Case Title: State v. Parker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-328

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1989-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-328


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
Roger Parker                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

                                             June Term, 1989


Alden T. Bryan, J. (motion to suppress); Edward J. Cashman, J. (trial)

William Sorrell, Chittenden County State's Attorney, Burlington, and Robert
  Katims, Law Clerk (On the Brief), Department of State's Attorneys,
  Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

Kurt M. Hughes and Pamela Hall, Law Clerk (On the Brief), of Wool & Murdoch,
  Burlington, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson and Dooley, JJ.



     GIBSON, J.   Defendant appeals his conviction of operating a motor
vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, 23 V.S.A. { 1201(a)(2), claiming that the court erred by failing to
suppress statements he made to a police officer after his arrest.  We
reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new hearing without admission
of the inculpatory statements.
     Defendant was stopped for driving through a red light and, based on the
officer's observations, was taken to the police station for DUI processing.
The officer gave defendant Miranda warnings at the station, reading
verbatim from the standard processing form, (FN1) which was admitted into
evidence.  Defendant was advised, and affirmed his understanding, that he
had the right to talk to a lawyer for advice and to have a lawyer with him
during questioning.  Defendant then answered "Yes" to the question "Do you
want a lawyer?"  It is not clear from the form whether this question refers
to a lawyer for advice only or to have one present at questioning.
     When defendant was unable to find the listing for his attorney in the
telephone book he had been given, the officer found the number for him,
dialed it, and then left the room.  After defendant had completed his
conversation with his attorney, the officer came back into the room and
asked him, "With all these rights in mind, are you willing to talk to me
now?"  Defendant answered "Yes."  The officer then asked a series of
questions that led to inculpatory statements by defendant.
     The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the officer's
testimony about any statements defendant made after he had asked for an
attorney, and defendant was convicted as charged.  Following the court's
denial of his motion for a new trial, defendant appealed the verdict.  The
sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred in refusing to suppress the
statements.  Defendant argues that denial of his motion to suppress
constituted reversible error because, under State v. Trombley, 147 Vt. 371,