Case Title: Poston v. Poston

Citation: 161 Vt.591, 657 A.2d 1076

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
ENTRY_ORDER.93-283; 161 Vt.591; 657 A.2d 1076

[Filed 17-Dec-1993]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 93-283

                             OCTOBER TERM, 1993


 Joanne Poston                     }          APPEALED FROM:
                                   }
                                   }
      v.                           }          Orleans Family Court
                                   }
                                   }
 James G. Poston                   }
                                   }          DOCKET NO. S60-89 OsF


              In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter:

      Defendant appeals from a family court order adjudging Merrill Lynch,
 Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. trustee of $31,588.68 of defendant's funds, and
 ordering execution therefor.  We affirm.

      Following the parties' divorce, plaintiff obtained judgment against
 defendant for unpaid child support, maintenance, and attorney's fees.
 Thereafter, she initiated trustee process, and when Merrill Lynch filed a
 disclosure indicating that it held funds belonging to defendant, plaintiff
 sought an order that Merrill Lynch be adjudged trustee and ordered to pay
 plaintiff the sum of $31,588.68.  Defendant failed to respond to plaintiff's
 motion for trustee process, but was allowed to present oral argument in
 opposition to the motion when the court scheduled a hearing on its own
 initiative.  See Williams v. Williams, 158 Vt. 574, 576, 613 A.2d 200, 201
 (1992) (court has discretion whether to hold hearing on post-trial motion).
 Plaintiff, citing V.R.C.P. 78(b)(1), contends that because defendant failed
 to file written objections to the motion, he should not have been allowed to
 raise oral objections at the hearing.  The only sanction specified in the
 rule, however, is that if no memorandum in opposition is filed, the court
 may dispose of the motion without argument.  Further, as defendant points
 out, subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that may be raised at any time,
 see V.R.C.P. 12(h)(3), and defendant may not be foreclosed from raising this
 issue.

      Defendant contests the court's subject matter jurisdiction over his
 Merrill Lynch Cash Management Account on two grounds: (1) the securities in
 the account were not physically seized as required by statute,  see 9A
 V.S.A. { 8-317(1) (no attachment of security valid unless actually seized by
 officer making attachment), and (2) the Cash Management account was not
 located in Vermont.  Defendant also argues that the court erred in ruling
 that personal jurisdiction over Merrill Lynch was a sufficient basis to
 sustain its jurisdiction over the assets in defendant's account, and

 

 reiterates his arguments in more general policy terms, asserting that the
 court's action runs counter to current trends in commercial law.

      Defendant contends that 9A V.S.A. { 8-317(1) requires actual physical
 seizure of the securities in his account or there is no subject matter
 jurisdiction over them.  Nothing in the record, however, identifies specific
 securities included in the account.  The disclosure by Merrill Lynch stated
 that the account contained "sufficient funds and/or securities," and that
 "said funds" had been restricted.  The disclosure acknowledges an
 obligation Merrill Lynch owes defendant but does not attempt to identify
 securities belonging to defendant.  The disclosure makes clear that this is
 not a case involving specific certificates of stock.  Cf. Bahre v. Pearl,