Case Title: SUSAN JUANITA SANCHEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUSAN JUANITA SANCHEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 12126 P.3d 897Case Number: 04-183Decided: 01/20/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
SUSAN 
JUANITA SANCHEZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. 
Delicath, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ., and ARNOLD, 
D.J.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In March 2004, a 
CarbonCounty jury found Susan 
Juanita Sanchez (the appellant) guilty of second-degree murder for shooting her 
boyfriend.  She now appeals that 
conviction, claiming that the district court erred in admitting extrinsic 
impeachment evidence, that the prosecutor committed misconduct because he 
intentionally misrepresented witness testimony to the jury during closing 
argument, and that the district court abused its discretion in excluding 
evidence concerning the victim's affiliation with an "outlaw" motorcycle 
gang.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.  Whether extrinsic impeachment evidence 
admitted by the district court was harmless error?  

 
 
            
2.  Whether the prosecutor 
committed misconduct during his closing argument?  

 
 
            
3.  Whether the district 
court erred in excluding evidence concerning the victim's affiliation with an 
"outlaw" motorcycle gang?  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The instant case 
essentially revolves around four people:  
the appellant (who has been paralyzed on one side of her body since she 
suffered a stroke and who apparently uses a leg brace to help her walk), the 
appellant's live-in boyfriend Marvin "Lucky" Batchelor (the victim), Travis 
Tappan (who occasionally lived with the victim and the appellant) (Tappan), and 
Sam Huffman (Huffman).1  All four individuals spent most of the 
day July 15-16, 2003, drinking and partying at the appellant's residence in 
Rawlins.  Huffman was "too drunk" to 
return home later that evening, so Tappan retrieved a sleeping bag for Huffman 
to use in the yard, where he eventually "passed out."  Tappan also arranged a tarp and a 
sleeping bag in the yard for himself and the appellant.

 
 
[¶4]      Sometime between 
1:00 and 1:30 a.m., the victim was shot once in the chest.  At 1:30 a.m., the appellant called 911 
and indicated that she thought that the victim was dead.  Law enforcement officers responded to 
the residence, where they discovered the victim's body (with no pulse) in the 
yard; the victim was wearing a t-shirt and underwear, and his pants were located 
nearby on a chair next to a picnic table in the yard.  As the appellant exited the residence at 
the officers' request, the officers asked her if she possessed any weapons.  She replied "no, the gun is . . . over 
there" (pointing to where she and Tappan had been sleeping), and officers 
discovered a black single-action .41 caliber Ruger handgun.  Ballistics analysis subsequently 
confirmed that the victim was shot with this gun.

 
 
[¶5]      Several witnesses 
provided information about the shooting.  
It appears that the appellant confessed to at least five different 
individuals that she shot the victim, and in several instances she confessed 
that fact more than once to the same individual.2  The appellant told the 911 dispatcher 
that she shot the victim "because he was raping" her, and numerous other 
statements were attributed to the appellant by the law enforcement officers who 
spoke with her after the shooting.  
According to the trial testimony of these officers, the appellant stated 
that while Tappan was arranging the sleeping accoutrements in the yard, the 
appellant retrieved some bedding and the Ruger handgun3 from her bedroom (she needed the 
gun for "her protection" because the victim became "mean" or "aggressive" when 
he was drinking).4  The appellant met Tappan in the yard and 
put the gun under her pillow, while the victim remained inside watching 
television.

 
 
[¶6]      As the appellant 
and Tappan were lying in the yard holding hands,5 the victim appeared and ripped off 
their covers, and Tappan got up and ran.  
The victim asked the appellant if she was "having sex" with Tappan and 
repeatedly told the appellant (in a profanity-laced exchange) to go in the 
house.  The appellant replied that 
she wanted to remain outside.  The 
victim then grabbed or pulled the appellant's legs in an attempt to get her into 
the house.  At some point, he tried 
to "get on top" of her (or he "jumped" on top of her) and said "get your ass in 
there and I'll f*** you," and the appellant "pushed him off."  The victim ultimately started walking 
towards the house, and away from the appellant's location.  When he stopped and turned to continue 
yelling at the appellant, she reached under her pillow (while lying down), 
"pulled" the gun, and shot the victim once.6

 
 
[¶7]      According to the 
appellant, Tappan, who was by this time next to the appellant, said "I think you 
killed him," and the appellant replied "[O]h, my God, we better go in and call 
911."  Tappan "helped [the 
appellant] put [her] leg brace on . . . so they could go in the house," and the 
appellant called 911.  When asked if 
the victim had raped her, the appellant told an officer "no, he got on top of me 
and I pushed him off," and further stated that she told the 911 dispatcher that 
she had been raped because "she was scared when she saw [the victim lying] there 
on the ground."7  The appellant maintained that Tappan 
"had nothing to do with it" and that she was not "covering" for him.  By 3:46 a.m., the appellant's blood 
alcohol content was .07; the victim's blood alcohol content was .213 at the time 
of his death.

 
 
[¶8]      At the scene of 
the shooting, Tappan provided Rawlins police officer David Ferguson several 
different versions (both exculpatory and inculpatory) of what happened.  We will detail these statements later in 
this opinion.  Tappan also 
subsequently gave another police officer several different versions of what 
happened:  (1) Tappan stated that he 
and the appellant were in the yard "getting ready to have sex" when the victim 
caught them.  The victim "started to 
rape" the appellant,8 and the appellant shot the victim; 
(2) Tappan then stated that the Ruger handgun was his, that the officer was 
"going to pin it on [Tappan] anyway," and that Tappan shot the victim; and (3) 
Tappan also stated that the victim exited the house with a gun, so Tappan shot 
the victim.  Tappan admitted that he 
had consumed "a lot" of alcohol and was "very drunk" that night; by 3:57 a.m., 
Tappan's blood alcohol content was .30.

 
 
[¶9]      Huffman stated 
that he was awakened because the appellant and the victim were arguing in "loud 
voices."  The victim asked the 
appellant if she was having sex with Tappan and the appellant replied "no."  He heard the appellant yell "[H]elp me, 
[Tappan]" while the victim was "helping" the appellant into the house.  Huffman then heard the gunshot, sat up, 
and heard the appellant ask "[I]s he dead, [Tappan]?"  Tappan replied "[Y]es, he was shot with a 
.44."  Huffman saw the appellant and 
Tappan walk back over to the area where they had been sleeping.  He heard Tappan tell the appellant (who 
was standing) "here, Sue, get your fingerprints all over this" because "if they 
convict me, I will go to the penitentiary, and you can say that [the victim] was 
beating you up and raping you and you will get off.  Say something fancy."  He also saw Tappan hand the appellant a 
"black object" with a "belt [or] something hanging down from the holster."   Huffman believed that the object 
was the gun.  The appellant and 
Tappan then left the area.  Tappan 
came out looking for something and returned to the house.

 
 
[¶10]   Two neighbors also provided 
information about the shooting.  One 
neighbor, who was a friend of the victim and the appellant, was awakened at "a 
little after 1:00" a.m. when she heard the victim's voice "louder than usual." 
 When she heard the gunshot, the 
neighbor went and looked out her window.  
She saw the appellant "sitting up," while a shirtless Tappan retrieved 
the appellant's leg brace from a clothesline.  Tappan knelt down and helped the 
appellant "strap the brace on," and Tappan helped the appellant walk to the 
house.  Tappan returned briefly to 
look for something, and then went back into the house.  The other neighbor returned home from 
work at about 1:00 a.m. and heard voices coming from the appellant's yard.  The victim was repeatedly 
asking the appellant what she was doing "naked" in the back yard, accused the appellant 
of having sex with Tappan, and told the appellant to go in the house.  The neighbor may have heard the 
appellant reply that she and Tappan were trying to "warm up," and also say 
"don't hit me, don't touch me" during the incident.  She also saw Tappan (dressed in shorts 
and a t-shirt) tip-toe up her driveway and look towards the appellant's yard 
through a hole in the fence.  After 
the neighbor went inside to care for her infant child, she heard the 
gunshot.

 
 
[¶11]   The appellant and Tappan were 
ultimately both charged with second-degree murder, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2005), and the two cases were joined for a jury 
trial.  However, Tappan apparently 
pled guilty to "being an accessory before the fact" a week prior to the trial, 
and the appellant's case proceeded to trial.  The appellant's trial strategy was 
essentially to claim that Tappan shot the victim, but if the appellant shot the 
victim, she acted in self-defense.  
The district court instructed on the elements of voluntary manslaughter, 
and the appellant also referenced that instruction during closing argument.  A jury found the appellant guilty of 
second-degree murder in March 2004, and the district court sentenced the 
appellant to imprisonment for twenty- to twenty-five years.  The appellant now appeals from that 
judgment and sentence.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Impeachment 
of Tappan

 
 
[¶12]   The appellant subpoenaed Tappan to 
testify at trial, but Tappan's counsel informed the prosecutor and the 
appellant's trial counsel that Tappan would invoke the Fifth Amendment if he 
were called as a trial witness.  The 
parties apparently then agreed that the appellant would simply elicit 
inculpatory statements attributed to Tappan from other trial witnesses.  Accordingly, the appellant called 
Officer David Ferguson, who had been assigned to monitor Tappan and Huffman at 
the scene of the shooting, to testify during the appellant's case.  Officer Ferguson testified that it "was 
not unusual to see [Tappan] intoxicated" and that Tappan's speech on the night 
of the shooting was very slurred.  
According to the officer, Tappan spontaneously volunteered the following 
information:

 
 
            
1.         
Tappan first stated that he "was sleeping during the incident so he 
didn't know what happened";

 
 
            
2.         
Tappan then stated that he saw the appellant shoot the victim and that 
the appellant was "being raped" by the victim;

 
 
            
3.         
Tappan next stated that he shot the victim, that he could not "let [the 
appellant] go down for something [Tappan] did," and indicated that the officer 
should handcuff him; and

 
 
            
4.         
After the officer advised Tappan of his Miranda rights and activated a tape 
recorder, Tappan reiterated that he saw the appellant shoot the victim with a 
.41 caliber Ruger handgun because the victim was "going to go inside the house 
and retrieve another pistol" and "if somebody was going to get shot with that 
[pistol], they were going to go down."

 
 
[¶13]   The prosecutor proceeded briefly to 
cross-examine Officer Ferguson regarding a September 2002 encounter between the 
officer and Tappan in which the officer responded to a call that a "very 
intoxicated" man had "collapsed" at a local bar.  When the officer asked Tappan "how he 
happened to be down," Tappan first stated that he believed "somebody hit him and 
then fell," but then stated that he had "fallen off the barstool."  Tappan began crying and indicated that he 
"was very upset about some family problems."

 
 
[¶14]   The appellant's trial counsel 
objected to the prosecutor questioning Officer Ferguson about the September 2002 
incident.  After hearing argument 
from both parties, the district court concluded that if Tappan had testified at 
trial, his credibility would have been subject to attack by the prosecution, and 
that the September 2002 incident was a fair and relevant attack on Tappan's 
credibility.  On appeal, the 
appellant contends that the testimony at issue was irrelevant, inadmissible 
under W.R.E. 404(b), and amounted to improper impeachment under W.R.E. 608(b).9

 
 

[¶15]   Even if we were to assume, for purposes 
of this appeal, that the district court erred in admitting the testimony at 
issue, the appellant must still demonstrate that such an error warrants a 
reversal of her conviction.  See Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 52 
(Wyo. 1999).  "An error warrants reversal only when it is 
prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial rights," and it is the 
appellant's "burden to establish that an error was prejudicial."  Candelaria v. 
State, 895 P.2d 434, 439-40 
(Wyo. 1995), overruled on other 
grounds by Allen v. State, 2002 WY 
48, ¶ 43, 43 P.3d 551, 566 (Wyo. 
2002).  See also W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) (any "error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded") and W.R.A.P. 9.04 (any "error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the reviewing 
court").  An 
error

 
 
is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the 
verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant had the error never 
occurred.  To 
demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under circumstances 
which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the 
public sense of fair play.

 
 

Law v. State, 2004 WY 111, ¶ 25, 98 P.3d 181, 190 (Wyo. 
2004) (internal quotation and citations 
omitted).  

 
 
[¶16]   The appellant contends, in a single 
paragraph in her appellate brief, that Tappan's inculpatory statements were 
"vital to the defense and impeachment of those statements was prejudicial" 
because the evidence against her was not overwhelming and pointed "more towards 
[Tappan's] guilt" than her own guilt.  In that regard, the appellant merely notes 
that Tappan made an incriminating statement to Officer Ferguson (although he 
also made exculpatory statements), Huffman testified that he overheard Tappan 
make an incriminating statement shortly after the shooting, and Tappan had a 
single particle on each hand that was consistent with gunpowder residue.10

 
 
[¶17]   Our review of the evidence received at 
trial reveals that Tappan's credibility did not hinge upon the fact that he, 
while intoxicated and emotionally unstable, previously gave Officer Ferguson two 
accounts of how he came to rest on a barroom floor.  Very brief 
testimony to that effect (which testimony the prosecutor did not refer to either 
during his opening statement or his closing argument) was negligible compared to 
the other much more significant evidence that was available to the jury in 
evaluating Tappan's credibility, including:

 
 
1.         
Tappan's intoxication level the night of the shooting, and the 
intoxication levels of the appellant and Huffman;

 
 
2.         The 
contents of Tappan's statement to Officer Ferguson, wherein he first claimed 
that he was asleep and did not know what happened, then claimed that he saw the 
appellant shoot the victim while the victim was raping her, then claimed that he 
shot the victim and should be handcuffed, and finally claimed (when advised of 
his Miranda 
rights and that his statement was going to be recorded) that he saw the 
appellant shoot the victim because the victim was going back to the house to 
retrieve a gun with which to shoot someone;

 
 
3.         How 
Tappan's statement to Officer Ferguson compared with Huffman's testimony, the 
statements attributed to the appellant, and the testimony of other witnesses who 
observed what happened shortly after the shooting;

 
 
4.         How 
Tappan's statement to Officer Ferguson compared with his statements to other law 
enforcement officers;

 
 
5.         
Tappan's potential motivations for giving inculpatory and/or exculpatory 
statements; and

 
 
6.         The 
physical evidence.

 
 
[¶18]   That being the case, we cannot find 
that there was a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the appellant if the testimony at issue had been excluded.  While the record 
contained some evidence to support the appellant's theory that Tappan shot the 
victim, the appellant does not endeavor on appeal meaningfully to analyze the 
weight of the totality of the evidence.  Merely characterizing the state of the record 
and referring to a few pieces of evidence that support a particular theory does 
not persuade us that a reversal of the appellant's conviction is warranted under 
the circumstances.

 
 
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 
 
[¶19]   The appellant next asserts that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct because he intentionally misstated Huffman's 
testimony and misled the jury during closing argument.

 
 
            
Standard of 
Review 

 
 
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are settled by reference 
to the entire record and hinge on whether the accused's case has been so 
prejudiced as to constitute the denial of a fair trial.  English v. State, 
982 P.2d 139, 143 
(Wyo.1999) (quoting Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 
(Wyo.1998); Arevalo 
v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 230 
(Wyo.1997)).  
The propriety of any comment within a closing argument is judged "in the 
context of the prosecutor's entire argument, considering the context of the 
statements and comparing them with the evidence produced at the trial."  Wilks [v. State, 2002 WY 100], at ¶ 26, [49 P.3d 975, 986 (Wyo.2002)] (citing Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 309, ¶ 11 
(Wyo.2002)).  
The burden of proving prejudicial error rests with the appellant.  Wilks, at ¶ 26; see also Taylor[v. State, 2001 WY 13], at ¶ 19, [17 P.3d 715, 722 
(Wyo.2001)]; Tennant 
v. State, 786 P.2d 339, 346 
(Wyo.1990).

 
 
            
Where, as in this case, no objection is raised at trial to the 
prosecutor's alleged misconduct, the standard of review is plain error, which 
demands:

 
 
First, the record must be clear as to the incident which is 
alleged as error.  
Second, the party claiming the error amounted to plain error must 
demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated.  Finally, that party 
must prove a substantial right has been denied him and, as a result, he has been 
materially prejudiced.

 
 

Wilks, at ¶ 7 (quoting Worcester [v. State, 2001 WY 82], at ¶ 7, [30 P.3d 47, 50 
(Wyo.2001)]).

 
 

Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶¶ 100-01, 99 P.3d 928, 957 (Wyo. 
2004), cert. 
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2513 (2005). 

 
 
Closing arguments must be based upon the evidence submitted 
to the jury.  
The purpose of closing argument is to allow counsel to offer ways of 
viewing the significance of the evidence.  Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 145 
(Wyo.1981).  
Prosecutors, just like defense counsel, may review the evidence and 
suggest to the jury inferences based thereon.  . . .  There are limits, however, on prosecutor's 
closing arguments that are designed to insure the fairness of the trial and 
prevent compromise of the judicial system.

 
 

Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 24, 63 P.3d 875, 884-85 (Wyo. 
2003).  In Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 27, 49 P.3d 975, 986-87 (Wyo. 2002), we stated in relevant part:

 
 
            
In Trujillo 
v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 5, 44 P.3d 22, ¶ 5 
(Wyo.2002), this court set forth the following broad guidelines found in the 
Standards for Criminal Justice which are applicable to a prosecutor's arguments 
to a jury:

 
 
(a)  The prosecutor may argue all reasonable 
inferences from evidence in the record.  It is unprofessional conduct for the 
prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the 
inferences it may draw.

 
 
            
Discussion

 
 
[¶20]   Huffman's testimony and the 
prosecutor's closing argument appear clearly in the record.  We have previously 
summarized Huffman's trial testimony, but we find the following excerpts of that 
testimony to be particularly relevant to our discussion of this issue: 

 
 
            
[The prosecutor:]       Okay. What's 
the next thing that happens?

 
 
            
A.        And I was 
there a little bit, and then [Tappan and the appellant] come walking back over 
to the bedroll where they was at.

 
 
            
Q.        Did you 
see them walk back over?

 
 
            
A.        I could 
see them.  It 
was dark, but could make out the obvious.

 
 
            
Q.        Then what 
happens?

 
 
            
A.        . . . 
 He said, here, 
Sue, get your fingerprints all over this.  Because, he said, if they convict me, I will 
go to the penitentiary, and you can say that Lucky was beating you up and raping 
you and you will get off.  Say something fancy.

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
Q.        
Okay.  
And where is Sue while he's saying this?

 
 
            
A.        Well, she 
was standing over by where they were sleeping.

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
Q.        Were you 
able to tell [the police] about the conversations?

 
 
            
A.        No.

 
 
            
Q.        
Okay.  
When did you remember the conversations?

 
 
            
A.        Well, 
some of it didn't come right to me right then.

 
 
            
Q.        When did 
they come to you?

 
 
            
A.        A couple 
days before I could really get the memory.

 
 
            
Q.        Why is 
that?

 
 
            
A.        Because 
some of that I thought was a dream.

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
Q.        
Okay.  
So it took you a couple days for it to all settle in your mind?

 
 
            
A.        Yeah, 
yes.

 
 
            
Q.        You 
weren't sure at the time what you heard?

 
 
            
A.        Not 
really sure, no.

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
[The appellant's trial counsel:]         And 
you saw [Tappan] hand something to Sue, and you thought it was the gun.  Do you remember 
saying that?

 
 
            
A.        Yes.

 
 
            
Q.        And you 
heard [Tappan] say, here, take it, Sue, you need to get your fingerprints on 
it.  Now, you 
remembered that back early morning of the 16th, 
didn't you?

 
 
            
A.        Yes.

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
[The prosecutor:]       Now, Sam, this 
thing that [Tappan] passed through hands to Sue, you just said it had like a 
holster hanging down?

 
 
            
A.        Yes.  It was a black 
object, and it had a belt [or] something hanging down from the holster.  I mean, it was like 
a black object.

 
 
            
Q.        
Okay.  
Not possible it was her brace?

 
 
            
A.        No.

 
 
            
Q.        
Absolutely sure?

 
 
            
A.        I would 
be sure.

 
 
            
Q.        
Okay.  
And then she stands up?

 
 
            
A.        She was 
standing.

 
 
            
Q.        
Okay.  
Sue needs a brace to stand?

 
 
            
A.        Yeah, she 
needs her brace, I guess.  I don't know.

 
 
            
Q.        Do you 
remember her getting her brace on that night?

 
 
            
A.        No, I 
don't.

 
 
[¶21]   The appellant claims that the 
prosecutor intentionally misrepresented this testimony to the jury by stating 
the following during his principal closing argument:

 
 
            
The last thing is Mr. Huffman.  Mr. Huffman is an essential witness for the 
State.  This is 
a man who has passed out, basically.  He is [awakened] by some yelling, some 
arguing that's going on, and he hears parts of it.  Now, how do we know 
it's parts?  
Because he saw [Tappan] hand a dark object to Susan.  Get your 
fingerprints on this.

 
 
            
The key word in that incidentally is not fingerprints, the key word is 
on, because you remember what Susan said in the interview, I asked [Tappan] to 
get my brace and get this on.  And Mr. Huffman did not see her get the 
brace, other than it's being handed by . . . Tappan.  So what we have are 
gaps in what he heard and saw.

 
 
The appellant first points out that Huffman testified that 
Tappan told the appellant to "get [her] fingerprints all over this," while the 
prosecutor stated "[g]et your fingerprints on this" and proceeded to emphasize 
the significance of the word "on" according to the prosecutor's particular view 
of the evidence.  
However, we cannot say that the prosecutor intentionally mischaracterized 
Huffman's testimony in this regard because such a characterization is not 
without an evidentiary basis in the record.  The following colloquy occurred during the 
cross-examination of Huffman:

 
 
            
[The appellant's trial counsel:]         And 
you heard [Tappan] say, here, take it, Sue, you need to get your fingerprints on 
it.  Now, you 
remembered that back early morning of the 16th, 
didn't you?

 
 
            
[Huffman:]       Yes.

 
 
It is also worth noting that the appellant's trial counsel 
characterized Huffman's testimony in a similar manner during her own closing 
argument:

 
 
            
Now, there is another person there, and that's Sam.  Sam said he was 
awakened by arguing.  
He heard a shot.  He looked over and he saw [Tappan] handing 
the gun to Susan.  
He heard [Tappan] say to Susan, take this, get your fingerprints 
on it, tell them Lucky was raping you and that you shot him.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 
[¶22]   The appellant further contends that the 
prosecutor misled the jury by stating that there were "gaps in what [Huffman] 
heard and saw" and misrepresented Huffman's testimony to reflect the 
prosecutor's theory that Huffman overheard Tappan and the appellant discussing 
the appellant's leg brace, rather than the gun used to shoot the victim.  According to the 
appellant, "Huffman's testimony did not support [this] theory" because he was 
adamant that he saw Tappan hand the gun to the appellant and was "sure" it was 
not her leg brace because the appellant was already standing during her 
conversation with Tappan.  The prosecutor was therefore merely 
"advancing his theory and calling it evidence" during his closing argument.

 
 
[¶23]   We find that the prosecutor was 
suggesting reasonable inferences that could be made from the evidence received 
at trial during his closing argument.  Considering the circumstances surrounding the 
shooting, Huffman's testimony, and other witness statements and testimony, it 
was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to suggest that there were "gaps" in 
what Huffman observed or overheard, or that Huffman may have been mistaken in 
that regard.  
Huffman, who was "too drunk" to return home and "passed out" in the yard 
earlier in the evening, had been awakened in the middle of the night when he 
heard the appellant and the victim arguing.  After the shooting, he had trouble 
remembering what happened and was unable to provide some of that information to 
the police the night of the shootingit was a "couple days before [he] could 
really get the memory" because he was not really sure what he heard and that he 
thought some of it was a "dream."  There is also some indication in the record 
that Huffman wore glasses and that law enforcement officers discovered the 
glasses in the area where he had been sleeping on the night of the shooting.

 
 
[¶24]   In addition, the prosecutor 
specifically referred to the appellant's statements during the above-quoted 
excerpt of his closing argument.  Huffman testified that he did not remember 
the appellant putting her brace on.  However, the appellant said that she was 
lying down when she pulled the gun and shot the victim, and that Tappan then 
helped her put on the leg brace before they went into the house.  We note that a 
neighbor also testified that she saw the appellant "sitting up" after the 
gunshot, and then saw Tappan retrieve the appellant's leg brace from the 
clothesline, help the appellant "strap" on the brace, and assist the appellant 
as she walked to the house.

 
 
[¶25]   We conclude that the prosecutor did not 
misrepresent Huffman's testimony, but merely suggested inferences that could be 
made about Huffman's testimony if it were viewed in the context of his physical 
and mental state and what other witnesses observed during the same time 
period.  It was 
not unreasonable for the prosecutor to suggest (despite the certainty Huffman 
professed) either that Huffman may not have seen everything that occurred that 
night, or that he may have been mistaken about what he had seen or heard.  Accordingly, the 
appellant has not demonstrated that the prosecutor's closing argument violated a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law.

 
 
Motorcycle Gang Affiliation Evidence

 
 
[¶26]   At trial, the appellant sought to 
introduce photographs of a Grim Reapers "biker vest" that purportedly belonged 
to the victim, and to then call Carbon County sheriff's deputy Richard Fowler to 
testify regarding the significance of a patch displayed on the vest and the 
general manner in which women are treated by "outlaw" motorcycle gang members.11  In particular, Deputy Fowler testified (as an 
offer of proof) that one patch on the vest was an "earned" patch indicating that 
"one percent of the American public who ride motorcycles . . . don't believe in 
laws, they are considered outlaws."  He further testified (without any specific 
knowledge of the Grim Reapers' gang culture) that "outlaw motorcycle culture 
views women [as] a subculture"single women have no rights or privileges within 
the gang, are considered property of the gang and its members (women can be 
"prostituted, sold, bought, traded at will" and disciplined), and exist for the 
sexual pleasure and economic benefit of the gang members.

 
 
[¶27]   The district court excluded this 
evidence for several reasons:  (1) a sufficient foundation had not been 
established for Deputy Fowler to testify about the Grim Reapers motorcycle gang; 
(2) the testimony was not relevant because it was too general and tenuous to the 
circumstances of the instant caseno evidence indicated that this was a 
motorcycle gang "related crime or situation"; and (3) any probative value that 
the testimony may have had was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, and the potential to mislead the jury regarding the 
issues of the instant case.

 
 
[¶28]   On appeal, the appellant claims that 
the district court abused its discretion in excluding Deputy Fowler's 
testimony.  
According to the appellant, she established an adequate evidentiary 
foundation for the testimony and the testimony was relevant to rebut witness 
testimony elicited by the prosecutor that the appellant and the victim "had a 
good relationship with no signs of physical or sexual abuse," to corroborate the 
appellant's statements that the victim had mistreated her in the past, and to 
explain why the appellant was afraid of the victim and took the murder weapon to 
the yard with her prior to the shooting.

 
 
[¶29]   We will focus our discussion on the 
district court's analysis pursuant to W.R.E. 403, which rule provides that 
although relevant,12 "evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  Our standard of 
review is as follows:

 
 
"Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of 
the trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and 
relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This court will 
generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of 
evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion.'  Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo.1999) 
(citation omitted).  
We have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the 
question of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Judicial discretion 
is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  In the absence of 
an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's 
determination.'  
[Griswold v. 
State, 2001 WY 14, ¶ 7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001).]  
The burden is on the defendant to establish such abuse."

 
 

Wilks, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 19, 49 P.3d at 984 (quoting Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766 (Wyo. 
2001), cert. 
denied, 535 U.S. 994 (2002)).

 
 

[¶30]   Evidence of an individual's gang 
affiliation can be probative of material issues in certain cases.  See generally, for 
example, Johninson v. State, 317 Ark. 431, 878 S.W.2d 727, 
730-33 (1994) (collecting cases); People v. James, 117 P.3d 91 (Colo.App. 2004), cert. denied, 2005 WL 1864140 (Colo. 2005); State v. Roberts, 261 Kan. 320, 931 P.2d 683, 686-87 (1997) (highly probative of witness bias); State v. Tran, 252 
Kan. 494, 847 P.2d 680, 687-88 (1993) (res gestae and motive); Butler v. State, 102 P.3d 71, 78-79 (Nev. 2004) (probative of motive); State v. Torres, 
183 N.J. 554, 874 A.2d 1084, 1093-95 (2005) (collecting cases); and Annotation, Admissibility of 
Evidence of Accused's Membership In Gang, 39 A.L.R. 4th 775 (1985 and Supp. 2005).

 
 
[¶31]   However, we find that whatever 
probative value Deputy Fowler's testimony arguably might have had in the instant 
case was diminished by the following additional facts:

 
 
1.         The 
victim's membership in the Grim Reapers' motorcycle gang is somewhat 
tenuous.  It 
appears that the only evidence of the victim's association with such a gang is 
that he purportedly possessed the "biker vest" at issue.13  While the 
appellant's trial counsel stated in her offer of proof that the vest belonged to 
the victim and that the victim "belonged" to the Grim Reapers, we have not been 
directed to any witness testimony (contained in the offer of proof or otherwise) 
that the vest was indeed the victim's vest or that the victim was an active 
member of the gang.  
Deputy Fowler testified that he was not familiar with the victim 
personally and we are not aware of any statements by the appellant in this 
regard.

 
 
2.         
Based on Deputy Fowler's testimony, the status of the Grim Reapers in 
this area is dubious.  
According to Deputy Fowler, western chapters of the Grim Reapers "have 
passed over to the Hell's Angels" and are "not even included anymore as 
outstanding motorcycle clubs that are still active in the west," and the deputy 
was not familiar with any Grim Reapers chapter that may have existed in 
Rawlins.  He 
also testified that there have been instances in which someone still possesses a 
gang's "colors" but no longer participates in the "full culture"; such an 
individual would typically "lay low, [and remain] low-key and out of sight, 
because clubs don't let them retire."

 
 
3.         
Deputy Fowler testified that he was only "generally" familiar with how 
"outlaw" motorcycle gangs treat single women and did not have any specific 
knowledge of the Grim Reapers' gang culture.   

 
 
4.         
Deputy Fowler asked the appellant if she had received the gang's "colors" 
indicating that she was the "property of" the victim and she replied that she 
had not.

 
 
5.         At 
trial, the district court allowed the appellant to elicit more specific and 
probative testimony as to the victim's past mistreatment of the appellant.

 
 
6.         Our 
review of the evidence adduced at trial does not reveal a strong nexus between 
Deputy Fowler's testimony and the facts and issues of the instant case.

 
 

[¶32]   With respect to the danger of unfair 
prejudice, we have said that trial courts "must exercise great caution so 
defendants will be convicted on the basis of the evidence pertinent to the 
crimes charged and not on the basis of evidence calculated to appeal to the 
jury's passions or prejudices."  Orona-Rangal v. State, 2002 WY 134, ¶ 15, 53 P.3d 1080, 1085 (Wyo. 
2002).  Evidence of an individual's gang affiliation 
can be quite prejudicial:

 
 
Gangs generally arouse negative connotations and often 
invoke images of criminal activity and deviant behavior.  There is therefore 
always the possibility that a jury will attach a propensity for committing 
crimes to defendants who are affiliated with gangs or that a jury's negative 
feelings toward gangs will influence its verdict.  Guilt by association is a genuine concern 
whenever gang evidence is admitted.  

 
 

United States v. Irvin, 87 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 903 (1996) (footnote omitted).  See also Utz v. 
Commonwealth., 28 Va.App. 411, 505 S.E.2d 380, 384-88 (1998) ("a juror might associate a defendant with 
such an affiliation as a person of bad character or someone prone to aggressive 
or violent behavior").14  We have not been persuaded that similar 
concerns would not arise in the instant case from the admission of Deputy 
Fowler's testimony, despite the fact that the alleged gang member was the 
victim, rather than the defendant.

 
 
[¶33]   With these considerations in mind, we 
conclude that the appellant has not demonstrated that the district court clearly 
abused its discretion in excluding Deputy Fowler's testimony pursuant to W.R.E. 
403.

 
 
[¶34]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Tappan and Huffman were friends, and both were also friends 
of the appellant and the victim.

 
 

2The prosecutor and the appellant's trial counsel seem to 
have referred to one of the appellant's tape-recorded statements during their 
closing arguments.  
A transcript of that statement was admitted as a trial exhibit (and the 
tape was played for the jury) without much accompanying testimony as to the 
contents of the statement.  Because the trial exhibits are apparently not 
contained in the record on appeal, we are unable to refer to whatever the 
appellant may have said during that interview.

 
 

3The appellant stated that she did not like guns, but that 
the victim bought the gun for her because he was a convicted felon and was not 
allowed to possess a firearm.  She maintained that the gun was hers, and 
that it was in its holster when she went out to the yard.  The only holster 
that officers discovered at the scene was located in a bedroom inside the 
appellant's residence.

 
 

4The appellant told one officer that the victim had been 
"abusive" in the past and that she was "fearful of what he was going to do" the 
night of the shooting because "she had been fearful in the past."

 
 

5One witness indicated that the appellant and the victim had 
agreed to end their relationship.

 
 

6Ballistics analysis revealed that the trigger had been 
pulled twice, once on an empty chamber.

 
 

7However, the appellant told another officer that when the 
victim was drinking, he would stay up late and come into the bedroom and "try to 
have sex with her."  
The victim was "real forceful and mean," but the appellant would "push 
him away."  The 
appellant seemed to indicate at another point in that interview that the victim 
had forced her to have sex with him and that this was why she "thought" the 
victim was going to rape her when she "grabbed the gun."  The appellant 
denied that the victim had otherwise "physically abused" her.

 
 

8Tappan told a different officer who requested that he 
provide a biological sample based on the appellant's statement that she had been 
raped:  "Damn 
right there was an assault.  [The victim] was raping her and I [Tappan] 
had my underwear around my ankles.  How do you think that made me feel about not 
being able to help her?"

 
 

9The potential admissibility of this testimony pursuant to 
W.R.E. 806, W.R.E. 608(b), and W.R.E. 611(b) poses several interesting 
questions.  See generally 3 and 
4 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, 
§§ 306, 311, 511 (2d ed. 1994 and Supp. 2005); Alan D. Hornstein, On the Horns of an 
Evidentiary Dilemma:  
The Intersection of Federal Rules of Evidence 806 and 608(b), 56 Ark. 
L. Rev. 543 (2003); and Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Evidence Rule 806 and 
the Problem of Impeaching the Nontestifying Declarant, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 495 
(1995).  
However, we do not feel compelled to address these issues, particularly 
when some of the issues are not addressed in the parties' appellate briefing and 
the disputed testimony did not affect the appellant's substantial rights.

 
 

10Gunshot residue tests revealed that neither the appellant, 
nor Huffman, had any particles consistent with gunshot residue on their faces or 
hands, and that the appellant's shirt did not contain any particles consistent 
with gunshot reside.  
Tappan had one particle consistent with, but not necessarily "unique to," 
gunshot residue on each hand, but none on his face.  An expert witness 
testified that such particles can be deposited by firing a gun, being in the 
proximity of a gun that is being fired, or by secondary transfer (i.e. picking 
up a gun that someone else has fired).  The particles "do not remain resident" on 
"hand surfaces" for long periods of time and can be eliminated relatively 
quickly by normal activity or by washing or wiping one's hands.

 
 

11Deputy Fowler had worked for a state gang task force in 
Arizona for five years and attended a basic gang school and other, more 
specialized gang schools relating to prison gangs, motorcycle gangs and street 
gangs.  With 
respect to motorcycle gangs, he testified that he knew the "mannerisms of the 
gang members themselves" as well as "the rituals of joining the gangs, clubs, 
such like that."

 
 

12Relevant evidence is defined as "evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence."  W.R.E. 401.

 
 

13The photographs of the vest are not contained in the record 
on appeal and we are unable to determine from the record whether the vest 
itself, or where it was discovered, contained indicia of the victim's 
ownership.

 
 

14One court has 
further noted that "when the expert witness testimony is an investigating 
officer, the expert opinion may present significant danger of undue prejudice 
because the qualification of the officer as an expert may lend credibility to 
the officer's fact testimony regarding the investigation."  Torres, 874 A.2d  at 
1100.