Case Title: Ex Parte State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1984-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
461 So. 2d 16 (1984)
Ex parte State of Alabama.
(Re: George Joseph THOMAS v. STATE).
83-917.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 31, 1984.
*17 Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Gerrilyn V. Grant, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Jack W. Wallace, Jr., Montgomery, for respondent.
BEATTY, Justice.
This Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals was correct in holding that it was error to allow a police officer to testify as a prosecution witness in the State's case in chief that the victim identified the defendant in a lineup.
The facts are set out in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 461 So. 2d 15, (Ala.Crim.App.1984).
We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals on its recognition of the general rule, as found in Aaron v. State, 273 Ala. 337, 345, 139 So. 2d 309, 316 (1961):
This principle was later reemphasized in Seals v. State, 282 Ala. 586, 603, 213 So. 2d 645, 662 (1968), when this Court stated:
Aaron v. State, supra, contains an analysis of the circumstances under which such evidence may be admitted. In that case, the victim of a rape positively identified the defendant as her attacker during the trial, testifying that she had positively identified the defendant at the jail on a previous occasion. Her physician was also present on that prior occasion when she identified the defendant, and he was allowed to testify to that identification:
This Court added, at 273 Ala. 344-345, 139 So.2d 316:
The identical point was extensively dealt with in Seals v. State, supra, 282 Ala. at 602-603, 213 So.2d at 661-662:
"Lt. Charles Wimberly, who was also a detective at the time of the line-up, testified that he was present and explained the manner in which the line-up was conducted. During the course of the direct examination of Lt. Wimberly the following occurred:
"Lt. Wimberly gave no testimony as to what Mrs. Shaw, then Mrs. Hickey, said on that occasion.
"In brief of appellant it is asserted that the testimony of witnesses Riddle and Wimberly relative to Mrs. Shaw's identification of Seals was inadmissible in that it was hearsay. Reliance is had upon Aaron v. State, 273 Ala. 337, 139 So. 2d 309; McBride v. State, 20 Ala.App. 434, 102 So. 728; and Jackson v. Vaughn, 204 Ala. 543, 86 So. 469.
"In Aaron v. State, 273 Ala. 337, 345, 139 So. 2d 309, 316, we did observe:
"This is not an express holding that testimony of the nature given by witnesses Riddle and Wimberly is inadmissible.
"In McBride v. State, supra, the appellant had been convicted of manslaughter in the second degree by running over one Sarah Clark with an automobile. In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals of this state said, in part:
"As bearing on the distinction sought to be made by the Solicitor between actions and statements testified to by third parties, we quote from Jackson v. Vaughn, 204 Ala. 543, 544-545, 86 So. 469, 470:
"In Key v. State, 240 Ala. 19, 197 So. 364, we were not concerned with the question presently under consideration. A violation of the hearsay rule was not involved.
The Seals court found the testimony of the police officers to be harmless error, because Seals's identification by Mrs. Shaw both in court and at the lineup was undisputed. The same conclusion cannot be reached in this case, because the victim did not make an in-court identification, nor did he testify that he identified the defendant at the lineup.
It is true that authority exists to the contrary, notably Abercrombie v. State, 382 So. 2d 614 (Ala.Crim.App.1980). The facts of that case are succinctly stated in the opinion at 382 So.2d 615:
That opinion cites as authority a passage in C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 273.01 (3d ed. 1977):
While this general statement has application in a number of instances, e.g., fixing the date of a crime, Kyzer v. State, 250 Ala. 279, 33 So. 2d 885 (1947), or the place where a crime was committed, Stone v. State, 243 Ala. 605, 11 So. 2d 386 (1943), it cannot be used, as its express terms recite, as the truth of the matter asserted.
In this case, the prosecuting witness, Watson, made no in-court identification of the defendant, nor did he testify that he identified the defendant in the lineup. Thus, there was no evidence identifying the defendant as the thief at that stage of the trial. Then, the State produced the two police officers who testified "that Watson [the prosecuting witness] identified Thomas [the defendant] in a lineup." This was the equivalent of allowing the officers to testify that "Watson said Thomas is the thief." Without question, that statement was admitted for a hearsay purpose, as evidence of "the truth of the matter asserted," i.e., that Watson's identification was the truth, and thus as substantive evidence that Thomas was the thief.
The allowance of such evidence in this case was contrary to the rule recognized in Aaron, supra, and Seals, supra, and the *21 general rule recognized in 71 A.L.R.2d 449 at 486:
To the extent that it is contrary to the views expressed herein, Abercrombie v. State, is overruled.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All the Justices concur.