Case Title: RODNEY ALLOWAY V. RT CAPITAL, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0042

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
RODNEY ALLOWAY V. RT CAPITAL, INC.2008 WY 123193 P.3d 713Case Number: S-08-0042Decided: 10/10/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 

RODNEY 
ALLOWAY,Appellant(Defendant),v.RT CAPITAL, 
INC.,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Pro 
se.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Larry 
W. Harrington, Harrington Law Firm, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Rodney Alloway, 
pro se, appeals from the district 
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of RT Capital, Inc. (RT 
Capital) on an outstanding credit card account balance.  He claims that RT Capital's summary 
judgment submissions were insufficient.  
We affirm. 

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Both parties 
present the same simply stated issue on appeal:  

 
 
Did 
the court improperly grant summary judgment?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In January 2007, 
RT Capital filed a complaint against Mr. Alloway, seeking to collect on a 
delinquent credit card account.  The 
complaint alleged Mr. Alloway had applied for and received a credit card from 
Metris/Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank (Metris).  RT Capital claimed that he used the card 
and did not pay the balance due of $5,847.19, plus interest.  Having failed to obtain payment on Mr. 
Alloway's account, Metris sold it to account collectors.  Eventually, RT Capital took assignment 
of the account.        

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Alloway 
answered the complaint and admitted that he had opened an account with Metris 
and used the credit card.  He 
denied, however, the balance due.  
RT Capital filed a motion for summary judgment, which it supported with 
an affidavit from one of its employees.  
Mr. Alloway responded to RT Capital's summary judgment motion with his 
personal affidavit which made various allegations against RT Capital's 
attorney.  After a hearing, the 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of RT Capital.  Mr. Alloway appealed.     

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      Summary judgments 
are governed by W.R.C.P. 56(c):

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
[¶6]      A district 
court's summary judgment ruling is reviewed de novo, using the same materials and 
following the same standards as the district court.  The evidence is considered from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  Metz v. Laramie County School Dist. No. 1, 
2007 WY 166, ¶ 17, 173 P.3d 334, 
339 (Wyo. 2007); Cook v. Shoshone First 
Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶7]      The summary 
judgment movant bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment by 
showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that judgment should 
be granted as a matter of law.  Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 
748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987).  He must present admissible evidence to 
meet his burden.  Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc. 
v. South Douglas Highway Water & Sewer Dist., 2007 WY 206, ¶ 9, 173 P.3d 398, 401 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
[¶8]      If the party 
seeking summary judgment carries his burden, the opposing party must present 
specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact exists.  Hatton v. Energy Electric Co., 2006 WY 
151, ¶ 9, 148 P.3d 8, 12 (Wyo. 2006).  
We explained the duties of the party opposing a motion for summary 
judgment in Cook, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d  at 
890, quoting Jones v. Schabron, 2005 
WY 65, ¶¶ 9-11, 113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo. 2005):

 
 
After 
a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing 
party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing 
there are genuine issues of material fact.  
The opposing party must affirmatively set forth material, specific facts 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and cannot rely only upon 
allegations and pleadings ..., and conclusory statements or mere opinions are 
insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's burden.  

 
 
The 
evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment "must be 
competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely 
eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or 
wishful speculation."  Speculation, 
conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even probability, are 
insufficient to establish an issue of material fact.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Alloway 
claims the district court erred by granting summary judgment because RT 
Capital's summary judgment materials were insufficient to meet its prima facie burden.  RT Capital's summary judgment motion was 
supported by Heather Herndon's affidavit, which stated in pertinent part:  

 
 

1.                  
That 
I am employed by RT CAPITAL, INC., and that I am the designated agent for the 
Plaintiff.

 
 

2.                  
That 
I am authorized to make this Affidavit on behalf of RT CAPITAL, INC. 

 
 

3.                  
That 
Plaintiff is in the business of purchasing commercial paper; in particular, 
credit accounts from lenders who have chosen to sell bad debt rather than 
continuing the collection process themselves.

 
 

4.                  
That 
as investors, we are familiar with the original lenders; and we know the 
original creditor to be a well-known-issuer of credit.

 
 

5.                  
That 
because of my position, I have become familiar with commercial paper used to 
document debt in the credit industry; and in particular, I am familiar with the 
paper used to document by the original lender in this 
matter.

 
 

6.                  
That 
as an investor in the credit industry, the documentation of the accounts is 
purchased from the original lender.

 
 

7.                  
That 
as an investor, we require the documentation from the original creditor to be 
true and accurate.

 
 

8.                  
That 
we know that the original creditor must keep records in the usual course of 
their business in order to conduct its business.  

 
 

9.                  
That 
as issuers of credit, the original lender must enter all transactions at or 
about the time that they occur.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
13. 
      That upon 
use of the credit card, monthly billing statements are sent to the cardholder to 
be paid.

 
 
14. 
      That the 
documents attached hereto are true and accurate copies provided by the original 
creditor and sold to the Plaintiff.

 
 
15.       That the 
account subject of this suit was originally issued by Direct Merchants Credit 
Card Bank/Metris Companies, and was subsequently acquired by the plaintiff as is 
evidenced by assignments attached as Exhibit 1.

 
 
16.       That 
attached hereto is a copy (Exhibit 2) of the Agreement that was issued by the 
original lender when the account was opened.

 
 
17.       That 
attached as Exhibit 3 are copies of statements of account sent to the defendant 
by the original lender dated May 13, 2003 to May 13, 2004.

 
 
18.       That the 
last payment was made on the account on September 30, 
2003.

 
 
19. 
      That the 
balance due as of 05/31/2004 is $5847.19.

 
 
20.       That the 
interest is accruing at $1.1214 per day from 05/31/2004.

 
 
21.       That 
interest of $1,432 has accrued since May 31, 2004.

 
 
2[2].     That RT Capital, Inc. 
has not in any manner canceled or forgiven the balance 
due.

 
 
2[3].     That principal and 
interest due is $7279.19 plus interest accruing at $1.1214 per day from November 
29, 2007 and reasonable attorney fees under the contract.

 
 
The 
assignments of the account, a copy of a Metris cardholder agreement, and 
numerous statements of Mr. Alloway's accounts were attached to Ms. Herndon's 
affidavit.  

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Alloway's responding affidavit 
stated:

 
 

1.                  
Mr. 
Harrington [RT Capital's attorney] is not being truthful with this 
court.

 
 

2.                  
Mr. 
Harrington's motion for SUMMARY JUDGMENT is not based on all the material facts 
filed in this case.

 
 

3.                  
Mr. 
Harrington has yet to answer documents filed by Rodney Alloway left out in 
support of his motion.

 
 
4.         
Mr. Harrington refuses to show where Rodney Alloway is liable to Mr. 
Harrington.

 
 
5.         Mr. Harrington refuses to 
provide the original contract, not a copy, if any.

 
 
6.         Demand for a copy 
of the original contract with RT Capital is unanswered.  

 
 
It 
is Rodney Alloway's opinion and belief that fraud is being committed by Mr. 
Harrington to obtain an unlawful order for collection of this debt without proof 
Mr. Alloway is the correct party. 

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Alloway argues that summary 
judgment was improper because RT Capital supplied only a copy of Metris' 
standard cardholder agreement, rather than providing the original contract he 
signed.  The problem with Mr. 
Alloway's argument is that he admitted in his answer to the complaint that he 
entered into an agreement with Metris and used the credit card.  Moreover, he did not assert in his 
summary judgment affidavit that the cardholder agreement attached to Ms. 
Herndon's affidavit did not accurately reflect the terms of his account.  W.R.C.P. 8(d) states, in relevant 
part:  "Averments in a pleading to 
which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of 
damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading."  Since Mr. Alloway admitted he applied 
for, received and used the credit card and he did not present any specific facts 
indicating that the terms of the agreement supplied by RT Capital were 
incorrect, the lack of the original agreement is meaningless. 

 
 
[¶12]   Although his argument is not 
entirely clear, Mr. Alloway apparently also contests the summary judgment in 
favor of RT Capital because he did not have an agreement with that company.  The cardholder agreement provided that 
Metris could "sell, assign or transfer your [a]ccount or any portion thereof 
without notice to you."  Our law is 
clear that, when a contract states it is assignable, we will honor that 
term.  See, e.g., Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. Bowen, 571 P.2d 974, 977-78 (Wyo. 1977).  
The documents attached to Ms. Herndon's affidavit included bills of 
sale and assignments showing transfer of the account from Metris, through 
several other entities and finally to RT Capital.  Mr. Alloway did not provide any specific 
facts in his affidavit showing that the account was not assignable or that any 
of the assignments were improper.  
Thus, Mr. Alloway's claim that he did not enter into an agreement 
directly with RT Capital is not tenable.    

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Alloway further insists that 
Ms. Herndon did not have the personal knowledge necessary to provide foundation 
for the credit card statements which established the balance due.  RT Capital argues that Mr. Alloway 
failed to file an answer denying the balance claimed in the complaint; however, 
his answer is contained in the record on appeal and reveals that he effectively 
denied the balance due.  RT Capital, 
therefore, had an affirmative obligation to present admissible evidence to 
establish the balance.

 
 
[¶14]   RT Capital attached to Ms. 
Herndon's affidavit the credit card statements sent by Metris to Mr. 
Alloway.  The credit card statements 
were, obviously, hearsay as they were not made by a declarant while testifying 
at the trial or hearing and were offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted, i.e. the balance due on the account.  W.R.E. 801(c).  Therefore, pursuant to W.R.E. 802, the 
credit card statements were not admissible unless they fell within an exception 
to the hearsay rule.  

 
 
[¶15]   The most obvious exception 
applicable to the statements is the business record exception in W.R.E. 
803(6):

 
 
The 
following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness:

 
 
. 
. . . 

            
(6) Records of Regularly Conducted 
Activity.  A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, 
of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time 
by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular 
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances or preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.  The term "business" as used in this 
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, 
and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for 
profit.

 
 
In 
order to be admissible under Rule 803(6), the proponent must provide testimony 
by a qualified witness demonstrating that "the report was made at or near the 
time [of the event, etc.]; . . . by a person with knowledge or made from 
information transmitted by a person with knowledge;" it was a regular practice 
of the business to make such a report; and, the report was kept "in the course 
of regularly conducted business practices."  McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 753 
(Wyo. 
1993).   

 
 
[¶16]   Mr. Alloway seems to argue that, 
because the original lender generated the credit card statements, Ms. Herndon, 
as an employee of RT Capital, could not provide the foundation necessary for 
admission of the statements.  In Great Seneca Financial v. Felty, 869 N.E.2d 30, 34 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), an Ohio court of appeals held, under 
circumstances similar to those presented here, an employee of the assignee of a 
credit card account could provide foundation for the statements.  The court followed federal court 
decisions which held that "exhibits can be admitted as business records of an 
entity, even when that entity was not the maker of those records, provided the 
other requirements of Rule 803(6) are met and the circumstances indicate that 
the records are trustworthy."   
Id.  

 
 
[¶17]   Ms. Herndon identified the 
documents and explained her relationship with RT Capital and how it had acquired 
the account and the associated statements from Metris.  She stated specifically that she was 
familiar with the types of documents employed by Metris in documenting 
debt.  Ms. Herndon averred that RT 
Capital knew that Metris kept the records as part of its regularly conducted 
business and, as an issuer of credit, Metris was required to enter the 
transactions in a timely fashion.  
Mr. Alloway's affidavit did not provide any specific facts to counter Ms. 
Herndon's averments.  

 
 
[¶18]   Moreover, Mr. Alloway's affidavit 
did not challenge the charges or the balance due reflected in the 
statements.  In that respect, his 
argument is similar to the one that failed in Hatton.  There, the Hattons argued that the 
district court should not have considered an affidavit made by Energy Electric's 
vice-president because he relied upon the official accident report and attached 
it to his affidavit, although he had no personal knowledge of the accident.  Id. at ¶ 11, 148 P.3d  at 14.  We ruled that the affidavit provided 
proper evidentiary support for Energy Electric's summary judgment motion because 
the Hattons did not contest the information contained in the report.  Id. at ¶ 13, 148 P.3d  at 14.        

 
 
[¶19]   We conclude that RT Capital 
presented a prima facie case in 
support of its motion for summary judgment.  Ms. Herndon's affidavit contained all of 
the foundational requirements necessary to establish the admissibility of the 
statements under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.  Mr. Alloway did not come forward with competent evidence 
admissible at trial showing there were genuine issues of material fact.  His assertions were general and 
conclusory and did not "affirmatively set forth material, specific facts in 
opposition to [RT Capital's] motion for summary judgment." Cook, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d  at 890, quoting Jones, ¶¶ 9-11, 113 P.3d  at 37.  On this record, the district court 
correctly granted summary judgment in favor of RT 
Capital.

 
 
[¶20]   Affirmed.