Case Title: Ametek v. O'Connor

Citation: 364 Md. 143

Docket Number: 63/99

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ametek, Inc., et al.  v. Susan O’Connor,
No. 63, September Term, 1999
HEADNOTE:
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; WORKERS’ COMPENSATION; DISABILITY
AWARD; 
UNDERPAYMENT 
OF 
BENEFITS; 
INCREASE 
OF
COMPENSATION
When an award is increased on judicial review, the employer and insurer are entitled to
a credit for previously paid benefits based on the number of weeks the benefits were paid.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. C-97-36553
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 63
September Term, 1999
AMETEK, INC., ET AL.
v.
SUSAN O’CONNOR
          Bell, C. J.
          Eldridge
        *Rodowsky
          Raker
          Wilner
          Cathell
          Harrell,
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C. J.
Eldridge, J., dissents
          Filed:    May 10, 2001
*Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
In Philip Electronics North American v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 212, 703 A.2d 150, 151
(1997), in which the worker’s compensation award to a claimant was reduced on judicial
review, this Court held proper, “a credit based upon the number of weeks the employer has paid
benefits,” rather than one for the total amount of money paid to the claimant before the
reduction of the original award.  In a footnote, we observed:
“Philip Electronics also argues at length that affirming the judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals would be detrimental to claimants if the reasoning of
the intermediate appellate court were applied to cases where an award is
increased after the filing of a petition for judicial review, and the Commission
must then determine whether to retroactively increase the award based on the
number of weeks of benefits previously paid by the employer, or based on the
total amount of monetary benefits previously received by the claimant.  The
issue is not presented in this case, and we express no opinion on that scenario.”
Id. at 215 n. 4, 703 A.2d at 153 n.4.  This case presents that issue, namely, whether, after a
claimant’s workers’ compensation award is increased on judicial review, the employer and
insurer are entitled to a credit for the total amount paid to the claimant pursuant to the award
or just a credit for the number of weeks the employer/insurer paid benefits.  The Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County held that the employer and insurer are entitled to a credit for the total
amount paid.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.  We shall hold that the proper credit is
for the number of weeks the award was paid, and, so, we reverse.
I.
The respondent, Susan O’Connor, filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits
against Ametek, Inc., her employer, and Home Indemnity, its insurer (collectively the
“petitioners”), pursuant to Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article, Maryland Code (1999
Repl. Vol., 2000 Cum. Supp.), the Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”).  After a hearing,
the Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded the respondent permanent partial disability
benefits for 10% loss of use of her body and ordered the petitioners to pay 50 weeks of
2
benefits at a weekly rate of $81.00 per week.  Those benefits were paid pursuant to the
Commission’s order.
Dissatisfied with the award, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the
Commission’s Order in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.  There, a jury increased
the respondent’s permanent partial disability to 70% loss of use of the body as a whole.  On
remand, the Commission determined that the respondent was entitled to permanent partial
disability benefits for 467 weeks, payable at the rate of $134.00 per week, which award it
ordered the petitioners to pay.  Ultimately, however, persuaded by the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners, in which they urged their entitlement to a credit for
the 50 weeks of compensation already paid, the Commission issued an order directing the
petitioners to pay the respondent $134.00 per week for 417 weeks.
Again dissatisfied with the Commission’s order, once again the respondent challenged
it in the Circuit Court, by seeking judicial review.  Faced with cross-motions for summary
judgment, the trial court granted the respondent’s and denied the petitioners’.  It reasoned:
“I do believe that the [A]ct, as indicated in the Wright versus Philips case, should
be liberally construed in favor of the claimant.  And I do appreciate and
acknowledge the arguments of counsel with regard to comparison of the facts
in Wright versus Philips as opposed to the facts here.
“I do find that the claimant is being compensated at the rate of $134 per week
for a period of 417 weeks and she was previously compensated 50 weeks at $81
per week.  That 50-week period was adjusted by the Commission in reducing the
award from 467 to 417 weeks.  And I believe and find that the claimant should
be compensated for the difference and would therefore award a dollar judgment
of $2,650 to accomplish that purpose, 50 weeks at $53 per week the difference,
for a total of $2,650 to be paid to her.”
3
The Court of Special Appeals agreed.  Ametek, Inc. v. O’Connor, 126 Md. App. 109,
727 A.2d 437 (1999).  After an extensive discussion of Philip Electronics, in which it stressed
the remedial nature of the Workers’ Compensation Act, the intermediate appellate court,
although noting this Court’s reliance on “[t]he ‘weekly credit’ approach [as being] consistent
with the Act’s benefit structure,” id., at 118, 727 A.2d at 441, concluded that crediting the
petitioners with the number of weeks they paid benefits to the respondent, without adjusting
for the fact that each of the weekly payments under the prior order was less than the weekly
payments under the present order, “would contravene the purpose of the Act, as elucidated by
the Court in Philip Electronics, 348 Md. at 226, 703 A.2d [at 158], and numerous other cases,”
as it would result in the respondent being underpaid by $ 2650.00.  Ametek at 116, 727 A.2d
at 440.  Further explaining its holding, the intermediate appellate court stated:
“We have not uncovered any case suggesting that, under the circumstances
attendant here, a claimant should receive less in benefit dollars than he or she
is otherwise entitled to recover.  Indeed, such a result would be an affront to the
legislative scheme set forth in the Act.  See [Montgomery County v.] Lake, 68
Md. App. at 276 [, 511 A.2d at 544-45].  Instead, we glean from the above cited
cases a consistent theme: the Act is liberally construed so as to minimize
hardship to the employee and his or her dependents.  Consequently, absent a
clear legislative directive, the approach that inures to the benefit of the
employee is ordinarily favored.  Thus, the appellate courts have not permitted
an employer to recoup benefits erroneously paid to an employee.  Rather, the
cases have countenanced a claimant’s recovery of benefits in excess of an
amount the claimant is actually entitled to receive.  Similarly, in Philip
Electronics [North America v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 703 A.2d 150 (1997)], the
court relied on the ‘weekly credit approach,’ which worked to the benefit of the
employee.  Because the benefits had already been paid, the monetary approach
would have required the employee to repay what may have already been spent,
generating a host of other problems.
“To be sure, ‘workers’ compensation cases must always turn on their individual
facts.’  Morris [v. Board of Educ. of Prince George’s County, 339 Md. 374, 663
A.2d 578 (1995)], 339 Md. at 384.  Under the facts of this case, however, the
analysis urged by appellee promotes the benevolent purposes of the Act.  If we
were to credit appellants for the number of weeks for which they paid benefits,
the Claimant would not receive the full amount of the compensation to which
she is unquestionably entitled.  As between a windfall to the Employer or
4
payment of the correct amount to the Claimant, the choice seems obvious.
Requiring the Employer to pay the correct monetary amount is consistent with
the purpose of the Act, and is readily accomplished under the factual scenario
of this case.  Therefore, we conclude that when an award is increased upon
judicial review, the Employer is not entitled to a credit based on the number of
weeks for which benefits were paid.  Rather, the Employer is entitled to a credit
for the total amount of money actually paid to the Claimant prior to the
increase.”
Id. at 122-23, 727 A.2d at 443-44.
We granted the petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari, Ametek, Inc. v. O’Connor, 355 Md.
610, 735 A.2d 1105 (1999), to address this issue of first impression.
II.
In this Court, the petitioners contend that the intermediate appellate court erred by
holding that an employer who has paid benefits pursuant to a workers’ compensation award
which is increased on judicial review is entitled to receive credit for the amount actually paid,
rather than for the number of weeks those payments were made.  Not only did the Workers’
Compensation Commission correctly interpret the Act, but, they maintain, this Court, in Philip
Electronics, 348 Md. at 220-21, 703 A.2d at 155-56, has already considered and “rejected a
‘dollar-for-dollar’ credit for previously paid benefits as improper and inconsistent with the
structure and purpose of the Act.”  Hence, the petitioners assert that they are entitled to a
credit for the period of 50 weeks that they previously paid pursuant to the Commission’s initial
order.
Not unexpectedly, the respondent believes the Circuit Court and the intermediate
appellate court correctly decided the issue.  To her, that the “Act is remedial in nature and
should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in
1 Maryland Code (1999 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.), § 9-627(k) of the Labor and
Employment Article governs “other cases.”  It provides:
“(k) Other cases.--(1)  In all cases of permanent partial disability not listed in
subsections (a) through (j) of this section, the Commission shall determine the
percentage by which the industrial use of the covered employee’s body was
impaired as a result of the accidental personal injury or occupational disease.
“(2) In making a determination under paragraph (1) of this
subsection, the Commission shall consider factors including:
“(i) the nature of the physical disability;  and
“(ii) the age, experience, occupation, and training
of the disabled covered employee when the
accidental personal injury or occupational
disease occurred.  
5
order to effectuate its benevolent purposes” is critical and dispositive.  Distinguishing Philip
Electronics as a case involving the overpayment of benefits, and not underpayment, as in the
case sub judice, the respondent argues that “to deprive Claimant of benefits to which she is
entitled does nothing to advance these purposes and is directly contrary to the overall statutory
scheme.”
III.
Philip Electronics, supra, 348 Md. 209, 703 A.2d 150, controls the result in this case.
There, the claimant having suffered a knee injury during the course of her employment and,
subsequently, while attempting rehabilitation to the knee, developed an adverse psychological
condition, filed a claim  with the Workers’ Compensation Commission against her employer
and its insurer.  Id. at 212, 703 A.2d at 151.  The Commission found, based on the knee injury
and the psychological overlay, that the claimant had suffered a permanent partial disability loss
of 50% of the use of her body as a whole, under “other cases,”1 id. at 212, 703 A.2d at 151,
“(3) The Commission shall award compensation to the covered
employee in the proportion that the determined loss bears to
500 weeks.  
“(4) Compensation shall be paid to the covered employee at the
rates listed for the period in §§ 9-628 through 9-630 of this
Part IV of this subtitle.”
2 Section 9-628 pertains to compensation payments for less than 75 weeks.
3 Section 9-629, applicable when compensation is awarded for period equal to or
greater than 75 weeks but less than 250 weeks, provides:
“If a covered employee is awarded compensation for a period equal to or greater
than 75 weeks but less than 250 weeks, the employer or its insurer shall pay the
covered employee weekly compensation that equals two-thirds of the average
6
and, accordingly, ordered that she be paid permanent partial disability benefits at the rate of
$178 per week for 333 weeks pursuant to § 9-630.  Id.
Both parties having filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for
Dorchester County, a jury determined that the claimant’s permanent partial disability was a
40% loss of the use of her body as a whole.  On remand, the Commission recalculated the
benefits to which the claimant was entitled, reducing them to $144 per week for 200 weeks,
and credited the employer for the monetary payments it had made pursuant to the
Commission’s prior order.  Id. at 212-13, 703 A.2d at 151.
After the Circuit Court, on judicial review, affirmed the Commission’s decision and the
Court of Special Appeals, rejecting the “total monetary” credit approach, reversed the
judgment of the Circuit Court, this Court granted the employer’s petition for writ of certiorari.
Affirming the judgment of the intermediate appellate court, we focused on the language of §
9-627(k), that of § 9-6282 and § 9-629,3 § 9-6304 being inapplicable, discerning from the
weekly wage of the covered employee but does not exceed one-third of the State
average weekly wage.”
4 Section 9-630, governing serious disability, for which compensation is paid for
250 weeks or more, provides:
“(a) In general.--(1)  Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, if
a covered employee is given an award or a combination of awards resulting from
1 accidental personal injury or occupational disease for 250 weeks or more
under § 9-627 of this subtitle:
“(i) the Commission shall increase the award or awards by
one-third the number of weeks in the award or awards, computed
to the nearest whole number;  and
“(ii) the employer or its insurer shall pay the covered employee
weekly compensation that equals two-thirds of the average
weekly wage of the covered employee, but does not exceed 75%
of the State average weekly wage.  
“(2) An award for disfigurement or mutilation under § 9-627(i) of this subtitle
may not be used to make up the 250 weeks under paragraph (1) of this
subsection.”
7
language of those sections a clear and unambiguous demonstration of a legislative commitment
to the payment of permanent partial disability benefits within a weekly framework, 348 Md.
at 218, 703 A.2d at 154, and that such an intent is consistent with the purposes sought to be
achieved by the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Our clear holding was that “any credit for
previous payments should . . . be expressed by ‘weeks.’”  Id. at 221, 703 A.2d at 155. 
The Philip Electronics Court started its analysis of the applicable statutory provisions
with § 9-627 (k), which authorized the claimant’s award.  In addition to itself referencing the
proper unit of consideration, see subsection (k) (3), supra, at n.1, the Court observed:
“As paragraph (4) of subsection (k) of § 9-627 indicates, the award of permanent
partial disability benefits is governed by three independent sections of the Act.
8
Section 9-628, not relevant here, authorizes compensation for less than 75
weeks.  Section 9-630, which governs compensation to an injured worker for a
period of greater than 250 weeks, authorized Wright’s original award on
November 30, 1992 by the Commission.  When Wright’s award was reduced to
200 weeks, that award was granted pursuant to § 9-629, which covers
compensation for a period equal to or greater than 75 weeks, but less than 250
weeks.”
348 Md. 219, 703 A.2d 154-55.
After reviewing the three provisions referenced by § 9-627 and § 9-627 itself, it
concluded:
“These statutory provisions reflect the intent of the General Assembly that the
payment of permanent partial disability benefits be based upon a weekly
framework.  Of greatest significance, the specific sections governing the
payment of benefits, § 9-629 and § 9-630, are distinguished by the number of
weeks of compensation awarded.  The general statutory provision, §
9-627(k)(3), also states that benefits shall be paid “in the proportion that the
determined loss bears to 500 weeks.”  Again, the Act emphasizes the weekly
nature of an award of benefits.
“The language of the specific sections of the Act also reinforces the legislative
focus upon the weekly nature of the payment scheme.  Both § 9-629 and §
9-630(a)(1)(ii) expressly state that “the employer or its insurer shall pay the
covered employee weekly compensation.”  Section 9-630(a)(1) speaks of a
covered employee being awarded compensation “for 250 weeks or more,” and
§ 9-630(a)(1)(i) mandates that “the Commission shall increase the award or
awards by one-third the number of weeks.”  Finally, the Act states that “[a]n
award for disfigurement or mutilation under § 9-627(i) of this subtitle may not
be used to make up the 250 weeks under paragraph (1) of this subsection.”  §
9-630(a)(2) (emphasis added).  It is telling that in barring an offset against an
award from another subsection of the Act, the General Assembly chose to
characterize an award under § 9-630(a) in terms of weeks, rather than as a
monetary amount.”
Id. at 220-21, 703 A.2d at 155.  In short, the plain language of the Act led the Court to the
conclusion “that the Legislature expressed a commitment to the payment of permanent partial
9
disability benefits based on a weekly framework, rather than focusing upon the total monetary
value of such an award.”  Id. at 121, 703 A.2d at 155.
Other than the fact that, in this case, § 9-628, which directs the payment of permanent
partial compensation for a period of less than 75 weeks, authorized the respondent’s original
award of 50 weeks, rather than, as in Philip Electronics, § 9-629, which directs such payments
for a period equal to or greater than 75 weeks, but less than 250 weeks, what we said in Philip
Electronics applies with equal force to the case sub judice.  In other words, the analysis
applicable to cases involving the subsequent reduction of a workers’ compensation award is
just as compelling when applied to those cases in which the award has subsequently been
increased.
Some of our sister jurisdictions have reached like results.  In Humpty Dumpty v.
Moorehead, 569 P.2d 998 (Okla. 1977), for example, the claimant was originally awarded 298
weeks of temporary total disability benefits, payable at a weekly rate of $45.00 per week.
Subsequently, after the claimant reached maximum medical improvement, he was awarded  500
weeks of permanent total disability benefits, payable at a weekly rate of $40 per week.  Credit
was given the employer for the 298 weeks that compensation was paid.  The Oklahoma
Supreme Court rejected the contention of the employer that “the weeks allowed for the
temporary total compensation should be transposed into dollars, i.e., 298 weeks times $45.00,
and thus this total deducted from maximum compensation allowable for permanent total dis
ability, or 500 weeks at $40.00 per week.”  Id. at 999.  It  held that “[t]he calculation of credit
for temporary total disability payments made . . . is to be made on the basis of the number of
5 In Alonzo v. Homeland Stores, 861 P.2d 348, 348-49 (Okla. 1993), the court
distinguished Humpty Dumpty v. Moorehead, 569 P.2d 998 (Okla. 1977), as follows:
“In Moorehead, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the 500 week limit on
total disability benefits formerly found in 85 O.S.Supp.1974 § 22(1), and found
that under this cap the weeks of temporary total disability paid had to be counted
when calculating the number of weeks of permanent total disability benefits
payable.  In 1977, this ceased to be an issue in workers’ compensation cases
because the 500 week cap on total disability benefits in § 22(1) was repealed,
and total disability benefits became payable so long as total disability continued.
See 85 O.S.1991 § 22(1).”
Also in that case, the court pointed out that:
“The Legislature has provided, in 85 O.S.1991 § 41(A) that
“Awards for permanent partial disability under Section 22 of this
title shall be made for the total number of weeks of compensation
which the Court shall find the claimant will be entitled to receive,
less any sums previously paid which the Court may find to be a
proper credit thereon.  (Emphasis added.)
“Under § 41(A), benefits are to be awarded in weeks, but credits are to be
calculated in ‘sums.’  The word ‘sums’ refers to money.  Wetz v. Elliot, 4 Okl.
618, 51 P. 657, 658 (1896).  The plain meaning of this statute is that credits
allowed under § 41 against the permanent partial benefits awarded under § 22 are
to be calculated in dollar amounts.”
Id. at 349.
6 Professor Larson explains:
“The amount of credit is not the amount of the wages paid, but the amount of
compensation due for the particular week.  Thus, if the wage paid was $200, and
if the compensation due for the week was $150, the credit is for $150 only.  In
other words, the credit is for the week, not for a number of dollars, and the
10
weeks payments were made, and not on the basis of the amount of money paid out.”  Id. at
1000.5  See Sturgis v. Int’l Paper Co., 525 So. 2d 813, 815 (Miss. 1988) (holding that the
proper credit is number of weeks and not total of earnings for the week) (quoting and applying
Larson, Workmens Compensation Law, 57.47.6); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Philip C. Morris, 670
excess cannot be carried over as a credit against other weeks of liability.”
11
S.W.2d 854, 856 (Ky. 1984) (concluding “that each weekly voluntary payment should be
credited against each weekly workers’ compensation payment due to the extent that the weekly
voluntary payment does not exceed the weekly compensation payment.”); Duffy Bros. Constr.
Co., Inc. v. W. Cas. and Sur. Co., 299 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Neb.1980) (deciding, after quoting
and applying Larson, Workmens Compensation Law, 57.47, that employer was properly given
credit for the 15 weeks); Stockton v. Indus. Comm’n, 370 N.E.2d 548, 549 (Ill. 1977) (noting
that both petitioner and respondent “agree that the employer is entitled to credit for the number
of weeks”); Brittle v. Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc., 127 S.E.2d 884, 886 (S.C. 1962) (finding that
the proper credit is for the week, not the number of dollars and “[t]his can be easily defended
under the intention rule, since the employer cannot be ascribed an intention to make certain
payments in lieu of compensation when the payments are too small to be compensation
benefits.”).
The Court of Special Appeals, as does the respondent, recognizes this Court’s
conclusion in Philip Electronics, that “the General Assembly intended that an employer’s
credit for the payment of permanent partial disability benefits be based upon the number of
weeks of compensation previously paid, absent clear legislative expression to the contrary.”
348 Md. 225, 703 A.2d at 158.  Nevertheless, focusing on the purpose of the Act, with which
the Philip Electronics Court indicated its decision was consistent, the intermediate appellate
court reaches the opposite result to that which that Court reached.
12
To be sure, in Philip Electronics, this Court began its analysis with the purpose of the
Workers’ Compensation Act, “to compensate employees for the loss of earning capacity
resulting from accidental injury, disease, or death occurring during the course of employment.”
348 Md. at 215-16, 703 A.2d at 153.  We also addressed the canons of construction as relates
to the Act.  Id.  Noting its remedial nature, we reiterated that the Act  “‘should be construed as
liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its
benevolent purposes.’”  Id. at 216, 703 A.2d at 153 (quoting Para v. Richards Group, 339 Md.
241, 251, 661 A.2d 737, 742 (1995) (quoting Howard Co. Ass’n Retard. Cit. v. Walls, 288 Md.
526, 530, 418 A.2d 1210, 1213 (1980)).  We also pointed out, however, that, while
uncertainty is resolved in the claimant’s favor when the intent of the Legislature is ambiguous
or remains unclear, id. at 217, 703 A.2d at 153-54, citing Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88,
97, 656 A.2d 757, 761-62 (1995) and Lovellette v. Baltimore, 297 Md. 271, 282, 465 A.2d
1141, 1147 (1983), “[t]his Court . . . may not stifle the plain meaning of the Act, or exceed its
purposes, so that the injured worker may prevail,” id. at 217, 703 A.2d at 154, citing Morris
v. Bd. of Educ., 339 Md. 374, 384, 663 A.2d 578, 583 (1995), and “may not create ambiguity
or uncertainty in the Act’s provisions where none exists so that a provision may be interpreted
in favor of the injured claimant.”  Id., citing R & T Constr. v. Judge, 82 Md. App. 700, 709, 573
A.2d 96, 100 (1990), modified, 323 Md. 514, 594 A.2d 99 (1991).
As the intermediate appellate court points out, the Court did state that the holding in
Philip Electronics was consistent with several basic purposes served by the Act and identified
them:  “to protect workers and their families from hardships resulting from work-related
13
injuries by providing compensation to workers for loss of earning capacity,” 348 Md. at 226,
703 A.2d at 158, citing Victor v. Proctor & Gamble, 318 Md. 624, 628, 569 A.2d 697, 699
(1990), and “benefits the taxpayers of the State of Maryland in helping to prevent the State
from having to assume the financial responsibility of caring for injured workers and their
dependents.”  Id.  Moreover, the Court explained how the purposes were furthered in that case:
“The result we reach today furthers both of these purposes.  In this case, Wright
will continue to receive the weekly payment of benefits for the allotted number
of weeks, albeit reduced to accurately reflect the degree of her injury as
determined by a jury.  By contrast, the result advocated by Philip Electronics
would immediately sever such weekly support, in direct contravention of one
purpose of the Act.  See Bayshore Industries v. Ziats, 229 Md. 69, 76-77, 181
A.2d 652, 656 (1962) (recognizing ‘the general policy which the prohibition
against stay by reason of an appeal has been held . . . to serve--that of affording
day to day support to injured employees’).  Moreover, in ensuring continued
weekly support to an injured claimant whose award has been reduced, the
citizens of this State are protected from having to care for workers, suddenly
bereft of income, who had been unable or unwilling to appreciate the risk of
their eventual lack of success before the circuit court.  Polomski, 344 Md. at
76-77, 684 A.2d at 1341; see Triangle Insulation v. Stratemeyer, 782 S.W.2d
628, 630 (Ky.1990) (‘An employee who has received an overpayment of income
benefits should not be deprived of future income as a result of any such
overpayment.’); Ransier, 766 P.2d at 277 (‘[S]uch a construction [of the statute]
would place Ransier in the untenable position of using the benefits paid to him
at the risk of having to repay them at a point when his family resources were
even more greatly stressed.’); see also Benedict v. Office of Workers’ Comp.,
29 F.3d 1140, 1142 (7th Cir.1994) (noting that under federal law ‘recovery of
an overpayment defeats the purpose of the Act where it would ‘deprive a person
of income required for ordinary and necessary living expenses’’) (quoting 20
C.F.R. § 410.561c(a)) (footnote omitted).”
Id. at 226-27, 703 A.2d at 158.
Neither of the identified purposes is at risk of contravention in this case.  There has
been no overpayment by the employer/insurer and, therefore, there is no reason for concern
14
about hardship that might attend the obligation to repay benefits received and used, but to which
there was no entitlement.  Nor is there in this case any danger that the respondent will not have
the day to day support to which she is entitled as a result of her injury.  The result of the jury’s
verdict was to increase both the amount of weekly payments and their duration. Thus, rather
than 50 weeks of benefits, the respondent will now be entitled, after the credit, to 417 weeks,
payable at the higher rate than the original award.
There is a bit of an equity issue in this case, only, unlike Philip Electronics, it affects
the respondent, rather than the employer/insurer and it is that issue about which both the
respondent and the Court of Special Appeals expressed concerned and found dispositive.  We
rejected the equity argument in Philip Electronics, reasoning that whether “the  overpayment
. . . is unjust or inequitable must be considered in light of the operation of the Act as a whole,”
348 Md. at 228, 703 A.2d at 159, and that “[a] single transaction does not represent the
appropriate focal point to determine the fairness or equity of the application of the Act.”  Id.
Further explaining our rejection of the argument, we said:
“As this Court has noted in the past, the Act reflects the Legislature’s
considered judgment as to the appropriate allocation of resources between
employers, employees, and the taxpayers of this State.  Polomski, 344 Md. [70,]
76-77, 684 A.2d [1338,] 1340-41 [(1996)].  Significantly, Philip Electronics,
as a party to this political equation, receives a valuable benefit in that they are
relieved ‘from the vagaries of tort liability.’  Id. at 77, 684 A.2d at 1341.  For
instance, unlike a tort recovery, benefits paid pursuant to the Act compensate
only for loss of earning capacity, and do not seek to return a claimant to his or
her pre-disability state.  1 Larson, supra,  § 2.50, at 1-9.  
‘Compensation awarded on [a] fault-free basis under the statutory
plan substitutes for an employee’s common law right to bring a
fault-based tort suit against an employer for damages resulting
15
from the employee’s injury or disablement on the job . . . .
*     *     *     *
‘Employers who purchase workers’ compensation insurance and
otherwise comply with the law of workers compensation can . .
. count on avoiding a negligence lawsuit.’”
Id. at 228-29, 703 A.2d at 159, quoting DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins, 342 Md. 432, 438, 677 A.2d
73, 75-76 (1996).
A similar analysis is applicable to the equity argument in favor of the respondent.  Her
situation cannot be judged in isolation either, but must be considered in the context of the Act
as a whole.  Moreover, she too, “a party to this political equation,” receives the valuable benefit
of being relieved “from the vagaries of tort liability.”  What we said in DeBusk about the
interpretation of the limitations period prescribed by § 9-709 is instructive, in that regard:
“The Workers’ Compensation Act, Md. Code (1957, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1995
Cum. Supp.), § 9-101 et seq. of the Labor & Employment Article . . . was
designed to provide employees with compensation for loss of earning capacity,
regardless of fault, resulting from accidental injury, disease, or death occurring
in the course of employment.  Queen v. Agger, 287 Md. 342, 343, 412 A.2d
733, 733-34 (1980); Howard County Ass’n for Retarded Citizens v. Walls, 288
Md. 526, 531, 418 A.2d 1210, 1214 (1980); Bethlehem-Sparrows Point
Shipyard v. Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474, 480, 50 A.2d 799, 802 (1947).
Compensation awarded on this fault-free basis under the statutory plan
substitutes for an employee’s common law right to bring a fault-based tort suit
against an employer for damages resulting from the employee’s injury or
disablement on the job.  See § 9-509 of the Act (compensation provided to a
covered employee under the Act replaces any right of action against any person,
including the employer); Brady v. Parsons Co., 327 Md. 275, 279, 609 A.2d
297, 298-99 (1992); Gray v. State Roads Comm’n, 253 Md. 421, 427-28, 252
A.2d 810, 812 (1969); Unsatisfied Claim Bd. v. Salvo, 231 Md. 262, 264, 189
A.2d 638, 639 (1963); Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 677, 39
A.2d 858, 859 (1944).
16
“Gone are the days when an injured employee had to bring an uncertain and
potentially expensive lawsuit against his employer, face numerous common law
defenses which operated in favor of the employer, and often lose the suit in the
end.  Employees who follow the procedural rules of the Act and can prove they
were injured while working can almost certainly recover compensation to
prevent undue hardships caused by loss of wages and medical expenses.
Employers who purchase workers’ compensation insurance and otherwise
comply with the law of workers’ compensation can likewise count on avoiding
a negligence lawsuit.  Courts and commentators over the decades have noted
how the Act strikes an important balance between the need to provide some
form of financial benefits to injured or sick employees and the need, of both
employers and employees, to avoid expensive and unpredictable litigation over
accidents in the workplace.  See Richard P. Gilbert & Robert L. Humphreys, Jr.,
Maryland Workers’ Compensation Handbook §§ 1.0-1.2 (2d ed. 1993 &
Supp.1996).
“Predictability and administrative ease, in the workers’ compensation statutory
plan as in all things, come at the price of some flexibility in unique or unusual
circumstances.  Objective standards and bright-line rules such as statutes of
limitations are the very keys to predictability, in the sense that everyone is
treated in the same manner and everyone knows or can discover the rules in
advance of their application.  By their very nature, though, such rules and
standards cannot make exceptions for every scenario which might arise.”
342 Md. at 437-39, 677 A.2d at 75-76.
Just as predictability and administrative ease are important from the standpoint of the
timing of actions, so too are they important in establishing the rules governing the award of
permanent partial disability benefits.  It simply will not do to have different rules, depending
upon whether it is the claimant or the employer to whom the result is inequitable.  Whether a
credit is the amount the employer has paid or for the number of weeks the employer has paid
should be determined on some principled and consistent basis and not made to depend upon
which of the parties it will benefit.  As the petitioner submits, “The Act should not be
interpreted differently depending on the outcome in different claims.”
17
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AND
REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY.
Dissenting Opinion by Eldridge, J.:
For the reasons set forth in Judge Hollander’s excellent opinion for the Court of Special
Appeals, Ametek v. O’Connor, 126 Md. App. 109, 727 A.2d 437 (1999), I would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.