Case Title: Dycus v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 18S-CR-488

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2018-10-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CR-488 
Monica Dycus 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
–v– 
State of Indiana 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Argued: April 24, 2018 | Decided: October 3, 2018 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G12-1601-CM-1053 
The Honorable David J. Certo, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
No. 49A05-1705-CR-978  
 
Opinion by Justice David 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Oct 03 2018, 3:47 pm
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David, Justice. 
Indiana’s Constitution affords its citizens certain rights, including the 
right to counsel through all stages of a prosecution.  That right entitles an 
accused to consult with counsel while in police custody.  In Pirtle v. State, 
our Court relied on our State Constitution to require an advisement of 
rights prior to police obtaining consent to a search from a person in 
custody.  So far, that requirement has been understood to apply only to 
searches of homes and vehicles.  Field sobriety tests, chemical breath tests, 
blood draws, and cheek swabs have all been found to be searches not 
requiring an additional advisement of rights prior to consent.  Here, we 
address whether our Pirtle requirement extends to Drug Recognition 
Exams (“DRE”); in other words, whether an advisement is necessary 
before police can obtain a person’s valid consent to a DRE.  We find that 
no advisement is required.  A DRE is not the type of search that calls for a 
Pirtle advisement.   
Facts and Procedural History 
On January 8, 2016, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department 
(“IMPD”) officers responded to a 911 call about a dispute on the road.  
Monica Dycus had allegedly been following her ex-boyfriend, El-hadj 
Barry, who was picking up a female friend at her school.  Barry’s friend 
called 911 because Dycus was tailgating Barry’s vehicle, swerving 
between lanes, and pulling up next to them at stoplights to shout 
obscenities.  
When IMPD Officer Christopher Cooper (“Officer Cooper”) arrived on 
the scene, he saw the two vehicles stopped at a red light.  Dycus had one 
foot out of her vehicle and was observed yelling at the car in front of her.  
Officer Cooper approached Dycus and asked for identification.  He also 
spoke with Barry to find out what had happened. 
After checking Barry and Dycus’s identification, Officer Cooper told 
Barry that he could leave.  Officer Cooper continued to detain Dycus 
because he suspected that she was driving with a suspended license.  
While speaking with Dycus, Officer Cooper noticed an odor of marijuana 
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coming from Dycus’s breath.  Officer Cooper called for back up from 
Officer Christopher Winter (“Officer Winter”), an IMPD officer who was 
certified to conduct DREs.  Officer Cooper continued to question Dycus as 
they waited for Officer Winter’s arrival.  In the course of that questioning, 
Dycus admitted to Officer Cooper that she had smoked marijuana with 
her mother “about an hour” prior to the encounter.  
When Officer Winter arrived, Dycus was asked to submit to various 
field sobriety tests.  She passed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which 
indicated that she was not under the influence of alcohol.  However, 
Dycus failed the walk-and-turn and the one-legged stand tests.  Based on 
the field sobriety test results, Officer Winter believed that Dycus was 
intoxicated.  He offered to administer a certified breath test, which would 
test for the presence of alcohol.  Dycus consented.  
Officers transported Dycus to an IMPD office located approximately 
four miles from the initial stop to conduct the test.  The results came back 
negative for the presence of alcohol in Dycus’s system.  However, while 
conducting the test, Officer Winter noticed a green, leafy substance in 
Dycus’s mouth and “a green streak going down her tongue.”  (Tr. Vol. 2, 
p. 130).  These signs were indicative of marijuana consumption. 
Officer Winter then offered Dycus a DRE.  He explained that he wanted 
her to submit to a DRE because her signs of impairment were not 
consistent with negative alcohol results.  Dycus again consented.  The 
exam took approximately thirty minutes to complete and involved a 
variety of measurements and observations that were assessed in a seven-
category evaluation matrix, known as a “drug symptom matrix.”  After 
entering all observations and results of Dycus’s DRE into the “drug 
symptom matrix,” Officer Winter determined that Dycus was under the 
influence of marijuana.                       
Dycus consented to a blood draw, to be administered at Eskenazi 
Hospital.  At the hospital, two vials of blood were obtained from Dycus, 
which were eventually sent for testing to National Medical Services, an 
accredited laboratory located in Pennsylvania.  The lab results revealed 
that Dycus’s blood tested positive for Delta-9 THC, an active metabolite of 
marijuana with psychoactive effects. 
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The State charged Dycus with Count I, Class A misdemeanor Operating 
a Vehicle While Intoxicated.  Later, the State added Count II, Class C 
misdemeanor Operating a Vehicle with a Schedule I or II Controlled 
Substance or its Metabolite in the Body.  At trial, Dycus objected to the 
admission of evidence regarding the DRE, arguing that she should have 
been given a Pirtle advisement before being asked if she consented to the 
exam.  Dycus also argued that the admission of the chain of custody forms 
and shipping documents for her blood samples violated her constitutional 
right to confrontation.  The trial court rejected both objections and Dycus 
was found guilty as charged.  At sentencing, the trial court vacated Count 
II.  Dycus was then sentenced to 365 days for the remaining count, with 
361 days suspended to probation.              
Dycus appealed, making the same arguments she made at trial: (1) that 
the officer’s testimony regarding the DRE was inadmissible because she 
should have been given a Pirtle advisement prior to being asked to 
consent to the exam, and (2) that the admission of chain custody forms for 
toxicology documents violated her right to confrontation under the United 
States Constitution.  The Court of Appeals found that there was no 
confrontation clause violation, but reversed Dycus’s conviction because a 
Pirtle advisement had not been given prior to the DRE consent.  Dycus v. 
State, 90 N.E.3d 1215, 1220-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).     
The State sought transfer, which we now grant, thereby vacating the 
Court of Appeals’ opinion.  Ind. App. Rule 58(A).      
Standard of Review 
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on admissibility of evidence.  
Tuner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ind. 2011).  We will ordinarily 
disturb a trial court’s admissibility rulings only where it has abused its 
discretion.  Id.  A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly 
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court 
or if it misapplies the law.  Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013).  
However, where, as here, a constitutional violation is alleged, the proper 
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standard of appellate review is de novo.  Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 
852 (Ind. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2299 (2014).     
Discussion and Decision  
Today, we are asked to decide whether, prior to obtaining consent to a 
DRE, police must advise a person in custody of her right to consult with 
counsel—a question that is grounded in protections offered by our State 
Constitution.    
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects” from unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
It requires police to obtain a search warrant from a neutral, detached 
magistrate prior to undertaking a search of either a person or private 
property.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  However, that 
requirement is subject to “certain carefully drawn and well-delineated 
exceptions.”  Id.  One such exception occurs when a person consents to a 
search; in other words, a person’s valid consent eliminates the need for a 
search warrant.  Our State Constitution offers citizens parallel protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  For instance, Article 1, 
Section 11 provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or 
seizure, shall not be violated . . . .” 
Although the wording of Section 11 is almost identical to that of the 
Fourth Amendment, our State Constitution’s search and seizure clause is 
given an independent interpretation and application.  Myers v. State, 839 
N.E.2d 1146, 1153 (Ind. 2005).  In fact, Indiana’s Constitution sometimes 
offers broader protections than those offered by the U.S. Constitution.  
Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 879 (Ind. 2012).  Amongst those broader 
protections offered by our State Constitution is the requirement that, prior 
to obtaining consent to a search, police must explicitly advise a person in 
custody of her right to consult with counsel.  It is unique to Indiana and 
has no federal counterpart.  See United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 337 
(7th Cir. 1994) (“A person in custody has no federal constitutional right to 
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consult with an attorney before consenting to a search of his property.  
However, the Indiana [C]onstitution does afford such a right.”).   
Whether our advisement requirement extends to a DRE—in other 
words, whether police are required to advise a person in custody of her 
right to consult with counsel before obtaining consent to perform the 
exam—is at issue in this case.  The State asks us to affirm the trial court’s 
determination that police need not specifically advise a person in custody 
of her right to consult with counsel before obtaining consent to a DRE.  
Dycus, on the other hand, argues that the Court of Appeals correctly held 
that without such advisement, evidence obtained through a DRE is 
inadmissible.  We agree with the State and find that a Pirtle warning, as 
such advisement has come to be known, is not required to obtain valid 
consent to a DRE from a person in custody.     
Pirtle v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 16, 323 N.E.2d 634, is the seminal case for 
Indiana’s law on consent to searches.  In that case, the defendant, Robert 
E. Pirtle, was taken into custody for possession of a stolen vehicle.  Id. at 
22, 323 N.E.2d at 637.  Police read Pirtle his Miranda rights twice—once in 
the squad car and another time at the police station.  Id.  Pirtle asked for 
an attorney upon the second reading of his rights.  Id.  Later, officers 
learned that Pirtle may have been involved in an unrelated homicide.  Id.  
Approximately twelve hours after Pirtle initially invoked his right to 
counsel, two other officers questioned him about the unrelated homicide.  
Id.  The officers, who were not aware that Pirtle had already invoked his 
right to counsel, asked Pirtle to consent to a search of his home.  Id.  Pirtle 
agreed and signed a search waiver.  Id.  When officers searched Pirtle’s 
apartment, they found evidence linking him to the homicide.  Id. at 22-23, 
323 N.E.2d at 637. 
Pirtle challenged the admission of evidence recovered as a result of the 
search.  Our Court held that a person in police custody is entitled to the 
presence and advice of counsel prior to consenting to a search, and that 
the right, if waived, must be explicitly waived.  Id. at 29, 323 N.E.2d at 640.  
Although our holding in Pirtle is the foundation for requiring that persons 
in custody be advised of their right to consult with counsel prior to 
consent, Pirtle, on its own, does not resolve our inquiry.  After all, Pirtle 
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involved only the search of an apartment; searches can range widely in 
breadth and scope.  
Since Pirtle, we’ve addressed the advisement requirement only a 
handful of times.  In Larkin v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 469, 393 N.E.2d 180—
an appeal by Pirtle’s accomplice following a separate trial on the same 
charges—we expressly reaffirmed the Pirtle requirement.  In Sims v. State, 
(1980) 274 Ind. 495, 413 N.E.2d 556, overruled in part on unrelated grounds by 
Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. 1995), decided five years after 
Pirtle, we cleared up some ambiguity left by our earlier jurisprudence.  We 
declared that our intention in Pirtle was to “recognize[] the right of those 
in custody to have the advice of counsel at the point where a consent to 
search is requested . . . .”  Id. at 500, 413 N.E.2d at 559.  Later, in Sellmer v. 
State, 842 N.E.2d 358 (Ind. 2006), we addressed Pirtle’s requirements in the 
context of a vehicle search.  We found that the defendant was in custody 
when she was asked to consent to a search of her vehicle and, as a result, 
“she was entitled to a Pirtle advisement . . . .”  Id. at 365.  
However, Pirtle, Larkin, Sims, and Sellmer all dealt with searches of 
homes or vehicles.  In Garcia-Torres v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. 2011), 
for the first time, we addressed consent requirements for a different type 
of search: a cheek swab for DNA.  It is worth noting that, at the time of 
Garcia-Torres, our Court of Appeals had already addressed consent to 
searches other than those of a home or a vehicle.  In fact, our Court relied 
on some of those cases in its Garcia-Torres majority.  But we had yet to 
weigh in on the extent of Pirtle’s reach beyond searches of homes and 
vehicles. 
A threshold question in Garcia-Torres was whether a DNA cheek swab 
should be deemed a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and 
our State Constitution.  Id. at 1232.  We had already held that fingerprints 
were not searches, and that blood tests to check alcohol content were.  See 
Palmer v. State, 679 N.E.2d 887, 892 (Ind. 1997); see also Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).  Taking the 
range of analytical treatment in prior cases as a whole, we determined that 
although cheek swabs for DNA have more in common with fingerprints 
than they do with chemical breath tests, we could not overlook that penis 
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swabs for DNA testing had been deemed searches requiring their own 
separate probable cause proceedings.  Garcia-Torres, 949 N.E.2d at 1237-38.  
Accordingly, we found that a DNA cheek swab was also a search.  Id.   
As for the central question—whether a Pirtle warning was required 
prior to consent—we noted that “Pirtle and the ensuing cases . . . applied 
this rule only to the weightiest intrusions.”  Id. at 1238.  Since the various 
interests at stake on occasions when a Pirtle advisement had been required 
were not present, we found that we would not extend Pirtle’s holding to 
cheek swabs; no advisement was required prior to consent.  Id. at 1239.      
As mentioned above, our Court of Appeals had already considered 
Pirtle’s extent several times before we decided in Garcia-Torres that Pirtle 
did not apply to cheek swabs.  As a general matter, those cases stand for 
the proposition that Pirtle does not apply to what the court has described 
as minimally intrusive searches.  For example, in Wilkerson v. State, 933 
N.E.2d 891, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), the Court of Appeals held that Pirtle 
was not applicable to pat downs for weapons.  The Court of Appeals also 
held that the purpose of the Pirtle would not be served by extending the 
doctrine to field sobriety tests, chemical breath tests, or blood draws.  See 
Ackerman v. State, 774 N.E.2d 970, 979-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that 
Pirtle does not apply to field sobriety tests); Schmidt v. State, 816 N.E.2d 
925, 942-44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that Pirtle does not apply to 
chemical breath tests); and Datzek v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1149, 1158-60 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2005) (finding that Pirtle does not apply to blood draws for blood 
alcohol content testing).  These searches, according to the court, were 
much narrower, and in some cases much less intrusive, than the home and 
vehicle searches that require an advisement prior to consent.  To the 
extent that Court of Appeals treats the issue with a focus on intrusiveness, 
we disagree.  The intrusiveness of a search does not inform the need for a 
Pirtle advisement.  However, we find that examining the scope and 
breadth of the searches helps us distinguish between the searches that 
require a Pirtle advisement and those that do not. 
In deciding whether Pirtle advisements are necessary for a particular 
search, such as a DRE, we need not contemplate whether a person has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy, nor whether the State’s intrusion was 
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unreasonable.  After all, those questions go to whether police must obtain 
a warrant—a question not at issue here.  Moreover, a person may freely 
consent to even the most unreasonable of intrusions; where such consent 
is valid, no warrant is required.  Rather, our concern in Pirtle, and in the 
ensuing cases, was that consent to certain weighty intrusions carries a 
great risk of involuntariness.  This is especially true, as described by the 
Court of Appeals in Ackerman, 774 N.E.2d at 981, for unlimited and 
general searches where police are given cart blanche to search for 
unspecified evidence.  Searches of a home or a vehicle ordinarily require 
officers to specify what they are looking for and their reasons for believing 
that the suspect had those items in their home or in their vehicle.  A 
person who consents to a search gives up those protections and subjects 
herself to a general search without probable cause.  Because a person in 
custody may not fully appreciate the magnitude of what is at stake when 
authorizing police to freely search a home or a vehicle, we require police 
to explicitly inform persons in custody of their rights under our 
Constitution.  Those concerns are not as strong when a search is narrowly 
focused. 
We need not look further than Pirtle to find a situation where a person 
failed to appreciate the extent of rights he was waiving when consenting 
to a search.  The defendant in Pirtle was arrested for possession of a stolen 
vehicle.  Nothing in his initial arrest necessitated the search of his home.  
It wasn’t until later, when police began to suspect that he had been 
involved in a murder, that a search of the defendant’s home became of 
interest to police.  But as our Court noted in Pirtle, had Pirtle refused 
consent to the search, officers would have had to make a showing of 
probable cause to a neutral, detached magistrate.  Pirtle, 263 Ind. at 26-28, 
323 N.E.2d at 639-40.  Pirtle’s consent to a search of his apartment exposed 
him to criminal liability for an unrelated murder when his arrest was for 
possession of a stolen vehicle—a minor crime compared to murder.  We 
require an advisement because persons in Pirtle’s circumstances rarely 
consent freely to an unlimited search unless fully informed of their rights 
and the magnitude of what they waive by consenting.  Perhaps in some 
cases, consent is of their own free will, but, to be sure, we require an 
additional advisement in those circumstances that carry great risk of 
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involuntary consent.  Such an advisement serves as a guarantee that 
consent is always fully informed.  For other more specific searches that do 
not carry such risk—where the likelihood that police will come across 
inculpatory evidence beyond what they specifically seek is low—a Pirtle 
advisement is not necessary.                         
We find that a DRE is not the type of search that requires a Pirtle 
advisement.  The exam consists of various field sobriety tests as well as a 
check of a person’s blood pressure and body temperature.  Officers also 
examine the person’s arms and look into the person’s mouth and nose.  
Parts of the procedure take place in a dark room, but the entire procedure 
lasts only about thirty minutes.  Once the measurements are taken from 
the various components of the exam, the results are put into a “drug 
symptom matrix” which helps the officer determine whether the suspect 
is under the influence of a drug.  
None of the components of a DRE, either individually or cumulatively, 
have a strong likelihood of uncovering inculpatory evidence of something 
other than what caused officers to conduct the DRE in the first place.  Each 
component of the exam—the use of the oral thermometer, the examination 
of the mouth and nasal cavity, the check for the person’s blood pressure—
is narrow in scope.  We do not have concerns that a person in custody will 
fail to appreciate the magnitude of the rights they forgo when consenting 
to a DRE.  By conducting the DRE, officers were only going to find 
evidence of Dycus’s intoxication—nothing more.  We find that a DRE is 
specific enough to eliminate the risk of involuntary consent.  No 
additional advisement is needed before a person in custody consents to a 
DRE.      
Conclusion 
For the aforementioned reasons, we find that consent to a DRE does not 
require an advisement of rights under Pirtle.  The trial court correctly 
determined that the evidence obtained as a result of the exam was 
admissible.  Accordingly, we affirm Dycus’s conviction.   
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Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L A N T 
Rory Gallagher 
Ruth Johnson 
Marion County Public Defender 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana 
George P. Sherman 
Andrew Kobe 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Indianapolis, Indiana