Case Title: Commonwealth v. Jones

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12564

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12564 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DENNIS JONES. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 6, 2018. - March 6, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Cellular Telephone.  Witness, Compelling giving of evidence, 
Self-incrimination.  Constitutional Law, Self-
incrimination. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 17, 2018. 
 
 
The case was reported by Gants, C.J. 
 
 
 
Gabriel Pell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
James A. Reidy (George F. Ohlson, Jr., also present) for 
the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Andrew Levchuk & Lauren C. Ostberg for Orin S. Kerr. 
 
David Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Randall E. Ravitz, 
Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General. 
 
Laurent Sacharoff, pro se. 
 
 
2 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A grand jury returned indictments charging the 
defendant, Dennis Jones, with trafficking a person for sexual 
servitude, G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a), and deriving support from the 
earnings of a prostitute, G. L. c. 272, § 7.  At the time of his 
arrest, the Commonwealth seized a cell phone from the defendant.  
During its investigation of the defendant, the Commonwealth 
developed information leading it to believe that the contents of 
the cell phone included material and inculpatory evidence.  The 
Commonwealth thereafter applied for and was granted a search 
warrant to search the cell phone.  The search warrant has yet to 
be executed, however, as the Commonwealth was -- and currently 
remains -- unable to access the cell phone's contents because 
they are encrypted.  The contents can only be decrypted with the 
entry of a password.1 
 
The Commonwealth sought to compel the defendant to decrypt 
the cell phone by filing a motion for an order requiring the 
defendant to produce a personal identification number access 
code in the Superior Court.  The central legal issue concerned 
whether compelling the defendant to enter the password to the 
                                                 
 
1 We understand the word "password" to be synonymous with 
other terms that cell phone users may be familiar with, such as 
Personal Identification Number or "passcode."  Each term refers 
to the personalized combination of letters or digits that, when 
manually entered by the user, "unlocks" a cell phone.  For 
simplicity, we use "password" throughout.  See generally, Kerr & 
Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 106 Geo. L.J. 989, 990, 994, 
998 (2018). 
3 
 
cell phone would violate his privilege against self-
incrimination guaranteed by both the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  The Commonwealth argued that under our 
decision in Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512 (2014), the 
act of entering the password would not amount to self-
incrimination because the defendant's knowledge of the password 
was already known to the Commonwealth, and was therefore a 
"foregone conclusion" under the Fifth Amendment and art. 12.  
Following a hearing, a judge denied the Commonwealth's motion, 
concluding that the Commonwealth had not proved that the 
defendant's knowledge of the password was a foregone conclusion 
under the Fifth Amendment. 
 
Several months later, the Commonwealth renewed its motion 
and included additional factual information that it had not set 
forth in its initial motion.  The judge denied the renewed 
motion, noting that because the additional information was known 
or reasonably available to the Commonwealth when the initial 
motion was filed, he was "not inclined" to consider the renewed 
motion under the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The 
judge concluded that even if he were to consider the renewed 
motion, the Commonwealth had still failed to prove that the 
defendant's knowledge of the password was a foregone conclusion. 
4 
 
 
The Commonwealth then filed a petition for relief in the 
county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3; the single justice 
reserved and reported the case to the full court.  The single 
justice asked the parties to address three specific issues, in 
addition to any other questions they thought relevant.  Those 
issues are the following: 
"1.  What is the burden of proof that the Commonwealth 
bears on a motion like this in order to establish a 
'foregone conclusion,' as that term is used in Commonwealth 
v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 520-526 (2014)? 
 
"2.  Did the Commonwealth meet its burden of proof in this 
case? 
 
"3.  When a judge denies a 'Gelfgatt' motion filed by the 
Commonwealth and the Commonwealth thereafter renews its 
motion and provides additional supporting information that 
it had not provided in support of the motion initially, is 
a judge acting on the renewed motion first required to find 
that the additional information was not known or reasonably 
available to the Commonwealth when the earlier motion was 
filed before considering the additional information?" 
 
We conclude that when the Commonwealth seeks an order pursuant 
to our decision in Gelfgatt (Gelfgatt order or motion) 
compelling a defendant to decrypt an electronic device by 
entering a password, art. 12 requires the Commonwealth to prove 
that the defendant knows the password beyond a reasonable doubt 
for the foregone conclusion exception to apply.  We also 
conclude that the Commonwealth met its burden in this case.  
Finally, we conclude that a judge acting on a renewed Gelfgatt 
motion may consider additional information without first finding 
5 
 
that it was not known or not reasonably available to the 
Commonwealth at the time the earlier Gelfgatt motion was filed. 
 
We therefore reverse the judge's denial of the 
Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion, and we remand the case 
to the Superior Court for entry of an order compelling the 
defendant to enter the password into the cell phone at issue.2 
 
Background.  The relevant undisputed facts are taken from 
the parties' submissions to the motion judge.3  See Gelfgatt, 468 
Mass. at 514. 
 
1.  The investigation and the defendant's arrest.  In 
December 2016, the police responded to a report of a stolen 
purse at a hotel in Woburn.  Upon arriving, the woman whose 
purse was stolen, Sara,4 identified the defendant as the 
perpetrator of the theft.  She explained that she knew the 
defendant because she had met him through an online dating 
website a few weeks earlier.  Sara eventually disclosed that 
                                                 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Attorney 
General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, and Professor Orin S. Kerr.  We also 
acknowledge the amicus submission of Professor Laurent 
Sacharoff. 
 
 
3 These submissions included the Commonwealth's initial 
search warrant application, and exhibits attached thereto; 
various affidavits of law enforcement officers, and exhibits 
attached thereto.  The motion judge did not hear testimony from 
any witnesses or make any credibility findings.  He denied the 
motion based on the documentary record. 
 
 
4 A pseudonym.  See G. L. c. 265 § 24C. 
6 
 
although she had initially believed that she and the defendant 
were dating, the defendant soon induced her into working as a 
prostitute in exchange for housing.  Based on this information, 
the police began investigating the defendant. 
 
During their investigation, police linked a cell phone, 
later determined to be an LG brand cell phone (LG phone), to the 
defendant.  Sara stated that she communicated with the defendant 
by contacting the LG phone.  Specifically, she "talk[ed] on the 
phone and [exchanged] text messag[es] with [the defendant]" 
while he used the LG phone.  Additionally, the LG phone's 
telephone number was listed in the contacts section of Sara's 
cell phone as "[]Dennis." 
 
Sara told police that the LG phone was used by the 
defendant and a female associate to conduct prostitution.  
Specifically, Sara explained that the defendant would regularly 
respond to customer text messages by using the LG phone, but 
that his female associate would answer telephone calls from 
customers so that the customers would hear a "female voice."  
Additionally, an examination of Sara's cell phone revealed 
several communications between her phone and the LG phone 
related to prostitution, including screenshots of customer 
communications sent to the LG phone in response to online 
advertisements seeking to arrange prostitution transactions with 
Sara; messages from the LG phone explicitly instructing Sara on 
7 
 
how to perform sexual acts on customers; messages from the LG 
phone trying to convince Sara to return to the defendant after 
she had attempted to flee from him out of fear; and messages 
from the LG phone apologizing for the defendant's behavior.  
Police also discovered several Internet postings on the website 
Backpage.com advertising Sara as an escort that listed the 
telephone number of the LG phone as the principal point of 
contact for customers seeking to engage in a prostitution 
transaction with her. 
 
The police arrested the defendant shortly after commencing 
their investigation.  At the time of the arrest, the police 
recovered two cell phones in his possession, one of which was 
the LG phone.  The LG phone was found in the defendant's pants 
pocket. 
 
Soon after the arrest, the police applied for a search 
warrant to perform a forensic search of the LG phone.  The 
application was granted.  The police thereafter attempted to 
execute the search warrant, but discovered that its contents 
were encrypted such that they could be accessed only after the 
entry of a password to unlock, and thereby decrypt, the cell 
phone.5  The police determined that they did not have the 
                                                 
 
5 We recognize that ordinary cell phone users are likely 
unfamiliar with the complexities of encryption technology.  For 
instance, although entering a password "unlocks" a cell phone, 
the password itself is not the "encryption key" that decrypts 
8 
 
technological capability to bypass the lock function without the 
entry of the password and were therefore unable to execute the 
search warrant. 
 
2.  The Commonwealth's Gelfgatt motions.  As discussed 
supra, the Commonwealth filed a Gelfgatt motion seeking a court 
order compelling the defendant to decrypt the LG phone by 
entering its password.  The Commonwealth argued that compelling 
the defendant to enter the password would not force him to 
incriminate himself because the act itself would not reveal any 
information that the Commonwealth did not already know.  
Following a hearing, a judge denied the motion, concluding that 
because the Commonwealth had failed to "demonstrate[] with 
reasonable particularity that [the defendant] possesses the 
[password] for the LG phone," the defendant's knowledge of the 
password was not a foregone conclusion under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
 
When the Commonwealth renewed its motion, it presented 
additional factual information that it argued proved that the 
                                                 
the cell phone's contents.  See Kerr & Schneier, supra at 995.  
Rather, "entering the [password] decrypts the [encryption] key, 
enabling the key to be processed and unlocking the phone.  This 
two-stage process is invisible to the casual user."  Id.  
Because the technical details of encryption technology do not 
play a role in our analysis, they are not worth belaboring.  
Accordingly, we treat the entry of a password as effectively 
decrypting the contents of a cell phone.  For a more detailed 
discussion of encryption technology, see generally Kerr & 
Schneier, supra. 
9 
 
defendant's knowledge of the password was a foregone conclusion, 
including the LG phone's subscriber information that tended to 
link the defendant to the LG phone, subsets of the LG phone's 
cell site location information (CSLI) records, and a prior 
statement the defendant had made to police during his booking in 
an unrelated criminal matter in which he identified the LG phone 
as his telephone number.  The judge denied the renewed motion. 
 
The Commonwealth filed a petition for relief in the county 
court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The single justice 
reserved and reported the case to the full court, asking the 
parties to address the three questions quoted supra. 
 
Discussion.  The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person 
. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself."  Similarly, art. 12 provides that "[n]o 
subject shall . . . be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence 
against himself."  Accordingly, it is a "fundamental principle 
of our system of justice" that a person enjoys the "right to be 
free from self-incrimination" under the Fifth Amendment and art. 
12.  Commonwealth v. Borans, 388 Mass. 453, 455 (1983). 
 
The privilege against self-incrimination applies when the 
"accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that 
is incriminating."  Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 
(1976).  See Commonwealth v. Burgess, 426 Mass. 206, 218 (1997).  
Testimonial communications are not limited to spoken words or 
10 
 
written statements, however, as the act of producing information 
"demanded by the government may have 'communicative aspects' 
that would render the Fifth Amendment" and art. 12 applicable.  
Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 520, quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.  
"Whether an act of production is testimonial depends on whether 
the government compels the individual to disclose the contents 
of his [or her] own mind to explicitly or implicitly communicate 
some statement of fact" (quotations and citation omitted).6  
Gelfgatt, supra at 520.  See id. at 525-526 ("Where the 
information conveyed by an act of production is reflective of 
the knowledge, understanding, and thoughts of the witness, it is 
deemed to be testimonial and, therefore, within the purview of 
art. 12" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
 
The Commonwealth may, however, compel testimonial acts of 
production without violating a defendant's rights under the 
Fifth Amendment or art. 12 where the "facts conveyed [by the 
act] already are known to the government, such that the 
                                                 
 
6 For example, the privilege against self-incrimination is 
not implicated when the government seeks "to compel an 
individual to be the source of real or physical evidence by, for 
example," furnishing a blood sample, taking a breathalyzer test, 
producing a voice exemplar, providing a handwriting exemplar, 
standing in a lineup, or putting on particular clothing.  
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 521 (2014), and cases 
cited.  In these circumstances, the conduct is not testimonial 
because the "the individual is not required to disclose any 
knowledge he [or she] might have or to speak his [or her] guilt" 
(quotations and citation omitted).  Id. at 521. 
11 
 
individual 'adds little or nothing to the sum total of the 
Government's information.'"  Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 522, quoting 
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.  In these circumstances, because the 
facts implicitly disclosed through the act of production are 
already known to the Commonwealth, they are considered a 
"foregone conclusion" and do not force a defendant to 
incriminate himself or herself.  Gelfgatt, supra at 522-523, 
525-526. 
 
Although the foregone conclusion exception originated in 
the context of the compelled production of documents in response 
to a government subpoena, see Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411, we  
extended its application to the compelled production of 
passwords to encrypted electronic devices in Commonwealth v. 
Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 522-525.7  In Gelfgatt, the defendant was 
an attorney who was alleged to have, "through his use of 
computers, conducted a sophisticated scheme of diverting to 
himself funds that were intended to be used to pay off large 
mortgage loans."  Id. at 513.  The files located on four 
computers seized from the defendant, however, were encrypted and 
                                                 
 
7 Several other courts have done the same.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 247-248 
(3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. United States, 138 
S. Ct. 1988 (2018); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated 
March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1344-1345 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(Subpoena Duces Tecum); United States vs. Spencer, U.S. Dist. 
Ct., No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1 (N.D. Ca. Apr. 26, 2018); State v. 
Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 135-137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
12 
 
were thus inaccessible to the Commonwealth without the entry of 
a password to decrypt them.  Id. at 516-517.  We concluded that 
compelling the defendant to decrypt the files by entering the 
passwords into the computers could be a testimonial act of 
production under the Fifth Amendment and art. 12.  Id. at 522, 
525-526.  Nonetheless, we held that "[t]he facts that would be 
conveyed by the defendant through his act of decryption . . . 
already [were] known to the [Commonwealth] and, thus, [were] a 
'foregone conclusion.'"8  Id. at 524.  We therefore held that the 
Commonwealth's motion to compel decryption did not violate 
either the Fifth Amendment or art. 12.  Id. at 524, 525.  See 
id. at 523 (because facts conveyed by act of decryption were 
foregone conclusion, "the act of decryption is not a testimonial 
communication that is protected" by Fifth Amendment or art. 12). 
                                                 
 
8 In Gelfgatt, we noted that by entering the passwords, the 
defendant implicitly conveyed the fact that he knew the 
computers were encrypted, that he knew the passwords to decrypt 
the computers, and that he had "ownership and control of the 
computers and their contents."  Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 524.  
Although correctly describing the facts in Gelfgatt, we clarify 
today that the entry of a password alone does not convey the 
fact of "ownership" of the device or its contents.  Id.  Whether 
entry of a password indicates control also is unclear.  Indeed, 
individuals may very well know the password to an electronic 
device that is owned and controlled by another person.  For 
example, family members and significant others routinely know 
the passwords to each other's cell phones, and students are 
regularly given passwords to school-owned computers.  The fact 
of knowledge of a password is distinct from the ownership or 
control of the device and its contents. 
13 
 
 
Accordingly, for the foregone conclusion exception to 
apply, the Commonwealth must establish that it already knows the 
testimony that is implicit in the act of the required 
production.  Id. at 522-523.  In the context of compelled 
decryption, the only fact conveyed by compelling a defendant to 
enter the password to an encrypted electronic device is that the 
defendant knows the password, and can therefore access the 
device.9  See id.  See also Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the 
                                                 
 
9 The Commonwealth's Gelfgatt motions in this case requested 
that the defendant "produce" or "provide" the password to the LG 
phone.  Although it is not perfectly clear what the Commonwealth 
meant by "produce" or "provide," its proposed order suggested 
that it sought to require the defendant to make a written 
disclosure of the actual password to the LG phone.  There is 
some debate among courts and commenters as to whether the 
foregone conclusion exception can apply in cases where the 
government seeks to compel the defendant to disclose -- whether 
orally or in writing -- the actual password, as opposed to cases 
requiring merely physically entering it into the device.  
Compare Stahl, 206 So. 3d at 134 (password itself has no 
"testimonial significance" and thus may be compelled [citation 
omitted]), with Spencer, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1 
("the government could not compel Spencer to state the password 
itself, whether orally or in writing"), and Sacharoff, Unlocking 
the Fifth Amendment:  Passwords and Encrypted Devices, 87 
Fordham L. Rev. 203, 236 (2018) ("It is a mistake to apply the 
foregone conclusion doctrine to the oral disclosure of a 
password").  See generally  Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 
210 n.9 (1988) (compelling someone to reveal combination to wall 
safe, as opposed to merely surrender key to strong box, is 
testimonial).  There is some support for the idea that the 
written disclosure of the password would amount to direct 
testimony, not an act of production, and that the foregone 
conclusion exception is limited only to acts of production. 3 
W.R. LaFave, J.H. Israel, N.J. King, & O.S. Kerr, Criminal 
Procedure § 8.13(a) (4th ed. 2015) ("requir[ing a] party to 
reveal a pass[word] that would allow [the government] to perform 
the decryption . . . would require a testimonial communication 
14 
 
Privilege Against Self-incrimination, Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2019) (manuscript at 18) ("the only assertion implied by 
entering the password is that the person compelled knows the 
password").  The Commonwealth must therefore establish that a 
defendant knows the password to decrypt an electronic device 
before his or her knowledge of the password can be deemed a 
foregone conclusion under the Fifth Amendment or art. 12.10 
                                                 
standing apart from the act of production, and therefore make 
unavailable the foregone conclusion doctrine").  We need not, 
and do not, resolve this distinction here, and our decision is 
therefore limited to only the physical entry of the password by 
the defendant, as we required in Gelfgatt.  The defendant may 
therefore only be compelled to enter the password to the LG 
phone, not disclose it. 
 
 
10 The motion judge interpreted our decision in Gelfgatt to 
require that the Commonwealth establish "(1) the existence of 
the evidence demanded; (2) the possession or control of that 
evidence by the defendant; and (3) the authenticity of the 
evidence."  What the motion judge meant by evidence in this 
context is not particularly clear, nor were we as clear as we 
might have been in our analysis in Gelfgatt.  We clarify that 
the evidence at issue in the compelled decryption here is the 
password itself, not the contents of the phone. 
 
 
As we explained supra, the only testimony that would be 
conveyed by compelling the defendant to enter the password is 
the fact that the defendant knows the password, and therefore 
has the ability to access the phone.  The entry would convey no 
information about the contents of the LG phone.  See Stahl, 206 
So. 3d at 136 ("The question is not the State's knowledge of the 
contents of the phone; the State has not requested the contents 
of the phone").  The analysis would be different had the 
Commonwealth sought to compel the defendant to produce specific 
files located in the contents of the LG phone.  If that had been 
the case, the production of the files would implicitly convey 
far more information than just the fact that the defendant knows 
the password.  See Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d at 1347, 1349.  
The defendant's production of specific files would implicitly 
15 
 
With this analytical framework in mind, we turn now to the 
reported questions.11 
                                                 
testify to the existence of the files, his control over them, 
and their authenticity.  United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 
36 n.19 (2000) ("by producing documents in compliance with a 
subpoena, the witness would admit that the papers existed, were 
in his possession or control, and were authentic").  
Accordingly, the Commonwealth would be required to prove its 
prior knowledge of those facts. 
 
 
11 The concurrence suggests that in addition to proving the 
defendant's knowledge of the password, the government must also 
demonstrate that it "already knows, with reasonable 
particularity, the existence and location of relevant, 
incriminating evidence it expects to find on that device."  Post 
at    .  Without this added requirement, the concurrence argues, 
the government may obtain "unlimited . . . access," post at note 
4, to a "trove of potential incriminating and highly personal 
data on an electronic device" by proving only "that the accused 
knows the device's pass[word]," post at    .  This is not 
correct. 
 
 
It is well established that under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, the police are ordinarily required to 
obtain a search warrant before a search of the contents of an 
electronic device may take place.  See, e.g., Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (cell phones); Commonwealth 
v. Mauricio, 477 Mass. 588, 594 (2017) (digital cameras); 
Commonwealth v. McDermott, 448 Mass. 750, 776, cert. denied, 552 
U.S. 910 (2007) (computers).  Accordingly, in this case, the 
police were required to obtain a warrant before they could seek 
to search the contents of the LG phone, and they did so.  The 
full protections against improper searches -- probable cause to 
believe that a crime had been committed and that evidence of the 
crime would be found on the device -- were required and, in the 
opinion of the clerk-magistrate who issued the search warrant, 
were satisfied here.  The standard proposed by the concurrence 
conflates these protections with the protections afforded by 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Our task 
under art. 12 in this context is to determine only what facts 
are conveyed to the government when a defendant is compelled to 
enter a password to decrypt an electronic device.  As we have 
explained, the only fact conveyed by the physical act of 
16 
 
                                                 
entering the password into an electronic device is that the 
defendant knows the password.  Such an act says nothing about 
the contents of the device.  Nor does the act alone "produce" 
any evidence to the Commonwealth.  Post at note 1. 
 
 
Accordingly, under these circumstances, the Commonwealth 
was required to abide by two sets of constitutional protections.  
Requiring this dual protection does not, as the concurrence 
contends, sound a "death knell" of constitutional protection in 
the digital age.  Post at    .  Nor do we read the two 
constitutional protections in "splendid isolation."  Post at 
note 1.  Each has its own purpose, function, and requirements, 
and they work together to form a double protection of digital 
privacy before particular files on the phone can be accessed. 
 
 
Moreover, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals 
cited by the concurrence in support of its proposed standard do 
not support its application to cases where, as here, the 
government seeks only to compel the entry of the password to an 
electronic device.  Post at    .  For example, the Eleventh 
Circuit's decision in Subpoena Duces Tecum was a case where the 
government "served [the defendant] with a subpoena duces tecum 
requiring him to . . . produce the unencrypted contents located 
on the hard drives of . . . laptop computers and five external 
hard drives" (emphasis added).  Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d 
at 1337.  There, the government sought not only to compel the 
defendant to enter the passwords to the devices, but also to 
compel the defendant to identify and produce the files located 
in the device in their unencrypted state.  Id.  The compelled 
act of identifying and producing files conveys far more 
information to the government than what the Commonwealth seeks 
in this case.  See note 10, supra.  The reference by the 
concurrence to the Third Circuit's decision in Apple MacPro 
Computer is similarly unavailing.  As the concurrence 
acknowledges, although the Third Circuit did apply the 
concurrence's proposed standard in that case, it did so while 
reviewing the Federal District Court's application of the 
standard for plain error and expressly stated that "[i]t is 
important to note that we are not concluding that the 
Government's knowledge of the content of the devices is 
necessarily the correct focus of the 'foregone conclusion' 
inquiry in the context of a compelled decryption order" 
(emphasis added).  Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d at 248 n.7.  
The court went on to note that "a very sound argument can be 
made that the foregone conclusion doctrine properly focuses on 
whether the Government already knows the testimony that is 
17 
 
 
1.  First reported question:  burden of proof in a Gelfgatt 
motion.  The first question reported to us by the single justice 
is one left unanswered in Gelfgatt:  "What is the burden of 
proof that the Commonwealth bears in [a Gelfgatt motion] in 
order to establish a foregone conclusion . . . ?" 
 
a.  Burden of proof under the Fifth Amendment.  Although 
several State and Federal courts have applied the foregone 
conclusion exception in the context of compelled decryption, 
apparently only one court has meaningfully articulated the 
standard of proof the government bears to establish that a 
defendant's knowledge of the password to decrypt an electronic 
device is a foregone conclusion under the Fifth Amendment. 
United States vs. Spencer, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1 
(N.D. Ca. Apr. 26, 2018).  In the Spencer decision, the court 
concluded that the appropriate standard of proof under the Fifth 
Amendment is clear and convincing evidence.  Id.  In so doing, 
the court explained that this standard places "a high burden on 
the government to demonstrate that the defendant's ability to 
decrypt the device at issue is a foregone conclusion."  Id.  The 
court noted that a high burden was necessary given the "Fifth 
Amendment's otherwise jealous protection of the privilege 
                                                 
implicit in the act of production.  In this case, the fact known 
to the government that is implicit in the act of providing the 
password for the devices is 'I, [the defendant], know the 
password for these devices.'"  Id. 
18 
 
against giving self-incriminating testimony."  Id.  The 
Commonwealth argues that this standard of proof should apply to 
Gelfgatt motions.12 
 
The parties have not identified, and we have not found, a 
United States Supreme Court case -- in Fisher or any subsequent 
cases -- or any United States Court of Appeals case that has 
specifically addressed these issues.  We need not speculate what 
the United States Supreme Court would decide is the appropriate 
standard of proof under the Fifth Amendment, however, as we 
conclude that art. 12 requires the Commonwealth to prove that a 
defendant knows the password to decrypt an electronic device 
beyond a reasonable doubt for the foregone conclusion exception 
to apply.  See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) ("Of 
course, the States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt 
a higher standard [of proof].  They may indeed differ as to the 
appropriate resolution of the values they find at stake"). 
 
b.  Burden of proof under art. 12.  The adoption of a 
standard of proof "represents an attempt to instruct the fact 
                                                 
 
12 Professor Orin Kerr, as amicus curiae, argues in favor of 
imposing the clear and convincing evidence standard under the 
Fifth Amendment as well, advocating that the standard is both 
"consistent with the Supreme Court decision" in Fisher "that 
established the foregone conclusion doctrine," and "a fair 
approximation of [the] burden needed to eliminate" the 
prosecutorial advantage that can be obtained from compelling 
testimonial acts of production.  He takes no position, however, 
on the appropriate standard under art. 12. 
19 
 
finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he 
[or she] should have in the correctness of [his or her] factual 
conclusions.'"  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 309 (2015), quoting In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).  In 
criminal cases, we require the Commonwealth to prove all 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, while 
generally requiring that other preliminary factual questions 
related to the admission of evidence be proved only by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 432 (2012) (admission of out-of-court 
statements of coventurers); Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 432 Mass. 
124, 126-127 & n.4 (2000) (admission of prior bad acts).  We 
have held, however, that some critical facts implicating a 
defendant's constitutional rights require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  For example, we have held that the 
Commonwealth must prove the voluntariness of a defendant's 
confession beyond a reasonable doubt before the confession may 
be placed before a jury.  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 
140, 152, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982).  Similarly, in 
Commonwealth v. Day, 387 Mass. 915, 921 (1983), we held that the 
Commonwealth must prove that a defendant's waiver of his or her 
Miranda rights was made knowingly and intelligently beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In both circumstances, we concluded that the 
20 
 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt -- the highest 
standard considered by courts in their function as fact finders 
-- was necessary to protect the defendant's rights at issue. 
 
In determining the reach of art. 12's protection of the 
privilege against self-incrimination, we also are attentive to 
the difference in wording of art. 12 from the Fifth Amendment.  
Article 12 protects a defendant from being compelled to "furnish 
evidence" against himself or herself, as opposed to becoming "a 
witness against" himself or herself.  Based in part on this 
textual difference, we have "consistently held that art. 12 
requires a broader interpretation [of the right against self-
incrimination] than that of the Fifth Amendment."13  Opinion of 
the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1210 (1992), quoting Attorney Gen. 
v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 796 (1982).  See Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 
at 525, 526 (art. 12 "demands a more expansive protection" but 
nonetheless recognizing the foregone conclusion exception itself 
and much of its "analytical" structure [citation omitted]); 
Burgess, 426 Mass. at 218 ("Although art. 12 demands a more 
expansive protection, it does not change the classification of 
evidence to which the privilege applies.  Only that genre of 
evidence having a testimonial or communicative nature is 
                                                 
 
13 Indeed, the Fifth Amendment requires the voluntariness of 
a confession and the waiver of Miranda rights to be proved only 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Colorado v. Connelly, 
479 U.S. 157, 168-169 (1986). 
21 
 
protected under the privilege against self-incrimination" 
[quotations and citation omitted]).  Accordingly, this court has 
remained vigilant to safeguard against governmental conduct that 
could infringe upon this privilege under art. 12. 
 
With these considerations in mind, we conclude that when 
the Commonwealth seeks a Gelfgatt order compelling a defendant 
to decrypt an electronic device by entering a password, art. 12 
requires that, for the foregone conclusion to apply, the 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant knows the password.14  Whatever the standard under the 
                                                 
 
14 The motion judge required the Commonwealth to prove the 
defendant's knowledge of the password, and the existence of 
information relevant to the charges against the defendant within 
the LG phone, with "reasonable particularity."  This standard 
has been used to define the level of particularity required in 
the identification of subpoenaed documents.  See, e.g., Subpoena 
Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d at 1349 ("We find no support in the record 
for the conclusion that the Government, at the time it sought to 
compel production [of the subpoenaed electronic files], knew to 
any degree of particularity what, if anything, was hidden behind 
the encrypted wall").  Here, neither documents nor the contents 
of the LG phone are sought.  As we explained supra, the 
Commonwealth therefore need not prove any facts with respect to 
the contents of the LG Phone.  The only consideration is whether 
the defendant knows the password to the encrypted device.  The 
reasonable particularity standard, which considers the level of 
specificity with which the Commonwealth must describe sought 
after evidence, is therefore inapt in the context of compelled 
decryption.  Indeed, as other courts have noted, the defendant 
either knows the password or does not.  His knowledge therefore 
must be proved to a level of certainty, not described with a 
level of specificity.  See Spencer, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 17-cr-
00259-CRB-1 ("While physical evidence may be described with more 
or less specificity . . . a defendant's ability to decrypt is 
not subject to the same sliding scale.  He [or she] is either 
able to do so, or he [or she] is not.  Accordingly, the 
22 
 
Fifth Amendment may be, requiring the Commonwealth to bear this 
high burden is necessary to ensure that the art. 12 rights of 
defendants are adequately protected, and reflects our 
recognition that a "person's right to be free from self-
incrimination is a fundamental principle of our system of 
justice," and that we have imposed even higher standards than 
the Fifth Amendment to protect that right.  Borans, 388 Mass. at 
455.  See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) ("The 
standard [of proof] serves to allocate the risk of error between 
the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached 
to the ultimate decision"); Commonwealth v. Alicea, 464 Mass. 
837, 841–842 (2013) (under art. 12, witness may not be compelled 
to testify unless "it is perfectly clear, from a careful 
consideration of all the circumstances in the case . . . that 
the [testimony] cannot possibly have such tendency to 
incriminate" [citation omitted]).  See also Opinion of the 
Justices, 412 Mass. at 1210 (discussing broader protections 
afforded under art. 12). 
 
Most critically, the imposition of this burden is also 
necessary to respect the meaning and purpose of the foregone 
                                                 
reasonable particularity standard cannot apply to a defendant's 
ability to decrypt a device").  We need not address how the 
reasonable particularity standard combines with the proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt requirement in document production cases, as 
no such content has been sought in this case. 
23 
 
conclusion exception.  Indeed, as its very name suggests, the 
government must be certain that the facts conveyed by a 
compelled act of production are already known before it can 
properly be considered a foregone conclusion.  See Black's Law 
Dictionary 762 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "foregone conclusion" 
as "[an] inevitable result; a foreordained eventuality").  The 
term, as it is used in this legal context, draws its roots from 
the Supreme Court's decision in Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.  There, 
the Court held that the production of tax documents prepared by 
an accountant was not protected by the Fifth Amendment because 
the existence and location of the documents were already known 
to the government and were thus "a foregone conclusion."  Id.  
Their disclosure therefore "add[ed] little or nothing to the sum 
total of the Government's information."  Id.  Although in Fisher 
the Court neither defined the term "foregone conclusion" nor 
articulated the standard of proof, the Court's discussion 
suggests that the government must have a high level of certainty 
that the defendant's act of production will not reveal any 
factual information beyond what it already knows for the 
exception to apply.  See id. at 410-411.  Indeed, in reaching 
its conclusion, the Court reasoned that it was "confident" that 
the disclosure would not violate the Fifth Amendment because 
"[s]urely the Government [wa]s in no way relying on the 
24 
 
'truthtelling' of the [defendant] to prove the existence of or 
his access to the documents" (emphasis added).  Id. at 410, 411. 
 
Our cases addressing the foregone conclusion exception also 
suggest holding the Commonwealth to a high standard of proof.  
For example, in Gelfgatt, where the Commonwealth sought to 
compel the defendant to decrypt several computers, we concluded 
that the exception applied because the defendant had already 
admitted to investigators that he had the ability to decrypt the 
seized computers.  Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 524.  In that 
circumstance, the Commonwealth conclusively knew that the 
defendant knew the password, and therefore, his knowledge was a 
foregone conclusion.  Id.  By contrast, we concluded in 
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 380 Mass. 583, 592, cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 900 (1980), that the exception did not apply where the 
Commonwealth sought to compel the defendant to produce a firearm 
that the Commonwealth suspected had been used in an assault.  
The defendant was known only to have registered a firearm; he 
had not reported its sale or transfer, and a search of the 
defendant's car had not resulted in its discovery.  Id. at 584, 
585.  We noted that production of the firearm was far from being 
a "foregone conclusion": 
"If the defendant should produce the [firearm], he would be 
making implicitly a statement about its existence, location 
and control . . . . [that] would deal with just those 
matters about which the Commonwealth desires but does not 
have solid information. . . .  [T]he Commonwealth is 
25 
 
seeking to be relieved of its ignorance or uncertainty by 
trying to get itself informed of knowledge the defendant 
possesses" (quotations and citations omitted). 
 
Id. at 592.  Because the production of the firearm would have 
conveyed facts not already known to the Commonwealth, we did not 
permit the Commonwealth to compel its production under the Fifth 
Amendment and art. 12.  Id. 
 
These decisions make clear that the Commonwealth must be 
certain that the compelled act of production will not implicitly 
convey facts not otherwise known to the Commonwealth.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard burdens the Commonwealth with the appropriate level of 
certainty to prove the fact of a defendant's knowledge of the 
password to an encrypted electronic device to be a foregone 
conclusion under art. 12.  To require anything less would defeat 
the meaning and purpose of the exception. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the privilege against self-
incrimination can be adequately protected by the clear and 
convincing evidence standard.  We disagree.  Permitting the 
Commonwealth to prove a defendant's knowledge of the password to 
an encrypted electronic device by a standard lower than beyond a 
reasonable doubt creates a greater risk of incorrectly imputing 
knowledge to those defendants who truly do not know the 
password.  Such an error would bring steep consequences.  
Indeed, beyond the fact that an error would directly violate the 
26 
 
defendant's art. 12 rights, the practical consequence of the 
erroneous imputation of knowledge would be the issuance of a 
Gelfgatt order with which the defendant could not possibly 
comply.  The defendant's inevitable failure to comply would 
likely then lead to a finding of civil or criminal contempt 
potentially resulting in incarceration.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 247, 249 (3d Cir. 
2017), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
1988 (2018) (reviewing defendant's appeal from contempt order 
after defendant found in contempt for refusing order to decrypt 
electronic device).  The increased risk of error brought on by a 
lower standard of proof is not one that we are willing to 
endorse here. 
 
2.  Second reported question:  application to this case.  
We turn now to the second reported question:  whether the 
Commonwealth met its burden in this case.  We conclude that the 
factual record put before the motion judge by the Commonwealth 
in its initial Gelfgatt motion and its renewed motion15 contained 
sufficient evidence for the Commonwealth to meet its evidentiary 
burden. 
                                                 
 
15 The additional information included in the renewed motion 
should have been considered by the motion judge.  See part 3, 
infra.  We therefore consider it in evaluating whether the 
Commonwealth met its burden. 
27 
 
 
At the start of the investigation of the defendant, Sara 
made statements to police tending to show the defendant's 
regular use of the LG phone.  Sara stated that she would speak 
directly with the defendant by calling the LG phone and that she 
also communicated with him by exchanging text messages with the 
LG phone.  She also explained that the defendant would regularly 
respond to customer text messages by using the LG phone.  
Additionally, an examination of Sara's phone revealed that the 
LG phone's telephone number was listed in the contacts section 
of her phone as "[]Dennis," creating the reasonable inference 
that, at the very least, Sara understood that the defendant 
could be reached by contacting the LG phone.16 
 
The record also reveals that the LG phone was in the 
defendant's possession at the time he was arrested by police.  
Indeed, it was recovered from his front pants pocket.  
Additionally, the motion judge acknowledged that the record 
revealed that the defendant had characterized the telephone 
number of the LG phone as his telephone number to police while 
he was being booked following an arrest in an unrelated criminal 
matter approximately one month before he was arrested in this 
                                                 
 
16 The motion judge, without explanation, appears to have 
declined to consider Sara's statements related to the connection 
between the defendant and the LG phone, concluding that he could 
not "put much stock in the statements of the complaining 
witness." 
28 
 
case.  Subscriber information for the LG phone also revealed 
that the LG phone subscriber had listed a "backup" telephone 
number.  Police records pertaining to this backup telephone 
number showed that it belonged to a "Dennis Jones" with the same 
Social Security number and date of birth as the defendant.  
Finally, the LG phone's CSLI records revealed that at various 
times, the LG phone was in the same location at the same time as 
another cell phone that was confirmed to be the defendant's 
phone.  The CSLI records also revealed that the phone calls were 
made from the LG phone when that phone was confirmed to be miles 
away from the female associate who assisted the defendant in 
conducting prostitution (and who had her own personal phone).  
These facts undoubtedly create the reasonable inference that the 
defendant regularly used the LG phone and that he therefore knew 
its password. 
 
The defendant principally argues that his knowledge of the 
password is not a foregone conclusion because the Commonwealth 
has failed to prove that he had sole ownership and control of 
the LG phone.  Specifically, the defendant points to evidence in 
the record showing that the LG phone was used by more than one 
person and to CSLI records confirming that, at various times, 
the LG phone and the defendant were in different locations. 
 
Although proof of ownership or exclusive control of the LG 
phone would certainly further support the Commonwealth's 
29 
 
argument, we explained supra that the Commonwealth is only 
required to establish the defendant's knowledge of the password 
beyond a reasonable doubt, not his ownership or exclusive 
control of the LG phone.  That multiple people may have used the 
LG phone and therefore may know its password does not disprove 
the defendant's knowledge of the password; exclusive control of 
the phone is not required.  This is especially so in light of 
Sara's characterization of the LG phone as the defendant's 
business phone that was used by both the defendant and a female 
associate to arrange and direct prostitution transactions -- a 
characterization that was corroborated by the record.17 
 
The defendant's possession of the phone at the time of his 
arrest, his prior statement to police characterizing the LG 
phone's telephone number as his telephone number, the LG phone's 
subscriber information and CSLI records, and Sara's statements 
that she communicated with the defendant by contacting the LG 
phone, taken together with the reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
                                                 
 
17 The record revealed several communications between Sara's 
phone and the LG phone related to prostitution, including 
screenshots of customer communications in response to online 
advertisements for prostitutions transactions with Sara; 
messages from the LG phone explicitly instructing Sara on how to 
perform sexual acts on customers; and several Internet postings 
on the website Backpage.com advertising Sara as an escort and 
listing the LG phone's telephone number as the principal point 
of contact. 
30 
 
knows the password to the LG phone.  Indeed, short of a direct 
admission, or an observation of the defendant entering the 
password himself and seeing the phone unlock, it is hard to 
imagine more conclusive evidence of the defendant's knowledge of 
the LG phone's password.  The defendant's knowledge of the 
password is therefore a foregone conclusion and not subject to 
the protections of the Fifth Amendment and art. 12.  The motion 
judge's denial of the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion is 
therefore reversed. 
 
3.  Third reported question:  consideration of additional 
information.  The third and final reported question asks us 
whether a judge may consider additional information included in 
a renewed Gelfgatt motion only after first finding that the 
additional information was not known or reasonably available to 
the Commonwealth at the time the earlier Gelfgatt motion was 
filed. 
 
We consider first the legal question posed in the reported 
question.  "Upon a showing that substantial justice requires, 
the judge . . . may permit a pretrial motion which has been 
heard and denied to be renewed."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (5), 
as appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004).  Substantial justice may 
require consideration of a renewed motion in a number of 
circumstances, including where the renewed motion contains "new 
or additional grounds . . . which could not reasonably have been 
31 
 
known when the motion was originally filed."  Reporters' Notes 
to Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (Revised, 2004), Mass. Ann. Laws Court 
Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1597 (LexisNexis 2018).  
It is well established, however, that the power of a judge to 
consider a renewed motion "is not restricted to those 
circumstances" where new facts have been raised.  Commonwealth 
v. Haskell, 438 Mass. 790, 792 (2003).  This is particularly 
true, we conclude, in the context of Gelfgatt motions, which 
arise in the course of ongoing investigations, often at early 
stages of such investigations, where the facts are still being 
investigated and developed. 
 
Accordingly, we answer the third reported question as 
follows:  a judge acting on a renewed Gelfgatt motion may 
consider additional information without first finding that it 
was not known or not reasonably available at the time of the 
first filing. 
 
We turn now to whether the motion judge abused his 
discretion in this case.  See Haskell, 438 Mass. at 792.  A 
judge's decision will be found to be an abuse of discretion only 
where it contains an error of law or "where we conclude the 
judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors 
relevant to the decision, . . . such that the decision falls 
outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (quotations and 
citation omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 
32 
 
n.27 (2014).  We conclude that the motion judge's decision that 
he "was not inclined to" consider the additional factual 
information supporting the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt 
motion without first finding that it was not known or reasonably 
available at the time of the first filing was incorrect and 
based on a mistaken analogy to motions to suppress, where we 
have imposed tighter constraints on renewed filings.  We believe 
that Gelfgatt motions are more aptly compared to search warrant 
applications, which can be renewed without similar constraints. 
 
Our conclusion is informed by the particular qualities of a 
Gelfgatt motion.  Much like a search warrant application, a 
Gelfgatt motion is an investigatory tool that aids investigators 
in obtaining material and relevant evidence related to a 
defendant's conduct.  Indeed, the purpose of a Gelfgatt motion 
is to enable the Commonwealth to gain access to an encrypted 
electronic device, thereby allowing it to further its 
investigation of a defendant.  As a result, one might reasonably 
expect that some relevant existing facts might be overlooked or 
missed by investigators when an initial Gelfgatt motion is 
filed, especially when such a motion is filed early on in an 
investigation. 
 
We do not consider the judge's apparent analogizing of 
Gelfgatt motions to motions to suppress to be an apt comparison, 
as the validity of motions to suppress are based upon the 
33 
 
information known at the time of the challenged government 
conduct.  The factual record before the court is therefore a 
much more fixed target than the one at issue in a Gelfgatt 
motion; a motion which, as explained supra, is directed at 
obtaining information necessary for an ongoing investigation, 
and is informed by that investigation.  For example, in 
reviewing a defendant's motion to suppress that challenges 
whether there was sufficient probable cause to authorize a 
search warrant, the reviewing judge is limited to reviewing the 
four corners of the affidavit in support of a warrant 
application to determine whether probable cause existed.  
Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 298 (2003) ("The 
magistrate considers . . . whether the facts presented in the 
affidavit and the reasonable inferences therefrom constitute 
probable cause.  That conclusion of law is neither buttressed 
nor diminished by other evidence").  Motions to suppress 
challenging other evidence must likewise be based on what the 
police knew at the time of the search.  What the police learned 
later in their investigation is irrelevant to a motion to 
suppress.18 
                                                 
 
18 We recognize that a defendant may learn through discovery 
more about what the police knew at the time of the search, 
thereby justifying a renewed motion to suppress, but this is 
still a more fixed, time defined inquiry than one connected to 
an ongoing criminal investigation. 
34 
 
 
Given the different nature and purpose of a Gelfgatt 
motion, the motion judge committed an error of law by imposing 
the tighter constraints required for renewed motions to 
suppress.  The Commonwealth should not have been barred from 
renewing its initial Gelfgatt motion simply because it failed to 
ascertain all available facts bearing on a defendant's knowledge 
of the password to an encrypted device at the time it filed its 
first Gelfgatt motions.  As is allowed for subsequent search 
warrant applications, the Commonwealth should have been 
permitted to renew its Gelfgatt motion upon the further 
development of the factual record of the case.  This is 
especially so in light of our holding today that the 
Commonwealth must prove the defendant's knowledge of the 
password beyond a reasonable doubt.  This standard of proof is 
rigorous, and the Commonwealth may use a renewed motion to bring 
additional factual information that it may have missed in 
preparing its initial motion to the reviewing court's attention 
in an attempt to meet this burden.  Cf. United States v. 
Greenfield, 831 F.3d 106, 128 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting, after 
finding that defendant could not be compelled to produce bank 
records under foregone conclusion exception, that "we do not 
. . . foreclose the possibility that the Government could 
develop a better record with respect to each of the relevant 
requirements in connection with the issuance of another summons 
35 
 
in the future.  Indeed, it is precisely because of this 
possibility that we have examined in such detail what is lacking 
in the present Summons"). 
 
This is not to say that courts are required to consider 
renewed Gelfgatt motions under every circumstance.  Incomplete, 
careless, repetitive, or tardy police or prosecution work need 
not be tolerated.  Decisions concerning whether to consider 
renewed motions remain in the sound discretion of the motion 
judge, and will depend on the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case.  A judge may not, however, decline to consider 
a renewed motion simply because the additional factual 
information contained in the renewed motion was either known or 
reasonably available to the Commonwealth at the time the 
Gelfgatt motion was first filed. 
 
In this case, the renewed filing should have been 
considered and allowed.  Indeed, the Commonwealth had reasonable 
grounds to believe that its initial motion as filed was 
sufficient to prove that the defendant's knowledge of the 
password was a foregone conclusion.  The original motion 
included critical facts bearing on the defendant's knowledge of 
the password to the LG phone, including the fact that the LG 
phone was found in his possession at the time of his arrest and 
the victim's detailed description of the defendant's use of the 
LG phone.  These facts created a strong inference that the 
36 
 
defendant knew the LG phone's password.  We understand, however, 
that the novelty of the question and the relative uncertainty of 
the proper legal standard in the compelled decryption context 
made this initial motion difficult for both the judge and the 
parties.  The additional factual information included in the 
renewed motion, however, certainly resolved any reasonable 
remaining doubts that may have existed in the initial motion.  
Although some, if not all, of the additional information 
included in its renewed motion may very well have been available 
to the Commonwealth at the time it filed its initial motion, in 
light of the nature and purpose of Gelfgatt motions and the 
circumstances of this case, the judge erred in concluding that 
he need not consider the additional information "[a]bsent a 
showing of new evidence not otherwise available to the 
Commonwealth."  The motion judge therefore abused his discretion 
in denying the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the motion judge's 
denial of the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion is 
reversed, and this case is remanded to the Superior Court for 
entry of an order compelling the defendant to enter the password 
into the cell phone at issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
LENK, J. (concurring).  I write separately because, unlike 
the court, I think that compelled decryption of a cellular 
telephone or comparable device implicates more than just its 
passcode; what the government seeks is access to the files on 
the device, which the government believes will aid in 
inculpating the defendant.  Given that the foregone conclusion 
doctrine is a narrow exception to the constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination, the government may compel a 
defendant's decryption of such a device only when it can show 
that any testimonial aspect involved in that act of production 
is already known to the government.  In other words, the 
government must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
accused knows the passcode to the device and that the government 
already knows, with reasonable particularity, the existence and 
location of relevant, incriminating evidence it expects to find 
on that device.  Because here the government met these 
requirements, I concur in the result.  I also agree with the 
court that the appropriate standard of proof is beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that the judge should have allowed the 
Commonwealth to present new evidence in an additional motion to 
compel. 
 
Act of producing files.  "A person's right to be free from 
self-incrimination is a fundamental principle of our system of 
justice," secured both by art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
2 
 
 
Declaration of Rights and the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  See Commonwealth v. Borans, 388 Mass. 453, 
455 (1983).  The constitutional privilege, however, applies only 
when an accused is "compelled to make a testimonial 
communication that is incriminating" (emphasis omitted).  See 
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).  The United 
States Supreme Court has long held that, in some instances, the 
act of producing evidence can be an incriminating, testimonial 
communication because an accused "tacitly concedes" the 
existence, custody, and authenticity of the evidence.  See 
Fisher, supra at 410.  When such is the case, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is implicated.  
Id. 
 
The "foregone conclusion" doctrine, first articulated by 
the United States Supreme Court in Fisher, and relied upon in 
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 526 (2014), provides a 
narrow exception to the otherwise uncompromising privilege 
against self-incrimination.  Under the Fifth Amendment and 
art. 12, the exception applies only where any testimonial 
aspects inherent in the act of producing evidence are a 
"foregone conclusion" already known to the government.  See 
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411; Gelfgatt, supra.  That is, where the 
government demonstrates its prior knowledge of the "existence 
and location of the papers" it seeks to compel, the accused 
3 
 
 
"adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's 
information by conceding that he [or she] in fact has the 
papers."  Fisher, supra at 411.  Under such circumstances, an 
accused's Fifth Amendment privilege is not implicated, as "[t]he 
question is not of testimony but of surrender."  Id. at 411. 
 
Compelled decryption.  Although these Fifth Amendment 
doctrines find their provenance in cases involving subpoenaed 
paper documents, courts since have applied their underlying 
principles to electronic documents in the context of compelled 
decryption.  See, e.g., United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 
851 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018); In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 
2012) (In re Grand Jury Subpoena); In re Boucher, U.S. Dist. 
Ct., No. 2:06-MJ-91(D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).  Indeed, in Gelfgatt, 
we held that, for the foregone conclusion exception to apply to 
an order compelling decryption of a device, "the government must 
establish its knowledge of (1) the existence of the evidence 
demanded; (2) the possession or control of that evidence by the 
defendant; and (3) the authenticity of the evidence."  See 
Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 522, citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-413; 
United States v. Bright, 596 F.3d 683, 692 (9th Cir. 2010); and 
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 40-41, 44-45 (2000).  
That is, by entering a passcode to provide the government with 
4 
 
 
unencrypted access to a device, "the defendant implicitly would 
be acknowledging that he has ownership and control of the 
[devices] and their contents."  See Gelfgatt, supra at 522.  
Unless the government demonstrates that such information already 
is a foregone conclusion, the Fifth Amendment protection bars it 
from compelling an accused to provide it.  See id. at 522-523. 
 
For the foregone conclusion exception to apply, the 
government also "must be able to 'describe with reasonable 
particularity' the documents or evidence it seeks to compel." 
Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d at 247, quoting Hubbell, 530 
U.S. at 29-30.  Although the government is not required to name 
every document it seeks or what its contents contain, it must 
demonstrate, with reasonable particularity, the existence and 
location of some incriminating files it expects to find on the 
device.  See, e.g., Matter of the Decryption of a Seized Data 
Storage Sys., U.S. Dist. Ct.,  No. 13-M-449 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 
2013) (government must demonstrate its "knowledge of the 
existence, possession, and authenticity of the files on the 
encrypted storage devices with reasonable particularity"); 
United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Colo. 
2012) (Fifth Amendment not implicated by requiring production of 
unencrypted contents of computer "where government kn[ew] of 
existence and location of the computer's files," although not 
5 
 
 
specific content of documents, and knew of defendant's custody 
and control of device).1 
                                                 
1 The Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and their relationship to each other in the 
criminal context have long been understood in different ways by 
judges and legal scholars.  See generally Sacharoff, Unlocking 
the Fifth Amendment:  Passwords and Encrypted Devices, 87 
Fordham L. Rev. 203, 246-247 (2018).  See also Carpenter v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2271 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (noting that "there is substantial evidence that the 
[Fifth Amendment's] privilege against self-incrimination was 
also originally understood to protect a person from being forced 
to turn over potentially incriminating evidence" [citations 
omitted]).  It is not surprising, then, that the court and I 
would have different views on these much debated issues.  This 
is especially so as we are called upon to meet the challenges 
emerging from encrypted devices seized by the government with a 
valid search warrant, which devices the government seeks to 
compel an individual to decrypt.  My view is that the coequal 
amendments do not dwell in splendid isolation, and that the 
Fourth Amendment does not somehow limit or trump the Fifth 
Amendment whenever there may be a valid search warrant.  As a 
result, it will no longer do to cower in the presence of a 
search warrant, but to attempt to reconcile the Fourth 
Amendment's authorization of the government's taking of evidence 
with the Fifth Amendment's limitations on its requiring an 
individual to produce it.  See Sacharoff, supra at 208 
(suggesting rule that "a court may compel a suspect to decrypt 
only those files that (1) the government already knows the 
person possesses, and (2) the government can describe with 
reasonably particularity.  Once the government has identified 
the specific files, it may compel the defendant to decrypt only 
those files.").  Other courts have adopted or applied rules that 
may be seen as effecting something of a reconciliation.  See 
e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1344 ; Apple MacPro 
Computer, 851 F.3d at 247-248; Matter of the Decryption of a 
Seized Data Storage Sys., U.S. Dist. Ct., slip op.  Contrast 
United States vs. Spencer, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1 
(N.D. Ca. Apr. 26, 2018).  In any event, what is before us is 
not the propriety of the rather broad search warrant here, but 
the constraints imposed by the Fifth Amendment.  My reading of 
what the cases require recognizes those constraints and gives 
them meaningful teeth. 
6 
 
 
 
Indeed, those United States Courts of Appeals that have 
addressed these issues in the context of compelled decryption 
have recognized that the foregone conclusion doctrine requires a 
showing, with reasonable particularity, as to the existence and 
location of incriminating files on a device.2  See, e.g., In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346 (applying reasonable 
particularity in context of compelled decryption); Apple MacPro 
Computer, 851 F.3d at 247 (same).  See also Matter of M.W., Ohio 
Ct. App., No. 2018CA0021 (Dec. 21, 2018) (same).  For example, 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, supra, involved the lawful taking of 
an accused's digital devices pursuant to a search warrant; a 
subpoena duces tecum subsequently issued to compel the accused 
to unlock the devices because law enforcement could not do so.  
Id. at 1139.  There, the court held that, before the government 
could compel an accused to unlock the device and produce access 
to the files contained therein, the government had to 
demonstrate, with reasonable particularity, its awareness that 
incriminating files exist and are located on those devices, and 
that the defendant has the ability to unlock and produce them.  
                                                 
2 As discussed, I do not contend that the contents of the 
files contained on the phone are protected by the Fifth 
Amendment, or are the focus of the foregone conclusion inquiry 
in the context of the compelled decryption of the device itself. 
 
7 
 
 
Id. at 1349.3  And if this is what the Fifth Amendment requires, 
well, art. 12 demands even more.  See Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. at 
525, quoting Commonwealth v. Burgess, 426 Mass. 206, 218 (1997) 
(we have consistently held that art. 12 provides broader 
"protection against self-incrimination than does the Fifth 
Amendment" and provides greater protection).  In fact, art. 12 
provides that no subject shall be compelled to "furnish evidence 
against himself" (emphasis added).  See Matter of a Grand Jury 
Investigation, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 534 (2017), citing 
Gelfgatt, supra at 523 (Commonwealth need not establish 
knowledge of specific contents of device, but is required "to 
demonstrate knowledge of the existence and the location of the 
content").  The court's departure from this constitutional 
doctrine is thus, in my view, imprudent, particularly in light 
                                                 
3 Likewise, Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d at 241, 
concerned the government's "ability to compel the decryption of 
digital devices when the government seizes those devices 
pursuant to a valid search warrant."  There, the court noted 
that "the Government has provided evidence to show both [1] that 
files exist on the encrypted portions of the devices and [2] 
that [the accused] can access them."  Id. at 248.  Because the 
government demonstrated those two things, the court concluded 
that the magistrate judge did not err in determining "that any 
testimonial component would be a foregone conclusion."  Id.  
Although the court applied the foregone conclusion and 
reasonable particularity doctrines to those facts, it also 
acknowledged that it "need not decide . . . that the inquiry can 
be limited to the question of whether [the accused's] knowledge 
of the password itself is sufficient to support application of 
the foregone conclusion doctrine," but that a sound argument 
could be made in support of such a position.  See id. at 248 
n.7. 
8 
 
 
of the vast amount of potentially incriminating information at 
risk.4 
 
Because the Commonwealth here has demonstrated its prior 
knowledge of the existence and location of specific files 
contained on the LG telephone, however, I conclude that it has 
met its burdens.  More specifically, the government made plain 
its knowledge of (1) specific text messages, sent from the LG 
telephone, related to illegal, commercial sex acts; (2) several 
online advertisements for commercial sex services that featured 
the woman's image, posted by the LG telephone, on specified 
dates; (3) particular text messages sent to the alleged victim 
from the LG telephone; (4) precise dates for CSLI location 
information for the LG telephone that corresponded to the 
location of the defendant and the locations where some of the 
sex services were provided; (5) distinct "screenshot" 
photographs of conversations with clients from the LG telephone; 
and (6) records of a hotel reservation, where the defendant was 
arrested, using the LG telephone's number and the defendant's 
                                                 
 
4 Permitting the government to undertake a "quintessential 
fishing expedition" by ordering an individual to enter a 
passcode and to provide the government with unlimited, 
unencrypted access to a personal electronic device is precisely 
the sort of act against which the Fifth Amendment was designed 
to guard.  See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 32, 34 n.8, 
quoting United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D. D.C. 
1998) (privilege against self-incrimination, in part, was 
structured to prevent government from "uncover[ing] uncharged 
offenses").  See generally Sacharoff, supra at 246-247. 
9 
 
 
electronic mail address.  Such a comprehensive showing of the 
government's prior knowledge of these particularized files on 
the LG telephone compels the conclusion that the Commonwealth 
has met its burden in this instance. 
 
Conclusion.  The court's decision today sounds the death 
knell for a constitutional protection against compelled self-
incrimination in the digital age.  After today's decision, 
before the government may order an individual to provide it with 
unencrypted access to a trove of potential incriminating and 
highly personal data on an electronic device, all that the 
government must demonstrate is that the accused knows the 
device's passcode.  This is not a difficult endeavor, and in my 
judgment, the Fifth Amendment and art. 12 demand more.  That is, 
before the government may compel an accused's assistance in 
building a case against that accused, the government must 
demonstrate that it already knows, with reasonable 
particularity, of files on the device relevant to the offenses 
charged, and that the defendant knows the passcode to unlock 
them.  Because I conclude that the government here met those 
burdens, I join in the court's result.