Case Title: Carter v. Romano

Citation: 426 A.2d 255

Docket Number: 

State: rhode-island

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Date: 1981-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
426 A.2d 255 (1981) Frank A. CARTER, Jr., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Salvatore L. ROMANO, Jr. No. 81-40-M.P. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. March 3, 1981. Frank A. Carter, Jr., pro se. Kirk Y. Griffin, Griffin & Higgins, Boston, Mass., John A. O'Neill, Providence, for defendant. PER CURIAM. The respondent attorney was convicted on September 4, 1980, pursuant to Indictment 79-1370, of conspiracy, perjury, injury to communication lines, and receiving stolen goods. All of the foregoing offenses constituted felonies. The respondent duly filed appeals from the judgments of conviction. Thereafter, in accordance with Rule 42-12(a) of the Rules Regarding Attorneys and Counselors of this court, an order issued to the respondent attorney to show cause why he should not be suspended during the pendency of his appeal from the foregoing convictions. Pursuant to the show-cause order, a hearing was held on October 16, 1980, during which respondent appeared with counsel. Action was withheld in respect to suspension pending receipt of memoranda from counsel for respondent. Subsequently, a memorandum was filed by counsel for respondent and also by disciplinary counsel. In a number of jurisdictions the constitutionality of interim suspension during the pendency of an appeal of an attorney who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude has been considered. Such suspensions have generally withstood attack on constitutional grounds. In re Bogart, 9 Cal. 3d 743, 511 P.2d 1167, 108 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 903, 94 S. Ct. 1395, 39 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1974); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Reamer, 281 Md. 323, 379 A.2d 171 (1977); State v. Denton, 598 P.2d 663 (Okla. 1979); Green v. County Attorney, 592 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1979). In passing upon the balancing of the right of an attorney to due process and the interest of the public, the Supreme Court of Maryland observed in Reamer: The court went on to say that it is not a deprivation of due process that the interim suspension provisions of the Maryland rule apply prior to the conclusion of the appellate process. *256 In a similar proceeding, the Court of Appeals of New York in Mitchell v. Association of the Bar of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 153, 351 N.E.2d 743, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1976), upheld the summary disbarment of the former Attorney General of the United States. In sustaining the constitutionality of the New York procedure, the Court of Appeals stated: In addition to the foregoing cases, it is worth noting that the Model Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement prepared by the Standing Committee on Professional Discipline of the American Bar Association, approved by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on February 14, 1978, and further approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1978 provides for the suspension of any attorney convicted of The Model Federal Rules define "serious crime" to include any felony and many lesser crimes involving moral turpitude. The cases cited seem clearly to uphold the constitutionality of interim suspension. Rule 42-12(a), (e) specifically authorizes the suspension of a convicted attorney during the pendency of an appeal in the following terms: Since interim suspension is constitutionally permissible and specifically authorized by the rule, it is a question of policy for this court to determine whether such interim suspension shall be applied. We are persuaded by the authorities set forth above that the better policy requires prompt action by this court to implement the provisions of Rule 42-12(a). As the Court of Appeals of New York in Mitchell, supra, has suggested: There can be no question in the case at bar that the respondent attorney has been convicted of a number of serious offenses involving moral turpitude. We are in agreement with many other courts that have passed upon similar questions that the respect for law in this jurisdiction would be greatly diminished if this attorney were permitted to continue to practice his profession *257 during the pendency of an appeal from his convictions. Therefore, for the reasons stated, we hereby order that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law beginning March 20, 1981, and continuing until further order of this court. He is directed to furnish the clerk of this court on or before March 16, 1981, with the names and addresses of all clients presently represented by him. The effective date of this order has been deferred so that there will be a reasonable period of time during which arrangements can be made to protect the interests of respondent's clients. Further, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 42-12(c), the matter is referred to the Disciplinary Board for the institution of a formal disciplinary proceeding that will be brought to hearing after appeals from the convictions are concluded.