Case Title: Musgrove v. Leonard

Citation: 396 P.2d 614, 97 Ariz. 44

Docket Number: 7333

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1964-11-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
97 Ariz. 44 (1964) 396 P.2d 614 Sebe MUSGROVE, Appellant, v. Rex LEONARD, Appellee. No. 7333. Supreme Court of Arizona. En Banc. November 13, 1964. *45 Westover, Mansfield, Westover & Copple, Yuma, for appellant. Ingraham & Dennis, Yuma, for appellee. BERNSTEIN, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant on his counterclaim. The complaint alleged an employment contract and the counterclaim alleged non-payment of the purchase price of cattle. The case was tried by the judge without a jury and findings of fact were requested and made under Rule 52(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. The trial judge entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his complaint and against defendant on his counterclaim. Defendant-appellant Musgrove contends here there is no evidence to support the judgment in favor of plaintiff and further that the pleadings and the evidence show he is entitled to a judgment on his counterclaim as a matter of law. Defendant makes three assignments of error: (1) Plaintiff pleaded a contract of employment as "manager and overseer" and no such contract was proven, (2) Plaintiff pleaded an account stated, and no account stated was proven, (3) The answer to the counterclaim and the uncontradicted admissions of the plaintiff show that $2,163 was due from the plaintiff to the defendant. Defendant, Musgrove, was a landowner engaged in farming and ranching activities in Yuma County. Leonard, the plaintiff, was a farm manager who also engaged in livestock ventures. When the parties did business together their contracts were made orally, and modified orally, although payments were made by check and some accounts were kept. In August 1957, plaintiff and defendant discussed farming 1200 acres of land on a share basis for the coming year. Under this arrangement plaintiff *46 would have been "farm manager and overseer". It was impossible to secure the necessary financing and this venture was abandoned. During this time plaintiff did some work for defendant, the exact nature and amount of which is in dispute. Plaintiff testified he had general supervisory duties throughout the period involved here. He had general supervision of the operation. He further testified he employed cotton pickers and a row boss, and arranged for their payment by funds advanced by the cotton gin. He drove trucks and tractors as occasion demanded and helped with the harvesting of alfalfa seed. He visited and checked on various cattle operations being conducted by defendant. No effort was made to show the exact time spent in these activities. Because of the pending share agreement, there was no agreement as to the amount which he was to be paid. Defendant contends that the complaint does not entitle plaintiff to recover for the reasonable value of his services, because under his pleadings the plaintiff may recover only for an account stated which he failed to prove. The complaint reads in applicable part: Plaintiff contends that the above pleading states a cause of action for the reasonable value of the services and that there is evidence to support the verdict for the reasonable value of the services actually rendered. While not a model of clarity, we regard the pleading quoted above as being in the alternative. Pleadings of an account stated or in the alternative for reasonable value is permissible. Wright v. Burhart, 35 Ariz. 246, 276 P. 837. Where a contract is abandoned by mutual consent of the parties, the party who has done work and labor may recover the reasonable value of his services. Parker v. Holmes, 79 Ariz. 82, 284 P.2d 455. No attempt was made to prove the value of plaintiff's services. But a minute entry shows this stipulation: The trial judge did not use the word "supervisor" in his findings of fact. He did find that plaintiff "performed work, labor and services for the defendant of the reasonable value of $1200.00." It is clear he was relying on the stipulation in setting the value of the plaintiff's services. The testimony of plaintiff was that his work was supervisory. We do not regard the variance between the stipulation and the finding of fact as significant. The assignments of error are directed at the court's considering the case on the theory that the plaintiff was entitled to the reasonable value of his services and not at this discrepancy between the language of the stipulation and the language of the finding. Cf. Shun v. Hospital Benefit Association, 89 Ariz. 12, 357 P.2d 603. As we said in Bohmfalk v. Vaughan, 89 Ariz. 33, 37, 357 P.2d 617, 620: The trial judge, however, found that plaintiff performed services only from August 15 to November 1, a two and one-half month period. Applying the stipulation for $400.00 per month to this finding, a verdict for more than $1,000.00 is not supportable. The judgment for the plaintiff must be reduced to $1,000.00, and as so modified it must be affirmed on this issue. Defendant in his final assignment of error contends that the reply to the counterclaim and the admission of the plaintiff show that defendant is entitled to judgment on the counterclaim. The counterclaim reads in applicable part: *48 In his reply the plaintiff admitted the purchase of the cattle, but denied indebtedness. Plaintiff testified that defendant had sent him 32 head of cattle from the Cornelius Feed Yards in Phoenix. The testimony continued: The trial judge found as a fact that "the defendant was not entitled to any relief under his counterclaim." More detailed findings would be preferable. In searching the record for evidence to support the trial judge's denial of relief under the counterclaim, we are met by the fact that the trial judge sustained an objection to the only material evidence in the record which would have supported his finding. It was error to sustain the objection. The witness was not asked to give his opinion on an accounting matter. He was merely asked if he made a credit entry in the ledger. He may testify as to his own act. See Henney v. Lambert, 237 Iowa 146, 21 N.W.2d 301, a case such as this one involving farm transactions. The question, therefore, is whether the trial judge could consider the answer to which he had erroneously sustained an objection, in making his findings of fact, in a trial in which no jury was involved. The trial judge, having expressly excluded the competent evidence, should not consider this excluded evidence in his findings. Judgment as modified affirmed in part and reversed in part for a new trial. UDALL, C.J., LOCKWOOD, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER and SCRUGGS, JJ., concur.