Case Title: Commonwealth v. Depiero

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11893

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-01-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11893  
 
 
 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOHN C. DEPIERO. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 3, 2015. - January 4, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Investigatory stop, Reasonable suspicion.  
Search and Seizure, Threshold police inquiry, Reasonable 
suspicion.  Threshold Police Inquiry.  Motor Vehicle, 
Operating under the influence.  Evidence, Anonymous 
statement, Corroborative evidence. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Cambridge Division 
of the District Court Department on August 11, 2011. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by 
Antoinette E. McLean Leony, J., and the case was heard by Joseph 
W. Jennings, III, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jane Prince (Randy S. Chapman with her) for the defendant.
 
Casey E. Silvia, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Daniel K. Gelb, for National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Chauncey B. Wood, Dahlia S. Fetouh, Nancy A. Dinsmore, & 
Benjamin R. Cox, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  In January, 2013, after a bench trial, the 
defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol (second offense) in violation of G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).  On appeal, he argues that the denial 
of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless 
stop of his vehicle was error. 
 
The stop, made by State police Trooper John Dwyer, was 
prompted by the receipt of an anonymous 911 call concerning an 
apparent drunk driver traveling on Memorial Drive in Cambridge.  
The defendant claimed that the stop was neither supported by 
reasonable suspicion nor made pursuant to an ongoing emergency.  
After a hearing, a judge denied the defendant's motion to 
suppress, concluding that Dwyer "had reasonable suspicion to 
conduct an investigatory stop."  The judge reasoned that "[t]he 
911 call was from an ordinary citizen -- not an informant -- who 
had witnessed a motor vehicle infraction, namely, a motor 
vehicle driving erratically on the roadway."1 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant objected to the introduction of the 911 call 
at the motion to suppress hearing because the Commonwealth had 
failed to authenticate the tape recording properly.  There was 
no error in admitting the 911 call.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 1101 
(d) (2015) ("[t]he law of evidence does not apply with full 
force at motion to suppress hearings").  See also Commonwealth 
v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 546 (2011) ("[a] proponent 
adequately lays the foundation for admission when a 
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the item is 
authentic").  The 911 call began with a statement that the 
3 
 
 
The Appeals Court affirmed the denial of the defendant's 
motion to suppress, but on different grounds.  Commonwealth v. 
Depiero, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 105, 106 (2015).  The Appeals Court 
concluded that the information bore sufficient indicia of 
reliability because the unidentified caller's observations were 
made "under the stress or excitement of a 'startling or shocking 
event.'"  Id. at 112, quoting Commonwealth v. Depina, 456 Mass. 
238, 244 (2010).  Dwyer could therefore rely on the information 
in establishing reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory 
stop.  Id. at 113. 
 
Subsequent to the judge's ruling on the defendant's motion 
to suppress, the United States Supreme Court released its 
decision in Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014), 
regarding the weight properly afforded to the reliability of 
information provided to police over the 911 emergency call 
system by an anonymous caller.  The Court concluded that because 
of technological and regulatory developments, "a reasonable 
officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice 
before using [the 911] system," and therefore its use is "one of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
caller had reached the "State [p]olice, 911."  State police 
Trooper John Dwyer testified that he was familiar with the 
procedure by which the State police treat incoming 
communications, and that such procedure was followed on the 
night in question.  Moreover, having reviewed the tape recording 
of the communications, the information contained in the portion 
of the 911 call that was recorded was consistent with the 
information later communicated to Dwyer by the dispatcher. 
4 
 
the relevant circumstances that, taken together, [can justify 
an] officer's reliance on the information reported in the 911 
call."  Id. at 1690.  We granted the defendant's application for 
further appellate review to consider whether the police had 
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop of his 
vehicle, and whether, under art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, we would afford weight similar to that 
afforded by the Supreme Court to the reliability of anonymous 
911 telephone callers. 
 
We decline to endorse the Supreme Court's reliance on the 
use of the 911 system as an independent indicium of reliability 
for an anonymous tip.  That being said, the information gleaned 
from the anonymous call in the present case, corroborated by 
other information, was sufficiently reliable to warrant a 
finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the 
defendant's vehicle.  The denial of the defendant's motion to 
suppress is therefore affirmed.2 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts found by the motion 
judge, supplemented with facts supported in the record.3  On 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
3 "[A]n appellate court may supplement a motion judge's 
subsidiary findings with evidence from the record that 'is 
uncontroverted and undisputed and where the judge explicitly or 
implicitly credited the witness's testimony,' Commonwealth v. 
5 
 
August 11, 2011, at approximately 2 A.M., Trooper Dwyer received 
a dispatch concerning a black Mercedes Benz motor vehicle 
operating erratically and unable to maintain a lane on Memorial 
Drive in Cambridge.  The dispatch was prompted by a 911 
telephone call received by a State police emergency operator in 
Framingham from an unidentified caller. 
 
The tape recording, played during the motion to suppress 
hearing, indicates that the 911 caller was first informed that 
"this line is recorded," before the emergency operator asked the 
caller, "[W]hat is your emergency?"  The caller replied, "Just a 
call, you got a drunk driver on Memorial Drive near Harvard 
Square and I've got his license number, but he's swerving all 
over the road."  The call was then relayed to the State police 
barracks in the Brighton section of Boston, where it was 
answered by Trooper Usom, who contacted Dwyer. 
 
Usom's dispatch to Dwyer referred to "one call" for 
"erratic operation" of a motor vehicle, and provided the make, 
color, and registration number for the vehicle.  Usom reported 
the Belmont address to which the vehicle was registered, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 
(2008), so long as the supplemented facts 'do not detract from 
the judge's ultimate findings.'"  Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 
472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Jessup, 471 
Mass. 121, 127-128 (2015).  The motion judge found "Dwyer's 
testimony to be credible." 
6 
 
that the owner of the vehicle in question was "on probation for 
drunk driving." 
 
On receiving the dispatch, Dwyer drove to the defendant's 
address, which took approximately five minutes.  After a few 
minutes the defendant's vehicle arrived, and Dwyer observed it 
being driven for less than one minute before it turned into the 
driveway of the Belmont address.  Dwyer did not see the 
defendant operate the vehicle in an illegal or unreasonable 
manner.  Dwyer turned into the driveway behind the defendant and 
activated his cruiser's emergency lights. 
 
The defendant almost fell on exiting the vehicle.  Dwyer 
"noticed [that the defendant's] hair was wild and unkept [sic]," 
as well as the "odor of an alcoholic beverage."  The defendant 
produced his driver's license and vehicle registration.  Dwyer 
asked if the defendant had been drinking, to which the defendant 
claimed to have had two drinks.  Dwyer conducted field sobriety 
tests, which the defendant failed.  He concluded that the 
defendant was operating his vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol, and placed the defendant under arrest.  At the station, 
the defendant agreed to a breathalyzer test, which registered a 
blood alcohol level of 0.18.  Ultimately, he was charged with 
operating a motor vehicle in violation of a license restriction, 
G. L. c. 90, § 10; and operating a motor vehicle while under the 
7 
 
influence of liquor, second offense, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) 
(1). 
 
2.  Discussion.  "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to 
suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous but independently review the 
judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law."  Commonwealth 
v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 619, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 433 
(2012). 
 
An investigatory stop is justified under art. 14 if the 
police have "reasonable suspicion, based on specific, 
articulable facts and reasonable inferences therefrom, that an 
occupant of the . . . motor vehicle had committed, was 
committing, or was about to commit a crime."  Commonwealth v. 
Alvarado, 423 Mass. 266, 268 (1996).  Where, "as here, a police 
radio broadcast directs officers to make an investigatory stop 
of a motor vehicle, the stop is lawful only if the Commonwealth 
establishes both the indicia of reliability of the transmitted 
information and the particularity of the description of the 
motor vehicle."  Commonwealth v. Lopes, 455 Mass. 147, 155 
(2009).  Here, the dispatch contained adequate particularity:  
it identified the make, color, and registration number of the 
motor vehicle and the address attributed to the owner of the 
vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 395 (2010).  
Therefore, the question whether Dwyer had reasonable suspicion 
8 
 
to conduct the investigatory stop of the defendant's vehicle is 
contingent on whether the information prompting the dispatch 
bore sufficient indicia of reliability. 
 
Under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, "[t]o establish the 
reliability of the information under art. 14 . . . , 'the 
Commonwealth must show the basis of knowledge of the source of 
the information (the basis of knowledge test) and the underlying 
circumstances demonstrating that the source of the information 
was credible or the information reliable (veracity test).'"  
Anderson, 461 Mass. at 622, quoting Lopes, supra at 155-156.  
See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).  Where the required standard is 
reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause, "a less 
rigorous showing in each of these areas is permissible."  Mubdi, 
456 Mass. at 396, quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 
19 (1990).  "Independent police corroboration may make up for 
deficiencies in one or both of these factors."  Commonwealth v. 
Costa, 448 Mass. 510, 514-515 (2007), quoting Lyons, supra. 
 
As an initial matter, we conclude that the basis of 
knowledge test was satisfied as to the 911 caller, as "[a]n 
eyewitness's report to police of [a] recent, firsthand 
observation satisfies the basis of knowledge prong."  Anderson, 
461 Mass. at 622, quoting Depina, 456 Mass. at 243.  See 
Anderson, supra (basis of knowledge test satisfied where caller 
9 
 
"personally witnessed two black men get into a silver or gold 
Toyota Camry bearing a registration plate 22CO77").  The degree 
of detail provided to the Framingham emergency operator, and 
then related by the dispatcher, including the caller's reported 
observation of the driver "swerving all over the road" at a 
specific location on Memorial Drive, the registration number, as 
well as the make and model of the motor vehicle, are sufficient 
to establish that the information derived from the personal 
observations of the 911 caller.  See Commonwealth v. Alfonso A., 
438 Mass. 372, 374 (2003) (basis of knowledge test satisfied 
where "it is apparent that the informant was reporting his own 
observation"); Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 
212, 214 (2000) (test satisfied where informant "described the 
operation of the truck as it was being driven along the 
highway"). 
 
We therefore turn to the reliability prong.  "The veracity 
test is more difficult for the Commonwealth to satisfy where, as 
here, the caller was anonymous.  Because the caller was 
anonymous, there could be no evidence regarding the caller's 
past reliability or reputation for honesty."  Anderson, 461 
Mass. at 622. 
10 
 
 
The Commonwealth urges us to incorporate into our art. 14 
jurisprudence4 the Supreme Court's recent decision in Navarette, 
in which the Court, in a divided opinion, held that the use of 
the 911 emergency system itself is an "indicator of veracity."  
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.  The Court's reasoning, as noted, 
was grounded in technological and regulatory developments 
regarding the 911 emergency call system (making it easier to 
identify telephone numbers of callers), coupled with the fact 
that false tipsters are subject to prosecution.  Id. at 1689-
1690.  Although Massachusetts also prosecutes false 911 reports, 
see G. L. c. 269, § 14B (a), and we have held in various 
contexts that a citizen informant who is identifiable is 
deserving of greater consideration than that of truly anonymous 
sources, see, e.g., Costa, 448 Mass. at 515, we are not inclined 
at this time to attribute veracity to all 911 callers.  As the 
dissenting Justices in Navarette pointed out, even if the police 
are able to recover the telephone number and identity of 911 
callers, "it proves absolutely nothing . . . unless the 
anonymous caller was aware of that fact.  It is the tipster's 
belief in anonymity, not its reality, that will control his 
                                                          
 
 
4 Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
provides greater protection in this area than does the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Commonwealth v. 
Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 373 (1985). 
11 
 
behavior."  Navarette, 124 S. Ct. at 1694 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  We agree. 
 
The caller in this case was aware that his call was being 
recorded; there is no way to know, however, based on the record 
before us, whether the caller had reason to believe that he 
might be identified or that the telephone that he was using 
might be traced back to him, such that it could affect his 
behavior or the veracity of the information he provided.5  See 
Anderson, 461 Mass. at 622, quoting Mubdi, 456 Mass. at 397 
(where no evidence presented to caller that he or she was 
identifiable by police, there is "no reason to believe the 
caller needed to fear he or she would be subject to a charge of 
filing a false report or any comparable consequence of providing 
false information to law enforcement").  Contrast Costa, 448 
Mass. at 517 ("By providing information to the police after 
knowing that her call was being recorded, and that the number 
she was calling from had been identified, . . . the caller 
placed her anonymity sufficiently at risk such that her 
reliability should have been accorded greater weight than that 
                                                          
 
 
5 In the "Frequently Asked Questions" portion of the Web 
site of the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, 
http://www.mass.gov/eopss/agencies/state-911/e911/trng-and-
progs/faq.html [http://perma.cc/2HRM-5HUK], those who inquire 
about the 911 emergency call system are advised that the system 
may or may not be able to identify the phone numbers of persons 
calling into it and the locations of their telephones, but 
callers should "[a]ssume the 9-1-1 call taker does not know your 
location" or "your [tele]phone number" (emphasis in original). 
12 
 
of an anonymous informant").  We therefore decline to credit any 
indicia of reliability to the unidentified caller's information 
merely because the information was transmitted in the form of a 
911 telephone call. 
 
However, even where a 911 telephone call is anonymous, the 
Commonwealth can still establish a caller's reliability "through 
independent corroboration by police observation or investigation 
of the details of the information provided by the caller. . . .  
Independent corroboration is relevant only to the extent that it 
was known to the police before the stop was initiated" 
(citations omitted).  Anderson, 461 Mass. at 623.  See 
Commonwealth v. Barros, 435 Mass. 171, 178 (2001).6 
                                                          
 
 
6 The Appeals Court relied on the "excited utterance" theory 
to conclude the 911 call bore adequate indicia of reliability, a 
theory not raised in the trial court.  Commonwealth v. Depiero, 
87 Mass. App. Ct. 105, 112-113 (2015).  See Commonwealth v. 
Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 624-625, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 433 
(2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Depina, 456 Mass. 238, 240 
(2010). 
 
 
Although we may consider this issue despite it being raised 
for the first time on appeal, see Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 
425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997), the excited utterance theory is 
inapposite in the present case, where the only information 
regarding the occurrence of any criminal conduct came from the 
911 caller.  This is unlike the circumstances in Anderson, supra 
at 619-620, 625, where police already had responded to a report 
of a store robbery by two men matching the description of people 
an anonymous caller subsequently described as getting into a 
particular vehicle, and in Depina, supra at 240, where police 
had received a request for an ambulance prior to receiving an 
anonymous tip reporting that the caller had heard gunshots in 
the backyard. 
 
13 
 
 
We conclude that the police observation and investigation 
in this case adequately corroborated the details provided by the 
unidentified caller, such that the information exhibited 
"sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable 
suspicion to make the investigatory stop."  Anderson, supra at 
623, quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000).  First, 
Dwyer's observations corroborated the location of the driver at 
the time of the 911 call.  Dwyer, after consulting a map, 
determined that he would not have the time to intercept the 
defendant between the defendant's home in Belmont and the 
location where the erratic driving was reported on Memorial 
Drive in Cambridge.  Based on those calculations, he drove 
directly to the defendant's home, which took approximately five 
minutes.  Within a few minutes of his arrival, Dwyer observed 
and identified a vehicle that matched the unidentified caller's 
description arriving at the address to which he had been sent.  
See Costa, 448 Mass. at 518 (police arrived within minutes of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Moreover, where there was no finding below, we have 
reviewed the tape of the 911 call, and perceive nothing 
particularly excited in the unidentified caller's tone or 
nature.  See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 437 Mass. 620, 624-625 
(2002) (to determine if statement satisfies excited utterance 
exception, we look to "whether the declarant displayed a degree 
of excitement").  Although drunk driving presents a "grave 
danger" to the public, Commonwealth v. Davis, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 
88, 91 (2005), and thus may, in some instances, cause a 911 
caller's declaration to warrant consideration as an excited 
utterance, the caller here introduced the reason for dialing 911 
as "[j]ust a call. . . ."  In any event, we discern no indicia 
of reliability from the unidentified caller's state of mind. 
14 
 
anonymous caller's tip, and "were able to corroborate many of 
the [albeit innocent] details provided by the caller").  Second, 
the fact that Dwyer was informed that the defendant was on 
probation for the same type of criminal activity of which he was 
suspected further corroborated the anonymous call.  See 
Commonwealth v. Germain, 396 Mass. 413, 418 (1985) (defendant's 
record of recent convictions for similar crimes indicate 
reliability of anonymous tip under Aguilar-Spinelli analysis).  
These details provide a level of corroboration beyond that of 
"innocent" or easily obtainable facts, see Alvarado, 423 Mass. 
at 272, and the information contained in the 911 call therefore 
passed the less rigorous veracity test needed under our 
reasonable suspicion analysis.  See Lyons, 409 Mass. at 19. 
 
Even armed with a reliable tip that it was indeed the 
defendant's motor vehicle that was driving erratically at 
2 A.M., Dwyer's investigative stop of the defendant's vehicle 
was justified only if the information created a reasonable 
suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot," Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); in other words, that the driver of a 
motor vehicle "had committed, was committing, or was about to 
commit a crime."  Alvarado, supra at 268.  We need not decide 
whether a single instance of erratic driving may not be a crime, 
because the information provided by the unidentified caller 
regarding the defendant "swerving all over the road," coupled 
15 
 
with the information about the defendant being on probation for 
a similar crime, was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal conduct, permitting Dwyer to make the stop even 
without seeing any suspicious behavior personally.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 511 (2009) (officer's 
knowledge of defendant's previous arrests on drug charges was 
factor for consideration in justifying stop).  Indeed, "[i]n 
these circumstances, the police would have been remiss had they 
not conducted an investigative stop of [the defendant's] 
vehicle."  Anderson, 461 Mass. at 625.7 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We affirm the motion judge's denial of the 
defendant's motion to suppress, albeit for reasons different 
than those relied on by the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                                                          
 
 
7 In light of the conclusion that the stop of the 
defendant's vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion, we 
need not reach the Commonwealth's argument, based on Davis, 63 
Mass. App. Ct. at 90-91, that the stop was reasonable under the 
emergency doctrine.