Case Title: McKinney v. Stubbs

Citation: 

Docket Number: 510, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
THE MCKINNEY FAMILY 
 
§ 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
 
§ 
No. 510, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Court of Chancery 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
WILLIAM STUBBS and  
 
§ 
DIANE STRICK,  
 
 
§ 
C.A. No. 2295-S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  April 2, 2007 
Decided:  July 2, 2007 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
This 2nd day of July 2007, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and 
the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1)  
Appellant McKinney Family Limited Partnership (“McKinney”) 
appeals the Court of Chancery’s grant of specific performance, requiring the 
partnership to sell to William Stubbs and Dianne Strick 83 +/- acres of land in 
Sussex County, Delaware.  McKinney makes three arguments on appeal.  First, 
McKinney contends that the agreement was ambiguous and incomplete and 
therefore, specific performance was inappropriate.  Second, it contends that parol 
evidence was impermissibly admitted at the hearing.  Third, McKinney contends 
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that the contract contains ambiguities and those ambiguities should be construed 
against Stubbs, as he drafted the portion of the agreement at issue.  We find no 
merit to these arguments and affirm. 
(2)  
Williams Stubbs and Dianne Strick contracted with McKinney to 
purchase 83 +/- acres of farmland on April 22, 2003.1  The sales agreement 
consisted of a single page written document.  The agreement was typed by Ms. 
Cramer, a McKinney partner.  Portions of the agreement, however, were left blank 
for Stubbs to complete, such as name, address and parcel number.  Stubbs wrote 
parcel number 20 on the agreement.  According to Stubbs and other witnesses at 
the hearing, included with the agreement was an aerial photograph of the land he 
wished to purchase.  Stubbs and Strick signed the contract and returned it with a 
copy of the map.  Elaine Fannin, a McKinney witness, testified that when Ms. 
Cramer received the contract from Stubbs, the map was attached to the contract.  
Ms. Cramer distributed copies of the map “just before the contract was sent out to 
be signed.”   
(3)  
The land Stubbs sought to purchase was a portion of a larger, 100 acre 
parcel.  Although Stubbs wrote Parcel 20 on the form, the area he marked on the 
aerial photo actually contained part of Parcel 9.  Ms. Cramer testified, however, 
                                          
 
1 The McKinney L.P. consists of six partners.  Four of the six executed the sales agreement on 
April 22, 2003.  Pursuant to the partnership agreement, four partners have the authority to sell 
partnership property. 
 3
that when Stubbs completed the form, “the survey had not been completed, so we 
did not know [the 83 acres to be sold] encompassed a little bit of land in Parcel 9.2 
(4)  
A survey was completed pursuant to the contract on July 17, 2003.  
The cost, as contemplated by the agreement, was split between the buyer and 
seller.  The survey revealed that the land to be sold included part of Parcel 9. 
(5)  
Settlement was scheduled for July 25, 2003.  At that point, Stubbs and 
Strick had paid a $1,000 deposit, secured the necessary financing and paid for one-
half of the land survey.  On July 23, 2003, two McKinney partners filed a 
complaint seeking to enjoin the sale of the land.  Stubbs and Strick filed a cross-
claim for declaratory judgment and specific performance.  A hearing was held 
before a Master in the Court of Chancery.  In the Master’s final report to the 
Chancellor, he concluded that the contract was valid and that Stubbs and Strick 
were ready, willing and able to perform.  
(6)  
McKinney filed a notice of exception more than 30 days after the 
Master filed his report.  As a result, the Chancellor held that the partnership waived 
its right to file exceptions pursuant to Chancery Court Rule 144(a).  Alternatively, 
                                          
 
2 Ms. Cramer also stated, “I mean [Mr. Stubbs] knew he wanted the pond area.  I knew he 
wanted the pond area, but I didn’t know where the line was between parcel 9 and parcel 20.  So I 
didn’t realize until the survey was competed that that was actually a little bit of parcel nine.” 
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the Chancellor concluded that his de novo review revealed that the contract was 
“definite and clear enough to be specifically enforced.”3  This appeal followed. 
(7)  
It is well-settled Delaware law that a “party seeking specific 
performance must rest his case on an agreement which is clear and definite and in 
which there is no need for the Court to be asked to supply essential contractual 
elements.”4  In addition, “[a] party seeking specific performance of an agreement 
relating to real estate has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence 
that they have ‘a valid contract to purchase real property and that [they were] 
ready, willing, and able to perform [their] obligations under the contract.’”5 
(8)  
McKinney first argues that the agreement is ambiguous and 
incomplete.  Specifically, McKinney contends that the aerial photo is not part of 
the contract and without the aerial photo, the boundaries of the land to be sold can 
not be determined.  
(9)  
The Master found that the aerial photograph specifically delineated 
the boundaries of the land to be sold.  Further, he found that the map was part of 
the agreement: 
The contract here was for 83 acres, more or less, parcel 20, and it 
names a sale price.  
                                          
 
3 Wallace v. The McKinney Family Ltd. P’Ship, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 2295-S, Chandler, C. (August 
24, 2006).  
4 M.F. v. F., 172 A.2d 274, 276 (Del. 1961).  
5 Beale v. Walton, 2006 WL 265489, at *3 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 913 A.2d 569 (Del. 2006) (TABLE). 
 5
Now, if that were all I had, because parcel 20 is around 100 acres, if 
that constituted the entirety of the contract, I don’t think it would be 
specific enough to be performed because . . . the leftover 15 or 17 
acres could have been taken from any place on that property, or more 
than one place, and there would have been no meeting of the minds. 
 
But in this case, in addition to that language, and distributed to all the 
partners of the defendant LP, was an aerial photograph which showed 
the boundaries drawn by the purchaser, and all the individuals who 
voted in favor of the sale had that. 
 
 
(10)  The record shows that the parties entered into the agreement intending 
the map to set the boundaries of the land.6  Stubbs returned his executed copy of 
the agreement with the map outlining the boundaries.  Ms. Fannin testified that Ms. 
Cramer received the map.  In fact, every partner who signed the contract received a 
copy of the map.  Thus, the map was part of the agreement.   
(11)  McKinney’s argument suggests that the map must in some way be 
fastened to the other page of the sales agreement for it to be considered by the 
court.  There is no merit to this argument.  In Beale, the Court of Chancery found it 
sufficient that a separate record plan sufficiently outlined the boundaries of the 
land at issue.  That plan was not in any way attached to the written portion of the 
contract.  Instead, the Vice Chancellor found that the parties contemplated that the 
                                          
 
6 The agreement listed parcel 20 for sale because all the parties at that time believed that all 83 
+/- acres were included in that parcel.  Indeed, Ms. Cramer testified that she did not know that 
the land at issue included part of parcel 9 until after the survey was complete. 
 6
record plan set forth the specific boundaries of the land.7  Here, it is also clear that 
the parties contemplated that the aerial photograph set forth the specific boundaries 
of the land to be sold. 
(12)  McKinney next argues that introduction of the map violated the parol 
evidence rule.  The parol evidence rules bars admission of extrinsic evidence that 
contradicts or supplements the terms of a contract only if the contract is completely 
integrated.8  Here, McKinney points to no facts to support the proposition that the 
agreement was completely integrated.  Rather, the evidence supports the 
conclusion that neither party intended the written portion of the agreement to 
constitute a final and complete expression of their arrangement.  Because the 
contract is not completely integrated, the map could be admitted to supplement the 
writing.9  There was no violation of the parol evidence rule by the introduction of 
the map. 
 
(13)  McKinney’s final contention on appeal is that the agreement should 
be construed in its favor because Stubbs drafted the agreement.  McKinney claims 
                                          
 
7 Beale, 2006 WL 265489, at *5 (“In this case both parties understood that the configuration of 
the property would be as drawn in the record plan. That plan was signed by both [parties] . . . .”). 
8 An agreement is completely integrated only where it is meant to be “final and complete.” 
Taylor v. Jones, 2002 WL 31926612, at *3 (Del. Ch.) 
9 Id. (“The parol evidence rule prevents the consideration of oral evidence that would contradict 
either total or partial integrated agreements. That rule does not, however, prohibit the 
supplementation of partially integrated contracts by evidence of an oral agreement that is 
consistent with, and does not contradict, the writing.”). 
 7
that the fact that “Stubbs wrote ‘Parcel 20’ in the purported contract when he 
supposedly meant to include a portion of Parcel 9 is his own problem.”  McKinney 
argues there is no basis for including a portion of Parcel 9 in the order below.  We 
disagree.  All of the parties involved knew that the pond was to be included in the 
contract of sale.  Indeed, Ms. Cramer testified at the hearing that even she did not 
know until after the survey had been completed that the pond was in Parcel 9.  We 
agree with the Chancellor that the contract was definite and clear enough to be 
specifically enforced.  We find no abuse of discretion by the Court of Chancery in 
ordering specific performance of this contract. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of 
Chancery is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice