Case Title: B. E. & K. CONSTRUCTION v. ABBOTT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97039

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
B. E. & K. CONSTRUCTION v. ABBOTT  B. E. & K. CONSTRUCTION v. ABBOTT 2002 OK 75 59 P.3d 38 Case Number: 97039 Decided: 10/01/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA B. E. & K. CONSTRUCTION and ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE, Petitioners v. DENNIS ABBOTT and the WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT, Respondents CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II Honorable Susan Witt Conyers, Trial Judge ¶0 While working for the respondent, B. E. & K. Construction (construction company/employer), the petitioner, Dennis Abbott (Abbott/employee), suffered a work-related injury. After returning under light-duty restrictions, the employee volunteered to participate in an employer-planned reduction in force and was terminated. Later, the employee sought temporary total disability benefits from the effective date of his lay-off until he was released by his physician. The employer opposed the award asserting that the employee voluntarily left his position. The trial judge, Honorable Susan Witt Conyers, agreed with the employer and denied benefits. The three-judge panel modified the order reinstating benefits. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the panel's order and remanded for an alteration in the date for onset of benefits. We hold that, even though an injured employee volunteers for inclusion in an employer-planned reduction in force, if the employer makes the final determination to terminate the employee, workers' compensation benefits are payable. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; ORDER OF THREE-JUDGE PANEL SUSTAINED IN PART, OVERRULED IN PART; TRIAL COURT OVERRULED; CAUSE REMANDED. John B. Vera, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, For Petitioner Brandon Burton, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, For Respondent. KAUGER, J: ¶1 A single, first-impression, question of law UNDISPUTED FACTS ¶2 On March 21, 2001, the petitioner, Dennis Abbott (Abbott/employee), while working for the respondent, B. E. & K. Construction (construction company/employer), was injured on the job. When the accident occurred, the employee was approximately thirty feet above ground on an extension ladder. A thirty-pound bearing cap fell, striking Abbott in the head and knocking him to the ground. The employee lost consciousness, cut his brow and suffered injuries to his neck and back. ¶3 Abbott resumed his job the day after the injury on light-duty restrictions. He continued to work from March 22nd ¶4 A hearing on the employee's claim for temporary total disability ¶5 The trial judge, Honorable Susan Witt Conyers, ordered Abbott's temporary total disability terminated effective April 26, 2001. The three judge panel modified the order, directing that temporary benefits be paid from April 26th through August 7, 2001 -- the date the employee was released from treatment by his physician. Finding that the employee left his job without coercion from his employer, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the panel's order and remanded for an alteration in the beginning date for benefits. We granted certiorari on July 2, 2002. ¶6 EVEN THOUGH AN INJURED EMPLOYEE VOLUNTEERS FOR INCLUSION IN AN EMPLOYER-PLANNED REDUCTION IN FORCE, IF THE EMPLOYER MAKES THE FINAL DETERMINATION TO DISCHARGE THE EMPLOYEE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE PAYABLE. ¶7 Although Abbott asked to be included in the employer's reduction in force, he argues that temporary total disability is payable. He asserts that, ultimately, the employer controlled the decision to conduct a layoff and to include him in the reduction in force. The employer concedes that had it either fired or laid off the injured employee, Abbott would be entitled to temporary total disability benefits. ¶8 The employer finds support in three non-precedential opinions released for publication by the Court of Civil Appeals: ¶9 Tubbs provides that an employee, released for light duty, is entitled to temporary total disability benefits if the employer offers no light-duty assignment. The precise issue presented in Tubbs is the effect that an employee's resignation will have on the right to receive benefits. The Court of Civil Appeals determined that employer's are not required to offer light-duty work to former employees not incapacitated and that the employee's resignation severed the employment relationship and the responsibility to pay benefits. Unlike the employee in Tubbs, Abbott did not resign his position nor did he refuse a light-duty assignment. ¶10 The employee in Akers was discharged for cause - failing a drug test. Essentially, the Court of Civil Appeals determined that the employee's own actions were an effective refusal to continue accepting the light-duty work provided by the employer. Although Abbott offered to be included in his employer's reduction in force, he did not leave his employment because of a violation of job related policies. Further, until ordered by his physician to discontinue work, he would have continued his light-duty assignments. ¶11 Hinton involved a single issue: whether an employer must offer light-duty work to an employee to avoid the payment of temporary total disability benefits. ¶12 Several views exist in extant jurisprudence on the issue of the payment of workers' compensation benefits to employees who subsequently leave their jobs. Some courts find that where an employee's separation from employment is voluntary, workers' compensation benefits are not payable. ¶13 Authority is split over whether an employee volunteering to be included in an employer-planned reduction in force, as Abbott did here, should be considered as having effectively resigned from employment. The majority of these cases provide that although an employee may opt for inclusion in an employer-mandated layoff, the layoff itself is still instituted at the employer's prerogative. The fact that the employees may decide among themselves who will bear the burden of termination does not make the employee's departure voluntary. ¶14 The majority recognizes that the ultimate choice and responsibility for unemployment lies only with the employer's decision to reduce available jobs. ¶15 We consider the analysis proffered by the majority of jurisdictions addressing whether an employee's offer to be included in an employer-announced lay off should be considered a voluntary termination persuasive and logical. The majority's conclusions are based in the realities of the workplace -- an employee electing to volunteer for an employer-planned reduction in force does not exercise the ultimate power or final decision as to which employees will be targeted for termination. It is the employer who decides to eliminate a job and to lay off a given individual, based on the employer's needs. It is irrelevant that the employee may have made the employer's determination easier by first volunteering to be laid off. ¶16 We hold that where, as here, an injured employee volunteers for an employer-instigated reduction in force, and the employer makes the ultimate decision to terminate, rights to workers' compensation benefits are not affected. In reaching this result, we align ourselves with the majority of jurisdictions addressing the nature of an employee's actions when deciding to volunteer for an employer-instigated reduction in force. ¶17 Were we not convinced by the majority position, we would still be compelled to hold in favor of the employee. Unquestionably, as the employer recognizes, CONCLUSION ¶18 Today's pronouncement addresses a first impression question of law on undisputed facts. We determine that, under the facts presented -- where Abbott suffered an on-the-job injury while in the course of his employment, volunteered for the employer's instigated reduction in force and was terminated following the construction company's decision to include him in the downsizing program -- the employee is entitled to temporary total disability benefits. Our holding: 1) aligns us with the majority of jurisdictions recognizing that even where an employee may volunteer for inclusion in a reduction-in-force program, it is the employer who has the ultimate control over the jobs which will be eliminated and the employees who will be terminated; CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; ORDER OF THREE-JUDGE PANEL SUSTAINED IN PART, OVERRULED IN PART; TRIAL COURT OVERRULED; CAUSE REMANDED. ¶19 HARGRAVE, C.J., WATT, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, KAUGER, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, JJ. concur. ¶20 OPALA, J. concurs in result. FOOT