Case Title: State v. Joseph F. Jiles

Citation: 2003 WI 66

Docket Number: 2002AP000153-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 66 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0153-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Joseph F. Jiles,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:258 Wis. 2d 982, 654 N.W.2d 95 
(Ct. App. 2002–Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 29, 2003 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert C. Crawford 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Mark S. Rosen and Rosen and Holzman, Ltd., Waukesha, and oral 
argument by Mark S. Rosen. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by David 
J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 66 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0153-CR   
(L.C. No. 
00 CF 2479) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph F. Jiles,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed both 
the defendant's conviction following a guilty plea to one count 
of first-degree reckless injury by use of a dangerous weapon, 
and one count of armed robbery, both as party to a crime, and 
the circuit court's order denying the defendant's motion for 
postconviction relief. 
                                                 
1 State v. Jiles, No. 02-0153-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2002). 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
2 
 
¶2 
On May 15, 2000, Joseph F. Jiles (Jiles) was arrested 
at 11:30 p.m. shortly after an armed robbery and shooting at a 
Milwaukee gas station.  He was taken into police custody and 
transported to the Milwaukee Police Department.  At 4:03 a.m. 
Jiles 
was 
awakened 
by 
a 
Milwaukee 
police 
detective 
and 
questioned about the robbery.  Over the next 80 minutes he 
allegedly made a number of incriminating admissions about his 
involvement in the robbery, which the detective reduced to 
writing in a report that Jiles signed.   
¶3 
In due course, Jiles moved to suppress his statements.  
He claimed that: (1) he was not informed of his constitutional 
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), prior to 
being interrogated; (2) he was unable to make a voluntary 
statement to police because he was intoxicated due to marijuana 
use prior to his arrest; and (3) any statements he made were not 
voluntary because they were the result of overbearing conduct by 
the interrogating officer. 
¶4 
The issue presented is whether Jiles received a full 
and fair evidentiary hearing on this motion to suppress his 
statements. 
¶5 
We conclude in this fact-specific matter that Jiles 
did not receive a full and fair hearing because the State did 
not meet its burden of proof.  We are disturbed by the disregard 
of established procedure that we see in the record.  We reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals, vacate Jiles' judgment of 
conviction, and allow Jiles to withdraw his guilty plea.  We 
remand this matter to the circuit court for a new Miranda-
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
3 
 
Goodchild hearing if Jiles renews his motion to suppress his 
statement. 
FACTS 
 
¶6 
This case is about the proper administration of 
justice.  We do not focus on the crime, which was a violent 
robbery; or on the defendant; or on the innocent victim who was 
badly injured and blinded in one eye when she was shot in the 
head.  We focus solely on the proceedings, especially the 
Miranda-Goodchild hearing, because proceedings of this nature 
may impact thousands of criminal cases. 
¶7 
Joseph Jiles was taken into custody on May 15, 2000.  
He waived his preliminary examination, and a jury trial was 
calendared for September 12, 2000.  At a hearing on September 5, 
the trial date was vacated when Jiles' defense counsel, Daryl A. 
Kastenson, raised questions about the defendant's competency.  
Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Robert Crawford suspended the 
proceedings and ordered a competency examination.  At this 
hearing, Kastenson and Assistant District Attorney Michael 
Mahoney also signed a "Felony Pretrial Scheduling Order" setting 
an October 9 final motion date, an October 20 final pretrial 
date, and an October 24 jury trial date.  The order contained a 
handwritten note: "(1) Any Miranda Goodchild motions to be filed 
so motion can be heard on 10/9/00-1:30 P.M." 
¶8 
On September 20, Kastenson signed the Jiles motion to 
suppress evidence.  It was filed with the court on September 22. 
¶9 
On October 12, the court convened a hearing to receive 
and consider a psychiatrist's report about Jiles' competency.  
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
4 
 
Present in court with Judge Crawford were Assistant District 
Attorney 
Douglas 
Simpson, 
defense 
counsel 
Kastenson, 
and 
defendant Jiles.  The psychiatrist had concluded in his report 
that Jiles was malingering.  The defense did not challenge the 
psychiatrist's conclusion, and the court determined that Jiles 
was competent.  Then the following exchange took place: 
MR. KASTENSON: Yes, Your Honor.  Currently this 
matter is set for a final pretrial next Friday at 8:30 
and jury trial on the 24th of October at 8:30. 
 
I have filed some motions in this case as well, 
and I don't know if the Court wishes to take them up 
today or next Friday.  One dealing with severance of 
the trials of this defendant and the codefendant, 
Lyron Wilson.  That motion I would like to withdraw at 
this time because it's my understanding that Mr. 
Wilson entered a guilty plea before this Court this 
past Tuesday and will not be having a jury trial. 
THE COURT: 
Mr. Wilson did plead guilty.  I am 
prepared to address your motion to suppress the 
statements.  Do you have the police reports, Mr. 
Simpson? 
 
MR. SIMPSON: 
Regarding which part of the——I 
thought I attached them to mine.  I did not, Judge? 
 
THE COURT: 
I don't have a response from you, 
Mr. Simpson. 
 
MR. SIMPSON: 
I filed one. 
 
MR. KASTENSON: I received a response from Mr. 
Simpson, but it was the response to Mr. Wilson's 
motion 
to 
suppress 
the 
statement 
rather 
than 
specifically a response to my client's motion to 
suppress the statement. 
 
MR. SIMPSON: 
Then 
I 
don't 
know 
if 
I 
ever 
received a motion from Mr. Jiles because I would have 
answered it. 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
5 
 
 
MR. KASTENSON: I 
filed 
with 
the 
Court 
the 
original, of course, with the clerk's stamp and the 
district attorney's stamp dated September 22nd.  I'm 
also showing Mr. Simpson a photocopy of a letter with 
the motions attached that I sent to him on September 
22nd. 
 
MR. SIMPSON: 
I do not recall receiving this.  I 
note that attached to the defendant's motion are the 
reports.  So if the Court has that, at least it gets 
the Court that far.  If you'd like another copy, I can 
provide one.  I don't have this motion nor have I 
responded to it. 
 
THE COURT: 
The motion which Mr. Jiles filed 
on September 22nd, 2000 bears the district attorney's 
Bate 
stamp 
reflecting 
service 
on 
the 
District 
Attorney's 
Office. 
 
It 
is 
helpful 
for 
future 
reference, Mr. Kastenson, to file the motions here in 
Branch 9.  The District Attorney's Office systems are 
inadequate, and documents that are actually filed in 
the District Attorney's Office seem to have a way of 
getting lost. 
 
MR. KASTENSON: That's why I mailed a copy to Mr. 
Simpson, but apparently that was lost in his office as 
well but—— 
 
MR. SIMPSON: 
I certainly believe 'cause I've 
had many, many cases with Mr. Kastenson that he did 
exactly what he says.  And I, quite frankly, don't 
expect the Court to offer the State any leeway should 
it feel that my failure to respond deserves something 
in terms of oral chastisement.  But I can only assure 
the Court that I answer these things whenever I see 
them.  If I missed this one and I should have had it, 
I apologize.  But I tried to answer it. 
¶10 This exchange reveals that the court had not scheduled 
a hearing for October 12 on the suppression motion.  The 
assistant district attorney had lost the motion, was surprised 
by the hearing, and unprepared to present evidence.  The court 
expected the assistant district attorney to produce a police 
report, and so the prosecutor scrambled to point out that 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
6 
 
relevant police reports were attached to the defendant's 
withdrawn, unrelated motion to sever his case from his co-
defendant. 
 
¶11 Undeterred by the State's lack of preparedness, Judge 
Crawford plunged forward.  He addressed the public defender: 
 
THE COURT: 
Do I understand that you raise two 
challenges?  First, you challenge whether the police, 
in fact, informed Mr. Jiles of his Miranda rights.  
And your second challenge is that, due to his 
voluntary intoxication, based upon his marijuana use, 
that any statements that he did make to police were 
not knowing and voluntary? 
¶12 After receiving an affirmative answer, the court 
launched into a lengthy discussion of the State's burden at a 
suppression hearing as well as the role of the court: 
 
THE COURT: 
Under State against Armstrong, the 
district attorney bears the burden of proof on both 
these issues.  The district attorney must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that, in fact, a 
defendant who was subjected to custodial interrogation 
was given his Miranda warnings and that the defendant 
made a knowing and voluntary waiver of those warnings. 
 
The question of whether a statement was taken 
involuntarily in violation of the due process clause 
requires the district attorney to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary.  
Statements can be involuntary if a defendant's use of 
narcotic drugs or alcohol so impairs a person's 
ability that their statements cannot be said to be the 
product of a free and voluntary choice. 
 
So during 
the 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
I'll be 
focusing on a couple of things.  I'll be focusing on 
whether the defendant was in custody, whether he was 
given Miranda warnings, whether he made a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of those warnings and whether he was 
then subjected to interrogation. 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
7 
 
 
I'll 
also 
be 
focusing 
on 
the 
due 
process 
question, on any behavior which indicates that the 
defendant was fully possessed of his faculties.  That 
means any behavior that shows that the defendant was 
asserting his will and making choices will be relevant 
to me in my decision on whether his consumption of 
marijuana or any other drug would have overcome his 
ability to make free and informed choices. 
 
The State's burden of proof on the Miranda issue 
and the due process issue has two components.  One is 
the burden of production; the other is the burden of 
persuasion.  The judge is not bound by the rules of 
evidence when considering whether a defendant made a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights and 
whether his statement was voluntary under the due 
process clause. 
 
So I'll start with the police reports which are 
attached to the defendant's motion to sever.  The 
reports 
recite 
the 
circumstances 
of 
Mr. 
Jiles' 
interrogation.  Page one of the police reports 
reflects that Mr. Jiles was arrested on May 15, 2000 
at 11:34 p.m.  Page two of the police reports reflects 
that the next day on May 16, 2000 at 3 a.m., Mr. Jiles 
was interrogated by Detective Billy Ball.  Page two 
recites that Detective Billy Ball advised—— 
¶13 At this point, the defense counsel intervened: 
 
MR. KASTENSON: Excuse me, Your Honor.  I think——
Actually I think that is Mr. Wilson's statement.  The 
codefendant's statement was attached to my batch of 
motions because it pertained to my motion to sever the 
cases for trial.  In the filing that I made, I believe 
it's the last three pages of that filing that is Mr. 
Jiles' statement. 
¶14 After acknowledging that he had been reading from the 
wrong police report, the court went on: 
 
THE COURT: 
Thank you for that correction.  I 
hadn't noticed that I was looking at the statement 
made by the codefendant Wilson.  I have turned now to 
the three-page statement of Mr. Joseph Jiles.  It 
reflects that he was arrested on May 15, 2000 at 11:30 
p.m.  Near the bottom of page one there's a place for 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
8 
 
the police to write any additional comments.  They 
wrote, quote, Jiles denies being high on drugs or 
drunk on alcohol.  Jiles admits to being counseled at 
mental health and was prescribed Ritalin which he—— 
 
MR. SIMPSON: 
When he. 
 
THE COURT: 
——when he was nine, closed quote.  
On page two of the police statement dealing with the 
interrogation of Joseph Jiles.  The report recites 
that on May 16th, at 4:03 a.m., Mr. Jiles was 
questioned.  That would be approximately four-and-a-
half hours after he was arrested.  The report recites 
that Detective Ronald Burch advised Joseph Jiles of 
his Miranda rights.  The report recites that Joseph 
Jiles stated he understood all of his rights, and the 
report recites that Joseph Jiles waived his rights and 
made the following statements. 
 
Following this recitation of information, there 
was a X placed on the report; and apparently Joseph 
Jiles signed his name.  Then the report goes on to 
recite the circumstances of Joseph Jiles' involvement.  
On page three of three, the report has a place where 
Joseph Jiles was free to sign his name, and he did 
sign 
his 
name. 
 
The 
report 
reflects 
that 
the 
interrogation concluded on May 16, 2000 at 5:25 a.m.  
That means that the interrogation lasted approximately 
one hour and 22 minutes, starting at 4:03 a.m. and 
concluding at 5:25 a.m. 
 
This information which I've recited from page 
one, page two and page three of Joseph Jiles' police 
report dealing with the interrogation by police of 
Joseph Jiles meets the State's burden of production on 
the question of whether Mr. Jiles received Miranda 
warnings and waived those warnings knowingly and 
voluntarily prior to being interrogated.  The report 
also meets the State's burden of production and 
demonstrated that the statements that were made were 
knowing and voluntary. 
 
I reach these preliminary conclusions based on 
the information on page one where the defendant 
himself denies being high on drugs or drunk on 
alcohol, and there's certainly nothing inconsistent 
which 
the 
officers 
noted. 
 
I 
also 
base 
these 
preliminary findings on the statement at the top of 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
9 
 
page two which recite in very plain language that Mr. 
Jiles was given his Miranda rights and he waived those 
rights. 
 
So, Mr. Kastenson, I'll turn to you for any 
evidence you have to offer which I might consider in 
opposition to the information I've recited when I make 
my ultimate conclusion on whether the State's carried 
its burden of proof on the two issues that Mr. Jiles 
raises.  Do you have any evidence that you want to 
present either by way of documents or testimony? 
 
MR. KASTENSON: Yes.  I call Mr. Jiles to testify. 
¶15 At this point in the proceedings, the State's only 
contribution had been to point out a document attached to an 
unrelated motion offered by the defendant and to correct the 
court when the court misread a word in the police report.  The 
assistant district attorney even failed to advise the court that 
it was reading from the wrong police report. 
¶16 After Jiles had testified, claiming that he did not 
know what Miranda warnings were and that he was still under the 
influence of marijuana when he was questioned, the prosecutor 
asked the court to take notice of the psychiatrist's report 
prepared 
for 
the 
competency 
hearing 
and 
its 
conclusions 
regarding Jiles' malingering and general lack of credibility. 
¶17 Jiles' counsel objected to the report as improper 
opinion evidence from an examiner as to another's credibility.  
The court responded that it would consider this report's 
conclusions because the rules of evidence did not apply to the 
hearing and because the report constituted an informed forensic 
opinion of Jiles' basic psychology. 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
10 
 
¶18 Then the court asked the prosecution if it wished to 
argue whether the State had demonstrated a proper Miranda waiver 
by a preponderance of the evidence and the voluntariness of 
Jiles' statements beyond a reasonable doubt.  The prosecutor 
responded that further argument was not necessary, given what 
had already been heard.  Jiles' defense counsel then made 
several arguments as to why, based on the record before the 
court at this hearing, the State had not met its burden of 
proof. 
¶19 The circuit court thereafter made numerous findings, 
including that the police report fairly recited that Jiles was 
advised of his Miranda rights and that he knowingly and 
voluntarily waived them.  The court also found that Jiles twice 
signed the report.  One signature appeared immediately after 
some writing indicating that the police informed Jiles of his 
Miranda rights and that Jiles waived them.  The other signature 
followed the recitation of Jiles' statements.  The court also 
found that Jiles was not credible in his testimony.  It then 
concluded, as matters of law, that Miranda warnings were given 
and that Jiles knowingly and voluntarily waived them.  The court 
also concluded that Jiles' statement was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be voluntary because Jiles' "ability to make 
informed choices was not overborne by any marijuana which he may 
have consumed prior to his arrest."  On these grounds, the court 
denied Jiles' motion to suppress his confession. 
¶20 Eight days after the motion hearing, Jiles pled guilty 
to one count of first-degree reckless injury with the use of a 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
11 
 
dangerous weapon,2 and one count of armed robbery with the use of 
force, both as a party to a crime.  Jiles was later sentenced to 
20 years on the first count and 40 years, to be served 
consecutively, on the second count, with 35 years of his 
sentence to be spent in prison and the remainder slated for 
extended supervision. 
¶21 Jiles 
filed 
a 
postconviction 
motion 
under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.303 requesting a Machner4 hearing to 
address the alleged ineffectiveness of his trial counsel.  Jiles 
based his postconviction claim on his trial counsel's failure to 
object to: (1) the circuit court's reliance on a police report 
instead of live testimony at the Miranda-Goodchild hearing; (2) 
the court's reliance on a police report that was not properly 
authenticated; 
and 
(3) 
the 
court's 
reliance 
on 
improper 
sentencing 
information. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
postconviction motion without holding a hearing. 
¶22 In his written order denying relief, Judge Crawford 
declared: 
 
[THE COURT:] 
A judge may rule upon motions to 
suppress without taking testimony if police reports, 
other documents, photographs, or physical objects 
provide an adequate factual basis for resolving the 
constitutional questions of fact.  A judge is not 
                                                 
2 Jiles had originally been charged with attempted first-
degree homicide, also while armed and party to a crime. 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
12 
 
required to consider testimony from the interrogating 
officer. 
 
A lawyer should not be surprised if a motion to 
suppress statements is decided on police reports or 
other supporting papers.  The Wisconsin Rules of 
Evidence 
exempt from 
their coverage hearings on 
"[p]reliminary 
questions 
concerning . . . the 
admissibility 
of 
evidence . . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 901.04(1).  This exemption is "restate[d], for 
convenience," in Wis. Stat. § 911.01(4)(a): 
 
. . . .  
 
The judge decides, when ruling upon a motion to 
suppress evidence, whether the defendant's statement 
or other physical evidence was come in by violation of 
a constitutional right or Miranda.  If it was, then 
the evidence is suppressed and will not be received at 
trial for the jury's consideration at trial.  The 
judge's 
decision 
on 
the 
admissibility 
of 
this 
evidence, 
with 
minor 
exceptions 
set 
out 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 901.04(1), is not bound by the rules of 
evidence. 
 
The judge, when ruling upon a motion to suppress, 
may rely upon (1) police reports, (2) oral testimony 
that would ordinarily be excluded as hearsay under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.01, and (3) "records, affidavits or 
other papers," Wis. Stat. §§ 802.01(2)(b) (supporting 
papers for motions), 972.11(1) (applying civil rules 
generally to criminal practice).  Thus, a prosecutor 
may provide the judge with records, affidavits, or 
other 
papers 
that 
set 
out 
facts 
necessary 
for 
resolution of constitutional questions.  Even if the 
parties present testimony, time may be saved by the 
introduction 
of 
records, 
affidavits, 
and 
police 
reports. 
ANALYSIS 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.31(2) requires a defendant to 
raise many defenses and objections by motion before trial or 
they will be deemed waived.  In this case, the defendant moved 
to suppress his statement before trial, Wis. Stat. § 971.31(3), 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
13 
 
and he maintained his objection to the admissibility of the 
statement throughout the suppression hearing. 
¶24 The defendant thereafter entered a guilty plea.  An 
order denying a motion challenging the admissibility of a 
statement of a defendant may be reviewed upon appeal from a 
judgment of conviction, "notwithstanding the fact that such 
judgment 
was 
entered 
upon 
a 
plea 
of 
guilty."  
Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10).  Because the present case involves a 
direct appeal from a judgment of conviction as well as an appeal 
from a denial of postconviction relief, the defendant is 
entitled to challenge the court's order on the admissibility of 
his statement.5 
¶25 Courts conduct pretrial hearings on such preliminary 
questions 
as 
the 
admissibility 
of 
evidence 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 901.04.  The admissibility of evidence includes the 
admissibility of confessions.  Wis. Stat. § 901.04(3); see also 
Wis. Stat. § 971.31(3). 
 
The 
hearings 
considering 
the 
admissibility of confessions are known as Miranda-Goodchild 
hearings after Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and 
State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 
(1965).  As a rule, the hearings are designed to examine (1) 
                                                 
5 The parties focused their arguments on whether Jiles' 
trial counsel was ineffective for not properly objecting to 
particular actions taken by the circuit court at his Miranda-
Goodchild hearing, with the State highlighting the questionable 
viability of this claim under the posture and facts of this 
case.  We, however, analyze the sufficiency of Jiles' Miranda-
Goodchild hearing through the lens of his direct appeal from his 
judgment of conviction. 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
14 
 
whether an accused in custody received Miranda warnings, 
understood them, and thereafter waived the right to remain 
silent and the right to the presence of an attorney; and (2) 
whether the admissions to police were the voluntary product of 
rational intellect and free, unconstrained will.  State v. 
Schlise, 86 Wis. 2d 26, 44, 271 N.W.2d 619 (1978).  The hearings 
on these separate but overlapping issues may be held at the same 
time.  Roney v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 522, 523, 171 N.W.2d 400 
(1969). 
¶26 Jiles raised both Miranda and voluntariness issues in 
his motion to suppress.  His motion imposed an evidentiary 
burden on the State.  At a suppression hearing, the State is 
required to show that the defendant received and understood his 
Miranda warnings, State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 345, 588 
N.W.2d 606 (1999); State v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 697, 482 
N.W.2d 364 (1992), and that he knowingly and intelligently 
waived the rights protected by the Miranda warnings.  Armstrong, 
223 Wis. 2d at 346; State v. Santiago, 203 Wis. 2d 3, 12, 556 
N.W.2d 687 (1996).  "The State also bears the burden on the 
issue of whether the warnings were sufficient in substance."  
Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d at 346; Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d at 12.  
Finally, 
the 
State 
has 
the 
burden 
of showing 
that the 
defendant's 
statements 
were 
voluntary. 
 
Armstrong, 
223 
Wis. 2d at 347; Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d at 696; Goodchild, 27 
Wis. 2d at 264.  The State's burden throughout the proceedings 
is preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Agnello, 226 
Wis. 2d 164, 181-82, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999). 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
15 
 
¶27 The 
importance 
of 
Miranda-Goodchild 
hearings 
was 
foreshadowed in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), where the 
United States Supreme Court explained that a defendant in a 
criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his 
conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary 
confession.  Jackson, 378 U.S. at 376.  The Court suggested two 
optional procedures for determining the voluntariness of a 
confession, one of which this court adopted in Goodchild, 27 
Wis. 2d at 264-65.  The Jackson court stressed that a defendant 
objecting to the admission of a confession "is entitled to a 
fair hearing in which both the underlying factual issues and the 
voluntariness of his confession are actually and reliably 
determined."  Jackson, 378 U.S. at 380.  Only a reliable 
determination 
on 
the 
voluntariness 
issue 
satisfies 
the 
constitutional rights of the defendant.  Id. at 387.  Where pure 
factual considerations are important, a full and reliable 
determination of voluntariness is required.  Id. at 392 (citing 
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)). 
¶28 The defendant argues that he did not receive a full 
and fair hearing on the motion to suppress his statement.  We 
agree. 
¶29 The defendant cannot prevail on an argument that the 
court must apply the rules of evidence at a suppression hearing.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 901.04(1) 
provides 
that, 
in 
making 
a 
determination on the admissibility of evidence, "the judge is 
bound by the rules of evidence only with respect to privileges 
and as provided in s. 901.05."  This rule is reinforced by 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
16 
 
Wis. Stat. § 911.01(4)(a), which states that, for the most part, 
the rules of evidence are inapplicable to the determination of 
preliminary questions of fact under § 901.04(1). 
¶30 These rules enjoy support from the Supreme Court's 
analysis in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-73 
(1974), a case coming out of Wisconsin.  The Court stated that 
"the rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do 
not operate with full force at hearings before the judge to 
determine the admissibility of evidence."  Id. at 172-74 
(discussing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Fed. 
R. Evid. 104(a) & 1101(d)(1), and citing 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 1385 (3d ed. 1940); C. McCormick, Evidence § 53 n.91 (2d ed. 
1972)); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 
(1980) ("At a suppression hearing, the court may rely on hearsay 
and other evidence, even though the evidence would not be 
admissible at trial."). 
¶31 The defendant also loses on a contention that a 
Miranda-Goodchild hearing without the State presenting live 
testimony from law enforcement officers will never constitute a 
full and fair hearing and will always amount to a denial of due 
process.  See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 174-75 (citing McCray v. 
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313 (1967)); State v. Frambs, 157 
Wis. 2d 700, 704, 460 N.W.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1990) ("We see no 
evidence that the Supreme Court intended the protection of the 
confrontation clause to be available to a defendant in those 
pretrial situations enumerated in sec. 901.04(1), Stats."). 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
17 
 
¶32 These conclusions do not diminish the importance of 
Miranda-Goodchild hearings in our system of criminal justice.  
These constitutionally required hearings are designed to protect 
a defendant's right against self-incrimination by assuring that 
Miranda warnings are given by the police and understood by the 
defendant and that any statements made by a defendant in custody 
are voluntary in fact.  Miranda-Goodchild hearings promote a 
complex of values, including the reliability of incriminating 
statements, 
the 
professionalism 
and 
integrity 
of 
law 
enforcement, and the fairness of the criminal justice system.  
The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
forbids 
the 
use 
of 
involuntary 
confessions, in part, because of the "deep-rooted feeling that 
the police must obey the law while enforcing the law."  Jackson, 
378 U.S. at 385-86 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 
(1959)). 
¶33 Here, our concern is not with the police.  Our concern 
is with the people in the court system who were charged with 
protecting the defendant from potential abuse. 
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 901.02 provides guidance to courts.  
The rules of evidence "shall be construed to secure fairness in 
administration . . . and promotion of growth and development of 
the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained 
and proceedings justly determined."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶35 We think it will be a rare case that the State is able 
to meet its burden of proof at a Miranda-Goodchild hearing by 
relying exclusively on an unsworn police report. 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
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¶36 In this case, the State did not meet its burden of 
proof. 
¶37 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 971.31(3) 
provides 
that 
"[t]he 
admissibility of any statement of the defendant shall be 
determined . . . by the court in an evidentiary hearing out of 
the presence of the jury . . . ."  As the circuit court 
acknowledged, the State has the burden of production and the 
burden of proof.  In this case, the State was obviously not 
prepared for the hearing.  It offered no evidence at the 
"evidentiary hearing."  Whether the State was denied an 
opportunity to present evidence or whether it gave up its 
opportunity to present evidence, the result is the same: the 
State failed to meet its burden of production and thus did not 
satisfy its burden of proof. 
¶38 When the State showed surprise that Jiles had filed a 
suppression motion, the circuit judge intervened and assumed the 
State's burden of establishing the existence of proper Miranda 
warnings and voluntariness.  The court took over, sua sponte, 
and dominated the hearing to such an extent that the State could 
barely get a word in, much less present evidence. 
¶39 The 
Miranda-Goodchild 
hearing 
is 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing for the parties.  It is not a soliloquy for the court.  
The court must not permit itself to become a witness or an 
advocate for one party.  A defendant does not receive a full and 
fair evidentiary hearing when the role of the prosecutor is 
played by the judge and the assistant district attorney is 
reduced to a bystander.  We hold that the procedure employed by 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
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the court in this hearing did not conform with the minimum 
requirements of § 971.31(3) for an "evidentiary hearing" and 
"did not afford a reliable determination of the voluntariness of 
the confession [to be] offered in evidence at trial."  Jackson, 
378 U.S. at 377. 
¶40 The record shows that the police report was never 
formally moved or received into evidence.  But even if the 
report had been received, the court mocked the seriousness of 
the hearing because the only "evidence" before it was an unsworn 
police report attached to an unrelated motion filed by the 
defendant.  All the court did with the evidence was to read it 
aloud.  The inherent unreliability of this procedure is 
demonstrated by the fact that the court began by reading the 
wrong report.  Certainly, the procedure the court used did not 
permit any examination of Detective Burch regarding when the 
Miranda warnings were given (assuming that they were given), 
whether they were sufficient in substance, and when the 
defendant signed his name. 
¶41 In his motion, the defendant also alleged that he was 
high on marijuana at the time of his interrogation.  The court 
dismissed this claim by noting that the police report stated: 
"JILES DENIES BEING HIGH ON DRUGS OR DRUNK ON ALCOHOL."  But the 
procedure employed at the hearing did not permit defense counsel 
to ask the detective whether the detective or the defendant 
initiated the discussion about being high on drugs.  If it was 
the detective, was that a standard inquiry, or did Detective 
Burch notice something or smell something about the defendant?  
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
20 
 
If the inquiry was a standard inquiry, why was a similar inquiry 
not noted on the co-defendant's report? 
¶42 Significantly, in its order denying the postconviction 
motion, the circuit court drew on testimony from the completely 
separate sentencing hearing of the co-defendant to explain that:  
Seventeen-year-old Joseph F. Jiles and his nineteen-
year-old co-defendant shot an elderly woman in the 
head during a robbery.  The two searched desperately 
for a victim after their marijuana dealer demanded 
$2,000 in payment for one pound of marijuana that he 
had fronted the pair.  Mr. Jiles smoked his marijuana 
rather than selling it. 
(Emphasis added.)  The court's own explanations of events lend 
plausibility to the defendant's claim that he was high on 
marijuana. 
¶43 Although the errors that demand our reversal of Jiles' 
conviction fall squarely on the shoulders of the circuit court, 
the other participants in this hearing each share some degree of 
responsibility. 
¶44 The prosecutor erred by acquiescing to the circuit 
court's 
improper 
occupation 
of 
the 
State's 
role 
at 
the 
suppression hearing, especially given the State's acknowledged 
lack of preparedness.  Moreover, when the circuit court finished 
reading from the police report and concluded that the report met 
the State's burden of production, the prosecutor should have 
respectfully requested that the court permit the State to make 
its own case regarding suppression or to allow the State to 
supplement what the court had done by its own initiative.  The 
prosecutor remained a bystander before, during, and after the 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
21 
 
court found that the police report met the State's burden of 
production.  It was not until Jiles' cross-examination that the 
prosecutor resurfaced in this hearing. 
¶45 Although 
the 
prosecution 
did 
eventually 
elicit 
information during its cross-examination of Jiles that supported 
its position, and it did reference the psychiatric report to 
question Jiles' credibility, the prosecution did not offer 
either the report or Jiles' testimony as evidence to meet its 
initial burden of production. 
¶46 Jiles' trial counsel also could have attempted to 
remedy the court's error.  Counsel could have refrained from 
presenting any evidence regarding the admissibility of Jiles' 
statements and forced the State to meet its burden of proof on 
the evidence proffered by the court alone.  Goodchild permits, 
but does not require, a defendant to testify for the limited 
purpose of explaining the circumstances under which a confession 
was obtained.  Goodchild, 27 Wis. 2d at 265.  When the court 
asked Jiles' counsel if he had any documentary or testimonial 
evidence to present, he could have answered that there was no 
need to submit evidence because the State had failed to meet its 
burden of proof based on the existing record.  While we agree 
that Jiles' counsel likely saw the proverbial handwriting on the 
wall after the court found the police report to have met the 
State's burden of production, declining to go on would have 
deprived the State of any favorable evidence resulting from 
Jiles' testimony. 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
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¶47 In addition, Jiles' counsel arguably erred in failing 
to object to the practice the court was engaging in and failing 
to insist that the State be required to make its own case 
regarding the admissibility of Jiles' custodial statement.  We 
acknowledge, however, that Jiles' trial counsel did sufficiently 
object at the hearing to the State's ultimate failure to meet 
its burden of proving that a Miranda warning was given to Jiles, 
that Jiles knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, and that 
Jiles' statements were voluntary. 
¶48 The manner in which Jiles' suppression motion was 
handled effectively caused the burden of proving an admissible 
confession to shift from the State to the defendant.  While the 
rules of evidence do not apply at suppression hearings, the 
State continues to bear the burden of proof at these hearings.  
Therefore, each court conducting a suppression hearing must 
maintain the proper role for each participant in order for a 
full and fair evidentiary hearing to occur. 
¶49 In 
conclusion, 
we 
reverse 
Jiles' 
judgment 
of 
conviction.  Based on the circuit court's failure to provide a 
full and fair evidentiary hearing on Jiles' motion to suppress 
his statements to the police and on the State's concomitant 
failure to meet its burden of proof, Jiles' Miranda-Goodchild 
hearing was inadequate.  Jiles is entitled to withdraw his 
guilty plea and to be granted a new and sufficient Miranda-
Goodchild hearing.  After this hearing, he is entitled to a 
trial if he so desires. 
 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
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By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
No. 02-0153-CR  
 
 
 
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