Case Title: BAKER v. SAINT FRANCIS HOSPITAL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 100713

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
BAKER v. SAINT FRANCIS HOSPITAL  BAKER v. SAINT FRANCIS HOSPITAL 2005 OK 36 126 P.3d 602 Case Number: 100713 Decided: 12/20/2005 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA LOWELL and STELLA BAKER, as Parents and next friends of SUMMER BAKER, a minor, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. SAINT FRANCIS HOSPITAL, an Oklahoma corporation d/b/a AVE MARIA CHILD CARE, Defendant/Appellee. ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA HONORABLE DORIS L. FRANSEIN, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 Summer Baker, an infant, was injured at Ave Maria Child Care when an employee of the childcare provider allowed her to roll off a crib onto the floor and then intentionally struck the infant's head against a shelf at the childcare facility. The child's parents sued Saint Francis Hospital, appellee, which operated the facility. The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment contending the fall was not the proximate cause of any injuries to the infant and that the employee was not acting within the scope of her employment when she deliberately struck the infant's head against the shelf. The trial court granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED. John F. McCormick, Jr., John L. Randolph, Jr., Harry A. Parrish, PRAY, WALKER, JACKMAN, WILLIAMSON & MARLAR, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for appellants. Timothy G. Best, Sean H. McKee, Matthew B. Free, BEST & SHARP, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for appellee. PER CURIAM ¶1 The question before this Court is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the appellee, Saint Francis Hospital, d/b/a Ave Maria Child Care. We conclude the trial court erred and reverse and remand for a hearing on the merits. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE ¶2 The parties have agreed on the following facts. Ave Maria Child Care is a daycare facility that cares for children of employees of Saint Francis Hospital and its affiliates. The appellant, Stella Baker, was an employee of Laureate Psychiatric Clinic and Hospital, an affiliate of Saint Francis Hospital. On September 6, 1998, Amy Davis was employed at the daycare facility as a caregiver when Stella Baker left her two-month-old daughter, Summer, there. About 3:30 p.m., when Mrs. Baker arrived to pick up Summer, she heard her crying and noticed two small red marks on her right temple. Davis was Summer's regular caregiver at Ave Maria, and when Mrs. Baker inquired about the marks, Davis denied knowing how Summer received them. ¶3 A few hours later, when bathing Summer at home, Mrs. Baker noticed the right side of Summer's head was swelling. She called her pediatrician's office and was told to take her to the emergency room at Saint Francis Hospital. The physicians there determined that Summer had two bilateral depressed skull fractures and suffered traumatic brain injury. ¶4 The appellants allege that Davis allowed Summer to fall from her crib while changing a diaper. The parties agree that Davis intentionally struck Summer's head two times against the corner of a shelf at the daycare facility. The record includes a copy of the Findings of Fact and Acceptance of Plea dated and file-stamped September 14, 1999, showing that Davis pled guilty to injury to a minor child. She received a sentence according to a plea agreement of ten years, seven in custody and the remaining three out of custody. On that document Davis claims to have hit Summer's head against the shelf because Summer would not stop crying. The pertinent language from Davis contained in the Findings of Fact and Acceptance of Plea document is as follows: "I hit Summers (sic) head against the cubby; she was crying she wouldn't stop crying." II. REVIEW OF SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS ¶6 Summary judgment is appropriate where it appears there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Daugherty v. Farmers Co-op. Ass'n, III. NEGLIGENCE ¶7 The appellants allege that Davis allowed Summer to roll off the crib onto the floor, which contributed to her injuries. The appellee asserts it is an uncontested fact that Summer's injuries could not have been caused by the fall described by the appellants. The appellee entered portions of a physician's deposition where he testified about the injuries likely from a fall. In response to the question: "Can you say to a hundred percent certainty, Doctor, that these fractures weren't caused by a fall?" the doctor responded, "I think without being there, nobody could say that with a hundred percent certainty." The doctor stated he believed that blows to the head were the plausible explanation for Summer's fractures rather than a fall from a crib. ¶8 The injuries to Summer did not include just the fractures but also traumatic brain injury. In exhibit A of "Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," offered by the appellee, the doctor's answers address the cause of the fractures, not the cause of the brain injury. The appellants' allegation is that "Summer suffered traumatic brain injury as a result of either, or both, the fall and having her head struck against the shelf." Since all inferences and conclusions to be drawn must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, in this case the appellants, the issue remains in controversy; therefore, summary judgment on this issue is improper. Ross, IV. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR LIABILITY FOR BATTERY ¶9 Davis intentionally struck Summer's head against a shelf at the daycare facility. The issue is whether her employer, the appellee, may be held liable in damages for this intentional wrongful act. ¶10 To hold an employer responsible for the tort of an employee, the tortious act must be committed in the course of the employment and within the scope of the employee's authority. Hill v. McQueen, ¶11 The appellee asserts, "It is self-evident that the act of smashing a child's head against a shelf does not accomplish the assigned work of caring for, protecting, and nurturing." Appellee's Answer to Appellants' Petition for Certiorari, p. 4. That mischaracterizes the law concerning liability of an employer for the tort of an employee. Where an employee of a daycare center is responsible for the care of infants, some type of stress-induced temporary loss of control over one's behavior (or other psychological malfunction) over a crying baby and/or babies and the act(s) of Davis in hitting Summer's head against a shelf (the cubby) arguably involve "an emotional response to actions being taken for the employer," ¶13 Cases holding the employer was not liable for the tort of the employee include: Hill v. McQueen, ¶14 The Court in N. H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) distinguished the facts in that case from those in Rodebush. The Court observed that the attendant who was bathing the Alzheimer patient acted impulsively when he slapped the combative patient, but that the impulse naturally arose from the situation he had been placed in by the employer, which was to complete the patient's bath. N. H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), ¶15 In the Hill case, the Court distinguished it from the Ada-Konawa Bridge and Radford cases. It was the employee's duty to obtain payment of the toll in Ada-Konawa Bridge and the train fare in Radford. The employee was to withhold the enjoyment of the right or privilege, if payment was not obtained. Since successful performance involved some type of immediate action in opposition to the will of the other, the employer could have anticipated the wrongful acts taken. Hill, ¶16 The question of whether or not a servant should be considered to have been acting within the line of duty sufficient to support respondeat superior liability is normally a question of fact to be determined by the jury from all the surrounding circumstances. See Chicago, R. I. & P. RY. Co., ¶17 In the instant case, the answer to the respondeat superior issue primarily lies in determining whether Davis had stepped aside from her employment at the time of the offending tortious act(s) on some mission or conduct to serve her own personal needs, motivations or purposes. See Tulsa General Drivers, Warehousemen, and Helpers Union, Local No. 523 v. Conley and Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Sandford. Our view of the instant matter is consistent with Rest.2d Agency § 245 (1958), comment f at 541, which provides: f. Servant actuated by personal motives. ¶18 In our view, a jury, as fact-finder (assuming the parties do not waive a jury trial) must decide if Davis's acts were so far removed from any work-related endeavor and geared, instead, toward a personal course of conduct unrelated to her work so that it would no longer be appropriate to hold her employer responsible for her act(s). Therefore, the purpose or motivation behind Davis's act(s) is an important, and potentially an overriding, consideration permeating resolution of arriving at a correct answer to the respondeat superior question. The statement on the plea document does not unequivocally answer the motivation question. In other words, one cannot tell from the words used in the plea document ("I hit Summers (sic) head against the cubby; she was crying she wouldn't stop crying") the purpose or motivation underpinning the act(s) of hitting the infant's head against the shelf (i.e., the cubby). Was it in whole or in part a misguided attempt to quiet the infant or, was it a conscious attempt to harm or injure the child because of Davis's own personal irritation or annoyance at the child? CONCLUSION ¶19 We hold the issue concerning appellee's respondeat superior liability for the act(s) of Davis in hitting Summer's head against the shelf (the cubby) is not one subject to determination as a matter of law on the instant summary judgment record. We also hold that the issue regarding any injury resulting from a fall remains in controversy and summary judgment on it was improper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED. ¶20 LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER and EDMONDSON, JJ., concur. ¶21 WATT, C.J., WINCHESTER, V.C.J., TAYLOR and COLBERT, JJ., dissent. FOOT