Case Title: Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino

Citation: 2001-Ohio-5

Docket Number: 19991740

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 90 Ohio St.3d 496, 
2001-Ohio-5.] 
 
 
COLUMBUS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT, v. 
ZAINO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 
496.] 
Taxation — Real property valuation — Exemptions — Board of Tax Appeals’ 
determination that property was exempt as public property reversed 
when title to property was not vested directly in state or one of its 
subdivisions or by some person holding exclusively for the benefit of the 
state. 
(No. 99-1740 — Submitted November 29, 2000 — Decided January 3, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 97-A-249. 
 
Per Curiam.  In 1986, the city of Columbus passed Ordinance 1891-86 
authorizing the mayor to enter into an agreement with appellant, I-670 Corridor 
Development Corporation (“I-670”), designating I-670 “an agency and 
instrumentality for economic development including land use planning and 
marketing strategy,” for a designated area.  I-670 is a private, not-for-profit 
corporation under R.C. Chapter 1702, and a 501(c)(3) corporation under the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
 
I-670 and the city entered into a loan agreement in 1990 whereby the city 
loaned I-670 money to purchase property for a mixed-use business park.  Using 
this money, I-670 purchased 14.92 acres of land near Joyce Avenue and Bliss 
Street in Columbus from the Consolidated Railway Corporation in 1992.  I-670 
took title to the property in its own name.  After constructing streets and sewers, 
I-670 sold this property in 1996. 
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In 1995, I-670 filed an application with the appellee Tax Commissioner, 
seeking real property tax exemption for this property for tax year 1995 and 
remission of taxes for 1993 and 1994. 
 
The Tax Commissioner granted the exemption and remission under R.C. 
5709.08.  However, the Columbus Board of Education (“BOE”), appellant, 
appealed the Tax Commissioner’s decision to the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”). 
 
The BTA found that “the property in question was acquired by I-670 
Corporation in its capacity as an agent and instrumentality of the city of 
Columbus, per Columbus City Ordinance No. 1891-86.”  The BTA found that the 
“property in question constitutes public property.”  The BTA also found the 
property to be used exclusively for a public purpose and therefore affirmed the 
Tax Commissioner’s decision. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
The BTA exempted this property under R.C. 5709.08, which provides: 
“Real or personal property belonging to the state or United States used 
exclusively for a public purpose, and public property used exclusively for a public 
purpose, shall be exempt from taxation.” 
 
For property to be exempt under R.C. 5709.08, (1) it must be public 
property, (2) it must be used for a public purpose, and (3) the use must be 
exclusively for a public purpose.  Carney v. Cleveland (1962), 173 Ohio St. 56, 
18 O.O.2d 256, 180 N.E.2d 14, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
The BOE contends that the property owned by I-670 is not public 
property.  We agree. 
 
In reviewing decisions of the BTA, we determine whether the BTA’s 
decision is reasonable and lawful.  Summit United Methodist Church v. Kinney 
(1983), 7 Ohio St.3d 13, 15, 7 OBR 406, 407, 455 N.E.2d 669, 670.  We stated 
our role in Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1997), 77 
Ohio St.3d 402, 405, 674 N.E.2d 696, 699: 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
“[W]e affirm the BTA’s basic factual findings if sufficient, probative 
evidence of record supports these findings.  We also affirm the BTA’s rulings on 
credibility of witnesses and weight attributed to evidence if the BTA has 
exercised sound discretion in rendering these rulings.  Finally, we affirm the 
BTA’s findings on ultimate facts, i.e., factual conclusions derived from given 
basic facts, Ace Steel Baling, Inc. v. Porterfield (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 137, 142, 
48 O.O.2d 169, 171-172, 249 N.E.2d 892, 895-896, if the evidence the BTA relies 
on meets these above conditions, and our analysis of the evidence and reading of 
the statutes and case law confirm its conclusion.” 
 
Ordinance 1891-86, appointing I-670 an agent of the city, sets forth the 
agreement of the parties.  Paragraph two of the agreement states that I-670 “will 
constitute and act as an agent of the City for overall economic development 
including land use planning and marketing strategy within its territorial 
jurisdiction.”  Paragraph three states that the purpose of having designated I-670 
an agent is “(A) to create jobs and employment opportunities and to improve the 
economic welfare of the people of the City and the State of Ohio; (B) to 
encourage and cause the maintenance, location, relocation, construction, 
expansion, modernization and equipment of sites, buildings, structures and 
appurtenant facilities for industrial, commercial distribution and research 
activities * * *; and (C) to maintain and increase the tax valuation of property 
located therein in order that tax revenues may be available to provide services * * 
*.” 
 
Paragraphs four through sixteen set forth agreements dealing with I-670’s 
powers and duties.  I-670 was to make recommendations for actions to be taken in 
aid of development, including: “the location, relocation, construction, extension, 
modernization, modification or improvement of public utility or municipal 
facilities or services.”  In addition, I-670 was authorized to advertise; solicit 
businesses to relocate to the area; serve as a clearinghouse for information; 
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“initiate, review, and recommend criteria and programs for the preservation, 
development and enhancement” of the area; recommend priorities for government 
services in the I-670 area; and meet with applicants for permits. 
 
While the ordinance appoints I-670 an agent for the city for certain 
express purposes, it does not appoint I-670 an agent for all purposes.  In 
particular, the ordinance does not authorize I-670 to act as an agent for the 
purchase of real property.  In Master Consol. Corp. v. BancOhio Natl. Bank 
(1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 570, 574, 575 N.E.2d 817, 820, we quoted the following 
passage from Stevens v. Frost (1943), 140 Me. 1, 7, 32 A.2d 164, 168: “ ‘Express 
authority is that authority which is directly granted to or conferred upon the agent 
or employee in express terms by the principal, and it extends only to such powers 
as the principal gives the agent in direct terms; and the express provisions are 
controlling where the agency is expressly conferred.’ ” 
 
The question of whether I-670 acted as an agent for the city in the 
purchase of the property is a question of ultimate fact.  In SFZ Transp., Inc. v. 
Limbach (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 602, 604-606, 613 N.E.2d 1037, 1039-1040, we 
reversed a BTA finding on an ultimate fact because the given basic facts did not 
support the finding on this ultimate fact.  Likewise in this case, the BTA’s 
inference of ultimate fact that I-670 acted as the city’s agent when it purchased 
the property is not supported by the basic facts. There is no evidence that the city 
authorized I-670 to act as its agent for the purchase and sale of the property in 
question. 
 
For property to be considered public property under R.C. 5709.08 requires 
that there be ownership “by the state or some political subdivision thereof, and 
title to which is vested directly in the state or one of its political subdivisions, or 
some person holding exclusively for the benefit of the state.”  Dayton Metro. 
Hous. Auth. v. Evatt (1944), 143 Ohio St. 10, 27 O.O. 557, 53 N.E.2d 896, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  The requirement that the property be public 
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5 
property has not been met here.  Title to the property in question was not vested 
directly in state or one of its subdivisions or by some person holding exclusively 
for the benefit of the state. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the decision of the BTA is unreasonable and 
unlawful, and it is hereby reversed. 
Decision reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  The majority holds that the 
property in question is not exempt from taxation as “public property” under R.C. 
5709.08 because “[t]here is no evidence that the city authorized I-670 to act as its 
agent for the purchase and sale of the property in question.”  I disagree. 
 
I believe that I-670 draws its authority to purchase and sell property as the 
city’s agent not only from its agreement with the city, but from the agreement’s 
enabling ordinance as well. 
Ordinance 1891-86 
 
The city enacted Ordinance 1891-86 to authorize it to enter into an 
agreement with I-670, which charged I-670 with the responsibility of promoting 
economic development in the I-670 corridor.  The ordinance authorized I-670 to 
carry out the following purposes and duties: 
 
“Whereas, Section 13 of Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution provides 
that, to create jobs and employment opportunities and to improve the economic 
welfare of the people of the State, it is in the public interest and a proper public 
purpose for a municipal corporation, its agents or instrumentalities, or a 
corporation not for profit designated by such municipal corporation as its agent or 
instrumentality to perform the acts and exercise the power therein provided; and 
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“ * * * 
 
“Whereas, the Articles of Incorporation of the I-670 Corridor 
Development Corporation sets [sic] forth that its purpose is as follows: 
 
“ ‘To promote the general and public welfare of the residents of the City 
of Columbus, Ohio * * * by the enhancement and development of all or part of 
that area of the corridor * * *. 
 
“ ‘To take and hold by * * * purchase * * * for any of its purposes, any 
property, real or personal, without limitation as to amount or value; to sell, 
convey and dispose of any such property * * * for any of the purposes 
hereinbefore set forth.’ ”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Pursuant to this ordinance, the city and I-670 entered into an agreement 
whereby I-670 was to encourage economic development in the I-670 corridor.  
This court has held that “[a] contract made in pursuance of a statute or resolution, 
must be construed as though such statute or resolution had been incorporated into 
such contract.”  Banks v. De Witt (1884), 42 Ohio St. 263, at paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  Pursuant to Banks, I would find that Ordinance 1891-86 should be 
incorporated into the agreement between the city and I-670.  Therefore, because 
Ordinance 1891-86 authorized I-670 to buy and sell property, I would find that 
agreement likewise authorized I-670 to buy and sell property for purposes of 
encouraging economic development in the I-670 corridor. 
The Agreement 
 
The majority finds that paragraphs four through sixteen define I-670’s 
powers and duties.  In examining those paragraphs, the majority finds that the 
agreement fails to authorize I-670 to act as the city’s agent to buy and sell 
property. 
 
I believe that paragraphs one and two of the agreement, omitted from the 
majority’s analysis, further define I-670’s power and duties.  Paragraphs one and 
two read: 
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“Whereas, in the public interest and for the public purposes authorized by 
Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Ohio, * * * the City of 
Columbus * * * has designated I-670 Corridor Development Corporation * * * as 
an agency and instrumentality for the economic development * * * within the 
Corporation’s defined jurisdiction, and 
 
“Whereas, the city and the Corporation desire to enter into an agreement 
in furtherance of the purposes hereinbefore set out and to provide the extent to 
which the Corporation shall participate as an agent and instrumentality of the 
City.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
I also believe that this language incorporates those “public purposes” set 
out in Section 13, Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution into the agreement by 
reference. 
 
Section 13, Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution states: 
 
“To create or preserve jobs and employment opportunities, * * * it is 
hereby determined to be in the public interest and a proper public purpose for the 
state or its political subdivisions * * * or their agencies or instrumentalities * * * 
to acquire * * * and to sell * * * property * * * within the State of Ohio for 
industry, commerce, distribution, and research * * *.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
Where one instrument incorporates another by reference, both must be 
read together.  Christe v. GMS Mgt. Co. (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 84, 88, 705 
N.E.2d 691, 693.  With the public purposes of Section 13 incorporated into the 
agreement, it is evident that the agreement authorized I-670 to purchase and sell 
property for the purpose of promoting employment opportunities in Ohio. 
Public Policy 
 
Although the argument is not addressed in the majority opinion, appellant, 
the board of education, in its brief, expresses concern that allowing the exemption 
in this case will set a standard that will allow any city in Ohio to grant a “tax 
exemption to any and all land belonging to a private developer merely by 
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executing an ‘agreement’ with the developer.”  (Emphasis added.)  I believe that 
the board’s concerns are completely unfounded. 
 
The Ohio Constitution indicates that economic development is a “public 
purpose.”  Section 13, Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution.  In order to 
encourage public property to be used for “public purposes,” including the 
encouragement of economic development, the General Assembly has exempted 
such property from taxation.  R.C. 5709.08.  This “public purposes” limitation is 
imposed not only on a political subdivision’s use of property in order to qualify 
the property for tax-exempt status, but also any agent’s use of the property.  
Accordingly, there is no merit to the school board’s argument that finding this 
property to be tax exempt will allow cities to make an agreement with a private 
entity that will exempt all its property from taxation because only property used 
for a public purpose will be exempt. 
 
The purpose of the tax exemption here is to encourage development of 
public purpose projects by allowing more dollars to remain in the project.  
Although I-670 is a private entity, it is a nonprofit entity that was created to be an 
agent of the city of Columbus.  Its sole purpose is to promote the economic 
development of the I-670 corridor, which is a public purpose.  See Canton v. 
Limbach (Mar. 13, 1992), BTA No. 890-E-431, unreported; Tiffin v. Tracy (Mar. 
25, 1994), BTA No. 92-X-1022, unreported.  The funds supplied by the city to I-
670 to purchase the property in question were in the form of low-interest loans.  
To deny the tax exemption would in effect tax the city’s own money that was 
earmarked to spur the economic development of the I-670 corridor.  That, in 
effect, would reduce the amount of funding available for the public purpose of 
revitalizing the economy in the I-670 corridor.  Taxing the property in question 
simply shifts government dollars from one category (development of I-670 
corridor) to another (public schools).  That would run contrary to the intent of 
R.C. 5709.08 and Section 13, Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution. 
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Conclusion 
 
For all of the aforementioned reasons, I believe that I-670, as the city’s 
agent, had the authority to purchase and sell the property in question, and 
therefore the property should have been exempt from taxation as property that 
was used for a public purpose pursuant to R.C. 5709.08.  Accordingly, I would 
find the decision of the BTA reasonable and lawful. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Teaford, Rich, Crites & Wesp, Jeffrey A. Rich and James R. Gorry, for 
appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Phyllis J. Shambaugh, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Thomas M. Zaino. 
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