Case Title: State v. John Doe, a minor Curfew

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2010-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

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Defendant Appetan 5 ste kann

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Gooding County. Honorable Barry Wood, District Judge; Honorable Mark A.
Ingram, Magistrate Judge.

District courts affirmance of the magistrate court’s decision, is affirmed.

Capitol Law Group, PLLC, Boise, for appellant. David A. Heida argued.

Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attomey General, Boise, for respondent
Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

 

 

J.JONES, Justice.

 

John Doe appeals the dist

facially unconstitutional. We affirm.

‘court's holding that Wendell City Ordinance No. 442 is not

L
Facts and Procedural History

John Doe, a minor, was a passenger in a vehicle stopped at 1:30 am. for a trafic
violation. Doe was supposed to be staying at a ftiend’s house, but sneaked out with two friends
to look for a party. Doe was cited for a violation of Wendell City Ordinance No. 442
(“Ordinance”), a curfew ordinance, which provides:

SECTION 1. CURFEW HOURS, VIOLATIONS, AND EXCEPTIONS,
A. NIGHT TIME CURFEW: It shall be unlawful for any minor person under
the age of eighteen (18) years to loiter, idle, wander, stroll, play, or otherwise

be upon the public sirets, highways, roads, sidewalks, alleys, parks,
playgrounds, of other public grounds, or public places, building, or other
property generally open to public use, or vacant lots within the City of
‘Wendell, between the hours of 11:00 o'clock p.m. and 5:00 o’clock a.m.

B. EXCEPTIONS: The provisions of this section do not apply to a minor
‘accompanied by his or her parents or legal guardians, or where the minor is
‘upon an emergency errand or other legitimate business directed by his or her
parents or legal guardian or custodian or school, having in their possession
‘some form of documentation as tothe business to be performed.

 

‘SECTION 5. PENALTIES
‘Any person in violation of any section or provision of this ordinance shall

be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished as

provided in Ordinance Number 192 of the City of Wendell, Idaho, Each viol

‘of any section ofthis ordinance shall constitute a separate offense,

 

Doe sought to dismiss the citation in juvenile cour, asserting the Ordinance was facially
unconstitutional. Specifically, Doe argued that the Ordinance was void for vagueness in violation
of the Due Process Clause, was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, denied Doe
equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and denied the
fundamental right of a parent to direct the upbringing of his child in violation of the Due Process
CClause.' The magistrate judge orally denied the constitutional challenge. As a result, Doe made a
conditional admission of guilt under the Ordinance and the constitutional challenge was orally
certified for appeal to the district court. The district court also orally rejected the constitutional
challenge.

Doe appealed, raising the same constitutional challenge and seeking reversal of the
district court's order. The appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
reversed the district court, finding that the Ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad. The
Court of Appeals did not reach the other constitutional issues. This Court then granted the State's
petition for review.

m
Issues on Appeal

‘The following issues are presented on appeal: (1) whether the Ordinance is

" Doe also asserted thatthe Ordizance violated similar provisions of the sho Constitution. However, Doe has
smade no showing or any conpeling argument conceraing how the standards applied by the Kaho Constitution
‘would be applied any dtfereaty than those ofthe US. Consttaton. In absence of such a showing, this Cout
orally aplis federal constitutional standards, Se Stat v. Rader, 134 Idaho 187, 190, 998 P.24 80, $3 (200).
‘Accordingly, all issues wil be addressed under the U.S. Constitution oly

 

2
‘unconstitutionally overbroad or void for vagueness; (2) whether the Ordinance denies equal
protection of the laws; and (3) whether Doe has standing to assert the alleged violation of his
parents’ rights to direct his upbringing.

 

A
Standard of Review

{A petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals will only be granted “when
there are special and important reasons” for review. Idaho App. R. 118(b). When the Supreme
Court reviews a case previously decided by the Court of Appeals, “this Court gives serious
consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of the lower
court.” In re Doe, 144 Idaho 819, 821, 172 P.3d 1094, 1096 (2007). “On appeal of a decision
rendered by a distict court while acting in its intermediate appellate capacity, the Court directly
reviews the district court's decision.” In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243, 248, 207 P.34 974, 979 (2009).

‘This Court freely reviews constitutional questions. Plummer v. City of Fruitland, 139
Idaho 810, 812, 87 P-3d 297, 299 (2004). When determining the constitutionality of a city
‘ordinance, the Court will review the ordinance de novo. Id. A party chellenging an ordinance on
constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing the ordinance’s unconstitutionality and is
required to “overcome a strong presumption of validity.” State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69
33d 126, 131 (2003). We are obligated to attempt to interpret the ordinance in @ manner that
‘upholds its consttutionality. Ld

B.
‘Overbreadth and Vagueness

Doe argues that his conviction should be reversed because the Ordinance is
_unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, Doe contends thatthe Ordinance is overbroad because it
prohibits activities that constitute protected speech under the First Amendment without providing
‘an exception for carrying out those activities. Doe points to three portions of the Ordinance he
contends are vague: (1) “loiter, idle, wander, stroll, play, or otherwise be upon;” (2) “where the
rminor is upon an emergency errand or other legitimate business;” and (3) “some form of
documentation.” Doe does not argue that these provisions are unconstitutional as applied to him,
but instead that the Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face because of the inclusion of the
challenged phrases. Doe contends that these are imprecise terms that have not been defined,

ing police officers with virtually unfettered discretion to make arrests under the Ordinance

 

 
‘and failing to inform the general public of the conduct made criminal. The State contends that
Doe should not succeed in his facial challenge because the Ordinance does not reach
substantial amount of protested conduct and is not unconsttutionally vague in all its
applications,

It is a key principle of constitutional law “that the First Amendment needs breathing
space and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights
‘must be narrowly drawn and represent @ considered legislative judgment that a particular mode
of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of society.” Broadrickv. Oklahoma, 413
US. 601, 611-12 (1973). As a result, a Iitigant need not be prohibited from any constitutionally
protected behavior in order to mount a facial challenge to a legislative measure in order to
protect the rights of others not before the court. Id. at 612 However, because invalidating an
ordinance based on a challenge of one who does not have standing in the traditional sense is
“strong medicine,” courts should use care in reviewing facial challenges. [dat 613.

Where a facial challenge is made to an ordinance on overbreadth and vagueness grounds,
1 court must first decide whether the ordinance “reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct.” Village of Hoffinan Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc, 455 US. 489,
494 (1982). Ifthe ordinance does not reach a substantial amount of protected conduct, then the
overbreadth challenge will fail. Zd. A court should then examine the ordinance on the facial
vagueness challenge. Zd. The ordinance will only be found void for vagueness if it is
unconstitutionally vague in all its applications. 1d. at 494-95, Normally, where the complaining
party has engaged in conduct that is clearly prohibited by the ordinance, he cannot argue thatthe
‘ordinance is vague. Jd. Accordingly, given this structure, the overbreadth challenge will be
auddressed first and then the vagueness challenge.

Doe argues that the Ordinance is facially overbroad. An ordinance may be facially
‘overbroad if it: (1) seeks to regulate only constitutionally protected speech; (2) impermissibly
burdens innocent associations; or (3) places regulations on “the time, place, and manner of
‘expressive or communicative conduct,” particularly where the restriction “delegate(s)
standardless discretionary power to local functionaries, resulting in virtually unreviewable prior
restraints on First Amendment rights” Broadrick, 413 US. at 612-13, The review of an
ordinance varies depending on the type of conduct prohibited or criminalized by the enactment

In this case, Doe argues that the Ondinance has incidental effects on expressive conduct
and innocent associations rather than directly prohibiting protected speech. “[O]verbreadth
scrutiny has generally been somewhat les rigid in the context of statutes regulating conduct in
the shadow of the First Amendment rather than pure speech, but doing so in a neutral,
noneensorial manner.” fd. at 614. Where conduct, as well as speech, is regulated by a statute and
the State has a legitimate interest in regulating the conduct in question, there must be
demonstration of real and substantial overbreadth in order for a facial challenge to be successful
1d, at 615. The party arguing overbreadth bears the burden of showing “from the text of [the
Jas] and from actual fac,’ that substantial overbreadth exists.” Virginia v. Hicks, $39 US. 113,
122 (2003) (quoting New York State Club Ass'n Ie. v. City of New York, 487 US. 1, 14 (1988)).
‘This showing requires a demonstration thatthe law prohibits @ substantial amount of protected
activity in relation tothe law's legitimate sweep. 1d. at 118-19 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at
615). This showing will invalidate the enactment as a whole “until and unless a limiting
construction or patil invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence 10
constitutionally protected expression.” Jd. at 119 (quoting Broadrick, 413 US. at 613).
(Overbreadth is not substantial if, despite the fact that some constitutionally protected conduet is
proscribed, the statute covers @ wide range of conduct that is easily identifiable and within the
city's power to prohibit. State v, Korsen, 138 Kdaho 706, 714, 69 P.3d 126, 134 (2003). Where an
ordinance proseribes protected speech only to some unknown extent, a court cannot justify
invalidating the ordinance. Id at 713, 69 P-3d at 133,

In Korsen, this Court overruled the district court's finding that Idaho Code section 18-
7008(8), which creates criminal lability for trespassing when a party refuses to vacate real
property after being asked to depart by the owner or the owner's authorized agent, was
unconstituionally overbroad on its face, /. at 710, 69 P.3d at 130. Korsen was charged with @
Violation of section 18-7008(8) when he refused to leave the offices of the Idaho Department of
“Health and Welfare after being asked to do so by the regional director. fd. This Court rejected the
istrict court's analysis because the district court failed to apply a significantly stringent
standard. Id. at 715, 69 P-3d at 135. The district court relied on one hypothetical situation, that
the trespassing statute could potentially be used to Keep citizens from engaging in a dialogue
‘with legislators atthe State Capitol as support for its finding of unconstitutional overbreadth. /d
We found that analysis to be flawed because it did not demonstrate “a realistic danger that the
statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of partes
not before the court ....” Id. (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
US. 789, 801-02 (1984). The Court also found fault with the district court’s failure to consider
‘the statute's constitutional applications to situations involving private property and those
situations in which no protected speech was implicated. Id. The Court noted that these forgotten
‘considerations were exemplified by Korsen’s conduct because any constitutionally protected
‘business he had on the premises was at an end well before his refusal to leave and subsequent
arrest. Id, at 715-16, 69 P.3d at 135-36. The Korsen opinion indicates that this Court will
‘consider all aspects of the statute and its application in determining whether
uunconsttutionally overbroad on its face. In addition, the Court will construe the terms of the
statute in order to determine the scope of protected conduct that might be affected and review
US. Supreme Court precedent to guide our determination of conduct that might constitutionally
be criminalized, State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 892-903, 88 P.3d 704, 711-22 (2004) Similar
analysis will be undertaken here.”

‘The Ordinance prohibits a minor from being in public from 11:00 p.m. till $:00 am.
unless one of the exceptions to the ordinance is applicable. A minor may be in public during
those hours if: (1) he is accompanied by a patent r legal guardian; or (2) the minor is on an
“emergency errand or other legitimate business” at the direction of his “parents or legal guardian
or custodian or schoo!” and has “some form of documentation as to the business to be
performed.” Doe argues that the broad reach and narrow exceptions of the Ordinance prohibit
protected conduct including attending religious exercises, town hall meetings, and schoo! events.
‘Accordingly, Doe argues that the Ordinance constitutes an impermissible time, place, and

‘manner restriction on speech,

 

 

 

“Regulations that burden speech incidentally or control the time, place, and manner of
‘expression, must be evaluated in terms of their general effect.” United States v. Albertini 472
USS. 675, 688-89 (1985). An incidental burden on speech may be justified if“[1] itis within the

2 iy State v Po, the Court, in 23-2 spit, found a statute to be overbroad. The Court found Idaho Code section
16.6409 unconsitutionally overbroad on is fice and applied a limting constuction in order to remedy the
‘overbreadth, striking section 18-6409(3) rom the atte. [dat 902, 88 Pd at 721. However, Poe dies from this
‘ace because the challenged portion of Lao Code section 18-6409 dealt ony with spoken words, meaning that it
‘could be found constintonaly invalid it applied to speech protected by the Fast Amendmeat, a lower standard
thn tat equted fr expressive conduct saute. fd at 92, 8 34a 711,

6
constitutional power ofthe Government; (2] it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; [3] the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4]
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.” United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S, 367, 376-77 (1968). When @
government regulation satisfies the O'Brien tes, it constitutes a reasonable time, place, and
‘manner restriction and will not be invalidated for its incidental effects on protected conduct
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US. at 808. The Ordinance will be analyzed according to the
O'Brien test.
a

‘The City of Wendell is empowered to enact ordinances by article XI, section 2 of the
‘daho Constitution. Under that provision, “[ajny county or incorporated city or town may make
and enforce, within its limits,
conflict with its charter or with the general law.” Idaho Const. at. XI, § 2. This Court has found
that there are three general restrictions that must be met by an ordinance enacted under this
provision: (1) it must be confined to the territorial limits of the enacting body; (2) it must not
conflict with the general laws of the State; and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary
enactment. Hobks v. Abrams, 104 Idaho 205, 207, 657 P.24 1073, 1075 (1983).

In this case, Doe does not argue, nor does the Ordinance indicat, that it extends beyond
the territorial limits of the City of Wendell In fact, the plan language of the Ordinance provides
that itis only in effect in the city. In addition, Doe has pointed to no other laws of the State of
Idaho that conflict with the Ordinance, In fact, juvenile curfew ordinances are specifically
contemplated by legislative enactment. Idaho Code section 32-1301 empowers municipalities to
impose criminal sanctions on parents for failure to supervise their children. LC. § 32-1301
Section 32-1301(2)(¢) provides that a parent automatically commits the offense of failure to
supervise a child under sixteen if that child violates a curfew ordinance enacted under local law.
ILC. § 32-1301. This provision indicates thatthe City of Wendell not only has the power to enact
curfew ordinances, but is expected todo so by the Legislature.

Doe has in fact recognized that municipalities have a legitimate interest in enacting a
juvenile curfew ordinance in order to promote the safety and welfare of their citizens and prevent
juvenile criminal activity and victimization. Doe's challenge to the Ordinance is focused on the
fact that it does not provide exceptions for protected conduct that may fall within its ambit. This,

ll such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in

 
without more, is insufficient to show thatthe Ordinance is unreasonable or arbitrary. As such, the
Ordinance isa valid enactment within the power of the City of Wendell, meeting the first prong
of the O Brien test
b.

‘Municipalities have a substantial interest in preventing juvenile crime and victimization
‘See, e., unex ex rel. Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 1997); State v.
JP., 907 $0.28 1101, 1118 (Fla, 2004). There has been no showing that the Ordinance does not
further those interests. Also, as pointed out in Doe’s brief, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that the physical and psychological well-being of minors is a compelling government
interest. See Sable Comme'ns v. Fed. Comme'n Comm'n, 492 US. 115, 126 (1989). While the
stated purpose of the Ordinance is not specific to these particular interests, such interests are
‘encompassed within its stated purpose, which is to promote the welfare and safety of the public.’
‘There is no requirement that a substantial interest sufficient to support the consttutionality or

 

validity of an ordinance must appear on the face of the enactment. Consequently, the Ordinance
serves a substantial government interest.
e

A ban on the means of expression is not a suppression of the expression itself for the
purpose of the O'Brien standard. City of Brie v. Pap's A.M., 529 US. 277, 292 (2000). In Pap's
AM, the U.S. Supreme Coust found that a ban on public nudity, even though likely directed at
nude dancing, had a valid, content-neutral purpose in prohibiting the secondary effects of nude
dancing, Id. at 291 The purpose was content neutral, despite the fact that mide dancing is a
protected form of expression. Jd. The Court found that the ban was not directed at expression
because it banned all public nudity, not simply nude dancing. 1d,

Although the Ordinance is quite different from the nudity ban in Pap's A.M, the rationale
behind them is the same, The Ordinance bans all juveniles from being in public between the
hours of 11:00 pum. to 5:00 am., unless they fall within one of the exceptions to the statute,
While this curfew may have the practical effect of preventing certain forms of expression during
‘curfew hours, the Ordinance, much like the ban in Pap’s A.M, eannot be said to directly target
that expression because it is targeted at all juvenile activity, both protected and nonprotected. As

> Oe of the stated purposes of the Ordinance is “to provide order and promote the safety and welfare of the
residents of th City of Wendell, daho™
such, the government interest in keeping juveniles off the streets is likewise unrelated to the
suppression of expression,
a

Where a restriction incidentally impacts protected conduct rather than speech, and the
restriction is content neutral, there is no requirement that the restriction be enacted through the
least restrictive means. Id. at 301-02. However, the restriction must be no greater than necessary
to carry out the governmental interest. Jd. at 301. In conducting the subjective inquiry into
‘whether the Ordinance meets that requirement, it is instructive to view other cases where the
USS. Supreme Court has applied the O’Brien test, as well as cases from other jurisdictions where
‘the test has been applied to curfew ordinances similar to the one in this case.

In Pap’s A.M, the Court found that the ban on appearing nude in public was no greater
than necessary to carry out the city’s interest in preventing the harmful secondary effects of
public nudity because it only regulated conduct and had a de minimis effect on the dancers’
ability to convey their erotic message because they were still allowed to dance in minimal attire.
14, at 301. A similar result was reached in Grayned v. City of Rockford, where the Court upheld a
city anti-noise ordinance that prohibited a person from willfully making a noise or diversion that
disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of the school session while on grounds
‘adjacent 10 a building in which a school was in session. 408 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1972). The
‘Court's holding was based on the city's important interest in preventing the disruption of school
activities. d. at 118-19, The Court found that even though the ordinance prohibited speech, it
only prohibited specch necessary to preserve the integrity of the educational environment by
limiting the prohibition to “conduct which disrupts or is about to disrupt normal schoo!
activities.” Id. at 119. The same result was reached in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, where the Court found that the incidental impact of a public park's overnight sleeping
ban on @ planned demonstration did not render the statute overbroad. 468 U.S. 288, 296-97
(1984) (“It is also apparent to us that the regulation narrowly focuses on the Government's
substantial interest in maintaining the parks . .. . The sleeping ban, if enforced, would thus
cffectively limit the nature, extent, and duration of the demonstration and to that extent ease the
pressure on the parks. .. I]t is evident from our cases that the validity of this regulation need
not be judged solely by reference to the demonstration at hang”)

‘The Supreme Court invalidated a local ordinance regulating the screening of drive-in
‘movies on overbreadth grounds in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville. 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975).
In that case, a local ordinance banned the screening of drive-in movies within view of a public
street or area if the movie contained nudity. Id. at 206-07. The stated interest behind the
ordinance was to protect minors from public displays of nudity. Jd. at 207. The Court found the
‘ordinance was not limited to that interest because it prohibited the display of all nudity and not
simply sexually explicit or obscene nudity and noted thatthe First Amendment did not allow the
limitation of information to minors in that manner. Id. at 213. Apart from Erznoznik, however, it
is difficult to find cases where the Court has invalidated statutes and ordinances that do not have
speech-content regulation as their purpose. This is explained by the Court's statements in Texas
+ Johnson concerning the “relatively lenient” or “less demanding” standards of review under the
O'Brien test. 491 US. 397, 407 (1989).* Consequently, given this statement, it appears that the
Ordinance must be substantially far afield from its stated purpose in order to be invalid under
O'Brien

‘The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a curfew ordinance on overbreadth
‘grounds in Johnson v. City of Opelousas. 658 F.2d 1065, 1071-74 (Sth Cir. 1981). In that case,
‘an ordinance substantially similar to the ordinance at issue here was declared unconstitutionally
overbroad because the ordinance had a substantial effect on a number of constitutionally
protected activities. Jd. However, a few characteristics of Johnson should be noted to determine
its persuasive authority, Firs, although similar, the ordinance in Johnson did not allow parents or
other child custodians to authorize a child's presence in public after hours with a permission slip
or some similar documentation. /. at 1071. Second, the court in Johnson used some amalgam of
the O'Brien test, neither specifically analyzing all of its factors nor focusing on the state's
interest in enforcing the ordinance. Id. at 1071-74, Finally, the court impermissibly considered
the right to interstate travel as part of the overbreadth balancing, even though overbreadth is

 

 

 

“The holding of Clank alo dispose of one of the elements of tae, place, and manner review, not dealt with by
(O'Brien, whichis a roqirement thatthe regulation leave open alternative channels of communication. Doe argues
that, Because the Ordinance probit al juvenile speech for one-quarter ofthe day, it fails to meet this requirement
“This argument is foreclosed by the rationale of Clarkin which the Court found a complete nightime ban on
onduct which prohibited expressive conduct, lef open alemative channels of communication. at 293,

the Court makes salar comments abou the review of time, place, and manner restriction, noting that the ets
axe exsentlly one andthe sme. d.

 

10
limited to speech eoncems. fd

‘Similar infirmities are presented by the analysi
found a San Diego juve
114 F.3d at 949-S1. The ordinance was also similar to the one at issue here, the key difference
being the “legitimate business” exception of the Ordinance, which was not included in the San
Diego ordinance. Jd, at 938, Further, although the Ninth Circuit articulates the factors of the
OBrien tes, it does not apply O'Brien, Id. at 949-51. The court simply declares the ordinance
uunconstitutionally overbroad because of its findings that the ordinance restricts any and all
access to public forum. Id, at 951. In fact, it seems that the Ninth Circuit's finding of
‘overbreadth is based on a finding that the ordinance was directed at expression rather than
tal effect on expression that is broader than necessary in order to carry out the
L (“[The San Diego ordinance ‘is directed narrowly and

 

in Nunez. In that case, the Ninth Circuit
curfew ordinance invalid on several grounds, including overbreadth.

 

 

having an inc

 

 

governmental interest in question. See i
specifically at expression or conduct commonly associated with expression.”). This finding
seems contradictory to the obvious and stated purpose of such an ordinance, to keep children off
the street at night for their own well-being and for the health and safety of the populous at large.
‘There is no indication from the evidence considered in the Nunez opinion that the San Diego City
Council had the prevention of juvenile speech in mind when it enacted its ordinance.
Accordingly, the Nunee opinion is of questionable persuasive value, despite Doe's extensive
reliance on it

‘The Ordinance does not reach an amount of conduct that is greater than necessary to
further the City of Wendell’s interests. As noted above, the City of Wendell has an interest in the
physical and psychological well-being of minors, which is a compelling government interest, and
the Ordinance appears to further that interest.” Further, the City has a compelling interest in
‘ensuring the health and safety of is citizens. The Ordinance, as opposed to those presented in
Nunez and Johnson, contains a provision allowing a child to be in public without the presence of
4 parent or custodian so Tong as the child has some form of documented authorization. Doe has

“This imitation was recognized bythe Ninth Circuit in Nunez, 114 F.3d at 94911 (citing Untied States v. Solero,
481 US. 739,745 (1987),

"The US. Supreme Court has also noted that where the following tree factors ae in pay, the analysis of the
‘consitational rights of minors may’ not be a8 seingent a the analysis ofthe constitutional rights of adults. Bello.
Bind, 443 US. 622, 634 (1979) The factors inchde: (1) the pecliar vulnerability of children; (2) ther inability to
‘make ctical devsions in sn informed, mature manner; nd (3) the importance of the parental role in chi ering.
te
not shown that this authorization would not allow children to assert their First Amendment
rights. Doe has also failed to show that the Ordinance would reach constitutionally protected
conduct in a substantial portion of the cases where it would apply. In many instances, a juvenile
cited under the Ordinance, like Doe, would be out looking for a party or engaging in some other
nonprotected activity, which is clearly prohibited.

Furthermore, although Doe argues that the Ordinance must have a First Amendment
exception, given the U.S, Supreme Court's statements concerning the laxity of the O’Brien test,
the Ordinance does not have to be enacted through the least restrictive means necessary to

 

further the compelling governmental interest. Although an ordinance may prohibit some forms of
First Amendment expression, that prohibition is insufficient to render it unconsttutionally
overbroad. The Ordinance seeks to keep children off the streets during the late hours ofthe night,
presumably to allow increased parental supervision and to prevent juvenile crime and other
dangers the juvenile may encounter. Allowing too many exceptions to the Ordinance, even
though allowing greater freedom to exercise protected rights, would potentially undermine the
purpose of the Ordinance. Accordingly, the Ordinance is not overbroad in relation tothe interest
it furthers

In addition, the Ordinance vests parents with the right to control whether their children
engage in protected conduct through the authorized legitimate business or emergency errand
exception. The exception allows a parent to authorize a child to engage in virtually any legal
activity, so long as the authorization is documented in some form. As such, the limitation on
‘conduct largely comes from the parent rather than a state actor, meaning that any burden on
protected rights are derived from an unchallengeable source. Finally, Doe's arguments for
overbreadth are largely based on a few hypotheticals without any actual showing of infringement
of rights or the danger of inftingement of rights. As this Court noted in Korsen, showing some
hypothetical situation where First Amendment rights could be infringed is insufficient support
for an overbreadth argument. As such, we find thatthe Ordinance does not impact more conduct
than necessary to carry out its purpose.

 

Because the Ordinance satisfies all prongs of the O’Brien test, it is @ reasonable time,

 

place, and manner restriction under Pap's A.M. In addition, Doe has failed to show that
impacts a substantial amount of protected conduct. As a result, we find that the Ordinance is not

2
‘unconstitutionally overbroad,

cy
Vagueness

In order to comply with due process, a criminal statute must define behavior that
constitutes a violation of that statute “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 US. 352, 357 (1983). Another concern
articulated by the Supreme Court is that “where a vague statute ‘abut(s) upon sensitive areas of
basic First Amendment freedoms,” it may chill the exercise of constitutionally protected
activity. Grayned, 408 US. at 109 (quoting Baggett v. Bullit, 377 USS. 360, 372 (1964)). The
Court has recognized that the more important concer is the provision of concrete guidelines to
police officers and prosecutors in order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of
penal laws. /d. The Court notes that “lawmaking [should not be entrusted] ‘to the moment-to-
‘moment judgment of the policeman on his beat."" Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360 (quoting Smith v.
Goguen, 415 US. 566, 575 (1974)). Where itis clear what an ordinance prohibits, “mathematical
certainty” or “meticulous specificity” of language is not required, allowing for “flexibility and
reasonable breadth.” Grayned, 408 US. at 110.

‘To succeed on a facial vagueness challenge, the challenged ordinance must be shown to
be “impermissibly vague in all its applications.” Hoffnan Estates, 455 U.S. at 497. If the law
interferes with the rights of speech or association, a more stringent vagueness test should be
applied. Jd. at 499, The test for vagueness is also more stringent in a case where criminal
sanctions are imposed for violation of the ordinance. /d at $00. We previously adopted a similar
standard in Korsen, noting that “in a facil challenge to a legislative enactment [on vagueness
grounds}, ‘the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
‘would be valid." 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132 (quoting Salerno, 481 UCS. at 745)?

* The Korsen standard, although adopted fom Hofinan Estates, sems directly conadiciory tothe statement in
Hoffman Estates that aaa challenge cannot succeed were the party bringing the challenge engaged in conduct
clearly proserbed bythe ordnance, 4 U.S at 44-95. Constung the two statements together, a facial challenge
could never suceced where the paty bringing the challenge has been charged under the statute and cannot rake an
‘applied challenge, Under tat standard, o facial challenge could succeed i this case

"Tim holding tat he wespasing state in Korsen was not wnconstutonlly vague, this Cour noted:

‘The statute makes ao distinction between private and public property. Furthermore, the statute

informs the public ofthe prohibited conduc, that is, remaining wilfully on property belonging to
‘other afer faving been asked to leave, Therefore, the staat gives fair notice ofthe conduc ht

3B
Doe argues that the US. Supreme Court’s decision in Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), is controlling because the Court found language similar to
that used in the Ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague. Papachristou and other similar cases
are distinguishable from the case at bar. The ordinance in Papachristou was based upon a class
of old English vagrancy ordinances that criminalized activities such as “wandering or strolling
around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object.” Jd. at 158.!° The Court
declared the statute invalid because, based on the huge class of undefined offenses and classes of
persons subject to arrest under the statute, it allowed the police virtually unfettered discretion to
arrest anyone in any situation, Id. at 170. The Court noted “{iJt would certainly be dangerous if
the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the
courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.”
1d, at 165 (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 US. 214, 221 (1875).

‘The Court reached a similar result in Kolender, where it invalidated a Califomia loitering
statute, 461 U.S. at 353, In that case, the statute provided that anyone “who loiters or wanders
‘upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason , . . and who refuses to identify
himself ... when requested by any peace officer to do so, ifthe surrounding circumstances are
such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification,” may
be arrested. Jd. at 354, The statute was subject to a limiting construction by the California Court
of Appeals, which noted that identification meant that an individual had to provide “credible

 

 

 

is made criminal bythe state, Simisly, the core of circumstances to which the trespassing
‘provision unquestionably applies isthe will esa to leave the premises afer having been
[Bed to do so by one in authouty, The ratte does not allow for unbridled discretion in police
nforement Inet, the police have no discretion when enforcing the state on any (pe of
‘propery any person who refuses o leave afer receiving a waming i subject wo are

Hd. a 713,69 Pda 133,
"the ardinance at sso in Papacrisou read as follows

 

Rogues and vagabond, or disolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers, persons
‘vo use juggling or ulawfl games or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves,
pillerers or pickpockets, traders i stolen property lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, Keepers
‘of eambling places, common rales and brawlers, persons wandering or solling around from
place to place without any Inf pupose or object, habia loafers, disorderly persons, persons
‘eglectng all awfl busines and habitwaly spending thir time by Requenting houses fil fame,
{taming houses, o places where alcoholic Beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but
Iban ving upon the earings of their wives or minor chen shall be deemed vagrants and,
‘pon conviction inthe Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.

i

4
and reliable’ identification when requested by a police officer who has reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity sufficient to justify @ Terry detention” 1d. at 356. Despite the limiting
‘construction, the Court found thatthe identification requirement vested the police with virtually
unfetered discretion because the statute did not inform the ondinary citizen what constituted
“credible and reliable identification.” fd. at 358, This holding was based, in part, on a finding
that a suspect violated the statue unless the questioning officer determined that the identification
was reliable at 360

The question presented in this case is much closer than that in either Papachrstou ot
Kolender. Doe points to three portions of the Ordinance that he contends are vague; the
language: (1) “iter, idle, wander, stroll, play, or otherwise be upon;” 2) “where the minor is
upon an emergency errand or other legitimate business,” and (3) “some form of documentation.”
‘The first challenged phrase, although using archaic language similar to that struck down in
Papachristou, plainly prohibits a specified class of conduct when taken in context. The first
phrase, when read as a whole, provides:

1t shall be unlawful for any minor person under the age of eighteen (18) to loiter,

idle, wander, toll, play, or otherwise be upon the public streets, highways, roads,

sidewalks, alleys, parks, playgrounds, or other public grounds, or public places,

‘buildings, or other property generally open to public use, or vacant lots within the

City of Wendel, between the hours of 11:00 o'clock pam. and 5:00 o’clock am.

While there is no argument that much of the language used in the Ordinance is redundant,
‘unnecessary, and potentially confusing, the intent of the Ordinance and what is prohibited by this
section are clear—no minor isto be in a public place within the City of Wendell between the
hours of 11:00 pam. and 5:00 am. Consequently, there ae no discretionary calls to be made by
an officer in this context, nor does it appear that @ reasonable person would not know what
conduct is prohibited by the Ordinance. This is contrast to Papactristou and Kolender where the
scope ofthe prohibition was subject to question.

Doe also relies on the Ninth Circuit's determination that the language “loiter, idle,
‘wander, soll, or play" ina curfew statute was unconstitutionally vague. Nunez, 114 F.3d at 938,
940-43. This reliance is misplaced because the Wendell ordinance also contains the phrase “or
otherwise be upon,” indicating that no public presence is allowed no matter what activity is
undertaken during the specified time period. This conclusion is supported by the Ninth Cireuit's
finding that the language was vague because it meant something other than mere presence—

1s
 

‘exactly what is proscribed by the Ordinance. /d. This finding is also inline with this Courts duty
to produce a reasonable construction of a statute or ordinance that renders it constitutionally
definite, Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711, 69 P.3d at 131, Accordingly, we find that the “loiter, idle,
‘wander, stroll, play, or otherwise be upon” language is not unconsttutionally vague.

‘The determination of whether the “where the minor is upon an emergency errand or other
legitimate business” and “some form of documentation” provisions are vague is closer
question. In order to determine whether these provisions are vague, this Court will first look to
the plain meaning of each, Because the other two challenged provisions are part of the same
clause, they should be construed together. “Emergency” is defined as “an unforeseen
combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action, ... a pressing
need.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 741 (Philip Babcock Gove et al
eds., 1966). “Errand” is defined as “a trip made in order to deliver a message or purchase or
attend to something,” “the object or purpose of a short trip,” or “a service, favor, or piece of
business undertaken for another.” Id. at 772. “Legitimate” is defined as “following in logical
sequence: reasonable.” Jd. at 1291. Finally, “business” in this context is defined as “an activity
‘engaged in toward an immediate specific end ...: task, chore, mission, assignment.” Id. at 302,
‘While there are multiple definitions for each of the above terms, itis the province of this Court,
where possible, to apply a reasonable limiting construction to legislative measures in order to
avoid facial unconstitutionality. See Hicks, $39 U.S. at 119.

‘The challenged provision as a whole provides:

 

‘The provisions of this section do not apply . . . where the minor is upon an
‘emergency errand or other legitimate business directed by his or her parents or
legal guardian or custodian or school, having in their possession some form of
documentation as to the business to be performed.
As evidenced by the definitions above, “emergency errand” appears to mean a trip made 10
attend to something that arose unexpectedly and which calls for immediate action. The use of the
term “emergency” indicates that this is not simply a benign tip to the comer store, but
something akin to seeking medical attention for a sudden injury. Further, the phrase “legitimate
business” appears to mean any reasonable activity authorized by a parent, guardian, custodian, or
school under the circumstances. In addition, because both emergency errands and legitimate
business require parental authorization, together they form a class of conduct that essentially
authorizes a minor to engage in any legal activity, 90 long as it is authorized by one of the

16
 

authorities inthe o
from one of the specified authorities and is engaged in the activity permitted by that document,
hae or she is engaged in legitimate business or an emergency errand. The documentation must
simply reflect that it was issued by one of the authorized authorities and actually authorizes the

 

ance. Thus, we find that if the minor is in possession of documentat

activity undertaken by the juvenile.

Furthermore, given the fact thatthe Ordinance clearly provides that minors are not to be
in public between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and $:00 am. unless they come within one of the
exceptions, Doe engaged in clearly proscribed conduct. As such, much like the defendant in
Korsen, where the arrest itself was the result of clearly proscribed behavior, Doe's facial
challenge must fail; thus, we find the Ordinance sufficiently definite in its terms to survive Doe's
vagueness challenge.

c.
Doe's “Equal Protection” Claim

Doe argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it denies him equal protection
of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, his basis for this claim is
unclear. Doe's apparent justification for this challenge is based on its restriction of a minor's
right of ffee movement. Tis theory appears to be drawn from the Nunez ease, where the Ninth
Circuit found that because age was not a suspect classification, the only way strict sertiny
review could apply would be through infringement on the fundamental right of free movement
114 F.3d at 944, While this is true, it is incorrect to label this analysis as an equal protection
analysis, Instead, the issue should be approached asa substantive due process issue because it
involves the potential denial of fundamental rights.

‘The Due Process Clause provides heightened protection against government interference
with fundamental rights and liberties. Washingron v. Glucksberg, 512 US. 702, 720 (1997). In
audition to the freedoms explicitly protected by the Bill of Rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that other rights may be fundamental and subject to heightened scrutiny, 1d. In order
to determine whether a right is fundamental, a two-step analysis is undertaken, 1d. First, the right
ust be shown objectively 19 “be deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tration’ and
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed," Jd. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 US, 494, 503
(197); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US. 319, 325 (1937). “Second, [the Court has] required, in

 

7
substantive-due-process cases, a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest.” Jd. In determining whether a right is fundamental, “[oJur Nation's history, legal

 

traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking.’
1a. (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 US. 115, 125 (1992).

‘The Ninth Circuit based its finding of a fundamental right to travel on a few lines in the
ULS. Supreme Court's opinion in Papachristou, in which the Court stated: “[TJhese activities are
historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the
Constitution or inthe Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for
giving our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of ereativty.” 405
US. at 164; Nunez, 114 F.3d at 944. By “these activities,” the Court was referring to walking,
strolling, idling, wandering, or loafing, from which the Ninth Circuit concluded there was a
fundamental right to freedom of movement. The only other context where the Court has
‘examined movement as a fundamental right is in the context of travel. See Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 US. 618, 629 (1969) (“Our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that
all citizens be free o travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statues,
rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”).

‘The Supreme Court has refused to draw a distinction between intrastate and interstate
travel. See Mem’ Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 US. 250, 255-56 (1974) (“Even were we to
draw a constitutional distinction between interstate and intrastate travel, a question we do not
now consider ...."). The Memorial Hospital statement seems to be a departure from the Court's
carlier position in United States. Wheeler, in which the Court stated:

In all the states, from the beginning down to the adoption of the Articles of
Confederation the citizens thereof possessed the fundamental right, inherent in
citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their
respective states, to move at will from place to place therein, and to have free
ingress thereto and egress therefrom, with a consequent authority in the States to
forbid and punish violations of this fundamental right.
254 US. 281, 293 (1920). However, the Wheeler decision was later limited to its facts in Guest
¥. Georgia, 383 US. 745, 759 n.16 (1966). Further, language in Jones v. Helms recognizes the
power of the State to limit travel, directly contradicting Wheeler. 452 U.S. 412, 419 (1981) (“The
right of the citizen to migrate from state to state which, ... is shown by our precedents to be one
of national citizenship, is not, however, an unlimited one. In addition to being subject to all

18
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal government, such citizen is subject to some
control by state govemments.”) (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 US. 160, 184 (1941)
(ackson, J, concurting)). Consequently, although the Ninth Circuit assumes that al feedom of
‘movement is a fundamental right, there may in fat be a difference inthe treatment of different
types of movement, depending on their nature, The issue i far from clear.

Further, even if movement is a fundamental right, the scope of protection of the rights
afforded to juveniles is not always coextensive withthe protection afforded the rights of adults.
For example, in Schall v. Martin, the Supreme Court noted that “(the State has ‘a parens patriae
interest in preserving and promoting tho welfare of the child.” 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984)
(quoting Santasky v. Kramer, 485 US. 745, 766 (1982)). Asa result ofthis interest “although
children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental
deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children’s
vulnerability and their needs for ‘concer, ... sympathy, and... paternal atention.” Bellotti,
443 US. at 635 (quoting MeKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 US. 528, $50 (1966) (plurality
pinion). in addition, “[s}tates validly may limit the ffeedom of children to choose for
themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences

{because} minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detimental to them.” It is common for states to vindicate this,
interest by requiring parental consent before minors may engage in activities that could be
detrimental to them. Jd, at 367. Bello isa prime example ofthis interest, as it holds thatthe
fundamental right to control one’s own procreatve activities was outweighed by the State's
interest in protecting minor's from potentially detrimental action, resulting in a finding that a
parental notice requirement for abortions was constitutional. fat 649.

Informed by the nature ofthe right at issue andthe treatment ofthat right when exercised
by a minor, this Court must determine whether infingement of the right of movement by the
Ordinance is sufficiently justified by the City of Wendell’s interest in enacting a juvenile curfew
ordinance. Assuming arguendo thatthe right to all forms of travel is a fundamental right, the
Ordinance should be subjected to strict scrutiny. “Unquestionably ... a government practice or
statute Which estits ‘fundamental rights’... i tobe subjected to ‘strict scrutiny” and ean be
justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less
restrictive altemative is available” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357

 

 

9
(1979). However, because the Ordinance is targeted at juveniles, the principles articulated above
conceming the State's interest in the protection of children must also be considered.

Doe has recognized, as have courts that have dealt with juvenile curfews, that
‘municipalities have a substantial interest in preventing juvenile crime and victimization, along
with preserving the health and safety oftheir citizens. See, e.g, Nunes, 114 F.3d at 947, Also, as
pointed out in Doe's brief, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the physical and
psychological well-being of minors is a compelling government interest. See Sable Comme'ns,

 

492 US. at 126. Consequently, thee is no serious doubt thet the goverment has a compelling
interest; instead, Doe argues thatthe Ordinance is not the least restrictive means of carrying out
that interest, As indicated by Maricopa County, Jones, and Wheeler, the U.S. Supreme Court has
not clearly defined the contours of the right to travel other than finding that there is right to
interstate travel. Since the Court has not clearly articulated a right to intrastate travel, the
possible impact of the Ordinance on intrastate movement cannot be stid to violate the narrow-
tailoring requirement. Further, given the substantial State interest in preventing juveniles from
decisions that could be detrimental to their growth and development, the breadth of the
Ordinance is the most effective means of effectively protecting juveniles. The Ordinance already
allows parents to exempt their children from the Ordinance when they determine that the
children have legitimate business during curfew hours. This is consistent with the Bellotti
‘recognition thatthe State may work together with parents in order to protect children from harm.
Accordingly, we fin that the Ordinance is enacted through the lest restrictive means necessary
to vindicate the government interest at issue. As a result, the Ordinance does not result in the

 

deprivation of a fundamental sight

D.
‘Standing to Assert a Parental Liberty Interest

Doe also argues thatthe curfew statute is unconstitutional because it infringes on parents’
liberty interest in directing the upbringing of ther chldren."' However, Doe's challenge, based
cn his parents’ liberty interest in controlling his upbringing, must be dismissed for lack of
standing. Standing is an issue over which this court exercises free review. Citibank (South
Dakota), N.A. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254, 257, 220 P.34 1073, 1076 (2009). The issue of whether

"dn making this argument, Doe ovetlooks the fact that the Ordinance vests the parents with broad authority (0
xorpt thc chiléren fom is coverage

20
‘a party has standing to assert a particular claim should be resolved before the merits of the claim
are reached, Id, at 259, 220 P.3d at 1078.

‘Courts must hesitate before resolving the rights of those not parties to litigation. Singleton
v. Wulf, 428 US. 106, 113 (1976), Even though a potentially illegal action may affect the
litigant as well as a third party, the litigant may not rest his claims on the rights or legal interests
of the third party. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990). A party challenging the
constitutionality of a statute must not only demonstrate some injury from the unconstitutional
aspect of the statute, but also that he is in the class of persons protected by that constitutional
interest. Heald v. Dist. of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114, 123 (1922). This requirement is based on the
presumption that the third parties themselves are the best proponents of their own rights.
Singleton, 428 US. at 113-14.

‘As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court requires a litigant who seeks to assert the rights of
‘another party to demonstrate three interrelated criteria: (1) he must have suffered injury in fact,
providing a significantly concrete interest in the outcome of the matter in dispute; (2) he must
hhave a sufficiently close relationship to the party whose rights he is asserting; and (3) there must
bbe a demonstrated bar to the third parties’ ability to protect their interests. Powers v. Ohio, 499
USS. 400, 411 (1991). While these factors have never been applied by a majority of the US,
‘Supreme Court to a child's attempt to assert his living parents’ interests, they were applied by
Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Miller v. Albright. 523 U.S. 420, 445-52 (1998)
(©'Connor, J, concurring).

In Miller, the Court considered a constitutional challenge to a statute governing the
citizenship of nonmarital children bom outside of the United States. [d, at 424 (majority
opinion). One basis for the challenge was thatthe statute violated Miller’s father’s right to equal
protection of the law. /d, Justice O'Connor, concurring in the Court's finding that the challenge
‘was without merit, engaged in an extensive discussion of a child’s right to assert the rights of her
‘parent when there was no bar to the parent’s involvement in the ease at bar ora similar suit. dat
‘445-S2 (O’Connor, J,, concurring). O° Connor applied the Powers test to Miller, finding that she
‘met the interest prong because she was denied citizenship under the statute, Id. at 447. O*Connor

"Children were found t have thitd-party standing to represent the rights oftheir deceased parents in ode! v.
ning, 81 US, 704 (1987), however, unlike the paris in the presen case or those in Miler, boing deceased
‘provides a clear bart the ability to represen yourself in any action

2
also found that Miller met the relationship prong, based on the parent-child relationship. 1d
However, O'Connor found that Miller lacked third-party standing because she failed to
demonstrate any bar to her father's ability to assert his own rights. dat 448,

‘Much the same issue is presented in this case. While Doe obviously has an interest in the
Ordinance being declared unconstitutional because he will avoid criminal sanctions and has &
close relationship with his father, he has failed to demonstrate any bar to his father’s ability to
challenge the consttutionality of the Ordinance. As a result, Doe has failed the Powers test and,
under the O'Connor rationale from Miller and Powers, cannot assert a deprivation of parental
liberty interests inthis matter.

 

WV.
Because Doe has failed to demonstrate that Wendell City Ordinance No. 442 is facially
‘unconstitutional, the decision of the district cour is affirmed.

Justices BURDICK, W. JONES, and HORTON, and Justice Pro Tem TROUT
CONCUR.

2