Case Title: Dean v. Narvaiza

Citation: 138 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 2

Docket Number: 81209

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2022-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
188 Nev, Advance Opinion Z.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

‘SEAN MAURICE DEAN, No. 81209
Appellant,

vs. z
AITOR NARVAIZA, ELKO COUNTY FILED =
SHERIFF, "
Respondent. JAN 13 2022

Appeal from a district court order denying a postconviction
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Fourth Judicial District Court, Elko
County; Alvin R. Kacin, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Lockie & Macfarlan, Ltd., and David B. Lockie, Elko,
for Appellant.
Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Tyler J. Ingram, District

Attorney, and Mark S. Mills, Deputy District Attorney, Elko County,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, HARDESTY and STIGLICH, JJ., and
GIBBONS, Sr. J.!

"The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.

12-184R

 

 
OPINION

 

By the Court, STIGLICH, J.

In this appeal, we consider whether a defense attorney's overt
interjection of racial stereotypes into a criminal trial constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. In conducting voir dire, counsel discussed several
offensive racial stereotypes. Because counsel carelessly introduced racial
animus into this criminal trial, we conclude that the district court erred in
denying appellant Sean Dean’s postconviction petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, as counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and resulted in prejudice. We therefore reverse the district
court’s order denying Dean’s petition and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dean faced charges of attempted murder with the use of a
deadly weapon and other related offenses. During jury selection, Dean's
counsel asked the prospective jurors if they had any preconceived ideas
about African Americans having “certain attributes.” None of the
prospective jurors answered that they did. Counsel responded “You don't?”
Counsel followed this with a discussion involving several offensive racial
stereotypes. Counsel insisted that the prospective jurors must have heard
that all African Americans “like watermelon” or “have an attribute of
violence, that they are sneaky.” Again, no one on the venire responded.

Eventually, one outspoken prospective juror rejected counsel's
suggestions and asserted that “we're all equal” and that it was “unfair” to
make assumptions based on race. Despite this clear disavowal of racial
bias, counsel further interrogated this prospective juror with more
questions about offensive racial stereotypes, including the following:
“{Dean| has a propensity for violence because he is black. You have heard

 

 
that?” Despite receiving no affirmative response, counsel asked if any of
the prospective jurors could not evaluate Dean “as just another guy, not a
black guy?”

‘The jury found Dean guilty of attempted murder with the use
of a deadly weapon, battery with the use of a deadly weapon, and battery
with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. ‘The
district court sentenced Dean to an aggregate prison term of 144 to 372
months. Dean appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction.
Dean v. State, No. 74602-COA, 2019 WL 398002 (Nev. Ct. App. Jan. 25,
2019) (Order of Affirmance). Dean filed a timely postconviction petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, alleging, among other claims, that counsel was
ineffective for introducing racial issues into the trial. After an evidentiary
hearing, the district court denied the petition. Dean appealed.

DISCUSSION

Dean argues that counsel's method of broaching the subject of
race during voir dire by asking the venire about offensive racial stereotypes
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree.

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below
‘such that,

 

an objective standard of reasonableness and resulted in preju
but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability of a different
outcome in the proceedings. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984)
(adopting the test in Strickland). “With respect to the prejudice prong, ‘lal
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Johnson v. State, 133 Nev. 571, 576, 402 P.3d 1266, 1273
(2017) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). A petitioner must show both

 

 
deficient performance and prejudice to warrant postconviction relief.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. We give deference to the district court's factual
findings if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous but
review the court’s application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v.
Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by a
fair and impartial jury. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 & n.9 (1986).
“Jury selection is the primary means by which a court may enforce a
defendant's right to be tried by a jury free from ethi
prejudice or predisposition about the defendant's culpability.” Gomez v.
United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989) (internal citations omitted). In some

cases, after weighing the risks and benefits, trial counsel may decide to raise

 

racial, or political

the issue of race and racial prejudice during voir dire, See Mahdi v. Bagley,
522 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “counsel had to weigh the
potential harm that could flow from a voir dire on racial and religious bias
against its arguable benefit”); see also Commonwealth v. Henry, 706 A.2d
313, 323 (Pa. 1997) (“[RJaising the issue of racial bias may have the adverse
effect of emphasizing racial stereotypes by focusing the jurors’ attentions on
skin color instead of the guilt or innocence of the accused.”). And under
some circumstances, counsel may be compelled to broach the issue of race.
For example, counsel may be ineffective for not asking any individual
questions of an empaneled juror “who expressly admitted her racially biased
view that black people—including [the defendant]—are inherently more
violent than other people.” State v. Bates, 149 N-E.3d 475, 484 (Ohio 2020).
But when probing for racial bias, counsel must discuss the subject in a
careful and responsible manner. See Middleton v. State, 64 N.E.3d 895, 901
(Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (explaining that counsel referring to his client as a

 

 
ie

“negro” while exploring potential racial bias during voir dire “was wholly
unacceptable and amounted to deficient performance”).

In this case, counsel chose to delve into possible racial bias
‘among the prospective jurors but did so in a flawed and inappropriate
manner. Among the numerous problematic comments, counsel suggested
that all African Americans, and Dean himself, had an “attribute” of being
sneaky and violent. Given that Dean faced charges involving violence, we
conclude that counsel's conduct went beyond an objectively reasonable
inquiry into potential racial bias. We, like the Florida Supreme Court, are
concerned that “[tJhe manner in which counsel approached the subject [of
race] unnecessarily tended either to alienate jurors who did not share his
animus against African Americans ‘just because they're black,’ or to
legitimize racial prejudice without accomplishing counsel's stated objective
of bringing latent bias out into the open.” State v. Davis, 872 So. 2d 250,
256 (Fla, 2004). At the evidentiary hearing on Dean's postconviction
petition, counsel testified that he sought to bring out the unconscious racial
biases present “in all of us.” However, counsel's stated goal does not make
his method of addressing possible racial bias reasonable. Indeed, at the
evidentiary hearing, the State described the outspoken prospective juror as
“offended” and counsel testified that the prospective juror was “very angry”
about the implication that race would factor into his deliberation, which
further demonstrates the impropriety of counsel’s conduct. See Mazzan v
State, 100 Nev. 74, 79-80, 675 P.2d 409, 412-13 (1984) (finding counsel
ineffective for, in part, antago

 

ing the jury). Whether counsel himself
believed any of the offensive stereotypes is immaterial because bringing
such racial invective into the courtroom cannot be justified. See Davis, 872

So. 2d at 253 (“Whether or not counsel is in fact a racist, his expressions of

 

 
prejudice against African-Americans cannot be tolerated.”). In particular,
we are troubled by counsel's comment that “[Dean} has a propensity for
violence because he is black.” This comment came after the outspoken
prospective juror rejected the idea of making any assumptions based on
race. Rather than ending this line of inquiry, counsel chose to ask more
problematic racial questions and undercut his stated purpose of challenging
tho prospective jurors’ unconscious feelings about race. Based on the
foregoing, we conclude that counsel's conduct constituted deficient
performance, as we discern no reasonable basis for his method of exploring
possible racial bias among the prospective jurors,

We next consider whether that deficient performance
prejudiced Dean. Under the facts in this case, we conclude that counsel's
offensive discussion about race resulted in prejudice. First, of particular
note, counsel’s repeated suggestion that African Americans are inherently
violent severely compromised Dean’s defense that he did not wield a knife
during the altercation and the victims stabbed each other. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 686 (“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced
a just result.”), Next, counsel's suggestion that African Americans are
“sneaky” potentially undermined his own client's credibility, particularly in
this case where Dean testified at trial. Lastly, counsel created an
unacceptable risk of infecting the jury's deliberations because his
statements “appealed to a powerful racial stereotype—that of black men as
violence prone,” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. __, _, 137 S. Ct. 759, 776 (2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because counsel suggested that Dean

 

“has a propensity for violence” based on his race, we do not believe that

 

 
 

counsel's concluding remarks about not evaluating Dean by his race cured
the prejudicial effect of counsel's earlier statements about African
Americans. Based on counsel's poorly designed introduction of offensive
rracial stereotypes into the jury-selection process, we do not have confidence
in the outcome at trial, as counsel's conduct created a reasonable probability
of an unreliable conviction. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
‘outcome.”); Davis, 872 So. 2d at 255 (finding that counsel’s conduct in
discussing racial prejudice “created a reasonable probability of unreliable
convictions”). Because Dean’s counsel performed deficiently and that
performance resulted in prejudice, we conclude that Dean received
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

We must also note that, under the facts of this case, the trial
court's inaction heightens our lack of confidence in the outcome of the trial.
In this case, counsel's conduct of discussing harmful racial stereotypes
warranted intervention by the trial judge. Instead, the venire may have
seen the judge's silence as normalizing, or even tacitly approving, counsel's
offensive questioning. See Azucena v. State, 135 Nev. 269, 272, 448 P.3d
534, 538 (2019) (“[J]udges [must] be mindful of the influence they wield over
jurors, as a trial judge's words and conduct are likely to mold the opinion of
the members of the jury to the extent that one or the other side of the
controversy may be prejudiced.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). ‘The
United States Supreme Court has recognized “that if the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot
be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that judges should strive
to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are

representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts.” McMann v.

 

 
 

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). Here, the trial court neither
cautioned counsel nor canvassed any of the prospective jurors to assess
whether the inappropriate comments had any adverse effect. Such actions
were needed because “t]he trial judge has a duty to restrict attorney-
conducted voir dire to its permissible scope: obtaining an impartial jury.”
Whitlock v. Salmon, 104 Nev. 24, 28, 752 P.2d 210, 213 (1988). When
‘counsel treads into improper or antagonistic lines of inquiry, itis incumbent
on judges to exercise their discretion and reign in such behavior. See id.
(acknowledging “the absolute right of a trial judge to reasonably control and
limit an attorney's participation in voir dire”); see also Nev. Code of Judicial

 

Conduct Canon 2, Rule 2.8. Exercising reasonable control over the conduct
of counsel safeguards not only the integrity of an individual trial proceeding
but also the decorum and public confidence in the justice system as a whole.
‘The district court’s duty is particularly critical when it comes to sensitive
issues like racial prejudice because vigilance is required from trial courts to
combat the corrosive effects of such prejudice in the justice system. As the
United States Supreme Court has explained, “[blecause of the risk that the
factor of race may enter the criminal justice process, we have engaged in
‘unceasing efforts’ to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice
system.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 US. 279, 309 (1987) (quoting Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986). Accordingly, counsel's offensive
‘questioning of the venire warranted intervention by the trial court? Thus,
we take this opportunity to urge trial judges to exercise reasonable control
when counsel exceeds the appropriate bounds of voir dire. See NRS 175.031

2We do not suggest that the court needed to reprimand counsel in
front of the venire; rather, the court could have excused the venire or
conducted a bench conference to admonish counsel.

 

 
(providing that the district court shall allow supplemental examination of
potential jurors “as the court deems proper”).
CONCLUSION
We conclude that counsel’s statements impermissibly tainted
the jury pool by introducing racial invective into the proceedings. Counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
prejudiced the defense. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order
denying Dean’s postconviction habeas petition and remand this matter for
further proceedings.

a

Stiglich

 

We concur:

  

Hardesty

Gibbon’