Case Title: Tschirgi v. Lander Wyoming State Journal

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-10-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Tschirgi v. Lander Wyoming State Journal1985 WY 153706 P.2d 1116Case Number: 84-218Decided: 10/03/1985ARNOLD B. TSCHIRGI, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

LANDER WYOMING STATE JOURNAL, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
 

ARNOLD B. TSCHIRGI, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF), 

v. 
LANDERWYOMINGSTATE JOURNAL, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Rehearing Denied October 
23, 1985.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Arnold B. 
Tschirgi, Lander, pro 
se.

Charles G. 
Kepler of Simpson & Kepler, Cody, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant sought to 
recover damages resulting from the publication of alleged defamatory material by 
the Wyoming State Journal, a newspaper published at Lander, Wyoming. This appeal is 
from a summary judgment in favor of the Wyoming State Journal. We 
affirm.

[¶2.]     The issue presented for 
our determination, as stated by appellant, is:

"When a county official 
acting as a private citizen (appellant) is stopped in another county for an 
alleged minor traffic violation and (1) passively declines to sign the citation 
and requests an opportunity to post bond, but (2) is threatened with several 
days in jail without an opportunity to post bond unless he signs the ticket, and 
(3) is then physically assaulted and arrested by the officers involved, but (4) 
remains passive and is not wrestled to the ground, can a newspaper (appellee) 
approximately nine months later publish that an opposing political candidate and 
the highway patrolman said that appellant `was wrestled to the ground by a 
Rawlins highway patrolman' without [being liable] therfor * * 
*?"

[¶3.]     Appellant was seeking 
election to a fourth term as county and prosecuting attorney for Fremont County, Wyoming. From August 12, 1982 through August 
23, 1982, the Wyoming State Journal printed four articles concerning an incident 
which had occurred nine months earlier in which appellant had been arrested for 
a traffic violation. Appellant contends that portions of the articles published 
August 19, 1982 and August 23, 1982, were libelous in that they stated he was 
"wrestled to the ground" at the time of his arrest.

"When a motion for 
summary judgment is before the supreme court, we have exactly the same duty as 
the district judge; and, if there is a complete record before us, we have 
exactly the same material as did he. We must follow the same standards. The 
propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness 
of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
This court looks at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the 
facts contained in affidavits, depositions and other proper material appearing 
in the record." Reno Livestock 
Corporation v. Sun Oil Company (Delaware), 
Wyo., 638 P.2d 147, 150 (1981). See also, Roth v. 
First Security Bank of Rock Springs, Wyoming, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, (1984), and 
Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo., 
671 P.2d 334 (1983).

[¶4.]     Appellant contends he 
was not "wrestled to the ground." It is undisputed that he was "wrestled against 
his car." Viewing the record in a light most favorable to appellant, we will, 
for purposes of considering the propriety of summary judgment, accept as true 
his contention that he was not wrestled to the ground, accepting also the 
undisputed fact that he was wrestled against his car.

[¶5.]     The newspaper contends 
that the news stories published on August 19 and 23, to which appellant objects, 
were substantially true; that in any event appellant was a public official 
(county and prosecuting attorney for Fremont County, Wyoming at the time) and as 
such it must appear that the articles were published with malice or reckless 
disregard of whether they were true or not, and that the contrary appears from 
the uncontroverted facts before the court. Since we will find that the articles 
as published were substantially true, it is unnecessary for us to decide issues 
concerning appellant being a public official and whether there was malice, or 
reckless disregard in publication.

[¶6.]     The portions of the 
news stories complained of are:

News Story of August 19, 
1982.

"An incident where 
FremontCounty and Prosecuting 
Attorney Arnold Tschirgi was allegedly wrestled to the ground by a Rawlins 
highway patrolman has surfaced in the heated election battle between Tschirgi 
and Rob Denhardt.

* * * * * 
*

"* * * When Ventling 
issued a citation, Tschirgi refused to sign it, the officer 
said.

"Ventling said he then 
arrested Tschirgi, but the attorney refused to get out of his car. By this time, 
the officer said he had called two additional patrolmen.

"`WE HAD TO 
drag him 
(Tschirgi) out of the car and wrestle him 
to the ground to get the handcuffs on,' Ventling said." (Emphasis 
added.)

News Story of August 23, 
1982

"Denhardt had initially 
made the allegation that Tschirgi had to be wrestled to the 
ground. 
Last week, Ventling concurred with that statement. However, when contacted on 
Friday, Ventling said the county attorney was not wrestled to the ground, but against the 
car.

"Two highway patrol 
officers, who served as back-up during the incident, agreed with the rest of the 
statements Ventling made to the Journal last week.

"ACCORDING TO Wayne 
Vantine, a highway patrolman from Medicine Bow, he was at the `highway shop' in 
Rawlins when he received a call from Ventling for back-up. The officer headed 
out to the scene, although he heard on the radio that Highway Patrolman Tad 
Armstrong from Rawlins was also on his way. Vantine said he went to the scene 
anyway and found Ventling sitting in his patrol car with Armstrong. He said 
Ventling was writing out a citation for Tschirgi.

"`Steve got out of his 
car and went up to Tschirgi's car and I saw him turn the citation book towards 
the window. I couldn't hear the conversation, but Steve opened the left hand 
door of Tschirgi's car. Steve motioned for Tad and I to come up to the 
car.

"`Steve reached in and 
told him to step out of the car and Tschirgi said no. Then Steve reached in with 
his right hand and got ahold of Tschirgi's left wrist. Tschirgi immediately 
jerked his arm away from Ventling and grabbed ahold of the steering wheel with 
both hands,' said Vantine.

"Vantine said he then 
reached in and grabbed Tschirgi out of the car. `I just flat yanked him out of 
the car, and kept on lifting him right up and put him against the car. He was 
not wrestled to the ground,' said the officer.

"Vantine said Tschirgi 
resisted their efforts to put the handcuffs on. `He jerked one arm away from me 
and Tad grabbed his arm, while I still had ahold of the other one.'" (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶7.]     Appellant conceded in 
his deposition that, except for the statement that he was wrestled to the 
ground, the statements of the officers as published by the newspaper were not 
libelous. With respect to the use of the word "wrestling," appellant 
stated:

"It's possible that they 
could have gotten a source for that. I won't say that one or more of the Highway 
Patrolmen might not claim that I, that they wrestled, but - and if they did, it 
wouldn't be libelous."

[¶8.]     Evidence before the 
trial court in support of the motions of the parties for summary judgment was in 
the form of depositions. Patrolman Vantine, in his deposition, reaffirmed the 
correctness of the Wyoming State Journal's publication of his version of the 
incident stating:

"Steve got out of his car 
and walked up to Mr. Tschirgi's car and turned the citation book around so that 
he could sign it.

* * * * * 
*

"Mr. Tschirgi did not 
sign it. Then Ventling stepped back and opened Mr. Tschirgi's car door. And 
shortly afterwards he motioned for us to help, to come up to the car, which Tad 
and I got out and we both went up to the Tschirgi vehicle.

* * * * * 
*

"About that time all I 
heard was, Steve asked Mr. Tschirgi to step out of his 
vehicle.

* * * * * 
*

"Since he had refused to 
sign the citation, our normal procedure is to place the person that refuses 
under arrest.

* * * * * 
*

"Normally by taking them 
out of the car and handcuffing them, putting them in a Patrol vehicle and 
transporting them to the sheriff's office to jail.

* * * * * 
*

"Mr. Tschirgi jerked his 
arm back away from him and grabbed ahold of the steering wheel with both of his 
hands. And at that time I grabbed Mr. Tschirgi and pulled him out of the 
car.

* * * * * 
*

"When he grabbed ahold of 
the steering wheel I just reached in - I was standing right at, you might say 
the doorpost, and when he jerked away from Steve, I just reached in and grabbed 
him and pulled him out of the car.

* * * * * 
*

"I let him get his feet 
under him and then I put him up against his vehicle at about approximately the 
back door, maybe a little bit just about the rear window, and I had him facing 
the car. And I was going to try to put the handcuffs on him, and - I don't 
remember whether I got my handcuffs, or one of them on him, or whether Tad used 
his, but he started to jerk away from me -

* * * * * 
*

"* * * [H]e was trying to 
get his arms away from us, and Mr. Tschirgi's wife got out of the car on the 
right-hand side, and she kept telling him to `Quit fighting them, go with 
them.'

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Would you recall * * * him being wrestled 
against the side of the car? Would that be a proper 
term?

"A. I would say he was forcefully put there, 
yes." (Emphasis added.)

[¶9.]     A defamatory 
communication is one which tends to hold the plaintiff up to hatred, contempt, 
ridicule or scorn or which causes him to be shunned or avoided; one that tends 
to injure his reputation as to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or 
confidence in which he is held. Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts (5th ed. 
1984), p. 773. It is undisputed that the material claimed to be libelous was 
published. It could reasonably be found defamatory. But, for liability to 
result, it must also appear that the published material was false, for truth is 
an absolute defense to a claim for damages resulting from libel. Article 1 § 20, 
Wyoming 
Constitution; Ando v. Great Western Sugar 
Company, 475 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1973); 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 
179.

[¶10.]  The question presented here is whether 
the libelous statement alleged to be true must be a literal and precise 
statement or account of an incident or whether, being substantially true, it is 
sufficient as a defense to the charge of libel. In the beginning, the law of 
libel and slander required that literal truth of the defamatory statement be 
proved in order to suffice as a defense. Gomba v. McLaughlin, 180 Colo. 232, 504 P.2d 337 
(1972); 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 180. Increasingly courts have 
recognized that injustice often resulted from requiring literal or precise 
accuracy in a statement, and the trend has been toward a relaxing of this 
requirement. Thus, it is now often said that

"it is not necessary to 
prove the literal truth of the accusation in every detail, and that it is 
sufficient to show that the imputation is substantially true, or, as it is often 
put, to justify the `gist,' the `sting,' or the `substantial truth' of the 
defamation." Prosser and Keeton, supra at 842. See also, Brueggemeyer v. Associated Press, 609 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1980); Maheu v. Hughes 
Tool Company, 569 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977); Gulf Construction Company v. Mott, 
Tex.Civ.App., 442 S.W.2d 778 (1969); 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 
180.

The Restatement 
of Torts 2d § 581(A), provides:

"It is not necessary to 
establish the literal truth of the precise statement made. Slight inaccuracies 
of expression are immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true in 
substance."

[¶11.]  In Gomba v. McLaughlin, supra, it was said 
of plaintiff that he assaulted an elderly gentleman in the show-ring at a dog 
show at Cheyenne, Wyoming. The statement was false for the 
plaintiff had never been to a dog show in Cheyenne, Wyoming. In fact, he had assaulted a Cheyenne man at a dog show in Brighton, Colorado. The court held the "gist" of the 
defamation was the assault, that it mattered not that it occurred at Brighton, 
Colorado, rather than Cheyenne, Wyoming, and that the statement, therefore, was 
substantially true and a complete defense to the libel 
action.

[¶12.]  In Downer v. Amalgamated Meatcutters and 
Butcher Workmen of North America, Tex.Civ.App., 550 S.W.2d 744 (1977), the 
union filed a claim upon plaintiff's bond on a printed form which asked a 
description of the money or property "misappropriated, stolen, or embezzled." 
Plaintiff contended that the money retained was not misappropriated, stolen or 
embezzled, but was a debt owed by him to the union and shown on the books as 
advances. His suit for defamation resulted in summary judgment in favor of the 
union. The court, on appeal, stated:

"[T]he defense of truth 
does not require proof that the alleged libelous statement is literally true in 
every detail; substantial truth is sufficient. For example, a charge that 
plaintiff had wasted $80,000 of the taxpayers' money was held to be 
substantially true, even though the actual amount was only $17,500. The court 
observed that no more opprobrium would be attached to a charge of embezzling the 
larger sum of money than to a charge of embezzling the smaller sum." 550 S.W.2d  
at 747.

[¶13.]  It seems clear to us that the gist, the 
sting, the hurt of the article here published, was appellant's resistance to law 
enforcement officers attempting to perform their duty as they saw it. When it 
was stated in the news story that appellant refused to step from his vehicle, 
grasped the steering wheel tightly and resisted the officers, was forcefully 
pulled from his vehicle, wrestled to a position that his hands were forced 
behind him and put in handcuffs, the damage to his reputation, if damage there 
was, was complete. That was the "sting" of the article. It made little 
difference in the final result whether appellant was wrestled against his car or 
wrestled to the ground. The news article reporting the incident was 
substantially true as a matter of law and, therefore, a complete defense to the 
charge. Summary judgment was correctly entered in favor of the newspaper and is, 
therefore, affirmed.