Case Title: Michael G. LeMere v. Marcia L. LeMere

Citation: 2003 WI 67

Docket Number: 2001AP002204

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 67 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2204 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Michael G. LeMere,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Marcia L. LeMere,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  258 Wis. 2d 300, 653 N.W.2d 772 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 8, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark A. Warpinski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by James R. Sickel, Daniel J. Vande Loo, and Hinkfuss, Sickel & 
Petitjean, Green Bay, and oral argument by James R. Sickel. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief by Lise 
Lotte Gammeltoft and Peterson, Berk & Cross, S.C., Green Bay, 
and oral argument by Lise Lotte Gammeltoft. 
 
 
2003 WI 67 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2204  
(L.C. No. 
00 FA 487) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Michael G. LeMere,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Marcia L. LeMere,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2003 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded to the circuit court.     
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   The issue in this divorce case is 
whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
in ordering an unequal property division based upon one spouse's 
greater direct contribution to the creation and expansion of the 
family business enterprise.   
¶2 
Michael and Marcia LeMere were married for nearly 20 
years.  During their marriage, Michael established and oversaw 
the family business, MGL Fitness, Inc.  Marcia worked two jobs 
No. 
01-2204   
 
2 
 
before having children, and then dedicated herself to full-time 
child-rearing and care of the family home. 
¶3 
Michael filed for divorce in 2001.  At trial, Michael 
asked the circuit court to divide the assets unequally to 
reflect his industriousness and extensive efforts in creating 
and expanding MGL Fitness.  The circuit court divided the 
marital assets equally, except for MGL Fitness, the largest 
asset, which was divided unequally, 65-35 percent in favor of 
Michael.  The court of appeals affirmed.  
¶4 
Property division in divorce is governed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.255(3)(2001-2002),1 which establishes a presumption of 
equal division of marital property.  The statute also provides 
that the circuit court may deviate from this presumption of 
equality, but only upon consideration of certain enumerated 
factors.  Here, the circuit court ordered an unequal division of 
the largest asset in the marital estate upon consideration of 
only one statutory factor, neglecting entirely the other 
statutory factors.  In so doing, the circuit court failed to 
apply the correct legal standard, which constitutes an erroneous 
exercise of discretion, requiring reversal and remand for 
reconsideration of the division of marital property. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-2002 volumes unless otherwise indicated.   
 
No. 
01-2204   
 
3 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
Michael and Marcia LeMere married on June 13, 1981.  
At that time, neither party had any appreciable assets.  Marcia 
was employed as a childcare worker until 1983.  From 1983 until 
1990, she held two jobs: working full-time as a dental office 
receptionist 
by 
day, 
and 
moonlighting 
part-time 
cleaning 
offices. 
¶6 
Michael worked for the post office when the couple 
married, but in 1983 he left his position there to become a 
firefighter.  He was an avid weightlifter and started selling 
small fitness products out of a local gym in 1982.  For the next 
several years he sold these products for two hours in the 
morning and three to four hours in the evening.  After several 
years of good sales, he decided to establish MGL Fitness, Inc.  
He operated the business on his days off from the fire 
department. 
¶7 
Michael quit his firefighting position in 1992 to 
focus 
full-time 
on 
expanding 
MGL 
Fitness. 
 
During 
this 
expansion, MGL Fitness opened retail stores in Green Bay, 
Appleton, Wausau, and Duluth, Minnesota.  Michael made all the 
business decisions for the company, such as product lines, 
expansion, and location.  Marcia filled in only occasionally, on 
an "as needed" basis, and sometimes helped with local shows and 
events.  The business was successful and several articles in 
Green Bay area publications recognized its unique growth. 
No. 
01-2204   
 
4 
 
¶8 
Marcia quit her part-time job in 1989 prior to the 
birth of the couple's first child, and quit her full-time 
receptionist position following the birth of their second child 
in 1990.  At that point, she decided not to return to work 
outside the home, but, rather, to stay at home full-time to 
raise the children.  Michael encouraged that move for several 
reasons, among them the success of MGL Fitness, the expense of 
daycare, and the tax consequences of Marcia's additional income.  
¶9 
Michael drew an annual salary of $41,000 from MGL 
Fitness, but this was dwarfed by the company's profits.  In the 
early years of retail operation, Michael left most of the 
profits in the business to serve as working capital and to 
reduce debt.  Despite the growing success of MGL Fitness, the 
family lived frugally in a modest home in order to save for 
retirement, the children's education, and to pay off their own 
debt.  Michael and Marcia each drove modest and dated vehicles.  
In the six years prior to the divorce, however, Michael's total 
earnings from the company averaged over $333,000 per year, and 
the family gradually began to spend more money.       
¶10 In May of 2000, Michael filed for divorce in Brown 
County Circuit Court.  On May, 17, 2001, the parties reached an 
agreement regarding custody of the children, division of certain 
assets, Marcia's earning capacity, and payment of attorney's 
fees.  On July 2, 2001, the circuit court, the Honorable Mark A. 
Warpinski, entered judgment dividing the marital assets equally, 
except for MGL Fitness, which was divided unequally, 65-35 
No. 
01-2204   
 
5 
 
percent in favor of Michael.2   This resulted in a 54-46 percent 
overall division of the net marital estate in favor of Michael.  
The circuit court also ordered Michael to pay child support in 
the amount of $4,606 per month.  Finally, the circuit court 
awarded maintenance to Marcia in the amount of $615 per month 
for eight years, a period which coincides with the youngest 
child's anticipated high school graduation.   
¶11 The circuit court premised the 65-35 percent division 
of MGL Fitness on Michael's ingenuity and industriousness in 
creating and expanding the business, concluding that his effort 
in this regard constituted a substantial economic contribution 
to the marriage justifying the unequal division: 
MGL Fitness is awarded to [Michael LeMere].  It 
was through his efforts that this business has 
prospered.  There is nothing in this record to suggest 
that [Marcia LeMere] contributed to the financial 
success of the business.  [Marcia] did not offer any 
testimony 
that 
she 
played 
any 
part 
in 
the 
organization, running, or expansion of the business. 
[Michael] 
asks that 
I unequally 
divide the 
property division to reflect the industriousness of 
[Michael] in increasing the value of the business.  
[Michael] relies on Parrett v. Parrett, 146 Wis. 2d 
830 (Ct. App. 1988) in this regard.  In Parrett, the 
[c]ourt unequally divided the husband's interest in a 
business that was awarded to him.  The Trial Court 
relied on the economic circumstances of the parties (§ 
767.255(3)(d) Wis. Stats.).  There as here, that 
decision was based on the husband's industriousness 
and 
extensive 
efforts 
in 
creating 
a 
business 
enterprise.  I find that [Michael's] efforts to start, 
maintain, and expand MGL Fitness from a small box 
                                                 
2 The circuit court set the fair market value of MGL Fitness 
at $1,782,831. 
No. 
01-2204   
 
6 
 
operation to a multi-location, multi-million dollar 
business is a substantial economic contribution to the 
marriage justifying an unequal property division. 
 
In making this finding, I am not ignoring the 
contributions that [Marcia] made to this marriage.  I 
do not find her testimony credible with respect to how 
much she was required to do in [Michael's] absence.  
[Marcia] indicated that the children do not like being 
with their father for periods of placement.  Yet she 
conceded that the girls preferred to be by themselves 
even when they are at home.  Neither child is in 
counseling.  Neither child is a problem in school.  
The parties took their children on family vacations as 
well.  From all of this I conclude that [Michael] 
spent reasonable periods of time with his children as 
they were growing up.  The tangible evidence suggests 
that the children have a normal relationship with 
their father and not an estranged one as portrayed by 
[Marcia]. 
. . . . 
 
The ratio for [the] division is problematic.  To 
award 100% of the asset to [Michael] would completely 
ignore the fact that to some extent [Marcia's] 
homemaking played a part in [Michael's] success.  
There 
is 
no 
scientific 
way 
to 
construct 
this 
percentage. 
 
It 
occurs 
to 
this 
Court 
that 
a 
significant deviation from the 50-50 division is 
warranted for the reasons stated above. . . . I find 
that a split of 65-35 in favor of [Michael] is 
reasonable. 
¶12 Marcia appealed on the issue of the unequal property 
division.  She also challenged the child support award as an 
improper deviation from the percentage guidelines, and the 
maintenance award as too low.  The court of appeals affirmed, 
concluding that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise 
its discretion in ordering the 65-35 percent division of MGL 
Fitness.  The court of appeals also rejected Marcia's challenge 
to the child support award, because her own request of $4,000 
No. 
01-2204   
 
7 
 
per month was itself a deviation from the percentage guidelines, 
and in any event, she was awarded more than she had requested.  
Finally, the court of appeals concluded that the circuit court 
did 
not 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion 
in 
awarding 
maintenance of $615 per month for eight years.  We accepted 
review, and now reverse on the issue of the unequal property 
division. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 The 
division 
of 
property, 
calculation 
of 
child 
support, and determination of maintenance in divorce actions are 
decisions entrusted to the discretion of the circuit court, and 
are not disturbed on review unless there has been an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  King v. King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 248-49, 
590 N.W.2d 480 (1999); Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 171-72, 
560 N.W.2d 246 (1997).  "[A] discretionary determination must be 
the product of a rational mental process by which the facts of 
record and law relied upon are stated and are considered 
together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable 
determination."  Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 
N.W.2d 16 (1981).  A circuit court's discretionary decision is 
upheld as long as the court "examined the relevant facts, 
applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated 
rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge 
could reach."  Long v. Long, 196 Wis. 2d 691, 695, 539 N.W.2d 
462 (Ct. App. 1995).   
¶14 
Discretionary 
decisions 
must 
be 
arrived 
at 
by 
application of the proper legal standards; the failure to apply 
No. 
01-2204   
 
8 
 
the correct legal standards is an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  King, 224 Wis. 2d at 251; Cook, 208 Wis. 2d at 171.  
"A circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if it 
makes an error of law or neglects to base its decision upon 
facts in the record."  King, 224 Wis. 2d at 248.  We decide "any 
questions of law which may arise during our review of an 
exercise of discretion independently of the circuit court and 
court of appeals."  Id.   
III. ANALYSIS 
¶15 The Divorce Reform Act of 1977 and its subsequent 
amendments govern Wisconsin divorces.  The Act was a predecessor 
to the Wisconsin Marital Property Act, passed in 1984, and both 
laws are part of The Family Code.  Wis. Stat. § 765.001(1).  The 
broadly-stated general purpose of The Family Code is "to promote 
the stability and best interests of marriage and the family."  
Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2).  As is more pertinent here, The Family 
Code's statement of legislative intent provides that "[i]t is 
the intent of the legislature to recognize the valuable 
contributions of both spouses during the marriage and at 
termination of the marriage by dissolution or death."  Id.    
¶16  Property division in divorce is governed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.255, which establishes a presumption in favor of equal 
division of marital property.  Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3).  "[T]he 
legislatively prescribed 50 percent presumption in awarding 
property division is a rebuttable one."  Jasper v. Jasper, 107 
Wis. 2d 59, 68, 318 N.W.2d 792 (1982).  A circuit court may 
deviate from the presumption of equal property division, but 
No. 
01-2204   
 
9 
 
only after considering a lengthy and detailed list of statutory 
factors.  Id.3 
¶17  The statutory list contains 12 enumerated factors, 
plus a catch-all, and is preceded by an explicit requirement 
that the circuit court consider all of the enumerated factors 
before altering the presumption of equal property division: 
(3) The court shall presume that all property not 
described in sub. (2)(a) [gifts and inheritances] is 
to be divided equally between the parties, but may 
alter this distribution without regard to marital 
misconduct after considering all of the following: 
(a) The length of the marriage. 
(b) The property brought to the marriage by each 
party. 
(c) Whether one of the parties has substantial assets 
not subject to division by the court. 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin's rules for distribution of property at 
divorce are a "hybrid" form of equitable distribution. 
They begin with a presumption of equal division of all 
property 
other 
than 
that 
acquired 
by 
gift 
or 
inheritance but then require the court to consider a 
list of equitable factors, including need, to see 
whether the presumed distribution should be varied.   
Distribution 
of 
spousal 
property 
at 
divorce 
without regard to title or property ownership during 
marriage follows from the conception of marriage as a 
partnership and attempts to recognize homemaking and 
childrearing 
contributions 
as 
well 
as 
financial 
contributions.  
Howard S. Erlanger and June S. Weisberger, From Common Law 
Property 
to 
Community 
Property: 
Wisconsin's 
Marital 
Property Act Four Years Later, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 769, 771 
n.10 (internal citations omitted). 
No. 
01-2204   
 
10 
 
(d) The contribution of each party to the marriage, 
giving appropriate economic value to each party's 
contribution in homemaking and child care services. 
(e) The age and physical and emotional health of the 
parties. 
(f) The contribution by one party to the education, 
training or increased earning power of the other. 
(g) The earning capacity of each party, including 
educational background, training, employment skills, 
work experience, length of absence from the job 
market, custodial responsibilities for children and 
the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient 
education or training to enable the party to become 
self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably 
comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage. 
(h) The desirability of awarding the family home or 
the right to live therein for a reasonable period to 
the party having physical placement for the greater 
period of time. 
(i) The amount and duration of an order under s. 
767.26 granting maintenance payments to either party, 
any order for periodic family support payments under 
s. 767.261 and whether the property division is in 
lieu of such payments. 
(j) 
Other 
economic 
circumstances 
of each 
party, 
including pension benefits, vested or unvested, and 
future interests. 
(k) The tax consequences to each party. 
(l) Any written agreement made by the parties before 
or during the marriage concerning any arrangement for 
property 
distribution; 
such 
agreements 
shall 
be 
binding upon the court except that no such agreement 
shall be binding where the terms of the agreement are 
inequitable as to either party. The court shall 
presume any such agreement to be equitable as to both 
parties. 
(m) Such other factors as the court may in each 
individual case determine to be relevant. 
No. 
01-2204   
 
11 
 
Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(emphasis added). 
¶18  We have held that "[i]n enacting the current property 
division statute, the legislature abandoned any dower-type 
formula in favor of a fifty-fifty presumption, subject to 
certain exceptions."  Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 81, 318 
N.W.2d 391 (1982).   "Part of the rationale in creating the 
presumption of equal property division is that the homemaking 
partner 
has 
contributed 
services 
which 
have 
enabled 
the 
financially supporting partner to achieve his or her station in 
life, and in so doing the homemaking partner has lost ground in 
the job market."  Jasper, 107 Wis. 2d at 68. 
¶19  The presumption of equality in the division of the 
marital estate is based upon the status of marriage as a 
partnership: 
We note that marriage is to be viewed as a 
partnership, and "in dividing property upon divorce, 
the contribution of a full-time homemaker may be 
considered greater than, or at least as great as, that 
of a working spouse.  The fact that one party to the 
marriage worked outside the home while the other cared 
for the home and children has little bearing on the 
outcome of the property division if marriage is to be 
viewed as a 'partnership,' in which the parties 
contribute according to their respective abilities to 
the acquisition and preservation of marital assets." 
Id. at 67 (quoting Perrenoud v. Perrenoud, 82 Wis. 2d 36, 49, 
260 N.W.2d 658 (1978)).  "[S]pouses are presumed to be equal 
contributors to the accumulated wealth of a marriage, regardless 
of whether their contributions are principally made inside or 
outside the home."  Katzman v. State Ethics Board, 228 Wis. 2d 
282, 297, 596 N.W.2d 861 (Ct. App. 1999). 
No. 
01-2204   
 
12 
 
¶20  A previous version of the statute provided that the 
circuit court may alter the presumptive equal division of 
property "after considering" the statutory factors.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 247.255 (1977-78)("The court shall presume that all 
other property except inherited property is to be divided 
equally between the parties, but may alter this distribution 
without regard to marital misconduct after considering . . . ") 
This language has been interpreted as requiring the circuit 
court to consider the statutory factors that are relevant to the 
case, but not necessarily all 12.  Lutzke v. Lutzke, 122 Wis. 2d 
24, 38, 361 N.W.2d 640 (1985)("[T]he assets of the marriage 
shall be allocated or distributed in accordance with the court's 
exercise of discretion after considering the pertinent and 
relevant factors."); Arneson v. Arneson, 120 Wis. 2d 236, 254, 
355 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1984)(citing In re the Marriage of 
Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 11-12, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982)). 
¶21  As noted above, however, the current version of the 
statute 
provides 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
may 
alter 
the 
presumptive equal division of property "after considering all of 
the following," and this language is followed immediately by the 
enumeration of the factors in subsections (a)-(m).  Wis. Stat. § 
No. 
01-2204   
 
13 
 
767.255(3)(emphasis added).  The "all of the following" language 
was added in 1993.4      
¶22 The statute, therefore, does not permit a circuit 
court to deviate from the presumption of equal property division 
after considering one factor alone.  That is what occurred here.  
The circuit court's unequal division of MGL Fitness was based 
entirely 
upon 
its 
analysis 
of 
the 
parties' 
respective 
contributions 
to 
the 
marriage 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
767.255(3)(d).  The circuit court completely neglected to 
address any of the other statutory factors, and therefore 
applied an incomplete, and thus incorrect, standard of law. 
¶23 The circuit court relied in part upon Parrett v. 
Parrett, 146 Wis. 2d 830, 432 N.W.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1988), in 
which the court of appeals affirmed a circuit court's unequal 
division of business assets because the husband served as "'the 
                                                 
4 In 1971, the state Senate had noted that the "after 
considering" language only required the trial judge to consider 
the relevant statutory factors, rather than each factor: "In its 
analysis of the proposed law, the Legislative Reference Bureau 
concluded that:  'The estate of either or both parties may be 
divided 
by 
the 
court 
after 
considering 
all 
appropriate 
factors.'" Wilberscheid v. Wilberscheid, 77 Wis. 2d 40, 46-47 
n.7, 
252 
N.W.2d 
76, 
80 
(1977)(emphasis 
added) 
(citing 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Drafting File, Chapter 220 (1971) 
and 1971 Senate Bill 241 (March 3, 1971)).  The relevant portion 
of the statute, Wis. Stat. § 247.26, was split into its own 
section, Wis. Stat. § 247.255.  See, §§ 41-42, ch. 105, Laws of 
1977.  It was then renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 767.255.  See § 
50, ch. 32, Laws of 1979.  Effective May 6, 1994, the 
legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3) to include the "all 
of the following" language.  See 1993 Wis. Act 422.   
 
No. 
01-2204   
 
14 
 
genius and driving force behind the commencement of the business 
and its development and prosperity.'"  Parrett, 146 Wis. 2d at 
835.  In Parrett, however, the court's unequal property division 
was also based on the relatively short duration of the marriage 
(seven years), the fact that neither party "brought much 
property to the marriage," the age, health, and earning capacity 
of the wife, the absence of any contribution by the wife to the 
education, training, or earning capacity of the husband, and the 
"generous child support" and maintenance awards in the case.  
Id. at 834-35.  The court in Parrett did not confine its 
analysis to the relative contributions of each spouse to the 
development of the business, but, rather, considered other 
relevant statutory factors. 
¶24  We note, too, that Parrett was decided under the prior 
statute.  The text of Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3) now explicitly 
requires that any deviation from the presumptive equal property 
division be based upon consideration of all the statutory 
factors. 
¶25 This is not to say that the circuit court is precluded 
from giving one statutory factor greater weight than another, or 
from concluding that some factors may not be applicable at all.  
Property division in divorce remains a discretionary decision of 
the circuit court, but the record must at least reflect the 
court's consideration of all applicable statutory factors before 
a reviewing court can conclude that the proper legal standard 
has been applied to overcome the presumptive equal property 
division under Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3).  Circuit courts must 
No. 
01-2204   
 
15 
 
subject requests for unequal division of property to the proper 
statutory rigor.  The failure to do so is an erroneous exercise 
of discretion. 
¶26  We emphasize, however, that a circuit court's failure 
to address factually inapplicable statutory factors will not be 
an erroneous exercise of discretion.  As we have noted, in 
considering a request for unequal property division under Wis. 
Stat. § 767.255(3), the circuit court may summarily conclude 
that certain of the statutory factors are irrelevant.  For 
example, subsection (3)(h), pertaining to consideration of the 
award of the family home to the party having physical placement 
of the children, will not be applicable to a childless divorcing 
couple. 
Similarly, 
subsection 
(3)(i), 
pertaining 
to 
consideration of the amount and duration of maintenance and 
family support awards, will not be applicable unless maintenance 
and family support are awarded. 
¶27  Neither do we hold that every incomplete consideration 
of the statutory factors must be reversed as an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  A circuit court's failure to consider 
all the statutory factors might well be harmless, particularly 
where the overlooked factors are only marginally relevant or not 
relevant at all.  See Parratt, 146 Wis. 2d at 842; Wis. Stat. § 
805.18(2). 
¶28 As we have noted, the circuit court's unequal division 
of the most valuable marital asset in this case, MGL Fitness, 
reflects consideration of only one of the statutory factors, the 
contribution of each party to the marriage, pursuant to 
No. 
01-2204   
 
16 
 
subsection (3)(d) of Wis. Stat. § 767.255.  Moreover, the 
circuit court's analysis of even this sole statutory factor 
contradicts the explicit legislative purpose to "recognize the 
valuable contributions of both spouses during the marriage," as 
well as our case law establishing marriage as an equal 
partnership, in which the contributions of the spouse who is 
primarily 
engaged 
in 
child-rearing 
and 
homemaking 
are 
presumptively valued equally with those of the income-earning 
spouse.  The spouse who raises the children and cares for the 
family home contributes, albeit indirectly, to the development 
and expansion of a family business, by carrying the child-
rearing 
and 
homemaking 
responsibilities 
of 
the 
marriage 
partnership, enabling the other spouse to focus more intensively 
on the business. 
¶29  Here, the circuit court devalued the contributions of 
the stay-at-home mother as against the entrepreneurship of the 
husband precisely because she did not directly contribute to the 
development and expansion of the family business.  While it is 
not per se impermissible to assign greater or lesser weight to 
spousal contributions depending upon the facts in the case, it 
is an erroneous exercise of discretion to do so without 
considering the other applicable statutory factors and in a way 
that eviscerates the legislative purpose to place child-rearing 
and homemaking on an equal footing with income-earning for 
purposes of property division in divorce.   
¶30  It is true that the total property division in this 
case——54-46 percent in favor of Michael——did not substantially 
No. 
01-2204   
 
17 
 
deviate from the statutory presumption of 50-50.  The deviation, 
however, was arrived at without considering the required 
statutory factors, and was, therefore, an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  See King, 224 Wis. 2d at 251 ("A failure to apply 
or a misapplication of the statutory factors is an erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion."). 
 
We 
reverse 
and 
remand 
for 
reconsideration of the property division in accordance with the 
statutory standards. 
¶31 We reject, however, Marcia's challenges to the child 
support and maintenance awards.  The circuit court deviated from 
the percentage guidelines for child support pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 767.25(1m).  However, the child support order exceeded 
Marcia's own child support request, which was itself a deviation 
from the percentage guidelines.  We recognize that Marcia's 
child support request was accompanied by an unsuccessful request 
for a substantial maintenance award; it was, nevertheless, a 
concession that deviation from the percentage standard was 
appropriate.  Having conceded that deviation from the percentage 
guidelines was appropriate, and having secured a child support 
award in excess of that which she requested, Marcia cannot now 
argue that deviation was unwarranted.  State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 
2d 337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996) (a party who succeeds in 
arguing a position in a legal proceeding is judicially estopped 
from arguing a contrary position simply because his or her 
interests have changed). 
¶32  Finally, we conclude that the circuit court's decision 
on the issue of maintenance reflects consideration of the 
No. 
01-2204   
 
18 
 
relevant statutory factors under Wis. Stat. § 767.26, as well as 
the "twin goals" of maintenance: support and fairness.  King, 
224 Wis. 2d at 250; LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 33, 
406 N.W.2d 736 (1987).  The circuit court's decision on 
maintenance 
was 
legally 
and 
factually 
comprehensive 
and 
thoroughly reasoned, and its award of $615 per month for a 
period of eight years was not an erroneous exercise of 
discretion. 
¶33  Marcia concedes that the circuit court followed this 
court's decision in LaRocque in arriving at an amount of 
maintenance necessary to meet the goal of sustaining a pre-
divorce standard of living, but objects to the circuit court's 
subtraction from that amount a sum representing the funds she 
claimed were for purposes of savings.  The circuit court 
explained that it subtracted this "savings" amount because 
Marcia had been awarded substantial liquid assets totaling 
$787,951 that would "insure her financial security into the 
future," that she would not be "burdened with any debt as she 
leaves this marriage," and that pursuant to the divorce 
judgment, she would have $14,022 per month in combined support 
payments and income-producing assets.  This analysis reflects an 
appropriate exercise of discretion. 
¶34  For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand this 
matter to the circuit court for reconsideration of the issue of 
division of property pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3).  The 
circuit court unequally divided the most valuable marital asset, 
MGL Fitness, without addressing all the applicable statutory 
No. 
01-2204   
 
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factors that must be considered in order to overcome the 
presumption of equal property division.  In so doing, the 
circuit court applied an incorrect standard of law, and 
therefore erroneously exercised its discretion. 
By the court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
  
 
 
No. 
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