Case Title: Nance v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR94-41-3

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Eric Randall NANCE v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 94-413                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered March 4, 1996


1.   Evidence -- challenge to sufficiency of -- factors on review.
     -- In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the
     court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the
     State and sustains the judgment of conviction if there is
     substantial evidence to support it; evidence is substantial if
     it is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable
     minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and
     conjecture; in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the
     court need only consider evidence in support of the
     conviction; circumstantial evidence constitutes substantial
     evidence when every other reasonable hypothesis consistent
     with innocence is excluded.  

2.   Evidence -- motion for directed verdict properly denied --
     circumstantial evidence of attempted rape was substantial. -- 
     Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in denying his
     motion for a directed verdict on the ground that insufficient
     proof was introduced of the underlying felony, attempted rape,
     was without merit where the court found that the
     circumstantial evidence of attempted rape was substantial;
     some of the evidence included opinion testimony of a
     criminalist that blood, head and pubic hairs recovered from
     appellant's vehicle belonged to the victim, and that hairs
     recovered from the victim's clothing belonged to appellant;
     opinion testimony of a forensic serologist that, based on his
     tests, he could neither confirm nor deny that sexual
     intercourse had occurred, that the exposure of the victim's
     body to the weather could account for lack of some evidence,
     and that enzyme-characteristic analysis showed blood recovered
     from appellant's vehicle was consistent with the victim; 
     opinion testimony of a forensic scientist that DNA analysis of
     the victim's muscle tissue was consistent with blood recovered
     from appellant's truck seat and from the victim's shirt pad;
     as well as testimony of several other witnesses, all tying
     appellant to the crime.

3.   Criminal procedure -- appellant not entitled to a verbatim
     transcription of the probable-cause hearing -- officer's
     affidavit and bench warrant satisfied appellant's
     constitutional requirements to due process. -- Where Arkansas
     Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.1(e) provided that the judicial
     determination of probable cause at the October 22 proceeding
     could be made from affidavit, recorded testimony, or other
     information; the state chose the affidavit method and the
     lieutenant's October 22 affidavit, which was the basis for the
     judicial determination of probable cause, and the bench
     warrant were a part of the record on appeal, appellant was not
     constitutionally entitled to a verbatim transcription of the
     probable-cause proceeding; the lieutenant's October 22
     affidavit and the bench warrant, which were included in the
     record on appeal, satisfied appellant's constitutional
     requirements to due process at this most preliminary stage of
     the criminal proceedings.

4.   Criminal procedure -- denial of demurrer by trial court not in
     error -- lack of probable cause is not a statutory ground for
     a demurrer to an indictment. -- Where, at the October 26, 1993
     hearing for plea and arraignment, appellant demurred to the
     felony information on the ground that it failed "to state
     probable cause," the trial court stated that the demurrer was
     effectively a motion to dismiss, summarily denied the demurrer
     because probable cause had previously been found, and entered
     a plea of not guilty, appellant's argument that the denial of
     the demurrer was error was without merit; lack of probable
     cause is not a statutory ground for a demurrer to an
     indictment, Ark. Code Ann.  16-85-708 (1987), or, by
     implication, to an information.  

5.   Motions -- motion to quash felony information for lack of
     probable cause properly denied at trial -- lack of probable
     cause is not a statutory ground for a motion to set aside an
     indictment. -- Where appellant filed a motion to quash the
     felony information for lack of probable cause to arrest or
     charge him with the crime, the trial court's summary denial of 
     the motion was proper; lack of probable cause is not a
     statutory ground for a motion to set aside an indictment, or,
     by implication, to quash an information.

6.   Criminal procedure -- circuit court has no authority to
     conduct a preliminary hearing determine if probable cause
     exists to justify a charge brought by information. -- The
     supreme court has held that the circuit court lacks authority
     to conduct a preliminary hearing, pending trial, to determine
     if probable cause exists to justify a charge brought by
     information and then to dismiss the information for want of
     probable cause; there is no constitutional or statutory
     authority for such a hearing.   

7.   Criminal procedure -- information filed charging appellant
     with an offense -- accused not entitled to judicial review of
     such a filing. -- An accused is not entitled to a judicial
     review of the prosecutor's filing an information charging him
     with an offense. 

8.   Search & seizure -- factors on review of trial court's denial
     of motion to suppress -- there need only be probable cause to
     believe that the place to be searched contains evidence of a
     crime. -- In reviewing the trial court's ruling on the motion
     to suppress, the court makes an independent determination
     based on the totality of the circumstances and reverses only
     if the ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the
     evidence; it is not necessary that sufficient information for
     a conviction be available when the search warrant is obtained,
     only that there is probable cause to believe that the place to
     be searched contains evidence of the crime.  

9.   Search & seizure -- probable cause did exist for the search --
     no error found. -- Where the evidence showed that the search
     was conducted with the written consent of the man who had
     possession of the truck, and who delivered it to the county
     sheriff's office for that purpose, and the evidence also
     showed that the search was conducted pursuant to a properly
     issued search warrant, the trial court's denial of appellant's
     motion to suppress and ruling that the evidence was admissible
     if relevant was not in error; the affidavit upon which the
     search warrant was issued contained sufficient probable cause
     for the search. 

10.  Search & seizure -- search warrant properly issued -- no error
     demonstrated. -- Appellant's argument that the search warrant
     was invalid because the application for the search warrant was
     dated October 21, 1993, eight days prior to the date of the
     lieutenant's affidavit in support of the search warrant
     application and the search warrant was meritless where, at the
     hearing on the motion to suppress, the lieutenant testified
     that the date on the application was an error and that he
     recalled that, on October 29, 1993, he appeared before the
     circuit court judge, made his affidavit, and the search
     warrant was granted; the trial court stated that the testimony
     revealed an apparent misprision in the documents, and then
     ruled that the warrant was properly issued; on this record, no
     error was demonstrated.

11.  Evidence -- admissibility of photographs -- no abuse of
     discretion found in trial court's admission of photos. --  
     Appellant's argument that three photographs taken at the crime
     scene were admitted in error because they were gruesome,
     inflammatory photographs of the victim's body that were not
     necessary to help the witnesses depict the crime scene was
     meritless where the appellate court found that of the three
     photographs, only State's Exhibit 8 was gruesome; however,
     even gruesome photographs are admissible within the trial
     court's discretion if they help the jury understand the
     accompanying testimony; here the court concluded that State's
     Exhibit 8 helped the jury understand the witness's testimony
     of the crime scene and, for the reasons enumerated by the
     trial court, otherwise possessed probative value; thus,
     although the photograph was gruesome, there was no abuse of
     discretion in admitting it.

12.  Evidence -- appellant's objection to photograph at trial
     limited to its admission into evidence -- showing photo to
     medical examiner not prejudicial. -- Appellant's argument that
     it was error to permit the medical examiner who autopsied the
     victim to be examined with respect to an autopsy photograph
     which was not admitted into evidence was meritless where the
     trial court permitted the state to show the photograph to the
     examiner and ask him if the condition of the victim's shoulder
     area was consistent with a cutting wound; appellant contended
     that he was prejudiced because the jury was impermissibly
     permitted to speculate as to the content of the photograph,
     yet, at trial, appellant objected only to the admission of the
     photo into evidence, which objection was sustained by the
     trial court; the photograph was not shown to the jury; no
     prejudice was demonstrated.  

13.  Criminal procedure -- pretrial amendment of an information
     which does not change the nature of the crime charged is
     allowed -- amendment to information to add an allegation of
     habitual offender does not change the nature or degree of the
     crime. -- Pretrial amendment of an information that charged
     capital murder on the basis of felony murder to add, as an
     alternative, the charge of capital murder on the basis of
     premeditated and deliberated purpose, does not change the
     nature of the crime charged in violation of Ark. Code Ann.
     16-85-407(b); additionally, amendment of an information that
     adds an allegation of habitual offender does not change the
     nature or degree of the crime. 

14.  Criminal procedure -- information need not be accompanied by
     an affidavit -- appellant cited no authority for his argument.
     -- Although appellant argued that "the affidavit legally
     required to accompany the amended information sufficient for
     the issuance of a new arrest warrant on the new charge was
     never filed," Arkansas Code Annotated 16-85-302 (1987) does
     not require that an information be accompanied by an
     affidavit, appellant cited no authority to support his
     argument, thus the court did not address it further.

15.  Criminal procedure -- an information containing a specific
     charge may by itself constitute a bill of particulars -- such
     was the case here. -- Arkansas Code Ann.  16-85-407(a) (1987)
     provides that the state, with leave of court, may amend an
     indictment as to matters of form or may file a bill of
     particulars; an information that stated the accused was
     charged with murder committed in the course of a felony (rape
     and/or kidnapping) constituted a specific charge that was in
     itself a bill of particulars; as a result of the state's
     filing of a sufficiently specific amended information,
     appellant demonstrated no prejudice.

16.  Statutes -- statute previously interpreted by the court --
     appellant's argument meritless. -- Appellant's argument that
     it was error to deny his motion to quash the amended
     informations because, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  16-85-410
     (1987), a subsequent indictment suspends the prior indictment
     and quashes it, was without merit; the court had previously
     considered section 16-85-410, and stated that it "simply
     declares the effect of the pendency of another prosecution";
     Section 16-85-410 was, therefore, inapplicable on the facts of
     this case, which involved a single prosecution. 

17.  Appeal & error -- argument not raised at trial -- court did
     not address it. -- Appellant's argument that the trial court
     erred in failing to arraign him and take his plea on the
     amended informations, in violation of Ark. Code Ann.  16-85-
     701 and -702 (1987) was not raised at trial, nor did appellant
     contend that he would have changed his not-guilty plea had he
     been rearraigned on each amended information, and the record
     in no way demonstrated that he was unaware of the nature and
     degree of the charge brought against him by the information,
     as amended; the court did not address the argument on appeal
     because the record failed to show that appellant raised it
     before the trial court or that prejudice was conclusively
     shown.  

18.  Criminal procedure -- reading of instruction in the
     disjunctive was proper -- appellant's argument without merit.
     -- Appellant's contention that the reading of the jury
     instruction on the alternative modes of committing capital
     murder in the disjunctive rendered it bad for uncertainty was
     without merit; where but one offense is charged but the
     several modes provided by the statute by which it may be
     committed are charged in the disjunctive, the indictment is
     good; the charge is based upon one offense, and the different
     modes of committing it provided in the statute are based upon
     the same transaction; the State, in proving the offense, might
     show that it was done by either or both of the several modes
     charged, in either event it related to the same transaction
     and constituted but one offense. 

19.  Jury -- appellant's argument erroneous -- no error to instruct
     the jury on both the premeditated and deliberated mode and the
     felony-murder mode of committing capital murder. --
     Appellant's argument that it was error to instruct the jury on
     both the premeditated and deliberated mode and the felony-
     murder mode of committing capital murder because, pursuant to
     section 16-85-410, the original information charging him with
     capital murder by premeditated and deliberated purpose, was
     suspended and quashed by the first amended information, which
     charged him with capital murder by felony murder, and,
     therefore, he was never charged with the crime for which he
     was convicted was patently meritless; his argument was based
     upon a premise that was determined to be erroneous above. 

20.  Jury -- appellant not convicted on purportedly erroneously
     given instruction -- argument not considered. -- Where
     appellant argued, without citation to authority, that it was
     error to instruct the jury as to capital murder by
     premeditated and deliberated purpose because there was
     insufficient evidence to support the instruction, but the jury
     verdict stated that appellant was found guilty of capital
     felony murder, appellant could not demonstrate that the
     premeditated and deliberated purpose instruction prejudiced
     him; therefore, the court did not consider the argument
     further. 

21.  Criminal procedure -- function of a bill of particulars --
     appellant's argument meritless. -- Appellant's argument that
     the trial court erred in denying his demand for bill of
     particulars, which prejudiced his ability to prepare an
     effective defense, was without merit; the true function of the
     bill of particulars is to require the state to set forth the
     criminal act in detail and with sufficient certainty to
     apprise the defendant of the crime and enable him to prepare
     his defense; where the information is definite in specifying
     the offense being charged, as in this case, the charge itself
     constitutes a bill of particulars; further, even where no bill
     of particulars is filed, there is no prejudice to the accused
     on that account when the state complies with its discovery
     obligation; appellant raised no argument on appeal that the
     state violated its discovery obligation under Arkansas's rules
     of criminal procedure.  

22.  Judgment -- motion to set aside judgment failed to demonstrate
     prejudice -- trial court's action was consistent with
     appellant's conviction for capital murder. -- Where appellant
     filed a post-trial motion to set aside the original judgment
     contending that the judgment was inconsistent with the jury
     verdict, which found appellant guilty of capital felony
     murder, because the trial court struck through the word
     "felony" on the face of the judgment so that, as edited, it
     pronounced appellant to be guilty of capital murder, and,
     following a hearing on the motion to set aside the judgment,
     the trial court entered an amended judgment that inserted the
     word "felony" in the amended judgment's recitation of the jury
     verdict and the pronouncement of guilt, the appellate court,
     in response to appellant's again raising the issue, found that
     no prejudice had been demonstrated; the criminal statute under
     which appellant was charged and convicted denominated his
     crime as "capital murder," felony murder being one of the
     several modes by which the crime may be committed, thus, the
     trial court's action was not inconsistent with appellant's
     conviction for the crime of capital murder, pursuant to the
     jury verdict, and did not modify the sentence imposed.

23.  Judgment -- jurisdiction to modify judgment not in issue here
     -- when trial court loses jurisdiction. -- Appellant's
     contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify
     the judgment because he was placed in the custody of the
     department of correction on March 31, 1994 to commence serving
     his sentence was meritless; the trial court is without
     jurisdiction to modify a sentence after the appellant
     commences to serve the sentence; here however, the trial court
     did not modify appellant's sentence; after a notice of appeal
     is docketed and the record is filed in this court, the trial
     court loses jurisdiction, except for appointment of defense
     counsel; in this case, the latter of those two events occurred
     in October 1994, when the record was filed in this court.   
                                
24.  Criminal law -- no erroneous finding of any aggravating
     circumstance with respect to the death penalty was found --
     harmless-error review not conducted. -- Where the jury
     unanimously found two aggravating circumstances existed beyond
     a reasonable doubt at the time of the commission of the
     capital murder, and no mitigating circumstances, the appellate
     court concluded that no erroneous finding of any aggravating
     circumstance with respect to the death penalty was found, and,
     therefore, did not conduct a harmless-error review under Ark.
     Code Ann.  5-4-603(d) (Repl. 1993).  


     Appeal from Hot Spring Circuit Court; John W. Cole, Jr.,
Judge; affirmed.
     Larry W. Horton and Phyllis J. Lemons, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kelly K. Hill and Pamela
Rumpz, Asst. Att'ys Gen., for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
 Associate Justice Donald L. Corbin, 3-4-96   *ADVREP4*








ERIC RANDALL NANCE,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE,



CR 94-413



APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SEVENTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
NO. CR 93-170-1,
HON. JOHN W. COLE, JR., JUDGE,





AFFIRMED.



     Appellant, Eric Randall Nance, appeals the amended judgment of
the Hot Spring County Circuit Court entered on April 11, 1994,
convicting him of one count of capital murder.  See Nance v. State,
319 Ark. 292, 891 S.W.2d 28 (1995) (per curiam) (granting motion
for rule on the clerk and finding timely notice of appeal from
amended judgment); Nance v. State, 318 Ark. 758,