Case Title: Sheeley v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-49

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sheeley v. State1999 WY 149991 P.2d 136Case Number: 98-49Decided: 11/18/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
ROBERT C. SHEELEY, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Johnson County, Honorable John C. Brackley, 
Judge

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, 
representing appellant.

Gay V. 
Woodhouse, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. 
Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, and 
Kenna J. Fisher, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program, 
representing appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the judgment and sentence entered November 12, 1997, convicting Appellant 
Robert C. Sheeley (Sheeley) of three counts of immodest, immoral or indecent 
liberties with a child, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105. Sheeley's 
conviction stems from sexual contact with his minor 
stepdaughter.

[¶2]      Sheeley presents 
three claims of error. First, he contends he did not receive a fair trial 
because the trial court denied his motion to excuse a juror for cause after the 
juror explained he may not be impartial because his daughter was a molestation 
victim. Second, he maintains that it was plain error for the prosecutor to 
elicit improper testimony from a witness. And third, he claims the trial court 
abused its discretion when it failed to perform, sua sponte, an in camera 
inspection of the entire Department of Family Services (DFS) file which tracked 
allegations of sexual abuse of the victim by Sheeley since 
1993.

[¶3]      We must agree 
that the prosecutor elicited improper and prejudicial testimony from a witness. 
Admission of the testimony was error per se because it denied Sheeley his right 
to a trial by jury. Therefore, the judgment and sentence are 
reversed.

ISSUES

[¶4]      Appellant Sheeley 
presents these issues for our review:

I. Whether the 
trial court denied the Appellant his constitutional right to a fair and 
impartial jury when it abused its discretion during the jury selection process 
by requiring the Appellant to use a peremptory challenge on a biased jury 
member?

II. Whether 
Appellant was denied a fair trial when the State elicited a witness statement 
regarding the judge's belief the alleged victim was perjuring herself during the 
preliminary hearing?

III. Whether the 
district court abused its discretion by denying Appellant access to the reports 
of the Department of Family Services without first completing an in camera 
review to determine whether the reports contained statements discoverable under 
Rule 26.2, Wyo. R. Crim. P.?

The State 
responds with these issues:

I. Did the 
district court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's challenge for cause 
to prospective juror [Juror]?

II. Did plain 
error occur when a defense witness testified on cross-examination that, at a 
preliminary examination, the court cautioned the child victim regarding 
perjury?

III. Did the 
district court abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant's demand for 
disclosure of the Department of Family Services' case file, without first 
conducting an in camera examination of the file to determine whether it 
contained statements required to be disclosed by Rule 26.2, W.R. Cr. 
P.?

FACTS

[¶5]      MM, the victim in 
this matter, was born on January 7, 1980. In March of 1993, police received a 
citizen's report that MM was being molested by her stepfather, Robert Sheeley. A 
police officer and a DFS worker interviewed the victim at that time. She related 
two incidents of inappropriate touching and two incidents of intercourse which 
occurred in February and March of 1993. The victim later recanted her 
allegations, saying it never happened and she made the allegations because she 
was angry at Sheeley. DFS did not take any further action because it lacked 
corroborative evidence of the crime. From March of 1995 until June of 1996, the 
victim and her family, including Sheeley, lived in Oregon. In May of 1996, the 
victim gave birth to a child, SHS.

[¶6]      On January 12, 
1997, a DFS worker received a report that Sheeley, who had returned with his 
family, including the victim, to Wyoming, pulled the victim's hair. During 
questioning at the Criminal Justice Center, the victim also alleged that Sheeley 
was the father of her child. The worker asked the victim if she wanted to fill 
out a statement-of-absent-parent form which is required for anyone seeking 
public assistance. On the form the victim stated that Sheeley was the father of 
the child and that the child was conceived as a result of incest or forcible 
rape. DFS referred the case to Child Support Enforcement to establish paternity 
and collect child support. Subsequent DNA testing showed a 99.82% probability 
that Sheeley was the father of SHS. Child Support Enforcement notified DFS and 
the district attorney's office of the test results. 

[¶7]      DFS and law 
enforcement personnel interviewed the victim again on May 22, 1997. The next 
day, the law enforcement officer stated in a sworn affidavit that the victim 
admitted to having sexual intercourse with Sheeley on a regular basis from 1993 
through March 1, 1995. On June 25, 1997, the district attorney's office filed an 
information charging Sheeley with three counts of indecent liberties, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105. Count One was for acts committed on or 
between October 1, 1993, and December 31, 1993. Count Two was for acts committed 
on or between January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994. The third count was for 
acts committed on or between January 1, 1995, and March 1, 
1995.

[¶8]      After a two day 
trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Sheeley was sentenced on November 10, 
1997, to three concurrent terms of two to three years, to run concurrently with 
another sentence of seven to eight years for taking indecent liberties with the 
victim in 1997.1 Sheeley filed a timely appeal with 
this Court.

DISCUSSION

Judge's 
Statement

[¶9]      At the 
preliminary hearing for another case against Sheeley,2 the victim testified she did not 
have sexual contact with Sheeley in Wyoming. At trial the victim testified she 
did have sexual contact with Sheeley in Wyoming, but then appeared to recant 
that testimony. On direct examination, the defense investigator testified that 
the victim told him she did not have sex with Sheeley in Wyoming. During 
cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the investigator about the victim's 
testimony at the preliminary hearing as follows:

[Prosecutor] Q: 
You were present for that. Then she testified in court apparently much the way 
that she talked to you, did she not, that it had happened once in Oregon and 
whatever?

A: 
Yes.

Q: And do you 
recall what the court, the judge said with regard to that testimony? [emphasis 
added]

A. I think he 
cautioned her in regard to perjury.

[¶10]   Sheeley did not object to this 
testimony and presents the issue to this court in terms of plain error. However, 
we are inclined to perform an error per se analysis because the prosecutor asked 
the witness to repeat a judge's admonition from another proceeding. We can not 
fathom a time nor a place where such a question would properly be presented to a 
witness. First, it improperly interjected judicial bias into the proceedings; 
and second, it required an answer that seemed to address the judge's opinion of 
the credibility of the victim.

[¶11]   We have held that "`testimony 
offering an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant, when elicited by a 
prosecuting attorney, should be perceived as error per se.'" Dudley v. State, 
951 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 
(Wyo. 1989)). We considered a similar dilemma in Stephens:

We are sensitive 
to the proposition that judicial restraint generally demands that we address 
only those issues properly before us and preserved for our review. We also know 
that it is within our jurisdiction to decide any case as justice may demand. In 
addition, recent experience with post-conviction remedies teaches us that the 
failure of counsel to raise issues which implicate constitutional rights of a 
defendant in an appeal will result in those issues being presented in a 
subsequent proceeding under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Consequently, judicial efficiency strongly suggests the treatment of obvious 
matters in the first appeal. We also have in mind the pertinency to the State of 
Wyoming of this statement by the Supreme Court of the United 
States:

"* * * Society 
wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; 
our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated 
unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice states the 
proposition candidly for the federal domain: `The United States wins its point 
whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.'"

Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 63 (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1197 
(1963) (citations omitted)).

[¶12]   In Dudley, we discussed the 
significance of per se error:

The import of 
proclaiming an event as error per se is articulated in Stephens as 
follows:

Even though 
error is found, it still is necessary, in most instances, to determine whether 
the error was prejudicial. Unless the situation reaches the level of error per 
se, or is perceived to be constitutional error, error is prejudicial only if the 
defendant can establish a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the 
error, the verdict might have been more favorable.

Id. at 67 
(citation omitted). Testimony elicited by a prosecutor which offers an opinion 
as to the defendant's guilt must be presumed prejudicial rather than treated as 
a question of plain error because it is impossible to determine whether the jury 
may have relied on the opinion in reaching its verdict. Id. at 68; Bennett v. 
State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 (Wyo. 1990); Whiteplume [v. State], 841 P.2d [1332] at 
1338 [(Wyo. 1992)].

Dudley, 951 P.2d  
at 1178. Although the investigator did not give his opinion as to the guilt of 
the defendant, the prosecutor's question obviously sought to elicit, and did 
elicit, not only irrelevant evidence, but evidence which infected the 
proceedings with judicial bias and improper opinion 
testimony.

[¶13]   The North Carolina Supreme Court 
has discussed the danger of judicial comments concerning perjury affecting the 
jury:

Any intimation 
by the judge in the presence of the jury, however, that a witness had committed 
perjury would of course, . . . constitute reversible error. . . . Therefore, 
judicial warnings and admonitions to a witness with reference to perjury are not 
to be issued lightly or impulsively. Unless given discriminatively and in a 
careful manner they can upset the delicate balance of the scales which a judge 
must hold evenhandedly. Potential error is inherent in such warnings, and in a 
criminal case they create special hazards.

First among 
these is that the judge will invade the province of the jury, which is to assess 
the credibility of the witnesses and determine the facts from the evidence 
adduced. . . . It is most unlikely that a judge would ever warn a witness of the 
consequences of perjury unless he had determined in his own mind that the 
witness had testified falsely.

State v. 
Locklear, 306 S.E.2d 774, 778 (N.C. 1983) (quoting State v. Rhodes, 224 S.E.2d 631, 636-38 (N.C. 1976)).

[¶14]   We have often warned that a trial 
judge must use care not to comment on the evidence. Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1118 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 458 (Wyo. 
1979)) (quoting Peterson v. McMicken (Nelson's Estate), 72 Wyo. 444, 499, 266 P.2d 238, 261 (1954)). In a jury trial the judge must refrain from expressing an 
opinion on the weight or quality of the evidence. Harris, 933 P.2d  at 1118. Any 
expression of opinion on the evidence indicating possible bias on the part of 
the trial judge is prejudicial, as infringing upon the jury's duties. Id. This 
is especially true in criminal cases. Phillips, 597 P.2d  at 458. Such comments 
are prejudicial, reversible error. Id.

[¶15]   The jury was asked to decide which 
version of the victim's allegations was true. The jury could have drawn the 
conclusion that the preliminary hearing judge believed the story which would 
result in the guilt of the defendant over the story which absolved him. That 
opinion, or the impression of that opinion, had no place before this jury. "The 
jury is charged with resolving the factual issues, judging the witnesses' 
credibility, and ultimately determining whether the accused is guilty or 
innocent." Newport v. State, 983 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Gayler v. 
State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 1998); Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo. 
1988)). "A witness may not, therefore, vouch for the credibility of another 
witness or a victim." Newport, 983 P.2d  at 1215 (citing Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 860; 
Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 373-74 (Wyo. 1995)). The testimony raises concerns 
about its effect on the jury, "namely, that `the testimony could have decided 
the case for the jury.'" Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 882 (Wyo. 1990) 
(quoting Stephens, 774 P.2d at 67). "[I]mproper invasion of the jury's function 
remains critical and any invasion of the jury's role must be treated as error 
per se." Id.

[¶16]   Our analysis does not change 
because the judge referred to in the testimony was not the trial judge. The 
testimony did not indicate the identity of the preliminary hearing judge. When 
it heard the testimony, the jury did not know whether the judge in the 
preliminary hearing was also the trial judge. The jury may have assumed the 
preliminary hearing judge was the trial judge, and could logically conclude that 
the judge did not believe the victim when she denied having sexual relations 
with Sheeley in Wyoming. To permit the jury to rely on a judge's opinion of 
guilt "`would be the ultimate abdication of the function of the jury.'" Id. at 
881 (quoting Stephens, 774 P.2d at 64). Such an implicit delegation of the 
decision of the jury "surely would deprive a defendant of his constitutional 
rights to a jury trial." Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 67 n.3. Admission of the 
statement was error per se, and the judgment and sentence must be reversed and 
this case remanded for a new trial.

[¶17]   Our decision concerning the 
inadmissible testimony is dispositive. The jury selection issue was unique to a 
particular juror, and Sheeley did not request an in camera inspection of the DFS 
file at trial. We find it is unlikely the issues will present themselves on 
remand. Therefore, we decline to address them at this 
time.

CONCLUSION

[¶18]   It is error per se for a prosecutor 
to elicit testimony concerning a judge's statement in another proceeding. This 
is especially true when the statement may be understood to implicate the judge's 
opinion on the credibility of a trial witness. Sheeley was denied his right to a 
trial by jury when the prosecutor elicited such testimony. Therefore, we reverse 
and remand for a new trial.

Footnotes

1 During 
sentencing for the crimes subject to this appeal, the judge also sentenced 
Sheeley to a term in the penitentiary of not less than seven nor more than eight 
years to run concurrently with the sentence in this case. Apparently in exchange 
for concurrent sentencing, Sheeley plead guilty to a separate charge of immoral 
or indecent liberties for an incident that took place between Sheeley and the 
victim on August 9, 1997.

2 It appears 
the preliminary hearing at issue was held on September 15, 1997, and involved 
the above case.