(a) as an extended 
part of the sentencing process in the underlying criminal case.  
Under rule 3.850, sentences are vacated and then—in a 
subsequent, separate proceeding—a new sentence is imposed.  
This understanding of the differences in the way the two rules 
operate fits with the fact that there is no provision in rule 3.800 
analogous to the finality provision of rule 3.850(f)(8)(C), a provision 
which Taylor relied on to support its conclusion that a resentencing 
proceeding after an order granting relief under rule 3.850 was a 
separate and distinct proceeding.  It is similarly consistent with rule 
9.140(c)(1)(J), which authorizes state appeals of orders “granting 
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relief under [rules] 3.801, 3.850, 3.851 or 3.853” but does not 
authorize appeals of orders granting relief under rule 3.800(a).3  
And our understanding of the difference between rule 3.850 
and rule 3.800(a) also fits with what we have previously said about 
rule 3.800(a).  Although we have not previously directly decided the 
question, we have relied on authority holding that an order granting 
a rule 3.800 motion is not a final order.  In State v. Gaines, 770 So. 
2d 1221, 1224 (Fla. 2000), we held that an order suppressing 
evidence during trial was not a final order.  We readily applied the 
traditional test of finality—that is, “whether the order in question 
 
 
3.  The dissent relies on section 924.066(2), Florida Statutes 
(2017), a statutory provision that is not mentioned—much less 
argued—by either Morgan or the State.  Of course, we do not 
overturn a decision on review on the basis of an argument that has 
not been presented.  In any event, the dissent’s assertion that 
section 924.066(2) provides the requisite statutory “authority” for 
an appeal in this case, dissenting op. at 21, apparently is based on 
the dissent’s underlying assertion that the order at issue is “a final 
order,” dissenting op. at 18.  Because we instead conclude that the 
order at issue is a nonfinal order, section 924.066(2) is not relevant.  
See art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. (establishing that review of 
interlocutory orders by district courts is only available “to the extent 
provided by rules adopted by the supreme court”); State v. Gaines, 
770 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 2000) (“[A]rticle V, section 4(b)(1) . . . 
vests exclusive power in this Court to authorize non-final 
appeals . . . .”).  We likewise reject the dissent’s reliance on Florida 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(P), which addresses appeals 
of certain “final orders.” 
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constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the cause, and nothing 
further remains to be done by the court to effectuate a termination 
of the cause as between the parties directly affected.”  Id. at 1223-
24 (quoting S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 
1974)).  In explaining our conclusion that “an order or ruling 
suppressing evidence at trial is a non-final order because judicial 
labor is still required to effectuate a termination of the case,” we 
cited as analogous the decision of the Fourth District in Delvalle, 
which we characterized as holding that “an order granting the 
defendant’s rule 3.800(a) motion was not a final order where the 
defendant had not been resentenced and judicial labor was still 
required.”  Id. at 1224.  Morgan has presented nothing to show that 
our reliance on Delvalle in Gaines was mistaken. 
Finally, Morgan’s reliance on Jackson is misplaced.  Indeed, 
the reasoning in Jackson supports our understanding of the 
difference between rule 3.800(a) proceedings and postconviction 
proceedings in which resentencing takes place after the entry of an 
order vacating a sentence.   
In Jackson, as here, we dealt with circumstances in which the 
relevant legal landscape had shifted.  We addressed the question 
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“whether a death sentence that was vacated by the postconviction 
court can be ‘reinstated’ if the State never appealed the final order 
granting relief, the resentencing has not yet taken place, and this 
Court has since receded from the decisional law on which the 
sentence was vacated.”  306 So. 3d at 937.  In rejecting the State’s 
argument for “reinstatement” of the sentence, we focused on the 
fact that the sentence had been vacated by a final order.  Our 
analysis relied on the provisions of rule 3.851(f)(5)(F), which 
contains a finality provision identical to the finality provision of rule 
3.850(f)(8)(C).  Id. at 940-41.  Based on the finality of a rule 3.851 
order vacating a death sentence, we thus held that “vacated death 
sentences cannot be retroactively reinstated.”  Id. at 945.  We 
rejected reliance on any analogy to rule 3.800 in interpreting rule 
3.851, and noted also that “rule 3.800(a) differs considerably from 
rule 3.850.”  Id. at 943. 
Unlike Jackson’s sentence, Morgan’s sentence was not 
vacated.  The order granting relief on Jackson’s rule 3.851 motion 
and vacating his death sentence was a final order.  The order 
granting Morgan’s rule 3.800(a) motion was not a final order but left 
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his sentence in place until further action was taken by the 
sentencing judge. 
V 
 
The trial court—based on a change in the governing law—
correctly reconsidered its initial nonfinal order granting Morgan’s 
rule 3.800(a) motion.  We therefore approve the decision of the 
Second District to affirm the trial court, and we disapprove the 
decisions in Jordan, Simmons, Jones, and Magill, together with their 
progeny. 
 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and 
FRANCIS, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LABARGA, J., 
concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
In 1979, Darryl Morgan was sentenced as a juvenile offender 
to life with the possibility of parole after 25 years on a second-
degree murder conviction.  In 2016, Morgan filed a postconviction 
motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), arguing that he was entitled to 
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resentencing according to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), 
and Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 2016) (“We 
conclude that Florida’s existing parole system, as set forth by 
statute, does not provide for individualized consideration of [the 
defendant]’s juvenile status at the time of the murder, as required 
by Miller, and that his sentence [of life with the possibility of parole 
after 25 years], which is virtually indistinguishable from a sentence 
of life without parole, is therefore unconstitutional.”).  In 2017, the 
postconviction court granted Morgan’s motion and ordered 
resentencing.  The State “filed a notice of appeal but voluntarily 
dismissed the appeal before it was perfected.”  Morgan v. State, 293 
So. 3d 1081, 1082 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).  Over a year and a half later, 
and before resentencing occurred, the State filed a motion for 
reconsideration of the order granting Morgan’s rule 3.800(a) motion 
based on this Court’s decision in State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3, 4 
(Fla. 2018), which receded from Atwell and held “that juvenile 
offenders’ sentences of life with the possibility of parole after 25 
years do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution [and] [t]herefore, such juvenile offenders are not 
entitled to resentencing.”  The postconviction court granted the 
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State’s motion, vacated its previous order, and denied Morgan’s rule 
3.800(a) motion. 
I agree on the merits that, pursuant to Michel, Morgan’s initial 
sentence was not illegal.  However, I dissent from the majority’s 
decision that gives a postconviction court unlimited time to 
reconsider its ruling on a rule 3.800(a) motion granting 
resentencing.  Because the postconviction court’s order granting 
resentencing was a final order for purposes of appeal, and the State 
did not timely pursue rehearing and voluntarily dismissed its 
appeal, I would conclude that the postconviction court lacked 
authority to vacate its initial order granting Morgan’s rule 3.800(a) 
motion. 
In determining the finality of an order, we examine “whether 
the order in question constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the 
cause.”  State v. Gaines, 770 So. 2d 1221, 1223-24 (Fla. 2000) 
(quoting S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 
1974)).  Morgan was initially sentenced in 1979.  More than 35 
years later, Morgan filed a postconviction rule 3.800(a) motion to 
correct an illegal sentence, and the trial court entered an order 
granting Morgan’s resentencing.  Because this case arises in the 
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collateral context, the difference between a postconviction 
proceeding and a resentencing is critical.  This Court has made 
clear that when ordered in the postconviction context, “resentencing 
is an entirely new, independent proceeding.”  Taylor v. State, 140 
So. 3d 526, 529 (Fla. 2014); see also State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d 
985, 988 (Fla. 2008) (“[R]esentencing is a de novo proceeding . . . .”).  
We have further elaborated on the distinction between 
“resentencing” and “postconviction proceedings”: 
If a postconviction proceeding is not a step in a 
criminal prosecution, and if a resentencing proceeding is 
legally distinct from a postconviction proceeding, then a 
postconviction court’s final order granting a resentencing 
cannot be analogized to a nonfinal, interlocutory order.  
Rather, that final order, absent rehearing or appeal, 
brings an end to the postconviction proceeding and thus 
“should be treated as a final judgment.” 
 
State v. Jackson, 306 So. 3d 936, 942 (Fla. 2020) (quoting 
Clearwater Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 
(Fla. 1976)).  To summarize, because a postconviction proceeding 
and a resentencing are legally distinct, judicial labor is complete 
once a postconviction court enters an order granting resentencing, 
and the right to challenge that order expires absent a timely and 
authorized motion for rehearing or appeal. 
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Here, the postconviction court’s initial order granting 
resentencing became final when the State failed to timely seek 
rehearing and voluntarily dismissed its appeal.  See Jones v. State, 
279 So. 3d 172, 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (“The order granting 
resentencing became final when neither party moved for rehearing 
or appealed that order.”); Magill v. State, 287 So. 3d 1262, 1262 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (“We find that the postconviction court lacked 
authority to vacate its initial order granting Magill’s [rule 3.800(a)] 
motion because that order became final when neither party moved 
for rehearing or appealed.”).  The State did not timely seek 
rehearing.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(1)(B) (“A party may file a 
motion for rehearing of any signed, written order . . . within 15 days 
of the date of service of the order or within 15 days of the expiration 
of the time period for filing an order if no order is filed.”). 
As to the State’s ability to appeal, the majority refers to the 
absence of an express finality provision in rule 3.800 and Florida 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(J), which authorizes the 
State to appeal orders “granting relief under [rules] 3.801, 3.850, 
3.851 or 3.853” and not under rule 3.800(a).  See majority op. at 
12-13.  “The State’s right to appeal in a criminal case must be 
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‘expressly conferred by statute.’ ”  State v. McMahon, 94 So. 3d 468, 
472 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Exposito v. State, 891 So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla. 
2004)).  The State’s authority in this case is set forth in rule 9.140 
and section 924.066, Florida Statutes (2017). 
Specifically, rule 9.140(c)(1)(P) allows the State to appeal an 
order “as otherwise provided by general law for final orders.”  
Further, the Florida Legislature, in chapter 924, titled Criminal 
Appeals and Collateral Review, has specifically provided for an 
appeal by the State in this instance.  The plain language of section 
924.066(2) provides: “Either the state or a prisoner in custody may 
obtain review in the next higher state court of a trial court’s adverse 
ruling granting or denying collateral relief.  The state may obtain 
review of any trial court ruling that fails to enforce a procedural 
bar.”  (Emphasis added.); see also Cramer v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 
461 F.3d 1380, 1382 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing section 924.066(2) 
for the proposition that the defendant “had thirty days in which to 
file an appeal from the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief 
under Rule 3.800(a)”).  Indeed, the State did file a notice of appeal 
of the initial order granting resentencing but voluntarily dismissed 
the appeal before it was perfected.  Accordingly, once the appeal 
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was voluntarily dismissed, the order granting resentencing became 
final, and the postconviction court lacked the authority to enter a 
second order rescinding the initial order and denying resentencing. 
The majority’s decision that gives a postconviction court 
unlimited time to reconsider its ruling on a rule 3.800(a) motion 
granting resentencing is not in accordance with Florida law as set 
forth above or with policy expressed by the Legislature and in the 
Florida Constitution.  See § 924.051(8), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“It is the 
intent of the Legislature that all terms and conditions of direct 
appeal and collateral review be strictly enforced, including the 
application of procedural bars, to ensure that all claims of error are 
raised and resolved at the first opportunity.  It is also the 
Legislature’s intent that all procedural bars to direct appeal and 
collateral review be fully enforced by the courts of this state.”); art. 
I, § 16(b)(10), Fla. Const. (providing victims the right to prompt and 
final resolution including collateral attacks). 
The majority attempts to distinguish and isolate our precedent 
by correlating the finality of an order granting resentencing with 
whether a motion is filed pursuant to rule 3.800 or rule 3.850.  See 
majority op. at 9-16.  The majority states that its decision is 
- 23 - 
“[b]ased on the nature of proceedings to correct an illegal sentence 
under rule 3.800(a)” and that “[s]entences are corrected under rule 
3.800(a) as an extended part of the sentencing process in the 
underlying criminal case.”  Majority op. at 1-2, 12.  However, the 
majority fails to acknowledge that the facts of this case involve a 
collateral postconviction proceeding, not a continuation of the 
underlying criminal proceeding.  Finality is based on whether the 
order brings an end to judicial labor, and in a postconviction 
proceeding, under either rule 3.800(a) or rule 3.850, judicial labor 
is complete once a court enters an order granting resentencing, and 
the right to challenge that order expires absent a timely and 
authorized motion for rehearing or appeal.  To conclude otherwise 
misapprehends the origination and nature of postconviction 
collateral proceedings.  See Jackson, 306 So. 3d at 939 (“[T]he State 
erroneously assumes that a postconviction proceeding is a step in 
the criminal prosecution and that a resentencing proceeding is a 
continuation of a postconviction proceeding.  Our caselaw says 
otherwise.”); see also State v. Bolyea, 520 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 
1988) (explaining that postconviction motions are collateral attacks 
on the underlying judgments that were traditionally addressed by 
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writs of habeas corpus, and the postconviction rule “is a procedural 
vehicle for the collateral remedy otherwise available by writ of 
habeas corpus [and] was designed to simplify the process of 
collateral review and prescribe both a fact-finding function in the 
lower courts and a uniform method of appellate review”). 
For the reasons above, because the postconviction court’s 
initial order granting resentencing was a final order that marked an 
end of judicial labor as to the question of Morgan’s entitlement to 
resentencing, and because that order was not subject to a timely 
motion for rehearing and the State voluntarily dismissed its appeal, 
I would conclude that the court had no authority to enter a second 
order vacating the initial order and denying resentencing. 
I respectfully dissent. 
LABARGA, J., concurs. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District – Case No. 2D18-4940 
 
 
(Pinellas County) 
 
Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Maureen E. 
Surber, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, 
Florida, 
 
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for Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor 
General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, 
Tallahassee, Florida, Carla Suzanne Bechard, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, and Allison C. Heim, Assistant Attorney General, 
Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent