Case Title: P. v. Shockley

Citation: 

Docket Number: S189462M

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2014-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 2/26/14  (Unmodified opinion attached) 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S189462 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
THOMAS RAYMOND SHOCKLEY, 
) 
 
) 
Stanislaus County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 1238243 
 
____________________________________) 
 
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND  
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
THE COURT: 
 
 
The opinion in this matter filed on December 26, 2013, and appearing at 58 
Cal.4th 400, is modified as follows and the petition for rehearing is denied: 
 
On page 405, the third sentence in the third full paragraph that now reads:  
“If guilt of battery is predicated on guilt of lewd conduct — i.e., if a person guilty 
of lewd conduct is automatically also guilty of battery — there would be no 
elements of battery not also required of lewd conduct,” is modified to read as 
follows:  “If guilt of battery is predicated on guilt of lewd conduct — i.e., if a 
person is guilty of battery because that person committed lewd conduct — neither 
crime would have an element not also required of the other.” 
 
This modification does not change the judgment. 
 
Filed 12/26/13  (Unmodified opinion) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S189462 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F058249 
THOMAS RAYMOND SHOCKLEY, 
) 
 
) 
Stanislaus County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 1238243 
 
____________________________________) 
 
We must decide whether battery is a lesser and necessarily included offense 
of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under 14 years of age (hereafter 
referred to as lewd conduct).  We conclude it is not. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On October 17, 2007, defendant Thomas Raymond Shockley attended a 
family gathering in Modesto to celebrate victim Jane Doe’s 10th birthday.  Jane, 
the stepdaughter of defendant’s adult daughter, was not biologically related to 
defendant, but Jane often called him “grandpa.”  When Jane was alone at the 
computer, defendant kissed her on the lips and stuck his tongue in her mouth. 
Two days later, as a birthday present to Jane, defendant took Jane and her 
nine-year-old stepsister (defendant’s biological granddaughter) to the movies.  On 
the drive home, Jane sat between defendant and her stepsister in the front seat.  
After Jane took off her sweatshirt, defendant began rubbing her bare stomach, near 
her belly button, with his hand.  When Jane asked defendant if she could steer the 
2 
car, defendant told her to put her leg over his leg.  Defendant rubbed Jane’s genital 
area with his hand through her clothes for about five minutes.  After giving her 
stepsister a worried look, Jane asked to switch seats with her. 
When they got home, Jane told her stepsister what had happened in the car.  
She also told her father, who later called police.  Modesto Police Officer Scott 
Nelson interviewed defendant.  Defendant admitted rubbing Jane’s stomach and 
poking her belly button.  He said “his girlfriend would do the same thing to him 
just for fun.”  He denied rubbing Jane’s genital area.  Defendant said Jane could 
have thought he kissed her with his mouth open because at the theater, he spilled 
soda on his mouth and was licking the soda off with his tongue when Jane leaned 
over and kissed him.  Defendant also thought that Jane might have said those 
things about him because she had had large coffee drinks after the movie, and the 
caffeine might have affected her thinking. 
A jury found defendant guilty of lewd conduct under Penal Code section 
288, subdivision (a) (section 288(a)).   On appeal, he argued that the trial court had 
a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on battery under Penal Code section 242 
(section 242) as a lesser and necessarily included offense of lewd conduct.  The 
Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment.  We granted defendant’s 
petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to “instruct on a lesser offense 
necessarily included in the charged offense if there is substantial evidence the 
defendant is guilty only of the lesser.”  (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 
118)  Substantial evidence in this context is evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could conclude that the defendant committed the lesser, but not the greater, 
offense.  (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 422.)  “The rule’s purpose is . . . 
to assure, in the interest of justice, the most accurate possible verdict encompassed 
3 
by the charge and supported by the evidence.”  (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 
Cal.4th 142, 161.)  In light of this purpose, the court need instruct the jury on a 
lesser included offense only “[w]hen there is substantial evidence that an element 
of the charged offense is missing, but that the accused is guilty of” the lesser 
offense.  (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443.) 
To determine if an offense is lesser and necessarily included in another 
offense for this purpose, we apply either the elements test or the accusatory 
pleading test.  “Under the elements test, if the statutory elements of the greater 
offense include all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense, the latter is 
necessarily included in the former.  Under the accusatory pleading test, if the facts 
actually alleged in the accusatory pleading include all of the elements of the lesser 
offense, the latter is necessarily included in the former.”  (People v. Reed (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227-1228.)  In this case, because the information charging 
defendant with lewd conduct simply tracked section 288(a)’s language without 
providing additional factual allegations, we focus on the elements test.  (People v. 
Anderson (1975) 15 Cal.3d 806, 809.) 
Under section 288(a), “any person who willfully and lewdly commits any 
lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of 
a child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, 
or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child, is 
guilty of a felony.”  “Any touching of a child under the age of 14 violates this 
section, even if the touching is outwardly innocuous and inoffensive, if it is 
accompanied by the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of either the 
perpetrator or the victim.”  (People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289.)  By 
focusing on the defendant’s intent to sexually exploit a child rather than on the 
nature of the defendant’s offending act, section 288 “assumes that young victims 
4 
suffer profound harm whenever they are perceived and used as objects of sexual 
desire.”  (People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 444.) 
“A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the 
person of another.”  (§ 242.)  “Any harmful or offensive touching constitutes an 
unlawful use of force or violence” under this statute.  (People v. Martinez (1970) 3 
Cal.App.3d 886, 889, quoted in People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 961.)  
“It has long been established that ‘the least touching’ may constitute battery.  In 
other words, force against the person is enough; it need not be violent or severe, it 
need not cause bodily harm or even pain, and it need not leave a mark.”  (1 Witkin 
& Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 13, p. 
804; see People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899, fn. 12.) 
Without analysis, the court in People v. Santos (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 723, 
739, stated that battery is not a lesser included offense of lewd conduct.  In People 
v. Thomas (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1291-1293, the court disagreed with 
Santos and held that battery is a lesser included offense of lewd conduct.  It 
rejected the People’s argument that lewd conduct does not require an actual 
touching but battery does.  It also noted that the “People do not dispute that any 
lewd act within the meaning of section 288 is necessarily a harmful or offensive 
touching.”  (Thomas, supra, at p. 1292, fn. 8, citing People v. Martinez, supra, 11 
Cal.4th at p. 444.)  We must resolve the conflict between these cases. 
In this case, the People do dispute that a lewd act is necessarily a harmful or 
offensive touching, as battery requires.  They argue that “a lewd act with a child 
does not always involve touching the victim in a harmful or offensive manner.”  
Defendant argues to the contrary that touching a child with lewd intent is 
inherently harmful and objectively offensive, and, accordingly, every touching that 
satisfies the elements of section 288(a), because done with lewd intent, necessarily 
5 
is harmful or offensive for purposes of the battery statute.  (Citing J.C. Penney 
Casualty Ins. Co. v. M.K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1026.) 
We need not resolve this point.  If we were to agree with defendant, that 
would mean this form of battery (where lewd conduct supplies the required 
harmful or offensive touching) is not a lesser and included offense of lewd 
conduct but is essentially the identical offense.  If guilt of battery is predicated on 
guilt of lewd conduct — i.e., if a person guilty of lewd conduct is automatically 
also guilty of battery — there would be no elements of battery not also required of 
lewd conduct.  Substantial evidence could never exist that an element of the lewd 
conduct offense is missing but that the defendant is guilty of battery as a lesser 
included offense.  (See People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 443.)  A jury 
could never find the defendant not guilty of lewd conduct (perhaps because of the 
lack of lewd intent), but guilty of battery, without finding some other element of 
battery not included within lewd conduct.  Accordingly, even under defendant’s 
argument, the court would never have to instruct on battery as a lesser included 
offense of lewd conduct. 
One can easily commit battery without also committing lewd conduct, as 
when a person touches a child nonconsensually and harmfully but without lewd 
intent.  In this situation, an element of the battery, the unwanted use of force, 
would not be included within the elements of lewd conduct.  It would be a distinct 
requirement.  For this reason, in a given case, the prosecutor might choose to 
charge a defendant with both lewd conduct and battery.  If the touching of a child 
was nonconsensual and harmful, and thus a battery for reasons unrelated to any 
lewd intent, and if the evidence of lewd intent, although sufficient to go to a jury, 
was ambiguous enough that a jury might not find that intent, the prosecution might 
want to charge both lewd conduct and battery.  The prosecution would have 
discretion to charge both crimes if it believed the facts warranted both charges.  
6 
(See People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 589.)  If both crimes are charged, 
and depending on how it viewed the facts, the jury could find the defendant guilty 
of both crimes if it found the elements of each had been proven, or of either one, 
or of neither. 
In response to the concurring and dissenting opinion, we merely conclude 
that when the elements of two offenses are essentially identical, as when guilt of 
battery would be predicated on being guilty of lewd conduct, neither is a lesser 
and included offense of the other.  The concurring and dissenting opinion argues 
that if only lewd conduct is charged, and the jury finds no lewd intent, it should be 
permitted to convict the defendant of battery if it finds an offensive touching on 
some basis other than lewd intent.  However, “[a] criminal defendant must be 
given fair notice of the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable 
opportunity properly to prepare a defense and avoid unfair surprise at trial.”  
(People v. Anderson, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 809.)  Convincing the jury there was 
no lewd intent would be a complete defense to a lewd conduct charge.  Charging 
only lewd conduct would not provide the defendant with notice of the need to 
defend additionally against a battery charge based on an offensive touching not 
included within the elements of lewd conduct. 
For these reasons, battery is not a lesser included offense of lewd conduct.  
Accordingly, if only lewd conduct is charged, the trial court has no duty to instruct 
on battery as a lesser included offense.  Of course, if both lewd conduct and 
battery are charged, the court would have to instruct on battery, but that would be 
as a separately charged offense, and not as a lesser included offense. 
7 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.  We also disapprove 
People v. Thomas, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 1278, to the extent it is inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
The majority holds that battery (Pen. Code, § 242; all unspecified statutory 
citations are to this code) is not a lesser offense necessarily included within the 
crime of lewd conduct with a child younger than 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a)).  I 
disagree, as in my view a lewd act on a child is always a battery.  Nevertheless, I 
agree with the majority’s affirmance of the Court of Appeal’s judgment because, 
on the facts presented, no reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant 
committed only the lesser offense of battery, but not the greater offense of lewd 
conduct with a child. 
I 
On October 17, 2007, defendant Thomas Raymond Shockley was at a 
family party in Modesto, California, to celebrate the 10th birthday of Jane Doe, the 
stepdaughter of defendant’s adult daughter, Hannah.  On this occasion, defendant 
kissed Jane on the lips, inserting his tongue into her mouth. 
Two days later, defendant took Jane and her nine-year-old stepsister 
(Hannah’s daughter from a prior relationship) to a movie theater.  On the drive 
home, Jane sat between defendant and her stepsister.  Defendant put his arm 
around Jane’s shoulder and began rubbing her stomach.  When Jane asked if she 
could steer the car, defendant told her to put her leg over his leg.  Then, for about 
five minutes, while Jane’s hands were on the steering wheel, defendant rubbed her 
vaginal area with his hand outside her clothes. 
 
2 
When they got home, Jane and her stepsister went into Jane’s bedroom.  
Crying, Jane told her stepsister what had happened in the car.  Jane then told her 
father, who called the police.  Officer Scott Nelson questioned defendant.  
Defendant said that Jane could have thought that he kissed her with his mouth 
open because, when they were at the theater, defendant spilled soda on his face 
and, while he was licking off the soda with his tongue, Jane kissed him on the lips.  
Thereafter, on the drive home from the theater, defendant put his arm around Jane, 
poked her in the belly button, and rubbed her stomach.  Defendant denied rubbing 
Jane’s vaginal area.  Jane’s different version of the events, defendant said, could 
have been affected by the caffeine in the large coffee drink she had after the 
movie.  
Defendant was charged with a single count of lewd conduct with a child 
younger than 14 years.  (§ 288, subd. (a).)  The jury found him guilty of the 
charge. 
On appeal, defendant faulted the trial court for not instructing the jury on 
the court’s own initiative that battery (§ 242) is a lesser offense necessarily 
included within the crime of lewd conduct with a child.  The Court of Appeal 
rejected that argument, as does this court’s majority, which disapproves a contrary 
holding by the Court of Appeal in People v. Thomas (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 
1278, 1291-1293.  I disagree with the majority, for the reasons given below. 
II 
If “ ‘a crime cannot be committed without also necessarily committing a 
lesser offense, the latter is a lesser included offense within the former.’ ”  (People 
v. Milward (2011) 52 Cal.4th 580, 585; see also People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 
108, 117.)  The question here is:  Can a defendant engage in lewd conduct with a 
child younger than 14 years without also perpetrating the lesser offense of battery?  
My answer is “no.”  
 
3 
Battery is statutorily defined as “any willful and unlawful use of force or 
violence upon the person of another.”  (§ 242.)  Thus, the crime of battery has two 
elements:  (1) a use of force or violence that is (2) willful and unlawful.  The first 
element is satisfied by any touching.  (People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899, 
fn. 12.)  The second element of battery, willfulness and unlawfulness, is satisfied 
by any touching that is harmful or offensive.  (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 
Cal.4th 865, 961.)  
Lewd conduct on a child has three elements:  (1) a touching (2) of a child 
younger than 14 years (3) done with lewd intent.  (§ 288, subd. (a).)  Thus, the 
crime of lewd conduct requires a touching (battery’s first element) done with lewd 
intent.  Lewd intent is the desire to “arous[e], appeal[] to, or gratify[] the lust, 
passions, or sexual desires of [the molester] or the child . . . .”  (Ibid.)  Touching a 
child with lewd intent is always harmful or offensive (battery’s second element).  
“[Y]oung victims suffer profound harm whenever they are perceived and used as 
objects of sexual desire.”  (People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 444; see also 
J. C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M. K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1026 [“Some acts 
are so inherently harmful that the intent to commit the act and the intent to harm 
are one and the same. . . .  Child molestation is not the kind of act that results in 
emotional and psychological harm only occasionally.”].)  Therefore, one who 
commits lewd conduct on a child necessarily commits the lesser offense of battery.  
The majority has a contrary view, based on a novel theory.  The opinion’s 
cursory analysis lacks clarity, but it appears to say the following.  
Battery, according to the majority, can be divided into two categories:  
(1) battery committed by a harmful or offensive touching with lewd intent, and 
(2) battery committed by a harmful or offensive touching without lewd intent.  
According to the majority, if a defendant is charged with lewd conduct and the 
evidence shows battery with lewd intent (the first category), the trial court need 
 
4 
not instruct on the lesser offense of battery because there is no possibility that the 
defendant is guilty of battery but not lewd conduct.  But, the majority says, if a 
defendant is charged with nonlewd conduct and the facts show a touching without 
lewd intent (the second category of battery), then the nonlewd harmful or 
offensive touching is a “distinct requirement” that “would not be included within 
the elements of lewd conduct.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.)  Therefore, the majority 
concludes, neither category of battery is a lesser offense necessarily included 
within the crime of lewd conduct with a child.  My criticism is twofold. 
First, as noted earlier, in deciding whether a crime is a lesser offense 
necessarily included within another, the inquiry is whether the greater offense can 
be committed without also committing the lesser crime.  (People v. Sanders (2012) 
55 Cal.4th 731, 737; People v. Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 117; People 
v. Pendleton (1979) 25 Cal.3d 371, 382; People v. Marshall (1957) 48 Cal.2d 394, 
398; People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 596.)  That test was articulated by this 
court more than 65 years ago.  Today, the majority devises a new test to reach its 
result.  As part of this two-category test, described in the preceding paragraph, the 
majority concludes that in certain specified circumstances the trial court need not 
instruct on battery as a lesser included offense of lewd conduct (maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 5) and it holds, on that basis, that battery is not a lesser included offense of lewd 
conduct (maj. opn., ante, at p. 6).  Thus, the majority confuses the standard for 
determining whether a trial court should instruct on a lesser included offense (see 
People v. Medina (2007) 41 Cal.4th 685, 700) with the standard for determining 
whether a crime is a lesser included offense.  Does the new test replace the 
traditional test?  If so, why?  The majority offers no answers.  
Second, the majority’s two-category test does not adequately address the 
possibility of conflicting evidence on whether a defendant’s conduct falls within 
one or the other category.  For instance, what if the evidence at trial shows that a 
 
5 
defendant committed an offensive touching of a child (a battery), but there is 
conflicting evidence on whether the touching was done with lewd intent?  In this 
situation, the jury should not be deprived of its right to decide whether the 
defendant is guilty only of battery or of lewd conduct with a child as well.  But 
under the majority’s test, the jury does not get to make this decision.  If, as the 
majority says, battery is not a lesser included offense of lewd conduct with a child, 
the jury is given only two options:  The jury can either convict the defendant of the 
charged crime of lewd conduct with a child, or it can acquit the defendant.  This 
defeats the purpose for requiring instructions on lesser included offenses.  As this 
court has explained:  “Truth may lie neither with the defendant’s protestations of 
innocence nor with the prosecution’s assertion that the defendant is guilty of the 
offense charged, but at a point between these two extremes . . . .  A trial court’s 
failure to inform the jury of its option to find the defendant guilty of the lesser 
offense would impair the jury’s truth-ascertainment function.”  (People v. Barton 
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 196.) 
The majority’s response:  When the evidence is “ambiguous enough that a 
jury might not find [lewd] intent, . . . [t]he prosecution would have discretion to 
charge both” battery and lewd conduct.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.)  But that is not a 
tactical decision for the prosecution to make.  When, as here, a charged offense 
cannot be committed without also committing another, less serious crime, and the 
evidence is ambiguous as to which crime was committed, the jury should not be 
denied the opportunity to decide whether the defendant committed the more 
serious crime or only the lesser offense.  As this court has observed, “[o]ur courts 
are not gambling halls but forums for the discovery of truth.”  (People v. St. 
Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 533.)  
Whether here the trial court, on its own initiative, was required to instruct 
the jury on the lesser offense of battery is discussed below.  
 
6 
III 
A trial court must instruct on a lesser included offense only when 
reasonable jurors could conclude that the defendant committed only the lesser but 
not the greater offense.  (People v. Medina, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 700.)  Here, the 
prosecution relied on three acts to prove the lewd conduct charge against 
defendant:  rubbing 10-year-old Jane Doe’s vaginal area, rubbing her stomach, and 
kissing her on the lips while inserting his tongue into her mouth.  As I explain, 
those acts would not have provided a reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that 
defendant committed only battery, and not the greater offense of lewd conduct 
with a child. 
As to rubbing Jane’s vaginal area, the only issue at trial was whether (as 
Jane testified) defendant did so, or whether (as defendant told the police) he did 
not — if defendant did, he indisputably acted with lewd intent, because there was 
no evidence that he had a nonsexual reason to touch Jane’s vaginal area.  Thus, no 
reasonable juror could have concluded that rubbing Jane’s vaginal area constituted 
the lesser offense of battery and not the greater offense of lewd conduct with a 
child.  
As to rubbing Jane’s stomach, if the jury determined that defendant did so 
with the requisite lewd intent, he would be guilty of both the greater offense of 
lewd conduct and the lesser offense of battery.  But if the jury found that 
defendant lacked such intent, he would be guilty of neither lewd conduct (because 
he lacked lewd intent) nor of battery (because there was no evidence that rubbing 
Jane’s stomach without lewd intent was either harmful or offensive).   
As to the kissing, if the jury concluded that, as Jane had testified, defendant 
put his tongue in her mouth while kissing her, the jury would necessarily have 
found that defendant acted with the requisite lewd intent when he did this act and 
was thus guilty of the charged crime of lewd conduct with a child.  This is because 
 
7 
sticking one’s tongue in the mouth of the person being kissed is so inherently 
sexual in nature that no reasonable jury would conclude that defendant lacked 
lewd intent if he did that act.  But if the jury concluded that, as defendant had told 
the police, Jane kissed him while he was licking soda off his lips and he did not 
put his tongue in Jane’s mouth, then no reasonable jury could have found that 
defendant touched Jane in a harmful or offensive manner, which is required for 
battery.  Under that version of events, defendant was not guilty of either lewd 
conduct or battery. 
Thus, as to each of the three alleged acts on which the prosecution relied, 
the jury could have found defendant guilty of the charged crime of lewd conduct, 
or it could have found defendant not guilty of either lewd conduct or battery, but it 
could not have found that defendant committed only battery but not lewd conduct.  
The trial court therefore was not required to instruct the jury, on the court’s own 
initiative, on the lesser offense of battery.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
I CONCUR: 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Shockley 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 190 Cal.App.4th 896 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S189462 
Date Filed: December 26, 2013 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Stanislaus 
Judge: Thomas D. Zeff 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Gregory W. Brown, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lloyd G. Carter, 
Janet Neeley and Leanne LeMon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Gregory W. Brown 
2280 Grass Valley Highway #342 
Auburn, CA  95603 
(530) 401-5554 
 
Leanne LeMon 
Deputy Attorney General 
2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090 
Fresno, CA  93721 
(559) 477-1674