Case Title: Proctor v. Upjohn Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80060

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the 
filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are 
subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime prior 
to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, 
because the following slip opinion is being made available prior to 
the Court's final action in this matter, it cannot be considered 
the final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following 
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of 
Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets following final 
action by the Court. 
 
              Docket No. 80060--Agenda 18--September 1996. 
     MEYER PROCTOR et al., Appellants, v. THE UPJOHN COMPANY et al., 
                               Appellees. 
                    Opinion filed February 20, 1997. 
 
     CHIEF JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: 
     The sole issue in this case is whether a decision of the 
appellate court obtains within the meaning of the Illinois 
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, 5), the Appellate Court 
Act (705 ILCS 25/1(d) (West 1994)), and the rules of this court 
(145 Ill. 2d R. 22(c)) where two judges concur in the opinion, the 
third judge dissents, and one of the concurring judges then vacates 
his office before the opinion is filed. The short answer is, it 
does not. 
     The record before us shows that the jury rendered a verdict in 
this case in favor of the plaintiffs, Meyer and Marjorie Proctor, 
against defendant Upjohn. The appellate court affirmed subject to 
a reduction in the punitive damage award, but then granted Upjohn's 
petition for rehearing. Upon rehearing, the appellate court issued 
a modified opinion which reversed the circuit court's judgment 
against Upjohn and granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in 
Upjohn's favor. 275 Ill. App. 3d 593. Justice McCormick, who 
participated in both the original opinion and the modified opinion, 
retired two months before the modified opinion was filed. The two 
remaining justices did not agree, with Justice DiVito listed as 
author, and Justice Hartman dissenting. 
     Two requirements are necessary for an appellate court opinion. 
First, three judges must participate in the decision of every case. 
145 Ill. 2d R. 22(c). Second, the concurrence of two judges in the 
judgment of the court is necessary. 145 Ill. 2d R. 22(c); Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. VI, 5; 705 ILCS 25/1(d) (West 1994). Absent the 
concurrence of at least two judges, the appellate court cannot 
render a valid judgment. See Cirro Wrecking Co. v. Roppolo,  153 Ill. 2d 6 , 17 (1992). 
     With regard to the requirement that three appellate judges 
participate in the decision of each case, this court has held that 
the departure of a judge prior to the filing date will not affect 
the validity of the decision so long as the remaining two judges 
concur. Cirro Wrecking Co. v. Roppolo, 153 Ill. 2d at 17-19; but 
cf. People ex rel. Director of Finance v. Young Women's Christian 
Ass'n,  74 Ill. 2d 561  (1979) (allowing a 1-1 appellate decision to 
function as an affirmance of the trial court where all the other 
appellate justices in the district had recused themselves). Here, 
the two judges who remained on the panel when the modified opinion 
was filed did not agree and nothing precluded substituting another 
appellate judge to replace the third panel member who had retired. 
Consequently, the modified opinion was invalid. 
     Given the invalidity of the modified opinion, this court has 
no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal therefrom. 166 Ill. 2d R. 
315; People ex rel. Director of Finance v. Young Women's Christian 
Ass'n, 74 Ill. 2d  at 567. Accordingly, we order that this appeal be 
dismissed and instruct the appellate court to enter a 
constitutionally valid opinion or order disposing of the matters 
raised, briefed and argued subsequent to Upjohn's unanimously 
allowed rehearing petition. 
 
Appeal dismissed. 
 
     JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
     Although the majority has not mentioned it, this case came 
before us under Rule 316 (155 Ill. 2d R. 316). That rule authorizes 
this court to review a decision of the appellate court where the 
appellate court certifies that the decision involves a question of 
such importance that it should be decided by us. Because there was 
no concurrence of two judges here, however, and therefore no 
"decision," the predicate for a Rule 316 appeal was absent and a 
certificate of importance should not have issued. People ex rel. 
Director of Finance v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 74 Ill. 561, 
567 (1979). There being no other basis for this court to assert 
jurisdiction, this appeal should be dismissed. To this extent I am 
in full agreement with my colleagues. 
     I dissent because I do not believe that the case should be 
sent back for further proceedings. In effect, the majority's 
disposition enables Upjohn to obtain a second rehearing before a 
newly constituted appellate court panel. This is wholly improper. 
The purpose of a motion for rehearing is to provide litigants with 
the opportunity to direct the reviewing court's attention to 
matters that it may have overlooked or misapprehended. 155 Ill. 2d 
R. 367. Upjohn has already been afforded this opportunity. Its 
contentions received full consideration, and it is not entitled to 
have its case considered again simply because the two members of 
the appellate court panel who remained in office could not agree on 
how the case should be decided.  
     The situation here is no different from any other case where 
the required concurrence of two judges cannot be obtained. Where, 
as here, the necessary majority is absent and the appellate court 
is left evenly divided, the litigants are not entitled to reargue 
their cases before different judges. Rather, this court has 
expressly held that the appellate court should affirm the judgment 
of the circuit court. People ex rel. Director of Finance v. Young 
Women's Christian Ass'n, 74 Ill. 2d  at 567. There is no basis for 
deviating from that precedent here. 
     For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss the appeal and 
remand the cause to the appellate court with directions to affirm 
the circuit court's judgment.