Case Title: Rands v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90-89

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rands v. State1991 WY 122818 P.2d 44Case Number: 90-89, 90-90Decided: 09/25/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
STEVEN DeWAYNE RANDS, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). (TWO 
CASES)

 
 
Appeal from the District Court, GoshenCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Defender Aid Program, and Donald F. Carey, Student Intern, for the 
Defender Aid Program, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy 
Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Milo M. Vukelich, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for appellee.

 
 
Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Steven Rands 
appeals from his convictions for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. §§ 6-1-303 (1988) and 6-2-101 (Supp. 1991) and for 
aggravated burglary in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-301 (1988).1

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant presents the 
following issues for our review:

 
 
     I. Whether the 
evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for conspiracy to commit 
murder in the first degree.

 
 
     II. Whether the State 
violated W.R.Cr.P. 15(e)(6) by introducing statements made at a change of plea 
hearing at trial.

 
 
     III. Whether the State 
violated Defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses, by introducing 
out of court statements made by a co-defendant at trial.

 
 

[¶4.]     In the evening of 
November 22, 1989, Karen Head and Michael Head were driving their car to 
Lusk, Wyoming. As they proceeded north on highway 
85, Appellant began following them in his car and drove within one or two feet 
of the rear bumper of their car. Appellant began to pull his vehicle up beside 
the Heads' vehicle as if he were going to pass. Instead, Appellant kept his car 
in a position just short of being parallel with the Heads' vehicle. All of a 
sudden, the passenger in Appellant's car, Gerald Ellett, fired a shot from a 
pistol, striking Mr. Head in the back. Appellant's vehicle passed the Heads' 
vehicle and slowly drove away. Mr. Head was not seriously injured. One day 
later, the police arrested Appellant in Torrington, Wyoming, and searched his car. Among other 
things, the police found a .38 caliber pistol, a flashlight, and a number of 
coins. One of the cartridges in the gun had been fired. On November 25, 1989, 
Mr. and Mrs. James Gamble returned to their home in Torrington, Wyoming, and discovered that it had been 
burglarized. The Gambles reported that a gun, a flashlight, three twenty-dollar 
bills, and a number of coins were missing from their 
house.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant was charged 
with conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and aggravated burglary. Appellant 
initially pleaded not guilty and later attempted to change his plea to guilty. 
The district court refused to accept Appellant's change of plea, however, 
because Appellant failed to provide a sufficient factual basis for the plea. The 
matter continued, and Appellant's case went to trial.

 
 

[¶6.]     At trial, Appellant 
gave the following account of events. Appellant and Ellett were traveling north 
on highway 85 when Ellett saw a woman who looked like his ex-wife in the 
passenger seat of a car. Appellant followed the car while he and Ellett 
discussed Ellett's past relationship and his bitter feelings for his ex-wife. 
Ellett asked Appellant to pull their vehicle up beside the Heads' vehicle so he 
could see if the woman was his ex-wife. Ellett said that he wanted to scare the 
woman, and then Appellant heard the gunshot. Appellant denied having any prior 
knowledge of Ellett's intent to shoot at the car. Appellant also testified that 
he and Ellett went to the Gambles' house and that Ellett went into the house and 
took several items. Appellant claimed that he did not enter the 
house.

 
 

[¶7.]     The jury found 
Appellant guilty of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and aggravated 
burglary. The district court sentenced Appellant to imprisonment at the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary for the remainder of his life for his conviction of 
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and for a minimum of seventeen years 
and a maximum of twenty years for his conviction of aggravated burglary. The 
sentences were to run consecutively.

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellant's first 
argument challenges the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the jury relied 
to convict him of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. To determine if a 
conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, we examine all the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the State. Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478 (Wyo. 
1988).

 
 
"[I]t is not whether the evidence establishes guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but rather whether it is sufficient to form 
the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be 
drawn by the jury when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State.

 
 
* * * * * *

 
 
     "It is not our 
function to weigh the evidence for a determination as to whether or not it is 
sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We have consistently 
held that even though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence 
presented, it is the responsibility of the jury to resolve conflicts in the 
evidence." Broom v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 640, 642 (1985) (citations 
omitted).

 
 

Id. at 487.

 
 

[¶9.]     The elements of 
conspiracy are prescribed in § 6-1-303(a):

 
 
     (a) A person is guilty 
of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons that 
they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime and one (1) or more of them 
does an overt act to effect the objective of the 
agreement.

 
 
In Bigelow v. State, 768 P.2d 558, 561 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1332 
(Wyo. 1977)), 
we stated:

 
 
     "A conspiracy is an 
agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act. The crime of 
conspiracy is complete when an agreement has been made and overt acts performed 
to further the unlawful design."

 
 
The elements of first-degree murder are set out in § 
6-2-101(a):

 
 
     (a) Whoever purposely 
and with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate, any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting 
arrest or kidnapping, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first 
degree.

 
 
To conclude that the evidence is sufficient to form 
the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we must 
examine two questions. First, did Appellant and another person agree to 
"purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt 
to perpetrate, any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting 
arrest or kidnapping," kill a human being? Second, did Appellant or the other 
agreeing person do an overt act to effect the objective of their 
agreement?

 
 

[¶10.]  "[C]ircumstantial evidence can be relied 
on to prove the conspiracy because of the covert nature of the crime itself." 
Bigelow, 768 P.2d  at 563. Likewise, the premeditation and deliberation elements 
of first-degree murder may be inferred from the circumstances. Murry v. State, 
713 P.2d 202 (Wyo. 1986). Malice may be inferred from the 
use of a deadly weapon. Id.; Leitel v. State, 
579 P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1978). Viewed in a light most favorable 
to the State, the record shows that Appellant drove his car up behind the Heads' 
car as it was traveling down the highway at a relatively high rate of speed. 
Appellant followed the Heads within two feet of their vehicle and then slowly 
pulled his vehicle up beside their vehicle. As Appellant maintained that 
position, Ellett fired a shot from a .38 caliber pistol at the Heads' car. The 
bullet went into the passenger compartment of the car and struck Mr. Head. In 
addition, a police officer who interviewed Appellant testified that Appellant 
said Ellett had possession of the pistol at the Gambles' residence and that 
Appellant said he may have told Ellett, preceding the shooting, to "`[b]low that 
motherfucker's head off.'" That evidence is sufficient to support the jury's 
conclusions that Appellant and another person agreed to "purposely and with 
premeditated malice" kill a human being and that Appellant or the other agreeing 
person did an overt act to effect the objective of their 
agreement.

 
 

[¶11.]  Appellant also contends that the district 
court erred when it allowed the prosecution to read statements in the presence 
of the jury which were made by Appellant during his attempt to establish a 
factual basis for a guilty plea. During trial, the following colloquy 
occurred:

 
 
     Q Mr. Rands, do you 
recall testifying under oath at a previous Court appearance that you did in fact 
enter the residence of Mr. Gamble[]?

 
 
     A I take the Fifth 
Amendment on that.

 
 
     Q I would ask the 
Court to instruct the witness to answer the question.

 
 
     THE COURT: Mr. Rands, 
this is not a charge of a crime. I don't know what it is. What do you have first 
of all? Go ahead.

 
 
     MR. FITCH: I have Mr. 
Rands under oath stating, "I left my house, went to that house, and I took three 
$20 bills from the house." And I also have Mr. Rands stating, in response to Mr. 
Kissinger's questions, question, "Mr. [Ellett] entered the home with you at the 
same time you did?" And Mr. Rands stating, "Mr. [Ellett] entered the house and I 
came in."

 
 
     THE COURT: Has Mr. 
Kissinger seen that?

 
 
     MR. FITCH: He has a 
copy of the transcript.

 
 
     THE COURT: Would you 
show it to Mr. Rands, please? Mr. Kissinger, you have a copy of this. Show it to 
Mr. Rands.

 
 
     Q (by Mr. Fitch) 
What's the date on that?

 
 
     A The date on this is 
February 1, 1990. I don't need to see it, Mr. Fitch. Yes, I said 
that.

 
 
     Q You said that under 
oath?

 
 
     A 
Yes.

 
 
     Q Is that 
true?

 
 
     A I believe I stated 
that due to the fact that I was going to get four 2 hour contact visits if I 
pled guilty.

 
 
     Q You lied under oath 
thinking you could get contact visits?

 
 
     A 
Yes.

 
 
At the change of plea hearing, the district court 
found that Appellant failed to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea and 
refused to accept Appellant's plea.

 
 

[¶12.]  W.R.Cr.P. 15(e)(6) 
states:

 
 
     Except as otherwise 
provided in this paragraph, evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a 
plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to 
the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with, 
and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any 
civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. 
However, evidence of a statement made in connection with, and relevant to, a 
plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contendere, or an offer to plead 
guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, is admissible 
in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was 
made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of 
counsel.

 
 
Because Appellant failed to object to the 
admissibility of his prior statements, we must analyze his alleged error under 
our plain error doctrine. W.R.Cr.P. 49(b); W.R.A.P. 7.05; W.R.E. 103(d); Bland 
v. State, 803 P.2d 856 (Wyo. 1990); Bradley v. 
State, 635 P.2d 1161 (Wyo. 1981); Leeper v. 
State, 589 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1979). The determination of whether plain 
error exists depends upon the following three-part test:

 
 
"First, the record must be clear as to the incident 
which is alleged as error. Second, the party claiming that the error amounted to 
plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
violated. Finally, that party must prove that a substantial right has been 
denied him and as a result he has been materially 
prejudiced."

 
 
Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822, 827 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting 
Bradley, 635 P.2d at 1164).

 
 

[¶13.]  Our analysis of Appellant's assertion 
begins and ends with the third prong of the plain error test. We hold that 
Appellant was not materially prejudiced by the admission of the testimony from 
the change of plea hearing. The quoted excerpt from the trial transcript 
indicates that Appellant went into the Gambles' house and took $60 and that 
Appellant lied under oath. Both of those facts were supported by testimony which 
was not related to the change of plea hearing. An officer who interviewed 
Appellant testified that Appellant said he went into the house and took items 
which belonged to the Gambles. The officer also stated that Appellant described 
where items were located inside the Gambles' house. That testimony, in addition 
to the testimony from the officers who searched Appellant's car and found some 
of the Gambles' possessions, including a gun, was sufficient to support 
Appellant's conviction for aggravated burglary.2 See Britt v. State, 734 P.2d 980 
(Wyo. 1987) (holding that a gun taken during a 
burglary satisfies the deadly weapon requirement of § 6-3-301(c)(i)), and Downs 
v. State, 581 P.2d 610 (Wyo. 1978) (holding that possession of stolen 
property is strong evidence of guilt).

 
 

[¶14.]  Appellant asserts that two statements 
made during the trial and one question asked by the prosecutor during the direct 
examination of a witness violated his rights under the confrontation clause of 
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. The first statement which 
Appellant complains about was made by an officer in response to a question by 
Appellant's attorney. Appellant's attorney asked the officer how he found a 
metal box which had been taken from the Gambles' house. The officer said, 
"Through an admission of the other defendant, Gerald [Ellett], who told me that 
he had thrown the box out along Mile Square Road."

 
 

[¶15.]  The statement made in response to a 
question asked by Appellant's attorney is not reversible error. While the 
statement may be hearsay, any error attributable to the district court's failure 
to exclude it or to strike it from the record was invited by Appellant's 
attorney. "Invited errors will not normally be grounds for reversal unless they 
go beyond a pertinent reply or are necessarily prejudicial." Sanville v. State, 
593 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Wyo. 1979). The officer's statement was a 
direct response to the query and, therefore, was no more than a pertinent reply. 
In addition, the statement was not necessarily prejudicial because other 
evidence existed which was sufficient to support Appellant's conviction for 
aggravated burglary.

 
 

[¶16.]  The second statement which Appellant 
complains about occurred during the following dialogue:

 
 
     Q Now, in this 
particular case, you have expressed a belief that [Ellett's] fingerprints were 
not lifted off of anything that you were able to lift?

 
 
     A That's 
correct.

 
 
     Q And that you had an 
explanation for that?

 
 
     A I 
do.

 
 
     Q And what was that 
explanation?

 
 
    
A Well, in subsequent interviews that Undersheriff Murphy and I had with 
Gerald Jones Ellett.

 
 
Appellant's attorney objected to the statement 
referring to interviews with Ellett because he believed that the prosecutor was 
asking the witness to repeat Ellett's statements. The district court sustained 
Appellant's objection and instructed the witness not to testify about what 
Ellett said. As a result, Appellant claims that the district court committed 
reversible error. Appellant has failed, however, to support his position with 
cogent argument or cogent authority. We will not address issues which are not 
supported by cogent argument or cogent authority. Bland, 803 P.2d 856.

 
 

[¶17.]  Appellant also contends that his right to 
confront witnesses against him was violated when the prosecutor asked questions 
of an undersheriff about a pretrial conference the prosecutor had with the 
undersheriff, Appellant, and Appellant's attorney. During the direct 
examination, the prosecutor asked the following question:

 
 
     Q And when we were all 
there talking, there was information out on the table that is not here today, 
including what [Ellett] said, activities that are not within the evidence 
presented at this trial?

 
 
Appellant's attorney did not object to the question, 
and the witness did not reveal the content of Ellett's statements. Once again, 
we apply the plain error doctrine and hold that Appellant is not entitled to a 
reversal because he has failed to show that he was materially prejudiced by the 
question. See Bradley, 635 P.2d 1161.

 
 

[¶18.]  Appellant also contends that his right to 
a fair trial was violated when the prosecutor asked the following question 
during voir dire:

 
 
[W]hat if * * * the guy [a hypothetical co-defendant] 
with the bat, we can't call for him [to] testify, and we can't, if he made a 
statement of any kind, you can't bring that statement in because it is hearsay, 
would you feel that case was woefully inadequate solely because any interview 
process or statement made by the guy with the bat was not brought to your 
attention during the course of the trial?

 
 
Appellant argues that the question was prejudicial 
because the prospective jurors were alerted that a co-defendant existed who made 
statements about Appellant which would not be admissible during his trial. 
Appellant's attorney did not object to the question. 

 
 

[¶19.]  We hold that the question does not give 
rise to plain error. Except for the statement which a witness made in response 
to a question asked by Appellant's attorney, the co-defendant's statements were 
not revealed to the jury, and Appellant has failed to cite an unequivocal rule 
of law which was violated when the prosecutor asked the hypothetical 
question.

 
 

[¶20.]  Finally, Appellant claims that the 
prosecutor made comments during voir dire and during trial which constitute 
plain error. Other than statements previously discussed, Appellant has failed to 
provide record citations for additional comments which serve as the basis for 
this argument. Since the record is not "clear as to the incident which is 
alleged as error," there cannot be plain error. Bradley, 635 P.2d  at 
1164.

 
 

[¶21.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
Appellant was also convicted of escaping by violence in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
§ 6-5-207 (1988), but he has not appealed from that 
conviction.

 
 

2 
Section 6-3-301 provides:

 
 
     (a) A person is guilty 
of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied 
structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with 
intent to commit larceny or a felony therein.

     (b) Except as provided 
in subsection (c) of this section, burglary is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both.

     (c) Aggravated 
burglary is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than five (5) years 
nor more than twenty-five (25) years, a fine of not more than fifty thousand 
dollars ($50,000.00), or both, if, in the course of committing the crime of 
burglary, the person:

(i) Is or becomes armed with or uses a deadly weapon 
or a simulated deadly weapon;

(ii) Knowingly or recklessly inflicts bodily injury 
on anyone; or

(iii) Attempts to inflict bodily injury on 
anyone.

     during which an 
attempt to commit the crime or in which flight after the attempt or commission 
occurred.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Chief Justice, dissenting.

 
 

[¶22.]  Although recognizing that Steven DeWayne 
Rands properly plead guilty to escape and was convicted by adequate evidence of 
at least burglary to join his many prior convictions for the same offense, I 
dissent from the conspiracy to commit first degree murder conviction and the 
life sentence mandatorily resulting as a consequence.

 
 

[¶23.]  In reading and re-reading this record, I 
concur with the trial judge when he initially found from what Rands stated when he tried to plead guilty that he neither 
admitted to the offense nor did the evidence properly demonstrate that the 
conspiracy to kill existed as an offense of attempted murder against the 
victims. Clearly, an offense was committed against the victims without question 
by the passenger in the Rands vehicle, Gerald Dean Ellett, also known as Gerald 
Dean Jones, but this record provides nothing to my satisfaction in its confused, 
antagonistic and psychopathic portrayal of Rands that murder of anyone was 
intended by him.1

 
 

[¶24.]  Rands, 
age thirty-one at the date of the offense and of native American origin, 
commenced his problems at age ten as a product of a troubled household with 
alcoholic parents. His criminal record developed with foster care and juvenile 
placement by the age of fifteen or sixteen and continued with regularity through 
numerous felony convictions and charged and uncharged offenses in a multitude of 
states, including a Texas offense providing a parole time 
technically extended until the year 2030.

 
 

[¶25.]  Rands 
was a life's loser, but I find nothing in this record disputing the central 
consistency of his testimony, no matter how drunk he was at the time of the 
shooting incident, that for him no killing was either planned or 
intended.

 
 

[¶26.]  I remain satisfied, in application and 
general conception, with the burden and method of proof for conspiracy which was 
enunciated in Bigelow v. State, 768 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1989). In Bigelow, a conspiratorial 
offense was committed, e.g., attempted burglary of the Casper Wonder Bar, 
leaving the question relating to the identity of the participants and the 
character of their joint intent and common participation. Here, I lack 
conviction from the record that Rands expected, assisted or conspired to commit 
a random murder which became the substance of wrong for which his life sentence 
results. Further, I do not find the fortress of plain error satisfactory here to 
defend properly against ineffectiveness of counsel. We should not absolve 
introduction of the plea colloquy when rejected by the trial court in initial 
attempt of guilty plea and later introduced into evidence in the succeeding 
guilt determinative trial in contravention of W.R.Cr.P. 15(e)(6), W.R.E. 410 and 
also the constitutional right against self-incrimination guaranteed by Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 11. Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 
1984).

 
 

[¶27.]  Introduction of evidence in this trial 
that Rands had previously entered into plea bargaining and any reference to the 
factual basis could not fail to be highly prejudicial to Rands and emphatically persuasive on the jury. Extreme 
prejudice to jury decision is the specific reason for the explicit evidentiary 
preclusion of W.R.Cr.P. 15(e)(6) and W.R.E. 410 regarding non-completed plea 
bargaining providing that any "statements made in connection with, and relevant 
to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or 
criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer." W.R.Cr.P. 
15(e)(6).

 
 

[¶28.]  W.R.E. 410 states:

 
 
Withdrawn pleas and offers.

 
 
     Evidence of a plea of 
guilty, later withdrawn, or admission of the charge, later withdrawn, or of a 
plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer so to plead to the crime charged or any 
other crime, or of statements made in connection with any of the foregoing 
withdrawn pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal action, 
case, or proceeding against the person who made the plea or 
offer.

 
 

[¶29.]  Case law in review of F.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(6), 
which is operationally the same as W.R.Cr.P. 15(e)(6) and a source of the 
Wyoming rule, is also similar in text to III ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 
§ 14-2.2 (2d ed. 1980) which provides:

 
 
     A plea of guilty or 
nolo contendere which is not accepted or has been withdrawn, and any statements 
made by the defendant in connection with entering such a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere, should not be received against the defendant in any criminal or 
civil action or administrative proceedings, except that such statements may be 
admitted against a defendant in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false 
statement if the statements were made by the defendant under oath, on the 
record, and in the presence of counsel.

[¶30.]  The history of non-admissibility of the 
withdrawn plea predates adoption of either rule and can be found decisively 
starting with Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224, 47 S. Ct. 582, 583, 
71 L. Ed. 1009 (1927) where the court said:

 
 
     The effect of the 
court's order permitting the withdrawal was to adjudge that the plea of guilty 
be held for naught. Its subsequent use as evidence against petitioner was in 
direct conflict with that determination. When the plea was annulled it ceased to 
be evidence. By permitting it to be given weight the court reinstated it pro 
tanto.

 
 
See also the emphatic and authoritative decision in 
State v. Boone, 66 N.J. 38, 327 A.2d 661 (1974).

 
 

[¶31.]  The clear and unquestionable phraseology 
of the criminal and evidentiary rules, W.R.Cr.P. 15(e)(6) and W.R.E. 410, is 
mandatory for rule application but also constitutional in basic intent. The 
propriety and effect of plea bargaining was resolved by the United States 
Supreme Court in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971). The historical derivation of F.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(6) was actually F.R.E. 
410 and the substance of its federal rule predecessor remains similarly restated 
in III ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, supra, § 14-2.2. U.S.C.S. Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 (1991). See also Annotation, Propriety and 
Prejudicial Effect of Showing, in Criminal Case, Withdrawn Guilty Plea, 86 
A.L.R.2d 326 (1962).

 
 

[¶32.]  Not only is the fact of the entry and 
withdrawal or denial of the plea inadmissible, but also statements made in 
connection with the plea.

 
 
     Statements made by a 
defendant in connection with a plea or an offer to plead may not be used 
substantively or for impeachment in any civil or criminal proceeding against the 
person who made the plea or offer.

 
 
2 Weinstein's Evidence § 410[02] (1990) (footnotes 
omitted). See United States 
v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1988) and United States v. 
Herman, 544 F.2d 791, reh'g denied 549 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1977). See also F.R.E. 
410; Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 
228 (1973); and Annotation, When is Statement of Accused Made in Connection with 
Plea Bargain Negotiations so as to Render Statement Inadmissible Under Rule 
11(e)(6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 60 A.L.R.Fed. 854 (1982).2

 
 

[¶33.]  The guilty plea admission before the jury 
in this case was particularly egregious since the trial court in its Rule 15 
Boykin review had earlier determined that the initially attempted guilty plea 
was not sustained by sufficient evidence to be acceptable, Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). When the circumstance and 
some facts relative to the denied plea came into jury trial evidence, it 
occurred in abject violation of both criminal and evidentiary rules and case 
law, although admittedly without objection which, in itself, was a demonstration 
of overt ineffectiveness of counsel.

 
 

[¶34.]  Contemporary analysis of F.R.Cr.P. 
11(e)(6) and its companion rule, F.R.E. 410, is most informatively found in the 
frequently cited cases of Herman, 544 F.2d 791; United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1974); People v. Cole, 195 Colo. 483, 584 P.2d 71, 76 (1978), 
Carrigan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; and Boone, 327 A.2d 661.

 
 

[¶35.]  The thoughtful legal scholarship of 
Justice Carrigan of the Colorado Supreme Court at a time predating Colorado 
adoption of F.R.E. 410 and F.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(6) recognized:

 
 
     No matter what the 
real reason for a bargained guilty plea may be in any particular case, whether 
or not the trial court will accept that plea generally depends on its 
determination that the plea has a "factual basis." Crim.P. 11; section 
16-7-207(2)(f), C.R.S. 1973. Such a determination, in turn, requires the 
defendant or his counsel to satisfy the court that the defendant's conduct 
giving rise to the more serious charges provides an adequate factual predicate 
to support a finding that he is guilty of the crime to which he wants to plead. 
Therefore, regardless of his reasons for negotiating a plea bargain, a defendant 
is placed in the inherently coercive situation of either providing the court 
with that factual basis or having the court refuse to accept his plea and force 
him to trial on the more grave charges. In such circumstances, a defendant may 
feel constrained to state what all in the courtroom expect of him, i.e., 
sufficient facts connecting him to the criminal incident to assure that his plea 
will be accepted. In my opinion, statements made under such compulsion, however 
subtle, cannot be viewed as "voluntary," and therefore their trustworthiness is 
unreliable at best. Hence, such statements should not be admissible at a 
subsequent trial for the offense originally charged.

 
 
* * * * * *

 
 
     The sound public policy 
favoring settlement, rather than trial, of lawsuits should require that 
statements made in connection with settlement or plea bargaining efforts not be 
admissible in evidence at the trial if the settlement efforts fail. This is the 
long-established rule governing attempts to compromise and settle civil 
litigation. McCormick, Evidence 663 (1972); IV Wigmore § 1061 (Chadbourn Ed. 
1972).

 
 
* * * * * *

 
 
     Last, but not least, 
we ought not adopt a procedure so fundamentally unfair as that approved by the 
majority. Normally a defendant will not make a statement, and thus provide 
evidence against himself, but for the State's inducement through a plea bargain. 
Moreover, the trial court's indication that it will refuse to accept the 
bargained plea unless the defendant admits facts sufficiently ensnaring him in 
criminal conduct to provide a "factual basis," amounts to an ultimatum delivered 
to one already under considerable emotional stress. Implicit in the situation is 
the understanding that the defendant's statement is being made solely for the 
court's consideration in deciding whether to accept the tendered plea. In effect 
the statement is extracted as a condition to obtain court approval of the plea 
bargain. When the court rejects the plea bargain and puts the defendant on trial 
on the original charge, it is not fair to allow the State to retain and use 
against the defendant the fruits of the rejected plea bargain. In my view this 
procedure is so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of due process. 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; * * 
*.

 
 
Cole, 584 P.2d  at 77-78 (footnotes omitted), 
Carrigan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 
 

[¶36.]  In Herman, 544 F.2d  at 797, it was 
said:

 
 
The rule's central feature is that the accused is 
encouraged candidly to discuss his or her situation in order to explore the 
possibility of disposing of the case through a consensual arrangement. Such 
candid discussion will often include incriminating 
admissions.

 
 
Ross, 493 F.2d  at 775 provided further 
insight:

 
 
     If, as the Supreme 
Court said in Santobello, plea bargaining is an essential component of justice 
and, properly administered, is to be encouraged, it is immediately apparent that 
no defendant or his counsel will pursue such an effort if the remarks uttered 
during the course of it are to be admitted in evidence as proof of guilt. 
Moreover, it is inherently unfair for the government to engage in such an 
activity, only to use it as a weapon against the defendant when negotiations 
fail.

 
 

[¶37.]  With the two specific prohibitory 
Wyoming rules 
precluding introduction of evidence of either the denied plea or the text of 
statements made, the failure of defense counsel to object is unexplained. Under 
the circumstance of this conspiracy case, the introduction of that 
knowledge to the jury could not have been less than devastating. The devastation 
was anchored by the confused and highly acrimonious testimony, frequently vulgar 
and heavily emotional, by Rands who descriptively communicated his obvious 
hatred for the prosecutor. This evidentiary admission of the prior events in 
violation of the two explicit rules clearly reaches the plain error criteria of 
W.R.Cr.P. 49(b) and cannot be considered to be harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Campbell v. State, 589 P.2d 358 
(Wyo. 1979); United States v. 
Brooks, 536 F.2d 1137 (6th Cir. 1976).

 
 

[¶38.]  The philosophic principle for the 
evidentiary exclusion rule was recognized in Boone, 327 A.2d at 
666:

 
 
The problem with revealing a prior guilty plea to the 
jury is that it is too prejudicial, and it "may induce the jury to become 
reckless in its consideration of the other evidence." State v. Thomson, supra, 
278 P.2d [142] at 150 [(Or. 1954)] (Rossman, J., 
concurring).

 
 
* * * * *

 
 

[¶39.]  The devastating effect of disclosure of a 
prior guilty plea to a jury was discussed by the court in People v. Haycraft, 
[76 Ill. 
App.2d 149, 221 N.E.2d 317 (App.Ct. 1966)]. In concluding that any evidence of a 
withdrawn guilty plea must be excluded, the court 
observed:

 
 
     It is also difficult 
to conceive a disclosure more apt to influence a jury than the information that 
the accused had at one time pled guilty to the commission of the crime with 
which he stands charged. * * * The human mind is not a blackboard from which 
unwanted information can be erased at will. We can think of nothing more 
damaging to an accused in the minds of the jury than the disclosure, however 
brief, that he had admitted guilt . . . and once that disclosure has been made 
we cannot say that he has received the fair and impartial trial to which he is 
entitled. 221 N.E.2d  at 319.

 

[¶40.]  The societal problem with this conviction 
and life sentence is that Rands is directed to 
spend the rest of his life in confinement for an offense he consistently denies 
committing, believing he is subjected to that result by an unfair system and, in 
realistic tenor of the evidence, probably did not intend to commit.3 It is the injustice, not his status 
as a life's loser, that precludes my concurrence in affirming the conviction. I 
also have difficulty with a conviction of conspiracy for both participants where 
the hard factual evidence was actual commission of a crime which was either 
attempted murder or completed aggravated assault. Obviously, defense counsel had 
access to the Ellett/Jones criminal file which was not noticed for judicial 
information and is not available for review in this appeal. Consequently, we are 
not informed about what Ellett/Jones said when his Rule 15 plea colloquy was 
considered and sentence was entered about his night time shooting at the car on 
that country road. In this record, we only find a handwritten statement signed 
by Ellett/Jones that states Rands was not 
responsible for the shooting.

 
 

[¶41.]  I would affirm the burglary conviction 
and reverse the conspiracy conviction to be remanded for retrial on an offense 
which may have been committed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
Ellett/Jones, on June 20, 1990 after the Rands 
conviction, entered a guilty plea to the same offenses, conspiracy to commit 
murder in the first degree and aggravated burglary, and similarly received a 
life sentence on the conspiracy to commit murder charge and a consecutive term 
of ten to thirteen years on the aggravated burglary guilty plea. Consequently, 
both the shooter and the driver were charged with conspiracy and neither was 
charged with the aggravated assault/attempted murder offense actually committed. 
Ellett/Jones was not called to testify at the Rands trial, although two of his 
statements were included in this record indicating he had been coerced into 
untrue accusations against Rands.

 
 

2 
Countervailing authority permitted rebuttal use to impeach the credibility of 
the accused as delineated in Harris v. New 
York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1971). A short answer to the Harris decision is found in comment that the 
current text of F.R.Cr.P. 11 was in part adopted to reverse Harris. 2 
Weinstein's Evidence, supra, § 410[01]. See also F.R.E. 410 and W.R.E. 410 which 
provide an identical admissibility preclusion.

 
 

3 
The length of the sentence, seventeen to twenty years for aggravated burglary, a 
life sentence for conspiracy to commit first degree murder to be served 
consecutively, with a concurrent nine to ten years for attempted escape, is not 
necessarily the issue. Aiding and abetting aggravated assault or a similar 
offense, not to ignore the aggravated burglary for which there was a conviction, 
in conjunction with the previous record of Rands would have sufficed under the 
Wyoming habitual criminal statute, W.S. 6-10-201, to justify a life sentence, 
W.S. 6-10-201(b)(ii). In Wyoming, a life sentence is a life sentence, 
subject only to pardon or commutation. Osborn v. State, 806 P.2d 259, 262 
(Wyo. 
1991).