Case Title: Lankford v. True Ranches, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91-82

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lankford v. True Ranches, Inc.1991 WY 170822 P.2d 868Case Number: 91-82Decided: 12/23/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
JON 
T. LANKFORD, JON ENGRAM LANKFORD, AND SARAH ROSE LANKFORD, BY AND THROUGH THEIR 
NEXT FRIEND, JON T. LANKFORD, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

TRUE 
RANCHES, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, AND TRUE RANCHES, A PARTNERSHIP, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District Court, 
PlatteCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

 Robert 
R. Rose, Jr., and Robert R. Rose, III, of Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, 
Cheyenne, for appellants.

Richard 
E. Day and Stuart R. Day, of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ., and ROONEY, J., Retired.

ROONEY, 
Justice, Retired.

 [¶1.]     In this appeal from a 
summary judgment entered against them in the district court, appellants word the 
issues on appeal:

"I. 
Is True Ranches, a partnership, a `contributing employer' as contemplated by 
W.S. § 27-12-103(a), of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, and Article 10, § 
4 of the Wyoming Constitution, and therefore immune from suit for 
negligence?

"II. 
Does a genuine issue of material fact exist as to whether True Ranches, a 
partnership, negligently injured Plaintiff-Appellant Jon T. 
Lankford?

"III. 
Does a genuine issue of material fact exist as to whether Plaintiff-Appellant 
Jon T. Lankford was wrongfully terminated from his employment with True Ranches, 
a partnership?

"IV. 
Were the claims of the minor children concerning parental consortium properly 
disposed of by summary judgment?"

Appellees 
word them:

"I. 
Is True Ranches, a partnership, entitled to immunity as an employer in 
accordance with the provision of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act and the 
Wyoming Constitution and the case law thereunder?

"II. 
Did the district court correctly find that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact that plaintiff Jon Lankford was an `at-will' employee of True 
Ranches and that, as such, he could be discharged for any reason or no reason at 
all?"

 [¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 [¶3.]     As reflected in the 
issues formulated by appellants in their brief and argued before this court, 
they have abandoned any claim against appellee True Ranches, Inc., a Wyoming 
corporation, since appellant Jon T. Lankford (hereinafter referred to as "Jon") 
was employed at the time of his injury only by appellee True Ranches, a 
partnership (hereinafter referred to as "True").

 [¶4.]     On September 9, 1986, 
while in the employ of True, Jon was injured when he caught his hand in an auger 
machine while grinding corn. He had opened a sliding door on the machine to 
check the flow of corn when he was distracted by the fighting of two dogs behind 
him. As he turned around he fell backwards and his left hand went into the 
machine through the open sliding door. The auger severed three of his fingers 
and otherwise cut and incapacitated the hand.

 [¶5.]     The resulting medical 
expenses were paid through Worker's Compensation. Jon recuperated for a 
substantial period of time. When he did report to True for work, he was told 
that his employment had been terminated.

IMMUNITY

 [¶6.]     An employer's immunity 
from liability for injuries to employees incurred during employment is 
established by Article 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution; which states in 
pertinent part:

"The 
right of each employee to compensation from the [Worker's Compensation] fund 
shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any and all rights of action 
against any employer contributing as required by law to the fund in favor of any 
person or persons by reason of the injuries or death."

 [¶7.]     The implementing 
statute, Wyo. Stat. § 27-12-103(a) (1977), which was in effect at the time of 
Jon's injury, provided in pertinent part:

"The 
rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee and his dependents for 
injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights 
and remedies against any employer making contributions required by this act, * * 
*."

(The 
statutory language was amended effective July 1, 1987, to insert after the word 
"employee," the words "including any joint employee," and to insert after the 
word "employer," the words "and any joint employer." It is now contained in Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-104 (1991).

 [¶8.]     In a very recent case, 
Clark v. The Industrial Company of Steamboat 
Springs, Inc., 818 P.2d 626, 629 (Wyo. 1991), we said in 
part:

"The 
immunity provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act are to be narrowly 
construed. Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield 
Company, 742 P.2d 198, 200 (Wyo. 1987), appeal after remand 773 P.2d 158 
(1989). An entity asserting the defense of immunity under the worker's 
compensation statute must establish that it is (1) an employer, (2) who pays 
into the worker's compensation fund, (3) as required by law. See Stratman v. Admiral Beverage 
Corporation, 760 P.2d 974, 979 (Wyo. 1988); Fiscus, 742 P.2d  at 
200."

 [¶9.]     As already noted, 
appellants acknowledge True was Jon's employer at the time of the injury, and 
the uncontradicted affidavit and deposition testimony before the trial court 
reflected that True made the required payments through a combination fund. 
Appellants contend, however, that the third requirement for immunity was not met 
inasmuch as the payments were not "as required by law." They argue that the law 
requires payment to be made either (1) in conjunction with a "joint employer," 
or (2) by the employer itself, and that True's payments were not here made in 
either fashion.

 [¶10.]  Without addressing the validity of the 
contention that the law requires payments to be made in one of the two listed 
methods, appellants are wrong in contending that the payments were not made by 
the employer itself. They are correct that Jon's employment was not "joint." He 
was employed by only one employer, i.e., True, and his work was controlled only 
by that employer. As defined in Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102(a)(xix) and (xxi) 
(1991):

"(xix) 
`Joint employer' means any person, firm, corporation or other entity which 
employs joint employees, is associated by ownership, commonly managed or 
controlled and contributes to the worker's compensation account as required by 
this act;

* 
* * * * *

"(xxi) 
`Joint employee' means any person:

(A) 
Who has an express or implied contract for employment with more than one (1) 
joint employer at the same time;

(B) 
Whose work is controlled by more than one (1) joint employer; 
and

(C) 
Who is engaged in the performance of work for more than one (1) joint 
employer."

 [¶11.]  The special statutory provisions for 
"joint" employees are necessary because of the difficulty in ascertaining the 
responsible account in event of injury to one employed by two or more employers 
at the same time. The same difficulty does not exist when the employment is by a 
single employer for whom the work is done and who controls the performance of 
the work.

 [¶12.]  As a bookkeeping procedure, and in the 
interest of efficiency and economy, it has long been recognized that employers 
under common ownership and control can submit the necessary reports and payments 
to the Division under one account. Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-202(d) (1991) provides in 
pertinent part:

"Any employer or joint employer contributing 
as required by this act and employing employees or joint employees covered by 
this act who elects to report the payrolls under one (1) consolidated Wyoming 
worker's compensation account shall be treated as a single employer for all 
purposes of this act."1 (Emphasis 
added.)

 [¶13.]  True made that election. It must be 
treated as having made the necessary contributions itself. But even without the 
provision in the statute, payments were obviously made by True itself. It did 
not deliver the payments in person or personally place them in the mail. The 
payment money may not have come directly from True's pocketbook any more than it 
would if True had borrowed money from a bank with which to make the payments, or 
if an independent accountant or bookkeeper was keeping True's records and 
submitting the reports and payments for it. The record reflected that True's 
reports and payments were made and submitted by True Drilling Company, together 
with that of other entities under the common control of the True family. True 
reimbursed the drilling company for the amount paid on its behalf. Thus, the 
payments were made by True.

 [¶14.]  Whether "employer" is considered to be 
True alone or is considered to be the account group of which True is a member 
(treated as a single employer per Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-202(d) quoted supra), the reports and contributions 
were made as required by the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act.

 [¶15.]  Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102(a) (1991) provides 
in pertinent part:

"(xx) 
`Employer making contributions required 
by this act' means the employee's employer and any joint employer when the 
employer or any joint employer reports the employee's wages to the division on 
an account or through a consolidated worker's compensation account and 
contributions are made to the fund as required by this 
act;

* 
* * * * *

"(xxii) 
`Consolidated Wyoming worker's 
compensation account' means an account maintained by the Wyoming workers' 
compensation division to which an employer reports the wages of its employees 
and joint employees for its own account and the account of its joint employers, 
pursuant to which contributions are made to the fund as required by this act 
[.]"

 [¶16.]  The payments were made as required by 
law, i.e., they were in the amount required for the different classifications of 
employees; the required employment data was furnished; classification of 
employees, names of employees, employment dates, social security numbers, wages, 
etc. were furnished; the designated forms were used; and, the specific employer 
of each employee was indicated. The reports were certified or affirmed by one 
having knowledge of the payrolls as required by Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-202(a).

 [¶17.]  From a practical standpoint, there is 
nothing negative about the use of a combined account as done here. It is simply 
a bookkeeping procedure. It is in accord with the constitutional and statutory 
purpose of worker's compensation. In this instance, it worked. The Worker's 
Compensation Division was advised that Jon was employed by True and payment was 
made into the fund in the proper amount required for his classification. Jon 
received the medical services for which worker's compensation exists. Combined 
accounts save labor and expense for the Worker's Compensation Division. The use 
of a combined account is not new. Other employers pay through a combined 
account. Entities under common control of the True family, with consent and 
approval of the Division, established a combined account with the Division as 
long ago as 1977. On December 9, 1983, True (appellee partnership) made 
application to be included in the True family combined account. The Division 
accepted and approved the inclusion, and payments have been made accordingly 
since that time.

 [¶18.]  The trial court properly found there was 
no issue of a material fact with reference to the existence of True's immunity 
in this case and that True should have judgment on this issue as a matter of 
law.

NEGLIGENCE 
AND CLAIMS OF DEPENDENTS

 [¶19.]  Appellants' claims for relief based on 
negligence must fail since True is afforded immunity against such 
claims.

DISCHARGE

 [¶20.]  In its decision letter, the trial court 
found Jon to have been an "at will" employee of True, and "as such, he could be 
discharged for any reason or for no reason at all." Jon's employment was "at will" since the record reflected 
the nonexistence of a contract with definite terms of employment. The trial 
court correctly stated the law. An "at will" employment may be terminated at any 
time for any reasons or for no reason at all by either party. Casper National Bank v. Curry, 51 
Wyo. 284, 65 P.2d 1116 (Wyo. 1937); Allen 
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 
1985); Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. 
Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985); Nelson v. Crimson Enterprises, Inc., 777 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 
1989) and cases cited therein.

 [¶21.]  It is violative of public policy to 
discharge an employee for exercising his rights under the worker's compensation 
statutes, and an employee has available a claim for relief if such is done. Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of 
Delaware, 776 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 
1989).

 [¶22.]  Jon's claim for relief would be valid if 
there were no other legitimate reason for the termination. In this case, that 
before the trial court reflected that True had made the decision to discharge 
Jon prior to the accident. Additionally, Jon would not have been able to perform 
the work if his employment had been continued. In their brief, appellants 
acknowledge that subsequent to the accident "[t]he plaintiff was able to 
approach the general mill area, but was unable to get close to the actual grain 
bin where the accident occurred. He broke down and wept, and had to be 
physically removed from the vicinity of the bin." Such would indicate that the 
termination was because of Jon's inability to do the work and not because he 
exercised his rights under the worker's compensation statutes. Also, Jon's 
injuries prevented a return to work for over 18 months. True could not be 
expected to hold the position open that long. Thus, True had logical reasons 
having nothing to do with the exercise of Jon's worker's compensation rights for 
termination of Jon's employment. There was nothing before the trial court to 
indicate True did other than expect Jon to receive the benefits of the worker's 
compensation law and nothing to indicate the termination was because Jon 
exercised his rights to benefits. There is a distinction between a termination 
for the exercise by the worker of his rights under the worker's compensation law 
and a termination for inability to do the work, even if such inability is caused 
by an accident requiring the exercise of worker's compensation rights. The 
disability and partial disability benefits of the worker's compensation law are 
in recognition of this distinction.

 [¶23.]  The summary judgment on this issue was 
proper, since there was nothing before the trial court to indicate the 
termination to have been wrongful because of a violation of public 
policy.

 [¶24.]  Affirmed.

1 The procedure was recognized in Stratman v. Admiral Beverage 
Corporation, 760 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1988).