Case Title: Hoffer Props., LLC v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2012AP002520

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 5 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2520 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Hoffer Properties, LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin, Department of 
Transportation, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 354 Wis. 2d 621, 848 N.W.2d 903) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 4, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 8, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
William F. Hue 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, A.W. BRADLEY, J.J., concur. (Opinion 
Filed) 
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents. (Opinion Filed) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: R.G. BRADLEY, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Benjamin Southwick, Richland Center and oral argument by 
Benjamin Southwick. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Abigail C.S. Potts, Assistant Attorney General, with whom on the 
brief was Brad D. Schimel, Attorney General.  
 
There was an amicus curiae brief by Erik Samuel Olsen, 
Joseph J. Rolling, Andrew Weininger and Eminent Domain Services, 
LLC, Madison, on behalf of Eminent Domain Services, LLC. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 5
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP2520   
(L.C. No. 
2009CV499) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Hoffer Properties, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin, Department of 
Transportation, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
FEB 4, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming a grant 
of partial summary judgment to the Department of Transportation 
(DOT).1 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 84.25 (2007-08),2 DOT eliminated 
Hoffer Properties, LLC's (Hoffer's) direct driveway connections 
to State Trunk Highway 19 (STH 19), a controlled-access highway. 
DOT also separately exercised its power of eminent domain to 
                                                 
1 Hoffer Props., LLC v. DOT, No. 2012AP2520, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 1, 2014). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
2 
 
acquire .72 acre of Hoffer's land in order to extend Frohling 
Lane westward so as to connect Hoffer's property to the highway. 
Hoffer received $90,000 in compensation for the .72 acre taken 
to construct the Frohling Lane extension. Hoffer is challenging 
the amount of compensation awarded. 
¶2 
Hoffer does not claim that the $90,000 was inadequate 
compensation for the .72 acre itself. Hoffer concedes that DOT 
properly designated STH 19 as a controlled-access highway.3 
Additionally, Hoffer agrees that the designation of a highway as 
"controlled-access" is a valid exercise of the police power and 
further agrees that such exercises are not compensable under the 
eminent domain statutes.4 Hoffer argues, however, that because 
there was a partial taking of some portion of its property under 
eminent domain, the damages attributable to the loss of direct 
access to STH 19 are compensable pursuant to the partial takings 
subsection 
of 
the 
just 
compensation 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
3 When asked in the trial court whether there was any 
dispute that STH 19 was a controlled-access highway, Hoffer 
responded "No argument, your Honor. As [the attorney for DOT 
said], the Department properly caused it to be or declared it to 
be a controlled-access highway." 
4 In its brief to this court, Hoffer states:  
In accordance with Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b), DOT can 
deprive or restrict an abutting owner's right of 
access to a highway 'without compensation under any 
duly authorized exercise of the police power.' The 
only way that DOT can acquire an abutting owner's 
access rights under the police power and without the 
payment of compensation is by declaring the highway in 
[sic] to be a controlled-access highway under § 84.25. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
3 
 
§ 32.09(6)(b). Consequently, Hoffer contends, compensation for 
the .72 acre must include the diminution of value of the 
property due to the loss of its direct access to the highway. 
¶3 
Hoffer appealed the amount of compensation to the 
Jefferson County circuit court, Honorable William F. Hue, 
presiding. At the circuit court, Hoffer argued that DOT owed him 
additional compensation for diminution of the value of the 
property due to the loss of direct access to STH 19 if a jury 
determined the access provided by the Frohling Lane extension is 
unreasonable. DOT argued that because it exercised its police 
power to eliminate Hoffer's direct access to STH 19 and because 
Hoffer has alternate access to the property through the Frohling 
Lane extension, Hoffer has reasonable access as a matter of law 
and no compensation is due. The circuit court agreed and granted 
partial summary judgment to DOT. 
¶4 
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that under 
our holding in Surety Savings & Loan Ass'n v. DOT, 54 
Wis. 2d 438, 195 N.W.2d 464 (1972), when DOT acts pursuant to 
the controlled-access highway statute "the inquiry is merely 
whether alternate access was provided." Hoffer Props., LLC v. 
DOT, No. 2012AP2520, unpublished slip op., ¶7 (Wis. Ct. App. May 
1, 2014) (citing Surety Savings, 54 Wis. 2d at 444-45). The 
court of appeals determined that the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment was proper because DOT provided alternate 
access to Hoffer's property. Id. 
¶5 
We consider two issues. First, whether DOT is duly 
authorized by Wis. Stat. § 84.25 to eliminate an abutting 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
4 
 
owner's direct access to a controlled-access highway and replace 
it with more circuitous access.5 Second, whether the provision or 
existence of some access to the abutting property obviates the 
need for a jury determination of "reasonableness" because the 
abutting property owner is precluded from compensation pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b).  
¶6 
First, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 84.25(3) authorizes 
DOT to change Hoffer's access to STH 19 in whatever way it deems 
"necessary or desirable." Such changes, including elimination of 
direct access points, are duly authorized exercises of the 
police power and are not compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09 as 
long as alternate access is given that does not deprive the 
abutting owner of all or substantially all beneficial use of the 
property. Second, we hold that when DOT changes an abutting 
property owner's access to a controlled-access highway but other 
access is given or exists, the abutting property owner is 
precluded from compensation pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) 
as a matter of law and no jury determination of reasonableness 
is required. Reasonableness is the wrong standard to apply 
because the provision of some access preserves an abutting 
property owner's right of access to a controlled-access highway, 
and thus no taking compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) 
occurs. Accordingly, Hoffer is precluded from compensation under 
                                                 
5 Neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals 
addressed this issue because Hoffer did not raise it before 
either court. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
5 
 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) because alternate access to the 
property was provided by the Frohling Lane extension. We 
therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶7 
Hoffer Properties, LLC, owns the subject property, a 
9.90 acre parcel of land located west of Watertown. The 
property's northern boundary is State Trunk Highway 19. Prior to 
2008, the property had direct access to STH 19 via two 
driveways. The property consists of a single-family dwelling, 
the first floor of which is Hoffer's real estate office; a barn 
that is rented for storage; and a machine shed that is partially 
rented as a workshop. On June 14, 2002, DOT designated 13.76 
miles of STH 19 a "controlled-access" highway pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 84.25.6 The portion of STH 19 that was designated 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 84.25, the controlled-access highway statute, 
consists of several subsections that outline the powers of DOT 
to regulate traffic on the highway and the rights of users, 
abutting 
landowners, 
and 
the 
general 
public 
after 
that 
declaration is made. The procedures DOT must follow to make a 
valid declaration of controlled-access are stated in section 
84.25(1): 
The legislature declares that the effective control of 
traffic entering upon or leaving intensively traveled 
highways is necessary in the interest of public 
safety, convenience and the general welfare. The 
department is authorized to designate as controlled-
access highways the rural portions of the state trunk 
system on which, after traffic engineering surveys, 
investigations and studies, it shall find, determine 
and declare that the average traffic potential is in 
excess of 2,000 vehicles per 24-hour day. Such 
designation of a portion of any state trunk highway in 
any county as a controlled-access highway shall not be 
effected until after a public hearing in the matter 
(continued) 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
6 
 
"controlled-access" included the portion that bounded Hoffer's 
property. 
¶8 
In 2008, DOT undertook a highway improvement project 
that involved relocating STH 26, which was to intersect with STH 
19 to the west of Hoffer's property. DOT determined that it was 
necessary to change the access points to STH 19 in the vicinity 
of the relocated STH 26 as part of the project.  To that end, on 
December 29, 2008,7 DOT eliminated Hoffer's direct access to STH 
19. DOT acquired through eminent domain both .72 acre of 
Hoffer's land as well as a temporary limited easement in order 
to create alternate access to Hoffer's property. DOT tendered to 
                                                                                                                                                             
has been held in the county courthouse or other 
convenient public place within the county following 
notice by publication of a class 3 notice, under ch. 
985, in a newspaper published in the county. If the 
department shall then find that the average traffic 
potential is as provided by this subsection, and that 
the designation of the highway as a controlled-access 
highway is necessary in the interest of public safety, 
convenience and the general welfare, it shall make its 
finding, determination and declaration to that effect, 
specifying the character of the controls to be 
exercised. Copies of the finding, determination and 
declaration shall be recorded with the register of 
deeds, and filed with the county clerk, and published 
as a class 1 notice, under ch. 985, in the newspaper 
in which the notice of hearing was published, and the 
order shall be effective on such publication. Not more 
than 1,500 miles of highway shall be designated as 
controlled-access highways under authority of this 
section. 
7 Hoffer's brief to this court states that the date of this 
taking was December 28, 2009; the Deed by Corporation indicates 
the date as December 29, 2008.   
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
7 
 
Hoffer $90,000 for this taking. Hoffer's existing direct access 
to STH 19 was replaced by extending Frohling Lane (a north-south 
roadway that intersects with STH 19) westward to Hoffer's 
property. DOT constructed a new driveway north from this 
extension to restore vehicular access to Hoffer's property.8 
Hoffer's replacement access requires vehicles to travel roughly 
1,000 feet to reach STH 19. 
¶9 
On May 29, 2009, Hoffer appealed the amount of 
compensation it received to the Jefferson County circuit court 
pursuant to the eminent domain statutes, Wis. Stat. ch. 32.9 
Hoffer claimed that because there had been a partial taking of 
its land, Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b)10 required DOT to include in 
                                                 
8 Payment for the driveway is not at issue because Hoffer 
conceded at oral argument that DOT had constructed and paid for 
the new driveway.  
9 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)-(7), DOT must have an 
appraisal of the property taken prior to condemnation. DOT must 
then negotiate with the property owner for purchase of the 
property. If no agreement can be reached, DOT makes a 
jurisdictional offer to purchase which describes the nature of 
the project, the property to be taken, the proposed date of 
occupancy, the amount of compensation offered, the right of the 
property owner to accept or reject the offer, and an explanation 
of how to appeal the amount of compensation offered. Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(3). If the property owner rejects the offer, the amount 
of compensation offered can be appealed to a judge of the 
circuit court for the county in which the property is located. 
See Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9)(a). 
10 Wis. Stat. § 32.09 governs just compensation in eminent 
domain proceedings.  Subsection (6) governs partial takings. 
Subsection (6)(b) allows for compensation for diminution of 
value to the rest of the property caused by "deprivation or 
restriction of [an] existing right of access to [a] highway from 
abutting land, provided that nothing herein shall operate to 
(continued) 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
8 
 
the amount of compensation paid for the taking the amount by 
which the value of the property was diminished due to the loss 
of its direct access to STH 19. Hoffer conceded that DOT 
properly 
designated 
STH 
19 
a 
"controlled-access" 
highway 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 84.25.11 Hoffer contended, however, that 
Wisconsin law requires DOT to pay compensation if DOT does not 
provide reasonable access between the highway and Hoffer's 
property. Citing our decision in National Auto Truckstops, Inc., 
v. DOT, 2003 WI 95, 263 Wis. 2d 649, 665 N.W.2d 198, Hoffer 
filed a motion in limine seeking an order that reasonable access 
was a jury question and that Hoffer was due compensation if a 
jury decided that the Frohling Lane access was unreasonable. 
¶10 DOT moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that 
pursuant to our holding in Surety Savings "there is no 
compensable taking when direct access to a controlled-access 
highway is denied, where other access is given or otherwise 
exists." Surety Savings, 54 Wis. 2d at 443. DOT stated that 
because there was no dispute that it had acted pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 84.25, the controlled-access highway statute, and 
because the Frohling Lane extension had provided "other access" 
to the property, Hoffer's access was reasonable as a matter of 
                                                                                                                                                             
restrict the power of the state . . . to deprive or restrict 
such access without compensation under any duly authorized 
exercise of the police power." 
11 See n.3. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
9 
 
law, so any claim for damages resulting from a change in 
Hoffer's access was barred. 
¶11 Following a hearing, the circuit court denied Hoffer's 
motions and granted partial summary judgment to DOT. The circuit 
court found that the elimination of Hoffer's direct access to 
STH 19 was a noncompensable exercise of the police power and 
that reasonable access had been given as a matter of law. 
Thereafter, the circuit court granted Hoffer's motion to dismiss 
the action but preserved Hoffer's right to appeal.  
¶12 On appeal, Hoffer argued that our holding in National 
Auto Truckstops required DOT to compensate the owner of abutting 
land if 1) DOT eliminates the property's direct access to a 
controlled-access highway; and 2) a jury determines that the 
replacement access is unreasonable. In an unpublished per curiam 
opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. Hoffer 
Props., LLC, No. 2012AP2520, unpublished slip op. The court of 
appeals distinguished National Auto Truckstops by noting that 
the highway at issue there was not a controlled-access highway. 
Id., ¶6. The court of appeals determined that Surety Savings 
controlled, and "reject[ed] Hoffer's argument that the question 
of whether the alternate access was reasonable was required to 
be decided by a jury, because reasonableness is not the correct 
legal standard to apply. Under Surety Savings, the inquiry is 
merely whether alternate access was provided." Id., ¶7. The 
court of appeals determined that because alternate access to 
Hoffer's property was provided, no compensable taking had 
occurred. See id. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
10 
 
¶13 Hoffer petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on February 10, 2015.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 This case requires us to construe the controlled-
access highway statute, Wis. Stat. § 84.25, and the just 
compensation statute, Wis. Stat. § 32.09.  "The interpretation 
of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo." Crown 
Castle USA, Inc., v. Orion Constr. Grp., LLC, 2012 WI 29, ¶12, 
339 
Wis. 2d 252, 
811 
N.W.2d 332. 
"We 
interpret 
statutes 
independently, but benefit from both our prior analyses and that 
of the lower courts." Id. (citation omitted). 
III.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
¶15 Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of 
the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry." State ex rel Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110. "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, 
and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning." Id. "We attempt to give reasonable effect 
to 
every 
word, 
avoiding 
both 
surplusage 
and 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results." Crown Castle USA, 339 Wis. 2d 252, ¶13 
(citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46). Further, "the context and 
structure of the statute are important, and we interpret the 
statute in light of 'surrounding or closely-related statutes.'" 
Masri v. LIRC, 2014 WI 81, ¶30, 356 Wis. 2d 405, 850 N.W.2d 298 
(quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46). 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
11 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
¶16 We first discuss whether the elimination of an 
abutting property owner's direct access to a controlled-access 
highway is an exercise of the police power duly authorized by 
Wis. Stat. § 84.25. We hold that it is, because the statute 
authorizes DOT to change access to such a highway as DOT deems 
"necessary or desirable." We then consider whether the provision 
of some alternate access to an abutting property owner's 
property 
obviates 
the 
need 
for 
a 
jury 
determination 
of 
"reasonableness" in controlled-access highway cases. We hold 
that reasonableness is the wrong standard to apply because when 
DOT changes an abutting property owner's access pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 84.25, 
no 
taking 
compensable 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(6)(b) occurs. Thus, in controlled-access highway cases 
abutting property owners are precluded from compensation for a 
change in access pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) as a 
matter of law. However, exercises of the police power cannot 
deprive the owner of all or substantially all beneficial use of 
the property without compensation. If the replacement access is 
so circuitous as to amount to a regulatory taking of the 
property, then compensation is due and the abutting property 
owner may bring an inverse condemnation claim pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 32.10. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
12 
 
A.  ELIMINATION OF AN ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER'S 
DIRECT ACCESS TO A CONTROLLED-ACCESS HIGHWAY 
IS A DULY AUTHORIZED EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER 
¶17 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of property 
without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The 
Wisconsin Constitution provides that "[t]he property of no 
person shall be taken for public use without just compensation 
therefor." Wis. Const. art. I, § 13. "It has long been settled, 
however, that these constitutional provisions interpose no 
barrier to the exercise of the police power of the state." State 
ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 151, 196 N.W. 451 
(1923). In other words, "injury to property resulting from the 
exercise of the police power of the state does not necessitate 
compensation." Surety Savings, 54 Wis. 2d at 443. A state acts 
under its police power when it regulates in the interest of 
public safety, convenience, and the general welfare of the 
public. See Nick v. State Highway Comm'n, 13 Wis. 2d 511, 513-
14, 109 N.W.2d 71 (1961). Government action such as a regulation 
can amount to a compensable taking absent a physical occupation, 
however, "if [the effects of the governmental action] are so 
complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest 
in the subject matter." Wisconsin Light & Power Co. v. Columbia 
Cty., 3 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 87 N.W.2d 279 (1958) (quoting United 
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)); see 
also Just v. Marinette Cty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15, 201 N.W.2d 761 
(1972) ("The protection of public rights may be accomplished by 
the exercise of the police power unless the damage to the 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
13 
 
property owner is too great and amounts to a confiscation."). 
Claims for such "regulatory takings" must be brought under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.10, the inverse condemnation statute.  
¶18 The primary distinction between the power of eminent 
domain and the police power of the state most relevant to the 
present case is that government takings by eminent domain are 
compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09, while government actions 
pursuant to the police power are not, except in limited 
circumstances. See Wis. Stat. § 32.09(4), (6)(b). While we note 
that "[t]he right of access to and from a public highway is one 
of the incidents of the ownership or occupancy of land abutting 
thereon," 118th Street Kenosha, LLC, v. DOT, 2014 WI 125, ¶30, 
359 Wis. 2d 30, 856 N.W.2d 486 (quoting Hastings Realty Corp. v. 
Texas Co., 28 Wis. 2d 305, 310, 137 N.W.2d 79 (1965)), we also 
note that, provided the damage does not amount to a regulatory 
taking of the property, Wisconsin. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) allows 
the 
state 
"to 
deprive 
or 
restrict 
such 
access 
without 
compensation under any duly authorized exercise of the police 
power."  
1.  DOT Exercises the Police Power When It 
Designates a Highway "Controlled-Access" 
¶19 By means of Wis. Stat. § 84.25, the controlled-access 
highway statute, the legislature has authorized DOT to designate 
up 
to 
1,500 
miles 
of 
heavily 
traveled, 
rural 
highways 
"controlled-access." This is a tightly circumscribed power, and 
the designation can be made only if DOT first takes the specific 
steps enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 84.25(1). Among other things, 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
14 
 
DOT must conduct "traffic engineering surveys, investigations 
and studies" to determine whether the average traffic potential 
for the highway is in excess of 2,000 vehicles per 24-hour day. 
Wis. Stat. § 84.25(1). Before the controlled-access designation 
can be made, DOT is required to hold a public hearing on the 
matter following notice by publication in a county newspaper in 
the county in which the highway lies. Id. If, after the required 
surveys and investigations and the required public notice and 
hearing, DOT then finds that both the traffic potential is above 
2,000 vehicles a day "and that the designation of the highway as 
a controlled-access highway is necessary in the interest of 
public safety, convenience and the general welfare," DOT "shall 
make its finding, determination and declaration to that effect, 
specifying the character of the controls to be exercised." Id. 
Copies of the finding, determination and declaration must be 
recorded with the register of deeds and filed with the county 
clerk as well as published in the same newspaper as notice of 
the 
hearing. 
Once 
the 
publication 
has 
taken 
place, 
the 
designation of "controlled-access" becomes effective. Id. 
¶20 It is this designation of a highway as "controlled-
access" that must be "necessary in the interest of public 
safety, convenience and the general welfare . . . ." Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.25(1). Thus, it is the designation that is an exercise of 
the police power. Surety Savings, 54 Wis. 2d at 443 ("The 
designation of a highway as a controlled-access highway is an 
exercise of the police power."). The designation of a highway as 
"controlled-access" serves as a precondition for the operation 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
15 
 
of the other subsections of Wis. Stat. § 84.25, the controlled-
access highway statute. These subsections grant DOT expansive 
powers after it has properly designated part or all of a highway 
"controlled-access," including authority over how the general 
public and abutting property owners access the highway. See Wis. 
Stat. § 84.25(3)-(5), (7)-(10), (13). Once the highway has been 
designated "controlled-access," the statute authorizes DOT to 
subsequently change the access points in whatever way it "deems 
necessary or desirable."12  
2.  The Effect of a Controlled-Access Highway Designation 
on the Rights of Users and Abutting Property Owners 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 84.25 explains how the rights of 
users and abutting property owners are restricted by the 
designation of the highway as "controlled-access." See Wis. 
Stat. § 84.25(4)-(6), (11), (12). Pertinent here, the statute 
states that "[n]o person shall have any right of entrance 
upon . . . any controlled-access highway, or to or from abutting 
lands except at places designated and provided for such 
purposes, and on such terms and conditions as may be specified 
from time to time by the department." Wis. Stat. § 84.25(5). The 
                                                 
12 The 
statute 
cannot 
authorize 
unconstitutional 
deprivations of property without just compensation; thus, in 
order to exercise the police power to change an abutting owner's 
access to the highway without paying compensation, DOT must 
provide some access to the property that is not so circuitous as 
to deprive the abutting owner of all or substantially all 
beneficial use of the property. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 84.25, 
DOT may change access in whatever way it deems "necessary or 
desirable" within these constitutional boundaries. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
16 
 
statute also expressly curtails the access rights of abutting 
property 
owners, 
so 
that 
"[a]fter 
the 
designation 
of 
a 
controlled-access highway, the owners . . . of abutting lands 
shall have no right or easement of access, by reason of the fact 
that their property abuts on the controlled-access highway or 
for 
other 
reason, 
except 
only 
the 
controlled 
right 
of 
access . . . ." 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 84.25(6). 
Pursuant 
to 
this 
subsection, 
abutting 
property 
owners 
lose 
any 
right 
to 
compensation under Wis. Stat. § 32.09 for a change in access to 
the highway, provided some access remains, at the moment DOT 
makes the "controlled-access" designation. See Nick, 13 Wis. 2d 
at 515 ("The situation regarding the question of damages [for 
diminution of value of the property due to a loss of direct 
access to a controlled-access highway] was frozen when the 
commission declared highway 30 a controlled-access highway.").  
¶22 The controlled-access highway statute is unique in its 
operation against abutting property owners,13 and consequently 
the legislature limited DOT's authority to exercise the police 
power 
and 
make 
a 
"controlled-access" 
designation. 
The 
legislature prescribed elaborate procedures, including public 
                                                 
13 As will be discussed below, the other statutes that 
comprise Wis. Stat. ch. 84, the State Trunk Highways chapter, 
contain different language regarding compensation to abutting 
property owners than does the controlled-access highway statute. 
Consequently, the access rights of abutting property owners are 
affected differently by the designation of the highway as 
"controlled-access" than by actions taken by the DOT pursuant to 
other statutes in the chapter.    
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
17 
 
notice and hearing, which DOT must follow to designate a highway 
"controlled-access." Furthermore, the legislature limited the 
amount of highway DOT can designate "controlled-access" to 1,500 
miles. DOT cannot change or restrict an abutting owner's 
existing access to a State trunk highway14 without paying 
compensation pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.09 unless DOT has 
validly designated the highway "controlled-access" and alternate 
access to the highway has been provided. An abutting property 
owner's opportunity to object to DOT's exercise of the police 
power comes at the time of the hearing on whether to designate 
the highway "controlled-access." After a valid controlled-access 
designation has been made, however, DOT may change an abutting 
owner's access to the highway without compensation, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 84.25(3), in whatever way it "deems necessary and 
desirable" as long as it provides other access that does not 
deprive 
the 
abutting 
owner 
of 
all 
or 
substantially 
all 
beneficial use of the property. After a valid controlled-access 
designation is made, the abutting owner's rights are curtailed——
and the DOT subsequently acts——pursuant to a duly authorized 
exercise of the police power.  
3.  Hoffer's Direct Access was Eliminated 
Pursuant to an Exercise of the Police Power 
¶23 Hoffer concedes that "DOT can deprive or restrict an 
abutting 
owner's 
right 
of 
access 
to 
a 
highway 
'without 
                                                 
14 Provided the State trunk highway has not otherwise been 
designated a freeway pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 84.295 or 
designated an interstate highway pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 84.29. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
18 
 
compensation under any duly authorized exercise of the police 
power.'"15 Hoffer further concedes that the designation of a 
highway as controlled-access is a duly authorized exercise of 
the police power and that DOT followed all of the required 
procedures in Wis. Stat. § 84.25(1) to designate STH 19 a 
controlled-access highway.16 Hoffer argues, however, that the 
controlled-access highway statute does not grant DOT the power 
to subsequently eliminate its direct access to STH 19 and 
replace it with more circuitous access. Rather, Hoffer claims 
that Wis. Stat. § 84.25 grants DOT "authority to regulate an 
abutting owner's direct access . . . to an existing State trunk 
highway without paying compensation to the owner, but such 
authority is not granted to eliminate that access." Hoffer's 
argument rests on its emphasis of certain language in the 
statute which grants DOT authority to prohibit anyone from 
entering or leaving the highway "except at places designated and 
provided for such purposes" and that abutting owners have no 
right of access "except only the controlled right of access." 
Hoffer 
claims 
that 
by 
using 
the 
words 
"except"17 
and 
                                                 
15 See n.4. 
16 See n.3. 
17 Hoffer does not explain how the word "except" is meant to 
withhold DOT's authority to eliminate access points. Presumably, 
Hoffer's theory is that by allowing DOT to prohibit anyone from 
entering the highway "except" at places "designated and provided 
for such purposes" by the department, the legislature granted 
DOT authority over the rest of the highway but not over the 
preexisting access points. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
19 
 
"controlled," the legislature indicated its intent to withhold 
from DOT authority to eliminate an abutting owner's direct 
access to a controlled-access highway. Hoffer insists that DOT's 
authority to regulate does not include the authority to 
eliminate preexisting direct access points and replace them with 
more circuitous access to a controlled-access highway.  
¶24 Hoffer is mistaken. Its proposed construction is at 
odds not only with the plain language of the statutes, but with 
the clear holdings of our case law. There are three reasons why 
Hoffer's proposed interpretation cannot be correct.  
¶25 First, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 84.25(3) 
states 
that 
"the 
department may use an existing highway . . . for a controlled-
access highway . . . and so regulate, restrict or prohibit 
access to or departure from it as the department deems necessary 
or desirable." This very precise language indicates that the 
legislature granted expansive authority to DOT to change access 
to a controlled-access highway. By allowing DOT to designate an 
existing highway "controlled-access" and thereafter "regulate, 
restrict or prohibit access to or departure from it as the 
department deems necessary or desirable," the legislature 
granted DOT broad control over the entire portion of the 
existing highway that has been designated "controlled-access," 
including placement and replacement of access points. Because it 
is self-evident that elimination of direct access points is a 
means of "restrict[ing] or prohibit[ing] access," Hoffer cannot 
be correct when it argues that the statute does not grant DOT 
authority to eliminate Hoffer's direct access points.  
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
20 
 
¶26 Second, Wis. Stat. § 84.25(5) states that "[n]o person 
shall have any right of entrance" to a controlled-access 
highway, "or to or from abutting lands," except at places 
designated for such purposes "and on such terms and conditions 
as may be specified [by the department] from time to time" 
(emphasis added). The phrase "from time to time" indicates that 
the legislature enabled DOT to periodically change the terms and 
conditions by which any person——abutter or otherwise——has access 
to 
a 
controlled-access 
highway. 
See 
Surety 
Savings, 
54 
Wis. 2d at 
444-45 
(holding 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 84.25(5) 
"demonstrate[s] the legislature's intent to give the highway 
commission 
continuing 
power 
to 
review 
and 
modify 
its 
authorizations for access to or across a controlled-access 
highway"). Replacing direct access with a more circuitous route 
is inarguably a change of the "terms and conditions" by which an 
abutter is allowed to enter the highway. We cannot accept a 
construction of a statute that does not "give reasonable effect 
to 
every 
word, 
avoiding 
both 
surplusage 
and 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results." Crown Castle USA, 339 Wis. 2d 252, ¶13 
(citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46). Hoffer's reading of the 
statute ignores that part of § 84.25(5) which expressly vests 
DOT with authority to change the "terms and conditions" of 
access "from time to time." Thus, this argument must be 
rejected. 
¶27 Third, Wis. Stat. § 84.25(6) states that once a 
highway is designated controlled-access, abutting owners "shall 
have no right or easement of access, by reason of the fact that 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
21 
 
their property abuts on the controlled-access highway or for 
other 
reason, 
except 
only 
the 
controlled 
right 
of 
access . . . ." 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 84.25(6). 
This 
subsection 
eliminates an abutting property owner's right to compensation 
under § 32.09(6)(b) for a change to existing access at the 
moment DOT designates the highway "controlled-access." See Nick, 
13 Wis. 2d at 515. Replacement access which results in a 
circuitous route rather than a direct one is a lawful——if 
regrettable——result of controlling access. See, e.g., Carazalla 
v. State, 269 Wis. 593, 71 N.W.2d 276 (1955) (holding that 
circuity of travel is not a compensable item of damages); Nick, 
13 Wis. 2d at 514 ("if no land is taken for the converted 
highway but the abutting landowner's access to the highway is 
merely made more circuitous, no compensation should be paid,"); 
McKenna v. State Highway Comm'n, 28 Wis. 2d 179, 184, 135 
N.W.2d 827 (1965) ("There is no taking in the sense required by 
the statute, where, as in this case, another access route is 
available."); Stefan Auto Body v. State Highway Comm'n, 21 
Wis. 2d 363, 369-74, 124 N.W.2d 319 (1963) (noting that in 
controlled-access highway cases circuity of travel resulting 
from a changed access point is not compensable).  
¶28 In the present case, DOT conducted the required 
traffic engineering surveys, investigations, and studies to 
designate STH 19 "controlled-access." DOT held a public hearing 
on the matter on May 4, 2002, at the Milford Town Hall in 
Jefferson 
County 
after 
giving 
notice 
by 
three 
separate 
publications in two separate Jefferson County newspapers. It 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
22 
 
found that the potential traffic on STH 19 exceeded 2,000 
vehicles per day and that it was necessary in the interest of 
public safety, convenience, and the general welfare to designate 
STH 19 "controlled-access." In sum, DOT did everything necessary 
to validly designate STH 19 "controlled-access." Upon that 
designation Hoffer lost its right to be compensated pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) for a change to existing access 
resulting in circuity of travel. By the time Hoffer's direct 
access was eliminated, the controlled-access designation of STH 
19 had been made, Hoffer's right of access had been curtailed to 
the "controlled right of access," DOT had determined it was 
"necessary or desirable" to change Hoffer's access to the 
highway, and DOT provided alternate access to Hoffer's property. 
¶29 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that DOT's 
replacement of Hoffer's direct access with circuitous access to 
a controlled-access highway was done pursuant to an exercise of 
the police power duly authorized by Wis. Stat. § 84.25. 
Consequently the elimination of Hoffer's direct access to STH 19 
was not compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b). 
B.  IN CONTROLLED-ACCESS HIGHWAY CASES 
ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS ARE PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING 
COMPENSATION UNDER WIS. STAT. § 32.09(6)(b) FOR 
DAMAGE TO THE PROPERTY RESULTING FROM A CHANGE IN ACCESS 
¶30 As 
noted 
above, 
when 
DOT 
designates 
a 
highway 
"controlled-access," an abutting owner's right to compensation 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) for a replacement of 
existing access is eliminated. The abutting owner's remaining 
property right of access is the controlled right of access and 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
23 
 
not 
the 
right 
to 
access 
as 
it 
existed 
prior 
to 
or 
contemporaneously with the highway's designation as "controlled-
access." The right of access  
involves only the right to enter and leave the 
property without being forced to trespass across the 
land of another. It does not include any right to 
develop property with reference to the type of access 
granted or to have access at any particular point on 
the boundary lines of the property. 
Surety 
Savings, 
54 
Wis. 2d at 
444 
(emphasis 
added). 
The 
controlled right of access is also subject to "such terms and 
conditions as may be specified from time to time by [DOT]." Wis. 
Stat. § 84.25(5). Requiring an abutting property owner to access 
a controlled-access highway by a more circuitous route rather 
than directly is a "term[] and condition[]" of access and a 
lawful means of "controlling" access. Consequently, this court 
has stated that "[w]here access to a highway is controlled under 
the exercise of the police power and reasonable access remains, 
no 
compensation 
is 
required." 
Schneider 
v. 
State, 
51 
Wis. 2d 458, 462, 187 N.W.2d 172 (1971) (citing Nick, 13 
Wis. 2d 511). In both Schneider and Surety Savings, we held that 
because DOT had changed the abutting property owners' access 
pursuant to the controlled-access highway statute, the abutting 
property owners were precluded from seeking compensation for 
diminution of value of the property that resulted from the 
changed access. See Schneider, 51 Wis. 2d at 463-64; Surety 
Savings, 54 Wis. 2d at 443. Hoffer states that the property 
owners in neither case challenged the replacement access as 
"unreasonable," and contends that because it has made such a 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
24 
 
challenge it is due compensation for diminution of value damages 
if a jury determines its replacement access is unreasonable. For 
the reasons discussed below, we disagree. 
1.  A Taking Occurs Only if the Access Provided 
Deprives the Abutting Property Owner of All or 
Substantially All Beneficial Use of the Property 
¶31 A taking must occur before a viable claim for 
compensation can arise. Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway 
Comm'n, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 80, 284 N.W.2d 887 (1979) (hereinafter 
Howell Plaza II). No compensable taking occurs when DOT changes 
an abutting property owner's access to a controlled-access 
highway if other access is provided that does not deprive the 
owner of all or substantially all beneficial use of the 
property. Additionally, "duly authorized" acts of the police 
power that restrict or deprive access to a highway from abutting 
lands are not compensable pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b). 
When no taking compensable pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) 
has occurred, there is nothing for a jury to determine pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b). Thus, in controlled-access highway 
cases, abutting property owners are precluded from compensation 
under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) as a matter of law because no 
compensation is possible pursuant to that statute. Making a 
claim that the access given is unreasonable does not transform 
an 
act 
that 
is 
noncompensable 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(6)(b) into a compensable one. 
¶32 This does not mean, however, that the provision of 
alternate access to a controlled-access highway precludes the 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
25 
 
abutting property owner from compensation in all possible 
contexts.  Changes in access to a controlled-access highway may 
support a claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.10 for a regulatory 
taking of the property. "The protection of public rights may be 
accomplished by the exercise of the police power unless the 
damage to the property owner is too great and amounts to a 
confiscation." Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 15. The abutting property 
owner may not be deprived of all or substantially all beneficial 
use of his property without compensation by means of an exercise 
of the police power or otherwise. See E-L Enterprises, Inc., v. 
Milwaukee 
Metro. 
Sewerage 
Dist., 
2010 
WI 
58, 
¶37, 
326 
Wis. 2d 82, 785 N.W.2d 409. "Whether a taking [pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.10] 
has 
occurred 
depends 
upon 
whether 
'the 
restriction practically or substantially renders the land 
useless for all reasonable purposes.'" Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 15 
(quoting Buhler v. Racine Cty., 33 Wis. 2d 137, 143, 146 
N.W.2d 403 (1966)).  
¶33 If the access DOT provides to a controlled-access 
highway 
deprives 
the 
abutting 
property 
owner 
of 
all 
or 
substantially all beneficial use of the property, DOT has taken 
the property and the change in access may support an inverse 
condemnation claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.10. However, 
"even if a highway construction project results in damages that 
are compensable under a particular statute, those damages cannot 
be recovered in a claim brought under the wrong statute." 118th 
Street, 359 Wis. 2d 30, ¶33. The proper mechanism for pursuing 
compensation for damages resulting from a change in access when 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
26 
 
DOT acts pursuant to the controlled-access highway statute is to 
bring an inverse condemnation claim under Wis. Stat. § 32.10. 
Thus, even had Hoffer's replacement access deprived it of all or 
substantially all beneficial use of its property, it could not 
recover under the Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) claim it has pursued 
here.  
¶34 We recognize that this is a high standard for owners 
of property abutting a controlled-access highway to meet. 
Controlled-access highways are, however, limited and unique, and 
the legislature granted DOT authority to regulate access to them 
under the police power in whatever way DOT deems necessary and 
desirable provided the abutting property owner retains some 
access to the highway. The legislature further codified the 
principle that valid exercises of the police power do not 
require payment under the just compensation statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09, except in limited circumstances. We will not intrude 
upon these legislative choices.  
2.  It is Presumed that the Legislature 
Purposefully Omitted a Reasonableness Standard 
from the Controlled-Access Highway Statute 
¶35 An analysis of the surrounding statutes in Wis. Stat. 
ch. 84 further compels the conclusion that "reasonableness is 
not the correct legal standard to apply" when DOT changes an 
abutting property owner's access to a controlled-access highway 
and thus no jury is required in controlled-access highway cases. 
Hoffer Properties, slip. op., ¶7. "When the legislature enacts a 
statute, it is presumed to act with full knowledge of the 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
27 
 
existing laws, including statutes." Mack v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 
3, 92 Wis. 2d 476, 489, 285 N.W.2d 604 (1979). The freeway 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 84.295, states that "reasonable provision 
for public highway traffic service or access to abutting 
property shall be provided by means of frontage roads . . . or 
the right of access to or crossing of the public highway shall 
be acquired on behalf of the state" when DOT is undertaking a 
freeway project (emphasis added). Identical language appears in 
Wis. Stat. § 84.29, the interstate highway statute.  
¶36 These statutes command that if DOT does not provide 
reasonable access to the highway by means of frontage roads when 
undertaking a freeway or interstate highway project, the 
abutting property owners are due compensation under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09 for a taking of their access rights.18 This language is 
conspicuously absent from the controlled-access highway statute. 
Rather, Wis. Stat. § 84.25(6) states that owners "of abutting 
lands shall have no right or easement of access . . . except 
only the controlled right of access." We presume that had the 
legislature intended to include reasonableness as a component of 
Wis. Stat. § 84.25 and allow for compensation under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09, it would have included this language in the statute, as 
it did for freeways and expressways in Wis. Stat. § 84.295 and 
for interstate highways in Wis. Stat. § 84.29.   
                                                 
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 990.01(2) governs the construction of 
Wisconsin laws, and it states that "[a]cquire," when used in 
connection with a grant of power to any person, includes the 
acquisition by purchase, grant, gift or bequest. It includes the 
power to condemn in the cases specified in s. 32.02. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
28 
 
¶37 The legislature, however, omitted this command from 
Wis. Stat. § 84.25. When DOT acts pursuant to the controlled-
access highway statute, abutting property owners must be 
compensated for DOT's "acquisition" of their property only if 
DOT does not provide some access or if the access provided is so 
circuitous as to amount to a regulatory taking of the property. 
Consequently, 
when 
DOT 
provides 
alternate, 
albeit 
more 
circuitous, access to abutting lands from a controlled-access 
highway, 
no 
taking 
compensable 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(6)(b) occurs. It is axiomatic that where there is no 
compensable taking there will be no compensation. "[T]here must 
be a taking before there can be a claim for just compensation." 
Howell Plaza II, 92 Wis. 2d at 80; see also Surety Savings, 54 
Wis. 2d at 444 ("Since appellants have always had access 
available 
to 
them, 
no 
property 
right 
was 
taken."). 
The 
legislature did not require DOT to either provide reasonable 
access to a frontage road or to acquire the access rights of 
abutting property owners when it acts pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.25. Thus, in controlled-access highway cases, provision of 
some access preserves the abutting property owner's controlled 
right of access to the property; no jury is required to 
determine whether the replacement access is reasonable because 
in controlled-access highway cases reasonableness is not the 
standard to apply to determine if compensation is due pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b).19  
                                                 
19 We reiterate, however, that circuitous access amounting 
(continued) 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
29 
 
3.  The Cases Hoffer Relies on Are 
Eminent Domain Cases, Not Police Power Cases 
¶38 Hoffer attempts to distinguish Surety Savings and its 
predecessors, in which we held that abutting property owners 
could not recover diminution of value damages caused by changes 
in access to the highway, by arguing that those cases were 
abrogated by the decisions in National Auto Truckstops, 263 
Wis. 2d 649, 
and 
Seefeldt 
v. 
DOT, 
113 
Wis. 2d 212, 
336 
N.W.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1983). We disagree. 
¶39 Both cases are easily distinguishable. In the present 
case DOT was exercising the police power pursuant controlled-
access highway statute, while in National Auto Truckstops and 
Seefeldt it was not. In National Auto Truckstops, the highway at 
issue (Highway 12) had not been designated "controlled-access." 
Thus, unlike the present case, the change in National Auto 
Truckstops' access "was not a 'duly authorized exercise of the 
police power.'" National Auto Truckstops, 263 Wis. 2d 649, ¶16 
(emphasis in original). Consequently Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) 
applied and a jury determination of reasonableness was required 
                                                                                                                                                             
to a regulatory taking of the property may be compensable under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.10. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
30 
 
to determine the amount of compensation due, if any.20 National 
Auto Truckstops is inapplicable to controlled-access highway 
cases 
because 
no 
compensation 
is 
due 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(6)(b) when DOT exercises the police power pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 84.25. In fact, the plaintiffs in National Auto 
Truckstops had conceded that if DOT had designated the highway 
"controlled-access" under Wis. Stat. § 84.25, no compensation 
would be due for the elimination of their direct access to 
Highway 12. See id., ¶8. Given that DOT did act pursuant to the 
controlled-access highway statute vis-à-vis Hoffer's property, 
National Auto Truckstops is unavailing to Hoffer. 
¶40 Seefeldt 
is 
similarly 
unhelpful 
to 
Hoffer. 
Preliminarily, as a court of appeals case, Seefeldt could not 
alter the holding of Surety Savings. See Cook v. Cook, 208 
Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) ("The supreme court is 
the only state court with the power to overrule, modify or 
withdraw language from a previous supreme court case."). More to 
the point, Hoffer's reliance on Seefeldt is misplaced because, 
                                                 
20 We note there is a tension between the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) stating that in partial takings cases 
compensation is due for "[d]eprivation or restriction of 
existing right of access to highway from abutting land [unless 
restricted by an exercise of the police power]" and our holding 
in National Auto Truckstops that no compensation is due to an 
abutting 
property 
owner 
whose 
existing 
access 
has 
been 
restricted if reasonable access remains even when DOT has not 
exercised the police power. Reconciliation of the two is not 
necessary for the determination of this case and it was neither 
briefed nor argued, so we will decline to address the matter 
further. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
31 
 
like in National Auto Truckstops, Seefeldt did not implicate the 
controlled-access highway statute. In Seefeldt, DOT was acting 
pursuant to the freeway statute, Wis. Stat. § 84.295. Seefeldt, 
113 Wis. 2d at 214-15. As noted above, the freeway statute 
contains language that the controlled-access highway statute 
does not:  when DOT designates a preexisting highway as a 
freeway pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 84.295, "reasonable provision 
for public highway traffic service or access to abutting 
property shall be provided by means of frontage roads . . . or 
the right of access to or crossing of the public highway shall 
be acquired on behalf of the state." Wis. Stat. § 84.295(5) 
(emphasis added). This language in § 84.295(5) requires DOT to 
pay compensation pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.09 if it does not 
provide reasonable access to the freeway. In Seefeldt, DOT had 
neither built a frontage road nor acquired Seefeldt's access 
rights. Seefeldt, 113 Wis. 2d at 215-16. Consequently, a jury 
determination of reasonableness was required to assess how much, 
if any, compensation was due under Wis. Stat. § 32.09. Id. at 
220-21.  
¶41 Unlike in National Auto Truckstops or Seefeldt, in the 
present case, DOT exercised the police power pursuant to the 
controlled-access highway statute to replace Hoffer's direct 
access with circuitous access. As we have explained previously, 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) precludes compensation under that 
subsection for such exercises of the police power. National Auto 
Truckstops and Seefeldt did not alter the rule that the 
provision of alternate access precludes compensation pursuant to 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
32 
 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) in controlled-access highway cases 
because neither case involved Wis. Stat. § 84.25. Likewise, they 
do not apply to this case. 
C.  HOFFER WAS FULLY COMPENSATED FOR 
ALL DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE TAKING OF THE .72 ACRE 
¶42 Hoffer has never articulated how the diminution of 
value caused by the loss of direct access to STH 19 relates to 
the compensation due for the taking of the .72 acre.21 Our 
                                                 
21 At the circuit court, Hoffer stated that "this is a 
partial taking eminent domain valuation case," mentioned that 
.72 of an acre was taken, and then argued that Hoffer was being 
"denied his constitutional right to be paid compensation by DOT 
for its taking of the subject property's access rights to STH 
#19." In its motions to that court, Hoffer refers only to "the 
taking" and never differentiates between the loss of access 
points and the .72 acre. 
At the court of appeals, Hoffer again stated that "this is 
a 
partial 
taking 
eminent 
domain 
valuation 
case" 
and 
characterized the case as relating "to compensation for the 
taking of access rights." Hoffer stated that "DOT's STH #26 
project necessitated a partial taking from the subject property" 
and claimed that elimination of direct access to STH 19 was one 
of the "aspects" of the taking.  Hoffer argued that "[d]ifferent 
legal standards apply when there has not been a taking as 
opposed to when there has been a partial taking. . . . In the 
partial taking situation, in accordance with Wisconsin Statutes, 
section 32.09(6), the owner is entitled to compensation for 
damages . . . accruing to the owner's remaining property as a 
result of the taking." (Emphasis added). 
In its brief to this court, Hoffer states that "[t]his is a 
partial taking eminent domain valuation case. . . .The issue in 
this case relates to compensation for the taking of access 
rights." Hoffer then states that "DOT's STH #26 project 
necessitated a partial taking from the subject property" and 
again characterized the termination of its direct access to STH 
19 as an "aspect" of the taking. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
33 
 
formulation of Hoffer's argument is as follows:  the taking of 
the .72 acre and the termination of Hoffer's direct access to 
STH 19 are not two distinct acts, but rather a single "taking." 
According to Hoffer this single taking resulted in a diminution 
in value of its property for which it is owed compensation. 
Thus, (the argument runs), the elimination of its direct access 
is compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) even though 
Hoffer's direct access points were not on the land taken because 
some portion of Hoffer's land was taken by eminent domain. 
¶43 Hoffer mistakenly styles its argument upon eminent 
domain when in actuality it prosecutes a separate and distinct 
claim based upon a challenge to DOT's exercise of the police 
power.22 Hoffer is not challenging the reasonableness of the 
$90,000 valuation of the .72 acre of land taken pursuant to 
eminent domain; rather, it is challenging the kind of remedies 
available for the state's legitimate exercise of the police 
power. Hoffer attempts to characterize this argument as a matter 
of compensation, but it is really a matter of whether it had a 
property interest in direct access to the highway.  
¶44 Our decisions in 118th Street and Jantz v. DOT, 63 
Wis. 2d  404, 217 N.W.2d 266 (1974) illustrate why Hoffer's 
argument is unavailing.  
                                                 
22 At oral argument, Hoffer stated it was only seeking 
compensation for loss of direct access to STH 19 and claimed 
that the difference between a taking under eminent domain and 
the police power was just "a label." 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
34 
 
¶45 In 118th Street,23 we held that "compensation for a 
taking cannot include damages for a lost point of access to a 
highway if the point of access was lost because of an act 
separate from the taking, such as the highway's relocation." 359 
Wis. 2d 30, ¶46. There, we cited with approval Jantz, 63 
Wis. 2d 404, a case almost directly analogous to Hoffer's case. 
See 
118th 
Street, 
359 
Wis. 2d 30, 
¶¶47-48. 
In 
Jantz, 
a 
restaurant owner sought compensation for diminution of value of 
his business after DOT took .38 acre of Jantz's land in order to 
expand the highway. DOT also relocated his access to the 
highway. Jantz, 63 Wis. 2d at 407-09. The .38 acre taken was 
separate from Jantz's highway access point. Id. We held that the 
diminution of value was properly excluded from the compensation 
for the partial taking "because those damages were not 'a 
consequence of the taking of .38 acre of land . . . .'" 118th 
Street, 359 Wis. 2d 30, ¶48 (quoting Jantz, 63 Wis. 2d at 412). 
¶46 Here——just like the property owners in 118th Street 
and Jantz——Hoffer did not lose its direct access points to the 
highway because of the taking of the .72 acre of its land; 
rather, it lost its direct access points due to DOT's decision 
to restrict access to STH 19 as part of the STH 26 relocation 
                                                 
23 The issue in 118th Street was whether diminution of value 
caused by the relocation of (and the LLC's consequent loss of 
direct access to) 118th Street should be included in the 
compensation for the taking of a temporary limited easement 
under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(g) when the temporary limited 
easement was used to create additional access to the property. 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
35 
 
project. Two separate acts occurred:  (1) the taking of Hoffer's 
.72 acre, and (2) the elimination of Hoffer's direct access 
points to STH 19 pursuant to the police power. None of Hoffer's 
access points were on the land taken. Hoffer has consistently 
argued that the diminution of value to the property was caused 
by the loss of direct access to STH 19, not by the taking of the 
.72 acre. The diminution of value of Hoffer's property was not a 
consequence of the taking of the .72 acre, and accordingly those 
damages should not be included in the compensation for the .72 
acre taken.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶47 First, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 84.25(3) authorizes 
DOT to change Hoffer's access to STH 19 in whatever way it deems 
"necessary or desirable." Such changes, including elimination of 
direct access points, are duly authorized exercises of the 
police power and are not compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09 as 
long as alternate access is given that does not deprive the 
abutting owner of all or substantially all beneficial use of the 
property. Second, we hold that when DOT changes an abutting 
property owner's access to a controlled-access highway but other 
access is given or exists, the abutting property owner is 
precluded from compensation pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) 
as a matter of law and no jury determination of reasonableness 
is required. Reasonableness is the wrong standard to apply 
because the provision of some access preserves an abutting 
property owner's right of access to a controlled-access highway, 
and thus no taking compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) 
No.2012AP2520 
   
 
36 
 
occurs. Accordingly, Hoffer is precluded from compensation under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(b) because alternate access to the 
property was provided by the Frohling Lane extension. We 
therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶48 REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J., did not participate.    
 
 
No.  2012AP2520.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I conclude, 
as does Justice Gableman's lead opinion, that the elimination of 
direct access from Hoffer's property to State Highway 19 is a 
duly authorized exercise of the police power and is not 
compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09.1   
¶50 I do not, however, join Justice Gableman's long, 
complex opinion.   
¶51 The lead opinion is, for example, unnecessarily 
replete with discussion of when the elimination of direct access 
to a controlled access highway may support a claim for inverse 
condemnation,2 "depriv[ing] the abutting owner of all or 
substantially all beneficial use of the property."3   
¶52 The parties' references to inverse condemnation are 
cursory, not full or adversarial.  As a result, I would not 
discuss inverse condemnation.  "The rule of law is generally 
best developed when matters are tested by the fire of 
adversarial briefs and oral arguments."  Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 
100, ¶120, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866 (Abrahamson, C.J. & 
Crooks, 
J., 
concurring) 
overruled 
on 
other 
grounds 
by 
Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, 293 
Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216. 
¶53 For the reasons set forth, I do not join the lead 
opinion and I write separately. 
                                                 
1 Only two justices join Justice Gableman's opinion. 
2 See, e.g., lead op., ¶¶6, 16-17, 20 n.12, 22, 33.  
3 Lead op., ¶6.   
No.  2012AP2520.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶54 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶55 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The petitioner 
in this case, Hoffer Properties, LLC (Hoffer), asks the 
following question: "What is the standard as to when DOT must 
pay compensation when it has eliminated an abutting property 
owner's direct access to an existing controlled-access state 
trunk highway?"  Hoffer's answer is that the DOT must pay 
compensation when a jury finds that the replacement access 
provided by DOT is not reasonable. 
¶56 The circuit court answered the question differently.  
It denied Hoffer a jury, concluding as a matter of law that no 
compensation is required if DOT provided any replacement access 
to the owner.  This position is supported by the State in its 
brief: "Under Wisconsin law, damage resulting to property 
through the exercise of the police power is not compensable.  
There is no compensable taking when direct access to a 
controlled-access highway is denied as long as other access is 
given or otherwise exists." 
¶57 The lead opinion concludes that "when DOT changes an 
abutting property owner's [direct] access to a controlled-access 
highway but other access is given or exists, the abutting 
property owner is precluded from compensation . . . as a matter 
of law and no jury determination of reasonableness is required."  
Lead op., ¶6.  The lead opinion adds that "[r]easonableness is 
the wrong standard to apply" because the provision of "some" 
access preserves the property owner's right of access; thus, no 
taking occurs.  Id. 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶58 The 
implications 
of 
this 
decision 
are 
stark.  
Henceforward, juries are precluded from ever finding that the 
alternative access provided to replace direct access to a 
controlled-access highway is unreasonable.  By transforming a 
traditional fact question into a question of law, the court 
justifies depriving property owners of their statutory right to 
a jury trial and also bars circuit judges from ever finding that 
alternative access is not reasonable.  According to the lead 
opinion, the only time the DOT is required to pay compensation 
to a property owner for eliminating direct access to a 
controlled-access highway is when the alternative access is so 
circuitous or so grossly inadequate that it deprives "the 
abutting owner of all or substantially all beneficial use of the 
property."  Id., ¶20 n.12. 
¶59 Because I disagree with the lead opinion's analysis 
and conclusions, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶60 State Trunk Highway 19 (STH 19) is a Wisconsin highway 
that stretches from a point near Mazomanie in Dane County to the 
point where it reaches STH 16 on the east side of Watertown in 
Jefferson County.  Its total length is about 60 miles.  On June 
14, 2002, the DOT designated 13.76 miles of STH 19 as 
"controlled-access" highway, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 84.25.  
The eastern end of the controlled-access segment in Jefferson 
County was Frohling Lane in the Town of Watertown, west of the 
City of Watertown. 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶61 Hoffer owned a 9.90-acre parcel of land abutting STH 
19.  This parcel is located south of STH 19.  It is separated 
from Frohling Lane to its east by another parcel of land.  When 
STH 19 became a "controlled-access" highway in 2002, Hoffer 
retained direct access to STH 19 by means of two driveways. 
¶62 Then, as the lead opinion notes, in 2008 the DOT 
undertook a highway improvement project that relocated STH 26 so 
that it intersected with STH 19 just west of Hoffer's property.  
Lead op., ¶8.  On December 29, 2008, as part of this project, 
DOT eliminated Hoffer's direct access to STH 19.  DOT 
acquired through eminent domain both .72 acre of 
Hoffer's land as well as a temporary limited easement 
in order to create alternate access to Hoffer's 
property.  DOT tendered to Hoffer $90,000 for this 
taking.  Hoffer's existing direct access to STH 19 was 
replaced by extending Frohling Lane (a north-south 
roadway that intersects with STH 19) westward to 
Hoffer's property. 
Id. 
¶63 The DOT remedied its elimination of Hoffer's direct 
access by extending Frohling Lane to the west, through the 
entire width of Hoffer's property, so that Hoffer would have 
access to his house and business from the south after a new 
driveway was constructed, and the large parcel to the west of 
Hoffer's property would have access to STH 19 by way of this new 
road.  The extension of Frohling Lane is now called Groth Lane. 
¶64 "Hoffer's replacement access requires vehicles to 
travel roughly 1,000 feet to reach STH 19."  Id.  The 
owners/occupiers of the adjacent parcel to the west presumably 
must travel a considerably longer distance to reach STH 19. 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
4 
 
¶65 To reach Hoffer's property, a person traveling east on 
STH 19 must turn right on Frohling Lane, drive to the end of the 
lane, turn right on Groth Lane, find the driveway for Hoffer's 
property, and then turn right into that driveway.  Thus, as a 
practical matter, the distance to be travelled is not the only 
consideration in evaluating whether an alternative access is 
reasonable.  Multiple factors may have to be taken into account. 
¶66 On the facts here, I would have no difficulty in 
affirming a jury determination that DOT had provided reasonable 
access to Hoffer's property.  The new access is no doubt 
inconvenient.  It may require special signage.  But it is not 
unreasonable in the totality of the circumstances. 
¶67 My problem is not with the result in this case.  My 
problem is with the law created in this case——approving the fact 
that a jury was never permitted to hear evidence and make a 
judgment.  The lead opinion says in essence that there is no 
place for a jury in these situations——that the result would be 
the same if the new access required vehicles to travel 10,000 
feet——closer to two miles——instead of 1,000 feet, to reach 
STH 19.  The lead opinion says that "reasonableness" is the 
wrong standard to apply in such situations because whatever the 
DOT deems "necessary or desirable" cannot be found unreasonable 
as a matter of law.  In my view, this is ill-advised new law. 
II 
¶68 This court has stated that "a person who owns property 
abutting a public street has a right of access, or right of 
ingress and egress, to and from the street. . . .  [A]lthough 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
5 
 
this right is subject to reasonable regulations in the public 
interest, it is a property right, the taking of which requires 
compensation."  Nat'l Auto Truckstops, Inc. v. State, Dep't of 
Transp., 2003 WI 95, ¶39, 263 Wis. 2d 649, 665 N.W.2d 198 
(quoting Narloch v. State, Dep't of Transp., 115 Wis. 2d 419, 
430, 340 N.W.2d 542 (1983)).  For this proposition, Narloch 
cited Schneider v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 458, 463, 187 N.W.2d 172 
(1971).  Schneider, in turn, had cited Carazalla v. State, 269 
Wis. 593, 70 N.W.2d 208, 71 N.W.2d 276 (1955), and Stefan Auto 
Body v. State Highway Commission, 21 Wis. 2d 363, 124 N.W.2d 319 
(1963).  The principle above is codified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6)(b). 
¶69 Paragraph (b), however, also contains a qualification 
to the principle: compensation is required for "[d]eprivation or 
restriction of [an] existing right of access to [a] highway from 
abutting land, provided that nothing herein shall operate to 
restrict the power of the state . . . to deprive or restrict 
such access without compensation under any duly authorized 
exercise of the police power."  (Emphasis added.)  Deprivations 
and restrictions pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 84.25 are exercises of 
the police power. 
¶70 Put 
bluntly, 
the 
state 
does 
not 
have 
to 
pay 
compensation for depriving a landowner of direct access to a 
controlled-access highway.  It does not follow, however, that 
reliance on the police power precludes altogether any need for 
compensation.  Although paragraph (b) does not say so, it is 
universally agreed that the deprivation of direct access cannot 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
6 
 
leave the property landlocked.  See Carazalla, 269 Wis. at 608b.  
Some access must be provided to avoid the necessity of 
compensation.  The issue presented by this opinion is whether no 
compensation is required if DOT provides any alternative access—
—even if that alternative access is plainly unreasonable——so 
long as the property owner cannot meet the requirements for 
inverse condemnation. 
¶71 The State's position is uncompromising: "[D]amage 
resulting to property through the exercise of the police power 
is not compensable.  There is no compensable taking when direct 
access to a controlled-access highway is denied as long as other 
access is given or otherwise exists."  The lead opinion adopts 
this position. 
¶72 Other judges have been less absolute.  For example, 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, stated: 
We assume that one of the uses of the convenient 
phrase "police power" is to justify those small 
diminutions of property rights which, although within 
the 
letter 
of 
constitutional 
protection, 
are 
necessarily incident to the free play of the machinery 
of government.  It may be that the extent to which 
such diminutions are lawful without compensation is 
larger when the harm is inflicted only as incident to 
some general requirement of public welfare.  But, 
whether the last-mentioned element enters into the 
problem or not, the question is one of degree, and 
sooner or later we reach the point at which the 
constitution 
applies 
and 
forbids 
physical 
appropriation and legal restrictions alike, unless 
they are paid for. 
Bent v. Emery, 53 N.E. 910, 911 (Mass. 1899) (emphasis added). 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
7 
 
¶73 Hoffer 
persuasively 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
spirit 
conveyed by Justice Holmes has run through Wisconsin law in 
cases involving controlled-access highways.  Hoffer cites 
Schneider, 51 Wis. 2d 458; Surety Savings & Loan Ass'n v. State 
(Division of Highways), 54 Wis. 2d 438, 195 N.W.2d 464 (1972); 
Jantz v. State (Division of Highways), 63 Wis. 2d 404, 217 
N.W.2d 266 
(1974); 
and 
Seefeldt 
v. 
State, 
Department 
of 
Transportation, 113 Wis. 2d 212, 336 N.W.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1983).  
These cases were preceded by Carazalla, 269 Wis. 593, and Nick 
v. State Highway Commission, 13 Wis. 2d 511, 109 N.W.2d 71, 111 
N.W.2d 95 
(1961). 
 
These 
cases 
will 
be 
discussed 
in 
chronological order. 
Carazalla v. State (1955) 
¶74 In Carazalla, Justice George Currie provided a broad 
statement of the law: 
The general rule is that damage resulting to 
property through the exercise of the police power is 
not compensable.  We consider the following statement 
appearing in 11 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. (3d ed.), p. 
319, sec. 32.27, to be particularly pertinent to the 
facts of the instant case: 
"The question of what constitutes a taking is 
often interwoven with the question of whether a 
particular act is an exercise of the police power or 
of the power of eminent domain.  If the act is a 
proper 
exercise 
of 
the 
police 
power, 
the 
constitutional provision that private property shall 
not be taken for public use, unless compensation is 
made, is not applicable." 
Limited-access highways and their effect upon the 
rights of abutting property owners to compensation are 
the subject of three excellent law-review articles in 
which are cited the court decisions bearing on the 
question.  The authors of all three articles agree 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
8 
 
that the limiting of access to a public highway 
through governmental action results from the exercise 
of the police power, and that in the case of a newly 
laid out or relocated highway, where no prior right of 
access existed on the part of abutting landowners, 
such 
abutting 
landowners 
are 
not 
entitled 
to 
compensation.  On the other hand, the authorities 
cited in these articles hold that where an existing 
highway is converted into a limited-access highway 
with a complete blocking of all access from the land 
of the abutting owner, there results the taking of the 
pre-existing easement of access for which compensation 
must be made through eminent domain.  However, if the 
abutting landowner's access to the highway is merely 
made more circuitous, no compensation should be paid 
according to the authors of these articles . . . .  In 
the instant case the plaintiff landowners still have 
their right of access to old U.S. Highway 51 which has 
not been closed off. 
Carazalla, 269 Wis. at 608a-608b (emphasis added; footnotes 
omitted).  In my view, Carazalla implied that alternative access 
that is merely "more circuitous" is reasonable.  It does not 
address what might be unreasonable. 
Nick v. State Highway Commission (1961) 
¶75 Petitioner 
acquired 
property 
in 
Waukesha 
County 
abutting STH 30, a controlled access highway, also known as 
Bluemound Road.  There had never been driveways from the parcel 
directly onto Highway 30.  The petitioner was denied access to 
Highway 30.  Justice Timothy Brown wrote: 
An impairment of the use of property by the 
exercise of police power, where the property itself is 
not taken by the state, does not entitle the owner of 
such property to a right to compensation.  The law on 
this subject remains as we stated it in State ex rel. 
Carter v. Harper (1923), 182 Wis. 148, 153, 196 N.W. 
451,——a zoning case, 
". . . incidental damage to property resulting 
from governmental activities, or laws passed in the 
promotion of the public welfare, is not considered a 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
9 
 
taking of the property for which compensation must be 
made." 
The situation here bears a close analogy to the 
enactment and the effect of a zoning statute. 
. . . . 
Neither in 1951 nor thereafter . . . did the 
state, through its highway commission, take any 
portion of Reinders' land.  No doubt the control of 
his access to Highway 30 impaired the value of his 
land, the impairment increasing as any part of the 
land lay distant from Calhoun road, but at the time of 
the commission's declaration Reinders still had access 
in every part of his land to Highway 30 via use of 
Calhoun road.  His access to the highway is made more 
circuitous but no part of Reinders' land was taken.  
The diminution of its value due to the exercise by the 
state of its police power in making Highway 30 a 
controlled-access highway is not recoverable. 
Nick, 13 Wis. 2d at 514-15 (first alteration in original; 
emphasis added). 
¶76 Justice George Currie concurred, recognizing that 
Wisconsin's less-generous position on compensation appeared to 
represent a minority view: 
Courts which hold that compensation must be paid 
to the abutting landowner in all cases where all 
direct-access rights to an existing highway are barred 
by statute, even though indirect access exists by 
means 
of 
service 
roads 
or 
connecting 
highways, 
consider 
that 
access 
rights 
constitute 
property 
distinct and apart from the land to which they 
appertain.  The writer of this opinion believes this 
to be erroneous and that highway-access rights are but 
one of a bundle of rights which appertain to a parcel 
of real estate. 
. . . If by reason of providing a frontage road, 
or the existence of a previously existing connecting 
highway, there is reasonable access to the controlled-
access 
highway, 
no 
taking 
requiring 
compensation 
should be held to have occurred. 
Id. at 517-18 (Currie, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
10 
 
¶77 In Nick, the court approved "incidental damage" to 
property by exercise of the police power.  In addition, "more 
circuitous" access to a controlled-access highway is very likely 
to satisfy Justice Currie's "reasonable access."  The opinion 
implicitly recognizes but does not define "unreasonable" access. 
Schneider v. State (1971) 
¶78 Justice Connor T. Hansen wrote: 
The creation of a controlled-access highway is a 
proper exercise of the police power.  This court has 
held that the exercise of the police power allows 
injury to property without compensation.  Where access 
to a highway is controlled under the exercise of the 
police 
power 
and 
reasonable 
access 
remains, 
no 
compensation is required. 
. . . The right of access or of ingress and 
egress of an abutting property owner is a property 
right the taking of which requires compensation.  
However, there was no issue in this case concerning 
the adequacy of access from the Schneider property by 
the 
frontage 
road. 
 
Since 
the 
state 
provided 
reasonable access to and from the Schneider property 
by a frontage road there was no taking requiring 
compensation. 
. . . . 
. . . Deprivation of direct access to a highway 
does not constitute a taking of property provided 
reasonable access remains. 
Schneider, 51 Wis. 2d at 462-63 (emphasis added; citations 
omitted). 
¶79 The court in Schneider used the phrase "reasonable 
access" 
five 
times 
in 
stating 
the 
law, 
implying 
that 
"unreasonable access" does not satisfy the law. 
Surety Savings & Loan Ass'n v. State (Division of Highways) 
(1972) 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶80 Justice Leo Hanley wrote for the court: 
The sole issue presented on this appeal is whether 
appellants should be compensated for damages suffered 
because of the termination of their right to direct 
access to U.S. Highway 41. . . .  [I]njury to property 
resulting from the exercise of the police power of the 
state does not necessitate compensation. 
. . . The 
designation 
of 
a 
highway 
as 
a 
controlled-access highway is an exercise of the police 
power. 
This court has frequently held . . . that there 
is no compensable taking when direct access to a 
controlled-access 
highway 
is 
denied, 
where 
other 
access is given or otherwise exists.  Since the 
department in this case granted reasonable access to a 
service road when it terminated direct access to the 
highway, under the foregoing rules of law, the 
appellants are not entitled to compensation for the 
termination of their direct access. 
. . . There is no suggestion that the frontage 
road access furnished is inadequate or unreasonable. 
. . . . 
We conclude that appellants have no right to be 
compensated, under the provisions of sec. 32.09(6)(b), 
Stats., merely because access to their property has 
been made more circuitous. 
Surety Savings, 54 Wis. 2d at 442-44, 446 (emphasis added; 
citations omitted). 
¶81 It should be noted that the makeup of the Surety 
Savings court was exactly the same as the makeup of the 
Schneider court and that the Surety Savings opinion cites 
Carazalla, Nick, and Schneider with approval.  Where a property 
owner suggests that alternative access is not reasonable, the 
court cannot ignore the issue. 
Jantz v. State (Division of Highways) (1974) 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
12 
 
¶82 In Jantz Justice Robert W. Hansen quoted Schneider v. 
State at length, including this statement: "It [Schneider] 
repeats that the '. . . [d]eprivation of direct access to a 
highway does not constitute a taking of property provided 
reasonable access remains. . . .'"  Jantz, 63 Wis. 2d at 410 
(all alterations but first in original) (quoting Schneider, 51 
Wis. 2d at 
463). 
 
The 
Jantz 
majority 
again 
invoked 
the 
"reasonable access" test two years after the Surety Savings 
case. 
Seefeldt v. State, Department of Transportation (1983) 
¶83 Judge Clair Voss of the court of appeals wrote: 
Initially, appellants had access to U.S. Highway 41.  
When U.S. Highway 41 was declared a controlled-access 
highway, 
the 
appellants' 
access 
was 
reduced 
to 
reasonable access.  Now, the appellants allege that 
even this reasonable access is being taken away as the 
result of the taking of appellants' real estate in 
conjunction with the upgrading of U.S. Highway 41 to 
freeway status. 
In general terms, the issue is whether the 
appellants have suffered a loss.  However, the real 
issue is whether the state can use a two-stage 
approach to deprive landowners of their reasonable 
access to a highway without compensating them for this 
loss.  We find that the appellants have suffered a 
loss because of this two-stage taking and, thus, 
should be compensated. 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
13 
 
Seefeldt, 113 Wis. 2d at 213-14 (emphasis added).1 
¶84 These cases may be summed up as follows: There is 
normally a distinction between an exercise of police power and 
eminent domain.  The general rule is that damage resulting to 
property through an exercise of police power is not compensable.  
This general rule will prevail in any case involving a property 
owner's loss of direct access to a controlled-access highway as 
long as some reasonable access remains.  This principle is found 
in Nick, Schneider, Surety Savings, Jantz, and Seefeldt.  It is 
either stated directly or implied by reference to facts that 
demonstrate reasonable alternative access.  The fact that 
alternative access is "circuitous" or "more circuitous" than 
before the deprivation does not render that access unreasonable 
per se.  Something more deleterious is required.  Although this 
court has never held that a particular exercise of the police 
                                                 
1 Recently, the Supreme Court of South Dakota evaluated a 
similar two-stage taking situation in Hall v. State ex rel. 
South Dakota Department of Transportation, 806 N.W.2d 217 (S.D. 
2011).  Property owners sought compensation after the state 
removed an interstate highway interchange adjacent to their 
property; a truck stop they operated on the property ceased 
operations within weeks of the interchange closure.  Hall, 806 
N.W.2d at 220-21.  The property owners argued that they had 
relied upon the presence of the interchange to operate their 
business and that, when the state originally condemned a portion 
of their property to build the interstate highway, the appraisal 
used to calculate just compensation had assumed "that 'the 
presence of the interchange' would be a 'significant' and 
'special benefit' to the Property."  Id. at 220.  Agreeing with 
that reliance argument, the court concluded that "an abutting 
property owner may acquire a compensable right of access to a 
controlled-access highway when access is designated and used to 
settle or mitigate damages in a condemnation, but that access is 
later removed."  Id. at 226. 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
14 
 
power left a property owner with only unreasonable access to his 
or her property, the broad scope of reasonableness does not 
preclude 
a 
finding 
of 
unreasonableness 
in 
specific 
circumstances. 
¶85 This summary of the case law is simply inconsistent 
with the lead opinion.  Consequently, either this summary is 
wrong or the lead opinion is making new law.  I believe the lead 
opinion is making new law. 
III 
¶86 The lead opinion appears a bit uncomfortable with its 
decision to abandon "reasonable" access.  It tries to hide the 
severity of its ruling by offering the fig leaf of inverse 
condemnation.  This remedy is simply not adequate. 
¶87 Generally, a property owner who brings an inverse 
condemnation 
claim 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.10 
can 
recover 
compensation by demonstrating that a restriction on use amounts 
to a regulatory taking that "den[ies] the property owner all or 
substantially all practical uses of a property."  Brenner v. New 
Richmond Reg'l Airport Comm'n, 2012 WI 98, ¶45, 343 Wis. 2d 320, 
816 N.W.2d 291 (citing Eberle v. Dane Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 
227 Wis. 2d 609, 622, 595 N.W.2d 730 (1999)); see Just v. 
Marinette Cnty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) 
("Whether a taking has occurred depends upon whether 'the 
restriction practically or substantially renders the land 
useless for all reasonable purposes.'" (quoting Buhler v. Racine 
Cnty., 33 Wis. 2d 137, 143, 146 N.W.2d 403 (1966))). 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
15 
 
¶88 But 
even 
property 
owners 
burdened 
by 
plainly 
unreasonable access will struggle to demonstrate that the 
remaining access renders the property substantially useless for 
all 
reasonable 
purposes. 
 
No 
matter 
how 
outrageously 
inconvenient a means of access might be, the property owner will 
still retain some ability to access the property.  Unreasonably 
inconvenient access does not necessarily mean that a property is 
substantially useless.  A use based standard for inverse 
condemnation is fundamentally incompatible with a claim of 
unreasonable access because any access at all likely ensures 
that the property owner retains the ability to use the property. 
¶89 In my view, whether alternative access is reasonable 
or unreasonable is a matter of degree, the determination of 
which should be submitted to a jury.  "[W]hether a change in 
access is 'reasonable' . . . is a question for a jury."  Nat'l 
Auto Truckstops, 263 Wis. 2d 649, ¶21; Narloch, 115 Wis. 2d at 
433-34; Bear v. Kenosha Cnty, 22 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 125 N.W.2d 375 
(1963). 
¶90 The right to trial by jury in these cases is embedded 
in Wis. Stat. § 32.05, especially in subsection (10) paragraph 
(a), subsection (11), and subsection (12).  Trial by jury serves 
as a vital check by an impartial fact finder on the exercise of 
government power. 
¶91 There is a great chasm between reasonable access and 
access so deficient that it constitutes inverse condemnation.  
The lead opinion permits government officials to push property 
owners into that chasm without compensation.  That is contrary 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
16 
 
to the spirit with which our statutes ought to be administered.  
It is ominous when the check of trial by jury disappears, as 
well. 
¶92 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
No.  2012AP2520.dtp 
 
 
 
1