Case Title: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Ins. Dept.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-52

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Ins. Dept.1983 WY 119672 P.2d 810Case Number: 83-52Case Number: 83-52Decided: 11/18/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
ALLSTATE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, TRUCK 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE, MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY, STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, AND STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLANTS 
(PETITIONERS),

 
 
v.

 
 
WYOMING 
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, J.T. LANGDON, AS INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, AND THOMAS E. POWER, AS HEARING OFFICER FOR THE WYOMING INSURANCE 
DEPARTMENT, APPELLEES (RESPONDENTS).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court, Laramie County, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

 
 
John 
A. Sundahl and George E. Powers, Jr., of Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, for appellants.

 
 
A.G. 
McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Kelly S. Davis, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellees.

 
 
Before 
ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN 
and CARDINE, JJ.

 
 

ROSE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     On February 11, 1983 
the district court affirmed administrative orders of the hearing officer for the 
Wyoming Insurance Department dated December 13, 1982 and December 28, 1982. The 
hearing officer's decisions upheld and affirmed an earlier order of the Wyoming 
Insurance Department which, on May 25, 1982, had the effect of withdrawing - for 
compulsory-insurance compliance purposes - the insurance commissioner's prior 
approval of all automobile liability-policy forms containing what is known in 
the insurance business as the "household exclusion clause." The policy forms in 
question contain household-exclusion language which excepts coverage from any 
loss to any insured or any spouse, relative or member of the family of an 
insured residing in the same household as the insured. It is stipulated that the 
exclusion clauses in the policies encompass persons who fall outside of and are 
in addition to the husband-and-wife, and parent-and-child categories, for which 
some courts have held that common-law immunity has traditionally existed. The 
hearing officer in his order of December 13, 1982, found and concluded that the 
household-exclusion clauses contained in the appellant insurance companies' 
liability policies are not excepted by statute.1 He went on to reason that the 
policies therefore violate the plain language of the statutes and the public 
policy of the state of Wyoming as that language and public policy are contained 
in the compulsory insurance statute, § 31-4-120, W.S. 1977, 1983 Cum.Supp., when 
the motor vehicle safety responsibility act, § 31-9-101, et seq., W.S. 1977, 
(hereinafter referred to as the financial responsibility law), the compulsory 
insurance statute, § 31-4-120, supra, and the uninsured motor vehicles act, § 
31-10-101, et seq., W.S. 1977, are considered together.

 
 

[¶2.]     The December 13 order 
made reference to the fact that the legislature, under the compulsory insurance 
statute, had directed that all motor vehicle owners in the state who operate or 
permit the operation of a motor vehicle must have an acceptable bond in effect 
or be insured against bodily-injury and property-damage liability. The 
automobile liability-insurance provision of § 31-4-120(a), W.S. 1977, 
says:

 
 
"(a) 
No owner of a motor vehicle required to be licensed shall operate or permit the 
operation of the vehicle without having in full force and effect an automobile 
liability policy as provided by W.S. 31-9-403 * * *."2

 
 

[¶3.]     The hearing officer 
found that the household-exclusion clause had the effect of eliminating the 
minimum liability security which is mandated by § 31-9-405(b)(ii) and § 
31-9-102(a)(x), W.S. 1977 of the financial responsibility law and § 31-10-101 of 
the uninsured motor vehicles act,3 and, to the extent of such minimum 
coverage, was void for any purposes contemplated by the compulsory insurance 
statute.4 The rule of Alm v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 
Wyo., 369 P.2d 216 (1962), to which the hearing officer had reference, supra n. 
4, holds that the parties have the right to embody in their insurance contracts 
whatever lawful terms they wish. It was his judgment that the companies remained 
free to include in their policies any such provisions as were not inconsistent 
with the public policy and the statutes of the state of 
Wyoming.

 
 

[¶4.]     In response, it is the 
contention of the appellant insurance companies that there is in fact an 
exception to Wyoming's compulsory-insurance mandate which is made applicable 
through the provisions of § 31-9-405(b)(ii) and (c), supra n. 3, and the 
uninsured motor vehicles act, § 31-10-101, supra. These statutes provide in 
relevant part that the vehicle owner's policy of liability insurance need only 
insure the named and other insureds "against [or from] loss from the liability 
imposed by law," and that policies containing the household exclusionary clauses 
do in fact furnish the required coverage.

 
 

[¶5.]     The insurance companies 
reason this way:

 
 

[¶6.]     When the compulsory 
insurance statute (§ 31-4-120(a)) speaks of the automobile owner being possessed 
of such a public liability policy as is contemplated by § 31-9-403, supra n. 2, 
of the financial responsibility law, the legislature intended that the liability 
policy need only contain such coverage as is envisioned by the financial 
responsibility law taken as a whole, including § 31-9-405(b)(ii) and (c) of that 
act (supra, n. 3), as well as the language of the uninsured motor vehicles act, 
and that any exclusions which are there contained and applicable to these 
provisions of the statute are, therefore, applicable to the compulsory insurance 
statute. It follows - say the appellants - that, if insurance policies 
containing the household exclusion are acceptable to the financial 
responsibility law and the uninsured motor vehicles act, they are, therefore, 
certifiable for compulsory - insurance purposes. This conclusion is reached 
through a course of logic which goes like this: Since this court has adopted the 
intra-family and inter-spousal immunity doctrine,5 the same policies which contained 
the household exclusionary clauses and were satisfactory for all purposes under 
the financial responsibility law and uninsured motor vehicles act, are also 
adequate for purposes of complying with the compulsory insurance statute for the 
reason that there is no possibility of "loss from the liability imposed by law" 
under either the financial responsibility law or the uninsured motor vehicles 
act as regards these family-household categories of 
individuals.

 
 

[¶7.]     It follows, say the 
appellant companies, that the household-exclusion clauses of the policies are 
compatible with this court's immunity decisions and, therefore, with the public 
policy announced in the compulsory insurance statute.

 
 

[¶8.]     The insurance companies 
identify these following issues for our appellate 
consideration:

 
 
"I. 
DOES THE FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE VIOLATE THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF 
WYOMING AS EMBODIED IN THE MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY-RESPONSIBILITY 
ACT?

 
 
"II. 
DOES THE FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE VIOLATE THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF 
WYOMING AS EMBODIED IN THE COMPULSORY INSURANCE STATUTE?

 
 
"III. 
DOES THE FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE VIOLATE THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF 
WYOMING AS EMBODIED IN THE UNINSURED MOTORIST ACT?"

 
 

[¶9.]     We perceive the main 
issue for decision to be more succinctly stated as 
follows:

 
 
Does 
the "loss from the liability imposed by law" language of the financial 
responsibility law and the uninsured motor vehicles act constitute an exception 
to the minimum coverage mandated by the compulsory insurance 
statute?

 
 

[¶10.]  For purposes of this opinion, we agree 
with the insurance companies that all relevant provisions of both the financial 
responsibility law and the uninsured motor vehicles act must be considered 
together when ascertaining the public policy which has been announced by the 
legislature through the enactment of the compulsory insurance statute. This 
means that the "liability imposed by law" language of both the financial 
responsibility law and the uninsured motor vehicles act must be taken into 
account when attempting to identify the public policy contained in the 
compulsory law. In undertaking our task, we must decide whether or not this 
language of the financial responsibility law and the uninsured motor vehicles 
act was intended to embrace inter-spousal and intra-family immunity in such a 
way as to effectively structure an exception to the compulsory insurance statute 
which contemplates that all owners of motor vehicles will be 
insured.

 
 

[¶11.]  We will affirm and hold that the 
compulsory-insurance provisions of the Wyoming statute (§ 31-4-120, supra), when 
considered together with the financial responsibility law (§ 31-9-101, et seq., 
supra) and the uninsured motor vehicles act (§ 31-10-101, supra), identify an 
overriding public policy which requires that automobile public-liability and 
property-damage insurance policies issued in purported compliance with the 
compulsory insurance statute, § 31-4-120, supra, must - to the extent of such 
minimum liability security as is identified in §§ 31-9-405(b)(ii) and 
31-9-102(a)(x), supra - cover all owners of motor vehicles who operate or permit 
the operation of their motor vehicles in Wyoming. Further, we will hold that no 
Wyoming statutes, nor any controlling Wyoming case law, make any such exceptions 
to the mandatory requirements of the compulsory-insurance provisions of § 
31-4-120, supra, as are contemplated by the household-exclusion clauses 
contained in the insurance companies' policies.

 
 

[¶12.]  In coming to these conclusions, we 
observe that, in Wyoming, the degree of protection afforded the motoring public 
and the requirements imposed on vehicle owners in order to maintain that degree 
of protection are embodied in the compulsory insurance statute (§ 31-4-120, 
supra), the financial responsibility law (§ 31-9-101 et seq., supra), and the 
uninsured motor vehicles act (§ 31-10-101 et seq., supra). The three acts must 
be considered together, keeping in mind the overriding public policy as 
announced in the compulsory insurance statute, the most recently enacted of the 
three statutes. Since the exceptions to the liability-insurance requirements set 
out in § 31-9-405(e), W.S. 1977,6 do not conflict with the public 
policy of protecting the motoring public, these exceptions legitimately limit 
the coverage required by the compulsory insurance statute. However, the § 
31-9-405(e) exceptions and the exception for self-insurers expressed in § 
31-4-120(c), W.S. 1977, 1983 Cum.Supp., itself are the only exceptions to 
liability-insurance coverage which can be found or read into the compulsory 
motor vehicle insurance statute, without violating public 
policy.

 
 

[¶13.]  The effect of this holding is to find 
that Wyoming's compulsory insurance statute overrules the former holdings of 
this court which recognize intra-family and inter-spousal immunity to and 
including the minimum requirements contained in the financial responsibility law 
and the uninsured motor vehicles act. In consequence, the household-immunity 
clauses of the appellants' policies - to the extent of the aforesaid minimum 
requirements - are rendered void and of no force and 
effect.

 
 
THE 
PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF WYOMING IS AS ANNOUNCED IN THE COMPULSORY 
INSURANCE STATUTE, § 31-4-120, W.S. 1977, 1983 CUM.SUPP., AND, TO THE EXTENT OF 
THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS CONTEMPLATED BY THE STATUTE, NEITHER THIS STATUTE, NOR 
ANY OTHER STATUTE, NOR APPLICABLE COURT DECISIONS CONSTITUTE OR ENVISION 
CONSTITUTE OR ENVISION SUCH EXCEPTIONS AS WILL RENDER VALID THE HOUSEHOLD 
EXCLUSIONS CONTAINED IN THE POLICIES OF THE APPELLANTS

 
 

[¶14.]  Our identification of the compelling 
public policy will point our way to decision in this appeal. Since it is urged 
that the language of the financial responsibility law and the uninsured motor 
vehicles act constitutes exceptions to the compulsory-insurance mandate, we are 
confronted with a question of statutory interpretation as we search for the 
prevailing public policy.

 
 

[¶15.]  This court has no difficulty in coming to 
the conclusion that the language of § 31-4-120(a), supra, describes the 
legislature's public-policy position on the subject of automobile liability 
insurance and the family-immunity doctrine does not constitute an exception to 
this public policy. The compulsory insurance statute says that no owner shall operate or permit the 
operating of a vehicle required to be licensed without having liability 
insurance. The only exceptions to this requirement are specifically spelled out 
in the compulsory insurance statute and the financial responsibility law. These 
exceptions contemplate only those situations where the owner is self-insured, 
where workers' compensation considerations are taken into account, where an 
employer-employee relationship exists, and where such other circumstances as are 
specifically set out in § 31-9-405(e), supra n. 6, are found to be present. 
There are no other statutory exceptions which can be found or read into the 
compulsory insurance statute.

 
 

[¶16.]  As can be seen, the foregoing groups of 
exceptions do not include the persons and classes of persons embraced by the 
household-exclusion clauses contained in the policies of the appellant insurance 
companies. It therefore follows that for this court to give effect to the 
household-exclusion provisions of the appellants' policies in face of the 
mandatory automobile liability insurance provisions of the compulsory insurance 
statute would be for us to render the excluded motor vehicle owner uninsured 
where suits are brought by household family members. The effect of such a 
decision would be to violate the statutes and public policy of the state of 
Wyoming and, in many instances, to immunize insureds against rights of action 
which might otherwise lie.7

 
 
The 
Law

 
 
The 
Public Policy

 
 

[¶17.]  The key to our decision will be found in 
our identifying and giving force and effect to the public policy of the state of 
Wyoming as that public policy is announced through the compulsory insurance 
statute, § 31-4-120(a), which, as we have seen, provides:

 
 
"No 
owner of a motor vehicle required to be licensed shall operate or permit the 
operation of the vehicle without having in full force and effect an automobile 
liability policy as provided by W.S. 31-9-403 or bond in amounts provided by 
W.S. 31-9-102(a)(x)."

 
 

[¶18.]  Public-policy identification is 
indispensable to the decision-making process here because, even though the 
compulsory insurance statute provides that all owners of motor vehicles will be 
possessed of automobile liability insurance, the insurance companies say that 
this public-policy pronouncement is subject to the family-exclusion exception 
contained in the "against loss from the liability imposed by law" language of 
the financial responsibility law and the uninsured motor vehicles act. We hold 
to the contrary, based upon what we perceive to be the overriding public policy 
as announced in the compulsory insurance statute, which says that all motor vehicle owners will be covered 
by liability insurance - not just some of them.

 
 

[¶19.]  It was said in Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Company v. 
Wiscomb, 25 Wn. App. 841, 611 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1980):

 
 
"`Public 
policy is a term not easily defined. Its significance varies as the habits and 
needs of a people may vary. It is not static and the field of application is an 
ever increasing one. A contract, or a particular provision therein, valid in one 
era may be wholly opposed to the public policy of another. . . . Courts keep in 
mind the principle that the best interests of society demand that persons should 
not be unnecessarily restricted in their freedom to contract. But they do not 
hesitate to declare void as against public policy contractual provisions which 
clearly tend to the injury of the public in some way.'

 
 
"Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 94-95 (1960), quoted with approval in Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wn.2d 198, 200-01, 
484 P.2d 405 (1971). See also McCutcheon 
v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wn.2d 443, 486 P.2d 1093 
(1971)."

 
 

[¶20.]  While the parties to an insurance 
contract have the right to embody in the policy such lawful terms as they wish, 
Alm v. Hartford Fire Insurance 
Company, supra, the insurance agreement must not conflict with pertinent 
statutes or public policy. McKay v. 
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, Wyo., 421 P.2d 166 
(1966); Cincinnati Insurance Company v. 
Mallon, 409 N.E.2d 1100 (Ind. App. 1980). In the case last mentioned, the 
Indiana appellate court put the rule this way:

 
 
"An 
insurance company is free to determine by its contract what risks it is 
undertaking to insure, provided policy 
provisions do not violate statutory mandates or are not against public 
policy. As summarized in 43 Am.Jur.2d, Insurance § 
279:

 
 
"`[S]ince 
the parties to an insurance contract may make the contract in any legal form 
they desire, insurance companies have, in 
the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, the same right as 
individuals to limit their liability and to impose whatever conditions they 
please upon their obligations, not 
inconsistent with public policy. Consequently, if such exceptions, 
exclusions and limitations are plainly expressed, insurers are entitled to have 
them construed and enforced as expressed.'" (Emphasis added.) 409 N.E.2d  at 
1103.

 
 

[¶21.]  In Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Company v. Wiscomb, supra, 611 P.2d  at 1307,

 
 
"Traditionally, 
insurance contracts have been considered to be private contracts between the 
parties. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 50 Wn.2d 443, 313 P.2d 347 (1957); Vandivort Constr. Co. v. Seattle Tennis Club, 11 Wn. App. 303, 522 P.2d 198 (1974). As private contractor, the insurer was permitted 
to limit its liability unless inconsistent with public policy or statute. 
Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Willrich, 13 Wn.2d 263, 124 P.2d 950 (1942); 7 S. 
Williston, Contracts § 900, at 28 (3d ed. 1963); 7 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of 
Insurance Law § 36:49 (2d ed. 1961); 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 241 (Supp. 1979)." 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 
With 
respect to public-policy considerations, the Washington appellate court went on 
to say:

 
 
"* 
* * Because of the important policy considerations inherent in excluding 
coverage to large classes of persons, courts strictly scrutinize exclusions to 
see whether they comport with public policy. See Touchette v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 
80 Wn.2d 327, 494 P.2d 479 (1972)." 611 P.2d  at 1307.

 
 
Public 
Policy and Compulsory Insurance

 
 

[¶22.]  The public-policy pronouncements of a 
legislative enactment will be ascertained by looking to the purpose of the law. 
The purpose of compulsory automobile liability insurance

 
 
"* 
* * is to protect members of the general public injured on the highways through 
the operation of the covered motor vehicle, by giving them security for the 
payment of their damages." Couch on Insurance 2d, § 45:682, p. 
319.

 
 

[¶23.]  It is said in 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile 
Insurance § 22, p. 468:

 
 
"Compulsory 
liability insurance is principally designed to protect travelers and to provide 
compensation to persons injured as a result of the negligent operation of motor 
vehicles, rather than to protect the motor vehicle operator from loss, through 
making vehicle registration conditional upon a showing by the registrant that he 
has liability insurance coverage on that vehicle."

 
 
Construction 
of Compulsory Insurance Statutes and Policies

 
 

[¶24.]  A compulsory liability policy is to be 
construed most strongly against the insurer - that is, such statutes as those 
with which we are here concerned must be liberally or broadly construed in favor 
of the insured in order to accomplish its purpose. Couch on Insurance 2d, supra, 
Automobile Insurance § 45:692, p. 330.8 Any ambiguities will be construed 
against the insurer.9 It is uniformly held that the 
compulsory insurance statutes and policies issued thereunder must be construed 
in the light of the purpose and public policy of the statute and liberally to 
advance the aim sought. Couch on Insurance 2d, supra, § 45:692, p. 330. The 
policy and the compulsory insurance statute relating thereto must be read and 
construed together as though the statute were part of the contract, and it has 
been said:

 
 
"A 
policy of insurance must be construed to satisfy the provisions of the law by 
which it was required, particularly when the policy specifies that it was issued 
to conform to the statutory requirement; and where an insurance policy has been 
issued in pursuance of the requirement of a statute which forbids the operation 
of a motor vehicle until good and sufficient security has been given, the court 
should construe this statute and the policy together in the light of the 
legislative purpose." Couch on Insurance 2d, supra, § 45:694, p. 
332.

 
 
Finally, 
the aforesaid writer says that

 
 
"[t]he 
statute is manifestly superior to and controls the policy; and its provisions 
supersede any conflicting provisions of the policy." Couch on Insurance, 2d, 
supra, § 45:697, p. 334.

 
 
Exclusions 
and Exemptions

 
 

[¶25.]  Recalling that there are certain 
exemptions which are specified in the statutes (see §§ 31-4-120, supra, and 
31-9-405(e)), supra n. 6, while the exception for which the companies contend is 
not mentioned, it is worthwhile calling up the rule of construction that 
says:

 
 
"The 
express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things." Citizens Mutual Insurance Company v. Central 
National Insurance Company of Omaha, 65 Mich. App. 349, 237 N.W.2d 322 
(1975).

 
 
We 
said in Town of Pine Bluffs v. State 
Board of Equalization, 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700, 708 
(1958):

 
 
"We 
have another rule which in effect is similar to the rule already mentioned as 
applied to the case, namely:

 
 
"`* 
* * where a statute enumerates the subject or things on which it is to operate, 
or the persons affected, or forbids certain things, it is to be construed as 
excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned * * *.' 82 C.J.S. 
Statutes § 333."

 
 
 

 
 
The 
Financial Responsibility Law, the Uninsured Motor Vehicles Act and the 
Compulsory Insurance Statute Compared

 
 

[¶26.]  In attempting to ascertain whether or not 
the family exclusion urged by the companies may be said to be contemplated as 
integral to the public policy announced through the compulsory insurance 
statute, we must compare the purpose of the compulsory insurance statute with 
the purpose of the financial responsibility law and the uninsured motor vehicles 
act. When we make this comparison, it will readily be seen that the financial 
responsibility law, the uninsured motor vehicles act and the compulsory 
insurance statute were intended to serve distinct and separate purposes and - 
where a family household exclusion might be acceptable as the public policy of 
the state for uninsured-motorist and financial-responsibility purposes - this 
could not possibly be true where a compulsory-insurance mandate is 
concerned.

 
 

[¶27.]  Given the purpose of the financial 
responsibility law as gleaned from the language of the act itself, it is 
necessary to conclude that, while in the restricted class of cases to which the 
act applies (those who have had an accident and did not carry liability 
insurance and culpability has been assigned by the superintendent, Thornley v. Wyoming Highway Department, 
Wyo., 478 P.2d 600 (1971), and those who carried insurance prior to the 
accident) the tangential beneficiary of the liability policy to be furnished can 
be said to be the motoring public, the law nonetheless is calculated primarily 
to benefit the relatively small number of drivers who have either surrendered 
their driving privileges and seek to reinstate them or who seek to protect their 
privileges from being taken away.

 
 

[¶28.]  In the same vein, the uninsured motor 
vehicles act is calculated to protect a restricted category of drivers - namely, 
those insured owners who are involved in accidents with drivers who do not carry 
insurance.

 
 

[¶29.]  Compulsory insurance, on the other hand, 
is intended to be but one of the conditions for driving upon the highways of the 
state and its purpose is to benefit the motoring public as a whole (see 7 Am Jur 
2d, Automobile Insurance § 20, p. 466, infra), not just a restricted class of 
persons who have shown themselves to be "bad drivers" or the limited class of 
insured motorists who are involved in accidents with those who do not carry 
insurance.

 
 

[¶30.]  Therefore, while the fallout benefits of 
Wyoming's financial responsibility law and the uninsured motor vehicles act may 
be similar to those of the compulsory insurance statute, i.e., the protection of 
various classes of motorists from drivers on the highways of the state, it is 
clear that the uninsured motor vehicles act and the financial responsibility law 
are intended to "benefit" a very limited category of drivers, while the 
compulsory insurance statute, on the other hand, is intended to protect all motorists who drive upon the 
highways of the state. It can therefore be seen that the avowed legislative 
purpose of the two acts is not the same and the classes of those who are 
intended to be benefited both in kind and in numbers are 
different.

 
 

[¶31.]  Assuming this conclusion to be sound, we 
are then comfortable with an ultimate resolution which says that the reference 
to "loss from the liability imposed by law," § 31-9-405(b)(ii) and (c), supra, 
and the uninsured motor vehicles act, § 31-10-101, supra, cannot be held to 
include a prior-case-law or an insurance-industry declared-immunity theory which 
causes the household-exclusion clauses in the companies' policies to override 
the public policy announced in the compulsory insurance 
statute.

 
 

[¶32.]  A more detailed comparison of the 
compulsory insurance statute with the financial responsibility law causes us to 
be even more resolute in this conclusion.

 
 

[¶33.]  The financial responsibility law was 
passed in 1947, while the compulsory insurance statute was enacted in 1979. The 
earlier legislation was enacted to serve two purposes. The appellants' brief 
describes these purposes in the following way: 

 
 
"The 
MVSRA serves a twofold purpose. First, the Act insures that anyone involved in 
an automobile accident will be required to demonstrate financial responsibility 
for any liability that may be imposed by law as a result of such an accident. 
Second, the Act singles out drivers, whose licenses have been either revoked or 
suspended under state law, and requires them to demonstrate a degree of 
financial responsibility before regaining the privilege of operating motor 
vehicles upon the highways of Wyoming."

 
 

[¶34.]  As has been noted, the financial 
responsibility law does not require proof of financial responsibility until the 
accident has occurred, while the compulsory insurance statute requires the 
obtaining of a bond or the purchase of insurance before one may operate a 
vehicle upon the highways of the state.

 
 
"The 
procuring of [compulsory liability] insurance is merely part of the price paid 
for obtaining a specific privilege from the government * * *." Couch on 
Insurance 2d, Automobile Insurance § 45:679, p. 315.

 
 

[¶35.]  It is said in 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile 
Insurance § 20, p. 466:

 
 
"Although 
both compulsory liability insurance laws and financial responsibility laws 
relate to the same subject - financial responsibility of motorists - they are 
distinguishable. Financial responsibility laws generally apply to a limited 
class of motorists: usually those who have been involved in an accident or whose 
drivers' licenses have been suspended. Compulsory insurance laws, on the other 
hand, apply to the unlimited class of all motor vehicle owners. The activity 
governed differs: the financial responsibility laws apply to drivers' licenses 
whereas the compulsory insurance laws apply to motor vehicle registrations. 
Thus, the statutes generally do not overlap, and a given state may enact both 
types of statutes."

 
 

[¶36.]  Couch on Insurance 2d, § 45:721, p. 352, 
361 says, in discussing the financial responsibility 
statutes:

 
 
"The 
basic problem with this type of statute is that the motorist is entitled to one 
`free' accident. These laws do not apply retroactively to the first accident, 
thereby allowing the motorist to permit his operator's license or vehicle 
registration to be revoked and that would be the end of state imposed penalties 
for his failure to satisfy a judgment rendered against him, at least to the 
extent of the minimum amount set forth in the statute. Such an act provides 
little consolation to the victim of the first accident whose only recourse is to 
seek to satisfy the judgment entered against the irresponsible motorist, attempt 
to recover from his own uninsured motorist carrier (if in fact the victim is 
insured), or seek recovery from a state indemnity fund or assigned claims 
facility. Financial responsibility laws are the oldest attempt to legislatively 
respond to the problems of assuring compensation to the traffic accident victim. 
Clearly, they are not totally effective in achieving such a goal which is one 
reason for the increase in the number of states with compulsory liability 
insurance laws."

 
 

[¶37.]  In Wyoming Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 
v. May, Wyo., 434 P.2d 507, 512 (1967), in interpreting the financial 
responsibility law, we said:

 
 
"* 
* * [W]e conclude that proof of financial responsibility under the Act is 
required only in cases where the Superintendent of motor vehicle division has 
received record of conviction or forfeiture of bail of a person and has 
suspended or revoked that person's driver's license or where the owner of the 
vehicle is involved in an accident or where a person involved in an accident is 
using a motor vehicle of another person with permission of the owner." (Emphasis 
omitted.)

 
 

[¶38.]  In interpreting Wyoming's financial 
responsibility law, this court has held that a motor vehicle owner (absent 
negligence on his part) who was immune from suit, need not respond to the 
directives of the act where the insured's daughter was involved in an accident. 
This holding was bottomed on the theory that - since the statute provided the 
owner need only present evidence of financial responsibility in those cases 
where he or she was liable at law, and, since Wyoming did not recognize the 
family-purpose doctrine - there was no need for the owner to surrender his or 
her registrations for those vehicles which were not involved in the accident. Wyoming Department of Revenue v. Wilson, 
Wyo., 400 P.2d 144, reh. denied 401 P.2d 960 (1965).

 
 

[¶39.]  We have also held that it is within the 
province of the superintendent's discretion to ascertain the degree of 
culpability when fixing the sufficiency of the security which the act requires 
be deposited. Thornley v. Wyoming Highway 
Department, supra, 478 P.2d 600. By the same token, if the superintendent 
were to decide that there is no culpability, then there would be no demand for 
security deposit. In these instances, the superintendent is called upon to make 
discretionary judgments that there is to be no "loss from the liability imposed 
by law."

 
 

[¶40.]  The interaction between a compulsory 
insurance act and a financial responsibility law was considered in Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Royle, 
Mont., 656 P.2d 820 (1983). There the issue was whether or not the compulsory 
insurance statute prohibits a family-exclusion clause. The pertinent language of 
the statute in question was as follows:

 
 
"`Every 
owner of a motor vehicle . . . shall continuously provide insurance against loss resulting from liability 
imposed by law for bodily injury or death or damage to property suffered by any person . . . .' 
(Emphasis added.)" 656 P.2d  at 821.

 
 
The 
insurance company argued

 
 
"* 
* * simply that the statute does not void the family exclusion clause because 
the statute only requires coverage for `liability imposed by law.' In other 
words, if Montana recognizes parental immunity from suit by their children then 
Mr. and Mrs. Haines cannot be liable; and since there would not be `liability 
imposed by law' the family exclusion clause would be valid." 656 P.2d  at 
822.

 
 

[¶41.]  One of the questions for the Montana 
court was whether policy containing the family exclusion, and thus not 
certifiable under the statute, was or was not valid.

 
 

[¶42.]  The Montana Supreme Court 
said:

 
 
"* 
* * [I]n 1979 the legislature mandated liability insurance. Every vehicle owner 
is now required to certify to the county treasurer that he possesses an 
automobile liability insurance policy. It appears from the briefs that `in the 
instant case, the subject insurance Policy was "certified" by the owner of the 
vehicle * * * as proof of having complied with the law requiring insurance for 
bodily injury suffered by "any person."' Thus, the policy was certified under 
the law requiring mandatory liability insurance but was not certified under the 
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act." 656 P.2d  at 822.

 
 

[¶43.]  The court went on to hold that the two 
parts of the act - i.e., the financial-responsibility provision and the 
compulsory-insurance provision - were separate, citing 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile 
Insurance § 20, supra, and that therefore

 
 
"[t]he 
effect of the language of the mandatory insurance law requires the liability 
policy to protect against bodily injury and property damage to `any person.' In so providing, the legislature has 
expressly outlawed the `household exclusion.'" (Emphasis added.) 656 P.2d  at 
823.

 
 

[¶44.]  In those circumstances where insurance is 
required to comply with a statute and the insurance policy contains exclusions 
which are contrary to statutory mandates, it is held that such exclusion clauses 
are void as against public policy and the insurance policy will be enforced as 
though the exclusions were not contained therein. Reeves v. Miller, Fla. 5th DCA, 418 So. 2d 1050 (1982).

 
 

[¶45.]  In Reeves v. Miller, supra, the Florida 
Court of Appeals put the rule this way:

 
 
"Insurance 
provided to comply with a statutory requirement must comply with the statute. A 
policy purporting to provide the required statutory coverage but containing 
exclusions not contemplated by the statute does not provide the required 
coverage. Since the unauthorized exclusions are contrary to public policy as 
established by the statute, they are deemed inapplicable and disregarded and the 
policy is enforced as if it were in express compliance with the statutory 
requirements. See, e.g., Mullis v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1971); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Chapman, 415 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Andriakos v. Cavanaugh, 350 So. 2d 561 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1977)." 418 So. 2d 1050-1051.

 
 

[¶46.]  Where the public policy is clearly 
identified in the statute, as it is in Wyoming's compulsory insurance statute, 
and the household exclusion is not specifically excepted, the rule is that the 
claimed exclusion will not supersede the public policy.

 
 

[¶47.]  In Estate of Neal v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 93 Nev. 348, 566 P.2d 81 (1977), the facts show that the insured 
was covered with a Farmers Insurance Exchange automobile liability policy which 
contained a household-exclusion clause. The insured and his wife were killed and 
three children injured in a one-car accident in which the insured was driving. 
In a declaratory-judgment suit brought by Farmers to test its liability, it was 
conceded that the children were members of the insured's household. The district 
court held that, because of Nevada's compulsory-insurance law, the exclusion 
clause was void up to the statutory limitations. In upholding the trial court, 
the Supreme Court of Nevada said:

 
 
"Respondent's 
contention that Nevada's Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, NRS Ch. 698, does not 
render the household exclusion clause void is equally without merit. That Act 
requires an owner of a motor vehicle registered in the state to provide, by a 
contract of insurance or by qualifying as a self-insurer, security for the 
payment of tort liabilities arising from the maintenance or use of the motor 
vehicle. * * *

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"* 
* * Therefore, respondent's household exclusion clause, insofar as it attempts 
to eliminate the minimum security, contravenes the statutory mandates of NRS Ch. 
698 and is void. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Hinkel, 87 Nev. 478, 488 P.2d 1151 (1971)." 566 P.2d  at 83.

 
 

[¶48.]  In Bishop v. Allstate Insurance Company, 
Ky., 623 S.W.2d 865 (1981), Ruth Ann Bishop was injured in a single-vehicle 
automobile accident in which she was the sole passenger and her husband, John 
Franklin, was the driver. He carried an Allstate automobile insurance policy 
with a household exclusionary clause. Ruth Ann was a member of John Franklin's 
household. Kentucky had a compulsory insurance act.

 
 

[¶49.]  Allstate contended that the household 
exclusionary clause relieved the company from tort liability. Ruth Ann Bishop 
contended that the exclusionary clause was in violation of the public policy of 
the state and thus the clause was void. In overruling the trial court, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court held that, through the enactment of the compulsory 
insurance act the legislature had declared the public policy to be that all 
motor vehicle owners in the state would be insured up to the minimum required by 
law. While acknowledging that it had upheld the exclusionary clauses prior to 
the enactment of the compulsory insurance law, the court said that, in adopting 
the compulsory insurance law, the legislature did not see fit to exclude the 
members of the insured's household from minimum coverage and therefore it was 
the legislature's intent that such persons and categories of individuals would 
be covered by insurance. The court said:

 
 
"An 
exclusionary clause in an insurance contract which reduces below minimum or 
eliminates [the minimum liability coverage of $10,000, $20,000 and $5,000] 
effectively renders a driver uninsured to the extent of the reduction or 
elimination. Because the stated purpose of the MVRA [compulsory insurance act] 
is to assure that a driver be insured to a minimum level, such an exclusion 
provision contravenes the purpose and policy of the compulsory insurance act. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
v. Sivey, 404 Mich. 51, 272 N.W.2d 555 (1978)." 623 S.W.2d  at 
866.

 
 
The 
court went on to say:

 
 
"Consequently, 
family or household exclusionary clauses in insurance contracts that dilute or 
eliminate the minimum requirements of * * * tort liability coverage are void and 
unenforceable. Allstate Insurance Co. v. De Frain, 81 Mich. App. 503, 265 N.W.2d 392 (1978)." 623 S.W.2d  at 866.

 
 
The 
court held:

 
 
"The 
cases which uphold the validity of family exclusion provisions are overruled to 
the extent that they dilute or eliminate the minimum coverage requirements of 
the MVRA [the compulsory insurance act]." 623 S.W.2d  at 
866-867.

 
 

[¶50.]  In Allstate Insurance Company v. De Frain, 
81 Mich. App. 503, 265 N.W.2d 392 (1978), where the husband had injured the wife 
in a motor vehicle accident, the company, relying upon an exclusionary clause, 
brought a declaratory-judgment action to determine whether it had an obligation 
to defend the husband in a suit brought by his wife. Michigan had a compulsory 
minimum-insurance act. In holding that the exclusionary clause was void as 
against public policy in the face of the compulsory motorist insurance act, the 
court said:

 
 
"Exclusions 
that cause a certified policy to deviate from statutory requirements are barred. 
[Citing cases.]" 265 N.W.2d  at 393.

 
 

[¶51.]  In Lilje v. Allstate Insurance Company, 393 
Mich. 259, 224 N.W.2d 279 (1974), the court held that family-exclusion clauses 
are void in those instances where a motor vehicle is registered as an insured 
vehicle on the strength of the certificate of insurance which represents that 
the liability policy covers the vehicle in compliance with the compulsory 
insurance law.

 
 

[¶52.]  In Citizens Mutual Insurance Company v. Central 
National Insurance Company of Omaha, 65 Mich. App. 349, 237 N.W.2d 322, 
324-325 (1975), the Court of Appeals of Michigan, citing with approval its prior 
opinion in Allstate Insurance Company v. 
Motor State Insurance Co., 33 Mich. App. 469, 190 N.W.2d 352 (1971), 
said:

 
 
"Allstate, supra, involved the validity 
of an exclusionary clause in an automobile liability policy issued to Judith or 
Norman L. Bangs which attempted to exclude Norman L. Bangs from liability 
protection as an operator of the motor vehicle. The court referred to the 
statutory scheme and concluded:

 
 
"`It 
is clear that the Legislature intended that no automobile should be registered 
in this State unless certain requirements have been met. To obtain registration 
for an automobile one must either have a policy of liability insurance or pay 
the uninsured motor vehicle fee. The requirements of the liability policy are 
those set forth in * * M.C.L.A. §§ 257.501-257.532 [now MCLA § 257.3009] * * 
*

 
 
"`The 
public policy as delineated by the Legislature requires that the liability 
policy must be written in conformity with the statutory requirements. The 
statute does not provide for the type of exclusionary clauses as were contained 
in the instant policy. Thus, the exclusionary clauses are contrary to the public 
policy of this State and are therefore invalid and of no effect.' Allstate, 
supra, at 473, 474, 190 N.W.2d  at 354.

 
 
"In 
accord with this view are Robinson v. 
Mendell, 45 Mich. App. 368, 206 N.W.2d 537 (1973); Cadillac Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bell, 
50 Mich. App. 144, 212 N.W.2d 816 (1973); Celina Mutual Insurance Co. v. Preferred 
Risk Mutual Insurance Co., 51 Mich. App. 99, 214 N.W.2d 704 (1974), 
overruled sub nom Lilje v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., 393 Mich. 259, 224 N.W.2d 279 (1974); State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Babcock, 54 Mich. App. 194, 220 N.W.2d 717 (1974)."

 
 
See 
also State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company v. Sivey, 404 Mich. 51, 272 N.W.2d 555 
(1978).

 
 

[¶53.]  In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company v. Smith, 167 Cal. Rptr. 410, 109 Cal. App. 3d 575 (1980), where the 
innocent third-party wife suffered bodily injury proximately caused by the 
negligence of the insured husband's permittee driver and the insurance company 
denied liability under a household-exclusion clause, the court 
held:

 
 
"The 
Financial Responsibility Law requires that all owners and drivers of motor 
vehicles be insured. The public policy of California is not to permit insurers 
the right to promiscuously choose those groups whom they will insure and those 
whom they will not, thereby eradicating at their pleasure the public policy 
requiring all drivers and owners to be insured. (See, Midcentury Insur. Co. v. Hernandez 
(1969) 275 Cal. App. 2d 839, 80 Cal. Rptr. 448; Jurd v. Pacific Indem. Co. (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 699, 21 Cal. Rptr. 793, 371 P.2d 569; Interinsur. Exch. etc. So. Cal. v. Ohio Cas. 
Insur. (1962) 58 Cal. 2d 142, 23 Cal. Rptr. 592, 373 P.2d 640.) The philosophy 
enunciated by Wildman [v. Government Employees' Insur. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 (1957)], still lives. The innocent third party suffering 
bodily injury proximately caused by the negligence of the permittee driver of an 
insured, is still within the penumbra of California's financial responsibility 
protective umbrella." 167 Cal. Rptr.  at 417.

 
 

[¶54.]  In summary, we hold that the prevailing 
and overriding public policy of the state of Wyoming - as contained in the 
financial responsibility law (motor vehicle safety responsibility act, § 
31-9-101, et seq., W.S. 1977), the compulsory insurance statute (§ 31-4-120, 
W.S. 1977, 1983 Cum.Supp.) and the uninsured motorist act (§ 31-10-101, et seq., 
W.S. 1977) - is to be found in the words of the compulsory insurance statute as 
follows:

 
 
"No 
owner of a motor vehicle required to be licensed shall operate or permit the 
operation of the vehicle without having in full force and effect an automobile 
liability policy as provided by W.S. 31-9-403 * * *." § 31-4-120, W.S. 1977, 
1983 Cum.Supp.

 
 

[¶55.]  Although some exceptions are mentioned in 
the applicable statutes, these statutes contain no exception for family members 
of insured owner-operators of motor vehicles. A statute which expressly mentions 
one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things. Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Board of 
Equalization, supra, 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700.

 
 

[¶56.]  An automobile liability insurance policy 
containing a household exclusionary clause, offered for certification under the 
compulsory insurance statute, is void to the extent of the minimum coverage 
contemplated by law, since the exclusion is in violation of the public policy of 
the state of Wyoming.

 
 

[¶57.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
In his Conclusions of Law, the hearing officer said:

 
 
"There 
is no place in the statutes, and counsel for Petitioners has not pointed to any, 
which authorizes the exception Petitioners have in their policies. For example, 
the legislature permits exclusion of coverage for the insured in instances 
subject to workmen's compensation and in liability involving an employee of the 
insured while engaged in employment as well as other exclusions. W.S. 
31-9-405(e). The legislature has not permitted exclusion of coverage for 
liability to a member of the insured's household. Likewise, there is no 
exclusion in the Uninsured Motor Vehicle Insurance Act for 
relatives."

 
 

2 
Section 31-9-403, W.S. 1977 of the financial responsibility law provides in 
pertinent part:

 
 
"Certificate 
of insurance carrier.

 
 
"(a) 
Proof of financial responsibility may be furnished by filing with the 
superintendent the written certificate of any insurance carrier duly authorized 
to do business in this state certifying that there is in effect a motor vehicle 
liability policy for the benefit of the person required to furnish proof of 
financial responsibility." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

3 
Section 31-9-405, W.S. 1977 of the financial responsibility law reads in 
pertinent part as follows:

 
 
"(a) 
A `motor vehicle liability policy' as 
said term is used in this act [§§ 31-9-101 to 31-9-414] shall mean an 
owner's or an operator's policy of liability insurance, certified as provided in 
section 19 [§ 31-9-403] or section 30 [§ 31-9-404] as proof of financial 
responsibility, and issued, except as otherwise provided in section 20, by an 
insurance carrier duly authorized to transact business in this state, to or for 
the benefit of the person named therein as insured.

 
 
"(b) 
Such owner's policy of liability insurance:

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"(ii) 
Shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using 
any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission 
of such named insured against loss from 
the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles within the United 
States of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of 
interest and costs with respect to each such motor vehicle, as follows: ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of one (1) 
person in any one (1) accident and, subject to said limit for one (1) person, 
twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of two 
(2) or more persons in any one (1) accident and five thousand dollars 
($5,000.00) because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one 
(1) accident.

 
 
"(c) 
Such operator's policy of liability insurance shall insure the person named as 
insured therein against loss from the 
liability imposed upon him by law 
for damages arising out of the use by him of any motor vehicle not owned by him 
* * *." (Emphasis added.)

 
 
Section 
31-9-102(a)(x), W.S. 1977 contemplates the same minimum requirements as § 
31-9-405(b)(ii). The uninsured motor vehicles act, § 31-10-101, et seq., refers 
to the minimum requirements of § 31-9-102(a)(x), and provides that no policy 
insuring against "liability imposed by law" shall be delivered or issued "unless 
coverage is provided therein * * * in limits * * * as set forth in § 
31-9-102(a)(x)."

 
 

4 
In his Conclusion of Law # 9, the hearing officer said:

 
 
"Thus, 
finding automobile liability insurance to be mandatory and finding that 
uninsured motorist coverage must be offered, and finding no authority for 
excluding a class of persons (i.e., household residents) from the protection of 
these laws, the Hearing Officer must affirm the order of the Insurance 
Department. One caveat. The Financial 
Responsibility Law and the Uninsured Motorists Act contain mandatory minimums 
only. Accordingly, I conclude as a matter of law that the `household exclusion' 
contravenes those statutes only up to the amounts therein provided. Thus, upon 
the authority of Alm v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., [infra] the household exclusion 
of Petitioners is invalid only to the extent of the minimum statutory liability 
or coverage limits." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

5 
See McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 
204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943); Ball v. 
Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954); Oldman v. Bartshe, Wyo., 480 P.2d 99 
(1971); and Vossler v. Peterson, 
Wyo., 480 P.2d 393 (1971).

 
 

6 
Section 31-9-405(e), W.S. 1977 provides:

 
 
"Such 
motor vehicle liability policy shall not insure any liability under any 
workmen's compensation law nor any liability on account of bodily injury to or 
death of an employee of the insured while engaged in the employment, other than 
domestic, of the insured, or while engaged in the operation, maintenance or 
repair of any such motor vehicle nor any liability or damage to property owned 
by, rented to, in charge of or transported by the 
insured."

 
 

7 
It is to be remembered and understood that the household exemptions of the 
appellants' policies include more individuals and classes of individuals than 
those who fall within the parental- and spousal-immunity categories. An excerpt 
from the appellee's brief describes the scope of the exclusions, where it is 
said:

 
 
"The 
family clause used by each of the Appellant insurance companies is broad in 
scope, going beyond the traditional spousal and parental immunities. It is the 
uniform law of the land that, `the fact of relationship by blood or marriage, 
other than that of parent and child or husband and wife between the tortfeasor 
and the person injured or killed, does not preclude maintenance of an action for 
the redress of such injuries.' Annot., 123 A.L.R. 1020, 1021; see Annot., 81 
A.L.R.2d 1155. Clearly, in Wyoming immunity does not exist beyond the spousal or 
parental relationship. Individuals related beyond the husband/wife or 
parent/child level are free to bring suit in our courts. See Fox v. Fox [75], Wyo. [390], 296 P.2d 252 (1956). It is impermissive to exclude coverage solely because the claimant 
is a relative of the insured. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange v. Teachers Insurance Company, 161 Cal. Rptr. 738, 101 Cal. App. 3d 804 (1980). Even if Wyoming had full spousal and parental immunities, 
the Appellant insurance companies' family exclusion clauses limit or deny 
protection to other members of the insured's family including inlaws, siblings, 
grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins, all of whom would have a right to 
maintain a lawsuit. As to these individuals, the insured cannot comply with the 
compulsory insurance law of Wyoming. As to these individuals, a Wyoming motor 
vehicle owner seeking to comply with the law by purchasing a motor vehicle 
liability policy from the Appellant companies stands unprotected by virtue of 
the broad family exclusion clauses. He is subject not only to financial loss but 
also criminal sanctions."

 
 

8 
See: Keystone Mut. Casualty Co. of 
Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Hinds, 180 Md. 
676, 26 A.2d 761 (1942); Desmarais v. 
Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 331 Mass. 199, 118 N.E.2d 86 (1954); Wood v. Vona, 147 Ohio St. 91, 33 Ohio 
Ops. 264, 68 N.E.2d 80 (1946); Leonard v. 
Murdock, 147 Ohio St. 103, 33 Ohio Ops. 260, 68 N.E.2d 86 (1946); Ferguson v. Employers Mutual Casualty 
Company, 254 S.C. 235, 174 S.E.2d 768 (1970).

 
 

9 
Couch on Insurance 2d, supra at p. 330, citing MacQuarrie v. McLaughlin, D.C.Mass., 294 F. Supp. 176, aff'd 394 U.S. 456, 89 S. Ct. 1224, 22 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1968); Canavan v. Hanover Insurance Company, 
356 Mass. 88, 248 N.E.2d 271 (1969); and Ferguson v. Employers Mutual Casualty 
Company, 254 S.C. 235, 174 S.E.2d 768 (1970).

 
 

ROONEY, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring, with whom BROWN, Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶58.]  I agree with the result reached in the 
majority opinion, i.e., the affirmance of the district court, but I do not agree 
with much of that said in the majority opinion. Its sweep is too broad, as is 
the sweep of the exclusionary rule used by the petitioners in their insurance 
policies.

 
 

[¶59.]  The general rule relative to exclusionary 
clauses is set forth in Annotation: Validity, construction, and application of 
provision of automobile liability policy excluding from coverage injury or death 
of member of family or household of insured, 46 A.L.R.3d 1024, § 2, p. 1027 
(1972):

 
 
"In the absence of a statutory 
prohibition to the contrary, provisions of automobile liability insurance 
policies excluding from coverage members of the insured's family or household 
have usually been held valid and effective to protect the insurer against claims 
for injuries to persons who fall within the specified classes. One court stated 
in this regard that insurance companies have the same right as individuals to 
limit their liability and to impose upon their obligations whatever conditions 
they please, not inconsistent with public 
policy * * *." (Emphasis added.)

 
 
We 
have accepted the general rule recognized by the Insurance Department's hearing 
officer in his conclusions of law and recognized in the majority opinion to the 
effect that the freedom on the part of insurance companies to include any 
desired provision in insurance contracts is limited to that which is not prohibited by statute or public 
policy. McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943); Ball v. 
Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954); Oldman v. Bartshe, Wyo., 480 P.2d 99 
(1971); and Vossler v. Peterson, Wyo., 480 P.2d 393 
(1971).

 
 

[¶60.]  Remembering that inter-spousal and 
parent-child immunity originated in common law and that the insurer steps into 
the position of the insured in determining the existence of fault or liability 
on the part of the insured, wherefore the conflict as to fault or liability is 
primarily between the insured and the one claiming injury1, that said by this court with 
reference to statutes and the public policy behind inter-spousal and 
parent-child immunity is pertinent.

 
 
"* 
* * `It is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to abrogate or 
modify a rule of the common law by the enactment of a statute upon the same 
subject; it is rather to be presumed that no change in the common law was 
intended unless the language employed clearly indicates such an intention. * * * 
The rules of common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication, nor 
overturned except by clear and unambiguous language.'" McKinney v. McKinney, supra, 135 P.2d  at 
942, quoting from 25 R.C.L. 1054, § 280.

 
 
"`* 
* * Conceding it to be within the power of the legislature to make this 
alteration in the law, if it saw fit to do so, nevertheless such radical and 
far-reaching changes should only be wrought by language so clear and plain as to 
be unmistakable evidence of the legislative intention. Had it been the 
legislative purpose * * * to permit the wife to bring * * * actions against him 
[her husband] also for injuries to person or property as though they were 
strangers, thus emphasizing and publishing differences which otherwise might not 
be serious, it would have been easy to have expressed that intent in terms of 
irresistible clearness.'" Id. 135 P.2d  at 944, quoting from Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180 (1910).

 
 
"`It 
must be presumed that the legislators knew the policy of the common law, as 
established by centuries of judicial decisions. Had it been the intention of the 
Legislature to permit husband and wife to sue each other for injuries to the 
person or property caused by the other, it surely would have so declared by 
express and clear legislative enactment. * * * If such is to become the policy 
of the law, if such a radical change, so vitally affecting the legal status of 
husband and wife, is to be made, it should be made by clear and express 
legislation and not by judicial construction.'" Id. 135 P.2d  at 950, quoting 
from Finn v. Finn, 19 Ohio App. 302 
(1924).

 
 
"`Unemancipated 
minor child has no right of action against parent or person standing in loco 
parentis for tort of such parent or person, unless right of action is authorized 
by statute.'" Ball v. Ball, supra, 
269 P.2d  at 305, quoting from Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 
(1939).

 
 
"* 
* * [I]n substance, * * * the judiciary should be reluctant to encourage actions 
as maintainable between children and their parents unless sanctioned by the 
statute law or where they disclose so clear an invasion of the rights of the 
child as tending to bring discord into the family and to disorganize its proper 
government. * * *" Id. 269 P.2d  at 314, and also Oldman v. Bartshe, supra, 480 P.2d  at 
101.

 
 

[¶61.]  The legislature has not enacted a statute 
changing the common law and long time judicially recognized public policy of the 
state to the effect that inter-spousal and parent-child immunity for negligence 
exists in Wyoming. As will be noted infra, the exclusionary clauses in 
appellants' policies go well beyond inter-spousal and parent-child immunity and 
are improper for that reason. 

 
 

[¶62.]  The established public policy in this 
respect was not changed by the enactment of § 31-4-120(a), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1983. It provides:

 
 
"(a) 
No owner of a motor vehicle required to be licensed shall operate or permit the 
operation of the vehicle without having in full force and effect an 

 
 
automobile 
liability policy as provided by W.S. 31-9-403 or bond in amounts provided by 
W.S. 31-9-102(a)(x). * * *"

 
 
Section 
31-9-403 referred to therein refers to a current liability insurance policy on a 
specified motor vehicle or motor vehicles with an insurance carrier authorized 
to do business in this state. Section 31-9-102(a)(x) requires the policy to be 
at least in the amount of $10,000 for bodily injury or death of one person in 
any one accident, $20,000 for such of two or more persons in any one accident, 
and $5,000 for injury to or destruction of property.

 
 

[¶63.]  Section 31-4-120(a), supra, does not 
prohibit an exclusionary clause. It does not address the question. Certainly, 
there is no express prohibition or clear 
language setting forth such. Nor does consideration of §§ 31-9-101, et seq. 
and 31-10-101, et seq., W.S. 1977, the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act 
and the Uninsured Motorist Act, change the result. As pointed out in the 
majority opinion, they concern separate matters for separate purposes. (It is 
difficult, however, to understand the necessity for the Motor Vehicle 
Safety-Responsibility Act in light of § 31-4-120(a) requiring compulsory 
insurance). The majority opinion seems to see some pertinency in the requirement 
of the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act for the insurance policy 
prescribed therein to protect the insured "from the liability imposed by law for 
damages arising out of the" ownership, use or maintenance of the vehicle. The 
"liability imposed by law" is that resulting from negligence or intentional 
invasion of another's rights. It says nothing about revoking the inter-spousal 
or parent-child immunity - i.e., a status which defines the perimeters of 
"liability imposed by law" and which status is one that is other than that in 
which liability is imposed by law.

 
 

[¶64.]  Likewise, the majority opinion finds some 
association between (1) the requirement in § 31-4-120(a) that "no owner * * * shall operate or permit 
operation of the vehicle" not covered by a liability policy, and (2) the 
identity of those to whom he may be liable. There is no connection. The 
liability policy is expected to protect the owner from economic loss in cases in 
which he is liable under the law. The fact that he must have such a policy does 
not define the group to whom he is liable, i.e., whether or not it includes 
those with inter-spousal or parent-child immunity.

 
 

[¶65.]  The majority opinion recognizes the 
purpose of § 31-4-120(a) to be for the protection of the "general public." But 
established public policy does not include spouses, parents, or their children 
as part of the general public. It sets them off from the general public for this 
purpose.

 
 

[¶66.]  Because the insurance policy required by 
the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act need not insure liability under any 
workmen's compensation law or on account of injury to an employee (§ 
31-9-405(e), W.S. 1977) but does not refer to inter-spousal or parent-child 
immunity, the majority opinion concludes that the legislature intended to 
abrogate this long-standing immunity. As noted, we have said that such 
abrogation must be express; but beyond that, the exceptions contained in § 
31-9-405(e) recognize the existence of a relationship for exclusion which is not 
nearly as close or important as the inter-spousal and parent-child relationship. 
And there are other exceptions under the act from the requirement as to 
security, such as a person who was legally parked at the time of the damage and 
an owner whose vehicle was being operated by someone without his permission. The 
point is that the two acts are separate and with different purposes - as 
recognized by the majority opinion, and, secondly, those exceptions listed in § 
31-9-405(e) are not similar to the inter-spousal and parent-child immunity. 
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies to similar things as noted in Citizens Mutual Insurance Company v. Central 
National Insurance Company of Omaha, 65 Mich. App. 349, 237 N.W.2d 322, 325 
(1975), (one of the two cases referred to in the majority opinion in this 
respect). The rule cannot be applied, for example, to exclude crutches when the 
words of exclusion are "dogs, cats, chickens and horses."

 
 

[¶67.]  The rationale for inter-spousal and 
parent-child immunity is that which common sense dictates:

 
 
"`* 
* * The procedural difficulties, the dangers of disrupting the secrecy and 
serenity of marital relations, the avenue for fraud, the startling innovation in 
permitting such controversies, and the lack of clear legislative indorsement 
have all been assigned as ample reasons for the refusal of the courts to 
sanction, by supplying statutory interpretation, a new form of litigation 
manifestly requiring unequivocal legislation for its existence. * * *'" McKinney v. McKinney, supra, 135 P.2d  at 
946, quoting from Emerson v. Western Seed 
& Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297, 56 A.L.R. 327 
(1927).

 
 
"`* 
* * [T]he specific purpose was to safeguard the company against the natural and 
inevitable partiality of the assured to an injured person if he should happen to 
be a member of the same family circle.'" Id. 135 P.2d  at 948, quoting from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company v. James, 80 F.2d 802 (1936).

 
 
"`* 
* * Without actual dishonesty, the disposition to favor those close to one 
reflects itself in opinions and judgments, and one insured is more likely to 
concede by admission or nonresistance blame for hurting a member of his 
household than for doing harms to others.'" Id. 135 P.2d  at 948, quoting from Cartier v. Cartier, 84 N.H. 526, 153 A. 6 (1931).

 
 
"`* 
* * [T]he rule * * * should be adhered to until such time as the Legislature 
shall deem it wise and prudent to open up a field for marring or disturbing the 
tranquillity of family relations * * *. If that source of litigation is to be 
opened up at all, it should come about by legislation. * * *'" Id. 135 P.2d  at 
950, quoting from Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624, 9 A.L.R. 1064 
(1920).

 
 
"`* 
* * The wide acceptance of this rule is chiefly due to the following reasons 
advanced in its behalf:

 
 
"`1. 
Preservation of family harmony.

 
 
"`2. 
Maintenance of disciplinary authority of the parent.

 
 
"`3. 
Prevention of collusion or fraud.

 
 
"`4. 
Preservation of equal distribution of the family 
exchequer.

 
 
"`5. 
Avoidance of useless litigations, since the parent may inherit any money which 
the child recovers in such an action.

 
 
"`6. 
Prevention of stale claims by minors upon reaching majority.'" Ball v. Ball, 
supra, 269 P.2d  at 305, quoting from Boston University Law Review, Vol. 23, pp. 
259, 260.

 
 

[¶68.]  McKinney v. McKinney, supra, and Ball v. Ball, supra, quote from many 
other holdings which word the rationale in several ways. Generally, they note 
the purpose of the rule is to promote domestic harmony, protect against over 
friendly lawsuits, engender peace of society, allow security in the home, uphold 
the sacredness of marriage, etc. The deterioration of the family unit with 
accompanying loss of discipline and morality is the cause of many of the social 
problems of today. Attention to such matters, ranging from the rise in the rate 
of crimes to malfunction of education, is most often directed at the effect 
rather than the cause. In most instances the cause lies in the aforesaid 
breakdown of the family unit, lack of discipline and low moral standards. 
Changing the public policy relative to inter-spousal and parent-child immunity 
would only aggravate an already bad situation.

 
 
"`* 
* * Family deterioration registers quickly in political life, appearing in loss 
of integrity in both citizenship and governmental activities.'" (Emphasis 
omitted.) Ball v. Ball, supra, 269 P.2d  at 314.

 
 

[¶69.]  Finally, the cases quoted in the majority 
opinion for the proposition that § 31-4-120(a) changes the Wyoming public policy 
recognizing inter-spousal and parent-child immunity can be easily distinguished. 
The quotations are from Montana (1), Nevada (1), Florida (1), Kentucky (1), 
Michigan (4), and California (1). There is no indication in any of these cases 
that inter-spousal and parent-child immunity has been judicially established in 
the respective states, as it has in Wyoming. But there are other distinguishing 
factors.

 
 

[¶70.]  The quotation from the Montana case of Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Royle, 
Mont., 656 P.2d 820 (1983), which follows the wording of the Montana statute, 
spells out the cardinal difference between the Wyoming and Montana law. Section 
61-6-301(1), Mont. Code Ann. (1983), provides in part:

 
 
"(1) 
Every owner of a motor vehicle * * * shall continuously provide insurance 
against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death 
or damage to property suffered by any 
person * * *." (Emphasis added.)

 
 
Obviously, 
the legislative intent was positive and express in establishing liability toward 
"any person." Not so in Wyoming. Neither § 31-4-120(a) nor the statutes referred 
to therein reflect that the liability is to be to "any person," and the intent 
to do so is not even implied, let alone expressed, in Wyoming law. Ergo, the 
public policy set forth in McKinney v. 
McKinney, supra, and Ball v. 
Ball, supra, remains Wyoming law.

 
 

[¶71.]  The quotation in the majority opinion 
from the Nevada case, Estate of Neal v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 93 Nev. 348, 566 P.2d 81 (1977), is likewise 
misplaced. The Nevada court was interpreting a proof of financial responsibility 
enactment. The court noted that the act "specifically prohibits an insurer from 
excluding this required minimum security for tort liability," 566 P.2d  at 83. 
The court then held:

 
 
"* 
* * In light of this provision and because the household exclusion would 
otherwise be valid, the insurance policy here need provide nothing more than the 
minimum security required by the Act, and, beyond this minimum security, the 
exclusionary clause is viable. * * *" Id. 566 P.2d  at 
83.

 
 
Again, 
a situation other than under Wyoming law.

 
 

[¶72.]  The Florida case of Reeves v. Miller, 
Fla., 418 So. 2d 1050 (1982), involved a clause in the insurance contract which 
excluded "any obligation for which the United States may be liable under the 
federal tort claims act." The question of inter-spousal or parent-child immunity 
was not before the court. In any event, the Florida enactment specifically 
provides:

 
 
"(1) 
Required benefits. - Every insurance policy * * * shall provide * * * for 
payment of all reasonable expenses incurred for necessary medical, surgical 
[etc.] * * * to the named insured, relatives residing in the same household, 
persons operating the insured motor vehicle, passengers in such motor vehicle, 
and other persons struck by such motor vehicle * * * all as specifically 
provided in subsections (2) and (4)(d), * * *.

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"(2) 
Authorized exclusions. - Any insurer may exclude benefits:

 
 
"(a) 
For injury sustained by the named insured and relatives residing in the same 
household while occupying another motor vehicle owned by the named insured and 
not insured under the policy, * * *.

 
 
"(4) 
* * *

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"(d) 
The insurer of the owner of a motor vehicle shall pay personal injury protection 
benefits for:

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"3. 
Accidental bodily injury sustained by a relative of the owner residing in the 
same household, under the circumstances described in subparagraph 1. or 
subparagraph 2., provided the relative at the time of the accident is domiciled 
in the owner's household and is not himself the owner of a motor vehicle with 
respect to which security is required * * *." Fla. Stat. Ann., § 627.736 
(West).

 
 
The 
public policy of Florida, as stated in this statute, is to recognize the 
propriety of including exclusionary clauses (much broader than that judicially 
recognized in Wyoming) in insurance contracts. The quotation from Reeves v. Miller, supra, in the majority 
opinion has no value as a precedent to Wyoming law.

 
 

[¶73.]  Kentucky does not have a compulsory 
insurance law similar to § 31-4-120(a). The Kentucky law is a "no fault" 
insurance law, regularly referred to as a "Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations 
Act" or a "Motor Vehicle Reparations Act." Among its purposes 
are:

 
 
"(1) 
To require owners, registrants and operators of motor vehicles in the 
Commonwealth to procure insurance covering basic reparation benefits and legal 
liability arising out of ownership, operation or use of such motor 
vehicles;

 
 
"(2) 
To provide prompt payment to victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to whose negligence caused 
the accident in order to eliminate the inequities which fault-determination 
has created;

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"(5) 
To reduce the need to resort to bargaining and litigation * * *;

 
 
"(6) 
To help guarantee the continued 
availability of motor vehicle insurance at reasonable prices * * *." 
(Emphasis added.) Ky.Rev.Stat., § 304.39-010 (1981 
Replacement).

 
 
Ky.Rev.Stat., 
§ 304.39-030 provides that "every person" suffering injury from motor vehicle 
accidents in the state "has a right to basic reparation benefits" unless 
rejected; and, if the accident occurred in another state, the basic reparation 
insureds and "the driver and other occupants" of the motor vehicle have such 
right. Ky.Rev.Stat., § 304.39-040 provides that "basic reparation benefits shall 
be paid without regard to fault" and that such "obligation exists without regard 
to immunity from liability or suit which might otherwise be applicable." 
Ky.Rev.Stat., § 304.39-060 "abolishes" tort liability for damages arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents in the state to the extent provided by the basic 
reparation benefits, but allows rejection of such benefits by "any person," who 
then retains tort rights and liabilities. Subsection (2)(c) then provides 
that:

 
 
"Tort 
liability is not limited for injury to a person who is not an owner, operator, 
maintainer or user of a motor vehicle * * *."

 
 

[¶74.]  When read in context with the "no fault" 
enactment, the quotations in the majority opinion from Bishop v. Allstate Insurance Company, 
Ky., 623 S.W.2d 865 (1981), referring to inapplicability of an exclusion clause 
to "dilute or eliminate the minimum coverage requirements," are hardly of value 
in interpretation of the Wyoming statutes and public 
policy.

 
 

[¶75.]  The Michigan statute is similar to the 
Montana statute, supra, in that it provides that the motor vehicle liability 
policy insures against loss suffered "by any person," and 
that:

 
 
"(2) 
When authorized by the insured, * * * coverage may be excluded when a vehicle is 
operated by a named person. * * *" (Emphasis added.) Mich. Stat. Ann., § 
24.13009 [M.C.L.A. § 500.3009].

 
 
As 
noted with reference to the Montana law, the Wyoming statute does not expressly 
establish liability toward "any person." Michigan law creates an only exception 
by authorizing an exclusion of a person designated in the policy for exclusion. 
The quotations in the majority opinion from Allstate Insurance Company v. DeFrain, 
81 Mich. App. 503, 265 N.W.2d 392 (1978); Lilje v. Allstate Insurance Company, 393 
Mich. 259, 224 N.W.2d 279 (1974), citing Allstate Insurance Company v. Motor State 
Insurance Co., 33 Mich. App. 469, 190 N.W.2d 352 (1971); and Citizens Mutual Insurance Company v. Central 
National Insurance Company of Omaha, supra, interpret a statute requiring 
insurance coverage for "every person." As noted, the Wyoming statute does not do 
so.

 
 

[¶76.]  The California law interpreted in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company v. Smith, 109 Cal. App. 3d 575, 167 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1980) is somewhat 
similar to the Michigan statute which authorizes an exclusion of insurance 
operation in favor of a "named person." Cal.Ins.Code, § 11580.1(c) (1983 P.P.) 
(West), provides in part:

 
 
"* 
* * [T]he insurance afforded by any such policy of automobile liability 
insurance * * * may, by appropriate policy provision, be made inapplicable to 
any or all of the following:

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"(5) 
Liability for bodily injury to an insured * * *."

 
 
The 
quotation in the majority opinion from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. 
Smith, supra, is of questionable value in reflecting California law. It 
comes from the Court of Appeal, Second District. In the same year, the Court of 
Appeal, Third District considered a clause which excluded

 
 
"`person[s] 
who [are] related by blood, marriage, or adoption to an insured against whom 
claim is made if such person resides in the same household as such insured.'" 
See Phelps v. Allstate Insurance Company, 106 Cal. App. 3d 752, 165 Cal. Rptr. 263, 
266 (1980).

 
 
The 
court found the clause to be overbroad and therefore void. But it noted that 
this resulted only because the excluded class was not the same as the named 
insured. It said that:

 
 
"* 
* * The overbreadth can be cured only by rewriting (reforming) either the 
exclusion clause or the insured clauses, or both. * * *" Id. 165 Cal. Rptr.  at 
266.

 
 
Two 
years later in 20th Century Insurance 
Company v. Stuart, 129 Cal. App. 3d 370, 181 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1982), the Court of 
Appeal, Second District, was presented with a claim by the mother of a driver of 
a motor vehicle insured under a policy in which the definition of the insured 
included the named insured, and "his relatives." The exclusionary clause 
included the "insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the 
same household as the insured." The court acknowledged that the word "family" 
was not defined in the policy, but that the mother was a member of the relatives 
in residence in any event and that the exclusion clause was not void as against 
public policy.

 
 

[¶77.]  The public policy of Wyoming as set forth 
in McKinney v. McKinney, supra, and 
Ball v. Ball, supra, has not been 
changed by statute or otherwise. Inter-spousal and parent-child immunity exists 
in Wyoming.

 
 

[¶78.]  However, the exclusionary clause 
contained in the policy involved in this case goes far beyond inter-spousal and 
parent-child immunity. There is no statutory provision or public policy 
authorizing additional exclusions, and the intent of the legislature to require 
liability insurance coverage in all instances not excluded by existing public 
policy is adequately expressed in § 31-4-120(a). For this reason, I specially 
concur in the majority opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
We said in Ball v. Ball, supra, 269 P.2d  at 308, quoting from Brumfield v. 
Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953):

 
 
"`* 
* * the fact [of] * * * liability insurance created no liability or cause of 
action where none otherwise existed. * * *'"