Case Title: Knadler v. Adams

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5809

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Knadler v. Adams1983 WY 46661 P.2d 1052Case Number: 5809Case Number: 5809Decided: 04/22/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
FRED 
B. KNADLER AND ELAINE M. KNADLER, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

DONALD F. ADAMS AND 
ROBERTA ANN ADAMS, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS). No. 5809

Appeal from the District Court,AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

George L. 
Zimmers, of Zimmers, Nelson & Castor, Laramie, for appellants.

Philip Nicholas, 
of Corthell, King, McFadden, Nicholas, Prehoda & Olson, Laramie, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ. 

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants-defendants 
appeal from a summary judgment enforcing a covenant in the deeds under which 
both parties hold title to adjoining lots in Cochran Addition to the City of 
Laramie. The 
covenant provides that "only one residence shall be erected on each lot." 
Appellees-plaintiffs instituted an injunction action to prevent appellants from 
expanding their residence into a multiple-family dwelling.1 Appellants allege error in the 
granting of the summary judgment because they contend the covenant language to 
be ambiguous, wherefore an issue of material fact exists as to its meaning. A 
motion for summary judgment should not be granted if there is a genuine issue of 
a material fact. Timmons v. Reed, 
Wyo., 569 P.2d 112 (1977); and Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 
Wyo., 609 P.2d 984 (1980).

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     A review of a summary 
judgment must be made from the viewpoint favorable to the party opposing it and 
with examination of the material upon which it is based from the same standpoint 
as did the district judge. DeHerrera v. 
MemorialHospital of Carbon County, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1342 
(1979); Bluejacket v. Carney, 
Wyo., 550 P.2d 494 (1976); Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil 
Company (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147 (1981); and Fegler v. Brodie, Wyo., 574 P.2d 751 
(1978).

[¶4.]     If the intention of the 
grantor does not readily appear in a deed, a question of fact is presented and 
circumstances surrounding the language used may be resorted to in order to 
ascertain such intention. Gregory v. 
Sanders, Wyo., 635 P.2d 795 (1981), and In Re Rennie's Estate, 430 F.2d 1388 
(10th Cir. 1970). But, if the intent of the parties can be gathered from plain 
and unambiguous language in the deed considered as a whole, such should be done 
as a matter of law without reference to extrinsic evidence. Dawson v. Meike, Wyo., 
508 P.2d 15 (1973); Gregory v. Sanders, supra. The issue of whether 
or not an ambiguity exists in an instrument is one of law. Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer 
Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463 
(1980).

[¶5.]     Although the language 
here in question is plain and unambiguous: "Only one residence shall be erected 
on each lot," appellant contends for ambiguity in two respects. (1) The language 
could mean either a dwelling occupied by a single family or a single structure 
which could be occupied by more than one living unit, and (2) the restriction 
was modified in a number of respects by the original grantors in deeds to others 
in the Cochran Addition, thus reflecting uncertain meaning for 
it.

FIRST 
CONTENTION

"* * * [T]he meaning of 
the phrase `one residence,' as used in the plaintiff's contract is a building 
constructed for the purpose of serving as a dwelling place of one family, and 
that a building constructed for the purpose of serving as the dwelling place of 
four distinct families, living separate and apart from one another, is outside 
of its meaning." Dillon v. Gaker, 57 Ohio App. 90, 12 N.E.2d 150, 151 
(1937).

"It seems clear to us 
from a simple reading of the original restriction above quoted that `only one 
residence' means exactly what it says and that it cannot be stretched to mean 
four residences. The noun `residence' itself is singular, and the definitions in 
Webster's New International Dictionary all indicate that a residence is a 
dwelling place or abode of a single person or family unit. This is likewise the 
commonly understood meaning. * * *" Macy 
v. Wormald, Ky., 
329 S.W.2d 212, 213 (1959).

[¶6.]     We agree that the words 
"only one residence" have reference to one living unit. The purpose of such 
restriction is to control the general density of population in an area, thereby 
making it a more desirable living environment. This purpose would not be 
accomplished if the language were interpreted to permit one structure without 
reference to the occupants because the structures could be many storied and 
house hundreds of people. Accord: see Coffman v. James, Fla., 177 So. 2d 25 
(1965); Callahan v. Weiland, 291 
Ala. 183, 279 So. 2d 451, 65 A.L.R.3d 1201 
(1973); Shapiro v. Levin, 223 
Pa. Super. 
535, 302 A.2d 417 (1973); Killian v. 
Goodman, 229 Mich. 393, 201 N.W. 454 
(1924); Bailey v. Jackson-Campbell 
Co., 191 N.C. 61, 131 S.E. 567 (1926); NeptunePark 
Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 84 A.2d 687 
(1951); and Cunningham v. Hall, La. App., 148 So. 2d 808 
(1963).

SECOND 
CONTENTION

[¶7.]     The foregoing refutes 
appellants' second basis for finding ambiguity in the restrictive language, i.e. 
that modification of the restriction in other deeds evidenced ambiguity in such 
language. As already noted, if there is no ambiguity in the language itself, 
extrinsic evidence should not be considered.

[¶8.]     Should the language, 
nonetheless, be considered ambiguous and resort be had to extrinsic evidence in 
an effort to ascertain the intention of the original grantors, the fact that 
they modified the language in deeds to others by authorizing one set of 
apartments, a church, the Newman Center, and a school administration building on 
lots in the subdivision would only serve to emphasize their intention for the 
restriction to prevent other than one living unit per lot absent specific 
modification of the restriction by them.

ADDENDUM

[¶9.]     Appellants have not 
presented to us an alleged error relative to the propriety of a summary judgment 
by the trial court on an issue concerning prevention of enforcement of the 
restriction by virtue of change in the character of the neighborhood from that 
intended by the restriction. Mention by appellants of other potential violations 
of the restriction was argued in support of the contention relative to ambiguity 
of the restriction language.2 We will not consider issues which 
are not supported by proper citation of authority and cogent argument or which 
are not clearly defined. Young v. 
Hawks, Wyo., 624 P.2d 235 (1981); Elder v. Jones, Wyo., 608 P.2d 654 
(1980); and Rule 5.01(2), W.R.A.P.

[¶10.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellants had begun 
construction of an addition to their house, moving the garage and installing 
sewer and water lines for four apartments with carports abutting the property 
line next to the alley and providing parking fronting a street in place of grass 
and trees on that area.

2 Appellants noted in 
their brief that twenty-three other property owners in the addition had more 
than one living unit in their residences. In their affidavit in opposition to 
summary judgment, the addresses of these twenty-three properties were listed 
together with the names of the owners. In appellees' affidavit in support of the 
motion for summary judgment, reference was made to "approximately 15 apartments" 
in the addition which:

"* * * are in buildings 
which were designed for single family residences and which remain unaltered from 
their original construction and design. Generally, these are basement apartments 
and do not change the complexion of the neighborhood."