Case Title: The People v. Avery V. Baker, Jr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 49  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Avery V. Baker, Jr.,
            Appellant.
Mitchell S. Kessler, for appellant.
Damian M. Sonsire, for respondent.
GRAFFEO, J.:
The primary issue in this case is whether defendant's
trial lawyer was ineffective because he did not ask the court to
instruct the jury that it should consider the three homicide
counts in the alternative.  We conclude that defendant has not
demonstrated that his attorney failed to provide meaningful
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representation and therefore affirm the order of the Appellate
Division.
Defendant Avery V. Baker, Jr., lived with his then
girlfriend and her 20-month-old son, Jordan, in the City of
Elmira, Chemung County.  On the evening of September 12, 2006,
defendant grabbed Jordan by one arm, carried him to his room and
slammed the child into his crib.  Shortly thereafter, Jordan
began making choking sounds and his mother found that he was
turning blue in his face, his body was seizing and he appeared to
be unconscious.  The child was brought to a hospital and was
released the next day.
Three days later, defendant got upset when he
discovered crayon drawings on a television.  Another child in the
household claimed that Jordan was responsible for the markings,
so defendant ordered his girlfriend to get Jordan. The boy was
brought to defendant and he proceeded to spank the child.  When
Jordan would not stop crying, defendant picked him up, shook him
violently and threw him to the floor head first.  Jordan screamed
and attempted to stand up but was unable to do so.  
Defendant lifted Jordan, who went limp and stopped
breathing.  Jordan's mother wanted to call 911, but defendant
told her that Jordan would "come out of it" like he did on
September 12th.  When defendant's attempts to revive Jordan were
unsuccessful, he telephoned 911 for emergency assistance. 
Paramedics took the child to the hospital for treatment of severe
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head trauma and, three hours later, Jordan was pronounced dead.
During his conversations with police investigators,
defendant made a series of inconsistent statements about what had
happened to Jordan.  He eventually admitted that he had spanked
Jordan, shaken him and thrown the child to the floor.  In a
written statement, defendant explained that he threw Jordan "too
hard" out of anger and revealed that he had thrown the child on
two prior occasions, with one incident occurring on September
12th.
A grand jury indicted defendant for depraved
indifference murder of a child (Penal Law § 125.25 [4]),
manslaughter in the first and second degrees (Penal Law §§ 125.20
[4], 125.15 [1]), and endangering the welfare of a child (Penal
Law § 260.10) stemming from the homicide on September 15, 2006. 
With respect to the September 12th incident, defendant was
indicted for endangering the welfare of a child and reckless
endangerment in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.20).  At the
People's request, County Court later dismissed the charge of
endangering the welfare of a child related to the September 15th
incident.  
A jury ultimately found defendant guilty of the
remaining charges and he was sentenced to an aggregate prison
term of 21 years to life.  The Appellate Division affirmed (58
AD3d 1069 [2009]) and a Judge of this Court granted leave to
appeal (12 NY3d 851 [2009]).
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At the trial, the court informed the parties that it
intended to allow the jury to consider all three homicide counts
and would not charge them in the alternative.  Defense counsel
agreed to this presentation under People v Trappier (87 NY2d 55
[1995]).  Defendant now asserts that his attorney's acquiescence
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because depraved
indifference murder of a child, manslaughter in the first degree
and manslaughter in the second degree are inconsistent counts
that should have been charged to the jury in the alternative
pursuant to People v Gallagher (69 NY2d 525 [1987]).
To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, a
defendant must prove that trial counsel failed to provide
meaningful representation (see e.g. People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143,
152 [2005]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; People v
Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).  "A single error may qualify as
ineffective assistance, but only when the error is sufficiently
egregious and prejudicial as to compromise a defendant's right to
a fair trial" (People v Caban, 5 NY3d at 152).  In addition, even
if a defendant shows that the lawyer erred, a defendant must
further "demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate
explanations" for the error (People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709
[1988]).
Deciding whether defendant's trial lawyer was
ineffective when he agreed that the jury should consider all
three homicide offenses requires us to assess our precedent
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addressing inconsistent counts.  In Gallagher (69 NY2d 525
[1987]), we explained that criminal charges must be considered in
the alternative by the finder of fact if guilt of one charge is
inconsistent with guilt of the other.  If so, the jury may find
the accused guilty of only one of the crimes because a finding of
guilt on inconsistent counts results in a repugnant verdict.  For
example, a person cannot simultaneously intend to cause another
person's death and at the same time consciously disregard a
substantial risk that death will occur (see id. at 529).  As a
result of this inconsistency, Gallagher held that the crimes of
intentional murder and depraved indifference murder must be
charged in the alternative.  
In Trappier, however, we recognized that "[a] defendant
could certainly intend one result -- serious physical injury --
while recklessly creating a grave risk that a different, more
serious result -- death -- would ensue from his actions" (87 NY2d
55, 59 [1995]).  Thus, a jury may consider both attempted assault
in the first degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree
because those charges are not inconsistent and therefore do not
have to be charged in the alternative.  Based on the reasoning of
Trappier, we recently determined that a defendant can be
convicted of both first-degree intentional manslaughter (Penal
Law § 125.20 [1]) and depraved indifference murder because the
former crime requires an intent to inflict serious physical
injury whereas the latter requires the reckless creation of a
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1 Depraved indifference murder under subdivision (2) of
Penal Law § 125.25 is different because it only applies to a
grave risk of death, not a grave risk of serious physical injury.
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different result -- a grave risk of death (see Matter of Suarez v
Byrne, 10 NY3d 523, 540-541 [2008]).
Considering this precedent, we conclude that the counts
of depraved indifference murder of a child and first-degree
manslaughter as charged in the indictment were not inconsistent
and it was proper to allow the jury to consider both offenses
simultaneously rather than in the alternative.  Depraved
indifference murder of a child under Penal Law § 125.25 (4)
requires that the defendant recklessly create a grave risk of
serious physical injury or death under circumstances evincing a
depraved indifference to human life.1  In contrast, first-degree
manslaughter under Penal Law § 125.20 (4) involves an intent to
cause physical injury.  As Trappier declared, a defendant can
"certainly intend one result . . . while recklessly creating a
grave risk of a different, more serious result" (87 NY2d at 59). 
Hence, trial counsel's failure to object to the court's proposed
charge with respect to these two counts did not amount to
ineffective legal assistance.
Whether manslaughter in the second degree should have
been charged as a lesser-included, alternative offense of the
count of depraved indifference murder of a child is a closer
question.  We have held that manslaughter in the second degree is
a lesser included offense of depraved indifference murder under
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Penal Law § 125.25 (2) (see People v Atkinson, 7 NY3d 765, 766-
767 [2006]), but we have not examined whether that also applies
to depraved indifference murder of a child under subdivision (4)
of section 125.25.  The Third and Fourth Departments have
considered this issue and ruled that second-degree manslaughter
is not a lesser included offense of depraved indifference murder
of a child (see People v Heslop, 48 AD3d 190, 195-196 [3d Dept
2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 935 [2008]; People v Robinson, 278 AD2d
798 [4th Dept 2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 762 [2001]).  Hence, it
was not unreasonable for defendant's trial attorney to believe
that the jury could consider both depraved indifference murder of
a child and manslaughter in the second degree, and that those
counts did not have to be charged in the alternative (see
generally People v Carter, 7 NY3d 875, 876-877 [2006]).  
In any event, defendant has not shown that there was no
legitimate tactical reason for trial counsel's decision to accept
the charge regarding second-degree manslaughter.  Because it is
undisputed that defendant caused the child's death, it is
conceivable that his attorney may have thought there was a
benefit in giving the jury the option of considering the less
serious homicide offense at the same time it deliberated over the
depraved indifference murder and first-degree manslaughter
charges.  If jurors were split on either of the higher counts,
defense counsel may have reasoned that they would compromise by
convicting defendant of the less serious offense.  Thus, counsel
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could have concluded that submission of all three homicide counts
created an opportunity for jury leniency.  Defendant therefore
has not demonstrated that he was denied his right to meaningful
representation at trial.
Defendant also contends that he was denied a fair trial
because the People used a projector to display the legal
definitions of depraved indifference and recklessness to the jury
during summation.  Defendant believes that this created a risk
that the jury would place undue emphasis on those definitions
during deliberations and that the prosecutor usurped the trial
judge's duty to explain the law to the jury.
The slides in the record before us contain virtually
verbatim definitions of depraved indifference murder and
recklessness as set forth in the pattern Criminal Jury
Instructions (see CJI2d[NY] Penal Law § 125.25).  Notably, the
CJI instructions on depraved indifference incorporate our recent
jurisprudence on the subject (see e.g. People v Feingold, 7 NY3d
288, 294-296 [2006]) and defendant concedes that the content of
the slides accurately described the legal definitions of those
terms.  The use of the slides, therefore, could have assisted the
jury in differentiating between ordinary recklessness for
manslaughter and the extreme recklessness and heightened mental
state that is needed to establish depraved indifference.
Furthermore, during the trial judge's pre-summation
charge to the jury, he specifically advised:  "I am responsible
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for setting forth the law, not the lawyers."  The judge also
explained that the lawyers were given a copy of the court's legal
instructions before summations and might refer to those
instructions during closing arguments.  The judge cautioned the
jurors that they had to "listen carefully to all the instructions
that I will give after the summations.  And if you think there's
any difference between what the lawyers may have said and what I
say the law is, your sworn duty as jurors is to follow my
instructions on the law."  In the final charge, the court
reiterated that the jurors were duty bound to "apply to the facts
the law as I explain it."  The slides were not given to the jury
to review during deliberations (cf. People v Owens, 69 NY2d 585,
591 [1987] [a jury cannot be given only certain portions of final
instructions in writing over the defendant's objection]).  
In our view, the judge's instructions were sufficient
to dispel any possibility that the jury would give precedence to
or place undue emphasis on the prosecutor's use of the slides
(see generally People v Tucker, 77 NY2d 861, 863 [1991]).  Jurors
are presumed to follow the legal instructions they are given (see
e.g. People v Guzman, 76 NY2d 1, 7 [1990]; People v Acevedo, 69
NY2d 478, 488 [1987]) and, in conjunction with the court's
appropriate commands, we believe that the use of the slides in
this case did not prejudice defendant or undermine his right to a
fair trial.  As a result, it cannot be said that the trial court
abused its discretion as a matter of law when it allowed this
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procedure.
Defendant's final contention is that his right to a
public trial was violated when the court granted the prosecutor's
request to exclude the mother of defendant's children from the
trial because she was a potential witness.  Courts have the
discretion to exclude potential witnesses from the courtroom (see
People v Santana, 80 NY2d 92, 100 [1992]; People v Cooke, 292 NY
185, 191 [1944]) without contravening the Sixth Amendment right
to a public trial.  On this record, it was not unreasonable for
the court to find that the woman might be called as a rebuttal
witness for the People, notwithstanding the fact that defense
counsel indicated that he would not call her to the stand because
her Family Court attorney prohibited her from being interviewed. 
In addition, the fact that the court allowed defendant's mother
to remain in the courtroom undermines defendant's claim that the
trial court sought to remove his relatives and friends from the
courtroom.  The constitutional cases defendant cites (see e.g.
Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39 [1984]; People v Nieves, 90 NY2d 426
[1997]) therefore have no bearing on this case.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Graffeo.  Chief Judge Lippman
and Judges Ciparick, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided March 25, 2010