Case Title: Butler v. Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 220, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LAMONTE BUTLER, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 220, 2013 
 
Defendant-Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Case No. 1203010443 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted: April 23, 2014 
Decided:  June 24, 2014 
 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED. 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, Santino Ceccotti, Esquire (argued), Office of the 
Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware for Appellant. 
 
Karen V. Sullivan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
STRINE, Chief Justice, for the Majority: 
 
 
 
 
2 
Defendant-Below/Appellant Lamonte Butler appeals from a judgment of 
convictions in the Superior Court of Attempted Robbery First Degree, Assault 
Second Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, 
Conspiracy Second Degree, Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, Resisting 
Arrest, Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, and misdemeanor drug 
possession.  Butler raises two claims on appeal.   
First, Butler contends that his convictions are barred by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause1 because the trial judge in a prior proceeding (the “Trial Judge”) took a 
series of improper actions that impelled defense counsel to move for a mistrial.  
The standard to demonstrate a violation of Double Jeopardy rights when the 
defendant himself moves for a mistrial is exacting, and requires a defendant to 
show that the Trial Judge “acted with intent to provoke a mistrial.”2 Recognizing 
that, defense counsel nonetheless felt that the circumstances were so unusual that 
she moved to dismiss the case against Butler under that exacting standard.   
Second, Butler argues that the Trial Judge abused her discretion by denying 
his post-trial Motion for Recusal without conducting the analysis required by Los 
v. Los.3  Believing that the Trial Judge had engaged in improper behavior, Butler’s 
counsel moved to have the Trial Judge recuse herself so that the motion to dismiss 
                                          
 
1 See U.S. CONST., amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb.”). 
2 Sullins v. State, 930 A.2d 911, 916 (Del. 2007). 
3 595 A.2d 381, 395 (Del. 1991). 
3 
could be decided on a record created before another judge.  Given the Trial Judge’s 
behavior, the State joined in the request for recusal but opposed the motion to 
dismiss.  Rather than conduct the Los analysis to determine whether to recuse 
herself, the Trial Judge denied the motion to dismiss and then denied the request 
for recusal as moot.  Butler was then forced to undergo a new trial before another 
jury, which began almost two months after his first trial was scheduled, and after 
which he was convicted. 
On direct appeal, Butler claims that the Trial Judge erred, both by not 
recusing herself from deciding his motion to dismiss and by denying that request 
on its merits.  Butler asks this Court to vacate his conviction because he contends 
that, on the record that the Trial Judge herself shaped, he has met his burden to 
show that the Trial Judge took actions intended to provoke defense counsel into 
seeking a mistrial.  At the very least, Butler claims that the motion to dismiss 
should have been decided in the first instance on a record created before another 
judge, given that the State and Butler both agreed that the Trial Judge should 
recuse herself and the Trial Judge never engaged in the required Los analysis.  
Because the Trial Judge chose to decide the motion to dismiss, we conclude 
that Butler is entitled to have this Court decide that motion de novo on the record 
that the Trial Judge herself shaped, based on factual inferences reasonably drawn 
from that record.  Forced to make the required factual determinations ourselves on 
4 
a de novo basis, the weight of the evidence leads us to conclude that: (1) the Trial 
Judge did not intend to preside over Butler’s trial before the already empaneled 
jury, and (2) the Trial Judge took a series of actions intended to ensure that the trial 
would not take place.  For these reasons, Butler’s convictions must be reversed. 
In so concluding, we note that this appeal presents aberrational 
circumstances that markedly depart from the serious priority the Superior Court 
gives to trying felony criminal cases.  Indeed, the reality that the actions taken 
were so different from that normally characteristic of our Superior Court 
unavoidably informs our resolution of this unusual case.  The outcome is 
regrettable, but it is dictated by the need to respect Butler’s constitutional right. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY4 
Butler was indicted for the robbery and assault of Richard Baldwin in 2012.  
Because handling criminal trials in a timely manner is the highest priority of the 
Superior Court, a judge who was then on the civil rotation stepped up to handle 
Butler’s trial, because all the judges on the criminal rotation had other trials 
scheduled.  On the morning of Tuesday, December 4, 2012, that Superior Court 
                                          
 
4 Our discussion of the facts is based on the record shaped by the Trial Judge’s own procedural 
choices.  Because the Trial Judge chose to conduct several colloquies with counsel off-the-
record, during which important issues were discussed and decided, we rely heavily upon the 
affidavits filed by two of the trial prosecutors who were present at those hearings.  We also rely 
on the portions of the proceedings that were transcribed.  Because the Trial Judge decided the 
motion to dismiss herself on a paper record and because the motion to dismiss involved the 
resolution of a factual question about the Trial Judge’s motivation for her actions, we are 
required to review the record independently and make the determinations necessary to resolve 
the case.  Our rendition of the facts is thus based on our de novo review of the record. 
5 
judge oversaw the selection of a jury for Butler’s trial, consisting of twelve jurors 
and four alternates.  Although the parties agreed that three days would probably be 
sufficient time for the trial, the jurors were selected based on their availability for a 
four day trial that would end on Friday, December 7, 2012.  
After the jury had been selected, the Superior Court recessed for lunch.  The 
trial was to begin in the afternoon following the recess.  During the recess, Butler’s 
trial was reassigned to the Trial Judge, because she was on the criminal rotation 
and the trial that she had previously been assigned to had pled-out that morning.5  
The Trial Judge was on the criminal rotation, so it was her responsibility to handle 
Butler’s case.  Because the Trial Judge’s colleague had already selected the jury, 
the Trial Judge was in a position to keep the trial on schedule and start immediately 
on the afternoon of December 4, 2012.  But that did not happen. 
Instead, the Trial Judge held a conference in her chambers without a court 
reporter.  Although a prosecutor had requested a court reporter, he was told that no 
court reporter was needed because the Trial Judge only wished to discuss 
scheduling.6  But that turned out not to be so.  At the conference, the Trial Judge 
pressed the parties to resolve the case by a plea, even suggesting that Butler plead 
to Robbery Second Degree and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of 
                                          
 
5 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A91–92.  
6 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A92. 
6 
a Felony.7  The prosecutors declined,8 and defense counsel explained that Butler 
“was unlikely to accept any plea offer.”9   
The Trial Judge then informed the parties that she had several unspecified 
scheduling conflicts,10 that she would preside over the trial for only a few hours 
each day, and that because of that limited schedule, the trial would likely need to 
extend until the following Monday.  Specifically, the Trial Judge gave the parties 
an odd patchwork schedule, with the Trial Judge declaring herself to be available 
only as follows: 
                                          
 
7 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A92 (“[The Trial Judge] then pressed the State on the plea 
offer.  Her Honor asked, ‘What’s the plea offer?’  We quickly responded that all previous offers 
had been revoked and that both sides were ready for trial.  [Defense counsel] concurred.  [The 
Trial Judge] continued to press, asking what the prior plea offer was.  It was explained that . . . 
we at one time extended a Robbery 2nd, PFDCF and Conspiracy 2nd plea offer.  That offer was 
rejected and no longer available.”); id. at A97 (“[The Trial Judge] also pressed the state and 
defense on the plea offer.  When [the prosecutor] explained that the original order to Robbery 2nd 
was no longer on the table, she pressed him as to why.”). 
8 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A92–93 (“Her Honor pressed us as to why the offer is 
revoked.  I explained that it is the day of trial and the prior plea offers were revoked.  I said, ‘It’s 
the day of trial and I can’t offer the same or better plea.’  Her Honor corrected me and stated that 
I can offer a plea, as her case earlier that day pled.  I apologized and clarified that I would not 
offer a plea.  Her Honor then stated that the State didn’t have to extend a worse plea, given the 
reluctance of our witness . . . .  It was suggested that the parties resolve the case with a Robbery 
2nd and PFDCF plea, and let the Court take care of it.  Both the State and defense stated that we 
were ready for trial and there would be no plea.  I attempted to explain the facts of our case, but 
was told by Her Honor that she did not ask nor did she want to hear about facts.”). 
9 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A93 (“This caused the judge to ask if a colloquy was held 
with the defendant about the plea.  Again, both the State and defense said we were past any plea 
and we wanted to try the case, but [the Trial Judge] said we needed to do another colloquy to see 
if he would entertain a plea.  Defense counsel stated that the defendant was unlikely to accept 
any plea offer.”); id. at A97 (“[Defense counsel] made it clear that the defendant was unlikely to 
accept any plea offer.”). 
10 See, e.g., Oral Argument at 8:15-10:00, available at http://courts.delaware.gov/supreme/ 
oralargs/video/2014-04-23_220,_2013_Butler_v_State_ of_Delaware.mp4; id. at 19:15-20:45; 
id. at 36:30-39:15. 
7 
• Wednesday, December 5, 2012:  The judge had a conflict in the 
morning and could not start until 10:30 A.M.  She proposed that the 
trial go to noon and then break for lunch before continuing until 4:30 
P.M. (5 hours) 
 
• Thursday, December 6, 2012:  The judge proposed trying the case 
from 9:30 A.M. until 11:00 A.M. and from 2:00 pm until 3:30 P.M. (3 
hours) 
 
• Friday December 7, 2012:  The judge proposed trying the case from 
11:00 A.M. until 12:30 P.M. and from 1:30 P.M. until 4:30 P.M. (4.5 
hours)11   
 
Given the sparse trial hours she had offered, the Trial Judge then announced 
that she would conduct additional voir dire to ascertain the jury’s availability to 
serve until Monday, if necessary.  The State objected, but defense counsel did 
not.12  The Trial Judge then conducted additional voir dire of the jury, asking the 
seated twelve jurors and four alternates three additional questions.  The first 
question related to the scheduling issues arising from the limited hours the Trial 
Judge was offering for trial.  The second and third were questions that the Trial 
Judge told the parties she always asked.13  Those questions were as follows: 
It is now estimated that the trial will last until Monday.  If anyone 
cannot serve through Monday, please raise your hand.  Have you, a 
relative, or a close friend ever assisted or cooperated with the police, 
whether Attorney General -- or the Attorney General’s Office in a 
civil or criminal investigation?  If you are a retiree, please raise your 
                                          
 
11 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A93, A97. 
12 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A93. 
13 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A93–94. 
8 
hand and come forward when directed by prothonotary so that you -- 
so that we may find out about your previous employment.14 
 
The questions the Trial Judge asked that were unrelated to scheduling are not 
uncommon when selecting a jury in the first instance, but here those questions 
were asked after the jury was sworn and without the consent of the parties.  Both 
parties were content with the voir dire that had previously been conducted by the 
Trial Judge’s colleague, and they opposed additional voir dire.  Despite the parties’ 
objection and despite knowing the jury had already been sworn, the Trial Judge 
proceeded to ask the additional voir dire questions unrelated to scheduling.  
Notably, the Trial Judge did that only after asking Butler if he wanted a trial, 
despite already having been told by Butler’s counsel that prior plea negotiations 
had failed. 
Five jurors came forward in response to these additional voir dire questions.  
The first, Juror #1, needed a note to furnish her employer, which the Trial Judge 
agreed to provide.  Juror #1 was not excused.  The second, Juror #7, said that he 
would be traveling out of the country starting on Monday afternoon.  The Trial 
Judge excused him.  At this point, defense counsel stood up and the following 
colloquy transpired: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Your Honor.   
THE COURT:  What’s the problem? . . .  
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  If we don’t go through Monday -- 
                                          
 
14 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A36 (as read by the Prothonotary). 
9 
THE COURT:  Do you really want a juror that’s going to rush things? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  No.15  
 
The third juror to come forward, Juror #15, said that he was a retired 
research scientist and that nothing about his employment would make it difficult 
for him to serve.  He was not excused.  The fourth, Juror #8, said that he was 
retired from Delmarva Power & Light Co., where he had worked in collections.  
He stated that knives and guns had been pointed at him during the course of his 
employment.  The Trial Judge asked Juror #8 whether, having been a victim of 
violence, he could be fair and impartial if someone was accused of violence.  Juror 
#8 stated, “I can be fair about it, yeah.  I have no problem, whatsoever.”16  After 
Juror #8 returned to his seat, the Trial Judge engaged in the following colloquy 
with defense counsel and the prosecutor: 
THE COURT:  Personally, I’m not convinced. 
PROSECUTOR:  It’s our position he answered all the questions right, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT:  But there was a hesitation and the body language 
which was speaking differently from the words he was saying.  If you 
want me to excuse him I will.  It’s up to Counsel.  (Brief pause.) 
Let’s go on with somebody else and, then, you can decide.  
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Okay.17 
 
The fifth juror to come forward, Juror #16, was immediately excused by the Trial 
Judge without further questioning or input from the parties after he said, “I have a 
                                          
 
15 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A37.   
16 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A38.   
17 Id.  
10 
hearing problem.  When you’re speaking, if not in a microphone, I can’t hear 
you.”18   
Conversations between the attorneys and the Trial Judge, some of which 
were again conducted off-the-record, indicated that the Trial Judge intended to 
excuse two additional jurors.  One was Juror #8, the retired collections agent for 
Delmarva Power.  The other was Juror #11, after the prosecutor revealed that Juror 
#11 had out-of-state arrests that he had not disclosed during the original voir dire, 
even though those charges had been dismissed and the State did not believe there 
was a basis for excusing him.  The net result of these excusals would have been a 
trial without any alternate jurors.  There is no record of any objection to the Trial 
Judge’s sua sponte decision to excuse those jurors, but then again the Trial Judge 
ruled without soliciting the parties’ views.   
In an effort to recreate the off-the-record portion of the conference, one of 
the prosecutors stated in an affidavit: 
While on the record in the conference room, counsel and the judge 
were discussing these events when Her Honor suddenly waved her 
arm in front of the court reporter.  The Court reporter then went off 
the record.  While off the record, Her Honor indicated that she was 
going to excuse 4 jurors, leaving us with 12.  I then brought up the 
issue of double jeopardy.  The Judge responded to the issue by asking 
if we would now plea the case out and asked what we are going to do 
now.  I answered that the jury had been sworn, and as such jeopardy 
has attached.  Thus, the State is not making any application.  Defense 
counsel would have to make an application for a mistrial given that 
                                          
 
18 Id.  
11 
the judge is going to excuse 4 or 5 of our jurors.  Defense counsel 
explained that while she wants to go forward now, she does not want 
to try the case with 12 jurors and no alternates and was wrestling 
with the idea of asking for a mistrial. . . .  While defense counsel was 
speaking, the Judge looked at [one of the deputy attorneys general] 
and mouthed the word “plea.”19 
 
The other prosecutor gave a similar version of the conference in an affidavit:  
While on the record in the conference room, counsel and the judge 
were discussing these events when [the Trial Judge] suddenly waved 
her arm in front of the court reporter to go off the record.  It was so 
abrupt that everyone paused and the reporter asked to clarify if it was 
off the record.  While off the record, conversations took place that led 
both the State and the defense to believe that only 12 jurors would 
remain.  These conversations began to turn toward a mistrial motion 
at which point [one of the deputy attorneys general] brought up the 
issue of double jeopardy.  [Defense counsel] explained that while she 
wants to go forward now, she does not want to try the case with 12 
jurors and no alternates . . . .  While it was raised that we don’t have to 
have 12 jurors, [the judge] emphatically stated, “We will have at least 
12 jurors.” . . . .  [One of the deputy attorneys general] raised a 
potential issue we discovered after jury selection regarding juror #10 
[sic].  Specifically, he has out-of-state arrests for felony thefts in PA.  
After approximately 5-7 minutes of off-the-record discussion, we 
eventually went back on the record and [defense counsel] requested a 
mistrial.  While back on the record, [the judge] was inaudibly 
mouthing a word to me; that appeared to be the word, “Plea.”20  
 
The on-the-record colloquy regarding a mistrial went as follows: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  We’re going to have no alternates, that’s the 
problem.  And we’re looking at five -- four, maybe a fifth day with no 
alternates.  I’m not doing this twice, I’m not doing it with less than 12.  
I really want to start right now and I don’t know we can and I’m not -- 
[the prosecutor] and I have been preparing for this since March. 
PROSECUTOR 1:  Yes. 
                                          
 
19 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A94–95 (emphasis added). 
20 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A98–99 (emphasis added).   
12 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  We had this ready to go mid October, we had 
this ready to go today.  
PROSECUTOR 1:  The jury was sworn; right? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  So if I’m looking at a mistrial, you can’t 
rebring it? 
PROSECUTOR 1:  Well, I think we can but I’m asking -- I don’t 
want to engage in motion practice afterwards, because I agree with 
everything you said, you know what I mean.  It’s your call.   
(Brief pause.) 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Your Honor, given the fact that we had Juror 
No. 8 . . . come forward on Your Honor’s question about retirees and 
he used to do collections, which, frankly, made him sound like 
somebody who broke knee caps for Delmarva Power and, then, he 
started talking about things that had happened to him with various 
weapons, in which he was a victim.   
And he didn’t really have a great excuse for why he didn’t come 
forward the first time that the two questions were asked about have 
you ever been a victim, or at least one.  And, then, we had Alternate 4 
who couldn’t hear and Alternate 3 was fine. . . . But we now have no 
alternates after further questioning.  Recognizing that the jury has 
been sworn, the defense counsel has to ask for a mistrial, I mean a 
new date, and a new date soon.   
. . . .  
PROSECUTOR 2:  And the only other issue, which I think is being 
remedied here is, the jury was, in fact, sworn; so, the issue of double 
jeopardy having attached at this point in time -- 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Right.  But since -- I think that it becomes a 
nonissue because the defense is asking for the mistrial because I need 
a full compliment [sic] of jurors, for lack of a better word.  
PROSECUTOR 1:  And to that point, which is well taken, we have 
already lost Juror No. 7, which Your Honor excused because he 
brought up travel issues on Monday; we have excused Alternate No. 
4, who did not come forward previously with hearing issues; and, 
now, we have the issues with Juror No. 8 that [defense counsel] laid 
out and Juror No. 11 that the State laid out, and Juror No. 1 was 
ambiguous and confusing at best, in which she came up to Your 
Honor about some opening --  
13 
THE COURT:  . . . All right, based on all the reasons given, I’m going 
to grant a mistrial without prejudice.  We need to set a new date.21 
 
After the mistrial was granted upon defense counsel’s request, the entire jury 
was excused.  On January 2, 2013, Butler changed the position on double jeopardy 
that defense counsel had taken in the midst of the fast-moving events of Tuesday, 
December 4, 2012.  After defense counsel had more time to reflect on those events, 
Butler moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Trial Judge had taken action 
intended to provoke defense counsel to move for a mistrial.  Butler also filed a 
motion, through the same counsel, requesting that the Trial Judge recuse herself 
from deciding the motion to dismiss.22  The State opposed the motion to dismiss, 
but also filed a motion requesting that the Trial Judge recuse herself.23  On January 
28, 2013, the Trial Judge denied Butler’s motion to dismiss,24 and then denied 
Butler’s recusal motion as moot.25  The Trial Judge made no reference to, or ruling 
on, the State’s recusal motion.   
On January 29, 2013, eight weeks after his original trial date, Butler’s new 
trial commenced before a different Superior Court judge and jury.  At the 
beginning of the trial, defense counsel objected to the trial “for all the reasons set 
                                          
 
21 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A39 (emphasis added).   
22 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A84. 
23 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A86–89. 
24 Appellant’s Op. Br. Ex. B. 
25 Appellant’s Op. Br. Ex. C. 
14 
forth in the motion to dismiss previously.”26  After a four-day trial, the jury found 
Butler guilty on all counts but one.  This appeal followed.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
Butler argues that Trial Judge erred by denying his motion to dismiss.  
Butler contends that the Trial Judge goaded defense counsel into requesting a 
mistrial through her unusual and inappropriate actions.  Butler further contends 
that the Trial Judge’s failure to conduct the required Los analysis before deciding 
not to recuse herself was reversible error that undermined the public’s confidence 
in the judicial process. 
The State responds that the Trial Judge correctly denied Butler’s motion to 
dismiss because defense counsel voluntarily moved for a mistrial, thereby 
consenting to a second trial.27  Although the State concedes that the Trial Judge 
erred by failing to conduct the Los analysis, the State argues that this error does not 
require the reversal of Butler’s conviction before a different judge and jury.   
This Court reviews “claims alleging an infringement of a constitutionally 
protected right, including the right not to be subjected to double jeopardy, de 
                                          
 
26 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A100. 
27 The State also argues waiver, based on the fact that Butler himself moved for a mistrial.  But 
waiver is not a doctrine that applies in this context.  Rather, if a defendant shows that his counsel 
was goaded into moving for a mistrial, then he has necessarily also shown that his rights were 
not waived.  
15 
novo.”28  We review the Trial Judge’s decision whether or not to recuse herself for 
an abuse of discretion.29   
A.  The Double Jeopardy Claim 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a defendant 
from being put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.30  “At the heart of the 
double jeopardy clause is a concern for protecting an individual from harassment 
by the government through its multiple attempts to bring the ‘same’ charge against 
a defendant for conduct arising out of the same factual situation.”31  In a jury trial, 
jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn.32   
A criminal defendant owns “the valued right to have his trial completed by a 
particular tribunal.  The declaration of a mistrial implicates that right.”33  But the 
“double-jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment . . . does not mean that every 
time a defendant is put to trial before a competent tribunal he is entitled to go free 
if the trial fails to end in a final judgment.”34  Rather, “[a] motion by the defendant 
                                          
 
28 Sullins v. State, 930 A.2d 911, 915 (Del. 2007) (citing Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 961 (Del. 
2006)). 
29 Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 385 (Del. 1991) (citing Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948, 952 (Del. 
1988)).  
30 U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
31 Tarr v. State, 486 A.2d 672, 674 (Del. 1984) (citing State v. Heitter, 203 A.2d 69, 71 (Del. 
1964)). 
32 Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978). 
33 Sullins, 930 A.2d at 915 (footnote and internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Wade v. 
Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949)).  
34 Wade, 336 U.S. at 688–89.  
16 
for a mistrial, which is granted, generally removes any barrier to reprosecution.”35  
That is because by filing a motion for a mistrial, the defendant is deemed to have 
consented to the second trial.36 
But there is a “narrow exception” to the rule that a defendant’s mistrial 
motion precludes a finding of double jeopardy.37  Where a defendant’s motion for a 
mistrial was the product of “judicial or prosecutorial impropriety” that forced the 
defendant to file the motion for a mistrial, then “there has been no consent and the 
Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial.”38  The defendant cannot be found to have 
consented to the new trial, because the impropriety was “intended to ‘goad’ the 
defendant into moving for a mistrial.”39  As a result, the defendant may raise a 
double jeopardy claim to bar a second trial, even after having succeeded in 
aborting the first trial on his own motion.40 
A defendant bears a heavy burden of demonstrating judicial impropriety 
sufficient to show that the judge “intended to provoke a mistrial.”41  That is an 
                                          
 
35 Sullins, 930 A.2d at 916 (quoting Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1075 (Del. 1987)). 
36 Cf. Wade, 336 U.S. at 688–89 (explaining that a rule allowing a defendant to escape 
prosecution on his or her own mistrial motion “would create an insuperable obstacle to the 
administration of justice in many cases in which there is no semblance of the type of oppressive 
practices at which the double-jeopardy prohibition is aimed”). 
37 Sudler v. State, 611 A.2d 945, 948 (Del. 1992). 
38 Sullins, 930 A.2d at 916 (quoting Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
39 Sudler, 611 A.2d at 948 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982)).  
40 Id. at 948–49 (quoting Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676).  
41 Sullins, 930 A.2d at 916 (quoting Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1078 (Del. 1987)); see also 
United States v. Borromeo, 954 F.2d 245, 247 (4th Cir.1992) (providing that the defendant has 
the burden of proving intentional provocation of the defense to move for a mistrial).  The same 
17 
“extremely exacting standard.”42  The fact that a judge committed errors will not, 
without more, establish that the judge intentionally goaded the defendant into 
requesting a mistrial.43  Rather, the errors and actions of the trial judge must 
demonstrate an intention to deprive the defendant of his right to a trial by a 
particular jury.44  To evaluate an alleged claim of goading, we must scrutinize the 
objective facts and circumstances.45  The reason for that is plain: a trial judge or 
prosecutor is unlikely to ever confess to having the intent to deprive a defendant of 
his right to trial before the empaneled jury.  As a result, the requisite intent must 
necessarily be inferred from the objective facts and circumstances. 
                                                                                                                                        
standard is also applied for allegations of goading resulting from prosecutorial impropriety.  See 
Sullins, 930 A.2d at 916. 
42 Sullins, 930 A.2d at 916 (quoting Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1130).  
43 See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976) (“[W]here circumstances develop not 
attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the defendant for mistrial is 
ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant’s motion is 
necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error.”); People v. Palmisano, 464 N.E.2d 1147, 1150 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that trial judge erred but the judge’s conduct “did not constitute 
judicial overreaching” that would otherwise bar retrial); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 432 746, 752, 
739 N.E.2d 1107, 1113 (Mass. 2000) (“Absent evidence that the judge acted in bad faith, alleged 
judicial errors giving rise to a mistrial do not support a claim of double jeopardy.”), overruled on 
other grounds by Commonwealth v. Britt, 987 N.E.2d 558 (Mass. 2013); Sheldon R. Shapiro, 
Double Jeopardy as Bar to Retrial After Grant of Defendant’s Motion for Mistrial, 98 A.L.R.3d 
997, § 6 (1980) (citing cases that collectively held that “even if the trial judge’s conduct had been 
improper or erroneous and had been responsible for creating a situation which led to the granting 
of the defendant’s motion for a mistrial, such conduct did not constitute judicial overreaching 
and did not bar the defendant’s retrial”).  
44 See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675–76. 
45 See Bailey, 521 A.2d at 1078 (conducting “[a]n examination of the objective facts and 
circumstances” to determine whether the prosecutor intentionally caused a mistrial). 
18 
B.  The Complained-Of Conduct 
Butler argues that several improper actions taken by the Trial Judge prove 
that she was intent on not presiding over his trial before the empaneled jury.  
Butler contends that those improper actions had the cumulative effect of goading 
him into requesting a mistrial.  These actions include: (1) holding off-the-record 
discussions, (2) reopening voir dire to eliminate additional jurors, (3) exerting 
pressure on the parties to resolve the case by a plea, (4) limiting her availability for 
trial so that the trial would proceed on a sparse, inefficient, and sporadic schedule, 
and (5) pressuring counsel to request a mistrial.  We next address each of these 
actions to determine whether the conduct was error or was otherwise improper.  
After doing that, we consider the separate actions collectively to determine 
whether Butler’s motion to dismiss was denied erroneously. 
1.  Holding Off-the-Record Discussions 
Butler’s first claim of error relates to unrecorded conferences, the first of 
which occurred in a pretrial conference after the case was reassigned.  The Trial 
Judge summoned the prosecutors and defense counsel to her chambers.  The State 
requested a court reporter, but was told that because only scheduling matters would 
be discussed no court reporter was necessary.  Nevertheless, the Trial Judge 
proceeded to ask counsel about substantive issues, including a stipulation regarding 
custody of evidence, proposed jury instructions, and the potential for a plea 
19 
agreement.  A second off-the-record discussion occurred when the parties held a 
sidebar conference to discuss the supplemental voir dire.  The Trial Judge told the 
court reporter to go off the record, yet continued to discuss the merits of the case.   
This Court has repeatedly held that “all sidebar conferences, except those 
involving non-substantive issues, must be recorded.”46  The Superior Court’s 
Criminal Rule 26.1 mandates that same result.47  “This requirement allows no room 
for discretion.”48  The trial court is responsible for ensuring that a record of the trial 
is made.  But the Trial Judge in this case did not do so.  That was judicial error 
compounded by repetition.   
2.  Reopening of Voir Dire 
Butler next contends that it was error for Trial Judge to reopen voir dire and 
consequently express her intent to dismiss four of the empaneled jurors.  The State 
concedes that additional voir dire is not customary, but argues that it was 
permissible in this case because the Trial Judge was substituted after another judge 
had presided over the selection of Butler’s jury.   
                                          
 
46 Sudler v. State, 611 A.2d 945, 947 (Del. 1992) (emphasis added) (citing In re Butler, 609 A.2d 
1080, 1082–83 n. 3 (Del. 1992); Ross v. State, 482 A.2d 727, 734–35 (Del. 1984)). 
47 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 26.1 (“All sidebar conferences and chambers conferences during trial 
shall be recorded unless the trial judge determines, in advance, that neither evidentiary nor 
substantive issues are involved.”).  
48 Sudler, 611 A.2d at 947. 
20 
As this Court has held, the “nature and extent of any voir dire examination 
rest within the sound discretion of the trial judge.”49  The exercise of that 
discretion, however, is limited “by constitutional requirements and ‘the essential 
demands of fairness.’”50  Generally, additional voir dire after the jury is selected 
requires some new information or event.  Here, additional voir dire to verify that 
the jurors could still serve during a different trial schedule was appropriate and not 
an abuse of the Trial Judge’s discretion.  Scheduling issues often arise in a case, 
which the judge may be required to address with the jury.  
But the sua sponte reopening of voir dire to ask general questions after the 
jury is sworn, in the absence of any new information or event creating a reason to 
do so, is far more problematic.  Neither the State nor Butler requested 
supplemental voir dire, nor did any party contend that the first judge failed to 
conduct adequate voir dire of the venire.  To the contrary, both parties opposed re-
opening voir dire of the jury that was already sworn.  And, because the Trial Judge 
was offering so few trial hours, one might think that she would have wanted to 
begin the trial as soon as possible that Tuesday afternoon, as the parties expected.  
Instead, the Trial Judge conducted additional voir dire that provided plausible 
grounds for certain jurors to be excused, and the record (such as it is) suggests that 
                                          
 
49 Diaz v. State, 743 A.2d 1166, 1176 (Del. 1999) (footnote omitted) (citing Aldridge v. United 
States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931); Parson v. State, 275 A.2d 777, 780 (Del. 1971)).  
50 Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 292 (Del. 2005) (footnote omitted) (quoting Parson, 275 A.2d at 
780–84) (citing Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981)). 
21 
the Trial Judge was quick to excuse jurors as soon as these grounds emerged.  The 
result would leave Butler with twelve jurors and no alternates to hear his case.  
Because there was no basis in the record to suggest a need to reopen voir dire 
beyond scheduling issues and because the parties did not agree that additional 
general voir dire should occur, it was an abuse of discretion for the Trial Judge to 
conduct another generalized voir dire of an already empaneled jury.  
3.  Pressuring The Parties To Resolve The Case By A Plea 
Butler’s next claim of error is based on the Trial Judge having discussed the 
possibility of a plea agreement on two separate occasions.  The first instance 
occurred in chambers at the first unrecorded pretrial conference, when the Trial 
Judge pressured the parties resolve the case through a specific plea agreement.  
The second instance occurred in open court, when the Trial Judge inaudibly 
mouthed the word “plea.”   
As arbiters of the criminal justice system, trial judges are required to be 
impartial and ensure that “the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential 
rights of the accused.”51  “Our adversarial system of justice assumes that the judge 
is a neutral, detached, impartial arbiter and not a partner with the state’s 
                                          
 
51 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978) (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 
60, 71 (1942)).  
22 
prosecutorial arm seeking to have the defendant adjudicated guilty.”52  The ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice provide that a trial judge “should not through word 
or demeanor, either directly or indirectly, communicate to the defendant or defense 
counsel that a plea agreement should be accepted or that a guilty plea should be 
entered.”53  The Standards further admonish: 
A judge should not ordinarily participate in plea negotiation 
discussions among the parties.  Upon the request of the parties, a 
judge may be presented with a proposed plea agreement negotiated 
by the parties and may indicate whether the court would accept the 
terms as proposed and if relevant, indicate what sentence would be 
imposed.  Discussions relating to plea negotiations at which the 
judge is present need not be recorded verbatim, so long as an 
appropriate record is made at the earliest opportunity.  For good 
cause, the judge may order the record or transcript of any such 
discussions to be sealed.54 
 
Here, the Trial Judge directly communicated with the parties and suggested 
that a specific plea agreement be reached on Robbery Second Degree and 
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.  Throughout the fast-
moving course of these events, the Trial Judge continued to express her desire to 
have the case resolved by a plea.  In fact, when the subject of whether to request a 
                                          
 
52 Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining Process, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1419–20 (2004). 
53 Criminal Justice Standards Committee, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pleas of Guilty 
Std. 14-3.3(c), at 9 (3d ed. 1999) (emphasis added).  This Court often relies on the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice for issues involving pleas of guilty and other matters.  See, e.g., 
Gregory v. State, 31 A.3d 76 (Del. 2011) (prosecutorial misconduct); MacDonald v. State, 778 
A.2d 1064, 1071–72 (Del. 2001) (guilty pleas); Lewis v. State, 757 A.2d 709, 713 (Del. 2000) 
(defense function); Brokenbrough v. State, 522 A.2d 851, 856 (Del. 1987) (function of 
prosecution and defense). 
54 ABA Standards, supra, Std. 14-3.3(c), at 9–10. 
23 
mistrial and who should seek it was being discussed, the Trial Judge inaudibly 
mouthed the word “plea,” presumably to prevent an appropriate record of her 
actions from being made.  By repeatedly pressuring the parties by word and 
demeanor to enter a plea agreement, the Trial Judge erred.   
4.  Limiting the Trial Schedule 
Butler also claims that the Trial Judge’s scheduling changes evidence her 
desire to eliminate Butler’s case from her trial docket.  During the first unrecorded 
pretrial conference, the Trial Judge explained that she had several unspecified 
scheduling conflicts that would result in a patchwork schedule for the trial and that 
would likely extend the trial into the following week.   
The record that the Trial Judge created nowhere indicates why she gave the 
parties such a sparse and sporadic trial schedule.  As a matter of respect for the 
court, the parties were hardly in a position to inquire when the Trial Judge 
announced that she was unavailable.  But judges are more likely to surface the 
reason for their unavailability when that reason involves other judicial duties.  
They say things like: “I have to take a break at eleven on Thursday, because I have 
a VOP calendar.  On Friday, I have a brief motion to suppress that I will move to 
lunch if I can, so we can keep the trial moving.”  The Trial Judge here did not 
identify any judicial matter that would explain any portion of the time that she was 
24 
unavailable.  There is thus no basis in the record to presume that judicial matters 
were the reason for her unavailability. 
The Trial Judge was assigned to the criminal rotation for the week that 
Butler’s trial was scheduled, and she therefore was expected to be available to 
handle criminal trials.  In fact, the Trial Judge was scheduled to preside over 
another criminal trial, which is why a different judge stepped up to handle Butler’s 
trial.  Thus, if there were room for any presumption on this record, the presumption 
would be that the plea in the original case freed up the Trial Judge to devote 
substantial, full-time effort to Butler’s trial.55  In addition, it is difficult to square 
the patchiness of the offered schedule with the notion that the schedule was 
occasioned by other judicial duties.  Regrettable as it is to have to acknowledge, 
the uncomfortable reality is that a fair inference arises that the Trial Judge had non-
judicial matters that she wished to attend to during that week and that Butler’s trial 
inconveniently threatened to intrude on those matters.  And there is no record 
evidence to rebut that inference. 
Lastly, the Trial Judge decided Butler’s motion to dismiss without recusing 
herself.  Addressing that motion afforded the Trial Judge a full opportunity to 
explain what other judicial duties necessitated giving the parties such a patchwork, 
scarce, and sporadic trial schedule.  But the Trial Judge did not do so.  That failure 
                                          
 
55 See generally DELAWARE JUDGES’ CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.1 & 2.5 cmt. (2008), 
available at http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?id=39408. 
25 
is disquieting, given that the Trial Judge was on the criminal rotation and had been 
scheduled to handle another trial that pled-out.  
5.  Lack of Alternate Jurors 
Finally, Butler points to the Trial Judge’s conduct immediately before 
defense counsel moved for a mistrial as further evidence of the Trial Judge’s intent 
to provoke a mistrial.  In a brief period, the Trial Judge signaled her intent to 
excuse four jurors.  Butler’s counsel did not object to the excusals on the merits but 
voiced a concern that there would no longer be any alternate jurors.  Defense 
counsel further explained that she did not want to try the case twice or try the case 
without a full complement of jurors.  Those were the in-the-moment reasons that 
defense counsel said motivated her request for a mistrial.   
We recognize that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to 
alternate jurors.56  But, given the odd conduct of the Trial Judge and the 
inconvenient schedule the Trial Judge would be forcing upon the parties and the 
jury, defense counsel had a reasonable basis to fear that other jurors might be later 
excused by the Trial Judge.  Equally important, defense counsel was responding to 
a blur of unforeseen events that she had no reason to have anticipated, in particular 
                                          
 
56 Cf. Dirring v. United States, 370 F.2d 862, 864 (1st Cir. 1967) (“Under [Federal] Rule 24(c) 
the selection of alternate jurors is entirely discretionary with the court.  Neither party is entitled 
to alternate jurors as a matter of right.”); Boisen v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 349, 350 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (holding that a trial judge under Rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure has discretion to empanel alternate jurors “and a failure to provide alternate jurors 
does not deprive a defendant of any rights”). 
26 
the Trial Judge’s spontaneous decision to conduct a new voir dire of the jury when 
defense counsel was expecting to begin the trial.   
6.  The Inference That Arises From The Collective Errors And  
Actions Of The Trial Judge 
 
The State is admirably candid in its papers.  The State concedes that the 
Trial Judge’s actions were improper in multiple respects.  But the State then argues 
that those errors do not prove that the Trial Judge intended to deprive Butler of his 
right to a trial before the empaneled jury.  Rather, the State argues that the Trial 
Judge’s actions only show a judge bent on doing things her own particular way, 
whether in pressing the parties to plead the case out, in conducting a new voir dire, 
or in trying cases on her own preferred schedule.  In so arguing, the State 
emphasizes that the standard to apply a double jeopardy bar when defense counsel 
moves for a mistrial is rightly a high one.57   
But that standard is not, and cannot be, so high that it can never be met.  A 
judge who is intent on not having a trial proceed before an empaneled jury is 
unlikely to confess that intention.  Rather, the requisite intent must be inferred 
from the objective facts and circumstances.58  The State analyzes each of the Trial 
Judge’s errors in isolation, rather than collectively.  But we cannot help but 
                                          
 
57 Sullins v. State, 930 A.2d 911, 916 (Del. 2007). 
58 See Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1078 (Del. 1987) (conducting “[a]n examination of the 
objective facts and circumstances” to determine whether the prosecutor intentionally caused a 
mistrial). 
27 
recognize what all of the errors had in common: their tendency to make it less 
likely that Butler would be tried before the already empaneled jury.  Taken 
together, the sum total of the Trial Judge’s conduct is so strikingly different from 
that normally characteristic of her judicial colleagues that it reasonably supports 
the inference that she was intent on not handling a criminal trial that week and 
therefore engaged in conduct having the logical and intended effect of causing 
defense counsel to request a mistrial.  When the Trial Judge was assigned Butler’s 
case, she was on the criminal rotation and should have been able to start his trial 
immediately on the afternoon of December 4, 2012.   
Instead of proceeding in that fashion, the Trial Judge:  
(1)  held a conference without a court reporter after the parties had been assured 
that the conference was only about scheduling;  
 
(2)  put pressure on the parties during that conference to resolve the case by a 
plea; 
 
(3)  when it became apparent that there would not be a plea, told the parties that 
they would have a sparse, sporadic, inconvenient, and odd trial schedule that 
not only would leave jurors bored and restless and on an irregular schedule, 
but also would make it possible that the trial would extend into the next 
week;  
 
(4) convened the jury and conducted additional voir dire that did not merely 
explore whether jurors could serve into the next week but also constituted a 
reopening of voir dire after the jury had been sworn;  
 
(5)  conducted that additional voir dire without the consent of the parties;  
 
(6)  immediately excused one of the jurors solely because he indicated that he 
needed the parties to use the microphone because he had hearing issues;  
28 
(7)  went off the record again during the additional voir dire and made 
statements that led the parties to believe that four jurors would be excused, 
leaving no alternates;  
 
(8)  raised the issue of a mistrial while off the record and indicated that unless 
 
defense counsel requested the mistrial, double jeopardy would attach; and  
 
(9)  suggested again that the case should be pled out by visibly mouthing the 
word “plea.” 
 
We do not believe this confluence of actions can be ignored or parsed as if they 
were unrelated to each other. 
Nor are we comfortable with the difficult position in which defense counsel 
was put.  Because the Trial Judge’s unusual actions occurred in rapid succession, 
defense counsel was forced to react to them without any opportunity for 
deliberation or consultation with colleagues from her office.  Although defense 
counsel moved for a mistrial, defense counsel had a reasonable basis to believe that 
the Trial Judge was determined not to try the case, that the Trial Judge would be 
unhappy if she was forced to do so, and that — because of the Trial Judge’s 
mindset — the dismissal of additional jurors was possible, which would result in a 
mistrial anyway.  Had defense counsel proceeded to try the case and a mistrial 
occurred, defense counsel would have shown her strategy to the prosecution.  
Furthermore, the Trial Judge’s inappropriate behavior, combined with the sporadic 
trial schedule, gave defense counsel reasonable cause to fear that whichever jury 
29 
was seated would be in a less than an ideal frame of mind, because the jury would 
be subjected to an odd schedule, with lots of down time and irregular hours.   
Underscoring the difficulty of faulting defense counsel for seeking a mistrial 
is that this is the rare case where both the State and defense counsel agree that the 
Trial Judge committed multiple errors that were so extensive as to require her to 
recuse herself from deciding Butler’s motion to dismiss the case.59  Nonetheless, 
the Trial Judge did not recuse herself and ruled on the merits of the motion to 
dismiss without applying the required Los analysis,60 even though the motion was 
premised on an argument that she had engaged in improper conduct.   
The Trial Judge’s failure to recuse herself is important, because it left us, as 
a reviewing court, with an inadequate record.  Having declined to recuse herself 
and instead having resolved Butler’s motion to dismiss, the Trial Judge 
compromised Butler’s right to make an evidentiary record.  That, in turn, gives us 
no practical recourse other than to decide the motion de novo on the record the 
                                          
 
59 We respect the dissent’s concern that defense counsel is being relieved of having specifically 
said that if she moved for a mistrial, then double jeopardy would be a “non-issue.”  Where we 
differ is that we cannot fault defense counsel for reacting to a bewildering and unexpected set of 
circumstances in the way she did.  Defense counsel arrived expecting to start a trial, not to 
confront a new trial judge who, among other things, continually pressured the parties to plea out 
the case, gave the parties a sparse and inconvenient schedule, conducted a new generalized voir 
dire, and indicated an intent to leave the jury with no alternates.  It is understandable that defense 
counsel did not have the case law governing this uncommon context, such as Oregon v. Kennedy, 
456 U.S. 667 (1984) or Sullins v. State, 930 A.2d 911 (Del. 2007), at her immediate command.  
In most lives, there come situations when one leaves an encounter with others that has been 
disorienting and surprising and then thinks “what just happened?”  This was one of those days 
for both defense counsel and the prosecutors.    
60 595 A.2d 381 (Del. 1991).  
30 
Trial Judge herself created.61  The Trial Judge had the opportunity to clarify the 
record when deciding the motion to dismiss, but she did not.  The Trial Judge’s 
decision failed to identify any other judicial duties that would explain the sporadic 
trial schedule she forced on the parties and the jury. 
Required now to make an essentially factual determination based on the 
record the Trial Judge herself created, we reluctantly find that Butler has 
established that the Trial Judge intended to take action that would result in Butler 
not having a trial before the jury that had already been empaneled.  The Trial 
Judge’s improper actions, taken together, goaded defense counsel into doing what 
the Trial Judge wanted — asking for a mistrial that would cause Butler’s trial to be 
rescheduled.  The fact that defense counsel asked for a mistrial does not preclude a 
finding that defense counsel was goaded into doing so.  The point of the inquiry is 
to determine whether a trial judge has taken action intended to cause defense 
counsel to move for a mistrial.  That the Trial Judge’s intention was not grounded 
                                          
 
61 Had the Trial Judge conducted the necessary Los analysis and recused herself from deciding 
the motion to dismiss, Butler would have had a prompt opportunity to make a record with 
another judge — or potentially a former judge because of the inelegant nature of the issue — 
before enduring a trial with a second jury.  One area of inquiry could have focused on what the 
Trial Judge was doing at the times she said she was not available.  If that inquiry revealed that 
the Trial Judge was in fact handling other judicial matters, then that would have cut against 
Butler.  But if that inquiry revealed that the Trial Judge had instead scheduled personal matters 
during a week when she was on criminal rotation and had expected that plea bargains would 
enable her to attend to those matters without inconvenience, then that would have provided 
evidence that the Trial Judge intended not to have Butler’s trial proceed that week.  In our view, 
it would be unfair at this late stage to subject Butler to further delay by making him present his 
motion in a new trial-level proceeding before a different judge. 
31 
in any personal animus toward Butler, but rather in an apparent desire to be 
relieved of the need to preside over a trial that week, does not justify violating 
Butler’s constitutional right.   
In so concluding, we again emphasize how markedly different the Trial 
Judge’s behavior on the afternoon of December 4, 2012 was from that which is 
typical of our Superior Court.  We are aware that being a judge on a court with a 
difficult and challenging caseload like our Superior Court is demanding.   Because 
judges are human beings, they cannot always be at their best.  Indeed, even the 
most conscientious judges will commit errors.   But where a Trial Judge’s 
infelicitous actions evidence an intention to avoid presiding over a defendant’s trial 
before an empaneled jury, and have the effect of impelling a motion for a mistrial 
by the defendant’s attorney, we are obligated to enforce the defendant’s 
constitutional right.     
C.  Butler’s Claim of Judicial Bias Is Moot 
Butler’s second claim is that the Trial Judge’s failure to conduct a two-part 
Los analysis was reversible error.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “requires a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal,’ before a judge with no actual 
bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case.”62  The 
                                          
 
62 Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904–05 (1997) (citation omitted) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 
421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975)). 
32 
“rules of disqualification have evolved to ensure that no judge shall preside in a 
case in which he [or she] is not disinterested and impartial.”63   
In Los, this Court adopted a two-part test that a judge is required to 
undertake when faced with a claim of personal bias or prejudice.64  The State 
concedes that the Trial Judge erred when she failed to conduct the Los analysis.  
But, because we have independently examined the record de novo and found that 
Butler’s motion to dismiss based on the Double Jeopardy Clause should be 
granted, Butler’s claim that the Trial Judge erred in not recusing herself is now 
moot.65   
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Butler’s motion to dismiss 
should have been granted and that his subsequent convictions before a second jury 
are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Accordingly, the judgment of 
convictions entered by the Superior Court on April 12, 2013 is REVERSED.
                                          
 
63 Los, 595 A.2d at 383. 
64 Id. at 384–85.  First, the judge must be satisfied “as a matter of subjective belief . . . that he [or 
she] can proceed to hear the cause free of bias or prejudice concerning that party.”  Id.  Second, 
if the judge subjectively believes that she is without bias, she must also find that there is no 
“appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge’s impartiality.”  Id.  
65 See Am. Littoral Soc., Inc. v. Bernie’s Conchs, LLC, 954 A.2d 909, 2008 WL 2520634, at *2 
(Del. 2008) (“Under the mootness doctrine, ‘although there may have been a justiciable 
controversy at the time the litigation was commenced, the [claim] will be dismissed if that 
controversy ceases to exist.’”) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. New Castle Cnty., 701 A.2d 819, 
823 (Del. 1997)). 
RIDGELY, Justice, dissenting: 
Butler makes the extraordinary claim that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars 
his convictions because the Trial Judge intended to provoke his mistrial request, 
thereby subjecting him to the substantial burden imposed by multiple prosecutions.  
“[O]nly a high-handed wrong intentionally directed against [a] defendant’s 
constitutional right” to a trial before an empaneled jury will bar a new trial.1  And 
more than a showing of prosecutorial or judicial error is required.2  The record here 
does not show the specific intent required for the Double Jeopardy Clause to apply.  
Rather, the totality of the record shows a Trial Judge who expected the trial to 
proceed on the schedule all could meet and that Butler voluntarily sought a mistrial 
because defense counsel wanted alternate jurors.  Defense counsel expressly 
acknowledged that double jeopardy was a “nonissue,” and Butler is bound by that 
concession.  Because Butler’s convictions are not barred by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, I respectfully dissent.   
When choosing to request a mistrial, Butler’s defense counsel explicitly 
based her request solely upon the lack of alternate jurors.  Alternate jurors are not 
required and a trial may proceed without them.3  Butler did not object to the 
additional voir dire that was conducted by the Trial Judge.  The jurors who were 
                                          
 
1 United States v. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467, 1469 (2d Cir. 1993).   
2 See United State v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976). 
3 See Dirring v. United States, 370 F.2d 862, 864 (1st Cir. 1967); Boisen v. United States, 181 F. 
Supp. 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
34 
excused (and not all were) were excused for cause and without objection.  There 
was no actual problem in trying the case before the motion for mistrial was made.  
In moving for a mistrial, defense counsel merely speculated about one stating,  
“We’re going to have no alternates, that’s the problem.  And we’re looking at five 
-- four, maybe a fifth day with no alternates.  I’m not doing this twice, I’m not 
doing it with less than 12 [jurors].”4   
Butler’s double jeopardy claim was waived.  His counsel expressly 
acknowledged that double jeopardy was a “nonissue.”5  He is bound by that tactical 
concession.  And Butler has not shown why he should be relieved of it.  The 
prosecutors relied on this concession in not opposing his mistrial request, and the 
Trial Judge relied upon it in granting the mistrial.  Afterthoughts developed with 
colleagues from defense counsel’s office cannot change the fact that Butler 
consented to the mistrial by requesting one and admitted there was no double 
jeopardy issue.   
On the merits, the totality of the record shows that the Trial Judge expected 
the trial to continue.6  Prior to Butler’s mistrial motion, the Trial Judge accepted 
the trial assignment, determined that there would be no plea agreement, and 
ascertained that twelve jurors and the parties could meet a trial schedule that ended 
                                          
 
4 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A39 (emphasis added).   
5 Id. (emphasis added).   
6 See United State v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 n.14 (1976) (refusing to find judicial goading 
where “the judge expected the trial to continue”). 
35 
consistent with her own availability on the following Monday.  It was Butler’s 
counsel—and not the Trial Judge, the prosecutors, or the jury—who was unwilling 
to proceed to trial without alternates.  None of the objections raised by Butler in his 
motion to dismiss were raised at the first trial.  The best evidence of why there was 
a mistrial is in the record of the trial itself.  As defense counsel explained at that 
trial, “the defense is asking for the mistrial because I need a full compliment [sic] 
of jurors.”7   
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “defense counsel had a 
reasonable basis to fear that other jurors might be later excused by the Trial 
Judge.”8  I find nothing in the trial record to support this conclusion.  The record 
shows that the jury of twelve was in fact available through Monday.  A mere 
possibility that another juror might be excused is insufficient to bar a new trial 
when Butler asked for one.  Butler has not met the exacting standard for the bar of 
double jeopardy to apply.  I would affirm his convictions.  
I respectfully dissent.  
 
                                          
 
7 Appellant’s Op. Br. Appendix at A79 (emphasis added).  
8 Majority Opinion, supra, at 25.