Case Title: Big-D Signature Corp. v. Sterrett Props., LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-12-0046

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
BIG-D SIGNATURE CORPORATION, a Wyoming Corporation v. STERRETT PROPERTIES, LLC, 3 CREEK RANCHES, LLC, Utah Limited Liability Companies, and MORRIS R. STERRETT, an individual; STERRETT PROPERTIES, LLC, 3 CREEK RANCHES, LLC, Utah Limited Liability Companies, and MORRIS R. STERRETT, an individual v. BIG-D SIGNATURE CORPORATION, a Wyoming Corporation2012 WY 138Case Number: S-12-0046; S-12-0047Decided: 10/31/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2012 

 
BIG-D SIGNATURE 
CORPORATION, a Wyoming 
Corporation,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.STERRETT PROPERTIES, 
LLC, 3 CREEK RANCHES, LLC, Utah Limited Liability Companies, and MORRIS R. 
STERRETT, an 
individual,Appellees(Defendants).
 
As well 
as
 
STERRETT PROPERTIES, 
LLC, 3 CREEK RANCHES, LLC, Utah Limited Liability Companies, and MORRIS R. 
STERRETT, an 
individual,Appellants(Defendants),v.BIG-D SIGNATURE 
CORPORATION, a Wyoming 
Corporation,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeals 
from the District Court of Teton County
The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge
 
Representing Big-D Signature 
Corporation:
David F. DeFazio and Sarah 
E. Tollison of DeFazio Law Office, LLC, Jackson, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. Tollison and Mr. 
DeFazio.
 
Representing Sterrett 
Properties, LLC, 3 Creek Ranches, LLC, and Morris R. 
Sterrett:
Andrea L. Richard of The Richard Law 
Firm, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.
 
Before KITE, C.J., and HILL, 
VOIGT, BURKE, JJ., and PRICE, D.J.
 
PRICE, District 
Judge.
 
[¶1]      
This case arises out of a home construction contract between the 
contractors, Big-D Signature Corporation (Big-D) and two 
LLCs, Sterrett Properties, LLC and 3 Creek Ranches, LLC 
(LLCs).  Morris Sterrett (Mr. 
Sterrett) is the owner of the property on which the home was 
built.  Big-D filed suit against the LLCs and Mr. 
Sterrett, who then counterclaimed.  The district court 
entered a partial summary adjudication which was later partially 
vacated.  Then a jury trial commenced, but a mistrial was 
declared.  A partial summary judgment order 
followed.  The remaining issues were disposed of by the 
district court under a sua sponte 
dismissal with prejudice.  Both sides appealed.  
We will affirm in part and reverse and remand in 
part.
 
Issues
 
[¶2]      
In their briefs, the parties present multiple issues for appeal, and 
there is conflict as to whether some of those issues are properly before this 
Court.  Rather than quote the issues as put forward in the 
briefs, this Court finds it simpler to restate the issues.  
There are six separate issues that need to be decided in these 
appeals.
 
1.    Does 
this Court have jurisdiction to consider the Order Granting Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Order on Issues Remaining for Trial 
even though it was not specifically mentioned in the notice of 
appeal?  In other words, is that order subsumed into the final 
order of the case?
 
2.    Did 
the district court properly grant summary judgment in favor of Big-D as to the 
original contract and Prime Contract Change Order (PCCO) Nos. 1 and 2, or 
was there a genuine issue of material fact making that ruling 
inappropriate?
 
3.    Was 
the partial summary judgment entered against Mr. Sterrett as an 
individual or only against the LLCs?
 
4.    Did 
the district court properly dismiss Big-D’s unjust enrichment claim against Mr. 
Sterrett?  Namely, was there an adequate remedy at law 
under the contract making the claim inappropriate?
 
5.    Did 
the district court properly dismiss Big-D’s claims under PCCO Nos. 3 
and 4?  Specifically, were they barred by the contract because 
they were unsigned?
 
6.    Did 
the district court properly dismiss the LLCs’ and 
Mr. Sterrett’s claim for delay damages?  Simply 
put, were they barred by the consequential damages waiver in the contract or 
because contractual requirements were not met in bringing the 
claim?
 
Facts
 
[¶3]      
This case arises out of 
an AIA (American Institute of Architects) contract to build a home 
on Lot 81,1 which was entered into by 
the LLCs and Big-D on October 26, 2005.  
Mr. Sterrett is the owner of Lot 
81.  
There are a number of contract 
provisions which are relevant to these appeals: First, the contract specifically 
allows for escalation costs, but bars consequential damages.  
Second, it contains an integration clause which states that the contract 
may be changed only by a modification.  A modification is 
defined as a written agreement signed by both parties or a change 
order.2  Finally, the 
contract contains a provision establishing the process for entering change 
orders.
 
[¶4]      
Two PCCOs were signed by 
both parties: No. 1 on November 7, 2006, and No. 2 on November 8, 
2006.  PCCO No. 2 contains a new contract value of 
$1,509,811, which is handwritten and initialed. 
 There were two more PCCOs 
which were proposed but never signed: No. 3, dated August 13, 2007, and No. 4, 
dated April 21, 2008. 
 The LLCs have 
paid $1,194,425.04 to Big-D for the home built on Lot 
81.
 
[¶5]      
This suit was initiated on September 
26, 2008, when Big-D filed a complaint alleging breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment against the LLCs and Mr. 
Sterrett.3  Then, on November 
3, 2008, the LLCs and Mr. Sterrett filed a counterclaim 
alleging breach of contract.  
The district court entered an Order 
of Partial Summary Adjudication on February 17, 2011, in which it made three 
rulings:
 
1.    
The LLCs and Mr. Sterrett are barred from 
bringing any claim for consequential damages.
 
2.    
The LLCs and Mr. Sterrett are barred from 
bringing claims related to Lots 75 and 85.4
 
3.    The 
final contract amount is $1,509,811.00 pursuant to PCCO No. 2.5
 
[¶6]      
A jury trial commenced on March 14, 
2011, and on March 15, 2011, was continued indefinitely in order for counsel to 
simplify the issues.  Because of the long delay before the 
trial could be recommenced, a mistrial was ordered.
 
[¶7]      
The district court then entered an 
Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Order on 
Issues Remaining for Trial on November 23, 2011, in which it made three 
rulings:
 
1.    
There is a valid, express, unambiguous, enforceable contract modified 
by PCCO Nos. 1 and 2.
 
2.    
Total contract price is $1,509,811.00.
 
3.    The 
remaining issues for trial are Big-D’s claims for breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment related to PCCO Nos. 3 and 4 and the LLCs’ and 
Mr. Sterrett’s counterclaims for breach of contract related to 
delay.
 
[¶8]      
Finally, the district court entered an 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice on December 16, 2011, in which it made 
three rulings:
 
1.    
Big-D’s breach of contract claim for PCCO Nos. 3 and 4 is 
dismissed for failing to follow the modification requirements of the 
contract.
 
2.    
Big-D’s unjust enrichment claim against Mr. Sterrett is 
dismissed because there is an adequate remedy at law.
 
3.    The 
LLCs’ and Mr. Sterrett’s breach of contract claim is 
dismissed for failure to meet the requirements of the contract in bringing the 
claim and as consequential damages, which were waived by the 
contract.
 
Standard of 
review
 
[¶9]      
As there are multiple issues to be decided, there will be multiple 
standards of review.
 
[¶10]   First, 
the standard of review on summary judgment is well known and has been set out as 
follows:
 
We review a summary judgment in the 
same light as the district court, using the same materials and following the 
same standards.  [Snyder v. 
Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Wyo. 
1999)]; 40 North Corp. v. Morrell, 964 P.2d 423, 
426 (Wyo. 1998).  We examine the record from the vantage point 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that party the 
benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  Id.  A material fact is one 
which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential 
element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties.  
Id.  If the moving party presents supporting 
summary judgment materials demonstrating no genuine issue of material fact 
exists, the burden is shifted to the non-moving party to present appropriate 
supporting materials posing a genuine issue of a material fact for 
trial.  Roberts v. Klinkosh, 
986 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo. 1999) [(overruled in part on other 
grounds by Borns v. Voss, 2003 WY 74, ¶ 17, 70 P.3d 262, 268-69 (Wyo. 2003))]; Downen v. Sinclair Oil 
Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 519 (Wyo. 1994).  
We review a grant of summary judgment deciding a 
question of law de novo and afford no deference to the district court's 
ruling.  Roberts v. Klinkosh, 
986 P.2d  at 156; Blagrove v. JB 
Mechanical, Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 
1997).
 
Lindsey v. 
Harriet, 2011 WY 80, ¶ 18, 
255 P.3d 873, 880 (Wyo. 
2011).
 
Wallace v. Pinnacle 
Bank-Wyo., 2012 WY 64, ¶ 11, 
275 P.3d 1250, 1253-54 (Wyo. 2012).
 
[¶11]   Second, 
the standard of review on sua sponte 
dismissals of claims and counterclaims has been stated as 
follows:
 
            
Review of the dismissal of a counterclaim is de novo.  
“This Court evaluates the propriety of a dismissal by employing the same 
standards and by examining the same material as the district court, without a 
presumption of correctness to the conclusions reached 
below.”  Askvig v. Wells Fargo Bank 
Wyo., N.A., 2005 WY 138, ¶ 11, 121 P.3d 783, 
787 (Wyo. 2005) (internal citation omitted).  We have 
addressed the standard of review 
regarding sua sponte 
dismissals:
 
            Sua 
sponte motions to dismiss a complaint are 
recognized in Wyoming and upheld when the proper procedure is 
followed.  Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 
848 P.2d 237, 241–42 (Wyo. 1993).  According to 
our standard of review, we will sustain a dismissal of a [counterclaim] by a 
trial court only if it shows on its face that the [counterclaimant] was not 
entitled to relief under any set of facts.  In considering 
such a motion, the “facts alleged in the [counterclaim] are admitted and the 
allegations must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
[counterclaimant].”  Dismissal is a drastic remedy and is 
sparingly granted.  Cranston v. Weston County Weed and Pest 
Bd., 826 P.2d 251, 254-255 (Wyo. 1992); Matter 
of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1259 
(Wyo. 1991) (quoting Mostert v. CBL & 
Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wyo. 1987) 
(citations omitted)).
 
Jackson v. 
Jackson, 961 P.2d 393, 395 (Wyo. 
1998).
 
Jenkins v. 
Miller, 2008 WY 45, ¶ 20, 
180 P.3d 925, 932 (Wyo. 2008).
 
discussion
 
1.      
Jurisdiction over the partial summary judgment 
order
 
[¶12]   Big-D 
spent much of its time, both in its briefs and at oral argument, claiming that 
the Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Order 
on Issues Remaining for Trial is not properly before this Court because it 
was not identified in the notice of appeal or attached as an appendix as 
required by W.R.A.P. 2.07.  The LLCs 
and Mr. Sterrett filed a Motion to Amend Notice of Appeal on 
September 17, 2012, to cure this.  A response in opposition to 
the motion was filed on October 5, 2012.  This Court finds 
that it has jurisdiction to consider the partial summary judgment order as part 
of these appeals.  Therefore, the motion to amend is moot, and 
this Court will not make any comments or rulings as to that 
motion.
 
[¶13]   The 
relevant portion of the rule is as follows:
 
2.07.   Notice 
of appeal; contents.
 
(a)   The notice 
of appeal shall:
 
. . . .
 
(2)   Identify 
the judgment or appealable order, or designated portion appealed; 
and
 
. . . .
 
(b)   In a civil 
case, the notice of appeal shall have as an appendix:
 
. . . .
 
(2)   All 
orders or judgments disposing of claims for relief and all orders or judgments 
disposing of all claims by or against any party[.]
 
W.R.A.P. Rule 
2.07.
 
[¶14]   Big-D 
also cites to the recently decided Evans case as authority for dismissing 
this part of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  That case 
held, “[T]he notice of appeal only perfects an appeal of the order(s) identified 
in the notice.”  Evans v. Moyer, 2012 WY 111, ¶ 18, 
282 P.3d 1203, 1209 (Wyo. 2012).  The Evans 
case cites two other cases: Painovich v. 
Painovich, 2009 WY 116, ¶ 11, 216 P.3d 501, 504 (Wyo. 
2009) and Nish v. Schaefer, 2006 WY 85, ¶ 23, 138 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Wyo. 2006).  Evans, 2012 WY 111, ¶ 18, 
282 P.3d  at 1209.  This Court finds that 
all three of these cases are distinguishable from the case at 
bar.
 
[¶15]   In 
Evans, the appellant filed the appeal on July 18, 2011, appealing orders 
that were entered in April and June of that same year.  
Id. at ¶ 17, at 1209.  The district court 
entered another order on October 7, 2011, and the appellant did not amend the 
notice of appeal to include this later order.  Id. at ¶ 
18, at 1209.  This Court ruled that the order of October 7, 
2011, that came after the notice of appeal, was not properly 
before it.  Id.
 
[¶16]   In 
Painovich, the district court denied a motion to vacate 
judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60 and then later also denied another 
motion for relief filed by the same party under the same rule.  
2009 WY 116, ¶¶ 10-11, 216 P.3d  at 504.  
When the appellant filed his notice of appeal, only the first order was 
included.  Id.  This Court ruled that 
claims and arguments related to the later order could not be 
considered in the appeal as W.R.A.P. 2.07 had not properly been 
followed.  Id.
 
[¶17]   In 
Nish, a judgment on a jury verdict was entered by the district 
court.  2006 WY 85, ¶ 22, 138 P.3d  at 
1142.  Appellant filed a notice of appeal from that 
judgment.  Id.  Later 
the district court entered an order awarding all specific costs requested by the 
other party.  Id.  Appellant filed a 
notice of appeal challenging that decision.  That appeal was 
dismissed after the appellant failed to submit a brief.  
Id.  Appellant then included the costs issue 
from the second appeal in his brief on the first appeal.  
Id.  This Court ruled that the costs issue could 
not be raised in the first appeal.  Id. at ¶ 24, at 
1143.
 
[¶18]   The 
law, as put forward in these three cases, is that when an order comes after the 
final order, it must be included in the notice of appeal and attached as an 
appendix in order for it to be properly before this Court.  
That is, however, not the situation in the case at bar.  
In this case, the Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Order on Issues Remaining for Trial came well before 
the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, which is the final order that was 
in the notice of appeal.  This Court has previously considered 
this situation and found that orders entered prior to the final judgment order 
are subsumed and do not need to separately be appealed from the final 
order.
 
An appealable order is “[a]n order 
affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, 
determines the action and prevents a 
judgment.”  W.R.A.P. 1.05(a).  
Generally, interlocutory orders merge into the final order.  
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 820 (Wyo. 1994).  
“[A] notice of appeal that names the final judgment is sufficient to 
support review of all earlier orders that merge in the final judgment under the 
general rule that appeal from a final judgment supports review of all earlier 
interlocutory orders.”  16A Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 3d § 
3949.4, at 72 (1999).
 
Kruckenberg v. 
Ding Masters, Inc., 2008 WY 40, ¶ 11, 
180 P.3d 895, 899 (Wyo. 2008).  See 
also Aviat Aircraft, Inc. v. 
Saurenman, 2009 WY 98, ¶ 1, 
213 P.3d 956, 957 (Wyo. 2009) (“[Appellant] actually appealed from a 
decision of the district court that was made independent of, but which was 
subsumed into, the above identified 'Judgment.’”); GGV v. 
JLR, 2005 WY 14, ¶ 15, 105 P.3d 474, 480 (Wyo. 2005) 
(“[E]arlier orders of the district court were subsumed into the current 
orders issued on the same subject.”); Seid v. 
Seid, 2001 WY 137, ¶ 19, 36 P.3d 1167, 1177 (Wyo. 2001) 
(“[W]e conclude that the order was also subsumed into the district court’s final 
order of October 6, 2000, and thus the appeal was 
timely.”).
 
[¶19]   This 
Court finds that the Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Order on Issues Remaining for Trial issued by the district 
court is subsumed into the final Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice.  Therefore, the partial summary judgment order 
is properly on appeal, and this Court has jurisdiction to consider 
it.
 
2.      
Summary judgment as to the original contract and PCCO Nos. 1 
and 2
 
[¶20]   The 
district court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the 
original contract and PCCO Nos. 1 and 2.  It, 
therefore, granted summary judgment in favor of Big-D on those contract 
issues.  This Court has reviewed all of the facts in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion and finds that the district 
court ruled correctly.
 
[¶21]   
The LLCs and Big-D entered into a valid contract which 
contained a provision for change orders to be entered.  
Both PCCO Nos. 1 and 2 were signed by the LLCs 
and Big-D.  It is apparent that the contract amount 
on PCCO No. 2 was agreed to as it was written in and then 
initialed.  Mr. Walker, agent for the LLCs, testified 
in his deposition that the revised contract amount is $1,509,811 as it appears 
in PCCO No. 2.  He was asked why he 
signed PCCO No. 2, and he said, “because it’s accurate.”  
This Court is satisfied that Big-D has established all of the essential 
elements of its contract claims against the LLCs as relates to the 
original contract and PCCO Nos. 1 and 2.  This 
then shifts the burden to the LLCs to demonstrate that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact.
 
[¶22]   The 
LLCs’ contention, in their brief in opposition to the motion for partial 
summary judgment, can be summarized in one argument–that Mr. Walker 
signed PCCO Nos. 1 and 2 with the understanding that further change 
orders would occur that would bring the price down.  Then on 
appeal to this Court, the LLCs argue that the partial summary 
judgment cannot stand because the original contract was modified by the conduct 
of the parties.  This Court will consider each of these 
contentions in turn.
 
[¶23]   First, 
the LLCs argue that the PCCOs were signed with the 
understanding that future change orders would follow.  Mr. 
Walker testified in his deposition that:
 
This -- this change order here, which 
brings it to 1509, has a bunch of approved change orders in it, but it doesn’t 
have all the approved change orders.  And here’s the issue: 
There was [sic] a significant amount of change orders that were price deducts, 
value engineering things that we changed in order to save 
money.
 
And we have pending change orders 
here.  There was [sic] huge credits.  And I 
wanted to get the credits -- because this is an inaccurate number because the 
credits aren’t there.  I wanted to get the credits in there so 
we can get to the actual contract number.  They would never 
give me the credits without giving me the extension along with it in the same 
change order.
 
And I always said, that’s not 
fair.  The credits are agreed to 
already.
 
His deposition testimony is 
contradictory.  At one point, he said the total 
in PCCO No. 2 is accurate and at another time said it was 
inaccurate.  However, the important point to this Court is 
that when he testified the number was inaccurate, it was because owed credits 
would be included in future change orders.  That leads this 
Court to believe that the figure in PCCO No. 2 is accurate as far as 
what was agreed at that time.  Mr. Walker signed the change 
order and initialed the handwritten figure.  Therefore, it is 
not a genuine issue of material fact as to the amount at that time.  
Any credits that were to be applied in future PCCOs were a 
separate issue that related to PCCO Nos. 3 and 4, which were not 
decided in the summary judgment order.  It is also important 
to note that the LLCs do not argue or claim that there was any fraud 
involved in signing PCCO No. 2.
 
[¶24]   Second, 
the LLCs argue that the contract was modified through mutual 
conduct.  They believe it was modified in five 
ways:
 
1.    
Building permits were not obtained in two weeks.
 
2.    All 
construction was not finished by August 2006.
 
3.    The 
guaranteed maximum price was exceeded.
 
4.    
Big-D’s obligation to credit the LLCs.
 
5.    
Big-D’s promise to credit the LLCs for overpayment on the Lot 
85 home.
 
This Court does not find that any of 
these create a genuine issue of material fact as to the contract 
or PCCO Nos. 1 and 2.  The first three alleged 
modifications are all facts of which all parties were aware 
when PCCO Nos. 1 and 2 were signed and, therefore, have been taken 
care of through those change orders.  The fourth alleged 
modification has already been discussed as being part of PCCO Nos. 3 
and 4.  Finally, the fifth alleged modification is not 
relevant to this case as the contract for the home on Lot 85 is a separate issue 
that is part of another suit.
 
[¶25]   This 
Court concludes that the district court properly entered its order of partial 
summary judgment in favor of Big-D against the LLCs on the original 
contract and PCCO Nos. 1 and 2 as there is no genuine issue of 
material fact.
 
3.      
Judgment against Mr. Sterrett
 
[¶26]   The 
district court’s ruling on this issue is confusing.  Big-D’s 
motion for summary judgment requests judgment against the LLCs on 
the original contract and PCCO Nos. 1 and 2, and against 
Mr. Sterrett on the unjust enrichment claim.  The 
district court’s Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Order on Issues Remaining for Trial says, “[Big-D’s] Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment is granted[.]”  Later the same order 
says, “[The LLCs and Mr. Sterrett] owe [Big-D] the 
outstanding balance on the Prime Contract and Prime Contract Change Order Nos. 1 
and 2.”  Finally, in the section on the remaining issues for 
trial, the order says, “[Big-D’s] claims for breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment related to Prime Contract Change Orders Nos. 3 and 4[.]”  
It appears that the district court granted summary judgment on the unjust 
enrichment claim as to the original contract and PCCO Nos. 1 and 
2.  However, the district court’s Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice says that Big-D’s unjust enrichment claims still remained after 
the partial summary judgment order and it then goes on to dismiss the unjust 
enrichment claims.  This leads this Court to find that even 
though the partial summary judgment order appears to grant the unjust enrichment 
claim as to the original contract and PCCO Nos. 1 and 2, it does 
not.
 
[¶27]   This 
leaves the question as to whether Mr. Sterrett is individually 
liable for the amount granted in the partial summary judgment.  
This Court finds that he is.  This topic was 
extensively covered in oral argument and counsel for Mr. Sterrett 
made several comments that are important:
 
Counsel:  He [Mr. 
Sterrett] filed an affidavit, and he said when there were representatives 
managing these projects for Sterrett Properties and 3 Creek Ranches, 
“They acted on my behalf.”  So he’s bound, and that’s in the 
record at 927-930.  So this isn’t an instance where we have 
somebody whose, um, you know, there’s gonna be a judgment and 
they’re not gonna be responsible.  There’s already 
a document of record in which he says, “This is, these are my 
projects.  This is gonna be my 
responsibility.”  So even though they’re contracted in an LLC, 
he signed an affidavit that says, “These are my 
projects.”
 
. . . .
 
. . . The only thing we do have in the 
record is Mr. Sterrett saying, “These are my entities.”  

 
. . . .
 
Justice 
Burke:  That’s only true 
if that contract binds Mr. Sterrett individually, and you’re 
conceding that it does?
 
Counsel:  Well that 
affidavit, I think they would have a pretty good argument that his actions, 
through those representatives, through the LLCs, arguably binds 
him.  They might be able to argue that, that’s not 
resolved.
 
Justice 
Burke:  Are you conceding 
it?
 
Counsel:  You know, I 
suppose, yes.
 
[¶28]   
Although counsel for Mr. Sterrett indicated that the 
affidavit of Mr. Sterrett is in the record, it is not.  
The document to which counsel refers is the Defendants’ Motion to 
Quash and Excuse Party.  That document does refer to an 
affidavit of Mr. Sterrett, but the affidavit is not attached.  
Therefore, this Court is unaware of exactly what the affidavit 
says.  However, counsel describes the affidavit in enough 
detail that this Court will find that Mr. Sterrett is bound 
individually by the contract.  This is in fact what counsel 
for Mr. Sterrett unequivocally concedes.
 
[¶29]   This 
finding is supported by precedent as illustrated by the following 
case:
 
A judicial admission is an express 
waiver made in court by a party or his attorney conceding the truth of an 
alleged fact.  Kohne v. 
Yost, 250 Mont. 109, 818 P.2d 360, 362 (1991). 
Under the right circumstances, an admission made by an attorney can be binding 
upon his client and constitute the basis for a verdict. 
 Childs v. Franco, 563 F. Supp. 290, 292 
(E.D. Pa. 1983); Larson v. A.T.S.I., 
859 P.2d 273, 275 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); see also World Mart, 
Inc. v. Ditsch, 855 P.2d 1228, 1237 (Wyo. 
1993).  Such an admission can be made in closing argument. 
 Childs, 563 F. Supp.  at 292; World 
Mart, Inc., 855 P.2d  at 1237; 
Kohne, 818 P.2d  at 
362.
 
In order to be considered an 
admission, the attorney's statement must be unequivocal. 
 Childs, 563 F. Supp.  at 292; Baxter v. 
Gannaway, 113 N.M. 45, 822 P.2d 1128, 1133 
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 16, 820 P.2d 1330 
(1991).  An admission is a declaration relating to factual 
matters; a statement of personal opinion is not an admission. 
Baxter, 822 P.2d  at 1133; 
Larson, 859 P.2d  at 276.  In 
determining whether a statement made by counsel is an admission, we must 
consider the circumstances of the case and the context of the statements. 
 Baxter, 822 P.2d  at 1133; 
Kohne, 818 P.2d  at 362.  If 
ambiguity or doubt exists as to whether or not the attorney's statement was an 
admission, we presume that the attorney did not intend to make a judicial 
admission during his argument.  Baxter, 
822 P.2d  at 1133.
 
Francis v. 
Pountney, 972 P.2d 143, 147 (Wyo. 
1999).
 
[¶30]   For 
these reasons, this Court concludes that the partial summary judgment should be 
entered by the district court against both the LLCs and Mr. 
Sterrett, making Mr. Sterrett personally liable for the 
amount of the original contract, plus PCCO Nos. 1 and 2, including 
the interest on those amounts.  Upon remand, the order shall 
be modified to clearly reflect that the judgment is against the LLCs 
and Mr. Sterrett.
 
4.      
Unjust enrichment claims
 
[¶31]   Because 
this Court has found that Mr. Sterrett is individually liable under 
the contract and the PCCOs, the unjust enrichment claims put forward by 
Big-D are determined above and need not be discussed 
further.
 
5.      
Dismissal of claim related to PCCO Nos. 3 and 
4
 
[¶32]   The 
district court dismissed Big-D’s contract claims related to PCCO 
Nos. 3 and 4 because it found that the contract only allowed for modification 
through the written modification process.  The district court 
found that since PCCO Nos. 3 and 4 were not signed by both parties, 
the modification process was not followed, and they therefore were not valid 
modifications to the contract.  This Court finds that this 
issue should be remanded to the district court.
 
[¶33]   Big-D 
argues that PCCO Nos. 3 and 4 were agreed to both verbally and 
through e-mail by the LLCs, but they then refused to sign 
them.  Furthermore, they claim that the contract was modified 
by the mutual conduct of the parties.  The first thing this 
Court must discuss is whether a contract with an integration clause such as the 
one involved in this case can be modified through oral agreement or by mutual 
conduct of the parties.
 
The rule followed by the courts 
generally, with some authority to the contrary, is that unless a contract is 
required by law to be in writing, 
the contract can be modified orally, even though it provides that it can be 
modified only in writing.
 
17A Am. 
Jur. 2d Contracts § 
514 (2004).  Wyoming 
follows the general rule as evidenced by the following 
case:
 
There are two illustrative Wyoming 
cases dealing with mutual agreements to vary the terms of a written 
contract.  Both rely on the concept 
that:
 
As a general rule, if the parties 
mutually adopt a mode of performing their contract differing from its strict 
terms or if they mutually relax its terms by adopting a loose mode of executing 
it, neither party can go back upon the past and insist upon a breach, because it 
was not fulfilled according to its letter.
 
Quin Blair 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien Construction 
Co., 597 P.2d 945, 951 n. 6 
(Wyo. 1979) (emphasis removed); Schuler v. Community First Nat'l 
Bank, 999 P.2d 1303, 1305 n. 1 (Wyo. 
2000).  Applying this general rule, however, the cases reached 
different results.  In the first, “there was never any 
mutual agreement” to change the contract, only “unilateral disregard” of 
certain contract terms.  Quin 
Blair, 597 P.2d  at 951 (emphasis in 
original).  We therefore enforced the contract as 
written.  In the second, there was unchallenged evidence that 
the parties had made an oral agreement to change the contract terms, and they 
had taken actions consistent with the altered terms.  
Schuler, 999 P.2d  at 1305.  
We therefore affirmed the trial court's summary judgment enforcing the 
terms of the new oral agreement.
 
PBS Enterprizes, Inc. 
v. CWCapital Asset Mgmt., 
LLC, 2008 WY 53, ¶ 9, 
183 P.3d 1140, 1142-43 (Wyo. 2008).  Accordingly, 
in order for a written contract to be modified without another writing, two 
elements must be met: First, there must be evidence that the parties orally 
modified the contract terms, and second, the parties have taken actions 
consistent with the new terms.
 
[¶34]   This 
claim was dismissed by the district court sua 
sponte, which means that if there are any facts under which Big-D 
could get relief, then the ruling should be reversed.  This 
Court finds that there are facts under which Big-D could get relief.  
Therefore, the ruling of the district court will be reversed.  
On remand, Big-D will have the burden of proving that there was a mutual 
oral agreement as to the terms in PCCO Nos. 3 and 4, and that both 
sides had taken action consistent with that agreement.
 
[¶35]   There 
is one more issue that must be discussed in conjunction with PCCO 
Nos. 3 and 4.  That is the issue of escalation costs and 
consequential damages.  Big-D classifies much of what is 
included in these change orders as escalation costs, which are permitted under 
the contract.  On the other hand, the LLCs and 
Mr. Sterrett classify those same costs as consequential damages 
which are barred by the contract.  This Court declines to go 
through PCCO Nos. 3 and 4 item by item to determine which are 
escalation costs and which are consequential damages.  That 
will be a task for the district court on remand.
 
[¶36]   
Finally, this Court also notes that the previous holding of this opinion 
that Mr. Sterrett is individually liable for the original contract 
and PCCO Nos. 1 and 2 will also apply to PCCO Nos. 3 and 
4.  Therefore, any liability found on remand against 
the LLCs will also be against Mr. Sterrett as an 
individual.
 
6.      
Dismissal of claim for damages caused by 
delay
 
[¶37]   The 
district court dismissed the LLCs’ and Mr. Sterrett’s claims 
for damages caused by delay for two reasons: First, it found the claim barred 
because they failed to meet the contractual requirements for bringing the 
claim.  Second, it found the claim barred because of the 
contractual waiver of consequential damages.  This Court finds 
this claim was properly dismissed.
 
[¶38]   This 
Court will first discuss whether the claim is barred by the contractual waiver 
of consequential damages.  The contract sets forth the waiver 
as follows:
 
§ 4.3.10  Claims for 
Consequential Damages.  The Contractor and Owner waive Claims 
against each other for consequential damages arising out of or relating to this 
Contract.  This mutual waiver 
includes:
 
.1    
damages incurred by the Owner for rental expenses, for losses of use, 
income, profit, financing, business and reputation, and for loss of management 
or employee productivity or of the services of such 
persons[.]
 
The damages claimed by 
the LLCs and Mr. Sterrett are set out in their 
counterclaim.  They claim that delay by Big-D caused the 
following:
 
[T]he Sterrett Defendants 
have been unable to sell the projects as anticipated and missed the opportunity 
to sell the projects when the market was appropriate[.]
 
These damages, as set out by 
the LLCs and Mr. Sterrett, fall under the waiver as loss of 
income and/or profit.  Therefore, the claim is barred by the 
contract.  This Court finds that there is no set of facts 
under which the LLCs and Mr. Sterrett can obtain relief; 
therefore, the district court’s sua sponte 
dismissal of this claim was appropriate.
 
[¶39]   Since 
the claim is barred by the contract, there is no reason for this Court to 
determine if the claim was properly brought under the 
contract.
 
Conclusion
 
[¶40]   We find 
that the Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Order on Issues Remaining for Trial entered by the district court is 
properly before this Court because it was subsumed into the final Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice.  We also find that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact as to the original contract and PCCO 
Nos. 1 and 2.  The Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Order on Issues Remaining for Trial entered by 
the district court is affirmed as to that issue.  Furthermore, 
this Court finds that Mr. Sterrett is individually liable under the 
contract and the PCCOs because his counsel conceded the point after 
referring to his affidavit in which he admitted it was his 
project.
 
[¶41]   Next, 
we find that there are facts under which Big-D could obtain relief 
under PCCO Nos. 3 and 4.  On this issue, the 
district court’s Order of Dismissal with Prejudice is reversed and the 
case is remanded.  On remand, Big-D will have the burden of 
proving that there was an oral agreement as to PCCO Nos. 3 and 4, 
and that both parties took action consistent with the oral 
agreement.  As to the contention of the LLCs and 
Mr. Sterrett that some of the items in PCCO Nos. 3 and 4 
were consequential damages barred by the contract and not escalation costs, this 
Court will also remand that issue to the district 
court.
 
[¶42]   
Finally, we find that the damages claims of the LLCs and 
Mr. Sterrett are barred by the contract’s waiver of consequential 
damages.  The district court’s Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice is affirmed on this issue.
 
[¶43]   In 
conclusion, the rulings of the district court are affirmed in part and reversed 
and remanded in part for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.
 
FOOTNOTES
1Lot 81 
is in the 3 Creek Ranch Subdivision in Teton County, Wyoming.
2There are other modifications defined which are not 
relevant to this case.
3There is also a promissory estoppel claim 
which is not relevant to these appeals.
4There were separate contracts for the homes built on 
these lots.
5This part of the ruling was later set 
aside.