Case Title: City of Cheyenne v. Simpson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-10

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-02-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
City of Cheyenne v. Simpson1990 WY 17787 P.2d 580Case Number: 89-10Decided: 02/15/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
CITY OF 
CHEYENNE,

 APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

ALBERT N. SIMPSON AND 
LUCILLE SIMPSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND 

D/B/A S-H BUILDING 
COMPANY, 

APPELLEES 
(PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Alexander K. 
Davison, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Rhonda Sigrist 
Woodard of Hanes, Burke & Woodard, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
appellees.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and HARTMAN, District 
Judge.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      Claiming improper 
jury instructions, the City of Cheyenne (City) appeals the verdict finding it 
liable for $61,273 in property damages caused by a city employee's negligent 
operation of a city motor vehicle during the severe thunderstorm which struck 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, on August 1, 1985.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      The City states 
these issues:

1. Did the trial court 
err in submitting this case to the jury with Instructions 8, 13, 14 and 
15?

2. Did the trial court 
abuse it's [sic] discretion and therefore err in not granting Defendant's 
post-trial motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and a New 
Trial?

3. Was it plain error for 
the Court to submit this case to the jury with Instruction 8 which adopts the 
position that the presence of the logo of the City of Cheyenne on a dump truck 
creates a rebuttable presumption that the driver was within the scope of his 
duties as defined by W.S. 1-39-103?

[¶4]      Appellees 
(Simpsons) respond with the following issues:

I. The trial court 
properly instructed the jury regarding the presumptions which were permissible 
from the seal on the vehicle which caused damage to appellee's 
property.

II. The instructions 
regarding the city ordinances and the effect of violations thereof were proper. 

III. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in not granting the City of Cheyenne's motions for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.

IV. There was no plain 
error by the court in submitting the case to the jury on the 
instructions.

FACTS

[¶5]      Albert N. Simpson 
and his wife Lucille Simpson owned the Deming Building located at the southwest 
corner of Seventeenth Street and Central Avenue in Cheyenne, Wyoming. On August 
1, 1985, a severe thunderstorm struck the city, causing more than two feet of 
water to accumulate and flow in the downtown streets.1 That evening a dump truck, bearing 
the City of Cheyenne emblem on its doors, drove south on Central Avenue, causing 
a large wave of water to strike and break a ground floor window of the Deming 
Building. Water flowed through the broken window into the building and damaged 
property in the building.

[¶6]      On December 31, 
1987, the Simpsons sued the City for property damages, alleging that a city 
employee had negligently operated a city dump truck at the time and place in 
question. The City answered, generally denying negligence and raising certain 
affirmative defenses. In the final pretrial conference order, the trial court 
required the parties to submit proposed jury instructions at least five days 
before the trial. Both parties complied.

[¶7]      At trial the 
Simpsons put on their case-in-chief and then rested. The City moved for a 
directed verdict, claiming the Simpsons had failed to present evidence 
identifying the driver of the vehicle bearing the City's emblem, thus failing to 
present evidence from which the jury could find negligence on the part of the 
City. The trial court denied that motion. The City called no witnesses and 
rested.

[¶8]      The trial court 
held an instructions conference with counsel for the parties, at which it 
presented a set of jury instructions numbered one through eighteen, including 
the verdict form. In the course of that conference the City objected to 
Instructions No. 8, 13, 14, and 15. We will identify those instructions and the 
City's objections to them in more detail in the analysis section of this 
opinion.

[¶9]      The jury returned 
its verdict in favor of the Simpsons. Following entry of the judgment, the City 
then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. In its 
motion the City claimed the trial court had erred in giving Instructions No. 8, 
9, 13 and 14. The motion was denied; this appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard 
of Review

[¶10]   This court's approach in reviewing 
alleged improper jury instructions is well settled. W.R.C.P. 51 states in 
pertinent part: "No party may assign as error the giving * * * an instruction 
unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict 
stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection." See Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1288-89 (Wyo. 1985), and 
cases cited therein. "We assume that juries follow their instructions and 
understand them." Id. at 1295 n. 17. A party's objection to an instruction is 
insufficient if it merely states that the instruction is not complete or an 
accurate statement of the law. Condict v. Whitehead, Zunker, et al., 743 P.2d 880, 885 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶11]   Assuming a party has both timely 
and distinctly objected at trial so as to preserve the alleged error on appeal, 
that party must show prejudicial error. The record must show that substantial 
rights were affected. That means that appellant must show "a reasonable 
possibility that, in the absence of error, the verdict might have been more 
favorable" to the appellant. Condict, 743 P.2d  at 885; W.R.A.P. 7.04. In Condict 
this court considered five factors for measuring the degree of error that will 
be found prejudicial: 

(1) The extent to which 
there is conflict in the evidence on critical issues; (2) whether or not the * * 
* argument to the jury may have contributed to the instruction's misleading 
effect; (3) whether or not the jury requested a re-reading of the erroneous 
instruction or of related evidence; (4) the closeness of the jury's verdict; and 
(5) the effect of other instructions in curing the error.

Condict, at 886 
(quoting 1 California Forms of Jury Instruction, Procedures and Instructions § 
1.13[3] (1987)).

[¶12]   If there is failure to timely and 
distinctly object to a jury instruction at trial, this court will review an 
alleged improper instruction only if plain error exists. Goggins, 704 P.2d  at 
1289; see W.R.A.P. 7.05. In Goggins this court reviewed the elements of the 
plain-error rule:

(1) that the record 
reflects clearly and unequivocally the fact complained of; (2) that the facts 
prove a transgression of a clear rule of law; (3) that the error affects a 
substantial right of the [appellant]; and (4) that the [appellant] has been 
materially prejudiced by that violation.

Goggins, at 1291 
(quoting Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220, 224 (Wyo. 1984)).

[¶13]   With the above standards of review 
in mind, we turn to the City's assignments of error.

II. Instruction No. 
8 - Presumptions Based on City Emblem on Truck

[¶14]   Instruction No. 8 read as 
follows:

     The presence of the 
seal or logo for the City of Cheyenne on a vehicle raises a presumption that the 
vehicle is owned by the City of Cheyenne, and that the driver of the vehicle is 
an employee of the City of Cheyenne acting within the scope of his employment. 
In order to rebut the presumption, the City of Cheyenne has the burden of 
proving that it did not own the vehicle or the driver was not an employee of the 
City.

The City stated 
its objection in this way:

     Your Honor, as to the 
instructions that the court is going to give, I have objection as to Instruction 
No. 8. My objection to Instruction No. 8 is that all the cases cited by the 
plaintiff in her brief, and to the ones noted on the proposed instructions, on 
the issue of the logo, without exception these cases all identify the driver of 
a vehicle, with a logo or decal on the side. The issue in those cases is whether 
or not the employee at the time of the accident or occurrence was acting as the 
agent of the employer. Many of those cases are after hours or Sunday-type 
situations. I believe that if the Wyoming Supreme Court were faced with this 
case, where the driver has not been identified, I don't believe that Instruction 
No. 8 sets forth the proper law with respect to the driver, just because there 
was a logo on the side.

     Additionally, Your 
Honor, the Wyoming governmental claims act provides that a municipality can be 
held liable for the acts of its employees while acting and during the course and 
scope of their employment. There has been no identification of this individual, 
whether or not he was an employee of the city driving the vehicle. There is no 
lawsuit against the City of Cheyenne naming its employee, a John Doe or a Jane 
Doe or otherwise, and I don't believe that the proper parties are before this 
court in this regard, and the instructions do not clarify that 
issue.

[¶15]   Measuring that objection against 
the law's requirement, that a party must state distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds of his objection, we find that objection to be 
deficient. The City's objection amounts to nothing more than a naked claim that 
the instruction is not complete or an accurate statement of the law. That type 
of an objection is legally deficient. Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d 1307, 1312 
(Wyo. 1975). Since the City's objection was legally deficient, the instruction 
became the law of the case. Goggins, 704 P.2d  at 1289. In passing we note that 
the case law in a number of jurisdictions supports the court's giving of an 
instruction of this kind. See Annotation, Presumption and Prima Facie Case as to 
Ownership of Vehicle Causing Highway Accident, 27 A.L.R.2d 167, 185-88 (1953); 
Carrazana v. Coca Cola Bottling Company, 375 So. 2d 345, 346 (Fla.App. 1979) and 
cases cited therein; McDougall v. Glenn Cartage Co., 169 Ohio St. 522, 160 N.E.2d 266, 269 (1959).

[¶16]   The City urges us to find plain 
error in the court's giving of the instruction. In this regard, the City claims 
the instruction should have told the jury that the City could rebut the 
presumptions raised by the City emblem by presenting evidence that the driver of 
the vehicle was not acting within the scope of employment. The City concedes it 
failed to raise this below. We do not find plain error on this ground for 
several reasons. First, at trial the City presented no evidence. Next, the City 
speciously asserts that the jury could have inferred from the testimony of one 
of the Simpsons' witnesses that the driver of the vehicle bearing the City 
emblem was on a "frolic and detour" when the incident happened since the driver 
stopped to drop off a passenger.

[¶17]   In light of Instruction No. 9, 
which informed the jury that the City's liability depended on a negligent 
employee's acting within the scope of his duties in the operation of a vehicle, 
we are not persuaded that the jury was misled or confused. Since we assume a 
jury reads, understands and follows instructions, we think the jury knew that 
the City could rebut the presumptions raised by showing the vehicle driver was 
not acting within the scope of his duties. Instruction No. 9 had a curative 
effect. Condict, 743 P.2d  at 883-84.

[¶18]   The City also asserts that 
Instruction No. 8 failed to inform the jury of the distinction between "scope of 
employment" and "scope of duties" revealed in Milton v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 372, 
377 (Wyo. 1988). Milton, however, had not been decided when this dispute between 
the Simpsons and the City was tried. Considering Instructions No. 8 and 9 
together, we are satisfied the jury was properly instructed in this 
case.

III. 
Instructions No. 13, 14 and 15

[¶19]   Instruction No. 13 told the jury 
that violation of an ordinance is evidence of negligence. Instruction No. 14 
told the jury that under a city ordinance a vehicle operator shall drive 
carefully and prudently, having regard for attendant circumstances. Instruction 
No. 15 told the jury that under a city ordinance a vehicle operator shall 
operate at a rate of speed which is reasonable and prudent, having regard for 
existing special traffic, road and weather conditions. In his trial objection to 
these instructions the City's counsel said

[t]he City * * * cannot 
be found guilty of a violation of a traffic law, only its employees can violate 
a traffic law, and again the employee has not been identified as John Doe or 
otherwise in this action and the giving of these instructions would cause the 
jury to find that the city is guilty of a traffic law.

We find that 
objection legally deficient for the same reasons stated earlier. Since 
Instruction No. 8 became the law of the case, the City's argument linking 
alleged errors in that instruction with Instructions No. 13, 14, and 15 fails. 
The City does not support its claim of plain error with respect to these 
instructions with either cogent reasoning or legal authority. Consequently, we 
find the City's argument meritless. Condict, 743 P.2d  at 885.

[¶20]   In conclusion, we find the trial 
court did not err in giving the questioned instructions to the jury nor abuse 
its discretion in denying the City's post-trial motions which were based on 
those instructions.

[¶21]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 That thunderstorm was 
described in Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 
1987).