Case Title: P. v. Soto

Citation: 51 Cal. 4th 229

Docket Number: S167531

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2011-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 1/20/11 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S167531 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H030475 
JAIME VARGAS SOTO, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. EE504317 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
The Legislature has made it a crime to commit a lewd or lascivious act on a 
child under age 14.  (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).)  It has mandated additional 
penal consequences when the act is committed ―by use of force, violence, duress, 
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim.‖  (Pen. 
Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1).)1  Unlike the crime of rape, there is no requirement that 
the lewd acts be committed ―against the will of the victim.‖  Indeed, 20 years ago 
the Legislature specifically deleted language to this effect from the definition of 
the aggravated lewd act crime.  (Stats. 1981, ch. 1064, § 1, p. 4093.) 
 
Despite this change, and despite longstanding precedent holding that a child 
under age 14 is legally incapable of consenting to sexual relations, some Courts of 
Appeal have reasoned that consent is a defense to an aggravated lewd act charge 
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.  Shortly before oral 
argument in this case, the Legislature amended section 288.  (Stats. 2010, ch. 219, 
§ 7; see fn. 3, post.)  Unless otherwise specified, all citations to section 288 refer 
to the former version of this statute.  Section 288, subdivisions (a), (b), and (b)(1) 
are referred to as sections 288(a), 288(b), and 288(b)(1). 
 
2 
because consent is logically inconsistent with the perpetrator‘s use of force or 
duress.  We disagree with this conclusion.  We hold that the victim‘s consent is 
not a defense to the crime of lewd acts on a child under age 14 under any 
circumstances.2  Thus, it is not error to so instruct a jury.  Because the lower court 
here reached a contrary conclusion, we reverse the judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Defendant Jaime Vargas Soto committed aggravated lewd acts against two 
girls, his 12-year-old cousin C. and C.‘s 11-year-old friend R.  C. gave two police 
officers detailed accounts of defendant‘s sexual acts.  Although she acknowledged 
making most of the statements the officers recorded, she disavowed them when 
testifying at defendant‘s trial.  At trial, C. denied that any lewd acts took place.  
She claimed she lied to the police because she was angry at defendant for dating 
one of her friends.  C. was impeached with her statements to the officers.  R.‘s trial 
testimony was consistent with her account to the police, which incriminated 
defendant. 
 
Defendant lived with C. and her mother but moved after C.‘s mother saw 
him kissing C.  The jury heard evidence of a pattern preceding the charged 
offense.  When he lived in C.‘s home, defendant often held C. tight, fondled her 
buttocks, and ―French-kissed‖ her.  He would refuse to release her when she told 
him to stop and tried to push him away.  He also ―talk[ed] dirty‖ to her when they 
were home alone.  Defendant threatened to tell C.‘s mother she had a boyfriend if 
she did not kiss him.  In one instance, C. was in the bedroom watching defendant 
and her brother play a video game.  After her brother left the room, defendant 
pushed her down onto the bed, lay on top of her, and rubbed himself against her.  
                                              
2  
The concurring and dissenting opinion agrees that ―consent is not an 
affirmative defense to charges under section 288(b)(1) . . . .‖  (Conc. & dis. opn., 
post, at p. 5.)  Accordingly, our disagreement appears to center on the narrow 
question whether it is confusing or misleading to instruct the jury that a child‘s 
consent is not a defense to the aggravated lewd act crime. 
 
3 
C. told a police officer she ―felt his thing and it felt nasty, but he was holding [her] 
so tight [she] couldn‘t do anything.‖  After he moved, defendant knocked on C.‘s 
window with a rock, saying he wanted to give her a last kiss.  His behavior scared 
C. because she thought defendant was going to break the window and enter her 
room.  
The first charged incident with C. occurred in April 2005, when defendant 
was driving C. to school.  Suddenly, defendant stopped the car, reclined C.‘s seat, 
and climbed on top of her.  He kissed her, rubbed his clothed penis against her 
crotch, and fondled her buttocks.  C. pressed her legs together and tried to turn 
away.  Defendant tried to touch her breasts, but C. pushed his hand away.  C. told 
defendant she wanted him to stop.  She tried to leave the car, but defendant locked 
the door.  
The second charged incident with C. occurred in May 2005 outside C.‘s 
middle school.  Before school began, defendant drove into the staff parking lot and 
called to C., who walked over and spoke with him.  When C. noticed that the 
school‘s secretary was watching them, she motioned for defendant to drive around 
the corner and followed him there.  The secretary became suspicious and alerted 
the principal.   
C. wanted to talk to defendant because she was angry that he was dating her 
best friend, 13-year-old A.  At the new meeting spot, defendant got out of the car, 
grabbed C. around the waist and pulled her toward him.  He hugged her, fondled 
her, and French-kissed her.  Although C. tried to pull away, defendant grabbed her 
again.  Holding her tightly, so that she could not move away, defendant rubbed his 
erect penis against C.‘s thigh.  Defendant eventually released C. when the bell 
rang and she told him she had to go to class.  The principal saw C. walking toward 
the school and brought her into the office.  After C. told him that defendant had 
kissed her, the principal said he intended to contact her mother and the police.  C. 
returned to class, borrowed a phone, and called defendant.  He told her not to 
reveal his name.  Later that day, C. was questioned by a police officer, and five 
 
4 
days later she was interviewed by a detective.  She identified defendant and 
described the lewd acts.  
C.‘s statements led the police to question her friend and next-door 
neighbor, R.  One day, when defendant saw R. standing in her doorway, he asked 
for her name and told her she was pretty.  R. told him she was 11 years old.  
Because R. thought defendant was nice and good looking, she asked C. to give 
him her phone number.  
A few days later, R. encountered defendant in a laundry room of their 
apartment complex.  After brief conversation, defendant grabbed her and began 
kissing her.  He tried to fondle her chest, but R. pushed his hand away.  He 
grabbed R.‘s hand, rubbed it against his erect penis, and said he wanted to have 
sex with her.  R. tried to push him away.  Later that night, defendant called R. and 
repeated his desire for sexual intimacy.  
Sometime later, after R. had started sixth grade, defendant telephoned and 
said that C. wanted her to come over.  When she got to C.‘s apartment, however, 
defendant was alone.  He took R. into his bedroom and started playing a 
pornographic movie.  R. asked him to turn it off because she was embarrassed.  
Defendant turned off the movie, lay on the bed, took a packaged condom out of 
his pocket, and told R. he wanted to have sex.  R. said she had to leave.  As she 
began to walk out, she tripped over a television cable and fell onto the bed.  
Defendant hugged and kissed her.  R. told him to stop because she had to leave.  
She stood up, but defendant pulled her onto the bed.  He repeatedly grabbed at her 
buttocks and ―the part between [her] legs.‖  He tried to pull her pants down, while 
R. tried to push his hands away.  Defendant removed his trousers but not his boxer 
shorts.  He took R.‘s hand in a firm, squeezing grip and placed it on his erect 
penis.  Defendant said he wanted to have sex with her.  After a few seconds, R. 
pulled her hand away and repeated that she had to leave.  R. did not want to do 
these things with defendant, but she was afraid he would get upset and do 
 
5 
something, like rape her.  After she left the apartment, R. avoided defendant 
because she was afraid of him.  
Based on the two incidents with C. and the incident with R. in the bedroom, 
defendant was charged with three counts of lewd acts on a child under 14 by use 
of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear.  (§ 288(b)(1).)  He was also charged 
with committing a nonforcible lewd act against R. (§ 288(a)), based on the laundry 
room encounter.  
As to the section 288(b)(1) counts, the trial court instructed the jury with 
CALCRIM No. 1111.  This instruction states that the People must prove ―the 
defendant used force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful 
bodily injury to the child or someone else‖ in committing the lewd act.  It defines 
―force‖ and ―duress‖ as follows:  ―The force used must be substantially different 
from or substantially greater than the force needed to accomplish the act itself.  
[¶] Duress means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or 
retribution that causes a reasonable person to do or submit to something that he or 
she would not otherwise do or submit to.‖  Finally, the version of CALCRIM 
No. 1111 read to defendant‘s jury stated:  ―It is not a defense that the child may 
have consented to the act.‖3  Defendant did not object to the instruction.  
In her closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury it could convict 
defendant of the section 288(b)(1) counts based on his use of force or duress.  The 
prosecutor explained, with regard to the statutory factors of force, violence, 
duress, menace, and fear:  ―You don‘t have to find all of them, just one of them is 
                                              
3  
A bench note to CALCRIM No. 1111 recognizes the existing disagreement 
in published opinions as to whether consent of the minor is an affirmative defense 
to a lewd act accomplished by force.  Accordingly, the note recommends that this 
portion of the instruction, stating that consent is not a defense, ―may be given on 
request if there is evidence of consent and the court concludes that consent is not a 
defense to a charge under section 288(b)(1).  If the court concludes that consent is 
a defense and there is sufficient evidence, the court has a sua sponte duty to 
instruct on the defense.‖  (Judicial Council of Cal. Crim. Jury Instns. (2011), 
Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 1111,  p. 931.) 
 
6 
enough.  It‘s also enough if some jurors find force and some jurors find duress, but 
you all must unanimously agree that it was accomplished [by one or the other].‖  
Referencing CALCRIM No. 1111, she also argued:  ―Consent is not a defense.  It 
is not a defense that one or both of the girls wanted to do it or wanted to be with 
the defendant when this happened.  Because he‘s the adult in the equation.‖  The 
defense presented no evidence.  During argument, defendant did not assert that C. 
or R. consented to any sexual contact.  The gist of the defense was that both girls 
were lying.  Even if the jury believed that defendant committed inappropriate 
touching under section 288(a), the defense maintained there was insufficient 
evidence of force or duress to convict under section 288(b)(1).  The jury convicted 
on all counts, and defendant was sentenced to a total of 12 years in prison.  
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for 
retrial on the charges involving force or duress.  Although the majority declined to 
address whether consent is a defense to a charge of lewd conduct committed by 
force, it held that consent is a defense to the charge of lewd conduct committed by 
duress and that it is error to instruct the jury otherwise.  One justice dissented from 
this holding, finding no error in the trial court‘s instruction. 
We granted review on the question whether consent of the victim is a 
defense to the crime of aggravated lewd acts on a child under age 14. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Section 288(a) prohibits the commission of a lewd or lascivious act on a 
child under age 14 done with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of 
the perpetrator or the child.  Section 288(b)(1) further prohibits the commission of 
such an act ―by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and 
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person . . . .‖  At the time of 
defendant‘s trial, both offenses were punishable by a range of three, six, or eight 
years in state prison.  However, a defendant convicted under section 288(b)(1) was 
ineligible for probation (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(1)) and subject to full-term 
consecutive sentencing (§ 667.6, subds. (c), (d)).  Thus, a defendant convicted 
 
7 
under section 288(b)(1) was subject to more stringent punishment than one 
convicted under section 288(a).4 
 
There is no language in section 288 requiring that a lewd or lascivious act 
be committed against the child‘s will.  Nevertheless, defendant argues this 
requirement must be read into the aggravated offense.  He reasons that a sexual act 
committed by use of force or duress necessarily implies that the perpetrator 
applied these pressures in order to overcome the victim‘s will.  Evidence that the 
child ―freely consented‖ to a sexual encounter would tend to rebut a finding that 
the perpetrator actually used force or duress to accomplish the act.  Thus, 
defendant maintains, it is error to instruct a jury that the victim‘s consent is not a 
defense to charges under section 288(b)(1). 
 
We reject defendant‘s analysis because its premise fails.  Lack of consent 
by the child victim is not an element of either lewd act offense defined in 
section 288.  Nor is willingness by the child a defense to either crime.  For over 
                                              
4  
On September 9, 2010, the Governor signed into law the Chelsea King 
Child Predator Prevention Act of 2010 (Chelsea‘s Law).  (Stats. 2010, ch. 219.)  
Chelsea‘s Law significantly increases the penalties for sex crimes against minors 
by imposing longer determinate sentences, indeterminate sentences for some 
crimes, and longer parole restrictions.  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of 
Assem. Bill. No. 1844 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jun. 2, 2010, p. 3.)  As 
amended, section 288(b)(1) now prescribes a sentencing range of five, eight, or 10 
years for the crime of lewd or lascivious acts against a child under 14 committed 
by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear.  The punishment for a violation 
of section 288(a) remains unchanged (three, six or eight years).  However, 
Chelsea‘s Law adds significant penal consequences for lewd act offenses that 
involve the infliction of bodily harm, defined as ―any substantial physical injury 
resulting from the use of force that is more than the force necessary to commit the 
offense.‖  (§ 288, subd. (i)(3), as added by 2010 Stats., ch. 219, § 7.)  If the 
defendant personally inflicted bodily harm on the victim in committing a lewd or 
lascivious act on a child under age 14, newly enacted section 288, subdivision (i) 
requires that the defendant be sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of 
parole.  Chelsea‘s Law also extends the minimum parole period for persons 
convicted of violating section 288(b)(1) to 20 years.  (§ 3000, subd. (b)(4), as 
amended by 2010 Stats., ch. 219, § 19.) 
 
8 
100 years, California law has consistently provided that children under age 14 
cannot give valid legal consent to sexual acts with adults.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Verdegreen (1895) 106 Cal. 211, 214-215.)  The Legislature has drafted the child 
molestation laws to make issues regarding the child victim‘s consent immaterial as 
a matter of law in these cases. 
I. 
Relevant Statutory History 
 
As originally enacted, section 288 did not distinguish between forcible and 
nonforcible lewd conduct.  In 1979, as part of a sentencing overhaul for forcible 
sex crimes, the Legislature amended the statute to add an aggravated offense.  The 
1979 version of section 288(b) stated:  ―Any person who commits an act described 
in subdivision (a) [i.e., a lewd act on a child under 14] by use of force, violence, 
duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm, and against the will of the victim 
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term of 
three, five or seven years.‖  (Stats. 1979, ch. 944, § 6.5, p. 3254, italics added.)5 
 
In 1981, the Legislature revisited section 288 when it enacted Senate Bill 
No. 586 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) (hereafter Senate Bill No. 586), the Roberti-
Imbrecht-Rains-Goggin Child Abuse Prevention Act.  (Stats. 1981, ch. 1064, § 5, 
p. 4096.)  As originally introduced, this bill proposed sweeping changes to the 
laws defining and punishing sex crimes against minors.  Among other things, 
Senate Bill No. 586 proposed to repeal section 288 and create two new crimes:  (1) 
unlawful sexual conduct with a child involving sexual penetration, and (2) 
unlawful sexual contact with a child involving touching alone.  (Sen. Bill No. 586 
§§ 9, 13, as introduced Mar. 16, 1981.)  If the unlawful sexual conduct or contact 
was committed ―by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of bodily injury,‖ it 
was a felony punishable by five, seven, or nine years in state prison.  (§§ 293, 
subd. (b), 294, subd. (a) as proposed by Sen. Bill No. 586, § 13, as introduced 
                                              
5  
Section 288(b) was renumbered as section 288(b)(1) by the 1995 
amendments to section 288.  (Stats. 1995, ch. 890, § 1, p. 6777.) 
 
9 
Mar. 16, 1981.)  Unlike the version of section 288 they were intended to replace, 
these new provisions did not require that the sexual conduct occur ―against the 
will of the victim.‖  This change did not go unnoticed.  For example, a Senate 
Judiciary Committee report analyzing an early version of the bill observed that, 
because of this change, a 16-year old boy who fondled his 13-year-old girlfriend‘s 
breast would be subject to mandatory imprisonment.  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 586, as amended Apr. 20, 1981, p. 5.)6 
 
Senate Bill No. 586 was similar in many respects to an Assembly bill that 
was under consideration around the same time.  Assembly Bill No. 457 (1981-
1982 Reg. Sess.) (hereafter Assembly Bill No. 457) provided less severe 
punishment for child molestation committed within the family, however.  In such 
situations, Assembly Bill No. 457 required mandatory imprisonment only if the 
lewd act was committed by force or threat and was shown to be against the will of 
the victim.  (See Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 586, as 
amended Aug. 10, 1981, pp. 5-6.)  The analysis of the Assembly Committee on 
Criminal Justice highlighted this difference between the bills, stating:  ―SB 586 
requires imprisonment if there is force or threats involved even if it is not against 
the victim‘s will.  This is contrasted with AB 457 where probation is authorized 
only in the unusual in-family case for such offense and not at all if it is 
accomplished against the will of the victim.‖  (Id. at p. 7.) 
 
On August 17, 1981, Assembly amendments added ―physical intimidation‖ 
and ―physical coercion‖ to the list of aggravating conduct in section 13 of Senate 
Bill No. 586‘s unlawful sexual conduct and sexual contact crimes.  A week later, 
the Assembly changed Senate Bill No. 586 drastically, replacing many of its 
provisions with those of Assembly Bill No. 457.  Among several other changes, 
Assembly amendments of August 25, 1981 deleted the unlawful sexual conduct 
                                              
6  
We have taken judicial notice of legislative history materials submitted by 
both sides.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).)  
 
10 
and contact crimes proposed by the Senate bill and, in their place, reinstated 
section 288.  Section 288 appeared in its original form except that the sentencing 
range was increased slightly and ―intimidation‖ and ―coercion‖ were added to the 
forms of aggravating conduct listed in section 288(b).  The Assembly amendments 
retained section 288(b)‘s requirement that the aggravated lewd conduct occur 
―against the will of the victim.‖  (Sen. Bill No. 586, § 1, as amended Aug. 25, 
1981.) 
 
Around the time of these amendments, the Joint Committee for Revision of 
the Penal Code circulated a report to all members of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee summarizing the major differences between the Assembly and Senate 
bills.  The report explained that, whereas the Assembly bill was ―primarily a 
penalty bill,‖ the Senate bill proposed to make ―a major philosophical change in 
the law‖ based on the twin premises that ―children do not generally lie about 
sexual abuse‖ and ―the present criminal justice system does nothing to meet the 
special needs of the child victim of sexual abuse.‖  (Com. for Revision of Pen. 
Code, Summary of Major Differences, Aug. 24, 1981, p. 1.)  The report 
emphasized that a major difference between the two bills concerned their 
treatment of consent:  ―Various crimes are redefined in SB 586 to give maximum 
support and credence to the child victim.  Children under age 14 are presumed to 
be incapable of consenting to sexual advances.  The victim who is under age 14 
need not prove that the sexual assault was accomplished against her will or that, in 
entering into a friendship with someone who later molests her, she did not solicit 
the act or share in that initial purpose at the time of befriending.  AB 457 requires 
that a victim over the age of 10 establish that she did not consent to the act of 
sexual abuse.‖  (Ibid.)  More succinctly, the report stated:  ―AB 457 requires, 
where force or violence is an issue, that the prosecution prove that force or 
violence was against the child victim’s will.  SB 586 does not.‖  (Id. at p. 2.)  
Clearly concerned by the Assembly‘s recent amendments, the authors of the report 
recommended that the Senate either:  (1) ―[k]ill AB 457,‖ and ―restore[] [Senate 
 
11 
Bill No. 586] to its former strength in Conference‖; (2) hold Assembly Bill No. 
457 ―for use as a ‗back-up‘ vehicle in the event the Assembly continues to play 
games with SB 586‖; or (3) attempt to merge the two bills.  (Id. at p. 3.) 
 
One day before the full Legislature took up the bills, the conference 
committee identified as one of the major issues in Senate Bill No. 586:  ―Should 
children under age 14 be presumed incapable of consenting to sexual advances in 
all instances?‖  (Conf., Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 586, Sept. 14, 1981, p. 2; see also 
Conf., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 586, Sept. 13, 1981, p. 2.) 
 
On September 15, 1981, Senate Bill No. 586 was amended in conference 
and passed by the Legislature.  The final amendments to section 288(b) removed 
―intimidation‖ and ―coercion‖ from the aggravated lewd act offense and removed 
the requirement that an aggravated lewd act be committed ―against the will of the 
victim.‖  The Legislative Counsel‘s Digest explained that the bill would increase 
the sentencing range for lewd act crimes ―and would delete the requirement that 
the act, when accompanied by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great 
bodily harm, be against the will of the victim.‖  (Legis. Counsel‘s Dig., Sen. Bill 
No. 586, 4 Stats. 1981, Summary Dig., p. 304, italics added.) 
 
The Legislature‘s intent on the issue of victim consent could hardly be 
more clear.  Committee reports demonstrate that the Legislature specifically 
considered whether the law should require lack of consent by children under age 
14.  (See Southern California Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 
653, 659 [―Statements in legislative committee reports concerning the statutory 
objects and purposes which are in accord with a reasonable interpretation of the 
statute are legitimate aids in determining legislative intent‖].)  The victim consent 
issue was consistently described as a key difference between the two bills.  Faced 
with these competing bills, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 586 and 
deleted language from section 288(b) that would have required proof that 
aggravated lewd acts were ―against the will of the victim.‖  The legislative intent 
 
12 
to do away with consent as a defense in lewd act cases is made manifest by this 
history. 
II. 
The People v. Cicero Decision 
 
After these amendments, efforts by the appellate courts to interpret 
section 288(b) produced mixed results.  Despite the removal of the phrase ―against 
the will of the victim‖ from section 288(b), some courts continued to recognize 
consent as a defense to an aggravated lewd acts charge because they reasoned 
consent was inconsistent with the use of force and duress.  Much confusion 
concerning the role of consent stemmed from the divided decision of the Third 
District Court of Appeal in People v. Cicero (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465 (Cicero).  
The Cicero majority‘s faulty reasoning caused it to interpret section 288(b) as 
meaning precisely the opposite of what the Legislature intended.  Because 
Cicero‘s holding and related dicta have led other courts astray, we discuss the 
decision in some detail. 
 
Cicero was charged with committing lewd acts by force on two girls, ages 
11 and 12.  (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at pp. 470-471.)  The girls testified 
that 24-year-old Cicero, a twice-convicted felon, had approached and engaged 
them in friendly conversation as they played by a waterway.  (Id. at pp. 469-470.)  
When the girls pretended to push each other in the water, Cicero proposed to 
throw them both in.  (Id. at p. 470.)  He lifted both girls by the waist and began to 
carry them.  As he did so, he closed a hand around each child‘s crotch.  (Ibid.)  
The girls laughed, believing the touching was accidental.  After he carried them 15 
to 20 feet, Cicero sat but continued to hold each girl by the waist.  (Ibid.)  When 
one child said she was afraid and had to go home, Cicero said they could leave if 
one of them kissed him.  (Ibid.)  The trial court found that one of the girls ―gave 
him a little brush kiss on the cheek[;] he requested a real kiss[;] and he attempted 
to kiss her again.‖  (Id. at p. 470, fn. 3.)  The girls ran away and reported the 
incident.  (Id. at p. 471.)  After a court trial, Cicero was convicted of two counts of 
lewd conduct by force.  (§ 288(b).)  The trial court found no evidence he had used 
 
13 
violence or threatened great bodily harm.  On appeal, Cicero did not dispute he 
had committed lewd acts but claimed ―no force was used as a matter of law.‖  
(Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 473, italics added.)  
 
The Court of Appeal therefore had to determine what level of force is 
necessary to support an aggravated lewd act conviction.  To answer that question, 
the majority reasoned that the harsher penal consequences of a conviction under 
section 288(b), as compared to section 288(a), require that the force used for a 
subdivision (b) conviction be ―substantially different from or substantially greater 
than that necessary to accomplish the lewd act itself.‖  (Cicero, supra, 157 
Cal.App.3d at p. 474.)  This formulation was, and remains, an appropriate 
definition of the force required for an aggravated lewd conduct conviction under 
section 288(b), now section 288(b)(1).  (See People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 
1015, 1027.)  However, after concluding this definition of force was satisfied by 
Cicero‘s conduct, the majority went on to consider whether section 288(b) also 
required that the force cause physical injury to the victim.  (Cicero, at p. 474.) 
 
In casting about to answer this question, the majority turned ―to the law of 
rape for guidance.‖  (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 475.)  At this point, the 
decision‘s skein of logic began to unravel.  As even the Cicero decision 
recognized, rape is an act of intercourse ―accomplished against a person‘s will.‖  
(§ 261, subd. (a)(2); see Cicero, at p. 475.)  Yet, just two years earlier, the 
Legislature had specifically deleted from section 288(b) a requirement that the 
lewd act be committed against the will of the victim.  By drawing an analogy to 
rape at the beginning of its journey, the Cicero majority chose a guide destined to 
lead it astray.7 
                                              
7  
In discussing the law of rape, the majority relied heavily on the treatise 
Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982).  (See Cicero, supra, 157 
Cal.App.3d at p. 475.)  However, the majority apparently overlooked the treatise‘s 
admonition that, while the crimes of rape and carnal knowledge of a child have 
much in common, ―[a]t one point they cannot be discussed effectively without 
complete separation.  The point has to do with the consent, or lack of consent on 
 
14 
 
In discussing the law of rape, the majority observed that the fundamental 
wrong punished as rape is not the infliction of physical injury but ―the violation of 
a woman‘s will and sexuality‖ from ―intercourse undertaken without her consent.‖  
(Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 475.)  The force used by a rapist need not 
cause physical harm, but it is relevant to show that the intercourse was against the 
victim‘s will.  (Ibid.)  The majority concluded the same definition of force should 
apply in aggravated lewd conduct cases:  ―It seems both logical and fair to us that 
if the will and sexuality of an adult woman are protected by the Penal Code, then 
the will and sexuality of children deserve no lesser protection.  Accordingly, both 
logic and fairness compel the conclusion that ‗force‘ in subdivision (b) must 
reasonably be given the same established meaning it has achieved in the law of 
rape:  ‗force‘ should be defined as a method of obtaining a child‘s participation in 
a lewd act in violation of a child‘s will and not exclusively as a means of causing 
physical harm to the child.‖  (Cicero, at pp. 475-476.) 
 
Cicero based its conclusion that consent is a defense to section 288(b) on a 
flawed analogy between lewd acts on a child and rape.  We have cautioned that 
significant differences between these crimes argue strongly against importing 
definitions from one context to the other.  (People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1026-1027.)  Unlike rape, the wrong punished by the lewd acts statute is not 
the violation of a child‘s sexual autonomy, but of its sexual innocence.  ―[S]ection 
288 was enacted to provide children with ‗special protection‘ from sexual 
exploitation.  (People v. Olsen (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638, 647-648.)  The statute 
recognizes that children are ‗uniquely susceptible‘ to such abuse as a result of their 
dependence upon adults, smaller size, and relative naiveté.  [Citation.]  The statute 
also assumes that young victims suffer profound harm whenever they are 
                                                                                                                                      
 
the part of [the victim].  Unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 
consent is a crime whether she consents or not.‖  (Perkins & Boyce, supra, at 
p. 209.) 
 
15 
perceived and used as objects of sexual desire.‖  (People v. Martinez (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 434, 443-444.) 
 
Next, having been asked only to define ―force,‖ the Cicero majority paused 
to consider the meaning of ―duress,‖ a question that was not presented.  It 
remarked that the terms ―duress,‖ ―menace,‖ and ―threat‖ ―are ordinarily used to 
demonstrate that someone has used some form of psychological coercion to get 
someone else to do something they don‘t want to do, i.e., something against their 
will.‖  (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 477.)  The observation is accurate 
when lack of consent must be proven.  The majority erred, however, in assuming 
that it is impossible to consider the concepts of duress, menace, or threat apart 
from their ultimate effect on a victim.  A perpetrator may use duress, menace, or 
threats against a victim even if this conduct does not ultimately influence the 
victim‘s state of mind.  In the context of lewd acts with a child under 14, it is the 
defendant‘s menacing behavior that aggravates the crime and brings it under 
section 288(b). 
 
After its diversion into duress, the Cicero majority arrived at the rather 
startling inference that the Legislature did not intend to eliminate lack of consent 
from most section 288(b) cases.  (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at pp. 478, 482.)  
It held that consent was not a defense if the child suffered demonstrable physical 
harm from a forcible lewd act.  (Id. at p. 479.)  However, if the child suffered no 
physical harm, the majority held that the prosecution was required to prove ―(1) 
that the defendant used physical force substantially different from or substantially 
in excess of that required for the lewd act and (2) that the lewd act was 
accomplished against the will of the victim.‖  (Cicero, at p. 484.)8 
                                              
8  
We had occasion to consider Cicero‘s definition of ―force‖ in People v. 
Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th 1015.  Although we recited the first part of the 
definition, requiring that the force be greater than that necessary to accomplish the 
lewd act itself, we did not mention or consider Cicero‘s requirement that the 
victim‘s will be overcome when forcible lewd acts have resulted in no physical 
harm.  (Griffin, at p. 1027.) 
 
16 
 
Quite obviously, this interpretation of section 288(b) directly contradicted 
the 1981 legislative amendments.  As Justice Regan pointed out in dissent, the 
majority ―wr[ote] back into the subdivision precisely what the Legislature wrote 
out of the subdivision, so that the majority may in turn rest the conviction of the 
question of ‗knowing consent.‘ ‖  (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 487 (dis. 
opn. of Regan, Acting P.J.).)  Aware of the discrepancy between its conclusion 
and the ―perplexing statutory amendment‖ (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 476) to section 288(b), the majority first sought an explanation for the 
amendment in legislative history.  After cursorily reviewing Senate Bill No. 586‘s 
chronology, however, the majority dismissed the legislative history as 
unenlightening.  (Cicero, at pp. 476-477.)  It observed that the phrase ―against the 
will of the victim‖ was not removed from section 288(b) until the final conference 
and concluded the reason for this change was not apparent.  (Cicero, at p. 477.)  
As we have discussed, however, a comprehensive review of the legislative history 
clearly shows that the Legislature deleted the phrase in order to eliminate consent 
as a defense to the aggravated lewd act crime. 
 
In dissent, Justice Regan criticized the majority‘s analysis.  Regarding the 
1981 amendments to section 288(b), he explained:  ―[T]he Legislature simply 
recognized the lewd act in subdivision (a) need not be against the [victim‘s] will, 
and thus, it need not be in the use of force under subdivision (b).  In fact, under the 
plain language of the statute, the act in subdivision (b) can be committed with 
knowing consent and still be a violation of the subdivision, if force is used.  Force 
is limited to something the perpetrator applies; it is independent of the actions or 
thoughts of the under-14-year-old victim.‖  (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at 
pp. 487-488 (dis. opn. of Regan, Acting P.J.).)  Justice Regan concluded that 
―knowing consent‖ by a child under 14 ―is not an affirmative defense to 
subdivision (a), and cannot be one to subdivision (b).‖  (Cicero, at p. 488 (dis. 
opn. of Regan, Acting P.J.).) 
 
17 
III. 
Consent Is Not a Defense to Aggravated Lewd Conduct 
 
Cicero‘s discussion of victim consent has generated disagreement.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Cardenas (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937, fn. 7; People v. 
Quinones (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1158.)  For example, in his concurring 
opinion in People v. Bolander (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 155, Justice Mihara noted 
that ―Cicero‘s legislative intent analysis led it down the wrong path.‖  (Id. at 
p. 162 (conc. opn. of Mihara, J.).)  He went on to correctly observe: ―Once lack of 
consent was eliminated as an element of the prosecution‘s case, it was not reborn 
as a part of the definition of force.  Lack of consent is not an element of the 
offense prohibited by section 288, subdivision (b), and the victim‘s consent is not 
an affirmative defense to such a charge.  The victim‘s consent or lack thereof is 
simply immaterial.‖  (People v. Bolander, at p. 163 (conc. opn. of Mihara, J.).) 
 
In this case, the Court of Appeal majority followed Cicero‘s flawed 
reasoning.  We conclude Justice Mihara had the better argument in his dissent 
below.  With respect to force, Justice Mihara explained:  ―While the fact that the 
victim actually consents to a lewd act might render the use of force unnecessary, 
the victim‘s actual consent does not eliminate the fact that the defendant actually 
uses violence, compulsion or constraint in the commission of the lewd act, nor 
does the victim‘s consent diminish the defendant‘s culpability or immunize the 
defendant from suffering the penal consequences that arise from a forcible lewd 
act.‖  Likewise, with respect to implied coercion or duress, a ―child victim‘s actual 
consent does not eliminate the fact that the perpetrator utilizes duress in the 
commission of the lewd act, and does not reduce the perpetrator‘s culpability or 
eliminate the penal consequences that attach due to the perpetrator‘s conduct.‖  
 
When the Legislature amended section 288(b) in 1981 to delete the 
previous requirement that lewd acts committed by use of force, violence, duress, 
menace, or fear be ―against the will of the victim,‖ it effectively removed the 
concept of consent from child molestation cases.  ―The rejection by the Legislature 
of a specific provision contained in an act as originally introduced is most 
 
18 
persuasive to the conclusion that the act should not be construed to include the 
omitted provision.‖  (Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 
591, 607.)  Since 1981, the lewd act crimes in section 288 have been defined based 
on the offender‘s wrongful conduct only.  The victim‘s ―consent,‖ such as it may 
be, is no longer material in these cases.  We cannot interpret section 288(b)(1) to 
reinsert what the Legislature intentionally removed.  ―To do so would not be 
interpreting the legislative intent but would be a gross example of judicial 
legislation in contravention of the legislative intent logically implied from the 
rejection by the Legislature of an identical provision.‖  (People v. Brannon (1973) 
32 Cal.App.3d 971, 977.) 
 
By intentionally removing the phrase ―against the will of the victim,‖ the 
Legislature kept the focus on the conduct of the assailant.  It recognized that there 
is an inherent imbalance of power in an encounter between a child and an adult 
bent on sexual conduct.  It acted to protect young children, who may make ill-
advised ―choices‖ when under the coercive influence of an overreaching adult.  
Accordingly, it set 14 as the age at which a child may legally give consent to 
sexual conduct.  This was a legitimate exercise of the Legislature‘s authority.  
―[T]he Legislature has determined that children are uniquely susceptible to 
‗outrage‘ and exploitation‖ and has accordingly broadened the range of sexual acts 
with children deemed criminal.  (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 341-342; 
cf. People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1008 [Legislature could define ―duress‖ 
more broadly in § 288(b)(1) than in the rape and spousal rape statutes to protect 
children under 14 from sexual abuse].) 
 
Despite this clear legislative intent, defendant repeats Cicero‘s error of 
assuming lack of consent must be proven when the prosecution relies on duress 
because this term necessarily implies that the victim‘s will was overcome.  
However, the legal definition of duress is objective in nature and not dependent on 
the response exhibited by a particular victim.  In People v. Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th 
999, we held that ―duress,‖ as used in section 288 (b)(1), means ― ‗a direct or 
 
19 
implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship or retribution sufficient to 
coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act which 
otherwise would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to which one 
otherwise would not have submitted.‘ ‖  (Leal, at p. 1004, second italics added, 
quoting People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50.)9  Because duress is 
measured by a purely objective standard, a jury could find that the defendant used 
threats or intimidation to commit a lewd act without resolving how the victim 
subjectively perceived or responded to this behavior.10  Consistent with the 
language of section 288 and the clear intent of the Legislature, the focus must be 
on the defendant‘s wrongful act, not the victim‘s response to it. 
 
Taking a different view of history, the concurring and dissenting opinion 
asserts that ―[a] virtually unbroken line of authority following the 1981 
amendments, from Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d 465, and Pitmon, supra, 170 
Cal.App.3d 38, through our own 2004 decision in Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th 999, has 
interpreted duress, menace and threat as behavior inconsistent with the victim‘s 
freely given consent.‖  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 10.)  In fact, no decision has 
actually held that consent is a defense when it is alleged that lewd acts were 
accomplished by duress.  As noted, the issue of duress was not presented in 
                                              
9  
The definition of ―duress‖ in CALCRIM No. 1111 is based on People v. 
Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at page 1004.  To make even more clear that the focus is 
on the perpetrator‘s actions, not the victim‘s response, this part of the instruction 
should be amended along the following lines:  ―Duress means the use of a direct or 
implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to 
cause a reasonable person to do [or submit to] something that he or she would not 
otherwise do [or submit to].  When deciding whether the act was accomplished by 
duress, consider all the circumstances, including the age of the child and (his/her) 
relationship to the defendant.‖  
10  
The concurring and dissenting opinion complains this conclusion ―distorts 
the holdings of Pitmon and Leal.‖  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 6.)  To the 
contrary, the analysis flows directly from the explicit definition of ―duress‖ stated 
in those cases.  That the definition was formulated in the context of a different 
legal issue does not make it irrelevant to the question we explore here. 
 
20 
Cicero; therefore, the majority‘s discussion of it was dictum.  Although other 
decisions have repeated Cicero‘s dictum, none has directly ruled that a child 
victim‘s consent negates a finding of duress under section 288(b)(1).  For 
example, as in Cicero, the issue in People v. Quinones, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 
1154 was force, not duress.  The court stated in dicta that it agreed with Cicero‘s 
observations on duress but disagreed with Cicero‘s extension of this reasoning to 
lewd acts committed by force.  (Quinones, at p. 1158.)  While duress was at issue 
in Pitmon, consent was not.  There, in finding that sufficient evidence supported a 
section 288(b) conviction, a panel of the same court that decided Cicero remarked 
that the defendant‘s conduct had ―prompted [the child] against his will to 
participate in the sexual acts‖ (Pitmon, at p. 51), but no argument had ever been 
made that the sex acts were consensual. 
 
Because no case following the 1981 amendments to section 288(b) has 
specifically held that consent is a defense to aggravated lewd acts on a child under 
14, we also reject the related argument that the Legislature‘s failure to alter 
section 288(b)(1) after Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d 465 indicates it has 
acquiesced in Cicero‘s interpretation of ―duress.‖  When the Legislature fails to 
act in the face of a direct holding, a conclusion of acquiescence may be in order.  
It is a slender reed to depend on indeed to argue that the Legislature acquiesced to 
dictum in a case that has been much criticized and that even the concurring and 
dissenting opinion acknowledges ―was not free from error.‖  (Conc. & dis. opn., 
post, at p. 3.) 
 
The approach we endorse today is venerable.  California law has long 
recognized that consent is not a defense when the victim of a sex crime is a child 
under age 14.  Many early decisions under the rape statute (§ 261) held that a 
minor could not legally consent to intercourse.  (E.g., People v. Verdegreen, 
supra, 106 Cal. at pp. 214-215; People v. Gordon (1886) 70 Cal. 467, 469.)  This 
incapacity was conclusively presumed notwithstanding any ―actual consent‖ the 
child may have conveyed.  (Verdegreen, at p. 214.)  Moreover, the presumption 
 
21 
applied even when the alleged crime was not rape but an assault with intent to 
commit rape.  In a similar argument to the one advanced here, Verdegreen argued 
consent was a defense to such an assault because the crime necessarily implied 
resistance by the person assaulted.  (Id. at p. 213.)  We disagreed, explaining, ―It is 
true that an assault implies force by the assailant and resistance by the one 
assaulted; and that one is not, in legal contemplation, injured by a consensual act.  
But these principles have no application to a case where under the law there can 
be no consent.  Here the law implies incapacity to give consent, and this 
implication is conclusive.  In such case the female is to be regarded as resisting, no 
matter what the actual state of her mind may be at the time.  The law resists for 
her.‖  (Id. at p. 215, italics added.)11 
 
Honoring the clear legislative intent expressed in the plain language of 
section 288(b)(1), we hold that consent of the victim is not a defense to the crime 
of aggravated lewd conduct on a child under age 14.  The prosecution need not 
prove that a lewd act committed by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear 
                                              
11  
The Legislature later raised the age of consent from 14 to 18 (Stats. 1897, 
ch. 139, § 1, p. 201; Stats. 1913, ch. 122, § 1, p. 212) and removed the crime of 
unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor from the rape statute (§ 261.5, added by 
Stats. 1970, ch. 1301, §§ 1, 2, pp. 2405-2406).  These changes led us to recognize 
a defense to statutory rape when the accused had a good faith, reasonable belief 
that the victim was 18 or older.  (People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 536.)  
However, no legislative action or judicial decision has altered the long-standing 
presumption that children under age 14 cannot give legal consent to sexual 
activity.  We made this clear in People v. Olsen, supra, 36 Cal.3d 638, when we 
refused to extend Hernandez‘s mistake-of-age defense to section 288.  Whereas 
statutory rape involves an element of consent, in that it is possible to mistakenly 
believe a female is older than 18 and capable of consenting to intercourse, we 
stated that ― ‘[a] violation of section 288 does not involve consent of any sort, 
thereby placing the public policies underlying it and statutory rape on different 
footings.‘ ‖  (Olsen, at p. 645, italics added, quoting People v. Toliver (1969) 270 
Cal.App.2d 492, 496.)  We observed that section 288 was enacted to serve a 
―strong public policy to protect children of tender years‖ (Olsen, at p. 646) and 
discussed several statutes that afford special protections to children under age 14.  
(Id. at pp. 647-649.) 
 
22 
was also against the victim‘s will.  To the extent they are inconsistent with this 
holding, we disapprove People v. Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d 465, and the 
cases following it.12 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal reversing defendant‘s convictions on 
counts 1, 2 and 4 is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
GEORGE, J. * 
 
 
                                              
12  
Specifically, we disapprove of statements in People v. Cicero, supra, 157 
Cal.App.3d 465 suggesting that consent of the victim is a defense to a charge of 
lewd acts accomplished by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear.  We 
also disapprove of similar statements in People v. Cochran (2002) 103 
Cal.App.4th 8, 15-16; People v. Bolander, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 155, 160-161; 
People v. Neel (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1784, 1787; People v. Hecker (1990) 219 
Cal.App.3d 1238, 1249-1251; People v. Quinones, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 1154, 
1158; People v. Mendibles (1989) 199 Cal.App.3d 1277, 1306; People v. Lusk 
(1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 764, 770-771; and People v. Pitmon, supra, 170 
Cal.App.3d 38, 51. 
_______________________ 
*  Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.   
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
I concur in the result.  I dissent, however, from most of the majority‘s 
conclusions and analysis. 
In defendant‘s trial for multiple counts of committing lewd acts with 
children under 14 years of age by use of force, violence, duress, menace or fear of 
bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)),1 the jury was instructed:  ―It is not a 
defense that the child may have consented to the act.‖  Because consent of the 
victim is inconsistent with the use of duress to commit a lewd act, I would hold it 
was error to so instruct in this case, where duress as well as force was at issue.  
I would, however, find the error harmless because, in light of the evidence and 
arguments, it is not reasonably likely (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 
836) the jury would have failed to find force or duress had the court refrained from 
giving the instruction.  On this ground (harmless error), I concur in the judgment 
reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
Section 288, subdivision (a) prohibits the commission of any lewd or 
lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 with the intent of arousing or 
satisfying the sexual desires of the perpetrator or the child.  Subdivision (b)(1) 
specially prohibits the commission of such acts ―by use of force, violence, duress, 
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another 
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
2 
person . . . .‖  Although at the time of defendant‘s crimes both offenses specified 
punishment by three, six or eight years in state prison, a conviction under section 
288, subdivision (b)(1) (section 288(b)(1)) had and has significant consequences 
in restricting the availability of probation and in determining consecutive 
sentencing.  (See §§ 667.6, 1203.066.)2 
When the prosecution, to prove a violation of section 288(b)(1), relies in 
whole or in part on a theory of duress, menace or threat of bodily injury, an 
instruction that consent is no defense is potentially confusing.  The statutory terms 
―duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury‖ (§ 288(b)(1)), 
used with their ordinary meanings as they are here, refer to coercion.  To commit a 
lewd act ―by use of‖ such coercion (ibid., italics added) necessarily means to 
coerce the victim into acquiescing to the act.  To tell jurors consent is no defense 
to such a charge could confuse them as to whether evidence of freely given 
consent should be considered on the issue of whether the act was committed by 
use of duress, menace or fear.  The 1981 amendments to section 288(b),3 on which 
                                              
2  
As the majority notes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, fn. 3), the sentence for 
violation of section 288(b)(1) has since been increased to five, eight or 10 years in 
prison.  This change makes even clearer that the Legislature regards section 
288(b)(1) offenses as significantly aggravated over offenses under section 288, 
subdivision (a). 
3  
As added to section 288 by amendment in 1979, subdivision (b) prohibited 
the commission of a lewd act ―by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or threat 
of great bodily harm, and against the will of the victim . . . .‖  (Stats. 1979, ch. 
944, § 6.5, p. 3254.)  The reference to ―against the will of the victim‖ was deleted 
in 1981.  (Stats. 1981, ch. 1064, § 1, p. 4093.)   
 
In 1995, subdivision (b) was divided into two paragraphs; the former text 
was placed in subdivision (b)(1) while a new subdivision (b)(2), relating to abuse 
of dependent adults, was added.  (Stats. 1995, ch. 890, § 1, p. 6777.)  I refer to the 
prohibition on lewd acts with a child by force, violence, etc. as section 288(b) or 
section 288(b)(1), according to the statute‘s organization at the time under 
discussion. 
 
3 
the majority primarily relies, did not focus on this aspect of the statute and cannot 
abrogate the statute‘s plain language.  That language, referring to commission of 
the lewd act by coercive means, must take precedence over general, nonspecific 
indications of a legislative desire to reduce the role played by consent in section 
288 cases, a desire, as I discuss, seemingly related to punishment, not to proof of 
the offense‘s elements. 
 ―Duress,‖ in section 288(b)(1), is not a legal term of art; it is used in its 
ordinary sense of ― ‗stringent compulsion by threat of danger, hardship, or 
retribution . . . .‘ ‖  (People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1009, italics omitted, 
quoting Webster‘s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 703; see also Random House 
Dict. of the English Language (2d ed. 1987) p. 607 [―compulsion by threat or 
force; coercion; constraint‖].)  To commit a lewd act on a child ―by use of . . . 
duress‖ (§ 288(b)(1)), then, is to use a threat of danger, hardship or retribution to 
compel the child‘s compliance with the act.  In a violation of section 288(b)(1) by 
duress, the duress is employed to overcome the child‘s will, making him or her 
perform or acquiesce in the lewd act. 
The decision in People v. Cicero (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465 (Cicero) was 
not free from error, but on this point the decision was clearly correct and, until 
now, has stood unchallenged.  The Cicero court observed that the terms ―duress,‖ 
―menace‖ and ―threat‖ ―are ordinarily used to demonstrate that someone has used 
some form of psychological coercion to get someone else to do something they 
don‘t want to do, i.e., something against their will.  Consequently, if the concept of 
violation of will is removed from these words, they are left, like shells on a beach, 
without substance.‖  (Id. at p. 477.)  ―The essential function played by the concept 
of ‗menace‘ is to avoid or vitiate consent to an act, so that the act cannot be said to 
constitute an exercise of free will. . . .  [¶] In light of these authorities, we conclude 
it is semantically unreasonable to amputate from the concept of ‗menace‘ the 
 
4 
requirement that an act be undertaken ‗against the will of the victim.‘  The latter 
concept is necessary to any coherent meaning of ‗menace.‘  We believe similar 
arguments could be constructed to demonstrate the terms ‗duress‘ and ‗threats‘ 
have no useful meaning absent a consideration of their effect on the will of a 
victim.‖  (Id. at p. 478.)4 
The year after Cicero was decided, the court in People v. Pitmon (1985) 
170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 (Pitmon) held ―duress‖ in section 288(b) should be 
interpreted according to its ordinary meaning as ―a direct or implied threat of 
force, violence, danger, hardship or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable 
person of ordinary susceptibilities‖ to perform or acquiesce in a lewd act.  
Analyzing the evidence at trial, the court concluded the charged crimes had been 
committed by use of duress; ―defendant‘s actions constituted an implied threat of 
force, violence, hardship or retribution which prompted [the child] against his will 
to participate in the sexual acts.‖  (Id. at p. 51, italics added.) 
Cicero was further followed on this issue in People v. Quinones (1988) 202 
Cal.App.3d 1154, 1158, where the appellate court agreed that ―a conviction based 
on ‗duress,‘ ‗menace,‘ or ‗threat of great bodily harm‘ necessarily implies that the 
‗will of the victim‘ has been overcome,‖ though the court disagreed with Cicero‘s 
parallel holding as to force, discussed below.  (See also People v. Cochran (2002) 
103 Cal.App.4th 8, 15-16 [evidence supported a duress finding where victim 
―engaged in sex acts only in response to her father‘s parental and physical 
authority.  Her compliance was derived from intimidation and the psychological 
control he exercised over her and was not the result of freely given consent.‖]; 
People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1321 [ ―Duress cannot be 
                                              
4  
Until 1986, section 288(b) referred to ―threat of great bodily harm.‖  The 
1986 amendment substituted the current wording, ―fear of immediate and unlawful 
bodily injury.‖  (Stats. 1986, ch. 1299, § 4, p. 4595.) 
 
5 
established unless there is evidence that ‗the victim[‘s] participation was impelled, 
at least partly, by an implied threat . . . .‘ ‖].) 
These decisions, forming an unbroken line from 1981 until the majority 
opinion in this case, clearly establish that ―duress‖ and its associated terms 
―menace‖ and ―fear of . . . bodily injury‖ are used in section 288(b)(1) in their 
ordinary meanings, and that to commit a lewd act ―by use of‖ one of these means, 
as prohibited in section 288(b)(1), is to coerce the victim, by direct or implied 
threat or by exploiting the victim‘s fear, into performing or acquiescing in the 
lewd act against his or her will.  To coerce an act by duress, menace or fear ―is to 
avoid or vitiate consent to [the] act, so that the act cannot be said to constitute an 
exercise of free will.‖  (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 478.)  Such coercion 
is thus inconsistent with the exercise of the victim‘s ―freely given consent.‖  
(People v. Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 15.)   
Because the victim‘s freely given consent is inconsistent with the 
commission of a lewd act by use of duress, menace or fear, as section 288(b)(1) 
employs those terms, to instruct a jury weighing such charges that the child‘s 
consent is not a defense is potentially confusing.  While consent is not an 
affirmative defense to charges under section 288(b)(1), evidence of consent tends 
to negate the statutory element that the lewd act be committed by use of duress, 
menace or fear.  An instruction that consent is not a defense might lead a 
reasonable juror to improperly disregard any evidence of freely given consent put 
forward by the defense, rather than considering that evidence, in deciding whether 
the prosecution has met its burden to prove the child‘s compliance was in fact 
produced by duress, menace or fear of bodily injury.  
Against the conclusion that commission of a lewd act by duress, menace or 
fear is inconsistent with the victim‘s consent, the majority cites the description of 
duress for purposes of section 288(b) — first offered in Pitmon, supra, 170 
 
6 
Cal.App.3d at page 50, and later quoted and adopted by this court in People v. 
Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at page 1004 (Leal) — as a threat ―sufficient to coerce a 
reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities‖ to perform the lewd act.  Because 
this states an objective standard, the majority reasons, ―a jury could find that the 
defendant used threats or intimidation to commit a lewd act without resolving how 
the victim subjectively perceived or responded to this behavior.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 19.) 
The majority‘s conclusion distorts the holdings of Pitmon and Leal.  In fact, 
these cases are inapposite to the issue here.  The definitional discussion in both 
cases went to the type and degree of threat that section 288(b) requires, not to 
whether a threat must actually overcome the victim‘s will.  In Pitmon, the question 
was whether a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm (as specified in § 26) 
was required (Pitmon held it was not); in Leal, the issue was whether a threat of 
―hardship,‖ included in the Pitmon definition, sufficed (Leal held it did).  (See 
Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1003-1010; Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at pp. 
48-50.) 
Neither Pitmon nor Leal held or even suggested that whether the victim is 
actually coerced into participating in a lewd act, or freely consents to it, is 
irrelevant under section 288(b).  To the contrary, in Leal we quoted with approval 
Pitmon‘s remark that section 288(b) punished ― ‗the obtaining of a child’s 
participation in a lewd act in violation of the child’s will.‘ ‖  (Leal, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at p. 1009, italics added, quoting Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 49.)  
As explained earlier, the court in Pitmon, consistent with that understanding, 
applied its definition to determine that the duress used was not only of an 
objectively sufficient magnitude, but actually had the effect of coercing the victim 
into participating:  the court concluded that the defendant‘s threats ―prompted [the 
child] against his will to participate in the sexual acts‖ and that the defendant had 
 
7 
thus ―accomplished his lewd acts by means of duress.‖  (Pitmon, at p. 51.)  In 
holding the People must show that the defendant‘s threats were objectively strong 
enough to coerce a reasonable person, then, neither Pitmon nor Leal suggested the 
People need not show these threats actually coerced the child into acquiescing to 
the lewd act. 
The majority also reasons that the Legislature, when in 1981 it deleted the 
phrase ―against the will of the victim‖ from section 288(b), intended to eliminate 
any consideration of consent from the adjudication of charges under this section.  
They rely on the legislative history of the 1981 amendment, which was enacted by 
Senate Bill No. 586 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) (hereafter Senate Bill No. 586).  As 
the majority explains, the requirement that a section 288(b) offense be committed 
―against the will of the victim‖ was removed in a September 15, 1981, conference 
reconciling provisions of Senate Bill No. 586 with those of a competing bill, 
Assembly Bill No. 457 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) (hereafter Assembly Bill No. 457), 
which was not passed.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 8-11.)  I find the legislative history 
less than definitive on the present issue. 
The majority relies on an August 24, 1981, report by the Joint Legislative 
Committee for Revision of the Penal Code, which was distributed to members of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee.  This report disparaged the Assembly proposal 
allowing probation in certain cases where the child solicited the lewd act5 as 
requiring the victim to ―establish that she did not consent to the act of sexual 
                                              
5  
Among other things, Assembly Bill No. 457 would have allowed probation 
in some cases where the defendant had befriended the victim for sexual purposes 
but the victim solicited the sexual act or shared in the perpetrator‘s sexual intent at 
the time he or she was befriended.  (Assem. Bill No. 457, § 3, as amended in 
Assem., May 6, 1981.)  This proposed provision was assertedly designed to 
exempt from the state prison mandate offenses involving ―the 13 year old 
prostitute and the Lolita situations.‖  (Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 586, as amended Aug. 10, 1981, p. 7.) 
 
8 
abuse‖ and as reflecting a belief ―that most children want to be molested, that 
there exist 11 year old prostitutes who freely and willingly choose that profession, 
and that those who molest children should not be harshly treated by the courts.‖  
(J. Com. for Revision of Pen. Code, Summary of Major Differences, Aug. 24, 
1981, p. 1.)  The report reflects a general division between the Assembly and the 
Senate over whether and how consent should affect punishment for lewd acts with 
children; it sheds no light on how Senate Bill No. 586‘s deletion of ―against the 
will of the victim‖ from section 288(b) would affect the prosecution‘s burden of 
proving a lewd act had been committed by duress, violence or threat of bodily 
harm.  It is of limited probative force on the intent of the Legislature, in any event, 
because there is no indication the report was presented either to the conference 
committee, which agreed to the change, or to the full membership of the two 
houses, which approved it. 
Also of interest is a conference committee report reviewing ―Major Issues‖ 
concerning Senate Bill No. 586, dated September 14, 1981 (the day before the 
conference committee reported the bill out and it was passed by both houses).  
Among the issues this report identified were ―2.  Should children under age 14 be 
presumed incapable of consenting to sexual advances in all instances?‖ and ―3.  In 
cases where the offender made friends with the victim for illicit sexual purposes 
should the prosecution have to establish that the victim neither consented nor 
solicited the act?‖  (Conf. Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 586, Sept. 14, 1981, pp. 2-3.)  The 
conference report does not mention the Senate‘s proposed deletion of ―against the 
will of the victim‖ from section 288(b); indeed, the wording of question No. 3 
invokes the language of the probation provision proposed in Assembly Bill No. 
457.  (See fn. 5, ante.)  At this critical stage, then, when the conference committee 
sought to resolve differences between the Senate and Assembly bills, debate 
focused not on the parameters of proof that a lewd act was committed by force, 
 
9 
violence, duress, menace or threats under section 288(b), but on the Assembly 
provision allowing probation in child prostitution cases. 
A fair reading of the 1981 amendment and its legislative history suggests 
the Legislature wanted, in relation to punishment, to deemphasize considerations 
of the child victim‘s consent or lack of consent in section 288 prosecutions.  
Significantly, the Legislature retained in section 288(b) an element — the 
commission of the lewd act ―by use of‖ duress, menace or threats — inherently 
inconsistent with freely given consent.  Nothing in the language or history of 
Senate Bill No. 586 indicates the bill‘s drafters or the legislators who passed it 
grappled specifically with how a lewd act could be committed by use of duress, 
menace or threat without overcoming the victim‘s free will.  The plain language of 
the statute, referring to commission of the lewd act by coercive means, must take 
precedence over general indications of a legislative desire to reduce or eliminate 
the role played by consent in punishing section 288 offenses.  (See Vasquez v. 
State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 253 [―We may not rewrite the statute to 
conform to an assumed intention that does not appear in its language.‖].) 
My conclusion in this regard is reinforced by the Legislature‘s subsequent 
acquiescence in 20 years of unanimous judicial opinion holding that commission 
of a lewd act by duress, menace or threat in section 288(b) requires coercive 
conduct used to overcome the victim‘s free will.  A virtually unbroken line of 
authority following the 1981 amendments, from Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d 
465, and Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d 38, through our own 2004 decision in 
Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th 999, has interpreted duress, menace and threat as behavior 
inconsistent with the victim‘s freely given consent.  The Legislature amended 
section 288(b) several times in that period without any change affecting this 
interpretation, leading to an inference of ratification.  (People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 
Cal.3d 467, 475.) 
 
10 
The victim‘s consent, of course, does not negate any element of a charge 
under section 288, subdivision (a).  That statute establishes 14 years as a minimum 
age, before which children are conclusively presumed incapable of consent to 
lewd acts whatever their actual state of mind.  In that sense the majority is correct 
that California has long recognized ―consent is not a defense when the victim of a 
sex crime is a child under age 14.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  But our concern 
here is solely with a particular aggravated form of the offense, section 288(b)(1).  
That evidence of consent can under some circumstances tend to negate an element 
of that specific aggravated offense is not inconsistent with the principle that 
children younger than 14 years cannot legally consent to sexual acts.  Consent in 
no way prevents a perpetrator‘s prosecution under section 288, subdivision (a).6 
On the commission of a section 288(b)(1) offense by force or violence, 
I would reach a different conclusion than on commission of the crime by duress, 
menace or fear.  Though Cicero held force, as well, must be shown to have 
overcome the will of the child victim, this aspect of Cicero has since been 
criticized in People v. Quinones, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at page 1158, and in a 
separate opinion in People v. Bolander (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 155, 162-163 (conc. 
opn. of Mihara, J.).  Consequently, in this respect, previous decisions established 
no clear rule in which the Legislature can be deemed to have acquiesced. 
                                              
6  
People v. Verdegreen (1895) 106 Cal. 211, construing section 220 (assault 
with the intent to commit rape) before section 288 was enacted, is not illuminating 
on the present question.  We did not consider there whether evidence of consent 
was relevant to a charge the sexual act was committed by use of duress, which was 
not an element of section 220.  Because section 288 did not yet exist, moreover, 
the question presented in Verdegreen was not whether evidence of consent could 
negate an element of an aggravated form of that offense, but whether the 
defendant was entitled to an instruction that consent was a complete defense to the 
charge of assault.  (Verdegreen, at pp. 212-213.) 
 
11 
Moreover, unlike duress or menace, the use of force or violence to commit 
a lewd act is not necessarily inconsistent with the victim‘s consent.  While 
commission of a sex act by duress inherently involves coercion, use of force is a 
more general concept.  Force and violence7 certainly are most commonly 
employed to overcome the victim‘s free will, as in forcible rape.  (§ 261, subd. 
(a)(2); see People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1027.)  But an adult can 
freely agree to be subjected to force or even violence as a means, for instance, of 
achieving sexual stimulation and gratification for the individual or another person.  
More pertinent to section 288, involving children, physical force is sometimes 
used to transport or position a child in order to facilitate a lewd act, as in Cicero 
itself, where the adult perpetrator picked up the two young victims as part of what 
seemed to them a game, using the opportunity of this contact to fondle them.  
(Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 470.)  To say a person consented to the use of 
force or violence to commit a sexual act may describe a rare event, but it is not 
inherently a contradiction in terms. 
It follows that in the unusual section 288(b)(1) case where no theory of 
commission by duress, menace or fear is presented and the prosecution‘s theory of 
force or violence does not include the use of those means to overcome the victim‘s 
will, the court could correctly (albeit superfluously) instruct the jury that the 
victim‘s consent is not a defense to the charges.  The present case, however, was 
of a more common variety:  the prosecution relied on both force and duress, and 
even as to force the prosecution‘s theory was that defendant used force to restrain 
                                              
7  
―Force is a general term.  When force causes physical harm, it is commonly 
called ‗violence.‘  (Webster‘s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed.) p. 1319.)‖  (People v. 
Bolander, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 163, fn. 3 (conc. opn. of Mihara, J.); see 
also Random House Dict. of the English Language, supra, p. 2124 [defining 
violence as ―swift and intense force‖ or ―rough or injurious physical force, action, 
or treatment‖].) 
 
12 
the victims and overcome their wills.  In the circumstances of this case, 
defendant‘s alleged commission of the acts by force or duress could have been 
negated by the victims‘ freely given consent.  For reasons already given, then, the 
instruction that consent was not a defense was potentially misleading.  A 
reasonable juror could have been confused as to whether any evidence that C. or 
R. freely consented to the lewd acts should be considered on the issue of whether 
defendant committed the acts by force or duress. 
I disagree, however, with defendant that giving the instruction violated his 
federal constitutional rights and is either reversible per se or subject to the 
harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 
386 U.S. 18, 24.  While potentially confusing on aspects of the issue, the 
instruction did not purport to define the element of commission of the offense by 
use of force, violence, duress, menace or fear.  That element was correctly defined 
for the jury through other instructions.  At most, the instruction that consent is not 
a defense could have been read as inconsistent with the instructions defining the 
force or duress element.  The error thus did not constitute a ―[m]isdescription‖ of 
an element requiring either automatic reversal or Chapman prejudice review.  
(People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 670.)  Neither per se reversal nor the 
Chapman standard being implicated by the circumstances here, I would apply the 
prejudice standard applicable to errors of state law; reversal is appropriate only if 
omission of the erroneous instruction would have been reasonably likely to 
produce a more favorable result on the section 288(b)(1) charges.  (People v. 
Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)   
In light of the evidence and argument before the jury, the error was not 
prejudicial.  As the People note, there was no evidence of consent before the jury.  
C.‘s friendly relationship with defendant, her solicitation of conversation with him 
in the school parking lot, and her recantation of her police statements 
 
13 
incriminating him, as well as R.‘s affectionate behavior to defendant in his 
bedroom, gave some potential grounds for speculating they consented to being 
kissed and fondled on the charged occasions, but there was no actual evidence, 
direct or circumstantial, that this was so.   
Nor was consent, as such, emphasized in the arguments to the jury.  The 
prosecutor, reviewing for the jury the instructions they would be given, briefly 
referred to the instruction that consent was no defense.  But in the portion of his 
argument addressing the force or duress element of section 288(b)(1), the 
prosecutor made no mention of evidence of consent.  He argued simply that 
defendant had restrained and held the victims by force, had coerced C.‘s 
compliance by threatening retribution, and had exploited R.‘s fear of bodily injury, 
using his physical dominance over and his friendly relationships with both young 
victims, and his family connection with C., to add weight and credibility to the 
duress and fear.  On the defense side, counsel argued that as to C. ―there was no 
force, no threats, no duress.‖  Counsel asserted the prosecution had not produced 
any corroboration that force was used in the car incident, and argued C.‘s 
statements that she found defendant‘s actions frightening and disgusting were 
inconsistent with the fact she sought to talk with him privately outside her school.  
With regard to the incident with R. in defendant‘s bedroom, defense counsel 
maintained R. had testified inconsistently as to how she came to be lying on the 
bed and hugging defendant, and argued her testimony that she feared a possible 
future rape was inconsistent with the fact she had stayed with defendant in his 
bedroom for an extended period of time. 
The potentially confusing instruction on consent, therefore, did not prevent 
the parties from fairly and fully presenting to the jury the factual issue of whether 
defendant committed the lewd acts charged in counts 1, 2 and 4 by use of force or 
duress.  The jury found he had committed the acts by these means.  Given the 
 
14 
correct definitional instructions on force and duress, the absence of evidence of 
consent, and the limited role the concept played in the arguments of counsel, a 
different result was not reasonably likely even absent the potentially confusing 
consent instruction. 
For the above reasons, I concur in the court‘s disposition reversing the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
KENNARD, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Soto 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 9/9/08 – 6th Dist. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S167531 
Date Filed: January 20, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Aaron Persky 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys: 
 
Heather MacKay, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Manuel M. 
Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. de Nicola, 
Deputy State Solicitor General, Stan Helfman, Mark S. Howell, Laurence K. Sullivan and Jeffrey M. 
Laurence, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Heather MacKay 
P.O. Box 3112 
Oakland, CA  94609 
(510) 653-7507 
 
Jeffrey M. Laurence 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5897