Case Title: Briley v. Farabow

Citation: 348 N.C. 537

Docket Number: 473PA97

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 473PA97
FILED: 9 JULY 1998
BERNICE A. BRILEY, Individually and NED H. BRILEY, as Spouse
v.
WILLIAM S. FARABOW and HIGH POINT OB-GYN ASSOCIATES, INC.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 127 N.C. App. 281,
488 S.E.2d 621 (1997), vacating the order denying the Rule
60(b)(1) motion entered by Greeson, J., on 24 October 1996 in
Superior Court, Guilford County, and remanding the case for a new
hearing.  Heard in the Supreme Court 9 March 1998.
Randolph M. James, P.C., by Randolph M. James, for
plaintiff-appellees.
Elrod Lawing & Sharpless, P.A., by Sally A. Lawing and
Damien J. Sinnott, for defendants-appellants.
Brinkley, Walser, McGirt, Miller, Smith & Coles,
P.L.L.C., by D. Clark Smith, Jr., Stephen W. Coles, and
S. Ranchor Harris, III, on behalf of North Carolina
Association of Defense Attorneys, amicus curiae.
ORR, Justice.
This case addresses whether Rule 60(b)(1) of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure may be used to provide relief
from sanctions imposed upon plaintiffs under Rule 26(f1) of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure for their attorney’s
failure to designate experts by a court-ordered deadline. 
Plaintiffs initiated this medical malpractice suit against
Dr. William S. Farabow and High Point Ob-Gyn Associates, Inc., on
11 August 1995, alleging that defendants negligently performed
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surgery by unnecessarily removing plaintiff’s female reproductive
organs and perforating her bladder.  On 8 September 1995,
defendants filed an answer in which they denied all allegations,
and a Rule 26(f1) motion in which they requested that the court
conduct a discovery-scheduling conference.  On 4 October 1995,
the court entered a discovery-scheduling order requiring that the
parties designate expert witnesses by specific dates; plaintiffs
were ordered to designate expert witnesses on or before
30 November 1995 and defendants were ordered to identify their
experts by 15 February 1996.  The court explained that failure to
designate experts in accordance with the order would result in
the expert not being allowed to testify at trial.
On 19 February 1996, defendants filed a summary
judgment motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure in which they argued that summary judgment
should be granted because no genuine issue as to any material
fact existed and defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.  In the motion, defendants asserted that plaintiffs had
failed to designate their expert witnesses by the scheduling
order deadline, 30 November 1995, and that plaintiffs still had
not named any experts to testify by the date of the summary
judgment motion.  Defendants asserted that pursuant to Rule
26(f1) and the scheduling order, experts not designated by the
order’s deadline should not be permitted to testify at trial.
In support of the summary judgment motion, defendants
also submitted an affidavit by Dr. G. Terry Stewart, a specialist
in obstetrics and gynecology.  In the affidavit, Dr. Stewart
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stated that he had experience performing hysterectomies and
treating patients similar to plaintiff Mrs. Briley, and that
after having reviewed the records of Dr. Farabow’s treatment of
plaintiff, that he believed that “Dr. Farabow met or exceeded the
standard of practice in every respect, before, during, and after
the surgery performed on Mrs. Briley.”  Dr. Stewart explained
that the complication plaintiff experienced was a risk of the
procedure which was performed on her that can and does occur
without negligence.  Dr. Stewart stated that, in his opinion,
plaintiff’s complication occurred without any negligence by
defendants.
On 5 March 1996, plaintiffs filed an expert witness
designation for the first time, identifying two obstetrician-
gynecologists, Dr. Harlan Giles and Dr. Paul D. Gatewood, to
testify at trial.  On 6 March 1996, plaintiffs then filed an
opposition to defendants’ summary judgment motion and submitted
an affidavit of plaintiff Mrs. Bernice Briley.  Mrs. Briley
stated in the affidavit that a report by the plaintiffs’ expert
witness, Dr. Paul Gatewood, was attached and adopted by the
affidavit, and requested that the report be “incorporated herein
by reference the same as if at this point it were set forth in
it’s [sic] entirety.”  Dr. Gatewood had rendered an opinion in
the report that plaintiffs’ negligence allegations were provable.
On 11 March 1996, defendants filed a motion to strike
plaintiffs’ tardy expert witness designation.  A hearing was held
as to defendants’ motion to strike and defendants’ motion for
summary judgment at the 29 April 1996 session of Superior Court,
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Guilford County.  On 1 May 1996, defendants filed an objection to
the admissibility of plaintiff’s affidavit and Dr. Gatewood’s
report arguing that:  (1) Dr. Gatewood’s report should not be
considered because he was not designated as an expert by the
scheduling order deadline; (2) the affidavit of plaintiff, to the
extent that it referred to Dr. Gatewood’s report, was not based
on personal knowledge; and (3) Dr. Gatewood’s report failed to
establish that he qualified as an expert.  Defendants thus asked
the court to sustain their objection and exclude Ms. Briley’s
affidavit and Dr. Gatewood’s report.
On 9 May 1996, the court granted defendants’ motion to
strike plaintiffs’ tardy expert witness designation pursuant to
Rule 26(f1).  In a separate order on 9 May 1996, the court also
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  In the order
granting summary judgment, the court stated that “having granted
the defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ expert designation,
and having sustained defendants’ objection to the affidavit of
Mrs. Briley and the unverified report of Dr. Gatewood, the Court
finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  On
10 May 1996, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal only of the
order striking the witness designation.  Plaintiffs did not file
a notice of appeal of the order granting summary judgment.
On 9 July 1996, plaintiffs filed a motion with the
trial court under Rule 60(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure requesting that the trial court grant relief from
its orders granting summary judgment and the motion to strike the
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designation.  Under Rule 60(b)(1), relief from a prior order or
judgment may be granted if the party establishes that the order
or judgment was mistakenly entered due to the party’s “[m]istake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”  N.C.G.S. § 1A-1,
Rule 60(b)(1) (1990).  In this case, plaintiffs argued that they
should be provided relief from the two prior orders because their
trial attorney’s failure to designate their expert witnesses by
the scheduling order deadline was “excusable neglect” under Rule
60(b)(1).  Plaintiffs stated that their attorney had stopped
preparing discovery, including the expert witness designation,
under the mistaken assumption that “the parties had agreed to
informally delay further discovery” since settlement discussions
had been initiated.  The summary judgment order should thus be
stricken because it was based at least in part on the allegedly
mistaken order striking the expert designation.
On 7 August 1996, defendants filed a response to the
Rule 60(b)(1) motion.  In the response, defendants stated that
“there was absolutely no discussion or agreement about putting
discovery on hold” on 1 December 1995 and that Ms. Young,
plaintiffs’ attorney, was told settlement was unlikely.  On
9 October 1996, a hearing was held in Superior Court, Guilford
County, and on 24 October 1996, the trial court entered an order
denying plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(1) motion.  In the order, the
court held that plaintiffs’ failure to designate the experts was
due to the unexcused negligence of plaintiffs’ attorney rather
than to excusable neglect.  The court made a finding that
plaintiffs’ counsel “did not . . . offer any excuse for the late
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designation” and did not request an extension of time to file
after the deadline.  The court concluded therefore that
plaintiffs did not qualify for relief because the “failure to
designate expert witnesses as required by a Rule 26(f1) order,
due to inexcusable neglect of counsel, does not constitute
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1).”  Also, the court stated
that Rule 26(f1), which requires identification of medical
experts within certain time periods, was enacted “to provide for
the prompt and orderly completion of expert witness discovery in
medical malpractice cases so as to avoid delay and surprise.” 
The court stated that Rule 60(b)(1) should not be used to provide
relief from sanctions which the legislature intended to be
imposed under Rule 26(f1).  Finally, the trial court held that
plaintiffs did not qualify for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) of the
order granting defendants’ summary judgment.  The court stated
that even if it reversed the order striking the witness
designation, plaintiffs still did not have evidence to defeat
defendants’ motion.
On 5 November 1996, plaintiffs filed an additional
notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals in which they appealed
the denial of the Rule 60(b)(1) motion.  The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court decision and vacated the Rule 60(b)(1)
order denying plaintiffs’ relief.  The Court of Appeals explained
that reversal of the order was required because the trial court
had applied the “incorrect legal standard” in determining whether
the conduct constituted “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Briley v. Farabow, 127 N.C. App. 281, 284, 488 S.E.2d 621, 624
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(1997).  The court stated that the trial court should have made
findings of fact regarding “whether plaintiffs’ behavior was
excusable or inexcusable, not whether their attorneys’ behavior
was excusable or inexcusable.”  Id.  Thus, the court remanded the
case for a new hearing on all issues in the Rule 60(b)(1) motion.
On 23 September 1997, defendants petitioned this Court
for discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31, which we
granted on 6 November 1997.  For the reasons which follow, we
hold that the trial court’s order denying plaintiffs relief under
Rule 60(b)(1) was proper.  Accordingly, we reverse the Court of
Appeals’ decision and reinstate the trial court’s order.
Plaintiffs argue that they should be relieved under
Rule 60(b)(1) of the order striking their expert witness
designation.  Plaintiffs assert that the order granting summary
judgment should also be stricken because it was based on the
order striking the expert witness designation.  We shall address
whether plaintiffs should be provided relief from the summary
judgment order under Rule 60(b)(1) first.  We note initially,
however, that plaintiffs did not file a notice of appeal of the
summary judgment order.  Thus, it is clear that plaintiffs are
attempting to use the Rule 60(b)(1) motion to gain appellate
review of the summary judgment order.  Still, we address the
issue here because we have determined that even if the Rule
60(b)(1) motion should have been granted and thus, the
designation not excluded, plaintiffs still would not prevail on
the summary judgment motion.
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Plaintiffs essentially argue that if the expert witness
designation had been considered in determining whether to grant
summary judgment, plaintiffs could have defeated defendants’
summary judgment motion.  Summary judgment is granted if the
moving party shows that there is no genuine issue of material
fact for trial and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
and the nonmoving party fails to meet its burden to come forward
with a forecast of evidence establishing that a genuine issue of
material fact exists.  Vassey v. Burch, 301 N.C. 68, 72-73, 269
S.E.2d 137, 140 (1980).  The moving party bears the initial
burden of coming forward with a forecast of evidence tending to
establish that no triable issue of material fact exists.  Creech
v. Melnik, 347 N.C. 520, 526, 495 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1998).  Once
this burden is met, then the nonmoving party must “‘produce a
forecast of evidence demonstrating that the [nonmoving party]
will be able to make out at least a prima facie case at trial.’” 
Id. at 526, 495 S.E.2d at 911 (quoting Collingwood v. General
Elec. Real Estate Equities, Inc., 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d
425, 427 (1989)) (alteration in original).
In the case sub judice, the trial court determined that
summary judgment for defendants was proper because there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact and defendants were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Defendants’ forecast of
evidence tended to show that defendant Dr. Farabow met the
applicable standard of care in performing surgery upon plaintiff
and that defendants were not negligent.  Defendants submitted an
affidavit by their expert, Dr. G. Terry Stewart, in which he
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stated that he was familiar with the standard of care; that he
had performed hysterectomies during that time; that he had
experience treating patients like Mrs. Briley; and that in his
opinion, Dr. Farabow was not negligent.
Plaintiffs’ forecast of evidence, on the other hand,
failed to show that a prima facie case could be made for trial. 
Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit by plaintiff Mrs. Briley in
which she stated that she caused the action to be filed, that the
allegations of negligence were set forth in the complaint, and
that Dr. Gatewood’s report was incorporated in the affidavit. 
This affidavit had no new evidence beyond what was alleged in the
complaint, except for Dr. Gatewood’s report and the expert
witness designation.  The trial court, however, excluded
Dr. Gatewood’s report because “it did not establish the witness’s
familiarity with the standard of care and because it was not
under oath.”  The court concluded that “[h]aving stricken the
designation and having sustained the objection to Dr. Gatewood’s
letter, there was absolutely no evidence before the Court in
opposition to the defendants’ properly supported motion.” 
Plaintiffs acknowledged such in that the trial court stated that
“the sole argument advanced by [plaintiffs’ counsel] was that by
filing a tardy expert designation, plaintiffs had created a
question of fact necessitating denial of defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.”
Even if the trial court’s exclusion of the expert
witness designation had been reversed, it still would not raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to summary judgment. 
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Plaintiffs’ expert witness designation named two experts,
Dr. Gatewood and Dr. Giles, to testify at trial.  Plaintiffs
alleged in the designation that the “experts” would testify that
defendants were negligent.  These assertions in the designation,
much like an assertion in a pleading, however, do not provide any
evidentiary material to create a genuine issue of a material
fact.  As evidence, the designation was also inadmissible since
the experts had not been qualified as such, and any opinion that
they offered would therefore be inadmissible.  Borden, Inc. v.
Brower, 17 N.C. App. 249, 193 S.E.2d 751 (affidavits or other
material offered which sets forth inadmissible facts should not
be considered for summary judgment), rev’d on other grounds, 284
N.C. 54, 199 S.E.2d 414 (1973).  If the designation had not been
stricken, therefore, plaintiffs would still have only unsupported
allegations in the pleadings, an affidavit which repeated such
assertions, and no specific facts showing the existence of a
triable issue.  Such unsupported, conclusory allegations are
simply insufficient to create the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact where the moving party has offered a proper
evidentiary showing.  Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 289 S.E.2d
363 (1982); Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 36 N.C. App. 350,
244 S.E.2d 208 (1978), aff’d, 296 N.C. 467, 251 S.E.2d 419
(1979).  The trial court also stated such, noting that
[e]ven if the Court were to reverse its order
striking plaintiff’s [sic] tardy expert
designation, plaintiffs would not be entitled
to any relief from the order allowing
defendants’ motion for summary judgment
because they would still have no competent
evidence, as of May 1, 1996, to rebut
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defendants’ properly supported motion.  Thus,
even if the Court were to find excusable
neglect, plaintiffs would not be able to
prevail on the record that existed on May 1,
1996, when the motion was heard.
We conclude, therefore, as the trial court did, that Rule
60(b)(1) affords no relief to plaintiff in regard to the trial
court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants
since even if the expert witness designation had been considered
in deciding summary judgment, plaintiffs would still not have a
sufficient forecast of evidence to overcome the motion.
The next issue we must address is whether plaintiffs
should be granted relief under Rule 60(b)(1), of the order
striking their expert witness designation under Rule 26(f1) when
the order was imposed because of plaintiffs’ attorney’s failure
to file the designation in a timely manner.  Rule 26(f1) provides
that
[i]n a medical malpractice action . . . , the
judge shall, within 30 days, direct the
attorneys for the parties to appear for a
discovery conference.  At the conference the
court . . . shall:
. . . .
(2)
Establish an appropriate schedule
for designating expert witnesses
. . . such that there is a deadline
for designating all expert
witnesses within an appropriate
time . . . .
. . . .
If a party fails to identify an expert
witness as ordered, the court shall, upon
motion by the moving party, impose an
appropriate sanction, which may include
dismissal of the action, entry of default
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against the defendant, or exclusion of the
testimony of the expert witness at trial.
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f1) (1990) (emphasis added).  This rule
was adopted in 1987 to expedite discovery and provide for the
prompt designation of expert witnesses.  By its express language,
it plainly mandates that the court impose mandatory sanctions if
a party fails to comply with a deadline regarding the designation
of experts.  This is exactly what occurred in the instant case: 
plaintiffs were ordered to designate experts by 30 November 1995
and failed to do so.  The sanction of excluding plaintiffs’
expert witnesses from testifying was therefore proper under Rule
26(f1).
Plaintiffs assert that these sanctions should be lifted
under Rule 60(b)(1) because their failure to file the expert
witness designation was due to “excusable neglect.”  As
previously explained, Rule 60(b)(1) permits a court to relieve a
party from an order for “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect.”  N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(1). 
Interpreting this provision in the context of discovery sanctions
is an issue of first impression.  This provision, however, is
almost indistinguishable from federal Rule 60(b)(1), which
provides that a district court may grant relief from an order for
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”  Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(1); see Sink v. Easter, 288 N.C. 183, 196, 217
S.E.2d 532, 540 (1975).  The “nearly identical provisions of our
Rule 60(b) and Federal Rule 60(b) point to the Federal decisions
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for interpretation and enlightenment.”  Wiggins v. Bunch, 280
N.C. 106, 110, 184 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1971).
Federal courts have held that although attorney error
may, under certain conditions, qualify as a reason for granting
relief under Rule 60(b)(1), “neither ignorance nor carelessness
on the part of an attorney will provide grounds for 60(b)
relief.”  Hoffman v. Celebrezze, 405 F.2d 833, 835 (8th Cir.
1969); see Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp., 84 F.3d 874, 878 (7th
Cir. 1996).  “[T]ime and time again [it has been held] that
inexcusable attorney negligence does not constitute proper
grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1).”  Helm, 84 F.3d at 878. 
“An attorney’s negligent mistake, evincing a lack of due care, is
not a proper ground for relief under Rule 60(b),” Rodgers v.
Wood, 910 F.2d 444, 449 (7th Cir. 1990), and “[t]he mere fact
that an attorney is busy with other matters does not excuse a
neglect on his part” for the purposes of Rule 60(b).  McDermott
v. Lehman, 594 F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (D. Me. 1984).  A showing of
carelessness or negligence or ignorance of the rules of procedure
also does not constitute “excusable neglect” within this rule. 
In re Wright, 247 F. Supp. 648, 659 (E.D. Mo. 1965).  “Litigants
whose lawyers fall asleep at crucial moments may seek relief from
the somnolent agents; inexcusable inattention to the case . . .
does not justify putting the adversary to the continued expense
and uncertainty of litigation.”  United States v. Golden
Elevator, Inc., 27 F.3d 301, 303 (7th Cir. 1994).
Clearly, an attorney’s negligence in handling a case
constitutes inexcusable neglect and should not be grounds for
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relief under the “excusable neglect” provision of Rule 60(b)(1). 
In enacting Rule 60(b)(1), the General Assembly did not intend to
sanction an attorney’s negligence by making it beneficial for the
client and to thus provide an avenue for potential abuse. 
Allowing an attorney’s negligence to be a basis for providing
relief from orders would encourage such negligence and present a
temptation for litigants to use the negligence as an excuse to
avoid court- imposed rules and deadlines.  Plaintiffs have argued
that this Court should provide relief from an order if only the
attorney, rather than the client, was negligent.  Looking only to
the attorney to assume responsibility for the client’s case,
however, leads to undesirable results.  As one federal judge
noted:
“Holding the client responsible for the
lawyer’s deeds ensures that both clients and
lawyers take care to comply.  If the lawyer’s
neglect protected the client from ill
consequences, neglect would become all too
common.  It would be a free good--the neglect
would protect the client, and because the
client could not suffer the lawyer would not
suffer either.”
United States v. 7108 West Grand Ave., 15 F.3d 632, 634 (7th
Cir.) (quoting Tolliver v. Northrop Corp., 786 F.2d 316, 319 (7th
Cir. 1986)) cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1212, 129 L. Ed. 2d 822
(1994).  Thus, we hold that an attorney’s negligent conduct is
not “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1) and that in
determining such, the court must look at the behavior of the
attorney.
In determining whether to grant relief under Rule
60(b)(1), the trial court has sound discretion which will be
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disturbed only upon a showing that the trial court abused its
discretion.  Harris v. Harris, 307 N.C. 684, 687, 300 S.E.2d 369,
372 (1983).  The trial judge has the duty to make findings of
fact, which are deemed conclusive on appeal if there is any
evidence on which to base such findings.  Hoglen v. James, 38
N.C. App. 728, 731, 248 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1978).
In the instant case, the trial judge made several
findings of fact in the order denying relief to plaintiffs under
Rule 60(b)(1).  The trial court found that “plaintiffs were
required to file their expert witness designation on or before
November 30, 1995,” and that they “failed to designate any expert
witnesses as required by the Rule 26(f1) order.”  The court found
that “no extension of time was sought”; that plaintiffs “did not
. . . offer any excuse for the late designation”; and that at the
hearing, plaintiffs acknowledged that “the failure to designate
was due to [their attorney’s] negligence.”  Consequently, the
court’s finding that “the failure to designate experts was due to
Ms. Young’s unexcused negligence, rather than to any mistake,”
was clearly based on competent evidence.
The trial court’s findings are thus deemed conclusive,
since based on competent evidence, and this Court’s review of the
denial of the Rule 60(b)(1) motion is limited to a determination
of whether an abuse of discretion occurred.  An abuse of
discretion is a decision manifestly unsupported by reason or one
so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned
decision.  White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833
(1985); see also State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 538, 330 S.E.2d
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450, 465 (1985).  Such an abuse may not be established here,
where there was ample evidence to support the trial court
decision that plaintiffs’ attorney’s inexcusable negligence
failed to constitute “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and the trial court’s decision denying relief under Rule 60(b)(1)
is reinstated.
REVERSED.