Case Title: Norman A. Koglin Associates v. Valenz Oro, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80695

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the 
filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are 
subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime prior 
to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, 
because the following slip opinion is being made available prior to 
the Court's final action in this matter, it cannot be considered 
the final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following 
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of 
Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets following final 
action by the Court. 
 
              Docket No. 80695--Agenda 30--September 1996. 
    NORMAN A. KOGLIN ASSOCIATES v. VALENZ ORO, INC., et al. (La Salle 
       National Bank, as Trustee under Trust No.  113495, et al., 
              Appellants; H.B. Barnard Company, Appellee). 
                      Opinion filed March 20, 1997. 
 
     JUSTICE NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court: 
     In this appeal, we decide whether a mechanic's lien claimant 
may enforce its lien where it asserted its lien in an answer rather 
than a counterclaim. 
     Plaintiff, Norman A. Koglin Associates (Koglin), is an 
architectural firm. One of the defendants, Valenz Oro, Inc. 
(Valenz), was a tenant in a downtown Chicago building. Koglin 
alleged that it entered into a contract with Valenz to perform 
architectural and interior design services in connection with the 
construction and improvement of Valenz's jewelry store. Koglin 
further alleged that it performed the services but was not fully 
paid. Koglin filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien under the Mechanics Lien Act (the 
Act) (770 ILCS 60/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)). Koglin named four 
defendants in the foreclosure action: Valenz, the tenant; La Salle 
National Bank (La Salle), the owner of the building where the 
jewelry store was located; JMB/Urban 900 Development Partners 
(JMB), the manager of the building; and H.B. Barnard Company 
(Barnard), the general contractor. Koglin alleged that Barnard also 
had a mechanic's lien in connection with work performed on the 
jewelry store. Barnard filed a pleading captioned "Answer to 
Complaint to Foreclose Mechanic's Lien," in which it asserted its 
lien. 
     While the suit was pending and before trial, Koglin negotiated 
a settlement with two of the defendants, La Salle and JMB. Barnard 
was not involved in the settlement. After settlement, Koglin sought 
voluntary dismissal of the entire action. Barnard objected, arguing 
that its rights under its mechanic's lien had not been adjudicated. 
The circuit court dismissed the entire action with prejudice. The 
appellate court vacated the dismissal order and remanded, thereby 
allowing Barnard to enforce its mechanic's lien. 277 Ill. App. 3d 
142. Defendants La Salle and JMB filed a petition for leave to 
appeal to this court (155 Ill. 2d R. 315), which was granted. We 
affirm the appellate court. 
 
                                BACKGROUND 
     Koglin's complaint was filed on June 16, 1992. It stated that 
Koglin provided architectural services in connection with Valenz's 
jewelry store, located in Valenz's space at 900 North Michigan 
Avenue. In the complaint, Koglin alleged that its work was 
authorized or knowingly permitted by defendants La Salle and JMB. 
Koglin further alleged that defendant Barnard also performed work 
on the jewelry store. Koglin alleged, however, that its lien rights 
were superior to Barnard's. 
     On July 20, 1992, Barnard filed a pleading designated as an 
answer. In the answer, Barnard alleged that it had also entered 
into a contract with Valenz involving work on the jewelry store. 
Barnard admitted the basic factual allegations of the complaint but 
denied that its lien rights were subordinate and inferior to 
Koglin's lien rights. Barnard alleged that it had a lien against 
the premises totalling $25,725.84 plus interest. With respect to 
its lien, Barnard specifically stated that "it last performed 
services on the premises under its contract on or after November 
23, 1991, and that it perfected its mechanics lien on the premises 
by recording a copy of notice of such lien with the Recorder of 
Deeds of Cook County, Illinois, on March 20, 1992, in accordance 
with the Mechanics' Lien Law." 
     A copy of the recorded claim for mechanic's lien was attached 
as an exhibit to the answer. The claim for lien provided 
information about Barnard's work and identified La Salle and JMB, 
among others, as having an interest in the property. Barnard's 
answer also contained a prayer for relief. In the prayer for 
relief, Barnard asked the court: (1) to determine the amount of its 
mechanic's lien as $25,725.84 plus interest; (2) to determine that 
Barnard had a "first, prior and superior lien" against the premises 
under the Act; (3) to foreclose its mechanic's lien and to order 
the premises sold to satisfy any judgment; and (4) to award any 
other relief the court would deem proper. 
     On September 10, 1993, La Salle and JMB filed a combined 
answer to the Koglin complaint. In their answer, they admitted that 
Barnard had provided certain labor and materials in connection with 
the construction and improvement of the jewelry store. They denied 
that they knew the terms of any contract between Valenz and 
Barnard, and further, they denied that they authorized or permitted 
such a contract. La Salle and JMB did not object to the form of 
Barnard's answer or make a motion to strike the affirmative relief 
requested in Barnard's answer. 
     On December 21, 1993, the circuit court held a pretrial 
conference. Koglin moved to voluntarily dismiss its action because 
it had resolved its claims through a settlement with La Salle and 
JMB. Barnard had not been informed of Koglin's intent to seek a 
voluntary dismissal at the pretrial conference. Despite Barnard's 
objection, the circuit court dismissed the entire action with 
prejudice. 
     On January 11, 1994, Barnard filed a motion titled "Motion by 
H. B. Barnard Company to Modify or Vacate the Order of December 21, 
1993, to Permit Filing of Amended Complaint and to Realign 
Parties." La Salle and JMB argued that, by this time, more than two 
years had passed since Barnard completed its work on the jewelry 
store. The Act provides that a claimant should enforce its lien 
within two years of completion of the work. 770 ILCS 60/9 (West 
1992). The circuit court denied Barnard's motion. The effect of 
this ruling was to preclude Barnard from enforcing its mechanic's 
lien against La Salle and JMB. Barnard appealed. 
     The appellate court vacated the dismissal order and remanded 
the cause to allow Barnard to enforce its mechanic's lien. The 
appellate court relied on four alternative reasons. The court held 
that: (1) Barnard's answer complied with the Act and that a 
counterclaim was not required; (2) even if a counterclaim was 
required, the answer should have been treated as a counterclaim 
because it contained all the elements needed to state a claim; (3) 
if a counterclaim was required, Barnard should have been allowed to 
amend its pleading to assert a counterclaim; and (4) Koglin should 
have provided notice to Barnard before Koglin sought to voluntarily 
dismiss the entire action at the pretrial conference. 
     On appeal, La Salle and JMB contest each of these four 
reasons. We note that defendant Valenz did not file an appearance 
or responsive pleading in the circuit court. Neither Valenz nor 
Koglin are involved in this appeal. We begin our analysis with a 
brief discussion of the Act. 
 
                                 ANALYSIS 
                   I. Overview of the Mechanics Lien Act 
     Mechanic's liens were not recognized at common law and exist 
only by operation of the Act (770 ILCS 60/0.01 et seq. (West 
1992)). In general, the Act provides a lien to an individual who 
has provided labor, material, or services in connection with the 
improvement of real estate, pursuant to contract. See 770 ILCS 60/1 
(West 1992). The Act prescribes the elements required to state a 
claim. Section 11 provides: 
               "The complaint shall contain a brief statement of 
          the contract or contracts on which it is founded, the 
          date, when made, and when completed, if not completed, 
          why, and it shall also set forth the amount due and 
          unpaid, a description of the premises which are subject 
          to the lien, and such other facts as may be necessary to 
          a full understanding of the rights of the parties." 770 
          ILCS 60/11 (West 1992). 
     The defendants in a mechanic's lien proceeding include all 
persons having an interest in the premises. 770 ILCS 60/11 (West 
1992). These defendants may include individuals having an ownership 
interest in the property, such as tenants and landlords. When a 
tenant has contracted for work that is the subject of a lien, the 
lien may be enforced against the landlord if the landlord has 
"authorized or knowingly permitted" work to be done on the 
premises. 770 ILCS 60/1 (West 1992); see also Abbott Electrical 
Construction Co. v. Ladin, 144 Ill. App. 3d 974, 978 (1986). Other 
mechanic's lien claimants are also included in the proceeding. The 
Act presumes that all claims and rights of interested parties can 
be adjudicated in one proceeding. 770 ILCS 60/11 (West 1992). 
     A contractor's rights under the Act are dependent on its 
taking the necessary steps to perfect a lien. Section 7 provides 
for the recording of a "claim for lien" in the office of the 
recorder of the county in which the property is located. 770 ILCS 
60/7 (West 1992). It also prescribes the contents of this claim for 
lien. 770 ILCS 60/7 (West 1992). A contractor must record its claim 
for lien within four months after completion of the work in order 
to subsequently assert a lien against a "creditor or incumbrancer 
or purchaser." 770 ILCS 60/7 (West 1992). The four-month recording 
requirement is intended to give third parties dealing with the 
property, other than those with an ownership interest, notice of 
the lien. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. American 
National Bank & Trust Co., 115 Ill. App. 3d 426, 429 (1983). If the 
lien has been recorded within the four-month period, the contractor 
can then seek to enforce the lien within two years of completion of 
the work. 770 ILCS 60/9 (West 1992). 
     The recording of a claim for lien is less significant where a 
contractor seeks to enforce a lien against a party with an 
ownership interest. As to a party with an ownership interest, the 
contractor may record a claim for lien within two years after 
completion of the contract. 770 ILCS 60/7 (West 1992). Regardless 
of whether a claim for lien has been recorded, the contractor must 
seek to enforce the lien within two years after completion of the 
contract. 770 ILCS 60/9 (West 1992). Thus, with respect to both 
owners and third parties, a contractor must assert its lien within 
two years of completion of the work. 
 
II. Section 9 of the Act 
     Section 9 of the Act describes the enforcement of a lien. 
Section 9 provides: 
               "If payment shall not be made to the contractor 
          having a lien by virtue of this act of any amount due 
          when the same becomes due, then such contractor may bring 
          suit to enforce his lien in the circuit court in the 
          county where the improvement is located ***. Any two or 
          more persons having liens on the same property may join 
          in bringing such suit, setting forth their respective 
          rights in their complaint; all lien claimants not made 
          parties thereto may upon filing a petition to intervene 
          become defendants and enforce their liens by counterclaim 
          against all the parties to the suit; and the complaint 
          shall not thereafter be dismissed as to any lien claimant 
          *** without the consent of such lien claimant. The 
          plaintiff and all defendants to such complaint may 
          contest each other's right without any formal issue of 
          record made up between them other than that shown upon 
          the original complaint, as well with respect to the 
          amount due as to the right to the benefit of the lien 
          claimed: Provided, that if by such contest by co- 
          defendants any lien claimants be taken by surprise, the 
          court may, in its discretion, as to such claim, grant a 
          continuance. The court may render judgment against any 
          party summoned and failing to appear, as in other cases 
          of default. Such suit shall be commenced or counterclaim 
          filed within two years after the completion of the 
          contract, or completion of the extra or additional work, 
          or furnishing of extra or additional material 
          thereunder." (Emphasis added.) 770 ILCS 60/9 (West 1992). 
The parties dispute the meaning of section 9. La Salle and JMB 
argue that a mechanic's lien claimant should assert its lien in a 
complaint or counterclaim. Barnard argues that the Act permits the 
assertion of a lien in an answer. On this issue, we agree with 
La Salle and JMB. 
     In reaching this conclusion, we note the history of the 
statute. Prior to 1976, the statute provided that defendants could 
"enforce their liens by answer to the complaint or petition in the 
nature of an intervening petition, and the same shall be taken as 
a counterclaim." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 82, par. 9. The statute 
further provided that "[s]uch suit shall be commenced or answer 
filed within two years after the completion of the contract ***." 
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 82, par. 9. Thus, before 1976, a 
defendant could assert its lien by answer. See, e.g., Rochelle 
Bldg. Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank, 121 Ill. App. 2d 274, 
277 (1970). In 1976, the statute was amended and the portions of 
the statute allowing enforcement of a lien by answer were deleted. 
The amended language of the statute provides that a defendant may 
enforce a lien by counterclaim. Accordingly, the amended statute 
contemplates that a defendant will assert its lien by counterclaim, 
rather than by answer. 
     We further note that section 12 of the Act expressly provides 
that the circuit court should generally use the same pleading 
procedure in a mechanic's lien proceeding as is used in other civil 
actions. Section 12 provides: 
               "The court shall permit amendments to any part of 
          the pleadings, and may issue process, make all orders, 
          requiring parties to appear, and requiring notice to be 
          given, that are or may be authorized in other civil 
          actions and shall have the same power and jurisdiction of 
          the parties and subject matter, and the rules of practice 
          and proceedings in such cases shall be the same as in 
          other civil cases, except as is otherwise provided in 
          this act." 770 ILCS 60/12 (West 1992). 
The rules of civil procedure ordinarily apply to mechanic's lien 
cases, as in other civil cases. 
     Barnard did not follow the proper civil pleading procedure in 
asserting its lien. In civil cases, a counterclaim should be used 
by a defendant to make a claim against another defendant. 735 ILCS 
5/2--608(a) (West 1992). A counterclaim differs from an answer or 
affirmative defense. A counterclaim is used when seeking 
affirmative relief, while an answer or affirmative defense seeks to 
defeat a plaintiff's claim. Section 2--608(b) of the Code of Civil 
Procedure provides that "[t]he counterclaim shall be a part of the 
answer, and shall be designated as a counterclaim." 735 ILCS 5/2-- 
608(b) (West 1992). In its pleading, Barnard should have formally 
asserted its lien as a counterclaim. 
     In support of its position, Barnard emphasizes certain 
language of the statute to argue that the legislature changed the 
rules of pleadings with respect to mechanic's liens. The statute 
provides that "all lien claimants not made parties thereto [to the 
complaint] may upon filing a petition to intervene become 
defendants and enforce their liens by counterclaim ***." 770 ILCS 
60/9 (West 1992). Barnard argues that the statute only requires 
that intervening claimants file counterclaims. Barnard argues that 
the statute does not require it to file a counterclaim because it 
was an original party to the suit, and therefore, it may assert its 
lien in an answer. 
     We disagree. The statute provides that claimants who are not 
involved in the original proceeding may intervene to assert their 
liens. It expressly gives these claimants the right to become 
involved in the proceeding. The statute, as amended, does not alter 
the rules of civil procedure in connection with claimants who are 
already parties to the proceeding. 
     Additionally, Barnard notes that section 9 provides that 
"[t]he plaintiff and all defendants to such complaint may contest 
each other's right without any formal issue of record made up 
between them other than that shown upon the original complaint 
***." 770 ILCS 60/9 (West 1992). Barnard contends that this 
language establishes a simplified pleading procedure. Barnard 
argues that this language eliminates the need for the filing of 
counterclaims entirely. 
     We also reject this argument. Although the statute provides 
that the parties "may contest each other's right without any formal 
issue of record," it still contemplates that they will assert their 
claims as in other civil cases. Mechanic's lien litigation often 
involves a number of counterclaims by claimants and by other 
parties claiming an interest in the property. This provision simply 
makes it easier to challenge the liens asserted by others. It does 
not affect how liens should be asserted in the first place. 
 
                  III. Liberal Construction of Pleadings 
     Even though Barnard failed to formally assert a counterclaim, 
it prevails on other grounds. The appellate court held that, even 
if Barnard should have asserted its lien by counterclaim, Barnard's 
pleading should be liberally construed. The court determined that 
Barnard's assertion of the lien and request for affirmative relief 
should be treated as the functional equivalent of a counterclaim. 
We agree. 
     As noted, section 12 of the Act adopts the same general rules 
of procedure that apply in other civil cases. The Code of Civil 
Procedure is to be liberally construed, so that cases are decided 
on the basis of the substantive rights of the litigants. 735 ILCS 
5/1--106 (West 1992); Superior Bank FSB v. Golding,  152 Ill. 2d 480 , 486 (1992). It also states that "[n]o pleading is bad in 
substance which contains such information as reasonably informs the 
opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he or 
she is called upon to meet." 735 ILCS 5/2--612(b) (West 1992). 
Section 2--603(c) further provides that "[p]leadings shall be 
liberally construed with a view to doing substantial justice 
between the parties." 735 ILCS 5/2--603(c) (West 1992). "Pleadings 
are not intended to create obstacles of a technical nature to 
prevent reaching the merits of a case," but instead are intended 
"to facilitate the resolution of real and substantial 
controversies." People ex rel. Scott v. College Hills Corp.,  91 Ill. 2d 138 , 145 (1982); see also Geary v. Dominick's Finer Foods, 
Inc.,  129 Ill. 2d 389 , 407-08 (1989). 
     Given these principles, the circuit court should have 
liberally construed the affirmative relief requested in the answer. 
Section 2--608(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a 
counterclaim "shall be pleaded in the same manner and with the same 
particularity as a complaint." 735 ILCS 5/2--608(c) (West 1992). 
Barnard did, in fact, allege the elements needed to state a claim 
under the Act. It alleged that Barnard and Valenz entered into a 
contract on October 15, 1991, that the work was completed on 
November 23, 1991, and that the amount due was $25,725.84 plus 
interest. Barnard further alleged that it recorded its claim for 
mechanic's lien in the recorder's office and attached the claim for 
lien as an exhibit. See 735 ILCS 5/2--606 (West 1992) (written 
instrument attached to pleading "constitutes a part of the pleading 
for all purposes"). The claim for lien contained a legal 
description of the property and asserted a claim "against the 
interest" of La Salle and JMB, among others. In its prayer for 
relief in the answer, Barnard asserted its lien and sought 
foreclosure based on the lien. As the appellate court stated, 
"[t]he only thing missing from the document was the word 
`counterclaim.' " 277 Ill. App. 3d at 151. Accordingly, Barnard's 
claim should not have been dismissed without its consent. See 770 
ILCS 60/9 (West 1992); 735 ILCS 5/2--1009 (West 1992). 
     La Salle and JMB argue that the Act is in derogation of the 
common law and the provisions of the Act are to be strictly 
construed. The strict construction rule, however, applies to the 
provisions of the Act that specify the substantive requirements 
upon which the right to a lien is based. The procedure established 
in the Act for perfecting a lien must be strictly followed in order 
to create the lien. See, e.g., Mutual Services, Inc. v. Ballantrae 
Development Co., 159 Ill. App. 3d 549, 552-53 (1987) (contractor's 
failure to timely record a claim for lien within four months of 
completion of the work made lien unenforceable against third 
parties). In light of section 12, the strict construction rule does 
not generally apply to technical objections to pleadings. See 
United Cork Cos. v. Volland, 365 Ill. 564, 572 (1937) (strict 
construction rule is applied where a "material requirement of the 
statute" is lacking but was not intended "as a pitfall to the 
unwary, in good faith pursuing the path marked by the statute, nor 
as an ambuscade from which an adversary can overwhelm him for an 
immaterial misstep"); Fitzgerald v. Van Buskirk, 96 Ill. App. 2d 
432, 434-40 (1968) (allegations in complaint construed liberally); 
see also Abbott Electrical Construction Co. v. Ladin, 144 Ill. App. 
3d 974, 981 (1986); Armco Steel Corp. v. La Salle National Bank, 31 
Ill. App. 3d 695, 699 (1975). 
 
                        IV. Amendment of Pleadings 
     Alternatively, the appellate court held that Barnard should be 
allowed to enforce its lien on a separate, but related, ground. 
Section 12 of the Act permits amendments to any part of the 
pleadings, as allowed generally in civil cases. 770 ILCS 60/12 
(West 1992). Even if Barnard's pleading could not be liberally 
construed, the appellate court held that the trial judge should 
have allowed Barnard to amend its answer to formally assert a 
counterclaim. We agree. 
     We note that Barnard sought to file an amended pleading more 
than two years after it completed its work. Section 2--616(b) of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, however, provides that an amended 
pleading may relate back to the date of filing of the original 
pleading. Specifically, section 2--616(b) provides: 
               "(b) The cause of action, cross claim or defense set 
          up in any amended pleading shall not be barred by lapse 
          of time under any statute or contract prescribing or 
          limiting the time within which an action may be brought 
          or right asserted, if the time prescribed or limited had 
          not expired when the original pleading was filed, and if 
          it shall appear from the original and amended pleadings 
          that the cause of action asserted, or the defense or 
          cross claim interposed in the amended pleading grew out 
          of the same transaction or occurrence set up in the 
          original pleading, *** and for the purpose of preserving 
          the cause of action, cross claim or defense set up in the 
          amended pleading, and for that purpose only, an amendment 
          to any pleading shall be held to relate back to the date 
          of the filing of the original pleading so amended." 735 
          ILCS 2--616(b) (West 1992). 
In applying section 2--616(b), this court recently stated: 
          "The purpose of the relation back provision has been 
          construed as the preservation of causes of action *** 
          against loss by reason of technical rules of pleading. 
          [Citation.] To further this purpose, courts should 
          liberally construe the requirements of section 2--616(b) 
          in order to allow the resolution of litigation on the 
          merits and to avoid elevating questions of form over 
          substance. [Citation.] The rationale behind the same 
          transaction or occurrence rule is that a defendant will 
          not be prejudiced by an amendment so long as `his 
          attention was directed, within the time prescribed or 
          limited, to the facts that form the basis of the claim 
          asserted against him.' [Citation.]" Boatmen's National 
          Bank v. Direct Lines, Inc.,  167 Ill. 2d 88 , 102 (1995). 
See also Wolf v. Meister-Neiberg, Inc.,  143 Ill. 2d 44 , 47-48 
(1991) (an amended pleading will relate back where a defendant has 
information about the claim and will not be prejudiced). 
Although both Boatmen's National Bank and Wolf involved amendments 
to a complaint, the same principle applies here. 
     We further note that section 2--616, and its predecessors, 
have been applied in mechanic's lien cases to preserve claims. See 
Douglas Lumber Co. v. Chicago Home for Incurables, 380 Ill. 87 
(1942) (amendment to complaint was timely even though made after 
time for bringing suit had expired because amended complaint 
related back to date of filing of original complaint); Charles A. 
Hohmeier Lumber Co. v. Knight, 350 Ill. 248 (1932) (amended 
complaint would relate back to date of filing of original complaint 
where amended complaint introduced no new claim or ground for 
relief); Martinez v. Knochel, 123 Ill. App. 3d 555 (1984) 
(subcontractor was allowed to amend answer after two years from 
completion of work to assert counterclaim where the subcontractor 
asserted a timely claim in its answer); Ceco Corp. v. Bank of 
Hickory Hills, 126 Ill. App. 3d 188, 191 (1984) (strict 
construction rule did not apply to proposed amendment to complaint 
where the plaintiff named the correct party but the wrong trust 
number because "[a]mending the pleadings to name the correct trust 
number would not have prejudiced any substantial right of defendant 
Bank"); cf. C.S. Lewis, Inc. v. Cabot Corp., 85 Ill. App. 3d 708 
(1980) (appearance, which did not set forth any transaction or 
occurrence, was not sufficient to serve as original pleading that 
could be amended after the two-year period expired). Given that the 
answer was timely filed and asserted the elements needed for a 
claim under the Act, Barnard should have been allowed to amend its 
answer to explicitly assert a counterclaim. Essentially, Barnard 
sought to do so by attempting to file an "amended complaint." 
Accordingly, the circuit court erred in failing to apply section 2- 
-616 in the instant case. 
     In arguing that the answer cannot be amended, La Salle and JMB 
rely primarily on Well Done Heating & Sheet Metal Co. v. Ralph 
Schwartz & Associates, 112 Ill. App. 3d 438 (1983). In Well Done 
Heating, a contractor was named as a defendant in a foreclosure 
suit. As here, the contractor filed an answer but did not file a 
counterclaim within the statutory two-year period. Later, the 
contractor sought to amend its answer to add a counterclaim. 
     Well Done Heating is distinguishable from the instant case. In 
Well Done Heating, the contractor did not, in any manner, assert 
its lien within the requisite two-year period or seek foreclosure. 
The contractor did not seek to enforce its lien at all until six 
years after the work was completed. In fact, the contractor first 
asserted its lien two years after the suit was settled and the 
complaint dismissed with prejudice. Based on these facts, the Well 
Done Heating court properly refused to allow the contractor to 
amend its answer to assert a counterclaim: 
               "While Illinois allows a party to amend its 
          pleading, even sometimes to the extent of altering the 
          nature of the claim previously made, it is still the law 
          that generally an amendment asserting a new cause of 
          action is not permitted once the statute of limitations 
          has expired [citations], particularly where, as here, 
          there had been no attempt of any kind to set forth the 
          claim prior to the running of the statute." (Emphasis 
          added.) Well Done Heating, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 443-44. 
Here, in contrast, Barnard asserted its lien prior to the running 
of the two-year period and sought foreclosure. Barnard asserted its 
lien in a timely manner although it failed to correctly label its 
lien as a counterclaim. 
     In Well Done Heating, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 445, the court also 
stated that the answer could not be amended to assert a claim 
against "new" defendants. Relying on Well Done Heating, La Salle 
and JMB argue that they were not specifically named as defendants 
in Barnard's pleading. Thus, they argue that they are also "new" 
defendants. La Salle and JMB contend that Barnard did not seek to 
assert its lien against them specifically until after the two-year 
period had passed. They argue that a party seeking relief against 
others should name those other parties in the body of its pleading. 
See 735 ILCS 5/2--401(c) (West 1992). 
     Given the circumstances of this case, we reject this argument. 
La Salle and JMB were parties to the foreclosure suit brought by 
Koglin. They were not new parties. They were served with copies of 
Barnard's answer and were on notice of Barnard's lien and the 
relief it sought at an early point in the proceedings. They were 
clearly implicated given the nature of the foreclosure proceeding, 
the prayer for relief in Barnard's answer, and the language of 
Barnard's claim for lien. To the extent the analysis in Well Done 
Heating is inconsistent with this analysis, we reject it. 
 
                                CONCLUSION 
     Barnard asserted its lien in a timely manner although it 
failed to correctly label its claim as a counterclaim. Under the 
facts of this case, the circuit court should have either liberally 
construed the answer or allowed an amendment to the answer. We 
express no opinion on the ultimate outcome of the litigation on 
remand to the circuit court. For the foregoing reasons, the 
judgment of the appellate court is affirmed. 
 
                                                                  Affirmed.