Case Title: JOSEPH BUCKLEY v. BRYCE H. BELL, W. EARL BELL AND BELL BROTHERS, A PARTNERSHIP CONSISTING OF BRYCE H. BELL AND W. EARL BELL, D/B/A JOHNIE'S

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-146

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOSEPH BUCKLEY v. BRYCE H. BELL, W. EARL BELL AND BELL BROTHERS, A PARTNERSHIP CONSISTING OF BRYCE H. BELL AND W. EARL BELL, D/B/A JOHNIE'S1985 WY 98703 P.2d 1089Case Number: 83-146Decided: 07/30/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOSEPH BUCKLEY, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

BRYCE H. BELL, W. EARL 
BELL AND BELL BROTHERS, A PARTNERSHIP CONSISTING OF BRYCE H. BELL AND W. EARL 
BELL, D/B/A JOHNIE'S, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Rehearing Denied 
September 16, 1985.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LincolnCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

 
 
Dennis L. 
Sanderson, Afton, for appellant.

Gary M. 
Greenhalgh of Greenhalgh, Bussart, West & Rossetti, P.C., Rock Springs, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The precise question 
posed in this case is whether the foreseeability of negligent conduct by a 
plaintiff occurring subsequent to the negligent acts of a defendant is a 
question of law or a question of fact. The district court, in a trial to the 
court, held that the acts of the defendant were not a proximate cause of the 
damages to the plaintiff finding that the actions of the plaintiff amounted to a 
new and independent force which caused those damages. In addition the district 
court found that the particular harm sustained by the plaintiff could not 
reasonably have been foreseen as a probable consequence of the acts of the 
defendant. In the context of the debate between the parties the question will be 
addressed from the perspective of our precedents relating to proximate cause, as 
well as the perspective of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. We shall affirm 
the judgment of the district court because we conclude that in this instance 
foreseeability was a question of fact subject to resolution by the trier of 
fact, and since there is evidence from which that finding can be inferred we 
will not change it on appeal.

[¶2.]     The issues propounded 
by the parties are best understood in light of the operative facts. There is no 
dispute between the parties wiht respect to these facts. Buckley ordered some 
regular gasoline from the Bells. When the Bells' driver arrived in Bells' fuel 
truck he handed Buckley a hose which was connected to a diesel fuel compartment, 
and Buckley filled a portable tank in his truck with diesel fuel. Buckley then 
drove to the field and filled his gasoline-engine hay baler with the diesel 
fuel. The hay baler would not run on the diesel fuel, and when he attempted to 
operate the machine Buckley discovered that he had diesel fuel in the baler's 
tank instead of gasoline. In the meantime Bells' driver had filled a 
bulk-gasoline storage tank at Buckley's ranch with the diesel 
fuel.

[¶3.]     Buckley drove to Bells' 
place of business to inform the Bells that they had delivered the wrong fuel. 
When he arrived Buckley was advised that Bells' employees knew they had 
delivered the wrong fuel, and they said they would replace the diesel fuel with 
regular gasoline. At that time the portable tank on Buckley's truck was drained 
of the diesel and gasoline mixture and filled with regular gasoline. (In the 
next two days the same procedure occurred with respect to the bulk-storage tank 
for regular gasoline.) After the portable tank had been filled Buckley went back 
to his hay baler in the field. He drained the diesel fuel from the tank onto the 
ground and filled the tank with the regular gasoline. In order to purge the fuel 
line of the diesel fuel Buckley disconnected it at the carburetor and turned the 
engine by jumping the solenoid to pump the diesel fuel out of the line. Buckley 
had his hand over the carburetor to choke the engine and at about the time the 
gasoline began to flow from the fuel line he removed his hand from the 
carburetor. The engine backfired and the gasoline was ignited. The fire then 
spread to the ground and fueled by dry grass and the diesel fuel it ultimately 
destroyed the hay baler.

[¶4.]     This action was brought 
by Buckley to recover the cost of his hay baler and additional costs incurred in 
harvesting his hay because his hay baler was destroyed. Buckley premised his 
action upon theories of strict products liability; breach of implied and express 
warranties; and negligence. The argument in the trial court and before this 
court focused upon the causation element of Buckley's claims. The district court 
entered the following findings of fact:

"9. That Defendants' 
delivery of the wrong fuel was not a proximate cause of the fire; and that 
Plaintiff's actions were a new and independent force which proximately caused 
the fire and resulting damages to Plaintiff's hay baler.

"10. That the fire and 
resulting damages could not reasonably have been foreseen as a probable 
consequence of any prior act of Defendants."

The district 
court then concluded that the Bells were entitled to judgment on Buckley's 
theory of strict liability because there was a failure of proof of a defective 
product; that Bells were entitled to judgment against Buckley on his claim for 
breach of warranty because of the absence of proximate cause, and finally that 
the Bells were entitled to judgment against Buckley on his theory of negligence 
because "the evidence proved that plaintiff's actions were the efficient 
intervening cause of the fire and plaintiff's damages."

[¶5.]     The issues identified 
in the appellant's brief are:

"A. DID THE TRIAL COURT 
ERR IN FINDING NO CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT'S ACTION AND THE 
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGE?

"B. SHOULD THIS COURT 
ADOPT THE RULES OF LEGAL CAUSATION SET FORTH IN 
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS?

"C. DID THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDE THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT DELIVER A `DEFECTIVE' PRODUCT 
UNDER RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, § 402A WHEN HE DELIVERED DIESEL FUEL TO THE 
PLAINTIFF INSTEAD OF GASOLINE?"

[¶6.]     The claims of appellant 
relating to error in finding no causal connection between the defendants' 
conduct and the plaintiff's damages and the desirability of adopting the rules 
of causation set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts will be discussed 
together. In Lemos v. Madden, 28 
Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791, 793 (1921), this court first defined proximate cause as "[t]hat which, in a 
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, 
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." This 
same definition has been relied upon in recent years. Robertson v. TWP, Inc., Wyo., 656 P.2d 547 (1983); Kopriva v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
Wyo., 592 P.2d 711 (1979). In Lemos v. Madden, 
supra, 200 P.  at 794, the court also rejected a "but for" rule of causation, 
stating:

"* * * But if the 
original wrong furnished only the condition or occasion, then it is the remote 
and not the proximate cause, notwithstanding the fact that there would have been 
no loss or injury but for such condition or occasion. * * 
*"

[¶7.]     In later cases our 
court has identified legal causation as that conduct which is a substantial 
factor in bringing about the injuries identified in the complaint. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyo., 666 P.2d 408 (1983); Chrysler Corporation v. 
Todorovich, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1123 (1978); Phelps v. Woodward Construction Co., 
Wyo., 66 Wyo. 33, 33, 204 P.2d 179 (1949). The obvious 
rationalization of that approach with the two propositions found in Lemos v. Madden, supra, is that if the 
conduct is "that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by a 
sufficient intervening cause produces the injury, without which the result would 
not have occurred," it must be identified as a substantial factor in bringing 
about the harm. If, however, it created only a condition or occasion for the 
harm to occur then it would be regarded as a remote, not a proximate, cause, and 
would not be a substantial factor in bringing about the 
harm.

[¶8.]     An alternative method 
for explaining these concepts is found in the discussions of intervening cause 
in our cases. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 
supra; Kopriva v. Union Pacific R. 
Co., supra; Gilliland v. Rhoads, 
Wyo., 539 P.2d 1221 (1975); Fagan v. 
Summers, Wyo., 498 P.2d 1227 (1972); and Tyler v. Jensen, 75 Wyo. 249, 295 P.2d 742 (1956). An intervening cause is one that comes into being after a 
defendant's negligent act has occurred, and if it is not a foreseeable event it 
will insulate the defendant from liability. It is reasonably foreseeable if it 
is a probable consequence of the defendant's wrongful act or is a normal 
response to the stimulus of the situation created thereby.

[¶9.]     The usual rule in 
Wyoming is 
that proximate cause of harm is a question for the trier of fact unless 
reasonable persons could not disagree. Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Donahue, 
Wyo., 674 P.2d 1276 (1983); McClellan v. 
Tottenhoff, supra; Kopriva v. Union 
Pacific R. Co., supra; Sinclair 
Refining Company v. Redding, Wyo., 439 P.2d 20 (1968); Caillier v. City of Newcastle, Wyo., 423 P.2d 653 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. 
Arguello, Wyo., 382 P.2d 886 (1963); Dallason v. Buckmeier, 74 Wyo. 125, 284 P.2d 386 (1955); O'Malley v. Eagan, 
43 Wyo. 233, 2 P.2d 1063, 77 A.L.R. 582, reh. denied 43 Wyo. 350, 5 P.2d 276 (1931); Hines v. Sweeney, 28 Wyo. 57, 201 P. 165, reh. 
denied 28 Wyo. 
82, 201 P. 1018 (1921). In this instance the finder of fact decided that the 
delivery of the diesel fuel was not a proximate cause of the fire and that the 
actions of Buckley were a new and independent force which proximately caused the 
fire and the resulting damages to the hay baler. The evidence in the record 
supports this inferential finding by the trial court, and it is not a situation 
which is so clear that reasonable minds could not 
disagree.

[¶10.]  Buckley, however, urges the rules of 
legal causation set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, contending that 
a different result would follow. In our judgment the result is the same. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 430, recognizes the requirement of a causal 
relationship. Section 431, Restatement (Second) of Torts then 
states:

"§ 431. What Constitutes 
Legal Cause "The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another 
if

"(a) his conduct is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and

"(b) there is no rule of 
law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his 
negligence has resulted in the harm."

Apparently the 
district court assumed the delivery of the wrong fuel was a substantial factor 
in bringing about Buckley's harm because, in disposing of the case, it focused 
upon Buckley's conduct.

[¶11.]  Continuing with the black-letter text in 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, we find in § 433 the 
following:

"§ 433. Considerations 
Important in Determining Whether Negligent Conduct is Substantial Factor in 
Producing Harm

"The following 
considerations are in themselves or in combination with one another important in 
determining whether the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing 
about harm to another:

"(a) the number of other 
factors which contribute in producing the harm and the extent of the effect 
which they have in producing it;

"(b) whether the actor's 
conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in continuous and 
active operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a situation harmless 
unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not 
responsible;

"(c) lapse of 
time."

Then § 435, 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, provides as follows:

"§ 435. Foreseeability of 
Harm or Manner of Its Occurrence

"(1) If the actor's 
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that 
the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the 
manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being 
liable.

"(2) The actor's conduct 
may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where after the event and 
looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the 
court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the 
harm."

[¶12.]  Against this background Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, then proceeds to discuss concepts of superseding cause. It 
begins in this way:

"§ 440. Superseding Cause 
Defined

"A superseding cause is 
an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the 
actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a 
substantial factor in bringing about."

"§ 441. Intervening Force 
Defined

"(1) An intervening force 
is one which actively operates in producing harm to another after the actor's 
negligent act or omission has been committed.

"(2) Whether the active 
operation of an intervening force prevents the actor's antecedent negligence 
from being a legal cause in bringing about harm to another is determined by the 
rules stated in §§ 442-453."

Section 442 then 
lists those considerations important in determining whether an intervening force 
is a superseding cause. The text language is:

"§ 442. Considerations 
Important in Determining Whether an Intervening Force is a Superseding 
Cause

"The following 
considerations are of importance in determining whether an intervening force is 
a superseding cause of harm to another:

"(a) The fact that its 
intervention brings about harm different in kind from that which would otherwise 
have resulted from the actor's negligence;

(b) the fact that its 
operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary 
rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of its 
operation;

"(c) the fact that the 
intervening force is operating independently of any situation created by the 
actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such 
a situation;

"(d) the fact that the 
operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's act or to his 
failure to act;

"(e) the fact that the 
intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is wrongful toward 
the other and as such subjects the third person to liability to 
him;

"(f) the degree of 
culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which sets the intervening force 
in motion."

Of the matters 
discussed in the succeeding sections the pertinent one in this instance is found 
in § 447, Restatement (Second) of Torts. It there is 
provided:

"§ 447. Negligence of 
Intervening Acts

"The fact that an 
intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done in a 
negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another which 
the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, 
if

"(a) the actor at the 
time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a third person might so 
act, or

"(b) a reasonable man 
knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person was done would 
not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or 

"(c) the intervening act 
is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's conduct and the 
manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily 
negligent."

[¶13.]  With these rules in mind the key to the 
disposition of this appeal is found in § 453, Restatement (Second) of Torts, and 
the comments thereunder. Section 453, Restatement (Second) of Torts provides as 
follows:

"§ 453. Function of 
Court

"It is the exclusive 
function of the court to declare the existence or non-existence of rules which 
restrict the actor's responsibility short of making him liable for harm which 
his negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, and to 
determine the circumstances to which such rules are 
applicable."

Then there 
follows Comment b:

"b. If the facts are 
undisputed, it is usually the duty of the court to apply to them any rule which 
determines the existence or extent of the negligent actor's liability. If, 
however, the negligent character of the third person's intervening act or the 
reasonable foreseeability of its being done (see §§ 447 and 448) is a factor in 
determining whether the intervening act relieves the actor from liability for 
his antecedent negligence, and under the undisputed facts there is room for 
reasonable difference of opinion as to whether such act was negligent or 
foreseeable, the question should be left to the jury."

Derdiarian v. Felix 
Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 434 N 
YS.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666 (1980), reargument denied 52 N.Y.2d 829, 437 N.Y.S.2d 1030, 418 N.E.2d 694 (1980); Ventricelli 
v. Kinney System Rent A Car, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 950, 411 N.Y.S.2d 555, 383 N.E.2d 1149 (1978); Young v. Tide Craft, 
Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978). A jury question is a question of 
fact for the trial court in a trial to the court. In this instance the district 
court, based upon facts which are not disputed, found:

"10. That the fire and 
resulting damages could not reasonably have been foreseen as a probable 
consequence of any prior act of Defendants."

It then held 
that the actions of Buckley were the efficient intervening cause of the fire and 
his harm. Under the correct application of the rules in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts the trial court was entitled to decide the issue of foreseeability, and 
it resolved it as a question of fact.

[¶14.]  As has been indicated, the application of 
these concepts leads to the same result as the result reached by the application 
of the historic tort precedents in Wyoming. We have previously accepted the 
rationale of the causation rules found in Restatement (Second) of Torts, and 
have applied them. In Chrysler 
Corporation v. Todorovich, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1123 (1978), this court relied 
upon some of the rules of causation set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
We there indicated that the definition found in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 
431, p. 428 (1965), expressed the essence of this court's conclusion in Convoy Company v. Dana, Wyo., 359 P.2d 885 (1961). As we understand the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered 
by the trial court in this case, it was using a dual approach in accommodating 
to the precedents articulated by this court, as well as the rules of causation 
set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts in deciding the case. The court's 
findings of fact follow from the undisputed evidence and are thus unassailable 
in this appeal. Given those findings of fact, we agree with the trial court's 
conclusions of law.

[¶15.]  Finally, we address the appellant's 
contention that the trial court erroneously concluded that the diesel fuel could 
not be a defective product under § 402(A), Restatement (Second) of Torts. This 
court has not adopted the rule set forth in § 402(A), Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. For several reasons we are also foreclosed in this case from considering 
the adoption of that principle. First, our conclusion that the district court 
accurately resolved the causation factor prevents any application of the concept 
of strict liability. Second, even in view of the appellant's argument that if an 
adulterated product is to be considered defective and lead to liability when 
unreasonably dangerous then a wrong product is one which should be considered as 
totally adulterated for purposes of determining whether it is defective, the 
authorities we have discovered seem to say that a wrong product is not a 
defective product for purposes of strict liability. Baptista v. St. Barnabas Medical Center, 
109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902 (1970), affirmed 57 N.J. 167, 270 A.2d 409 
(1970). See also Berkeley Pump Co. v. 
Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983); Montez v. Ford Motor Company, 101 Cal. App. 3d 315, 161 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1980); and Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, ___ 
Pa.Super. ___, 485 A.2d 408 (1984). Finally, it does not seem that a strict 
products liability theory is recognized as an appropriate vehicle for recovery 
of an economic loss, which is the only injury in this instance in light of the 
resolution of the causation factor. Hart 
Engineering Company v. FMC Corporation, 593 F. Supp. 1471 (D.R.I. 1984). 
Singularly or collectively these concepts foreclose any reliance upon the 
doctrine of strict liability as articulated in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 
402(A), in this case.

[¶16.]  Under the facts and circumstances of this 
case the district court committed no error with respect to its findings that 
there was no causal connection between the actions of the defendants and the 
damages claimed by the plaintiff resulting from the fire which destroyed his hay 
baler. This result flows from the precedents pursuant to which rules of 
causation have been stated in this state, and as well from an application of the 
concepts found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Furthermore, this failure 
of the causal connection and the general inapplicability of the doctrine of 
strict liability to such circumstances foreclose any adjustment of the decision 
of the trial court under that theory of liability. The judgment of the district 
court is affirmed.

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶17.]  I agree fully with the dissenting remarks 
of Justice Cardine that this case, involving the intervening conduct of the 
plaintiff, should be resolved in accordance with our comparative negligence 
rules. I note, however, that even the concepts of superseding cause set out in 
Restatement (Second) of Torts do not relieve appellee from liability in this 
case. Section 446 provides:

"If the actor 
intentionally or negligently impedes the exercise of another's rights or 
privileges, the other's normal efforts to remove the impediment or to exercise 
the right or privilege notwithstanding its existence are not a superseding cause 
of harm resulting from such efforts."

Applying this 
rule to the undisputed facts - a function of the court under § 453 and Comment 
b, Restatement (Second) of Torts, quoted in the majority opinion, 703 P.2d  at 
1094 it is apparent that appellant's normal efforts to rid his hay baler of the 
negligently supplied diesel fuel cannot relieve the appellee of liability. Nor 
would appellant's negligence in removing the fuel free appellee from liability. 
Section 447, Restatement (Second) of Torts, quoted in the majority opinion, 703 P.2d  at 1093. Rather, our comparative-negligence rules would apply to apportion 
liability among the parties. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 
623 P.2d 1174, reh. denied 627 P.2d 163 (1981).

[¶18.]  I would have reversed the judgment of the 
district court and remanded the case for a determination of the parties' 
relative negligence.

CARDINE, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom ROSE, Justice, joins.

[¶19.]  I dissent.

[¶20.]  With the adoption of comparative 
negligence, old, musty doctrines, replicas of the dinasaur age when contributory 
negligence - no matter how slight - was a complete defense, have been held no 
longer valid or appropriate. We held that after adoption of comparative 
negligence, assumption of risk was no 
longer an absolute defense in a negligence action. Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532, 
534 (1979); Ruhs v. Pacific Power & 
Light, 671 F.2d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 1982). We eliminated gross negligence as a separate 
consideration in most circumstances, stating:

"The category of `gross 
negligence' will no longer be pertinent except in a few isolated circumstances. 
The obsolescence of the term `gross negligence' will be no great loss toward the 
attainment of equity. The term has been characterized as `an unhappy term of 
ill-defined content.' Prosser, Torts 4th Ed., p. 10 (1971)." (Footnote omitted.) 
Danculovich v. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d 187, 192-193 (1979).

We also 
eliminated as a doctrine entitled to separate consideration, last clear chance, when we 
said:

"Wyoming has recognized 
the doctrine of `last clear chance' as a defense to contributory negligence. * * 
*

"* * * However, there is 
no practical basis to the rationale used to retain the doctrine of last clear 
chance in face of a comparative negligence statute. Such rationale is that the 
doctrine is premised on the fact that defendant's failure to avail himself of 
the last clear chance to avoid the accident made such failure the sole proximate cause of the injury and 
plaintiff's negligence was therefore only a remote cause. * * 
*

"The apportionment of 
damages under the comparative negligence statute makes unnecessary the doctrine 
of last clear chance." Danculovich v. 
Brown, supra at 194-195.

Thus, we have 
said that the doctrines of gross negligence, assumption of risk, and last clear 
chance are no longer recognized and are unnecessary because of the adoption of 
comparative negligence. If gross negligence, assumption of risk, and last clear 
chance are outmoded, why not intervening cause? In this case it is a defense 
involving plaintiff's own negligence. In Sherman v. Platte County, Wyo., 642 P.2d 787, 790 (1982), we said:

"Comparative 
negligence * * * abrogated absolute defenses involving the plaintiff's own 
negligence in bringing about his or her injuries."

[¶21.]  These special defenses which still haunt 
us merely serve to confuse and make what ought to be simple, extremely 
difficult, even incomprehensible. I confess that I am unable to accept a 
proposition cast in stone that one who creates a condition, no matter how 
dangerous or likely to cause injury when acted upon by a third person, is not 
liable because it was a condition. In this case a rancher ordered gasoline for 
use in his hay baler; the dealer negligently delivered diesel fuel to the baler 
and the gasoline storage tank at the ranch. The mistake in delivering diesel 
fuel was discovered almost immediately. Appellant called the dealer who admitted 
the misdelivery. He did not offer, however, to correct the condition he had 
negligently created. Because the baler would not run on diesel fuel, appellant 
had to drain the diesel fuel from the baler and disconnect and purge the fuel 
lines. The fire occurred during appellant's effort to correct the problem 
created by appellee. I cannot agree that as a matter of law or fact appellee was 
not in any way at fault for this occurrence. I much prefer the simplicity of 
comparative negligence under which the fact finder simply determines the 
percentage of negligence of the respective parties rather than the confusion of 
old incomprehensible doctrines left over from a different 
era.

[¶22.]  For the reasons stated, I would reverse 
and remand.

ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING

[¶23.]  This case came on before the Court upon 
the Petition for Rehearing filed on behalf of the Appellant, and the Court, 
having carefully considered the case and the Petition for Rehearing, finds that 
the Petition for Rehearing should be denied, and it therefore 
is

[¶24.]  ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing, 
filed in this case on behalf of the appellant be, and the same hereby is, 
denied.

[¶25.]  CARDINE, J., would grant the Petition for 
Rehearing in this case.

[¶26.]  ROSE, J., comments that he continues to 
feel strongly that the majority opinion is in error but finds no grounds to 
grant the petition for rehearing.