Case Title: Matter of Adoption of G.A.R.

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-90-8

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Adoption of G.A.R.1991 WY 60810 P.2d 113Case Number: C-90-8Decided: 04/23/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
ADOPTION OF, G.A.R., J.E.R., A.S.R., and J.R.R. E.R., Petitioner (Respondent 
below),

v.

L.T. and E.M.T., 
Respondents (Petitioners below). No. C-90-8

Appeal from the Supreme 
Court, Rooney, J.

Affirmed.

John M. Burman, 
Designated Faculty Supervisor and Carol Warnick, Student Intern, Wyoming Legal 
Services, Laramie, for petitioner.

Cherie Shelton Norman of 
Skiles, Hageman & Butler, Laramie, for respondents.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
THOMAS, MACY, and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, Retired J.

ROONEY, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     This matter is before 
this court upon a grant of a petition for certiorari1 to review the district court's 
denial of a motion for a new trial after the trial court granted the petition 
for adoption of the four minor children of E.R. and E.M.T. without the consent 
of E.R. and over his objection.

[¶2.]     We affirm.

[¶3.]     E.R. words the issues 
here presented to us:

     "I. Whether the trial 
court erred in determining that [E.R.] was legally responsible for the support 
of his children pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-204, the liability for support 
statute?

     "II. Whether the trial 
court erred in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that [E.R.] 
willfully failed to contribute to the support of or abandoned his 
children?"

[¶4.]     E.R. and E.M.T. were 
married July 4, 1981. They had four children: G.A.R., J.E.R., A.S.R., and 
J.R.R.E.M.T. filed for divorce from E.R. in January 1987. E.R.'s whereabouts 
were unknown and service was made by publication. The divorce was finalized on 
July 13, 1987. E.R. was awarded visitation rights upon giving E.M.T. one week's 
notice of intent to exercise visitation and provided he not remove the children 
from the city in which E.M.T. resided. The decree provided that E.R. "shall be 
responsible for child support." The amount of child support and other provisions 
relative thereto were not ordered inasmuch as the court did not have personal 
jurisdiction over E.R.E.M.T. married L.T. on November 21, 1987.

[¶5.]     W.S. 1-22-110 provided 
in pertinent part:2 

     "(a) * * * the 
adoption of a child may be ordered without the written consent of the parents or 
putative father * * * if the court finds that the nonconsenting parent or 
putative father has:

* * * * * *

     "(iii) Willfully 
abandoned or deserted the child; or

     "(iv) Willfully failed 
to contribute to the support of the child for a period of one (1) year 
immediately prior to the filing of the petition to adopt[.]"

[¶6.]     The district court made 
a factual finding "by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent father 
has willfully abandoned or desserted [sic] his children or that he has willfully 
failed to contribute to the support of the children for one year immediately 
prior to the filing of the Petition to Adopt."

LIABILITY FOR 
SUPPORT

[¶7.]     E.R. argues 
that:

     "Since there was no in 
personam jurisdiction [over him in the divorce proceedings], and no specified 
amount of child support [contained in the divorce decree, he] was under no 
obligation to pay support to his children which could lead to the adoption of 
his children, over his objection, for willful failure to pay 
support."

[¶8.]     His argument overlooks 
the obligation for parental support of minor children which exists absent a 
court ordered duty to do so. We recognized this common law duty in Warren v. Hart, 747 P.2d 511 (Wyo. 1987). As L.T. and 
E.M.T. noted in their brief, the court there quoted from I Chitty's Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, Pt. I and II at 368 (1838):

     "`The duty of parents 
to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle of 
natural law; an obligation, says Puffendorf (b), laid on them not only by nature 
herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world: * * *. By 
begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation to 
endeavour, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall 
be supported and preserved. And thus the children will have the perfect 
right of receiving maintenance from their parents.'"

Warren, 747 P.2d  at 514 n. 
1.

[¶9.]     There may be instances 
in which a court can define or limit this common law duty, but, properly, such 
was not done here. Rather, the court expressly recognized the continuance of the 
duty in the divorce decree insofar as it could, absent personal jurisdiction. 
The duty being thus recognized, the failure to perform it is 
actionable.

     "Any person legally 
responsible for the support of a child under the age of eighteen (18) years who 
abandons, deserts, neglects or unjustifiably fails to support the child is 
liable for support of the child. It is no defense that the child was not or is 
not in destitute circumstances."

W.S. 
14-2-204(a).

[¶10.]  E.R. had a duty to contribute to the 
support of the minor children prior to the time of their adoption.

FAILURE TO 
SUPPORT

[¶11.]  After contending that he had no duty to 
support the minor children, E.R. argues, perhaps inconsistently, that he did not 
willfully fail to contribute to such support. We agree with the trial court to 
the contrary, even under the restrictive standard for review of the evidence in 
matters such as this:

"[I]t is a fundamental 
right for one to have custody of his minor child, and that we must therefore 
consider the evidence with `strict scrutiny.'"

Matter of Parental Rights 
of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 513 (Wyo. 1982).

     "`* * * [A]doption 
statutes are strictly construed when the proceeding is against a non-consenting 
parent and every reasonable intendment is made in favor of that parent's claims. 
* * *' Matter of Adoption of Voss, Wyo., 
550 P.2d 481, 485 (1976). See DS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social 
Services, Wyo., 607 P.2d 911, 918 (1980).

     "Such strict 
construction is mandated by the fact that parental rights are fundamental 
rights. A strict construction of § 1-22-110(a)(iv) * * * requires interpretation 
of the words `contribute to the support' and careful examination of the facts of 
the case to determine if such contribution was made, and, if not, whether the 
failure to do so was `willful.'

* * * * * *

     "* * * At least, such 
contributions, which are necessary by the nonconsenting parent to prevent 
adoption without his consent pursuant to § 1-22-110(a)(iv), must be 
`substantial' or `regular' or `constitute a material factor' in the child's 
support."

Matter of Adoption of CCT 
and CDT, 640 P.2d 73, 74-76 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶12.]  The evidence in this case does not 
reflect contributions by E.R. to have been "substantial" or "regular" or 
sufficient to constitute a "material factor" in the support of his children. 
E.R. testified that he made periodic gifts to the children on some birthdays and 
on some Christmases. As noted by the trial court, periodic gifts are not 
sufficient to meet a support obligation. Id. Here, certainly, they were not a 
substantial, regular or material factor in the support of the 
children.

[¶13.]  E.R. testified that he made some 
occasional cash payments to E.M.T. He could not recall the exact times or 
amounts of such payments. E.R. testified with reference to making support 
payments:

     "Q. Do you consider 
yourself employable?

     "A. Very much 
so.

      "Q. And you 
don't have trouble finding jobs; is that correct?

      "A. No, not in 
Colorado. Jobs 
are kind of scarce here in Laramie.

     "Q. But you don't have 
trouble finding employment in Colorado?

     "A. No, I 
don't.

     "Q. And have you been 
employed most of the time since 1987 to the present?

     "A. Yes.

     "Q. And you've been 
earning money; is that correct?

     "A. Yes.

     "Q. And you've been 
able to support yourself; is that correct?

     "A. Yes.

     "Q. Have you given any 
support to [E.M.T.] for your children since July of 1987?

     "A. Yes.

     "Q. And what support 
have you given her.

     "A. On different 
occasions, I've provided her with cash money, $100, $200 when I 
could.

     "Q. Do you have any 
proof of that?

     "A. No, I didn't. We 
had an understanding that I would give her money when I could, and she would let 
me see the kids; and I hardly ever seen the kids, even when I did give her the 
money.

* * * * * *

     "Q. Did anyone ever 
see you give [E.M.T.] any money for the support of your children?

     "A. [E.M.T.] and I 
have always been real private. The hand-off? No.

     "Q. No one was present 
when you gave her this money?

     "A. No.

      "Q. And when did 
you give her this money?

     "A. Well, on different 
occasions when we met. We met at Taco Bell. We met at Kentucky Fried Chicken, 
WashingtonPark. That's probably about 
it. There were a couple of cases when I met her at the park.

     "Q. And no one was 
present?

     "A. No. They knew I 
was going to meet with her, but, no, they were not present.

     "Q. Do you have dates 
as to when you gave her this money?

     "A. Specific dates, I 
do not. I don't keep very good records. No, I don't.

     "Q. Do you remember 
months? 

     "A. No, I 
don't.

     "Q. How about 
years?

     "A. Years, 
yes.

     "Q. Okay, 1987, how 
much did you give her in child support?

     "A. In child support 
in 1987, it varied. Probably $1,000.

     "Q. And 1988, did you 
give her any child support?

     "A. That was '88, I'm 
sorry. That was '88. In '89, I did. '87, no. We were - we were barely getting 
the divorce then, in '87. '86, no.

* * * * * *

     "Q. Did you give 
[E.M.T.] any money in 1989 for the support of your children?

     "A. Yes, I 
did.

     "Q. And how 
much?

     "A. 1989, I met with 
her three times and approximately $600.

     "Q. Do you have any 
proof of that?

     "A. No, I 
don't.

     "Q. And you paid her 
in cash?

     "A. 
Uh-huh.

     "Q. Was anybody else 
present?

     "A. No.

     "Q. Do you know the 
dates?

     "A. No, I 
don't.

     "Q. Do you know the 
months?

     "A. No, I don't. I 
don't recall now the months that I met with her.

* * * * * *

     "Q. And where did you 
go to pay her this money? Tell us about that.

     "A. Well, at one time 
we met at Taco Bell on Grand 
Avenue. We also met at Kentucky Fried Chicken, at 
WashingtonPark. We drove in the city 
- town. That was it.

* * * * * *

     "Q. Did anyone else 
come with her when she came to see you at these places?

     "A. No, she usually 
came by herself. She always came by herself.

     "Q. Did anyone else 
come with you?

     "A. No, 
no.

     "Q. And how was the 
transfer of money - in what form was the money that you gave her?

     "A. It was cash. * * 
*

* * * * * *

     "Q. Did you ever give 
[E.M.T.] a check?

     "A. No. I pay 
everything in cash.

     "Q. Why is 
that?

     "A. My dad taught me 
that lesson a long time ago. He's always paid everything in cash. I've never had 
a bank account. It was just always easier for me. There was times that I 
borrowed $100 from by father to give to her, and I didn't have time to go get a 
money order or anything like that.

     "We had an agreement, 
basically, that we didn't need - I didn't need to have any records, because we 
had an understanding.

     "Q. Did you ever ask 
[E.M.T.] for a receipt?

     "A. No, I never asked 
her for a receipt. I trusted her.

* * * * * *

     "Q. Okay. [E.R.], you 
have testified that you have given [E.M.T.] money and that you met her on two or 
three occasions. Did those occasions occur in 1987?

     "A. No, they 
didn't.

     "Q. Did those 
occasions occur in 1989?

     "A. Yes.

     "Q. Let's take the 
first occasion. What month was it?

     "A. I don't recall 
what month it was.

     "Q. Was it cold? Was 
it warm?

     "A. It was in the 
fall, I think. It was cool.

     "Q. Was it the fall of 
'89?

     "A. It was cool. I 
don't remember what month it was.

     "Q. So you said it was 
in the fall of '89; is that correct?

     "A. I could be 
wrong.

* * * * * *

     "Q. (By Ms. Norman) 
[E.R.], where did you meet her on that occasion?

     "A. On which occasion? 

     "Q. The first occasion 
in 1989 when you met with [E.M.T.]?

     "A. I can't be sure. I 
think it might have been at Kentucky Fried Chicken.

     "Q. And what time of 
day was it?

     "A. It was in the 
afternoon.

     "Q. And the next 
occasion you claim that you met with her, where was that?

     "A. At WashingtonPark.

     "Q. Do you remember 
what month?

     "A. I 
don't.

     "Q. Do you remember 
what year?

     "A. It was in 
'89.

     "Q. What about the 
third occasion?

     "A. I can't be 
sure.

     "Q. Do you know where 
you met then?

     "A. No, I don't. It 
was probably Taco Bell. I'm not sure.

     "Q. Do you remember 
what month?

     "A. No, I 
don't.

     "Q. Do you remember 
what year?

     "A. I'm sure it was 
like the end of '88. I really can't be sure. It's been a while. I've had a lot 
of other things - I don't remember.

     "Q. Isn't it possible 
that none of these occasions occurred in '89, and they did in fact occur in '87 
or '88?

     "A. '88 and '89 is 
when they occurred, I'm sure. The months I cannot - I know that the weather was 
well, because I drove down. On one occasion when I came down, it was rather 
cold, because the roads were bad; but, no."

Accepting E.R.'s 
testimony, the payments were not "substantial," "regular," or sufficient to 
constitute a "material factor" in the support of his children.

[¶14.]  Additionally, there was a direct conflict 
of evidence in this respect. E.M.T. denied that she received any cash 
payments from E.R. The district court accepted E.R.'s evidence on this point. It 
is the province of the district court to make factual determinations. We review 
them only for an abuse of discretion.

     "A court does not 
abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse 
of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances."

Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 
838 (Wyo. 
1980).

[¶15.]  We have said before:

"`* * * We will examine 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and will resolve all 
conflicts in evidence for the appellee. We will assume the evidence in favor of 
the successful party is true, leave out of consideration entirely evidence of 
the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of the 
successful party every favorable inference which may fairly be drawn from 
it.'"

TR v. Washakie County 
Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 736 P.2d 712, 715 (Wyo. 
1987) (quoting DS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 919-20 (Wyo. 1980)) (citations omitted).

[¶16.]  "Strict scrutiny" of evidence does not 
require a disregard of evidence in which there is a conflict. If it did, any 
piece of evidence could be rendered inoperative in a case requiring "strict 
scrutiny" through a simple contest of its veracity.

[¶17.]  The trial court did not act in a manner 
exceeding the bounds of reason under the circumstances of this case. It could 
reasonably conclude as it did. It did not abuse its discretion.

[¶18.]  E.R. argues that his failure to 
contribute to the support of the children was not "willful."

     "As used in the 
context of § 1-22-110(a)(iv) * * * willfully means intentionally, knowingly, 
purposely, voluntarily, consciously, deliberately, and without justifiable 
excuse, as distinguished from carelessly, inadvertently * * * or 
thoughtlessly."

Matter of Adoption of CCT 
and CDT, 640 P.2d  at 76.

[¶19.]  E.R. acknowledged that E.M.T. was on 
welfare and had requested support money from him, and that he has been steadily 
employed, earning $5.00 and $6.00 an hour. His failure to furnish some support 
money was not due to inadvertence, carelessness or thoughtlessness. He knew of 
the whereabouts of E.M.T. and his children. He did not present any justifiable 
excuse for failure to contribute to the support of his children. The trial court 
did not err in finding such failure to be "willful."

ABANDONMENT

[¶20.]  Inasmuch as the evidence was sufficient 
to support the finding that E.R. willfully failed to contribute to the support 
of the children for a period of one year prior to the filing of the petition for 
adoption, making unnecessary his consent to the adoption, we need not address 
the issue concerning abandonment.

[¶21.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 An appeal by E.R. was 
dismissed by this court as being untimely. E.R.'s subsequent Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari was granted.

2 A 1990 amendment changed 
the first quoted paragraph to read:

     "(a) * * * the 
adoption of a child may be ordered by the court without the written consent of a 
parent or the putative father * * * if the court finds that the putative father 
or the nonconsenting parent or parents have."