Case Title: State v. Knipfer

Citation: 2015 WI 3

Docket Number: 2013AP000578, 2013AP000225

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 3 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP225 & 2013AP578 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the commitment of Michael Alger: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael Alger, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.   
------------------------------------------------ 
In re the commitment of Ronald Knipfer: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Ronald Knipfer, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 352 Wis. 2d 145, 841 N.W.2d 329) 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2013 WI App 148 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 352 Wis. 2d 563, 842 N.W.2d 526) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2014 WI App 9 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 20, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 2, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit/Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie/Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Des Jardins/Nicholas McNamara 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For respondent-appellant-petitioner Michael Alger, there 
were briefs by Steven D. Phillips, assistant state public 
defender. Oral argument by Steven D. Phillips. 
 
 
2 
For respondent-appellant-petitioner Ronald Knipfer, there 
were briefs by Donald T. Lang, assistant state public defender, 
and oral argument by Donald T. Lang. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent in both cases, the cause was 
argued by Nancy A. Noet, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2015 WI 3
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.   2013AP225 & 2013AP578 
(L.C. Nos. 2004CV654 & 2002CI3) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the commitment of Michael Alger: 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Petitioner-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Michael Alger,   
 
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.  
   
FILED 
 
JAN 20, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
In re the commitment of Ronald Knipfer: 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Petitioner-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Ronald Knipfer,   
 
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of 
two published decisions of the court of appeals, State v. Alger, 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
2 
 
2013 WI App 148, 352 Wis. 2d 145, 841 N.W.2d 329, and State v. 
Knipfer, 2014 WI App 9, 352 Wis. 2d 563, 842 N.W.2d 526.1  In 
Alger the court of appeals affirmed the Outagamie County Circuit 
Court's2 order denying Michael Alger's ("Alger") petition for 
discharge from involuntary commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
as a sexually violent person, as defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.01(7) (2011-12).3  In Knipfer the court of appeals affirmed 
the Dane County Circuit Court's4 order denying Ronald Knipfer's 
("Knipfer") petition for discharge from involuntary commitment 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 as a sexually violent person.  
¶2 
Both Alger and Knipfer argue that the circuit courts 
erred by refusing to apply the Daubert5 evidentiary standard 
                                                 
1 We consolidated these two cases after oral argument 
because they present similar issues and facts.  
2 The Honorable John A. Des Jardins presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 980.01(7) provides: 
"Sexually violent person" means a person who has 
been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been 
adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, 
or has been found not guilty of or not responsible for 
a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or 
mental disease, defect, or illness, and who is 
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental 
disorder that makes it likely that the person will 
engage in one or more acts of sexual violence. 
4 The Honorable Nicholas McNamara presided. 
5 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 
(1993) (holding that, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
expert 
testimony 
must 
be 
reliable 
and 
relevant 
to 
be 
admissible). 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
3 
 
under Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1)6 to the State's expert witnesses who 
testified in their Chapter 980 discharge petition trials.  The 
legislature provided that the Daubert standard, which requires 
that 
particularized 
standards 
be 
met 
before 
an 
expert's 
testimony can be admitted, would "first apply to actions or 
special proceedings that are commenced on the effective date of 
this subsection [February 1, 2011]."  2011 Wis. Act 2, § 45(5).7  
Both Alger and Knipfer argue that the Daubert evidentiary 
standard should have applied to the State's expert testimony at 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.02(1) provides:  
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education, 
may 
testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 907.02(1) was adopted by 2011 Wis. Act 2, 
§ 34M. 
7 2011 Wis. Act 2, § 45(5) provides:  
CIVIL 
ACTIONS. 
 
The 
treatment 
of 
sections 
230.85(3)(b), 
802.10(7), 
809.103(2)(a), 
814.04 
(intro.), 
814.29(3)(a), 
895.043(6), 
895.044, 
895.045(3), 895.046, 895.047, and 907.03 of the 
statutes, the renumbering and amendment of sections 
907.01 and 907.02 of the statutes, and the creation of 
sections 907.01(3) and 907.02(2) of the statutes first 
apply to actions or special proceedings that are 
commenced on the effective date of this subsection. 
The effective date was the following day, February 1, 2011.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 991.11. 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
4 
 
trial on their Chapter 980 discharge petitions because the 
petitions commenced "actions" or "special proceedings" after the 
Daubert standard's first date of applicability.8  Alger and 
Knipfer further argue that their constitutional right to equal 
protection was violated when the Daubert evidentiary standard 
did not apply to and thus bar the State's expert testimony in 
their Chapter 980 discharge petition trials.9  Knipfer also 
argues that his constitutional right to due process was violated 
because the circuit court did not apply the Daubert standard to 
the State's expert testimony in his Chapter 980 discharge 
petition trial.10   
                                                 
8 The court of appeals held that Alger conceded that his 
discharge petition did not commence a special proceeding.  State 
v. Alger, 2013 WI App 148, ¶11, 352 Wis. 2d 145, 841 N.W.2d 329. 
Knipfer's argument also centers on whether the discharge 
petition commenced an "action."  Nevertheless, we will address 
whether Alger's and Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge petitions 
commenced "special proceedings." 
9 Although Alger and Knipfer seem to argue that the mere 
failure 
to 
apply 
the 
Daubert 
evidentiary 
standard 
was 
unconstitutional, their argument seems to hinge on their view 
that the State's expert testimony would have been inadmissible 
under the Daubert standard. 
10 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution provides in part, "No State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Article 
I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: "All people 
are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent 
rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."  
This court has held that the Wisconsin Constitution's due 
process clause is the substantial equivalent of the federal due 
(continued) 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
5 
 
¶3 
The State argues that the Daubert evidentiary standard 
does not apply to Alger's and Knipfer's petitions to discharge 
their Wis. Stat. ch. 980 commitments.  The State contends that 
those discharge petitions did not commence "actions" or "special 
proceedings."  Instead, the State argues, those discharge 
petitions are part of the underlying Chapter 980 commitments, 
which commenced several years before the Daubert standard's 
first date of applicability.  The State also argues that the 
legislature had a rational basis for not applying the Daubert 
standard to the State's expert witnesses in Alger's and 
Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge petition trials such that no 
violation of equal protection or due process occurred.  
¶4 
We conclude that the Daubert evidentiary standard 
under Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) does not apply to expert testimony 
in Alger's and Knipfer's Wis. Stat. ch. 980 discharge petition 
trials because their discharge petitions did not "commence" 
"actions" or "special proceedings."  The Daubert standard 
applies to "actions" or "special proceedings" commenced on or 
after February 1, 2011.  The original Chapter 980 commitments 
here began several years before the Daubert standard was 
adopted, and although Alger's and Knipfer's petitions seek 
relief from those original commitments, those filings do not 
constitute the "commencement" of an "action" or a "special 
                                                                                                                                                             
process clause.  State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶5 n.2, 336 
Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929 (citation omitted).  This court's 
interpretation is the same for the state and federal equal 
protection clauses.  Id. (citation omitted). 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
6 
 
proceeding."  We also conclude that because the legislature had 
a rational basis for not applying the Daubert evidentiary 
standard to expert testimony in post-Daubert Chapter 980 
discharge petitions that seek relief from pre-Daubert Chapter 
980 commitments, no violation of equal protection or due process 
occurred.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
A. State v. Alger 
¶5 
It is undisputed that Alger was deemed to be a 
sexually violent person and was involuntarily committed under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980 on May 10, 2005.  He has been under Chapter 
980 commitment ever since. 
¶6 
In the six years between his Chapter 980 commitment 
and Wisconsin's adoption of the Daubert evidentiary standard, 
Alger 
filed 
one 
petition 
for 
discharge 
and 
much 
other 
correspondence with the committing court.  The Daubert standard 
was not a Wisconsin evidentiary standard during any prior 
proceeding in Alger's Chapter 980 commitment.  
¶7 
On April 21, 2011, about two months after Wisconsin 
adopted the Daubert evidentiary standard, Alger filed a petition 
for discharge from his Chapter 980 commitment.  The petition 
relied on Alger's expert's opinion that Alger was no longer a 
sexually violent person.  The State's expert opined that Alger 
was still a sexually violent person and should not be discharged 
from Chapter 980 commitment.  
¶8 
On July 29, 2011, Alger filed a motion in limine to 
exclude the State's expert testimony at the discharge petition 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
7 
 
trial on the ground that the testimony did not meet the newly 
adopted Daubert evidentiary standard.  The State responded and 
argued that the Daubert standard did not apply because Alger's 
underlying commitment began before the Daubert standard was 
first applicable, and that the discharge petition was not a new 
"action" or "special proceeding."  On November 18, 2011, Alger 
filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion in 
limine in which he also argued that his constitutional right to 
equal protection would be violated if the Daubert standard did 
not apply to the State's expert testimony in his Chapter 980 
discharge petition trial.  On November 23, 2011, Alger filed 
another Chapter 980 discharge petition and that petition was 
merged with his previously filed discharge petition.  
¶9 
On January 30, 2012, the circuit court denied Alger's 
motion in limine.  The court concluded that the Daubert 
evidentiary standard did not apply to Alger's Chapter 980 
discharge petition.  The court reasoned that Alger's discharge 
petition, although filed after the Daubert standard was first 
applicable, was part of the underlying Chapter 980 commitment 
proceeding that began when the State filed "[a] petition for a 
commitment trial under [Wis. Stat. §] 980.02" several years 
before the Daubert standard was even adopted.  The court also 
concluded that the failure to apply the Daubert standard to 
Alger's Chapter 980 discharge petition did not violate equal 
protection.  
¶10 On August 20, 2012, Alger's Chapter 980 discharge 
petition was tried before a six-person jury.  Two expert 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
8 
 
witnesses testified on behalf of Alger and two experts testified 
on behalf of the State.  The jury found that Alger still met the 
criteria for Chapter 980 commitment.  On August 22, 2012, the 
court entered an order denying Alger's Chapter 980 discharge 
petition.  
¶11 On November 19, 2013, the court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court's order denying Alger's Chapter 980 discharge 
petition.  
¶12 On December 18, 2013, Alger petitioned this court for 
review, which we granted on May 23, 2014. 
B. State v. Knipfer 
¶13 It is undisputed that Knipfer was deemed to be a 
sexually violent person and was involuntarily committed under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980 on October 1, 2003.  He has been under 
Chapter 980 commitment ever since. 
¶14 In the seven and a half years between his Chapter 980 
commitment and Wisconsin's adoption of the Daubert evidentiary 
standard, Knipfer filed three petitions for discharge and much 
other correspondence with the committing court.  The Daubert 
standard was not a Wisconsin evidentiary standard during any 
prior proceeding in Knipfer's Chapter 980 commitment.  
¶15 On May 11, 2012, more than one year after Wisconsin 
adopted the Daubert evidentiary standard, Knipfer filed a 
petition 
for 
discharge 
from 
his 
involuntary 
Chapter 
980 
commitment.  The petition relied on Knipfer's expert's opinion 
that Knipfer was no longer a sexually violent person.  The 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
9 
 
State's expert opined that Knipfer was still a sexually violent 
person and should not be discharged from Chapter 980 commitment. 
¶16 Knipfer argued that the Daubert evidentiary standard 
applied to the State's expert testimony in his Chapter 980 
discharge petition trial such that the State's expert would be 
precluded 
from 
testifying. 
 
He 
also 
argued 
that 
his 
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process would 
be violated if the Daubert standard did not apply to exclude 
that expert testimony. 
¶17 The State argued that the Daubert evidentiary standard 
did not apply to expert testimony in Knipfer's Chapter 980 
discharge 
petition 
trial 
because, 
like 
Alger's 
discharge 
petition, Knipfer's discharge petition did not commence a new 
"action" or "special proceeding," and Knipfer's rights to equal 
protection and due process were not thereby violated.  
¶18 On September 14, 2012, the circuit court held a bench 
trial on Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge petition.  The court 
held that the Daubert evidentiary standard did not apply to the 
State's expert testimony in the discharge petition trial because 
Knipfer's discharge petition was essentially a motion within the 
Chapter 980 commitment action, not a separate action or 
proceeding.  The court also held that the failure to apply the 
Daubert standard to the expert testimony in the discharge 
petition trial did not violate Knipfer's equal protection or due 
process rights.  On September 20, 2012, the court held that 
Knipfer still met the criteria for Chapter 980 commitment and 
entered an order denying Knipfer's discharge petition. 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
10 
 
¶19 On December 23, 2013, the court of appeals affirmed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
denying 
Knipfer's 
Chapter 
980 
discharge petition.  
¶20 On January 27, 2014, Knipfer petitioned this court for 
review, which we granted on May 23, 2014. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
 
A. Standard of Review and Principles of 
Statutory Interpretation 
¶21 The interpretation and application of a statute 
present questions of law that this court reviews de novo while 
benefitting from the analyses of the court of appeals and 
circuit court.  State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶37, 342 
Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238 (citing Heritage Farms, Inc. v. 
Markel Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶24, 339 Wis. 2d 125, 810 
N.W.2d 465).  This court begins statutory interpretation with 
the language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, 
and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id.  We interpret statutory language in 
relation to surrounding or closely-related statutes.  Id., ¶46.  
"Where statutory language is unambiguous, there is no need to 
consult extrinsic sources of interpretation, such as legislative 
history."  Id.   
¶22 The constitutionality of a statute is also a question 
of law that this court reviews de novo while benefitting from 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
11 
 
the analyses of the court of appeals and circuit court.  State 
v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶8, 323 Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90 (citing 
State v. Weidner, 2000 WI 52, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 306, 611 
N.W.2d 684; 
State 
v. 
Janssen, 
219 
Wis. 2d 362, 
370, 
580 
N.W.2d 260 (1998)).  A statute is presumed constitutional.  Id. 
(citing Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 370).  A party challenging a 
statute's constitutionality bears a heavy burden to overcome 
that presumption.  Id. (citing State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶11, 
264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328).  A party challenging a statute 
does not overcome the presumption of constitutionality by 
establishing that a statute's constitutionality is doubtful or 
that a statute is probably unconstitutional.  Id. (citing Cole, 
264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶11).  "Instead, the party challenging a 
statute's constitutionality must 'prove that the statute is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  Id. (quoting 
Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶11).  
 
B. Whether the Daubert Evidentiary Standard Applies to Alger's 
and Knipfer's Chapter 980 Discharge Petitions 
¶23 In short, Alger and Knipfer argue that the Daubert 
evidentiary standard applies to the State's expert testimony in 
their Chapter 980 discharge petition trials.  They contend that 
their Chapter 980 discharge petitions "commenced" "actions" or 
"special proceedings" after February 1, 2011, the first date of 
the Daubert standard's applicability.  They argue that the 
State's initial petitions for Chapter 980 commitment began 
separate actions that concluded when the circuit courts ordered 
Alger 
and 
Knipfer 
to 
be 
committed 
in 
2005 
and 
2003, 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
12 
 
respectively.  Alger and Knipfer reason that the circuit courts' 
initial commitment orders were final because they had a right to 
appeal from the orders, and a final order "disposes of the 
entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties."  
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  They further contend that a committing 
court's continuing administrative authority over a Wis. Stat. 
ch. 980 commitment does not mean that a discharge petition is 
part of the underlying commitment proceeding.  They reason that 
a committing court generally takes no action with respect to a 
Chapter 980 committed person until the person petitions the 
court.  They assert that Chapter 980 discharge proceedings are 
separately governed by their own set of rules and procedures.  
Alger and Knipfer also note that a Chapter 980 discharge 
petition must allege that the petitioner's condition has changed 
since being committed.  For these reasons, Alger and Knipfer 
assert that the Daubert evidentiary standard should apply to the 
State's expert testimony in their Chapter 980 discharge petition 
trials despite the fact that it did not apply to the initial 
commitment. 
¶24 Alger and Knipfer further argue that failing to apply 
the Daubert evidentiary standard to their Chapter 980 discharge 
petitions at issue results in the pre-Daubert standard applying 
to every discharge petition they might file during their present 
commitments, even those petitions filed decades after the 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
13 
 
Daubert standard was adopted.  They contend that the legislature 
did not intend that absurd result.11   
¶25 The State argues that the Daubert evidentiary standard 
does not apply to expert testimony in Alger's and Knipfer's 
Chapter 980 discharge petition trials.  The State responds that 
a Chapter 980 discharge petition does not "commence" an "action" 
or a "special proceeding."  Instead, according to the State, a 
discharge petition seeks relief from a Chapter 980 commitment.  
The State asserts that applying the pre-Daubert standard to 
Chapter 980 discharge petitions filed years after the Daubert 
standard was adopted would not be absurd because when a court 
reviews a Chapter 980 discharge petition, it may consider 
evidence that was admitted in a commitment hearing or prior 
discharge hearing under the pre-Daubert standard.  The State 
                                                 
11 Knipfer makes an additional argument that the Daubert 
evidentiary standard should apply to expert testimony at his 
Chapter 980 discharge petition trial because amendments to 
procedural rules generally apply retroactively.  E.g., Trinity 
Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶40, 302 
Wis. 2d 299, 735 N.W.2d 1 ("The general, well-recognized rule in 
Wisconsin jurisprudence is that 'if  a statute is procedural or  
remedial, rather than substantive, the statute is generally 
given retroactive application.'") (quoting Gutter v. Seamandel, 
103 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 308 N.W.2d 403 (1981)).  However, that 
general rule is inapplicable if the amendment's text explains 
when the new rule first applies.  See id., ¶¶34-39.  In the 
present cases, that general rule is inapplicable because the 
legislature explained that the Daubert standard would "first 
apply to actions or special proceedings that are commenced on 
the effective date of this subsection."  2011 Wis. Act 2, 
§ 45(5).  
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
14 
 
rejects the notion that the pre-Daubert standard was so 
deficient that its continued application would be absurd.  
¶26 We conclude that the Daubert evidentiary standard 
under Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) does not apply to expert testimony 
in Alger's and Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge petition trials 
because their Chapter 980 discharge petitions did not "commence" 
"actions" or "special proceedings."  Instead, the discharge 
petitions are part of the underlying Chapter 980 commitments 
that occurred several years before the Daubert standard's 
initial applicability on February 1, 2011.  
¶27 In analyzing the arguments, we must first define the 
relevant 
words: 
"commence," 
"actions," 
and 
"special 
proceedings."12  
In Alger, the court of appeals defined 
"commence" as "'begin; start[.]'"  Alger, 352 Wis. 2d 145, ¶12 
(quoting 
New 
Oxford 
American 
Dictionary 
343 
(2001)).  
"Accordingly, Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) first applies to [actions 
or special proceedings] begun or started on February 1, 2011."  
Id.  We agree. 
¶28 "'An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of 
justice by which a party prosecutes another for the enforcement 
or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, 
or the punishment of a public offense.'"  Ruediger v. Sheedy, 83 
Wis. 2d 109, 121, 264 N.W.2d 604 (1978) (quoting State ex rel. 
Ashley v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee Cnty., 219 Wis. 38, 43, 
                                                 
12 See supra note 7. 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
15 
 
261 N.W. 737 (1935)).  The word "action" "refer[s] to an entire 
proceeding, not to one or more parts within a proceeding."  
State ex rel. Henderson v. Raemisch, 2010 WI App 114, ¶22, 329 
Wis. 2d 109, 790 N.W.2d 242.  "The word 'action' in the 
Wisconsin statutes denotes the entire controversy at issue."  
Id., ¶23 (emphasis added) (quoting Gowan v. McClure, 185 
Wis. 2d 903, 912, 519 N.W.2d 692 (Ct. App. 1994)) (quotation 
marks omitted); see also id. (stating that "action" "refers to 
an entire proceeding, lawsuit or controversy").  For example, a 
motion to establish paternity is not an action.  DiBenedetto v. 
Jaskolski, 2003 WI App 70, ¶¶25-26, 261 Wis. 2d 723, 661 
N.W.2d 869.  Similarly, a probate matter is not an action.  See 
Estate of Stoeber v. Pierce, 36 Wis. 2d 448, 452, 153 N.W.2d 599 
(1967). 
¶29 A special proceeding, like an action, is a stand-alone 
proceeding that is not part of an existing case.  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1398 (10th ed. 2014) (A special proceeding is "[a] 
proceeding that can be commenced independently of a pending 
action 
and 
from 
which 
a 
final 
order 
may 
be 
appealed 
immediately."); 
Wellens 
v. 
Kahl 
Ins. 
Agency, 
Inc., 
145 
Wis. 2d 66, 69, 426 N.W.2d 41 (Ct. App. 1988) ("[A] special 
proceeding [is] one occurring entirely outside the underlying 
action . . . ."); Ryder v. Soc'y Ins., 211 Wis. 2d 617, 619, 565 
N.W.2d 277 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1084 
(5th ed. 1979); Voss v. Stoll, 141 Wis. 267, 271, 124 N.W. 89 
(1910)) ("Special proceedings [do] not include matters that 
[are] incident to an existing action.").  Examples of special 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
16 
 
proceedings include a stand-alone proceeding for contempt or to 
condemn land, Wellens, 145 Wis. 2d at 69; a non-party's motion 
to intervene, id.; a voluntary assignment for the benefit of 
creditors, 
Wisconsin 
Brick 
& 
Block 
Corp. 
v. 
Vogel, 
54 
Wis. 2d 321, 324-25, 195 N.W.2d 664 (1972); and a proceeding to 
obtain discovery of books.  Ernst v. The Steamer "Brooklyn", 24 
Wis. 616, 616-17 (1869). These examples demonstrate how a 
special proceeding involves a separate filing outside of an 
action.  
¶30 By contrast, the following are not deemed to be 
special proceedings: a motion for costs and attorney fees, 
Ryder, 211 Wis. 2d at 619; a motion to vacate a judgment on the 
ground of excusable neglect, Wellens, 145 Wis. 2d at 70; and a 
party's motion to make a non-party into a party.  State v. 
Wisconsin Tel. Co., 134 Wis. 335, 341, 113 N.W. 944 (1907).  
Similarly, a motion for postconviction relief "is a part of the 
original criminal action," and "is not a separate proceeding."  
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(2).  All of these examples are neither 
actions nor special proceedings but rather, involve a filing 
made within an action.  
¶31 In light of the foregoing definitions and examples, 
Alger's and Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge petitions do not 
"commence" an "action" or a "special proceeding" because the 
discharge 
petitions 
could 
not 
exist 
without 
the 
initial 
commitments and are "a part of" the initial commitments.  Hence, 
even though the requests for discharge are seeking relief from 
commitments, the requests are necessarily dependent on and 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
17 
 
tethered to the original commitments.  A discharge petition does 
not "start" or "begin" an "action" or a "special proceeding" but 
rather, it is more akin to a motion within an existing matter.  
A discharge proceeding is "incident to an existing action" and 
does not stand alone or exist "entirely outside the original 
action."  See Ryder, 211 Wis. 2d at 619; Wellens, 145 Wis. 2d at 
69.  Instead, Alger's and Knipfer's discharge petitions are a 
part of the "entire controversy at issue," the underlying 
Chapter 980 commitments.  See Henderson, 329 Wis. 2d 109, ¶23.  
The analogy between a Chapter 980 discharge petition and a 
motion for postconviction relief is particularly apt as each 
seeks relief from a final order without directly challenging the 
final order.  See Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1), (2); Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09(1).  A Chapter 980 discharge petition, like a motion 
for postconviction relief, does not "commence" an "action" or a 
"special proceeding." 
¶32 Stated differently, a Chapter 980 discharge petition 
is necessarily tied to the underlying petition for commitment 
and commitment order in multiple ways.  Because a Chapter 980 
discharge petition seeks discharge from commitment, a Chapter 
980 discharge petition cannot exist unless a person was 
committed in a Chapter 980 action.  See State v. Arends, 2010 WI 
46, ¶15, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 784 N.W.2d 513 ("If the State wishes to 
commit a sexually violent offender, it must file a [commitment] 
petition . . . .").  A valid Chapter 980 commitment order cannot 
otherwise be terminated without a court order discharging that 
person from commitment; such discharge orders most often result 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
18 
 
from a discharge petition and trial.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 980.06, 
980.09; Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶17, 33 n.19.  Rather than being 
a discrete action or proceeding that ends with a commitment 
order, a Chapter 980 commitment action is an ongoing process 
that potentially extends far beyond the original commitment 
order.  
¶33 Further, the Chapter 980 discharge petition process 
necessarily relates back to the prior proceedings in the initial 
court file.  For example, a Chapter 980 discharge petition must 
allege facts that suggest that the petitioner's "condition has 
changed since the most recent order denying a petition for 
discharge after a hearing on the merits, or since the date of 
his or her initial commitment order if the person has never 
received a hearing on the merits of a discharge petition," such 
that he or she is no longer a sexually violent person.  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(1) (2013-14) (emphases added).  When reviewing a 
Chapter 980 discharge petition, a "court may consider the 
record, including evidence introduced at the initial commitment 
trial or the most recent trial on a petition for discharge, 
[and] any current or past [annual reexamination] reports filed 
under s. 980.07 . . . ."13  Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) (2013-14) 
(emphases added).  
                                                 
13 Every 12 months after a person has been committed under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 
980, 
the 
Department 
of 
Health 
Services 
("Department") must reexamine the person and make a report of 
the reexamination.  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1), (2).  During the 
annual reexamination, the Department must also make a report on 
the person's treatment progress.  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(4).  The 
(continued) 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
19 
 
¶34 Moreover, the court that originally committed a person 
under Chapter 980 retains administrative authority over that 
person during the period of commitment.  For example, the 
committing court may order the committed person to be reexamined 
at any time.  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(3).  The committing court 
receives copies of the Department of Health Services' annual 
reexamination report and progress treatment report on the 
committed person.14  See Wis. Stat. § 980.07(6)(a) (2013-14).  
Every petition for supervised release or discharge must be 
submitted to the committing court.  Wis. Stat. §§ 980.08(1), 
980.09(1).  After receiving a petition for supervised release, 
the 
committing 
court 
appoints 
an 
expert 
to 
examine 
the 
petitioner and holds a hearing on the petition.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(3)(a), (4)(a) (2013-14).  The committing court also 
reviews 
a 
discharge 
petition 
and 
oversees 
any 
necessary 
discharge hearing or trial.  § 980.09(1), (2), (3).  Each of 
these proceedings is part and parcel of the initial Chapter 980 
action rather than the commencement of an action or a special 
proceeding. 
¶35 The foregoing discussion demonstrates that a Chapter 
980 discharge petition does not "commence" an "action" or a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Department must submit each reexamination report and treatment 
progress 
report 
to 
the 
committing 
court. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.07(6)(a) (2013-14). The committing court may order a 
reexamination at any time while the person is committed.  
§ 980.07(3). 
14 See supra note 13 for a discussion of these reports. 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
20 
 
"special proceeding," but rather, it is more akin to a motion or 
petition in an existing action.  A Chapter 980 discharge 
petition does not seek relief independently of the "entire 
controversy" of the underlying commitment.  Therefore, a Chapter 
980 discharge petition is part of the underlying commitment 
action and does not "commence" an "action" or a "special 
proceeding."  See Henderson, 329 Wis. 2d 109, ¶23 (The word 
"action" 
"refers 
to 
an 
entire 
proceeding, 
lawsuit 
or 
controversy."); Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (10th ed. 2014) (A 
special proceeding "can be commenced independently of a pending 
action . . . .").  Stated differently, a Chapter 980 discharge 
petition is neither a separate "action" nor is it a "special 
proceeding" because it does not "occur[] entirely outside the 
underlying [Chapter 980] action."  See Wellens, 145 Wis. 2d at 
69. 
¶36 We also disagree with Alger and Knipfer that failing 
to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to the State's expert 
testimony in their Chapter 980 discharge petition trials is an 
absurd result that the legislature did not intend.  First, the 
plain language of 2011 Wisconsin Act 2, § 45(5) states that the 
Daubert 
standard 
first 
applies 
to 
"actions" 
or 
"special 
proceedings" "commenced" on February 1, 2011.  Second, the pre-
Daubert standard was not so deficient that its continued 
application to Alger's and Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge 
petition trials would be absurd.  Alger and Knipfer opine that 
the Daubert standard is an entirely new and higher standard for 
expert opinions to be admissible.  If it is as Alger and Knipfer 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
21 
 
suggest applying the Daubert standard could inject significant 
confusion and difficulty in review of the original Chapter 980 
commitment because it would confound competing standards.  
Specifically, the post-Daubert experts would be reviewing, in 
part, the pre-Daubert expert opinions to render an opinion as to 
whether the committed person's condition has changed such that 
he or she is no longer a sexually violent person.  
¶37 The reality is that this kind of expert testimony 
offered at a Chapter 980 hearing or trial may be admissible 
regardless of which standard applies.  See Fed. R. Evid. 702 
advisory committee's notes (2000 amendments) ("A review of the 
caselaw after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert 
testimony is the exception rather than the rule.  Daubert did 
not work a 'seachange over federal evidence law . . . .'") 
(quoting United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land Situated in 
Leflore Cnty., Miss., 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996)).  For 
example, the testimony offered in the cases at issue is from 
licensed psychologists who hold doctoral degrees.  Even pre-
Daubert, circuit courts served a gate-keeping function.  The 
pre-Daubert standard required that (1) expert testimony assist 
the trier of fact; (2) expert testimony be based on "scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge"; and (3) an expert be 
qualified 
"by 
knowledge, 
skill, 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education."  Wis. Stat. § 907.02 (2009-10).  Post-Daubert, the 
expert testimony at issue would be subject to an additional 
"reliability" component.  But a hearing is not always required 
for expert testimony to be admitted under the Daubert standard. 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
22 
 
Daniel D. Blinka, The Daubert Standard in Wisconsin: A Primer, 
Wis. Lawyer, Mar. 2011 (citing United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 
105, 110-11 (1st Cir. 2009)).  Contrary to Alger's and Knipfer's 
suggestion, the State's expert testimony is not the kind of 
"junk science" that is rejected by the Daubert standard. 
¶38 Accordingly, we conclude that the Daubert evidentiary 
standard in Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) does not apply to the expert 
testimony in Alger's and Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge 
petition trials.  
 
C. Whether the Failure to Apply the Daubert Evidentiary 
Standard to Alger's and Knipfer's Chapter 980 Discharge 
Petitions Violates Equal Protection and Due Process 
¶39 To determine the merits of an equal protection claim 
or a substantive due process claim,15 we must first determine 
which 
level 
of 
judicial 
scrutiny 
applies. 
 
Smith, 
323 
Wis. 2d 377, ¶12.  If the challenged legislation neither 
implicates a fundamental right nor discriminates against a 
                                                 
15 Knipfer alleges violations of substantive and procedural 
due process.  "Under a procedural due process analysis, we must 
determine first whether there exists a liberty interest of which 
the individual has been deprived, and if so, whether the 
procedures 
used 
to 
deprive 
that 
liberty 
interest 
were 
constitutionally sufficient."  
West, 336 Wis. 2d 578, ¶83 
(citing Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 
(1989)).  Although Knipfer has a protectable liberty interest in 
freedom from bodily restraint, id., ¶85, he has no protectable 
interest in the Daubert evidentiary standard.  See Brown v. 
Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 616 (7th Cir. 2010).  Therefore, the 
failure to apply the Daubert standard to Knipfer's Chapter 980 
discharge petition does not violate his right to procedural due 
process.  See West, 336 Wis. 2d 578, ¶89.  Alger does not rely 
on due process at all.  Accordingly, our analysis will focus on 
substantive due process and equal protection. 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
23 
 
suspect class, we apply rational basis review rather than strict 
scrutiny to the legislation.16  Id.  A law subject to strict 
scrutiny will be upheld "only if narrowly tailored 'to serve a 
compelling state interest.'"  State v. Mary F.-R., 2013 WI 92, 
¶35, 351 Wis. 2d 273, 839 N.W.2d 581 (quoting City of Cleburne, 
Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).  We 
will uphold legislation under rational basis review "unless it 
is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to a 
legitimate government interest."  Smith, 323 Wis. 2d 377, ¶12 
(quoting State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131, 447 N.W.2d 654 
(1989)) (quotation marks omitted).   
1. Which Level of Judicial Scrutiny Applies? 
¶40 Knipfer17 argues that strict scrutiny applies to the 
failure to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to expert 
testimony in his Chapter 980 discharge petition trial because 
                                                 
16 A law that implicates a fundamental right is not 
necessarily subject to strict scrutiny.  Whether strict scrutiny 
applies sometimes depends on the degree to which the law burdens 
a fundamental right.  See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 
(1992) (strict scrutiny applies to "'severe' restrictions" on 
the fundamental right to vote, and rational basis review applies 
to "'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions'" on that right) 
(citations omitted); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-88 
(1978) (rational basis review applies to "reasonable regulations 
that do not significantly interfere with" the fundamental right 
to 
marry, 
and 
strict 
scrutiny 
applies 
to 
a 
law 
that 
"significantly interferes" with that right) (citations omitted).  
17 The court of appeals held that Alger conceded that 
rational basis review applies.  See Alger, 352 Wis. 2d 145, ¶25. 
Our strict scrutiny and rational basis analysis applies to Alger 
and Knipfer alike. 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
24 
 
Chapter 980 commitment implicates his fundamental right to 
freedom from bodily restraint.  Knipfer relies on cases where 
courts "assumed, without deciding" that strict scrutiny applied 
to claims challenging the constitutionality of aspects of 
Chapter 980 commitment.  See State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶91, 336 
Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929; State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 
321, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995); State v. Williams, 2001 WI App 263, 
¶11, 249 Wis. 2d 1, 637 N.W.2d 791. Knipfer also relies on 
Foucha v. Louisiana, where the Supreme Court stated that 
involuntary 
civil 
commitment 
implicates 
an 
individual's 
"fundamental" right to freedom from bodily restraint.  Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).  Knipfer does not argue that 
a suspect class has been discriminated against. 
¶41 The State argues that rational basis review applies 
because the failure to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to 
expert testimony in Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge petition 
trial does not implicate a fundamental right or discriminate 
against a suspect class.  The State relies on Mary F.-R., where 
we applied rational basis review to a challenge against the use 
of a non-unanimous six-person jury in a Wis. Stat. ch. 51 
commitment hearing.  
¶42 We conclude that rational basis review applies to 
Alger's and Knipfer's constitutional claims because the failure 
to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to expert testimony in 
a Chapter 980 discharge petition trial does not implicate a 
fundamental right.  Our decision in Mary F.-R. is instructive.  
In that case, a circuit court ordered Mary F.-R. to be 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
25 
 
involuntarily committed under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 for treatment 
for her mental illness after a six-person jury unanimously found 
that she qualified for such commitment.  Mary F.-R., 351 
Wis. 2d 273, ¶¶2, 6.  Mary F.-R. appealed the commitment order.  
Before this court, she argued that § 51.20(11) violated her 
right to equal protection because it authorized Chapter 51 
commitment based on a six-person non-unanimous jury verdict.  
Id., ¶2.  Her equal protection claim rested on the fact that 
potential Wis. Stat. ch. 51 committed persons were treated 
differently than potential Wis. Stat. ch. 980 committed persons 
because the latter persons had a statutory right to a unanimous 
12-person jury at their commitment hearings.  Id., ¶¶1-2.  Mary 
F.-R. argued that this court should apply strict scrutiny to 
§ 51.20(11) 
because 
Chapter 
51 
commitment 
implicates 
her 
fundamental right to freedom from bodily restraint.  Id., ¶36. 
¶43 We held that rational basis review was the appropriate 
level of judicial scrutiny.  Id., ¶38.  We recognized that 
"liberty is a fundamental right," id. (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. 
at 86), and "involuntary civil commitment is a 'significant 
deprivation of liberty.'"  Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418, 425 (1979)).  However, rational basis review applied 
because "Mary F.–R.'s challenge relate[d] only to the jury 
procedures available for initial commitment hearings under Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20 and not to the use of involuntary commitments in 
general."  Id.  "There is no right to a 12–person jury in civil 
proceedings such as here."  Id. (citing State v. Huebner, 2000 
WI 59, ¶¶17-19, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727).  Mary F.-R. 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
26 
 
did not argue that the challenged legislation discriminated 
against a suspect class.  Id. 
¶44 Like in Mary F.-R., rational basis review applies in 
the present cases because the challenged legislation does not 
implicate the fundamental right to freedom from bodily restraint 
and there is no fundamental right to a particular evidentiary 
standard.  Like Mary F.-R., Knipfer does not challenge "the use 
of involuntary commitments in general."  Id.  Instead, Knipfer 
challenges 
the 
unavailability 
of 
the 
Daubert 
evidentiary 
standard in his Chapter 980 discharge petition trial. Knipfer 
has no constitutional right to have the Daubert evidentiary 
standard apply.  Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 616 (7th Cir. 
2010).  Knipfer argues that strict scrutiny applies because 
"evidentiary standards . . . directly impact the substantive 
nature of the evidence that can ultimately be submitted and 
considered by the finder of fact."  If Knipfer were correct, 
then every evidentiary ruling in a Chapter 980 hearing or trial 
could be subject to strict scrutiny.  Precedent and the fact 
that deference is due to a circuit court's evidentiary ruling 
would militate otherwise.  See State v. Mark, 2006 WI 78, ¶35, 
292 Wis. 2d 1, 718 N.W.2d 90 (stating that a circuit court's 
evidentiary ruling, even in a Chapter 980 proceeding, is 
generally reviewed under a deferential standard).  Although 
Chapter 980 involuntary commitment implicates the right to 
freedom from bodily restraint, the availability of the Daubert 
evidentiary standard in a Chapter 980 proceeding does not 
implicate that right so as to trigger strict scrutiny.  See Mary 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
27 
 
F.-R., 351 Wis. 2d 273, ¶38.  There is no right to a particular 
evidentiary ruling in a Chapter 980 discharge petition trial.  
¶45 Knipfer's reasons for distinguishing Mary F.-R. are 
unpersuasive. 
 
First, 
he 
argues 
that 
Mary 
F.-R. 
is 
distinguishable because the Daubert evidentiary standard, unlike 
a six-person, non-unanimous jury, directly impacts the right to 
physical liberty that is at stake in a commitment proceeding.  
He contends that the evidence considered by a jury more directly 
impacts the outcome of a commitment proceeding than the size or 
unanimity 
of 
a 
jury 
does. 
 
We 
reject 
this 
basis 
for 
distinguishing Mary F.-R.  Knipfer does not persuade us that the 
pre-Daubert standard more directly impacts his liberty interest 
in a discharge trial than Mary F.-R. being tried by a non-
unanimous, six-person jury in an original commitment trial.  
Indeed, the jury standard at issue in Mary F.-R. is more closely 
related to the liberty interest at stake in an original 
commitment proceeding than in a discharge trial.  Moreover, that 
jury standard, under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11), applies only to 
commitment proceedings brought under Wis. Stat. ch. 51, whereas 
the Daubert standard is a rule of evidence which is generally 
applicable in all proceedings, whether civil or criminal.  
¶46 Knipfer's other ground for distinguishing Mary F.-R. 
and applying strict scrutiny is that the law at issue in Mary 
F.-R. differentiated between two groups that were not similarly 
situated (Chapter 51 committed persons and Chapter 980 committed 
persons), whereas the law at issue here differentiates between 
two groups that are similarly situated (persons whose Chapter 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
28 
 
980 commitment was initiated before February 1, 2011, and 
persons whose Chapter 980 commitment was initiated on or after 
that date).  We also disagree with this argument for applying 
strict scrutiny because strict scrutiny does not apply if 
neither a fundamental right is implicated nor a suspect class is 
discriminated against.  See Smith, 323 Wis. 2d 377, ¶12.  A 
court 
determines 
whether 
differently-treated 
groups 
are 
similarly situated and hence, whether equal protection is 
violated, by applying a particular level of judicial scrutiny.  
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-18 (1982); Mary F.-R., 351 
Wis. 2d 273, ¶55 ("'[W]hen properly understood and applied, 
"similarly situated" is another way of stating the fundamental 
values of the Equal Protection Clause.'") (quoting Giovanna 
Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 581, 615 
(2011)); Smith, 323 Wis. 2d 377, ¶15 ("The equal protection 
clause . . . 'is designed to assure that those who are similarly 
situated will be treated similarly.'") (quoting Treiber v. 
Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 68, 398 N.W.2d 756 (1987)).  
¶47 Knipfer's reliance on cases where courts applied 
strict scrutiny in the Chapter 980 context requires further 
explanation.  The cases relied upon by Knipfer challenged 
procedural aspects of Chapter 980 commitment which directly 
impacted one's right to freedom from bodily restraint, whereas 
the application of a particular rule of evidence is much further 
removed from that direct impact on restraint of freedom.  See 
West, 336 Wis. 2d 578, ¶5 (challenging law that placed burden of 
proof on committed person seeking supervised release); Post, 197 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
29 
 
Wis. 2d at 
292-93 
(challenging 
Chapter 
980 
commitment 
in 
general); 
Williams, 
249 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶¶2-3 
(challenging 
prohibition on filing a petition for supervised release within 
first 18 months of commitment).  Further, the courts in those 
cases "assumed, without deciding" that strict scrutiny was the 
appropriate 
level 
of 
judicial 
scrutiny 
for 
those 
equal 
protection claims.  See West, 336 Wis. 2d 578, ¶¶91-99; Post, 
197 Wis. 2d at 321; Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 1, ¶11.18  Such an 
assumption is hardly a conclusion that strict scrutiny is the 
applicable standard in the cases at issue.  In the present 
cases, rational basis review is appropriate because the Daubert 
standard is a generally applicable rule of evidence that does 
not 
directly 
impact 
one's 
right 
to 
freedom 
from 
bodily 
restraint.  See Mary F.-R., 351 Wis. 2d 273, ¶38. 
¶48 In sum, we hold that rational basis review applies to 
Knipfer's equal protection and substantive due process claims 
and to Alger's equal protection claim. 
2. Whether Rational Basis Review Is Satisfied 
¶49 Our analysis applying rational basis review is the 
same for Knipfer's substantive due process claim as for Alger's 
                                                 
18 Knipfer asserts that this court in State v. Post held, 
rather than assumed without deciding, that strict scrutiny 
applied to a substantive due process claim challenging ch. 980 
commitment in general.  See State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 302, 
541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).  However, even if that interpretation of 
Post is correct, strict scrutiny does not apply in the present 
cases because the failure to apply the Daubert evidentiary 
standard to a Chapter 980 discharge petition does not directly 
impact a fundamental right. 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
30 
 
and 
Knipfer's 
equal 
protection 
claims. 
 
See 
Smith, 
323 
Wis. 2d 377, ¶¶12, 16.  To resolve the substantive due process 
and equal protection claims, we must determine whether a 
legitimate governmental interest is rationally furthered by the 
failure to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to Alger's and 
Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge petitions.  See id., ¶12. 
¶50 Rational 
basis 
review 
is 
deferential 
to 
the 
legislature.  Id., ¶17.  A legislative classification satisfies 
rational basis review if "'any reasonably conceivable state of 
facts . . . could 
provide 
a 
rational 
basis 
for 
the 
classification.'"  Mary F.-R., 351 Wis. 2d 273, ¶52 (quoting 
F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).  The 
legislature need not have actually based its decision on the 
reason conceived by a reviewing court.  Id. (citing Beach 
Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 315).  Alger and Knipfer bear the "high 
burden" of proving that the failure to apply the Daubert 
evidentiary standard to expert testimony in their Chapter 980 
discharge 
petition 
trials 
is 
unconstitutional 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt.  Smith, 323 Wis. 2d 377, ¶18.  
¶51 Alger and Knipfer19 argue that the failure to apply the 
Daubert evidentiary standard to expert testimony in their 
Chapter 980 discharge petition trials violates equal protection 
because 
it 
arbitrarily 
differentiates 
between 
discharge 
                                                 
19 Although Knipfer argues that we should apply strict 
scrutiny, he also argues that he should prevail even if we apply 
rational basis review. 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
31 
 
proceedings 
based 
upon 
when 
their 
underlying 
commitment 
proceedings began.  Alger and Knipfer provide a hypothetical 
scenario in which the State files a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
commitment petition against Person A in January 2011 and files 
one against Person B in February 2011.  Under this hypothetical 
scenario, both of these persons are committed and have discharge 
proceedings at the same time as each other.  Alger and Knipfer 
argue that it would be unconstitutionally arbitrary to apply the 
Daubert standard to the discharge proceedings of Person B while 
applying the pre-Daubert standard to the discharge proceedings 
of Person A.  
¶52 In his brief, "Alger concedes the state did have a 
legitimate interest in seeking to prevent the revision of [Wis. 
Stat. §] 907.02 from applying 'midstream' to litigation that was 
already pending (or even concluded) at the time this legislation 
was enacted."  Alger argues that, in such litigation, attorneys 
would have prepared expert testimony in reliance on the pre-
Daubert standard that was then in place.  Because applying the 
Daubert standard to such litigation would be unfair and 
disruptive and would waste judicial resources, Alger concedes 
that the legislature lawfully prohibited application of the 
Daubert standard to such litigation.  Similarly, Knipfer admits 
that "the legislature might have had a valid reason not to 
extend the Daubert standard to pending litigation insofar as 
litigants may have already relied upon the [pre-Daubert] 
standard in filing pleadings and preparing for trial." 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
32 
 
¶53 However, Alger and Knipfer contend, the reasons for 
refusing to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard "midstream" 
to pending litigation do not apply to their Chapter 980 
discharge petition trials.  Alger and Knipfer reason that, 
because they filed their discharge petitions after the Daubert 
standard's first date of applicability, they and the State did 
not prepare any expert testimony for their discharge petition 
trials in reliance on the pre-Daubert standard.  Alger and 
Knipfer therefore argue that the failure to apply the Daubert 
standard to expert testimony in their discharge petition trials 
is not rationally related to achieving a legitimate governmental 
interest.  
¶54 The State argues that the failure to apply the Daubert 
evidentiary 
standard 
to 
expert 
testimony 
in 
Alger's 
and 
Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge 
petition trials satisfies 
rational basis review and is therefore constitutional.  The 
State argues that the legislature had to draw the line somewhere 
and the line it drew has a rational basis.  The State reasons 
that the legislature's application of the Daubert standard to 
"actions" and "special proceedings" commenced on or after 
February 1, 2011, promoted efficiency and predictability and 
avoided difficulties involved with a rule that allows for 
retroactive application of the Daubert standard.    
¶55 We hold that the legislature's decision to apply the 
Daubert 
evidentiary 
standard 
to 
"actions" 
or 
"special 
proceedings" "commenced" on or after February 1, 2011, satisfies 
rational basis review and therefore is constitutional.  Alger 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
33 
 
correctly 
concedes 
that 
ensuring 
the 
fair 
treatment 
of 
litigants, avoiding the disruption of pending litigation, and 
preserving 
judicial 
resources 
are 
legitimate 
governmental 
interests.  See State ex rel. Schatz v. McCaughtry, 2003 WI 80, 
¶43, 263 Wis. 2d 83, 664 N.W.2d 596 ("The State has a legitimate 
interest in . . . preserving judicial resources.") (citing State 
ex rel. Khan v. Sullivan, 2000 WI App 109, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 260, 
613 N.W.2d 203).  See also supra ¶¶36-37 (noting that applying 
the Daubert standard to Alger's and Knipfer's Chapter 980 
discharge petitions could have caused confusion and difficulty). 
¶56 Further, the legislature's decision to apply the 
Daubert 
evidentiary 
standard 
to 
"actions" 
or 
"special 
proceedings" "commenced" on or after February 1, 2011, is 
rationally related to achieving those legitimate governmental 
interests.  The legislature could have rationally believed that 
retroactively applying a new rule of evidence to pending 
litigation 
would 
be 
unfair 
to 
litigants, 
waste 
judicial 
resources, and disrupt that litigation by resulting in motions, 
appeals, and retrials.  See Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 
201, 
531 
N.W.2d 70 
(1995) 
(explaining 
that 
"retroactive 
legislation presents unique constitutional problems in that it 
often 
unsettles 
important 
rights" 
and 
may 
result 
in 
"unfairness").  
¶57 When determining which cases will be subject to a new 
rule of evidence, the legislature is not constitutionally 
required to differentiate between various types of cases and 
retroactively apply the new rule to some types of cases and not 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
34 
 
others.  Instead, the legislature may differentiate between 
cases that were commenced before and after a particular date and 
may apply the new rule of evidence to only cases that were 
commenced after that date.  See Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. 
Rhodes, 220 U.S. 502, 505 (1911) ("[T]he 14th Amendment does not 
forbid statutes and statutory changes to have a beginning, and 
thus to discriminate between the rights of an earlier and later 
time."); Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wis. Tax Comm'n, 198 Wis. 
368, 373, 224 N.W. 121 (1929) (upholding a law that applied a 
higher interest rate to tax deficiencies that were assessed 
before 1927 than to those assessed in or after 1927); Montgomery 
Ward & Co. v. DOR, 142 Wis. 2d 772, 778-82, 419 N.W.2d 348 (Ct. 
App. 1987) (upholding a law that applied a higher interest rate 
to tax deficiencies that were assessed on or after August 1, 
1981, than to tax deficiencies that were assessed before that 
date).  Therefore, in the present cases, the legislature's 
decision to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to "actions" 
and "special proceedings" that were commenced on or after 
February 1, 2011, survives constitutional scrutiny.  See Banas 
v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 468, 473, 149 N.W.2d 571 (1967) (The 
legislature has the "power to make reasonable rules for limiting 
the admission of evidence and to make valid classifications of 
people for that purpose.").  
¶58 We also conclude that application of the Daubert 
evidentiary standard to these Chapter 980 discharge petition 
trials is a "midstream" application of that standard to pending 
litigation.  Alger's and Knipfer's contrary conclusion is based 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
35 
 
on the mistaken premise that the only expert testimony relevant 
to their Chapter 980 discharge petitions is the expert testimony 
proffered at their discharge petition trials.  But we have 
already concluded that a Chapter 980 discharge petition is part 
of a pending commitment action.  As we explained earlier, when 
reviewing a Chapter 980 discharge petition, a court often 
considers expert testimony from a prior discharge proceeding or 
the initial commitment trial.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1), (2).  
The State's experts at Alger's and Knipfer's original Chapter 
980 
commitment 
trials 
were 
not 
subject 
to 
the 
Daubert 
evidentiary standard.  The Daubert standard did not apply to any 
previous proceeding in Alger's and Knipfer's cases.  However, a 
Chapter 980 discharge petition requires that an expert render an 
opinion based in part upon the previous determination of 
continued commitment.  The fact that a petition for discharge 
requires an expert to evaluate and review prior expert opinions 
and whether commitment is still warranted, militates in favor 
of, not against, having the same legal standard apply.  Thus, we 
reject Alger's and Knipfer's contention that their Chapter 980 
discharge petitions were not part of a pending action that could 
be disrupted by "midstream" application of a new rule of 
evidence.20  Moreover, as was previously discussed, this kind of 
                                                 
20 Even if a Chapter 980 commitment is unlike other types of 
pending litigation that could be disrupted by "midstream" 
application of a new rule of evidence, the legislature's 
decision to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to "actions" 
or "special proceedings" commenced on or after February 1, 2011, 
is still constitutional under rational basis review.  A 
(continued) 
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
36 
 
expert testimony in a Chapter 980 case will often meet the 
Daubert standard even though it was admitted under the pre-
Daubert standard.  See supra ¶37. 
¶59 Our 
rejection 
of 
Alger's 
and 
Knipfer's 
equal 
protection challenges and Knipfer's substantive due process 
challenge is even supported by cases in which Wisconsin courts 
upheld changes to Chapter 980 procedures under strict scrutiny.  
See West, 336 Wis. 2d 578, ¶¶98-99 (upholding a statute that 
placed the burden of proof on a Chapter 980 committed person who 
petitions for supervised release); Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20 
(upholding an 18-month waiting period for petitioning for 
supervised release).  We conclude that the failure to apply the 
Daubert evidentiary standard to expert testimony at Alger's and 
Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge petition trials satisfies 
rational basis review.  Further, the petitioners in Williams and 
West challenged unique procedures applicable to Chapter 980, 
whereas Alger's and Knipfer's challenges center on a generally 
applicable rule of evidence.  
¶60 In sum, we hold that the failure to apply the Daubert 
evidentiary 
standard 
to 
expert 
testimony 
in 
Alger's 
and 
Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge 
petition trials satisfies 
rational basis review, and therefore survives constitutional 
scrutiny.   
                                                                                                                                                             
legislative enactment can be rationally related to achieving a 
legitimate governmental interest even if it is overinclusive. 
See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979).  
Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578   
 
37 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶61 We conclude that the Daubert evidentiary standard 
under Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) does not apply to expert testimony 
in Alger's and Knipfer's Wis. Stat. ch. 980 discharge petition 
trials because their discharge petitions did not "commence" 
"actions" or "special proceedings."  The Daubert standard 
applies to "actions" or "special proceedings" commenced on or 
after February 1, 2011.  The original Chapter 980 commitments 
here began several years before the Daubert standard was 
adopted, and although Alger's and Knipfer's petitions seek 
relief from those original commitments, those filings do not 
constitute the "commencement" of an "action" or a "special 
proceeding."  We also conclude that because the legislature had 
a rational basis for not applying the Daubert evidentiary 
standard to expert testimony in post-Daubert Chapter 980 
discharge petitions that seek relief from pre-Daubert Chapter 
980 commitments, no violation of equal protection or due process 
occurred. 
By the Court.—The decisions of the court of appeals are 
affirmed. 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶62 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority disregards its own reasoning to reach a result its 
opinion does not support. 
¶63 It might be difficult to determine in some cases 
whether a particular proceeding is a special proceeding.1  
Nevertheless, when I apply the majority opinion's definition of 
a "special proceeding" to the instant cases, the most legally 
sound conclusion is that proceedings on a Chapter 980 petition 
for discharge are special proceedings. 
¶64 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.02(1) (2011-12) sets forth the 
Daubert standard for the admissibility of expert testimony.2  In 
enacting this statute, the legislature decreed that the Daubert 
standard first applies "to actions or special proceedings that 
are commenced on the effective date of this subsection [February 
1, 2011]."3 
¶65 Michael Alger and Ronald Knipfer, hereinafter referred 
to as the petitioners, filed Chapter 980 discharge petitions 
after February 1, 2011.  Thus, whether the Daubert standard 
applies to their discharge proceedings turns on whether these 
petitions "commenced" "actions" or "special proceedings" under 
                                                 
1 See Ernst v. The Steamer "Brooklyn", 24 Wis. 616, 617 
(1869) ("It may not be easy in all cases to determine what is a 
special proceeding."). 
2 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 
U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 2011 Wis. Act 2, § 45(5). 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
2 
 
the session law adopting the Daubert standard in Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.0(1).4 
¶66 All Chapter 980 proceedings are included in the 
Wisconsin 
Judicial 
Benchbook 
in 
its 
section 
on 
special 
proceedings.  After a careful examination of the definition of 
"special proceeding" in Black's Law Dictionary, which the 
majority opinion employs; the case law regarding special 
proceedings on which the majority opinion relies; the detailed 
provisions of Chapter 980 governing commitment proceedings and 
discharge proceedings; and the legislative purpose for adopting 
the Daubert standard, I conclude that the petitioners commenced 
special proceedings by filing their Chapter 980 petitions for 
discharge.  Thus, the Daubert standard should have been applied 
at the proceedings on the petitioners' discharge petitions.  The 
majority opinion's contrary conclusion is unpersuasive. 
¶67 Accordingly, I would remand the instant cases to their 
respective circuit courts to determine whether the challenged 
testimony satisfies the Daubert standard. 
I 
¶68 The majority opinion adopts the definition of "special 
proceeding" in Black's Law Dictionary:  "A proceeding that can 
be commenced independently of a pending action and from which a 
final order may be appealed immediately."5 
                                                 
4 See 2011 Wis. Act 2, § 45(5). 
5 Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (10th ed. 2014). 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶69 This definition contains two criteria.  First, a 
special proceeding "can be commenced independently of a pending 
action."6  Second, a special proceeding must result in a "final 
order" that can "be appealed immediately."7 
¶70 I apply this definition to proceedings on a Chapter 
980 discharge petition.  I begin with the second criterion:  
Special proceedings result in a final order that can be appealed 
immediately.   
¶71 Proceedings on a Chapter 980 discharge petition easily 
meet this second criterion.  A circuit court's decision granting 
or denying a Chapter 980 petition for discharge is, by statute, 
a final order that can be appealed immediately.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.095(3) ("Any party may appeal an order under this 
subsection as a final order under chs. 808 and 809."). 
¶72 I now turn to the first criterion in the definition:  
Special proceedings "can be commenced independently of a pending 
action."8 
¶73 There was no pending action when the petitions for 
discharge were filed in the instant cases.  After an individual 
has been adjudicated a "sexually violent person" and the circuit 
court has entered a judgment and commitment order, the original 
                                                 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
4 
 
Chapter 980 commitment proceedings are at an end.9  If the 
committed person wants to be discharged, the person must file a 
petition in the committing court.10  In other words, the 
commitment proceedings have ended by the time a petition for 
discharge is filed. 
¶74 I now tackle the phrase "commenced independently."  In 
the 
instant 
cases, 
this 
phrase 
must 
mean 
"commenced 
independently of the original commitment proceedings." 
¶75 The majority opinion concludes that proceedings on a 
Chapter 980 discharge petition are not commenced independently 
of the original commitment proceedings, but rather are part of 
the original commitment proceedings.11  This is where the 
majority opinion loses its way.  The majority opinion departs 
from its definition of "special proceeding" and does not adhere 
to the cases it cites in support of its position. 
                                                 
9 See Wis. Stat. § 980.05(5) ("If the court or jury 
determines that the person . . . is a sexually violent person, 
the court shall enter a judgment on that finding and shall 
commit the person as provided under s. 980.06. . . ."); Wis. 
Stat. § 980.06 ("If a court or jury determines that the person 
who is the subject of a petition under s. 908.02 is a sexually 
violent person, the court shall order the person to be committed 
to the custody of the department for control, care and 
treatment . . . ."). 
10 See Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1) ("A committed person may 
petition the committing court for discharge at any time.  The 
court shall deny the petition . . . unless the petition alleges 
facts from which the court or jury may conclude the person's 
condition has changed since the date of his or her initial 
commitment order . . . ."). 
11 Majority op., ¶¶26, 31. 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶76 The majority opinion cites several Wisconsin cases to 
provide examples of special proceedings.12  These cases do not 
support the majority opinion's application of the Black's Law 
Dictionary definition of "special proceeding" to the instant 
cases.  Rather, the cases cited by the majority opinion support 
the conclusion that proceedings on a Chapter 980 discharge 
petition are special proceedings.  See, for example, the 
following: 
• 
Ernst v. The Steamer "Brooklyn", 24 Wis. 616, 617 (1869), 
provides three examples of proceedings that are "readily 
recognized" as special proceedings:  "proceedings to 
attach for contempt, [proceedings] to obtain discovery of 
books, [and] proceedings supplementary to an execution."  
All 
three 
of 
these 
"readily 
recognized" 
special 
proceedings relate to an underlying action but are 
nevertheless treated as being commenced independently of 
any other action or proceeding. 
In a later case, Witter v. Lyon, 34 Wis. 564, 574 
(1874), the court reaffirmed the determination in Ernst 
that a proceeding "to obtain discovery of books" is a 
special proceeding.  The court expressly rejected the 
contention that "there can be no special proceeding which 
grows out of, or is connected with, a pending action."13 
                                                 
12 See majority op., ¶29. 
13 Witter v. Lyon, 34 Wis. 564, 574 (1874). 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
6 
 
• 
In Voss v. Stoll, 141 Wis. 267, 271, 124 N.W.2d 89, 
(1910), the court held that the proceeding required by 
statute to "revive" a case on behalf of a party who died 
after the case commenced is classified as a special 
proceeding.  The Voss court stated that "[t]he test to be 
applied in determining the nature of any judicial remedy, 
as regards whether it is a special proceeding, is whether 
it 
is 
a 
mere 
proceeding 
in 
an 
action, 
or 
one 
independent[] thereof or merely connected therewith."14 
Thus, as in Ernst and Witter, the Voss court 
acknowledged that special proceedings will often be 
"connected" with another proceeding. 
• 
In 
Wellens 
v. 
Kahl 
Insurance 
Agency, 
Inc., 
145 
Wis. 2d 66, 426 N.W.2d 41 (Ct. App. 1988), the court of 
appeals referred to contempt proceedings as special 
proceedings, just as this court did in Ernst.  A contempt 
proceeding is one in which a "court of record [] 
impose[s] a remedial or punitive sanction" for a person's 
misconduct or disobedience in a court proceeding.15  A 
contempt proceeding is therefore factually connected to a 
prior or pending action but is classified as a special 
proceeding. 
                                                 
14 Voss v. Stoll, 141 Wis. 267, 271, 124 N.W.2d 89 (1910) 
(emphasis added). 
15 See Wis. Stat. § 785.02 (regarding the power of the court 
to punish for contempt of court); see also Wis. Stat. § 785.01 
(defining "contempt of court"). 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
7 
 
• 
In Ryder v. Society Insurance, 211 Wis. 2d 617, 565 
N.W.2d 277 (Ct. App. 1997), the court of appeals stated 
that "[s]pecial proceedings include[] all remedies that 
[a]re not ordinary actions."  Chapter 980 petitions for 
discharge provide a remedy for institutionalized persons, 
and as we explain more fully later on, the legislature 
has 
established 
special 
rules 
applicable 
to 
these 
proceedings. 
The court of appeals in Ryder also stated that 
matters "incident to an existing action" are not special 
proceedings.16  Again, as we explain more fully later on, 
proceedings on a Chapter 980 discharge petition are, by 
statute, 
not 
incident 
to 
the 
original 
commitment 
proceedings.  Rather, they are separate and distinct 
proceedings. 
¶77 In sum, the case law demonstrates that proceedings 
this court has previously classified as special proceedings have 
a connection with prior or pending actions or proceedings but 
are nevertheless viewed as independent special proceedings. 
¶78 Furthermore, Chapter 980 makes clear that proceedings 
on a discharge petition are governed by a set of statutory rules 
and procedures different from (and independent of) those 
governing Chapter 980 commitment proceedings.  Moreover, the two 
proceedings examine the condition of the person at different 
times.  Thus, although proceedings on a Chapter 980 discharge 
                                                 
16 Ryder 
v. 
Society 
Ins., 
211 
Wis. 2d 617, 
619, 
565 
N.W.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1997). 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
8 
 
petition share a factual history with the original commitment 
proceedings, they are nevertheless independent of the commitment 
proceedings. 
¶79 The provisions of Chapter 980 relating to the initial 
commitment proceedings govern notice to the department of 
justice and district attorney;17 the contents and filing of a 
petition alleging that a person is sexually violent;18 the rights 
of persons subject to such petitions;19 examination of the person 
alleged to be sexually violent;20 change of the place of jury 
trial 
from 
another 
county;21 
"discovery 
and 
inspection";22 
detention, 
probable 
cause 
hearings, 
and 
transfer 
for 
examination;23 the commitment trial;24 commitment itself;25 and 
various other procedural matters.26 
¶80 In contrast, Wis. Stat. §§ 980.09 and 980.095 govern 
proceedings on a Chapter 980 discharge petition.  These 
provisions control the filing of a petition for discharge, its 
                                                 
17 Wis. Stat. § 980.015. 
18 Wis. Stat. § 980.02. 
19 Wis. Stat. § 980.03. 
20 Wis. Stat. § 980.031. 
21 Wis. Stat. § 980.034(1). 
22 Wis. Stat. § 980.036. 
23 Wis. Stat. § 980.04. 
24 Wis. Stat. § 980.05. 
25 Wis. Stat. § 980.06. 
26 Wis. Stat § 980.038. 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
9 
 
contents, the burden of proof, the appropriate methods for 
demanding and selecting a jury, receipt of a jury verdict and 
its effect, and the filing of postverdict motions and appeals 
from orders granting or denying discharge. 
¶81 The differences between commitment proceedings and 
proceedings on a petition for discharge are substantial and 
significant, demonstrating that proceedings on a discharge 
petition are separate from and independent of the initial 
commitment.  For example: 
• 
At the commitment proceedings, the State "has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
person . . . is [] sexually violent,"27 and a jury 
verdict on whether the State has met its burden "is 
not valid unless it is unanimous."28  In contrast, at a 
proceeding on a petition for discharge, the State "has 
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence 
that the person meets the criteria for commitment as a 
sexually violent person,"29 and agreement by just five 
of the six jurors is sufficient for a verdict.30 
• 
The person against whom a petition for involuntary 
commitment has been filed is automatically entitled to 
                                                 
27 Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a). 
28 Wis. Stat. § 980.03(3). 
29 Wis. Stat. § 980.09(3). 
30 Wis. Stat. § 980.095(1)(c). 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
10 
 
a jury trial,31 while a committed person who files a 
petition for discharge is entitled to a jury trial 
only if "the petition alleges facts from which the 
court or jury may conclude the person's condition has 
changed 
since 
the 
date 
of 
his 
or 
her 
initial 
commitment order . . . ."32 
• 
The focus at the original commitment proceedings is on 
the 
person's 
condition 
at 
the 
time 
of 
those 
proceedings.  The focus at discharge proceedings is on 
the committed person's condition at the time the 
discharge petition was filed.  The circumstances that 
existed at the time of commitment are no longer 
dispositive.   
• 
A petition for discharge must allege facts that are 
new since the commitment order was entered.33  In other 
words, the petition must include "something more than 
facts, professional knowledge, or research that was 
considered 
by 
an 
expert 
testifying 
in 
a 
prior 
proceeding that determined the person to be sexually 
violent" from which the jury or court could conclude 
                                                 
31 Wis. Stat. § 980.03(3). 
32 Wis. Stat. § 980.09 (emphasis added). 
33 Wis. Stat. § 980.09 (requiring the petitioner to allege 
"facts from which the court or jury may conclude the person's 
condition has changed since the date of his or her initial 
commitment . . . "). 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
11 
 
that the person no longer meets the criteria for 
commitment.34 
¶82 These statutory provisions are persuasive evidence 
that proceedings on a petition for discharge are separate from 
and independent of the original commitment proceedings.  They 
persuade me that filing a petition for discharge commences (that 
is, begins) a special proceeding to which the Daubert standard 
applies. 
¶83 It is a truism that without a Chapter 980 commitment 
order, there would be no proceedings on a petition for 
discharge.  This connection does not, however, make a petition 
for discharge or a proceeding on that petition "part of" the 
initial 
commitment 
proceedings. 
 
Rather, 
Chapter 
980 
demonstrates that the two proceedings share a common factual 
history but are independent and separate. 
¶84 The purpose of the statute adopting the Daubert 
standard and "the consequences of alternative interpretations" 
also inform my interpretation.35  Courts decline to read statutes 
in a way that produces absurd, implausible, or unreasonable 
results, or results that are at odds with the legislative 
purpose.36  Interpreting Wis. Stat. § 970.02(1) as applying the 
                                                 
34 State v. Combs, 2006 WI App 137, ¶32, 295 Wis. 2d 457, 
720 N.W.2d 684; see also State v. Kruse, 2006 WI App 179, ¶35, 
296 Wis. 2d 130, 722 N.W.2d 742. 
35 Legue 
v. 
City 
of 
Racine, 
2014 
WI 
92, 
¶61, 
357 
Wis. 2d 250, 849 N.W.2d 837. 
36 Hubbard v. Messer, 2003 WI 145, ¶9, 267 Wis. 2d 92, 673 
N.W.2d 676. 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
12 
 
Daubert standard to proceedings on a petition for discharge 
filed after February 1, 2011, avoids an absurd, unreasonable, or 
implausible result clearly at odds with the legislature's 
purpose and takes into consideration the consequences of 
alternative interpretations. 
¶85 The legislature adopted the Daubert standard as part 
of broader tort reform legislation, obviously intending to 
impose a more stringent standard to the admission of expert 
testimony in Wisconsin.  The legislature did not, however, limit 
the Daubert standard to tort cases or even to civil cases.  The 
legislature adopted the Daubert standard for all cases, civil 
and criminal. 
¶86 The legislature adopted the 
Daubert standard to 
"ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence 
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."37 
¶87 The statute adopting the Daubert standard, Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02(1), provides as follows: 
If 
scientific, 
technical, 
or 
other 
specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education, 
may 
testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
(Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
37 Daubert 
v. 
Merrell 
Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 
509 
U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (citations omitted). 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶88 The standard for the admissibility of expert testimony 
that applied when the petitioners were initially committed 
lacked the reliability requirement set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02(1) (underlined above).  This pre-Daubert standard 
provided as follows: 
If 
scientific, 
technical, 
or 
other 
specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education, 
may 
testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.38 
¶89 As Professor Daniel D. Blinka explains, the Daubert 
standard adopted by the Wisconsin legislature requires that 
"[t]he expert's testimony [] be grounded in an accepted body of 
learning or experience in the expert's field, and [that] the 
expert [] explain how the conclusion is so grounded."39 
¶90 When I examine the legislative purpose for adopting 
the Daubert standard and "the consequences of alternative 
interpretations" of the Daubert statute, the answer is clear:  
The Daubert standard applies in the instant cases.  It seems to 
me the legislature would want to have only reliable expert 
witnesses, whose testimony is grounded in an accepted body of 
learning or experience in the expert's field, testify on behalf 
                                                 
38 Wis. Stat. § 907.02 (2003-04); Wis. Stat. § 907.02 (2005-
06). 
39 Daniel D. Blinka, The Daubert Standard in Wisconsin:  A 
Primer, Wis. Lawyer, Mar. 2011, at 60 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 
advisory committee note (2000 amendment)) (first alteration in 
original). 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
14 
 
of either the State or the petitioner in Chapter 980 discharge 
petition proceedings. 
¶91 The proceedings on a petition for discharge result in 
either the release of a committed sex offender or the continued 
institutionalization of that offender.  A huge liberty interest 
is at stake in Chapter 980 proceedings.  A Chapter 980 
commitment is indefinite in duration and is therefore tantamount 
to a life sentence in a custodial setting.  Consequently, 
Chapter 980 reflects a "delicate balancing of the public safety 
with individual liberty."40  Based on the profound importance of 
the interests at stake, it is only logical that the legislature 
would seek to ensure the reliability of the expert testimony 
presented 
at 
proceedings 
on 
a 
Chapter 
980 
petition 
for 
discharge. 
¶92  Why would the legislature apply the less stringent 
relevance-based 
standard 
rather 
than 
the 
more 
stringent 
reliability-based standard at proceedings on a Chapter 980 
petition for discharge filed after February 1, 2011?  The 
simple, obvious answer is it would not.  To fulfill the purpose 
of Chapter 980 discharge proceedings, the Daubert standard 
should be used. 
¶93 Furthermore, the majority opinion's interpretation 
extends 
the 
application 
of 
the 
pre-Daubert 
standard 
indefinitely.  Decades might pass between a commitment order and 
the filing of a petition for discharge.  Why would the 
                                                 
40 State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶100, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 
N.W.2d 929. 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
15 
 
legislature want to have different evidentiary rules applied for 
many, many years into the future to persons similarly situated?  
It would not. 
¶94 Under the majority opinion's interpretation, discharge 
proceedings for a person committed on January 31, 2011, and a 
person committed on February 1, 2011, are governed by different 
evidentiary rules.  The majority opinion's interpretation 
creates confusion for committed persons, lawyers, and the 
courts.   
¶95 With these implications of the majority opinion's 
alternative interpretation in mind, I think it is clear that the 
legislature would want expert testimony that is reliable under 
Daubert presented at proceedings held on petitions for discharge 
filed after February 1, 2011. 
¶96 In sum, I conclude that the Daubert standard governs 
the expert testimony presented at the proceedings on the 
petitioners' Chapter 980 discharge petitions.  The majority 
opinion's contrary conclusion is unpersuasive. 
II 
¶97 The petitioners also raise constitutional claims.  The 
constitutional question presented is whether applying the 
Daubert standard to only those discharge petition proceedings 
for which the original commitment proceedings commenced on or 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
16 
 
after February 1, 2011, violates the petitioners' constitutional 
rights to equal protection and due process of law.41 
¶98 The majority opinion determines that rational basis 
review applies to the petitioners' constitutional claims because 
applying the Daubert standard to proceedings on a discharge 
petition only when the original commitment proceedings commenced 
on or after February 1, 2011, neither "implicates a fundamental 
right nor discriminates against a suspect class."42  The majority 
opinion further determines that "the legislature's decision to 
apply 
the 
Daubert 
[] 
standard 
to 
'actions' 
or 
'special 
proceedings' 'commenced' on or after February 1, 2011, satisfies 
rational basis review and therefore is constitutional."43 
¶99 Because I conclude that the Daubert standard should 
have been applied at the proceedings on the petitioners' 
discharge petitions, I need not reach the constitutional 
questions presented. 
¶100 Nevertheless, I disagree with the majority opinion's 
conclusion on this point.  Even if rational basis review is the 
appropriate level of scrutiny, which is far from clear (a person 
                                                 
41 Specifically, Alger argues that applying the Daubert 
standard to only those discharge petition trials for which the 
original commitment action commenced on or after February 1, 
2011, violates his constitutional right to equal protection.  
Knipfer argues that applying the Daubert standard to only those 
discharge petition trials for which the original commitment 
action commenced on or after February 1, 2011, violates his 
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. 
42 Majority op., ¶39; see also majority op., ¶42.   
43 Majority op., ¶55. 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
17 
 
committed under Chapter 980 is detained indefinitely), there 
appears to be no rational basis for applying the Daubert 
standard to proceedings on a discharge petition only when the 
original commitment proceedings commenced on or after February 
1, 2011.  In my view, the legislative classification produced by 
the majority opinion's interpretation of 2011 Wis. Act 2, 
§ 45(5) fails to pass constitutional muster. 
¶101 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶102 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2013AP225 & 2013AP578.ssa 
 
 
 
1