Case Title: Florida Association of Professional Lobbyists, Inc., Etc., Et Al. v. Division of Legislative Information Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC08-791

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-791 
____________ 
 
FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL LOBBYISTS, INC.,  
etc., et al. 
Appellants, 
 
vs. 
 
DIVISION OF LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION SERVICES,  
etc., et al. 
Appellees. 
 
[March 19, 2009] 
 
POLSTON, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of questions of Florida law certified 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that are 
determinative of a cause pending in that court and for which there appears to be no 
controlling precedent.1   
Background 
 
The instant case arose after Appellants, the Florida Association of 
Professional Lobbyists (“FAPL”), initiated a facial challenge of chapter 2005-359, 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. 
Laws of Florida, currently codified at sections 11.045 and 112.3215, Florida 
Statutes (2008), which regulates and disciplines lobbyists.2   
The case was originally filed in circuit court, Second Circuit, Leon County, 
but was removed to federal district court in the Northern District of Florida.  The 
Northern District granted summary judgment to the defendants, Division of 
Legislative Information Services, et al. (the “Division”), on all counts, and FAPL 
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Northern 
District on the federal question presented and held that the Act is not 
unconstitutionally vague or overly broad under federal constitutional standards.   
Fla. Ass’n of Prof’l Lobbyists v. Div. of Legislative Info. Servs., 525 F.3d 1073, 
1080-81 (11th Cir. 2008).  However, it also stated that “the law in Florida is not 
sufficiently well-established for us to determine with confidence whether the act is 
unconstitutional under the state’s constitution.”  Id. at 1077.  Consequently, it 
certified three questions of Florida law to this Court, specifically:  
(I) WHETHER THE ACT VIOLATES FLORIDA’S SEPARATION 
OF POWERS DOCTRINE;  
 
(II) WHETHER THE ACT WAS VALIDLY PASSED BY THE 
LEGISLATURE ACCORDING TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION; and 
 
                                          
 
 
2.  The challenged legislation came about through the introduction and 
passage of Senate Bill 6-B during the 2005 special legislative session.  Hereinafter, 
it will be referred to as “the Act” or “SB 6-B.”   
 
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(III) WHETHER THE ACT INFRINGES ON THE FLORIDA 
SUPREME COURT’S EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO 
REGULATE LAWYERS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW. 
 
The Eleventh Circuit set out the particulars of the Act as follows: 
 
According to the Act, “no lobbyist or principal shall make, directly or 
indirectly, and no member or employee of the legislature,” Fla. Stat. § 
11.045(4)(a) (emphasis added), nor any “agency official, member, or 
employee shall knowingly accept, directly or indirectly, any 
expenditure.”  Id. § 112.3215(6)(a).[n.1]  Given the use of the 
conjunctive “and,” the Act does not bar all lobbying expenditures; 
instead, it bars only those expenditures that are made for lobbying 
purposes and are accepted by an official. 
[n.1]  The term “expenditure” is defined as “a payment, 
distribution, loan, advance, reimbursement, deposit, or 
anything of value made by a lobbyist or principal for the 
purpose of lobbying.”  Fla. Stat. §§ 11.045(1)(d), 
112.3215(1)(d). 
The Act also includes a disclosure provision that requires 
lobbying firms to file quarterly statements reporting the total 
compensation paid or owed by their “principals” — that is, their 
clients.  Id. §§ 11.045(3)(a)1.c, 112.3215(5)(a)1.c.  Lobbying firms 
must also disclose the full name, business address, and telephone 
number of each principal, as well as the total compensation that each 
principal paid or owed to the lobbying firm.  Id. §§ 11.045(3)(a)2, 
112.3215(5)(a) 2. 
In addition to the disclosure provision, the Act has enforcement 
provisions that allow for audits as well as for the filing of sworn 
complaints.  Id. §§ 11.045(7)-(8), 112.3215(8)-(10).  For legislative 
lobbying, every sworn complaint or audit indicating a possible 
violation (with the exception of an untimely report) is subject to 
investigation by designated committees of either house of the 
Legislature.  Id. § 11.045(7).  If a violation is found, the committee 
must report its findings, together with a recommended penalty, to 
either the President of the Senate or Speaker of the House, as 
appropriate.  Id.  The President of the Senate or Speaker of the House 
then submits the committee report and recommendation to their 
respective chamber; and a final determination is made by a majority 
vote of the members.  Id.  Authorized penalties include “a fine of not 
 
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more than $5,000, reprimand, censure, probation, or prohibition from 
lobbying for a period of time not to exceed 24 months.”  Id. 
For executive lobbying, every sworn complaint or audit 
indicating a possible violation (with the exception of an untimely 
report) is subject to investigation by the Commission on Ethics.  Id. § 
112.3215(8)(a), (c).  If the Commission finds probable cause of a 
violation, then it submits a report to the Governor and the Cabinet for 
a determination of the penalty.  Id. § 112.3215(9), (10).  Authorized 
penalties include reprimand, censure, or a prohibition on lobbying any 
agency for a period not to exceed two years.  Id. § 112.3215(10).  But, 
“[i]f the violator is a lobbying firm, the Governor and Cabinet may 
also assess a fine of not more than $5,000.”  Id. 
 
Fla. Ass’n of Prof’l Lobbyists v. Div. of Legislative Info. Servs., 525 F. 3d 1073, 
1075-76 (11th Cir. 2008). 
Analysis 
For the following reasons, we find that the Act (I) does not violate Florida’s 
separation of powers doctrine; (II) was validly enacted by the Florida Legislature; 
and (III) does not infringe on the Florida Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to regulate 
lawyers or the practice of law.   
I.  The Act Does Not Violate Florida’s Separation of Powers Doctrine 
 
 FAPL argues that, in enacting SB 6-B and thereby giving itself the power to 
issue advisory opinions, investigate violations, and recommend punishment for 
infractions of the Act that it alone can approve, the Legislature has directly 
encroached on the powers of the judicial and executive branches.  We disagree.   
“The [separation of powers] doctrine encompasses two fundamental 
prohibitions.  The first is that no branch may encroach upon the powers of another. 
 
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The second is that no branch may delegate to another branch its constitutionally 
assigned power.”  Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 
1991) (citation omitted).  Because improper delegation of powers is not implicated 
here, we only address the issue of encroachment.     
The Florida Constitution does not explicitly prohibit any of the functions set 
out in the Act.  Although the constitution does not give the Legislature the 
exclusive power to discipline lobbyists, it also does not prevent it from doing so.  
As this Court has noted, “the state constitution does not exhaustively list each 
branch’s powers.”  Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 990 So. 2d 1035, 1045 
(Fla. 2008).  Rather,  
the powers of the respective branches “are those so defined . . . or 
such as are inherent or so recognized by immemorial governmental 
usage, and which involve the exercise of primary and independent 
will, discretion, and judgment, subject not to the control of another 
department, but only to the limitations imposed by the state and 
federal Constitutions.”  [Each branch has] “the inherent right to 
accomplish all objects naturally within the orbit of that department, 
not expressly limited by the fact of the existence of a similar power 
elsewhere or the express limitations in the constitution.”   
 
Id. at 1045 (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 47 So. 2d 
969, 974 (Fla. 1908); Sun Ins. Office v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 742 (Fla. 1961)).  
Therefore, since the regulation, discipline, and licensing of lobbyists is not subject 
to the control of any branch or office, the Legislature is not prohibited from using 
its own discretion and judgment to accomplish the task.  See State v. Palmer, 791 
 
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So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (“[A] branch of government is prohibited 
from exercising a power only when that power has been constitutionally assigned 
exclusively to another branch; and the separation of powers doctrine does not 
contemplate that every governmental activity must be classified as belonging 
exclusively to a single branch.”).  Accordingly, we answer the first question in the 
negative and find that the Act does not violate Florida’s separation of powers 
doctrine. 
II.  The Act Was Validly Enacted by the Florida Legislature 
 
FAPL also claims that the Act was not validly enacted by the Legislature 
according to the procedural requirements of the Florida Constitution.  We disagree. 
 
Two constitutional provisions are relevant here.  First, article III, section 3 
provides in part that, during a special session, the only legislative business that 
may be transacted is that business which is within the purview of the governor’s 
proclamation or that which is introduced by consent of two-thirds of the 
membership of each house.  See Art. III, § 3(c)(1), Fla. Const.  Also relevant is 
article III, section 7, which provides the procedure for valid enactment of a bill.  It 
states:  
Any bill may originate in either house and after passage in one may be 
amended in the other.  It shall be read in each house on three separate 
days, unless this rule is waived by two-thirds vote; provided the 
publication of its title in the journal of a house shall satisfy the 
requirement for the first reading in that house.  On each reading, it 
shall be read by title only, unless one-third of the members present 
 
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desire it read in full.  On final passage, the vote of each member 
voting shall be entered on the journal.  Passage of a bill shall require a 
majority vote in each house.  Each bill and joint resolution passed in 
both houses shall be signed by the presiding officers of the respective 
houses and by the secretary of the senate and the clerk of the house of 
representatives during the session or as soon as practicable after its 
adjournment sine die. 
 
Art. III, § 7, Fla. Const.   
 
After reviewing the journals of both chambers, we find that all the rules and 
requirements for enacting a bill during special session were followed.  On 
December 5, 2005, SB 6-B was formally introduced in the Florida Senate after it 
received the required two-thirds vote of the membership.  It was also read for the 
first time.   Fla. S. Jour. 2 (Spec. Sess. 2005).  Then, on December 7, 2005, the 
rules were waived and it was read for the second and third times.  Thereafter, SB 
6-B was passed, the vote was recorded, it was ordered engrossed, and it was 
certified to the House.  Fla. S. Jour. 33, 42 (Spec. Sess. 2005).  In the Florida 
House, on December 5, 2005, House Bill 63-B, a bill relating to the registration 
and reporting requirements for lobbyists, was formally introduced after receiving 
the required two-thirds vote.  See Fla. H.R. Jour. 3 (Spec. Sess. 2005).  Then, on 
December 8, 2005, SB 6-B was read three times in the House after the rules were 
waived; it was also formally introduced in the House by a two-thirds vote after the 
bill’s second reading; its passing vote was properly recorded in the House Journal; 
and it was enrolled, signed, and filed.  Fla. H.R. Jour. 45 (Spec. Sess. 2005); see 
 
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also State v. Kaufman, 430 So. 2d 904, 905 (Fla. 1983) (“[W]hen enrolled, signed, 
and filed, acts of the legislature are prima facie valid.”). 
 
FAPL claims that the Act was not properly enacted because SB 6-B was 
read twice in the House before its formal introduction and only once afterwards.  It 
asserts that the three-readings requirement, when executed in this manner, is 
insufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements for enacting legislation.  We 
find FAPL’s argument unpersuasive because SB 6-B did not require a formal 
introduction in the House.   Rather, since HB 63-B, a similar subject bill, had 
already been formally introduced in the House by the requisite two-thirds vote, no 
further introduction of SB 6-B was necessary because it fell within the purview of 
the subject matter of HB 63-B.  Therefore, the passage of SB 6-B constituted the 
transaction of “legislative business” which was “introduced by consent of two-
thirds of the membership of each house.”  Art. III, § 3(c)(1), Fla. Const.3  
Accordingly, we answer the second question affirmatively and find that SB 6-B 
was validly enacted by the Florida Legislature.   
                                          
 
 
3.  We need not address, and specifically do not rule on, whether the two-
thirds vote with respect to SB 6-B after its second reading in the House would have 
been independently sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement.   
 
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III.  The Act Does Not Infringe on the Florida Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction 
to Regulate Lawyers or the Practice of Law 
 
 
FAPL also argues that lobbying is part of the general practice of law and that 
the Act is unconstitutional because it regulates and disciplines lawyers who work 
as lobbyists and thereby encroaches on the jurisdiction of this Court.  We disagree.   
Section 112.3215, Florida Statutes (2008), which pertains to lobbying before 
the executive branch, defines “lobbies” and “lobbyist” as follows:   
(f)  “Lobbies” means seeking, on behalf of another person, to 
influence an agency with respect to a decision of the agency in the 
area of policy or procurement or an attempt to obtain the goodwill of 
an agency official or employee.  “Lobbies” also means influencing or 
attempting to influence, on behalf of another, the Constitution 
Revision Commission’s action or nonaction through oral or written 
communication or an attempt to obtain the goodwill of a member or 
employee of the Constitution Revision Commission. 
 
 
. . . .  
(h)  “Lobbyist” means a person who is employed and receives 
payment, or who contracts for economic consideration, for the 
purpose of lobbying, or a person who is principally employed for 
governmental affairs by another person or governmental entity to 
lobby on behalf of that other person or governmental entity.  
“Lobbyist” does not include a person who is: 
1.  An attorney, or any person who represents a client in a 
judicial proceeding or in a formal administrative proceeding 
conducted pursuant to chapter 120 or any other formal hearing before 
an agency, board, commission, or authority of this state. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
Similarly, section 11.045(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2008), defines legislative 
lobbying as “influencing or attempting to influence legislative action or nonaction 
through oral or written communications or an attempt to obtain goodwill of a 
 
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member or employee of the Legislature.”  See also Black’s Law Dictionary 845 
(5th ed. 1979) (defining “lobbying” as “[a]ll attempts including personal 
solicitation to induce legislators to vote in a certain way or to introduce 
legislation”).   
On the other hand, this Court has explained that “the performance of 
services in representing another before the courts is the practice of law.”  State ex 
rel. Fla. Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962), vacated on other grounds, 
373 U.S. 379 (1963).  Additionally, as the Act expressly acknowledges, the 
practice of law includes representing clients in administrative proceedings under 
chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and representing clients in formal hearings before 
agencies, boards, and commissions.  See § 112.3215(1)(h)(1), Fla. Stat. (2008).  
The practice of law also includes “the giving of legal advice” and “the preparation 
of legal instruments.”  Sperry, 140 So. 2d at 591; see also Fla. Bar v. Neiman, 816 
So. 2d 587, 596 (Fla. 2002). 
 
Given the differences between the two activities, we conclude that lobbying 
as defined by the Act does not constitute the practice of law.  Accordingly, we find 
that lobbyists, who may also be lawyers when engaged in lobbying activities, may 
be regulated and disciplined for their actions or inactions as prescribed by the Act.  
We also find that those regulations and disciplinary actions described in the Act do 
 
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not infringe on this Court’s jurisdiction to regulate and discipline lawyers, who 
may also be lobbyists, in matters relating to their practice of law.   
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we answer the first and third questions in the 
negative and the second question affirmatively and hold that the Act (I) does not 
violate Florida’s separation of powers doctrine; (II) was validly enacted by the 
Florida Legislature; and (III) does not infringe on the Florida Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction to regulate lawyers or the practice of law.   
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit - Case No. 07-10435 
 
Mark Herron, Thomas M. Findley, and Robert J. Telfer, III of Messer, Caparello 
and Self, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellants 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Scott D. Makar, Solicitor General, Louis F. 
Hubener, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Kenneth W. 
Sukhia and David P. Healy of the Sukhia Law Group, PLC, Tallahassee,  Florida, 
 
 
for Appellees