Case Title: People v. Tully

Citation: 

Docket Number: S030402

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
Filed 7/30/12 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S030402 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
RICHARD CHRISTOPHER TULLY, 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. H97978 
 
____________________________________) 
 
An amended information charged defendant Richard Christopher Tully 
with the 1986 murder of Shirley Olsson (Pen. Code, § 187) and assault with intent 
to commit rape (id., § 1203.065, subd. (b)).1  The information also alleged a 
special circumstance that the murder was committed in the commission of a 
burglary and, as to both counts, that defendant used a dangerous and deadly 
weapon, to wit: a knife.  (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii), 12022, subd. (b).) 2 
Shirley Olsson, a 59-year-old nurse at the Livermore Veterans 
Administration medical center, was brutally murdered sometime in the night or 
early morning hours of July 24 to 25, 1986.  A coworker went to her residence and 
discovered Olsson‟s nude body in her bed; she had been stabbed 23 times.  A 
bloody knife and Olsson‟s purse were found on the golf course that abutted her 
                                              
1 
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2  
A 1995 amendment to the statute changed the designations of section 
190.2, subdivision (a)(17)‟s subparagraphs from Roman numerals (i) to (xi) to the 
letters (A) to (G); the current designation for the burglary-murder special 
circumstance is section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(G). 
2 
 
house.  The screen to her bathroom window was found in a neighbor‟s backyard.  
The blood on the knife was the victim‟s.  Several months later, a fingerprint and 
palm print on the knife were matched to defendant.  Defendant, who had lived two 
houses down from Olsson‟s residence, admitted to police he had been at the 
victim‟s house the night she was murdered and had had sex with her, but claimed 
the murder was committed by another man. 
A jury convicted defendant as charged and found true the special 
circumstance and weapon allegations.  It then returned a verdict of death, which 
the trial court declined to modify.  This appeal is automatic.  We affirm the 
judgment. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
a.  Shirley (Sandy) Olsson’s murder and the ensuing investigation3 
In July 1986, Sandy Olsson worked as a registered nurse at the Veterans 
Administration medical center in Livermore.  Her specialty was ostomony — 
caring for people who had colostomies — and she also worked as a charge or 
supervising nurse.  Typically, she worked Monday through Friday, arriving 
sometime between 7:00 and 7:30 a.m. and leaving at 4:00 p.m.  Olsson was 59 
years old and divorced with two adult children, a daughter, Sandra Walters, and a 
son, Elbert “Tripp” Walters III.  For much of the year she lived alone at 1556 
Hollyhock Street, except from October through March when her father, Clifford 
Sandberg, came from Kansas and stayed with her.  Olsson‟s residence backed up 
against the Springtown Golf Course. 
                                              
3  
Ms. Olsson‟s given name was Shirley but she was called Sandy by 
everyone but her father. 
3 
 
The portrait of Olsson that emerged from the testimony of various 
witnesses was of a person of fairly set habits.  When she arrived home from work, 
she locked the front door with a chain lock.  After changing her top, she poured 
herself a glass of Coca-Cola and added a little bourbon to it.  When her father 
visited, he and Olsson ate dinner together and watched television.  She usually 
rejected his suggestions that they do something in the evenings because she was 
tired from work.  Instead, she went into her bedroom with her drink to read her 
mail, magazines, and the newspaper.  Olsson‟s daughter testified that Olsson went 
to bed sometime between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m.  She first went through her house 
and made sure all the windows and doors were locked.  Olsson was a modest 
woman who slept in a pair of men‟s flannel pajamas. 
Olsson‟s father testified that during his annual visits to his daughter, she 
never had any male visitors.  Her social life apparently consisted of occasionally 
going out to dinner with work friends. 
On Thursday, July 24, 1986, Olsson arrived for work at the Veterans 
Administration medical center at 7:00 a.m. and left at around 4:00 p.m.  She 
walked to her car with another nurse, Deborah Gifford.  Gifford testified that 
Olsson was in a good mood because she was flying to Topeka that weekend for a 
family celebration of her father‟s 85th birthday.  Olsson‟s across-the-street 
neighbor, Elden Freeman, saw her arrive home sometime between 4:15 and 4:45 
p.m.  From his living room, Freeman saw Olsson leave her den at about 8:00 p.m. 
and then turn off the light in the room at about 10:00 p.m.  At that point, there 
were no other lights on at her house that he could see. 
At about 4:00 a.m., Linda Rocke, who lived in a house on the opposite side 
of the golf course from Olsson, was awakened by her dog‟s barking.  She took the 
dog outside to keep it from waking the rest of her family.  In her backyard, Rocke 
4 
 
found what looked like a small bathroom screen.  It had not been in her backyard 
earlier. 
Olsson failed to appear at work the next morning, July 25.  This was 
unusual because Olsson was described as “very reliable” by her colleague Maxine 
Gatten.  When Olsson failed to appear by 7:25 a.m., Gatten called her residence 
but did not get an answer.  Later, she again unsuccessfully tried to reach Olsson by 
phone.  She discussed the matter with other nurses; they worried that Olsson might 
be sick, because she had complained about chest pains.  Eventually, Gatten left the 
matter of Olsson‟s absence to another nurse, Barbara Green. 
Green and Olsson had a close relationship.  They shared an office and 
frequently ate lunch together.  Olsson brought her lunch to work in a paper sack 
that she kept in her purse.  Her lunch sometimes included fruit, like grapes.  Green 
was aware that Olsson was flying to Kansas the next day for her father‟s birthday.  
When, at about 8:45 a.m., Gatten told Green that Olsson had not reported for 
work, Green became “[v]ery concerned.”  After she, too, failed to reach Olsson by 
phone, Green drove to Olsson‟s residence.  Green found Olsson‟s car parked in the 
driveway and the newspaper in front of her house.  She went to the front door, 
rang the bell, knocked, and called Olsson‟s name, but did not receive a response.  
She looked in through a glass panel at the front of the house; there was no 
movement inside.  
Green went around to the back where the house abutted the golf course.  
The windows and the sliding door were locked.  However, she noticed the 
bathroom window was open.  She could not reach it on her own, so she pulled a 
wooden plant stand beneath it and climbed onto the stand.  She was still unable to 
see through the window.  Eventually, Green enlisted the help of Olsson‟s 
neighbor, Freeman.  
5 
 
Freeman knew Olsson well enough that she would ask him to water her 
plants and watch her house when she was on vacation.  He had been expecting 
Olsson to bring him the key to her house so he could take care of it while she was 
in Kansas.  As of Friday morning, the day before she was leaving, she had not 
done so.  Green went to Freeman‟s house and, after explaining that she had been 
trying to reach Olsson, asked to use the phone.  Green called 911.  When there was 
no response from the 911 call, she and Freeman returned to Olsson‟s house.  With 
Freeman‟s help, she managed to get high enough to see through the bathroom 
window.  In the bathroom mirror, she saw Olsson‟s reflection.  Olsson was lying 
naked on her stomach across her bed; there was a puddle of blood on the floor 
beneath her head.  Green “knew that [she] had to get in as soon as [she] could 
because [she] had to stop the bleeding.”  Freeman returned to his house and got a 
ladder.  Using the ladder, Green entered the house through the bathroom window.  
Freeman went around to the front door and waited. 
Green went to her friend‟s side.  She saw “slits” on Sandy Olsson‟s back, 
“blood dripping down her face,” and “her left eye was bulging out of her head.”  
Her bedclothes were crumpled beneath her.  She touched Olsson‟s body; it was 
cold.  She left the bedroom to find a phone to call 911.  As she left the bedroom, 
she saw a framed photograph had fallen from the wall to the floor while another 
photograph, still on the wall, was crooked and broken.  She was unable to find the 
phone and went to the front door.  She saw that a chain lock had been broken; two 
of the screws that attached to a plate on the door were hanging from the chain.  
She opened the door and let Freeman in.  She told him she could not find the 
phone.  Freeman told her the phone was in the shape of a Coca-Cola bottle and 
where she would find it.  Green called 911 and told the operator that Olsson had 
been murdered.  Before long, a police officer arrived.  He asked Green if Olsson 
was dead.  Green tried unsuccessfully to get a pulse.  She told the officer that 
6 
 
Olsson was dead.  At some point, Green left the house and went to Freeman‟s 
residence. 
Sergeant Scott Robertson of the Livermore Police Department was put in 
charge of the investigation.  He arrived at the house at about 9:45 a.m.  He 
conferred with other officers already at the crime scene and then walked though 
the house.  There were some green grapes on the living room carpet.  He observed 
signs of a struggle in the front entryway, where he saw a framed photograph that 
had apparently fallen to the floor and two photographs on the wall that were 
slightly askew.  Just inside the master bedroom he saw another photograph that 
had fallen from the wall.  He also observed signs of a forced entry into the house 
in the form of the broken slide chain latch on the front door. 
In Olsson‟s bedroom, he observed blood splatters on the closet door and a 
smear of blood on a light switch.  He examined Olsson‟s body and saw wounds he 
believed were consistent with a forced entry into the house.  There were bruises on 
Olsson‟s forehead and lips that seemed to be consistent with the edge of a door.  
There was a similar bruise on the outside of her left ankle.  Beneath her body 
police found a pair of flannel pajamas and blankets.  There was a glass of Coca-
Cola and a glass of bourbon on the nightstand next to the bed.  A bathrobe and pair 
of slippers were on the floor.  On a desk in the bedroom were folded clothes, 
evidently put there by Olsson for her trip to Kansas.  Robertson found no money in 
the house but a receipt in the kitchen indicated Olsson had received change of 
$3.95 from a supermarket purchase the prior evening. 
Around noon, Judith Williams and Cathie Garton were finishing a round of 
golf at the Springtown Golf Course.  They saw a purse floating in a pond on the 
course.  They fished the purse out of the pond and took it into the clubhouse.  The 
purse contained Olsson‟s hospital identification card, driver‟s license, credit cards 
7 
 
and checkbook, among other items, as well as some loose grapes.  It had no cash 
in it. 
Later that afternoon, police searched the golf course for the murder weapon, 
assisted by security officers from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.  At about 
3:00 p.m., one of those officers, Renorise Conn, discovered a bloody knife beneath 
a tree in knee-high brush.  That evening, police retrieved the window screen that 
Linda Rocke had discovered in her backyard the previous night.  Police 
determined that the screen belonged to Olsson‟s master bathroom window. 
Pathologist Sharon Van Meter autopsied Sandy Olsson‟s body.  Dr. Van 
Meter counted 23 stab wounds.  The wounds were consistent with the knife 
recovered from the golf course, a Buck 110 knife.  Apart from the stab wounds, 
Van Meter found hemorrhaging of Olsson‟s neck and larynx muscles consistent 
with strangulation.  Van Meter also observed injuries to Olsson‟s lip and head 
consistent with her head having come into contact with the edge of a door being 
forced open.  While Van Meter found no trauma to Olsson‟s vaginal area, she 
testified that the absence of such trauma did not mean Olsson had not been forced 
to submit to sexual intercourse before her death.  Van Meter testified that the 
cause of death was shock and hemorrhaging, as the result of multiple stab wounds, 
associated with asphyxia due to fractures of the larynx.  Olsson may have survived 
for more than an hour after the wounds were inflicted. 
The blood on the knife was consistent with Olsson‟s blood.  The sheets on 
her bed had bloodstains that indicated they had been used to wipe off the bloody 
knife.  Forensic examination of Olsson‟s body, clothes, and bedding failed to 
reveal the presence of semen or spermatozoa.  The criminalist who conducted the 
examination testified that her findings did not rule out the possibility of sexual 
intercourse if the assailant had not ejaculated. 
8 
 
Two identifiable prints were recovered from the knife handle.  Between 
July 25, 1986, and March 1, 1987, the Livermore Police Department submitted the 
names of 40 or 50 possible suspects to the California Department of Justice for 
fingerprint comparison purposes.  Among the prints submitted were defendant‟s.  
However, the fingerprint analysts were unable at that time to match the prints on 
the knife or any prints taken from the crime scene to a suspect. 
b.  Defendant is connected to the murder 
In July 1986, John Chandler lived on Hollyhock Street, two houses from 
Olsson‟s residence.  Chandler was the boyfriend of defendant‟s mother and had 
known defendant since defendant was 15 years old.  Defendant had lived with 
Chandler, moving out only three weeks before Olsson was murdered.  Defendant 
kept a key and sometimes stayed at Chandler‟s house.  He also received mail and 
phone messages there.  Chandler told the district attorney and a district attorney 
investigator that he was with defendant when defendant purchased a Buck 110 
knife in September 1985.4 
On March 17, 1987, Sergeant Robertson had a conversation with Officer 
Scott Trudeau, also a member of the Livermore Police Department.5  Based on 
that conversation, Robertson resubmitted defendant‟s prints for analysis.  A 
fingerprint and a palm print on the murder weapon were matched to defendant‟s 
right ring finger and right palm.  On March 27, Robertson arrested defendant. 
                                              
4  
At trial, Chandler testified that he did not remember if defendant had 
purchased the knife. 
5  
Trudeau had arrested defendant on March 7, 1987, on drug charges 
following a traffic stop.  Defendant made statements to Trudeau that Trudeau 
ultimately realized connected defendant to Olsson‟s murder and he informed 
Robertson of his suspicions.  Defendant‟s statements to Trudeau were suppressed 
prior to trial, but the trial court declined to suppress the fingerprint evidence as 
fruit of the poisonous tree.  The trial court‟s ruling is the subject of defendant‟s 
first claim. 
9 
 
That same day, defendant was interrogated by Robertson and Detective 
Mike Newton, also of the Livermore Police Department.  Defendant 
acknowledged that his mailing address was John Chandler‟s residence and 
admitted to having lived there.  He claimed, however, that he had never met Sandy 
Olsson and had never been in her house.  When Robertson told him that his 
fingerprints had been found on the knife that killed Olsson, defendant denied any 
involvement.  He said his knife had been stolen from his car in the spring of 1986.  
Defendant, who said he read about the murder in the newspapers, suggested it was 
a “domestic type of killing.” 
Robertson also told defendant‟s wife, Vicky Tully, that defendant‟s 
fingerprints had been identified on the murder weapon.  Robertson and Newton 
met with Vicky Tully the following Monday, March 30, 1987.  Afterwards, the 
officers talked to defendant again. 
At the second interview, defendant told the following story:  At some point 
in the early morning hours of July 25, 1986, he met up with a man he knew only as 
“Doubting Thomas,” who was a member of the Hell‟s Angels.  Defendant had 
already consumed four or five 12-ounce beers and four or five 4-ounce 
“kamikazes” at a bar in Pleasanton.  Thomas told defendant he wanted to go to the 
house of a woman who lived on Hollyhock Street in Livermore, from whom he 
bought drugs that she obtained from the hospital.  When defendant told Thomas he 
rented a room from John Chandler on the same street, Thomas said “that worked 
out good” and told defendant to park at Chandler‟s because it was “only a couple 
of houses down” from their destination.  The two men walked to the woman‟s 
residence.  Thomas entered first and then signaled for defendant to enter.  While 
Thomas and the woman talked in her bedroom, defendant waited in the living 
room where he found a bottle of whiskey and “took a few pulls off” of it. 
10 
 
He heard Thomas and the woman start to argue.  After they calmed down, 
Thomas motioned for defendant to come into the bedroom and asked him if he 
“wanted to have a little fun” with the woman.  Defendant entered the bedroom and 
found the woman naked on her bed.  He had intercourse with the woman but was 
too drunk to maintain an erection and did not ejaculate.  He was in the bedroom 
for under ten minutes and left feeling “kinda stupid.” 
Defendant went back out into the living room while Thomas rejoined the 
woman in the bedroom.  He heard Thomas and the woman arguing again; “[i]t 
sounded like they were wrassling or he was knocking her around or something.”  
Defendant went to the hallway to listen in and the woman came charging naked 
out of the bedroom and ran into him.  Thomas came out and pulled the woman 
back into the room by her throat and hair.  Defendant returned to the living room.  
Within a matter of minutes, it got quiet and Thomas came out of the bedroom.  
Defendant went into the bedroom and saw the woman lying naked on the bed with 
multiple stab wounds on her back.  He said he “was freaking out” and asked 
Thomas if he had killed her.  Thomas said yes, but did not say why. 
Observing that Thomas had been wearing leather gloves the entire time, 
defendant went to his car to get his gloves.  When he returned he saw Thomas in 
the living room rummaging through a purse.  Defendant attempted to wipe his 
fingerprints off any object he had touched.  He and Thomas left through the patio 
door.  Thomas handed defendant the knife defendant had had in his car.  
Defendant became angry that Thomas had used his knife to kill the woman.  
Thomas wanted to return to Chandler‟s house, but defendant told him, “we can‟t 
go back over there, you know, looking like we do.”  They walked toward the pond 
on the golf course.  Defendant tossed the knife while Thomas, after taking what he 
wanted from the purse, threw it into the pond.  Defendant gave some of his clothes 
11 
 
to Thomas while he went to get his car.  When he returned for Thomas, his clothes 
were gone and Thomas told him, “I stashed ‟em so they won‟t be found.” 
Defendant sought to be placed in a witness protection program because he 
was afraid of Doubting Thomas.  He denied having stabbed the victim. 
Later that day, defendant spoke to a deputy district attorney and an 
investigator.  Defendant again expressed interest in the witness protection 
program.  The district attorney declined to make any promises, rebuffed 
defendant‟s request for a plea bargain, and reminded him that what he said could 
and would be used against him.  Defendant then essentially repeated the story he 
had told the police.  Defendant told the district attorney that other women had 
offered themselves to him for sex before, explaining, “Sometimes it was party 
situations, sometimes it was just, um, what they call a pass-around chick.” 
A review of medications handled by Olsson revealed no shortages of any 
controlled substance.  Police identified “Doubting Thomas” as Thomas Pillard.  
His fingerprints were obtained and submitted to the California Department of 
Justice along with defendant‟s. 
 
2.  Defense evidence 
The defense called Sergeant Scott Robertson, who identified a pair of 
men‟s shoes recovered from a dumpster near the golf course as well as bedding 
items taken from the victim‟s bedroom.  The defense also recalled criminalist 
Sharon Binkley regarding her examination of hair evidence taken from Olsson‟s 
bedroom.  Binkley testified that all the hairs retrieved from the crime scene were 
consistent with Olsson‟s hair and inconsistent with defendant‟s hair, except for 
some reddish-brown hairs on a pillowcase (which evidently belonged to Olsson‟s 
daughter‟s dog) and two unidentified human hairs on a knitted blanket.  The 
defense‟s only other witness was Charles Fraser, the deputy district attorney who 
12 
 
had interviewed defendant on March 30, 1987.  He testified to his experience as a 
trial lawyer, particularly to the number of cross-examinations he had conducted 
prior to his interview with defendant. 
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
The prosecution presented evidence that defendant had been involved in 
two physical altercations while in jail.  On January 7, 1988, defendant engaged in 
a fistfight with another inmate during mealtime.  Defendant received a split lower 
lip that required a stitch, while the other inmate suffered no visible injuries.  On 
September 26, 1991, Alameda County Deputy Sheriff Michael Perkins saw 
defendant and another inmate in a “wrestling hold” with each other.  They had to 
be forcibly separated.  Defendant had some bumps and bruises on his face.  The 
other inmate was treated for an eye injury. 
The prosecution also presented victim impact evidence in the form of 
testimony from Sandy Olsson‟s adult children, Sandra Walters and Elbert “Tripp” 
Walters III; her sister, Jan Dietrich; and Olsson‟s then 91-year-old father, Clifford 
Sandberg.  Sandra Walters, 35 years old at the time of trial, testified that her 
mother was her “best friend,” and “meant everything to me.”  She stayed with her 
mother once a month and called her every week.  Her mother‟s death had left her 
feeling “lost” and “afraid.”  She “didn‟t know who was going to take care of me if 
my mom wasn‟t around.”  Her first thought about her mother “is the horror of how 
she died,” and she could not see a knife without remembering the manner of her 
mother‟s death.  She testified that she slept “with a night light” and a “hatchet 
underneath my bed.”  She knew her mother had had breast cancer “but if she 
would have died by cancer, [Walters] could have at least said good bye to her.”  
13 
 
She remained angry because her mother had been taken from her and it had 
become hard for her to be close to anyone. 
Tripp Walters testified that his mother was his “anchor,” who had 
“unconditional love” for him even when he “a little bit wild” as a teenager and 
into his 20‟s.  He described his mother as “happy” and “caring.”  Her death 
“turned [his] whole world upside down,” was “devastating,” and left him “very 
depressed.”  Since his mother‟s murder, he had married and he and his wife were 
planning to have a child.  He would have understood if his mother had died from 
cancer but he could not understand that she was murdered. 
Jan Dietrich, who lived in Washington, D.C., at the time of the trial, was 
Sandy Olsson‟s younger sister.  They were each other‟s only sibling, and were 
close friends.  They had travelled together in Europe and the United States.  
Dietrich testified that Olsson had planned to retire in three years and they had 
talked about Olsson‟s plans to travel.  Dietrich had to tell her father about Olsson‟s 
death, and flew to Topeka, Kansas, so that she and her father could fly to 
California together.  She and her father were at the airport at Topeka preparing to 
fly to California at about the same time Olsson‟s plane would have been arriving 
in Topeka for her father‟s birthday celebration.  Dietrich felt no closure because of 
the manner of her sister‟s death. 
Clifford Sandberg testified he and his daughter had planned to buy a car 
together after she retired and to use it to travel.  At 91, he had experienced the 
death of many people, but the manner of his daughter‟s death still caused him 
difficulty. 
 
2.  Defense  Evidence 
Derek Mendoca, the inmate with whom defendant was fighting on 
January 7, 1988, testified that he threw the first punch because defendant had 
14 
 
wiped mustard or ketchup on Mendoca‟s shirt.  He and defendant were friends 
before the fight and were friends afterwards. 
Defendant‟s older siblings, Shirley Brown and Roger Tully, also testified.  
Brown testified that defendant was born in Turkey, one of five children their 
mother had by three different men.  Defendant‟s father, Richard Ross Tully 
(Richard Ross), was Brown‟s stepfather; their mother‟s name was Louise.  
Richard Ross was in the Air Force and the family moved often.  Richard Ross also 
received assignments that took him away from home for long periods of time.  
Once, when he was gone for six months, Louise began living with another man. 
Richard Ross had a drinking problem, and he and Louise “were always 
fighting.”  Louise was the physical aggressor.  She was very demanding of the 
children, “wors[e] than a drill sergeant.”  Brown was ashamed of her stepfather‟s 
constant drinking because she “didn‟t know what he was going to do.”  If he was 
at home “he was drinking.”  Richard Ross‟s drinking affected his career — he lost 
rank and was forced to enter a rehabilitation clinic.  Once, when Brown was 
age 11, her stepfather came into her room, asked her if she wanted to learn how 
boys kissed, and tried to lay her down on her bed.  She told her mother about the 
incident but Louise did nothing. 
Defendant was a bed wetter.  He was also the object of his mother‟s rage 
and she would call him stupid.  Brown left home as soon as she graduated from 
high school, but continued to have emotional and psychological problems, for 
which she was hospitalized.  She had visited defendant in jail and corresponded 
with him and she wanted to continue to do that. 
Roger Tully, defendant‟s older brother, was adopted by Richard Ross Tully 
but was not his natural son.  At the time of defendant‟s trial, Roger was a burglary 
detective in the Baton Rouge Police Department, where he had also served as a 
homicide detective. 
15 
 
During defendant‟s childhood, neither Richard Ross nor Louise was often 
at home, and responsibility for taking care of him fell to Roger and Shirley.  
Richard Ross was drunk most of the time he was at home, if he came home at all.  
Sometimes he drank to the point of hallucinating.  Once, on a camping trip, he got 
so drunk he thought he was in a sinking boat in the lake where they were camped.  
He began screaming, “Get out, get out, get out.  We‟re going down, we‟re going 
down.”  Roger tried to tell him they were not in the lake, but parked next to it.  
Richard Ross would also be brought home by the military police with black eyes 
and other injuries.  Both he and Louise had affairs.  Once Roger discovered his 
mother naked with another man.  He also found incest pornography in his parents‟ 
bedroom. 
Richard Ross and Louise fought over his drinking.  Often she would rouse 
the children from sleep and they would be “hauled off to a friend‟s house or a 
neighbor‟s house.”  The fights were sometimes physical.  One night Roger came 
home and found broken glass everywhere.  Later, he saw Richard Ross on the 
kitchen floor with a skillet over his head; he had apparently been knocked cold.  
Richard Ross would leave, and then Louise channeled her anger at her children.  
Discipline was inconsistent and her rules were arbitrary.  Louise hit her children 
with her hands and a belt.  Defendant was a particular target of his mother‟s anger.  
Louise was “volatile” and had no close friends.  Roger had had to intervene when 
his mother attempted suicide; it was the last time he saw her. 
Roger reacted to the family‟s dysfunction by “act[ing] out.”  He 
experimented with drugs and ran away from home.  When Roger was age 17, he 
became involved in a church.  His mother threw him out of the house and he went 
to live with a family he had met through the church.  For the first time, he 
experienced “what a normal life is.”  He tried to share his religious experience 
with defendant, but Louise would not allow defendant to go to church with Roger. 
16 
 
Roger said about defendant‟s actions, “The only thing between me being up 
here and him being there, was the fact that I had a religious conversion when I was 
18 . . . .  He‟s got to take his responsibility for his [actions], but as far as how it all 
came out . . . it‟s the most normal, natural result.  I don‟t blame him.” 
Defendant‟s 18-year-old niece, Ursula — Shirley Brown‟s daughter — 
testified that she had begun to correspond with defendant while he was in jail on 
the present charges and she had come to feel comfortable confiding in him.  She 
hoped to continue their relationship.  Defendant‟s son Richard Anthony Tully, 
known as Tony, testified that he often spoke to his father on the phone and 
received letters from him.  He wanted his father to live. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Suppression Motions  
 
1.  Motion to suppress asserting unlawful detention on March 7, 1987 
Sandy Olsson was murdered on July 24 or 25, 1986; by March 1987, the 
police investigation had failed to yield a suspect.  On March 7, 1987, however, 
defendant was detained for driving on a suspended license.  This led to his arrest 
on drug charges and ultimately to his arrest for Olsson‟s murder.  Prior to trial, 
defendant brought two motions to suppress the fingerprint evidence that linked 
him to the murder weapon and also statements he made to police during 
interrogations on March 27 and March 30, 1987.  The first suppression motion 
asserted this evidence was the poisonous fruit of his illegal detention on March 7, 
1987.  (See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 484.) 
a.  Evidence adduced at hearing 
On March 7, 1987, Officer Scott Trudeau of the Livermore Police 
Department was conducting surveillance of the residence of Kenneth Perry, a 
known narcotics offender.  Trudeau was alone in his unmarked patrol car.  Two 
17 
 
other officers, Timothy Painter and Jeff Shweib, were nearby.  At about 8:00 p.m., 
Trudeau saw a Fiat Brava drive past him with two occupants.  He recognized the 
passenger as Ed Snyder.  He also recognized the driver — defendant — because 
he had stopped him two or three months earlier, but did not recall his name.  The 
Fiat passed Trudeau twice before parking near Perry‟s residence.  Trudeau 
described the occupants to Painter.  Painter identified the driver as defendant.  
Painter had taken a vandalism report a week earlier allegedly involving defendant.  
Painter told Trudeau defendant was driving on a suspended driver‟s license and 
that there was an arrest warrant out for Snyder. 
Defendant got out of the car and went into the building where Perry lived, 
emerged 20 to 25 minutes later, and drove away.  Trudeau followed and stopped 
him.  Trudeau stopped defendant because of the license violation and Snyder‟s 
arrest warrant.  He approached defendant and asked him for his driver‟s license 
and his registration.  Defendant gave Trudeau his license but could not find his 
registration.  While Trudeau was talking to defendant about his license and 
registration, Painter and Shweib were at the passenger side of the car talking to 
Snyder.  Painter took Snyder to his own car where Shweib remained with him.  
Trudeau returned to his vehicle to write out the citation.  He completed most of the 
citation in his car, but defendant still had to sign it and there were some boxes on 
the citation which required further discussion with defendant. 
While Trudeau was in his patrol car, Painter approached defendant, who 
was now standing outside his car.  Because of the vandalism incident, Painter 
knew defendant was a narcotics user who was normally armed and liked to use a 
knife.  Painter had been told by the victims that they and defendant had been 
involved in a drug deal “gone sour” and defendant had retaliated against them by 
damaging their car with a knife.  At that point, however, the vandalism incident 
was closed.  Defendant had not even been listed as a suspect because there was no 
18 
 
definite evidence of his involvement.  Even if he had admitted vandalizing the car, 
Painter would not have arrested him because it was a misdemeanor that had not 
been committed in his presence.  He could only have written up a report and asked 
for a complaint.  Painter‟s purpose in talking to defendant was to obtain 
information that either confirmed or discredited what he had been told about 
defendant‟s involvement in the vandalism. 
Painter told defendant “what had been said about him being a narcotics user 
and being armed” with a knife.  He asked defendant if he could search him.  
Defendant said, “Sure, I don‟t have anything on me.”  Painter searched defendant 
by using a flashlight.  He held the flashlight and peered in defendant‟s clothing 
and around him but did not want to “squeeze things too much” because he was 
afraid of being stuck by a needle.6  Painter found a bindle in the coin pocket of 
defendant‟s left pants pocket.  The bindle contained white power that Painter 
believed was methamphetamine.  He turned it over to Trudeau.  
As Trudeau returned to defendant‟s car to complete the citation, he heard 
Painter ask defendant for consent to search and defendant reply “[s]omething to 
the effect, you know, go ahead and knock yourself out, something like that.”  
Trudeau heard Painter say he was concerned that defendant carried weapons but 
could not recall “[w]ord for word” what Painter said when he asked defendant if 
he could search him.  After Painter gave Trudeau the bindle, Trudeau asked 
defendant for permission to search his car.  Defendant said, “[S]ure, go ahead.”  
Trudeau found three hypodermic syringes and a bent, burnt spoon.  Defendant was 
                                              
6  
At the suppression hearing, Painter testified that he told defendant he 
wanted to search him for “weapons and narcotics.”  He was confronted with his 
testimony at the preliminary hearing, at which he testified that he searched 
defendant because he thought he might have a weapon, but made no explicit 
mention of drugs.  In response, Painter testified, “I believe it‟s more to that,” but 
conceded he did not specifically recall asking defendant whether he could also 
search him for drugs as well as a weapon. 
19 
 
then arrested for possession of methamphetamine, possession of hypodermic 
syringes and driving on a suspended license.  He was transported to the police 
station where a booking search revealed seven or eight bindles of 
methamphetamine secreted in his underwear. 
Trudeau read defendant his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 
U.S. 436), which defendant waived.  However, when Trudeau told defendant he 
“was going to ask [defendant] questions pertaining to the items that were found on 
him, [defendant] told [Trudeau] he didn‟t want to talk to [him].”  Trudeau stopped 
questioning defendant.  Defendant then “initiated [a] conversation about how he 
did not want to go to jail on that particular evening.”  Trudeau told him there were 
“ways for that not to occur,” specifically that they could reach an agreement for 
defendant to “work off his offense,” by becoming an informant.  Defendant was 
interested and Trudeau went out to call a narcotics detective, Detective Jensen.  
While he and defendant were waiting for Jensen to arrive, they talked.  Trudeau 
learned that defendant had been in the Marine Corps, was injecting himself with 
methamphetamine four or five times a day, and supported his habit by breaking 
into cars and houses and selling items he took from them.  He also told Trudeau 
that he was being treated for stomach problems at a Veterans Administration 
hospital.  Trudeau told defendant that what he had revealed about his drug habit 
and the way he supported it would not be used against him, and it did not appear in 
the police report.  After Jensen arrived, Trudeau left the room.  Jensen came out 
and said he and defendant had reached a deal.  Defendant was released that night. 
At this point, Trudeau knew very little about the Olsson investigation, 
although he had read an FBI profile of it.  It “never entered [his] mind” that 
defendant might be a suspect in that crime.  Trudeau was off work for a few days 
after the interview with defendant.  When he returned he discovered he still had 
defendant‟s driver‟s license attached to his clipboard.  He sought out Detective 
20 
 
Jensen, who told him the deal with defendant was off because defendant had failed 
to keep his end of the bargain.  Jensen said he was going to file the drug case.  
Trudeau said he would return defendant‟s license to him.  He drove to the 
residence listed on defendant‟s driver‟s license — 1572 Hollyhock — and realized 
it was only two houses from where Sandy Olsson had lived.  He remembered 
defendant had told him he was being treated at a Veterans Administration hospital 
and that Olsson was a nurse at the Veterans Administration medical center.  He 
also remembered that the FBI profile suggested that the suspect lived in the area of 
the crime scene and was probably a drug user.  Trudeau went to the address but 
found no one home.  He returned to the police station and talked to Sergeant 
Robertson about defendant.  As he was leaving, he ran into another officer, John 
Leal.  Leal told Trudeau that defendant was a suspect in an assault with a deadly 
weapon case.  Trudeau conveyed this new information to Robertson.  He 
suggested Robertson run defendant‟s fingerprints against the prints found on the 
murder weapon. 
Sergeant Robertson and his men had canvassed between 150 and 200 
houses around the crime scene.  Defendant‟s name had not come up from this 
canvass.  Between July 1986 and March 1987, Robertson had looked at around 30 
potential suspects.  He had sent fingerprint cards of potential suspects to the 
California Department of Justice in Sacramento to compare to the prints found on 
the murder weapon but there had been no matches.  Defendant‟s fingerprints had 
been among those sent to Sacramento.7 
As of March 17, 1987, when Trudeau approached him, Robertson had a 
new supervisor, Sergeant Jack Stewart, who had been assigned to the case in 
January 1987.  He told Robertson he wanted to recanvass the entire neighborhood 
                                              
7  
The record is unclear why defendant‟s fingerprints were among those 
submitted to the Department of Justice. 
21 
 
to determine who owned each house, and who had been living in the houses, 
whether as renters or visitors, at the time of the murder.  A plot map of the houses 
surrounding the murder scene indicated that 1572 Hollyhock, where defendant had 
lived, had been double-checked during the first canvass to verify that someone at 
the residence had been interviewed.  Both Robertson and Stewart testified that the 
new canvass would have resulted in a triple check of that address.  Stewart also 
testified that he planned to run a computerized address check to identify all 
residents at houses around the scene of the crime.  He was also going to see if it 
was possible to run a computer check through the Department of Motor Vehicles 
to determine whose driver‟s licenses listed those houses as their residence. 
Based on the information about defendant provided to Robertson by Officer 
Trudeau on March 17, 1987, Robertson took defendant‟s fingerprint card, from a 
1973 juvenile offense, and hand-delivered it to the Department of Justice in 
Sacramento.  Angelo Rienti, a latent fingerprint analyst, told Robertson that 
defendant‟s fingerprint matched the print on the murder weapon.8  Defendant‟s 
palm print, taken after his arrest, was later matched to a partial palm print on the 
murder weapon. 
Defendant was arrested on March 27, 1987, at the home of his wife‟s 
parents.  Police went there with arrest warrants on drug charges.  Sergeant Stewart 
and Detective Tart went to the front door of the residence while Sergeant 
Robertson and Detective Newton were deployed to the rear.  Diane Holbert, Vicky 
Tully‟s mother, answered the front door.  She told police defendant was not there, 
but let the police into her house to talk to her.  Once inside, Stewart asked Holbert 
                                              
8  
Stewart testified that the earlier comparison of defendant‟s prints to the 
print on the knife had not yielded a match because the analyst performing the 
earlier comparison had looked only at the right middle finger for each print card; 
the match that was eventually made was to defendant‟s right ring finger. 
22 
 
if she knew where Vicky was.  Holbert said no.  However, as they were talking 
Stewart saw a woman in the hallway who he thought was Vicky Tully leaving one 
room and about to enter another.  He asked her if she was Vicky Tully.  She said 
yes and asked why he wanted to know.  Stewart told her he was looking for 
defendant.  Vicky looked at the door she was walking toward and told police 
defendant was asleep inside the room.  She said she would get him because he did 
not have clothes on. 
As she opened the door, Stewart went swiftly down the hall and told her the 
police would get him.  At that point, the door was opened about a foot.  Stewart 
saw a man lying on his stomach with his head on a pillow.  Stewart entered the 
room, yelled at him to wake him and asked him if he was Richard Tully.  Stewart 
identified himself as a police officer.  Defendant woke slowly and identified 
himself as Richard Tully.  Stewart told him the police had warrants for his arrest.  
Defendant was arrested, handcuffed and taken to jail wearing only a pair of blue 
jeans. 
b.  Trial court ruling 
Defendant‟s initial motion, filed on February 2, 1992, asserted that all 
evidence arising from defendant‟s initial detention on March 7, 1987, and from his 
subsequent arrest on March 27, 1987, should be suppressed as a product of an 
illegal search and seizure.  Following the hearing on the motion, defendant was 
allowed to file a supplementary motion specifying the grounds for suppression.  
These included: (1) any consent by defendant to a search of his person in the 
course of the March 7 vehicle stop was invalid as the product of an unlawful 
interrogation because he was not given a Miranda warning; (2) even if valid, the 
search of defendant‟s person exceeded the scope of his consent; (3) statements he 
made after his arrest on March 7 on drug charges regarding his drug use and 
23 
 
criminal activity were involuntary; and  (4) entry into the bedroom where he was 
arrested violated section 844‟s knock-notice requirement.  The prosecution argued 
the stop was lawful but, even if it was illegal, the fingerprint comparison evidence 
connecting defendant to Olsson‟s murder was not tainted by such illegality.  The 
prosecution also argued that the fingerprint comparison evidence would have 
inevitably been discovered in light of the new investigative measures that Sergeant 
Stewart intended to undertake. 
The trial court concluded that the search of defendant‟s person did not 
exceed the scope of his consent.  It found further, however, that the statements he 
made following his March 7 arrest about his drug use, his criminal activity to 
support his drug use — breaking into homes and cars — and that he was being 
treated at a Veterans Administration hospital were involuntary and must be 
suppressed because he had been told these statements would not be used against 
him. 
Nonetheless, the court declined to suppress the fingerprint comparison 
evidence because it “was not tainted by the illegally obtained statements and is 
admissible.”  Specifically, “[a]t the time the involuntary statements were obtained, 
the officer had no reason to suspect or believe the conversation would turn up 
evidence of any crime other than the narcotics offenses.  In the court‟s view, this 
was a case of investigatory serendipity.”  The court also found “the police would 
inevitably have again compared defendant‟s prints with those found on the knife 
found at the murder scene.”  On this point, the court found “credible” the 
prosecution‟s evidence that in the “normal course of the continuing murder 
investigation, [defendant] would have emerged as a prime suspect quite apart from 
the statements he gave to Officer Trudeau.” 
24 
 
c.  Discussion 
 “In reviewing a suppression ruling, „we defer to the superior court‟s 
express and implied factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, 
[but] we exercise our independent judgment in determining the legality of a search 
on the facts so found.‟ ” (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 563.) 
Thus, while we ultimately exercise our independent judgment to determine 
the constitutional propriety of a search or seizure, we do so within the context of 
historical facts determined by the trial court.  “As the finder of fact . . . the 
superior court is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 
resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual 
inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable.”  (People 
v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.)  We review its factual findings “ „ “under 
the deferential substantial-evidence standard.” ‟ ”  (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 225, 255.)  Accordingly, “[w]e view the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the order denying the motion to suppress” (People v. Manderscheid (2002) 99 
Cal.App.4th 355, 357), and “[a]ny conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor 
of the superior court‟s ruling.”  (People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 529.)  
Moreover, the reviewing court “must accept the trial court‟s resolution of disputed 
facts and its assessment of credibility.”  (People v. Valenzuela (1994) 28 
Cal.App.4th 817, 823.) 
Because the Attorney General asserts that many of defendant‟s arguments 
on appeal are forfeited by his failure to have advanced them in the trial court, we 
must also briefly examine the question of when an argument not made to the trial 
court is, nonetheless, cognizable on appeal. 
Constitutional claims raised for the first time on appeal are not subject to 
forfeiture only when “the new arguments do not invoke facts or legal standards 
different from those the trial court itself was asked to apply, but merely assert that 
25 
 
the trial court‟s act or omission, insofar as wrong for the reasons actually 
presented to the court, had the additional legal consequence of violating the 
Constitution.”  (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17, italics omitted; 
see People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117.)  However, “[a] party cannot 
argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct.”  
(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435.)  
Defendant contends he was unlawfully detained because the duration of the 
traffic stop was excessive in relation to its purpose.  Additionally, he claims that 
Officer Painter‟s questions about defendant‟s involvement in the vandalism 
incident were unjustified by the purpose of the stop and lacked a separate 
“reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity.  He concludes that because the 
detention was excessive and the questioning unjustified, his consent was 
involuntary.  Additionally, he asserts his consent to search his person was 
involuntary because he was not given Miranda advisements before consent was 
sought. 
Only the Miranda claim was argued below; the others are forfeited.  The 
questions raised by these arguments — whether the duration of the stop was 
excessive and whether Painter‟s questions were proper — involve analyses the 
trial court was not asked to conduct and potentially required factual bases 
additional to those adduced at the hearing.9  The claims are also without merit. 
                                              
9  
Here, as elsewhere, defendant also argues forfeiture should not apply 
because his claim involves the deprivation of fundamental rights, citing People v. 
Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269.  In Vera, we observed that a defendant “is not 
precluded from raising for the first time on appeal a claim asserting the 
deprivation of certain fundamental, constitutional rights.”  (Id. at p. 276.)  But 
none of the narrow class of such rights — a plea of once in jeopardy and the right 
to jury trial (id. at pp. 276-277) — is implicated here.  Moreover, that dictum in 
Vera was not intended to provide defendants with an “end run” around the 
forfeiture rule, thus eviscerating it.  We therefore reject defendant‟s reliance on 
Vera here and at every other point at which he invokes it to avoid forfeiture. 
26 
 
“ „As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable 
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has 
occurred.  (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 810 [135 L.Ed.2d 89, 116 
S.Ct. 1769].)  If there is a legitimate reason for the stop, the subjective motivation 
of the officer is irrelevant.”  (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 564, fn. 
omitted; see People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 785-786.)  “[T]he law 
contemplates that the officer may temporarily detain the offender at the scene for 
the period of time necessary to discharge the duties that he incurs by virtue of the 
traffic stop.”  (People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 584 (McGaughran); 
see People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 496-497.)  Those duties may 
“necessarily include the time required by the officer to write out the citation and 
obtain the offender‟s promise to appear . . . .  [U]pon demand of a police officer 
every motorist must present for „examination‟ both his driver‟s license [citation] 
and the registration card of the vehicle [citation]. . . .  And although not 
specifically compelled by law, certain other steps customarily taken as matters of 
good police practice are not less intimately related to the citation process: for 
example, the officer will usually discuss the violation with the motorist and listen 
to any explanation the latter may wish to offer; and if the vehicles of either are 
exposed to danger, the officer may require the driver to proceed to a safer location 
before the investigation continues.  [Citations.]  [¶]  Each of the foregoing steps, of 
course, requires a certain amount of time to accomplish.”  (McGaughran, supra, at 
p. 584, fn. omitted.) 
Defendant argues that “once [the citation] process was completed, there 
was no cause to detain him for questioning, and any consent to search, which was 
obtained from [defendant] during the illegal questioning was tainted.”  This claim 
assumes that the citation process was completed when Officer Painter questioned 
defendant about the vandalism incident and asked to search him.  Not so. 
27 
 
After Trudeau asked defendant for his license and registration, and 
discussed them with him — while Painter and Shweib were removing Snyder from 
defendant‟s car — Trudeau testified he went back to his car to write the citation, 
but still had to obtain defendant‟s signature and discuss with defendant some 
boxes on the citation form.  While Trudeau was in his car working on the citation, 
Painter approached defendant, spoke to him about the vandalism incident and 
asked for his consent to search.  Thus, defendant was not detained after the 
completion of the citation process to allow Painter to question him.  As the factual 
predicate of his argument falls, the argument itself — that the detention was 
excessive in relation to the time required by Trudeau to complete the citation 
process — also collapses. 
Moreover, Painter was permitted to ask defendant about matters unrelated 
to the traffic stop so long as the questioning did not prolong the stop beyond the 
time required to cite defendant.  (See McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 584 
[“[i]f a warrant check can be completed” within the period of time necessary for 
the completion of the citation process, “no reason appears to hold it improper: 
because it would not add to the delay already lawfully experienced by the offender 
as a result of his violation, it would not represent any further intrusion on his 
rights”], fn. foll. quote; see People v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, 767  
[“investigative activities beyond the original purpose of a traffic stop are 
permissible as long as they do not prolong the stop beyond the time it would 
otherwise take”].) 
In People v. Brown, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 493, the defendant was lawfully 
detained for riding a bicycle without a light or reflectors.  While running a warrant 
check, the detaining officer asked the defendant about his probation status and, 
evidently, the contents of his fanny pack.  A consent search of the pack yielded 
methamphetamine.  On appeal, the defendant argued that it was improper for the 
28 
 
officer to have questioned him about matters unrelated to the vehicle stop.  The 
reviewing court rejected the claim:  “Questioning during the routine traffic stop on 
a subject unrelated to the purpose of the stop is not itself a Fourth Amendment 
violation.  Mere questioning is neither a search nor a seizure.”  (Id. at p. 499; see 
United States v. Shabazz (5th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 431, 435-437 [where car 
stopped for speeding, police could question defendant about his travels and ask 
consent to search his car as long as they were waiting for results of computer 
check on his driver‟s license].) 
In People v. Bell, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th 754, where a similar claim was 
raised, the court observed:  “Defendant argues that . . . police cannot ask questions 
unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop, regardless of whether those questions 
prolong the stop.  The warrant check in McGaughran, [supra, 25 Cal.3d 577] 
however, was unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop; nevertheless, the court 
held that a warrant check would be permissible as long as it did not prolong the 
stop.”  (Id. at p. 767.)  Nor must questioning on an unrelated matter, which does 
not unduly prolong the traffic stop, be justified by reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing.  (People v. Gallardo (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 238 [where, 
during traffic stop, police asked defendant whether he had anything illegal in his 
car, obtained his consent to search and found drugs, an articulable suspicion of 
wrongdoing preceding search request was not required “as long as the detention 
[was] not unreasonably prolonged as a result of the request to search”].) 
Accordingly, we reject defendant‟s claims that the traffic stop detention 
was unduly prolonged, that Painter‟s questions about the vandalism incident were 
improper because they were unrelated to the traffic stop, or that a separate 
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing was required before Painter could inquire or 
seek consent to search, or that defendant‟s consent was obtained in the course of 
an illegal detention. 
29 
 
Defendant claims that his consent to search his person was improper 
because Painter did not give him his Miranda rights before questioning him about 
the vandalism incident.  In Berkemer v. McCarty (1983) 468 U.S. 420 (Berkemer), 
the Supreme Court held that a routine traffic stop, although a detention, is not 
tantamount to a formal arrest, and, therefore, questions asked during such 
detentions do not constitute a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.  
(Id. at pp. 435-440.)  The court characterized routine traffic stops as similar to 
Terry stops (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1), which permit police to briefly 
question individuals about whom the police entertain a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity that falls short of probable cause.  “[T]his means that the officer 
may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and 
to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer‟s suspicions.  But 
the detainee is not obliged to respond.  And, unless the detainee‟s answers provide 
the officer with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be released.  The 
comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the 
absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the 
dictates of Miranda.  The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops 
prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not 
„in custody‟ for the purposes of Miranda.”  (Berkemer, at pp. 439-440, fns. 
omitted.) 
Here, defendant was lawfully detained for a traffic violation during which 
Officer Painter asked him questions about the vandalism incident either to confirm 
or dispel his information that defendant had been involved.  While defendant was 
not free to leave until the citation process was completed, he was under no 
obligation to answer Painter‟s questions.  Unless his answers had provided Painter 
with probable cause to arrest him for vandalism — which, in any case, Painter 
testified he could not have done — he would have been free to leave once the 
30 
 
citation was completed.  Accordingly, pursuant to Berkemer, Painter was not 
required to give defendant Miranda warnings before questioning him and his 
failure to do so did not invalidate defendant‟s consent to search.  We reject 
defendant‟s assertions to the contrary.10 
Next, defendant argues that the search of his person exceeded the scope of 
his consent because he consented only to a search for weapons, not drugs.  He 
claims “Painter exceeded the scope of any consent when he forced his fingers 
in[to] the coin pocket of [defendant‟s] jeans in hopes of finding narcotics, under 
the pretext of searching for a knife, which could not possibly fit in that pocket.”  
“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect‟s consent under the Fourth 
Amendment is that of „objective‟ reasonableness — what would the typical 
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the 
suspect?”  (Florida v. Jimeno (1990) 500 U.S. 248, 251.)  “Whether the search 
remained within the boundaries of the consent is a question of fact to be 
determined from the totality of the circumstances.  [Citation.]  Unless clearly 
erroneous, we uphold the trial court‟s determination.”  (People v. Crenshaw 
(1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1408; see United States v. Sierra-Hernandez (9th Cir. 
1978) 581 F.2d 760, 764.) 
Defendant‟s argument focuses on a perceived discrepancy about what 
Officer Painter said he told defendant.  At the suppression hearing, Painter 
testified that he told defendant he wanted to search him for weapons and narcotics, 
                                              
10  
We also reject defendant‟s related claim that his statement was involuntary 
because he was not told he could refuse to consent.  The argument is forfeited 
because it was not raised below.  It is also without merit.  The circumstances 
surrounding Painter‟s request for consent to search are such that the search was 
not rendered involuntary because he did not tell defendant he had a right to refuse 
to consent.  (See United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 207 [in assessing 
validity of consent “the totality of the circumstances must control, without giving 
extra weight to the absence of this type of warning”].) 
31 
 
while at the preliminary hearing Painter testified he searched defendant because he 
thought he might have a weapon, but made no mention of narcotics.  Defendant 
also cites testimony by Officer Trudeau who, when asked whether he heard 
Painter say something to defendant about weapons but not drugs, replied, “He said 
weapons, correct.” 
Defendant‟s focus is too narrow.  The question is what a reasonable person 
would have understood from his or her exchange with the officer about the scope 
of the search.  To answer that question, we look at the totality of the 
circumstances.  Here, Painter testified that he told defendant about his information 
that defendant used drugs and carried a knife.  When he asked defendant if he 
could search him, defendant said, “Sure, I don‟t have anything on me.”  When 
Painter was confronted by his seemingly inconsistent testimony about whether he 
had asked to search for both a weapon and drugs, he responded, “I recall 
mentioning the weapon and I recall mentioning the narcotics use.  But I — 
apparently made reference in the transcript of searching for weapons.  But I don‟t 
recall exactly narrowing my scope of my search at that point.”  As for Trudeau, his 
response was, at best, ambiguous and, in any event he also testified that he did not 
remember what Painter said to defendant “[w]ord for word,” in asking his consent 
to search. 
Thus, Painter knew defendant was an armed drug user, and communicated 
his awareness to defendant before he asked to search him.  It is therefore 
reasonable to conclude — as evidently the trial court did — that defendant 
understood Painter was asking to search for both drugs and weapons.  It appears, 
moreover, that the trial court found Painter to be a credible witness.  We do not 
second-guess the trial court‟s credibility findings nor, on the record before us, can 
we conclude its implied determination that defendant understood the search to be 
for both drugs and weapons was clearly erroneous.  For this reason, we reject 
32 
 
defendant‟s further claim that the consent search of his car, his arrest, and the 
search of his person at the police station were tainted by the illegality of the initial 
search. 
Defendant asserts that his statements to Trudeau that were suppressed by 
the trial court because they were induced by Trudeau‟s promise not to use them 
against defendant — a promise broken when he repeated them to Sergeant 
Robertson — should also have been suppressed because they were taken in 
violation of Miranda.  From this premise, he argues that all further evidence 
connecting him to Olsson‟s murder should have been suppressed as the fruit of the 
Miranda violation.  Not so.  Trudeau advised defendant of his Miranda rights.  
Defendant invoked those rights by declining to speak about the events surrounding 
his arrest.  At that point, Trudeau ceased his questioning.  Defendant reinitiated the 
conversation when he told Trudeau he did not want to go to jail that night, after 
which Trudeau suggested defendant might “work off” his offense by becoming an 
informant.  Defendant indicated his interest, and a narcotics detective was 
summoned.  While he and Trudeau waited for the detective, defendant made the 
statements at issue here.  Thus, it was defendant who reinitiated the conversation 
of his own volition after Trudeau had acceded to his initial invocation of his right 
to remain silent.  There was no Miranda violation.  (Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 
451 U.S. 477, 484-485; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648-649.) 
As noted, although the trial court suppressed defendant‟s statements to 
Trudeau on the ground they were induced by Trudeau‟s promise not to use them 
against defendant, it went on to find that the fingerprint evidence need not be 
suppressed either because it was the result of “investigative serendipity,” or would 
inevitably have been discovered.  Defendant contends the latter rulings were error. 
The Attorney General contends it was the trial court‟s initial finding that 
defendant‟s statements were involuntary that is the error here.  The Attorney 
33 
 
General argues that there is no substantial evidence those statements were induced 
by Trudeau‟s promise not to use them because defendant spoke voluntarily before 
Trudeau made that promise.  We agree.11 
“In general, a confession is considered voluntary „if the accused‟s decision 
to speak is entirely “self-motivated” [citation], i.e., if he freely and voluntarily 
chooses to speak without “any form of compulsion or promise of rewards . . . .” 
[Citation.]‟  [Citation.]  However, where a person in authority makes an express or 
clearly implied promise of leniency or advantage for the accused which is a 
motivating cause of the decision to confess, the confession is involuntary and 
inadmissible as a matter of law.”  (People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 238.)  
“A confession is „obtained‟ by a promise within the proscription of both the 
federal and state due process guaranties if and only if inducement and statement 
are linked, as it were, by „proximate‟ causation. . . . The requisite causal 
connection between promise and confession must be more than „but for‟:  
causation-in-fact is insufficient.”  (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 778.)  
“This rule raises two separate questions:  was a promise of leniency either 
expressly made or implied, and if so, did that promise motivate the subject to 
speak?”  (People v. Vasila (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 865, 873.)  To answer these 
questions “ „an examination must be made of “all the surrounding circumstances 
— both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” ‟ ”  
(People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 347.)   
                                              
11  
“ „[T]he People may, on an appeal by the defendant and pursuant to the 
provisions of section 1252, obtain review of allegedly erroneous rulings by the 
trial court in order to secure an affirmance of the judgment of conviction.‟  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1076-1077, quoting 
People v. Braeseke (1979) 25 Cal.3d 691, 701, italics omitted; § 1252 [“On an 
appeal by a defendant, the appellate court shall, in addition to the issues raised by 
the defendant, consider and pass upon all rulings of the trial court adverse to the 
State which it may be requested to pass upon by the Attorney General”].)  
34 
 
Officer Trudeau testified that defendant made the statements in question 
while he and Trudeau were conversing as they awaited the arrival of the narcotics 
detective with whom defendant was going to work out an agreement that would 
allow him to be released that night in exchange for becoming a police drug 
informant.  When asked specifically whether “this information about the use of 
methamphetamine and how [defendant] supported his habit” was made “in 
response to something . . . you said to him,” Trudeau testified, “No, it was not.”  
Rather, Trudeau testified these statements were made “after [defendant] had 
agreed to work his case off.”  Moreover, it was only after defendant made these 
unsolicited statements that Trudeau told him those statements would not be used 
against him in the drug case. 
Trudeau‟s uncontroverted testimony establishes that defendant‟s statements 
about his drug use and burglaries were made after defendant had already agreed to 
“work off” his arrest, were not solicited by Trudeau, and were not part of any 
inducement for defendant to become an informant.  Furthermore, Trudeau‟s 
testimony shows that the promise he made to defendant not to use those statements 
— the very promise that the trial court ruled rendered those statements involuntary 
— was not given until after the statements had been made.  There is simply no 
evidence in the record, much less substantial evidence, to support the trial court‟s 
ruling that Trudeau‟s promise induced the statements.  Rather, the statements were 
gratuitous and untethered to any promise made by Trudeau. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred when it suppressed 
defendant‟s statements as involuntary.  Those statements should have been 
admitted and it was unnecessary for the trial court to justify admission of the 
fingerprint evidence as having been purged of the taint of the involuntary 
statement or as admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.  Likewise, it is 
unnecessary for us to address the propriety of those justifications.  
35 
 
Inasmuch as we conclude that the fingerprint comparison evidence was not 
the fruit of any illegal police conduct, we necessarily reject defendant‟s further 
claim that his eventual arrest for the Olsson murder and statements he made to 
police on March 27 and March 30, 1987, were likewise tainted. 
 
2.  Motion to suppress defendant’s statements on March 27 and 
March 30, 1987 
a.  Evidence adduced at hearing 
Shortly before trial began, defendant moved to suppress the statements he 
gave to police on March 27 and March 30, 1987.  During the March 27 
interrogation defendant admitted to having lived at John Chandler‟s residence two 
houses from Olsson‟s residence.  He otherwise denied knowing Olsson or having 
any involvement in her murder.  During the March 30 interrogation, however, he 
claimed he had been taken to Olsson‟s house by a man he knew as “Doubting 
Thomas” to purchase drugs from her.  Defendant admitted he had had sexual 
intercourse with Olsson but blamed “Doubting Thomas” for her murder. 
Defense counsel argued the statements were obtained in violation of 
defendant‟s Miranda rights and were also involuntary. 
Sergeant Robertson testified that defendant was taken into custody on 
March 27, 1987, at about noon.  When arrested, he was wearing only a pair of blue 
jeans, but no shirt or shoes.  Robertson could not recall if defendant was given 
clothing at the police station.  At the same time defendant was arrested, his wife, 
Vicky Tully, was instructed to come to the police station because she was being 
investigated for writing checks on insufficient funds.  The check investigation had 
originally been assigned to Robertson but was reassigned to Detective Jacobs, to 
whom Vicky Tully spoke.  She admitted the charges, but she was not arrested 
because it was the policy of the Livermore Police Department to refer such cases 
to the district attorney for a misdemeanor complaint. 
36 
 
The police interrogation of defendant on March 27 began about 6:00 p.m. 
The interrogation was conducted initially by Sergeant Robertson and Detective 
Newton.  Toward the end of the session, however, Officer Trudeau came in and 
Detective Newton left.  At first, the police used a concealed microphone but, 
because the quality of the recording was poor, they replaced it with a microphone 
that they put on the table at which they and defendant were sitting. The 
interrogation ended at 12:05 a.m. 
At the outset of the interrogation, defendant was advised of, and waived, 
his rights.  During the interrogation, defendant was supplied with candy bars, 
pizza, and soft drinks and allowed cigarette and bathroom breaks.  At one point, he 
was put into an ankle shackle because the officers were in and out of the room.  
Toward the end of the interview, Robertson asked defendant if he would take a 
polygraph test.  Defendant asked, “Do I have a choice?”  Robertson replied with a 
series of rhetorical questions about whether defendant was being coerced, e.g., 
“Do I have a rubber hose?” “Hot lamp?” “Water dripping on your face?” “[A] gun 
to your head?”  Defendant replied in the negative.  Robertson continued, “There‟s 
your choices.” 
“A.  Well this charge you placed on me and the accusations, to say the least 
are serious, I think it would be — 
“Q.  In the State of California there is nothing more serious than murder. 
“A.  Okay. 
“Q.  Period. 
“A.  Then I think it would behoove me to consult a lawyer. 
“Q.  Okay.  Before submitting to a polygraph examination? 
“A.  Um, yeah.  Before submitting to any questions I wouldn‟t want to 
answer.” 
37 
 
After some further discussion about polygraph machines and their 
fallibility, defendant said, “I think it best that if, if I wanted to face, I think it‟d be 
best if I consult a lawyer.”  He and Robertson discussed whether defendant knew 
how the machines worked.  Defendant said, “I don‟t know [so] that‟s why I‟d like 
to talk to somebody who does.”  There was a short break in the interrogation.  
When it resumed, Robertson said, “When we last left this tape, we were talking 
about polygraph and you mentioned talking to a lawyer.  Do you want a lawyer 
now?   [¶] A.  No.  I‟m all right.  [¶]  Q.  You‟re sure?  [¶]  A.  Yeah.” 
At the conclusion of the interrogation, Vicky Tully and defendant spoke for 
about five minutes.  Afterwards, defendant was transported to the county jail. 
On Sunday, March 29, Vicky Tully called the police station and asked to 
speak to Robertson or Newton about information she had regarding the case.  
Neither officer was on duty that day, so Roberson did not talk to her until Monday, 
March 30.  Vicky Tully came to the police station and told Robertson defendant 
had been present at the murder but that “Doubting Thomas” had killed Sandy 
Olsson.  She and Robertson talked about the witness protection program because 
she was afraid of Doubting Thomas.  Robertson told her if the information she had 
given him was true, and if she qualified, arrangements could be made for her to go 
into the program but that the final decision rested with the district attorney. 
Robertson and Newton then went to the jail to talk to defendant.  Vicky 
Tully followed in her own car.  The taped portion of the March 30 interview began 
at 8:08 p.m.  Before the taping began, the officers told defendant about the 
information his wife had given them.  Defendant did not respond.  Robertson 
thought that defendant “was thinking,” because he might be frightened of 
Doubting Thomas.  He told defendant that he and his family might possibly 
qualify for the witness protection program.  Less than a minute passed between the 
time Robertson initially confronted him with what Vicky had said and when he 
38 
 
told him about the witness protection program.12  Defendant asked about the 
program and there was some further discussion about it, after which he wanted to 
speak to his wife.  She entered the room and she and defendant spoke privately.  
After she left, the taped portion of the interview began.  Defendant was again 
advised of and waived his rights.  After acknowledging and waiving his rights, 
defendant asked, “Can you add in the part about the Witness Protection 
program[?]”  Newton replied,  “Ok, prior to this tape being come on [sic] . . . 
we‟ve discussed with [defendant] and with [defendant‟s] wife Vicky that some 
testimony that might be given or furnished by [defendant] might involve . . . the 
Witness Protection Program, be it the Federal and [sic] the State level. . . .  I‟ve 
assured [defendant] that in the event that the testimony and what information that 
he has meets that criteria then we would work on the Witness Protection Program 
and get he and his wife involved in that program.  This testimony may be 
involving . . . the Hells Angels.  Is that correct Richard?  [¶]  [A]:  Yes it is.” 
Defendant also testified at the suppression hearing.  According to 
defendant, his family‟s participation in the witness protection program was the 
“key part” in his decision to talk to police.  He also testified that the police told 
him unless he cooperated his wife would go to jail on “the check charges” and his 
children would be placed in foster homes.  Detective Newton, who was also called 
by the defense, denied any such threats were made. 
                                              
12  
Defendant asserts that he remained silent for 30 minutes after Robertson 
told him about his wife‟s statement.  The only citation he provides in support of 
this assertion is to a page in the reporter‟s transcript that records some discussion 
between the court and counsel prior to the hearing  It contains nothing about the 
length of defendant‟s silence.  By contrast, Sergeant Robertson specifically 
testified that defendant‟s silence was “momentary.” 
39 
 
b.  Trial court ruling 
Defense counsel argued that defendant‟s March 27 interrogation was taken 
in violation of Miranda because his statement “Then I think it would behoove me 
to consult a lawyer” was an invocation of his right to counsel.  Counsel argued 
defendant‟s March 30 interrogation violated Miranda because his lack of response 
when initially confronted by police with the information given them by his wife 
was an invocation of his right to remain silent.  Defense counsel also argued that 
the statement was involuntary because it was induced by the promise of placing 
defendant and his family in the witness protection program. 
The trial court denied the motion in its entirety.  The court found that 
defendant did not “unambiguously invoke his right to counsel” during the March 
27 interrogation, nor did his failure to immediately respond to the officers at the 
beginning of the March 30 interrogation constitute an invocation of his right to 
remain silent.  The court also concluded, based on “the totality of the 
circumstances,” that discussions of the witness protection program did not render 
defendant‟s statement on March 30 involuntary. 
c.  Discussion 
Defendant contends that his March 27 statement was obtained in violation 
of Miranda because the police continued to question him after he had invoked his 
right to counsel.  “In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), we held that law 
enforcement officers must immediately cease questioning a suspect who has 
clearly asserted his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation.”  
(Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 454 (Davis).)  In Davis, the Court 
had held that such invocation must be unambiguous.  “As we have observed, „a 
statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not.‟  [Citation.] 
. . . [A] suspect . . . must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently 
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the 
40 
 
statement to be a request for an attorney.  If the statement fails to meet the 
requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require that the officers stop 
questioning the suspect.”  (Davis, at p. 459.)  Moreover, the court “decline[d] to 
adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions.”  (Id. at p. 461.)  
“Consistent with Davis, a reviewing court . .  . must ask whether, in light of the 
circumstances, a reasonable officer would have understood a defendant‟s reference 
to an attorney to be an unequivocal and unambiguous request for counsel, without 
regard to the defendant‟s subjective ability or capacity to articulate his or her 
desire for counsel, and with no further requirement imposed upon the officers to 
ask clarifying questions of the defendant.  [Citation.]  In reviewing the issue, 
moreover, the reviewing court must „accept the trial court‟s resolution of disputed 
facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial 
evidence.  [The reviewing court] independently determine[s] from the undisputed 
facts and the facts properly found by the trial court whether the challenged 
statement was illegally obtained.‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 
Cal.4th 1111, 1125.) 
Applying these standards to the facts before us, we uphold the trial court‟s 
ruling.  The context in which defendant referred to an attorney was not a request 
for counsel for purposes of the interrogation then occurring, but an indication that, 
if required to submit to a polygraph test, he would first want to consult with a 
lawyer.  This interpretation of his initial remark is reinforced by further statements 
he made in the context of the fallibility of polygraph machines and his lack of 
understanding of how they operated, i.e., “I think it best that if, if I wanted to face 
[it], I think it‟d be best if I consult a lawyer,” and “I don‟t know [so] that‟s why I‟d 
like to talk to somebody who does.”  Finally, any ambiguity regarding his meaning 
was dispelled when, after a short break, Sergeant Robertson, referring to his earlier 
mention of lawyer while discussing the polygraph test, asked him pointblank,  “Do 
41 
 
you want a lawyer now?” to which defendant replied, “No.  I‟m all right.” 
Robertson pressed him, asking, “You‟re sure?”  Defendant replied, “Yeah.”  Thus, 
defendant did not unambiguously invoke his right to counsel during the March 27 
interrogation and the police were not required to cease their questioning. 
We also conclude that defendant‟s momentary silence when confronted by 
police with his wife‟s statements to them at the beginning of the March 30 
interrogation was not an invocation of his right to remain silent.  “As Miranda 
itself recognized, police officers must cease questioning a suspect who exercises 
the right to cut off the interrogation. . . . „Whether the suspect has indeed invoked 
that right, however, is a question of fact to be decided in the light of all the 
circumstances . . . .‟ [Citation.]”  (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 
1238.)  The standard of review is the same as set forth above with respect to 
whether a defendant has invoked his or her right to counsel.  (See People v. 
Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 128-129.) 
Sergeant Robertson testified, “We informed [defendant] that Vicky had 
come to see us and had told us what he had told her regarding the homicide scene 
[and] Doubting Thomas.”  Thus, defendant was not accused of the murder himself 
nor asked any questions about it.  Indeed, the information the police told him had 
been provided by his wife exonerated him of the murder.  When defendant failed 
to immediately respond, Robertson, thinking he might be apprehensive about 
Doubting Thomas, explained that he and his family might qualify for the witness 
protection program.  Defendant asked about the program and then to speak to his 
wife.  It appears that the entire exchange was relatively brief.  Defendant‟s 
ultimate response — asking about witness protection and to speak to his wife — 
indicates not that he was invoking his right to remain silent but that he was 
nonplussed to learn his wife had talked to the police.  He seems simply to have 
been absorbing the information when he failed to immediately respond to 
42 
 
Robertson‟s statement.  Therefore, defendant‟s momentary silence was not an 
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Defendant maintains that both his March 27 and March 30 statements were 
involuntary.  The Attorney General contends that defendant did not specifically 
argue involuntariness with respect to the March 27 statement and has thereby 
forfeited the claim on appeal.  Defendant responds by citing evidence adduced 
during the hearing that he claims shows that the statement was involuntary.  Even 
if there was evidence that could have supported such an argument, the argument 
was not made.  The only argument trial counsel made to the court regarding the 
March 27 interrogation was that the statement was taken in violation of 
defendant‟s invocation of counsel.  Thus, with respect to the March 27 
interrogation, trial counsel never mustered evidence in support of an 
involuntariness claim and the trial court was never asked to undertake a 
voluntariness analysis.  Accordingly, the argument is forfeited.13 
                                              
13  
In any event, the argument fails on its merits.  “[A] statement is involuntary 
if it is the product of coercion or, more generally, „overreaching‟; involuntariness 
requires coercive activity on the part of the state or its agents; and such activity 
must be, as it were, the „proximate cause‟ of the statement in question, and not 
merely a cause in fact.”  (People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 647.)  As 
evidence of coercion defendant cites the following: (1) he was interrogated 
wearing only a pair of pants; (2) he was deceived regarding the purpose for which 
he was arrested — on a drug charge, rather than for the Olsson murder; (3) he was 
implicitly threatened that, unless he talked, his wife would be arrested on check 
charges; (4) Officer Trudeau, with whom he had a prior relationship, was brought 
in to keep defendant talking; and (5) the police used his wife as their agent when 
they allowed her to speak to defendant after they finished their interrogation of 
him.  In his reply brief, he also cites the fact that he was shackled.  Because these 
facts themselves and the inferences to be drawn from them were disputed below, 
we view them in the light most favorable to the trial court‟s ruling.  (People v. 
Manderscheid, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 357; People v. Limon, supra, 
17 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.)  Applying that standard, we find there was no definitive 
evidence that defendant was interviewed wearing only a pair of pants or whether 
clothes were supplied to him at the jail.  Also, defendant was arrested on two 
43 
 
Defendant renews his claim that his March 30 statement was involuntary 
because it was induced by the promise he and his family could enter the witness 
protection program.  As a corollary, he claims the police manipulated Vicky Tully 
into getting him to incriminate himself.  He also asserts the police acted 
deceptively when they suggested defendant and his family might qualify for the 
witness protection program because, at the time they made the suggestion, they 
already believed defendant was guilty of the Olsson murder.  Defendant also 
maintains police threatened to prosecute his wife on the check charges and put his 
children into foster care. 
“It is well settled that a confession is involuntary and therefore inadmissible 
if it was elicited by any promise of benefit or leniency whether express or 
implied.”  (People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 611.)  “In terms of assessing 
inducements assertedly offered to a suspect, „ “[w]hen the benefit pointed out by 
the police . . . is merely that which flows naturally from a truthful and honest 
course of conduct,” the subsequent statement will not be considered involuntarily 
                                                                                                                                      
 
narcotics charges.  Moreover, at the time he was arrested on those outstanding 
warrants, probable cause also existed to arrest him for the Olsson murder.  Thus, 
his arrest was not a ruse nor was he deceived as to why the police were 
questioning him.  There was no evidence defendant was threatened that, unless he 
talked to the police, his wife would be arrested.  While defendant testified this 
threat was used with respect to the March 30 interrogation, Detective Newton 
specifically denied that charge.  We accept the trial court‟s implicit credibility 
finding on this point.  There was no evidence of a prior relationship between 
Trudeau and defendant other than that Trudeau had arrested defendant on March 
7, nor does the evidence support defendant‟s claim that his wife was acting as an 
agent for the police.  While at one point police placed an ankle shackle on 
defendant because they were in and out of the interview room, there was no 
evidence he was continuously shackled.  There was also evidence that, during the 
interrogation, defendant was supplied with candy bars, pizza, and soft drinks and 
allowed cigarette and bathroom breaks.  Viewed under the totality of the 
circumstances standard, we conclude that defendant‟s March 27 statement was not 
the product of coercion and therefore was not involuntary.  
44 
 
made.  [Citation.]‟ ”  (People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 398.)  “The 
prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that 
a defendant‟s confession was voluntarily made.  [Citations.]  In determining 
whether a confession was voluntary „ “[t]he question is whether defendant‟s 
choice to confess was not „essentially free‟ because his [or her] will was 
overborne.” ‟  [Citation.]  Whether the confession was voluntary depends upon the 
totality of the circumstances.  [Citations.]  „ “On appeal, the trial court‟s findings 
as to the circumstances surrounding the confession are upheld if supported by 
substantial evidence, but the trial court‟s finding as to the voluntariness of the 
confession is subject to independent review.” ‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Carrington 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 169.)  “ „[W]hen a reviewing court considers a claim that a 
confession has been improperly coerced, if the evidence conflicts, the version 
most favorable to the People must be relied upon if supported by the record.  
[Citations.]‟ ”  (People v. McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 357.) 
Defendant bases his involuntariness claim on interpretations of the 
evidence and questions of the credibility of witnesses that the trial court implicitly 
rejected.  Because substantial evidence supports those factual determinations, we 
rely on them and, therefore, independently reject defendant‟s claim that his March 
30 statement was the result of either threats or promises. 
Defendant claims that the police promised him they would place him and 
his family into a witness protection program if he spoke to them.  The record 
dispels the assertion.  Robertson testified that he told both Tullys the same thing:  
if they were being truthful, they might qualify for witness protection, but the final 
decision would be made by the district attorney.  Deputy District Attorney Fraser, 
who interviewed defendant after the police, confirmed that he could make no 
promises to defendant.  Fraser repeated this statement at the end of the interview, 
reminded defendant that everything he had disclosed could and would be used 
45 
 
against him, and admonished him that Fraser would compare defendant‟s 
statement against the physical evidence.  Even defendant‟s own testimony fell 
short of asserting that explicit promises were made to him by the police about 
witness protection.  He testified that the police “explained” the program and 
“talk[ed]” to him about it but, when asked whether he had pressed Detective 
Newton about any promises, he acknowledged he did not do so. 
To the extent there was conflict in the evidence about whether the police 
promised defendant protection, the trial court resolved it in favor of the 
prosecution.  The record provides substantial evidence in support of its finding and 
we are bound by it.  Thus, the evidence shows only that defendant was told if his 
statement was truthful and he otherwise qualified, he and his family could be 
placed into a witness protection program if the district attorney approved.  
Therefore, the police did no more than permissibly point out a possible benefit that 
might accrue from his “ „ “truthful and honest course of conduct. ” ‟ ”  (People v. 
Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 398.)  Accordingly, his statement was not induced 
by a promise to place him and his family into witness protection. 
We also reject his claim that the police manipulated his wife into 
persuading him to make a statement.  The trial court found credible the police 
officers‟ testimony that they did not engineer Vicky Tully‟s initial discussion with 
defendant at the end of the interrogation on March 27, where he evidently told her 
the “Doubting Thomas” story.  Moreover, it is undisputed that Vicky Tully 
contacted the police on her own and asked to speak to Robertson or Newton about 
what defendant had told her.  Finally, the trial court evidently rejected defendant‟s 
testimony that the police threatened to prosecute his wife on the check charges and 
place his children into foster care if he did not speak to them.  Again, we are 
bound by the trial court‟s resolution of conflicts in the evidence and its credibility 
determinations.  Finally, and for the same reason, we reject defendant‟s assertion 
46 
 
that the police had already concluded he was the murderer before they spoke to 
him on March 30 and, therefore, their offer of protection was a deception to induce 
him to speak to them.  When defense counsel asked Sergeant Robertson whether 
he had believed defendant‟s account of the murder, Robertson testified that he had 
not known what to believe and wanted to “gather more information . . . [to] 
continue the investigation.” 
On this record, we conclude that defendant‟s March 30 statement was not 
involuntary. 
B.  Excusal of prospective jurors for cause  
 
1.  Overview 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in removing for cause five 
prospective jurors who expressed reservations about the death penalty, thereby 
violating his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the California 
Constitution.14 
“A prospective juror in a capital case may be removed for cause if his or 
her views on capital punishment „would “prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his 
oath.” ‟  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 
844].)  Because prospective jurors „may not know how they will react when faced 
with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to 
                                              
14  
In People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, we held that an appellate 
challenge to a Witherspoon/Witt excusal (Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412; 
Witherspoon v. Illinois (1969) 381 U.S. 510) is not forfeited by a failure to object 
at trial.  (Witherspoon, at p. 443.)  In People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 
we overruled Velasquez‟s no-forfeiture rule.  (McKinnon, at p. 643.)  
“Nevertheless . . . because at the time of this trial we had not expressly held that an 
objection is necessary to preserve Witherspoon/Witt excusal error on appeal, we do 
not apply this rule here.”  (Ibid.)  
47 
 
hide their true feelings‟ (id. at p. 425), „deference must be paid to the trial judge 
who sees and hears the juror‟ and must determine whether the „prospective juror 
would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law‟ (id. at p. 426).  We 
have adopted this standard for determining whether excusing for cause a 
prospective juror in a capital case based on the prospective juror‟s views on capital 
punishment violates the defendant‟s right to an impartial jury under article I, 
section 16 of the California Constitution.  [Citations.]  [¶]  „On appeal, we will 
uphold the trial court‟s ruling if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as 
binding the trial court‟s determination as to the prospective juror‟s true state of 
mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or 
ambiguous.  [Citations.]‟  [Citation.]  „In many cases, a prospective juror‟s 
responses to questions on voir dire will be halting, equivocal, or even conflicting.  
Given the juror‟s probable unfamiliarity with the complexity of the law, coupled 
with the stress and anxiety of being a prospective juror in a capital case, such 
equivocation should be expected.  Under such circumstances, we defer to the trial 
court‟s evaluation of a prospective juror‟s state of mind, and such evaluation is 
binding on appellate courts.  [Citations.]‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Thomas (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 449, 462-463.) 
“ „ “There is no requirement that a prospective juror‟s bias against the death 
penalty be proven with unmistakable clarity.  [Citations.]  Rather, it is sufficient 
that the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror 
would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case before the 
juror.”  [Citation.]  “Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a 
matter falling within the broad discretion of the trial court. ” ‟  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 497-498.) 
Initially, defendant argues that the trial court improperly “excluded jurors 
who could not promise they would vote for death based solely on the [trial court‟s 
48 
 
description of the] bare facts of the capital offense.”  Defendant failed to object to 
the trial court‟s description of the offense and, therefore, his claim is forfeited.  
Moreover, in his opening brief defendant fails to identify which jurors were 
improperly dismissed based on the trial court‟s summary of the offense.  In his 
reply brief, defendant argues, “it was the trial court‟s jury selection protocols, 
admonitions, and questions that led to the systematic exclusion of the five jurors, 
and others, as raised in the Opening Brief.”15  As we demonstrate, however, the 
trial court‟s excusal of those five prospective jurors was entirely correct and, 
therefore, no error can be attributed to the trial court‟s description of the offense.  
In the same vein, defendant argues the prospective jurors excused by the trial court 
were improperly excused because of their attitudes toward the particular facts of 
this case, rather than their abstract inability to impose a death sentence.  Again, 
however, our conclusion that the five prospective jurors were properly excused 
subsumes and rejects this complaint.16 
                                              
15  
Defendant faults the trial court for failing to follow what he characterizes as 
death-qualification “protocols” purportedly set forth in People v. Heard (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 946, 966, fn. 9.)  Defendant‟s failure to object to the manner in which the 
trial court conducted voir dire forfeits any claim on appeal that it erred.  In Heard, 
we concluded that the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror for cause 
following an inadequate voir dire examination by the court.  (Id. at pp. 963-966.)  
In the footnote defendant cites we directed trial courts to treatises and handbooks 
that might help them avoid the errors made by the trial court in Heard.  By 
pointing out these resources, we did not intend to limit the trial court‟s discretion, 
much less impose rigid rules that trial courts were thenceforth required to follow.  
Moreover, defendant‟s trial was conducted 11 years before Heard was decided and 
before any of the treatises and handbooks therein referenced had been published. 
16  
Defendant contends at length that our decisions permitting case-specific 
questions during the death-qualification process, starting with People v. Fields 
(1984) 35 Cal.3d 329, are based on an erroneous interpretation of Wainwright v. 
Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, and should be reconsidered.  We are not persuaded by 
his argument and decline his invitation to revisit our decision. 
49 
 
 2.  Specific challenges17 
a.  Prospective Juror M.D. 
On his juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror M.D. wrote about his general 
feelings regarding the death penalty, “I do not feel that it works very well as a 
deterrent to crime, but in some cases it is necessary and perhaps the best solution.”  
He wrote he was “[m]oderately in favor” of the death penalty and held no 
religious, moral or philosophical views that would affect his ability to vote for the 
death penalty. As to whether he would vote for a death penalty law were it to 
appear on the ballot, he wrote, “I just don‟t want to make that choice until I have 
to.” 
The court asked M.D. whether he could listen to the penalty phase evidence 
and consider both death and life without possibility of parole after having found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that “the defendant, either alone or with somebody 
else, had burglarized the house of the woman by the name of Shirley Olsson.  That 
she had been intentionally killed by way of multiple stab wounds, perhaps as many 
as 25 of those.  You may also have found that she was assaulted with an intent to 
commit rape.”  M.D. replied, “ I think I could.”  Under questioning by defense 
counsel, however, M.D. acknowledged he entertained some “ambivalence” about 
the death penalty.  Defense counsel continued:  “[The prosecutor] is going to ask 
you, in effect, to sentence this man to death.  If you get to the appropriate stage of 
the proceeding, he‟s going to ask you to decide by signing a verdict or raising your 
hand or being polled.”  He reminded M.D. he would taking the first step of putting 
defendant “in the gas chamber” and asked whether M.D.‟s ambivalence “would be 
so great as to impact upon that decision?”  M.D. replied:  “Honestly, I would have 
                                              
17  
Pursuant to Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, prospective jurors 
were individually questioned outside the presence of other prospective jurors, first 
by the trial court and then by the parties, after which the court entertained 
challenges for cause. 
50 
 
to say that that‟s a possibility.  Because I‟ve always had to deal with the death 
penalty in a theoretical context.  I never had to apply it.”  He added, “I would tend 
against the death penalty, but that doesn‟t mean I would definitely vote against the 
death penalty.”  However, he then said that, given the special circumstances in this 
case — what defense counsel called “a burglary” that “went awry”  — “I would be 
very hard pressed to decide on the death penalty.”  
M.D. told the prosecutor that on a scale of 1 to 10, he was a three and a half 
in favor of the death penalty.  He repeated that where the special circumstance was 
felony-murder involving burglary, he would not be open to imposing the death 
penalty.  The prosecutor asked him again whether the “[d]eath penalty is out of the 
door” and he would “always go for life without possibility of parole in this type of 
case.”  M.D. replied:  “Based only on the information I‟ve gotten today, yes.  I 
don‟t know what other information might sway my mind, but based on what 
you‟ve told me today and what I‟ve heard up to this point, I would have to say I 
would be inclined not to.”  The prosecutor asked a third time whether, in this case, 
“I could stand up here and ask you for the death penalty and I‟ve got a shot?”  
M.D.  replied, “I would have to say no, based on what I know now . . . but that‟s 
the only way I could answer the question because I don‟t know all the evidence.”  
He added, “something may come up which would sway me.  I don‟t know what it 
would be, I don‟t know where it would come up, but based on what I know now, 
I‟d have to say no, that I can‟t.”  The prosecutor said:  “If we‟re talking about a 
case of a person breaking into a home, and in the course of a burglary gone awry, 
as defense counsel says, a single person is killed.   [¶]  Given this type of fact 
situation, the death penalty is not a viable penalty here for you?”  M.D. replied:  
“No, so long as the other option is available, life without possibility of parole.” 
The prosecutor challenged M.D. for cause.  Defense counsel asked no 
further questions and submitted the matter.  The trial court excused the juror. 
51 
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing M.D. on the ground 
that his voir dire answers demonstrated that his “views would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.”  M.D.‟s responses 
indicated he would not consider the death penalty in a case like this where the 
special circumstance alleged was burglary murder.  (See People v. Pinholster 
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 917 [prospective juror properly excused where he 
“concluded that he would never vote for the death penalty in a burglary-murder 
case unless the killing were in fact premeditated”].) 
We are not swayed by defendant‟s claim that M.D.‟s responses indicated he 
might have been able to consider both penalties based on further evidence that 
might emerge at trial.  He was told the case involved a brutal murder by the 
multiple stabbing and possible sexual assault of a victim in the course of — as 
defense counsel described it — a burglary gone awry.  This was an accurate 
overview of the case.  We are not persuaded acquainting him with further details 
would have changed his mind and made him more inclined to consider death.  
Moreover, while he said he might be swayed by additional information, he added, 
“I don‟t know what it would be,” indicating there was no further circumstance he 
could think of that would allow him to consider the death penalty in this case.18  
Additionally, defense counsel had every opportunity to attempt to rehabilitate 
M.D. but made no effort to do so and submitted without argument on the 
                                              
18  
Defendant contends that the trial court‟s error in granting the cause 
challenge as to M.D. is underscored by its denial of his challenge for cause to 
Prospective Juror D.dR.  Defendant claims M.D. and D.dR. were “virtually 
identical on the strength of their views” on the death penalty, though on different 
sides of the question.  D.dR. admitted he had strong views on the death penalty 
and he would worry that those views might affect his judgment.  However, he also 
consistently maintained that he would strive to keep an open mind and to follow 
the law.  Unlike M.D. he never ruled out one or the other penalty in a felony-
murder case.  Accordingly, we reject the analogy defendant attempts to draw 
between the two. 
52 
 
prosecutor‟s challenge for cause.  Finally, to the extent M.D.‟s answers were 
equivocal, we defer to the trial court‟s evaluation of his state of mind.  (People v. 
Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 462-463.) 
b.  Prospective Juror E.H.  
Prospective Juror E.H. indicated on her questionnaire that the death penalty 
“in some cases is necessary,” described her view toward it as neutral and wrote 
she would have to “research” before she could decide how to vote were the death 
penalty law on the ballot.  (Subsequently, she told defense counsel she would vote 
for a death penalty law.) 
She told the court she could consider both penalties.  But when defense 
counsel asked her whether the death penalty would be appropriate where a “man 
broke into a house to commit a burglary . . . and killed a lady who lived there, 
stabbed her to death 25 times,” E.H. replied, “Based on that outline, I wouldn‟t 
think so.”  Even after he introduced the possibility of the perpetrator‟s intent to 
commit rape, E.H. indicated it was not the kind of crime where she would consider 
the death penalty, as opposed to “a mass murder.”  She maintained her position 
when again questioned by the court.  
The prosecutor challenged E.H. for cause.  The defense submitted without 
argument and she was excused. 
E.H.‟s responses clearly show she would not consider the death penalty in a 
burglary-murder case because in her view it was not the kind of serious crime — 
as opposed, for example, to a mass murder — where the penalty was appropriate.  
Accordingly, she was properly excused. 
c.  Prospective Juror M.K. 
Prospective Juror M.K. wrote on her questionnaire that she “believe[d] in 
the death penalty.”  She explained that her views about the death penalty had 
53 
 
changed after the Robert Alton Harris case because she “became aware of the 
death penalty and the need for a death penalty.”  She described herself as 
moderately in favor of it.  She wrote she would vote in favor of a death penalty 
ballot measure because of overcrowded prisons and the costs of supporting them. 
Under questioning from the court, M.K. indicated she would be open to 
both penalties.  However, when the prosecutor asked her how she felt when she 
first heard from the trial judge “that this case might involve the death penalty,” she 
replied, “I felt like I‟d rather not have to make that decision.”  The prosecutor 
suggested there was a difference between abstract support of the death penalty and 
actually imposing it on a “real person,” and asked whether she had “thought about 
the idea of being asked to impose the death penalty?”  She responded:  “I thought I 
would get to know this person for six weeks and it probably won‟t be an easy 
thing to do.”  When the prosecutor asked her whether she could “vote death for 
that person over there,” she said, “I don‟t know.  Saying I believe in the death 
penalty and then knowing the person involved are two different things as far as 
I‟m concerned.”  The prosecutor then asked M.K. a long hypothetical that ended:  
“Let‟s assume further that you‟re the foreperson of this jury, and part of the job of 
the foreperson is to sign the verdict form . . . .  Can you sign your name on that 
death warrant, appreciating the fact that that is the first step that will carry this 
man onto a bus to be taken across the bay to San Quentin, put into eventually that 
green gas chamber which we saw time and time again over all this publicity 
regarding Harris, and he will at that point in time breathe in poisonous gas until 
he‟s dead.  [¶]  Can you do that?”  M.K. replied, “No.” 
The prosecutor challenged her for cause.  Defense counsel declined to 
question her and submitted without argument.  The trial court, however, asked her 
twice if what she meant was that she could not impose the death penalty even if 
54 
 
she concluded it was warranted by the evidence.  M.K. replied, “Yes, that‟s 
correct,” and “Yes, I could not do that.” 
“[W]e previously have held it permissible to excuse a juror who indicated 
he would have a „hard time‟ voting for the death penalty or would find the 
decision „very difficult.‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 
697.)  Here, M.K. stated unequivocally that, notwithstanding her support of the 
death penalty in the abstract, she could not actually impose it.  She was so clear 
that defense counsel did not attempt to rehabilitate her.  The court properly granted 
the prosecutor‟s cause challenge. 
Defendant claims the prosecutor‟s hypothetical question about whether 
M.K. could sign the verdict form was improper.  Trial counsel did not object to the 
question and any claim of error at this point is forfeited, whether of prosecutorial 
misconduct or abuse of discretion by the trial court in permitting the question.  
Moreover, defense counsel had used a similar gambit when he asked M.D. if he 
could sign the verdict that would be the first step toward putting defendant “in the 
gas chamber.”  Like defense counsel‟s use of that imagery, the prosecutor‟s 
reference to M.K. signing the verdict form was a way of impressing upon her the 
gravity of a juror‟s role in imposing the death penalty so as to gauge her ability to 
assume that role.  There was neither misconduct by the prosecutor nor an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court. 
d.  Prospective Juror B.D. 
Prospective Juror B.D. wrote on her questionnaire that she believed the 
death penalty “is appropriate in certain cases — although it is heartbreaking.”  She 
wrote she was moderately in favor of the death penalty and would vote for a death 
penalty ballot measure because “it is appropriate in some cases.” 
55 
 
When asked by the court whether she would be able to impose either 
penalty, she replied that it would be “very difficult” to vote for the death penalty 
and that she had “some anxiety” on the subject.  She added, “[I]t‟s one thing to 
think about these things in theory and then to actually . . . . Part of me . . . wonders 
if I really could impose a death penalty.”  When asked for her “best opinion” about 
whether she could do so, she replied, “I don‟t think I could say an unqualified yes.  
I think I could, but there‟s, you know, maybe 80 percent yes, and there‟s still 
maybe 20 percent — I apologize.  I‟ve been sorting this stuff out.” 
B.D. told defense counsel that this case was “bad enough” for the death 
penalty, “but I don‟t want to be the one to make that decision.”  The prosecutor 
asked her the same hypothetical question he had asked M.K. about whether she 
could sign the verdict form if the jury imposed death.  She replied, “I don‟t think 
so.”  Seeking clarification, he asked, “I‟m talking about voting for the death 
penalty, this is not something you could personally do; is that correct?”  B.D. 
replied, “Well, I have serious doubts about my ability to do that.”  In response to 
further questioning, she said, “Well, the more I‟m sitting here, the more I‟m 
realizing that . . . I don‟t think I could.  I couldn‟t sign the paper, and if I can‟t sign 
the paper, how can I, you know, vote.”  The court asked whether she could impose 
the death penalty even if she determined death was warranted.  She replied, “I 
don‟t think so.” 
The prosecutor challenged her for cause.  Defense counsel submitted and 
declined the court‟s invitation to ask further questions.  The court indicated it 
would take the matter under submission.  This led to further questioning by both 
the prosecutor and the defense.  While B.D. indicated there was some possibility 
she might be able to vote for death, she also said, “I don‟t think I could do it.  I 
don‟t think I could make that decision.”  Ultimately, the prosecutor asked, “Is the 
death verdict one you couldn‟t return in this case?”  B.D. replied, “No.”  The court 
56 
 
asked, “[W]here are we in terms of procedure?” The prosecutor replied, 
“Basically, the question was . . . could she return a death verdict in this case, and 
her answer was „No.‟ ”  The defense submitted without argument and the 
challenge was granted. 
Although B.D.‟s answers about whether she could impose the death penalty 
were somewhat equivocal, we defer to the trial court‟s assessment of her state of 
mind.  Defendant again complains about the prosecutor‟s hypothetical but, again, 
he failed to object, forfeiting any claim and we find no error in the question.  He 
also asserts that the prosecutor‟s last question, because it contained a double 
negative, was ambiguous and that, by answering “no,” what B.D. meant was 
“yes,” she could return the death penalty.  Just moments later, however, when the 
prosecutor interpreted her reply to mean she could not vote for death, neither B.D. 
nor defense counsel corrected him.  We conclude the trial court properly granted 
the challenge for cause. 
e.  Prospective Juror T.L. 
In response to the question about his general feeling toward the death 
penalty, Prospective Juror T.L. wrote on his questionnaire that it was “[n]ot really 
a big problem for me.”  He wrote he was neutral toward the death penalty and not 
sure how he would vote on a death penalty ballot measure. 
Under questioning by the court, T.L. initially said he could consider both 
penalties.  When asked directly whether he could vote to impose death, he replied, 
“No.”  Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel asked any questions of T.L.  
The prosecutor challenged him for cause.  Defense counsel submitted without 
argument.  The challenge was granted. 
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court‟s ruling.  While T.L.‟s voir 
dire was brief, he clearly indicated he could not vote to impose death in this case.  
57 
 
The fact that neither the prosecution nor the defense asked him questions suggests 
that his position was so plain neither side believed it worthwhile to attempt to 
rehabilitate him.  While T.L.‟s answers were somewhat inconsistent, this is 
classically a situation that calls for deference to the trial court‟s evaluation of the 
prospective juror‟s mental state and demeanor.  (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 
Cal.4th 668, 727.) 
Defendant complains that the court failed to ask clarifying questions and 
cut T.L. off, and that the record is incomplete.  T.L. said he could not vote to 
impose the death penalty.  His position was sufficiently clear that not even defense 
counsel attempted to rehabilitate him.  Under these circumstances, we find no 
error in the trial court‟s acceptance of his answer as definitive and its decision not 
to question him further.  Nor is the record incomplete because it indicates T.L. 
shook his head in the negative instead of verbally replying when the court pressed 
him whether he could impose the death penalty.  The gesture is widely understood 
to indicate the negative.  Nor did the court cut off T.L. when it interrupted him and 
asked if he understood its question about his ability to consider both penalties.  In 
response, T.L. said, “Yeah.”  The court then essentially repeated its original query, 
to which T.L. responded, “You mean deciding one way or the other.”  The court 
said, “Exactly, right.”  Thus, any confusion T.L. had about the question was 
clarified.  
Accordingly, we reject defendant‟s claim that the trial court erred when it 
excused these jurors for cause.  We add, however, a note of caution.  Defendant‟s 
complaint in this case is that the trial court‟s summary of the offense was too 
truncated to allow it to assess whether the prospective jurors who expressed 
qualms about the death penalty could nonetheless have been able to apply it.  In 
other words, he apparently would have had the trial court provide additional 
details about aggravating factors.  We, on the other hand, are concerned that the 
58 
 
trial court‟s summary of the offense here may have been too detailed.  As we 
observed in People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, death-qualification voir dire 
“must avoid two extremes.”  While “it must not be so abstract that it fails to 
identify those jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of their duties as jurors,” neither should it be “so specific 
that it requires the prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty issue based on a 
summary of the mitigating and aggravating evidence likely to be presented.”  
(Cash, at pp. 721-722.)  We advise trial courts against the kind of overly detailed 
summary of the offense the court used in this case. 
C.  Exclusion of witnesses from court  
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion under former 
section 1102.6 when it refused to exclude members of the victim‟s family — her 
father, Clifford Sandberg, sister, Jan Dietrich, and son and daughter, Elbert 
Walters III and Sandra Walters — from the guilt phase.19  The trial court 
permitted Dietrich and Elbert Walters to remain in the court based on the 
prosecutor‟s representation that they would not be testifying at the guilt phase.  It 
appears that both Sandberg and Sandra Walters also attended some sessions of the 
guilt phase after they had testified and been excused.  
                                              
19  
Defendant contends the trial court‟s ruling also violated his due process 
rights, and his rights to a fair trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to 
a reliable death penalty determination pursuant to the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution.  He did not raise these claim in the trial 
court.  While we may entertain these claims to the extent they are consistent with 
the exception to the no-forfeiture rule we set forth earlier (see pp. 24-25, ante; 
People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 441, fn. 17), our rejection on the merits of 
the claim actually raised in the trial court “necessarily leads to rejection of the 
newly applied constitutional „gloss‟ as well.  No separate constitutional discussion 
is required in such cases, and we therefore provide none.”  (Ibid.) 
59 
 
Former section 1102.6, subdivision (a), provided that either the “victim” — 
defined as the crime victim or, if she or he was unavailable, up to two members of 
the victim‟s family —  “shall be entitled to be present and seated at the trial,” 
unless the “court finds that the presence of the victim would pose a substantial risk 
of influencing or affecting the content of any testimony,” in which case, “the court 
shall exclude the victim from the trial entirely or in part so as to effect the 
purposes of this section.”  (Former § 1102.6, subd. (a), as enacted by Stats. 1986, 
ch. 1273, § 2, p. 4448, and repealed by Stats. 1995, ch. 332, § 2, p. 1824.)  
However, in this case, the prosecutor did not seek to permit Olsson‟s family 
members to be present at trial under section 1102.6.  Rather, the defense moved to 
exclude them.  Although the defense did not specify its authority, the motion was 
presumably based on Evidence Code section 777.  Under that statute, the court 
“may exclude from the courtroom any witness not at the time under examination 
so that such witness cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.”  The standard 
of review of a trial court‟s ruling under both statutes is abuse of discretion.  
(People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1053 [§ 1102.6]; People v. Griffin 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 574  [Evid.  Code, §777].)20 
                                              
20  
Because it was a defense motion, it is understandable that the trial court 
made no specific reference to section 1102.6.  Nonetheless, seizing on this 
omission, defendant claims the trial court failed to perform the balancing required 
by section 1102.6, subdivision (a) between the victim‟s right to be in the 
courtroom and the risk of influencing or affecting the content of any testimony.  
The argument is entirely without merit.  It is clear from the record that the basis of 
the defense‟s motion was its concern that permitting the victim‟s family members 
to remain in the courtroom might in some way affect their testimony.  In 
fashioning its ruling —excluding two members from the guilt phase and declining 
to exclude any of the witnesses from the penalty phase without a further showing 
of potential harm — the trial court was, in effect, performing the balancing 
required by section 1102.6, whether or not the words of the statute passed its lips.  
60 
 
At the hearing on the defense request, the prosecution objected to the 
proposed exclusion as it related to Sandy Olsson‟s sister and son because they 
would not be testifying at the guilt phase.  The trial court asked defense counsel if 
his motion encompassed only the guilt phase.  Defense counsel replied that his 
motion extended to the entire trial “[a]s long as the circumstances of the crime 
under [section] 190.3 are circumstances in aggravation.” 
The trial court granted the motion to exclude, limited to guilt phase 
witnesses.  This permitted Olsson‟s sister and son to remain in the courtroom.  The 
court‟s ruling, however, was without prejudice to a renewed objection to particular 
witnesses or testimony.  When defense counsel complained it would be difficult to 
anticipate such objectionable testimony, the  court replied, “If you contemplate 
with a particular witness, even a possibility, then we will interrupt the proceedings 
and you can make your representations.”  The defense did not make any such 
further objections, nor evidently did the defense object when the victim‟s father 
and daughter remained in the courtroom for some period after they testified at the 
guilt phase. 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion because, contrary to 
section 1102.6, it permitted four family members, rather than two, to be present at 
the trial.21  He asserts, further, that the “presence of these witnesses created a 
substantial risk of influencing or affecting the content of their penalty phase 
testimony.”  He argues the trial court‟s ruling failed to properly balance his rights 
to a fair trial and due process “against the prosecutor‟s need for his penalty phase 
victim impact witnesses” to attend the guilt phase.  Finally, he claims that the 
                                              
21  
Defendant is wrong.  The trial court‟s ruling permitted only the victim‟s 
sister and son to remain in the courtroom during the guilt phase portion of the trial.  
Although apparently the victim‟s father and daughter also attended some sessions 
of the guilt phase, defense counsel did not bring this violation of the court‟s order 
— if it was a violation — to the court‟s attention.  
61 
 
court unfairly placed the burden upon the defense of anticipating guilt phase 
testimony during which the victim‟s family members should be excluded.22   His 
arguments are entirely without merit. 
The purpose of section 1102.6 is not, as defendant implies, to allow the 
prosecutor to engage the jury‟s sympathy by exhibiting crime victims, but to 
advance the interests of victims of crime.  When it enacted the statute in 1986, the 
Legislature declared that section 1102.6 embodied the “public policy of this state” 
that “a victim of a criminal offense be afforded a reasonable opportunity to attend 
any criminal trial for that offense,” and “not be excluded . . . merely because the 
victim has been or may be subpoenaed to testify at the trial” because permitting 
the victim such access is “essential to the fair and impartial administration of 
justice.”  (Stats. 1986, ch. 1273, § 1, reprinted at Historical and Statutory Notes, 
50B West‟s Ann. Pen. Code (2004 ed.) foll. § 1102.6, p. 370.) 
The statute is clear that the victim is “entitled to be present” subject only to 
the finding that his or her presence would pose “a substantial risk of influencing or 
affecting the content of any testimony.”  (Former § 1102.6, subd. (a), italics 
added.)  This language — and the Legislature‟s statement of intent — suggests 
that any balancing begins with a preference in favor of the victim‟s right to be 
present.  Our decisions support this interpretation of the statute in their emphasis 
that the substantial risk referred to be real, not speculative or hypothetical. 
For example, in People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, where the 
defendant claimed the trial court abused its discretion under section 1102.6 by 
permitting family members of the victims to remain in the courtroom during 
                                              
22  
In effect, the trial court‟s ruling allowed defendant to renew his motion to 
exclude at any point at which he thought or even suspected there might be 
testimony the victim‟s family members should not be permitted to hear.  We fail to 
see how defendant was injured by this favorable ruling, nor does he demonstrate 
any such injury. 
62 
 
opening statements, we said:  “Defendant‟s mere assertion that the victims could 
or would be influenced by the opening statements was insufficient to establish that 
the victims‟ presence posed „a substantial risk of influencing or affecting the 
content of any testimony.‟ ”  (Bradford, at p. 1322, original italics.)  In People v. 
Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th 536, we held the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it allowed the victim‟s mother and sister to be present during penalty phase.  
“Nothing before the trial court at the time it made its ruling suggested that [the 
victims‟] presence posed a substantial risk that either woman would craft or shape 
her own testimony, or cause any other witness to do so, as a result of her 
presence. . . .  [D]efense counsel asserted only that such a risk existed, but an 
assertion of this sort is insufficient to support a claim that the trial court abused its 
discretion.”  (Id. at p. 574.) 
Here, too, defendant asserts formulaically and without specificity that the 
presence of the victim‟s family members at the guilt phase posed the substantial 
risk referred to in the statute but fails to point to anything in the record to support 
this assertion.  This is simply not enough to show an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court. 
D.  Sufficiency of the evidence 
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his guilt phase 
convictions of first degree murder with burglary-murder special circumstances and 
assault with intent to commit rape.  The claim is without merit. 
“ „In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court‟s 
task is to review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to 
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is 
reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could 
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  [Citation.] . . .  The standard 
63 
 
of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on 
circumstantial evidence.  [Citation.]  “ „Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit 
a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two 
interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it 
is the jury, not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendant‟s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  “ „If the circumstances reasonably justify the 
trier of fact‟s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances 
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a 
reversal of the judgment.‟ ” [Citations.]‟ ” [Citation.]‟ ”  (People v. Story (2009) 
45 Cal.4th 1282, 1296.)  The same standard applies to special circumstance 
allegations.  (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763,788.) 
Defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the first degree 
murder conviction based on a burglary-murder theory or to support the burglary-
murder special-circumstance allegation because the evidence failed to prove that 
defendant entered the victim‟s home to commit either theft or rape, the target 
offenses of the burglary.23  Notably, defendant does not discuss the evidence in 
any detail — and certainly not in light of the applicable standard of review — but 
relies on the fact that neither burglary nor rape was charged as a separate offense.  
This is a red herring.  We are not concerned with whether there was sufficient 
evidence to prove offenses that were not charged.  The question is whether the 
evidence was sufficient to prove the offenses that were charged.  It was. 
The evidence showed defendant, armed with a knife, forcibly entered 
Sandy Olsson‟s house late at night or in the early morning hours of July 24 or 25, 
1986.  The open bathroom window, with its screen removed and discarded, 
indicated that he first attempted to enter her residence surreptitiously through this 
                                              
23  
The jury was instructed it was not required to unanimously agree on which 
particular crime defendant intended to commit. 
64 
 
window but, for whatever reason, failed to do so.  The broken chain-lock on the 
front door was another sign of forced and unconsented-to entry.  Defendant told 
police he went to Olsson‟s house with “Doubting Thomas” because Thomas 
wanted to buy drugs that Olsson obtained from the hospital where she worked.  
Coincidentally, Olsson lived only two houses away from where defendant had 
lived with John Chandler.  Defendant‟s statement shows that he knew Olsson 
worked at a hospital where she would have access to drugs.  It is a reasonable 
inference that he learned about her job and that she lived alone while he was living 
at Chandler‟s residence.  Olsson‟s purse was taken from her residence and found 
discarded in the pond on the golf course.  Defendant told police he had seen 
Doubting Thomas rummaging through the victim‟s purse in her living room after 
he stabbed her; a receipt indicated she had received $3.95 from a purchase on July 
24, but no money was found in her purse or at her home.  The jury could easily 
have discarded defendant‟s implausible invention of Doubting Thomas‟s role in 
the crime and concluded that defendant himself went to Olsson‟s residence and 
broke in to steal drugs or property.  (See People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 
1128 [“We have explained that when presented with evidence that a defendant 
killed another and took substantial property from the victim at the time of the 
killing, a jury ordinarily may reasonably infer that the defendant killed for the 
purpose of robbery”].)   
There is also substantial evidence that defendant entered the victim‟s 
residence with the intent to commit rape.  This conclusion would have been 
consistent with his late night attempt to surreptitiously enter the residence of a 
woman who he knew lived alone.  Defendant, furthermore, admitted he had sexual 
intercourse with the victim but did not ejaculate.  His admission that he did not 
ejaculate is consistent with testimony from the prosecution‟s criminalist that the 
absence of semen did not rule out the possibility of intercourse if there was no 
65 
 
ejaculation.  The pathologist also testified that the absence of trauma to the 
victim‟s genitals did not mean she had not been forced to submit to sexual 
intercourse.  Defendant was armed with a knife.  The jury could reasonably have 
concluded defendant forced the victim to have sex with him at knifepoint and not, 
as he claimed, consensually. 
Thus, there was substantial evidence to support the felony-murder theory of 
first degree murder and the burglary-murder special circumstance. Our assessment 
of the evidence also demonstrates there was substantial evidence to support 
defendant‟s conviction of assault with intent to commit rape.24 
E.  Evidence that defendant was unemployed 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted 
testimony that he was unemployed, to show motive to steal.  “Ordinarily it would 
be unfair to persons in difficult financial circumstances to permit general evidence 
of their poverty to be introduced for the purpose of establishing a motive for theft 
                                              
24  
In light of our conclusion, we do not discuss in detail defendant‟s further 
claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a first degree murder 
conviction based on a premeditation and deliberation theory.  We note, however, 
there was strong evidence of planning that includes the manner and timing of 
defendant‟s entry into the victim‟s residence, the fact that he was armed, the care 
he took to eliminate his fingerprints from the residence and also evidence of 
motive — fear that Olsson recognized him as a former neighbor.  The manner of 
killing — defendant had time to wipe his knife on the sheets as he was stabbing 
the victim — also constitutes substantial evidence of premeditation and 
deliberation.  (See People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [evidence of 
planning, motive and manner of killing are nonexclusive factors that may support 
a finding of premeditated and deliberate killing].)  “Contrary to defendant‟s 
suggestion, Anderson does not require that these factors be present in some special 
combination or that they be accorded a special weight nor is the list exhaustive.  
Anderson was simply intended to guide an appellate court‟s assessment whether 
the evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred as the result of 
preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.”  (People v. Pride 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247.)  
66 
 
or robbery.  The risk of causing suspicion of indigent persons generally outweighs 
the probative value of such evidence.”  (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 
96; but see People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1325 [based on evidence 
of the defendant‟s sporadic employment combined with evidence of his drug 
addiction, “a rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant had a motive to 
steal” and formed the intent to do so before the victim‟s death].)  Such evidence 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, “such as to refute a defendant‟s 
claim that he did not commit the robbery because he did not need the money.”  
(People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 939) or to “ „eliminate other possible 
explanations for a defendant‟s sudden wealth after a theft offense.‟  [Citations.]”  
(Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 96.) 
In this case, the prosecutor asked John Chandler, at whose residence 
defendant had been living off and on in the six months before Sandy Olsson‟s 
murder, whether “the defendant had a hard time keeping a job.”  Defense counsel 
objected on relevance grounds.  The prosecutor responded, “Motive.”  The trial 
court overruled the objection.  In his closing argument, the prosecutor, referring to 
this testimony, said, “[Defendant‟s] using drugs.  Well, where do you get money 
for that if you can‟t keep a job.  How do you support that?  I mean we‟re not 
talking about keeping a roof over your head.” 
Assuming, without deciding, that the testimony should not have been 
admitted, we find its admission harmless under any standard.  The testimony was 
brief, as was the prosecutor‟s reference to it in argument, and, as demonstrated in 
the previous section, there was more than ample evidence, quite apart from this 
testimony, to support a finding that defendant broke into Olsson‟s residence to 
steal drugs or money. 
67 
 
F.  Erroneous admission of “victim impact” evidence at guilt phase  
Defendant contends that, through a combination of prosecutorial 
misconduct and trial court error, evidence was improperly placed before the jury 
during the guilt phase resulting in a verdict tainted by sympathy for the victim.  
Defendant characterizes this evidence as “victim impact” evidence. 
“ „A prosecutor‟s misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution when it “infects the trial with such unfairness as to 
make the conviction a denial of due process.”  [Citations.]  In other words, the 
misconduct must be “of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the 
defendant‟s right to a fair trial.”  [Citation.]  A prosecutor‟s misconduct that does 
not render a trial fundamentally unfair nevertheless violates California law if it 
involves “the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade 
either the court or the jury.”  [Citations.]‟ ”  (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
856, 960.)  “A defendant‟s conviction will not be reversed for prosecutorial 
misconduct, however, unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable 
to the defendant would have been reached without the misconduct.  [Citation.]  
Also, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not preserved for appeal if defendant 
fails to object and seek an admonition if an objection and jury admonition would 
have cured the injury.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839.)25 
“ „Only relevant evidence is admissible (Evid. Code, § 350; [citations]), 
and, except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible 
(Evid. Code, § 351; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d) . . .).‟  [Citation.]  
                                              
25  
Defendant repeatedly cites as instances of prosecutorial misconduct actions 
to which he failed to object on this ground.  In his reply brief, he asserts that he 
should be exempt from the forfeiture rule because of the prosecutor‟s repeated 
pattern and course of misconduct.  We discern no such pattern and, as we have in 
the past, we reject the suggestion that the forfeiture rule is inapplicable to capital 
cases.  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 757.) 
68 
 
„Relevant evidence is defined in Evidence Code section 210 as evidence “having 
any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action.”  The test of relevance is whether 
the evidence tends “logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference” to establish 
material facts such as identity, intent, or motive.  [Citations.]‟  [Citation.]  [¶]  
Defendant placed all material issues in dispute by pleading not guilty.”  (People v. 
Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 116-117.)  “[T]he trial court has broad discretion to 
determine the relevance of evidence.”  (People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
p. 727.)  This discretion extends to evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Evidence 
Code section 352.  (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1149.)  “ „Under 
California law, error in admitting evidence may not be the basis for reversing a 
judgment or setting aside a verdict unless “an objection to or a motion to exclude 
or to strike the evidence . . . was timely made and so stated as to make clear the 
specific ground of the objection or motion . . . . ”  (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a), 
italics added.)  “In accordance with this statute, we have consistently held that the 
„defendant‟s failure to make a timely and specific objection‟ on the ground 
asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable.” ‟ ”  (People v. Nelson 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 223.) 
Bearing these principles in mind, we review defendant‟s specific claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct and trial court error. 
1.  Voir dire 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during voir dire 
when, “[w]hile questioning juror [J.W.], the prosecutor stated „. . . [i]t‟s not fair to 
the family members of the woman who was murdered if people can‟t impose 
either of the two penalties.‟ ”  Defendant‟s contention is based on a factual error.  
The prosecutor did not ask this question of Prospective Juror J.W., who ultimately 
69 
 
sat on the jury, but of Prospective Juror J.B.  J.B. was questioned just before J.W. 
and did not sit on the jury.  Although defendant asserts that J.W. “heard the 
comment,” he fails to provide any citation in the record that would support his 
claim.  Furthermore, defendant fails to show in the record that the prosecutor made 
the remark to any other prospective juror.  Thus, even if we assumed this fleeting 
comment was misconduct, defendant could not have been prejudiced since J.B. 
was not a juror in his case.  Moreover, his failure to show that the comment was 
repeated to any other juror belies his assertion that there was a pattern of 
prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire. 
2.  Prosecutor’s opening statement 
Defendant complains that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his 
opening statement (1) when he contrasted the intended family gathering for which 
the victim was preparing on the weekend before her death— her visit to Topeka 
for her father‟s 85th birthday — to the family gathering that actually occurred — 
her funeral; (2) by discussing her nursing career; and (3) by discussing her habits 
and routines. 
Defendant failed to object to any of these remarks at the time they were 
made.  He subsequently referred to them when he objected, not to the opening 
statement, but to the actual evidence of these matters.  Indeed, defense counsel 
conceded that the prosecutor “has a right to refer to any evidence he expects in 
good faith to be admitted during the course of the trial,” but went on to question 
the relevance of evidence of Olsson‟s background and the birthday reunion.  
Defendant did not move to strike the opening statement.  Instead, he asked the 
court to make a substantive ruling on his relevance objection.  Thus, the specific 
claim he advances here — misconduct during the opening statement — is 
forfeited.  We take up his substantive objection in the following section. 
70 
 
3.  Admission of evidence 
Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by presenting 
evidence about the family reunion, Olsson‟s nursing career, and her habits and 
routines, as well as eliciting assertedly improper testimony from Olsson‟s 
coworkers and her daughter. 
a.  Background 
After the prosecutor‟s opening statement and before any testimony, there 
was a lengthy hearing outside the presence of the jury during which defense 
counsel demanded that the trial court rule on its objections to prospective evidence 
of the victim‟s nursing career, her plans to attend her father‟s 85th birthday 
celebration on the weekend she was killed, and her habits and routines.  Defense 
counsel argued the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 352.)  Later, counsel said he was also objecting on relevance grounds. 
The prosecutor responded as follows:  evidence of the victim‟s professional 
background was relevant because it demonstrated she was not a docile person and, 
thus, her submission without resistance to defendant indicated that “he had her 
under complete control at the point of a weapon,” and that, having complete 
control, he committed a gratuitous murder; evidence of her plans to attend a family 
reunion was relevant to the concern of her coworkers when she failed to appear at 
work the day before she was to have left; and evidence of her habits and routines, 
particularly after she came home from work, was relevant to whether — as 
defendant‟s statement to the police had suggested — she would have entertained 
late night male visitors on a work night.  Defense counsel argued that what the 
prosecution called habit and custom evidence was really impermissible character 
evidence; that the family reunion evidence was irrelevant because there would be 
no dispute that Olsson‟s coworkers were concerned by her failure to appear at 
71 
 
work; and that the prosecutor should not be permitted to show that “she stayed at 
home at night” by “proving she was a wonderful person at work.” 
The trial court told defense counsel, “I‟m going to agree with you in part 
and not in totality.”  “[I]n terms of what her duties at the hospital might have been, 
I will overrule that objection . . . I‟ve engaged in 352, the weighing process.  I see 
some relevance, certainly not at the risk of undue prejudice.”  Furthermore, “[i]n 
terms of whether there was . . . a trip contemplated for July 26th, again, I‟m going 
to overrule that objection.  I can see some relevance to that, and I certainly don‟t 
see the risk of undue prejudice.”  “With regard to what I‟ll describe as personality 
evidence I‟m going to sustain your objection.  That, based on the offer of proof, as 
I understand it, I think there is a limited relevance to that. . . .  Now, it‟s not 
inconceivable to me that, based on cross-examination or based on possible defense 
presentation of evidence, that something like that could become relevant. . . .  At 
this point, based on the offer of proof. . .  it does not appear to be relevant direct 
testimony.” 
b.  Prosecutorial misconduct claims 
Defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting 
testimony about the purpose of Olsson‟s planned trip to Topeka — to celebrate her 
father‟s 85th birthday — in violation of the trial court‟s ruling limiting such 
evidence to whether a trip was contemplated, but omitting any mention of its 
purpose.  Defendant misreads the record.  The trial court did not impose any such 
limitation. The court simply overruled the defense‟s objection to testimony that a 
trip was planned.  It said nothing further that could be construed as requiring the 
prosecutor to omit any mention of the purpose of the trip.  Indeed, defense counsel 
did not object to the questions about the birthday celebration, suggesting that he 
72 
 
did not believe the questions violated the court‟s ruling.  His failure to object also 
forfeits the claim.  (People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 839.) 
Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct when 
questioning Barbara Green.  Specifically, he argues the prosecutor impermissibly 
asked Green a series of questions about when and why she became concerned after 
Olsson failed to appear for work.  Two of those questions— involving Green‟s 
inability to sleep the night before Olsson was killed and her pact with Olsson that 
the two women would be with each other if one was dying — did not draw an 
objection, thus forfeiting any claim of misconduct.26  (People v. Crew, supra, 31 
Cal.4th at p. 839.)  Defendant did object to other questions about Green‟s concern.  
Following an unreported bench conference, the trial court ultimately sustained an 
objection when the prosecutor asked Green, “What was it about this set of 
circumstances that caused you to leave your work and go out to a coworker‟s 
home?”  It did so, however, only as to the form of the question.  Thus, even if we 
                                              
26  
Defendant cites other instances of Green‟s testimony, as well as the 
testimony of Olsson‟s father and sister, which he characterizes as “impermissible” 
but to which he did not object at trial.  He concedes he did not object to this 
testimony, but says he presents it as part “of the factual background of the claim to 
show context, to show prosecutorial misconduct, and to show how the prosecutor 
violated the court‟s orders violating notice.”  We deem his explanation to be a 
concession that any argument based on this testimony is forfeited and we do not 
consider or address further whether this unobjected-to testimony was improper. 
 
Also threaded through defendant‟s claim is an assertion that the prosecutor 
violated a court order requiring him to notify both the court and trial counsel in 
advance when he was going to elicit testimony that the defense might find 
objectionable.  The court, however, simply instructed the prosecutor to notify the 
court and counsel in advance when he “anticipate[d]” he might be getting into 
areas the court characterized, “for lack of better description,” as “victim impact.”  
Plainly the ruling left much to the prosecutor‟s judgment.  Nowhere does 
defendant cite an objection on defense counsel‟s part that the prosecutor had 
violated the court‟s instruction, much less any ruling by the court on the issue.  
The claim is therefore forfeited. 
73 
 
assume that the basis of defendant‟s objection at the bench conference was 
prosecutorial misconduct, the trial court‟s ruling implicitly rejected that ground. 
Nonetheless, defendant asserts all the testimony regarding Green‟s concern 
was impermissible because it only served to show the impact of Olsson‟s murder 
on her.  We disagree.  Green‟s concern and her subsequent decision to go to 
Olsson‟s house to check on her well-being helped provide a context and to 
establish a time line for the prosecution‟s case-in-chief.  Moreover, Green‟s 
decision to go to the home of a coworker simply because she missed work was 
unusual; to have forced her to omit any mention of the cause of her concern may 
have raised unnecessary questions about her credibility.  (See People v. Box 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1202 [references to the fact victim was murdered on his 
third birthday “helped place the testimony of prosecution witnesses in context and 
assisted the jury in assessing their credibility”].)  Finally, we are unpersuaded that 
these relatively brief references to Green‟s concern had a significant emotional 
impact on the jury.  
Defendant next claims the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
elicited from Green testimony that she had never heard Olsson use profanity.  
Defense counsel objected to the question and his objection was sustained.  
Defendant fails to demonstrate that the remedy was inadequate to the impropriety. 
Defendant claims two other questions to Green were intended to elicit 
impermissible “victim impact” evidence.   The prosecutor asked Green whether 
her description of the coldness in the bedroom referred only to the temperature or 
also Green‟s feelings.  Green replied, “It could be a combination of both.”  Later, 
he asked her if she ever had flashbacks to “what you found in Sandy Olsson‟s 
bedroom on July 25, 1986?”  Green replied, “Yes, I do, twice a month or more.  I 
know that it‟s been at least that frequently since the death of Sandy.”  Defendant 
failed to object to these questions, thus forfeiting his claim of prosecutorial 
74 
 
misconduct on appeal.  (People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 839.)  Even if he 
had not, we would find no grounds for reversible misconduct based on these brief 
exchanges. 
Next, defendant claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his 
questioning of Clifford Sandberg, Sandy Olsson‟s father.  While questioning 
Sandberg about Olsson‟s habit of locking the front door after she came home from 
work, he asked if Sandberg remembered “ever having someone come over to the 
house and her opening the door when the chain was on the door?”  Sandberg 
replied there was a “special case” when a man came and pounded on the door 
saying that his wife was ill and had fallen to the floor.  Defense counsel objected 
“to narrative.”  The trial court replied:  “All right.  The answer up to this point can 
remain.  Next question.”  When the prosecutor then asked whether Olsson had 
gone to help the neighbor, defense counsel objected on relevance grounds and the 
objection was sustained, although not before Sandberg answered, “Yes.” 
Contrary to defendant‟s current claim, his initial objection to Sandberg‟s 
response was not sustained and, therefore, the prosecutor did not commit 
misconduct when he asked a followup question.  In any event, the basis of the 
objection was not prosecutorial misconduct but that the answer was a narrative.  
The court sustained defendant‟s second objection on relevance grounds.  He 
complains that the answer was not stricken and the jury not admonished to 
disregard it.  Defense counsel, however, did not request either remedy and, in any 
event, we are unpersuaded that Sandberg‟s single-word answer — “Yes” — was 
“highly prejudicial,” as defendant now maintains. 
Defendant cites as misconduct a series of questions by the prosecutor to 
Olsson‟s daughter, Sandra Walters, about her relationship with her mother, the 
subjects of their conversations and whether, from these conversations, Walters 
knew whether her mother enjoyed much of a social life and if she knew whether 
75 
 
Olsson ever slept in the nude.  Defendant failed to object to two of the nine 
questions, resulting in forfeiture.  None of his objections to the remaining 
questions were for prosecutorial misconduct.  Rather, they were largely technical 
objections such as inadequate foundation and hearsay.  Moreover, defense 
counsel‟s objections were repeatedly sustained.  Thus, even assuming that his 
claim is not forfeited by his failure to have objected to these questions on the 
ground of prosecutorial misconduct (People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 839), 
he fails to demonstrate the inadequacy of the remedy he did receive when his 
various objections were sustained. 
Moreover, we reject his underlying claim that the evidence the prosecutor 
sought to elicit from these questions “was only relevant to the impermissible 
consideration of  victim impact.”  The questions directed to Walters were also 
relevant to show — contrary to the implication of defendant‟s statement to the 
police — that Olsson was a modest woman who led a quiet life. 
Defendant also contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during 
closing argument when he argued:  “It is time to put a halt to the brutality and 
viciousness of this defendant.  And it is time to give Sandy Olsson back her good 
name and reputation.”  Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was 
attempting to “inflame the jury” and that his comment was “irrelevant.”  The court 
replied:  “I indicated to the jury now that this is argument.  These are the 
arguments of the attorneys.  The arguments are not evidence in the case.”  The 
prosecutor continued:  “The evidence in this case establishes this man tried to take 
everything in the world that Sandy Olsson had and he did take everything, except 
for her good name and reputation, and he tried to take that and steal that like 
everything else he took on the morning of July 25, 1986.” 
The prosecutor‟s comments about the victim‟s good name and reputation 
were undoubtedly allusions to defendant‟s statement to police about the murder.  
76 
 
In that statement, he suggested that Sandy Olsson stole drugs from the hospital 
where she worked and sold them to people like “Doubting Thomas,” who, 
according to defendant, was a Hell‟s Angel.  Defendant also suggested that Olsson 
was the kind of woman who entertained late night male visitors and engaged in 
sex with strangers.  Defendant‟s statement was in evidence.  There was no 
misconduct.  (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 463 [prosecutor has a right 
to comment on the evidence in closing argument].) 
Defendant also claims the prosecutor committed misconduct during his 
rebuttal argument but he failed to object to the comments he asserts were 
improper.  The claim is therefore forfeited. 
In any event, we would find no misconduct.  During the defense argument, 
defense counsel repeatedly maintained that defendant was telling the truth in his 
statement to the police about the circumstances of the murder.  He suggested that 
Olsson had, in fact, taken drugs from the hospital to sell to “Doubting Thomas.”  
The implication of that argument is that testimony by Olsson‟s friends and family 
that she was a modest woman who lived quietly was not credible.  It is in this 
context that the prosecutor made the statement defendant now claims was 
misconduct:  “He [defense counsel] attacked the victim.  He even attacked the 
victim‟s family.  Isn‟t it outrageous that these folks are here.  Isn‟t it so outrageous 
that they‟re in this courtroom with some of her friends.  Terrible thing.  Terrible 
thing, because the only person who has to lie is the defendant over there.”  In 
context, the prosecutor‟s argument was permissible rebuttal on the issue of witness 
credibility. 
c.  Trial court error 
In addition to charging the prosecutor with misconduct for eliciting 
improper victim impact evidence, defendant faults the trial court for rulings that 
77 
 
allegedly abetted the misconduct.  Specifically, he claims the trial court failed to 
limit evidence and argument to relevant and material matters and erred by 
admitting into evidence a photograph of the victim while she was alive.  He also 
argues he was cumulatively prejudiced by the trial court‟s errors and the 
prosecutor‟s misconduct. 
Defendant contends the trial court failed to issue “firm rulings” in response 
to defense objections.  As a result, he asserts that the prosecutor exploited the 
court‟s vague rulings to elicit improper victim impact evidence. 
Defendant claims the trial court failed to adequately rule on his objection to 
the prosecutor‟s voir dire comment to Prospective Juror J.B. that it would be 
unfair to Olsson‟s family if a juror were unable to consider both penalties.  But 
defendant did not make a contemporaneous objection to the comment.  Instead, he 
waited until both that prospective juror and the next prospective juror, J.W., had 
been questioned and excused.  Only then did defense counsel argue the comment 
was “inappropriate.”  The trial court, after hearing from both sides, observed, “I‟ve 
only heard that reference on one occasion . . . .  I think we could spend a fair 
amount of time whether it‟s an appropriate subject . . . .  I would simply ask you at 
this time to note our conversation for the record.  If the situation arises again, you 
may react appropriately and I‟ll react as I feel appropriate.” 
In short, the trial court declined to rule on the propriety of the prosecutor‟s 
comment to a single prospective juror, to which defendant had failed to object at 
the time it was made.  The court‟s action was entirely reasonable.  There was no 
need for the court to make a definitive ruling unless the situation recurred, which it 
did not. 
Defendant contends the trial court‟s ruling was inadequate on his objection 
to prospective evidence of the victim‟s nursing career, her plans to attend her 
father‟s 85th birthday celebration, and her habits and routines.  He cites the court‟s 
78 
 
remark that the prosecutor had agreed to give the court and defense counsel 
advance notice if “he anticipates that any of the areas may be the subject of direct 
testimony,” at which point the court would hear and rule on any objections.  
Defendant asserts the court failed to clarify the “areas” over which the prosecutor 
was to tread lightly.  Neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor, however, found it 
necessary to request clarification.  This is because it was clear in context that the 
“areas” to which the court was referring were those areas of anticipated testimony 
by prosecution witnesses that defendant had just objected to:  Olsson‟s career, the 
family reunion evidence, and evidence of her habits and routines.  
Defendant complains that the prosecutor “[took] advantage of [the court‟s] 
inadequate ruling by asking objectionable questions and eliciting improper 
testimony before drawing an objection.”  Clearly not.  The court‟s instruction to 
the prosecutor to advise it and defense counsel of questions he anticipated might 
tread into potentially objectionable areas committed those decisions to the 
prosecutor‟s judgment.  That the prosecutor and defense counsel might disagree on 
this issue was to be expected.  The prosecutor asked questions he thought were 
permissible and, when the defense disagreed and objected, the trial court ruled on 
the specific question, sustaining some objections and overruling others.  Defendant 
argues that by requiring objections to specific prosecution questions, the court 
made it look as though his counsel was “bullying” witnesses.  He cites nothing in 
the record to support this speculation.  Moreover, the trial court‟s instructions to 
the jury made clear that objections were simply a normal part of a trial.  We 
discern no error by the trial court or misconduct by the prosecutor. 
Defendant renews his claim that the prosecutor‟s reference in closing 
argument to the victim‟s good name and reputation were improper and faults the 
trial court for not sustaining his objection but simply admonishing the jury that 
arguments are not evidence.  As we have concluded that the argument was a 
79 
 
permissible comment on the evidence, we find no error in the trial court‟s handling 
of defendant‟s objection.  
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to sustain a defense 
objection to the prosecutor‟s remark in rebuttal argument that defendant had 
“smear[ed] the good name and reputation” of the victim.  Defendant objected that 
the remarks invited the jury to speculate on matters outside the record and referred 
to a previous objection during opening arguments.  Defendant had tried to prevent 
the prosecutor from arguing that defendant had attempted to sully the victim‟s 
good name and reputation because the trial court had sustained an objection when 
the prosecutor had asked Olsson‟s supervisor, Margaret Brick, about Olsson‟s 
reputation for honesty and integrity.  The prosecutor replied that his argument was 
based on Brick‟s testimony that an audit had revealed no missing drugs from the 
hospital during the period Olsson had worked there, contrary to the implication of 
defendant‟s statement that Olsson sold drugs she had stolen from the hospital.  
Defense counsel also argued that the prosecutor could not base his argument on 
defendant‟s statement to police because the prosecutor had introduced that 
statement.  The court rejected that argument.  It also ruled that the prosecutor 
could support his argument with Brick‟s drug audit testimony. 
The court did not err in overruling defendant‟s objection that the 
prosecutor‟s rebuttal argument referred to matters outside the record.  Defendant‟s 
statement to the police and the drug audit testimony by Brick were in evidence and 
the prosecutor could comment on them.27  For these same reasons, we reject 
                                              
27  
Defendant renews the claim made by his trial counsel that the prosecutor 
was prohibited from commenting on defendant‟s statement to police because the 
prosecution introduced the statement.  He cites no authority for this assertion.  
Moreover, as already noted, defense counsel relied on that statement in his own 
closing argument, suggesting that defendant had been truthful when he told police 
Olsson was a drug dealer and the murder was committed by Doubting Thomas or 
some other third party. 
80 
 
defendant‟s claim that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial 
based on the prosecutor‟s rebuttal argument. 
Defendant‟s remaining claims can be summarily disposed of.  He renews 
his claim the trial court erred when it denied his request to exclude Olsson‟s 
family members from the courtroom during the guilt phase.  We have already 
rejected his argument and, for the reasons previously given, do so again.  (See pp. 
58-62, ante.)  Defendant renews his claim that the trial court‟s ruling regarding the 
scope of testimony about Olsson‟s planned trip to Kansas for her father‟s birthday 
was ambiguous in that it did not clearly preclude the prosecutor from presenting 
evidence of the purpose of the trip as opposed to the mere fact of it.  We have 
already rejected this claim and, for the reasons previously given, do so again.  (See 
pp. 71, 77-78, ante.)  Defendant contends the trial court cut defense counsel off 
when he was attempting to object to the prosecutor‟s references to the victim‟s 
good name and reputation.  Not so.  The court had already heard extensive 
argument when it remarked to defense counsel, “I don‟t mean to cut you off, sir, 
but what I‟d like to do at this time is . . . give you an opportunity . . . to 
memorialize the issue now because you brought it to my attention, I want to make 
sure we have a record about that which we do.”  The court made a preliminary 
ruling with respect to the kind of testimony the prosecutor could elicit from his 
first witness, Maxine Gatten.  The parties then resumed their argument both at this 
session and in the next court session at even greater length than before the court‟s 
comment.  In no way does the record support defendant‟s claim that the court 
prevented him from making a comprehensive argument on this issue. 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted 
evidence that Olsson‟s coworkers were concerned when she failed to appear for 
work on July 25, 1986.  We have previously rejected this argument and, for the 
reasons given, do so again.  (See pp. 72-73, ante.)  We have also rejected his claim 
81 
 
that the trial court erred when it admitted testimony by Barbara Green about her 
flashbacks to the crime scene and, for the reasons given, we do so again.  (See p. 
73, ante.)  Defendant contends evidence of Olsson‟s duties at the medical center 
were irrelevant and, therefore, the court abused its discretion in admitting such 
testimony.  We disagree. 
A focal point of the prosecution‟s case was showing that Olsson‟s job was 
all consuming and accounted for her quiet lifestyle, which excluded the possibility 
of drug dealing and promiscuity.  Thus, the nature and scope of her professional 
duties was relevant, and the trial court acted well within its considerable discretion 
when it admitted such evidence.  Defendant contends the trial court erred when it 
overruled his foundational objection to testimony by Sandberg that his daughter 
slept in flannel pajamas based on his observations when he stayed with her from 
October to March.  (Evid. Code, § 1105 [“Any otherwise admissible evidence of 
habit or custom is admissible to prove conduct on a specified occasion in 
conformity with the habit or custom”].)  “[T]he determination of the admissibility 
of [habit or custom] evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.”  
(People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 337.)  Here the court reasonably 
concluded that Sandberg‟s observations of his daughter‟s sleepwear and the fact 
that he regularly laundered her pajamas during the six months a year he stayed 
with her provided sufficient foundation for the prosecution‟s contention that she 
wore pajamas on the night she was murdered and was forced to remove them by 
her assailant.  
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted 
into evidence a photograph of Sandy Olsson in her work clothes while she was 
alive.  Initially, the defense had offered to stipulate to identity, but the prosecution 
rejected the stipulation.  The prosecutor showed the photograph to several 
witnesses to establish identity.  Later, the defense objected to admission of the 
82 
 
photograph on grounds it was irrelevant and prejudicial.  The trial court overruled 
the objection. 
As defendant acknowledges, the prosecutor used the photograph for 
identification purposes while examining four different witnesses.  “Our cases have 
permitted similar uses of photographs of victims while alive.  [Citations.]  We find 
no error in admitting [this] photograph[].”  (People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 
673, 692.)  “The photograph, which was shown to three witnesses, was relevant to 
establish the witnesses‟ ability to identify the victims as the people about whom 
they were testifying.  The possibility that it generated sympathy for the victims is 
not enough, by itself, to compel its exclusion if it was otherwise relevant.”  
(People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1230.)  Moreover, given that the jury 
was aware Olsson was a nurse, we reject defendant‟s claim that the photograph 
was particularly prejudicial because she was depicted in her work clothes. 
Defendant contends that he suffered cumulative prejudice from the impact 
of the prosecutor‟s misconduct and the trial court errors discussed above.  We 
have rejected his claim of errors or, if error, of individual prejudice, and therefore 
he could not have suffered cumulative prejudice.  
G.  Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument  
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in his guilt phase 
closing argument.  
First, defendant contends the prosecutor impugned the integrity of defense 
counsel in his rebuttal argument when the prosecutor asked rhetorically, “[D]id 
you ever get the feeling [defense counsel] believed his client was telling the 
truth?”  Defense objected that the remark was “improper” and requested an 
admonition.  The court obliged, instructing:  “The jury is advised to disregard this 
83 
 
comment.”  Subsequently, the defense sought a mistrial, claiming that court‟s 
admonition was inadequate.  The motion was denied. 
We presume the jury fully understood and applied the court‟s instruction.  
(People v. Richardson (2009) 46 Cal.4th 339, 356, fn. 13.) 
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when the 
prosecutor referred to him as “a despicable excuse for a man,” a “despicable 
individual,” “garbage,” and “a sucker.”  Defendant failed to object to the last three 
remarks, thus forfeiting his claim of misconduct on appeal.  (People v. Panah, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 462.)  
In any event, we find no misconduct.  We have observed that a prosecutor 
is not “required to discuss his [or her] view of the case in clinical or detached 
detail.”  (People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 463.)  “[T]he use of derogatory 
epithets to describe a defendant is not necessarily misconduct.”  (People v. Friend 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 32 [defendant described as “ „living like a mole or the rat that 
he is‟ ”].)  “A prosecutor is allowed to make vigorous arguments and may even 
use such epithets as are warranted by the evidence, as long as these arguments are 
not inflammatory and principally aimed at arousing the passion or prejudice of the 
jury.”  (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1251.)  We have repeatedly 
rejected claims of prosecutorial misconduct involving the use of such epithets in 
guilt phase arguments.  (See, e.g., People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1195 
[no misconduct where prosecutor characterized crimes as “ „serial killing,‟ ” and 
“ „terrorizing and killing‟ ” people (italics omitted); People v. Jones (1998) 17 
Cal.4th 279, 308-309 [no ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to 
prosecutor‟s characterization of defendant‟s crime as a “terrorist attack” and 
comparison of defendant to “[t]errorists”]; People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 
1210, 1250-1251 [no misconduct where prosecutor referred to defendant as a 
“ „perverted maniac‟ ”].)  Here, as in those cases, we conclude that these epithets, 
84 
 
which were but fleeting characterizations in the course of the prosecutor‟s very 
lengthy summations, did not constitute misconduct. 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed Griffin error (Griffin v. 
California (1965) 380 U.S. 609), when he argued that the jury should assess the 
credibility of defendant‟s statement to police using the same standards as applied 
to trial testimony.  In Griffin, “the high court held the prosecution may not 
comment on a defendant‟s failure to testify.”  (People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
577, 596.)  That did not happen here.  As the trial court aptly observed when it 
denied defendant‟s mistrial motion on this ground, “There was no reference to the 
defendant‟s failure to testify.”  The Attorney General contends that the 
prosecutor‟s comments “simply urged the jurors to evaluate the credibility of 
[defendant‟s] out-of-court statements — which had been received into evidence 
under the hearsay exception for the admission of a party — under the same 
standards and criteria used to evaluate in-court testimony.”  We agree. 
A hearsay declarant is subject to the same credibility standards as if “the 
declarant had been a witness at the hearing.”  (Evid. Code, § 1202.)  Here, the 
prosecution argued that its evidence proved that defendant alone had murdered 
Sandy Olsson.  This was inconsistent with defendant‟s statement to police that a 
third party committed the crime.  Thus, the jury was confronted with a question of 
the defendant‟s credibility.  The prosecutor did not err by arguing they should 
apply the same standards to that statement as they would to the testimony of a 
witness.  That argument was plainly limited to defendant‟s statement to the police 
and did not implicate directly or indirectly defendant‟s decision not to testify at 
trial. 
Defendant next contends that the prosecutor misstated the evidence and 
referred to facts not in evidence during his argument.  Specifically, he cites the 
prosecutor‟s comment that Olsson felt safe in her neighborhood because “you 
85 
 
know this is a good neighborhood, I mean there are no bars on the windows.”  
Defendant contends there was no evidence of the neighborhood‟s safety or 
whether Olsson felt secure in her home.  “[P]rosecutors have wide latitude to draw 
reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial. . . .”  (People v. 
Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1153-1154.)  The evidence showed that the 
victim lived in a quiet neighborhood of single-family dwellings that partly abutted 
a golf course.  It showed further that she employed no special safety precautions in 
her own home beyond a chain lock on the front door that was easily broken.  
There was also Sandberg‟s testimony that when a neighbor had come knocking at 
Olsson‟s door one night, she simply opened it.  The prosecutor‟s characterization 
of the neighborhood and the victim‟s sense of security was not impermissible. 
Defendant contends the prosecutor misstated the law when he argued that 
the jury did not have to unanimously agree on the applicable theory of first degree 
murder — burglary murder or premeditated murder — by using an analogy to 
burglary:  “Just like in the burglary where you can be divided as to why he 
entered, whether it was to steal, whether it was to rob, whether it was to do both.  
As long as you all agree that he had that intent or one of those intents, he‟s guilty 
of burglary. [¶]  In this particular case, as long as you agree he either had all these 
things when he killed, or that it occurred during the course of a burglary.”   
Defendant complains the argument was improper because defendant was never 
charged with either burglary or robbery; that the prosecutor conflated the intent 
requirement for premeditated burglary and burglary murder; and “he did not tell 
them what „all these things‟ were that could lead them to a finding of 
premeditated, as opposed to felony, murder.” 
The prosecutor was correct that the jury need not agree on the same theory 
of first degree murder to convict defendant of that charge.  (People v. Nakahara 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 712.)  He was also correct when, by way of analogy, he 
86 
 
pointed out that, similarly, there was no unanimity requirement for burglary.  
(People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132-1133.)   It is plain from the context 
that he was not speaking of burglary or robbery as separate crimes but, rather, 
alluding to burglary because the offense was before the jury for purposes of  
felony murder and burglary-murder special circumstances.28  
The Attorney General argues that, when the prosecutor referred to “all these 
things” he was alluding to a chart on which the elements of willful, deliberate and 
premeditated murder had been itemized in contradistinction to burglary murder.  
The record lends some support to the Attorney General‟s assertion in that it is 
clear the prosecutor was using charts to illustrate legal concepts.  Chart or no, 
however, we agree that, in context, the prosecutor‟s reference to “all these things” 
was to the elements of premeditated murder which he had explained at some 
length to the jury before addressing burglary murder.  Thus, we conclude the 
phrase could not have led the jury to believe that the elements of premeditated 
murder and burglary murder were the same. 
Finally, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor‟s 
misconduct requires reversal.  As we have found no misconduct in the 
prosecutor‟s summation, we necessarily find no prejudice, cumulative or 
individual.  (People v. Stitely (2007) 35 Cal.4th 514, 560.) 
H.  Jury unanimity  
Defendant contends that, in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 
U.S. 466, his constitutional rights were violated because the jury was not 
instructed that it must unanimously agree on a theory of first degree murder, that 
                                              
28  
We think the prosecutor‟s reference to “rob” may have a slip of the tongue 
and that what he meant to say was “rape,” which, as the jury was correctly 
instructed, was the other predicate crime for burglary murder.  In light of those 
instructions, we reject the notion that the reference could have confused or misled 
the jury. 
87 
 
is, whether it was premeditated murder or burglary murder.  Furthermore, he 
asserts Apprendi also required the jury to unanimously agree on which of the two 
possible target offenses — theft or rape — supported the burglary-murder theory 
of first degree murder.  We have previously rejected these arguments and do so 
again. 
“[A]though the two forms of murder have different elements, only a single 
statutory offense of murder exists.  Felony murder and premeditated murder are 
not distinct crimes, and need not be separately pleaded.  [Citations.]  As for 
defendant‟s claim that a unanimity instruction should have been given, our cases 
have repeatedly rejected this contention, holding that the jurors need not 
unanimously agree on a theory of first degree murder as either felony murder or 
murder with premeditation and deliberation.  [Citations.]  [¶]  We are not 
persuaded otherwise by Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466.  There, the 
United States Supreme Court found a constitutional requirement that any fact that 
increases the maximum penalty for a crime, other than a prior conviction, must be 
formally charged, submitted to the fact finder, treated as a criminal element, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  [Citation.]  We see nothing in Apprendi that 
would require a unanimous jury verdict as to the particular theory justifying a 
finding of first degree murder.  (See also Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 610 
[122 S.Ct. 2428, 2443-2444, 153 L.Ed.2d 556] [requiring jury finding beyond 
reasonable doubt as to facts essential to punishment].)”  (People v. Nakahara, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th  at pp. 712-713, original italics; and see People v. Taylor (2010) 
48 Cal.4th 574, 626  [rejecting contention that for purposes of felony murder the 
jury must unanimously agree on the target offense].) 
88 
 
I.  Instructional error claims 
 
1.  Consciousness of guilt instruction  
Defendant contends consciousness of guilt instructions given in this case 
(CALJIC Nos. 2.03, 2.06, 2.52) were contradictory and misleading and lessened 
the prosecution‟s burden of proof.29  These standard instructions explicitly state 
that any inference regarding guilt to be drawn from the circumstances described by 
them — a willfully false or misleading statement, destruction or suppression of 
evidence, and flight — is permissive and insufficient alone to prove guilt.  
Nonetheless, defendant claims the jury could have convicted him based on 
consciousness of guilt alone even if it was not otherwise convinced of his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  As defendant acknowledges, we have repeatedly 
rejected challenges to these instructions.  (See generally People v. Zambrano, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1159; People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 125-126.)  
We decline to revisit this authority.  We have also previously rejected the claim he 
makes here that such instructions are improper pinpoint instructions.  (People v. 
Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 142.)  We do so again. 
 
2.  Circumstantial evidence instructions 
Defendant next contends that the circumstantial evidence instructions given 
in this case impermissibly lightened the prosecution‟s  burden of proof (CALJIC 
No. 2.01 [when one interpretation of circumstantial evidence appears reasonable 
                                              
29  
CALJIC No. 2.03 as given stated:  “If you find that before this trial the 
defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading statement concerning 
the crimes for which he is now being tried, you may consider such statement as a 
circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt.  However, such conduct is 
not sufficient by itself to prove guilt and its weight and significance, if any, are 
matters for your determination.”  CALJIC No. 2.06 contained similar language 
regarding the destruction or concealment of evidence.  CALJIC No. 2.52 
contained similar language regarding flight after the commission or accusation of 
committing a crime.  
89 
 
and the other unreasonable, jury must accept the reasonable interpretation]; 
CALJIC No. 2.02 [same standard, for circumstantial evidence of specific intent or 
mental state]; CALJIC Nos. 8.83, 8.83.1 [same standard, for special circumstance 
allegation and specific intent or mental state for special circumstance allegation].)  
“Defendant acknowledges that we have rejected similar arguments in prior cases.  
[Citations.]  We find our reasoning in those cases to be sound.”  (People v. 
Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 621.) 
 
3.  Voluntary intoxication 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it failed to give a voluntary 
intoxication instruction as to the burglary-murder special circumstance.  Defendant 
acknowledges that the court did give the instruction with respect to count 1 
(murder) and count 2 (assault with intent to commit rape).  The jury was 
instructed, in relevant part:  “If the evidence shows that the defendant was 
intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime, you should consider that fact in 
determining whether defendant had such specific intent or mental state.  [¶]  If 
from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant formed 
such specific intent or mental states, you must find that he did not have such 
specific intent or mental states.”  (CALJIC No. 4.21.)  Defendant argues the 
court‟s failure to give this instruction as to the special circumstance may have led 
the jury to ignore whether intoxication prevented defendant from forming the 
specific intent required to establish the special circumstance, e.g., the specific 
intent to steal or commit rape. 
“In assessing a claim of instructional error, „we must view a challenged 
portion “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record” to 
determine “ „whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the 
challenged instruction in a way‟ that violates the Constitution.” ‟  [Citation.]”  
90 
 
(People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 831.)  The voluntary intoxication 
instruction informed the jury it could consider the effect of defendant‟s 
intoxication on his ability to form the required “specific intent or mental state” at 
“the time of the alleged crime.”  This necessarily included all conduct and events 
that comprised the crimes and the special circumstance.  Indeed, the jury was 
further instructed that the special circumstance applied only if “[t]he murder was 
committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted 
commission of a burglary.” 
The jury could not have evaluated the effect of defendant‟s intoxication on 
his ability to form the required specific intent for purposes of burglary murder 
without also deciding the issue with respect to the special circumstance.  This is 
also true of count 2.  The jury could not have evaluated the effect of defendant‟s 
intoxication with respect to whether he formed the specific intent required for 
assault with intent to commit rape without also deciding that issue for the special 
circumstance allegation.  That is, the question of the effect of defendant‟s 
intoxication on his ability to form specific intent was the same whether it was for 
felony murder, assault with intent to commit rape, or the burglary murder special 
circumstance.  In resolving the issue for one purpose, the jury resolved it for all 
purposes.  Accordingly, we reject defendant‟s claim of instructional error. 
We also reject defendant‟s further claim that, as given, the voluntary 
intoxication instruction was inadequate because it told the jury it “should” 
consider intoxication rather than it “shall or must.”  The use of “should” did not 
give the jury discretion whether to consider defendant‟s intoxication.  The very 
next sentence informed the jurors that if they entertained a reasonable doubt 
regarding defendant‟s ability to form the requisite mental states because of his 
intoxication they “must” conclude that he did not.  There was no error. 
91 
 
J.  Cumulative guilt phase error  
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of guilt phase error requires 
reversal.  “However, we either have rejected his claims and/or found any assumed 
error to be nonprejudicial on an individual basis.  Viewed as a whole, such errors 
do not warrant reversal of the judgment.”  (People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 
p. 560.) 
K.  Admission of unadjudicated criminal activity in penalty phase  
Pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b), the prosecution presented evidence 
that defendant had been involved in two jailhouse altercations.  Section 190.3, 
factor (b) allows the jury to consider “[t]he presence or absence of criminal 
activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or 
violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or violence.”  The court 
held a Phillips hearing (People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29 (Phillips) to make a 
preliminary determination whether the evidence was admissible. 
Defendant argues:  (1) the court‟s Phillips hearing ruling was error; (2) 
admission of the evidence of the altercations violated state law because defendant 
was not the aggressor and did not use force or violence; (3) admission of the 
evidence violated federal due process guarantees because it “allowed the jury to 
punish [defendant] for prior bad acts of „violence‟ that were wholly unrelated to 
any crimes proven at the guilt phase”; (4) admission of the evidence rendered 
section 190.3, factor (b) unconstitutional as applied in this case because it 
“allowed the introduction of conduct that had no bearing on any issue relevant to 
the penalty determination”; (5) admission of evidence of “such de minimis acts in 
aggravation” violates the Eighth Amendment‟s requirement of “heightened 
reliability” in capital cases; (6) in his closing argument the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by linking defendant to a defense penalty phase witness who had been 
convicted of rape. 
92 
 
“Both former and present section 190.3, factor (b) . . .) provide that in 
making the penalty determination, the trier of fact is to consider, if relevant,  
„ “The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved 
the use or attempted use of force or violence or the expressed or implied threat to 
use force or violence.” ‟  [Citation.] . . . [E]vidence admitted under this provision 
must establish that the conduct was prohibited by a criminal statute and satisfied 
the essential elements of the crime.  [Citations.]  The prosecution bears the burden 
of proving the factor (b) other crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. 
Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1135.)  The other crimes evidence may be conduct 
amounting to either a felony or a misdemeanor.  (Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 
71.)  Whether the other crimes evidence is significant enough to be given weight 
in the penalty determination is a question for the jury.  (People v. Smith (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 334, 369.)  
“In Phillips, we admonished that „in many cases it may be advisable for the 
trial court to conduct a preliminary hearing before the penalty phase to determine 
whether there is substantial evidence to prove each element‟ of other violent 
crimes the prosecution intends to introduce in aggravation under section 190.3, 
factor (b). . . . „Moreover, a trial court‟s decision to admit “other crimes” evidence 
at the penalty phase is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and no abuse of discretion 
will be found where, in fact, the evidence in question was legally sufficient.‟  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 225.) 
At the Phillips hearing in this case, the prosecution called the two 
correctional officers who witnessed the jailhouse altercations.  Deputy Sheriff 
Robert Pinkerton testified that, while he was supervising dinner at the Santa Rita 
county jail on January 7, 1988, his attention was drawn to defendant and another 
inmate, Derek Mendoca.  Pinkerton testified the two men were “involved in a 
fistfight, throwing punches at each other.”  Pinkerton did not recall if any of the 
93 
 
punches landed, nor did he see who started the fight.  He immediately separated 
the two men.  Mendoca was uninjured but defendant had a cut lip that required 
treatment at a hospital. 
Deputy Sheriff Michael Perkins testified about the second incident, which 
occurred on September 26, 1991.   About 4:00 p.m., he heard a commotion and 
saw defendant and Robert McKinney “clutched in a wrestling match.”  The two 
men “threw a couple of punches” at each other and again “grasped each other and 
started wrestling around.”  Perkins did not see any punches land, nor could he 
remember who threw the first punch.  Defendant was treated for “bruises and 
bumps” to his face and McKinney was treated for an injured eye. 
The trial court denied defendant‟s motion to exclude evidence of these 
incidents.  The two deputy sheriffs testified for the prosecution at the penalty 
phase, essentially repeating the testimony they had given at the Phillips hearing.  
Derek Mendoca testified for the defense that he threw the first punch at defendant 
after defendant wiped mustard or ketchup on Mendoca‟s shirt.  He testified further 
that he and defendant were friends before and after the fight.  On cross-
examination, Mendoca testified he had been convicted of kidnapping, robbery and 
rape. 
On the other crimes issue, the jury was instructed that before it could 
consider the two batteries as an aggravating circumstance, it must find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed them.  The jury was also instructed on 
the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof and the elements of 
misdemeanor battery.  The latter instruction informed the jury that “[t]he use of 
force and violence is not unlawful when done in lawful self-defense.  The burden 
is on the People to prove that the use of force and violence was not in lawful self-
defense.  If you have a reasonable doubt that such use was unlawful, you must not 
consider that evidence for any purpose.” 
94 
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence of 
the jailhouse altercations.  The testimony by Deputies Pinkerton and Perkins 
constituted substantial evidence sufficient to prove misdemeanor battery.  
Defendant asserts the first incident did not constitute battery because Pinkerton did 
not see defendant land a blow and without touching there is no battery.  However, 
Pinkerton testified that the “fight had started” before his attention was drawn to it.  
He saw the men “throwing punches” at each other and, after they were separated, 
noted that defendant was injured.  Pinkerton‟s testimony established that the men 
were involved in mutual combat — as opposed to Mendoca unilaterally attacking 
defendant — and that the fight had already started when Pinkerton‟s attention was 
drawn to it and blows had been thrown with sufficient force to injure defendant.  It 
was a reasonable inference from this testimony that defendant had also struck 
Mendoca.  Defendant cites Mendoca‟s trial testimony that he started the fight and 
threw the only punch.  This testimony, however, was not before the trial court 
when it ruled on the Phillips motion. 
As to the second incident, there was obviously touching, given Perkins‟s 
testimony that defendant and McKinney were “clutched in a wrestling match.”  
Defendant asserts that this “touching was consensual.”  This characterization is 
unsupportable in light of the record as a whole.  Perkins testified that the 
altercation took place at meal time and that the two men separated and threw 
punches at each other before again grabbing each other.  Plainly, this was a fight, 
not horseplay or sport.  Again, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
admitting evidence of this altercation. 
Defendant contends that admission of the altercation evidence violated his 
right to due process under state law because he “was not the aggressor and did not 
use force or violence.”  The claim is forfeited because defendant failed to raise it 
below.  It is also without merit.  The evidence before the trial court at the Phillips 
95 
 
hearing indicated that, at minimum, each altercation involved mutual combat 
rather than a unilateral attack on defendant.  The evidence, as we have explained, 
also constituted sufficient evidence that defendant used force or violence to put the 
issue before the jury.  Therefore, the factual predicate of defendant‟s claim 
collapses and it fails on its merits. 
Defendant next contends that the other crimes evidence admitted in this 
case renders section 190.3, factor (b) unconstitutional as applied because (1) it 
allowed the jury to punish him for acts of violence unrelated to the crimes of 
which he was convicted; and (2) his conduct was minimal.  In a related claim, he 
contends admission of the other crimes evidence violated the Eighth Amendment‟s 
requirement of “heightened reliability” in capital cases. 
The purpose of 190.3, factor (b) “is to enable the jury to make an 
individualized assessment of the character and history of a defendant to determine 
the nature of the punishment to be imposed.”  (People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 
829, 851.)  We have repeatedly held that the statute does not violate any federal 
constitutional guarantees.  (See, e.g., People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 368 
[admission of adjudicated violent acts does not violate Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amend.]; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1054 [rejecting the defendant‟s 
claim that “use of evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity in aggravation 
pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b), renders his death sentence unreliable and 
violates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal 
Constitution”].)  Like his state law claim, defendant‟s “as applied” federal claim is 
based entirely on his tendentious view of the jailhouse altercations as “minor” and 
as to which he was not the aggressor.  We have concluded the trial court did not 
err in submitting the evidence to the jury.  Whether defendant‟s use of force was 
legally justified and the weight, if any, to be given to these incidents for purposes 
of the individualized assessment of his character and history were matters for the 
96 
 
jury to decide in light of the instructions given to it.  We find no violation of 
defendant‟s federal constitutional rights under the Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendment in either the submission of the evidence to the jury or the jury‟s 
consideration of it. 
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during 
closing argument when, referring to defense witness Mendoca, he said:  “How 
many of you would have guessed [Mendoca] is a rapist?  But he is a friend of the 
defendant‟s.”  Defendant failed to object to the remark, and his claim of 
misconduct is forfeited.  In any event, there was no misconduct.  The prosecutor‟s 
statement was made in the context of questioning Mendoca‟s credibility because 
of his convictions for rape and his acknowledged friendship with defendant, both 
facts that were in evidence. 
In summary, we find no error in the admission of the section 190.3, factor 
(b) evidence in this case. 
L.  Trial court’s admission of victim impact evidence 
Defendant challenges the trial court‟s admission of victim impact evidence 
on both constitutional and evidentiary grounds.  His arguments are without merit. 
“The introduction of victim impact evidence in capital cases does not 
violate any rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.  (Payne v. 
Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808.  In Payne, the United States Supreme Court 
explained that „ “[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the 
mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the 
sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too 
the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in 
particular to his family.” ‟  [Citation.]  „We have followed the high court‟s lead 
[citation] and have also found such victim impact evidence admissible as a 
97 
 
circumstance of the crime pursuant to section 190.3, factor (a) [citation].‟  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 211.)  “ „Unless it invites a 
purely irrational response from the jury, the devastating effect of a capital crime 
on loved ones and the community is relevant and admissible as a circumstance of 
the crime under section 190.3, factor (a).‟  [Citation.]  „The federal Constitution 
bars victim impact evidence only if it is “so unduly prejudicial” as to render the 
trial “fundamentally unfair.” ‟  [Citations.]”  (People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
1221, 1240 (Bramit); see People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 565.)  
“ „[V]ictim impact testimony is not limited to the victims‟ relatives or to persons 
present during the crime . . . .‟  [Citation.]”  (Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 213.)  
Nor is victim impact evidence “limited to circumstances known or foreseeable to 
the defendant at the time of the crime.”  (Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1240; see 
People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1135, 1183 [“We have approved victim 
impact testimony from multiple witnesses who were not present at the murder 
scene and who described circumstances and victim characteristics unknown to 
defendant.  [Citation.]”) 
When defendant murdered Sandy Olsson in 1986, victim impact evidence 
was inadmissible in capital cases.  But, prior to defendant‟s 1992 trial, the United 
States Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. 808, overruled its 
earlier decision in Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, and held that the 
Eighth Amendment “erect[ed] no per se bar” to victim impact evidence.  (Payne, 
at p. 827.)  Thereafter, in People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787 (Edwards), we 
revisited the issue of victim impact evidence in light of Payne and held, contrary 
to our earlier decision in People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, that “factor (a) 
of section 190.3 allows evidence and argument on the specific harm caused by the 
defendant, including the impact on the family of the victim.”  (Edwards, at 
p. 835.)  “Payne and Edwards apply even where, as here, the murder occurred 
98 
 
while Booth, supra, 482 U.S. 496, was in effect.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Stitely, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 565.) 
Defendant urges us to overrule Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787; we decline.  
Next, defendant contends that admission of victim impact evidence violates the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Clearly, in light of Payne it does not.  
Defendant‟s suggestion that Payne has been undermined by subsequent decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court is a claim that should be addressed to that 
body.  Defendant contends further that admission of victim impact evidence in this 
case violated ex post facto principles and due process because the crime was 
committed pre-Payne.  Assuming defendant did not forfeit this objection by failing 
to raise it below, we have previously rejected it and do so again.  (People v. 
Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 732 [“applying the rule in Payne in a case where 
the crime preceded that decision does not violate ex post facto principles”].)  
Defendant also contends that admission of victim impact evidence not limited to 
facts or circumstances known to the defendant is unconstitutional.  Assuming 
defendant did not forfeit this claim by failing to raise it below, we have rejected it.  
(Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1240; People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 
p. 1183.)  We do so again. 
Defendant also argues the victim impact testimony in this case was unduly 
prejudicial and inflammatory.  Specifically, he complains about testimony from 
the victim‟s family that she died before her children could give her grandchildren; 
that she had been an “anchor” to her son; that, following Olsson‟s murder, her 
daughter had become fearful for her personal safety and of emotional intimacy; 
that her sister had feared news of his daughter‟s death might have given her father 
a heart attack; her sister‟s guilt at not having been with the victim when she died; 
and her father‟s belief that Shirley Olsson had been tortured. 
99 
 
“This court previously has rejected arguments „that victim impact evidence 
must be confined to what is provided by a single witness [citation], that victim 
impact witnesses must have witnessed the crime [citation], and that such evidence 
is limited to matters within the defendant‟s knowledge.‟ ”  (People v. McKinnon, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 690.)  Indeed, the “People are entitled to present a 
„ “complete life histor[y] [of the murder victim] from early childhood to 
death.” ‟ ”  (People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 751.)  The People are also 
entitled to present the full impact of the victim‟s death on his or her survivors.  
(See, e.g., People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 466-467, 494-495 [victim‟s 
father testified he could not stop thinking about what the victim endured before 
she died; victim‟s sister, brother and brother-in-law testified to their residual fear 
following the murder]; People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 193 [testimony by 
victim‟s mother about her suicide attempt and hospitalizations “was relevant 
victim impact evidence”]; People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 485 [testimony 
by victims‟ daughter and granddaughter about what they imagined the last 
moments of victims‟ life were like “was relevant to the witnesses‟ own states of 
mind and the effect that the murders had upon them personally, and therefore was 
permissible victim impact testimony”; People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 
793 [victim impact testimony is not limited “to expressions of grief” but 
“encompasses the spectrum of human responses, including anger and 
aggressiveness [citation], fear [citation], and an inability to work [citation]”].)  We 
have carefully reviewed the victim impact evidence in this case.  Far from being 
unduly inflammatory and prejudicial, “[t]he evidence admitted here was „typical‟ 
of the victim impact evidence „we routinely have allowed.‟  [Citation.]”  (People 
v. Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 494.) 
Finally, defendant contends that the victim impact evidence should have 
been excluded because of inadequate notice.  “As here relevant, section 190.3 
100 
 
provides that in a capital case the prosecution may present evidence in aggravation 
only if it has given the defendant „notice of the evidence to be introduced . . . 
within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial.‟  
[Citation.]  To be timely, the notice must be given „before the cause is called to 
trial or as soon thereafter as the prosecution learns the evidence exists.‟  [Citation.]  
To be sufficient as to content, the notice must afford the defendant „ “a reasonable 
opportunity to prepare a defense to the allegation[].” ‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Mayfield, supra,14 Cal.4th at p. 798.) 
Here, the prosecution filed its notice of intent to present victim impact 
testimony before the trial began.  The notice listed the names of all the family 
members — the victim‟s father, sister, daughter and son — who ultimately 
testified, as well the names of coworkers who did not.  The trial court conducted a 
pretrial hearing on the admissibility of victim impact in light of the then recent 
Payne and Edwards decisions.  Later, in denying defendant‟s motion to exclude 
the evidence on grounds of inadequate notice below, the trial court ruled:  “[T]here 
is no evidence on the victim impact issue anticipated that was not already adduced 
at the guilt phase or is not within the range of evidence that is to be reasonably 
anticipated based on the notice given with respect to the death and loss of the 
family member . . . .”  The court referenced its pretrial ruling, noting:  “That 
matter was discussed at the commencement of the guilt phase of this trial, and the 
record is clear as to how the court addressed or was prepared to address that issue 
as the trial progressed.” 
Defendant nonetheless claims the court erred.  He asserts the prosecution‟s 
notice was “inadequate because it did not contain any information as to the 
substance of the proposed victim impact testimony.”  Not so.  Given the 
prosecutor‟s notice of intent to call family members, the extensive pretrial 
discussion about the scope of permissible victim impact evidence, and the actual 
101 
 
testimony of two of those witnesses at the guilt phase, defense counsel could not 
have failed to understand that the prosecutor intended to call the victim‟s family 
members to testify to their relationships with her and the effect of her death on 
them.  This was sufficient to afford the defense an opportunity to prepare a 
defense.  No further specification of what the evidence would be was required.  
(See People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 734.) 
M.  Prosecutorial misconduct: victim impact evidence  
 
1.  Defendant’s claims that the prosecutor elicited inadmissible 
testimony and violated court orders; the court erred by denying defendant’s 
two mistrial motions  
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during the 
examination of his victim impact witnesses by eliciting testimony the trial court 
had specifically ruled inadmissible.  He also asserts that the prosecutor violated 
the trial court‟s order that the prosecutor ask only leading questions of his victim 
impact witnesses to avoid having them stray into areas the court had ruled 
inadmissible.  As a result, he contends, he was compelled to repeatedly object to 
the prosecutor‟s examination of his witnesses.  Finally, he claims the trial court 
erred when it denied his two motions for mistrial.  Defendant‟s claims are without 
merit. 
As noted, at the time of defendant‟s 1992 trial, victim impact evidence had 
only recently become admissible in capital trials as a result of the Payne and 
Edwards decisions.  (Payne, supra, 502 U.S. 808; Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 
787.) Thus, as the trial court observed, regarding the scope of permissible victim 
impact evidence there “are very few guidelines in this area,” and it “is a very 
difficult area for everybody.”  Before the penalty phase began, the prosecutor 
made a lengthy offer of proof as to every victim impact witness he intended to 
call.  Afterwards, both sides argued their position regarding the proper scope of 
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such evidence.  Defense counsel argued for a narrow interpretation of the case 
law:  “[I]t‟s a simple statement of my sister, my daughter, my mother is gone, and 
I miss her very much . . . .  A quick glimpse into the victim‟s life, I think that‟s the 
key phrase again.” 
The prosecutor disagreed.  He cited the observation in Payne that it was 
unfair to allow virtually limitless evidence in mitigation but to bar the state from 
then “ „either offering a glimpse of the life which the defendant chose to 
extinguish or demonstrating the loss to the victim‟s family and to society which 
[has] resulted from the defendant‟s homicide.‟ ”  The prosecutor continued, 
“[Payne] doesn‟t limit it to well, I love this person and I miss him, as counsel 
would have it . . . . [¶]  [T]hat is not what is envisioned by the cases, and that is not 
the type of thing that would offset the type of mitigating evidence that the defense 
can get in.” 
Ultimately, the trial court ruled admissible evidence of the victim‟s 
“profession and such details about her job, which have already been received [in 
the guilt phase] . . . that she was a caring individual which seems to be implicit[] in 
the information previously admitted, and that she looked forward to retirement;  
[¶]  Inadmissible victim impact evidence would include . . . evidence as to her 
military service, leisure time pursuits and financial sacrifices which may have 
been made toward retirement.” 
As to the impact of her death on her family, the court ruled admissible “that 
a family member enjoyed a close relationship with the victim and that she was 
loved and is missed, that the reality of her death was brought home while packing 
belongings and making other arrangements, that a son or daughter married and had 
children after her death, the impact of the loss of a child on a parent as a general 
matter, and the loss of her companionship during her anticipated retirement, but 
not the specific plan or details of that travel.”  Also ruled admissible was “the 
103 
 
impact [on her survivors] of the nature of her [violent] death here as distinguished 
from” the impact had she died an “accidental death or [from] natural causes . . . 
and the impact of having to tell a family member of the victim‟s death;  [¶]  
Inadmissible victim impact evidence . . . would include a family member‟s 
difficulty with alcohol abuse, fear for personal safety or that of another family 
member, guilt feelings because of failure to contact the victim . . . on the night of 
her death, a sense of suspicion as to other people, or testimony about what the 
victim‟s thoughts may have been immediately prior to her death.”30 
In view of the possibility a witness might wander into excluded areas, the 
trial court told the prosecutor, “I would be inclined to allow you some latitude 
with regard to leading questions in this area subject, of course, to objection.”  
Later, when defense counsel asked the court to instruct the prosecutor to ask 
leading questions, the court told the prosecutor only “to utilize that form of 
question whenever possible, and be as specific as possible with respect to the 
questions that are articulated.”  The prosecutor pointed out that the problem with 
asking leading questions “where we get „yes‟ and „no‟ answers” was that a 
question‟s form “has a significant impact on the evidence itself,” while “the reason 
you ask open-ended questions or direct forms of questions is so that the 
information comes from the witness not from me.”  The court responded by again 
                                              
30  
We have subsequently held admissible certain victim impact evidence that 
the trial court excluded in this case, including, for example, a survivor‟s feelings 
of fear (People v. Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 494), testimony by survivors about 
how they imagined the victim‟s last moments of life (People v. Cowan, supra, 50 
Cal.4th at p. 485), and testimony about a survivor‟s substance abuse following the 
victim‟s murder (People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 495).  Of course, we 
cannot fault the trial court for not anticipating these decisions, but that we have 
concluded such evidence is admissible must certainly factor into any prejudice 
analysis. 
104 
 
“requesting that you ask leading questions whenever possible, subject to objection 
by the other side.” 
“ „It is, of course, misconduct for a prosecutor to “intentionally elicit 
inadmissible testimony.”  [Citations.]‟  [Citation.]  Such misconduct is 
exacerbated if the prosecutor continues to elicit such evidence after defense 
counsel has objected.”  (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960.)  However, 
a prosecutor cannot be faulted for a witness‟s nonresponsive answer that the 
prosecutor neither solicited nor could have anticipated.  (People v. Valdez (2004) 
32 Cal.4th 73, 125.) 
We turn to the specific instances where defendant claims the prosecutor 
elicited inadmissible testimony.   
a.  Sandra Walters 
Defendant contends the prosecutor attempted to elicit inadmissible 
evidence from the victim‟s daughter, Sandra Walters, when he asked her, “Tell us 
about your mother.”  Defense objected on grounds the question called for a 
narrative.  The court sustained this objection and directed the prosecutor to ask 
more specific questions.  The prosecutor asked a series of questions about 
Walters‟s relationship with her mother before the next defense objection, when he 
asked Walters, “When you say that she made you the person you are today, what 
did you mean by that?”  The objection was again that the question called for a 
narrative; it was sustained.  
The defense next objected when the prosecutor asked about Olsson‟s 
“thoughts” regarding the possibility of Walters having children.  Walters replied, 
“I have one guilt, that I never provided my mom with a grandchild, something she 
always wanted.”  The defense successfully objected as to form and asked that the 
answer be stricken.  Another objection was sustained when the prosecutor asked 
105 
 
Walters whether her mother‟s death had had any impact on Walters‟s relationship 
with other people.  The objection was sustained as to form.  The prosecutor then 
asked essentially the same question.  After Walters answered that her mother‟s 
death had had “a big impact on me being intimate with anybody,” the prosecutor 
asked, “Why is that?”  The defense objected, without stating grounds; the 
objection was sustained. 
The prosecutor asked a series of questions about how Walters learned of 
her mother‟s death.  When she answered that she was told by a detective about an 
“accident” involving her mother, the prosecutor asked, “How did that make you 
feel?”  The defense objected, stating no grounds; the objection was sustained.  
Walters‟s boyfriend drove her to her mother‟s house.  When asked whether her 
boyfriend told her “anything about what happened to your mother,” the defense 
objected on hearsay grounds; the objection was sustained on that ground and also 
on relevance.  The prosecutor asked whether, on the drive to her mother‟s house, 
she received any information about what had happened to her mother.  She 
replied, “Yes, [my boyfriend] told me he had called and talked to the detective.”  
The defense objected to the form of the question and on hearsay grounds.  The 
objection was sustained and the answer stricken. 
Following a series of questions about the impact of her mother‟s death on 
her, Walters was asked, “What are the hardest times of the year for you?”  The 
defense objected, without stating grounds; the objection was sustained.  The court 
next sustained an objection to a question by the prosecutor about how her mother‟s 
earlier cancer diagnosis had “[brought] home her mortality to you.”  
In addition to these questions, defendant contends the prosecutor 
improperly elicited testimony from Walters about the fear she continued to 
experience as a result of her mother‟s death and about her plans to have children.  
Defendant failed to object to these questions; his claim of misconduct is forfeited.  
106 
 
(People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 122.)31  Moreover, as noted, we have 
since held that testimony by a victim impact witness about the fear he or she has 
continued to experience as a result of the murder is permissible.  (People v. Scott, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 466-467, 494.)  Similarly, Walters‟s testimony that she did 
not want to have children because she was afraid they, too, might have to 
experience the same loss of their mother as she had related to the lasting effects on 
her of her mother‟s murder.  Thus, the testimony was not impermissible 
By our count, five of the defense‟s objections to Walters‟s testimony were 
to the form of the prosecutor‟s questions because they called for a narrative 
response.  This would be misconduct only if we agreed with defendant that the 
prosecutor was under orders to ask only leading questions, but he was not.  
Initially, the court simply told the prosecutor it would allow him some latitude to 
ask leading questions because such questions are ordinarily not permitted on direct 
examination.  (Evid. Code, § 767, subd. (a)(1); see People v. Williams (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 584, 631 [“Evidence Code section 767 vests a trial court with broad 
discretion to decide when to permit the use of leading questions on direct 
examination”].)  Even after the defense complained the prosecutor was not asking 
leading questions, the court directed him to use leading questions “whenever 
possible.”  This left the prosecutor with some discretion as to the form of his 
questions.  Under these circumstances, we decline to find misconduct simply 
                                              
31  
Citing People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, defendant contends that his 
failure to object to any question he cites as misconduct should be excused.  In Hill, 
we concluded that the prosecutor‟s egregious misconduct, coupled with the trial 
court‟s hostility toward defense objections, rendered such further objections futile. 
“Under these unusual circumstances, we conclude [defense counsel] must be 
excused from the legal obligation to continually object, state the grounds of his 
objection, and ask the jury be admonished.”  (Id. at p. 821.)  Those “unusual 
circumstances” are not present in this case where defense repeatedly and 
successfully objected.  Thus, Hill does not excuse defendant‟s failure to object to 
questions he now contends were misconduct. 
107 
 
because the prosecutor elected to ask direct or open-ended questions.  Defendant‟s 
remedy in such cases was to object to the form of the question.  As we have seen, 
he did so vigorously and the court sustained his objections. 
On four occasions the defense objected without any stating any grounds.    
Ordinarily, the failure to object specifically on grounds of misconduct and to seek 
an admonition forfeits the claim unless an admonition would not have cured the 
harm.  (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 125.)  In each case, defendant‟s 
objection was sustained.  Defendant fails to demonstrate that the remedy was 
inadequate. 
Moreover, defendant‟s remaining objections were also sustained.  Again, 
defendant fails to demonstrate that this remedy was inadequate. 
We realize, of course, that defendant‟s position is that the prosecutor had a 
pattern of eliciting inadmissible evidence, but no such pattern emerges.  In 
context, the prosecutor was attempting to elicit then novel victim impact evidence 
consistent with the trial court‟s guidelines for admissible testimony through a 
combination of leading and open-ended questions, as he was permitted to do.  The 
defense, which understandably wanted to narrow the amount of victim impact 
evidence the jury heard, objected to some questions.  The trial court appropriately 
ruled on those objections.  There was no prosecutorial misconduct in the 
prosecutor‟s examination of the victim‟s daughter. 
b.  Elbert “Tripp” Walters III  
Defendant contends the prosecutor elicited inadmissible testimony from the 
victim‟s son.  The first instance he points to is Tripp Walters‟s response to a 
question about going into his mother‟s house after her death.  In passing, he 
mentioned dolls she had collected when “she was stationed over in Japan and 
Korea in the service.”  The trial court specifically excluded testimony regarding 
108 
 
the victim‟s military service, but defendant failed to object on this ground and the 
claim of misconduct is forfeited.  In any event, the prosecutor neither solicited nor 
could have anticipated the reference to military service, and there was no 
misconduct.  (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 125.) 
Defendant objected, on relevance grounds, to two questions about the 
number of times the witness and his family moved when he was a child.  The 
objections were sustained.  While irrelevant, the questions did not broach areas of 
victim impact evidence ruled inadmissible by the trial court.  Thus, even assuming 
the claim is not forfeited by reason of defendant‟s failure to object on the grounds 
he now asserts, there was no misconduct. 
Defendant claims the prosecutor asked questions of this witness deemed 
objectionable by the trial court during Sandra Walters‟s testimony.  Those 
objections, however, were to the form of the question, not their content. We have 
rejected defendant‟s claim the prosecutor committed misconduct by sometimes 
asking open-ended questions.  In any event, to the extent defendant‟s objections 
were sustained, he suffered no prejudice. 
Finally, defendant cites as misconduct the witness‟s response to a question 
regarding his feelings about his mother‟s murder as opposed to how he would 
have felt had she died of natural causes.  The witness replied, in part, “For her to 
be murdered, I cannot understand that . . . . [I]t‟s absolutely asinine.”  Defendant 
failed to object, forfeiting the claim.  In any event, the testimony was within the 
guidelines of admissible testimony set forth by the trial court, which included “the 
impact of the nature of her death here as distinguished from accidental death or 
natural causes . . . .” 
109 
 
c.  Jan Dietrich 
Defendant cites as evidence of prosecutorial conduct the prosecutor‟s open-
ended questions of Jan Dietrich, the victim‟s sister.  Again, we decline to find 
misconduct based on the form of the prosecutor‟s questions.  Defendant contends 
further that the prosecutor “made no attempt to control the witness,” requiring the 
defense to object, and that the witness “had to be interrupted numerous times by 
the defense or the trial court when she gave nonresponsive or narrative answers to 
questions.”  A witness‟s nonresponsive answer cannot be the basis of a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct.  (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 125.) 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor impermissibly questioned Dietrich 
about her father‟s reaction to his daughter‟s death.  He claims he “objected to this 
line of questioning.”  Not so.  He objected to a single question at the end of the 
prosecutor‟s examination of the witness on this point and his objection — on 
relevance grounds — was sustained.  His claim of misconduct is, therefore, 
forfeited and to the extent his one objection was sustained, even before the witness 
answered, he was not prejudiced.  Moreover, we have since held that “[t]here is no 
requirement that family members confine their testimony about the impact of the 
victim‟s death to themselves, omitting mention of other family members.”  
(People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 495.)  Nor did defendant object to the 
next question and answer he claims involved misconduct, about the events 
surrounding the departure of Dietrich and her father from Kansas after she 
informed him of the victim‟s death.  The claim is therefore forfeited.  In any event, 
the testimony was not impermissible because it dealt with the impact of the 
victim‟s death on her sister and father, who found themselves waiting at the airport 
to fly to California at the same time Sandy Olsson had been expected to arrive in 
Kansas for a family celebration.   
110 
 
Defendant refers us to series of questions the prosecutor asked at the end of 
his examination of Dietrich involving the impact of her sister‟s death on her.  To 
one question  —“Given the manner in which she died, are there any thoughts that 
constantly reoccur?”  — the witness responded, “The terror.”  A defense objection 
was sustained.  To a question about how the impact on the witness was different 
because the victim was murdered rather than dying from cancer or accidentally, 
Dietrich replied in part, “[B]ut to worry about her last fifteen or twenty minutes, as 
I do all the time, when I wasn‟t there to help her.”  An objection was sustained.  A 
few questions later, the prosecutor asked, “Has the manner of her death impacted 
you in such a fashion that when you think of your sister, you think of what was 
happening to her the last fifteen minutes of her life.”  The witness answered, “Yes.  
And the guilt that I wasn‟t there to help her.”  The defense objected that the 
question called “for a „yes‟ or „no‟ answer, and I would ask anything after the 
„yes‟ gets stricken.”  The court granted the request.  When the prosecutor then 
asked whether the witness thought about what was going through the victim‟s 
mind the last fifteen minutes of her life, the defense objected that “this is 
specifically something the court ruled on.”  The objection was sustained and the 
witness‟s answer  — “Yes” — was stricken.  The court also sustained and struck 
the witness‟s answer “Yes” to the prosecutor‟s question about whether the witness 
thought about “at what point [the victim‟s] spirit actually left her body.”  
Defendant contends these questions violated the court‟s specific prohibition 
against questioning witnesses about the victim‟s thoughts just before her death.  
The defense subsequently moved for mistrial.  The prosecutor explained that he 
had not been attempting to elicit from the witness the victim‟s last thoughts, but 
whether the witness thought about her sister‟s last moments.  Although defendant 
derides this explanation, in fact we have subsequently held that testimony by 
survivors about what they imagined were a victim‟s last moments of life is 
111 
 
“relevant to the witnesses‟ own states of mind and the effect that the murders had 
upon them personally, and therefore [is] permissible victim impact testimony.”  
(People v. Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 485.)  Here, the court concluded that the 
prosecutor had not deliberately disregarded its order by asking these questions.  
The court also noted it had sustained the defense‟s objection, not because the 
prosecutor had elicited impermissible evidence, but “because of the possibility of 
overlap into areas” that were prohibited.  Accordingly, the court found no 
misconduct in this line of questions.  Nor do we.  For this reason, we also reject 
defendant‟s claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his 
mistrial motion on this ground.  (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 39-40 
[“ „[T]he trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial 
motions . . .‟ ”].) 
Finally, defendant cites questions as to which objections were sustained on 
relevancy and hearsay grounds.  He fails to demonstrate the remedy was 
inadequate. 
d.  Clifford Sandberg 
Defendant focuses on two questions asked of the victim‟s father:  when the 
prosecutor asked about details of travel plans Sandberg had made with his 
daughter and when he asked, “With regard to losing [Sandy] has her death been 
different in its effect on you, given how she died[?]”  The court sustained the 
defense‟s objection to the first question before Sandberg could respond.  To the 
second question, Sandberg answered, “Yes, sir.  Yes, sir, because I know she was 
tortured to death.”  The trial court sustained the defense‟s objection, struck the 
answer and directed the jury to disregard it.  Nonetheless, Sandberg‟s reference to 
torture became the basis for the defense‟s renewed motion for a mistrial.  The 
defense complained that the prosecutor‟s question had violated the trial court‟s 
112 
 
order on the scope of victim impact evidence.  The trial court denied the motion, 
observing that the question posed to Sandberg was within the court‟s ruling and 
“also an area that was taken up with the previous witnesses.”  Furthermore, the 
court noted it had immediately sustained the objection, struck the answer and 
admonished the jury to disregard it.  
Since the defense objection to the first question was sustained before 
Sandberg could answer it, defendant was not prejudiced even if the prosecutor‟s 
question strayed into an area prohibited by the court about the “specific plan or 
details of her travel.”  The prosecutor‟s second question involved the difference in 
impact between a murder and a death by accident or natural causes, which was 
permissible.  He did not solicit, nor could he have anticipated, Sandberg‟s 
testimony about torture, and thus committed no misconduct.  (People v. Valdez, 
supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 125.)32  Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying defendant‟s motion for mistrial when it found, in effect, that 
sustaining the objection, striking the testimony and directing the jury to disregard 
it cured any prejudice.  (People v. Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 39-40.) 
In conclusion, the record does not support defendant‟s claim that the 
prosecutor engaged in a pattern of misconduct in his presentation of victim impact 
evidence.  Accordingly, we reject the claim. 
 
2.  Defendant’s claim of misconduct in opening statement and closing 
argument 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed pervasive and 
prejudicial misconduct during his opening statement and closing arguments.   
                                              
32  
In the trial court and on appeal, defendant insinuates that the prosecutor 
may have been aware Sandberg and his other witnesses would stray into areas the 
trial court had banned and did nothing to prevent them from doing so.  This is 
mere conjecture unsupported by the record. 
113 
 
a.  Opening statement 
“ „The purpose of the opening statement is to inform the jury of the 
evidence the prosecution intends to present. . . .‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Farnam  
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 168.)  Defendant contends the prosecutor‟s opening 
statement failed to present such an overview of his evidence but, instead, dwelt on 
guilt phase evidence and instructions the jury might later hear and misled the jury 
as to its task. 
Defendant failed to object to the two statements by the prosecution that he 
claims misled the jury as to the purpose of the penalty phase — “what brings us 
here today is for you to decide whether this man should die for what he did to 
[Sandy] Olsson or spend the rest of his life in prison,” and “in this phase you will 
hear evidence to make that determination as to what the penalty should be:  death 
in the gas chamber or . . . by lethal injection . . . or life without possibility of 
parole.”  Therefore, his claim on appeal is forfeited.  (People v. Clark, supra, 52 
Cal.4th at p. 960.) 
Even were his claim not forfeited we would find no misconduct.  We deem 
these remarks to have been no more than colloquial, shorthand descriptions of the 
purpose of the penalty phase.  (See People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 138 
[no misconduct by prosecutor who referred to killing as an “execution” because 
“the challenged term simply served as a shorthand means of describing an 
intentional and premeditated murder”].)  As the prosecutor made clear in his 
further remarks, the jury‟s verdict was to be based on its assessment of the 
evidence in aggravation and mitigation.  Thus, contrary to defendant‟s claim, his 
first remark did not mislead the jury about its duty to make an individualized 
assessment of defendant and his second remark did not steer them toward 
irrelevant considerations of the method of execution. 
114 
 
The chief factor in aggravation upon which the prosecution relied at the 
penalty phase was the circumstances of the crime.  (§ 190.3, factor (a).)  Such 
circumstances include guilt phase evidence relevant to “the immediate temporal 
and spatial circumstances of the crime,” as well as such additional evidence, like 
victim impact evidence, that “ „surrounds materially, morally, or logically‟ the 
crime.”  (Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 833.)  Thus, it was not misconduct for 
the prosecutor to have referred to the guilt phase evidence relevant to the 
circumstances of the crime as well as the victim impact evidence he intended to 
produce.  Similarly, we find no misconduct in the prosecutor‟s brief reference to 
the court‟s prior instruction to the jury about the purpose of the penalty phase or 
his even briefer reference — cut off by objection — about further instructions the 
jury could expect. 
b.  Closing argument re circumstances of the crime 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor‟s arguments regarding the aggravating 
factor of the circumstances of the crime was intended to inflame and prejudice the 
jury because it was based on facts not in evidence.  “The prosecutor should not, of 
course, argue facts not in evidence.”  (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 
698.)  However, “the prosecutor has a wide-ranging right to discuss the case in 
closing argument.  He has the right to fully state his views as to what the evidence 
shows and to urge whatever conclusions he deems proper.  Opposing counsel may 
not complain on appeal if the reasoning is faulty or the deductions are illogical 
because these are matters for the jury to decide.”  (People v. Lewis (1990) 50 
Cal.3d 262, 283.)  “ „When [a prosecutorial misconduct] claim focuses on 
comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, a court must determine at the 
threshold how the remarks would, or could, have been understood by a reasonable 
juror.  [Citations.]  If the remarks would have been taken by the juror to state or 
115 
 
imply nothing harmful, they obviously cannot be deemed objectionable.‟  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 960.) 
Defendant summarizes his claim of misconduct as follows:  “The 
prosecutor urged the „enormity‟ of the crime was aggravated beyond the basic fact 
of burglary murder and assault with intent to commit rape by arguing over and 
over that [defendant] forced Ms. Olsson at knifepoint to remove her clothes, that 
she made an intentional decision not to fight back because she hoped he would 
only rape her, that he told her he would not hurt her if she complied with his 
wishes, that she bargained with him to spare her life, that she did not resist or 
struggle, that he tortured her by playing with the knife on her body, that he 
„actually‟ and brutally raped her, and that she was still alive when he left her 
bedroom to go through her purse.  No evidence was introduced to support any of 
these assertions.” 
In order to assess this claim, we briefly review the relevant evidence.  The 
only signs of struggle in Olsson‟s house were two photographs askew on the wall 
in the front entryway and a photograph that had fallen to the ground in the master 
bedroom.  There were grapes on the living room floor; the same kind of grapes 
were later found in the victim‟s purse.  Otherwise, according to Sergeant 
Robertson, “[n]othing really appeared out of order” in the house.  Specifically, 
apart from the fallen photograph, there was no sign of a struggle in the victim‟s 
bedroom.  The victim‟s pajamas were found on the bed beneath her body.  While 
there was no evidence of semen or of forcible sexual intercourse, both the 
pathologist and the criminalist testified that the absence of such evidence did not 
mean the victim had not been forced to have sexual intercourse before her death.  
Defendant admitted to police that he had sexual intercourse with the victim, but 
said he did not ejaculate, a statement consistent with the criminalist‟s view that 
there would be no semen had there been no ejaculation.  The pathologist testified 
116 
 
that the victim may have survived as long as an hour after she was stabbed and 
strangled.  The victim was attacked with a knife that defendant admitted to police 
belonged to him.  The victim‟s purse was removed and tossed into a pond in the 
golf course behind the victim‟s house.  A receipt in the victim‟s kitchen indicated 
she had received $3.95 in change from a purchase earlier that evening but no 
money was found in her purse or in the house. 
From our review of the prosecutor‟s argument regarding the circumstances 
of the crime evidence, we conclude that the bulk of the complained-of remarks 
were based on permissible inferences and conclusions he drew from this evidence.  
Specifically, we conclude the prosecutor did not commit misconduct when he 
argued, at various points, that the victim submitted to defendant because, by doing 
so, she may have hoped or believed she would not be killed.  This was an arguable 
inference from the absence of evidence of a struggle in the victim‟s bedroom, 
coupled with defendant‟s admission he had sexual intercourse with the victim and 
the testimony of the pathologist and criminalist that the absence of semen or 
traumatic injury did not mean the victim had not been forced to have sexual 
intercourse before her death.  It was a matter for the jury to decide whether the 
inference was faulty or illogical and, as defendant acknowledges, the court 
repeatedly reminded the jurors that argument was not evidence.  Similarly, we 
reject defendant‟s claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
argued that, as the victim lay dying, defendant did not assist her but was going 
through her purse looking for money.33  This was an arguable inference from the 
                                              
33  
In connection with this argument, defendant complains of the prosecutor‟s 
remark:  “Another aggravating factor is his callousness at the scene and his failure 
to show any remorse at the scene of that crime.  Totally callous.  [In]different to 
what she was going through, totally and completely.”  Defendant failed to object 
to this remark, thus forfeiting his claim on appeal.  In any event, it was a fair 
comment on the evidence that defendant acted in a callous manner, which was 
relevant to the circumstances of the crime.  We do not believe his brief 
117 
 
fact that grapes found on the living room floor were also found in the victim‟s 
purse when it was ultimately recovered, defendant‟s statement that he saw 
“Doubting Thomas” rummaging through her purse in the living room after she had 
been stabbed, that the $3.95 in change the victim had received on the evening 
before she was murdered was not found in her purse or anywhere in her house, and 
that the victim may have lived as long as an hour after she was attacked.  
Regarding the victim‟s state of mind and the hopes she may have entertained for 
herself and her family, these comments were also drawn from victim impact 
evidence about her relationships with her children and father and her 
postretirement plans. 
We also reject defendant‟s claim that it was misconduct for the prosecutor 
to urge the jury to put itself in the victim‟s place and to use a chart to illustrate that 
point.  To the extent defendant failed to object to this line of argument, his claim is 
forfeited.  In any event, such argument is not misconduct.  “We repeatedly have 
held that it is proper at the penalty phase for a prosecutor to invite the jurors to put 
themselves in the place of the victims and imagine their suffering.  [Citations.]”  
(People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1212.)  Nor do we deem it 
misconduct that the prosecutor argued “maybe [defendant] is an animal.”  
“Argument may include opprobrious epithets warranted by the evidence.  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1172 [prosecutor 
permissibly characterized the defendant as a “ „dangerous sociopath‟ ” and 
“ „especially evil‟ ”].)  Given the circumstances of the crime, the prosecutor‟s use 
of the epithet was “within the range of permissible comment regarding egregious 
conduct on defendant‟s part.”  (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 537 
                                                                                                                                      
 
characterization of callousness as an aggravating factor, which he did not repeat, 
could have in any way misled the jury about the relevant factors it was required to 
consider. 
118 
 
[prosecutor‟s characterization of defendant as “ „mass murderer rapist,‟ ” 
“ „perverted murderous cancer‟ ” and “ „walking depraved cancer‟ ” permissible].) 
Defendant also complains that the prosecutor committed misconduct when 
he discussed the characteristics of a knife.  “[W]ith a knife you point.  You can run 
it down the side of a face.  You can play with buttons with a knife.  You can put 
the knife in places that are terribly intimidating and threatening . . . .”  “With a 
knife you can indicate you can do more than simply kill.  You can maim.  You can 
disfigure.”  Contrary to defendant‟s claim, the prosecutor did not argue that 
defendant engaged in these actions with knife before killing the victim — 
although, as the Attorney General correctly points out, the injuries he ultimately 
inflicted on her as he stabbed her 23 times could be fairly characterized as 
mayhem and disfigurement — but made these remarks in the context of his 
contention that the victim submitted without resistance hoping to survive.  In any 
event, even if these remarks did fall just beyond the pale, they did not constitute 
the kind of misconduct for which reversal is required under either federal or state 
standards. 
c.  Closing argument re other matters 
Defendant perceives misconduct in a number of other remarks made by the 
prosecutor in his closing and rebuttal arguments. 
The prosecutor quoted Roger Tully‟s testimony, in which he said that 
defendant‟s actions were “his responsibility.”  The prosecutor commented:  “It‟s 
his responsibility.  What is it that was ticking in Roger that he sees in that 
defendant, that he doesn‟t say, „spare my brother.‟ ”  Defense counsel objected 
that the remark “ask[ed] the jury to speculate.”  The trial court reminded the jury 
that statements of counsel are not evidence and “you are not to speculate about 
evidence that was not presented to you.”  Assuming the prosecutor‟s comment was 
119 
 
objectionable as calling for speculation, defendant‟s objection was, in effect, 
sustained and the jury admonished not to speculate.  Defendant fails to 
demonstrate that the trial court‟s swift action was inadequate. 
Next, defendant complains about comments by the prosecutor regarding the 
prospect of defendant being sentenced to life without possibility of parole.  Some 
of these arguments were directed at future dangerousness.  For example, after 
referring to evidence of defendant‟s jailhouse altercations, the prosecutor asked, 
“What does that tell you about this defendant and his future violence or his 
violence in the future? . . . [W]hat happens when he gets a life sentence.”  Defense 
counsel objected.  The trial court reminded the jury that statements of counsel 
were not evidence and that it would instruct the jury on the law after argument.  
The prosecutor continued in this vein, arguing, “you have to keep [defendant] on 
death row where he is isolated [from] all the other prisoners, because [if] he gets 
on the main line with all the other prisoners, with his life sentence, he has an 
American Express Platinum card to do violence at will.  Because what can they do 
to him?  They can‟t give him another day, he‟s got life.  And some other prisoner, 
some other guard, some hospital or some jail prison [sic] nurse, or social worker 
does something that he doesn‟t like, and he acts out violently, hits, maims, hurts, 
he can do it at will.”  The defense did not renew its objection. 
Assuming the claim is not forfeited by defendant‟s failure to renew his 
objection, we find no misconduct.  “[W]e have repeatedly declined to find error or 
misconduct where argument concerning a defendant‟s future dangerousness in 
custody is based on evidence of his past violent crimes admitted under one of the 
specific aggravating categories of section 190.3.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Ray 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 353.) 
Here, the prosecutor‟s argument was based on evidence of other criminal 
activity admitted pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b).  Defendant maintains that 
120 
 
this evidence of his two jailhouse altercations was trivial, but the prosecutor was 
entitled to advance a different view of the evidence.  Nor was the argument 
misconduct because the prosecutor‟s reference to “death row” was unsupported by 
evidence “concerning the level of isolation afforded death row prisoners compared 
to life prisoners.”  It is a matter of common knowledge that inmates on death row 
are separated from the general prison population; indeed, the very term “death 
row” signifies as much. 
Nor was the argument misconduct because the prosecutor gave as examples 
of people a life prisoner might encounter “a prison nurse, or social worker.”  In 
context, the meaning of the argument was simply that, in the general population, a 
violent inmate might have access to potentially more victims than an inmate on 
death row.  We do not believe the jury would have understood the example to have 
been a request to the “jury to impose death so that [defendant] would not again 
hurt or maim a prison nurse or social worker, where there was no evidence he had 
ever done so before.”  (See People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 960 [when the 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct is based on remarks to the jury “ „a court must 
determine at the threshold how the remarks would, or could, have been understood 
by a reasonable juror.‟ ”].) 
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor‟s remarks about the kind of 
existence a life prisoner might experience in prison constituted irrelevant and 
impermissible comments on the conditions of confinement.  We do not understand 
them as such, nor would have a reasonable juror.  The prosecutor‟s references to 
resources and amenities to which a life inmate might have access — food, shelter, 
access to medical care, phone calls, television, radio or stereo, films — was in 
service of his argument that, in view of the crime, life in prison was “too good for 
[defendant].”  We have held that a prosecutor may “assert that the community, 
acting on behalf of those injured, has the right to express its values by imposing 
121 
 
the severest punishment for the most aggravated crimes,” so long as those 
comments were “not inflammatory,” did not “seek to invoke untethered passions,” 
and did not “form the principal basis of his argument.”  (People v. Zambrano, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1179.)  “This case, the prosecutor was at pains to suggest, 
was one of those that deserved such severe punishment.  No misconduct 
occurred.”  (Ibid.)34 
Defendant next complains that the prosecutor misstated the law.  First, he 
cites the prosecutor‟s argument that any sympathy the jurors might harbor had to 
be directed at defendant rather than his family.  The argument was not improper.  
(People v. Bennett, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 601 [“The impact of a defendant‟s 
execution on his or her family may not be considered by the jury in mitigation”]; 
People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1000 [“ „sympathy for a defendant‟s 
family is not a matter that a capital jury can consider in mitigation . . . .‟ ”].) 
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to disregard 
evidence in mitigation in the course of his argument that the circumstances of the 
crime alone were sufficient to warrant the death penalty.  We have carefully 
                                              
34  
Defendant complains that the prosecutor‟s passing reference to the 
availability of conjugal visits for life inmates was improper because, at the time of 
his trial, the availability of such visits for life prisoners was a privilege, not a right, 
and it has since been rescinded.  If, at the time of trial, a life prisoner might be 
granted the privilege, the reference was not improper, nor does a later revocation 
of the privilege render it so.  Similarly, the prosecutor‟s comparison between 
defendant‟s life in prison and the predicament of the homeless and the 
unemployed does not render his argument misconduct; it simply reinforced his 
point that, in light of the factors in aggravation, defendant did not “deserve hope 
. .  . [or] the simple pleasures of life.  The only thing he deserves is your verdict of 
death and that‟s what justice demands.”  Finally, to the extent that the prosecutor‟s 
brief speculation that a life prisoner could entertain the hope of a cataclysmic 
event that might free him — “an earthquake and the jail falls apart” — the trial 
court sustained defendant‟s objection and instructed the jury to disregard it.  We 
presume the jury followed the trial court‟s instruction.  (People v. Martinez (2010) 
47 Cal.4th 911, 957.)  
122 
 
reviewed the complained-of remarks and, while they are no model of clarity, we 
fail to see how a reasonable juror could possibly have understood the prosecutor to 
be urging him or her to disregard the evidence in mitigation.  (See Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo (1973) 416 U.S. 637, 647 [“[A] court should not lightly infer that a 
prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or 
that a jury, sitting through a lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the 
plethora of less damaging interpretations”]; see People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 
p. 960.)  For the same reason we reject defendant‟s claim that the prosecutor‟s 
remarks about the absence of postcrime remorse “was a backhanded and highly 
effective means of misleading the jury into thinking the absence of remorse was an 
aggravating factor . . . .”  The point of the prosecutor‟s argument was that there 
was no evidence of remorse for purposes of mitigation.  Indeed, he said just that:  
“You haven‟t heard any evidence that this defendant has demonstrated any 
remorse, so it‟s not present as a mitigating factor.”  There was no misconduct.  
(People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 449 [“The prosecutor properly argued 
defendant‟s lack of remorse showed the potential mitigating factor was 
inapplicable”].)  We also reject defendant‟s claim that the prosecutor misled the 
jury, and thus lowered the prosecution‟s burden of proof, by suggesting that 
defendant‟s uncharged rape of the victim was a section 190.3, factor (b) 
consideration rather than a factor (a) consideration.  Indeed, the prosecutor 
explained to the jury that the rape was to be considered a circumstance of the 
crime and not uncharged criminal activity:  “We don‟t double dip.  We‟re talking 
about something else, other acts beyond . . . what he did to Sandy Olsson, other 
acts of violence, and then whether or not he had any felony convictions.” 
Finally, defendant contends the cumulative effect of prosecutorial 
misconduct requires reversal.  We have found either no impropriety by the 
123 
 
prosecutor or minor impropriety from which defendant could not have sustained 
any prejudice.  Accordingly, we reject his assertion of cumulative prejudice. 
N.  Biblical and religious references in closing arguments  
Defendant contends that the prosecutor impermissibly “relied on the Bible, 
religious law and biblical authority to convince the jurors to return a death 
verdict.”  Defendant devotes considerable ink to what were relatively brief and 
minor digressions in the prosecutor‟s lengthy argument.  These remarks occupy 
perhaps three pages in two arguments that exceed 120 pages in the reporter‟s 
transcript.  Some were in rebuttal to religiously themed arguments by the defense.  
As we explain, defendant‟s claims are forfeited, but even if they were not, he fails 
to demonstrate that any arguable impropriety was prejudicial. 
Defendant failed to object to the prosecutor‟s references to the Bible or to 
his use of a chart quoting biblical passages in support of the death penalty. 35  
“Because we cannot assume that an objection and admonition would have been 
futile or ineffective, [he has] forfeited [his] appellate claim[s] of misconduct.”  
(People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 201 (Letner and Tobin).)  In 
any event, we conclude that certain of the remarks defendant now finds 
objectionable were not misconduct.  In the other instances, even assuming, for the 
sake of argument, that the prosecutor overstepped proper bounds, we find that 
                                              
35  
The chart, captioned “The Bible Sanctions Capital Punishment,” contained 
four quotations:  “Who shed the blood of man by man shall his blood shed, for in 
his image did God make man,” attributed to Genesis, chapter 9, verse 6; “He that 
smiteth a man so that he die, shall be surely put to death,” attributed to Exodus, 
chapter 21, verse 12; “And if he strike him w[ith] an instrument of iron so that he 
die, he is a murderer: the murderer shall surely be put to death,” attributed to 
Numbers, chapter 35, verse 16; and “And you shall not take reparations for the 
soul of a murderer who deserves to die but he shall be put to death,” attributed to 
Numbers, chapter 35, verse 31. 
124 
 
defendant suffered no prejudice warranting reversal.  (Ibid.; People v. Zambrano, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1170 (Zambrano).)  
In his opening argument, while apparently displaying the chart, the 
prosecutor argued that defendant had done nothing “decent” in his life to merit 
compassion.  By contrast, he pointed to Roger Tully‟s religious conversion:  
“You‟ve heard Roger tell us about what a difference in his life his religious 
conversion had.  Have you heard anything like that about the defendant?  Roger 
said he‟s different now, there‟s been this intervention.  You know Roger puts it in 
the terms of, but for this woman, I wouldn‟t have been converted to God, but the 
reality is it takes two to tango.  [¶]  Now, you can hit somebody over the head all 
day long, but if they‟re not willing, if they‟re not receptive, it‟s not going to [] 
happen.” 
The prosecutor then briefly turned to the issue of religion and what role, if 
any, it should play in the jury‟s determination of defendant‟s sentence.  He 
reminded the jury that religious belief “is not something that is to be used in 
aggravation at all, what the Bible or the Koran or anything has to say.”  
Nonetheless, he argued, “one thing that is universal throughout all religions is this 
idea that murderers are to be punished, and that the death penalty is sanctioned and 
that it is appropriate.”  Addressing any juror who might have last minute religious 
scruples about imposing the death penalty, the prosecutor argued that “the Bible 
does, in fact, sanction capital punishment.”  To illustrate his point, he quoted the 
scriptural passages on his chart:  “ There is one that is just so right on point:  [¶]  
„He who strikes him with an instrument of iron so that he die, he is a murderer, 
and the murderer will surely be put to death.  And you shall take no reparations for 
the soul of a murderer who deserves to die, but he shall be put to death.  [¶]  He 
who sheds the blood of man by man, shall his blood be shed.  For in his image did 
God make man.  His blood or his life will be shed by man.‟”  He concluded, “I just 
125 
 
want to clear the air there that religion does not stand in the way, and that‟s not 
supposed to enter into your evaluation.”  The prosecutor devoted the rest of his 
lengthy argument to demonstrating why in this case the factors in aggravation 
outweighed any factors in mitigation and justified imposition of the death penalty.  
Following the prosecutor‟s opening argument, defendant‟s counsel, Mr. 
Strellis, gave his closing argument.  As part of his argument, Strellis putatively 
quoted the New Testament:  “Jesus at one point in time said, „Hate the sin, but 
love the sinner.‟ ”  He also argued that, contrary to the prosecutor‟s assertion that 
all religious traditions condone the death penalty, “I don‟t think Buddhism does.” 
In an effort to counter the prosecutor‟s use of quotations from the Old Testament, 
he cited the Talmud on capital punishment, arguing that it was an infrequently 
used punishment under Jewish law. 
The prosecutor then gave a rebuttal argument, followed by Defense 
Cocounsel Wagner‟s closing argument.  Wagner also elected to briefly address the 
prosecutor‟s reference to religious themes and imagery.  He noted that in the Old 
Testament, God did not execute Cain for taking the life of his brother, Abel, but 
“banished him.”  He pointed out that major religious dominations “have taken 
rigorous stands against the death penalty.” 
The prosecutor began his rebuttal argument by briefly responding to 
Strellis‟s remarks questioning religious support for the death penalty.36  In the 
course of those comments, he distinguished between biblical law and the secular 
law the jurors were required to apply.  “The Old Testament, when God spoke, he 
made it very clear. Very clear.  Murderers shall die,” but “when man gets into the 
act he starts softening up the rules a little bit and that‟s okay.”  The prosecutor 
                                              
36  
It is not clear from the record or the briefing whether the biblical quotation 
chart was still on exhibit or at what point it may have been taken down.  The 
prosecutor did not refer to it during his rebuttal argument. 
126 
 
pointed out that secular law provided defendant with various due process 
protections including counsel and the two-tiered trial procedure and that, in the 
penalty phase, the law required the jurors to weigh the factors in aggravation 
against those in mitigation.  He explained:  “And then we get to this [penalty] 
phase where we start talking about aggravating and mitigating and he gets to bring 
in anything that could cause you to have some sympathy that shows something 
about his character.  His record that causes you to say that the aggravating 
circumstances don‟t substantially outweigh the mitigating and that the proper 
penalty is not death.  You have to do all that.” 
Somewhat later in his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor alluded briefly to 
the crucifixion of Jesus and the two thieves who were crucified on either side of 
him.  He said:  “And we‟ve labeled them the good thief and the bad thief.  Why?  
They‟re both thieves.  But what makes the difference is one of them repented, one 
of them said, „Forgive me Lord, I believe in you.‟  The other one just, you know, 
cussed at Christ, turned his nose, whatever.  Christ said to the good thief, you 
know, you‟ll be with me in heaven.  He was saved.  The good thief was saved.  
The bad thief wasn‟t.  [¶]  Well, the moral of that story was that the good thief was 
not cut down off that cross until he was dead and his soul was saved in heaven.  
But Caesar law [sic] was completed.  And the good thief died along with the bad 
thief.” 
We have held “[i]t is misconduct for a prosecutor to argue that biblical 
authority supports imposing the death penalty, because it suggests to the jurors 
that they may follow an authority other than the legal instructions given by the 
court.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 614.)  “On the other 
hand, we have suggested it is not impermissible to argue, for the benefit of 
religious jurors who might fear otherwise, that application of the death penalty 
according to secular law does not contravene biblical doctrine [citations], or that 
127 
 
the Bible shows society‟s historical acceptance of capital punishment.”  
(Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1169; original italics.)  Because the line 
between permissible argument and misconduct in this area is difficult to draw, we 
have often focused on whether, assuming misconduct for purposes of argument 
only, the defendant was prejudiced.  (See, e.g. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th 
at p. 202 [Even if the prosecutor‟s argument overstepped proper bounds reversal is 
not required where his comments “ „ “were part of a longer argument that properly 
focused upon the factors in aggravation and mitigation” ‟ ”]; Zambrano, supra, 41 
Cal.4th at p. 1170 [same]; People v. Viera (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 298 [same].) 
With this background in mind, we turn to defendant‟s specific claims.  He 
asserts that the prosecutor‟s comparison of defendant with his brother, who 
underwent a religious conversion, suggested to the jury that defendant was 
“unworthy of mercy because he had neither repented nor converted.”   We 
disagree.  The prosecutor‟s point was that defendant, unlike his brother, had not 
availed himself of any opportunity to change his life.  A rational jury could not 
have understood otherwise.  Accordingly, we find no misconduct. 
Next, defendant maintains that the prosecutor‟s use of biblical authority, 
buttressed by his chart, in his opening argument was intended to “give the jurors 
the strength to impose the death penalty.”  Initially, however, the prosecutor 
explicitly directed his comments to the juror who might be troubled by religious 
scruples that would prevent the juror from imposing the death penalty.  To the 
extent the prosecutor‟s argument merely admonished that a juror‟s religious 
beliefs need not stand in the way of imposing death, the argument was 
permissible.  (People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 201.) 
Defendant contends, however, that by using a chart containing biblical 
quotations supporting the death penalty, which he then orally repeated, the 
prosecutor went beyond arguing that the Bible permits the death penalty by 
128 
 
suggesting that in this particular case the Bible mandated it.  However, even if we 
assume there was misconduct, defendant was not prejudiced. 
These remarks occupy fewer than two pages in an argument that spans over 
a hundred pages of reporter‟s transcript and went on for a day and half.  Thus, they 
were a minor point in an extensive argument devoted primarily to a discussion of 
why the aggravating factors outweighed any in mitigation, circumstances which 
we have found to render any improper religious argument nonprejudicial.  (People 
v. Viera, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 298.)  The remarks also came at the beginning of 
the argument which would have further diminished their impact.   (Cf. People v. 
Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 202-203 [“the biblical reference in the 
present case came at the end of the prosecutor‟s argument and therefore might 
have been somewhat more prominent in the minds of the jurors than if it had fallen 
somewhere in the middle of the argument”].)  Thus, regardless of any impropriety 
we find no basis for reversal. 
The prosecutor briefly returned to the issue of religious support for the 
death penalty in his rebuttal argument, in response to claims made by defendant‟s 
counsel, Strellis, that called into doubt biblical support of the death penalty.  
Defendant finds impropriety in these remarks as well, particularly in the 
prosecutor‟s statement that in the Old Testament, “when God spoke, he made it 
very clear.  Very clear.  Murderers shall die.”  But, having made that statement, 
the prosecutor immediately contrasted the law of the Old Testament with the 
secular law.  This law, he made clear, required the jurors to first determine the 
defendant‟s guilt, then reach a penalty determination only after listening to and 
balancing the evidence in aggravation and mitigation. 
Even if the prosecutor overstepped by referring to the “very clear” Old 
Testament rule, we are satisfied that reversal is not required.  These remarks 
occupy a half a page in a 20-page argument.  Additionally, by immediately 
129 
 
explaining that secular death penalty law was different and must prevail, the 
prosecutor negated any prejudicial effect his initial comments might have had.  
Moreover, the prosecutor did not have the last word.  That went to Cocounsel 
Wagner, whose plea for defendant‟s life was the last thing the jury heard before it 
was instructed.  For these reasons, we conclude that, even assuming the 
prosecutor‟s Old Testament remarks crossed the line, defendant suffered no 
reversible harm. 
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the prosecutor‟s reference to 
the crucifixion scene later in his rebuttal argument.  The remarks came at the 
beginning of the argument and consist of two paragraphs of transcript.  They were 
therefore not the main focus of the prosecutor‟s argument, nor did he return to this 
imagery or make any further allusions to biblical or religious support for the death 
penalty as an appropriate punishment for murder.  Moreover, in an analogous 
circumstance, we found no misconduct and no prejudice.  (People v. Lenart (2004) 
32 Cal.4th 1107, 1128-1130 (Lenart).) 
In Lenart, a penalty phase defense witness apparently involved in a prison 
ministry repeatedly referred to the Bible and God during direct examination.  On 
cross-examination, the prosecutor, after eliciting from the witness that God 
forgave one of the thieves crucified along with Jesus, asked, without objection:  
“ „Didn‟t stop the punishment, did he? . . .  [T]he crucifixion?‟ ”  The witness 
answered, “ „No.‟ ”  On rebuttal, defense counsel questioned the witness about 
Cain‟s punishment for the murder of Abel, to which the witnessed replied:  “ „It 
was life.‟ ”  (Lenart, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1128.)  Regarding these exchanges, we 
observed:  “Here, both sides asked questions of Stewart, a witness who described 
his job as teaching men about Jesus.  That questioning highlighted biblical 
passages in which one wrongdoer was punished for life and one was punished by 
death.  [¶]  We emphasize that this is not a case of improper prosecutorial 
130 
 
argument.  Even in such a case, we have considered whether the defense itself 
relied on biblical text in assessing prejudice.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 1130.) 
Here, as in Lenart, the prosecutor adverted to the “good thief” story in 
rebuttal to defense arguments that attempted to undercut biblical support for the 
death penalty.  Thus, Lenart lends support to our conclusion that the prosecutor‟s 
brief allusion to the crucifixion, even assuming misconduct, was not prejudicial. 
Accordingly, we find no basis for reversal in the prosecutor‟s references to 
biblical and religious authority.37 
O. Future dangerousness  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to 
argue that defendant posed a threat of future danger.  “[T]he prosecutor may not 
present expert evidence of future dangerousness as an aggravating factor, but he 
may argue from the defendant‟s past conduct, as indicated in the record, that the 
defendant will be a danger in prison.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Zambrano, supra, 
41 Cal.4th at p. 1179.)  In this case, the prosecutor‟s argument was grounded in 
evidence of defendant‟s jailhouse altercations.  As such, it was permissible and the 
trial court did not err in overruling defendant‟s objection to it.  Defendant‟s 
argument on appeal merely rehashes his assertion that the trial court erred in 
permitting the prosecutor to present the evidence of the jailhouse altercations and 
that the prosecutor‟s argument was inflammatory.  We have rejected both claims. 
                                              
37  
We also reject defendant‟s claim that the prosecutor invoked the principle 
of “an eye for an eye” as a justification for imposing the death penalty in this case.  
The prosecutor told the jury that our system had “evolved beyond the rule of 
[Hammurabi] talking about an eye for an eye,” and went on to discuss notions of 
proportionality in crime and punishment.  Nowhere in this brief discussion do we 
perceive an invocation of scriptural authority as a basis for the death penalty. 
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P.  Prosecutor’s use of charts  
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously permitted the prosecutor 
to use six charts during his closing argument that defendant characterizes as 
“inflammatory.”  “The six charts were:  Chart 1. „Factors for Consideration‟; Chart 
2.  „Battery‟;  Chart 3. „Aggravating Factor, Increases Guilt/Enormity/Injurious 
Consequences‟;  Chart 4.  „What Didn‟t You Hear About Richard Christopher 
Tully‟;  Chart 5.  „What Have You Heard about Richard Christopher Tully‟; and 
Chart 6.  „The Bible Sanctions Capital Punishment.‟ ”  
The Attorney General contends that defendant has forfeited his claim as to 
any chart other than charts No. 3 and No. 4 because those were the only charts as 
to which defendant lodged specific objections.  We agree. 
The prosecutor displayed the charts at the beginning of his closing 
argument without having shown them to the court or defense counsel.  Defense 
counsel objected:  “The [prosecutor] is using charts and presenting them to the 
jury without showing them to us first.”  Following the noon break, the court and 
counsel met outside the presence of the jury to discuss the issue.  Defense counsel 
lodged his “objection to some of the entries” on the charts, but the only specific 
objections he made were to entries on chart No. 4, captioned, “What Didn‟t You 
Hear About Richard Christopher Tully.”  The defense objected to various 
statements on that chart, including:  “That this violence is out of character for 
him”; “He‟s remorseful, sorry for what he did”; “That he is not violent in a prison 
setting”; “That he has done one decent thing in his life, that he found God and 
repented.”  Counsel argued, “[T]hese are all items that would be appropriate as 
items in mitigation, and the inference is that the absence of these items are [sic], 
therefore, aggravation” and also potentially constituted Griffin error.  
The trial court ordered the prosecutor to strike the four statements set forth 
above.  It otherwise overruled the defense objections without prejudice.  
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Defense counsel later also objected to an entry on chart No. 3 (“. . . 
Increases Guilt/Enormity/Injurious Consequences”) about whether the victim 
attempted to bargain with defendant.  The trial court sustained the objection and 
admonished the jury that argument of counsel was not evidence.  
We agree that defendant has forfeited any claim other than the specific 
objections he made to charts No. 3 and No. 4.38  (People v. Riggs (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 248, 324 [failure to object to chart used at trial on specific ground 
advanced on appeal forfeits the claim].)  Moreover, defendant fails to show with 
any specificity how the prosecutor‟s use of the other charts was improper and thus, 
even if his claim was not forfeited, he demonstrates neither error nor prejudice. 
As to chart No. 3, defendant‟s objection was sustained and his requested 
admonition was given to the jury.  We presume the jury understood and followed 
the court‟s admonition.  (People v. Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 299.) 
As to chart No. 4 defendant repeats the claim that listing items the jury did 
not hear about defendant in mitigation amounted to an argument that they 
constituted factors in aggravation.  The prosecutor made no such argument to the 
jury.  Indeed, in that part of the argument illustrated by the chart, he stated that the 
absence of a mitigating factor “doesn‟t become an aggravating factor, it‟s not 
something that aggravates it.”  Moreover, the trial court specifically instructed the 
jury, “The absence of a statutory mitigating factor does not constitute an 
aggravating factor.”  We presume the jury understood and followed that 
instruction.  (People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 168.) 
                                              
38  
Defendant suggests that his counsel may have lodged additional objections 
during the unreported bench conference involving his objection to the entry on 
chart No. 3.  But neither of his attorneys corrected the court when, in 
memorializing that conference, it referred to a single objection.  We presume, 
therefore, that the court‟s recollection was accurate.   
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Q.  Jury query re life without possibility of parole  
After it began deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court that asked for 
the “legal definition of life in prison without possibility of parole.”  The day after 
the request was received, the trial court memorialized the discussion it had had 
with counsel about the query.  “The court and counsel have conferred with regard 
to the issue of a response to this matter, and it has been agreed the court will 
respond to this inquiry as follows:  For the purpose of determining the appropriate 
sentence for this defendant, you should assume that either the death penalty or 
confinement in state prison for life without the possibility of parole would be 
carried out.  You are not to consider or speculate as to any other possibility or any 
circumstance that might preclude either of the two penalties from being carried 
out.”  The jury was summoned and this response was read to it twice. 
Citing Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154, defendant contends 
that the trial court‟s response was inadequate because it did not inform the jury 
that life without possibility of parole “meant that [defendant] would not be eligible 
for parole if so sentenced.” 
Defense counsel agreed to the trial court‟s response to the jury‟s request.  
Accordingly, defendant may not now complain that the response was inadequate.  
(See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1193 [“Inasmuch as defendant 
both suggested and consented to the responses given, the claim of error has been 
waived”].)  Here as elsewhere defendant attempts to avoid forfeiture by asserting 
the record is incomplete because the bench conference at which the response was 
agreed upon was unreported and only memorialized the following day.  But 
defense counsel did not object when the court stated that “it has been agreed” the 
court would respond as it did.  On this record, defendant‟s assertion that there may 
have been an unreported objection fails. 
134 
 
The claim is also meritless.  In Simmons, where the South Carolina jury 
was told simply that its choice was between a death sentence and life 
imprisonment, the high court held that “prohibiting the defendant from informing 
the jury that „life imprisonment‟ meant life in prison without the possibility of 
parole resulted in a violation of his right to due process of law.”  (People v. 
Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1008 (Smithey).)  “[W]e have distinguished 
Simmons on the ground that under California‟s statutory scheme, the jury 
expressly is informed of the defendant‟s ineligibility for parole by the instruction 
that it must choose between death or „confinement in the state prison for life 
without the possibility of parole‟; an instruction that such a sentence „will 
inexorably be carried out‟ would be incorrect.”  (Id. at p. 1009.)   Such an 
instruction is incorrect because it ignores both the superior court‟s power to 
“reduce a sentence of death on review under section 190.4, subdivision (e) . . . 
[and] the Governor‟s power of commutation.”  (People v. Thompson (1988) 45 
Cal.3d 86, 130.)    
If the court would have erred by initially instructing the jury that the 
sentence would inexorably be carried out, it would likewise have erred by doing so 
in response to the jury‟s query.  Thus, we find no error. 
Defendant argues that, unlike in Smithey, the jury in this case was not 
expressing concern about the appellate process.  (Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 
1007 [jury asked trial court, “ „If the death penalty is overthrown — would 
[defendant] get life or life without parole‟ ”].)  Implicit in the jury‟s request for a 
“legal definition” of life without possibility of parole was a question about 
whether some future eventuality might result in defendant‟s earlier release.  The 
trial court‟s response, directing the jury to desist from any such speculation, was 
correct.  (Id. at p. 1009 [“[T]he court properly may address such confusion by 
135 
 
instructing the jury to assume that whatever penalty it selects will be carried 
out”],original italics.) 
R.  Allocution  
Defendant contends that the trial court denied his various federal 
constitutional rights and violated section 1200 when it rejected his request for 
allocution.  Under that section, the trial court must ask a defendant, before 
imposing sentence, whether there is “any legal cause to show why judgment 
should not be pronounced against him.”  (§ 1200.)39  “[W]e have repeatedly 
rejected similar arguments.  [Citations.]  [¶]  We have generally held that capital 
and noncapital sentences are not similarly situated for purposes of equal 
protection.  [Citation.]  With regard to allocution specifically, we have explained 
that noncapital sentencees have no other right to express themselves about the 
appropriate sentence, while capital defendants may take the stand and testify on 
that issue.”  (People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1182-1183.) 
Moreover, in People v. Evans, supra, 44 Cal.4th 590, we held that 
noncapital defendants do not have a right to allocute under section 1200.  Any 
statement they wish to make in mitigation “must be made under oath and be 
subject to cross-examination.”  (Evans, at p. 598.)  Thus, in addition to the 
noncomparability of the two classes of defendants, the basic premise of 
defendant‟s equal protection claim — noncapital defendants have a right denied to 
capital defendants — is no longer valid.  In Evans, we also observed, with respect 
to the defendant‟s due process claim, that permitting a noncapital defendant to 
                                              
39  
“In legal parlance, the term „allocution‟ has traditionally meant the trial 
court‟s inquiry of a defendant as to whether there is any reason why judgment 
should not be pronounced.  [Citations.]  In recent years, however, the word 
„allocution‟ has often been used for a mitigating statement made by a defendant in 
response to the court‟s inquiry.”  (People v. Evans (2008) 44 Cal.4th 590, 592, 
fn. 2, italics omitted.) 
136 
 
make a sworn statement subject to cross-examination “affords the defendant a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard and thus does not violate any of the 
defendant‟s rights under the federal Constitution.”  (Id. at p. 600.)  This is also true 
of capital defendants who, in the penalty phase, “[are] allowed to present evidence 
as well as take the stand and address the sentencer.”  (People v. Robbins (1988) 
45 Cal.3d 867, 889.) 
We decline defendant‟s invitation to revisit our settled authority on this 
point and we are not persuaded by his remaining arguments. 
S.  Absence of remorse 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed the prosecutor 
to argue that defendant had not demonstrated remorse.  Though cast as a claim of 
trial court error, the argument also includes a criticism of our decisions allowing 
the prosecutor to argue lack of remorse as a circumstance of the crime for 
purposes of section 190.3, factor (a).  Defendant argues that the prosecutor‟s 
argument impermissibly converted lack of remorse into a distinct factor in 
aggravation.  Finally, he asserts the trial court failed to give the jury proper 
instruction regarding the absence of remorse.  His claims are without merit. 
By way of background, the prosecutor‟s argument regarding remorse was 
double pronged.  First, he argued that defendant had failed to produce evidence of 
remorse and thus the jury could not consider it as a mitigating factor.  Second, he 
argued that defendant‟s failure to show remorse at the scene of the crime could be 
considered in connection with the aggravating factor of the circumstances of the 
crime under section 190.3, factor (a).  Both arguments were permissible. 
“The presence of remorse is mitigating under the 1978 death penalty law.  
[Citation.]  Its absence, however, is generally not aggravating.”  (People v. 
Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 992.)  Nonetheless, “[c]onduct or statements at the 
137 
 
scene of the crime demonstrating lack of remorse may be consider[ed] in 
aggravation as a circumstance of the capital crime under section 190.3, factor (a).  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1184.)  “Overt 
remorselessness is a statutory sentencing factor . . . because factor (a) of section 
190.3 allows the sentencer to evaluate all aggravating and mitigating aspects of 
the capital crime itself.  Moreover, there is nothing inherent in the issue of remorse 
which makes it mitigating only.  The defendant‟s overt indifference or callousness 
toward his misdeed bears significantly on the moral decision whether a greater 
punishment, rather than a lesser, should be imposed.  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1232, original italics.) 
Defendant criticizes our decisions permitting consideration of absence of 
remorse as within the purview of section 190.3, factor (a) because it is not a 
separate statutory factor in aggravation under the 1978 death penalty law.  He also 
asserts that permitting the prosecutor to argue the absence of remorse interferes 
with the jury‟s duty to weigh relevant factors to determine the appropriate penalty 
and renders the death penalty law unconstitutional.  We are not persuaded by 
defendant‟s arguments and adhere to the reasoning of our decisions cited above.  
Defendant argues that, because our decisions have failed to provide a definition of 
“remorselessness” or “absence of remorse,” “the defense is provided no notice of 
what facts may draw an argument that defendant lacked remorse.”  Neither phrase 
has a specialized or technical meaning so as to warrant a particular definition.  
Moreover, the facts that might show either remorse or absence of remorse will 
necessarily vary from case to case and any attempt at a global definition would be 
inadequate. 
We reject defendant‟s related claim that a special instruction is required 
directing the jury how to assess and consider the absence of remorse.  Because the 
phrase has no technical or specialized meaning, an instruction as to its meaning 
138 
 
and what weight it should or should not be given is unnecessary.  In this case, 
there was no danger the jury would consider the absence of remorse to be a factor 
in aggravation in and of itself because it was specifically instructed that the 
absence of a statutory mitigating factor did not constitute an aggravating factor.  
The prosecutor made the same point when he told the jury the absence of remorse 
could be considered only in the context of factor (a), the circumstances of the 
crime.  We are not persuaded that the instructions as given, in light of the 
prosecutor‟s argument, were insufficient to direct the jury‟s consideration of 
evidence of absence of remorse as an element of section 190.3, factor (a). 
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor impermissibly argued that remorse 
was a “condition precedent” that must be fulfilled before the jury could “grant 
sympathy or mercy to [defendant].”  We have examined the passage about which 
defendant complains.40  In context, the prosecutor simply and correctly stated that 
no evidence of remorse had been shown and, therefore, it was not a mitigating 
factor.  After the defense objected to these remarks, the prosecutor added:  “The 
absence of remorse, after the commission of a crime, after the crime has been 
completed, cannot be used as an aggravating factor.”  He reiterated that “you 
haven‟t heard any evidence that this defendant has demonstrated any remorse, so 
it‟s not present here.”  Viewing the argument as a whole, we do not believe a 
reasonable juror would have subscribed to the meaning that defendant seeks to 
impose upon it.  (People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 960.) 
                                              
40  
“You know, what is in the law, we call it a condition precedent, something 
that has to happen before another thing follows, a prerequisite, something that you 
would expect to see in existence before you give sympathy, before you grant 
mercy, remorse, the presence of remorse, the fact that you‟re sorry for what you 
have done can be a mitigating factor, but it‟s not present here.  It is not present in 
this case.”  
139 
 
Defendant asserts further that the argument constituted an improper 
comment on defendant‟s failure to testify, in violation of Griffin v. California, 
supra, 380 U.S. 609.  The prosecutor, however, did not refer to defendant‟s failure 
to testify. (People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 479, 509 [rejecting claim of Griffin 
error where prosecutor did not refer to defendant‟s failure to testify].)  A 
reasonable juror would have understood his reference to the absence of evidence 
of remorse to be directed at the evidence the defense did present, not to testimony 
it did not.  (People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 960.) 
Defendant contends the prosecutor “created” a factor in aggravation “based 
on speculation as to [his] alleged lack of remorse at the time of the crime.”  First, 
defendant cites the prosecutor‟s statement:  “Another aggravating factor is his 
callousness at the scene and the failure to show any remorse at the scene of the 
crime.  Totally callous. [In]different to what she was going through, totally and 
completely.”  As we have already noted, the prosecutor‟s argument — overt lack 
of remorse at the scene of the crime can be considered under section 190.3, factor 
(a) — was proper.  We have also concluded that the prosecutor‟s passing reference 
to callousness as an aggravating factor could not have misled the jury about the 
factors it was to consider.  (See p. 116, fn. 33, ante.)  Defendant also asserts the 
prosecutor‟s argument that as the victim lay dying, defendant did not assist her but 
was going through her purse looking for money was not supported by the 
evidence.  We have already rejected this claim and do so again.  (See pp. 116-117, 
ante.)  In short, the prosecutor did not exceed the permissible bounds of argument 
by asserting that defendant‟s conduct at the scene of the crime showed a lack of 
remorse. 
Second, defendant argues that consideration of lack of remorse by the jury 
was impermissible because he sought permission to allocute and express remorse.  
He cites Johnson v. Mississippi (1988) 486 U.S. 578.  In Johnson, the high court 
140 
 
reversed the defendant‟s death sentence because one of the three aggravating 
circumstances on which the jury had relied, a New York conviction for assault 
with intent to commit rape, was reversed by the New York courts after the 
Mississippi Supreme Court had affirmed the death sentence.  That court 
subsequently denied the defendant postconviction relief.  At the high court, 
Mississippi contended that the defendant‟s sentence should be affirmed “because 
when [the Mississippi Supreme Court] conducted its proportionality review of the 
death sentence on petitioner‟s initial appeal, it did not mention petitioner‟s prior 
conviction in upholding the sentence.”  (Id. at p. 589.)  The high court responded:  
“[T]he error here extended beyond mere invalidation of an aggravating 
circumstance supported by evidence that was otherwise admissible.  Here the jury 
was allowed to consider evidence that has been revealed to be materially 
inaccurate.”  (Id. at p. 590, fn. omitted.) 
Johnson is inapposite.  This is not a case where evidence before the jury in 
its penalty determination was subsequently revealed to have been materially 
inaccurate.  There was no evidence of remorse because defendant elected not to 
present any such evidence after his request to allocute was properly denied.  The 
prosecutor was entitled to comment on the record as it existed and the jury to rely 
on that record. 
Finally, defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the “absence of 
remorse” errors requires reversal.  As we have rejected all of defendant‟s claims of 
error, there is no cumulative effect requiring reversal. 
T.  Cumulative error 
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of error during the penalty phase 
trial requires reversal.  We have found that many of defendant‟s claims of errors 
are forfeited because he failed to lodge a timely and specific objection below.  To 
141 
 
the extent his claims were either not forfeited or we have discussed their merits 
notwithstanding forfeiture, we have found either no error or no prejudice.  
Accordingly, we reject his claim of cumulative error. 
U.  Automatic motion to modify death verdict  
Defendant contends the trial court‟s ruling on his automatic motion for 
modification of the death verdict suffered from multiple defects.  His claim is 
without merit. 
“In ruling on defendant‟s application for modification of the verdict” under 
section 190.4, subdivision (e), “the trial court must reweigh the evidence; consider 
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances; and determine whether, in its 
independent judgment, the weight of the evidence supports the jury‟s verdict.”  
(People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 588.)  “ „That is to say, [the judge] must 
determine whether the jury‟s decision that death is appropriate under all the 
circumstances is adequately supported.‟ ”  (People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 
p. 1006.)  The trial court‟s role is not to make an independent and de novo penalty 
determination.  (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 989.)  “In ruling on an 
automatic motion to modify a death verdict, a trial court need not recount details 
of, or identify, all evidence presented in mitigation or aggravation.  [Citation.]  
The trial court‟s only obligation [is] to provide a ruling that allows effective 
appellate review.”  (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 427; see People v. 
DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 56 [“The court need not describe „every detail‟ in 
making its ruling.”].)  On review, the trial court‟s ruling “is subject to independent 
review, [but] we do not make a de novo determination of penalty.”  (Brady, 
50 Cal.4th at p. 588.)  
The trial court‟s preliminary remarks demonstrate that it clearly understood 
its  role.  The court quoted the statutory description of its function and cited 
142 
 
decisions by this court “requiring that the trial judge make an independent 
determination whether [imposition] of the death penalty is appropriate in light of 
the relevant evidence and the applicable law . . . . [¶]  [W]hether in [the court‟s] 
independent judgment the weight of the evidence supports the jury verdict.”  The 
court acknowledged further that “the only evidence which the court is to review is 
that which was before the jury,” and, as part of the exercise of independent 
judgment, “the judge is required to assess the credibility of the witnesses, 
determine the probative force of the testimony and weigh the evidence.”  
Based upon its “personal[]” and “careful[]” review of the penalty phase 
evidence, including “its own personal notes relating to the evidence received” the 
court made the following findings:  (1) “the court . . . specifically agrees that the 
jury‟s assessment that the circumstances in aggravation outweigh the 
circumstances in mitigation is supported by the evidence”; (2) “the court agrees 
with the implicit findings of the jury that the witnesses for the [P]eople were 
credible and believable”; (3) “the court independently finds that the circumstances 
surrounding the first degree murder of Shirley Olsson were vicious and pitiless.  
The defendant brutally stabbed the victim numerous times and exhibited a high 
degree of cruelty and callousness”; (4) “there is no question that the first degree 
murder of Shirley Olsson was committed during the commission or attempted 
commission of a burglary”; (5) “there were no circumstances which extenuated the 
gravity of [defendant‟s] crimes whether or not they be a legal excuse”; (6) after 
considering “the evidence from the members of the defendant‟s family who have 
testified about his family history, activities and background . . . the court further 
independently finds that none of the evidence offered by the defendant could in 
any way be considered a moral justification or extenuation of his conduct”; (7) 
“there are no factors in mitigation which will extenuate and mitigate the gravity of 
the crimes committed,” specifically, “the capacity of the defendant to appreciate 
143 
 
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to [the] requirements of 
law, was not impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the effects of 
intoxication,” “the offenses were not committed while the defendant was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional distress,” and the defendant‟s age “is not 
a mitigating factor.” 
Further, the court considered and independently reviewed “any other 
circumstance which could extenuate the gravity of the crime even though it is not 
a legal excuse for the crime . . . any sympathetic or other aspect of defendant‟s 
background[,] character or record . . . whether or not related to the offenses for 
which he was on trial, and finds that there are none that extenuate the gravity of 
the crimes or mitigate[] these offenses.”  The court concluded that in its “personal 
assessment” the “factors in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation,” and “the 
evidence in aggravation is so substantial in comparison to the evidence in 
mitigation that death is warranted and not life in prison without the possibility of 
parole.” 
Defendant complains that the trial court failed to make written findings but, 
to the contrary, the court complied with the statutory directive to “set forth the 
reasons for his ruling . . . and direct that they be entered on the Clerk‟s minutes.”  
(§ 190.4, subd. (e).)  Defendant also complains that the court “failed to mention 
any specific evidence . . . did not assess the credibility of the witnesses, determine 
the probative force of the testimony, and weigh the evidence.”  These claims are 
meritless. 
Defendant asserts that the court‟s findings on aggravation were deficient 
because its discussion of the circumstances of the crime “was so vague that it does 
not provide any basis for a finding of evidence in aggravation.”  The court 
specified the manner of the murder — “the defendant brutally stabbed the victim 
numerous times and exhibited a high degree of cruelty and callousness.”  We have 
144 
 
no difficulty understanding the court‟s meaning or subjecting this finding to our 
own review.  
Similarly, we reject defendant‟s claim that the trial court‟s findings as to 
mitigation were too vague to allow meaningful review.  The court was not 
required to set forth in detail all the evidence presented in mitigation or 
aggravation.  (People v. Romero, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 427.)  We do not presume 
that, because it did not refer to all evidence in mitigation, it did not review and 
consider that evidence.  Here, the trial court specifically referred to the testimony 
of defendant‟s family members regarding his background, character and record, 
evidence of intoxication, his age and any other circumstance, whether or not 
related to the crime, and concluded that none of it “extenuate[d] the gravity of the 
crimes or mitigate[d] these offenses.”  Furthermore, as its statement shows, the 
trial court applied the appropriate standard in its examination of the evidence in 
mitigation, referring not simply to evidence related to the circumstances of the 
crime, but to all evidence offered in mitigation.  (See People v. Jennings (1988) 46 
Cal.3d 963, 993-994.) 
Defendant contends that the trial court failed to properly analyze as 
mitigating factors his “disadvantaged” childhood, his lack of an extensive violent 
criminal record, and his lack of prior felony convictions.  As to the first factor, the 
trial court specifically cited in its discussion of mitigation evidence the testimony 
of defendant‟s family members about his background.  Regarding the second 
factor, defendant asserts that, because the trial court did not mention his jailhouse 
altercations in its discussion of factors in aggravation, it must have discounted 
them.  From this premise, he reasons that the court should then have considered in 
mitigation the absence of violent criminal activity by defendant.  (§ 190.3, factor 
(b) [sentencer to consider “[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the 
defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the 
145 
 
express or implied threat to use force or violence”].)  But the evidence did not 
show an absence of such conduct; rather, it demonstrated that defendant had 
engaged in such conduct.  The court did not err by failing to consider the absence 
of such conduct as a factor in mitigation. 
In any event, the court is not required to engage in “a rote recitation” of 
every single factor in mitigation.  (People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 727.)  
“The trial court‟s mere failure to mention expressly all evidence presented in 
mitigation . . . does not mean the trial court ignored or overlooked such evidence, 
but simply indicates that the court did not consider such evidence to have 
appreciable mitigating weight.”  (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 860.)  
“[A]bsent an indication that [the court] „ “ignored or overlooked” ‟ [citation] the 
mitigating evidence, we will not find error, and there is no such indication of such 
an omission here.”  (Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 727.)  The same analysis 
applies to the trial court‟s failure to expressly mention the absence of felony 
convictions. 
Next, defendant claims that the trial court‟s ultimate finding that the factors 
in aggravation outweighed those in mitigation was deficient because it failed to 
make an adequate record in support of this conclusion.  We reject the assertion.  
The trial court‟s lengthy statement demonstrated an understanding of its function 
and the applicable legal standards, and was supported by references to the 
evidence.  It bears no resemblance at all to the summary statements we found 
defective in the two cases on which defendant relies.  (People v. Bonilla (1989) 48 
Cal.3d 757, 800-801 [“ „I think the aggravating circumstances were there, that 
they did exceed the mitigating circumstances‟ ” (italics omitted)]; People v. 
Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 793 [“ „[T]he Court finds that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances and that the weight of the 
evidence supports the jury‟s verdict of death‟ ”].) 
146 
 
Defendant asserts that the trial court impermissibly relied on its own notes.  
“In ruling on an application for modification of the verdict, the trial court may 
only rely on evidence that was before the jury.”  (People v. Navarette (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 458, 526.)  The trial court acknowledged this rule in its prefatory remarks.  
The court‟s use of its notes did not violate this rules because, as the court 
explained, those notes “relat[ed] to the evidence received.”  Therefore, we reject 
defendant‟s claim that the court‟s ruling was based on “undisclosed and unknown 
information.”  (See People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1065 
[“Based on the record, the court consulted its private notes only for the purpose of 
complying with the mandate of section 190.4, subdivision (e)”].)  
Defendant contends that the trial court improperly relied on a probation 
report.  The court acknowledged that it had read the probation report but only for 
purposes of sentencing defendant on the noncapital offenses and it specifically 
stated that it “did not consider [the probation report] in its ruling on [the automatic 
application].”  Where a defendant is convicted of both noncapital and capital 
offenses, it is “preferable” for the trial court “to defer reading the probation report 
until after ruling on the automatic application for modification of verdict.”  
(People v. Lewis, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 287.)  Here, however, there is nothing in 
the record to suggest the trial court did not limit consideration of that report to the 
noncapital offenses. 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court failed to make an independent 
determination that the death penalty was proper.  His claim is belied by the trial 
court‟s statement in which it stressed the independent nature of its review and its 
conclusions.  The fact that the court said it agreed with certain findings by the jury 
— regarding witness credibility, for example — does not mean the court simply 
deferred to those findings.  Rather, in context, it is clear that such agreement was 
the product of the court‟s independent review. 
147 
 
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court‟s ruling on the automatic 
application for modification of verdict was conducted in the manner prescribed by 
section 190.4, subdivision (e). 
V.  Death qualification voir dire  
Citing the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution and article I of the California Constitution, defendant contends that 
the death qualification of juries in California is unconstitutional.  The claim is 
forfeited by defendant‟s failure to raise it below.  (People v. Howard (2010) 51 
Cal.4th 15, 26 (Howard ).)  It is also meritless. 
 
“The death qualification process is not rendered unconstitutional by 
empirical studies concluding that, because it removes jurors who would 
automatically vote for death or for life, it results in juries biased against the 
defense.  [Citations.]  [¶]  Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162 . . ., which 
approved the death qualification process, remains good law despite some criticism 
in law review articles.  [Citations.]  „We may not depart from the high court ruling 
as to the United States Constitution, and defendant presents no good reason to 
reconsider our ruling[s] as to the California Constitution.‟  [Citation.]  [¶]  The 
impacts of the death qualification process on the race, gender, and religion of the 
jurors do not affect its constitutionality.  [Citations.]  Nor does the process violate 
a defendant‟s constitutional rights, including the Eighth Amendment right not to 
be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, by affording the prosecutor an 
opportunity to increase the chances of getting a conviction.  [Citations.]  
Defendant claims the voir dire process itself produces a biased jury.  We have held 
otherwise.  [Citation.]  [¶]  Death qualification does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment by undermining the functions of a jury as a cross-section of the 
community participating in the administration of justice.  [Citations.]  Finally, 
148 
 
defendant‟s constitutional rights were not violated by the prosecutor‟s use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors with reservations about capital 
punishment.”  (Howard, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 26-27; see People v. Taylor, 
supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 602-603.)  We adhere to the views expressed in these 
decisions and reject defendant‟s claims. 
W.  Constitutional claims re death penalty scheme and statute  
 
1.  Jury unanimity 
Defendant contends “the death penalty scheme” is unconstitutional because 
“the jury was not required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that any aggravating 
circumstance existed, that any unanimously proven aggravated circumstances 
substantially outweighed the mitigating circumstances or that death was the 
appropriate penalty.”  Thus, he asserts, his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and article I of the California 
Constitution were violated. 
“The jury need not make written findings, achieve unanimity as to specific 
aggravating circumstances, find beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating 
circumstance is proved (except for section 190, factors (b) & (c)), find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
circumstances, or find beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate 
penalty.  [Citations.]  Moreover, the jury need not be instructed as to any burden of 
proof in selecting the penalty to be imposed.  [Citation.]  The United States 
Supreme Court‟s recent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment‟s jury trial 
guarantee (Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270; United States v. 
Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 961; Ring v. 
Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466) have 
not altered our conclusions in this regard.  [Citations].”  (People v. Gonzalez and 
149 
 
Solis (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 333.)  Defendant‟s arguments do not persuade us 
otherwise. 
 
2.  Constitutional challenges to the death penalty statute 
Defendant mounts various constitutional challenges to the death penalty 
statute that we have consistently rejected.  We do so again, finding: 
a.  “California‟s death penalty law „adequately narrows the class of 
murderers subject to the death penalty‟ and does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.”  (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 848.) 
b.  “Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider, in choosing 
the appropriate penalty, „[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant 
was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special 
circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1,‟ does not violate the 
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution merely 
because those circumstances differ from case to case, or because factor (a) does 
not guide the jury in weighing these circumstances.  [Citations.]”  (People v. 
Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1133.)  “Section 190.3, factor (a), . . . is not 
unconstitutionally vague, arbitrary or capricious.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Cowan, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 508.) 
c.  “Factor (a) of section 190.3. . . does not impermissibly result in „double-
counting‟ or automatically create a bias in favor of a death verdict.  [Citations.]”  
(People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 627.) 
c.  “We also reject defendant‟s contention that the California death penalty 
law violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the jury is not 
instructed as to any burden of proof in selecting the penalty to be imposed.  As we 
have explained, „[u]nlike the guilt determination, “the sentencing function is 
inherently moral and normative, not factual” [citation] and, hence, not susceptible 
150 
 
to a burden-of-proof quantification.‟  [Citation.]  The instructions as a whole 
adequately guide the jury in carrying out their „moral and normative‟ function.”  
(People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1053-1054.)  The death penalty statute 
is not unconstitutional because it fails “to impose a burden of proof on either 
party, even if only proof by a preponderance of the evidence, or, alternatively, in 
failing to instruct the jury on the absence of a burden of proof.  [Citations].”  
(People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 891.) 
e.  “Defendant contends that the California death penalty statute violates the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because 
certain procedural safeguards are lacking:  juries are not required to make written 
findings regarding circumstances in aggravation, or to achieve unanimity as to 
aggravation circumstances. . . . Each of these contentions has been rejected, and 
we decline to reconsider them.”  (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) 
f.  The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional “[i]n failing to require 
intercase proportionality review.”  (Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 891; see People 
v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 1186.) 
g.  “The [death penalty] statutes are not invalid because they permit the jury 
to consider in aggravation, under section 190.3, factor (b), evidence of a 
defendant‟s unadjudicated offenses.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Letner and Tobin, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 208.) 
h.  “Consideration of both section 190.3, factors (b) (criminal activity 
involving force or violence), and (c) (prior felony convictions) is permissible.  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 510.) 
i.  “ „The use in the statutes, and in the standard jury instructions, of terms 
such as “extreme,” “substantial,” “reasonably believed,” and “at the time of the 
offense” in setting forth the mitigating factors does not impermissibly limit the 
mitigation evidence or otherwise result in an arbitrary or capricious penalty 
151 
 
determination.‟ ”  (People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 208.)  
Neither factor (i) nor factor (k) of section 190.3 is unconstitutionally vague.  (See 
People v. Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1224; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 
Cal.4th 130, 192.)  The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional because it does 
not identify which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating, nor was the 
trial court required to so instruct.  (People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1217.) 
j.  “ „There is no violation of the equal protection of the laws as a result of 
the statutes‟ asserted failure to provide for capital defendants some procedural 
guarantees afforded to noncapital defendants.‟ ”  (People v. Letner and Tobin, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 208.)  The death penalty is not per se unconstitutional 
(Gregg v. Georgia (1975) 428 U.S. 153, 187; People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 
Cal.4th at p. 1187.) 
k.  We have also repeatedly considered and rejected attacks on the 
constitutionality of CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88.  (People v. Moon (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 1, 41-44.)  Defendant provides no persuasive reasons to revisit those 
claims. 
l.  “Defendant argues that the death penalty in California violates the 
California Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution because it is imposed arbitrarily and capriciously depending on 
the county in which the case is prosecuted.  [¶]  We have repeatedly rejected 
substantially similar claims, concluding over 20 years ago that „prosecutorial 
discretion to select those eligible cases in which the death penalty will actually be 
sought does not . . . offend principles of equal protection, due process, or cruel 
and/or unusual punishment.‟  [Citations.]  [¶] Defendant, however, urges this court 
to reexamine our decisions in prior cases in light of the United States Supreme 
Court‟s voting rights decision in Bush v. Gore (2000) 531 U.S. 98, which, he 
asserts, requires uniformity among California‟s 58 counties for prosecutorial 
152 
 
standards for seeking the death penalty.  But as the high court explained, its 
consideration of the equal protection challenge to Florida‟s voting recount process 
was „limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in 
election processes generally presents many complexities.‟  (Id. at p. 109, italics 
added.)  That case, therefore, does not warrant our revisiting our prior holdings on 
the instant issue.”  (People v. Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 889-890.) 
X.  International law  
“Defendant‟s death sentence violates neither international law nor his rights 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, as no 
authority „prohibit[s] a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and 
federal constitutional and statutory requirements.  [Citation.]  Unless a defendant 
establishes his trial involved prejudicial violations of state or federal constitutional 
law, we need not consider the question whether he also suffered violations of 
international law.  [Citation.]”  (People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 698.)  
“Finally, we again reject the contention that the death penalty violates 
international law, is contrary to international norms, or that these norms require 
the application of the death penalty to only the most extraordinary crimes.  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Blacksher, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 849.) 
Y.  Inadequate record 
Defendant contends that missing reporter‟s transcripts render the record 
inadequate for meaningful appellate review.  His claim is meritless. 
“All proceedings in a capital case must, under section 190.9, be conducted 
on the record with a reporter present and transcriptions prepared.  [Citation.]  
„ “[N]o presumption of prejudice arises from the absence of materials from the 
appellate record [citation], and defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that 
the record is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review [citations].” ‟  
153 
 
[Citations.]”  (People v. Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 586.)41  “The record on 
appeal is inadequate . . . only if the complained-of deficiency is prejudicial to the 
defendant‟s ability to prosecute his appeal.  [Citation.]  It is the defendant‟s burden 
to show prejudice of this sort.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 
155, 196, fn. 8.) “Moreover, irregularities in the preliminary hearing are no basis 
for reversal on appeal unless defendant can demonstrate a resulting unfairness in 
the subsequent trial.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 
p. 1192.) 
Defendant concedes that the allegedly missing transcript for August 14, 
1992, is, in fact, in the record.  A second allegedly missing transcript, for January 
27, 1992, listed at page 20 of defendant‟s opening brief, appears in the augmented 
court reporter‟s transcript at pages 115 to 117.  With respect to defendant‟s claim 
that the trial court‟s personal notes are missing from the record, defendant does not 
demonstrate that he ever requested these notes and, in any event, he would not 
have been entitled to them.  (People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 
1065 [defendants not entitled to augment the record with trial court‟s notes:  “The 
notes were the court‟s own work product, and personal to the judge”].) 
                                              
41  
A defendant‟s burden to show the inadequacy of the record begins with an 
accurate representation of the alleged missing records.  In this case, defendant 
claims that there were “ „forty-four‟ ” court hearings, proceedings or conferences 
. . . not transcribed in this case,” and “on 17 other occasions there is „no reporter‟s 
transcript‟ of a hearing.”  He also asserts entitlement to the trial court‟s trial notes.  
He concludes: “In short a total of sixty (60) proceedings are missing from the 
record.”  But 44 plus 17 is 61, and the court trial notes would be 62.  Defendant 
also double-counts a number of dates under two different categories (e.g., hearings 
“not transcribed” and occasions where there is “no reporter‟s transcript”).  Finally, 
he claims that the Attorney General failed to address the absence of 14 unrecorded 
proceedings but unhelpfully he fails to specify these 14 proceedings, much less 
carry out his burden of showing that these allegedly missing records prevented 
meaningful appellate review.  
154 
 
Defendant contends that transcripts are missing for proceedings in the 
(former) municipal court for August 11 and 19 and September 20, 1987.  As to 
each of these dates, defendant‟s trial counsel indicated in the settled statement that 
his recollection of the hearings is contained in the minute orders.  The minute 
orders show the subject matter of the August dates was a defense discovery 
motion.  The trial court granted some items outright, granted others as modified, 
and denied others.  Defendant has neither raised any issue regarding discovery nor 
demonstrated how he was precluded from doing so because of the missing 
transcripts. 
Defendant contends the record is missing transcripts for preliminary 
transcript proceedings for November 17, 18, 19, and 24, and December 1, 1987.  
The settled statement for these dates indicates that the chief subject of these 
proceedings was a prosecution witness named Thomas Marshall.  Marshall 
testified at the preliminary hearing that defendant told him in jail that he had 
murdered Sandy Olsson. Marshall did not testify at defendant‟s trial.  Accordingly, 
any missing proceedings involving his testimony at the preliminary examination 
could not have resulted in any unfairness to defendant at trial.  (People v. 
Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1192.)  The settled statement also refers to in 
camera proceedings involving the assertion by police witnesses of a privilege 
against disclosing records involving Marshall‟s work as a police informant.  
Again, because Marshall did not testify at trial, defendant cannot show any 
prejudice. 
The settled statement for November 24, 1987, indicates two off-the-record 
discussions involving  the scope of defense questioning of Sergeant Robertson, 
about the other leads and suspects in the murder investigation.  A review of the 
clerk‟s transcript supports this summary.  Defendant asserts that the missing 
record “contains potentially exculpatory evidence” that someone other than he 
155 
 
may have committed the murder and the “lack of record” has prevented him from 
fully pursuing this evidence.  This assertion is completely without merit. 
On the extant record, defendant‟s trial counsel acknowledged he had been 
provided with the information regarding other suspects.  His concern was that 
there might be more.  After an unreported discussion, he noted on the record that 
the prosecutor had agreed to provide him with additional material on the subject of 
other suspects.  Thus, there is no support for defendant‟s claim that the 
untranscribed proceedings involved missing and “potentially exculpatory 
evidence.”  To the contrary, the extant record indicates that the untranscribed 
proceedings involved the prosecutor‟s agreement to turn over materials about 
other suspects in addition to those already in the defense‟s possession.  None of 
this, in any event, fulfills defendant‟s obligation to demonstrate that the 
untranscribed proceeding has prevented meaningful appellate review of any claim 
he raised on appeal. 
The settled statement for December 1, 1987, indicates there was an off-the-
record discussion concerning “the preservation of blood samples and other 
refrigerated evidence.”  This followed defendant having been held to answer and 
ordered to appear for arraignment on December 15, 1987, and an ensuing 
conversation about the whereabouts and transportation of blood samples.  
Defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice arising from the absence of a transcript of 
this apparently routine housekeeping matter. 
Next, defendant cites untranscribed pretrial and in limine proceedings for 
December 15, 1987; April 15, April 18, June 6, and June 7, 1988; June 17, 
September 23, and November 25, 1991; and January 27, February 11, March 10, 
March 20, April 17, May 6, and June 9, 1992.  The settled statement reveals that 
the missing transcripts for December 15, 1987, and all of the 1988 transcripts 
involved routine matters, including continuance of arraignment, the filing of a 
156 
 
section 995 motion that was then continued for hearing, the dropping of pending 
matters without prejudice because defendant was absent, and the continuance of a 
motion to settle the record of the preliminary examination.42  Our review of the 
settled statement and the clerk‟s transcript for all of the 1991 dates and all of the 
1992 dates except June 9, 1992, reveals that on each of those occasions the court‟s 
only action was to continue the case for trial setting.  The settled statement and 
clerk‟s transcript reflect that June 2, 1992, was the first day of trial.  However, 
counsel waived the reporter‟s presence, conferred with the court in chambers, and 
continued the trial to June 9.  On June 9, 1992, counsel again waived the reporter‟s 
presence, conferred with the court in chambers, and put the matter over to June 10 
for trial.  On both days, counsel waived defendant‟s presence.  Although trial 
counsel Wagner had no specific memory of the proceedings of those days, the 
settled statement reflects that “[t]he majority of court appearances following Mr. 
Wagner‟s appointment related to scheduling matters . . . .”  Thus, again, the record 
indicates that nothing more took place on these dates other than routine scheduling 
matters and defendant fails to persuade otherwise.  Given the vigor with which 
trial counsel conducted the defense, it is inconceivable that they would have 
waived defendant‟s appearance and the reporter had they anticipated that any 
substantive matter would be discussed on any of these dates. 
                                              
42  
Defendant contends that the April 18 and June 6, 1988 proceedings 
involved his suppression motions and are therefore relevant to his claim on appeal 
that these motions were erroneously denied.  However, the reporter‟s certificate 
states that his shorthand notes “reflect that on both dates, when the Court called 
the case of [defendant], the defendant was not present in court and the pending 
matters were dropped from the calendar.”  Even if the matters dropped were 
defendant‟s suppression motions, we fail to see how this routine proceeding 
prevented meaningful appellate review of his claims, nor does he enlighten us.  
Defendant‟s burden to demonstrate prejudice requires something more than the 
fortuity that an untranscribed proceeding had some tangential relationship to a 
claim he later raised on appeal. 
157 
 
Defendant next directs us to untranscribed trial proceedings for the 
following 1992 dates:  June 11, June 25, July 1, July 24, August 4, August 11, 
August 12, August 13, August 20, August 27, September 3, September 9, 
September 10, September 15 (three times), September 16, and November 2.  The 
extant record of the proceedings on these dates is sufficient to disclose their nature 
and belies defendant‟s assertion that they may have contained information that 
precludes meaningful appellate review of any argument he has raised or prevented 
him from advancing an argument he would otherwise have made. 
The extant record for June 11 shows that the court and counsel conferred 
off the record for scheduling purposes and to mark certain exhibits during a 
pretrial proceeding.  The extant record for June 25 and July 1 indicates that on 
both dates the court and counsel conferred off the record about juror 
questionnaires, as the result of which the parties excused a number of prospective 
jurors by stipulation.  Defendant asserts there is an untranscribed conference on 
July 24, but the page to which he refers us in the reporter‟s transcript is for June 
16, and contains no such notation.  There was an off-the-record discussion on July 
23 involving the prosecutor‟s request to use certain photographs at the guilt phase 
trial.  This was followed on July 24 by an on-the-record discussion of each 
proposed photograph that included the defendant‟s objections and the court‟s 
rulings.  
On August 4, there was an unreported discussion of defendant‟s objection 
to the prosecutor‟s question to John Chandler about defendant‟s employment 
history.  Before recessing for the morning, the trial court memorialized the 
discussion on the record, explaining the basis of defendant‟s objection  — 
relevance — and that it had overruled the objection.  Defendant cites an 
unreported discussion on August 11, following an objection by defense counsel to 
the prosecutor‟s question to Sergeant Robertson about whether Thomas Pillard, 
158 
 
also known as “Doubting Thomas,” had come up in the investigation prior to 
March 30, 1987.  Before recessing for the day, the trial court memorialized for the 
record the basis of the objection — relevance — and its ruling.  Defendant cites an 
unreported discussion on August 12 regarding the prosecutor‟s objection to 
questions of his criminalist by the defense regarding DNA testing of hairs found in 
the victim‟s bedroom.  The prosecutor withdrew the objection and the matter was 
resolved by stipulation.  The record reveals that on August 13, there was an 
unreported discussion regarding exhibits and guilt phase jury instructions.  
According to the settled statement, Defense Counsel Wagner “recall[ed] 
conferring on guilt phase instructions and believe[d] the results of these discussion 
were later put on the record.”  In fact, there was a lengthy on-the-record hearing 
regarding the admission of exhibits into evidence and guilt phase instructions.  
Defendant points to an unreported discussion on August 20, after the jury had been 
sent out for guilt phase deliberations.  That discussion followed an on-the-record 
discussion regarding possible jury requests for tapes and transcripts of the tapes.  
Just before going off the record, the court stated, “We have certain matters to take 
up,” which included a “review of the verdict forms,” “several items of evidence 
we‟ve referred to as the envelope,” and “the issue how we will accommodate any 
request for these tapes and transcripts.  And once we arrive at that determination 
we‟ll put that on the record.”  These were housekeeping matters, none of which 
required any further on-the-record discussion.  Defendant asserts there was an 
unreported discussion on August 27, but at the page he cites the court refers 
merely to “a brief scheduling conference.”  
Defendant directs us to an unreported discussion on September 3.  A review 
of the record reveals that this involved a request by the parties for a written copy 
of the court‟s victim impact evidence ruling.  This is confirmed by defense 
counsel‟s recollection in the settled statement that the discussion “concerned the 
159 
 
court‟s issuance of a written ruling on victim impact evidence.” An unreported 
discussion on September 9 occurred after defendant‟s brother finished testifying 
and the defense requested he be excused.  The prosecutor asked that he remain on 
call.  After the discussion, the witness was provisionally excused.  This is 
confirmed by defense counsel‟s recollection in the settled statement that the 
discussion involved “holding or excusing witness Roger Tully.”  A second 
unreported discussion involved a defense objection to the prosecutor‟s question of 
defendant‟s son about what he and defendant had done the last time they had seen 
each other.  Defense counsel objected it was beyond the scope of direct; the 
objection was overruled.  This is confirmed by defense counsel‟s recollection in 
the settled statement.  
According to the clerk‟s transcript, an unreported discussion on September 
10 involved penalty phase instructions.  This is confirmed by defense counsel‟s 
recollection in the settled statement that the discussion involved “penalty phase 
instructions” and was later “put on the record.”  In fact, there is an on-the-record 
discussion of penalty phase instructions.  Defendant points to three unreported 
discussions on September 15.  The first two unreported discussions involved 
defense objections to the prosecutor‟s victim impact arguments.  The trial court 
subsequently memorialized these discussions, the nature of the defense‟s concern, 
and its rulings.  The third discussion involved scheduling.  This is confirmed by 
the recollections of Defense Counsel Wagner in the settled statement.  Defendant 
cites an unreported discussion on September 16, following the receipt by the court 
of a jury question about the definition of life without possibility of parole.  The 
next morning, September 17, the court explained the purpose of the conference 
and that counsel had agreed to its proposed response.  
160 
 
Defendant cites an unreported discussion on November 2, but, as defense 
counsel‟s recollection in the settled statement confirms, it was simply to put the 
case over to December 4 for the probation report and sentencing.  
In his opening brief, defendant merely makes a global and unsubstantiated 
claim that missing or unreported transcripts prevented meaningful appellate 
review, without bothering to specify the exact issues on which he rests this claim.  
Our review of these missing transcripts belies his claim.  In each case, either the 
record is sufficient for review or the proceedings involved routine matters. 
For the first time in his reply brief, defendant attempts to specify 11 claims 
as to which the absence of transcripts prevented meaningful appellate review.  It is 
axiomatic that arguments made for the first time in a reply brief will not be 
entertained because of the unfairness to the other party.  In any event, defendant‟s 
specification does nothing more than attempt to link each missing transcript to 
various arguments without explaining why the missing transcript had any impact 
at all on his ability to raise the issue or on our ability to review it.  This is 
inadequate to sustain his burden of showing prejudice. 
We have before us an 18-volume reporter‟s transcript comprising over 
3,900 pages as well as supplemental reporter‟s transcripts and a 51-volume clerk‟s 
transcript comprising almost 15,500 pages.  The opening brief in this case is in 
two separate volumes, coming in at 745 pages, while the reply brief adds another 
522 pages to defendant‟s briefing. The Attorney General‟s brief is 375 pages long; 
total briefing comprises over 1,600 pages.  “With respect to every issue raised on 
appeal, we have found the record sufficient to permit review.  It is in this context 
that we must find that any abuse of discretion, assuming it existed, was not 
prejudicial, because the record is clearly adequate for meaningful appellate 
review.”  (People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 922.)  Accordingly, we 
reject defendant‟s claim. 
161 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment in its entirely. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
I join the majority in affirming the judgment of death.  I write separately, 
however, to address the merits of defendant‟s claim that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct at the penalty phase by using biblical quotations in his closing 
statement to the jury, a subject the majority does not address because it concludes 
that defendant forfeited the claim by failing to object. 
I 
During closing argument at the penalty phase of defendant‟s capital trial, 
the prosecutor showed the jury a large chart entitled “The Bible Sanctions Capital 
Punishment.”  The chart contained these four quotations from the Bible:  (1) “Who 
sheds the blood of man by man shall his blood be shed, for in his image did God 
make man”; (2) “He that smiteth a man so that he die, shall be surely put to 
death”; (3) “And if he strike him w[ith] an instrument of iron so that he die, he is a 
murderer:  The murderer shall surely be put to death”; (4) “And you shall not take 
reparations for the soul of a murderer who deserves to die but he shall be put to 
death.”   
In his initial argument to the jury,1 the prosecutor said:  “[W]hen we talk 
about religion, it is not something that is to be used in aggravation at all, what the 
Bible or the Koran or anything has to say, but the one thing that is universal 
                                              
1  
The trial court allowed both the prosecution and the defense two penalty 
phase arguments. 
 
2 
throughout all religions is this idea that murderers are to be punished, and that 
the death penalty is sanctioned and that it is appropriate.  And just so there isn‟t 
anybody who lies awake at night saying . . . is it permissible under my religion to 
do this sort of thing?  . . .  [T]hat was something we hoped you thought of 
beforehand.  And there is a question to that effect in various forms that asks you 
about your religious beliefs:  Is that going to stand in the way?  [¶]  Well, many 
times people get to this point, and they start thinking about that . . . .  [T]he Bible 
does, in fact, sanction capital punishment.  There is one that is just so right on 
point:  [¶]  „He who strikes him with an instrument of iron so that he die, he is a 
murderer, and the murderer will surely be put to death.  And you shall take no 
reparations for the soul of a murderer who deserves to die, but he shall be put to 
death.  [¶]  He who sheds the blood of man by man, shall his blood be shed.  For 
in his image did God make man.  His blood or his life will be shed by man.‟  [¶]  
Now, as I said, religion is not supposed to be the guiding factor in finding 
aggravation, but I just want to clear the air there that religion does not stand in the 
way, and that‟s not supposed to enter into your evaluation.”  (Italics added.) 
Defense counsel then argued to the jury that, contrary to the prosecutor‟s 
claim that all religions permit punishment by death, Buddhism does not.  Also, 
defense counsel said, under ancient Jewish law such punishment was almost never 
imposed — once every 30 years according to one scholar quoted in the Talmud; 
once every 160 years according to another.  He then quoted from the New 
Testament:  “Vengeance is mine, said the Lord.”   
The prosecutor began his final statement to the jury with these words:  
“[T]his process that we go through here [is] a lot different than it was in the Old 
Testament.  The Old Testament, when God spoke, he made it very clear.  Very 
clear.  Murderers shall die.  And God also made it very clear that it was man who 
was going to impose that penalty.  [¶]  . . . Paul makes it very clear, „the ruler bears 
 
3 
not the sword in vein [sic: vain] for he is the minister in God, a revenger to 
execute wrath upon him that do with [sic: doeth] evil.‟  [¶]  . . .  God made it clear, 
[but] when man gets into the act he starts softening up the rules a little bit and 
that‟s okay.”  (Italics added.) 
In a final statement, defense counsel told the jury:  “God did not sentence 
Cain to death for killing his brother.  He banished him.”  Counsel also noted that 
“the major religious groups in this country . . . have taken rigorous stands against 
the death penalty.”   
II 
As this court has said, in a capital case the prosecution may not rely on 
biblical authority in urging the jury to return a verdict of death, as this would 
“create and encourage an intolerable risk that the jury will abandon logic and 
reason and instead condemn an offender for reasons having no place in our 
judicial system.”  (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 743; see also People 
v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 465 (Williams).)  Federal courts too have said 
this.  (See Romine v. Head (11th Cir. 2001) 253 F.3d 1349, 1358 [prosecutor 
committed reversible error by arguing “biblical law to the jury as a basis for 
urging it to . . . sentence [the defendant] to death”]; Sandoval v. Calderon (9th Cir. 
2000) 241 F.3d 765, 777 [“[R]eligious arguments have been condemned by 
virtually every federal and state court to consider their challenge.  [Citations.]”]; 
Bennett v. Angelone (4th Cir. 1996) 92 F.3d 1336, 1346 [“Federal and state courts 
have universally condemned . . . religiously charged arguments as confusing, 
unnecessary, and inflammatory.”].)  As one federal appellate court has explained, 
“[biblical] statements, worthy of the profoundest respect in proper contexts, have 
no place in our non-ecclesiastical courts and may not be tolerated there.”  (Ibid.) 
 
4 
Here, as discussed in part I, ante, the prosecutor showed the jury a large 
chart bearing the heading “The Bible Sanctions Capital Punishment,” and 
containing four biblical passages requiring death for murderers; and the prosecutor 
told the jury that God “made it very clear” that “[m]urderers shall die.”  The 
majority does not decide whether the prosecutor‟s religion-based argument was 
proper.  Instead, it concludes that defendant forfeited his claim of error by failing 
to object at trial, and that even if the prosecutor committed misconduct no 
prejudice resulted.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 123-124, 127-129.)  In my view, the 
prosecution‟s reliance on religious authority went beyond the parameters of 
permissible argument. 
Pertinent here is this court‟s decision in Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th 405.  In 
that capital case, the prosecutor at the penalty phase quoted several statements 
from the Bible that, in the prosecutor‟s words, “ „unambiguously command[] that 
murderers be put to death.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 465.)  Therefore, the prosecutor argued, 
“even the Bible for those of you who may have some religious scruples does not 
say that you should not use your own moral beliefs in making [the] determination 
here.”  (Ibid.)  This court in Williams held that the prosecutor‟s argument was 
improper, explaining:  “Although . . . the prosecutor framed her religious 
comments as an ostensible exhortation for jurors to refrain from deciding against 
the death penalty based upon religious views” by telling jurors not to have 
“religious scruples” about imposing the death penalty, “the content of her remarks 
emphatically communicated that the Bible supports imposition of the death 
penalty.  She „urged that the Bible not only permits such action, but demands it.‟  
[Citation.]  Similarly framed arguments have been held improper.  [Citations.]”  
(Id. at p. 466.) 
Like the prosecutor in Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th 405, the prosecutor here 
tried, put colloquially, to have it both ways.  He correctly explained to the jury that 
 
5 
“religion . . . [is] not supposed to enter into your evaluation.”  But he also 
repeatedly reminded the jury that the Bible required that murderers be put to death.  
For instance, in his initial statement to the jury, the prosecutor described as “just 
so right on point” the biblical statement (one of several shown to the jury), that 
“ „[h]e who strikes him with an instrument of iron so that he die [here the victim 
was killed with a knife], he is a murderer, and the murderer will surely be put to 
death.‟ ”  Then, in his final statement to the jury, the prosecutor said:  “[W]hen 
God spoke, he made it very clear.  Very clear.  Murderers shall die.”   
As in Williams, here the prosecutor‟s reliance on religious authority 
“emphatically communicated that the Bible supports imposition of the death 
penalty” (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 466), and “strayed beyond the bounds 
of permissible argument based upon religion” (ibid.). 
III 
As I noted at the outset (see ante, p. 1), the majority declines to decide 
whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by relying on religious authority in 
his penalty phase arguments.  Instead, it concludes that, by failing to object to the 
prosecutor‟s argument at trial, defendant has forfeited his right to challenge it in 
this appeal.  As explained below, I reluctantly agree. 
In concurring and dissenting opinions in three previous capital cases, I 
concluded that, notwithstanding the defense attorney‟s failure to object, the 
prosecutor‟s improper penalty phase reliance on religious authority for imposition 
of the death penalty required reversal of the judgment of death, as defense 
counsel‟s failure to object to the prosecutor‟s religion-based argument resulted in a 
denial of the defendant‟s right to effective representation.  (See People 
v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1202-1203 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, 
J.); People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1225-1229 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
 
6 
Kennard, J.); People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 279-283 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Kennard, J.).)   
It may well be that here defense counsel decided not to object to the 
prosecutor‟s religion-based argument favoring death for murderers so the defense 
could in turn cite religious authority expressing a contrary view.  But as I have 
said in the past:  “ „A religious argument against the death penalty is no more 
acceptable at the penalty phase of a capital case than a religious argument in favor 
of the death penalty. . . .  It follows that defense counsel‟s decision to respond to 
the prosecutor‟s religious argument by relying on opposing religious authority 
cannot be considered a legitimate tactical choice that would excuse his failure to 
object to the prosecutor‟s impermissible religious argument.‟ ”  (People 
v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1203 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.), 
quoting People v. Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 283 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, 
J.); see also People v. Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1227 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Kennard, J.).) 
That view, however, has not been embraced by this court.  (People 
v. Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1210; see also People v. Riel (2000) 22 
Cal.4th 1153, 1212-1213; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 764.)  Also, 
here defendant does not argue on this appeal that his counsel‟s failure to object to 
the prosecutor‟s religion-based argument constituted ineffective representation, 
perhaps because he plans to raise that argument in a petition seeking habeas 
corpus relief.  (See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267 [“A 
claim of ineffective assistance . . . is more appropriately decided in a habeas 
 
7 
corpus proceeding.”].)  For these reasons, on this appeal I agree with the majority 
that defendant‟s attack on the prosecutor‟s religion-based closing statement should 
be rejected on the ground of forfeiture.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
                                              
2  
The majority also concludes that even if the prosecutor‟s use of biblical 
quotations in closing argument was improper, the misconduct did not prejudice 
defendant.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 127-129.)  Because defendant forfeited his 
right to raise the issue, I see no need to decide whether the prosecutor‟s 
misconduct would require reversal of the judgment of death. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
I join the opinion of the court and also agree with Justice Kennard, for the 
reasons persuasively stated in parts I and II of her concurring opinion (conc. opn. 
of Kennard, J., ante, at pp. 1-5), that the prosecutor‟s use of religious authority 
was improper in this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Tully 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S030402 
Date Filed: July 30, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: William R. McGuiness 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
James S. Thomson, under appointment by the Supreme Court; Thomson & Stetler, Saor E. Stetler; and 
Jolie Lipsig for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Bill Lockyer and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, 
Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald S. Matthias and Margo J. Yu, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
James S. Thomson 
819 Delaware Street 
Berkeley, CA  94710 
(510) 525-9123 
 
Margo J. Yu 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5872