Case Title: Johnson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 578, 2000

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROGER JOHNSON, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 578, 2000 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. A. Nos. IK99-08-0130, 0133,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  0134, 0137, 0138. 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  April 9, 2002 
Decided:  June 18, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 18th day of June 2002, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
1) 
In May 2000, a Superior Court jury convicted Appellant Roger 
Johnson of two counts of Robbery in the First Degree, two counts of Possession of 
a Firearm During Commission of a Felony and one count of Conspiracy in the 
Second Degree.  The jury acquitted Johnson of two additional counts each of 
Robbery in the First Degree and Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a 
Felony.  On June 23, 2000, the State filed a Motion to Declare Defendant an 
Habitual Offender.  On November 9, 2000 Johnson filed a document entitled 
“Motion to Declare 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) Unconstitutional or in the Alternative to 
 
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Declare 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) Not Applicable to This Defendant.”1  On November 
15, the trial judge denied Johnson’s motion and declared him an habitual offender.  
The judge then sentenced Johnson to a mandatory minimum of eighty years to be 
served at Level V supervision.  This is Johnson’s direct appeal of his conviction 
and sentence. 
 
2) 
On July 31, 1999, Appellant Roger Johnson (Roger) traveled to Dover 
with two of his cousins, John Johnson (John) and Ronald Bacon, as well as a third, 
unrelated individual, Larry Johnson (Larry).  At trial, the State presented evidence 
that, once in Dover, the three Johnsons robbed Eric Tilghman, Darryl Langston, 
and Jermaine Jones at gunpoint and, soon after, robbed and shot at close range a 
fourth individual, Bennie Murphy.  There was conflicting testimony about whether 
Roger was actually involved in the robberies and shooting.  Both John and Larry 
entered into plea agreements for charges stemming from these incidents.  In 
addition, at the time of his guilty plea, John had also been charged with Capital 
Murder in New Castle County for an unrelated attack in Wilmington. 
 
3) 
At trial, the State offered Bacon’s videotaped statement as affirmative 
evidence under Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 3507.  Among the requirements for the 
admission of an out of court statement under this provision is that the declarant 
have made the statement voluntarily.  It is clear from the record that, after 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 4214 is Delaware’s Habitual Offender Statute. 
 
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receiving a Miranda warning, Bacon conditioned his agreement to make a 
statement on the basis that he not be recorded.  The officer interrogating him 
showed him that an audio recorder on the table was switched off.  That officer did 
not, however, inform Bacon that he was being recorded by a hidden surveillance 
system.  We have held that a statement given subject to certain conditions is not 
admissible because it violates Miranda unless those conditions have been met.2   
4) 
Here, the State did not introduce Bacon’s statement against his 
interests, but as evidence against Roger.  To be introduced for this reason, the 
statement must have been given voluntarily.  For purposes of ruling on the 
voluntary nature of a Section 3507 statement, we have found that the trial judge 
must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the declarant made the 
statement voluntarily.3  To arrive at a finding on this issue, a trial judge must 
consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the declarant’s will “was 
so overborne that the statements produced were not the product of rational intellect 
and free will.”  At trial, Bacon admitted on voir dire that he made the statement 
voluntarily.  Moreover, the record reveals that the trial judge indeed reviewed the 
statement in the totality of the circumstances and found that Bacon did speak 
voluntarily.  Because there are sufficient facts in the record to support his 
conclusions, we will not disturb that ruling. 
                                                 
2 Draper v. State, Del. Supr., No. 147, 2000, Berger, J. (January 28, 2002). 
3 Hatcher v. State, 337 A.2d 30, 32 (Del. 1975). 
 
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5) 
Roger contends that the trial judge erred by refusing to allow 
questioning during John’s direct testimony on the minimum and maximum 
sentences John faced before he entered into a plea bargain.  In this instance, Roger 
had little need to impeach John’s credibility because John, called as a defense 
witness, testified almost entirely beneficially to Roger’s case.  The sole exception 
seems to have been testimony concerning John’s guilty plea to a charge that he 
criminally conspired with Roger.  On direct examination, John testified that he, in 
fact, had conspired with Larry, not Roger.  D.R.E. 607 permits Roger to impeach 
his own witness.  Thus, the trial judge properly allowed testimony about the 
generally favorable terms of the plea agreement to support the defense theory that 
John pled to a factually incorrect charge because of the benefit he derived from the 
deal.   
6) 
The judge’s narrowly tailored ruling precluded only the discussion of 
the actual minimum and maximum sentences because they were nearly identical to 
those faced by Roger himself.  We have warned of the possibility that knowledge 
of potential sentences may interfere with the proper functioning of the jury’s 
deliberative role.4  In light of this, we find that the trial judge correctly weighed the 
potential for the sentencing information to prejudice Roger or the State against its 
probative value to Roger’s case.  We conclude that the trial judge acted well within 
                                                 
4 Kauffman v. State, 452 A.2d 945, 947 (Del. 1982). 
 
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his discretion to exclude this testimony under D.R.E. 403.  The carefully tailored 
ruling properly allowed Roger’s counsel to examine John about the reasons for the 
discrepancy between his statements and present to the jury those reasons along 
with favorable inferences that could be taken from them without improperly 
introducing the range of punishment that Roger, like John, could potentially face. 
7) 
At trial, Roger’s counsel also attempted to introduce into evidence the 
record of Larry’s plea agreement even though Larry did not testify.5  In general, the 
courts allow the introduction of evidence of criminal conduct only for the purpose 
of attacking the credibility of a witness.  Here, Roger sought to introduce this 
testimony to bolster John’s testimony that he had conspired with Larry.  In light of 
the fact that the State’s case rested on a conspiracy among all three Johnsons, 
Larry’s plea of guilty has, at best, only marginal relevance to the question of 
Roger’s guilt.   Indeed, it does nothing to prove or disprove Roger’s involvement 
in the robberies and shooting at issue in this case.  Given the minimal aid that 
document could provide the jury in this case, we cannot find that the trial judge 
abused his discretion when he determined that the potential prejudice arising from 
the jury being aware of Roger’s potential sentence substantially outweighed the 
probative value of that information. 
                                                 
5 As with John, Larry entered a guilty plea on substantially the same charges as those on which 
the jury convicted Roger.   
 
6
8) 
Finally, Appellant argues that Delaware’s habitual offender statute is 
unconstitutional because the statute lacks guidelines for its application by the State 
and that it removes sentencing from the discretion of the Court, violating both the 
Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  This argument is without merit.  In Reeder v. State,6 
and more recently in Hawkins v. State7 we reaffirmed our view that the State has 
the discretion to seek habitual offender status for each count or none.  The State 
may constitutionally exercise its prosecutorial discretion to seek an enhanced 
sentencing in the absence of an arbitrary or capricious application.8  The record 
before us does not support such an allegation here. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court be, and hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_/s/ Myron T. Steele__________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
                                                 
6 783 A.2d 124, 2001 WL 355732 (Del. 2001) (Steele, J., order). 
7 792 A.2d 189, 2002 WL 384436 (Del. 2002) (Walsh, J., order). 
8 Ward v. State, 414 A.2d 499 (Del. 1980) (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 
L.Ed.2d 446 (1962).