Case Title: State v. Benson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 75590-6

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 17–0650 
 
Filed October 19, 2018 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
OWEN F. BENSON, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey L. 
Poulson, Judge. 
 
 
The defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision 
that affirmed his convictions for assault causing bodily injury and child 
endangerment.  REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
 
Priscilla E. Forsyth, Sioux City, for appellant. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant 
Attorney General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Kristine 
Timmins and Joshua Widman, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
 
 
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CHRISTENSEN, Justice. 
In this appeal, Owen Benson contends he did not cross the line from 
lawful corporal punishment to criminal conduct.  Benson maintains there 
was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for both assault 
causing bodily injury and child endangerment because the State did not 
prove his actions exceeded the scope of legal corporal punishment.  
Similarly, he contends the district court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion for a new trial because the verdict was contrary to the weight 
of the evidence.  For the reasons set forth below, we conclude the evidence 
was sufficient to support Benson’s convictions, and the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. 
Benson also claims that the jury instructions (1) misled the jury 
because the district court failed to provide a marshaling instruction 
explaining which form of intent applied to which charge, and (2) did not 
adequately describe specific intent.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
conclude the jury instructions were prejudicially erroneous, and we 
reverse Benson’s convictions and sentence and remand for new trial. 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings. 
On March 6, 2016, Owen Benson was watching B.B., G.B., and 
Z.B.—three of his fiancé’s children—until their father arrived to take them 
to his home as part of an arranged custody agreement.  The children were 
approximately eleven, ten, and eight years old at the time.  Benson joined 
the children on the porch carrying the wooden handle from a toy 
broomstick, upset about alleged damage the children caused to some 
furniture.  Benson subsequently hit B.B. and G.B. twice each on the 
buttocks with the broom handle.  Next, Benson hit Z.B. twice on the back 
of his upper legs with the broom handle.  The children’s father arrived soon 
after to take them to his home.   
 
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The next morning, the children’s father noticed bruises on the back 
of Z.B.’s legs.  G.B. and B.B. did not have bruises.  The father 
photographed the bruises and reported them to a school counselor.  The 
school counselor reported the bruises to the Iowa Department of Human 
Services (DHS), and a child protective investigation commenced.   
Ruth Stewart, the DHS investigator, conducted a home visit at 
Benson’s home, where Benson admitted hitting Z.B. but declined to 
answer her questions fully.  When Stewart met with Z.B., she observed 
bruises on the back of his legs that were “[a]pproximately three inches 
long, maybe an inch or more in width, and the one specifically on his right 
leg had a dark redness around it” similar to an outline.  After observing 
Z.B.’s bruises and speaking with Benson and his fiancé’s children, Stewart 
contacted law enforcement and referred Z.B. to the Child Advocacy Center 
at Mercy Medical Center in Sioux City for a forensic interview.   
The forensic interview with Dr. Michael Jung from the Child 
Advocacy Center revealed that Z.B.’s bruising was a “high-impact 
acceleration/deceleration injury” resulting from an object.  Dr. Jung noted 
that the injury “wasn’t from sitting on something [and] it required 
significant velocity or speed to injure the tissue in that manner.”  Further, 
he explained,  
The central sparing, where there’s no bruising in the inner 
part of the injury, is less injured than the surrounding tissue, 
and that occurs when tissue is injured in a high-impact, 
accelerating type of injury that actually shears the tissue on 
the edge of the object, and it requires a fairly high velocity or 
impact to do that. 
Following the investigation, the State charged Benson with assault 
causing bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1(2)(a) and 
708.2(2) (2016), a serious misdemeanor, and child endangerment in 
violation of Iowa Code sections 726.6(1)(a) and 726.6(7), an aggravated 
 
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misdemeanor, for hitting Z.B.  The State did not charge Benson for hitting 
B.B. or G.B.  A jury convicted Benson of assault causing bodily injury and 
child endangerment.  Benson filed a motion for a new trial, arguing the 
verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, and the district court 
denied this motion at Benson’s sentencing hearing. 
Benson appealed his convictions, presenting multiple claims on 
appeal.  First, he claimed there was insufficient evidence to support his 
convictions since the evidence showed his actions were within the bounds 
of legal corporal punishment.  Second, he alleged the district court abused 
its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial because the verdicts 
were contrary to the weight of the evidence.  Third, Benson argued the 
district court erred by instructing the jury on both general and specific 
intent without providing a marshaling instruction explaining which form 
of intent applied to which charge.  Finally, he asserted the jury 
instructions did not adequately describe specific intent.   
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court.  It 
concluded there was sufficient evidence to support Benson’s convictions, 
especially given Benson’s testimony that he intended for the punishment 
to “sting.”  The court of appeals also determined the jury instructions were 
not confusing or misleading since the marshaling instruction “clearly 
stated the specified purpose in mind.”  Benson sought further review, 
which we granted. 
II.  Standard of Review. 
We review claims of insufficient evidence for correction of errors at 
law, “and we will uphold a verdict if substantial evidence supports it.”  
State v. Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d 884, 890 (Iowa 2017).  Substantial evidence 
supports a verdict “if, ‘when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, 
it can convince a rational jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a 
 
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reasonable doubt.’ ”  State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 563 (Iowa 2018) 
(quoting State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 705 (Iowa 2016)).  Moreover, “[w]e 
generally review rulings on motions for new trial asserting a verdict is 
contrary to the weight of the evidence for an abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 
563–64 (quoting State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016)).  An abuse 
of discretion occurs when the district court “exercises its discretion on 
grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable” in such a 
manner that the district court’s decision “is not supported by substantial 
evidence or . . . is based on an erroneous application of the law.”  Id. at 
564 (quoting State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Iowa 2016)). 
“[W]e review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors 
at law.”  Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 707 (Iowa 2016) 
(quoting Anderson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 2005)).  Erroneous 
jury instructions warrant “reversal when prejudice results.”  State v. 
Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 138 (Iowa 2018).  Prejudice results when jury 
instructions mislead the jury or materially misstate the law.  Id.  We also  
“review refusals to give a requested jury instruction for correction of errors 
at law.”  Alcala, 880 N.W.2d at 707.  In doing so, we consider the jury 
instructions as a whole rather than in isolation to determine whether they 
correctly state the law.  State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 188 (Iowa 
2018).   
III.  Analysis. 
A.  Sufficiency of the Evidence.  Benson proclaims we should 
reverse his convictions because there was insufficient evidence, and he 
contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion 
for a new trial since the verdicts were contrary to the weight of the 
evidence.  To convict Benson of assault causing bodily injury, the State 
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Benson committed an act 
 
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“intended to cause pain or injury to, or which [was] intended to result in 
physical contact which [was] insulting or offensive to [Z.B.], coupled with 
the apparent ability to execute the act,” Iowa Code § 708.1(2)(a), and the 
act caused “bodily injury” to Z.B., id. § 708.2(2).  Moreover, to convict 
Benson of child endangerment, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Benson was a “person having custody or control over a child” 
who “[k]nowingly act[ed] in a manner that create[d] a substantial risk to 
[the] child or minor’s physical, mental or emotional health or safety.”  Id. 
§ 726.6(1)(a). 
Benson contends the State failed to demonstrate that his conduct 
constituted an act intended to cause pain or injury or to result in offensive 
physical conduct to support his conviction of assault causing bodily 
injury.  Likewise, he argues the State failed to demonstrate that his 
conduct created a substantial risk to Z.B.’s health and safety to support 
his conviction of child endangerment.  Rather, Benson proclaims the 
evidence only demonstrates that his actions constituted “legal corporal 
punishment as allowed by Iowa law.”  
“[P]arents have a right to inflict corporal punishment on their child, 
but that right is restricted by moderation and reasonableness.”  State v. 
Arnold, 543 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Iowa 1996).  When a parent’s conduct 
surpasses “the line of reasonable correction, his or her conduct becomes 
criminal.”  Id.  “The proper test is whether, under the particular 
circumstances, the amount of force used or the means employed by the 
parent rendered such punishment abusive rather than corrective in 
character.”  Id.  This determination “varies with the age, physical 
condition, and other characteristics of a child as well as with the gravity 
of the child’s misconduct.”  Id. 
 
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Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State,” the 
record contains substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict that 
Benson is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of assault causing bodily 
injury and child endangerment.  Wickes, 910 N.W.2d at 563 (quoting 
Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d at 890).  Benson testified that he used the 
broomstick handle because the children had previously “laughed and said 
that didn’t hurt” when he spanked them with an open hand.  
Consequently, he did more research into spanking and discovered 
guidance from an online article that declared “you should use an object to 
make [a spanking] sting.”  Benson testified that he “implemented” that 
guidance when he hit Z.B. with the broom handle, and a reasonable jury 
could conclude from this testimony that Benson intended to cause pain, 
injury, or offensive contact as well as a substantial risk to Z.B.’s health 
and safety. 
Further, there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s 
conclusion that Benson’s use of force on Z.B. was “abusive rather than 
corrective in character.”  Arnold, 543 N.W.2d at 603.  Z.B. was wearing 
jean pants when Benson hit him with the broomstick, yet Z.B. had bruises 
that were still visible four days after the incident.  See id. at 603 (holding 
there was sufficient evidence to support a child endangerment conviction 
when the child’s bruises “were clearly visible three days after the 
incident”).  The bruises were “[a]pproximately three inches long, maybe an 
inch or more in width, and the one specifically on his right leg had a dark 
redness around it.”  As Dr. Jung explained at trial, Z.B. sustained a “high-
impact acceleration/deceleration injury” that “required significant velocity 
or speed to injure the tissue in that manner.”  Though Benson contends 
he did not spank Z.B. with the intent to injure him because his conduct 
was only to discipline Z.B. for allegedly damaging furniture, “the jury [is] 
 
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free to reject certain evidence, and credit other evidence.”  Reed, 875 
N.W.2d at 705 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Thomas, 847 N.W.2d 
438, 442 (Iowa 2014)).  Based on the evidence that Benson used the broom 
handle because he wanted the use of force to “sting” and the severity of 
the bruises, the State presented substantial evidence to “convince a 
rational jury that defendant [was] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Wickes, 910 N.W.2d at 563 (quoting Ramirez, 895 N.W.2d at 890).   
Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Benson’s motion for a new trial because the verdicts were not 
contrary to the weight of the evidence.  “A verdict is contrary to the weight 
of the evidence only when ‘a greater amount of credible evidence supports 
one side of an issue or cause than the other.’ ”  Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706 
(quoting State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006)).  “[A] 
district court should only grant a motion for new trial ‘in the extraordinary 
case in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict 
rendered.’ ”  Wickes, 910 N.W.2d at 570 (quoting Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706).   
This is not the rare case in which the verdicts run contrary to the 
weight of the evidence.  As we have already noted, there was substantial 
evidence to support the jury’s finding that Benson was guilty of assault 
causing bodily injury and child endangerment.  This is true even without 
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.  Thus, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Benson’s motion 
for a new trial. 
B.  Jury Instructions Regarding Intent.  Benson argues the jury 
instructions did not properly inform the jury which form of intent to apply 
to which charges, nor did they adequately convey the definition of “specific 
intent.”  The district court included the following marshaling instructions: 
 
 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
 
To commit a crime, a person must intend to do an act 
which is against the law.  While it is not necessary that a 
person knows that act is against the law, it is necessary that 
the person was aware he or she was doing the act and he or 
she did it voluntarily, not by mistake or accident.  You may, 
but are not required to, conclude a person intends the natural 
results of his or her acts. 
 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
 
“Specific intent” means not only being aware of doing an 
act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a 
specific purpose in mind. 
 
Because determining the defendant’s specific intent 
requires you to decide what the defendant was thinking when 
an act was done, it is seldom capable of direct proof.  
Therefore, you should consider the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the act to determine the defendant’s specific 
intent.  You may, but are not required to, conclude a person 
intends the natural results of his or her acts. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
The State must prove all of the following elements of 
Assault Causing Bodily Injury: 
1.  On or about the 6th day of March, 2016, Owen Benson did 
an act which was intended to cause pain or injury to [Z.B.] or 
which was intended to result in physical contact which was 
insulting or offensive to [Z.B.]. 
2.  Owen Benson had the apparent ability to do the act. 
3.  Owen Benson’s act caused bodily injury to [Z.B.] as defined 
in Instruction No. 19. 
. . . . 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
 
The State must prove all of the following elements of Child 
Endangerment: 
1.  On or about the 6th day of March, 2016, Owen Benson was 
a person having custody or control of [Z.B.] 
2.  [Z.B.] was under the age of fourteen years. 
 
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3.  Owen Benson acted with knowledge that he was creating a 
substantial risk to [Z.B.’s] physical, mental, or emotional 
health or safety. 
. . . . 
Benson objected to the general-intent instruction, claiming it was 
unnecessary since assault is a specific-intent crime.  Benson also objected 
to the instruction on specific intent and requested the court add language 
informing the jury that “[s]pecific intent is present when from the 
circumstances the offender must have subjectively desired the prohibited 
result.”  Bacon ex rel. Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Iowa 1997) 
(quoting State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Iowa 1976)).  The district 
court overruled Benson’s objections and refused to submit Benson’s 
requested jury instruction.  On appeal, Benson contends the inclusion of 
instructions on both general intent and specific intent without a 
marshaling instruction explaining which intent applied to which charge 
misled the jury.  He also challenges the district court’s refusal to include 
his requested language in the instruction on specific intent, reasoning his 
proposed language would have “more appropriately instruct[ed] the jury 
as to the elements of the case.” 
In order to determine whether the jury instructions misled the jury 
or materially misstated the law, we must first examine the form of intent 
required for both assault causing bodily injury and child endangerment.  
Notably, we have never analyzed whether child endangerment requires 
specific or general intent, though the district court appears to have 
instructed the jury that it is a general-intent crime by stating that the State 
had to prove Benson “acted with knowledge.”  Specific intent exists “when 
from the circumstances the offender . . . subjectively desired the prohibited 
result,” whereas general intent is present “when from the circumstances 
the prohibited result may reasonably be expected to follow from the 
 
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offender’s voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire to have 
accomplished such result.”  State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Iowa 
2010) (quoting Redmon, 244 N.W.2d at 797).  This distinction parallels the 
federal distinction between specific and general intent, as the United 
States Supreme Court has declared, “ ‘[P]urpose’ corresponds loosely with 
the common-law concept of specific intent, while ‘knowledge’ corresponds 
loosely with the concept of general intent.”  United States v. Bailey, 444 
U.S. 394, 405, 100 S. Ct. 624, 632 (1980).  Since Benson was charged with 
child endangerment under Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(a), which requires 
a person to act “knowingly,” the district court was correct to instruct the 
jury that child endangerment is a general-intent crime.  See Iowa Code 
§ 726.6(1)(a). 
In contrast, assault “includes a specific intent component.”  
Fountain, 786 N.W.2d at 265.  “Although in the past we have defined the 
assault alternative in section 708.1(2) as a general intent crime,” we 
overruled those cases and declared it a specific-intent crime in State v. 
Heard, 636 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Iowa 2001).  We based our holding in Heard 
on the language of section 708.1(2), which requires intent to cause pain, 
injury, offensive contact, or fear of injurious and immediate physical 
contact.  Id. at 231–32; see also Iowa Code § 708.1(2)(a)–(b). 
Following Heard, the legislature amended the language of section 
708.1, adding, “An assault as defined in this section is a general intent 
crime.”  State v. Bedard, 668 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Iowa 
Code § 708.1(1) (2003)).  However, we noted in Bedard that “this 
amendment did not alter the substantive content of the statute as it 
pertains to the element of the crime,” and the language regarding intent in 
the statute remained an element of the offense.  Id. at 601.  We have 
continued to focus “on the elements of the crime,” proclaiming in Fountain 
 
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that assault “includes a specific intent component” because the elements 
“include an act that is done to achieve the additional consequence of 
causing the victim pain, injury[,] or offensive contact.”  786 N.W.2d at 265.  
Thus, regardless of the legislature’s designation, assault substantively is 
a specific-intent crime under section 708.1 based upon the language in 
the statute.  Id.   
The issue in this case is whether the jury instructions “convey[ed] 
the applicable law in such a way that the jury ha[d] a clear understanding 
of the issues” before it.  Rivera v. Woodward Res. Ctr., 865 N.W.2d 887, 
892 (Iowa 2015) (quoting Thompson v. City of Des Moines, 564 N.W.2d 839, 
846 (Iowa 1997)).  That was not the case here.  Based on our review of the 
jury instructions as a whole, the district court’s failure to provide a 
marshaling instruction explaining which form of intent applied to which 
charge rendered the instructions confusing and misleading.   
For example, the court of appeals concluded that the language of 
Instruction No. 15 and Instruction No.16 clearly conveyed to the jury that 
assault causing bodily injury required specific intent.  In part, Instruction 
No. 15 defined “specific intent” as an act done “with a specific purpose in 
mind,” and Instruction No.16 proclaimed the State had to show Benson 
did an act “intended to cause pain or injury to [Z.B.]” or “intended to result 
in physical contact which was insulting or offensive to [Z.B.]” in order to 
convict Benson of assault causing bodily injury.  (Emphasis added.)  
However, the court of appeals overlooked the impact of Instruction No. 14, 
which instructed the jury that “[t]o commit a crime, a person must intend 
to do an act which is against the law . . . .”  (Emphasis added.)  The 
similarities between “intend[ing] to cause pain or injury to [Z.B.] [or] 
intend[ing] to result in physical contact” and “intend[ing] to do an act” 
create confusion about the form of intent applicable to assault causing 
 
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bodily injury.  This confusion could have been resolved with a marshaling 
instruction explaining which form of intent applied to which charge, such 
as: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
 
[Concerning Instruction 16 only,] “specific intent” means 
not only being aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, 
but in addition, doing it with a specific purpose in mind . . . . 
Moreover, the record contains instances in which statements made 
to the jury during Benson’s trial may have created further confusion for 
the jury as to the requisite intent for each charge.  In its closing, the State 
began to walk the jury through the elements of assault causing bodily 
injury, noting,  
[T]he State will have to prove that on or about the 6th day of 
March, the defendant did an act which was intended to cause 
pain or injury, the defendant had the apparent ability to do 
the act, and that the defendant caused bodily injury to [Z.B.]. 
The State continued to discuss the elements of assault causing bodily 
injury, explaining bodily injury then discussing intent.  The State 
explained,  
[A]nd so going back to our main marshaling instruction, 
looking at the elements we have to consider, the bodily injury 
element is proven.  So that leaves us with the question of did 
the act—was the act intended to cause pain or injury? 
You’re going to be instructed on intent in this case.  
You’re going to be given the general criminal intent definition.  
And the things you focus on there, basically was the defendant 
aware that he was doing an act and did he do it voluntarily? 
The Court is also going to instruct you on the specific 
intent instruction under Iowa law.  And that is not only 
knowing that the defendant was aware he was doing an act, 
he did it voluntarily, the State also has to show that the 
defendant did the act with a specific purpose in mind. 
By discussing both general and specific intent in its discussion on 
the elements of assault causing bodily injury, the State may have blurred 
 
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the jury’s understanding of the requisite form of intent for assault causing 
bodily injury. 
Similarly, the State argued on rebuttal,  
The State’s argument is that the defendant consciously 
was aware of his actions on March 6th and that those actions 
constituted Assault Causing Bodily Injury and Child 
Endangerment. 
He acted with a specific purpose in mind when he picked 
the stick up and struck [Z.B.] on the buttocks two times . . . .  
(Emphasis added.)  While the State argued Benson’s actions constituted 
assault causing bodily injury—a specific-intent crime—if Benson 
“consciously was aware of his actions,” the jury instruction on general 
intent informed the jury that general intent is present when “the person 
was aware he or she was doing the act.”  These are essentially the same 
descriptions, yet they discuss two different forms of intent.  Thus, the State 
incorrectly described to the jury the form of intent required to convict 
Benson of assault causing bodily injury.   
Upon reading the jury instructions as a whole, it is evident that the 
district court’s refusal to submit Benson’s requested marshaling 
instruction explaining which form of intent applied to which charge was 
erroneous because the submitted jury instructions did not “convey the 
applicable law in such a way that the jury ha[d] a clear understanding of 
the issues.”  Rivera, 865 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting Thompson, 564 N.W.2d 
at 846).  As a result, Benson was prejudiced because the instructions 
misled the jury.  See Coleman, 907 N.W.2d at 138.   
In contrast, the district court did not err in refusing to submit 
Benson’s requested jury instruction on specific intent.  The district court 
must submit “a requested jury instruction if it correctly states the 
applicable law and is not embodied in other instructions.”  Alcala, 880 
 
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N.W.2d at 707 (quoting Sonnek v. Warren, 522 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1994)).  
Here, Benson’s requested jury instruction that “[s]pecific intent is present 
when from the circumstances the offender must have subjectively desired 
the prohibited result,” Bacon, 567 N.W.2d at 417 (quoting Redmon, 244 
N.W.2d at 797), was already adequately conveyed in the jury instructions.  
The district court instructed the jury that specific intent means “doing [an 
act] with a specific purpose in mind.”  This instruction was taken verbatim 
from the Iowa State Bar Association’s Criminal Jury Instructions, and it 
correctly states the law.  See Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury 
Instructions 200.2 (2016) (“ ‘Specific intent’ means not only being aware 
of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a 
specific purpose in mind.”).  Thus, the district court’s denial of Benson’s 
requested specific-intent instruction was not erroneous since the 
submitted instructions already embodied the requested instruction and 
accurately conveyed the law.  Nevertheless, we reverse and remand 
Benson’s case to the district court for a new trial due to the prejudicial 
jury instructions that failed to inform the jury of the applicable form of 
intent for each charge.  See, e.g., State v. Hoyman, 863 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Iowa 
2015) (“[C]ontradictory and confusing instructions will necessitate a new 
trial.”).  
IV.  Conclusion. 
We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for a new 
trial for the aforementioned reasons. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.