Case Title: Matter of a Member of the Bar: Freebery

Citation: 

Docket Number: 105650

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

In the Matter of a Member )
of the Bar of the Supreme Court. _) No. 113, 2008
of the State of Delaware, )
) (Board Case No. 22,2004)
SHERRY L. FREEBERY, )
)
Respondent. )
‘Submitted: April 17, 2008
Decided: April 21, 2008

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices,
ORDER
This 21* day of April 2008, the Court having reviewed the Report of the
Board on Professional Responsibility, the Limited Objections of Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, and Respondent’s Response,

IT IS ORDERED that the Board’s recommendations are hereby adopted and
the Respondent is hereby disbarred effective immediately.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Myron T. Steele
Chief Justice
ELZUFON AUSTIN REARDON

   

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February 27, 2008,

HAND DELIVERY
Personal and Confidential
Mr. Stephen D. Taylor
Court Administrator
Supreme Court of Delaware
Carvel State Office Building
Wilmington, DE 19899

RE: In the Matter of Freebery
Board Case No.: 22, 2004
Board Of Professional Responsibility

  

81a od LZ eo

Dear Mr. Taylor:

Enclosed is a Final Report containing the findings and recommendations of the Panel in
this matter. A copy of this report is being simultaneously served on Andrea L. Rocanelli
Esquire at the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and William J. Rhodunda, Esquire, counsel for
Respondent,

‘Should the Court require any additional information from this panel, we are available at
the pleasure of the Court.

 

 

gic L. REARDON

MLR/rar

Enclosure to all parties

Cc: Andrea L. Rocanelli, Esquire (Via Hand Delivery- Personal and Confidential)
William J. Rhodunda, Jr, Esquire (Via Hand Delivery - Personal and Confidential)
Wayne J. Carey, Esquire - (Via First Class Mail - Personal and Confidential)

Mr. John Stafford (Via First Class Mail - Personal and Confidential)

 
BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE

IN THE MATTER OF CONFIDENTIAL,

SHERRY L. FREEBERY,

;
§ Board Case Nos. 22, 2004
§

RESPONDENT. 5

 

REPORT OF THE BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

‘This is the report of the findings and recommendations of the Board on Professional
Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Delaware in the above captioned matter. A Hearing was
hheld on December 12, 2007, in the Supreme Court Hearing Room, 11% Floor, Carvel State
Building, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, Delaware,

‘The Panel of the Board on Professional Responsibility consisted of Wayne J. Carey,
Esquire, Mr. John Stafford, and Mark L, Reardon, Esquire (Chair). The Office of Disciplinary
Counsel (*ODC") was represented by Andrea L. Rocanelli, Esquire. Respondent was
represented by William J. Rhodunda, Jr. Esquire and Elizabeth G. Taylor, Esquire, the latter
having been admitted pro hac vice.

1. Procedural History

‘The ODC filed a Petition for Discipline (“the Petition”) with the Board on Professional

Responsibility of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware (“the Board”) on November 13,

2007. As set forth in more dé

 

below, the ODC asserted in the Petition that Sherry L.
Freebery, Esquire (“Respondent”) committed a criminal act in violation of Rule 8.4(6) of the
Delaware Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct (“the Rules"). The Respondent filed a

response to the ODC’s Petition on December 7, 2007. In her response, Respondent
acknowledges that her conviction under 18 U.S.C. §1014 constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4(b).
Aaddltionally, Respondent's answer requested a Hearing to determine the appropriate sanction for
the admitted violation,

‘On Devember 7, 2007, ODC filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of a Recommendation
for the Sanction of Disbarment. On December 10, 2007, Respondent, through her counsel, filed a
‘Memorandum of Law asserting thatthe appropriate sanction for the admitted offense is a period of
suspension, not disbarment,

‘The record in this case is extensive. At the Hearing, Respondent testified on her own behalf,
During the Hearing, ODC and Respondent presented documents that were marked as Hearing
exhibits. ODC Exhibits 1-3 and Respondent's Exhibits 1-9 were admitted to the record for the
Board's consideration. Following the Hearing atthe request of the Board, Respondent's Exhibit 10
\was made part of the recordin this case.

I, The Alleged Violation of Professional Conduct

ODC alleges Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) by knowingly making a false statement on
‘8 mortgage loan application in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1014, a felony criminal offense, Rule
8.4(b) states: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: ...commit a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects."

IIL. Factual Findings of the Board
1. Respondent is a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware, having

been admitted in 1995, but has never practiced law as an attorney (T-14, 18)

 

2. In connection with a Federal criminal matter docketed as United States v,
Eresbery, Cr. Action No. 05-541-JPF, in the United States District Court forthe Eastem District

of Pennsylvania, before the Honorable John P. Fullam, Jr, Respondent entered a guilty plea to
the charge of Making « False Statement to a Bank, a violation of Title 18 US.C. $1014 (ODC
Ex. 1). The elements of Making a False Statement to a Bank are: (the defendant made a false
statement to a bank; (i fr the purpose of influencing the action of sad bank; and, (i) the bank
is an institution the accounts of which were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. (ODC Ex. 1; R. Ex. 9).

3. The circumstances surrounding the admitted offense are amply described in the
documents presented as exhibits during the Hearing

4. According to the Memorandum of Plea Agreement, the Respondent knowingly,
‘voluntarily and intelligently admitted that on or about January 26, 2001, she executed @
negotiable promissory note (‘the Note") in the amount of $2.3 million payable on demand to
Lisa Dean Moseley ("Ms. Moseley"). The Note also obligated the Respondent to pay Ms.
‘Moseley interest on the loan atthe rate of 5.9% per annum. (R. Ex. 10). The annual interest

payment on this loan ig ealeulated at $135,700, (ODC Ex 1 $3)

 

i Respondent
‘was a long-time personal friend of Ms. Moseley. (T-19). Ms. Moseley was born into a wealthy

5. From the exhibits and the Hearing testimony, the Board finds 1

family. (R. Ex. 3 at 34).

6. According to the documents, Ms. Moseley decided to give Respondent a git of
substantial amount of money. Her purpose was to give Respondent an opportunity to take some
time off forthe first ime in her life and decide what she wanted to do afte her retirement from a
career in public service, (R. Ex. 3 at 41; 7-23). Ms. Moseley was persuaded by her lawyer and
estate planner to set the gift up as a loan to avoid the substantial gift ax that would result from a
pure gift to Respondent, (T= 19). According to the testimony of Ms. Moseley at the sentencing

hearing in Federal Court and the testimony of Respondent during the Board Hearing, it was
never intended by Ms, Moseley or Respondent that Respondent would repay the money. (R. Ex.
3 at 35; T- 25). Documents presented during the hearing confirm that Ms. Moseley did not
intend to pursue repayment of the loan during her lifetime and did not intend for anyone to
pursue repayment of the loan after her death. (R. Ex. 4; 1-25). In fact, subsequent to Ms.
Moseley's testimony in the Federal Court in January 2006, Ms. Moseley cancelled the
Promissory Note that Respondent had signed and forgave any principle and unpaid interest. (R.
Ex. 4; R. Ex, 10),

7. After receiving the loan from Ms. Moseley, Respondent purchased a new home
for $255,000. (T-26). Because of delays in the mortgage process, Respondent paid cash for the
home. (T-26). Respondent then applied to Commerce Bank to refinance the purchase with a
‘mortgage on the property of $200,000.00, less than the value of the property on which
‘Commerce Bank held the mortgage. (T-27). On October 3, 2003, Respondent signed a loan
application, knowing that it did not list the loan from Ms. Moseley as a liability. (T-27).

8. In retrospect, Respondent acknowledges that she should have made sure that the
Joan was disclosed, but, at the time, she viewed it as irrelevant to her ability to repay the
‘mortgage (T-27); she knew that Ms. Moseley had intended the money as a gift and never would
have asked for repayment. (T-28). Respondent always intended to repay the mortgage in full,
and has done 80. (T-28).

9. ‘The Board finds that both Ms. Moseley and Respondent did consider that the
transaction would ultimately be characterized as a gift and not a loan. Nonetheless, at the time
Respondent signed the mortgage application on October 3, 2003, Respondent had cooperated
with Ms. Moseley in making the gift “appear” to be a loan for Ms. Moseley’s own tax planning

purposes. To facilitate Ms, Moseley’s tax planning, Respondent executed a loan document and
made at least two interest payments So the loan “didn’t look like something different,” as
Respondent testified. (1-32; R 2p. 4).

10. In view of Respondent taking steps to make the “gift” appear as a “loan” (and in
fact it was legally a loan), the Board finds Respondent had an obvious legal and ethical
obligation to disclose the loan. She admits as much. (T-27). By failing to do so, Respondent
demonstrated an absence of the honesty and trustworthiness fundamentally expected of a
Delaware lawyer.

IV. Standard of Proof

Allegations of professional misconduct set forth in the Office of Disciplinary Counsel's
Petitions for Discipline must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. (Rule 13, Disc. Pros.
Rules). Due to Respondent's acknowledgement that her felony conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§1014 establishes a violation of Rule 8.4(b) ', ODC’s burden has been met, and the only issue for
‘the Board's determination is an appropriate recommendation of sanction.

V. Discussion and Analvsis

‘A. Jurisdiction
‘The Delaware Supreme Court possesses “inherent power and authority over the

regulation ofthe legal profession,” and has the responsiblity to “maintain appropriate standards
of professional conduct forall lawyers subject to it jurisdiction." (Rule 1(a,Dise, Proc. Rules).
Accordingly, any lawyer admited to practice law in Delaware is subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Court. (Rule 5(3), Dise, Proc. Rules). The Cour, in exercising is power, has

appointed the members of the Board to conduct hearings and to make factual findings and

‘a cried copy ofa judgment f conviction of anatomy for any cine sal be prima fii evden ofthe commision of
tha hime in ny csciplinary proceeding nse agai! he trey based nthe conviction” (Role t(D), Diss. Pow Rel).
recommendations regarding appropriate disposition of disciplinary matters. (See Rules 1 and 2,
Die, Proc, Rules; Rule 62, Del. Supr. Ct. Rules).

B. Parties Argument

ODC claims Respondent's admitted violation of federal criminal statute 18 U.S.C. §1014
constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4(b) meriting the sanction of disbarment. (Office of
Disciplinary Counsel's Memorandum in Support of Recommendation of Disbarment (*ODC
Memo.) at 6). ODC asserts that Respondent, by knowingly making a false statement to a
financial institution for the purpose of influencing its actions, has committed a felony offense
which erodes confidence in the legal profession. (ODC Memo. at 3). ODC further asserts that
“Delaware disciplinary precedent supports only imposition of the sanction of disbarment” for
lawyers who engage in felony criminal conduct. (ODC Memo. at 4).

Respondent argues the only appropriate sanction, based on guidelines relied upon by the
Delaware Supreme Court and relevant case law, is a suspension. (Respondent’s Memorandum
Regarding Appropriate Sanction (“Resp. Memo.”) at 1). Respondent submits “Delaware does
not have a rule requiring disbarment for conviction of all felonies or even . . . some types of
felonies.” (Resp. Memo. at 2). Furthermore, Respondent states a weighing of the ABA

1 of suspension in light of the

 

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions supports the san
absence of harm to any clients, and the presence of mitigating circumstances. (Resp, Memo. at
813)

© Respondent's Misconduct

ODE and Respondent have stipulated to Respondent's underlying criminal conviction
and violation of Rule 8.4(0). Nevertheless, the Board examines Respondent's misconduct in

formulating its recommendation for sanctions. Respondent committed a felony criminal act
when she knowingly made a false statement on a mortgage loan application for the purpose of
influencing, for her personal benefit, a financial institution insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. See 18 U.S.C. $1014,

A violation of 18 U.S.C. §1014 is a felony, and it carries a maximum penalty of
‘$1,000,000 in fines, or 30 years in prison, or both. Regardless of Respondent's characterization
of the loan as a gift from Ms. Moseley, Respondent executed a valid and enforceable promissory
note obligating her to $2.3 million, plus interest, In fact, Respondent testified to making two
interest payments on the loan, (T-25, T-26). By consciously omitting this liability from the bank
loan application, Respondent engaged in a criminal act that reflects adversely on her honesty,
trustworthiness and fitness to practice law in Delaware.

This conclusion is unaffected by Respondent’s stated intent to repay the mortgage loan,
her belief that the promissory note had no bearing on her ability to repay the mortgage loan, her
actual subsequent repayment, Ms. Moseley's stated intention never to call the note, or Ms,
Moseley's subsequent actual forgiveness and payment of gift tax, The mere existence of a $2.3,
million demand note, whose exercise could reasonably have left the bank with little recourse but
foreclosure, where recovery is not a certainty, constituted a risk beyond the bank’s knowledge or
control. Creating that risk was the harm done by the purposeful omission on the loan
application

D. Knowing v, Intentional Misconduct

(ODC and Respondent present differing views on the critical issue of the mental state that
forms the basis of Respondent's conviction. ODC analogizes Respondent's admitted misconduct
to bank fraud and cases involving intentional misrepresentation, where the Court has upheld a

sanction of disbarment, Jnre Brewster, $87 A.2d 1067, 1071 (Del, 1991); Matter of Childers,
2002 WL 384440 (Del. Supr. Ct. Mar. 6, 2002). Alternatively, Respondent emphasizes the
‘knowing” language of the statute, as being distinct from “intentional”, which provides:
“{wJhoever knowingly makes any false statement or report. .. for the purpose of influencing in
any way the action of... any institution the accounts of which are insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not
more than 30 years...” 18 U.S.C. §1014; (Resp. Memo. at 6-8). This distinction is critical,
since the recommendations suggested by the ABA Standards are based on the mental state that
forms the basis of an attorney's misconduct—ie., more culpable mental states generally receive
more severe sanctions.” Specifically, under the ABA Standards, “knowledge” is defined as “the
‘conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the
ssonscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.” ABA Standards Definitions
(emphasis added).

Given the language of 18 U.S.C. §1014, Respondent's contention that her conduct was
merely “knowing,” and not “intentional,” is misplaced. The federal statute under which
Respondent was convicted specifically requires that Respondent's false statement be made “for
the purpose of influencing ... any institution the accounts of which are insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.” Her guilty plea establishes this wrongful conduct. Respondent
purposely omitted her $2.3 million liability to ensure Commerce Bank's expeditious approval of
her loan application. While Respondent may not have sought to defraud Commerce Bank, she
did intend to have Commerce Bank rely on the erroneous application in granting a mortgage on

hher new home with favorable terms. Accordingly, her mental state cannot fall within the ABA

  

Unde Saar 5113) disbarment genelyappeopite when 2 lwyer engages in srou criminal conduc. 4 necessary
tlement of wich is false swearing, suspen or food, ABA Standard .1(2)Caoversy, under Standard 313
‘pramand i gverlly appro when & nye Anny engages conduc! at valves dabooesty, fad eve, oF
‘sreprosntion, ABA Standard 3.13.
Standard’s definition of “knowledge”, which excludes “the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result." Rather, the statute, on its face, requires purposeful influencing of
4 financial institution, a mental state the Board considers in the context of this disciplinary
proceeding to be substantially equivalent to intentional

ODC relies heavily on In re Brewster and Matter of Childerston. In both eases, an
attomey pled guilty to one count of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. §1344 and was subsequently
disbarred for a violation of Rule 8.4(b). Respondent attemps to distinguish In re Brewster and
‘Matter of Childerston on the basis that both cases involved intentional fraud. Respondent argues
that unlike an act of fraud—which secks to induce another to act to histher detriment—her false
statement under 18 U.S.C. §1014 required only the making of a knowingly false statement
(Resp, Memo. at 11). Respondent suggests the level of culpability for knowingly making a false
statement does not rise tothe level of fraud and therefore does not warrant disbarment.

‘The Board does not find these distinctions significant given the analysis above and the
similarities between 18 U.S.C. §1344—the statute at issue in In re Brewster and Matter of
Childerston—and 18 U.S.C. §1014—the statute bearing on Respondent's case. A violation of
either statute involves @ misrepresentation to a financial institution with the purpose of
influencing the institution's actions. A violation under either is a felony under federal law, and
both are punishable by a fine of $1,000,000 or 30 years in prison, or both. See 18 U.S.C. $1344;
18 USC $1014. And any “state of mind” differentiation between §1014 and §1348 has not
influenced the classification or punishment allotted to ether offense, such punishment being
identical. Likewise, the “state of mind” distintion between “knowing” and “intentional” does

not present a meaningtil di

 

inction in this disciplinary proceeding.
Respondent also relies on In.re Pankowski, 2007 WI. 4245472 (Del. Supr. Ct, Dec. 5
2007). In Penkowski, the Court imposed public reprimand and suspension on an attomey who
falsely notarized his client's signature on an Answer filed in the Family Court in violation of
8.4(¢). Respondent contends this conduct is akin to providing false information on a loan
application for the purposes of expediency. Respondent asserts that in both situations, there is no
intent to defraud. The Board disagrees. Respondent's conviction under §1014 constitutes
violation of 8.4(b), not 8.4(@). In Pankowski, the attormey engaged in “conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” in violation of 8.4(c), which excludes criminal
acts. Respondent's felony conviction, on the other hand, falls under 8.4(b) which encompasses
“a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects.” While a violation of either establishes professional misconduct, a
violation of 8.4(b) requires an examination of the underlying criminal conduct to determine
appropriate sanctions.
VI. Sanctions

‘A. Standards for Imposing Sanctions

In determining the appropriate sanction for lawyer misconduct, the Supreme Court of the
State of Delaware follows the ABA standards for imposing lawyer sanctions (The ABA
Standards):

‘The ABA framework consists of four key factors to be considered by the Court:

{a) the ethical duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the actual or

potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and, (4) aggravating and

‘mitigating factors,
In.se Bailey, 821 A.2d 851, 866 (Del. 2003) (Internal citations omitted); see also In ze Fountain,
878 A.2d 1167, 1173 (Del. 2005); In re Steiner, 817 A.2d at 793, 796 (Del. 2003).

 
‘The record establishes that Respondent’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. §1014 constitutes
clear and convincing evidence of violation of her ethical duties tothe legal profession. Although
her conduct may not have injured any specific client’, Respondent's knowing disregard for her
obvious ethical duty and her disregard for the law seriously undermines the legal profession and
reflects adversely on every member of the legal profession.

B. Agsravati

‘After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be
considered in deciding what sanction to impose. In re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851 (Del. 2003). In this
case, the Board recognizes the Respondent's absence of a prior disciplinary record; the admitted
violation resulted from a single instance of misconduct rather than a pattern of transgression;
Respondent's cooperation with the disciplinary process; Respondent's reputation as a dedicated
public servant; and, Respondent's remorse. Nonetheless, for reasons elaborated herein, the
Board finds the mitigating circumstances to be unavailing.

C. Case Law Analysis

‘The Board's recommendation of an appropriate sanction assists the Court, but it is not
binding. Ine Bailey, $21 A.2d at 877. The Court “has wide latitude in determining the form of
discipline, and {it} will review the recommended sanction to ensure that itis appropriate, fair and
consistent with... prior disciplinary decisions.” 1d. Accordingly, prudence dictates that the

Board carefully examine prior disciplinary precedent in recommending sanctions.
Respondent cites several Delaware and out-of-state opinions that address the issue of
sanctions in disciplinary matters. (Resp. Memo. at 7-12). While a case-by-case examination is

unnecessary, the Board makes the following observations:

° Ax oad ear, harm was done Commere Bank by subjecting it ark yond ts knowl,
() Delaware Disciplinary Precedent

Respondent directs the Board’s attention to the following Delaware matters: In re
‘Thompson, 911 A.2d 373 (Del. 2006) (three-year suspension for failure to file tax returns and
‘making false statements on certificates of compliance); In re Garrett, 835 A.2d 514 (Del. 2003)
(three-year suspension for failure to file tax returns, filing false certificates of compliance, and
‘commingling client funds); In_re Gielata, 933 A2d 1249 (Del. 2007) (reprimand for
‘misdemeanor theft); In re Lewis-Ryan, 498 A.2d $15 (Del. 1985) (two-year probation for
altering letter from state securities agency); In re Landis, 850 A.2d 291 (Del. 2004) (three-year

 

suspension for failing to file tax returns, filing false certificates of compliance, and failing to

keep adequate records of client escrow funds); In re Lassen, 672 A.2d 197 (Del. 1996) (three

 

year suspension for falsifying invoices to clients); and Matter of Hull, 767 A.2d 197 (Del. 2001)
(two-year suspension for making false statement to Bankruptcy Cour, falsifying evidence, and
providing false information to Office of Disciplinary Counsel).

‘The Board has carefully reviewed the Delaware authority upon which Respondent relies,
but itis not persuaded that a one-year suspension is the appropriate sanction. Quite apart from
this unethical conduct found in the cited cases, Respondent's ethical misconduct stems from a
Federal felony conviction. Respondent’s criminal charge is more akin to the underlying
misconduct found in In re Brewster and Matter of Childerston. In each case, an attorey

provided false information to a financial institution for the purpose of influencing the

 

institution's actions in violation of federal law. In both instances the sanction of disbarment was

imposed,
Out-of-State Cases
1n support of Respondent's request for leniency inthe sanction, Respondent points to the
following out-of-state decisions: Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Del Sol Morell, 839 A.2d
179 (Po, 2003) (thirty-month suspension of lawyer who pled guilty to false statement to financial
institution in violation of 18 US.C. §1014); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. D'Aiello, 789
‘A2d 203 (Pa, 2001) (two-year suspension of lawyer who pled guilty of making false toan
application in violation of 18 U.S.C. $1014); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Obod, 817 A.2d
4448 (Pa, 2003) (one-year suspension of lawyer convicted of making false statement to Securities

‘and Exchange Commission in violation of 18 U.S.C. $1001); Attomey Grievance Comm'n of
Maryland v. Greenspan, $45 A.2d 12 (Md. 1988) (six-month suspension of lawyer who falsely

 

represented to savings and loan that he held client funds in escrow); and others.

Respondent's reliance on out-of-state cases likewise does not convince the Board that a
‘one-year period of suspension is the appropriate sanction for her misconduct. Though certain
out-of-state eases are distinguishable on their face, the fundamental reason to disregard the
leniency seen in ther states’ disciplinary proceedings is this: members of the Delaware Bar are
held to the highest standards of honesty and trustworthiness In maintaining the highest possible
standards for ethical conduct in the legal profession, the Supreme Court of Delaware has not, 0

date, condoned any Delaware lawyer continuing to practice law once convicted of a felony.?

“For example, he Fenylvania Soprene Cour in Oks of Disipnay Cons »_D'Ael, imposed» two-year suspension
{or ssttns of Rue 84(0) and BAG) eran aorey pled ity 0 one ean cout of Frise Lean Appicon, NUS
{§101—the same vilauon a sve im the present ease” The Cat oped te Display Boar's repon which read
*nespondent’s misconduct user sevousgoesionsconcoming it share» The dihonst and aad ate of
Respondent's cond cubic br onareu epoch nw Diiplinny Bd fhe Supreme of Pew, Ree 33 DB 200,
07 (Nev 2.2001). While we are nth he Ponmvana Dscpiary Beard’ asset hts lnyers ny contin
Under 13 USC. §1018 enables an unftnes o procice lav we euant endorse Pemayivai's anion i view of Daaware
Besant, Cases relied on by Respondent uch Inst Thmeaan $38 A. 28247 (©. C. hop. 1987 Ine Cal 683 A 26
150 (DC. App. 1996) snd age owe. 771 A. 241002 (D.C. 300) tooled fae satrmnts on bea of et, 0,
bere nthe fuer’ on selfs, which itncton may expla the ene.

iat knoe nwa» reaps cone! wa» ony contin, eT 918 A2¢
1108 (at Supe. 2057)

 

 

 
Panel of the Boagg of Professional Responsibility
BY: 4 a
KL, Reardon, Esquing Chairman

 

ats: Fabenany 27, 2608