Case Title: Clark v. Arkansas Democrat Company

Citation: 413 S.W.2d 629

Docket Number: 5-4110

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1967-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
413 S.W.2d 629 (1967) Marvin CLARK, Guardian of the Estate of Thomas Harvey Cage, a Minor, Appellant, v. ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT COMPANY, Appellee. No. 5-4110. Supreme Court of Arkansas. March 13, 1967. Rehearing Denied May 1, 1967. Ben D. Lindsey and Spencer & Spencer, by Don Gillaspie, El Dorado, for appellant. Robert C. Compton, El Dorado, and Austin McCaskill, Little Rock, for appellee. *630 BROWN, Justice. This appeal involves an action for personal injuries to Tommy Cage, age thirteen years, who was injured while working his newspaper route on a motor scooter in El Dorado. Tommy's guardian brings this appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, Arkansas Democrat Company. The appeal questions the propriety of an instruction which told the jury that the Democrat had the legal right to contract with Tommy Cage, notwithstanding he was under fourteen years of age. Tommy, with the approval of his parents, had executed a written agreement with Arkansas Democrat Company. The instruction questioned by Tommy's guardian on appeal, given at the request of the Democrat, is as follows: The Democrat responds to the attack on this instruction by asserting that Act No. 96, March 21, 1883, § 2 (Ark.Stat. Ann. § 51-504 [1947]), authorized them to contract with the minor. The pertinent part of this section says that the contract of a minor, when approved by the parent having control of the minor, shall be binding. Cases coming to this court in which provisions of Act No. 96 have been applied have been concerned with sharecropping contracts. We have no hesitancy in holding that such part of Act No. 96 as deals with minors under fourteen years of age has been superseded by Initiative Act No. 1 of 1914. See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-701 (Repl. 1960), which reads as follows: Initiative Act No. 1 repeals "all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act. * * *" As they relate to minors under fourteen years of age, the two Acts are inconsistent and the repealing clause speaks for itself. The Democrat next asserts that Ark.Stat. Ann. § 81-701 does not apply in this case. This contention is grounded on the theory that the statute does not prevent a child under fourteen years from operating his own business. In other words, the Democrat contends this minor was an independent contractor and that his contract is not void but merely voidable. Even if the boy were placed in that classification, the Democrat has contracted with him to work in a remunerative occupation. This is prohibited by the statute and Court's Instruction No. 8 is therefore an incorrect statement of the law. Vacation employment under control of the parent excepted, we hold that the type of contractual arrangement herein utilizedwhereby a child under fourteen years is employed or permitted to work in a remunerative occupationviolates the letter, the spirit, and the clear purposes of Initiative Act No. 1 of 1914. The purpose of the Act was set forth in Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, 146 Ark. 448, 225 S.W. 887, 12 A.L.R. 1208 (1920): Here it should be pointed out that the right of the State to deny the parent the authority to bind a child of tender years to a labor contractas did Act 96 of 1883is unquestioned. In the Terry Dairy Company case, our court quoted from Tiedeman on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property, as follows: Our court gave Initiative Act No. 1 a liberal construction in Cox Cash Stores, Inc. v. Allen, 167 Ark. 364, 268 S.W. 361 (1925): Under the Democrat's so-called "independent contract," work was made available to this child which involved delivering three newspaper routes on a motor scooter in the city of El Dorado. He was also called upon by the Democrat to solicit insurance, and canvass for new customers at night. It would indeed be a most narrow construction to deny the boy the protection given him by the Child Labor Act of 1914 on the ground that he and his parents had contracted away that protection. Here, it should be noted that the child has no coverage under our Workmen's Compensation Act, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1302 (c) (1) (Repl.1960). Appellee argues that our Child Labor Act, passed in 1914, never contemplated the situation now before us; that at that time children were being exploited by employing them at low wages in occupations detrimental to their health, education, morality, and general welfare. In support of this argument, appellee cites the Cox case. That same case holds that another end to be accomplished by the Act was to prevent the injury and maiming of children in hazardous occupations. The Act may not have been important to the protection of newsboys in 1914, but in 1967 it should be considered very important. A plat of young Cage's newspaper routes reveals that he served a well populated area of El Dorado. In his area of service appear State Highway 15, Main Street, Warner Brown Hospital, the Youth Center, El Dorado-to-Camden Highway, Union Memorial Hospital, and numerous residential streets. Because of heavy vehicular traffic and his use of a motor scooter, it would be absurd to say that injury to this child should not have been reasonably anticipated. Under the holding in Terry Dairy, and reiterated in Cox, this case should be reversed, with directions to the trial court to ascertain the damages. It was held in the Cox case that when the undisputed evidence shows the child to have been injured in the course of his employment, the trial court takes the question of proximate cause from the jury. The only other element necessary to complete the chain of proximate cause is that some injury should have been reasonably anticipated from hiring the child contrary to the provisions of the statute; this element is established by the law itself. In the case at hand, it was undisputed that Thomas Harvey Cage was thirteen years of age, that he was injured *632 at a time when he was delivering newspapers for the Democrat and under a relationship created by the Democrat whereby Cage was engaged in remunerative work. Reversed. HARRIS, C. J., and JONES, J., concur. HARRIS, Chief Justice. I concur with the majority in its holding that this case should be reversed, but I would reverse it solely on the basis that Tommy Cage was an employee of the Arkansas Democrat. I do not think it necessary in this case to reach the question of what constitutes "permitting" a child to work. This is a broad term (and a broad holding) with more than one interpretation, and the majority holding today can extend much further than simply prohibiting a child less than 14 years old from selling newspapers. Likewise, I do not consider it essential to this decision to examine the question of whether an independent contract can be legally entered into between a publisher and a newsboy of this age, and not being vital, should not be passed upon. As stated, in my view, based on the provisions of the Agreement between the Arkansas Democrat and Tommy, together with the acts of the parties established by the evidence, the boy was not an independent contractor, but was an employee of appellee, i. e., a master and servant relationship existed. Let us first look at some of the definitions and decisions with reference to the term "independent contractor." Volume 1, Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Third Revision), Page 1533, defines an independent contractor as: This court, in Barr v. Matlock, 222 Ark. 260, 258 S.W.2d 540 said: In Hollingsworth and Frazier v. Barnett, 226 Ark. 54, 287 S.W.2d 888, we stated: With these rules and tests in mind, let us briefly examine the testimony in this case. Tommy Cage testified that he was hired by Charles N. Gentry, District Adviser for District No. 1 (which includes El Dorado) for the Arkansas Democrat. The boy testified that he was given specific delivery *633 routes * * * he was directed to throw the papers in wax paper on rainy days * * * he could not take subscriptions on other routes, and if any subscriptions were taken on routes other than his own, the carrier boys of those routes would be credited with the subscriptions * * * Gentry would pick up the newsboys once or twice per month in the evening, and they would work two or three hours at obtaining new subscriptions * * * he (Tommy) received directions (or training) in selling accident and health insurance which was offered only to subscribers of the Democrat * * * he delivered papers to prepaid subscribers (those who paid directly to the Democrat office). The testimony of Tommy as to his activities as a paper boy was pretty well substantiated by Mr. Gentry. V. M. Sorrells, Circulation Manager for the Arkansas Democrat, who signed the contract for appellee, testified that he was also resident agent for Continental Assurance Company, which was the company offering the health and accident insurance to Democrat subscribers, and he stated that appellee company received a small portion of the premiums paid for the insurance. Sorrells testified that the purpose in selling the policies was to hold readership, and they were sold only to subscribers. Under the provisions of the contract itself, Tommy was required to give two weeks written notice of the time he desired to terminate the contract, and he agreed that he would diligently maintain delivery service until the date of termination. The publisher, however, was given the right to cancel the agreement "with or without cause, at any time and without previous notice." Furthermore, the written agreement recites that the distributor "will not distribute or sell either directly or indirectly, any other newspaper in the area in which he operates, during the period of this agreement and during the period of three months immediately following the termination thereof." (Emphasis supplied.) This last, of course, is actually a restrictive covenant, being in effect, an agreement not to compete with the Arkansas Democrat. The usual consideration for such a covenant is simply the employment of the individual. In Bailey v. King, 240 Ark. 245, 398 S.W.2d 906, this court said: A study of the testimony relating to Tommy's activities, and the contract itself, under our holdings and recognized definitions of independent contractor, convinces me that a master-servant relationship existed between this boy and appellee. I would therefore, as stated at the outset, so hold, and reverse this case without considering the question of what constitutes "permitting" a child under 14 to engage in any employment for remuneration, nor would I pass on the question of whether a valid relationship of independent contractor could be established. I am authorized to state that JONES, J., joins in this concurrence. BROWN, Justice. The original opinion contains this language: "Under the holding in Terry Dairy, and reiterated in Cox, this case should be reversed, with directions to the trial court to ascertain the damages." This phraseology could well be interpreted to mean that on retrial the only question to be submitted to the jury is damages. This interpretation does not comport with our case *634 law. We have a long line of cases which hold that on remand for trial of a law case it is tried de novo. In the early case of Harrison v. Trader and wife, 29 Ark. 85 (1874), this court said, quoting with approval from an Alabama case: This holding was approved in Holt v. Gregory, et al., 222 Ark. 610, 260 S.W.2d 459 (1953). Also, see Manzo v. Boulet, 220 Ark. 106, 246 S.W.2d 126 (1952); Martin v. Street Improvement District No. 349, 180 Ark. 298, 21 S.W.2d 430 (1929); and Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. First National Bank of Green Forest, et al., 241 Ark. 287, 407 S.W.2d 388 (1966). Rehearing denied.