Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Nathan E. DeLadurantey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2023-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2023 WI 17 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1616-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Nathan E. DeLadurantey, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
     v. 
Nathan E. DeLadurantey, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DELADURANTEY  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 3, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per curiam. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 17
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2020AP1616-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Nathan E. DeLadurantey,  
Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Nathan E. DeLadurantey, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
MAR 3, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
appeals 
Referee 
Robert 
E. 
Kinney's 
report, 
as 
amended, 
recommending that the court dismiss the remaining charges in the 
disciplinary 
complaint 
filed 
against 
Attorney 
Nathan 
E. 
DeLadurantey alleging that Attorney DeLadurantey violated the 
Attorney's Oath in Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 40.15,1 which is 
                                                 
1 SCR 40.15 (Attorney's Oath) provides in relevant part:  "I 
will abstain from all offensive personality . . . ."  
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
2 
 
enforced via SCR 20:8.4(g),2 by failing to abstain from 
"offensive personality."   
¶2 
This court issued an initial opinion in this case on 
July 8, 2022.  As explained below, because we were unaware of 
the referee's submission of errata pages for his report that 
eliminated much of the legal basis for our initial opinion, we 
withdrew that opinion by order dated July 12, 2022.  The 
discovery of those errata pages caused us to further review the 
basis upon which the parties had requested the referee to accept 
Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea and upon which the 
referee had made factual findings in his report.  Having asked 
for and received responses from the parties regarding their 
agreement as the factual basis for the plea, and having 
reconsidered the record in this matter, we now issue this 
revised opinion.  We conclude that Attorney DeLadurantey did 
engage in "offensive personality" in one incident that he 
admits, and we determine that the appropriate discipline for 
that misconduct is a public reprimand.  We also determine that 
Attorney DeLadurantey should be required to pay costs of this 
disciplinary proceeding in the amount of $17,570.10. 
¶3 
In order to review the legal conclusion in the 
referee's 
amended 
report, 
we 
first 
need 
to 
clarify 
the 
procedural context in which this case comes to us on appeal 
because that informs what we are reviewing and how we can 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:8.4(g) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to violate the attorney's oath."   
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
3 
 
proceed.  This further requires us to provide some background on 
the use of no-contest pleas in attorney disciplinary cases, and 
the procedural history of the proceedings before the referee in 
this case.  
¶4 
Supreme Court Rule 22.14(2)3 contemplates that in a 
respondent attorney's answer to a complaint filed by the OLR, 
the attorney may "plead no contest to allegations of misconduct 
in the complaint."  Although this rule speaks only in terms of 
pleading no contest in the respondent's answer, we have 
regularly upheld the entry of a no-contest plea entered at any 
stage of the proceedings before the referee, even if the 
respondent attorney's answer initially denied some or all of the 
complaint's factual allegations and claims of misconduct.  See, 
e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis, 2019 WI 55, 
386 Wis. 2d 719, 927 N.W.2d 525 (no-contest pleas entered 
pursuant to stipulation after respondent attorney filed answers 
to 
original 
and 
amended 
complaints); 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Hudec, 2019 WI 39, 386 Wis. 2d 371, 925 
N.W.2d 540 (no-contest pleas entered pursuant to stipulation 
after respondent attorney filed unsuccessful motion to dismiss 
and an answer that denied all allegations of misconduct); In re 
                                                 
3 SCR 22.14(2) provides: "The respondent may by answer plead 
no contest to allegations of misconduct in the complaint.  The 
referee shall make a determination of misconduct in respect to 
each allegation to which no contest is pleaded and for which the 
referee finds an adequate basis in the record.  In a subsequent 
disciplinary 
or 
reinstatement 
proceeding, 
it 
shall 
be 
conclusively presumed that the respondent engaged in the 
misconduct determined on the basis of a no contest plea."  
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
4 
 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Heins, 2017 WI 93, 378 Wis. 2d 
27, 902 N.W.2d 257 (referee construed stipulation entered after 
completion of discovery and just prior to final evidentiary 
hearing to be entry of no-contest pleas to all counts in 
complaint). 
¶5 
In 
the 
criminal 
context, 
a 
circuit 
court 
has 
discretion whether to accept a plea, be it a guilty plea or a 
no-contest plea.  State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 904, 470 
N.W.2d 900 (1991) (". . . a court has discretion whether or not 
to officially receive or accept [guilty or no-contest] pleas . . 
."); State v. Erickson, 53 Wis. 2d 474, 476, 192 N.W.2d 872 
(1972) ("The trial court earlier rejected a plea of nolo 
contendere [i.e., no contest], but it was within its discretion 
to do just that."); State v. La Pean, 247 Wis. 302, 308, 19 
N.W.2d 289 (1945) ("The right of the court to refuse to accept a 
plea is an inherent power of all criminal courts.");  Brozosky 
v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N.W.2d 311, 313 (1928) (a plea of 
nolo contendere "is received at the discretion of the court").  
Although an attorney disciplinary proceeding is a civil action, 
rather than a criminal case, we see no reason why this rule 
would not also apply to a referee in an attorney disciplinary 
proceeding.  First, referees in such matters generally have the 
powers of a circuit court judge trying a civil action.  
Moreover, our rules both explicitly authorize the entry of no-
contest pleas in attorney disciplinary proceedings and use 
language that tracks the rules for accepting pleas in criminal 
cases.  See SCR 22.16(1) ("The referee has the powers of a judge 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
5 
 
trying a civil action . . . ."); SCR 22.14(2) (authorizing entry 
of no-contest pleas and providing requirements for accepting 
such pleas).  Thus, it is logical to interpret the plea entry 
rule in disciplinary proceedings to give the referee the same 
discretion in deciding whether to accept a plea that a circuit 
court possesses in a criminal case. 
¶6 
Rule 22.14(2) states that when a no-contest plea is 
included in the answer (or offered later in the proceeding), the 
referee "shall make a determination of misconduct in respect to 
each allegation to which no contest is pleaded," but only if 
"the referee finds an adequate factual basis in the record" to 
support the plea.  Id.  This tracks the language in the statute 
that governs the entry of pleas in criminal cases, Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(b), which requires a circuit court, before accepting 
a guilty or no-contest plea, to "[m]ake such inquiry as 
satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the crime 
charged."   
¶7 
We have said in the criminal context that how a plea-
taking judge makes that inquiry and what the judge uses in the 
record as the factual basis is left to the judge's discretion.  
See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶¶19-22, 232 Wis. 2d 
714, 605 N.W.2d 836.  However the plea-taking judge makes the 
inquiry and whatever portion of the record the judge ultimately 
relies on, the judge must satisfy the two purposes of the 
factual basis requirement:  (1) that the defendant is aware of 
the elements of the crime, and (2) that the defendant's conduct, 
as established by the record, meets those elements.  Id., ¶22.  
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
6 
 
Moreover, the plea-taking judge "must ensure that a defendant 
realizes that his or her conduct does meet the elements of the 
crime charged."  Id., ¶21 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 
U.S. 459, 467 (1969)).  We see no reason why those statements of 
the law of pleas in the criminal context would not apply to the 
requirement to find a "factual basis" for a no-contest plea in 
an attorney disciplinary proceeding.  The use of similar 
language in the disciplinary rule regarding the need to 
establish a "factual basis" for a no-contest plea by an attorney 
supports this conclusion. 
¶8 
With this background in mind, we now turn to the facts 
of this case.  Attorney DeLadurantey was admitted to practice 
law in Wisconsin in 2007.  Since 2008, he has been the owner of 
DeLadurantey Law Office, LLC in Brookfield.  Since 2013, the 
primary focus of Attorney DeLadurantey's law firm has been 
consumer litigation.  Attorney DeLadurantey has not previously 
been disciplined. 
¶9 
The OLR's complaint in this proceeding focused on the 
relationship 
between 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey 
and 
H.M., 
the 
grievant, during the time period that H.M. worked as an 
associate 
attorney 
for 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
law 
firm.  
Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M. graduated from the same law 
school and met at an alumni function.  Attorney DeLadurantey 
subsequently hired H.M., and her employment with his law firm 
extended from February 2012 until October 2017.   
¶10 The OLR's complaint alleged that the law firm's 
growing consumer litigation practice required H.M. and Attorney 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
7 
 
DeLadurantey to work evenings and weekends, and to often travel 
together for interviews, depositions, and court proceedings.  
The complaint further alleged that over the course of H.M.'s 
employment, Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M. "established a 
friendship outside the office, including going to a gym to work 
out, playing online games, sharing meals together when working, 
and participating in social activities while traveling for Firm 
business such as snorkeling, going to the beach, and watching 
Netflix."  The complaint alleged, however, that during this time 
period Attorney DeLadurantey had "engaged in a pattern of 
behavior that was inappropriate and at times constituted sexual 
harassment."  The OLR's complaint proceeded to allege a number 
of incidents and statements that were a part of the alleged 
pattern of inappropriate and harassing behavior.  The complaint 
alleged multiple violations of two ethical rules arising from 
"each instance" of subjecting H.M. to physical contact, sexual 
advances, and comments regarding her physical appearance:  (1) 
violations of SCR 20:8.4(i) (harassment),4 and (2) violations of 
the "offensive personality" clause in the Attorney's Oath in SCR 
40.15.  In other words, the complaint alleged that each instance 
of such conduct summarized in the complaint had violated both of 
those ethical rules.  Consequently, although the OLR's complaint 
listed only a single count and the parties and the referee have 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:8.4(i) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, 
creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual 
preference or marital status in connection with the lawyer's 
professional activities."   
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
8 
 
often spoken of a single charge under each ethical rule in this 
case, the OLR's complaint actually alleged multiple counts of 
misconduct under each of two separate rules.  We will therefore 
refer to "charges" in the plural for each rule. 
¶11 Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
answer 
to 
the 
complaint 
admitted that the two attorneys had worked together on evenings 
and weekends and had often traveled together.  His answer denied 
that he had engaged in harassment prohibited by SCR 20:8.4(i) 
and that he had violated the "offensive personality" clause of 
the Attorney's Oath.  With the exception of what we will 
reference as the "San Francisco incident," which we will 
describe in detail below, Attorney DeLadurantey's answer and 
subsequent deposition testimony denied at least some portion of 
the allegations surrounding each of the various incidents or 
comments described in the complaint.  Given the nature of the 
proceedings for the taking of Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest 
plea and his denial of many of the allegations of the complaint, 
we will not set forth in detail those other alleged incidents 
and comments.  We will include in the factual recitation only 
facts that are uncontested. 
¶12 It is undisputed that while H.M. was employed by 
Attorney DeLadurantey's law firm, Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M. 
traveled together on a number of business trips.  On some of 
those 
trips, 
the 
two 
stayed 
in 
a 
two-bedroom, 
Airbnb 
accommodation, with each occupying their own bedroom.  It is 
undisputed that one such trip occurred in February 2016, when 
the two attorneys traveled to San Francisco for depositions.  
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
9 
 
¶13 Five paragraphs of the OLR's complaint (¶¶17-21) 
addressed the San Francisco incident.  Attorney DeLadurantey's 
answer admitted some portions of those paragraphs, but denied 
some portions.  In his deposition testimony, however, he 
clarified that he had only vague and generalized recollections 
of the events of that evening because he had been highly 
intoxicated.  He therefore essentially indicated that he could 
not dispute the allegations of the complaint about the San 
Francisco incident, which had been based on H.M.'s statements to 
the OLR.  Also, in the statement of facts in Attorney 
DeLadurantey's appellate brief, he says that he conceded before 
the referee at the plea hearing that "his conduct relating to 
the San Francisco incident referred to in the complaint 
constituted offensive personality."  His brief then quoted the 
five paragraphs of the complaint addressing the San Francisco 
incident in his statement of facts, indicating that he does not 
dispute those factual allegations for purposes of this case, 
although 
he 
also 
included 
an 
extended 
excerpt 
from 
his 
deposition setting forth his limited recollection of the events 
of that evening.  Consequently, we use the allegations of 
paragraphs 17-21 of the complaint to describe the events of the 
San Francisco incident. 
¶14 On the evening of February 3, 2016, H.M. was in a 
common 
space 
watching 
television. 
 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey 
approached her and began to rub her back, arms, and legs in a 
suggestive manner.  H.M. left the common area and went to her 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
10 
 
bedroom.  H.M. was upset and afraid, to the extent that she felt 
physically ill. 
¶15 Attorney DeLadurantey subsequently texted H.M. and 
attempted to explain his inappropriate behavior.  In the ensuing 
text exchange between the two, Attorney DeLadurantey asked if he 
could "try and fix the awkwardness."  H.M. responded, "I'm 
pretty sure I'm going to throw up shortly – I'm struggling not 
to."  
¶16 Later in the evening, H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey 
had a face-to-face conversation in the kitchen of the rental 
unit.  Despite H.M.'s earlier expression of being upset due to 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
suggestive 
conduct, 
during 
the 
conversation Attorney DeLadurantey told H.M. that he wanted to 
"take her upstairs to her bedroom and hold her."  H.M. told 
Attorney DeLadurantey that would not happen.  She also told him 
during the conversation that she may have to leave Attorney 
DeLadurantey's law firm. 
¶17 At the end of the conversation, Attorney DeLadurantey 
left the kitchen, went upstairs, and got into the bed in H.M.'s 
bedroom.  When she discovered Attorney DeLadurantey in her bed, 
H.M. told him that she was not going to share a bed with him.  
He then left the bedroom.  
¶18 The next morning, Attorney DeLadurantey admitted to 
H.M. that his actions the prior evening had been inappropriate, 
and he apologized for them.  
¶19 Although we will not comment on specific alleged 
incidents, it is undisputed that the working relationship 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
11 
 
between H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey subsequently deteriorated 
and that H.M. left Attorney DeLadurantey's law firm in October 
2017.   
¶20 As noted above, Attorney DeLadurantey denied many of 
the allegations in the OLR's complaint about other incidents, at 
least in part.  He continued to deny those allegations in his 
deposition testimony. 
¶21 The parties appeared before the referee for the 
evidentiary hearing in this matter on May 17, 2021.  The referee 
noted that there were a number of pending motions in limine that 
needed to be resolved.5  Before doing so, however, the referee 
met with the attorneys representing the OLR and Attorney 
DeLadurantey.  The result of that off-the-record discussion was 
an apparent agreement that the OLR would dismiss the charges6 of 
harassment on the basis of sex under SCR 20:8.4(i) and that 
Attorney DeLadurantey would plead no-contest to the charges7 of 
engaging in offensive personality under SCR 40.15 and 20:8.4(g), 
                                                 
5 The referee noted that he had received and read copies of 
the 
parties' 
voluminous 
trial 
exhibits, 
except 
for 
the 
deposition transcripts of Attorney DeLadurantey and H.M., which 
counsel for the parties had asked him not to read in advance of 
the evidentiary hearing.   
6 As noted above, the OLR's complaint alleged that "each 
instance" of physical contact, sexual advance, or comment about 
H.M's appearance constituted a separate violation of SCR 
20:8.4(i). 
7 The OLR's complaint also alleged that "each instance" of 
physical contact, sexual advance, or comment about H.M's 
appearance constituted a violation of the offensive personality 
clause of the Attorney's Oath and therefore of SCR 20:8.4(g). 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
12 
 
with the parties jointly requesting the imposition of a private 
reprimand. 
¶22 Unfortunately, neither the attorneys nor the referee 
specified on the hearing transcript precisely what facts the 
referee 
was 
to 
use 
as 
the 
factual 
basis 
for 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's plea.  It is not even clear whether they fully 
understood precisely what was within the scope of their 
agreement.  Counsel for the OLR initially said that Attorney 
DeLadurantey's no-contest plea would be "supported by the 
allegations of the complaint."  In response, however, counsel 
for Attorney DeLadurantey responded that while he did not have 
an objection to the description of the agreement described by 
OLR's counsel, he said that there were "other provisions of the 
agreement" 
that 
should 
also 
be 
placed 
onto 
the 
record, 
indicating that the OLR's counsel had not described the full 
agreement of the parties.  Specifically, Attorney DeLadurantey's 
counsel stated that the referee should consider the record in 
the case as a whole, which would include the proposed hearing 
exhibits and the deposition transcripts of Attorney DeLadurantey 
and H.M.8  OLR's counsel did not dispute this clarification.  
This meant that the parties asked the referee to rely not only 
on the factual allegations of the complaint, but also on a 
                                                 
8 Actually, 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
proposed 
hearing 
exhibits included the transcript of an interview that H.M. gave 
to an OLR investigator that was not under oath.  Attorney 
DeLadurantey's counsel asked that the transcript of H.M.'s 
deposition be substituted for that interview transcript.  There 
was no objection by OLR's counsel to this substitution. 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
13 
 
record that contained express denials of allegations in the 
complaint and competing affirmative assertions of fact.   
¶23 The referee then initiated a plea colloquy with 
Attorney DeLadurantey.  As part of that colloquy, the referee 
noted that, in order to accept Attorney DeLadurantey's no-
contest plea, he was required to find an adequate factual basis 
for the plea and he clearly indicated that he found such an 
adequate factual basis in the record as a whole, not just in the 
allegations of the complaint: 
The rule that I alluded to a minute ago requires that 
I find that there is "adequate factual basis" in the 
record, unquote, to support your plea.  And I want to 
make sure that it's clear that I have reviewed 
hundreds of pages of discovery materials, and I have 
no difficulty finding that there is an adequate 
factual basis to support the plea of no contest to 
that charge. 
Having also found that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary, the referee accepted the plea.  The parties agreed to 
submit simultaneous legal memoranda in support of their sanction 
request. 
¶24 After receiving the parties' sanction memoranda, the 
referee prepared his report and recommendation.  Although he had 
accepted 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
no-contest 
plea 
to 
the 
"offensive 
personality" 
charges 
at 
the 
plea 
hearing, 
he 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
14 
 
concluded in his report that the "offensive personality" charges 
should be dismissed.9 
¶25 The referee's conclusion of no "offensive personality" 
violations stemmed from his subordinate legal conclusion that in 
order to engage in "offensive personality" in the context of 
allegations of sexual conduct, the OLR was required to prove at 
least 
one 
element 
of 
a 
sexual 
harassment 
employment 
discrimination 
claim—that 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
sexual 
advances to H.M. and alleged comments about her appearance were 
"unwelcome," which the referee characterized as the "gravamen" 
of any sexual harassment claim.  See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB 
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). 
¶26 In his report, the referee did not consider just the 
allegations of the OLR's complaint.  Consistent with the 
parties' agreement expressed at the plea hearing, he reviewed 
the totality of the record, including photographs of the two 
attorneys together, communications between them, and their 
testimony about their various interactions, which he discussed 
in a section of his report entitled "Additional Facts."  From 
some of that record evidence, which he believed to be not in 
dispute, the referee found that the two attorneys had a platonic 
personal relationship as well as a professional one.  From his 
findings about their personal relationship, the referee further 
                                                 
9 Alternatively, the referee stated that if the court 
disagreed with his conclusion and found a violation of the 
Attorney's Oath, he recommended that the court impose a private 
reprimand and that the case file should be sealed "for the 
benefit of both parties."  
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
15 
 
found that the OLR would have been unlikely to have proven that 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
conduct 
during 
the 
San 
Francisco 
incident or in the other instances alleged in the complaint was 
objectively "unwelcome," as that term is used in sexual 
harassment law.  Since he concluded that a reasonable person in 
Attorney DeLadurantey's position would not have known that his 
conduct was "unwelcome," the referee further concluded that the 
same conduct could not be "offensive" under the Attorney's Oath.  
Thus, he determined that the remaining "offensive personality" 
charges should be dismissed.   
¶27 The OLR appealed from the referee's report and 
recommendation.  In the Statement of Facts portion of the OLR's 
appellate brief, it did not cite to the complaint as the source 
of its factual statements.  It did, however, repeatedly cite to 
Attorney DeLadurantey's and H.M.'s deposition transcripts as 
support for its factual assertions.10  Indeed, in at least one 
instance, the OLR's brief described an incident as Attorney 
DeLadurantey had done in his deposition, rather than as the OLR 
had alleged in its complaint, indicating its belief that the 
entire record, not just the complaint, was to be considered in 
reviewing the referee's report. 
¶28 The heading for the first argument in the OLR's 
appellate brief was that "[t]he record supports by clear, 
                                                 
10 In the factual section of the brief, which occupied 
roughly five pages, the OLR cited Attorney DeLadurantey's 
deposition transcript 16 times and it cited H.M.'s deposition 
transcript four times.  It cited the complaint zero times.  It 
followed this same pattern in the argument section of its brief. 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
16 
 
satisfactory 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
[Attorney] 
DeLadurantey engaged in offensive personality and violated the 
Attorney's Oath."  OLR Brief at 12 (emphasis added).  In that 
section the OLR essentially urged the court to find or rely on a 
sizable number of "facts" from the record that the referee had 
not found in his report, but which the OLR contended support a 
conclusion that Attorney DeLadurantey engaged in multiple acts 
of "offensive personality."     
¶29 The OLR also argued in its brief that the referee had 
made an error of law in concluding that the ethical rule against 
sexual harassment is violated only by proving a violation of 
federal 
employment 
law 
against 
sexual 
harassment 
in 
the 
workplace.  Similarly, the OLR argued that the referee legally 
erred in concluding that because H.M. had occasionally requested 
non-sexual 
physical 
contact 
(shoulder 
rubs), 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's request for more intimate and sexual contact 
during the San Francisco incident was not "unwelcome" under both 
federal law and Wisconsin's ethical rules.   
¶30 As noted above, Attorney DeLadurantey's response brief 
indicated, at least implicitly, that his agreement to plead no-
contest was primarily based on the allegations of the portion of 
the complaint relating to the San Francisco incident.  He 
argued, however, that his no-contest plea did not prevent the 
referee from making a recommendation to dismiss the offensive 
personality charges that was based on the referee's review of 
the record as a whole.  Moreover, he further asserted that the 
referee's recommended dismissal of the remaining "offensive 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
17 
 
personality" charges was based on the referee's factual findings 
from the record which were not clearly erroneous.   
¶31 Our initial opinion in this matter focused on what 
appeared to be a clear contradiction in the referee's report.  
Although the ultimate conclusion and recommendation of the 
report was that the evidence did not support a determination 
that 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey 
had 
engaged 
in 
"offensive 
personality," the second page of the report, as initially filed, 
contained a Finding of Fact #3 that the complaint did contain an 
adequate factual basis for Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest 
plea to the charges of "offensive personality."  That page also 
contained 
a 
single 
"conclusion 
of 
law" 
that 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey 
"did 
engage 
in 
the 
misconduct 
charged, 
specifically, he did not abstain from all offensive personality" 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
This 
factual 
finding 
and 
this 
legal 
conclusion appeared to conflict with the report's subsequent 
"additional facts," legal analysis, and recommendation that the 
"offensive personality" charges should be dismissed.  We adopted 
the initial Finding of Fact #3 and accepted the initial 
conclusion of law in the referee's report, treating the 
referee's report as having confirmed the acceptance of Attorney 
DeLadurantey's no-contest plea and affirming the referee's 
initial determination at the plea hearing that there was a 
sufficient factual basis in the complaint as a whole for 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
no-contest 
plea. 
 
We 
essentially 
concluded that the remainder of the referee's report was 
factually and legally faulty, and we therefore disregarded it. 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
18 
 
¶32 When we issued the initial opinion, however, we were 
not aware of the fact that the referee had submitted errata 
pages for his report, which had deleted both Finding of Fact #3 
and the legal conclusion on page two of the report.11  In the 
cover 
letter 
accompanying 
the 
errata 
pages, 
the 
referee 
explained that after writing the first few pages of his report, 
including Finding of Fact #3 and the initial legal conclusion on 
page two, he had engaged in further review and research, which 
had led him to conclude ultimately that Attorney DeLadurantey 
had not engaged in "offensive personality."  This explanation 
clarified that, although the referee had initially accepted 
Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea, he had ultimately 
rejected the no-contest plea in his final report because he had 
concluded that the facts in the record as a whole showed that 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
actions 
toward 
H.M. 
were 
not 
"unwelcome," 
as 
that 
term 
is 
used 
in 
employment 
sexual 
harassment statutes and case law. 
¶33 The referee's deletion of Finding of Fact #3 and the 
initial legal conclusion on page two of his report eliminated 
the basis for our initial opinion, which implicitly upheld 
Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea.  Our further review of 
the plea hearing transcript, the referee's report, and the 
                                                 
11 The referee's cover letter accompanying the errata pages 
directed that the attached errata pages be substituted for pages 
two, six, and 22 of the referee's report.  The clerk's office, 
however, did not substitute those pages as requested by the 
referee.  It simply filed the referee's submission as a letter, 
leaving the report unchanged. 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
19 
 
parties' appellate briefs demonstrated that there was confusion 
among the referee and the parties as to what the parties had 
agreed should be the factual basis for the no-contest plea and 
therefore what should be the factual basis for this court's 
opinion.   
¶34 The changes to the referee's report in the errata 
raised a number of questions.  If the referee determined that he 
needed to withdraw his interlocutory acceptance of Attorney 
DeLadurantey's no-contest plea, on what basis did he make 
factual findings in his report, since there was no evidentiary 
hearing at which he could weigh the credibility of witnesses?  
Did the parties agree that the allegations of the entire 
complaint (and only those allegations) could serve as the 
factual basis for the plea?  Did they agree, as Attorney 
DeLadurantey's appellate brief implies, that only the five 
paragraphs of the complaint regarding the San Francisco incident 
constituted the factual basis for his plea?  Alternatively, did 
they agree that both the allegations of the complaint and the 
record as a whole should be used by the referee as the factual 
basis for Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea?  If the last 
of those scenarios was accurate, what was the effect of the fact 
that parts of the record (e.g., Attorney DeLadurantey's answer 
and his deposition testimony) disputed many of the allegations 
of the complaint, at least in part, and the fact that Attorney 
DeLadurantey never withdrew his denials?   
¶35 Given these questions, we ordered the parties to 
submit supplemental legal memoranda addressing the issue of what 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
20 
 
they had agreed should serve as the factual basis for the no-
contest plea, as well as the issue of whether the matter should 
be remanded to the referee for further proceedings.  The OLR's 
supplemental 
memorandum 
initially 
claimed 
that 
only 
the 
complaint had served as the factual basis for the no-contest 
plea, but it subsequently acknowledged that the referee had been 
asked at the plea hearing to review the record as a whole.  
Attorney DeLadurantey's supplemental memorandum indicated that 
he had agreed that the five paragraphs of the complaint relating 
to the San Francisco incident, which he acknowledged he could 
not materially dispute in his deposition testimony, could be 
used as the factual basis for the plea, along with the record as 
a whole.  Both parties urged this court not to remand the matter 
to the referee for further proceedings, given the additional 
time and expense that would result. 
¶36 Ordinarily, when we review a referee's report that is 
prepared following the entry of a comprehensive stipulation of 
facts or following a full evidentiary hearing, we affirm a 
referee's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, 
and we review a referee's legal conclusions on a de novo basis.  
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 
305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  If we conclude that the 
attorney has engaged in professional misconduct, we then 
determine the appropriate level of discipline to impose given 
the particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's 
recommendation, but benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
21 
 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686.   
¶37 In this case, however, there was no comprehensive 
stipulation of facts or an evidentiary hearing at which the 
referee could weigh credibility.  There was a no-contest plea.  
If the referee had continued to accept that plea and had 
submitted a report based on that plea, we would review whether 
the referee had properly exercised his discretion in accepting 
the plea.  Cf. State v. Schmidt, 2021 WI 65, ¶12, 397 Wis. 2d 
758, 960 N.W.2d 888 (circuit court's denial of a motion to 
withdraw a plea in a criminal case is reviewed under an 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard); White v. State, 85 
Wis. 2d 485, 491, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978) (same).12 
¶38 In this case, however, it is clear from the referee's 
report, as amended, that he reconsidered his acceptance of 
Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea and ultimately refused 
to 
accept 
that 
plea 
because 
he 
concluded 
that 
the 
                                                 
12 The usual procedural path of pleas in criminal cases is 
different from the path in attorney disciplinary cases.  In most 
instances, there is no appellate review of the circuit court's 
acceptance of a guilty or no-contest plea.  What is reviewed 
normally on appeal is a circuit court's denial of a defendant's 
request to withdraw a plea.  In the attorney disciplinary 
context, however, this court reviews every case in which a plea 
is entered, whether or not the respondent attorney subsequently 
sought to withdraw the plea or appealed from the referee's 
report following the acceptance of the plea.  Thus, when the 
respondent attorney does not seek plea withdrawal and the 
referee's report confirms the acceptance of the plea, we review 
the acceptance of the plea for an erroneous exercise of 
discretion. 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
22 
 
"uncontroverted" facts he found from the record as a whole  
demonstrated that Attorney DeLadurantey's conduct did not 
constitute 
"offensive 
personality" 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
Attorney's Oath and SCR 20:8.4(g) because his conduct was not 
objectively "unwelcome."  His ultimate report is therefore more 
in the nature of a report in a case where no plea is entered, 
and we will utilize the standards of review for such cases, as 
summarized above. 
¶39 There are two primary problems with the referee's 
report, which preclude us from accepting the referee's findings 
or legal conclusions. 
¶40 First, the case was presented to the referee as being 
resolved through a no-contest plea.  The referee initially 
followed the proper procedure for the entry of that plea and 
exercised his discretion to accept it.  He then reconsidered the 
entry of the plea and determined that it should not be accepted.  
This is permissible in an attorney disciplinary proceeding.  
Referees in attorney disciplinary proceedings generally have the 
powers of a judge trying a civil action.  SCR 22.16(1).  This 
would include the ability to reconsider an interlocutory 
decision, such as in this case accepting a no-contest plea to a 
charge of misconduct, and then, after further consideration, 
reaching the opposite conclusion in a subsequent report.  
Although it is unusual, this is not the first time it has 
happened.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Clark, 
2016 
WI 
36, 
368 
Wis. 2d 409, 
878 
N.W.2d 662 
(following 
attorney's entry of a no-contest plea to a charge in a 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
23 
 
disciplinary complaint, the referee concluded that the OLR had 
failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to that charge). 
¶41 What we do find troubling is that, once the referee 
determined that the no-contest plea should not be accepted, he 
proceeded to make findings of fact that served as the basis for 
his ultimate legal conclusion of no "offensive personality" 
violations.  As an initial matter, it is clear from the record 
of this case, both before the referee and on appeal, that the 
parties and the referee were not on the same page as to 
precisely what was the universe of facts that should serve as 
the factual basis for the plea.  That would have been 
problematic even if the referee had continued to accept the 
plea.13   
                                                 
13 This case is a cautionary tale for referees and lawyers 
who appear in attorney disciplinary proceedings.  When a 
respondent attorney decides to enter a no-contest plea, the 
lawyers and the referee need to be clear regarding what universe 
of facts will serve as the factual basis for the plea, 
especially 
when 
the 
record 
contains 
disputes 
as 
to 
the 
underlying events or the context of those events.  Moreover, one 
cannot agree to have one set of facts (e.g., the allegations of 
the complaint) serve as the factual basis for a no-contest plea 
and then ask the referee to consider a broader set of 
conflicting factual assertions (e.g., the record as a whole) in 
making 
a 
recommendation 
as 
to 
the 
appropriate 
level 
of 
discipline.  In the context of a no-contest plea, a referee 
cannot make factual findings from disputed record evidence to 
support a discipline recommendation without a hearing at which 
the referee can assess witness credibility, especially when 
those factual findings conflict with the facts used to support 
the plea.  Finally, both referees and practicing lawyers need to 
understand that clarity as to the facts relied on by referee to 
accept a no-contest plea is necessary to permit this court to 
review the referee's acceptance of the plea and to write a full 
opinion deciding the case. 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
24 
 
¶42 Once the referee rejected the plea, however, there was 
no express stipulation of the parties as to any facts.  The case 
at that point reverted to the status of any other case prior to 
an evidentiary hearing.  There was a complaint containing many 
factual allegations, and there was an answer that disputed many 
of those factual allegations.  There were also deposition 
transcripts for H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey, but both of 
those consisted of out-of-court declarations that the referee 
had not observed in order to make credibility determinations.  
Moreover, the deposition testimony of both of those witnesses 
was certainly not the full testimony that those witnesses would 
have presented at an evidentiary hearing.  H.M. and Attorney 
DeLadurantey answered only those questions that were asked by 
opposing counsel, and those questions did not cover every aspect 
of the various incidents alleged in the complaint.  Moreover, 
even with respect to the documentary exhibits that the parties 
submitted and asked the referee to review, H.M. and Attorney 
DeLadurantey were not given the opportunity to explain their 
contents or put them in context.  This case was not about the 
language of a contract or an insurance policy or a deed, which 
could be interpreted on its face by a referee or by this court 
on review; it involved various interactions between two people, 
some of which were captured in paper form (e.g., printouts of 
text messages), but many of which depended on the testimony of 
H.M. and Attorney DeLadurantey, as well as any other third party 
who might have witnessed their interactions.   
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
25 
 
¶43 In this situation, we cannot see how the referee could 
make the large number of factual findings that he did about 
various 
aspects 
of 
the 
relationship 
between 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey and H.M.  Once there was no longer an accepted no-
contest plea to resolve the case, the referee should have 
proceeded either to obtain a comprehensive stipulation of facts 
from the parties or to conduct an evidentiary hearing, at which 
he could observe the demeanor of the witnesses and make 
credibility determinations.  At that point, he could then have 
made factual findings based either on the stipulation or on the 
testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing.   
¶44 While the referee stated that he was making only 
factual findings that were "uncontroverted," it is clear that 
there were still many disputes of fact about a wide range of 
incidents.  The OLR's appellate brief included a statement of 
facts that was very different from the factual recitation in the 
referee's report.  Given the presence of ongoing factual 
disputes and the lack of a basis for the referee to make factual 
findings in the absence of an opportunity to weigh the 
credibility of the witnesses, we cannot accept the referee's 
"additional" findings of fact in his report.  The failure to 
follow the proper procedure for making findings of fact was an 
error of law, which invalidates those additional factual 
findings. 
¶45 The second foundational problem with the referee's 
report is another error of law.  Although the referee stated in 
his report that a charge of "offensive personality" is "neither 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
26 
 
a watered-down version of sexual harassment nor a lesser 
included offense of it," it is clear that he conflated sexual 
harassment under SCR 20:8.4(i) and engaging in "offensive 
personality" under SCR 20:8.4(g).  He began the discussion 
section of his report with an extended discussion of what 
constitutes sexual harassment under employment discrimination 
law, stated that the "gravamen" of a claim of sexual harassment 
is whether the conduct at issue was "unwelcome," and then 
reasoned that conduct that would not be considered "unwelcome" 
under sexual harassment law also cannot be "offensive" under the 
"offensive personality" clause of the Attorney's Oath.  Indeed, 
he analyzed whether both Attorney DeLadurantey's sexual advances 
during the San Francisco incident and his alleged comments about 
H.M.'s appearance at other times were "unwelcome," concluding 
from what he believed to be the context of their personal, as 
well as professional, relationship that neither type of conduct 
was objectively unwelcome.   
¶46 Although it is possible that the same conduct could 
constitute both harassment on the basis of sex and "offensive 
personality," they are separate ethical violations.  The 
requirement to "abstain from all offensive personality" is one 
of a number of standards to which attorneys must conform when 
they enter the practice of law in this state.  Such standards 
apply not only to the direct practice of law, but also to the 
business of law, and to the lawyer's conduct beyond the practice 
or business of law.  See, e.g., SCR 20:4.1 (requiring a lawyer 
to avoid knowingly making a false statement of a material fact 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
27 
 
or law to a third party when representing a client); SCR 
20:4.4(a) (when representing a client, a lawyer may not use 
means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, 
delay, or burden a third party); SCR 20:6.1 (every lawyer has a 
professional responsibility to provide legal services to those 
unable to pay); SCR 20:8.4(b) (lawyer has duty to avoid 
committing any criminal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, 
whether or not the act occurs during the provision of legal 
services); SCR 20:8.4(c) (lawyer has duty to avoid engaging in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation).  Similarly, the duty to abstain from 
"offensive personality" can apply to conduct that occurs outside 
the direct practice of law.  See In re Disciplinary Proceeding 
Against Johann, 216 Wis. 2d 118, 574 N.W.2d 218 (1998).  This 
does not mean, however, that all personal conduct of a lawyer 
that 
is 
"offensive" 
violates 
the 
Attorney's 
Oath. 
 
The 
prohibition in SCR 20:8.4(g) against engaging in "offensive 
personality" 
applies 
to 
offensive 
conduct 
that 
reflects 
adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.  Id. at 122.  
When offensive conduct reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness 
to practice law, this court, on behalf of the state, has a 
legitimate interest in prohibiting such actions and disciplining 
attorneys who engage in such conduct in order to protect the 
public and the administration of justice. 
¶47 Contrary to the referee's conflation of the charges of 
"offensive personality" and employment discrimination through 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
28 
 
sexual harassment, we have previously held that inappropriate 
language and conduct may constitute offensive personality in 
violation of the Attorney's Oath in a number of situations 
involving sexual conduct that did not constitute employment 
discrimination.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Beatse, 2006 WI 115, 297 Wis. 2d 292, 722 N.W.2d 385 
(using state's email system to send and receive sexually 
explicit email messages and making inappropriate comments to a 
county employee who was not the attorney's subordinate in a work 
environment); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bruckner, 
161 Wis. 2d 385, 467 N.W.2d 780 (1991) (trading surreptitiously 
taken photographs of nude minors without their consent); see 
also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Heilprin, 168 Wis. 
2d 1, 482 N.W.2d 908 (1992) (although the court indicated that 
repeatedly asking divorce clients explicit questions about their 
sexual behavior qualified as "offensive personality," it relied 
on the attorney's disobedience of a prior court order against 
such conduct as an alternative basis for finding such actions to 
be professional misconduct).  Consequently, the referee's legal 
analysis that relied on the "welcomeness" element of employment 
sexual 
harassment 
claims 
was 
legally 
erroneous, 
which 
invalidates his legal conclusion of no "offensive personality" 
violation and his ultimate rejection of Attorney DeLadurantey's 
no-contest plea. 
¶48 Having concluded that the referee made errors of law 
in ultimately rejecting Attorney DeLadurantey's no-contest plea, 
the question becomes what should the next step be in this case.  
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
29 
 
Ordinarily, because the decision to accept a no-contest plea is 
a discretionary one initially committed to a referee and there 
is a need for an evidentiary basis for the referee to make 
affirmative factual findings (as opposed to finding an adequate 
factual basis for a plea in an agreed-upon set of facts), we 
would remand the matter back to the referee for further 
proceedings—either a new plea based on a more specifically 
defined set of facts or a full evidentiary hearing. 
  ¶49 
In this unique instance, however, we choose not 
to do so.  First, the parties have urged us not to remand the 
matter in light of the additional time and expense that would be 
involved.  Second, there is a set of agreed-upon facts here that 
permit us to render a proper judgment.  Sending the matter back 
to the referee for further proceedings would not change those 
particular facts and would not change the ultimate outcome in 
this proceeding.  Thus, in this unique circumstance, it is 
proper for us to proceed at this time with rendering a final 
decision in this disciplinary proceeding. 
¶50 Specifically, although we do not address the other 
incidents alleged in the complaint because there are still 
disputes as to some portion of those incidents in the record as 
a whole, Attorney DeLadurantey has admitted that he cannot 
contest the allegations of the complaint regarding the events of 
the San Francisco incident because his intoxication at the time 
has left him with no real memory of those events.   
¶51 As summarized above, there is no dispute that while on 
a 
business 
trip, 
a 
senior 
lawyer 
and 
employer, 
while 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
30 
 
intoxicated, made repeated sexual advances toward a subordinate 
attorney employee that were clearly and repeatedly rebuffed.  
Indeed, even after H.M. told Attorney DeLadurantey that his 
physical contact had made her physically ill and then had 
refused his request to go to her bedroom, Attorney DeLadurantey 
still went into H.M.'s bedroom and crawled into her bed, which 
can be interpreted only as a persistent demand for sexual 
activity despite H.M.'s refusal to consent.  We have no 
hesitation in holding that such conduct constituted "offensive 
personality" that not only reflected adversely on Attorney 
DeLadurantey's professional judgment and fitness to be a member 
of the legal profession, but also reflected adversely on the 
reputation and integrity of the legal profession generally.  
Regardless of any personal relationship that had developed, H.M. 
was a subordinate attorney whose professional success and 
continued employment were, in large part, subject to Attorney 
DeLadurantey's control.  This was not a matter solely of 
Attorney DeLadurantey's private affairs and personal morality.  
Consequently, 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
offensive 
conduct 
in 
pressuring a subordinate employee to engage in unwanted sexual 
activity during the San Francisco incident constituted a clear 
violation of the Attorney's Oath and SCR 20:8.4(g). 
¶52 We now turn to the question of the appropriate 
sanction for Attorney DeLadurantey's professional misconduct.  
We weigh the seriousness, nature, and extent of the misconduct; 
the level of discipline needed to protect the public; the need 
to impress upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct; 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
31 
 
and the need to deter other attorneys from similar misconduct.  
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, 
269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  Sources of guidance in 
determining 
appropriate 
sanctions 
are: 
 
prior 
case 
law; 
aggravating and mitigating factors; and the American Bar 
Association (ABA) Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur, 2005 WI 40, 279 
Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910. 
¶53 Both Attorney DeLadurantey and the OLR have requested 
a private reprimand in this proceeding, and the referee agreed 
that a private reprimand would be the appropriate level of 
discipline if we reject his legal conclusion that the "offensive 
personality" charges should be dismissed.  In prior cases, a 
lawyer's sexually offensive language and conduct has often 
received a private or public reprimand, unless it was coupled 
with other misconduct.  See, e.g., Beatse, 297 Wis. 2d 292, 
¶¶16-17 
(public 
reprimand); 
Private 
Reprimand 
No. 
1991-6 
(consensual private reprimand imposed on lawyer who, while 
awaiting the return of a jury, approached a female law 
enforcement officer at a courthouse and made statements that she 
interpreted as sexually aggressive, subsequently grabbed her 
shoulders and attempted to embrace her, and later approached a 
different female officer, pushed her against a wall and made 
suggestive and disparaging remarks); Private Reprimand No. 2008-
38 (consensual private reprimand imposed on attorney who made 
sexually suggestive comments to a co-worker over a period of 
several years and, on one occasion, kissed the co-worker without 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
32 
 
consent); Private Reprimand No. 2015-2 (imposing consensual 
private reprimand on attorney who grabbed the breast of a female 
employee of a bar, made several sexually suggestive comments to 
her, followed her from the bar, was arrested, and completed a 
deferred prosecution agreement after being charged with fourth-
degree sexual assault).  We note that the private reprimands 
cited above were consensual reprimands that were issued by 
referees without this court's review pursuant to our rules.  
While we recognize that similarly situated respondents should 
receive 
comparable 
levels 
of 
discipline, 
we 
take 
this 
opportunity to advise members of the bar that we are applying 
increasing scrutiny to attorneys' sexual misconduct.  Compare In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ritland, 2021 WI 36, 396 
Wis. 2d 509, 957 N.W.2d 540.  We do so because sexual harassment 
comes at a heavy price for victims who can suffer significant 
psychological effects as well as job-related costs, including 
job 
loss, 
reputational 
harm, 
impairment 
of 
professional 
opportunities, 
and 
irreparable 
damage 
to 
interpersonal 
relationships at work.  Attorneys should be on notice that 
sexual misconduct by attorneys, whether directed toward fellow 
lawyers, clients, or others, is not taken lightly.  Ritland, 396 
Wis. 2d 509, ¶39. 
¶54 This court has the responsibility to oversee the 
practice of law in this state.  Consequently, it is our 
responsibility to determine what is the appropriate level of 
discipline in an attorney disciplinary proceeding.  While the 
facts of each case are unique, in light of existing precedent, 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
33 
 
we conclude that Attorney DeLadurantey should be publicly 
reprimanded.  His misconduct is at least as serious as the 
conduct in Beatse, where we also imposed a public reprimand on 
an attorney who downloaded pornographic images onto a work 
computer, sent and received sexually explicit messages on a work 
email system, and made inappropriate sexual comments to female 
government employees.  Here, a supervising lawyer engaged in 
unwanted sexually suggestive physical contact with a subordinate 
employee, repeatedly asked the employee for sexual activity even 
in the face of clear refusals, and then escalated the situation 
by climbing into the employee's bed.  A private reprimand would 
unduly depreciate the seriousness of such misconduct.  Moreover, 
we conclude that a public reprimand is necessary to put other 
members of the bar on notice that such actions will not be 
tolerated.   
¶55 We next address the question of costs, which were 
$20,530.47 as of November 4, 2021, at the completion of 
appellate briefing.  Attorney DeLadurantey filed an objection to 
costs, arguing that SCR 22.24(1m) supports a reduction of the 
costs imposed on him.  Supreme Court Rule 22.24(1m) articulates 
six factors we consider when evaluating a costs challenge.  
First, we consider the number of counts charged, contested, and 
proven.  In Attorney DeLadurantey's view, the OLR's "major 
focus" was the sexual harassment charges that the OLR eventually 
dismissed.  He argues that because the OLR dismissed these 
charges, no costs should be assessed in connection with the 
OLR's pursuit of these alleged violations.  Second, we consider 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
34 
 
the nature of the misconduct.  Attorney DeLadurantey says that 
had the "offensive personality" charges been the only alleged 
violations from the outset of this matter, the costs incurred 
would have been substantially lower.  Third, we consider the 
level of discipline sought by the parties and recommended by the 
referee.  The parties ultimately requested a private reprimand, 
and the referee recommended a dismissal of the remaining 
charges. 
 
Fourth, 
we 
consider 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey's 
cooperation with the disciplinary process.  It is undisputed 
that 
Attorney 
DeLadurantey 
cooperated 
throughout 
the 
disciplinary process.  Fifth, we consider prior discipline.  
Attorney 
DeLadurantey 
has 
no 
prior 
disciplinary 
record.  
Finally, we consider "other relevant circumstances."  Attorney 
DeLadurantey contends that the "sexual harassment claim was 
poorly based in fact from the start and all costs in furtherance 
of the OLR's attempts to satisfy that claim should not be 
assessed."  He suggests we impose ten percent of the total 
costs, or $2,053.05. 
¶56 The OLR maintains that the sexual harassment and 
offensive personality claims were intertwined, meaning that the 
OLR's counsel's time was spent concurrently pursuing both.  The 
OLR reminds us that, traditionally, costs are not reduced even 
when a respondent prevails on some, but not all, counts, and it 
cites several cases in support of this assertion.   
¶57 We generally agree with the OLR on this issue.  We 
decline to deviate from our long-standing disinclination to 
apportion costs based solely on the number of counts proven or 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
35 
 
unproven.14  We note, moreover, that the referee found the pre-
appellate costs to be both reasonable in amount and necessarily 
incurred, stating: 
Having read and made notes on the hundreds of pages of 
exhibits 
provided 
by 
both 
counsel, 
and 
having 
performed many hours of research, I am in a good 
position to assess the work that went into this case.  
I find that the sum of $18,311.47 is reasonable, and 
the costs enumerated were necessarily incurred by the 
[OLR] in this matter. 
¶58 We acknowledge that Attorney DeLadurantey has, by all 
accounts, 
cooperated 
completely 
with 
this 
disciplinary 
investigation and proceeding.  He ultimately entered a no-
contest plea to the "offensive personality" charges, but the 
referee undertook a lengthy analysis and issued a problematic 
report, resulting in the OLR's appeal.  The referee billed 
$5,920.74 
for 
the 
time 
spent 
writing 
his 
report 
which, 
unfortunately, complicated this matter.  We therefore reduce the 
costs billed for writing the report by 50 percent ($2,960.37).  
This matter has also been made unnecessarily complex by the 
parties' lack of precision in specifying what facts could serve 
as the factual basis for the no-contest plea.  This lack of 
clarity required us to order the parties to submit supplemental 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Eisenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 284, 423 N.W.2d 867 (1988) (declining 
respondent's request to apportion costs according to the number 
of 
misconduct 
counts 
that 
resulted 
in 
determinations 
of 
professional misconduct); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Konnor, 2005 WI 37, 279 Wis. 2d 284, 694 N.W.2d 376 (rejecting 
argument that costs not be assessed because he would have agreed 
to a public reprimand, which the referee ultimately recommended 
as discipline). 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
36 
 
legal memoranda.  Because this was caused in part by the OLR and 
was not corrected by the referee, we do not require Attorney 
DeLadurantey 
to 
pay 
the 
OLR's 
costs 
of 
preparing 
its 
supplemental legal memorandum.  Consequently, we direct Attorney 
DeLadurantey to pay costs of $17,570.10.   
¶59 Finally, 
we 
reject 
the 
referee's 
unsupported 
recommendation that we "seal" the record in this case.  Our 
rules require that once a disciplinary complaint is filed, the 
disciplinary proceeding and all papers filed in it are public 
documents, except where a specific rule or other law mandates 
confidentiality, or where the court determines that sealing or 
redaction of a document in a disciplinary proceeding is 
necessary.  SCR 22.40(1).15  There is nothing in this proceeding 
that mandates that the record be sealed.  It is true that the 
filings in this proceeding may be embarrassing for everyone 
involved, but that is not a legal basis for sealing a case 
record.  We recognize that keeping the record in the case open 
to the public may cause distress to H.M., but the public has a 
                                                 
15 SCR 22.40(1) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in 
this chapter, all papers, files, transcripts, and communications 
relating 
to 
an 
allegation 
of 
attorney 
misconduct, 
an 
investigation pursuant to SCR Chapters 10, 22, and 31, and 
monitoring compliance with conditions, suspension, or revocation 
imposed by the supreme court, are to be held in confidence by 
the director and staff of the office of lawyer regulation, the 
members of the district committees, special investigators, the 
members of the special preliminary review panel, and the members 
of the preliminary review panel.  Following the filing of a 
complaint or petition, the proceeding and all papers filed in it 
are public, except where expressly provided otherwise in this 
chapter, by court order, or by law." 
No. 
2020AP1616-D   
 
37 
 
right to learn and understand the process by which this court 
renders decisions in attorney disciplinary proceedings and we 
have attempted to minimize the impact of this published opinion 
by using her initials.  There is nothing in this case that 
overcomes the public's right to observe its government in 
action.  
¶60 IT IS ORDERED that, as discipline for his professional 
misconduct 
and 
violation 
of 
SCR 
40.15, 
enforced 
via 
SCR 20:8.4(g), Nathan E. DeLadurantey is publicly reprimanded. 
¶61 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Nathan E. DeLadurantey shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation $17,570.10 for the costs of this proceeding. 
 
 
1 
 
¶62 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring).  Although I do not 
join the per curiam opinion, I concur with the level of 
discipline it imposes.