Case Title: Horwath v. WN. WATER POWER CO.

Citation: 416 P.2d 92, 68 Wash. 2d 835

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1966-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
68 Wn.2d 835 (1966) 416 P.2d 92 FRANCIS I. HORWATH, Individually, as Executrix, and as Guardian, Appellant, v. THE WASHINGTON WATER POWER COMPANY, Respondent.[*] No. 37807. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. June 23, 1966. Jack Dibblee, for appellant. Paine, Lowe, Coffin, Herman & O'Kelly, by Horton Herman and Lawrence R. Small, for respondent. LANGENBACH, J.[] This is a wrongful death action, brought by a widow for herself and for her minor children, to recover damages for the death of her husband and their father. *836 On May 21, 1962, he was electrocuted. While he was painting a neon sign, he somehow came into contact with a power line, owned and maintained by defendant. The jury returned a general verdict for the defendant, and plaintiff has appealed. The facts are not seriously disputed. In the spring of 1955, the Baldwin Neon Sign Company (hereinafter referred to as Baldwin) prepared to erect a neon sign upon a building in Spokane. The sign was about 6 feet wide, 29 feet high, and about 10 inches in thickness. It was to be erected 11 feet above the street so that the top would be 40 feet in the air. Adjacent to and beside the point of installation, the defendant (hereinafter referred to as the Power Company) had a high tension transmission line carrying 2,300 volts of electricity, being part of a three phase 4,000 volt feeder line. The wire was bare, uninsulated and about 1/10th of an inch in diameter. Prior to completion of the sign, Baldwin had attached a bracket and an insulator pin, 14 inches high, on the outer edge of the sign. Baldwin's crew required the assistance of the Power Company's employees, as they believed the transmission line was too close to the building on which the sign was being installed. A conference was held between the city's chief electrical inspector, Baldwin and the Power Company. After the sign had been properly affixed to the building, the power line was fastened to the bracket and insulator. As to placing the line in question on this 14-inch insulator pin attached to the sign, the chief electrical inspector testified, "At that time it was considered that a man painting the sign or servicing it would never get that high." His opinion was that such an installation was not a violation of the code applicable to this situation at that time. On two occasions Baldwin had requested and received assistance relating to this wire from the Power Company.[1]*837 Before the accident, one of Baldwin's employees had twice painted this sign without incident. The safety regulations apparently required Baldwin to notify the Power Company whenever anyone was going to paint or service the sign.[2] After the accident, the Department of Labor and Industries issued a "Correction Notice" to Baldwin, but none was sent to the Power Company. In April, 1962, the decedent, Mr. Horwath, was employed by Baldwin as a painter. On May 21, 1962, he and one Abitz, *838 a journeyman painter who was in charge of the task, were assigned to service or paint this particular sign. They were furnished with a ladder and a boatswain's chair apparatus with other tools to use in painting. Nothing, however, had been said to these men about any possible danger. When decedent and Abitz arrived at the sign, they de-energized it by removing the fuse plugs to its interior mechanism. From the boatswain's chair and the ladder, they proceeded to paint the sign. They could not reach the upper corners of the sign in this manner. So the decedent went into the building and out on top of the sign; he was to finish the spots and corners left unpainted. No one saw the decedent go on top of the sign. Abitz saw him after he was electrocuted; no one knows how this happened. Abitz testified that he and the decedent thought the bare wire was carrying an electric current, but they had not been warned by anyone at the Baldwin shop that there was a bare wire on the sign. Upon viewing the wire, he thought it might be hot, as it was not insulated. Decedent had said he was not going to touch it to find out. There were no warning signs of danger. Baldwin was not a party to this action inasmuch as the deceased workman was covered with industrial insurance in an extrahazardous employment. From the judgment for the Power Company, the appellant has five assignments of error. They will be set forth and considered seriatim: 1. The trial court erred in refusing to give her requested instruction No. 6, which reads: [1] In support of this instruction, appellant cited Adkisson v. Seattle, 42 Wn.2d 676, 687, 258 P.2d 461 (1953), which set forth the definition of wanton misconduct as follows: Accord, Bensen v. South Kitsap School Dist., 63 Wn.2d 192, 386 P.2d 137 (1963). Appellant contended that the Power Company's maintenance of the high voltage line on a short staff of 14 inches for several years amounted to wanton misconduct. The Adkisson case, however, declared that wanton misconduct required an intent, i.e., the circumstances and conditions must be such that a reasonable man would know that there is a high degree of probability of harm to another person. Here the decedent's employer, the city's chief electrical inspector and the Power Company cooperated in the erection and manner of installation of this bracket for the support of the high tension line and they considered the wire to be safely installed. Another of Baldwin's employees had twice previously performed the same task of servicing this sign, as did the decedent, without coming into contact with this power wire. Moreover, the safety regulations, set forth in footnote 1, required Baldwin to notify the Power Company when the sign was to be painted. This allowed the Power Company to take the necessary steps, if any, for the safety of employees. Furthermore, whenever Baldwin or its employees requested any help, it was always furnished by the Power Company immediately. The trial court properly ruled, as a matter of law, that *840 there was no evidence sufficient to warrant such an instruction. 2. The trial court erred in refusing to give appellant's proposed instruction No. 12, to which exception was taken. She stated this instruction would have advised the jury that: Instead, the court gave instruction No. 7 (to which no exception was taken), the material parts of which are: .... Appellant's argument was that this instruction limited the jury to only one proximate cause of the death of decedent. She contended that there might have been the possibility of two or more concurring proximate causes which may have contributed to the fatal accident. The case of Russell v. Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 466, 305 P.2d 740 (1956), was cited in support of this position. That case is not apposite. It involved several defendants and several causes of action involving negligence. Here we have but one party and only one alleged claim of negligence. Appellant's brief stated: "Any failure on the part of the Baldwin Company, to protect its employees, however, does not exonerate the respondent from negligence which contributed to the death of Mr. Horwath." However, the jury found no negligence on the part of the respondent. *841 Under this same claim of error was the assertion that respondent failed to exercise the standard of care required in the location and maintenance of this high voltage power line and this failure was a proximate cause of the death involved in this action. The cases of Scott v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 178 Wash. 647, 35 P.2d 749 (1934), and Vannoy v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 59 Wn.2d 623, 369 P.2d 848 (1962), are cited in support of this position. The essence of the Scott case, as approved in the Vannoy case, appears in instruction No. 12 (to which no exception was taken). Accordingly, it became the law of the case at bar. It follows: [2] This assignment and these arguments are not properly raised. The exception to the court's failure to give her proposed instruction No. 12 was merely a paraphrasing of the instruction itself. This was not sufficient to apprise the trial court of the questions involved. See Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 51.16W, RCW vol. 0; and Franks v. Department of Labor & Indus., 35 Wn.2d 763, 215 P.2d 416 (1950). Also, the appellant's failure to except to instruction No. 7 made it the law of the case. Wright v. Kennewick, 62 Wn.2d 163, 381 P.2d 620 (1963). Moreover, considering all of the instructions as a whole, the jury could not have misunderstood "proximate cause" in this case. Instruction No. 11, in part, provided: Was the plaintiff's deceased husband negligent? .... No exception was taken to this instruction which became the law of the case. In addition, the court gave instruction No. 15, to which no exception was taken: *843 The instructions as a whole advised the jury that it must find some act of negligence on the part of respondent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury in question. The action was based upon wanton misconduct (which the trial court ruled out as a matter of law) or negligence of respondent. The only claim of negligence was the manner in which this high tension line had been attached to this sign and its maintenance. There would be only one proximate cause so far as the Power Company was concerned. The only issues submitted to the jury were this alleged negligence of respondent and the contributory negligence of decedent. Any negligence of Baldwin in failing to notify either party cannot be imputed to either party. Neither can it be intermingled with the other issues, viz., the alleged negligence of installation and maintenance of the wire as a proximate cause of the death and the claimed contributory negligence of decedent in touching the wire. For these reasons, this claim of error cannot be sustained. 3. The trial court erred in giving instruction No. 14, which was based upon the Safety Standards for Construction Work of the State of Washington, as follows: The appellant's exception stated: Later, appellant's counsel offered an addition to this instruction: "Our instruction would be that the jury is directed that the safety code of the state of Washington included in its safety code...." The court then asked: "You mean the section 6 you read, the one that excludes employees of the utility?" Counsel replied: "Yes." The court stated: "The motion will be denied." The essence of subsection 6 is as follows: Thus, it very plainly appears that said subsection 6 has no possible application to the case at bar. [3, 4] The appellant argued that this instruction was erroneous; the safety standards are not the law of the state and the violation thereof is not negligence per se and they do not apply to employees. This argument is not within the scope of the exception set out above. The exception merely *845 proposed an addition to this instruction, not its deletion. In order to have preserved this claimed error, appellant must have brought the error to the attention of the trial court for correction. Otherwise the portion of the instruction to which no exception was taken became the law of the case. Harrison v. A Bar A Ranch, Inc., 63 Wn.2d 592, 388 P.2d 531 (1964); and Wright v. Kennewick, supra. Moreover, this instruction was based upon testimony introduced by appellant. In the absence of a proper exception, this claim of error must be rejected. 4. Erroneous Ruling on Evidence. Carl Abitz, coworker with decedent and in charge at the time of the accident, was brought to the trial by respondent but testified at length for appellant. He said he considered decedent a careful painter; they had de-energized the sign mechanism. He figured all wires were hot; he looked this wire over and told decedent he thought it was hot. He wouldn't consider it safe to get near a wire thought to be hot; he told everyone he worked with to be careful. Decedent had said he was not going to touch wire to find out; decedent went on to the sign after he was told the wire was thought to be hot. Referring to a talk Mr. Abitz had with a police officer: (All without objection.) Later Mr. Abitz testified for respondent and said he had no independent recollection of having told decedent, "Joe, be careful." Lt. Hendron was then asked if Abitz had told him that he told decedent "Joe be careful." There was an objection hearsay as to what Abitz told decedent; overruled. *846 Then Hendron said, "He stated that he told the victim to be careful anyway." [5] There was no motion to strike nor to instruct the jury to disregard this. Appellant argued this evidence by Hendron was inadmissible and highly prejudicial on the issue of contributory negligence. At most, it was cumulative. While testifying for appellant, the substance of the same statement had been made and admitted without objection. It has been summarized above. This assignment is without merit. 5. Failure of the court to grant a new trial. Since this was argued only with other assignments, it will not be considered further. The allegations of negligence and contributory negligence were the only issues before the jury. When the jury returned the general verdict for respondent, the case was ended. Inasmuch as there was little dispute in the testimony and evidence and as to the law set forth in the instructions (to most of which no exceptions were taken), the verdict of the jury must stand. The judgment is affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., HILL, OTT, and HUNTER, JJ., concur. November 21, 1966. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 416 P.2d 92. [] Judge Langenbach is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution. [1] These two occasions were: (1) at the time of installation; (2) in 1956, the Power Company insulated the 4,000 volt line by two rubber hoses and a pin shield on the insulator. [2] The parties considered that Baldwin had violated the following provisions of the Safety Standards for Construction Work of the State of Washington, issued by the Division of Safety of the Department of Labor and Industries, Part A, General Requirements: § A-31 Working in the Proximity of Electrical Conductors It is the responsibility of those carrying on construction projects or performing any other work in close proximity to electrical conductors, to effectively guard their employees and the public against accidental contact with these lines, and also to eliminate the unnecessary interruptions and expense to the owners of electrical utilities and its customers. It is a requirement of those who do such work to make such provisions. 1. General Provisions No person, firm, corporation, or agent of same, shall require or permit any employee to perform any function in proximity to electrical conductors or to engage in any excavation, construction, demolition, repair, or other operation, unless and until danger from accidental contact with said electrical conductors has been effectively guarded against in the manner hereinafter prescribed. 2. Notification to the Electrical Utility or Owners and Responsibility of Safeguards When any operations are to be performed within 10 feet of any electrical conductors, the person or persons responsible for the work to be done shall notify in advance the owner of the electrical conductors of the work to be performed, and such person shall be responsible for the completion of the safety measures hereinafter stated before proceeding with any work which would impair the aforesaid clearances. 3. Clearance or Safeguard Required Any operation is expressly prohibited if at any time during such operation, erection, etc., it is possible to bring material, equipment, or any part thereof or personnel within 10 feet of electrical conductors, except where such lines have been effectively guarded against danger from accidental contact by either: 1. The erection of mechanical barriers to prevent physical contact, or 2. The de-energizing of the electrical conductors and grounding when necessary.