Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoppel

Citation: 2011-Ohio-2672

Docket Number: 20101805

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoppel, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2672.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-2672 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. HOPPEL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoppel,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2672.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Multiple disciplinary violations — Two-year 
suspension, partially stayed. 
(No. 2010-1805 — Submitted February 2, 2011 — Decided June 8, 2011.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-068. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Richard Vincent Hoppel of East Liverpool, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0063000, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1994. 
{¶ 2} In August 2009, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint 
charging respondent with more than 80 violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct after he accepted attorney fees to represent multiple clients in bankruptcy 
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proceedings and then failed to perform the work.  At the hearing, the relator 
dismissed two of the alleged violations.  Based upon findings that respondent 
committed all of the remaining charged violations and that his cocaine addiction 
contributed to his misconduct, the panel and board recommend that we 
indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice of law in Ohio. 
{¶ 3} Respondent has accepted the board’s findings of fact and 
misconduct, but objects to the recommended sanction.  We granted him leave to 
supplement the record with mitigating evidence demonstrating that since the 
board issued its report, he has made restitution to each of the clients identified in 
relator’s complaint. 
{¶ 4} In light of respondent’s successful completion of inpatient 
treatment for his addiction, his more than two years of sustained sobriety, and his 
payment of restitution to each of the clients harmed by his misconduct, we reject 
the board’s recommended sanction and impose a two-year suspension, with 18 
months stayed on conditions. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 5} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline accepted the parties’ agreed stipulations of fact, as well as respondent’s 
stipulation to 30 of the alleged violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  It 
also received 52 stipulated exhibits, including a transcript of respondent’s 
deposition testimony.  At the hearing, the panel heard respondent’s testimony and 
received 17 additional exhibits submitted by respondent.  This evidence 
demonstrates that respondent accepted retainers and deposits for court costs 
totaling over $14,000 for 14 separate client matters and converted them to his own 
use to buy cocaine.  He repeatedly failed to perform work on behalf of his clients 
and failed to appear at court hearings.  Respondent was found in contempt of 
court, and the judge suspended his fine and court costs conditioned on his good 
behavior.  When he missed two additional hearings, the judge sentenced him to 
January Term, 2011 
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two consecutive 60-day jail terms.  Respondent served 13 days of that sentence 
before it was suspended on the condition that he immediately report for inpatient 
drug rehabilitation. 
{¶ 6} Respondent also failed to respond to his client’s attempts to contact 
him, failed to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters, 
and failed to reasonably consult with one client about the means necessary to 
achieve her objectives.  He collected excessive and unreasonable fees, as 
demonstrated by his collection and retention of attorney fees and corresponding 
failure to perform the clients’ work.  He engaged in dishonesty, deceit, and 
misrepresentation, seeking leave of court to pay filing fees in installments when 
he had already collected the full filing fee from his clients.  And having spent his 
client’s funds on drugs, he falsely advised them that he needed more time to 
prepare their bankruptcy petitions for filing. 
{¶ 7} Based upon these facts, the panel found that respondent had 
committed each of the charged violations.  Thus, the panel found that respondent 
had committed three violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide 
competent representation to a client), 14 violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring 
a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), one violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(1) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client of any decision or 
circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent is required), one 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with 
the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be 
accomplished), ten violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to 
keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter), 13 violations of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5 (prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, charging, 
or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee), three violations of Prof.Cond.R. 
3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of fact 
or law to a tribunal), 14 violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer 
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from 
engaging 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation), six violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 
15 violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). 
{¶ 8} The board adopted these findings of fact and misconduct, and so 
do we. 
Sanction 
{¶ 9} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 10} As mitigating factors, the parties stipulated and the board found 
that respondent had no prior disciplinary record, had made full and free disclosure 
to the board, and had displayed a cooperative attitude toward these disciplinary 
proceedings.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (d).  The board also found 
that respondent’s cocaine addiction qualified as a mitigating factor pursuant to 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g).  In doing so, the board relied upon the testimony of 
Paul A. Caimi, a regional director of the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program 
(“OLAP”).  He testified that at the time of the hearing, respondent, a crack-
cocaine addict, was in remission and had been sober since October 23, 2008, as 
verified through random drug and alcohol testing.  Respondent has successfully 
completed an inpatient treatment program at the Keating Center, as well as 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
outpatient, aftercare, and family-services programs.  He has also complied with 
his OLAP contract, which was to expire on May 11, 2011.1  
{¶ 11} Caimi testified that in his professional opinion, respondent’s 
addiction to cocaine contributed to his misconduct, all of which occurred while he 
was using cocaine.  He stated that respondent’s prognosis is good and that he 
could competently practice law as long as he continues to follow his recovery 
program. 
{¶ 12} The parties did not stipulate to any aggravating factors, but the 
board found that respondent acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, engaged in a 
pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses, caused harm to vulnerable 
victims, and failed to make restitution.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), 
(d), and (i). 
{¶ 13} The board observed that the cases relator cited in support of its 
recommended sanction of an indefinite suspension are distinguishable from this 
case because some of them involved the aggravating factor of failure to cooperate 
in the disciplinary investigation and none of them involved the mitigating factor 
of drug dependency.  Columbus Bar Assn. v. Chasser, 124 Ohio St.3d 578, 2010-
Ohio-956, 925 N.E.2d 595, ¶ 21; Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Gottehrer, 124 
Ohio St.3d 519, 2010-Ohio-929, 924 N.E.2d 825, ¶ 15; Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. 
Deaton, 102 Ohio St.3d 19, 2004-Ohio-1587, 806 N.E.2d 503, ¶ 31; and 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Kiesling, 125 Ohio St.3d 36, 2010-Ohio-1555, 925 N.E.2d 
970, ¶ 45.  Nonetheless, the panel and board recommend that we indefinitely 
suspended respondent from the practice of law in Ohio.  The board also 
                                                 
1 On May 16, 2011, respondent moved this court to supplement the record with evidence that he 
has extended his contract with OLAP until May 11, 2013.  Relator moved to strike that motion on 
May 19, 2011.  Because S.Ct. Prac. R. 9.9 prohibits a party from filing additional briefs or other 
materials relating to the merits of the case after it has been orally argued unless ordered by the 
court, with the exception of a citation to relevant authority issued after oral argument, we grant 
relator’s motion to strike respondent’s motion to supplement the record. 
 
 
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recommends that we order respondent to pay restitution to the clients harmed by 
his conduct. 
{¶ 14} Respondent objects to the board’s recommended sanction, arguing 
that the panel and board did not have information regarding his payment of 
restitution to all of the clients named in relator’s complaint and failed to consider 
certain evidence of his good character.  Based upon these additional mitigating 
factors and the sanctions imposed by this court in seven cases cited by respondent, 
he argues that a two-year suspension with 18 months stayed on conditions is the 
appropriate sanction for his misconduct. 
{¶ 15} At the time of the panel hearing, respondent had not made 
restitution to the clients harmed by his misconduct and did not have the financial 
means to do so.  On January 19, 2011, however, we granted respondent’s motion 
to supplement the record with evidence that he had made full restitution to each of 
the clients identified in relator’s complaint.  Respondent personally delivered 
checks and letters of apology to 11 of those clients.  The three remaining clients 
received their checks and respondent’s apology by mail. 
{¶ 16} Although respondent submitted five letters attesting to his good 
character apart from the events at issue here, his treatment for drug addiction, and 
his continued sobriety, the panel and board reports do not specify whether they 
were afforded any mitigating effect.  Because this court is the final arbiter of the 
facts and conclusions of law in disciplinary proceedings, see, e.g. Ohio State Bar 
Assn. v. Reid (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 708 N.E.2d 193, at paragraph one of the 
syllabus, respondent has not suffered any prejudice as a result of this alleged 
oversight. 
{¶ 17} Respondent has submitted letters from two judges, an attorney who 
considered respondent to have been a mentor, an attorney who served as 
respondent’s cosponsor during his rehabilitation and recovery, and a licensed 
independent chemical-dependency counselor.  The two judges wrote that they 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
have known respondent throughout his legal career and have observed his 
competent, ethical, and professional practice of law, his decline into substance 
abuse, and his subsequent rehabilitation.  Having observed the best and worst of 
respondent’s professional career, these judges support respondent’s efforts to 
return to the practice of law and state that they would welcome him in their 
courtrooms.  And the attorney who considered respondent to have been his 
mentor has known him to be “approachable, courteous, and respectful to his 
colleagues and clients.”   He expressed his view that the actions giving rise to this 
disciplinary action were “totally out of character” for respondent and expressed 
his belief that “[s]omething was affecting his good judgment and personality.”  
These letters, although limited in number, offer credible evidence of respondent’s 
good character when he is not using cocaine. 
{¶ 18} The remaining letters state that respondent has completed a term of 
inpatient treatment for his drug addiction, that he has made progress, and that he 
has made a commitment to his sobriety.  And although they may have been 
considered as evidence that respondent has completed a course of drug 
rehabilitation, they nonetheless offer some limited evidence of his character and 
commitment to staying sober. 
{¶ 19} Although we have accepted evidence that respondent has made 
restitution to those clients harmed by his drug addiction and attribute some 
mitigating value to his character evidence, we reject the parties’ stipulation, 
respondent’s testimony, and the board’s finding that respondent has no prior 
disciplinary record.  This court’s publicly available online attorney directory 
shows that this court briefly suspended respondent’s license to practice law on 
December 3, 2007, for failing to comply with attorney-registration rules.  See In 
re Attorney Registration Suspension of Hoppel, 116 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2007-Ohio-
6463, 877 N.E.2d 305; In re Reinstatement of Hoppel, 116 Ohio St.3d 1498, 
2008-Ohio-290, 880 N.E.2d 97.  Though this registration suspension occurred 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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during the height of respondent’s drug addiction, it is, nonetheless, an aggravating 
factor pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a).  See, e.g., Columbus Bar Assn. v. 
Larkin, 128 Ohio St.3d 368, 2011-Ohio-762, 944 N.E.2d 669, ¶ 9; Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Mitchell, 124 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-135, 921 N.E.2d 634, ¶ 8; 
and Akron Bar Assn. v. Paulson, 112 Ohio St.3d 334, 2006-Ohio-6678, 859 
N.E.2d 932, ¶ 12 (all recognizing attorney-registration violations as prior 
disciplinary offenses pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a)). 
{¶ 20} We have acknowledged that the presumptive sanction for the 
misappropriation of client funds is disbarment.  Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Fernandez, 99 Ohio St.3d 426, 2003-Ohio-4078, 793 N.E.2d 434, ¶ 9.  A 
presumption in favor of permanent disbarment, however, may be rebutted.  See, 
e.g., Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Kellogg, 126 Ohio St.3d 360, 2010-Ohio-3285 , 933 
N.E.2d 1085, ¶ 18, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Smith, 101 Ohio St.3d 27, 2003-
Ohio-6623, 800 N.E.2d 1129, ¶ 9 (“ ‘Absent any mitigating factors, disbarment is 
the appropriate sanction for an attorney’s misappropriation of client funds’ ”); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 106 Ohio St.3d 418, 2005-Ohio-5411, 835 
N.E.2d 707, ¶ 42 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (“by definition, a presumptive sanction 
of disbarment does not preclude the application of mitigation.  That is, the 
presumption in favor of disbarment in the case of theft from clients is a rebuttable 
one”). 
{¶ 21} The primary purpose of the disciplinary sanctions is not to punish 
the offender but to protect the public from lawyers who are unworthy of the trust 
and confidence essential to the attorney-client relationship.  Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-6510, 858 N.E.2d 368.  “Thus, even 
in cases of egregious misconduct and illegal drug use, we have decided against 
permanent disbarment based on the lawyer’s probable recovery from the drug 
addiction that caused the ethical breaches.”  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Lawson, 119 
Ohio St.3d 58, 2008-Ohio-3340, 891 N.E.2d 749, ¶ 73, citing Disciplinary 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
Counsel v. Garrity, 98 Ohio St.3d 317, 2003-Ohio-740, 784 N.E.2d 691, ¶ 12 
(lawyer and former pharmacist convicted of stealing prescription drugs suspended 
indefinitely after showing renewed dedication to his treatment for his addiction).  
When an attorney’s misconduct is motivated by an addiction to drugs or alcohol, 
and we believe that the attorney is committed to recovery and no longer poses a 
threat to the public or the judicial system, we tailor the sanction to assist and 
monitor the attorney’s recovery.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Connor, 105 Ohio St.3d 
100, 2004-Ohio-6902, 822 N.E.2d 1235, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 22} In this case, the evidence demonstrates that respondent was a 
conscientious, capable, and professional attorney until his judgment was clouded 
by his drug addiction.  He has successfully completed a 90-day inpatient 
treatment program for his drug addiction, and has complied with all of the terms 
of his OLAP contract, including his regular attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous 
meetings and compliance with random drug and alcohol screenings, and has 
expressed his willingness to extend his OLAP contract for the rest of his 
professional career if necessary.  At the time of the panel hearing in May 2010, he 
had been sober for a year and a half.  And since the board issued its opinion, he 
has made restitution to each of the clients identified in relator’s complaint, 
delivering their refunds and a sincere letter of apology to many of them in person. 
{¶ 23} Of the cases cited by respondent in his objections, we find 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Greco, 107 Ohio St.3d 155, 2005-Ohio-6045, 837 N.E.2d 
369, to be most instructive.  Greco had accepted retainers from numerous clients, 
neglected their cases, lied to his clients to conceal his neglect, and was slow to 
comply with their requests for refunds of their retainers and unearned fees.  Id. at 
¶ 56.  Like the respondent in this case, Greco’s misconduct emanated from a 
diagnosed chemical dependency, for which Greco had successfully completed 
several treatment programs.  Id. at ¶ 46-52.  Greco was extremely cooperative and 
forthcoming throughout the disciplinary process and expressed sincere remorse 
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for his conduct, id. at ¶ 52, but he had not made full restitution to his affected 
clients, id. at ¶ 56.  Based upon these facts, we concluded that an actual 
suspension was necessary to protect the public.  Therefore, we suspended Greco 
from the practice of law for two years, with 18 months stayed on the conditions 
that he comply with his OLAP contract and serve monitored probation in 
accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(9) during the stayed portion of the suspension.  Id. 
at ¶ 57. 
{¶ 24} We also imposed two-year suspensions with 18 months 
conditionally stayed based upon comparable misconduct emanating from 
substance abuse in Toledo Bar Assn. v. Shouser, 112 Ohio St.3d 533, 2007-Ohio-
611, 861 N.E.2d 536; and Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Washington, 109 Ohio St.3d 
308, 2006-Ohio-2423, 847 N.E.2d 435. 
{¶ 25} Based upon the foregoing, we sustain respondent’s objection to the 
board’s report and agree that a two-year suspension, with 18 months stayed on 
conditions, is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct. 
{¶ 26} Accordingly, Richard Vincent Hoppel is hereby suspended from 
the practice of law in Ohio for two years.  The final 18 months of that suspension, 
however, shall be stayed on the conditions that he extend his OLAP contract for 
two years from the date of this opinion, maintain full compliance with that 
contract, and commit no further misconduct.  If he fails to comply with these 
conditions, the stay will be lifted, and he will serve the full two-year suspension.  
Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Heather L. Hissom, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
The DePietro Law Office, L.L.C., and Harry J. DePietro, for respondent. 
______________________