Case Title: In re Child of Radience K.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 73

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 73 
Docket:  
Was-18-180 
Argued:  
December 12, 2018 
Decided: 
May 21, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF RADIENCE K. 
 
 
HJELM, J.  
 
[¶1]  A mother and father appeal from a judgment of the District Court 
(Calais, D. Mitchell, J.) terminating their parental rights to their child pursuant 
to Maine’s Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act (MCPA), 22 M.R.S. 
§§ 4001 to 4099-H (2018) and the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 
25 U.S.C.S. §§ 1901-1963 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-8).  Both parents 
challenge the court’s determination that “active efforts [had] been made to 
provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the 
breakup of the Indian family,” as required by ICWA.  25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(d).  
Additionally, the mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
the court’s determination that she is parentally unfit within the meaning of 
state law, see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), and the father challenges the 
court’s denial of his two motions to transfer the case to the Penobscot Nation 
Tribal Court, see 25 U.S.C.S. § 1911(b), and the denial of his post-judgment 
 
2 
motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, see M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  We 
affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts are drawn from the court’s findings, which are 
supported by competent record evidence, and from the extensive procedural 
record.  In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182, ¶ 4, 169 A.3d 914.  
[¶3]  The child at issue in this case is an Indian child within the meaning 
of ICWA.  See 25 U.S.C.S. § 1903(4).1  The Department first became involved with 
the family in 2012 when the father was charged with crimes arising from his 
possession of child pornography on the family computer.  The following year, 
he was convicted of multiple counts of possession of sexually explicit material 
(Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 284(1)(C) (2018).  After the father served the 
unsuspended portion of the resulting prison sentence, the Department closed 
the family’s case because any contact between the father and the child was to 
be supervised by the mother.2   
                                         
1  ICWA defines an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either 
(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the 
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”  25 U.S.C.S. § 1903(4) (LEXIS through 
Pub. L. No. 116-8).  The child is a member of the Penobscot Nation and is therefore an “Indian child” 
within the meaning of ICWA.  
 
2  The court was presented with evidence showing that, as part of the father’s sentence, he was 
subject to conditions of probation that prohibited him from having contact with children under the 
age of sixteen, except for supervised contact with his child and the children of friends or family.   
 
3 
[¶4]  The Department became involved with the family again in February 
of 2016, when it petitioned the court for child protection and preliminary 
protection orders on behalf of the child, see 22 M.R.S. §§ 4032-4034, who was 
then six years old.  The Department filed the petition after receiving new 
information that the father had sexually abused a child to whom he is related.  
The Department knew of the family’s affiliation with the Penobscot Nation and, 
before filing the petition, notified the Nation of its intent to do so.3  See 
25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(a) (requiring that notice be provided to the Indian child’s 
tribe); see also id. § 1903(5) (defining “Indian child’s tribe”).  The court granted 
the petition for a preliminary protection order and placed the child in 
departmental custody.  The court also appointed counsel for each parent, see id. 
§ 1912(b); 22 M.R.S. § 4005(2), and granted the Penobscot Nation’s motion to 
intervene, see 25 U.S.C.S. § 1911(c); 22 M.R.S. § 4005-D(5). 
[¶5]  After holding a summary preliminary hearing in March of 2016, the 
court found that the child was in immediate risk of serious harm and ordered 
that the child remain in the Department’s custody.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4034(4).  The 
court also addressed the pertinent provisions of ICWA, finding that active, 
                                         
3  Because the child was not living on the reservation when she was placed in the Department’s 
custody, the District Court had concurrent jurisdiction with the Penobscot Nation Tribal Court.  See 
25 U.S.C.S. § 1911(b) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-8); see also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. 
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 60-61 (1989).   
 
4 
albeit unsuccessful, efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian 
family and that continued custody of the child by the parents would result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.4  See 25 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1912(d)-(e).  Soon after the court held the summary preliminary hearing, the 
father was arrested on charges resulting from the child abuse allegations that 
had been reported to the Department, and he remained incarcerated 
throughout the pendency of this child protection action.   
 
[¶6]  In June of 2016, the mother—who was now represented by her 
second attorney—and the father agreed to a jeopardy order, see 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4035, in which the court found, among other things, that the child had made 
detailed disclosures of inappropriate conduct by the father, that the father 
posed a threat of sexual abuse or exploitation to the child,5 and that the mother 
                                         
4  Evidence in the record indicates that a few days after the summary preliminary hearing, the 
child was placed with her current foster parents, one of whom is a member of the Passamaquoddy 
Tribe and, at the time of the child’s placement, was thought to be a distant relative of the child.  
Though it was later discovered that the foster parent is biologically unrelated to the child, both the 
Penobscot Nation’s caseworker and its designated expert witness testified that the placement of the 
child with these foster parents is considered by the Penobscot Nation to be a placement with 
“extended family.”  See Penobscot Nation Laws and Ordinances, ch. 15, subch. 1, § 2(16) (2016) 
(defining “extended family” to include “individuals [who] are unrelated by either birth or marriage, 
who have an emotionally significant relationship with the [child] that would take on the 
characteristics of a family relationship”). 
 
5  During the jeopardy hearing, when asked about the pending sexual abuse charges, the father 
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and from this the court drew an 
adverse inference against him.  See M.R. Evid. 513(b); In re Ryan M., 513 A.2d 837, 841-42 (Me. 1986).   
 
5 
had failed to protect the child from the risk of sexual abuse or exploitation 
posed by the father.  
 
[¶7]  In the months after the court entered the jeopardy order, counsel 
for each parent filed a motion to withdraw.  The court granted the motions and 
appointed new counsel for each parent.   
 
[¶8]  A contested judicial review hearing began in February of 2017.  See 
id. § 4038.  Shortly thereafter, the father’s second attorney filed a motion to 
withdraw.  The court granted the motion and appointed the father his third 
attorney.  In late March of 2017, before the second day of the judicial review 
hearing was held, the Department filed a petition to terminate the parental 
rights of each parent.  See id. § 4052.  On the Department’s motion, the court 
consolidated the termination hearing with the ongoing judicial review hearing.  
See M.R. Civ. P. 42(a).   
 
[¶9]  In early June of 2017, each of the parents’ third attorneys filed a 
motion to withdraw.  The court granted both motions and assigned the father 
new counsel; the mother initially stated that she wanted to represent herself 
but eventually petitioned the court to appoint a new attorney.  During the 
transition of counsel, the parents filed a number of joint motions pro se, which 
the court addressed at a hearing held on a date in July when the consolidated 
 
6 
hearing had been scheduled but was continued by the court because of the 
recent change in the parents’ representation.   
[¶10]  Because of circumstances unrelated to this appeal, the 
now-consolidated hearing on the termination petition and the judicial review 
was not rescheduled to begin until December 4, 2017.  Just prior to that date, 
on November 28, the father filed a motion for the case to be transferred from 
the District Court to the Penobscot Nation Tribal Court pursuant to ICWA.  See 
25 U.S.C.S. § 1911(b); 25 C.F.R. § 23.115 (2018).  The Nation and the child’s 
guardian ad litem each filed a written objection to the transfer.6  The court held 
a hearing on the motion on the first morning of the consolidated hearing and, 
after receiving evidence, denied it, stating:  
The Court finds that this proceeding is at an advanced stage and 
that the father did not act promptly to request the transfer after he 
received notice of the action. . . . He’s had a desire to request a 
transfer for a long time[,] according to his testimony. 
 
 
. . . [E]ven assuming that his prior attorneys were indeed not 
responsive, he’s demonstrated an ability on his own to file his own 
motions.   
 
                                         
6  As the court noted at the motion hearing and as we were advised during oral argument, the 
Penobscot Nation’s objection to the father’s motion to transfer does not necessarily mean that the 
Tribal Court would have declined to accept transfer of the case.  Neither the mother nor the 
Department took a position on the father’s motion to transfer. 
 
7 
[¶11]  The court then proceeded with the hearing on the termination 
petition and judicial review, which took place over six days from December of 
2017 through February of 2018.  The court heard testimony from a number of 
witnesses, including the mother and the father; caseworkers from the 
Department and the Penobscot Nation Department of Social Services; 
therapists for the mother and the child; one of the child’s foster parents; and a 
qualified expert witness, as ICWA requires, designated by the Penobscot 
Nation, see 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(f); 25 C.F.R. § 23.122 (2018).   
[¶12]  On April 19, 2018, the court entered a judgment granting the 
Department’s termination petition.  Addressing the standards set out in the 
MCPA, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that each parent was 
unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for 
the child and that those circumstances were unlikely to change within a time 
reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  The court also found by clear and convincing 
evidence that termination of each parent’s parental rights is in the best interest 
of the child.  See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).  Then, applying the provisions of ICWA, 
the court found that the Department had proved by clear and convincing 
evidence that active remedial efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of 
 
8 
the Indian family and that those efforts had proved unsuccessful, see 25 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1912(d), and also that the Department had proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that continued custody of the child by the parents was likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the child, see id. § 1912(f)—a conclusion 
supported by the testimony of the Nation’s ICWA-mandated expert witness.   
[¶13]  In its judgment, the court made the following findings of fact, all of 
which are supported by competent record evidence. 
Mother has failed to demonstrate through her conduct that she 
understands the risk posed by the Father and that she is able to 
protect the child.   
 
 
. . . Mother permitted [Father to have] unsupervised contact 
[with the child,] which, based on the child’s disclosures, enabled 
Father to watch naked pictures or movies with the child while 
naked.  Despite engaging in counseling and the Non Offenders 
Group, something she did on an inconsistent basis, Mother 
continued to maintain contact with the Father, calling him daily and 
visiting him on weekends during his incarceration to discuss this 
case. . . . Mother’s actions speak much more loudly than do her 
words and the court does not find her testimony credible. 
 
The Department through its various case workers offered 
rehabilitative services and attempted on numerous occasions to 
maintain contact with the mother, who at times was simply not 
around and who rarely maintained contact with the Department 
herself. . . . The Department made referrals to counselors, held 
family team meetings, and took efforts to ensure that Mother 
understood what was expected of her. . . . [Mother] is in no better 
position now to safely parent the child, protect the child from 
jeopardy and take responsibility for the child than she was when 
the case began.  These circumstances are not likely to change 
 
9 
within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, 
particularly when the child has been in care since February 2016. 
 
. . . [The jeopardy order] found that Father “poses a threat of 
serious harm to the child . . . in particular a threat of sexual abuse 
or exploitation” . . . based on his criminal convictions and the 
current criminal allegations involving a young relative.  [The 
psychologist] who conducted the CODE [court-ordered diagnostic 
evaluation] and whose testimony the court finds credible, found 
. . . that Father “either lacks an ability to understand or 
acknowledge the jeopardy he poses to a child sexually and to the 
pathological power and control as well as potential exploitation he 
has over a vulnerable child.” . . . Significantly, the evidence also 
supports a finding that Father carries a diagnosis of pedophilia, a 
condition that is exceedingly difficult to treat if at all, particular[ly] 
from a jail, where Father has been since essentially the outset of 
this case.   
 
. . . . 
In this case, reasonable or active efforts[7] to provide 
services designed to prevent the breakup of the family would 
                                         
7  In In re Annette P., 589 A.2d 924 (Me. 1991), we affirmed a judgment terminating parental rights 
to Indian children, stating that “all reasonable active efforts” had been made to prevent the breakup 
of the Indian family.  Id. at 929 (emphasis added).  After we issued that opinion, the federal Bureau 
of Indian Affairs issued a rule, 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2018) (the Final Rule), and non-binding guidance, 
Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,790-91, 38,825 (June 14, 2016) (to be 
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23), that addressed the standard for assessing “active efforts.”  The BIA’s 
non-binding guidance notes that the “active efforts” standard is different than a “reasonable efforts” 
standard, which is contained in many state child protection laws.  See Indian Child Welfare Act 
Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. at 38,791; see also, e.g., 22 M.R.S. § 4036-B (2018) (requiring the 
Department to “make reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child from home”); In re Child of 
James R., 2018 ME 50, ¶ 21, 182 A.3d 1252 (stating that “the Department is required to make 
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunify the family of a child removed from the home” 
(quotation marks omitted)).  Although at oral argument the mother raised this distinction between 
the two standards, she did not raise the issue in her brief—and in fact in her brief she cited the 
reasonableness standard set forth in Annette P. as the correct standard—and therefore did not 
preserve the issue for our review.  See Bayside Enters., Inc. v. Me. Agric. Bargaining Bd., 513 A.2d 1355, 
1361 (Me. 1986) (holding that an issue raised for the first time at oral argument is not preserved for 
review).  Even if the issue had been preserved, her argument would be unavailing because the court’s 
findings in this case regarding active efforts satisfy the standard set out in the BIA’s Final Rule and 
non-binding guidance.   
 
10 
include, at a minimum, offering services to the mother designed to 
improve her ability to recognize the threat posed by Father and be 
able to demonstrate her ability to protect the child from that threat.  
The court finds that the Department has done that.  Although it 
offered services with more local therapists, the Mother wanted to 
see counselors in Bangor.  The Department at times provided 
transportation for that to occur.  Moreover, the Department 
provided Family Team Meetings in order to gauge the direction of 
the case and address issues.  Despite the services offered, the 
Department’s efforts were not successful. . . . 
 
With respect to Father, the Department did assist in having a 
counselor at the jail see the Father and also took efforts with the 
county jail to enable Father to participate in team meetings.  It also 
arranged for a CODE early on, which the Father did not initially 
attend. . . . Admittedly, Father’s incarceration made it difficult for 
services to be offered and for him to participate.  However, 
. . . pedophilia lacks an effective treatment, and according to the 
Qualified Expert Witness, the Department is not obligated to 
engage in efforts, reasonable[,] active[,] or otherwise, that may 
prove fruitless.  Based on the evidence and based on the [Nation’s] 
Qualified Expert Witness’s opinion, the court finds, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that active efforts have been made to provide 
remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent 
the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved 
unsuccessful. 
 
In addition to engaging in “active efforts[,”] the Department 
has established and the court finds by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that . . . continued custody of the child by either parent is 
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 
. . . Absent a demonstrated understanding of the significant risk 
Father poses both by his prior conduct and by that which the child 
has recently disclosed, the child remains at significant risk and is 
likely to suffer serious emotional or physical damage, victimization 
and injury, all of which is supported by the opinion of the Qualified 
Expert Witness.  
 
 
11 
(Footnotes omitted.)   
 
 
[¶14]  The mother and father filed timely notices of appeal.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4006; M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).  The mother then filed a motion in the District 
Court for relief from judgment on the ground of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  See M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 20-21, 126 A.3d 
718.  At the same time, the Department and the mother filed a joint motion to 
stay the appeal and permit the trial court to act on the mother’s Rule 60(b) 
motion.  See M.R. App. P. 3(d).  
 
[¶15]  The father then filed his own motion for relief from judgment in 
the District Court on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
accompanied by his supporting affidavit, see M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); In re M.P., 
2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 20-21, 126 A.3d 718, and a motion to enlarge the time to file 
additional affidavits in support of that motion.  The father also filed a motion 
with us to stay the appeal and permit the trial court to act on his Rule 60(b) 
motion.  See M.R. App. P. 3(d).  We granted each parent’s motion to stay the 
appeal and permitted the trial court to act on the parents’ Rule 60(b) motions.  
Following the issuance of our order, the father filed his second motion in the 
District Court to transfer the case to the Penobscot Nation Tribal Court.  See 
25 U.S.C.S. § 1911(b); 25 C.F.R. § 23.115.   
 
12 
 
[¶16]  Based on the existing record and the court’s extensive familiarity 
with this case, and without taking additional evidence, see In re David H., 2009 
ME 131, ¶ 34, 985 A.2d 490, the court issued two orders.  In one order, the court 
addressed the father’s motion to transfer the case to Tribal Court and 
concluded that it was without authority to act on the motion because the father 
had failed to seek leave from us to take such action.  See M.R. App. P. 3(d).  The 
court’s second order denied the parents’ Rule 60(b) motions after determining 
that the father’s claim of ineffectiveness at the jeopardy hearing was untimely 
and rejecting on the merits each parent’s claim of ineffectiveness.  See In re M.P., 
2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 26-27, 126 A.3d 718.   
[¶17]  After the court entered judgment on all of the matters properly 
before it, the appeal moved forward, taking us to the issuance of this opinion. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶18]  This appeal presents a broad range of issues for our consideration: 
the substantive state and federal standards governing the termination of 
parental rights to an Indian child; temporal considerations for motions to 
transfer a child protection action from state court to a tribal court; temporal 
and substantive standards for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the 
 
13 
jeopardy and termination stages of a child protection case; and appellate 
practice.   
A. 
Judgment Terminating the Parents’ Parental Rights 
 
[¶19]  State court child protection proceedings involving Indian children, 
such as the child at issue here, see supra n.1, require the court to apply both 
state child protection law prescribed by Maine’s Child and Family Services and 
Child Protection Act, and federal law prescribed by the Indian Child Welfare Act 
of 1978.  Because of the differences in state and federal law, we briefly review 
the pertinent parts of each before addressing the merits of the parents’ 
contentions. 
1. 
Applicable Provisions of the MCPA and ICWA 
 
[¶20]  “Recognizing that . . . the right to family integrity is limited by the 
right of children to be protected from abuse and neglect,”  22 M.R.S. § 4003, the 
Legislature enacted the MCPA to provide legal processes that  
[remove children] from the custody of their parents only where 
failure to do so would jeopardize their health or welfare; . . . [g]ive 
family rehabilitation and reunification priority as a means for 
protecting the welfare of children, but prevent needless delay for 
permanent 
plans 
for 
children 
when 
rehabilitation 
and 
reunification is not possible; . . . [and p]romote the early 
establishment of permanent plans for the care and custody of 
children who cannot be returned to their family, 
 
14 
id. § 4003(2)-(4).8  Because the relationship between a parent and a child is 
constitutionally protected, see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000), 
when the Department files a petition to terminate parental rights, the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution and Maine law require that the 
Department prove each of the two elements of a termination case—parental 
unfitness as statutorily defined,9 and the child’s best interest—by clear and 
convincing evidence, see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745, 769-70 (1982).     
 
[¶21]  When a child protection action involves an Indian child, the 
Department is also obligated to meet the federal requirements found in ICWA.  
Through ICWA, Congress recognized “that there is no resource that is more vital 
to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children,” 
                                         
8  Title 22 M.R.S. § 4003(3) (2018) has since been amended.  P.L. 2017, ch. 470, § 1 (effective 
December 13, 2018) (codified at 22 M.R.S. § 4003(3)).   
 
9  As provided in 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b) (2018), the four statutory forms of parental 
unfitness are as follows: 
 
(i) The parent is unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and these 
circumstances are unlikely to change within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet 
the child’s needs;  
 
(ii) The parent has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a 
time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs;  
 
(iii) The child has been abandoned; or  
 
(iv) The parent has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify 
with the child pursuant to section 4041. 
 
15 
25 U.S.C.S. § 1901(3), and established “minimum Federal standards for the 
removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such 
children in foster or adoptive homes [that] will reflect the unique values of 
Indian culture,” id. § 1902; see also In re Trevor I., 2009 ME 59, ¶ 15, 973 A.2d 
752. 
 
[¶22]  ICWA imposes two elements of proof in a state court termination 
proceeding beyond those required by state law.  First, ICWA requires “[a]ny 
party seeking to effect a . . . termination of parental rights to . . . an Indian child 
under State law [to] satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to 
provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the 
breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.”  
25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(d).  Although ICWA does not identify the standard of proof 
applicable to this element, we have held that those active efforts must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence.  See In re Annette P., 589 A.2d 924, 
928 (Me. 1991).  Second, ICWA requires that the petitioning party show 
“beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the continued custody of the child by the 
parent . . . is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the 
child.”  25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(f).   
 
16 
[¶23]  Therefore, pursuant to the combined effect of the state and federal 
statutes, when the child to be protected is an Indian child, the Department must 
prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the parent of the 
child is parentally unfit; (2) termination of parental rights is in the child’s best 
interest; and (3) active efforts have been made to prevent the breakup of the 
child’s Indian family and those efforts have been unsuccessful.  Additionally, the 
Department must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child is likely to 
suffer serious emotional or physical damage if the child were to remain in the 
parent’s custody.   
2. 
The Parents’ Contentions  
 
[¶24]  With that background, we first address the parents’ common 
assertion that the court erred by finding that active efforts had been made to 
prevent the breakup of the Indian family, as required by ICWA.  See 25 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1912(d).  We then address the mother’s assertion that the court erred by 
finding that she was parentally unfit within the meaning of state law.  See 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b).   
a. 
The Parents’ Shared Contention: Active Efforts  
 
[¶25]  The parents do not challenge the court’s conclusions that 
termination of their parental rights is in the best interest of the child and that 
 
17 
the child would likely suffer serious emotional or physical damage if she were 
to remain in their custody, and the father does not challenge the court’s 
conclusion that he is parentally unfit.  Instead, each parent contends that the 
court erred by finding that active efforts had been made to prevent the breakup 
of the Indian family and that those efforts had proved unsuccessful.  “Like the 
determination of the other elements under [22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)], we will affirm 
the court’s findings [of active efforts] if supported by clear and convincing 
evidence in the record.”  In re Annette P., 589 A.2d at 928.   
 
[¶26]  Although the nature of “active efforts” is not defined in ICWA itself, 
it is defined in a rule promulgated in 2016 (the Final Rule) by the federal Bureau 
of Indian Affairs.10  See 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2018).  The Final Rule specifies that 
“active efforts” comprise “affirmative, active, thorough, and timely efforts 
intended primarily to maintain or reunite an Indian child with his or her 
family.”  Id.  Where an agency—such as the Department—is involved, “active 
efforts must involve assisting the parent or parents . . . through the steps of a 
case plan and with accessing or developing the resources necessary to satisfy 
the case plan.”  Id.  Moreover, “[t]o the maximum extent possible,” active efforts 
should be made consistent with “the prevailing social and culture conditions 
                                         
10  The Final Rule applies in this case because it was promulgated in December of 2016, three 
months before the termination petition was filed.  See 25 C.F.R. § 23.143 (2018).  
 
18 
and way of life of the Indian child’s Tribe and should be conducted in 
partnership” with the child, the parents, the extended family members, and the 
tribe.  Id.  “Active efforts are to be tailored to the facts and circumstances of the 
case,” and may include the following: 
(1) Conducting a comprehensive assessment of the circumstances 
of the Indian child’s family, with a focus on safe reunification as the 
most desirable goal; 
 
(2) Identifying appropriate services and helping the parents to 
overcome barriers, including actively assisting the parents in 
obtaining such services; 
 
(3) Identifying, notifying, and inviting representatives of the Indian 
child’s Tribe to participate in providing support and services to the 
Indian child’s family and in family team meetings, permanency 
planning, and resolution of placement issues; 
 
(4) Conducting or causing to be conducted a diligent search for the 
Indian child’s extended family members, and contacting and 
consulting with extended family members to provide family 
structure and support for the Indian child and the Indian child’s 
parents; 
 
(5) Offering and employing all available and culturally appropriate 
family preservation strategies and facilitating the use of remedial 
and rehabilitative services provided by the child’s Tribe; 
 
. . . .  
 
(7) Supporting regular visits with parents . . . in the most natural 
setting possible as well as trial home visits of the Indian child 
during any period of removal, consistent with the need to ensure 
the health, safety, and welfare of the child; 
 
 
19 
(8) Identifying community resources including housing, financial, 
transportation, mental health, substance abuse, and peer support 
services and actively assisting the Indian child’s parents or, when 
appropriate, the child’s family, in utilizing and accessing those 
resources; 
 
(9) Monitoring progress and participation in services. 
 
Id.   
[¶27]  In this case, competent record evidence supports the court’s 
findings that active efforts were made to prevent the breakup of this Indian 
family and that those efforts were unsuccessful.  See 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(d); 
25 C.F.R. § 23.2.  As the court found, the Department had provided significant 
case management services to the family, including scheduling family team 
meetings to address parenting issues and gauge any progress toward 
reunification; referring the mother to services intended to “improve her ability 
to recognize the threat posed by [the] Father and . . . protect the child from that 
threat,” including the non-offenders group and multiple counselors; helping to 
provide the mother with transportation to attend the services provided to her; 
assisting the father in securing a counselor willing to provide services at the jail 
facility; and arranging for each parent to participate in a CODE.11    
                                         
11  Though not included as a finding in the termination judgment, the court was presented with 
evidence that, after being placed in the Department’s custody, the child was also provided with 
counseling and participated in a CODE evaluation.   
 
20 
[¶28]  As the court found, the active efforts directed toward the mother 
were not successful—an outcome that was largely attributable to her 
unwillingness to participate in the services that were offered.  The Department 
presented the court with evidence that its caseworkers had difficulty contacting 
the mother and that multiple counselors had discharged the mother as a client 
because of her inconsistent attendance.  Moreover, in spite of the efforts made 
to improve the mother’s understanding of the danger the father poses to their 
child, the mother chose to maintain a relationship with the father by regularly 
contacting him—including in person—while he was incarcerated.   
[¶29]  With regard to the father, the court made the supported finding 
that because he was incarcerated throughout the pendency of this case on 
charges of sexually assaulting a child, it was difficult for the Department to 
provide him with services.  The court also found that the father is a diagnosed 
pedophile, a pathology that lacks effective treatment, particularly for 
incarcerated persons.  Given the high risk of harm the father poses to the child, 
the court did not err by concluding that the Department’s actions—including 
facilitating his attendance at family team meetings, assisting him with access to 
a counselor, and making two CODE referrals—rose to the level of active efforts 
 
21 
“tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case,” 25 C.F.R. § 23.2, and that 
those efforts were unsuccessful, see 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(d). 
[¶30]  Competent record evidence also supports the court’s finding that 
“the Department included the Penobscot Nation in the process of managing this 
case.”  The Department gave the Nation advance notice of its plan to file the 
child protection petition, and, through its caseworker, the Nation was an active 
participant—including as a decision-maker—throughout the pendency of the 
proceedings.  The Nation’s caseworker attended family team meetings, 
communicated directly with the child’s foster parents, and made a home visit.  
Moreover, the Nation’s caseworker helped to fashion a cultural contract 
between the Penobscot Nation and the child’s foster parents—whom the 
Nation considers to be the child’s extended family members, see supra n.4—to 
ensure that the child’s life will continue to be enriched by tribal culture, thereby 
manifesting a demonstrable active effort to maintain and nurture the 
connection between the Nation and the child.12   
                                         
12  Additionally, in accordance with the provisions of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of 
Children, 22 M.R.S. §§ 4251-4269 (2018), the Department arranged for ICPC studies of the homes of 
the child’s maternal grandmother and grandfather, see id. § 4255, who live separately in California, 
as possible kinship placements for the child.  At the time of the hearings on the termination petition, 
neither home was approved as a placement for the child.   
 
22 
[¶31]  Importantly, the court properly relied on the opinion of the 
Nation’s designated qualified expert witness, cf. 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(e); 25 C.F.R. 
§ 23.122, who testified that, in her opinion, the Department had engaged in 
active efforts as ICWA requires, and, although the Department bears the burden 
of proving active efforts, that the parents are responsible for engaging in those 
efforts.  The court’s supported findings establish that the parents failed to fulfill 
that responsibility. 
[¶32]  For these reasons, the court was fully warranted in concluding that 
the Department had satisfied its burden to show clearly and convincingly that 
active efforts had been made to prevent the fracture of this Indian family but 
that the efforts were unsuccessful. 
b. 
The Mother’s Additional Contention: Parental Unfitness  
[¶33]  Beyond this, the mother contends that the court also erred by 
determining that she is parentally unfit because she was unable or unwilling to 
protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time 
period reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  She asserts that evidence in the record shows that 
she now understands the risks that the father poses to the child, that she has 
learned how to identify signs of sexual abuse and sexual abusers, and that she 
 
23 
has “improved since starting therapy.”  We review the court’s findings of fact 
for clear error.  See In re Child of Kimberlee C., 2018 ME 134, ¶ 5, 194 A.3d 925.     
[¶34]  The mother’s assertion is undermined by the court’s supported 
assessment that her words were belied by her actions throughout this child 
protection proceeding.  The court found in its earlier jeopardy order—and the 
mother agreed—that she had failed to protect the child from the threat of 
sexual abuse or exploitation posed by the father.  At the termination hearing, 
the court was presented with evidence of the mother’s close and ongoing 
relationship with the father despite his incarceration and the risks she knows 
he presents to the child, including evidence that she even invited him to 
participate in her own therapeutic counseling sessions.  The court rejected the 
credibility of the mother’s testimony—as it was entitled to do—that sought to 
minimize her contact with the father and demonstrate a shift in her 
appreciation of the danger he poses to the child.  Moreover, the mother’s failure 
to engage meaningfully with the Department or the services provided to her is 
further proof of her inability to protect or take responsibility for the child 
within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.  See In re Child of 
Ronald W., 2018 ME 107, ¶ 11, 190 A.3d 1029; In re Charles G., 2001 ME 3, ¶ 7, 
763 A.2d 1163.   
 
24 
[¶35]  The court did not err by finding the mother to be parentally unfit 
on those two statutory grounds.   
B. 
The Father’s Motions to Transfer to Tribal Court 
 
[¶36]  The father asserts that the court erred by denying both of his 
motions to transfer this proceeding to the Penobscot Nation Tribal Court.  See 
25 U.S.C.S. § 1911(b).  He filed the first of these motions shortly before the 
termination hearing was scheduled to begin, and he filed the second after we 
stayed this appeal to allow the court to adjudicate the parents’ Rule 60(b) 
motions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  Because of the differing 
procedural contexts in which the father filed the motions to transfer, we 
address them separately.   
 
1. 
Pre-Judgment Motion to Transfer to Tribal Court  
 
[¶37]  The father challenges the court’s denial of his first motion to 
transfer the case to the Tribal Court, see 25 U.S.C.S. § 1911(b), which he filed 
within a week before the termination hearing was scheduled to begin.  In 
denying the motion, the court concluded that there was good cause to allow the 
matter to continue in state court because the motion was filed at an advanced 
stage of the case.  See id.  The father asserts that the court erred because ICWA 
precludes a court from treating an advanced-stage filing of such a motion as a 
 
25 
proper basis to deny it.  We construe the provisions of section 1911(b) de novo.  
See In re Children of Shirley T., 2019 ME 1, ¶ 16, 199 A.3d 221. 
[¶38]  Section 1911(b) specifies that 
[i]n any State court proceeding for the . . . termination of parental 
rights to . . . an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the 
reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, the court, in the absence of 
good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the 
jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the 
petition of either parent . . . or the Indian child’s tribe: Provided, that 
such transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal court of 
such tribe. 
 
25 U.S.C.S. § 1911(b) (first emphasis added).  Thus, when a petition to transfer 
a case to a tribal court is filed by either a parent or the child’s tribe, “[t]he tribal 
court’s jurisdiction is ‘presumptive[]’ unless a parent objects, the tribe declines 
jurisdiction, or good cause to maintain the matter in the state court is 
established.”13  In re Children of Shirley T., 2019 ME 1, ¶ 14, 199 A.3d 221 
                                         
13  Pursuant to both the Final Rule, 25 C.F.R. § 23.116 (2018), and general notions of case 
management, the best practice is for the state court, at the earliest practicable time, to contact the 
tribal court and inquire whether the tribal court would be inclined to accept or decline the transfer, 
to the extent that the tribal court is in a position to assess the situation in that preliminary setting.  
Here, this provision of the Final Rule was not brought to the attention of the trial court by any party 
in this case, and given the temporal circumstances discussed in the text, any procedural shortcoming 
is not material to our treatment of this issue on appeal.    
 
The Final Rule also provides that a party objecting to a transfer motion must present the objection 
and its basis on the record, either orally or in writing, and the court must then provide all parties 
with an opportunity to be heard on the matter.  25 C.F.R. § 23.118(a)-(b) (2018).  These requirements 
were satisfied here. 
 
26 
(quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989)) 
(second alteration in original); see also 25 C.F.R. § 23.117 (2018).    
 
[¶39]  As with the meaning of “active efforts” discussed supra ¶¶ 21-32, 
“good cause” is neither defined nor further explicated in ICWA itself but is 
addressed in the Final Rule.  See 25 C.F.R. § 23.118 (2018).  The Final Rule, 
however, does not go so far as to define or provide examples of what is good 
cause.  Rather, the Final Rule identifies certain factors that a court may not 
consider in its calculus of whether there is good cause to deny a transfer of the 
case to a tribal court.  The prohibited consideration relevant here is “[w]hether 
the . . . termination-of-parental-rights proceeding is at an advanced stage if the 
Indian child’s parent . . . or Tribe did not receive notice of the child-custody 
proceeding until an advanced stage.”14  Id. § 23.118(c)(1).  BIA guidelines 
published in 2016 further clarify the relevant provisions in ICWA and the Final 
Rule by stating that “Congress intended for the transfer requirement and its 
                                         
14  The other factors, none of which is germane here, are  
 
(2) Whether there have been prior proceedings involving the child for which no 
petition to transfer was filed; 
(3) Whether transfer could affect the placement of the child; 
(4) The Indian child’s cultural connections with the Tribe or its reservation; or 
(5) Socioeconomic conditions or any negative perception of Tribal or BIA social 
services or judicial systems. 
 
25 C.F.R. § 23.118(c)(2)-(5) (2018). 
 
27 
exceptions to permit State courts to exercise case-by-case discretion regarding 
the ‘good cause’ finding,” similar to “a modified (i.e. limited, narrow) version of 
the forum non conveniens analysis.”  Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 
81 Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,821, 38,825 (June 14, 2016) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. 
pt. 23); see also In re Children of Shirley T., 2019 ME 1, ¶ 24, 199 A.3d 221. 
 
[¶40]  Although “[t]here is no dispute that the burden to prove good 
cause falls on the party opposing tribal jurisdiction,” Thompson v. Fairfax Cty. 
Dep’t of Family Servs., 747 S.E.2d 838, 848 (Va. Ct. App. 2013); see also People ex 
rel. T.I., 707 N.W.2d 826, 834 (S.D. 2005), neither ICWA nor the Final Rule 
identifies the evidentiary standard applicable to the good-cause analysis.  
Several courts have determined that the applicable standard of proof is clear 
and convincing evidence.  See, e.g., State v. Reich-Crabtree (In re M.H.C.), 
381 P.3d 710, 715 (Okla. 2016); People ex rel. J.L.P., 870 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Colo. 
App. 1994); In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Mont. 1981); see also Indian 
Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. at 38,827.  This is the standard of 
proof that the court applied here.  Because this high standard operates to the 
father’s benefit, we assume, without the need to decide, that this is the proper 
quantum of evidence that must be met to defeat a motion to transfer. 
 
28 
 
[¶41]  The father contends that the court erred by finding that his motion 
was “untimely and made at [an] advanced stage and [that the] father didn’t act 
promptly” because, the father asserts, the provision of the Final Rule quoted 
above prohibits the court from considering the advanced stage of the 
proceedings in its good-cause analysis.  This prohibition, however, does not 
apply here because, pursuant to the plain language of the Final Rule, the court 
is foreclosed from considering an advanced stage of the proceeding when 
making a good-cause determination only “if the Indian child’s parent . . . or Tribe 
did not receive notice of the child-custody proceeding until an advanced stage.”  
25 C.F.R. § 23.118(c)(1) (emphasis added).  In this way, the prohibition is meant 
to “ensure[] that parents . . . and Tribes who were disadvantaged by 
noncompliance with ICWA’s notice provisions may still have a meaningful 
opportunity to seek transfer.”  Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 38,825.   
 
[¶42]  Here, there was no deficiency in the notice of this action—and the 
applicability of ICWA to it—provided both to the father and to the Penobscot 
Nation.  In fact, the father testified during the hearing on his motion to transfer 
that “[v]ery early on” he had asked his first attorney “to give [him] information 
on ICWA and tribal aspects of this case” and that his request to transfer the case 
 
29 
to the Tribal Court was “something [he had] been thinking about since this case 
first started.”  The Nation received notice of the impending child protection case 
even before the Department filed the child protection petition in February of 
2016 and was granted intervenor status the following month—and in that 
capacity explicitly opposed the father’s motion to transfer the case to its Tribal 
Court.  Because there was no failure or deficiency in notice of this child 
protection action, the court did not err as a matter of law when it considered 
the advanced stage of the proceedings in its good-cause inquiry. 
 
[¶43]  The father further contends that even if the court was permitted 
to consider the advanced stage of the proceedings, the term “advanced stage” 
refers to each stage of a child protection case, not the case as a whole, and that 
because his motion was filed before the termination hearing began, the motion 
was not filed at an advanced stage of that proceeding.   
[¶44]  For purposes of the advanced-stage analysis, the sequential 
procedural phases of a child protection case are considered separately.  See 
Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. at 38,825 (“Each individual 
proceeding will culminate in an order, so ‘advanced stage’ is a measurement of 
the stage within each proceeding.”).  Therefore, we must look only to the 
 
30 
termination phase of this case to assess whether the court erred by concluding 
that the father filed the motion unduly late.   
[¶45]  Although the termination hearing had not begun when the father 
filed the motion, the termination proceeding in this case began in March of 
2017—almost eight months before the father filed the motion—when the 
Department filed the termination petition.  The hearing on that petition was 
then continued multiple times for legitimate reasons—including once at the 
father’s own request so that his fourth, most recently appointed attorney would 
have adequate time to prepare.   
 
[¶46]  Given those temporal circumstances, including the last-minute 
filing of the motion to transfer, and the father’s demonstrated proficiency at 
filing motions without the assistance of counsel, the court did not err by 
concluding that there was good cause to deny the father’s pre-judgment motion 
to transfer.   
2. 
Post-Judgment Motion to Transfer to Tribal Court  
 
[¶47]  The father next asserts that the court erred by declining to 
consider his post-judgment motion to transfer this case—meaning the 
proceeding to address his Rule 60(b) motion alleging ineffectiveness of 
counsel—to the Penobscot Nation Tribal Court for adjudication there.  The 
 
31 
father filed that motion in the District Court after we had stayed the appeal to 
allow the District Court to act on his pending Rule 60(b) motion.  The court 
denied the motion to transfer after concluding that it did not have authority to 
act that motion because of the effect of Maine Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c).  
The court was correct. 
 
[¶48]  After an appeal is filed, “[t]he trial court shall take no further action 
pending disposition of the appeal,” Doggett v. Town of Gouldsboro, 2002 ME 
175, ¶ 5, 812 A.2d 256 (quotation marks omitted), unless either the trial court’s 
action is explicitly permitted by Maine Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), or, on 
a motion that states the reason for the request, we authorize the trial court to 
act, see M.R. App. P. 3(d).   
[¶49]  Rule 3(c) did not authorize the trial court to adjudicate the father’s 
post-judgment motion to transfer because the motion is not among the small 
number of enumerated matters on which the trial court may take action while 
an appeal is pending without our leave.  Beyond that, with respect to Rule 3(d), 
the father’s motion for us to stay the appeal so as to allow the trial court to act 
on post-trial matters did not encompass the motion to transfer.  Rather, his 
motion sought to allow the District Court to act only on “his May 31, 2018, 
motions,” which comprised only his Rule 60(b) motion alleging ineffective 
 
32 
assistance of counsel and a related motion for an enlargement of time to file 
affidavits in support of that motion.  Because the court was not authorized to 
act on the father’s post-judgment motion to transfer, the trial court correctly 
declined to consider it.   
C. 
The Father’s Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment Alleging 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel  
 
 
[¶50]  The father finally argues that the court erred by denying his motion 
for relief from judgment based on an allegation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.15  He claims that he was not represented effectively by his first 
attorney at the jeopardy hearing, and he also claims that his next three lawyers, 
who represented him sequentially through the time the court issued the 
termination judgment, were ineffective because none of them filed a timely 
motion to transfer the case to the Tribal Court.  The father filed his notice of 
appeal, however, before the court denied his Rule 60(b) motion and did not file 
a separate notice of appeal from that order.  This raises the question of whether 
the father’s challenge to this post-judgment order is properly before us.  We 
address this issue first. 
                                         
15  Although the court also denied the mother’s Rule 60(b) motion alleging ineffective 
representation, she does not challenge that determination on appeal. 
 
33 
1. 
Appealing a Decision on a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from 
Judgment 
 
[¶51]  As the governing rule applies here, to appeal a civil judgment, the 
party must file a notice of appeal within “21 days after entry into the docket of 
the judgment or order appealed from.”  M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1)-(2), (d).  The 
notice of appeal “shall specify the party taking the appeal [and] designate the 
judgment or part thereof appealed from.”  M.R. App. P. 2A(b)(1).   
[¶52]  Maine Rule of Appellate Procedure 2B(c)(2) provides that a timely 
notice of appeal is deemed to encompass challenges to certain enumerated 
post-judgment orders issued after the notice of appeal is filed, without the need 
for the party to file a separate notice of appeal from that order.  The list of 
motions that qualify for this treatment is explicitly exhaustive, as the Rule 
states that it “does not apply to any post-judgment motion that is not listed” 
therein.  Id.  
 
[¶53]  The effect of this is to place all parties on notice of what the 
appellant must do to be able to challenge a particular judicial action on appeal, 
and to ensure that the appellee receives the opportunity to adequately 
represent its interests on that appeal, such as verifying that the appendix 
contains the documents that bear on the appellate issues, see M.R. App. P. 8(i).  
See Estate of MacComb, 2015 ME 126, ¶ 10, 124 A.3d 1119 (“A failure to comply 
 
34 
with the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure . . . compromises both the 
appellee’s ability to defend against the appeal and our ability to decide it.”).   
 
[¶54]  A motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)—
such as the motion at issue here—is not among the motions enumerated in 
Rule 2B(c)(2).  Consequently, the father’s notice of appeal from the underlying 
termination judgment was not sufficient to preserve a challenge to the 
subsequent denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion.  Rather, to present that 
challenge for appellate review, he was required to file a separate notice of 
appeal of that post-judgment order.  Having not done so, the father’s assertion 
that the court erred by denying his Rule 60(b) motion is not cognizable on this 
appeal.  See Rice v. Amerling, 433 A.2d 388, 391 (Me. 1981) (stating that “[a]ll 
statutory requirements for perfecting an appeal are jurisdictional and require 
strict compliance”); cf. In re Melissa T., 2002 ME 31, ¶ 5, 791 A.2d 98 (stating 
that because the mother filed a brief but did not file any notice of appeal as 
required by the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure “we lack jurisdiction to 
review her claim”).   
 
[¶55]  Even if the father had preserved for appellate review his challenge 
to the court’s denial of his motion, his contention would be unavailing.  The 
father’s claim of ineffectiveness extended to all four of the attorneys who 
 
35 
represented him in the trial court and encompassed the jeopardy and 
termination phases of this case.  In its order, the court concluded that the 
motion as it related to the jeopardy hearing was untimely, and that, on the 
merits, the father had not established ineffective assistance of counsel 
subsequent to the jeopardy hearing, including during the termination 
proceedings.  The court committed no error by denying both aspects of the 
motion.  As to the claim of ineffectiveness by the three attorneys who 
represented him seriatim after the jeopardy hearing, we are satisfied the 
evidence did not compel the court to make the findings necessary for it to grant 
his motion.  See In re Alexandria C., 2016 ME 182, ¶¶ 18-20, 152 A.3d 617 
(stating the elements of a claim of ineffectiveness and the standard of review 
for an appellate challenge of the denial of a motion asserting such a claim).  As 
to the father’s claim that the court erred by denying his motion as untimely to 
the extent the motion related to the jeopardy stage of this case, we take this 
opportunity to clarify the applicable law. 
2. 
Raising a Claim of Ineffective Representation Provided at the 
Jeopardy Stage of a Child Protection Action  
[¶56]  As a threshold matter, we must conclude that a parent’s right to 
counsel during the jeopardy stage of child protection proceeding includes the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Maine law provides that, subject to 
 
36 
two limited exceptions not relevant to this appeal, parents are entitled to be 
represented by legal counsel in all child protection proceedings, which includes 
the jeopardy phase of the case.  22 M.R.S. § 4005(2).  Implicit in this right to 
legal counsel is the right to representation that is competent and effective.  See 
Petgrave v. State, 2019 ME 72, ¶ 6, ---A.3d--- (concluding that the statutory right 
to counsel at a probation revocation hearing encompasses the right to effective 
representation); In re Henry B., 2017 ME 72, ¶ 6, 159 A.3d 824 (same with 
respect to the statutory right to counsel during an involuntary commitment 
proceeding).  This is particularly true in a child protection action, which 
implicates a parent’s constitutional right to parent his or her child.  See Troxel, 
530 U.S. at 65-66; see also Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 11, 90 A.3d 1169. 
[¶57]  The issue generated here is of a narrower, temporal nature: for 
how long after the entry of a jeopardy order may a parent bring a timely claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion for relief from judgment 
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)?   
[¶58]  In In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 18-21, 126 A.3d 718, we established 
procedures for parents to bring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a 
termination proceeding.  Among other things, we stated that a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised in a direct appeal if the record 
 
37 
already contains the basis for the claim, but otherwise the claim must be 
presented in a Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from a judgment that is filed 
within 21 days after the expiration of the time to appeal the underlying 
judgment.  Id. ¶¶ 19-20.  We have made clear that the importance of protecting 
“parents’ fundamental right to effective assistance of counsel” must be balanced 
against the “simultaneous interest of the State in promoting ‘the early 
establishment of permanent plans’ for the children.”  In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 
182, ¶ 19, 169 A.3d 914 (quoting 22 M.R.S. § 4003(4)); see also In re M.P., 2015 
ME 138, ¶ 21, 126 A.3d 718 (“Because of the counter-balancing interests of the 
State in ensuring stability and prompt finality for the child, if the parent fails to 
comply with this procedure, the parent’s motion asserting the ineffective 
assistance of counsel must be denied.”). 
[¶59]  The need for a “swift resolution of ineffectiveness claims” at the 
termination stage of child protection proceedings, In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶ 19, 
126 A.3d 718, applies just as forcefully at the jeopardy stage because of the 
nature of the parents’ interests that are affected by a jeopardy order and the 
ongoing importance of achieving ultimate permanency for the child.  If, for 
example, a parent were allowed to wait until after the entry of a termination 
judgment before reaching back and challenging the process affecting a much 
 
38 
earlier phase in the case, there would be the prospect that much of the case 
could be unwound, resulting in unnecessary and damaging delays in the case’s 
resolution.  Therefore, we now announce that the procedural requirements 
governing a motion for relief from judgment based on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in a jeopardy proceeding—including the deadlines for 
filing such a motion relative to the date a jeopardy order is entered—are the 
same as those we prescribed for a claim of ineffectiveness at a termination 
hearing, see id. ¶¶ 20-21.16   
[¶60]  This extension of the post-termination framework governing 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to jeopardy hearings was not in place 
at the time the jeopardy order was issued against the father, and we therefore 
do not hold the father rigidly to the temporal requirements of that process.  
Nonetheless, the court did not err by denying the father’s Rule 60(b) motion for 
relief from the jeopardy order as untimely because, even if the father is allowed 
to benefit from a more generous view of when such a claim must be raised, the 
father filed the motion beyond any reasonable temporal parameter—nearly 
two years after the jeopardy order was entered.  See In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 
                                         
16  A parent has the statutory right to appeal from a jeopardy order, see 22 M.R.S. §§ 4006, 4035 
(2018), and therefore has access to the same procedural vehicle for asserting a claim of 
ineffectiveness as with a judgment terminating parental rights. 
 
39 
182, ¶¶ 7, 12, 19, 169 A.3d 914 (concluding that the parents’ challenge to the 
effectiveness of counsel at a jeopardy proceeding “came far too late” where the 
challenge was brought more than two years after the entry of the jeopardy 
order and many months after the termination judgment was entered); M.R. 
Civ. P. 60(b) (requiring that a motion for relief from judgment be made “within 
a reasonable time”); see also 22 M.R.S. § 4003(3) (stating the Legislature’s 
intent to “prevent needless delay for permanent plans for children”).  During 
that nearly two-year period that began in June of 2016, the attorney who 
represented the father at the jeopardy hearing was given leave to withdraw in 
September of 2016, and the father then came to be represented by three more 
attorneys in series, eliminating any concern that the father would have had to 
assert a claim of ineffectiveness against his current attorney.  These 
circumstances allowed ample time and opportunity for the father to have 
asserted, pursued, and be heard on a claim of ineffective representation at the 
jeopardy hearing.  
[¶61]  Therefore, the court acted well within its authority when it denied 
as untimely the father’s Rule 60(b) motion as it related to counsel’s 
representation of him at the jeopardy hearing.   
 
40 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
[¶62]  This action presented the court with considerable challenges both 
in case management and on the merits, including the application of complex 
laws governing substance and process, the consideration and analysis of a large 
body of evidence, and the participation of parents who did not work well with 
their numerous legal counsel.  Despite these challenges, the court’s 
management of this case was exemplary, and the court committed no error by 
terminating the parents’ parental rights and denying their other requests for 
relief.     
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Randy G. Day, Esq., Garland, and Amy R. McNally, Esq. (orally), Woodman 
Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & Jacques, P.A., Biddeford, for appellant mother 
 
Laura P. Shaw, Esq. (orally), Camden Law LLP, Camden, for appellant father 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and 
Human Services 
 
Carolyn Adams, Esq., Law Office of Carolyn Adams, Waterville, for appellee 
Penobscot Nation Department of Social Services.   
 
 
Calais District Court docket number PC-2016-01 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY