Case Title: STATE v FITZPATRICK RADI

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-07-29T00:00:00Z

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No. 13253 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1977 T H E STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, BERNARD JAMES FITZPATRICK, GARY RADI, TRAVIS HOLLIDAY, PAUL BAD HORSE, J R . , and EDWIN R. B U S H M A N , Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Nat Allen, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellants: John L. Adams, Jr. argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Robert L. Stephens, Jr. argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Reno and Dove, B i l l i n g s , Montana James Reno argued, ~ i l l i n g s , Montana Chris J. Nelson argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Clarence T. Belue, Hardin, Montana Cate, Lynaugh, F i t z g e r a l d & Huss, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Michael Greely argued, Attorney General, Helena, Montana James Seykora argued, County Attorney, Hardin, Montana James S i n c l a i r argued, S p e c i a l Deputy C o . Attorney, B i l l i n g s , Montana .jf)t- F i l e d : - Submitted: January 28, 1977 Decided: $ ! @ i = & g j 9 ; 4 7 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s a n appeal from t h e f i n a l judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Big Horn County, following a jury t r i a l . Defendants F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi appeal from judgments of conviction f o r d e l i b e r a t e homicide, aggravated kidnapping and robbery. Defen- d a n t s Holliday and Bad Horse appeal from judgments of conviction f o r robbery. O n May 20, 1975, t h e S t a t e of Montana f i l e d an Informa- t i o n charging defendants F i t z p a t r i c k , Radi, Holliday, Bad Horse and Bushman with d e l i b e r a t e homicide, i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-5-102 (1) ( a ) (b) , R.C .M. 1947; aggravated kidnapping i n v i o l a - t i o n of s e c t i o n s 94-5-303 (1) (b) (c) , 94-5-303 (2) and 94-5-304, R.C.M. 1947; and robbery, i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-5-401 (1) (b) , R.C.M. 1947. The a f f i d a v i t of probable cause i n d i c a t e s t h e s e charges s t e m from t h e April 5, 1975 robbery of t h e Safeway s t o r e i n Hardin, Montana and t h e murder of Monte Dyckman, a Safeway s t o r e employee. Following defense motions f o r severance of t r i a l , change of venue and d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of judges, t r i a l was held i n B i l l i n g s , Montana i n October 1975. Defendant Bushman testi- f i e d i n behalf of t h e s t a t e and was granted immunity from prose- c u t i o n . A t t h e conclusion of t h e s t a t e ' s case-in-chief, a l l defendants r e s t e d without o f f e r i n g evidence. Defendants F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi were found g u i l t y of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, aggravated kidnapping, and robbery. Defendants Holliday and Bad Horse w e r e found g u i l t y only of robbery. O n October 29, 1975, defendants F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi were each sentenced t o 100 years imprisonment f o r t h e crime of d e l i b e r a t e homicide; 100 years imprisonment f o r t h e c r i m e of robbery a s p e r s i s t e n t felony offenders pursuant t o s e c t i o n 95-2206.5, R.C.M. 1947; and death by hanging f o r t h e c r i m e of aggravated kidnapping. Defendants Holliday and Bad Horse w e r e each sentenced t o 4 0 years imprisonment f o r t h e crime of robbery. Defendants Radi and F i t z p a t r i c k ' s sentences of death were stayed by t h e d i s - t r i c t c o u r t pending appeal t o t h i s Court. A t t r i a l t h e state o f f e r e d evidence t o prove t h a t de- fendants m e t i n B i l l i n g s , Montana on A p r i l 5, 1975 and conspired t o rob t h e Safeway grocery s t o r e i n Hardin, a small community 50 miles south of B i l l i n g s . The state o f f e r e d d i r e c t and circum- s t a n t i a l evidence tending t o prove t h a t on t h e evening of A p r i l 5, 1975 defendants F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi drove t o Hardin i n Radi's automobile, while ~ o l l j . d a y , ~ a d Horse and Bushman together drove t o ~ a r d i n i n another automobile. Defendants parked i n f r o n t of t h e Safeway s t o r e and waited u n t i l c l o s i n g t i m e when E v e r e t t S t o l t z , t h e s t o r e manager, and Monte Dyckman, a s t o r e employee locked t h e s t o r e doors and drove away i n d i f f e r e n t automobiles. F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi followed t h e s t o r e manager. The remaining defendants purportedly followed Monte Dyckman but l o s t s i g h t of him when he stopped a t t h e p o s t o f f i c e t o d e p o s i t mail. When t h e s t o r e manager drove t o h i s home, Radi and F i t z p a t r i c k r e a l i z e d t h e s t o r e r e c e i p t s were c a r r i e d by Dyckman and they proceeded t o t h e bank where t h e d e p o s i t w a s t o be dropped. It i s a l l e g e d F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi abducted Monte Dyckman a t t h e bank, p r i o r t o h i s depositing t h e s t o r e ' s r e c e i p t s , robbed him, and then k i l l e d him i n t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e Toluca Interchange, 12 m i l e s w e s t of Hardin, within t h e boundaries of Big Horn County. Defendants r a i s e numerous i s s u e s on appeal. W e hold t h e judgments of conviction must be reversed and t h e causes remanded f o r new t r i a l s . Therefore, w e d i s c u s s only t h e following i s s u e s t o i n s u r e t h a t w e do not comment on m a t t e r s t o come before t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n a new t r i a l : I. Whether t h e Montana s t a t u t o r y provisions f o r jury s e l e c t i o n are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v a l i d and, i f so, whether t h e jury i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e was s e l e c t e d and drawn i n s u b s t a n t i a l compliance with t h e law? 11. Whether t h e defendants were prejudiced by t h e joinder of t h e i r t r i a l s ? 111. Whether t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t corroboration of de- fendant Bushman's testimony? I V . Whether t h e convictions of defendants Holliday and Bad Horse should be reversed and t h e charges a g a i n s t them d i s - missed on t h e grounds t h e jury was inadequately i n s t r u c t e d on t h e a p p l i c a b l e law and returned i n c o n s i s t e n t v e r d i c t s ? Issue I. Defendants i n i t i a l l y contend t h e i r convictions should be reversed and t h e causes remanded on t h e grounds t h e Montana s t a t u t o r y provision f o r s e l e c t i n g j u r o r s i s unconstitu- t i o n a l and, even i f t h e s t a t u t e i s found t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , t h a t t h e jury panels i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e w e r e s e l e c t e d and drawn i n t o t a l disregard of t h e a p p l i c a b l e Montana l a w . Section 95-1908, R.C.M. 1947, sets f o r t h t h e procedure i n challenging t h e s e l e c t i o n of a jury panel: "Motion t o discharge jury panel. (a) Any o b j e c t i o n t o t h e manner i n which a jury panel has been selected o r drawn s h a l l be r a i s e d by a motion t o discharge t h e jury panel. The motion s h a l l be made a t l e a s t f i v e (5) days p r i o r t o t h e t e r m f o r which t h e jury i s drawn. For good cause shown, t h e c o u r t may e n t e r t a i n t h e motion a t any t i m e t h e r e a f t e r . " (b) The motion s h a l l be i n w r i t i n g supported by a f f i d a v i t and s h a l l s t a t e f a c t s which show t h a t t h e jury panel was improperly s e l e c t e d o r drawn. " ( c ) I f t h e motion s t a t e s f a c t s which show t h a t t h e jury panel has been improperly s e l e c t e d o r drawn, it s h a l l be t h e duty of t h e c o u r t t o conduct a hear- ing. The burden of proof s h a l l be on t h e movant. " ( d ) I f t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e jury panel was improperly s e l e c t e d o r drawn, t h e c o u r t s h a l l order t h e jury panel discharged and t h e s e l e c t i o n o r drawing of a new panel i n t h e manner provided by law. I' A t t h e o u t s e t w e note defendants have f a i l e d t o comply with s e c t i o n 95-1908. Defendants r a i s e d t h e i s s u e of improper jury s e l e c t i o n and drawing i n a t i m e l y and s p e c i f i c manner, b u t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t record f a i l s t o d i s c l o s e t h e submission o f any a f f i d a v i t i n support of t h e a l l e g a t i o n . Defense counsel contend, on o r a l argument b e f o r e t h i s Court, t h a t t h e t i m e l y submission o f a supporting a f f i d a v i t , r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 95-1908, was p r o h i b i t i v e s i n c e counsel lacked t h e means of determining t h e manner i n which t h e jury panel was s e l e c t e d and drawn. Absent such knowledge, d e f e n s e counsel conclude t h e f i l i n g of a f f i d a v i t s b e f o r e t h i s Court a t t h e t i m e of appeal i s s u f f i c i e n t . W e d i s a g r e e . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e c l e a r l y r e v e a l s t h a t a t l e a s t one defense counsel was cognizant of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 95- 1908. The motion of defendant Bad Horse t o d i s c h a r g e t h e jury panel s t a t e s : "COMES NOW t h e Defendant, PAUL BAD HORSE, J R . , and moves t h e Court t o Discharge t h e J u r y Panel h e r e i n pursuant t o S e c t i o n 95-1908, R.C.M. 1947. "Said motion w i l l be supported by a f f i d a v i t when t h e jury panel i s s e l e c t e d and made known t o t h i s defendant. "Dated t h i s 29th day of August, 1975." The d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e i s d e p l e t e of any a f f i d a v i t supporting t h i s motion t o d i s c h a r g e t h e j u r y panel. Absent such a showing of good cause t o s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e i r motion, defendants cannot c h a l l e n g e t h e j u r y panel f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appeal on t h e ground t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f a i l e d t o s e l e c t and draw jury p a n e l s i n accordance w i t h a p p l i c a b l e Montana law. Ledger v. McKenzie, 107 Mont. 335, 85 P.2d 352; S t a t e v. C o r l i s s , 150 Mont. 4 0 , 430 P.2d 632. The means of e s t a b l i s h i n g good c a u s e , s p e c i f i - c a l l y t h e sworn a f f i d a v i t s of t h e c h i e f deputy c l e r k o f t h e d i s - t r i c t c o u r t of Yellowstone County and t h e Yellowstone county r e g i s t r a r of v o t e r s , were a s a c c e s s i b l e a t t h e t i m e of t r i a l a s a t t h e t i m e o f appeal. Y e t , defendants' f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h s e c t i o n 95-1908, w i l l n o t f o r e c l o s e our c o n s i d e r a t i o n of whether t h e j u r y panel was properly selected and drawn where t h e fundamental c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of t h e defendants a r e a t stake. S t a t e v. P o r t e r , 125 Mont. 503, 242 P.2d 984; S t a t e ex rel. Henningsen v. ~ i s t r i c t Court, 136 Mont. 354, 348 P.2d 143; S t a t e v. Chapman, 139 Mont. 98, 360 P.2d 703. Thus we consider t h e question of whether t h e s e l e c t i o n of j u r o r s and drawing of jury panels i n t h e i n s t a n t case infringed on defendants' fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s ? This Court has long held t h e accused i n a criminal prose- c u t i o n is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y guaranteed a t r i a l by an i m p a r t i a l jury s e l e c t e d and drawn i n accordance with t h e law. S t a t e ex rel. Henningson v. D i s t r i c t Court, supra; S t a t e v. Hay, 120 Mont. 573, 194 P.2d 232; Dupont v. McAdow, 6 Mont. 226, 9 P. 925. Any m a t e r i a l d e v i a t i o n o r d e p a r t u r e i n procuring a jury has been held t o c o n s t i t u t e a d e n i a l of fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . S t a t e v. P o r t e r , supra; S t a t e v. Groom, 49 Mont. 354, 1 4 1 P. 858; S t a t e v. Tighe, 27 Mont. 327, 71 P. 3; reversed on o t h e r grounds 35Mont. 512, 90 P. 981. The Revised Codes of Montana are e x p l i c i t l y c l e a r i n defining t h e procedure t o be followed i n s e l e c t i n g j u r o r s and drawing jury panels. Section 93-1301, R.C.M. 1947, provides t h a t r e g i s t e r e d e l e c t o r s whose names appear on t h e most r e c e n t list of a l l r e g i s t e r e d e l e c t o r s , a s prepared by t h e county r e g i s - trar, a r e competent t o serve a s jurors. Section 93-1401, R.C.M. 1947, provides t h a t a list of persons t o s e r v e a s j u r o r s must be prepared by t h e chairman of t h e county commissioners, o r i n h i s absence, any member of t h e board of county commissioners, t h e county t r e a s u r e r and t h e county a s s e s s o r o r any two cf such o f f i c e r s . Once t h e jury l i s t is composed, s e c t i o n 93-1402, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r e s t h a t each name on t h e l i s t be assigned a number and t h e l i s t of t h e names of t h e persons be d e l i v e r e d by those o f f i c e r s t o t h e c l e r k of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t pursuant t o section 93-1403, R.C.M. 1947. Section 93-1404, R.C.M. 1947, mandates that the clerk of court place the individual pieces of paper, embossed with the number assigned each juror, in a box and from this box the numbers are to be drawn by the district judge in the presence of the clerk of court pursuant to section 93-1502, R.C.M. 1947. Section 93-1512, R.C.M. 1947, provides that in the event additional jurors are needed, their numbers must also be drawn by the district judge. Defendants contend section 93-1301, regarding the com- petency of jurors, is unconstitutional in that voter registra- tion lists fail to provide a true cross-section of the community in violation of equal protection requirements of the state and federal constitutions. It is argued the voter registration system excludes residents who are qualified for jury service, but are not qualified to vote or do not choose to vote. The issue of whether voter registration lists are a proper instrument for selecting jurors was recently discussed in United States v. Ramos Colon, 415 F.Supp. 459, 464: "From a constitutional standpoint it is well settled that voting lists may be used as a basis for jury selection unless it appears that in the comm;nity there is systematic, intentional and deliberate exclusion from those lists of a partic- ular economic, social, religious, racial, geograph- ical or political group. [Citing cases.] From Colon and Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, we glean the prima facie case for establishing a statutory challenge to a jury selection system on the ground of jury composition: 1) Proof that the jury selection system is disadvantageous to a cognizable class, and 2) proof that the disadvantage is occasioned by discrimination in the selection process. Defendants bear the burden of establishing the cognizable class which is discriminated against by the jury selection process. Purposeful discrimination may not be assumed or merely asserted. Swain v . Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L ed 2d 759; Smith v . Texas, 311 U . S . 128, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L ed 84. De- fendants' only allegation of discrimination was that the jury panel was composed of all whites, with the exception of two Indians, and that the convicting jury was exclusively white in composition. Such allegation falls short of establishing a prima facie case challenging the jury selection system on the ground of racial composition. Petition of Boe, 156 Mont. 303, 481 P.2d 45; State v. Johnson, 149 Mont. 173, 424 P.2d 728. It is a well accepted proposition of law that the voter registration list, from which the jurors are selected, and the jury panel need not perfectly mirror the racial composition of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 69242 L ed 2d 690; Foster v. Sparks, supra; State v. Taylor, 168 Mont. 142, 542 P.2d 100, 32 St.Rep. 993. Defendants further contend the jury panels in the instant case were selected and drawn in total disregard of the applicable Montana law. We find merit in defendants' claim that the manner in which jurors were selected and drawn substantially deviated from the procedures mandated in Title 93, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947. Specifically, all duties delegated to the jury commission and district court judge were performed by the clerk of court without any apparent overseeing. While we have no cause to question the good faith of the public officers involved, it is obvious the statutory scheme for selecting and drawing a jury was completely circumvented. The rule in Montana is that juries must be selected and drawn in substantial compliance with the law. Where the disregard for legislative mandates amounts to more than technical irregularity substantial compliance has not been achieved. State ex rel. Henningsen v. District Court, supra; State v. Porter, supra. We stated initially that this m a t t e r was n o t p r o p e r l y r a i s e d on appeal, b u t it i s of suf- f i c i e n t import t o warrant a f u l l d i s c u s s i o n f o r f u t u r e guidance. I s s u e 11. Defendants contend t h a t t h e joinder of t h e i r t r i a l s , a f t e r timely and s p e c i f i c f i l i n g of motions f o r severance, brought about t h e s e e r r o r s : 1. The j u r y was allowed t o c o n s i d e r hearsay evidence which was inadmissible a g a i n s t c e r t a i n defendants, y e t admissible a g a i n s t o t h e r s . 2. The admission of hearsay evidence denied i n d i v i d u a l defendants t h e i r fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o confronta- t i o n under t h e S i x t h Amendment of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . 3 . The joinder of defendants' t r i a l s denied defendants t h e i r r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. The only s p e c i f i c example of t h e admission of e x t r a j u d i - c i a 1 hearsay c i t e d t o u s is Bushman's testimony of statements a l l e g e d l y made by defendant Radi. Bushman t e s t i f i e d t h e s e state- ments w e r e made a t R a d i ' s home i n B i l l i n g s on A p r i l 6, 1975, a t approximately 2:30 a . m . , s e v e r a l hours a f t e r t h e commission of t h e a l l e g e d crimes. A l l of defendants, w i t h t h e exception of F i t z p a t r i c k , w e r e p r e s e n t when t h e statements w e r e made. Bushman t e s t i f i e d Radi s t a t e d : "A. ' F i t z d i d n ' t have t o shoot t h e k i d . ' I ! * * * "A. And he s a i d , ' F i t z s h o t him.' H e s a i d , 'Boom, boom, he blew h i s head o f f . ' "A. * * * he s a i d , ' F i t z p a t r i c k is p r e t t y p i s s e d o f f . ' he said, ' H e i s uptown g e t t i n g drunk be- cause him having t o shoot t h e k i d f o r nothing because tlere w a s no money i n t h e bag."' The c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1, s t a t e d : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t where one defendant testifies about what was said by a second de- fendant, it is ordinarily not admissible as evidence against any other defendant if that other defendant was not present at the time and place where it was said. "However, what is said is admissible against the defendants that are present when it is said. "In your deliberation, you are not to consider what was said against any defendant who was not present at the time and place where it was said. "You may consider what was said as evidence against those defendants present at the time and place it was said. "The reason for this is that a defendant who is not present when something was said about him, cannot, of course, deny that it was said because it is quite obvious he was not there to know the facts. Therefore, you will not use it as evidence against him." Defendants contend the instruction of the district court was insufficient and failed to erase from the minds of the jurors the crucial and devastating prejudice naturally flowing from the testimony. In support of their argument defendants cite Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L ed 2d 476. In Bruton the codefendants Bruton and Evans were tried jointly and convicted of armed postal robbery. During the trial a postal inspector testified Evans confessed that Bruton and Evans com- mitted the robbery. Evans' conviction was later reversed be- cause the oral admission had been elicited by police officers in disregard of Evans' Miranda rights. Bruton's conviction was upheld on the theory the trial court sufficiently instructed the jurors not to consider Evans' confession as evidence against Bruton. The United States Supreme Court disagreed and reversed Bruton's conviction stating: " * * * because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining petitioner's guilt, admission of Evans' confession in this joint trial violated petitioner's r i g h t of cross-examination secured by t h e Con- f r o n t a t i o n Clause of t h e S i x t h Amendment." 391 U.S. 126. I n a footnote t h e Court s a i d : "We emphasize t h a t t h e hearsay statement incul- pating p e t i t i o n e r was c l e a r l y inadmissible a g a i n s t him under t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e s of evidence * * * t h e problem a r i s i n g only because t h e statement was * * * admissible a g a i n s t t h e d e c l a r a n t Evans. * * * There i s not before u s , t h e r e f o r e , any recognized excep- t i o n t o t h e hearsay r u l e i n s o f a r a s p e t i t i o n e r is concerned and we intimate no view whatever t h a t such exceptions n e c e s s a r i l y raise questions under t h e Confrontation Clause." 391 U . S . 128. The s t a t e argues Bruton is d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e in- s t a n t case s i n c e t h e hearsay statements t e s t i f i e d t o by Bushman w e r e admissible under t h e coconspirator exception t o t h e hearsay r u l e . Section 93-401-27, R.C.M. 1947, provides i n p a r t : "Facts which may be proved on t r i a l . I n conformity with t h e preceding provisions, evidence may be given upon a t r i a l of t h e following f a c t s : "6. After proof of a conspiracy, t h e a c t o r declara- t i o n of a conspirator a g a i n s t h i s coconspirator, and r e l a t i n g t o t h e conspiracy." The s t a t e f u r t h e r argues even i f Radi's d e c l a r a t i o n s w e r e not admissible under t h e coconspirator exception t o t h e hearsay r u l e , they were admissible under s e c t i o n 93-401-7, R.C.M. 1947, which provides : "Declarations which a r e a p a r t of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n . Where, a l s o , t h e d e c l a r a t i o n , a c t , o r omission forms p a r t of a t r a n s a c t i o n , which i s i t s e l f t h e f a c t i n d i s p u t e , o r evidence of t h a t f a c t , such d e c l a r a t i o n , a c t , o r omission i s evidence, a s p a r t of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n . " The s t a t e contends t h e coconspirator exception t o t h e hearsay r u l e i s a v a i l a b l e i n t h i s c a s e , s i n c e t h e s t a t e prose- cuted t h e c a s e on t h e theory t h e r e was a conspiracy t o commit robbery. It i s argued t h a t , even though t h e crime of conspiracy was not charged a s a s e p a r a t e offense i n t h e Information, t h e s t a t e could properly p r e s e n t evidence t o show t h e r e w a s a con- spiracy. Defendants urge t h e s t a t e i s barred from u t i l i z i n g t h e coconspirator exception t o t h e hearsay r u l e s i n c e t h e s t a t e d i d not charge defendants with t h e c r i m e of conspiracy; t h a t t h e s t a t e ' s evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o prove a conspiracy; and, t h a t t h e hearsay statements t e s t i f i e d t o by Bushman were made a f t e r t h e conspiracy ended, i f t h e r e was one, and w e r e not made i n furtherance of a conspiracy. W e d i s a g r e e with defen- d a n t s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e coconspirator exception t o t h e hearsay r u l e . The s t a t e may present evidence e s t a b l i s h i n g a conspir- acy even though t h e crime of conspiracy was not charged as a separate offense i n t h e Information. S t a t e v. Dennison, 94 Mont. 159, 2 1 P.2d 63. Whether o r not a conspiracy was proved f o r t h e purpose of permitting a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e coconspirator exception was a t o t h e hearsay r u l e j q u e s t i o n t o be decided by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . The existence of a conspiracy can be shown by c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evi- dence. To e s t a b l i s h a conspiracy it i s not necessary t o prove by d i r e c t evidence an agreement t o commit a crime. S t a t e v. Alton, 139 Mont. 479, 365 P.2d 527; S t a t e v. C o l l i n s , 88 Mont. 514, 294 P. 957; S t a t e v. Hopkins, 68 Mont. 504, 219 P. 1106. A n examination of t h e record d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t made a finding, without a d i s c l o s u r e of i t s grounds, con- cerning t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of e x t r a j u d i c i a l statements made by a defendant a g a i n s t a nonpresent codefendant, by another co- defendant. The c o u r t admitted t h e testimony, then admonished t h e jury by its I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 ( h e r e t o f o r e c i t e d i n f u l l ) t h a t t h e statement could not be used a g a i n s t a codefendant not present when t h e statement was made. This procedure was approved by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n P a o l i v. United S t a t e s , 352 U.S. 232, 77 S . C t . 294, 1 L ed 2d 278. I n P a o l i a confession of one defendant was admitted inculpating t h e o t h e r defendants. A five-four Court approved t h e giving of a cautionary i n s t r u c t i o n , i f s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r , and reasoned t h a t it could be assumed t h e jury would follow t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n . Y e t , t h i s s t a r t e d a series of cases based on t h e Sixth Amendment command t h a t a l l defendants i n a criminal prosecution s h a l l enjoy t h e r i g h t t o confront t h e witnesses a g a i n s t them. I n 1968, Bruton presented a f a c t s i t u a t i o n where Bruton was j o i n t l y t r i e d with a codefendant named Evans and convicted of robbery. A p o s t a l inspector t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t Evans had o r a l l y confessed t o him and a l s o implicated Bruton. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court held t h i s added s u b s t a n t i a l weight t o t h e c a s e i n a form not subject t o cross-examination, s i n c e Evans d i d not take t h e stand. The Court of Appeals, Eighth C i r c u i t , 375 F.2d 355, set a s i d e t h e Evans conviction f o r a "Miranda" v i o l a t i o n but affirmed t h e conviction of t h e nonconfessor Bruton. The c o u r t r e l i e d on P a o l i because t h e jury w a s i n s t r u c t e d not t o con- s i d e r Evans1 confession i n determining Bruton1s innocence o r g u i l t . The Supreme Court i n Bruton s p e c i f i c a l l y overruled P a o l i and challenged t h e naive assumption t h e p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t of such testimony could be overcome by jury i n s t r u c t i o n s . The Court held t h a t since s u b s t a n t i a l weight was added t o t h e government's case by t h e testimony i n a form not subject t o cross-examination, Bruton's S i x t h Amendment r i g h t t o confront witnesses a g a i n s t him was v i o l a t e d , and t h e v i o l a t i o n was not cured by t h e c o u r t ' s in- s t r u c t i o n t o disregard t h e testimony of t h e p o s t a l inspector concerning Evans1 confession inculpating Bruton. For a case by case examination of t h e application of t h e "Bruton r u l e " see Harrington v. California ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 395 U . S . 250, 89 S.Ct. 1 7 2 6 , 2 3 L ed 2d 284. I n Harrington t h e r e a r e demonstrations of con- s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s of t h e "Bruton r u l e " , i n Bruton type s i t u a t i o n s where it i s not r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . W e do not f i n d these exceptions present i n t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n i n t h e i n s t a n t case. - 13 - The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the right of the defendant to confront his witnesses at the time of trial. In Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242, 243, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L ed 409, 411, the Court said: "The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testi- mony whether he is worthy of belief. * * *" The United States Court of Appeals in United States v. Adams, 446 F.2d 681, 683, cert. den. 404 U.S. 943, found the relevant factual inquiry in determining whether the Confronta- tion Clause is violated to be: " * * * whether under the circumstances, the un- availability of the declarant for cross-examina- tion deprived the jury of a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the extrajudicial declaration." The criteria to be considered in making this factual inquiry are: (1) the declarant's knowledge of the identities and roles of the other coconspirators; (2) the possibility that declarant was relying on faulty recollection; (3) the circumstances under which the statements were made, indicating declarant might be lying about the codefendant's involvement in the crime; (4) the possibility defendants could have shown by cross-examination the declarant's statements were unreliable; and (5) whether the testimony is so "crucial" to the prosecution or "devastating" to the defense as to require reversal of the conviction. United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730; United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, cert. den. 416 U.S. 940. Whether a defendant was denied the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses must be resolved case-by-case, based on an examination of all the circumstances and evidence. A r i a s v. United S t a t e s , 388 F.Supp. 736. There is l i t t l e doubt t h a t d e c l a r a n t Radi c l e a r l y knew F i t z p a t r i c k ' s r o l e i n t h e a l l e g e d crime and t h e i d e n t i t i e s and r o l e s of t h e o t h e r c o n s p i r a t o r s . The e v e n t s w e r e f r e s h i n h i s mind. Y e t , without d i s c u s s i n g t h e t r u t h and v e r a c i t y of t h e d e c l a r a n t , w e recognize t h a t Radi had good reason t o l i e about who s h o t t h e victim. Without F i t z p a t r i c k p r e s e n t , Radi might e a s i l y persuade h i s c o c o n s p i r a t o r s t h a t a l l f a t a l s h o t s w e r e f i r e d by F i t z p a t r i c k and t h u s avoid some conceived c r i m i n a l c u l p a b i l i t y . I n any event, w e recognize t h e d e v a s t a t i n g e f f e c t t h i s testimony would have upon a j u r y and hold, a t least as t o F i t z p a t r i c k , t h e r e was a d e n i a l of t h e r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t t h e d e c l a r a n t on cross-examination before t h e trier of f a c t . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n admonishing t h e jury was i n s u f f i - c i e n t a s f a r a s o f f s e t t i n g any p r e j u d i c e which r e s u l t e d from t h e admission of t h e e x t r a j u d i c i a l statements. Bruton v. United S t a t e s , supra; Roberts v. R u s s e l l , 392 U.S. 293, 88 S.Ct. 1921, W e acknowledge t h e i n h e r e n t d i s c r e t i o n of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n determining whether defendants j o i n t l y charged with p u b l i c o f f e n s e s a r e t o be provided s e p a r a t e t r i a l s o r t r i e d j o i n t l y . However, w e recognize a need f o r j u d i c i a l g u i d e l i n e s i n t h e i n s t a n c e where t h e prosecution i n t e n d s t o i n t r o d u c e i n t o evidence t h e e x t r a j u d i c i a l statement of one defendant t h a t im- p l i c a t e s a codefendant. This i s s u e was discussed i n People v . Aranda, 63 C.2d 518, 47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265, 272: "When t h e prosecution proposes t o i n t r o d u c e i n t o evidence an e x t r a j u d i c i a l statement of one defendant t h a t i m p l i c a t e s a codefendant, t h e t r i a l c o u r t must adopt one of t h e following procedures: (1) It can permit a j o i n t t r i a l i f a l l p a r t s of t h e e x t r a j u d i c i a l statements i m - p l i c a t i n g any codefendants can be and a r e e f f e c t i v e l y d e l e t e d without p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e c l a r a n t . By e f f e c t i v e d e l e t i o n s , w e mean not only d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s of codefendants but any statements t h a t could be employed a g a i n s t nondeclarant codefendants once t h e i r i d e n t i t y i s otherwise e s t a b l i s h e d . ( 2 ) It can g r a n t a severance of trials i f t h e prosecution i n s i s t s t h a t it must use t h e extra- j u d i c i a l statements and it appears t h a t e f f e c - t i v e d e l e t i o n s cannot be made. (3) I f t h e prosecution has s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s i s t e d a motion f o r severance and t h e r e a f t e r o f f e r s an extra- j u d i c i a l statement implicating a codefendant, t h e t r i a l c o u r t must exclude it i f e f f e c t i v e d e l e t i o n s a r e not possible. Similar r u l e s concerning j o i n t t r i a l have been adopted i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s and have been found work- able. [Citing c a s e s . ] " 407 P.2d 272. W e a r e i n agreement with t h e e f f e c t of t h e s e j u d i c i a l g u i d e l i n e s . Our f i n a l inquiry i n t h i s a r e a of joinder concerns de- fendants' contention t h e joinder of t h e i r t r i a l s denied them t h e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. Defendants claim: (1) The number of defendants and independent counsel m81.de it impossible t o employ e f f e c t i v e t r i a l t a c t i c s ; (2) one defendant o r another d i s q u a l i f i e d a d i s t r i c t judge o r challenged a juror t h a t another defendant would have allowed t o remain i n t h e case; (3) c e r t a i n counsel delved i n t o a r e a s on cross-examination t h a t merely re- peated t h e s t a t e ' s case a g a i n s t p a r t i c u l a r defendants; and ( 4 ) a l l defendants, with t h e exception of Radi, e l e c t e d t o rest t h e i r cases following t h e state's case-in-chief, t h u s compelling Radi t o rest. W e note t h a t most of t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s a r e of a general n a t u r e and could be r a i s e d i n almost any m u l t i p l e de- fendant-counsel proceeding. It would be most unusual, i n our opinion, i f four defense counsel representing i n d i v i d u a l c l i e n t s d i d agree on every question of t r i a l t a c t i c s . Further, a de- fendant has no r i g h t t o have h i s c a s e t r i e d by a s p e c i f i c judge o r have a p a r t i c u l a r person s i t on h i s jury. S t a t e v. Moran, 1 4 2 Mont. 423, 384 P.2d 777. I n concluding discussion of t h e i s s u e of joinder, we r e i t e r a t e our position. Defendants incurred s u b s t a n t i a l preju- d i c e through t h e joinder of t h e i r t r i a l s because of a f a i l u r e to protect individual defendant's right to confrontation. We fully realize the benefits of joint trials, specifically, the conservation of state funds, diminished inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and the avoidance of delay in bringing those accused of crime to trial. Yet, where we obtain speed, economy and convenience in the administration of the law at the cost of fundamental constitutional rights, that price is too high. Trial courts must examine joinder of defendants' trials more closely, particularly where separate counsel is required because of potential conflicts of interest between the defendants. Issue 111. This issue attacks the sufficiency of evi- dence which the state presented to corroborate Bushman's testi- mony. Section 95-3012, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Testimony of person legally accountable. A con- viction cannot be had on the testimony of one responsible or legally accountable £ 0 ; the same offense, as defined in section 94-2-106, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in it- self, and without the aid of the testimony of the one responsible or legally accountable for the same offense, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient, it merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof." In State v. Orsborn, Mont . , 555 P.2d 509, 514, 33 St.Rep. 935, 940, this Court said: "State v. Cobb, 76 Mont. 89, 92, 245 P.2d 265, has been cited many times as to the general guidelines for determining the sufficiency of evidence corrob- orating the testimony of one legally accountable. Though Cobb was decided under section 11988, R.C.M. 1921, since repealed, the language of the old statute is nearly identical to that of section 95- 3012, R.C.M. 1947, in pertinent part. * * *" State v . Cobb, 76 Mont. 89, 92, 245 P. 265, set out these general rules: "(a) The corroborating evidence may be supplied by the defendant or his witnesses. "(b) It need not be direct evidence--it may be circumstantial. "(c) It need not extend to every fact to which t h e accomplice t e s t i f i e s . " ( d ) It need pot be s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a con- v i c t i o n o r t o e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e case of g u i l t . " ( e ) It need not be s u f f i c i e n t t o connect t h e defendant with t h e commission of t h e crime; it i s s u f f i c i e n t i f it tends t o do so. " ( f ) Whether t h e corroborating evidence tends t o connect t h e defendant with t h e commission of t h e offense is a question of l a w , b u t t h e weight of t h e evidence--its e f f i c a c y t o f o r t i f y t h e testi- mony of t h e accomplice and render h i s s t o r y t r u s t - worthy--is a matter f o r t h e consideration of t h e jury. '' A t t r i a l t h e s t a t e presented two minor g i r l s who t e s t i - f i e d they were with a l l f i v e defendants on t h e day of t h e robbery and murder. The g i r l s t e s t i f i e d a l l f i v e defendants planned t o go t o Hardin and t h e g i r l s themselves accompanied Bushman, Bad Horse and Holliday on t h e t r i p t o Hardin and t h e r e t u r n t r i p t o B i l l i n g s , a t about midnight on April 5, 1975; t h a t F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi were i n R a d i l s automobile a t a s e r v i c e s t a t i o n i n B i l l i n g s j u s t before Bushman, Holliday, Bad Horse and t h e two g i r l s l e f t f o r Hardin; t h a t R a d i l s automobile passed them on t h e highway t o Hardin; and t h a t two men, who t h e g i r l s presumed t o be Radi and F i t z p a t r i c k , g o t o u t of R a d i l s automobile i n Hardin. Both g i r l s t e s t i f i e d they observed a hole i n t h e windshield of Radi's automobile on t h e morning following t h e crimes. Carol Broach t e s t i f i e d Bushman, Bad Horse and Holliday were i n Hardin from approximately 10:45 p.m. t o midnight on April 5, 1975; t h a t she returned t o B i l l i n g s with t h e s e t h r e e defendants and t h e two minor g i r l s ; and, t h a t t h i s group a r r i v e d a t Radi's house a t approximately 2:00 a.m. on ~ p r i l 6 , 1975. Raleigh Kraft, Jr. t e s t i f i e d he had discussed with Bushman and Bad Horse t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of robbing t h e Safeway s t o r e . - 18 - Ronald Potts and Lyle Doane testified they were custo- mers at the Safeway store on the evening of April 5, 1975, and observed an automobile, blue or green in color,parked in front of the Safeway store, with two male occupants approxi- mately the same ages as Radi and Fitzpatrick. Radi's automo- bile was metallic blue in color. Agent Dieckman of the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified Fitzpatrick was arrested in Spokane, Washington on June 3, 1975, and Fitzpatrick told him he had been drinking with Radi in Billings on the evening of April 5 . The witness established that Fitzpatrick used a fictitious name while in Spokane and possessed a newspaper clipping stating Fitzpatrick was wanted by the police for the crimes committed in Hardin on April 5, 1975. Robert Balko, employed by Nyquist Financial Services in Billings, testified Radi indicated in a conversation with him that someone had shot a hole through his windshield. The testimony of Mary Jenkins and Helen Jones established that Radi had changed his Montana automobile license plates for Nevada license plates shortly after the crimes. Roger Asbury of the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified the bullet found in Radi's automobile was fired from the same gun as the slug found in the victim's automobile and the slug which killed the victim. This evidence sufficiently corroborates Bushman's test- imony. Issue IV. The final issue we will consider is whether the convictions of defendants Holliday and Bad Horse should be reversed on the ground the jury was inadequately instructed on the applicable law and returned inconsistent verdicts. Holliday and Bad Horse contend that since the state prosecuted its case on the theory of conspiracy it is logically inconsistent to find them guilty of robbery, but not guilty of deliberate homicide and aggravated kidnapping. In support of this contention de- fendants direct our attention to the court's Instruction No. 28, an instruction on the felony-murder doctrine, which provided: "You are instructed that when two or more persons agree to commit a crime under such cir- cumstances as may * * * result in the taking of human life, either in the furtherance of, or the resistance to their unlawful agreement, then each party * * * will be held responsible for the consequences which might reasonably be ex- pected to flow * * * from carrying into effect their unlawful agreement * * *. "The law is that, if two or more persons agree to commit a felony and death happens in the fur- therance of the common object, all are alike guilty of the homicide. The act of one of them done in the furtherance of the original design, in the contemplation of the law, is the act of all. And if such an agreement is to do or per- form an unlawful act constituting a felony, and in the prosecution of such unlawful act constitut- ing a felony, an individual is killed, such killing is deliberate homicide." A general principle of law is that consistency in crim- inal verdicts is unnecessary. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L ed 356. Where two or more defendants are tried together in a criminal case the verdicts need not demonstrate rational consistency. United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, cert. den. 420 U.S. 991. The United States Supreme Court explained the rationale for the Dunn holding when it said: "That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters." 284 U.S. 394. Defendants Holliday and Bad Horse distinguish Dunn from the instant case. They contend the jury in Dunn correctly followed the instructions of law given to it in reaching that verdict, but the jury here when finding Holliday and Bad Horse not guilty on two counts and guilty on the other count, completely disregarded Instruction No. 28 and relied on Instruction No. 36 which provided the jury might "find any one of the follow- ing verdicts" as to each defendant: "1. Guilty of Count One, deliberate homicide; "2. Not guilty of Count One, deliberate homicide; "3. Guilty of Count Two, aggravated kidnapping; "4. Not guilty of Count Two, aggravated kidnapping; "5. Guilty of Count Three, robbery; "6. Not guilty of Count Three, robbery." The jury verdicts returned in this case can be distinguished from the inconsistent verdicts which were the subject of the general rule announced in Dunn. These verdicts are not merely inconsistent, they are legally unsupportable. his case was prosecuted on a conspiracy to commit robbery theory and each de- fendant prosecuted under the felony murder rule or doctrine which contemplates, as set forth in the trial court's Instruction No. 28, that each defendant is guilty of deliberate homicide or must be acquitted. This jury was improperly and inadequately instructed on that point of law and could not reach a proper verdict. State v. Bean, 135 Mont. 135, 337 P.2d 930; State v. Jackson, 88 Mont. 420, 293 P. 309. The inconsistency between the court's Instruction No. 28 and Instruction No. 36 is apparent and the resulting confusion in the minds of the jury is evidenced by its request for clar- ification of Instruction No. 28: "Question on Instruction #28 "If we find one defendant guilty of robbery does Inst. No. 28 require guilty verdict on two remaining counts." The district court responded: "Instruction number 36 answers this question." No further clarification was provided, the jury completed d e l i b e r a t i o n and reached i t s v e r d i c t . This Court has held t h a t t h e need f o r giving addi- t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e jury i s a m a t t e r of d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v. Hawkins, 165 Mont. 4 5 6 , 529 P.2d 1377. However, here t h e jury was d i r e c t e d t o examine I n s t r u c - t i o n N o . 36, which i s an improper i n s t r u c t i o n c o n t r a r y t o t h e l a w of t h e case. The c o u r t should have f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury i n a manner t h a t would s u f f i c i e n t l y and c l e a r l y p r e s e n t t h e a p p l i c a b l e law. Such f a i l u r e i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . The judgments of conviction of a l l defendants a r e reversed. The causes a r e remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r new t r i a l s . J u s t i c e ( Chief J u s t i c e A J u s t i c e s 0 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison concurring i n p a r t and dissenting i n p a r t : I concur with the majority's opinion a s t o a l l defendants except Radi whose conviction I would affirm. By h i s own s t a t e - ments he was one of two men who kidnapped a young man (who unlike any of the defendants worked f o r a l i v i n g ) , took him outside h i s hometown robbed and ruthlessly murdered him. I n ~ a d i ' s case it makes l i t t l e o r no difference who f i r e d the shots, f o r h i s very a c t s i n participating i n the kidnapping and robbery make him a principal t o the murder. A s t o Fitzpatri'ck, who was not present a t the time of Radi's statement on who f i r e d the shots, t h i s Court i s compelled t o follow the decision of the United States Supreme Court i n Bruton v. United States, supra, and i t s progeny. To do otherwise would be t o delay the ultimate decision on r e t r i a l . Bruton i s based upon the r i g h t of defendant Fitzpatrick, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, t o cross-examine witnesses. Bruton thus held t h a t , i n a j o i n t t r i a l where one defendant did not take the stand the introduction of h i s e x t r a j u d i c i a l confession which incriminated the second defendant, violated the second defendant's Sdxth and Fourteenth Amendment r i g h t s even though the jury was instructed the confession was not t o be considered against him. Subsequent cases i l l u s t r a t e Bruton does not invalidate use of codefendant statements in a l l j o i n t t r i a l situations. When, f o r example, the declarant codefender takes the stand and subjects himself t o cross-examination, there i s no infringement of any constitutional r i g h t t o cross-examine. Nelson v. O'Meil, 402 U.S. 622, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 29 L ed 2d 222. The Bruton rule cannot be invoked by a defendant who i n s i s t s upoi~ a join^ trial, knowing the prosecution intends t o use codefendants' inculpatory scatements. United States v. Sullivan, 435 F.2d 650, c e r t . denied +d2 U.S. 912, 91 S.Ct. 1392, 28 L ed 2d 654. See a l s o Anno. 29 I f the inculpatory codefendant's confession i s admissible u n d e ~ an exception t o the hearsay r u l e , a s f o r example an admis- sion of a coconspirator, the Bruton r u l e w i l l not be invoked. : ~ n i t e d States v. Kelley, 526 F.2d 615,620. Also where extra- j u d i c i a l statements of both defendants interlock, and do not c o n f l i c t on v i t a l points, courts have held t h a t no reversal i s required. United States ex r e l . Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45. For the above reasons I would confirm a s t o defendant Radi.