Case Title: Levasseur v. Wheeldon

Citation: 112 N.W.2d 894

Docket Number: 

State: south-dakota

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1962-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
112 N.W.2d 894 (1962) M. C. LEVASSEUR, William Barron, P. H. Peterson, Earl Westendorf, Eugene Bachtell, Cecil Arnold, and Clara Aker, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Fay WHEELDON, John N. Browning, and Richard W. Dalthorp, as the duly elected, qualified and acting Mayor and City Commissioners of the City of Sioux Falls; and the City of Sioux Falls, a Municipal Corporation, South Dakota, Defendants and Respondents. No. 9892. Supreme Court of South Dakota. January 19, 1962. Herbert S. Thatcher, Washington, D. C., Gene E. Pruitt, Sioux Falls, for plaintiffs and appellants. John E. Burke, Robert S. Golden, Sioux Falls, for defendants and respondents. ROBERTS, Judge. This is an action against the city of Sioux Falls, its mayor, and city commissioners to enjoin them from carrying into effect a resolution requiring officers and employees of the police, fire and health departments of the city to terminate their membership in any union affiliated with a national or other labor federation and from discharging them for failure to comply. Plaintiffs brought this action individually and as a class suit for the benefit of other members of local unions affiliated either with the International Fire Fighters or American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. Judgment of dismissal was entered and plaintiffs appeal. On January 18, 1960, defendant commissioners adopted a resolution declaring that *895 the three municipal departments mentioned are so affected with public safety, health and welfare that the officers and employees thereof should not belong to any organization which might in any manner prevent or interfere with the fair and impartial performance of their duties, and it was therein resolved as follows: Article VI of the Constitution of this state is known as the Bill of Rights. An amendment of Section 2 thereof was adopted at the general election in 1946 reading as follows: The complaint is based primarily on the contention that the resolution denying employment because of membership in a nationally affiliated labor union is repugnant to the above constitutional amendment. In addition thereto, the complaint alleges that the resolution sought to be annulled is unconstitutional in that it would deprive city employees of certain freedoms, rights and privileges granted by both the federal and state Constitutions. Under the commission form of government adopted by the city of Sioux Falls, the board of commissioners consisting of the mayor and two commissioners elected at large has control of all municipal departments. The mayor is president of the board and has a vote upon all questions. Authority is conferred upon the commissioners to make rules and regulations, subject of course to constitutional and statutory restrictions, for the organization and management of the several departments of the city and such agencies as may be created for the administration of its affairs. SDC 45.0805. Defendant city pursuant to the provisions of SDC 1960 Supp. 45.0201 (103) enacted an ordinance establishing a civil service system. The ordinance provides for the appointment of a civil service board and prescribes its powers and duties. Defendant city thus has a legislative method for selection, tenure, fixing of compensation and regulating of other matters concerning its employees which apply to the plaintiffs and the classes they represent. There is no denial that the governing body of a municipality possesses only such authority as is conferred upon it by law together with such powers as are necessary to carry into effect those granted. Ericksen v. City of Sioux Falls, 70 S.D. 40, 14 N.W.2d 89; see also in 31 A.L.R.2d 1142 citation of cases and discussion of rights and powers of public employers with respect to union organization and activities. *896 In City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 545, the court recognizing a distinction in relations between a municipality and its employees and those between labor and private industry said: The court concluded, however, that this did not mean that public employees could not organize; that the right of citizens to assemble peaceably and organize for any proper purpose, to speak freely, and to present their views to public officers was preserved by the federal and state Constitutions. In Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482, 484, 31 A.L.R.2d 1133, the court while recognizing the right of public school teachers to organize as a union held that school officers could not bargain away discretionary powers vested in them to establish rules. It said: The resolution sought to be annulled is clearly repugnant to and in conflict with the constitutional amendment requiring that no persons be denied employment because of membership or nonmembership in a labor union if it applies to public employees. Defendants argue that the provisions of this right to work amendment are not so plain as to leave no room for construction and that by a process of practical construction we should hold that it does not include public employment. It is argued in support of this contention that The Supreme Court of Arkansas in a recent decision, Potts v. Hay, 229 Ark. 830, 318 S.W.2d 826, held that the words "No person shall be denied employment because of membership in * * * a labor union" do not exclude public employment. It was argued in that case that the court should recognize the applicability of the rule of constitutional and statutory construction that general words do not include the state or its subdivisions unless that intention is stated expressly or by necessary implication and hold that an implied exception excluded public employment. The court rejected this contention. While the precise question is not discussed, the Supreme Court of Florida in Miami Water Works Local No. 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194, 165 A.L.R. 967, apparently assumed that the words "The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization" in the constitution of that state applies to public employment. The constitutional provisions referred to include a proviso to the effect that the words above quoted "shall not be construed to deny or abridge the right of employees by and through a labor organization or labor union to bargain collectively with their employer". The court observed that this section of the constitution did not give the right of collective bargaining to any group. The proviso merely grants the right of collective bargaining otherwise conferred. The court in Beverly v. City of Dallas, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W.2d 172, held an ordinance prohibiting the formation of unions among city officials and employees invalid as in conflict with a general statute providing "that no person shall be denied public employment by reason of membership or nonmembership in a labor organization". In sustaining the validity of a statutory *898 provision restricting collective bargaining with public employers the court said: When the people amended Section 2, Article VI, of the Constitution to provide that the "rights of persons to work" shall not be denied because of "membership or non-membership" in a labor union, we think that the language is plain and unambiguous and that there is no occasion for interpretation. Language in a constitution, as well as words in a statute or contract, must be applied as it reads in the absence of ambiguity. State ex rel. Payne v. Reeves, 44 S.D. 568, 184 N.W. 993; Elfring v. Paterson, 66 S.D. 458, 285 N.W. 443. We hold that this constitutional amendment does not exclude public employment and that membership among city employees cannot be banned by municipal legislation or rule. It will be observed that under this amended section, the converse also obtains. Nonmembership in any union shall not operate to deny or abridge the right to work. A municipality cannot by legislative action or otherwise require union membership as a prerequisite to employment. As we have observed, distinctions exist in the relations between employees and a municipality and those between employees and an employer in private industry. What we have stated does not mean that a union of municipal employees possesses the rights of collective bargaining or the right to strike to enforce its demands. The judgment appealed from is reversed. All the Judges concur.