Case Title: Woodside Village Condo. Ass’n. v. Adolph Jahren

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC00-1030

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
______________
No. SC00-1030
______________
WOODSIDE VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
ADOLPH S. JAHREN and GARY M. MCCLERNAN,
Respondents.
[January 3, 2002]
ANSTEAD, J.
We have for review Woodside Village Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Jahren,
754 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), which expressly and directly conflicts with
White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979), Flagler
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Crestview Towers Condominium Ass’n, Inc.,
595 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), and Seagate Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v.
Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, §
3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set forth below, we quash the district court’s
1.  According to the record, Jahren has been a unit owner in Woodside
Village since 1979.  He currently owns four units which were purchased prior to the
Declaration amendment at issue in this case.  McClernan has been a unit owner in
Woodside Village since 1996 when he purchased two units.  Neither Jahren nor
McClernan resides in his units.
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decision invalidating certain restrictions on leasing set out in the petitioner’s
Declaration of Condominium.
FACTS
At issue is the validity of amendments to the Declaration of Condominium
adopted by the condominium owners which restrict the leasing of units in
Woodside Village.  Woodside Village is a condominium development located in
Clearwater, Florida, consisting of 288 units.  It was established in 1979 pursuant to
Florida’s “Condominium Act,” chapter 718, Florida Statutes (1977).  Petitioner,
Woodside Village Condominium Association, Inc. (“Association”), is the
condominium association that was formed pursuant to the Declaration of
Condominium of Woodside Village (“Declaration”), recorded in the public records
of Pinellas County.  Respondents, Adolph S. Jahren and Gary M. McClernan, each
own residential condominium units in Woodside Village.1
The original Declaration of Condominium for Woodside Village included a
provision regarding leasing:
10.3  Leasing.  The apartment may be leased or rented without prior
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approval, for any period of one (1) year or less, and may be leased by
successive leases for periods in excess of one (1) year without the
approval of the Board of Directors of the Association.  In the event
apartment owner leases to a lessee for a period of one (1) year or less
and the apartment owner and lessee desire to extend that lease for a
term of one (1) year or less, said extension shall not require the
approval of the Association.  However, if the Association finds during
the term of any such lease that the lessee has violated the rules and
regulations of the Association or the terms and provisions of the
Declaration of Condominium of Woodside Village or other documents
governing Woodside Village, a Condominium, or that the lessee has
otherwise been the cause of a nuisance or annoyance to the residents
of Woodside Village, then the Association may so notify lessor of its
disapproval of such lessee in writing and lessor shall be precluded
from extending any lease to said lessee without the written approval of
the Association.
Further, section 11.1(b) stated: “Lease.  No apartment owner may dispose of an
apartment or any interest therein for a term in excess of one (1) year without
approval of the Board of Directors of the Association.”  Thus, while leasing was
permitted under the original Declaration, initial leases in excess of one year were
subject to board approval.  In addition, section 10.3 was amended in 1995 to
require that all leases and renewals receive prior approval from the Board of
Directors.
In 1997 some owners became concerned that units were increasingly
becoming non-owner occupied, and that such a condition would have a negative
impact on the quality of life in Woodside Village and on the market value of units. 
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Accordingly, section 10.3 was amended in March of 1997 to limit the leasing of
units to a term of no more than nine months in any twelve-month period.  A
provision was also added prohibiting owners from leasing their units during the first
twelve months of ownership.  These amendments were adopted by a vote of at
least two-thirds of the unit owners as required by the Declaration.  As amended,
section 10.3 provides:
10.3  Leasing.  All leases, subleases or assignments of leases and all
renewals of such agreements shall be first submitted to the Board of
Directors for approval or disapproval.  No record owner or owners of
units in this condominium shall rent or lease more than three of their
units at any one time.  No lease of an owner or owners who have three
units rented or leased shall be approved by the Association.  No unit
may be rented for more than a total of nine (9) months in any twelve
(12) month period.  However, if the Association finds during the term
of any such lease that the lessee has violated the rules and regulations
of the Association or the terms and provisions of the Declaration of
Condominium of Woodside Village or other documents governing
Woodside Village, a Condominium, or that the lessee has otherwise
been the cause of a nuisance or annoyance to the residents of
Woodside Village, then the Association may so notify lessor of its
disapproval of such lessee in writing and lessor shall be precluded
from extending any lease to said lessee without the written approval of
the Association.
No owner shall enter into a lease, rental agreement, or other similar
conveyance of use of a unit during the first twelve (12) months of
ownership of that unit.
(Emphasis added.)  The following year the Association notified respondents in
writing that two of their respective units were not in compliance with the nine-month
2.  Prior to the parties’ motions for summary judgment, the two cases were
consolidated.
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lease restriction set out in section 10.3 as amended. 
When the respondents failed to come into compliance with the leasing
restrictions, the Association filed complaints in circuit court seeking injunctions to
enforce compliance with the provisions of the Declaration.  Respondents filed
essentially identical answers admitting notice of their failure to comply with section
10.3, but denying that compliance could be mandated under Florida law.  In
addition, respondents filed counterclaims for declaratory and injunctive relief
asserting that the lease restriction was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, and
had no purpose other than to effectively ban all leasing of units.  Respondents also
asserted the lease restriction was confiscatory and deprived them of lawful uses
which were permissible at the time of purchase.  Accordingly, respondents sought
an injunction prohibiting the Association from enforcing the lease restriction or,
alternatively, requiring the Association to compensate respondents for the fair
market value of their units.
Thereafter, the Association and respondents filed separate motions for
summary judgment.2  Following a hearing on the parties’ motions, the circuit court
granted summary judgment in respondents’ favor.  Although the circuit court
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acknowledged that the Association has the authority to pass an amendment
restricting the leasing of units, it concluded that the lease restriction at issue
impermissibly “creates more than one class of ownership because it cannot be
applied retroactively against unit owners who purchased their unit prior to the date
of the amendment.”  The court ruled that the Association would be required to
purchase respondents’ units if it decided to enforce the nine-month lease restriction
retroactively.  
On appeal, the Second District affirmed the trial court’s final summary
judgment and held that the lease restriction could not be enforced because it was
adopted after the respondents acquired their units and no significant lease
restrictions existed when respondents purchased their units.  See Woodside Village
Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Jahren, 754 So. 2d 831, 833 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). 
The court acknowledged that the lease restrictions would be valid if they predated
the respondents’ purchase of units.  See id. at 832-33.  In its analysis, the court
rejected the reasoning of Flagler Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Crestview
Towers Condominium Ass’n, 595 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), and
distinguished Seagate Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1976), wherein the Third and Fourth Districts upheld the validity of
amendments to condominium declarations imposing additional lease restrictions on
3.  The petitioner conceded in the district court that the respondents could
not be forced to terminate existing leases that were entered into in good faith
reliance on the prevailing provisions in the Declaration at the time such leases were
executed.  For example, if the respondents leased a unit for twelve months, the
amendment barring leases for more than nine months could not be enforced to
terminate that lease.
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existing unit owners.  See id. at 833-35.3  The district court also cited an
accommodation for leasing that Woodside Village made in a discrimination lawsuit
on behalf of the handicapped as additional support for its holding.  See id. at 835-
36.
ANALYSIS
Condominiums and the forms of ownership interests therein are strictly
creatures of statute.  See §§ 718.101-718.622, Fla. Stat. (2000); see also
Winkelman v. Toll, 661 So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Suntide
Condominium Ass’n v. Division of Florida Land Sales & Condominiums, 463 So.
2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).  In Florida, Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, known
as Florida’s “Condominium Act,” gives statutory recognition to the condominium
form of ownership of real property and establishes a detailed scheme for the
creation, sale, and operation of condominiums.  Pursuant to section 718.104(2), a
condominium is created by recording a declaration of condominium in the public
records of the county where the land is located.  See § 718.104(2), Fla. Stat.
4.  See, e.g., Schmidt v. Sherrill, 442 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
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(2000).  
The declaration, which some courts have referred to as the condominium’s
“constitution,”4 strictly governs the relationships among the condominium unit
owners and the condominium association.  As explained by the court in Pepe v.
Whispering Sands Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 351 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977): 
A declaration of a condominium is more than a mere contract
spelling out mutual rights and obligations of the parties thereto–it
assumes some of the attributes of a covenant running with the land,
circumscribing the extent and limits of the enjoyment and use of real
property.  Stated otherwise, it spells out the true extent of the
purchased, and thus granted, use interest therein.  Absent consent, or
an amendment of the declaration of condominium as may be provided
for in such declaration, or as may be provided by statute in the
absence of such a provision, this enjoyment and use cannot be
impaired or diminished. 
Id. at 757-58 (footnotes omitted).  Hence, because condominiums are a creature of
statute courts must look to the statutory scheme as well as the condominium
declaration and other documents to determine the legal rights of owners and the
association.  See §§ 718.101-718.622, Fla. Stat. (2000); see also Shorewood West
Condominium Ass’n v. Sadri, 992 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Wash. 2000) (noting that the
property rights condominium unit owners have in their units are creations of
condominium statute and are subject to the statute, the declaration, the
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association’s bylaws, and amendments to the declaration and bylaws).
From the outset, courts have recognized that condominium living is unique
and involves a greater degree of restrictions upon the rights of the individual unit
owners when compared to other property owners.  See Seagate Condominium
Ass’n, 330 So. 2d at 486 (citing cases).  For instance, in White Egret
Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979), we recognized that
“[r]easonable restrictions concerning use, occupancy and transfer of condominium
units are necessary for the operation and protection of the owners in the
condominium concept.”  Id. at 350.  In White Egret, we quoted favorably from
Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), to
further explain the restrictive nature of condominium ownership and living:
[I]nherent in the condominium concept is the principle that to promote
the health, happiness, and peace of mind of the majority of the unit
owners since they are living in such close proximity and using facilities
in common, each unit owner must give up a certain degree of freedom
of choice which he might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned
property.  Condominium unit owners comprise a little democratic sub
society of necessity more restrictive as it pertains to use of
condominium property than may be existent outside the condominium
organization.
White Egret, 379 So. 2d at 350.  Consistent with this analysis of condominium
ownership, courts have acknowledged that “increased controls and limitations upon
the rights of unit owners to transfer their property are necessary concomitants of
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condominium living.”  Aquarian Foundation, Inc. v. Sholom House, Inc., 448 So.
2d 1166, 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).  Indeed, section 718.104(5), Florida Statutes
(2000), expressly recognizes that a declaration of condominium may contain
restrictions concerning the use, occupancy, and transfer of units.  See §
718.104(5), Fla. Stat. (2000).  
Courts have also consistently recognized that restrictions contained within a
declaration of condominium should be clothed with a very strong presumption of
validity when challenged.  The logic behind this presumption was explained in
Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981),
wherein the court reasoned:
There are essentially two categories of cases in which a
condominium association attempts to enforce rules of restrictive uses. 
The first category is that dealing with the validity of restrictions found
in the declaration of condominium itself.  The second category of
cases involves the validity of rules promulgated by the association’s
board of directors or the refusal of the board of directors to allow a
particular use when the board is invested with the power to grant or
deny a particular use.
In the first category, the restrictions are clothed with a very
strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that each
individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the
restrictions to be imposed.  Such restrictions are very much in the
nature of covenants running with the land and they will not be
invalidated absent a showing that they are wholly arbitrary in their
application, in violation of public policy, or that they abrogate some
fundamental constitutional right.  See White Egret Condominium, Inc.
v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
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Id. at 639-40 (emphasis added).  
AMENDMENTS TO DECLARATION
Significantly, section 718.110 also provides broad authority for amending a
declaration of condominium.  In particular, section 718.110(1)(a) provides:
If the declaration fails to provide a method of amendment, the
declaration may be amended as to all matters except those listed in
subsection (4) or subsection (8) if the amendment is approved by the
owners of not less than two-thirds of the units.  Except as to those
matters described in subsection (4) or subsection (8), no declaration
recorded after April 1, 1992, shall require that amendments be
approved by more than four-fifths of the voting interests.
§ 718.110(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added).  Based upon this broad
statutory authority and the provisions for amendment set out in the declaration of
condominium, courts have recognized the authority of condominium unit owners to
amend the declaration on a wide variety of issues, including restrictions on leasing. 
Of course, section 718.110(1)(a) itself contains some restrictions on the
amendment process.  For example, pursuant to subsections (4) and (8), all unit
owners must consent to amendments which materially alter or modify the size,
configuration or appurtenances to the unit, change the percentage by which the unit
owner shares the common expenses and owns the common surplus of the
condominium, or permit timeshare estates to be created in any unit of the
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condominium, unless otherwise provided in the declaration as originally recorded. 
See § 718.110(4), (8), Fla. Stat. (2000).  These provisions are not at issue here. 
SEAGATE
In Seagate Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1976), the court upheld an amendment to the declaration of condominium
prohibiting leasing of any units, except for limited periods in cases of hardship. 
The amendment provided:
As previously stated, it is the intent that the owner of each unit of
Seagate Towers Condominium shall occupy and use such unit as a
private dwelling for himself and his immediate family, and for no other
purpose including business purposes.  Therefore, the leasing of units
to others as a regular practice for business, speculative, investment or
other similar purposes is not permitted.
To meet special situations and to avoid undue hardship or practical
difficulties the Board of Directors may grant permission to an owner
to lease his unit to a specified lessee for a period not less than four
consecutive months nor more than twelve consecutive months.
Id. at 484-85.  The trial court held that the amendment was both an unreasonable
restriction and an unlawful restraint on alienation and awarded damages for lost
rents to the unit owners who challenged the amendment.  See id. at 485.  On
appeal, the Fourth District reversed, and explained:
It is our opinion that appellant’s leasing restriction constitutes
neither an unlimited nor unreasonable restraint on alienation.  The
restriction is not unlimited in several respects: it prohibits only a
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specific form of alienation, i.e., leasing; under general but not unlimited
circumstances, i.e., the condominium association will consider its
suspension in hardship for a not unlimited period of time, i.e., because
it can be terminated at any time by a vote of the condominium unit
owners pursuant to the amendment provisions of their Declaration of
Condominium.  The restriction, moreover, is reasonable.  Given the
unique problems of condominium living in general and the special
problems endemic to a tourist oriented community in South Florida in
particular, appellant’s avowed objective–to inhibit transciency and to
impart a certain degree of continuity of residence and a residential
character to their community–is, we believe, a reasonable one,
achieved in a not unreasonable manner by means of the restrictive
provision in question.  The attainment of this community goal
outweighs the social value of retaining for the individual unit owner the
absolutely unqualified right to dispose of his property in any way and
for such duration or purpose as he alone so desires.
Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted).  The district court upheld the amendment even as
it was applied to unit owners who acquired their units prior to the amendments.
FLAGLER FEDERAL
In Flagler Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Crestview Towers
Condominium Ass’n, 595 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), the court also
addressed a declaration amendment prohibiting leasing as applied to an owner who
acquired title to a unit prior to the amendment.  The original declaration provided
that unit owners could not lease their units without the express approval of the
association, but excluded from the leasing restriction institutional mortgagees
acquiring title.  While this provision was in effect, Flagler Federal became the
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mortgagee on units 216 and 503.  Subsequently, the declaration was amended to
prohibit leasing entirely and eliminated the previous exclusion for institutional
mortgagees acquiring title.  In 1987, Flagler Federal acquired title to unit 503 by
purchasing the unit at a foreclosure sale and acquired title to unit 216 when the
mortgagors gave it a quitclaim deed in lieu of foreclosure.  Thereafter, when the
association objected to Flagler Federal’s attempt to lease the units, the bank filed
suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  The trial court denied the bank’s
claim and granted the association a final summary judgment upholding the lease
restriction as amended.
On appeal, the Third District affirmed, holding that both units were bound by
the amendment to the declaration.  First, the court rejected Flagler Federal’s
argument that title to unit 216, acquired by quitclaim deed in lieu of foreclosure,
related back to the date of the mortgage.  See id. at 220.  Thus, the court found that
the operative date for determining the applicability of the declaration amendment to
unit 216 was the date of the quitclaim deed.  See id.  The court noted that when
Flagler Federal acquired title by quitclaim deed the amended declaration was in
effect.  Further, the court stated Flagler Federal had notice of the recorded
declaration and its amendment provisions when it mortgaged the unit and acquired
the unit.  Accordingly, the court concluded that Flagler Federal could not complain
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that the declaration amendment was binding on unit 216.  See id.  
Although Flagler Federal’s title to unit 503 related back to the date of its
mortgage, the court held it was nonetheless bound by the subsequent declaration
amendment prohibiting leasing.  See id. at 200.  In so doing, the court recognized
that restrictions found in a declaration “are clothed with a very strong presumption
of validity which arises from the fact that each individual unit owner purchases his
unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed.”  Id. (quoting Hidden
Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)).  As to
the effect of the subsequent amendment, the court reasoned that since Flagler
Federal was on notice of the recorded declaration’s provisions for amendments to
the declaration when it issued the mortgage, it, like other unit owners who acquired
title prior to the amendment, was bound by the subsequent amendments to the
declaration.  See id.  
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
We note that the majority of courts in other jurisdictions have held that a duly
adopted amendment restricting either occupancy or leasing is binding upon unit
owners who purchased their units before the amendment was effective.  See Ritchey
v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass’n, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695, 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978);
Hill v. Fontaine Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 334 S.E.2d 690, 692 (Ga. 1985); Apple
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II Condominium Ass’n v. Worth Bank & Trust Co., 659 N.E.2d 93 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995); Breezy Point Holiday Harbor Lodge–Beachside Apartment Owners’ Ass’n
v. B.P. P’ship, 531 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (in dicta);
McElveen-Hunter v. Fountain Manor Ass’n, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 435, 436 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989), aff’d, 399 S.E.2d 112 (N.C. 1991); Shorewood West Condominium
Ass’n v. Sadri, 992 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Wash. 2000); cf. Burgess v. Pelkey, 738 A.2d
783, 788 (D.C. 1999); but see 560 Ocean Club, L.P. v. Ocean Club Condominium
Ass’n (In re 560 Ocean Club, L.P.), 133 B.R. 310, 320 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991);
Breene v. Plaza Tower Ass’n, 310 N.W.2d 730, 734 (N.D. 1981). 
An appellate opinion from Illinois is illustrative of these decisions.  In Apple II
Condominium Ass’n v. Worth Bank & Trust Co., the Illinois appellate court applied
the Fourth District’s analysis in Basso in upholding the validity of a declaration
amendment which restricted leasing of units to no more than once during ownership,
with no lease exceeding twelve months.  In enforcing the amendment, the court
declared:
The Condominium Property Act specifically states that
amendments to the Declaration “shall be deemed effective upon
recordation unless the amendment sets forth a different effective date.” 
(765 ILCS 605/17 (West 1994).)  In our view, neither the fact that there
were no restrictions on the property when the Harmons purchased their
unit nor the fact that the Harmons purchased the property for
investment purposes is relevant to the proper resolution of the issues
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presented in this case.  As purchasers of the condominium property,
the Harmons are charged with knowledge of the Condominium
Property Act and that the Declaration governing their unit was subject
to amendment.  Section 18.4(h) of the Act specifically recognizes that
the Board may implement rules governing the “use of the property,” so
long as the restrictions do not impair those rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution or the Free Speech
provisions of the Illinois Constitution.  (See 765 ILCS 605/18.4(h)
(West 1994).)  In the absence of a provision either in the Amendment
or in the original Declaration, condominium owners do not have vested
rights in the status quo ante.  See Crest Builders, Inc. v. Willow Falls
Improvement Association (1979), 74 Ill.App.3d 420, 30 Ill.Dec. 452,
393 N.E.2d 107 (party challenging amendment has no vested interest in
the Declaration as originally written); McElveen-Hunter v. Fountain
Manor Association, Inc. (1989), 96 N.C.App. 627, 386 S.E.2d 435
(noting that most courts have adopted the “sounder view” that changes
to a condominium declaration are binding upon both previous and
subsequent owners).
Apple II Condominium Ass’n, 659 N.E.2d at 97.  The court further reasoned that
the approval of the amendment by the association’s membership made the leasing
restriction a “category one” restriction under Basso, thereby elevating the level of
deference given by the court.  See id. at 98.  Accordingly, the court concluded that
when an amendment has been passed by an association’s membership it would
presume the restriction was valid and uphold it unless it was shown that the
restriction was arbitrary, against public policy, or in violation of some fundamental
constitutional right.  See id. at 98-99.  
We agree with this reasoning.  To hold otherwise, we would have to conclude
5.  Section 14.5, however, provides in part that “no amendment shall
discriminate against any apartment owner nor against any apartment or class or
group of apartment owners unless the apartment owners so affected . . . consent;
and no amendment shall change any apartment nor the share in the common
elements, and other of its appurtenances nor increase the owner’s share of the
common expenses unless the owner of the apartment concerned . . . join[s] in the
execution of the amendment.” 
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that the right to amend a declaration of condominium is substantially limited, well
beyond those limitations imposed by the Legislature in section 718.110(4) and (8). 
We would also be faced with the difficult task of deciding what subjects could be
addressed by the amendment process, a task much better suited for the Legislature,
as can be seen by its imposition of restrictions in section 718.110.
THIS CASE
Respondents in this case purchased their units subject to the Declaration
which expressly provides that it can be amended and sets forth the procedure for
doing so.  See Providence Square Ass’n v. Biancardi, 507 So. 2d 1366, 1372 (Fla.
1987) (noting that condominium purchasers are charged with notice of the recorded
documents).  Section 14 of the Declaration generally provides that an amendment
may be adopted by a supermajority of two-thirds of the owners.5  Further, section
13 expressly states that each owner shall be governed by the Declaration as
amended from time to time:
13.  Compliance and Default.  Each apartment owner shall be governed
6.  For example, the legal description for unit 1203D owned by Jahren, as
recited in the Association’s complaint, reads as follows:
That certain condominium parcel described as Unit 1203D, Building 3,
Woodside Village, a Condominium, and an undivided interest or share
in the common elements appurtenant thereto, in accordance with and
subject to the covenant, conditions, restrictions, easements, terms and
other provisions of the Declaration of Condominium of Woodside
Village, a Condominium, as recorded in Official Records Book 4816,
page 1517, and amendments thereto, and the Plat thereof recorded in
Condominium Plat Book 34, page 78-86, Public records of Pinellas
County, Florida.  A/K/A 4215 East Bay Drive, #1203D, Clearwater,
Florida 33764.
(Emphasis added.)  The legal descriptions for the other three units involved in this
case contain similar language.   
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by and shall comply with the terms of this Declaration, the By-Laws
and the Rules and Regulations adopted pursuant thereto, and
Management Agreement, and said documents as they may be amended
from time to time.  Failure of the apartment owner to comply therewith
shall entitle the Association or other apartment owners to the following
relief in addition to other remedies provided in this Declaration and the
Condominium Act . . . .
(Emphasis added.)  In addition, the legal description for each of respondents’ units
that were allegedly being used in violation of the lease restriction provides that the
units are subject to the restrictions contained in the Declaration and subsequent
amendments thereto.6  
Thus, we find that respondents were on notice that the unique form of
ownership they acquired when they purchased their units in the Woodside Village
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Condominium was subject to change through the amendment process, and that they
would be bound by properly adopted amendments.  See Kroop v. Caravelle
Condominium, Inc., 323 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (upholding restriction
limiting leasing to once during ownership where condominium owner acquired unit
with knowledge that the declaration might thereafter be lawfully amended); see also
Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass’n, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695, 700 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978) (noting that declaration provided bylaws could be amended and that
purchaser would be subject to any reasonable amendment properly adopted);
McElveen-Hunter v. Fountain Manor Ass’n, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 435, 436 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989), aff’d, 399 S.E.2d 112 (N.C. 1991) (noting that plaintiff acquired her
units subject to the right of other owners to restrict their occupancy through
properly enacted amendments to the declaration); Worthinglen Condominium Unit
Owners’ Ass’n v. Brown, 566 N.E.2d 1275, 1277 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (stating
that purchasers of condominium units should realize that the regime in existence at
the time of purchase may not continue indefinitely and that changes in the
declaration may take the form of restrictions on the unit owners’ use of their
property); cf. Burgess v. Pelkey, 738 A.2d 783, 789 (D.C. 1999) (stating unit owner
was on notice at time of purchase of the possibility that his rights in the cooperative
could be affected by subsequent changes in the cooperative’s bylaws and house
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rules).  
It is also uncontradicted that the Association acted within the framework of
the Declaration in adopting the amendment at issue.  As noted above, the
Declaration for Woodside Village specifically provides for amendment and sets
forth the procedure for doing so.  Further, pursuant to the Declaration, the
amendment imposing the nine-month lease restriction was approved by at least two-
thirds of the condominium unit owners.  Hence, we conclude that the lease
restriction amendment was properly enacted under the amendment provisions of the
Declaration, and that the respondents took title to their units subject to the
amendment provision set out in the Declaration and authorized by statute.  
We also conclude that the respondents have failed to demonstrate that the
restriction, in and of itself, violates public policy or respondents’ constitutional
rights, at least as asserted herein.  See Apple II Condominium Ass’n, 659 N.E.2d at
98-99.  The respondents have simply failed to point out any provision in the
statutory scheme for condominiums or any provision in the state or federal
constitutions that would bar such lease restrictions.  It is apparent from the
circumstances giving rise to its adoption that the amendment was intended to
promote owner occupancy of the condominium units, a goal certainly consistent
with the concept of condominium living as originally contemplated by the legislation
7.  It should be noted that a copy of the “Abilities Amendment” is not in the
record.
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authorizing the condominium form of land ownership.  Although a different
restriction could have been adopted to better promote owner occupancy within the
condominium, we cannot conclude that the amendment restricting leases to nine
months in any twelve-month period is arbitrary in its attempt to achieve this goal. 
As discussed above, most such restrictions simply come with the unique territory of
condominium ownership.  Indeed, it is restrictions such as these that distinguish
condominium living from rental apartments or single-family residences.  Hence,
persons acquiring units in condominiums are on constructive notice of the extensive
restrictions that go with this unique, and some would say, restrictive, form of
residential property ownership and living.  Accordingly, we conclude the
amendment is valid and enforceable against respondents. 
ABILITIES AMENDMENT
Petitioner maintains that the district court also erred in concluding that a
subsequent amendment to the Declaration known as the “Abilities Amendment,”
when viewed together with the nine-month lease restriction, impermissibly created
two classes of condominium unit ownership.7  As reflected in the decision below,
Abilities of Florida, Inc. (“Abilities”) is a non-profit corporation that obtains
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financing through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) to purchase condominium units that it then leases to handicapped persons. 
HUD refused to finance Abilities’ purchase of units at Woodside Village because of
the nine-month lease restriction.  As a result, Abilities filed a federal lawsuit alleging
that Woodside Village had violated fair housing laws by failing to provide a
reasonable accommodation to tenants based on their disabilities.  The federal court
entered a temporary injunction against the Association barring the enforcement of
the lease restriction against Abilities.  Subsequently, the parties settled the lawsuit. 
One condition of the settlement was that the Association adopt the so-called
“Abilities Amendment,” which would permit Abilities to purchase six units at the
condominium that would be exempt from the nine-month lease restriction.  The
amendment was properly adopted by the Association’s members in November of
1997.
On appeal, the district court agreed with the trial court that the Abilities
Amendment impermissibly created two classes of condominium ownership,
although the court cited no authority to support its conclusion.  See Woodside
Village Condominium Ass’n, 754 So. 2d at 836.  In so doing, the court rejected
petitioner’s claims that the issue was not properly before the trial court and that the
amendment should not be considered in an equal protection argument regarding an
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arbitrary creation and treatment of two classes of unit owners since the “class”
created by the amendment resulted from the settlement of a contested claim
involving alleged civil rights violations.  See id.  
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that some courts and
commentators have expressed considerable doubt as to whether the actions of a
community association, such as a condominium association, constitute state action
necessary for constitutional claims.  See, e.g., Laguna Royale Owners’ Ass’n v.
Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136, 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (“[T]here is considerable
doubt of whether the actions of Association constitute state action so as to bring
into play the constitutional guarantees.”); Lewis A. Schiller, Limitations on the
Enforceability of Condominium Rules, 22 Stetson L. Rev. 1133, 1167 (1993)
(noting that state action appears to be lacking in condominium rules, although author
expressed view that constitutional standards should apply to condominium rules).  
On the other hand, some courts have either assumed state action exists or have
chosen not to address the issue.  For example, in White Egret, this Court analyzed a
due process and equal protection challenge to an age restriction contained in a
declaration without specifically discussing the issue of state action.  See White Egret
Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979); see also Franklin v.
Spadafora, 447 N.E.2d 1244, 1249-51 (Mass. 1983) (assuming state action for
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purposes of analyzing claim that an amendment limiting to two the number of units
which could be owned by any individual or entity deprived plaintiffs of their due
process and equal protection rights).  We resolve the issue here by concluding that
no colorable claim of discrimination has been demonstrated.
We recognize that amendments which grant different benefits or impose
different restrictions on truly similarly situated unit owners may be subject to
challenge.  For instance, in Pearlman v. Lake Dora Villas Management, Inc., 479 So.
2d 780 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), the court invalidated a declaration provision prohibiting
all children under sixteen from permanent residence, except children of transferees
from an institutional first mortgage.  In so doing, the court agreed with the
appellants’ argument that the provision violated equal protection by its arbitrary
creation and treatment of two classes of grantees.  See id.  at 780.  The court
reasoned as follows:
The Association does not argue that children under the age of
sixteen whose parents own a unit as transferees from an institutional
first mortgage are less intrusive that those children whose parents
obtained title from another source.  It speculates such a group may be
smaller and the exception is required for financing purposes.  However
true that may be as a practical matter, the distinction between the two
classes of children still remains arbitrary and discriminatory.
Id. at 781.  However, unlike the situation in Pearlman, the distinction between
Abilities and other unit owners, such as the respondents, is not arbitrary and
8.  Section 760.23(7)-(8) provides:
(7) It is unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of, or to
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter
because of a handicap of:
(a) That buyer or renter;
(b) A person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling
after it is sold, rented, or made available; or
(c) Any person associated with the buyer or renter.
(8) It is unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling,
because of a handicap of:
(a) That buyer or renter;
(b) A person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling
after it is sold, rented, or made available; or
(c) Any person associated with the buyer or renter.
§ 760.23(7)-(8), Fla. Stat. (2000).  Analogous federal provisions are found in 42
U.S.C. § 3604.  
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discriminatory.  Rather, it is directly related to providing reasonable
accommodations to enable handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a unit in the complex through the assistance of Abilities.  
As noted by petitioner, both federal law and section 760.23, Florida Statutes
(2000), generally prohibit discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling based on,
among other things, a person’s handicap.  For purposes of section 760.23(7) and
(8),8 pertaining to discrimination because of a handicap, discrimination includes “[a]
refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services,
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when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”  § 760.23(9)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000).  Thus,
contrary to the holdings below, we conclude the Abilities Amendment does not
constitute an arbitrary and discriminatory creation of two classes of unit owners in
its attempt to accommodate the disabled.  Cf. Lakeside Manor Condominium
Ass’n, Inc. v. Forehand, 513 So. 2d 1104, 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (rejecting
argument that right of first refusal in condominium declaration pertaining to sales and
leases was invalid merely because the developer and first mortgage holders were
exempt from its operation). 
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
We recognize the concerns that owners, such as respondents, who purchased
their individual condominium units for investments have regarding the imposition of
lease restrictions through subsequent declaration amendments without the consent
of all unit owners.  The question is, of course, how far can two-thirds of the
condominium owners go in restricting leasing rights in the condominium units.  The
answer will usually be found in the legislative scheme creating and governing
condominiums.  Although we believe such concerns are not without merit, we are
constrained to the view that they are better addressed by the Legislature.  If
condominium owners are to be restrained in their enactment of such lease
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restrictions, it is appropriate that such restraint be set out in the legislative scheme
that created and regulates condominiums and condominium living.  As noted above,
the Legislature has demonstrated its awareness of the need for limitations on the
authority of unit owners to amend a declaration by its enactment of section
718.110(1)(a), (4), and (8).  However, as noted, in this instance no provision in the
Condominium Act prohibits the adoption of an amendment imposing a lease
restriction, nor does any provision require the consent of all unit owners to adopt
such an amendment.  To the contrary, the Condominium Act provides broad
authority for amending a declaration of condominium.  See § 718.110(1)(a), Fla.
Stat. (2000).  
For the reasons stated above, we quash the decision below and approve the
decisions reached in Seagate and Flagler Federal to the extent consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
QUINCE, J., specially concurring.
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I concur in the majority’s decision which quashes the decision by the Second
District Court of Appeal.  I write simply to urge the Legislature to seriously consider
placing some restrictions on present and/or future condominium owners’ ability to
alter the rights of existing condominium owners.  At the time the units in question
here were purchased, the owners had the right to lease their property with relatively
few restrictions.  One of the owners purchased his units in 1979 and had enjoyed
this leasing right for eighteen years before the Declaration of Condominium was
amended.  The twelve-month lease which was permitted at the time these unit
owners purchased their units is no longer valid.  These owners can now only lease
their property for nine months in any twelve month period.  As the district court
pointed out the amendment has deprived these owners of a valuable right that
existed at the time of purchase.  See Woodside Village Condominium Assoc., Inc.
v. Jahren, 754 So. 2d 831, 833 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).  This valuable right may well
have been the determinative factor for their decisions to buy these properties.  As
the district court suggested, there should at least be some type of “escape”
provision for those “unit owners whose substantial property rights are altered by
amendments to declarations adopted after they acquire their property.”  754 So. 2d
at 835.
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Second District - Case No. 2D99-504 
(Pinellas County)
Samuel R. Mandelbaum and James R. De Furio of Becker & Poliakoff, P.A.,
Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert G. Walker, Jr., Clearwater, Florida,
for Respondents