Case Title: Zenaida Gomez v. Village of Pinecrest

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC09-1401

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1401 
____________ 
 
ZENAIDA GOMEZ,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
VILLAGE OF PINECREST,  
Respondent. 
 
[July 8, 2010] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Third District 
Court of Appeal in Gomez v. Village of Pinecrest, 17 So. 3d 322 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2009).  The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the 
decision of the First District Court of Appeal in In re Forfeiture of a 1993 Lexus 
ES 300, 798 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), and the decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in Brevard County Sheriff‟s Office v. Baggett, 4 So. 3d 67 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2009).  We have jurisdiction.  See art V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.   
 
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The issue presented in this case is whether the Florida Contraband Forfeiture 
Act (“the Act”),1 requires a seizing agency to establish at the seizure stage of a 
forfeiture proceeding that the owner knew, or should have known after a 
reasonable inquiry, that the property was being employed or was likely to be 
employed in criminal activity.  We conclude, based on the plain and unambiguous 
language of the Act, that the seizing agency is not required to establish the owner‟s 
actual or constructive knowledge at the seizure stage.  Rather, at the seizure stage, 
the seizing agency is required to establish only that there is probable cause to 
believe that the property was being employed or likely to be employed in criminal 
activity—establishing the owner‟s actual or constructive knowledge is not required 
until the forfeiture stage. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Appellant, Zenaida Gomez, is the title owner of a house located in the 
Village of Pinecrest, Florida.  Pinecrest is a municipality and the seizing agency in 
this case.  Gomez purchased the property in 2006 as an investment property.  In 
                                          
 
 
1.  Sections 932.701 through 932.706, Florida Statutes (2008), constitute the 
Act.  Section 932.703(1)(a) provides: 
Any contraband article, vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, other personal 
property, or real property used in violation of any provision of the 
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, or in, upon, or by means of which 
any violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act has taken or is 
taking place, may be seized and shall be forfeited subject to the 
provisions of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. 
 
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October 2007, Gomez entered into a lease agreement with Rolando Herrera for the 
rental of the house for a period of one year.   
 
On January 17, 2008, Pinecrest police officers were dispatched to the 
property in response to an anonymous call advising of three armed males entering 
the house.  The officers entered the house and discovered that two rooms contained 
marijuana and a hydroponics marijuana laboratory.   
 
As a result of finding clear evidence of criminal activity occurring on the 
property, Pinecrest filed a verified complaint for forfeiture, alleging that the 
“property was used or intended to be used to facilitate a criminal activity and/or the 
. . . property is contraband” under the Act.  Pinecrest served Gomez with a notice 
of seizure and the right to an adversarial preliminary hearing.  Gomez requested an 
adversarial preliminary hearing, at which she testified that she had no knowledge 
that the house was being used for an illegal hydroponics operation.  Pinecrest 
argued that that the trial court should grant a preforfeiture seizure because 
Pinecrest had established probable cause that the property was being used for 
illegal purposes in violation of the Act, irrespective of Gomez‟s knowledge of the 
illegal activity.  Pinecrest also noted that Gomez leased the property to someone 
she had never met and took no steps to verify his identity or confirm that the 
driver‟s license she was shown for him was legitimate.  Gomez argued in response 
that pursuant to section 932.703(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), a preliminary order 
 
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of seizure can be granted only upon a showing by the seizing authority that the 
property owner knew, or should have known after reasonable inquiry, that the 
property was being employed or likely to be employed in criminal activity.  At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that probable cause existed 
under section 932.703(2)(a) for the seizure of the property and entered an order 
accordingly without regard to the issue of the owner‟s actual or constructive 
knowledge.   
 
Gomez filed an interlocutory appeal in the Third District Court of Appeal.  
The Third District framed the issue on appeal as follows: 
[W]hether section 932.703(2)(a) of the Act requires the seizing 
agency to present some evidence at the adversarial preliminary 
hearing stage that the property owner knew or should have known that 
her property was employed or was likely to be employed in criminal 
activity, in addition to establishing probable cause to believe that the 
property was used in violation of the Act. 
 
Gomez, 17 So. 3d at 324-25.  The district court first explained that “[f]orfeiture 
proceedings in Florida are a two-stage process.”  Id. at 325 (quoting Velez v. 
Miami-Dade County Police Dep‟t, 934 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 2006)).  “The first 
stage addresses seizure of the property and provides for an adversarial preliminary 
hearing, whereas, the second stage is the actual forfeiture proceeding.”  Id.  After 
reviewing the applicable statutory provisions, the Third District affirmed the trial 
court‟s seizure order, concluding: 
 
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[B]ased on the plain language of the Act, Pinecrest, as the seizing 
agency, was not required to demonstrate at the adversarial preliminary 
hearing, conducted under section 932.703(2), that Gomez, as the real 
property owner, either knew, or should have known after a reasonable 
inquiry, that her property was employed or was likely to be employed 
in criminal activity.  Because the trial court correctly determined that 
Pinecrest established the necessary probable cause at the adversarial 
preliminary hearing, the preforfeiture seizure of Gomez‟s real 
property was lawful. 
 
 
Id. at 327.  In reaching this conclusion, the Third District reasoned: 
 
A careful review of section 932.703 reveals that the focus at the 
first stage of the process, the seizure stage, is on the property and 
whether there exists probable cause to believe that the property was 
used in violation of the Act (to conceal, transport, or possess 
contraband).  At the second stage, the forfeiture stage, however, the 
seizing agency must not only prove that the property was in fact being 
used to conceal, transport or possess contraband, it must also prove 
that the owner or owners knew or should have known that the 
property was being used or was likely to be used for an illegal 
purpose. 
 
Id. at 326.  The Third District also noted: 
 
[T]he Legislature has already considered the possibility that some 
seizures will not ultimately result in a forfeiture of the property, and 
has provided for penalties to be imposed against a seizing agency 
where insufficient evidence is submitted to support a forfeiture of the 
property and the seizing agency has retained or restricted seized 
property prior to forfeiture, or acted in bad faith. 
 
Id. at 327.   
 
 
The Third District certified conflict with In re Forfeiture of a 1993 Lexus ES 
300, 798 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), and Brevard County Sheriff‟s Office v. 
Baggett, 4 So. 3d 67 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), in which the First and Fifth Districts 
 
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concluded that establishment of probable cause to believe that property was used in 
violation of the Act requires, among other things, a preliminary showing of the 
owner‟s actual or constructive knowledge of criminal activity.  The trial court 
granted the parties‟ agreed motion to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of 
this appeal.   
ANALYSIS 
The certified conflict issue before this Court is whether the Florida 
Contraband Forfeiture Act requires a seizing agency to establish at the seizure 
stage of a forfeiture proceeding that the owner knew, or should have known after a 
reasonable inquiry, that the property was being employed or was likely to be 
employed in criminal activity.  Because the conflict issue involves the 
interpretation of the Act, resolving the issue requires an analysis of the language of 
the Act to discern legislative intent.  In analyzing this issue, we first set forth the 
applicable history and provisions of the Act.  Next, we examine the Act‟s plain 
language to determine whether the Legislature intended to require a seizing agency 
to establish the owner‟s actual or constructive knowledge at the seizure stage of a 
proceeding.  In doing so, we explain why we approve the reasoning of the Third 
District in Gomez.   
The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act 
 
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Section 932.702(3) of the Act provides in relevant part that it is unlawful 
“[t]o use any . . . real property to facilitate the transportation, carriage, conveyance, 
concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter, exchange, or giving away 
of any contraband article.”  Under the Act, a “contraband article” is defined in 
pertinent part as follows: 
Any real property, including any right, title, leasehold, or other 
interest in the whole of any lot or tract of land, which was used, is 
being used, or was attempted to be used as an instrumentality in the 
commission of, or in aiding or abetting in the commission of, any 
felony . . . .  
 
§ 932.701(2)(a)6., Fla. Stat. (2008).  This Court recently explained that forfeiture 
proceedings in this state are a two-part process.  Velez, 934 So. 2d at 1164.  In the 
first stage, the seizure stage, the Act provides in relevant part as follows: 
(a)  Personal property may be seized at the time of the violation 
or subsequent to the violation, if the person entitled to notice is 
notified at the time of the seizure or by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, that there is a right to an adversarial preliminary hearing 
after the seizure to determine whether probable cause exists to believe 
that such property has been or is being used in violation of the Florida 
Contraband Forfeiture Act. . . . 
   
(b)  Real property may not be seized or restrained, other than by 
lis pendens, subsequent to a violation of the Florida Contraband 
Forfeiture Act until the persons entitled to notice are afforded the 
opportunity to attend the preseizure adversarial preliminary hearing.  
A lis pendens may be obtained by any method authorized by law. 
Notice of the adversarial preliminary hearing shall be by certified 
mail, return receipt requested.  The purpose of the adversarial 
preliminary hearing is to determine whether probable cause exists to 
believe that such property has been used in violation of the Florida 
Contraband Forfeiture Act.  The seizing agency shall make a diligent 
 
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effort to notify any person entitled to notice of the seizure. The 
preseizure adversarial preliminary hearing provided herein shall be 
held within 10 days of the filing of the lis pendens or as soon as 
practicable.  
 
(c)  When an adversarial preliminary hearing is held, the court 
shall review the verified affidavit and any other supporting documents 
and take any testimony to determine whether there is probable cause 
to believe that the property was used, is being used, was attempted to 
be used, or was intended to be used in violation of the Florida 
Contraband Forfeiture Act.  If probable cause is established, the court 
shall authorize the seizure or continued seizure of the subject 
contraband.  A copy of the findings of the court shall be provided to 
any person entitled to notice.  
 
(d)  If the court determines that probable cause exists to believe 
that such property was used in violation of the Florida Contraband 
Forfeiture Act, the court shall order the property restrained by the 
least restrictive means to protect against disposal, waste, or continued 
illegal use of such property pending disposition of the forfeiture 
proceeding.  The court may order the claimant to post a bond or other 
adequate security equivalent to the value of the property.  
 
§ 932.703(2), Fla. Stat. (2008).   If an adversarial preliminary hearing is held, “the 
seizing agency is required to establish probable cause that the property subject to 
forfeiture was used in violation of the Forfeiture Act.”  Velez, 934 So. 2d at 1164 
(citing § 932.701(2)(f), Fla. Stat. (2002)). 
The second stage, the forfeiture stage, “is a forfeiture proceeding „in which 
the court or jury determines whether the subject property shall be forfeited.‟ ”  
Velez, 934 So. 2d at 1164 (quoting § 932.701(2)(g), Fla. Stat. (2002)).  The seizing 
agency must file a complaint for forfeiture within forty-five days after the seizure.  
§§ 932.701(2),  932.704(4), Fla. Stat. (2008).  “At the forfeiture proceeding, the 
 
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court „shall‟ order the seized property forfeited to the seizing agency „[u]pon clear 
and convincing evidence that the contraband article was being used in violation‟ of 
the Forfeiture Act.”  Velez, 934 So. 2d at 1164 (citing § 932.704(8), Fla. Stat. 
(2002)).  Moreover, after amendments to the Act in 1995, the Legislature shifted 
the burden to the seizing agency to establish the owner‟s actual or constructive 
knowledge in order to establish a forfeiture.2  Section 932.703(6)(a) now provides:   
Property may not be forfeited under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture 
Act unless the seizing agency establishes by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the owner either knew, or should have known after a 
reasonable inquiry, that the property was being employed or was 
likely to be employed in criminal activity.   
 
§ 932.703(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008).   
 
Statutory Interpretation of the Act 
                                          
 
2.  Prior to the 1995 amendments, an “innocent owner” defense to forfeiture 
was available to claimants under the Act.  As explained by this Court in 
Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 
1991):  
Owners [were permitted under the pre-1995 Act to] raise a 
defense only after the property ha[d] been seized, and they [were 
required to] bear the burden in forfeiture proceedings of proving that 
they neither knew, nor should have known after a reasonable inquiry, 
that the property was being used or was likely to be used to commit an 
enumerated crime. 
 
See also § 932.703(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993) (“No property shall be forfeited under 
the provisions of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act if the owner of such 
property establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he neither knew, nor 
should have known after a reasonable inquiry, that such property was being 
employed or was likely to be employed in criminal activity.”).   
 
 
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Because this case involves statutory interpretation, this Court‟s review is de 
novo.  Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008).  “A court‟s purpose in 
construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar that 
guides the court in statutory construction.”  Id. (citing Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 
1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003)).  “To discern legislative intent, a court must look first and 
foremost at the actual language used in the statute.”  Id.  As this Court set forth in 
Velez, 934 So. 2d at 1164-65: 
As this Court has often repeated, when the language of the 
statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite 
meaning . . . the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.  
Further, we are without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a 
way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its 
reasonable and obvious implications.  To do so would be an 
abrogation of legislative power.  A related principle is that when a 
court interprets a statute, it must give full effect to all statutory 
provisions.  Courts should avoid readings that would render part of a 
statute meaningless.  
 
(Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)  Moreover, because “forfeitures 
are considered harsh exactions, and as a general rule . . . are not favored in law or 
equity[,] . . . this Court has long followed a policy that it must strictly construe 
forfeiture statutes.”  Real Property, 588 So. 2d at 961. 
The plain and unambiguous language of the Act leads us to adopt the 
statutory construction set forth in the Third District‟s opinion in Gomez for several 
reasons.  First, the plain language of section 932.703 indicates that forfeiture 
proceedings in Florida are a two-stage process, which includes a seizure stage and 
 
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a forfeiture stage, as recognized by this Court in Velez.  934 So. 2d at 1164 
(“Forfeiture proceedings in Florida are a two-stage process.”).  Several subsections 
of 932.703 specifically distinguish between seizure and forfeiture.  For example, 
section 932.703(1)(a) provides:   
Any contraband article, vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, other personal 
property, or real property used in violation of any provision of the 
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, or in, upon, or by means of which 
any violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act has taken or is 
taking place, may be seized and shall be forfeited subject to the 
provisions of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Similarly, section 932.703(1)(b) states:   
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Contraband 
Forfeiture Act, except the provisions of paragraph (a), contraband 
articles set forth in s. 932.701(2)(a)7. used in violation of any 
provision of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, or in, upon, or by 
means of which any violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture 
Act has taken or is taking place, shall be seized and shall be forfeited 
subject to the provisions of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.  
 
(Emphasis added.)  See also § 932.703(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2008) (“If the court 
determines that probable cause exists to believe that such property was used in 
violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, the court shall order the 
property restrained by the least restrictive means to protect against disposal, waste, 
or continued illegal use of such property pending disposition of the forfeiture 
proceeding.  The court may order the claimant to post a bond or other adequate 
security equivalent to the value of the property.”) (emphasis added).   
 
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Second, as explained in Gomez, the unambiguous language of section 
932.703(2), which deals with the seizure stage of a forfeiture action, “clearly 
focuses on the property” and not the owner‟s actual or constructive knowledge.  
Gomez, 17 So. 3d at 326.  Section 932.703(2)(c) states in relevant part: 
When an adversarial preliminary hearing is held, the court shall 
review the verified affidavit and any other supporting documents and 
take any testimony to determine whether there is probable cause to 
believe that the property was used, is being used, was attempted to be 
used, or was intended to be used in violation of the Florida 
Contraband Forfeiture Act.  If probable cause is established, the court 
shall authorize the seizure or continued seizure of the subject 
contraband.   
 
(Emphasis added.)  Quite simply, under this unambiguous language, “[i]f law 
enforcement establishes [at the adversarial preliminary hearing] probable cause to 
believe that the property was used in violation of the Act, the court shall authorize 
the seizure or continued seizure of the property.”  Gomez, 17 So. 3d at 326. 
 
Third, section 932.703(6)(a), which places the burden on the seizing agency 
to prove the owner‟s actual or constructive knowledge, clearly refers to the 
forfeiture stage of the proceedings, not the seizure stage: 
Property may not be forfeited under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture 
Act unless the seizing agency establishes by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the owner either knew, or should have known after a 
reasonable inquiry, that the property was being employed or was 
likely to be employed in criminal activity. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
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Fourth, as noted in Gomez, 17 So. 3d at 327, the Legislature contemplated 
that some seizures would not ultimately result in forfeiture and provided for 
penalties against the seizing agency when there is insufficient evidence to support 
a forfeiture of the property and the seizing agency has retained or restricted seized 
property prior to forfeiture or acted in bad faith.  Section 932.704(9)(b) provides: 
The trial court shall require the seizing agency to pay to the claimant 
the reasonable loss of value of the seized property when the claimant 
prevails at trial or on appeal and the seizing agency retained the seized 
property during the trial or appellate process.  The trial court shall also 
require the seizing agency to pay to the claimant any loss of income 
directly attributed to the continued seizure of income-producing 
property during the trial or appellate process.  If the claimant prevails 
on appeal, the seizing agency shall immediately release the seized 
property to the person entitled to possession of the property as 
determined by the court, pay any cost as assessed by the court, and 
may not assess any towing charges, storage fees, administrative costs, 
or maintenance costs against the claimant with respect to the seized 
property or the forfeiture proceeding. 
 
The Legislature also provided for an award of attorney‟s fees to claimants if the 
seizing agency does not prevail and has not acted in good faith: 
The court shall award reasonable attorney‟s fees and costs, up to a 
limit of $1,000, to the claimant at the close of the adversarial 
preliminary hearing if the court makes a finding of no probable cause. 
When the claimant prevails, at the close of forfeiture proceedings and 
any appeal, the court shall award reasonable trial attorney‟s fees and 
costs to the claimant if the court finds that the seizing agency has not 
proceeded at any stage of the proceedings in good faith or that the 
seizing agency‟s action which precipitated the forfeiture proceedings 
was a gross abuse of the agency‟s discretion. . . .  Nothing in this 
subsection precludes any party from electing to seek attorney‟s fees 
and costs under chapter 57 or other applicable law. 
 
 
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§ 932.704(10), Fla. Stat. (2008).   
 
The conflict cases, Forfeiture of 1993 Lexus and Baggett, set forth a 
contrary interpretation of the Act—that the seizing agency must demonstrate the 
owner‟s actual or constructive knowledge at the adversarial preliminary hearing, 
which takes place in the seizure stage.  In Forfeiture of 1993 Lexus, 798 So. 2d at 
10, the First District held: 
[E]stablishment of “probable cause to believe that the property was 
. . .  used in violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act” 
requires, among other things, a preliminary showing of a basis for 
belief that the owner knew, or should have known after a reasonable 
inquiry, that the property was being employed or was likely to be 
employed in criminal activity. 
 
In Baggett, the Fifth District agreed with the First District‟s conclusion in 
Forfeiture of 1993 Lexus that the seizing agency must make a preliminary showing 
of innocent owner status at the adversarial preliminary hearing, but disagreed with 
the quantum of proof required by the First District in determining innocent owner 
status:   
We . . . agree with the First District that the seizing agency 
must make a preliminary showing of innocent owner status at the 
adversarial preliminary hearing.  The First District, in [Forfeiture of 
1993 Lexus], established a “basis for belief” standard in determining 
innocent owner status at the adversarial preliminary hearing.  
However, we do not adopt this “basis for belief” standard because we 
believe the proper quantum of proof is probable cause.  Thus, when an 
owner requests an adversarial preliminary hearing and asserts she did 
not know the property was being used in criminal activity, the seizing 
agency must show probable cause to believe that the owner knew or 
 
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should have known, after a reasonable inquiry, the property was 
employed or was likely to be employed in criminal activity. 
 
Baggett, 4 So. 3d at 69.  
 
We conclude that the interpretation of the Act in Forfeiture of 1993 Lexus 
and Baggett construes an unambiguous statute in a way that would impermissibly 
extend its express terms and therefore amount to an abrogation of legislative 
power.  See Velez, 934 So. 2d at 1164-65.  The plain and unambiguous language 
of the Act states that the seizing agency‟s burden to prove the owner‟s actual or 
constructive knowledge is applicable only to the forfeiture stage.  At the seizure 
stage, a seizing agency is required to establish only probable cause that the 
property was used in violation of the Act.   
 
Accordingly, we approve the Third District‟s decision in Gomez and 
disapprove the First and Fifth Districts‟ decisions in Forfeiture of 1993 Lexus and 
Baggett.  
CONCLUSION 
The plain language of the Act requires that the seizing agency establish 
probable cause at the seizure stage of a forfeiture proceeding that the subject 
property was used in violation of the Act.  The Act does not require the seizing 
agency to establish at the seizure stage that the owner knew, or should have known 
after a reasonable inquiry, that the property was being employed or was likely to be 
employed in criminal activity.  Based on the foregoing reasoning, we approve the 
 
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Third District‟s decision in Gomez and disapprove the First and Fifth Districts‟ 
decisions in Forfeiture of 1993 Lexus and Baggett.   
It is so ordered. 
 
CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D08-394 and 08-5850 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Richard J. Diaz, Coral Gables, Florida, and Guy Richard Strafer, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Cynthia A. Everett, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent