Case Title: In re ESTATE OF SORENSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re ESTATE OF SORENSON2000 WY 1599 P.3d 259Case Number: 99-249 99-267Decided: 07/27/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GLENN A. SORENSON, DECEASED.

 JEFF SORENSON, APPELLANT 
(PETITIONER),

 v.

 BRETT SORENSON, APPELLEE (RESPONDENT). 

JEFF SORENSON, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),v. BRETT SORENSON, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Johnson and Sheridan Counties, John C. Brackley, 
J.

Representing 
Appellant: Paul J. Drew of Drew 
& Carlson, LLC, Gillette, Wyoming.Representing Appellee: Hardy H. 
Tate, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY,* GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

* Retired June 2, 
2000.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] Once again 
this Court is confronted with a disagreement between siblings arising out of a 
devise from their father. Glenn Sorenson, the deceased father (the father), 
devised ranch lands to his sons, Jeff Sorenson (Jeff) and Brett Sorenson 
(Brett), "in equal shares, as tenants in common[.]" The father's Last Will and 
Testament included a restriction upon alienation, described as a condition 
subsequent, which prescribed divestiture as the penalty for violation. After the 
father's estate was distributed, Brett commenced an action seeking partition of 
the ranch property and also claiming that an earlier lease from the father to 
Jeff was void. Jeff filed an answer and counterclaim asserting that the 
partition action violated the condition subsequent, and he also alleged that the 
attempt to challenge the lease violated an "in terrorem" clause that was 
included in the father's will. The district court ruled that the common law and 
Wyoming statutes justified the partition action despite the language in the 
will, and granted Brett's motion for summary judgment on Jeff s claim that 
Brett's petition for partition violated the condition subsequent. 

[¶2] In the 
estate matter, Jeff filed a Petition to Reopen Estate seeking to have amended 
the Decree of Partial Distribution or the final Decree of Distribution to 
incorporate the condition subsequent and the "in terrorem" clause from the 
father's will. The district court ruled that its holding with respect to the 
partition action made irrelevant any effort to reopen the estate to add the 
condition subsequent or "in terrorem" language to the Decree of Distribution, 
and that the withdrawal by Brett of the challenge to the lease, in effect, made 
moot any ruling on the application of the "in terrorem" 
clause.

[¶3] Jeff has 
appealed the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Defendant's Counterclaim entered in favor of Brett and the Order Denying Motion 
to Reopen Estate. We affirm, albeit on different grounds than those relied upon 
by the district court.

[¶4] Jeff, by 
his Brief of Appellant, presents this statement of the 
issues:

I. Is the devise of real 
property to the parties subject to the condition subsequent in the decedent's 
will?

II. Is the devise of real 
property to the parties subject to the in terrorem clause in the decedent's 
will?

III. Did the probate 
judge err in refusing to reopen the probate for the purpose of accurately 
describing the property interests devised to the parties?

[¶5] The issues 
presented in the Brief of the Appellee filed by Brett are:

I. Is the final decree of 
distribution following probate res judicata on the nature of a real property 
interest held by the devisees of a will or must a final decree of distribution 
be forever read in conjunction with the will?

II. Do any of the claims 
of the appellant Jeff Sorenson state a cause upon which relief can be 
granted?

[¶6] The father 
owned a ranch in Sheridan and Johnson counties, known as "The Powder River 
Place," which encompassed approximately 2,485 acres on which was a ranch house, 
barn, and other outbuildings and improvements. In 1994, the father leased most 
of his ranch to Jeff for a term of ten years, with an option to renew the lease 
for another ten years. On June 20, 1997, the father executed his Last Will and 
Testament, in which he made this devise:

[¶7] Article 5. 
Subject to the foregoing Article [Article 4 - providing for the distribution of 
certain items of personal property according to a list made by the father], I 
hereby make the following specific bequests:

A. To my sons in equal 
shares, as tenants in common, I give and devise all of my right, title, and 
interest in and to my ranch, known commonly as "The Powder River Place," as 
their sole and separate property, subject to the following 
restrictions:

[¶8] For a 
period of twenty years following the date of my death, neither of my sons may 
individually, sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise divest himself, whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily, of any incidents of ownership in the surface 
interest of this property to any person or entity, other than to the other of my 
sons. Provided, however, that both of my sons, acting together, so long as 
neither of them is acting under any form of duress or compulsion, may sell, 
lease, or encumber the surface interest in this property to a third person. The 
foregoing restriction is a condition subsequent and immediately upon violation 
of any aspect of it, the title of the violating devisee to said property shall 
immediately terminate, and the terminated interest shall immediately become 
vested in my other son, so that he shall hold title to this property as his sole 
and separate property in fee simple absolute. In the event that either of my 
sons shall die before the termination of the twenty year period, those persons 
who are entitled to his interest by virtue of inheritance or devise shall be 
bound by the foregoing provision, and no sale or lease of the surface estate 
shall be permitted without their prior unanimous consent.

[¶9] The will 
also contained an "in terrorem" clause that read:

Article 8: In the event 
that any legatee, devisee, or beneficiary of this my LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT, 
for whose benefit I have made any provision, shall endeavor in any way to 
contest in any court, or before any tribunal, or in any other forum, this my 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT, or the validity thereof, or its due or proper 
execution, or the provisions or distributions applicable to him or her, or any 
other provision or distribution, or shall in any manner question any acts in 
making this will or any of its provisions, or of any other form of gift or 
conveyance made outside of this will, then and in that event, such contestant 
shall thereupon forever forfeit, and shall thenceforth cease to have any right, 
title, or interest in, under, or to any portion of my estate or any property or 
interest in property devised or bequeathed to such person, or any income 
therefrom, and all provisions of this my LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT in favor of, or 
for the benefit of, such contestant are hereby absolutely and forever revoked, 
and any and all rights which said contestant would otherwise have had shall fall 
into and become a part of the residue of my estate referred to above, and shall 
be disposed of as provided above, to the absolute exclusion of such contestant 
in the same manner as if such contestant had been specifically disinherited in 
this my LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT. This provision shall be liberally construed to 
include, but is not in any way limited to, any form of harassment, abuse, 
molestation, or intimidation of the Personal Representive or of any other 
beneficiary, devisee, or legatee, or any attempt whatsoever to interfere with 
the peaceful use and enjoyment of any property or interest in property left or 
given to any such beneficiary by me, whether such property or interest in 
property is left. to that beneficiary by way of this will or otherwise, 
including, but not limited to, any outright gift of property or joint ownership 
of property held by myself and anyone else with a right of 
survivorship.

(Emphasis in 
original.)

[¶10] The father 
died on July 15, 1997, and his will was promptly admitted to probate with Jeff 
appointed as the personal representative, in accordance with the father's will. 
On June 1, 1998, Jeff and Brett reached an agreement styled Order Approving 
Final Report and Accounting, and Decree of Partial Distribution. That order 
stated that the ranch was "to be distributed to Jeff L. Sorenson and Brett 
Sorenson in equal shares as tenants in common[.]" The order made no mention of 
the condition subsequent or the "in terrorem" clause included in the father's 
will.

[¶11] Brett 
filed a Complaint for Partition of Real Property and Other Relief on December 
10, 1998, in which he asked the district court to either partition the ranch or 
force a sale of the ranch and divide the proceeds pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann §§ 
1-32-101 through 1-32-122 (Lexis 1999). 1 He later filed an Amended Petition 
for Partition of Real Property and Other Relief, which omitted the alternative 
request for a forced sale. In both the original and amended petitions, Brett 
asked the district court to void the father's lease to Jeff as unconscionable in 
its terms and not entered into willingly and knowingly by the father, and 
because the father lacked contractual capacity. Jeff filed an Answer in which he 
included a Counterclaim asserting claims that the partition action violated both 
the condition subsequent and the "in terrorem" clause of the father's will and 
sought to have title to the ranch quieted in him. After filing his Answer to 
Counterclaim, Brett presented a Motion for Summary Judgment on Jeff's 
counterclaim.

[¶12] While the 
Motion for Summary Judgment was pending, Jeff filed a Petition to Reopen Estate 
in the probate matter, in which he sought to have the condition subsequent and 
the "in terrorem" clause of the father's will included in an amended decree of 
distribution. The district court issued a single decision letter resolving in 
Brett's favor both the summary judgment motion and the petition to reopen the 
estate, In that letter, the district court reported that, in the hearing on May 
26, 1999, Brett no longer disputed validity of the lease between Jeff and their 
father. Separate orders later issued. In the probate matter, the district court 
entered the Order Denying Motion to Reopen Estate, and in the partition action 
the district court entered the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Defendant's Counterclaims in which Brett was authorized to prosecute 
his partition action; Jeff's counterclaims were. denied with the provision that 
the order operate as a final judgment on the counterclaims pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
54 (b); and the lease was declared to be valid and enforceable. Jeff timely 
appealed both of those orders.

[¶13] We begin 
by addressing the summary judgment order. Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56; University of Wyoming v. Gressley, 
978 P.2d 1146, 1153 (Wyo. 1999). We review grants of summary judgment de novo 
upon the same record that was before the trial court. Gressley, 978 P.2d  at 
1153. We consider the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion, and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may 
fairly be drawn from the record. Id. We can affirm a grant of summary judgment 
on any legal grounds appearing in the record. Id. It may well be true, as the 
district court stated in its opinion letter, that a legal axiom exists to the 
effect that "[n]o person can be compelled to remain a co-tenant." This Court has 
said:

[¶14] No person 
is compelled to remain a co-tenant of another. That was the rule of the Roman 
Law.Code Justinian 3, 37, 5. That, with few exceptions, is the rule of the 
Common Law. 47 C.J. 288. And that is the rule under our statute. Section 3-6901 
and Section 6-2317, Wyo.Comp.St. 1945.

[¶15] In re 
Dixon's Estate, 66 Wyo. 197, 213, 207 P.2d 510, 515 (1949). The parties have 
vigorously debated the propriety of preferring that axiom over the expressed 
intention of the father in his will. As this case comes before us, we can 
discern no reason to resolve that debate.

[¶16] Jeff first 
argues that Brett's partition action violated the will's restrictions on 
alienation because the ultimate remedy in partition is a forced sale. A forced 
sale to a third party could violate the restrictions in the father's will, but 
we hold that Jeff's Amended Petition for Partition of Real Property and Other 
Relief did not invoke the condition subsequent. Pertinent statutes 
provide:

§ 1-32-109. Appraisement 
required where estate cannot be divided according to writ; return by 
commissioners; election to take at appraised value.

[¶17] When the 
commissioners are of the opinion that the estate cannot be divided according to 
the demand of the writ without manifest injury to its value, they shall return 
that fact to the court with a just valuation of the estate. If the court aproves 
proves the return and one (1) or more of the parties elects to take the estate 
at such appraised value, it shall be adjudged to him upon his paying to the 
other parties their proportion of the appraised value according to their 
respective rights, or securing the same as hereinafter 
provided.

§ 1-32-110. Terms of 
payment upon election to take; execution of conveyance.

[¶18] If one (1) 
or more of the parties elects to take the estate at the appraised value, unless 
the court for good cause directs the entire payment to be made in cash, or 
unless all the parties in interest agree to different terms, the terms of 
payment shall be one-third (1/3) cash, one-third (1/3) in one (1) year and 
one-third (1/3) in two (2) years, with interest, the deferred payments to be 
secured to the satisfaction of the court. On payment in full or in part with 
sufficient security for the remainder, the sheriff shall make and execute a 
conveyance to the party electing to take the same according to the order of the 
court.

§ 1-32-111. Order for 
sale of estate in absence of election to take.

[¶19] If no 
election to take the estate at the appraised value is made, at the instance of a 
party the court may order the sale thereof at public auction by the sheriff who 
executed the writ of partition or his successor.

[¶20] The 
statutory scheme makes it clear that the appointed commissioners must endeavor 
to make an equitable division of the property. Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-32-106. If 
that is not possible, the statute then provides for an appraisal and an election 
by a party or parties to take the estate at the appraised value. Wyo. Stat, Ann 
§ 1-32-109. If no party elects to take the estate at the appraised value, the 
district court can order a forced sale only "at the instance of a party * * *." 
Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-32-111. In his amended petition, Brett did not ask the 
district court to force a sale of the land. Since Brett did not seek a forced 
sale, his partition action does not violate the condition subsequent set forth 
in the will. In fact, the father's will specifically permits a conveyance 
between Jeff and Brett, and permits them to join in a conveyance to a third 
party:

[¶21] For a 
period of twenty years following the date of my death, neither of my sons may 
individually, sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise divest himself, whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily, of any incidents of ownership in the surface 
interest of this property to any person or entity, other than to the other of my 
sons. Provided, however, that both of my sons, acting together, so long as 
neither of them is acting under any form of duress or compulsion, may sell, 
lease, or encumber the surface interest in this property to a third 
person.

[¶22] (Emphasis 
added.) It is clear that the mere initiation of a partition action does not 
conflict with the condition. subsequent in the will because it could lead either 
to a retention of separate interests by the two sons or a conveyance from one to 
the other.

[¶23] Jeff next 
contends that Brett violated the "in terrorem" clause of the father's will by 
contesting his lease. He specifically points to the language revoking any 
bequest to a devisee that "shall in any manner question any acts in making this 
will or any of its provisions, or of any other form of gift or conveyance made 
outside of this will[.]" Brett responds that the "in terrorem" clause was no 
longer effective when he sought to have the lease voided because it was not 
incorporated into the decree. We eschew the arguments of both parties, and hold 
that Brett's challenge to the lease was inefficacious because he withdrew it 
before it required a ruling by the district court. Brett, therefore, was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

[¶24] In denying 
Jeff's petition to reopen the estate, the district court said that the omission 
of the restrictions in the decree was irrelevant. Jeff had sought to have the 
decree amended to include the condition subsequent and the "in terrorem" clause 
from the will. Having determined that Brett neither insisted on a forced sale 
upon partition nor prosecuted, after pleading, a challenge to the lease, we hold 
that including the desired language in the decree would have no bearing on the 
outcome of this matter. 

[¶25] We affirm 
the judgment of the district court.

FOOTNOTES

1 The 
pertinent statutes provide:

§ 1-32-101. Who compelled to make 
partition.

Tenants in common and coparceners of any estate of lands, tenements or 
hereditaments within the state may be compelled to make a partition thereof as 
hereinafter prescribed

§ 1-32-102. Where proceedings to be had.

When the estate is situated in one (1) county the proceedings shall he 
had in that county, and when situated in two (2) or more counties the 
proceedings may be had in any county in which a part of the estate is 
situated.

§ 1-32-103. Filing and contents of 
petition.

A 
person entitled to partition of an estate may file his petition in the district 
court setting forth the nature of his title, a description of the lands, 
tenements or hereditaments of which partition is demanded, and naming each 
tenant in common, coparcener or other interested person as 
defendant.

 § 1-32-104. Finding of 
court; order for partition; appointment of commissioners; ordering writ of 
execution to issue.

If 
the court finds that the plaintiff has a legal right to any part of the estate, 
it shall order partition in favor of the plaintiff or all parties in interest, 
appoint three (3) disinterested persons of the vicinity to be commissioners to 
make the partition and order a writ of execution to 
issue.

§ 1-32-105. Writ of partition directed to sheriff; contents; 
administering oath to commissioners.

The 
writ of partition may be directed to the sheriff of any county in which any part 
of the estate lies, and shall command him to administer the oaths of the 
commissioners, and setoff and divide to the plaintiff or each party in interest 
such part and proportion of the estate as the court shall 
order.

§ 1-32-106. View and examination of estate by commissioners; setting 
aside under oath.

In 
making the partition, the commissioners most examine the estate and set apart 
the same in such lots as will be most advantageous and equitable, having due 
regard to the improvements, situation and quality of the different 
parts.