Case Title: Charles W. Finney V. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC00-1351

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
Nos. SC00-1351, SC01-356
____________
CHARLES W. FINNEY,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
___________
CHARLES W. FINNEY,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE,
Respondent.
[September 26, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Charles W. Finney appeals an order of the circuit court denying his first
motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. 
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We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  We affirm.  Finney also
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V,
§ 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.  We deny the petition.
I.  FACTS
The relevant facts are set forth in this Court’s decision on direct appeal,
which provides in part:
According to the testimony at trial, Sandra Sutherland was
discovered stabbed to death in her apartment shortly after 2 p.m. on
January 16, 1991.  The victim was found lying face down on her bed. 
Her ankles and wrists were tied and she had been gagged.  On a
nightstand near the bed was an open jar of face cream.  The lid was
lying next to the jar.  The victim’s bedroom had been ransacked, the
contents of her purse had been dumped on the floor, and her VCR
was missing.
According to the medical examiner the cause of death was
multiple stab wounds to the back.  Of the thirteen stab wounds, all but
one penetrated the lungs causing bleeding and loss of oxygen,
ultimately resulting in death.  No bruises or other trauma was
observed.
Numerous fingerprints were gathered from the victim’s
apartment, including prints from a piece of paper with German writing
and from the jar on the nightstand.  Fingerprints also were taken from
the missing VCR, which was located at a local pawn shop.  Pawn
shop records indicated that the VCR was brought in on January 16 at
1:42 p.m. by Charles W. Finney for a loan of thirty dollars.  Finney’s
fingerprints matched prints taken from the pawn ticket, the VCR, the
jar lid, and the paper with German writing.
After it was determined that Finney had pawned the victim’s
VCR, Detective Bell of the Tampa Police Department interviewed
Finney on the afternoon of January 30, 1991.  Finney told Bell that he
knew the victim due to the fact that they had lived near each other in
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the same apartment complex.  Finney told Bell that he had seen the
victim twice since she moved to another apartment in the complex. 
Once, he had talked to her about putting a screened porch on the back
of her new apartment and then about two months prior to the murder
he talked to her by the mailboxes at the complex.  When asked about
his whereabouts on the day of the murder, Finney told Detective Bell
that he was home sick all day and never left his apartment.  Upon
being confronted with the fact that he had pawned the victim’s VCR,
Finney told the detective he found it near the dumpster when he took
out the garbage and then pawned it.
Finney called a witness who testified that the day before the
murder he saw the victim arguing with a white male near the mailboxes
at the apartment complex.  Another defense witness testified that
around 10 a.m. on the day of the murder, he saw William Kunkle, who
worked as a carpenter at the apartment complex, come out of the
victim's apartment.  According to the witness, when Kunkle saw him,
Kunkle came out of the door very quickly, locked the door with a key,
and walked around the corner.  The witness’s girlfriend offered similar
testimony as to Kunkle’s conduct.  In rebuttal, Kunkle testified that on
January 16 he worked in the building next door to Ms. Sutherland’s
apartment, but had not been in her apartment that day.  He denied ever
having any conversation or interaction with the victim.  The fingerprint
examiner also testified during rebuttal that Kunkle’s fingerprints did
not match those found in the victim’s apartment.
The defense sought to recall the medical examiner, Dr. Diggs, to
testify that the crime scene was consistent with both a consensual
sexual bondage situation and a situation where the victim consented to
being bound and gagged out of fear.  The State objected to the
testimony as speculative.  During proffer, Dr. Diggs told the court that
whether a bondage situation was consensual was not something that a
medical examiner would typically testify about or try to determine. 
The trial judge disallowed any testimony about the circumstances
being consistent with sexual bondage, but allowed Dr. Diggs to testify
concerning the probable positions of the victim and of the attacker and
about the fact that there were no defensive wounds or other signs of a
struggle.
Finney took the stand in his own defense.  He testified that he
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had lived near Ms. Sutherland in the same apartment complex until she
moved about eight months prior to the murder.  A couple of months
after she moved, Ms. Sutherland talked to him about screening in the
patio of her new apartment.  At that time, she handed him a piece of
paper to write down measurements but took the paper back.  Finney
testified that he returned about a week or two later but Ms. Sutherland
had decided not to screen the patio.  On that occasion he was in the
victim's apartment, helped her move boxes and took various items out
of the boxes.  According to Finney the last time he saw Ms.
Sutherland was a day or two before the murder. She was coming out
of her apartment early one morning.  She came over to his car and
they talked.  He further testified that he found the VCR near the
dumpsters at the complex and had pawned it the same day for pocket
cash.  He stated that he did not steal the VCR and that he did not kill
Ms. Sutherland.
Finney was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery,
and dealing in stolen property.  The jury recommended death by a
vote of nine to three.  The trial judge followed the recommendation.
The judge found three aggravating factors:  1) Finney previously had
been convicted of a violent felony; 2) the murder was committed for
pecuniary gain; and 3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel.  She found five nonstatutory mitigating factors:  1) Finney’s
contributions to the community as evidenced by his work and military
history; 2) Finney’s positive character traits; 3) Finney would adjust
well to a prison setting and had potential for rehabilitation; 4) Finney
had a deprived childhood; and 5) Finney’s bonding with and love for
his daughter.
Finney v. State, 660 So. 2d 674, 678-79 (Fla. 1995) (footnote omitted).  This Court
affirmed.
Finney subsequently filed in circuit court his first postconviction motion for
1.  Finney raised the following claims: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective in
the guilt and penalty phases of the trial; (2) the jury instructions were
unconstitutional; (3) newly discovered evidence showed that the conviction and
sentence were unreliable; (4) Finney’s death sentence rests on an automatic
aggravating circumstance; (5) Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is
unconstitutional.
2.  Finney raises the following claims: (1) the circuit court erred in summarily
denying Finney’s rule 3.850 claims; (2) the circuit court erred in summarily denying
Finney’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to certain
prosecutorial comments; (3) the circuit court erred in summarily denying Finney’s
claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately question prospective
jurors; (4) the circuit court erred in summarily denying Finney’s claim that trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the excusal of certain jurors; (5) the
circuit court erred in summarily denying Finney’s claim that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to present additional mitigating evidence; (6) the circuit court
erred in summarily denying Finney’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to provide the defense mental health expert with adequate background information;
(7) the circuit court erred in summarily denying Finney’s claim that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to retain an expert to testify concerning the crime scene; (8) the
circuit court erred in failing to ensure that postconviction counsel rendered effective
performance; (9) Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional; (10)
Finney’s trial was fraught with error; (11) Finney is innocent of the death penalty.
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relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising five issues.1  The
court granted an evidentiary hearing on his ineffectiveness claim concerning hair
and semen samples found at the crime scene but, when postconviction counsel
received new DNA results relating to those specimens, counsel declined to proceed
with that claim.  The court denied the motion.  Finney appeals, raising eleven
issues.2  He also has filed in this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
3.  Finney raises the following claims: (1) appellate counsel was ineffective in
failing to raise the issue of the admissibility of victim photographs; (2) appellate
counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue of the victim’s mother being
present in the courtroom; (3) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the
issue of the trial court’s failure to rule on the defendant’s motion for sequestration;
(4) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue of the excusal of
two jurors for cause; (5) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the
issue of the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury to disregard certain comments by
the prosecutor; (6) Finney may be incompetent at the time of execution; (7) the
Death Penalty Reform Act of 2000 is unconstitutional; (8) execution by lethal
injection is unconstitutional.
4.  See generally Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 66-67 (Fla. 2000)
(noting the problems caused by the failure of circuit courts to conduct such
hearings).  
5.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(A)(i).
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raising eight issues.3
II.  EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Finney first claims that the circuit court erred in denying his various rule
3.850 claims without conducting an evidentiary hearing.  We disagree.  This Court
encourages circuit courts to conduct evidentiary hearings on initial postconviction
motions in capital cases when appropriate.4  Currently, our rules of procedure
provide that such a hearing “shall” be held in capital cases on initial postconviction
motions filed after October 1, 2001, “on claims listed by the defendant as requiring
a factual determination.”5
For motions filed before October 1, 2001, the Court applies the following
6.  The circuit court noted that the following claims were raised by Finney in
his rule 3.850 motion:
1.  Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel in the
guilt and sentencing phases of his capital trial.
A.  Counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately question potential jurors on their view of the
death penalty, credibility of witnesses, mental health
mitigation, and mental health experts, and counsel failed
to object to misstatements of the law by the prosecutor,
and failed to present issues for appeal.
B.  Counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge
the State’s case.
C.  Counsel was ineffective for failing to provide
the mental health expert with adequate background
information to establish mitigation or negate specific
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standard of review:
To uphold the trial court’s summary denial of claims raised in a
3.850 motion, the claims must be either facially invalid or conclusively
refuted by the record.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(d).  Further, where
no evidentiary hearing is held below, we must accept the defendant’s
factual allegations to the extent they are not refuted by the record.  See
Lightbourne v. Dugger, 549 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Fla. 1989).
Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999). 
In the present case, Finney filed his initial “shell” motion in March 1997 and
his present amended motion in April 1999.  As noted above, the circuit court
granted an evidentiary hearing on his ineffectiveness claim but postconviction
counsel declined to proceed with that hearing.  The court then denied the motion. 
In its written order, the circuit court listed each of Finney’s claims6 and disposed of
intent.
D.  Counsel was ineffective for failing to present all
mitigating evidence.
E.  Counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve
the record.
F.  Counsel was ineffective in presenting mitigation
evidence.
2.  The death sentence is invalid because the jury instructions
were constitutionally invalid.
A.  The instruction on the aggravator of
“commission of a murder during the course of a robbery”
is unconstitutional on its face and as applied.
B.  The jury instructions shifted the burden to Mr.
Finney to prove death was inappropriate.
C.  The Trial Court’s instruction to the jury diluted
its sense of responsibility.
3.  Newly discovered evidence established that Defendant
Finney’s capital conviction and sentence are constitutionally unreliable.
4.  Defendant Finney’s sentence rests upon an
unconstitutionally automatic aggravating circumstance.
5.  Florida’s capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its
face and as applied.
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each as follows:
Claims Two, Four, and Five are denied because they are
procedurally barred.  Postconviction motions are not to be used as
second appeals.  Issues that were or could have been raised on direct
appeal are not cognizable in a Rule 3.850 motion.  
As to Claim Two, defendant Finney’s attack on jury
instructions must be challenged on direct appeal.
Claim Four, pertaining to sentencing aggravators, should have
been raised on direct appeal.  Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court
has rejected this argument on its merits.
Claim Five is also procedurally barred as it should have been
raised on direct appeal.  Additionally, this claim has been repeatedly
rejected.
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Lastly, as to Claims Two, Four, and Five, defense counsel
stated at the Huff hearing that Claims Two, Four, and Five, were
primarily pled for purposes of federal habeas petition.
Claim One alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and breaks
the claim into various sub-issues.
A.  Inadequate Voire Dire
First, defendant complains that a potential juror brought up the
race issue.  This juror was excused for cause.  The record clearly
establishes that a question was posed to juror Kinsley about whether
he had ever been wrongly accused of doing something.  Mr. Kinsley
responded, “I thought it was a racial thing.”  It is clear that Mr. Kinsley
is responding to the posed question and is not making a comment on
the instant case.
Defendant complains that the voir dire was not adequate.  The
record speaks for itself and the transcript of the complete voir dire is
attached.
Defendant Finney also argues that the prosecution extracted
promises from the jurors regarding their ability to be fair and alluded to
the additional evidence they would hear in the second phase.  The
transcript clearly establishes that the prosecutor asked the jury to
“promise Mr. Finney that they would keep an open mind.” 
Furthermore, Defendant’s contention fails under the analysis of
Strickland.  It is the obligation of counsel to determine in voir dire if a
juror can be fair and unbiased [in] the penalty phase.  
Counsel for defendant Finney acknowledges that his complaint
about the prosecutor interjecting his personal feelings was
procedurally barred.
Defendant Finney complains that counsel failed to object when
the prosecutor misstated the law.  The trial court clearly instructed the
jury that the court instructs on the law, not counsel.
The last point in sub-issue A of Claim One was a complaint that
the prosecutor excused two jurors, Silas and Jennings, for cause who
were opposed to the death penalty.  The record is clear that neither
juror was successfully rehabilitated.  The excusal for cause was
correct.
B.  Counsel was ineffective for failure to challenge the State’s
case.
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The defense claimed there were hair samples, fingerprints and
semen stains taken at the time of the offense.  However, a stipulation
was entered acknowledging that according to FDLE, there was not a
sufficient sample of semen to test.  This Court on May 26, 1999,
granted an evidentiary hearing to compare the hair samples and semen
samples to defendant Finney’s as DNA replication is now possible. 
Subsequently, after court orders were granted for defendant Finney’s
blood samples and the blood was taken, defense counsel indicated he
could not proceed with this claim.
C.  Counsel was ineffective for failure to provide a mental health
expert with adequate background information to permit a meaningful
evaluation.
Defense counsel admits that some of the mitigation evidence is
cumulative.  There are no specific examples of mitigation evidence
pled, nor is there an affidavit from defendant Finney’s mental health
expert at trial that he has reviewed the mitigation evidence and that his
testimony would have been different than at trial.  Defendant Finney
has failed to establish how any failure on the part of his counsel has
prejudiced him.
Mr. Finney has not alleged any specific facts regarding what
mitigating evidence exists or what the alleged witnesses could testify
to.  The Florida Supreme Court in LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236
(Fla. 1998), addressed this issue:
A motion for post conviction relief can be denied without
an evidentiary hearing when the motion and record
conclusively demonstrate that the movant is entitled to no
relief.  A defendant may not simply file a motion for post
conviction relief containing conclusory allegations that his
or her trial counsel was ineffective and then expect to
receive an evidentiary hearing.  The defendant must allege
specific facts that, when considering the totality of the
circumstances, are not conclusively rebutted on the
record and demonstrate deficiency on the part of counsel
which is detrimental to the defendant.
As in LeCroy, defendant Finney failed to make even a prima
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facie showing of prejudice which would warrant an evidentiary hearing.
E.  Counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the State
introduced collateral crime evidence in the penalty phase.
Defendant Finney complains that the trial court improperly
admitted the [live testimony of the] victim of a prior similar crime
committed by defendant Finney.  However, on direct appeal the
Supreme Court specifically held that evidence of a prior violent felony
conviction is admissible in a capital sentencing proceeding, unless
unduly prejudicial.
Testimony concerning the circumstances that resulted in a prior
conviction is allowed to assist the jury in evaluating the defendant’s
character and the weight to be given the prior conviction so that the
jury can make an informed decision as to the appropriate sentences.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that it is not appropriate
to go behind the jury’s verdict in the prior case in an attempt to retry
that conviction.
F.  The sentencing court’s inability to find and apply various
mitigating circumstances because ineffective presentation of mitigating
evidence violates the Eighth Amendment.
Defendant Finney complains that mitigation evidence of his
abusive childhood and other matters were not weighed by the
sentencing court.  To the contrary, the trial court’s sentencing order of
November 10, 1992, and the transcript state:
Dr. Gamache testified that the defendant came from a
deprived childhood with an alcoholic father whom he
barely knew and how he left the family when the
defendant was merely three years old.  The defendant was
extremely poor and had to fend for himself for most of
his needs.  This testimony was not seriously impeached
by the prosecution and the Court gave this some weight.
Subissue F is without merit.
All of the issues under Claim One are hereby denied.  Defendant
is not entitled to relief.
Claim Three—Newly discovered evidence establishes that Mr.
Finney’s capital conviction and sentences are constitutionally
7.  Finney’s main contention in his pro se motion was that postconviction
counsel should not use Finney’s own pretrial specimen for DNA matching with hair
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unreliable.
This claim is also denied and defendant is not entitled to any
relief.  This claim is a “catch all” and as the results of the DNA testing
were not litigated, there is no newly discovered evidence. 
(Citations omitted.)  Based on the foregoing and our review of the record, we
conclude that the circuit court properly applied the law and did not err in denying
Finney’s rule 3.850 motion after Finney declined to proceed with an evidentiary
hearing on his ineffectiveness claim vis-a-vis hair and semen specimens found at the
crime scene.
III.  POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL 
While Finney acknowledges that no remedial mechanism has been formalized
in Florida for resolving claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel,
he nevertheless asserts that his prior postconviction counsel rendered
impermissibly substandard performance in formulating his present rule 3.850
motion.  He claims that prior counsel failed to adequately allege that trial counsel
was ineffective in presenting mitigating evidence and that this failure led to the
circuit court’s denial of his ineffectiveness claim.  Finney notes that he previously
filed in circuit court a pro se motion to dismiss his prior postconviction counsel but
the court denied that motion.7 
and semen found at the crime scene because the pretrial specimen may have been
tampered with by police.  That issue, however, was resolved when counsel
arranged for an independent blood draw from Finney.  As explained above, once
the results of that blood draw were made available to the defense, the defense
abandoned that issue.  We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of
Finney’s pro se motion.  See Howell v. State, 707 So. 2d 674, 680 (Fla. 1998).
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Finney now alleges that his prior postconviction counsel should have
asserted that trial counsel failed to present specific witnesses who “could have
strengthened the story of appellant’s upbringing, childhood and teen years through
independent sources, perhaps more persuasively than the appellant himself.” 
Finney contends that these witnesses could have attested to the following: as a
child, Finney fell from his rocking chair and hit his head; as a child, he was anemic
and often fainted; he had trouble reading and was stubborn in school; his best
friend drowned; his cousin shot him in the abdomen; he witnessed the hit-and-run
death of a cousin; he developed a drug problem in the military and entered a
rehabilitation program.  We disagree.
The record shows that trial counsel presented substantial mitigating evidence
during the penalty phase.  Finney’s common law wife, Tammy Gallimore, testified
at length about his positive character traits, describing him as gentle, kind, and
caring and relating how he had supported her emotionally and financially as she
pursued her education and as she progressed through the pregnancy and birth of
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their daughter.  She testified that he was a hard worker, taking a second job when
they lived in Georgia in order to make voluntary child support payments to his ex-
wife and again when they lived in Florida to help their own financial situation.  She
described his devotion to their daughter, even throughout his incarceration, and
extensively discussed his artistic talents.  She noted that everyone liked Finney and
that he always had stable employment and helped around the house.
Joseph Williams also testified during the penalty phase.  He was a friend of
Finney’s who helped him get a job at University Community Hospital shortly after
Finney moved to Florida.  Williams testified that he loved Finney like a son, that
Williams’s two sons, ex-wife, and mother all liked Finney.  He said that Finney was
honest, appreciative, completely trustworthy, very spiritual, and crazy about his
(i.e., Finney’s) family.  He testified that Finney had been honorably discharged
from the military and that Finney was “the best working man” Williams had ever
met; he would do anything that anyone asked of him and was a dependable,
enthusiastic employee.
Dr. Michael Gamache, a forensic psychologist, also testified on Finney’s
behalf during the penalty phase.  He stated that he conducted two clinical
examinations of Finney, spending a total of five and one-half hours with him.  He
described Finney’s background in detail.  Finney was born in Macon, Georgia,
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where his family lived at or near the poverty level.  His mother was a dietitian; his
father was a carpenter.  His father was a very heavy drinker; he abandoned the
family when Finney was about three years old.  Finney was the youngest of three
children.  Gamache described Finney as an average or better student who got along
well with teachers and other students.  He noted that Finney enlisted in the Army
after graduation, serving two years in the First Airborne Ranger Division before
being honorably discharged.  Upon returning to Macon, he used his military
benefits to pursue his educational and career goals.  He had gotten married while in
the military, and a son was born in 1973, while Finney still was in the Army.  In
Macon, Finney maintained stable employment and provided for his family,
ultimately landing a “plum” job at a power plant that had excellent job security and
benefits.  He and his wife were both religious, but they grew apart and started
losing interest in each other; they were separated and then divorced.  Finney later
met Tammy and they became close friends; he was willing to give up his secure job
to come with her to Florida, where she wanted to continue her education.
Dr. Gamache noted that Finney had been a very good employee his entire
adult life; there never was any difficulty or dissatisfaction with his work habits. 
Gamache had spoken with Tammy at length and she had corroborated Finney’s
description of the ending of his first marriage and the strength of their relationship,
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as well as Finney’s very close bond with his daughter.  He noted that Finney,
Tammy, and their daughter Shannon were a very close, loving family, and that the
family relationships were very strong and positive, without any serious problems. 
The record shows that the mitigating evidence that was presented during the
penalty phase was sufficiently compelling to convince the circuit court to find and
give weight to five nonstatutory mitigating factors: Finney’s contribution to the
community and society as evidenced by his exemplary work and military history;
his positive character traits; his ability to adjust well to prison life and his excellent
potential for rehabilitation; his deprived childhood; and his continued contribution
to his family through the bonding and love he showed for this daughter during
frequent visitations and contacts.
In light of the mitigating testimony that was presented at trial, and considering
the aggravated nature of the murder in this case, we conclude that the newly
proffered evidence is not sufficiently compelling to have changed the outcome of
the penalty phase proceeding.  As noted above, there was testimony presented
during the penalty phase concerning Finney’s military service, which took place in
1972-74, and the fact that he may have used drugs nearly twenty years before the
murder.  We do not find this sufficiently compelling to warrant relief at this stage of
the proceedings.  Nor is the fact that he may have experienced several childhood
8.  Claims (1) through (8) are without merit for the reasons given above.  To
the extent that claim (1) alleges additional circuit court error in the rendering of the
order under review, those allegations also are without merit.  To the extent that
claim (8) alleges additional instances of substandard performance by
postconviction counsel or errors committed by the court below, those allegations
are without merit.  Claim (9) was properly denied by the circuit court below.  See,
e.g., Hall v. State, 742 So. 2d 225, 226 (Fla. 1999).  Claim (10) was not raised
below and thus is procedurally barred.  See, e.g., Shere v. State, 742 So. 2d 215,
219 n.9 (Fla. 1999).  Likewise, claim (11) was not raised below and is procedurally
barred.  Id.  
9.  Finney’s habeas claims are without merit for various reasons. (1) Trial
counsel objected to only one victim photo but the trial court determined that this
was the only photo that showed the gag placed on the victim’s mouth and the court
admitted that photo.  We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in this matter
and thus no ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in failing to raise this claim on
appeal.  See, e.g., Mendyk v. State, 592 So. 2d 1076, 1081-82 (Fla. 1992).  (2)
Finney fails to allege how he was prejudiced when the trial court allowed the
victim’s mother to sit in the courtroom after she testified; Finney does not allege
that the mother engaged in any prejudicial conduct.  We find no abuse of discretion
by the trial court in this matter and thus no ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in
failing to raise this claim on appeal.  See Sireci v. State, 587 So. 2d 450, 454 (Fla.
1991).  (3) Finney fails to allege any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s denial
of his motion to sequester the jury.  We find no abuse of discretion by the trial
court in this matter and thus no ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in failing to
raise this claim on appeal.  See generally Banda v. State, 536 So. 2d 221, 224 (Fla.
1988).  (4) Two jurors were excused for cause after expressing prejudice against
the death penalty.  We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in this matter
and thus no ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in failing to raise this claim on
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falls, bumps, and traumas.  Accordingly, we find no merit to this claim.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The remainder of Finney’s rule 3.850 claims are either procedurally barred or
without merit.8  His habeas claims also are without merit.9  We affirm the denial of
appeal.  See Castro v. State, 644 So. 2d 987, 990 (Fla. 1994).  (5) The trial court
sustained defense counsel’s objection when the prosecutor said in closing
argument that no sperm was found vaginally or orally on the victim; the court gave
a curative instruction to which defense counsel did not object.  This issue was not
preserved for review and appellate counsel cannot be faulted not raising it on
appeal.  See Kokal v. Dugger, 718 So. 2d 138, 142-43 (Fla. 1998).  (6) Defense
counsel acknowledges that this claim is premature but contends that it must be
raised to preserve it for federal review.  (7) This claim already has been decided
adversely to the defendant.  See Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 663-65 (Fla. 2000). 
(8) This claim already has been decided adversely to the defendant.  Id. at 666-68.
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rule 3.850 relief and deny his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., SHAW, WELLS, and LEWIS, JJ., and HARDING, Senior
Justice, concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result only.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Two Cases:
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County, Chet A. Tharpe,
Judge - Case No. 91-1611, and 
An Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
John W. Moser, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle Region, Joseph T.
Hobson, Assistant CCRC, Richard E. Kiley, Assistant CCRC, and Eric C.
Pinkard, Assistant CCRC, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
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Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Carol M. Dittmar, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent