Case Title: State v. Mulalley

Citation: 126 Ariz. 278, 614 P.2d 820

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1980-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
126 Ariz. 278 (1980) 614 P.2d 820 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Michael James MULALLEY, Appellant. No. 4770. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. June 23, 1980. *279 Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer III and Gerald R. Grant, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Kemper & Henze by James Hamilton Kemper, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Justice. This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment of guilt to the crime of escape, A.R.S. § 13-395,[1] with a sentence of not less than four nor more than five years in prison, said sentence to be consecutive to punishment imposed in Pima County Cause No. A-31908, and in the first five counts of Maricopa County Cause No. CR-103536. Because we considered the appeal in the companion Maricopa County case, we elected to consider this appeal even though we would not normally take initial jurisdiction where the punishment actually imposed was less than life imprisonment. A.R.S. § 12-120.21. We must answer two questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter are as follows. Defendant had been previously convicted of a felony and was an inmate in the Arizona State Prison. While at the prison, defendant had witnessed an assault and indicated that he was willing to testify against the prisoner who had committed the assault. To protect the defendant's safety, he was transferred to the Chandler Jail. He was eventually given trustee status and though observed by a jailer on 23 August 1978 at about 4:30 p.m., defendant did not return to his cell at 8:00 p.m. It was not ascertained that he had escaped until the next morning. Defendant was returned to custody later on 24 August and, as a result of events occurring during his absence from jail, was charged with six felonies. The first five burglary, lewd and lascivious acts, aggravated battery, first degree rape, and armed robbery were tried separately; and defendant was convicted on all five counts. His convictions were affirmed by this court in a memorandum decision. Defendant was later tried and convicted of the crime of escape, which conviction resulted in this appeal. WERE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS VOLUNTARY? After defendant was apprehended on 24 August, a Tempe police officer, Joe N. Smith, went to the Chandler Jail to obtain defendant's clothing in connection with the first five charges or counts. After *280 advising the defendant of his Miranda rights, he asked defendant if he would answer some questions. Defendant said that he "would think about it." Smith tried to ask some other questions and defendant said that he didn't "want to talk at all about it." About an hour later, Smith saw the defendant in the courtroom of the Tempe Justice Court. Officer Smith testified as follows: After the hearing, the court ruled that the statements were voluntary and admitted them into evidence. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1977), the socalled "Christian burial case," the defendant had asserted his right to counsel in Davenport, Iowa, where he was arrested. His counsel there had advised him not to make any statements until after consulting with his counsel in Des Moines, Iowa, the place of the crime. While transporting Williams to Des Moines, a police officer got the defendant to lead him to the murder victim's body by playing upon defendant's religious beliefs. A majority of the United States Supreme Court held that the officer's conduct constituted an interrogation in violation of defendant's expressed desire to have assistance of counsel and that the evidence should have been suppressed. The court stated: Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court, in a somewhat similar fact situation, has affirmed the admission of statements made after assertion of right to counsel. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980), the defendant was arrested in connection with the shotgun murder of a cab driver. After arrest, defendant was advised three times of his right to counsel and defendant indicated he wanted an attorney. Three officers were ordered to take the defendant to the station but not to interrogate the defendant. While transporting the defendant, the officers talked among themselves about the fact that there was a school for handicapped children nearby and if a child should find the murder weapon he might be injured. Defendant overheard the conversation and asked the officer to return to the scene so that he could show them where to find the shotgun. He was returned and again read his rights. He then showed the officers where the gun was located. The Rhode Island Supreme Court, relying upon Brewer, supra, ruled the gun inadmissible. State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 1978). The United States Supreme Court reversed the Rhode Island Supreme Court stating: We believe, pursuant to Innis, supra, that defendant's refusal to talk about the rape did not preclude the admission of defendant's later statements to the officer about the escape. The actions of Officer Smith in the instant case did not even approach the "subtle compulsion" found objectionable by the Rhode Island Supreme Court and approved by the United States Supreme Court. We cannot say that the defendant's response was the product of "words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Innis, supra. We find no error. INSTRUCTIONS ON DURESS During trial, testimony concerning the dangerous conditions at the Arizona State Prison was presented. This testimony indicated that inmates who snitch were considered "fair game." There was testimony that five other inmates were at the Chandler Jail. A jailer at the Chandler Jail, however, testified he was unaware of any physical violence at the jail. The defendant testified that he had been threatened at the Arizona State Prison if he testified for the State and that others had been stabbed or assaulted and at least one inmate at the Chandler Jail knew he was a snitch. Defendant asked for two instructions which would justify defendant's escape based on threats of physical force, death or serious bodily harm. These instructions were not given, but instead the following instruction was given: This instruction given by the court was based on a prior Arizona case in which we stated that prison or jail conditions afford no justification for escape. State v. Alberigo, 109 Ariz. 294, 508 P.2d 1156 (1973). In that the instruction followed Alberigo, it was a correct statement of the law in Arizona. Defendant, however, relies upon two decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which reversed two convictions for escape holding that the trial court should have allowed the jury to consider coercive jail conditions in determining the defendants' guilt. United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087 (C.A.D.C. 1978) and United States v. Cogdell, 585 F.2d 1130 (C.A.D.C. 1978) (both cases reversed 444 U.S. 394, 100 S. Ct. 624, 62 L. Ed. 2d 575, 1980). The United States Supreme Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals, but based its decision on the fact that the defendants, having been gone for over a month, had to show that they were willing to return to custody as soon as the coercive jail conditions were no longer present. The United States Supreme Court stated: In the instant case, the defendant was gone for less than 24 hours. Because he did not have time to present himself for reincarceration, it would not be reasonable to require him to return to custody before allowing a plea of coercion and necessity. We do not believe that Bailey, supra, applies to the facts of this case. There is, however, some language in Bailey suggesting that if conditions were sufficiently bad duress or necessity would be a valid defense. Mr. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, stated: Even if we assume that the United States Supreme Court would require us to recognize the defense of duress and necessity to the crime of escape, we do not believe the conditions described by the defendant would justify such an instruction in this case. There was no evidence of any threats or force against defendant while at the Chandler Jail. We find no error. State v. Alberigo, supra. Judgment affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., HOLOHAN, V.C.J., and HAYS and GORDON, JJ., concur. [1] Title 13 citations in this opinion are to the Arizona Criminal Code as it existed prior to its extensive revision effective 1 October 1978.