Case Title: Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2009-Ohio-4975

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4975.] 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-4975 
COLONIAL VILLAGE, LTD., APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-
APPELLANTS. 
COLONIAL TERRACE APARTMENTS, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-
APPELLANTS. 
COLONIAL TERRACE APARTMENTS II, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-
APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip 
Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4975.] 
Real estate taxation — Valuation of subsidized housing — BTA’s duty to make 
independent valuation — Burden of proof on appeal to the BTA — 
Multiple tax years and consistency — Law-of-the-case doctrine. 
(Nos. 2008-0443, 2008-0559, 2008-0560, and 2008-0561 — Submitted August 
11, 2009 — Decided September 29, 2009.) 
APPEALS from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 2004-A-574, 2005-A-987, 2005-
A-992, and 2005-A-993. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} The appellants and cross-appellees in these consolidated appeals 
are affiliated entities that own adjacent tracts of federally subsidized low-income 
housing in Washington County.  In Colonial Village Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. 
of Revision, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298 (“Colonial 
Village I”), we reviewed the determination of value for tax year 2003 rendered by 
the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) for one of the tracts at issue.  In that case, the 
BTA had found that the owner’s appraisal did not constitute probative evidence of 
value, and as a result it adopted the value assigned by the auditor and affirmed by 
the Washington County Board of Revision (“BOR”).  On appeal we reversed and 
remanded.  Relying on the property record card, we concluded that the auditor 
had valued the property based on a cost approach, and we held that the BTA had 
contravened our precedents by using a cost valuation, given the entire record in 
the case. 
{¶ 2} The BTA’s decisions in the consolidated cases before us 
demonstrate the influence of our holding in Colonial Village I.  The first of the 
consolidated cases, No. 2008-0443, addresses the BTA’s decision on remand of 
Colonial Village I. The second, No. 2008-0559, concerns the very same tract but 
addresses the valuation for tax year 2004.  The third and fourth appeals, Nos. 
2008-0560 and 2008-0561, concern the value of two separate tracts improved 
with government-subsidized housing that are owned by different but affiliated 
entities.  The tax year at issue in Nos. 2008-0560 and 2008-0561 is 2004. 
{¶ 3} For convenience, we will refer to No. 2008-0443, which addresses 
the BTA’s decision after we remanded in Colonial Village I, as the “2003 tax-year 
case” or more simply the “2003 case.” 1  We will also refer collectively to Nos. 
                                                 
1. When a case has been appealed from the BTA to a court and the court has remanded to the 
BTA, we have observed that the BTA’s “order following the mandate” of the court was “not a 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
2008-0559, 2008-0560 and 2008-0561 as the “2004 tax-year cases” or more 
simply the “2004 cases.”  As for the three different but affiliated property owners, 
we will use the term “Colonial” to refer to all of them collectively and each of 
them individually. 
The 2003 tax-year case 
{¶ 4} As noted, the 2003 case – No. 2008-0443 in this court – calls upon 
us to review the BTA’s decision after remand of Colonial Village I.  Our 
instruction to the BTA was to perform an independent valuation of the property 
based on the evidentiary record that had been developed in the case. The evidence 
before the BTA did not change.  First, Colonial had presented to the BOR an 
owner’s opinion of value consisting of an income approach, along with the 
testimony of Colonial’s Randall Palmer.  Second, Colonial had presented the 
testimony and appraisal report of Charles Snyder to the BTA. 
{¶ 5} The owner’s opinion of value notes that the improvements 
constitute a Section 8 federally subsidized housing project where tenants pay 30 
percent of their adjusted gross income as rent, with the federal government paying 
the remainder of a specified monthly rental fee.  The federal government also 
specifies a utility allowance that helps pay utility bills, and the amount of these 
allowances is paid to Colonial to be remitted to the tenants.  At Colonial Village, 
each apartment is separately metered and tenants pay electric bills separately, but 
                                                                                                                                     
final determination to be appealed under R.C. 5717.04.”  Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. 
Bd. of Revision (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 344, 346, 639 N.E.2d 25, citing Rowland v. Lindley (1979), 
58 Ohio St.2d 15, 12 O.O.3d 8, 387 N.E.2d 1367 (the “journal entry which the Tax Commissioner 
issues only in order to carry out the expressed mandate of this court is not a final determination 
within the purview of R.C. 5717.02”).  These cases cause no concern about our jurisdiction over 
No. 08-443, however, because we have not hesitated to entertain an appeal from a later BTA 
decision if that appeal contests additional findings and conclusions that the BTA rendered 
pursuant to the remand order.  See United Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Tracy (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 506, 
705 N.E.2d 679 (noting that the case “is again before the court after having been reversed and 
remanded to the [BTA] in United Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Limbach (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 369, 6443 
N.E.2d 1129”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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other utilities are apparently provided by the landlord.  There are a total of 45 
apartments, of which 35 are two-bedroom and 10 are three-bedroom units. 
{¶ 6} In Colonial Village I, we briefly summarized the valuation 
methods pursued by both the owner’s opinion of value at the BOR and the 
appraisal at the BTA.  Colonial Village I, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 
873 N.E.2d 298, ¶ 17, 18.  As for the owner’s opinion of value, the BOR’s 
technical advisors stated that (1) the capitalization rate was “too high” and (2) the 
expenses were “not based on market” and “not realistic.”  On appeal, the BTA 
impugned Snyder’s sales-comparison approach by faulting (i) the appraiser’s 
limited inspection of the comparables, (ii) the disparate use of location 
adjustments, and (iii) the extrapolation from five comparables, of which three 
were determined to be valued at over $24,000 per unit, to a value of $22,000 per 
unit for Colonial Village.  With respect to the income approach, the BTA found 
that both the vacancy-loss figures and the expense estimate lacked factual support.  
Because of these flaws, the BTA found the appraisal unreliable, and it affirmed 
the county’s valuation of the property. 
{¶ 7} As noted, we reversed in Colonial Village I because, based on our 
reading of the property record card, we determined that the county had used a 
cost-based approach, which is inappropriate for government-subsidized 
properties.  Colonial Village I, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 
298, ¶ 19, 22.  As we have more recently explained, our subsidized-housing case 
law seeks to prevent the affirmative benefits of government subsidies from unduly 
inflating the value of the property for tax purposes.  Woda Ivy Glen Ltd. 
Partnership v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Revision, 121 Ohio St.3d 175, 2009-Ohio-762, 
902 N.E.2d 984, ¶ 29.  Reliance on a cost approach tends to run afoul of this 
precept because the subsidies allow developers to incur costs that ordinary market 
rents would not support.  See Oberlin Manor, Ltd. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision 
(1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 56, 57, 543 N.E.2d 768.  Nor have such subsidies been 
January Term, 2009 
5 
 
understood as pertaining directly to the value of the realty – we have excluded 
consideration of the effect the subsidies have on value on the theory that they 
constitute an “encumbrance” that should be disregarded, or alternatively because 
they appear to constitute separable intangible benefits accorded in connection 
with the government program.  Compare Alliance Towers, Ltd. v. Stark Cty. Bd. 
of Revision (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 16, 523 N.E.2d 826, paragraph one of the 
syllabus, with Woda Ivy Glen, ¶ 29, fn. 4.  Additionally, we discerned in Colonial 
Village I that the record contained sufficient evidence to permit the BTA to 
perform an independent valuation, thereby obviating the need to adopt a cost-
based approach.  Id., ¶ 24. 
{¶ 8} On February 1, 2008, the BTA issued its decision on remand in the 
2003 tax-year case.  In that decision, the BTA carried out this court’s instruction 
by (1) marshaling evidence from the record whose validity had not previously 
been impugned and (2) deriving an income approach from that evidence.  
Colonial Village Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision (Feb. 1, 2008), BTA No. 
2004-A-574, at 11.  The BTA’s income approach derives the gross potential 
income, reserves for replacement, and capitalization rates from the Snyder 
appraisal, and the vacancy and collection loss from the owner’s opinion of value.  
Id.  After computing net operating income and applying the capitalization rate and 
a tax additur, the BTA derived a rounded figure of $1,171,930.  The BTA then 
subtracted $9,000 for furniture, fixtures, and equipment and concluded that the 
value was $1,162,930.  Id. 
{¶ 9} Both Colonial on appeal and the county on cross-appeal 
characterize the BTA’s valuation as unsupported by the evidence.  We address 
their objections as follows. 
{¶ 10} First, Colonial states that the 40 percent expense ratio used by the 
BTA lacks support.  We disagree.  The BTA forthrightly stated that it derived the 
ratio by examining the expenses associated with properties “that appear to be 
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similar to the subject in size, configuration, and age, as contained in [Snyder’s 
appraisal] report under the sales comparison and the capitalization rate section.”  
Colonial Village (Feb. 1, 2008), BTA No. 2004-A-574, at 11, fn. 3.  Snyder’s 
appraisal report discloses the data to which the BTA refers and bears out the 
propriety of the figures the BTA used.  In particular, two properties appear on 
both the list of Snyder’s sale comparables and the capitalization-rate 
determination. The expense ratios for those two are 37 percent and 42.2 percent.  
Additionally, these two parcels have expense ratios that are close to the highest 
and lowest on the list of properties in the capitalization-rate section. 
{¶ 11} Accordingly, the 40 percent figure the BTA adopted is supported 
by the information adduced in the very appraisal report upon which Colonial itself 
would have the BTA rely.  See AP Hotels of Illinois, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 118 Ohio St.3d 343, 2008-Ohio-2565, 889 N.E.2d 115, ¶ 16 (even 
where appraiser’s conclusion of value could not be used, his certification of the 
truth of statements of fact in the appraisal report justified the BTA in treating 
those statements as evidence).  Indeed, as between the BTA’s estimation and the 
analysis of Colonial’s appraiser (who derived what amounted to a 51 percent 
expense ratio from actual expenses provided by the owner) the BTA’s number 
certainly appears to be the more tenable of the two.  See Colonial Village, Ltd. v. 
Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision (Apr. 21, 2006), BTA No. 2004-A-574, at 7, 
reversed and remanded, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298. 
{¶ 12} Second, Colonial faults the BTA for not adopting Snyder’s 
vacancy- and collection-loss figure.  This argument is barred by the law-of-the-
case doctrine:  the BTA already decided that Snyder’s 8 percent figure lacked 
credibility, and we deferred to that finding on appeal.  Colonial Village (Apr. 21, 
2006), BTA No. 2004-A-547, at 7, reversed and remanded on other grounds, 114 
Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298, ¶ 18, 19; see Columbus Bd. of 
Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 344, 345, 639 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2009 
7 
 
25.  In carrying out the instruction of this court on remand, the BTA looked to 
other evidence in the record:  the owner’s opinion of value that Colonial presented 
to the BOR.  From that document the BTA derived the 5 percent figure it used in 
its February 1, 2008 decision.  Colonial Village (Feb. 1, 2008), BTA No. 2004-A-
574, at 11, fn. 2.  That action by the BTA in no way qualifies as unreasonable or 
unlawful under the circumstances. 
{¶ 13} Third, Colonial similarly argues that the BTA should ignore its 
previous ruling and adopt Snyder’s sales-comparison approach for 2003.  Once 
again, the law-of-the-case doctrine bars this argument. 
{¶ 14} Fourth, Colonial in various places argues that the record and 
disposition of the 2004 tax-year cases should affect the disposition of the 2003 
tax-year case.  In particular, Colonial compares the expense ratios for tax year 
2003 and 2004 and argues that the 2003 tax-year determination must be incorrect 
in light of that comparison.  These objections are mistaken.  Quite simply, the 
record developed in the 2004 tax-year cases differs from the record in the 2003 
tax year case – and the evidence adduced for one tax year may not be considered 
with respect to another year if it is not made a part of the record in the case 
pertaining to that other year. 
{¶ 15} Indeed, we have recently had occasion to consider and reject the 
argument that the BTA’s determination of value as to one tax year is subject to 
legal constraints of consistency to its determination of value as to other tax years.  
Olmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 122 Ohio St.3d 134, 
2009-Ohio-2461, 909 N.E.2d 597, ¶ 19, 23–25.  Of particular importance is our 
holding that “[a]s a matter of both case law and elementary principles, each tax 
year should be determined based on the evidence presented to the assessor that 
pertains to that year.”  Id., ¶ 20.  This holding of Olmsted Falls bars many of 
Colonial’s contentions in its appeal from the BTA’s decision regarding the 2003 
tax year. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 16} Like Colonial, the county lodges sweeping objections to the BTA’s 
determination of value for the 2003 tax year.  All of these objections run afoul of 
the law-of-the-case doctrine:  quite simply, the BTA carried out our explicit 
instruction for tax year 2003, and the county’s attempt to return to the status quo 
before our Colonial Village I decision has no legal basis.  Moreover, to the extent 
the county asks us to overrule Colonial Village I, we decline to do so because the 
decision correctly applied the law to the record before us in that case. 
{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, we find that the BTA acted reasonably 
and lawfully in carrying out our instruction on remand.  We therefore affirm the 
BTA’s decision in No. 2008-0443. 
The 2004 tax-year cases 
A. The evidentiary record. 
{¶ 18} The record in the 2004 tax-year cases differs from the record in the 
2003 tax-year case.  Both at the BOR and at the BTA, the 2004 cases were tried 
on a consolidated basis.  The owners offered three appraisal reports, one for each 
of the properties, along with the testimony of Charles Snyder at the BOR.  After 
the BOR rejected the owner’s position in each of the 2004 cases, the owners 
appealed to the BTA, which held a hearing on August 14, 2006.  Colonial 
subpoenaed the BOR’s consultant, Fred W. Westbrook, to the hearing and 
examined him as on cross-examination. 
{¶ 19} Westbrook was executive vice president of Barry R. Ankney, Inc., 
and in that capacity served as the overall project manager for Washington 
County’s 2004 revaluation of real property.  Of greatest significance for the 2004 
tax-year cases is Westbrook’s testimony that although the county’s appraisal of 
Colonial’s properties is set forth as a cost approach on the property record cards, 
the actual underlying approach reflects a “composite of those three approaches,” 
that is, sales-comparison, income, and cost.  More specifically, Westbrook 
testified that the valuation of the Colonial Village tract for the 2004 tax year 
January Term, 2009 
9 
 
constituted a mix of “market” and cost approaches, whereby the “market” 
approach constitutes an income approach.  As for Colonial Terrace and Colonial 
Terrace II, Westbrook’s testimony establishes that an income approach 
constituted the sole approach as to those tracts for tax year 2004. 
B. Because the record in the 2004 tax-year cases showed that 
the county did not rely exclusively on a cost approach, the BTA 
erred in regarding Colonial Village I as controlling its disposition 
of the 2004 cases. 
{¶ 20} In evaluating the record in the 2004 tax-year cases, the BTA 
plainly accorded controlling significance to our decision in Colonial Village I.  In 
each case the BTA devoted an abbreviated review to the appraisal of Charles 
Snyder that Colonial presented to the BOR, identified certain deficiencies in the 
appraisal, cited Colonial Village I, and proceeded to perform an independent 
income-approach valuation of the tract at issue.  Although the BTA in each of the 
2004 cases recited the testimony of Fred Westbrook, the BTA attached no 
particular significance to it. 
{¶ 21} As part of its cross-appeal, the county contends that the BTA erred 
in the 2004 tax-year cases because “[t]here was no ‘trigger’ as set forth in 
[Colonial Village I] that would authorize or allow the BTA to create its own value 
for the three properties.”  By “trigger,” the county refers to our determination in 
Colonial Village I that “the record in this case contains sufficient evidence to 
trigger the BTA’s duty to undertake an independent valuation of the property.”  
Colonial Village I, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298, ¶ 24.  
We agree in part with this contention:  unlike the situation in the 2003 tax-year 
case, the BTA’s duty to perform an independent valuation was not triggered in the 
2004 tax-year cases.  That is so not because of the quantum of appraisal evidence 
presented by Colonial, but because the record in the 2004 cases – unlike the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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record in the 2003 tax-year case – establishes that the county did not rely 
exclusively on a cost-based valuation. 
{¶ 22} Our reasoning on this point begins with our decision in Colonial 
Village I, in which we relied upon an analysis of the case law that is more fully set 
forth in our contemporaneous decision in Dayton–Montgomery Cty. Port Auth. v. 
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 113 Ohio St.3d 281, 2007-Ohio-1948, 865 
N.E.2d 22.  In Dayton–Montgomery, the taxpayer contested the auditor’s cost-
based determination of value and presented actual-cost evidence that (1) 
corroborated the initial figure the auditor arrived at by consulting his cost 
schedules but that (2) tended to negate the auditor’s use of a 1.6 “grade factor 
adjustment” that increased the valuation by 60 percent.  Dayton–Montgomery, ¶ 
13, 14.  The BTA held that the actual-cost analysis was incomplete, and because 
the board of revision had not explained its decision to order a modest departure 
from the auditor’s determination, the BTA adopted the auditor’s valuation that 
used the 1.6 grade factor.  On appeal, we reversed. 
{¶ 23} In Dayton–Montgomery, we acknowledged the rules that usually 
apply.  The first rule is that the party challenging the board of revision’s decision 
at the BTA has the burden of proof to establish its proposed value as the value of 
the property.  Dayton–Montgomery, ¶ 15; Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 564, 566, 740 N.E.2d 276 
(“When cases are appealed from a board of revision to the BTA, the burden of 
proof is on the appellant, whether it be a taxpayer or a board of education, to 
prove its right to an increase or decrease from the value determined by the board 
of revision”).  The second rule is that the board of revision (or auditor) bears no 
burden to offer proof of the accuracy of the appraisal on which the county initially 
relies, with the result that the BTA is justified in retaining the county’s valuation 
of the property when an appellant fails to sustain its burden of proof at the BTA.  
Dayton–Montgomery, ¶ 15; Simmons v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1998), 81 
January Term, 2009 
11 
 
Ohio St.3d 47, 48, 689 N.E.2d 22 (failure to sustain burden of persuasion justified 
approving the board of revision’s valuation of the property even though the 
county offered no proof of the validity of its determination); W. Industries, Inc. v. 
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1960), 170 Ohio St. 340, 342, 10 O.O.2d 427, 164 
N.E.2d 741 (a taxpayer who appeals to the BTA “is not entitled to the deduction 
claimed merely because no evidence is adduced contra his claim”). 
{¶ 24} In spite of these general principles, Dayton–Montgomery came 
within a narrow exception to their usual application.  We discerned that exception 
in Amsdell v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 572, 635 
N.E.2d 11, and Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996), 76 
Ohio St.3d 13, 665 N.E.2d 1098.  In both of those cases, as in Dayton–
Montgomery, the developed record before the BTA affirmatively negated the 
validity of the county’s valuation of the property.  See also AP Hotels, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 343, 2008-Ohio-2565, 889 N.E.2d 115, ¶ 17, 18 (affirmative evidence of 
owner’s appraiser that September 11 terrorist attacks had depressed demand for 
hotel rooms negated the county’s valuation). 
{¶ 25} In Colonial Village I, we confronted the same type of situation:  
the property record card affirmatively indicated that the county had relied on a 
cost-based approach in valuing the property, and our precedent disfavored the cost 
approach in the valuation of government-subsidized properties.  Colonial Village 
I, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298, ¶ 19, 20.  This conflict 
triggered the legal duty of the BTA to determine whether the record as developed 
by the parties contained sufficient evidence to permit an independent valuation of 
the property.  We concluded that it did, and directed the BTA on remand to 
perform such a valuation. 
{¶ 26} Reciting this background allows us to articulate the BTA’s error in 
deciding the 2004 tax-year cases.  Because the uncontroverted testimony of Fred 
Westbrook established that the county did not rely exclusively on a cost-based 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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approach for any of the tracts in tax year 2004, the exception that applied in 
Dayton–Montgomery and Colonial Village I does not apply to the 2004 tax-year 
cases.  Quite simply, there was no impediment in the 2004 cases for the BTA to 
approve the BOR’s determination of value if it found that Colonial had failed to 
discharge its burden to show the value of the property. 
{¶ 27} Moreover, our review of the BTA’s decisions in Nos. 2008-0559, 
2008-0560, and 2008-0561 leads us to conclude that the error we have just 
identified pervaded the decisions and truncated the BTA’s consideration of the 
appraisal evidence offered by Colonial at the BOR.  Because of this, we conclude 
that the proper course of action is to vacate the BTA’s decisions in Nos. 2008-
0559, 2008-0560, and 2008-0561, and remand to the BTA.  Additionally, this 
disposition renders moot the more specific objections raised by Colonial and the 
county to the BTA’s decisions in the three cases. 
C. On remand, the BTA has authority to determine the probative 
value of the evidence before it for each tax year, and the county does 
not have the burden to prove the accuracy of the appraisal upon 
which it relies. 
{¶ 28} It is important in this context to clarify that the BTA on remand 
possesses plenary authority to review the decisions of the BOR and determine the 
value of the property in the 2004 cases.  In this regard the first point is the one just 
made:  there is no legal bar to the BTA’s approving the BOR’s valuation in those 
cases. 
{¶ 29} Second, in the 2004 tax-year cases the BTA is not bound by law to 
arrive at the same conclusions concerning the probative value of Snyder’s 
appraisal as it reached in the 2003 case.  We recently rejected the contention that a 
legal constraint of consistency binds the BTA as to how it evaluates evidence 
from one tax year to the next.  Olmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
January Term, 2009 
13 
 
Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-2461, ¶ 24, 25.  That principle will apply 
to the BTA’s consideration of the 2004 tax-year cases on remand. 
{¶ 30} Moreover, we reiterate that the county does not have the 
affirmative burden to establish as a general matter the accuracy of any appraisals 
that underlie its valuation of the property.  See W. Industries, Inc., 170 Ohio St. 
340, 342, 10 O.O.2d 427, 164 N.E.2d 741.  In Colonial Village I, the county’s 
omission consisted not of failing to discharge such a burden, but merely in failing 
to show that the property record card was wrong in indicating exclusive reliance 
on a cost approach.  See Colonial Village I, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 
873 N.E.2d 298, ¶ 22, fn. 2.  Accord Dayton–Montgomery, 113 Ohio St.3d 281, 
2007-Ohio-1948, 865 N.E.2d 22, ¶ 30 (county auditor could have prevailed by 
showing the basis for using the 1.6 grade factor).  In other circumstances the 
board of revision or auditor may be called upon to present evidence as a rebuttal 
as to some particular factual matter.  See id. at ¶ 20 (county could have presented 
evidence negating the probative value of aspects of the owner’s actual-cost study 
but did not); Cummins Property Servs., L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
117 Ohio St.3d 516, 2008-Ohio-1473, 885 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 45 (county could have 
developed and presented evidence of an improvement after an arm’s-length sale 
but before the tax lien date, but did not). 
{¶ 31} But unlike a school board or a property owner that seeks to depart 
from the county’s valuation of the property, the board of revision and the auditor 
do not themselves acquire the burden of proving the general accuracy of the 
appraisals on which they initially relied.  Compare Mentor Exempted Village Bd. 
of Edn. v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Revision (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 318, 319, 526 N.E.2d 
64 (once school board presented probative evidence of value, owner had the 
burden to present contrary evidence of value), with Simmons, 81 Ohio St.3d 47, 
48, 689 N.E.2d 22 (once BTA found that owner who had appealed did not 
affirmatively show value, BTA properly affirmed the county’s valuation even 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
though the county had presented no evidence).  This distinction arises because of 
the settled principle that “when a county auditor acts ‘within the limits of the 
jurisdiction conferred by law,’ the auditor’s action is ‘presumed, in the absence of 
proof to the contrary, to be valid and to have been done in good faith and in the 
exercise of sound judgment.’ ”  Dayton–Montgomery, ¶ 13, quoting Wheeling 
Steel Corp. v. Evatt (1944), 143 Ohio St. 71, 28 O.O. 21, 54 N.E.2d 132, 
paragraph seven of the syllabus.  The county’s appraised value thus forms in most 
cases a default valuation that must be preferred and adopted if the appellant at the 
BTA fails to prove a different value of the property, and our review of the record 
in the 2004 tax-year cases persuades us that this principle applies in these cases. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 32} For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of the BTA in No. 
2008-0443.  In Nos. 2008-0559, 2008-0560, and 2008-0561, we vacate the BTA’s 
decisions and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 33} In Colonial Village Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 114 
Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298 (“Colonial Village I”), at ¶ 23, 
we stated, “The BTA must ‘ “independently weigh and evaluate all evidence 
properly before it” ’ in order to ‘ “make an independent determination concerning 
the valuation of the property at issue,” ’ ” quoting Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 13, 16, 665 N.E.2d 1098, 
quoting Black v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1985), 16 Ohio St.3d 11, 13, 16 
January Term, 2009 
15 
 
OBR 363, 475 N.E.2d 1264.  In this case, the Board of Tax Appeals reviewed all 
the evidence before it, including testimony of the qualified appraisers used by 
both parties.  Based on that review, the BTA concluded that neither the appraisal 
offered by Colonial Village nor the appraisal offered by the BOR accurately 
reflected the value of the various parcels for the various tax years.  Accordingly, 
the BTA made specific reasonable adjustments to the appraisals, including 
adjusting expense ratios, vacancy rates, and credit-loss rates to reflect market 
averages, and arrived at its own valuation.  As in Colonial Village I, “[t]he record 
contains ample information for the BTA to ‘determine the taxable value of the 
property,’ ” and I would defer to the conclusions reached by the BTA.  Id. at ¶ 24, 
quoting R.C. 5717.03. 
{¶ 34} Furthermore, the majority opinion states that the county’s 
valuation is presumptively valid.  I would not go that far.  In many instances, 
including here, the county auditor does nothing more than make a percentage 
adjustment to the property record card.  In many instances, including here, that 
property record card has a valuation that was not the result of an appraisal by a 
qualified appraiser.  When the country auditor has not conducted a reasonable 
appraisal, its valuation should not be entitled to deference. 
{¶ 35} Because the BTA properly applied the relevant case law, including 
Colonial Village I, it did not commit error in independently valuing the properties, 
and I would affirm the decisions of the BTA in all four cases before us. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Karen H. Bauernschmidt Co., L.P.A., and Karen H. Bauernschmidt, for 
appellants and cross-appellees. 
 
James R. Gorry, for appellees and cross-appellants. 
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