Case Title: Jeanette Ocasio v. Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hospital

Citation: 2002 WI 89

Docket Number: 2000AP003056

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 89 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3056 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Jeanette Ocasio,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hospital,  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Michael Kefer, M.D.,  
 
Defendant, 
ABC Insurance, DEF Insurance, GHI Insurance, JKL 
Insurance, and Wisconsin Patients Compensation 
Fund,  
 
Defendants-Respondents, 
Medical College of Wisconsin and Gary L. Swart, 
M.D.,  
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 264 
Reported at:  248 Wis. 2d 932, 637 N.W.2d 459 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 28, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael G. Malmstadt   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
SYKES, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Thomas A. Ogorchock and Miller & Ogorchock, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
Timothy J. Aiken and Aiken & Scoptur, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Thomas A. Ogorchock and Timothy J. Aiken. 
 
 
 
2
For defendants-respondents there was a brief by Todd M. 
Weir, Jennifer A. Slater Carlson, and Otjen, Van Ert, Lieb & 
Weir, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jennifer A. Slater 
Carlson. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark E. Larson, Bradley 
S. Foley, and Gutglass, Erickson, Bonville, Seibel & Falkner, 
S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Civil Trial Counsel of 
Wisconsin. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Randall E. Reinhardt 
and David M. Skoglind, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
2002 WI 89 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3056  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 8454) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jeanette Ocasio,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hospital,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Michael Kefer, M.D.,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
ABC Insurance, DEF Insurance, GHI  
Insurance, JKL Insurance, and Wisconsin  
Patients Compensation Fund,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Medical College of Wisconsin and Gary L.  
Swart, M.D.,  
 
          Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Jeanette 
Ocasio, seeks review of a court of appeals decision affirming a 
No. 
00-3056   
 
2 
 
circuit court order dismissing her medical malpractice action 
against 
Froedtert 
Memorial 
Lutheran 
Hospital 
and 
other 
defendants.  She asserts that the court of appeals erred by 
concluding that dismissal is mandated for noncompliance with the 
provision in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) (1999-2000)1 requiring a 
medical malpractice claimant to wait until the end of the 
statutory 
mediation 
period 
before 
filing 
a 
summons 
and 
complaint.  We agree with Ocasio that failure to comply with 
that provision does not require as a remedy the circuit court's 
dismissal of the action.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
I 
¶2 
The parties agree to the facts necessary to our 
decision in this case.  Ocasio was treated at Froedtert on 
October 17, 1996.  She alleges that she sustained an injury to 
her arm after a nurse negligently injected her with Benadryl, an 
antihistamine used to treat symptoms of allergic reactions. 
¶3 
Ocasio mailed a request for mediation to the Director 
of State Courts by registered mail on October 8, 1999, as 
required by Wis. Stat. ch. 655.  Chapter 655 provides, among 
other things, for the establishment of a mediation system for 
medical malpractice actions as defined in the statute.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 655.006, 655.007, and 655.42. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-3056   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Section 655.44(5) provides that no court action may be 
commenced until the expiration of a 90-day mediation period.  
The mediation period is intended to be a "cooling off" period.2  
Schulz v. Nienhuis, 152 Wis. 2d 434, 441, 448 N.W.2d 655 (1989). 
¶5 
On October 18, 1999, well before the end of the 
mediation period, Ocasio filed a summons and complaint in 
circuit court.  No party's answer to the complaint raised the 
issue of the premature commencement of the action.  
¶6 
Because of scheduling problems,3 mediation was not held 
within the statutory period.  Instead the mediation session was 
conducted on February 4, 2000, approximately three weeks outside 
the mediation period.  A few days later, Ocasio filed an amended 
summons and complaint, essentially to drop a party from the 
action, but she otherwise repeated the originally asserted 
allegations against the remaining defendants. 
¶7 
On February 17, 2000, the statute of limitations 
expired.4  Subsequently, the defendant, Medical College of 
Wisconsin, 
raised 
the 
noncompliance 
with 
§ 655.44(5) 
by 
asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction and competence over 
the defendants.  Froedtert, however, made no assertion of 
                                                 
2 Because 
Ocasio 
sent 
her 
request 
for 
mediation 
by 
registered mail, the mediation period spanned 93 days, beginning 
with the date her request was mailed.  Wis. Stat. § 655.465(7). 
3 Counsel for Ocasio stated at oral argument that this was 
the reason for the delay. 
4 The statute of limitations was tolled from the date Ocasio 
mailed the mediation request until 30 days after the last day of 
the mediation period.  Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4). 
No. 
00-3056   
 
4 
 
Ocasio's noncompliance with § 655.44(5) in its answer to the 
amended complaint. 
¶8 
The Medical College of Wisconsin moved for dismissal 
on March 17, 2000, and argued that Ocasio failed to comply with 
§ 655.44(5) by filing her action before the expiration of the 
statutory 
mediation 
period 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 655.465(7).  
Section 655.44(5) states:  
Except as provided in s. 655.445, no court action 
may be commenced unless a request for mediation has 
been filed under this section and until the expiration 
of the mediation period under s. 655.465(7). 
Froedtert then joined in the motion to dismiss, and the circuit 
court concluded that because Ocasio had failed to comply with 
§ 655.44(5), her suit must be dismissed. 
¶9 
In the court of appeals, Ocasio argued that the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
in 
dismissing 
her 
suit 
because 
the 
requirement in § 655.44(5) that a claimant must wait for the 
mediation period to expire before filing a medical malpractice 
action was merely directory.  In addition, she asserted that her 
amended pleadings rectified any problem, and that Froedtert 
waived any jurisdictional objections. 
¶10 The court of appeals concluded that the expiration of 
the 
mediation 
period 
is 
a 
condition 
precedent 
to 
the 
commencement of a filing of a medical malpractice action and 
that 
noncompliance 
required 
dismissal 
of 
Ocasio's 
claim.  
Further the court opined that there was no waiver here because 
there can be no waiver of a court's lack of competency to 
No. 
00-3056   
 
5 
 
proceed.  Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the 
decision of the circuit court. 
II 
¶11 The question we address is whether a circuit court 
must dismiss an action when a ch. 655 claimant fails to comply 
with the provision in § 655.44(5) stating that no court action 
may be commenced until the expiration of the mediation period 
under § 655.465(7).  This issue of statutory interpretation 
presents a question of law subject to independent appellate 
review.  Patients Comp. Fund v. Lutheran Hosp., 223 Wis. 2d 439, 
454, 588 N.W.2d 35 (1999).5 
III 
¶12 The language in § 655.44(5) is clear and unambiguous 
as applied to the facts here:  "Except as provided in s. 
655.445, no court action may be commenced . . . until the 
expiration of the mediation period under s. 655.465(7)."  Ocasio 
failed to comply with this statutory provision.  The question 
becomes what is the proper remedy. 
¶13 Section 655.44(5) is silent as to the remedy for 
failure to comply with the timing provision.  Thus, we look to 
the purpose of § 655.44(5) and previous interpretations given 
                                                 
5 Although the court of appeals discussed competence and 
subject matter jurisdiction, we do not view this case as 
implicating those concepts.  There is no question that Ocasio 
failed to comply with the language of the statute.  The question 
is what remedy ensues as a result of this statutory violation, 
since the statute does not provide one.  
No. 
00-3056   
 
6 
 
other timing provisions in ch. 655 in order to determine the 
proper remedy. 
¶14 The purpose of ch. 655 is apparent from the statement 
of legislative intent in the statutes.  The legislature 
expressly stated that the mediation system is intended to 
provide claimants with an "informal, inexpensive, and expedient 
means for resolving disputes."  Wis. Stat. § 655.42(1).  The 
informal, flexible nature of the mediation system under ch. 655 
has been recognized repeatedly by this court.  See Eby v. 
Kozarek, 153 Wis. 2d 75, 83, 450 N.W.2d 249 (1990); Schulz, 152 
Wis. 2d at 439.  The court also has indicated that ch. 655 is 
intended to provide a cooling off period regardless of whether a 
mediation session occurs during that period.  Schulz, 152 
Wis. 2d at 441. 
¶15 This court and the court of appeals previously have 
concluded that dismissal for failure to comply with certain 
timing requirements in ch. 655 is inconsistent with the purpose 
of ch. 655.  Eby, 153 Wis. 2d at 83; Schulz, 152 Wis. 2d at 443; 
Gauger v. Mueller, 149 Wis. 2d 737, 742, 439 N.W.2d 637 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
¶16 For 
example, 
in 
Eby, 
this 
court 
addressed 
a 
plaintiff's failure to comply with the statutory requirement in 
§ 655.44's 
companion 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 655.445, 
that 
a 
claimant file a request for mediation within 15 days of filing 
an action.  The court concluded that failure to comply did not 
require dismissal despite the use of the word "shall" in the 
statute.  Eby, 153 Wis. 2d at 77. 
No. 
00-3056   
 
7 
 
¶17 Similarly, in Gauger, the court of appeals addressed 
whether the time period in § 655.465(7) was mandatory where the 
plaintiff 
failed 
to 
participate 
in 
mediation 
within 
the 
statutory period.  149 Wis. 2d at 739.  Despite the use of the 
term "shall" in the statute, the court of appeals concluded that 
the statute was directory rather than mandatory, and that 
dismissal was not required.  See id. at 743.  
¶18  Finally, in Schulz, this court concluded that failure 
to participate in a mediation session within the statutory 
mediation period under § 655.465(7) does not require the circuit 
court to dismiss the action.  152 Wis. 2d at 436.  The court 
noted that its decision was consistent with that of the court of 
appeals in Gauger.  Id. at 439. 
¶19 In all of these decisions, the courts relied on the 
purpose of the statute as providing for a system of informal, 
flexible procedures.  Dismissal for failure to comply with a 
ch. 655 timing provision was considered inconsistent with this 
purpose despite the legislature's use of the term "shall."  
Thus, in none of these cases did the courts determine that 
failure to comply with the statute necessitated dismissal. 
¶20 A conclusion that the failure to abide by the timing 
provision 
in 
§ 655.44(5) 
mandates 
dismissal 
would 
be 
inconsistent with these prior holdings.  All of the statutory 
provisions are part of the same mediation system.  Each was 
created by the legislature to serve the same objectives, as 
stated in § 655.42(1). 
No. 
00-3056   
 
8 
 
¶21 Accordingly, we follow Eby, Schulz, and Gauger in 
determining that failure to comply with the timing provision in 
§ 655.44(5) also does not require dismissal.  We agree with this 
reasoning by the court in Schulz and apply it here: 
If the legislature 
intended 
the 
result the 
defendants urge, it could have expressly stated that a 
claimant's failure to participate in a mediation 
session within the statutory mediation period results 
in dismissal.  It did not do so.  In the absence of 
express language, we are unwilling to read the harsh 
penalty of dismissal of the lawsuit into the mediation 
statute.  The tenor of modern law is to avoid 
dismissal of cases on technical grounds and to allow 
adjudication on the merits. 
152 
Wis. 2d at 
443. 
 
Holding 
claimants 
to 
"precise 
and 
inflexible requirements" does not comport with the legislature's 
stated intent in § 655.42 to make procedures in medical 
malpractice cases informal and flexible.  Eby, 153 Wis. 2d at 
83; see also Bertorello v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 685 F. Supp. 192, 
195 (W.D. Wis. 1988).    
¶22 In addition, if failure to comply with § 655.44(5) 
mandated dismissal, the statute would promote game playing 
rather 
than 
an 
informal, 
flexible 
procedure 
for 
dispute 
resolution.  An interpretation of the statute to mandate 
dismissal would allow defendants to lie in the weeds until the 
statute of limitations ran, then move to dismiss based on the 
plaintiff's failure to comply with § 655.44(5).  The statute 
would serve as a trap for the unwary, not the informal and 
flexible system intended. 
No. 
00-3056   
 
9 
 
¶23 In short, we follow precedent and the purpose of the 
statute to conclude that a plaintiff's failure to comply with 
the timing provision in § 655.44(5) does not mandate that the 
circuit court dismiss an action.  As in Schulz, in the absence 
of language expressly mandating the remedy of dismissal, we are 
unwilling to read into the statute the requirement of such a 
harsh remedy for noncompliance with this mediation provision.    
¶24 The chronology of events in this case reinforces our 
concern that interpreting § 655.44(5) to mandate the remedy of 
dismissal will result in game playing by defendants and a trap 
for unwary plaintiffs.  Here, the defendants filed their initial 
answers before the statute of limitations on Ocasio's claim had 
run, and they made no objection to Ocasio's failure to comply 
with § 655.44(5).  It was only after the running of the statute 
of limitations that the defendants raised Ocasio's failure to 
comply with § 655.44(5) as grounds for dismissal. 
¶25 Having concluded that the failure to comply with the 
timing provision in § 655.44(5) does not mandate dismissal, we 
still must determine what sanction is available for failure to 
comply with the statute.  A defendant is not without any 
recourse when a plaintiff fails to comply with § 655.44(5).  We 
follow Eby in concluding that the circuit court retains 
discretion to determine the appropriate sanction, if any, for 
the failure to comply with the timing provision in § 655.44(5).  
See 153 Wis. 2d at 82.  The sanction may range from no sanction 
to dismissal in the most egregious cases.  Id. 
IV 
No. 
00-3056   
 
10 
 
¶26 In sum, we conclude that failure to comply with the 
timing provision in § 655.44(5) does not require the circuit 
court to dismiss the ch. 655 claimant's action.  We therefore 
reverse the court of appeals, and we remand for the circuit 
court to exercise its discretion in determining what sanction, 
if any, is appropriate for Ocasio's failure to comply with the 
statute. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No.  00-3056.npc 
 
1 
 
¶27 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  I cannot join 
the majority's opinion because I disagree that failure to comply 
with Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) does not necessitate dismissal.  The 
majority 
acknowledges 
that 
Ocasio 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
§ 655.44(5), but then concludes that the statute is silent as to 
the appropriate remedy, requiring the court to look to the 
purpose of the statute and previous interpretations given other 
timing provisions in ch. 655.  I respectfully dissent because 
this 
analysis 
is 
wholly 
unnecessary. 
 
The 
language 
in 
§ 655.44(5) unambiguously states, "no court action may be 
commenced" unless two conditions are satisfied.  I find this 
language unambiguous and instructive regarding the appropriate 
remedy for failure to comply with the statute.  Failure to 
comply with § 655.44(5) necessitates dismissal since a statutory 
condition precedent was not met. 
¶28 The majority first turns to the purpose of the medical 
malpractice mediation system and states that ch. 655 is intended 
to provide claimants with an "informal, inexpensive, and 
expedient means for resolving disputes."  Majority op. at ¶14 
(citing Wis. Stat. § 655.42(1)).  After examining case law 
interpreting various sections of ch. 655, the majority then 
concludes, "in the absence of language expressly mandating the 
remedy of dismissal, we are unwilling to read into [§ 655.44(5)] 
the requirement of such a harsh remedy for noncompliance with 
this mediation provision."  Id. at ¶23.    I agree with the 
objectives and purpose of ch. 655.  I disagree, however, that 
§ 655.44(5) does not expressly mandate the remedy of dismissal 
No.  00-3056.npc 
 
2 
 
for noncompliance.  Furthermore, I conclude that mandating 
dismissal for failure to comply with § 655.44(5) is consistent 
with the purpose of ch. 655. 
¶29 The majority needs to look no further than the statute 
itself to determine that Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) mandates that 
Ocasio's medical malpractice cause of action must be dismissed.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 655.44(5) states:  "Except as provided in s. 
655.445, no court action may be commenced unless a request for 
mediation has been filed under this section and until the 
expiration of the mediation period under s. 655.465(7)."  
(Emphasis added).  It is undisputed that Ocasio did not follow 
the statutory requirements because she filed the summons and 
complaint 83 days before the mediation period expired.  To 
determine the appropriate remedy for noncompliance, therefore, 
we need simply to interpret the meaning of this language:  "no 
court action may be commenced." 
¶30 By holding that Ocasio's lawsuit does not necessitate 
dismissal, the majority apparently concludes that the statutory 
language, "no court action may be commenced," is directory 
rather than mandatory.  I disagree.  Although the statute uses 
the word "may," which often indicates directory language, here 
it is coupled with "no."  Using "may" in a negative sense——such 
as "may not"——makes the statute mandatory.  For example, in 
Brookhouse v. State Farm Mutual Insurance, 130 Wis. 2d 166, 170, 
387 N.W.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1986), the court of appeals concluded 
that the statutory language "may not be enlarged" is mandatory. 
The distinction is not between "shall" and "may" but 
between "may" and "may not."  "May not" is a negative 
No.  00-3056.npc 
 
3 
 
term.  Where statutory restrictions are couched in 
negative terms, they are usually held to be mandatory. 
Negative words in a grant of power should never be 
construed as directory. . . . Thus, where the statute 
says that the time for motions after verdict may not 
be enlarged, these are negative words regarding the 
grant of power.  We hold that the language is 
mandatory. 
(Citations omitted.) 
¶31 This case presents a similar question and accordingly, 
I conclude that "no court action may be commenced" is mandatory.  
When statutory language is unambiguous, the court's duty is to 
give that language its ordinary meaning.  Gauger v. Mueller, 149 
Wis. 2d 737, 740, 439 N.W.2d 637 (Ct. App 1989).  Section 
655.44(5) is unambiguous and means exactly what it states.  
Acting under the statute at issue, Ocasio may not commence a 
court action until the mediation period has expired.  The 
unambiguous language in § 655.44(5) prohibits the commencement 
of Ocasio's court action here; thus, failure to comply with the 
statute necessitates dismissal.6 
¶32 I find further support for this conclusion because the 
plain language of Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) creates a condition 
precedent, which, when not complied with, means that the cause 
of action has not been properly commenced.  "If an action may 
not be brought except upon the happening of an event, then the 
occurrence of that event is a condition precedent to the 
                                                 
6 This 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) 
is 
consistent with this court's previous decision in Eby v. 
Kozarek, 153 Wis. 2d 75, 82, 450 N.W.2d 249 (1990).  In that 
case, Justice Bablitch, writing for a unanimous court, cited 
§ 655.44(5) and stated:  "Once the request [for mediation] has 
been filed, the patient may not commence a court action until 
the mediation period under sec. 655.465(7) has expired."   
No.  00-3056.npc 
 
4 
 
commencement of the action."  Siemering v. Siemering, 95 
Wis. 2d 111, 114, 288 N.W.2d 881 (Ct. App. 1980).  The plain 
language in § 655.44(5) states that a cause of action may not be 
brought except upon the expiration of the mediation period under 
§ 655.465(7).  Expiration of the mediation period, therefore, is 
a condition precedent and a suit filed prematurely is void 
because of the failure to comply with the condition precedent.   
¶33 Applied here, Ocasio failed to comply with the 
condition precedent in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5); thus, the circuit 
court did not have competency to hear the case.7  See Colby v. 
Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 362, 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996) ("A 
cause of action is not properly commenced when a plaintiff 
prematurely files a summons and complaint. . . . "); McMillan-
Warner Mut. Ins. v. Kauffman, 159 Wis. 2d 588, 594, 465 
                                                 
7 The court of appeals correctly noted that the terms 
"competence" and "jurisdiction" are not synonymous.  Ocasio v. 
Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hospital, 2001 WI App 264, ¶1 n.2, 
248 Wis. 2d 932, 637 N.W.2d 459.  In Figgs v. City of Milwaukee, 
121 Wis. 2d 44, 51-52 n.6, 357 N.W.2d 548 (1984), this court 
specifically discussed the difference: 
[W]e point out that this court has stated that [] 
statutory conditions or conditions precedent have 
nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction of a 
circuit court.  They deal only with the appropriate 
conditions set by the legislature as a prerequisite 
for commencing or maintaining an action.  Subject 
matter jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit courts 
by the constitution.  Whether or not a proper claim 
has been filed, the circuit court has jurisdiction of 
the subject matter. 
(Internal citations omitted).  Several years later this court 
revisited that language with approval in Gillen v. City of 
Neenah, 219 Wis. 2d 806, 824-825, 580 N.W.2d 628 (1998). 
No.  00-3056.npc 
 
5 
 
N.W.2d 201 
(Ct. 
App. 
1990) 
(noting 
that 
the 
court 
has 
"competency to act when a properly subscribed summons and 
complaint is filed with the court.").8  I conclude, therefore, 
that the circuit court properly dismissed Ocasio's medical 
malpractice claim since the circuit court lacked competency to 
proceed with the matter. 
¶34 Contrary 
to 
the 
majority's 
approach, 
I 
further 
conclude that mandating dismissal for failure to comply with 
Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) is consistent with the purpose of the 
medical malpractice mediation system.  The majority claims that 
dismissal is a harsh penalty in a system where procedures are 
intended to be informal and flexible.  Majority op. at ¶21.  
Again, I disagree. 
¶35 In establishing the mediation system in ch. 655, the 
legislature provided for flexibility by creating two options for 
commencing a medical malpractice case.  See Eby v. Kozarek, 153 
Wis. 2d 75, 82, 450 N.W.2d 249 (1990) (describing the current 
statutory scheme as "two alternatives for pursuing redress"); 
Seaquist v. Physicians Ins. Co., 192 Wis. 2d 530, 541, 531 
N.W.2d 437 (Ct. App. 1995) ("A claimant must choose one of two 
ways of participating in the mediation system.").   First, under 
Wis. Stat. § 655.445 a plaintiff can initially file a claim in 
court and then within fifteen days file a request for mediation.  
                                                 
8 As the court of appeals in this case noted, the condition 
precedent in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) is analogous to notice of 
claim statutes.  Ocasio, 2001 WI App 264, ¶16 (analogizing to 
§ 893.80 where failure of a plaintiff to give notice within the 
statutory time period results in the party losing the right to 
proceed). 
No.  00-3056.npc 
 
6 
 
Second, under § 655.44, which Ocasio relied on, a plaintiff can 
initially request mediation and then, after the mediation period 
has expired, file a claim in court.  These two procedures are 
clearly written in the statutes to provide the flexibility that 
the legislature intended for medical malpractice cases. The 
majority's decision here unnecessarily bends those procedures to 
allow for further options that are contrary to the unambiguous 
language of § 655.44. 
¶36 Finally, mandating dismissal for failure to comply 
with 
the 
condition 
precedent in 
Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) is 
consistent with the legislature's intent of having a "cooling 
off" period.  Chapter 655 provides that during the mediation 
period, the statutes of limitations are tolled, and furthermore, 
no discovery, pretrial conference, or scheduling conference is 
to 
take 
place 
until 
the 
mediation 
period 
expires.  
Wis. Stat. § 655.445(2) and (3).  Moreover, this court discussed 
the mediation period in Schulz v. Nienhuis, 152 Wis. 2d 434, 448 
N.W.2d 655 (1989).  Now Chief Justice Abrahamson, writing for a 
unanimous court, described the mediation period: 
Section 655.445(3) provides that "no trial, pretrial 
conference or scheduling conference may be held until 
the expiration of the mediation period under sec. 
655.465(7)."  Thus litigation cannot proceed until the 
statutory mediation period ends.  The prohibition on 
pretrial activities applies to the entire 90-day 
period.  No provision is made for allowing parties who 
complete the mediation session before the statutory 
mediation period expires to proceed to trial.  The 
period for mediation under the statutes therefore 
seems 
to 
be 
a 
statutory 
"cooling 
off" 
period, 
apparently unrelated to whether a mediation session 
occurs during that period. 
No.  00-3056.npc 
 
7 
 
152 Wis. 2d at 441 (emphasis added).  I acknowledge that Schulz 
was 
addressing 
the 
procedure 
in 
§ 655.445, 
rather 
than 
§ 655.44(5).  Nonetheless, the purpose of the mediation period——
to allow the parties to "cool off"——applies to both statutes.  
The legislature intended that litigation neither be initiated 
nor proceed during the mediation period.  Consequently, the 
circuit court appropriately dismissed Ocasio's claim for failure 
to follow that statutory mandate.   
¶37 In conclusion, ch. 655 unambiguously and explicitly 
provides two options for commencement of a medical malpractice 
claim.  Ocasio did not follow either.  Her actions were contrary 
to the unambiguous language in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5).  I agree 
with the circuit court and the court of appeals, therefore, that 
her failure to comply with § 655.44(5) mandates dismissal of her 
medical malpractice claim since the circuit court lacked 
competency to hear the case.  For these reasons, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶38 I am authorized to state that Justice DIANE S. SYKES 
joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  00-3056.npc 
 
 
 
1