Case Title: JOSHUA KENT COLLINGS V. ALAN LORDS

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0225

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOSHUA KENT COLLINGS V. ALAN LORDS2009 WY 135Case Number: S-08-0225Decided: 11/06/2009NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
JOSHUA 
KENT COLLINGS,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.ALAN 
LORDS,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta CountyThe Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, 
Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Mark 
W. Harris of Harris Law Firm, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Raymond 
W. Martin of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, LLC, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Alan Lords hired 
Joshua Collings to assist him in restoring an older home.  Collings was injured while using Lords' 
table saw.  Collings filed a 
complaint, alleging negligence on the part of Lords.  The district court granted summary 
judgment for Lords, and we affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Collings states 
the single issue as follows:

 
 
Did 
the District Court err in granting summary judgment and concluding that no 
genuine issue of material fact existed that Lords' negligence was not a cause of 
Collings' injuries?

 
 
Lords 
phrases the issue slightly differently:

 
 
Did 
the District Court err when it found there was no material question of fact that 
existed upon which to find a causal connection between Lords' alleged negligence 
and Collings' injuries?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In 2002, Alan 
Lords bought a home to restore.  He 
hired Joshua Collings to help him in that process.  In November of 2003, as he was making 
window frames for the house, Collings suffered a serious injury1 to the index finger and thumb of 
his left hand while using Lords' table saw to make a "dado" cut through a piece 
of wood.2  Collings happened to be alone when his 
accident happened, but testified that a "test board" became bound in or on the 
dado blades and a kickback occurred, essentially throwing Collings' hand into 
the dado blades.

 
 
[¶4]      Collings filed a 
negligence action against Lords on September 6, 2006.  On April 10, 2008, Lords filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment and asserted that he owed no legal duty regarding Collings' 
safety, due to Collings' status as an independent contractor; or, if a legal 
duty existed, one was not breached, and Lords committed no act which would 
constitute a proximate cause of Collings' injuries.  Collings opposed Lords' motion, and the 
parties eventually argued the motion at the pretrial conference.  An order granting Lords' Motion for 
Summary Judgment was entered August 20, 2008, noting that the "dispositive issue 
is whether [Collings] has met his burden of showing any material fact exists 
that establishes the causation element of his negligence claim."  The court concluded that Collings showed 
"no facts establishing the element of causation."  Additional facts will be set out below 
as necessary.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      We recently 
stated our oft-repeated standard of review when reviewing an order granting 
summary judgment:

 
 

   We evaluate the propriety of a 
summary judgment by employing 
the same standards and using the same materials as the district court. Cook 
v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 
(Wyo.2006).  Thus, our review is 
plenary. Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2003 WY 102, ¶ 7, 75 P.3d 640, 647 (Wyo.2003).

Wyo.R.Civ.P. 
56 governs summary 
judgments.  A summary judgment is appropriate when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  
W.R.C.P. 56(c).  When reviewing a summary judgment, we consider the 
record in the perspective most favorable to the party opposing the motion and 
give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be fairly 
drawn from the record.  We review 
questions of law de novo without giving any deference to the district 
court's determinations.

Cathcart 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
2005 WY 154, P 11, 123 P.3d 579, 586 (Wyo.2005), quoting Baker v. Ayres and 
Baker Pole and Post, Inc., 2005 WY 97, P 14, 117 P.3d 1234, 1239 
(Wyo.2005).

   "A genuine issue of material fact 
exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an 
essential element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have 
asserted."  Christensen v. Carbon 
County, 2004 WY 135, ¶ 8, 100 P.3d 411, 413 (Wyo.2004) (quoting Metz 
Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 
1055 (Wyo.2002)).  The party 
requesting a summary judgment 
bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment.  If he carries his burden, "the party who 
is opposing the motion for summary 
judgment must present specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists."  
Id.  We have explained 
the duties of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment as follows: 

"After 
a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing 
party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing 
there are genuine issues of material fact.  
The opposing party must affirmatively set forth material, specific facts 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and cannot 
rely only upon allegations and pleadings , and conclusory statements or mere 
opinions are insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's 
burden."

   The evidence opposing a prima 
facie case on a motion for summary 
judgment "must be competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting 
summary judgments be entirely 
eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or 
wishful speculation."  Speculation, 
conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even probability, are 
insufficient to establish an issue of material fact.Cook, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d  at 890, quoting Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, ¶¶ 9-11, 113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo.2005).

Hatton 
v. Energy Elec. Co., 
2006 WY 151, ¶¶ 8-9, 148 P.3d 8, 12-13 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 

Loredo 
v. Solvay Am., Inc., 
2009 WY 93, ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 614, 618-619 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      In order to 
maintain a claim of negligence, 
a plaintiff must prove: 1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable 
care; 2) the defendant breached the duty; and 3) the defendant's breach was the 
proximate 
cause of injury or loss to the plaintiff.  Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 
2002 WY 105, ¶ 11, 49 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Wyo. 2002).  In order for proximate cause to exist, 
"the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the act 
of negligence." Foote v. Simek, 2006 
WY 96, ¶ 22, 139 P.3d 455, 
463 (Wyo. 2006).  In fact, "[t]he ultimate test of 
proximate cause is foreseeability of injury.  In order to qualify as a legal cause, 
the conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's 
injuries."  Foote, ¶ 22, 139 P.3d  at 464.  In our consideration of cases involving 
proximate cause, we have discussed not only what constitutes proximate cause, 
but also what does not:

 
 
In 
Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791, 793 (1921), 
this court first defined proximate cause as "[t]hat which, in a natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the 
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."  This same definition has been relied 
upon in recent years.  Robertson 
v. TWP, Inc., 656 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1983); Kopriva v. Union Pacific R. 
Co., 592 P.2d 711 (Wyo. 1979).  
In Lemos v. Madden, supra, 200 P.  at 794, the court also 
rejected a "but for" rule of causation, 
stating:

 
 
"* 
* * But if the original wrong furnished only the condition or occasion, then it 
is the remote and not the proximate cause, notwithstanding the fact that there 
would have been no loss or injury but for such condition or occasion. * * 
*"

 
 
In 
later cases our court has identified legal causation as that conduct which is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injuries identified in the 
complaint.  McClellan v. 
Tottenhoff, Wyo. 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983); Chrysler Corporation v. 
Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978); Phelps v. Woodward Construction 
Co., 66 Wyo. 33, 33, 204 P.2d 179 (Wyo. 1949).  The obvious rationalization of that 
approach with the two propositions found in Lemos v. Madden, supra, is 
that if the conduct is "that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by a sufficient intervening cause produces the injury, without which 
the result would not have occurred," it must be identified as a substantial 
factor in bringing about the harm. If, however, it created only a condition or 
occasion for the harm to occur then it would be regarded as a remote, not a 
proximate, cause, and would not be a substantial factor in bringing about the 
harm. An alternative method for explaining these concepts is found in the 
discussions of intervening cause in our cases.  McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 
supra; Koprina v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra; Gilliland 
v. Rhoads, 539 P.2d 1221 (Wyo. 1975); Fagan v. Summers, 498 P.2d 1227 
(Wyo. 1972); and Tyler v. Jensen, 75 Wyo. 249, 295 P.2d 742 (Wyo. 1956). 
 An intervening 
cause is one that comes into being after a defendant's negligent act has 
occurred, and if it is not a foreseeable event it will insulate the defendant 
from liability.  It is reasonably 
foreseeable if it is a probable consequence of the defendant's wrongful act or 
is a normal response to the stimulus of the situation created 
thereby.

 
 

Killian 
v. Caza Drilling, Inc., 
2006 WY 42, ¶ 20, 131 P.3d 975, 985 (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 
[¶7]      Proximate cause 
is a question of fact in the usual case, reserved for the determination by the 
trier of fact, unless the evidence is such that reasonable minds could not 
disagree.  The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 434(1) (1965), cited in Bigley 
v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892 (Wyo. 1989), states the following regarding 
causation and the function of the court:

 
 

(1)          
It 
is the function of the court to determine

(a)  Whether 
the evidence as to the facts makes an issue upon which the jury may reasonably 
differ as to whether the conduct of the defendant has been a substantial factor 
in causing the harm to the plaintiff;

(b)  Whether 
the harm to the plaintiff is capable of apportionment among two or more causes; 
and

(c)  The 
questions of causation and apportionment, in any case in which the jury may not 
reasonably differ.

 
 

Bigley, 
769 P.2d  at 897.

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court found there was no question of material fact with respect to the causation 
element of Collings' negligence claim.3  Indeed, "a plaintiff has the burden of 
proving all four of these elements before 
negligence can be found  [and] negligence and proximate cause are never 
presumed from the happening of an accident, and mere conjecture cannot form the 
basis of liability."  Vasquez v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., 913 P.2d 441, 443 (Wyo. 1996) (emphasis 
in original).  To quote the district 
court in the instant case,

[Collings] 
has the obligation of pointing to specific facts that would prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that the negligent acts of [Lords] caused the injury 
to [Collings]

 . 

[Collings] 
must put forth facts showing [Lords'] actions were a substantial factor in 
bringing about [the] injury.

 
 
[¶9]      We now turn to 
the facts in the instant case, in which the question we must address is whether 
Lords' conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about Collings' injury.  Collings asserts error in the district 
court's finding that viewing the claim "through the evidentiary prism of a 
preponderance of evidence, reasonable minds could not conclude that [Lords'] 
failure to warn or the failure to require [Collings] to read the safety portions 
of the [table saw] manual or any other condition was the cause of his 
injury."  Collings argues that these 
are facts in the record from which a reasonable mind would find that the damage 
to his fingers occurred as a natural and foreseeable consequence of Lords' 
failure to abide by precautionary and reasonable safety standards for use of the 
table saw.  Specifically, Collings 
points to the fact that Lords failed to warn Collings about the dangers of the 
saw, and Lords failed to require Collings to read the safety portions of the 
table saw manual.  Also, Collings 
argues that "facts [were] presented which indicate that the binding of the piece 
of material being cut could have been caused from the failure to properly place 
material on the fence of the saw as required by the Owner's Manual."4  Collings testified that, "I thought [the 
wood] skipped on the fence from what I remember.  That's why I thought there was something 
on the fence and it skipped and that's what primarily caused the bind up and 
kickback."  As a result, Collings 
argues on appeal that the binding of the piece of material being cut could have 
been caused from the failure to properly place material on the fence as required 
by the owner's manual.  Collings 
states that, "the failure to provide facing for the fence and a kickback of the 
material being worked on is a natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of 
not complying with the manual's directions."  Finally, Collings argues that Lords was 
not familiar with the requirements in the owner's manual regarding placing 
material on the face of the saw fence, or any specific operation of the saw with 
dado blades.

 
 
[¶10]   We disagree with Collings' 
argument.  In a case such as this, 
again, the plaintiff must show a reason for his injury.  There was no showing made of neglect or 
failure to perform a duty on the part of Lords.  Mere conjecture is never sufficient to 
establish liability.  Bluejacket v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo. 1976).  There is no liability for 
injuries from dangers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as well known to 
the person injured as they are to the defendant.  Id.  There is no substantial evidence in the 
record that shows that the accident was a foreseeable consequence of Lords' 
conduct.  Rather, the evidence 
presented to the district court shows that neither Collings nor Lords knows 
exactly what caused the blade to bind.

 
 
[¶11]   Specifically, Collings could not 
identify what Lords did, if anything, to cause the kickback and resultant injury 
to Collings.  Lords knew of 
Collings' prior experience with both table saws and dado blades.  As to the particular task at hand, 
Collings assured Lords he understood what needed to be done.  In fact, there is evidence on the record 
as to Collings' experience as a cabinet maker and carpenter  in the past, 
Collings had actually taken precautions to eliminate and/or reduce the risk of 
the potential and obvious danger of using dado blades.  He was familiar with and in the past had 
made and used "push sticks" when using dado blades.  The purpose of a "push stick," according 
to Collings, is to prevent the operator's hands from coming into contact with 
the dado blades  the exact scenario in the instant case.  By Collings' own account, not keeping 
wood straight in alignment with the fence and blade on the table saw can cause a 
bind  the only "input" into keeping a piece of wood in alignment is the 
operator, who manually pushes the wood across the saw.  Lords was not pushing the wood with 
Collings, and, accordingly, did not proximately cause his 
injuries.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶12]   Collings fails on appeal to show 
any genuine issue of material fact on the element of causation, and, as such, 
Lords is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Collings described his injury on the record: "The bone of my left index 
finger was ripped out between the first and second knuckle.  The second knuckle was damaged.  I required surgery on my right hip to 
remove bone that was needed for finger reconstruction, but reconstruction failed 
and it may now need to be removed down to the second knuckle.  My left thumb was damaged and I may need 
surgery to repair needed skin grafts."

 
 

2   A "dado" cut is a 
type of cut that uses several stackable saw blades to cut a groove into a board 
on single pass through the saw.

 
 

3The district court initially found, however, that Collings' motion for 
summary judgment was denied on the issue of duty.

 
 

4According to Collings, the Owner's Manual for the table saw, instructs 
owners/users to attach a "wood facing" to the "rip 
fence."