Case Title: Matter of Walsh

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Walsh1997 WY 14931 P.2d 241Case Number: 96-71Decided: 01/24/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

In the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of 
Walter T. WALSH, anemployee of Holly Sugar 
Corporation: Walter T. WALSH, Appellant (Claimant/Petitioner),

v.

HOLLY SUGAR CORPORATION,

Appellee (Employer/Respondent), and State of Wyoming, 
ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, Appellee 
(Respondent).

  

Appeal from District Court, Goshen County, Keith G. 
Kautz, J.

 

Lowell H. Fitch of Fitch Law 
Offices, Torrington, for appellant 
(Claimant/Petitioner).

 William R. Dabney of Holland & Hart, Cheyenne, 
for appellee (Employer/Respondent) Holly Sugar 
Corporation.

 William U. Hill, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, 
Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and 
Jennifer A. Evans, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, for appellee 
(Respondent) State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division.

 

Before TAYLOR, 
C.J., and THOMAS, MACY and LEHMAN, JJ., and GRANT, District 
Judge.

 

GRANT, District Judge.

 [¶1]      Appellant asks 
this court to review the decision of the administrative hearing examiner finding 
for the respondent at the close of claimant's evidence pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
52(c). The hearing examiner ruled that claimant had failed to carry his burden 
of proof that the condition for which benefits were sought was directly related 
to appellant's original injury pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605(c)(ii) (1991). 
An examination of the record reveals that appellant's evidence did indeed fall 
short of the proof required to make a prima facie case of entitlement to benefits. 
Affirmed.

 

I. 
ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant, Walter 
T. Walsh (Walsh), states the issues as follows:

 

1. Did Appellant present substantial evidence for 
entitlement to medical benefits pursuant to the Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Act and under the "second compensable injury rule?"

 

2. Did Appellees' evidence not amount to "substantial 
evidence" in conflict with Appellant's substantial evidence supporting 
entitlement to medical benefits[?]

 

3. Is an administrative hearing examiner in a 
contested workers' compensation case, restricted when applying Rule 52(c) 
W.R.C.P., at the conclusion of a claimant's case, to testing the claimant's 
evidence only, and by the standards of a demurrer to claimant's 
evidence?

 

4. Did the hearing examiner violate Appellant's 
procedural rights by weighing evidence and resolving apparent evidentiary 
conflicts in the context of deciding a Rule 52(c) W.R.C.P. 
motion[?]

 

5. Did the hearing examiner violate Appellant's 
procedural rights when he considered the evidence of Appellees, in granting 
Appellees' Rule 52(c) motion before Appellees rested their 
case?

 

6. Was the action by the examiner in the denial of 
medical benefits to Appellant done arbitrarily and without observance of 
procedure required by law?

 

[¶3]      Appellee, Holly 
Sugar Corporation (Holly Sugar), provides the following 
issues:

 

1. Was the hearing examiner's dismissal on the merits 
in accordance with law and supported by substantial 
evidence?

 

2. Was the hearing examiner's grant of a Rule 52(c) 
motion to dismiss procedurally proper?

 

[¶4]      Appellee, State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division (Division), asserts their 
issues:

 

A. Whether the Office of Administrative Hearings 
properly entered judgment against Claimant under Rule 52(c) of the Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure after the moving party had presented a witness and after 
weighing the evidence and resolving conflicts in that 
evidence.

 

B. Whether the Office of Administrative Hearings' 
order was otherwise in accordance with law and supported by substantial 
evidence.

 

II. 
FACTS

 

[¶5]      Walsh was 
hospitalized in 1984 for treatment of low back pain of unknown origin. In 
September 1989, Walsh suffered a compensable injury to his lower back while 
working for Holly Sugar. Walsh received medical and disability worker's 
compensation benefits. He left the employ of Holly Sugar in January of 1990. In 
August 1993, Walsh sought treatment for low back and left leg pain after working 
at his small farm baling hay. Walsh claimed benefits under Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-605 contending that his back pain was a "second injury" which arose out of and in the course of his 
employment with Holly Sugar.

 

[¶6]      The Division 
determined that the 1993 injury resulted from Walsh's custom haying and related 
activities after he left the employ of Holly Sugar and the claim was referred to 
the Office of Administrative Hearings. The hearing examiner granted Holly 
Sugar's W.R.C.P. 52(c) motion to dismiss. The district court affirmed the 
hearing examiner's ruling and Walsh appeals from that 
order.

 

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶7]      We review an 
administrative agency's contested case decision pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09 and 
Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c) (1990).  
Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) mandates that we:

 

Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings 
and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law;

 

* * *

 

(E) Unsupported by substantial 
evidence[.]

 

[¶8]      We accord no 
special deference to the conclusions of the district court, instead reviewing 
the action as if it came to us directly from the agency. Martinez v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 619, 621 (Wyo. 1996). If the 
agency's conclusions of law are correct, its decision will be affirmed. Id. If 
the agency has not invoked and applied the correct rule of law, we correct it. 
Id.

 

IV. 
DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      A claimant of 
worker's compensation benefits carries the burden of proving all essential 
elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 968 (Wyo. 1996); Gilstrap v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 875 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Wyo. 1994). The second compensable 
injury rule recognizes that a work accident may give rise to more than one 
compensable injury. Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 225 (Wyo. 1995); 
Matter of Krause, 803 P.2d 81, 82 (Wyo. 1990).  Under this rule, the claimant must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury for which he is seeking 
benefits resulted from his prior work accident. Matter of Krause, 803 P.2d  at 
82-83. A claimant must prove that his work accident, not a pre-existing 
condition, caused the condition. Matter of Claim of Fortier, 910 P.2d 1356, 1358 
(Wyo. 1996); Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d  at 970; State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Div. v. White, 837 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Wyo. 1992); Herring v. 
Welltech, Inc., 660 P.2d 361, 366 (Wyo. 1983); Black Watch Farms v. Baldwin, 474 P.2d 297, 299-300 (Wyo. 1970).

 

[¶10]   Walsh offered the testimony of the 
physician who treated his 1993 symptoms to establish the necessary medical basis 
for his claim that the symptoms were a "continuation" of the 1989 compensable 
injury. We have carefully examined Walsh's evidence and conclude that it could 
be fairly summarized that the current problem could be causally related to the 
1989 injury and that it could just as well not be related to the 1989 injury. 
Representative of the testimony are these questions and 
answers:

 

Q 
(BY [COUNSEL]) If the 1989 injury had not happened, assume that, it is just as 
possible that as a result of his 1984 problems that this 1993 injury would have 
cropped up, isn't it?

 

A 
Yes.

 

* 
* *

 

Q 
[BY COUNSEL] Okay. And despite that, you still make your opinion that there's 
some connection, in your mind, between the '93 injury and the '89 
injury?

 

A 
Yes.

 

* 
* * 

 

Q 
[BY COUNSEL] And so I understand you, it's just basically you're speculating on 
this '93 injury and how it relates back to the '89 injury, are you 
not?

 

A 
It occurred or is it speculation?

 

Q 
To tie it together, you're speculating that those things are tied 
together?

 

A 
Yes.

 

[¶11]   This does not meet the requirement 
which we have articulated in similar cases, that the claimant must prove that 
the injury resulted from his activities, or an accident, in the course of his 
employment. See Jackson v. J.W. Williams, Inc., 886 P.2d 601, 603 (Wyo. 1994); 
Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994); and 
Jaqua v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 873 P.2d 1219, 1221 
(Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶12]   We do not address Walsh's assertion 
of procedural irregularities related to the hearing examiner's consideration of 
the employer's medical evidence, taken out of order to accommodate a witness' 
schedule, in ruling on the W.R.C.P. 52(c) motion because our ruling on the 
burden of proof issue is dispositive.

 

V. 
CONCLUSION

 

[¶13]   In affirming the district court's 
decision, we hold that the hearing examiner correctly determined that Walsh 
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his 1993 symptoms 
were causally related to his 1989 injury while working for Holly Sugar. The 
order granting the motion to dismiss and denying benefits entered by the hearing 
examiner is affirmed.