Case Title: State v. Caniglia

Citation: 272 Neb. 662, 724 N.W.2d 316

Docket Number: 

State: nebraska

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
724 N.W.2d 316 (2006) 272 Neb. 662 STATE of Nebraska, Appellant v. Cynthia J. CANIGLIA, Appellee. No. S-05-069. Supreme Court of Nebraska. December 8, 2006. *317 L. Kenneth Polikov, Sarpy County Attorney, and Tricia A. Freeman, for appellant. Thomas P. Stringenz, Sarpy County Public Defender, and Patrick J. Boylan, Bellevue, for appellee. HEAVICAN, C.J., WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHAN, McCORMACK, and MILLER-LERMAN, JJ. MILLER-LERMAN, J. After Cynthia J. Caniglia, appellee, admitted that she had violated the terms of her probation, the district court for Sarpy County entered an order on January 7, 2005, providing that "the probation be terminated as unsuccessful." The State filed an appeal, relying on Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2320 (Cum. Supp. 2004) as the basis for jurisdiction. Section 29-2320 allows the State to appeal in a criminal case when it believes that a sentence is excessively lenient. The Nebraska Court of Appeals concluded that it had jurisdiction pursuant to § 29-2320, found that the district court had imposed an excessively lenient sentence, and vacated the sentence and remanded the cause with instructions for a different judge to impose a greater sentence. State v. Caniglia, 14 Neb.App. 714, 714 N.W.2d 462 (2006). Caniglia petitioned for further review challenging the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. We granted the petition for further review. Because we conclude that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter orders accordingly. The Court of Appeals described the facts of this case as follows: State v. Caniglia, 14 Neb.App. 714, 715-17, 714 N.W.2d 462, 464-65 (2006). Following the above-quoted dialog, the Sarpy County District Court entered a written order dated January 7, 2005, in which it stated its finding that "it would be in the best interests of justice that the probation be terminated as unsuccessful." On January 13, the State filed a notice of appeal stating its intent to appeal the January 7 order of the Sarpy County District *319 Court terminating Caniglia's probation as an order imposing an excessively lenient sentence. The State purported to appeal under § 29-2320. In its published opinion, the Court of Appeals determined that the State could appeal the district court's January 7, 2005, order terminating Caniglia's probation under § 29-2320. The Court of Appeals concluded: State v. Caniglia, 14 Neb.App. at 718, 714 N.W.2d at 466. After concluding that the January 7, 2005, order was a sentencing order over which it had jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals evaluated the sentence it had determined was imposed and found such sentence to be excessively lenient. The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence and remanded the cause to the district court with instructions that a different district court judge impose a greater sentence. Caniglia filed a petition for further review. We granted Caniglia's petition for further review. Caniglia asserts on further review that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that it had jurisdiction over this appeal filed by the State under § 29-2320. A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of law that requires an appellate court to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below. Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 271 Neb. 616, 715 N.W.2d 134 (2006). Caniglia claims that no sentence was imposed by the district court for Sarpy County on January 7, 2005, and that, therefore, there was no sentencing order which the State could challenge as excessively lenient under § 29-2320. Caniglia asserts on further review that because there was no sentence, the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that it had jurisdiction and considered the State's appeal. We agree with Caniglia. It is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it. State v. Vela, ante, 272 Neb. 287, 721 N.W.2d 631 (2006). In the instant case, the State claims that appellate jurisdiction is premised on § 29-2320. Section 29-2320 provides as follows: We give the phrase "may appeal the sentence imposed" in § 29-2320 its plain meaning and therefore require that a sentence be imposed in order for the prosecuting attorney to appeal under § 29-2320. The requirement that a sentence be imposed extends to the probation violation context. In this regard, we note that we have treated sentencing orders made in *320 revocation of probation proceedings as sentences from which an appeal may be taken by a criminal defendant, e.g., State v. Finnegan, 232 Neb. 75, 439 N.W.2d 496 (1989), and given the statutory authority of § 29-2320 permitting the State to appeal, it logically follows that a sentence imposed in the context of a probation violation proceeding is a sentence from which the prosecuting attorney may appeal under § 29-2320. Accordingly, we conclude that a sentence imposed in a revocation of probation proceeding will be considered a sentence under § 29-2320 and is subject to an appeal by the prosecutor challenging its leniency. In the instant case, a probation violation proceeding was conducted in the district court for Sarpy County. The initial issue before the district court was whether Caniglia violated a condition of her probation. She admitted as much, and the district court found a violation. Having found a violation, the district court proceeded under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2268 (Reissue 1995), which provides as follows: Given the violation, under § 29-2268, the district court was authorized to revoke probation and impose a sentence, to reprimand and warn the probationer, to intensify supervision, to impose additional terms of probation, or to extend the term of probation. The district court did none of the above. Instead, the district court ordered the probation "terminated as unsuccessful." This was neither an authorized order nor a sentence. We have observed that a violation of probation is not itself a crime, but that § 29-2268(1) merely provides a mechanism whereby the previous probation is revoked and the court may impose a new sentence. State v. Wragge, 246 Neb. 864, 524 N.W.2d 54 (1994). Alternatively, the court can find a violation and not revoke probation and instead order the probationer to comply with one of the orders indicated in § 29-2268(2). The district court in this case found a violation of probation but failed to follow the statutory mechanism found in § 29-2268 for imposing a consequence for the violation. The Court of Appeals was confronted with the district court's failure to follow § 29-2268 and correctly noted that "the district court did not technically impose a sentence on January 7, 2005." State v. Caniglia, 14 Neb.App. 714, 718, 714 N.W.2d 462, 466 (2006). Although the district court failed to impose a sentence, the Court of Appeals supplied the sentence it believed comported with the district court's having found the probation to have been terminated as unsuccessful. We have stated that "[i]n imposing sentence, the court should state with care the precise terms of the sentence which is imposed." *321 State v. Bensing, 249 Neb. 900, 903, 547 N.W.2d 464, 466 (1996). Imposition of a sentence in a revocation of probation context is deserving of the same clarity expected when the initial sentence is imposed. It was error for the Court of Appeals to supply a sentence where none had been imposed by the district court. Because the Court of Appeals supplied a sentence, it then concluded that a sentence existed which the prosecuting attorney could challenge as excessively lenient under § 29-2320. Contrary to the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals, no sentence had been imposed by the district court in the violation of probation proceeding and there was no sentence from which the prosecuting attorney could appeal under § 29-2320. In the absence of a sentence, appellate jurisdiction asserted by the prosecuting attorney could not be founded on § 29-2320 and the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction. The district court found that Caniglia violated probation but failed to issue a proper order under § 29-2268. In particular, the district court did not impose a sentence. Because there was no sentence, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal brought by the prosecuting attorney claiming an excessively lenient sentence under § 29-2320. The Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that it had jurisdiction and thereafter considered the merits. Because the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cause to the Court of Appeals with directions to vacate the order of the district court and remand the cause to the district court with directions to enter a proper order outlining the consequences resulting from the finding that Caniglia had violated probation. JUDGMENT VACATED, AND CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.