Case Title: Vernon J. Mortensen v. Dennis Lyle Akers Easement and tresspass

Citation: 

Docket Number: 33587

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2009-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 33587/33694 
 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.  
AKERS, husband and wife,                                  
                                                        
          Plaintiffs-Respondents,                       
                                                        
v.                                                      
                                                        
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E.  
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,                      
                                                        
          Defendants-Appellants,                        
                                                        
and                                                     
                                                        
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,  
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.       
WHITE, husband and wife,  
 
             Defendants. 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.  
AKERS, husband and wife,                                  
                                                        
          Plaintiffs-Respondents,                       
                                                        
v.                                                      
                                                        
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,  
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife,  
                    
           Defendants-Appellants,                              
                                                        
and                                                     
                                                        
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E.  
MORTENSEN, husband and wife, 
      
           Defendants.                                                  
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Lewiston, March 2008 Term 
 
2009 Opinion No.  6 
 
Filed:  January 22, 2009 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
SUBSTITUTE OPINION.  THE  
COURT’S PRIOR OPINION  
DATED JUNE 4, 2008 IS  
HEREBY WITHDRAWN 
 
 
 
 
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Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County.  Honorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 
 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the district court are affirmed in 
part, vacated in part, and the case is remanded. 
 
Givens Pursley, LLP, Boise, for appellants Mortensen.  Terri Yost argued. 
 
Robert Covington, Hayden, for appellants White.   
 
James Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d’Alene, for respondents.  Susan Weeks 
argued. 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
HORTON, Justice 
This appeal arises from a bench trial concerning an easement and trespass dispute.  
Vernon and Marti Mortensen, David and Michelle White, and D.L. White Construction, Inc. 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Appellants”) appeal the district court’s ruling regarding 
the existence, scope, and location of Appellants’ easement across Respondents Dennis and 
Sherrie Akers’ property and the district court’s award of compensatory and punitive damages for 
trespass and emotional distress.  This Court previously decided an appeal concerning this case in 
Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005) (Akers I).  We affirm in 
part and vacate in part the district court’s judgment issued after Akers I and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The facts of this case are set out in detail in Akers I.  There are four parcels of property 
involved in this case: “Government Lot 2,” “Parcel A,” “Parcel B” and the “Reynolds Property.”  
The four parcels are rectangular and meet together at a four-way corner.  Government Lot 2 is 
located to the northeast, and Parcel B is to the northwest.  The Akers own the southwestern 
corner of Government Lot 2 and the southeastern corner of Parcel B.  Parcel A is located to the 
southwest and much of Parcel A, including that adjoining Parcel B, is owned by the Whites.  The 
Mortensens own a portion of Parcel A located to the south of that owned by the Whites.  The 
Reynolds Property is located to the southeast and is not owned by any of the parties to this 
litigation.  Together, the Whites and Mortensens plan to subdivide and develop their respective 
properties. 
 
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Government Lot 2 is bisected roughly north to south by a county road, Millsap Loop 
Road.  Appellants hold an easement for ingress and egress to Millsap Loop Road across portions 
of the Akers’ property.  Because the properties meet at a four-way corner, Parcel A and 
Government Lot 2 do not actually share a border.  It is therefore physically impossible to access 
Parcel A from Millsap Loop Road in Government Lot 2 without also passing through some other 
property. 
The Akers acquired their real property in 1980.  At the time of acquisition, a road 
provided access to a Quonset hut on Parcel A, running through the southern portion of 
Government Lot 2 and the southeastern corner of Parcel B.  The Quonset hut is located near the 
border of Parcel A and Parcel B.  The access road was connected to Millsap Loop Road by an 
approach (the original approach) that turned sharply north from the access road, which runs east 
to west.  The original approach was located on a blind curve in Millsap Loop Road.  In order to 
obtain a building permit, the Akers were required to alter the entrance point of the access road 
where it connects to Millsap Loop Road, so that the entrance had a 30-foot line of sight in each 
direction of Millsap Loop Road.  The Akers constructed a new approach (the curved approach), 
which starts to turn earlier and curves more gently to the north before meeting Millsap Loop 
Road.  The Akers eventually quarreled with the Whites’ predecessors in interest, the Peplinskis, 
over the Peplinskis’ use of the access road, leading to the Peplinskis filing a lawsuit.  The 
Peplinski/Akers suit ended in 1994 when the Peplinskis sold their property, including Parcel A, 
to the Mortensens.  The Mortensens later sold much of Parcel A, including that portion adjoining 
Parcel B, to the Whites. 
In January 2002, the Akers blocked Appellants’ use of the curved approach to the access 
road and forbade Appellants from traveling on the western end of the access road where it passes 
through Parcel B before connecting to Appellants’ property in Parcel A.  Appellants then brought 
in heavy equipment, including a bulldozer, to carve a route around the Akers’ gate and to 
otherwise alter the access road.  This led to a series of confrontations between the Akers and 
Appellants, as well as alleged damage to the Akers’ property and alleged malicious behavior by 
Appellants. 
In response, the Akers filed the instant action for trespass, quiet title, and negligence.  
The district court bifurcated the trial proceedings.  After the first phase of the trial, the district 
court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that Appellants had an express 
 
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easement 12.2 feet in width across the Akers’ property in Government Lot 2.  The district court 
determined that the express easement began at Millsap Loop Road, ran through the original 
approach rather than the curved approach, and tracked the southern boundary of Government Lot 
2, terminating at the western boundary of that parcel and did not enter into the Akers’ property in 
Parcel B.  The district court concluded that Appellants had failed to establish a prescriptive 
easement or an implied easement arising from prior use.  The district court further concluded that 
Appellants had trespassed and unreasonably interfered with the Akers’ use of their property, with 
damages to be determined in the second phase of the trial.   
Before the damages portion of the trial, the district court personally viewed the property 
in dispute in the company of counsel for the parties.  After the second phase of the trial, the 
district court awarded the Akers compensatory damages arising from Appellants’ trespass in the 
amount of $17,002.85, which was trebled pursuant to  I.C. § 6-202 for a total of $51,008.55, to 
be paid by Appellants jointly and severally.  Sherrie Akers was awarded $10,000 in 
compensatory damages for emotional distress, also to be paid jointly and severally by 
Appellants.  Additionally, the district court entered punitive damage awards in favor of the Akers 
against the Mortensens in the amount of $150,000 and against the Whites in the amount of 
$30,000.  Finally, the district court granted an award of costs and attorney fees to the Akers, to 
be paid jointly and severally by the Mortensens and Whites, in the amount of $105,534.06. 
Appellants appealed from that judgment and the dispute came before this Court in Akers 
I.  This Court remanded the case to the district court for additional fact finding and a 
determination regarding whether Appellants were entitled to a prescriptive easement or an 
easement implied from prior use.  Additionally, we vacated the award of damages, costs, and 
attorney fees for further consideration in light of the district court’s conclusions on remand 
regarding the scope of Appellants’ easement rights. 
On remand, the district court concluded that Appellants were not entitled to an implied 
easement from prior use because the access road was not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment 
of the dominant estate, Parcel A.  The district court based this conclusion of law on its finding 
that, at the time of the severance of the dominant estate from the servient estate, there was a 
second road that provided access to Parcel A.  The district court concluded that Appellants were 
entitled to a prescriptive easement across Government Lot 2, 12.2 feet in width, which was 
coextensive with the scope and location of the express easement.  The district court also found 
 
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the prescriptive easement passed from Government Lot 2 into Parcel B and immediately turned 
ninety degrees to the south to provide access to Parcel A.  Based on these findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, the district court reinstated the award of damages, costs, and attorney fees 
from Akers I, and awarded the Akers their costs and attorney fees on remand.  Appellants timely 
appealed from the district court’s order on remand. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Review of a trial court’s decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports 
the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.  Benninger 
v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006) (citing Alumet v. Bear Lake 
Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 P.2d 253, 256 (1991)).  Since it is the province of the trial 
court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 
this Court will liberally construe the trial court’s findings of fact in favor of the judgment 
entered.  Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 (1999) (citing Sun Valley 
Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 
(1990)).  A trial court’s findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous.  Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006) 
(citing Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856, 55 P.3d 304, 310 (2002);  
Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 650, 39 P.3d 588, 590 (2001); I.R.C.P 
52(a)).  If the findings of fact are based upon substantial evidence, even if the evidence is 
conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal.  Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 
1238 (citing Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151, 953 P.2d 588, 591 (1998)).  This Court will 
not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court.  Ransom, 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d 
at 4 (citing Bramwell, 136 Idaho at 648, 39 P.3d at 588).  The findings of the trial court on the 
question of damages will not be set aside when based upon substantial and competent evidence.  
Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 1119, 1121 (2007) (citing 
Idaho Falls Bonded Produce Supply Co. v. General Mills Rest. Group, Inc., 105 Idaho 46, 49, 
665 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1983)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The parties ask that we resolve all remaining issues in the case without further remand.  
We are unable to fulfill their requests.  We affirm the district court’s decision concluding that 
Appellants do not hold an easement implied from prior use across the Akers’ property.  We also 
 
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affirm the district court’s finding that Appellants hold a prescriptive easement across 
Government Lot 2 totaling 12.2 feet in width that is coextensive with the scope and location of 
Appellants’ express easement.  However, we conclude that the district court’s finding concerning 
the location of Appellants’ prescriptive easement across Parcel B is not supported by substantial 
and competent evidence and we vacate this finding and remand the issue to the district court.  
We also vacate and remand the district court’s award of damages in favor of the Akers for 
further determination consistent with the district court’s conclusions concerning Appellants’ 
easement rights on remand. 
 
Appellants argue that (1) the district court’s Order on Remand did not comply with 
I.R.C.P. 52(a); (2) the district court erred when it concluded that Appellants do not have an 
easement by implication across the Akers’ real property; (3) the district court erred when it found 
that Appellants’ prescriptive easement is coextensive with Appellants’ expressed easement 
across Government Lot 2 and the prescriptive easement turns immediately to the south upon 
turning into Parcel B; (4) the district court erred when it awarded the Akers compensatory and 
punitive damages for trespass and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (5) the district 
court erred when it awarded the Akers attorney fees and costs below.  We address these 
arguments in turn. 
A. Although the district court’s Order on Remand failed to comply with the 
requirements of I.R.C.P. 52(a), it is sufficient to permit appellate review. 
 
Appellants argue that the district court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on remand in accordance with I.R.C.P. 52(a).  Rather than remanding this case, Appellants 
ask to resolve their claims of easement because the relevant facts and conclusions to be drawn 
therefrom are clear and obvious in the record.   
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides in relevant part: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment . . . . A written 
memorandum decision issued by the court may constitute the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law only if the decision expressly so states or if it is thereafter 
adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law by order of the court. 
 
The district court issued a written memorandum decision that did not expressly state that 
the decision constituted its findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Neither did the district court 
 
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adopt the memorandum decision as its findings of fact and conclusions of law by order.  
Accordingly, the Order on Remand did not comply with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 52(a).     
However, this conclusion does not end our inquiry.   
The purpose of the underlying rule is to “afford the appellate court a clear understanding 
of the basis of the trial court’s decision, so that it might be determined whether the trial court 
applied the proper law to the appropriate facts in reaching its ultimate judgment.”  Pope v. 
Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 225, 646 P.2d 988, 996 (1982) (citing Perry Plumbing 
Co. v. Schuler, 96 Idaho 494, 497, 531 P.2d 584, 587 (1975)).  To that end, the findings required 
by Rule 52(a) should be clear, coherent, and complete while avoiding an unnecessary review of 
the evidence.  Browning v. Ringel, 134 Idaho 6, 14, 995 P.2d 351, 359 (2000).  
We considered the effect of a trial court’s failure to comply with the requirements of 
I.R.C.P. 52(a) in Petition of Steve B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 723 P.2d 829 (1986).  In that case, the 
appellant argued that a magistrate’s order must be reversed because the memorandum opinion 
did not expressly state it constitutes findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We rejected this 
argument, stating: 
[W]e agree with and affirm the district court who noted:  “This court concludes 
that it is abundantly clear from a reading of the entire memorandum and order 
what facts the magistrate accepted and what law he acted upon.”   The decision of 
[the magistrate] permits meaningful appellate review, and while perhaps 
technically violative of I.R.C.P. 52(a), such does not require a remand in this case.  
Accord Matter of Adoption of Baby Girl Chance, 609 P.2d 232 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1980). 
 
Id. at 292, 723 P.2d at 836.  This conclusion is completely consistent with the admonition that 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure “shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”  I.R.C.P. 1(a).  Although we expect 
the trial courts of this state to comply with our rules of procedure, the interests identified in 
I.R.C.P. 1(a) would not be served if we were to rigidly interpret I.R.C.P. 52(a) as requiring that a 
trial court’s decision must be vacated and remanded solely because of the failure to comply with 
the requirements of I.R.C.P. 52(a).       
In the instant case, the district court’s Order on Remand clearly articulates the facts the 
district court accepted and the law that it applied.  Our instructions on remand in Akers I directed 
the district court to make additional findings and conclusions regarding the Appellants’ claims of 
an implied easement from prior use and prescriptive easement.  As to the existence of an 
 
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easement implied from prior use, the district court noted that our decision in Akers I required the 
district court to determine whether, at the time of the severance of the dominant and servient 
estates, there was an easement across the servient estate that was reasonably necessary to the 
proper enjoyment of the dominant estate.  The district court found that, at the time of the 
severance of the dominant and servient estates, a “back way” provided access to the dominant 
estate.  Therefore, the district court found that an implied easement across the servient estate was 
not reasonably necessary and concluded that Appellants did not hold an easement implied by 
prior use across the Akers’ property.   
With regard to Appellants’ claim of a prescriptive easement, the district court noted that 
our decision in Akers I held that Appellants were entitled to a presumption of adverse use and the 
relevant time period the district court was to examine on remand was from 1966 to 1980.  The 
district court concluded that Appellants had a prescriptive easement across Government Lot 2 
that was coextensive with their express easement that continued into Parcel B and turned 
immediately south into Appellants’ property.  Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s 
Order on Remand affords us a clear understanding of the basis of the district court’s decision.  
B. The district court did not err when it found that Appellants do not have an 
easement by implication across the Akers’ property. 
 
In Akers I, we limited the scope of the remand to one of three elements needed to 
establish an implied easement from prior use.  142 Idaho at 301, 127 P.3d at 204.  In order to 
prove the existence of an implied easement by prior use, a party must show: (1) unity of title or 
ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous 
use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be 
permanent; and (3) that the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of 
the dominant estate.  Id.  In Akers I, we held that Appellants had satisfied the first two elements 
of an easement implied from prior use.  Id. at 302, 127 P.3d at 205.  However we remanded the 
case due to the lack of findings necessary for the resolution of the question whether in 1966, 
when the dominant estate was separated from the servient estate, use of the access road through 
Parcel B was “reasonably necessary” to the enjoyment of the dominant estate.  Id.   
Appellants argue that the district court erred when it found that the access road across the 
Akers’ property was not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of Appellants’ property.  
Appellants argue that the district court erred when it found that a back way provided sufficient 
 
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alternative access to the property in 1966, and therefore the access road across Government Lot 2 
was not reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate. 
“‘[R]easonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity required for an 
easement implied by necessity.’”  Beach Lateral Water Users Ass’n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 
605, 130 P.3d 1138, 1143 (2006) (quoting Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 643, 991 P.2d 362, 
368 (1999)).  Because an implied easement from prior use arises at the time of severance, the 
issue of reasonable necessity is based upon the circumstances that existed at that time.  Akers I, 
142 Idaho at 302, 127 P.3d at 205 (citing Davis, 133 Idaho at 642, 991 P.2d at 367).   When 
deciding the issue of reasonable necessity, the court should “balance the relative situations pro 
and con, as to the respective convenience, inconvenience, costs and all other pertinent, connected 
facts.”  Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266, 270, 215 P.2d 812, 814 (1950) (citations omitted).  
Although Eisenbarth involved a private condemnation action under I.C. § 7-701(5), its analysis 
of reasonable necessity required for the private condemnation of a road is also applicable to the 
reasonable necessity required for an implied easement by prior use.  Thomas v. Madsen, 142 
Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 n.3 (2006). 
The district court found that Appellants “failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that [a] ‘back way’ did not exist back in 1966” that provided sufficient alternative 
access to the dominant estate.  The district court found that, in 1966, Appellants’ property was 
used for agricultural purposes.  There is substantial evidence in the record to support the district 
court’s conclusion that the back way existed in 1966.  First, the district court relied on the 
testimony of Reynolds, who testified that the back way was an old road.  Reynolds did not testify 
as to how old the road was, however, he did indicate the road was in existence at the time he was 
six years old.  When he testified on September 9, 2002, Reynolds was 63 years old, meaning he 
was six years old in 1945.  Reynolds’s testimony indicates that the back way existed prior to the 
separation of the dominant and servient estates in 1966.  The district court also found that the 
back way was depicted on a United States Geological Survey topographic map from 1901.   
 
Appellants argue that the testimony of William A. Millsap, whose father was the 
Appellants’ predecessor in interest, proves that the back way did not exist in 1966.  During 
William Millsap’s testimony, Appellants’ counsel asked whether there was access to the property 
by means other than the access road running through the Akers’ property.  William Millsap 
answered: “Uh, no, not that we ever used.”  (emphasis added).  Similarly, Appellants argue the 
 
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testimony of Richard Peplinski, whose father was also the Appellants’ predecessor in interest, 
proves that the back way did not exist in 1966.  Appellants’ counsel asked Peplinski: “Other than 
this access road that was there when you purchased – when your dad purchased the property, was 
there any other road you used to access the 160 acres?”  (emphasis added).  Richard Peplinski 
answered “No.” 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The district court examined the testimony of both William Millsap and Richard Peplinski 
and found that their testimony implied that the back way existed but it was not used by either of 
the witnesses’ fathers to access the dominant estate.  We conclude that there was substantial 
evidence supporting the district court’s finding that the back way existed at the time of the 
separation of the dominant and servient estates in 1966.  When deciding the issue of reasonable 
necessity, it is the province of the trial court to balance the respective convenience, 
inconvenience, costs, and other pertinent facts.  Appellants have not persuaded us that the trial 
court’s conclusion should be overturned on appeal. 
C. The district court’s findings of fact regarding the scope and location of the 
prescriptive easement are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
 
The district court found that Appellants’ prescriptive easement was coextensive in scope 
and location with Appellants’ express easement across Government Lot 2.  The district court also 
found that the prescriptive easement turned immediately south upon entering Parcel B.  
Appellants argue that they hold a prescriptive easement over the entire length of the access road 
in Government Lot 2, including the curved approach.  Appellants also argue that the prescriptive 
easement does not turn immediately south upon entering Parcel B and that the district court 
improperly limited the width of the prescriptive easement to 12.2 feet. 
1. The district court did not err when it found that the location of Appellants’ 
prescriptive easement across the Akers’ property was coextensive with the 
express easement in Government Lot 2. 
 
Appellants argue that the curved approach is part of their prescriptive easement across 
Government Lot 2.  The district court found that Appellants’ prescriptive easement is 
coextensive in scope with Appellants’ express easement, which does not include the curved 
approach.  We conclude that Appellants’ argument regarding the curved approach is not properly 
before this Court on appeal.   
Our remand in Akers I directed the district court to determine whether a prescriptive 
easement across Government Lot 2 was acquired during the time between the severance of the 
 
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dominant and servient estates in 1966 and when the Akers purchased the their property in 1980.  
The Akers did not construct the curved approach until 1982.  Because the Akers constructed the 
curved approach after they had purchased their property, the question whether a prescriptive 
easement arose across the curved approach was outside the scope of the remand.  Therefore, we 
decline to address this argument on appeal.  
2. The district court erred when it found that Appellants’ prescriptive easement 
turned immediately south upon entering Parcel B.  
 
Appellants argue that their prescriptive easement does not turn immediately south upon 
entering Parcel B, and instead extends further to the west around a hill before turning south onto 
Appellants’ property.  The district court found that the access road on Parcel B, prior to 1980, 
turned south immediately after entering Parcel B from Government Lot 2.  The district court 
included an attached exhibit to its amended judgment that illustrated the location of Appellants’ 
prescriptive easement on Parcel B.  After the prescriptive easement crossed the boundary of 
Government Lot 2 into Parcel B, the exhibit indicates that the easement turns 90 degrees to the 
south and enters Appellants’ property.  However, this finding is not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
The district court stated that it relied upon a number of exhibits when it concluded that 
Appellants’ easement turned immediately south upon entering Parcel B, including Defendants’ 
Exhibits 42 and 44.  However, these exhibits, which are aerial photographs of the relevant 
property, indicate that the access road historically made a more gradual turn resembling a 
shepherd’s crook rather than a 90-degree turn.  Defendant’s Exhibit 41, an aerial photograph 
from 1978 also shows that the access road made a gradual turn through Parcel B before entering 
Parcel A.  Perhaps most telling is Plaintiff’s Exhibit 253, which is a photograph of the shared 
boundary between Government Lot 2, Parcel B, and Parcel A, and the Quonset hut on Parcel A.  
While the photograph was taken in 2003 (well after the prescriptive easement was established 
prior to 1980), it is nonetheless informative.  The photograph depicts a large hill to the south of 
the access road, which the access road gradually curves around.  We recognize that the 
uncontroverted evidence showed that the Akers permitted Peplinski to extend the access road 
further to the west in Parcel B after the Akers purchased the property.  However, the photograph 
does not support a finding that the access road previously turned 90 degrees to the south 
traveling straight up a steep hill in order to access Parcel A, as would be required if the access 
 
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road had immediately turned 90 degrees upon entering Parcel B.  In light of this photographic 
evidence, we conclude that there is not substantial evidence supporting the district court’s 
conclusion as to the location of Appellants’ prescriptive easement on Parcel B.  This issue must 
be remanded to the district court for additional fact finding consistent with this opinion.   
3. The district court did not err when it found that the scope of Appellants’ 
prescriptive easement across the Akers’ property was limited to a width of 12.2 
feet. 
 
Appellants argue that the scope of the prescriptive easement is at least 25 feet in width, 
including ditches and shoulders.  Appellants argue that their predecessors in interest originally 
used the prescriptive easement for agricultural purposes and operated farming equipment in 
excess of 20 feet in width on the access road.  The district court concluded that the scope of 
Appellants’ prescriptive easement was 12.2 feet in width.   
The district court examined a number of exhibits and personally viewed the property 
during the trial before concluding that the scope of the prescriptive easement was limited to a 
width of 12.2 feet.  The district court based its finding of fact on Plaintiffs’ exhibits 304 and 305.  
These exhibits depict a portion of the access road without ditches or shoulders on either side.  
The district court also considered the testimony of W.L. Millsap and Reynolds when it 
considered the width of Appellants’ prescriptive easement.  The district court found, based on its 
viewing of the property and the record, that the width of the traveled portion of the access road 
was 12.2 feet.  We conclude that the district court’s finding is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence and affirm the district court’s decision. 
D. The damages award and award of attorney fees and costs must be vacated.   
As we held in Akers I, the question of whether and to what degree Appellants’ conduct 
constituted trespass on the Akers’ property is intertwined with the question of the scope and 
boundaries of Appellants’ easement rights.  Akers I, 142 Idaho at 304, 127 P.3d at 207.   Because 
the district court must determine the location of Appellants’ prescriptive easement in Parcel B on 
remand, we vacate the district court’s award of damages below based upon trespass. 
Similarly, we also vacate the district court’s award of damages to Sherrie Akers for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.  The district court awarded Sherrie Akers $10,000 for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, for which Appellants are jointly and severally liable.  
To support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a party must prove a breach of a 
recognized legal duty.  Nation v. State, Dept. of Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 191, 158 P.3d 953, 967 
 
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(2007).  In the instant case, the district court predicated the award of damages for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress on Appellants’ malicious behavior while trespassing on the 
Akers’ property.  As we indicated in Akers I, the question of damages flowing from Appellants’ 
conduct is inseparable from consideration of Appellants’ easement rights.  Akers I, 142 Idaho at 
304, 127 P.3d at 207.  Without a determination of Appellants’ easement rights, it is impossible to 
determine the scope of Appellants’ trespass.  Therefore, we vacate the district court’s award of 
damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress and remand the issue for further 
determination after the district court determines Appellants’ easement rights.  For the same 
reason, we vacate the district court’s award of punitive damages in favor of the Akers.  
 
For the same reasons that we vacate the district court’s damage awards, we vacate the 
district court’s award of costs and attorney fees to the Akers. 
E. Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Both the Akers and Appellants request an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal.  In 
light of the mixed result in this case, we conclude that there is no prevailing party on appeal.  
Therefore, we decline to award costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court’s judgment that Appellants do not have an implied easement 
by prior use and that Appellants’ prescriptive easement is 12.2 feet in width.  We vacate the 
district court’s judgment as to the location of the prescriptive easement in Parcel B, the award of 
damages, and the award of attorney fees and costs.  We remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  We do not award attorney fees or costs on appeal.   
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and Justice Pro Tem TROUT  
CONCUR.