Case Title: Educational Testing v. Hildebrant

Citation: 399 Md. 128

Docket Number: 115/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Educational Testing Service v. Elba Hildebrant
No. 115, September Term, 2006.
JUDGMENT - GROUNDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - DISPUTE AS TO MATERIAL
FACT: An affidavit that presents a general, conclusory denial of
misconduct is not sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether a testing proctor acted in bad faith.
Assertions of material fact must be supported, in accordance with
Maryland 
Rule 
2-501(b), 
by 
affidavit, 
discovery 
response,
transcript of testimony, or other statement under oath that
demonstrates the dispute of material fact.
In the Circuit Court for M ontgomery County
Case No. 255677-V
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 115
September Term, 2006
EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE
v.
ELBA HILDEBRANT
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan, M .
(Retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J. 
Filed:    May 10, 2007
This case arises out of the administration of a standardized test by Educational Testing
Service (“ETS”), petitioner, to Elba Hildebrant, respondent.  We granted certiorari to
consider the following two questions:
1.  Whether one contracting party, which commits an issue to the
exclusive discretion of a second party, may nonetheless go to
trial against the second party for relying in good faith on its
agent’s report merely by alleging that the agent wrote that report
in bad faith and against the interests of the second party.
2.  Whether a party suing for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing may avoid summary judgment merely by
alleging, without evidentiary support, that the moving party
acted in bad faith.
Educational Testing v. Hildebrant, 396 Md. 11, 912 A.2d 648 (2006).
I.
ETS administered the standardized Praxis Series School Leaders Licensure
Assessment Test on September 11, 2004 at Montgomery College in Rockville, Maryland.
ETS is a non-profit corporation that develops, administers, and grades the standardized
Praxis test at issue in this case.  The Praxis test is a standardized licensing examination
required by many school districts, including Montgomery County Public Schools, for a
teacher to become a County school principal.  Hildebrant, a principal-intern at a Montgomery
County elementary school, registered for the Praxis test and was among the candidates who
took the test at Montgomery College on September 11, 2004.  Dana Baker, a professor at
Montgomery College, administered the test and monitored the room on behalf of ETS.
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Before taking the test, a test taker is required to sign an acknowledgment agreeing to
the conditions set forth in ETS’s published “Information and Registration Bulletin,” which
provides detailed information about the Praxis test and ETS’s testing policies.  The Bulletin
contains, for example, sections entitled, “Contact Information,” “Registration Information,”
“On the Test Day,” “Scores & Score Reports,” and “Forms.”  The Bulletin lists the various
test centers and codes for academic institutions.  All candidates who take the Praxis test are
sent a Bulletin beforehand.
The Bulletin addresses the consequences of breaking ETS’s testing rules and
procedures.  In the “Scores & Scores Reports” section, ETS states that “ETS reserves the
right to cancel any test score when, in ETS’s judgment, a testing irregularity occurs, there is
an apparent discrepancy in a test taker’s identification, the test taker engages in misconduct
or plagiarism, or the score is invalid for another reason.”  Misconduct is broadly defined.
The Bulletin states the following regarding misconduct:
“When ETS or test center personnel find that there is
misconduct in connection with a test, the test taker may be
dismissed from the test center, or ETS may decline to score the
test, or cancel the test score.  Misconduct includes, but is not
limited to, noncompliance with the “Test Center Procedures and
Regulations,” pages 10-12 of this Bulletin.”
The “Test Center Procedures and Regulations” provide that scores may be canceled by ETS
for actions such as, but not limited to, “working on any test, or test section, when not
authorized to do so, or working after time has been called.”  The “Test Center Procedures and
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Regulations” emphasize that test takers must comply with the test administrator’s directions.
The Bulletin includes the following pertinent paragraph:
“ETS reserves the right to take all action—including, but not
limited to, barring you from future testing and/or canceling your
scores—for failure to comply with test administration
regulations or the test administrator/supervisor’s directions.  If
your scores are canceled, they will not be reported, and your fees
will not be refunded.”
Hildebrant accepted the terms of the Bulletin by signing, in her own hand, the
following certification standard:
“CERTIFICATION STATEMENT: (Please write the following
statement below. DO NOT PRINT.)  ‘I hereby agree to the
conditions set forth in the Registration Bulletin and certify that
I am the person whose name and address appear on this answer
sheet.’
“/s/ I hereby agree to the conditions set in the Registration
Bulletin and certify that I am the person whose name and
address appear on this answer sheet.
“SIGNATURE: /s/ E. Hildebrant DATE: /s/ 9/11/04 Month Day
Year.”
After the test was administered, Baker submitted a “Supervisor’s Irregularity Report”
to ETS.  The report cited Hildebrant for an irregularity during two of the testing sessions;
both irregularities were categorized as “misconduct.”  During Session I of the test, Baker’s
report stated that Hildebrant “refused to stop writing when time was called.  Warning given.
Material Taken.”  In Session II, Baker noted that Hildebrant “had to be instructed twice to
stop work and close the test book.  (She insisted on completing her thought.).”
-4-
ETS informed Hildebrant by letter on September 30, 2004 that it was considering
canceling her scores because it had been reported that she had continued to work on a section
of the test after time was called and failed to follow directions.  ETS stated that it had not yet
made a final decision concerning the report of the irregularity, and would take no action until
she responded in writing or October 28, 2004, whichever came first.  ETS requested
Hildebrant to provide a written statement providing any additional information to help
explain the report of the irregularity.
Hildebrant responded to ETS by letter dated October 9, 2004.  In her letter, Hildebrant
stated that she did not engage in any irregularity and criticized the test proctor’s “over-
zealous perception of the test procedures.”  Hildebrant informed ETS that she was “willing
to accept that the staff may think they were doing what they were instructed to do to maintain
the secure, standard conditions” of the test center, but that she had “conformed completely
to those standards, and that the report to the contrary was an error in judgment on the part of
the proctor.”
ETS reviewed Hildebrant’s response and concluded that Hildebrant had not followed
the required testing procedures.  As a result, ETS canceled Hildebrant’s test scores and
informed her of the decision by letter dated October 14, 2004.  Hildebrant’s counsel
requested on October 18, 2004 that ETS reconsider its decision to cancel her scores, but ETS
did not respond to this request.
-5-
Hildebrant filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against
ETS, alleging malicious defamation and breach of contract.  Hildebrant amended her
complaint to add Baker as a defendant on the malicious defamation count while deleting ETS
as a defendant on that same count and to add a third cause of action sounding in negligence
against ETS.  Count one of the amended complaint, against Baker only, alleged that Baker
defamed Hildebrant by falsely and maliciously implying to individuals within ETS that
Hildebrant had acted dishonestly in taking the Praxis test.  Count two, against ETS, alleged
that ETS breached its contract with Hildebrant by failing to “fairly and accurately report her
leadership assessment scores” to the Montgomery County Board of Education.  Count three,
against ETS, alleged that ETS was negligent in failing to properly train and supervise Baker.
As part of discovery, Baker and Hildebrant completed affidavits and Baker was
deposed on December 21, 2004.  Baker testified that she had administered roughly ten to
fifteen tests per year for the past eight years for ETS.  Baker further testified that she was “an
associate supervisor of a testing site” and that she “generally [has] no knowledge of what
ETS does after the testing session is over.”  When asked how long Hildebrant continued to
write after time was called during the second testing session, Baker stated that “it was a
significant amount of time.  I don’t time it on my timepiece.  More than 30 seconds, not five
minutes.”
Baker’s affidavit provided information about her background and testing experience
with ETS.  The affidavit, dated January 18, 2005, stated as follows:
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“1.  I am currently a Professor in and Department Chair of the
Department of Counseling at Montgomery College, Rockville
campus.  I was chosen as one of twelve faculty members at the
college to receive a Faculty Outstanding Service Award for
2003-2004.
“2. I received a B.A. in psychology from The College of
Wooster in 1981.
“3. I received a M.A. in counseling and guidance from Trinity
College in Washington, DC in 1992.
“4. I am currently pursuing a Ph.D. at American University in
Washington, DC.
“5.  I have administered tests for Educational Testing Service
(“ETS”) and other testing companies for approximately ten
years.
“6. On behalf of ETS, I administered the September 11, 2004
The Praxis Series:  Professional Assessments for Beginning
Teachers, The School Leaders Licensure Assessment test
(“Praxis test”) at Montgomery College.  Assisting me in my
duties, which included monitoring the testing room, was a room
proctor, Ms. Jocelyn Lowry.
“7. One of the candidates who took the September 11, 2004
Praxis test that I administered at Montgomery College was Elba
Hildebrant.  I had never previously met Ms. Hildebrant, nor did
I know anything about her before the test.
“8. On September 11, 2004, I filled out a “Supervisor’s
Irregularity Report” regarding Ms. Hildebrant.  I provided this
report to the test site supervisor, who sent the report on to ETS.”
In opposition, Hildebrant filed an affidavit, stating, in pertinent part, as follows:
“1.  I am a principal intern at an elementary school in
Montgomery County School System in Maryland (“MCPS”).
One of the requirements to become a principal in MCPS is to
1 At the motions hearing, Hildebrant’s counsel clarified that ETS allowed Hildebrant,
as an accommodation, to register for the Praxis test by phone because she was unable to
complete an online registration.  Hildebrant’s counsel acknowledged that she was
nonetheless subject to the terms in the Bulletin, however.
-7-
take and pass the Praxis II, School Leaders Licensure
Assessment test (“Assessment Test”), which is administered by
ETS.
“2. I registered by telephone with ETS to take the Assessment
Test scheduled for September 11, 2004, for which I paid a fee
of $465.  I did not receive from ETS at any time a document
entitled, “Registration Bulletin” or similar title.1
“3.  I have read the Supervisor’s Report of Irregularities. . . .
Each statement on the report concerning my conduct during the
administration of the Assessment Test is false in every respect
and has no basis in fact whatsoever.  These statements are so
contrary to any reasonable understanding or interpretation of
anything that could have been observed that I have readily
concluded that they were made with the knowledge that they
were false and with the intent to harm me personally.”
ETS and Baker filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary
Judgment.  Hildebrant filed an opposition to that motion.  After a hearing on the motion,
Judge John W. Debelius, III, granted summary judgment as to the breach of contract count
and dismissed the defamation and negligence counts.  The court concluded as follows:
“Well, I’ve considered the motion to the parties as well as the
argument that we’ve heard on the record, and it seems to me that
there’s a contract.  The contract has been acknowledged by
plaintiff.  And the contract did reserve to ETS the judgment to
make those calls and it seems to me that it’s inescapable that
that’s exactly what ETS did.  I don’t see the defamation here.  I
think that it does fail on both harm and lack of communication
to someone else because the defendant Baker was acting as an
2 Hildebrant filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, arguing that summary
judgment was improper on the breach of contract count, and asserting that an issue of
material fact existed regarding whether ETS had exercised its judgment in good faith when
it determined that Hildebrant had violated test procedures.  ETS responded in opposition to
the motion.  The Circuit Court denied the motion.
3 The Court of Special Appeals summarized Hildebrant’s argument as follows:  (1)
Hildebrant said in her affidavit that everything Baker said in the “Irregularity Report”
concerning Hildebrant’s failure to stop writing after time was called was false;  (2) if what
Baker said was false, then she knew it was false when she wrote the report;  (3) Baker was,
at all times here pertinent, ETS’s agent;  (4) ETS is bound by the knowledge of its agents;
(5) because Baker knew the allegations of misconduct were bogus, then so did ETS;  and (6)
therefore, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, when ETS exercised
its discretion to cancel the test scores, it did so in bad faith.  Hildebrant v. Educational
Testing, 171 Md. App. 23, 31, 908 A.2d 657, 661 (2006).
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agent and employee of ETS.  And I think that with regard to the
negligence, the same problem.  The duty, the breach— I don’t
see that here.”2
Hildebrant noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals as to the breach of
contract claim.  Before the Court of Special Appeals, Hildebrant argued that, in deciding
whether to cancel the test scores, ETS must exercise its discretion in good faith, because in
every contract, there exists an implied covenant that each of the parties thereto will act in
good faith and deal fairly with the others.  Hildebrant maintained that an issue of material
fact existed as to whether ETS canceled the test scores in good faith.3  ETS did not dispute
Hildebrant’s position that it must act in good faith, but argued that Baker’s knowledge could
not be imputed to ETS because the Bulletin expressly reserves to ETS, not to test
administrators, the judgment of whether to cancel a test score for misconduct.
-9-
The Court of Special Appeals  analyzed the law of principal and agent and held that
it was proper to impute Baker’s knowledge to ETS.  Hildebrant v. Educational Testing, 171
Md. App. 23, 34, 908 A.2d 657, 663 (2006).  The intermediate appellate court held that
summary judgment was granted improperly because there was a dispute of material fact.  Id.
at 37-38, 908 A.2d at 665.  The court concluded:
“Here there exists a material dispute of fact as to whether Ms.
Baker made up her allegations of misconduct against Hildebrant.
If she did make up those allegations, her knowledge of the false
allegation is imputable to ETS and that imputed knowledge
would suffice to show bad faith on the part of ETS.”
Id.  Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the entry of summary judgment on
the breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings.  Id.  ETS filed a petition
for writ of certiorari, which we granted.  Educational Testing, 396 Md. 11, 912 A.2d 648.
II.
Before this Court, petitioner argues that the Court of Special Appeals applied agency
law principles improperly by expanding the implied contractual covenant of good faith and
fair dealing impermissibly into a mechanism for overriding explicit contractual terms.
Petitioner asserts also that the intermediate appellate court erred in concluding that
Hildebrant established a genuine dispute as to a material fact.  Hildebrant responds in several
ways:  (1) that ETS acts through its agents and may not disavow its relationship with agents
through a contract provision; (2) that the knowledge of Baker, as ETS’s agent, in submitting
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a false report is imputed to ETS; (3) that Hildebrant met the evidentiary standard for
overcoming a motion for summary judgment; and (4) that there is no valid public policy
reason to insulate ETS from liability for the acts of its agents.
III.
This Court’s review of the Circuit Court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment
is de novo.  Harford County v. Saks Fifth Avenue Distribution Co., ___Md. ___, ___ A.2d
___, 2007 WL 1119877 (2007).  In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we
independently determine first whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists and only
where such dispute is absent will we proceed to determine whether the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Hill v. Knapp, 396 Md. 700, 711, 914 A.2d 1193,
1199 (2007).
The law in regard to the sufficiency of allegations in a response to a motion for
summary judgment motion is well settled.  In order to defeat a motion for summary
judgment, the party opposing the motion must identify with particularity each material fact
in genuine dispute and provide support for its contentions “by an affidavit or other written
statement under oath.”  Md. Rule 2-501 (b).  An affidavit supporting or opposing a motion
for summary judgment must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence.  Md.
Rule 2-501 (c).  Consequently, mere general allegations or conclusory assertions which do
not show facts in detail and with precision will not suffice to overcome a motion for
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summary judgment.  See, e.g., O’Connor v. Baltimore County, 382 Md. 102, 111, 854 A.2d
1191, 1196 (2004); Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 738, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1993);
King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 112, 492 A.2d 608, 615 (1985); Dietz v. Moore, 277 Md. 1,
5, 351 A.2d 428, 431 (1976); Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, 273 Md. 1, 7-8, 327 A.2d
502, 508-09 (1974); Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 320-22, 104 A.2d 624, 626 (1954).  We
explained the standard and the necessity for materiality of disputed facts as follows:
“The function of the summary judgment procedure is not to try
the case or decide the issues of fact raised; it is merely to
determine whether or not there is an issue of fact to be tried and
if there is none, to cause judgment to be rendered accordingly.
At the trial level, the purpose of the hearing on the motion is to
decide whether a real dispute as to material facts does exist; if
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits (if any)
show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
summary judgment should be granted.
“A bare allegation in a general way that there is a dispute as to
material facts is never sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.  General allegations which do not show facts in detail
and with precision are insufficient to prevent the entry of
summary judgment.
“Even where it is shown that there is a dispute as to a fact, when
the resolution of that factual dispute is not material to the
controversy, such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary
judgment.  Such a material fact must be one, the resolution of
which will somehow affect the outcome of the case.”
Lynx, 273 Md. at 7-8, 327 A.2d at 508-09 (citations omitted).
We review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and construe
any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts against the moving party.
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Harford County, ___Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___, 2007 WL 1119877 at *3.  Ordinarily, we
will uphold the grant of summary judgment only on the grounds relied upon by the trial court.
Md. Rule 8-131.  With these principles in mind, we turn to the question of whether the case
sub judice was properly resolved by grant of summary judgment.
IV.
We determine first whether Hildebrant has presented a genuine dispute of material
fact sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.  The material fact at issue in this
case is not merely whether Hildebrant engaged in misconduct.  In such a classic “he said, she
said” situation, where the test administrator reports misconduct and the test taker denies such
misconduct, the Bulletin clearly provides that ETS may, in its judgment, rely on its agent’s
report and cancel the test scores.  Although such a “he said, she said” case might be sufficient
to overcome a motion for summary judgment if the suit was between Baker and Hildebrant,
it is not sufficient on a breach of contract action between Hildebrant and ETS, because, under
the terms of the contract, ETS has the right to rely on the report of its agent, Baker.
Here, the material fact at issue is whether ETS breached its contract with Hildebrant
because it failed to act in good faith when it canceled her test scores.  In every contract there
exists an implied covenant that the parties to the contract will act in good faith when dealing
with each other.  See, e.g., Food Fair v. Blumberg, 234 Md. 521, 534, 200 A.2d 166, 174
(1964).  Hildebrant alleges that the test administrator knowingly lied in her report, that this
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knowledge of the report’s falsity is imputable to ETS, and therefore ETS did not act in good
faith when canceling Hildebrant’s scores because it knew the report was false.  Thus, to
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding ETS’s good faith, Hildebrant must
show that Baker acted in bad faith, i.e., because Baker knew that the Supervisor’s Irregularity
Report she filed was false.  ETS does not dispute that it must act in good faith, but it argues
that Baker’s knowledge, as an agent, is not imputable to ETS, the principal.  We need not
decide whether the knowledge of a testing administrator is imputable to ETS, because, even
if we assume arguendo that Baker’s knowledge is imputable to ETS, Hildebrant fails to
establish by any evidence, under oath, that Baker acted in bad faith.  Consequently, she has
made no showing that ETS failed to act in good faith.  Unless Hildebrant can show that there
is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Baker acted in bad faith, she has no
basis for a breach of contract claim against ETS.
The record to oppose summary judgment before the trial court consisted of
Hildebrant’s affidavit.  Our review of the action of the Circuit Court is based on this same
record.  Hildebrant’s affidavit stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
“Each statement on the [Supervisor’s Irregularity] report
concerning my conduct during the administration of the
Assessment Test is false in every respect and has no basis in fact
whatsoever.  These statements are so contrary to any reasonable
understanding or interpretation of anything that could have been
observed that I have readily concluded that they were made with
the knowledge that they were false and with the intent to harm
me personally.”
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Hildebrant argues that this portion of her affidavit creates a genuine dispute of material fact
because it indicates that the statements made by the administrator were not true, and “this,
in turn, raises the clear inference that the test administrator falsified the report and, thus,
acted in bad faith, which is a material fact as to whether ETS breached the contract.”
Hildebrant’s affidavit presents the classic case of “he said, she said.”  Baker reported
that Hildebrant engaged in misconduct, and Hildebrant denies that the statements in the
report are true.  Hildebrant’s affidavit fails to show facts that support her allegation that
Baker acted in bad faith — and that, therefore, ETS did not act in good faith — when filing
the Supervisor’s Irregularity Report.  Beatty, 330 Md. at 738, 625 A.2d at 1011 (“[M]ere
general allegations which do not show facts in detail and with precision are insufficient to
prevent summary judgment.”).  The affidavit consists only of a general denial and personal
conclusion that the test administrator knowingly made a false report.  Hildebrant presents no
evidence that indicates a factual basis for her allegations.  Thus, there is nothing other than
Hildebrant’s bare allegation that would lead the trial court to believe that Baker acted in bad
faith.
Without any factual evidence to support her allegations, there is no genuine dispute
as to a material fact.  Id.  To survive summary judgment, Hildebrant must show that it is
genuinely disputed that Baker lied when reporting Hildebrant’s testing conduct, because
otherwise there is no dispute as to whether ETS acted in good faith.  Hildebrant may not rest
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upon mere allegations or denials of ETS’s pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.  Hildebrant has not presented such facts.
In her brief to this Court, Hildebrant sets out additional facts that allegedly support
her claim that the test administrator had a motive to falsify her report.  For example,
Hildebrant asserts that Baker could have overheard and been offended when she jokingly
sang “Welcome to the Hotel California” before the test began, and that Baker may have
overheard someone referring to her as “the Test Nazi.”  The additional factual allegations in
briefs filed before this Court are not part of the trial court record and are not considered in
our de novo review of the grant of summary judgment as they were not before the Circuit
Court.  Harford County, ___Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___, 2007 WL 1119877 (2007).
Maryland Rule 2-501 (d) provides that a party opposing a motion for summary
judgment may set forth in an affidavit the reasons why essential facts could not be
established.  Based on the affidavit, the trial court may deny the motion, order a continuance,
or enter any other order that justice requires.  Md. Rule 2-501 (d).  Hildebrant did not avail
herself of this procedure; she cannot now urge us to consider that “mandatory discovery had
not been completed” and that she “has had little opportunity to develop any evidence in
support of her claim.”  This Court considers only the record before the trial court, as
Hildebrant acknowledges in her brief when she stated that “evidence not in the record cannot
be considered by this Court.”
4 In the letter to ETS, Hildebrant asserted that Baker’s report to ETS “simply reflects
[Ms. Baker’s] over-zealous perception of the test procedures,” and stated that “several events
during the testing period corroborate this conclusion.”  Hildebrant noted that Baker lectured
them between test sections about getting into the shoes of their students, discussed a long list
of ways in which test takers cheat on exams, and lectured test takers before a test section
after a cell phone inadvertently had rung during the previous section.  Hildebrant also stated
that “the proctor’s rudeness was so pervasive” that some referred to Baker as the “Testing
Nazi” as they walked out of the test.
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Hildebrant further asserts that her unsworn letter to ETS, dated October 9, 2004, is
additional evidence in support of her allegation that ETS did not act in good faith by
canceling her scores because it relied upon Baker’s report filed in bad faith.4  We disagree
for several reasons.  First, the letter is not a statement under oath.  As Rule 2-501 makes
clear, a response asserting the existence of a material fact shall be supported by an affidavit
or other statement under oath.  The letter alleges only that certain acts occurred.  Hildebrant’s
unsworn letter does not allege that Baker acted in bad faith nor does it claim that the alleged
occurrences referenced in the letter supplied Baker with a motive to lie and to lie specifically
about Hildebrant’s actions.  Nor can we reasonably infer from the letter that these
occurrences motivated Baker to retaliate against Hildebrant.  Indeed, Hildebrant concludes
her letter by stating, “I am willing to accept that the staff may think they were doing what
they were instructed to do to maintain the secure, standard conditions you referred to in your
letter.”
In this case, we cannot reasonably infer any facts in favor of Hildebrant, as Hildebrant
has not presented any facts to support her claim that Baker acted in bad faith.  Hildebrant has
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not presented facts to show that Baker had any motive to lie or to act in bad faith.  Noticeably
absent from the affidavit in opposition to summary judgment, the only statement in this
record under oath, is any reference to the facts that Hildebrant now relies upon.  That Baker
may have heard Hildebrant sing “Hotel California” or hear another test taker refer to Baker
as the “test Nazi” was not in the affidavit or in any other statement under oath, such as a
deposition or interrogatory.  Hildebrant not only fails to present such facts and to support
them by an affidavit or other statement under oath, but also fails to link how such facts
caused Baker to make a report in bad faith which was then relied upon by ETS.
The Court of Special Appeals held that Baker’s knowledge is imputable to ETS.
Assuming arguendo that we agree, there is nothing under oath here that demonstrates bad
faith on the part of Baker.  Hildebrant’s affidavit presents a general, conclusory denial of
misconduct and is not sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Baker acted in bad faith.  Hildebrant must support her assertions of material fact by affidavit,
discovery response, transcript of testimony, or other statement under oath that demonstrates
the dispute of material fact.  Md. Rule 2-501 (b).
The trial court held that a contract existed between the parties, and that the contract
reserved to ETS the judgment of whether to cancel a test-taker’s scores.  We agree.  ETS has
the right, under the Bulletin, to cancel test scores where ETS or test center personnel find that
there is misconduct in connection with the test.  Hildebrant wrote out and signed a
certification statement indicating that she agreed to the conditions set forth in the Bulletin.
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Moreover, Hildebrant has acknowledged on record that she is a party to the contract with
ETS.  Baker’s report that Hildebrant engaged in misconduct on the test triggered the terms
of the Bulletin, and it was completely within ETS’s rights under that contract to cancel
Hildebrant’s scores.  Consequently, we hold that the trial judge was correct in granting
summary judgment for ETS where Hildebrant acknowledged her acceptance of the contract
with ETS and did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Baker had acted
in bad faith.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
REVERSED.
CASE 
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT
COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
C I R C U I T  
C O U R T  
F O R
MONTGOMERY COUNTY.  COSTS
IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID
BY RESPONDENT.