Case Title: Lee County v. Town of St. Charles

Citation: 

Docket Number: 012543

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
LEE COUNTY 
 
v.  Record No. 012543   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
                          September 13, 2002 
TOWN OF ST. CHARLES 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY 
Ford C. Quillen, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in ruling that a board member of a water and sewer authority 
must reside within the authority's service area to be qualified 
to hold that office. 
 
In 1967, Lee County (the County) and the Town of St. 
Charles (the Town) entered into a joint resolution to create the 
St. Charles Water and Sewer Authority (the Authority) to provide 
water and sewer services to the residents of a designated 
service area.  In the joint resolution, the County and the Town 
appointed five members to the Authority's Board of Directors 
(the Board).  However, the joint resolution and the Authority's 
articles of incorporation and by-laws were silent concerning 
qualification requirements for future Board members. 
 
In 1992, the Town filed a declaratory judgment action 
against the County to determine the respective rights of the two 
entities to appoint members to the Board.  In 1997, the trial 
court entered an order declaring that the Town and the County 
each have the right to appoint two members to the Board and that 
the fifth board member shall be appointed jointly by the Town 
and the County.  The court did not address the issue whether 
members of the Board must reside within the Authority's service 
area.1
 
The present litigation began after Nell Stewart, who was 
serving as the joint appointee on the Board, moved her residence 
from St. Charles to Pennington Gap.  Although Stewart's new 
residence is located within the County, that residence is 
outside the Authority's service area. 
 
The Town Council voted to remove Stewart from the Board and 
to appoint a new member as her replacement.  The Town requested 
that the County also act to remove Stewart from the Board and to 
designate its choice for a joint appointee to replace her.  The 
County, by vote of its board of supervisors, refused the Town's 
request. 
 
The Town filed the present declaratory judgment action 
against the County, asking that the trial court determine, among 
other things, the qualification requirements for membership on 
the Board.  After hearing argument of counsel, the court held 
that all Board members must be residents of the Authority's 
service area.  In explaining its decision, the court stated: 
                     
 
1 These rulings were made by the Honorable James C. 
Roberson. 
 
2
This [residency] requirement makes sense in that a 
member of [the Authority], in effect, represents all 
the people within the service area of the Authority.  
Therefore, to properly represent the citizens of the 
service area, that member should be a resident of the 
defined service area of the Authority.  Without this 
requirement, a person could live in another area of 
the county (or even in another county or state) served 
by a different water and sewer authority and yet make 
decisions which directly affect the lives of the 
citizens served by [the Authority]. 
 
 
The trial court disqualified Stewart from membership on the 
Board and directed the Town and the County to appoint jointly a 
replacement member who met this residency requirement.  The 
County appeals from this judgment. 
 
The County argues that the trial court erred in imposing a 
service area residency requirement for Board membership and 
notes that Code § 15.2-5113(A), which addresses the selection of 
board members of a water and sewer authority, does not specify 
such a requirement.  The County observes that numerous other 
statutes impose a residency requirement for appointment to 
various offices, boards, and commissions in the Commonwealth.  
Therefore, the County argues, had the General Assembly intended 
that all board members of a water and sewer authority be 
residents of that authority's service area, the General Assembly 
would have expressly stated such a requirement.  The County also 
notes that the joint resolution establishing the Authority, as 
                                                                  
 
 
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well as its articles of incorporation and by-laws, do not 
contain a residency requirement for all Board members. 
 
In response, the Town argues that Code § 15.2-5113(A) does 
not prohibit the imposition of a residency requirement, and that 
a residency requirement can be inferred from the fact that the 
joint resolution establishing the Authority named as Board 
members individuals who were all residents of the Authority's 
service area.  The Town also notes that from the date the 
Authority was created until the date Stewart moved to Pennington 
Gap, all Board members had been residents of the Authority’s 
service area.  Finally, the Town argues that the trial court’s 
1997 order implicitly established a residency requirement for 
the fifth Board member by requiring that this member be 
appointed jointly by the County and the Town.  We disagree with 
the Town’s arguments. 
 
In our review of the trial court’s judgment, we first 
observe that the trial court’s legal conclusions are not binding 
on this Court, and we are accorded the same opportunity as the 
trial court to consider the issue of law presented.  See Eure v. 
Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 631, 561 
S.E.2d 663, 667 (2002); Craig v. Dye, 259 Va. 533, 537, 526 
S.E.2d 9, 11 (2000).  This issue of law is resolved by our 
examination of Code § 15.2-5113(A). 
 
4
 
Under basic principles of statutory construction, we 
consider all relevant provisions of a statute and do not isolate 
particular words or phrases.  Industrial Dev. Auth. v. Board of 
Supervisors, 263 Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2002); 
Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001).  
When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we are 
bound by the plain meaning of that statutory language.  
Industrial Dev. Auth., 263 Va. at 353, 559 S.E.2d at 623; Shelor 
Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473, 479, 544 S.E.2d 345, 348 
(2001).  Thus, when the General Assembly has used words that 
have a plain meaning, courts cannot give those words a 
construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly 
meant something other than that which it actually expressed.  
Vaughn, Inc. v. Beck, 262 Va. 673, 677, 554 S.E.2d 88, 90 
(2001); Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 262 Va. 91, 
100, 546 S.E.2d 696, 702 (2001). 
 
Code § 15.2-5113(A) provides, in relevant part: 
The powers of each authority created by the governing 
bodies of two or more localities shall be exercised by 
the number of authority board members specified in its 
articles of incorporation, which shall be not less 
than one member from each participating locality and 
not less than a total of five members.  The board 
members of an authority shall be selected in the 
manner and for the terms provided by the agreement 
. . . or concurrent ordinances or resolutions creating 
the authority. 
 
 
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We conclude that this statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous.  That language provides for the selection of board 
members of a water and sewer authority and requires that at 
least one person from each participating locality be included 
among the appointees to such an authority board.  However, 
compliance with this requirement is not an issue here because 
the Town does not argue, and the record does not show, that Nell 
Stewart was the sole resident from the Town serving on the 
Board. 
 
The above requirement is the sole restriction contained in 
Code § 15.2-5113(A) concerning the residence of water and sewer 
authority board members.  Moreover, contrary to the trial 
court's interpretation, the statute does not require that each 
person appointed by a locality to a water and sewer authority 
board reside within that authority's service area.  When the 
General Assembly has intended to impose a residency requirement 
for service on boards, authorities, and commissions in the 
Commonwealth, it has done so explicitly.  See, e.g., Code 
§ 15.2-4203(B) (establishing residency requirement for certain 
members of planning district commissions); Code § 15.2-4904(C) 
(mandating residency requirement for directors of industrial 
development authorities); Code § 15.2-5204 (providing that 
members of hospital or health center commissions be residents of 
political subdivisions they represent); Code § 15.2-6403(A) 
 
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(requiring that board members of regional industrial facilities 
authorities be residents of appointing member locality). 
 
Finally, we note that the 1997 order entered by Judge 
Roberson did not address the issue of a residency requirement 
for Board members.  Nor did the provision in that order for the 
joint appointment of one Board member implicitly impose any 
residency requirement for that member, because the record does 
not show that the Town's appointment power is restricted to the 
selection of residents from the Authority's service area.  Thus, 
we hold that the trial court erred in imposing a service area 
residency requirement for all appointments to the Board and in 
concluding that Nell Stewart is disqualified from serving on the 
Board because she resides outside the Authority's service area.2
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's 
judgment and enter final judgment declaring that there is no 
requirement that every Board member be a resident of the 
Authority's service area and, thus, that Nell Stewart is not 
disqualified from serving on the Board based on her place of 
residence and she is entitled to remain in office for the 
duration of her present term. 
                     
 
2 We need not address the issue whether the County and the 
Town had the power to impose a residency requirement for the 
appointment of all Board members.  The joint resolution 
establishing the Authority, the Authority's articles of 
incorporation, and its by-laws do not provide such a 
requirement. 
 
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Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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