Case Title: People v. Johnsen

Citation: 

Docket Number: S040704

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2021-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
BRIAN DAVID JOHNSEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S040704 
 
Stanislaus County Superior Court 
R239682 
 
 
February 1, 2021 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban and Ikola* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
S040704 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant Brian David Johnsen of first 
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187; all undesignated statutory 
references are to the Penal Code), attempted murder (§ 664), 
two counts of robbery (§ 212.5), three counts of burglary (§ 459), 
and five counts of solicitation to commit murder (§ 653f).  The 
jury found true the special circumstances that Johnsen 
murdered Juanita Bragg during a robbery and a burglary.  
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G).)  The jury also found true that the 
murder was perpetrated by personal use of a deadly weapon 
(§ 12022, subd. (b)) and that the attempted murder count was 
committed with personal use of a deadly weapon and resulted in 
great bodily injury (§§ 12022, subd. (b), 12022.7).  At the close of 
the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.  Johnsen 
moved for a new trial and to modify his sentence to life without 
the possibility of parole.  (§ 190.4, subd. (e).)  The trial court 
denied these motions and sentenced Johnsen to death.  
Johnsen’s appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm 
the judgment. 
I.  FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case 
Sylvia Rudy lived alone in a residential complex owned by 
her employer.  Johnsen and his mother lived in the duplex just 
behind Rudy’s home.  There were openings on each side of the 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
 
fenced patio area of Johnsen’s home, which allowed for 
unimpeded access to Rudy’s home. 
(a)  September 3, 1991 
Rudy went to work in the morning.  During lunchtime, 
Rudy returned home to cash a check for her adult daughter, 
leaving the cash on Rudy’s dining room table before returning to 
work.  Around 3:00 p.m., Rudy’s daughter arrived at Rudy’s 
home to discover the front door wide open and the cash on the 
table missing.  When Rudy came home, she found a large hole 
in the glass window of her back bedroom.  Her VCR and her 
jewelry, which Rudy kept in her bedroom dresser, were missing. 
(b)  February 15, 1992 
Around 10:00 a.m. on February 15, Johnsen called his 
friend, Mickey Landrum, to ask him to come to Johnsen’s house 
and help move a television set.  Landrum arrived around 2:30 
p.m., at which point Johnsen drew Landrum’s attention to the 
television located inside Rudy’s home.  Landrum refused to help 
steal Rudy’s television.  Johnsen then showed Landrum various 
items he had taken from Rudy’s home, including a microwave, 
boom box, portable bar, china plates, and jewelry.  Johnsen 
informed Landrum he had broken into Rudy’s home before.  
Either at that time or a few days later, Johnsen also showed 
Landrum 10 keys attached to a key ring he had taken from 
Rudy’s home, one of which Johnsen surmised was Rudy’s home 
key. 
When Rudy returned home for the day, she noticed that 
her microwave and china plates were missing.  She also noticed 
that the window in her back bedroom was broken.  Rudy later 
realized that her liquor, boom box, and answering machine were 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
 
missing.  Her portable bar, camera, spare car keys, and spare 
front door key were also missing. 
Rudy attempted to call 911 from her kitchen telephone, 
but the phone’s internal components had been disassembled.  
She then tried to call 911 from the combination clock-radio-
telephone in her bedroom, but it was missing.   
(c)  February 18–19, 1992 
On February 18, Landrum spent the night at Johnsen’s 
house, where he and Johnsen drank, smoked pot, and snorted 
“crank” (i.e., crystal methamphetamine) together.  On the 
morning of February 19, a Modesto Police Department detective 
arrived at Johnsen’s home and took Johnsen in for questioning 
for an unrelated matter.  At Johnsen’s insistence, the detective 
allowed Landrum to stay at the residence. 
Shortly thereafter, Landrum received a call from Johnsen, 
who had been taken to the Modesto jail.  Johnsen asked 
Landrum to hide all the items he had taken from Rudy because 
he was worried that the police would soon get a search warrant 
and find Rudy’s stolen property.  Landrum acceded to Johnsen’s 
request and placed all the stolen goods into a truck.  Landrum 
then drove the items to a friend’s house.  Landrum’s friend 
refused to take possession of the items for safekeeping. 
Landrum then phoned Johnsen’s mother.  He informed 
her that Johnsen had left with a detective and that he had taken 
the items from Johnsen’s home at his request.  Landrum and 
Johnsen’s mother met up for dinner at a pool hall near Johnsen’s 
home.  Afterward, they drove separately to Landrum’s friend’s 
house so they could transfer the items into Johnsen’s mother’s 
car. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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Over the next few days, Johnsen’s mother kept the items 
in the trunk of her car.  She then asked her father, Johnsen’s 
grandfather, to keep several of the items in his garage, including 
the microwave, portable bar, china plates, boom box, and 
possibly an answering machine.  At some point, Johnsen’s 
grandparents told her that they no longer had space, so 
Johnsen’s mother moved the items to her aunt and uncle’s home. 
At trial, Johnsen’s mother testified that she did not know 
that the items were stolen at the time.  Despite her lack of 
awareness, she was suspicious about the origin of the items 
because Johnsen had told her, “As far as you know, I got it either 
at a garage sale or it was given to me.” 
(d)  February 28 – March 1, 1992 
On the morning of Friday, February 28, Rudy went to 
work.  After work, she left Modesto for a weekend trip to Pebble 
Beach with friends without first returning home.  Some time 
that weekend, Juanita Bragg and Leo Bragg, Sr., came to stay 
at their daughter Rudy’s home (to avoid confusion, Leo, Sr., will 
be referred to in this opinion as Leo, and his son, discussed post, 
will be referred to as Leo, Jr).  The Braggs lived in Las Vegas, 
but they came to Modesto every year to visit Rudy.  So they could 
get into her home, Rudy left a spare key for them in a furnace 
just outside her home.  The Braggs arrived at Rudy’s home some 
time before 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, when they spoke with Rudy’s 
daughter over the phone. 
On Saturday, February 29, Landrum spent some of the 
evening at Johnsen’s home, where he helped Johnsen and his 
mother prepare to move out of their home.  Johnsen and 
Landrum also drank, smoked pot, and used methamphetamine 
together.  Between 9:00 to 10:30 p.m., Landrum drove to his 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
 
mother’s home in the same city, where he spent the remainder 
of the night.  The next morning, around 8:30 a.m., Johnsen and 
his mother began moving out of their apartment.  Johnsen was 
moving into a Modesto apartment with Landrum while 
Johnsen’s mother was moving to San Jose.  Landrum arrived at 
Johnsen’s home around 10:00 a.m. to help them move. 
Later that day, around 3:00 p.m., Rudy returned home.  
She spotted her parents’ car parked in her carport.  After 
parking her own car, Rudy unlocked the front door’s deadbolt 
lock and entered her home.  She immediately noticed that the 
house was quiet and the curtains were closed. 
Rudy looked into the guest bedroom and saw her parents 
lying in bed.  At first, Rudy assumed they were napping.  When 
she entered the room, she heard Leo moaning.  As Rudy 
approached him, he reacted fearfully, and she saw that the left 
side of his head appeared to be bashed in.  Rudy then checked 
on Juanita.  There was blood on Juanita’s hair, and her body felt 
cold and damp.  Rudy attempted to call 911, but the bedroom 
phone was missing and the line to the kitchen phone had been 
severed.  Rudy was eventually able to call the police from a 
neighbor’s home. 
By the time the police and paramedics arrived, Juanita 
was dead.  Dr. William Ernoehazy, a pathologist, arrived around 
6:00 p.m. to analyze her body, which he found lying facedown on 
one side of the bed.  He determined that Juanita had suffered 
over 15 blunt force injuries to her head, resulting in several skull 
fractures penetrating into her brain.  He also identified six stab 
wounds on her neck and abdomen, and one that penetrated her 
airway.  There were cuts on her wrist, hands, and fingers.  
Considering Juanita’s injuries, Dr. Ernoehazy concluded she 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
 
died from blood loss from the injuries on the front, top, and back 
of her head caused by a ball peen hammer.  Based on her body’s 
lividity and the rigidity in her neck, upper extremities, and 
knees, Dr. Ernoehazy estimated that Juanita died between 
10:00 a.m. and noon and estimated that she was attacked two to 
three hours earlier. 
The police found Leo alive but badly injured.  He was 
treated at a nearby hospital emergency room.  A neurosurgeon 
treated the injuries to Leo’s neck, head, and abdomen.  
Physicians removed skull fragments and a clot from Leo’s brain, 
and sutured Leo’s lacerated inferior mesenteric vein and two 
holes in Leo’s large intestine and colon.  According to his 
treating physicians, Leo would have died without this lifesaving 
surgery. 
Detective Jon Buehler found no signs of forced entry into 
Rudy’s home.  All the windows and sliding glass doors remained 
closed, still secured with dowels.  Detective Buehler concluded 
the only other entryway into Rudy’s home was her front door, 
though there was no indication the door had been opened other 
than through ordinary use of a key.  A locksmith confirmed that 
neither the door’s deadbolt lock nor knob lock had been picked. 
Inside Rudy’s home, Detective Buehler discovered a pair 
of pantyhose consistent with the brand she wore, but irregularly 
located on her living room armchair.  Forensic analysis found 
inside the pantyhose a four-inch clipped blond hair originating 
from a Caucasian individual.  Through a polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) test, it was also determined that the hair had a 
DQ-Alpha type of 2,4, common among 9 percent of the 
population.  The lab testing destroyed the hair, so the hair itself 
was not introduced as an exhibit at trial.  Detective Buehler also 
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found a bloody knife in a knife block in Rudy’s kitchen.  DNA 
analysis concluded that the blood on the knife had a DQ-Alpha 
type of 1.3,2, the same type as Juanita’s and common among 3 
percent of the population. 
In the evening of March 1, Johnsen brought a paper bag 
with two phones and a calculator to the apartment of Linda Lee, 
his new neighbor.  Lee was with a friend at the time.  Johnsen 
was shaking and appeared scared and nervous.  He asked Lee 
to “get rid of [the bag] where no one would ever see it again.”  
After Johnsen left, Lee told her friend to go look for Johnsen, but 
her friend could not find him.  Lee’s friend then went to 
Landrum’s mother, who lived two doors down to see if she would 
take the paper bag.  His mother agreed to do so.  A few weeks 
later, Johnsen sold a combination clock-radio-telephone to Lee.   
(e)  Police Investigation 
On March 10, Rudy enlisted a moving company to pack 
her belongings at her home.  During the move, a company 
employee informed Detective Taylor, who was at Rudy’s home 
that day, that he found a bent five-inch kitchen knife covered in 
dried blood inside a dried flower vase in the guest bedroom.  Lab 
testing found that the caked-on blood contained a mix of 
phosphoglucomutase (PGM) types matching Juanita’s and Leo’s 
blood.  Because Landrum has the same 2+1+ PGM type as 
Juanita, he could not be categorically ruled out as a contributor 
to the blood on the knife. 
Sometime between March 1 and March 25, Johnsen and 
Landrum gave or sold Jorge Romo a pair of yellow dishwashing 
gloves.  Romo later gave the gloves to the police, and blood on 
the gloves was found to have a DQ-Alpha type of 1.3,2, the same 
as Juanita’s. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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About two weeks after March 1, Johnsen and Landrum 
drove to San Jose to visit Johnsen’s mother and grandparents.  
On the drive, Johnsen attempted to hand Landrum the front 
door key to Rudy’s home.  When Landrum refused to take the 
key, Johnsen threw it out of the car window along with a ball 
peen hammer inside a blue sweatshirt.  No home key or hammer 
was ever recovered by the police. 
On March 25 or 26, Landrum accompanied Detective 
Jolene Gonzales to his mother’s home, where Detective Gonzales 
took a calculator, jewelry, and three telephones into evidence.  A 
few days earlier, Landrum’s mother asked Landrum to take the 
suspicious goods away from her home, which she received from 
Lee and Lee’s friend, who had in turn received them from 
Johnsen.  Rudy identified two of the phones as hers and believed 
the third phone was the one her parents traveled with.  Rudy 
also said the jewelry was hers and the calculator was owned by 
her father. 
On March 26, Detective Taylor contacted Johnsen’s 
mother about the goods Johnsen asked Landrum to hide.  
Johnsen’s mother initially said she had no knowledge of the 
items, though she later conceded she kept them a secret because 
she “didn’t want to hang her own son.”  The detectives picked up 
Johnsen’s mother, and they went to her aunt and uncle’s home, 
where they picked up a box of china plates, a boom box, a video 
recorder, a portable bar set, and a microwave.  Rudy identified 
these as her property.  An evidence technician discerned Rudy’s 
daughter’s fingerprints on the china plates. 
(f)  Post-arrest Communications 
Johnsen was arrested on March 26.  Johnsen called Lee 
from jail, and he learned that she had turned over to Detective 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
 
Grogan the combination clock-radio-telephone he (Johnsen) had 
sold her.  Upon hearing this, Johnsen responded, “I’m done for 
now.”  Johnsen asked Lee if she would pretend to have memory 
loss during future conversations with the police since they 
“couldn’t do anything” to her.  Informing her that he had a key 
to Rudy’s home because his mother used to rent that unit, 
Johnsen inquired whether Lee knew of anyone who would break 
into Rudy’s home while he was in jail to draw suspicion away 
from him.  Rudy later identified the combination clock-radio-
telephone as hers. 
From jail, Johnsen also called Chester Thorne, Lee’s 
boyfriend and a recent acquaintance of Johnsen’s.  Johnsen 
inquired if Thorne knew of anyone who would be willing to 
“whack” Landrum and an unspecified woman, which Thorne 
understood to mean “kill.”  Johnsen wanted Landrum and the 
unspecified woman killed with a hammer and stabbed, and for 
the crime scene to be as bloody as possible.  Johnsen also wanted 
the person to place a telephone and other items into a dumpster.  
According to Johnsen, these steps would cause the police to 
think that the person who assaulted the Braggs remained at-
large, “still out there killing people.”   
Although Thorne did not intend to help Johnsen, he 
wanted to find out “for sure” whether Johnsen “really did kill 
them two old people,” so he promised to look into it.  When 
Johnsen asked Thorne if he would commit the requested 
murders in return for a “favor,” Thorne refused, saying he would 
find someone else.  Thorne did not tell the police about this call 
because there was a warrant out for his arrest for an unrelated 
matter, but he also took no steps to carry out Johnsen’s request. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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At some point, Thorne was jailed for receiving stolen 
property, unrelated to the offenses at issue here.  While Thorne 
was incarcerated in the Stanislaus County jail, Johnsen passed 
him notes.  Thorne copied one of Johnsen’s notes in his own 
handwriting before handing the note back to Johnsen.  That 
copied note instructed Thorne to inculpate “Mouse” (i.e., 
Landrum) for the crimes at Rudy’s home, provided a set of 
“facts” for Thorne to rely on, and advised Thorne to tell the police 
Landrum “said he would kill you & Linda if you ever tell.” 
Thorne also testified about another of Johnsen’s notes, in 
which Johnsen instructed Thorne and Lee as follows:   
“When Linda [Lee] is asked (on the stand) what it 
was that I said to her when I handed her the bag of 
property, she must not remember what I said to her. 
. . .  [E]ven when [the police officer] remind[s] her, 
she still must have no memory of the words I said!  
No matter what!  I will protect you and Linda till the 
day I die.  I expect the same from both of you. . . .  
Remember, if you or Linda is asked a question, and 
you know the truth will hurt me, lose your memory!” 
Thorne eventually pleaded guilty to various unrelated 
crimes, and in exchange for his truthful testimony against 
Johnsen, he received a reduced jail sentence of 16 months. 
(g)  Confession to Eric Holland 
From June to August 1992, Johnsen was housed in a 
Stanislaus County jail cell next to Eric Holland.  Holland had 
previously been convicted of counterfeiting and forgery in 
federal court, and he also faced several pending felony charges 
for forgery and auto theft in several counties. 
According to Holland, Johnsen repeatedly tried to 
convince nearby inmates to kill Landrum and Landrum’s 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
 
girlfriend.  Holland “wanted to get [Johnsen] to shut up,” so 
Holland fabricated “a colonel in San Diego that could take care 
of it” for “a lot of money.”  After hearing this, Holland thought 
Johnsen would “blow his smoke” and “that would be the end of 
it,” but Johnsen offered to pay the made-up contract killer with 
his Harley-Davidson motorcycle, some commissary credit, and 
any unconditional favors Holland might need in the future.  
Holland told Johnsen “the colonel owed him a favor worth 
$50,000” and therefore Holland’s use of that favor on Johnsen’s 
behalf would mean that Johnsen owed Holland $50,000. 
Initially, Johnsen offered Holland a written confession for 
his role in the death of Johnsen’s pregnant girlfriend, Terry 
Holloway, in San Diego, discussed in greater detail further 
below.  Holland rejected this offer as inadequate collateral 
because he was concerned the confession could not be verified.  
He insisted that Johnsen’s confession be related to his pending 
charges.  Johnsen agreed to confess to the crimes at Rudy’s 
home.  He instructed Holland to tell the colonel to kill Landrum, 
Landrum’s girlfriend, Landrum’s mother, Landrum’s uncle and 
girlfriend, Detective Grogan, Officer Fred Vaughn, Thorne, and 
Lee. 
Johnsen told Holland three different versions of Juanita’s 
murder.  First, Johnsen claimed Landrum murdered the Braggs 
and that Landrum was framing him.  Second, Johnsen said that 
both he and Landrum killed the Braggs.  Third, Johnsen 
admitted that he alone was involved in Juanita’s murder and 
the crimes at Rudy’s home. 
Johnsen told Holland specific details leading up to 
Juanita’s murder.  He had previously burglarized Rudy’s home 
twice — once in September 1991 and once in February 1992 — 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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while he was living at his mother’s home nearby.  During the 
first burglary, he broke into Rudy’s home to steal cash on a 
countertop.  At the time of the second burglary, Johnsen asked 
Landrum to help him steal a television from Rudy’s home, but 
Landrum could not make it.  During one of these burglaries, 
Johnsen stole the front door key to Rudy’s home. 
Johnsen told Holland he had planned to move into an 
apartment on March 1 with Landrum.  The evening of February 
29, he and Landrum got “stoned” and played games.  After 
Landrum returned to his mother’s home for the night, Johnsen 
stayed awake watching television before eventually going to 
bed. 
Around 5:30 a.m. on March 1, Johnsen woke up and “got 
dressed to kill.”  Because he was about to move away, Johnsen 
knew that this was his last opportunity to rape and kill Rudy, 
and he wanted to see if he could “do it.”  Johnsen went into his 
mother’s kitchen to grab a pair of yellow dishwashing gloves, a 
knife, and a ball peen hammer.  Using Rudy’s spare front door 
key, Johnsen entered Rudy’s home through the front entrance.   
Johnsen entered Rudy’s bedroom, which he found to be 
empty, before heading to the guest bedroom.  Spotting an elderly 
couple asleep, he stood beside their bed for three minutes 
contemplating if he had the nerve to murder them.  Johnsen 
then began stabbing Juanita and Leo with the knife and 
bludgeoning them with the hammer.  As Johnsen stabbed them 
through the blanket, the knife he brought bent, so he went to 
the kitchen to get more knives.  When Johnsen hit Leo in the 
head with the hammer, he assumed Leo had died when he saw 
Leo’s skull depress an inch.  To ensure he killed Juanita, 
Johnsen stabbed her body and slit her wrist and throat. 
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After he grabbed money from Leo’s wallet and Juanita’s 
purse, Johnsen walked around Rudy’s home and found other 
items to steal, including Leo’s calculator, several telephones, 
and a camera.  He returned to the guest bedroom and noticed 
Juanita was still alive.  To avoid being identified, Johnsen took 
a pair of pantyhose from Rudy’s dresser and placed it over his 
head before reentering the guest bedroom to stab Juanita again.  
As the sun began to rise, Johnsen rushed to leave Rudy’s home 
with a bag of stolen goods.  He placed the bag by a dumpster 
before going inside his home.  Johnsen told his mother he was 
jogging early in the morning and then went to McDonald’s for 
breakfast with the rest of the household.  As they were moving 
out, Johnsen saw an ambulance in front of Rudy’s home around 
3:00 p.m. 
After learning some of these details, Holland informed his 
attorney about Johnsen’s crimes, but Holland also asked his 
attorney “not to say anything” about Holland because he did not 
want to risk being labeled a snitch while in jail.  Still, Holland 
wanted the district attorney to know about the confession 
because he believed Johnsen was “sick,” and without the 
confession, Holland was worried Johnsen might “get off” and kill 
others.  Holland’s attorney informed District Attorney 
Investigator Fred Antone. 
Believing Johnsen’s signed confession would be sufficient, 
Holland was under the impression he would not need to testify 
at Johnsen’s trial for the notes to be admissible.  But on June 
26, 1992, Antone arranged a meeting with Holland and his 
attorney, during which Antone informed Holland that he would 
need to testify or Johnsen’s written confession would be 
inadmissible at trial.  At the meeting, Holland told Antone that 
if he had to testify, he wanted his state sentence to run 
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concurrently with his federal term, so he would not be 
villainized as an informant while serving time in a California 
prison.  Antone made no promises, telling Holland:  “[I] want 
you to understand that I’m not asking you to be a police agent 
and do these things for me.”   
Informing Antone that he could probably get Johnsen to 
disclose details about Holloway’s murder in writing, Holland 
asked, “Should I continue, should I stop?”  Antone responded, 
“Well, that’s, that’s up to you, Eric.”  Holland’s attorney then 
advised him, “The only agreement that they’re making with you 
at the moment is not to use any of this against you.”  At the close 
of the meeting, Holland signed a written form acknowledging 
that he was receiving nothing in return for his continued 
engagement with Johnsen. 
On July 3, 1992, Holland and Antone met again.  At that 
meeting, Holland said that he could get a written confession 
from Johnsen soon, but that he would not hand over the 
confession unless the prosecutor cut him a deal.  Antone refused, 
saying, “If you have any idea that you even think you’re working 
for us, stop,” and he stressed, “I don’t want you to do anything 
to try and make my case [against Johnsen] better.” 
Over several weeks, between June and a few days after 
Holland’s July 3 conversation with Antone, Johnsen gave 
Holland several written notes, prompted by questions from 
Holland.  In the first, Johnsen claimed Landrum committed the 
crimes.  In the second, Johnsen wrote that he and Landrum 
committed the crimes together.  For the third, Johnsen wrote 
out two or three pages detailing his sole responsibility for the 
crimes.  Holland rejected this confession as inadequate 
collateral because it offered only cursory details.  Consequently, 
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Johnsen prepared a 14-page account with two one-page 
supplements, where Johnsen again took sole responsibility.  
Johnsen also prepared additional notes detailing various 
aspects of the crime.  Johnsen flushed the first note and third 
note down his toilet. 
By September 1992, Holland refused to testify at trial 
because the district attorney had still not entered into any 
agreement with him.  Soon after, Holland was served a search 
warrant of his cell, and several notes were confiscated, including 
Johnsen’s 14-page confession.  A handwriting expert confirmed 
that the writing on the confession and notes matched Johnsen’s 
handwriting.  Johnsen’s fingerprints were also found on all but 
one of the pages of his written confession and on all of the notes 
passed between Johnsen and Holland.  Only after Holland was 
told that he would be subpoenaed did he agree to testify.  
Holland committed to tell the truth at Johnsen’s trial; in 
exchange, his state sentence would run concurrently with his 
federal sentence. 
2.  Defense Case 
(a)  February 29 – March 1, 1992 
On March 1, David Johnson, a coworker of Johnsen’s 
mother and unrelated to the Johnsens, moved into the home as 
Johnsen and his mother were moving out.  Johnson noticed a 
gauze bandage around Landrum’s left hand, and he 
remembered Landrum playing with the bandage. 
Johnsen’s mother learned from Johnsen that an unknown 
person’s blood was found on the knife, in violation of the court’s 
order not to discuss her testimony with Johnsen.  Following that 
conversation, she recalled seeing Landrum with a bandage on 
his hand.  Johnsen’s mother also testified that she gave 
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Landrum a spare key to her home so he could help care for her 
cats.  Landrum handed the key back to her four days later, well 
before March 1.  Antone testified that he recalled seeing a 
quarter-inch scar between Landrum’s thumb and forefinger, 
“near the webbing.”  Landrum told Antone that he got the scar 
eight years ago while playing a knife game. 
Johnsen’s mother also testified that when she went to bed 
on February 29 around 10:30 p.m., Johnsen was still lying on 
the sofa watching television.  Around 3:00 a.m., she woke up to 
stop a running toilet, and because she saw Johnsen asleep on 
the sofa with the television still on, she turned the television off.  
Around 6:40 or 6:45 a.m., Johnsen’s mother woke up to see 
Johnsen awake on the couch.  The two of them went to 
McDonald’s for breakfast with their housemates, the Greshams, 
around 7:00 a.m. and returned to the home between 7:30 to 7:45 
a.m.  Around noon, Johnsen and Landrum went for a 10-minute 
walk to buy soda and beer.  They spent the rest of the afternoon 
moving out of the home, leaving for good around 5:00 p.m. 
Ray Gresham, a cotenant of the Johnsens, testified that he 
and his six-year-old stepdaughter woke up around 6:30 to 7:00 
a.m. to find Johnsen and his mother already awake.  All of them 
went to McDonald’s, and they spent the rest of the day moving 
out.  Gresham recalled Johnsen leaving the home around 10:00 
a.m. for about 30 minutes to buy soda. 
After testifying for the prosecution, Landrum was recalled 
as a defense witness.  Landrum testified he was 99 percent sure 
that on the night of February 29, he left Johnsen’s home 
between 10:00 to 10:30 p.m. and slept at his mother’s house.  The 
only other person there with him that night was his mother, who 
left for work around 6:00 a.m.  On the morning of March 1, he 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
 
woke up at his mother’s home at around 8:00 a.m., had 
breakfast, and watched television.  Around 10:00 a.m., he drove 
to Johnsen’s home to help the Johnsens move out.  Landrum 
denied having a cut on his hand that morning or wearing a 
bandage on his hand.  He denied ever possessing a key to 
Johnsen’s home, aside from the day when Johnsen “went away 
with the police” and Johnsen left Landrum his house key.  He 
returned that key to Johnsen’s mother later that day.  Landrum 
also denied participating in any crimes at Rudy’s home. 
(b)  Juanita’s Time of Death 
Dr. Ernoehazy, a time of death expert, testified that he 
had performed over 10,000 autopsies and testified on time of 
death hundreds of times.  As noted, Dr. Ernoehazy examined 
Juanita’s body inside Rudy’s home around 6:00 p.m. on March 
1.  He observed that her body had not yet begun to decompose, 
which led him to conclude she had not been deceased for “a very 
long period of time.”  Based on her body’s lividity and rigidity, 
he estimated that Juanita likely died between six to eight hours 
before 6:00 p.m. — in other words, between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 
p.m.   
During the preliminary hearing, Dr. Ernoehazy said that 
Juanita’s injuries were probably inflicted no more than one or 
two hours before her death, which would place the attack 
between 8:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.  At trial, Dr. Ernoehazy could 
not recall exactly the basis for that prior estimate, and he opined 
that the amount of bodily hemorrhaging and vital reaction 
suggested that Juanita likely died several hours after her 
injuries.  On cross-examination, Dr. Ernoehazy conservatively 
estimated that Juanita died more than five minutes but less 
than 24 hours after sustaining her injuries, which was 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
 
consistent with the prosecution’s theory that Juanita was 
mortally wounded by Johnsen at around 5:00 or 6:00 a.m. on 
March 1. 
(c)  Eric Holland 
A witness testified that he sold a 1987 Porsche to Eric 
Holland for a $20,600 cashier’s check in 1990.  The cashier’s 
check turned out to be fraudulent. 
3.  Prosecution Rebuttal 
Detective Grogan testified that he did not see a bandage 
on Landrum’s hand when he saw Landrum on March 1 at 7:00 
p.m.  Detective Taylor testified that Johnsen’s mother told him 
that she woke up at 7:00 a.m. on March 1 and that Gresham said 
he woke up around 7:30 a.m. that day. 
B.  Penalty Phase  
1.  Prosecution Case 
(a)  Prior Criminal Acts 
Holloway’s former coworker Edward Nieto saw Johnsen 
slap Holloway’s face multiple times with his open hand.  In June 
1990, Johnsen threatened to hit Nieto’s new car with a bat 
because he had offered to give Holloway a ride to work.  When 
Nieto called to check on Holloway, Johnsen answered the phone, 
and Holloway had been tied up.  When Johnsen placed the phone 
over Holloway’s ear, she sounded fearful.  However, she asked 
Nieto not to call the police.  The next time Nieto saw Holloway 
at work, she had cut wrists and marks around her ankles.  Three 
days later, Johnsen came to their work and pointed a gun at 
Nieto.  Johnsen threatened to kill Nieto if Holloway refused to 
talk to him. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
 
On May 17, 1991, Holloway’s body was found in a drainage 
ditch off a highway in San Diego.  Forensic pathologist and 
deputy medical examiner Dr. Mark Super autopsied Holloway’s 
body.  At the time of her death, Holloway was 16 to 17 weeks 
pregnant with Johnsen’s child.  Dr. Super observed that 
Holloway had suffered several face and scalp lacerations, facial 
bone fractures, defensive wounds on her hands, and 
strangulation abrasions on her neck.  Her injuries were 
consistent with assault with a scissor jack and strangulation, as 
evidenced by hemorrhaging in her eyes, deep neck bruises, and 
fractures in her larynx and hyoid bone.  He opined that 
Holloway died by strangulation and blunt force injury to her 
head. 
At the time of Holloway’s death, Johnsen was confined at 
the San Diego County jail.  Two days before the discovery of 
Holloway’s body, Johnsen called his friend Mark Schmidt and 
asked to speak with Robert Jurado.  Schmidt, Jurado, Denise 
Shigemura, and Holloway all went to Schmidt’s apartment to 
await Johnsen’s call.  When Johnsen called, Jurado and 
Shigemura took the call in another room.  Johnsen also spoke 
privately to Holloway.  Around then, Jurado’s girlfriend, Anna 
Humiston, arrived at the apartment. 
After Johnsen ended the call, Schmidt gave Jurado a Weed 
Eater wire, which Schmidt characterized as a clear thin plastic 
line used for lawn trimmers.  Jurado looped the wire around his 
neck, tightened it, and commented, “[t]hat will do.”  At Jurado’s 
insistence, Schmidt told Holloway to leave with everyone else.  
At around 8:45 p.m., everyone except Schmidt left the 
apartment. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
 
On May 16, Humiston called her friend Melissa Andre and 
told her that she was involved in something very bad with 
Jurado and Shigemura.  Humiston told Andre that the three of 
them had murdered Holloway on May 15.  While Holloway was 
sitting in the front passenger seat of Shigemura’s car, Jurado 
and Humiston sat in the back seat.  Jurado began strangling 
Holloway with the wire as Humiston punched Holloway.  “Why 
are you killing me and my baby?” Holloway screamed, as she 
begged them to “[p]lease stop.”  They pulled to the side of the 
highway, which allowed Jurado to throw Holloway’s body into a 
ditch and beat her with a tire jack to confirm she was dead. 
Another friend of Humiston’s, Mia Rodigues, testified that 
Humiston told her on May 16 that she helped kill “Terry.”  She 
told Rodigues how it happened:  while in the car, Humiston 
pinned Holloway’s arms down as Jurado strangled her with a 
rope and killed her with a car jack.  With Humiston’s help, 
Jurado then threw Holloway’s body into a ditch.  On May 17, 
Humiston and Rodigues spoke and discussed Holloway’s murder 
again.  According to Humiston, during the attack, Holloway 
pleaded, “[w]hy me?” and “[t]ell me why.” 
Holland testified regarding Johnsen’s notes confessing to 
his involvement in Holloway’s murder, which occurred about a 
year before the crimes at Rudy’s home.  That handwritten note 
was admitted into evidence.  A handwriting expert confirmed 
the note’s writing as consistent with Johnsen’s, and a 
fingerprinting expert found latent prints from Johnsen and 
Holland on the note.  
Johnsen’s written confession offered an account consistent 
with the testimony of the other witnesses.  Johnsen called 
Schmidt so he could speak with Jurado and Shigemura.  All of 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
 
them went to Schmidt’s house with Holloway, as did Humiston.  
Jurado and Shigemura learned from Johnsen that Holloway 
threatened to tell drug dealer Doug Mynatt that Johnsen, 
Jurado, and Shigemura were planning to kill him.  Johnsen was 
also angered because Holloway was using methamphetamine 
while pregnant with their child.  Johnsen then spoke privately 
with Holloway and conveyed his anger about her threats to 
“snitch” on them for planning to kill Mynatt.  He noted her 
actions would “get a lot of people killed, including me.”  Johnsen 
spoke again privately with Jurado, who said they would need to 
kill Holloway.  If Johnsen could persuade Holloway to leave 
Schmidt’s apartment with the others, Jurado agreed to “do the 
rest.”   
Johnsen then told Holloway that he would tell her 
everything she wanted to know later, and he encouraged her to 
leave with Jurado, Humiston, and Shigemura.  Johnsen 
promised to call her later that evening.  Two days later, on May 
17, the police informed Johnsen that Holloway had been 
murdered.  Johnsen told them he believed Brian Dick, a drug 
dealer, was the perpetrator because Holloway owed him money. 
On September 1, 1991, San Diego District Attorney 
Investigator Anthony Bento interviewed Johnsen as a witness 
in Holloway’s murder.  Johnsen admitted his involvement in the 
conspiracy to murder Mynatt.  He also expressed sadness about 
the death of Holloway and their unborn child.  Jurado, 
Shigemura, and Humiston pleaded guilty or were convicted of 
Holloway’s first degree murder.  (See People v. Jurado (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 72, 82.)  The record does not reflect whether Johnsen 
was charged with any crimes related to Holloway’s murder. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
 
(b)  Victim Impact Evidence 
Dr. Lloyd Brown, the medical director of Leo Bragg’s 
outpatient rehabilitation facility, testified about Leo’s recovery.  
Leo spent half a year at the facility from June 1992 to December 
1992.  Before his arrival, Leo had already received physical 
rehabilitation for his injuries, so Dr. Brown’s efforts centered on 
restoring Leo’s cognitive and communication capabilities.  Upon 
Leo’s arrival, his ability to process information was severely 
debilitated, and he could not use proper facial expressions or 
speak except for an occasional word.  Leo began to regain control 
of his bladder, but it was not safe to leave him alone at any time 
due to impulsivity that arose due to his brain injuries.  After half 
a year of cognitive rehabilitation, Leo left the facility still very 
impaired; he still could not carry on a conversation orally or in 
writing.  In Dr. Brown’s view, Leo would never be able to live 
alone or make his own decisions; he would need constant 
supervision for the rest of his life. 
The Braggs’ adult children testified about their mother’s 
death and the caretaking duties they took on for their father.  
Rudy constantly visualized her mother’s dead body, and her 
mother’s death affected her daily.  Rudy’s personality changed 
after the murder, causing her to become fearful and avoid 
people.  Rudy also felt personal guilt for her mother’s death and 
father’s near-death injuries, believing that she should have 
realized her key was missing sooner and that she should not 
have left town for the weekend.  Leo Bragg, Jr., testified about 
his difficulty coping with the loss of his mother. 
After the attack, Leo spent three months in the hospital, 
a few days with Rudy, and the next six months at a cognitive 
rehabilitation facility in Tennessee.  During Leo’s brief stay with 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
 
Rudy, he could not communicate with her, his actions were 
unpredictable, and he had no control over his body.  Because his 
injuries prevented him from communicating properly, Rudy felt 
as though she had lost him too.   
Leo, Jr., and his wife took on full-time caretaking duties 
for his father.  Constantly agitated, frightened, emotional, and 
impulsive, Leo had to be constantly supervised; as a result, Leo, 
Jr.’s wife quit her part-time college teaching job to care for him 
and usher him between his medical and rehabilitation 
appointments.  Leo had to be retaught basic tasks as though he 
were a child, which was made more difficult by the fact that they 
could no longer communicate with him.  He regularly broke 
down emotionally every time he saw a picture of Juanita.  After 
15 months of familial caregiving, he was moved to an assisted 
living facility.  By that time, Leo could only muster smiles, 
handshakes, and an occasional farewell. 
2.  Defense Case 
Clinical psychologist Dr. Gretchen White prepared a 
psychosocial history of Johnsen.  She reviewed case materials, 
educational records, and mental health records.  She also 
interviewed Johnsen’s family and his mental health clinicians. 
Her report revealed that Johnsen had warning signs for 
future psychological problems as early as infancy.  Johnsen was 
a “difficult” baby, cried often, had frequent infections, and had 
difficulty sleeping.  His father was routinely absent from 
Johnsen’s childhood because of his naval service, so he barely 
parented his sons.  Johnsen was the eldest sibling, and he was 
talented at the piano, which improved his self-esteem until he 
quit playing at age eight or nine.  Johnsen’s grandparents were 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
 
involved in Johnsen’s life, including whenever his parents were 
absent. 
During his early childhood, Johnsen was prescribed 
Ritalin for his defiant, erratic, and fidgety behavior in school.  
Dr. White suspected that Johnsen had attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and that his mother’s lack of 
structure exacerbated its effects.  His parents took him off 
Ritalin at age eight or nine without medical consultation.  
Johnsen’s father was concerned the drug was stunting his 
growth, and his mother believed he no longer needed it because 
he was doing well in school.  Johnsen’s behavioral problems 
returned after his prescription was discontinued. 
During Johnsen’s early teenage years, his parents 
separated and divorced.  Following the separation, Johnsen’s 
father became more involved in his life, but his involvement 
declined when he remarried.  Johnsen disliked his stepmother; 
she in turn was critical of him.  At one point, Johnsen gave his 
father an ultimatum, demanding that his father choose between 
him or his stepmother.  When Johnsen was 16 years old, 
Johnsen’s father discontinued his relationship with his sons, 
and Johnsen’s tearful pleas for him to visit were rebuffed.  After 
that, Johnsen’s father only contacted his sons by sending cards 
to them for their birthdays and for Christmas, with a few dollars 
inside. 
Robert Remmer, a friend of Johnsen’s mother who lived 
with the Johnsens for about 10 years, babysat Johnsen when his 
mother traveled for work.  Remmer exerted minimal discipline 
in Johnsen’s life, and he often smoked pot and ingested 
methamphetamine with Johnsen and Johnsen’s brother, Kevin.  
Dr. White identified Johnsen’s mother’s boyfriend, Jack 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
 
Minteer, as a positive influence on his life when he was 17.  
When Johnsen’s mother and Minteer broke up, his departure 
disappointed Johnsen. 
In middle school, Johnsen began using pot.  He started 
using methamphetamine about a year later, at age 14 or 15.  
Johnsen may also have used LSD and cocaine.  A neighbor of the 
Johnsens told Dr. White about an incident in Johnsen’s teenage 
years when the neighbor’s bathroom window screen was slashed 
and a hand was stuck through it while his daughter was 
showering.  The neighbor went to Johnsen’s home, where he saw 
a carpet knife on the table, and Kevin told him that Johnsen had 
been cutting window screens around the neighborhood. 
After Johnsen overdosed and was hospitalized at age 17, 
he was enrolled in a drug treatment program with his brother.  
While undergoing treatment, Johnsen lamented the absence of 
his father in his life.  A psychologist found that Johnsen’s loss of 
his father from his life had a strongly negative impact on him.  
The psychologist also noticed Johnsen had a fear of failing due 
to anticipation of criticism and that his fear of failure infected 
his daily life.  He diagnosed Johnsen with an “under socialized, 
nonaggressive” conduct disorder as well as cannabis and 
amphetamine dependency.  The psychologist spotted symptoms 
consistent with ADHD, dysthymic disorder, and borderline 
personality disorder, but he never formally diagnosed Johnsen 
with any of those conditions because he was hesitant to label 
teenagers whose brains and personalities were still in flux. 
Upon 
Johnsen’s 
discharge, 
the 
treatment 
center 
recommended that Johnsen be moved into a residential 
treatment program, but he ended up moving back in with his 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
 
mother.  Following treatment, Johnsen maintained sobriety for 
about six months. 
Johnsen, his brother, and his mother were referred to 
outpatient counseling with a family therapist.  They received 
counseling for 20 to 25 weeks.  During these sessions, Johnsen’s 
mother regularly complained about Johnsen and his brother, 
and said she had no time to raise them because of her work.  
Johnsen disliked these counseling sessions and often expressed 
his anger and depression during them.  But the therapist 
avoided prescribing Johnsen antidepressant medication in light 
of Johnsen’s history of drug abuse.  These sessions caused the 
therapist to believe that Johnsen suffered from dysthymic 
disorder, borderline personality disorder, and major depressive 
episodes.  The therapist did not suspect that Johnsen suffered 
from any antisocial personality disorders.  At age 19, Johnsen 
was once again entered into a drug treatment program. 
A former director of the California Department of 
Corrections testified about Johnsen’s three disciplinary reports 
during his two-year pretrial detention, which included not being 
dressed in time for court, not being out of jail clothes in a timely 
manner, and unauthorized possession of the painkiller Motrin.  
Based on Johnsen’s behavior while incarcerated, he concluded 
that Johnsen would not be a danger to others if he were 
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.  But he had no 
answer to whether he was confident Johnsen would stop 
soliciting the murder of witnesses and others from inside prison. 
II.  PRETRIAL ISSUES 
A.  Denial of Motion To Change Venue 
Johnsen contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to change venue from Stanislaus County.  According to 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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Johnsen, the county’s media outlets engaged in “inflammatory 
coverage” that publicized inadmissible evidence and erroneously 
reported that Johnsen had “attempt[ed] to manipulate the 
system and delay the trial, thereby costing the county thousands 
of dollars.”  He alleges that the court’s denial here deprived him 
of a fair jury trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution. 
1.  Background 
Before trial, in November 1993, Johnsen moved for a 
change of venue pursuant to section 1033.  In support of his 
motion, Johnsen compiled about 20 news articles pertaining to 
his case and attached a survey report by Dr. Stephen J. 
Schoenthaler, a criminal justice professor at California State 
University, Stanislaus, which concluded that Johnsen could not 
have a fair trial in Stanislaus County. 
The district attorney opposed Johnsen’s motion, arguing 
that Professor Schoenthaler’s survey did not even ask 
interviewees the crucial question:  whether they would be 
willing to set aside their preexisting views and decide the case 
based on evidence introduced at trial.  The prosecutor’s 
opposition also noted that all 35 relevant newscasts aired in 
March 1992 in the weeks after Juanita’s murder and at the time 
of Johnsen’s arrest — nearly two years before Johnsen’s trial 
began in February 1994. 
The trial court held a four-day hearing on Johnsen’s 
motion.  Reviewing the newscasts, the court noted that in the 
aftermath of Juanita’s killing, journalists used fairly strong 
language to describe the scene, characterizing it as “an awful 
story,” a “tale too horrible to believe,” a “vicious and baffling 
crime,” and a “brutal crime against innocent people” with “no 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
 
motive.”  On March 3, some newscasts noted a $10,000 reward 
for information leading to the perpetrator’s arrest.  Upon 
Johnsen’s arrest, a few newscasts used photos of Johnsen as the 
suspect, noting that Johnsen had been acting suspiciously.  
Finally, on March 30, 1992, one newscast suggested that the 
investigation into Johnsen had unearthed some evidence linking 
him to the crime scene. 
At the hearing, the court also considered testimony from 
several experts.  Professor Schoenthaler detailed his survey 
findings, whose bottom-line findings purported to establish that 
Johnsen could not receive a fair trial in Stanislaus County.  To 
conduct the survey, defense investigators randomly called 
Stanislaus County phone numbers and asked 239 adult 
respondents whether they had been exposed to pretrial publicity 
pertaining to Johnsen’s case.  The survey found that 70 percent 
of respondents had already heard of Johnsen’s case, that 41 
percent believed Johnsen killed Juanita, and that 60 percent 
believed that Johnsen, if convicted, deserved the death penalty. 
Prosecution expert Dr. Ebbe Ebbesen, a psychology 
professor at University of California, San Diego, contested the 
survey findings.  Before Johnsen’s trial, Dr. Ebbesen had 
testified in opposition to venue change motions 25 times.  First, 
he criticized change-of-venue surveys generally, arguing that 
such studies are poor predictors of how jurors may behave at 
trial.  Second, Dr. Ebbesen contested the survey’s selection 
methodology on the ground that the survey participants were 
unrepresentative of the people who might be called for jury duty 
and unrepresentative of those who might actually be selected for 
the jury following voir dire.  Third, Dr. Ebbesen rejected the 
survey’s bottom-line conclusion in light of the questions asked, 
opining that the questions did not accurately pinpoint 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
 
respondents who had prejudged the case based on media 
exposure.  Finally, even taking the survey results at face value, 
Dr. Ebbesen opined that 44.1 percent of residents had no 
exposure to media publicity whatsoever and had no fixed view 
about the case, and that less than one in four residents could 
present impartiality problems in light of the case’s publicity. 
After hearing from both sides, the court had “serious 
doubts about the validity of the defendant’s survey.”  Professor 
Schoenthaler’s survey, according to the court, “was not 
conducted in a manner to ensure that the respondents were 
representative of the individuals who might serve on the jury for 
this case,” and it failed to “ask a sufficient range and variety of 
questions to provide good evidence about the meaning of the 
responses.” 
The court also found that based on Dr. Ebbesen’s 
testimony, the survey “did not show the high numbers of persons 
that were so affected that they could not be fair and impartial.”  
“No more than 20 percent of the venire have knowledge and 
attitudes that might prevent them from serving in a fair 
manner.”  The court also observed that “editorializing in both 
[the defense expert’s] report and in his testimony” suggested 
“some bias toward the defense.”  In the end, the court credited 
Professor Ebbesen’s report over Professor Schoenthaler’s 
survey. 
The court observed that the nature and gravity of 
Johnsen’s offense supported a venue change, but that all of the 
other legally relevant factors weighed in the other direction.  
The court ultimately denied Johnsen’s motion, finding there was 
not a reasonable likelihood that Johnsen could not receive a fair 
and impartial trial in Stanislaus County.  Still, the court left 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
 
open the option for Johnsen to renew his venue change motion 
if issues arose during the jury selection process.  In response, 
Johnsen sought a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal, which 
the court denied.  (Johnsen v. Superior Court, writ petition 
summarily denied Jan. 28, 1994, F020985.) 
2.  Discussion 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to “an 
impartial jury.”  (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.)  In furtherance of 
this right, California law provides that “the court shall order a 
change of venue . . . [¶] . . . [o]n motion of the defendant, to 
another county when it appears that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the 
county.”  (§ 1033; see People v. Smith (2015) 61 Cal.4th 18, 39 [a 
“ ‘ “reasonable likelihood” . . . “means something less than ‘more 
probable 
than 
not’ ” 
and 
 “something 
more 
than 
merely  ‘possible’ ” ’ ”].)  To make this determination, the court 
must consider “the nature and gravity of the offense, the nature 
and extent of the media coverage, the size of the community, and 
the community status of the defendant and the victim.”  (Smith, 
at p. 39.)   
“The trial court’s essentially factual determinations such 
as the gravity of the crimes, the size of the community, the 
status of the defendant and victims, and the nature and extent 
of the pretrial publicity, will be sustained if supported by 
substantial evidence.  We independently review the trial court’s 
ultimate determination of the reasonable likelihood of an unfair 
trial.”  (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 806.)  On appeal, 
Johnsen must show both error and prejudice — i.e., it was (1) 
“ ‘reasonably likely that a fair trial could not be had in’ ” 
Stanislaus County at the time of his motion, and (2) 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
 
“ ‘reasonably likely that a fair trial was not had’ ” based on voir 
dire of prospective and actual jurors.  (People v. Famalaro (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 1, 21 (Famalaro).)  Because we find no error in the 
court’s denial of Johnsen’s motion to change venue, we do not 
proceed to consider prejudice. 
Beginning with the first factor, there is no doubt that the 
nature and gravity of Johnsen’s alleged offenses — the capital 
murder and attempted murder of an elderly couple while they 
were asleep — are grave allegations that weigh in favor of a 
venue change, as the trial court noted.  (People v. Jennings 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 360; People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 
1142, 1159.)  As the press coverage highlights, people in the 
community “lived in fear” after this violent home invasion and 
viewed the “brutal crime against innocent people” as 
particularly sensational.  But because the nature and gravity of 
the offenses in this case are not dispositive by themselves in 
favor of a venue change (cf. Hamilton, at p. 1159 [there is no 
“presumption in favor of a venue change in all capital cases”]), 
we proceed to consider the other factors. 
With respect to the second factor, substantial evidence 
supports the trial court’s assessment that the nature and the 
extent of media coverage in Johnsen’s case does not weigh in 
favor of a venue change.  According to Johnsen, some media 
reports pertained to inadmissible evidence, hinted at Johnsen’s 
confession, inaccurately reported that “detectives found a bloody 
hammer, bloody tennis shoes and several of Sylvia Rudy’s 
possessions in [Johnsen’s] apartment,” and were potentially 
inflammatory by noting Johnsen’s possible involvement in a 
different homicide and his invocation of his Fifth Amendment 
right to silence.  Johnsen also complains that a few articles 
noted that his case had gone through several lawyers who had 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
 
declared conflicts of interest through no fault of Johnsen’s and 
that Johnsen had filed a $1 million lawsuit against one of his 
former lawyers. 
After reviewing all the media articles and newscasts 
relating to Johnsen’s case, the court observed that there were 
not so many articles pertaining to the case, approximately 30.  
Even Professor Schoenthaler acknowledged that the media 
publicity surrounding Johnsen’s case was “fairly moderate.”  
While a few articles used strong language and speculated 
beyond the facts of Johnsen’s case, the court noted that those 
articles were few and far between, and the court chalked up 
those discrepancies to “sensationalism . . . typical of the TV.”   
Finally, given that most of the coverage occurred nearly 
two years before Johnsen’s trial, the court noted that the 
coverage was temporally limited and had largely subsided “over 
the passage of time.”  This conclusion was further bolstered by 
the trial court’s observation, in response to Johnsen’s request for 
additional peremptory challenges during voir dire, that few 
jurors had even heard of the case.  The court noted “any publicity 
that [the jurors] had received was so attenuated and so long ago 
that it didn’t have any effect at all.” 
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual 
findings.  Over a two-year period, there were a few dozen news 
articles published about Johnsen’s case, and most were written 
nearly two years prior to Johnsen’s trial.  As we have recognized, 
“[t]he passage of time ordinarily blunts the prejudicial impact of 
pretrial publicity.”  (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 
1063, 1077; see People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 314 [“the 
effect of the publicity” was less “substantial . . . after an 
11-month interim” between the coverage and the defendant’s 
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33 
 
trial]; People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 434 (Ramirez) 
[“passage of more than a year from the time of the extensive 
media coverage served to attenuate any possible prejudice”].)  It 
is also true that strong language appeared in some articles.  But 
their characterizations were not disproportionate to the facts 
and circumstances of the crimes.  (People v. Suff (2014) 58 
Cal.4th 1013, 1048 [“ ‘Media coverage is not biased or 
inflammatory simply because it recounts the inherently 
disturbing circumstances of the case.’ ”].)   
Moreover, the trial court took appropriate steps to avoid 
prejudicial pretrial media coverage.  Media reports conveying 
dramatic facts that would not be admissible in court may 
inflame potential jurors and render a future trial in the county 
unfair.  (See Williams v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 584, 
592 [media coverage of defendant’s charges of burglary and 
assault with a deadly weapon, which were later dismissed, 
“could nevertheless have inflamed potential jurors”].)   Prejudice 
may also arise from media reports that suggest the defendant 
committed the offense.  (See Martinez v. Superior Court (1981) 
29 Cal.3d 574, 579–580) [finding potentially prejudicial an 
article discussing a witness’s invocation of the 5th Amend. 
during a codefendant’s trial and describing the witness’s 
admission to being defendant’s partner in charged crimes and 
disposing of weapons].)  Such media coverage, especially when 
widespread or occurring close in time to jury selection, “can 
dangerously lead to prejudgment by the reader or listener of the 
news coverage” and so generally “weigh[s] heavily” in favor of 
changing venue.  (Williams, at p. 591.)  The trial court largely 
avoided such pretrial publicity by, for example, excluding the 
press from the suppression hearing on Holland’s testimony and 
Johnsen’s confession to Holland. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
 
Next, we turn to the third factor, the size of the 
community.  “The size of the community is important because in 
a small rural community, a major crime is likely to be embedded 
in the public consciousness more deeply and for a longer time 
than in a populous urban area.”  (People v. Coleman (1989) 48 
Cal.3d 112, 134; see Rideau v. Louisiana (1963) 373 U.S. 723, 
724, 726 [finding denial of venue change violated due process 
where a film of the defendant admitting to various offenses aired 
three times in a parish (similar to a county) with a population of 
150,000 and was viewed by 24,000, 53,000, and 29,000 people]; 
People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 50 [“ ‘populous 
metropolitan character of the community [can] dissipate[] the 
impact of pretrial publicity’ ”].)  The trial court found that the 
size of Stanislaus County did not weigh in favor of Johnsen’s 
venue change motion.  The parties stipulated that at the time of 
trial, the county was home to “405,000 people . . . .  It’s not the 
largest county in California and it’s not the smallest.”  In People 
v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, we held that the size of 
Stanislaus County alone did not weigh in favor of a venue 
change at the time of another defendant’s trial in the 1990s.  (Id. 
at pp. 280–283 [finding that the size of Stanislaus County, with 
a population of approximately 370,000 according to the 1990 
census, did not compel a venue change].)  When Johnsen’s trial 
took place in 1994, the county’s population had risen by 35,000.  
(Ibid.)  In light of these data, substantial evidence supports the 
court’s finding. 
As for Johnsen’s social status, the court observed that 
“[t]here’s no evidence that [Johnsen] was well-known in his 
community or a public figure or that he grew up in Modesto and 
lots of people know him, whether he went to school here or high 
school or anything of that nature.”  The absence of any 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
 
reputation in Modesto renders Johnsen’s social status a 
“ ‘neutral factor[].’ ”  (Famalaro, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 23.)  Nor 
does the social status of the victims favor venue change.  
Johnsen presented no evidence showing the Braggs were known 
in Stanislaus County.  In fact, the record shows that they were 
Las Vegas residents who visited Rudy in Modesto for only a 
week annually.  Since “[n]either defendant nor the victim[] w[as] 
known to the public prior to the crimes and defendant’s arrest,” 
their relative obscurity properly weighed against venue change.  
(Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 434.) 
In sum, although substantial evidence supports the trial 
court’s findings that the nature and gravity of Johnsen’s crimes 
favored Johnsen’s motion to change venue, all the other factors 
weighed against his motion.  Reviewing the legal question de 
novo based on the factors above, we conclude Johnsen has not 
shown a reasonable likelihood that a fair trial could not be had 
in Stanislaus County at the time of his motion.  The trial court 
did not err in rejecting his motion. 
B.  Admission of Jail Informant Testimony  
Johnsen alleges the incriminating statements elicited by 
Holland outside the presence of Johnsen’s counsel violated his 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and article I, 
section 15 of the California Constitution. 
1.  Background 
Johnsen was arrested on March 26, 1992.  A few days 
later, on March 30, the prosecutor filed a complaint against 
Johnsen, charging him with murder with special circumstances, 
attempted murder, robbery, and burglary.  The charges in the 
information pertained exclusively to the crimes at Rudy’s home; 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
 
none of the allegations were associated with Holloway’s death in 
San Diego. 
From June to August 1992, Johnsen was awaiting trial in 
a jail cell adjacent to Holland’s.  Holland had been previously 
convicted of various forgery and counterfeiting offenses in 
federal court, and he had ongoing state criminal proceedings 
alleging forgery and auto theft.  According to his testimony, 
Holland had no prior history of “giv[ing] any information to law 
enforcement officials of any type.”   
Holland testified that Johnsen, while incarcerated, 
solicited his fellow inmates to murder Landrum and Landrum’s 
girlfriend, claiming that Landrum was framing him for 
Juanita’s murder.  Thinking it would “put an end” to Johnsen’s 
solicitation and “get him to shut up,” Holland pretended that he 
knew of a “colonel in San Diego” who would eliminate Johnsen’s 
targets in return for a sizable fee.  Johnsen named a list of 
people he wanted the “colonel” to kill, including Landrum’s 
girlfriend, mother, and uncle as well as Landrum.  Johnsen also 
demanded that Detective Grogan, Officer Vaugh, Thorne, and 
Lee be eliminated.  Johnsen outlined how he wanted them all to 
be killed.   
As collateral, Johnsen offered to prepare a written 
confession detailing his involvement in Holloway’s murder in 
San Diego.  Holland initially rejected this proposal.  Johnsen 
then offered to reveal his involvement in the crimes at Rudy’s 
home, which Holland accepted.  From that point forward, 
Johnsen described his crimes against the Braggs in 35 detailed 
notes responding to Holland’s extensive questioning.  Johnsen 
eventually also told Holland about “how he ended up being 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
 
involved in killing his girlfriend and his unborn child” a year 
earlier. 
Johnsen’s admissions worried Holland.  Holland was 
particularly perturbed by Johnsen’s lack of motive for killing the 
Braggs.  Johnsen told Holland he tried to kill them “because he 
wanted to see if he could get away with killing somebody.”  
Because of his concerns that Johnsen might “get off” and kill 
others, Holland asked his attorney to convey all the information 
he had learned to the district attorney.  At that time, Holland 
insisted he did not want “anything” in return, but he also did 
not want to testify at trial because that would put him at risk 
while incarcerated. 
On June 26, Holland’s attorney arranged a tape-recorded 
meeting with District Attorney Investigator Antone.  Antone 
told Holland that he understood Holland “may want to work a 
deal or something along those lines.”  Antone said he “was 
definitely interested” in any information that Holland had to 
offer and that he could guarantee Holland would not be 
prosecuted for anything he disclosed.  However, Antone also 
clarified that the district attorney would make no promises for 
Holland’s cooperation.  Holland disclosed details to Antone 
about the crimes at Rudy’s home, including Johnsen’s motive for 
killing Juanita and Johnsen’s solicitation of fellow inmates.  
Antone reminded Holland, “I’m not asking you to be a police 
agent and do these things for me,” to which Holland responded:  
“Oh, I do this on my own.” 
Holland then told Antone that Johnsen had mentioned 
being involved in a San Diego murder last year and that he 
expected Johnsen to reveal his role in that crime later that 
evening.  Antone emphasized it was up to Holland whether he 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
38 
 
decided to inquire into the San Diego murder, saying, “I don’t 
want get [sic] anything construed . . . where at some point in 
time you come back and says, well I only did it for, cause Antone, 
you know . . . said it would be okay.”  Holland acknowledged that 
he was not planning to ask Johnsen on behalf of the district 
attorney and that he just wanted to know he would not be 
prosecuted for lying to Johnsen.  Antone confirmed that the 
district attorney would not prosecute him for lying to Johnsen. 
On July 3, Holland met with Antone without counsel.  At 
this tape-recorded meeting, Holland wanted assurances that a 
leniency deal would be forthcoming.  Antone explained that the 
process of even arranging such a deal would require 
coordination between multiple counties given the charges 
pending against Holland, and Antone refused to say if any deal 
was in the works.  Holland told Antone he had convinced 
Johnsen to write several incriminating notes, and Holland was 
confident he could persuade Johnsen to prepare a signed 
confession detailing “exactly what happened” at Rudy’s home.  
Holland insisted that if he were to hand over that information 
to convict Johnsen, it would only be used if he got a deal.  Antone 
left the room to confer with the deputy district attorney.  Upon 
his return, Antone refused to enter into any agreement, even 
with a signed written confession. 
In August, Holland called Antone to tell him that Johnsen 
had accused Holland of being a snitch.  To protect Holland from 
potential retribution, the district attorney arranged for Holland 
to be moved from the Stanislaus County jail to the San Joaquin 
County jail. 
By September, Holland refused to testify because the 
district attorney had still not committed to any leniency 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
39 
 
agreement.  After learning that they had secured a warrant to 
search his jail cell, Holland promised to testify at trial about his 
jailhouse conversations with Johnsen, all the notes they 
exchanged, as well as Johnsen’s written confessions.  On 
September 4, Holland’s jail cell was searched; all of Johnsen’s 
notes, including his confessions, and Holland’s handwritten 
copies were confiscated and booked into evidence.  Holland had 
originally prepared “word for word” copies of Johnsen’s notes so 
he could show Antone the useful information contained therein 
without handing over Johnsen’s actual confessions until he 
received a deal. 
Before trial, Johnsen moved to suppress Holland’s 
testimony, alleging that Holland was a government agent under 
Antone’s direction and elicited inculpatory statements from 
Johnsen about his arraigned offenses in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.  During the suppression hearing, the court asked 
Holland if “anyone from law enforcement t[old him] to continue 
to gather information from [Johnsen].”  Holland replied:  
“Never.”  Holland emphasized, “No one ever asked me to get 
information on anything.  I did this all on my own.”   
In the end, the court observed, “Antone indicated he was 
interested” in what Holland had to share regarding Johnsen’s 
case, but he never “instruct[ed] [Holland] to elicit the 
information” and he never promised anything in return.  
Finding that neither of Holland’s meetings with Antone on June 
26 and July 3 rendered him a government agent under the Sixth 
Amendment, the court denied Johnsen’s motion to suppress.  
Given their comprehensive detail, Holland’s testimony and the 
incriminating notes Johnsen prepared became the cornerstone 
of the prosecution’s case.  After trial, the district attorney 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
40 
 
arranged for Holland’s state sentence to run concurrently with 
his federal sentence. 
2.  Discussion 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees the assistance of counsel during all stages of a 
criminal prosecution.  In Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 
U.S. 201, the high court held that once a defendant has been 
charged with any crime, any “government agent[]” who elicits 
incriminating statements from a defendant regarding that 
crime outside the presence of counsel violates this protection.  
(Id. at p. 206.)  Statements made under such conditions “are 
inadmissible at a trial on the charges to which the statements 
pertain.”  (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 33, overruled 
on other grounds in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192.)  
This prohibition on government agents applies equally to law 
enforcement officers and private persons enlisted by the 
government to elicit incriminating statements.  “[T]he primary 
concern of the Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation 
by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct 
police interrogation.”  (Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436, 
459.)   
“A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress informant 
testimony is essentially a factual determination, entitled to 
deferential review on appeal.”  (People v. Coffman & Marlow 
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 67 (Coffman).)  To prevail, Johnsen must 
show “ ‘that the informant (1) was acting as a government agent, 
i.e., under the direction of the government pursuant to a 
preexisting arrangement, with the expectation of some resulting 
benefit or advantage, and (2) deliberately elicited incriminating 
statements.’ ”  (Ibid.; see In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 950.)  
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
41 
 
“Circumstances probative of an agency relationship include the 
government’s having directed the informant to focus upon a 
specific person, such as a cellmate, or having instructed the 
informant as to the specific type of information sought by the 
government.”  (In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 915 (Neely).)   
Johnsen argues that the court erred in denying his motion 
to suppress Holland’s testimony.  He claims that Holland was 
acting as a government agent as early as his June 26 meeting 
with Antone and thus the Sixth Amendment demands 
suppression of any information Holland exacted from Johnsen, 
including his 14-page signed, written confession.  There is no 
question that Holland “ ‘deliberately elicited incriminating 
statements’ ” (Coffman, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 67) from 
Johnsen, so the merits of Johnsen’s claim turn on whether 
Holland was in fact acting as a government agent when he 
elicited Johnsen’s confession.  We conclude he was not. 
“Where the informant is a jailhouse inmate, the [agent 
prong of the] test is not met where law enforcement officials 
merely accept information elicited by the informant-inmate on 
his or her own initiative, with no official promises, 
encouragement, or guidance.”  (Neely, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 
p. 915.)  Although Johnsen argues that Antone encouraged 
Holland to elicit more incriminating information, his argument 
has no basis in the record before us.  Holland testified that he 
primarily told his attorney about Johnsen’s confessions because 
he was worried that Johnsen would avoid prosecution and 
continue to murder others, not because of any desire to negotiate 
a more lenient sentence for himself.  During his June 26 meeting 
with Antone, Holland was repeatedly informed that the district 
attorney would accept any useful information Holland had to 
offer about Johnsen’s case but would not make any promises of 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
42 
 
leniency.  (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1141 [“a 
general policy of encouraging inmates to provide useful 
information does not transform them into government agents”].)   
While it is clear that early on Holland recognized 
Johnsen’s confessions were sufficiently valuable that they could 
be leveraged into some deal, Holland also understood he was 
eliciting Johnsen’s confessions “on [his] own” initiative without 
external direction, guidance, or encouragement.  Holland 
acknowledged this when he told Antone, “I do this on my own,” 
and again when he testified in court, “I did this all on my own.”  
(See People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1247 [“If an 
informant ‘acts on his own initiative,’ even if he interrogates the 
accused, ‘the government may not be said to have deliberately 
elicited the statements.’ ”].)  In addition, after each meeting with 
Antone, Holland signed a form clarifying that Holland received 
nothing in return for his disclosures.  And unlike a repeat 
informant, Holland had never given authorities information 
about another inmate, so there is no indication that Holland was 
working under a preexisting agreement or continuing practice 
of collaboration with law enforcement.  (See, e.g., United States 
v. Henry (1980) 447 U.S. 264, 270, fn. 7.)   
As the trial court acknowledged, Holland was likely 
motivated in part by “some self-interest . . . in working a deal for 
himself.”  Likewise, Antone’s instruction that Holland should 
not consider himself a police agent “can be deemed as 
self-serving.”  For this reason, Antone’s statements that Holland 
acted on his own do not, by themselves, establish that no agency 
relationship existed.  (See Coffman, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 67 
[noting that a preexisting agreement “need not be explicit or 
formal”]; Rest.3d Agency, § 1.02 com. a, p. 50 [“Although agency 
is a consensual relationship, how the parties to any given 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
43 
 
relationship label it is not dispositive.  Nor does party 
characterization or nonlegal usage control whether an agent has 
an agency relationship . . . .”].)  Rather, we take into account the 
totality of the circumstances, including the possibility that 
attempts to disclaim agency may be self-serving.  The trial court 
considered this possibility and weighed it against Holland’s 
“testimony and demeanor,” which suggested he was “ethically 
motivated.”  The court also noted that an agency theory 
appeared inconsistent with Holland’s refusal to “give [Antone] 
the information” and the need “to serve a search warrant to get 
it.”  The court reasonably concluded that “based on the totality 
of the circumstances in this case” and “focusing on the state’s 
conduct as a whole,” Holland did not act as a government agent. 
The fact that Holland ultimately received leniency in 
return for the information he elicited did not transform him into 
a government agent because the district attorney did not offer a 
leniency deal or even say a deal was in the works until 
September, months after Johnsen had made his incriminating 
statements to Holland.  Although the district attorney did 
appear to be back-channeling with other prosecutors’ offices to 
work out a potential deal, there is no evidence that Holland was 
aware of such discussions aside from Antone’s brief comment 
that a deal of that magnitude would require significant 
coordination between various district attorneys’ offices.  We 
conclude Holland was not acting as a government agent and that 
the court did not err when it admitted Holland’s testimony about 
Johnsen’s incriminating statements pertaining to his crimes at 
Rudy’s home. 
In addition, Johnsen challenges Holland’s efforts to elicit 
inculpatory statements regarding his role in Holloway’s death.  
This claim also lacks merit.  At the time Holland elicited these 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
44 
 
incriminating statements, Johnsen had not been charged with 
or arraigned on any crimes associated with Holloway’s death.  
The Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s right to counsel on 
arraigned charges, not unarraigned offenses.  (Kirby v. Illinois 
(1972) 406 U.S. 682, 688–689.)  Even assuming the Sixth 
Amendment applied, we find no violation.  As discussed, 
Holland elicited all of the incriminating information about 
Holloway’s death from Johnsen on his own accord as a private 
citizen, not as a government agent. 
III.  GUILT PHASE 
A.  Alleged Instructional Errors 
Johnsen argues the trial court committed reversible error 
by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on various jury 
instructions with respect to Landrum’s testimony.  In 
particular, Johnsen asserts that because Landrum was an 
accomplice to Johnsen’s crimes, the trial court should have 
advised the jury with CALJIC No. 3.10 [definition of 
accomplice]; CALJIC No. 3.11 [corroboration requirement]; 
CALJIC No. 3.18 [accomplice testimony should be viewed with 
distrust]; and CALJIC No. 8.83.3 [corroboration requirement for 
special circumstances].  He also challenges the court’s decision 
to grant defense counsel’s request for the jury to be instructed 
with CALJIC No. 2.11.5 [limitation on discussing why 
coparticipant is not being prosecuted] as well as the court’s 
refusal to give certain special instructions.  According to 
Johnsen, these instructional errors violated his rights under the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution; article I, sections 7, 15, and 16 of the California 
Constitution; and California law. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
45 
 
1.  Accomplice Testimony and Corroboration 
Section 1111 bars any conviction predicated on “testimony 
of an accomplice unless it [is] corroborated by such other 
evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the 
commission of the offense.”  An accomplice is “one who is liable 
to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the 
defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the 
accomplice is given.”  (Ibid.)  “To be chargeable with an identical 
offense, a witness must be considered a principal under section 
31.”  (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 368–369 (Lewis); see 
§ 31 [defining “principal”].)  In other words, there must be 
evidence of that person’s “guilt . . . based on a combination of the 
direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts 
and own mental state.”  (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 
1117, italics omitted.) 
Only when there is “substantial evidence that a witness 
who has implicated the defendant was an accomplice” must the 
trial court instruct on “the principles regarding accomplice 
testimony.”  (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1223; see 
Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 369 [“Substantial evidence is 
‘evidence sufficient to “deserve consideration by the jury.” ’ ”].)  
“ ‘But if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support 
a finding that a witness is an accomplice, the trial court may 
make that determination and, in that situation, need not 
instruct the jury on accomplice testimony.’ ”  (People v. Gonzales 
and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 302.) 
The Attorney General contends there is minimal evidence 
Landrum aided and abetted Johnsen’s offenses.  According to 
the Attorney General, Landrum was merely an accessory to 
Johnsen’s crimes — i.e., a “person who, after a felony has been 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
46 
 
committed, harbors, conceals or aids a principal in such felony, 
with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape from 
arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that 
said principal has committed such felony or has been charged 
with such felony or convicted thereof . . . .”  (§ 32.)  Because an 
accessory is not “liable to prosecution for the identical offense 
charged against the defendant on trial,” an accessory’s 
testimony does not implicate section 1111.  (§ 1111; see People 
v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1113–1114.) 
We agree that the trial court did not err by declining to 
give accomplice instructions.  The trial evidence was 
overwhelmingly oriented toward the theory that Johnsen 
committed the crimes alone.  As noted, the jury heard testimony 
that Landrum was at Johnsen’s home the evening before the 
March 1 crimes and that Landrum drove to his mother’s home 
around 9:00 p.m. and spent the night there.  Landrum also 
explained how he came to briefly possess the property taken 
from Rudy’s home — namely, Johnsen phoned him from the jail 
and told him to dispose of the stolen property, which Johnsen 
had stored in his own home.  Landrum further testified that 
Johnsen tossed Rudy’s key and a ball peen hammer out the car 
window on their drive to San Jose.  He also disavowed 
participating in any of the crimes in Rudy’s home, including the 
February burglary where Johnsen tried to enlist Landrum into 
stealing Rudy’s television with him.  
Lee also explained how Landrum’s mother took possession 
of Rudy’s stolen property after Johnsen frantically dropped off a 
paper bag with the stolen goods at Lee’s apartment.  The jury 
heard Thorne’s testimony, in which he described notes from 
Johnsen instructing him to frame Landrum for the crimes at 
Rudy’s home.  Although Johnsen accused Landrum of 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
47 
 
participating in his crimes at Rudy’s home in his earliest two 
accounts to Holland, Johnsen later admitted that he was solely 
responsible.  Most importantly, Johnsen’s 14-page handwritten 
and signed confession was admitted into evidence alongside 
Holland’s testimony that Johnsen eventually conceded that he 
had committed all of the crimes on his own.   
In the end, the only evidence at trial that potentially 
connected Landrum to the March 1 crimes were Johnsen’s 
earliest statements to Holland attempting to frame Landrum, 
which he later retracted, and conflicting witness testimony 
about whether Landrum had a bandage on his hand on March 
1.  Landrum testified against Johnsen pursuant to a grant of 
immunity on these accessory offenses.  He was never charged or 
convicted of any principal offenses associated with the crimes 
that took place in Rudy’s home.  We therefore conclude that 
Johnsen’s claim that the court failed to instruct the jury to view 
Landrum’s testimony with skepticism lacks merit. 
2.  CALJIC No. 2.11.5 and Special Jury Instruction 
No. 28 
Before trial, Johnsen’s counsel moved to have the jury 
instructed on CALJIC No. 2.11.5 and special instruction No. 28.  
CALJIC No. 2.11.5 advises the jury to neither discuss nor 
consider why other individuals are not also being prosecuted.  
special instruction No. 28 would have modified CALJIC No. 
2.11.5 to “permit the jurors to consider evidence of ‘the guilt of 
any other person’ in determining whether there was reasonable 
doubt of the appellant’s guilt.”  At the time of Johnsen’s request, 
the court briefly considered the special instruction in 
conjunction with CALJIC No. 2.11.5 and observed that the 
relevance of the special instruction would depend on how 
Johnsen presented his theory of the case.  Accordingly, the court 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
48 
 
placed the special instruction in its “possible” file for 
consideration “[d]epending on how the argument goes.” 
After closing arguments, the court instructed the jury 
using the unmodified version of CALJIC No. 2.11.5 at the 
request of Johnsen’s counsel.  Johnsen did not reintroduce his 
request for special instruction No. 28, and the court did not 
revisit it or rule on it one way or another.  The court scribbled 
on the special instruction that it had been “[g]iven elsewhere.”  
On appeal, Johnsen now contends that the trial court erred both 
by providing CALJIC No. 2.11.5 and by refusing to provide 
special instruction No. 28. 
Johnsen begins by arguing that he did not forfeit his 
CALJIC No. 2.11.5 claim by requesting the instruction and by 
not asking the court to limit its application.  Even assuming 
Johnsen’s argument was not forfeited, we find that the 
instruction was not erroneous.  It is well established that 
CALJIC No. 2.11.5 “should be clarified or not given when a 
nonprosecuted participant testifies at trial.”  (People v. Crew 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 845 (Crew).)  Whether a person “ ‘was or 
may have been involved in the crime[s]’ for the purposes of 
CALJIC No. 2.11.5 is a ‘separate issue’ [citation] from . . . 
whether [he or she] was an accomplice.”  (People v. Williams 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 226.)  On the other hand, this instruction 
“is not error when it is given together with other instructions 
that assist the jury in assessing the credibility of witnesses.”  
(Crew, at p. 845) 
The Attorney General observes that in Crew, we upheld a 
conviction where the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 
2.11.5 because the jury also received instructions to consider 
“any evidence of witness credibility, including the existence or 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
49 
 
nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive (CALJIC No. 
2.20), and to consider the instructions as a whole (CALJIC No. 
1.01).”  (Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 845.)  Further, during 
closing arguments in Crew, defense counsel raised the 
unprosecuted coparticipant’s immunity agreement as a ground 
to discount his testimony.  (Ibid.)  Given these considerations, 
we concluded in Crew that the trial court’s inclusion of CALJIC 
No. 2.11.5 was not error. 
Similar circumstances were present here.  Not only was 
the jury advised with both CALJIC No. 2.20 and CALJIC No. 
1.01, but Johnsen’s counsel also warned the jury during closing 
arguments that “Mr. Landrum has been given immunity from 
prosecution for stolen property and drug offenses.  This is some 
evidence of motive of bias to testify in this case.”  Moreover, the 
defense’s case largely rested on the theory that Landrum, not 
Johnsen, committed the crimes at Rudy’s home.  Central to this 
theory were Johnsen’s efforts to show Landrum’s mother was 
Landrum’s only alibi the night of February 29 and the morning 
of March 1, and that he variously handled the goods taken from 
Rudy’s home.  At the same time, the defense sought to 
undermine Landrum’s credibility by (1) arguing his testimony 
was unreliable because he had ingested “crank” the night before 
and (2) introducing testimony that Landrum had a bandaged 
wound on his hand during the Johnsens’ move on March 1.  As 
a result, notwithstanding CALJIC No. 2.11.5, the jury received 
other instructions to assist them in evaluating Landrum’s 
credibility as a nonprosecuted coparticipant.  Consequently, 
Johnsen’s claim lacks merit. 
Johnsen has also failed to establish instructional error 
with respect to special instruction No. 28.  There is no precedent 
that compels the trial court to instruct the jury specifically on 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
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50 
 
the reasonable doubt standard in the context of third party 
culpability when the jury has already received a general 
instruction on the reasonable doubt standard.  (See People v. 
Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 825 [“because the jury could 
have acquitted defendant had it believed that a third party was 
responsible for [the victim’s] death, no third party culpability 
instruction was necessary”].) 
3.  Special Jury Instruction No. 14 
Johnsen also challenges the court’s denial of related 
defense-requested instructions, which he asserts “were 
necessary to guide the jury’s consideration of Landrum’s 
testimony” and of third party culpability. 
Special instruction No 14 read:  “The testimony of a 
witness who provides evidence against a defendant for 
immunity from punishment, or for any other personal 
advantage, must be examined to determine whether this 
testimony has been affected by the grant of immunity, by 
personal interest, by expectation of reward, or by prejudice 
against the defendant.”  In denying special instruction No. 14, 
the court found that it would be duplicative of CALJIC No. 2.20.  
As noted, CALJIC No. 2.20 permits the jury to consider any 
evidence of witness credibility, including “[t]he existence or 
nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive.”  (CALJIC No. 
2.20.)  The Attorney General reiterates special instruction No. 
14 would have been redundant.  We agree.  Having been 
instructed with CALJIC No. 2.20, the jury was already aware 
that it could consider any “bias, interest, or other motive” in 
assessing witness credibility, including a grant of immunity. 
Johnsen claims our reasoning in People v. Hunter (1989) 
49 Cal.3d 957 supports his position.  But in Hunter, we found no 
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error in the court’s refusal to instruct the jury to view an 
immunized witness’s testimony with “ ‘greater care and caution’ 
than the ‘testimony of an ordinary witness.’ ”  (Id. at p. 976.)  “No 
California authority supports [Johnsen’s] contention that an 
immunized witness, unlike an informant, is so analogous to an 
accomplice that a trial court must, upon request, give cautionary 
instructions as to the trustworthiness of immunized witness 
testimony.”  (Id. at p. 977.)  
B.  DNA Evidence Chain of Custody 
Johnsen contends the trial court improperly rejected his 
motion to exclude the expert testimony of molecular biologist 
Julie Cooper.  During trial, Cooper testified about her analysis 
of DNA extracted from hair found on pantyhose in Rudy’s home.  
Before Cooper analyzed the hair, it was accidentally broken into 
two hair fragments at the Department of Justice’s crime lab in 
Modesto.  On appeal, Johnsen asserts the trial court abused its 
discretion by finding that the hair’s chain of custody had been 
established with reasonable certainty. 
1.  Background 
Several prosecution witnesses testified regarding the 
hair’s chain of custody from its initial discovery until the point 
where the DNA analysis dissolved it.  Detective Buehler first 
discovered a pair of pantyhose on an armchair in Rudy’s living 
room.  The pantyhose were delivered to the state Department of 
Justice’s lab in Modesto.  There, criminalist Dr. Richard Lynd 
discovered a single four-inch blond hair inside.  Through 
microscopic analysis, Dr. Lynd concluded the hair came from a 
Caucasian person’s head, which may have been Johnsen’s, given 
similarities 
in 
color, 
length, 
texture, 
and 
microscopic 
characteristics.  Dr. Lynd’s analysis ruled out Juanita, Rudy, 
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and Landrum as possible sources of the hair.  Later, the hair 
was brought to a Stockton lab, where it was analyzed.  The 
criminalist sealed the hair in a plastic petri dish with tape and 
returned it to the Modesto lab.   
On June 3, 1992, Dr. Lynd unsealed the petri dish to 
photograph the hair.  While doing so, he found the hair “taped 
to the plastic container.”  In his efforts “to get [the hair] out,” Dr. 
Lynd inadvertently “broke the hair in two pieces.”  He 
photographed the evidence on a slide and returned it to storage.  
Two weeks later, Dr. Lynd retrieved the evidence to take 
another round of photographs.  He then “removed the hair from 
the slide, rinsed the mounting media off of the hair and 
packaged it for shipping for the DNA analysis.”  Dr. Lynd did 
not normally wear a mask, hairnet, or gloves while working. 
On June 22, 1992, Detective Bill Grogan transported the 
hair evidence to Cellmark Diagnostics, a DNA testing lab.  
Cooper, a Cellmark molecular biologist, opened the container to 
find “two very fine blond hairs” and “nothing else.”  Cooper 
testified that she “did not examine both ends of both pieces of 
hair [with] more than just a quick glance,” but she thought “at 
least one of those hairs did have an end which looked thicker 
and could have been a pulled root.”   
Three months later, Cooper again visually examined the 
hair.  She noticed that the “[t]wo pieces of hair . . . looked like 
they had an end that breathed out a bit which, from my 
experience, I know that hairs usually with a root, that’s the 
fatter end.”  She said she was simply making a lay observation 
because Cellmark is “not a hair analyzing laboratory.”  She 
clipped what appeared to be the fatter ends off the hair and 
placed them into a single tube for PCR analysis.  This process 
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53 
 
consumed the hair pieces altogether.  As a result, the jury heard 
Cooper’s testimony on the results of her DNA analysis, but the 
hair fragments were never admitted into evidence at trial. 
Upon hearing Cooper’s testimony, Johnsen’s counsel did 
not move to strike her findings based on inadequate chain of 
custody or on any other ground.  After hearing testimony on the 
hair’s chain of custody, the court credited Dr. Lynd’s explanation 
that he accidentally broke a single hair into two when 
extricating it from the tape as adequate justification for the two 
hair pieces.  The court also noted that Cooper’s subsequent 
impression that “there were two hairs [that] both had roots” was 
easily explained because her perception was based on mere 
visual observation that both hairs “looked like they had an end 
that breathed out a bit” without actually confirming that they 
were in fact root ends.  The court accepted Cooper’s assertion 
that she “never looked at [the hairs] closely.”  In the end, the 
court found there was only “bare speculation that it’s not the 
same hair” and that the speculation should bear on the weight 
of the evidence, not admissibility.   
2.  Discussion 
Johnsen argues that the apparent presence of root ends on 
both hairs is a “critical anomaly” and “indicat[es] that the hair 
evidence had been altered either by contamination or by 
substitution/addition of one or both of the hair fragments.”  The 
crux of Johnsen’s claim is that it is factually impossible to break 
a single hair with one root end into two hairs each with root 
ends.  Given this, Johnsen complains that the presence of two 
hairs each with root ends is clear evidence of tampering. 
Although Johnsen’s counsel expressed general concerns 
about the hair’s chain of custody at trial, Johnsen never objected 
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54 
 
to Cooper’s testimony on the record before or after it was 
introduced.  Thus, the Attorney General asserts, Johnsen’s 
claim is forfeited.  Johnsen concedes that the record does not 
show his counsel moved to strike Cooper’s testimony at any 
point.  Nevertheless, Johnsen asserts his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance (1) by eliciting testimony from Cooper 
reiterating that Johnsen’s DQ-Alpha type matched the blond 
hair found in the pantyhose and (2) by failing to have Cooper’s 
testimony stricken altogether. 
Even assuming Johnsen’s claim is not forfeited, we reject 
it on the merits.  We clarified in People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 
566 (Riser), that “the party relying on an expert analysis of 
demonstrative evidence must show that it is in fact the evidence 
found at the scene of the crime, and that between receipt and 
analysis there has been no substitution or tampering . . . .”  (Id. 
at p. 580.)  There, we “set[] forth the rules for establishing chain 
of custody:  ‘The burden on the party offering the evidence is to 
show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all the 
circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty with 
which the particular evidence could have been altered, it is 
reasonably certain that there was no alteration.  [¶] The 
requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when some vital 
link in the chain of possession is not accounted for, because then 
it is as likely as not that the evidence analyzed was not the 
evidence originally received.  Left to such speculation the court 
must exclude the evidence.  [Citations.]  Conversely, when it is 
the barest speculation that there was tampering, it is proper to 
admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to its 
weight.’ ” (People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 559 (Diaz).) 
The trial court acted within its discretion when it held the 
district attorney had properly accounted for the hair’s chain of 
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custody and thus Cooper’s testimony offered only “the barest 
speculation that there was tampering.”  (Riser, supra, 47 Cal.2d 
at p. 581.)  By furnishing firsthand testimony from Dr. Lynd 
that he accidentally broke one hair into two pieces at the 
Modesto lab, the prosecution made “at least a prima facie 
showing that the evidence had not been tampered with,” at least 
not in any way that could alter the subsequent forensic analysis.  
(People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1135.)  Aside from 
Cooper’s testimony that she may have seen two root ends, there 
is no evidence supporting Johnsen’s theory that the hair was 
tampered with.  The trial court properly held that testimony 
about the hair was admissible and that the discrepancies, if any, 
raised by Cooper’s visual perception go to the weight of that 
evidence.  (Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 559.) 
C.  Alleged Error in Stating Reasonable Doubt 
Standard 
Johnsen alleges that statements made by the prosecution 
and defense diluted the reasonable doubt standard and shifted 
the burden of proof to Johnsen.  He complains that this error 
violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights and corresponding rights in the state Constitution. 
1.  Background 
In his opening argument, the district attorney recited the 
jury instruction defining reasonable doubt (CALJIC No. 2.90), 
and he then informed the jury:   
“[H]aving that definition which the Court will 
read to you in mind, you can see that reasonable 
doubt doesn’t mean a mere possible doubt.  It does 
not mean proof to an absolute certainly [sic] and it 
doesn’t mean proof beyond a shadow of a doubt. 
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“I’m going to suggest to you that, based on this 
definition of reasonable doubt, if any one of you feels 
that he or she might have a reasonable doubt, he or 
she should be able to do three things.  One, they 
should be able to put the doubt into words; two, they 
should be able to point to something in the evidence 
that makes them have that doubt; and, three, that 
juror should be able to convince his or her fellow 
jurors that the doubt is reasonable. 
“If you can’t do all three of these things then I 
suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, the doubt that 
you are contemplating is the imaginary or mere 
possible doubt that is referred to in the Court’s 
instruction.” 
Johnsen’s counsel did not object at the time to the 
prosecution’s characterization of the reasonable doubt standard. 
During closing argument, however, defense counsel 
directly confronted the prosecutor’s opening comments: 
“[The prosecutor] talked about a method to decide 
whether or not any doubt that you might have on 
any particular fact is reasonable. 
“And I agree with the first two steps that he said 
to take, and that number one step is articulate the 
doubt.  If you have a doubt that you can talk about, 
if you can put it into words, if you can articulate it, 
it may be reasonable doubt.  If you can point to a 
particular piece of evidence to support that doubt 
and say, “I don’t feel good about this evidence and it 
makes me doubt which it’s offered to prove,” those 
are two steps that you should do. 
“However, [the prosecutor] is wrong on the third 
step.  You’re not required and you don’t need to be 
able to convince your fellow jurors regarding 
whether or not the doubt is reasonable.  Your job is 
not to convince others.  Your job is to deliberate.  
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Your job is to deliberate and decide in your own mind 
whether each piece of evidence is reasonable, 
whether it’s unreasonable, what it means, what it 
doesn’t mean.  And if you have doubt, you’re entitled 
to retain that doubt and to consider it a reasonable 
doubt, even though you cannot convince another 
juror or the rest of your fellow jurors about that 
particular issue. 
. . . 
“I can’t articulate for you or I can’t say for you 
what is reasonable and what is unreasonable but I 
think if you can state it in your mind, if you can talk 
about it to someone else and point to a piece of 
evidence that you think is crucial and critical to the 
prosecution’s case that you have a doubt about, that 
creates in your mind a doubt which is reasonable, 
and you can talk about[,] then you have not been 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, to a moral 
certainty. 
“It’s not necessary, as I said before, it’s not 
necessary that you’re able to convince anybody else 
in this jury.  Your duty is to deliberate, which means 
to discuss, listen with an open mind, state your 
opinion, listen to other people’s opinions.  But if you 
believe something to be such that it creates a doubt 
in your mind and you can’t get rid of that doubt then 
you don’t have to change your mind.  You’re entitled 
to maintain that opinion as long as you deliberate 
fairly.” 
During his rebuttal, the prosecutor clarified: 
“Reasonable doubt is the burden of proof which 
the People shoulder.  And the operative word is 
‘reasonable.’  If you don’t have any method of 
assessing whether or not any doubt that you have is 
reasonable or unreasonable, then the instruction is 
meaningless.  The concept is useless. 
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“And you have to test the reasonableness of any 
doubt.  And one of the ways you do that is to discuss 
any perceived doubt with your fellow jurors, put it 
into words, test it, and see if anybody else agrees 
with you that that is a reasonable doubt.  That’s how 
you test it.  There’s no other way to assess any doubt.  
There’s no way to tell whether a doubt is fanciful, 
imaginary, or just a mere possible doubt.” 
After closing arguments, the court instructed the jury with 
CALJIC No 2.90.  As given, the instruction provided:  
“A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to 
be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in the 
case of a reasonable doubt whether guilt is 
satisfactorily shown, the defendant is entitled to a 
verdict of not guilty.  This presumption places upon 
the People the burden of proving the defendant’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
“Reasonable doubt is defined as follows:  It is not 
a mere possible doubt because everything relating to 
human affairs and depending on moral evidence is 
open to some possible or imaginary doubt.  It is the 
state of the case which, after the entire comparison 
and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the 
mind of the jurors in that condition that they cannot 
say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral 
certainty of the truth of the charge.” 
The court also instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.40.  
As given, that instruction provided: 
“The People and the defendant are entitled to the 
individual opinion of each juror. 
“Each of you must consider the evidence for the 
purpose of reaching a verdict if you can do so.  Each 
of you must decide the case for yourself, but should 
do so only after discussing the evidence and 
instructions with the other jurors. 
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“Do not hesitate to change an opinion if you are 
convinced it is wrong.  However, do not decide any 
question in a particular way because a majority of 
the jurors, or any of them, favor such a decision.” 
2.  Discussion 
As an initial matter, the Attorney General argues that 
Johnsen forfeited his challenge to the alleged misconduct.  “It is 
well settled that making a timely and specific objection at trial, 
and requesting the jury be admonished (if jury is not waived), is 
a necessary prerequisite to preserve a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct for appeal.”  (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 
1293, 1328 (Seumanu).)  Johnsen did not object to the district 
attorney’s characterization of the reasonable doubt standard.  
While failure to object would not forfeit his claim when doing so 
would have been futile or an admonition would be insufficient to 
cure the purported harm, the record does not suggest that a 
timely objection would be futile or insufficient.  (People v. 
Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674 (Centeno).)  Thus, Johnsen 
has forfeited this challenge on appeal. 
Johnsen claims that his counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to object.  To demonstrate ineffective 
assistance of counsel, Johnsen “must show that counsel’s 
performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced 
the defense.”  (Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, 521, citing 
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).)  
On direct appeal, a finding of deficient performance is 
warranted where “(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel 
had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or 
omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to 
provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory 
explanation.”  (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)  
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“[W]here counsel’s trial tactics or strategic reasons for 
challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will not 
find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there 
could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions.”  
(People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 926.) 
We have said that “the decision . . . whether to object to 
comments made by the prosecutor in closing argument is a 
highly tactical one.”  (People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 
942.)  Instead of registering a contemporaneous objection, 
defense counsel appears to have made a tactical choice to 
undermine the prosecutor in his own closing remarks.  In 
Centeno, we held that there was “no reasonable tactical purpose” 
for defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s use of 
an improper hypothetical that was reasonably likely to have 
misled the jury regarding the reasonable doubt standard.  
(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 676.)  The prosecutor in 
Centeno mischaracterized the reasonable doubt standard for the 
first time during rebuttal arguments.  By contrast, the 
prosecutor in this case made nearly identical misstatements 
during both his opening and rebuttal arguments.  Defense 
counsel may have made a strategic decision to rely on the 
counterarguments he had already made during his closing 
statement rather than objecting to the prosecutor’s rebuttal 
statements.  Such a tactical choice was not objectively 
unreasonable under Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668.   
Even assuming Johnsen did not forfeit the claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct, his allegations do not warrant 
reversal.  To determine whether a prosecutor has committed 
reversible misconduct in this context, we examine (1) whether it 
was reasonably likely that the prosecutor’s statements misled 
the jury on reasonable doubt and (2) whether there is “a 
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reasonable probability that the prosecutor’s argument caused 
one or more jurors to convict defendant based on a lesser 
standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Centeno, 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 674, 677.) 
We find that the prosecutor’s statements were reasonably 
likely to mislead the jury.  As to the prosecutor’s statement that 
the reasonable doubt standard requires jurors “to point to 
something in the evidence that makes them have that doubt,” 
we found a similar mischaracterization to be misconduct in 
People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800 (Hill).  There, the prosecutor 
“addressed the concept of reasonable doubt, stating:  ‘it must be 
reasonable.  It’s not all possible doubt.  Actually, very simply, it 
means, you know, you have to have a reason for this doubt.  There 
has to be some evidence on which to base a doubt.’ ”  (Id. at p. 831, 
first italics added.)  Over a defense objection, the court allowed 
the prosecutor to continue, at which point she informed the jury:  
“ ‘There must be some evidence from which there is a reason for 
a doubt.  You can’t say, well, one of the attorneys said so.’ ”  
(Ibid., italics added by Hill.)  While we observed those remarks 
were “somewhat ambiguous,” (ibid.) we concluded that the 
prosecutor had engaged in misconduct because it was 
“reasonably likely” the jury understood this comment “to mean 
defendant had the burden of producing evidence to demonstrate 
a reasonable doubt of his guilt” (id. at p. 832).  We ultimately 
reversed Hill’s judgment due to a litany of misconduct, including 
error in diluting the reasonable doubt standard.  (Id. at p. 815.) 
Here, as in Hill, it is reasonable to construe the 
prosecutor’s remarks — “[t]here has to be some evidence on 
which to base a doubt” — to preclude jurors from having 
reasonable doubt solely based on the insufficiency of the 
prosecution’s evidence.  (See Hill, supra,17 Cal.4th at p. 832; 
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People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1195–1196 [prosecutor 
“may not suggest that ‘a defendant has a duty or burden to 
produce evidence, or a duty or burden to prove his or her 
innocence’ ”].)  The prosecutor’s remarks also erroneously 
suggest that a juror is precluded from considering factors such 
as common sense and life experience to form a reasonable doubt.  
The fact that defense counsel not only did not object to the 
misstatement but affirmatively agreed with it heightened the 
likelihood that the misstatement misled the jury. 
The prosecutor also misstated the law by advising the jury 
that in evaluating whether a perceived doubt is reasonable, a 
“juror should be able to convince his or her fellow jurors that the 
doubt is reasonable.”  It is misconduct to “ ‘attempt to absolve 
the prosecution from its prima facie obligation to overcome 
reasonable doubt on all elements.’ ”  (Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 
p. 829.)  “Among the essential elements of the right to trial by 
jury are the requirements that a jury in a felony prosecution 
consist of 12 persons and that its verdict be unanimous.”  (People 
v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 693, superseded by statute on 
another ground as stated in People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 
381, 462, fn. 19.)  Embedded in this right is the well-settled 
principle that a single juror may validly hold reasonable doubt 
even if all other jurors disagree.  Under such a scenario, the jury 
has not reached a unanimous verdict, and the defendant may 
not be found guilty.  (See Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) __ U.S. __, 
__ [140 S.Ct. 1390, 1395].)  Thus, the prosecutor rendered an 
incorrect characterization of the reasonable doubt standard by 
suggesting that any single juror’s personally held doubt cannot 
be “reasonable” unless at least he or she can persuade another 
juror.  The Attorney General does not dispute that the 
prosecutor misstated the applicable legal standard. 
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Nevertheless, we conclude that it was not reasonably 
likely that the prosecutor’s misstatements caused one or more 
jurors to convict Johnsen on a standard lower than beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The court provided the jury with correct 
instructions on reasonable doubt and directed the jury to follow 
these instructions in the event of any conflicting statements.  
The court began by instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 1.00, 
which provided in relevant part:  “You must accept and follow 
the law as I state it to you, whether or not you agree with the 
law.  If anything concerning the law said by the attorneys in 
their arguments or at any other time during the trial conflicts 
with my instructions on the law, you must follow my 
instructions.”  The court then instructed with CALJIC No. 2.90, 
which stated that “[a] defendant in a criminal action is 
presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved . . . . This 
presumption places upon the People the burden of proving the 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  This instruction 
clarified that Johnsen is presumed innocent until proven guilty 
and that the prosecutor had the sole obligation to present 
evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The court also 
provided CALJIC No. 17.40, which stated that the parties “are 
entitled to the individual opinion of each juror,” that each juror 
“must decide the case for yourself,” and that no juror should 
“decide any question in a particular way because a majority of 
the jurors or any of them favor such a decision.”  With this 
instruction, each juror presumably understood that he or she 
was entitled to make his or her own assessment of reasonable 
doubt and that persuading “a majority of the jurors or any of 
them” is not necessary.  Defense counsel also stressed to the 
jury:  “[I]t’s not necessary that you’re able to convince anybody 
else in this jury,” and “if you believe something to be such that 
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it creates a doubt in your mind and you can’t get rid of that doubt 
then you don’t have to change your mind.  You’re entitled to 
maintain that opinion as long as you deliberate fairly.” 
In addition to the prosecutorial misconduct claim, Johnsen 
alleges his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by agreeing 
with the prosecutor’s assertion that jurors must be able to “point 
to something in the evidence” that supports their reasonable 
doubt.  We need not decide whether the decision to agree with 
the prosecutor on this point was deficient because, even if it was, 
Johnsen was not prejudiced.  (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 
p. 697 [“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on 
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should 
be followed”].)  Just as instructing with CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 2.90 
and 17.40 mitigated any misimpression the prosecutor’s 
misstatements of the reasonable doubt standard would have 
given, it likewise reduced any risk the jury would be misled by 
defense counsel’s similar misstatements.  
In sum, we find no reasonable probability that the 
prosecutor’s or defense counsel’s misstatements caused any 
jurors to convict Johnsen based on a lesser standard than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
IV.  PENALTY PHASE 
A.  Juror Misconduct 
Johnsen claims Juror Y.P.’s out-of-court discussion with 
her priest on the Catholic Church’s (the Church) position on 
capital punishment just before the penalty phase violated his 
rights under the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  He argues that the court (1) did not conduct an 
adequate investigation into Juror Y.P.’s misconduct and (2) 
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should have removed Juror Y.P. on its own motion because her 
misconduct biased her against Johnsen. 
1.  Background 
On March 10, the court adjourned for a two-week break in 
advance of the penalty phase.  Before dismissing the jury, the 
court said:  “Remember it’s your duty not to converse among 
yourselves or with anyone else . . . or to form or express any 
opinion thereon until the cause is finally submitted to you.” 
The next day, Juror Y.P. reached out to her Catholic priest 
over the phone.  Leaving a voicemail, Juror Y.P. inquired 
whether it was a sin for Catholics to vote to impose the death 
penalty.  The priest returned her call later that day and 
informed her that he had spoken to a different judge about her 
message.  When Juror Y.P. reiterated her question, the priest 
replied that he would answer her question, but he advised her 
that she had a duty to disclose this conversation to the judge 
presiding over Johnsen’s case.  Juror Y.P. agreed to do so.  
The priest then asked her whether the Church’s views 
would change the way she felt about the case.  She said no, she 
simply wanted to know the Church’s views.  He then told Juror 
Y.P. that voting for the death penalty was not a sin as the 
Church “do[es] believe in capital punishment.”  Shortly 
thereafter, Juror Y.P. called the court and spoke to the bailiff.  
According to the bailiff, Juror Y.P. said she had asked a priest 
about the death penalty and “the priest told her that the 
church’s position was that it wasn’t against the death penalty.” 
A few days later, the court, prosecutor, and defense 
counsel convened to discuss the juror’s out-of-court conduct.  The 
court noted that Juror Y.P. had violated her oath not to discuss 
any aspect of Johnsen’s case with nonjurors.  Then, with both 
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attorneys present, the court phoned Juror Y.P.  During the call, 
Juror Y.P. stressed that she had not discussed any details about 
Johnsen’s case with her priest.  She said she simply inquired 
about the Church’s position on capital punishment because she 
was “just curious to know if it was a sin.”  Despite her curiosity, 
Juror Y.P. insisted, “Even if [the priest] were to tell me yes, it is 
a sin, it doesn’t mean I wouldn’t [vote for the death penalty] or 
vice versa.  I just wanted to know.” 
The court then gave the parties an opportunity to question 
Juror Y.P.  They declined to do so.  After ending the call with 
Juror Y.P., the court informed both parties, “[I] don’t see any 
reason to do anything” about Juror Y.P.’s conduct.  According to 
the court, Juror Y.P. “shouldn’t have actually been talking about 
the death penalty, although we didn’t really specifically tell 
them not to talk about the death penalty.  But it does involve 
the case.”  Defense counsel observed, “I think it’s technically a 
violation but I don’t think there’s much substance to it.”  In the 
end, neither party accepted the court’s invitation “to bring a 
motion” to remove Juror Y.P. from the jury. 
2.  Discussion 
The Attorney General argues that Johnsen forfeited his 
juror misconduct claims because he did not ask the court to 
conduct further inquiry, nor did he ask the court to remove Juror 
Y.P.  However, the trial court has an independent “duty to 
conduct an investigation when the court possesses information 
that might constitute good cause to remove a juror . . . whether 
or not the defense requests an inquiry, and indeed . . . even if 
the defense objects to such an inquiry.”  (People v. Cowan (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 401, 506.)  Thus, Johnsen’s failure to object at trial 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
67 
 
did not forfeit his claim that the court failed to adequately 
investigate alleged juror misconduct. 
As for Johnsen’s claim that the trial court erred by failing 
to remove Juror Y.P. on its own motion, we have held that a 
defendant forfeits such claims of prejudicial juror misconduct 
when defense counsel does not “propose additional questions [be 
asked of jurors], object to any juror’s continued service, or 
request a mistrial on the ground of juror misconduct.”  (People 
v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1341; see People v. Holloway 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 124.)  Defense counsel declined the trial 
court’s invitations to question Juror Y.P. and to bring a motion 
to remove Juror Y.P. from the jury.  When the court informed 
the parties that it did not “see any reason to do anything” about 
Juror Y.P.’s conduct, defense counsel agreed.  By failing to seek 
Juror Y.P.’s excusal or otherwise object to the court’s course of 
action, Johnsen forfeited his claim that the court should have 
removed Juror Y.P.  As discussed below, this claim also fails on 
the merits. 
As to the merits, we first address whether the trial court 
conducted an adequate investigation into Juror Y.P.’s alleged 
misconduct.  When a court becomes aware of possible juror 
misconduct, it must “ ‘ “ ‘make whatever inquiry is reasonably 
necessary’ to determine whether the juror should be 
discharged.” ’ ”  (People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 941.)  
The nature of the court’s inquiry may consist of a full hearing or 
informal questioning of the juror in the presence of counsel.  
(People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 712.)  “The specific 
procedures to follow in investigating an allegation of juror 
misconduct are generally a matter for the trial court’s 
discretion.”  (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 676.) 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
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According to Johnsen, the trial court’s inquiry was 
inadequate because the court did not ask “questions designed to 
probe the effect of the priest’s information on Juror Y.P.’s ability 
to decide [Johnsen’s] fate free from outside influence” and did 
not question Juror Y.P. in person.  As noted, in the presence of 
Johnsen’s counsel and the prosecutor, the court asked Juror Y.P. 
about her conversation with her priest.  After hearing Juror 
Y.P.’s account, the court accepted her assertion that the 
Church’s views had no effect on her assessment of Johnsen’s 
case.  The court then took the precaution of inviting either party 
to move to remove Juror Y.P.  After both parties declined to do 
so, the court did not remove her on its own motion.  Implicit in 
the court’s decision was a finding that Juror Y.P. had been 
forthright about her conversation and her statement that it 
would not affect her views of the case.  On this record, we have 
no 
basis 
to 
second-guess 
the 
trial 
court’s 
credibility 
determination. 
Nor did the court abuse its discretion by questioning Juror 
Y.P. telephonically.  The court opted for a telephonic inquiry to 
expeditiously determine whether Juror Y.P. had discussed the 
case before or after she had returned her verdict at the guilt 
phase.  As the prosecutor observed, the parties would have 
responded differently if Juror Y.P. had “talked to the priest 
during deliberations.  Then we have a whole different ball game.  
Then the question becomes whether [Johnsen] wants to move 
for a mistrial or whether mistrial is an appropriate remedy or 
whether we can substitute an alternate, tell them to go back in 
and deliberate the guilt . . . .”  The court agreed that it could not 
leave this inquiry until the jurors returned from their two-week 
break.  Although an in-person examination may have been 
preferable, the court did not abuse its discretion by choosing to 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
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69 
 
conduct a telephonic inquiry to quickly determine the extent of 
Juror Y.P.’s out-of-court contact. 
As for Johnsen’s claim that the trial court erred by failing 
to remove Juror Y.P. on its own motion, we ask “whether there 
is any overt event or circumstance . . . which suggests a 
likelihood that one or more members of the jury were influenced 
by improper bias.”  (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 294, 
italics omitted.)  A finding of “juror misconduct ‘raises a 
presumption of prejudice that may be rebutted by proof that no 
prejudice actually resulted.’ ”  (In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 
97, 118.)  The Attorney General contends that even assuming 
Juror Y.P. committed misconduct, “there is not a substantial 
likelihood that Juror Y.P. was biased on the issue of 
punishment.”  “[Juror] bias can appear in two different ways.  
First, we will find bias if the extraneous material, judged 
objectively, is inherently and substantially likely to have 
influenced the juror.  [Citations.]  Second, we look to the nature 
of the misconduct and the surrounding circumstances to 
determine whether it is substantially likely the juror was 
actually biased against the defendant.  [Citation.]  The 
judgment must be set aside if the court finds prejudice under 
either test.”  (In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 653; see 
People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 579 [“If we find a 
substantial likelihood that a juror was actually biased, we must 
set aside the verdict, no matter how convinced we might be that 
an unbiased jury would have reached the same verdict, because 
a biased adjudicator is one of the few structural trial defects that 
compel reversal without application of a harmless error 
standard.”].)  Our review “accept[s] the trial court’s credibility 
determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if 
supported by substantial evidence,” and we independently 
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70 
 
examine the mixed question of “[w]hether prejudice arose from 
[the] juror misconduct.”  (Nesler, at p. 582.) 
We agree with the Attorney General that, even assuming 
without deciding that there was misconduct, any attendant 
presumption of prejudice has been rebutted.  As noted, Juror 
Y.P. asked her priest whether it would be a “sin” for her to vote 
for the death penalty.  Her priest said the Church “believes in 
the death penalty,” so it would not be sinful to vote for the death 
penalty.  But the priest did not indicate it was desirable to vote 
for the death penalty in any given case, nor would a reasonable 
listener understand the priest’s response to generally favor 
imposing capital punishment.  Contrary to what Johnsen 
claims, Juror Y.P.’s question and her priest’s reply did not 
“relieve” her of the personal burden of sentencing him to death.  
There is no evidence that the priest opined further on the death 
penalty or that any other discussion transpired.  We cannot say 
that Juror Y.P.’s out-of-court contact with her priest was 
inherently and substantially likely to result in bias.  (See People 
v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 310–311 [“[W]e are unwilling to 
ascribe to any perceived stereotype that jurors who receive 
advice from Christian spiritual leaders, or are exposed to 
Biblical passages, per se suffer a diminished sense of 
responsibility for their penalty verdict, and are automatically 
rendered incapable of fairly evaluating the evidence and law 
before them.”].) 
Nor can we conclude on the record before us that it is 
substantially likely that Juror Y.P. was actually biased against 
Johnsen.  Although we recognize that a juror’s insistence that 
she is not biased against a defendant does not end the court’s 
inquiry (see Crawford v. United States (1909) 212 U.S. 183, 196), 
the record shows that Juror Y.P. repeatedly clarified to her 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
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71 
 
priest and later to the court that the Church’s views would have 
no effect on her assessment of Johnsen’s case.  Immediately 
after her conversation with her priest, Juror Y.P. informed the 
bailiff.  The court credited Juror Y.P.’s assurances that “[e]ven 
if [my priest] were to tell me yes, it is a sin, it doesn’t mean I 
wouldn’t [vote for the death penalty] or vice versa.  I just wanted 
to know.”  Juror Y.P. reiterated that the Church’s position on 
the death penalty was “not going to change the way [she] feel[s]” 
about Johnsen’s case.  Nothing in her out-of-court conversation 
or her statements to the court suggested that she had prejudged 
the case before any penalty phase testimony had been 
introduced or that she was predisposed to one result over the 
other.  Nor does the record indicate that Juror Y.P.’s ultimate 
vote would be motivated by her religion.  In fact, her colloquy 
with the court conveyed the opposite.  
This case is distinguishable from Hill, where we 
emphasized that “an appeal to religious authority in support of 
the death penalty is improper because it tends to diminish the 
jury’s personal sense of responsibility for the verdict.”  (Hill, 
supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 836–837.)  In reversing the defendant’s 
conviction and death judgment, we made clear “that to ask the 
jury to consider biblical teachings when deliberating is patent 
misconduct.”  (Id. at p. 836, fn. 6.)  Here, the record provides no 
basis to second-guess the trial court’s finding that Juror Y.P.’s 
discussion with her priest would not influence her views on the 
case.  Nor is there any indication that Juror Y.P. consulted or 
mentioned her religious views or the Church’s position on the 
death penalty during jury deliberations. 
In sum, the record does not show a reasonable likelihood 
that Juror Y.P. was biased against Johnsen. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
72 
 
B.  Victim Impact Evidence 
1.  Evidence of Leo’s Rehabilitation 
Johnsen argues that penalty phase evidence presented on 
Leo’s physical recovery exceeds the bounds of permissible victim 
impact evidence (Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808) and 
violates his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as well as state law.  The crux of his claim is that 
“the rationale for victim impact evidence set forth in Payne 
simply does not justify permitting victim impact testimony for 
any crimes other than the capital crime” and that during the 
penalty phase “a defendant’s moral culpability must be assessed 
on the basis of that [capital] crime alone.”  Johnsen asks us to 
narrowly construe “victim,” to mean “capital victim” to the 
exclusion of impact testimony on Leo, a surviving victim of the 
murder-robbery.  Johnsen acknowledges we have rejected 
similar arguments before.  (See People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 
Cal.4th 1027, 1062–1063; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 
649.)  Nevertheless, he asks us to reconsider these prior 
holdings. 
We decline to do so.  “Although victim impact is not 
expressly enumerated as a statutory aggravating factor, . . . such 
evidence [i]s generally admissible as a circumstance of the crime 
under section 190.3, factor (a).”  (People v. Brown (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 382, 396 (Brown).)  Johnsen’s argument that victim 
impact evidence is exclusively limited only to impact evidence 
on the deceased victim is unavailing; the language of factor (a) 
is not so narrow.  That provision authorizes consideration, at the 
penalty phase, of “[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the 
defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and . . . any 
special circumstances. . . .”  (§ 190.3, factor (a), italics added.)   
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73 
 
Leo’s near-death injuries occurred alongside Juanita’s 
murder while Johnsen was robbing them, a special circumstance 
found by the jury.  According to Dr. Brown, the injuries Leo 
sustained during Johnsen’s assault rendered him incapable of 
oral or written communication.  Leo’s adult children testified 
regarding their increased caregiving duties of Leo, directly 
attributable to Leo’s injuries and the murder of their mother, 
Juanita, who would have otherwise cared for Leo. 
Their victim impact testimony was also admissible during 
the penalty phase because it concerned the effect of Johnsen’s 
violent crimes against Juanita on her family, including Leo.  
(See People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 618; People v. Taylor 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1171–1172.)  Finally, the testimony 
regarding Leo’s rehabilitation was not “so voluminous or 
inflammatory as to divert the jury’s attention from its proper 
role or invite an irrational response” in violation of due process.  
(Taylor, at p. 1172; see People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 
731.)  
2.  Alleged Instructional Error  
Johnsen argues that the trial court erred in denying two 
defense-requested jury instructions pertaining to the victim 
impact evidence.  Johnsen’s proposed penalty phase instruction 
No. 35 read:   
“Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of 
showing the specific harm caused by the defendant’s 
crime.  Such evidence, if believed, was not received 
and may not be considered by you to divert your 
attention from your proper role of deciding whether 
defendant should live or die.  You must face this 
obligation soberly and rationally and you may not 
impose the ultimate sanction as a result of an 
irrational, purely subjective response to emotional 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
74 
 
evidence and argument.  On the other hand, 
evidence and argument on emotional though 
relevant subjects may provide legitimate reasons to 
sway the jury to show mercy.”   
The court declined to instruct the jury to this effect, 
characterizing the proposed instruction as “unnecessary.”  In 
People v. Russell (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1228, we found no error in 
the trial court’s refusal to give an identical jury instruction to 
the one at issue here because it was confusing and because other 
instructions already advised the jury to determine the facts and 
apply the law as directed.  (Id. at p. 1265 & fn. 6.)  As in Russell, 
we conclude the trial court here did not err in refusing to 
instruct the jury with proposed instruction No. 35. 
The court also refused defendant’s penalty phase 
instruction No. 61, which the court opined was an incorrect 
statement of law.  That instruction would have provided:  “The 
facts of this case may arouse in you a natural sympathy for the 
victim or the victim’s family.  Such sympathy, while natural, is 
not relevant to the penalty decision in this case.  [¶] You are to 
base your decision on the evidence, the arguments of counsel, 
and the law stated in these instructions.  You are directed not 
to consider any feelings of sympathy you may feel for the parties 
injured or aggrieved in this case.”  During the penalty phase, 
however, “the jury may exercise sympathy for the defendant’s 
murder victims and for their bereaved family members” in 
aggravation, as a circumstance of the crime.  (People v. Pollock 
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1195; see § 190.3, factor (a).)  The trial 
court was correct to deny this instruction, which erroneously 
stated that the jury must “not . . . consider any feelings of 
sympathy . . . for the parties injured or aggrieved.” 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
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C.  Admission of Photographs of Deceased Victim 
Theresa Holloway 
Over an objection by Johnsen’s counsel, the trial court 
admitted into evidence three postmortem photographs of 
different parts of Holloway’s body.  The three photos showed 
close-up shots of injuries to Holloway’s face, neck, and scalp.  
Johnsen renews his argument that these photographs should 
have been excluded from the penalty phase as irrelevant and 
more prejudicial than probative.  (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 352.)  
Johnsen begins by disputing the relevance of the photos 
pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b).  Factor (b) authorizes 
admission of evidence of Johnsen’s unadjudicated violent 
criminal activity as a factor in aggravation during the penalty 
phase.  Johnsen’s primary argument is that photos of Holloway’s 
bodily injuries are not relevant because Johnsen did not 
personally injure Holloway; thus, her injuries could not be 
indicative of Johnsen’s state of mind when he aided and abetted 
her murder. 
We have said that “[v]iolent ‘criminal activity’ presented 
in aggravation may be shown in context, so that the jury has full 
opportunity in deciding the appropriate penalty to determine its 
seriousness.”  (People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 757.)  
Here, the photos were not introduced to ascertain Johnsen’s 
state of mind with respect Holloway’s death but rather to convey 
to the jury the unusual context and circumstances of Johnsen’s 
prior violent criminal activity, which the prosecution had to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  (§ 190.3, factor (b); see People 
v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 54.)  Johnsen did not injure 
Holloway himself, but the other crime’s evidence and Johnsen’s 
written confession strongly suggest that he directed Jurado to 
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76 
 
kill Holloway to prevent her from disclosing their plans to kill 
Mynatt. 
Contrary to Johnsen’s claim that the photographs were 
cumulative of other testimony, they did have probative value 
during the penalty phase.  They rendered Johnsen’s written 
confession more credible and enabled the pathologist to 
effectively communicate the peculiar nature of Holloway’s 
injuries to the jury.  (See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler 
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 423 [“ ‘[a]utopsy photographs are 
routinely admitted to establish the nature and placement of the 
victim’s wounds’ ”].)  In other words, the photos had a “tendency 
in reason to prove or disprove a[] disputed fact that is of 
consequence” (Evid. Code, § 210), and the court correctly 
concluded that they are relevant under Penal Code section 
190.3, factor (b). 
As to whether the photos were more prejudicial than 
probative, we are mindful that Evidence Code section 352 
confers on the trial court “broad discretion” (People v. Rodrigues 
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124) to “exclude evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its 
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) 
create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the 
issues, or of misleading the jury” (Evid. Code, § 352).  Our review 
is limited to whether the trial court’s determination under 
section 352 constituted an “abuse of discretion.”  (Rodrigues, at 
p. 1125.)  Our intervention is only warranted when “the 
probative value of the photographs clearly is outweighed by 
their prejudicial effect.”  (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 
83, 134.) 
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The trial court noted that the prosecution selected only 
three autopsy photos — each depicting a different injury point 
on Holloway’s neck, face, and head — out of nearly 100 photos.  
While recognizing that in general photos of a deceased victim 
may provoke a visceral reaction, we have reviewed the 
challenged photos and conclude that the photos, while 
unpleasant, were not likely to evoke a visceral reaction 
disproportionate to the murder itself.  Because the photos’ 
probative value was not clearly outweighed by their prejudicial 
effect (Evid. Code, § 352), we conclude that the court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs.   
D.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Johnsen contends the prosecutor committed multiple acts 
of prejudicial misconduct in his opening and closing argument 
during the penalty phase, requiring reversal.  But Johnsen did 
not preserve his objection to much of the alleged misconduct, 
and in any event, his claims either lack merit or do not rise to 
the level of prejudicial misconduct. 
“The 
same 
standard 
applicable 
to 
prosecutorial 
misconduct at the guilt phase is applicable at the penalty 
phase.”  (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 132 (Valdez); see 
People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1153.)  “ ‘ “Under the 
federal 
Constitution, 
a 
prosecutor 
commits 
reversible 
misconduct only if the conduct infects the trial with such 
‘ “unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process.” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 480 
(Sattiewhite).)  Johnsen raises no claims pursuant to the 
California Constitution, so we consider his federal claims alone. 
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1.  Comments on Society and the Integrity of the Law 
(a)  Background 
During his opening argument, the district attorney told 
the jury, “[Y]ou are representatives of 30 million Californians, 
the great majority of whom are law abiding citizens.  You owe 
them and yourselves a conscientious, courageous and thorough 
review of the evidence in this phase of the trial.  You owe 
yourselves and them the imposition of a just and appropriate 
punishment.  [¶] I urge you to remain faithful to your oath and 
to do the right thing.  Fellow citizens expect that you will 
discharge your duty and they are entitled to the discharge of 
that duty.”  The prosecutor also contextualized societal values, 
saying, “By subjecting certain murderers to death, society 
acknowledges the level of their evil and their depravity and the 
preciousness of the innocent lives which such murderers 
violently and prematurely ended.”  He observed that “[a] society 
which lacks the will to protect its citizens from the likes of the 
Brian Johnsens of the world, is as immoral as it is weak and 
criminally negligent.  Fortunately we live in a society which has 
the courage and the will to confront evil and eradicate it.” 
Johnsen’s counsel did not object to any of the prosecutor’s 
remarks.  Instead, defense counsel responded in his opening 
argument:  “The prosecutor has asked you to return a death 
sentence and the message is if you vote for the death penalty, 
you’re tough on crime; and if you vote for life without possibility 
of parole, well, then you’re not tough on crime because you’ve 
got all these 30 million people behind you.  [¶] Well, that’s not 
true.”  Defense counsel said:  “There’s 12 people and they’re all 
individuals.  Each one of you are the ones who are responsible 
for making this decision.  You don’t have to worry about the 30 
million people out there.” 
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In rebuttal, the prosecutor told the jury:  “You are here to 
apply the law of the State of California in a capital murder case 
and that law requires that you weigh the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in deciding whether to impose the 
penalty of death.”  “You will be voting for death to, one, maintain 
the integrity of the law, to insure that it works the way it has 
been designed to work.  You will be voting for death to impose a 
just and an appropriate penalty.”  
Johnsen’s counsel responded:  “I think that Mr. Fontan 
[the prosecutor] is wrong when he says we have to kill Mr. 
Johnsen to maintain the integrity of the law.  What we have to 
do to maintain the integrity of the law is do the right thing.”  
“[K]illing Mr. Johnsen would certainly not make the system 
work better, make anybody have more respect for the system,” 
defense counsel said.  “The system will be in good shape, thank 
you, tomorrow and next week and next month and next year 
whether you kill Mr. Johnsen or whether you sentence him to 
life without possibility of parole.” 
Although Johnsen’s counsel never objected to the 
prosecutor’s remarks, he requested defendant’s penalty phase 
instruction No. 60:  “After weighing all the aggravating and 
mitigating factors, it is up to you individually to decide which of 
the punishments, life without parole or death, should be 
imposed in this case.  You must always keep in mind that each 
of you bears the ultimate moral responsibility to determine the 
appropriate penalty under all the circumstances of this case.”  
The district attorney opposed this request. 
The court asked Johnsen’s counsel if he would be satisfied 
if, instead of giving the requested instruction, the court modified 
CALJIC No. 8.88 to include the word “individually” so that it 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
80 
 
would read:  “To return a judgment of death, each of you 
individually must be persuaded that the aggravating 
circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the 
mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life 
without parole.”  (Italics added.)  Johnsen’s counsel replied:  
“Well, all right.  I think that’s appropriate.”  The court 
instructed the jury accordingly.   
(b)  Discussion 
On appeal, Johnsen contends that the prosecutor’s 
reference to “[a] society which lacks the will to protect its 
citizens from the likes of the Brian Johnsens of the world, is as 
immoral as it is weak and criminally negligent” shamed jurors 
into favoring the death penalty to uphold social expectations 
rather than engaging in an “ ‘individualized inquiry’ ” of 
Johnsen as compelled by the Eighth Amendment.  (Romano v. 
Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 7.)   
To the extent Johnsen’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct 
alleges a due process violation, he has forfeited it by failing to 
“ ‘ “make a timely objection and ask the trial court to admonish 
the jury,” ’ ” as there is no indication a timely objection would 
have been inadequate.  (Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 
p. 480.)  However, his “failure to object at trial does not preclude 
him from raising . . . on appeal” a claim under Caldwell v. 
Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 (Caldwell).  (Sattiewhite, at 
p. 481; see Caldwell, at pp. 328–329 [a verdict “made by a 
sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for 
determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests 
elsewhere” violates the 8th Amend.].) 
The prosecutor’s remarks here did not run afoul of the 
Eighth Amendment.  “It [i]s not improper for the prosecutor to 
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81 
 
argue that the jury would be acting as the representative of the 
community or for society as a whole.”  (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 79, 149.)  In Sattiewhite, we declined to find 
misconduct because the prosecutor “accurately described the 
jurors as the conscience of the community.”  (Sattiewhite, supra, 
59 Cal.4th at p. 481; see Caldwell, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 333 
[capital jury may be asked to decide penalty “on behalf of the 
community”].)  Here, as in Sattiewhite, the prosecutor “did not 
urge the jury to abrogate their personal responsibility to 
determine the appropriate punishment” or “suggest to the jury 
that ‘the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of 
the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.’ ”  (Sattiewhite, at 
p. 481.)  The prosecutor merely told jurors that they “owe 
[them]selves and [others] the imposition of a just and 
appropriate punishment” and that a death verdict would be 
consistent with societal values.  (See People v. Zambrano (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 1082, 1179 [“the community . . . has the right to 
express its values by imposing the severest punishment for the 
most aggravated crimes”], disapproved on other grounds in 
People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)  And as in 
Sattiewhite, the court here instructed the jury to determine 
“individually” whether death is the appropriate penalty. 
As for the district attorney’s statement urging the jurors 
to “confront evil and eradicate it,” the word “it” could have been 
understood by a reasonable juror to label Johnsen an “evil” that 
must be “eradicate[d].”  “A prosecutor is allowed to make 
vigorous arguments and may even use such epithets as are 
warranted by the evidence, as long as these arguments are not 
inflammatory and principally aimed at arousing the passion or 
prejudice of the jury.”  (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 
1210, 1251.)  The prosecutor’s suggestion that Johnsen is “evil,” 
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followed by a call to “eradicate” such evil, borders on 
“inflammatory” rhetoric.  (Ibid.; see People v. Fosselman (1983) 
33 Cal.3d 572, 580 [a prosecutor may “ ‘use appropriate epithets 
warranted 
by 
the 
evidence,’ ” 
but 
“the 
prosecutor’s 
inflammatory characterization of defendant” could not be 
condoned].)  But the comment was limited and fleeting such that 
any error was nonprejudicial. 
2.  Comments on Johnsen’s Lack of Sympathy and 
Mercy 
During his opening argument, the district attorney asked 
the jury several rhetorical questions, including:  (1) “Why should 
Brian Johnsen’s life be spared when he failed to show any 
compassion or sympathy for his victims at the time he 
committed his murders?”; (2) “Why should a cold-blooded, 
cavalier, thrill-killer like Mr. Johnsen be permitted to live after 
killing twice and attempting to kill again?”; and (3) “Why should 
[Johnsen] live while the remains of his victims decay in the 
earth and their survivors are condemned to grieve the manner 
and tragedy of the death of their loved ones each and every day 
that they live?”  Johnsen did not object to these comments, nor 
has he shown that a sustained objection and an admonition from 
the court would have been inadequate.  (Seumanu, supra, 61 
Cal.4th at p. 1328.)  Thus, he has forfeited this claim on appeal.   
We also reject it on the merits.  Section 190.3, factor (k) 
permits penalty phase consideration of any “circumstance which 
extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal 
excuse for the crime.”  “[R]emorse, which by definition can only 
be experienced after a crime’s commission, is something 
commonly thought to lessen or excuse defendant’s culpability.” 
(Brown v. Payton (2005) 544 U.S. 133, 142–143.)   
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
83 
 
Contrary to Johnsen’s arguments, the prosecutor did not 
attempt to turn Johnsen’s lack of remorse or mercy for his 
victims into an aggravating factor.  Rather, the rhetorical 
questions are most reasonably read to advise the jury that 
Johnsen’s lack of compassion or sympathy weighs against 
mitigation.  Although a prosecutor may not “argue that the 
absence of such mitigating factors [such as the lack of remorse] 
is itself an aggravating factor justifying the death penalty” 
(People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 82, italics omitted), the 
prosecutor may argue “a particular mitigating circumstance, 
such as [Johnsen’s] remorse for his victims, is lacking from the 
case” (ibid.) and may also “urge[ the jury] not to be swayed by 
arguments for sympathy” (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 
475, 554).  Here, the district attorney pointed to Johnsen’s lack 
of remorse or mercy for his victims, and urged the jury not to 
offer any sympathy.  Such arguments opposing mitigation do not 
offend due process. 
3.  Comments on Conspiracy Evidence 
Johnsen alleges the prosecutor’s reference to Johnsen’s 
participation in a conspiracy to kill Mynatt mischaracterized the 
section 190.3, factor (a) motive evidence behind Holloway’s 
killing as a factor (b) violent criminal activity.   
In his opening remarks, the district attorney asked the 
jury to “[t]hink about the motive.  [Johnsen] decided to 
participate in [Holloway’s] murder because she was going to go 
to the object of a plot he was involved with, a plot to kill another 
person.  So we have a killer here . . . who not only premeditates 
and deliberates his killings, we have a killer that kills so he can 
continue to kill.  That was his motive.  He had his girlfriend 
killed so he could kill Doug Mynatt.”  (Italics added.)  As noted, 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
84 
 
the district attorney also introduced section 190.3, factor (a) 
motive evidence that Jurado, Shigemura, Humiston, and 
Johnsen killed Holloway because they were concerned that 
Holloway might tell Mynatt about Johnsen’s plans to kill him.  
Johnsen claims that his confession to Holloway’s murder 
disavowed any intent to kill Mynatt, instead evincing a fear that 
Mynatt would kill “all of [them]” if Holloway “ratted” them out.  
His confession stated, “I had no choice.  It was her or all of us.”  
Thus, Johnsen claims he never intended to kill Mynatt and 
observes Mynatt was never murdered.  Because there was 
insufficient corroborating evidence to establish the conspiracy 
under factor (b), Johnsen argues that the prosecutor’s remarks 
transformed his unproven conspiracy crime into a standalone 
aggravating factor in violation of due process. 
We conclude Johnsen’s claim lacks merit.  Both parties are 
entitled to “ ‘ “fair comment on the evidence, which can include 
reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom.” ‘ ”  
(People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 215.)  “ ‘ “Whether the 
inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to 
decide.” ’ ”  (Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 134.)  The 
prosecutor’s theory that Johnsen’s motive for killing Holloway 
to conceal a plot to kill Mynatt was a “reasonable inference” 
based on the evidence presented.  Importantly, the court 
instructed the jury that it could consider “[e]vidence regarding 
a plot to kill a Doug Mynatt . . . only to establish the motive for 
the murder of Terry Holloway.”  Johnsen does not demonstrate 
how the court’s admonishment was insufficient to prevent the 
jury from misinterpreting or misapplying the motive evidence 
pertaining to Holloway’s killing.  Accordingly, Johnsen’s 
misconduct claim fails. 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
85 
 
E.  Cumulative Error 
Johnsen asserts that the combined errors during the guilt 
and penalty phase warrant reversal of his conviction, his death 
sentence, or both.  During the guilt phase, we found error with 
respect to the prosecutor’s misstatement of the reasonable doubt 
standard.  (Ante, at pp. 59–64.)  At the penalty phase, we have 
acknowledged 
the 
prosecutor’s 
potentially 
inflammatory 
comment about Johnsen during penalty phase arguments.  
(Ante, at pp. 81–82.)  We conclude that their cumulative effect 
does not rise to the level of prejudice necessary to reverse 
Johnsen’s conviction or his sentence. 
F.  Challenges to the Death Penalty 
Johnsen raises myriad challenges to the constitutionality 
of California’s death penalty regime.  While he acknowledges we 
have consistently found similar claims to be meritless, he 
nevertheless asks us to reconsider our precedent.  We decline to 
do so. 
Johnsen contends his conviction and sentence are invalid 
because state judges are subject to direct elections, retention 
elections, or both.  Pointing to the 1986 election where California 
voters declined to retain three high court judges ostensibly due 
to their views disfavoring the death penalty, Johnsen argues 
political disincentives to “make defense-favorable rulings in 
capital cases” result in a “tilted system.”  Although Johnsen is 
certainly entitled to “impartial” judges, he “is not . . . entitled to 
have his appeal decided by justices who have never formed or 
expressed opinions or thoughts on general topics such as the 
propriety of the death penalty.”  (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 1100, 1140 (Kipp); see People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
1179, 1299; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 615 [“This 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
86 
 
court’s review process is not impermissibly influenced by 
political considerations.”].)  Even if judicial elections were a 
conflict of interest, they “would apply equally to all California 
judges and, under the common law rule of necessity, the justices 
of this court [and our lower courts] would not be disqualified.”  
(Kipp, supra, at p. 1141.) 
Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider 
the individualized circumstances of the capital offense, does not 
result in arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty.  
(Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 401.)  On the contrary, section 
190.3, factor (a) guarantees “each case is judged on its facts, each 
defendant on the particulars of his offense.”  (Brown, at p. 401.)   
We have previously held that the jury is not required to 
unanimously agree on:  (1) which circumstances of the crime are 
aggravating; (2) whether Johnsen engaged in prior violent 
criminal activity under section 190.3, factor(b); (3) whether 
Johnsen committed a prior felony under section 190.3, factor (c); 
and (4) which sentencing factors were aggravating.  (People v. 
Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 860–861; see also Brown, supra, 
33 Cal.4th at p. 402; People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 
1014 (O’Malley).) 
Johnsen asserts it is unconstitutional to allow the same 
jury that convicted him to decide whether he also committed 
other criminal activity.  We have concluded otherwise.  (See 
People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 76–77.)  “[D]ue process 
does not preclude the consideration of this type of evidence by a 
penalty jury [that] has found the defendant guilty of murder,” 
and “the strong legislative preference for a unitary jury 
outweighs any ‘supposed disadvantage’ to defendant in the 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
87 
 
single-jury process.”  (People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 
204.) 
Johnsen also complains that section 190.3 factor (i), which 
requires the sentence to consider the defendant’s age at the time 
of the offense, is unconstitutionally vague.  We have held that 
“[t]he use of defendant’s age as a sentencing factor [citation] is 
not impermissibly vague under the Eighth Amendment.”  
(O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1013.) 
Johnsen raises several objections to CALJIC No. 8.85, all 
of which we have denied previously, and we again deny them 
here.  “The trial court has no obligation to delete from CALJIC 
No. 8.85 inapplicable mitigating factors . . . .”  (People v. Mitchell 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 589 (Mitchell).)  Nor must the court advise 
the jury which factors to consider aggravating or mitigating, as 
“[t]he aggravating or mitigating nature of the factors is self-
evident within the context of each case.”  (People v. Hillhouse 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 509.)  “The use of certain adjectives such 
as ‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ in the list of mitigating factors in 
section 190.3 does not render the statute unconstitutional.”  
(People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 144.)  And the court 
need not specify a burden of proof for aggravating or mitigating 
sentencing factors.  (People v. Jackson (2014) 58 Cal.4th 724, 
773.) 
We have previously held that “neither the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, nor the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a 
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating 
circumstances exist or that aggravating circumstances outweigh 
mitigating circumstances or that death is the appropriate 
penalty.”  (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 753.)  Johnsen 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
88 
 
asserts that the failure to require written jury findings is 
unconstitutional, but “[j]urors need not make written findings 
in determining penalty.”  (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 
180.) 
Johnsen challenges CALJIC No. 8.88, but “[w]e repeatedly 
have rejected identical claims . . . .”  (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 81, 174.)  “The court’s use of CALJIC No. 8.88, which 
instructs that jurors must be ‘persuaded that the aggravating 
circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the 
mitigating circumstances’ to warrant a death judgment, is not 
unconstitutionally vague, appropriately informs jurors, and 
does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution.”  (Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 589.)  
“CALJIC No. 8.88 does not misstate the law by asking jurors 
whether the circumstances ‘warrant[]’ death . . . .”  (People v. 
Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 100.)  “The trial court need not 
instruct jurors that . . . they should impose life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole if they find that the mitigating 
circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances.”  
(People v. Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 179–180.)  “CALJIC 
No. 8.88 is not constitutionally defective for failing to inform the 
jury that is has the discretion to impose a sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole even in the absence of 
mitigating circumstances.”  (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 
1146, 1211.)  Likewise, we decline to revisit our precedent 
holding that “[t]he jury is not required to unanimously find that 
certain aggravating factors warrant the death penalty under the 
federal Constitution, and the equal protection clause does not 
compel a different result.”  (Mitchell, at p. 588.) 
Contrary to Johnsen’s contention that California law fails 
to meaningfully narrow the pool of all those convicted of murder 
PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
89 
 
for death penalty eligibility, section 190.2 “adequately performs 
the constitutionally mandated narrowing function.”  (People v. 
D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 308.)  “Our state death penalty 
statute is not unconstitutional for failing to require intercase 
proportionality review or disparate sentence review.”  (People v. 
Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 154.)  “California’s use of the 
death penalty does not violate international law, the federal 
Constitution, or the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment in light of ‘evolving standards of 
decency.’ ”  (Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 590.) 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
IKOLA, J.* 
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Johnsen 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding   
Review Granted        
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S040704 
Date Filed:  February 1, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  Stanislaus    
Judge:  David G. Vander Wall    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Neoma Kenwood, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ryan B. McCarroll and A. Kay Lauterbach, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Neoma Kenwood 
1569 Solano Avenue 
Berkeley, CA 94707 
(510) 528-4775 
 
A. Kay Lauterbach 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 
(916) 210-7671