Case Title: Callis, Papa, Jackstadt & Halloran, P.C. v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88306

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88306-Agenda 16-September 2000.
CALLIS, PAPA, JACKSTADT & HALLORAN, P.C., Appellee,
v. NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY,
Appellant.
Opinion filed April 19, 2001.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiff, Callis, Papa, Jackstadt & Halloran, P.C. (hereinafter,
the law firm), sought injunctive relief in the circuit court of
Madison County against defendant, Norfolk and Western Railway
Company(1) (hereinafter, the railroad). The circuit court granted a
preliminary injunction, and the railroad appealed. In a summary
order, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment.
No. 5-98-0756 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23). The railroad then filed a petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a)), which this court granted. For the reasons that
follow, we now reverse the judgment of the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
	The parties do not dispute the essential facts in this matter.
The railroad is a corporation that operates trains and maintains
track, rolling stock, and equipment in the southern Illinois region.
Thomas R. Rush is a conductor in defendant's employ. Rush is a
member of the United Transportation Union (UTU), and his
employment is governed by a collective-bargaining agreement
between the railroad and the UTU, as well as by the provisions of
the federal Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (1994)).
Under the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement, the
railroad may only discipline a covered employee such as Rush
after first conducting a fair and impartial investigation. In
accordance with the agreement, an accused employee must be
given written notice of the charges against him. The employee has
the right to a hearing, at which he may have witnesses appear and
testify on his or her behalf. At the hearing, the employee is
permitted to be represented by a union official, but both the
employee and the railroad are barred from having attorneys
participate in the proceedings. The employee may appeal any
discipline imposed through the established grievance procedure.
If such an appeal is not resolved to the employee's satisfaction, the
employee or the union representative may submit the dispute to
arbitration as provided under the Railway Labor Act.
	While on duty on August 12, 1998, Rush fell, landing on his
right buttock and right leg. He declined the medical treatment
offered by defendant's personnel and continued with his work.
Several days later, Rush informed M.J. Wheeler, the railroad's
assistant superintendent of terminals, that he was experiencing
occasional pain. Rush requested to see a doctor and was
transported to a health care center, where he was examined by Dr.
Cheryl Patterson, who diagnosed the injury as a bruise to the right
buttock and a strain to the right hamstring. Dr. Patterson
prescribed over-the-counter ibuprofen and released Rush for return
to full work duty.
	On September 1, 1998, at approximately 3:40 p.m., the
railroad's superintendent of terminals, D.L. Williams, spoke with
Rush over the telephone. Williams asked Rush how he was
feeling. Rush stated that he had not gotten any better. Rush
explained that he was limping around on the job and was not able
to perform his assignments. Williams told Rush that the railroad
had scheduled a doctor's appointment for him at 10 a.m. the
following day.
	Approximately one hour after the phone conversation between
Williams and Rush, Assistant Superintendent Wheeler observed
Rush on duty from 5 to 6:15 p.m. During this period, Rush
apparently was unaware of Wheeler's presence. Wheeler observed
Rush throw approximately 10 to 12 switches and walk back and
forth between switches at a brisk pace. Wheeler also saw Rush set
and release handbrakes by mounting and dismounting tank cars.
Wheeler watched Rush perform these tasks without any apparent
difficulty and without any noticeable limp. At approximately 6:45
p.m., Wheeler saw Rush once more, with Rush again apparently
unaware of Wheeler's presence. Rush performed tasks without a
discernible limp and without difficulty. As Rush rounded the front
of a locomotive, he saw Wheeler. At that point, he began to walk
with a limp. Wheeler asked Rush how he felt. Rush stated that his
leg was not getting any better. Wheeler thereafter reported his
observations to Williams.
	On the next day, September 2, Williams spoke with Rush at
the clinic following the scheduled doctor visit. Rush limped and
walked very slowly in Williams' presence. At the conclusion of
the conversation, at 10:30 a.m., Williams informed Rush that he
was taking Rush out of service because Williams had reason to
believe that Rush was being dishonest about the extent of his
physical condition and his ability to perform his duties. Williams
intended that a complete factual record on this issue be developed
so that the railroad could determine whether Rush had, in fact,
engaged in conduct unbecoming a railroad employee and whether
it would be appropriate to discipline him if such conduct were to
be found to have occurred. The investigation was to be conducted
pursuant to, and in accordance with, the collective-bargaining
agreement.
	At some point after the 10:30 a.m. conversation, Rush
contacted the law firm. Later that afternoon, Lance Callis of the
law firm wrote a letter to the railroad informing it that the firm had
been retained by Rush to represent him "in a claim for damages"
as a result of the August 12 accident. The letter advised the
railroad that the law firm was claiming a reasonable contingent fee
of any sums recovered by Rush. The letter closed by asking the
railroad to "have no further contact with [Rush]."
	On the next day, September 3, 1998, Superintendent Williams
wrote a letter to Rush on behalf of the railroad, informing Rush in
writing of the charges under investigation. According to the letter,
the purpose of the investigation was "to determine [Rush's]
responsibility, if any, in connection with conduct unbecoming a
[railroad] employee in that [Rush] made false statements
concerning the extent of [his] physical condition subsequent to an
alleged personal injury at approximately 3:45 p.m. on Tuesday,
September 1, 1998." The railroad scheduled the hearing to be held
on September 9, 1998. The letter further identified three persons
as witnesses and advised that others might be called.
	On September 8, 1998 the law firm filed a verified complaint
for injunction and temporary restraining order. In the complaint,
the law firm alleged that, on September 2, 1998, it had entered into
a contractual relationship with Rush and had determined that Rush
had a claim against the railroad under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. §51 et seq. (1994)). The law firm
further alleged that it had filed a complaint against the railroad in
the circuit court of Madison County.(2) According to the law firm,
the disciplinary hearing scheduled by the railroad would subject
Rush to questioning by railroad representatives concerning the
accident for which the law firm represented Rush. The law firm
claimed that the railroad was "attempting to question Rush outside
the presence of his attorneys concerning the subject matter for
which [the law firm] represents Rush in a separate action filed
under the FELA." The law firm alleged that, unless restrained by
the court, the railroad would interfere with the contractual
relationship between the law firm and Rush and would interfere
with the law firm's prospective economic advantage by forcing
Rush to either subject himself to questioning and provide
information regarding his FELA suit, without the firm's
assistance, or risk immediate dismissal for failure to do so. This
action, the law firm alleged, would cause it immediate and
irreparable harm.
	The law firm further claimed that the railroad's action would
subject the law firm to immediate and irreparable harm due to the
fact that the law firm had an ethical and contractual duty to
represent its client fully and zealously. According to the firm, if
the railroad were allowed to question Rush, then the law firm
would be subject to potential malpractice and ethical charges. The
law firm stated that the railroad's actions would harm the law firm
due to the fact that the firm "had a prospective economic
advantage" because of its employment relation with Rush.
Moreover, the firm claimed that the railroad's attempt to
interrogate Rush outside the presence of, and without the law
firm's counsel, "would interfere with the firm's prospective
economic advantage by preventing the law firm's legitimate
expectancy from ripening into a valid business relationship." The
law firm requested that the circuit court enter a temporary
restraining order against the railroad and that the order be made
permanent upon a final hearing.
	The circuit court entered a temporary restraining order on the
same day the verified complaint was filed. The court also set the
matter for a preliminary injunction hearing, to be held one week
later.
	The railroad filed a memorandum in opposition to the law
firm's application for a preliminary injunction. In it, the railroad
maintained that the law firm failed to meet the requirements for a
preliminary injunction because the allegations in the verified
complaint did not establish the likelihood of the tortious
interference claim's success on the merits. In response, the law
firm argued that the railroad's position was not supported by
Illinois law. The law firm cited to a decision of the appellate court,
Callis, Papa, Jensen, Jackstadt & Halloran, P.C. v. Norfolk
Southern Corp., 292 Ill. App. 3d 1003 (1997) (Callis I), in support
of its cause of action. In that case, a Fifth District panel of the
appellate court considered facts similar to the those advanced in
the instant case and concluded that, under the circumstances,
injunctive relief, based upon tortious interference, was proper.
	At the hearing, the circuit court took judicial notice of the
entire circuit court file in Callis I, including the pleadings and
transcripts. The court granted the law firm a preliminary injunction
in an order dated October 21, 1998. The court found that the law
firm had established a clearly ascertained right in need of
protection, a likelihood of success on the merits, and a lack of
privilege. The court ruled that the law firm would suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction did not issue and that the law
firm lacked an adequate remedy at law. The railroad appealed. The
appellate court affirmed the circuit court's order in an unpublished
summary order, holding that the case at bar was indistinguishable
from the issues and facts previously addressed in Callis I.
	As noted above, this court allowed the railroad's petition for
leave to appeal. We subsequently granted the following
organizations leave to submit briefs as amici curiae: the
Association of American Railroads, the Academy of Rail Labor
Attorneys, and the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association. 155 Ill. 2d
R. 345. Prior to oral argument, but after briefing in the matter had
been concluded, the law firm moved to dismiss the appeal as
moot. In its motion, the law firm indicated that the FELA litigation
between Rush and the railroad had been settled and that Rush's
complaint had been dismissed with prejudice. As such, the law
firm contended that a real controversy between the parties no
longer existed and that none of the exceptions to the mootness
doctrine existed so as to allow appellate review. See Madison Park
Bank v. Zagel, 91 Ill. 2d 231 (1982). The railroad objected to the
motion, arguing that the case should be reviewed notwithstanding
the settlement because it presented (i) a question of public interest,
(ii) an issue in need of authoritative determination for future
guidance, and (iii) a situation likely to recur. This court denied the
law firm's motion on August 22, 2000.
ANALYSIS
	We begin our discussion by first addressing a point of
appellate procedure raised by the law firm. In its brief, the law
firm notes that the circuit court based its ruling on the "entire
record," including the "case and contents of the case file Callis,
Papa, Jenson, Jackstadt, & Halloran, P.C. v. Norfolk Southern
Corp., 96 CH 253." However, the law firm points out that the
record on appeal does not contain these Callis I materials and
argues that the railroad has presented an "incomplete record of the
matters considered by the circuit court in exercising its discretion
to grant the preliminary injunction." The law firm accordingly
suggests that we employ a presumption, utilized on appeal where
the record is incomplete, that the circuit court's ruling was in
conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis. We
decline the law firm's suggestion.
	Supreme Court Rule 321 governs the contents of the record
on appeal. The rule provides that the record shall consist of "the
judgment appealed from, the notice of appeal, and the entire
original common law record, unless the parties stipulate for, or the
trial court *** orders less." 155 Ill. 2d R. 321. The "common law
record" includes every document filed, as well as every judgment
and order entered in the cause, along with any documentary
exhibits offered and filed by any party. 155 Ill. 2d R. 321. The
record also includes any report of proceedings prepared in
accordance with Rule 323. 155 Ill. 2d R. 321.
	Our examination of the record on appeal reveals that every
document filed by the parties, along with all orders of court, were
included in the record that is now before us. With respect to the
Callis file to which the law firm refers, we note that it was the law
firm that asked the circuit court to take judicial notice of the case.
In so doing, the law firm, however, did not file, with the circuit
court, a copy of the documents which constituted the entire
Callis I case file. Thus, fault for the case file's omission from the
common law record lies not with the railroad but rather with the
proponent of the evidence. In any event, the Callis I case file is a
public document, capable of being readily verifiable. Therefore,
this court will, as did the circuit court, take judicial notice of it.
See People v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 134 (1996).
	The dispositive issue for our review is whether the circuit
court properly granted preliminary injunction relief to the law
firm. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the
status quo pending a decision on the merits of a cause. Hartlein v.
Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill. 2d 142, 156 (1992). This court, like
others, has viewed a preliminary injunction as an extreme remedy
which should be employed only in situations where an emergency
exists and serious harm would result if the injunction is not issued.
See Buzz Barton & Associates, Inc. v. Giannone, 108 Ill. 2d 373
(1985) (and cases cited therein). A party seeking a preliminary
injunction must establish that (i) a clearly ascertained right in need
of protection exists, (ii) irreparable harm will occur without the
injunction, (iii) there is not an adequate remedy at law for the
injury, and (iv) there is a likelihood of success on the merits.
Hartlein, 151 Ill. 2d  at 156; In re Adoption of Scraggs, 125 Ill. 2d 382, 388 (1988).
	On appeal, a reviewing court examines only whether the party
seeking the injunction has demonstrated a prima facie case that
there is a fair question as to the existence of the rights claimed.
The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests within
the sound discretion of the trial court, and, on review, the decision
will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion. Stated differently,
the only question before the court of review is whether there was
a sufficient showing to sustain the order of the trial court. See
Dixon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Thompson, 91 Ill. 2d 518,
524-25 (1982).
	The circuit court in this case found that the law firm had
established a clearly ascertained right in need of protection in that
the law firm's ability and right to perform its contractual duty to
Rush had been threatened by the impending disciplinary hearing.
The court found that the law firm would be "physically restrained
or be excluded from the place where it would perform its contract
of representation" and that such conduct on the part of the railroad
constituted "wrongful interference" with the professional
relationship. The court also found that irreparable harm would
occur absent an injunction because "nothing could be done to
restore the status quo should the railroad be allowed to proceed
with its interrogation of the client, ex parte." Finally, the court
found that there was no other remedy at law which would "undo"
the damage done by such an interrogation and that "nothing short
of preventing the interrogation, could make [the law firm] whole."
 	In essence, the circuit court applied to this case the same
analysis set forth by the appellate court in Callis I. Indeed, on
appeal, the circuit court's order was summarily affirmed by a panel
of the Fifth District after it concluded that this case is virtually
indistinguishable in both fact and in law from Callis I. Therefore,
the propriety of the lower courts' actions in this case is largely
dependent upon the correctness of Callis I.
	In Callis I, the law firm sought a preliminary injunction in
order to enjoin the railroad from holding the disciplinary hearing
provided for in the collective-bargaining agreement. The facts of
the case are similar to those at bar. The railroad employee was
injured at work on August 21, 1996. Six days later, he retained the
services of the law firm. On August 30, the railroad notified the
employee by letter of the disciplinary hearing. On September 4, the
railroad became informed of the law firm's retention. One day
later, the law firm filed suit to enjoin the scheduled disciplinary
hearing, arguing that the railroad was interfering with the
contractual relationship that existed between the employee and the
law firm. The circuit court granted the injunction.
	On appeal, the appellate court concluded that the law firm
properly and adequately pleaded a cause of action under Illinois
law for intentional interference with the attorney-client
relationship. Callis I, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 1010. The court stated
that the action "is a species of the tort of intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage." Callis I, 292 Ill. App. 3d
at 1010. In so holding, the appellate court rejected the railroad's
contention that the claim was based upon the rights of the
employee rather than the rights of the law firm as the employee's
attorney. The court recognized that the law firm had a protectable
interest in its professional relationship with its client and that the
action was brought to vindicate the law firm's rights and not the
client's rights. Moreover, the court stated that under the tort of
interference with prospective economic advantage, neither a
breach nor a termination of contract is an element of the cause of
action. Callis I, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 1012. According to the court,
if the hearing were to be held and the employee were to be
unrepresented by counsel, then the law firm's performance of its
obligations as attorney would be impaired or prevented. Relying
on section 766A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
appellate court noted a contract may be interfered with when the
actor is excluded "from the place of performance." Callis I, 292
Ill. App. 3d at 1012-13. In rejecting the railroad's claim of
privilege, i.e., the railroad was entitled to hold the hearing under
the collective-bargaining agreement, the appellate court concluded
that an alleged tortfeasor should not be granted a privilege "to
engage in an activity that is designed to both intimidate the client
and prevent the client's attorney from performing a basic duty, i.e.,
being present when his client is questioned by the alleged
tortfeasor." Callis I, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. The appellate court
further held that the law firm's cause of action was not preempted
by the terms of the Federal Railway Labor Act and that the railroad
had waived its contentions regarding irreparable harm and
adequate remedy at law because it failed to comply with Supreme
Court Rule 341(e)(7). Callis I, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 1013-16.
	As it did in its complaint, the law firm, in its brief, speaks in
terms of protecting its "prospective economic advantage." We note
that the firm has sought injunctive relief on the basis of the tort of
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage as
recognized in Callis I. We agree with the lower courts that the
facts and issues presented in this case are similar to, if not
identical to, those present in Callis I. Nevertheless, we disagree
with the analysis employed by the appellate court in its opinion.
	As an initial matter, we note that the conclusion in Callis I
that the law firm properly and adequately pleaded a cause of action
under Illinois law for intentional interference with the attorney
client relationship belies the need for equitable relief. See
Hartlein, 151 Ill. 2d  at 156 (discussing no adequate remedy at
law). Nevertheless, even if we were to agree that the tort could
somehow serve as a predicate for the injunctive relief sought, we
do not believe that tort has been established under the
circumstances present in this case.
	The relationship between the law firm and Rush is a
contractual, at-will relationship. Until such a relationship is
terminated, the at-will contract is of value to the law firm; thus,
intentionally causing the termination of an at-will contract, without
just cause, is an actionable tort. See 12 Ill. Jur. Interference with
Rights §14:8 (1994). In Illinois, four elements are needed to
establish the tort: (i) the plaintiff's reasonable expectation of
entering into a valid business relationship, (ii) the defendant's
knowledge of the plaintiff's expectancy, (iii) the purposeful
interference by the defendant that prevents the plaintiff's
legitimate expectancy from ripening into a valid business
relationship, and (iv) the damages to the plaintiff resulting from
such interference. Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495,
511 (1991). In the context of attorney-client relationships,
recovery has been allowed or a complaint has been held sufficient
when "it was either alleged or shown that the client was induced
by or conspired with the defendant to breach or terminate his
contract with an attorney, thus depriving the attorney of
compensation." Herman v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co., 41 Ill
2d 468, 474-75 (1969) (collecting and discussing cases).
Moreover, an attorney, in order to prevail, must "show not merely
that the defendant has succeeded in ending the relationship or
interfering with the expectancy, but 'purposeful interference'-that
the defendant has committed some impropriety in doing so."
Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 485 (1998),
quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §766B, Comment a (1979).
	We fail to see how the law firm's allegations established that
the railroad's action prevents or will prevent the law firm's
legitimate expectancy from ripening into a valid business
relationship and that damages will be suffered as a result thereof.
Nothing the railroad has threatened to do has caused Rush to sever
or alter, in any way, the contractual relationship he has with the
law firm. Contrary to the view expressed by the circuit court, the
holding of a disciplinary hearing does not render the law firm's
FELA representation impossible to perform. The railroad's
holding of the disciplinary hearing does nothing to deny the law
firm's ability to represent Rush in the FELA action. In other
words, the railroad's action does not serve to close, unlawfully, the
doors to any court in this state. The railroad's actions have not
stopped the law firm from filing its FELA action, nor have they
prevented the firm from going ahead with that litigation.
	We emphasize that the law's firm contractual relationship
with Rush is based upon its representation of Rush in the FELA
proceeding, not in the disciplinary proceeding. The law firm has
not been excluded from any FELA proceeding. Rather, the law
firm has been precluded only from being present at the disciplinary
proceeding. This exclusion is not due to the unilateral, wrongful
action of the railroad, but is the result of the bilateral agreement
between the railroad and its employee, Rush. As this court stated
many years ago, "in the absence of factual allegations that the
[attorney retainer] employment contracts were breached or
terminated with resulting damage to plaintiffs, the complaint fails
to state a cause of action for damages for malicious interference
with contract." Herman, 41 Ill. 2d  at 477. Therefore, we do not
believe that the law firm made a sufficient showing to sustain the
circuit court's granting of preliminary injunctive relief.
	Moreover, to the extent that the law firm argues it has a
clearly ascertainable right to be able to perform its contractual
duties to Rush, the law firm has not established the irreparable
harm required for injunctive relief. In this regard, we disagree with
the appellate court's conclusion in Callis I that the railroad's
actions will unlawfully cause the firm's performance of its
obligations as attorneys to be impaired or prevented. The gist of
the law firm's claim in this case is that the law firm is concerned
that the railroad will secure, during the course of the disciplinary
hearing, some evidence that will render the FELA litigation more
difficult for the law firm to prosecute. The law firm and its amici
warn that an employee could even be fired as a result of such a
proceeding and the fact of such a firing would serve to diminish
the damages that would otherwise be assessed against the railroad
in the FELA case.
	Whether or not the disciplinary hearing would even produce
the prejudicial evidence claimed by the law firm or a termination
of the employee is a matter of pure speculation. Courts have long
adhered to the notion that the right to injunctive relief rests on
actual or presently threatened interference with another's rights.
Generally, the damage sought to be enjoined must be likely and
not merely possible. "Injunctive relief will not be granted merely
to allay the fears and apprehensions or to soothe the anxieties of
the parties." 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions §15, at 583 (2000). In
Illinois, the following principles have been consistently applied by
our courts:
			"The act to be enjoined should be actually threatened
and must be such as might be expected with reasonable
certainty if not enjoined. Thus an injunction will not be
granted on a mere suspicion of an intended wrong, or
upon speculation or conjecture, or because there is a mere
possibility or apprehension on the part of the plaintiff that
some illegal act will be done." 21A Ill. L. & Prac.
Injunctions §16, at 267 (1977).
In this case, any harm suffered by the law firm as a result of the
hearing is too remote and speculative to support injunctive relief.
	Additionally, we note that all of the evidence in the FELA
trial will be subject not only to our rules of evidence but to our
rules of discovery. It is the trial judge in the FELA action who
serves as the evidentiary gatekeeper in that action. Questions
concerning the admission of evidence are within the purview of
the trial judge. With respect to the law firm's concerns as to
discovery, we must remind the law firm that the client's rights to
discovery are his to assert, not the law firm's. Nevertheless, our
conclusion would not change were we to allow the law firm here
to vindicate the rights of the client in its own name. The law firm
fears that nondiscoverable information might be revealed at the
hearing by Rush because the railroad would threaten Rush with
termination if he did not respond. We believe, however, that once
a FELA action is filed, the trial judge in that action has, by virtue
of our discovery rules, a great deal of discretion in guarding
against, and sanctioning, abuses of discovery. See 166 Ill. 2d R.
201. As for the fact that an employee may potentially be fired by
the railroad at the hearing and his potential damages in the FELA
action may thus be diminished, we note that the any impropriety
in the discipline that is imposed during such a hearing is subject to
appeal and federal arbitration under the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. Rush or a representative of his union is
allowed to initiate such proceedings under the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement. If a law firm suspects that a
FELA litigant was wrongfully terminated during the disciplinary
proceedings, the law firm can seek a stay of the FELA proceedings
until the arbitration process has concluded and a final
determination on the propriety of the discipline has been rendered.
	The law firm states in its brief that "[t]he question to be
answered is whether a railroad is entitled to question an employee,
who is represented by counsel and who has filed a lawsuit against
the railroad, regarding issues central to the lawsuit during the
pendency of the lawsuit, while excluding the employee's counsel
from being present at the interrogation." We are not unsympathetic
to the concerns raised by the law firm and its amici in this case.
We must, however, remind them that, under the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement in effect between the railroad and
Rush's union, the railroad has the right to hold disciplinary
proceedings such as the one at issue in the case at bar. More
importantly, the parties to the collective-bargaining agreement
explicitly agreed that the hearing was to be held without attorneys
present from either side. We cannot allow Rush's attorney to do
that which Rush himself cannot do. We have identified, in the
proceeding paragraph, several ways in which the law firm can
mitigate any potential harm caused by the disciplinary
proceedings. This court has faith in the ability of both the trial
judges in this state and in the federal courts to deal appropriately
with the discovery and evidentiary issues which might arise under
such circumstances.



CONCLUSION
	In light of the above, we do not believe that the law firm made
a sufficient showing of the need for injunctive relief in this case.
We, therefore, hold that the circuit court abused its discretion in
granting the law firm the preliminary injunction. To the extent that
Callis I is inconsistent with this opinion, it is hereby overruled.
The summary order of the appellate court is reversed.


Appellate court judgment reversed.





	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring:
	I concur with the majority's decision that the parties to the
collective-bargaining agreement explicitly waived the presence of
attorneys at disciplinary hearings. Nevertheless, I submit this
concurrence to underscore three points. First, I believe that our
decision should be based upon our longstanding respect for
collective-bargaining agreements. Second, we should note that this
decision is limited to the facts in this particular case and that a
different factual scenario may well present a sufficient claim to
invoke the public policy exception to our general rule of deference
to collective-bargaining agreements. Third, the trial judge in any
collateral FELA proceeding must vigilantly exercise the gate-keeping role as noted by the majority.
	First, our courts afford great deference to the agreed-upon
terms of a collective-bargaining agreement. Generally, courts will
enforce a collective-bargaining agreement unless it contains
specific terms that violate public policy. See United Paperworkers
International Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42-44, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286, 301-03, 108 S. Ct. 364, 373-74 (1987) (holding that
appellate court erred in finding a public policy violation);
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v.
Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 307
(1996) (stating that a court will not enforce a collective-bargaining
agreement that contradicts public policy). Here, the law firm
presents no adequate public policy exception claim.
	The public policy exception is narrow and invoked only when
contravention of public policy is clearly demonstrated by the
collective-bargaining agreement. See American Federation of
State, County & Municipal Employees, 173 Ill. 2d  at 307. An
applicable public policy concern must be explicit, well defined,
dominant, and ascertained by reference to the law and legal
precedent rather than general considerations of supposed public
interest. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers
of America, District 17, 531 U.S. 57, --, 148 L. Ed. 2d 354, 361,
121 S. Ct. 462, 467 (2000); American Federation of State, County
& Municipal Employees v. State of Illinois, 124 Ill. 2d 246, 261
(1988). Any public policy exception inquiry requires a fact-driven
analysis. See American Federation of State, County & Municipal
Employees, 173 Ill. 2d  at 311.
	 Under certain circumstances, preservation of the attorney-client privilege and ethical considerations may require that a court
alter or strike an agreement's terms. See, e.g., Leoris v. Dicks, 150
Ill. App. 3d 350, 354 (1986) (finding that fee-splitting agreement
violated public policy and was therefore unenforceable). The
Callis firm suggested some concerns about the attorney-client
relationship, but the law firm principally argued that we should
void the agreement to protect the financial interests of the law
firm. The Callis firm did not, however, present sufficient factual
and legal arguments to raise a public policy exception in this case.
Specifically, the law firm did not demonstrate that their absence
from the disciplinary hearing would in effect cause irreparable
harm to the attorney-client relationship or to the firm's ability to
represent Rush. As the majority notes, mere speculation that an
injury may occur is insufficient to support a claim for injunctive
relief. HCR Ltd. Partnership I v. Behrens, 226 Ill. App. 3d 666,
669-70 (1992). 
 	Additionally, the trial judge presiding over Rush's FELA
action may exercise great discretion in addressing discovery
abuses. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 201. Any discovery abuses tending to
impact upon the FELA attorney-client relationship must be
carefully scrutinized by the trial judge. The trial judge must assure
that the disciplinary hearing does not usurp the employee's FELA
rights. If the collective-bargaining agreement can exclude attorney
representation, then the disciplinary hearing's findings and
conclusions should be limited to the collective-bargaining
agreement's purpose of determining the appropriate disciplinary
measure, if any, and not to impinge upon the employee's FELA
rights.
	Finally, our decision does not mean, however, that an
applicable public policy concern, including one based upon the
attorney-client privilege or ethical considerations, could not arise
under different facts.
	Settlement of Rush's FELA claim against the railroad
rendered this appeal moot. His law firm's motion to dismiss the
appeal should therefore have been allowed. I so voted when the
motion was first presented to this court, and I continue to adhere
to that view.
	Even if the merits of the appeal were properly before us, I
could not join in the majority's opinion. Contrary to my
colleagues, I believe that Callis, Papa, Jensen, Jackstadt &
Halloran, P.C. v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 292 Ill. App. 3d 1003
(1997) (Callis I) was correctly decided. Under Callis I, the
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court in this case was
plainly proper, and the judgment of the appellate court affirming
the circuit court's interlocutory order granting the preliminary
injunction should be affirmed.
	In reviewing the propriety of the circuit court's preliminary
injunction, there is one additional point that must be noted. The
railroad's appeal is premised on Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1)
(166 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). In such an appeal, the only question
properly before the reviewing court is whether there was a
sufficient showing made to the trial court to sustain its order
granting or denying the interlocutory relief sought. The rule may
not be used as a vehicle to determine the merits of the case.
Postma v. Jack Brown Buick, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 391, 399 (1993).
	Whether a preliminary injunction should have been granted or
denied was a matter for the trial court's sound discretion. A
reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's decision absent a
clear abuse of that discretion. Desnick v. Department of
Professional Regulation, 171 Ill. 2d 510, 516 (1996). No abuse of
discretion will be found if the trial court had a legal basis for
granting the injunction. See Murges v. Bowman, 275 Ill. App. 3d
153, 159 (1995).
	The trial court in this case clearly had a legal basis for ruling
as it did. Its decision was mandated by Callis I. Callis I was
binding on the circuit court, and it had no alternative but to adhere
to that precedent. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian,
152 Ill. 2d 533, 539 (1992). Accordingly, the trial court cannot be
said to have abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary
injunction.
	Where, as here, a preliminary injunction is proper at the time
it is issued, its validity is not subject to attack based on subsequent
changes in the facts or the law. See Field v. Field, 79 Ill. App. 2d
355, 359 (1967). That does not mean, however, that the
preliminary injunction is unchangeable. An injunction may always
be modified or dissolved, as to its prospective effect, where equity
no longer justifies a continuance of the injunction or the court
finds that the law has changed. Benson v. Isaacs, 22 Ill. 2d 606,
609 (1961). That is so whether the change in the law is based on
legislative action or judicial decision. Material Service Corp. v.
Hollingsworth, 415 Ill. 284, 288 (1953). If my colleagues believe
that Callis I is no longer good law, the appropriate course of
action, therefore, is for them to vacate the preliminary injunction
and to declare that the rule in Callis I will not be followed in the
future.
	 
	 
1.      1After this suit was filed, the original defendant, Norfolk and
Western Railway Company, merged into its parent corporation, Norfolk
Southern Railway Company, and ceased its separate corporate
existence.

2.      2Rush v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. et al., No. 98- L-687
(Madison Co. Cir. Ct.).