Case Title: State v. Wilton Tye

Citation: 2001 WI 124

Docket Number: 1999AP003331-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 124 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-3331-CR 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Wilton Tye,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 27, 3001   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Emily S. Mueller   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH and WILCOX, J.J., join concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by William 
L. Gansner, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Mark D. 
Richards and Christy M. Hall, Racine, and oral argument by Mark 
D. Richards. 
 
 
2001 WI 124 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official 
reports.   
No.  99-3331-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 F 550) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Wilton Tye,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 27, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Racine 
County, Emily S. Mueller, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This case 
comes before the court on a certification by the court of 
appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.60 (1999-2000).1  The State 
appeals an order of the Circuit Court for Racine County, Emily 
S. Mueller, Circuit Court Judge, suppressing evidence seized 
pursuant to a search warrant.  We affirm the order. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
99-3331-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The circuit court granted the motion of the defendant 
Wilton Tye to suppress evidence of drugs seized during a search 
of his residence.  The warrant authorizing the search was not 
supported by a statement under oath or affirmation.  The circuit 
court suppressed the evidence seized, holding that the warrant 
violated the oath or affirmation requirement explicitly set 
forth in the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, 
that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation."2  Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution similarly states, in relevant part, that 
"no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation."3 
¶3 
The parties agree, and we hold, that the total absence 
of any statement under oath to support a search warrant violates 
the explicit oath or affirmation requirement of both the federal 
and state constitutions and that the warrant therefore is 
constitutionally infirm.  The question presented is whether 
evidence seized pursuant to such a search warrant must be 
                                                 
2 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is applied 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.  Walberg v. Deisler, 73 Wis. 2d 448, 455, 243 
N.W.2d 190 (1976).   
3 Except for the use of the singular "warrant," Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution is identical to the 
Fourth Amendment. 
No. 
99-3331-CR   
 
3 
 
suppressed.  We conclude that the evidence seized must be 
suppressed. 
 
I 
 
¶4 
For the purposes of the motion to suppress, the facts 
are not in dispute.  A 30-year veteran investigator of the city 
of Racine police department drafted an affidavit in support of a 
search warrant for a residence occupied by the defendant.  The 
investigator presented the affidavit to an assistant district 
attorney 
for 
review 
and 
approval, 
and 
she 
approved 
the 
affidavit.   
¶5 
The investigator then presented the affidavit to 
Racine County Circuit Court Judge Dennis Flynn on June 28, 1999.  
The investigator failed, however, to sign and swear to the truth 
of the affidavit written in support of the search warrant and 
failed to give sworn testimony attesting to the accuracy of the 
statements in the affidavit.  The circuit court issued the 
warrant.  Neither the assistant district attorney who initially 
reviewed the affidavit nor the circuit court judge who issued 
the warrant nor the investigator detected that the investigator 
failed to make the allegations contained in the affidavit under 
oath.  The warrant states that attached thereto is the "sworn 
affidavit which is incorporated by reference."  The warrant was 
facially defective because no sworn affidavit was attached. 
¶6 
After the warrant was issued on June 28, 1999, the 
investigator copied the face of the search warrant, placed the 
No. 
99-3331-CR   
 
4 
 
original search warrant and attached affidavit in a file and did 
not review these documents again until July 1, 1999, after the 
search warrant had been executed and he was preparing the return 
on the search warrant.  Heroin and other evidence were seized 
during the search, indicating that the residence was being used 
for heroin sales.  
¶7 
On July 1, 1999, upon returning from executing the 
search warrant, the investigator realized that the affidavit 
supporting the warrant had not been given under oath.  The 
investigator 
notified 
the 
district 
attorney's 
office 
and 
prepared a second affidavit describing the search warrant 
application process, his failure to sign and swear to the 
initial affidavit, and his discovery of these facts after he 
executed the search warrant.  The second affidavit also stated 
that the contents of the initial affidavit were true.  The 
investigator then swore to the truth of the statements contained 
in the second affidavit.  The circuit court concluded, and the 
parties stipulated, that the allegations in the affidavit, if 
true, provided probable cause for issuance of the search 
warrant. 
 
II 
 
¶8 
To frame our discussion, we begin by examining the 
historical antecedents of the oath requirement of both the 
federal and state constitutions.  The oath or affirmation 
requirement relating to search warrants first appeared, albeit 
No. 
99-3331-CR   
 
5 
 
briefly, in England.  In 1662, Parliament authorized the 
issuance of general warrants, known as Writs of Assistance, for 
collecting taxes and enforcing customs laws.4  The 1662 English 
law required officials seeking search warrants to swear an oath 
as a means of controlling the unfettered discretion of the 
searcher.5  In 1664, Parliament deleted the oath requirement,6 
and in 1696 an act of William III officially applied the Writs 
of Assistance without the explicit oath requirement to the 
American colonies.7  Thereafter, the writs were used in the 
American colonies to search wherever government officials chose 
with nearly absolute and unlimited discretion.  This power 
continued in the colonies well into the eighteenth century. 
¶9 
The colonists viewed the Writs of Assistance as 
fundamental violations of their basic right to be undisturbed in 
their person and property.  The "[p]erceived abuses . . . were 
among the most deeply felt grievances held by the colonists 
against British government."8  Following independence, each of 
                                                 
4 Nelson B. Lasson, The History and Development of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 28 (1937). 
5 William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the 
"Per Se" Rule: Justice Stewart's Struggle to Preserve the Fourth 
Amendment Warrant Clause, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1013, 1024 
(1994). 
6 Id. at 1098 n.45. 
7 Nelson B. Lasson, The History and Development of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 53 (1937).   
8 4 Sanford H. Kadish, Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 
1416 (1983).   
No. 
99-3331-CR   
 
6 
 
the state constitutions guaranteed individuals the right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  In 1776, the 
Pennsylvania Constitution made an oath or affirmation essential 
to the validity of a warrant.  The Pennsylvania provision was 
the basis for the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
which included the oath or affirmation language.  The states 
ratified the Fourth Amendment in 1791 as part of the Bill of 
Rights. 
¶10 In 1839, three years after the Organic Act of 1836 
created the Territory of Wisconsin, the territorial legislature 
enacted Act 44, which required an oath in an application for a 
search warrant.9  When Wisconsin became a state in 1848, the 
declaration of rights in the Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, 
Section 11, required an oath or affirmation to support the 
issuance of a search warrant.  This constitutional provision has 
never 
been 
amended 
and 
remains 
part 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.   
¶11 The Wisconsin state constitutional oath provision has 
been reinforced by legislation.  The 1848 Wisconsin legislature 
reiterated the need for an oath in an application for certain 
search warrants.10  The text of this statutory provision has been 
revised numerous times, eventually permitting telephonic search 
                                                 
9 Section 2, ch. 44, Statutes of the Territory of Wisconsin 
1839.  
10 Wis. Stat. § 2, ch. 142 (1849): "Any such magistrate when 
satisfied that there is reasonable cause, may also, upon like 
complaint made on oath, issue search warrants . . . ." 
No. 
99-3331-CR   
 
7 
 
warrant applications.11  Nonetheless, the oath requirement has 
remained throughout.12  Most state constitutions presently 
include an oath or affirmation requirement for a search 
warrant.13  
¶12 This cursory review of the oath or affirmation 
requirement demonstrates the 
critical 
importance 
that the 
drafters of the federal and state constitutions have placed on 
the oath to support a search warrant.  
¶13 This court has long recognized an oath or affirmation 
as an essential prerequisite to obtaining a valid search warrant 
under the state constitution.  As early as 1924, this court held 
in State v. Baltes, 183 Wis. 545, 198 N.W. 282 (1924), that when 
no sworn testimony exists to support a search warrant, then the 
warrant is void.  In Baltes, the magistrate did not administer 
an oath to any of the individuals providing information for the 
issuance of the search warrant.  The Baltes court stated that 
                                                 
11 Wis. Stat. § 363.02 (1949) (search warrant issues upon "a 
sworn complaint or affidavit, or of oral testimony recorded by a 
phonographic reporter"); Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3)(a) (1983-84) 
(allows a judge to "issue a warrant based upon sworn oral 
testimony communicated by telephone, radio, or other means of 
electronic communication."). 
12 Under current law, a search warrant may be based either 
"upon sworn complaint or affidavit, or testimony recorded by a 
phonographic reporter" under Wis. Stat. § 968.12(2), or "upon 
sworn oral testimony communicated to the judge by telephone, 
radio or other means of electronic communication" under Wis. 
Stat. § 968.12(3)(a). 
13 See 
Westlaw 
search: 
PR(constitution) 
& 
oath 
/25 
affirmation /99 warrant!  
No. 
99-3331-CR   
 
8 
 
"the magistrate should examine under oath the applicant for the 
search warrant and his witnesses . . . at least so much thereof 
as he relied upon in issuing the warrant . . . ."14  The Baltes 
court also unequivocally stated that the "essential prerequisite 
to the issuance of a valid search warrant is the taking of sworn 
testimony from the applicant and witnesses, if any . . . ."15  
The information provided to support the issuance of a warrant 
"must be sworn to."16  The Baltes court then suppressed the 
evidence because no sworn testimony existed to support the 
warrant.17  This court has repeatedly cited Baltes for the 
proposition that a valid search warrant requires an oath or 
affirmation.18 
¶14 Cognizant of the significance of the constitutional 
requirement of an oath or affirmation, the State acknowledges, 
and we agree with the State, that the "failure to swear to the 
information upon which a warrant is obtained cannot be dismissed 
                                                 
14 State v. Baltes, 183 Wis. 545, 552, 198 N.W. 282 (1924). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 See, e.g., Walberg v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 448, 455, 243 
N.W.2d 190 (1976) (citing Pflanz); State ex rel. Pflanz v. 
County Court, 36 Wis. 2d 550, 561, 153 N.W.2d 559 (1967); Kraus 
v. State, 226 Wis. 383, 385, 276 N.W. 303 (1937); Glodowski v. 
State, 196 Wis. 265, 268, 220 N.W. 227 (1928); Bergeman v. 
State, 189 Wis. 615, 617, 208 N.W. 470 (1926); Hansen v. State, 
188 Wis. 266, 268, 205 N.W. 813 (1925); State v. Blumenstein, 
186 Wis. 428, 430, 202 N.W. 684 (1925). 
No. 
99-3331-CR   
 
9 
 
as a mere failure to comply with a technicality."19  As the 
circuit court wisely stated, the oath or affirmation requirement 
"is so basic to the Fourth Amendment that the Court simply can't 
look at it as a technical irregularity not affecting the 
substantial rights of the defendant."   
¶15 However, the State makes four arguments to support its 
position that the seized evidence should not be suppressed:20  
First, it relies on Wis. Stat. § 968.22, which provides that no 
evidence shall be suppressed for a technical irregularity in the 
warrant if that irregularity does not affect the substantial 
rights of the defendant.  Second, the State argues that the 
second sworn affidavit remedies the defect of the initial 
unsworn affidavit.  Third, the State relies on State v. 
Nicholson, 174 Wis. 2d 542, 497 N.W.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1993), to 
argue that an error in a warrant does not require suppression of 
seized evidence.  Fourth, the State requests the court to allow 
the admission of the seized evidence under a good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  We examine each of these 
four arguments in turn. 
¶16 First, the State relies on Wis. Stat. § 968.22 to save 
the seized evidence from suppression.  Section 968.22 provides 
that "[n]o evidence seized under a search warrant shall be 
                                                 
19 State's Brief at 17. 
20 The four arguments relate to the application of the 
statutory and constitutional provisions to undisputed facts.  
These four arguments present issues of law that this court 
determines independently of the circuit court, but benefiting 
from its analysis. 
No. 
99-3331-CR   
 
10 
 
suppressed because of technical irregularities not affecting the 
substantial rights of the defendant." 
¶17 The State concedes that the constitutional requirement 
of an oath or affirmation is not a technicality.  The State 
nevertheless, and perhaps in a somewhat contradictory fashion, 
argues that the absence of a sworn statement to support the 
search warrant in this case is a technical irregularity not 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and that the 
seizure of evidence under this warrant is admissible under 
Wis. Stat. § 968.22.   
¶18 The essence of the State's position is that the 
failure to support an application for a search warrant by any 
sworn 
information 
whatsoever 
is 
"a 
matter 
of 
form, 
not 
substance."21  The State summarizes its position by stating that 
"while the oath is not a mere technicality, it is a matter of 
formality."22 
¶19 We disagree with the State.  An oath is a matter of 
substance, not form, and it is an essential component of the 
Fourth Amendment and legal proceedings.  The purpose of an oath 
or affirmation is to impress upon the swearing individual an 
appropriate sense of obligation to tell the truth.23  An oath or 
affirmation to support a search warrant reminds both the 
                                                 
21 State's Brief at 15. 
22 Id. at 16. 
23 Kellner v. Christian, 197 Wis. 2d 183, 192, 539 N.W.2d 
685 (1995). 
No. 
99-3331-CR   
 
11 
 
investigator seeking the search warrant and the magistrate 
issuing it of the importance and solemnity of the process 
involved.24  An oath or affirmation protects the target of the 
search from impermissible state action by creating liability for 
perjury25 or false swearing26 for those who abuse the warrant 
process by giving false or fraudulent information.  An oath 
preserves the integrity of the search warrant process and thus 
protects the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right of 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
¶20 The State's second argument is that the investigator's 
sworn statement, made after the warrant was issued and executed, 
remedies the absence of a sworn statement before the issuance of 
the search warrant.  
¶21 We are not persuaded that the two affidavits are 
interchangeable as suggested by the State.  Curing the absence 
of an oath or affirmation before a circuit court issues a 
warrant by permitting the swearing of an oath or affirmation 
                                                 
24 Lynn B. Oberlander, A First Amendment Right of Access to 
Affidavits in Support of Search Warrants, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 
2216, 2240-42 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and 
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1409, 1467 (1990); William W. Greenhalgh and Mark J. 
Yost, In Defense of the "Per Se" Rule: Justice Stewart's 
Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause, 31 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1013, 1024 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1457, 
1491 n.57 (1997). 
25 Wis. Stat. § 946.31. 
26 Wis. Stat. § 946.32. 
No. 
99-3331-CR   
 
12 
 
after 
the 
warrant 
was 
executed 
eviscerates 
the 
oath 
or 
affirmation requirement.  An after-the-fact oath or affirmation 
disregards the historical importance of the oath or affirmation 
as the basis upon which a neutral magistrate issues a warrant.  
The State acknowledges that its research has revealed no case 
law in Wisconsin or elsewhere "supporting the proposition that 
failure to have a warrant investigator swear to a search warrant 
application before approval and issuance of a warrant can be 
cured by the investigator's swearing to the affidavit after 
issuance of the warrant."27  We will not create such a remedy for 
the total absence of an oath or affirmation required by the 
federal and state constitutions. 
¶22 Third, the State relies on Nicholson, 174 Wis. 2d 542, 
to support its claim that an unintended mistake in a search 
warrant does not vitiate the warrant and is not cause to 
suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.  In 
Nicholson, the affidavit and the search warrant correctly 
described in detail the premises to be searched, but gave the 
wrong street address.  The correct address was 1510 State 
Street, while the address in the warrant was 1512 State Street.  
The officers searched the correct premises on the basis of the 
detailed description in the warrant. 
¶23 The information before the judge in Nicholson was 
sworn to and the search warrant met the requirement of the 
federal and state constitutions that the warrant "particularly" 
                                                 
27 State's Brief at 14-15. 
No. 
99-3331-CR   
 
13 
 
describe the place to be searched.28  So in Nicholson, the 
warrant was valid when issued.  Only while executing the warrant 
did the police officers learn that the warrant recited the wrong 
address.  The officers continued the search because they were on 
the premises correctly described in the warrant except for the 
street number.  The mistake in Nicholson could easily be 
characterized as a technical irregularity not affecting the 
substantial rights of the defendant.  But in the present case, 
the error was a wholesale failure in the constitutionally 
required process of obtaining a search warrant.  In the present 
case the warrant was invalid when issued.  Consequently, 
Nicholson is inapplicable. 
¶24 Fourth and finally, the State asks this court to allow 
admission of the seized evidence under a good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule.29  This court adopted a version of the 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in State v. Eason, 
2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  However, we do not 
extend the good-faith exception to a warrant issued on the basis 
of a statement that totally lacks an oath or affirmation, as in 
                                                 
28 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wis. Const. art. I, § 2. 
29 We do not adopt the rule set forth in United States v. 
Richardson, 943 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1991), as the State urges.  
In Richardson, a law enforcement officer was not placed under 
oath when applying for a search warrant.  The Richardson court 
held that the warrant was constitutionally infirm but fell 
within a good-faith exception because the error was inadvertent 
and not dishonest or reckless.  See also United States v. Moore, 
968 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1992) (lack of oath or affirmation did not 
destroy warrant's facial validity because the absence of an oath 
was an oversight). 
No. 
99-3331-CR   
 
14 
 
the present case.  The exclusionary rule applies when no oath or 
affirmation supports a search warrant; "it is plainly evident 
that a magistrate or judge had no business issuing a warrant."30 
¶25 For the reasons set forth, we affirm the order of the 
circuit court granting the defendant's motion to suppress the 
evidence. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 264 (1983) (White, J. 
concurring in judgment).  See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 
U.S. 981, 991 n.7 (1984) (quoting Justice White that there are 
circumstances when "it is plainly evident that a magistrate or 
judge had no business issuing a warrant."). 
No.  99-3331.npc 
 
 
 
1
¶26 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority opinion that the search warrant, absent the oath 
requirement, violates both the federal and state constitutions.  
I write separately only to explain further why the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply.   
¶27 As the majority opinion recognizes, we adopted the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in State v. Eason, 
2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  Majority op. at 
¶24.  After an extensive review of United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897 (1984), and the development of the good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule in this court, we held that suppression 
was not necessary when police officers reasonably relied upon a 
warrant issued by an independent magistrate, even though the 
"no-knock" portion of the warrant was constitutionally infirm.  
Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶73.  In adopting the good faith exception, 
we also recognized, however, that the good faith exception has 
parameters31.  Id. at ¶¶36, 64, 66.  In Leon, the United States 
                                                 
31 Based on the Wisconsin Constitution,  
we require that in order for the good faith exception 
to apply, the State must show that the process used 
attended to obtaining the search warrant include a 
significant investigation and a review by a police 
officer trained in, or very knowledgeable of, the 
legal 
vagaries 
of probable cause 
and 
reasonable 
suspicion, or a knowledgeable government attorney. 
State v. 
Eason, 2001 WI 
98, ¶63, 
245 Wis. 2d 206, 610 
N.W.2d 208.  Accordingly, in Wisconsin, the good faith exception 
must be applied within the parameters of United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897 (1984), as well as the additional parameters we 
adopted in State v. Eason, 2001 WI App 98, ¶63, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 
610 N.W.2d 208. 
No.  99-3331.npc 
 
 
 
2
Supreme Court set out four circumstances where even though an 
officer has obtained a warrant and abided by its terms, 
exclusion may be appropriate.  468 U.S. at 923; see also Eason, 
2001 WI 98, ¶36.  The good faith exception does not apply:   (1) 
where the issuing magistrate has been knowingly misled; (2) 
where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his or her 
judicial role; (3) where the application is so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause as to render reliance upon it 
unreasonable; and (4) where the warrant is so facially deficient 
that reliance upon it is unreasonable.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; 
see also Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶36. 
¶28 The facts of this case fall squarely within the fourth 
exception to the good faith exception.  A warrant that totally 
lacks an oath or affirmation is so facially deficient that 
reliance upon the warrant is unreasonable.  An officer, who 
obtains or executes a search warrant unsupported by an oath or 
affirmation, 
cannot 
reasonably 
rely 
on 
that 
warrant.  
Accordingly, the good faith exception does not apply and 
exclusion is appropriate.32 
                                                 
32 I agree with the majority's decision not to apply the 
good faith exception used in United States v. Richardson, 943 
F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1991) or United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216 
(2d Cir. 1992).  Both cases are distinguishable because it was 
the 
magistrate's 
inadvertent 
failure 
to 
place 
the 
law 
enforcement officer under oath, or require an oath, that caused 
the warrants in those cases to be constitutionally infirm.  See 
Richardson, 943 F.2d at 550-551; Moore, 968 F.2d at 223.  
Furthermore, the officer in Moore signed the search warrant 
application whereas the officer in this case failed to sign and 
swear to the truth of the affidavit.  See Moore, 968 F.2d at 
220. 
No.  99-3331.npc 
 
 
 
3
¶29 Furthermore, 
although 
not 
dispositive 
in 
finding 
reliance on the warrant unreasonable, it cannot be overlooked 
that here, the same officer obtained and executed the warrant. 
In examining whether there was objectively reasonable reliance, 
"we look to the conduct of all the officers associated with the 
warrant."  Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶66 n.33. Here, only one officer 
was involved.  The fact that the officer who failed to sign and 
swear to the truth of the affidavit is the same officer who 
executed the facially invalid warrant simply adds to the 
unreasonableness of the reliance. 
¶30 Although I agree with the majority that the search 
warrant in this case is constitutionally infirm, I would not 
summarily dismiss the State's argument under the good faith 
exception.  This case presents an opportunity to clarify further 
the good faith exception in Wisconsin, by explaining the 
circumstances under which an officer may obtain and execute a 
warrant 
according 
to 
its 
terms, 
but 
exclusion 
remains 
appropriate because the warrant was facially deficient, making 
the officer's reliance on the warrant unreasonable.  
¶31 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶32 I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  99-3331.npc 
 
 
 
1