Case Title: In re B.S.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 322A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-71 
No. 322A20 
Filed 18 June 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: B.S. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 16 
March 2020 by Judge Monica Bousman in District Court, Wake County. This matter 
was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 22 April 2021 but determined 
on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Mary Boyce Wells for petitioner-appellee Wake County Human Services. 
 
Michelle FormyDuval Lynch for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Garron T. Michael for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
BARRINGER, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent appeals from the order terminating his parental rights to his 
minor child B.S. (Bailey).1 The trial court found that grounds existed to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (5) and 
that termination was in Bailey’s best interests. Respondent has not challenged on 
appeal the trial court’s conclusion that the ground for termination pursuant to 
                                            
1 The pseudonym “Bailey” is used throughout this opinion to protect the identity of 
the juvenile and for ease of reading. 
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N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) existed or that termination was in Bailey’s best interests. 
Respondent instead contends that this Court should reverse the trial court’s order as 
to this ground for termination of respondent’s parental rights because he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. As we conclude that respondent has not carried his 
burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm the trial court’s order 
terminating the parental rights of respondent to Bailey. 
I. 
Background 
¶ 2 
 
Wake County Human Services (WCHS) became involved with Bailey at the 
time of her birth when Bailey and her mother tested positive for cocaine. Bailey’s 
mother was also homeless and suffering from mental health issues which required 
hospitalization. 
¶ 3 
 
On 18 July 2018, WCHS filed a petition alleging that Bailey and her two half-
siblings were neglected juveniles.2 Respondent and Bailey’s mother subsequently 
consented to the entry of an order adjudicating Bailey a neglected juvenile, which was 
entered on 16 October 2018. In this consent order on adjudication and disposition, 
the trial court ordered respondent to submit to genetic marker testing and to 
establish legal paternity if found to be the biological father of Bailey. At the time, 
respondent was incarcerated and denied knowing Bailey’s mother and being Bailey’s 
biological father. Nevertheless, on 15 January 2019, respondent was determined to 
                                            
2 This appeal does not involve Bailey’s half-siblings or her mother. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
be the biological father of Bailey after respondent submitted to genetic marker 
testing. Respondent continued to deny that he was the biological father of Bailey until 
a social worker sent him a copy of the genetic marker report in late January 2019. 
¶ 4 
 
After respondent was released from incarceration, WCHS filed a motion for 
termination of the parental rights of Bailey’s mother, respondent, and the known or 
unknown fathers of Bailey’s two half-siblings. WCHS alleged that grounds existed to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and 
(5). The termination-of-parental-rights hearing was conducted over four days in 
November 2019 and January and February 2020. On 16 March 2020, the trial court 
entered an order terminating respondent’s parental rights. The trial court concluded 
that WCHS had proven all three alleged grounds for termination, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), (2), (5), and that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in 
Bailey’s best interests. The trial court’s findings of fact included that: 
[Respondent] was served with a copy of the petition filed 
July 18, 2018 which contained the name of the child and 
her date of birth. He had access to paper, envelopes, and 
stamps while he was incarcerated. He corresponded via 
U.S. Mail with both the social worker and his attorney in 
this case. He had the means to file an affidavit of paternity 
with [WCHS]. The same attorney has been appointed to 
represent him in this case and also in cases involving two 
other children. In a termination of parental rights order 
filed for two of [respondent]’s other children on August 7, 
2019, finding of fact #31 indicates that [respondent] filed 
an affidavit of parentage for another of his children. In 
orders filed on October 16, 2018, February 1, 2019, and 
July 24, 2019 the [c]ourt ordered . . . [respondent] to 
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establish “legal paternity” if genetic marker testing showed 
him to be the biological father of the child. While N.C.G.S. 
§[ ]7B-1111(a)(5) does not require that an unwed father 
have actual notice that a ground exist[s] for termination of 
parental rights unless paternity and/or legitimation is 
established prior to the filing of a termination of . . . 
parental rights action, [respondent] was on “notice” that he 
was to establish legal paternity beginning with the 
disposition order filed October 16, 2018. He had “notice” 
that he could have sired a child when he had a sexual 
encounter with [Bailey’s mother]. He further knew by late 
January 2019 that genetic marker testing showed him to 
be the biological father of [Bailey] which was more than six 
months before the motion to terminate his parental rights 
was filed. 
 
¶ 5 
 
Respondent appealed. 
¶ 6 
 
On appeal, respondent challenges several findings of fact as not supported by 
competent evidence and the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed for 
termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2). However, respondent has 
neither challenged the trial court’s conclusion that the ground for termination 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) had been established nor challenged any 
findings of fact supporting this conclusion. Thus, it is undisputed that respondent 
failed to establish legal paternity as required by the trial court’s order and failed to 
do any of the acts specified in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5)(a)–(e). 
¶ 7 
 
Subsection 7B-1111(a)(5) provides that a trial court may terminate parental 
rights upon a finding that: 
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The father of a juvenile born out of wedlock has not, prior 
to the filing of a petition or motion to terminate parental 
rights, done any of the following: 
a. Filed an affidavit of paternity in a central registry 
maintained by the Department of Health and Human 
Services. The petitioner or movant shall inquire of the 
Department of Health and Human Services as to 
whether such an affidavit has been so filed and the 
Department’s certified reply shall be submitted to and 
considered by the court. 
b. Legitimated the juvenile pursuant to provisions of G.S. 
49-10, G.S. 49-12.1, or filed a petition for this specific 
purpose. 
c. Legitimated the juvenile by marriage to the mother of 
the juvenile. 
d. Provided substantial financial support or consistent 
care with respect to the juvenile and mother. 
e. Established paternity through G.S. 49-14, 110-132, 
130A-101, 130A-118, or other judicial proceeding. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) (2019). 
¶ 8 
 
Respondent, however, argues for the first time on appeal that his appointed 
trial counsel was ineffective. Respondent contends that because he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court should reverse the portion of the trial 
court’s order concluding that the ground set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) existed 
to terminate his parental rights. 
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II. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 
¶ 9 
 
As “a finding of only one ground is necessary to support a termination of 
parental rights,” In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 194 (2019), and respondent has not 
challenged the conclusion or findings of fact supporting the trial court’s conclusion 
that the ground set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) existed to terminate his parental 
rights, we must affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights 
if respondent has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
Juvenile Code provides that “[i]n cases where the juvenile petition alleges that a 
juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-602(a) (2019), and “[w]hen 
a petition [for termination of parental rights] is filed,” the parent “has the right to 
counsel, and to appointed counsel in cases of indigency, unless the parent waives the 
right,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.1(a) (2019). When addressing a contention by a respondent 
that he or she received ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court has explained that: 
Parents have a right to counsel in all proceedings dedicated 
to the termination of parental rights. Counsel necessarily 
must provide effective assistance, as the alternative would 
render any statutory right to counsel potentially 
meaningless. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of 
counsel, 
respondent 
must 
show 
that 
counsel’s 
performance was deficient and the deficiency was so 
serious as to deprive him of a fair hearing. To make the 
latter showing, the respondent must prove that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there 
would have been a different result in the proceedings. 
 
In re G.G.M., 2021-NCSC-25, ¶ 35 (cleaned up). 
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¶ 10 
 
Respondent’s argument in his brief to this Court is as follows: 
Although the trial court ordered him to “establish 
legal paternity” in three separate orders dating back to 16 
October 2018, no action was ever undertaken by 
[respondent] to do so. Nothing contained in the record on 
appeal or within the transcript of the termination hearing 
indicate appointed counsel ever advised or informed 
[respondent] of how or why he needed to “establish legal 
paternity” as [the] court ordered. Nothing in the record 
indicates that appointed counsel sent or provided an 
affidavit of paternity to [respondent] prior to the motion to 
terminate parental rights being filed. Instead, appointed 
counsel argued during its closing on grounds that WCHS 
failed to make reasonable efforts to achieve reunification 
by assisting [respondent] in executing an affidavit of 
paternity. 
Appointed counsel’s failure to advise, inform or 
assist [respondent] with filing an affidavit of paternity, or 
otherwise legally establish paternity as [the] court ordered 
in the underlying juvenile case fell below an objective 
standard [of] reasonableness. Specifically, the trial court 
formally ordered [respondent] to establish legal paternity 
over nine months before the motion to terminate parental 
rights was filed on 2 August 2019. Moreover [respondent] 
was transported to Wake [C]ounty on both 7 May 2019 and 
24 June 2019 for scheduled hearings affording appointed 
counsel face to face access to [respondent] despite his 
incarceration. Had appointed counsel properly informed, 
advised, or assisted [respondent] in establishing legal 
paternity, a single filing would have precluded the trial 
court from terminating his parental rights pursuant to 
N.C.[G.S.] § 7B-1111(a)(5) (2019). 
 
¶ 11 
 
WCHS and the guardian ad litem contend that respondent has failed to show 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that respondent has not shown that 
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had counsel assisted with establishing paternity that there is a reasonable 
probability there would have been a different outcome in the proceeding. 
¶ 12 
 
We agree that respondent has not met his burden to establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel. This State’s jurisprudence has “recognized that there could be 
no law if knowledge of it was the test of its application” and has not permitted a 
respondent’s purported absence of knowledge of his or her parental duties to protect 
the respondent from the termination of his or her parental rights. In re Wright, 64 
N.C. App. 135, 139 (1983); see also In re S.E., 373 N.C. 360, 366 (2020) (quoting In re 
Wright in a parenthetical); In re T.D.P., 164 N.C. App. 287, 289 (2004) (quoting In re 
Wright in a parenthetical), aff’d per curiam, 359 N.C. 405 (2005). Thus, when 
addressing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise the 
respondent of what he needed to do to regain custody of a juvenile child, this Court 
has recognized that ignorance of an inherent duty of a parent to their child does not 
excuse a parent’s failure to fulfill this duty, and as a result, any alleged failure by 
counsel to advise concerning these inherent duties cannot be prejudicial. In re J.M., 
2021-NCSC-48, ¶¶ 35–36. 
¶ 13 
 
Based on the foregoing, our examination of the record, and the undisputed 
factual findings, we conclude that there is no reasonable probability that any of the 
alleged omissions by respondent’s counsel affected the outcome of the termination-of-
parental-rights hearing. See State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563 (1985) (“[I]f a 
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reviewing court can determine at the outset that there is no reasonable probability 
that in the absence of counsel’s alleged errors the result of the proceeding would have 
been different, then the court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was 
actually deficient.”). Respondent’s argument of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
without merit. 
III. 
Conclusion 
¶ 14 
 
Because respondent has not challenged on appeal the trial court’s conclusion 
that the ground for termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) existed or that 
termination was in Bailey’s best interests and because we conclude that respondent’s 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit, we affirm the trial court’s 
order terminating respondent’s parental rights. 
AFFIRMED.