Case Title: Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v. Park-Ohio Industries

Citation: 2010-Ohio-2745

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v. Park-Ohio Industries, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2745.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2745 
PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE, v. PARK-OHIO 
INDUSTRIES; NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v. Park-Ohio Industries,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2745.] 
Insurance — Equitable contribution among multiple insurers — Insured’s duty to 
cooperate with insurer targeted for full payment — Failure to notify 
nontargeted insurers of claim. 
(No. 2009-0104 — Submitted December 2, 2009 — Decided June 22, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 90619, 
179 Ohio App.3d 385, 2008-Ohio-5991. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  When loss or damage occurs over time and involves multiple insurance-policy 
periods and multiple insurers, a claim may be made by the targeted insurer 
against a nontargeted insurer with applicable insurance policies for 
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2 
 
contribution.  (Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 
Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842, 769 N.E.2d 835, followed.)  
2.  When the targeted insurer requests information from the insured regarding 
other policies that may also cover the claim, the insured has a duty to 
cooperate with the targeted insurer by identifying those policies; but 
failure to timely notify a nontargeted insurer of a pending claim does not 
automatically make that insurer’s policy inapplicable for contribution to 
the targeted insurer.  (Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842, 769 N.E.2d 835, explained.) 
3.  Lack of notification to a nontargeted insurer will bar the targeted insurer’s 
claim for contribution against that nontargeted insurer only if the failure to 
notify resulted in prejudice to that nontargeted insurer.  (Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-
2842, 769 N.E.2d 835, explained.) 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal addresses issues regarding the allocation of insurance 
coverage among multiple insurers in cases in which loss or injury is caused over a 
period of time (“progressive injury”) and multiple insurance policies cover that 
timeframe.  This court has adopted an allocation approach known as “all-sums” in 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-
Ohio-2842, 769 N.E.2d 835.  Although the parties ask us to overrule the case and 
adopt the competing pro rata approach, we decline to do so in this case. 
{¶ 2} We continue to adhere to the all-sums method of allocation 
adopted in Goodyear, while emphasizing that the insured has a duty to cooperate 
with the targeted insurer.  Recognizing the need to clarify Goodyear, we hold that 
when the targeted insurer requests information regarding other policies that may 
cover the claim, the insured has a duty to cooperate by identifying any such 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
policies.  In the event that a nontargeted insurer is not timely notified of a claim, a 
targeted insurer’s contribution claim against that nontargeted insurer will be 
barred only if the failure to notify resulted in prejudice to the nontargeted insurer.  
Although there was a delay in notification to the nontargeted insurers in the 
present case, we affirm the decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals 
because this delay did not result in prejudice to those insurers. 
I. Case Background 
{¶ 3} George DiStefano filed suit for asbestos-related injuries against 
Park-Ohio Industries, Inc. (“Park-Ohio”) and other defendants in the Superior 
Court of California in March 2002 after being diagnosed with mesothelioma.  In 
August 2002, Park-Ohio notified one of its insurers, appellee Pennsylvania 
General Insurance Company (“Penn General”) of the action, and in September 
2002, Penn General’s representative retained attorney Henry Rome to handle the 
DiStefano litigation.  Park-Ohio settled DiStefano’s case the next month, without 
Penn General’s formal consent, agreeing to pay $1 million in exchange for a full 
release and dismissal of the lawsuit.  After reviewing the terms, Penn General’s 
counsel concluded that the $1 million settlement between Park-Ohio and 
DiStefano was reasonable for several reasons: In similar mesothelioma cases local 
juries had recently awarded verdicts in the $3-million-to-$5-million range, Park-
Ohio’s evaluation report indicated that a conservative verdict in the DiStefano 
case could reach $5 million to $6 million, and DiStefano’s previous settlement 
demand had been $3 million.  The settlement in DiStefano’s lawsuit against Park-
Ohio was finalized in October 2002. 
{¶ 4} In September 2003, Park-Ohio filed a complaint for declaratory 
judgment against Penn General as its insurer, in the Cuyahoga County Court of 
Common Pleas, seeking a declaration that Penn General was obligated to defend 
Park-Ohio in the DiStefano lawsuit and that Penn General owed Park-Ohio 
indemnification for the full amount of the DiStefano settlement, compensatory 
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damages for damages, attorney fees, expenses, loss, and costs, and punitive 
damages.  During the litigation, Penn General had paid $250,000 to Park-Ohio as 
the full per-person bodily-injury limit of one of the policies at issue in the suit.  
But not until July 2004 did Park-Ohio’s counsel notify Penn General’s counsel 
that other insurance policies were discovered covering the timeframe during 
which DiStefano’s injuries were alleged to have occurred.  Until Park-Ohio as the 
insured produced these documents, Penn General had no knowledge of any other 
comprehensive general liability insurance coverage available during the dates 
relevant to the DiStefano case because Park-Ohio maintained sole control of this 
information. 
{¶ 5} Within two months of discovering the identity of other insurers, 
Penn General mailed letters providing notification of the DiStefano claim to 
appellant Nationwide Insurance Company, appellant Continental Casualty 
Company,1 and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company.  Each notification letter 
stated that Penn General assumed but wished to confirm that Park-Ohio had 
notified the insurer of the DiStefano claims.  Penn General also stated that it 
requested reimbursement from the insurer for litigation defense and 
indemnification paid and reserved the right to file an action for contribution from 
the insurer.  In October 2004, Penn General filed the present action against Park-
Ohio for a declaratory judgment and against Nationwide, Continental, and 
Travelers seeking equitable contribution, indemnification, and a declaratory 
judgment. 
                                                 
1.  The conditions section in Continental’s policy states:  “4. Insured’s Duties in the Event of 
Occurrence, Claim or Suit:  (a) In the event of an occurrence, written notice * * * shall be given by 
or for the insured to the company or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable.  * * * (b) 
If claim is made or suit is brought against the insured, the insured shall immediately forward to the 
company every demand, notice, summons or other process received by him or his representative.  
(c) * * * The insured shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any 
obligation or incur any expense other than for first aid to others at the time of accident.”  The 
relevant portions of the insurance policies issued to Park-Ohio by Nationwide are virtually 
identical.   
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 6} The earlier suit by Park-Ohio against the targeted insurer, Penn 
General, was settled in November 2005.  Penn General paid an additional 
$750,000, which, added to the $250,000 previously paid, totaled $1 million in 
payments to Park-Ohio and resulted in full payment of the DiStefano settlement.  
Soon after that settlement, Penn General also dismissed Park-Ohio from the 
present action. 
{¶ 7} Nationwide and Continental denied any obligation for contribution.  
Travelers settled with Penn General before trial and is no longer a party to the 
case.  After a bench trial, the trial court found that Nationwide and Continental 
had no obligation to indemnify or defend Park-Ohio from the DiStefano claims 
because Park-Ohio had breached the notification provisions of their policies, 
relieving the insurers of the obligation to indemnify or reimburse Penn General 
for any portion of the DiStefano settlement because they were “effectively 
prejudiced.”  Furthermore, the trial court found that Penn General did not take 
reasonable measures to preserve its contribution rights and did not notify the two 
other insurers in a timely and reasonable manner. 
{¶ 8} On appeal, Penn General argued that (1) Park-Ohio’s failure to 
comply with contracts to which Penn General was not a party should not defeat 
Penn General’s contribution claim, (2) the DiStefano claim was resolved in 
accordance with its contractual obligations to Park-Ohio, and (3) because it had 
complied with Goodyear, the equities of the case favored Penn General’s 
contribution claim.  The nontargeted insurers, Nationwide and Continental, 
responded that (1) they owed no coverage to Park-Ohio because their insured 
failed to provide them with prompt notice of the DiStefano claim, which was a 
breach of  their contracts, (2)  settlement of the claim without their approval 
breached the contracts, (3) Penn General’s failure to give reasonable notice of the 
suit and claim prejudiced their ability to participate in the DiStefano suit, and (4) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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they shared no common liability with Penn General and had no liability for 
contribution.  
{¶ 9} The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the judgment in 
favor of the nontargeted insurers and held that Goodyear controlled and that Penn 
General was entitled to contribution from Nationwide and Continental.  179 Ohio 
App.3d 385, 2008-Ohio-5991, 902 N.E.2d 53.  Responding to Nationwide and 
Continental’s argument that contribution is precluded by Park-Ohio’s failure to 
comply with their insurance policies, the court of appeals noted that this case is 
not a contract action and that Penn General’s claim sounds in equity.  Because the 
Goodyear rule does not give Nationwide and Continental a right to participate in 
the DiStefano litigation, the appellate court concluded that the insurance 
companies were not prejudiced by Park-Ohio’s failure to notify them of the claim.  
The court also held that because Penn General notified Nationwide and 
Continental of its intention to seek contribution from them within weeks of 
learning of Park-Ohio’s other insurers, it did not lose its right to contribution from 
the nontargeted insurers.  The court of appeals also concluded that the settlement 
was fair to all parties and that Penn General appropriately handled the claim. 
{¶ 10} We accepted jurisdiction over the first proposition of law in 
appellants’ discretionary appeal, which states, “No claim for contribution can be 
made against a nontargeted insurer pursuant to Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842, unless its policy is 
‘applicable.’  In order for the policy to be ‘applicable’ to a claim, there must be 
full compliance with all terms and conditions of coverage in the nontargeted 
insurer’s policy.”  121 Ohio St.3d 1472, 2009-Ohio-2045, 905 N.E.2d 653.  In 
other words, appellants seek to define “applicable” to allow nontargeted insurers 
to escape from liability for contribution unless they have been brought into a 
lawsuit from the beginning. 
II. Legal Analysis 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
A.  The All-Sums Approach of Goodyear 
{¶ 11} In Goodyear, this court was asked to decide whether Ohio law 
requires the use of the all-sums approach (joint and several liability) or the pro 
rata approach (time on the risk) to allocate insurance coverage for progressive 
injuries or damages among multiple insurers.  The all-sums approach allows an 
insured “to seek full coverage for its claims from any single policy, up to that 
policy’s coverage limits, out of the group of policies that has been triggered.”  
Goodyear, 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842, 769 N.E.2d 835, ¶ 6.  The 
insured selects one insurer (the “targeted insurer”), from which it is able to obtain 
a defense to the action and full coverage for any eventual judgment.  The targeted 
insurer is then able to file a later action against any other insurers (the 
“nontargeted insurers”) to obtain contribution.  The pro rata approach, on the 
other hand, requires an insurer to pay “only a portion of a claim based on the 
duration of the occurrence during its policy period in relation to the entire 
duration of the occurrence.”  Id.2 
{¶ 12} We adopted the all-sums approach and held that “when a 
continuous occurrence of environmental pollution triggers claims under multiple 
primary insurance policies, the insured is entitled to secure coverage from a single 
policy of its choice that covers ‘all sums’ incurred as damages ‘during the policy 
period,’ subject to that policy’s limit of coverage.”  Id. at ¶ 11.  In such an 
instance, any targeted insurer bears the burden of obtaining contribution from 
other applicable primary insurance policies as it deems necessary.  Id.  In 
explaining our decision to adopt the all-sums approach, we stated that “[t]his 
                                                 
2.  For example, consider an insured who is insured for a four-year period, with Insurer A 
providing coverage in the first and second years, Insurer B providing coverage in the third year, 
and Insurer C providing coverage in the fourth year.  Under the all-sums approach, the insured 
could select Insurer A as the targeted insurer and obtain full coverage.  Insurer A could then seek 
contribution from Insurer B and Insurer C for those insurers’ share of the coverage.  Under the pro 
rata method, each insurer’s liability is determined by its time on the risk. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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approach promotes economy for the insured while still permitting insurers to seek 
contribution from other responsible parties when possible.”  Id. 
{¶ 13} Appellants argue that Park-Ohio’s failure to notify them as 
nontargeted insurers of the DiStefano litigation violated the terms of their 
insurance policies and precludes coverage under Goodyear.  They reason that 
Goodyear allows for contribution only when a policy is applicable, and a policy is 
applicable only when the insured has complied fully with the terms of the 
insurance policy. 
B.  The Delay in Notifying the Targeted Insurers Was Not Unreasonable 
{¶ 14} We previously noted in Goodyear that when an insurance policy 
contains a notice provision, the insured must comply with that provision.  “Notice 
provisions in insurance contracts are conditions precedent to coverage, so an 
insured’s failure to give its insurer notice in a timely fashion bars coverage.”  
Goodyear, 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842, 769 N.E.2d 835, at ¶ 14.  Despite 
this statement, the Goodyear decision did not detail how the equitable all-sums 
approach to allocation affects contractual duties set forth in insurance policies.  
The court did, however, look to prior decisions for the definition of “timely” 
notice, stating that if notice is required to be given “as soon as practicable,” it 
must be given “ ‘within a reasonable time in light of all the surrounding facts and 
circumstances.’ ”  Id., quoting Ormet Primary Aluminum Corp. v. Emps. Ins. of 
Wausau (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 292, 725 N.E.2d 646, syllabus. 
{¶ 15} Appellants cite Ormet as support for their proposition that the 
delay in giving notice to appellants was unreasonable and resulted in prejudice 
due to their inability to be involved with the DiStefano litigation and settlement.  
In Ormet, the insured first learned of potential environmental problems in 1966.  
Ormet at 301.  The United States Environmental Protection Agency had identified 
the insured as a potentially responsible party for contamination with possible 
liability for all cleanup costs at its site in 1986.  Id. at 302.  In 1987, the insured 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
signed a settlement agreement with the United States EPA and the Ohio EPA but 
then delayed sending notice to its insurers until 1992.  Id.  We held that the 
insurers had demonstrated actual prejudice because a number of key witnesses 
had died since the events giving rise to the litigation and a number of other 
witnesses admitted that their memories of the events had substantially faded.  Id. 
at 303-304.  No insurer had notice of the proceedings until five years after the 
settlement agreement had been signed.  Id. 
{¶ 16} In Goodyear, we concluded that Ormet was distinguishable on its 
facts because the insured in Ormet did not notify its insurers until six years after 
being identified by the EPA and five years after entering into a settlement 
agreement dictating the terms of an environmental cleanup.  Goodyear, 95 Ohio 
St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842, 769 N.E.2d 835, at ¶ 15-17.  Ormet is similarly 
distinguishable here.  The DiStefano lawsuit was filed in March 2002, Park-Ohio 
notified Penn General of the pending litigation in August 2002, Park-Ohio settled 
the DiStefano litigation in October 2002, Park-Ohio filed suit against Penn 
General as a targeted insurer in September 2003, Park-Ohio notified Penn General 
of the nontargeted appellants’ policies in July 2004, and Penn General notified the 
nontargeted appellants’ of the claim in September 2004. 
{¶ 17} Unlike the insured in Ormet, which failed to notify any insurer 
until five years after signing the settlement agreement, Park-Ohio placed Penn 
General on notice while the DiStefano litigation was still pending.  In accordance 
with Goodyear, Park-Ohio selected Penn General as the targeted insurer, and 
Penn General provided notification of the claim to appellants approximately two 
months after being notified of appellants’ policies.  Because Goodyear created an 
equitable approach to the unique situation surrounding the allocation of liability in 
progressive-injury cases, Park-Ohio’s  notice to appellants can be seen as being 
“within a reasonable time in light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances” 
under Ormet. 
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C.  Appellants Did Not Suffer Prejudice and Are Liable for Contribution 
{¶ 18} It must be emphasized that the all-sums allocation method 
established in Goodyear is a remedy that is equitable in nature, and we must now 
consider how the nontargeted insurers’ contractual right to notice must be treated 
in light of the equitable all-sums approach.  In Goodyear, we stated that the all-
sums approach “promotes economy for the insured while still permitting insurers 
to seek contribution from other responsible parties when possible.”  Id. at ¶ 11.  
The Eighth District was correct when it noted that no privity of contract existed 
between Penn General and appellants Nationwide and Continental.  The 
Nationwide and Continental insurance policies were contracts between those 
insurers and Park-Ohio.  It would be inequitable to hold that Park-Ohio’s failure 
to abide by the notice provisions in the Nationwide and Continental policies 
eliminates Penn General’s right to contribution, given the equitable nature of the 
all-sums approach to allocation and the fact that Penn General followed the 
procedure established in Goodyear during the litigation. 
{¶ 19} In keeping with the equitable nature of the all-sums approach to 
allocation, we clarify Goodyear by stating that the insured has a duty to cooperate 
with the targeted insurer.  While Goodyear allows the insured to choose a targeted 
insurer from which it may recover a full amount of indemnification, this does not 
mean that the insured may engage in tactics to delay or obstruct the targeted 
insurer in the process of obtaining contribution from nontargeted insurers. When 
the targeted insurer requests information from the insured regarding other policies 
that may also cover the claim, the insured has a duty to cooperate by identifying 
those policies.  The failure to notify nontargeted insurers will not necessarily 
foreclose contribution from nontargeted insurers to the targeted insurer. 
{¶ 20} If the failure to notify nontargeted insurers pursuant to the relevant 
insurance policies results in prejudice to the nontargeted insurers, then the 
nontargeted insurers will not be required to contribute to the targeted insurer.  In 
January Term, 2010 
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cases in which the nontargeted insurers have not been prejudiced by a failure to 
notify, the equitable nature of the all-sums approach requires that those 
nontargeted insurers will still be liable in a contribution action brought by the 
targeted insurer. 
{¶ 21} Appellants argue that Penn General should be barred from 
obtaining contribution because Park-Ohio’s delay in notification resulted in 
prejudice to appellants.  “An insured’s unreasonable delay in giving notice is 
presumed prejudicial to the insurer absent evidence to the contrary.”  Ferrando v. 
Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St.3d 186, 2002-Ohio-7217, 781 N.E.2d 927, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  Nationwide and Continental assert that they were 
prejudiced because they had no opportunity to defend their interests in the 
DiStefano matter, including investigating the claim, choosing counsel, and 
determining litigation and settlement strategies.  These facts, however, do not 
amount to prejudice, as they are the natural result of Goodyear’s all-sums 
approach, which was designed to streamline the recovery process for the insured 
by permitting the insured to choose one primary targeted insurer with which to 
deal during the litigation.  The decision in Goodyear presupposes that some 
insurers might not receive an opportunity to sit at the negotiation table and that 
those insurers must wait for a resolution in the underlying case.  Furthermore, as 
noted above, Park-Ohio’s delay in notifying Nationwide and Continental was not 
unreasonable, because the delay occurred while Park-Ohio and Penn General 
moved through the all-sums procedures established in Goodyear.  Because 
Goodyear remains viable, Park-Ohio and Penn General’s adherence to the all-
sums approach does not in and of itself result in prejudice to the nontargeted 
insurers. 
{¶ 22} While it is true that Nationwide and Continental did not receive 
notification of the DiStefano suit until two and a half years after that suit was 
filed, they were not prejudiced by the delay.  The terms of the settlement were 
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reasonable.  As noted in attorney Rome’s report, the $1 million settlement was far 
below the $3-million-to-$5-million range of recent jury verdicts in similar cases 
and the previous $3 million settlement offer.  Furthermore, any delay in notifying 
Nationwide and Continental was not unreasonable.  Considering the Goodyear 
rule, Nationwide and Continental were not to become involved in the case until 
Penn General brought its contribution action, which it accordingly did in October 
2004.  Because the DiStefano settlement was reasonable and because the delay in 
notifying Nationwide and Continental occurred while Penn General followed the 
approach established in Goodyear, we hold that appellants were not prejudiced by 
Park-Ohio’s failure to provide timely notification. 
{¶ 23} Because we hold today that Nationwide and Continental have not 
been prejudiced in this case, we do not address the issue of what consequences 
might result if a nontargeted insurer is prejudiced by an insured’s failure to notify. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 24} When loss or damage occurs over time and involves multiple 
insurance-policy periods and multiple insurers, a claim may be made by the 
targeted insurer against a nontargeted insurer with applicable insurance policies 
for contribution.  We therefore affirm the holding of the court of appeals that 
Goodyear controls in this case.  However, we do explain Goodyear to make clear 
that when the targeted insurer requests information from the insured regarding 
other policies that may also cover the claim, the insured has a duty to cooperate 
with the targeted insurer by identifying those policies; but failure to timely notify 
a nontargeted insurer of a pending claim does not automatically make that 
insurer’s policy inapplicable for contribution to the targeted insurer.  Lack of 
notification to a nontargeted insurer will bar the targeted insurer’s claim for 
contribution against that nontargeted insurer only if the failure to notify resulted 
in prejudice to that nontargeted insurer.  Because appellants were not prejudiced, 
we affirm the decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 25} I concur with the clarification of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842, 769 N.E.2d 835, in 
this case.  However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s legal conclusion 
that the appellants were not prejudiced by Park-Ohio’s failure to provide timely 
notification of the DiStefano lawsuit.  In light of the clarification of Goodyear, I 
believe that we should remand this case for the trial court to conduct an inquiry 
into the actual prejudice, if any, suffered by Nationwide and Continental as a 
result of the delay. 
{¶ 26} The trial court decided this issue on contractual grounds, finding 
that because Nationwide and Continental did not get notice of the DiStefano 
lawsuit until almost two years after the case was settled, they were “effectively 
prejudiced” by the failure of notice and the settlement of the case.  However, the 
trial court made no factual findings of actual prejudice. 
{¶ 27} The court of appeals likewise made sweeping legal conclusions 
regarding prejudice without a factual record before it.  The appellate court merely 
concluded that “applying equitable principles to these facts, we cannot discern, 
nor have Nationwide and Continental demonstrated, any prejudice arising from 
Pennsylvania General’s notice.”  179 Ohio App.3d 385, 2008-Ohio-5991, 902 
N.E.2d 53, ¶ 30.  In addition, the court concluded that Nationwide and 
Continental had no right to participate in the DiStefano litigation; thus, they could 
not have been prejudiced by the inability to participate.  ¶ 32. 
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{¶ 28} Now this court also concludes that there is an absence of prejudice 
despite no factual findings to support its conclusion.  I believe that the parties are 
entitled to an opportunity to litigate the issue of actual prejudice.  They may be 
unable to establish actual prejudice, but after having clarified that as the 
appropriate standard, we then deny the insurers the right to a hearing on the issue.  
Although the settlement may be reasonable, that alone does not establish the 
absence of prejudice.  There are other issues such as the destruction of 
subrogation rights. 
{¶ 29} There is no question that Park-Ohio breached its contractual duties 
to Nationwide and Continental.  I believe we should remand for the parties to 
litigate the issue of actual prejudice resulting from the breach of duty under the 
standards set forth today. 
__________________ 
 
Davis & Young and Richard M. Garner; and Christie Parabue Mortensen 
Young and Elaine Whiteman Klinger, for appellee. 
 
Mazanec, Raskin, Ryder & Keller Co., L.P.A., John T. McLandrich, 
Thomas S. Mazanec, and Frank H. Scialdone, for appellant Nationwide Insurance 
Company. 
 
Troutman Sanders, L.L.P., and Rebecca L. Ross; Quinn, Emanuel, 
Urquhart, Oliver & Hedges, L.L.P., Kathleen M. Sullivan, and Jane M. Byrne; 
and Gallagher Sharp, Paul J. Schumacher, and Timothy Fitzgerald, for appellant 
Continental Casualty Company. 
 
Brouse McDowell, Paul A. Rose, Sallie Conley Lux, and Amanda M. 
Leffler, for amici curiae Ohio Manufacturers’ Association, Bridgestone Americas 
Tire Operations, L.L.C., Dana Holding Corporation, Day-Glo Color Corporation, 
Goodrich Corporation, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Lincoln Electric 
Company, Lubrizol Corporation, Pilkington North America, Inc., Procter & 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
Gamble Company, RPM, Inc., Resco Holdings, L.L.C., Sherwin-Williams 
Company, Tremco Incorporated, and United Policyholders. 
Frantz Ward, L.L.P., Stephen F. Gladstone, and Brendan M. Gallagher, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae Complex Insurance Claims Litigation 
Association. 
Duane Morris, L.L.P., Phillip R. Matthews, and William J. Baron, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Great American Insurance Company. 
Thomson Hine, L.L.P., Alan F. Berliner, Phillip B. Sineneng, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae The Ohio Insurance Institute. 
______________________