Case Title: O'Brien v. Everfast

Citation: 

Docket Number: 962461

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1997-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson,
1 Hassell, Keenan, and 
Koontz, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
PEGGY S. O'BRIEN 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
v.  Record No. 962461               September 12, 1997 
 
EVERFAST, INC., ETC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
 
Theodore J. Markow, Judge 
 
 
The principal issue in this appeal is whether there was 
sufficient evidence of negligence by the defendant to support a 
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.  We also consider whether 
the verdict should be set aside on the alternative ground that the 
plaintiff was contributorially negligent by exposing herself to a 
dangerous condition that was open and obvious. 
 
On February 8, 1992, Peggy Sharon O'Brien was shopping at a 
Calico Corners fabric store operated by Everfast, Inc., in the 
City of Richmond.  Fabric at the store was displayed on racks in 
bolts rolled around cardboard tubing approximately 60 inches in 
length.  A bolt of fabric might weigh as much as 50 pounds when 
full. 
 
When customers selected a fabric, the bolt would be removed 
from the rack and taken to a cutting table where the appropriate 
length of fabric could be measured and cut from the bolt.   
Everfast instructed its salespersons to replace bolts on the racks 
when fabric was not being measured and cut.  Although the tables 
contained depressions that could hold a bolt of fabric in place, 
                     
     
1Justice Stephenson participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on July 
1, 1997. 
  
these were to be used only to hold bolts from which fabric was 
being measured and cut. 
 
Anne Coughenour, another customer at the store, selected four 
bolts of fabric and, with the assistance of friends or of an 
Everfast employee, removed the bolts from their racks and brought 
them to a cutting table.  The employee placed the first bolt on 
the cutting table.  The other three bolts were standing on end 
against an adjacent table.  A handwritten statement by the 
plaintiff concerning the accident stated that the bolts had been 
leaned against the table by "[t]he salesperson or customer," and 
the word customer had been circled.  Coughenour could not recall 
who carried the bolts of fabric to the table. 
 
While O'Brien was walking near the table against which the 
bolts were leaning, one of the three bolts slid from the table, 
striking O'Brien's right heel or foot.  As a result of the injury, 
O'Brien incurred over $6,300 in medical expenses. 
 
On February 8, 1996, O'Brien filed a motion for judgment 
against Everfast seeking $300,000 in damages.  In its grounds of 
defense, Everfast asserted that O'Brien's injury resulted solely 
from her own negligence or that she was contributorially 
negligent. 
 
A jury trial was held in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond on August 27, 1996.  O'Brien presented evidence through 
her own testimony and that of Coughenour, as well as that of two 
Everfast employees called as adverse witnesses.  At the conclusion 
of O'Brien's evidence, Everfast declined to put on a defense, and 
moved to strike the evidence and for summary judgment in its favor 
on the ground that the evidence failed to show that it had 
breached any duty owed to an invitee on its premises.  The trial 
court took the motion under advisement and permitted the case to 
be submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of 
O'Brien, awarding her $100,000 in damages. 
 
Everfast renewed its motion to strike and moved to set aside 
the jury's verdict, again asserting that the evidence failed to 
show that Everfast had breached a duty of care.  Expanding on the 
argument made at the conclusion of the evidence, Everfast asserted 
that O'Brien had failed to show that the employees had actual 
knowledge of the dangerous condition created by the bolts being 
leaned against the table.  Absent sufficient evidence to draw an 
inference of such knowledge, Everfast maintained that the jury's 
verdict was at best speculative. 
 
By final order dated September 6, 1996, the trial court 
sustained Everfast's motion to set aside the verdict and entered 
judgment for Everfast.  Responding to a motion for reconsideration 
and clarification filed by O'Brien, the trial court declined to 
revisit its ruling and provided the following basis in support of 
its decision: 
 
. . . the court's decision was made immediately after 
trial and before its receipt of the defendant's post 
verdict motions.  The decision was based upon the record 
as it existed at the adjournment of trial. . . . 
 
 
 
There is no[] evidence of who placed the bolt of 
cloth in a position to fall and strike the plaintiff, of 
the instrumentality which caused it to fall, how long 
the condition existed, that an employee had sufficient 
opportunity to observe, appreciate and correct the 
condition.  There is no evidence upon which negligence 
of the defendant could have been determined without 
guesswork or speculation.  Further, the condition was 
open and obvious. 
 
 
Discussion
 
We review the trial court's decision sustaining the motion to 
strike the evidence and set aside the jury's verdict in accordance 
with well-settled principles.   
 
When the sufficiency of a plaintiff's evidence is 
challenged by a motion to strike, the trial court should 
resolve any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of 
the evidence in plaintiff's favor and should grant the 
motion only when "it is conclusively apparent that 
plaintiff has proven no cause of action against 
defendant," or when "it plainly appears that the trial 
court would be compelled to set aside any verdict found 
for the plaintiff as being without evidence to support 
it." 
 
Williams v. Vaughan, 214 Va. 307, 309, 199 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1973) 
(citations omitted).  "A jury issue exists '[i]f there is conflict 
of the testimony on a material point, or if reasonably fair-minded 
[persons] may differ as to the conclusions of fact to be drawn 
from the evidence, or if the conclusion is dependent on the weight 
to be given the testimony.'"  State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Davies, 226 Va. 310, 319, 310 S.E.2d 167, 171 
(1983)(quoting Hoover v. J.P. Neff & Son, Inc., 183 Va. 56, 62, 31 
S.E.2d 265, 268 (1944)).   
 
"Where the trial court has set aside a jury verdict, that 
verdict is not entitled to the same weight as a verdict which has 
been approved by the trial court."  Kendrick v. Vaz, Inc., 244 Va. 
380, 384, 421 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1992).  Nevertheless, this Court 
will accord the party who received the verdict the benefit of all 
substantial conflict in the evidence, as well as all reasonable 
inferences that could be drawn therefrom.  Fobbs v. Webb Building 
Ltd. Partnership, 232 Va. 227, 230, 349 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1986).  
However, if a jury necessarily has reached its conclusions based 
on speculation and conjecture, the plaintiff's case fails.  Id.
 
Here, the trial court's decision to set aside the verdict 
rests principally on its finding that there was insufficient 
evidence from which the jury could infer, without resorting to 
speculation or conjecture, that Everfast had actual knowledge of 
the dangerous condition created by the bolts having been leaned 
against the cutting table.  We disagree with that decision. 
 
Coughenour and the salesperson both testified that the 
salesperson was aware that Coughenour had selected more than one 
bolt of fabric.  The salesperson further testified that she was 
aware of Everfast's policy that she was not to lean bolts against 
the cutting tables, that she was to have only one bolt of fabric 
at a cutting table, and that she was to return the bolt to its 
rack after the fabric was cut from it.  This policy was "[f]or 
safety and to keep the store neat."  Coughenour testified that 
while the salesperson was cutting fabric from the first bolt, the 
remaining three were leaning against the adjoining cutting table 
in plain view.  The report of the accident states that the bolt of 
fabric which fell and injured O'Brien was leaned against the 
cutting table either by "[t]he salesperson or customer."  These 
facts were sufficient to permit the jury to find, without 
resorting to speculation or conjecture, that the salesperson knew 
of the potential danger. 
 
The absence of evidence as to what caused the bolt of fabric 
to fall would not preclude the jury from finding that O'Brien's 
injury resulted from Everfast's negligence.  This issue is 
substantially identical to one raised in Holcombe v. NationsBanc 
Financial Services Corporation, 248 Va. 445, 450 S.E.2d 158 
(1994).  In Holcombe, the defendant contended that its action of 
stacking movable wall partitions in such a way that they might 
fall and cause an injury was insufficient to subject it to 
liability where the jury would be left to speculate as to what 
actually caused the partitions to fall.  We held that the 
foreseeability of the danger, and not the manner of its actual 
occurrence, was the relevant question for the jury to consider in 
determining whether the defendant had been negligent.  Id. at 448, 
450 S.E.2d at 160. 
 
The rationale applied in Holcombe is equally applicable to 
the circumstances presented in the record here.  Everfast was 
clearly aware of the danger presented by having the bolts off the 
racks and required its employees to take charge of the bolts when 
they were removed from the racks for measuring and cutting.  As in 
Holcombe, these facts were sufficient to permit the jury to 
determine whether the defendant was negligent in permitting the 
dangerous condition to exist. 
 
Although not relied upon by Everfast in arguing its motion to 
strike, it may be inferred from the trial court's finding that the 
danger was open and obvious, that contributory negligence was 
relied upon by the trial court in reaching its decision to set 
aside the verdict.  A business invitee has the duty to be aware of 
open and obvious dangers.  Tazewell Supply Company v. Turner, 213 
Va. 93, 95, 189 S.E.2d 347, 349 (1972).   Whether a danger is open 
and obvious is usually a jury question.  Shiflett v. M. 
Timberlake, Inc., 205 Va. 406, 411, 137 S.E.2d 908, 912 (1964).  
Several heavy bolts of fabric leaning against a table is not so 
remarkable or patent a danger that an invitee unfamiliar with the 
nature of the danger posed thereby would naturally seek to avoid 
it.  Absent clear knowledge by O'Brien of the danger this 
condition presented, the jury properly could have found that she 
was privileged to browse the display floor without guarding 
herself from being struck by a falling bolt of fabric.  See Clark 
v. Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 667-68, 385 S.E.2d 885, 892-93 (1989). 
 
Since we conclude that the factual issues were properly 
submitted to the jury, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court, reinstate the jury's verdict, and enter final judgment for 
the plaintiff on this verdict.
2
 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
     
2O'Brien also assigned error to the trial court's exclusion of 
testimony that similar accidents had occurred in other stores 
owned by Everfast.  However, the resolution of the principal 
issues renders this issue moot.