Case Title: Columbus Ornamental Iron Works, Inc. v. Martin

Citation: 240 A.2d 405

Docket Number: 

State: rhode-island

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Date: 1968-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
240 A.2d 405 (1968) COLUMBUS ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKS, INC. v. George H. MARTIN et al. No. 243-Appeal. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. April 1, 1968. Felix A. Appolonia, West Warwick, for plaintiff-appellant. Abraham Goldstein, Providence, for defendants-appellees. PAOLINO, Justice. This case is before us on the plaintiff's appeal from a judgment entered against it at a pretrial conference by a justice of the superior court. The pertinent facts are as follows. On January 4, 1966, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendants for goods sold and delivered. The defendants' answer denied that they were indebted to the plaintiff. Subsequently, on February 11, 1966, and pursuant to rule 56 (b), (c), of the rules of civil procedure of the superior court, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied by a supporting affidavit. The plaintiff filed a motion objecting to the defendants' motion for summary judgment and chose to rely on its pleading in support thereof. On February 21, 1966, defendants' motion was heard with plaintiff offering no testimony to rebut the motion. After a brief hearing, the trial justice denied defendants' motion to which defendants duly objected. The case was thereafter assigned for pretrial hearing to May 24, 1967 at 10 a.m. The plaintiff's attorney was not present when the case was called ready and did not appear until 10:20 a.m. After noting the absence of plaintiff's attorney, the trial justice commenced the hearing. Upon reviewing the record, he took cognizance of the affidavit supporting defendants' motion for summary judgment which had been previously denied and granted the same. Judgment was thereupon entered for defendants. *406 The plaintiff alleges that it had no notice that defendants' motion for summary judgment would be decided at the pretrial hearing; that it did not consent to the entry of said judgment; and that there was neither a hearing in open court nor a record of the evidence with the exception of a record of docket entries made by the clerk of the court. The plaintiff bases its appeal on three grounds. It maintains that a justice at a pretrial hearing cannot grant an interlocutory motion previously denied by another justice of the same court; that a judgment cannot be entered at a pretrial hearing without the agreement or consent of the party against whom judgment is rendered; and that a pretrial conference cannot serve as a hearing on the merits of a case without a hearing in open court and absent a record of testimony or evidence. For reasons soon to become apparent, we shall treat plaintiff's contentions in the above-stated order. In granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, the justice at the pretrial conference violated the doctrine of the law of the case as it is set forth in Payne v. Superior Court, 78 R.I. 177, 80 A.2d 159, petition for reargument denied, 78 R.I. 188, 82 A.2d 167. In that case we said at 183, 80 A.2d at 163: We then went on to explain our reasons for adopting this view and concluded at 184, 80 A.2d 163, that it was a rule of policy and convenience which The denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order involving a pure queston of law rather than an exercise of discretion. 3 Barron and Holtzoff, § 1242. It therefore follows that the justice at the pretrial conference erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment when that motion had previously bee denied by another justice of the same court. See also Rhode Isalnd Co. v. Superior Court, 42 R.I. 5, 104 A. 634; New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. v. Superior Court, 83 R.I. 292, 115 A.2d 534. In view of this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to discuss the plaintiff's remaining contentions. The plaintiff's appeal is sustained and the judgment appealed from is reversed.