Case Title: Wolfe v. Wolfe

Citation: 2000-Ohio-322

Docket Number: 19982630

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Wolfe v. Wolfe, 88 Ohio St.3d 246, 2000-Ohio-322.] 
 
 
 
 
 
WOLFE, APPELLANT, v. WOLFE ET AL.; COLONIAL PENN INSURANCE COMPANY, 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Wolfe v. Wolfe (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 246.] 
Insurance — Motor vehicles — Policy period for liability insurance — R.C. 
3937.31(A), construed and applied. 
1. 
Pursuant to R.C. 3937.31(A), every automobile liability insurance policy 
issued in this state must have, at a minimum, a guaranteed two-year policy 
period during which the policy cannot be altered except by agreement of the 
parties and in accordance with R.C. 3937.30 to 3937.39. 
2. 
The commencement of each policy period mandated by R.C. 3937.31(A) 
brings into existence a new contract of automobile insurance, whether the 
policy is categorized as a new policy of insurance or a renewal of an existing 
policy. 
3. 
The guarantee period mandated by R.C. 3937.31(A) is not limited solely to 
the first two years following the initial institution of coverage. 
(No. 98-2630 — Submitted November 3, 1999 — Decided March 29, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 17111. 
 
The facts of this matter are largely undisputed.  Appellant, Marie B. Wolfe, 
and her husband, George L. Wolfe, were insured under a policy of automobile 
liability insurance issued through appellee, Colonial Penn Insurance Company.  It 
is undisputed that automobile liability coverage was originally purchased from 
appellee in 1983.  The policy in the case now before us provided liability coverage 
in the amounts of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence.  The policy 
under consideration also provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with 
limits of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per occurrence. 
 
 
2
 
On April 2, 1995, appellant was riding as a passenger in an automobile 
owned and operated by her husband.  Appellant suffered extensive injuries when 
the vehicle in which she was travelling was involved in an accident.  Appellant 
thereafter filed a complaint against several defendants in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Montgomery County seeking recovery for the damages she sustained from 
the accident.  Relevant to this matter, appellant alleged that her husband was 
negligent in the operation of his motor vehicle and, as a result thereof, appellant 
sustained personal injuries.  In addition, appellant sought a declaration that she was 
entitled to recover benefits from the underinsured motorist provision of the policy 
provided by appellee. 
 
On January 5, 1998, appellee paid appellant $100,000, the limit of liability 
coverage provided under the policy at issue, in settlement of appellant’s claims 
against her husband.  On March 6, 1998, the trial court granted summary judgment 
in favor of appellee.  In rejecting appellant’s assertion that she was entitled to 
underinsured motorists benefits, the trial court determined that this matter was 
governed by the version of R.C. 3937.18 that was enacted as part of Am.Sub.S.B. 
No. 20 on October 20, 1994.  Appellant had argued that Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. 
Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809, controlled the outcome of her 
underinsured motorist claim.  However, the trial court reasoned that “[a]ll events 
relevant in deciding the application of the governing law took place after the 
enactment of [Am.Sub.]S.B. [No.] 20.”  Thus, pursuant to the provision of the 
statute at issue, R.C. 3937.18(A)(2),1 as well as the terms of the policy, the trial 
court concluded that appellant could not recover underinsured motorist benefits. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court.  The court of appeals determined that the policy of 
automobile liability insurance covering appellant was renewed on December 12, 
1994, after the enactment of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20.  The court of appeals, relying on 
 
 
3
our decision in Ross v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 281, 695 
N.E.2d 732, found that this renewal constituted a new policy of insurance and, 
thus, that the statutory law in effect on the date of renewal, i.e., R.C. 3937.18 as 
amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, was incorporated into the policy of insurance 
and governed the terms of the coverage.  The court of appeals further held, despite 
appellant’s argument to the contrary, that R.C. 3937.31(A),2 which prescribes a 
minimum two-year policy period for automobile insurance, applied only to the 
initial, or original, issuance of an automobile liability insurance policy and not to 
subsequent continuations or renewals of the insurance contract.  The court of 
appeals therefore concluded that the trial court did not err when it applied the 
version of R.C. 3937.18 that was enacted as part of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 to deny 
appellant’s underinsured motorist claim. 
 
This matter is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Elk & Elk Co., L.P.A., and Todd O. Rosenberg, for appellant. 
 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., and Carl A. Anthony, for appellee. 
 
Sandra J. Rosenthal, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of 
Trial Lawyers. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  This court is called upon yet again to resolve issues involving 
automobile insurance policies and provisions of uninsured and underinsured 
motorist coverage.  In this matter we are asked by the parties to interpret R.C. 
3937.31(A).  Specifically we must decide what effect R.C. 3937.31(A) has in 
determining the applicable law governing appellant’s underinsured motorist claim.  
For the reasons that follow, we find that the trial court and the court of appeals 
erred in their respective resolutions of this matter. 
 
 
4
 
R.C. 3937.31 provides in part: 
 
“(A) Every automobile insurance policy shall be issued for a policy period 
of not less than two years or guaranteed renewable for successive policy periods 
totaling not less than two years.  Where renewal is mandatory, ‘cancellation,’ as 
used in sections 3937.30 to 3937.39 of the Revised Code, includes refusal to renew 
a policy with at least the coverages, included insureds, and policy limits provided 
at the end of the next preceding policy period.  No insurer may cancel any such 
policy except pursuant to the terms of the policy, and in accordance with sections 
3937.30 to 3937.39 of the Revised Code * * *.” 
 
Appellant contends that, as a matter of law, all automobile liability insurance 
policies issued in this state must have, at a minimum, a guaranteed two-year policy 
period.  Appellant interprets R.C. 3937.31(A) to require that the policy period be at 
least two years regardless of the number of one month, six-month, or yearly 
renewals.  Appellant further argues that R.C. 3937.31(A) establishes the existence 
of successive two-year policy periods.  In contrast, appellee claims that the 
“guarantee period” set forth in R.C. 3937.31(A) applies only to the first two years 
after an insurance company initially issues coverage to an insured. 
 
Since the statutory provision at issue is subject to varying interpretations, it 
is fair to say that it is ambiguous.  Therefore, R.C. 3937.31(A) must be construed 
to give effect to the legislative intent.  Harris v. Van Hoose (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 
24, 26, 550 N.E.2d 461, 462, citing Cochrel v. Robinson (1925), 113 Ohio St. 526, 
149 N.E. 871, paragraph four of the syllabus.  It is a cardinal rule of statutory 
interpretation that a court must first look to the language of the statute itself to 
determine legislative intent.  Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 
105, 65 O.O.2d 296, 298, 304 N.E.2d 378, 381.  In addition, R.C. 1.49 provides 
that if a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the 
 
 
5
legislature, may consider, among other matters, both the objective of the statute 
and the consequences of any particular construction. 
 
We conclude initially that the language of the statute does not support 
appellee’s position.  R.C. 3937.31(A) provides that “[e]very automobile insurance 
policy shall be issued for a policy period of not less than two years or guaranteed 
renewable for successive policy periods totaling not less than two years.”  
(Emphasis added.)  In promulgating R.C. 3937.31(A), the General Assembly, in its 
wisdom, decided not to choose language that would limit any guarantee policy 
period solely and entirely to the first two years following the insurer’s original 
offering of coverage.  Had the General Assembly intended otherwise, it could 
easily have said so. 
 
In addition, R.C. 3937.31(B), construed with R.C. 3937.31(A), contemplates 
successive two-year policy periods.  R.C. 3937.31(B) establishes that “[s]ections 
3937.30 to 3937.39 of the Revised Code do not prohibit:  * * * (4) [a]n insurer’s 
refusing for any reason to renew a policy upon its expiration at the end of any 
mandatory period, provided such nonrenewal complies with the procedure set forth 
in section 3937.34 of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.)  There is no question 
that the “mandatory period” of R.C. 3937.31(B)(4) refers to the two-year period set 
forth in R.C. 3937.31(A).  According to appellee, there can be only one two-year 
mandatory period, i.e., the two-year period after the insurance company first issues 
coverage to the insured.  However, by obvious implication, use of the word “any” 
to modify “mandatory period” suggests that the statute contemplates successive, 
mandatory policy periods.  Clearly, R.C. 3937.31(B) provides support for the 
proposition that the General Assembly, by enacting R.C. 3937.31(A), intended to 
provide for mandatory two-year periods beyond the first two years following 
initiation of coverage.  To interpret R.C. 3937.31(B)(4) any other way would 
render the language of R.C. 3937.31(A) inoperative. 
 
 
6
 
Moreover, the objective sought by the General Assembly in promulgating 
the statutory scheme involved herein would be defeated should we reach any other 
conclusion.  One of the purposes behind R.C. 3937.31 is to ensure that consumers 
of automobile liability insurance are able to maintain the level of coverage and 
policy limits that they had originally contracted for.  See R.C. 3937.31(A) (“ 
‘cancellation,’ * * * includes refusal to renew a policy with at least the coverages, 
included insureds, and policy limits provided at the end of the next preceding 
policy period”).  See, also, R.C. 3937.31(B)(3) (policy modifications that do not 
effect a withdrawal or reduction in the initial coverage or policy limits are 
permitted).  Second, the statute is intended to protect insureds from unilaterally 
being left without the protections that automobile insurance coverage affords by 
requiring that insurers provide an adequate method of notification when canceling 
insurance policies.  See R.C. 3937.31(A) (grounds for cancellation limited), 
3937.31(B)(4) (cancellation permitted at end of any mandatory period), 3937.32 
(notice of cancellation required), and 3937.33 (procedures for cancellation). 
 
It is clear that the public policy of this state, as gleaned from the Acts of the 
General Assembly, is to ensure that all motorists maintain some form of liability 
coverage on motor vehicles operated within Ohio.  R.C. 3937.31(A) is designed to 
further that policy.  In DeBose v. Travelers Ins. Cos. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 65, 67, 6 
OBR 108, 110, 451 N.E.2d 753, 755-756, this court stated that “[i]t is beyond 
reasonable dispute that R.C. 3937.30 et seq. are primarily designed to protect the 
public from the dangers which uninsured motorists pose.  R.C. 3937.31(A) 
attempts to ameliorate this threat by mandating that insureds whose policies have 
been in effect for less than two years receive notice of any planned cancellation of 
their policies in time for them to secure new coverage.”  In addition, the public 
policy is buttressed by R.C. Chapter 4509, Ohio’s Financial Responsibility Act.  
Thus, restricting the guarantee period in R.C. 3937.31(A) solely to the first two 
 
 
7
years of initial coverage defeats, rather than advances, the laudatory objectives of 
the General Assembly. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that, pursuant to R.C. 3937.31(A), every automobile 
liability insurance policy issued in this state must have, at a minimum, a 
guaranteed two-year policy period during which the policy cannot be altered 
except by agreement of the parties and in accordance with R.C. 3937.30 to 
3937.39.  We further hold that the commencement of each policy period mandated 
by R.C. 3937.31(A) brings into existence a new contract of automobile insurance, 
whether the policy is categorized as a new policy of insurance or a renewal of an 
existing policy.  Pursuant to our decision in Ross v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos. 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 281, 695 N.E.2d 732, the statutory law in effect on the date 
of issue of each new policy is the law to be applied. 
 
Finally, the guarantee period mandated by R.C. 3937.31(A) is not limited 
solely to the first two years following the initial institution of coverage.  Rather, 
the statute applies to every new automobile insurance policy issued, regardless of 
the number of times the parties previously have contracted for motor vehicle 
insurance coverage. 
 
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties agree that the original 
issuance date of appellant’s automobile liability insurance policy was December 
12, 1983.  Counting successive two-year policy periods from that date, appellant’s 
last guaranteed policy period would have run from December 12, 1993 to 
December 12, 1995.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 was enacted on October 20, 1994, 
approximately fourteen months before the end of appellant’s two-year guaranteed 
policy period.  Therefore, those provisions of the statute intended to supersede our 
decision in Savoie, 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809, could not have been 
incorporated into the contract of insurance until the mandatory policy period had 
expired on December 12, 1995 and a new guarantee period had begun. 
 
 
8
 
A final contention is made regarding our decision in Ross, supra, and our 
reliance therein on Benson v. Rosler (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 41, 19 OBR 35, 482 
N.E.2d 599.  Appellee contends that our decisions in Benson and Ross resolve this 
matter in its favor.  We disagree. 
 
In Benson, a majority of this court held that “statutes pertaining to a policy 
of insurance and its coverage, which are enacted after the policy’s issuance, are 
incorporated into any renewal of such policy if the renewal represents a new 
contract of insurance separate from the initial policy.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 
44, 19 OBR at 37, 482 N.E.2d at 602, citing 12 Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice (1981) 166, Section 7041.  A majority of the court in Benson went on to 
determine, notwithstanding the provisions of R.C. 3937.31(A), that the policies at 
issue therein, written for six-month durations, were considered new polices at their 
renewal.  Id.  Given the language of R.C. 3937.31(A), that determination in Benson 
is confusing at best and flat-out wrong at its worst.  When we relied on Benson in 
Ross, we did so without consideration of the R.C. 3937.31(A) question which, of 
course, was not before us in Ross.  Ross, 82 Ohio St.3d at 288-289, 695 N.E.2d at 
737. 
 
We now believe that in Benson the majority misconstrued R.C. 3937.31(A).  
The discussion of R.C. 3937.31(A) in the Benson court’s per curiam opinion could 
be described as cursory at best.  The Benson majority failed to consider the 
statute’s proper application, as well as the public policy behind the enactment, to 
contracts of automobile liability insurance issued in this state.  In effect, the 
majority’s final determination in Benson renders the language of R.C. 3937.31(A) 
meaningless. 
 
Moreover, Benson, as well as Ross, could not be dispositive of the matter 
before us without also considering the mandatory requirements of R.C. 
3937.18(A).  Pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A), insurers are required to offer uninsured 
 
 
9
and underinsured motorist coverage with every motor vehicle policy delivered or 
issued in this state.  Failure to do so results in the insured’s acquiring such 
coverage by operation of law.  Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc. 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 565, 567, 669 N.E.2d 824, 826.  Were we to adopt 
appellee’s argument, insurance companies would have the unenviable task of 
complying with R.C. 3937.18(A) every time a renewal constituted a new policy of 
insurance. 
 
Thus, we conclude that certain aspects of the court’s decision in Benson are 
contradictory to the language and statutory purpose of R.C. 3937.31(A).  We, 
therefore, limit the holding of Benson and reject those portions of the Benson 
opinion to the extent that they conflict with R.C. 3937.31(A). 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand 
this matter to the trial court for final determination consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
According to the provisions of Section 7 of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, it 
was the intent of the General Assembly in amending R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) to 
supersede the effects of this court’s holding in Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. 
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809, relative to the issue of denying 
recovery of underinsured motorist benefits in those situations where the 
tortfeasor’s liability limits are greater than or equal to the limits of underinsured 
motorist coverage.  145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 238. 
 
2. 
See infra. 
__________________ 
 
 
10
 
COOK, J., dissenting. Because I would adhere to this court’s decision in 
Benson v. Rosler (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 41, 19 OBR 35, 482 N.E.2d 599, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
The majority’s decision today interprets R.C. 3937.31(A) as mandating 
successive two-year periods of guaranteed coverage rather than one such initial 
period.  From this conclusion, the majority then determines that Benson is no 
longer a correct statement of the law, and that only at the beginning of a two-year 
mandatory coverage period may new contracts of insurance exist. These 
propositions, however, do not follow from the majority’s initial conclusion 
concerning R.C. 3937.31(A), and are therefore adopted without analytical support. 
 
To appreciate the flaw in the majority’s analysis, it is useful to view it 
against the background of the law as it existed prior to today.  In Benson this court 
held that even if a renewal occurred within a mandatory two-year coverage period 
under R.C. 3937.31(A), it could still be considered a “new contract” where the 
terms of the policy supported that characterization. In such instances, the law in 
effect on the date of the renewal applied. 
 
The majority now announces that the Benson court misconstrued this issue 
and that we are to look only to the beginning of each R.C. 3937.31(A) two-year 
period for the “new contract” date. The majority apparently believes that its 
conclusion concerning mandatory periods compels the proposition that renewals 
within a mandatory period may not be “new contracts.”  It is at this point that the 
logic of the majority’s analysis breaks down. 
 
While the majority attempts to undercut the Benson decision based upon its 
interpretation that R.C. 3937.31(A) contemplates successive mandatory periods, in 
fact, that interpretation does not contradict the holding in Benson.  Benson held that 
a renewal could be a new contract even if it occurred within a mandatory two-year 
period.  Even accepting the majority’s expansion of R.C. 3937.31(A) to require 
 
 
11
successive two-year mandatory periods, the Benson court’s analysis applies 
equally well to the first mandatory period as to later ones. In other words, it makes 
no difference during which mandatory period the renewal occurs—the rationale 
that a renewal may be a new contract even during such periods remains the same.  
Thus, the majority’s citation to R.C. 3937.31(A) as the reason for reversing Benson 
is plainly insufficient. 
 
In fact, by concentrating its analysis upon the number of mandatory 
coverage periods required under R.C. 3937.31(A), the majority actually misses the 
crucial issue in this controversy. What it should have analyzed is whether a 
renewal may be considered a “new contract” if it occurs within a mandatory two-
year period.  It is that statement that needed to be countered in order to overrule or 
limit Benson. 
 
Had the majority analyzed this issue, however, it would have found little, if 
any, support for its elimination of Benson as a valid statement of law on this point.  
First, it is “a basic tenet of insurance law that each time an insurance contract is 
renewed, a separate and distinct policy comes into existence.” Hercules Bumpers, 
Inc. v. First State Ins. Co. (C.A.11, 1989), 863 F.2d 839, 842, citing 13 Appleman, 
Insurance Law and Practice (Rev.Ed.1976), Section 7648; see, also, Moses v. Am. 
Home Assur. Co. (Ala.1979), 376 So.2d 656, 658.  Based upon that premise and 
principles of contract law, the Benson court appropriately reasoned that, where a 
policy is written for a specific term and would expire unless the insured acted upon 
the renewal offer by paying a premium, the language of the policy should be given 
effect and the renewal considered a new contract. 
 
Moreover, as the Benson court understood, the text of R.C. 3937.31(A) 
contains no justification for a departure from these basic insurance and contract 
concepts.  That statute includes neither a mandate nor even a suggestion 
concerning what is and is not a new contract.  Regardless of the number of two-
 
 
12
year periods it requires, the statute concerns itself only with the availability of 
coverage during those years.  Had the General Assembly meant to convert all 
insurance policies into two-year continuing contracts, thereby prohibiting any 
characterization of renewals as new contracts despite their very terms, certainly it 
would have used more specific terms, as it has elsewhere in the Revised Code.  
See, e.g., R.C. 3319.08 (concerning continuing contracts for teachers).  This is 
particularly true when to do so would depart from well-settled insurance concepts.  
At the very least, the General Assembly would have eliminated from R.C. 
3937.31(A), as superfluous, the concept of renewals within a mandatory term. 
Thus, the majority in effect adds provisions to the statute in order to support its 
determination—a determination unfounded based upon the text of the statute. 
 
I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that Benson’s continued validity 
would circumvent the purpose of R.C. 3937.31(A).  According to the majority’s 
own reasoning, R.C. 3937.31(A) was enacted to further the public policy of 
ensuring that all motorists maintain some form of liability coverage on motor 
vehicles in Ohio. The General Assembly achieved this goal by imposing upon 
insurers various cancellation restrictions.  Contrary to the majority’s view, this 
purpose is in no way compromised by adherence to Benson and established 
concepts of insurance and contract law.  The proposition that a renewal may be 
considered a new contract quite plainly has no effect upon the statute’s 
continuation of insurance coverage provision. 
 
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s visions of chaos concerning 
compliance with the uninsured and underinsured offering requirements were we to 
follow Benson.  The majority specifically warns: “Were we to adopt appellee’s 
argument, insurance companies would have the unenviable task of complying with 
R.C. 3937.18(A) every time a renewal constituted a new policy of insurance.” The 
statutory language of R.C. 3937.18(C), however, specifically excepts renewals and 
 
 
13
replacement contracts from the offering requirement of R.C. 3937.18(A).  In those 
instances, the insured’s prior choice controls unless the insured expressly requests 
such coverage.  See, e.g., Remington v. Triplett (June 30, 1999), Fairfield App. No. 
98CA00070, unreported, 1999 WL 547815; Savage v. Shelby Ins. Group (July 22, 
1998), Crawford App. No. 3-98-03, unreported, 1998 WL 409146. Thus, no 
infeasible compliance task would await insurance companies were we to simply 
follow Benson and continue to hold that the terms of the policy itself, rather than a 
statute enacted for a different purpose, control whether a renewal constitutes a new 
contract. 
 
Given that no valid support exists to overturn or limit Benson, I believe that 
it should remain the law on this issue and should control the outcome of this case.  
Accordingly, based upon Benson, I would conclude that the terms of the policy at 
issue dictate whether the renewal constitutes a new contract, regardless of whether 
that renewal occurred within a mandatory guarantee period under R.C. 3937.31(A). 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent because I 
believe the majority reads more into R.C. 3937.31 than was intended by the 
General Assembly.  Although the statute is not a model of clarity, I believe that the 
majority’s interpretation creates more confusion, rather than providing 
clarification. 
 
R.C. 3937.31(A) provides that “[e]very automobile insurance policy shall be 
issued for a policy period of not less than two years or guaranteed renewable for 
successive policy periods totaling not less than two years.”  (Emphasis added.)  I 
believe that this language simply means that an insurer must provide coverage for a 
minimum of two years without a reduction in benefits.  I agree with the analysis by 
this court in Benson v. Rosler (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 41, 19 OBR 35, 482 N.E.2d 
 
 
14
599.  The Benson court reasoned that statutes enacted after an insurance policy is 
issued “are incorporated into any renewal of such policy if the renewal represents a 
new contract of insurance separate from the initial policy.”  Id. at 44, 19 OBR at 
37, 482 N.E.2d at 602. 
 
This approach would simplify an insured’s review of the applicable law 
when a claim is made.  An insured or his or her attorney need only determine the 
initial term and contract length of the policy.  Any renewal of the policy would 
incorporate current law. 
 
In addition, the Benson court recognized that R.C. 3937.31 provides that an 
insurance company may issue a policy for a period of six months with the option to 
renew for an additional six-month period.  When a policy is written for a specific 
period, it may be considered a term policy, not a continuing policy, and each 
renewal policy may be considered a new contract. 
 
I agree with the appellee that Benson controls and that a renewal policy may 
constitute a new contract that simply renews the terms of the prior contract for a 
subsequent period.  The insurance company agrees to provide insurance coverage 
in exchange for the insured’s payment of a premium for the coverage.  R.C. 
3937.31(A) merely requires the insurer to guarantee the same coverage to an 
insured for the first two years.  The statute does not require the insurer to issue a 
two-year contract. 
 
There is nothing in the language of R.C. 3937.31 that prohibits successive 
term insurance policies.  To read such prohibitive language into R.C. 3937.31 
renders the phrase “or guaranteed renewable for successive policy periods totaling 
not less than two years” meaningless.  The majority now mandates automatic two-
year contracts and prohibits successive term contracts, a result that is clearly not 
 
 
15
evident in a plain reading of the statute.  Now that each insurance contract extends 
for a minimum of two years, many insureds may be precluded from the benefit of 
any change in the law that may occur during that two-year period. 
 
Insureds must now determine when each two-year policy commenced, a 
difficult task, especially for those who have maintained a long-term contractual 
relationship with one insurer.  Once again, the majority injects chaos into the 
insurance field.