Case Title: Walker v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 100263

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
TONY JERMAINE WALKER 
 
 
 
             OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 100263  
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
                                      January 13, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal from a conviction of grand larceny of an 
automobile under Code § 18.2-95, the Commonwealth relied on 
the “blue book” published by the National Automobile Dealer’s 
Association (NADA) to prove that the value of the stolen 
property exceeded $200.  The dispositive question is whether 
proof by that method, although expressly authorized by 
statute, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation as elucidated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 68 (2004), and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 
U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009). 
Facts and Proceedings. 
 
On July 7, 2008, Thanh Ngo parked a white 2004 Toyota 
Sienna van owned by his wife behind a nail salon that he and 
his wife operated in a shopping mall in the City of Hampton.  
Ngo testified that the car was “in very good condition” and 
that there was a bicycle mounted on a rack attached to it.  
The car was still there at 3:30 p.m. but was gone when Ngo 
looked for it at 4:00.  At approximately 6:50 p.m., Officer 
Matthew Peele of the Hampton Police Division found the vehicle 
in a ditch.  The defendant, Tony Jermaine Walker was slumped 
over the steering wheel, unconscious.  After regaining 
consciousness, Walker told the officer that he had seen Ngo 
park the van behind the nail salon and inadvertently drop the 
keys to the van.  Walker told the officer that he picked up 
the keys and took the van as an act of retaliation.  He 
contended that Ngo had stolen his bike a few days earlier but 
that he had not reported the theft to the police because he 
was “keeping it in the streets.” 
 
Walker was indicted for grand larceny in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Hampton.  At a bench trial, he was 
convicted and sentenced to nine years imprisonment with five 
years suspended on conditions of probation.  At trial, the 
court admitted the NADA “blue book” into evidence as proof 
that the stolen vehicle had a value in excess of $200.  Walker 
objected on the ground that his counsel could not cross-
examine the book and that its admission violated his right to 
confront the witnesses against him. 
 
Walker appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that 
the circuit court erred in admitting the “blue book” into 
evidence and that without it, there was no proof of value, a 
requisite element of grand larceny.  By memorandum opinion and 
order entered January 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
 
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the conviction, holding that the “blue book” was not 
testimonial in character and therefore its admission did not 
violate Walker’s constitutional confrontation rights.  Walker 
v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2931-08-1, slip op. at 2-3 
(January 26, 2010).  We awarded Walker an appeal. 
Analysis 
 
Because Walker’s appeal presents a question of law as to 
the admissibility of evidence, we apply a de novo standard of 
review.  Commonwealth v. Garrett, 276 Va. 590, 599, 667 S.E.2d 
739, 744 (2008).  Code § 18.2-95 defines grand larceny as 
“simple larceny not from the person of another of goods and 
chattels of the value of $200 or more.”  Therefore the 
Commonwealth, to prevail in a prosecution for that offense, 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt not the exact value of 
stolen property, but only that its value exceeded the 
statutory minimum. 
 
Code § 8.01-419.1 provides, in pertinent part: 
Whenever in any case not otherwise specifically 
provided for the value of an automobile is in issue, 
either civilly or criminally, the tabulated retail 
values set forth in the National Automobile Dealers' 
Association (NADA) "yellow" or "black" books or any 
vehicle valuation service regularly used and 
recognized in the automobile industry that is in 
effect on the relevant date, shall be admissible as 
evidence of fair market value on the relevant date. 
 
 
Walker argues that the effect of that section, as applied 
at his trial, was to deny him his right to cross-examine the 
 
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Commonwealth’s witnesses against him on the issue of the van’s 
value.  The Commonwealth contends that Walker’s confrontation 
rights were not infringed because the “blue book,” unlike 
certificates of drug or blood alcohol analysis, is a 
repository of information prepared for general use by the 
automobile sales industry, not for litigation.  The book is 
neutral, the Commonwealth argues, and not accusatory because 
it was not designed to prove criminal wrongdoing by Walker or 
anyone else.∗ 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Crawford and 
Melendez-Diaz, made it clear that the admission of documentary 
evidence in lieu of the live testimony of witnesses violates a 
criminal defendant’s confrontation rights under the Sixth 
Amendment, if the documents are testimonial in nature, because 
such documents cannot be tested “in the crucible of cross-
examination.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.  On the other hand, 
the admission of documentary evidence that is not testimonial 
does not offend the confrontation clause.  Business and public 
records, for example, are not testimonial because they are 
created for the administration of affairs generally “and not 
                     
∗ Guides prepared by the NADA are “intended . . . to 
assess the values of various vehicles.”  N.A.D.A. Services 
Corp. v. Business Data of Virginia, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 44, 47 
(E.D. Va. 1986). 
 
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for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at 
trial.”  Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2539-40. 
 
It is most improbable that the compilers of the “blue 
book” ever heard of Walker or the charges against him and they 
certainly did not prepare the book for the purpose of 
assisting the Commonwealth in securing his conviction.  We 
agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that 
the book was not testimonial in character. 
 
Walker also argues on appeal that the circuit court erred 
in admitting the “blue book” as a business record under the 
business records exception to the rule against hearsay because 
the Commonwealth failed to lay the requisite foundation to 
support that exception.  We find no merit in that contention.  
The Commonwealth did not rely on the business records 
exception at trial, but rather offered the “blue book” on the 
sole authority of Code § 8.01-419.1.  That statute provided 
the only foundation necessary. 
 
Walker further argues that the “blue book” did not give 
the value of the particular vehicle stolen.  Instead, the book 
listed four classes of 2004 Toyota Sienna vans and assigned 
values to each class.  There is no contention that the stolen 
van fell into some category not listed in the book but Walker 
contends that its value cannot be ascertained by reference to 
classes or models.  Walker’s argument is based on the 
 
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erroneous premise that the Commonwealth was required to prove 
the precise value of the stolen property.  As stated above, 
the Commonwealth’s burden was only to prove that its value 
exceeded $200.  Because all four classes of 2004 Toyota Sienna 
vans were shown by the book to have values far in excess of 
that amount, there was credible evidence before the court from 
which a rational fact-finder could conclude that the 
Commonwealth had met its burden of proof. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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