Case Title: Wilkes v. Celadon Group, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 19S-CT-00564

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-CT-564 
Paul Michael Wilkes, 
Appellant, 
–v– 
Celadon Group, Inc., et al., 
Appellees. 
Argued: November 26, 2019 | Decided: December 6, 2021 
Appeal from the Marion County Superior Court 10 
No. 49D10-1601-CT-3170 
The Honorable David J. Dreyer, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 18A-CT-2011 
Opinion by Justice Slaughter 
Chief Justice Rush and Justice Massa concur. 
Justice Goff concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion, in which 
Justice David joins. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Dec 06 2021, 1:33 pm
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CT-564 | December 6, 2021 
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Slaughter, Justice. 
A commercial truck driver sustained injuries when his cargo fell on 
him. The issue is whether liability for his injuries belongs to the carrier or 
the shipper. We adopt the Fourth Circuit’s “Savage rule”, which holds that 
carriers have the primary duty for loading and securing cargo. If the 
shipper assumes a legal duty of safe loading, it becomes liable for injuries 
resulting from any latent defect. But if a shipper’s negligence is apparent, 
then the carrier remains liable for the injuries. Applying the Savage rule, 
we hold that the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment for 
the shipper and its agent and against the driver. 
I 
A 
Paul Wilkes became a commercial truck driver in 2009. In 2014 his 
employer, Knight Transportation, Inc., assigned him to haul cargo from 
Indiana to North Carolina. The cargo belonged to Cummins, Inc., and 
consisted of empty, reusable, molded container trays—so-called 
“returnables”—that Cummins would use to house oily engine parts. After 
using the trays, Cummins would stack them at its own facility. Once 
enough of the trays accumulated, Cummins would contract with Celadon 
to pick them up, take them to a Celadon facility in Columbus, Indiana, 
and ship them to North Carolina for cleaning. Celadon, on Cummins’s 
behalf, would use a third-party logistics provider to “find the cheapest 
carrier” to haul the trays to and from North Carolina.  
Here, Celadon retained Knight as the carrier. Knight then dispatched 
Wilkes to the Celadon warehouse in Columbus to pick up a Knight trailer 
filled with the used, oily trays. Although Cummins owned the trays, 
Celadon directed and supervised their loading and shipping onto the 
Knight trailer. The Celadon employee who loaded Wilkes’s trailer had no 
formal training in how to distribute loads. He merely stacked the 
Cummins container trays on top of each other and did not bind, strap, or 
shrink-wrap them. Wilkes was an experienced driver but had never 
carried these trays or been to Celadon’s Columbus facility.  
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When Wilkes saw the trailer, he noticed that its rear doors were open. 
From the back of the loaded trailer, he looked inside and saw stacks of the 
trays rising nearly to the top of its 13-foot-six-inch ceiling. According to 
Wilkes, “you had two major pallets sitting up in there. In between the two, 
you could see the other ones going back in the back.” Wilkes then closed 
the trailer doors, locked them, and affixed Knight’s seal. On his way to 
North Carolina, Wilkes did not feel the load shift or the trailer make any 
sudden movements. Yet when he arrived in North Carolina and opened 
the doors, some of the trays fell and injured him. After Wilkes was 
injured, several employees of the North Carolina facility were deposed. 
One said that the trays would fall out about half of the time because they 
are not secured. Another added that one of Celadon’s own drivers 
likewise had trays fall on him as he was opening his trailer’s doors.  
B 
Wilkes sued Cummins, Celadon, and their affiliated companies for 
negligently packing, loading, and failing to secure the cargo in the trailer. 
His complaint alleged other claims, too, but they are waived because he 
did not raise them on appeal. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). 
Additionally, in his appellant’s brief, Wilkes appears to argue that he is 
entitled to relief under sections 388 and 392 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. These sections apply to product-liability claims. But Wilkes did not 
assert a product-liability claim in the trial court, so this claim also is 
waived on appeal. See Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 
(Ind. 2013). 
Thus, the only claim properly before us is whether the defendants were 
negligent in packing, loading, and failing to secure the trailer’s cargo. In 
three separate motions, defendants sought summary judgment, arguing 
they owed Wilkes no duty, and even if they did, they did not breach any 
duty. The trial court granted summary judgment on all three motions for 
the Celadon and Cummins entities, and Wilkes appealed. The court of 
appeals affirmed summary judgment for the Cummins defendants but 
reversed and remanded as to the Celadon defendants. Wilkes v. Celadon 
Group, Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1095, 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). 
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We granted transfer, Wilkes v. Celadon Group, Inc., 137 N.E.3d 918 (Ind. 
2019), and heard oral argument. During argument, Wilkes’s counsel 
acknowledged he is not challenging the entry of judgment for the 
Cummins defendants. Thus, we summarily affirm the court of appeals’ 
ruling for Cummins. A few weeks after argument, some of the Celadon 
entities filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. Wilkes asked us 
to stay proceedings until the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay 
under 11 U.S.C. § 362, and we agreed. That court eventually granted 
Wilkes relief from the automatic stay so he could prosecute his claims in 
our Court. We then lifted our stay and now affirm the trial court as to the 
Celadon defendants, too. 
II 
At issue is whether the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment to the Celadon defendants. We review summary-judgment 
decisions de novo. Perkins v. Mem’l Hosp. of South Bend, 141 N.E.3d 1231, 
1234 (Ind. 2020). The moving party “bears the initial burden of making a 
prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Gill v. Evansville Sheet 
Metal Works, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ind. 2012) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 
56(C)). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to come forward 
with contrary evidence showing “differing accounts of the truth”, or that 
“the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences”. 
Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009). We draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party and review only materials 
designated in the trial court. Perkins, 141 N.E.3d at 1234. 
In Part II.A, we dispose of the summary-judgment motions for all but 
three of the Celadon defendants. And in Part II.B, we adopt the Fourth 
Circuit’s Savage rule and find that while Celadon assumed a legal duty of 
safe loading, it designated evidence establishing that it did not breach its 
duty because any alleged defect in loading or securing cargo should have 
been apparent to Wilkes. Wilkes designated no contrary evidence to 
support finding a latent loading defect, and thus he failed to establish the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. We affirm the entry of 
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summary judgment for all Cummins and Celadon defendants and against 
Wilkes. 
A 
Before turning to the merits of Wilkes’s lone claim for negligence, we 
first address the procedural question of which defendants remain. As 
noted, given Wilkes’s stipulation during oral argument, we affirm the 
entry of judgment for all Cummins defendants and against Wilkes. In 
addition, the following five Celadon entities are parties on appeal: 
Celadon Group, Inc.; Celadon Logistics Services, Inc.; Celadon Trucking 
Services, Inc.; Celadon Trucking Services, Inc., f/k/a Panther 
Transportation Services; and Quality Equipment Leasing, LLC, f/k/a 
Quality Equipment Leasing, Inc., & f/k/a Quality Equipment Sales. 
In the trial court, two of these entities—Celadon Trucking Services, 
Inc., f/k/a Panther Transportation Services and Quality Equipment 
Leasing—moved for summary judgment on the ground that they are 
improper parties. The trial court granted their motion, and Wilkes 
appealed. Wilkes says he is appealing the order granting summary 
judgment as to these two defendants, but his appellate brief does not 
argue why they are proper parties. In fact, he mentions these two parties 
only in his statement of the case. He then lumps all Celadon entities 
together, referring to them as Celadon throughout his brief.  
To avoid waiver on appeal, a party must develop a cogent argument. 
App. R. 46(A)(8)(a); Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 n.1 (Ind. 2006). 
Wilkes, however, failed to develop any argument that Celadon Trucking 
Services, Inc., f/k/a Panther Transportation Services and Quality 
Equipment Leasing are proper parties. Thus, Wilkes has waived argument 
on appeal about these two defendants. That means the substantive legal 
issue before us, to which we now turn, concerns only three Celadon 
entities: Celadon Group, Inc.; Celadon Logistics Services, Inc.; and 
Celadon Trucking Services, Inc., which we refer to collectively as 
“Celadon”. Neither side disputes that summary judgment for one requires 
summary judgment for all.  
 
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B 
On the merits, we start with a question of first impression for our state 
courts: whether to adopt the longstanding federal common-law rule from 
United States v. Savage Truck Line, Inc., 209 F.2d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 1953). 
Savage sets out the following two-part framework: first, under federal 
statutes and common law, the “primary duty” for safely loading cargo 
rests with the carrier; and, second, as a matter of federal common law, the 
shipper is liable if it takes responsibility for loading cargo, ibid., but only if 
the defect is “latent” or “concealed”, ibid. In other words, the liability for 
safe loading shifts to the shipper only if (1) the shipper takes responsibility 
for loading the cargo, and (2) the defect is latent or concealed. Ibid. 
Otherwise, liability remains with the carrier. 
Other states and federal circuits have followed Savage. Maine adopted 
the rule in Decker v. New England Public Warehouse, Inc., 749 A.2d 762, 766–
67 (Me. 2000), and noted that “[m]ost courts now accept the rationale of 
Savage”. In adopting Savage, the Maine supreme court looked to the 
practice and understanding of the trucking industry, as well as federal 
regulations, which “reflect that carriers logically should have the final 
responsibility for the loads they haul.” Id. at 766. Thus, Decker found that 
the Savage rule “simply extends the industry’s reasonable understanding 
to negligence suits involving carriers and shippers.” Id. at 766–67. See also 
Vargo-Schaper v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 619 F.3d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(presuming Savage applies under Minnesota law); Missouri Pac. Railroad 
Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 368 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1963) (holding identical rule 
applies under Texas common law); Spence v. ESAB Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 
212, 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2010) (presuming Savage applies under Pennsylvania 
law). Like these courts, we hold that the policy and rationale of Savage are 
well founded. 
In addition, we hold that the Savage rule is consistent with Indiana law. 
By statute, Indiana incorporated the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulations, which provide regulatory standards for those operating 
commercial vehicles in interstate commerce in Indiana. See Ind. Code § 8-
2.1-24-18(a). These standards require carriers and their drivers to make 
certain determinations before a driver may operate a motor vehicle. One 
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such determination is that the cargo has been “properly distributed and 
adequately secured”. 49 C.F.R. § 392.9(a)(1). Another is that drivers must 
ensure they have complied with applicable regulations before operating 
their vehicles. See id. at § 392.9(b)(1). But drivers are relieved of their duty 
to inspect the cargo if, among other things, the commercial motor vehicle 
“has been loaded in a manner that makes inspection of its cargo 
impracticable”. Id. § 392.9(b)(4). This regulatory framework—incorporated 
into Indiana law—is consistent with the common-law rule set forth in 
Savage. Under the Savage rule, carriers have a primary duty of safe 
loading, but shippers may also assume a legal duty of safe loading if they 
take responsibility for loading the cargo. To resolve these competing 
duties, Savage holds a shipper liable only for latent defects in loading that 
a carrier could not observe even if the carrier successfully discharged its 
duty. Given both the rule’s sound policy and its consistency with Indiana 
law, we formally adopt the Savage rule. 
Here, Wilkes challenges on appeal the trial court’s order granting 
summary judgment to Celadon on his negligence claim. Having adopted 
the Savage rule, we apply it to this record and consider, first, whether 
Celadon assumed a legal duty of safe loading. We conclude it did. Second, 
we consider whether any alleged defect in loading was latent. On this 
record, we conclude it was not and should have been apparent to Wilkes 
through a reasonable inspection. 
1 
The first inquiry under the Savage rule is whether the shipper owed a 
duty of safe loading. The clearest way for the shipper to assume this legal 
duty is to load the trailer itself without any help from the carrier. See 
Savage, 209 F.2d at 443-44 (shipper loaded and secured airplane engines 
into trucks); Franklin Stainless Corp. v. Marlo Transp. Corp., 748 F.2d 865, 866 
(4th Cir. 1984) (shipper loaded steel coils but did not secure them). In 
contrast, the shipper does not assume a legal duty if it merely assists with 
loading while the carrier retains “full control and responsibility for 
loading and securing” the cargo. Texas Specialty Trailers, Inc. v. Jackson & 
Simmen Drilling Co., No. 2-07-228-CV, 2009 WL 2462530, at *7 (Tex. App. 
Aug. 13, 2009); see also Whiteside v. United States, No. 1:11-CV-154, 2013 
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WL 2355522, at *7-*9 (E.D. Tex. May 28, 2013) (holding that government 
did not assume a legal duty of safe loading because it did not load the 
cargo but merely watched it being loaded). 
Some jurisdictions consider not only the shipper’s acts but also its 
statements when deciding if it assumed a legal duty. See Spence, 623 F.3d 
at 219 (holding genuine issue of material fact as to whether shipper owed 
a duty of care when shipper loaded the cargo, selected the securing 
device, and assured carrier the securement method was safe). But we need 
not decide today whether a shipper’s statements may be relevant to the 
assumption-of-duty analysis because, under such circumstances, a 
shipper’s lone actions to take on that responsibility speak louder than any 
contrary words disclaiming it. Therefore, we hold that if a shipper alone 
loads the cargo, that is sufficient under the Savage rule to find the shipper 
assumed a legal duty of safe loading.   
Here, there is no dispute that a Celadon employee loaded the trailer 
without any help from Wilkes or another agent of the carrier. The 
designated evidence shows that when Wilkes arrived at the facility, a 
trailer was already loaded with the trays. The fact that Celadon loaded the 
trailer without any participation from Wilkes is sufficient to hold Celadon 
assumed the legal duty for loading the trailer. Because Celadon assumed 
this duty, it had a duty to load safely, meaning without latent defect. 
Under Savage, even if the shipper assumes a legal duty to load without 
latent defect, the carrier retains its primary duty to inspect for apparent 
defect. See Savage, 209 F.2d at 445. To determine whether Celadon is liable 
for Wilkes’s injury, i.e., whether it breached its duty of safe loading, we 
turn next to whether the loading was defective and, if so, whether that 
defect was latent. 
2 
The second inquiry under Savage is whether the shipper breached its 
legal duty of safe loading by loading with a latent or nonobvious defect. In 
other words, for the shipper to be liable, its loading must be defective and 
the defect one that “cannot be discerned by ordinary observation by the 
agents of the carrier”. Ibid. Whether a defect is latent also depends on the 
driver’s experience and any assurances the shipper makes about the load’s 
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safety. Here, Celadon designated evidence showing any alleged defect in 
loading was apparent, thus meeting its initial burden to make a prima 
facie case showing no genuine issue of material fact as to breach of duty. 
The burden then shifted to Wilkes to designate contrary evidence showing 
“differing accounts of the truth” or that “the undisputed material facts 
support[] conflicting reasonable inferences”. Williams, 914 N.E.2d at 761. 
On this record, Wilkes failed to meet his burden because he designated no 
contrary evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the defect was 
latent. Thus, we agree with Celadon and hold it is entitled to summary 
judgment. 
Under Indiana law, a latent defect is one not discoverable through a 
reasonable inspection. Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 229, 342 
N.E.2d 619, 621 (1976). A reasonable inspection does not demand 
“abnormal scrutiny”, Decker, 749 A.2d at 767, and an inadequate 
inspection will not “force liability” onto a shipper, id. at 768. Here, the 
undisputed evidence shows that Wilkes both observed and inspected the 
cargo. When he first approached the trailer, Wilkes noticed the doors were 
open, and he looked inside and saw nothing “outlandish”. Nothing 
inhibited his view of the cargo. In fact, he could see in between two stacks 
of pallets and “see the other ones going back in the back.” He then closed 
the doors, locked them, and affixed Knight’s seal. Wilkes’s hasty 
inspection was akin to that in Decker, where the driver performed only a 
cursory review of his load because it appeared to be loaded safely. Ibid. In 
rejecting the driver’s claim, the court reiterated that an inadequate 
inspection does not turn an apparent defect into a latent one. Ibid. Here, 
the designated evidence shows that Wilkes was able to see into the trailer 
and observe how the trays were loaded. For this reason, any defect in 
loading or securing the cargo should have been apparent to him. 
Moreover, Wilkes does not even argue, much less designate any 
evidence, that the lack of securing devices was not apparent or that the 
trays should have been loaded in a different configuration. Instead, he 
argues that the nature of the cargo itself – oily, greasy trays – created a 
latent defect. He argues that an ordinary inspection would not reveal the 
risk that the unsecured trays presented because he could not see the trays 
were covered in oil and grease. But Wilkes does not point to any evidence 
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that these trays presented any more of a risk due to the oil and grease than 
any other type of unsecured cargo. Nor does he cite any legal authority 
that supports finding a latent loading defect based solely on the nature of 
the cargo being shipped. We could speculate about whether the oil and 
grease created a latent defect, but speculation is not sufficient to create a 
genuine issue for trial. See Griffin v. Menard, Inc., 175 N.E.3d 811, 814 (Ind. 
2021). 
The combination of Wilkes’s observation and inspection, along with 
the conspicuous absence of any securing device, establishes that any 
defect was, or should have been, apparent to him through a reasonable 
inspection. See Morris v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:10CV504, 2012 WL 5947753, 
at *10, *12 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 28, 2012) (observing both that the driver had 
“multiple opportunities to inspect the load” and that “the absence of 
devices used to secure the cargo from rearward movement . . . cannot be 
said to be latent”); Savage, 209 F.2d at 446 (attributing fault to the carrier 
when the driver inspected the load and concluded it had been fastened 
inadequately); Aragon v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 735 F.3d 807, 810 (8th 
Cir. 2013) (declining to find a latent defect when, among other things, the 
driver had an opportunity to view and inspect his cargo and noticed it 
was not secured). 
Whether a defect is latent also depends on the extent of the driver’s 
experience and “the presence or absence of any assurances by the shipper 
regarding the security of the load” upon which the driver reasonably 
relied. Ibid. “[D]rivers with more experience are more capable of detecting 
loading defects than those without experience.” Vargo-Schaper, 619 F.3d at 
849. But inexperience alone will not absolve a driver of his duty to inspect 
his load and ensure it is secured. Aragon, 735 F.3d at 811. An otherwise 
open and obvious loading defect will be rendered latent only if the 
inexperienced driver asks about the security of the load, receives 
assurances from the shipper that it is secure, and reasonably relies on such 
assurances. Ibid.  
In Franklin Stainless Corporation, the driver had never hauled the 
material before, so he asked the shipper if it was loaded properly. 748 F.2d 
at 866. In response, the shipper assured the driver that it had used “the 
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standard loading method and that there would be no trouble with the 
load.” Ibid. The court found that the driver reasonably relied on the 
shipper’s assurance in part because of the driver’s inexperience. Ibid. And 
in Spence, a driver complained that he was not comfortable with the 
shipper’s method of securing the cargo, and the shipper told the driver 
that it had “never had a problem with any of its loads.” 623 F.3d at 213–14. 
The court used the shipper’s statement in finding enough evidence of 
reasonable assurance to preclude summary judgment. See id. at 221–22. In 
both Franklin and Spence, the shippers made affirmative statements 
regarding the safety of the loads in response to the driver inquiries. 
Here, in contrast, the designated evidence shows that Wilkes did not 
ask about the safety or security of the load, and Celadon made no 
assurances about the load’s safety or security. Wilkes argues that the 
Celadon dispatcher assured him the cargo was safely loaded and properly 
secured, thus rendering the defect latent. But the designated evidence 
does not show that Wilkes asked about the load’s security or that any 
Celadon employee assured him about the load’s security. Wilkes relies on 
excerpts from his own deposition where he says that a Celadon dispatcher 
told him his trailer was “loaded and ready to go”. But this excerpt is not 
designated evidence. Wilkes failed to designate his own deposition as 
evidence in his response to the summary-judgment motion. Even though 
Wilkes later sought permission from the trial court to designate his 
deposition belatedly, the trial court did not rule on the motion. Because 
Wilkes did not designate this excerpt, we may not rely on it for summary-
judgment purposes. See Perkins, 141 N.E.3d at 1234. Further, in his 
response briefs in the trial court, Wilkes argued neither that the Celadon 
dispatcher provided reasonable assurances nor that he relied on such 
assurances. He raises this assurance-reliance argument for the first time on 
appeal, and for this reason, it is waived. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).  
Even had Wilkes properly designated his own deposition as evidence 
and raised the assurance-reliance argument in the trial court, we would 
reject it. Wilkes had five years’ experience operating commercial motor 
vehicles when he picked up the trailer at Celadon. Despite his lack of 
experience with these trays or this type of cargo, he did not ask Celadon if 
the load was secure. The comment “loaded and ready to go”, especially 
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when not in response to a question about the load's security, pronounces 
only that the loading is complete, not that its contents were loaded 
properly or securely. And, in fact, Wilkes admits that no one at Celadon 
told him the trays were “properly loaded”. Thus, Celadon’s statement is 
not the kind of assurance upon which Wilkes was entitled to rely.  
We thus hold that Celadon met its burden to establish no genuine 
issue of material fact as to the lack of a latent loading defect, and Wilkes 
failed to meet his burden to designate contrary evidence upon which a 
jury could conclude that any alleged defect in loading was latent. Wilkes 
did not inquire into the safety of the loading. Celadon did not provide any 
affirmative assurances that it loaded the trays safely. And any defect in 
loading or securing the cargo should have been apparent to Wilkes 
through a reasonable inspection.  
*          *          * 
For these reasons, we expressly adopt the Savage framework, meaning 
that Knight Transportation, as carrier, was presumptively responsible for 
the injuries that its driver, Wilkes, sustained when the cargo fell on him. 
Celadon, as the shipper’s agent, assumed responsibility for loading the 
trays onto the trailer, but Celadon is not liable for the injuries because on 
this record any alleged defect in loading the trailer should have been 
apparent. We affirm the trial court’s entry of judgment for the Celadon 
and Cummins defendants and against Wilkes. 
Rush, C.J., and Massa, J., concur.  
Goff, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion, in 
which David, J., joins. 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CT-564 | December 6, 2021 
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A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  PAU L M IC H AE L WI L KES  
Caroline Burchett Briggs 
Lafayette, Indiana 
W. Winston Briggs 
Atlanta, Georgia 
Terry D. Jackson 
Atlanta, Georgia 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E S CE LA D ON  G R O U P, I NC. ; CEL A D O N 
L O G IS T ICS  SE R V IC ES , I N C. ; C EL A D ON  T R U C KI N G SE R V IC ES , 
I N C. ; CEL A D ON  T R U C K IN G  SE R V IC ES,  I N C .  F / K/A  P AN T HER  
T R A NS P O R TA TI O N S E R VI CES ; QU AL ITY  E QU I PME N T L EASI N G , 
L LC  F/ K/A  QUA LI T Y E QU I PME N T L EAS IN G  I NC.  A N D F/ K/ A 
Q U AL IT Y  E QU I PM EN T  SA LES   
Kevin C. Tyra 
The Tyra Law Firm, PC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Bailey Christine Coultrap 
Paganelli Law Group 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E S CU MMI NS , I N C. ; C UMM I NS 
C O R P O R A TI O N;  C UM MI NS  J O HN  D OE  E N TI TI ES (1 – 3) , D/ B/ A 
C UM MI NS E N GI N ES;  A N D J O H N D O E EN T IT IE S (1 -3)  
Jane Dall Wilson 
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Thomas C. Kus 
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CT-00564 | December 6, 2021 
Page 1 of 2 
Goff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision as to Celadon1 and 
would find the designated evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether there was a loading defect and whether that 
defect was latent. And because resolution of this single fact-sensitive case 
doesn’t require adopting a rule that could likely impact the entire trucking 
industry, I would decline to adopt the Savage rule at this time. 
First, summary judgment is improper under either our traditional 
negligence analysis or the Savage rule. There is no question that Celadon 
assumed the duty to load the trays which ultimately caused Wilkes’ 
injury. The issue is whether it breached that duty by loading the trays in a 
defective manner, thereby causing the injury (or, under the Savage rule, in 
a defective manner, thereby causing the injury when the defect was 
latent). Whichever test we apply, I find the designated evidence leaves 
open a genuine issue of material fact as to this issue. Celadon told Wilkes 
the trays were “loaded and ready to go,” the trays at issue were covered in 
an industrial lubricant (a fact that may not have been apparent and that 
might have made the load particularly susceptible to shifting), the trays 
were loaded nearly to the top of the thirteen-foot-high trailer (a fact that 
may have made closer inspection particularly difficult), and Wilkes had 
no experience with the type of cargo at issue. Taken together, I believe 
these facts, and the reasonable inferences from them, are more than 
sufficient to defeat summary judgment as to Celadon. I would, therefore, 
hold as my colleagues on the Court of Appeals did and deny summary 
judgment. 
Second, regardless of the merits of the Savage rule, I see no need to 
adopt it in this case. Under either test, Wilkes designated sufficient 
evidence to survive summary judgment. And because adoption of a new 
 
1 I concur with the Court’s holding that summary judgment was proper as to Cummins. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CT-00564 | December 6, 2021 
Page 2 of 2 
rule—a rule followed in only nine states2—is unnecessary to resolve the 
case before us, I would refrain from doing it today.3 In my view, 
unnecessarily adopting such rules impedes the ability of courts to do what 
they are intended to do: decide individual controversies on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Because I disagree with both the Court’s resolution of this case and its 
decision to unnecessarily adopt a rule that will affect all similarly situated 
parties, I respectfully dissent in part. 
David, J., joins.  
 
2 My research indicates that the rule, or a variation of the rule, has been adopted by appellate 
courts in Arizona, California, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Louisiana, Ohio, 
Texas, Wisconsin. See, respectively, Moro v. Thomas, No. 1 CA-CV 10-0353, 2011 Ariz. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 582, at *10 (Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2011); BBD Transp. Co. v. Buller, 49 Cal. App. 3d 
124, 132 (1975); Decker v. New England Pub. Warehouse, Inc., 749 A.2d 762, 767 (Me. 2000); 
McMaster v. DTE Energy Co., No. 339271, 2020 Mich. App. LEXIS 4181, at *10 (Ct. App. July 2, 
2020); Smart v. Am. Welding & Tank Co., 826 A.2d 570, 574 (N.H. 2003); Instrument Sys. Corp. v. 
Associated Rigging & Hauling Corp., 70 A.D.2d 529, 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Stroder v. Hilcorp 
Energy Co., 242 So. 3d 1240, 1245 (La. App. 2018); Romig v. Baker Hi-Way Express, Inc., 2012 WL 
258563, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2012); Tex. Specialty Trailers, Inc. v. Jackson & Simmen 
Drilling Co., No. 2-07-228-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6318, at *26 (Tex. App. Aug. 13, 2009); 
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 198 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Wis. 1972). 
3 Trucking “has emerged as one of the most acute bottlenecks in a supply chain” that’s 
currently in turmoil. Ari Hawkins, A Trucking Crisis Has the U.S. Looking for More Drivers 
Abroad, Bloomberg (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-02/a-
trucking-crisis-has-the-u-s-looking-for-more-drivers-abroad [https://perma.cc/S9DT-BSJK]. 
Because “[c]arriers routinely are not allowed on loading docks at shipping facilities, receiving 
no opportunity to inspect cargo before the trailer doors are sealed,” I would not place 
additional demands on carriers at this time. See Jackson G. O’Brien, Note, Your Shipment Has 
Been Delayed: Liability of Shippers and Carriers for Loading and Securing Cargo in Iowa, 67 Drake L. 
Rev. 283, 289 (citing Terry Morgan, Loading and Unloading, Who Is Responsible?, N. Am. Transp. 
Ass’n).