Case Title: Glass v. People

Citation: 127 Colo. 210, 255 P.2d 738

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1953-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
255 P.2d 738 (1953) 127 Colo. 210 GLASS v. PEOPLE. No. 17013. Supreme Court of Colorado, en Banc. March 16, 1953. Moynihan-Hughes-Sherman, Montrose, Richard V. Anderson, La Jara, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., H. Lawrence Hinkley, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Norman H. Comstock, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error. MOORE, Justice. An information was filed in the district court of Weld county in which Owen Bryan Glass and three other persons were named defendants. The crime with which they were charged was that of aggravated robbery alleged to have been committed in Weld county. In additional counts of the information it was alleged that defendant Glass had previously been convicted of three separate felonies within the State of Oklahoma, and had served separate terms in penal institutions pursuant to said convictions and the judgments rendered thereon. The trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant Glass, and, after a consultation between counsel thus appointed and defendants, they were arraigned. Defendant Glass entered a plea of guilty to counts one, seven, eight and nine of the information. In count one he was charged with the substantive offence of aggravated robbery. It was alleged in counts seven, eight and nine that he had previously been convicted, as hereinabove indicated. After hearing evidence offered upon the pleas of guilty, the court entered judgment and sentence that defendant Glass be confined in the penitentiary for the remainder of his natural life. Thereafter, a petition to vacate judgment and sentence was filed in said district court on behalf of defendant Glass and one other defendant, who also had been given a life sentence as an habitual criminal. Said petition did not include the proposition contained in the assignment of error, and since no contention is now made that the trial court erred in denying said petition we give it no further consideration. Counsel for Glass set forth a single assignment of error on which they rely for reversal, to-wit: "The trial court erred in failing to properly and fully explain to Owen Bryan Glass the consequences of entering pleas of guilty to the counts contained in the Information, including three counts under the Habitual Criminal Act of the State of Colorado, in that the trial court advised Owen Bryan Glass that the consequences of such pleas of guilty `may be imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the remainder of your natural life,' whereas, *739 in truth and fact, it was mandatory upon the trial court under such pleas to sentence the said Glass to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the remainder of his natural life, and the trial court therefore should have used the word `must' rather than the word `may' in so advising the said Glass." The record discloses that Glass was represented by appointed counsel who was present at the time of arraignment; that counsel requested, and was granted, an hour's delay in said arraignment for the purpose of consulting with Glass; and at the expiration of that time the following proceedings occurred: As grounds for reversal of the judgment it is argued that the trial court did not fully or correctly explain to Glass the consequences which would follow upon the entry by him of the pleas of guilty. Section 482, chapter 48, '35 C.S.A., provides, inter alia: "In all cases where the party indicted shall plead `guilty,' such plea shall not be entered until the court *740 shall have fully explained to the accused the consequences of entering such plea, * * *." It further is argued that, because the habitual criminal statute makes the imposition of a life sentence mandatory under the circumstances shown in the case at bar, defendant Glass was not fully informed by the trial court concerning the consequences of his plea. No authority is called to our attention which holds that the language employed by the trial court in this cause is insufficient to comply with the requirements of our statute. We think that under the facts of the instant case the right of defendant to be advised concerning the consequences of his pleas of guilty was sufficiently protected. The judgment accordingly is affirmed. BRADFIELD, J., not participating.