Case Title: State v. Washington

Citation: 164 Vt 609, 669 A.2d 550

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Washington  (93-410); 164 Vt 609; 669 A.2d 550

[Filed 24-Oct-1995]



                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 93-410

                              MAY TERM, 1995


State of Vermont                     }     APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
     v.                              }     District Court of Vermont,
                                     }     Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
                                     }
Jerome Washington                    }
                                     }     DOCKET NO. 1909.10.11-5-92CnCr


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant appeals his jury conviction of murder in the first degree,
  attempted murder, aggravated assault, and his sentence of life
  imprisonment.  Defendant raises four points:  (1) that the trial court
  violated his right to confrontation; and that the trial court erred by (2)
  preventing cross-examination of the State's key witness with character
  evidence, (3) preventing defendant from arguing in closing that inferences
  favorable to defendant could be drawn from the prosecutor's failure to
  produce evidence that defendant was involved in drug dealing, and (4)
  finding at sentencing that the evidence supported two aggravating factors
  under 13 V.S.A. §2303.  We affirm.

       On May 22, 1992, defendant, his brother Jacob Washington, Chance
  Marden, and others were subjects of search warrants executed by the
  Burlington Police Department.  During the search, the police seized drugs,
  drug paraphernalia, and guns at defendant's apartment which he shared with
  his brother Jacob.  As a result of the investigation and searches, Jacob
  Washington was arraigned and held in custody on federal charges. 
  Defendant, Marden, and others were issued citations to appear in state
  court.  Defendant was cited for distribution of cocaine.

       On the night of May 23, 1992, Chance Marden, his girlfriend Melissa
  Wells, and his roommate Matthew Petrie were eating a late dinner at
  Marden's apartment.  Marden was the principle witness at trial and
  described what happened in the apartment.  According to Marden, defendant
  arrived at approximately 9:00 P.M. and stayed for about an hour.  During
  this time, defendant's conversation with Marden included various topics,
  including whether Marden had been the police informant that lead to the
  search warrants.  Sometime during this conversation, Marden moved to take
  his dishes into the kitchen when he heard a "pop" and a scream from
  Melissa.  Melissa Wells had been shot in the head.  Marden then saw
  defendant about five feet away with a gun pointed at Marden's forehead. 
  Marden fell backwards and defendant fired the gun twice, hitting Marden in
  the forearm.  Defendant next shot the gun into the other side of Wells's
  head, and then fired the remaining three shots into Petrie.  Marden smashed
  through his bedroom window, jumped outside, ran to find help, and called
  911.  Meanwhile, defendant left the house and rode away on his bicycle. 
  The police apprehended defendant after a short chase.

       Melissa Wells died from her injuries.  Matthew Petrie suffered gunshot
  wounds to his

  

  head, face, neck, and left forearm.  About that night, Petrie recalled
  only that he was in the room with Marden, Wells, and defendant.

       The State's theory at trial was that defendant believed Marden had
  given the police evidence against defendant's brother Jacob, and that
  defendant went to Marden's apartment to murder him.  The defense contended
  that Marden was actually covering up for a more influential member of their
  drug ring by falsely accusing defendant of the murder.

                                I.

       Defendant's first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred
  when it denied admission of a videotape of Marden's deposition.  According
  to defendant, Marden's testimony at trial was overly emotional, whereas at
  the deposition he was "as cool as a cucumber" when describing the murder. 
  Defendant claimed that the difference in Marden's demeanor would be
  probative of Marden's credibility as a witness, and that the jury should
  have been allowed to see it.  The trial court denied the motion, stating
  that Marden's testimony at trial was not emotional, and that viewing the
  videotape might confuse the jury.  Defendant now claims that this ruling
  violated defendant's constitutional right to confrontation.

       According to defendant, the trial court's ruling had an unfair
  prejudicial effect on the jury's deliberations because they were deprived
  of crucial demeanor evidence.  The initial question in examining a
  confrontation clause claim is whether defendant was prohibited from
  engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination.  State v. French, 152
  Vt. 72, 79, 564 A.2d 1058, 1062 (1989).  Cross-examination may be limited. 
  "The Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective
  cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way,
  and to whatever extent, the defense may wish."  State v. Raymond, 148 Vt.
  617, 620-21,