Case Title: State v. Zespy

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Zespy1986 WY 162723 P.2d 564Case Number: 85-165Decided: 08/15/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
The 
STATE ofWyoming, Plaintiff,

v.

Robin ZESPY, 
Defendant.

Appeal from The District 
Court.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia Hackl, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Tim Goddard, argued, Legal 
Intern, and J. Scott Evans, Dist. Atty., Seventh Judicial Dist., for plaintiff.

Frank R. 
Chapman, Casper, 
for defendant.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

FACTS

[¶1.]     We are presented with a 
very scanty transcript of the proceedings. Many of our background facts are 
drawn from the parties' briefs or from statements made by the lawyers during 
motion hearings. These facts are included to set the stage for our opinion but 
cannot form a basis for resolution of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence question. 
"We can only decide a case upon what appears in the record before us." Matter of 
Estate of Reed, Wyo., 566 P.2d 587, 590 (1977). Matters 
alluded to by attorneys at motion hearings or in briefs are not testimony and 
cannot be considered. Kirby Building Systems, Inc. v. Independence Partnership 
No. One, Wyo., 
634 P.2d 342, 345 n. 2 (1981).

[¶2.]     Mr. Zespy was charged 
with manufacturing and possessing psilocybin with intent to deliver in violation 
of § 35-7-1031(a)(ii), W.S. 1977. He pled not guilty, not guilty by reason of 
mental illness or deficiency, and not competent to stand trial. He was examined 
by Dr. Burnett at the WyomingStateHospital in Evanston, 
by Dr. Elkin, a private psychiatrist practicing in Casper, and by Dr. 
Miracle, a psychologist. They found that he was not mentally responsible for his 
actions under § 7-11-305(b), W.S. 1977. The State determined, nevertheless, that 
it should proceed; and his jury trial began on January 14, 
1985.

[¶3.]     Although § 7-11-305(b) 
had been amended to place the burden of proving insanity upon the defendant, the 
parties agreed that the older version of the statute applied. Under that 
version, once the defense produced some evidence of insanity, the burden shifted 
to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Zespy was sane at the 
time of the offense. Prior to its 1983 amendment, § 7-11-305(b) 
provided:

"The prosecution shall 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense charged and the 
mental responsibility of the defendant. However, every defendant is presumed to 
be mentally responsible and the burden of first going forward and entering 
evidence on the issue of mental responsibility is upon the defendant."1

[¶4.]     There is no doubt that 
the defense produced enough evidence of insanity to shift the burden to the 
prosecution. Drs. Miracle, Elkin and Burnett all testified that Mr. Zespy was 
not mentally responsible for his actions when he committed the alleged crimes. 
In rebuttal the State called Dr. Lee Coleman, a psychiatrist from Berkeley, California, who had never personally examined 
Mr. Zespy. After inquiring into Dr. Coleman's training, practical experience and 
writings, the prosecutor asked him to describe the kind of expert testimony he 
usually gave in criminal cases. Dr. Coleman responded:

"Because of my view about 
the limits on methods of the state of the art of psychiatry, I do not testify 
about the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the crime or whether a 
person will be dangerous or try to give a diagnosis.

* * * * * 
*

"So my testimony goes to 
whether or not the methods employed by the psychiatrists, who have already 
testified in the case, deserve any credibility. My opinion is that the state of 
psychiatry does not deserve to be given that credibility. We just don't have the 
tools[;] therefore the answer to your question that whoever is bringing in 
psychiatry to try to prove their case, it will be the other side who might be 
interested in having me come in to testify about whether or not the methods are 
really reliable.

* * * * * 
*

"I am saying that the 
methods of psychiatry, the methods by which we decide upon diagnosis, the method 
by which we decide upon legal issues such as whether a person knew what they 
were doing was wrong or had capacity to conform. The methods psychiatry applies 
do, in my opinion, not come up to the standard of the expertise that the law 
thinks they do."

[¶5.]     Defense counsel 
objected to Dr. Coleman's anticipated testimony on grounds that it would amount 
to an attack on the legislature's determination that expert psychiatric 
witnesses are competent to render an opinion in insanity cases. The district 
judge asked Dr. Coleman if it was his position that there are no proper 
psychiatric methods which could be used to reach the conclusions set forth in 
the Wyoming 
statutes. Dr. Coleman said that it was proper for psychiatrists to testify under 
the law, but he did not believe that their opinions were entitled to any 
credibility. The judge then told the prosecutor that he did not understand how 
Dr. Coleman's testimony would be admissible, and the prosecutor responded by 
explaining that the doctor would talk about the merits of the specific 
procedures followed by the other psychiatrists. The following discussion between 
the judge and prosecutor occurred:

"THE COURT: As I 
understand it, your witness is not going to say that the particular methods used 
by the experts for the Defense in this case were necessarily deficient, that 
something better could be done, but no matter what would have been done, it 
would not be sufficient.

"MR. EVANS: I think that 
that is correct, except that his testimony is going to focus on what they did, 
if he has an opinion that there is a better way perhaps he could suggest it, but 
he is going to focus on what they did and express his concern and the concerns 
of a lot of American Psychiatric Association about 
methodology.

* * * * * 
*

"THE COURT: I think you 
are presenting the position to the wrong forum that belongs probably in the 
Legislature, the Legislature has given us a law we must work with, obviously the 
Legislature thought there were methods that could be used to reach conclusions, 
otherwise to say the law for the Legislature is not good, that is not for us to 
say here."

[¶6.]     Dr. Coleman then tried 
to explain his prospective testimony to the judge:

"THE WITNESS: Well, what 
I intend to testify to once these qualifications were finished with, my 
expectation was to examine the methods and means used by experts who have 
testified for the Defense and give my opinion on the methods that were 
used.

"THE COURT: But you, as I 
understand it, have stated that there are no methods that could be used to 
present a satisfactory answer to the question in our 
statute.

"THE WITNESS: Well, they 
are satisfactory, they are legally permissible, what I would expect to testify 
is as to their credibility, how scientific, how psychiatrists arrive at 
diagnosis, are there inconsistencies in the record, are the statements of the 
doctors in their reports inconsistent with actual records of hospitalization, 
and many, many other such issues, which I found in my study of the 
records.

* * * * * 
*

"THE COURT: Well, I 
think, do I understand correctly, Doctor, what your position amounts to is you 
are saying there is not at this time any scientifically valid method, that can 
be applied to answer the questions posed by our statute? Is that 
right?

"THE WITNESS: Yes, that 
is true, methods don't exist.

* * * * * 
*

"THE COURT: The problem 
with that approach, it seems to me, it is basically a statement that our law is 
no good, invalid, the Legislature is mistaken in this procedure. I do not think 
that is admissible."

[¶7.]     The district judge 
refused to admit Dr. Coleman's testimony, because it would indicate that there 
are no valid methods in psychiatry which can be used to answer the questions 
posed by the insanity statute. According to the judge, this would contradict the 
legislature's intent because the legislature was "obviously of the opinion there 
are some valid methods that can be used to answer the questions 
proposed."

[¶8.]     Without Dr. Coleman's 
rebuttal testimony, the State was left with only lay witnesses to contradict the 
psychiatric testimony introduced by the defense. Relying on Reilly v. State, 
Wyo., 496 P.2d 899 (1972), the district judge held that lay testimony is 
insufficient, by itself, to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt when it is 
contradicted by the opinion of examining psychiatrists. Therefore, the trial 
court concluded that Mr. Zespy was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal 
by reason of insanity.

REBUTTING EXPERT 
PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY

[¶9.]     The constriction placed 
upon Reilly v. State, Wyo., 496 P.2d 899 (1972), was not correct. In 
Reilly, we held that a court may direct a verdict in favor of a criminal 
defendant if the prosecution does not provide any substantial credible evidence 
that he was sane. Id. at 902-903. We pointed out that, if the 
defendant's evidence of insanity is strong, the State may not be able to provide 
substantial credible evidence simply by producing lay witnesses. But we never 
said that lay witnesses were always insufficient or that the prosecution must 
always produce a psychiatrist to contradict the defendant's 
psychiatrists.

[¶10.]  The proper rule is more clearly stated in 
Gerard v. State, Wyo., 511 P.2d 99, 104 (1973), a case which 
neither of the parties cited to the district judge:

"We noted in Reilly, 
supra, that neither the trial court nor this body should substitute its opinion 
for that of the jury, whose finding of fact should not be interfered with if 
there is any substantial evidence to support it. As the court said in People v. 
Krugman, 377 Mich. 559, 141 N.W.2d 33, 35 [(1966)], `The jury is the ultimate 
judge of defendant's sanity at the time of the crime, and * * * since it had 
before it evidence of defendant's behavior and state of mind upon the basis of 
which it could have found defendant sane at that time, it was not bound by the 
expert opinion testimony of the doctor. * * *' We again recognized this view in 
Jarrett v. State, Wyo., 500 P.2d 1027, 1031-1032 [(1972)], involving a murder 
charge, where we held that the trial court correctly denied a motion for 
acquittal notwithstanding the testimony of psychiatrists that defendant had 
suffered from a mental disease or disorder, our position being that the other 
evidence which had been adduced was sufficient to show that defendant knew and 
understood the nature and probable consequences of his act, knew that it was 
morally wrong or forbidden by law, and had sufficient will power to control his 
acts. As Mr. Chief Justice McIntyre said in Rice v. State, Wyo., 500 P.2d 675, 
676 [(1972)], `A jury can always disregard the testimony of an expert if the 
jurors find it to be unreasonable.'"

[¶11.]  There may be cases where neither lay 
testimony nor expert testimony by a non-examining psychiatrist is sufficient to 
rebut the testimony of examining psychiatrists. If reasonable minds could not 
differ on the defendant's insanity, then that issue should not be submitted to 
the jury, and a directed verdict of acquittal should be entered. But, a court 
should not grant an acquittal solely because the prosecution fails to produce an 
examining psychiatrist to rebut the testimony of the defendant's psychiatrists. 
Under some circumstances, rebuttal by a lay witness or a non-examining 
psychiatrist may be sufficient to make the defendant's sanity a question for the 
jury.

ADMISSIBILITY OF DR. 
COLEMAN'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

[¶12.]  The State contends that the district 
court should have admitted Dr. Coleman's rebuttal testimony under § 7-11-305(d), 
W.S. 1977, which states:

"In addition [to the 
designated examiners who examined the defendant for competency], the state and 
the defendant may summon other expert witnesses who did not examine the 
defendant. Such experts are not competent to testify as to the mental 
responsibility of the defendant; however, they may testify as to the validity of the 
procedures followed and the general scientific propositions stated by other 
witnesses." (Emphasis added.)

According to the 
State, this statute expressly permitted Dr. Coleman to attack the various tests 
employed by the defense psychiatrists. We agree.

[¶13.]  When it was held that Dr. Coleman's 
proffered testimony would undermine statutory procedures, the distinction 
between the competency of a witness and the competency of a witness' opinion was 
improperly blurred. In § 7-11-305(c), the legislature stated that examining 
psychiatrists are competent to testify about the sanity of the defendant.2 A rebuttal witness cannot argue 
that examining psychiatrists are incompetent witnesses who should not be 
permitted to testify. That matter is settled by the 
statute.

[¶14.]  But, § 7-11-305(c) does not say that the 
opinions expressed by psychiatric 
witnesses are automatically competent, i.e., credible. Through § 7-11-305(d), 
the legislature has expressly permitted a non-examining psychiatrist to question 
the validity of the procedures and general scientific propositions presented by 
the examining psychiatrists. The legislature did not list the psychiatric 
procedures or propositions that it endorses. Nor did it limit the number of 
procedures or propositions that can be offered or attacked. If the examining 
psychiatrists offer every proposition or procedure for testing sanity that is 
known to man, a rebuttal psychiatrist can attack every one of them. And if the 
rebuttal psychiatrist can attack every test individually, there is no logical 
reason why he cannot attack them as a group by stating that there are no valid 
tests that have been developed by the psychiatric 
profession.

[¶15.]  If the legislature thought that there are 
at least some valid psychiatric tests of sanity, it could have endorsed those 
tests in the statute. But the legislature did not do so. Apparently, the 
legislature could not decide which psychiatric tests, if any, are valid, so it left that 
decision to the juries on a case-by-case basis. The legislative intent is not 
violated when a rebuttal witness tells the jury that there are no psychiatric 
tests which can be used to ascertain sanity. Instead, such testimony helps the 
jury perform its delegated task, the evaluation of the psychiatric 
tests.

[¶16.]  Under our interpretation of § 
7-11-305(d), the jury is free to disregard the rebuttal testimony of a witness 
like Dr. Coleman and conclude that some or all of the tests performed by the 
examining psychiatrists are credible. On the other hand, the jury should also be 
free to conclude that there are no psychiatric tests that can help it ascertain 
the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense. The jury would then have to 
decide the sanity issue based on evidence other than psychiatric test results. 
For example, it might have to apply its collective understanding of human 
behavior to the defendant's criminal acts, his demeanor in the courtroom or his 
other out-of-court conduct.

[¶17.]  The jury's reliance on evidence other 
than psychiatric opinion is consistent with our opinion in Gerard v. State, 
supra, 511 P.2d  at 104. There we said that a jury can disregard psychiatric 
testimony and rely on other evidence which shows that the defendant knew his 
actions were morally wrong and that he had sufficient will power to control his 
acts.3 We quoted with approval the 
following statement:

"`The jury is the 
ultimate judge of defendant's sanity at the time of the crime, and * * * since 
it had before it evidence of defendant's behavior and state of mind upon the 
basis of which it could have found defendant sane at that time, it was not bound 
by the expert opinion testimony of the doctor.'" Id., quoting People v. Krugman, 377 Mich. 559, 141 N.W.2d 33, 
35 (1966).

Of course, the 
jury would have been free to ignore Dr. Coleman's views and rely upon the 
opinions of the defendant's psychiatrists. In either case, the jury would have 
ultimately applied the legislature's definition of insanity. Dr. Coleman's 
critique of all psychiatric testing would not have interfered with the jury's 
ability to determine Mr. Zespy's sanity under the legislature's definition of 
that term.

[¶18.]  In conclusion, the district court should 
have allowed Dr. Coleman to testify about the tests conducted by the examining 
experts. He should also have been permitted to testify that there are no 
psychiatric tests upon which a psychiatrist can base a valid opinion about a 
defendant's sanity. This kind of testimony is permitted by § 7-11-305(d), W.S. 
1977. It would not have nullified the legislature's decision that examining 
psychiatrists are competent witnesses, and it would not have prevented the jury 
from applying the legislature's definition of insanity.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE

[¶19.]  The State argues, in a perfunctory 
manner, that there would have been sufficient evidence of sanity to prevent a 
directed verdict if the court had permitted Dr. Coleman to testify. This is not 
the kind of legal issue which merits attention in a bill of exceptions. Our 
analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence under the facts of this case will 
have no impact on either of these parties or future litigants. Moreover, the 
record does not contain any psychiatric or lay testimony other than the 
statements of Dr. Coleman. With this record, we would not be able to comment on 
the sufficiency of the evidence even if it merited our attention. See Matter of 
Estate of Manning, Wyo., 646 P.2d 175, 176 
(1982).

FOOTNOTES

1 The statute, as amended, 
provides:

"The prosecution shall 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense charged. Every 
defendant is presumed to be mentally responsible. The defendant shall have the 
burden of going forward and proving by the greater weight of evidence that, as a 
result of mental illness or deficiency, he lacked capacity either to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
the law." Section 7-11-305(b), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985.

2 Section 7-11-305(c), 
W.S. 1977, states:

"The designated examiners 
who examined the defendant pursuant to W.S. 7-242.3 [§ 7-11-303] or 7-242.4 [§ 
7-11-304] are competent witnesses."

3 Under § 7-11-304(a), 
W.S. 1977:

"A person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of the conduct, as a result of 
mental illness or deficiency, he lacked substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law."

URBIGKIT, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶20.]  I concur with the court in determining 
that the rebuttal testimony of lay witnesses is admissible and may have been 
sufficient to raise a jury issue, and further that no 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue was suitably presented.

[¶21.]  I differ with the majority in regard to 
the claimed error of the trial judge in rejecting the proffered testimony of the 
nonexamining psychiatric expert which was tendered to rebut the efficacy of the 
examining experts' testimony on the mental illness and deficiency 
plea.

[¶22.]  Although I have serious concern for court 
control and supervision of expert witnesses as a class of paid professionals, 
this discussion will be confined to the peculiar status of experts in Wyoming, 
within the purview of the plea made pursuant to Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P. and § 
7-11-301 et seq., W.S. 1977, and particularly § 
7-11-305(d).

[¶23.]  In support of the trial court's decision 
to exclude the testimony of the nonexamining psychiatric witness, I will address 
the difference between rebuttal attack on the validity of procedures utilized by 
examining experts, described in their testimony, and a general attack on an 
entire field of academic inquiry.

[¶24.]  It is not logical to contend, as did the 
witness (Coleman), and now the State of Wyoming in this bill of exceptions, that 
if the witness challenges the validity of specific processes he can also 
logically deny the validity of all processes without first demonstrating 
knowledge and expertise about every possible process or combination of processes 
that may or may not have been utilized by the examining expert witness on the 
subject of constitutionality and statutorily required absence of mental illness 
or deficiency.

[¶25.]  Found in the syllogistic conclusion is 
one of the classic fallacies of logic.1

[¶26.]  The authorities evaluating logic as a 
reasoning process have also defined this negative argumentative approach as 
"scientific crank" logic - the attack of an entire area of expertise as a method 
to contradict the knowledge and testimony of the individual expert witness. See 
Salmon, Logic, p. 68 (1963).

[¶27.]  Whatever Coleman may consider to be his 
limits to accomplish determinative evaluations within the field of psychiatry, 
the Wyoming 
legislature has determined that the knowledge and techniques of psychiatrists 
will be used to evaluate the mental illness or deficiency of a criminal 
defendant, and the United States Supreme Court requires the utilization of 
psychiatry to afford constitutional rights. Section 7-11-303, W.S. 1977; State 
v. Pressler, 16 Wyo. 214, 92 P. 806 (1907); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 
84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966); Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 76 S. Ct. 440, 100 L. Ed. 835 
(1956); Blake v. Kemp, 1 F.R.S.3d 1263, 758 F.2d 523 (11th Cir.), reh. denied 
763 F.2d 419, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 106 S. Ct. 374, 88 L. Ed. 2d 367, 3 F.R.S.3d 494 (1985).

[¶28.]  It is nonsensical to attack an area of 
expertise when the constitutions, both state and federal, require that an 
inquiry into that discipline may be necessary to provide individual rights 
within the criminal justice system.

[¶29.]  The broad question presented by the bill 
of exceptions is whether the trial court has the authority, Lessard v. State, 
Wyo., 719 P.2d 227 (1986), and Rocky Mountain Trucking Co. v. Taylor, 79 Wyo. 
461, 335 P.2d 448 (1959), to deny admission of the testimony of an expert 
witness when the expert denies the efficacy of previously introduced 
professional evaluation as an attack on psychiatry in general. I have no doubt 
that if Coleman had taken each of the methods of evaluation utilized by each of 
the witnesses for the defense, and first testified as to his professional 
knowledge and experience with that test or process and finally described its 
separate invalidity, then the issue presented would have been his credibility 
and not his competency.

[¶30.]  The difference to be recognized is that 
competency is the threshold requirement - possession of the legal fitness and 
qualifications to testify, Black's Law Dictionary, p. 257 (5th ed. 1979), while 
credibility is the subjective evaluation of the testimony of a competent witness 
by the fact-finder, Black's Law Dictionary, supra at 330. The court determines 
competency and the fact-finder assesses credibility. This dissent is postured on 
that difference.

[¶31.]  It would be foolish not to recognize that 
some inhabitants of the earth still believe that the earth is flat, and that 
likewise others conceptualize that psychiatry is only slightly preferable to 
witch-doctoring.

[¶32.]  However, the trial court has just so much 
time to exercise its discretion in trying to provide social justice. 
Consequently, authority to make reasoned decisions in the broad field of mental 
illness or deficiency should not be denied. Psychiatry is all that there is, and 
its use is constitutionally invoked and statutorily defined.2

[¶33.]  I would find the decision overbroad in 
applying the criteria of credibility to the statutory limitation of competency 
wherein the witness "may [only] testify as to the validity of the procedures 
followed and the general scientific propositions stated by other witnesses." 
Section 7-11-305(d). This statutory language does not afford creation of a 
"field of competency" to testify that psychiatry is invalid, but only that the 
particular diagnostic efforts were invalid in concept or application. See 
Coleman, Psychiatry and Personal Injury: Exposing the Experts, For the Defense, 
p. 8 (February 8, 1985); Blinder, Psychiatric Analysis in Personal Injury Cases, 
Trial, p. 75 (May, 1986). The cross-examination techniques outlined in the 
latter publication are appropriate for impeaching credibility, but the intrinsic 
question which this court should here consider is competency, and competency 
should be determined by the trial judge. See Lessard v. State, supra. The 
witness should be able to make himself incompetent as well as incredible.

[¶34.]  We said in Smith v. State, Wyo., 564 P.2d 1194, 1199 (1977):

"* * * The admission or 
rejection of expert testimony on a wide range of subjects is a decision solely 
within the sound discretion of the trial court; and that court's decision will 
only be reversed upon a showing of clear and prejudicial abuse. 
[Citations.]"

[¶35.]  In my view, the thrust of Coleman's 
testimony - its competency - falls directly within the court's sound discretion 
since his testimony did not evaluate the procedures followed and the general 
scientific proposition stated by the prior psychiatric witnesses and, of 
significance, did not see the individual involved in order to make some personal 
assessment for diagnostic purposes. See Lessard v. State, 
supra.

[¶36.]  Equally valid assistance to the jury 
could likely have been afforded by one or two witch doctors, one or two medicine 
men, and both the town barber and the female hair stylist. Cf. Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1090 (1983), and Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 473, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 1878, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981). I do not 
find compliance with provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, specifically Art. 
1, § 6, the due-process clause, from such unreliable testimony. See Note, 
Evidence - Expert Testimony - Admissibility of Expert Testimony: Wyoming Takes A 
Moderate Approach, XIX Land & Water L.Rev. 708 (1984). See also McCabe v. 
R.A. Manning Construction Co., Inc., Wyo., 674 P.2d 699 (1983); Buhrle v. State, 
Wyo., 627 P.2d 1374 (1981); and Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 
1923).

"There are good reasons 
why not every ostensibly scientific technique should be recognized as the basis 
for expert testimony. Because of its apparent objectivity, an opinion that 
claims a scientific basis is apt to carry undue weight with the trier of fact. 
In addition, it is difficult to rebut such an opinion except by other experts or 
by cross-examination based on a thorough acquaintance with the underlying 
principles. In order to prevent deception or mistake and to allow the 
possibility of effective response, there must be a demonstrable, objective 
procedure for reaching the opinion and qualified persons who can either 
duplicate the result or criticize the means by which it was reached, drawing 
their own conclusions from the underlying facts." United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S. Ct. 456, 46 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1975).

"Like the insanity 
defense, the practice whereby the courts call in experts to advise them on 
matters not generally known to the average person goes back a long time: in 
English courts, over four centuries. Initially, the experts were used as 
technical assistants to the court, rather than as witnesses. The judge summoned 
experts to inform him about technical matters; he then determined whether the 
information should be passed on to the jury. By the middle of the seventeenth 
century, when the finding of the facts had become the exclusive province of the 
jury, the practice of court-appointed experts reporting to the judge was 
abandoned; instead, the experts were called as witnesses by the parties involved 
in the dispute." Simon, The defense of insanity, 11 Journal of Psychiatry and 
Law 183, 193 (1983).

[¶37.]  The article from which the quotation 
above is taken affords a brief and interesting history of the insanity defense, 
including the early stated criteria in 1723 of the "wild beast test." See also 
Levine, The adversary process and social science in the courts: Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 12 Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 147, 149-150 
(1984):

"Expert testimony is 
admitted at trial because an expert may be able to contribute something beyond 
what the lay jury or fact finder can determine from the facts. The expert may 
not only testify to facts, but based upon special knowledge, skill, or 
experience, the expert may assist the trier of fact to draw inferences from 
facts. To warrant use of an expert, the `subject of the inference must be so 
distinctively related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to 
be beyond the ken of the average layman.' [Cleary, McCormick's Handbook of the 
Law of Evidence (2d ed. 1972).]"

The article 
properly comports with my concern and distills the basis upon which the sound 
discretion of the trial court to evaluate the proffered testimony should still 
be afforded.

"In Barefoot v. Estelle, 
the Supreme Court admitted psychiatric testimony of dangerousness in the death 
penalty phase of a trial for a capital offense, despite substantial empirical 
evidence such predictions were more often wrong than right, and despite 
opposition from the American Psychiatric Association stating that such 
predictions were scientifically unacceptable and possibly unethical. The Court's 
opinion relied on adversary process to protect against the unreliability of 
expert testimony." 12 Journal of Psychiatry and Law, supra, synopsis at 
147.

See also Chavez 
v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1341, 1349 (1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1980). This court should

"* * * `[recognize] the 
well established rule that the district court's determination of whether an 
expert's qualifications are established will not be disturbed except in extreme 
cases or when a clear abuse of discretion is shown,' referring to Lee v. State, 
Wyo., 556 P.2d 217 (1976), and Rule 702, W.R.E. Also see Runnion v. Kitts, Wyo., 
531 P.2d 1307 (1975)."

I would affirm 
the trial court's decision to exclude the proposed Coleman testimony as rebuttal 
evidence in the insanity inquiry.

FOOTNOTES

1 The syllogism may be 
variously illustrated: Either:

I am an expert about some 
evaluative processes.

Those processes are 
invalid.

All evaluative processes 
are invalid.

Or:

Some evaluative processes 
are invalid.

Other experts may use 
those processes.

The conclusions of those 
experts are invalid.

This appears to be the 
fallacy of an undistributed middle term and illicit process of a major or minor 
term. Chase, Guides to Straight Thinking, p. 205 (1956).

2 "* * * The cunning of 
modern bureaucracy is that it creates a hierarchy in which no one feels 
personally responsible for anything important that goes wrong. Everywhere I look 
I see the public mental health system being shaped by this cunning, and legal 
reform seems to me to have hastened that process. By setting barriers in the 
path of treatment responsibilities, and by imposing on psychiatrists 
responsibilities they could not fulfill, legal reform has turned a ratchet that 
will not easily be turned back. As we pass through the 1980s the great 
ideological dragon of psychiatry has been coaxed out of its cave. The major 
legal battles have been fought, and when the dust settled the dragon was gone 
and all that remained was a collection of hapless civil servants. Yet madness 
has not gone out of the world as was hoped, in fact madness is more visible than 
ever before in this century." Stone, Law, Psychiatry, and Morality p. 156 
(1984).