Case Title: Babaletos v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13469

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13469 
 
JONI BABALETOS, personal representative,1  vs.  DEMOULAS SUPER 
MARKETS, INC., & others.2 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 3, 2023. - February 2, 2024. 
 
Present (Sitting at Lowell):  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, 
Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Civil, Jury trial, Judicial discretion.  Evidence, 
Judicial discretion.  Time. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 10, 2018. 
 
The case was tried before Camille F. Sarrouf, Jr., J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Andrew A. Rainer (Mark A. Gottlieb also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
Scott A. Chesin (Christopher M. Morrison also present) for 
the defendants. 
 
 
 
 
1 Of the estate of Thomas Babaletos. 
 
 
2 Philip Morris USA Inc. and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. 
 
2 
 
LOWY, J.  The issue in this case involves whether the time 
limits a trial judge set for the presentation of evidence in a 
complex tobacco trial constituted an abuse of discretion.  This 
appeal arises from a wrongful death action brought by the 
plaintiff, Joni Babaletos, who served as a personal 
representative of the estate of her late husband, Thomas 
Babaletos, against the defendants, Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.; 
Philip Morris USA Inc.; and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.  The 
plaintiff alleged that cigarettes produced and sold by the 
defendants caused Thomas Babaletos's death from cancer.  The 
plaintiff brought claims for breach of warranty in design, 
negligence in design and marketing, fraud, civil conspiracy, and 
unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation of G. L. 
c. 93A, § 9.  A jury found for the defendants on the four claims 
presented to them, and the trial judge subsequently found no 
liability with respect to the c. 93A claim.  The plaintiff 
timely filed a notice of appeal, and we transferred the case 
here on our own motion. 
On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the trial judge's 
imposition of time limits forced her to forgo the presentation 
of evidence essential to her case.  The plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate either an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial judge in the face of general objections, or how the 
plaintiff was prejudiced by the imposition of time limits.  
 
3 
Given that the trial judge repeatedly offered to extend 
scheduled half days to full days should the need arise during 
trial, that the plaintiff made no such requests as the trial 
progressed, and that the trial judge adopted the only two 
specific requests the plaintiff made for more time, we conclude 
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in setting 
reasonable time limits in this case.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
trial court's judgment. 
In most instances trial judges will find that they are able 
to manage the efficient presentation of evidence to the trier of 
fact without the need to impose time limits.  Trusting in that, 
we also take this opportunity to provide some guidance in an 
Appendix to this opinion to trial judges who, in civil trials, 
believe that setting time limits for the presentation of 
evidence would be prudent in a particular case. 
Background.  We summarize the relevant facts as indicated 
by the record, reserving certain details for our analysis of the 
issues.  Before trial, the defendants moved to impose time 
limits for the presentation of evidence, and the plaintiff 
opposed that motion.  Prior to confirming time limits in the 
case, the trial judge heard arguments from both parties, 
discussed the matter at three separate pretrial conferences in 
October 2021, and received the parties' joint pretrial 
memorandum.  The trial judge ultimately confirmed time limits 
 
4 
for the presentation of evidence and the length of trial on 
October 15, 2021, having reiterated that the limits were subject 
to change should a need to extend half days to full days3 or to 
stay late on any given day arise. 
At the first pretrial conference on October 1, the trial 
judge proposed an initial schedule of 1,575 minutes for the 
plaintiff and 1,575 minutes for the defendants, or just over 
twenty-six hours each, for all testimony and the presentation of 
evidence.  The presentation of evidence was scheduled to 
conclude by November 9, after which point closing arguments 
would begin.  The trial judge also informed the parties that the 
court would not be in session on November 12 because the judge 
had a prior commitment that day.  In response to the proposed 
time limits, the plaintiff specifically requested that October 
29, which was set to be a half day, be extended to a full day to 
accommodate a difficult-to-schedule witness.  The plaintiff also 
 
3 It is unclear from the transcript whether the trial 
judge's offers to extend half days to full days were offers to 
extend the minutes allotted to each party.  Because the 
extension of October 29 from a half day to a full day was 
ultimately accompanied by an increase in the number of minutes 
allotted to each party, it is possible the judge's offers to 
extend days were also offers to increase minutes.  However, 
given that (1) the plaintiff clarified at the October 8 pretrial 
hearing that her objection was to the allotted number of days, 
not the allotted number of minutes; and (2) the plaintiff failed 
to request either more days or more minutes during trial, the 
question whether the trial judge's offers to extend half days to 
full days were offers to increase the parties' allotted minutes 
is immaterial. 
 
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made a general objection, telling the court it would be 
difficult to finish presenting the plaintiff's case before 
November 9.  The trial judge agreed to the plaintiff's specific 
request for the extension of a half day on October 29 to a full 
day, affirmed a commitment to adjusting the schedule as needed 
to ensure the parties' ability to present their cases, and 
indicated a firmness as to the end date of November 9 for the 
presentation of evidence: 
"So, as I sit here now, I'm sticking with my deadline. As 
to half day/full day, if there's a witness that needs to be 
on, I have no problem staying.  If we have to stay till 
4:30 to finish somebody so they don't have to come back the 
next day, I'm fine with that.  If we have to leave a little 
bit early one day because somebody isn't coming in till the 
next morning, I'm fine with that.  So, I'll work with the 
parties so that they can get their case in, they can get 
their witnesses when they need them.  As to Friday 
afternoon on the 29th, I have no problem doing it.  I just 
laid out that staggered schedule as something for you to at 
least look at because we're trying to sort of clear the 
deck so that this case proceeds as efficiently as possible.  
I hear you . . . .  As I said, I'll always listen and I'll 
consider it, but you've heard me." 
 
At the second pretrial conference on October 8, the 
plaintiff again generally objected to the end date for the 
presentation of evidence for both parties, stating after a 
discussion of the plaintiff's intended witnesses:  "When we went 
back and mapped out our case . . . the way that we see it is we 
think there's a good chance that the plaintiff rests our case on 
the 9th or maybe even the 10th, depending on how it goes."  To 
which the trial judge responded, "I've got mapped out 1,635 
 
6 
minutes per side.  How is that not . . . ," before being 
interrupted by the plaintiff.  The plaintiff then clarified: 
"Let me -- if I could explain, your Honor?  It's not the 
minutes.  It's the days, and I'll explain to you what I 
mean by that.  The way this is working is –- I know the 
Court has indicated . . . that if we're at side bar or 
something like that happens, that's not going to be counted 
against the person's minutes, but that is counted in the 
sense that if we're at side bar and we're having arguments 
and we're doing other things, the clock is ticking whether 
it's being held against us or not.  In other words, I may 
not be able to finish a witness on a particular day.  I may 
end up not even using all the minutes you've given me but 
exceed the day total, and that's our concern." 
 
Having just asserted that the allotted number of days, not the 
minutes, posed a problem, the plaintiff concluded by requesting 
an additional week of time, acknowledging that the court would 
not be in session on November 12 and seeking to move the end 
date for the conclusion of evidence from November 9 to November 
15 or 16.  The trial judge responded, "As I said at the 
beginning, I'll listen to everybody, and I will consider 
everything." 
At the third pretrial conference on October 14, the trial 
judge asked all parties how much time they would need for their 
closing arguments.  The plaintiff indicated about one hour.  The 
trial judge also noted that it came to his attention that the 
court would not be in session on November 11, due to the 
Veteran's Day holiday.  Wanting to avoid a four-day break 
between closing arguments and the start of deliberations, the 
 
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trial judge indicated a likely shift of the end date for the 
presentation of evidence from November 9 to November 10, with 
closing arguments now likely to start on November 15:  "So, 
likely, evidence would close no later than the 10th, Wednesday, 
and if we have to go a full day Wednesday, I'll go."  Commenting 
on his decision to move the end date for the presentation of 
evidence to November 10 despite his earlier affirmance of 
November 9, the trial judge stated, "As much as I wanted to 
shrink the trial, I was not going to go back on my word of what 
I had given as sort of an outlier of time and then move you back 
a full day."  The trial judge then referenced receipt of the 
plaintiff's objection to the timeline and promised that a 
decision would be issued later that day, October 14, or on the 
next day, October 15.  The trial judge also stated: 
"[L]isten, everyone here is extremely experienced at trying 
cases.  There's a flow to a case and a cadence to a case, 
and you're not going to know what it is until it starts.  
So I think once it gets going, we're all going to have a 
much better idea of how it's going to flow.  But my job is 
to make sure it flows efficiently and properly and lets 
everyone try their case at the same time." 
 
On October 15, the trial judge presented his pretrial time 
limits for the presentation of evidence, increasing his 
preliminary allotment of 1,575 minutes, or just over twenty-six 
hours, for each party, to 1,680 minutes, or twenty-eight hours, 
for each party.  The parties' cases were now set to conclude on 
November 10, with closing arguments to begin on November 15.  
 
8 
These adjustments had the effect of both extending the number of 
days allotted for the presentation of evidence and increasing 
the number of minutes the plaintiff had to present her case. 
The plaintiff made no specific requests during trial for 
additional time for the presentation of evidence.  Despite the 
trial judge's indications pretrial that he was willing to extend 
days should the need arise, the plaintiff made no proffer to the 
trial judge as to additional evidence she would have presented 
with additional time, nor did the plaintiff request during trial 
that additional half days be extended to full days or that the 
court remain in session later than usual on any given day to 
allow counsel to finish presenting evidence.  The plaintiff's 
only request for additional time throughout the trial came at 
closing arguments, where counsel expressed that the allotted one 
hour was insufficient and requested ten additional minutes.  The 
trial judge granted that request.  Neither the defendants nor 
the plaintiff used all their allotted time at trial, with the 
plaintiff forgoing just over twenty minutes.  The trial judge 
never interrupted the plaintiff's presentation of evidence on 
the basis of time during trial. 
Discussion.  We review a lower court's imposition of a time 
limit for the presentation of evidence and the length of trial 
for abuse of discretion.  See Van Liew v. Eliopoulos, 92 Mass. 
App. Ct. 114, 118 (2017); Clark v. Clark, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 
 
9 
746 (1999); Chandler v. FMC Corp., 35 Mass. App. Ct. 332, 338 
(1993).  A judge, "as the guiding spirit and controlling mind of 
the trial," has broad discretion over setting a schedule for the 
presentation of evidence, so long as exercise of that discretion 
is reasonable and does not interfere with a party's right to 
present his or her case.  Clark, supra.  See Guardianship of 
Brandon, 424 Mass. 482, 494 (1997); Van Liew, supra; Chandler, 
supra. 
In light of the scarcity of case law in the Commonwealth 
specifically addressing the issue of time limits for the 
presentation of evidence and length of trial, we also survey 
general evidentiary principles and various other sources of 
authority in an effort to gauge common practices.  "The judge 
presiding over the trial of a case has the power to keep the 
examination of witnesses within the limits of common decency and 
fairness, and he has the duty to exercise that power promptly 
and firmly when it becomes necessary to do so."  Commonwealth v. 
Rooney, 365 Mass. 484, 496 (1974).  See generally Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 611(a) (2023).  Furthermore, relevant evidence is "excludable 
in the judge's discretion as an unduly time-consuming . . . 
diversion" should the probative value of that evidence be 
substantially outweighed by such a risk.  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 
53 Mass. App. Ct. 393, 407-408 (2001).  See generally Mass. G. 
Evid. § 403.  These evidentiary principles are at least one 
 
10 
source of a judge's broad discretion to impose time limits as 
necessary in the Commonwealth.  See generally Mass. G. Evid. 
§§ 403, 611(a). 
Other jurisdictions have relied on a court's inherent 
authority to control its docket as a source of a judge's broad 
discretion in this area, shedding light on what litigants may 
expect to be within a judge's power to implement.  See United 
States v. DeCologero, 364 F.3d 12, 23 & n.7 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(discussing courts' reliance on Fed. R. Evid. 403 versus courts' 
inherent authority when considering propriety of imposition of 
time limits); Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 
F.3d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. 
Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Although 
the procedural rules governing federal civil litigation do not 
explicitly authorize a district court to set time limits for a 
trial, a district court has inherent power 'to control cases 
before it'"); United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1577 
(E.D. Ky. 1986) ("the inherent power of the court to manage its 
workload by placing reasonable time limits on trials is 
theoretically unchallengeable"). 
Further, local court rules and professional organizations 
have offered guidance for judges.  Rule 43.1 of the Local Rules 
of the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts (effective Oct. 1, 2023) (Local Rule 43.1) permits 
 
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a judge to impose time limits in the absence of agreement among 
the parties and to adjust any such limits upon a showing of good 
cause.  In considering a request for an increased allotment of 
time after the commencement of trial under Local Rule 43.1, a 
judge may consider, among other relevant factors, whether the 
moving party has used the time allotted reasonably so far, 
complied with orders, and explained sufficiently why additional 
time is needed and how it would be used.  Id. ("A request for 
added time will be allowed only for good cause.  In determining 
whether to grant a motion for an increased allotment of time, 
the court will take into account . . . the moving party's 
explanation as to the way in which the requested added time 
would be used and why it is essential to assure a fair 
trial . . ."); American Bar Association, Civil Trial Practice 
Standards § 8(f), SN063 ALI-ABA 839, 865 (2007) ("The court 
should reassess imposed limits in light of developments during 
trial, and may grant an extension upon a showing of good 
cause"). 
The American Bar Association's Civil Trial Practice 
Standards advise that, before imposing time limits, courts 
should make an informed analysis of the parties' cases and plans 
for trial, discuss the possibility of self-imposed time limits 
with the parties, and afford the parties an opportunity to be 
heard on the matter.  Civil Trial Practice Standards § 8(a), 
 
12 
SN063 ALI-ABA at 865.  These sources provide insight into how a 
judge can suitably exercise his or her broad discretion in 
choosing whether and how to impose time limits for the 
presentation of evidence and length of a trial. 
In light of our case law and the instructive sources 
discussed supra, in determining whether to impose time limits, 
and if so the length to impose, a trial judge should perform an 
informed analysis of case-specific circumstances, including but 
not limited to the complexity of a case and the parties' 
representations of their needs.  This informed analysis may 
involve reviewing written motions and affording the parties an 
opportunity to be heard on the issue.  Upon request of a party, 
a judge should reassess imposed time limits in light of evolving 
circumstances at trial.  Flexibility is essential.  Importantly, 
though, it is incumbent on the parties to reevaluate their 
ability to present their case within the framework imposed by 
the court and to make specific requests and objections 
accordingly.  A trial judge cannot be expected to respond with 
flexibility unless the parties alert the judge to a prospective 
need for additional time. 
In the instant case, the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion in setting time limits.  The trial judge reviewed the 
parties' motions for and against time limits, received the 
parties' joint pretrial memorandum, and heard arguments from 
 
13 
both parties on the matter on multiple occasions before setting 
pretrial time limits:  "As I said at the beginning, I'll listen 
to everybody, and I will consider everything."  Cf. Chandler, 35 
Mass. App. Ct. at 338 (holding judge abused discretion where, 
among other things, he arbitrarily limited redirect examination 
of witness in middle of trial without parties having opportunity 
to have been heard).  The trial judge also expressed a 
commitment to reassessing his pretrial time limits by offering, 
on multiple occasions, to extend half days to full days and stay 
late as needed. 
The trial judge's offers of flexibility in this regard are 
significant.  The schedule as set by the trial judge was subject 
to change, driven by the parties' abilities to put on their 
cases.  The judge, however, can only be expected to exercise his 
discretion to extend time limits in response to developments at 
trial if a party represents such a need to the court.  The 
plaintiff in this case simply never provided the kind of input 
the judge invited.  Specifically, not once after trial began did 
the plaintiff ask for the extension of a half day to a full day, 
nor did the plaintiff ever connect general pretrial objections 
to an actualized need during trial to forgo specific evidence. 
The plaintiff asserts on appeal that she had to forgo 
entirely the testimony of multiple of her witnesses.  Yet, we 
cannot know on appeal whether the trial judge would have granted 
 
14 
or denied the plaintiff's request for more time had the 
plaintiff, for example, requested during trial that a half day 
be extended to a full day to allow for such testimony, as the 
trial judge specifically offered to do.  Had the plaintiff in 
fact requested as much and had the trial judge elected to honor 
the request -- which his earlier offer indicated was likely –- 
the plaintiff would have had two more hours, in addition to the 
twenty minutes she forwent at trial, to present additional 
evidence.  Without any input of this kind from the plaintiff, it 
cannot be said that the trial judge abused his discretion.  
Given the plaintiff's failure in this regard, she cannot 
demonstrate how she was prejudiced, or that the judge abused his 
discretion. 
The trial judge's decision on October 15 as to the schedule 
cannot be understood as final in light of his repeated offers to 
adjust as needed.  The trial judge again offered to extend half 
days after he had already granted the plaintiff's request for 
one such half-day extension, indicating a continued willingness 
to adjust:  "So, likely, evidence would close no later than the 
10th, Wednesday, and if we have to go a full day Wednesday, I'll 
go."  Moreover, in the two instances in which the plaintiff made 
specific requests -- when the plaintiff sought the extension of 
October 29 to a full day at the pretrial stage and when the 
plaintiff sought ten extra minutes for her closing argument -- 
 
15 
the trial judge adjusted the schedule accordingly.  A trial 
judge, having wide discretion over the management of a trial, 
cannot be said to have abused his or her discretion if he or 
she, having received no requests from parties to do otherwise, 
proceeds according to a reasonable schedule set at the start of 
trial.  Because the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an abuse 
of discretion or how she was prevented from presenting her 
entire case, we affirm the trial court's judgment. 
Conclusion.  In sum, we conclude that the judge's 
imposition of a reasonable limit on the length of the trial in 
this instance neither constituted an abuse of discretion nor 
prevented the plaintiff from presenting her case to the fact 
finder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.
Appendix. 
 
 
Surely, time limits are neither the only method nor usually 
the best method by which to ensure the efficient presentation of 
evidence to the trier of fact.  Nonetheless, they may prove a 
useful tool available to a trial judge in the context of complex 
civil trials, and so we provide the following guidance for 
judges for how best to approach the imposition of time limits.  
With the recognition that every case is different and trial 
judges have wide discretion over the management of a trial: 
 
• judges should avoid setting time limits for the various 
components of a trial before a thorough review of the case and 
the parties' plans with respect to the presentation of 
evidence; 
 
• judges should provide parties with an opportunity to be heard 
on the issue of time limits; 
 
• judges should pay particular attention to (1) the complexity 
of a given case and (2) the nature of the claims and defenses 
of the parties; 
 
• judges should generally allocate time equally to the 
plaintiff(s) and defendant(s) but may consider the possibility 
that a party with the burden of proof might, in a given case, 
require enhanced trial time; 
 
• judges should give the parties notice of any time limits 
before the start of trial, so that the parties may plan 
accordingly, and should likewise provide updates as to the 
accounting of time throughout trial; 
 
• judges should not be reticent to reevaluate their pretrial 
determinations based on developments during trial; 
 
• judges should reasonably accommodate a party's request during 
trial for a reasonable adjustment of the time limits if that 
party adequately explains why additional time is needed and 
how, if granted, that additional time would be used; and 
 
• judges should emphasize when informing a jury venire of the 
anticipated length of a trial that such estimates are not 
precise.