Case Title: In the Matter of Ridge Road Fire District v. Michael P. Schiano

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2011-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 55  
In the Matter of Ridge Road Fire 
District,
            Appellant,
        v.
Michael P. Schiano, &c., et al.,
            Respondents.
Mary Louise Conrow, for appellant.
Daniel P. DeBolt, for respondents.
PIGOTT, J.:
Respondent Kevin Nowack, a firefighter employed by
petitioner Ridge Road Fire District, claimed to have sustained a
back injury while on duty on November 7, 2002.  Specifically, Nowak
claimed that the fire truck he was driving hit a "low spot", manhole
cover or pot hole in the road, causing the truck's air suspension
seat to elevate and "shoot" downward, causing a "twinge" or
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No. 55
"tightness" in his low back.  
Nowack sought General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits, to
which certain firefighters are entitled if they are "injured in the
performance of [their] duties" (see General Municipal Law § 207-a
[1]).  He completed an "accident-sickness packet" containing, among
other things, an employee injury report, physician report and
authorization for medical records.  The District denied Nowack's
application finding that his complained-of injury was a preexisting
one that he sustained while off duty.
Nowack requested a hearing with respect to the District's
denial of benefits in accordance with the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) between the District and respondent Ridge Road
Firefighters Association, IAFF, Local 3799.  The CBA provides that a
hearing officer "shall conduct the hearing in accordance with the
established rules of evidence, consistent with the NYS
Administrative Procedure Act," and that "[i]t is the employee's
burden to prove [that he] is entitled to GML 207-a benefits."  The
hearing was held before respondent hearing officer Michael Schiano.
Nowack and the District each called witnesses and presented evidence
relative to their respective theories of causation. 
In his written decision, the hearing officer stated,
incorrectly, that the standard of review was "whether or not
substantial evidence was presented to override the Fire District's
Determination" (emphasis supplied), and concluded that there was and
that Nowack was therefore entitled to section 207-a benefits.  
The District challenged this determination in a CPLR article 78
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No. 55
proceeding. Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the
decision, and remanded the proceeding, directing the hearing officer
to apply the proper standard of review, namely, whether the
District's determination denying Nowack benefits was supported by
substantial evidence. 
On remand, the hearing officer's second decision
proffered the same analysis word-for-word as his first and stated
the proper standard of review, but nonetheless concluded that the
District's denial of Nowack's section 207-a benefits was not
supported by substantial evidence. The District again challenged
that determination and Supreme Court granted the District's
petition, vacated the decision and reinstated the District's
original denial of section 207-a benefits.  Supreme Court held that
the hearing officer's decision was arbitrary and capricious, and
noted that the District's determination denying benefits "was
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole despite
the fact that there was conflicting medical evidence to support a
contrary result."  
The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the
petition, holding that the District's "denial of benefits, which was
based on the determination that the disability was solely related to
a prior non-work-related injury, [was] not supported by substantial
evidence" (67 AD3d 1342, 1345 [4th Dept 2009]).  This Court granted
leave, and we reverse.
Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the hearing
officer was required to "conduct the hearing in accordance with the
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No. 55
established rules of evidence, consistent with the [New York State]
Administrative Procedure Act."  That Act provides, in relevant part,
that "[n]o decision, determination or order shall be made except
upon consideration of the record as a whole or such portion thereof
as may be cited by any party to the proceeding and as supported by
and in accordance with substantial evidence" (State Administrative
Procedure Act § 306 [1] [emphasis supplied]).  The parties here
agree, and we therefore assume, that, as applied to this case, the
statute requires the District's denial of benefits to be upheld if
substantial evidence supports it.  Therefore, in accordance with
this standard and in light of the CBA's terms, the independent
hearing officer was required to give deference to the District's
decision and Nowack bore the burden of establishing that the
District's denial determination had not been supported by
substantial evidence.
This Court has defined "substantial evidence" as such
relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to
support a conclusion or ultimate fact, and "is less than a
preponderance of the evidence, overwhelming evidence or evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt" (300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div.
of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180-181 [1978]). The standard "demands
only that 'a given inference is reasonable and plausible, not
necessarily the most probable'" (Matter of Miller v DeBuono, 90 NY2d
783, 793 [1997] quoting Borchers and Markell, New York State
Administrative Procedure and Practice § 3.12, at 51 [1995]). 
Viewing this record as a whole, Supreme Court correctly
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No. 55
held that the hearing officer's decision, i.e. that the District's
denial of section 207-a benefits was not based on substantial
evidence, was arbitrary and capricious.  The District's evidence
consisted of testimony from its medical expert that Nowack's back
injury was not causally related to the November 2002 incident, but
was instead attributed to a fractured lumbar vertebra he had
sustained in an accident in 1993 and an August 4, 2002 injury.  The
battalion chief testified that, after Nowack told him that he was
experiencing back pain, he prepared an initial report.  During his
investigation, Nowack did not relate the version of events he now
claims is the cause of his injury--that the air suspension seat on a
fire truck had malfunctioned--nor did he tell him that he hit a "low
spot" or "pothole" in the road.  The District offered the further
testimony of its group battalion chief, who stated that he had
contacted the District mechanic and a representative of the
manufacturer, who each examined the seat and found nothing wrong
with its operation or adjustment mechanisms.  This evidence was
significant in light of the testimony by Nowack's neurosurgeon that
if the accident did not occur in the manner that Nowack claimed,
then he would not causally relate Nowack's injury to a work-related
incident. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was
substantial evidence supporting the District's denial of benefits,
and the hearing officer's conclusion to the contrary was irrational
as a matter of law.  
It is of no consequence that the record also indicates
that there was evidence supporting Nowack's contention. Quite often
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No. 55
there is substantial evidence on both sides. The applicable standard
here was whether the District's denial of benefits was supported by
substantial evidence.  Thus, the dissent errs in suggesting that,
because either side might reasonably have prevailed, we are required
to uphold the hearing officer's ruling.  To the contrary, since, as
all judges of this Court agree, there is unquestionably substantial
evidence supporting both sides' positions, the hearing officer acted
arbitrarily in deciding that none supported the District's.  The
order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and
the judgment of Supreme Court reinstated.  
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Matter of Ridge Road Fire District v Michael P. Schiano, et al.
No. 55
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge (dissenting):
This would seem to be an easy case.  The decision of a
hearing officer as to whether a firefighter is entitled to
General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits, issued pursuant to a
procedure outlined in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA),
has been challenged as arbitrary under CPLR article 78.  There
is, as the majority acknowledges, evidence supporting the hearing
officer's decision, and, as the majority also acknowledges,
"[q]uite often there is substantial evidence on both sides."  In
such cases, the decisions made by hearing officers are to be
upheld, as the court's role in an article 78 proceeding is not to
decide which side has the most persuasive case, but simply to
decide if the hearing officer acted arbitrarily.  This appeal is
no different in any meaningful respect -- the hearing officer
determined that the firefighter met his burden under the CBA,
concluded that the firefighter was injured in the performance of
his duties, and concluded on the record before him that the fire
district's "initial determination" denying the firefighter
benefits was not supported by substantial evidence.  Support for
all of those conclusions is found in this record.  Thus, the
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No. 55
firefighter is, without question, entitled to receive his
benefits. 
Under this CBA, when a firefighter believes that he or
she may be entitled to General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits,
the Ridge Road Fire District (the District) makes what the CBA
refers to as an "initial determination" with respect to benefits
based on an "accident-sickness packet" completed by the
firefighter.  If, as here, the District denies benefits, the
firefighter may take an appeal to a hearing officer to be chosen
at random from a list of names attached to the CBA in an
appendix.  The hearing officer, pursuant to the CBA, conducts a
hearing "in accordance with the established rules of evidence,
consistent with the NYS Administrative Procedure Act."  There is
no dispute that the CBA, by reference to the Administrative
Procedure Act, directs the hearing officer to apply the
substantial evidence standard to the District's "initial
determination," nor should there be dispute that it is the
hearing officer's decision, made after the record is developed at
the hearing, that the CBA provides may be "appeal[ed]" by either
the firefighter or the District pursuant to CPLR article 78.
Unlike the "initial determination" made by the
District's review of the "accident-sickness packet" of forms and
other documentation, the hearing officer's decision is made after
a full hearing.  The hearing officer in this case took medical
evidence from several physicians, heard testimony from various
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No. 55
witnesses, including the firefighter and others who interacted
with him on the day of the alleged accident, and reviewed
evidence concerning the operation of and inspections of the air
suspension seat.  As every court that has reviewed this record
has acknowledged, there is evidence supporting the contentions of
each side.
The majority states, however, that "[i]t is of no
consequence that the record also indicates that there was
evidence supporting" the firefighter's contention and the hearing
officer's decision.  I disagree.  When the majority states that
"[t]he applicable standard here was whether the District's denial
of benefits was supported by substantial evidence," it is correct
only insofar as that was the standard to be applied by the
hearing officer.  That is most certainly not the standard for the
courts to apply in this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging
the hearing officer's decision.  The District's decision is not
before us; we are not faced with determining, as the majority
would have it, "whether the District's denial of benefits was
supported by substantial evidence."  Rather, we are faced with
determining whether the hearing officer's decision was arbitrary. 
Moreover, the majority appears in great measure to base
its approach to the standard of review on a perceived agreement
between the parties as to how the hearing officer was to apply
the substantial evidence standard (majority op at 4).  However,
the majority is mistaken; the parties here are not in agreement
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No. 55
as to whether the District's initial determination to deny
benefits was to be upheld if substantial evidence supported it. 
As the majority notes, State Administrative Procedure Act § 306
(1) (borrowed by the parties and applied to the hearing officer's
job here only through the CBA's reference to it), provides that
the substantial evidence standard is to be applied "upon
consideration of the record as a whole."  The record "as a
whole," however, did not even exist at the time the District made
its initial determination; rather, the record was created at the
hearing conducted by the hearing officer. 
The hearing officer, who heard and weighed all of the
evidence, determined that the firefighter met his burden under
the CBA and was entitled to GML 207-a benefits.  When that
decision is challenged as arbitrary in a CPLR article 78
proceeding, courts are not to weigh the persuasiveness of the
evidence.  Here, for instance, the majority comments that certain
testimony from the District's battalion chief to the effect that
he "contacted the District mechanic and a representative of the
manufacturer, who each examined the seat and found nothing wrong
with its operation or adjustment mechanisms" is "significant."   
The majority finds this evidence to be important "in light of the
testimony" from the firefighter's "neurosurgeon that if the
accident did not occur in the manner" the firefighter claimed,
then "he would not causally relate" the injury to the alleged
"work-related incident."  The evidence on that point, however, is
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No. 55
not at all clear cut.  The majority, without an apparent
rationale, finds it less significant that the neurosurgeon
testified that if the incident did occur as the firefighter
claimed it did (and the hearing officer concluded that the
firefighter did sustain his injuries in the performance of his
duties), then he would tie the firefighter's back injury to the
work-related incident.  
The conclusions to be reached from a detailed analysis
of various portions of the testimony taken at the hearing is
largely beside the point.  This Court should not parse the
relative significance or insignificance of the testimony the
hearing officer heard.  That was the role of the hearing officer
and the entire purpose of holding a hearing.  Other than to
ascertain whether the hearing officer's decision was arbitrary
and capricious, it simply is not the judiciary's job to weigh
such conflicting evidence in an article 78 proceeding.  The
majority not only mistakes this Court's role, it gives the
"initial determination" the veneer of an evidentiary hearing and
elevates it beyond what it was -- a preliminary decision made on
the basis of a packet of forms -- while vitiating the role of the
officer conducting the only full hearing in this case.
Pursuant to the CBA, the District's "initial
determination" is made by the "chief or his designee," who "will
review the accident-sickness packet" of forms submitted by the
firefighter and review "any available medical records and
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No. 55
interviews with any witnesses."  There was no testimony before
the fire chief or his designee; testimony, like the testimony the
majority relies upon, was only received by the hearing officer in
the course of the full hearing.  It was only during that hearing
that evidence was marshaled, testimony was heard, and arguments
relevant to the firefighter's eligibility for GML 207-a benefits
were made.  
Given this CBA's structure, by necessity the hearing
officer was aware of the limited documentation that was before
the fire chief or his designee when that determination was made. 
He was also in a position to compare that packet of forms to the
fully developed record before him after the actual evidentiary
hearing.  It is from that vantage point that he is charged with
determining whether or not substantial evidence supports the
"initial determination" to deny benefits.  To view the "initial
determination" as the majority seems to -- as a determination
akin to a decision reached after review of a fully developed
record that must be upheld by the hearing officer if it has any
meaningful support at all -- is to render this CBA's hearing
process nonsensical.  By the parties' design, the outcome reached
by the District after only a preliminary review of application
materials was not intended to be the final determination; rather,
the hearing officer's decision reached after a full hearing was
the final administrative determination that could be challenged
in an article 78 proceeding.  Thus, on this appeal, we are only
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No. 55
to determine whether the hearing officer's decision was
arbitrary.  
Once it is clear which decision is before us and what
the standard of review is, the analysis is straightforward.  We
"have noted that rationality is the underlying basis for both the
arbitrary and capricious standard and the substantial evidence
rule" (Matter of Jennings v New York State Office of Mental
Health, 90 NY2d 227, 240 [1997]), and "where substantial evidence
exists" to support a decision being reviewed by the courts, "that
determination must be sustained, irrespective of whether a
similar quantum of evidence is available to support other varying
conclusions" (Matter of Collins v Codd, 38 NY2d 269, 270 [1976];
see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45
NY2d 176, 180-181 [1978]).  With respect to causation in this
context, it is settled that the firefighter "need only prove a
direct causal relationship between job duties and the resulting
illness or injury," and that preexisting "non-work-related
conditions do not bar recovery" where the firefighter
"demonstrates that the job duties were a direct cause of the
disability" (Matter of White v County of Cortland, 97 NY2d 336,
340 [2002]).   
As the hearing officer's decision that the firefighter
was injured in the course of performing his duties and was
entitled to GML 207-a benefits was rational, I cannot join the
majority's determination to disturb it.    
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No. 55
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed, with costs, and judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe
County, reinstated. Opinion by Judge Pigott. Judges Graffeo, Read
and Smith concur. Chief Judge Lippman dissents and votes to
affirm in an opinion in which Judges Ciparick and Jones concur.
Decided April 5, 2011
         
 
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