Case Title: Commonwealth v. Sullivan

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11504

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11504 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     April 10, 2014. - August 15, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Gants, & Duffly, JJ.1 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, New trial. 
Evidence, Scientific test, Exculpatory. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 24, 1986, and May 14, 1986, respectively.  
 
 
A motion for a new trial, filed on March 9, 2012, was heard 
by Kathe M. Tuttman, J. 
 
 
A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Spina, J., in 
the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
 
Robert J. Bender, Assistant District Attorney (Steven C. 
Hoctor, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  The defendant, Michael J. Sullivan, was 
convicted by a jury in Superior Court of murder in the first 
                     
 
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
 
2 
 
degree and armed robbery arising out of the brutal stomping 
death of Wilfred McGrath.  We affirmed the defendant's 
convictions on direct appeal.  Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 410 
Mass. 521, 533 (1991).  Since then, the defendant has sought 
postconviction relief both in State and Federal courts.2  At 
issue in this case is the defendant's most recent motion for a 
new trial.  As a result of the reexamination by a private 
forensic laboratory of certain physical evidence from the 
defendant's trial, which revealed that the victim's blood was 
not present on a jacket purportedly worn by the defendant during 
the killing, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial based 
                     
 
2 The defendant filed his first motion for a new trial in 
1993 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  The motion was 
denied by the trial judge, and the defendant's subsequent 
application for leave to appeal the ruling was denied by a 
single justice of this court.  In 1996, the defendant filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which also was 
denied.  The defendant pursued further litigation of the 
petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit, which ordered in 2002 that any further Federal 
proceedings be stayed to allow the defendant to exhaust certain 
claims in State court.  The defendant thereafter filed a second 
motion for a new trial in Superior Court in 2008 and, along with 
that motion, requested funds to permit further scientific 
testing of a jacket belonging to the defendant and a hair found 
in the pocket of that jacket.  The defendant's motion for a new 
trial was denied on the merits by a judge in the Superior Court, 
and the defendant's subsequent application for leave to appeal 
was denied by a single justice of this court.  In 2010, the 
defendant renewed his request for funds for testing of the 
jacket.  The judge denied the motion for funds but allowed the 
motion for retesting once informed that the Committee for Public 
Counsel Services Innocence Program was willing to provide funds 
for scientific analysis in a private laboratory. 
3 
 
on newly available evidence.  The motion judge3 granted the 
defendant's motion, and the Commonwealth sought leave to appeal 
from a single justice of this court.  The Commonwealth's 
application was granted, and the Commonwealth argues on appeal 
that the motion judge erred in concluding that the jacket was a 
key piece of corroborative evidence in the case against the 
defendant and that the newly available evidence arising from the 
retesting of the jacket casts real doubt on the justice of the 
defendant's conviction.  We agree with the motion judge, and we 
affirm the order granting the defendant's motion for a new 
trial. 
 
1.  Facts.  The facts surrounding the killing of the victim 
are set forth in detail in Sullivan, 410 Mass. at 522-523.  We 
summarize those facts here and supplement them with other 
relevant facts from the trial record and the facts found by the 
motion judge to be significant with respect to the defendant's 
motion for a new trial, all of which are supported by the 
record. 
 
In the early morning hours of March 7, 1986, the victim, 
Wilfred McGrath, was murdered by kicking and stomping in the 
apartment of an individual named Gary Grace.  Id.  The victim's 
body was looted for drugs, money, and jewelry, including a watch 
                     
 
 
3 As the trial judge had retired, the motion judge was not 
the trial judge. 
4 
 
and gold chains.  Id. at 523.  The victim's body was then 
transported in the trunk of the defendant's car and left in an 
alley behind an abandoned grocery store, where it was discovered 
close to eighteen hours later, after midnight on March 8.  At 
trial, none of these facts was disputed.  The defendant granted 
in his closing argument that the key issue in dispute was 
whether the defendant was present and participated in the 
beating and robbery of the victim. 
 
At trial, the prosecution and the defense each presented 
the testimony of a witness who admitted to being present during 
the killing.  However, the witnesses' respective accounts of the 
killing "diverged sharply."  Id. at 522-523.  One witness 
testified that the defendant kicked and stomped the victim to 
death.  Id.  The other testified that the defendant was not even 
present at the scene.  Id. at 523. 
 
Grace served as the key prosecution witness.  See id. at 
522.  The jury heard evidence that Grace had entered into a plea 
agreement with the Commonwealth which provided that in exchange 
for truthful testimony at the defendant's trial, the 
Commonwealth would withdraw the indictments charging murder and 
armed robbery then pending against Grace for his involvement in 
the killing of McGrath and instead seek an indictment charging 
accessory after the fact, to which Grace would plead guilty and 
5 
 
for which the Commonwealth would recommend a sentence of six to 
seven years.  Id. at 523-524. 
 
Over four days of testimony, including almost two days of 
cross-examination, Grace testified in detail to the 
circumstances of McGrath's death.  He testified that on the 
evening of March 6, 1986, he slept alone in his apartment and 
was awakened by a knock at his door at approximately 7 or 8 A.M.   
The defendant, along with Emil Petrla and Steven Angier, all 
people Grace knew, had arrived at Grace's apartment.   
Accompanying them was the victim, whom Grace testified he had 
not met before.  Grace testified that the defendant was wearing 
sneakers, jeans, and a purple jacket.  Petrla was wearing dress 
shoes, dress pants, a white sweater, and a black jacket.  Angier 
was wearing sneakers, sweat pants, and a sweat shirt.  Grace was 
initially wearing only his underclothes when he answered the 
door but subsequently put on pants, a shirt, and a pair of 
sneakers. 
 
As Grace began to wash up in the bathroom of his apartment, 
the other four men sat in Grace's kitchen, drinking beer and 
using cocaine as the defendant and the victim discussed a 
potential arrangement for the sale of drugs.  At different 
points, the defendant and Petrla each informed Grace that they 
were planning to rob the victim.  Despite Grace's requests that 
they not do so in his apartment, Petrla wrapped a belt around 
6 
 
his hand and struck the victim in the head three times.  The 
victim then either was pulled or fell to the floor.  Grace also 
testified that once the victim was on the floor, Petrla kicked 
the victim three to four times.  The defendant then commenced 
kicking and stomping the victim's head repeatedly, even after 
the victim was unconscious, and despite Grace's, and eventually 
Petrla's, attempts to stop him. 
 
Grace further testified that after the beating, the victim 
lay unconscious on the floor and appeared dead.  There were 
puddles of blood on the floor, blood on the walls, and blood on 
the stove.  Grace testified that the defendant at one point 
ripped gold chains off the victim's neck with such force that 
the victim's body was lifted off the ground.  The defendant, 
Petrla, and Angier also searched the victim's pockets, splitting 
the cash they found among the three of them.  According to 
Grace's testimony, Petrla also took a gold watch from the 
victim's body. 
 
Grace then insisted that the men remove the victim's body 
from his apartment.  Grace, Petrla, and Angier wrapped the body 
in a quilt from Grace's bed along with towels from Grace's 
bathroom while the defendant went outside to move his car.  The 
three men then helped the defendant empty his trunk, and with 
the defendant in the driver's seat, Petrla, Angier, and Grace 
placed the victim's body in the trunk. 
7 
 
 
According to Grace's testimony, the defendant drove the car 
with Petrla riding in the passenger seat, Grace behind the 
defendant, and Angier behind Petrla.  The four men drove 
together first to the area behind the abandoned grocery store 
where Petrla, Angier, and the defendant removed the body from 
the trunk, and then they drove to a car wash where the four men 
attempted to clean the interior and exterior of the car.  After 
leaving the car wash, while still driving, the defendant removed 
one of his sneakers and threw it out the window.  He attempted 
to throw the other one out, but Petrla stopped him from drawing 
attention to the car. 
 
The four men then stopped at a liquor store to purchase 
beer, and then at an apartment to purchase cocaine.  At 
approximately 10:30 A.M., they arrived at the defendant's 
apartment, which he shared with his sister, Kathy Sullivan.  
Grace further testified that later that afternoon, he saw the 
defendant, Petrla, and the defendant's sister, Kathy, go into a 
bedroom in the apartment.  When they emerged fifteen to twenty 
minutes later, Kathy was crying.  While she was washing dishes 
over the sink, the defendant told her not to worry and to "stick 
by your brother no matter what."  Finally, Grace testified that 
after the killing, he saw Petrla wearing the victim's watch and 
that Petrla then told him of his plan to sell the watch for 
cocaine. 
8 
 
 
Testimonial evidence presented at trial tended to 
corroborate Grace's version of the events surrounding the 
victim's death.  First, the investigation had established that 
the night before his death, the victim had been out at a local 
bar called Mallet where he was with the defendant's sister, 
Kathy.  The victim and Kathy went to some other bars with an 
acquaintance before being dropped off by a friend of the 
victim's at Kathy's apartment at approximately 3:30 A.M. on 
March 7.  At 3:30 A.M., Kathy's niece, Kimberly Sullivan, called 
the apartment and spoke to Kathy.  Kimberly then arrived at the 
apartment sometime between 3:30 and 4 A.M.  Kathy, Kimberly, and 
the victim sat in the living room until the victim departed at 
approximately 6 A.M. 
 
Although Kimberly did not see the defendant during that 
time, she saw that the defendant's bedroom door was closed, and 
she saw Kathy's young son, whom the defendant had been 
babysitting that evening.  Kimberly also testified that she saw 
the victim leave the apartment at approximately 6 A.M. and that 
she saw the defendant leave sometime after that.  She testified 
that it was light out when the defendant left, although she was 
not certain whether the defendant left shortly after the victim 
or closer to two hours later at 8 A.M.  Kimberly further 
testified that hours later, around 10:30 A.M., the defendant 
returned to the apartment with Grace, Petrla, and Angier.  
9 
 
According to Kimberly's testimony it appeared that the four men 
arrived together, and they were carrying beer with them.  She 
also testified that Grace and Angier were wearing sneakers on 
their feet and that Petrla was wearing dress shoes.  Unlike 
Grace, however, Kimberly testified that the defendant was 
wearing boots while he was in the apartment, although she also 
testified that the defendant usually wore boots, and she did not 
have a strong memory of what he had on his feet when she saw him 
arrive at the apartment. 
 
Evidence regarding the victim's activities leading up to 
his death, combined with Kimberly's testimony, provided an 
explanation as to how the victim could have come to be in the 
presence of the defendant in the early morning of March 7 when 
he arrived at Grace's apartment.  Additionally, Kimberly's 
testimony was consistent with Grace's as to the time that the 
men arrived at the apartment, what the men were wearing on their 
feet, and the fact that they were carrying beer with them.  Like 
Grace, Kimberly also testified that later in the afternoon on 
March 8, she saw her aunt, Kathy, washing dishes in the kitchen 
with tears in her eyes and heard the defendant say to her, 
"Don't worry about it." 
 
Physical evidence presented to the jury also corroborated 
certain details of Grace's testimony.  The medical examiner 
testified that the victim was likely killed between 6 A.M. and 
10 
 
10 A.M. on March 7 and that two distinct wound patterns appeared 
on the victim's skull.  On one side were wounds consistent with 
the victim having been kicked with a dress shoe, and on the 
other side were more severe blows consistent with a sneaker.  
Additionally, Grace testified that at one point the defendant 
was stomping the victim's head so intensely that he was using 
two feet, almost standing on the victim's head.  This testimony 
was corroborated by an injury that the medical examiner 
described as almost a puncture wound or a "cut out" consistent 
with the heel of a sneaker on the right side of the victim's 
skull. 
 
Certain blood evidence in the apartment and the car was 
also consistent with Grace's testimony.  Grace testified that 
the defendant kicked the victim with such force that at one 
point the defendant had to steady himself against the stove.  
The State chemist who processed Grace's apartment testified that 
the underside of the stove handles tested positive for blood.  
Additionally, trace evidence of blood was found in several 
places in the defendant's car, including on the steering wheel, 
on the turn signal lever, on both the brake and accelerator 
pedals, on the passenger seat on the back of the headrest, and 
on the passenger side window and door frame.  The State chemist 
also testified that he identified what appeared to be an imprint 
consistent with the sole of a sneaker on the quilt in which the 
11 
 
victim's body had been wrapped.  He opined that the imprint 
appeared to him to be consistent with the sole of the sneakers 
Angier was wearing upon his arrest. The instep of Angier's left 
sneaker also tested positive for trace evidence of blood. 
 
Finally, the chemist testified regarding a purple jacket 
that was obtained from the defendant's sister-in-law on the day 
of his arrest and which Grace identified as the same one the 
defendant was wearing during the killing.  First, the chemist 
testified that blood was detected on both cuff areas of the 
jacket.  Second, he testified that a hair was found in a pocket 
of the jacket and that the hair was, in his opinion, 
"consistent" with that of the victim.  This physical evidence 
served to tie the defendant to the scene of the killing and 
could have corroborated Grace's claim that the defendant ripped 
chains from the victim's neck and went through his pockets after 
the beating. 
 
However, not all of the evidence presented to the jury 
corroborated Grace's testimony.  Emil Petrla testified on behalf 
of the defendant.  Petrla had no plea arrangement with the 
Commonwealth and his own trial for murder in the first degree 
for the killing of the victim had not yet taken place.  
Nonetheless, Petrla waived his right under the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution to avoid self-incrimination 
and testified that although he was present during the killing of 
12 
 
the victim, neither the defendant nor Angier was present, and 
Grace was in fact the person who delivered the kicks that 
ultimately crushed the victim's skull.4 
 
Petrla's testimony comported with the timeline established 
by the police investigation and other testimony, yet his version 
of events was quite different from that presented by Grace.  
Petrla testified that on the evening of March 6 the defendant 
was babysitting his nephew, so Petrla borrowed the defendant's 
car.5  From the evening of March 6 until the early morning of 
March 7, Petrla and Grace were together.  Petrla picked up Grace 
at his apartment, and the two drove first to Mallet, where Grace 
purchased cocaine; then to a liquor store; and then back to 
Grace's apartment, where they remained for the evening. 
 
Sometime between 5:30 and 6 A.M. on March 7, the two men 
left Grace's apartment and drove toward the defendant's 
apartment in order to return the car to the defendant before he 
                     
 
4 Petrla also submitted an affidavit in support of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial in which he stated that, 
"[t]o this day," he maintains that his trial testimony was "true 
and accurate."  After the defendant's trial, Petrla entered a 
plea of guilty to a charge of murder in the second degree based 
on his own involvement in the killing, and Petrla remains in 
prison.  He further stated in his affidavit, "I have nothing to 
gain by making something up that is not true about [the 
defendant's] involvement or lack of involvement in the killing." 
 
 
5 Petrla testified that at the time of the killing, Petrla 
had been staying with the defendant in the Sullivan apartment 
and that the defendant had given Petrla the second set of keys 
to his car, permitting Petrla to use the car whenever the 
defendant did not need it himself. 
13 
 
needed it for work.  As they drove toward the defendant's 
apartment, Grace noticed the victim waiting by a taxicab stand.  
Petrla testified that he did not know the victim, but that Grace 
called him by name and invited him into the car.  The three men 
then reversed direction and returned to Grace's apartment, where 
Grace asked the victim to provide him with cocaine.  The victim 
did so, and Grace went into his bathroom to use the cocaine. 
 
Petrla testified that Grace then emerged from the bathroom 
screaming at the victim about the poor quality of the cocaine.  
The victim and Grace then began screaming at each other, and 
punches were thrown, at which point Grace was knocked to the 
ground.  Petrla testified that in order to help Grace, he 
grabbed a nearby belt, wrapped it around his hand, and punched 
the victim in the head, which knocked him to the ground near the 
stove.  Petrla then kicked the victim a few times, at which 
point Grace became so enraged that he began kicking and stomping 
the victim's head repeatedly until Petrla stopped him.  Petrla 
testified that after the beating, Grace was the one who searched 
the victim's pockets, taking cocaine, money, and the victim's 
gold chains and watch, and that Grace and Petrla alone disposed 
of the body using the defendant's car. 
 
According to Petrla, after he and Grace left the body 
behind the abandoned grocery store and proceeded to the car wash 
where they cleaned the defendant's car, the two men returned to 
14 
 
the neighborhood of the Sullivan apartment where they 
encountered the defendant and Angier outside on the street.  The 
four men then proceeded together into the Sullivan apartment, 
and all four used cocaine in the defendant's bedroom.  After 
Grace botched an attempt to use cocaine intravenously, resulting 
in blood spraying on the defendant's ceiling, the defendant 
asked him to leave the apartment.  According to Petrla, Grace 
did not return to the Sullivan apartment that day.  Petrla 
testified that some days later, however, he accompanied Grace to 
the apartment of a woman named Rosemary Squires-Clark to whom 
Grace sold the victim's watch. 
 
Certain evidence presented at trial also corroborated 
Petrla's version of events.  The defense presented the testimony 
of both Rosemary Squires-Clark and her seventeen year old son, 
John Squires, regarding the victim's watch.  John Squires 
testified that he knew Grace and that Grace approached him and 
offered to sell him the watch, at which point Squires told Grace 
that he was interested in purchasing it, but that Grace would 
have to come back when his mother was home.  Additionally, 
Squires-Clark testified that she purchased the watch from Grace, 
not Petrla, and that at the time she purchased it, Grace came 
into her bedroom alone with the watch and stated to her, "Don't 
tell anybody I got it off him, I don't want to hurt anybody's 
feelings."  Evidence was further presented that Squires-Clark 
15 
 
identified Grace as the person who sold her the watch in a 
photographic array soon after she turned the watch over to the 
police.  Additionally, the jury heard evidence that two of 
Grace's bloody fingerprints were found on the inside of the 
passenger-side window of the defendant's car.  This evidence 
corroborated Petrla's testimony that he was driving the 
defendant's car with Grace riding in the passenger seat, and it 
undermines Grace's testimony that he rode in the rear of the car 
on the driver's side. 
 
Petrla's testimony also was undermined by certain evidence 
presented at trial.  The prosecution elicited from Petrla on 
cross-examination that in the year between the killing and the 
defendant's trial, Petrla and the defendant had been housed in 
the same jail, on the same floor.  Petrla testified that he and 
the defendant ate their meals together and spent recreation time 
together, and that since the trial had commenced he and the 
defendant had spoken daily about its progress.  Therefore, the 
prosecution raised the inference that Petrla and the defendant 
had concocted a plausible alternative version of events to 
exculpate the defendant.  However, no evidence was presented to 
explain why Petrla would testify falsely on behalf of the 
defendant only to admit to his own involvement in a brutal 
robbery and killing.  Additionally, Petrla admitted that he was 
wearing dress shoes when the victim was killed.  However, he 
16 
 
testified that Grace was wearing work boots, not sneakers.   
Petrla also testified that Grace did not return to the Sullivan 
apartment on the afternoon of March 7.  However, Grace's 
testimony was consistent with Kimberly Sullivan's regarding 
seeing Kathy Sullivan in tears while washing dishes that 
afternoon. 
 
Ultimately, the parties each acknowledged that the case 
came down to an evaluation of the credibility of the two key 
witnesses:  Grace and Petrla.  In closing, defense counsel began 
by seeking to undermine the strength of the evidence related to 
the defendant's purple jacket, asking why, if the defendant were 
truly the killer, there was not more blood on the jacket in 
light of the amount of blood at the scene, and why the defendant 
would not have disposed of the jacket between the time of the 
killing on March 7 and his arrest on March 24.  Further, defense 
counsel sought to undermine the chemist's testimony that the 
hair in the jacket pocket was consistent with the victim's by 
describing numerous weaknesses in hair comparison methodology 
and reminding the jury that the hair had not been compared to 
any other people with whom the defendant had contact, such as 
his sister or niece or girlfriend.  Counsel used the remainder 
of closing to emphasize the reasons that the jury should not 
credit Grace's testimony and reminded the jury that unlike 
17 
 
Grace, Petrla had no plea arrangement and testified against his 
own penal interest. 
 
The prosecution, in contrast, spoke at length about the 
reasons to believe Grace over Petrla.  The prosecutor emphasized 
that Grace had given consistent statements regarding the major 
details of the crime from his first statement the day he was 
arrested, to a letter he wrote approximately one month later 
detailing the killings, and throughout his lengthy trial 
testimony.  The prosecutor also described Petrla's testimony as 
a "chain of incredible coincidences."  Further, the prosecution 
repeatedly emphasized the consistency between Grace's version of 
events and the physical evidence, including the blood on the 
rear of the headrest and the door jambs of the defendant's car, 
the bloody footprint on the quilt found with the victim's body 
which appeared consistent with Angier's sneakers, and the blood 
on the cuffs of the purple jacket and the hair found in the 
pocket which the prosecution argued tied the defendant directly 
to the crime. 
 
Ultimately, the jury appear to have credited Grace's 
testimony over Petrla's as they found the defendant guilty of 
armed robbery and murder in the first degree. 
 
2.  Newly available evidence.  In 2011, the defendant's 
motion for scientific testing of the purple jacket was granted.  
The jacket was analyzed once again by the State police crime 
18 
 
laboratory, and cuttings of the jacket cuffs as well as the hair 
fragment were submitted to a private laboratory for scientific 
analysis, including the comparison of deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) profiles.  
 
The State police crime laboratory reported that it retested 
the cuffs of the jacket and that the cuffs screened negative for 
the presence of blood.  The private laboratory also tested the 
cuffs for the presence of blood, and it compared a DNA sample 
from the victim with DNA found on the jacket.  Like the State 
police crime laboratory, the private laboratory found that the 
cuffs screened negative for the presence of blood.  
Additionally, although the substance on the cuffs contained a 
mixture of two DNA profiles, the private laboratory excluded the 
victim as the source of either profile.  Moreover, the 
laboratory reported that attempts to match the hair found in the 
pocket to a sample of the victim's hair were "inconclusive" due 
to a mixture of two or more DNA profiles on the hair fragment.  
By comparison, at trial, the forensic chemist from the State 
police crime laboratory testified that the cuffs of the jacket 
tested positive for blood and that in his opinion the hair 
fragment found in the pocket "was consistent with" that of the 
victim. 
 
On the basis of the new test results, the defendant filed a 
motion for a new trial arguing that the test results cast real 
19 
 
doubt on the justice of the defendant's conviction in light of 
the importance of the forensic evidence in a case such as this 
where the jury were asked to assess the competing credibility of 
two eyewitnesses.  The judge granted the defendant's motion on 
the basis that had these new test results been available at the 
time of trial, they would likely have eliminated the purple 
jacket as evidence linking the defendant to the crime, and the 
defendant would have been able to argue that there was no 
physical evidence tying him directly to the killing.  
Consequently, in a case that came down to two competing 
eyewitness accounts of the killing, the physical evidence 
stemming from the purple jacket, which was the only physical 
evidence tying the defendant to the scene, likely was a "real 
factor" in the jury's deliberations such that its elimination 
would cast real doubt on the justice of the defendant's 
conviction. 
 
3.  Discussion.  In a motion for a new trial based on new 
evidence, the defendant must show that the evidence is either 
"newly discovered" or "newly available"6 and that it "casts real 
                     
 
6 Newly discovered evidence is evidence that was unknown to 
the defendant or counsel and not reasonably discoverable by them 
at the time of trial.  Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 306 
(1986).  Newly available evidence is evidence that was 
unavailable at the time of trial for a reason such as a 
witness's assertion of a privilege against testifying or, as 
here, because a particular forensic testing methodology had not 
yet been developed or gained acceptance by the courts.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Mathews, 450 Mass. 858, 870-871 (2008); 
20 
 
doubt" on the justice of the defendant's conviction."  See 
Commonwealth v. Cintron, 435 Mass. 509, 516 (2001); Commonwealth 
v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305 (1986).  New evidence will cast 
real doubt on the justice of the conviction if there is a 
substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different 
conclusion had the evidence been admitted at trial.  Grace, 
supra at 306.  The standard is not whether the verdict would 
have been different, but whether the evidence probably would 
have been a "real factor" in the jury's deliberations.  Id. 
 
Such fact-specific analysis requires a thorough knowledge 
of trial proceedings.  Id.  Therefore, we afford special 
deference to the rulings of a motion judge who was also the 
trial judge.  Id. at 307.   Where, as here, the motion judge was 
not the trial judge and the motion judge did not make 
credibility determinations arising from an evidentiary hearing, 
we consider ourselves in as good a position as the motion judge 
to review the trial record.  See Commonwealth v. Raymond, 450 
Mass. 729, 733 (2008).  See also Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 
Mass. 169, 176 (1999).  Nevertheless, we review a judge's 
decision on a defendant's motion for a new trial based on the 
common-law claim of newly discovered evidence for a "significant 
error of law or other abuse of discretion."  Grace, supra at 
                                                                  
Commonwealth v. Cintron, 435 Mass. 509, 518 (2001).  "The 
standard applied to a motion for a new trial based on newly 
available evidence is the same as applied to one based on newly 
discovered evidence."  Cintron, supra at 516. 
21 
 
307.  See Cintron, 435 Mass. at 517 ("In the absence of a 
constitutional error, the granting of a motion for a new trial 
on the ground of newly discovered evidence rests in the sound 
discretion of the judge").  We will reverse a judge's ruling on 
appeal only if the decision is "manifestly unjust."  
Commonwealth v. Moore, 408 Mass. 117, 125 (1990). 
 
Here, the Commonwealth does not dispute that the results of 
the scientific analysis by the private laboratory constitute 
"newly available evidence" in the requisite sense.  Therefore, 
we consider only whether the motion judge abused her discretion 
in concluding that the test results cast real doubt on the 
justice of the defendant's conviction.  We conclude that she did 
not. 
 
The results of the reexamination of the purple jacket by 
both the State crime laboratory and a private forensic 
laboratory demonstrated first that the cuffs tested negative for 
the presence of blood, and second that DNA on the cuffs 
definitively was not that of the victim.  Third, the 
"inconclusive" results of the attempted DNA comparison between 
the hair found in the jacket pocket and the victim's hair mean 
that the hair cannot be identified as that of the victim. 
 
The results of this new testing justify the grant of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial for several reasons.  First, 
the results relate to the central issue in this case:  whether 
22 
 
the defendant was present during the killing of the victim.  
This is not like cases in which evidence, although new, was 
relevant to only a tangential matter.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Staines, 441 Mass. 521, 531-534 (2004) (new evidence tending 
to prove alleged third-party culprit had driven defendant's car 
on one occasion did not warrant new trial where evidence did not 
shed light on central question of who had placed cocaine behind 
dashboard of defendant's car).  Further, the purported blood on 
the defendant's cuffs and the hair in defendant's pocket were 
not merely cumulative of other physical evidence presented at 
trial.  They were different in kind because they served as the 
sole pieces of physical evidence indicating the defendant had 
been in the presence of the victim during the killing.  See 
Cintron, 435 Mass. at 518. 
 
Additionally, the evidence presented against the defendant 
at trial was not otherwise so compelling as to render this new 
evidence unlikely to have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations.  Compare Raymond, 450 Mass. at 731, 734 (new 
evidence that key prosecution witness may have had plea 
agreement at time of testimony did not warrant new trial where 
other evidence against defendant, including defendant's own 
confession, was "overwhelming").  Here, the defendant presented 
testimony of an eyewitness who not only described a very 
different version of events but also testified against his own 
23 
 
penal interest, waiving his rights and implicating himself in a 
murder and armed robbery.  Additionally, the defense presented 
the testimony of two witnesses who undermined a key aspect of 
Grace's story -- that he had nothing to do with taking and 
selling the victim's watch.  Moreover, physical evidence also 
tied Grace himself to the killings, including his bloody 
fingerprint on the inside passenger side of the defendant's car, 
and his own admission that he was wearing sneakers, which the 
medical examiner opined were the sort of shoes that could have 
delivered the severe blows to the right side of the victim's 
skull. 
 
Finally, the new evidence that neither the victim's blood 
nor DNA was found on the cuffs of the defendant's jacket 
justifies the grant of a new trial because it does more than 
merely impeach the forensic chemist who testified for the 
prosecution.  Rather, the new evidence negates a key piece of 
physical evidence that the prosecution relied on in arguing that 
the jury should credit Grace's testimony.  Had the evidence from 
the private laboratory been available at the time of Grace's 
trial, it would not merely have served to cast doubt on the 
reliability of the methods used to test other surfaces for the 
presence of blood.  It effectively would have eliminated a key 
piece of physical evidence linking the defendant to the killing.  
Therefore, this new evidence is more than mere impeachment 
24 
 
evidence, which, alone, is usually insufficient to warrant a new 
trial.  See Commonwealth v. Sleeper, 435 Mass. 581, 607 (2002). 
 
We acknowledge, as did the motion judge, that much of the 
evidence the Commonwealth presented against the defendant 
remains, and that the Commonwealth may have been able to carry 
its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed murder in the first degree even without the evidence 
of the purple jacket.  However, our inquiry is not whether the 
verdict may have been different, but whether the evidence in 
question probably served as a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations.  Grace, 397 Mass. at 306.  In light of this, we 
cannot ignore the fact that but for the purple jacket, the jury 
would not have been presented with any physical evidence 
connecting the defendant's person to the crime scene or the 
victim's blood.  Without the purple jacket, the defendant could 
have argued at closing that not one piece of physical evidence 
linked the defendant directly to the killing of the victim.  
Combined with the testimony of defense witnesses, this fact may 
have been sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of 
the jury.  At the very least, the evidence was probably a real 
factor in the jury's deliberations because it was one of the 
pieces of physical evidence that the prosecution pointed to more 
than once in closing as a basis on which to credit Grace's 
testimony over that of Petrla. 
25 
 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the motion judge did not abuse 
her discretion in ruling that physical evidence arising from the 
purple jacket served as a "real factor" in the jury's 
deliberations such that the new test results cast real doubt on 
the justice of the defendant's conviction.  The judgment 
granting the defendant's motion for a new trial is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.