Case Title: Benton v. Hamilton Cty. Educational Serv. Ctr.

Citation: 2009-Ohio-4969

Docket Number: 20081946 and 20081949

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Benton v. Hamilton Cty. Educational Serv. Ctr., Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4969.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-4969 
BENTON ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. HAMILTON COUNTY EDUCATIONAL SERVICE 
CENTER, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Benton v. Hamilton Cty. Educational Serv. Ctr., Slip Opinion 
No. 2009-Ohio-4969.] 
Workers’ Compensation — R.C. 4123.512 — Subject-matter jurisdiction of 
common pleas court on appeal — Refusal of the Industrial Commission to 
discontinue a claim does not involve the right of the claimant to 
participate in the workers’ compensation fund under R.C. 4123.512, and 
thus, a court of common pleas lacks subject matter jurisdiction on appeal 
— Judgment reversed. 
(Nos. 2008-1946 and 2008-1949 — Submitted June 2, 2009 — Decided 
September 29, 2009.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-
070223, 2008-Ohio-4272. 
__________________ 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Refusal of the Industrial Commission to discontinue a claim does not involve the 
right of the claimant to participate in the workers’ compensation fund 
under R.C. 4123.512 and thus, a court of common pleas lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction on appeal. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} We are asked to determine whether refusal by the Industrial 
Commission to find employee fraud in order to exercise continuing jurisdiction 
over a workers’ compensation claim is a right-to-participate issue under R.C. 
4123.512.  We hold that it is not.  Therefore, R.C. 4123.512 does not vest the 
court of common pleas with subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal from 
the Industrial Commission. 
I.  Case Background 
{¶ 2} Diazonia Benton, an employee of Hamilton County Educational 
Service Center (“Hamilton ESC”), was injured in a motor vehicle accident on 
March 19, 2003.  Benton filed a “first report of injury” with the Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”) on February 18, 2005, claiming that she had 
been injured in the accident while driving for Hamilton ESC to pick up the 
medical forms of a client.  In March 2005, the BWC granted the claim and 
allowed Benton to participate in the workers’ compensation fund.  Hamilton ESC 
did not appeal that determination within the 60 days allowed by R.C. 
4123.51.2(A). 
{¶ 3} On February 3, 2006, Hamilton ESC filed a motion asking the 
Industrial Commission to find fraud and terminate Benton’s participation in the 
fund.  The motion alleged that Benton had misrepresented her purpose for driving 
in 2003 and that she had not been in the scope of her employment when she was 
injured.  A district hearing officer denied the motion, finding no evidence of 
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fraud, and a staff hearing officer affirmed.  The commission declined to hear 
further appeal. 
{¶ 4} Hamilton ESC filed a notice of appeal with the Hamilton County 
Court of Common Pleas. Benton filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that “alleging common law fraud does not go 
to the right to participate under [R.C.] 4123.512.”  The court granted the motion. 
{¶ 5} The First District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 
common pleas court had subject matter jurisdiction because the Industrial 
Commission’s refusal to exercise continuing jurisdiction to make a finding of 
fraud is an issue involving the right to participate in the fund under R.C. 
4123.512. Benton v. Hamilton Cty. Educational Serv. Ctr., 1st Dist. No.070223, 
2008-Ohio-4272, ¶ 18.  The court then certified its decision as being in conflict 
with decisions from the Second and Eleventh District Courts of Appeals. The 
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation now seeks determination of the following 
proposition of law:  “A court of common pleas lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals 
under R.C. 4123.512 once a workers’ compensation claimant’s right to participate 
is established and has not been appealed or discontinued.”  We also recognized 
the certified conflict, “Whether the refusal by the Industrial Commission of Ohio 
to exercise continuing jurisdiction to make a finding of fraud is a right to 
participate issue under R.C. 4123.512.”  Benton v. Hamilton Cty. Educational 
Serv. Ctr., 120 Ohio St.3d 1450, 2008-Ohio-6813, 898 N.E.2d 966. 
 
II. Legal Analysis 
A.  Administrative and Common Pleas Jurisdiction 
{¶ 6} Under R.C. 4123.52, the Industrial Commission of Ohio is vested 
with continuing jurisdiction over certain of its orders. The commission may 
exercise its continuing jurisdiction in cases of “(1) new and changed 
circumstances, (2) fraud, (3) clear mistake of fact, (4) clear mistake of law, or (5) 
error by an inferior tribunal.” State ex rel. Nicholls v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 81 
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Ohio St.3d 454, 459, 692 N.E.2d 188.  When the commission refused to exercise 
its continuing jurisdiction in Benton’s case, the employer appealed to the common 
pleas court.  We must now determine whether that court has jurisdiction to hear 
such an appeal. 
{¶ 7} Courts of common pleas have been given jurisdiction by statute to 
hear appeals in workers’ compensation matters. “Courts of Common Pleas do not 
have inherent jurisdiction in workmen’s compensation cases but only such 
jurisdiction as is conferred on them under the provisions of the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act.”  Jenkins v. Keller (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 122, 35 O.O.2d 147, 
216 N.E.2d 379, paragraph four of the syllabus. 
{¶ 8} R.C. 4123.512(A) states, “The claimant or the employer may 
appeal an order of the industrial commission * * * in any injury or occupational 
disease case, other than a decision as to the extent of disability to the court of 
common pleas * * *.”  We have explained that appeals are limited to cases 
involving “whether an employee’s injury, disease, or death occurred in the course 
of and arising out of his or her employment.”  State ex rel. Liposchak v. Indus. 
Comm. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 276, 279, 737 N.E.2d 519. The issue to be 
determined is whether the appeal involves the claimant’s right to participate or 
continue to participate in the fund.  See R.C.4123.512(D).  Claimants and 
employers may appeal Industrial Commission orders to a common pleas court 
under R. C. 4123.512 only when the order grants or denies the claimant's right to 
participate.  Liposchak at 279.  Determinations as to the extent of a claimant's 
disability must be challenged in mandamus. Id. at 278-279. 
{¶ 9} Here, the commission found no evidence of fraud and thus 
declined to exercise continuing jurisdiction to reconsider the allowance of 
Benton’s claim.  Therefore, we must determine whether that determination is 
itself an issue involving the right to participate under R.C. 4123.512.  If the issue 
is the right to participate, then the court of common pleas may hear the appeal; if 
January Term, 2009 
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not, the court of common pleas lacks subject matter jurisdiction,  but the employer 
may file a complaint in mandamus with the Tenth District Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 10} We have held that R.C. 4123.512 authorizes appeals only in 
limited circumstances.  Felty v. AT & T Technologies, Inc. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 
234, 238, 602 N.E.2d 1141. “The courts simply cannot review all the decisions of 
the commission if the commission is to be an effective and independent agency.  
Unless a narrow reading of [the statute] is adhered to, almost every decision of the 
commission, major or minor, could eventually find its way to common pleas 
court.” Id. 
B.  Right to Participate 
{¶ 11} For the reasons that follow, we hold that refusal of the Industrial 
Commission to discontinue a claim does not involve the right of the claimant to 
participate in the workers’ compensation fund under R.C. 4123.512 and thus, a 
court of common pleas lacks subject matter jurisdiction on appeal. 
{¶ 12} First, the Industrial Commission’s decision on a claimant’s right to 
participate is a threshold determination. “When [the right-to-participate question 
has been answered affirmatively], the claimant has cleared the first hurdle, and 
then may attempt to establish his or her extent of disability.” Liposchak, 90 Ohio 
St.3d at 279, 737 N.E.2d 519.  Benton’s initial claim was allowed, and Hamilton 
ESC did not appeal her right to participate.  If it had, the court of common pleas 
would have fully reviewed the initial right-to-participate determination, including 
any allegations of fraud.  R.C. 4123.512(A).  Hamilton ESC may not stand in the 
position it would have if it had alleged fraud on appeal of the allowance of the 
claim. 
{¶ 13} Second, district and staff hearing officers did review Hamilton 
ESC’s claim and found no evidence of fraud.  The denial of Hamilton ESC’s 
motion for a finding of fraud does not disturb the effect of the initial order that 
granted Benton’s right to participate. If evidence of fraud had been found and 
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Benton’s right to participate had been terminated, Benton would have had a right 
to appeal.  (“[A] ruling that terminates the right to participate [is] appealable 
pursuant to R.C. 4123.519 [current R.C. 4123.512.  See 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 
2990].”  Felty, 65 Ohio St.3d 234, 602 N.E.2d 1141, paragraph two of the 
syllabus.)  The commission’s refusal to find fraud, however, does not change the 
effect of the initial order. 
{¶ 14} Additionally, appeal under R.C. 4123.512(D) involves a de novo 
review in which the claimant has the burden of proof: “The claimant shall * * * 
file a petition containing a statement of facts in ordinary and concise language 
showing a cause of action to participate or to continue to participate in the fund 
and setting forth the basis for the jurisdiction of the court over the action.”  
Allowing the employer to appeal the continuance of the claim would require a 
successful claimant like Benton to prove again in common pleas court that her 
claim should be allowed, even when she had already prevailed administratively. 
{¶ 15} Because Hamilton ESC did not appeal the initial determination that 
Benton’s claim should be allowed and because the Industrial Commission did not 
make a finding of fraud so as to terminate Benton’s participation in the workers’ 
compensation fund, the initial determination of her right to participate remains 
unchanged.  The commission’s refusal to exercise continuing jurisdiction to 
reconsider the allowance of Benton’s claim is not a right-to-participate issue.  We 
decline to extend the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas to review 
decisions of the Industrial Commission in cases like this. 
C.  Equal Protection 
{¶ 16} Hamilton ESC argues that an employer does not receive equal 
protection under the law because only a claimant whose right to participate in the 
fund has been terminated may appeal under 4123.512(D). Thomas v. Conrad 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 475, 478-479, 692 N.E.2d 205; White v. Conrad, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 125, 2004-Ohio-2148, 807 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 12.  Nevertheless, when a 
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claimant’s right to participate is granted, the claimant’s employer has the right to 
appeal; and when the right to participate is terminated, the claimant has the right 
to appeal. “Because both the employer and the employee have the right to appeal 
when they are negatively affected by the commission's ruling, both are equally 
situated.” Thomas at 479. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 17} We answer the certified question in the negative because the 
Industrial Commission of Ohio’s refusal to find fraud in order to exercise its 
continuing jurisdiction is not an issue involving the right to participate or to 
continue to participate in the worker’s compensation fund under R.C. 4123.512.  
Therefore, a court of common pleas lacks subject matter jurisdiction on appeal. 
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and this case is dismissed. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, and O’CONNOR, JJ., 
concur. 
 
O’DONNELL and CUPP, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 18} I concur in the judgment because the facts in this case do not 
justify a departure from the general rule stated in Felty v. AT & T Technologies, 
Inc. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 234, 602 N.E.2d 1141, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
The court in Felty noted that AT & T did not ask the commission to terminate 
Felty’s participation in the workers’ compensation system, but only to indefinitely 
suspend her claim because she refused to allow AT & T access to her medical 
records. Id. at 241. Thus, the decision that AT & T sought to appeal from was not 
on Felty’s right to participate in the system. Accordingly, under paragraph two of 
the syllabus in Felty, the commission’s decision was not appealable. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 19} Similarly, in Thomas v. Conrad (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 475, 692 
N.E.2d 205, this court affirmed a decision that there was no right to appeal a 
denial of the employer’s motion to limit or terminate a previously approved claim 
based on an intervening cause, a dog bite. The employer had argued that the dog-
bite injuries superseded the injuries on the previously allowed claim and that 
payment on the claim should be terminated. The court ruled that unlike a situation 
involving fraud surrounding the injured worker’s initial claim, a decision on 
whether an intervening injury that was different from the injured worker’s 
allowed condition superseded the worker’s right to benefits, pertained to extent of 
disability. The initial right to participate remained undisturbed. Accordingly, the 
decision was not appealable under R.C. 4123.512.  Id. at 477-478. 
{¶ 20} This court in Thomas specifically distinguished cases in which the 
employer had alleged fraud regarding facts surrounding the claimants’ initial 
claims. Id. at 478-479. In this case, Hamilton County Educational Service Center 
(“Hamilton ESC”) argues that the decision on its motion to terminate benefits 
related to Benton’s alleged fraud in her initial application for workers’ 
compensation benefits. That situation, Hamilton ESC argues, falls within the 
exception posited in Thomas for fraud in the initial application, which would 
affect the injured worker’s initial right-to-participate determination. 
{¶ 21} However, the facts in this case do not support Hamilton ESC’s 
characterization of the issue as one involving fraud in the initial application. 
Hamilton ESC did not appeal the initial determination that Benton was entitled to 
participate in the workers’ compensation system. Hamilton ESC does not contend 
that it was unable to discover evidence of the alleged fraud by the time of the 
initial determination of Benton’s right to participate. The evidence upon which 
Hamilton ESC bases its argument was not discovered after that initial hearing. 
This case does not squarely present a situation of fraud in the initial application 
for workers’ compensation benefits. 
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{¶ 22} Consequently, this case falls within the rule in Felty and Thomas 
and does not present a necessary occasion for this court to determine whether 
those cases should be modified to accord a denial of a motion to terminate 
benefits based on fraud in the initial workers’ compensation claim as an 
immediately appealable decision on the injured worker’s right to participate in the 
workers’ compensation system. 
{¶ 23} For these reasons, I concur in the judgment. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Weber, Dickey & Bellman and Gregory W. Bellman Sr., for appellant 
Diazonia Benton. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
Kimberly A. Olson, Deputy Solicitor, Elise Porter, Assistant Solicitor, and James 
M. Carroll, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation. 
Ennis, Roberts & Fischer Co., L.P.A. and David J. Lampe, for appellee. 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, William A. Thorman  III, and Philip J. Fulton, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Association for Justice. 
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