Case Title: Commonwealth v. Evans

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-10873

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-10873 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  THOMAS EVANS. 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 8, 2013. - October 20, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.1 
 
Homicide.  Robbery.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Malice.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Required finding, Argument by 
prosecutor.  Evidence, Consciousness of guilt, Expert 
opinion.  Witness, Expert.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 15, 2007.  
 
 
The cases were tried before Raymond J. Brassard, J.  
 
 
 
Leslie W. O'Brien for the defendant. 
 
Fawn D. Balliro Andersen, Assistant District Attorney (John 
C. Verner, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The defendant was indicted for the armed robbery 
and murder of Paula Doherty.  The victim was last seen alive on 
Saturday, September 30, 2006, at her Medford residence, where 
she, a friend, the defendant, and the defendant's nephew had been 
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
                                                 
 
2 
using cocaine.  When the friend left at 5:30 P.M. that afternoon, 
the defendant had passed out in a chair in the victim's room and 
the victim was preparing to go to sleep.  On Monday, October 2, 
after the victim failed to return telephone calls, the friend 
went to the victim's house to check on her, and discovered the 
body of the victim, who had been beaten to death.  A Superior 
Court jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-
murder, with armed robbery as the predicate felony.   
 
On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial judge erred 
in denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty, 
because the circumstantial evidence of guilt was insufficient to 
establish that the defendant was at the scene of the crime during 
the period when the victim was robbed and killed.  The defendant 
argues also that the judge erred in allowing the admission of 
expert testimony concerning the potential absence of blood on the 
victim's killer.  We conclude that there was no error requiring 
reversal and, after a careful review of the record, that there is 
no reason to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
order a new trial or to reduce the conviction to a lesser degree 
of guilt.  
 
1.  Facts.  Based on evidence introduced at trial, the jury 
could have found the following. 
 
a.  Events of September 28 to 30, 2006.  The victim sold 
 
3 
cocaine from her residence, including to the defendant, who lived 
two or three houses away.  On Thursday, September 28, 2006, at 
the victim's request, the defendant and his nephew, Sean Kanode, 
drove the victim to a bank where the defendant cashed a check in 
the amount of $1,100, and handed the cash to the victim.2 
 
The following day, Friday, at about 6 P.M., the victim's 
childhood friend, Jean McCarthy, arrived at the victim's home in 
Medford, where they planned to use cocaine, consume alcohol, and 
play cards.  The victim had been in the process of renovating the 
house, and although there was electricity, there was no running 
water, some windows were missing, and some walls were torn down.  
Tools were scattered throughout the interior, including saws, 
drills, hammers, and crowbars.  The victim led McCarthy to a back 
room, which the victim had set up as her living space.  The bed, 
consisting of two mattresses on the floor, piled on top of each 
other, was in a corner, with one side flush along a wall and a 
chair at its foot.  When McCarthy arrived, the defendant and 
Kanode were present.  The four spent the rest of that evening and 
the early morning hours of Saturday drinking, using cocaine, and 
playing cards; McCarthy gave the victim $50 for some cocaine, 
which the victim put into her pants pocket ; the victim kept 
2 The defendant, with his wife, his two sons, and his 
nephew, Sean Kanode, lived two or three houses down the street 
from the victim. 
                                                 
 
4 
cocaine in another pocket.  Kanode left at approximately 5 A.M. 
on Saturday morning, but the others stayed until late in the 
afternoon.   
 
Over the course of that period, a number of people arrived 
at the house in order to purchase cocaine, after telephoning the 
victim to arrange the transaction.  While some transactions took 
place elsewhere in the apartment, at least three people came into 
the back room to conduct the transaction.  Each of the three paid 
in cash, which the victim placed in her pants pocket.  The 
defendant was present for each transaction that took place in the 
back room.  At no point during the period from Friday evening 
through the late afternoon on Saturday did McCarthy see the 
defendant with any money, although at some point on Saturday the 
defendant left and returned a short time later with an antique 
clock to trade for money or drugs.  At approximately 5:30 P.M. on 
Saturday afternoon, as McCarthy was preparing to return to her 
home, the defendant appeared to be passed out in the chair at the 
foot of the victim's bed, and the victim was lying down and 
seemed sleepy.  As she left, McCarthy told the victim to get up 
and lock the door behind her, and the victim did so. 
 
Soon after McCarthy left, Barbara Welch, one of the victim's 
customers from the previous night, began to call the victim on 
her cellular telephone, but was unable to reach her.  A call 
Welch placed to the victim's telephone around 6 P.M. was answered 
 
5 
by a male; when Welch asked him if "Paula" was there, he 
responded that she was asleep.  On Sunday, October 1, Welch tried 
to telephone the victim many times, but there was no answer, and, 
contrary to her usual practice, the victim did not return Welch's 
calls.   
 
b.  Discovery of victim's body.  On the evening of Monday, 
October 2, after the victim had failed to return telephone calls 
placed the previous day, McCarthy went to the victim's house to 
check on her.  McCarthy found the porch door standing open, the 
front door to the house unlocked, and the victim dead in the back 
room.  Her body was partially on the bed.  Everything else 
appeared to be almost exactly as it had been when McCarthy left 
the previous Saturday at 5:30 P.M.  Responding police officers 
observed that the victim was lying diagonally across the 
mattress, face down, with her head towards the corner of the room 
and her left shoulder resting on the floor . After an initial 
sweep to secure the house, police contacted emergency medical 
services.  
 
c.  Police investigation.  At approximately 5 A.M. on 
Tuesday morning, police began a canvass of the neighborhood.  
Later that morning, State Trooper Michael Banks observed the 
defendant and Kanode sitting on the front steps of their house a 
few doors away.  Banks and other officers asked the two whether 
they had seen anything unusual at the victim's home, and they 
 
6 
replied in the negative.  The following day, after police 
interviewed McCarthy, Banks returned to the defendant's house and 
asked him if he would speak with police.  The defendant and 
Kanode drove to the police station and were interviewed.   
 
i.  Defendant's first statement.  The defendant told police 
that he knew the victim because she lived down the street, and 
that he had purchased cocaine from her in the past.  He recently 
had relapsed and had gone to her house on Saturday, where he had 
stayed from approximately 8:30 A.M. until about 2 or 3 P.M.  He 
brought an antique clock to the victim's house, for which he 
received $30 that he used to purchase an "8-ball" of cocaine, and 
left when he had run out of money to purchase additional cocaine.  
The defendant then walked to a nearby park to consume his 
remaining cocaine, returned home, and went to bed.  
 
ii.  Events at the James Street house.  After comparing the 
defendant's statement with that of his nephew, police subpoenaed 
the telephone records for the defendant's landline in order to 
look for an incoming call that Kanode said the defendant made on 
Sunday night, October 1.  Police determined that he had made the 
call from Peter Milonopoulos's landline telephone at his house on 
Pearl Street in Somerville.  Milonopoulos testified that he had 
seen the defendant arrive at the house of his friend, Michael 
Wolfe, who lived around the corner on James Street, at 9 P.M. or 
10 P.M. on Saturday, September 30.   
 
7 
 
The James Street house was the home of Gary Young, Wolfe's 
uncle and a longtime friend of the defendant, and Young's girl 
friend, Madeline Osborne, and also was a "crack house" where 
people gathered to purchase and use drugs, including "crack" 
cocaine.  Wolfe, who had been released from jail at 7:05 P.M. 
that evening and arrived home approximately forty minutes later, 
testified that the defendant had arrived at the James Street 
house after 8:30 P.M.3  Young and Osborne said that the defendant 
was at their house twice on Saturday, once earlier in the day, 
while it was still light out, and then later that night.4  
Osborne said that the defendant returned sometime between 11 P.M. 
and midnight; he appeared a little shaky and nervous, and told 
everyone in the house that if anyone came looking for him, he was 
not there.   
 
The defendant told Young that he had been working that day 
and that he cut his finger while cleaning gutters.  Young thought 
the defendant's pants appeared dirty and "painted," and that the 
3 In testimony admitted only for purposes of impeachment, a 
police officer stated that Wolfe had told police that the 
defendant arrived at 10 or 10:30 P.M. 
4 Young was asleep when the defendant arrived the first 
time, and, by the time of trial, he could not recall the time of 
the defendant's arrival on either occasion. On redirect 
examination, Young affirmed that he had testified at a prior 
proceeding that the defendant was at his house twice, first 
arriving at 4 or 5 P.M. and staying for an hour or two, and then 
returning when it was dark out, at approximately 10 or 10:30 P.M. 
                                                 
 
8 
defendant might have wiped the blood from the cut onto his 
pants.5  At some point during the night, the defendant asked 
Young if he could borrow some clothes because his were dirty.  
Although the defendant was not seen with more than $40 while he 
was at the victim's house from Friday evening through Saturday at 
5:30 P.M., he had cocaine and a considerable amount of cash when 
he arrived at the James Street house.  In total, witnesses at the 
house observed the defendant spend hundreds of dollars, making at 
least two purchases of cocaine during the evening of Saturday, 
September 30, and into the early morning hours of Sunday, October 
1.6 
 
At some point, the defendant asked Osborne to wash the 
clothes he had been wearing when he arrived and some other 
laundry he had with him.7  During the day on Sunday, Osborne took 
the clothes the defendant had been wearing, as well as two of his 
shirts and a pair of pants, some clothes belonging to Young, and 
some of her own clothes, to a nearby laundry.  She saw a maroon 
5 No one else at the James Street house testified to 
observing anything unusual about the defendant's clothing; all 
other witnesses who were present at the James Street house said 
that they saw no blood on the defendant's clothes.  
6 The defendant also left the house in an unsuccessful 
effort to find a prostitute. 
7 In his second statement to police, the defendant denied 
asking Osborne to do his laundry, but said that she offered to do 
it for him.  Young testified that he had asked Osborne to do the 
defendant's laundry.  
                                                 
 
9 
stain on one pair of pants.  In the ten to fifteen years that 
they had known each other, the defendant had not previously asked 
her to do his laundry.  
 
iii.  Defendant's second statement.  On the evening of 
October 6, 2006, police again requested that the defendant come 
to the police station; the defendant agreed to be interviewed, 
was given Miranda warnings, and agreed to having the interview 
tape recorded.8  The defendant told police that after leaving the 
victim's house on Saturday afternoon sometime between 2 and 3 
P.M., he went to Young and Osborne's James Street house.9  He 
shared "a little pot" with others at the house, and "mooched 
drugs from" others.  At some point in the early morning hours of 
Sunday, October 1, he fell asleep at the James Street house, 
after using some heroin provided by Young.  Late Sunday night, 
the defendant called his son to come pick him up.  Lacking a 
vehicle to use, the defendant's son and Kanode came to meet him, 
and the three of them walked back to their home. 
 
d.  Trial proceedings.  i.  Forensic evidence.  The 
Commonwealth's forensic pathologist, Dr. Phillip Robert Croft, 
who conducted the autopsy, determined that the cause of the 
8 A redacted transcript of the defendant's statement was 
introduced in evidence at trial.  
9 Kanode testified that walking from the victim's house to 
James Street would take "maybe about half an hour, forty minutes 
maybe."  
                                                 
 
10 
victim's death "was blunt force injuries of the head with skull 
fractures and brain contusions."  The victim suffered fourteen 
abraded lacerations to the back and top of her head; the injuries 
were caused by blows that could have numbered up to fourteen, 
depending on the object with which the victim was struck.  The 
victim had wounds to the back of her hands that were consistent 
with a person "trying to protect themselves or ward off blows."  
In Croft's opinion, it was equally possible that the victim was 
killed on Saturday or Sunday, but it was not likely that the 
death occurred later than very early Monday morning.  
 
A State police criminalist who assisted in processing the 
crime scene observed and made a chart of nine damaged or dented 
areas ("impact areas") located on the wall above the victim.  The 
impacts were located in an circular area of approximately one 
square foot.  Red-brown stains were observed in seven of the 
impacts.  In the criminalist's opinion, the damage was caused by 
an object hitting the wall.  No bloodstains were observed either 
leading out of the bedroom or in the hallways and areas exiting 
the dwelling.  The blood and blood spatter was focused in the 
corner of the room where the victim's body was found.  There was 
what appeared to be brain matter on the victim's pillow. 
 
According to Detective Lieutenant Kenneth F. Martin, the 
Commonwealth's bloodstain pattern analyst, the bloody event took 
place in the corner near the mattress.  Martin opined that, 
 
11 
depending on the weapon used, the direction in which the weapon 
struck the point of impact, and the position of the victim, there 
would not necessarily be any resulting impact blood spatter or 
cast-off from the weapon on the perpetrator.  The victim was 
found in what Martin called a "well" between the mattress and the 
wall, which would restrict outward radiation of the blood.  
Martin described bloodstains on the wall above the mattress 
indicating that the victim's body had been in that area and 
created a stain while sliding downward, ultimately resting as the 
body was found.  The instrument used to inflict the wounds was 
narrow, approximately one inch or one and one-half inches in 
width.10 
 
Although another cellular telephone was found at the scene, 
police were unable to locate the cellular telephone belonging to 
the victim that Welch and others had been calling that weekend.  
According to records from the victim's telephone service 
provider,11 the last activity posted for that cellular telephone 
10 The criminalist also testified about the jeans the victim 
was wearing, noting that there were several stains on the 
interior and exterior, in front and in back, including red-brown 
stains, dirt stains, fecal material, and some debris on the 
interior that appeared to be dandruff or skin flakes.  Kanode 
testified that the victim "always had the same outfit on," 
"always the same jeans," and never took showers.  The criminalist 
noted fibers, dirt, and other debris on the victim's fingernail 
clippings. 
11 Police obtained a search warrant permitting access to 
voicemail messages for the victim's cellular telephone number; 
                                                 
 
12 
was on Saturday, September 30, 2006, at 8:25 P.M.12 
 
The clothing the victim had been wearing was examined by a 
technician in the office of the medical examiner.  No currency 
was found in the pockets of the victim's jeans, or anywhere 
amongst her personal possessions.  The Commonwealth's 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) expert, Cailin Drugan, who conducted 
an analysis of DNA recovered from inside the pockets of the 
victim's jeans, testified that the major DNA profile in all four 
of the pockets matched the DNA profile of the defendant.13  She 
also testified that it was probable that the major profile was 
the result of a primary transfer, meaning that the contributor 
made direct contact with the inside of the victim's pockets.    
those messages indicate that numerous calls were placed from 
9:06 P.M. on Saturday, September 30 through Tuesday, October 3, 
by people trying to reach the victim. 
12 That particular cellular telephone service provider does 
not record any calls placed to a given telephone number if the 
handset is turned off, the battery wears out, or the phone is 
destroyed. 
13 The deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis was conducted 
using the Y-STR method, which is "commonly used in situations 
such as that here, where there is a large amount of female DNA 
and potentially only a small amount of male DNA."  Commonwealth 
v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 406 n.9 (2011), citing Commonwealth 
v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 543 & n.8 (2010).  Y-STR testing is 
based on comparing allele frequencies at sixteen loci on the Y-
chromosome, as compared to STR-testing, which involves allele 
frequency at fifteen loci on several different chromosomes.  
Because Y-STR testing is limited to the Y-chromosome, and men in 
the same paternal line each have the same Y-chromosome, Y-STR 
testing cannot discriminate among members of the same paternal 
line.  The defendant's nephew, Kanode, the son of his sister, was 
not a member of the defendant's paternal line. 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
13 
 
The defendant's motions for a required finding of not guilty 
at the close of the Commonwealth's case and at the close of all 
the evidence were denied.  After the jury convicted the defendant 
of armed robbery and murder in the first degree on theories of 
felony-murder and extreme atrocity or cruelty, the judge 
dismissed the armed robbery conviction as duplicative.  Because 
the defendant was convicted of murder on both theories of murder 
advanced by the Commonwealth, the conviction of armed robbery 
should not have been dismissed.  See Commonwealth v. Felder, 455 
Mass. 359, 370-371 (2009), citing Commonwealth v. Brum, 441 Mass. 
199, 200 n.1 (2004) ("Where, as here, the conviction of murder is 
based on a theory in addition to the theory of felony-murder, the 
conviction of the underlying felony stands"). 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that the evidence was 
insufficient for the jury to convict him on either theory of 
murder advanced by the Commonwealth, and that his motions for a 
directed verdict should have been allowed.  He argues also that 
the admission of certain testimony by the Commonwealth's blood 
spatter expert requires a new trial, because the testimony 
erroneously invaded the province of the jury.  We conclude that 
the evidence was sufficient to support both of the Commonwealth's 
theories, and that there was no error in the admission of the 
expert's testimony.  In addition, in our review pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, we note an error not raised by the defendant; we 
 
14 
conclude that certain portions of the prosecutor's closing 
argument were impermissible because they were not based on 
evidence admitted at trial, but that the improper argument did 
not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
 
a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant contends 
that the evidence introduced was not sufficient to establish his 
presence at the victim's house at the time she was killed; that 
others who were present to purchase drugs on the evening of 
Friday, September 29, and the early morning hours of Saturday, 
October 1, had equal motive and opportunity to rob the victim; 
that the method of the killing was more consistent with a motive 
other than robbery; and that the victim's former boy friend, with 
whom she had a conflict, would appear to have had such a motive.   
 
In considering whether the evidence was sufficient to 
support a conviction,  
"[t]he standard we apply is whether, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677–678 (1979), 
quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–319 (1979).  
Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to meet the 
burden of establishing guilt.  Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 
Mass. 207, 215 (2007).  Commonwealth v. Rojas, 388 Mass. 
626, 629 (1983).  Indeed, the Commonwealth may submit a case 
wholly on circumstantial evidence, and inferences drawn from 
that evidence 'need only be reasonable and possible; [they] 
need not be necessary or inescapable.'  Commonwealth v. 
Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 533 (1989), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Beckett, 373 Mass. 329, 341 (1977).  Where conflicting 
inferences are possible from the evidence, 'it is for the 
jury to determine where the truth lies.'  Commonwealth v. 
 
15 
Martino, 412 Mass. 267, 272 (1992), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Wilborne, 382 Mass. 241, 245 (1981)." 
 
Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 712-713, cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 2855 (2014). 
 
Under the theories of murder advanced by the Commonwealth, 
it was required to prove that the defendant unlawfully killed the 
victim either with extreme atrocity or cruelty or in the course 
of committing a felony.  Because the jury convicted the defendant 
on both theories, evidence supporting either theory would suffice 
to affirm the verdict.  Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 
416-417 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Hensley, 454 Mass. 721, 
734 n.9 (2009).  The evidence presented was sufficient to support 
both theories. 
 
i.  Felony-murder.  To prove that the defendant was guilty 
of felony murder, the Commonwealth was required to establish that 
the defendant committed a homicide during the commission of a 
felony, here, armed robbery.  See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 460 
Mass. 817, 821 (2011).  "It would be enough that the homicide[] 
occurred as part of the defendant's effort to escape 
responsibility for the underlying felony."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 408 Mass. 463, 466 (1990).  
 
The evidence presented would have permitted a rational trier 
of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
killed the victim during an armed robbery.  The jury could have 
 
16 
found that the defendant was aware that the victim possessed a 
large amount of cash, which she kept in the pockets of her jeans, 
along with a supply of cocaine.  On September 28, the defendant 
cashed a check for the victim in the amount of $1,100, and was 
present when three people, during the evening of September 29, 
gave the victim cash that she put into her pants pockets.  After 
an initial purchase of cocaine, the defendant was not seen with 
any money during the approximately twenty-four-hour period that 
he was at the victim's home ingesting cocaine provided by the 
victim and others.  This evidence is sufficient to establish the 
defendant's motive to rob the victim.  See Commonwealth v. Lao, 
443 Mass. 770, 780 (2005) (evidence sufficient based on evidence 
of motive to kill coupled with identification of defendant 
standing, at approximate time of killing, outside residence where 
wife was killed). 
 
The evidence also allowed a rational jury to infer that the 
defendant had the means (one of the tools lying around the 
victim's house) and opportunity to kill the victim.  Based on the 
testimony of the forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsy, 
the victim likely died on Saturday, September 30, or Sunday, 
October 1.  The last witness to have seen the victim alive saw 
her at approximately 5:30 P.M. on September 30, when the witness 
left the victim alone with the defendant.  The jury reasonably 
could have inferred that the victim was killed within the three-
 
17 
hour time frame between 5:30 P.M., when McCarthy left the 
victim's house, and 8:25 P.M., when the last activity for the 
victim's cellular telephone was posted and the victim ceased 
responding to calls.  When Welch, who did not know the defendant, 
attempted to telephone the victim around 6:00 P.M., the call was 
answered by a male who told Welch that the victim was asleep.  
Based on this, the jury could have inferred that the defendant 
hit the victim repeatedly in the head when she woke up 
unexpectedly as he was reaching into her pockets to take the cash 
and cocaine.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. 581, 593 
& n.21 (2012) (evidence established that fatal shots fired 
shortly before 8:00 A.M.; based on reasonable inferences, jury 
could have concluded that defendant had driven distance from his 
home to location of shooting shortly before 8:00 A.M., providing 
evidence of opportunity, and that he had taken gun from victim's 
house). 
 
Witnesses present at Young's James Street house differed 
about when the defendant was there.  While a number of witnesses 
testified that the defendant was at the house after 9 P.M., none 
of the witnesses saw the defendant present at Young's house 
throughout the period from 2 or 3 P.M. to 9 P.M. on September 30.  
Several witnesses said that the defendant was at Young's house 
sometime in the afternoon, arriving around 4 or 5 P.M., and 
staying for one-half hour to an hour before leaving and returning 
 
18 
later in the evening.  Others testified that the defendant only 
arrived sometime after 9 P.M.  According to Wolfe, who arrived 
around 8 P.M., after his release on bail, the defendant arrived 
after he did. 
 
The jury took a view and traveled the distance between the 
victim's house and Young's house; they also heard testimony that 
walking between the houses took approximately thirty to forty 
minutes.  The jury could have considered this evidence, along 
with evidence that some of the DNA in the victim's pockets 
matched the defendant's, that there was no money in any of the 
pockets when the victim's body was found, and that the defendant 
was in sudden possession of a large amount of cash, to infer that 
the defendant remained at the victim's house after McCarthy left; 
the victim, who has been sleepy, fell asleep; and, sometime 
between 5:25 and 8:25 P.M., the defendant reached into the 
victim's pockets and robbed her. 
 
ii.  Extreme atrocity or cruelty.  To convict a defendant of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, the jury must consider the Cunneen factors and determine 
that the manner of the killing met one or more of them:  "(1) 
whether the defendant was indifferent to or took pleasure in the 
victim's suffering; (2) the consciousness and degree of suffering 
of the victim; (3) the extent of the victim's physical injuries; 
(4) the number of blows inflicted on the victim; (5) the manner 
 
19 
and force with which the blows were delivered; (6) the nature of 
the weapon, instrument, or method used in the killing; and (7) 
the disproportion between the means needed to cause death and 
those employed."  Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 546 & 
n.10 (2010), citing Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 
(1983).   
 
The evidence here was sufficient to support the defendant's 
conviction of murder on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty 
because there were sufficient facts from which the jury 
reasonably could infer that at least one of the criteria 
established in Commonwealth v. Cunneen, supra, were met.  The 
forensic pathologist testified that the victim suffered at least 
fourteen blows to the head, and other evidence indicated that at 
least some of the blows were delivered with so much force that 
there was brain matter on the victim's pillow.  Defensive wounds 
indicated that the victim attempted to ward off those blows with 
her hands, and blood spatter evidence suggested that she had been 
sitting up when the blows were delivered, and then slid down the 
wall at some point.  Thus, the victim was conscious, and the jury 
could conclude that she endured great suffering as she was beaten 
to death. 
 
iii.  Consciousness of guilt.  The Commonwealth argued that 
the defendant's actions and his inconsistent statements after the 
 
20 
victim was killed showed consciousness of guilt.14  "In 
conjunction with other evidence, a jury may properly consider 
actions and statements of a defendant that show a consciousness 
of guilt."  Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 715 (2014), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Rojas, 388 Mass. 626, 629 (1983).  See 
Commonwealth v. Best, 381 Mass. 472, 483 (1980); Commonwealth v. 
Montecalvo, 367 Mass. 46, 52 (1975).  The jury reasonably could 
have concluded that a number of the defendant's statements 
indicated consciousness of guilt.  
 
In his initial, unrecorded statement to police on October 3, 
2006, the defendant asserted that he had been at the victim's 
14 The judge did not instruct on consciousness of guilt.  The 
prosecutor initially requested an instruction on consciousness of 
guilt, and the judge, while expressing some hesitation about 
giving the instruction in the circumstances of this case, 
provided a copy of the instruction that she generally gave, which 
the prosecutor suggested placed too great a burden on the 
Commonwealth.  Defense counsel objected to any instruction on 
consciousness of guilt, maintaining that the defendant's 
statements were equivocal, not false, and therefore not 
indicative of consciousness of guilt. Ultimately, both defense 
counsel and the prosecutor requested that the judge not provide 
the instruction.  The judge noted that the prosecutor could argue 
in closing concerning inconsistencies in the defendant's 
statements.  
 
Absent a request for an instruction on consciousness of 
guilt, the decision whether to give such an instruction is left 
to the sound discretion of the trial judge.  See Commonwealth v. 
Simmons, 419 Mass. 426, 435-436 (1995).  We have said that the 
better practice is to allow counsel to decide, as a matter of 
trial tactics, "to discuss evidence suggesting consciousness of 
guilt in closing arguments or simply to leave it for the jury's 
reflection unadorned by comment either by them or the judge."  
Id.  
                                                 
 
21 
house on September 30, consumed cocaine with her beginning at 
about 8:30 A.M., and left at approximately 2 or 3 P.M.15  He then 
took a walk on a specific route he described to police, which 
included a park, during which he consumed a single remaining gram 
of cocaine in his possession.  After he consumed the cocaine, it 
was night and he returned home and went to bed.  At that point, 
he had no money and no energy, following three days of drug use, 
and stayed home Sunday and Monday.  The defendant did not make 
any reference to his trip to James Street.  A number of these 
statements were inconsistent with the defendant's later 
statements to police, and with the testimony of other witnesses. 
 
During his second interview at the police station, the 
defendant told police that, after he had been "partying" for two 
days at the victim's house, from Friday into Saturday, his son 
and nephew came to the victim's house looking for him, sometime 
between 2 and 3 P.M.;16 and after they had gone, he left, walking 
a particular route to a location with a wooden tower, where he 
15 The defendant denied ever seeing the victim engage in any 
drug transactions while he was at her house; he said she 
conducted her business in the hallway, outside his view.  
McCarthy, however, testified that while some transactions took 
place at the front door, at least three individuals came to the 
back room to purchase cocaine from the victim, and the defendant 
was present on those occasions. 
16 Kanode testified that when the defendant had not returned 
after being out all night on Friday, he and the defendant's son 
went to the victim's house looking for the defendant, but did not 
find him there, and left. 
                                                 
 
22 
ingested a gram of cocaine.  He then walked into Somerville.  He 
had no money to get more cocaine,17 so he went to the homes of 
several friends, ending up at the home of a friend named Gary, 
where he "mooched" drugs provided by others throughout the night, 
finally using heroin provided by Gary, fell asleep, and slept 
there all day Sunday.  The defendant said that when he woke up 
Sunday it was dark and he was hungry and cold; he used someone 
else's cellular telephone to call his son, telling him he was 
walking home and would meet him on the way.  The defendant, his 
son, and his nephew met up and walked home together. 
 
As stated, other testimony at trial did not accord with the 
defendant's assertions regarding the time of his arrival at the 
James Street residence and his statement that he had had very 
little money with him at the James Street house and could not 
afford to purchase any drugs.  Contrary to the defendant's 
statements, several witnesses testified that the defendant did 
not arrive at the James Street residence until well after 9 P.M.  
No witness testified to seeing the defendant there between 6 and 
8:30 P.M., including Young, the victim's childhood friend.  
17 The defendant said that he had no drugs when he arrived at 
Gary's house, and denied having a lot of money when he arrived 
there.  Although witnesses differed in their estimates of the 
amount, with some estimating $60 and others upwards of $500, all 
of the witnesses described the defendant's repeated purchases of 
cocaine with cash he had with him, as well as his spending cash 
on other items or giving others cash to make purchases. 
                                                 
 
23 
Several witnesses testified to the defendant's purchases of 
cocaine after his arrival at the James Street house; his leaving 
the house to purchase more cocaine, which he brought back to the 
house; and, on one occasion, his trip into Boston in an attempt 
to locate a prostitute.  Moreover, telephone records indicate 
that, at 11 P.M. on Sunday night, a call was made to the 
defendant's house from a landline telephone number assigned to 
Milonopoulos's residence, and not from an unidentified cellular 
telephone.  Thus, the jury could have viewed the defendant's 
statements to police as an attempt to conceal his whereabouts 
from 5:30 to 8:25 P.M. on Saturday evening, and to deflect police 
attention from his possession of large amounts of cash.  See 
Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 715-716 (2014).  On that 
basis, the defendant's statements properly "could be seen as an 
attempt to hamper the police officers' investigation by 
preventing them from locating witnesses."  See id. at 715. 
 
In sum, the evidence supports the reasonable inference that 
it was the defendant who answered Welch's telephone call and then 
attempted to rob the sleeping victim of the cash and cocaine in 
the pockets of her jeans; that she was awakened by this action 
and sat up on the mattress to confront the defendant; that the 
defendant at some point picked up a crowbar or similar implement 
from among the tools lying around the house, and used it to 
strike the victim in the head as she turned away from the blows 
 
24 
toward the wall, raising her hands in an effort to protect 
herself.  Based on the DNA evidence, the jury could have inferred 
that the defendant reached into at least three of the victim's 
pockets.  The jury also reasonably could have inferred that the 
defendant took the victim's cellular telephone, which police were 
unable to locate, and disposed of it and the murder weapon, which 
was also never located, as he walked from the victim's Fellsway 
residence to the James Street residence of his friends Young and 
Osborne, where he arrived sometime after 9 P.M., flush with cash 
and in possession of cocaine.  
 
The defendant contends that this case is like Commonwealth 
v. Mazza, 399 Mass. 395, 399 (1987), in which we held that the 
circumstantial evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant 
of murder.  In that case, the defendant went to a restaurant 
where he planned to meet the victim.  The victim's body was 
discovered about an hour later, lying facedown in a vehicle 
parked in the restaurant lot.  Id. at 396.  Although 
acknowledging evidence of the defendant's presence at the crime 
scene "together with the evidence of motive and consciousness of 
guilt," id. at 398, we noted also that there was no evidence of 
the time of death, or evidence that the particular vehicle had 
been in the restaurant parking lot when the defendant arrived, or 
that the defendant had had a gun when he entered the parking lot.  
Id. at 399. 
 
25 
 
The facts in that case differ significantly from the 
circumstances here.  As in Commonwealth v. Mazza, supra, the time 
of the victim's death was uncertain, others could have had means, 
motive, and opportunity to kill her, and the evidence was almost 
entirely circumstantial.  The theory of the defense was to point 
to other possible perpetrators who might have entered the 
victim's room, including the victim's former boy friend, who had 
been convicted of an assault and battery against her and who had 
been ordered to keep away from her house, and a real estate 
broker and business associate of the victim to whom she owed 
substantial amounts of money.  Nonetheless, the evidence in this 
case established that the defendant was the last person seen with 
the victim, in the bedroom of her locked apartment, and that he 
had the opportunity to commit the crime during the approximately 
three-hour window thereafter before the victim's cellular 
telephone ceased accepting calls.  In addition, DNA matching the 
defendant's was found in the victim's pockets and, along with his 
sudden possession of a large amount of cash, and the absence of 
any cash on the victim's person where she normally kept it, is 
sufficient for the jury to have found that the defendant robbed 
and killed her.  
 
b.  Expert testimony on blood spatter.  The defendant claims 
error in the admission of testimony by Martin, the blood spatter 
expert, over the defendant's objection, that there would "not 
 
26 
necessarily" be any blood found on the victim's assailant.  The 
defendant argues that this line of questioning did not aid the 
jury because they could have understood the evidence without the 
expert testimony, and that the testimony culminated in a 
conclusion by the expert that invaded the province of the jury.18  
We review a judge's decision concerning the admission of expert 
testimony for abuse of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Federico, 425 
Mass. 844, 847 (1997).  Commonwealth v. Colin, 419 Mass. 54, 59 
(1994).  Where the error is preserved, we consider whether the 
admission was harmless error.  Commonwealth v. Federico, supra at 
852. 
 
Expert testimony "is admissible whenever it will aid the 
jury in reaching a decision, even if the expert's opinion touches 
on the ultimate issues that the jury must decide."  Commonwealth 
18 Following this line of questioning, in response to the 
prosecutor's question as to the meaning of the phrase "absence of 
evidence is not evidence of absence," Martin testified that "the 
fact that I don't have any evidence resulting from a crime, isn't 
necessarily the fact that I wasn't there, doesn't relate to the 
fact that [I] wasn't at the scene."  The defendant objected, on 
the ground that the expert's reply was more in the nature of 
argument, and the judge ordered the question and response struck.   
 
The defendant argues that, notwithstanding the judge's 
instruction striking both the question and the response, both 
must be considered along with the rest of the challenged 
testimony because the judge's instruction to "disregard" the 
question and the answer underscored that testimony.  Because 
there was no error in the admission of the remaining testimony, 
the judge's instruction to disregard adequately addressed the 
defendant's objection to the single improper exchange. 
                                                 
 
27 
v. Dockham, 405 Mass. 618, 628 (1989), quoting Simon v. Solomon, 
385 Mass. 91, 105 (1982).  There was no abuse of discretion in 
the decision to permit Martin's testimony.   
 
Martin explained to the jury that blood stain analysis or 
blood spatter analysis is "the study of blood once blood leaves 
the body and a force has acted on it."  He explained further 
that, if a strike with a weapon is of sufficient force to break 
the skin, blood from the wound would be projected in a certain 
direction, based on the rules of physics.  He testified that in 
the area of bloodstain pattern analysis, it is generally accepted 
that if a person is struck and the skin is lacerated, a 
subsequent strike would result in projected blood and there would 
potentially be cast-off from the blood found on the implement.  
When the implement is brought back, as a result of centrifugal 
force, blood is projected off the weapon and onto a surface such 
as a wall.  Demonstrating, Martin testified that the shape of the 
tails on the blood stains would be different depending on the 
manner in which the implement was swung.  
 
The prosecutor asked Martin, without objection, whether, if 
there were cast-off, "it necessarily mean[s] that the person 
swinging the implement is going to get cast-off onto them?" to 
which Martin replied, "Not all the time.  No, sir."  Martin 
explained that the type of weapon used and the shape of the 
implement would dictate how the blood was distributed, and that 
 
28 
it also would depend on the direction in which someone swung the 
weapon and the position of the victim; Martin demonstrated 
different directions of strike and the resulting direction of 
projection.  Martin then described the victim's bedroom and the 
observed bloodstains, concluding that "the bloody event itself 
took place in [the] corner by [the] mattress in the southwest 
corner of the room."  Over defense counsel's objection, the 
prosecutor asked:  "Based on your training and experience and 
education in the field of bloodstain analysis, would you expect 
to see blood in this situation that you described on the 
perpetrator? . . . [W]ould you expect to see any type of impact 
spatter or cast-off on the perpetrator of the crime?"  Martin 
answered, "Not necessarily."19   
 
Although the defendant argues that the expert testimony was 
not necessary and the jury could have understood the evidence 
without such testimony, Martin's explanation regarding cast-off 
spatter could have assisted the jury in understanding the various 
19 Asked to elucidate, Martin repeated that it would depend 
on how the weapon was being wielded, its shape, the location of 
the victim, and how close to the victim the perpetrator was 
standing when the victim was struck.  He explained that "[f]or 
example, if the victim, as in the case here, is in what I would 
call a well between a mattress and a wall," that would restrict 
the blood, which would "radiate out" and ultimately "fall to the 
ground," and that any physical condition, such as blankets, 
pillows, or anything else, could act as a curtain.  He said that 
he had observed no cast-off spatter on the ceiling of the 
victim's room, or on the other side of the mattress. 
                                                 
 
29 
directions in which blood may travel after a person is struck 
with an instrument.  Without this explanation, the jury might 
have believed, for example, that the perpetrator of such an 
attack will always end up covered with blood spatter.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Federico, supra at 851 (in case involving child 
sexual abuse where there is no evidence of physical injury, "a 
medical expert may be able to assist the jury by informing them 
that the lack of such evidence does not necessarily lead to the 
medical conclusion that the child was not abused").  Martin did 
not opine whether the perpetrator in this case would have had 
cast-off blood on his person.  Rather, Martin testified to 
observations he made at the scene, and explained the variables 
that could affect whether cast-off might be found on a person 
wielding a weapon and striking another in a position similar to 
that in which the victim was found.   
 
c.  DNA from victim's left back pocket.  Pursuant to our 
duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we consider an error in the 
prosecutor's closing argument that was not raised by the 
defendant.  In his closing, the prosecutor told the jury that the 
DNA profile found in all four of the victim's jeans pockets 
"matched the profile of the defendant . . . to an exclusion rate 
of. . . 99.8 percent," and that for "all four of the pockets, the 
known standard from [the defendant] was collected and analyzed 
and compared to the swabs of all four pockets and to a 99.8 
 
30 
percent exclusion.  [Ninety-nine point eight] percent of society 
is excluded but for [the defendant] and his paternal relatives."  
Although Drugan, the Commonwealth's DNA expert, testified that 
99.8 per cent of the population could be excluded as a source of 
the DNA found in three of the victim's jeans pockets, there was 
no direct testimony about the exclusion rate for the DNA found in 
the back left pocket.  The defendant did not object to the 
closing argument, or to Drugan's testimony about the back left 
pocket.20    
 
Because "DNA evidence that a particular individual could not 
be excluded as a potential contributor of the DNA at issue should 
not be admitted without accompanying statistical evidence of the 
likelihood that the test could not exclude other individuals in a 
given population," Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 
409-410 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 
851-855 (2010), we consider the issues raised by the lack of such 
evidence to determine whether "there is a substantial likelihood 
that a miscarriage of justice has occurred."  Commonwealth v. 
Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 (1992).  See generally Commonwealth v. 
20 The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence 
of DNA matches without evidence of statistical significance.  At 
a pretrial hearing, it was agreed that evidence about the pockets 
would be inadmissible unless statistics were provided.  The 
defendant, however, did not renew the objection at trial, and the 
objection is therefore not preserved.  See Commonwealth v. Jones, 
464 Mass. 16, 18 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Whelton, 428 
Mass. 24, 25 (1998). 
                                                 
 
31 
Riley, 467 Mass. 799, 807 (2014). 
 
Drugan testified that Y-STR testing of swabs of the victim's 
pockets showed a mixture of DNA.  At least three men contributed 
to the DNA found in the right front pocket of the victim's jeans, 
the left front pocket, and the back right pocket; Drugan 
testified that she identified a "major" profile within the 
mixture, that is, the contributor of one profile who contributed 
more cellular material than the other contributors.  A major 
profile was found at sixteen loci for the front left and back 
right pockets, and at ten loci for the front right pocket.  
Explaining the significance of this match as to these three 
pockets, Drugan testified that, apart from the defendant's 
paternal relatives, 99.8 per cent of the population could be 
excluded as a source of the DNA with respect to DNA from these 
three pockets.21  
 
As to the back left pocket, Drugan testified that her 
analysis of the DNA detected a major profile at three of the 
21 Drugan testified that the major profile is not contained 
in a database that includes Y-STR profiles from a sample of 2,852 
Caucasian males, 2,574 African-American males, 1,612 Hispanic 
males, and 537 Asian males.  She extrapolated from these samples 
to the general population by applying a ninety-five per cent 
confidence interval and concluded that she would expect over 99.8 
percent of unrelated Caucasian males to be excluded as having the 
major profile, and that 99.8 percent of unrelated African-
American males, 99.8 percent of unrelated Hispanic males, and 
99.4 percent of unrelated Asian males would be excluded.  The 
defendant is Caucasian. 
                                                 
 
32 
sixteen loci which matched the DNA profile of the defendant, and 
that "at the [thirteen]  locations where there was not a major 
profile detected . . . I still observed [the defendant's] 
alleles" and "could not exclude him."  She did not testify as to 
the "statistical evidence of the likelihood that the test could 
not exclude other individuals in a given population."  
Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, supra at 409-410, citing Commonwealth 
v. Mattei, supra at 851-855.  It is not apparent from the record 
whether, in light of the differences between the DNA findings at 
the left-back pocket and the findings as to the other three 
pockets, the statistical evidence would have been different from 
that of the other three pockets.22   
 
Because it was based, in part, on evidence that was not 
before the jury, the prosecutor's argument should not have been 
made.  See Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577, 580 (2005), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Coren, 437 Mass. 723, 730 (2002).  In 
closing arguments, prosecutors may not misstate the evidence, but 
must tailor their remarks to ensure they remain properly grounded 
in the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Roy, 464 Mass. 818, 831-832 
(2013).  Nonetheless, the improper argument did not create a 
22 The defendant, who was well aware of the statistical 
issues relative to DNA testing, see note 21, supra, did not 
object, but it is not clear whether the lack of objection was 
strategic or inadvertent; Drugan's testimony as to the different 
pockets took place over a two-day period separated by a weekend. 
                                                 
 
33 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Whether the 
defendant's DNA matched that of the major profile in three of the 
victim's pants pockets, or four of those pockets, was not likely 
to have influenced the jury's conclusion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Wright, supra at 682.  It was not essential to the Commonwealth's 
case that the evidence establish that the defendant put his hand 
into four of the victim's pockets.23  Even if it had been 
established that the defendant's DNA matched that of the major 
profile in only three of the pockets, the jury could have 
inferred that the victim woke up before the defendant completed 
the search of her pockets.    
 
Having reviewed the entire record pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, we discern no reason to reduce the conviction of murder in 
the first degree to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new 
trial. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order dismissing the defendant's 
conviction of armed robbery is vacated and set aside.  The 
convictions of armed robbery and murder in the first degree are 
affirmed. 
23 In his closing argument, defense counsel referred 
consistently to "the pockets" when discussing the DNA evidence.  
Apparently focused on Drugan's testimony that she assumed the DNA 
sample was from skin left in the pockets because no blood had 
been found in them, he argued that if the defendant had killed 
the victim, there would have been blood on his hands (either his 
own, from a cut, or the victim's) that would have gotten into the 
pockets. 
                                                 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.