Case Title: Highland Tavern, L.L.C. v. DeWine

Citation: 2023-Ohio-2577

Docket Number: 2022-0014

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Highland Tavern, L.L.C. v. DeWine, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2577.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-2577 
HIGHLAND TAVERN, L.L.C., ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. DEWINE, GOVERNOR, ET 
AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Highland Tavern, L.L.C. v. DeWine, Slip Opinion No.  
2023-Ohio-2577.] 
Challenge to constitutionality of an emergency rule of Ohio Liquor Control 
Commission adopted in response to COVID-19 pandemic—Appeal and 
underlying case are moot because the rule is no longer in effect—Court of 
appeals’ judgment vacated. 
(No. 2022-0014—Submitted January 10, 2023—Decided August 1, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 21AP-176, 2021-Ohio-4067. 
________________ 
BRUNNER, J., announcing the judgment of the court. 
{¶ 1} This case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of an 
emergency rule of the Ohio Liquor Control Commission that was adopted as part 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
of the state’s initial response to the 2020 COVID-19 (“Covid”) pandemic.  Because 
the rule is no longer in effect, we hold that this appeal and the underlying case are 
moot.  Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals 
and remand the case to the trial court with instructions for it to dismiss the action. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The adoption of Rule 80 
{¶ 2} Under Ohio’s liquor laws, class D-1, D-2, and D-3 liquor permits 
allow the holder to sell beer, wine, mixed beverages, and spiritous liquor 
(“alcoholic beverages”) for on-premises consumption.  See R.C. 4303.13; R.C. 
4303.14; R.C. 4303.15.  Before the Covid pandemic, the holder of any of these 
permits could sell and allow on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages until 
1:00 a.m.  See Ohio Adm.Code 4301:1-1-49(B).  A D-3a permit under R.C. 4303.16 
would allow sales and consumption to continue until 2:30 a.m.  See Ohio 
Adm.Code 4301:1-1-49(C).  From Monday to Saturday, sales and on-site 
consumption could resume at 5:30 a.m.  See Ohio Adm.Code 4301:1-1-49(B)(1), 
(B)(3), (C)(1), and (C)(3).  On Sunday, they could resume at midnight, Ohio 
Adm.Code 4301:1-1-49(B)(2) and (C)(2), unless the holder had a D-6 permit, 
which allowed sales and on-site consumption during certain hours on Sundays, see 
former R.C. 4303.182, 2016 Sub.H.B. No. 342 (effective Sept. 28, 2016). 
{¶ 3} Within the first few months of the pandemic, appellee Ohio Liquor 
Control Commission adopted an emergency rule restricting these statutorily 
permitted hours of sale and on-site consumption of alcoholic beverages.  This rule 
was codified as Ohio Adm.Code 4301:1-1-80, known at the time as “Rule 80.”  
Rule 80 applied to all liquor-permit holders who were authorized to sell alcoholic 
beverages, that is, beer, wine, mixed beverages, or spirituous liquor, for on-
premises consumption.  The rule limited the permitted times for the sale and on-
premises consumption of alcoholic beverages, requiring that sales cease at 10:00 
p.m. and that on-premises consumption cease at 11:00 p.m.  See former Ohio 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
3 
Adm.Code 4301:1-1-80(A)(1) and (2), 2020-2021 Ohio Monthly Record 2-61, 
effective July 31, 2020. 
{¶ 4} Rule 80 was adopted through the emergency procedure prescribed by 
R.C. 119.03(G).  Specifically, appellee Governor Mike DeWine signed an 
executive order stating: “[A]n emergency exists requiring the immediate adoption 
of [Rule 80].”  The rulemaking procedures that would ordinarily be required for the 
adoption of a rule such as Rule 80 were suspended, and as set forth in R.C. 
119.03(G), the rule took effect immediately upon the filing of the final rule on July 
31, 2020.  See Executive Order 2020-30D, available at https://governor.ohio.gov 
/media/executive-orders/executive-order-2020-30d (accessed Mar. 6, 2023) 
[https://perma.cc/BR2Y-SYTS].  By operation of law pursuant to R.C. 
119.03(G)(1), Rule 80 could remain in effect for only 120 days, causing its 
automatic expiration on November 29, 2020. 
B.  Highland violates Rule 80 
{¶ 5} Appellant, Highland Tavern, L.L.C., held class D-1, D-2, D-3, D-3a, 
and D-6 liquor permits for the sale and consumption on premises of alcoholic 
beverages for the tavern/bar it operated at 808 West Market Street in Akron.  
Appellant, Highland Square Tavern, L.L.C., had purchased the assets of Highland 
Tavern, L.L.C., including its liquor permits, and operated at that location.  For ease 
of reference, this opinion refers to the two entities jointly as “Highland.” 
{¶ 6} Because Highland’s liquor permits were for the sale and on-premises 
consumption of alcoholic beverages, it was subject to the requirements of Rule 80.  
On three days in August 2020, agents with the Ohio Department of Public Safety 
visited the bar and observed that Highland’s employees allowed patrons to consume 
alcohol on the premises after 11:00 p.m. and on at least one of the days also sold 
alcohol for on-site consumption after 10:00 p.m.  The agents issued three violation 
notices, each of which cited Highland for violating Rule 80(A). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4 
{¶ 7} The commission held a hearing on the three violation notices within 
a few weeks after the notices were served on Highland.  Highland had the right “to 
be represented by counsel, [and] to offer evidence” at the hearing, R.C. 4301.04.  
Counsel for Highland offered evidence and questioned three witnesses, including 
Gary Trentman, an employee of the Ohio Department of Health Bureau of 
Infectious Diseases.  In questioning Trentman, Highland’s counsel sought to 
develop a factual record for a constitutional argument.  He asked Trentman why 
Covid restrictions were being applied to bars and restaurants covered by Rule 80 
but no similar Covid restrictions were being applied to other places where crowds 
gathered, such as retail establishments and sporting events.  At the end of the 
hearing, Highland’s counsel cited this line of questioning and argued to the 
commission that Highland was being “targeted” because it is a bar and that Rule 80 
was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
{¶ 8} On September 11, 2020, the commission found that Highland had 
violated Rule 80 as alleged in each of the three notices and ordered that its permits 
be revoked as of the close of business on October 2, 2020. 
C.  Highland pursues an administrative appeal and a separate civil lawsuit 
{¶ 9} Highland appealed the commission’s order to the Franklin County 
Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 119.12.  See Highland Tavern, L.L.C. v. 
Ohio Liquor Control Comm., Franklin C.P. No. 20CV-6447 (“the administrative 
appeal”).  Soon after the case was assigned to a judge, Highland moved the court 
for a stay of the commission’s revocation of its liquor permits pending the 
conclusion of the administrative appeal.  The trial court denied the motion.  
Highland closed its business on October 2, 2020. 
{¶ 10} Before the deadline for the filing of merit briefs in its administrative 
appeal, Highland initiated a separate civil action for declaratory judgment, 
contesting the constitutionality of Rule 80.  This action was also filed in the 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
5 
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, where its prior-filed administrative 
appeal was pending.  The declaratory-judgment action was assigned to a different 
judge.  At Highland’s request, the trial judge presiding over the administrative 
appeal stayed the briefing in the administrative appeal pending resolution of the 
declaratory-judgment action.  The court ordered the parties to the appeal to inform 
it when the declaratory-judgment matter was decided.  The judgment in the 
declaratory-judgment action is the judgment we review today. 
{¶ 11} Highland filed its declaratory-judgment action on November 25, 
2020—before it filed merit briefs in the administrative appeal and just four days 
before Rule 80 expired.  Highland named as defendants the governor, the 
commission, and the commission’s three members, all of whom are appellees in 
this case.  Highland alleged that Rule 80 was unconstitutional under the separation-
of-powers principles inherent in the Ohio Constitution and the substantive due-
process protections of both the Ohio and United States Constitutions.  Highland 
sought a declaratory judgment that Rule 80 was unconstitutional and an injunction 
“to prevent further harm.” 
D.  The declaratory-judgment action is dismissed because of the pending 
administrative appeal 
{¶ 12} On January 4, 2021, after Rule 80 had expired, appellees moved to 
dismiss Highland’s declaratory-judgment action, asserting that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction.  Appellees argued that Highland’s declaratory-judgment action was an 
improper attempt to bypass the administrative-appeal process, a special statutory 
proceeding for appealing liquor-permit revocations, that was already underway.  
Highland opposed appellees’ motion. 
{¶ 13} On March 31, 2021, the trial judge in the declaratory-judgment 
action granted the commission’s motion to dismiss, holding that the statutory 
scheme governing the revocation of liquor permits deprived the court of 
jurisdiction, citing State ex rel. Albright v. Delaware Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6 
60 Ohio St.3d 40, 42, 572 N.E.2d 1387 (1991),1 and Kazmaier Supermarket, Inc. v. 
Toledo Edison Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 147, 153, 573 N.E.2d 655 (1991) (“where the 
General Assembly has enacted a complete and comprehensive statutory scheme 
governing review by an administrative agency, exclusive jurisdiction is vested 
within such agency”).2  The trial court concluded that Highland’s declaratory-
 
1. Albright is factually distinguishable from this case.  The competing actions at issue in that case 
had been filed in two different counties and involved the municipal annexation of land that was 
located in the two counties.  Albright was an action in prohibition to prevent one of the courts from 
maintaining jurisdiction over the action because a related matter had already been filed in the county 
in which the original annexation hearing had been held.  In Albright, we stated: 
 
Relators argue that R.C. Chapter 709, supplemented by our decision in 
[State ex rel.] Lewis [v. Warren Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 52 Ohio St.3d 249, 
556 N.E.2d 1184 (1990),] fixes exclusive jurisdiction to consider annexation 
matters in the county in which the hearing takes place.  We agree and therefore 
find that the respondent court has no jurisdiction to consider the matter set forth 
in the pending declaratory judgment/injunction action.  Accordingly, we overrule 
respondents’ motions to dismiss the complaint, and grant a peremptory writ of 
prohibition prohibiting respondents from proceeding in that case.  
 
Id. at 41-42. 
 
2. Kazmaier is not analogous to this case, because it involved an action that was filed in a common 
pleas court raising claims that were clearly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Utilities 
Commission.  In Kazmaier, we stated: 
 
In regard to administrative agency exclusivity, generally, this court has 
recognized that where the General Assembly has enacted a complete and 
comprehensive statutory scheme governing review by an administrative agency, 
exclusive jurisdiction is vested within such agency.  State ex rel. Geauga Cty. 
Budget Comm. v. Geauga Cty. Court of Appeals (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 110, 113, 
438 N.E.2d 428; * * * 
This appeal involves a dispute over the correct rate to be assessed and 
the reimbursement of any overcharge along with interest upon the overcharge, if 
any.  Kazmaier’s claim alleged that it was charged a rate other than the appropriate 
commission-approved rate.  Whether expressly alleged or not, Kazmaier’s claim 
is that it was subjected to an unjust and unreasonable rate in violation of R.C. 
4905.22. 
* * * 
We conclude that in this type of matter involving a dispute inherently 
arising from charges based upon tariffs filed with and approved by the 
commission, the General Assembly has granted the commission exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine the mutual rights and responsibilities of the parties. 
 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
7 
judgment action had been filed in an effort to bypass the administrative-appeal 
procedure for appealing the liquor commission’s order revoking its permits.  The 
trial court further noted that Highland should have pursued a constitutional 
challenge to Rule 80 through claims for declaratory and injunctive relief in a suit 
filed immediately after the rule was adopted rather than in a suit filed after it was 
cited for violating the rule.  The trial court agreed with appellees and held that 
Highland’s “true aim [in the declaratory-judgment action was] to resolve the 
legality of its liquor permit revocation.”  It opined, based on Albright and Kazmaier, 
that the proper way to pursue that goal was through the administrative-appeal 
process. 
E.  The trial court presiding over the administrative appeal affirms the 
commission’s order, and Highland does not appeal 
{¶ 14} When the trial court dismissed Highland’s declaratory-judgment 
action, the stay was lifted in the administrative appeal.  Highland then argued in its 
merit brief in that case that, among other things, Rule 80 was unconstitutional 
because it violated Highland’s right to equal protection and the separation-of-
powers doctrine. 
{¶ 15} On September 24, 2021, the court hearing the administrative appeal 
affirmed the commission’s order revoking Highland’s liquor permits.  It rejected 
Highland’s arguments that Rule 80 was unconstitutional.  Highland did not appeal 
that judgment. 
F.  The appellate court affirms the trial court’s judgment in the declaratory-
judgment action, and this court accepts jurisdiction over Highland’s 
discretionary appeal 
{¶ 16} On November 16, 2021, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s 
dismissal of the declaratory-judgment action.  It agreed with the trial court that 
 
 
Id. at 153-154. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
Highland’s declaratory-judgment action sought to bypass a special statutory 
proceeding, contrary to the holdings of Albright and Kazmaier. 
{¶ 17} Highland appealed to this court, presenting two propositions of law: 
 
Proposition of Law I: Ohio Administrative Code section 
4301:1-1-80, “Rule 80,” is unconstitutional as it violate[s] the 
separation of powers doctrine implicitly embedded in the Ohio 
Constitution. 
Proposition of Law II: An administrative appeal challenging 
the application of an administrative rule does not divest a court of 
common pleas of jurisdiction over a separate constitutional 
challenge to the facial validity of the administrative rule. 
 
We accepted jurisdiction.  166 Ohio St.3d 1438, 2022-Ohio-798, 184 N.E.3d 131. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 18} Highland could have filed its two claims—the administrative appeal 
of the revocation of its liquor permits and the declaratory-judgment action to 
challenge the constitutionality of Rule 80—in the same action.  Additionally, the 
common pleas court could have consolidated the two separate cases that Highland 
filed, but it declined to do so.  Clearly, the trial and appellate courts were troubled 
by Highland’s “true aim” in filing a separate declaratory-judgment action.  
However, the tendency of trial and appellate courts in administrative appeals to 
limit the presentation of additional evidence to “newly discovered” evidence,3 if 
 
3. See, e.g., Hudson v. Brown, 75 Ohio Misc.2d 4, 6-7, 662 N.E.2d 99 (C.P.1995) (denying request 
to introduce additional evidence even though the appellant had not had an opportunity to present 
evidence before administrative agency); Herubin v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2022-Ohio-
3243, 196 N.E.3d 896, ¶ 44-45 (7th Dist.) (upholding trial court’s decision to strike additional 
evidence because it was not “newly discovered”); Starr v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce Div. of Real 
Estate & Professional Licensing, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-47, 2021-Ohio-2243, ¶ 31-32 
 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
9 
that, may also account for Highland’s having pursued separate actions in order to 
fully develop its arguments against Rule 80. 
{¶ 19} The additional evidence permitted in administrative appeals brought 
under R.C. 119.12 is described in R.C. 119.12(K): 
 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the court may grant a request for 
the admission of additional evidence when satisfied that the 
additional evidence is newly discovered and could not with 
reasonable diligence have been ascertained prior to the hearing 
before the agency. 
 
The phrase “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” in R.C. 119.12(K) has largely 
been omitted from consideration by trial and appellate courts of this state, see, e.g., 
Herubin at ¶ 44-45, and those courts have applied the statute to limit additional 
evidence in administrative appeals to only newly discovered evidence, with the 
admission of that evidence subject to the discretion of the trial court.  Id. 
{¶ 20} But the phrase “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” is broader than 
was characterized by the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Herubin and should not 
be ignored.  In the context of the statutory language, the phrase may be taken to 
mean either when the law permits new evidence other than newly discovered 
evidence or when the law does not permit even newly discovered evidence.  Here, 
it seems that Highland sought the ability to bring sufficient evidence to challenge 
the constitutionality of Rule 80, especially as it applied to Highland as the holder 
of class D liquor permits.  Even though Highland did raise but sought to develop 
 
(same); Gainer v. Cavanaugh, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2019CA00043, 2020-Ohio-175, ¶ 19 (recognizing 
that the phrase “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” in R.C. 119.12(K) is an exception to the general 
prohibition on additional evidence in administrative appeals under R.C. 119.12 and distinguishing 
that provision from one lacking any such “qualifiers or limitations”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
evidence for a constitutionality claim before the commission, the commission could 
not adjudicate that claim.  See Pivonka v. Corcoran, 162 Ohio St.3d 326, 2020-
Ohio-3476, 165 N.E.3d 1098, ¶ 24.  “[T]he proper procedure for raising a 
constitutional challenge is to first exhaust all administrative remedies.  A party can 
then raise the constitutional challenge in the court that hears the administrative 
appeal.”  Id. 
{¶ 21} R.C. 119.12(L) prescribes that for administrative appeals from an 
agency to the common pleas court, “[t]he hearing in the court of common pleas 
shall proceed as in the trial of a civil action, and the court shall determine the rights 
of the parties in accordance with the laws applicable to a civil action.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  This language in the administrative-appeal statute is similar to R.C. 
2721.02(A), which pertains to declaratory-judgment actions.  R.C. 2721.02(A) 
provides that 
 
courts of record may declare rights, status, and other legal relations 
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.  No action or 
proceeding is open to objection on the ground that a declaratory 
judgment or decree is prayed for under this chapter.  The declaration 
may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect.  The 
declaration has the effect of a final judgment or decree. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 22} Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution states that common 
pleas courts have “such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as 
may be provided by law.”  We have interpreted this to mean that “ ‘the general 
subject matter jurisdiction of Ohio courts of common pleas is defined entirely by 
statute.’ ”  (Emphasis added in Ruehlman.)  Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. 
Ruehlman, 157 Ohio St.3d 296, 2019-Ohio-2845, 136 N.E.3d 436, ¶ 7, quoting 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
11 
State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 42, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995).  In addition, as Justice 
(now Chief Justice) Kennedy stated, with respect to actions for declaratory 
judgment, 
 
[t]he General Assembly exercised its power to define the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the common pleas courts in enacting R.C. 
Chapter 2721, the Declaratory Judgment Act. * * * “[C]ourts of 
record may declare rights, status, and other legal relations,” R.C. 
2721.02(A) * * *. 
 
Cincinnati v. Fourth Natl. Realty, L.L.C., 163 Ohio St.3d 409, 2020-Ohio-6802, 
170 N.E.3d 832, ¶ 22 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The legislature specified in R.C. 
2721.13 that “[t]he provisions of [the declaratory-judgment] chapter are remedial 
and shall be liberally construed and administered.”  Thus, because the declaratory-
judgment provisions are statutory, they satisfy the phrase “[o]therwise provided by 
law” in R.C. 119.12(K) for the admission of additional evidence in administrative 
appeals beyond newly discovered evidence. 
{¶ 23} And in the context of administrative appeals, this makes sense.  
Without the evidence necessary to “determine the rights of the parties in accordance 
with the laws applicable to a civil action,” R.C. 119.12(L), constitutional claims of 
litigants could not be heard.  It was unfair for the trial court, in dismissing the 
declaratory-judgment action, to suggest that Highland should have brought its 
declaratory-judgment action at the time Rule 80 was adopted by emergency 
measure instead of waiting until after its liquor permits were revoked for violating 
the rule.  The rule was adopted in the midst of a pandemic, when businesses, 
including Highland’s, were losing money and were quickly implementing measures 
to avoid having to shut down.  The trial court did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction 
to hear Highland’s action. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
{¶ 24} Before addressing Highland’s two propositions of law, this opinion 
addresses appellees’ assertion that Highland’s case is moot.  Rule 80 expired on 
November 29, 2020.  Highland seeks a declaratory judgment that Rule 80 was 
unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting it from being enforced in the future.  
Even if we were to agree that Rule 80 was unconstitutional, appellees argue, we 
would be unable to provide the relief that Highland seeks.  As appellees state in 
their mootness argument, “[a]n order enjoining a rule that no longer exists will 
achieve nothing.  And a declaration that the same rule ‘was’ unconstitutional will 
not entitle Highland to anything.” 
{¶ 25} In response, Highland argues that an exception to the mootness 
doctrine applies.  It first points to case law providing that a party’s voluntary 
cessation of a challenged practice ordinarily does not render the case moot unless 
the party can show that it is “absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could 
not reasonably be expected to recur,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 190, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).  
According to Highland, appellees have not met this burden, because they have not 
provided any evidence to support their suggestion that neither Rule 80 nor a similar 
rule can reasonably be expected to be adopted in the future. 
{¶ 26} Highland also frames this case as one involving an issue that is 
capable of repetition yet evading review.  This mootness exception applies when 
“(1) the challenged action is too short in its duration to be fully litigated before its 
cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same 
complaining party will be subject to the same action again.”  State ex rel. Calvary 
v. Upper Arlington, 89 Ohio St.3d 229, 231, 729 N.E.2d 1182 (2000).  According 
to Highland, because Rule 80 was an emergency rule that could remain in effect for 
only 120 days, there was not enough time to fully litigate the constitutionality of 
the rule before it expired.  While that may be true in the abstract, we agree with 
appellees’ assertion that the question of the constitutionality of Rule 80 is moot. 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
13 
{¶ 27} As earlier quoted, Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution 
grants courts of common pleas “such original jurisdiction over all justiciable 
matters * * * as may be provided by law.”  An essential component of justiciability 
is that “ ‘ “the danger or dilemma of the plaintiff must be present, not contingent 
on the happening of hypothetical future events * * * and the threat to his position 
must be actual and genuine and not merely possible or remote.” ’ ”  (Ellipsis sic.)  
Mid-American Fire and Cas. Co. v. Heasley, 113 Ohio St.3d 133, 2007-Ohio-1248, 
863 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 9, quoting League for Preservation of Civil Rights & Internatl. 
Tranquility, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 64 Ohio App. 195, 197, 28 N.E.2d 660 (1st 
Dist.1940), quoting Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, at 40 (1934). 
{¶ 28} Although a case may present a live dispute at the time it is filed, 
subsequent events may transform it into one involving only a hypothetical dispute.  
One example is when a party alleges that a law is unconstitutional and the law at 
issue is repealed or materially amended while the case is underway.  See Hill v. 
Snyder, 878 F.3d 193, 203-204 (6th Cir.2017).  In that situation, the dispute is no 
longer “live” and the case is ordinarily moot.  Id. at 203.  That is what has happened 
here.  When Rule 80 expired, the dispute in this case then involved a condition that 
had ceased to exist; hence, the case is moot. 
{¶ 29} And neither the exception to the voluntary-cessation defense nor the 
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception apply here.  Both exceptions 
apply only when there is a reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will 
occur again.  See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 
(voluntary cessation); Calvary, 89 Ohio St.3d at 231, 729 N.E.2d 1182 (capable of 
repetition yet evading review).  It is not reasonably likely that a rule substantially 
similar to Rule 80 will be adopted in the future.  Several events that occurred since 
Rule 80 expired support this statement. 
{¶ 30} First, the laws related to both states of emergency and emergency 
rules have changed substantially.  On March 24, 2021, the General Assembly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
passed Sub.S.B. No. 22 (“Sub.S.B. 22”), over the governor’s veto.  Sub.S.B. 22 
became effective June 23, 2021, and it added provisions to the Revised Code 
limiting a state of emergency to 90 days and giving lawmakers authority to 
terminate by concurrent resolution a state of emergency after 30 days.  See R.C. 
107.42.  It also added a provision empowering the General Assembly to terminate 
by concurrent resolution any administrative rule adopted in response to the state of 
emergency.  See R.C. 107.43(C)(1).  With these new laws in place, rules similar to 
Rule 80 will be in effect for a much shorter time, from 30 to 90 days, and there will 
be more opportunity for public response to proposed orders that affect more than a 
specific group of people.  The passage of Sub.S.B. 22 leaves us only to speculate 
about what will happen if a similar situation occurs in the future; we cannot say it 
is reasonably likely that a similar rule will be adopted again or have the same effect 
on persons or entities similarly situated to Highland. 
{¶ 31} The United States Food and Drug Administration granted final 
approval to two vaccines providing protection against Covid.  See United States 
Food and Drug Administration, August 23, 2021 Press Announcement, FDA 
Approves First COVID-19 Vaccine, https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-
announcements/fda-approves-first-covid-19-vaccine (accessed Mar. 13, 2023) 
[https://perma.cc/BWP8-AHA5]; United States Food and Drug Administration, 
January 31, 2022 Press Announcement, Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA 
Takes Key Action by Approving Second COVID-19 Vaccine, https://www.fda.gov 
/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-takes-key-
action-approving-second-covid-19-vaccine 
(accessed 
Mar. 
13, 
2023) 
[https://perma.cc/25TH-9883].  Appellees also did not reimpose a restriction like 
Rule 80 during the spikes in Covid cases caused by the Delta variant in the fall of 
2021 or the Omicron variant in the winter of 2021-2022.  Nor have they reimposed 
a restriction resembling Rule 80 in the time since the peak of the Omicron variant.  
Finally, to the extent Highland suggests that a similar restriction may be imposed 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
15 
in the future in reaction to events unrelated to the Covid pandemic, it relies entirely 
on speculation. 
{¶ 32} Even though Rule 80 has expired, Highland attributes its permit 
revocations to the application of the allegedly unconstitutional rule.  However, 
Highland does not seek a remedy that would order the reinstatement of its permits.  
Rather, Highland seeks a declaration that Rule 80 was unconstitutional and an 
injunction to prevent enforcement of a future rule similar to the now-expired Rule 
80.  Counsel for Highland confirmed at oral argument that this was all the relief 
that Highland seeks in this case.  Even if we were to find that Rule 80 was 
unconstitutional, neither that declaration nor an injunction to prevent enforcement 
of a future similar rule would reinstate Highland’s permits. 
{¶ 33} In the end, Highland seeks only prospective relief from a future harm 
that is no longer possible—harm from the application of Rule 80, a rule that is no 
longer in effect.  Analyzing the exceptions to the mootness doctrine, we find no 
viable situation in which it is likely that Rule 80 or a rule of similar import will be 
adopted in the future. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 34} This case is moot.  We therefore vacate the judgment of the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals and remand the cause to the Franklin County Court of 
Common Pleas with instructions for it to dismiss the action.  See United States v. 
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950) (stating 
that when a civil case becomes moot while on appeal, the ordinary practice of the 
United States Supreme Court is to “reverse or vacate the judgment below and 
remand with a direction to dismiss” because review of the judgment “was prevented 
through happenstance”). 
Judgment vacated 
and cause remanded to the trial court. 
BALDWIN and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
KENNEDY, C.J., and BYRNE and STEWART, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
DETERS, J., concurs in paragraphs ¶ 32-34 of the opinion announcing the 
judgment of the court and otherwise concurs in judgment only. 
CRAIG R. BALDWIN, J., of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
FISCHER, J. 
MATTHEW R. BYRNE, J., of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, sitting 
for DEWINE, J. 
_________________ 
Mendenhall Law Group, Warner Mendenhall, and Brian Unger, for 
appellants. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, 
Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor General, and Joseph E. Schmansky, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellees. 
_________________