Case Title: IMO the Grant of the Charter School Application of Englewood on the Palisades Charter School, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-36-99

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). IMO the Grant of the Charter School Application of Englewood on the Palisades Charter School (A-36-99) IMO the Grant of the Charter School Application of the Classical Academy Charter School of Clifton, Passaic County (A-37-99) IMO the Grant of the Charter School Application of the Franklin Charter School, Somerset County (A-38-99) Argued February 29, 2000 -- Decided June 28, 2000 LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court. These appeals were brought by the Englewood City Board of Education, the Clifton Board of Education, and the Franklin Township Board of Education (Boards), who challenge the grants of charters to new charter schools within their districts pursuant to the Charter School Program Act of 1995, N.J.S.A. 18A:36-1 to -18 (Act). The Commissioner of Education and the State Board of Education (State Board) had approved the charter school applications and the Boards appealed those approvals to the Appellate Division, asserting, among other things, that the Act is unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied. In addition, they contended that the Act and its implementing regulations are unconstitutional as applied to the charter schools within their districts. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the State Board in each of the three cases. The court was unpersuaded by any of the challenging districts'arguments and on the issues that are raised before the Supreme Court, deferred to the Commissioner's implied judgment in the Englewood City matter that racial-balance considerations were satisfied; held that the Act does not require the Commissioner to consider the financial impact of a charter school on the local district when approving a charter school application; held that the State Board's regulatory system for implementing the Act was not inconsistent with or antagonistic to the Act; and held that the Act did not violate the constitutional right to a thorough and efficient education. The Supreme Court granted the petitions for certification filed by the Boards, limited to the issues of the as-applied constitutional challenge; the asserted need of the Commissioner to consider the racial and financial impact of a charter school on a school district; and the authority of the Commissioner under the Act to award conditional approval to a charter school. Held: The Charter School Program Act of 1995 is not unconstitutional as applied to the charter schools within the school districts of Englewood City, Clifton and Franklin Township. The Commissioner of Education must assess the racial impact of a charter school's approval on the school district where the charter school is located and also must consider the financial impact if a district makes a preliminary showing that its ability to provide a thorough and efficient education is at risk. 1. The Legislature's determination to include charter schools among the array of public entities providing educational services is a choice appropriately made by the Legislature so long as the constitutional mandate to provide a thorough and efficient education is satisfied. In addition, the State must ensure that no student is discriminated against or subjected to segregation in the public schools. (pp. 4-10) 2. The Act balances a legislative desire to prevent race-based discrimination in admission policies with a desire to prevent racial segregation in the charter schools, and requires a charter school's admission policy to seek a pupil population similar to the pupil population sought by way of the Guidelines used by New Jersey school districts to monitor racial balance in the public schools. The Commissioner must assess the racial impact the movement of students to a charter school will have on the district where the school is located. The impact must be assessed when the Commissioner initially reviews a charter school for approval to open, and on an annual basis thereafter. (pp. 10-17) 4. The Act should be applied to promote the legislative objective to establish charter schools. The Legislature responded to the financial concerns of school districts regarding the level of per-pupil finding for charter schools by setting a presumptive per-pupil amount of 90" of the local levy budget per pupil (rather than 100" as originally proposed) and by giving the Commissioner discretion in setting the per-pupil percentage at a figure appropriate for the charter school and its home district. (pp. 21-26) 5. In a challenge to the application of a charter school, if the district of residence makes a preliminary showing of some specificity that the constitutional requirements of a thorough and efficient education would be jeopardized by loss of the presumptive amount, or proposed different amount of per-pupil funds to a charter school, the Commissioner must evaluate carefully the effect the loss of funds would have on the ability of the district of residence to deliver a thorough and efficient education to the students remaining in the district's other schools. The districts challenging the charter school approvals in this case do not contend that they cannot meet the thorough and-efficient education requirement and no evidence raising constitutional concerns was presented. The applicability of the standard established here in the context of an Abbott district is not before the Court. (pp. 26-28). 6. The Commissioner's step-by-step review process for charter school applications, as embodied in a duly promulgated regulation of the State Board, is a reasonable implementation of the Act. The procedure is efficient and practical for the applicant and the Department of Education and does not prejudice any legitimate objection to the charter school application. (pp. 30-33) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED. JUSTICE STEIN, concurring, writes separately only to state that he reads and understands the Court's opinion as neither expressing nor implying any view about the wisdom of the Legislature's determination to authorize the establishment of charter schools. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ, JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN and LONG, and JUDGES HAVEY and CARCHMAN join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA's opinion. JUSTICE STEIN also wrote a separate concurring opinion. JUSTICES O'HERN and VERNIERO did not participate. IN THE MATTER OF THE GRANT OF THE CHARTER SCHOOL APPLICATION OF ENGLEWOOD ON THE PALISADES CHARTER SCHOOL. ___________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THE GRANT OF THE CHARTER SCHOOL APPLICATION OF THE CLASSICAL ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL OF CLIFTON, PASSAIC COUNTY. ____________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THE GRANT OF THE CHARTER SCHOOL APPLICATION OF THE FRANKLIN CHARTER SCHOOL, SOMERSET COUNTY. _____________________________ Argued February 29, 2000 -- Decided June 28, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 320 N.J. Super. 174 (1999). Eric Martin Bernstein argued the cause for appellant Englewood City Board of Education (Mauro, Savo, Camerino & Grant, attorneys; Mr. Bernstein and Michael V. Camerino, of counsel and on the briefs). Anthony V. D'Elia argued the cause for appellant Board of Education, City of Clifton. Russell Weiss, Jr., argued the cause for appellant Franklin Township Board of Education (Carroll, Weiss & Josephson, attorneys). Lois H. Goodman argued the cause for respondents Englewood on the Palisades Charter School and The Classical Academy Charter School (Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, attorneys; Ms. Goodman and Stephen F. Payerle, of counsel; Ms. Goodman, Mr. Payerle and Melissa B. Popkin, on the briefs). David C. Apy argued the cause for respondent Franklin Charter School (McCarter & English, attorneys; Mr. Apy and Meredith L. Bryand on the brief). Michelle Lyn Miller, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent State Board of Education (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Nancy Kaplen and Mary C. Jacobson, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel; Ms. Miller, Arlene Goldfus Lutz and John K. Worthington, Deputy Attorneys General, on the briefs). John G. Geppert, Jr., argued the cause for amicus curiae Morris School District (Wiley, Malehorn and Sirota, attorneys). David G. Sciarra, Executive Director, Education Law Center argued the cause for amicus curiae Abbott plaintiffs (Mr. Sciarra and Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, attorneys; Mr. Sciarra, Lawrence S. Lustberg and Lori Outzs Borgen, on the brief). LaVECCHIA, J. In this consolidated appeal, the Englewood City Board of Education, the Clifton Board of Education and the Franklin Township Board of Education (Boards) challenge the grants of charters to newly created charter schools within their respective school districts. The Boards contend that the Charter School Program Act of 1995, N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-1 to -18 (Act), is unconstitutional because it violates principles of equal protection and due process, contravenes the prohibition against the donation of public funds for private purposes, and constitutes an improper delegation of legislative power to a private body. The Boards also mount challenges to the Act and its implementing regulations, N.J.A.C. 6A:11-1 to -8.2, as applied to the charter schools approved to operate within each of their districts. All of those challenges were comprehensively addressed in the opinion of the Appellate Division authored by the Honorable Michael Patrick King, P.J.A.D. In re Charter School Application, 320 N.J. Super. 174 (App. Div. 1999). Yet if they lost the $3 million in State and local funds, they would still have five buildings to run, debt service to be paid, maintenance to be performed, space to be heated and insured. In recognition of the problem of fixed cost staying at the local district, charter school initiatives in other states have limited the funding that follows the child to less than 100 percent or allows the matter to be negotiated directly between the district and/or the State and charter school. [Public Hearing before Senate Education Committee and Assembly Education Committee: Charter Schools (Dec. 5, 1995) (testimony of John Henderson, Associate Director, N.J. School Boards' Assoc.) at 6-7; see also Legislation Analysis of New Jersey School Board Association at 117X.] In December 1995, the Senate adopted the Senate Committee Substitute for Assembly Bill No. 592 and Senate Bill No. 1796. Section 12 of that bill substantially modified the funding provisions contained in the Assembly Committee Substitute and in the original Senate bill to read in the manner now contained in the Act. As noted, Section 12 of the Act reduced the per-pupil amount that would be forwarded from the district of residence to the charter school from 100" to 90" and made it a presumptive amount. The Commissioner may set the amount higher, up to 100%, or lower than the presumptive amount chosen by the Legislature. The evolution of this provision demonstrates that the Legislature responded to concerns about the loss of 100" of per-pupil funding to the charter school and intended to give the Commissioner discretion in setting the percentage of local level budget per pupil at a figure appropriate both for the charter school and for the district of residence. While the focus of the examination that the Commissioner must perform in setting the per-pupil amount is on the charter school applicant, the Commissioner cannot reasonably be expected to perform that function in a vacuum. The obligation to supervise the provision of a thorough and efficient system of education in all public schools is omnipresent for the Commissioner. N.J.S.A. 18A:4-23. The Commissioner cannot review the charter school's needs and set a per-pupil amount to be shifted from the district of residence without being circumspect about the district of residence's continuing ability to provide a thorough and efficient education to its remaining pupils. We conclude, however, that the Commissioner is entitled to rely on the district of residence to come forward with a preliminary showing that the requirements of a thorough and efficient education cannot be met. The Act affirmatively entitles the district of residence to analyze the charter school applicant's submission to the Commissioner and to challenge or augment the applicant's submitted information. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-4c; N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1. Further, the Legislature has put districts on notice that the presumptive per pupil loss shall be 90%. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12. Read in combination, those statutory provisions require a district of residence to make an initial showing that imposition of the presumptive amount, or a proposed different amount for the charter school applicant's pupils would impede, or prevent, the delivery of a thorough and efficient education in that district.See footnote 55 We note, however, that application of this standard in the context of an Abbott district is not part of this case. We leave that question for another day. We do not regard the discretion allotted to the Commissioner under the Act, when determining whether to apply the presumptive percentage or to apply a different percentage, to be controlled by focusing on the financial consequences to a district of residence. But, if a district of residence demonstrates with some specificity that the constitutional requirements of a thorough and efficient education would be jeopardized by loss of the presumptive amount, or proposed different amount of per pupil funds to a charter school, then the Commissioner is obligated to evaluate carefully the impact that loss of funds would have on the ability of the district of residence to deliver a thorough and efficient education. The Commissioner is well positioned to analyze such contentions and should do so when they arise. The thrust of that legislative initiative was to advance the creation of charter schools as stated in N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-2, and the Act should be applied to promote that objective. The Legislature chose to finance the charter schools from monies provided to the district of residence of the charter school. The districts' fears and concerns were heard and addressed by the adjustments to Section 12 of the Act, which now contains the 90" presumptive amount provision. IN THE MATTER OF THE GRANT OF THE CHARTER SCHOOL APPLICATION OF ENGLEWOOD ON THE PALISADES CHARTER SCHOOL. ___________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THE GRANT OF THE CHARTER SCHOOL APPLICATION OF THE CLASSICAL ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL OF CLIFTON, PASSAIC COUNTY. ____________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THE GRANT OF THE CHARTER SCHOOL APPLICATION OF THE FRANKLIN CHARTER SCHOOL, SOMERSET COUNTY. _____________________________ STEIN, J., concurring I join the Court's thoughtful, comprehensive, and persuasive disposition of this appeal. I write separately only to add an observation that I am confident is implicit in the Court's opinion. The Court correctly observes that [t]he choice to include charter schools among the array of public entities providing educational services to our pupils is a choice appropriately made by the Legislature so long as the constitutional mandate to provide a thorough and efficient system of education in New Jersey is satisfied. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 9-10). Because the constitution authorizes the Legislature to determine the means by which a thorough and efficient education is to be provided, I read and understand the Court's opinion as neither expressing nor implying any view about the wisdom of that legislative choice. See State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 65 (1983) (stating that We do not pass on the wisdom of this legislation's mandatory three year imprisonment or the wisdom of its imposition on the offenses covered. That is a matter solely for the Legislature to decide. ) NO. A-36/37/38 IN THE MATTER OF THE GRANT OF THE CHARTER SCHOOL APPLICATION OF ENGLEWOOD ON THE PALISADES CHARTER SCHOOL. _______________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THE GRANT OF THE CHARTER SCHOOL APPLICATION OF THE CLASSICAL ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL OF CLIFTON, PASSAIC COUNTY. _______________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THE GRANT OF THE CHARTER SCHOOL APPLICATION OF THE FRANKLIN CHARTER SCHOOL, SOMERSET COUNTY. DECIDED June 28, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz