Case Title: State v. Steven G. Walters

Citation: 2004 WI 18

Docket Number: 2001AP001916-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 18 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1916-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Steven G. Walters,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 24 
Reported at: 260 Wis. 2d 210, 659 N.W.2d 151 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 9, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 13, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
James L. Carlson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by David A. 
Danz and Danz Law Offices, LLC, Elkhorn, and oral argument by 
David A. Danz. 
 
 
2004 WI 18 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1916-CR  
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 390) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Steven G. Walters,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 9, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.  
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, State of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals that reversed the defendant's conviction on three counts 
of sexual assault of a child.1  The State asserts that the court 
of appeals wrongfully interpreted State v. Davis, 2002 WI 75, 
254 Wis. 2d 1, 645 N.W.2d 913, as "compelling" the admission of 
the defendant's proffered Richard A.P.2 evidence, which compared 
                                                 
1 State v. Walters, 2003 WI App 24, 260 Wis. 2d 210, 659 
N.W.2d 151 (reversing a decision of the circuit court for 
Walworth County, James L. Carlson, Judge). 
2 State v. Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 795, 589 N.W.2d 
674 (Ct. App. 1998).   
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
2 
 
the personality characteristics of the defendant with the 
personality 
characteristics 
of 
known 
sex 
offenders.  
Additionally, the State claims the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in excluding the evidence.   
¶2 
We 
take 
this 
opportunity 
to 
clarify 
that 
the 
admissibility of Richard A.P. evidence is not compelled by 
Davis, but rather is subject to the discretionary determination 
of the circuit court.  Because we conclude that the circuit 
court here did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
excluding the proffered evidence, we reverse the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶3 
On December 28, 1998, the defendant, Steven G. 
Walters, was charged with three counts of first-degree sexual 
assault of a child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (1999-
2000).3  Prior to trial and in response to discovery demands, the 
parties exchanged witness lists.  Walters notified the State 
that he planned to present expert testimony from Dr. Ralph 
Underwager4 and Ms. Hollida Wakefield.  He intended that these 
two experts testify as to "adult behaviors towards children and 
                                                 
3 All statutory references are to the 1999-2000 version of 
the Wisconsin Statutes unless otherwise noted. 
4 Dr. Underwager's expert testimony concerned interviewing 
techniques used to obtain information from the two victims.  The 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision to 
exclude his testimony, and Walters does not challenge that 
decision in this case.   
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
3 
 
eliciting 
statements" 
and 
"the 
characteristics 
of 
child 
molesters." 
¶4 
In response, the State filed a motion in limine, 
asking the circuit court to preclude Walters from calling any 
expert "to testify that the defendant is less likely to have 
committed this sexual assault because of some psychological 
make-up."  In addition to challenging the witnesses' expertise 
and the reliability of their opinions, the State claimed that 
the testimony would not satisfy the requirements of State v. 
Richard A.P. "which the state believes was wrongfully decided 
 . . . ."  The State further argued that such testimony would 
invade the province of the jury and that its probative value was 
outweighed by its prejudice to the State. 
 
¶5 
Circuit Court Judge John R. Race presided over 
pretrial hearings, spanning a period of three days.  At these 
hearings, Walters made an offer of proof as to the testimony of 
Ms. Wakefield and Dr. Underwager.   
¶6 
Wakefield testified that she had conducted several 
psychological tests on Walters and was prepared to testify as to 
Walters's personality characteristics and those of known sex 
offenders.  The record reveals the following exchange between 
Walters's counsel and Ms. Wakefield: 
Q. So as an offer of proof, you would be prepared to 
testify as an expert as it related to the defendant's 
character? 
A. His personality characteristics. 
Q. And compare that against known sex offenders? 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
4 
 
A. Yes, I would also talk about the characteristics of 
known sexual offenders, and I would assume that the 
finder of 
fact would 
be 
the one to 
draw any 
conclusions from that.  
Wakefield explained that she would not give any opinion on the 
ultimate issues of fact.  Rather, she stated that her testimony 
"gives 
information 
for 
the 
trier 
of 
fact 
in 
weighing 
probabilities." 
 
¶7 
Judge Race issued a memorandum decision on December 
20, 1999, in which he concluded that Ms. Wakefield's testimony 
was admissible.  Judge Race observed that "[w]hether or not the 
state likes the Richard A.P. case or not, it is still the law 
which I must follow . . . ."  He then denied the State's motion 
to exclude the evidence. 
¶8 
Pursuant to the standardized judicial rotation in 
Walworth County, Circuit Court Judge James L. Carlson assumed 
the felony court assignment, replacing Judge Race in the case.  
On May 17, 2000, the State filed a motion asking Judge Carlson 
to reconsider Judge Race's ruling.  In this motion, the State 
alleged that "Judge Race was mistaken when he stated that he 
must follow the holding in Richard A.P." and "[o]bviously 
Richard A.P. is a wrong decision and contrary to precedent 
nation wide."   
¶9 
Judge Carlson conducted hearings on the State's motion 
and ordered Walters to present a synopsis of the pretrial offer 
of proof testimony.  He decided to exclude the Richard A.P. 
evidence, concluding that it had minimal probative value and was 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
5 
 
issues, and the danger that it might mislead the jury.  He 
explained: 
[T]o suggest that statistical analyses of people in 
prison 
with 
psychological 
disorders 
and 
their 
personality profiles would make it less likely that 
this defendant would offend is of minimal probative 
value. 
I'm not saying it doesn't have any probative value.  
Minimal probative value in comparison to —— Well, I'm 
employing 904.03.  Relevant evidence can be excluded 
if the probative value is substantially outweighed by 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or the fact 
that it might be misleading to the jury.  I think all 
of those would apply here. 
I think the probative value is slight, from just my 
own experience as a judge, seeing that all types of 
people can be involved in sexual assaults, whether 
they have a psychological profile of a sexual offender 
or not, and also from the studies which have been 
submitted in the briefs.  I think in that regard, John 
– I'm not sure if that cite is correct.  It says 1 
John E.B. Meyer, evidence in child abuse and neglect 
cases, Section 5.54 ed. 2d.  I would say third edition 
1997.  Just say that it's not reliable.  Profile 
testimony is not reliable.   
And I heard – I heard the lengthy testimony that these 
witnesses gave, and I think it would just – it would 
be – it would obscure the real issues here of 
credibility of witnesses and the jury function of 
weighing that credibility to have substantial evidence 
about this wandering – I just have to admit they went 
all over.5  Your outline summary even takes two, three 
pages.  Would be substantially confusing to the jury 
and it would cause unfair prejudice to the State 
                                                 
5 At the pretrial hearing, defense counsel challenged Judge 
Carlson's statement that he had heard the testimony of the 
expert witnesses in this case.  Judge Carlson later clarified 
that he had heard their testimony in a previous, unrelated case.  
He also stated on the record that he had reviewed the 
transcripts of the pretrial hearings in the present case. 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
6 
 
because again, it would cause them to, in this case 
and in future cases, to have a battle of experts on a 
matter that is of slight probative value.  And I think 
that could confuse the jury and mislead the jury. 
So I'm rejecting the use of these expert witnesses to 
get into the issue of profile evidence for the reasons 
I've stated. 
¶10 Walters then filed a motion for an interlocutory 
appeal, which was denied.  Subsequently, a jury found him guilty 
of three counts of sexual assault of a child. 
 
¶11 On appeal, Walters claimed that Judge Carlson had 
erred in granting the State's motion for reconsideration and 
prohibiting him from offering expert testimony regarding profile 
and personality characteristics.  The court of appeals agreed 
and reversed his conviction.   
 
¶12 In its decision, the court of appeals concluded that 
the circuit court did not apply the proper legal standard in 
excluding the proffered Richard A.P. evidence.  State v. 
Walters, 2003 WI App 24, 260 Wis. 2d 210, ¶24, 659 N.W.2d 151.  
It explained that while the circuit court had conducted a 
relevancy analysis, "the analysis was colored by the trial 
court's belief that Richard A.P. was seriously limited as 
authority and that other jurisdictions have held such evidence 
to be inadmissible."  Id., ¶16.  The court determined that the 
evidence had probative value and was not outweighed by any 
possible danger of unfair prejudice.  Id., ¶24.  Accordingly, it 
observed that State v. Davis "compels a different result here 
than the one arrived at by the trial court."  Id., ¶17.  
II 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
7 
 
¶13 This case addresses a circuit court's evidentiary 
ruling that excluded expert testimony comparing the personality 
characteristics 
of 
the 
defendant 
with 
the 
personality 
characteristics of known sex offenders.  We review a circuit 
court's decision to exclude such evidence under the erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
standard. 
 
State 
v. 
Pharr, 
115 
Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983).   
¶14 An appellate court will uphold an evidentiary ruling 
if it concludes that the circuit court examined the relevant 
facts, applied a proper standard of law, used a demonstrated 
rational process, and reached a conclusion that a reasonable 
judge could reach.  Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 
320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).  Any question that arises in reviewing 
whether the circuit court applied a proper legal standard, 
however, presents a question of law subject to independent 
appellate review.  City of Madison v. Wisconsin Dep't of 
Workforce Dev., 2003 WI 76, ¶10, 262 Wis. 2d 652, 664 N.W.2d 
584. 
III 
 
¶15 The primary thrust of the State's argument is that the 
court of appeals misapplied this court's decision in Davis and 
wrongfully viewed Davis as "compelling" the admission of Richard 
A.P. testimony.  Additionally, the State contends the court of 
appeals erred when it reversed the discretionary determination 
of the circuit court to exclude the proffered evidence. 
¶16 In order to understand the issues in this case, we 
must first examine the law governing the admissibility of 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
8 
 
Richard A.P. evidence.  The term "Richard A.P. evidence" comes 
from a decision of the court of appeals in which a defendant 
accused of molesting a child sought to introduce character 
evidence through the testimony of a psychologist.  State v. 
Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 795, 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 
1998).  The testimony was intended to demonstrate that the 
defendant did not exhibit character traits consistent with a 
sexual disorder such as pedophilia.  Id.  The defendant's expert 
planned to testify that the defendant's "sexual history and 
responses to specific testing about his sexual behavior did not 
show evidence of any diagnosable sexual disorder."  Id. at 791.  
Additionally, the expert would testify that absent such a 
diagnosable disorder, it was unlikely that such a person would 
molest a child.  Id.   
¶17 The court of appeals in Richard A.P. concluded that 
such evidence was both relevant and admissible under Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02,6 the general rule governing expert testimony, and Wis. 
Stat. § 904.04(1)(a),7 the rule governing character evidence.  
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.02 provides: 
 
907.02 
 
Testimony 
by 
experts. 
 
If 
scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, expertise, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise. 
 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(1)(a) provides: 
 
(1)  CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY.  Evidence of a 
person's 
character 
or 
a 
trait 
of 
the 
person's 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
9 
 
Id. at 795.  It observed that such testimony would have assisted 
the jury in determining the likelihood that the defendant 
committed the charged offenses.  Id. at 792.   Moreover, it 
cited support for the proposition that such "arguments or 
evidence about character profile, which seek to explain conduct 
or the absence of it, must be supported by competent underlying 
expert testimony."  Id. at 794 (citing King v. State, 75 
Wis. 2d 26, 248 N.W.2d 458 (1977), and State v. Pulizzano, 155 
Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990)). 
 
¶18 In State v. Davis, this court revisited Richard A.P. 
and addressed whether such evidence is generally admissible at 
trial.  Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶2.  There, the defendant's expert 
intended to testify that the defendant did not exhibit character 
traits consistent with a sexual disorder such as pedophilia.  
Furthermore, 
because 
the 
defendant 
did 
not 
possess 
such 
character traits, he would have been unlikely to commit a sexual 
assault on his daughter.  Id., ¶5.  The State argued for a 
blanket restriction on Richard A.P. evidence on grounds that it 
has low probative value and is substantially outweighed by its 
inherent dangers.  Id., ¶14. 
 
¶19 The court in Davis expressly rejected the State's 
request for a blanket restriction and declined to overrule 
                                                                                                                                                             
that the person acted in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
 
(a) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent 
trait of the accused's character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same. 
 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
10 
 
Richard A.P.  Instead, it concluded that the rules on character 
evidence and expert testimony allow for the admissibility of 
Richard A.P. evidence.  Id., ¶16.   
¶20 Specifically, 
the 
court 
determined 
that 
traits 
regarding the defendant's propensity to commit sexual assault 
are pertinent traits of his character.  Id., ¶18.  It noted that 
such evidence has probative value in sexual assault cases, 
"where there is often no neutral witness to the assault and 
there 
is 
seldom 
any 
physical 
evidence 
implicating 
the 
defendant."  Id.  Additionally, the court observed that such 
evidence might be useful to the jury "helping it to determine a 
fact in issue, that is, whether the defendant committed the 
crime, by showing circumstantial evidence of the defendant's 
innocence."  Id.   
¶21 However, the Davis court observed that a circuit court 
is entrusted to act as a gatekeeper with the power to exclude 
unduly prejudicial evidence.  Id., ¶21.  It explained that, "the 
circuit court retains discretion in admitting such evidence and 
must carefully scrutinize such Richard A.P. expert testimony in 
each case for its admissibility."  Id. 
 
¶22 In the present case, the State contends that the court 
of appeals wrongfully interpreted Davis as compelling the 
admission of the defendant's proffered Richard A.P. evidence.  
In support of its argument, the State directs this court's 
attention to the following excerpt of the court of appeals' 
opinion: "Thus while we agree with the State that Davis applies 
to the case at hand, we conclude that Davis compels a different 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
11 
 
result here than the one arrived at by the trial court."  
Walters, 260 Wis. 2d 210, ¶17. 
 
¶23 However, in focusing on the excerpted portion of the 
opinion, the State fails to give any import to the several 
passages that consistently emphasize that although Richard A.P. 
evidence may be admissible, such admissibility is subject to the 
sound discretion of the circuit court.  ("The discretion to 
admit or exclude Richard A.P. evidence remains with the trial 
court."  Id., ¶14.  "[T]he rules on character evidence and 
expert testimony allow for the admissibility of Richard A.P. 
evidence . . . ."  Id., ¶18.  "Again, the admissibility of 
expert testimony is committed to the discretion of the trial 
court."  Id., ¶28.) 
 
¶24 Thus, we read the court of appeals' opinion here 
differently than does the State.  To the extent that the opinion 
can be read to interpret Davis as compelling the admission of 
proffered 
Richard 
A.P. 
evidence, 
however, 
we 
take 
this 
opportunity to clarify and reemphasize that the decision to 
admit or exclude Richard A.P. evidence remains a discretionary 
determination.   
¶25 Richard A.P. evidence, like other expert evidence, is 
subject 
to 
the 
requirements 
of 
the 
rules 
governing 
the 
admissibility of evidence.  These include not only the rules 
governing character evidence and expert testimony, but also Wis. 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
12 
 
Stat. § 904.03,8 the rule governing the exclusion of otherwise 
relevant evidence. 
¶26 The Davis court aptly set forth the framework of 
analysis in evaluating the admissibility of Richard A.P. 
evidence.  It instructs: 
The rules on character evidence and expert testimony 
allow for the admissibility of Richard A.P. evidence.  
Under our rules of evidence, a defendant may introduce 
"pertinent trait[s]" of his or her character as 
evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1)(a).  "Pertinent" 
refers to the relevance of the traits.  7 Daniel 
Blinka, 
Wisconsin 
Practice: 
 
Wisconsin 
Evidence 
§ 404.4, at 133 (2d ed. 2001).  Thus, like all 
admissible 
evidence, 
character 
evidence 
must 
be 
relevant to the facts at issue.  Relevancy has two 
facets:  (1) the evidence must relate to a fact or 
proposition 
that 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination of the action and (2) the evidence must 
have probative value, that is, a tendency to establish 
those consequential propositions.  Id. at § 401.1 at 
82. 
Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶16.   
¶27 In addressing the expert testimony necessary for 
Richard A.P. evidence, the Davis court advised: 
Expert 
testimony 
is 
permitted 
when 
specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 907.02.  Again, relevancy of the testimony is 
an essential requirement for the admissibility of such 
expert testimony.  Blinka, supra, § 702.2, at 473.  In 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.03 provides:   
 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
13 
 
addition, 
admissibility 
of 
the 
expert 
testimony 
depends on the qualifications of the expert and the 
usefulness of the testimony to the trier of fact.  Id.  
The testimony is useful if it will assist the trier of 
fact to understand evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue.  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 907.02.   
Id., ¶17.  
¶28 Finally, we note that circuit courts may employ the 
balancing test of Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  Under this rule, relevant 
evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 904.03. 
IV 
¶29 
Having established that Davis does not compel the 
admission of Richard A.P. evidence, we turn next to the issue of 
whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  
The court of appeals determined that the circuit court's analysis 
was "colored" by its belief that Richard A.P. was seriously 
limited as authority and that other jurisdictions have held such 
evidence to be inadmissible.  Walters, 260 Wis. 2d 210, ¶16.  
Although we note concerns about the circuit court's analysis, we 
nevertheless determine that the record supports its exercise of 
discretion in excluding the evidence. 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
14 
 
¶30 As discussed above, Davis requires that Richard A.P. 
evidence relate to pertinent traits of a defendant's character.9  
It determined that traits relating to the likelihood that a 
defendant committed a sexual assault are relevant.  Here, the 
circuit court concluded that Walters's proffered evidence was 
relevant. 
¶31 However, while the circuit court found the evidence to 
be relevant, it concluded that it was of "minimal probative 
value."  Probative value is a product of relevance and an 
assessment of what the evidence is likely to add to the case.  7 
Daniel 
D. 
Blinka, 
Wisconsin 
Practice: 
Wisconsin 
Evidence 
§ 403.1, at 114 (2d ed. 2001).  In reaching its conclusion that 
the evidence was minimally probative, the circuit court relied 
upon its experience as a judge in observing the types of 
individuals that have been involved in sexual assaults as well 
as studies supplied by the parties in their briefs.  The circuit 
court also cited a treatise indicating that profile testimony 
was unreliable. 
¶32 After determining that the evidence was minimally 
probative, the circuit court went a step further than the Davis 
court and applied Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  When applying § 904.03, 
                                                 
9 Although the State acknowledges that State v. Davis, 2002 
WI 75, 254 Wis. 2d 1, 645 N.W.2d 913, applies to this case, it 
asserts that the defendant's proffered testimony did not reach 
the level of the testimony at issue in Richard A.P.  We need not 
address whether Walters's expert testimony met the technical 
requirements of Richard A.P. because both sides agree in this 
case that the testimony was relevant. 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
15 
 
a circuit court is required to compare the probative value of 
the evidence against other countervailing factors.  Id. at 113.   
¶33 The circuit court conducted such a balancing test and 
considered the potential for the confusion of the issues, and 
its propensity to mislead the jury.  The court stated that the 
proffered 
evidence 
would 
be 
inappropriately 
"lengthy" and 
"wandering" and would "obscure" the real issue of witness 
credibility.   
¶34 Although a Wis. Stat. § 904.03 analysis was the basis 
of the determination to exclude the evidence, the circuit court 
nevertheless referenced a treatise indicating that such evidence 
is unreliable.  Such a reference is a cause for concern here 
because an argument that the evidence was unreliable was offered 
as grounds to exclude outright similar testimony in Davis.  
There, the court noted that in Wisconsin, "the reliability of 
expert testimony is an issue for the trier of fact, not the 
circuit court as a predicate for admissibility."  Davis, 254 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶22. 
¶35 Likewise, the circuit court's conclusion that the 
"battle of experts" would cause the State unfair prejudice 
raises concern.  Again, this issue was advanced by the State in 
Davis.  The Davis court found this argument unpersuasive, noting 
that, "a battle between experts is a frequent occurrence in 
criminal cases where specialized knowledge on a relevant issue 
is required."  254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20. 
¶36 However, on balance, the record supports the circuit 
court's conclusion that the minimal probative value of Walters's 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
16 
 
proffered expert testimony was substantially outweighed by the 
danger that the issues would be confused and the jury would be 
misled.  The circuit court determined first that although 
relevant, 
the 
evidence 
was 
minimally 
probative. 
Character 
evidence as proof of conduct may properly be determined to be of 
low probative value in a given case.  See Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice: Wisconsin Evidence, § 404.1, at 124. 
¶37 Here, due to the victims' late reporting, there was a 
six-year gap between the first alleged assault and Wakefield's 
evaluations.  During the time frame when the assaults occurred, 
Walters had a drinking problem.  However, when Wakefield 
evaluated him, he told her that he was no longer drinking and no 
longer believed that he had a problem with alcohol.  At the 
offer of proof hearing, Wakefield testified that the tests 
administered assess personality, and that personalities are 
generally consistent, but can be altered by the consumption of 
alcohol.  She indicated that her test results did not take into 
account whether the alleged assaultive behavior was triggered by 
alcohol consumption.  This circumstance further minimized the 
probative value of the expert testimony. 
¶38 At the motion for reconsideration, the circuit court 
remarked that the proffered testimony did not reach the level of 
the offer of proof as characterized by the court in Richard A.P.  
Unlike the offers of proof in both Richard A.P. and Davis, 
Wakefield would not have offered any conclusions as to Walters's 
propensity to commit sexual assault.  Rather she testified: 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
17 
 
What I've done is assess Mr. Walters' personality so 
that the finder of fact can look at it.  And I can 
talk about what kind of personality child sexual 
abusers are more likely to have.  But clearly you are 
always going to have some people who aren't child 
abusers who have the same kind of problems and you are 
going to find some child abusers who don't have them, 
but 
it's 
a 
matter 
of 
probability. 
 
These 
are 
characteristics found more often in child sexual 
abusers, and I can talk about those. 
Given the nature of the evidence, the circumstances of the 
testing, and the scope of the proffered testimony, we determine 
that the circuit court arrived at a conclusion that a reasonable 
judge could make when it assessed the evidence to be of low 
probative value. 
¶39 The record also supports the circuit court's opinion 
that 
the 
testimony 
would 
be 
sufficiently 
"lengthy" 
and 
"wandering" and could mislead the jury.  The defense expert 
conducted a battery of seven psychological evaluations on the 
defendant, the results of which would be detailed at trial.10  An 
expert would need to explain each of these evaluations to the 
jury, vouch for their reliability, in addition to explaining the 
results of the evaluations and the conclusions drawn from them.   
¶40 Without this expert testimony, the testimonial portion 
of Walters's trial lasted one day.  In contrast, the offer of 
proof hearing consumed approximately 165 pages of transcript 
                                                 
10 The seven psychological evaluations performed on the 
defendant were the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – 
2, the California Psychological Inventory (CPI), Millon Clinical 
Multiaxial Inventory – III, Shipley Institute of Living Scale, 
Adjective 
Checklist, 
Biographical 
Data 
Sheet, 
and 
Hare 
Psychopathy checklist. 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
18 
 
over three days of hearing.  Additionally, the defense counsel 
initially informed Judge Carlson that he had anticipated the 
experts' testimony would add another three days to the trial.  
In sum, the admission of this evidence potentially would have 
increased significantly the length of the trial. 
¶41 In light of the scope and length of the proffered 
expert testimony in relation to the rest of the testimony, we 
determine that the circuit court arrived at a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could make and that this testimony could have 
misled the jury and confused the issues in this case.  Given the 
time spent on collateral forays, it was also reasonable for the 
circuit court to conclude that these dangers substantially 
outweighed the probative value of the expert testimony here. 
¶42 Thus, we determine that there is neither a blanket 
restriction of Richard A.P. evidence nor is it compelled.  
Rather, courts must scrutinize such evidence on a case-by-case 
basis to assess admissibility.  Such evidence has probative 
value in sexual assault cases where there often is no neutral 
witness to the assault and seldom any physical evidence 
implicating 
the 
defendant. 
 
Davis, 
254 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶18.  
Moreover, it may be of special importance to the jury by helping 
it to determine whether the defendant committed the crime, by 
showing circumstantial evidence of the defendant's innocence.  
Id. 
¶43 We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in excluding the proffered testimony.  
Although the State questioned the precedential value of Richard 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
19 
 
A.P. at the motion for reconsideration, ultimately the court 
determined the testimony to be relevant, applied a Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03 analysis, and reached a conclusion that a reasonable 
judge could reach.  Accordingly, we uphold the evidentiary 
ruling of the circuit court. 
V 
¶44 In sum, we determine that the admissibility of Richard 
A.P. evidence is not compelled by Davis, but rather is subject 
to the sound discretion of the circuit court.  Because we 
conclude that the circuit court here did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence, we 
reverse the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  01-1916.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶45 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the court of appeals that the circuit court did not apply 
the proper legal standard and therefore erred in prohibiting the 
defendant from presenting his evidence.  I also agree with the 
majority opinion's interpretation of our decision in State v. 
Davis, 2002 WI 75, 254 Wis. 2d 1, 645 N.W.2d 913, that circuit 
courts are not required to admit Richard A.P. evidence but may 
exercise their discretion in deciding whether to admit such 
evidence.11   
¶46 I dissent because I disagree with the majority 
opinion's conclusion that the circuit court properly exercised 
its discretion with respect to the proffered evidence in this 
case.  
¶47 The appropriate standard of review in evaluating 
whether a circuit court properly excluded evidence is whether 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  This 
court has often said that "a discretionary determination must be 
the product of a rational mental process by which the facts of 
record and law relied upon are stated and are considered 
together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable 
                                                 
11 Majority op., ¶2.  Although the State latches onto the 
court of appeals' use of the word "compels," State v. Walters, 
2003 WI App 24, ¶17, 260 Wis. 2d 210, 659 N.W.2d 151, the 
decision of the court of appeals carefully and frequently 
recognizes that the admission of evidence is a discretionary 
decision for the circuit court.  See Walters, 260 Wis. 2d 210, 
¶¶14, 19, 21.  
No.  01-1916.ssa 
 
2 
 
determination."12  An appellate court will affirm a circuit 
court's discretionary decision as long as the circuit court 
"examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, 
and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion 
that a reasonable judge could reach."13  Therefore, the record on 
appeal must "reflect the circuit court's reasoned application of 
the appropriate legal standard to the relevant facts in the 
case."14  "If a judge bases the exercise of his discretion upon 
an error of law, his conduct is beyond the limits of 
discretion."15 
¶48 In making the decision to exclude the proffered 
Richard A.P. evidence in this case, the circuit court made the 
following statements on the record when excluding the evidence: 
I've heard [the expert] testimony, and in my opinion, 
it invades the province of the jury.  That is the 
function of the jury to weigh the testimony and the 
probabilities. 
 And 
to 
suggest 
that 
statistical 
analyses 
of people 
in 
prison with psychological 
disorders and their personality profiles would make it 
                                                 
12 Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 
(1981). 
13 Long v. Long, 196 Wis. 2d 691, 695, 539 N.W.2d 462 (Ct. 
App. 1995).  See also State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 
Wis. 2d 536, 541, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985); Shuput v. Lauer, 109 
Wis. 2d 164, 177-78, 325 N.W.2d 321 (1982). 
14 State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 281, 588 N.W.2d 1 
(1999). 
15 State v. Hutnik 39 Wis. 2d 754, 763, 159 N.W.2d 733 
(1968); see also In re Settlement for Personal Injuries of 
Konicki 186 Wis. 2d 140, 150, 519 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("[A] trial court erroneously exercises its discretion when its 
decision is based on a misapplication or erroneous view of the 
law."). 
No.  01-1916.ssa 
 
3 
 
less likely that the defendant would offend is of 
minimal probative value. 
I'm not saying it doesn't have any probative value.  
Minimal probative value in comparison to——Well, I'm 
employing 904.03.  Relevant evidence can be excluded 
if the probative value is substantially outweighed by 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or the fact 
that it might be misleading to the jury.  I think all 
of those would apply here. 
I think the probative value is slight, from just my 
own experience as a judge, seeing that all types of 
people can be involved in sexual assaults, whether 
they have a psychological profile of a sexual offender 
or not, and also from the studies which have been 
submitted in the briefs.  I think in that regard, 
John——I'm not sure if that cite is correct.  It says 1 
John E.B. Meyer, evidence in child abuse and neglect 
cases, Section 5.54 ed. 2d.  I would say third edition 
1997.  Just says that it's not reliable.  Profile 
testimony is not reliable. 
And I heard——I heard the lengthy testimony that these 
witnesses gave, and I think it would just——it would 
be——it 
would 
obscure 
the 
real 
issues 
here 
of 
credibility of witnesses and the jury function of 
weighing that credibility to have substantial evidence 
about this wandering——I just have to admit they went 
all over.  Your outline summary even takes two, three 
pages.  Would be substantially confusing to the jury 
and it would cause them to, in this case and in future 
cases, to have a battle of experts on a matter that is 
of slight probative value.  And I think that could 
confuse the jury and mislead the jury. 
So I'm rejecting the use of these expert witnesses to 
get into the issue of profile evidence for the reasons 
I've stated.16 
 
¶49 As I understand the circuit court's ruling on this 
issue, it provided eight justifications for its decision to 
                                                 
16 Transcript of proceedings held before the Honorable James 
L. Carlson, Circuit Court, Branch 2, on Nov. 8, 2000, at 9-10 
(No. 98-CF-390). 
No.  01-1916.ssa 
 
4 
 
exclude the Richard A.P. evidence.  Those justifications are as 
follows: 
(1) Richard A.P. evidence is relevant but of minimal 
probative value. 
(2) The judge's own "experience" suggested that all sorts 
of people can be involved in sexual assaults. 
(3) Profile testimony is not reliable. 
(4) The Richard A.P. evidence would obscure the real issue 
of credibility. 
(5) The circuit court was concerned that the evidence 
"wander[ed]" and "went all over." 
(6) The Richard A.P. evidence would be substantially 
confusing to the jury. 
(7) The evidence would cause unfair prejudice to the State 
because of the battle of experts on a matter of slight 
probative value. 
(8) The evidence might confuse and mislead the jury. 
¶50 I address each of circuit court's reasons in turn.  
Upon examining these reasons, I cannot conclude that the circuit 
court properly exercised its discretion in the present case.  A 
number of the circuit court's conclusions, as pointed out by the 
majority opinion,17 are based on misstatements of the applicable 
law.  Others appear to invade the province of the jury, to give 
the jury too little credit with regard to its ability to 
understand legal questions, or to fail to appreciate the 
significance of the evidence for the defense. 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶¶34-35. 
No.  01-1916.ssa 
 
5 
 
(1) 
¶51 The circuit court concluded in this case that the 
evidence was relevant but of minimal probative value.  Richard 
A.P. testimony is a combination of character evidence and expert 
testimony that is relevant to an accused's likelihood to commit 
a sexual assault.18  This evidence not only is probative but also 
may be "extremely important," particularly in "he said, she 
said" cases.19  We explained the probative value of the evidence 
as follows: 
[T]his evidence has probative value in sexual assault 
cases, where there is often no neutral witness to the 
assault and there is seldom any physical evidence 
implicating the defendant.  Such profile evidence may 
be extremely important to the defense.  Such testimony 
may also be useful to the trier of fact, helping it to 
determine a fact in issue, that is, whether the 
defendant 
committed 
the 
crime, 
by 
showing 
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's innocence.20 
                                                 
18 State v. Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 792-93, 589 
N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Davis, 2002 WI 75, ¶19, 254 
Wis. 2d 1, 645 N.W.2d 913. 
19 Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶18. 
20 Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶18 (emphasis added).  See also 
Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d  at 792 (character "testimony may well 
have assisted the jury in determining whether [the defendant], 
who maintained that the child had misinterpreted his actions, 
committed the charged offense"); State v. Pulizzano, 155 
Wis. 2d 633, 657-58, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990) (suggesting that 
evidence of battering syndrome to demonstrate propensity of 
defendant to engage in acts consistent with that profile 
requires testimony of an expert); King v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 26, 
38-39, 
248 
N.W.2d 458 
(1977) 
(testimony 
of 
psychologist 
admissible to demonstrate defendant's character for nonhostility 
and nonaggressiveness in first-degree murder case). 
No.  01-1916.ssa 
 
6 
 
This is a "he said, they said" case.  The evidence is of more 
than minimal probative value.  The circuit court erred in 
evaluating the probative value of the evidence. 
(2) 
¶52 Second, the circuit court judge claimed that his 
personal experience suggested that all sorts of people can be 
involved in sexual assaults.  Although the circuit court does 
not clearly set forth its reasoning, the circuit court seems to 
be arguing that because the various individuals the judge had 
seen in sexual assault cases did not appear to him to be of a 
similar profile, such profile evidence was not reliable. 
¶53 This argument is quite similar to the arguments set 
forth by numerous courts that have chosen to exclude such 
evidence.  Indeed the circuit court referred to a treatise21 that 
in turn referred to a number of non-Wisconsin cases that have 
ruled that this type of "[p]rofile testimony is not reliable."22  
The circuit court should have relied on State v. Richard A.P., 
223 Wis. 2d 777, 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1998), a published 
precedential decision, not on a treatise or other state court 
decisions.  Richard A.P. did not follow these other state 
courts, and this court has explicitly rejected their views.23  
The circuit court misinterpreted the applicable law. 
                                                 
21 John E.B. Myers, Evidence in Child Abuse and Neglect 
Cases, § 554, at 587 (3d ed. 1997). 
22 See, e.g., State v. Floray, 715 A.2d 855 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1997); Wyatt v. State, 578 So. 2d 811 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991); 
Jennette v. State, 398 S.E.2d 734 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); State v. 
Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329 (Iowa 1992). 
23 See Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶14-15. 
No.  01-1916.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶54 The judge's own personal experiences about whether the 
evidence is reliable invades the province of the jury.  The jury 
also has personal experiences and is capable of making a 
determination as to the reliability of profile evidence.24 
(3) 
¶55 The third reason is like the second.  The reliability 
of the evidence is a question for the jury, not the judge. 
(4) 
¶56 The fourth reason proffered by the circuit court is 
that profile evidence will obscure the real issue in the case, 
namely, the credibility of the accusers and the defendant.  On 
the contrary, this evidence attacks the credibility of the 
accusers and supports the credibility of the defendant.25  "[T]he 
expert's testimony in [Richard A.P.'s] case was admissible 
because it would have assisted the jury in determining whether 
Richard committed the charged offense by providing expert 
opinion on the likelihood that Richard committed the crime in 
light of his psychological profile."26  The credibility of both 
the accusers and the defendant is a question for the jury.27 
(5), (6), and (8) 
                                                 
24 Whether the heterogeneity of sexual offenders makes 
profile evidence less reliable is a question for the jury. Id., 
¶17. 
25 Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d at 792. 
26 Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶12. 
27 Kohlhoff v. State, 85 Wis.2d 148, 155, 270 N.W.2d 63 
(1978); State v. Hines, 173 Wis. 2d 850, 861, 496 N.W.2d 720 
(Ct. App. 1993) 
No.  01-1916.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶57 The fifth, sixth, and eighth reasons are essentially 
the same: that the proffered evidence would be a waste of time 
and might confuse the jury.  It is true that introducing profile 
evidence would require additional time and would require 
thoughtful evaluation by the jury.  Nevertheless, the fact that 
introducing such evidence might require additional time is not a 
sufficient reason to exclude it. 
¶58 The test under Wis. Stat. § 904.03 is whether the 
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by 
"considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence."  The circuit court did not 
evaluate the defendant's need for the Richard A.P. evidence 
against the amount of time required to introduce such evidence. 
¶59 The circuit court accepted and the majority opinion 
accepts without question the State's argument that introducing 
such evidence would add to the length of the trial.28  While it 
is true that defense counsel initially thought that the 
introduction of the expert testimony would take some time, he 
also argued that the trial could be substantially shortened over 
                                                 
28 Majority op., ¶40: 
Without this expert testimony, the testimonial portion 
of Walters's trial lasted one day.  In contrast, the 
offer of proof hearing consumed approximately 165 
pages of transcript over three days of hearing.  
Additionally, the defense counsel initially informed 
Judge Carlson that he had anticipated the experts' 
testimony would add another three days to the trial.  
In sum, the admission of this evidence potentially 
would have increased significantly the length of 
trial. 
No.  01-1916.ssa 
 
9 
 
the time consumed by the offer-of-proof hearing.29  Also, had the 
circuit 
court 
admitted 
the 
proffered 
evidence 
but 
later 
concluded that it was needlessly cumulative or unduly long, it 
could have limited the testimony at that point. 
¶60 Furthermore, these arguments were expressly rejected 
by this court in Davis when the court remarked as follows: 
The State also asserts that such expert testimony 
wastes the jury's time and may mislead the jury into 
thinking that reasonable doubt is present because the 
defendant lacks the character traits of a sexual 
offender.  However, the fact that the defendant may 
not possess the relevant character traits of a sexual 
offender will not necessarily lead to an impermissible 
inference of reasonable doubt.30 
Other actions by the circuit court, such as giving limiting 
instructions or excluding 
evidence when appropriate, 
will 
prevent 
juries 
from 
reaching 
impermissible 
inferences 
in 
specific cases.  
¶61 The circuit court did not carefully scrutinize the 
evidence.  The circuit court recited some of the "magic" words 
but did not demonstrate a thought process sufficient to support 
the permissible exercise of discretion. 
(7) 
 
¶62 Finally, 
the 
seventh 
factor, 
expressing 
the 
circuit court's concern that introduction of such evidence might 
lead to a "battle of the experts" has been rejected. This 
                                                 
29 Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 21. 
30 Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21. 
No.  01-1916.ssa 
 
10 
 
problem is present in every case involving expert testimony.31  
The court has not found this reasoning persuasive.32 
* * * * 
 
¶63 I cannot conclude, as the majority opinion does, that 
in spite of the circuit court's incorrect understanding of the 
law and the limited rationale, the circuit court nevertheless 
properly exercised its discretion.   
¶64 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
 
                                                 
31 State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 163, 258 N.W.2d 260 
(1977). 
32 "[A] battle between experts is a frequent occurrence in 
criminal cases where specialized knowledge on a relevant issue 
is required.  In such cases, Richard A.P. evidence may be highly 
relevant."  Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
01-1916-CR   
 
 
 
1