Case Title: Mark Anderson v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company

Citation: 2003 WI 148

Docket Number: 2002AP000980

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 148 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0980 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Mark Anderson and Janet Anderson, his  
wife,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Mary Anne Brasure,  
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Gregory L. Brasure,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 315 
259 Wis 2d. 413, 655 N.W.2d 531 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 25, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 16, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marinette   
 
JUDGE: 
Tim A. Duket   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Mark A. Pennow, Tina M. Dahle and Denissen, Kranzush, Mahoney 
& Ewald, S.C., Green Bay, and oral argument by Mark A. Pennow. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief by Frank W. 
Kowalkowski and Hanaway, Weidner, Bachhuber, Woodward & Maloney, 
S.C., Green Bay, and oral argument by Frank W. Kowalkowski. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Edward E. Robinson and 
Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield, on behalf of The Wisconsin 
Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
2003 WI 148 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0980  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 77) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Mark Anderson and Janet Anderson, his  
wife,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Mary Anne Brasure,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Gregory L. Brasure,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 25, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
   
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   In Wisconsin, persons who furnish 
alcohol beverages to others are statutorily immune from civil 
liability arising out of the act of furnishing the alcohol.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2)(1999-2000).1  This immunity is subject to 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
02-0980   
 
2 
 
an exception: if the provider knew or should have known that the 
person to whom he was providing the alcohol was under the legal 
drinking age and the alcohol provided to the underage person is 
a substantial factor in causing injury to a third party, there 
is no immunity.  Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4). 
¶2  The issue in this case is whether an underage drinker 
who is injured as a result of the consumption of alcohol that 
was provided to a companion underage drinker is an injured 
"third party" under the exception to immunity.  We hold that he 
is. 
¶3  The defendant, Mary Anne Brasure, provided a bottle of 
vodka to her 19-year-old son, Gregory, who took the vodka to the 
family's vacation home where he and two friends drank it.  One 
of 
the 
friends, 
Craig 
Anderson, 
died 
of 
acute 
alcohol 
intoxication.  Craig's parents sued Mary Anne Brasure. 
¶4  The circuit court applied the statutory immunity and 
dismissed the case on summary judgment.  The court of appeals 
reversed, concluding that Craig was an injured third party 
within the meaning of the exception to immunity for injuries to 
third parties arising out of the provision of alcohol to 
underage persons.  Anderson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 
App 315, ¶1, 259 Wis. 2d 413, 655 N.W.2d 531. 
¶5  We affirm.  Craig Anderson was a third party to the 
illegal provision of alcohol by Mary Anne Brasure to her 
underage son, Gregory.  While Craig Anderson's consumption of 
the alcohol may well affect the factfinder's evaluation of his 
contributory negligence, it does not alter his status as a third 
No. 
02-0980   
 
3 
 
party to the original illegal transaction between Mary Anne 
Brasure and her son for purposes of the statutory exception to 
immunity. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
This is an appeal from an order of summary judgment.  
Therefore, we take the following facts from the pleadings and 
materials submitted on the motion in the circuit court.  On or 
about March 19, 1999, Mary Anne Brasure ("Mary Anne") purchased 
a 1.75 liter bottle of vodka for her son Gregory, who was then 
19 years old, and left it on her kitchen table with a note that 
said, "Greg, you owe me $12.00."  Gregory took the vodka to the 
family's vacation property in rural Marinette County, where he 
and two friends, Craig Anderson and Robert Tripp, drank it.  
Late that night or early the next morning, Craig died of acute 
alcohol intoxication, having consumed enough alcohol to put his 
blood alcohol concentration at between .357 percent and .402 
percent. 
¶7 
 Craig's parents, Mark and Janet Anderson, brought a 
claim in Marinette County Circuit Court for Craig's wrongful 
death, naming Mary Anne, Gregory, and the Brasures' insurer, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company ("American Family") as 
defendants.  Mary Anne and Gregory moved for summary judgment on 
the basis of the immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2).  
American Family moved for summary judgment on the basis of 
exclusions in its homeowner's policy.  The Honorable Tim A. 
Duket granted summary judgment in favor of Mary Anne and 
Gregory, concluding that they were immune under the statute, and 
No. 
02-0980   
 
4 
 
also granted American Family's motion in part, finding no 
coverage under the insurance policy for the claim against 
Gregory but concluding that material issues of fact existed as 
to coverage for the claim against Mary Anne.2 
¶8 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court as to 
the insurance coverage issue and Gregory's immunity, but 
reversed as to Mary Anne's immunity.  Anderson, 259 Wis. 2d 413, 
¶1.  The court held that because Craig was a third party to the 
transaction whereby Mary Anne provided alcohol to Gregory, and 
because the alcohol Mary Anne provided to Gregory was a 
substantial factor in causing Craig's death, Mary Anne is 
subject to suit under the exception to immunity contained in 
Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b).  Anderson, 259 Wis. 2d 413, ¶12.  We 
granted review, and now affirm.    
II.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
¶9 
 In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we employ 
the same methodology used by the circuit court.  Stelpflug v. 
Town of Waukesha, 2000 WI 81, ¶17, 236 Wis. 2d 275, 612 
N.W.2d 700.  Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact in dispute and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  The resolution of this case also requires the 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 125.035 in the context of 
undisputed facts.  A question of statutory interpretation is a 
                                                 
2 The circuit court's summary judgment orders in favor of 
Gregory and American Family are not before this court. 
No. 
02-0980   
 
5 
 
question of law that we review de novo.  Czapinski v. St. 
Francis Hosp., Inc., 2000 WI 80, ¶12, 236 Wis. 2d 316, 613 
N.W.2d 120. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶10 The Andersons' suit against Mary Anne is predicated on 
Craig being an injured third party under the exception to 
immunity contained in Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b).  The immunity 
statute states the general rule of immunity as follows: "A 
person is immune from civil liability arising out of the act of 
procuring alcohol beverages for or selling, dispensing or giving 
away alcohol beverages to another person."  Wis. Stat. § 
125.035(2).  The note that Mary Anne affixed to the bottle of 
vodka establishes that she procured alcohol for Gregory.  This 
fact, which is undisputed, is sufficient to trigger the general 
grant of immunity from civil liability under Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.035(2).  
¶11 Mary Anne loses this immunity, however, if the 
exception contained in Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4) applies.  The 
exception is comprised of two subsections.  The first sets 
limits on who may be covered by the exception; the second sets 
forth the substantive conditions necessary for satisfying the 
exception.  The first subsection states: 
In 
this 
subsection, 
"provider" 
means 
a 
person, 
including 
a licensee 
or 
permittee, who 
procures 
alcohol beverages for or sells, dispenses or gives 
away alcohol beverages to an underage person in 
violation of s. 125.07(1)(a). 
Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(a). 
No. 
02-0980   
 
6 
 
¶12  Mary Anne's status as a "provider" under this 
definition depends upon whether her provision of alcohol to 
Gregory was in violation of Wis. Stat. § 125.07(1)(a).  That 
statute states that "[n]o person may procure for, sell, dispense 
or give away any alcohol beverages to any underage person not 
accompanied by his or her parent, guardian or spouse who has 
attained the legal drinking age."  Wis. Stat. § 125.07(1)(a).  
Applying this statute to the undisputed facts here, it is clear 
that Mary Anne is a "provider" for purposes of the exception to 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(a), because she gave her 
underage 
son 
Gregory 
a 
bottle 
of 
vodka 
while 
he 
was 
unaccompanied 
by 
a 
parent, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 125.07(1)(a).   
¶13 The substantive subsection of the immunity exception 
provides, in relevant part: 
Subsection (2) [the grant of immunity] does not apply 
if the provider knew or should have known that the 
underage person was under the legal drinking age and 
if the alcohol beverages provided to the underage 
person were a substantial factor in causing injury to 
a 3rd party. 
Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b).  Mary Anne knew her son Gregory was 
under the legal drinking age.  She argues that Craig is not a 
third party under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b).      
 
¶14 Mary Anne contends that because Craig consumed the 
vodka that ultimately killed him, he himself is a "provider" 
under the terms of the statute and therefore cannot also be a 
third party.  Mary Anne reasons that Craig is a "provider" 
because he "procured" the vodka from Gregory before drinking it; 
No. 
02-0980   
 
7 
 
in other words, he "provided" the vodka to himself by drinking 
it with Gregory.  This use of the term "provider" is illogical 
and runs contrary to the use of the term in the statute. 
¶15  The general focus of the statute——both the immunity 
grant and the exception——is on the provision of alcohol 
beverages by one person to another, and whether the one who does 
the providing can be held liable for any injuries that may flow 
from that act.  Meier v. Champ's Sport Bar & Grill, Inc., 2001 
WI 20, ¶24 n.10, 241 Wis. 2d 605, 623 N.W.2d 94.  The statute 
itself is not concerned with a person's own contributory 
liability for providing alcohol to himself, although the injured 
person's contributory fault may bear upon a defendant's ultimate 
liability. 
¶16  The status of the injured person as a third party to 
the provider's act of furnishing the alcohol comes into play in 
determining the applicability of the exception to immunity.  The 
exception defines "provider" as one who "procures alcohol 
beverages for . . . an underage person in violation of s. 
125.07(1)(a)," and proceeds to eliminate the provider's immunity 
where the provision of alcohol to the underage person causes 
injury to a third party.  Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(a), (b).  If 
the injured claimant is a third party to the transaction by 
which the defendant provided alcohol to an underage person, and 
the alcohol was a substantial factor in causing the third-party 
claimant's injury, then the exception to immunity applies and 
the defendant may be liable to the claimant. 
No. 
02-0980   
 
8 
 
¶17  Therefore, the applicability of the immunity exception 
to Mary Anne's potential liability to the Andersons for Craig's 
wrongful death depends upon whether Craig was a third party to 
the transaction by which Mary Anne provided alcohol to Gregory.  
Whether Gregory was secondarily a "provider" to Craig or Craig 
"provided" to himself by drinking with Gregory is not relevant.  
That Craig may be considered a first party to a subsidiary 
transaction between himself and Gregory (because they consumed 
the alcohol together) does not make him a party to the 
transaction by which Mary Anne provided the alcohol to Gregory. 
¶18 By its terms, then, the exception to immunity under 
Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b) applies when: 1) the injured person 
is a third party to the provider's act of furnishing alcohol to 
an underage person when the provider knew or should have known 
the person was underage; and 2) the alcohol was a substantial 
factor in causing the third party's injury. 
¶19  Here, it is undisputed that Mary Anne provided the 
vodka to Gregory and that Gregory later shared it with Craig.  
No one has identified any fact tending to show that Craig was 
present at the time of Mary Anne's provision of alcohol to 
Gregory.  No one has asserted that Craig contributed money to 
the purchase of the vodka.  See Miller v. Thomack, 210 
Wis. 2d 650, 656-57, 563 N.W.2d 891 (1997)(holding that one who 
contributes money toward purchase of alcohol beverages for 
consumption by a person known to be underage, "procures" within 
No. 
02-0980   
 
9 
 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)).3  No one has pointed to 
facts suggesting that Craig asked his friend Gregory to get 
vodka from his mother or otherwise participated in any way in 
Mary Anne's provision of the alcohol to Gregory.  In short, 
nothing in the record suggests that Craig had any role 
whatsoever in Mary Anne's provision of alcohol to Gregory.4  We 
conclude that Craig is a third party with respect to that 
transaction. 
¶20 
It is also undisputed that the 
alcohol 
was a 
substantial factor in causing Craig's death.  Therefore, the 
exception to immunity under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b) applies.     
¶21 This interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4) is 
consistent with our prior cases applying the exception to 
immunity.  In Meier, 241 Wis. 2d 605, ¶2, we held that a person 
                                                 
 
3  In Miller v. Thomack, 210 Wis. 2d 650, 660 n.11, 563 
N.W.2d 891 (1997), we specifically declined to address the issue 
presented here——whether an underage consumer of alcohol can be a 
third party for purposes of the immunity exception in Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.035(4)(b)——as it was not fully argued by the parties.  In 
Miller we held only that one "who contributes money with the 
intent of bringing about the purchase of alcohol beverages for 
consumption by an underage person whom the person knows, or 
should know, is under the legal drinking age, procures alcohol 
beverages for the underage person within the meaning of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 125.07(1)(a)1. and 125.035(4)."  Id. at 656.   
  
 
4  Although the Andersons' complaint alleged that Mary Anne 
Brasure purchased the alcohol and provided it "to Gregory 
Brasure and/or Craig P. Anderson," the parties have not asserted 
that material factual disputes exist on the issue of Craig's 
involvement in Mary Anne's provision of alcohol to her son Greg, 
thus conceding Craig's nonparticipation in that act.  See 
Anderson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI App 31, ¶12 n.8, 
259 Wis. 2d 413, 422, 655 N.W.2d 531.    
  
No. 
02-0980   
 
10 
 
who provides alcohol to an underage drinker cannot claim third-
party status for purposes of the exception to immunity when he 
himself is injured by the actions of the intoxicated underage 
drinker.  Id.  Meier, 19, spent an evening drinking beer at a 
bar with two companions, one of whom was also 19.  Meier ordered 
and paid for a number of the drinks shared by the trio of 
drinkers.  After leaving the bar in a car driven by the other 
19-year-old, the group was involved in a car accident in which 
Meier was seriously injured.  Id., ¶¶3-8. 
¶22  Meier sued the bar and the driver.  We held that since 
Meier had paid for and otherwise procured alcohol for his 
companion, the underage drinker/driver, which was a substantial 
factor in causing his own injury, he was a party to the 
transaction that provided the alcohol to the underage person and 
thus did not qualify as a third party under the statute.  Id., 
¶13.  We held in Meier: "It is difficult to imagine a class of 
individuals that the legislature would have more likely intended 
to exclude from qualifying as a 'third party' than those persons 
involved in procuring alcohol for the underage drinker who 
ultimately injures another party."  Id.     
¶23 The only similarity between Craig and the injured 
plaintiff in Meier is that both young men consumed alcohol prior 
to their injuries.  But there is a key difference: Meier 
procured alcohol for the underage drinker who later caused his 
(Meier's) injury; in contrast, here, Craig did not procure 
alcohol 
for 
Gregory. 
 
As 
we 
stated 
in 
Meier, 
"[t]he 
transactional focus of § 125.035(4)(b) is the provision of 
No. 
02-0980   
 
11 
 
alcohol to underage persons."  Id., ¶24.  It was because Meier 
was involved in the illegal transaction by which alcohol was 
provided to his underage friend, not because they consumed 
alcohol together, that he was precluded from suing under the 
exception as an injured third party.   
¶24 Alcohol immunity issues may well arise most often in 
cases 
of 
accidents 
caused 
by 
intoxication, 
but 
neither 
intoxication nor a resultant accident is statutorily necessary 
for the exception to immunity to apply.  The statute requires 
only the knowing provision of alcohol to an underage person, and 
an injury to a third party caused by the alcohol.  The statutory 
language does not limit the exception to certain types of 
injuries.  The fact that Craig died as a result of alcohol 
consumption does not itself take this case outside of the 
exception to immunity. 
¶25 In addition, Craig's status as a companion underage 
drinker does not dictate whether he qualifies as an injured 
third party under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b).  The statute does 
not limit third-party status by age, condition of sobriety, or 
separation of circumstance from the alcohol consumption.5  It 
                                                 
 
5  Mary Anne cites Doering v. WEA Insurance Group, 193 Wis. 
2d 118, 142-43, 532 N.W.2d 432 (1995), for the proposition that 
Wis. Stat. § 125.035 disallows a suit by an underage drinker.  
Doering is not applicable here.  The case involved a claim 
against a tavern by a motorist who was injured by an adult 
intoxicated driver who had been drinking at the tavern.  The 
injured 
motorist 
lodged 
an 
unsuccessful 
equal 
protection 
challenge to the immunity statute.  Doering specifically 
addressed the "single issue" of "whether sec. 125.035, Stats. 
1991-92, violates the equal protection clause. . . ."  Id. at 
124.  The case did not address the issue of whether an underage 
No. 
02-0980   
 
12 
 
requires only that the injured person be a third party to the 
defendant/provider's provision of alcohol to an underage person, 
and that the alcohol so provided is a substantial factor in 
causing the injury.  Craig's age and complicity in his own 
intoxication are factors for the comparison of negligence, but 
they do not determine the applicability of the exception to 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b).         
¶26 Mary Anne argues that Kwiatkowski v. Capitol Indemnity 
Corp., 
157 
Wis. 2d 768, 
461 
N.W.2d 150 
(Ct. 
App. 
1990), 
unequivocally rules out those who consume alcohol from third-
party status.  In Kwiatkowski, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's dismissal of a lawsuit alleging negligence in 
providing alcohol to an underage person.  Kwiatkowski, 157 
Wis. 2d at 771.  Raymond Kwiatkowski, an "obviously intoxicated 
underage 
drinker," 
was 
served 
alcohol 
by 
the 
Red 
Lion 
Entertainment Center in Okauchee, Wisconsin.  His companion, Amy 
Pederson, also bought him alcohol while they were at the tavern.  
Kwiatkowski and Pederson left the Red Lion in an automobile with 
Kwiatkowski at the wheel; an accident took place in which 
Kwiatkowski and Pederson were injured.  Id.    
¶27 Kwiatkowski 
sued 
the 
Red 
Lion, 
its 
owner, 
and 
Pederson.  The court of appeals framed the issue as "whether the 
statute contemplates a cause of action to a minor consumer of 
alcohol beverages where a third party [there, Pederson] is 
                                                                                                                                                             
drinker can be a third party for purposes of the exception to 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b). 
  
No. 
02-0980   
 
13 
 
injured or whether the cause of action is limited to only the 
injured third party."  Id. at 775.  The court examined the 
statute and concluded that it was ambiguous because it "does not 
expressly grant a cause of action to either category of 
claimants," but merely "set[s] out when the immunity applies and 
when it does not."  Id. 
¶28  The court in Kwiatkowski then turned to the history of 
the statute and concluded that the statute was in derogation of 
the common law because it was enacted after two decisions of 
this court6 that altered the common law of immunity by permitting 
a cause of action against providers of alcohol who serve alcohol 
to minors where the minor's consumption was a cause of injury to 
a third party.  Id. at 776-77.  The court of appeals held: 
The legislature in sec. 125.035(4)(b), Stats., 
has 
not 
sanctioned 
by 
clear, 
unambiguous 
and 
peremptory language a cause of action against a 
provider by a minor plaintiff whose injuries, at least 
in part, result from his own consumption of alcohol 
beverages.  Absent such an unequivocal statement from 
the legislature or a further limitation of common law 
immunity by the supreme court, the present common law 
rule of nonliability still applies in such a case. 
Id. at 777.     
¶29 Mary Anne asserts that Kwiatkowski is clear and 
controlling precedent, and therefore Craig, a consumer of 
alcohol, cannot be a third party for purposes of the exception 
to immunity.  Mary Anne's reliance on Kwiatkowski is misplaced.  
The premise upon which it relied——that the statute is in 
                                                 
6  Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985); 
Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984). 
No. 
02-0980   
 
14 
 
derogation of the common law——was subsequently rejected by our 
decision in Meier.   
¶30 In 
Meier, 
we 
recapitulated 
the 
history 
of 
the 
enactment of Wis. Stat. § 125.035, and, in particular, the 
statute's relationship to this court's decisions in Sorensen v. 
Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984), and Koback v. 
Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985).  Meier, 241 
Wis. 2d 605, ¶¶30-35.  For decades, Wisconsin common law 
recognized no liability on the part of sellers of alcohol for 
damages arising from the acts of an intoxicated person.  See, 
e.g., Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 117 
N.W.2d 347 (1962).  In Sorensen, 119 Wis. 2d at 629, however, we 
held that a third party injured by an intoxicated minor could 
sue a provider who negligently sold intoxicating beverages to a 
person the seller knew or should have known was underage when 
the consumption of alcohol was a cause of the accident.  In the 
following term we extended the Sorensen rule to social hosts who 
serve alcohol to minors where the minor's consumption was a 
cause of injury to a third party.  See Koback, 123 Wis. 2d at 
275.       
¶31 The legislature responded to Sorensen and Koback by 
enacting statutory immunity from liability arising from the 
provision of alcohol beverages, Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2), 
effectively codifying the old common-law rule.  Meier, 241 
Wis. 2d 605, ¶33.  At the same time, the legislature adopted the 
exception to immunity contained in subsection (4)(b), which 
No. 
02-0980   
 
15 
 
permits a cause of action in situations like those present in 
Sorensen and Koback.  Id., ¶34.  Thus, we said in Meier:  
[b]ecause 
the 
legislature 
drafted 
§ 125.035 
with 
Sorensen and Koback in mind and because the statute 
tracks the language of the case law, we conclude that 
the statute is not one in derogation of the common 
law, but indeed is one that attempted to codify the 
common law as it existed in 1985.   
Id. 
¶32 Although this passage from Meier is enough to rebut 
Mary Anne's reliance on Kwiatkowski, a footnote to our decision 
in Meier forecloses her argument definitively.  We recognized in 
Meier that our interpretation ran contrary to conflicting court 
of appeals' discussions, in Kwiatkowksi, 157 Wis. 2d at 776-77, 
and Miller, 204 Wis. 2d at 263, regarding the immunity statute's 
relationship to the common law.  Meier, 241 Wis. 2d 605, ¶34 
n.16.  Therefore, to avoid any possible confusion on the issue, 
we specifically held: "To the extent that the court of appeals 
discussions [regarding statutes in derogation of the common law] 
in Miller and Kwiatkowski are inconsistent with this opinion, 
such discussions are no longer valid precedent."  Id.           
¶33   Although 
Kwiatkowski's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
immunity statute's relationship to the common law was erroneous, 
the result in the case would have been the same under our 
interpretation of the statute in Meier and here.  The facts in 
Kwiatkowski were significantly different from the facts in this 
case.  Craig, like Kwiatkowski, consumed the alcohol that was a 
substantial factor in causing his injury.  Kwiatkowski, however, 
could not claim third-party status to the transaction by which 
No. 
02-0980   
 
16 
 
the alcohol was provided, because his suit was against the 
tavern which had provided alcohol directly to him and his 
companion, Pederson.  Kwiatkowski, 157 Wis. 2d at 771.  Here, 
the Andersons are suing Mary Anne, who provided alcohol directly 
to her son Gregory, but not to Craig; the Andersons' son Craig 
was a third party to Mary Anne's provision of alcohol to 
Gregory.       
 
¶34 We have previously observed that the exception to 
immunity is intended to discourage the knowing provision of 
alcohol to underage persons by making providers liable for 
third-party injuries.  Meier, 241 Wis. 2d 605, ¶27; Miller, 210 
Wis. 2d at 668-69.  A provider has a defense to the 
applicability of the exception if he or she was actively misled 
about the recipient's age.  The statute restores immunity if the 
facts establish all of the following: 
1. The underage person falsely represents that he or 
she has attained the legal drinking age. 
2. The underage person supports the representation 
with documentation that he or she has attained the 
legal drinking age. 
3. The alcohol beverages are provided in good faith 
reliance on the underage person's representation that 
he or she has attained the legal drinking age. 
4. The appearance of the underage person is such that 
an ordinary and prudent person would believe that he 
or she had attained the legal drinking age. 
Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b)1.-4.   
¶35 This 
defense 
to 
the 
immunity 
exception 
further 
demonstrates that the focus of the statute is on the transaction 
No. 
02-0980   
 
17 
 
between the provider and the underage person.  By restoring the 
provider's 
statutory 
immunity 
where 
the 
facts 
establish 
deception by the underage person, the legislature has opted to 
permit civil liability to injured third parties only where the 
provider knew or should have known that he or she was directly 
violating the state drinking law.  Such is the case here.   
¶36 Accordingly, we conclude that an underage drinker who 
is injured or dies as a result of the consumption of alcohol 
that was illegally provided to a companion underage drinker is 
an injured third party for purposes of the exception to immunity 
under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b).  The exception applies under 
these circumstances, and the Andersons may proceed with their 
suit against Mary Anne for the death of their son, Craig, 
arising out of Mary Anne's provision of alcohol to her underage 
son, Gregory.  While Craig's own consumption will bear upon his 
contributory negligence, it does not affect his status as a 
third party to Mary Anne's provision of alcohol to Gregory for 
purposes of the statutory exception to immunity. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.     
 
No. 
02-0980   
 
 
 
1