Case Title: Clark v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR96-839

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Donald Lloyd CLARK v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-839                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered May 12, 1997


1.   Criminal procedure -- custodial confessions presumed
     involuntary -- burden is on State to show statement
     voluntarily made. -- All custodial confessions are presumed to
     be involuntary; the burden is upon the State to show that the
     statement was voluntarily made; a statement induced by a false
     promise of reward or leniency is not a voluntary statement.

2.   Criminal procedure -- no evidence appellant's confession
     obtained in exchange for false promise -- waiver of rights
     signed by appellant specifically provided that no promises had
     been made. -- There was no evidence that appellant's
     confession was obtained in exchange for a false promise where
     it did not appear that any county law enforcement officer made
     any promises to appellant that, if he would cooperate,
     appellant would get a ten-year sentence for the crimes
     committed in that county; the record revealed that when
     appellant gave a written statement the day after his arrest,
     he signed a waiver-of- rights form which specifically provided
     no promises were offered to induce him to make a statement;
     from a careful review of the evidence, the State breached no
     promise.

3.   Motions -- motion to suppress -- trial court did not err in
     denying. -- Even if it could be said that disputed testimony
     existed on the promise-of-leniency issue, officers clearly
     testified that they offered no reward to appellant at any
     time; the trial judge was entitled to believe this evidence;
     appellant, upon his arrest, was fully advised of his rights,
     was not detained or questioned for any prolonged length of
     time before giving his statement, was not subjected to mental
     or physical punishment; was forty-two years old, had attended
     college for four years, and was no stranger to the criminal
     justice system, having been previously convicted of two
     felonies; in view of this evidence, the supreme court could
     not say the trial court erred in denying appellant's
     suppression motion.

4.   Jury -- course and conduct of voir dire primarily within
     judge's discretion -- no reversal absent abuse of discretion.
     -- The course and conduct of voir dire examination of the
     venire persons is primarily within the trial judge's
     discretion, and the supreme court will not reverse absent an
     abuse of that discretion. 

5.   Jury -- appellant not charged with nor did State's proof have
     any connection with drugs -- no abuse of discretion in trial
     court's denial of appellant's proposed questioning on voir
     dire as irrelevant. -- Appellant's assertion that, because he
     suffered from drug addition, he should have been permitted to
     voir dire the jurors concerning their experiences with friends
     or family members who used drugs, was without merit where
     appellant was not charged with drug offenses, nor did officers
     find any drugs on appellant at the time of his arrest; drugs
     had nothing to do with the State's proof regarding the
     burglary and theft charges; neither did appellant raise drugs
     as an affirmative defense which might have made his
     questioning of jurors relevant; based upon the record before
     it, the supreme court concluded that the trial court did not
     abuse its discretion in denying appellant's proposed
     questioning on voir dire as being irrelevant.

5.   Criminal law -- sentencing -- trial court properly instructed
     jury on law applicable to parole, meritorious good time, and
     transfer -- irrelevant testimony ordered by appellant properly
     excluded. -- Appellant's argument that the trial court abused
     its discretion in precluding him, during the sentencing phase,
     from testifying to what it is like in the penitentiary and
     arguing how prison life works and how difficult it is to be a
     class-one prisoner was without merit; the trial court properly
     instructed the jury on the law applicable to parole,
     meritorious good time, and transfer as required by Ark. Code
     Ann.  16-97-103(1); appellant never proffered any additional
     law on the subject; his suggestions had nothing to do with the
     sentencing law as it applies to parole, meritorious good time,
     or transfer, but instead left the jury to speculate as to the
     relevance of appellant's description of prison life; the trial
     judge did not err in excluding the testimony and argument
     offered by appellant, since the relevancy of such matters was
     never shown.

6.   Appeal & error -- appellant failed to timely object to
     introduction of previous judgment -- issue waived on appeal. -
     - Appellant's contention that, during the penalty phase, the
     trial court erred in admitting into evidence a twenty-one-
     year-old prior conviction, was without merit where the record
     reflected that appellant had no objection to his twenty-one-
     year-old judgment when it was admitted into evidence;
     appellant's failure to timely object was a waiver of this
     issue on appeal. 


     Appeal from Clark Chancery Court; W. H. "Dub" Arnold, Judge;
affirmed.
     Baxter, Wallace & Jensen, by:  Ray Baxter, for appellant,
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  J. Brent Standridge, Asst.
Att'y Gen., for appellee.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     On May 2, 1995, the appellant, Donald Lloyd Clark, was
arrested for some burglaries and thefts committed in Dallas County. 
At the time of his arrest, Clark expressed relief to law
enforcement officers at being caught because he was suffering from
an addiction to crystal methamphetamine.  He claimed his addiction
cost him $300 a day, and he committed crimes to underwrite those
costs.  After his arrest, law enforcement authorities from three or
four other counties met in Dallas County to determine whether Clark
had any information concerning burglaries committed in their
surrounding counties.  At this time, Dallas County Sheriff Donnie
Ford told Clark that, if he would cooperate, Ford would recommend
that Clark serve only ten years' imprisonment to be served
concurrently for all the crimes he had committed.  Clark
subsequently cooperated with the various authorities, and in some
instances, accompanied them to drug dealers' houses where the
officers located stolen guns and other stolen property.
     On appeal, Clark argues that he had been given the impression
that the prosecuting attorneys of all the counties, where crimes
were committed, would follow the recommendations of law enforcement
officials and that he was "almost" told he would not need to hire
a lawyer because "it was just going to fall into place."  Clark
claims that, in reliance upon the "promise of leniency," he
cooperated extensively with authorities in six counties, including
Clark County.  However, the Clark County prosecutor refused to 
agree to Dallas County Sheriff Ford's ten-year concurrent
recommendation, but instead the prosecutor sought to impose the
maximum sentence for each of four felony offenses committed in
Clark County.  Consequently, Clark defended against the Clark
County charges, and filed a motion to suppress his confession in
that proceeding.  The Clark County Circuit Court denied Clark's
motion, and the matter went to trial.  Clark was tried on two
charges of burglary and two charges of theft of property, and he
was convicted and given the maximum sentence for each charge to run
consecutively -- a total of forty years.  
     Clark appeals his convictions, and argues the trial court
erred (1) in refusing to exclude his confessions and denying his
request to enforce the promise of leniency offered him by law
enforcement authorities, (2) in rejecting his request to voir dire
the jury regarding the subject of drug use, (3) in denying his
attorney the opportunity to elicit evidence or to give argument
during the sentencing phase of the trial regarding prison life and
the workings of parole and meritorious good time, and (4) in
permitting the State to introduce a conviction Clark sustained
twenty-one years ago.
     In considering Clark's initial suppression argument, we do so
in light of the rule all custodial confessions are presumed to be
involuntary and the burden is upon the State to show the statement
was voluntarily made.  Durham v. State, 320 Ark. 689,