Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Nathan E. DeLadurantey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 66 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1616-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Nathan E. DeLadurantey, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
     v. 
Nathan E. DeLadurantey, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DELADURANTEY   
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per curiam. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 66
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2020AP1616-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Nathan E. DeLadurantey,  
Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Nathan E. DeLadurantey, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
appeals Referee Robert E. Kinney's report recommending that the 
court dismiss the disciplinary complaint filed against Attorney 
Nathan 
E. 
DeLadurantey 
alleging 
one 
count 
of 
offensive 
personality in violation of the Attorney's Oath, Supreme Court 
Rule (SCR) 40.15,1 enforced pursuant to SCR 20:8.4(g).2   
                                                 
1 SCR 40.15 (Attorney's Oath) provides in relevant part:  "I 
will abstain from all offensive personality . . .."  
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The OLR maintains that Attorney DeLadurantey's conduct 
to Attorney H.M., an associate in his law firm, constituted 
offensive 
personality 
and 
that 
a 
private 
reprimand 
is 
appropriate.  Attorney DeLadurantey asks the court to accept the 
referee's recommendation and dismiss the offensive personality 
charge such that no costs would be imposed.  Alternatively, if 
the court concludes that he committed misconduct, Attorney 
DeLadurantey seeks a private reprimand and asks the court to 
significantly reduce the costs, which are $20,530.47 as of 
November 4, 2021.  The OLR maintains that full costs are 
appropriate.  
¶3 
We 
have 
no 
difficulty 
concluding 
that 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's conduct to H.M., as alleged in the complaint, 
constituted offensive personality in violation of SCR 40.15, as 
enforced pursuant to SCR 20:8.4(g).  Constrained by prior 
precedent, we elect to impose a public reprimand rather than a 
more severe sanction.  We take issue with several aspects of the 
referee's report and for the reasons explained herein we reduce 
the costs by $2,960.37 and direct Attorney DeLadurantey to pay 
costs of $17,570.10.  Restitution is not at issue; because this 
case solely concerns Attorney DeLadurantey's offensive conduct, 
there are no funds to restore. 
¶4 
Attorney DeLadurantey was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 2007 and practices in Brookfield.  He has not 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 SCR 20:8.4(g) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to violate the attorney's oath."   
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
3 
 
previously been disciplined.  Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M., 
the grievant, graduated from the same law school, which is not 
American Bar Association (ABA) accredited.  They met at an 
alumni event.  In 2012, Attorney DeLadurantey, by then an 
established 
attorney, 
hired 
H.M. 
as 
a 
junior 
associate.  
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
busy 
consumer 
litigation 
practice 
required both Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M. to work evenings 
and weekends and required extensive travel for interviews, 
depositions, and litigation.  
¶5 
It is undisputed that Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M. 
developed a friendship and that they socialized, exercised 
together, communicated frequently by text message, went on 
social outings during work travel, and generally spent a lot of 
time together.  H.M. worked at the firm until October 2017.  
About five months after her departure, H.M. filed a grievance 
with the OLR alleging that her departure was due to Attorney 
DeLadurantey's pattern of inappropriate behavior toward her that 
at times constituted sexual harassment.   
¶6 
The complaint alleges that in 2014, H.M. spoke to 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey 
about 
the 
need 
to 
maintain 
clear 
boundaries in their social and professional relationship.  In 
July 2015, Attorney DeLadurantey asked H.M. to travel with him 
to Door County to prepare for an upcoming trial.  H.M. agreed 
and went to Door County with him but alleged this request made 
her uncomfortable, although she did not communicate this to 
Attorney DeLadurantey.  When Attorney DeLadurantey suggested a 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
4 
 
second trip for further trial preparation, H.M. told Attorney 
DeLadurantey that she would not join him on a second trip. 
¶7 
Later in 2015, Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M. had a 
trial scheduled in Florida.  Attorney DeLadurantey rented a two 
bedroom Airbnb accommodation for them.  During their stay in 
Florida, on one occasion H.M. took a nap on the couch in the 
common space and when she awoke, Attorney DeLadurantey was 
napping on the same couch and told her he did not want to be 
alone.  On the same trip, while shopping together, Attorney 
DeLadurantey suggested H.M. purchase some "lucky underwear" for 
the forthcoming trial and gave her some money.  H.M. reported 
that these incidents made her uncomfortable.3  
¶8 
The complaint alleged that in 2015 while they were 
traveling 
together 
on 
an 
airplane, 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey 
suggested H.M. put her legs across his lap.  H.M. declined.  
Attorney DeLadurantey then pulled H.M.'s legs over his lap.  
When H.M. removed her legs, Attorney DeLadurantey attempted to 
pull H.M.'s head onto his shoulder.  H.M. alleges that several 
times 
between 
late 
summer 
and 
December 
2015 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey placed his hand on H.M.'s leg above her knee while 
                                                 
3 H.M. 
explained 
that 
she 
did 
not 
feel 
comfortable 
confronting Attorney DeLadurantey because she was concerned for 
her employment security.  The complaint alleged that Attorney 
DeLadurantey would tell H.M. she was lucky to have a job with 
him because it was unlikely another law firm would hire her or 
pay her what she was earning with his firm, because she (like 
Attorney DeLadurantey) was not a graduate of an ABA accredited 
law school.  The complaint alleged Attorney DeLadurantey told 
H.M. she did not possess the skills to manage her own law firm.  
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
5 
 
they were driving together.  The complaint alleges that during 
this same period, on several occasions, Attorney DeLadurantey 
took and held H.M.'s hand.  The complaint further alleges that 
in December 2015, H.M. expressed discomfort about unwelcome 
physical contact and asked Attorney DeLadurantey to respect 
"clear boundaries."  She says Attorney DeLadurantey apologized 
and agreed to modify his behavior.   
¶9 
In February 2016, Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M. 
traveled to San Francisco, California for depositions.  Attorney 
DeLadurantey rented a two bedroom Airbnb accommodation; each had 
their own bedroom.  One evening, H.M. was watching television in 
a common area when Attorney DeLadurantey approached her and 
began rubbing her back and rubbing his arms up and down her arms 
and legs in a suggestive manner.  H.M. alleges she was upset and 
scared, left the common area and went to her bedroom.  Attorney 
DeLadurantey then texted H.M. from within the accommodation, 
asking: "Can I try and fix the awkwardness?"  H.M. responded by 
text:  "I'm pretty sure I'm going to throw up shortly - I'm 
struggling not to."  
¶10 Later 
that 
same 
evening, 
H.M. 
and 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey 
spoke 
together 
in 
the 
kitchen 
and 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey told H.M. he wanted to take her upstairs to her 
bedroom and "hold her."  H.M. said no.  Attorney DeLadurantey 
left the kitchen.  When H.M. went to her bedroom later, she 
found Attorney DeLadurantey lying in her bed.  H.M. told 
Attorney DeLadurantey she was not going to share a bed with him 
and Attorney DeLadurantey left H.M.'s bedroom.  The next 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
6 
 
morning, Attorney DeLadurantey admitted to H.M. that his actions 
the previous night had been inappropriate, attributed them to 
intoxication, and apologized.  Attorney DeLadurantey does not 
dispute this incident occurred. 
¶11 H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey agree that thereafter, 
their personal and working relationship deteriorated.  Conflicts 
arose regarding H.M.'s vacation time and her responsibilities to 
the firm while she was on vacation.  H.M. alleged that Attorney 
DeLadurantey was more critical of her work.  She says he made it 
clear that he preferred her to wear makeup, and commented she 
looked like "trash" when she did not.  Once in 2016, Attorney 
DeLadurantey told H.M. she could not attend a luncheon with a 
third party because she was not wearing makeup.  In October 
2017, H.M. told Attorney DeLadurantey she had applied for a 
position with another firm.  They ultimately negotiated a 
severance package and H.M. left the firm in late October 2017.   
¶12 On September 29, 2020, the OLR filed a complaint 
against Attorney DeLadurantey alleging that by subjecting H.M. 
to physical contact and sexual advances, and to inappropriate 
comments regarding her physical appearance, in each instance 
Attorney DeLadurantey violated SCR 20:8.4(i)4 (sexual harassment) 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:8.4(i) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, 
creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual 
preference or marital status in connection with the lawyer's 
professional activities."  The OLR dismissed this charge.  The 
court is perplexed as to why the OLR elected to dismiss the 
sexual harassment charge on this record, but that issue is not 
before us. 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
7 
 
and did not abstain from offensive personality in violation of 
the Attorney's Oath, SCR 40.15, enforced via SCR 20:8.4(g).  The 
OLR sought a private reprimand. 
¶13 Attorney DeLadurantey filed an answer admitting some 
but not all of the factual allegations, providing context for 
others, and denying he committed professional misconduct.  
Referee Kinney was appointed on December 10, 2020.  Extensive 
discovery ensued. Hundreds of pages of exhibits, photographs, 
and 
text 
messages 
were 
produced, 
as 
well 
as 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's and H.M.'s deposition transcripts.  
¶14 On 
May 
17, 
2021, 
shortly 
before 
the 
scheduled 
evidentiary hearing, the OLR dismissed the sexual harassment 
charge, SCR 20:8.4(i), and Attorney DeLadurantey agreed to enter 
a "no contest" plea to the offensive personality charge, 
SCR 40.15 enforced pursuant to SCR 20:8.4(g).  Referee Kinney 
agreed that the complaint provided a sufficient factual basis 
for the offensive personality charge and accepted Attorney 
DeLadurantey's no-contest plea.  No evidentiary hearing was 
held.  The only remaining issue was discipline; both parties 
requested a private reprimand.  The referee ordered briefing on 
the question of appropriate discipline. 
¶15 Following 
receipt 
of 
the 
briefing 
regarding 
discipline, the referee filed a 23-page report concluding that 
Attorney DeLadurantey committed the alleged misconduct5 but, 
                                                 
5 Finding #3 of the referee's report explicitly confirms the 
referee's 
previous 
determination 
that 
that 
the 
complaint 
provides an adequate factual basis for the offensive personality 
charge.   
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
8 
 
based on the referee's own "additional findings,"6 the referee 
recommends we dismiss the complaint and/or impose no discipline 
on Attorney DeLadurantey.  The OLR appeals.   
¶16 On an appeal from a referee's report, we will affirm a 
referee's findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly 
erroneous and we review the referee's conclusions of law on a 
de novo basis.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 
2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine 
the appropriate level of discipline given the particular facts 
of each case, independent of the referee's recommendation, but 
benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶17 The 
referee's 
report 
is 
concerning 
in 
several 
respects.  It is internally inconsistent, contains superfluous 
and in some instances clearly erroneous factual findings, 
reflects an incorrect application of law, and expresses the 
concerning 
opinion 
that 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
inebriated 
sexual advances to his employee in San Francisco violates no 
rule of professional conduct and merits no discipline.  First, 
the referee's report is internally inconsistent.  The referee 
explicitly finds that the complaint forms an adequate factual 
basis for Attorney DeLadurantey's no contest plea to offensive 
personality, but then inconsistently 
states that 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's conduct was not offensive and thus recommends we 
                                                 
6 Finding 
#4 
of 
the 
referee's 
report 
states 
that 
"[a]dditional 
findings 
appear 
below." 
 
Those 
"additional 
findings" are recounted in a narrative form.   
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
9 
 
dismiss the charge and/or impose no discipline.  A referee can 
reject a previously accepted no contest plea and recommend 
dismissal of a previously admitted violation.  See In re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Clark, 
2016 
WI 
36, 
368 
Wis. 2d 409, 878 N.W.2d 662 (following attorney's entry of a no 
contest plea to charge in a disciplinary complaint, the referee 
concluded that the OLR had failed to meet its burden of proof 
with respect to that charge).  That is not what the referee has 
done here.  Rather, the report contains conflicting and thereby 
confusing findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether 
Attorney DeLadurantey engaged in offensive personality.  
¶18 The referee's narrative recounting of "additional 
findings" is also problematic.  Most of these additional 
findings pertain to whether Attorney DeLadurantey engaged in 
sexual harassment in violation of SCR 20:8.4(i).  However, the 
OLR 
dismissed 
that 
charge.7 
 
Unaccountably, 
the 
referee 
nonetheless proceeded to make a number of wholly superfluous 
factual 
findings 
regarding 
whether 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
conduct legally constituted sexual harassment.  These findings 
include various credibility determinations that far exceed the 
scope of the complaint, which was the agreed upon basis for 
Attorney DeLadurantey's no contest plea to a violation of the 
Attorney's Oath.  
¶19 In making these additional findings, the referee 
purported to distill what he deems "uncontroverted facts" from 
                                                 
7 See supra at ¶14. 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
10 
 
the voluminous discovery record.  Yet, many of these findings 
are not derived from "uncontroverted facts."  Rather, the 
referee offers his opinion and interpretation of many disputed 
factual events despite the absence of any stipulation or witness 
testimony 
on 
which 
to 
base 
his 
implicit 
credibility 
determinations.  There was no reason for the referee to 
undertake a lengthy legal analysis of a claim that the OLR had 
dismissed, and the expansive scope of the referee's "additional" 
findings of fact far exceed what was necessary to confirm an 
adequate factual basis or to recommend a sanction. Moreover the 
"additional" factfinding resulted in the referee turning the 
tables and blaming the victim seemingly for being present during 
Attorney DeLadurantey's several incidents of inappropriate, 
harassing, offensive, and boorish behavior.  
¶20 We will overturn a referee's factual findings if those 
findings are clearly erroneous.  Several of the referee's 
"additional findings" are also clearly erroneous.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle, 2015 WI 110, ¶41, 365 
Wis. 2d 649, 872 N.W.2d 637. 
¶21 The referee found that Attorney DeLadurantey "asked" 
to escalate the relationship with H.M. in San Francisco.  This 
finding is clearly erroneous.  A law firm owner drunkenly 
groping a subordinate attorney is not a request, nor is getting 
into a subordinate attorney's bed on a business trip without her 
consent.  
¶22 The referee found that Attorney DeLadurantey's sexual 
advances to H.M. in San Francisco were not "unwelcome" and that 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
11 
 
H.M. could not have experienced a hostile or toxic work 
environment based on certain information the referee gleaned 
from the record. This "information" consisted of photographs of 
H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey taken while they stayed at 
"various beach accommodations" on business trips;8 the fact that 
H.M. was well compensated; that Attorney DeLadurantey gave H.M. 
more than the usual amount of professional authority, including 
management consultation; and that after the incident in San 
Francisco, H.M. remained employed at the firm for almost 20 
months.  The referee's apparent assumption that a preexisting 
friendship, pleasant surroundings, or a decent salary precludes 
an employee from being subjected to offensive, hostile, or 
unwelcome conduct by one's boss is clearly erroneous.9  
¶23 Compounding these erroneous "additional findings" is 
the fact that on this record, it was unnecessary for the referee 
                                                 
8 The record contains a number of photos that show Attorney 
DeLadurantey and H.M. and occasionally another firm employee at 
various client locations and vacation spots smiling at a camera. 
None depict any intimate contact.  
9 The referee also found that Attorney DeLadurantey's 
comments to H.M. regarding her dress and use of makeup could not 
support a charge of "offensive personality."  Because we 
determine that the incident in San Francisco, standing along, 
was sufficient to substantiate the offensive personality charge, 
we need not decide whether these allegations, standing alone, 
might also constitute offensive personality.  However, it is 
troubling that the referee scoured the record to independently 
decide that Attorney DeLadurantey's comments to H.M. "appear to 
have been 'couple's banter' made in the context of a private, 
personal 
relationship." 
The 
referee 
then 
engaged 
in 
inappropriate speculation, concluding that the "real" reasons 
H.M. eventually left the firm was due to a "break-up" that the 
referee attributed to tension over H.M.'s frequent vacations.  
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
12 
 
to make them at all.  It appears they stem from the referee's 
incorrect assumption that legally, a violation of SCR 40.15 
(violation of the Attorney's Oath) requires that the attorney's 
challenged 
conduct 
also 
violated 
SCR 
20:8.4(i) 
(sexual 
harassment).10  This is incorrect.  These are separate rule 
provisions.  A violation of SCR 20:8.4(i) is not a required 
element for a violation of the Attorney's Oath, SCR 40.15 
enforced pursuant to SCR 20:8.4(g).  As such, the referee's 
lengthy sexual harassment analysis, including his assessment of 
the "welcomeness" of Attorney DeLadurantey's conduct, and the 
additional findings pertaining to that analysis are misplaced 
and we reject them. 
¶24 The 
referee 
also 
erroneously 
assumed 
that 
the 
discussions 
H.M. 
and 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey 
had 
about 
"boundaries" pertained only to travel housing arrangements.  
However, the record shows that in December 2015, Attorney 
DeLadurantey acknowledged that: 
[T]here was a discussion of the two hand holding 
occasions.  At that time, [H.M.] did indicate she 
wasn't comfortable with it, that he was married, and 
that their mutual faiths . . . wouldn't approve of 
such contact.  [H.M.] indicated that the hand holding 
should 
stop 
before 
something 
happened. 
 
Mr. 
DeLadurantey agreed, apologized for having held her 
hand, and never did it again. 
                                                 
10 The referee queried, "[i]f DeLadurantey's conduct was 
welcome (which, presumably, was the primary basis for [OLR's] 
dismissal of the sexual harassment charge), how could the same 
conduct be offensive?"  (Emphasis in original omitted). 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
13 
 
¶25 The referee also erroneously accuses H.M. of "moving 
the goal posts", that is, being inconsistent with respect to 
permissible "boundaries."  The referee apparently faults H.M. 
because she initially expressed discomfort about staying in a 
shared Airbnb lodging but later she agreed to and approved 
various Airbnb accommodations for business travel.  However, as 
noted above, the record does not support the finding that H.M.'s 
reference to "boundaries" only pertained to travel lodging.  We 
see no evidence that H.M.'s position regarding unwanted sexual 
contact ever changed, nor that she conceded her "boundaries" 
changed.  Therefore, we deem clearly erroneous the referee's 
finding 
that 
H.M. 
"conceded 
the 
goal 
posts 
seemed 
to 
move . . . ."  We accept and affirm only factual findings 1-3 in 
the referee's report.11 
                                                 
11 The first three findings in the referee's report state as 
follows: 
1.  The respondent was licensed to practice law in 
the State of Wisconsin on April 18, 2007. He operates 
his own law firm, located in Brookfield, Wisconsin. 
2.  On May 17, 2020, the respondent entered a plea 
of 
"no 
contest" 
to 
the 
charge 
of 
"offensive 
personality" contained in OLR's Complaint filed on 
September 29, 2020.  Before and at the time the plea 
was entered the respondent was represented by counsel, 
and he fully understood the rights he was waiving by 
entering the plea, as the record of the proceedings 
shows. 
3.  Upon my independent review of the allegations 
contained in the Complaint, I find that the Complaint 
contains an adequate factual basis for the charge of 
"offensive personality." 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
14 
 
¶26 The referee's faulty analysis caused the referee to 
conclude that Attorney DeLadurantey's conduct did not, as a 
matter of law, constitute offensive personality under SCR 40.15 
and SCR 20:8.4(g).  In the referee's view, H.M. and Attorney 
DeLadurantey had a lengthy platonic relationship which involved 
occasionally sharing hot tubs, mutual back rubs, and hand 
holding, which he deemed to be all voluntary, "welcome" conduct.  
The referee thus concludes that the San Francisco incident could 
not have been unwelcome and therefore was not "offensive" as 
that term is used in SCR 40.15.  In short, the referee assumes 
that because H.M. had enjoyed spending time with Attorney 
DeLadurantey and was comfortable with sharing a hot tub at a 
hotel and shoulder rubs12 it was not offensive for Attorney 
DeLadurantey to suggest his employee purchase "lucky trial 
underwear" while they were shopping during a business trip, or 
to drunkenly run his "hands up and down her arms and legs" or, 
after she informed him this overture made her nauseous, to climb 
into her bed a few hours later.  We flatly reject the referee's 
                                                 
12 In her deposition, H.M. testified there were a few 
occasions she asked Attorney DeLadurantey for "a shoulder rub." 
H.M. described this conduct as friendly, not flirtatious.  In 
other words, H.M. did not consider a shoulder rub to be sexually 
suggestive physical contact. 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
15 
 
characterization of these events.13  A subordinate attorney who 
befriends the boss should not be assumed to "welcome" the boss's 
drunken sexual overtures when the employee has unequivocally 
rejected such advances.  
¶27 The referee's analysis fails because a failure to 
abstain from offensive personality under the Attorney's Oath 
does not require that the attorney's conduct constitute sexual 
harassment under SCR 20:8.4(i).  Additionally, it fails because 
the 
referee 
disregards 
the 
critical 
fact 
that 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey was, at all times, H.M.'s employer.14  
¶28 What then is required to constitute a failure to 
abstain from offensive personality under the Attorney's Oath?  
Our profession requires attorneys to maintain certain standards 
of conduct.  See, e.g., SCR 20:3.1; SCR 20:8.4; and SCR 62.02.  
The Attorney's Oath taken by every lawyer when admitted to 
practice requires attorneys to "abstain from all offensive 
personality" and we have disciplined attorneys for failing to do 
                                                 
13 The OLR notes that even if the "welcomeness" of Attorney 
DeLadurantey's conduct is deemed relevant (which it disputes), 
an objective, reasonable and prudent person would have no 
trouble 
ascertaining 
that 
H.M.'s 
consistent 
rejection 
of 
Attorney DeLadurantey's physical advances signaled that those 
attempts were not welcome.  We agree.  The record is clear that 
H.M. 
clearly 
and 
repeatedly 
signaled 
that 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's drunken sexual overtures in San Francisco were 
unwelcome, and any finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous.   
14 Referencing Attorney DeLadurantey's comments about H.M.'s 
appearance, the referee opines, "it is likely that these 
comments were not made to [H.M.] as an employee but were instead 
made 
to 
[H.M.] 
as 
a 
female 
friend 
and 
traveling 
companion . . .."   
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
16 
 
so.15  We have stated, moreover, that an attorney may violate the 
Attorney's Oath by conduct that occurs out of court as well as 
by 
in-court 
conduct. 
 See In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against Johann, 
216 
Wis. 2d 118, 
574 
N.W.2d 218 
(1998).  
However, its application is restricted to conduct that reflects 
adversely on a person's fitness as a lawyer.  Johann 216 
Wis. 2d at 122. 
¶29 The referee is correct that we must take care that the 
term "offensive personality" not be read to include conduct that 
the court, acting on behalf of the state, has no legitimate 
interest in prohibiting.  We also take care to limit the scope 
and application of the Attorney's Oath so that it does not reach 
constitutionally protected conduct or significantly inhibit an 
attorney's exercise of the right of free speech.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sommers, 2012 WI 33, 339 
Wis. 2d 580, 811 N.W.2d 387.  The conduct we regulate by this 
rule transcends mere incivility.  However, the provisions of 
that oath are expressly incorporated into the rules promulgated 
by this court governing the professional conduct of attorneys.  
Under those rules a violation of the Attorney's Oath constitutes 
professional misconduct.  SCR 20:8.4(g). 
¶30 We have previously ruled that sexually inappropriate 
language and conduct may constitute offensive personality in 
                                                 
15 This court has upheld the constitutionality of the 
"offensive personality" phrase in the Attorney's Oath as applied 
to an attorney's professional conduct.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Beaver, 181 Wis. 2d 12, 510 N.W.2d 129 
(1994).  
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
17 
 
various scenarios:  trading surreptitiously taken photographs of 
nude 
minors 
without 
their 
consent, 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Bruckner, 161 Wis. 2d 385, 467 N.W.2d 780 
(1991); using the state's e-mail system to send and receive 
sexually explicit e-mail messages and making inappropriate 
comments to a county employee in a work environment; In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Beatse, 2006 WI 115, 297 
Wis. 2d 292, 722 N.W.2d 385; repeatedly asking a woman divorce 
client explicit questions about her sexual behavior; In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Heilprin, 168 Wis. 2d 1, 482 
N.W.2d 908 (1992); and shouting obscenities at a female client, 
Public Reprimand of Richard L. Jones, No. 1992-17.16   
¶31 Here, the complaint alleges that, during a business 
trip a law firm partner - while intoxicated – made unwelcome 
sexual advances to a subordinate associate which were clearly 
rebuffed, then the same evening the lawyer entered that 
employee's separate bedroom without permission and climbed, 
uninvited, into the employee's bed.  We refuse to ignore such 
behavior on the part of a supervising attorney with a 
subordinate employee.  To do otherwise would condone behavior 
                                                 
16 Electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium. 
wicourts.gov/app/raw/000311.html). 
 
Sexually 
inappropriate 
language and conduct is by no means the only type of behavior 
that can constitute offensive personality under SCR 40.15 and 
SCR 20:8.4(g).  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Blask, 216 Wis. 2d 129, 573 N.W.2d 835 (1998) (lawyer 
committed offensive personality by engaging in a loud physical 
confrontation with a 67-year-old man leaving the register in 
probate's office and, in separate incident, shoving a high 
school basketball referee over a game call). 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
18 
 
that is detrimental to the reputation and integrity of the legal 
profession.  Because of Attorney DeLadurantey's position as 
H.M's supervisor, he put H.M. in an impossible position.  
Additionally, Attorney DeLadurantey held the keys to her 
success.  If she crossed him, she risked professional and 
financial harm.  Attorney DeLadurantey's offensive conduct to 
H.M. in San Francisco, given the context of their employer-
employee relationship, clearly crossed the line separating the 
personal from the professionally offensive, showed a lack of 
trustworthiness 
and 
reflected 
poorly 
on 
his 
professional 
judgment and ability, thereby reflecting adversely on Attorney 
DeLadurantey's fitness to practice law.   
¶32 Accordingly, we accept the referee's Finding #3 that 
that the complaint contains an adequate factual basis for a 
charge of "offensive personality" and his conclusion that the 
allegations in the complaint demonstrate by clear, convincing, 
and satisfactory evidence that Attorney DeLadurantey's conduct 
in San Francisco violated the Attorney's Oath constituting 
offensive personality, in violation of SCR 40.15, enforced 
pursuant to SCR 20:8.4(g).   
¶33 We now consider the appropriate sanction.  We weigh 
the seriousness, nature and extent of the misconduct; the level 
of discipline needed to protect the public; the need to impress 
upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct; and the 
need to deter other attorneys from similar misconduct.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, 269 
Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  Sources of guidance in determining 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
19 
 
appropriate sanctions are:  prior case law; aggravating and 
mitigating factors; and ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur, 2005 
WI 40, 279 Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910. 
¶34 Ironically, Attorney DeLadurantey appears more mindful 
of his own culpability than does the referee, acknowledging that 
his conduct in San Francisco was wrong.  The referee, however, 
suggests that Attorney DeLadurantey's conduct to H.M. merits no 
discipline, citing In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Johns, 
2014 WI 32, 353 Wis. 2d 746, 847 N.W.2d 179 (finding no 
SCR 20:8.4(b) violation despite an attorney's conviction for the 
vehicular homicide of his brother in light of evidence showing 
the exceedingly anomalous nature of the attorney's conduct and 
his 
full 
acceptance 
of 
responsibility 
for 
its 
tragic 
consequences).  Johns was a very different case.  Attorney Johns 
was criminally prosecuted then charged with a violation of SCR 
20:8.4(b), which states that it is professional misconduct to 
commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects.  Attorney Johns was deeply remorseful and had served 
prison time for his conviction.  We concluded that the accident 
did not reflect adversely on John's fitness as a lawyer.  By 
contrast, Attorney DeLadurantey was not criminally charged for 
his misconduct.  His misconduct involved a subordinate employee 
at his law firm and does reflect on his fitness as a lawyer.   
¶35 The referee points to ABA Comment [2] to ABA's Model 
Rule 8.4, upon which SCR 20:8.4 was based, which states: 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
20 
 
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on 
fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving 
fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an 
income tax return.  However, some kinds of offenses 
carry 
no 
such 
implication. 
 
Traditionally, 
the 
distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving 
"moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to 
include offenses concerning some matters of personal 
morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, 
that have no specific connection to fitness for the 
practice of law.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶36 The referee argues this court should overlook Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
conduct 
on 
the 
grounds 
that 
an 
office 
extramarital relationship is not necessarily an offense that 
reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness to practice law.  This 
perspective completely ignores the actual record before us.  
Attorney DeLadurantey made unwanted sexual overtures to a 
subordinate employee on a business trip, and that does reflect 
adversely on his fitness to practice law. 
¶37 The parties both request a private reprimand and the 
referee agreed a private reprimand would be appropriate if we 
decline to dismiss the case or impose no discipline.  The 
collective recommendation reflects an unfortunate historical 
reality.  Under past precedent, a lawyer's sexually offensive 
language and conduct has often received no more than a private 
or public reprimand.  See, e.g., Private Reprimand No. 1991-6 
(private reprimand imposed on lawyer who, while awaiting the 
return of a jury, approached a female law enforcement officer at 
a courthouse and made statements that she interpreted as 
sexually aggressive, later grabbed her shoulders and attempted 
to embrace her, and later approached a different female officer, 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
21 
 
pushed her against a wall and made suggestive and disparaging 
remarks); Private Reprimand No. 2008-38 (private reprimand 
imposed on an attorney who made sexually suggestive comments to 
a co-worker over a period of several years and on one occasion, 
kissed the co-worker without consent); Private Reprimand No. 
2015-2 (imposing private reprimand on attorney who grabbed 
breast of female employee of a bar, made several sexually 
suggestive and offensive comments to her, followed her home, was 
arrested, and charged with fourth-degree sexual assault).  Past 
precedent constrains us to impose no more than a public 
reprimand on Attorney DeLadurantey, but we take this opportunity 
to remind practitioners that we are applying increasing scrutiny 
to attorneys' sexual misconduct.  Compare In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Ritland, 2021 WI 36, 396 Wis. 2d 509, 957 
N.W.2d 540.  We do so because sexual harassment comes at a heavy 
price for victims who can suffer significant psychological 
effects as well as job-related costs, including job loss, 
reputational harm, impairment of professional opportunities, and 
irreparable damage to interpersonal relationships at work.  At 
the risk of redundancy, we emphasize that sexual misconduct by 
attorneys, whether with clients or non-clients, is not taken 
lightly.    Ritland, 396 Wis. 2d 509, ¶39.   
¶38 We turn to the question of costs, which are $20,530.47 
as of November 4, 2021.  Attorney DeLadurantey filed an 
objection to costs, arguing that SCR 22.24(1m) merits reducing 
the costs imposed on him.  Supreme Court Rule 22.24(1m) 
articulates six factors we consider when evaluating a costs 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
22 
 
challenge.  First, we consider the number of counts charged, 
contested, and proven.  In Attorney DeLadurantey's view the 
OLR's "major focus" was the sexual harassment charge that the 
OLR eventually dismissed.  He argues that because the OLR 
dismissed this count, no costs should be assessed in connection 
with the OLR's pursuit of this violation.  Second, we consider 
the nature of the misconduct.  Attorney DeLadurantey says that 
had the offensive personality been the only claim from the 
outset, the costs incurred would have been substantially lower.  
Third, we consider the level of discipline sought by the parties 
and recommended by the referee.  The parties and the referee 
recommended a private reprimand or dismissal.  Fourth, we 
consider 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
cooperation 
with 
the 
disciplinary 
process. 
 
It 
is 
undisputed 
that 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey cooperated throughout the disciplinary process.  
Fifth, we consider prior discipline.  Attorney DeLadurantey has 
no prior disciplinary record.  Finally, we consider "other 
relevant circumstances."  Attorney DeLadurantey contends that 
the "sexual harassment claim was poorly based in fact from the 
start and all costs in furtherance of the OLR's attempts to 
satisfy that claim should not be assessed."  He suggests we 
impose ten percent of the total costs, or $2,053.05. 
¶39 The OLR maintains that the sexual harassment and 
offensive personality claims were intertwined; the OLR's counsel 
spent time concurrently pursuing both.  The OLR reminds us that 
traditionally, costs are not reduced even when a respondent 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
23 
 
prevails on several counts, and cites several cases in support 
of this assertion.   
¶40 We agree with the OLR.  We decline to deviate from our 
long-standing disinclination to apportion costs on the number of 
counts proven or unproven.17  We note, moreover, that the referee 
found the pre-appellate costs to be both reasonable in amount 
and necessarily incurred, stating: 
Having read and made notes on the hundreds of pages of 
exhibits 
provided 
by 
both 
counsel, 
and 
having 
performed many hours of research, I am in a good 
position to assess the work that went into this case.  
I find that the sum of $18,311.47 is reasonable, and 
the costs enumerated were necessarily incurred by the 
[OLR] in this matter. 
¶41 We acknowledge that Attorney DeLadurantey has, by all 
accounts, cooperated completely with this disciplinary matter.  
He entered a no contest plea to offensive personality, but the 
referee undertook a lengthy analysis and issued a problematic 
report, resulting in the OLR's appeal.  The referee billed 
$5,920.74 
for 
the 
time 
spent 
writing 
his 
report 
which, 
unfortunately has delayed and complicated this matter.  We 
reduce the costs billed for writing the report by 50 percent or 
$2,960.37.  We direct Attorney DeLadurantey to pay the remaining 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Eisenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 284, 423 N.W.2d 867 (1988) (declining 
respondent's request to apportion costs according to the number 
of 
misconduct 
counts 
that 
resulted 
in 
determinations 
of 
professional misconduct); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Konnor, 2005 WI 37, 279 Wis. 2d 284, 694 N.W.2d 376 (rejecting 
argument that costs not be assessed because he would have agreed 
to a public reprimand, which the referee ultimately recommended 
as discipline). 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
24 
 
costs 
of 
$17,570.10. 
 
Finally, 
we 
reject 
the 
referee's 
unsupported recommendation that we "seal" this case.   
¶42 IT IS ORDERED that, as discipline for his professional 
misconduct 
and 
violation 
of 
SCR 
40.15, 
enforced 
via 
SCR 20:8.4(g), Nathan E. DeLadurantey is publicly reprimanded. 
¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Nathan E. DeLadurantey shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation $17,570.10 for the costs of this proceeding. 
¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation shall advise this court if Nathan E. DeLadurantey 
fails to comply with all conditions of this order.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
¶45 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J., I concur only in the mandate. 
 
No.  2020AP1616-D.awb 
 
1 
 
¶46 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I considered 
joining only the mandate of this per curiam and writing nothing 
more, as does my colleague Justice Brian Hagedorn.  For me, that 
would accomplish a total disassociation from the opinion's 
discussion, a desired goal.  Ultimately, however, I decided to 
write separately to address some of the blatant infirmities of 
the opinion. 
¶47 First and foremost, I stress that this is a lawyer 
discipline case.  Nevertheless, the majority skews the focus, 
spending more ink on addressing the perceived assumptions and 
conduct of the referee, rather than on the actual conduct of the 
lawyer.  What started out as a case where the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation was seeking only a private reprimand has certainly 
escalated well beyond its modest beginning. 
¶48 Referees serve at the pleasure of the court, as do 
most of the court's appointees.  The undertones of the per 
curiam should issue an alert:  Appointees beware, lest your 
conduct become the focus of future public discussion.  The 
majority's skewed focus sets a dangerous precedent. 
¶49 And speaking of precedent, the majority would have the 
reader believe that Attorney Nathan DeLadurantey is actually 
deserving of greater discipline than a mere public reprimand, 
but its hands are tied.  It asserts that because the court is 
"[c]onstrained by prior precedent, we elect to impose a public 
reprimand rather than a more severe action."  Per curiam, ¶3.  
Nonsense.  One need look only to the recent case of In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Meyer to know that when the 
No.  2020AP1616-D.awb 
 
2 
 
court so desires, it can toss precedent to the wind, ignoring it 
completely.1  The imposition of a public reprimand, one of the 
lowest levels of attorney discipline, appears markedly at odds 
with the court's discussion that takes the referee to task for 
failing to recognize the serious nature of the offense.  Id., 
¶¶34-36.  Its claim that it is constrained by precedent here 
appears disingenuous. 
¶50 After setting forth the facts and the standard of 
review, the per curiam directs its focus on the referee, 
describing his report, among other things, as "internally 
inconsistent."  Id., ¶17.  This brings to mind the adage that 
one can see the splinter in a neighbor's eye, but not the log in 
their own.   
¶51 The per curiam is marred by internal inconsistency.  
Detailing 
some 
of 
the 
cases, 
the 
per 
curiam 
ultimately 
acknowledges that "[w]e have previously ruled that sexually 
inappropriate language and conduct may constitute offensive 
personality."  Id., ¶30.  Yet, at the outset of its discussion, 
the per curiam takes the referee to task for making "wholly 
superfluous 
factual 
findings 
regarding 
whether 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's conduct legally constituted sexual harassment."  
Id., ¶18.  The majority can't have it both ways:  either a 
discussion of sexually inappropriate language and conduct is 
                                                 
1 In a case released only a few weeks ago, In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Meyer, 2022 WI 39, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ___N.W. 2d ___, not only did the court fail to follow 
existing precedent, it failed to cite any precedent whatsoever 
that supported the level of discipline to be imposed. 
No.  2020AP1616-D.awb 
 
3 
 
relevant because it can constitute offensive personality subject 
to discipline, or discussion of it by a referee is "wholly 
superfluous."   Which is it? 
¶52 Because the per curiam is skewed in its focus, 
disingenuous in its claim of being constrained by precedent in 
its choice of the level of discipline to impose, and marred by 
internal inconsistency, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2020AP1616-D.awb 
 
1