Case Title: STATE OF WYOMING v. Eleven Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Six Dollars and No Cents in U.S. Currency

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-227

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE OF WYOMING v. Eleven Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Six Dollars and No Cents in U.S. Currency1989 WY 148777 P.2d 65Case Number: 88-227Decided: 07/07/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

ELEVEN THOUSAND THREE 
HUNDRED FORTY-SIX DOLLARS AND NO CENTS IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

Russell A. 
Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellant.

Gayla L. Daniels 
and Kenneth W. Hildebrand, Casper, for appellee; argument by Ms. 
Daniels.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The State of Wyoming seized $11,346.00 
from Terry Davis Jaeger and initiated civil forfeiture proceedings against the 
money, asserting that it had been used to facilitate the sale of certain 
controlled substances. The district court determined that the State had not 
established probable cause to believe that the money was used or intended to be 
used in violation of the Wyoming Controlled Substance Act of 1971, W.S. 
35-7-1001 through 35-7-1057, and, therefore, granted Jaeger's motion for summary 
judgment.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     During the course of a 
narcotics investigation, the Gillette Police Department made three controlled 
purchases of methamphetamine. On each occasion the Department furnished "buy 
money" to a confidential informant with the intent of tracing the chain of 
transfers of that money to the ultimate supplier of the drugs. Surveillance 
teams observing the third purchase on April 13, 1987, followed that trail to 
Jaeger's automotive repair shop. Officers approached Jaeger for identification 
and, as he produced his driver's license, observed a large amount of currency in 
his wallet. At their request, Jaeger permitted the officers to inspect the money 
and compare it to photocopies of the bills which they had provided to their 
informant earlier that evening. No matches were found. Nevertheless, the 
officers detained Jaeger for nearly two hours, until they were able to match 
some of his money with photocopies of bills provided for two earlier 
methamphetamine purchases. He was then arrested and charged with one count of 
conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance.

[¶4.]     Subsequently, on May 
27, 1987, the State brought an action under W.S. 35-7-1049 seeking forfeiture of 
the money seized from Jaeger. Jaeger filed a motion to suppress the money as 
evidence in the pending criminal action. The district court's order granting 
that motion states, in pertinent part:

"1. That no probable 
cause existed for a search of Defendant or a seizure of evidence from Defendant 
and the Defendant did not consent to the search or 
seizure.

* * * * * 
*

"5. That the initial 
search of the Defendant was illegal, and since the product of that search formed 
the probable cause for the arrest, the arrest was illegal * * 
*.

* * * * * 
*

"That all evidence seized 
from the Defendant and any statements made by the Defendant either prior to or 
subsequent to his arrest are hereby suppressed * * *."

Jaeger then 
filed, in the forfeiture proceeding, a motion for return of property pursuant to 
Rule 40(e), W.R.Cr.P., which provides in part:

"A person aggrieved by an 
unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for the county in which 
the property was seized for the return of the property and to suppress for use 
as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was 
illegally seized without warrant * * *. If the motion is granted the property 
shall be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and it shall not 
be admissible in evidence in any hearing or trial."

He also filed a 
motion for summary judgment. In support of these motions, he argued that the 
State could not forfeit property unless it had been lawfully seized under the 
provisions of the forfeiture statute. Such a seizure could only occur, Jaeger 
contended, where the State had probable cause to seize the property at the time 
of the seizure. The two grounds advanced for his claim that the State could not 
meet its burden of establishing probable cause to seize his money 
were:

(a) The issue had been 
conclusively determined to the detriment of the State pursuant to his motion to 
suppress evidence, so as to collaterally estop the State from relitigating the 
issue;

(b) The exclusionary rule 
required the suppression of evidence in both the criminal action and the 
forfeiture proceedings, thereby leaving the State no untainted evidence with 
which to prove its case.

[¶5.]     After considering the 
parties' briefs and after two separate hearings, the district court granted 
Jaeger's summary judgment motion, explaining its ruling:

"The issues presented are 
- or the arguments presented are pretty narrow, and accordingly, my holding is 
equally narrow.

"The State's arguments 
with respect to the requisites for collateral estoppel, that is, identity of 
parties and issues, seems to me to draw distinctions without differences. That's 
particularly true with respect to the parties.

"It's also true, it seems 
to me, with respect to the issues. Judge Judson determined that there was no 
probable cause. That was done in a prior hearing with a full opportunity for 
both sides to develop facts and present their arguments.

* * * * * 
*

"If there was not 
probable cause to search these people for the money about which we're now 
fighting, then there isn't probable cause to believe that the money itself is 
used or intended to be used in violation of this act.

"Accordingly, the motion 
for summary judgment is granted."

We 
agree.

[¶6.]     Forfeiture under W.S. 
35-7-1049 is appropriate only with respect to certain types of property which 
the legislature has deemed to be "subject to forfeiture." Of the eight general 
categories of forfeitable property defined by subsection (a) of the statute, the 
State attempted to forfeit Jaeger's money pursuant to W.S. 35-7-1049(a)(viii), 
which provides for forfeiture of

"[a]ny property or other 
thing of pecuniary value furnished in exchange for a controlled substance in 
violation of this act including any proceeds, assets or other property of any 
kind traceable to the exchange and any money, securities or other negotiable 
instruments used to facilitate a violation of this act. Property used or 
furnished without the consent or knowledge of the owner is not forfeitable under 
this section to the extent of his interest."

[¶7.]     In addition to 
substantively limiting the scope of forfeiture to certain defined property, the 
legislature also imposed certain procedural restrictions on the State's access 
to that remedy. Section 35-7-1049(b) provides:

"(b) Property subject to forfeiture under 
this act may be seized by any law 
enforcement officer of the state upon process issued by any district court or 
district court commissioner having jurisdiction over the property. Seizure without process may be made 
if:

"(i) The seizure is 
incident to an arrest or a search under a search warrant or an inspection under 
an administrative inspection warrant;

"(ii) The property 
subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the 
state in a criminal, injunction or forfeiture proceeding based upon this 
act;

"(iii) The board or commissioner has probable cause 
to believe that the property was used or is intended to be used in violation of 
this act." (emphasis added)

[¶8.]     If subsection (b) is to 
be given any meaningful effect, it must be read to condition the State's right 
to forfeiture. The legislature's creation of a specific mode of exercising a 
power excludes all others. Hopkinson v. State, 704 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Wyo. 1985); Attletweedt v. State, 684 P.2d 812, 815 
(Wyo. 1984). 
Furthermore, the clear language of the statute requires that these conditions 
which the legislature has statutorily imposed upon the seizure of property must 
exist at the time law enforcement officers make the 
seizure.

[¶9.]     In the present case, 
the State relies wholly upon subsection (b)(iii) to justify the seizure of 
Jaeger's money. Accordingly, the State had a dual burden of proof. It ultimately 
had to prove that Jaeger's money was traceable to the exchange of a controlled 
substance or otherwise used to facilitate a violation of the Wyoming Controlled 
Substances Act. However, as a threshold matter, the State also had to establish 
that either the Wyoming State Board of Pharmacy or the Attorney General had 
probable cause to believe that such was the case at the time the law enforcement 
officers seized that money. Jaeger asserted that the State was precluded from 
establishing its probable cause to seize his money by the prior contrary 
determination of that issue at his criminal suppression hearing. Since it could 
not establish one of the necessary conditions to forfeiture under the statute, 
Jaeger asserted, the State was not entitled to forfeit his money as a matter of 
law. He is correct only insofar as the State sought to impute, to the "board or 
commissioner," any probable cause possessed by the police officers who seized 
his property.

[¶10.]  The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars 
the parties to an action, and their privies, from contesting in a subsequent 
suit all issues which were actually litigated in the former action. That is, 
where the parties have had a full and fair opportunity to contest a question 
which is essential to the determination of their dispute, a final valid judgment 
on the merits of that dispute by a court of competent jurisdiction precludes the 
relitigation of that question by those parties and their privies. Matthews v. 
Fetzner, 768 P.2d 590, 592 (Wyo. 1989); Delgue 
v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208, 213-214 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶11.]  The State, in this appeal, does not argue 
that the suppression order issued in Jaeger's criminal prosecution was not a 
final valid judgment. Rather, it argues that the agency of the State which 
appears as the nominal plaintiff in forfeiture is neither identical to nor in 
privity with the State's agency that prosecuted Jaeger. Nevertheless, it would 
rely on facts within the knowledge of the Gillette Police Department and the 
Campbell County Prosecutor's office to establish the "commissioner's" probable 
cause to seize forfeitable property. To accept this argument and to thereby deny 
preclusive effect to the suppression order would be to elevate form over 
substance and permit the State to, incongruously, have its cake and eat it too. 
Not only do the forfeiture provisions of W.S. 35-7-1049 supplement and enhance 
the State's enforcement of the criminal provisions of Wyoming's Controlled 
Substances Act, W.S. 35-7-1001 through 35-7-1057, but we note in this case that 
the Deputy County and Prosecuting Attorney whose office handled Jaeger's 
criminal prosecution was also appointed as Special Assistant Attorney General 
for purposes of initiating and conducting these forfeiture proceedings. There is 
sufficient identity of interest between these agents of the State to warrant the 
application of collateral estoppel.

[¶12.]  Anticipating that we would find such an 
identity of interest, the State alternatively argues that it had no opportunity 
to fully and fairly litigate the issues raised by the suppression hearing. The 
gravamen of this contention appears to be that the State, foreclosed from 
appealing an unfavorable verdict in a criminal case, could not fully contest the 
legal conclusions upon which the suppression order rested. The State asserts 
that it would therefore be unfair to collaterally estop the relitigation of 
those issues in the forfeiture proceedings. We cannot agree. The State admitted 
at the suppression hearing that, at the time the police officers detained Jaeger 
and seized the contested evidence, they had no probable cause to do so. We fail 
to see how the State could overcome this admission on appeal. Notwithstanding 
our doubts in that regard, had there been a reviewable deficiency in the 
suppression proceedings, the State was not foreclosed from pursuing such review 
either through a bill of exceptions, pursuant to W.S. 7-12-102 or a writ of 
certiorari. State v. Heiner, 683 P.2d 629, 632 (Wyo. 1984). We therefore conclude that the 
State indeed had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues determined 
by the suppression order.

[¶13.]  The State finally contends that the 
issues determined by that order differ from the issues raised in the forfeiture 
action and that collateral estoppel should not apply. The State is clearly 
mistaken. We are not concerned here with a suppression order which merely 
declared that the seizure of Jaeger's money was unlawful. Such an order might 
properly issue, despite the State's proof of probable cause, based on some 
deficiency in a warrant or the lack of such circumstances as would permit a 
warrantless seizure. In the present case, however, the suppression order 
explicitly set forth the trial court's finding that the officers seized Jaeger's 
money without probable cause to believe that he or his money had been involved 
in a drug sale. To the extent that the State relies upon the knowledge of these 
police officers to establish that the "board or commissioner" had probable cause 
at the time of the seizure to believe Jaeger's property was forfeitable, the 
identical issue must be determined as a prerequisite to the State's right to 
forfeit the money. There is no contention that the issue of the officers' 
probable cause was not actually litigated nor a contention that the issue was 
unnecessary to the suppression order. Thus, the district court in this 
forfeiture action correctly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to that 
issue.

[¶14.]  This is not to say that the application 
of that doctrine is entirely determinative of the State's right to relief. 
Jaeger only established through such means that the police officers who seized 
his money had no probable cause to believe that he or the money had been 
involved in a violation of the act. He did not conclusively establish that the 
"board or commissioner" had no such probable cause. He did, however, offer 
evidence of the prior suppression hearing in support of his summary judgment 
motion which carried the clear implication that no probable cause determination 
had been made prior to the seizure. Collateral estoppel in no way prevented the 
State from challenging that implication. Indeed, where the moving party has 
produced evidence which, if unchallenged, would entitle him to a summary 
judgment, the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts that 
establish a genuine issue for trial. Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 635-36 
(Wyo. 1986). 
In this regard, the State had only to produce evidence that the "board or 
commissioner" possessed the requisite probable cause at the time of the seizure, 
independent of any knowledge of the Gillette Police Department. The State simply 
did not carry its burden of proof. The district court properly granted Jaeger's 
summary judgment motion.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring and dissenting.

[¶16.]  I also would affirm the decision of the 
district court in this case except for the inclusion of the $1,400 in fourteen 
prerecorded hundred dollar bills which were identified as having been furnished 
by the City of Gillette as buy money. I am intrigued with 
Justice Urbigkit's discussion of the appropriate treatment for that money, and 
he well may be right that it should be treated, in substance, as contraband per 
se. I have a more fundamental concern, however.

[¶17.]  Section 35-7-1049, W.S. 1977, in 
subsection (a), defines the property that is subject to forfeiture. Section 
35-7-1049(b) provides that such property may be seized by a law enforcement 
officer under certain circumstances. Subsection (c) of the statute then requires 
the prompt institution of proceedings with respect to property that has been 
seized. Section 35-7-1049(d) then provides:

" - Property taken or 
detained under this section shall not be subject to replevin, but is deemed to 
be in the custody of the commissioner subject only to the orders and decrees of 
the court having jurisdiction over the forfeiture 
proceedings."

I note in 
passing that subsection (d) of the statute is remarkably vague with respect to 
those proceedings to be instituted under that subsection which are alluded to in 
subsection (c).

[¶18.]  Be that as it may, I can find no category 
in the definitional section of the statute that would include the identified 
money belonging to the City of Gillette. I am satisfied that while the City 
parted with possession of this money for purposes of its criminal investigation, 
it never intended to, nor did it, part with title to the money. Under those 
circumstances, even conceding that there was no probable cause for the search 
pursuant to which the money was recovered, the City should not be foreclosed 
from exercising self help in recovering its own property. The victim of a mugger 
surely would be entitled to keep his property even though he might have 
recovered it by an armed robbery. The City should be afforded no lesser rights 
under the law.

[¶19.]  Since the $1,400 is not subject to 
forfeiture because it does not fit any of the definitions, I cannot discern how 
the district court acquired jurisdiction over it in the forfeiture proceeding. I 
understand that this point was not raised by the parties, but we have often said 
that we have an independent responsibility with respect to jurisdiction. E.g., 
Parker v. Haller, 751 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1988); 
Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Development Company, Inc., 708 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 1985); Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 569 (Wyo. 1979); Gardner v. 
Walker, 373 P.2d 598 (Wyo. 
1962).

[¶20.]  The status quo, as of the time of the 
initiation of these proceedings, was that police officers of the City of 
Gillette were in 
possession of the entire sum of $11,346 including the City's $1,400 that it had 
recorded prior to furnishing it for the purpose of criminal investigation. I 
suppose it was a mistake for the City to include the prerecorded bills with the 
other money in the forfeiture proceeding. The money was no more subject to 
forfeiture pursuant to the statute than the automobile that the investigating 
officer was driving. The City of Gillette, however, could not invest the court 
with jurisdiction by this mistake and, consequently, the district court acquired 
no jurisdiction over the money. It is for that reason that I would reverse the 
judgment of the district court with respect to the $1,400.

[¶21.]  I also must confess some consternation 
with respect to the apparent mixing of the remedy under Rule 40, W.R.Cr.P., and 
the forfeiture proceedings set forth in § 35-7-1049. In my judgment, the two 
proceedings should not be mixed, nor should there be any casual acceptance of 
the fact that they have been mixed. I think there are differences in burdens of 
proof in criminal proceedings, and even differences in issues, which make it 
unwise to suggest that a motion for the return of property pursuant to Rule 
40(a) is an appropriate pleading in the context of the civil forfeiture 
proceeding.

URBIGKIT, Justice, specially 
concurring and dissenting.

[¶22.]  I concur in this decision to affirm the 
summary judgment granted by the trial court except to the portion of the money 
identified to be "buy money," which was provided by the police to agents who 
used it to purchase the illegal drugs.1 I would hold that the trial court 
erred as a matter of law because the marked and identifiable buy money, fourteen 
one hundred dollar bills, is contraband per se which is similar to the purchased 
drugs and not subject to return whether or not the seizure was illegal. 
Logically, that cash has a status similar to a stolen vehicle, proceeds of 
extortion or receipts from a bank robbery.

[¶23.]  The governmental agencies should not be 
relegated to the forfeiture process of W.S. 35-7-1049(e)(v) to re-acquire drug 
buy money. As to this identifiable, tangible property, acquisition by a drug 
vendor when exchanged in the police undercover operation should not extinguish 
the initial public ownership of the money any more than if the money itself had 
been stolen. Consequently, I would permit retention after re-acquisition of any 
provable funds advanced by the agency as an asset of the public from which 
ownership has never actually been severed.2 Contraband per se are "[t]hings 
which intrinsically are illegal to possess and are therefore insusceptible of 
ownership." State v. Manuel, 426 So. 2d 140, 144 (La. 1983). Buy money is analogous to such 
items because it is not capable of being owned by individuals. Title to buy 
money does not pass when used for law enforcement purposes to pursue and 
incriminate persons selling illegal drugs. The character of the transaction by 
which the sellers acquire the money cannot create a title for them upon exchange 
for the product which they cannot legally sell.

[¶24.]  The police officers who were conducting 
this extensive drug surveillance operation described that the use of the money 
"was an investment." I agree that it should be considered to be retainable upon 
repossession and identification. Application of the forfeiture procedure can and 
should be confined to property which the custodian may assert some claim as a 
legitimate owner. Legal possession "denotes custody coupled with a right or 
interest of proprietorship; and `possession' is inclusive of `custody,' although 
`custody' is not tantamount to `possession.'" Craig v. Gudim, 488 P.2d 316, 319 
(Wyo. 1971). 
Title is not necessarily determined by temporary custody. See Cheeseman v. 
Fenton, 13 Wyo. 436, 80 P. 823 
(1905).

[¶25.]  The United 
States Supreme Court in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710, 
68 S. Ct. 1229, 1235, 92 L. Ed. 1663 (1948), overruled on other grounds sub nom. 
United States v. Robinowitz, 
339 U.S. 56, 70 S. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653 
(1950) recognized that "since this property was contraband, they have no right 
to have it returned to them," even though it was error to refuse petitioner's 
motion to exclude and suppress the property which was improperly seized. With 
this case and conclusion, as a general principle, the subject of forfeiture and 
its relationship to contraband is well litigated. In terms of forfeiture or 
non-return, there is clearly a difference between two characters of property 
each of which may have been suppressed as far as criminal evidence is concerned. 
The difference is between contraband per se to which the custodian had no right 
of possession and derivative contraband where usage for illegal purposes renders 
the property subject to forfeiture although the property and its acquisition in 
itself was not illegal. One 1958 PlymouthSedan v. Com. of Pa., 380 U.S. 693, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965). Funds used for public purposes by law enforcement officers in drug 
sale surveillance would be contraband per se.

[¶26.]  The confusion arises in trying to apply 
the suppression determination to the forfeiture proceeding. In 
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96, 96 L. Ed. 59 (1951), where the cocaine itself was found, that court 
detailed:

Since the evidence 
illegally seized was contraband the respondent was not entitled to have it 
returned to him. It being his property, for purposes of the exclusionary rule, 
he was entitled on motion to have it suppressed as evidence on his 
trial.

The broad 
principle resulting is that the evidence of suppression has no affect on rights 
for agency retention if the property is contraband. Funds from the public 
treasury advanced to document illegal sales of drugs surely acquires that 
status.

[¶27.]  The starting point for the return of 
illegally seized property is W.R.Cr.P. 40(e) (F.R.Cr.P. 41(e)), whereby "[i]f 
the motion [for suppression] is granted the property shall be restored unless 
otherwise subject to lawful detention." Since the buy money was not legally 
obtained when traded for illegal drugs, that identifiable property is not 
normally merchantable nor subject to subsequent private party ownership no 
matter how acquired. Support for this thesis is found in the early Wyoming case of 
Cheeseman, 80 P. 823, where recovery was dependent upon proof of right to the 
property, and lacking a favorable determination, recovery by the claimant was 
denied. Consequently, a forfeiture proceeding under W.S. 35-7-1049 is not 
required for retention of public property even if contended to have been seized 
through illegal search or seizure when the property is contraband per se. See 
People v. Ziomek, 179 Ill. App.3d 303, 128 Ill.Dec. 356, 341, 534 N.E.2d 538, 543 (1989). Conversely, if the property is derivative contraband, as 
in this case all of the cash except the identified buy money, retention is 
inappropriate when seized illegally.

[¶28.]  This general rule is stated in 2 J. 
Varon, Searches, Seizures and Immunities ch. XIV, § 7 at 912 (2d ed. 
1974):

The mere fact that 
property is illegally seized from the possession of an aggrieved person does not 
necessarily command its return. We have already stated that the fourth amendment 
does not guarantee that illegally seized property will be returned to its owner. 
This applies particularly to contraband property, or property forfeitable or 
subject to lien. The general rule is that if property unconstitutionally seized 
is contraband or illegal per se, the owners have no right to have it returned to 
them.

[¶29.]  "[S]uch property is not required to be 
returned to the owner when it is contraband or forfeitable." Welsh v. 
United 
States, 220 F.2d 200, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Cf. 
United 
States v. Wright, 610 F.2d 930, 941 n. 50 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979), where the court required return of the cash, but 
said:

We assume, arguendo, that 
appellants would not be entitled to the return of money if it were the proceeds 
of crime.

[¶30.]  Similar in result is United States v. 
LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 971, 98 S. Ct. 1611, 
56 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1978), where the defendant had been acquitted in state court of 
extortion and then filed a proceeding in federal court for the return of the 
$50,000 which had been paid to him as the funding for the contended extortion 
process. That court said:

The acquittal of LaFatch 
in the criminal proceedings did not necessarily mean that he is the rightful 
owner of the money. In the criminal proceedings the jury determined that the 
evidence was not sufficient to establish the guilt of LaFatch beyond a 
reasonable doubt.

Id. at 84. Consequently, a 
civil determination of the title ownership remained between LaFatch and the 
party subject to the extortion. As stated by 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Criminal 2d § 673 at 754 (1982), "[a] motion to suppress evidence may 
be made under Rule 41(f) even though the items seized are contraband, and the 
movant has no right to their return." Obviously, the right to suppress 
contraband as evidence is different from the right to its return as illegally 
possessed property.

[¶31.]  In People v. Mota, 27 Ill. App.3d 982, 327 N.E.2d 419, 421 (1975), where illegal seizure was shown and the issue of 
forfeiture remained for determination, the rule is stated: 

We feel that it is 
important to determine if the money seized in this case is a contraband per se 
or a derivative contraband since the former will be forfeited even when 
illegally seized. Per se contrabands are objects the possession of which without 
more, constitutes a crime * * *, while a derivative contraband is forfeitable 
only because of its use in criminal activity.

The criminal 
nature of the knowing acquisition of buy money from the sale of drugs surely 
needs no extended disputation. These funds as a critical element of the criminal 
offense are contraband to the recipient. Consequently, I would follow the result 
of People v. Ward, 685 P.2d 238, 239 (Colo. App. 1984), where the defendant "was 
in no way entitled to claim the $620 he received as payment for the cocaine" 
from the agents making the purchase. See also Stewart v. People, 193 Colo. 399, 566 P.2d 1069 
(1977), where the defendant could not claim the money received from forged 
checks.

[¶32.]  Although the seized property was 
suppressed in United 
States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 
1957), the court then denied return of some items as stolen property which 
included coins. "Bait money" was found to fall within the non-return exception 
of F.R.Cr.P. 41(e) as contraband, although other non-criminal implement property 
was restored following illegal seizure. United States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp. 256 (E.D.Pa. 1966). Matter of 
2029 Hering Street, Bronx, 
N.Y.
, 464 F. Supp. 164, 173 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) provides a case where the evidence presented at hearing tended 
"to show that the seized property may have been the fruit of an illegal scheme. 
As such, that property is presently subject to lawful detention and will not be 
returned to the applicants."3 Cf. Eggleston v. State of 
Colorado, 873 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1989), relating to title and claims 
priorities.

[¶33.]  Another case very similar in result is 
United States v. White, 660 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1981), where forfeiture of $38,394 in United States 
currency developed. In difference, although summary judgment on the majority of 
the money was reversed, police retention of $3,800 in prerecorded funds seized 
from a defendant's apartment was not contested.

One proceeding, not at 
issue on this appeal, sought the forfeiture of the $3,800 in pre-recorded funds 
seized from White's apartment. White did not contest that forfeiture action. The 
second proceeding sought the forfeiture of the remaining $38,394 of the seized 
money.

Id. at 
1185.

[¶34.]  I would reverse the summary judgment to 
permit retention by the State of the marked money used by the police to buy the 
drugs as cash which shortly thereafter came back into the hands of the State. 
See People v. Bustam, 641 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1982).

FOOTNOTES

1 It is recognized that 
the State failed in trial court preparation or appellate brief to definitively 
advance the severable issue of the marked money. With this summary judgment 
determination of ownership where public funds are involved, title of 
governmental ownership should not be subject to litigative waiver. I write on a 
subject not essentially addressed by the litigants to favor a partial reversal 
of the summary judgment which denies retention of the buy money and which was 
used for criminal investigation drug purchases. This only involves the bills 
which were identified by police officer affidavit as the specific fourteen bills 
in $100 denomination.

2 This case does not 
present, nor do I consider, a bona fide purchaser for value involving a title 
inquiry where the holder claims or proves a title interest asserted to be 
superior to the original owner.

3 Issue preclusion by 
conviction was denied in United States v. $100,000 in United States Currency, 
602 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), where the controversy was whether the money 
came not from crystalline white powder but was won in the Puerto Rican lottery. 
Despite conviction, the judge determined that the controverted issue of 
ownership and source of the funds required trial upon remand. Probable success 
of the claimant in that trial was not over-emphasized.