Case Title: Thomas D. Woodel v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC05-1336

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2008-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC05-1336 
_____________ 
 
 
 
THOMAS D. WOODEL, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[May 1, 2008] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Thomas Woodel appeals the death sentence imposed upon him after we 
remanded for a new written sentencing order that complied with the procedural 
requirements outlined in Jackson v. State, 767 So. 2d 1156, 1160-61 (Fla. 2000).  
See Woodel v. State, 804 So. 2d 316, 327 (Fla. 2001) (vacating the sentences of 
death and remanding for a new written sentencing order).  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the 
sentence of death imposed for the murder of Bernice Moody and the sentence of 
life in prison imposed for the murder of Clifford Moody. 
 
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I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Thomas Woodel was convicted of armed robbery, armed burglary, and two 
counts of first-degree murder based on the murders of Clifford and Bernice 
Moody.  The facts surrounding the murder were set forth as follows: 
Clifford Moody, who was seventy-nine years old, and his 
seventy-four year old wife, Bernice, lived in a mobile home trailer on 
lot 533 at Outdoor Resorts of America in Polk County.  The Moodys 
owned another trailer on adjoining lot 532, which they sometimes 
rented.  Bernice was seen by the newspaper delivery man cleaning lot 
532 about 4:30 to 4:45 a.m. on December 31, 1996.  Clifford was last 
seen by a security person at the Outdoor Resorts Laundromat at about 
5:30 a.m.  The Moodys were preparing to show the mobile home for 
rental that day. 
 
The Moodys were found dead a little after 1 p.m. on December 
31, 1996.  Clifford was found lying on his back in the dining room 
area of the trailer on lot 532.  His underwear and pants had been 
pulled down to below his knees.  His eyeglasses lay approximately 
two feet from his head.  Dr. Alexander Melamud, the medical 
examiner, testified that Clifford received a total of eight stab wounds, 
causing more internal than external bleeding, and that he died as a 
result of these stab wounds close in time to his wife’s death. 
 
Bernice was found in the same trailer with multiple stab 
wounds.  She lay dead on a bed in the back of the trailer and was nude 
except for one sock.  A nightgown and female underwear with a knot 
tied in it lay on the floor next to the bed.  Additionally, pieces of a 
porcelain toilet tank lid were found underneath her.  Dr. Melamud 
testified that Bernice incurred a total of fifty-six cut or stab wounds, 
many of which on her right arm he opined to be defensive.  Her 
jugular vein had been slit.  Additionally, she had received significant 
blunt trauma injuries to her head, and her nasal bones were fractured.  
Dr. Melamud testified that Bernice died as a result of her injuries 
sometime in the early morning hours of December 31, 1996.  No 
semen was detected on Bernice. 
 
With the permission and assistance of Outdoor Resorts, 
detectives searched the park’s dumpsters the morning of January 3, 
1997.  The dumpsters had not been emptied since prior to December 
 
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31, 1996.  During the search, detectives found three garbage bags 
containing pieces of a porcelain toilet tank lid, a wallet containing 
Clifford’s identification and credit cards, keys with a tag stating 
―Cliff’s keys,‖ glasses, bloody socks, paperwork with the address of 
lot 301, and paperwork bearing the names of the defendant and his 
son, Christopher Woodel. 
 
That afternoon, detectives went to lot 301.  Woodel lived there 
with his long-time girlfriend, Christina Stogner, and his sister, Bobbi 
Woodel.  Woodel and his sister signed consent forms to have their 
trailer searched.  Stogner was out of town at that time.  Also present 
that day at lot 301 was Gayle Woodel.  Although not known at that 
time, it would later be discovered that Gayle married Woodel in 1989, 
and they had a son together, Christopher.  Gayle and Woodel 
separated in 1992 but never divorced.  In 1996, Gayle and Christopher 
lived in North Carolina while Woodel lived in Florida.  However, 
Gayle had just come to Florida from North Carolina so that 
Christopher could spend some time with Woodel.  Gayle, Christopher, 
and two of Gayle’s friends were staying at Woodel’s trailer. 
 
While some detectives searched the premises, Woodel agreed to 
be questioned by other detectives.  As Woodel left with the detectives, 
Woodel went over to Gayle and whispered for her to get rid of the 
knife Woodel had hidden.  Gayle told Woodel’s landlady and friend 
about the content of the communication.  Gayle later told deputies as 
well. 
 
The detectives gave Woodel Miranda warnings, and he 
consented to talk with them.  He initially told the detectives that he 
had been home asleep at the time of the murders.  After further 
questioning, Woodel began to write out a statement.  He then stopped 
and confessed to killing the Moodys, whom he said he had never met.  
The detectives then tape-recorded Woodel’s confession.  In this taped 
confession played for the jury, Woodel admitted to drinking with 
others that evening after work in the lot next to the Pizza Hut where 
he worked.  Afterwards, Woodel walked to Outdoor Resorts, a little 
over a mile from the Pizza Hut.  Woodel admitted to entering the 
Moody’s rental trailer early in the morning after seeing Bernice 
through the window.  He said he went in to ask for the time.  
According to Woodel, Bernice was alone in the trailer.  Upon seeing 
him, she came at him with a knife, over which Woodel soon gained 
control.  He then proceeded to stab her many times and hit her over 
 
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the head with a porcelain toilet tank lid one to three times.  The toilet 
lid shattered. 
 
Clifford was last seen doing laundry at the Laundromat by 
security guard Elmer Schultz between 5:30 and 5:40 a.m.  In his 
confession, Woodel said that he was leaving the trailer when Clifford 
came inside.  Woodel then stabbed Clifford.  As Clifford lay on the 
floor, Woodel picked up a bucket and placed pieces of the shattered 
toilet tank lid in it.  He also placed the knife along with several other 
items in the bucket.  Woodel said that after stabbing Clifford, he took 
Clifford’s wallet. 
Woodel also said in his confession that he threw some items 
into a canal in the mobile home park, threw some items away in his 
garbage, and hid the knife behind a dresser.  Deputies would later find 
pieces of the toilet tank lid and Bernice’s eyeglasses in the canal, and 
a knife in Woodel’s room wedged between a wall and the dresser. 
 
Woodel, 804 So. 2d at 319-20.  The jury recommended death by a vote of nine to 
three for Clifford’s murder and by a vote of twelve to zero for Bernice’s murder.  
The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Woodel to death 
for both murders.  On December 20, 2001, this Court affirmed all of the 
convictions but vacated both death sentences because we were unable to provide a 
meaningful review of the death sentence in light of the sentencing order, which 
failed to expressly evaluate each mitigating circumstance, determine whether these 
mitigators were truly mitigating, and properly weigh the aggravators against the 
mitigators, as set forth in Jackson, 767 So. 2d at 1160-61.  See Woodel, 804 So. 2d 
at 327. 
The original trial judge was no longer available, so the case was assigned to 
a new judge, and a new penalty phase was held, where the State presented 
 
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numerous victim impact statements and evidence to show the jury a comprehensive 
picture of the crime.  Counsel for Woodel presented detailed information about 
Woodel’s childhood, character, and mental health, emphasizing the abuse and 
neglect Woodel suffered as a child and how the crime was extremely out of 
character for Woodel.  The jury recommended a life sentence for the murder of Mr. 
Moody and recommended death by a vote of seven to five for the murder of Ms. 
Moody.  After a Spencer1 hearing was held, the trial court followed the jury’s 
recommendation as to both murders.  The court found four aggravating 
circumstances (prior violent felony conviction; committed during commission of a 
burglary; especially heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC); and victim vulnerability 
due to age or disability); four statutory mitigators (no significant criminal history; 
defendant’s age; substantial impairment of capacity to appreciate his actions or 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law; and extreme emotional 
disturbance); and ten nonstatutory mitigators (physical abuse as a child; neglect 
and rejection by his mother and others; an unstable home as child; parents who 
were deaf and spoke primarily in sign language; abuse of alcohol and drugs; 
willingness to meet with the victims’ daughter; willingness to be tested for bone 
marrow donation for his daughter; the defendant’s belief in God; his voluntary 
confession; and the defendant’s compassion for others).  The court concluded that 
                                          
 
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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the aggravating factors far outweighed the mitigation and imposed a sentence of 
death for the murder of Ms. Moody. 
On appeal, Woodel raises six claims: (1) the trial court erred in excusing for 
cause two jurors who were not sufficiently fluent in the English language without 
the aid of an interpreter; (2) fundamental error occurred when the jury heard and 
considered prejudicial testimony from a State witness; (3) the trial court erred in 
finding the aggravating factor of ―vulnerability due to advanced age or disability‖ 
with regard to the murder of Bernice Moody; (4) Woodel’s sentence of death is  
not proportional; (5) Woodel is entitled to a life sentence because Florida’s death 
penalty law violates his due process right and his right to a jury; and (6) execution 
by lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
First, Woodel asserts that during his new penalty phase, the trial court erred 
in dismissing for cause two jurors because they were not proficient in English, 
thereby depriving him of a jury that comprised a fair cross-section of the 
community.  The State contends that this claim is procedurally barred.  The record 
shows that when the first juror informed the court that he was having trouble 
understanding the proceedings without an interpreter, the trial judge excused the 
juror after an interpreter could not be found.  The judge further advised counsel 
that while she could appoint an interpreter for voir dire and the proceedings, 
 
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caselaw prohibited the interpreter from assisting the juror during jury deliberations.  
Defense counsel expressed some concern about this ruling.  Later in the 
proceedings, the trial court excused a second juror after the juror informed the 
court that he did not feel that he spoke English well enough to serve as a juror.  
Defense counsel raised a fair cross-section argument to the trial judge, recognizing 
that there was caselaw which prevented the court from permitting an interpreter to 
enter the jury room for deliberations but arguing that this case violated the 
Constitution.  Defense counsel later renewed this objection when the parties were 
accepting the jury panel.  Based on the record, we find the objection was 
sufficiently preserved. 
In turning to the merits of the claim, the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979), held that in order to 
establish a violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the following three 
elements are required: 
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ―distinctive‖ group in the 
community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from 
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the 
number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this 
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the 
jury-selection process. 
Id. at 364; see also Gordon v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215, 1218 (Fla. 2003) (applying 
the Duren test in evaluating a fair cross-section claim).  Even if these three prongs 
are met, this does not mean a constitutional violation has occurred.  As the United 
 
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States Supreme Court held, ―States remain free to prescribe relevant qualifications 
for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions so long as it may be fairly 
said that the jury lists or panels are representative of the community.‖  Duren, 439 
U.S. at 367 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)).  Such 
exemptions, however, must be supported by a significant state interest, as opposed 
to merely rational grounds.  Id.  ―[O]nce the defendant has made a prima facie 
showing of an infringement of his constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair 
cross section of the community, it is the State that bears the burden of justifying 
this infringement by showing attainment of a fair cross section to be incompatible 
with a significant state interest.‖  Id. at 368. 
 
Turning to the case before us, while Woodel argues that the exclusion of two 
jurors violated the fair cross-section requirement, he fails to demonstrate any of the 
necessary elements as required under the Duren test.  First, he has failed to present 
any argument that the group ―Hispanics who are not proficient in English‖ is a 
―distinctive‖ group in the community.  Likewise, Woodel fails to offer any 
statistical evidence showing ―the representation of this group in venires from 
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of 
such persons in the community.‖  Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.  Woodel has offered no 
statistical evidence of the number of non-English-speaking Hispanics in his 
community.  In Gordon, this Court summarily denied a fair cross-section claim 
 
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after noting that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie showing under the 
Duren test. 
Because Gordon has not initially established a prima facie showing in 
his motion that black people were systematically excluded from the 
jury selection process, his claim was properly summarily denied by 
the trial court.  In other words, Gordon has not set out in his motion a 
proper claim on the merits on this issue that counsel could have 
advanced. 
Gordon, 863 So. 2d at 1218; see also Robinson v. State, 707 So. 2d 688, 699 (Fla. 
1998) (holding that trial court did not err in summarily denying claim where 
appellant ―made no showing at trial or in his postconviction motion that blacks are 
systematically excluded from venires in St. Johns County‖). 
 
Even if Woodel had presented evidence as to these elements, we would not 
find that a constitutional violation occurred in excluding these jurors.  The United 
States Supreme Court has expressly held that states may prescribe ―relevant 
qualifications for their jurors‖ so long as this is supported by a significant state 
interest.  See Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68.  Woodel points out that there is no 
statutory requirement under Florida law mandating that a juror must be proficient 
in English in order to serve on a jury.  Compare § 40.01, Fla. Stat. (2005) (setting 
forth the qualifications of a juror, none of which address a proficiency in English), 
with 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2)-(3) (2000) (providing that the ability to speak and 
understand the English language are a requirement for federal jury service).  While 
Woodel is correct that a Florida statute does not expressly address this issue, 
 
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section 40.013(6), Florida Statutes (2005), states that a person is to be excused 
from jury service ―upon a showing of hardship, extreme inconvenience, or public 
necessity.‖  (Emphasis added.)  Here, the trial judge recognized that she was able 
to appoint an interpreter to assist in the voir dire and the trial proceedings, but that 
permitting the interpreter to assist during jury deliberations would contravene the 
crucial state interest in protecting the sanctity of the jury deliberations, which is a 
necessity.  In Dilorenzo v. State, 711 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal held that permitting the use of an interpreter during jury 
deliberations constituted fundamental error because ―[u]nder the common law of 
this jurisdiction the sanctity of the jury room has been so zealously protected that 
the introduction or intrusion therein of an unauthorized person during jury 
deliberations has been regarded as fundamental error requiring either a mistrial or a 
new trial.‖  Id. at 1363.  We find no error in the trial court’s ruling to follow 
Dilorenzo. 
Moreover, a trial court has inherent power to assure due process in the trial 
of a case by protecting the integrity of jury deliberations.  Numerous problems 
would occur if trial courts permitted the use of an interpreter in jury deliberations, 
even if only one juror required such special accommodations.  Jury deliberations 
are to be exchanges of analysis and beliefs based upon lawfully admitted evidence 
by discussions among only the sworn jurors and are protected against influences 
 
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extraneous to the deliberations by those sworn jurors.  The trial court’s ruling on 
this issue adhered to this fundamental principal. 
In his second claim for relief, Woodel asserts that fundamental error 
occurred when jailhouse informant Arthur White testified that Woodel admitted 
that he had dragged Bernice Moody into the bedroom and fondled her.  This Court 
has defined fundamental error as follows: 
Fundamental error is error that reaches ―down into the validity of the 
trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been 
obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.‖  Kilgore v. State, 
688 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1996) (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 
643, 644-45 (Fla. 1991)).  Error during the penalty phase is 
fundamental if it is ―so prejudicial as to taint the jury’s recommended 
sentence.‖  Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 609 (Fla. 2003) (quoting 
Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 985 n. 10 (Fla. 1999)). 
Jones v. State, 949 So. 2d 1021, 1037 (Fla. 2006). 
We do not agree that Woodel met this standard of showing that a 
fundamental error occurred.  Specifically, when White was questioned as to 
Woodel’s admission concerning the removal of Bernice Moody’s clothes, White 
replied: 
[White]:  Well, at the point in time when he knocked her down, 
he ripped her nightgown from here (indicating), you know.  And I 
really don’t remember what else, but he drug her into the bedroom. 
 
[Prosecutor]:  I’m sorry, he did what? 
 
[White]:  He drug her in the bedroom and he fondled her, but he 
didn’t tell me exactly where or how because somebody walked in and 
like the conversation just stopped, you know, because I was telling 
him don’t tell nobody else about the case and things like this here 
because they would use it against him and things of that nature. 
 
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Woodel provides no direct authority as to why White’s statements would be 
improper other than alleging that this was irrelevant and highly inflammatory, 
constituting a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance.  Section 921.141(1), Florida 
Statutes (2005), which governs the penalty-phase proceedings, provides in 
pertinent part that evidence ―relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of 
the defendant‖ is admissible ―regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary 
rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut 
any hearsay statements.‖  In this case, White’s statements regarding Woodel’s 
confession that he pushed Bernice into the bedroom and fondled her were relevant 
to the nature of the crime.  Woodel failed to show a meritorious basis for excluding 
this testimony and clearly did not demonstrate why the admission of this evidence 
constituted fundamental error. 
 
In his next claim for relief, Woodel alleges that the trial court erred in 
finding the aggravating factor that the victim was particularly vulnerable due to 
advanced age or disability.  First, he asserts that this Court should review this 
claim de novo.  In Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695-96 (Fla. 1997), this Court 
explicitly rejected such an argument, holding that 
it is not this Court’s function to reweigh the evidence to determine 
whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt—that is the trial court’s job.  Rather, our task on 
appeal is to review the record to determine whether the trial court 
 
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applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if 
so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its finding. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  In turning to the trial court’s findings as to this aggravator, 
the trial court found that this aggravator was established and supported based on 
the following: 
Bernice Moody was 74 years of age when she died.  She wore 
glasses, had limited range of motion of her left arm due to a shoulder 
injury in the spring of the year resulting in loss of arm strength. 
Dr. Steve Nelson, the Medical Examiner, testified that the 
toxicology screen indicated that the drugs she had ingested were not 
prescriptions drugs and may have been for arthritis, general pain and 
allergies. 
Based on the evidence, the court finds that this aggravator was 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and gives it moderate weight. 
 
State v. Woodel, Sentencing Order at 4, No.CF97-00047A-YY (10th Cir. order 
filed July 1, 2005) (Order).  Woodel does not challenge any of these specific 
findings but asserts that in reviewing them as a whole, this is insufficient to support 
the aggravator, particularly since Ms. Moody’s arm was back to normal other than 
a loss of arm strength.  In support of his argument, Woodel relies on the testimony 
of some of the Moodys’ good friends who were not aware that Bernice Moody had 
any physical disabilities and testified that she was very active. 
Woodel made a similar claim in the prior proceeding, and this Court then 
explicitly rejected his claim, holding that competent, substantial evidence 
supported that aggravator.  Woodel, 804 So. 2d at 324-26.  Even though a new 
penalty phase was held, similar evidence was presented and relied upon by the trial 
 
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court in finding this aggravator a second time.  In reviewing the record before us, 
we find competent, substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s finding as 
to this aggravator.  Ms. Moody’s daughter testified as to her mother’s age, that she 
wore glasses, and that her mother had broken her arm earlier that spring in a 
serious accident.  As the daughter recalled, Ms. Moody ―broke the ball and socket 
apart, just broke it, snapped it right off.‖  Ms. Moody was initially told that she 
could lose all use of that arm, but she exercised it daily in order to get it back to 
normal.  At the time of her death, the daughter testified that her mother had not yet 
regained all of the strength in that arm.  The medical examiner testified that he 
found some medicine in Bernice’s system which could indicate that she was in 
pain.  The limitations which were proven by the record, in addition to Ms. 
Moody’s age, are sufficient to support this aggravating circumstance. 
 
In his fourth claim, Woodel contends that the sentence of death is not 
proportional.  In reviewing the resentencing order, the trial judge found four 
aggravators;2 four statutory mitigators;3 and ten nonstatutory mitigators.4  In 
balancing these factors, the court stated as follows: 
                                          
 
 
2.  The court found the following aggravators: (1) the defendant was 
previously convicted of another capital felony based on the contemporaneous 
murder of Clifford Moody (great weight); (2) the capital felony was committed 
while the defendant was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit or 
flight after committing or attempting to commit a burglary (great weight); (3) the 
capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great weight); and (4) the 
 
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In weighing the aggravating circumstances against the 
mitigating factors, the court understands that the weighing process is 
not simply an arithmetic exercise.  The court’s role is to consider the 
quality of the factors to be weighed, not the quantity of those factors.  
Accordingly, the court considers the nature and quality of the 
aggravators and mitigators that it has found to exist. 
 
The court allowed the introduction of Victim Impact testimony 
pursuant to Fla. Stat. 921.141.  The Court is sympathetic to the impact 
this murder has had on family and friends and gives no weight to that 
testimony in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
in determining a proper sentence. 
 
The court finds that the aggravating circumstances in this case 
far outweigh the mitigating circumstances.  Each of the four 
aggravating circumstances is appalling and even if the aggravating 
circumstances of the heinous, atrocious and cruel manner in which 
this senseless crime was committed were not to be considered, this 
court would feel that the remaining three aggravators outweigh the 
existing mitigators. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
victim was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability (moderate 
weight). 
 
 
3.  The court found the following statutory mitigators: (1) the defendant had 
no significant history of prior criminal activity (moderate weight); (2) age of the 
defendant (little weight); (3) the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality 
of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially 
impaired (little weight); and (4) the felony was committed while the defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (little weight). 
 
 
4.  The court found the following nonstatutory mitigators: (1) the defendant 
suffered physical abuse as a child (moderate weight); (2) the defendant was 
neglected and rejected by his mother (moderate weight); (3) the defendant had an 
unstable home as a child (moderate weight); (4) his parents were deaf and spoke 
primarily in sign language (moderate weight); (5) the defendant abused alcohol and 
drugs (little weight); (6) the defendant was willing to meet with the victims’ 
daughter (little weight); (7) the defendant was willing to donate bone marrow to his 
daughter, who had leukemia (little weight); (8) the defendant believes in God (little 
weight); (9) he confessed to the murders (little weight); and (10) he had 
compassion for others (little weight). 
 
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Order at 10.  This Court has described the proportionality review as follows: 
The function of this Court’s proportionality review is to foster 
uniformity in death penalty law.  See Beasley v. State, 774 So. 2d 649, 
673 (Fla. 2000) (citing Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 
1991)).  The analysis by which to achieve this function is to ―consider 
the totality of circumstances in a case, and to compare it with other 
capital cases.‖  Id. (quoting Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 
(Fla. 1990)).  As we have explained:  
[T]he death penalty is reserved ―for the most aggravated 
and unmitigated of most serious crimes.‖  Clark v. State, 
609 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1992) (quoting State v. Dixon, 
283 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973)).  This Court performs 
proportionality review to prevent the imposition of 
―unusual‖ punishments contrary to article I, section 17 of 
the Florida Constitution.  See Tillman v. State, 591 So. 
2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991).  In deciding whether death is a 
proportionate penalty, the Court must consider the 
totality of the circumstances of the case and compare the 
case with other capital cases.  See Urbin v. State, 714 So. 
2d 411, 416-17 (Fla. 1998).  ―It is not a comparison 
between the number of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.‖  Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 
(Fla. 1990).  
Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 935 (Fla. 2000).  Further, this Court 
has stated: 
Proportionality review ―requires a discrete analysis 
of the facts,‖ Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 965 (Fla. 
1996), entailing a qualitative review by this Court of the 
underlying basis for each aggravator and mitigator rather 
than a quantitative analysis. 
Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 416. 
Morris v. State, 811 So. 2d 661, 668 (Fla. 2002).  Based on the circumstances of 
the crime, we find the sentence of death is proportional to other similar crimes. 
 
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In Smithers v. State, 826 So. 2d 916, 931 (Fla. 2002), after the defendant 
was found with a bloody ax in his hands, the defendant confessed to murdering two 
women.  The trial court found three aggravators for the one victim (previous 
violent felony based on the contemporaneous murder, HAC, and cold, calculated, 
and premeditated) and two aggravators for the murder of the other victim (previous 
violent felony for the contemporaneous murder and HAC).  The trial court in 
Smithers found two of the same statutory mitigators that were found in Woodel: 
(1) the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and (2) the defendant’s capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law was substantially impaired.  Smithers, 826 So. 2d at 931.  
The trial court in Smithers also found seven nonstatutory mitigators, including 
physical and emotional abuse by his mother as a child, and the defendant confessed 
to the crime.  After balancing these factors and the jury’s unanimous 
recommendation for a death sentence, the trial court found that the aggravators 
outweighed the mitigation and imposed the death sentence.  This Court upheld the 
death sentence, finding that it was proportionate to similar cases that involved 
similar aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  Id.  This Court has found the 
death sentence proportional in other situations involving stabbing murders which 
occurred during a burglary.  See, e.g., Jimenez v. State, 703 So. 2d 437, 442 (Fla. 
 
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1997) (upholding Jimenez’s death sentence for stabbing death of elderly female 
inside her home where court found four aggravators—prior violent felony, 
committed during commission of a burglary, committed while on community 
control, and HAC—outweighed one statutory mitigator and two nonstatutory 
mitigators), receded from on other grounds by Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233 
(Fla. 2000); Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 637, 648 (Fla. 1995) (upholding death 
sentence for stabbing death of elderly female inside her home during a burglary 
where court found three aggravators—prior violent felony, committed for financial 
gain, and HAC—outweighed fifteen nonstatutory mitigators).  Based on the 
foregoing, we find the sentence of death is proportionate to other cases in which 
the death sentence was imposed. 
In his penultimate claim, Woodel alleges that Florida’s death penalty law 
violates his due process right and his right to a jury based on Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  This 
Court has repeatedly rejected this argument, and Woodel presents no new reasons 
for revisiting this issue.  See, e.g., Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1005-06 (Fla. 
2006) (explicitly rejecting the claims that the United States Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Apprendi and Ring require a finding that the Florida capital sentencing 
scheme is unconstitutional, rejecting the claim that a jury must unanimously 
 
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recommend death, and rejecting the claim that the State must allege the 
aggravating circumstances in the indictment), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2918 (2007). 
In his final claim, Woodel challenges whether Florida’s current protocol, 
including the three-drug cocktail, violates the Eighth Amendment.  This Court has 
recently rejected these claims.  See Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 353 
(Fla. 2007); Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 325 (Fla. 2007).  We likewise deny 
Woodel’s claim on this same issue. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we find all of Woodel’s claims to be without 
merit.  Accordingly, we affirm Woodel’s sentences, including the sentence of 
death for the murder of Bernice Moody. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County,  
Susan W. Roberts, Judge – Case No. CF97-00047A-XX 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Robert F. Moeller, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
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Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Carol M. Dittmar, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee