Case Title: K&S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc.

Citation: 2007 WI 70

Docket Number: 2005AP002148

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2148 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
K&S Tool & Die Corporation, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc., 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
Industrial Rebuilding & Machining, Inc., 
          Defendant, 
United National Insurance Company, 
          Intervenor. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 148 
Reported at: 295 Wis. 2d 298, 720 N.W.2d 507 
(Ct. App. 2006—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 12, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 14, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson   
 
JUDGE: 
Jacqueline R. Erwin 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Gregory P. Seibold and Murphy Desmond D.C., Madison; Paul T. Fox 
and Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Chicago, IL, and oral argument by 
Gregory P. Seibold. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Michael 
J. Hanrahan and Fox, O’Neill & Shannon, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Michael J. Hanrahan. 
 
 
2007 WI 70
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2148  
(L.C. No. 
2001CV273) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
K&S Tool & Die Corporation, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Industrial Rebuilding & Machining, Inc., 
 
          Defendant, 
 
United National Insurance Company, 
 
          Intervenor. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 12, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of a published 
court of appeals decision, K&S Tool & Die Corporation v. 
Perfection 
Machinery 
Sales, 
Inc., 
2006 
WI 
App 
148, 
295 
Wis. 2d 298, 720 N.W.2d 507.  The court of appeals affirmed a 
judgment of the Jefferson County Circuit Court, Jacqueline R. 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
2 
 
Erwin, Judge, in favor of K&S Tool & Die Corporation (K&S).  K&S 
claimed that Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc. (Perfection) 
violated Wis. Stat. § 100.18 (2005-06),1 Wisconsin's Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act (DTPA), by making a misrepresentation about 
the pressing force of a press K&S purchased from Perfection.  
After a trial, the jury found in favor of K&S. 
¶2 
Perfection petitioned this court for review of two 
issues.  First, whether the circuit court erred in ruling that 
Perfection was not entitled to a ruling as a matter of law 
pertaining to K&S's status as a member of "the public" for the 
purpose of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).2  We hold that the circuit 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise stated. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18(1) provides, in pertinent part, 
the following: 
No person, firm, corporation or association, or agent 
or employee thereof, with intent to sell . . .  
merchandise . . . offered . . . directly 
or 
indirectly, to the public for sale . . . or with 
intent to induce the public in any manner to enter 
into any contract or obligation relating to the 
purchase . . . of 
any . . . merchandise . . . shall 
make, publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before 
the public, or cause, directly or indirectly, to be 
made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed 
before the public, in this state, in a newspaper, 
magazine or other publication, or in the form of a 
book, 
notice, 
handbill, 
poster, 
bill, 
circular, 
pamphlet, letter, sign, placard, card, label, or over 
any radio or television station, or in any other way 
similar 
or 
dissimilar 
to 
the 
foregoing, 
an 
advertisement, 
announcement, 
statement 
or 
representation of any kind to the public relating to 
such purchase . . . of such . . . merchandise . . .  
or 
to 
the 
terms 
or 
conditions 
thereof, 
which 
advertisement, 
announcement, 
statement 
or 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
3 
 
court did not err because whether K&S was a member of "the 
public" under § 100.18(1) presented a question of fact that the 
court properly submitted to the jury.  Second, whether the jury 
erred in finding that the misrepresentation in Perfection's 
quotation for the two 1000-ton presses caused K&S pecuniary loss 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11)(b)2.3  We hold that the jury 
did not err because sufficient evidence supports its finding.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶3 
K&S creates metal parts and dies in Ixonia, Wisconsin.  
One service offered by K&S is production stamping, which entails 
using a press and a die to stamp steel into parts.   
¶4 
Late in 1999, or early in 2000, John Deere approached 
K&S about creating platforms for some of its riding lawnmowers.  
As an initial step, K&S began building a die.  It performed die 
tryouts with a press that had a 450-ton pressing force.4   
¶5 
After completing the die, K&S began producing the 
platforms with their 450-ton press.  It soon discovered that it 
                                                                                                                                                             
representation contains any assertion, representation 
or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or 
misleading. 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18(11)(b)2. provides, in pertinent 
part, the following: "Any person suffering pecuniary loss 
because of a violation of this section by any other person may 
sue in any court of competent jurisdiction and shall recover 
such pecuniary loss, together with costs, including reasonable 
attorney fees . . . ." 
4 A "die tryout" is a process used to refine the design of a 
die. 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
4 
 
needed a press with at least a 1000-ton pressing force.  A 1000-
ton press would allow K&S to create the platforms with one hit, 
rather than needing multiple hits from its 450-ton press.  
Needing fewer hits would allow K&S to create the platforms more 
profitably.  Upon its discovery, K&S began shopping for a 1000-
ton press.     
¶6 
Perfection, 
an 
Illinois 
corporation, 
sells 
used 
industrial machinery to commercial clients nationwide.  When K&S 
began looking for a 1000-ton press, it was familiar with 
Perfection because Perfection had periodically sent K&S catalogs 
highlighting its inventory.  K&S had also purchased a machine 
known as a roll former from Perfection in 1996.   
¶7 
Thomas Klusken (Klusken), an owner of K&S, contacted 
Jason Broderick (Broderick), a Perfection sales representative, 
to inquire about the 1000-ton press K&S sought.  Perfection had 
a 1000-ton Danly press in its inventory, but it did not have the 
cushions that K&S required.  With the 1000-ton Danly press not 
being suitable, Perfection did not have a press meeting K&S’s 
specifications in its inventory.  However, the conversation 
between Klusken and Broderick ended with Broderick agreeing to 
keep 
an 
eye 
out 
for 
a 
1000-ton 
press 
that 
fit 
K&S 
specifications.   
¶8 
Broderick subsequently contacted Klusken to inform him 
that he had found two 1000-ton presses in Michigan.  Shortly 
thereafter, Perfection faxed a quotation to K&S on Perfection 
letterhead that began with form language stating "GENTLEMEN: We 
are pleased to offer for your consideration . . ." followed by  
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
5 
 
 
TWO (2) 1000 TON CLEARING STRAIGHT SIDE PRESSES 
Model #:  
    SE4 - 1000-108-60 
Serial No.: 10-1646 and 10-4163 
 
Bed Area:  
 
 
 
 
108" x 60" 
Ram Area:  
 
 
 
 
108" x 60" 
Stroke: 
 
 
 
 
 
20" 
Adjustment: 
 
 
 
 
15" 
Shut Height: 
 
 
 
 
50" 
SPM:  
 
 
 
 
 
25 
Bolster:  
 
 
 
 
8" "T" Slotted 
Cushions 
Gibbings:  
 
 
 
 
8 point 
T-Slotted Ram 
Controls 
Recirculating Lube System 
Pit 
Hydraulic Overloads 
Hydraulic Tie-Rod Nuts 
PRICE:..............$225,000.00 Each As Is Loaded 
SPECIFICATIONS ARE APPROXIMATE ONLY, INTENDED       
SOLELY AS A GUIDE AND ARE NOT BINDING 
The letterhead also stated the following at the bottom: "THE 
COUNTRY'S 
LARGEST 
INVENTORY 
OF 
USED 
LATE 
MODEL 
PRESSES, 
FABRICATING & METALWORKING EQUIPMENT."  
¶9 
K&S hired Industrial Rebuilding & Machining, Inc. 
(Industrial Rebuilding) to inspect the condition of the two 
presses, both of which were dismantled.  The inspection did not 
include assessing the pressing force.  After the inspection, 
Industrial Rebuilding recommended one of the presses over the 
other.  K&S contacted Perfection to let it know that it was 
interested in purchasing the press that Industrial Rebuilding 
recommended.  Perfection then purchased the press and sold it to 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
6 
 
K&S.  After K&S had purchased the press, it hired Industrial 
Rebuilding to rebuild and install the press in K&S’s plant.   
¶10 When K&S began using the press, it discovered that the 
press failed to function as expected.  Rather than creating the 
John Deere platforms with one hit, it took three hits.  After 
K&S unsuccessfully attempted to adjust the press to remedy the 
problem, it contacted the manufacturer of the press.  The 
manufacturer informed K&S that it had bought an 800-ton press, 
which had been converted from a 1000-ton press. 
¶11 K&S filed suit against Perfection and Industrial 
Rebuilding asserting a number of claims.  Although K&S settled 
its claims against Industrial Rebuilding, it proceeded to trial 
against Perfection claiming that Perfection had violated the 
DTPA.   
¶12 After the close of K&S’s evidence, Perfection moved to 
dismiss on two grounds.  First, Perfection argued that K&S had 
provided no evidence that it had relied on Perfection's 
quotation when it purchased the 800-ton press.  Second, 
Perfection argued that K&S was not a member of "the public" for 
the purpose of § 100.18(1).  The circuit court denied the motion 
to dismiss as it pertained to reliance, but took the motion 
under advisement as it related to whether K&S was a member of 
"the public."       
¶13 After the close of all of the evidence, Perfection 
renewed its motion to dismiss on the same grounds.  The circuit 
court made the same ruling, denying it related to reliance and 
taking the member of "the public" issue under advisement.   
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
7 
 
¶14 The circuit court submitted the following special 
verdict questions to the jury: 
1. 
Was K&S Tool & Die Corporation a member of the 
"public" 
under 
§ 100.18 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes? 
________ ________ 
Yes  
No 
2. 
Regardless of whether or not K&S was a member of 
the public,  
Did Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc. violate 
§ 100.18 of the Wisconsin Statutes? 
________ ________ 
Yes  
No 
Only if you answered Question #2 "Yes", answer 
Question #3. 
3. 
Did the untrue representation cause K&S Tool & 
Die Corporation to enter a transaction with 
Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc.? 
________ ________ 
Yes  
No 
Regardless of how you answered Questions 1-3, answer 
Question #4. 
4. 
What monetary loss, if any, did [K&S] sustain as 
a result of a § 100.18 violation? 
$_________________  
The jury marked "Yes" for the first three questions and filled 
in $306,000 for the fourth. 
¶15 Perfection made five motions after verdict: (1) to 
dismiss, (2) to change answers, (3) for judgment notwithstanding 
verdict, 
(4) 
for 
remittitur, and (5) for a new trial.  
Perfection presented multiple grounds for the various motions.  
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
8 
 
Like with its previous motions to dismiss, it argued that K&S 
failed to establish that it was a member of "the public" or 
prove that it relied on Perfection's quotation.  Perfection also 
argued that the jury answer related to damages was excessive and 
not supported by the evidence.  Finally, Perfection moved the 
court based on what it characterized as inflammatory and 
prejudicial comments made during K&S's closing argument.  The 
circuit court denied all of the motions after verdict.     
¶16 Perfection appealed to the court of appeals.  It 
sought review of three issues.  First, whether K&S was a member 
of "the public" as a matter of law.  Second, whether the circuit 
court erroneously instructed the jury related to the meaning of 
"the public."  Finally, whether sufficient evidence supported 
the jury's finding that Perfection's untrue representation 
caused K&S pecuniary loss.   
¶17 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
circuit court.  It concluded that Perfection was not entitled to 
a ruling as a matter of law as to K&S being a member of "the 
public," the circuit court did not erroneously instruct the jury 
on the meaning of "the public," and the jury did not err in its 
finding related to K&S's pecuniary loss. 
¶18 Perfection petitioned this court for review of two 
issues.  First, whether the circuit court erred in ruling that 
Perfection was not entitled to a ruling as a matter of law 
pertaining to K&S's status as a member of "the public" for the 
purpose of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).  Second, whether the jury 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
9 
 
erred in finding that Perfection's quotation for the two 1000- 
ton presses caused K&S pecuniary loss.5   
II 
¶19 K&S 
claims Perfection violated § 100.18(1).  To 
prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must prove three 
elements.  Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2004 WI 32, ¶39, 
270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 233; Wis JI-Civil 2418.6  First, that 
with the intent to induce an obligation, the defendant made a 
representation to 
"the 
public." 
 
Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).  
Second, that the representation was untrue, deceptive or 
misleading.  Id.  Third, that the representation caused the 
plaintiff a pecuniary loss.  Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11)(b)2.  The 
issues presented in this case relate to the first and last 
elements, which we address in that order. 
A. Representation to "the Public" 
                                                 
5 Unlike in the court of appeals, Perfection did not 
petition for review of whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in instructing the jury about the 
meaning of "the public."  Accordingly, we do not address that 
issue. See Taylor v. Greatway Ins. Co., 2001 WI 93, ¶1 n.2, 245 
Wis. 2d 134, 628 N.W.2d 916.  
6 In MADCAP I, LLC v. McNamee, 2005 WI App 173, ¶22, 284 
Wis. 2d 774, 702 N.W.2d 16, the court of appeals suggested that 
a § 100.18(1) claim had four elements.  Unlike this court in 
Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2004 WI 32, ¶39, 270 
Wis. 2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 233, it listed as a distinct element the 
defendant's intent to induce an obligation.  MADCAP I, 284 
Wis. 2d 774, ¶22.  Although the suggestion did not affect the 
outcome of that case, we note for consistency that a § 100.18(1) 
claim has three elements, not four.  
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
10 
 
¶20 Perfection argues that the circuit court erred in its 
decision that Perfection was not entitled to a ruling as a 
matter of law pertaining to K&S's status as a member of "the 
public."  The DTPA does not define the phrase "the public."  
However, courts have interpreted the phrase.  State v. Automatic 
Merchs. of Am., Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 659, 663, 221 N.W.2d 683 
(1974); Kailin v. Armstrong, 2002 WI App 70, ¶44, 252 Wis. 2d 
676, 643 N.W.2d 132; Bonn v. Haubrich, 123 Wis. 2d 168, 174, 366 
N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1985).  
¶21 In 
Automatic 
Merchandisers, 
the 
court 
considered 
whether § 100.18(1) applied to "oral representations made in 
private conversations to prospective purchasers."  Automatic 
Merchs., 64 Wis. 2d at 662.  To address the issue, the court 
interpreted § 100.18(1) "in relation to its scope, history, 
context, subject matter and the object intended to be remedied 
or accomplished."  Id. at 663.  Based on an amendment by the 
legislature to expand the types of marketing methods covered, 
the court concluded that "the legislature intended to protect 
the residents of Wisconsin from any untrue, deceptive or 
misleading representations made to promote the sale of a 
product."  Id. 
¶22 The Automatic Merchandisers defendants argued that 
their conduct fell outside of the scope of § 100.18(1) because 
allegations in the complaint related to private statements made 
to prospective purchasers that had responded to notices in the 
classified sections.  Statements made in private, the argument 
went, were not made to "the public." 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
11 
 
¶23 The 
Automatic 
Merchandisers 
court 
rejected 
the 
proposition that statements made in private were not made to 
"the public."  The court concluded that a statement made to an 
individual could be a statement made to "the public."  Id. at 
664.  The court also noted that when it comes to determining if 
a plaintiff is a member of "the public," "[t]he important factor 
is whether there is some particular relationship between the 
parties."  Id.  Applying its interpretation of "the public," the 
court stated that "[h]ere there is no peculiar relation between 
the defendants and the prospective purchasers which would 
distinguish the prospective purchasers from 'the public' which 
the legislature intended to protect."  Id. 
¶24 The Automatic Merchandisers court did not specify when 
a relationship was particular enough to exclude a plaintiff from 
"the public."  In this regard, it followed the lead of the court 
when it interpreted the phrase "public utility" in Cawker v. 
Meyer, 147 Wis. 320, 326, 133 N.W. 157 (1911).  The Cawker court 
stated the following:  
While we find it quite easy to ascertain the true 
spirit and intent of the law, yet we deem it 
inexpedient and unsafe to attempt to define in more 
specific terms than the statute what does and what 
does not constitute a public utility.  Each case will 
depend upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances 
and must be tested by the statute in light of such 
facts and circumstances. 
Id.  The use of "the public," in the context of § 100.18(1) and 
utility law, did not lend itself to the formulation of a bright-
line test.   
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
12 
 
¶25 Subsequent to this court establishing the presence of 
a particular relationship as an important factor, the court of 
appeals has provided some further guidance on who and when a 
plaintiff is a member of "the public."  First, the substance of 
a representation made to induce an obligation, rather than the 
form 
of 
the 
initial 
contact, 
has 
more 
significance 
in 
determining whether a plaintiff is a member of "the public" for 
the purpose of § 100.18(1).  Bonn, 123 Wis. 2d at 174.  In Bonn, 
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated § 100.18(1) 
when he made misrepresentations about the appreciation value of 
rubies and the liquidation value of a ruby the plaintiff 
purchased from him.  The relationship between the plaintiff and 
defendant commenced when the defendant telephoned the plaintiff 
to inquire about his interest in investing in gem stones.  The 
defendant argued that he did not violate § 100.18(1) because the 
relationship commenced with a phone call, not an advertisement.  
The court rejected the argument, stating that "[t]he fact that 
the alleged untrue, deceptive or misleading representations were 
made to [the plaintiff] as part of a sales promotion is 
sufficient to afford him protection under sec. 100.18(1)."  Id. 
at 173.  The court "conclude[d] that the fact that [the 
plaintiff] was initially contacted by telephone rather than by 
media advertisement [was] not controlling."  Id. at 174.     
¶26 Additionally, a plaintiff is no longer a member of 
"the public" for the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) once he 
or she has entered into a contract to purchase the offered item.  
Kailin, 252 Wis. 2d 676, ¶44.  In Kailin, the plaintiffs alleged 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
13 
 
that the defendants violated § 100.18(1) when they failed to 
disclose a tenant's history of delinquency in rent payments.  
The tenant was in default both at the time the defendant 
accepted the offer to purchase and at the time of closing.  The 
court concluded that "[o]nce the contract was made, the Kailins 
were no longer 'the public' under [§ 100.18(1)] because they had 
a particular relationship with Armstrong—that of a contracting 
party to buy the real estate that is the subject of his post-
contractual representation."  Id., ¶44.  Accordingly, the 
Kailins' 
§ 100.18(1) 
claim 
was 
limited 
to 
alleged 
misrepresentations made before they entered into the contract to 
purchase. 
¶27 Based on the existing interpretations of "the public," 
a plaintiff remains a member of "the public" unless a particular 
relationship exists between him or her and the defendant.  The 
existence of a particular relationship "will depend upon its own 
peculiar facts and circumstances and must be tested by the 
statute in the light of such facts and circumstances."  Cawker, 
147 Wis. at 326.    
¶28 Perfection has argued that a particular relationship 
existed between it and K&S, meaning K&S fell outside the scope 
of "the public" for the purpose of § 100.18(1).  Before the 
circuit court, Perfection challenged the sufficiency of the 
evidence.  Assessing the evidence as overwhelmingly in favor of 
there being a particular relationship, it moved the circuit 
court to address K&S's status as a member of "the public" as a 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
14 
 
matter of law.  However, the circuit court denied each of 
Perfection's challenges of the sufficiency of the evidence.     
¶29 When 
circuit 
courts 
consider 
challenges 
of 
the 
sufficiency of the evidence, Wis. Stat. § 805.14(1) provides the 
following test:  
No motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
as a matter of law to support a verdict, or an answer 
in a verdict, shall be granted unless the court is 
satisfied that, considering all credible evidence and 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion is 
made, there is no credible evidence to sustain a 
finding in favor of such party. 
Appellate courts overturn only a clearly erroneous denial of a 
motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.  Hasse v. 
Badger Mining Corp., 2004 WI 97, ¶17, 274 Wis. 2d 143, 682 
N.W.2d 389; Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 
273, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998).  In assessing the sufficiency of the 
evidence, circuit courts are accorded substantial deference 
because they are in a better position to decide the weight and 
relevancy of the evidence presented.  Id.   
¶30 A circuit court's decision to submit a question to the 
jury is clearly erroneous if it is a question of law.  See, 
e.g., Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 438, 265 
N.W.2d 513 (1978).  However, in this case, whether K&S was a 
member of "the public" presented a question of fact.  Based on 
the evidence, a reasonable jury could have made conflicting 
inferences or found in either party's favor.  The circuit court 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
15 
 
did not err in denying Perfection's motions pertaining to K&S's 
status as a member of "the public."     
¶31 On one hand, the jury could have reasonably found that 
a particular relationship existed between Perfection and K&S.  
The jury heard evidence that K&S had purchased a roll former 
from Perfection in the past.  It heard that Klusken, an owner of 
K&S, and Broderick, a Perfection sales representative, entered 
into an agreement for Perfection to find K&S a suitable press, 
after the parties agreed that a suitable press was not in 
Perfection's inventory.  If a jury inferred from these facts 
that a particular relationship existed between Perfection and 
K&S, it could have reasonably concluded that K&S was not a 
member of "the public" when it received the quotation that 
contained the misrepresentation.   
¶32 On the other hand, a jury could reasonably find that 
K&S was a member of "the public" when Perfection faxed the 
quotation, as the jury did in this case.  Evidence supporting 
this finding includes that Perfection held itself out as having 
"the country's largest inventory of used late model presses, 
fabricating 
& 
metalworking 
equipment," 
according 
to 
its 
quotation.  Given the nature of Perfection's business as an 
industry leader, the jury could reasonably infer that K&S 
contacting Perfection for a used press would not be a sufficient 
fact to create a particular relationship.  Additionally, K&S 
bought the roll former from Perfection back in 1996, but had 
purchased nothing else either before or after that purchase.  
The purchase could be construed as too isolated to establish a 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
16 
 
particular relationship.  The jury also heard the following 
testimony from Broderick, the Perfection sales representative:  
I always try to help customers.  I always try to help 
them out; try to sell a machine.  If I could earn 
their business, help them out, do them a favor, the 
hope is that they will want to come back and buy other 
equipment from us and you can get repeat sales.  So, 
yes, it is standard procedure that I would, I would 
offer: "Hey, what are you looking for? If I can find 
that, I'll let you know." As far as suiting their 
needs, it's more of "I'm looking for this machine XYZ; 
let me know if you find one" – then I can do that.  
But I'm not an engineer or manufactor. 
From this testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that the 
agreement that Broderick made with Klusken to make K&S aware of 
any suitable presses he found did not rise to the level of 
Perfection and K&S having a particular relationship if Broderick 
"always" tried to help customers in the same way he offered to 
help K&S.  If a jury inferred from these facts that a particular 
relationship did not exist between Perfection and K&S, it could 
reasonably conclude that K&S was a member of "the public" when 
it received Perfection's quotation. 
¶33 Based on the evidence, a question of fact existed over 
whether K&S was a member of "the public" when the circuit court 
took Perfection's motions to dismiss under advisement at the 
close of K&S's evidence and at the close of all evidence.  The 
question also existed when the circuit court submitted the 
question to the jury.  After the jury answered the question of 
fact in favor of K&S, sufficient evidence was in the record to 
sustain the jury verdict and deny Perfection's motion for 
directed verdict.  Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
17 
 
did not err because whether K&S was a member of "the public" 
under § 100.18(1) presented a question of fact that the court 
properly submitted to the jury.   
B. Representation Caused Pecuniary Loss 
¶34 As mentioned above, one of the other elements K&S 
needed to prove was that Perfection's misrepresentation in its 
quotation for the two 1000-ton presses caused it to sustain a 
pecuniary loss.  Perfection argues that the jury erred in 
finding that its quotation caused K&S pecuniary loss because 
there was a lack of sufficient evidence to support such a 
verdict. 
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18(11)(b)2. provides that "[a]ny 
person suffering pecuniary loss because of a violation of this 
section by any other person may sue in any court of competent 
jurisdiction and shall recover such pecuniary loss."  This 
section requires a causal connection between the untrue, 
deceptive, or misleading representation and the pecuniary loss.  
Tim Torres Enters., Inc. v. Linscott, 142 Wis. 2d 56, 70, 416 
N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1987).  Because the purpose of the DTPA 
includes protecting Wisconsin residents from untrue, deceptive, 
or 
misleading 
representation 
made 
to 
induce 
action, 
see 
§ 100.18(1); Kailin, 252 Wis. 2d 676, ¶44 (citing Bonn, 123 
Wis. 2d at 173 n.4), proving causation in the context of 
§ 100.18(1) requires a showing of material inducement.  See Wis 
JI-Civil 2418. 
¶36 A plaintiff does not have the burden of proving 
reasonable reliance.  Unlike common law causes of action for 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
18 
 
misrepresentations, reasonable reliance is not the standard for 
a DTPA claim because the legislature created a distinct cause of 
action.  Kailin, 252 Wis. 2d at 708.  "There is no indication in 
[§§ 100.18(1), 100.18(11)(b)2., and 100.18(11)(b)3.], or any of 
the other many and detailed subsections that make up § 100.18, 
that the legislature intended to add a remedy for common law 
misrepresentation claims rather than to create a distinct 
statutory cause of action."  Id.  Although the reasonableness of 
a plaintiff's reliance may be relevant in considering whether 
the representation materially induced the plaintiff's pecuniary 
loss, the plaintiff does not have the burden of proving 
reasonable reliance.  See Malzewski v. Rapkin, 2006 WI App 183, 
¶24, 296 Wis. 2d 98, 723 N.W.2d 156 (citing K&S Tool & Die Corp. 
v. Perfection Mach. Sales, Inc., 2006 WI App 148, ¶¶39-45, 295 
Wis. 2d 298, 720 N.W.2d 507).   
¶37 In this case the jury heard the following instruction 
related to what K&S needed to prove pertaining to the causation 
element:  
To constitute an untrue, deceptive, or misleading 
representation in this case, there are three elements 
which must be proved by K&S Tool & Die Corporation. 
. . . . 
Third, K&S Tool & Die Corporation sustained a monetary 
loss 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
representation. 
 
In 
determining whether K&S Tool & Die Corporation's loss 
was caused by the representation, the test is whether 
K&S Tool & Die Corporation would have acted in its 
absence.  Although the representation need not be the 
sole 
or 
only 
motivation 
for 
K&S 
Tool 
& 
Die 
Corporation's decision to buy the press, it must have 
been 
a 
material 
inducement. 
 
That 
is, 
the 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
19 
 
representation must have been a significant factor 
contributing to K&S Tool & Die Corporation's decision. 
This jury instruction tracks the language provided in Wis JI—
Civil 2418.7 
¶38 Appellate courts do not upset a jury verdict if there 
is any credible evidence to support it.  Meurer v. ITT Gen. 
Controls, 90 Wis. 2d 438, 450, 280 N.W.2d 156 (1979); Tim Torres 
Enters., 142 Wis. 2d at 67.  "Weighing testimony and evaluating 
credibility of witnesses are matters for the jury."  Id.  In 
reviewing a jury verdict, "evidence will be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict" and courts "search for credible 
evidence that will sustain the verdict, not for evidence to 
sustain a verdict the jury could have but did not reach."  
Meurer, 90 Wis. 2d  at 450-51.  
                                                 
7 Wisconsin 
JI—Civil 
2418 
provides 
the 
following, 
in 
pertinent part:  
To constitute an untrue, deceptive, or misleading 
representation in this case, there are three elements 
which must be proved by (plaintiff). 
. . . . 
Third, (plaintiff) sustained a monetary loss as a 
result 
of 
the 
(assertion) 
(representation) 
(statement).  In determining whether (plaintiff)'s 
loss was caused by the (assertion) (representation) 
(statement), the test is whether (plaintiff) would 
have acted in its absence.  Although the (assertion) 
(representation) (statement) need not be the sole or 
only motivation for (plaintiff)'s decision to (buy) 
(rent) (use) the ______________ [product or item], it 
must have been a material inducement.  That is, the 
(assertion) (representation) (statement) must have 
been 
a 
significant 
factor 
contributing 
to 
(plaintiff)'s decision. 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
20 
 
¶39 Based on our review of the record, credible evidence 
supports the jury's finding that Perfection's misrepresentation 
in the quotation caused K&S pecuniary loss.  For instance, 
during the direct examination of Klusken, done by counsel for 
K&S, the following exchange took place: 
Q: 
Mr. Klusken, now turning to [the  quotation], if 
you had received a promotional quotation from 
Perfection Machinery that said they were offering 
two 
800-ton 
Clearing 
straight-sided 
presses, 
would you have made further inquiry about those 
presses? 
A: 
No.  I wouldn't have.  I would have wanted to—I 
would have just said we don't want to inquire on 
an 800-ton; we want a thousand ton. 
Viewing this testimony in a light most favorable to sustaining 
the jury verdict, we conclude that Klusken's testimony indicated 
the quotation was a material inducement: in its absence, K&S 
would not have purchased the 800-ton press.  Accordingly, the 
jury did not err in finding that Perfection's quotation caused 
K&S pecuniary loss. 
¶40 Perfection argues that Klusken's testimony was merely 
self-serving.  It also directs this court to evidence that 
supports findings other than the jury's.  The findings include 
the following: K&S really relied on the expert advice of 
Industrial Rebuilding, rather than Perfection's quotation; K&S 
knew that Perfection had not inspected the press, making its 
reliance unreasonable; and Perfection's quotation's "as is" 
clause, and statement about specifications being approximate, 
prevented 
K&S 
from 
reasonably 
relying 
on 
the 
quotation.  
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
21 
 
However, we "search for credible evidence that will sustain the 
verdict, not for evidence to sustain a verdict the jury could 
have but did not reach."  Meurer, 90 Wis. 2d at 451.   
¶41 We hold that the jury did not err in finding that 
Perfection's 
quotation 
caused 
K&S 
pecuniary 
loss 
because 
sufficient evidence supports its finding. 
III 
¶42 Because K&S's status as a member of "the public" 
presented a question of fact, the circuit court did not err in 
denying Perfection's motions challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence related K&S's status as a member of "the public."  
Because credible evidence existed to support the jury's findings 
related to the cause of K&S's pecuniary loss, the jury did not 
err either.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No. 
2005AP2148   
 
 
 
1