Case Title: DEVERNIERO v EBY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12046 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1972 M A R G A R E T A. DeVERNIERO and JAMES V. DeVERNIERO, P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, MARK ALLEN EBY, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Hutton, Schiltz and Sheehy, B i l l i n g s , Montana. John C. Sheehy argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana. For Respondent: Crowley, Kilbourne, Haughey, Hanson and Gallagher, Billings, Montana. George C. Dalthorp and Jack S. Ramirez argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Submitted : January 10, 1972 Filed : APR 19 I9P M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is a negligence action brought by p l a i n t i f f s Margaret A. DeVerniero and James V. DeVerniero, husband and wife, a r i s i n g out of an automobile accident i n Billings, Montana, involving p l a i n t i f f Margaret A . DeVerniero and defendant Mark Allen Eby, represented by h i s father, Allen H. Eby, appointed guardian ad litem. The case was t r i e d t o the d i s t r i c t court s i t t i n g with a jury, i n the t h i r t e e n j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Yellowstone. Margaret A . DeVerniero and James V. DeVerniero a r e joined as p l a i n t i f f s i n t h i s action t o recover damages for physical i n j u r i e s sustained by the wife; and f o r the loss of the wife's services, companionship, and society sustained by the husband; a l l alleged t o have been t h e r e s u l t of the automo- b i l e accident. From a judgment entered on a verdict f o r defendant, p l a i n t i f f s appeal, The accident here involved occurred a t 2:00 p.m., January 22, 1968, a t the intersection of Alderson Avenue and Third S t r e e t West i n the c i t y of Billings. A t the time of t h e accident, the s t r e e t s were described a s having snow, i c e , and water on them, with temperatures warm enough so t h a t t h e snow and i c e were melting and water running. Plaintiff.3 did not maintain t h a t the presence of slush or i c e on the s t r e e t s had any e f f e c t on the accident. Defendant Mark Eby was driving a 1963 Pontiac s t a t i o n wagon i n a northerly direction on Third S t r e e t West toward the intersection a t a speed of approximately 25 miles per hour. P l a i n t i f f Eiargaret DeVerniero was driving a 1966 Dodge Monaco i n a westerly d i r e c t i o n on Alderson Avenue toward the i n t e r - s e c t i o n a t a speed of between 20 t o 25 miles per hour. Although testimony a s t o t h e speed of both automobiles ranged from 15 t o 25 miles per hour, t h e only independent eyewitness, Beverly Runkle, t e s t i f i e d the vehicles were approach- ing t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n a t approximately the same speed. Neither automobile was exceeding t h e speed l i m i t of 25 miles per hour. The i n t e r s e c t i n g s t r e e t s were of equal s t a t u s and were not marked with s t o p s i g n s , s t o p l i g h t s , o r warning approach s i g n a l s . Neither party contested t h e f a c t t h a t t h e presence of s u f f i c i e n t afternoon daylight and t h e absence of obstructions i n t h e l i n e of s i g h t of both d r i v e r s gave each d r i v e r an unob- s t r u c t e d view f o r t h e s a f e operation of h i s automobile a t the unmarked i n t e r s e c t ion. It is uncontested t h a t i n such a s i t u a t i o n a s existed here---where two vehicles , a r e entering o r approaching an i n t e r - s e c t i o n from d i f f e r e n t highways a t approximately t h e same time, t h a t under Montana s t a t u t e s e c t i o n 32-2170, R.C.M. 1947, and sections 21-145 and 21-170, B i l l i n g s T r a f f i c Code, t h e d r i v e r of t h e vehicle on t h e l e f t is required t o y i e l d t h e r i g h t of way t o the vehicle on the r i g h t . Here, defendant was on t h e l e f t and p l a i n t i f f was on the r i g h t , therefore p l a i n t i f f was t h e favored d r i v e r . A t t r i a l , Margaret DeVerniero t e s t i f i e d t h a t a s she approached t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n she slowed down t o about 15 miles per hour and looked "again and again both ways"; t h a t she did not "remember seeing anything"; and the f i r s t she saw of the other vehicle was ''Just before the impact." Thus a t t r i a l , Mrs. DeVerniero was completely unable t o remember seeing the other automobile approaching, although she did remember looking both ways a s she approached the intersection. P l a i n t i f f s ' Exhibit 10, the investigation report f i l e d by Police Officer John Colter, contained t h i s interview with Mrs. DeVerniero immediately following the accident: "That she was going W. on Alderson a t approx. 20 MPH a s she approached the intersection of Alderson and 3rd St.W. she observed another veh. going No. on 3rd St. She thought the other c a r would stop and grant the r i g h t of way and when she realized t h a t it wasn't going t o she applied her brakes and it was too l a t e t o avoid the acc. 1 I The same accident report a l s o contained a similar i n t e r - view with the defendant, Mark Eby, driver of the other vehicle: 1' That he was going No. on 3rd St.W. a t approx. 25 MPH. H e did not see the other veh. u n t i l he was j u s t entering the intersection he applied h i s brakes but could not avoid the acc." A t t r i a l , defendant Mark Eby supplemented t h i s report with h i s testimony, repeating t h a t he did not see p l a i n t i f f ' s vehicle u n t i l he had entered the intersection, and "I accelerated be- cause I thought I could g e t out of the way i n time." A t the point ox impact p l a i n t i f f ' s automobile struck the right rear door of defendant's automobile and came t o r e s t i n the intersection, while defendant's automobile continued down Alderson Avenue, spun around, and struck two parked automobiles. Defendant and h i s passenger, Mark Longo, were unhurt. P l a i n t i f f was knocked momentarily unconscious when her head struck the steering wheel of her automobile. Shortly thereafter Officer Colter of the Billings Police Department arrived a t t h e scene, made measurements, and talked t o both p a r t i e s . The measurements taken by Officer Colter revealed the point of impact was approximately 12 f e e t i n t o the intersection from the easterly boundary of Third S t r e e t West and 16 f e e t from the northerly boundary of Alderson Avenue. The nor th-south dimensions of the intersection a r e 32 f e e t and the east-west dimensions a r e 30 f e e t . For the purposes of t h i s appeal, the medical h i s t o r y of p l a i n t i f f Margaret DeVernierots i n j u r i e s is not recited, although i t was thoroughly explored a t t r i a l . It is s u f f i c i e n t t o s t a t e t h a t i n the intervening period of time from the accident t o the date of t r i a l , she alleged spinal i n j u r i e s which necessitated a spinal fus ion, continuing migraine headaches, and a resulting "thoracic o u t l e t syndrome" which necessitated a separate opera- tion t o remove a r i b . Complaint was f i l e d on January 26, 1970, r e c i t i n g two claims for r e l i e f and joining Margaret and James DeVerniero a s p l a i n t i f f s . Margaret DeVerniero i n her amended prayer a t t r i a l recited $7,500 s p e c i a l damages and $150,000 general damages. James DeVerniero similarly amended h i s prayer t o r e c i t e $82,500 damages. T r i a l commenced on December 1, 1970, and resulted i n a jury verdict i n favor of defendant, Mark Eby. During t r i a l several motions and objections were made by counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f s which a r e the basis of t h i s appeal. P l a i n t i f f s issues presented for review are: Issue 1. P l a i n t i f f , Margaret DeVerniero, a s a matter of law, was not g u i l t y of contributory negligence; the issue should not have been submitted t o the jury. Issue 2. The court order of December 4, 1970, allowing defendant 's counsel t o inspect a l l medical records of p l a i n t i f f i n two hospitals, irrespective of t h e relationship t o p l a i n t i f f ' s physical condition from the accident, was an abuse of Rule 35, M.R.Civ.P. The order became prejudicial t o t h e p l a i n t i f f and the court erred t o p l a i n t i f f ' s prejudice when it allowed evi- dence of hospital records not related t o the accident under the guise of impeachment. Issues 4 and 5 concern instructions t h a t were given or refused by the t r i a l court. Conceding h i s own negligence, defendant argues t h a t the p l a i n t i f f i n approaching and entering an uncontrolled intersection without observing the vehicle t o her l e f t and colliding with defendant's vehicle which had passed i n front of her, is not f r e e from contributory neglgence and such factual issue should have been placed before the jury f o r its determination upon t h e f a c t s . Here, it is important t o note t h a t a t t h e close of evidence a t t r i a l the court instructed the jury defendant was negligent a s a matter of law, f o r f a i l u r e t o y i e l d t h e r i g h t of way. Plain- t i f f s appeal on the basis of the denial of t h e i r motion f o r directed verdict on l i a b i l i t y and t h e giving of jury instructions on contributory negligence. The duty of drivers approaching and entering an uncon- t r o l l e d intersection is contained i n section 32-2170, R.C.M. 1947: "Vehicle approaching o r entering intersection. (a) When two (2) vehicles enter o r approach an intersection from d i f f e r e n t highways a t approxi- mately the same time, the driver of t h e vehicle on the l e f t s h a l l yield the r i g h t of way t o the vehicle on the r i g h t . -k * *" The record discloses the provisions of section 32-2170, R.C.M. 1947, were s t i p u l a t e d t o by counsel. City ordinance No. 3069, the Billings T r a f f i c Code, i n section 21-170 provides the i d e n t i c a l wording a s section 32-2170, R.C.M. 1947. Defendant's f a i l u r e t o yield the r i g h t of way constituted both s t a t u t o r i l y recognized duty and breach of t h a t duty. It i s c l e a r t h a t by statutory d i r e c t i v e automobiles approaching or entering an intersection a r e accorded the s t a t u s of favored and disfavored drivers t o f a c i l i t a t e the orderly movement of automobiles. Defendant, conceding h i s f a i l u r e t o yield the r i g h t of way, nevertheless argues p l a i n t i f f was g u i l t y of contributory negligence i n her f a i l u r e t o keep a lookout and t o control her automobile. Defendant argues t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s duty a s she approached the intersection was to: (1) look ahead and l a t e r - a l l y ahead, (2) operate her c a r a t a speed no greater than was reasonably proper under the circumstances then existing, and (3) keep her c a r under control. For authority dekendant r e l i e s on Autio v. Miller, 92 Mont. 150, 165, 1 1 P.2d 1039, which held: "The driver must look 'not only s t r a i g h t ahead, 1 but l a t e r a l l y ahead.' [Citing cases] Moreover, a person is presumed t o see t h a t which he could see by looking. * * * H e w i l l not be permitted t o say t h a t he did not see what he must have seen, had he looked, ' * * *'The duty t o keep a lookout includes t h e duty t o see t h a t which is i n plain s i g h t . I II This contention has merit i n the limited area t o which it applies --- negligence, but standing alone does not demon- s t r a t e contributory negligence i n a s much a s no consideration has been given t o proximate cause. Contributory negligence by d e f i n i t i o n i n Montana includes "proximate cause", and t h i s s t r i c t formula does not t o l e r a t e any less o r remote "contribution" by the p l a i n t i f f , p l a i n t i f f ' s conduct must not only "contribute" t o the injury but must contribute a s a "proximate cause". This i s demonstrated i n Montana Jury Instruct ion Guides, No. 11.00 : I I Contributory negligence is negligence on the part a f a claimant which contributed a s a proxi- mate cause t o h i s injury. f 1 Also see: Wolf v. ~ ' ~ e a r y , Inc., 132 Mont. 468, 318 P.2d 582. Proximate cause is a twofold l e g a l concept which may l i m i t l i a b i l i t y depending upon the existence of (1) an i n t e r - vening a c t and (2) the unforseeability of t h a t intervening a c t . This Court s t a t e d i n Sztaba v. Great Northern Ry., 147 Mont. 1 1 Causation i s a f a c t . It is important t o deter- mine causation f i r s t t o avoid its confusion with the issues t o follow. This is not a relationship between negligence and injury, but rather a causal r e l a t i o n between conduct and h u r t , both of which a r e factual concepts. It is only a f t e r the causal relationship, duty, and its scope a r e found t h a t the negligence issue i s reached. 61 Co1.L.R. 1401. "The t e s t most generally employed i n determining causation is the 'but f o r ' t e s t . Montana has adopted t h i s t e s t i n numerous cases. 1 "Proximate cause is one which i n a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new, inde- pendent cause, produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred.' Stroud v. Chicago, M.St.P. & P.Ry. Co., 75 Mont. 384, 393, 243 P. 1089, 1092," (Emphasis supplied) O n the point of proximate cause, defendant seems t o h i n t the "but for" doctrine can be applied i n a manner t h a t approaches l 1 l a s t c l e a r chance", which of course is not our case, by the assertion t h a t the accident could have been e a s i l y avoided by the s l i g h t e s t decelezation on the part of p l a i n t i f f had she been keeping a proper lookout. This is a misapplication of the r u l e under the facts of t h i s case. There is nothing i n t h e record t o indicate t h a t p l a i n t i f f would have been a l e r t e d t o any danger had she seen defendant's vehicle a t a point when she could have stopped. Defendant gave no indication he was not going t o yield the r i g h t of way, by traveling too t a s t , o r by being inattentive. Remembering,also, t h a t it is defendant's duty t o yield, there i s no 1.aw t h a t would hold p l a i n t i f f responsible for f a i l u r e t o a n t i c i p a t e t h a t defendant would accelerate t o pass i n front of p l a i n t i f f a t the l a s t i n s t a n t , when there was no chance f o r p l a i n t i f f t o stop. Rather, when a l l appeared normal, p l a i n t i f f had every r i g h t t o assume defendant would yield, a s the law requires. Defendant argues a t length t h a t p l a i n t i f f has no r i g h t t o ignore "obvious danger" i n a blind uncompromising reliance upon the r i g h t of way. Support for t h i s position has been c i t e d a t length and defendant r e l i e s on cases such a s Flynn v. Helena Cab & Bus Co., 94 Mont. 204, 21 P.2d 1105, which c i t e s Autio. Flynn i s a well-reasoned and correctly decided case, but factually easily distinguishable from t h e instant case. Here, there i s no similar f a c t o r any f a c t s t o be con- sidered concerning proceeding i n the face of obvious danger. This was an absolutely normal appearing s i t u a t i o n , u n t i l t h e defendant accelerated through the intersection and whatever h i s s t a t e d reasons f o r so doing w i l l not s h i f t t h e proximate cause t o the p l a i n t i f f . I f t h i s rationale could be applied t o the f a c t s i t u a t i o n , it would by implication render meaningless the r i g h t of way regula'tions designed t o avoid, i n any case, a race f o r the intersection. Additionally, f a i l u r e t o accept defendant's argument does not abrogate the duty t o keep a lookout by a l l p a r t i e s , a s defendant seems t o indicate. The d i s t i n c t i o n pointed out here is s t a t e d i n very concise language by the Utah Supreme Court i n Bates v. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P.2d 209, 213: "Had p l a i n t i f f looked j u s t prior t o , o r a t the time o f , crossing the center l i n e , defendant's position would not have a l e r t e d p l a i n t i f f t o any danger--then defendant would have been further away from the intersection than a t t h e time he did look. Had p l a i n t i f f looked it would not have affected defendant's driving o r speed. Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t he never saw p l a i n t i f f till defendant was within 100 f e e t of the intersection. Unless p l a i n t i f f had been a b l e t o c a s t some hypnotic s p e l l over defendant h i s looking e a r l i e r would have had no e f f e c t on the collision." The f a i l u r e of the record t o demonstrate any negligence of t h e p l a i n t i f f t h a t contributed a s a proximate cause t o her i n j u r i e s compels the finding t h a t p l a i n t i f f was not contribu- t o r i l y negligent, a s a matter of law. P l a i n t i f f s ' Issue 2, although grounded on an order of the t r i a l court given under Rules 34 and 35, M.R.Civ.P., concerns i t s e l f i n t h e main with impeachment based on the f a c t s of t h i s case and does not bring the rules themselves squarely before t h i s Court i n a manner t h a t would require interpretation o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n . I n view of our holding herein, t h e remaining issues a s need not be discussed/they r e l a t e only t o matters withini~dzhe f a c t s of t h i s cause and should not appear a t r e t r i a l . The judgment of t h e t r i a l court is reversed and a new t r i a l is ordered on t h e i s s u e of damages. d-+ Associate J u s t i c e I Chief J u s t i c e \ Associate J u s t i c e M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles dissenting: I dissent. The facts of t h i s case show the c o l l i s i o n t o have taken place when the front of p l a i n t i f f ' s automobile was but 12 f e e t i n t o the intersection, the rear of her car had not entered the intersection. ~ e f e n d a n t 's automobile was about t o e x i t from the intersection when the c o l l i s i o n occurred. It is c l e a r t h a t i f p l a i n t i f f had maintained a lookout a s she was required t o do, and which she did not do, she would have seen defendant's car crossing the intersection i n her path i n time t o avoid the c o l l i s i o n . Here, blind and uncompromising reliance upon a r i g h t of way i s held by the majority opinion a s t o not r a i s e a jury question a s t o whether t h a t is negligence. I wonder i f t h e Court would apply t h a t stringent a r u l e t o a pedestrian. This Court i n Autio v. Miller, 92 Mont. 150, 166, 11 P.2d 1039, did not and said "* * * But t h i s does not relieve him [the driver with the r i g h t of way] from exercising due care under the circum- stances.It In Autio it was an eight year old boy. In Jessen v. O'Daniel, 136 Mont. 513, 349 P.2d 107, t h i s Court affirmed a p l a i n t i f f ' s judgment for the disfavored driver. Also i n Flynn v. Helena Cab & Bus Co., 94 Mont. 204, 2 1 P.2d 1105, the cab driver who had t h e r i g h t of way was found not e n t i t l e d t o rely blindly upon h i s r i g h t of way. The majority opinion recognizes these cases a s t h e correct law but by some "mysticr' of a discussion of proximate cause does not find them applicable here. Additionally, the majority opinion, seemingly in an e f f o r t t o j u s t i f y its holding, s t a t e s i n referring t o f a c t s distinguishing t h i s case from Flynn, t h a t "* * * This was an absolutely normal appearing s i t u a t i o n u n t i l the defendant accelerated through the i n t e r - section * * *." This simply is not the record unless one takes completely out of context the testimony of defendant. I would affirm the judgment and verdict of the jury. A S S ~ & ~ t e Justice.